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BARE NOMINALS, FOCUS STRUCTURE, AND REFERENCE

IN GERMANIC, ROMANCE AND SEMITIC

By

Murad Salem

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis is concerned with providing a unified approach to bare nominals crosslinguistically by drawing on the properties of focus structure and word order facts. It essentially seeks to assimilate the seemingly disparate behavior of bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic (PA) and Spanish, on the one hand, and English, on the other, by conceiving of such behavior as stemming from deeper distinctions between these two language groups in the properties of focus and the differences in word order. The picture that emerges is highly restrictive and thus desirably minimizes crosslinguistic variation among these languages.

The proposed analysis argues in the first place that there is no asymmetry in the distribution of bare nominals in PA or Spanish in terms of structural positions. Relying on the behavior of determinerless nominals in the Semitic Construct State, I advance an analysis of bare nominals in the general case that views these nominals as being focalized, or non-topical. Since bare nominals in both PA and Spanish are subject only to an existential interpretation, it seems natural to predict that this analysis would carry over to existential bare nominals in English. This should in fact be the null hypothesis. The present dissertation argues for the accuracy of this prediction.

Once I have established that existential bare nominals are always focused, I set out to explain the differences observed to hold between PA and Spanish, on the one hand,

and English, on the other, in the distribution of bare nominals as emanating from deeper distinctions between these two language groups in the properties of focus and word order facts. Word order in English is generally rigid, which rules out the possibility of (de)focalizing constituents through movement. This language, therefore, has recourse to marked focus, i.e. non-contrastively focusing a sentence-internal constituent. By contrast, PA and Spanish enjoy a flexible word order system which makes prosodic movement an option at their disposal; marked focus is accordingly precluded. A bare nominal in PA and Spanish cannot be non-contrastively focused in situ, but would have to be placed in the lowest position in the syntactic tree in terms of c-command, where Nuclear Stress is assigned in these two languages. These basic differences between English, on the one hand, and PA and Spanish, on the other, translate into differences in the distribution of bare nominals.

The proposed analysis also seeks to explain why English expresses genericity via bare nominals whereas PA and Spanish lack that option. I argue that this difference can be pursued along two tracks. First, I make the assumption that generic operators in PA and Spanish cannot bind nominals in a DP with a null or empty head, whereas English generic operators can. Second, due to their focal status, bare nominals in PA and Spanish, just like their English counterparts, cannot be mapped into a restrictive clause of a generic operator. These nominals are always mapped into the nuclear scope. It is then predicted that existential bare nominals in PA and Spanish are never bound by generic operators and these languages make use of the definite article to express genericity.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.0 Overview

In recent years there has been increased interest in exploring to what extent the different branches of linguistics interface. Parallel to that there has also emerged a great body of work on the similarities and differences across languages, mainly spurred and invigorated by Chomsky's Principles and Parameters Theory (PPT) (Chomsky 1981, 1986, 1995). PPT has maintained that languages are not all that different, but that they vary across a limited number of parameters: different sounds, different words or word orders.

In the present dissertation I seek to combine both parallel lines of inquiry by undertaking a cross-linguistic study that essentially attempts to investigate an aspect of the interface between two facets of linguistic theory, namely, Syntax and Semantics. This dissertation attempts to flesh out what similarities (as well as differences) there are between apparently different languages such as Palestinian Arabic, Spanish, Italian and, of course, English, in terms of the structure of noun phrases (or, rather, determiner phrases) generally, and bare nominals (i.e. bare plurals and singular mass nouns) specifically. I attempt to ground the similarities between languages such as Palestinian Arabic, Spanish and Italian, on the one hand, in their treatment of bare nominals, and explain the differences these languages have with English, in terms of the larger framework of similarities, or differences, that hold between these languages, or language groups, in terms of focus and word order possibilities.

The focus of my attention in the current work will then be on a type of nominal that is present in many languages with distinctly varied syntax and semantics, namely, determinerless nominals or bare nominals. Upon closer scrutiny, the distinctive syntactic and semantic properties of bare nominals across the aforementioned languages, it turns out, are only surface manifestations of deeper differences between these languages in focus and word order. In other words, the variations bare nominals reveal cross-linguistically are predicted, or predictable, from the differences that set these languages apart from one another in terms of the properties of the system of focus and word order facts.

1.1 Bare Nominals: The Basic Problem

Determinerless nominals, or bare nominals, have been noted in the literature to exhibit a curious asymmetry in distribution in many languages including Italian (Longobardi 1994, 1996, 2000, 2002) and Spanish (Suñer 1982; Contreras 1986; Casielles-Suarez 1997). On the one hand, bare nominals cannot occur preverbally under normal conditions of stress; these nominals can show up in preverbal positions if, for example, they are focused. This restriction on bare nominals, it has been argued, does not hold when these nominals occur postverbally: focusing a bare nominal does not seem to be crucial, or even required, if it is not preverbal in the sentence. The supposed asymmetry just noted can be exemplified by the following sentences from Palestinian Arabic.¹

¹ The purpose of the examples in (1) and (2) in the text is strictly expository, i.e. to illustrate the alleged

- (1) a. liʕ bu wlaad fi-l-ḥadiiqa
 played-3MP boys in-the-garden
 'Boys played in the garden'
- b. *wlaad liʕbu fi-l-ḥadiiqa
 boys played-3MP in-the-garden
- c. . nizlat mayyeh min l-dʒabal
 came down-3FS water from the-mountain
 'Water came down from the mountain.'
- d. * mayyeh nizlat min l-dʒabal
 water came down-3FS from the-mountain

The descriptive generalization the examples in (1) point to is that a bare nominal has to occur postverbally, and not preverbally, in order for the outcome to be grammatical. Additionally, as the standard argument in the literature would have it, this prohibition against preverbal bare nominals is suspended or cancelled when the bare nominal occurring preverbally is *focused* (2a, 2b) , *modified* (2c), or *conjoined* (2d) (focus is indicated by capitalization):

- (2) a. WLAAD liʕbu fi-l-ḥadiiqa
 BOYS played-3MP in-the-garden
 'BOYS played in the garden.'

asymmetry in distribution as represented in the literature. I do not commit myself at this point to the correctness of the judgments concerning the grammaticality of these examples. As a matter of fact, I will be arguing in the following chapters against some of the assumptions of the very view this set of examples is said to represent.

- b. MAYYEH nizlat min l-dʒabal
 WATER came down-3FS from the-mountain
 'WATER came down from the mountain.'
- c. wlaad min l-ḥaara l-mudʒaawreh liʔbu fi-l-ḥadiiqa
 boys from the-neighborhood the-next played-3MP in-the-garden
 'Boys from the adjacent neighborhood played in the garden.'
- d. wlaad w banaat liʔbu fi-l-ḥadiiqa
 boys and girls played-3P in-the-garden
 'Boys and girls played in the garden.'

The examples in (1) and (2) represent a predicament to any approach seeking to explain or account for the distribution of bare nominals in languages such as Palestinian Arabic. How could such an approach reconcile such apparently conflicting facts? On the one hand, bare nominals are ungrammatical preverbally, grammatical postverbally, while, on the other hand, they are seemingly acceptable in either position (i.e. pre- or post-verbally) when focused, modified or conjoined.

These problematic issues have in fact remained unresolved within the many approaches offered to explain the distribution of bare nominals. For instance, Longobardi (1994) proposes to account for the asymmetry in the distribution of bare nominals (in Italian) according to their pre- and post-verbal position in terms of a lexical government requirement (see Chapter 3). Bare nominals, according to Longobardi (1994), are lexically governed in their postverbal position while they fail to fulfill this structural requirement preverbally. Descriptively, Longobardi's lexical government condition provides an explanation to the paradigm in (1). However, the paradigm of examples in (2) seems to argue against the correctness of this view that

endorses such a structural requirement.

As mentioned immediately above, the seemingly idiosyncratic behavior of bare nominals seen in (2) has in fact remained mostly an intractable problem area for (purely) syntactic approaches attempting to explain the distribution of bare nominals (Contreras 1986; Longobardi 1994; Casielles-Suarez 1997). Moreover, in attempting to provide a motivated explanation for the behavior of bare nominals generally, these approaches have inescapably posited a disjunction in their treatment of bare nominals. A theory that does not posit such a disjunction is *a priori* more preferable to one that does.

The proposal I put forward in this dissertation attempts to surmount such shortcomings while at the same time provide a motivated account of the distributional facts of bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic and Spanish, on the one hand, and English, on the other. In the next section I preview the proposal I advance in this dissertation.

1.2 The Proposal

The central claim of the current work is that there is no asymmetry in the distribution of bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic or Spanish depending on their structural position (i.e. preverbally or postverbally). These nominals are not subject to a structural requirement such as lexical government (as in Longobardi (1994)), nor should these nominals be claimed to be NPs unable to move out of the verb phrase (as in Casielles-Suarez 1997) (see Chapter 3). To the extent that such a unified account of bare nominals proves viable an important generalization will be captured in their distribution. Such a generalization should be preferable on theoretical as well as empirical grounds.

Now I would like to make my proposal a little more precise. The structural position of a bare nominal plays the crucial role in licensing the bare nominal insofar as the latter is placed in a position where nuclear stress would be assigned to it (hence, *focus*) by the Nuclear Stress Rule. Nothing actually hinges on whether the nominal is lexically governed or not as far as its licensing is concerned. To be licensed in Palestinian Arabic or Spanish, the bare nominal has to be focalized by being assigned the nuclear stress by the Nuclear Stress Rule (or else focalized contrastively).

The conception of the Nuclear Stress Rule I make use of in this work is that articulated and elaborated on by Zubizarreta (1998), or Cinque (1993). Zubizarreta (1998) conceives of the Nuclear Stress Rule as being non-monolithic, i.e. modularized. Romance differs from Germanic, according to her analysis, in that nuclear stress is assigned to a constituent in the former family of languages only if it is lowest in the syntactic tree in terms of c-command in the sentence. This stress assignment mechanism is equally operative in Germanic; however, in Germanic languages nuclear stress can also be assigned in terms of the selectional ordering of constituents in the sentence. In fact, Zubizarreta (1998) maintains that the second mechanism, although unordered with respect to the first in English, takes precedence in German.

Cinque's (1993) approach to stress assignment basically relies on the difference between neutral and marked focus. Stress assignment, by the Nuclear Stress Rule, is parasitic on the direction of syntactic recursion (i.e. the direction of the branching) in the language. Nuclear stress is assigned to the constituent that is most deeply embedded, once the direction of recursion is taken into consideration. Marked stress can be assigned to a constituent that is not in the most deeply embedded position by a 'marked

focus rule' that shifts the stress away onto the focused constituent. More about both Zubizarreta's and Cinque's analyses will be said in Chapter 5.

To reiterate, capitalizing on the role played by the Nuclear Stress Rule, as conceived of either by Zubizarreta (1998) or Cinque (1993), I argue that bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic and Spanish are only possible when assigned nuclear stress by the Nuclear Stress Rule, in a position that is the lowest in the c-command ordering (or, alternatively, most deeply embedded), which renders the bare nominal focal in the sentence. Otherwise, if the bare nominal is not in a position to be assigned stress by the Nuclear Stress Rule, the bare nominal will be contrastively focused as it occurs internal to the sentence. Therefore, I argue, bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic and Spanish, which are always subject to an existential interpretation can never be topical. This focalized status of bare nominals is crucial even if the nominal is not assigned stress by the Nuclear Stress Rule (i.e. it occurs sentence-internal). In this case the bare nominal retains its focal status but it comes out contrastively focused, rather than informationally focused. Therefore, according to my assumptions here, the examples in (1) can be recast as in (3) (nuclear stress assignment and (neutral) focalization indicated by underlining, contrastive focus by capitalization):

- (3) a. liʕ bu fi-l-ħadiiqa wlaad
 played-3MP in-the-garden boys
 'Boys played in the garden'

- b. WLAAD liʕbu (WLAAD) fi-l-ħadiiqa (miš BANAAT)
 BOYS played-3MP (BOYS) in-the-garden (not GIRLS)

c. nizlat min l-dʒabal mayyeh
 came down-3FS from the-mountain water
 'Water came down from the mountain.'

d. MAYYEH nizlat (MAYYEH) min l-dʒabal (miš BETROOL)
 WATER came down-3FS (WATER) from the-mountain (not PETROL)

To expand the empirical coverage of my main argument I show that the same analysis afforded to bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic and Spanish can be carried over to existentially interpreted bare nominals in English. English bare nominals clearly differ from their Spanish and Palestinian Arabic counterparts in that the former distribute more freely in the sentence. However, bare nominals in English that are subject to an existential interpretation, like all Palestinian Arabic/Spanish bare nominals, can also be shown to be always focal. That existentially read English bare nominals should behave like their Palestinian Arabic/Spanish counterparts seems to be the null hypothesis if cross-linguistic variation is to be kept at a minimum.

In order to illustrate that in fact the null hypothesis does hold, I examine more closely the internal structure of the Palestinian Arabic DP in order to show how exactly bare nominals in this language are deficient in the general case so as to be subject to this seemingly arbitrary restriction that they be focal in their linguistic environment. This in turn will enable us to see how an understanding of such nominals in Palestinian Arabic can enrich our understanding of bare nominals in English, too. With this goal in mind, I isolate and investigate a construction in Palestinian Arabic that is both widespread and well-studied in which *bare* nominals occur quite productively, namely, the so-called

'Construct State' (CS).² In CS constructions, interestingly enough, bare nominals occur freely, both pre- and post-verbally, and do not appear to be subject to the constraint that they be focalized. Upon closer examination, I demonstrate, along the lines of what has been standardly argued in the literature for the head N of the CS construction moving overtly into a head D position, that bare nominals occurring in this construction are not in the same structural position as bare nominals in non-CS structures occur in. I argue that nominals are unmarked or unspecified for the +/- Definiteness features, an assumption that is the more plausible when looked at from a crosslinguistic perspective. I assume further that the head D position possesses strong +/- Definiteness features that need to be checked overtly (i.e. in the syntax or before spell-out). Accordingly, bare nominals in CS constructions substitute in the head D position, thereby checking in the process the strong +/- Definiteness features of D. Bare nominals in non-CS constructions, by contrast, are unable to check those features since, by assumption, these nominals are unmarked for +/- Definiteness features (since these features are a property of the D position to begin with) and are therefore unable to move into D. Bare nominals in CS constructions, although they are equally unspecified for the +/- Definiteness features, inherit these features in CS constructions from the possessor DP obligatorily present in this structure.

It seems to follow quite expectedly, then, that the same should hold of bare nominals in English, since, by assumption, these nominals are unmarked for +/- Definiteness

² Even though the nominals that occur in Construct State constructions are morphologically identical to the bare nominals encountered generally in non-CS constructions, it will be shown that the two groups of nominals differ in the structural position they occupy in the syntactic tree. Therefore, using the term 'bare nominal' to refer to those nominals occurring determinerless in CS constructions is for ease of exposition only.

features and should be unable to substitute in the D position. English bare nominals should also be subject to the requirement that they be focalized. This, I argue, is indeed the case for existentially interpreted bare nominals in English. However, this state of affairs does not hold in the case of generically interpreted bare nominals in this language. As a possible solution to this apparent paradox I suggest that generically interpreted bare nominals can be said to move into the specifier position of a Topic Phrase since, I argue, these nominals always carry a topical feature and are never focalized. The DP in which these nominals are contained would then enter into a checking relation with a head Top(ic) from which they would inherit their topical status. These nominals, then, would be licensed in that specifier position and interpreted accordingly, as topics, hence definite. Another solution is to suggest that generically interpreted bare nominals in English may be able to substitute in D at the level of Logical Form, and are thus interpreted referentially, similar to the interpretation their DP (with the definite article) counterparts in PA and Spanish have. The claim, therefore, is that existentially-interpreted English bare nominals and generically-interpreted ones are different entities. This conclusion is not unfounded especially that other languages, such as Palestinian Arabic and Spanish, use an entirely different mechanism to express the generic use (by using the definite article) than that used to express the existential usage (via bare nominals).

The current proposal, then, fundamentally relies on the DP status of bare nominals and the way or ways in which the strong features of the D position are checked and the bare nominal is licensed. On the one hand, in CS constructions the features of D are checked by a bare nominal moving into it overtly. The bare nominal can only do that

due to the obligatory presence of a possessor DP that provides the nominal with the necessary +/- Definiteness features to land in D. The (in)definiteness of the DP in whose head position the bare nominal substitutes would then be determined by which features the bare nominal is supplied with from the possessor DP. But, what about bare nominals in non-CS constructions? To say that these nominals are only acceptable when focused is to state that focus somehow licenses these nominals, in a fashion that could be parallel, though not identical, to what we see in CS constructions. If the bare nominal is licensed in CS constructions via a possessive DP that supplies the former with the necessary +/- Definiteness features, we should then look for a licenser that performs a similar function with respect to bare nominals in non-CS constructions. I would like to suggest that focus does indeed license bare nominals in non-CS constructions and that that takes place in the following way. To focus a bare nominal is to place it in a specifier position of a Focus Projection (FP), in an obvious analogy with marking the topical status of a generically interpreted bare nominal by moving it into the specifier position of a Topic Phrase (*Cf.* Rizzi (1997)). To say that bare nominals are DPs, rather than NPs, means that the DP in which the bare nominal occurs would enter into a checking relation with an F head in a Specifier-Head configuration within the FP projection (as, I assume, the generically interpreted DP enters into a checking relation in a Specifier-Head configuration with a Top head). Since focus is inherently a means of encoding new information, it is therefore plausible to assume that focus is always indefinite.³ This indefiniteness is passed on from the F head onto its specifier via the very local

³ This does not apply to contrastive focus on definites since I argue in Chapter 4 that contrastively focused definites are more appropriately dealt with as contrastive topics, rather than contrastive foci.

relationship that holds between the two (Spec-Head configuration). The DP that contains the bare nominal is accordingly interpreted as indefinite, which is exactly the result we are looking for since bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic and Spanish are always interpreted as indefinite. Existentially-interpreted bare nominals in English would be amiable to the same analysis.

Two questions become relevant at this point. First, if existential bare nominals in English, and all bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic and Spanish, are focalized, hence subject to a uniform treatment, why should English be different in terms of the distribution of bare nominals from either Palestinian Arabic or Spanish? Second, why should English be able to express genericity by using bare nominals, while Spanish and Palestinian Arabic resort to the use of the definite article to express this usage?

As an answer to the first question, notice that what we see in the examples in (3) above is clearly different from what can be seen in their English counterparts. More precisely, stressing an element or a constituent internal to the sentence in English does not necessarily have to be interpreted as being contrastively focused, unlike what happens in both Palestinian Arabic and Spanish. English makes ample use of what Cinque (1993) calls 'marked focus' (see Chapter 5), an option unavailable for both Palestinian Arabic or Spanish. The latter two languages exploit a different strategy, namely, what Zubizarreta (1998) terms 'prosodically-motivated' movement, which moves focalized constituents to be placed inside the scope of the operation of the Nuclear Stress Rule, while at the same time displacing defocalized constituents so as not to be assigned nuclear stress by this rule. English does not have access to this strategy of prosodic movement since this language can instead utilize marked focus.

Looking at word order in English, on the one side, and Palestinian Arabic and Spanish, on the other side, it becomes quite expected and understandable that prosodic movement should be available in the latter languages but not the former. English word order is rigid, SVO for the most part. Palestinian Arabic and Spanish allow different variations or permutations, SVO, VSO, VOS, to name some. Now, since a bare nominal in both Palestinian Arabic or Spanish has to be assigned nuclear stress by the Nuclear Stress Rule in the lowest position in the syntactic tree in terms of c-command, or most embedded, it is predicted that a bare nominal in these two languages can be allowed to occur in that position, and that position only. For that nominal to occur in a different position in the sentence, i.e. sentence-internal, it can only be licensed by being contrastively focused, an interpretively distinct option . In English, on the other hand, since this language is far more constrained in terms of its word order possibilities and the consequential absence of prosodic movement, a bare nominal can be focused in situ without resorting to movement. This would in turn explain why bare nominals in this language are afforded more freedom in the sentence, relative to what we see in both Palestinian Arabic and Spanish .

As far as the second question is concerned, I make the assumption that generic operators in these two language groups, English, on the one hand, and PA and Spanish, on the other, differ in their binding possibilities. Generic operators in English can bind nominals contained in a DP whose head D is empty or null. In PA and Spanish, by contrast, this option is not available since generic operators are unable bind nominals in a DP with a null head. Therefore, these two languages have to use the definite article to express genericity. A second possible argument, which is not unrelated to my first

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assumption, is, as I argue in Chapter 4, that generically interpreted BNs in English, and generic DPs with the definite article in PA, are never foci, but always topical. I will also make the argument in Chapter 4 that when focused, these DPs turn out to be contrastive topics, rather than foci. Notice that the difference between contrastive foci and contrastive topics is a difference in the information status of the bare nominal. Contrastive foci are essentially new information, unlike contrastive topics that do not contribute new information but rather depend on their prominence in the discourse. The latter would plausibly include definite DPs, which I argue to be contrastive topics when focused, because they depend for their interpretation on their prominence and the addressee's ability to recognize them (either since they are prominent in the immediate discourse or part of the 'shared knowledge/assumptions' or 'common ground'). We can hypothesize, then, that to be interpreted generically in a sentence a BN or a definite DP have to be topical or defocalized. One way to cash out this solution is to say that when topical or non-focal a BN or a definite DP is mapped into the restrictive clause of a generic operator to be bound by that operator, a possibility which is available for English BNs. Being focal, BNs in PA and Spanish do not fit the bill, since BNs in these two languages, due to their focal status, are arguably always caught in the nuclear scope and never occur in the restrictive clause of a generic operator. Therefore, these BNs cannot be bound by generic operators.

1.3 Organization

The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows. **Chapter 2** investigates the structure of the DP in Palestinian Arabic and draws the necessary conclusions that are

also going to be pertinent to bare nominals in English. The basic working hypothesis in this chapter will be the following: by investigating the structure of the DP in Palestinian Arabic through isolating a structure in which bare nominals in this language are productively used, namely, the Construct State (CS), we will be in a better position to understand the behavior of bare nominals as they occur generally in the language. By comparing and contrasting the way bare nominals are used in the construct state to the way they are used in non-CS contexts, we are able to pinpoint more precisely the properties or features that non-CS bare nominals possess, or rather do not possess, to cause them to be 'deficient' somehow. As it turns out, non-CS bare nominals, being deprived or unmarked for (in)definiteness features, fail to be licensed in their environment since they are unable to check the strong matching Def features of the D position of the DP shell in which they occur. This very hypothesis enables us to generalize the analysis further by predicting that bare nominals in English should be 'deficient' in that respect too, a prediction that is borne out, at least with respect to existentially read bare nominals. The cross-linguistic generality of the analysis should be viewed as ultimately advantageous since it enables us to minimize cross-linguistic variation as much as possible.

In **Chapter 3** I review the relevant analyses that have been proposed in the literature as attempts to account for the seemingly idiosyncratic behavior of bare nominals. I demonstrate that these analyses fall short of providing a satisfactory and adequate account of the behavior of bare nominals and that there are important issues that remain unresolved which these analyses tend to sidestep. Among the issues that stand as problem areas for such analyses is the apparent effect focusing, modifying or

coordinating a bare nominal is said to have on the ability of the bare nominal to occur in preverbal positions. In an analysis such as Longobardi's (1994), which basically argues that a bare nominal is subject to a lexical government requirement, satisfied postverbally but not preverbally, these issues plague the analysis to such an extent that they remain as violations or exceptions to its generality.

In this Chapter I also make the relatively novel proposal that bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic and Spanish, and existential bare nominals in English, are subject to the requirement that they are focused or non-topical, a proposal that by and large achieves a higher degree of uniformity in dealing with such nominals. The problematic issues of modification and coordination that are left over from traditional analyses are not exceptions or violations according to my proposal and should not be dealt with as such.

Since I seek to expand the empirical and conceptual coverage of my claims to English, **Chapter 4** deals primarily with illustrating that existential bare nominals in this language behave in a fashion similar to their Palestinian Arabic and Spanish counterparts. The central claim in this chapter is that generic bare nominals in English are always topical, and existential ones are never so. Whether in subject or object positions, existentially interpreted bare nominals in English can be shown to be informationally (or contrastively) focalized, unlike the generic ones which always surface as contrastive topics when focused. The notion of contrast is significant here since it will be pivotal to explaining away apparent counterexamples to this hypothesis. The so-called *affective verbs*, such as *love*, *like*, *hate*, *loathe*, ...etc can take object bare nominals that can only be generically or universally interpreted but appear to be

informationally focused. I argue that the notion of contrast is part and parcel of the meaning of such predicates and the object nominals these predicates take emerge as contrastive topics, as I assume generally for generic bare nominals.

Chapter 5 attempts to derive the surface differences seen between English, on the one hand, and Palestinian Arabic and Spanish, on the other hand, in the distribution of bare nominals from deeper differences in the properties of the focus system and word order facts. If existential bare nominals in English, and all bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic and Spanish are always focal, then the differences in the distribution of these nominals between these two groups of languages must be sought in the very properties of focus, and the word order facts, in these languages. I show that since English is characterized by a rigid word order, which generally rules out word order permutations and hence signals the lack of 'prosodically-motivated' movement (Zubizarreta (1998)), focusing in situ, or 'marked focus' in Cinque's (1993) terms, in this language is possible. A bare nominal can be focused in English in a sentence internal position without coming out contrastive. This, however, is not the case in Palestinian Arabic and Spanish. A bare nominal can be informationally focused if assigned stress by the Nuclear Stress Rule in the lowest position in the syntactic tree in terms of c-command or in the most deeply embedded position. To focus a constituent that is internal to the sentence would only result in contrastive focus. Therefore, or perhaps as a result, prosodically-motivated movement is possible in these languages, a possibility made available by the rich and flexible word order possibilities that characterize both Palestinian Arabic and Spanish. It is therefore predicted, the chapter concludes, that bare nominals in these two languages would exhibit a limited freedom of distribution, unlike

what we see in English where bare nominals are more freely distributed.

In this chapter I also take up the issue of how exactly focus can license bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic and Spanish, and existentially read bare nominals in English. I argue that these nominals move into the specifier position of a Focus Phrase to enter into a checking relationship with the head F of that projection, thereby inheriting the features necessary to be licensed and interpreted.

Another finding of this Chapter concerns reference in the two language groups under consideration. Bare nominals in English can be used in generic sentences; however, both Palestinian Arabic and Spanish use the definite article to express this usage. I suggest that this difference has to do with the binding properties of generic operators in these two language groups and also from the focal status of bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic and Spanish.

Finally, in **Chapter 6** I conclude this dissertation by delineating the assumptions and the findings of the analysis argued for in this work. Moreover, areas that could be candidates for further future research that could enrich and expand on the findings of the current work, are alluded to in this chapter.

Before I move on to considering the structure of the DP in Palestinian Arabic in Chapter 2, I would like to point out that I assume in this work the Principles and Parameters theory, as in Chomsky (1986), and as amended and expanded on in Chomsky's Minimalist Program (1995).

Chapter 2

The Internal Structure of the DP in Palestinian Arabic

2.0 Introduction

Understanding the behavior (or *misbehavior*, as some researchers prefer to dub it) of bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic necessitates the understanding of the internal workings and structure of the Determiner Phrase (DP) in this language. Ideally, we should be able to find a structure that involves the use of bare nominals, but in which these nominals exhibit a distinct behavior and play a role markedly different from that they would otherwise play in the language in the general case. Palestinian Arabic provides us with precisely that opportunity for there exists in this language, as is the case with other varieties of Arabic including the Standard variety, a construction whose properties could potentially provide us with a deeper understanding of the characteristic behavior of bare nominals generally. This construction is the *Semitic Construct State*. In this chapter I take a closer look at the construct state in Palestinian Arabic with the ultimate goal of shedding light on why bare nominals in this language behave the way they do.

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In § 1.1 I will set the stage by giving some descriptive preliminaries about the Semitic Construct State. § 1.2 is mainly concerned with illustrating that *bare* nominals participate freely in the Semitic construct state. In § 1.3 I argue that the strict adjacency presumed to hold between the head noun of a construct state and its genitive argument/possessor does not always hold. In the same section I also argue that there is some evidence to show that the definite article in

Arabic, which is presumably an affix, can be separated from the head it is affixed to. § 2, with its different subsections are dedicated to a preview and a brief critique of primarily two major approaches proposed in the literature to account for the peculiarities of the construct state. In § 2.2.3 I present the analysis of the construct state I will be adopting in this work. § 2.2.4 deals with the behavior of bare nominals outside of the construct state environment. I also show in this section how an understanding of the behavior of bare nominals in the construct state can enable us gain a better understanding of bare nominals in the language generally. I propose that (bare) nominals in Palestinian Arabic are unspecified for (in)definiteness features and that what the construct state environment does is help endow nominals occurring within such a context with the necessary feature value. § 3 and its subsections investigate the possibility of extending this analysis to bare nominals in English. I demonstrate in this section that the analysis argued for in the present work helps us achieve a restrictive account of the surface differences exhibited by apparently different languages, namely, (Palestinian) Arabic and English. § 4 is the conclusion.

2.1 The Construct State: The Basic Properties

As noted in the introduction, to attempt an investigation of the behavior of bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic (henceforth, PA), and their distribution in particular, understanding the structure of the Arabic DP is a prerequisite. To gain a good understanding of the Arabic DP one would perhaps be well-advised to examine a certain structure that has aroused much interest and has been widely investigated by many researchers, namely, the synthetic genitive possessive or, as is commonly referred to in

the Afro-Asiatic literature, the Construct State (CS) (see, among others, Ritter (1988, 1991), Fassi Fehri (1999), Siloni (1994, 1996, 1997), Longobardi (1996), Borer (1999), Dobrovie-Sorin (2000), Danon (2001), and references cited there).

The construct state is a highly productive construction in Semitic languages such as Arabic and Hebrew (see Longobardi (1996) for an attempt to argue that traces of such a construction are also present in Romance as well as Germanic). A cursory look at the works mentioned above would suffice to show that the CS has a number of well-documented, well-defined characteristics and the attempt in these works has been to try to account adequately for these characteristics. These characteristics include the following:

- (1) a. The head N occurs first in the construction which has been argued to be a DP.
- b. The head N carries the Case assigned to the whole DP.
- c. An obligatory genitive argument/DP (or possessor) that carries genitive Case follows N.
- d. The head N lacks the (definite) article (whether the head N is interpreted as definite or indefinite).
- e. The head N is interpreted as definite or indefinite depending on the (in)definiteness of the genitive argument or possessor (*(in)definiteness inheritance*).
- f. The head N must be adjacent to the genitive argument.

I illustrate these properties with the following examples from PA:

- (2) a. *beet* *(z-zalame)
house the-man
'the man's house'
- a'. *beet* *(zalame)
house man
'a man's house'
- b. (*l)-*beet* z-zalame
(the)-house the-man
- b'. (*l)-*beet* zalame
(the)-house man
- c. *beet*-M (*l-kbiir-MS) l-mara l-kbiir-MS
house (the-big) the-woman the-big
'the woman's big house'
- c'. *beet*-M (*kbiir) mara kbiir-MS
house (big) woman big
'a woman's big house'
- d. dʒaaʔizit l-walad ʔilli ribiħ-a fi s-sibaag
prize-FS the-boy that won-3MS-3FS in the-race
'the boy's prize that he won in the race'
- d'. dʒaaʔizit walad ribiħ-a fi s-sibaag
prize-FS boy won-3MS-3FS in the-race
'a boy's prize (that) he won in the race'

(2a) above is an example of a definite construct state construction whereas (2a') is an instance of an indefinite CS. These two examples illustrate properties (1a) and (1c) as can be seen from the initial placement of the head N *beet* 'house' (property (1a)) and the resulting ungrammaticality if the genitive argument is omitted (property (1c)).¹

¹ The relevant examples in the text would be acceptable with the deletion of the genitive argument, but they would no longer be instances of CS. Once the genitive argument is deleted the examples would merely be bare singular nouns with no understood possessive reading.

Examples (2b) and (2b') illustrate property (1d), i.e. the ungrammaticality of a definite article with the head N, whether the latter is definite or indefinite. As for (2c) and (2c'), these examples illustrate (in)definiteness inheritance (property (1e)) where we see in (2c) and (2c') that a modifying adjective (*l-kbiir* 'the-big' or *kbiir* 'big') of the head noun *beet* 'house' agrees with the head it modifies in definiteness or indefiniteness, respectively.² In other words, the (in)definiteness of the head N is parasitic on the (in)definiteness of the genitive argument. This is further illustrated in (2d) and (2d') with a modifying relative clause. In (2d) a definite relative clause modifies the head N that is followed by a definite genitive argument. The complementizer *?illi* 'that' only appears when the modified head N carries a definiteness feature; its absence in (2d') is then expected since the head N *dʒaa ?izit* 'prize-FS' is indefinite (by virtue of having an indefinite genitive argument *walad* 'boy'). Finally, (2c) and (2c') illustrate property (1f) above (i.e. strict adjacency): a modifying adjective of the head noun obligatorily shows up at the right edge of the CS construction after the genitive argument and not after the head noun. Notice that it is certainly possible to modify both the head noun and the genitive argument, resulting in a nesting structure that could potentially give rise to ambiguity if the agreement features were to overlap as in (3):

(3) *dʒaa?izit*-FS *l-binit* *l-kbiire*-FS *l-ħilwe*-FS
prize the-girl the-big the-beautiful

² Note that adjectives in PA agree with the head they modify in gender, number, Case (see the proviso in the text concerning Case in PA) and (in)definiteness. In the case of (in)definiteness the agreement will be marked syntactically by the presence (definite) or the absence (indefinite) of the article *l-* 'the.' Note also that PA does not have an indefinite article.

'the prize of the beautiful, big girl'
'the big girl's beautiful prize'
'the girl's beautiful, big prize'³

It can be noted from the preceding discussion that the property (1b) is not illustrated by any of the examples in (2) since morphological Case is not realized on nominals in PA, unlike standard Arabic that exhibits a rich pattern of Case and Case agreement on nominals and their modifying adjectives. I assume that Case is abstract in PA.

2.2 Plurals in Construct State Constructions

A property of the construct state that does not normally get mentioned, and which will prove of great interest to my main concerns in this work, is that the head noun in CS constructions is not restricted to the class of singular nominals in PA. Plural nominals can occur freely as head nouns of the CS and these plurals adhere quite closely to the set of rules, or properties, characterizing CS constructions with singular head nouns mentioned in (1) above. Most importantly, these plural nominals can, and, in fact, have to, appear bare in the head position of the construct state as a consequence of (1d)

³ I find the fourth logical possibility in (i) extremely marginal at best, downright ungrammatical at worst:

(i) 'the big prize of the beautiful girl'

This possibility is not realized if we follow Fassi Fehri (1999) (who follows Cinque 1996) in assuming that adjectives are generated in the specifier position of the head they modify. This being so, *l-kbiire* 'the-big' in (i) has to be generated in Spec position of the head N *dʒaa ʔizit* 'prize.' The possessor *l-binit* 'the-girl' would be generated in a position higher than both of the head N *dʒaa ʔizit* and its modifying adjective, and *l-ħilwe* 'the-beautiful' in a position higher yet than the possessor *l-bint*. Assuming then movement of N to a higher functional head (D, see below in the text), and the possessor to a position higher than both adjectives but lower than the head N, this order for the modifying adjectives with the reading in (i) would not be possible (see Fassi Fehri (1999) for details and execution of movement operations). Note also that in the second possibility in the text (namely, *the big girl's beautiful prize*) the adjective *beautiful* would be read predicatively, rather than attributively (meaning, *the big girl's prize which is beautiful*).

above.⁴ This latter fact concerning the head of construct state will turn out to be a crucial element in our attempt to understand the overall behavior of bare nominals in general.

For concreteness, consider the following examples:

(4) a. (*l-) byuut (*l-gadiime) l-zalame (l-gadiime) inħaragu-MP
 (the-) houses (the-old) the-man (the-old) burned
 'The man's old houses burned'

b. (*l-) byuut (*gadiime) zalame (gadiime) inħaragu-MP
 (the-) houses (old) man (old) burned
 'Old houses of a man burned'

(5) a. ħakeet maʕ (*l-) Tullab (*z-ʔaar) l-madrased (z-ʔaar)
 spoke-1S with (the) students (the-young) the-school (the-young)
 'I spoke to the young students of the school'

b. ħakeet maʕ (*l-) Tullab (*ʔaar) madrase (ʔaar)
 spoke-1S with (the-) students (young) school (young)
 'I spoke to young students of a school'

(4) and (5) with plural heads illustrate the properties of the construct state mentioned in (1) above. Above all, these examples serve to show that the singular-plural distinction is of no consequence as far as the construct state structure is concerned. These examples also illustrate that there are no structural restrictions on the placement of the construct state. In (4) the CS occurs preverbally while it is a prepositional object occurring

⁴ However, as will be seen later on in the text, bare plurals/singulars in the CS are not in the same structural position they are normally in in non-CS constructions. Therefore the notion of *bareness* here has to be understood in this context and in these terms. Perhaps *determinerless* would be a more appropriate way of referring to nominals in CS constructions. I will still keep using *bare nominals* for ease of reference.

postverbally in (5).

2.3 Strict Adjacency in the Construct State

Since the goal of this chapter is to explore the internal structure of the DP, in this section I would like to make a brief digression to discuss a fact concerning one of the properties of the CS constructions that, to my knowledge, has not received enough attention in the literature. It has been noted earlier that one of the characteristics of CS constructions is the strict adjacency between the head noun occurring initially in the structure and the genitive argument (or possessor) following it. The question that can be raised at this point is the following: does this supposed adjacency hold all the time or is it only a condition regulating the positioning of modifying adjectives alone? As it turns out, this supposed condition of strict adjacency on CS constructions does not seem to hold all the time. Consider the following examples from PA:

- (6) ḥakeet maʔ Saahib-M ṭalaṭ bnuuk-MP (maʕhuuriin-MP)
spoke-1S with owner three banks (famous)
'I spoke to an owner of three famous banks'

- (7) ḥakeet maʔ Saahib-MS (*muḥtaram) ṭalaṭ bnuuk-MP (muḥtaram-MS)
spoke-1S with owner (respected) three banks (respected)
'I spoke to an owner of three banks'

The state of affairs (6) seems to point to is the following: strict adjacency of the head noun and the genitive DP may be broken by a numeral modifying the genitive DP.⁵

⁵ A question here arises regarding the difference between attributive modifying adjectives and numerals in

Note also that the fact that the numeral occurs between the head N and the genitive DP does not interfere with latter's ability to be modified by an adjective exhibiting the usual pattern of (in)definiteness agreement. *ma řhuuriin-MP* 'famous' in (6) modifies the genitive DP *bnuuk* 'banks' and it agrees with it in indefiniteness (and gender and number). (7) shows that the head N can also be modified by an adjective but the latter would more plausibly be read as predicative, rather than attributive.

A similar, though not identical, state of affairs can be observed with examples involving definite CS constructions as in (10). First, however, note that recursion is possible in construct state structures as in (8). It can be further noticed that the definite article attaches only to the last genitive phrase in the string:

(8) *saTiħ-M (*l-)beet (*l-)Saaħib l-bank (l-gadiim-M)*
 roof (the-)house (the-) owner the-bank (the-old)
 'the (old) roof of the bank owner's house'

(9) *ħakeet mař Saaħib l-bnuuk-MP (l-ma řhuuriin-MP)*
 spoke-1S with owner the-banks (the-famous)
 'I spoke to the owner of the famous banks'

terms of their ability to interrupt the strict adjacency between the head N and the genitive phrase. Numerals can occur medially between the head N and the genitive DP. Modifying adjectives, on the other hand, can never interrupt the adjacency seen between the head N and the genitive DP. The question takes *on* more weight if we regard numerals as (attributive) modifying adjectives. Note, finally, that modifying *adjectives* cannot generally occur prenominal, i.e. before the head N (*cf.* Fassi Fehri 1999). For a suggestion, see below in the text.

- (10) *ħakeet maʕ Saaħib l-θalaθ bnuuk-MP (l-maʕħuuriin-MP)*
 spoke-1S with owner the-three banks (the-famous)
 'I spoke to the owner of the three famous banks'
- (11) * *ħakeet maʕ Saaħib θalaθ l-bnuuk-MP (l-maʕħuuriin-MP)*
 spoke-1S with owner three **the**-banks (the-famous)
- (12) *ħakeet maʕ Saaħib-M (*l-muħtaram) l-θalaθ bnuuk (l-muħtaram-M)*
 spoke-1S with owner (the-respected) the-three banks (the-respected)
 'I spoke to a (respected) owner of three banks'

If recursion is possible in CS definite constructions with the whole construction taking on a definite reading, provided that the definite article obligatorily attaches to the last genitive DP in the string, then what should we make of the status of example (10) and its ungrammatical counterpart (11)? Descriptively, what we have in (10) is a head N *Saaħib* 'owner' occurring initially as is customary in CS constructions, followed by a numeral *θalaθ* 'three' carrying the definite article *l-* 'the' and a genitive DP *bnuuk* 'banks' occurring finally in the string. Mysteriously, the genitive phrase fails to carry the definite article, as is expected with a recursive string, and (11) is consequently ungrammatical; however, (10) is perfect and is still interpreted as definite as witnessed by the fact that the agreeing adjective *l-maʕħuuriin* 'the-famous' carries the definite article obligatorily. In fact *l-maʕħuuriin* 'the-famous' agrees with the genitive phrase in definiteness, gender, and number. In other words, the whole construct state is interpreted as definite since the genitive phrase is definite. This is further illustrated in (12) where the adjective *l-muħtaram* 'the-respected,' which is interpreted as predicated of *Saaħib*

'owner,' carries the definite article.

The discussion immediately above shows that a numeral (or, NumP) can occur between the head N and the genitive phrase. In fact, the sentences in (8)-(12) seem to point to a stronger observation: If (9), repeated here as (13), is a typical example of a definite CS construction, in which the article attaches to the genitive phrase, then (10), repeated as (14), illustrates a case where adjacency is not even observed between the definite article *l-* 'the' and the nominal it attaches to, *bnuuk* 'banks'.⁶ In other words, the definite article in PA requires the same treatment afforded to the definite article in English:

- (13) *ħakeet maʕ Saahib l-bnuuk-MP (l-maʕhuuriin-MP)*
spoke-1S with owner the-banks (the-famous)
'I spoke to the owner of the famous banks'

- (14) *ħakeet maʕ Saahib l-θalaθ bnuuk-MP (l-maʕhuuriin-MP)*
spoke-1S with owner the-three banks (the-famous)
'I spoke to the owner of the three famous banks'

⁶ Aside from their use in CS constructions, numerals such as *θalaθ* 'three', *tisʕa* 'nine' ...etc cannot ordinarily combine with a definite nominal as in (i), but with indefinites as in (ii). This could be due to the fact that a numeral combining with a definite nominal in PA indicates a partitive reading, a reading only possible to express with definites using a preposition as in (iii). The numeral can also modify a definite nominal without triggering a partitive reading but in this case the numeral occurs postnominally as in (iv). However, I think that the point in the text concerning the lack of adjacency still stands.

- (i) **θalaθ l-wlaad*
three the-boys
(ii) *θalaθ wlaad*
three boys
(iii) *θalaθ min l-wlaad*
three of the-boys
(iv) *l-wlaad l-θalaθ*
the-boys the-three

Before bringing the present discussion to a close a word on the difference between numerals and attributive adjectives in CS constructions, as noted in fn. 5, is in order. That strict adjacency between the head N of the construct state and its genitive phrase can be interrupted by a numeral, but not an attributive adjective, could be a consequence of where in the base structure numerals and attributive adjectives are generated. Following Fassi Fehri (1999), who follows Cinque (1996), I assume that adjectives are generated in the specifier position of the head noun they modify before the latter moves to an initial position.⁷ The genitive phrase/possessor would raise, as will be explained shortly, to a position higher than all adjectives but lower than the head N. The numeral, on the other hand, would be generated in NumP, a projection the discussion above has showed to project optionally between the head N and the genitive phrase.

