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This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

A SOClO-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MICHIGAN
YOUTH CORRECTIONAL FACILITY: ECONOMIC
TURMOIL AS AN IMPETUS FOR SOCIAL AND

POLITICAL CHANGE
presented by

Adam T. Histed

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Masters , Criminal Justice
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6/01 C'JCIRC/DatoDuo.p65-p.15

A SOClO-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MICHIGAN YOUTH
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY: ECONOMIC TURMOIL AS AN
IMPETUS FOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE
By

Adam T. Histed

A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE

School of Criminal Justice

2003

ABSTRACT
A SOClO-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MICHIGAN YOUTH
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY: ECONOMIC TURMOIL AS AN
IMPETUS FOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGE
BY

Adam T. Histed

Over the past eight years, the State of Michigan has been swept into a
tide of national sentiment advocating punitive juvenile justice reforms. This
thesis argues that the shift to a just deserts model of juvenile corrections can be
traced to the poor economic conditions of the late 19705. Due to the intertwining
of the juvenile and adult systems of justice, juvenile offenders were equally
caught in the swell of public sentiment as witnessed in the development of such
control devices as juvenile waiver statutes. Furthermore, Michigan's specific shift
in juvenile correctional philosophy combined with its desire for cost-savings has
fueled the expansion of the prison-industrial complex and the construction of the
Michigan Youth Correctional Facility (MYCF). The arguments presented herein

are derived from a SOCiO-historical analysis of the MYCF.

This Thesis is dedicated to the memory of my mother, Deborah A. Histed.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The compilation of the information presented within the pages of this
Thesis were made possible by the cooperation of juvenile justice Specialists,
policy makers, and politicians across the State of Michigan. Without their
contributions, the story Of the development of the Michigan Youth Correctional
Facility may never have been told.

I wish to also express my Sincere appreciation to Dr. Michael Reisig, my
advisor, for all the guidance, support, and direction he has Offered throughout the

process of completing this Thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................. vii
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................ viii
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1
Socioeconomic Conditions ...................................................................... 2
Sociopolitical Conditions ......................................................................... 4
Research in Context ................................................................................ 6
Organization of Thesis ............................................................................ 6
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE ............................................................. 8
Sociopolitical Factors .............................................................................. 9
Divergent Methods of Social Control ............................................ 9
Shifting Objectives of the Criminal Justice System ...................... 12
Juvenile Justice Reforms ............................................................. 15
Socioeconomic Factors ........................................................................... 18
Fiscal Strain on the State ............................................................. 18
The Prison Industrial Complex ..................................................... 20
Synthesis of Existing Literature ............................................................... 23
Existing Literature as a Framework for the Present Analysis .................. 26
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY ................................................................................. 30
In-depth Interviews ...................................................................... 3O
Unobtrusive Measures .................................................................. 35
CHAPTER 4
INCEPTION: MICHIGAN’S PLANS FOR A JUVENILE PRISON ....................... 40
The Idea Takes Shape ............................................................................ 40
Economic Precursors to Change ............................................................ 41
Juvenile Justice Reforms: The Michigan Perspective ............................ 45
Discussion ............................................................................................... 52
CHAPTER 5
FORMULATION: PRIVATIZATION TAKES ROOT IN MICHIGAN ................... 56
The Move Toward Privatization ............................................................... 57
Wackenhut’s Fast Track to Baldwin ........................................................ 59
Lake County: History, Intrigue, & Economics ......................................... 62
Construction Continues ........................................................................... 68
Discussion ............................................................................................... 69

CHAPTER 6

DISPOSITION: PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS ................................................ 73
A Series of Debacles: Wackenhut Nationwide ........................................ 73
Difficulties at Home: Wackenhut in Michigan ......................................... 75
From Blunders to Business: Wackenhut Recovers ................................ 80
The MYCF Today .................................................................................... 83
Discussion ............................................................................................... 85

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS .............................................................................. 88

APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Core Questions ................................................................... 95
Appendix 2: Common Questions ............................................................ 96
Appendix 3: Exclusive Questions ............................................................ 97

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................ 98

vi

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1
NATIONAL AND STATEWIDE UNEMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS: 1990-1995.....
......................................................................................................... 44

vii

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1
SNOWBALLING NETWORK ANALYSIS ................................................... 32

FIGURE 2
TWELVE-MONTH UNEMPLOYMENT RATE AVERAGES: 1975-2002 ........... 42

FIGURE 3
ANNUAL FEDERAL AND STATE PRISON POPULATIONS: 1977-2001 ......... 53

FIGURE 4
MINORITY POPULATIONS AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL
POPULATION FOR LAKE COUNTY AND THE STATE OF MICHIGAN ........... 64

FIGURE 5

Median NON-FAMILY HOUSEHOLD INCOME FOR THE YEARS 1950-
2000 .................................................................................................. 67

viii

CHAPTER I

Introduction

In Baldwin, a small town nestled in the hills and pine forests of Lake
County in northwestern Michigan, there exists a prison for youthful Offenders.
These offenders, convicted as adults for the serious crimes they have committed
- some as young as 14 years of age — have not only been labeled “punks”
(Engler, 1995; 1996), but have been identified as the “worst of the worst” as far
as juvenile offenders are concerned. Furthermore, those housed in the facility
face a very different reality than most juveniles convicted of less serious crimes
at a young age since their vistas of concrete and razor wire do not dissipate at
age 20, but rather, continue indefinitely following their likely transfer to one of
Michigan’s adult prisons.

It would not be difficult to drive through Baldwin and fail to realize that the
town harbors some of the most serious types of juvenile Offenders in the State of
Michigan - murderers, rapists, and arsonists to name a few. Off the main strip
that weaves its way through the quaint town, is an unmarked dirt road, lined with
pine trees. However, the scenery changes only a short distance down the road,
when the trees dissipate, revealing Michigan’s “dirty little secret.” The facility’s
facade looks quite different than what one would expect. In fact, at first glance,
one could easily assume that the facility is nothing more than a corporate office
or some form of business enterprise. Ironically, the facility is exactly that - a
hybrid of sorts - a combination of corporate America and the state’s correction

function. Specifically, the facility is owned an operated by one of the world’s

largest private providers Of corrections services: The Wackenhut Corrections
Corporation. The facility prompts many questions including: What factors
contributed to the development of a prison dedicated to harden youthful
offenders? Why did the State of Michigan choose to contract with a private
provider for juvenile comections services? Has the facility been successful in its
endeavors? What can be expected with regard to juvenile corrections in the
future for the State of Michigan? This is the story of the Michigan Youth
Correctional Facility (MYCF) and the economic, political, and social forces that
contributed to its inception, formation, and disposition.

Past research is rich with examples of individuals who have addressed the
development of prisons over time as a function of both existing socioeconomic
and sociopolitical conditions from a qualitative perspective (CoIvin, 1992;
Hallinan, 2001; Jacobs, 1977). It is within this tradition that the dynamic factors
that contributed to the development of the MYFC as a response to crime

committed by juveniles will be addressed.

Socioeconomic Conditions

From a criminal justice system perspective, the social ramifications that
arise from existing economic conditions are key to the exploration of the MYCF’S
development. Substantial qualitative research addressing the influence of
economic conditions on social policy specific to the criminal justice arena was
published by Rusche and Kirchheimer in 1968. These researchers posit that

increased punitive measures by a society, usually through greater use of

incarceration as a disposition for criminal offending, can be attributed to a
society's desire to eliminate the threat posed by those who are unemployed
during periods of trying economic conditions. Rusche and Kirchheimer’s theory
has since been supported empirically by Jankovic (1977) and Inverarity and
McCarthy (1988), thus providing an impetus to explore the relative impact of
economics within the context of the MYCF.

However, further exploration of existing socioeconomic literature
enhanced Rusche and Kirchheimer's theory and addressed the impact of poor
economic conditions on public and private sector organizations, ultimately (as
this research will demonstrate) contributing to the development of the Prison
Industrial Complex (PIC).

O’Connor (1973) suggests that conflicts arise between public and pivate
sector entities such that during times of economic distress, the public sector
experiences the strain of social welfare programs that must be provided to those
the private sector has either laid-off or is unable to employ. The ease with which
O’Connor’s research can be integrated with that of Rusche and Kirchheimer is
truly compelling and begs to question whether the MYCF could be a result of a
public sector solution to a problem initially grounded in the private sector. In
other words, O’Connor’s (1973) research also serves to enrich the understanding
of the political element arising from economic distress by illustrating the response
of the public sector (comprised of all individuals functioning in a political capacity)

to private sector shortfalls.

Another interesting facet of the MYCF that has prompted the present
research is its administration. Unlike most other juvenile facilities statewide (and
nationwide for that matter), not only is the MYCF a prison for juveniles, but it is
owned and operated by a private corporation - the Wackenhut Corrections
Corporation based in Palm Springs Gardens, Florida. From an economics
standpoint, difficult economic conditions did not oppress all private sector entities
during the timeframe that this analysis encompasses, but rather fostered the
substantial development and growth of private providers of correctional services.
This topic will be explored to a greater extent in the following chapters.

Only in a capitalist market system could one expect the surfacing of
opportunists in an expanding corrections market, desiring to “cash-in” on and
capture market share by promoting their services to public sector agencies with
promises of cost savings during such times of fiscal strain. The work of Hallinan
(2002) and Schlosser (1998) specific to the growth of the PIC and its likely

impact on the State of Michigan will be explored to a greater extent.

Sociopolitical Conditions

From a sociopolitical perspective, three concepts have guided the present
research: mass versus class society as articulated in the work of both Colvin
(1992) and Jacobs (1977), and just deserts described by both Emmanuel Kant
(1887) and von Hirsch (1976). These concepts guide the present research in

that they may help explain the emergence of a just deserts system of criminal

justice in relation to the Shift from mass society to class society as a result of
deteriorating economic conditions during the 19703.

Not only do Colvin’s (1992) and Jacobs’ (1977) examinations of the
development of prisons within an economic, political, and social context provide a
sound foundation that the present analysis is rooted, but they also expand on the
social outcomes of policy decisions and political philosophy as they relate to the
granting of individual rights. Whereas mass society is concerned with the
granting of individual rights as a form of benevolence by policymakers (usually
the socially elite), class society suggests that rights are granted only to generate
a sense of equilibrium between the classes. When this equilibrium is unable to
be maintained, forms of social control, such as imprisonment, are employed.

The above concepts are important with regard to exploration of the
development of the MYCF in that they may explain the shifts in the Objectives of
the criminal justice system in that they invariably swing from one extreme
(rehabilitation as explained by mass society) to the other (just deserts as
explained by class society).

Finally, the concept of the just desert as it relates to the shifts described
above will be addressed within the present research. Of particular importance is
the differentiation between the just desert concept as illustrated under Kantian
philosophy (1887) as being an end in-and-Of-itself as opposed to the work of von
Hirsch (1976) that identifies it as being a mean to an and (punishment and

perpetrator/societal equilibrium).

Research in Context

Although much can be gleaned from scholarly research, the present
research will expand far beyond simply a review of existing literature (as will be
provided in the following chapter) to better understand the MYCF. Using this
past research as a contextual framework, the exploration Of the MYCF’S
development will not only employ existing theory to enrich the story of the facility,
but will also examine the impact of socioeconomic and sociopolitical conditions
from a Michigan perspective over the past two decades.

The most significant insight as to the development of the facility, however,
will come directly from those involved with its inception, formation, and
disposition. The results of interviews with some of Michigan’s most influential
policy makers, juvenile justice practitioners, and correctional experts will be
presented and analyzed within the framework established above. These
interviews provide highly substantial and intriguing information as to the
decisions regarding the need for a facility such as the MYCF, Changes in juvenile
justice statues and policies, corrections service providers, facility placement,
facility operation, demographic conditions in Lake County, and the future of the

facility as society moves into the next millennium.

Organization of Thesis

The story of the MYCF will begin with a review Of past research by
prominent prison scholars, such as Colvin (1992), Hallinan (2001), Jacobs
(1977), and Rusche and Kirchheimer (1968). In addition, a review of topics

related to the development of the MYCF including the dynamics of social control,

Changing philosophies of punishment, and juvenile justice reform will be provided
as a contextual framework upon which the story of the facility may be told.
Chapter III, Methodology, will describe the scientific process by which the author
obtained information necessary to comprehensively address his research
objectives. Chapters IV, V, and VI provide a detailed exploration Of the three
primary phases of the MYCF’S development: formulation, inception, and
disposition, respectively. The final Chapter will expand on the information from
the preceding Chapters and will focus on making informed predictions regarding

the future of the facility.

CHAPTER II

Review of Existing Literature

The development of corrections, both juvenile and adult, in the United
States has been a subject of research and debate for decades. Whereas
prominent scholars, such as Hirschi, Gottfredson, and Sutherland, spent much of
their academic careers studying the etiology of crime; other scholars, such as
Colvin, Jacobs, Hallinan, Rusche, Kirchheimer, and O’Connor, devoted
significant time to the study of the underlying factors that contribute to the
development of correctional systems.

The research that these individuals have conducted contributed greatly to
the existing body of literature that guides the present research. Their findings
can be categorized into two broad groups that are inherent in the inception of any
correctional movement or facility — namely sociopolitical and socioeconomic
factors. The Michigan Youth Correctional Facility (MYCF) is no exception. The
sociological component Of the aforementioned economic and political factors
substantiates the individual and/or group influences on economic and political
policy.

For the purposes of the present research, sociopolitical factors refer to the
combination of multiple sub-factors specific to society’s pressure on politicians to
bring about Change. Sociopolitical sub-factors include such things as mass
versus Class society theories that explain the use of prison as a means of social

control, shifts toward a just deserts philosophy of criminal justice, and statutory

developments in juvenile waiver provisions. Similarly, socio-economic factors
refer to the combination of multiple sub-factors related to the societal reaction to
existing economic conditions at a particular point in time. These sub-factors
consist of fiscal strain on the state, and the emergence of the prison-industrial
complex. However, it must be noted that none of the sub-factors mentioned
above completely lend themselves to independently contribute to either a
sociopolitical or socioeconomic factor. Rather, there is somewhat of a crossover
effect when addressing the sub-factors in relation to their large factor category.
For example, mass and class society theories, although primarily contributing to
an understanding of sociopolitical understanding of correctional development,
also touches on issues otherwise affecting socioeconomic factors.

The following pages explore the components of these factors upon which
the present socio-historical analysis of the development of the MYCF is based.
In addition, the synthesis of the factors in totality have resulted in guiding
questions that will evaluate the development of the facility from its inception to its

disposition.

Sociopolitical Factors

Divergent Methods of Social Control

Colvin’s (1992) and Jacobs’ (1977) sociopolitical research in itself is a
substantial contribution not only to penology, but to the social sciences in
general. However, their analyses indicate that conditions within the American

judicial and correctional systems can be attributed to a mélange of societal

factors, rather than a single factor or phenomenon that could explain the shifts in
correctional philosophy that have occurred over the last century.

