_-_.‘.» -: '
‘f

' .-

-” '1
fazﬁ
_.>3u-

if

v...“

w-

_-

U

11-.
(W? “"1

t 3W1
“1'13“! 5 4.)
n3“...-

‘5
:97.

g}:

 

‘ D

:"Vf'm-
‘ h

t' t H: W“
i 1 vii; .‘ ‘7‘ ‘
Him! :1“ : ix?" [4139“!

:iH
g" Tm

\E‘ K

1‘! 150'

‘n‘ﬂ‘ ‘ I id's”?

H- ' "
jun"

’wéﬁ;

w ' A
'3» '-
,. a!»
.

mr"

, r

9..
o ' ‘
7:1":

Ex.
‘ ‘.I7

931“: u
wxﬁﬁv‘ »
‘ w.

1" .
”ii?

0
.
1

:2

.n.'

,, ,
V. 7"‘t4-

=22:-
.ﬁg‘
’5?-

ya!
a“
"‘1‘."
.h_ ‘

 

‘I A LIBRARIES
~r MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
2“ V EAST LANSING, MICH 48824-1048

This is to certify that the
dissertation entitled

MICHIGAN EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND VALUES:
INSTRUMENTAL VALUES AND THE FORMATION OF
CHARTER SCHOOL POLICY

presented by
BRADLEY ROBERT CARL

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for the

DOCTORAL degree in SOCIOLOGY-URBAN
STUDIES

 

 

 

ham /é[@[7

ggbr gngrofessor’ s Signature

.934 “L7 300%

Date

MSU is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution

 

 

5 A! "Tin

PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record.
TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due.
MAY BE RECALLED with earlier due date if requested.

 

DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE

 

OCT 0 6 2006

11 135

it“

 

 

 

 

 

 

1:
—-::.-‘..
m”:
V’T.‘
E
'“1;
a.
_ 3:1
_,_~_
5.:
«I—
- 3-43:
\‘

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6/01 c:/ClRC/Date0ue.p65—p.15

 

 

MICHIGAN EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND VALUES:
INSTRUMENTAL VALUES AND THE FORMATION
OF CHARTER SCHOOL POLICY
By

Bradley Robert Carl

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Sociology/Urban Studies

2004

ABSTRACT
MICHIGAN EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND VALUES:
INSTRUMENTAL VALUES AND THE FORMATION
OF CHARTER SCHOOL POLICY
By

Bradley Robert Carl

In response to growing concern over the past several decades regarding the
quality of public education, particularly in the troubled schools of major cities,
numerous reform efforts have been launched. Among the most notable is the
public charter school movement, which cUrrently enrolls more than a half-million
students nationwide. Michigan has been a national pioneer in the charter
movement, having passed one of the nation’s first laws. The comparatively
“charter-friendly” provisions of this law have resulted in high numbers of both

schools and students, particularly in Detroit and other urban areas of the state.

Charter schools, as is true for other educational initiatives, can be understood as
a result of certain values that predominate over others within policy arenas,
particularly at the state level where most educational policymaking has
traditionally occurred. Four “instrumental values” - Quality, Efficiency, Equity,
and Choice - have been identified as particularly important in the formation of
education policy, with each having held substantial influence at various times.
Research has also identified a set of key stakeholder groups and “policy elites” -
including state legislators, school administrators, and leaders of education-

related interest groups - that consider these values as they formulate educational

policy. The process by which policy elites allocate these values in the formation
of educational policy has been the topic of some research in the past, although
considerably less is known about how values are employed in state-specific
situations at a given time, nor how the values and attitudes of policy elites impact

their behavior regarding Specific policy issues such as Charter schools.

This dissertation uses the Specific context of charter school policy in Michigan to
re-test and expand upon the important work of Garn (2000) and Marshall,
Mitchell, & Wirt (1989) regarding the distribution of instrumental values among
selected policy elites. Specifically, my work examines how elites’ views of the
four instrumental values impact their values and behavior relative to charter
school legislation, and explores variables associated with elites” background and
experience that may influence the values they bring to the policy process. While
the passage of Charter legislation and the rapid expansion of the movement
suggests support on the part of policy elites for certain values, such as Choice
and Efficiency, at the expense of other values, my work suggests that value
preferences are instead unevenly distributed across elites by factors such as
political affiliation. Using an exploratory, qualitative and quantitative case study
methodology involving surveys and interviews of educational policy elites in
Michigan complemented by secondary document analysis, the primary objective
of this research is to investigate which instrumental values have been assigned
comparatively high or low priority, and various factors associated with elites’

backgrounds help explain their value preferences.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank my committee chair, Dr. Harry Perlstadt, Department of Sociology,
for guiding this work; without his timely and thoughtful contributions, completion
would have been impossible. I also wish to thank committee members Dr. Steve
Gold (Sociology), Dr. Stan Kaplowitz (Sociology), and Dr. John Schweitzer
(Urban Planning) for their assistance and feedback. Special thanks goes to Dr.
Robert L. Green, Professor and Dean Emeritus, for his constant support of my
work and professional development, and to Fran Fowler and Tammy Dennany for
friendship and assistance navigating departmental and university policies. I also
acknowledge the memory of my late advisor, Dr. Ruth Simms Hamilton,-and her
contributions to my intellectual development. Finally, special recognition of my
wife, Merideth Trahan, is necessary for her love and support during the long

process of completing this work.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................. VIII

CHAPTER 1: STATEMENT OF PROBLEM AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE....1

Review of Literature ............................................................................................ 5
The Role of Values in American Society ....................................................... 5
The Relationship between Values and Policy ............................................... 6
Attitudes and Values as Determinants of Behavior ...................................... 8
The Role of Values in Shaping Educational Policy .................................... 12
Four Instrumental Values in Educational Policy ......................................... 13
Policy Elites and Their Role in the Educational Policymaking Process...20

The Significance of Policy Elites at the State Level ................................ 21
Policy Elite “Clusters” ............................................................................... 23
Research on Values in Education: Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt (1989) ........ 27
The Charter School Movement ..................................................................... 32
Key Characteristics and Intended Outcomes of Charter Schools ......... 32
A Historical Context for the Rise of Charters and Choice ...................... 36
The Growth and Present Status of the Charter Movement ..................... 37
The Signiﬁcance of Charter Schools as an Urban Reform Strategy ..... 38
Research on Values within a Charter School Context: Garn (2000) ......... 40

Specific Hypotheses Tested ............................................................................. 45

Sources of Data and Methodology .................................................................. 49

Contributions of the Dissertation .................................................................... 53

Organization of Findings and Discussion ...................................................... 57

CHAPTER 2: INSTRUMENTAL VALUES IN MICHIGAN CHARTER SCHOOL

POLICY: LEGISLATION AND REPORTS ......................................................... 59
Michigan’s 1993 Charter School Law .............................................................. 60
The Commission on Charter Schools ............................................................. 64
Key Charter Bills from the 2003 Legislature: HB 4148 and SB 393 .............. 77

House Bill 4148 ............................................................................................. 78

Senate Bill 393 ............................................................................................... 91
Summary .......................................................................................................... 102

CHAPTER 3: DATA COLLECTION PROCESS AND RESPONSE RATES ....104

Selection of Sample and Data Collection Process ....................................... 104
Description of Sample Selection Process ................................................. 104
Description of Potential Sample ................................................................. 106

Completed Surveys and Response Rates .................................................... 114

Summary .......................................................................................................... 120

CHAPTER 4: SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS ........................................... 121

Profile of Respondents: Key Non-Education Characteristics ..................... 123
Characteristics of Respondents’ Home Districts/Constituencies:
Geography, Political Tendencies, and Race/Ethnicity ............................. 123
Self-Reported Political Afﬁliation ............................................................... 126
Involvement in Education and Charter Schools ........... . ........................... 127

Contrasting Measures of Value Preference among Policy Elites ............... 132
Comparison of Paired Statements Representing Instrumental Values .. 133
Direct Preferences for Instrumental Values .............................................. 153
Rank-Ordering of Values ............................................................................. 155

Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix of Validity"... ................................................... 157

Contrasting Definitions of the Four Instrumental Values ............................ 160

Views of Education and Charter Schools ..................................................... 166
Defining an Appropriate Role for the State in Educational Policy .......... 167
Perceived Effectiveness of Educational Policymaking Agencies ........... 168
Perceptions of K-12 School Performance ................................................. 171
Perceived Benefits/Successful Outcomes of Charter Schools ............... 172
Concerns Regarding Charter Schools ....................................................... 176
General Support for Charters and Choice-Related Initiatives ................. 181
Charter Schools as a “Stepping Stone” to More School Choice? .......... 184

CHAPTER 5: KEY RELATIONSHIPS AND SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

FROM SURVEYS AND TELEPHONE INTERVIEWS ....................................... 186

Relationships Involving the Political Afﬁliation of Respondents ............... 187

Why Charter Legislation was Passed and Ofﬁcial Positions on Charters .191
Telephone Interviews ...................................................................................... 193

Information from Incomplete Surveys ........................................................... 199

vi

CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND REVIEW OF HYPOTHESES ...................... 202

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH ............................ 219
APPENDICES ................................................................................................... 222
Appendix A: Inﬂuence Rankings of Policy Actors in Education ................. 223
Appendix B: Survey Instrument ..................................................................... 224
Appendix C: Information Form Sent with Survey Instrument ..................... 234
Appendix D: Survey Instrument Used by Marshall, Mitchell, 8. Wirt .......... 236
Appendix E: Modified Version of Survey Used in Marshall Study .............. 239
Appendix F: Individual Responses to Survey Question 7 ........................... 240

Appendix G: Open-Ended Responses to Questions 2, 4, 13, 20, and 21 ..246

Appendix H: Individual Scores for Survey Question 7 ................................ 261
Appendix I: Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix (MTMM) Correlations ................ 263
Appendix J: Question 1 Scores by Individual .............................................. 265
Appendix K: Question 3 Scores by Individual .............................................. 267
Appendix L: Question 5 Scores by Individual .............................................. 269
SOURCES CITED ............................................................................................. 271

vii

Table 1:
Table 2:
Table 3:
Table 4:
Table 5:
Table 6:
Table 7.:
Table 8:

Table 9:

Table 10:
Table 11:
Table 12:
Table 13:
Table 14:
Table 15:
Table 16:
Table 17:
Table 18:
Table 19:
Table 20:

Table 21:

LIST OF TABLES

Value Preferences of Policy Elites ........................................................ 30
Response Rates among Respondent Subgroups ............................... 117
Geographic Nature of Respondents’ District/Constituency .................. 124
Political Tendencies of Respondents” District/Constituency ................ 125
Race/Ethnicity of Respondents’ District/Constituency ......................... 126
Self-Reported Political Affiliation of Survey Respondents ................... 127
Survey Respondents’ Involvement in K-12 Education ......................... 128
K-12 Support/Advocacy Activities of Survey Respondents ................. 131
Statements Representing Values and Policy Domains ....................... 134
Value Preferences of Michigan Policy Elites by Domain ................... 141
Value Preference Scores of Michigan Policy Elites, by Domain ........ 142
Value Preferences by Respondent Subgroup ................................... 145
T-Tests of Signiﬁcance between Mean Scores of Values ................. 148
Paired Samples Correlations ............................................................. 150
Rank-Ordering of Values ................................................................... 156
Rank-Ordering Value Preferences of Subgroups, by Value .............. 157
Respondents’ Agreement with Deﬁnitions of Values ......................... 163
Views of an Appropriate State Role in Education .............................. 168
Perceived Effectiveness of Educational Policymaking Agencies ....... 169
Perceptions of K-12 School Performance among Policy Elites ......... 172
Intended Beneﬁts of Michigan Charter Schools ................................ 173

viii

Table 22: Perceived Concerns Regarding Michigan Charter Schools ............... 177

Table 23: Support for Charter Schools and School Choice ............................... 182
Table 24: Intended Benefits of Charter Schools by Political Affiliation .............. 189
Table 25: Concerns Involving Charter Schools by Political Afﬁliation ................ 190

Table 26: Support for Charters and Choice by Political Affiliation ..................... 191

ix

Chapter 1: Statement of Proglem an; Review of Literature

Within the past two decades, concern over the quality of public education in the
US. has emerged as perhaps our nation’s most pressing domestic issue.
Unease regarding stagnant or declining academic performance, high dropout
rates, and students who are Viewed as unprepared for meaningful contributions
to society in the form of work and/or postsecondary education highlight a long list
of woes that have characterized American public schools since the 19803. It has
become rare, in fact, to Open a newspaper or magazine, or to View television

news, without some proclamation of the desperate Situation in public education.