To sum up, the discussion in this section has basically helped illustrate two points: first, strict adjacency between the head N of the construct state and the genitive phrase is not always required, or necessarily observed. At least one projection has been

⁷ Fassi Fehri (1999) makes the claim that Arabic is, like English, and A-N (Adj-N) language where adjectives occur prenominal in the base position and are placed postnominally as a consequence of the noun moving leftward. He first draws attention to the fact that adjectives in (Standard) Arabic are generally postnominal, rather than prenominal. He then points out (1999: 108) that postnominal adjectives in Arabic observe the mirror image ordering (MIO) of prenominal adjectives in an A-N language (like English) (for example, object adjectives have the ordering *quality* > *size* > *shape* > *color* > *provenance* in Germanic, but the MIO in Arabic). This could be indicative of the prenominal origin of Arabic adjectives and the movement of the head N. Second, purely attributive adjectives in English (as in *the alleged murderer*), which show up prenominal, can be shown to fail the predicativity test in Arabic as in (i):

- (i) * l-qaatil-u maz'uum-un
 the-killer-nom alleged-nom
 'the killer is alleged'

This shows that although the adjective occurs postnominally in Arabic it is still attributive. So, postnominal positioning of the adjective is not indicative of predicativity. Third, according to Fassi Fehri (p. 112) prenominal adjectives do exist in Arabic as in (ii):

- (ii) ?akal-tu ladiida t-ta'aam-i
 ate-I delicious-acc the-food-gen
 'I ate the delicious (of the) food.'

shown to occur between the position in which N sits and the projection containing the genitive phrase, namely, a NumP. The second point our discussion has attempted to bring out is that adjacency can be broken between the definite article in PA and the nominal it attaches to.

2.4 The Construct State Analyzed

Accounting for the properties of the construct state listed in (1) has been a matter of considerable debate among researchers. One common thread between the numerous approaches to the construct state is that the surface position of the head N is a derived one and the whole structure is a DP. Another point of agreement has been that the head N raises to D. However, disagreement is the common theme among researchers when it comes to trying to account for the other properties. In what follows I will attempt a brief, yet somewhat critical, overview of two approaches to construct state in Fassi Fehri (1999) and Longobardi (1996). Whenever relevant, mention will also be made to other analyses.

2.4.1 Fassi Fehri (1999)

Fassi Fehri (1999) adopts a 'split' or 'fissioned' DP structure in order to account for the behavior of the construct state in Standard Arabic. In such a structure Case and Def(initeness) are assigned by separate D heads in the DP. It is assumed in this system that movement occurs for both the head N in the construct state as well as the

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possessor.⁸ However, the target and the motivation for movement in both cases is different. Therefore, the example in (15) from Standard Arabic would be represented by the syntactic tree in (16) ((15) is his example (53a) and the tree representation is his (56)) (I have taken the liberty to add onto the original tree from Fassi Fehri since some projections or their heads are not very clear in his original structure. The lower section of the tree, however, that includes the np projections, is not very clear to me from his formulation):⁹


- (15) ḥtaraqa-t daar-u r-rajul-i l-waas'a-t-u
 burned-fem house-nom the-man-gen the-large-fem-nom
 'The man's large house burned.'

⁸ Fassi Fehri (1999: 121) claims that adjectives move in Arabic due to the richness of their inflectional properties and that these features on the adjectives are checked against matching features in a DP domain. He argues that adjectives "target DP, to check their agreeing Case, article, and phi-features against those of a higher functional head, which could arguably be (a segment of) D" (*ibid*). He then "designate[s] this D with a small d, for ease of reference, giving this notation no theoretical content" (*ibid*). The claim, then, is that adjectives move to a dp projection containing Agr(eement) features. For Fassi Fehri, one piece of evidence for movement of APs in Arabic is the placement of adverbial modifiers of adjectives as in (i):

(i) l-axbar-u l-mudaa'u mu?axxar-an
 the-new the-broadcast late-acc
 'the lately broadcast news'

He points out (p. 122) that assuming a modifying adverb is generated in the specifier position of the AP it *modifies* then the positioning of the AP before the adverbial results from the presumed movement of the AP across the former.

⁹ It is not very clear in Fassi Fehri's analysis what the status of *np1* (or *np2*) is .



The basic intuition behind Fassi Fehri's analysis is that movement, or raising, occurs for both the head N and the possessor DP, but that movement is triggered in each case for different reasons. Since the head N inherits its definiteness or indefiniteness from the possessor, then it is reasonable, according to Fassi Fehri (1999: 127), to say that the possessor raises to check the strong Def features of a head D (D_1 , in his analysis), by moving in the specifier position of DP_1 . However, since it has been argued in the literature that the head N moves or raises to a head D position, then the position to which N moves has to be another D position, hence the *fissioned* or *split* structure Fassi Fehri argues for. But, Fassi Fehri contends, if the possessor moves to [spec, DP_1] to check the strong Def features of D_1 , then it follows that the position to which N raises, namely, D_2 , could not contain Def features to be checked, because the latter features are a property of D_1 .

The trigger for movement of N to D_2 , Fassi Fehri points out, would then be the

strong Case features of the D_2 position. The head N would then raise to check the strong Case features of that position against its own Case features. The head N would then inherit the Def features from the possessor by adjoining to D_1 on its way to D_2 . Recall that the possessor in Fassi Fehri's analysis sits in a Spec-Head configuration with D_1 (i.e. sits in the specifier position of DP_1) and the definiteness value of the possessor would be passed on to D_1 to be picked up by the head N on its way to D_2 . This would explain the dependence of the head N in its definiteness specification on the possessor.

Fassi Fehri further argues that the correctness of this fissioned or split structure is reinforced by the observation that in some cases the possessor does not move and therefore definiteness inheritance does not take place. The following examples are used to illustrate his point (his 58a and b):

- (17) haaðaa ʔax-ii wa haaðaa (ʔayDa-an) ʔax-ii
 this brother-mine and this (also) brother-mine
 'This is my brother and this is (also) my brother.'

- (18) haaðaa bayt-u r-rajuli wa-haaðaa (ʔyD-an) bayt-u r-rajul-i
 this house-nom the-man-gen and-this (also) house-nom the-man-gen
 'This is the man's house and this is (also) the man's house.'

If definiteness is understood in terms of either familiarity or individual or unique reference then the example in (18) does not fulfill either since it is used predicatively and non-referentially. This means, Fehri suggests, that construct state constructions do not necessarily have to realize individual reference, hence definiteness. He takes this to mean that in indefinite construct state constructions the possessor does not move.

However, he reasons, the head N has to move independently whether the possessor

moves or not since the former has to check the strong Case features of D₂. This provides the evidence needed to support such split structure.

I believe that Fassi Fehri's analysis unnecessarily differentiates between the derivation of definite and indefinite construct state constructions. Furthermore, it seems to me that his argument concerning the examples in (17) and (18) above does not hold. What seems to be relevant in the examples in (17)-(18) for Fehri is in fact semantic definiteness, and not syntactic definiteness (see Danon 2001 for arguments and distinction between syntactic and semantic definiteness in Hebrew (construct state, in particular)). It can be demonstrated that syntactic definiteness does hold in the examples under discussion if we assume (as Danon (2001) does) that adjectival modification constitutes a good test for checking for such definiteness. Consider, in fact, how modifying adjectives have to obligatorily carry the definite article in the relevant examples above. I demonstrate this observation with examples from PA where the same facts hold.¹⁰

(19) haaða ʔax-uy z-zʔiir w haaða ʔax-iuy l-ikbiir
 this brother-1S the-young and this brother-1S the-old
 'This is my young brother and this is my old brother.'

(20) haaða beet z-zalame l-idʒdiid wa-haaða beet z-zalame l-gadiim
 this house the-man the-new and-this house the-man the-old
 'This is the man's new house and this is the man's old house.'

¹⁰ Fassi Fehri does mention that the lack of individual reference, and therefore definiteness, holds when no adjectival modification is involved. The fact still remains that adjectival modification has to carry the definite article which can be taken as a sign of syntactic definiteness via agreement with the head noun in the CS. Syntactic definiteness is the relevant notion here, not semantic definiteness, as Fehri implicitly assumes.

Therefore, in indefinite CS constructions, the absence of the definite article on a modifying adjective should be taken as agreement in indefiniteness as in the following example from PA:

(20') haaḏa beet zalame dʒdiid/*l-idʒdiid
this house man -new / thenew
'This is a man's new house'

As seen in (19) and (20) syntactic definiteness is realized on the head N and the agreeing adjective. The definiteness feature in Fehri's system is a formal feature (in the sense of Chomsky 1995) that is not interpretable at LF and therefore has to be checked before spell-out. I believe that it is the correct intuition to look at definiteness as a formal feature, as Fehri does, that is visible in the syntax. This means that the only type of definiteness that is, and in fact should be, relevant in construct state constructions is syntactic definiteness that is discharged via feature checking, but not semantic definiteness.

What has been said so far renders suspect a system that posits movement for definite CS constructions while denying such movement for indefinites. It appears more theoretically appealing in light of the empirical evidence to treat construct state constructions, whether definite or indefinite, as a unified phenomenon that calls for a unified approach.

As noted above in § 1.2, (bare) nominals can occur as heads in CS constructions. In terms of the present system this means that these nominals raise to D₂ overtly for Case purposes. That the possessor, as argued by Fassi Fehri, does not raise/move in indefinite

construct state constructions means that movement of N to D₂ is taken to be independent of raising the possessor. A question here arises concerning bare plurals in non-CS constructions: if the possessor plays no role in the (overt) raising of N to D, thus exhibiting the well-known feature (1d) above (*no definite article*), what prevents bare nominals in general in non-CS constructions from raising overtly to D if Case is the driving force for such movement? That bare nominals in non-CS constructions do not exhibit property (1d) of the construct state, and therefore cannot be said to raise (overtly) to D, is illustrated in (21a) contrasted with the CS-sentence in (22):

- (21) a. ʔadʒ-u (l-) wlaad
 came-3MP (the) boys
 ' (The) Boys came.
- (21) b. ʔadʒ-u (*l-) wlaad l-dʒiraan z-zʔaar
 came-3MP (the) boys the-neighbors the-young
 'The neighbors' young boys came.'

The argument concerning (21a) and (21b) has two parts. First, the bare plural *wlaad* 'boys' in the non-CS sentence in (21a) should be read as definite if the bare plural in this case truly moves into the D position. However, *wlaad* 'boys' in (21a) can only have an indefinite reading (if the definite article is not realized on N). On the other hand, *wlaad* 'boys' in the CS-sentence in (21b) is in fact read as definite as witnessed by the modification by the adjective *z-zʔaar* 'the-young' which carries the definite article.

Secondly, the definite article can be lexically realized with the bare plural in (21a), but, expectedly, it cannot show up with the nominal in the CS-sentence in (21b). This further

indicates that whereas *wlaad* 'boys' in (21b) sits in the D position, *wlaad* in (21a) does not.

If the possessor plays absolutely no part in facilitating N-movement to take place then we cannot account for this striking difference in the behavior of essentially identical nominals. What would prevent the bare nominal in non-CS-constructions from raising to D if checking the strong Case features of that position is the trigger of such movement? (Actually, the nominal would have to raise obligatorily in this scenario to check Case, if Case was truly the relevant feature). It is perhaps the wrong assumption to presume movement of the head N for Case checking since bare plurals and singulars in non-CS constructions do not exhibit the same movement operation as (21a) clearly illustrates. I therefore conclude that it may be wrong to assume that raising of the head nominal to D can be independent of the raising of the possessor to some higher projection below D. The movement of head N in the construct state seems to be strongly parasitic on (the movement of) the possessor, and (in)definiteness inheritance and the lack of the definite article on the head N in D are symptomatic of this strong relationship between the pair.

Summing up, Fassi Fehri's account misses the mark by assuming that indefinite construct state constructions do not involve raising of the possessor. It does not seem correct either to assume that raising of N is independent of, and separate from, raising of the possessor. By making this latter assumption we lose a uniform treatment of (bare) plural nominals (and singular nominals) that would otherwise be preferred. Finally, Case cannot be the motivation for N-raising since this assumption would not help us understand why bare nominals generally in non-CS constructions fail to raise to D.

I will next look at an approach argued for in Longobardi (1996) that makes a different set of assumptions than those made in Fassi Fehri (1999).

2.4.2 Longobardi (1996)

Longobardi (1996) is an attempt to parameterize the existence of the construct state cross-linguistically. He argues that Romance and Germanic exhibit N to D raising (in a class of lexically restricted words in Romance, unrestricted in Germanic), overtly in the former covertly in the latter, that results in a non-prepositional genitive similar to the construct state in Semitic. Longobardi attempts to offer a parametric approach for Romance, Germanic, and Semitic that would deduce as a property of Universal Grammar the following descriptive generalization (1996: 6):

- (22) Movement of a common noun to (an empty) D is licensed only if an overt or understood genitive argument is realized (in other words, if a corresponding argument role is somehow discharged)

Longobardi shows that Romance exhibits overtly a variant of Semitic construct state with a very limited stock of lexical items such as *casa* 'home.' However, the Romance construct state differs from that of Semitic in disallowing plural head nouns, disallowing modification by a restrictive relative clause, and by rigidity of designation and transparency as in the case of proper nouns.

Longobardi (1994) has also argued for such movement of N to D, overt in Romance and covert in Germanic. In the case of Romance, this movement has been restricted to

proper nouns. A fundamental claim he makes in this work is that raising to D only affects proper nouns at S-Structure in Romance while raising of common nouns is not possible at this level. This is due to the need to check a +/- R(eferential) feature of D (to achieve direct reference via substitution into D as in the case of proper nouns).

However, languages such as Romanian exhibit a productive system of raising common nouns to D at S-Structure which is unexpected in Longobardi's system. In order to rescue his assumption that no S-Structure movement of common nouns to D is possible Longobardi is therefore forced to assume two, and only two, types of movement into D: *adjunction* and *substitution*. Substitution into an empty determiner, he maintains, takes place in Romance while adjunction crucially attaches the common noun to an overt operator-the definite article- in Romanian.

In view of this state of affairs, the Semitic construct state provides *prima facie* counter-evidence to Longobardi's (1994) account. Semitic construct state displays a productive pattern of common noun overt raising to an empty D, like that of Romance proper nouns, that is not lexically restricted to any class of words. The Semitic construct state clearly does not fit the Romance pattern of substitution into D due to the perspicuous differences between the two in terms of productivity of the construction, the class of nouns it involves, plurality and singularity of the head noun, and the rigidity and transparency of designation or lack thereof. However, the Semitic construct state does not seem to fit the Romanian pattern either since in the former the head N appears to *substitute* in D therefore precluding the appearance of the definite article (*I-*) unlike what happens in Romanian where the noun left-adjoins to a lexical definite article in D.

To maintain that there are only two types of movement to D, Longobardi (1996) is

therefore forced to assimilate the raising of the head N in the Semitic construct state to the Romanian pattern. He implements this in the following manner: suppose that raising the head N in Semitic does not take place as substitution into an empty D as in Romance, but rather as adjunction to an operator in D as in Romanian. However, since no definite article is allowed in D in the presence of the head N in Semitic construct state then the adjunction should be assumed to take place to a *null* operator in D (a *null article*).¹¹

Before assessing Longobardi's arguments concerning the difference between Romance on the one hand and Semitic on the other in terms of the properties of D, I want to briefly review Longobardi's assumptions and execution of the derivation of construct state in the next section.

2.5 Deriving the Semitic Construct State

We have seen above that Fassi Fehri (1999) treats raising of the head N independently of raising the possessor in CS constructions. I have also remarked above that if the genitive phrase fails to raise in indefinite CS constructions, but that the head N raises anyway, this would leave the behavior of bare nominals in the general case in PA unexplained. Specifically, we would not be able to say why, if Case is the motivation for N movement in the construct state, bare nominals (both plural and singular) fail to raise to D in non-CS contexts. Longobardi (1996), unlike Fassi Fehri, does in fact assume that the raising of the head N is dependent on the raising of the

¹¹ Note that Longobardi's account makes raising to D of common nouns such as *casa* 'home' in Romance parasitic on that of raising of proper nouns. In other words, raised common nouns in Romance are object-referring just like proper nouns.

genitive argument/possessor.

Longobardi (1996) adopts the proposed analysis to Semitic construct state advanced in Siloni (1994). According to that proposal, Longobardi (1996:25) points out, genitive Case is a structural Case assigned or checked in a Spec-Head configuration. The abstract Case head in this case is Agr_{gen} (i.e. $Agr_{genitive}$). Agr_{gen} does not occur in D but in a distinct head position directly below it in its own AgrGP (Agr Genitive Phrase) according to the schema in (23) (before N raising has taken place):

$$(23) [DP [D \ e]] [AgrGP [Agr \ e]] [XP \dots]$$

Longobardi assumes that genitive Case in Semitic has to be both licensed and identified. One of the two ways that Case can be licensed on a category α by a head γ is if " α is a member of the internal domain of a Chain headed by γ " (1996:28). Identification can also be achieved in one of two ways. Relevant to Semitic is that if " α is in the Spec of a designated category β " (*ibid*). Once N raises to D in the Semitic construct state Case-checking of the genitive DP is licensed in D's internal domain and the genitive Case on that DP is identified in the specifier position of AgrGP. This so-called Case Checking Principle of Longobardi is intended to capture nonstipulatively the following descriptive generalizations he makes (p.24):

(24) a. If a common noun raises to D a prepositionless Genitive occurs.

b. If a prepositionless Genitive occurs a common noun raises to D.

Here Longobardi clearly establishes the link that was missing in Fassi Fehri's system considered above, that between the raising of N to D and the presence of the genitive DP. However, he rejects the idea that N raises to D in order to check (Case) features of the genitive DP or check features of its own. Rather, he argues that N raises to D in order to check features of D itself, which to him argues against a version of Last Resort in terms of Greed.

Longobardi further argues that the trigger for N raising in the Semitic construct state is to check +/- definite features of the DP. He assumes that D in Semitic has an abstract grammatical label [*+article*] that is part of the "feature content" of an empty operator licensed in D but in need of identification (pp. 31-32). This [*+article*] is -Interpretable and strong in Semitic. It is checked according to the following condition (p.32):

(25) Definiteness Condition:

A *+article* feature can be checked by any lexical element in D (i.e. attached to it by Move) displaying a specified + or - definite value.

To quote, Longobardi executes the movement operations and feature checking in Semitic construct state as follows (p.32):

Suppose[...] that AgrG may inherit the definiteness value of the genitive argument in its Spec and that the raising of a noun to D takes place in the following way: N first adjoins to AgrG and then the new complex so formed adjoins to (or substitutes for) D. Now the condition on the identification of D will be satisfied: the raising of the lexical noun (along with AgrG) to D in Semitic will be functionally motivated and licensed by the need to check the *+article* feature and the presence of a prepositionless genitive is explained by the fact that this operation can be performed only by dragging to D an AgrG being in a Spec-Head relation with a genitive argument.

If I understand Longobardi correctly, it seems to me that although he makes the link, missing from Fassi Fehri (1999), between raising of N and the presence of the genitive phrase, he still does not articulate precisely why it is necessary for a genitive phrase to be present. To put it differently, if it is not +/- Def features of D *per se* that the head N is checking, but a [+ *article*] feature of the latter position, then it is not very clear why a genitive phrase has to be present in a Spec-Head configuration with an Agr head.

2.5.1 The Status of D in Semitic

As has been noted above, Longobardi (1996) tries to assimilate the Semitic pattern of N raising to D to that of Romanian. In the former, N will adjoin to a null operator, differing in this respect from Romance, while in Romanian N will adjoin to an overt operator in D, namely, the definite article. Longobardi's assumption of the existence of a null operator to which the head N adjoins in Semitic is based on the observation that the distribution of empty determiners in Arabic and Hebrew is free(r) than it is in Romance or Germanic. Bare singular nouns, Longobardi argues, can occur freely with no restriction on the empty D to a mass/plural reading as is the case in Romance (and most Germanic). Hebrew (and Arabic) are therefore *article drop* languages which explains the lexically generalized occurrence of common nouns in the construct state in Semitic.

Longobardi's analysis seems to beg the following question: if Semitic, specifically Arabic and Hebrew, has a [+*article*] feature that is strong and has to be checked prior to spell-out, and if in the construct state movement of N to D checks that feature (such movement, of course, being parasitic on the generation of a possessive phrase to provide

N with the necessary + or - Def feature value),¹² then should not the prediction be that the [+*article*] feature is also present and in need of checking before spell-out (being strong) whenever *article drop* takes place? In other words, bare singular count nouns in non-CS constructions should not be possible or grammatical in Arabic or Hebrew (since these nouns surface articleless) due to the strength of the [+*article*] features. However, Longobardi claims that these nouns distribute freely in Hebrew articleless and are possible in argument position anywhere. As such, the strong [+*article*] feature in these cases would remain unchecked and the derivation should therefore crash.¹³

Another point concerns bare plurals in Semitic, more specifically Palestinian Arabic. Bare plurals in PA, as will be explained in more detail in subsequent chapters, have the same distribution and interpretation as bare plurals in Spanish (and Italian, if we abstract away from the observations made in Longobardi (2002) concerning the supposed varied interpretations of bare nominals under modification). Since bare plurals in PA and Spanish, a Romance language, and, to a great extent Italian, behave in virtually identical ways, these nominals seem to call for the same treatment.¹⁴ In Longobardi (1994) an analysis was proposed to account for the distribution and interpretation of bare plurals in Romance in terms of a structural requirement on the empty determiner introducing these nominals. Specifically, it was argued in this work that bare plurals in Romance need to meet a lexical government requirement. Such a requirement prohibits their occurrence

¹² Recall, however, what has just been said in the previous section: it is not clear in Longobardi's system if +/- Def features and [+*article*] features are one and the same.

¹³ This is in fact the conclusion I will argue for in the present work: that bare nominals (singular and plural) in a language such as Arabic are ungrammatical unless certain conditions are met. However, checking of [+*article*] strong features is not one of these conditions.

¹⁴ Such a uniform treatment will be argued for in this work in later chapters.

in preverbal positions, positions that are not lexically governed. However, in postverbal positions this requirement is met. I will not go through a detailed exposition of the issues involved here since this will be dealt with in Chapter 3. For our purposes here, suffice it to say that bare plurals in PA appear to require the same treatment extended to bare plurals in Romance in Longobardi (1994).¹⁵ In other words, PA bare plurals are supposedly ungrammatical in preverbal positions and grammatical in postverbal positions. This would presumably follow from the lack of lexical government in preverbal positions. Since bare plurals are ungrammatical preverbally in the framework of Longobardi (1994), this fact can be recast for PA bare plurals in the current terms of Longobardi (1996) as follows: bare plurals surface articleless in PA; in other words, they constitute an instance of *article drop*. The argument then would proceed in the following manner: since the empty determiner in PA has a strong [+*article*] feature that needs to be checked by moving a noun into D, this would explain the ungrammaticality of bare plurals preverbally; the derivation would not converge since the [+*article*] feature has not been checked before spell-out and is not interpretable at LF. Thus Longobardi's (1996) analysis provides a nice explanation for this observed behavior of bare plurals in PA (note that the same result would also be achieved through applying Longobardi's (1994) requirement of lexical government). However, the shortcomings of Longobardi's (1996) account become evident when we consider the behavior of PA bare plurals postverbally. If, within the framework of Longobardi (1994), PA bare plurals are acceptable postverbally since the supposed lexical government requirement is met, then

¹⁵ However, the present dissertation actually argues against the approach proposed in Longobardi (1994). So this last statement made in the text is for the sake of argumentation only.

we would have to assume that the strong [+*article*] feature is not 'operational' postverbally (however that can be implemented), or else we would have to assume that this strong feature is *somehow* checked (again, how or by what means is not very clear). An additional shortcoming of the [+*article*] proposal is of a conceptual nature. As observed earlier, bare plurals in PA are similar in interpretation and distribution with Romance bare plurals. However, Longobardi's account would have to posit two different ways for accounting for the behavior of bare plurals cross-linguistically: Romance bare plurals are explained via the restrictions imposed on them by the lexical government requirement; PA bare plurals, on the other hand, would have to be explained in terms of the strength of the feature [+*article*] of the empty determiner.¹⁶

To sum up, if bare nominals in PA have basically the same distribution and interpretation as the Romance ones it does not seem plausible to bestow on the Arabic (and Hebrew) empty determiner qualities, such as a null operator, different from those Romance determiners have. In this light it is not plausible either to claim that N raising in Romance is an instance of substitution into an empty determiner while in the case of Semitic it is adjunction to an empty operator (on the analogy with N adjunction to an overt operator in Romanian). I conclude that this proposal in terms of the strength of the [+*article*] feature is untenable.

Notwithstanding this problematic aspect of Longobardi's analysis I still think that the connection he makes between N raising and the presence of a genitive DP in (Semitic) construct state is on the right track. I believe that the presence of the genitive

¹⁶ Even this option does not work for PA as I have argued above in the text, since postverbally bare nominals are arguably grammatical in terms of Longobardi (1996).

DP in the construct state plays an important role in licensing, in a pre-theoretical sense, the raising of the head N to D. This fact comes out more strikingly when compared with the behavior of bare nominals in PA in the general case (in non-CS constructions). However, before investigating this issue further, I want to spell out more clearly, yet briefly, the analysis I will be adopting in this work for deriving the Semitic construct state. This issue is the focus of the next section.

2.5.2 A Working Analysis of the Construct State in Arabic


An analysis that makes N raising parasitic on the presence of the genitive DP should be theoretically more superior in that it could account for the behavior of bare nominals in Arabic vis-à-vis their behavior in construct state constructions. In this light an analysis such as Longobardi (1996), which is a modified version of Siloni (1994), and abstracting away from certain problematic details in the Longobardi analysis, seems to me to have the potential to offer us more explanatory adequacy than that upheld by Fassi Fehri (1999).

Accordingly, I make the following assumptions-some of which are by no means novel. I will assume, as is standardly the case, that the head noun of the construct state in PA is generated in a position lower than that of the genitive DP in the base structure and it moves to a head D position. I will also assume that N raising to D is functionally motivated, not for Case-checking purposes, but rather to check another feature of the head D to be determined shortly. The genitive DP will raise to a functional projection higher than attributive adjectives (and lower than NumP, if the latter projects in the structure, see § 2.3) and lower than the D projection to which the head N is to raise to.

Raising of the genitive DP takes place uniformly in definite and indefinite construct state sentences alike. To assume otherwise is not only a loss of a generalization but is not confirmed by the empirical facts either. The projection to which the genitive phrase raises is argued to be DP₁ in Fassi Fehri (1999). In Longobardi (1996) and Siloni (1994, 1997) such a projection is assumed to be AgrG(enitive)P. For my purposes in this work I think it is inconsequential what the category label is of the projection which the genitive DP moves into and would not actually affect the general argument pursued here. Therefore, for my purposes I will call this functional projection FP (stands for Functional Projection, which is different and distinct from Focus Phrase/Projection), to abstract away from any commitment to the type of functional projection it might be. However, I assume, with Longobardi and Siloni, that the genitive DP moves into FP to check the Case features of the relevant functional head, F, with which it will be in a Spec-Head structural configuration. I similarly take the Case features of the head F to be strong in the sense they trigger overt movement of the genitive DP. The resulting structure for the example in (26) and (27) should be as in (28):

(26) byuut l-walad
 houses the-boy
 'the boy's houses'

(27) byuut walad
 houses boy
 'lit. a boy's houses'



(28)

I have assumed that the genitive DP raises into the Spec position of FP for Case reasons. What I have not spelled out yet is what the functional feature motivating the movement of the head N is. As argued above, this feature cannot be the strong [+article] feature presumed in Longobardi's analysis. It could not be Case as assumed by Fassi Fehri either. Intuitively, since I have maintained all along that raising of N has to be thought of as parasitic on the genitive DP, the feature that 'attracts' the head N has to find a matching feature on the head N bestowed upon the latter by no other than the genitive DP itself. If we grant that it is the genitive DP that endows the head N with the matching feature we would be in a better position to explain why in non-CS constructions bare nominals, not occurring with a genitive DP, cannot raise to D to check the relevant, presumably strong, features of this head.

Now suppose that the head noun in its base position, i.e. before moving or raising to

D, is not specified for (in)definiteness.¹⁷ In other words, the head noun would be base generated without + or - feature value for definiteness. This does not seem unreasonable especially if looked at from a cross-linguistic perspective. Consider, in fact, that in languages such as Japanese or Russian bare nominals are indeterminate or ambiguous between a definite or indefinite interpretation (see, for example, Chierchia (1998)). The context, in the case of Russian or Japanese, would play the disambiguating role. Chierchia (1998: 361) observes that bare arguments in Russian have a free distribution and could be read as definite or indefinite depending on the context. Consider the following from Russian Chierchia cites:

- (29) V komnate byli malcik i devocka.
 in (the) room were (a) boy and (a) girl.
 Ja obratilsja k malciky.
 I turned to (the) boy

(29) illustrates that the definite/indefinite distinction is neutralized in the absence of the article and that the context helps disambiguate which reading is intended. According to Chierchia, the word *malcik* 'boy' and *devocka* 'girl' are read as indefinite in such a presentational sentence. However, the second instance of *malcik* is read anaphorically to the first and is therefore interpreted as definite.

¹⁷ A similar claim has been made by Borer (1999) in the context of arguing for an incorporation account of the construct state in Hebrew. Borer argues that the head N of the construct state is not specified for +/- Definiteness feature, and since D in Semitic is inherently unspecified for +/- definiteness, the head N cannot move to D. Incorporation of the head noun and the genitive phrase becomes necessary since the latter would supply the head N with the relevant feature value. Among other things, the incorporation analysis is undermined by the facts argued for in §1.3 in the text: strict adjacency between the head noun and the genitive DP is not necessary, and sometimes impossible if a NumP projects. See Siloni (1997) and Fassi Fehri (1999) for arguments against the incorporation account of the construct state in Semitic.

If we assume that bare nominals are not specified for the feature value +/- Definiteness, it is quite plausible to say, contra Borer (1999), that the determiner position is where the definiteness/indefiniteness specifications lie. English is a good example of how this might work since this language possesses two articles, a definite and indefinite, and nouns, which occur *bare* following the determiner, are interpreted either as definite or indefinite depending on the occurrence of the relevant article.¹⁸ In other words, definiteness is a property of the DP, not nouns. I therefore assume that the D position is endowed with strong +/- Def features that have to be checked overtly through realizing a lexical determiner (for example, an article) or through movement of a head N as is the case in the Semitic construct state. My assumption is not identical to that of Longobardi's (1996), however. Recall that in Longobardi's system it is the strong [+*article*] feature that needs to be checked in Semitic.

Keeping what has been said immediately above in mind, the raising analysis can be implemented in the construct state as follows: supposing that bare nominals in PA generally lack a +/- Def specification, and assuming that D (in Semitic) has a strong +/- Def feature, this means that the head noun would not have the relevant matching features to check the corresponding features of D. However, Semitic construct state constructions are generated with an obligatory genitive DP, and this genitive DP needs to check its structural genitive Case in a Spec-Head configuration with a Case-assigning head, F in this case. Consequently, the genitive DP would raise into FP and land in its specifier position. The genitive DP is of course specified for (in)definiteness in that it

¹⁸ I set aside for the moment bare nominals in English.

either carries the definite article or is articleless (i.e. indefinite).¹⁹ The head F, by virtue of being in a Spec-Head structural configuration with the genitive DP sitting in [Spec, FP], would acquire the relevant Def features of the genitive DP. Now, since D has strong Def features to be checked overtly one option is to realize the definite article to check those strong features. However, in this case raising of the head N would not be functionally motivated or even required/permitted; it is precisely such a circumstance that gives rise to the observed complementarity between the definite article and the occurrence of the head N in D.²⁰ The head N could not in this case raise since the morphological trigger that would set the N raising in motion, namely, checking the strong Def features of D, would be satisfied by the lexical realization of the definite article in that position. However, if the lexical article is not realized in D, the strong Def features of the latter would still remain unchecked which would trigger raising of the head N to substitute in that position. But recall that nouns in Semitic are not specified for Def features in the base position. At this point the genitive DP proves crucial. If the head N has to adjoin to F on its way to D, as a consequence of the Head Movement Constraint, then N would inherit the Def feature specification of the genitive DP transmitted to F by the former in a Spec-Head configuration. This is precisely where (in)definiteness inheritance in the construct state occurs. N would acquire the necessary

¹⁹ Recall that there is no indefinite article in PA.

²⁰ Of course, there has to be a way of ruling out a derivation where the lexical definite article would be generated in D to check the latter's strong Def feature, thus eliminating the trigger necessary to prompt or initiate N raising to that position, resulting in the head N staying in situ. In other words, in such a derivation we would have an article in D and a raised possessor but a head N which is in situ. This derivation would be ruled out on the principled ground that the definite article, due to its affixal nature, would need a host to attach to. Therefore, the derivation *article-possessor-N* is not a convergent derivation. The article in D could not attach to the possessor since the latter is sitting in the specifier position of an FP projection, which is arguably in a complement position to D.

features to match the strong features of D.

I believe this analysis, which is minimally different from that of Longobardi (1996) (and Siloni (1994), as previewed in Longobardi (1996)), successfully accounts for the observed properties of the construct state in Semitic. The head N occurs initially in the construction through movement to D. The obligatoriness of the genitive phrase is expected if raising of the N is parasitic and dependent on it. (In)definiteness inheritance is a consequence of N's adjunction to the head of the projection in whose specifier the genitive DP sits. The impossibility of realizing the definite article on the head N follows naturally from such an analysis by assuming that the strong +/- Def features of D can be checked only in one of two ways, but not the two together: either raising of N to D or lexically realizing the article. In a construct state construction, the head N has to raise since an article in that position would need to be supported by a host due to its affixal nature, as explained in fn. 20. However, generating a definite article in D, and at the same time raising N to that position, is not possible since the movement of N to D cannot be initiated in the first place due to the absence of the triggering feature in D (i.e. the strong Def feature of D which would in this scenario be checked by realizing a definite article).

2.5.3 Bare Nominals in Non-CS Constructions

One immediate advantage to the analysis expounded above is that it enables us to account for the question raised earlier in § 2.2.2 above: if bare/determinerless nominals can raise to D in the construct state, how can we explain their inability to raise in non-CS constructions?

As noted for example (21a) and (21b) above, repeated here as (30a) and (30b), bare nominals in non-CS structures exhibit a possibility that has been argued to be unavailable for CS head nouns, namely, carrying the definite article. This latter property, i.e. the impossibility of the definite article on the head N in D, as noted earlier, is a consequence of raising N to D in CS constructions. It follows that bare nominals in PA cannot raise (at least overtly) to D in non-CS structures. (31) also shows that the same facts hold for singular nominals.

(30) a. ʔdʒ-u (l-) wlaad
 came-3MP (the) boys
 ' (The) Boys came.

b. ʔdʒ-u (*l-) wlaad l-dʒiraan
 came-3MP (the) boys the-neighbours
 ' The neighbors' boys came.'

(31) ʔdʒ-a (l-) walad
 came-3MS (the) boy
 ' (The) Boy came.

Since I have argued that D has strong +/- Def features that need to be checked in the syntax, and since bare nominals in PA in the base position lack the specification for the Def feature value, these nouns would not be able to raise since they do not have the corresponding Def features. If these features are bestowed upon the head N by a genitive DP in CS constructions, then the head nouns in non-CS constructions have no means of acquiring the necessary Def features to be able to raise to D due to the absence of the genitive DP. This analysis makes a strong theoretical prediction: if the head noun in

non-CS constructions can somehow acquire the necessary +/- Def features to be able to check the matching strong features of D, then we predict that the head noun would actually raise to D even in the absence of a genitive DP. I believe this prediction is empirically borne out in PA as attested in the following sentences:

(32) beet-o inħaraq
home-3MS burned-3MS
'His house burned.'

(33) byuut-hum inħaraq-u
houses-3MP burned-3MP
'Their houses burned.'

First of all, recall that the genitive DP is obligatory in the Semitic construct state. In addition, it has been argued by Longobardi (1996) that whereas it is possible for the genitive argument of Romance construct state to be understood, i.e. not realized overtly, this is not an option for the Semitic construct state.²¹ Under these assumptions the sentences in (32)-(33) are instances of non-CS constructions. However, it has been argued in the literature (e.g. Longobardi (1996)) that the clitics realized on the head noun in (32) and (33), *-o* and *-hum*, respectively, are actually pronominal possessors. In other words, these examples in (32) and (33) are essentially instances of CS structures, although the possessor is pronominalized.

To begin to address this point, recall first that Arabic (and Hebrew) have a construction traditionally called *clitic-doubling*. Notice that (32) and (33) can be clitic-

²¹ Longobardi argues that the genitive argument in Romance can be a non-overt Pro, to differentiate it from either PRO or *pro*.

doubled as is seen in (34) and (35) respectively:

(34) beet-o la l-walad inħaraq
home-3MS to the-boy burned-3MS
'The boy's house burned.'

(35) byuut-hum la l-wlaad inħaraq-u
houses-3MP to the-boys burned-3MP
'The boys' houses burned'

The clitic-doubled argument in (34) and (35) are *l-walad* 'the-boy' and *l-wlaad* 'the-boys' respectively. The clitic-doubled argument in these two examples are read as genitive arguments or possessors (comparable to the Free Genitive of Hebrew). Now, if the pronominalized clitic on the head noun, *-o* and *-hum*, are also possessors, then the sentences above would conceivably have two possessors realized in the same sentence. However, no such situation can be found in traditional construct state constructions as the following examples in (36a) and (36b) attest:

(36) a. * beet l-walad la l-walad / huwwe inħaraq
house-3MS the-man to the-boy/ he burned-3MS
b. * byuut l-wlaad la l-wlaad / huwwe inħaraq-u
houses-3MP the-boys to the-boys / he burned-3MP

As seen in these examples the outcome is ungrammatical. Construct state constructions cannot be clitic-doubled, a possibility still open for sentences with pronominalized clitic *possessors*. This seems to argue against viewing the pronominal clitic on the head N as

a possessor.

Another possibility is to regard the clitic as a determiner, as in the English expression *their home*. However, the clitic *-hum* in *byuut-hum* 'homes-3MP,' for example, could not be analyzed as a determiner or a possessive adjective as in English *their* since that would mean that *byuut* 'homes' has actually raised and occurs in [Spec, DP] and, moreover, that the raising would be an instance of NP, rather than N raising. This would incorrectly predict that NP raising could pied-pipe postnominal adjectives:

- (37) a. byuut-hum l-wsiiʕa inħarqau
 homes-3MP the-spacious burned-3MP
- b. *byuut-l-wsiiʕa-hum inħarqau
 homes-spacious-3MP burned-3MP
- c. *l-wsiiʕa- byuut-hum inħarqau
 the-spacious-3MP homes burned-3MP

It then seems that the clitic on the head could not be a determiner as is the case in English. However, I believe that an account of such clitics on the head N is available.

Roberts and Shlonsky (1996) and Shlonsky (1997) propose an attractive analysis of clitics in Hebrew and Palestinian Arabic. They argue that clitics in these two languages have, among others, the following three characteristics (1996:183):

- (38) a. Clitics occur on the right of their host, never on the left.
- b. Clitics are always attached to the closest c-commanding head.
- c. Clitics in Semitic appear on all lexical categories and on certain functional

categories.

These descriptive statements pretty much apply to the clitics under discussion in (32) and (33). The authors above also propose that Semitic clitics are Agreement elements whose function is to identify a null pronominal *pro* in argument position as in the following schema:

(39) X+Clitic *pro*

(32) and (33) would then have the following structure:

(40) beet-*o* *pro* inħaraq
 home-3MS burned-3MS
 'His house burned.'

(41) byuut-*hum* *pro* inħaraq-u
 houses-3MP burned-3MP
 'Their houses burned.'

It is reasonably the case therefore that the clitic on the head N is an Agr marker whose purpose is to identify the null pronominal *pro*. Now note that the head N in these sentences exhibits the one of the same properties the head N of a traditional construct state displays, namely, that it cannot carry the definite article:

(42) *l-beet-o *pro* inħaraq
 the-home-3MS burned-3MS

Also notice that the head noun carrying the Agr clitic in (40) and (41) is interpreted as definite as attested by definite agreement on the modifying adjective in (43) and the definite relative clause in (44):

(43) beet-o *pro* l-gadiim inħaraq
 home-3MS the-old burned-3MS
 'His old house burned.'

(44) byuut-hum *pro* ?illi dahanuhum mbariħ inħaraq-u
 houses-3MP that painted-3MP-3MP yesterday burned-3MP
 'Their houses which they painted yesterday burned.'

These observations can be taken to mean that the head N in (40) and (41) has raised overtly, as the case is in traditional construct state, to D. However, this possessive construction, despite being very similar to the traditional construct state, should not be treated as an identical phenomenon since an overt genitive DP is obligatory in the latter.

This state of affairs argues against the assumptions contained in Longobardi (1994). In this work, it is argued that overt movement to D is only possible for proper nouns at S-Structure. Common nouns, on the other hand, are forbidden from raising and substituting into D overtly, although they can adjoin to an overt operator in D as is the case in Romanian. Raising of proper nouns at S-Structure in Italian/Romance is assimilated with the raising of generic/kind-denoting common nouns at LF in English. If an empty determiner is interpreted as a default existential operator, then generic/kind-denoting common nouns have to raise, at LF, to substitute for the empty determiner at that level and thereby preventing the noun from being interpreted existentially. In other words, what happens in Italian at S-Structure in the case of proper nouns happens in

English at LF in the case of generically interpreted common nouns.

Longobardi's assumptions noted immediately above predict that if raising of a common noun takes place overtly at S-Structure in any language, thus substituting into an empty D, then that would preclude the existential reading for the common noun and would mean the only reading available for such a noun is a kind reading. However, this is not what happens in PA. The common nouns in (40) and (41) are not interpreted generically. In fact, they can only be interpreted existentially.

Raising of possessively interpreted common nouns to D at S-Structure is very productive in PA and is quite lexically generalized. Raising of proper nouns to D is also attested (in fact, obligatory, in the absence of a definite article as is the case in Italian):

(45) *l-urdun l-dʒamiil*
the-Jordan the-beautiful
'the beautiful Jordan'

(46) *faransa l-ħadiiθa*
France the-modern

(47) **l-faransa l-ħadiiθa*
the-France the-modern

As can be seen in (45)-(47) whether the article is attached to the proper noun or not, i.e. whether the proper noun has raised into D or not, the proper noun is understood as being definite as attested by the definite article marked on the modifying adjective. As a matter of fact, even proper nouns such as *l-urdun* '(the-) Jordan,' which normally carries the definite article, have to give up their definite article if they occur in possessive

sentences with Agr clitics:


(48) urdun-na l-dʒamiil
Jordan-1P the-beautiful
'our beautiful Jordan'

(49) *l-urdun-na l-dʒamiil
the-jordan-3P the-beautiful

However, we are still left with this nagging question: what enables the bare nominal to raise to D in sentences that lack an overt genitive DP? As an answer to this question consider first the structure of (41), repeated here, in (41a):

(41) byuut-*hum* *pro* inħaraq-u
houses-3MP burned-3MP
'Their houses burned'

(41a)



Assuming that the Agr clitic *-hum* is generated in head position in the FP projection (perhaps AgrP, as in Siloni (1994, 1997), Longobardi (1996), also Shlonsky (1997)), *pro* would conceivably be generated in [Spec, FP] since the Agr clitic is there in the first place to identify the null pronominal *pro*. N would left-adjoin to F pied-piping *-hum* with it and inheriting the definiteness features from the latter. I think the preceding discussion does not commit us to any conception of the null pronominal *pro* as a null possessor (on analogy with *Pro* supposedly attested for Romance as discussed by (Longobardi (1996))).

In the next section I will turn to the issue of applying such notions concerning the strength of the Def features of the D position to English. I will argue that this notion may in fact be carried over to English and thus afford us a more restrictive picture of the surface differences between languages as different as PA and English.

2.6 Bare Nominals in PA and English

I have argued above that PA nominals are not specified for +/- Definiteness feature value. I have also maintained that D in PA has strong +/- Def features that need to be checked in the syntax. In the general case, expectedly, bare nominals can not raise to D overtly since they do not have the necessary corresponding +/- Def feature specification to check the relevant strong features of D.²² In the construct state, on the other hand, bare nominals, unspecified for Def features at the base, can acquire the necessary specification for the Def feature value, needed to check D's strong features, by adjoining

²² 'Bare nominals' are to be understood here and elsewhere to mean DPs without an overt or lexical D.

to a functional head, labeled F above, that is in a Spec-Head configuration with a definite/indefinite genitive DP.

One consequence of this analysis is the following: bare nominals in PA non-CS constructions, whether singular or plural, are predicted to be ungrammatical in argument positions anywhere in the sentence. This is so because the strong features of the D head of the DP which contains the bare nominal would go unchecked resulting in the derivation non-converging.²³ My claim is exactly that. This, obviously, goes against arguments leveled for Romance in Longobardi (1994, 1996) where it is claimed that bare nominals are ungrammatical preverbally, but not postverbally. I will also make the claim that PA bare nominals are ungrammatical under normal conditions of stress. In other words, they are always focused. These issues will be taken up again in greater details in Chapter 3. For now, however, I will assume that my claims hold true.