Specifically, Colvin (1992) and Jacobs (1977) evaluate mass society
theory by explaining it as being the development of a society where the disparity
between the civil and human “rights” historically reserved for those in positions of
power is minimized by the extension of rights to citizens considered to be
members of marginal societal groups, such racial minorities, indigents, and
prisoners. Rather than placing full confidence in mass society theory as being
the most appropriate explanation of shifts in correctional philosophy, Colvin
(1992) elaborates on the theory as being intimately related to that of class society
theory. This theory posits that rights are not granted to marginal groups out of a
sense of benevolence, but rather are granted by those considered to be the
socially elite or captains of industry in order to alleviate class conflict until the
point at which external pressures prevent the maintenance of equilibrium
between the elite and the masses. When equilibrium is unattainable, “structures
of social control” are necessary to address the discord between the two groups
(Colvin, 1992, p. 19).

Furthermore, the social and political analyses presented in Colvin’s (1992)
and Jacob’s (1977) research provide evidence that the United States has
transitioned between punitive and rehabilitative objectives within the judicial
system due to a combination of social, political, and economic conditions. What
then, if at all, could be the elusive underlying condition that can explain the shifts

in the judicial system’s objectives in the context of social and political pressure?

10

The answer may well be found Rusche and Kirchheimer’s (1968) Punishment
and Social Structure.

Primarily qualitative in nature, Rusche and Kirchheimer's (1968) analysis
and evaluation of Western society’s response to crime claims that changes
regarding the acceptance and subsequent rejection of rehabilitation as being the
principal objective of judicial systems is explained by fluctuations in the number
of persons unemployed due to varying economic conditions. Their theory posits
that as economic conditions improve and the demand for labor increases, a
liberal philosophy supporting the rehabilitation of Offenders will be pervasive in a
society in order to supply industry with the necessary means of production
(Rusche & Kirchheimer, 1969, pp. 24-33). However, during times of economic
stress and/or when labor surpluses exist, society historically advocates the
imprisonment of offenders as both a form of social control and in order to
minimize the financial impact on the state, merchants, and propertied classes to
provide social welfare programs to unemployed laborers (pp. 94-97). This theory
has been supported by more contemporary researchers.

Based on the analysis of both imprisonment and unemployment rates
during the period between 1926 and 1974, Jankovic (1977) found that the
relationship between these two variables was direct and positive as
hypothesized, even when controlling for the volume of criminal activity. Similarly,
Inverarity and McCarthy’s (1988) research, which was based on unemployment
and imprisonment rates from 1948 and 1981, revealed a statistically significant

relationship between unemployment and imprisonment. More specifically,

11

increases in unemployment led to increases in rates of imprisonment. However,
unlike Jankovic (1977), Inverarity and McCarthy (1988) could not completely rule

out the influence of crime rates on rates of imprisonment.

Shifting Objectives of the Criminal Justice System

As described in the previous section, when the economic conditions in a
society cause unemployment levels to increase, it leads to societal pressure
(presumably on politicians and policy makers) to employ imprisonment as a form
of social control over labor surpluses. The result is a shift from a rehabilitative to
a just deserts philosophy of criminal justice.

The philosophy of the just desert traces its roots to the works of Immanuel
Kant in the latter half Of the nineteenth century. Kant (1887) advocated the
punishment of offenders as being a responsibility of society for the wrongs that
were committed unto it based on the violation of previously established
expectations (laws).

Clear (1996) elaborated on two versions (justifications) of the just desert
philosophy: benefits and burdens, and moral education. The benefits and
burdens claim suggests that offenders offend because they receive pleasure
from the crimes they commit. For example, an individual who robs a bank enjoys
the fruit of the crime through spending the stolen money. Therefore, a
punishment proportionate to the harm realized by society must be given to the
offender. Thus, the benefits of the crime (money) are cancelled by the burden

(imprisonment) placed on the offender (p. 96). Secondly, just deserts can also

12

be described as a moral response to offending in that rather than balancing
benefits and burdens, punishment provides an avenue through which the
Offender is made aware of the immorality of his actions and their negative impact
on society (p.97). Taking into account the description of the just deserts
philosophy as described above, such an approach theoretically encompasses
societal Objectives regarding both deterrence (by demonstrating the potential for
and likelihood of proportionate punishments in response to criminal Offending)
and retribution (by requiring the offender to repay society for a wrong committed
unto it through punishment). According to von Hirsch (1976), however, just
desert philosophies fail to include rehabilitation as an ingredient as salient to
punishment as incapacitation and deterrence (p. 46).

It is important to note, as implied above a just deserts philosophy makes
few concessions for rehabilitative initiatives regarding the offenders, but rather
supports a belief in the proportionality of the punishment to the seriousness of
the crime committed. In other words, the ‘punishment should fit the crime.’ As
the social and political climate of the mid-1970s became more conservative, just
deserts beliefs surfaced and favoritism was given to greater punitive measures in
the justice system — particularly imprisonment (Lawrence, 1991).

It is impossible to identify an exact point in time or a specific occurrence
that both illustrates the validity of the aforementioned scholars’ theories and
shifts in political opinion. However, two examples of historical significance that
took place in the 1970s provide insight into the climate of the time as being

supportive Of a Shift to a just deserts rather than the rehabilitative model of

13

criminal justice that existed in the beginning of that decade: a) the publication of
Robert Martinson’s "nothing works" study regarding rehabilitative practices in
corrections, and b) the third sociopolitical sub-factor specifically, expansion of
juvenile waiver statutes.

The objectives of both the adult and juvenile justice systems as being
centered on rehabilitation were confronted in 1974 with the publication of Robert
Martinson’s controversial study entitled "What Works? - Questions and Answers
About Prison Reform." In this study, Martinson directed attention toward the
questionable positive effects of offender rehabilitation efforts. Specifically,
Martinson evaluated over 230 studies conducted between 1945 and 1967 that
addressed the efficacy of rehabilitation efforts in both United States and foreign
correctional systems as indicated by recidivism rates.

Ultimately the findings of Martinson's inquiries were summed with the
asking of his famous, or infamous for that matter, question: "Does nothing
work?" (Martinson, 1974, p. 48). This question was subsequently answered in a
twofold response, such that the lack of evidence indicating rehabilitation
programs have a positive effect on reducing recidivism could be explained by
either: a) programs then offered were either not fully developed or substantially
effective, or b) the belief that treatment can cure criminality is flawed since it fails
to take into account the normalcy of crime in society and offenders’ criminal
behavior as a natural response to conditions within a society that are conducive
to the precipitation of criminal acts (1974, p. 49). Martinson’s Claims were a

satiric commentary that attempted to elucidate his belief that no particular form Of

14

offender rehabilitation was a panacea in and of itself, and that research had yet
to provide evidence of the success of existing programs. Regardless, his
misinterpreted research essentially became a battle cry for conservative
politicians that advocated a more stringent approach toward offender sanctions.

Even though Martinson (1979) publicly Clarified his previous ”nothing
works" position the subsequent and drastic changes that took place within the
United States criminal justice system were already established due to its
influence on decisions made by policy makers and criminal justice professionals.
This was evidenced by growing support of deterrence (a function of the just

deserts model) as a means to reduce recidivism (Gendreau, 1995).

Juvenile Justice “Reforms”

Perhaps one of the most prominent examples of change in the juvenile
justice system that began during the 1970s was the movement toward increasing
the means that juvenile offenders could be tried, convicted, and sentenced by an
adult court. These changes, needless to say, were viewed and continue to be
viewed as one of the most controversial developments within the juvenile justice
system since its inception at the end of the last century, for they seemingly
contradict the courts original objectives.

The juvenile justice system can be traced to the progressive era of the late
nineteenth century, particularly to a group of people known as the "Child-savers"

who advocated a movement toward a parens patriae model for adjudicating

15

youthful offenders (Klein, 1998; Moak & Wallace, 2000; VanVleet, 1999). Thus
the court would act in a parental capacity.

In 1899, the Illinois legislature sanctioned the creation of the first juvenile
court system in the United States (Klein, 1998; Roush, 1996), which was based
in Cook County (Moak & Wallace, 2000). Inherent to the new court was an
enlightened view of the court as the entity responsible for the care and
rehabilitation of juvenile offenders. These views soon became a widespread
initiative across the country and were accepted as a tenet of the greater
American judicial system. Most importantly, judges were now able to use their
discretion in determining the most appropriate disposition that would provide the
desired blend of treatment and care and would ultimately lead to the production
of a lawful and contributing member of society.

It is important to note that even during this period, most state legislatures
enacted statutory provisions that allowed juvenile court judges to transfer (or
waive) their court's original jurisdiction to adult court in juvenile Offense cases of a
especially serious and violent nature, such as homicide or rape (Long & DeVault,
1992). This process became subsequently known as judicial waiver.

Sixty-five years after its establishment, both the purpose of the juvenile
court in general and judicial waiver practices in particular were addressed by the
Supreme Court in the landmark case Kent v. United States (383 US. 541
(1966)). Specifically, the Supreme Court noted that the intended purpose of the
juvenile court system was inconsistent with then judicial waiver practices (Klein,

1998). In the opinion of the court, a list of eight guidelines or criteria for

16

determining the appropriate transfer of juveniles to adult court was established
(Kent, 383 US. 541, at 566-567). Of the 46 states (Michigan included)
authorizing judicial waiver in 1998, many of these criteria and in some cases all,
were in some form incorporated into their state codes (Griffin, Torbet, and
Szymanski, 1998, p. 3).

However, since the 19705 the means available for juveniles to be
transferred from the juvenile court (that which has original jurisdiction in such
matters) to the adult court has expanded, and has even been attributed to an
increasingly punitive justice system (Anderson, 1992; Frazier, Bishop, & Lanza-
Kaduce, 1998). Currently, all states have the ability to try a juvenile as an adult
using one or more of three types of waiver (Griffin, Torbet, & Szymanski, 1998;
Klein, 1998; Puzzanchera, 2000; Sickmund, 1994): judicial waiver (as previously
explained), prosecutorial waiver (otherwise known as direct file), and statutory
exclusion.

As the name implies, prosecutorial waiver (direct file) allows a prosecuting
attorney to decide which court to initiate proceedings against a youthful offender
under concurrent jurisdiction statutes (Sickmund, 1994). Statutory exclusion
waivers, however, are a function of law that mandates the waiver of juveniles to
adult court usually based on a combination of their age, prior record, and
seriousness of the offense committed (Griffin, Torbet, and Szymanski, 1998;
Sickmund, 1994).

Additional or altered juvenile waiver provisions in all states had profound

effects on the juvenile justice system as a whole. No longer did discretion in the

17

waiver process lie solely with the juvenile court judge, but rather was
disseminated to prosecutors and/or waiver was statutorily required due to the
seriousness of an offense committed. These developments seem to be contrary
to the original intent of the juvenile court. The objective of a court reserved for
juvenile offenders was to address juvenile-specific problem behaviors and act in
a parental capacity by offering guidance and treatment with a firm hand (many
times lacking within their home) ultimately providing a second chance for success
to wayward youth. However, fragmenting the juvenile court through the
possibility of waiver has limited its fundamental original jurisdictional purview,
bringing into question its necessity as a separate court (see Federle, 1999).

F urthennore, although it has been reported that juvenile waivers to adult
court only occur in about one percent of formally processed delinquency cases
nationwide (Puzzanchera, 2000), this statistic may be diluted in that some states
may take advantage of juvenile waiver provisions to a greater extent than other
states. For example, from 1992-1997, of those juvenile delinquency cases
referred to the courts in Florida, between 6.8 and 9.6% were transferred to the
adult court in any given year (Frazier, Bishop, 8. Lanza-Kaduce, 1999), a finding

at least outwardly more substantial than that of the country overall.

Socioeconomic Factors

Fiscal Strain on the State
Reeling from the Vietnam War that had endured for over nine years and
consumed exorbitant numbers of American lives, the already weakened spirit of

the citizenry was further damaged with an economic recession that initially began

18

in 1974 and continued for several years. During this period, unemployment grew
to levels not seen since the Great Depression, and the prison population
exploded in an unprecedented fashion (Colvin, 1992).

In many ways, the 1974 recession can be considered a catalyst that
initiated substantial and significant socioeconomic changes in the United States
criminal justice system. Such changes are described in O’Connor’s (1973)
research describing imprisonment as a response to fiscal strain on the state.

O’Connor’s (1973) research indicates that social crises can be explained
by fiscal strain on the state, usually arising due to the relationship between the
monopoly and state (henceforth known as private and public) sectors. Perhaps
the most concise definition of the private (monopoly) sector, as herein referred,
was provided by Quinney (1977). In his renowned book Class, State, and Crime,
Quinney defined the private sector as encompassing “the large corporations and
multinationals that control virtually all capital-intensive industries, [and] is the
primary force of private capital accumulation in the advanced capitalist economy”
(1977, p. 117).

The relationship between the private and public sectors is fascinating.
Although fundamentally different with respect to the Objectives of each, the
private sector creates conditions that must be addressed by the public sector.
Specifically, O’Connor (1973) argues that in this respect, when issues arise in the
private sector that cause a decrease in the demand for labor (i.e., poor economic
conditions) the public sector becomes responsible for the care of those persons

unemployed, by means of social welfare programs.

19

Rusche and Kirchheimer’s (1968) economic, and O’Connor’s (1973) fiscal
strain theories, when taken in tandem, seem to be able to explain the pendular
nature of the justice system within the United States. During times of economic
prosperity when unemployment is low and the demand for labor is high, a liberal
philosophy will take root throughout society and will advocate a rehabilitative
model of corrections based on the need to continually provide labor to the private
sector. However, as economic conditions worsen and the private sector requires
less labor, unemployment increases placing financial strain on the state to
provide support to those without employment by means of social welfare
programs. As state expenditures on social welfare programs increase, three
things will likely occur: a) debt, taxes, or both will be increased in order to
finance such programs; b) citizens will advocate a more stringent just deserts
model (as explained below) of criminal justice; and c) due to pressure exerted by
social and political forces, the state will “control” the surplus labor through
incarceration. Ideally, the state under these Circumstances will seek the most
cost-effective means to incarcerate those whom it deems as threatening to the
already strained social order. As far as corrections is concerned, the public
sector has addressed its fiscal strain through the prison-industrial complex (PIC),

which is the second socioeconomic sub-factor to be discussed.

The Prison-Industrial Complex
The cold war commencing in the 1950s and continuing for over thirty-five
years brought with it the concept of a military-industrial complex (MIC).

Proponents of the MIC felt that the build-up of military power through industry not

20

only provided the stability of jobs for the masses but also protection from the
threat of communism (Hallinan, 2001). As the foundation of communism began
to crumble in the 1980s and the MIC became less necessary, the development of
a PIC began to develop in response to the startling growth of prisons nationwide.

The PIC may best be defined as “a set of bureaucratic, political, and
economic interests that encourage increased spending on imprisonment
regardless of the actual need” (Schlosser, 1998, p. 53). Schlosser also points
out that although the PIC is not a conspiracy between private industry and public
officials, it is more of an opportunity for businesses to take advantage of services
necessary to prison operation from which they could potentially profit. The
importance of this concept becomes an integral focus of the present analysis
since it helps explain the expansion of corrections (in this case the privatization
of corrections) as a result of the social and political pressures for public sector
action in relation to crime. Specifically, as economic conditions worsen and
pressure falls on the state to control surplus labor, corrections become an
expanding institution that provide both an opportunity for the private sector to
“cash in” by selling their goods and services to the prisons and inmates
themselves and also opportunities for individuals to gain employment.