In response to these ooncems, a host of reform efforts have been launched over
the past half Cantury, with many concentrated in the past two decades. Among
the most notable reform initiatives has been the publicly-funded charter school
movement, which has expanded rapidly following the passage of the nation’s first
charter school law (in 1991) and the establishment of the first Charter school (in
1992), both in Minnesota (Finn, Manno, & Bierlein, 1996; Gill et al, 2001). At the
time of this writing in early 2003, more than 684,000 students are enrolled in one
of almost 2700 charter schools nationwide, with 39 states plus the District of
Columbia and Puerto Rico having passed charter legislation1 (Center for
Education Reform, 2003). In Michigan, which has been among the pioneers of

the charter movement, more than 180 schools are in existence, enrolling more

 

' Among the 39 states (and the District of Columbia) that have passed charter legislation as of this writing,
all but three (New Hampshire, Tennessee, and Iowa) have at least one actual charter school in operation.

than 60,000 students (Carrasco & Summers-Coty, 2000; Michigan Department of
Education, 2003a). Charters have been particularly prominent as a strategy for
the troubled schools of major urban areas, which are commonly Viewed as a
prime example of the decline of public education. A large percentage of charters
nationwide are located in urbanized areas, and the movement hasbecome
particularly prominent in urban centers such as Detroit, where 55 charters were
in operation within the city at the beginning of the 2002-03 school year (Michigan

Department of Education, 2003b).

Charter schoOIs, as is true for other efforts to enact and reform educational
policy, can be understood as a distinct result of certain values (and combinations
of these values) that predominate over others within the policy arena (Marshall,
Mitchell, & Wirt, 1989; Cam, 2000; Garrns, Guthrie, & Pierce, 1978; Wirt & Kirst,
1982, 1997; Labaree, 1997). Specifically, policy researchers have argued that

four “instrumental values” compete for influence in educational policy:

- Quality. the pursuit of the “best” educational outcomes, typically deﬁned
and pursued by (a) Setting standards for school and teacher
characteristics and measurable student achievement, and/or (b) allocating
funding in pursuit of these standards

- Efﬁciency. a value with (a) an economic dimension that seeks to minimize
costs while maximizing gains, and (b) an accountability dimension that

seeks to oversee and control the exercise of power and responsibility

- Equity. the use and (if necessary) redistribution of public resources to
satisfy disparities in human needs
- Choice: the presence of a range of options for action, as well as the ability

to select a preferred option

Policy researchers have also identified a set of key stakeholder groups and
“policy elites” that use these values in the process of influencing educational
policy at the state level, which has historically been the most important
jurisdiction for education-related policy. These elites include elected state
legislators and their staff, members of state boards of education, state school
superintendents (also known as chief state school ofﬁcers), governors and their
policy advisors, administrators within state departments of education, and
leaders of education-related interest groups such as teachers’ unions and
associations of school administrators. These groups of elites, who participate in
a broad range of education-related policy issues, are joined on the charter school
issue by another set of stakeholders that includes the public entities authorized to
issue and oversee charters and the private sector organizations that are
frequently contracted to operate them. Also participating in the educational
policy process in increasingly Significant ways are business interests and trade
associations, which advocate for their members’ interests in calling for improved
educational results, containment of education-related expenditures, and greater
accountability for school performance (Hertz & lmber, 1995; Kingdon, 1995;

Moyser & Wagstaffe, 1987; Scott, 1990; Wirt, Mitchell, & Marshall, 1985).

This dissertation uses the concept of instrumental values within educational
policy, along with the views of key educational stakeholders and policy elites
relative to these values, to understand how the charter school movement in
Michigan has emerged and expanded. While the passage of Charter legislation
and the expansion of the movement suggests support on the part of stakeholders
and policy elites for certain values, such as Choice and Efficiency, research has
suggested that across the Spectrum of these participants in the policy process
there is likely to be uneven distribution of, and preference, for these values
(Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt, 1989; Garn, 2000). Using an exploratory, qualitative
case study methodology involving surveys of educational policy elites in Michigan
and secondary document analysis, this research investigates which instrumental
values have been assigned comparatively high or low priority, and how value
preferences on the part of selected policy elites appear to inﬂuence the formation
of Michigan’s charter school policy. Key research questions that guide this

investigation include the following:

1. Which of the instrumental values, either individually or in combination with
others, are valued the most (and the least) by Michigan policy elites who
have played an active role in shaping the state’s education agenda and
Charter school policy?

2. How, if at all, do policy elites’ relative preferences for certain instrumental

values, or combinations thereof, appear to be correlated with key status -

variables such as political party affiliation and demographic characteristics
(race/ethnicity, geography, etc.) of elites and/or their constituents?

3. What relationships, if any, appear to exist between policy elites’
preferences in terms of the four instrumental values on the one hand and
their Views regarding Michigan’s charter school experiment on the other?

4. How are value preferences evident in Michigan’s charter school
legislation, as well as a selected set of attempts to modify this legislation
over the past decade?

5. What do the value preferences of Michigan policy elites suggest about

possible future directions for the state’s charter school movement?

Review of Literature

The Role of Values in American Society

The existence of values within American society, as well as their inﬂuence upon
policy-related processes, have long been topics of interest to social scientists
and commentators. Jary & Jary (19912543) define values as “ethical ideals and
beliefs” and “the central beliefs and purposes of an individual or society.” Values
are held on both an individual and a societal level, and include both variable
beliefs that are subject to change and those of a fixed nature (Schaefer 8. Lamm,
1997). The study of how values help Shape American society dates back as far
as the observations of Tocqueville (in Wirt & Kirst, 1989:79-80, and Garn, 2000),

who noted a series of “curious contradictions” between American values and

policy. Within the sociological literature, the study of values and their role in
society has occupied a prominent place in the work of Parsons (1951 ), among
others, who believed that values played an integral rOIe in addressing “the
problem of social order." Other noted thinkers who have examined the nature
and role of values in American society include the anthropologist Margaret Mead

(in Devine, 1972) and the sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset (1990).

The Relationship between Values and Policy

How, speciﬁcally, do values influence the policymaking process in American
society? The work of Easton (1953), Wildavsky (1987), Elazar (1984), and
Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt (1989), among others, has attempted to answer this
question by studying the extent to which policy represents the manifestation of
cultural values. Emerging from the work of these scholars is a paradigm with two
central propositions: ﬁrst, that culture shapes institutions and traditions, and
second, that culture is reﬂected in written and unwritten codes of behavior. The
political process, using input from state legislatures and other apparatuses of
state government (governorships, executive agencies, etc.) and institutions that
influence policy formation (labor unions, etc.), represents a cultural “stage” which
has been built by previous generations, and reflects understandings of cultural
values held by policy actors. Legislators are authorized and empowered
(through statutes and the electoral process) to reﬂect societal goals in making

policy, but are also influenced by the values held by other actors (including

interest groups), and are constrained by the rules of the political subculture within

which they operate.

The values embraced by a particular culture exert a strong influence upon the
policy process by providing legislators with a measure of how important proposed
policies are to their constituents in terms of costs, probable impacts, and
consequences (Easton, 1953). The ongoing activity of the policymaker is to
transform cultural values into policy through the allocation of values into
legislation (Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt, 1989). Statutes, budgets, and other
matters debated by legislators represent the “concrete outcomes” of cultural
values. Easton (1953:130) adds that policymaking is the “authoritative allocation
of values and resources for a society;” a policy represents a “web of decisions
and actions that allocates values.” A policy is thus a set of values expressed in
words, issued with authority, and reinforced with power in order to induce a shift
toward designated values. Policies reflect the values of people, transformed into
a set of statements about the way things must be done, and the policymaking
process can thus be thought of as the way in which cultural values are authorized
and conﬁrmed. The allocation of values by government is a two-way process, in
that government both receives and reﬂects values from the public (in the form of
elected representatives whose Views must reasonably match those of their
constituents) gig inﬂuences the values held by the public (in the form of elected
policymakers campaigning on various issue platforms and urging constituents to

support them based upon these views) (Wirt & Kirst, 1997).

Attitudes and Values as Determinants of Behavior

Relationships between attitudes and behavior have long been a topic of interest
in the social sciences, and particularly to social psychologists. Perhaps the best-
known research in this area has been contributed by the work of Ajzenand
Fishbein (1980; see also F ishbein & Ajzen, 1975) through their theory of
“reasoned action.” The general premise of the theory is that human behavior is
governed primarily by the rational and systematic use of information and reflects
an intention to perform that particular behavioral action. Intentions, in turn, are
inﬂuenced by both personal and social influences, and reflect a person’s
judgment as to whether a potential behavior both ﬁts within their Own system of
beliefs ﬂ is likely to be viewed as acceptable by those important to the actor.
In contrast to behavioral analyses that focus on the role of external variables
(including personality characteristics, social roles, and demographic factors such
as age, sex, and race) as predictors of behavior, Ajzen and F ishbein contend
(p.9) that these external variables inﬂuence behavior “only to the extent that they
inﬂuence the determinants of that behavior.” External variables may inﬂuence
behavior, in other words, but do so indirectly, by impacting the personal and

social influences that form of intentions and thus guide behavior.

Rokeach (1973) also contributes to the understanding of how attitudes, and the
values that underlie them, are related to behavior. He argues (p.122) that values

underlie many, if not all, social attitudes; that a given value determines several or

many attitudes; and that a given attitude is determined by several or many
values.” Also of interest to Rokeach is the matter of relationships between
values and behaviors; he argues (p.122) that “...a person’s values should enable
us to predict how he will behave in various experimental and real-life situations.”
He confirms this hypothesis through his research, demonstrating that not only are
attitudes shaped by values, but that “values are signiﬁcantly related to all kinds of
behavior" (p.158). He concludes that socioeconomic, political, and religious
values are especially powerful predictors of behaviOr (as well as attitudes).
Rokeach cautions, however (p.162), that there is no reason to think that (a) “...all
values must serve equally as standards to guide attitudes and actions,” and (b)

that “. . .any one value or attitude should predict behavior perfectly.”