2.7 English Bare Nominals and (In)definiteness Feature Checking

PA nominals are ungrammatical in non-CS constructions since they are unspecified for Def features and therefore unable to check the strong D Def features. Could this situation be detected in a language such as English?

The answer to this question is, I think, positive. As a matter of fact, this seems to me to be the null hypothesis. Note first of all that English generally lacks bare singular count nouns in argument position. Examples such as the following are ungrammatical:

²³ Crucially, I am assuming here that only DPs can be arguments as argued by Longobardi (1994) and that bare nominals in PA are contained in a DP shell.

(50) * Boy came

(51) * I saw boy.

These examples contrast with the fully grammatical English sentences in (52) and (53):

(52) A/The boy came.

(53) I saw a/the boy.

The pattern in (50) and (51) is presumably attested in PA since articleless singular nominals are possible in this language. However, recall that my claim here is that the English pattern seen in (50) and (51) is also ungrammatical in PA under normal conditions of stress. As is witnessed in (52) and (53), the English sentences in (50) and (51) become grammatical once the D position is filled by a definite/indefinite article. Within the system of assumptions argued for here, and taking all the observations above concerning examples (50)-(53) in tandem, this could mean that English D also has strong (in)definiteness features that need to be checked in the syntax.²⁴

Longobardi (1996) argues that Romance and Germanic exhibit traces of the Semitic construct state, overtly in the former and at LF in the latter. The head noun in the English Saxon genitive in (54), Longobardi argues, raises at LF to D and the genitive DP would occur in the Spec position of AgrGP (FP, in our terms). So, (54) would have the structure in (55) which is essentially the PF structure of the Semitic construct state

²⁴ This could be recast in the terms of Longobardi's (1996) analysis in terms of the strength of the [+article] features. However, this approach has been showed to be inadequate for PA.

(his (81b) and (81a) respectively):

(54) The teacher's new book.....

(55) Book the teacher's new *t* about syntax

If Longobardi's analysis is on the right track then the ungrammaticality of (56) is predicted:

(56) *The teacher's a/the (new) book

The ungrammaticality of (56) is therefore parallel to the ungrammaticality of the Semitic equivalent head of the construct state with a definite article with the obvious difference that in Semitic raising of the head N occurs overtly. If bare singular count nominals in English are not specified for +/- Def features either then one way of implementing the correctness of (55) is to say that the head noun, unspecified for +/- Def features as it is, acquires the definiteness/indefiniteness features of the genitive DP *the teacher* (which would be in Spec AgrGenP at LF, according to Longobardi's analysis). This is further attested in the grammaticality of (57)-(58) and the ungrammaticality of (59) (notice that, interestingly, *book* in (57) and (58) is interpreted as indefinite and definite, respectively, depending on the (in)definiteness of the genitive DP):

- (57) a. a student's book about syntax
 b. *book* a student's *t* about syntax
- (58) a. the student's book about syntax
 b. *book* the student's *t* about syntax
- (59) a. *student's book about syntax
 b. #*book* student's *t* about syntax

The grammaticality of (57) would follow directly from the fact that *a student* is specified for the indefiniteness features in this case; therefore, *book*, moving covertly to the head position D, would acquire the necessary indefiniteness features necessary to check the Def features of D. Therefore, the sentence in (57) is predicted to be grammatical. The same analysis can be carried over to (58). In this case, however, it is the definiteness features that get passed on to the bare nominal *book*. Once the head N is specified for the relevant Def features it can covertly raise to D to check the corresponding feature of the head D. (59) therefore is expectedly ungrammatical since the genitive DP *student*, being deprived or unspecified for Def features, cannot pass those on to *book* to enable the latter to raise and check the Def features of the head D. It follows that the LF derivation in (59b) is unacceptable and the S-Structure (59a) crashes.

Now compare this pattern witnessed in (57)-(59) to the following examples with existentially interpreted bare plurals in English:

- (60) *students' book(s)

The ungrammaticality of (60) is in line with the general argument put forth so far. If English nominals, just like their PA counterparts, are not specified for the +/- Def features, then the ungrammaticality of (60) is in fact two-fold: first, LF-raising of *book(s)* to D is not licensed since this nominal is not specified for the Def features in the base position and it cannot acquire the necessary features from the genitive DP which is itself unspecified for Def features. This brings us to the second source of ungrammaticality of (60): being a bare nominal itself *students* cannot raise overtly to check the strong Def features of the D head in the DP shell in which it is contained. Either way, the derivation cannot converge. However, if the strong features of D of the DP containing *students* were to be checked by another means, e.g. realization of the lexical definite article *the*, or a determiner such as *those*, the derivation would be expected to converge which is the case in (61):

(61) *these/the students' book(s)*

In (61) the +/- Def features of the head of the DP containing *students* are checked by either *these* or *the*. The other source of potential ungrammaticality is eliminated since now *book(s)* can raise to D at LF because it can acquire the necessary features from the (definite) genitive DP *these/the students* sitting in the specifier of the AgrGP projection.

The discussion so far makes this prediction: if the English D has strong +/- Def features then *bare plurals* should not be acceptable in English, under normal conditions of stress, as in the case of PA. I believe this prediction is also confirmed. As will be argued in the following chapters, bare plurals (that are existentially interpreted) are not

possible in English anywhere in the sentence under normal conditions of stress.²⁵ In other words the following examples containing existentially read bare plurals are unacceptable if not focused, a position I argue for in this dissertation:²⁶

(62) * Dogs are in my garden.

(63) * I can see spots on the floor.

A question immediately arises: if D in English has strong +/- Def features that need to be checked why are generically interpreted bare plurals in English acceptable under normal conditions of stress? Consider the following examples:

(64) Dogs are common in North America.

(65) Men smoke more heavily than women do.

(66) Women's place in society

As is clear from (64)–(66) generically interpreted bare plurals in English are acceptable. To phrase the problem in more technical terms, generically interpreted bare plurals in English can somehow satisfy the requirement that the strong +/- Def features of D be checked. But how can these plural nominals achieve this?

Two potential solutions suggest themselves at this point. As will be argued in

²⁵ Diesing (1992), Kratzer (1995), and Longobardi (1996) assume that existentially quantified bare nominals in English are impossible only outside of the VP.

²⁶ Of course it remains to be addressed precisely how focusing a bare plural can exempt bare plurals from violating the requirement that the D in their DP shell needs to have their features checked. I will return to this issue in Chapter 5.

Chapter 4, generically interpreted bare plurals in English are distinct from existentially quantified bare nominals in being non-focal. It is then reasonable to assume that their behavior would diverge from that of existentially read bare nominals. Suppose, in accordance with what has been suggested by Rizzi (1997) (see Chapter 5), that generically read bare nominals carry a topical feature that needs to be checked in the proper configuration. Suppose, then, that generically interpreted bare nominals are structurally located in the specifier position of a TopicPhrase and the DPs in which these nominals are contained enter into a checking relation with the head Top of that projection. This way, these nominals would be able to be licensed and also interpreted (as topics, presumably, definite). In Chapter 5, I argue that the same analysis can be assumed for focused existential BNs, with the obvious difference that the latter enter into a checking relation, in Specifier-Head configuration, with a head F of a Focus Phrase.

Another solution could be the following: Longobardi (1994) argues that generically interpreted bare nominals in English raise at LF to fill D, a position I have argued is problematic for languages such as PA where overt raising to D is attested. These problems aside, suppose, then, that raising to D of a common noun is a necessary, but crucially, not sufficient condition for the generic/kind interpretation. Now, recall that generically interpreted bare plurals in English are read as (names) of kinds (as argued in Carlson 1977, and Longobardi (1994)) which assimilates them with proper nouns. Assume farther that generically interpreted bare plurals in English can raise to D at LF, thus satisfying the feature checking requirement of the D position. Existentially read bare plurals, on the other hand, have to satisfy this requirement in the syntax since they

do not have the kind reading necessary to raise to D.

2.8 Conclusion

I have argued in this chapter that we can gain a good understanding of the behavior of bare nominals in PA by investigating the properties of the Semitic construct state. The analysis I have adopted of the construct state is basically a modified version of the analysis adopted in Longobardi (1996).

I have attempted to demonstrate that if we assume that bare nominals in PA are not specified for the +/- Def feature, and if the D position in this language is equipped with such a feature that is strong and in need of overt checking, we can gain a working understanding of the reason why bare plurals in non-CS constructions cannot raise to D overtly. I have also argued that this restriction on bare nominals in PA can also be detected in English. If an analysis such as Longobardi's (1996) is correct, parameterizing and extending the Semitic genitive structure to English, the system of assumptions argued for here could reasonably be applied to English. Such an analysis, it seems to me, may be able to reduce the surface differences noted between PA and English bare plurals and achieve a higher degree of cross-linguistic uniformity.

In the next chapter I offer a more uniform view of bare nominals in PA and Spanish where I argue that these nominals are always focused. I also extend the reach of this analysis to English existential nominals in Chapter 4.

Chapter 3

Bare Nominals in PA: Distribution and Interpretation

3.0 Introduction

I have argued in Chapter 2 that to understand the overall behavior of bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic it may be necessary to understand the structure of the Determiner Phrase (DP) in the language. To achieve this goal, I have singled out a construction that is both prevalent and widely investigated in the Afro-Asiatic literature, namely, the Construct State (CS). A closer examination of the Palestinian Arabic construct state has revealed an idiosyncratic behavior of bare (or, rather, *determinerless*) nominals, which can freely and productively occur in this construction, both in the singular and plural forms. Such behavior of bare/determinerless nominals as seen in CS-constructions is perspicuously different from that generally observed of bare nominals in this language.

Most intriguing about the behavior of bare/determinerless nominals in the construct state is their ability to substitute into the head D position of the possessive structure. In this respect, bare nominals in non-CS constructions differ distinctly in that they are unable to move into the D position. This distinction has proved both crucial and illuminating; if we assume that bare nominals in CS constructions are somehow endowed with certain features that make it possible for them to substitute into D, and further assume that these features are 'inherited' or passed on from the possessive DP or possessor, then we can explain the failure of non-CS bare nominals to substitute into the determiner head D. These features, I have claimed, are (in)definiteness features. Bare nominals are devoid of the (in)definiteness feature specifications in the general case.

The D head has, in Minimalist terms (à la Chomsky 1995), strong +/- Definiteness features that need to be checked overtly by N, that carries the matching feature specification- a possibility unavailable for bare nominals in non-CS constructions as they arguably lack such feature specification.

If bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic (PA) are unmarked for (in)definiteness features, it may be surprising, both on conceptual and empirical grounds, that the same should not hold for other languages, English in particular. In Chapter 2 I have claimed that such a state of affairs can be argued to hold true of English bare nominals as well. To the extent that this claim is correct this would provide us with a truly minimalist, in the pre-theoretical sense of the word, and a desirably restrictive account of the apparent differences that exist between the two languages, Palestinian Arabic and English (or, perhaps, language *families*). However, the parallels between Palestinian Arabic and English can only be pushed so far since there are indeed conspicuous differences in the distribution and interpretation of bare nominals in these two languages. These differences, to be discussed in more detail in chapter 5, I wish to claim to be explicable as originating from deeper and more principled differences, in part, in the 'focus system,' as it were, and word order facts, of these two languages (or, again, language families). This issue is the topic of Chapter 5.

The present system of assumptions naturally leads to the following prediction: being unmarked for the relevant (in)definiteness features non-CS bare nominals in PA should be unacceptable, irrespective of their structural position in the sentence. *A priori*, the same should also be said about bare nominals in English (excepting, of course, generically interpreted bare plurals; cf. Chapter 2). This is in fact the position I would

like to argue for in the present work. This line of argument, however, flies in the face of various analyses advanced in the literature to explain the apparently idiosyncratic distributional facts of bare nominals (for example, Longobardi (1994, 1996, 2000, 2002) for Italian, Contreras (1986) and Casielles-Suarez (1997) for Spanish).

In this chapter I propose to analyze the distribution of bare nominals in PA (and Spanish) in terms of the information structure of the sentence. This analysis is not, however, entirely unconventional since a somewhat similar line was proposed for Spanish by Suñer (1982). I wish to argue that a (purely) syntactic analysis leaves many important questions unanswered concerning the distribution of bare nominals. In addition, these analyses undesirably posit a disjunction in accounting for the distribution of these nominals. As a common theme, some of these syntactic analyses make the arguably unmotivated assumption that there exists a structural asymmetry in the distribution of bare nominals: these nominals, the proponents of these analyses argue, can occur postverbally in the sentence while their preverbal occurrence is far more restricted so as to be impossible under normal conditions of stress (i.e. *unfocused*). The proposal I advance here diverges in very important ways from such analyses by completely dispensing with this alleged asymmetry in favor of a more uniform approach to explaining the distribution of bare nominals. To be specific, I argue that bare nominals are only possible if focused regardless of their structural positioning in the sentence. More precisely, bare nominals in postverbal positions display the same ungrammaticality under normal conditions of stress (i.e. *unfocused*) as do their preverbal counterparts.

I begin in § 3.1 by introducing the basic facts regarding the distribution of bare

nominals cross-linguistically. § 3.2.1 reviews a popular proposal advanced by Longobardi (1994) concerning a structural requirement bare nominals (in Romance and Germanic) are allegedly subject to, namely, lexical government. I demonstrate in § 3.2.2 that Longobardi's proposal is not without problems and that it leaves much to be desired. Specifically, Longobardi (1994) is unable to explain how focused preverbal bare nominals can circumvent the lexical government requirement. Moreover, he is forced, within the framework of assumptions he makes, to regard the apparent effects of coordination and modification claimed to hold in the literature of the distribution of bare nominals as exceptions or violations of the generality of his analysis. This latter issue is taken up in § 3.2.2.2. and the former in § 3.2.2.3. In § 3.3 I consider another proposal made by Casielles-Suarez (1997) as an attempt to explain the behavior of Spanish bare nominals. Since Casielles-Suarez's approach depends primarily on the conceptual and empirical validity of Diesing's (1992b) Mapping Hypothesis, I review the implications, and the correctness, of the Mapping Hypothesis on the interpretative distribution of bare nominals. In § 3.3.2.1 and § 3.3.2.2 two main sets of objections to the mapping hypothesis are considered: those contained in Reinhart (1995) and Pinto (1997), respectively. The conclusions arrived at from examining these two works point to the inadequacy of the mapping hypothesis, theoretically and empirically; §3.3.3 is devoted to such an endeavor. In § 3.4 a uniform account of bare nominals in PA is proposed. As has just been noted, the major highlight of this account is that bare nominals in PA, which can only be read existentially, are always focal. Such an account can also be argued to hold for singular bare nominals in PA, which is the topic of § 3.4.1.5. Within such a framework as the one I propose here coordination and modification effects have

no role to play and as such do not constitute 'violations' or 'exceptions' as in Longobardi (1994). Finally, § 3.6 and its subsections are concerned with the interpretation of bare nominals in PA. I consider three proposals, which are not necessarily exclusive of one another, that have been put forth in the literature to explain the interpretation of indefinites. § 3.6.4 is the conclusion.

3.1 The Basic Facts

The consensus in the literature seems to have taken for granted the following descriptive generalization: the distribution of bare nominals (henceforth, BN(s)) (in Romance)¹ is far from uniform in that these nominals can occur only postverbally, while their preverbal occurrence is ruled out under normal conditions of stress. Many attempts have been made to explain this supposed asymmetry, most notably Longobardi (1994, 1996, 2000, 2002) for Italian, Suñer (1982), Contreras (1986), and Casielles-Suarez (1997) for Spanish. The following examples, taken from Longobardi (1994) illustrate this alleged asymmetry in Italian (These are Longobardi's examples 14a, 14b, 14c):

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|
| (1)*Acqua viene giù dalle colline | (Italian) |
| water comes down from the hills | |
| (2) Viene giù acqua dalle colline | |
| comes down water from the hills | |
| (3) Ho preso acqua dalla sorgente | |
| I took water from the spring | |

¹ To my knowledge bare nominals in (Palestinian) Arabic have not been dealt with previously.

According to Longobardi (1994), and as seen in the contrast between the minimally different (1) and (2), the BN *acqua* 'water' occurs preverbally in (1) which results in an ungrammatical outcome. In (2), on the other hand, the BN is postverbal, hence the grammaticality. The acceptability of (3) is parallel to the acceptability of (2) in that the BN occurs within the VP. Descriptively, it appears that the BN in a preverbal position fails to satisfy a requirement, structural or otherwise, that the postverbal BN is able to satisfy. Notice that this requirement cannot be equated with a subject/object asymmetry that certain syntactic structures are sensitive to since BNs can apparently occur postverbally both as subjects and objects.² Whatever is responsible for the difference in grammaticality between (1), on the one hand, and (2)-(3), on the other, seems to be tied closely to the structural position of the BN in the sentence (i.e. pre- vs. post-verbal).

This last observation has tempted researchers, Longobardi included, to attempt an explanation of these facts on syntactic grounds. Such an attempt does not seem implausible *a priori* for parallel asymmetries have been observed in the syntactic literature. For example, Standard Arabic displays a curious pre-/post-verbal asymmetry in agreement in terms of ϕ -features where the verb agrees fully with the preverbal subject in gender and number. When the subject is in a postverbal position the verb exhibits an impoverished agreement pattern with the subject and the verb can only carry gender agreement (see for example, Aoun et al. (1994, 1999), Munn (1999)). Insofar as these agreement facts can be explained structurally, proponents of a syntactic approach

² Actually, Longobardi's claim would have more merit if the alleged asymmetry in the distribution of BNs could be reduced to a subject/object asymmetry. This would be so since, as I point out in § 3.2.2.1, the notion of government Longobardi assumes seems to be so tight as to demand a *head-complement* structural configuration between the governing head and the BN. Such a configuration is evidently absent in the case of subject BNs. See § 3.2.2.1 for details.

to the distribution of BNs in Romance can indeed be tempted to pursue a similar line of inquiry. However tempting or appealing such a strictly syntactic approach to this problem may be, I believe it is ultimately incapable of explaining certain observed facts in the behavior of BNs about which I will have more to say below. In addition, such an approach is indeed oblivious to the significant contribution the information structure of the sentence has in the distribution and interpretation of BNs so as to ultimately affect the (un)acceptability of the relevant sentence. The significance of information structure is most evident in the widely attested, though ill-explained, observation that BNs become legitimate preverbally in the sentence if they are focused. It seems to me that any adequate theory of the distribution and interpretation of BNs has to have the explanatory power to note and provide an account for such an observation. I wish to show that the available theories fall short of this goal.

For concreteness, I consider in what follows two attempts that have been made in this regard: Longobardi's (1994) work on Italian BNs and Casielles-Suárez (1997) on Spanish. Both these researchers propose analyses that are more or less syntactic in nature, more so in the case of Longobardi than in the case of Casielles-Suárez. I show that such analyses fall short of the desired level of explanatory adequacy, however appealing in their simplicity these analyses may be.

3.2 BNs and Government

As noted immediately above, to explain the alleged asymmetry in the distribution of BNs in structural terms has a certain degree of appeal. Contreras (1986) was perhaps one of the first to take notice of the importance of syntactic factors and to claim that

they are instrumental in explaining the distribution of BNs in Spanish. I will only very briefly touch on Contreras' analysis since it does not differ in any substantial ways from the more articulated approach of Longobardi (1994).

What Contreras (1986) offers is basically an analysis of the distribution of BNs based on the Empty Category Principle (ECP). He assumes that Spanish BNs have the structure $[_{NP} [_{QP} e] N']$ whose distribution is sensitive to proper government of the empty quantifier phrase (1986: 26). However, since the preverbal subject position is governed by Infl in Spanish, Contreras suggests, preverbal subjects in Spanish have to be adjunctions rather than occurring in specifier positions. Contreras' claim is that if the subject position was governed in Spanish examples such as (4) (his 6) would be predicted to be grammatical, contrary to fact:

(4) * $[_S [_{NP} [_{QP} e] \text{café}] \text{INFL} [_{VP} \text{me gusta}]]$
 'I like coffee.'

Infl, Contreras argues, governs the NP and K-governs³ the QP which would incorrectly predict the sentence to be grammatical (1986:38). However, if, Contreras argues, subjects in Spanish are adjoined then the ungrammaticality of (4) is given a natural explanation in terms of the ECP.

It is fairly clear from this brief overview of Contreras' analysis that government of the preverbal subject position by Infl, be it lexical government (in the sense of Rizzi

³ Contreras gives the definition in (i) of K(ayne)-government:
 (i) A lexical category governs its sisters and the categories immediately dominated by its sisters.

1990) if Infl is assumed in Spanish to be a lexical governor, or not, is absent in the preverbal domain. This assumption on Contreras' part causes him to assume further that preverbal subjects in Spanish are cases of adjunctions, rather than specifier positions.

In a similar vein Longobardi (1994) argues for the existence of a structural requirement to explain the distribution of BNs in Italian. Longobardi suggests that the operative notion of government relevant to BNs is strictly government by a lexical head. Therefore, he does not have to claim, as Contreras does, that (preverbal) subjects are instances of adjunction. In the next section I take a closer look at Longobardi's analysis.

3.2.1 The Lexical Government Approach

Longobardi (1994) is an attempt to demonstrate that there exists an N to D movement in Romance. Insofar as this can be shown to hold the DP hypothesis of Abney (1987) would turn out to be the winning hypothesis and the NP would be shown to be in complement position to a head D in a DP shell.

In order to achieve this end, Longobardi argues that BNs in Italian are DPs, rather than NPs. To begin with, bare (i.e. determinerless) singular nouns are impossible in Italian in argument position, either preverbally or postverbally, as seen in (5) and (6) below. However, in non-argument positions, these nominals turn out to be acceptable as (7) illustrates (The examples are Longobardi's (6a, 6b, and 7a, respectively)).

(5) *(Un/Il) grande amico di Maria mi ha telefonato
(a/the) great friend of Maria called me up

(6) Ho incontrato *(un/il) grande amico di Maria ieri.
I met (a/the) great friend of Maria yesterday

- (7) Caro amico, vieni a trovarmi
dear friend come to visit me

The same cannot be said of all bare nominals in Italian, however. Bare plurals and singular mass nouns can appear articleless/determinerless in argument position as in (8) and (9) (Longobardi's 12a and 12b):

- (8) Bevo sempre vino.
I always drink wine

- (9) Mangio patate.
I eat/am eating potatoes

However, the occurrence of bare plurals and mass nouns in Italian, Longobardi points out, is subject to a structural requirement in that their (un)grammaticality is determined by whether they occupy a pre- or post- verbal position in the sentence. This is attested in the contrast seen in examples (1)-(3) above, repeated here as (10)-(12):⁴

- (10)*Acqua viene giù dalle colline (Italian)
water comes down from the hills

- (11) Viene giù acqua dalle colline.
comes down water from the hills

- (12) Ho preso acqua dalla sorgente.
I took water from the spring

⁴ We will see in § 3.3.1 the kind of evidence Longobardi provides for the DP status of BNs in Italian.

This contrast in grammaticality according to whether the BN is in pre- or post-verbal position is reminiscent for Longobardi of a structural requirement empty categories in the general case, and empty complementizer heads in English in particular, are subject to, namely, lexical government (1994: 616). Longobardi takes this empty category, which is presumably in need of lexical government, to be an empty D and claims further that it is to be understood as an existential operator imposing a plurality (count or mass) constraint on the head noun, hence the ungrammaticality of bare singular count nouns in Italian.⁵ Longobardi (1994:617) sums up this state of affairs in the following generalizations concerning BNs in Italian:

(13) Empty determiners may occur at S-Structure in Italian only under the following conditions:

- a. They are restricted to plurals or mass head nouns like several other determiners.
- b. They are subject to a lexical government requirement like other empty heads.
- c. They receive an indefinite interpretation corresponding to an existential quantifier unspecified for number and taking the narrowest possible scope (default existential).

If BNs in Italian are headed by an empty D that needs to be lexically governed, this begs

⁵ Recall from Chapter 2 that this situation does not hold for PA since singular count nominals occur bare. If we assume that the singular bare nominal in PA is also introduced by an empty D, an assumption both reasonable and desirable at least conceptually, then the empty D in PA does not force such plurality requirement on the N it quantifies over.

the question why proper nouns in Italian are not subject to such a requirement especially since they can occur determinerless at S-Structure. The situation at hand naturally leads Longobardi to the conclusion that determinerless proper nouns have to substitute into D at S-Structure to avoid violating the lexical government constraint. The details of the analysis are not relevant at this point. What is relevant in this context is to what extent the lexical government analysis holds and what problems it seems to give rise to or leave unresolved. My contention is that this analysis leaves much to be desired to which I turn directly.

3.2.2 Problems with the Lexical Government Approach

3.2.2.1 The Nature of the Lexical Government

As Longobardi himself notices (1994: 117-fn. 11), the lexical government requirement null determiners are allegedly subject to is such that a loose definition of government is ruled out. To be more precise, the government relation needs to be tight enough so as not to allow governing the empty head across a small clause boundary as in (14) which parallels the impossibility of governing an empty C in English as in (15):

- (14) *Consideravo studenti intelligenti
I considered students intelligent

- (15) I expected *(that) John is intelligent (to be) an obvious truth.

Longobardi concludes that this lexical government has to be satisfied by a *head-complement* relation holding between the lexical head and the BN, respectively. While

this may be the correct generalization for examples such as (8), repeated here as (16),

- (16) Bevo sempre vino.
I always drink wine

where the BN is in complement position to the lexical head, or even in examples with unaccusative verbs where the subject is arguably generated in object position, lexical government seems to be far less straightforward when the BN is in the subject position of a sentence with a transitive verb with a VOS order. Consider the VOS order example in (17) from PA:

- (17) banu l-ʔahraamat ʔabiid
built-3P the-pyramids slaves
'slaves built the pyramids'

It may very well be safe to assume that the counterpart of (17) is also acceptable in Romance, at least in Spanish where the VOS order is attested (see for example, Zubizarreta (1998), Ordóñez (1998)). Whether we assume that the VOS order is generated via right-adjunction of S to the VP (as in Suñer (1994) and Torrego (1984) (cited by Ordóñez (1998)), or by moving the object to a specifier position higher than the subject but lower than the verb as Ordóñez (1998) proposes, or even as in Zubizarreta (1998) who argues that VOS order is derived from VSO by moving VP₂ that

contains the object to left adjoin to VP₁ stranding the subject,⁶ it is by no means clear how lexical government obtains between the verb and the subject, let alone in a head-complement relation.

To sum up, the lexical government requirement may well hold between a lexical head and its BN *object* in complement position. However, this is by no means an unproblematic assumption in the case of BN *subjects*, especially in the VOS order. To implement such an assumption would require Longobardi (1994) to qualify his analysis in ways that might make such an analysis lose its explanatory power or generality.

3.2.2.2 Modification and Coordination of BNs

It has been claimed that BNs may show up preverbally in Spanish (and also Italian) if modified or conjoined as in the following examples from Suñer (1982:226-228) (her 55a, 60a):⁷

- (18) Hombres así no deberian existir
 ‘Men like that ought not to exist.’

- (19) Cubiertos, platos y vasos aparecieron como por milagro
 ‘Flatware, plates, and glasses appeared as if by miracle.’

⁶ Zubizarreta argues that in Spanish VOS order is derived from VSO by moving the VP₂ that contains the object to left adjoin to VP₁ as in (i):

(i) [_{TP} me regalo [_{VP1} [_{VP2} la botella de vino_k [_{e_k} [_{V₂} e_k]]]_i [_{VP1} Maria [_{V₁} [_{e_i}]]]]]
 to-me gave the bottle of wine Maria

⁷ Suñer points out (1982:227) that the modified BNs in preverbal position are somehow contrastive. So, in (18) in the text she explains that the sentence does not refer to men in the general sense, but to a subset of men who happen to be ‘like that.’ This seems to me to be in line with the general analysis I argue for in this work.

Longobardi (1994: 618, fn. 12) makes the same observation. He acknowledges that the generalizations in (13) above posited for BNs do in fact allow room for exceptions. To start with, he notices that BNs can occur preverbally if modified by an AP, PP, or a relative clause (however, he notes that this is acceptable at an elevated stylistic level) as in (20)-(22):

- (20) Meravigliose foreste/Foreste meravigliose si aprivano davanti ai nostri occhi.
beautiful forests opened in front of our eyes
- (21) Ragazze delle più varie origini affollavano i marciapiedi
girls of most varied origins crowded the sidewalk
tra Rue St. Denis e Boulevard Sébastopole
between Rue St. Denis and Boulevard Sébastopole
- (22) Ragazze che Gianni non aveva mai visto affollavano i maciapiedi tra...
girls that Gianni had never seen crowded the sidewalk between...

Longobardi also says that BNs may be acceptable in post-copular argument position if modified:

- (23) La causa delle rivolte sono spesso marocchini che non vogliono tornare a casa
the cause of the riots are often Moroccans who don't want to go back home

Coordinated BNs also violate Longobardi's generalization in (13b):

- (24) Cane e gatto erano già addormentati**
dog and cat had already fallen asleep

It is important to note that these examples stand as violations to the generality of Longobardi's claims for his analysis. He does acknowledge the status of these examples as exceptions in the language, however marked they may be. In the footnote he suggests that perhaps modification of a BN endows the D head that is empty with certain features (which he does not specify) that allow it to circumvent or satisfy the lexical government requirement. As for coordination Longobardi admits that this remains a mystery under his account.

Note first that to acknowledge that these examples are exceptions to the generality of his analysis, Longobardi has unavoidably weakened his position somewhat. It would certainly be more advantageous, on theoretical and empirical grounds, to propose an analysis that does not view the examples in (18)-(24) as 'violations' or 'exceptions' to the generality of the analysis. Second, while Longobardi claims that these exceptions hold at a restricted stylistic level, the same cannot be said of BNs in other languages such as PA. In the latter language, where BNs behave in a parallel fashion to Romance BNs, such 'violations' or 'exceptions' are quite ubiquitous and not only limited to a stylistic or elevated level of discourse. Therefore, Longobardi's analysis would not offer us any new insights with respect to PA BNs. In the analysis argued for in this work, on the other hand, modification and coordination do not stand as exceptions or indeed violations to the generality and explanatory power of the analysis proposed. As a matter of fact, I demonstrate later in this chapter that modification and coordination play absolutely no role in licensing BNs.

In more general terms, Longobardi's analysis is conceptually unappealing in that a disjunction is assumed in the behavior of an essentially uniform phenomenon. BNs are

subject to precisely the same interpretation in both pre- and post-verbal positions; that is, they are always interpreted existentially. This seems to call for a unified analysis.

Such an analysis will be forthcoming in § 3.4.

3.2.2.3 Focused Preverbal BNs

Perhaps more troubling about Longobardi's analysis is its failure to take the interaction between BNs and the information structure of the sentence into account. It is indeed the case that he observes that focusing a preverbal BN makes it more acceptable (1994:616, fn.10) and suggests that the lexical government requirement on the head D may be satisfied by reconstructing the preverbal BN to a postverbal position.⁸

A reconstruction analysis of a focused preverbal BN cannot be correct, however. It contradicts Longobardi's general assumptions concerning the level at which the lexical government requirement is satisfied in Italian. Longobardi's contention is that such a structural requirement is fulfilled for Italian overtly at S-Structure (i.e. *in the syntax*), unlike English in which this requirement is satisfied covertly at LF. A reconstruction analysis must crucially assume that this process, reconstructing the BN to a postverbal position, has to take place covertly, at LF, in Italian. However, this is not the relevant level for Italian since in this language, according to Longobardi's own formulation, the lexical government requirement has to be fulfilled at S-Structure, otherwise Italian BNs would be able to distribute across the board both pre- and post-verbally, exactly as in English, unrestricted, which is obviously not the case.

⁸ Longobardi assumes here that the left-peripheral placement of the focused BN is a result of a topicalization process.

Longobardi's second suggestion, based on personal communication with Luigi Rizzi, is that it can be assumed that only the NP moves to a preverbal position, leaving the D head behind to satisfy the lexical government locally. This suggestion, I think, is a stipulation at best. One can hypothesize further that postverbal nominals that are modified by overt determiner (e.g. an indefinite article *un* in Italian or its plural counterpart) would actually have this option of moving to a preverbal position leaving the overt D head behind. This option is obviously impossible and empirically unattested.

I conclude, therefore, that Longobardi's attempts to explain away the acceptability of focused preverbal BNs in terms of reconstruction, or particularly in terms of NP movement that strands a determiner head, are unmotivated and conceptually inadequate.

3.2.2.4 The Empty D as a Default Existential Operator

Longobardi (1994:617) argues that the empty D head acts as an existential operator that imposes a certain requirement of plurality (count or mass) on the head BN. This, he points out, explains why BNs in Italian are restricted to plural count and singular mass nominals. Cross-linguistically, however, this assumption is problematic.

PA does not possess an indefinite article. Singular count nominals, therefore, occur bare and distribute, and are interpreted, in identical ways to bare plurals in this language. Furthermore, I have noted in Chapter 2 that plural BNs in PA also behave in an identical fashion to Romance BNs. It seems to be highly stipulative to posit a different internal structure for singular BNs and plural BNs in PA on the one hand, or plurals BNs in PA and plurals BNs in Romance, on the other. In other words, it would likely be an incorrect assumption to say that singular BNs in PA are NPs while plural

BNs in this language are DPs, with an empty D quantifying over the BN. This claim is empirically problematic and leads to the wrong predictions. Recall from Chapter 2 that singular and plural BNs participate equally and in identical ways in syntactic operations argued to take place in the Construct State in PA, in particular substituting into a D position. Such a syntactic operation, i.e. substituting a *singular* BN into a head D, would not be possible if these nominals are assumed to be NPs, rather than NPs contained in a DP shell. Finally, as will be shown in more detail in § 3.4.1.5, both singular and plural BNs interact in identical ways with the information structure of the sentence in PA which calls for a uniform analysis. It is in fact the null hypothesis that these nominals should be subject to such a uniform treatment. The onus of proof, it seems to me, would be on an analysis that argues for the opposite state of affairs.

These observations are not meant to argue against the existence of an empty D head. In fact, my proposal in this work assumes the correctness of the DP hypothesis and that BNs are DPs, and not NPs. What the preceding remarks attempt to contradict is positing interpretive or structural constraints such as lexical government on this empty head.

Summing up, Longobardi's analysis leaves a number of issues unresolved. The nature of lexical government would have to be tight enough to allow lexically governing a subject, in a VOS sentence in particular. The implementation of this is far from trivial and would require extra assumptions and machinery that may render the analysis cumbersome. In addition, modification and coordination remain weak links in such an analysis in that they would constitute exceptions that do not lend themselves to a straightforward explanation within the set of assumptions available in Longobardi's approach. Longobardi's system also makes contradictory assumptions concerning the

level at which the lexical government requirement is presumed to hold in Italian. To account for the acceptability of focused preverbal BNs in Italian Longobardi would have to assume either reconstructing the BN at LF to a postverbal position or NP-movement out of a DP shell into a preverbal position. Both assumptions are decidedly problematic. An analysis in which these problematic issues do not arise would be more desirable. Such an analysis seems to me to be tenable. I will have more to say about this in the following sections. In what follows directly I turn to an examination of another approach argued for by Casielles-Suarez (1997).

3.3 BNs and the Mapping Hypothesis

We have seen above that a lexical government account is unable to satisfactorily and adequately account for the distribution of BNs. Casielles-Suarez (1997) seeks to account for the distribution of BNs in Spanish without resorting to a government requirement, contra Contreras (1986) and Longobardi (1994). I briefly review the analysis in Casielles-Suarez (1997) (henceforth, C-S) noting in conclusion that it too falls short of adequately accounting for the distribution of BNs.

3.3.1 NPs or DPs

Before tackling the technical details of C-S's analysis, I would like to note that first and foremost C-S assumes, without argument, that BNs in Spanish are NPs, and not DPs. I think there is enough evidence, especially of a cross-linguistic nature, to argue against this assumption. The first piece of evidence is in fact provided by Longobardi (1994).

Perhaps Longobardi's major piece of evidence to the DP-status of BNs in Italian stems from his contention that BNs are unable to fulfill a lexical government restriction preverbally, unlike their occurrence in postverbal positions. We cannot, however, accept such an argument due to the simple fact that I have immediately above argued against the correctness of the applicability of this notion of government to BNs. The evidence for the DP status of BNs has to be sought elsewhere. Longobardi does in fact provide other empirical evidence which bears on this issue.

According to Longobardi (1994:618), determinerless predicative expressions with mass or plural heads can be shown to contain an empty D head. Consider the following (Longobardi's 19a-19f) :

- (25) a. Gianni è medico.
Gianni is doctor
- b. Gianni è un medico.
Gianni is a doctor
- c. *Gianni è medico che si cura davvero dei suoi pazienti.
Gianni is doctor who really cares for his patients
- d. Gianni è un medico che si cura davvero dei suoi pazienti.
Gianni is a doctor who really cares for his patients
- e. Noi siamo medici che ci curiamo davvero dei nostri pazienti.
We are doctors who really care for our patients
- f. Noi siamo dei medici che ci curiamo davvero dei nostri pazienti.
We are PARTIT ART doctors who really care for our patients

The minimal pair in (25a) and (25b) argues for the optionality of the indefinite article in these sentences. Relativization in (25c) is ungrammatical. The source of the

ungrammaticality is arguably the absence of the article. Evidence for this comes from contrasting (25c) with (25d) which minimally differs from the former in that the article is present and relativization works here. In other words, the relevant factor to make relativization work seems to be the presence of a D head.⁹ Now, Longobardi explains, if relativization is parasitic on the presence of a D head, either an overt head in the case of (25d) and (25f) with the partitive article, or empty in the case of (25e), taken in tandem with the optionality of the article in (25a-b), this suggests that in the case of plural BNs there always has to be a (n empty) D head.^{10 11}

Another cross-linguistic observation may provide further evidence in this regard. Recall from Chapter 2, § 2.2.4, that BNs (or determinerless nominals) in PA can substitute into a D position when they are marked with the necessary (in)definiteness features, as argued also for bare nominals in the PA Construct State. If such a head position did not exist then no N movement would be possible out of the NP in complement position to the empty D. These cross-linguistic observations waken C-S's assumption that BNs in Spanish are NPs, rather than DPs.¹²

⁹ This line of argument, of course, takes for granted that the indefinite article is in D, an assumption that is not uncontroversial. Munn and Schmitt (1999) argue that the indefinite article is the spell out of singular number, which would explain the impossibility of bare singulars in predicative positions in English, unlike what happens in Romance. This, Munn and Schmitt (1999:7) argue, would follow from the difference in the structure of the predicate nominal in Romance and English. In the former, Agr and Num would be split, unlike English in which Agr and Num are fused. So, in Romance the predicate nominal would be an AgrP whereas in English it would be an Agr/NumP.

¹⁰ Similar examples with mass nominals are also provided by Longobardi.

¹¹ An additional argument provided by Longobardi (p.620) is exemplified by the following sentences:

(i) Ritengo Mario *(un) bravo medico.

I believe Mario (a) good doctor

(ii) Ritengo Gianni e Mario (dei) bravi medici.

I believe Gianni and Mario (PARTIT ART) good doctors

The indefinite singular article *un* is obligatory in (i). However, in the almost identical (ii), except for plurality, the article is optional. (ii) would be good with an overt partitive article or a non-overt D head.

¹² Schmitt and Munn (2000) argue, however, that bare nominals in Romance are NumPhrases while bare

3.3.2 NP-Movement Vs. DP-Movement

Acting on the assumption that BNs in Spanish are NPs, and not DPs- an assumption noted immediately above to be problematic from a cross-linguistic perspective- Casielles-Suarez (1997) contends that the asymmetry apparent in the behavior of BNs, for her attested in the contrast between (26) and (27), follows from the fact that BNs, being NPs, cannot move out of the VP (These are her examples (3) and (4), p. 95):

(26) jugaban niños en la calle
played children in the street

(27) * Niños jugaban en la calle
children played-3pl in the street

In other words, BNs in Spanish are always interpreted within the VP, C-S argues. This would help explain why BNs in Spanish can only be interpreted existentially and the BNs in examples (26) and (27) above can never be interpreted generically. This is also seen in the ungrammaticality of (28) and (29) (her 17 and 19, respectively) with a generic reading:

(28) * Niños (generalmente) jugaban en la calle (generic)
children (generally) played-3pl in the street

(29) * jugaban (generalmente) niños en la calle *generic
played (generally) children in the street

nominals in Brazilian Portuguese and English are DPs.

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To account for the acceptability of focused preverbal BNs, C-S unavoidably assumes a different kind of movement for BNs out of the VP, namely, focus-preposing. The claim is that while BNs can focus-prepose at S-Structure these nominals are reconstructed back into the VP at LF. That also, C-S argues, explains why they are interpreted existentially. This last observation follows from the Mapping Hypothesis of Diesing (1992b), which C-S assumes to be correct and applicable to Spanish BNs. This brings me to the first major problem that can be noted with C-S's analysis, namely, that the analysis in essence relies on the correctness of Diesing's Mapping Hypothesis (MH). The MH, however, has been shown to be inadequate and empirically problematic by several researchers, among whom are Reinhart (1995) and Pinto (1997). In the following section I briefly review the essential assumptions of the Mapping Hypothesis of Diesing (1992b) and the criticism leveled against it by Reinhart (1995) and Pinto (1997). However, I first begin by looking at Heim's (1982) analysis of indefinites as variables on which Diesing (1992b) bases her own proposal.

3.3.3 The Mapping Hypothesis: Assumptions and Problems

3.3.3.1 Heim's (1982) Conception of Indefinites

Diesing (1992b) assumes a view of indefinites as variables unselectively bound based on the analysis presented in Heim (1982).¹³ Heim (1982) argues that indefinites do not have any quantificational force of their own. The quantificational force indefinites seem to have is brought about by other expressions in the linguistic

¹³ See Carlson (1977a, b) for arguments against viewing bare nominals as indefinites.

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environment of the indefinite. So, adverbs of quantification (such as *always*) act as operators that bind two arguments according to the following schema:

$$(30) \text{ Q-Adv } (\Phi, \Psi)$$


The Q-Adv in this case unselectively binds the variables in the following manner exemplified for *always*:

$$(31) \text{ "always } (\Phi, \Psi) \text{ " is true iff every assignment to the free variables in } \Phi \text{ which makes } \Phi \text{ true also makes } \Psi \text{ true.}$$

The first argument Φ of the quantifying adverb acts as a restriction on the domain of quantification of the adverb, hence the term 'restrictive clause.' The second term in the quantification corresponds to what Heim labels 'nuclear scope.' So $Q\text{-Adv } (\Phi, \Psi)$ is true iff the variable assignment to Ψ (the nuclear scope) belongs to the restricted set of variable assignment satisfying Φ (the restrictive clause). Indefinites, Heim argues, act more like variables than quantifiers. Indefinites have this variable reading in virtue of their lexical meaning and this variable reading is the only reading contributed by the indefinite to whatever sentence it occurs in. Thus, the quantification present in sentences containing indefinites is triggered by something else in the sentence and not by the indefinite: either by an adverb of quantification, overt or invisible, i.e. implicit, or by existential closure. The mapping from S-Structure to Logical Form is achieved via a

number of rules Heim calls 'rules of construal.'¹⁴ The end result of these rules of construal is cutting up the logical form into a tripartite structure as demonstrated for the example "Every man arrived" below:

(32) Every man arrived




Also consider the following example (32a) and its representation in (32b) (her examples (16) and (17c')) from Heim (1982: 191) that shows how this work with a quantifying adverb (such as *always*):

(32a) If a cat has been exposed to 2,4-D it always goes blind.

¹⁴ According to Heim (1982), the first rule of construal is called *NP-Indexing*: *Assign every NP a referential index*. Another rule of construal is *NP-Prefixing*: *Adjoin every non-pronominal NP to S (i.e. IP), leaving behind a co-indexed empty category*. A third rule of construal is *Quantifier Construal*: *Attach every quantifier as left-most immediate constituent of S (IP)*. This rule of construal helps create the tripartite structures characteristic of quantificational sentences. Finally, Existential Closure is a rule of construal that subdivides into 2 parts: *Adjoin a quantifier $\exists$ to the nuclear scope of every quantifier*, and the other division of Existential Closure takes care of indefinites in unembedded sentences: *Adjoin the quantifier $\exists$ to T(ext)* (as in the sentence *He went to a restaurant. It was expensive.*). Here it is assumed that there is an operation or process of text formation where a number of sentences are *conjoined* under a T node.

(32b)



Depending on where the indefinite is placed the interpretation will vary accordingly. If it is caught in the restrictive clause of an implicit or explicit quantifier/operator (as in (32b)) it gets the generic interpretation. However, if it occurs in the nuclear scope of the operator it gets bound by existential closure (the default existential operator ($\exists$ in (32b))).