The PIC is unique in that prisons are necessary to house increasing
numbers of convicted offenders yet not all counties or other geographic locations
are clamoring for the jobs and revenue a prison can bring to an area. There is a
concept in the criminal justice arena known as NIMBY or “Not in my back yard,”

which explains the hesitancy of many Citizens to allow prison placement in Close

21

proximity to their homes, schools, and businesses. Frequently, those
communities that are not financially starved or in need of jobs to rejuvenate their
economies are able to prevent prison placement. However, examples resound Of
those communities or geographic areas, that due to a dwindling tax base, limited
industry, and high unemployment, embrace prisons as a form of financial stability
(Hallinan, 2001; Schlosser, 1998), and even if not, are unable to effectively
oppose them due to a lack of resources.

The PIC goes beyond providing jobs for residents of the communities in
which prisons are placed. Private industries nationwide that provide products
and services to the correctional community, and inmates specifically, also have
much at stake within the prison industry. Numerous companies, such as AT&T
and MCI, regularly place pay phones within correctional facilities due to the
staggering amount of income generated through collect calls made by inmates
(Hallinan, 2001; Schlosser, 1998). For example, inmates in the State of
Louisiana alone during 1995 averaged an annual telephone bill of $605.00
04amnan,2001,p.146)

Other companies such as Proctor & Gamble, Dial Corporation,
Correctional Cable TV, and Pillsbury Company, generate huge profits by
marketing their products to correctional facilities (Hallinan, 2001, p. 156-157).
Even Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. had a booth at an annual American
Correctional Association meeting in attempts to sell its high-end shampoo to

pfisons(p.157)

22

As evidenced, the PIC is far from being devoid of private interests, but
perhaps the greatest private interests lie in the two largest private prison
companies: the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and the Wackenhut
Corrections Corporation who, in 1998, housed approximately 65,000 inmates
combined (Schlosser, 1998, p.63).

Citing changes in state-specific correctional philosophies in Illinois,
Georgia, and New York, Hallinan (2001), has indicated that the days of prisons
as the preferred form of social control for the state, and cash-cows for private
organizations may be numbered. Specifically, Hallinan’s research has
demonstrated that states may now be exploring the possibility that their policies
and existing legislation may have widened the net too far, contributing to

perpetual under-capacity in the corrections sector.

Synthesis of Existing Literature

Consider the totality of the circumstances of the 1970s explored within the
confines of the present analysis, specifically the economic recession of 1974,
Martinson’s “nothing works” position regarding rehabilitation, the changes that
took place within the juvenile justice system specific to the additional juvenile
waiver provisions that were created, and how these Circumstances can be
viewed in the context of Jacob’s (1977) writings on mass society, Colvin’s (1992)
elaboration thereof to include class society, and Rusche and Kirchheimer’s
(1936) and O’Connor’s (1973) theories of social control through incarceration in

attempts to explain those circumstances’ immediate outcomes.

23

Elements of mass society were most certainly present in 1974, and as
previously discussed, are identified as the extension of human rights to marginal
Classes within society, including minorities and prisoners. Both Colvin (1992)
and Jacobs (1977) identify the extension of rights or in other forms - leniency —
to the prisoners of the Penitentiary of New Mexico and Stateville, respectively,
which likely developed out of the broader extension of human rights to such
marginal groups as African Americans, arising from the civil rights movement of
the 1960s. However, as economic conditions adversely affected the private
sector thus increasing unemployment, strain was placed on the state sector to
address the needs of mass society. Unable to Operate under such fiscal
pressures, and influenced by the social and political forces of Colvin’s (1992)
class society, a punitive response to criminal Offenses was advocated, leading to
a rise in imprisonment as predicted by Rusche and Kirchheimer (1936) and used
ultimately as a form of social control.

This analysis presents an immediate question: Did the United States
prison population increase during the period following the recession? The
answer is a resounding “yes.” In fact, since 1978 the number of inmates in the
United States has tripled. Placing this fact into context is enlightening. Although
the general population of the United States represents five percent of the world’s
total population, the United States incarcerates 25 percent of those incarcerated
globally - a total of approximately two million people (Overview: Critical

resistance to the prison-industrial complex, 2000, p. 1).

24

Perhaps initially, increasing rates of incarceration through a shift to a just deserts
model of criminal justice as previously discussed, may have alleviated social and
political pressures to “get tough” on crime as well as reduce the surplus
population (i.e., unemployed). However, another question presents itself
regarding this foundational analysis: In the light of past research, why did
incarceration rates continue to increase during the economically prosperous
decade of the 19803? The answer to this question is twofold.

Prison incarceration rates have increased substantially over the past 25
years in the United States and have shown little evidence of dramatically
declining. Had Rusche and Kirchheimer the opportunity to predict (based on
their 1936 research) the specific situation that occurred during the 1970s when
rates of imprisonment increased in response to the poor economic conditions
within society, they surely would have believed those rates to decrease during
the economically prosperous conditions of the late 1980s. However, they did not
make such assertions. It has been suggested that the United States economy
has become less dependent on manual labor traditionally found within
manufacturing and commodity subsections of the private sector, and more
dependent on information and information processing (see O’Connor, 1973). In
this way, the economic prosperity of the country during the 1980s came without
the demand for the same levels of manual labor as were necessary during the
previous decade. Thus, absent was the influence of those in the private sector to
obtain employees that would have contributed to reductions in unemployment

and the use of imprisonment as a form of social control for those unemployed.

25

Furthermore, new initiatives based at the federal level may have been
responsible for increased incarceration that has continued to this day, especially
the “War on Drugs.” Under the Reagan administration, the federal government
publicly declared war on the trafficking, sale, and use of illegal substances.
Changes in both federal and state laws advocated for harsher treatment of those
convicted of those offenses and has undoubtedly contributed (although its extent
has been exaggerated at times) to the growth of the prison population

(Greenberg & West, 2001).

Existing Literature as a Framework for the Present Analysis

The work of those scholars previously discussed, begs to ask how their
research can provide a theoretical framework that will help explain the
establishment of the MYCF as the State of Michigan’s response to strenuous
underlying economic conditions. To attempt to answer this question is
particularly important since past research addresses the phenomena of adult
rather than juvenile incarceration. It is assumed by the author, within the
confines of this analysis, that Changes in juvenile adjudication and correctional
philosophy come part and parcel with those in the adult system. In other words,
increases in juvenile incarceration obviously cannot be explained as a direct
effect of Rusche and Kirchheimer’s theory as being the removal of surplus labor.
Rather, the juvenile system is intimately connected with the adult system in that
they travel together through time on a parallel continuum, both equally and

simultaneously influenced by the same social forces. In this respect, it is

26

assumed that changes with regard to the juvenile justice system will be
expressed as a function of those occurring within the wider adult system.

With this being said, the primary research-guiding question (or Guiding
Question 1) of this analysis is: Can the M YCF ultimately attribute its existence to
a complex tapestry of interwoven social and political influences that originally
surfaced due to the poor economic conditions experienced in the United States
during the mid-late 1970s, rather than a purported increase in juvenile crime?
By analyzing these influences within the State of Michigan, broader
generalizations can essentially be made with regard to the United States as a
whole concerning the influences underlying the contemporary judicial and
correctional systems” shifts in Objectives and philosophy.

To comprehensively address the above-mentioned question, several sub-
questions that are grounded in theory will be assessed in order to guide the
present research. F irst, Were the increases in the number of incarcerated
persons in the United States (including juveniles) the result of the
aforementioned poor economic conditions of the 19703? The research of
Rusche and Kirchheimer (1969) and O’Connor (1976) suggest that such
conditions significantly impact the prison population as a form of social control
prompted by the need to address fiscal strain on the state and to control labor
surpluses caused by unemployment.

Second, Did economic conditions in the private sector place fiscal
pressure on the State of Michigan resulting in greater punitive measures being

formulated with regard to juvenile offenders? This question, based on

27

O’Connor’s (1976) research aims to address the existing pressures under which
private sector employers were experiencing (i.e., low demand for products) which
led to industrial overcapacity and resulted in increased rates of unemployment.

The next question: Who was primarily responsible for initiating the move
toward greater punitive measures with regard to juvenile offenders and why did
they do so? This question addresses whether the government of the State of
Michigan was the primary proponent of shifts away from rehabilitative to a just
deserts philosophy of criminal justice as a form of social control during times of
economic instability (Colvin, 1992; Hallinan, 2001; Jacobs, 1977; and Rusche
and Kirchheimer, 1969).

Fourth, Why was the MYCF placed in the town of Baldwin in Lake County,
Michigan? Hallinan’s (2001) socio-historical research suggests that prisons are
placed in remote, economically depressed areas for the state to both provide
jobs to the unemployed as well as to functionally exile those incapacitated there
from their usual environment.

Lastly, what does the future have in store for the facility as it gets a
foothold in the twenty-first century. More specifically: erl the conectional
philosophy of the State of Michigan shift back to a rehabilitative focus centered
on decreased prison construction and the alteration of existing legislation in a
way that limits how far the “net” is cast? This question addresses two notions -
namely philosophical shifts and mass versus Class society theories. Colvin
(1992) and Jacobs (1977) speak extensively about the shifts in justice system

philosophies from just deserts to rehabilitation and vice versa. Furthermore, with

28

additional “rights” granted to Citizens (suggested by mass society theory)
additional penetration of offenders into the prison system would be limited. Thus,

movement away from a “Class society” would be had.

29

CHAPTER III
Methodology
The research methodology utilized in the present research was inspired by

the socio-historical designs of previous prison researchers (Colvin, 1992; Jacobs,
1977). These researchers explored the social, political, and economic factors
that led to the development of prisons. The author’s choice of a similar
methodology leveraged two categories of data, namely in-depth interviews and
unobtrusive measures. The following two sections explore the elements of these

categories of data, and how they were used to enrich the story of the MYCF.

ln-depth Interviews

In order to obtain detailed information about the MYCF, the author began
by obtaining a small sample of well-informed individuals to contact and arrange
interviews. Colvin (1992), Hallinan (2001), and Jacobs (1977) incorporated
interviews into their research methodology to obtain information regarding the
development of the prisons they researched. The author initially contacted three
personal associates with considerable knowledge of both the MYCF and the _
workings of Michigan politics. Two of these individuals were still involved with
the Michigan “political machine” and offered great insight as to whom should be
contacted in order to obtain useful information, the other associate (the Chair of
the author’s Thesis committee) provided an entree into the Michigan Department
of Corrections. These initial leads were not sufficient in-and-of-themselves, so
the author used a snowball sampling technique to identify, contact, and interview

additional informants.

30

Hagan (2000) describes snowball sampling as Obtaining a primary subject
(or in this case, several primary subjects by way of my associates’ referrals) who
then refers the researcher to another subject and so-on-and-so-forth until an
“adequate” number of individuals are interviewed. Such a technique was used in
Jeffrey Fagan’s (1989) study of drug use and dealing among urban gangs.

Overall, interviews were conducted with informants representing five
different groups: a) Wackenhut Corrections Corporation operation specialists; b)
Michigan Department of Corrections operations specialists; c) political
specialists; d) historical specialists; and e) juvenile justice specialists. The above
categories were thought to provide a comprehensive group of target individuals
with knowledge specific to their area of expertise and also provided a general
guide when choosing to contact referrals. In order to graphically depict the
snowballing methodology utilized, as did Wright and Decker in their 1994 book
entitled Burglars on the Job: Streetlife and Residential Break-Ins, a quasi

network analysis diagram is presented in Figure 1 below.

31

Figure 1. Snowballing Network Analysis

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Author
I Initial Leads Personal Contacts I
I Two Personal Associatesl Research Director I
lnforrnant: C I I Informant: C I
Informant: C
Political Commentator Informant: E I
I Informant: C T L Informant; A I
I Thesis Chair lnforrnant: D I
I Informant: B lnfonnant: E J

 

 

 

Key
lnforrnant A: Wackenhut Specialist
Informant B: MDOC Specialist
Informant C: Political Specialist
Informant D: Historical Specialist
Informant E: Juvenile Justice Specialist

 

 

 

 

 

After establishing categories of individuals to target, a list of interview
questions was developed. These questions were written in an open-ended
format. Open-ended (or unstructured) questions, according to Hagan (2000), are
both formulated by researchers based on the type of information they wish to
obtain (usually longer answers with depth) and are especially well-suited for an
analysis such as the present one since their function is to concentrate on a few
key individuals. Focusing attention on a select group of key subject matter
experts is highly conducive to the acquisition of substantial information regarding

a particular subject. Fortunately, due to the qualitative nature of the present

32

analysis, the common problem of coding the data obtained from open-ended
questions is avoided. Furthermore, open-ended questions can be used to
facilitate discussion, which in this case uncovered some of the intricacies of the
MYCF. Lastly, the questions were aligned with existing research, the concepts
and theories explored within that research, as well as the needs of the research
inasmuch as establishing those concepts and theories in relation to the
development of the MYCF were concerned.

All nine subjects that were interviewed were offered confidentiality prior to
the interview per federal human subjects requirements. Written consent was
Obtained both from those who wished to have their identity to remain confidential
and from those who chose to share their identity. Therefore, some names and/or
genders of individuals cited in the following pages have been changed to protect
individual identities. For the most part, however, information obtained during the
interview process is provided in quotation marks, without a specific source being
cited. This form methodology is more conducive to the telling of the MYCF story,
and has been used by other pn'son researchers, such as Colvin (1992).
Information regarding referrals per the snowball technique has also been
withheld to protect the identities of those involved.

Due to specific qualifications, information, and positions of key informants,
certain questions were posed to all individuals (core questions), some were
posed to most individuals (common questions) and others were posed

exclusively to only certain interviewees (exclusive questions). Below, these

33

categories of questions are discussed, and samples of these questions and their
respective rationales are provided when necessary.

“Core questions” were asked of all interviewees. An example of this type
Of question is: Do you feel that the M YCF can attribute its development to social
pressures on politicians to ‘get tough’ on juvenile crime? This taps into aspects of
Rusche and Kirchheimer’s (1969) theory explaining the “get tough” approach as
resulting from economic stress on the masses and their subsequent pressure on
politicians to Clamp down on crime. Additional “core questions” can be found in
Appendix 1.

“Common questions” were frequently, but not always, posed to specialists
to obtain their insight into the MYCF. Questions such as these included the
following example: What do you feel the impetus was for choosing a private
vendor rather than the State Department of Conections? This question reflects
whether the decision to construct and Operate the prison by a private vendor was
cost-driven, thus supporting O’Conner’s (1973) theory regarding fiscal strain on
the state. The remaining “common questions" are listed in Appendix 2.

Finally, “exclusive questions” were those questions that could only be
answered by specialists in a specific category. Examples of these types of
questions were: When did you begin working for Wackenhut Conections
Corporation? In the MYCF? This question was only asked of Wackenhut
specialists, whereas only MDOC specialists were asked: When did you begin

working for the MDOC? Other “exclusive questions” can be found in Appendix 3.