Schuman (in Cook, Fine, & House, 1995270) also examines relationships among
attitudes, values (which he characterizes as a “conceptual cousin” of attitudes),
and behavior. He summarizes the earlier work of Fishbein & Ajzen (1975) and

Azjen & Fishbein (1980) in this area as follows:

 

 

 

 

Beliefs Attitudes Intention Behavior
about —’ toward ’ toward —’ toward
Object X f Object X Object X Object X

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Borrowing terminology developed by Ajzen 8 Fishbein (1980), Schuman notes
that through a theory of “reasoned action, “...a person’s beliefs about an object
leads to their overall tendency toward a positive or negative evaluation; their

overall evaluative attitude shapes their intentions to behave in positive or

negative ways toward the object; and, finally, these intentions — unless checked -
ordinarily lead to behaviors that are, on the whole, positive or negative toward the

object” (p.70).

Eagly & Chaiken (1993) review the history of the relationship between attitudes
and behaviors within the social sciences and social psychology in particular by
noting that for much of the past several decades, there were substantial doubts
as to the efficacy of this relationship. While not directly refuting the validity of this
body of research, Eagly 8 Chaiken attempt to specify the conditions under which
attitudes $1 appear to serve as reasonably effective predictors of behavior. They
acknowledge that while the attitude-behavior correlation is indeed lower in some
cases, particularly when attitudes are correlated to a single behavioral incident, it
is much higher in other instances (such as voting behavior), particularly when
attitudes are correlated to an appropriate “aggregative index” of behaviors. They
conclude (p.158) that “...the size of correlations between attitudes and behaviors
is to a great extent under the investigator’s own control,” as “the magnitude of
these correlations varies systematically with the characteristics of the measuring
instruments used to assess attitudes and behaviors.” They also caution that
ascertaining a correlation between attitudes and behaviors is far different from
claiming that attitudes cause behavior. Any Single behavioral incident directed
toward a person or object, for example, is likely determined at least in part by a
host of factors apart from attitudes toward the person or object, meaning that any

incidence of behavior should thus be considered “a somewhat unreliable

10

indicator of the attitude.” Far more telling, Eagly & Chaiken argue, are composite
indices and aggregations of behavior across time, typically measured using a
combination of questionnaires and observations, that can generally be correlated

to attitudes much more readily than a single incidence of behavior.

Eagly & Chaiken (1993) also devote attention to factors and considerations that
inﬂuence, or mediate, relationships between attitudes and behaviOr, and in some
cases increase their intensity. They note (p.194), for example, that experience
serves as one such mediating inﬂuence, with the attitudes of those who have had
direct experience with an attitude object correlating at least moderately with
“attitude-relevant” behaviors, while the attitudes of those who lack such direct
experience correlate weakly, if at all. Among other explanations, they note that
this is because “. . .attitudes based upon direct experience are more easily
retrieved from memory than those not based on direct experience” (see also
Fazio & Zanna, 1981; Crano, 1995). Similarly, correlations between policy elites'
attitudes and behaviors are thought to be increased by prior knowledge about
attitude objects. Attitude-behavior correlations for policy elites can also be
affected by the presence of constituencies which may demand behavior that is
compatible with their own (the constituencies') values, in the event that the
values of the elites that represent them are not congruent with their own. As a
ﬁnal example, Crane (1995) has Observed that vested interests, such as a

ﬁnancial stake in a given matter or the involvement of a close friend or family

11

member, can lead to the formation of comparatively strong attitudes that are

more predictive of behavior than in instances where no vested interest exists.

The Role of Values in Shaping Educational Policy

Policies within education, as is true of other institutions in US. society, can be
understood as a representation of distinct values held by the society (Tozer,
Violas, & Senese, 1993; Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt, 1989; Ballantine, 1983).
While there has been near-unanimous agreement for more than 150 years that
investment in public education is a worthwhile policy goal, the history of
educational policymaking in the US, as is true of other institutions in American
society, has been characterized by conflict (Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt, 1989;
Sarason, 1997; Tyack, 1974). Educators, ordinary citizens, and policymakers
alike have held very different ideas about what schools ought to be doing and
how they should be doing it; disagreement has characterized issues as broad as
what schools should teach reading and as narrow as how many hours of
instructional time are required (Marshall, Mitchell, & ert, 1989; Berliner & Biddle,
1985; Bennett, 1988; Hirsch, 1987, 1996). Repeated instances of conﬂict within
education, while consistent with those in other public institutions that allocate
limited resources across competing demands, illustrate, as Marshall, Mitchell, &
Wirt (1989) argue, the collisionof value preferences on the part of policymakers

and their constituents occurring within the “arena” of the political process.

12

Four Instrumental Values in Educational Policy

Borrowing from Kaufman (1956) and Garrns, Guthrie, & Pierce (1978), and
building upon the contributions of Wildavsky (1987), Easton (1953), Wirt & Kirst
(1997), and Kingdon (1995), among others, Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt (1989),
Sergiovanni et al (1999), and Garn (2000) have identified four “instrumental
values” that represent key cultural priorities within education that have been used
to inﬂuence educational policy. Individual citizens and various interest groups
develop (and sometimes modify) values in response to the basic question of
which give them the best chance of maximizing their own educational interests
(which may be ﬁnancial, political, social, or some combination of these), and
make demands upon their elected representatives accordingly (Marshall,
Mitchell, & Wirt, 1989). Because each value represents a distinct View of what is
deemed important, policy actions taken to advance one of the values often come

at the expense of one or more of the others.

The four instrumental values, each of which is rooted in a unique political

ideology or philosophy, include the following:

- Quality. This value, also known as Excellence, describes “the use of
public resources to match professionally-determined standards of
excellence, proficiency, or ability.” It is based upon the View, best

expressed by Rousseau’s social contract theory (in Marshall, Mitchell, &

l3

Wirt, 1989), that citizens join together in collective action, or the formation
of government, to achieve goals they would be incapable of reaching
through private actions. One such goal is the establishment of free and
compulsory public education. For about a century and a half, Americans
have believed that the overall quality of life in this country is substantially
improved through free, compulsory public education, and have created a
system of public schools, guided at the state and local levels, to achieve
this end. Citizens may disagree on the greatest good that is to be
accomplished through public education — for some, it is greater economic
productivity (resulting from educated workers), for others it is civic
(appreciation for American history and the cultivation of responsible
citizens), and for others it may be private (increased appreciation for
culture, language, or literature) — but there is a general consensus that
education improves the overall quality of life, and that government

therefore has both a responsibility and an interest in providing it.

In addition to the establishment of free and compulsory schools, other
policy actions that illustrate Quality include the movement to establish and
raise standards for student achievement, increased allocations of money
to schools, the establishment of minimum requirements for teacher
certification, and increased numbers of required courses in the school

curriculum as examples.

l4

Efficiency: This value is primarily concerned with minimizing educational
costs while simultaneously maximizing outcomes. It represents a
response to the need of Americans to feel that their institutions operate in

an orderly, predictable, and controlled manner; without government to

~ perform these functions, argued Hobbes, the life of man would become

“...solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Marshall, Mitchell, 8. Wirt,
1989). Wirt & Kirst (1997) note that the Efﬁciency value contains both an
economic perspective that seeks to minimize costs while maximizing gains
(examples: policies pertaining to class size and pupil-teacher ratios) and
an accountability perspective, through which superiors oversee and
control subordinates’ use of power (example: publicizing the stages of the
budgetary process). It emphasizes the accountability of schools, both to
students and to taxpayers who fund them, and was ﬁrst embraced on a
large scale in the 19503 when theories of “scientific management” gained
widespread acclaim. Since that time, it has continued to be a major force
influencing policymakers’ decisions, due in large part to the escalating
costs of education and some level of doubt over the outcomes (or lack
thereof) that have resulted from these expenditures. A vocal faction of
researchers, in fact, has railed against ever-increasing levels of funding
devoted to educational purposes at a time when performance has
remained stagnant or declined, and has argued that educational outputs
(in the form of student performance) are at best only marginally related to

ﬁnancial inputs (see Garrns, Guthrie, & Pierce, 1978).

15

Examples of policies which illustrate the Efﬁciency model include state-
mandated caps on property taxes as a means of funding schools and
elimination of teachers’ right to strike for improved salaries (as is currently
the case in Michigan). Efficiency is also a major driving force behind the
accountability and testing movements that dominate educational policy
today, as states develop standardized tests to measure student
performance as well as sanctions for schools that fail to demonstrate

progress (Wirt & Kirst, 1997).

Equity: This value, also known as Equality, refers to the redistribution of
resources to meet morally or societally-deﬁned needs within schools.
Operationalized in the “self-evident belief that all men are created equal”
principle set forth in the US. Constitution, and drawing upon Marxist and
Jeffersonian thinking, the Equity value places emphasis on the pursuit of
equalized educational opportunities for all students, regardless of social,
economic, and other barriers (poverty, race/ethnicity, disability status, etc.)
known to work against this goal. It does this mainly by creating programs
that work to provide more equalized access as well as improved outcomes
on the part of marginalized students. Examples of policies that represent
an Equity perspective include school desegregation, compensatory
education programs such as Title I, and initiatives (such as IDEA)
intended to ensure access and improve outcomes for students with '

disabilities. Concerns over equity were the dominant force driving

16

educational policymaking from roughly the 19603 to the 19803, but have
come under increasing attack from a policy standpoint because they are a
matter of redress rather than address (Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt, 1989).
Policymakers cannot decree social equity, so they are relegated to
creating laws and social programs that operate within settings such as
schools, and are intended to relieve the effects of inequity after it is
identiﬁed. The need for governmental action cannot be justiﬁed until some
identiﬁable inequity (such as segregated schools) has been shown to
exist, and by the time a policy intervention is planned, proposed, debated,
modiﬁed, and implemented, the inequity may be so strongly entrenched
that it is difﬁcult, if not impossible, to uproot solely by working through

schools.

Choice: Few, if any, values are more basic to the American experience
than the right of individual consumers to choose products and services
(Smith, 1976; Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt, 1989). Indeed, it was the
“passionate belief” of classical liberalism (best personified by John Locke
and John Stuart Mill), as well as the authors of the Constitution, that good
government was to be deﬁned by its ability to preserve freedom of choice
and a range of options for its citizens; as Thomas Jefferson stated, “That
government governs best which governs least.” As such, it is hardly
surprising that Choice represents a key value that drives educational

decision-making. Within a context of educational policy, Choice consists

l7

of legislated options for parents and guardians with respect to the schools
their children attend. Examples include inter— and intra-district choice
programs, magnet schools, charter schools, and voucher programs. The
key principle behind the choice value is the power of individual consumers
to act in the interests of their children by selecting schools that best ﬁt their
educational needs, however defined (Bast & Wittman, 1991; Chubb 8.
Moe, 1990; Boyd & Wahlberg, 1990; Cookson, 1994; Coons & Sugarrnan,

1978; Fuller & Elmore, 1996; Gewirtz, Ball, & Bowe, 1995).