Diesing adopts Heim's analysis with very minimal changes. Among the modifications that Diesing makes to the original Heim analysis is Diesing's assumption that existential closure only closes off the nuclear scope and there is no existential closure applying to the whole text (see *fn.* 14). The application of existential closure to texts would give the wrong reading for a sentence such as the following:

(33) Oscar owns sheep. Otto vaccinates them.

Applying text-level existential closure to this sentence would mean that there are some

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sheep that Oscar owns that Otto vaccinates. However, the meaning of the sentence is that Otto vaccinates all of the sheep owned by Oscar.

Diesing further assumes that the mapping from the syntactic structure to the logical form is straightforward. She splits the (two-subject¹⁵) syntactic tree into material that maps into the nuclear scope which is isomorphic with the VP (containing the VP-internal subject) and material that gets mapped into the restrictive clause which includes the higher subtree dominating the VP. From there on it is a very short step to produce the relevant interpretations for indefinites, Diesing argues. An indefinite that is mapped into the nuclear scope (i.e. within the VP) is interpreted existentially, where existential closure is operational, whereas an IP-level indefinite gets interpreted generically. This Diesing formalizes as the Mapping Hypothesis (1992b:10) in (34):

(34) The Mapping Hypothesis

Material from VP is mapped into the nuclear scope.
Material from IP is mapped into a restrictive clause.

Diesing brings a good amount of empirical data from both German and English to bear on the correctness of the mapping from the syntactic structure to the semantic representation the Mapping Hypothesis is supposed to encode. German seems to provide *prima facie* confirmation of the MH since in this language subjects can occur in either of the two positions argued for the subject at S-Structure: in the VP-internal

¹⁵ Diesing assumes the VP-Internal Subject Hypothesis which maintains that subjects are base-generated in a specifier position internal to the verb phrase (see, among others, Koopman and Sportiche 1991).

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position or in VP-external position. The placement of the subject in either of these positions coincides with a difference in interpretation: in the VP-internal position the indefinite subject is read existentially whereas in the VP-external position it can only be generic.¹⁶ Since subjects in English only occur VP externally Diesing is forced to assume LF lowering for existentially read subjects. Therefore, the indefinite subject *firemen* in (35), which Diesing takes to be ambiguous between a generic and an existential reading, would have to lower, or reconstruct, back into the VP at LF on the existential reading. This option is unavailable when the indefinite subject *firemen* is generically interpreted in (35) and in (36) (or for German indefinite subjects for that matter since the mapping in German takes place overtly).

(35) Firemen are available.

(36) Firemen are altruistic.

To execute this idea Diesing assumes, with Kratzer (1995), that subjects of Individual-Level predicates (Carlson 1977a, b) are base generated outside the VP, and cannot therefore reconstruct. Subjects of Stage-Level predicates are base generated VP-internally and their S-Structure position is derived. These subjects can accordingly reconstruct back into the VP at LF.

This brief overview of Diesing's (1992b) analysis would be sufficient for my

¹⁶ Diesing's judgments concerning the positioning of subjects at S-Structure, either pre- or post-verbally, follow from her claim that certain adverbials such as *ja doch* 'indeed' mark off the edge of the VP. An indefinite subject occurring to left of this particle would be outside the VP whereas an indefinite occurring to the right would be inside.

purposes here. For the exact technical details of Diesing's analysis the reader is referred to that work. I turn in the next section to an evaluation of the theoretical and empirical soundness of the MH by briefly considering the work of Reinhart (1995) and Pinto (1997).

3.3.3.2 Problems with the Mapping Hypothesis

3.3.3.2.1 Reinhart (1995)

Reinhart (1995:63) points out that Diesing posits a parametric variation (e.g. between English and German) at the LF level. Recall that the MH assumes a lowering rule for the indefinite subject in English, when existentially interpreted, to reconstruct back into the VP at LF. This possibility, on the other hand, cannot be entertained for German since indefinite subjects in this language need not reconstruct due to the availability of two S-Structure positions for subjects.¹⁷ To assume a parametric variation between languages at the LF level, Reinhart explains, runs counter to fairly standard assumptions to the effect that languages do not differ in their LF representations.

Another problem Reinhart points to is the following. *There*-Insertion sentences perhaps provide the strongest evidence for Diesing's analysis.¹⁸ However, Diesing fails

¹⁷ If a lowering rule is assumed for German, indefinite subjects in German would be expected to be ambiguous between a generic and an existential reading in preverbal position, as in English. Furthermore, VP-internal indefinite subjects in German could also be interpreted generically since a 'raising' analysis could in principle be argued for on a par with a lowering analysis. Neither possibility, lowering or raising, is allowed or attested according to Diesing (1992b).

¹⁸ This is so since it is widely known that *there*-insertion sentences give rise to the so-called "definiteness effects" (DE). DE are exemplified by the fact definites are not allowed in *there*-insertion sentences as in **There is the boy in the garden*. Bare plurals occurring in such sentences are interpreted existentially, not

to explain how exactly the facts follow in these sentences. If the mapping from the syntactic structure to the logical representation takes place in English at LF, what, Reinhart asks (p.63, fn), prevents the existential subject from moving at LF to an IP position, as is commonly assumed for the associate in *there*-insertion sentences (e.g. Chomsky (1995)), and in so doing be interpreted outside the VP (i.e. generically).

A claim of Diesing's (1992b) that also turns out to be problematic for Reinhart (1995:71) is the fact that weak indefinites¹⁹ as in (37) are argued to be ambiguous between a strong/presuppositional reading and a weak reading:

(37) Two/Some firemen are available.

Diesing assumes such a distinction to be there, with no further argument, Reinhart points out, nor does Diesing provide a sufficient test to detect this supposed ambiguity, other than an imagined context which to Reinhart's mind leaves many questions unanswered (p.72). As for Diesing's claim that a stressed SOME provides the disambiguation necessary in that it indicates presuppositionality in examples such as (38), Reinhart argues that the stressed SOME can actually occur in *there*-insertion sentences, traditionally a testing ground for weak indefinites where the strong reading is

generically. These BNs in *there*-insertion structure are clearly in the VP at S-Structure. So, according to Diesing's MH they are predicted to have an existential reading. However, note Reinhart's criticism in the text.

¹⁹ Roughly, indefinites that can occur in *there*-insertion sentences (see fn. 18). Milsark (1974), as cited in Ladusaw (1994), makes a distinction in the class of determined NPs between those that have a cardinality reading (*sm men*) (i.e. weak indefinites), and those that are quantificational (*the men*) (i.e. strong indefinites). Diesing also claims that weak indefinites (such as *three men*) are ambiguous between a strong (presuppositional or partitive) reading and a cardinal reading.

excluded, as in (39) (1995:73):

(38) SOME ghosts are in the pantry, the others are in the attic.

(39) There are SOME ghosts in the attic.

If a stressed SOME can be used to diagnose the strong or presuppositional reading then we lose our account of the ungrammaticality of sentences such as "*There is every ghost in the garden," Reinhart explains. These problems are non-trivial in that they demand from Diesing extra assumptions that could further complicate her analysis.

3.3.3.2.2 Pinto (1997)

Other problems with the MH have been pointed out by Pinto (1997) who demonstrates that empirical evidence from Italian is at odds with the basic tenets of Diesing's MH.

Pinto's (1997) main concern is to argue that (subject-verb) inversion in Italian is not free but is syntactically determined. To begin with, she shows that inversion cannot be connected to or reflective of unaccusativity since some unaccusative verbs cannot invert with a wide focus reading and some unergatives can invert with such a reading.²⁰ The availability of inversion with a wide focus reading for Pinto follows from the presence of a locative argument LOC that is syntactically projected but could be lexically covert.

²⁰ A sentence with a wide focus reading is basically an answer to the question "what happened?" as opposed to a sentence with a narrow focus reading whose question could be, for example, "who *v-ed* (DP)?" The importance of wide focus reading here is that the answer to a question with wide focus reading in languages such as Italian, which has two surface positions for the subject, would usually be answered by an inverted structure.

Evidence for this comes from the difference in meaning between inverted (VS) and non-inverted sentences (SV). In the former the meaning seems to involve a locative argument or location that is deictic (i.e. speaker oriented). Such an argument is absent from non-inverted sentences. The syntactic implementation of Pinto's ideas is achieved through adopting a Minimalist (in the sense of Chomsky (1995)) approach to the data. Since the details or the execution of these ideas are not relevant here I will only give Pinto's findings and generalizations that are in conflict with or critical of Diesing's MH.

Pinto (1997:199) observes that the mapping to logical forms in Italian must occur overtly in the syntax (like German) since with inversion verbs the indefinite subject in preverbal position has only a partitive reading (i.e. strong, therefore mapped into the restrictive clause at LF). Postverbally, the subject can only have a weak (i.e. existential) reading. This pattern, which supports Diesing's MH, is exemplified as in (40a-b):

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| (40) a. Due linguisti sono arrivati.
two (of the) linguists arrived | partitive/ #existential |
| b. Sono arrivati due linguisti.
arrived two linguists | existential/ #partitive |
| c. Due dei linguisti sono arrivati.
two of the linguists arrived | partitive/ #existential |
| d. Sono arrivati due dei linguisti.
arrived two of the linguists | partitive/ #existential |

With overt partitives, however, the readings are not predicted by the MH.²¹ In both

²¹ However, Pinto realizes that it could be argued that overt partitives are not indefinites as such. Still, she

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(40c) and (40d) the overt partitive does not have an existential reading.²² Assuming the MH, the overt partitive in (40d) occurring postverbally has to be mapped into the nuclear scope (since it is VP-internal) and should get an existential reading, a reading which is in reality unavailable. To rescue example (40d) it could be argued that the mapping takes place at LF where the postverbal partitive scrambles out of the VP to be mapped into the restrictive clause. But then (41a) would be expected to be ambiguous between a strong and a weak reading (depending on whether the indefinite reconstructs or not, like English BNs with stage-level predicates), which is again contrary to fact.

As for indefinite subjects in sentences with non-inversion verbs, Pinto argues that the following generalization holds:

- (42) Interpretation of indefinites in non-inversion verb contexts:
 preverbal subjects → partitive or existential
 postverbal subjects → not available with wide focus

Pinto points out that (42) is not necessarily problematic to the MH; however, to account for the ambiguity in the interpretation of the preverbal subject the mapping would have to be assumed to occur covertly; but this again conflicts with the mapping supposed to take place overtly for examples (40a-b) above.

The following examples are also noted to pose a problem to the MH:

maintains that the fact remains that Diesing's analysis does not account for or consider overt partitives.

²² A partitive reading for Pinto coincides with a strong (as opposed to weak) reading of the indefinite. This reading in Diesing's system is possible in the IP domain, not within the VP.

(43) a. Che cosa è successo?
what happened

b. Ha pianto un bambino.
cried a child

c. E' svenuto un uomo.
fainted a man

These examples are acceptable postverbally with wide focus reading with non-inversion verbs, Pinto argues (p. 204). So, she proposes to modify (42) as follows:

(44) Indefinite subjects with non-inversion verbs:
strong and weak indefinites must occur in preverbal subject position where they are ambiguous. When the determiner is the indefinite article, the subject can show up both in preverbal and postverbal position, correlating with a strong and a weak interpretation respectively.

In other words, it would have to be assumed that the mapping is overt for the indefinite article, while all other weak determiners, which can only show up preverbally, would require covert mapping. This is surely a problematic assumption.

Apart from all these empirical problems with the MH Pinto (1997: 205) also points out a conceptual problem. The MH comes at the cost of a redundancy at the lexical level **by** positing an ambiguity approach to indefinites. Indefinites would be ambiguous **between** weak and strong or existential and presuppositional.

To sum up, we have seen in the brief overview of Reinhart's and Pinto's analyses **that** the assumptions contained in Diesing's (1992b) proposal are problematic at best. **Reinhart** demonstrates that the MH leaves some questions unanswered. The MH also

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makes assumptions that are theoretically unorthodox and problematic such as stating parametric variation between languages at level of Logical Form. Pinto in turn points out some conceptual inadequacies of the MH, such as the redundancy at the lexical level the MH assumes for indefinites. More importantly, Pinto's analysis shows that the MH is empirically inadequate in that it makes the wrong empirical predictions for Italian data.

3.3.4 An Evaluation of Casielles-Suarez's (1997) Analysis

The discussion in the previous two sections has been intended to illustrate, and it seems to me has also established, that for an analysis assuming the correctness of the MH some conceptual and empirical problems emerge that would need to be overcome. Casielles-Suarez's (1997) (C-S, henceforth) analysis essentially presupposes the correctness of the MH. However, apart from this significant weakness in C-S's analysis, i.e. relying entirely on the correctness of the MH, there remain some other problems that C-S's proposal faces, to which I turn directly.

Recall from § 3.3.2 C-S's basic proposal: BNs in Spanish are NPs, not DPs, which cannot move out of the VP. This explains, in C-S's view, their unacceptability in preverbal positions as well as their existential reading since these nominals are 'caught' inside the VP, thus subject to the effects of existential closure. An immediate problem this analysis faces is how to explain the alleged grammaticality of BNs when modified or coordinated. If modification and coordination could in principle rescue BNs in preverbal positions then it would have to be said that, when modified or coordinated, BNs a) are no longer NPs, or b) become DPs, or c) are NPs that can, somehow, DP-

move out of the VP. It is not clear to me how any of these assumptions can be implemented or executed; or, at least, their implementation is far from trivial. As for the acceptability of focused preverbal BNs C-S is forced to assume a movement account for these nominals from within the VP. This movement is licit, she suggests, since it is an instance of focus-preposing.

To assume focus-preposing (i.e. movement) for focused BNs causes C-S's analysis to lose the uniformity that would have been otherwise a welcome result of her approach. Here are the cold facts of the analysis: unfocused BNs are NPs that cannot move out of the VP at S-Structure; focused BNs can focus-move or prepose out of the VP at this level. This bifurcation unnecessarily complicates the analysis of BNs and a simpler analysis would obviously be more desirable.

More damaging to C-S's analysis is her argument concerning focus-preposing while, at the same time, assuming Diesing's MH. It is abundantly clear from her analysis that the mapping to logical representations she assumes for Spanish, in keeping with the MH, takes place overtly in the syntax (i.e. at S-Structure). If focus-preposing occurs overtly, then the focused bare nominal would have to reconstruct into the VP to be caught by the default existential operator closing off the nuclear scope. The mapping for focus-preposed BNs, therefore, should inevitably be assumed to occur covertly, at LF, not overtly. But, of course, this is not, nor should it be in terms of C-S's overall system of assumptions, the relevant level for Spanish. This situation seriously undermines C-S's analysis, I think.²³

²³ This is also reminiscent of the situation we have encountered with Longobardi's (1994) solution to

C-S assumes that DP movement in Spanish is topic-driven and that BNs do not have the necessary features and therefore cannot be topics. Abstracting away from whether DP-movement is topic-driven movement or not, I believe C-S's assumption that BNs cannot be topics is essentially correct. This is in essence the line of argument I propose in the present work. However, the (syntactic) execution of the idea that C-S adopts seems to me to beg numerous questions some of which have been raised in the preceding discussion. In addition, C-S fails to recognize the close interaction between BNs in English and information structure. As a matter of fact she assumes that English BNs stand at odds with Spanish BNs with each at a different end of the spectrum. I believe this assumption is the wrong assumption. As has been alluded to in Chapter 2, and as will be seen in more details in the chapters that follow (Chapter 4, in particular), existentially interpreted BNs in English also resist a topic reading in that they are always focal. I show in § 3.5.2 below that (existentially interpreted) English BNs behave much more like Spanish BNs, and also PA BNs, than C-S seems to suggest in her analysis. I conclude, therefore, that C-S's proposal is inadequate in some important respects and a more uniform analysis is called for.

3.4 A Uniform Account of Bare Nominals

The attempts to explain the behavior of BNs based on purely syntactic grounds have turned out to be untenable. Analyses based on the idea of lexical government leave

focused BNs preverbally.

many important issues unresolved, such as the effect modification, coordination or focus may presumably have on the acceptability of BNs. These issues are not satisfactorily addressed in C-S's (1997) account either which takes BNs to be NPs whose movement out of the VP is ruled out, unless, of course, it is focus-preposing. Aside from the lack of uniformity characteristic of C-S's approach, her account is also undermined primarily by the unmotivated reliance on Diesing's Mapping Hypothesis.

Both of the analyses previewed in the previous sections, namely Longobardi (1994) and Casielles-Suarez (1997), have managed somehow to overlook the importance of the information structure of the sentence in which the BN occurs. On the one hand, Longobardi (1994) ignores the glaring relevance of the notion of focus in rehabilitating BNs in preverbal position and unjustifiably assumes it to be an idiosyncratic behavior that can find a motivated explanation in terms of the syntax of BNs. Casielles-Suarez (1997), on the other hand, does recognize the significance of information structure and its relevance to explaining the behavior of BNs when she argues that DP movement in Spanish is topic-driven and that BNs in this language do not have the necessary features to participate in such movement. In other words, BNs cannot be topics. However, C-S fails to see that this restriction on BNs is much stronger and tighter than she assumes as I will explain directly below. Moreover, C-S's analysis mistakenly posits a split between BNs in Spanish and English by failing to recognize that BNs in English actually exhibit a noticeably strong interaction with the information structure of the sentence. This particular issue is taken up in greater detail in the Chapter 4.

In the next section I propose a more restrictive account of BNs in PA and Spanish, and English, as it turns out. In the analysis to be elaborated shortly no disjunction in the

behavior of PA or Spanish bare nominals is presumed. Bare nominals in these languages are unacceptable in preverbal or postverbal position unless they are focal. No structural requirement such as government is needed nor is it necessary to assume that BNs are NPs that have always to occur within the VP. Furthermore, my analysis does not rely on, nor does it assume, Diesing's Mapping Hypothesis, which, as I have attempted to illustrate, is conceptually and empirically inadequate. I believe the analysis I argue for here should prove more superior in the way of explanatory adequacy and conceptually more appealing. Moreover, it will enable us to present a truly restrictive view of the differences in the behavior of BNs between English, on the one hand, and PA and Spanish, on the other. Such a restrictive view would ultimately allow us greater understanding of why these languages use DPs to refer the way they do. This will be the topic of Chapter 5.

3.4.1 Bare Nominals and Informational Focus

3.4.1.1 Bare Nominals and Presentationalism

I begin by discussing the relevant notion of presentationalism. Presentational sentences have the order [VS]. Suñer (1982:125) points out that the communicative function of presentational sentences is asserting the existence of the NP (i.e. DP) referent as exemplified in the following:

- (45) A pareció un hombre
 appeared a man

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- (46) A somó el sol radiante
peeked (3sg) the sun radiant
'The radiant sun peeked out'

That the referent denoted by the NP (DP) is what is being asserted (or, more specifically, its existence) can be demonstrated through negation (p.192.fn 2):

- (47) No apareció un hombre, en realidad no apareció absolutamente nada
no appeared (3sg) a man, in reality no appeared absolutely nothing

What is being negated in (47) is the existence of the referent denoted by *a man* and its participation in the act of *appearing*. In other words, presentational sentences are existential. Both the verb and the NP (DP) in presentational sentences are in the scope of assertion, so both can be rhematic. In declarative sentences (with the order SV(O)) S is **thematic** while the VP is rhematic.

Suñer (1982: 212) further explains that presentationalism is exclusively characteristic of semantically intransitive verbs. If BNs in Spanish are unacceptable in preverbal positions (under normal conditions of stress), and since in presentational sentences the subject is rhematic (and the verb may be), the expectation would be that BNs are perfectly acceptable in presentational (i.e. intransitive) sentences. What remains to be decided, however, is the status of transitive sentences and their interaction with BNs: can transitive sentences be presentational? And if so, can BNs freely occur in them? The answer to the first question Suñer argues to be negative. If the ultimate purpose of presentational sentences is to introduce the DP referent into the world of the

discourse, uniquely and exclusively, then the prediction would be that transitive sentences, which characteristically have two DP referents, cannot be presentational. Suñer also answers the second question in the negative: postposing a BN in a transitive sentence (i.e. creating a presentational context) does not license the BN. This is exemplified by the following examples (Suñer 's (16)-(19)):

- (48) a. *Hombres cazaron un ciervo
 men hunted a deer
- b. *cazaron hombres un ciervo
- c. *cazaron un ciervo hombres
- (49) a. *Rumores llenaban el cuarto
 Rumors filled the room
- b. *Llenaban rumores el cuarto
- c. *Llenaban el curato rumores
- (50) a. *Alumnos dieron regalos a la maestra
 students gave presents to the teacher
- b. *Dieron alumnos regalos a la maestra
- c. *Dieron regalos alumnos a la maestra
- d. *Dieron regalos a la maestra alumnos

Suñer speculates that since transitives have two arguments (V NP NP) ambiguity may **result** under normal conditions of stress and intonation (1982: 213). Therefore the use of **unmodified** BNs postverbally in transitive sentences can be allowed if such ambiguity **can** somehow be barred from arising as in the following examples:

(51) La cosecha la destuyeron langostas
the harvest (f.sg.) it (f.sg.) destroyed (3 pl.) locusts
'The harvest, locusts destroyed it'

(52) El cuarto lo llenaban rumores
the room (m.sg) filled rumors
'The room, rumors filled it'

Notice that (51) and (52) are acceptable since it has been made abundantly clear that the BNs, *langostas* 'locusts' and *rumores* 'rumors,' respectively, are the only rhematic or focal elements in the sentences. Left-dislocating the DPs *La cosecha* 'the harvest' and *El cuarto* 'the room' in (51)-(52) serves to signal their 'topical' status and also highlight the focal status of the BNs in the sentences. I believe Suñer's overall argument is sound and can be shown to be on the right track. I also believe Suñer's descriptive observations can be formalized and carried over successfully to PA.

I have just noted concerning Suñer's examples (51)-(52) that what seems to be crucial for BNs is that they be focal. Focus, then, plays the decisive role in licensing BNs. In the next section I examine briefly Zubizarreta's (1998) assumptions regarding the interaction of focus and nuclear stress (in Spanish) and the notion of informational focus that I adopt in this study.

3.4.1.2 Nuclear Stress and Focus

It has been pointed out by Reinhart (1995) that there are two schools of thought when it comes to the relation between focus and phrasal stress. On the one hand, there has been the argument that the stress of a sentence is phonologically determined, apart from any discoursal consideration. This approach has been revived by Cinque (1993).

On the other hand, the counterargument has been that focus is not phonologically determined and it is primarily determined by discourse determinations. Such an approach has been argued for, for example, in Zubizarreta (1998). For my present purposes, it suffices to say that both these approaches can be shown to be compatible with the PA facts. For simplicity of exposition, and also due to its relevance to the argument to be made in this chapter, I very briefly introduce the main ideas of Zubizarreta (1998) at this stage. A more detailed discussion of Zubizarreta's analysis will have to wait until Chapter 5.

Zubizarreta (1998:37) points out that natural languages make use of one or more of the following ways to mark the focus in the sentence: prosody, morphology or a syntactically specified position. She puts forward an analysis of how prosody identifies the focus of the sentence. Phrasal prominence, as determined by the Nuclear Stress Rule, mediates the relationship between prosody and focus, according to Zubizarreta. To achieve more empirical coverage she argues against a monolithic view of the Nuclear Stress Rule (NSR) and proposes a modular view of this rule according to which asymmetric c-command and selectional ordering play a pivotal role. Glossing over a lot of technical details to be reviewed in the Chapter 5, Zubizarreta argues that in Spanish the Nuclear Stress Rule assigns prominence to the constituent lowest in the syntactic tree in terms of c-command. With this in mind, she motivates what she calls *prosodically-motivated movement* which dislocates constituents that are not focal so that focused constituents end up lowest in terms of c-command. The same facts carry over to PA sentences; for now I assume the correctness of this hypothesis until a thorough examination in Chapter 5.

Taking Suñer's (1982) observations into account, and working within the framework of assumptions in Zubizarreta (1998), I will demonstrate that BNs in PA are only acceptable if focused. However, prior to doing that, I want to briefly explain the notion of focus I assume in this work.

The notion of focus I am assuming in this dissertation will be that adopted in Zubizarreta (1998) (based on Chomsky (1971, 1976) and Jackendoff (1972)). Focus is understood in terms of the discourse notion of presupposition as the non-presupposed part of the sentence (Zubizarreta 1998: 1). Zubizarreta uses the question/answer pattern to determine the information structure of the sentence in terms of focus and presupposition (i.e. shared assumptions). She assumes that the focus structure of the sentence should be represented in connection to and in tandem with the context question of **that** sentence as in the example in (53) below (the focus is indicated with the diacritic *F*). **The** focused constituent in the answer will correspond to the *wh*-element in the **context** question:

- (53) a. [What happened?]
 [_F John [ate [the pie]]].
- b. [What did John do?]
 [John [_F ate [the pie]]]
- c. [What did John eat?]
 [John [ate [_F the pie]]].
- d. [Who ate the pie?]
 [[_F John] [ate [the pie]]].
- e. [What happened to the pie?]
 [[_F John] [[_F ate] [the pie]]].

- f. [What did John do with the pie?]
[John [[_F ate] the pie]].

I think this simplified notion of focus will be sufficient for my purposes in this work.

My next task will be utilizing this notion of focus in fleshing out the details of my main argument, namely, that BNs in PA are always focal. To this I turn directly.

3.4.1.4 Bare Nominals are Always Focal

Let me begin by considering the following example:

- (54) *ʕabiid banu l-ahraam
slaves built the-pyramids

As is **ex**pected the sentence is ungrammatical since the BN *ʕabiid* 'slaves' occurs pre**verb**ally under normal conditions of stress (i.e. unfocused). In accordance with Zubizarreta's system of assumptions noted in the preceding section, the DP *l-ahraam* 'the-pyramids' in (54) would be assigned nuclear stress (NS) (indicated by underlining) by the **N**uclear Stress Rule (NSR). This means *l-ahraam* 'the-pyramids' has to be the **focused**, i.e. the non-presupposed, constituent. However, the sentence would be **grammatical** if the BN was focused as in (55) (I indicate contrastive focalization by **capital**s):²⁴

²⁴ Note that the NS cannot be assigned to *l-ahraam* 'the-pyramids' in (55) as in (i) since the focus in the utterance is *ʕABIID* 'slaves' in which case the latter is contrastively focused, thereby attracting all and the

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- (55) ʔABIID banu l-ahraam
 SLAVES built the-pyramids

This much is uncontroversial. The claim I wish to argue for, however, is stronger: BNs are not possible postverbally either, under normal conditions of stress. Thus, the postverbal BN in (56) is ungrammatical, contrary to common assumptions (for example, as in Longobardi (1994) for Italian (*Romance*), C-S (1997) for Spanish):

- (56) * banu ʔabiid l-ahraam
 built slaves the-pyramids

Let us for the moment abstract away from the ungrammaticality of (56) and attempt to formulate a context question that would be appropriate for such a sentence. Recall from the **brief** discussion above that the NSR in PA and Spanish, as argued by Zubizarreta, **assigns** stress to the lowest element in the syntactic tree in terms of c-command. **Therefore**, stress (or nuclear stress (NS)) would be assigned to *l-ahraam* 'the-pyramids' in (56) since it is lowest in terms of the c-command ordering. According to (the ungrammatical) (56), that the NS is assigned to *l-ahraam* 'the-pyramids' means that *l-ahraam* should be, or is, the non-presupposed part of the structure (i.e. the *asserted* or

only stress in the sentence:
 (i) *ʔABIID banu l-ahraam.

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rhematic part of the sentence). In line with the version of focus assumed in this work, *l-ahraam* 'the-pyramids' should replace, and be represented by, a *wh*-phrase in the context question as in (57a) or a variable in the logical representation as in (57b) (see Zubizarreta 1998: 5). The prediction is that (57a) should therefore be the context question for (56). However, (57a) is ungrammatical:

- (57) a. *šuu banu ʕabiid?
 what built slaves
- b. there is an x, such that slaves built x
 the x, such that slaves built x = the pyramids

I will return in a moment to the source of the ungrammaticality of (57a). For now, notice that since the context question in (57a) is ungrammatical, we need to seek an alternative context question for (56). Let me assume, for the sake of argument, that the correct or felicitous context question for (56) is (58), an assumption I will revise immediately below:

- (58) miin banu l-ahraam?
 who built the-pyramids

However, the context question for (56) could not possibly be (58). To understand why this is the case, notice the contradiction or conflict in the information status of *l-ahraam* 'the-pyramids' in the context question and its status in the answer: *l-ahraam* 'the-pyramids' would be theme (i.e. presupposed) in the context question (i.e. (58)) and rheme (i.e. focus) in the answer (i.e. (56)). Recall that in (56) *l-ahraam* would be

assigned the NS, in virtue of being most deeply embedded or lowest in the chain of c-command, which would mean that it is the focus or the rheme.

Support for the infelicity of (58) as a possible context question to (56) comes from the fact that the only possible answer (with a full sentence) to (58) must in fact be (59a) (placing the so-called *narrow focus* on the subject):

(59) a. banu l-ahraam ʕabiid
 built the-pyramids slaves
 'Slaves built the puramids'

 b.l-ahraam, banu-hin ʕabiid
 the-pyramids built-3P-3P slaves
 'The pyramids, slaves built them'

Alternatively, left-dislocation can be employed to mark the thematic or topical status of *l-ahraam* 'the-pyramids' as in (59b). Going back to (59a), the non-presupposed (focal) constituent (*ʕabiid* 'slaves' in this example, which could be replaced by a variable such as *x* to indicate its focal status: 'the x, such as x built the pyramids') would be assigned the NS. Accordingly, there would be no conflict between the focal status of *l-ahraam* 'the-pyramids' in (58) and (59a) since it would be thematic (i.e. presupposed) in the former (i.e. the context question) and also in the latter (i.e. the answer). Nor would there be conflict in the information status of *ʕabiid* 'slaves' because it would be asserted (i.e. rhematic or non-presupposed) in both the context question and the answer. It therefore seems that an impasse has been reached; no felicitous context question could so far be found for the utterance in (56).

To begin to address our predicament let us keep abstracting away from the ungrammaticality of (56), repeated here as (60). Now, to reiterate, (60) could not be an answer to the context question (57a), repeated here as (61), since ((57a)/(61) is ungrammatical. Since we have exhausted all the possible context questions for (60), and since *ʕabiid* 'slaves' seems to only be subject to a focal reading as the ungrammaticality of (61) illustrates (see below), it follows then that (60) has to be an answer to a context question in which *ʕabiid* 'slaves' cannot be presupposed or thematic; it has to be the focus or the rheme. Therefore, (58), repeated here as (62), seems to be the only possible or compatible context question to (60) (however, see below for a modification in the discussion of examples (67)-(70)):

(60) *banu ʕabiid l-ahraam
built slaves the-pyramids

(61) *ʕuu banu ʕabiid ?
what built slaves.

(62) miin banu l-ahraam?
who built the-pyramids

In (62) *l-ahraam* 'the-pyramids' is the theme or the presupposed constituent; it should not be assigned the NS in the answer in (60). Not only is the ungrammaticality of (60), with **the** NS falling on *l-ahraam* 'the-pyramids,' explained, but it is also expected. There would be two ways (60) could be handled so as *l-ahraam* 'the-pyramids' would not be assigned the NS. First, *l-ahraam* could be right-dislocated (i.e. outside the clause), with

ʕabiid 'slaves' being assigned stress by the NSR. It would be necessary in this case for *l-ahraam* 'the-pyramids' to be (right)-dislocated so that no contradiction would ensue between its status in the context question ((62)), as theme, and its status in the answer ((60)), as rheme. The second option for *l-ahraam* 'the-pyramids' is to be inside the clause (i.e. not dislocated) and *ʕabiid* 'slaves' would crucially have to be focused (contrastively, see Chapter 5) as in (63):²⁵

(63) *banu ʕABIID l-ahraam*
 built SLAVES the-pyramids

In the first option where *l-ahraam* 'the-pyramids' in (60) would be right-dislocated, and under Kayne's (1994) assumptions of phrase structure rules prohibiting right-adjunction, *l-ahraam* would arguably left-adjoin to IP in TopicPhrase (*l-ahraam* being topical), with the subsequent movement of *banu ʕabiid* 'built slaves' to Focus Phrase in order to get the word order facts correctly.²⁶ Or, rather, *ʕabiid* 'slaves' only would move to FP while *banu* 'built' would move into a TopicPhrase since it is thematic or topical. However, I tend to think that *l-ahraam* 'the-pyramids' may actually be *in-situ*, and not right-dislocated, and that *ʕabiid* 'slaves' is contrastively focused. The choice is ultimately

²⁵ This obviously contradicts Sufer's claim (§ 3.4.1.1) that transitive verbs cannot participate in presentational sentences. I believe that transitives can be presentational as long as the BN is assigned focus by the NSR or otherwise contrastively focused (for the differences between informational and contrastive focus see Kiss (1998)).

²⁶ I am assuming here Rizzi's (1997) structure of the left periphery where a focus phrase/projection (FP) is flanked on either side by a topic phrase/projection (TP) (see Chapter 5).

theory-internal. More about this will be said in the Chapter 5.

Returning to (57a)/(61) above, I believe the source of the ungrammaticality of this context question stems from the fact that it has two focuses: the *wh*-phrase and, according to the analysis being presented here, the focused BN, *ʕabiid* 'slaves.' Such a context question cannot be salvaged by contrastively focusing *ʕabiid* 'slaves' since in this case the context question would again have two focuses: the *wh*-pronoun and *ʕABIID* 'slaves.' This line of reasoning is also confirmed by the possibility of contrastively focusing a bare nominal in a question where there is no *wh*-pronoun as in (64):

(64) Q. banu l-ahraam BANAAT?
built the-pyramids GIRLS

A. laʔ. banu l-ahraam ʕABIID
no built the-pyramids SLAVES

The **main** point that emerges from the discussion so far is that the BN is always focused.

The **same** analysis can be extended to sentences containing PPs as in (65):

(65) *ʔaʒo wlaad ʕa-l-beet
came boys to-the-house

(65) is ungrammatical since the bare plural *wlaad* 'boys' occurs in the sentence under **normal** conditions of stress. This sentence could not be an answer to a context question

such as (66) since the question is ungrammatical:

- (66) *ween ʔaʒo wlaad?
where came boys

Again the unacceptability of (66) can be explained in a fashion similar to that argued for (61) above: the utterance in (66) is out since it has two focuses. The only felicitous context question that is possible for (65) is (67):

- (67) miin ʔaʒo ʔa-l-beet?
who came to-the-house

ʔa-l-beet 'to-the-house' is thematic (presupposed) in the context question (67). It may therefore not be assigned stress by the NSR in (65). It follows, as in the analysis for (60), that *ʔa-l-beet* 'to-the-house' in (65) has to be either right-dislocated, in which case *wlaad* 'boys' would be assigned stress by the NSR, or, alternatively, *wlaad* by itself is focused contrastively as in (68):

- (68) ʔadʒo WLAAD ʔa-l-beet
came BOYS to-the-house

However, adopting the latter option for *WLAAD* 'BOYS,' where it would be **contrastively** focused as in (68), may not be the optimal choice. Notice that a more

felicitous answer for the context question in (67) would in fact be (69):

- (69) ʔadʒo ʕa-l-beet wlaad
 came to-the-house boys

As will be explained in more detail in the Chapter 5, in VOS order sentences the subject would be assigned narrow focus (i.e. as an answer to *who V-ed?*). To count as a felicitous answer to (67), where the subject is assigned narrow focus, the preferable constituent order for the answer would need to be VOS (as in (69)). However, if we were to adopt the second option where *WLAAD* 'BOYS' as in (68) would be contrastively focused, a good context question for (68) would then be (70) or (70'):

- (70) ʔaʒo BANAAT ʕa-l-beet?
 came GIRLS to-the-house
 'Did GIRLS come to the house?'

- (70') ʔaʒo ʕa-l-beet BANAAT ?
 came to-the-house GIRLS
 'Did GIRLS come to the house?'

At this point the following question can be posed: why is the context question in (71) grammatical? This is so in spite of the fact that the context question apparently has two focuses, the *wh*-pronoun and the bare nominal, and should therefore be predicted to be ungrammatical:

- (71) miin šaaf WLAAD?
 who saw BOYS

I think the answer to the question is pretty straightforward. In line with my assumptions so far, (71) is acceptable with *WLAAD* 'BOYS' focused contrastively and would be unacceptable if the bare noun is unfocused. However, the reading we get in the question is pair-list reading similar to the pair-list reading we get in questions such as *who saw what?* in which there is only one focus consisting of pairs: *John saw a cat, Bill saw a lion*, etc. (Zubizarreta 1998). So, the dictum that every sentence should have one, and only one, focus, formally expressed in Rizzi's (1997) assumption that a sentence can have multiple TPs (Topic Phrases) but only one FP (Focus Phrase) (see Chapter 5), is not violated by our example.

To sum up, I have argued for a uniform account of BNs in PA. The picture that emerges is very restrictive indeed, particularly when we consider that this analysis, I believe, can happily be applied to Spanish (and English, see Chapter 4). The information structure of the sentence proves vital in deciding the acceptability of BNs since the latter have to always be focal.

Recall from Chapter 2 that I have argued that plural BNs are unmarked for the (in)definiteness features necessary to check the strong +/- Definiteness features of the D position. This argument predicts that singular bare nominals in PA could be afforded the same treatment since these nominals occur determinerless. This prediction is actually borne out. In the next section I wish to argue that singular BNs in PA pattern like plural BNs in this language in being focused regardless of their structural position.

3.4.1.5 Singular Bare nominals in PA

PA does not have an indefinite article. Singular indefinites in Arabic are therefore determinerless, unlike the case in English, for example. I have argued in Chapter 2 that plural bare nominals in non-CS constructions are ungrammatical since they lack the (in)definiteness features necessary to saturate the D position. I have also illustrated there how bare singular indefinites participate freely in construct state constructions, on a par with bare plurals. If the D position is where the (in)definiteness features reside, the expectation would then be that bare singular in PA would not be able to raise to D in non-CS constructions to check the strong features of that position since these nominals would lack (in)definiteness features. Bare singulars would therefore have to be focal in the same way bare plurals are.

This prediction is confirmed by the empirical data. Abstracting away from the singular-plural distinction, singular BNs in PA display a similar behavior like that of plural ones: both have identical distribution and the same interpretation as well. It follows that singular BNs too should be subject to being focused, irrespective of their structural position. This is what we see in the following examples:

(72) *walad ribiḥ l-dʒaaʔize
 boy won-3MS the-prize

(73) *ribiḥ walad l-dʒaaʔize
 won-3MS boy the-prize

(74) ribiḥ l-dʒaaʔize walad
 won-3MS the-prize boy
 'A boy won the prize.'

(75) WALAD ribih l-dʒaaʔize
 BOY won-3MS the-prize

(76) ribih WALAD l-dʒaaʔize
 won-3MS BOY the-prize

The BN *walad* 'boy' is unacceptable under normal conditions of stress as in (72) and (73). However, it is acceptable with a narrow focus reading as seen in (74) and the BN is assigned stress by the NSR (being most deeply embedded or lowest in terms of the c-command ordering). If the BN is not lowest in terms of the c-command ordering, whether occurring pre- or post-verbally, the reading the BN receives is contrastive focus, as seen in (75)-(76). This overall behavior is essentially the same as that noted with respect to plural BNs in the previous section and the same arguments can be constructed for singular BNs to show their focal status on a par with plural ones.

The discussion so far predicts the correctness of the following conceptual statement: since singular and plural BNs have to be focused, and since a sentence cannot have more than one focus, contrastive or otherwise, then no two BNs, singular or plural or a mix of the two, should be able to co-occur. The correctness of this statement is empirically attested. Consider the following:

(77) a. *šaaf walad banaat
 saw boy girls

b. *šaaf banaat walad
 saw-3MS girls boy

c. *WALAD šaaf banaat
 BOY saw-3MS girls

- d. *walad šaaf BANAAT
boy saw-3MS GIRLS
- e. *šaaf WALAD banaat
saw-3MS BOY girls
- f. *šaaf walad BANAAT
saw-3MS boy GIRLS
- g. *šaafu wlaad banaat
saw-3MP boys girls
- h. *šaaf banaat wlaad
saw-3S girls boys

Any combination of singular or plural BNs, as seen in (77), is unacceptable.²⁷ Since a sentence can have no more than one focus, two BNs of any kind are unacceptable in the same sentence, even if one of them is contrastively focused as in (77c-f). Provided that BNs in PA are always focal, a straightforward explanation for this could be that a sentence can never have more than one focus that attracts all and the only stress in that sentence. One way to cash this out would be to say that a focused BN would occupy a Focus Projection and when two PA BNs co-occur they would be basically vying or competing for the same position, presumably that of [Spec, FP] (*cf.* Chapter 5).

3.5 Modification and Coordination of Bare Nominals

In Longobardi (1994) it is assumed that BNs can be allowed to occur in preverbal positions if modified, coordinated, or, of course, focused. No satisfactory explanation

²⁷ (77a) could have an acceptable reading where the sentence would have a pair-list reading as in the following English paraphrase: a boy saw girls, a(nother) boy saw old ladies, etc.

for why modification or coordination allow BNs preverbally is available in that analysis; quite the opposite, in fact, since modified or coordinated BNs stand as exceptions (or, violations) to Longobardi's analysis.

I have argued in § 3.4.1.4 and § 3.4.1.5 that BNs in PA have to be focal, irrespective of their structural position. Within the system of assumptions I have argued for so far, in which a lexical government requirement has no place as a licenser, the fact that modified or coordinated BNs can occur preverbally may be explained in one of two ways: either BNs, when modified or coordinated, are no longer bare, therefore not subject to being obligatorily focal; or that modified and coordinated BNs are in fact subject to the same restriction as non-modified, non-coordinated, BNs, namely, being focused. Evidence in either direction has to be sought on empirical grounds, since conceptually either hypothesis seems to be plausible. However, the latter hypothesis, namely, that BNs, even if modified or coordinated, have to be focal, seems to me to be more appealing. First of all, it should be noted that if the second hypothesis is adopted it will guarantee us a greater degree of uniformity in dealing with the distribution of BNs. Focalizing a BN would in that case be an across-the-board kind of constraint BNs are subject to. Second, the consensus in the literature (for example, Longobardi (1994), Carlson (1977a, b)) seems to take bare nominals to be those that are determinerless (i.e. not determined by, for example, an article or quantifier). In other words, BNs with adjectival modification (i.e. pre-modification (at least in English)) are still considered to meet the 'bareness' criterion, so to speak. It would be kind of surprising for the same not to carry over to post-modification, i.e. modification with a relative clause (see § 3.5.1.4). If what has been said so far turns out to be correct, then BNs in PA or

Spanish are uniformly and obligatorily subject to being focal, regardless of whether or not they are modified (or coordinated). I believe the empirical evidence points to the correctness of this hypothesis: BNs have always to be focused, regardless of modification or coordination, or else they would be unacceptable, again, irrespective of their structural position.

One of the tests for 'topic-hood' in English has been argued to be 'left-dislocation' (Reinhart (1981)). For example, *Felix* in (78) and *Matilda* in (79) would be topics:

(78) Felix, it's been ages since I've seen him.

(79) As for Matilda, she can't stand him.

Topicalization, which differs from left-dislocation in lacking a pronoun referring back to the topicalized argument (i.e. anaphoric pronoun), can also mark a topic (Reinhart: (1981)). In this case, however, there would not be an anaphoric pronoun, but rather a gap, co-indexed with the topicalized argument.²⁸

(80) Your second proposal, the board found t unfeasible.

Another test I have made crucial use of in § 3.4.1.4 has been the context-question/answer pairing. The focused part of a sentence corresponds to, or substitutes for, the *wh*-phrase in the context question. So, for example, in (81) *l-madiine* 'the-city'

²⁸ (78)–(80) are taken from Reinhart (1981).

would be part of the presupposition of the context question (and therefore of the answer) while *miin* 'who' stands for the focus of the context-question and would be substituted by the focused material in the answer, *dʒunuud* 'soldiers' in (82):

(81) *miin dammaru l-madiine?*
 who destroyed-3MP the-city
 'Who destroyed the city?'

(82) *damamru l-madiine dʒunuud*
 destroyed-3MP the-city soldiers
 'Soldiers destroyed the city.'

I have used this last test to demonstrate that BNs in PA are always focalized in that they can never be part of the presupposition of the context-question or its answer. The same can be shown to hold for modified or coordinated BNs. In other words, it can be shown that modified or coordinated BNs can not occur in the presupposition of the context-question or the answer. The application of the first two tests, left-dislocation and topicalization, produce a similar outcome. To an illustration of how these tests interact with the modification and coordination facts I now turn.