Interviews were then conducted in a manner most convenient for each
subject. For example, several of the subjects interviewed were from remote
locations throughout the State of Michigan. In order to obtain information from
these subjects, the author traveled to those locations to conduct interviews. Still
others wished to meet in person, and either a designated meeting location was
established (i.e., coffeehouse) or a visit to their respective workplace was
arranged. In some cases, consent forms for study participation were faxed to
subjects who were unable to meet in person or wished to be interviewed via
telephone. In this case, the signed consent form was returned and interviews
were conducted over the phone. The time to conduct interviews varied in time
due to the amount of information a subject wished to provide or due to their own
time constraints. However, the average length of time for each interview was

approximately an hour-and-a-half.

Unobtnrsive Measures

Four forms of unobtrusive data were collected. These data consisted of
existing numerical data (including incarceration, labor, and census statistics),
newspaper articles, existing documents, and a site visit to the MYCF.

The numerical data obtained for the analysis came in three forms: a) adult
incarceration rates from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS); b) economic data
specific to unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS); and c)
sociO-demographic census data from the Bureau of the Census (BOC). Adult
incarceration rates were obtained for the years 1975-2002 to determine whether

the increase in punitive measures against juveniles as a function of the adult

35

system of criminal justice. Data gathered from BJS were used to conduct an
incarceration rate trend analysis during the period specified above. Labor
statistics obtained from the BLS were used in a trend analysis to investigate
periods of high in order to draw conclusions regarding economic impacts on both
criminal justice and the Prison Industrial Complex. Finally, census data were
obtained on national, state, and local (Lake County) levels to illustrate the
variations in overall minority populations within all three venues. Specifically, it
was necessary to compare the racial proportions on a national and state level
with those of Lake County to explore the demographic disparities of that locale.

Using existing numerical data can be problematic since researchers
cannot always be sure of its absolute integrity and accuracy. However, all data
used in the present analysis were Obtained directly from the federal agency
responsible for compiling them rather than relying on other researchers data
compilations. Therefore, these data can accurately address changes over time
of various social, economic, and demographic features. These changes are an
integral part to the understanding of the development of the MYCF. A

Recognizing that there was no existing scholarly research available on the
facility, attention was turned tO other literary sources of information, specifically
newspapers. Twenty-seven newspaper articles spanning the years 1994-2000
were obtained that tracked the political, social, and economic development of the
facility from a journalistic perspective. Most of these articles were published in
the following newspapers: Grand Rapids Press, the Detroit News, and the

Detroit Free Press. Using a content analysis approach, the research-relevant

36

information from all articles was identified and included in the chapters that
follow. The inherent drawback using archival data of this type is the potential for
journalistic bias, thus tainting the information provided through this form of media.
Even though this may be considered problematic, newspaper articles do provide
information when none is available from independent researchers. Even
journalistic biases uncovered during the course of investigation may be useful in
that they help explain the underlying sentiments that exist at certain periods in
time.

The use of existing documents primarily refers to both the acquisition of a
copy of the actual contract agreement (NO. 071B9000096) between the State of
Michigan and Wackenhut Corrections Corporation that allowed the latter to
construct and operate the MYCF; and copies of Governor Engler’s 1995 and
1996 State of the State Addresses. The contract provides explicit details
regarding construction requirements of the facility, operating costs, educational
program requirements, and American Correctional Association accreditation
mandates. Engler’s State of the State Addresses were helpful in establishing the
objectives of the Govemor’s Office as far as juvenile justice initiatives were
concerned in the mid-1990s.

Lastly, information was gathered and recorded from a site visit to the
MYCF using a participant as observer approach. The site visit conducted on
March 15, 2002, consisted of a tour guided by Lt. Robert Morey (assistant to
Warden Frank Elo) and lasted for approximately two hours. Observations of the

facility from the exterior as well as interior (including specifics such as cell size,

37

cell contents, facility amenities, etc.) were obtained to enrich the story of the
facility as well as place background research and interviews into context. Polsky
(1967) offered valuable advice related to conducting observations when he
suggested that although a participant as an Observer should not take steps to
look exactly like those he or she is studying, neither should they look
conspicuous. Therefore, when visiting the site the author “dressed down,”
wearing only jeans and a T-shirt. Given that the author was not allowed to bring
anything other than his person into the facility, notes specific to the visit and
interview with Lt. Morey were recorded immediately following the tour in the
facility’s parking lot.

There is one primary drawback to using observational data such as that
from the MYCF specifically, the concern for accuracy (Hagan, 2000). This
concern primarily concentrates on the question: Did I Observe what actually and
regularly occurs in the environment in which I conducted the Observation? From
past experience in correctional facility tours, the author was quite aware that he
was (to put it in the terms of a professional acquaintance) merely a “Circus side
show" to those housed at the MYCF. He was not an everyday occurrence. He
was someone these individuals were not used to seeing on a daily basis.
Therefore, he was aware that the behavior he was to witness would most likely
not be “run of the mill,” and accounted for that fact throughout this research. .

An overall review of the present research’s methodology would suggest
that not only is the research consistent with other scholars’ methodologies, but

also great lengths were taken to ensure the accuracy of the data gathered from

38

multiple sources. Rather than relying only on existing data specific to the facility
(i.e., newspaper reports) to describe the formation, inception, and disposition of
the MYCF, the author enhanced the accuracy of his research by “going to the
source” of the data through interviews of key players connected with the facility
and by consulting and gathering information specific to numerical data, directly
from the federal government. Thus, the author believed that by employing such
a methodology, the most comprehensive and accurate picture of the facility might

be painted.

39

CHAPTER IV

Inception: Michigan’s plans for a juvenile prison

The present chapter explores both significant sociopolitical and
socioeconomic conditions that created an environment conducive to the planning
of the MYCF. The chapter begins with some foundational background
information, and then discusses economic conditions (as indicated through
unemployment rates) on a national level in conjunction with adult incarceration
data. The examination of these data provides an avenue to establish the
existence of economic influences on the justice system’s decision to incarcerate.
Michigan-specific conditions that may have affected the State’s determination
that the MYCF was necessary are also discussed. The remainder of the Chapter
describes foundational and developmental information regarding the MYCF from
print media sources, and personal interviews with some of the State’s players in

the saga that became known as Michigan’s “punk prison.”

The Idea Takes Shape

Vying for reelection as Governor of the State of Michigan in late 1994,
Republican John Engler included plans in his campaign platform to establish a
prison for serious youthful offenders — a facility that he would later dub
Michigan’s ‘punk prison.’

Juvenile justice reforms in Michigan were the driving force of Engler’s

initiative. Specifically, the prison proposal was intended to “separate the wheat '

40

from the chaff” in juvenile facilities rather than a public relations ploy by
Republicans to secure constituent approval. The Republicans had a “Clear-eye
revelation” that there were too many victims of serious juvenile crime. Although
drastic actions focusing on this population were neither pleasant nor desirable,
“at some point you have to say public safety takes over.”

The Republican plan was to both increase the sentencing discretion of
judges then bound to send youths aged 15 years or older and sentenced as
adults to the W. J. Maxey Boys Training School in Livingston County and
increase punitive standards within Michigan’s juvenile justice system. This plan
would require extensive alterations and enhancements to existing Michigan
statutes; alterations that were identified as having long been objectives of

Michigan Republicans.

Economic Precursors to Change

The efforts of some Michigan lawmakers to alter the State’s laws
encompassing juvenile justice practice had continued Since 1989 - five years
prior to Engler’s announcement. The economic context of the time these efforts
directed toward changing the juvenile laws is intriguing, and begs an answer to
two specific questions: a) What is the relationship between economics and
recent periods of philosophical transition to a just deserts model of criminal
justice; and, b) Was the initiative to alter Michigan’s juvenile laws rooted in the
existing economic conditions of the time? Figure 2 below provides a trend
analysis of annual unemployment rate averages, which is presented as an

indicator of economic conditions from 1975 to 2002.

41

figure 2. Twelve-month unemployment rate averages: 1 975-2002

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Note: 2002 unemployment rate average was calculated using monthly rates from
January through July
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2002

As can be seen in Figure 2, there are three specific time periods over the
course of the past 27 years when unemployment was particularly turbulent.
Specifically, in 1975 the US economy was in the process of recovering from a
substantial economic recession - one not only described by Calvin (1992) as a
period when unemployment reached unprecedented levels, but one described by
Sanford Weil, Chairman and CEO of the world’s largest financial institution (i.e.,
Citigroup, Inc.), as being the most Significant since the great depression (Well,
2002). Interestingly, Martinson’s (1974) What Works paper was published during
the brunt of the economic downturn, and although not definitively tied to his

research results, changes in juvenile waiver statutes were implemented during

42

the years immediately following and were attributed to an increasingly punitive
justice system (Anderson, 1992; Frazier, Bishop, & Lanza-Kaduce, 1998).

The second major economic recession occurred during the early years of
the Reagan administration. Between 1981 and 1984 almost 10% of those who
were able to work were unable to find employment. The following years marked
the commencement of the “War on Drugs.” During this time, changes to federal
and state laws resulted in harsher treatment of those convicted of drug
trafficking, sale, and use (Greenburg & West, 2001).

Economic recession once again became a figurative “thorn in the side”
during the middle of the George H. Bush administration and extending into the
early years of Bill Clinton’s presidency. It was during these years that the
national and state governments began their “get tough on crime” campaigns, but
more importantly, from a Michigan perspective, the period was one in which a
framework for altering Michigan’s existing juvenile justice legislation was on-the-
move. .

The early 1990s were a particularly devastating time for the Michigan
economy, leading to statewide unemployment rates averaging three percentage
points higher than the national average (Japan bashing: Where the jobs are,
1992). For a state associated with being the home-base of the big three
automakers (i.e., Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler), the economic conditions
of the early 1990s led to some of the largest numbers of employee layoffs in the
organizations’ histories (74,000 announced by GM in 1992), as well as car

production at 30-year lows (Japan bashing: Where the jobs are, 1992).

43

Table 1 below provides annual unemployment rate averages for the
United States, the State of Michigan, and the Detroit, Flint, Grand Rapids, and

Lansing metro areas.

Table 1. National and statewide unemployment conditions: 1990-1995

 

Location

 

Year US. State of Michigan Detroit Flint Grand Rapids Lansing

 

1990 5.6 7.6 7.6 9.8 6.2 6.3
1991 6.9 9.3 9.3 12.7 8.0 7.5
1992 7.5 8.9 9.2 12.0 7.6 5.7
1993 6.9 7.6 7.3 9.6 5.6 5.1
1994 6.1 5.9 5.8 8.0 4.5 4.1
1995 5.6 5.4 5.1 6.8 4.0 3.7

 

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2002

Table 1 demonstrates the magnitude of economic impact the recession
had on the State of Michigan when compared with the nation as a whole. During
the brunt of the recession (during the latter half of 1990 through 1992), the
Michigan unemployment rates were significantly higher than those of the nation,
particularly in the Flint metro area with a 1991 unemployment average of 12.7. In
fact, a 1991 article in U. S. News & World Report identified Genesee County (i.e.,

where the city of Flint is located) as one of four most affected by the recession.

44

Specifically, the Flint area had lost upwards of 19,000 GM jobs during the decade
previous to the recession, received a funding cut of $30 million in 1991 by
Governor Engler eliminating the County’s General Assistance and Emergency
Needs programs for residents, and had reached their maximum property tax rate
that was predicted to drive the County into further deficit spending during the
following fiscal year. Furthermore, the county jail staff had been reduced from
167 to 146 from 1988 to 1991 although they experienced a 58% increase in the
number of inmates during the same time period (Boroughs, Black, and Collins,
1991). Unemployment rates were not the only thing fluctuating in Michigan
during this time. Policies regarding juvenile waiver to Michigan’s probate court

were also changing.

Juvenile Justice Refonns: The Michigan Perspective

In the early 1990s, prosecutors could either request the waiver of a
juvenile aged 15 years or older charged with certain serious crimes (i.e., murder
or rape) to the adult/circuit court or file charges directly with the adult court. In
either case, the judge determined whether the case should remain within the
purview the circuit court or be remanded to the probate court. However, between
1989 and 1990, prosecutors were becoming frustrated with the decisions of
Circuit Court judges to remand juveniles to the Probate Court. The judicial
climate demonstrated limited prosecutorial discretion and resulted in a greater
push by both prosecutors and some Michigan politicians to make legislative
changes. These changes were focused on allowing prosecutors to direct file

charges against juveniles within the Circuit Court system for a greater number of

45

offenses, to have those charges remain in the Circuit Courts, and to allow for the
sentencing of juveniles (as young as 10 years old) as adults. Those efforts
aimed at expanding prosecutorial and judicial discretion, as well as the “net” that
would snare these young offenders, would prove to be copious in the coming
years.

Not only would substantial procedural changes be made to the juvenile
and adult systems, but also Michigan’s practices for youthful offenders would
have to be altered under Engler’s initiative. As it then stood under Michigan law,
the State Department of Social Services (DSS) had jurisdiction over the
correction and rehabilitation of all youthful offenders including those charged as
adults and waived to adult criminal courts. An act of legislation would be
necessary to allow the latter to be housed in a prison under the jurisdiction of the
Michigan State Department of Corrections (MDOC) until they reached the age of
majority and were transferred to an adult facility. Furthermore, Engler had to
raise support for this initiative among law makers at all levels of government in
order that the estimated $40 million price tag for the construction of a new or
refurbishment of an existing facility be allocated in the 1996 budget (Hoffman,
1994), which was presented in February of 1995.

During the waning days of 1994, spokespeople for both the DSS, as well
as Governor Engler’s office (Karen Smith and John Truscott, respectively), spoke
of rehabilitation and protection of youthful offenders as being the main objectives

of any future juvenile prison initiatives (Hoffman, 1994, p. 6A). However, the

46

developments in juvenile offender policy and practice throughout the state
differed from those objectives.

Initial evidence of support for Engler’s juvenile prison was found in the
January 2, 1995 edition of the Detroit News and Free Press. The paper’s
editorial staff endorsed the separation of exceptionally serious juvenile offenders
from other less threatening juveniles in training schools and juvenile facilities;
recognized the importance of preventing the placement of juveniles in adult
facilities where they may become targets for mistreatment by their adult
counterparts; and postulated as to the benefits that could be realized by melding
the rehabilitative function of training schools within a punitive environment such
as one that may exist in a prison for juvenile offenders (Kids in trouble, 1995).

Engler had much to say regarding his prison proposal during his formal
State of the State Address, which he delivered on the evening of January 17,
1995. During the speech, Engler proclaimed that the “Michigan Renaissance is
real” (par. 13) referring to efforts being taken to improve the quality of life,
employment, education, etc., throughout the state. included in this “Renaissance
Plan’ was Engler’s justification for deveIOping stringent juvenile justice initiatives,
such as the juvenile prison. Toward the end of his speech, Engler stated:

Unfortunately, there are other young people who put the rest of us at risk.