Historically, the goals of American education have changed in response to shifts
in values, with each of the four instrumental values (either by itself or in
combination with others) acting as the dominant inﬂuence at various points
(Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt, 1989). Quality, along with child labor laws, was the
driving force behind the establishment of compulsory public education in the 19th
century, as societal realization of the importance of an educated citizenry was the
dominant inﬂuence on the policy process. This remained the dominant inﬂuence
until the early part of the 20th century, when Efficiency became a primary conCern
within the context of ﬁnancial difﬁculties associated with the Great Depression, as
well as emerging concern regarding the allocation of public dollars for returns
that were increasingly unclear and difﬁcult to measure. Support for Efficiency, as
Marshall et al 1989) note, tends to increase during difficult ﬁnancial times, when

the demands of schools must be balanced against declining revenues, and when

18

the relationship between school inputs (in the form of tax revenues and

spending) and outputs (student performance) becomes unclear.

Beginning around the 19608, Equity became a dominant influence on the policy
process as a result of concern over the increasingly unequal outcomes produced
by public schools. Landmark studies such as the famed Coleman Report
(Coleman, 1966), which documented the vastly differing educational outcomes

. that existed across lines of race and social class, led to the creation of large
categorical programs at both the federal and state levels. These included
compensatory education (Title I), bilingual and special education, and school
desegregation efforts, that were increasingly rolled back over the past decade

(see Orﬁeld, 1996; Orﬁeld & Yun, 1999).

By the 19805, however, concern had shifted from Equity back to a combination of
Quality and Efﬁciency, as policymakers became increasingly concerned about
the poor performance and rising costs associated with public education. A re-
emphasis on Quality was stimulated by moments of perceived national crisis
such as the Sputnik launch by the Soviet Union in 1957 and the subsequent Cold
War, the Nation at Risk report in 1983, and the emerging concern over dismal
educational outcomes in urban areas in the 1980s and 1990s (Marshall, Mitchell,
& Wirt, 1989). Efﬁciency re-emerged as a preferred value for a variety Of

reasons, including increased attention to issues involving school funding.

19

Around the late 19803, the Choice value became a signiﬁcant inﬂuence upon
educational policy. In a historical sense, Choice is perhaps the oldest of all the
values, as expressed in the principles of the Constitution and Operationalized
through private schools that existed even before the first publicly-funded schools
in the 18703. Stimulated by concern over educational performance as well as
increased privatization in other sectors of government, Choice became a
competing value to the Quality/Efficiency combination in education, with
increased opportunities - highlighted by the charter movement - for parents to

7 select schools becoming a signiﬁcant component of the educational landscape
(Harmer, 1994; Henig, 1994; Kuttner, 1997; McGroarty, 1996; Peterson &

Hassel, 1998; Rasell & Rothstein, 1993; Smrekar & Goldring, 1999).
Policy Elites and Their Role in the Educational Policymaking Process

Within education, as is true for other policy arenas, a selected set of individuals
known as “policy elites” inﬂuence and make decisions about which values are
reﬂected in policy (Hertz & lmber, 1995; Kingdon, 1995; Moyser & Wagstaffe,
1987; Scott, 1990; Wirt, Mitchell, & Marshall, 1985). These are “the primary
participants in the policy process” (Kingdon, 1995), or, as Lasswell (cited in
Hunter [1995]) succinctly puts it, “those who have more of whatever scarce
values there are in a society.” Elites are actors who, through various

combinations of their political power, words, actions, and contribution of

20

resources (including time and money), advocate for and in some cases vote on

particular policies or combinations of policies.

The Signiﬁcance of Policy Elites at the State Level

In contrast to other areas of policymaking, in which the nexus of power lies either
at the federal or the local level, the most signiﬁcant jurisdiction for the formation
of educational policies is the state. As Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt (1989:2)
succinctly note, “...we study the states because that is where education is
anchored and thrives.” This arrangement is a product of the US. Constitution,
whose authors sought to avoid the establishment of a European-style centralized
monarchy that ruled with absolute power and blended religious functions with

those of government (Lowi & Ginsberg, 1992; Skidmore & Tripp, 1985).

The fact that the Constitution delegates primary responsibility for educational
policy to the states does not mean that the federal and local levels are
insignificant, for each plays a key role, albeit in different ways. Regarding the
federal role, involvement from Washington has become increasingly signiﬁcant,
in the form of programs and mandates developed by the President, Congress,

and the US. Department of Education and its predecessors (Hill. 2000).2 The

 

2 Hill (2000) notes that the involvement of the federal government in education was minimal until the
middle part of the 20th century, with no cabinet-level Department of Education in existence until 1979 and
elected ofﬁcials in Washington largely content to let states and local school districts govern their own
affairs. An Office of Education at the federal level had existed since 1867, but its originally-intended
function of collecting basic statistics — without any substantial role in terms of leadership and setting
educational policy priorities - changed little until the 19503. The Ofﬁce of Education, in fact, had a number
of oddly-situated “homes” within the federal bureaucracy following its formation in 1867; it was originally

21

most recent manifestation of the expanding federal role in education, following
more than a half century of initiatives that included desegregation, Title I funding
for disadvantaged schools and students, and the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, is President George W. Bush’s “No Child Left Behind” legislation,
which mandates increased student testing and involves a series of sanctions for

low-performing schools (Paige, 2002; Robelen, 2002).

At a local level, elected boards of education in the nearly 15,000 local school
districts nationwide, including 554 in Michigan, also play a key role in shaping
educational policy. On the one hand, control over public schools has become
much more consolidated at the state and federal levels over the past half-
century, as witnessed by a steady decline in the number of local school districts
from nearly 120,000 in 1937 to fewer than 15,000 today (Public Purpose, 2002;
US. Department of Education, 2002). On the other hand, the notion of local
control has a long and cherished history within American education, and the local
school district is the entity through which this principle has been Operationalized
since the establishment of public schools (Katznelson & Weir, 1985; Tyack,
1974; Tyack & Cuban, 1988). States typically delegate much of their
constitutionally-granted power to run schools down to the local level, with specific

functions entrusted to local boards of education including the choosing of a

 

housed within the Department of the Interior, was transferred to the Federal Security Agency in 1939, and
then to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1953 (Campbell et al, 1985). The US.
Department of Education was established in 1979 and has existed as such since that time, although Ronald
Reagan sought to abolish it shortly after taking ofﬁce in 1980 and various other politicians have also
proposed its elimination.

22

superintendent (who in turn chooses building-level administrators), determining a

budget, and overseeing the curriculum (Campbell et al, 1985).

Policy Elite “Clusters”

Returning to the state level, a large number of policy elites are involved in
influencing and formulating educational policy. Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt (1989)
have researched the varying levels of involvement on the part of these various
actors extensively in six states, measuring the relative inﬂuence that each
individual and group exerts upon the educational policy process. They divide
state-level policy elites into five groupings, or “clusters,” in accordance with the
amount of influence they wield (see Appendix A). The most inﬂuential group of
state-level policy elites within education, or the “insiders,” according to Marshall
and colleagues, includes individual members of the legislature and legislatures
as a whole. Legislators, both individually and collectively, wield the greatest
influence due to their exclusive voting power over education-related legislation
and state budgets, with members of education-related committees standing out
as particularly influential. In their role as the branch of government primarily
responsible for making laws, legislators act as “gatekeepers” for policy initiatives,
deciding on an individual and collective basis whether any particular legislative
proposal passes into law or dies beforehand (Kingdon, 1995). Rosenthal (in Van
Horn, 1989:69), somewhat more colorfully, describes legislatures as “...probably

the principal political institutions in the states — the guts of democracy.” Lowi &

23

Ginsberg (1992) argue that most of the functions that occupy the greatest
importance in the day-to-day lives of the average citizen, including education, are
determined at the state level, and Dvorin & Misner (1971) add that comparatively
speaking, state legislatures exerts far more power over the counties and
municipalities that comprise its constituency than the US. Congress does over

the ﬁfty states that represent its membership.

Ranking just behind the “Insiders” in terms of influence is a Cluster known as the
“Near Circle.” It includes the Chief State School Ofﬁcer (CSSO), who is known in
Michigan and many states as the superintendent. The duties of this position are
threefold: to serve as the executive ofﬁcer of the state board of education, to
serve as the administrative head of the state department of education, and to act
as the chief administrative Ofﬁcer for the state in executing the laws, rules, and
regulations pertaining to educational policy in accordance with the state

constitution and laws (Council of the Chief State School Officers, 1983).

Education interest groups (combined) comprise a second group located within
the “Near Circle.” Marshall and colleagues found teachers’ organizations, and
teachers’ unions in particular, to be extremely influential within this second tier.
In Michigan, the dominant teachers’ organization is the Michigan Education
Association (MEA), which is the state-level afﬁliate of the National Education
Association (NEA). Of particular signiﬁcance for this research on relationships

between the values of policy elites and their Views on charter schools is that

24

teachers’ organizations have, as a general rule, been very skeptical about, if not

outright hostile to, the charter experiment.

The governor and his/her executive staff comprise another subcategory within
the “Near Circle.” Through their power to introduce, advocate for and against,
and veto legislation, as well as formulating state budgets, the influence of the
governor and top advisors is substantial. Marshall and colleagues rank
governors below other actors such as legislators, however, because budget
constraints and pressure from interest groups have forced governors into a
largely reactive, rather than proactive, role in terms of formulating educational
policy. The twelve-year reign of former Michigan Gov. John Engler, which
concluded in 2002, offers an excellent example of both the influence that a
governor can wield over educational and charter school policy as well as the
limitations they face. Engler’s tenure witnessed sweeping changes to Michigan’s
system for financing schools, including a provision that essentially enabled the
Charter movement by making school funding “portable,” not to mention the
passage of charter legislation and dramatic expansion of the movement. At the
same time, growth in the state’s charter schools was essentially frozen for the
last three years of Engler’s tenure, and he was unable to engineer an increase
despite numerous attempts. Engler was an avid supporter of charters, but his
Democratic successor, Jennifer Granholm, has thus far been more measured

and cautious in her support.

25

The “Far Circle” and “Sometimes Players” are the final two stakeholder groups.
The state board of education, which in Michigan is comprised of eight members
elected statewide, is the lone entity situated in the “Far Circle” of influence. The
Michigan state board oversees important educational functions in additiOn to K-
12 schools, including the formation of charter school policy. It has no direct
capacity as an elected body to pass legislation or authorize money for
educational purposes, as these remain the exclusive responsibility of the state
legislature and the governor (Council of the Chief State School Ofﬁcers, 1983).
The “Sometimes Players” group includes associations of leaders and
professionals within education, including those that represent school board
members and administrators. As is the case for the state board of education, the
ability of “Sometimes Players” to directly impact policy may not match that of
statelegislators or the governor, but their influence is signiﬁcant nonetheless in
that they represent key constituencies who respond to, and in some cases

create, charter schools.

An interesting omission from the cluster schematic developed by Marshall and
colleagues is business interests. Presumably, this is because their study
concluded that business and trade associations exerted comparatively little
influence upon educational policy at the time of their work in the mid-19803. A
convincing argument can be made that this situation no longer holds true, and

that business interests have become signiﬁcant players within educational policy.