3.5.1 Adjectival Modification

3.5.1.1 Intersective/ Non-Intersective Adjectives

First, let us consider what effect, if any, the intersective/non-intersective distinction in adjectives has on BNs. Larson (1998) exemplifies the ambiguity between intersective and non-intersective reading by the following sentence:

(83) Olga is a beautiful dancer.

(83) is ambiguous between these two readings as paraphrased in (84) and (85) (Larson, 1995: 1):

(84) a. 'Olga is a dancer and Olga is beautiful'

b. 'Olga is beautiful as a dancer'/'Olga dances beautifully'

The intersective reading is exemplified by (84a) which means that Olga is both a dancer and she is also beautiful. However, *beautiful* only applies to her person, excluding her dancing, which could be far from beautiful. In the second reading in (84b), *beautiful* is said to hold of Olga's dancing, not of Olga herself. This is the non-intersective reading.

Modifying PA BNs by intersective adjectives does not license them under normal conditions of stress:

(85) **muḥamiin mašhuriin ribḥu dʒaaʔizit nobil*
lawyers famous won-3MP prize Nobel

Applying any of the aforementioned topic-hood tests to the BN *muḥamiin mašhuriin*

'famous lawyers' would illustrate the latter's unacceptability as a topic. First, in a question, this BN cannot be part of the presupposition as in (85a):

- (85) a. *šuu ribħu muħamiin mašhuriin ?
 what won-3MP lawyers famous
 'what did famous lawyers win?'

Second, *muħamiin mašhuriin* 'famous lawyers' cannot occur in left-dislocated positions as in (85b) or (85c):

- (85) b. *bilnisbe la muħamiin mašhuriin, humme ribħu dɜaaʔizit nobil
 as for lawyers famous they won-3MP prize Nobel
- (85) c. *muħamiin mašhuriin, (humme) ribħu dɜaaʔizit nobil
 lawyers famous (they) won-3MP prize Nobel

Topicalizing the BN is not possible either as (85d) attests:

- (85) d. *muħamiin mašhuriin, ma-šuft-iš t fi-l-maħkame
 lawyers famous neg-saw-1MS-neg in-the-courthouse

Adjectival modification of BNs with non-intersective adjectives cannot license the BN preverbally unfocused either:

- (86) a. *muħamiin saabqin ribħu dɜaaʔizit nobil
 lawyers former won-3MP prize Nobel

The unacceptability of unfocused BNs with non-intersective adjectives is clearly **illustrated** by their failure to be topics:

(86) b. *šuu ribħu muħamiin saabqin?
 what won-3MP lawyers former

c. *bilnisbe la muħamiin saabqin, humme ribħu d3aaʔizit nobil
 as for lawyers former they won-3MP prize Nobel

d. *muħamiin saabqin, (humme) ribħu d3aaʔizit nobil
 lawyers famous (they) won-3MP prize Nobel

Topicalizing the BN is not possible either as (86e) clearly illustrates:

(86) e. *muħamiin saabqin, ma-šuft-iš t fi-l-maħkame
 lawyers famous neg-saw-1MS-neg in-the-courthouse

It is clear, then, that modification, whether by an intersection or non-intersective adjective, does not play any role in 'licensing' BNs preverbally. What is of consequence in effecting such an outcome is focalization of the BN.

3.5.1.2 Ethnic Adjectives

Modification with ethnic adjectives does not license BNs under normal conditions of stress:

(87) a. *muħamiin ʔurdiniyiin ribħu d3aaʔizit nobil
 lawyers Jordanian won-3MP prize Nobel

b. *šuu ribħu muħamiin ʔurdiniyiin?
 what won-3MP lawyers Jordanian

- c. *bilnisbe la muḥamiin ʔurdiniyiin, humme ribḥu dʒaaʔizit nobil
as for lawyers Jordanian they won-3MP prize Nobel
- d. *muḥamiin ʔurdiniyiin, (humme) ribḥu dʒaaʔizit nobil
lawyers Jordanian (they) won-3MP prize Nobel
- e. *muḥamiin ʔurdiniyiin, ma-šuft-iš t fi-l-maḥkame
lawyers Jordanian neg-saw-1MS-neg in-the-courthouse

3.5.1.3 Cardinal Adjectives

The same pattern can also be seen when BNs are modified by cardinal adjectives:

- (88) a. *θalaθ muḥamiin (ʔurdiniyiin) ribḥu dʒaaʔizit nobil
three lawyers (Jordanian) won-3MP prize Nobel
- b. *šuu ribḥu θalaθ muḥamiin (ʔurdiniyiin)?²⁹
what won-3MP three lawyers (Jordanian)
- c. *bilnisbe la θalaθ muḥamiin (ʔurdiniyiin), humme ribḥu dʒaaʔizit nobil
as for three lawyers Jordanian they won-3MP prize Nobel
- d. *θalaθ muḥamiin (ʔurdiniyiin), (humme) ribḥu dʒaaʔizit nobil
three lawyers Jordanian (they) won-3MP prize Nobel

²⁹ As noted in § 2.3 from Chapter 2, strict adjacency is not always observed between the definite article in PA and the head noun. Also when a NumP intervenes between the article and the head N the head N is read as definite, although it cannot bear the definite article. This gives rise to the following pattern of (un)grammaticality with modified BNs as in (i)-(iv):

- (i) *šuu ribḥu l-θalaθ muḥamiin ʔurdiniyiin?
what won the-three lawyers Jordanian
- (ii) *šuu ribḥu l-θalaθ l-muḥamiin ʔurdiniyiin?
what won the-three the-lawyers Jordanian
- (iii) *šuu ribḥu l-θalaθ l-muḥamiin l-ʔurdiniyiin?
what won the-three the-lawyers the-Jordanian
- (iv) šuu ribḥu l-θalaθ muḥamiin l-ʔurdiniyiin?
what won the-three lawyers the-Jordanian

- e. *θalaθ muḥamiin ʔurdiniyiin, ma-šuft-iš t fi-l-maḥkame
three lawyers Jordanian neg-saw-1MS-neg in-the-courthouse

The cardinal can also appear postnominally. The same remarks can be said concerning the postnominal modifying cardinal.^{30 31} The BNs in the following examples are crucially read under normal conditions of stress (i.e. not focused), hence the ungrammaticality:

- (89) a. * muḥamiin (ʔurdiniyiin) θalaθe ribḥu dʒaaʔizit nobil
lawyers (Jordanian) three won-3MP Prize Nobel
- b. *šuu ribḥu muḥamiin (ʔurdiniyiin) θalaθe?
what won-3MP lawyers (Jordanian) three
- c. *bilnisbe la muḥamiin (ʔurdiniyiin) θalaθe, humme ribḥu dʒaaʔizit nobil
as for lawyers Jordanian three they won-3MP Prize Nobel
- d. *muḥamiin (ʔurdiniyiin) θalaθe, (humme) ribḥu dʒaaʔizit nobil
lawyers Jordanian three (they) won-3MP Prize Nobel

³⁰ It must be noted, however, that in the case of postnominal modifying cardinals the cardinal may more likely be read predicatively, rather than attributively. Therefore, the grammatical counterpart of (89a) where the BN would be focused, the meaning of the sentence would roughly be "Jordanian lawyers who are three, won the Nobel Prize."

³¹ Dual NPs behave in identical fashion when bare as seen in (i)–(iv):

- (i)*waladiin kasar-u l-gazaaz
boys (dual) broke-3MP the-glass
- (ii)*šuu kasar-u waladiin ?
what broke-3MP boys-dual
- (iii)*shuu kasar-u waladiin ʔurdiniyiin θniin?
what broke-3MP boys-dual Jordanian two
- (iv)*bilnisbe la waladiin, humme kasaru l-gazaaz
as for boy-dual they broke-3MP the-glass

This shows that the relevant licensing element in PA has to do with the presence or absence of the definite article.

- e. *muḥamiin ʔurdiniyiin θalaθe, ma-ʃuft-iʃ t fi-l-maḥkame
lawyers Jordanian three neg-saw-1MS-neg in-the-courthouse

3.5.1.4 Relativization and Bare Nominals

Modification by gerundive reduced clauses does not license unfocused BNs:

- (90) a. *wlaad gaʕdiin fi l-gahwe xisr-u kull maSarii-hum
boys sitting at the-coffee shop lost-3MP all money-3MP
'boys sitting in the coffee shop lost all their money'

Applying any of the usual topic-hood tests would expectedly yield ungrammatical results:

- (90) b. *ʃuu xisr-u wlaad gaʕdiin fi l-gahwe?
what lost-3MP boys sitting at the-café
- c. *bilnisbe la wlaad gaʕdiin fi l-gahwe, Omar ḥaka maʕhum
as for boys sitting in the-coffee shop, O. talked to them
- d. *wlaad gaʕdiin fi l-gahwe, (humme) xisr-u kull maSarii-hum
boys sitting at the-coffee-shop (they) lost-3MP all money-3MP
- e. *wlaad gaʕdiin fi l-gahwe, Omar ma-laaḥaḏ-iʃ t
boys sitting in the-coffee-shop O. neg-noticed-3MS-neg

If Kayne (1994) is correct in arguing that postnominal adjectives are reduced relatives, and since modifying adjectives as has been remarked above cannot license BNs unfocused, then the prediction is that relative clause modification should not be

able to license BNs.³² This prediction is empirically confirmed. Modification by reduced relatives or indefinite relatives cannot license BNs under normal conditions of stress:

- (91) a. *ʕabiid maʕrufiin b-guwwit-hum banu l-ahraam
 slaves known for-strength-3P built-3P the-pyramids
- b. *ʕuu banu ʕabiid maʕrufiin b-guwwit-hum?³³
 what built-3P slaves known for-strength-3P
- c. *bilnisbe la ʕabiid maʕrufiin b-guwwit-hum, (humme) banu l-ahraam
 as for slaves known for-strength-3P (they) built-3P the-pyramids
- (92) a. *ʕulamaaʔ ribhu dʒaaʔizit nobil hiDru l-ʔidʒtimaaʔ
 scientists won3-MP Prize Nobel attended the-meeting
- b. *ʕuu hiDru ʕulamaaʔ ribhu dʒaaʔizit nobil?
 what attended-3MP scientists won-3MP Prize Nobel
- c. *bilnisbe la ʕulamaaʔ ribhu dʒaaʔizit nobil,
 as for scientists won-3MP Prize Nobel
 (humme) hiDru l-ʔidʒtimaaʔ
 (they) attended-3MP the-meeting

At this point it is perhaps revealing to note that in all the examples cited above where BNs are unacceptable in topic positions grammaticality is restored once the BN is modified by the definite article. Consider, for example, what happens when the BNs in

³² Recall from Chapter 2 that Fassi Fehri (1999) argues that Arabic is an A-N language, where adjectives occur prenominal, rather than N-A language and that the observed surface order for Arabic (i.e. N-A) is derived.

³³ A marginal reading that is available here is that of a contrastive nature where a pair-list juxtaposition is available. So the pair-list reading would be what slaves who are known for their strength built contrasted with what slaves who are known for their weakness built, for example.

(92) are determined by the definite article:

- (92) a. *l-ʕulamaaʔ ʔilli ribħu dzaaʔizit nobil ħiDru l-ʔidʒtimaaʔ*³⁴
the-scientists that won-3-MP Prize Nobel attended the-meeting
- b. *ʕuu ħiDru l-ʕulamaaʔ ʔilli ribħu dzaaʔizit nobilʔ*
what attended-3MP the-scientists that won-3MP Prize Nobel
- c. *bilnisbe la l-ʕulamaaʔ ʔilli ribħu dzaaʔizit nobil,*
as for the-scientists that won-3MP Prize Nobel
(humme) ħiDru l-ʔidʒtimaaʔ
(they) attended-3MP the-meeting

3.5.2 Coordination and the Licensing of Bare Nominals

Modification and coordination have remained something of an idiosyncrasy in the behavior of BNs in the analyses reviewed earlier, that of Longobardi (1994) and Casielles-Suarez (1997). These phenomena, i.e. modification and coordination, stand out as violations or exceptions to the generality of these analyses. As has been remarked in the previous sections, modification, which Longobardi's analysis does not address in any satisfactory manner, is to be viewed in the approach I argue for in this work as non-exceptional in any way. Whether bare nominals are modified or not is in fact to be seen as inconsequential to how BNs behave generally (in particular, how they distribute in sentences).

In a similar fashion, I wish to argue that coordinated BNs are quite unremarkable in that they do not present us with any need to make new, additional assumptions. Taking

³⁴ Note that with definite relative clauses the presence of *ʔilli* 'that' is obligatory, unlike in the case of indefinite relative clauses where it is disallowed.

the tests proposed in Reinhart (1981) for topic-hood to be correct, as I have assumed so far, coordinated BNs can be shown to be unavailable as candidates for topical readings. To begin with, coordinated BNs cannot be part of the presupposition of the context question as in (93b) or the answer as in (93a):

- (93) a. *zlaam w niswaan ħiDru l-ʔidʒtimaaʔ
 men and women attended-3P the-meeting
- b. *šuu ħiDru zlaam w niswaan?
 what attended men and women

Coordinated BNs also fail the "As for.." test as the following example attests:

- (93) c. *bilnisbe la zlaam w niswaan, (humme) ħiDru l-ʔidʒtimaaʔ
 as for men and women (they) attended-3P the-meeting

Nor do coordinated bare nominals pass the left-dislocation or the topicalization tests:

- (93) d. *zlaam w niswaan, šuft-hum fi l-ʔidʒtimaaʔ
 men and women saw-1MS at-the-meeting
- e. *zlaam w niswaan, šuft t fi l-ʔidʒtimaaʔ
 men and women saw-1MS at-the-meeting

Again, as a reminder, what should be kept in mind here and elsewhere above is that the BNs in these sentences are crucially not intonationally marked as focused. This reminder is important since an utterance such as (93e) would be grammatical if the

coordinated BNs are contrastively focused as in (94):

- (94) ZLAAM W NISWAAN šuft t fi l-ʔidʒtimaaʔ,
MEN AND WOMEN saw-MS at-the-meeting
miš WLAAD W BANAAT
not BOYS AND GIRLS
'MEN AND WOMEN I saw at the meeting, not BOYS AND GIRLS.'

Example (94) seems to me to be an instance of focusing, not left-dislocation, where the contrastively-focused coordinated bare nominals are co-indexed with a gap in the site of extraction.

It is perhaps worth noting here that Casielles-Suárez (1997: 105-107) considers non-contrastive (-ly focused) BNs in left-dislocated positions grammatical in Spanish and she assumes that they are topical (an assumption, C-S points out, she makes contrary to Suñer (1982)). Therefore, the following example, which C-S takes from Suñer (1982), is an instance of a left-dislocated *topical* BN for C-S:

- (95) Petróleo, no surgió pero sí agua
oil not bubbled-up-3sg but yes water
'Oil did not bubble up but water did'

C-S claims that this example contains a topical BN in left-dislocated position. However, she notes that left-dislocated BNs are characterized by the lack of a clitic, unlike genuine or typical cases of left-dislocation which are co-indexed with an anaphoric pronoun or a clitic (1997: 108). As a way out, C-S argues that the absence of the clitic in this case is closely tied to the very nature of what is being left-dislocated; in this case, a

BN. To illustrate the point she cites Vallduví (1988) who points out the impossibility of a clitic when BNs are dropped, as seen in (96) (her example, (39)):

- | | |
|--|---|
| (96) &Trajiste tenedores?
brought-2sg forks
'Did you bring forks?' | Sí, sí traje
yes, yes brought-1sg
*yes, I brought |
|--|---|

C-S's claim is basically that only DPs trigger the appearance of a clitic. BNs in Spanish, she argues (p. 109), are NPs, rather than DPs. It then follows that they do not trigger the appearance of a clitic. To illustrate this point she provides the following examples (her 40, 41, 42, and 43, respectively):

- | | |
|---|---|
| (97) a. *Los libros , no traje
b. Los libros , no los traje
'The books, I didn't bring them' | <i>(original emphasis)</i> |
| (98) -&Trajiste Los libros ?
'Did you bring the books?' | a. -*No, no traje
b. -No, no los traje 'No, I didn't' |
| (99) Libros , no traje
(100) -&Trajiste libros ? | -No, no traje |

I believe C-S's analysis is incorrect. First of all, I think her judgment, contrary to Suñer's (1982) who considers them contrastive, that BNs can appear left-dislocated as topics is not correct. I have shown in the previous sections that PA BNs cannot occur topical in sentences. It seems therefore unlikely that Spanish BNs, whose behavior is almost identical to PA BNs, should be drastically different in terms of this interpretive aspect. Second, C-S's claim that the failure of BNs in Spanish to trigger the appearance of a

clitic is due to their NP-status is not justified and seems to be the incorrect assumption.

Before I discuss this point let me note that the same facts expressed in (97)-(100) also hold in PA as the examples below, which are equivalent to the Spanish examples, clearly attest:

- (101) a. *l-kutub, ma dʒibtiš
the-books neg brought-1MS-neg
'*the books, I didn't bring'
b. l-kutub, ma dʒibt-**hum**-iš
the-books neg brought-1MS-**3P**-neg
'the books, I didn't bring them'

- (102) dʒibit l-kutub?
brought-3S the-books
'did you bring the books?'

- a. *laʔ, ma dʒibtiš
no, neg brought-1S
'*no, I didn't bring'
b. laʔ, ma dʒibt-hum-iš
no, neg brought-1S-3P-neg
'no, I didn't bring them'

- (103) kutub, ma dʒibtiš
books, neg brought-1S-neg

- (104) a. dʒibt kutub?
brought-2S books
'did you bring books?'

- b. laʔ, ma dʒibtiš
no, neg brought-1S-neg
'*no, I didn't bring'

The empirical facts from PA are identical to those in Spanish. A BN fails to trigger the

appearance of an agreement marker or clitic that is anaphorically related. A determined nominal, on the other hand, does entail the appearance of such a clitic. However, I believe that C-S's explanation of the facts is flawed. Crucially, as I noted above in § 2.3.4, C-S fails to see the effect information structure has on English BNs. Note, in fact, that the lack of a clitic in Spanish or an agreement marker in Arabic corresponds to a lack of pronoun in English as (105) illustrates:

- (105) a. Did you bring forks?
 b. *?Yes, I brought them.
 c. Yes, I brought some.

The fact that (105a) cannot be answered with a pronoun anaphoric to the BN *forks*, or at best it is marginal, is essentially an identical phenomenon to that noted above for Spanish and Arabic (i.e. the emergence of an anaphoric clitic or Agr marker). In other words, the ungrammaticality of the English glosses to examples (96) (**yes, I brought*) and (104b) (**no, I didn't bring*) stems from the fact that the argument grid of the two-place predicate is not saturated (i.e. the object θ -role has not been discharged). To argue otherwise, C-S would have to assume that BNs in English are also NPs, rather than DPs, since they fail to trigger the presence of an anaphoric pronoun. This is a very problematic assumption, to say the least. Note also that this assumption is falsified in PA by N to D movement in the construct state construction considered in Chapter 2.

On the other hand, if BNs are always focal, as I assume in this work, a natural

explanation for the observed facts can be found. Since BNs are always focused,³⁵ i.e. non-topical, they resist being anaphorically related to a pronoun in English, or a clitic in Spanish, or trigger an agreement marker in PA. When non-focal, BN in English would in fact trigger the presence of a pronoun anaphorically linked to the BN. This is attested in the case of generically read BNs in English which I argue in the next chapter to be non-focused (i.e. topical), unlike existentially read BNs. Generically interpreted BNs in English, therefore, pattern with determined NPs:

(106) a. Did you bring the forks?

b. Yes, I brought them.

(107) a. Do you like dogs?

b. Yes, I like them.

Once the determined NP *the forks* is mentioned in the context question (106a), or the generic BN *dogs* in (107a), this makes either a possible topic for the ensuing discourse. *forks* in (105a), on the other hand, is mentioned in the context-question which should, on a par with *the forks* in (106a) and *dogs* in (107a), make it a possible topic for the following discourse. However, this is not the case. This immediately follows from the inability of existential bare nominals in English to act as topics and the restriction they are subject to to be focal.³⁶ The difference between English on the one hand, and

³⁵ This is the position I argue for in this work: BNs are always focal even in English, unless generically read. This issue will be taken up in more detail in the next chapter.

³⁶ It may seem undesirable to assume a divide between generic and existential BNs in English since a uniform treatment would *a priori* be more appealing. However, such a distinction seems necessary

Spanish and PA on the other, follows from the fact that the object argument has to be overtly realized in English, unlike the case in PA or Spanish .

The remainder of this chapter will be dedicated to investigating the interpretive properties of BNs. I illustrate in what follows that the existential interpretation BNs in PA and Spanish (and (one interpretation of) English BNs) are subject to is quite expected and follows directly from the fact that these nominals are focused.

3.6 The Interpretation of Bare Nominals

3.6.1 Stage-Level Vs. Individual-Level & Generic Vs.

Existential

Cross-linguistically, BNs have been noted to possess one, or both, of these two readings: an existential reading and a generic reading (Carlson (1977a, b), Diesing (1992a, b), Longobardi (1994, 2002), Kratzer (1995), Cohen and Erteschik-Shir (2002), among others). In Carlson's work this distinction in interpretation follows from a distinction between predicates in terms of their being either S(tage)-Level or I(ndividual)-Level predicate. According to Carlson's original theoretical framework, English BNs are interpreted existentially with S-level predicates, while the generic reading is reserved for BNs with I-level predicates. This contrast can be seen in the

anyway since BNs in languages such as Romance and PA can only get the existential reading. The very fact that English BNs can also have a generic reading is reflective of a deeper distinction with or difference from Romance and PA. This distinction is taken up in more detail in the Chapter 5.

following two examples:

(108) Tickets are available.

(109) Tickets are expensive.

The BN *tickets* in (108), with the S-level predicate *available*, would be read existentially, whereas in (109), with the I-level predicate *expensive*, it can only be read generically. However, Carlson's neat dichotomy has been challenged by Diesing (1992a, b) who argues that S-level predicates such as *available* are, at least, two-ways ambiguous. (108) would be ambiguous between an existential reading for *tickets*, meaning roughly 'at the moment of speaking there are tickets available for sale,' and a generic reading, meaning that it is a characteristic of tickets to be available.

However, the S-level/I-level distinction has been argued not to be the relevant distinction in triggering the existential/generic readings of BNs. Higginbotham and Ramchand (1996), for example, argue that the difference in the readings we get in examples such as (109) and (108), existential vs. generic, respectively, cannot be due to the S-Level/ I-level distinction since the norm for verbal predicates in the simple present tense is the generic reading. Nor can the transient nature of the predicate be correlated with the existential reading since subjects of sentences such as *Children are fat/skinny/joyful/sad*, with predicates that would be predicted to allow the existential reading due to their transient character, can only get a generic reading here.

Higginbotham and Ramchand (1996) consider the existential reading to be correlated with predicates that involve spatio-temporal proximity to the speaker. Jäger (1999) also

rejects the idea that S-Level/I-Level distinction is what is relevant for the interpretation. He argues that in place of the S-Level/I-Level distinctions there are three contrasts that need to be distinguished: whether the predicate is permanent or temporary, if it admits a weak (i.e. existential) reading of its indefinite subject, and whether it can occur as the complement of a perception verb (1999:74-75). Jäger then considers the intricacies of one of these contrasts, namely, the weak (existential)/strong (generic) readings of indefinite subjects. He suggests that the relevant distinction here is the thetic/categorical (cf. Ladusaw (1994), see § 3.6.3.2; McNally (1998)). According to Jäger, German differentiates between thetic and categorical judgments by placing the subject in the former *in-situ* (within the VP) while scrambling it in the latter outside of the VP. The subject in categorical sentences is read as Topic and in thetic sentences as comment. In thetic sentences where no topic is available the event argument is considered as topic. Subject effects (weak/strong contrast) are a consequence of a principle requiring every clause to have a topic. Events, but not states, can function as topics, so stative predicates cannot accommodate weak subjects ([–WS] in Jäger's terminology) if none of their arguments (including implicit ones) can serve as topic. In other words, if there is an argument of the stative predicate that can be topic the stative predicate can be [+WS], otherwise it cannot.

Cohen and Erteschik-Shir (2002) make a similar proposal to that of Jäger's. However, for these authors the S-Level/I-Level distinction is still important, though not in the traditional, clear-cut sense as expressed in Carlson (1977a, b) and Diesing (1992a, b). Cohen and Erteschik-Shir argue that it can be demonstrated that existential subjects can be disallowed with some Stage-Level predicates or that such subjects are allowed

with some I-Level predicates. Both results, of course, conflict with traditional conceptions of the S-Level/ I-Level contrast as articulated in Carlson's and Diesing's works. The subject effects, borrowing Jäger's terminology, for Cohen and Erteschik-Shir (2002), follow from the focus structure of the sentence. I will come back to a more detailed exposition of these authors' analysis below.

Despite the criticism leveled against the relevance of the original S-Level/ I-Level contrast I still think that it should not be dispensed with. The distribution of the interpretational possibilities of nominals in PA turn out to correlate closely with whether the predicate is Stage or Individual level. To demonstrate this, I would like to consider Longobardi's (2002) analysis of Italian BNs and compare/contrast the facts observed for Italian with those that hold in PA. I consider this topic in the next section.

3.6.2 Do PA BNs Have Generic Readings?

English BNs, as is well known, are subject to two kinds of interpretations: existential and generic. Longobardi (2002) claims that Italian BNs exhibit this bifurcation of interpretation, although the interpretations in this case distribute differently than in the case of English BNs. In other words, Italian BNs are generically read only in 'independently quantificational environments' (2002: 340), unlike English where BNs can be generic in all environments. The question that arises here is whether or not the interpretive facts argued to hold for Italian can also be carried over to PA. In what follows I consider an answer to this question and I conclude that the answer is in the negative.

Before I consider Longobardi's analysis, a brief typology of genericity is in order.

Krifka et al. (1995: introduction) point out that there are two kinds of generics. The first is what can be referred to as *reference to kind* as in *The potato was first cultivated in South America./Potatoes were introduced into Ireland by the end of the 17th century.* (their examples (1a, 1b), p. 2). The second type of genericity has to do with "propositions which do not express specific episodes or isolated facts, but instead report a kind of general property, that is, report a regularity which summarizes groups of particular episodes or facts" (Krifka et al. (1995:2)). The second kind of genericity is exemplified by sentences such as *John smokes a cigar after dinner* and *A potato contains vitamin C, amino acids, proteins and thiamine*, which are called *characterizing sentences*. The latter sentences make up most of the instances of generic sentences in English.

Italian BNs, according to Longobardi (2002: 340), have only an existential reading with episodic Stage-Level predicates.³⁷ In this respect PA patterns exactly like Italian.

³⁸ However, the similarity ceases in characterizing sentences with stage level predicates. Longobardi (p. 340) claims that Italian BNs can be read generically in this case while the existential reading is marginal. As (110) and (111) below show, PA BNs in such sentences cannot be read generically:

(Gen=generic; EX=existential):

(110) *ʔalaat ʔadiiθe yimkin tθiir kθiir min l-fuDuul tools modern may raise a lot of curiosity 'Modern equipment can raise a lot of curiosity'	Gen
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³⁷ I model the examples that follow after those offered by Longobardi for Italian.

³⁸ Of course, with the proviso that BNs are focused, even if modified.

- (111) *sayyaraat beiDah yimkin tkallif ʔakθar Gen
cars white may cost more
'White cars can cost more'

Nor can a BN in PA be read generically in episodic sentences with a generalizing adverb with S-Level predicates which Longobardi argues to give rise to a generic reading in Italian. In fact, not even an existential reading is possible for the PA BN here due to the presence of 'always.'

- (112) *ʔalaat ʔadiiθe/fiyala beiDah dayman/ʔaaliban ʔθaarat kθiir min l-fuDuul
tools modern/elephants white always/often raised a lot of curiosity
'Modern tools/White elephants always/often raised a lot of curiosity'

As far as I-Level predicates go, Longobardi (p. 341) claims that Italian BNs behave non-uniformly in that they pattern in one of two ways: with 'more eventive' predicates, BNs are possible with a generic reading while with 'more stative' predicates they are degraded (his examples, 8, 9, and 10, respectively):

- (113) a. Stati di grandi dimensioni sono pericolosi Italian
 'States of large size are dangerous.'

- b. ??Stati di grandi dimensioni sono prosperi**
'States of large size are prosperous'

- (114) a. Cani da guardia di grosse dimensioni sono più efficienti/aggressivi.
'Watchdogs of large size are more efficient/aggressive.'

- b.??Cani da guardia di grosse dimensioni sono più pelosi/neri.
'Watchdogs of large size are more hairy/black.'**

(115) a. Uccelli di zone paludose sono ghiotti di insetti.
'Birds from marshy areas are greedy for insects.'

b. ??Uccelli di zone paludose sono scuri/intelligenti.
'Birds from marshy areas are dark/intelligent.'

Descriptively, Longobardi sums up the readings BNs have in Italian as follows:

(116) S-level a. episodic → Ex

b. characterizing (habitual aspect) → Ex/Gen

I-level a. lexically characterizing A (habitual aspect) → Gen³⁹

b. lexically characterizing B (non-habitual aspect) ∅

What is important to note here is that the PA counterparts of (113)-(115) are all ungrammatical. PA BNs are unacceptable with I-level predicates of either group, the eventive or the stative, as seen in the equivalent examples to (113a-b):

(117) a. *wilayaat ḥadʒim-hin kbiir xiTraat
states size-3FP big dangerous-3FP

b. *wilayaat ḥadʒim-hin kbiir mintiʔšaāt
states size-3FP big prosperous

No generic reading is available for either (117a) or (117b). Not even an existential

³⁹ A group corresponds to examples with more eventive I-level predicates that Longobardi characterizes as being 'habitual.'

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reading is possible either in these examples. The sentences can only be acceptable with a generic reading with the definite plural:

- (118) a. l-wilayaat ʔilli ħadʒim-hin kbiir xiTraat
 the-states that size-3FP big dangerous-3FP
- b. l-wilayaat ʔilli ħadʒim-hin kbiir mintiʕšaāt
 the-states that size-3FP big prosperous.

In fact, even if the tense in such sentences is changed into a tense with an episodic interpretation these sentences remain unacceptable as witnessed in (119b):

- (119) a. *fiyala beiDah xitraat/ ʕakiyyat
 elephants white dangerous-3P/ intelligent-3P
- b. *fiyala beiDah kaan-in xitraat/ ʕakiyyat
 elephants white were-3P dangerous-3P/ intelligent-3P

PA BNs in object position are also unacceptable with a generic reading, unlike Italian BNs which are claimed by Longobardi to be acceptable with such a reading in object position (his 27, 28):

- (120) Una buona legge esclude solo cittadini stranieri dal diritto di voto. Gen/Ex
 'A fair law only excludes foreign citizens from the right to vote.'
- (121) Amo/Adoro/Mi piacciono arance di grandi dimensioni. Gen
 'I love/adore/like oranges of large size.'

In fact the only way to express a generic reading in (120) and (121) in PA is by using the definite article as seen in (122) and (123):

(122) l-qanuun l-ʕaadel byistaθni bas l-muwaTiniin l-ʔdʒaneb.....
the-law the-just excludes only the-citizens the-foreign....

(123) ʔana baħibb l-burtgaan l-kbiir
I like the-oranges the-big

Finally, PA BNs, just like their Italian counterparts, are impossible with Kind-denoting predicates such as *extinct*, *widespread*:

(124) *fiyala beiDah Saru munqaridiin
elephants white became extinct

(125) *fiyala beiDa muntišriin
elephants white widespread

If the facts claimed by Longobardi (2002) to hold for Italian BNs do actually hold, it becomes obvious from this discussion that PA BNs behave differently as far as the S-level/I-level distinction is concerned.⁴⁰ As seen above, PA BNs are only subject to an existential reading in episodic sentences with Stage-Level predicates. The generic reading is impossible for PA BNs with characterizing S-level predicates or episodic sentences with generalizing adverbs. PA BNs are also unacceptable with I-level

⁴⁰ Schmitt and Munn (2000) observe that the interpretive facts argued for by Longobardi (2002) do not hold for Spanish. This would basically suggest that Longobardi's argument cannot even be carried over to all Romance.

predicates or Kind predicates. The picture that emerges here is very streamlined: PA BNs are only acceptable with an existential reading in sentences with S-level predicates and are unacceptable with I-level predicates. PA BNs are never possible with a generic reading, irrespective of modification or coordination. Their occurrence is also confined to sentences with S-level predicates. To achieve the generic interpretation for PA sentences the use of the definite article is necessary.

All that has been said, of course, suggests that the S-level/I-level contrast should not be dispensed with as it proves relevant after all. As a matter of fact, even for some authors who argue that this contrast may not be the crucial distinction triggering the weak/strong readings of indefinite subjects, they still maintain that it becomes relevant if understood correctly. Cohen and Erteschik-Shir (2002) provide such a perspective. Their analysis can in fact be instrumental in shedding some light on, or at least providing an alternative view for, why BNs in PA can only be read existentially, and not generically. This issue will be taken up in the next section.

3.6.3 Why the Existential Reading for PA BNs?

I have argued above that PA BNs cannot be interpreted generically, *pace* Longobardi. The existential interpretation is the only interpretation available for BNs in PA. I have also maintained that the S-level/ I-level contrast should not be discarded since BNs in PA can co-occur with the former, but not the latter, which argues for the relevance of this distinction. This last fact seems to argue that the reason that only the existential interpretation is available for BNs in PA should be rooted in, or attributed to, **such** a distinction. In what follows I investigate this possibility. Before I do that,


however, I demonstrate that an analysis of PA BNs as variables, as in Heim (1982), coupled with my assumption in this work that PA BNs are always focused, can still get us the correct results. It can explain why BNs are without exception interpreted existentially.

3.6.3.1 BNs as Variables

In § 3.3.3.1 I have illustrated Heim's (1982) treatment of indefinites as variables unselectively bound. I have also noted that Diesing (1992b) adopts, with slight modifications, Heim's analysis of indefinites and carries it over to BNs in German and English. Abstracting away from Diesing's mapping hypothesis, which has been shown in § 3.3.3.2 to be conceptually and empirically problematic, Heim's analysis of indefinites adopted by Diesing can still give us the correct results in the case PA BNs.

Partee (1991) argues that there is a correlation between the tripartite structure posited for the logical representation of sentences with indefinite nominals by Heim (1982) on the one hand, and the topic-focus structure or articulation of the sentence, on the other hand. More specifically, Partee points out that the restrictive clause of the tripartite structure can be correlated with the topic or non-focused part of the sentence, whereas the nuclear scope can be shown to coincide with the focus of the sentence. For concreteness, a sentence such as (127) would get the representation at LF as in (128):

(127) Mary always took [John]_F to the movies.



The operator in (127), in this case the adverbial *always*, would bind an event variable. *John*, being the focus of the sentence, would be mapped into the nuclear scope of the logical representation of the sentence, while the sentence, with the focus replaced by a variable existentially quantified, maps into the restrictive clause. Partee brings much empirical evidence to bear on the main argument, evidence ranging from sentences with focus sensitive elements such as *only* and *even*, counterfactuals, modals, frequency adverbs, generics, to sentences with emotive factives and attitude verbs.

Now recall that in the original Heim (1982) account existential closure takes place at two levels: at the textual level and at the level of the nuclear scope. Diesing (1992b) dispensed with Heim's assumption concerning text-level existential closure. Diesing, along with Heim, assumes that existential closure (*only*, in Diesing's case) closes off the nuclear scope. This assumption is sufficient for my current purpose: nothing really hinges on whether or not existential closure is operating at the level of the text. Nothing hinges either on whether or not the domain of existential closure, and that of nuclear scope, is concurrent with the VP, as in Diesing's MH. However, to make my point, I make the following assumptions: I assume with Diesing that BNs are, like indefinites, variables operator-bound (for a different view, see Carlson (1977a, b); I also assume with Partee that the focus coincides with the nuclear scope and with Heim and Diesing



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that existential closure closes off the nuclear scope. Now recall that I have argued above that BNs in PA are always focused. Taking these assumptions in tandem we arrive at the conclusion that BNs in PA, being focused, would always be mapped into the nuclear scope, rather than the restrictive clause. Therefore, they would always be within the scope of existential closure. In other words, they would always be bound by an existential quantifier/operator having scope over the nuclear scope and would therefore be interpreted existentially. Note, again, that none of what has been said assumes Diesing's mapping hypothesis: no assumption is made here that the VP maps into the nuclear scope at S-Structure or LF, and being inside the VP, BNs are interpreted existentially.

Looking at matters in this light we are able to accomplish the results we have set out to accomplish. No generic reading is possible, or even allowed, for PA BNs which follows from their being always focused and, therefore, always mapped into the nuclear scope at LF. This effectively rules out the possibility that PA BNs be mapped into the restrictive clause (and be interpreted generically in the process).

This analysis, then, proves to be viable. In what follows, I would like to consider another way of achieving exactly the same result. It is important to keep in mind here the key assumption I have made so far, namely, that BNs are always focused, irrespective of their structural position. Such an assumption essentially renders any of these analyses, the one just reviewed and others to be looked at directly, compatible with an adequate treatment of PA BNs. In the next section I will consider Cohen and Erteschik-Shir's (2002) approach to BNs in English to see how well it can be rendered to fit my current goals.

3.6.3.2 Cohen and Erteschik-Shir's (2002)

The basic claim of Cohen and Erteschik-Shir (2002) (C&E-S henceforth) is that the generic/existential readings of indefinite subjects follow from the focus structure of the sentence. Topics are interpreted generically while focused BNs are interpreted existentially.

Although the Stage-level/Individual-level distinction is not considered adequate by C&E-S they do not discard it. What the authors call the Topic Constraint, that every sentence has to have a topic, follows from the assumption that sentences express predications over topics. Topics can be subjects or objects, i.e. arguments, as in the following examples (their examples (14) and (16)):

(129) John_{TOP} [is clever]_{FOC}

(130) MARY loves John.

However, C&E-S maintain that it is hard to construe adjuncts as topics since topics are not 'superfluous' elements in sentences, as adjuncts may be. This contrast between argument and adjuncts is seen in (131) and (132):

(131) As for the problem, John will work on it.

(132) ? As for the office, John will work there.

They also point out that topics could be spatio-temporal locatives where the italicized expressions are read as topics. These locatives can be overt or implicit:

(133) a. There was a nametag *near every plate*.⁴¹

b. A flag was hanging *in front of every window*.

c. A student guide took visitors to *two museums*.

d. A spectator put contributions *in the hat*.

e. A ghost appeared *at midnight*.

f. A student arrived *during class*.

g. sTOPt [A policeman arrived]_{FOC}⁴²

Topics are usually arguments which also holds true for the spatio-temporal locatives in the sentences immediately above. To make their overall argument, C&E-S draw on the analysis of the S-level/ I-level distinction in Kratzer (1995), which I briefly review here.

Kratzer (1995) claims that S-level predicates differ from I-level predicates in their argument structure. The former have an additional spatio-temporal argument that I-level predicates lack. Crucial evidence for the difference in argument structure comes from the following examples Kratzer (1995: 129) provides (her 15 a-d):

(134) a. *When Mary knows French, she knows it well.

b. When a Moroccan knows French, she knows it well.

c. When Mary knows a foreign language, she knows it well.

d. When Mary speaks French, she speaks it well.

⁴¹ C&E-S point out that since topics have to be specific, singular indefinites in (133) cannot be topics which makes the locatives topics.

⁴² 'sTOPICt' stands for 'stage topic' when the topical element is non-overt. The index 's' indicates the 'spatial' location while the 't' index denotes the 'temporal' localization of the topic.

Kratzer observes that when an I-level predicate, such as *knows* in (134a), occurs in the antecedent of a conditional, and supposing that the antecedent clause of a conditional maps into the restrictive clause of an operator, along with the assumption that I-level predicates lack a spatio-temporal argument, sentence (134a) is predictably bad. (134b), which is minimally different from (134a), is grammatical since the indefinite, *a Moroccan*, provides the variable needed for the operator to bind in order to fulfill the principle of Full Interpretation and the prohibition against Vacuous Quantification.^{43 44} Vacuous Quantification does not result in (134c) since the variable needed for the operator to bind is provided by *a foreign language* even though the predicate in this case is I-level (i.e. 'knows'). The crucial difference for Kratzer is provided by (134d). This example does not contain an indefinite in the antecedent of the conditional which can provide the variable needed for the operator to bind. However, the predicate in (134d) is S-level. If it is assumed that S-level predicates contain an extra spatio-temporal argument that can provide the variable needed for the operator to bind, then the grammaticality of the sentence is explained. Kratzer (pp.129-130) argues for this position and provides the following logical representations for (134a) and (134d) (her (15'a) and (15'd), respectively):

(134') a. *Always [knows(Mary, French)] [knows-well(Mary, French)]

d. Always₁ [speaks(Mary, French, 1)] [speaks-well(Mary, French, 1)]

⁴³ Recall Heim (1982) treatment of indefinites as bound variables.

⁴⁴ The Prohibition against Vacuous Quantification can be defined as follows (Kratzer, 1995: 131): For every quantifier Q, there must be a variable x such that Q binds an occurrence of x in both its restrictive clause and its nuclear scope.

In the tripartite quantificational structures in (134'a) and (134'd), the difference in argument structure, according to Kratzer, is what triggers the (un)grammaticality of the relevant sentence. In (134'd) the prohibition against Vacuous Quantification is respected since the operator, *always* in this case, binds the extra argument variable provided by the S-level predicate. No such argument exists for *knows* and (134'a) is accordingly an unacceptable logical representation.^{45 46}

Cohen and Erteschik-Shir (2002) exploit Kratzer's line of argument here concerning the difference in argument structure between S-level and I-level predicates. C&E-S argue that since an I-level predicate such as *brave* in (135) lacks such an extra spatio-temporal argument, and by the Topic Constraint which says that all sentences have to have topics, the BN *boys* would have to be read as the topic.

(135) Boys are brave.

(136) Boys are present.

In (136), on the other hand, since *present* is an S-level predicate the extra spatio-

⁴⁵ See De Swart (1991) for criticism of Kratzer's arguments here.

⁴⁶ Kratzer (1995) utilizes this line of argumentation to propose a syntactic account of weak (existential)/strong (generic) interpretations of BNs. She argues that the extra argument is always external; therefore subjects of S-level predicates cannot be base-generated outside of the VP but inside. Since I-level predicates lack such an argument the subject can be base-generated outside of the VP, in the IP domain. Kratzer further draws on Diesing's (1992b) Mapping Hypothesis to argue that the mapping to logical representations is straightforward from that point on: the VP material is mapped into the nuclear scope (and get existentially closed off) whereas the IP material gets mapped into the restrictive clause and is therefore interpreted generically. In spite of its appeal, Kratzer's and Diesing's analyses are problematic since, as Cohen and Erteschik-Shir's (2002) point out (p. 140), the evidence for the VP-internal subject hypothesis is equally applicable to both S-level and I-level predicates. Note also that I have shown in the text above that the Mapping Hypothesis of Diesing (1992b) is conceptually and empirically problematic (see § 3.3.3.2).

temporal argument can be the topic freeing the BN *boys* to be focal, which is the preferred reading for the BN. This sentence, however, is ambiguous: *boys* can also be read generically. In this case, the BN itself is read as topic, and not the extra argument. The argument-hood of topics figures in in examples such as the following:

(137) Boys are hungry.

C&E-S argue that (137) are infelicitous. The existential reading, they point out (p.141), is hard to obtain here since the stage topic (i.e. the extra argument) is an adjunct, rather than an argument of the predicate. This can be seen in the contrast between (138) and (139):

(138) In the dining room, John was hungry.

(139) ? In the dining room, John was present.

As far as how the existential and the generic readings of BNs are generated, C&E-S assume the mapping between the topic and the restrictive clause and the focus and the nuclear scope (cf. §3.6.3.1 above). Generic BNs with kind-denoting predicates denote or refer to kinds. In characterizing sentences the BN gets mapped into the restrictive clause to get bound by the implicit Gen operator (after type-shifting to resolve the type mismatch; see C&E-S (2002) for details). As far as the existential reading is concerned, C&E-S assume that BNs are not variables but that they get incorporated to the predicate. The existential interpretation of the BN is provided by the lexical meaning of the verb. I

will not engage in the technical details of the incorporation account of existential BNs referring the reader to C&E-S (2002).

For my purposes here, in view of the above discussion, C&E-S's analysis can carry over to BNs in PA. Recall that BNs in PA are always interpreted existentially and they cannot co-occur with I-level predicates. If the latter, according to C&E-S 's account (based on Kratzer, (1995)), lack an extra spatio-temporal argument that can act as a topic, then the non-occurrence of PA BNs with I-level predicates is predicted. On the other hand, if S-level predicates have such a spatio-temporal argument then this argument can act as a topic thereby freeing the BN to be focal. PA BNs are always focused, which is a natural outcome of assuming C&E-S's approach. Therefore, this analysis extends quite naturally to the observed facts concerning BNs in PA. Then, these BNs get assigned the existential reading supposedly through incorporation to the verb.