They have no concept of personal responsibility, and no compunction

about preying on others. Our message to these thugs and punks must be

unambiguous. They not only forfeit their childhood: they forfeit their right

to privacy and special treatment . . . The public is demanding - and I
concur - that young punks be treated as adults” (pars. 67-68).

47

With a budget proposal due in February, Engler took this opportunity to
prime Michigan’s Legislature for the yet-to-be-requested hefty allocation of funds
for this and related endeavors:

But this commitment is not without cost. Soon I will submit to you a

special appropriations bill that comes with a price tag of over $200 million

- money for [along with other facilities, expansions, and refurbishments] a

“punk prison’ (par. 70).

Governor Engler’s words that evening were most certainly not the last said
on the topic of the now-dubbed “punk prison” during 1995. There was much
work in the legislature during this period to alter existing statutes, and to create
new legislation that would enable Engler’s ‘punk prison’ to become a reality. In
fact, these issues were being addressed by both the Michigan Senate Judiciary
Committee under the chairmanship of Senator William VanRegenmorter (R-
Georgetown), and member of the House of Representatives, such as Michael
Nye (R-Hillsdale) and Claire Duvet (also a Republican, but whose district cannot
be disclosed for reasons of confidentiality).

Senator VanRegenmorter indicated that his committee’s primary focus
was Michigan’s waiver process, with efforts directed toward securing for
prosecutors greater discretion in the processing and charging of “arrested
juveniles that posed a particular threat.” In the House, Nye and Duvet played
significant roles in legislative development. Specifically, Nye’s legislative drafts,

which were begun as early as 1990, provided a framework for a final legislative

package.

48

According to Duvet, she had “tremendous involvement” with regard to

these issues. The following is a paraphrased excerpt from an interview with Ms.

Duvet:

The way it [legislative development] worked was that the
Republicans converged to discuss this issue [juvenile justice
reforms]. The Republicans excluding myself, wanted to reduce the
age at which juvenile offenders could be sent to the adult court.
This was lunacy. They also wanted to ‘get tough on crime.’ I
wanted to keep the kids in Probate Court because the judges there
have expertise in, and know how to handle youthful offenders. The
others thought that Circuit Court judges would be, or had the
reputation of being ‘hard-noses,’ a reputation they considered
desirable, whereas Probate judges were considered “soft on crime.’
I wanted to put more methods into the hands of Probate judges due
to their expertise, and let them decide if a juvenile should be sent to
adult court, be kept in probate court, or if they should delay the
sentencing of a youth. The results included the age in the bill being
lowered to 14 for prosecutorial waiver however, the proposal also
gave more authority to Probate judges to waive as well, thus
increasing their discretion.

Mr. Nye’s comments mirror those of Duvet as to the climate of legislative

development of the juvenile statutes. As a past Public Defender, Nye reflected

on those concerns that girded his attitude toward serious juvenile offenders at the

time:

[When I was a public defender] I noticed that the ones [juveniles]
who had their hands slapped and were placed on probation were
the ones I wound-up defending over and over. [These kids] needed
to be hit with a two-by-four to get the message. [Tougher santions
were necessary because] a crime is a crime is a crime whether 14
or 50 [years old]. If you kill someone, you kill someone.

In December the Detroit News reported that a bill was in the state

legislature that if approved would solidify the Governor’s plans for a punk prison

by authorizing its construction. Furthermore, it was reported that a plan was

before the board of commissioners in Macomb County that if approved would

49

establish the punk prison’s location in Clinton Township. Contrary to previous
estimates, the cost of construction for the prison was estimated at $75 million
with an annual operating cost of $21 million (Savitske, 1995a, p. 5C).
Prophetically, Macomb County Commissioner Michael Sessa indicated
that “The only downside to this whole thing is the ‘not-in-my-back-yard’ syndrome
. . . People want to see these punks incarcerated; they just don’t want them close
to where they live”(Savitske, 1995a, p. 50). These words rang true when twenty
days later the Detroit News reported that Macomb County was no longer a
contender for the punk prison. Sessa indicated that the benefits (economic) the
prison would have brought were not greater than public concern over prison’s
proximity (Savitske, 1995b). Although placement procedures in Macomb County
had failed, Engler spokesperson John Truscott said, “The governor has indicated
the punk prison will be built in southeastern Michigan” (Savitske, 1995b, p. 30).
With the wheels set in motion for site selection, Engler maintained the
objective’s momentum twenty days later in mid-January 1996 with his yearly
State of the State Address. As in the previous year, emotionally charged
language regarding Engler’s perceived need for the juvenile prison confronted
the State’s residents when he said the following:
If you’re serious about getting tough on violent criminals, then you’d better
get serious about building the prisons to lock them away. . . . [l]t is critical
that we build four new prisons. And that includes the “punk prison’ I called
for last year. . . [l]t’s time to stop pampering punks (Engler, 1996a, pars.
49-51).
In May 1996, the Detroit News reported that Tuscola County was being

considered as a possible location for the juvenile prison. Specifically, it would be

50

located at the Caro Center psychiatric facility (Williams, 1996), but just as with
Macomb County, there were concerns. Representative Mike Green, (R-
Mayville), felt that the biggest challenge to this new proposed location for the
prison was the apprehension of county residents toward having this facility within
close proximity. At that time, the actualization of these concerns through the
rejection of the placement proposal would have most certainly been another
inconvenience for the State Department of Corrections. According to Green,
officials desired the placement of the juvenile prison to be within 100 miles of
metro-Detroit since it was anticipated that the majority of its population would be
comprised of youths from that area (Williams, 1996, p. C3).

With increasing efforts being made to establish a location for the new
prison - only matters of law were left to be addressed. As described previously,
under existing Michigan law, juveniles convicted of crimes as adults were under
the jurisdiction of the MDSS until the age of 18 and unable to, in any way, be part
of the adult correctional system of prisons run by the MDOC. However, in June
1996, Governor Engler signed a 21-bill package that provided some resolution
for these and other related issues. Among these bills were measures that
included, but were not limited to: a) lowering the age at which adult-charges
could be brought against a juvenile from 15 to 14; b) adult sentencing for serious
crimes; and c) the creation of a “punk prison’ (Engler, 1996b; Puls, 1996). In
response to this legislation, Joan Young, a chief judge in the Oakland County
Probate Court said: “Now we don’t have to send kids that won’t be rehabilitated

to expensive treatment programs. Jail time is an option” (Puls, 1996, p. 4B).

51

Discussion

lnfonnation provided within this chapter speaks to the first three guiding
questions as outlined in Chapter II, which centered on the relationship between
unemployment and incarceration, fiscal strain on the state as a precursor to
greater use of incarceration as a social control, and the key players behind
Michigan’s youth prison initiative.

The unemployment trends and analysis presented earlier in the chapter
(see Figure 1) are thought provoking, and seem to support past research that
suggests a governmental and social emphasis on forms of social control, such as
imprisonment, during times of economic instability (Colvin, 1992; O’Connor,
1973). But how can one apply the research of Rushe & Kirchheimer (1969),
Jankovic (1977), and Inverarity and McCarthy (1998) that indicated incarceration
rates will increase in conjunction with unemployment rates? Is there a
relationship present between these two factors at present?

Unfortunately, juvenile incarceration rates (or residential placement rates
as the statistic is referred to in the field) on a national level have only been
collected in a comprehensive fashion the past five years, and are currently
reported through the federal govemment’s Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention’s (OJJDP) Census of Juveniles in Residential
Placement. According to OJJDP officials, the Bureau of the Census also collects
similar statistics, but on a much more limited basis. Therefore, as assumed

earlier in the present analysis, that juvenile incarceration rates increase and

52

decrease in conjunction with those of adults due to the political, social, and
economic climate of the times, adult incarceration (prison) rates from 1977 to

2001 were obtained and are presented in Figure 3 below for analysis.

figure 3. Annual federal and state prison populations: 1977-2001

 

1,400,000 T . 1'? 1M , fl;
1,200,000 I -
1,000,000 _
800,000 ~» —-|» ..
600,000 I , -:,
400,000 I ——-, L
200,000 ~ «5;. .
0 r I I I I ,‘

«QN‘56’\9’\'5°D’\ '\
@508e8e“e“e“e“e“e°e“e°9e°

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

L-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Number of Prisoners

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1
7

 

Year

 

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2002

Figure 3 above, demonstrates the significant growth witnessed in adult
corrections stretching back to the 1970s. Unlike Figure 2, it is difficult to pinpoint
certain timeframes during which there was a particularly significant increase or
decrease in prison populations. Rather, the number of prisoners in federal and
state prisons seems to increase steadily and substantially overtime. Even
though both Jancovic (1977) and Inverarity and McCarthy (1988) both identified

statistically significant relationships between unemployment and incarceration

53

rates (i.e., increases in the former will lead to increases in the later), Figure 2
suggests that their findings may be a function of the time when they conducted
their research, and should similar research be conducted in the present day,
alternative patterns may be observed. As previously discussed, O’Connor (1973)
suggested that the US economy is increasingly dependent on forms of labor
other than those of a manual nature. Whereas Rushe and Kirchheimer (1969)
supported findings that were more aligned with those of Jankovic (1977) and
Inverarity and McCarthy (1988), perhaps their inability to foresee the substantial
changes in labor demographics in the late twentieth century explain the disparity
between their contention that incarceration will be used as a form of social
control during times of economic turbulence.

Therefore, it may be the case that the poor economic conditions of the
early 1970s contributed to a shift in criminal justice philosophy to one more
centered on just deserts and that incarceration (as a form of social control) was
employed. However, shifts in labor demographics and the subsequent decrease
in demand for manual labor, which Rusche and Kirchheimer suggested would
contribute to a more lenient justice system, have resulted in a figurative
“incarceration ball.” This ball, set in motion during the early 1970s, was left not
only to “roll,” but was further supported during future periods of economic
difficulty, ultimately resulting in unprecedented prison population growth in the
United States. More specifically, when Michigan experienced devastating blows
to its economic base with the massive layoffs from the Big Three auto-makers in

the early 1990s the fiscal strain on the state (as indicated by O’Connor, 1976) to

provide welfare services to residents also contributed to an environment
conducive to the use of incarceration as a form of social control. However, the
social control package in this case came in the form of a juvenile prison facility
wrapped in the rhetoric of its primary sponsor — Governor John Engler.

Now that the idea or as some would call it, the “mandate,” was set forth to
develop a prison specifically for the “punks” of the State of Michigan, revisions to
the state’s existing legislation specific to the juvenile justice process had to be
undertaken and a site had to be selected to “host” what would become known as

the “Governor’s baby.” These issues are explored in the following Chapter.

55

CHAPTER V

Formulation: Privatization Takes Root in Michigan

A series of new “get tough” bills, which were signed the previous year,
were scheduled to take effect in the early spring of 1997. Included among the
assortment of legislation was the Public Act 164, which not only established the
Governor’s “punk prison,” but also allowed for the construction and operation of
the facility by a private vendor (T ruscott, 1997). The legislative process resulting
in a private correctional institution for Michigan youths was controversial since
many of the changes made to existing Michigan law were monetarily based
rather than based on reform, correction, or rehabilitation.

The development of a private prison for serious youthful offenders
prompts many questions. Who was responsible for initiating the move to
privatized juvenile corrections? What was the rationale for such a proposal?
How was the private vendor chosen? As mentioned in the previous chapter,
Engler was originally unwavering in his support for facility placement near the
Detroit area due to the projected inmate demographics that suggested a large
portion of its occupants would originate from that area. Why then, would the
MYCF be placed in the very opposite comer of the state - over 250 miles from
the Detroit-metro area? What was it about Lake County, Michigan that attracted

the attention of the Govemor’s Office as being an ideal location for his “baby?”

56

The Move Toward Privatization

Initially, the development and operation of a facility specifically for the
confinement of serious youthful offenders was expected to fall under the purview
of the MDOC. The path taken by Michigan officials was quite different. For a
state heavily populated and politically influenced by labor unions, a move toward
privatized corrections for adults would have been surprising. Michigan’s decision
to pursue a contract for private vendor correctional services for juveniles raised
many eyebrows. There were two foundational reasons for the support of a
private prison of this sort: a) legislativelgubematorial initiative; and b) the cost
savings inherent in contracts between the state and a private vendor.

Past state representative Mike Nye (R-Hillsdale) takes credit for initiating
“privatization discussion with other Republicans.” His support of a privatization-
initiative was inspired by a trip with some of his colleagues to a private prison in
Tennessee. The facility Nye toured offered a variety of programs to inmates,
such as drug rehabilitation, counseling, and mandated facility jobs for residents.
Nye’s support for a privatized facility was not solely the result of his travels, but
also because he wanted the State of Michigan to avoid using an existing facility
to house youths sentenced as adults. He felt that many of them were old.
Private corrections providers offered services considered by Nye to be the
“. ..best [we] could get.”

Nye’s site visit was catalytic - strengthening the case for a private vendor
rather than the MDOC. Others felt the impetus behind the push for privatization

was much different. In fact, the private facility was referred to by many as being

57

the “Governor’s baby,” since Engler was a “big fan” of privatized corrections.
Furthermore, a state-run facility was never an option. Not even the Michigan
union of state correctional employees wanted to handle Michigan’s “worst of the
worst” juvenile offenders. With the lack of support by the Michigan corrections
union for this type of facility remaining under state control, the Republicans
recognized Engler’s intiative as an excellent opportunity for a pilot project, which
if successful, could spill over into other forms of corrections across the state.
There were other stakeholders, however, who had reservations over the use of a
private vendor. In fact “deep concerns” were expressed by individuals, such as
state Senator William VanRegenmorter, one of the state’s foremost politicians
whose legislative efforts focused primarily on Michigan’s criminal justice system.

To attribute the development of the MYCF as being the result of individual
efforts of certain legislators and Engler’s desires would be incomplete since a
salient factor that affects governmental decision-making is money. The concept
of the MYCF as being an institution run by a private organization was not only
driven by a “dollars ideology [rather than] the potential for rehabilitation," but was
explained as being the result of corrections “just [coming] down to dollars and
cents.”

In the mid-1990s, sending a serious youthful offender to the Maxey
Training School cost the state approximately $150.00 per day. In comparison the
cost to send the same youth the MYCF would equal just over $67.00 - less than

half that charged by the state’s own corrections agency. The bottom line, as far

58

as the privatization initiative was concerned, was to achieve for the state a cost

savings no less than 5% as mandated by civil service law.

Wackenhut’s Fast Track to Baldwin

During the summer of 1996, two committees comprised of various
Michigan departmental officials met to begin the process of drafting a Request for
Proposal (RF P) - a type of invitation for individuals or organizations to submit
bids for future services to be rendered to identify an appropriate vendor to build
and operate the MYCF. Since the RF P was focused on the construction and
operation of a maximum-security juvenile prison, several members of the MDOC
traveled to the Joliet Youth Center in Joliet, Illinois, the state’s only maximum-
security youth facility. While on-site, officials assessed the facilities education
programs, physical and mental health services, as well as the construction of the
facility in order to obtain benchmark data to establish best practice upon which
the RF P would be centered. Frustrations were since voiced by members of the
Michigan’s Family Independence Agency (F lA) regarding their lack of
involvement in the development of the RFP. It seems as though some felt it was
only common sense that the agency otherwise responsible for youth corrections
in the State of Michigan to have significant input into the development of a youth
pnson.