26

This work reﬂects such a viewpoint, as a variety of business-related associations

are included in the sample of Michigan policy elites.

Research on Values in Education: Marshall, Mitchell, 8. Wirt (1989)

Instrumental values, and the extent to which they inﬂuence policy elites, have
been the topic of several notable studies. To investigate the ways in which
cultural values become manifested within the arena of educational policymaking,
and more speciﬁcally to test the question of “which values prevail?” in the policy
process, Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt (1989) surveyed and later interviewed 140 key
policymakers from six different states (Arizona, California, Illinois, Pennsylvania,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin) in the mid-19803. Elites included legislators, chief
state school officers, education advisors to governors, and high-ranking ofﬁcials
within educational interest groups such as teachers’ unions and school
administrators’ associations. The researchers’ objective was to measure the
extent to which each of the four values acted as an influence upon policymakers’

positions on three common topics, or “policy domains,” within education:

- Finance: control over how educational funds are distributed to schools
- Program deﬁnition: specifying what schools teach and how long they must
do so

- Organization/govemance: decisions regarding authority and responsibility

27

In the analyses performed by Marshall and colleagues, policy elites completed an
18-item survey instrument that used forced-choice, paired comparisons (see
Appendix D). Each of the four inStrumental values was represented by different
statements (one for each “policy domain” listed above) signifying ways in which
the value might be Operationalized through policy actions (e.g., the Equity value
is represented by the following three statements: “greater equalization of
resources” for the Finance domain, “broader participation in decision-making” for
the Organization/Governance domain, and “giving more attention to children with
special needs” for the Program Deﬁnition domain). Respondents were asked to
rate the importance of the four values, using the three statements that
represented each value, in a paired comparison format with statements
representing one of the other instrumental values. Each statement, as Marshall
at al. note (p.92), “was phrased in such a way as to reﬂect the application of one
of the core values to a particular school program or policy issue.” It is important
to note, however, that respondents in the Marshall study were not made aware
that the statements they were asked to compare were being used to represent
‘the four instrumental values and the three domains, and were not given an
opportunity to suggest statements that they felt more accurately represented the

values and domains.
At a broad level, the most significant finding emerging from the Marshall study

was that variations in the policymaking preferences and actions of policy elites

were correlated with their divergent views on the four instrumental values. More

28

speciﬁcally, Marshall and colleagues found that the Quality value was ranked the
highest across all three domains (Finance, Program Deﬁnition, and
Organization/Governance), using Mean Item Scores,3 as shown in the “Sum of
Mean Scores” statistic shown in Table 1 below. The authors conclude that

“. . .this value [Quality] was widely held and was generally recognized as a critical
concern in current educational policy debates” (Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt,
1989293). They also note that “...Quality is the dominant concern of state policy
leaders in the 19803,” and there exists “a clear cultural norm...[that identiﬁes]
Quality as the dominant value perspective” (p.95). Findings were equally clear in
terms of the lowest value priorities for policy elites as a group, as the rank order
of the four instrumental values was identical within the ﬁnance and
organization/governance domains: Choice ranked “a distant last.” Within the

program deﬁnition domain, Choice ranked third, ahead of only Efﬁciency.

 

3 Higher numerical scores (as shown in the “Sum of Mean Scores” and “Average of Mean Scores” columns
in Table 1) indicate greater inﬂuence of an instrumental value upon policymakers’ views; lower scores
indicate less inﬂuence. Mean item scores were calculated by assigning values to each pair of value choices,
with responses scored as +1 when the respondent’s choice was closest to the center of the six-point scale,
+2 when the choice was one space further out from the center, and +3 when furthest out (see Appendix D).
Thus, the highest possible score for any value in a single paired comparison used by Marshall and
colleagues was +3 (and the lowest score is -—3). Since each value is represented by three different
statements, each of which could receive a score as high as +3 from the paired comparison questions, the
highest possible score any value could receive from a Single respondent is +9, if the value were to be
ranked by that respondent as “much more important” than each of the other three values. Conversely, a
value could receive a score as low as —9 from a single respondent, if each value statement opposing it in the
paired comparison questions were chosen as “much more important.” Additional discussion of how mean
item scores are calculated and used appears in the Sources of Data/Methodology section below.

29

Table 1: Value Preferences of Policy Elites

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Policy Domain and Mean Score for All Sum of
Respondents, by Value and Domain: Mean
Scores
Program Finance Organization]
Governance
Value:
. Making programs Improving the More efficient
. more cost- use of school
EfﬁCIency effective education tax management '0'28
(-2.01) dollars (0.82) (0.91)
Giving more Greater Broader
attention to equalization of participation in
Equity children with resources decision-making -0.68
special needs (0.08) (-1.12)
(0.36)
Setting higher Increasing the Developing
academic level of quality-
Quality standards (2.71) funding for conscious 8.85
schools (2.63) leadership
(3.51)
Increasing Reducing Providing more
program flexibility restrictions on choices for
Choice (-1.07) local families and -7.89
expenditures children
(-3.53) (-3.29)

 

Source: Marshall,

Mitchell, & Wirt (1989:93-95).

In assessing the low priority given to the Choice value by policymakers, the

authors note (p.94) that “...It was surprising to find so little priority given to

approaches that would enhance the Choice value...We found consistently

negative scores for all three Choice items.” In interviews that followed the written

survey, state policy elites did not actually oppose the expansion of the Choice

perspective, but rather gave clear priority to the other three values when asked to

make choices between competing values or to rank-order their preferences. An

30

 

emphasis on the Quality value, in particular, appeared to come at the expense of
‘ Choice; the authors interpreted this (p.94) to “expanded choice [being seen] as
competing with such direct approaches to quality improvement as setting higher
academic standards, increasing school funding, and developing quality-
conscious leadership.” In essence, Choice and Quality were Viewed as mutually
exclusive values, and when given a choice between the two, policy elites
expressed a clear preference for pursuing Quality in the legislation and policy

actions they advocated for.

Signiﬁcantly, however, Marshall and colleagues did ﬁnd some state-by-state
variation with respect to policy elites’ preferences for the four instrumental values
in the six states they studied. Among the most signiﬁcant was that while the
Choice value was “...rejected in all states...the rejection in Arizona and California
was much less pronounced” than in other states within the sample. They
interpret this state-by-state variation as a product of differences in “state political
culture” (Elazar, 1984). Interestingly, the level of charter school activity in
Arizona and California is among the highest in the nation, with Arizona having by
far the largest number of charters as of this writing. Arizona is also the setting for
research by Garn (2000; see discussion below), who found Choice (along with

Efficiency) to be the preferred value among that state’s educational policy elites.

31

The Charter School Movement

In the span just over a decade, the public charter movement has emerged as
perhaps the most signiﬁcant attempt to reform public education since
desegregation. Emerging from a long history of free market principles within
American society such as deregulation (see, for example, Smith, 1976;
Friedman, 1962; Chubb & Moe, 1990; Hirschman, 1971; Witte, 2001), the charter
movement has become a particularly salient issue in and around major urban
areas, where a disproportionate number of charters have located, and in certain
states (including Michigan) where a series of policy decisions inﬂuenced by

policy elites has resulted in high levels of charter school activity.

Key Characteristics and Intended Outcomes of Charter Schools

Charter schools are publicly-funded educational institutions that operate
autonomously from the traditional public school districts in which they are located
(Budde, 1989; Nathan, 1996a, 1996b, 19960; Finn, Manno, & Vanourek, 2000;
Wells, 1998; Kolderie, 1990, 1998; Bulkley & Fisler, 2002). While “charter
schools” is the general name for this new type of public school, they go by
various other names in some states; in Michigan, they are ofﬁcially known as
”public school academies” (Arsen, Plank, & Sykes, 1999). Charter schools can
be established by a variety of persons and organizations, depending on the
legislation in the state in which they are located, including individuals, groups of

teachers, and in some cases school districts and universities. Their “charter,”

32

which is a contract for operation that states the school’s intended purpose,
mission, and desired outcomes, is issued (again, depending on the speciﬁc
provisions of state legislation) by state boards of education, universities, school
districts, and other public entities (Bulkley, 2001; Center for Education Reform,

2003; Moe, 1980, 2001; Peterson & Campbell, 2001; Vergari & Mintrom, 1996).

Charter legislation in many states is speciﬁcally intended to free these new
schools from many of the policies and regulations that apply to traditional public
schools, perhaps most notably those that pertain to specified attendance zones
for students, a speciﬁed curriculum, and having teachers who are employed by.
local school districts (Bomotti, Ginsberg, & Cobb, 1999; Peterson & Hassel,
1998). Among the features of the charter movement that have resulted from
these policies include schools that are small in size and often have a :speciﬁc
academic and/or cultural focus such as performing arts, science and technology,
or a racial/cultural focus such as Afrocentrism (Horn & Miron, 1999; RPP

International, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001).

Charters are issued for schools to operate any combination of grades K-12 for a
predetermined period of time (a maximum of 10 years in Michigan, for example),
with the chartering agency responsible for monitoring the school’s progress
toward the goals set forth in its charter a minimum of every seven years (Center
for Education Reform, 2003). Funding for charters generally flows from the state

to the school in accordance with per-pupil levels established by the state,

33

although in some cases funds must ﬁrst pass through the local school districts in
which charters are located. Charter schools are largely responsible for their own
facilities and teachers, with states generally providing limited, if any, start-up
funding, although some start-up assistance is made available from the federal

government (see, for example, US. Department of Education, 2001). ~

Teachers in charter schools may or may not be members of unions, depending
upon state-speciﬁc policies. Perhaps most importantly, parents must apply for
their child to attend charter schools, with basic nondiscrimination policies
(pertaining to race/ethnicity, religion, disability status, and academic ability)
governing the selection Of students, and parents are ostensibly free to move their
children to other schools if dissatisfied. Charter schools fall into one of two
categories: new and conversion. New charters are those that have not existed
previously as another school, while conversions are those that were formerly

private or traditional public schools (SRI International, 1997, 2000).

Advocates of the charter concept envisioned at least six major outcomes from

these new schools (Bulkley & Fisler, 2002):

. Availability of New Choices in Public K-12 Education: Perhaps the
most important goal of the charter movement is to provide parents and
students witha publicly-funded and non-selective alternative to traditional

public schools; this was proclaimed to be of particular importance to

34

educational consumers for whom options were largely Closed off by
economic constraints (e.g., the inability to afford private schools or move
to more desirable public schools).

Increased Autonomy: Founders of charter ostensibly receive the
freedom to design and run schools as they see fit (within certain
guidelines), ideally experimenting with different forms of curriculum,
instruction, and governance. This vision differs substantially from
traditional public schools, which are more constrained by policies and
regulations at the federal, state, and local levels.

Innovation: Charters were envisioned as “laboratories of experimentation”
in which innovation in the areas of curriculum and instruction, school
governance, and policies related to teachers would constantly be tested.
Greater Accountability: With no charter school guaranteed a‘“captive”
student population, charter advocates proclaimed that these new schools
would be unable to take their student populations for granted, and would
instead be forced to continually improve their “product” in order to retain
their base of consumers.

Improved Student Achievement and Consumer Satisfaction: The
result of autonomy, innovation, and accountability is to be higher levels of
student achievement, greater satisfaction on the part of students, parents,

and teachers.