Despite the appeal of this analysis, I find it a bit problematic. It does not consider the S-level/I-level distinction paramount. This distinction has been demonstrated earlier to be relevant for PA BNs. Furthermore, the assumption that S-level predicates have an extra argument that I-level predicates lack has been challenged in the literature (e.g. De Swart (1991)). In the next section I consider an analysis, which I adopt, put forth by Ladusaw (1994) that was touched upon very briefly in § 3.6.1 above in my brief discussion of Jäger (1999), concerning the categorical/thetic distinction.

3.6.3.3 Categorical Vs. Thetic Judgments

In the last two sections I have briefly considered two analyses concerning the so-called subject effects (mainly, the existential/generic distinction). I have pointed out that

these analyses could adequately be utilized towards an explanation of the interpretive distribution of BNs in PA. In this section I briefly review, and adopt, a proposal advanced by Ladusaw (1994) to explaining the interpretive facts of BNs (in English).

Ladusaw (1994) bases his proposal on the hypothesis presented by Yuki Kuroda ((1972) and (1992), as cited by Ladusaw).⁴⁷ Ladusaw quotes Kuroda as follows:

"This theory assumes, unlike either traditional or modern logic, that there are two different fundamental types of judgments, the categorical and thethetic. Of these, only the former conforms to the traditional paradigm of subject-predicate, while the latter represents simply the recognition or rejection of material of a judgment. Moreover, the categorical judgment is assumed to consist of two separate acts, one the act of recognition of that which is to be made the subject, and the other, the act of affirming or denying what is expressed by the predicate about the subject. With this analysis in mind, thethetic and the categorical judgments are also called the simple and the double judgments (*Einfache Urteil* and *Doppelurteil*)."

What is important, Ladusaw explains, is to note that the difference between the two types of judgments is that in the case of the categorical judgment there has to be a presupposed subject of which the predicate is predicated. In the case of athetic judgment, on the other hand, no presupposed subject needs to exist. For concreteness, consider Ladusaw's examples (his 1 and 2):

(140) Some unicorns entered the garden.

(141) Many people were at the party.

⁴⁷ I do not use page numbers in reference to Ladusaw (1994) due to their absence in the copy of his article I am consulting.

Ladusaw observes that there is an ambiguity in each of these examples that reflects the difference in the type of judgment involved. Examples such as (140) have been noted to be ambiguous between an indefinite reading (i.e. weak) and a partitive one (i.e. strong): it could mean either that there is an indefinite number of unicorns that entered the garden (indefinite/weak reading) or that some of (contextually identified) unicorns entered (while the others have not) (partitive/strong). In the latter case, where the indefinite subject is partitive/strong, the categorical judgment singles out a presupposed subject (*some unicorns*) and then it predicates the predicate of it. In other words, we single out a contextually defined set of unicorns and then say of them that they entered the garden. So, a prerequisite to saying 'entered the garden' is the existence of a defined set 'some unicorns' that is *presupposed*. On the other hand, thethetic judgment does not presuppose the existence of a set of unicorns, but it merely reports the event of an indefinite number of unicorns entering the garden. It follows from this discussion, Ladusaw reasons, that I-level predicates must be predicates in categorical judgments.

The thetic/categorical distinction is defined over the difference between the bases for judgments, Ladusaw argues. The basis for a judgment could be simple (hence resulting in a thetic reading) or compound (resulting in a categorical reading). These judgments come in two modes, that of affirmation and denial. As far as thetic judgments are concerned, these are presentations of an object (an entity or an eventuality). To affirm such a presentation is to commit oneself to the existence of an object or an eventuality that satisfies such a presentation. To deny that presentation, on the other hand, is to deny the existence of that presentation. Ladusaw equates a presentation with a description. He further takes objects to range over individuals and eventualities. What

we end up with, Ladusaw argues, is a description of individuals or eventualities in the case of thetic judgments.

As for the basis of a categorical judgment it is not simple, as the case is for thetic judgments, but compound: an object satisfying the presentation is first posited or presupposed and then a property is affirmed or denied of that object. Properties, of course, differ from descriptions of individuals or eventualities. In short, a thetic judgment is an existential commitment (*a denial or affirmation*) while a categorical judgment is a predication (again, *a denial or affirmation of the applicability of that property to the object*). Ladusaw gives the following in way of summary of his assumptions in this regard:

- (142) a. Properties cannot be the basis of a thetic judgment, only part of the basis of a Categorical Judgment.
- b. The subject of the basis of a categorical judgment must be an object, not a description of an object.
- c. Strong construals are either object denoting or quantificational.
- d. Therefore, the subject of an ILP must have a strong construal.

The set of assumptions made by Ladusaw just presented in the discussion above can be immediately generalized to carry over to PA BNs. My argument so far has been that BNs in PA are always non-presupposed, i.e. focal. Recall also that these BNs do not combine with I-level predicates. If, according to Ladusaw, I-level predicates are properties, and not descriptions, they cannot combine with descriptions (of individuals or eventualities). This directly accounts for the non-occurrence of PA BNs with I-level predicates. Since PA BNs are descriptions of objects (and not objects themselves) they cannot combine with I-level predicates, which are properties. Moreover, the existential

reading such as bare nominals have is a direct result of existential closure due the thetic judgment involved. No generic reading is possible since, by argument, BNs in PA are focused.

I believe Ladusaw's analysis provides us with an elegant explanation of the observed facts. No commitment as to what the syntactic domain of the thetic judgment is necessary (for example, as in Diesing's (1992b) Mapping Hypothesis where the domain of existential closure is the VP). Therefore not only do we not have to assume the domain of existential closure to be the VP, but this would in fact be also an entirely redundant move.

To conclude, bare nominals in PA are always subject to the existential reading due to their very nature as descriptions of objects, rather than objects themselves. Categorical judgments are cases of predicating a property of a presupposed object, not a description. Only I-level predicates can be predicates in categorical judgments. It closely follows that BNs in PA may not co-occur with I-level predicates. The existential reading of BNs is due to the existential closure characteristic of sentences of thetic judgment (recall that the latter are denials or affirmations of an existential commitment per Ladusaw (1994)).

3.6.4 Conclusion

In conclusion, the preceding discussion in this chapter has been a mix of literature review, critique and an attempt at the introduction of some fairly novel ideas. In reviewing some of the proposals offered concerning the distribution of bare nominals cross-linguistically I have argued that such proposals suffer from the lack of an adequate

and uniform account of the behavior of BNs.

I have started out the discussion in this chapter by recalling the facts from chapter 2. Bare nominals in PA non-construct-state constructions are ungrammatical under normal conditions of stress and intonation. This is due to the strength of the +/- Definiteness features of the head D position and the inability of BNs to satisfy, or check, such features due to the latter being unmarked or unspecified for the relevant (in)definiteness features. In the current chapter, I have argued against analyses that posit a structural requirement, such as government, of BNs explaining that such an analysis leaves a number of issues unresolved. More specifically, it is unable to account for why coordinating, focusing or modifying a BN apparently supposedly rescue the nominal from violating such a requirement. I have proposed, instead, not to view coordination or modifications as exceptions, or idiosyncrasies, but rather to take such phenomena as inconsequential in the analysis of BNs. Existentially interpreted BNs are always focal, irrespective of coordination or modification.

As for the existential reading itself I have reviewed a number of proposals that I claim to be quite in line with the general thread of my proposal here. In all these analyses, Partee (1991), C&E-S (2002) and Ladusaw (1994), and in keeping with the spirit of the analysis I propose here to the effect that PA BNs are focal, the generic reading for these nominals is not only unexpected, but it is in fact ruled out.

In the next chapter I propose to expand the reach of the analysis advanced here to include existentially read BNs in English. I wish to show that English BNs that are existentially interpreted are also focal, just like their PA counterparts. This outcome is actually expected in view of my analysis in Chapter 2 where I have argued that BNs are

generally devoid of (in)definiteness features. I also wish to demonstrate that what C&E-S (2002) have argued for, that English topical BNs are generic, does in fact hold in the opposite direction too. English generic BNs are always presupposed, and never focal, in contrast to existentially interpreted BNs in both PA and English.

Chapter 4

Focus and English Bare Nominals

4.0 Introduction

The driving force behind the current analysis has been a desire to achieve a unified account of the distribution and interpretation of bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic. This goal, I have attempted to demonstrate, is indeed attainable. To the extent that the claims regarding the distribution and the interpretation of BNs in PA (and Spanish) in this work turn out to be on the right track, the following question assumes extra significance: could such an analysis be generalized to encompass languages as varied and different from PA and Spanish as English? The most perfunctory examination of the phenomenon across this spectrum of languages suffices to illustrate the apparent implausibility of such an endeavor, since bare nominals, though attested in all these languages and arguably exhibit very similar semantics, seem to exhibit a remarkably varied syntax. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that it appears, at least on the surface, that such a phenomenon would not lend itself with any degree of ease to a uniform analysis. The sole purpose of the present chapter is to underscore and establish the inaccuracy of such a conclusion.

In the previous two chapters I have proposed to view the phenomenon under discussion in a manner which promises more uniformity and dispenses with any disjunctive accounts that lack such uniformity. Moreover, I would like to argue, such a view as the one being proposed in this work may prove more fruitful in accounting for, or rather eliminating, the differences seen cross-linguistically with respect to bare

nominals. I have essentially disposed of the need for any structural requirements or constraints in regulating the distribution of bare nominals generally. The claim I have made is that bare nominals in PA and Spanish are subject to a focal interpretation which makes them unsuitable, or resistant, to being read as topics. That these nominals are always read existentially follows from their status as foci. The generic reading, then, turns out to be neither possible nor permissible for these nominals, irrespective of how we choose to analyze them.

In my examination of the structure of the DP in PA in Chapter 2 I have observed a telling difference between construct state (CS) constructions and non-CS constructions. The former, but not the latter, allow bare nominals (BNs) to move overtly into a head D position. This, I have suggested in that chapter, can be explained by the hypothesis that BNs lack (in)definiteness features in the general case. All things being equal, this will in turn make these nominals unsuitable candidate checkers of the strong +/- Definiteness features of the D position. In CS structures, on the other hand, BNs are empowered to perform such a function due to the crucial presence of a possessor that passes on the necessary (in)definiteness features to the BN. I have also suggested that the same can be hypothesized for English at the level of Logical Form (based on remarks by Longobardi (1996)). Such an extension of the facts to English should be expected, and perhaps, welcomed, since the phenomenon of determinerless nominals is not a prerogative of or exclusive to PA (and Spanish). In fact, since Carlson (1977a, 1977b) English has proven to be a very productive and, indeed, fertile testing ground for the patterns of behavior noted of BNs generally.

Recall further from the previous chapter my contention that PA and Spanish BNs are

foci, and therefore always subject only to an existential interpretation. Ideally, we should expect to find the same state of affairs to hold in the case of English BNs, thus pushing the claims of uniformity even farther. However, a cursory look at the behavior of the latter confirms the apparent inaccuracy of this expectation: English BNs allow a generic, as well as an existential reading. Looking at the issues in this light, it becomes apparent that English BNs do not lend themselves to an analysis such as the one presumed for PA and Spanish BNs. However, in order to minimize cross-linguistic variation as much as possible, I wish to argue that this latter hypothesis is also inaccurate, or at least, too strong. More precisely, I believe English BNs that are existentially interpreted do meet the null hypothesis, namely, that they should behave like their existential counterparts in PA and Spanish. Obviously, insofar as this could be proven to be the case, we would reach a desirable outcome, that of reducing as much as possible cross-linguistic variation.

Therefore, my intention in this chapter is to demonstrate that such a task is not intractable. I show that English BNs that are subject to an existential interpretation are always foci, just like their PA and Spanish counterparts. English generic BNs, on the other hand, are topics and can not be focused.¹ Focusing generic BNs in English, and generic DPs in PA (i.e. with the definite article) can only attain us a contrastive topic reading, unlike focusing an existential BN which can be non-contrastive foci.

If existential BNs in English are foci as in PA and Spanish, this begs the question of why English BNs should be able to express genericity while their PA and Spanish

¹ In other words, I wish to argue that what Cohen and Erteschik Shir (2002) argue for, that topics are read generically and foci existentially, holds in exactly the opposite direction: existential BNs have to be foci, and generic BNs cannot be focused.

counterparts can not. I think there is a principled answer to this question. This, however, will have to wait until Chapter 5.

The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In § 4.1 I reconsider Diesing's (1992b) Mapping Hypothesis to argue that what the MH accomplishes can be accomplished by putting the focus structure of the utterance under scrutiny. In § 4.2 I argue that there is a very tight correlation between generically interpreted BNs in English and being presupposed or non-focal, and being existential and being focalized. This correlation holds regardless of the structural position of the BN, be it in subject or object position, and is reminiscent of the situation noted of existential BNs in PA. In § 4.3 more evidence is presented to the correctness of this correlation by considering more closely English BNs in object position. A category of verbs that presents us with *prima facie* evidence to the inaccuracy of such a correlation is taken up in § 4.4 where I argue that contrast is an inherent component of the meaning of these verbs. Consequently, the BN object, which is interpreted generically, is predictably contrastive. § 4.5 contains some concluding remarks.

4.1 Diesing's Mapping Hypothesis Revisited

One of the points that has emerged from the discussion in the previous chapter is that the mapping algorithm of Diesing (1992b) has turned out to be insufficient or, at least, problematic. The Mapping Hypothesis (MH) gives the wrong results and, furthermore, makes the wrong predictions, both on conceptual and empirical grounds. Aside from all the problems noted in the discussion in Chapter 3 with respect to the MH, Diesing herself observes, and dismisses, what appears to be a noticeable weakness

in the MH, namely, its redundancy.

Diesing (1992b: 49-53) observes that the transparency of the mapping from syntactic structures to logical representations predicted by the MH is violated by focusing the bare nominal. To begin with, consider the following German examples from Diesing (1992b) which conform to her MH (her 78a-b and 79a-b, respectively):

- (1) a. ...weil Professoren ja doch verfügbar sind
 since professors 'indeed' available are
 'since (in general) professors are available
- b. ...weil ja doch Professoren verfügbar sind
 since 'indeed' professors available are
 'since there are professors available'
- (2) a. ...weil Skorpione ja doch giftig sind
 since scorpions 'indeed' poisonous are
 'since (in general) scorpions are poisonous'
- b. ... *weil ja doch Skorpione giftig sind
 since 'indeed' scorpions poisonous are

The positioning of *ja doch* 'indeed' in (1) and (2) enables Diesing to determine the placement of the BN in the sentence since *ja doch* is assumed by Diesing to mark off the edge of the VP. Accordingly, in (1a) *Professoren* 'professors' is to the left of *ja doch*, which means the BN is located VP-externally, or in the IP domain. Therefore, the BN is subject to a generic interpretation as the gloss makes clear. Being a Stage-level predicate, *verfügbar* 'available' also allows its subject to take on an existential interpretation as is expected in Diesing's analysis; (1b) exemplifies this possibility where the BN is read existentially. Notice also that the placement of the BN in (1b)

conforms to the MH by occurring VP-internally. *giftig* 'poisonous,' on the other hand, is an Individual-level predicate and the BN *Skorpione* 'scorpions' can only occur outside the VP. Therefore, the BN is interpreted generically. As far as (2b) is concerned, this sentence should be predicted to be ungrammatical within Diesing's framework of assumptions. This prediction is borne out since (2b) is ungrammatical. The BN in this sentence is placed within the VP and should be assigned an existential reading.

However, this is not possible with an I-level predicate such as *giftig* 'poisonous.'

So far this paradigm of examples does indeed argue for the correctness of the MH. However, Diesing observes that destressing the BN in (2b), while stressing or focusing the predicate, restores grammaticality to the sentence as seen in (3) (her (80)):

- (3) ...weil ja doch Skorpione GIFTIG sind
 since 'indeed' scorpions POISONOUS are
 'since (in general) scorpions are poisonous

Unfortunate as it turns out for the MH, the example in (3) is acceptable. Notice that the subject *Skorpione* 'scorpions' occurs inside the VP, assuming of course, with Diesing, that *ja doch* 'indeed' delimits the VP. Notwithstanding the position of the subject, and the fact that *GIFTIG* 'POISONOUS' is an I-level predicate, the sentence is acceptable if the subject is deaccented and the predicate is focused. The subject BN is interpreted generically even though it occurs VP internally, a clear violation of the MH. A point that stands out from the discussion of this example, which will turn out to be crucial in what follows, is the fact that the generic BN is deaccented (non-focal) whereas the predicate is focalized. I argue below that this is not an isolated example in German but is a

recurrent pattern also in English, in which generically interpreted BNs, I argue, are always presupposed (i.e. non-focal).

The MH of Diesing (1992b) appears to have been formulated in order to prevent subjects of Individual-level predicates such as *intelligent* in (4) from being interpreted existentially:

(4) Firemen are intelligent.

To prevent *firemen* from acquiring an existential interpretation in (4), the MH acts as a constraint or filter to rule out the wrong reading. To recap the discussion from the previous Chapter 3, this will be achieved by assuming that the IP-level material maps into the restrictive clause at LF, and not into the nuclear scope. *firemen*, being outside the VP at S-Structure, is prevented from mapping into the nuclear scope at LF

(i.e. lowering into the VP at the LF level and hence be mapped into the nuclear scope).²

However, if we consider the following examples from Partee (1991) it becomes evident that what the MH is trying to accomplish can be achieved concisely and adequately by considering the focus structure of the sentence containing the indefinite bare nominal (Focus is indicated by capitalization):

(5) a. TICKETS are available.

b. Tickets are AVAILABLE.

² Subjects of I-level predicates, according to Diesing's (1992b) assumptions, which are in turn based on Kratzer (1995), are base-generated outside the VP and cannot therefore reconstruct back into the VP at LF, unlike subjects of S-level predicates. Since subjects of S-level predicates are base generated VP-internally they can move back into the VP at LF.

(6) a. *TICKETS are expensive.

b. Tickets are EXPENSIVE.

First of all, the difference between (5) and (6) is essentially a difference in the type of predicates the BN co-occurs with. (5) contains an S-level predicate, whereas the predicate in (6) is I-level. What is seen in (5) is basically a more liberal pattern of focus possibilities than in (6).³ In (5), both the BN subject or the predicate can be focused. In (6), however, only the predicate can be focused.⁴ In an out of the blue utterance of the sentences above, the BN *TICKETS* in (5a) is read existentially. On the other hand, *Tickets* in (5b), with the predicate focused, is read generically. The BN in example (6) cannot, in an out of the blue reading, be focused (see fn. 4, and below). Only the predicate in (6b) can be focused. These interpretive differences seen in (5) and (6) are precisely the same possibilities predicted by Diesing's MH.⁵ Since *available* is a stage-level predicate, it follows, according to Diesing's analysis, that the sentence should be ambiguous between a weak and a strong reading for the BN, i.e. the BN should be subject to both a generic as well as an existential reading, depending on whether or not it reconstructs back into the VP at LF. In (6a), where the indefinite subject with an Individual-level predicate is focused, the sentence is unacceptable (unless *TICKETS* is read contrastively). (6b) shows that when the predicate is focused the sentence is

³ This of course begs the question why an S-level predicate can allow the BN to be focal or non-focal, whereas I-level predicates only allow the BN to be non-focal. I leave this question open for the moment.

⁴ The BN *Tickets* in (6a) can be focused contrastively, however. More will be said about this possibility below.

⁵ Recall that we have seen in § 3.6.3.2 that this was also a proposal made by Cohen and Erteschik-Shir (2002), namely, the mapping of bare plurals to logical forms according to their focus structure.

acceptable and the indefinite subject is read generically.⁶

The preceding discussion serves two purposes. First, it highlights the observation made earlier that the MH is cumbersome in that it makes unnecessary assumptions to explain phenomena that could otherwise quite easily be explained by a focus theory. Second, and more importantly, the discussion brings out an important point: existential BNs are always focused whereas generic BNs are non-focused, or presupposed.

Despite the differences, there is a common thread between (5) and (6): in both sets of examples the generically interpreted BN resists a focal reading. When the generic BN is focused, it is contrastively focused, as is attested in the following grammatical counterpart of (6a):

(7) TICKETS are expensive, not BOOKS.

The existentially interpreted BN in (5) can be non-contrastively focused with a S-level predicate such as *available*. When the BN is not focused with a S-level predicate it is assigned a generic reading. As a matter of fact, (5) simultaneously illustrates two possibilities for the BN, and it also displays the two options available for an S-level predicate: either being focal or non-focal. Each possibility for the predicate in terms of

⁶ The same analysis argued for concerning examples (5) and (6) in the text automatically carries over to the familiar examples in (i) and (ii) Diesing (1992) uses to argue for the MH:

(i) Firemen are available.

(ii) Firemen are altruistic.

In (i), where the BN is ambiguous between an existential and a generic reading, the ambiguity correlates with different focus assignments. If the BN is focused, the existential reading follows; if it is non-focal, the generic reading follows. In (ii), the predicate only can be focalized. The BN is topical and is read generically. If focused, the BN gets a contrastive reading.

focus correlates with an opposite focal status for the BN subject; if the S-level predicate is focal, as in (5b), the BN subject is non-focal, and therefore, generically interpreted. If, on the other hand, the S-level predicate is non-focal, as in (5a), the BN subject is focal, and, therefore, existentially interpreted. Only the former possibility is open for I-level predicates, unlike S-level predicates. To put it differently, I-level predicates have to be focal, since they combine with BNs that are non-focal (i.e. generic).

This intriguing descriptive pattern noted immediately above for English in examples (5) and (6) finds further support in PA. Recall from the previous chapter that PA BNs only co-occur with S-level predicates to the exclusion of I-level predicates. Furthermore, PA BNs, I have argued, have to be foci and are only subject to an existential interpretation. It can be argued, then, that I-level predicates must always be focused, unlike S-level predicates, which can be focal, but do not have to be. We could speculate that the impossibility for a PA BN to co-occur with an I-level predicate follows naturally from this difference. PA BNs, being focal, cannot co-occur with I-level predicates, the latter being always focal, assuming, crucially, that one focus is possible per sentence.

However appealing this hypothesis appears to be, it seems to me that it may not be accurate. The focal/non-focal status of the predicate, whether it is an S- or I-level, I believe, follows from the focal/non-focal status of the BN subject in this case, and not the other way around. Existential BNs, being focal, impose a non-focal status on their predicate. Generic BNs, on the other hand, force a focal status upon their predicate because these nominals are obligatorily non-focal, otherwise they would get the existential interpretation. This observation explains the fact that when a generically

interpreted BN co-occurs with an S-level predicate the latter becomes focused, as seen in (5b). The pattern seen in PA BNs is that of the English sentence in (5a): a focal, existentially-interpreted BN imposing a non-focal status on its predicate. The English pattern seen in (5b) is not attested in PA, however. This can be explained by making two important assumptions, the first of which I have argued for in the previous chapter and the second will be taken up in the next chapter. First, BNs in PA, like their existential English counterparts (see below), are always focused and therefore impose a non-focal status on their predicate; second, as I claim in Chapter 5, generic operators in PA cannot bind bare nominals contained in a DP shell with a null or empty determiner.

This line of argument is what I would like to develop in what follows. Therefore, I set out to demonstrate that existential BNs in English are inherent foci. Conversely, generically-interpreted ones are non-focal, or presupposed.

4.2 Existential/Generic & Focal/Non-Focal

Bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic have been argued in Chapter 3 to be always foci. Furthermore, these nominals, it has been noted, are only subject to an existential interpretation. It would certainly be ideal if the same focal status of PA BNs could be shown to carry over to existentially interpreted bare nominals in English. This task, I believe to be attainable. Once we are able to show that existentially read BNs in both Palestinian Arabic and English can be handled equally on the same footing, what remains is to show that the differences in the general behavior of BNs in these two languages can be explained on principled grounds. This second task I put off until Chapter 5. For now I turn to an exposition of the first task.

As a test to differentiate between object-referring (i.e. existential) and kind-referring (i.e. generic) DPs, Krifka et al. (1995:13) note that in upward-entailing contexts (i.e. non-negative sentences) object-referring DPs can be replaced by "less informative" DPs without affecting the truth-conditions of the sentence. Kind-referring DPs, in contrast, do exhibit such a difference in truth-condition:

(8) Berber lions escaped from the zoo. $\Rightarrow$ Lions escaped from the zoo.

(9) Berber lions are extinct. $\# \Rightarrow$ Lions are extinct.

The fact that Berber lions escaped from the zoo clearly entails that lions escaped from the zoo. However, that Berber lions are extinct by no means entails that lions are extinct. The BN in (8) is therefore read existentially (i.e. object-referring) whereas that in (9) gets the kind reading or a generic reading. Now, since the context question-answer pairing has proven instrumental in my discussion of BNs in PA in Chapter 3, I believe such a strategy will turn out to be just as useful in the case of English. Let us, then, consider the relevant context questions of the examples just cited in (8)-(9).

Since *Berber lions* in (9) is interpreted existentially a felicitous context question (CQ) for (8) would be (10)

(10) What escaped from the zoo?

in which *Berber lions* would be focalized since it substitutes for the *wh*-pronoun.

However, (11) would be an infelicitous CQ for (8):

(11) # Where did Berber lions escape from?

This follows from the fact that the BN in the CQ in (11) is more felicitously read generically (as kind-referring) rather than existentially (i.e. object-referring). Actually, (11) may not be a felicitous or an acceptable question at all due to the clash between the (kind-referring) generic subject *Berber lions* and the episodic S-level predicate *escape*, unless a very specific context is conjured up for the question.

Consider next a possible CQ for (9) as in (12):

(12) # / * What/ Who is extinct?

The CQ in (12) is awkward at best, ungrammatical at worst. This seems to say that *Berber lions* in (9) cannot be focalized. A more plausible CQ for (9), then, would be (re-)phrased as in (13), or even (14):

(13) What kind(s) of animal(s) is/are extinct?/What animal is extinct?

(14) Tell me about Berber lions: What about them?/What do you know about them?

Both (13) and (14) are acceptable as CQs for (9) since they clearly signal the topical status of the kind-referring or generic DP *Berber lions*. However, these two CQs are not actually equivalent. On the one hand, if (9) is a reply to (13) then *Berber lions* would be read contrastively (i.e. juxtaposing extinct and non-extinct animals) contrasting *Berber lions* to other animals which are not extinct. In this case (9) would be more plausibly

rendered as in (15):

(15) BERBER LIONS are extinct (*as opposed to some unspecified animal(s)*).

As such *BERBER LIONS* would be carrying contrastive stress and the kind-predicate, *extinct*, would be destressed, quite an expected result since the predicate in (15), and its CQ in (13), is outside the scope of the assertion (i.e. presupposed). If, on the other hand, (9) is an answer to (14), *Berber lions* would be topical, and not contrastive. In this case, *Berber lions* would be deaccented, since it is presupposed or non-asserted, and the kind-predicate would be focalized as the rendering in (15') illustrates:

(15') Berber lions ARE EXTINCT.

A similar argument can be formulated for the following example also cited in Krifka et al. (1995: 24):

(16) Typhoons arise in this part of the Pacific.

This example is ambiguous between two readings paraphrased in (17) and (18) (Krifka et al. 1995: 24). *Typhoons* in (17) has a generic interpretation while it is interpreted existentially in (18).

(17) Typhoons in general have a common origin in this part of the Pacific.

(18) There arise typhoons in this part of the Pacific.

The paraphrases in (17) and (18) correlate with distinct CQs. To start with, note that (19) would be a perfectly plausible CQ for (16):

(19) What arises in this part of the Pacific?

This CQ would get us the second reading in (18) argued to be available for (16). Notice that *this part of the Pacific* in the CQ in (19) is presupposed, i.e. thematic. It should therefore have the same thematic status in (16). *Typhoons*, by contrast, is not presupposed in (19) and should therefore be asserted in (16), i.e. rhematic or focused. The reading available here, paraphrased in (18), presupposes that *this part of the Pacific* is what is under discussion, or part of the common ground or common assumptions of the interlocutors. In other words, this reading does not commit to any existential presupposition with respect to typhoons; *typhoons* is not part of the background knowledge of the interlocutors. Accordingly, *typhoons* in (16) would be focalized.

The CQ in (19), however, cannot get us the other reading available for (16), namely, the one paraphrased in (17). This is so since *typhoons* would be focal in the CQ in (19) but thematic or presupposed in (16). A plausible CQ that would generate the reading in (17) would rather be (20)

(20) Where do typhoons arise?

or even (21)

(21) What about typhoons: tell me about them?/What do you know about them?/

What do you know about typhoons?

and in both CQs *typhoons* would be presupposed, thus read generically. Under such a reading, the focus of (16) would either be the locative PP *in this part of the Pacific*, or the VP *arise in this part of the Pacific*, depending of course on which CQ (16) would be an answer to (i.e. either (20) or (21), respectively). Possible yet, *this* alone could be contrastively focused, but in this case the relevant CQ would be as in (22), which is different from either (20) or (21):

(22) Do typhoons arise in THAT part of the Pacific?

As an answer to the CQ in (22), (16) would be rendered as in (23):

(23) Typhoons arise in THIS part of the Pacific.

A quick comparison to PA is revealing here. Consider the literal equivalent to (16) in PA as in (16'):⁷

⁷ A postverbal position for the BN is most felicitous to indicate focalization. A preverbal position would be possible but the BN would come out contrastive (i.e. *TYPHOONS*, not *TORNADOES*, *arise in this part of the Pacific*. More about this in the next chapter.

(16') b-tiTlaʕ min haða l-dʒuzuʔ min l-muħiiT l-haadi ʔaʕaaSeer
 arise from this the-part of the-ocean the-Pacific typhoons
 'Typhoons arise from this part of the Pacific (Ocean).'

As is clear from my assumptions so far, the only reading available for the (16') in Palestinian Arabic is where the BN, ʔaʕaaSeer 'typhoons' is both focused (assigned stress by the NSR) and read existentially; the generic reading cannot be expressed by the BN. So, (16') can only have the PA counterpart of (19) as a felicitous CQ, as seen in (19'):

(19') šuu b-iTlaʕ min haða l-dʒuzuʔ min l-muħiiT l-haadi ?
 what emerge from this the-part of the-ocean the-Pacific
 'What arises in this part of the Pacific (Ocean)?'

By contrast, the CQs in (20) and (21), exemplified here in (20') and (21'), would not get us the reading expressed in (16'). Notice also that a CQ such as (21'') is ungrammatical, a result by now expected in view of my contention that BNs in PA are always focalized. Thus, a question such as (21'') would be out on the principled ground that the CQ would have two focuses, an unacceptable outcome.

(20') (min) ween b-iTlaʕu l-ʔaʕaaSeer?
 (from) where arise the-typhoons
 'Where do (the) typhoons arise?'

(21') šuu b-tiʕraf ʕan l-ʔaʕaaSeer?
 what know-2S about the-typhoons
 'What do you know about typhoons?'

(21") *šuu b-tiʕraf ʕan ʔaʕaaSeer?
 what know-2S about typhoons
 'What do you know about typhoons?'

(20') and (21') would be acceptable CQs to the PA example in (16"), where the nominal is determined by the definite article and the reading is, of course, generic:

(16") l-ʔaʕaaSeer b-iTlaʕu min haða l-dʒuzuʔ min l-muħiiT l-haadi
 the-typhoons arise from this the-part of the-ocean the-Pacific
 'Typhoons arise from this part of the Pacific (Ocean).'

Non-contrastively focalizing *l-ʔaʕaaSeer* 'the-typhoons' in (16") is unacceptable. First, if, for the sake of argument, we assume *l-ʔaʕaaSeer* 'the-typhoons' in (16") to be informationally (i.e. non-contrastively) focused, (19'), repeated below, would not be felicitous as the relevant CQ

(19') šuu b-iTlaʕ min haða l-dʒuzuʔ min l-muħiiT l-haadi ?
 what emerge from this the-part of the-ocean the-Pacific
 'What arises in this part of the Pacific (Ocean)?'

the reason being that the preverbal position is reserved for topical or presupposed (non-asserted) elements. The subject, which would replace *šuu* 'what' in (19'), would carry narrow focus and should therefore be placed in a postverbal position as in (19") which is, however, ungrammatical.

(19") *b-tiTlaŋu min haða l-dʒuzuʔ min l-muħiiT l-haadi l-ʔaŋaaSeer
 arise from this the-part of the-ocean the-Pacific the-typhoons
 'Typhoons arise from this part of the Pacific (Ocean).'

Thus, *l-ʔaŋaaSeer* 'the-typhoons' in (16") cannot be informationally focused. It can either be topical, in which case another constituent or element in the sentence would be focused, or else, if focused, it would be contrastively focused⁸ (i.e. notationally, it would be capitalized) as in (19'''). In this latter case, a felicitous CQ would be (19''''):

(19''') L-ʔAŋAASEER b-iTlaŋU min haða l-dʒuzuʔ min l-muħiiT l-haadi
 THE-TYPHOONS arise from this the-part of the-ocean the-Pacific
 'TYPHOONS arise from this part of the Pacific (Ocean).'

(19''') šuu ʔilli b-iTlaŋ min haða l-dʒuzuʔ min l-muħiiT l-haadi,
 what that arise from this the-part of the-ocean the-Pacific
 l-ʔaŋaaSeer willa l-ʔawasef ?
 the-typhoons or the-hurricanes
 'Which (*natural phenomenon*) arises in this part of the Pacific (Ocean),
 typhoons or hurricanes?'

Note also the addition of *ʔilli* 'that' which indicates the *definite* status of what is being questioned is added in (19''').

The purpose of this little detour to PA is twofold. First, it serves to confirm our intuitions regarding the availability in English of the two interpretations to examples such as (16). These interpretations correspond to two different utterances in PA, one

⁸ See below for an important qualification of the 'focal' status of generic DPs.

with a BN and the other utilizing the definite article to express the generic reading. My second purpose behind this digression is to illustrate that the null hypothesis is in fact true: if generically interpreted BNs in English are non-focal, then determined DPs that are read generically in PA should be predicted to resist being focalized. Both generic BNs in English and generic DPs with the definite determiner in PA are only open for a contrastive topical interpretation. This result is not trivial; it will turn out to be significant in the next chapter.

The same observations made with respect to (16) can also be made concerning the following two examples cited in Krifka et al. (1995: 24).⁹ These authors point out that these examples too are ambiguous between a generic and an existential reading of the BN, as paraphrased in *a* and *b*, respectively:

(24) Dogs must be carried. (Sign in front of the escalator).

- a. A dog must be carried to use the escalator.
- b. Any dogs on the escalator are to be carried.

(25) Shirts must be worn. (Sign at a restaurant entrance).

- a. If you want to enter this restaurant, you must wear a shirt.
- b. The only thing you can do with a shirt is to wear it.

The readings in (24a) and (25a), where the BN is subject to an existential reading,

⁹ The examples are due to Halliday (1970).

would have (26a) and (26b) as possible CQs, respectively:

(26) a. What must be carried (*to use the escalator*)?

b. What must be worn (*to enter the restaurant*)?

Both these CQs entail that the BNs in (24) and (25) are asserted and not presupposed, hence focused or rhematic. This would basically produce the existential reading for these nominals, therefore entailing the unintended, ludicrous reading for (24a) where the reader of the sign would take it to be mandatory to carry a dog in order to use the escalator.¹⁰ However, such readings as (24a) and (25a) could not possibly arise in answer to the following CQs:

(27) a. What about dogs? / What do you know about dogs? Tell me (more) about them?

b. What about shirts? / What do you know about shirts? Tell me more about them?

What is in common between (27a) and (27b) is that the BNs, *dogs* and *shirts*, respectively, are presupposed, i.e. non-asserted, therefore subject to a generic reading. The reading generated by these CQs would be (24b) and (25b), respectively, resulting in the unintended, ludicrous reading for (25b) where the reader of such a sign at a

¹⁰ The mechanism by which the existential reading is achieved for the bare nominal can be the same mechanism argued for with respect to BNs in PA in the previous chapter (*cf.* Ladusaw (1994)).

restaurant would take it as giving pointers on the numerous purposes or uses shirts could be put to (or, in this case, the *only* purpose).

Link (1995) considers the following two examples:

(28) a. Computers assist EXPERTS.

b. COMPUTERS assist experts.

Link observes that by shifting the stress from *experts* in (28a) to *computers* in (28b) the $\forall/\exists$ (i.e. universal-generic/existential) structure of the sentence is shifted or reversed (1995: 374-375). In (28a) *EXPERTS* would be read existentially, while *computers* generically. In (28b), on the other hand, *COMPUTERS* is subject to an existential reading whereas *experts* is generically interpreted this time around. Consider how it can be demonstrated that when the BN gets the generic reading it is non-focal. (28a) would plausibly be an answer to the following CQ:

(29) a. What can/ do computers do (*these days*)?

b. Who do computers assist?

In both CQs, (29a) and (29b), *EXPERTS* would be non-presupposed. This means that it is rhematic or focused in the answer in (28a). Notice that (29a) and (29b) entail slightly different focus structures for (28a). If (29a) is the relevant CQ for (28a), then the predicate *assist* as well as the BN *EXPERTS* would be part of the assertion. Both would in that case be focused. Conversely, *assist* would be outside of the focus structure of

(28a) if the relevant CQ is in fact (29b). What is fairly clear here is that neither of the CQs in (29a) and (29b) would generate the reading, or rather the focus structure, in (28b), where *COMPUTERS* is asserted and *experts* is presupposed. There would obviously be a clash between the focal status of the BN *computers* in (29), where it would be presupposed, and its informational status in (28b), where the bare nominal *COMPUTERS* is focalized. A more likely CQ for (28b) would either be (30a) or (30b):

(30) a. What assists experts (*these days*)?

b. What about experts?

Notice, however, that (28a), repeated here as (28a') for convenience, may have a totally different focus structure than has been argued for it. The BN in object position, *experts*, can also be read generically. That this reading is also available is attested by the possibility of replacing the BN object with a generic DP (i.e. with the definite article) in PA as in (28a''):

(28a') Computers assist EXPERTS.

(28a'') l-ħawasib bi-tsaaʔid l-xubaraaʔ
 the-computers assist the-experts
 'computers assist experts'

In this case, as exemplified in (28a'), if the BN *experts* is focused, the reading would be contrastive and the sentence would be an answer to a CQ such as (29c):

(29c) What kind of people do computers assist (*as opposed to others*)?

A good paraphrase for the answer to (29c) would be that experts are the kind of people assisted by computers, but that novices, for example, or high school students, would not benefit from such technology. It is therefore evident that to focus a generically interpreted BN is to trigger the contrastive (*topical*, see below) reading, unlike the situation found with existential BNs.

A similar situation holds for (31a) and (31b) also cited in Link (1995):

(31) a. Cats chase MICE.

b. CATS chase mice.

An identical argument utilizing CQs can be brought to bear on these sentences. For that reason, I limit myself here to considering the following CQ in (32):

(32) Which animals chase mice?

In (32) the BN *mice* is part of the presupposition of the sentence. The element in an answer substituting for *which animals* should therefore be focalized. But *which animal* is more likely here to be asking about the *kind*-referring, rather than about an object-referring DP. This would contradict the general argument that a generic DP cannot be focalized, especially when it is noted that (33) is a felicitous answer to the CQ in (32):

(33) CATS chase mice.

As an answer to the CQ in (32), *CATS* in (33) would be focalized. However, as I have just remarked regarding the CQ in (29c) and its answer in (28a'), I believe that the focus here is contrastive. In other words, the answer in (33) could be re-phrased as (34):

(34) CATS chase mice (not DOGS).

The example, then, does not constitute an exception to or violation of my argument. More will be said about contrastive topics/foci below.

Finally consider (35)-(40), also taken from Link (1995) (capitalization mine):

(35) Cowboys carry GUNS.

(36) Indians make BASKETS.

(37) Soldiers wear BERETS.

(38) CIA agents perform COVERT ACTIONS.

(39) Lions have MANES.

(40) Unicorns have HORNS.

These examples can lend themselves easily to a similar treatment. Take (35), for example. *Cowboys* in (35) is most appropriately interpreted generically, whereas *GUNS* would get the existential reading. For concreteness, a possible CQ for (35) would be (41), but not (42):

(41) What do cowboys carry?/ What do cowboys do?

(42) Who carries guns?

The CQ in (42) is not unacceptable, however. It is acceptable, not with the reading or focus structure in (35), but with a reading where *cowboys* would be both generic and contrastive as in (35'):

(35') COWBOYS carry guns.

It also seems to me that when COWBOYS is contrastively focused *guns* appears to be more appropriately interpreted as generic. The existential interpretation is, however, still available for *guns*, I think. Consider, for example, that in PA *guns* could still be expressed with a BN (therefore, existential) even when *cowboys* is generic (therefore determined by the definite article):

(43) R-RUʕAA b-yiħmilu musaddasaat
THE-COWBOYS carry-3MP guns
'cowboys carry guns.'

This means that *guns* should still be focalized, even though *cowboys* is contrastively focused. This situation is potentially problematic for any account assuming one, and only one, focus per sentence, as in Rizzi (1997) and Zubizarreta (1998). However, I believe there is a way out of this problem. If contrastively focused, generically interpreted BNs can co-occur with focalized existential BNs, this may mean that generic

BNs that are contrastively focused are actually contrastive topics, rather than contrastive foci. Most significantly, this hypothesis is more kindly to, and accommodating of, my main argument since I have maintained so far that generically interpreted BNs cannot be foci, but are always presupposed (i.e. thematic).

Other evidence pointing in the same direction of my general argument comes from Kratzer's (1995) following examples:

(44) PONDS belong to this property.

(45) COUNTEREXAMPLES to this claim are known to me.

(44) and (45) indicate that subjects of I-level unaccusative (or passive) predicates can be interpreted existentially. In both these examples the subjects have to be focalized, otherwise the sentences would be unacceptable. In fact, notice that if (44) is minimally modified to include another existential BN the sentence would become unacceptable:

(46) *PONDS belong to BOYS from London.

Since *BOYS* in (46) is existentially read it has to be focalized, as we have seen in (44). To focalize *PONDS* in this case, along with *BOYS*, would result in two focuses for the sentence, which is unacceptable. In other words, the reason why (44) is grammatical is due to the focal status of the existential BN which means that (*belong to*) *this property* in (44) is thematic.

Consider next the following example from Carlson (1977a):

(47) Dinosaurs ate kelp.

Carlson points out that this example is ambiguous between a generic statement about dinosaurs or as simply reporting an event. Note that the two readings come out under different assignments of sentential stress:

(47) a. DINOSAURS ate kelp (while Grog watched). (EX)

b. Dinosaurs ATE KELP (*before they became extinct*; MS) (GEN)

As Carlson notes, this ambiguity has consequences on truth conditions. This observation follows directly from the focus structure assigned in (47a) and (47b) and is reminiscent of the difference in truth conditions, which results from different focus assignments, noted by Rooth (1992) for the following two examples:¹¹

(48) a. [Mary]_F always took John to the movies.

b. Mary always took [John]_F to the movies.

What is important to note about (47) is that the existential/generic readings of the BN *Dinosaurs* correlate with being focused/presupposed, respectively. As soon as *Dinosaurs* is understood in generic terms the focus of the sentence shifts away from it to

¹¹ A difference in focus structure in (48a,b) results in a difference in the truth conditions of the sentences as noted in the text. So, for (48a) to be true, it has to be Mary that always takes John to the movies, not, for instance, Sara. On the other hand, for (48b) to be truth-conditionally sound it has to be John who Mary always takes to the movies, but not Bill.

the predicate *ate kelp*. The sentence would then be understood as saying that it was characteristic of dinosaurs (in general) to eat kelp. When the BN *dinosaurs* is focused, however, the whole sentence is understood as reporting a specific event of kelp-eating by a group of dinosaurs. Only the existential reading is available in this case.

Another of Carlson's (1977a) examples can be accorded a similar treatment.

Consider (49):

- (49) a. Trucks hauling dynamite ARE ILLEGAL IN NEVADA. (GEN)
- b. TRUCKS HAULING DYNAMITE were spotted on Nevada highways. (EX)
- c. * Trucks hauling dynamite WERE SPOTTED ON NEVADA HIGHWAYS.