Regardless, in 1997 the State of Michigan issued a single RFP for facility
construction and operation. Rather that issuing two RFPs (one for the design

and construction, and the other for the facility’s operation) the state issued only

59

one, arguing that the process involved to review and approve two bids would
take too long. The resultant single RFP, written by state employees Mary Levine
and Kathy Jones, was extensive.

The response by vendors to Michigan’s RF P was overwhelming, even
being described as resulting in the “death of a forest” due to the substantial
amount of paper submitted by each prospective vendor in attempt to win the
contract. Bids from vendors were then submitted to two State of Michigan review
committees coordinated by the MDOC. One committee focused on the design
and building portions of bids while the other concentrated on operations.

Once the deadline for submitting bids to the state had passed, the
committees reviewed the submissions and invited three vendors (i.e., vendors
they felt offered the best combination of programs and services for the best price)
to make a proposal presentation to the state. According to a senior MDOC
official “Wackenhut made a slick presentation and lowered their initial offer.“ The
committee was impressed with the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation (WCC)
since it made concrete promises (i.e., physical and mental health programs).
Kathy Jones was then charged with the responsibility of conducting a due
diligence audit of the corporation’s financial positions. After working with an
independent accounting firm, which attested to WCC’s financial stability, the
contract was awarded to them.

In 1988, the WCC became a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Wackenhut
Corporation, which was founded in 1954 and based in Palm Beach Gardens,

Florida. WCC claims that their corporate function is to provide detention and

60

correction services to government agencies throughout the world that are more
cost-effective for governments, yet a lucrative endeavor for the corporation’s
bottom-line.

In addition to providing incarceration services, the WCC was also required
under contract to provide other services, such as drug, alcohol, and impulse
control therapy, a high school education, and vocational training (Richard, 1998).
However, the prison was not met with unwavering acclaim as evidenced by
comments made by State Senator Jim Barryman (D-Adrian): “When you have to
build a children’s prison, I think that’s an admission of a failed state policy on
children” (Detroit News, 1998, p. 7C).

Now that the contract and responsibility were in the hands of the WCC,
the state government estimated a cost savings of approximately $33 million in
construction and $4.5 million per year in operating costs as compared with the
reality had the state endeavored to complete the project on its own (Richard,

1 998).

Engler’s long-awaited plans for constructing the MYCF were finally
solidified on March 3, 1998. On this day, he traveled to the town of Baldwin in
Lake County (located in the northwestern lower peninsula) to take part in a
groundbreaking ceremony for the construction of the 480-bed prison (Richard,

1 998).

In response to the celebration, Engler declared that: “This prison gives

judges an additional sentencing option, it keeps young offenders segregated

from the adult prison population and it send a strong message to gang members

61

and other violent young offenders that they will be severely punished" (quoted in

Richard, 1998, p. A5). Engler’s trip to Baldwin and the construction of the MYCF
in that locale is intriguing. The brief vignette of Lake County that follows provides
an understanding of the conditions in this area of the state that were conducive to

the establishment of the MYCF within its borders.

Lake County: History, lntn'gue, & Economics

Driving through the lush timberland of Lake County, Michigan near the
town of Baldwin, it is difficult to imagine that the area is home to many of
Michigan’s most violent youth. This feature of the contemporary Lake County
lies in stark contrast to yesteryear. For an area so secluded in northern
Michigan, Lake County has a long and rich African American history. In Baldwin,
and its neighboring township of Yates, lies an area known as the ldelwild Lake
community — a resort primarily populated by aging blacks who are the vestige of
a once glittering vacation and entertainment hotspot.

Answers as to why Lake County’s proportion of minority residents is the
second highest in the state (the first being Wayne County — that in which greater
Detroit is located), can be traced back to the vision of two brothers, Erastus and
Albert Branch, who were residents of the area in 1912.

Up until the early part of the twentieth century, northwest Michigan was
prime timber country. By 1912, however, much of the forest surrounding ldlewild
Lake was depleted. It was at this time that the Branch brothers (both of whom
were white) purchased a significant portion of land at ldlewild with the intent to

develop the property into a resort community specifically for blacks (Walker 8.

62

Wilson, 2002, pp. 6-7). Social structures in the early twentieth century excluded
blacks from the benefits normally enjoyed by whites. The Branch brothers
recognized the opportunities inherent to providing blacks with a resort community
since white resorts systematically prevented blacks from enjoying their benefits.

Although the Branch brothers are historically credited with the resort’s
inception, others were also involved with its development, including Chicagoan
Dr. Wilbur Lemon (primary financier), William Sanders, Albert Flogus, Arthur
Riffe, William Green, and Carl and Marion Arthur (Walker & Wilson, 2002, p. 16).
These individuals, organized by Lemon, purchased an additional 2,700 acres of
land at ldlewild Lake around 1915 in order to help “fulfill the vision of a ‘Black
Eden’” (Walker & Wilson, 2002, p. 17).

The latter half of this decade witnessed the running of ads in various
locales, including Atlanta, Chicago, Gary, and Peoria, which advertised resort
lots for sale (Micinski, 2002). What is more, bus excursions from Chicago,
Cleveland, Detroit, Grand Rapids, and Indianapolis were organized to escort a
cache of economically advantaged blacks to ldlewild Lake in hopes that they
would purchase resort property (Walker & Wilson, 2002, p. 17).

The popularity of ldlewild grew tremendously, and in 1925 the Branch
brothers and Lemon entered into an agreement that affectively established the
ldlewild Resort Company. In a separate agreement, interest in this company
between the former and the latter were split into 40% and 60% allotments,
respectively (Walker & Wilson, 2002, p. 13). Year-round minority residents of

ldlewild increased significantly between 1910 and 1960 as shown in Figure 4.

63

Interestingly, it was not until recently (i.e., 1990) that the total percentage of
minority residents of the State of Michigan surpassed the similar percentage of
minority residents in Lake County. To the uninformed observer, total
percentages of minority populations as witnessed in Lake County even in the
present, illustrate a phenomenon that is difficult to explain should one not be
privy to the history that drew minorities in droves to the shores of ldlewild.

Figure 4. Minon'ty Populations as a Percentage of the Total Population for Lake
County and the State of Michigan

 

30% s
25% -
20% -*

 

 

Lake County
- - - -Michigan

15% ~
10% a
5% I

 

 

 

Percent of Total

 

 

0% IT I 1 fr 1 r Ifi
ceccccceec
N '5 hence

9.59.9 .3139 9.9.9 31$

Year

 

 

Source: United States Bureau of the Census

Several contractual agreements ensued between various parties involved
with the ldlewild Lake resort community and included among other things,
several changes in the name of the resort owners’ “association” during the

course of its existence. However, one thing remained unchanged until relatively

recently - the resort’s popularity with blacks nationwide. Between 1915 and
1927, ldelwild accommodated between 5,000 and 6,000 summer resort-goers,
not including temporary vacationers (Walker & Wilson, 2002, p. 29). Increases in
the number of summer residents brought increases in the number of businesses.
Up until the 19503, over a dozen nightclubs and hotels alone were constructed at
ldlewild (Walker & Wilson, 2002, p. 51).

Just as entertainment was a salient feature at exclusive white resorts, so
too was entertainment an important feature at ldlewild. “At one time or another
many of the most notable intellectual, musical, and artistic talents were nurtured
at ldlewild” (Walker & Wilson, 2002, p. 70). Walker and Wilson’s tale of the
development of the ldlewild community lists entertainers who performed there
that reads like a “Who’s Who” of black talent. This list includes such persons as
Louis Armstrong, William “Count” Basie, James Brown, Cab Calloway, Bill
Cosby, Sammy Davis Jr., Duke Ellington, Billy Eckstine, and Aretha Franklin to
name only a few (2002, pp. 71-88). The visits by these celebrities greatly
contributed to both the resort’s success and growth until the mid-1960s, and
interestingly, drew large numbers of whites to see the performances.

The mid-19605 were also a time of dramatic social change in the United
States - a time when society began to recognize that blacks should enjoy the
same rights and befits as white citizens. The civil-rights legislation boom at this
time brought with it the passage of the Public Accommodations Act, which made
it an illegal practice for traditionally white establishments to systematically

discriminate against black patrons (Walker & Wilson, 2002, p. 126). With their

65

new-found rights and freedoms, blacks and black performers were no longer
relegated to ldlewild. Over several years, black patrons began to vacation at
other resorts that had been previously “off limits.” The results were devastating
for ldlewild. In the past four decades, the once thriving resort community has
witnessed the erosion of its economic foundation, businesses close, nightclubs
and hotels be demolished, and its once living history become nothing more than
a legacy for blacks worldwide.

The economic conditions of the greater Lake County are similarly bleak.
As Figure 5 shows, Lake County’s median non-family household income has
traditionally been much lower than the average for the State of Michigan. In fact,
according to the United States Census Bureau, over 20% of Lake County

residents live below the poverty line.

66

Figure 5. Median Non-Family Household Income for the Years 1950-2000

 

$30,000 ..
$25,000 T I

$20,000 “ I

’ h- - - Michigan
15,000 ~ I /
S I —-—— Lake County

$10,000 « .

 

 

Income

 

$5,000 .4 ’ O . ~ ~ :f:/’“/

 

 

$0 I I I I I l
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Year

 

Source: United State Bureau of the Census

The MYCF’s placement in Lake County was for purely economic reasons.
Due to its staggering unemployment levels and number of people living at or
below the poverty line, the Governor’s Office chose to relocate the facility from its
desired southeastern Michigan location to Lake County. Perhaps the strongest
rationale for doing so was the situation in Jackson, lonia, and Marquette,
Michigan whose economies were built on the prison system. In turn, Michigan
authorities felt that the state’s poorest county could get an economic boost and
be revitalized by an influx of jobs resulting from the county’s very own, home-

grown piece of the Prison Industrial Complex.

67

Construction Continues

Automatically becoming the largest employer in the state’s poorest county
(Guthrie, 1999; Kolker, 2000a), it was not suprising that over 2,000 people
attended a job fair in Big Rapids and applied for prison jobs. This seemed to be a
promising sign, especially considering resident’s willingness to accept less pay
than their state-employed equivalents (Detroit News, 1999, p. 87). Since the
WCC was a private entity whose corrections officers were not part of any state or
national union that would enforce standard state correction-officer pay, initial
hourly rates for 90 new WCC officers at the MYCF would be $10.29, which was
$3.00 less than their MDOC counterparts. However, by reducing labor costs, the
WCC was able to, in part, fulfill its mission to increase shareholder returns.
Although the turnout at the Big Rapids job fair was impressive, its resultant
correctional officer yield was not. After applying for positions, applicants were
screened by the State of Michigan to ensure that there was no record of felonies,
sex offenses, and/or past employment with the MDOC that ended in termination.
Of the over 2,000 applicants who applied for positions with the facility, most were
rejected, in part due to the stringent policies of the MDOC with regard to the
above listed criteria. The facility administration’s inability to fill their correction
officer positions proved to haunt them in the coming year. Lake County's human
resources seemed to have been “tapped-out" before the facility even opened its
doors.

While construction carried on, one key staff member of the facility was

hired - Luella Burke. Ms. Burke, one of the most respected individuals in the

68

MDOC by both Democrats and Republicans, and had a twenty-five year record of
excellence within Michigan’s correctional systems. Prior to her position with
Wackenhut, she had served as the warden for the Saginaw Correctional Facility
in Freeland, Michigan for five years after serving as warden for almost five years
at the Western Wayne Correctional Facility in the Detroit area. One of Burke’s
first public actions was to respond to the general concern of Baldwin residents
when she stated that “The number one priority here [at the facility] is the
protection of the public” (Roelfs, 1999a, p. A1).

Burke, however was not the only MDOC veteran that was expected to be
within the walls of the MYCF. Jim Armstrong, a senior MDOC official, was
assigned to be the contract monitor for the state per the contract between
Michigan and Wackenhut. As contract monitor, Arrnstrong’s role was to oversee
that all stipulations within the contract were followed (further analysis of the
contract can be found in Chapter VI), as well as to review critical incidents within

the facility and report them to the state.

Discussion

Perhaps the strongest connection to existing theory that the information
presented within this chapter exhibits is addressed by the fourth guiding question
from Chapter II. This question addresses past research on prison placement as
described by Hallinan (2001), specifically the factors considered by political

decision makers when making their choice of a locale prime for construction.

69

Hallinan’s (2001) research suggests that the location of a facility is usually
determined by both the state’s desire to provide jobs to the unemployed in an
economically depressed area, as well as to functionally exile those incarcerated
there from their normal environment. The MYCF has, in essence, achieved both
of the above objectives.

First, from the demographic data presented earlier specific to Lake
County, there is no question that the area is one of the most impoverished in the
State of Michigan. The county’s high rate of unemployment was perceived by
the state to offer both a substantial pool of candidates that would “benefit" from
employment in the Govemor’s pet project and relieve part of the financial burden
on the state at that time to provide welfare assistance to a large portion of the
county’s residents. Unfortunately, the state’s “master plan" for economic
rehabilitation of the area was unable to be fully achieved due to the number of
local residents disqualified for positions within the facility.

Second, the functional exile of the facility’s inmates from their normal
environment was demonstrated by its large inmate population originating in the
Detroit-metro area. Hallinan (2001) found that the location of correctional
facilities is often times far removed from the area where most inmates originate.
This makes it very difficult for inmates to receive visitors that provide some social
connection and support from the “outside world.” The facility’s Lake County
location, over 250 miles from Detroit, makes such visits from family difficult and

infrequent for many, and impossible for others.

70

Irony is an integral component of the tale of the facility from a location
perspective. Specifically, the State of Michigan did not initially intend to place the
prison in Lake County, rather the Governor’s objective was to place the facility
near the Detroit-metro area precisely because the majority of its inmates would
come from that region of the state. The irony is evident in that that what began
as a campaign to place the facility near Detroit (which would have challenged the
research of Hallinan (2002) ended with its placement in a remote area riddled
with economic problems. Hallinan’s predictions were on-target.

Irony is also evident regarding prison placement from an economic
perspective. Whereas more affluent areas in the Detroit-metro area were able to
place political pressure on their representatives to keep the “punk prison out,”
Lake County was caught in a “catch-22.” On one hand, even if the county did
not want the prison to be placed there, it could not fight such plans due to its
incapacity to obtain and utilize resources necessary to do so. On the other, the
county had a dire need for the resources a prison could provide (i.e., jobs).
Either way, the county “never stood a chance.”

Plans to open the new 163,000 square foot, $40 million facility, were
accomplished on July 19, 1999 when it accepted its first 40 youths who were
transferred from the Handlon Michigan Training Unit in lonia (Detroit News, 1999,
p. B7; Grand Rapids Press, 1999). However, the operation of the facility did not
begin without problems, and has continued to face some serious obstacles along
the way including suicide attempts, prison escapes, violations of the state

contract, lack of appropriate prison staff, weeks of bad publicity, and a Michigan

71

State Senate formal investigation. These and other issues will be explored in the

following chapter.