35

0 Systemic Improvement: Charters were envisioned as disseminating
information on new and promising practices, as well as forcing traditional

public schools to improve by making them compete for students.
A Historical Context for the Rise of Charters and Choice

Given the fact that the intellectual origins of the charter and choice concept have
existed for many years, how can the sudden emergence of the charter movement
in the early 19903 be explained? Four events and patterns seem particularly

salient in retrospect:

- The publication, beginning with the famed Coleman Report (see Coleman,
1966) and continuing through the 19803 and 903, Of a series of reports
that drew attention to the woes of public education, thereby creating a
“problem” that charters and choice were a “solution” to; perhaps the most
famous of these was the “rising tide of mediocrity” forewarned in the
landmark A Nation at Risk report (US. Department of Education, 1983;
see also Bloom, 1987; Bunzel, 1985; Berliner & Biddle, 1995);

- The rise of conservative leadership at the federal and state levels that was
unabashedly receptive to the solution of market-based forces and the
charter concept (see Ballatti, 2001; House, 1998; Winerip, 1998; Ascher,

Fruchter, 8. Berne, 1996; Molnar, 1994, 1996);

36

- Increasingly negative and cynical views of nearly a half-century’s worth of
government-initiated attempts to reform public education (see Ravitch,
2001; Anthony & Jacobson, 1992; Finn & Rebarber, 1992; Fullan, 1991;
Hodgson, 1973; Jencks, 1972);

- A changing politics of race associated with school reform efforts, in which
minority advocacy groups, along with urban policymakers and many of
their constituents, became more willing to set aside traditional political
differences with conservatives in embracing charters and choice (Olson,

2002; Schnaiberg, 2000; Wilgoren, 2000; Shokraii, 1996; Lacayo, 1996).

The Growth and Present Status of the Charter Movement

Since the opening of the nation’s first charter school, the City Academy, in St.
Paul, MN, in 1992, the charter movement has expanded rapidly. California
passed the nation’s second charter school law in 1992, followed by Michigan4
and five other states in 1993, and a host of additional states in subsequent years
(Center for Education Reform, 2003). As of this writing, 39 states and the District
of Columbia have passed legislation authorizing charters, with schools actually in
operation in 36 states in addition to Washington, DC. An estimated 2,700
Charters were in operation at the beginning of the (2002-03) academic year,

enrolling more than 575,000 students nationwide. Arizona had chartered the

 

4 Michigan’s original charter school law, in late 1993, was replaced in early 1994 by legislation that was
declared unconstitutional. In December of 1994, the state legislature passed a replacement bill that
withstood legal challenges by giving the state a greater oversight role (Vergari & Mintrom, 1996). Several
modifications to the original legislation have been passed in the years since.

37

most schools as of the fall of 2002, with an estimated5 468, followed by California
with 452, Texas with 228, Florida with 232, and Michigan with 191.6 California’s
charters enrolled an estimated 129,163 students in 2001-02, followed by

Arizona’s 78,517 and Michigan’s 55,526 (Center for Education Reform, 2003).

In Michigan, the expansion of charters has proceeded at a pace matched by few
states. Aided by legislation and legislators considered “charter-friendly,” the
number of charters in Michigan grew rapidly (Mintrom, 2000; Michigan
Association of Public School Academies, 2000, 2001; Michigan Center for
Charter Schools, 1994). The state’s 55,000+ charter students7 were more than
3.1% of the state’s total K-12 school enrollment in 2000-01, a share exceeded
only by the District of Columbia and Arizona (Center for Education Reform,

2003)

The Signiﬁcance of Charter Schools as an Urban Reform Strategy

Above and beyond their signiﬁcance as a school reform strategy. my interest in

the charter movement is rooted in their distinctly urban flavor and the extent to

 

5 The Center for Education Reform, which is the most up-to-date source of information on the charter
movement, notes on its website that estimates of the number of charters actually in operation and students
enrolled in these schools may vary by as much as 10%, given the ﬂuid nature of charter openings and
student movement.

6 Michigan had 200 charters authorized to be in operation for the fall of 2001 (Michigan Department of
Education, 2001a; Michigan Education Association, 2001), although only 191 were veriﬁed as actually in
operation; several have closed, while others experienced delays opening their doors due to logistical
difﬁculties.

7 As is true for records that show numbers of charter schools in existence at any given time, counts of
charter school students vary by source. While the Center for Education Reform lists 55,526 as the number

38

which they have been proclaimed as an answer to the persistent problem of
urban education. For more than three decades, the poor performance of
students in urban schools -— who have come to be increasingly poor and non-
white — has been the subject of considerable angst and competing “solutions”
(Brown, 1997; Jencks & Peterson, 1991). Charter schools, and the market
forces they are based upon, represent the latest in a series of efforts to reform
urban schools that has, at various times, emphasized each of the four
instrumental values in educational policy: Equity during the 19603, Efﬁciency

during the 19803, and Quality and Choice during the 19903 and into the present.

Data from the National Study of Charter Schools conﬁrm the decidedly urban
natUre of the charter movement. They show that non-white students comprised
more than half (52%) of the total charter school enrollment in the 27 states with
charters in operation in 1997-98, compared to 41% non-white enrollment for all
public schools in these same states (RPP International, 2000). In states such as
Michigan with large numbers of Charters, furthermore, minority students are
substantially overrepresented in comparison with their enrollment in all public
schools. In contrast to early fears that charters would seek to emulate some
private (and selective public) institutions by catering to an affluent, high-
achieving, and predominantly white clientele, then, charters have in many cases
~ done just the opposite in attracting their greatest support from disadvantaged and

non-white constituencies concentrated in urban areas.

\

0f charter students in Michigan, the Michigan Education Association (2001) counts a somewhat higher
ﬁgure of 57,436.

39

Research on Values within a Charter School Context: Garn (2000)

The work of Garn (2000) re-tests the ﬁndings of Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt within a
speciﬁc context of charter school policy in Arizona, thus providing an ideal
framework and point of comparison for this study. His ﬁndings both conﬁrm the
importance of the four instrumental values as influences upon educational policy
elites egg develop a set of new conclusions related to the role of these values in
shaping the policy process. Using interviews with Arizona policy elites (including
board members and administrators from the two Arizona agencies that sponsor
charter schools, individuals from the Arizona Department of Education, and
legislators from both houses of the legislature), Garn attempted to answer the

following key questions:

- What values were allocated8 during the development of charter school
legislation?
- How were these values reflected in statute and through the working

program?

Three major ﬁndings from Garn’s work are particularly salient for this study. The
ﬁrst is that in contrast to Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt’s ﬁndings, in which Quality
ranked ﬁrst and Choice ranked last among the instrumental values in the minds

of policy elites, Garn found Choice to be one of two “favored values” in Arizona

40

that help explain the passage of that state's charter law and the expansion of the
movement since that time. He found “surprising uniformity" among policy elites
in Arizona with respect to value preferences, with the Choice and Efﬁciency
values ranking most highly. The Choice value permeated the legislative
proceedings and public relations campaign that led up to the passage of
Arizona’s charter law in 1994, and is “explicitly expressed” in the language of the
statute itself by providing parents with an expanded range of options within the
public school system that had not existed previously. Policy elites from all
subgroups that Garn investigated — including the state board of education,
department of education, and state legislature alike - expressed clear and
unconditional support for the Choice value, and used this support to advocate for
passage of the charter law itself as well as the subsequent expansion of the

movement.

Concurrently, Garn found that the Efﬁciency value was reflected explicitly in the
proceedings and results of the charter school legislative process. This was
illustrated by policy elites’ perceptions that vast amounts of money were spent on
public schools with little or nothing to show for it (reflecting the economic
dimension of the Efficiency value), as well as the belief that charter schools
represented the best means of restoring accountability that had been lost to large
and unresponsive public school bureaucracies (reﬂecting the accountability

dimension of Efﬁciency). Policy elites from all subgroups that Garn investigated

K

8 This term is one used by Garn (2000) rather than being my own interpretation of his work. My
understanding of how he uses this term is to refer to the ways in which different values were used and

41

were clear in their support for Efficiency, as they wrote into law specific

provisions that reflected both its economic and accountability dimensions.

Quality and Equity, in contrast, were characterized by Garn as “forgotten values”
in terms of influence on Arizona policy elites and the state's charter policies.
Despite proclamations proponents that charters were created to create
opportunities for educational excellence, Garn notes that this purported support
for the Quality value is clearly usurped by Choice and Efficiency, in that no
minimum standards for this “excellence" are spelled out by Arizona law. Instead,
parents with children enrolled in charters, and not government, are empowered

with the authority to judge whether Quality and Equity are being upheld.

Garn attributes the differences between his own ﬁndings and those of Marshall
and colleagues on which values are held in the highest regard by policy elites to
several factors. The most important, he notes, is the relatively stable political
culture that characterized the single state in his analysis (Arizona), which stands
in contrast to the varying levels of political stability that were present across the
six-state sample used by Marshall et al. Arizona during the time of Garn’s
analysis was dominated by a strongly conservative and traditionalistic
policymaking context, with Republican dominance of the legislature and
governor’s ofﬁce for the better part of three decades (Elazar, 1984). This is
signiﬁcant, he argues, in that a conservative and traditionalistic philosophy is

more likely to support Choice and Efficiency (both of which advocate less

 

distributed across Arizona policy elites with respect to political affiliation, etc.

42

governmental involvement) than Quality and Equity (which typically involve a
greater role for government in the form of more programs, redirection of
resources, and monitoring). Garn also attributes differences between his own
findings and those of the Marshall study to timing, in that an increasingly
conservative political environment characterized much of the US. during his own
work in the 1990s, as opposed to a more balanced political situation during the

Marshall study across a six-state sample during the 19803.

A second major finding of importance from Garn’s work is that previous
assumptions regarding the relationships among the four instrumental values may '
be incorrect. More specifically, he challenges the contention of Marshall,

Mitchell, & Wirt (1989), as well as the related work of Guthrie, Garrns, & Pierce
(1988), that certain values either reinforce or are fundamentally in opposition to
one another as influences upon policy elites' views within the educational policy
process. Marshall and colleagues argued, for example, that the Choice and
Efﬁciency values are opposed to one another, and in fact make the case that
Choice is opposed to all three of the other values. Efﬁciency, by contrast,
reinforces both Quality and Equity (but opposes Choice), while Equity reinforces

Efﬁciency (but is opposed to both Quality and Choice).

Garn’s ﬁndings, however, challenge at least part of this interpretation in that he

found Arizona policy elites to be supportive of both Choice and Efﬁciency at the

same time. He attributes this to the two-dimensional nature of Efﬁciency: while

43

Choice is indeed opposed to the accountability dimension of Efﬁciency (in the
sense that the state establishing a “one best system" set of regulations would
leave little room for the exercise of choice), it is not at all opposed to the
economic dimension of Efficiency (in that providing parents with choices among
public schools will, at least in theory, require the schools to become more cost-
effective). Arizona policy elites that Garn interviewed did not view Choice and
Efﬁciency as mutually exclusive at all; to the contrary, they asserted (often by
citing the U.S. automobile industry) that Choice stimulates Efﬁciency by forcing

producers of goods and services to offer a better product.