As can be clearly seen in (49a), the generic reading of the BN *Trucks hauling dynamite* coincides with the placement of sentential stress on the I-level predicate, *ARE ILLEGAL IN NEVADA*. With a Stage-level predicate, such as *were spotted in Nevada*, the BN is subject to an existential interpretation. Sentential stress is therefore placed on the BN, not on the predicate, as seen in the contrast between (49b) and (49c). The *topic-hood* of the BN in (49a), and its absence in the case of the BN in (49b), can be brought out by using one of the tests utilized in Chapter 3 from Reinhart (1981):

- (50) a. As for trucks hauling dynamite, they are illegal in Nevada.
- b. *As for trucks hauling dynamite, they were spotted on Nevada highways.

This test brings out the topical status of the BN in (49a). However, the BN in (49b)

cannot be read generically, hence the ungrammaticality of (50b).

The same test for topichood just employed can be successfully utilized to disambiguate the following ambiguous sentence:

(51) Girls are sick.

The adjective *sick* is ambiguous between *physically sick* or *mentally sick*. These two readings correspond to distinct interpretations for the subject BN. If *sick* is taken to mean physically sick (i.e. as an S-level predicate, temporary or transient), the subject BN would be read existentially. By contrast, if *sick* is understood in the sense of being mentally sick, which is a more permanent property than being physically sick (i.e. it would be an I-level predicate), *Girls* would be read generically. Note, moreover, that there is another level at which these two readings differ, namely, the level of information or focus structure. The difference in terms of being an S-level or I-level predicate results in a difference in how the BN is to be rendered in terms of its information structure. If what is meant by *sick* here is physically sick (S-level predicate), and *Girls* would therefore be read existentially, the focus of the sentence would be the BN, as in (51'a). If, on the other hand, *sick* is construed as being mentally sick (an I-level predicate, since potentially permanent), and *Girls* is therefore understood generically, the focus of the sentence would be placed on the predicate itself, not the BN, as seen in (51' b).

(51') a. GIRLS are sick.

b. Girls ARE SICK.

The meaning of (51' b) would be that girls in general are characteristically mentally ill (or, perverted, bogus,...etc). Again this is a rather more permanent property than physical illness.

The generic/existential distinction interacts in the same interesting ways seen so far in the following examples:

(52) a. I know WOMEN.

b. I KNOW women.

(53) a. I know LAWYERS.

b. I KNOW lawyers.

Again, when understood existentially, the BN bears the sentential stress in (52a) and (53a) (or, conversely, focusing the BN makes the existential interpretation far more appropriate than the generic one). To be interpreted generically, or if interpreted generically, the stress has to be shifted away from the BN to be placed on the predicate, as witnessed in (52b) and (53b). So, (52a) would mean that there are women such that I know them. By contrast, (52b) means that I know what women are like (perhaps, they are *kind, mischievous, fickle*, ...etc, again, rather permanent properties). The same can be said about (53a) and (53b). Note, moreover, that if the BN in either (52) or (53) is focused, but, at the same time, understood generically, the reading that will come out is contrastive (i.e. as contrastive topics), as in (52') and (53'):

(52') I know WOMEN (*but not MEN*). (Gen)

(53') I know LAWYERS (*but not REAL STATE AGENTS*). (Gen)

Another piece of evidence in favor of my argument is provided by remarks made in Carlson (1977b). Carlson notes that predicate nominals select a generic subject whereas prepositional phrases select an existentially interpreted subject. This can be seen in the contrast between (54a, b) and (55a, b):

(54) a. Dogs are sweet animals.

b. Dentists are book collectors.

(55) a. Dogs are in the next room.

b. Children were without parents.

Dogs in (54a) and *Dentists* in (54b) are more appropriately interpreted generically due to the I-level predicates co-occurring with these BNs. So, what is being discussed is *dogs* and *dentists* in general terms and we are making the observation that it is characteristic of *dogs* to be sweet animals and of *dentists* to be book collectors. In (55a) and (55b), on the other hand, it is not a general tendency of the referent of the BN that is under discussion. So, *Dogs* and *Children* in (55) are more accurately interpreted existentially. These pre-theoretic remarks, which seem intuitively plausible, are confirmed by applying the by- now familiar test for topic-hood to the BNs in (54)-(55):

- (56) a. As for dogs, they are good animals.
 b. As for dentists, they are book collectors.
- (57) a. *As for dogs, they are in the next room.
 b. *As for children, they were without parents.

Let us now see what status each one of these BNs would have in terms of the focus structure of the sentence. First, take *Dogs* and *Dentists* in (54). A possible set of context questions for these two sentences would be (58):

- (58) What about dogs | Dentists?/What do you know about dogs | Dentists? Tell me
 (more) about them?

Notice that (59) would not be a felicitous CQs for (54)

- (59) a. What animals are sweet?
 b. (*?) Who are book collectors?/ What kind of people are book collectors?

unless *Dogs* and *Dentists* in (54a) and (54b), respectively, are read as contrastive topics. In this case distinctions would be drawn between animals that are sweet and people who are book collectors, on the one hand, and animals that are not sweet and people who are not book collectors, on the other hand. If (58) is the relevant CQ, then it is fairly obvious then that the BNs in (54) are non-focal or presupposed, unlike the situation in (55). The examples in (55) can be appropriate answers to the following CQs:

(60) a. What is in the next room?

b. Who was without parents?

Note also the unacceptability of the following CQ as a context question to (55):

(61) (*) Where are dogs? [To be answered: *Dogs are in the next room.*]

This will follow directly from the focal status of *Dogs* in (55a) which would clash with its topical status in (61). The very awkwardness (or, perhaps, ungrammaticality) of the question in (61) follows immediately from that the question has two focuses, *dogs* and the *wh*-element, which is presumably always focal.

As has been noted earlier, the focus structure of the utterance can affect the truth conditions of the sentence. For example, Rooth (1992) points out that an answer such as (63) is unacceptable to the question in (62) with the focus structure shown:

(62) Who cut Bill down to size?

(63) * Mary cut [Bill]_F down to size.

Also, a question such as (64) cannot be answered by (65):

(64) Who did Mary cut down to size?

(65) [Mary]_F cut Bill down to size.

This is essentially due to the conflict between the question and the answer in terms of focus structure. It follows, then, that the question in (62) can be answered by (65), and the question in (64) can be answered by (63), since in this case there would arise no clash in the focus structure of the CQ and its answer. So an answer to question (62) would be of the form "x cut Bill down to size" while an answer to (64) would take the form "Mary cut y down to size."

Now consider the following set of data:

(66) a. *Who cut boys down to size?

b. Who cut the boys down to size?

(67) *Where did boys go?

(68) *Why did girls leave early? ¹²

(69) *When will boys leave?

Notice first of all that all the predicates (66)-(69) are stage predicates and that the BNs should thus be interpreted existentially. The question in (66a) is ungrammatical (unless, of course, it is interpreted in a pair-list fashion). Abstracting away from the ungrammaticality of the question, an appropriate answer to (66a) would take the form "x cut boys down to size" where the BN *boys* would be presupposed or non-focal. That it is

¹² A question arises concerning the acceptability of (i), where the BN, which is existentially interpreted, can co-occur in a CQ with *why*:

(i) Why did people leave early?

It seems to me that the acceptability of (i) could be pragmatically facilitated in that the existential reading is alluded to, but somehow masked in the CQ. In fact, if the BN *people* is further anchored, so as to clearly mark its existential status, the sentence would no longer be acceptable as seen in (ii):

(ii) *Why did people in the room leave early?

the status of the BN *boys* that is problematic is evident when the grammatical (66b) is considered where a determiner is used.

The interpretation the BNs have in (66)-(69) is existential due to the stage-level predicates involved. With individual-level or habitual predicates where the BNs are interpreted generically we do not encounter the same unacceptable outcomes. The reason for the difference stems from the non-focal status of the BNs in (70)-(72). These context questions would therefore be felicitous due to the fact that only one focus exists per sentence, that of the *wh*-element.

(70) Why do boys hate school?

(71) What do girls like?

(72) What do boys smoke?

The major point the discussion so far has helped establish is that generic BNs can never be focal and existential BNs can never be presupposed. When a generic BN is focused, the focus turns out to be contrastive. In fact, we have seen some evidence suggesting that contrastively focused generic BNs are not foci, but rather contrastive topics. In the following section I consider further evidence to the correctness of my claims that has been pointed out by Laca (1990) concerning BNs in object positions. The evidence reviewed will further strengthen my argument. Furthermore, I propose in what follows a solution to a potential problem for the current analysis posed by predicates such as *hate*, *love*, ..etc, whose BN objects can only be read generically. More about this will be said in the next section.

4.3 Object Bare Nominals and Focus Structure: More Evidence

My main concern so far has been subject BNs and their interaction with the focus structure of the sentence, although object BNs have also been sporadically touched on. A closer look at object BNs is, however, warranted and could provide further support for my general analysis.

Laca's (1990) work is primarily an attempt to demonstrate that the lexical classification of verbs is not the only relevant factor in determining the interpretation a BN in object position is assigned. The information structure of the sentence also plays a role. BNs in object position that are read generically are presupposed, unlike existential BNs which are asserted. However, she argues that the terms 'universal' and 'existential' with respect to BNs could be misleading since these readings do not correspond exactly to the quantified meanings ($\forall$, $\exists$, respectively) in allowing exceptions or triggering inference. Consider (69)-(72):

(73) Bill hates dogs.

(74) Bill hates all dogs.

(75) *? Bill hates dogs except for his own terrier.

(76) Bill hates all dogs except for his own terrier.

As seen in the contrast between (75) and (76) quantified nominals allow for exceptions unlike BNs which do not. Moreover, BNs and quantified nominals differ in terms of the inferences they trigger as seen in (77)-(79):

(77) Bill mistrusts politicians.

(78) Bill mistrusts all politicians.

(79) Bill mistrusts George Bush.

The inference from (78) to (79) goes through; so, if Bill mistrusts *all* politicians it then follows that he does not trust George Bush. On the other hand, the inference from (77) to (79) is blocked; for Bill to mistrust politicians does not necessarily mean he mistrusts George Bush. Laca, therefore, opts to use the terms *inclusive* (for universal) and *non-inclusive* (existential). She further argues that information structure plays a role in sorting out these two readings for object BNs.

To make her argument, Laca first observes that inference is blocked when the bare plural is generically interpreted. Consider (80):

(80) a. The Gwamba-Mamba eat salmon.

b. The Gwamba-Mamba eat fish.

The fact that the Gwamba-Mamba eat *salmon* does entail that the Gwamba-Mamba eat *fish* and the inference from (80a) to (80b) goes through. *Salmon* is interpreted existentially in this case. Now consider (81):

(81) a. The Gwamba-Mamba hate salmon.

b. The Gwamba-Mamba hate fish.

For the Gwamba-Mamba to hate *salmon* does not necessarily mean that the Gwamba-Mamba hate *fish*. The inference is therefore blocked from (81a) to (81b), where only the generic reading is possible for the BN *salmon*. The same blocking-of-inference effect can also be seen with *predicative adjectives*:

- (82) a. I see big green spots when the light goes off.
- b. I see green spots when the light goes off.

Again, (82a) entails (82b). If I see *big green spots*, which is an existentially read BN, then that entails that I am able to see *green spots* when the light goes off. The same holds for (83) where if Mary wears *silk blouses* it will also be true that she wears *blouses*.

- (83) a. Mary wears silk blouses.
- b. Mary wears blouses.

However, when a predicative adjective is used, which causes the BN to be read generically, the inference is blocked. So, in (84), the fact that I see *big spots green* does not entail that I am also able to see *spots green* when the light is off.

- (84) a. I see big spots green when the light goes off.
- b. I see spots green when the light goes off.

Nor would it hold that if Mary wears silk blouses unironed that she wears (all her) blouses unironed. The same line of reasoning can be carried over to (86) where eating *salmon*, a generically interpreted BN, raw does not entail eating *fish* raw.

(85) a. Mary wears silk blouses unironed.

b. Mary wears blouses unironed.

(86) a. The Gwamba-Mamba eat salmon raw.

b. The Gwamba-Mamba eat fish raw.

Manner adverbials also behave similarly (Laca 1990: 34). The inference does not go through between (87a) and (87b):

(87) a. The Gwamba-Mamba eat salmon with their fingers.

b. The Gwamba-Mamba eat fish with their fingers.

This follows from the fact that the BN *salmon* in (87a) is interpreted generically, hence the blocking effect noted.

Laca (1990: 35) observes that predicative adjectives and manner adverbials are interpreted as the focus of the sentence while the rest of the sentence is interpreted as presupposed. This is further confirmed by her observation that the relation between (88a) and (88b) is that of presupposition since it is retained under negation as in (88c):

- (88) a. Los guamba-mamba comen el salmón crudo. (Spanish)
The Gwamba-Mamba eat (the) salmon raw
- b. Los guamba-mamba comen salmón.
The Gwamba-Mamba eat salmon
- c. Los guamba-mamba no comen el salmón crudo.
The Gwamba-Mamba don't eat salmon raw

This clearly illustrates that the BN *salmon* is read generically and is also presupposed, not asserted. The same point can also be made by considering (89a-d)

- (89) a. Linguists read thrillers.
- b. Linguists read books.
- c. Linguists read thrillers at an incredible speed.
- d. Linguists read books at an incredible speed.

The inference between (89a) and (89b) goes through; if linguists read *thrillers*, then it follows that they read *books*. However, if they *read thrillers at an incredible speed* that does not entail that they *read books at an incredible speed*. Since *at incredible speed* tends to stand out as being focal, the BN *thrillers*, which is read generically, comes out as being presupposed in (89c).

Laca finds further confirmation for her argument by observing that when there is a close or intimate relation between the object and the verb, such a relation either being based on a semantic relation or world knowledge, the non-inclusive (i.e. existential) reading is available (1990: 36).

(90) Henry smokes cigars.

This follows from the fact that we cannot interpret the verb as being focused while at the same time excluding the object. So, in (90), Laca points out, the sentence can be taken to mean either that Henry does something, i.e. *smoking cigars*, or that he smokes something, i.e. *cigars*. In the former case the object *cigars* would be part of the focus of the sentence, in the latter case it would be the focus of the sentence. The interpretation that Henry does something to cigars (i.e. smoking them), is, however, unavailable, since that is what we normally do with cigars anyway.

To sum up, what emerges from the discussion of Laca's (1990) arguments is the following. The generic (i.e. *inclusive*, in Laca's terms) and existential (i.e. *non-inclusive*) readings correlate with whether the object BN is interpreted as part of the focus or not. If the object is indeed part of the focus of the sentence, or if it is the focus of the sentence, then the preferred interpretation would be existential. If, on the other hand, the object is outside the focus of the sentence then the generic interpretation is more prominent.

A potentially problematic case, also noted by Laca (1990), is the case of the so-called *affective attitude* verbs. These are verbs such as *like*, *love*, *loathe*, *admire*, *respect*, ...etc, that exclude a non-inclusive or existential interpretation for their direct object. I consider the problem in more detail in the next section.

4.4 Affective Verbs and the Generic/Existential Interpretation

There is a category of verbs that constitute *prima facie* counter evidence to the analysis I propose in this work. The problematic nature and idiosyncratic behavior of these verbs have also been noted by Laca (1990) who uses the term *affective verbs* to refer to this category of verbs. Examples of affective verbs include *like, love, despise, admire, loathe, fear, ...etc.*

Recall from my earlier discussion the following basic claims. First, existentially interpreted BNs are always focalized, unlike generic BNs which can never be focalized (non-contrastively). Second, generically interpreted BNs can be focused contrastively, and in that case they are interpreted as contrastive topics rather than contrastive foci. Looking at matters from this perspective, affective verbs present us with an apparent problem. Consider the following:

(91) John likes novels.

(92) My boss respects women.

(93) Everybody admires athletes.

(94) Mary loves coffee.

The BN in object position is interpreted generically. This is confirmed by the impossibility of a BN in PA in the same position, since BNs in this language are only subject to an existential reading as can be seen in the minimally different PA counterparts of (95)-(98). The definite article is used to express the generic interpretation of the DP:

- (95) omar b-iħibb l-riwayaat
Omar likes the-novels
- (96) mudiiri b-iħtrim l-niswaan
my-boss respects the-women
- (97) kull n-naas bi-qaddru l-riyaDiyiin
all the-people admire the-athletes
- (98) salma b-ithibb l-gahwe
Salma likes the-coffee

So far all of this is unproblematic and is quite expected. The problem arises however when we consider that context questions such as (99)-(102) are acceptable, contrary to what my assumptions so far have lead us to expect:

- (99) What does John like?
- (100) Who does my boss respect?
- (101) Who does everybody admire?
- (102) What does Mary love?

Recall from earlier discussion that the CQ in (99), for example, is of the form *What is the x, such that John likes x?* and (100) would be *Who is the x, such that my boss respects x?* Consequently, the answer to (99)-(102) should be of the following logical forms, respectively (with some unnecessary details omitted):

- (103) John likes x.

(104) My boss respects x.

(105) Everybody admires x.

(106) Mary likes x.

This being so, whatever substitutes for the variable x in both the context question and the answer should be focalized. But remember now that the BNs in object position in (91)-(94), and (95)-(98), are interpreted generically. Generic BNs, according to my assumptions so far, are always presupposed or non-asserted, and should therefore not be able to be focalized in the manner just illustrated in (99)-(102) and the informal logical representations in (103)-(106).

Laca (1990) recognizes this problem and suggests the following. Affective verbs are a different breed altogether since they are not linked to any spatio-temporal events. Moreover, these verbs signal relations that hold between individuals rather than stages of individuals, as in Carlson (1977b).¹³ In addition, the objects of affective verbs are interpreted intensionally, rather than extensionally. Finally, the subjects of these verbs are non-agentive but are interpreted as experiencers.

It seems to me that what Laca (1990) overlooks is another important property of these verbs. Before I state that property, however, recall from our discussion so far that generically interpreted BNs always come out contrastive if they are focalized, most likely, contrastive topics. With this in mind, let me return to our examples with affective verbs. Consider (91) again, repeated here as (107), and its CQ in (99), repeated here as

¹³ However, Laca casts doubt on the correctness of this notion of individuals vs. stages of individuals arguing that it is hard to imagine that when, for example, John beats his wife it is a slice of John that is involved but when John hates his wife it is the 'whole' individual that is involved.

(108):

(107) John likes novels.

(108) What does John like?

Although (107) seems to say that generically read BNs can be focused, it can be noticed that the BN *novels* in (108) is contrastively focused, although the *contrast* is implicit, rather than explicit. The contrastive reading is triggered by the affective verb *like* which basically takes (the) things John likes and places them in juxtaposition against (the) things he does not like. That this contrast is inherent in the lexical meaning of I-level predicate *like* is evident when compared to another I-level predicate such as *own* in (109) and its answer in (110):

(109) What does John own?

(110) John owns houses.

Notice that *novels* in (107) would be used with a definite article in PA since it is generically interpreted, as we have seen in (95) above. *Houses* in (110), on the other hand, would not be used with a definite article which means it is interpreted existentially. This contrast is seen in (111)-(112):

(111) omar b-iħibb l-riwayaat
Omar likes **the**-novels

(112) omar b-yumluk byuut
Omar owns houses

It is clear, then, that contrast is not an inherent property of *any* I-level predicate, but that it is indeed an inherent property of affective verbs such as *like* or *respect*. That contrast is not part and parcel of the meaning of *own* is exemplified in the following questions:

(113) Who likes novels?

(114) Who owns houses?

(115) Who owns this hotel?

A good answer to (115), for example, is

(116) Criminals own this hotel.

where no contrast is necessarily part of the meaning of the answer. It is also important to point out that it does not necessarily follow that with *own* in (110) and (116) a contrast is drawn between the things John owns and the things John does not own, or the things criminals own vis-à-vis the things criminals do not own. However, in (107) it is quite plausible to say that a contrast is drawn between the things John likes and the things he does not like. When you say that your boss respects women, you are generally taken to mean that he respects women in comparison to someone or something else or another.

Summing up, the claim that generically interpreted BNs can never be non-

contrastively focalized can still be maintained. This applies to BNs in both subject as well as object positions. The case of affective verbs does not constitute an exception to this analysis since *contrast* is part of the meaning of affective verbs which results in the objects of these verbs being read contrastively.

4.5 Conclusion

I have attempted to put forward and establish the following claims. Existential bare nominals in English are focused, on a par with their PA counterparts. Generically interpreted BNs in English are always presupposed or non-asserted (i.e. non-focal or thematic). If these nominals occur in the scope of focus in the utterance or are the focus of the utterance, they are interpreted as contrastive (topics).

This view of the issues seems to me to be appealing in its simplicity and explanatory power. Languages that seem on the surface to be vastly different are given a uniform and a unified analysis from which not only do the differences follow naturally, but are in fact quite predicted. In the next chapter I wish to show exactly how such differences between Palestinian Arabic (and, Spanish) and English, can be predicted from the little we have uncovered in relation to the interaction of the focus structure of the utterance and BNs in these languages.

Chapter 5

Bare Nominals, Word Order and Reference

5.0 Introduction

I have set out in Chapter 2 to explore the properties of bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic. My working hypothesis has been that insofar as bare (i.e. determinerless) nominals can be found and studied in other special environments, environments in which their behavior is distinctly different from the general case, we may be able to provide a more adequate description of the idiosyncratic behavior generally noted of these nominals. This guiding assumption has turned out to be instrumental and, indeed, illuminating in shedding some light on the properties of bare nominals, not only in Palestinian Arabic, but also in English.

One such environment, as it turns out, is the so-called Construct State (CS) in (Palestinian) Arabic. Bare nominals (BNs) in this construction do not exhibit a sensitivity to the usual restrictions noted generally of BNs, such as their supposed grammaticality in postverbal positions and their ungrammaticality preverbally. BNs in CS constructions distribute freely, a fact I have attributed to the presence of a possessor DP in this environment, which enables the BNs to substitute into D. I have further hypothesized that BNs in non-CS constructions lack certain features, (in)definiteness features to be exact, which makes these nominals unfit, and thus unable, to land in D. In CS constructions these features are inherited from the possessor DP. If the D position has strong +/- Definiteness features to be checked overtly, and since BNs generally do not have these features, then it is to be expected that BNs should be unacceptable (if

they occur under normal conditions of stress)¹ since the strong +/- Definiteness features of D go unchecked.²

I have reasoned that if PA BNs in non-SC constructions are not possible, unless focused, it would be surprising if this state of affairs was an oddity peculiar to PA. The null hypothesis would be that the same situation holds in other languages which may be remarkably different from PA. Therefore, I have argued, the null hypothesis turns out to be true in English as we have seen in Chapter 4, where I have demonstrated that existentially interpreted BNs, like their PA and Spanish counterparts, are always focalized.

So, if the facts are as such, then the following two questions become ever more significant. First, if existentially interpreted BNs in both PA and English lend themselves to such a unified analysis, then why can BNs in English be used to express genericity-both with kind-referring predicates or in characterizing sentences- while this possibility is unavailable to PA BNs? In order to express genericity, PA (and Spanish) has to resort to the use of the definite article, unlike what happens in English. Second, why would BNs in English, on the one hand, and PA and Spanish, on the other hand, differ in terms of their distribution? BNs in English distribute quite freely relative to the somehow more constrained distribution of PA and Spanish BNs.

¹ The assumption here is that for (existentially interpreted) BNs to be acceptable they would need to occur in, presumably, specifier position of a Focus Projection (FP). This would explain the ungrammaticality of more than one BN co-occurring in the same utterance noted in Chapter 3 since they would compete for the same position (*Cf.* Rizzi (1997)). The issue of the nature and implementation of the FP projection will be taken up in greater detail in § 5.4 below.

² Of course, this begs the question why the derivation would not crash anyway when the BN occurs in the specifier of the Focus Projection and the strong features of D would still remain unchecked (recall that the strong features of D would be checked by a determiner or by substituting a BN with the relevant features into this position as in the Construct State construction). An answer to this question will be proposed in § 5.4.

An answer to the first question may be pursued along two tacks. First, I would like to make the assumption that generic operators in these two language groups, English, on the one hand, and PA and Spanish, on the other, differ in their binding possibilities.³ Generic operators in English can bind nominals contained in a DP whose head D is empty or null. In PA and Spanish, by contrast, generic operators are unable to realize this possibility, and these two languages have to use the definite article to express genericity. A second possible argument, which is related to the suggestion concerning generic operators just made, is to recall from Chapter 4 my contention that generically interpreted BNs in English, and generic DPs with the definite article in PA, are never foci, but always topical. I have also argued that when focused these DPs turn out to be contrastive topics, rather than foci. It could then be hypothesized that to be interpreted generically in a sentence a BN or a definite DP have to be topical or defocalized. One way to cash out this solution is to say that when topical or non-focal a BN or a definite DP is mapped into the restrictive clause to be bound by the generic operator. Being focal, BNs in PA and Spanish do not fit the bill, since they are arguably always caught in the nuclear scope and cannot be bound by generic operators.

As far as the second question concerning the distributional facts is concerned, the differences, I would like to argue, are merely surface manifestations of much deeper differences in the properties of focus and word order between English, on one side, and PA and Spanish, on the other side. The differences in the properties of focus are reflective of, or reflected in, the differences that exist between these language groups in

³ I thank Cristina Schmitt for suggesting this line of argument.

word order. PA and Spanish assign ('neutral' or non-contrastive) focus to the constituent lowest in terms of c-command (à la Zubizarreta (1998)), or, alternatively, the most deeply embedded (per Cinque (1993)). English has the additional possibility of assigning sentential stress, thus marking focus, more freely (but in a *marked* way, see below) than PA or Spanish do. To destress a constituent, i.e. to mark it as non-focal, the latter languages resort to movement (in the terms of Zubizarreta (1998), *prosodically-motivated movement*). This is made possible, of course, by the relatively free word order these languages possess; no need arises in PA or Spanish to employ *marked* focus (informally, focus that is assigned to a constituent not most deeply embedded). English, on the other hand, restricted as it is by a rigid word order, has to resort to the marked focus strategy since movement is generally not an option. It is therefore able to assign focus non-contrastively to constituents that are not lowest in terms of c-command (or, alternately, most deeply embedded). The freedom with which BNs distribute in English, and the lack of it in the case of PA or Spanish BNs, thus follows from the properties of focus and word order in these languages.

I would like to proceed as follows. In § 5.1 I consider the interaction of sentential stress, focus and word order. In this regard, two analyses prove relevant, that of Zubizarreta (1998) and Cinque (1993). I consider these two analyses in § 5.1.1 and § 5.1.2, respectively. Along the way the workings of the Nuclear Stress Rule and *prosodically-motivated* movement are considered in § 5.1.1.1 and § 5.1.1.2. Prosodic movement in PA and its interaction with focus and sentential stress are taken up in § 5.2. Before offering an argument to account for the differences between English and PA/Spanish in terms of expressing genericity in § 5.5, I consider first the differences

that exist between these two language groups in the distribution of bare nominals in § 5.3 and the nature of the Focus Phrase and its interaction with BNs in § 5.4. § 5.6 is the conclusion.

5.1 Sentential Stress Assignment, Focus, and Word Order

In order to flesh out the details of my argument regarding the differences with respect to BNs between PA and Spanish, on the one hand, and English, on the other hand, it is imperative to look at the interaction of sentential stress assignment, focus and word order variation in these two language groups. Two proposals thus become of particular interest in this regard; a proposal advanced by Zubizarreta (1998) and another by Cinque (1993). My goal will be to briefly preview both analyses with the intention of illustrating that adopting either would serve my purposes well. I begin by examining Zubizarreta's (1998) work.

5.1.1 Zubizarreta (1998)

5.1.1.1 The Nuclear Stress Rule (NSR)

Zubizarreta (1998) proposes a modular version of the Nuclear Stress Rule (NSR)⁴ utilizing syntactic notions such as c-command and selectional ordering to account for differences between Germanic and Romance in computing phrasal prominence.

⁴ Zubizarreta (1998:38) explains that the NSR that was first formulated by Chomsky and Halle (1968) was essentially an algorithm that construes phrasal boundaries as cycles assigning stress to the rightmost element or word in the cycle. Not only does this algorithm assign primary stress but it also assigns secondary stress assuming that the NP as well as the IP constitute cycles for the operation of the NSR. This is illustrated in the following example (Zubizarreta's (3), p. 38):
(i) ((The cat (in the blue hát)) (has written (a book (about ráts))))).

Zubizarreta (1998:37) points out that natural languages make use of one or more of the following ways to mark the focus in the sentence: prosody, morphology or a syntactically specified position. She puts forward an analysis of how prosody identifies the focus of the sentence. Phrasal prominence, as determined by the Nuclear Stress Rule, mediates the relationship between prosody and focus according to Zubizarreta. To achieve more empirical coverage she argues against a monolithic view of the Nuclear Stress Rule (NSR) and proposes a modular version of this rule according to which asymmetric c-command and selectional ordering play a pivotal role. Such a modular view will be able to explain satisfactorily the positioning of nuclear stress (NS) in paradigms such as the following from German (her 43, 45, 50a, 50b, respectively):

- (1) Hans hat das/ein Búch gelesen
Hans has the/a book read
- (2) Karl hat ein Buch ins Regál gestellt
Karl has a book on-the shelf put
- (3) a. Peter hat an einem Papíer gearbeitet
Peter has on a paper worked
'Peter worked on a paper.'
- b. Peter hat an einem kleinen Tisch gearbeitet
Peter has on a small table worked
'Peter worked on a small table.'

In (1) the NS falls on the direct object in V-final transitive structures whereas in (2) the PP complement gets the NS since it is selected by the verb. (3) illustrates an argument/adjunct asymmetry. If the PP is an argument of the verb as in (3a) it is assigned the NS; however, it is not assigned stress if it is an adjunct as in (3b). These

examples argue for the importance of *selectional* properties (see fn.5) to the assignment of the NS in German. However, in V-second sentences this asymmetry is not exhibited by these structures and the NS is assigned uniformly on the last constituent as in (4) (her 54a, 54b, respectively):

- (4) a. Peter arbeitet an einem Papier
Peter is-working on a paper
- b. Peter arbeitet an einem kleinen Tisch
Peter is-working on a small table

The examples in (4) suggest that only 'constituent structure' is relevant in the assignment of NS in V-second structures in contrast to the examples in (3) that show clearly that the 'selectional ordering' is what is relevant in assigning the NS. Zubizarreta calls the part of the NSR that is sensitive to selectional ordering the S(electional)-NSR⁵ while that part

⁵ Zubizarreta (1998: 52) formalizes this ordering of selected heads as in (i):

- (i) (C, T, V₁,..., V_i, P/V_m, D_m) with possibly m=1
(C, T,..., V_i, D_i), for i=1, 2,..., m-1 (for the cases where m>1)
where D_i, i=1, 2,..., m-1 is the nominal argument of V_i (for the cases where m>1) and D_m is the nominal argument of the lowest (possibly only) verb or prepositional predicate (P/V_m) in the selectional ordering.

According to (i), Comp selects Tense, Tense selects a VP. V₁,..., V_i, P/V_m, D_m is an ordering of the lexical verb into elementary verbs or prepositions while D_m is the nominal argument of P/V_m and D_i is *the nominal argument of V_i* when it exists. A category to the right is lower than the one to its left.

As an illustration of how the S-NSR works consider the following example from German (Zubizarreta 1998: 57):

- (ii) [_{CP} Karl₁ [_{hat} [_e [_{V1} [_{ein} Búch₂ [_{V2} gekauft [_{e2}]]]]]]]]
Karl has a book read

D₁ (=Karl) and [D₂ V₂] (= [_{ein} Búch₂ [_{gekauft}₂ [_{D2} e]]]) are metrical sisters (see fn. 6) that are not selectionally ordered since D₁ (=Karl) has no metrical sister that is a head, hence a selector. Notice that [_{ein} Búch₂ [_{V2} gekauft [_{D2} e]]] is metrically non-distinct (in other words, *equivalent*) from [_{ein} Búch₂ [_{V2} gekauft]] since empty categories are metrically invisible (i.e. do not count toward the computation of the NS). Since there is no selectional ordering, but there is an ordering in terms of asymmetric c-command, the C-NSR applies assigning prominence to the rightmost sister, [_{ein} Búch₂ [_{V2} gekauft [_{e2}]]]. Then the cycle is repeated for the metrical sisters D₂ (= *ein Buch*) and V₂ (= [_{gekauft}₂ [_{D2} e]]]). These two sisters are selectionally ordered since there is a selecting head, *gekauft*. The S-NSR applies assigning prominence to

of the NSR that does not take selectional properties into account she calls the C(onstituent)-NSR. She also argues that both the S-NSR and C-NSR are active in German and English with only one difference: in German the S-NSR takes precedence while the S-NSR and the C-NSR are unordered in English. She states the NSR as follows (p71):

(5) NSR

Given two sister nodes C_i and C_j , (a) if C_i and C_j are selectionally ordered, in the sense of (57) (=58)) [(i) in fn. 5], the one lower in the selectional ordering is more prominent, (b) otherwise, the one lower in the asymmetric c-command is more prominent.⁶

5.1.1.2 The C-NSR and Prosodically-Motivated Movement

We have just noted that both modules of the NSR, according to Zubizarreta (1998), namely, the S-NSR and C-NSR, are active in both German and English, ordered in the former but unordered in the latter. In Romance languages such as Spanish, on the other hand, the S-NSR is not active since these languages position the NS on the lowest

the lower constituent D_2 (= *ein Buch*) (Notice that [*ein Buch*] is lower than the verb since it has moved from complement position to the right of the verb). *Buch* is therefore assigned the NS.

⁶ Zubizarreta defines c-command as in (i) and argues that at least a weaker version of Kayne's (1994) notion of asymmetric c-command and linear precedence holds as in (ii):

(i) α c-commands β =_{def} α and β are visible to the syntactic computation (i.e. either heads or maximal projections (excluding segments)) and (a) α and β are sisters or (b) there exists a γ such that α and γ are sisters and γ dominates β .

(ii) Given two constituents A and B, if A asymmetrically c-commands B then every terminal that A dominates precedes every constituent that B dominates.

Zubizarreta adopts this formulation of c-command in order to avoid the contradiction that would result in requiring sisterhood and asymmetric c-command in formulating the C-NSR. She also adopts what she calls "metrical invisibility" in order to expand on the notion of sisterhood. Some elements in the sentence are metrically invisible such as anaphoric DPs in English and German as in "Mary walked in. John kissed *her*." and defocalized elements that are outside the focal domain. Empty categories are also metrically invisible. Therefore, no one-to-one correspondence necessarily exists between syntactic sisterhood and metrical sisterhood since metrical sisters could be interrupted by defocalized elements.

constituent in the c-command domain; therefore, only the C-NSR is active in Spanish. Since only the C-NSR is operational in Romance another type of movement can be motivated, not driven by feature checking (as in Chomsky 1995), but motivated by prosodic considerations. Such movement Zubizarreta labels *prosodically-motivated* movement (or *p-movement*).

The C-NSR in Spanish, for example, is responsible for the contrasts seen in (6) between the Spanish examples and the English ones (note that stressed constituents are underlined in Spanish, accented in English). (6a) is ungrammatical with prominence on (*EL*) *bebé*, unlike the English example (6c) where phrasal prominence can be placed on (*the*) *baby*. As seen in (6b) and (6e), once the NS is located on *llora* and *salió*, being the lowest elements in the c-command ordering, the examples are acceptable again. Similar contrasts between Spanish and English can also be seen in (6g-l).

- (6) a. *El bebé llora. vs b. El bebé llora
 c. The báby's crying.
- d. *El sol salió. vs e. El sol salió
 f. The sún came out
- g. María me regaló la botella de vino
 h. María to-me gave the bottle of wine
- i. El sindicato habló contra el gobierno
 j. the union talked against the government
- k. Ana escondió debajo de la cama la muñeca
 Ana hid under the bed the doll
 l. Ana hid the dóll under the bed'

It is clear, then, that only the C-NSR is operative in Spanish which Zubizarreta

(1998:124) formulates as follows:

(7) C-NSR in Romance

Given two sister nodes C_i and C_j , the one lower in the asymmetric c-command ordering is more prominent.

Stressing a constituent other than the lowest in asymmetrical c-command in the Spanish examples (6) would result in a contrastive reading as in (8):

(8) EL SINDICATO habló contra el gobierno (y no el partido)
THE UNION talked against the government (and not the party)

Alongside the NSR, there exists another rule that Zubizarreta (1998: 21) calls the F(ocus) (P)rominence (R)ule. This rule is active since the focus structure of the sentence is determined by the placement of the main phrasal prominence:

(9) FPR

Given two sister nodes C_i (marked [+F]) and C_j (marked [-F]), C_i is more prominent than C_j .

A fundamental difference between Germanic and Romance is that in the former languages defocalized constituents are reanalyzed as metrically invisible to the NSR. In Spanish, on the other hand, all phonological material is metrically visible to the NSR. It is thus inevitable that conflict would arise between these two rules, the NSR and the

contrastive/emphatic rule such as in (11) and (12) cannot be an answer to a question such as (13) which places narrow focus on the subject:

- (13) Quién te regaló la botella de vino?
 who to-you gave the bottle of wine?

Another order is also possible in Spanish, namely *VOS*. *VOS* order, unlike *VSO* and *SVO*, is not compatible with a focus-neutral interpretation (where the subject (S) in the *VOS* sentence is not right-dislocated). It only admits to a narrow focus on the subject and the interpretation is not contrastive:

- (14) me regaló la botella de vino {María}
 to-me gave the bottle of wine {María}

(14) is the only answer to the question in (13) with a full sentence (where narrow focus is placed on the subject). The main stress in (14) is generated by the NSR, not the Emphatic/Contrastive Stress Rule (Zubizarreta 1998:126). The main stress is on the subject, and it is impossible to focus the object in such sentences, unless, of course, the subject is right-dislocated, in which case the subject would be set off from the rest with an intonational break (notationally, a comma). However, this is not the case in either (15) or (16).

- (15) *me regaló la BOTELLA de vino María
 to-me gave the BOTTLE of wine María

- (16) *me regaló la botella de VINO María
 to-me gave the bottle of WINE María

Since the subject gets the NS in VOS sentences it can be argued that the VOS order is derived from either VSO order or SVO order with the ultimate goal of stressing the subject. Zubizarreta argues that in Spanish VOS order is derived from VSO by moving VP₂ that contains the object to left adjoin to VP₁ as in (17):

- (17) [_{TP} me regalo [_{VP1} [_{VP2} la botella de vino_k [_{e_k} [_{V₂} e_k]]]]_i [_{VP1} Maria [_{V₁} [_{e_i}]]]]]
 to-me gave the bottle of wine Maria

The reason for movement is prosodic, not feature checking;⁸ hence the name *prosodically motivated* movement (*p-movement*).

To summarize, Zubizarreta's (1998) analysis revolves around a modular view of the NSR. The difference between Germanic and Romance in this respect is which module of the NSR is operative in the language. In Spanish, only the C-NSR is active while both modules, the S-NSR and the C-NSR, are operative in Germanic. Another rule is active in these languages, namely, the FPR, resulting in potential conflict from the overlap between the NSR and the FPR. Germanic and Romance possess different strategies in resolving this conflict; in the former by marking invisible defocalized constituents, in Romance by resorting to *prosodically-motivated* movement.

⁸ In other words, the movement is motivated by the need to stress the subject by placing it into a position where the NSR is operational (in Spanish, lowest in the tree in terms of c-command).

Prior to an illustration of how these notions of focus and nuclear stress, and prosodically-motivated movement are applicable to PA, I would like to briefly consider Reinhart's exposition of Cinque's (1993) work on stress assignment. My modest goal here is to demonstrate that Cinque's analysis is compatible with the empirical facts in PA, as will also be demonstrated of Zubizarreta's (1998) analysis.

5.1.2 Cinque (1993)

In this section I consider briefly Reinhart's (1995) to-the-point exposition of Cinque's (1993) analysis of stress assignment. It has to be pointed out, however, that Reinhart's take on and implementation of the analysis discussed in Cinque's work differ in very minimal ways with no difference in the outcome, as she points out (1995: 27).



Cinque's (1993) proposal basically revives Chomsky's (1971) analysis of focus as being determined with reference solely to the PF structure itself without reference to discourse (Reinhart 1995: 20). The core of Cinque's analysis is that sentence stress assignment, as defined on PF structures, and as assigned by the Nuclear Stress Rule (NSR), does not need to be parameterized in order to capture the varied stress assignment patterns across languages. Rather, the NSR can be assumed to apply cyclically to syntactic constituents assigning sentence stress to the 'most embedded' element in the sentence. Of course, the notion of 'most embedded' becomes crucial here especially when cross-linguistic differences are considered, such as the difference between English and Dutch. In a sentence such as (18), as Reinhart (1995: 26) points out, identifying the most embedded constituent does not seem to be straightforward when English and Dutch are compared:

(18) a. I read the **book**.

b. (Dat) I het **boek** las (Dutch).⁹

The crux of the problem, Reinhart points out, is that if it is straightforward to say that *(the) book* in (18a) is most embedded, hence assigned sentential stress, complications ensue if we say that stress is assigned in Dutch in a left-headed fashion (to get the stress correctly in (18b)) since that would generate the correct stress for (18b) (since *boek* is leftmost in the VP), but will not work in the case of intransitive sentences (since the subject would be leftmost) (Reinhart, however, does not illustrate this possibility).

Cinque's solution to this problem is simple. We need to know the direction of the *branching* or *recursion* in a language anyway. The most embedded constituent would then be identified in tandem with the direction of the recursion in the language. English, being right-branching as in (19a), would identify *(the) book* in (18a) as the most embedded constituent/element. Dutch, on the other hand, being left-branching in the VP as in (19b), would single out *boek* as most embedded in (18b).



⁹ Reinhart does not provide an independent gloss to the example in (18b), which I take to mean that it is to be translated in a similar fashion to the English example in (18a).

Sentential stress would thus fall on (*the*) *book* in (18a) and on *boek* on (18b), both being the most embedded constituents/elements in their respective structures.

Cinque also argues that the neutral focus is assigned in the sentence according to the sentential stress assignment on the PF structure in accordance with the following focus rule (Reinhart 1995: 30):

(20) The Focus Rule

The focus of IP is a(ny) constituent containing the main stress of IP, as determined by the stress-rule.

The Focus Rule in (20) would then predict that in a sentence such as (21) any of the three constituents bearing sentential stress could serve as focus:

	(21)	[My neighbor [is building [a desk]]]
		* * *
a) NP cycle:		[*]
b) VP cycle:		[*]
c) IP cycle:		[*]

On the word cycle every constituent is assigned an asterisk. On the NP cycle, the NSR assigns the most embedded word an asterisk, in this case *a desk* (or the NP (i.e. DP) *a*

desk)), on the first line (a). On the VP cycle, the most embedded word in the VP, again *a desk*, is assigned an asterisk, on the second line (b). Finally, on the IP cycle, *a desk*, being the most embedded word in the IP, is assigned an asterisk, on line (c). Sentential stress is then assigned by the NSR to *a desk* on all cycles. Now, any of these three constituents, i.e. NP, VP, or IP, can serve as focus, in accordance with the Focus Rule above, as Reinhart's following example illustrates (her example (26a-e), p. 30) (stress is indicated by bolding, focus by underlining):

- (22) a. What's this noise?
 -My neighbor is building a desk.
- b. What's your neighbor doing?
 -My neighbor is building a desk.
- c. What's your neighbor building?
 -My neighbor is building a desk.
- d.-Has your neighbor bought a desk already?
 # My neighbor is building a desk.
- e. -Who is building a desk?
 #-My neighbor is building a **desk**.

(22a) illustrates the instance where the IP constituent is focused with sentential stress assigned to the most embedded word or element, namely, *a desk*. When the VP constituent is focused we get the focus structure and stress assignment in (22b). Finally, (22c) illustrates the case where the stress assignment and focus coincide to make the most embedded word in any and all constituents most prominent, namely, *a desk*. Notice that the subject *my neighbor* and the verb alone, *building*, are not possible

neutral foci according to the Focus Rule. The subject and the verb can be assigned focus by another rule, namely, the Marked Focus Rule:

(23) Marked Focus Rule:

Relocate the main stress on a constituent you want to focus.

The Marked Focus Rule, when applied, generates (24a) and (24b), for (22d) and (22e), respectively:

(24) a. My neighbor is **building** a desk.

b. **My neighbor** is building a desk.

As Reinhart (1995: 32) points out, this is essentially the essence of Cinque's analysis, namely, the distinction between neutral and marked stress and it is precisely here where such analyses have been challenged (due to the idea that a distinction needs to be systematically drawn at the sentence level between 'neutral' and 'marked' stress). The opposing analyses look at the matter differently in that they consider focus as determining sentential stress, rather than the other way around (Reinhart (1995: 32)).

I think this brief look at Cinque's (1993) analysis suffices to enable us to consider whether or not his analysis would prove applicable to PA data. In the next section I will show how both Zubizarreta's (1998) and Cinque's (1993) analyses are compatible with the data from PA.