72

CHAPTER VI
Disposition: Problems and Progress

All was not “smooth sailing” for the MYCF during its first several months of
operation. It seemed the “Governor’s baby" was “sick,” according to expose
articles written in several Michigan newspapers after the facility’s opening.
Perhaps the driving force behind these articles were reports of difficulties
Wackenhut was facing in several of its approximately 40 facilities around the
United States from New Mexico to Louisiana.

Wackenhut’s problems were not only being played out in their remote
venues, but were also reflected in their shaky start-up operations in Michigan.
The series of reports coming from the prison and plastered throughout
Michigan’s newspapers regarding heightened rates of violence and suicide
attempts, not to mention their failure to comply with the contract they signed with
the state, played out in a state inquiry into the operations on site. In addition,
debates ensued throughout the state as to whether the privatized path was a

proper one to follow in the first place.

A Series of Debacles: Wackenhut Nationwide

Was Wackenhut an appropriate choice of corrections providers to handle
some of the most difficult juvenile offenders in the State of Michigan? Several
newspapers around the state raised such concerns over several months

following the opening of the MYCF. Reports included allegations of inmate

73

sexual abuse in Texas’ Coke County facility, a Louisiana State investigation
regarding poor training, security, and rioting (Sinclair, 1999, p. D1). Also,
indictments of twelve former Wackenhut employees from the Travis County
Community Justice Center in East Austin, Texas were reported and were based
on charges ranging from sexual harassment to rape of 16 female inmates
(Kolker, 2000b, p. A20). Another Wackenhut facility that received attention in the
newspapers regarding improprieties was the Jena Juvenile Justice Center
located outside New Orleans.

In February of 1999, the United States Department of Justice released a
report that cited Wackenhut officers as demonstrating excessive force, abuse,
mistreatment, and humiliation of inmates. In the very same facility, 125
employees (officers mainly) were fired during their first year as Wackenhut
employees for having sexual relations with inmates, using excessive force,
smuggling contraband into the facility, and/or for falsifying documents (Kolker,
2000b, A20).

As if a national recognition of the WCC’s shortcomings was not enough
bad publicity for the vendor, on August 31, 1999 a riot broke out in the
Guadalupe County Correctional Facility in Santa Rosa, New Mexico. During the
incident, inmates stabbed to death a 35-year-old prison guard and set prison
property on fire - all this only one week after an inmate in the facility was killed
with a laundry bag full of rocks (Grand Rapids Press,1999b; Kolker, 2000b).
Wackenhut’s problems in New Mexico went beyond the Guadalupe riot. During

the year preceding the riot, three inmates were stabbed to death in Wackenhut’s

74

Hobbs facility in New Mexico. Furthermore, a class-action lawsuit was filed that
claimed mentally ill inmates were abused and humiliated in both previously
mentioned New Mexico facilities, in ways similar to those highlighted in
Wackenhut’s Louisiana facility (Kolker, 2000b). An organization, already bruised
and battered by public outcry and federal inquiries was about to have a similar

experience in Michigan.

Difficulties at Home: Wackenhut in Michigan

From July-October 1999, operations at the MYCF continued with seeming
placidity until Luella Burke, the facility’s first Warden, announced that she would
be retiring from her post. Ms. Burke claimed that advice from her doctor
indicated that her recovery from a surgery conducted prior to her assumption of
the position was slowed due to the strenuous nature of her job. After Burke’s
departure, Wackenhut hired David Trippett, another MDOC veteran and past
Warden of the Thumb Correctional Facility in Lapeer to take the reigns (Grand
Rapids Press, 1999). Trippett had no idea that he had just inherited what would
prove to be one of the most turbulent organizations in Michigan - one that would
be the primary focus of politicians, the public, and reporters over the coming
year.

The bomb dropped on April 30, 2000 when the Grand Rapids Press
issued their debut article, entitled Problems at “’Punk Prison’ - - ‘They’re breedin’
killers here’” that began a lengthy series regarding supposed ‘punk prison’

injustices. In the article, reporter Ken Kolker claimed that the MYCF was more

75

violent that Michigan’s six adult maximum security facilities, five prison guards
sustained serious injuries from youths housed there, and twelve suicide attempts
had occurred since the prison had opened less than a year before, and
understaffing had resulted in 70-hour workweeks (2000c, p. A1).

Although Kolker’s articles would prove to be the impetus for a State
investigation of the facility, the information he reported about the current climate
in the facility was somewhat inflated, especially regarding the suicide attempts.
In fact, some have stated that he “must have been trying to win a Pulitzer.”
Further investigation into the high number of suicide attempts at the time of
Kolker’s articles revealed that many of them could be explained not by mental
illness, but by teenage hormones.

In 1999, David W. Roush, Director of the National Juvenile Detention
Association’s Center for Research and Professional Development in cooperation
with the National Commission on Correctional Healthcare published the
Standards for Health Services in Juvenile Detention and Confinement Facilities.
In this document the “Two-Level Suicide Prevention Protocols” are outlined. The
MYCF followed these standard protocols for those youths at-risk for committing
suicide. According to the protocol for High-risk suicidal juveniles - those who
have actively attempted or threaten to immediately attempt suicide, they “should
be placed under constant watch — physically observed by staff on a continuous,
uninterrupted basis” (Roush, 1999, p. 185).

It seems as though an attractive female corrections officer had been

assigned to the medical/observation ward in the facility. The youths housed in

76

the facility quickly realized that by claiming they had thoughts of suicide, the
facility would be compelled to place the youths under observation, specifically
under the observation of the female corrections officer. Even though these
youths had no real intention of committing suicide, their claims of such were
required to be reported to the state, thus the large number of “suicide attempts.”

Kolker’s reports did not go without comment by both Trippett and the
Executive Director of the Michigan Corrections Organization (MCO), Fred Parks,
both of whom agreed that the prison was problematic, but problematic
fundamentally rather than functionally. Accordingly, Trippett offered this
explanation for the difficulties experienced within the prison:

You’ve got all these hormones. They’re active...You get a lot of
people without self-control. Adults are easier to handle. Most of
the adults, you can reason with. Here, you’re speaking to a child,
and kids are kids (2000c, p. A1).

Similar sentiments were offered by Parks who observed:

At the Punk Prison, you’ve got 300 youthful violent offenders.
Nobody is there to put a clamp on them, to set the society norms
for a prison. In other prisons, older prisoners will tell youthful
offenders to sit down, knock it off. It’s no different than having an
older brother, a parent (2000c, p. A1).

Kolker’s reports of understaffing were perhaps a little more accurate than
those regarding suicide attempts. Although it was unemployment in Lake
County, that made the location an attractive option for placement by the state,
finding minimally qualified individuals to enter correctional offer roles proved
difficult. In fact, appropriate staffing has been an ongoing problem at the MYCF

since it first opened. Several factors have contributed to this challenge. First,

the population of the facility was not attractive to large numbers of potential

77

applicants. The opportunity to supervise the most hardened of juvenile offenders
was not necessarily a dream job since they are a “real challenge, destructive,
and challenge [officers’ authority] constantly.” Second, the staff that Wackenhut
was able to procure was relatively young and inexperienced. Lastly, the pay
offered to new correctional officers, although somewhat attractive to Lake County
locals, was not necessarily enough to draw large numbers of potential employees
from greater distances.

Staffing issues at the facility became a major concern of the state early on.
By the end of April 2000 (approaching one year from its opening in July 1999) the
prison was still 120 prisoners shy of its rated capacity. The facility was
understaffed by 18 guards, and suffering from public scrutiny due to reports
emanating from within the prison’s walls of difficulties faced by its employees. In
early May it was announced that State Corrections Director Bill Martin would no
longer authorize continued transportation of new inmates to the facility until it met
the employment requirements per its contract with the state (Kolker, 2000a).
Wackenhut failed to “provide a trained and efficient work force in sufficient
numbers to ensure adequate staff coverage of both five (5) day and seven (7)
day duty posts (24 hours per day, 7 days per week, 365 days per year)," which
was stipulated in the 1999 contract between the State of Michigan and
Wackenhut (hereafter, contract). Even though the state only guaranteed
Wackenhut an occupancy level of 240 beds for the first year of operations

(Contract, 1999, §39.4), the facility was motivated to increase staffing in order to

78

increase the likelihood that they could fill additional beds and increase per-diem
payments.

Achieving adequate staffing levels was not the only issue Wackenhut was
facing during this time period. Under the contract with the state, Wackenhut was
required to provide counseling services to residents. These services were to be
provided to inmates based on their assessed needs at the time of intake to the
facility, and were to include group counseling that encompassed sex offender
therapy, as well as assaultive offender therapy. In addition, should offenders
need substance-abuse intervention, such services were to be provided (Contract,
1999, §§23.1-2). However, these programs were not being provided, or at very
least, were not provided adequately. At the time, Wackenhut’s staff of
psychological specialists included four individuals with degrees in social work,
but had established no particular curriculum or program to provide contractually
required mental-health services. Wackenhut mentioned to Kolker that it did plan
to provide these services as soon as they hired additional social workers (Kolker,
2000d).

Wakenhut’s commitment to improving the facility’s conditions of
confinement, almost one year after opening their doors, failed to buffer outside
interest. Prompted by The Grand Rapids Press reports on the conditions within
the MYCF, as well as blatant evidence of Wackenhut’s non-compliance with the
contract, the Senator William VanRegenmorter (R-Georgetown), Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, informed The Press that his committee would hold

hearings to investigate conditions at the MYCF (Kolker, 2000d).

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In quest that could be described as nothing short of muckraking, the press
around the State of Michigan continued to report statistics to the public regarding
the MYCF, such as its purported numbers of rapes, beatings, and suicides at
rates nearly three times higher than their maximum security adult counterparts
(Michigan’s Devil’s Islands, 2000). While many experts on juvenile corrections
were aware that problems were common with start-up facilities and that many of
the numbers being reported from the MYCF were either inflated, inaccurate, or
provided without necessary explanation, state politicians were called to action by
constituent pressure.

Following continued reports of difficulties within the facility, it was not
suprising that State Representative Charles LaSata (R-St. Joseph), who was
Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, claimed that he would ask for
quarterly rather than yearly reports (as required under the contract) from the
facility. In a statement to The Grand Rapids Press, LaSata said:

I am equally concerned with the safety of the corrections officers as
well as the inmates at the facility...This is an extremely important

issue. Our goal is to make sure they [Wackenhut officials] are
following the contract” (Kolker, 2000f, p. C1).

From Blunders to Business: Wackenhut Recovers

On May 19, 2000, one week after Kolker’s interview with LaSata, it was
revealed that MDOC officials had committed a blunder of their own. At that time,
it was revealed that the state had been violating its own law (1953 PA 232)
passed in 1996 that mandated that only offenders who had committed their

crimes at age 16 or younger could be housed in the MYCF until their twentieth

80

birthday. It seems as though state corrections officials had misinterpreted the
law and had been sending all “qualifying” individuals aged 19 and younger to the
facility regardless of when they committed their crime(s). In response to these
infractions, the state was forced to remove almost half of the 330 inmates housed
at the facility, and place them in other prisons run by the state (Kolker, 20009).
Although the state was required to pay Wackenhut for a “guaranteed occupancy“
of 240 beds, the removal of so many inmates was a blow to the WCC who would
not be compensated for the 110 inmate differential (from 330 to 240 inmates) due
to inmate removal and was already receiving less than the expected 200 new
inmates per year (Kolker, 20009).

In June of 2000, Governor Engler approved Public Act 211 (or 2000 PA
211). This Act revised that previously described regarding the placement of
juveniles in the MYCF. Under the new provisions, the MDOC was authorized to
house all offenders aged 19 and younger at a youth facility run by either the state
or a private vendor (MYCF included), and also required all youth offenders aged
16 and under to be housed in such a facility unless deemed in need of special
security, safety, or due to physical or mental needs (§209 (1)). Furthermore, the
Act called for the separation of youths aged 16 and under from those aged 17
and older (§209 (2)). Policy alterations specific to whom the state could house
within the MYCF were a coup for Wackenhut. With Wackenhut finding it difficult
to reach maximum occupancy (for maximum profit) under the old laws, the
passage of new laws “widened the net.” Now, there were no restrictions on

which juveniles could be sent to the MYCF enabling the state to fill the facility’s

81

differential with a significant portion of non-violent youthful offenders. What had
originally begun as a prison for the “worst of the worst” had become a prison for
some youths that were not quite the “worst.”

Following the attention the MYCF had received from lawmakers and the
press, Wackenhut spokesperson Patrick Cannan acknowledged that the facility
was a “dangerous place,” and informed The Grand Rapids Press that Wackenhut
was taking steps to improve the safety and quality of the facility. This was to be
achieved through increasing training of correctional workers, creating a Director
of Training position, formulating a specialized task-force with an Ombudsman to
address inmate complaints, creating an office of Professional Responsibility to
investigate employee misconduct, commencing anger management classes with
other forms of counseling to follow, and training 40 new guards (Kolker, 2000h, p.
A1).

In May of 2000, several Michigan lawmakers, including Senator
VanRegenmorter, toured the MYCF and seemed pleased with the steps that
WCC officials were taking to improve the prison’s conditions (Kolker, 2000i). A
little more than two months following the tour of the facility, a report from MDOC
officials to a Michigan House panel was issued that attested to the increase in
safety within the facility. Following the lifting of the previously described “new
inmate placement ban” instituted by Bill Martin in 1999, by August the MYCF was
approaching capacity with approximately 400 inmates. These inmates, as
promised by Wackenhut, were being offered sex offender counseling, a new

computer literacy program, as well as a more organized physical education

82

program (Kolker, 2000]). The prison had also managed to address those staffing
concerns that were one of the main impetuses for the placement ban.
Specifically, the facility was able to reduce average correctional officer overtime
from approximately 100 hours per month to between 32 and 64 hours (Grand
Rapids Press, 2000, p. A12).

Even more promising for Wackenhut’s future were the words of Marsha
Foresman, a state MDOC official who was in charge of ensuring Wackenhut’s
contract compliance for the state. Regarding disturbances in the prison,
Foresman said: “I am seeing the rate of criticals [critical incidents] going down as
staff matures and prisoners get more acclimated to the prison” (Grand Rapids

Press, 2000]).

The MYCF Today

The MYCF has made significant improvements in its operations over the
past three years. Granted, many of the improvements that the facility made were
already required in the contract, but they were made nonetheless. Residents at
the facility are now offered an array of counseling and therapy services including
alcohol and substance abuse therapy and sexual offender counseling. In
addition, vocational training specific to custodial management and computer
technology is offered. All residents who have not completed high school at the
time of placement are also required to obtain their Graduate Equivalency Degree
(GED) on the pain of forfeiting any personal responsibilities and privileges they

may possess. Lastly, staffing levels are currently being maintained at levels

83

adequate to sustain the population of inmates (hovering around maximum
capacity of 450). Such improvements have brought the facility into contractual
compliance.

Inmates are also encouraged to take full advantage of the library and
computing services available on site, and are given special privileges to use the
facilities during their free time should they so choose.