A third major ﬁnding from Garn’s work was that differences among policy elites
with respect to favored values in general, and charter school policy in particular,
were closely related to political party afﬁliation, with Democrats (who were a
numerical minority in Arizona) advocating for Equity and Quality while opposing
charter policy, and Republicans pushing a mostly pro-Choice and pro-Efﬁciency
agenda highlighted by charters. Democrats, Garn notes, made repeated
attempts to inject Equity and Quality-driven provisions into Arizona’s charter
school legislative process, which were quickly denounced by Republicans as
attempts to defeat the intent of the legislation. Democratic efforts to make this
type of modification failed, and Garn concludes that the law retained a strong

reflection of the Choice and Efficiency values.

44

Speciﬁc Hypotheses Tested

Five hypotheses this research was intended to test included the following:

1.

The Choice value will have the highest mean score of all the four
instrumental values in the minds of policy elites, followed (in order) by
Efﬁciency, Quality, and Equity, with this pattem being largely consistent
across each of the three domains (Program, Finance, and
Organization/Governance). This will hold true for each of the three

different ways that elites' preferences will be measured:

a. Paired statements representing the four values, as used by
Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt (Question 7 on the survey instrument; see
Appendix B). For example, the total score for the Choice value as
calculated by the nine statements representing this value (three
each in Program, Finance, and Organization/Governance, as
shown in Appendix F) will be higher than for the nine statements
representing the other three instrumental values;

b. Preferences for each value against all others (Question 8); in other
words, Choice will be chosen more often than the other three

values in the-forced-choice format used in Question 8;

45

c. Rank-ordering of the four values as a group (Question 9); in other
words, Choice will have the lowest rank-ordering value, signifying

that it is the most preferred of the four instrumental values.

To the extent these hypotheses were supported by the data, they would
more closely resemble those of Garn than those of Marshall, Mitchell, &
Wirt, in that the Choice value has become so powerful, and so
fundamental to other sectors of American life, that it enjoys widespread
support among Michigan policy elites and has become difﬁcult to refute.
In this schematic, Quality and Equity are likely to emerge as the least
important, or largely forgotten, values, although some policy elites are

likely to continue advocating for them.

. At least some differences with respect to preferred values are likely to
emerge both across and within the different “clusters” of policy elites
postulated by Marshall at al and the ﬁve subgroups of respondents in this
research. For example, the “Near Circle” of elites was expected to be less
supportive of the Choice value than the “Insiders” cluster of legislators,
since the “Near Circle” includes teachers’ organizations such as the
Michigan Education Association and should show the lowest level of
support for Choice. To the extent that those within the “Near Circle”
expressed support for Choice, furthermore, it was expected to be

conditional, spelling out specific circumstances under which Choice could

46

be supported that were highly objectionable to the most devoted
supporters of charter schools and school choice.9 It was also expected,
however, that within each cluster would appear at least some variation;
among the eight-member State Board of Education within the “Far Circle"
cluster, for example, differences of opinion were predicted to emerge,

perhaps along partisan lines.

The value preferences of policy elites, both individually and as a group,
are likely to show that some value pairs -— in particular, Choice and
Efﬁciency - reinforce each other in that they are supported simultaneously
(e. g., I should ﬁnd positive correlations emerging from policy elites’ ratings
of these values), while other pairs — such as Choice and Equity - oppose
one another (e. g.,I should ﬁnd negative correlations). Marshall and
colleagues, for example, argued that Choice and Efficiency oppose one
another, while Garn’s work in Arizona found that these two values
reinforce each other. The expectation was that Michigan elites would
(among other possible value pairings) support Choice and Efficiency

simultaneously, with Choice and Equity emerging as an opposing pair.

 

9 I expected that these conditions and caveats would best be measured by open-ended questions such as #6
and #17 on the survey instrument (see Appendix B). What I predicted would emerge from these questions
is that policy elites from “educational establishment” organizations such as the Michigan Education
Association and the Michigan Association of School Boards would indicate general support for school
choice and charter schools, but would couch this support around a set of conditions they deem necessary.
The MBA, for example, has developed a list of nine criteria (see http://www.mea.org//design.cfm?p=505) it
believes are necessary “. . .to provide a high quality education while meeting the diverse needs of students.”
Supporters of charter schools have argued that these criteria are the equivalent of the oversight and
regulation that the charter movement Was designed to offer an alternative to.

47

4. The overall construct validity of using three distinct measures of value
preference will be veriﬁed by statistical analyses showing that respondents
who prefer certain values over others along one measure of preference
(for example, the paired statements format used in Question 7) will prefer
these same values using other measures of preference (the direct
comparison format in Question 8 and the rank-ordering format in Question
9). This research builds upon the work of Marshall and colleagues and
Garn in that it measures the value preferences of Michigan policy elites
using three different methods rather than just one. If the overall construct
of using these three measures is valid, the value preferences of policy

elites should not show substantial variation across measures.

5. Preferences for values on the part of policy elites will be unevenly
distributed in accordance with variables such as political party affiliation
and the race/ethnicity and geography of elites. Legislators and members
of the State Board of Education, for example, were seen as likely to be
split along partisan lines, with Republicans tending to favor Choice and
perhaps Efﬁciency and Democrats more inclined than Republicans to
support Equity. I also predicted, however, that Choice has become
sufficiently entrenched as an affirming cultural value that those who
identify as Democrats - and particularly Democrats from urban areas of

the state such as Detroit - were unlikely to reject it completely. In a similar

48

manner, non-white policy elites were predicted to show greater support for

Equity, although again not at the complete expense of Choice.

Sources of Data and Methodology

The primary source of data for this study is a survey of key informants, or “policy
elites” (Hertz 8 lmber, 1995; Kingdon, 1995; Moyser & Wagstaffe, 1987; Scott,
1990; Wirt, Mitchell, & Marshall, 1985) who have participated in the formation of
charter school policy in Michigan. A copy of the survey instrument appears as
Appendix B. Policy elites from six groups (described below) comprise the target
population because they represent the major and relevant “clusters” of elites
identified by Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt (1989) as having the greatest inﬂuence
within educational policy. This is the same population utilized in studies by
Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt (1989) and Garn (2000), although the target p0pulation
of Michigan policy elites involved in this study is larger. Whereas Marshall and
colleagues and Garn both used samples of 20-25 respondents in the states they
selected,10 the sample in this study consists of approximately 175 policy elites in

Michigan.

Justiﬁcation for a sample of this size is that it expands the Marshall and Garn
studies by involving key policy elites that were not included in the previous

studies. These include a broader range of interest groups (such as those

R

'0 Marshall et al used a sample of approximately 140 respondents spread across the six states they studied,
for an average of some 23 respondents per state.

49

representing business interests) that have had substantial involvement and input
into educational policy, as well as new groups of actors not studied by Marshall
and colleagues, such as Michigan charter school authorizers. This larger sample
size is also based upon logistical considerations related to data collection
methods. Whereas Marshall at al and Garn had both the time and resources to
conduct in-depth, face-to-face interviews to complement their surveys of policy
elites, the survey data for this study were collected by email or regular mail,
complemented by telephone interviews with selected policy elites. In this way, a
valuable contribution to the knowledge base is made by including a larger and

more diverse sample of informants than has been used in prior research.

The sample of informants comes from six primary groups of policy elites
identified by Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt (1989) and Garn (2000) as important

players in policy processes related to education in general and charter schools:

1) Current'and former elected legislators from the Michigan Senate and
House of Representatives: specific legislators of interests include formal
leadership positions in both chambers, members of the Legislative Black
Caucus, and legislators who introduced or cast key votes on charter-
related bills from the 2003 legislative session.

2) Education—related subgroups within state government: also of interest are
other agencies and units of state government having key input into, and

oversight of, educational and charter school matters. Included here are

50

3)

4)

5)

actors such as the Lieutenant Governor, the Michigan State Board of
Education, and key administrators from the state Department of Education
who oversee programs related to charter schools and school choice.
Education—related interest groups and professional associations: leaders
from educational interest groups that have participated in the charter
process are another group of respondents. These organizations represent
constituencies that include associations of charter and private schools,
school administrators (principals, school boards, business ofﬁcers, etc.),
teachers, higher education, and students with disabilities; also included
are private, for-proﬁt companies known as educational management
organizations (EMOs) that manage many charter schools in Michigan.
Business, advocacy, and civic organizations: these actors, who have
taken on an increasingly important role in formulating and influencing
educational policy, are also of interest to this work. One subset consists
of organizations representing business interests or organized labor; a
second includes civic associations and coalitions of governmental entities;
and a third consists of advocacy organizations that have been actively
involved in school-related policymaking.

Charter school authorizers: administrators from the four types of public
agencies authorized to issue and oversee charter schools in Michigan
(public universities, community colleges, intermediate school districts, and

local school districts).

51

6) Urban and minority advocacy organizations: state-level and/or local
afﬁliate chapters of the NAACP and the National Urban League represent
two of the many organizations that advocate specifically for the interests of
urban areas and/or minority residents. Unfortunately, no responses were
received from any of these organizations, leaving the sample with ﬁve

groupings from which completed surveys were actually received.

A second source used to examine instrumental values within the policy process
associated with charter schools consists of secondary documents. These
include two key bills from the 2003 legislative session, along with the voting
records of Michigan legislators and news coverage of these bills. Also included
among secondary sources of data are public records from the Commission on
Charter Schools, a group appointed by former Gov. John Engler and the
Legislature in 2002 to study charters and develop recommendations for their
improvement. Secondary sources serve a variety of research-related purposes,
the most notable of which include identifying the presence of instrumental values
embedded in policy proposals and linking the behavior of policy elites to their
expressed attitudes regarding charters. Secondary documents also serve the
purpose, as Garn (2000) notes, of providing background and contextual

information, as well as a “check" on information obtained from elite surveys.

52

Contributions of the Dissertation

This study makes ﬁve principal contributions to the existing base of research.
The first is that it provides a re-testing of the important work begun by Marshall,
Mitchell, and Wirt (1989) and later taken up by Garn (2000) regarding policy
elites’ views of the four instrumental values in educational policy. Examining
policy elites’ preferences for instrumental values (and combinations thereof)
relative to others is a worthwhile research objective, as Marshall et al and Garn
have shown, in that such preferences help explain the considerations that drive
policy elites to advocate for certain policy options - and can be similarly helpful in
predicting the future behavior of constantly—changing policymaking bodies such
as the Michigan legislature. Additionally, this study expands upon that of
Marshall and colleagues by performing signiﬁcance tests of the differences

between the mean scores assigned to the four values by Michigan policy elites.