5.2 Focus, Sentential Stress and Prosodic Movement in PA

Upon reviewing Zubizarreta's (1998) analysis, two questions become important. First, does PA follow the pattern of nuclear stress assignment presumably typical of Germanic-where both the S-NSR and the C-NSR are active, or would it instead follow the Romance pattern-where only the C-NSR is active? The second question would be whether or not *prosodically-motivated* movement could be attested in PA, or English for that matter? In what follows I take up these important questions in turn.

Concerning the first question, whether PA follows the Germanic pattern or the Romance one, let us start by considering the following sentences (I follow Zubizarreta (1998) in underlining stressed constituents):

- (25) a. *l-Tifil bibki.
 the-baby (is)-crying
 b. l-Tifil bibki
 c. The báby is crying.
- (26) a. *l-šams TilŋaT.
 the-sun came-out
 b. l-šams TilŋaT
 c. The sún came out
- (27) a. Slama ʔaŋTatni gazazit l-ŋaSiir
 Salma gave-3FS-1MS bottle the-juice
 'Salma gave me the juice bottle.'
- b. l-ʔittiñaad Sawwat Ded l-ħukuume
 the-union voted against the-government
 'The union voted against the government.'
- c. Salma xabbat taħt s-sriir l-luŋbe
 Salma hid-3FS under the-bed the-doll
 'Salma hid the doll under the bed.'

- d. Salma xabbat l-luʕbe taħt s-sriir
 Salma hid-3FS the-doll under the-bed
 'Salma hid the doll under the bed.'

The contrast seen between (25a-b) and (26a-b), on the one hand, and (25c) and (26c), on the other hand, shows that PA and English (can) differ in the placement of nuclear stress. English can stress *(the) baby* and *(the) sun* in situ, i.e. where the stressed element is not moved to a position lowest in c-command, or most deeply embedded, as seen in (25c) and (26c). By contrast, the PA examples above illustrate that to stress a constituent in this language it needs to be placed in a position lowest in the syntactic tree in terms of c-command or most deeply embedded. So, in (25a), (non-contrastively) stressing the preverbal DP, *l-Tifil* 'the-baby' while destressing the VP *bibki* '(is)-crying' is unacceptable. Similarly, assigning the nuclear stress to *l-šams* 'the-sun' while destressing *Til ʕaT* 'came-out' in (26a) results in an unacceptable outcome. These observations are further supported by the examples in (27) where only the constituent lowest in c-command is assigned the nuclear stress. The contrast seen in (27c) and (27d) is especially instructive. In (27c), the focused constituent is *l-lu ʕbe* 'the-doll' and the sentence means that what Salma hid under the bed was *the doll*. In contrast to (27c), (27d) says that where Salma hid the doll was *under the bed*, and the PP, *taħt l-sriir* 'under the-bed' gets the NSR and is therefore focused.

It is important to note at this point that embedding a sentence does not change the stress assignment facts just observed. This is attested in the following examples where some of the examples in (25)-(27) are embedded within super-ordinate clauses:

- (28) smiʕit ʔinno l-Tifil bibki.
 heard-1S that the-baby (is)-crying
 'I heard that the baby was crying'
- (29) ʔakitel-hum ʔinno Slama ʔaʕTatni gazazit l-ʕaSiir
 told-1S-3MP that Salma gave-3FS-1MS bottle the-juice
 'I told them that Salma gave me the bottle of juice'
- (30) ma bagdar-iʃ ʔinno ʔaʔakkid ʔinno l-Ittiḥaad Sawwat Ded l-ḥukuume
 neg able-neg that confirm that the-union voted against the-government
 'I can't confirm that the union voted against the government'

It is thus clear that embedding does not change the facts concerning nuclear stress assignment. The stressed constituent continues to be the one lowest in terms of the c-command ordering or the most deeply embedded.

The preceding discussion also allows us to answer the second question raised at the outset: does PA utilize what Zuizarreta (1998) labels as *prosodically-motivated* movement? I believe the answer to this question is positive. First of all, note that, since only the C-NSR is active in PA, stressing a sentence-internal constituent would give rise to a contrastive reading to the sentence as (31a) and (32a) clearly illustrate for (25) and (27b), respectively. Notice also the obligatory absence of nuclear stress on *bibki* '(is)-crying' and *l-ḥukuume* 'the-government', as the ungrammaticality of (31b) and (32b) attests:

- (31) a. L-TIFIL bibki (miʃ ʔimmo)
 THE BABY (is)-crying (not his mother)
- b. *L-TIFIL bibki (miʃ ʔimmo)

(32) a. L-ITTIhAAD Sawwat Ded l-ħukuume (miš l-ħizib)
 THE-UNION voted against the-government (not the-party)

b. *L-ITTIhAAD Sawwat Ded l-ħukuume (miš l-ħizib)

This would also predict that cases of conflict between the NSR and the FPR would be resolved by moving the defocalized constituents so the focused constituent would be assigned stress by the NSR, as has been observed for Spanish. Therefore, a felicitous answer to (34), where the subject would be stressed (i.e. focused), with a full sentence, is (35), rather than (36):

(34) miin ʔaʔTatak l-xubiz?
 who gave-3FS-1MS the-bread
 'Who gave you the bread?'

(35) ʔaʔTatni l-xubiz Salma
 gave-3FS-1MS the-bread Salma
 'Salma gave me the bread'

(36) * Salma ʔaʔTatni l-xubiz ¹⁰
 Salma gave-3FS-1MS the-bread

In (36), a conflict ensues between the NSR, which would want to assign the nuclear

¹⁰ (i) would not be a felicitous answer to (34) either since Salma in (i) is contrastively focused. A felicitous context question for (i) would be (ii):

- (i) SALMA ʔaʔTatni l-xubiz
 SLAMA gave-3FS-1MS the-bread
 'SALMA gave me the bread.'
- (ii) ʔaʔTatak l-xubiz LAILA?
 gave-3FS-2MS the-bread LAILA
 '(who) gave you the bread Laila?'

stress to *l-xubiz* 'the-bread' by virtue of being lowest in terms of c-command, and the FPR, whose job would be to assign stress to the subject *Salma* (as an answer to the CQ in (34)). This conflict is sorted out by moving the constituent that is focused to be placed in the lowest position in terms of the c-command ordering. This means that *l-xubiz* 'the-bread,' being defocalized, would be moved to a position where it would be outside the scope of the NSR, as in (35), and the word order resulting would be VOS. Further support for this analysis comes from the fact that *l-xubiz* 'the-bread' in (35) cannot be (contrastively) stressed, unless *Salma* is right-dislocated:

- (36) *ʔaʃTatni L-XUBIZ Salma
 gave-3FS-1MS THE-BREAD Salma
 'Salma gave me the bread.'

The preceding discussion allows us to conclude that PA follows the Romance pattern of nuclear stress assignment where only the C-NSR is active. The constituent to which nuclear stress is assigned has to be placed lowest in the syntactic tree terms of c-command. Furthermore, *prosodically-motivated* movement has been demonstrated to take place in PA, as the case is in Spanish.

Cinque's (1993) assumptions regarding stress assignment can also be assimilated quite nicely into the current framework with respect to PA. PA is similar to English in terms of the direction of recursion in that it is also right-branching. Therefore, the most embedded constituent bears the stress and the pattern seen for English in (22a-c) above, repeated here as (37a-c), can be shown to hold for PA as well as seen in (38):

(37) a. What's this noise?
-My neighbor is building a desk.

b. What's your neighbor doing?
-My neighbor is building a desk.

c. What's your neighbor building?
-My neighbor is building a desk.

(38) a. šuu haaði d-dadʒʒe?
what this the-noise

- b-yibni dʒaari b-Tawla¹¹
is-building neighbor-1S (a)-table
'My neighbor is building a table.'

b. šuu b-yiʒmal dʒaarak?
what is-doing neighbor-2MS
'What is your neighbor doing?'

-dʒaari b-yibni b-Tawla
neighbor-1MS is-building (a)-table
'My neighbor is building a table.'

c. šuu b-yibni dʒaarak?
what is-building neighbor-2MS
'What is your neighbor building?'

- dʒaari b-yibni b-Tawla
neighbor-1MS is-building (a)-table
'My neighbor is building a table.'

(38a) represents the option where the whole sentence is focused. In this case the NS is assigned to the most embedded constituent, *Tawla* 'a table,' although the whole sentence is in focus. In (38b), only the VP is focused and the nuclear stress is still assigned to the

¹¹ In a so-called out-of-the-blue answer, where the whole sentence is in focus, the more preferred word order is VS(O), rather than SVO.

most embedded word in the sentence, namely, *Tawla* 'a table.' Finally, when only the NP (i.e. DP), *Tawla* 'a table' is focused, it also gets the NS, as in (38c). So far, English and PA behave similarly. Now consider the so-called *marked focus* in English as exemplified by (22d-e) above, repeated here as (37d-e), and their PA equivalent (38a-b):

(37) d.-Has your neighbor bought a desk already?

My neighbor is building a **desk**.

e. -Who is building a desk?

#-My neighbor is building a **desk**.

(38) a. ʔištara dʒarak Tawla?

bought-3MS neighbor-2MS (a)-table

'Has your neighbor bought a table?'

-#dʒarai b-yibni **b-Tawla**

neighbor-2MS is-building-3MS (a)-table

'My neighbor is building a table.'

b. miin b-yibni b-Tawla?

who is-building (a)-table

-# dʒarai b-yibni **b-Tawla**

neighbor-3MS is-building-3MS (a)-table

Notwithstanding the similarity in the grammaticality judgments in (37d-e) and (38a-b) between English and PA, these two languages go about resolving the unacceptability of these sentences in completely different ways. In other words, English and PA diverge in their implementation of Cinque's *marked focus*. English, as has been noted in (24a-b) above, repeated here as (39a-b) for convenience, resorts to using marked focus by destressing *a desk*, i.e. the constituent that would be assigned the NS by the NSR, and

stressing the focused element, *building* and *my neighbor*, respectively,
in situ:

- (39) a. My neighbor is **building** a desk.
b. **My neighbor** is building a desk.

PA, on the other hand, does not resolve the conflict between stress assignment by the NSR and focus via destressing the most deeply embedded constituent, while leaving it in situ, as the case is in English. Rather, as I have noted above, PA defocalizes the non-focal constituent by *p*-moving it to a position outside of the scope of the NSR, and by placing the focalized constituent in the most embedded position within the scope of the NSR as witnessed in (40b) (the PA counterpart to the English (39b)). If this proves to be unavailable, and *p*-movement does not turn out to be an option as in (40a) (the PA counterpart of the English (39a)), the focused element in PA would be read contrastively (since it is focused internal to the sentence), unlike what happens in English.^{12 13}

- (40) a. dʒarai B-YIBNI b-l-Tawla
neighbor-2MS IS-BUILDING-3MS the-table
'My neighbor is building the table.'

¹² I have replaced the indefinite 'a table' with the definite 'the table' since, as I have argued in Chapter 3, the singular indefinite is subject to the same conditions as plural BNs in PA, in that all these nominals have to be assigned stress by the NSR, or contrastively focused. In (40b) in the text, if *Tawla* '(a)-table' is defocalized and moved to the left in order to assign the NS to *dʒarai* 'neighbor-1MS,' this would generate an unacceptable outcome since the singular BN would be defocalized and destressed.

¹³ P-movement is unavailable in (40a) since the outcome of moving the verb to the right periphery is very marginal as in (i):

- (i) *?dʒarai b-l-Tawla b-yibni
neighbor-2MS the-table is-building-3MS

b. b-yibni b-l-Tawla dʒarai
 is-building-3MS the-table neighbor-3MS
 'My neighbor is building the table.'

The crucial examples here are (39b) and (40b). One immediate observation concerning (39b) is the following. English, (39b) clearly says, does not have the option of Zubizarreta's prosodic movement. This sets English apart from both PA and Spanish since the latter two languages make use of this option, i.e. the option of focalizing or stressing constituents by moving them into the scope of the NSR (or, alternatively, defocalizing or destressing a constituent or element by moving it to a position outside the scope of the NSR). PA and Spanish, then, do not need to (in fact, they cannot) resort to the so-called *marked focus* that English utilizes since a 'less marked' focusing option is available via *prosodically-motivated* movement.¹⁴

This fundamental difference between English on the one hand, and PA and Spanish, on the other hand, is in fact quite expected. These two groups of languages differ in another important respect, namely, that of the word order possibilities available to them (Cf. Reinhart (1995)). Recall that English word order is generally more restricted and less flexible than that of either PA and Spanish. Word order in English is more or less a fixed SVO. PA and Spanish, by contrast, allow SVO, VSO, VOS, among other permutations. It should come as no surprise then that English would allow in situ focus

¹⁴ Reinhart (1995: 32) makes similar observations in her exposition of Cinque's (1993) analysis of the differences between Italian and English. She notes that focusing in-situ, as is the case in English, is a *more marked* choice (hence, marked focus) than moving elements around to express neutral focus as is the case in Italian. The notion of markedness, and the related notion of economy, is a thorny issue since movement, especially in terms of Chomsky's (1995) minimalist assumptions, is always the less economical, hence more marked, option.

(i.e. *marked focus*) since this is the only option that is available for this language.

Prosodically-motivated movement, as has been just noted, is generally unavailable to English. If English had a less rigid word order, like PA and Spanish, then the option of marked focus would be quite unacceptable. This is actually the case for PA and Spanish since word order is relatively free in these two languages. Therefore, using the more marked option- i.e. *marked focus*- (cf. fn. 14) is not acceptable non-contrastively.

Consider the contrast seen between the English examples in (41) and the Italian ones in (42), which is essentially the same contrast noted between English and PA and Spanish (the examples are cited in Reinhart (1995: 32) from Cinque (1993)) (bolding indicates stress):

(41) a. Johnson **died**.

b. **Johnson** died.

(42) a. Johnson é **morto**.

b. É morto **Johnson**.

c. # **Johnson** é morto.

English can stress the subject or the verb in situ, as seen in (41a-b). The same cannot be said of the Italian examples in (42). To stress the subject Italian resorts to (*prosodically-motivated*) movement, thus moving the subject *Johnson* to the most deeply embedded position to get assigned stress by the NSR. To use the more marked focus option in (42c) would be unacceptable with the stress on the subject that is not read contrastively. Of course, the same paradigm in (42) can be reproduced in PA, and Spanish, I am sure.

The only available reading for the equivalent of (42c) in PA would be where *Johnson* is interpreted contrastively. Again, (42c) turns out to be unacceptable in an out-of-the-blue utterance since a 'less marked' option is available, attainable via prosodic movement as in (42b), and its corresponding equivalent in PA.

With the preceding discussion in mind, I believe we are now in a position to address our main concern here, namely, the reason why bare nominals differ the way they do between English, on the one hand, and PA and Spanish, on the other, in terms of distribution. This will be the subject matter of my next section.

5.3 The Distribution of Bare Nominals and Focus in English and PA/Spanish

Let me very briefly recapitulate my assumptions so far. Stress assignment in PA and Spanish is achieved via the C-NSR, where the lowest constituent in terms of c-command, or most embedded, is assigned stress. The conflict between the FPR (in the terms of Zubizarreta (1998)) and the NSR, or alternatively, between the focus structure, expressed via the Focus Rule and PF stress assignment (in the terms of Cinque (1993)), is resolved in PA and Spanish through *prosodically-motivated* movement (à la Zubizarreta (1998)). In English, on the other hand, this conflict is resolved via destressing non-focal constituents through using the option of *marked focus*. Prosodic movement is generally absent from English.¹⁵ I have also noted that these differences between both language groups occur concurrently with the more fundamental

¹⁵ Abstracting away from Heavy NP Shift, if it turns out that this option is in fact an instance of prosodic movement.

differences in word order. Word order in English is more rigid, almost a fixed SVO. Unlike English, PA and Spanish are privileged with a flexible system of word order possibilities.

Let me further recap my assumptions regarding BNs in these two language groups. BNs in PA and Spanish, I have argued, are always existentially interpreted and, additionally, focalized. The generic reading for these nominals is not possible. English BNs can be read both existentially and generically. In their existential usage English BNs also turn out to be focalized. Generically interpreted BNs in English, and their PA and Spanish determined DPs (with a definite article) counterparts, cannot be focused, unless they are read contrastively (and in that case they are read more plausibly as contrastive topics, rather than foci), as has been explained in Chapter 4.

As we have seen in Chapter 3, the claim in the literature has been that BNs in Romance, and by argument, also PA, are subject to a lexical government requirement. I have argued against this idea claiming that a more unified approach is called for to account for the distribution of these nominals. The distribution of BNs in PA/Spanish, I have argued, is constrained rather by the requirement that they be non-topical, i.e. focal. English differs in this respect in that its BNs can, but do not have to, be focal. The difference between the distribution of BNs in the two language groups (*families?*), could therefore be, as I have suggested at the beginning of the present chapter, closely reflective of the difference in how focus is achieved in these languages.

For concreteness, consider the following examples from English and PA:¹⁶

¹⁶ I use PA as also representative of the facts in Spanish.

(43) a. Boys played in the park.

b. # Boys played in the park (not girls).

(44) a. liʕbu f-l-ħadiiqa wlaad
played-3MP in-the-park boys
'Boys played in the park.'

b.* wlaad liʕbu f-l-ħadiiqa
boys played-3MP in-the-park

c. WLAAD liʕbu f-l-ħadiiqa (miš BANAAT)
BOYS played-3MP in-the-park (not GIRLS)

d. liʕbu WLAAD f-l-ħadiiqa (miš BANAAT)
played-3MP BOYS in-the-park (not GIRLS)

Boys in (43), according to my assumptions so far, is focused since it is interpreted existentially (I indicate that through underlining). This is basically the only word order option available for English, other permutations being unacceptable. Crucially, *Boys* in (43) is not contrastively focused, as in (43b) (or, at least, does not necessarily have to be contrastively focused). Now, the PA word-for-word equivalent of (43), namely (44b), is ungrammatical since the BN *wlaad* 'boys,' which still gets the existential interpretation typical of all PA BNs, occurs under normal conditions of stress (i.e. unstressed, hence non-focal). Since the C-NSR is the only viable option for PA, to be assigned stress the BN *wlaad* 'boys' has to move to the lowest position in terms of c-command, or the most embedded position in Cinque's terms, where it would be assigned the NS by the NSR. This would get us (44a), which is the acceptable equivalent of the English (43). *wlaad* 'boys' in (44a) is assigned the NSR in its most deeply embedded position. Therefore, just like its English counterpart in (43), it is non-contrastively focused in that position. Now,

significantly, to occur in any other position, i.e. outside the scope of the NSR, *wlaad* 'boys' would only get the contrastive reading as in (44c-d).

Due to its rigid word order, English can make use of the so-called marked focus, as in (43a), where the BN is not most deeply embedded to be assigned stress by the NSR (in terms of Cinque (1993)). Notwithstanding its sentence-internal position in the English sentence, the BN is focused non-contrastively. Conversely, due to its flexible word order, PA does not have the option of using *marked focus* available to it. This is so since a 'less marked' focusing option is available, viz. that of *prosodically-motivated* movement, thus displacing the defocalized element and removing it from within the scope of the NSR. Using the marked focus option in PA, i.e. by stressing the BN in a position that is sentence internal as in English, would in fact result in a contrastive reading, as witnessed in (44c-d).

To sum up, these underlying differences between English and PA are, then, responsible for the distinct and differing distribution of BNs in these two languages (or language groups, counting Spanish in). On the one hand, English enjoys a flexible focus system, while it suffers from a rigid word order. PA and Spanish suffer from a rigid focus system, while they are privileged with flexible word order permutations. In fact, one is tempted by this intriguing state of affairs to hypothesize that because English has such an impoverished or restricted word order it compensates for that by a rich focus system (or, perhaps, *vice versa*). We can additionally and equally hypothesize that because PA and Spanish have an impoverished or restricted focus system, they make up for that by permitting different word order possibilities (or, again, quite logically, *vice versa*).

In the next section I would like to consider an issue that has not been adequately explored. I have claimed at different points in this dissertation that one way to treat focalization is to say that a focused BN moves into a specifier position of a Focus Phrase (FP). However, I have not spelled out how this would license the BN, how being in an FP interacts with the NSR, and finally, at what level moving into an FP can be assumed to take place. To these issues I now turn.

5.4 Focus Phrase (FP) and Bare Nominals

My basic assumption has been that to be *informationally* focused in PA and Spanish the bare nominal has to be in the lowest position in terms of the c-command ordering (or, the most deeply embedded position) so as to be assigned the NS by the C-NSR. Otherwise, in all other positions, the bare nominal cannot be *informationally* focused, but has to be *contrastively* focused. At this point, Rizzi's (1997) conception of clausal structure becomes relevant. In the following remarks I present a truncated discussion of his assumptions in this work.

Rizzi (1997: 285) points out that traditionally the left periphery of the clause has been said to involve dichotomies such as topic and comment as the following topicalization English example demonstrates (his (1)):

(45) Your book, you should give t to Paul (not to Bill).

In Italian, Rizzi points out, the topic-comment dichotomy is traditionally expressed by the so-called Clitic Left Dislocation (CLLD) structures where a resumptive clitic is

involved in the comment coreferential with the topic as in the Italian example in (46) (his example, (3)):


(46) Il tuo libro, lo ho letto
 "Your book I read (,not his)"

Another dichotomy that has been said to involve the left periphery of the clause is the focus-presupposition articulation as seen in (47) (his (2)):

(47) YOUR BOOK you should give t to Paul (not mine).

Rizzi gives the following structures for the left periphery of the clause involved the aforementioned dichotomies (his (5) and (6)):


(48a)



XP= topic

YP= comment

(48b)



ZP= Focus

WP= Presupposition

Rizzi (p. 287) makes the important assumption that a constituent possessing a topic or focus feature would end up in a Spec-Head relationship with a Top head or a Foc head,

respectively. This way movement of a focused or topicalized constituent would be subsumed under movement for feature checking.

It is also argued by Rizzi (1997: 290) that a clause can involve many topics but that there is only one unique focus as the examples that follow illustrate (his (21) and (22)):

(49) Il libro, a Gianni, domani, glielo darò senz'altro
"the book, to John, tomorrow, I'll give it to him for sure"

(50) *A GIANNI IL LIBRO darò (non a Piero, l'articolo)
"TO JOHN THE BOOK I'll give, not to Piero, the article"

Furthermore, Rizzi argues that a focus and one or more topics can co-occur as seen in (51) (his (23)):

(51) A Gianni, QUESTO, domani, gli dovrete dire
"To Gianni, THIS, tomorrow, you should tell him"

If we adhere to this conception of clause structure articulated in Rizzi (1997), where a Focus Phrase is said to occur in the left periphery of the clause, flanked on either side by a (number of) Topic Phrases, then the PA SVO order, where S is, of course, contrastively focused preverbally, is quite straightforwardly accounted for. S would be in the specifier position of the Focus Phrase, and would be licensed in that position. The potentially problematic case would be as in (44d) above, repeated below for convenience,

(44d) liʕbu WLAAD f-l-ħadiiqa (miš BANAAT)
 played-3MP BOYS in-the-park (not GIRLS)
 'Boys played in the park (not girls).'

where the bare nominal *WLAAD* 'BOYS' occurs postverbally. By assumption, the bare nominal in this position is contrastively focused. This claim, however, does not seem to be compatible with the view of the clause structure assumed here where the Focus Phrase occurs in a left peripheral position. So, the question now becomes how and in what position the postverbal contrastively-focused S, *WLAAD* 'boys' in (44d), is licensed.

It may be argued that a possible answer to this question may lie in the analysis offered by Belletti (2001). Belletti argues that the postverbal positioning of the subject (i.e. subject inversion) in Italian should be looked upon as a way of focalizing the subject. Overt DPs are either licensed by Case or by Focus. The postverbal subject is therefore licensed in a Focus Phrase that is internal to the clause (in the lowest functional projection, a higher functional position than the VP) and the subject enters into a checking relation in the specifier of that position (presumably, with the functional head of the Focus Phrase). Looking at matters this way, the impossibility of the VSO order in Italian, Belletti points out, and the marginality of the VOS order in that language, would then be accounted for in terms of Relativized Minimality (RM) violations. In the VSO order, the subject, according to Belletti's analysis, would move to Focus Phrase from its VP-internal position to be licensed. Since the specifier of the Focus Phrase is filled by the subject, the object would have to be licensed through Case, rather than Focus. The object would then have to move into a specifier position of a

Case-checking projection to be licensed. But that is not possible since the subject is sitting in the lowest functional projection of the clause. Further movement of the object, crossing the subject, would then be prohibited as a RM violation. The marginal VOS order would also be ruled out in a similar fashion, but in this case it is the subject that gets trapped in the VP, hence unlicensed. The obvious, and immediate, objection to Belletti's analysis, which she notes herself (2001: 72-73), would be that in other Romance languages such as Spanish, and also in Palestinian Arabic, both VSO and VOS orders are acceptable and productive, which is not predicted by Belletti's analysis. Belletti suggests that this tells us that the subject in Spanish is in a different position than in Italian. At any rate, I think Belletti's assumptions seem to be inadequate as far as both PA and Spanish are concerned.

It seems to me that the conception of the clause structure offered by Rizzi (1997) could still be maintained. Take (44d). From what I have assumed so far, this example cannot be an answer to (52), but rather (53):

(52) # miin liʕbu f-l-ħadiiqa?
 who played-3MP in-the-park

(53) liʕbu BANAAT f-l-ħadiiqa?
 played-3MP GIRLS in-the-park

This so since the BN in (44d) is contrastively focused, whereas answering (52) with a BN in subject position would necessarily entail narrow focus on the subject (whose stress would be assigned by the NSR), not contrastive focus. So, if the context question

to (44d) is (53), not (52), it then follows that *li ʕbu* 'played-3MP' in (44d) is part of the presupposition, not the assertion (i.e. topical). It can then be assumed that *li ʕbu* 'played-3MP' would sit in a Topic Phrase projection flanking the Focus Phrase on the left, since it has a topical feature (as in Rizzi (1997)). *WLAAD* 'boys' would therefore occur, or rather, would have moved into, the peripheral Focus Phrase projection. *f-l-ħadiiqa* 'in-the-park' in (44d) could then be in Topic Phrase on the right edge of Focus Phrase, again, a reasonable assumption in terms of Rizzi's analysis, since *f-l-ħadiiqa* carries a topical feature. The same analysis can be applied to (54):

(54) *banu ʕABIID l-ahraam*
 built-3P SLAVES the-pyramids

In this case *banu* 'built-3P' would be in Topic Phrase, while *ʕABIID* 'SLAVES' would be in Focus Phrase. *l-ahraam* 'the-pyramids' could then be in another Topic Phrase on the right edge of Focus Phrase, or else it could be said to be in its canonical object position.

However, how could this discussion be applied in the important case of (44a) in the text, repeated here as (55):

(55) *li ʕbu f-l-ħadiiqa wlaad*
 played-3MP in-the-park boys
 'Boys played in the park.'

Since *wlaad* 'boys' is focalized, therefore assigned the NS by the NSR in its lowest position in the syntactic tree in terms of c-command, then it does not seem to suffice, or work, to claim that *wlaad* 'boys,' being a focalized constituent, would have to occur, overtly in the syntax (i.e. at S-Structure), in Focus Phrase in the left periphery of the clause. However, recall that the context question for (55) would be (56):

- (56) *miin liʕbu f-l-ħadiiqa?*
 who played-3MP in-the-park
 'Who played in the park?'

Taking the CQ in (56) into consideration, it becomes evident that *li ʕbu f-l-ħadiiqa* 'played-3MP in-the-park' is presupposed, or topical in (55). It could then be argued that *li ʕbu f-l-ħadiiqa* 'played-3MP in-the-park,' since it has a topical feature, is in Topic Phrase flanking the left edge of Focus Phrase in which *wlaad* 'boys' would be sitting. Viewing things in this manner enables us to maintain that a focused BN in PA and Spanish moves into the specifier position of an FP overtly in the syntax (at S-Structure). However, another option is still logically possible, as has been suggested by Rizzi (1997: 287) in regards to the following Italian example (his (7)),

- (57) *Ho letto IL TUO LIBRO (,non il suo)*
 "I read YOUR BOOK, not his"

which is to say that when focalized a BN in PA and Spanish moves into the specifier position of a Focus Phrase covertly at the level of Logical Form (LF) to enter into a

checking relation with a Focus head F in a Specifier-Head configuration. This option would minimize cross-linguistic variation since the level of LF is the relevant level anyway for English focused BNs, if we abstract away from English examples such as (47) above, since overt movement to FP (Focus Phrase) is constrained by the rigid word order in English.

The last issue I would like to consider in this section is how focusing a bare nominal licenses it. Recall from Chapter 2 that I have claimed that BNs in non-Construct-State constructions in PA are unmarked for +/- Definiteness features, and are therefore unable to substitute into D. I have also assumed that the same can be carried over to existential BNs in English. In Construct-State constructions, on the other hand, a BN is supplied with the features necessary to check the strong Def features of D, and in the process, the BN receives the appropriate interpretation. The +/- Definiteness features are passed on to the BN by a possessive DP in the construct state (CS). Ideally, focusing a BN in non-CS construction should perform a similar function to that performed by the possessor DP, namely, endowing the BN with the necessary features to be interpreted.

I would like to argue that focus does just that. It enables the BN to check its features against an F head in a Specifier-Head configuration to achieve an interpretation. Focus is standardly taken to encode new information. It can thus be said to encode indefiniteness features. Even contrastive focus can also be argued to encode new information and thus signaling indefiniteness since the contrasted BN still supplies new information as witnessed in the next example:

(58) A. *ħakeet maʔ DAKATRAH?*
 talked-2MS with DOCTORS
 '(Did) you talked to DOCTORS?'

B. *laʔ. ħakeet maʔ MʔALLMAAT*
 no. talked-MS with TEACHERS-3FP
 'No. I talked to (FEMALE) TEACHERS.'

If the DP that contains the BN sits in a specifier position in FP in a checking configuration with a focus head F, and since focus is inherently indefinite, the indefiniteness features are passed on to the DP containing the BN in the specifier position. It is then predicted that the only features that can be inherited by a BN sitting in an FP would be indefiniteness features. This prediction is exactly what we encounter in PA. BNs in this language can only be interpreted as indefinite. Furthermore, the prediction is also confirmed for English, since the sole interpretation an existentially read BN can get is indefinite.

In the next section, I tentatively explore another difference between English and PA and Spanish concerning how generic or, rather, kind reference, is achieved in both groups in languages.

5.5 Bare Nominals and Reference in English and PA/Spanish

Chierchia (1998) proposes a neocarlsonian view of bare nominals and suggests that these nominals, in English and Italian, denote kinds and that the generic and existential uses of BNs in these languages are accomplished via type-shifting. Although interesting and well worked-out I believe Chierchia's analysis has some problems. I will not

consider a critique of his analysis here.¹⁷ I would just note that Chierchia's assumption that BNs in Italian denote kinds is quite problematic, and cannot be carried over to PA BNs (for example, see Zamparelli (2002), who rejects Chierchia's contention that Italian BNs denote kinds).

I would rather like to suggest that when we deal with generically interpreted BNs in English, on the one hand, and existentially interpreted BNs, on the other hand, we are in fact dealing with two somewhat different entities. In fact, this should be the null hypothesis, since other languages, languages such as PA and Spanish, express these two usages by resorting to two quite different mechanisms. On the one hand, the existential usage is expressed via BNs, and the generic usage is achieved by using a definite article with the nominal. That generic BNs in English are different from existential ones in this language has been suggested in Chapter 2. In that chapter, I have argued that generically interpreted BNs in English are able somehow to satisfy the +/- Definiteness features of the D position, unlike existentially interpreted BNs. I have speculated then that two solutions could be offered to this problem. In accordance with Rizzi's (1997) assumptions, I have suggested that generically read bare nominals carry a topical feature that needs to be checked in the proper configuration. I have suggested that these nominals are structurally located in the specifier position of a TopicPhrase and the DP in which the nominal is contained enters into a checking relation with the head Top of that projection (*Cf.* (48a) above). Licensing the bare nominal is then accomplished in this configuration. Moreover, interpreting the BN would also be accomplished this way

¹⁷ Consider for example Munn and Schmitt (2000) and their objections to Chierchia's Nominal Mapping Parameter and the problems it encounters when applied to Brazilian Portuguese.

since generically interpreted BNs are interpreted as topics, presumably, definite. The other solution, I have suggested in Chapter 2, is that the generic BN is somehow able to substitute in D. This position seems to get support from Zamparelli's (2002) contention that when D is filled the expression is read referentially.¹⁸ This does not seem to be implausible in the case of generic BNs, kind-referring BNs in particular, in English since these nominals do give rise to a referential reading. Further support for this last point comes from PA and Spanish where the generic reading, always referential, is expressed by filling the D position with a definite article.

So, if generic BNs in English and determined nominals with the definite article in PA and Spanish are alike, this begs the question why the former language can express genericity using BNs while the latter two languages have to use the definite article for this purpose.¹⁹

Let us first consider the following diagram:

¹⁸ Zamparelli (2002: 14) argues that referentiality could be linked to the presence of lexical material in the D position (at LF). This, he speculates, is responsible for the narrow-scope reading of the indefinite in (i) and the wide scope reading in (ii), since in the latter there is no material to substitute in D:


(i) John is looking for a piece of paper.

(ii) John is looking for pieces of paper.

In (i) it is possible to interpret the sentence as meaning that there is a piece of paper such that John is looking for it. In (ii) such an interpretation is unavailable. However, Zamparelli's analysis assumes that the indefinite article is in D, which is not uncontroversial.

¹⁹ That generically interpreted BNs in English have more in common with determined nominals with the definite article than is usually assumed is in fact the crux of Zamparelli's (2002) analysis.

(59)



The most striking observation that can be made concerning (59a-c) is the virtual symmetry seen between English and PA. Interestingly, (59a) and (59b) exhibit a striking pattern. PA BNs can be used only existentially, whereas BNs in English have a three-fold usage where they could be used either existentially, generically, or in reference to a kind. These latter two usages English BNs can be put to are realized in PA by *the*-plurals. The differences, thus, should follow from principled reasons.

I believe the differences can be seen to stem from two related assumptions. First, I would like to make the assumption that generic operators in these two language groups, English, on the one hand, and PA and Spanish, on the other, differ in their binding possibilities. In English, generic operators can bind nominals contained in a DP whose head D is empty or null. In PA and Spanish, by contrast, generic operators are unable to realize this possibility, and these two languages have to use the definite article to express genericity. The second assumption I would like to make, which is not unrelated

to the first assumption concerning generic operators, is to recall from Chapter 4 my contention that generically interpreted BNs in English, and generic DPs with the definite article in PA, are never foci, but always topical. When focused, these DPs turn out to be contrastive topics, rather than foci. It could then be hypothesized that to be interpreted generically in a sentence a BN or a definite DP have to be topical or defocalized. One way to cash out this solution is to say that when topical or non-focal a BN or a definite DP is mapped into the restrictive clause to be bound by the generic operator. Being focal, BNs in PA and Spanish, and existential BNs in English, do not fit the bill, since they are arguably always caught in the nuclear scope and cannot be bound by generic operators.

It should then be expected that English can express genericity using BNs since the generic operators in this language can bind a nominal contained in a DP with a null head D. Furthermore, English bare nominals can be defocalized and mapped into the restrictive clause of a generic operator to be bound by the latter. Conversely, PA and Spanish generic operators may be taken to be unable to bind nominals in DPs with empty or null heads. A BN in PA and Spanish is also always focused, which rules out the possibility of binding the nominal in the restrictive clause since these nominals are always mapped into the nuclear scope. The latter two languages have to use the definite article in order to express the generic use, unlike English, which can express it using a bare nominal.

5.6 Conclusion

I have argued in this chapter that the differences seen between English, on the one hand, and PA and Spanish, on the other hand, in terms of the distribution of BNs are quite predictable and predicted from the following assumptions. Existential BNs in English, and all BNs in PA and Spanish, are always focused and always bear sentential stress as assigned by the NSR. Since these nominals behave similarly in all three languages, or perhaps, in the two language groups, then the differences should be sought in the very fact that all these nominals are focused.

The properties of focus in these two language groups, I have argued, are different. Such differences in turn reflect on how these nominals distribute in the utterance. In English, both the S-NSR and the C-NSR are active or, alternatively in terms of Cinque's (1993) analysis, marked focus is an option. The most embedded constituent does not have to be focalized but can be destressed so as to focus, non-contrastively, a constituent that is internal to the utterance. In Spanish and PA, on the other hand, only the C-NSR is active and the marked focus option open to English is unavailable to the former languages. To stress a constituent, PA and Spanish move this element and place it where it can be assigned stress by the NSR (lowest in the syntactic tree in terms of c-command or in the most deeply embedded position). Using the marked focus option in PA and Spanish would only generate a contrastive interpretation.

Finally, I have argued that reference in these two language groups can perhaps be explained through utilizing two assumptions. I have assumed that generic operators are different in these two language groups. English generic operators can bind nominals in DPs with null heads, whereas PA and Spanish generic operators cannot. Additionally, I

have suggested that if BNs in PA and Spanish are always focal these nominals could not be caught in the restrictive clause of a generic operator to be bound by that operator. Assuming that focused BNs are mapped into the nuclear scope, whether in English or PA/Spanish, would rule out the possibility of being bound by generic operators. These nominals would instead be bound by existential closure, and be interpreted existentially.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

I have started out the discussion of bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic by putting forward this hypothesis: one way of understanding the workings of bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic, or in any language for that matter, would be for there to be, in the ideal case, a certain environment in which bare nominals occur, perhaps quite productively, but in which they display a pattern of behavior manifestly and markedly different from their behavior in the general case. By closely examining the behavior of bare nominals in such an exceptional context, and then juxtaposing that behavior with what is witnessed of bare nominals in the usual case, we should be in a better position to understand the behavior of these nominals.

Palestinian Arabic (PA), as it turns out, provides us with precisely that option since this language possesses a construction, namely, the Construct State (CS), in which bare nominals occur productively and in which their behavior seems pretty unconstrained. The head noun of the construct state has been standardly assumed, in the Afro-Asiatic literature, to substitute into the D position. This, I have argued, provides the underpinnings of a fundamental difference between bare nominals (BNs) in CS constructions and nominals in non-CS constructions. In other words, BNs in CS constructions are able to move into D, thereby checking the strong +/-Definiteness features of that position, once these nominals inherit the necessary matching features from the possessive DP obligatorily present in the CS. Since, by assumption, BNs are unmarked for such features, and are only able to acquire them through the presence of a

possessor DP, BNs in non-CS constructions fail to perform this function, and the strong +/- Definiteness features of the D position of the DP shell in which these nominals occur would remain unchecked. This in turn would render ungrammatical any utterance in which these nominals would occur and would also explain, for instance, why BNs can occur preverbally *only* when they are contrastively focused, since they would not be licensed otherwise.

I have then attempted to push this line of reasoning a little farther. First, I have demonstrated, drawing on the placement of nuclear stress via the Nuclear Stress Rule and the subsequent focal status of the constituent stressed, that BNs in PA and Spanish, which are only subject to an existential reading, are always focal (informationally, otherwise, contrastively, if sentence-internal). If the BN is assigned the NS, via the C-NSR module operative in PA and Spanish (in Zubizarreta's (1998) terms), or via the NSR to the most deeply embedded position (in Cinque's (1993) terms), that nominal comes out informationally focused. If, on the other hand, the BN occurs internally in the sentence it surfaces contrastively focused.

I have used the occurrence of bare (or, determinerless) nominals in CS constructions, and the mechanism by which these nominals are licensed, to argue that focus performs the function of the licenser for BNs in non-CS constructions by analogy with the function performed by the possessive DP in CS constructions. In CS constructions the features of D are checked by a bare nominal moving into it overtly due to the presence of a possessor DP from which the nominal acquires its (in)definiteness features. In non-CS constructions the BN is licensed by focus. To focus a bare nominal is to place it in a specifier position of a Focus Projection (FP). Since BNs are DPs it

follows that the DP in which the nominal occurs would enter into a checking relation with an F head in a Specifier-Head configuration within the FP projection. Since focus is inherently a means of encoding new information, I have argued that it is quite reasonable to assume that focus is always indefinite. This indefiniteness is passed on from the F head onto its specifier via the very local relationship that holds between the two (spec-head configuration). The DP that contains the bare nominal is accordingly interpreted as indefinite, which is exactly the result we are looking for since bare nominals in Palestinian Arabic and Spanish are always interpreted as indefinite.

To argue that BNs in the general case are devoid of (in)definiteness features necessary to check the strong features of the D position begs the obvious question whether English BNs should be different in this respect from their PA and Spanish counterparts. I have argued that in fact English BNs are not different but can be shown to conform to the pattern seen of BNs in the other two languages. More specifically, I have argued that existential BNs in English are also focused, and that these nominals are different entities from BNs that are subject to a generic reading in this language. Such a move should be welcomed on the principled ground that it minimizes cross-linguistic variation. Furthermore, to say that existential BNs are different from generic ones in English should not be as far-fetched as it may at first seem since other languages, PA and Spanish are only two examples, have two distinct mechanisms of expressing the existential use (via BNs) and the generic one (by using the definite article). Another difference that points to the accuracy of this assumption is that, as I have attempted to demonstrate, unlike existential BNs in English, and all BNs in PA and Spanish, which are focalized, generic BNs, and generic DPs with the definite article in PA and Spanish,

are never foci. If focused, generic BNs in English, and generic DPs with the definite article in PA and Spanish, emerge as contrastively focused topics, not foci. This reasonably illustrates that we are dealing with two different entities, not one, when dealing with BNs in English. I have also argued that existential BNs in English would be licensed by focus in a way identical to what I have argued for BNs in PA and Spanish (although the level at which the movement into FP occurs could be different).

Once we look at the issues involved from this point of view, I have further argued, the other differences between English, on the one side, and PA and Spanish, on the other, in terms of the distribution of BNs fall out naturally from this analysis. I have reasoned that since existential BNs in English and all BNs in both PA and Spanish are focused, then the difference in their distribution in these two language groups should be pursued by examining two other fundamental differences that exist between these languages, namely, the differences in the system of focus and word order facts. English is characterized by a restricted word order, but a flexible focus system, therefore making it possible to focus bare nominals, non-contrastively, that occur sentence-internally, by exploiting what Cinque (1993) terms *marked focus*. This also explains the absence of Zubizarreta's (1998) *prosodically-motivated* movement from English. PA and Spanish, by contrast, have rich word order possibilities and a more restrictive focus system than that seen in English. Focusing a bare nominal internal to the sentence results in a contrastive reading, unlike what happens in English. Marked focus, therefore, is unavailable for either PA or Spanish. Prosodic movement, however, is an option available for these languages, which should be expected since only the C-NSR is operational in PA and Spanish (or, alternatively, stressing the most embedded element

in the sentence via the NSR as in Cinque (1993)). To be informationally focused, which as I have argued is the case for all bare nominals in PA and Spanish, a bare nominal is therefore confined to such a position (i.e. lowest in c-command or the most deeply embedded), otherwise it would only be contrastively focused. These deep contrasts between English, on the one hand, and PA and Spanish, on the other hand, are responsible for the difference in the distribution of BNs seen in these two language groups.

Finally, I have argued that taking all the preceding assumptions in tandem we are able to hypothesize as to why genericity is expressed differently in the two language groups. I have argued that reference in these two language groups can perhaps be explained by pursuing two related tacks. On the one hand, I have assumed that generic operators differ in these two language groups in that English generic operators can bind nominals in DPs with null heads, whereas PA and Spanish generic operators cannot. On the other hand, I have suggested that if BNs in PA and Spanish are always focal these nominals could not be mapped in the restrictive clause of a generic operator. Assuming that focused BNs are mapped into the nuclear scope, whether in English or PA/Spanish, would rule out the possibility of being mapped into the restrictive clause and thus be bound by generic operators.

I believe that the picture that emerges from the analysis in this work is desirably a restrictive one. Languages that seem to be noticeably different with respect to the syntax and the semantics of bare nominals such as English and PA and Spanish turn out to have more in common than meets the eye. The differences follow from deeper distinctions that can be made at the level of stress assignment, focus and word order.

This in fact leads us to one of the interesting questions the study undertaken in this work raises, which is obviously beyond the scope of this dissertation, is how such an analysis as the one espoused here could be applied, if at all, to bare nominals in languages such as Russian, and perhaps, Chinese. Russian allows bare nominals in argument positions to occur freely. Obviously, the system of focus in this languages needs to be examined before any conclusions can be reached. Also word order becomes relevant as it has turned out to be with respect to English, PA and Spanish. Such an inquiry into the properties of BNs in Russian, I believe, could ultimately enhance our understanding of the issues discussed in the current work.

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