The facility also has a new Warden. David Trippett resigned his post in
early 2001. The reasons for his departure from the facility are twofold. First, he
originally accepted the Warden position as a “retirement job” following his years
in Michigan’s correctional system. He quickly realized that the position was more
strenuous than he had expected. Second, Wackenhut was looking for an
individual who had vision, and the ability to lead the organization into a favorable
light - they needed an individual with “fire in their belly.” Therefore, Wackenhut
hired Frank Elo, yet another past Warden from the MDOC system. Elo’s resume,
much like his predecessors, was extensive and included work at Michigan’s
Thumb Correctional Facility and the State Prison of Southern Michigan where he
served as Warden of the south complex.

Perhaps one of the greatest achievements of the facility over the past
three years has been the accreditation rating they received from the American
Correctional Association (ACA). According to the contract with the State of
Michigan, Wackenhut was required to obtain ACA accreditation within two years
of its commencement of operations. Fortunately, the facility was fully accredited

and is a source of pride for both the employees of the facility as well as the

Wackenhut Corrections Corporation. In 2001, the facility was given an
accreditation rating of over 99 percent — the highest accreditation rating of any
facility in the state.

The facility is still experiencing some “growing pains.” On March 10, 2002,
inmate Richard Nelson, convicted of murder and sentenced to the MYCF
escaped from the facility. Insiders indicated that the escape could be attributed
to a romantic relationship that had developed between Nelson and a female
corrections officer. On the morning of the 10’", the officer provided Nelson with a
pair of wire clippers and during his recreation time, out through the facility’s
fences and escaped.

Although the facility had state-of-the-art motion sensors on the fences and
monitored in the control room, Baldwin had been experiencing high winds for
several days, thus tripping off the alarms on multiple occasions. When the alarm
sounded that morning, officers assumed that it was another “false alarm.”
Fortunately, Nelson was found four hours later, outside wearing only boxer shorts
and a sweatshirt, with the wind-chill below freezing. He was apprehended

without incident (Fischbach, 2002, p. 1).

Discussion

Considering there are only seven months remaining before the state’s
contract with Wackenhut expires, and considering the recent election of
Democrat Jennifer Granholm as Governor of the State of Michigan, two
questions have yet to be asked: What is in-store for the facility as the state

transitions to a Democratic administration? Or more specifically, as outlined in

85

the fifth guiding question: IMII the conectional philosophy of the State of
Michigan shift back to a rehabilitative focus centered on decreased prison
construction and the alteration of existing legislation in a way that limits how far
the “net” is cast?

First, it seems as though the MYCF and Wackenhut are here to stay.
Inside sources have indicated that contract negotiations have already
commenced with Wackenhut for the renewal of their original contract, and that
there is little chance that the vendor would abandon or divest their significant
investment in the facility. However, both parties have undisclosed revisions they
wish to make to the existing contract. Such revisions will certainly include an
increase of Wackenhut’s current per diem set at $69.25. Should contract
negotiations be completed before Granholm takes office, her administration will
have little influence on the current operations of the facility. Ironically, with only
one month left in his position, Governor Engler may still be able to keep his
“baby” alive for at least another four years.

Interestingly, over the past year, both Republican and Democratic policy
makers have questioned whether corrections as we know it, is the preferred
methodology for addressing youthful offending. All individuals interviewed during
the course of this research have either hinted at, or plainly stated that there will
soon be a shift to a corrections philosophy aimed at prevention and rehabilitation,
thus lending credence to the pendular effect discussed previously. This shift
would support the research of Colvin (1992) and Jacobs (1977). Over the past

12 years under the Engler administration, the state has arguably operated under

86

a class society philosophy in that prison was used as a form of social control
through the limitation of individual rights (i.e., juvenile waiver statutes). By
providing the public with a new focus, politicians were able to refocus their
constituencies on the need for “get tough” measures rather than focus on the dire
economic conditions the state was experiencing.

There will also be another aim of the corrections system in the State of
Michigan - offender reentry once their time in confinement is complete. The
State of Michigan has the programmatic foundation to be one of the most
progressive systems in the country with a growing emphasis on Balanced and
Restorative Justice (BARJ). As for reentry programs focused on addressing the
needs of incarcerated youthful offenders prior to their release from confinement,
only now has the federal government recognized the need for such programs
and has begun providing grants for what could be called “holistic” approaches
toward reentry. These funds support an integrated, community-wide network of
support services to youths upon release.

With new Democratic Govemor-Elect Granholm ending the reign of the
Republican administration that lasted in excess of a decade, the steps she may
take concerning the MYCF are unclear. The most likely approach she will take
will be one of avoidance — not necessarily avoidance of juvenile justice issues in
general, but most likely avoidance of the MYCF exclusively due to it remaining a
political “hot-potato.” In fact, Granholm’s policy analysts indicated that she has
not even issued a formal position on corrections within the state, let alone one

addressing the MYCF specifically.

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CHAPTER VII

Concluding Thoughts

The information provided throughout the present research has consistently
demonstrated the influence of economics on prison construction and placement,
including the construction and placement of the MYCF. From an applied
perspective, however, how can the compilation of this data influence policy and
best practice within the juvenile justice system — especially within the State of
Michigan?

Periods of economic downturn (as explored in Chapter IV) have resulted
in both philosophical shifts regarding the general purpose of the criminal justice
system (rehabilitation versus just deserts) and dramatic increases in US prison
populations (both adult and juvenile). For a state that depends heavily on the
revenues of the automotive sector and on the employment opportunities it
provides, the recession of the early 19908 became the proverbial "straw that
broke the camel’s back” — or in this case, the state’s back. With massive layoffs
and the resultant fiscal strain on the state to provide assistance to the
unemployed, “get tough” programs including Engler’s “punk prison” became a
form of social control, or at least, a form of social distraction.

One of the most interesting findings that arose through discussions with
many of the state’s top Republican policy makers was the speed at which many
of those individuals took ownership for developing the plan for the facility.

Certainly, the MYCF cannot be attributed to any one individual’s efforts, but the

88

efforts of many in various positions and departments throughout the state. All
Republicans did affinn that this project was nothing short of a gubernatorial
mandate, and that they were charged with the responsibility of “making it
happenf

In short, the future politics revolving around the MYCF have been
described as “SCUD missile politics - one huge issue bomb.” There is currently
much philosophical dissent within the ranks of both the Democratic and
Republican parties in the State of Michigan regarding the facility, such that it has
in essence, become a non-partisan, albeit emotionally charged, issue.

Philosophically speaking, there are many individuals with considerable
political clout that have extraordinary divergent opinions about the underlying
message a prison reserved for youthful offenders sends. On the one hand,
proponents have called the facility an example of a “compassionate and realistic
approach [rather than an indicator of] ‘get tough’” measures. On the other, some
pundits have said that “we need to quit hating kids for some of the things which
some of us did in our own youths.” Granted, the latter comment was not referring
to offenses such as murder, rape, or arson. Nevertheless, the message is clear:
“our kids need to be looked at as a resource and not objects at which we express
our fear and hatred through public policy.”

Govemor-Elect Granholm has also remained distant with regard to her
views of the facility and corrections throughout the State of Michigan in general.
Although her primary focus throughout her tenure as Michigan’s Attorney

General was on matters concerning consumer protection, those seeking reform

89

of the justice system see her as being their “last ditch effort” at affecting positive
change and a movement away from many of Governor Engler's harsh initiatives
during his 12-year administration. The information provided within the pages of
the present research provides an avenue to explore several policy issues within
the State of Michigan. First, the impact of a community on the development of a
child needs to be considered. Although it has become somewhat of a cliché in
the past several years, the title of Hillary Rodham Clinton’s 1999 book, It Takes a
Village, and Other Lessons Children Teach Us, says it all. Clinton (1999) posits
that children are an investment that reaps a return equal to that which is
deposited. Positive role models, excellent education, and neighborhoods
committed to reducing crime and violence, as well as many other key ingredients,
are necessary for children to become productive members of society. When
Clinton’s book is considered in tandem with the fact that federal grants to
research and community organizations have recently focused on holistic
approaches toward the re-integration of violent offenders into the community
following the completion of their sentence, the importance of community
involvement in the well-being and development of both adults and children is a
clear message being communicated from all fronts. Those housed in the MYCF
are no different. As described earlier, their placement in Baldwin effectually
exiles them from their respective communities. Separating juveniles from their
ties to positive influences in their community - especially their families - could be
assumed to have nothing short of a devastating impact on their potential to

become productive citizens should they eventually reenter society. Therefore,

90

measures should be taken by the State of Michigan that would support, either
through complete financing or significant subsidies, opportunities for family
members of those incarcerated at the MYCF to travel to Baldwin in order to see
their relations.

Second, the importance of workforce planning became quite evident
throughout the MYCF staffing debacle. The State of Michigan, attracted to the
Lake County area due to its poor economic status, failed conduct workforce
planning activities or staffing feasibility studies. From a Human Resources
perspective, a critical analysis of Lake County’s labor market demographics may
have demonstrated the staffing difficulties the prison would have faced. These
staffing difficulties led to bad press, a state legislature inquiry, lost revenue for
Wackenhut when additional prisoners were not sent to the MYCF due to
inappropriate staffing levels, and placement difficulties for the Michigan (i.e.,
inability to send new prisoners to the site). Perhaps these past difficulties, as
well as the present staffing difficulties the prison faces, could have been avoided
had more extensive research been conducted prior to the prison site’s
determination. In the future, the ability of a locale to sustain the human
resources a prison such as the MYCF requires should be considered more
thoughtfully.

Finally, the State of Michigan should focus on alternative means to
address juvenile crime, rather than traditional incarceration approaches.
Whereas the objective of state policy makers during the 1990s was to “get tough

on crime” as cheaply as possible, future policy makers should leverage existing

91

research that advocates alternative forms of treatment for juvenile offenders. If
the true motive of governmental bodies is to reduce fiscal strain, drastic
measures must be taken in the near future to curb the ever-increasing number of
inmates — including juveniles. Legislation that concentrates on incarcerating
only those individuals that pose a real and substantial threat to society at large
therefore seems both necessary and inevitable, and would begin the cycle of
rehabilitation/just deserts anew as described by Colvin (1992) and Jacobs

(1 977).

The saving grace for reformist may not come with the fresh initiatives of
Michigan’s first female Governor. Rather, they may result from the ironic fact that
even though the state took measures to reduce fiscal strain by hiring a private
vendor to construct and operate the MYCF, such actions were insufficient as far
as the greater correctional system is concerned. Even the support that the
Republicans gave to the concept of privatized corrections based on cost savings
to the state has waned over the past three years. No longer do individuals in
Michigan address the question of public or private facilities. The question they
do address is “Can we conceivably open more facilities?” The answer to this
question seems to be a resounding “no.” Even though the 1990s saw the prison
“industry” as one defined by almost endless growth - continued growth may be
coming quickly to an and. Michigan, which is rapidly running out of prison beds,
is also practically tapped-out of funds to operate its 43 existing facilities let alone
pursue any additional construction or re-openings. Recently over 100

employees, mostly correction officers, have been laid-off due to insufficient funds

92

to maintain their positions in addition to many middle managers being demoted in
status.

Chapter VI touched on irony as being an integral component of the story
of the MYCF. Perhaps the greatest irony is the relationship between the inmate
demographics of the facility and the historic population of the Baldwin area,
specifically ldlewild Lake. The ldlewild resort in its heyday offered blacks
nationwide a place of peace, relaxation, and refuge from the social constraints
they faced in white-dominated society. Not only was the resort a mixing pot of
both the creme de la creme of black society — industrialists, scholars, and
entrepreneurs - but also blacks of average income and status. ldlewild was also
the place than many of the most famous black entertainers of the twentieth
century went to both vacation and to perform.

Idlewild’s nightclubs are gone — torn down long ago. The voices of Aretha
Franklin and Ella Fitzgerald no longer drift through the soft breeze across the
lake on warm summer nights, and Louis Armstrong is only a memory. What has
become a reality for the area is the MYCF only a few miles down the road.
Busses still do travel to Baldwin. The busses and caravans that once brought
black vacationers from the inner city, now bring black teens to the MYCF to serve
sentences for the serious crimes they have committed. What was once referred
to as a “Black Eden,” can now be considered a “Black Perdition” (Walker &
Wilson, 2002).

The story of the MYCF elicits numerous questions, and provides limited

answers. However, one thing is known for sure. Without the financial benefits

93

.. . i
0' rm .

 

 

the MYCF as part of the PIC brought to poor little Baldwin, the town may never
have experienced the joy of getting their very own McDonald’s, but that is

another American business story.

APPENDIX 1
Core Questions

1. Do you feel that the Michigan Youth Correctional Facility can attribute its
development to social pressures on politicians to “get tough” on juvenile crimes?

2. If prisons ceased to exist, or at least, further construction was halted, what
would the ramifications be to those dependent on such institutions for
employment?

3. What do you feel is in store for the Michigan Youth Correctional Facility in the
future? For Michigan’s juvenile justice system? For Michigan’s system of
juvenile corrections in general?

95

APPENDIX 2

Common Questions

1. How was Wackenhut chosen to be the private vendor? Were bids
submitted?

2. What do you feel the impetus was for choosing a private a private vendor
rather than the State Department of Corrections?

3. Do you feel that the Michigan Youth Correctional Facility faced hardships
when it first commenced operations in 1999? If so, what were they and why do
you feel they existed? Do you feel that the Michigan Youth Correctional Facility
continues to face hardships? If so, what are they and why do you feel they
exist?

4. Do you feel that the Michigan Youth Correctional Facility opened
prematurely?

5. Do you support punitive dispositions for convicted juvenile offenders? If so,
under what circumstances?

6. Do you support rehabilitative dispositions for convicted juvenile offenders? If
so, under what circumstances?

96

APPENDIX 3

Exclusive Questions

1. When did you begin work for the Wackenhut Corrections Corporation? In the
Michigan Youth Correctional Facility?

2. Do you feel that this facility is fundamentally problematic due to its inmate
composition?

3. Do you feel that the media initially sensationalized their reporting regarding
the Michigan Youth Correctional Facility?

4. When did you begin work for the Michigan Department of Corrections?

5. Did you have any involvement in formulating the “idea” of the Michigan Youth
Correctional Facility as a prison for youthful offenders? If so, in what capacity?

6. At the time that a private prison forjuvenile offenders was proposed, did you
support such an idea? Do you now?

7. Do you feel that the contract between the State and Wackenhut is adequate?

8. Did you have any involvement in the development of laws that would widen
the range of juveniles subject to prosecutorial waiver to include those 14 years
of age? If so, in what capacity?

9. Did you have any involvement in the development of laws that would allow a
private vendor to operate a prison for juvenile offenders? If so, in what
capacity?

10. Census data that compares Lake County with the State of Michigan,
indicates that the population of minorities in Lake County is disproportionately
large. Why in your opinion is this so? At what point in time, or during what
period did the increases in the minority populations become most evident?

11. Do you feel that Lake County’s high population of minorities and low-

income households contributed to the placement of the Michigan Youth
Correctional Facility in this region?

97

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