A second contribution of this study involves its speciﬁc focus on Michigan, which
was not included in the Marshall and Garn studies, and to my knowledge has not
been targeted in any other similar research. Michigan, and more specifically the
development of its charter school legislation and movement, offers an intriguing
context for re—testing this work for several key reasons. A ﬁrst is that Michigan
has been one of the national “pioneers" in the school choice and charter school
movements, having passed one of the nation’s ﬁrst charter laws (in 1993) that

has resulted in the fifth highest number of schools in existence and the third

53

highest number of students enrolled in charters (Center for Education Reform,

2003)

Additional justification for studying the value preferences of policy elites in
Michigan, both in a general sense and in relation to charter schools, is a political
history and context that offers both similarities to and differences from those
described by Garn in Arizona and Marshall and colleagues in their six-state
sample. As was true of Arizona during the time frame that Garn studied, and
several states (most notably Arizona and West Virginia) included in the Marshall
study, the “critical mass” of support for charter school legislation in Michigan took
place during a lengthy period of Republican dominance of state government.
Elected in a political upset in 1990 and reelected by landslide margins in 1994
and 1998, former Republican Gov. John Engler was a vocal supporter of
charters, and was supported in his efforts to pass charter-friendly legislation by
Republican dominance of both houses of the Michigan legislature throughout
much of his tenure. Engler was also aided by substantial support for charters on
the elected state board of education (which, although technically a nonpartisan
board, is highly political in that the two major parties nominate and fund
candidates), as well as by his own appointees on boards of most of the state’s
public universities (which have been active chartering agencies) and within the

state Department of Education.

54

Unlike Arizona during the time of Garn’s analysis, however, and in contrast to
Arizona and West Virginia during Marshall at al's research, Michigan has recently
witnessed somewhat of a political shift, in that a Democratic governor (Jennifer
Granholm, the state’s former attorney general) defeated Engler’s longtime
Lieutenant Governor (former Republican Rep. Dick Posthumus) in the
gubernatorial election of November, 2002. The implications of this change in
leadership at the highest level of state government in terms of charter school
policy are still playing out, as the new governor and legislature have been
primarily concerned with addressing unprecedented budget deﬁcits. The point
here, however, is that the presence of a Democratic governor, along with
Republican control of both houses of the Michigan legislature and substantial
legislative turnover, presents a political context that differs from that found in 4
previous research on instrumental values. Precisely how this political context will
ultimately impact the charter school movement in Michigan is unknown, but the
presence of large budget deﬁcits seems likely to become a factor, as Granholm
and legislators spar over spending cuts to public schools, among other areas of
the state budget. One possibility is that ﬁnancial crises will cause legislators to
be less supportive of certain values viewed as more costly (such as Quality and
Equity) in favor of those that promote a climate of greater ﬁscal accountability

(Efﬁciency and to a lesser extent Choice).-

A third contribution of this study is that it investigates the value preferences of

policy elites from both the public and private sectors. In this respect, it differs

55

from Garn, who looked exclusively at value preferences among public sector
policy elites. It is similar to the approach used by Marshall and colleagues, who
studied both public and private sector elites, but differs from the Marshall study in
its explicit focus on Michigan. Using the single state approach obviously limits
the cross-state comparison used by Marshall and colleagues permitted, but does
provide an opportunity to compare Garn’s recent ﬁndings in Arizona with the
situation in Michigan, as well as a chance to make comparisons between

different groups of Michigan stakeholders and policy elites.

A fourth contribution involves the focus of this study on values in educational
policy within a speciﬁc context of charter schools. More speciﬁcally, it enhances
the research base by examining relationships between Michigan policy elites'
preferences in terms of instrumental values and their views on the state’s charter
school experiment. Charters as an educational phenomenon are clearly worthy
of additional study due both to their numerical magnitude (e.g., the number of
schools and students involved) and their prominent position within educational
policy debates. The charter movement clearly represents a major experiment in
educational reform, and one that is particularly signiﬁcant for troubled urban
school systems. Charters, and the values that fueled their establishment, are
also signiﬁcant in that they are viewed by some (both advocates and opponents)
as merely one stop on the way to a more expansive system of public school
choice led by vouchers and/or tuition tax credits for private schools. Vouchers

have, in fact, been voted on in Michigan twice in the recent past, and while such

56

efforts have thus far been unsuccessful,11 there will undoubtedly be others.
Research on Michigan policy eb’tes’ views of the Choice value and the charter
movement thus can be considered a key predictor of future activity related to

choice-based initiatives such as vouchers.

The fifth major contribution of this research involves testing the construct validity
of using multiple methods to measure the value preferences of policy elites.
Whereas the research conducted by Marshall, Mitchell, & Wirt (1989) and Garn
(2002) involved a single measure of value preference (a survey question which
measure preference using paired statements representing the four instrumental
values across three domains), the survey instrument employed for this
dissertation involves three measures of preference: paired statements as
described above in Question 7, a direct and forced-choice format in Question 8,
and a rank-ordering format used in Question 9. Through the use of Multitrait-
Multimethod Matrix (MTMM) correlations, the overall validity of using these three

measures is tested.
Organization of Findings and Discussion
Following the preceding introduction to instrumental values in educational policy,

charter schools, and the key questions and hypotheses that guide this research,

the pages that follow present ﬁndings in two major sections. The ﬁrst is an

 

” Michigan’s two voucher initiatives in recent history, in 1978 and 2000, were defeated by large margins
(74% to 26% in 1978 and 71% to 29% in 2000) (Wisconsin Education Association Council, 2001).

57

analysis of instrumental values as contained in four key public records and
legislative proposals pertaining to charter schools: Michigan’s original charter
school law from 1993, the 2002 report of the Michigan Commission on Charter
Schools, and two bills from the 2003 legislative session. The second major
section, beginning with Chapter 3, presents findings from surveys and interviews
of Michigan policy elites investigating their perceptions of charter schools and the
values that have shaped their views on this important policy topic. Findings are
discussed both for individual survey questions as well as in the form of
noteworthy relationships between attitudes toward charters and key independent
variables such as the political affiliation of policy elites and characteristics of their
district/constituency. Analyses culminate with a review of ﬁndings in relation to
key research hypotheses, and then conclude with considerations for future
research in the area of instrumental values in educational policy and charter

schools.

58

Chapter 2: Instrumental Values in Michigan Charter School Policy:
Mation and ReLrts

The following section uses four secondary sources related to charter school
policy in Michigan — including three legislative acts and a state-commissioned
report — to illustrate how instrumental values have influenced the formation of the
state’s charter school policy. The first is the state’s charter law, originally passed
in 1993 and amended to meet constitutional challenges in 1994. The second is a
report issued by the Commission on Charter Schools in April 2002; the
Commission was an eight-member group appointed by the Legislature and
former Gov. John Engler to study charter schools and develop recommendations
for their improvement. The final two sources are bills introduced during the 2003
session of the Michigan Legislature — House Bill 4148 and Senate Bill 393 - that

proposed signiﬁcant changes to the state’s existing charter law.

These four sources have been chosen because they illustrate how each of the
instrumental values, both individually and in combination with others, has
influenced the thinking of policymakers in formulating charter-related legislation
and policies. In addition to examining specific ways in which the instrumental
values are reflected in the four secondary sources, a brief history of each source

is helpful in understanding their impact on the state’s charter school policies.

59

Michigan’s 1993 Charter School Law

Michigan’s original charter school law was passed in 1993 as one of the nation’s
ﬁrst charter laWs. The most basic elements of the law clearly promote the Choice
value, whose primary objective is to make available - both to schools and to
consumers of education - a wider array of options, as well as the ability to select
one of these options. Michigan’s charter law clearly works in support of this goal, '
as it provides both schools and parents with new autonomy. Schools are able,
with certain restrictions, to operate largely as independent entities in choosing
their own mission, curriculum, staff, and size; parents having access to and
interest in these new schools are provided with an alternative to the “default” of
their neighborhood school in the ability to select the best match for their child.
The Choice value is also personiﬁed in Michigan's charter law in that a
comparatively wide array of entities (including public universities, community
colleges, and intermediate and local school districts) are allowed to authorize
charters; in other states, a much narrower set of entities is permitted to authorize

charters [Michigan Center for Charter Schools, 1994; Vergari & Mintrom, 1996).

In addition to its obvious promotion of the Choice value, Michigan’s charter
school law can also be understood as upholding Quality. This value is primarily
concerned with realizing the best educational outcomes, typically through setting
standards for student achievement and the allocation of public resources in

pursuit of this goal. An obvious way in which Michigan’s charter law upholds

6O

Quality, as noted, is through its stated intention of improving the quality of public
schools, both by establishing high-quality charters themselves as well as by
improving traditional public schools forced to compete with charters. A second
feature of the law which upholds Quality is the “charter” that prospective schools
establish with their authorizing agency. In this document, the school spells out
the standards it expects students to meet, the curricular means by which it will do
so, and the measures (such as the Michigan Educational Assessment Program
tests) that will be used as benchmarks. A third way in which Quality is upheld by
Michigan’s charter law is through provisions requiring that charter school
teachers be certiﬁed in the same manner as are their colleagues in traditional

public schools (Arsen, Plank, 8 Sykes, 1999; Vergari 8 Mintrom, 1996).

Efﬁciency is also reflected quite clearly in Michigan's charter law. This value has
an economic dimension that seeks to minimize education-related costs while
maximizing gains, as well as an accountability dimension that seeks to inﬂuence
the exercise of decision-making authority in educational policy. The economic
aspect of Efﬁciency is reflected in the funding mechanism of the 1993 charter
law: for each student it attracted, a charter would receive the lesser of the per
pupil funding level of the district in which the school was located g_r an amount
roughly equal to the statewide average for per pupil funding (approximately
$5700 in 1993). Charter proponents emphasized that per pupil funding levels in
most charters would be far less than in traditional public schools within districts

such as Detroit, where most charters were predicted (correctly) to locate. In

61

addition to touting the quality that charters would provide, then, the charter law
was pledging that these new schools would deliver a higher quality of education
at a lower cost (Vergari 8 Mintrom, 1996; Carrasco 8 Summers-Coty, 2000;

Arsen, Plank, 8 Sykes, 1999).

The accountability dimension of Efficiency is reflected perhaps even more
strongly in Michigan's charter law than is the economic dimension. Indeed,
accountability — most notably of schools and chartering agencies to students and
parents -— is arguably the foundation of the movement. The purpose of having
prospective charters apply to a charter—granting entity, to begin, was to make the
school's planners accountable for developing a mission, curriculum, and
indicators for measuring progress, and also to make the authorizing agency
responsible for ensuring that the school lives up to its promises. The state board
of education also has an accountability role, as the charter law directs it to
suspend the ability of authorizing agencies to issue more charters if it ﬁnds that
they are not engaging in appropriate oversight of schools they have chartered.
The law further stipulates that meetings of a charter school’s governing board are
subject to the state’s Open Meeting and Freedom of lnfonnation provisions, both
intended to ensure public access and accountability. As noted in the preceding
discussion of the Quality value at work in Michigan’s charter law, the law
stipulates that the MEAP test or an alternative state-approved assessment must
be used to measure the progress of students, and that this information must be

made publicly available in the same manner as it would for a traditional public

62

school. Finally and perhaps most importantly, the law promotes accountability by
empowering parents to choose schools for their children and to remove them if

dissatisfied (Summers-Coty, 2003; Vergari 8 Mintrom, 1996).

Evidence of the fourth instrumental value, Equity, is also present in Michigan's
charter law. This value involves the use of public resources to address perceived
inequities in human needs, academic opportunity, or performance. Notable
examples of how the law promotes this value include provisions that charters
may not charge tuition nor discriminate in admissions decisions on the basis of
race, economic status, disability, or academic performance. The Michigan
Center for Charter Schools (1994) notes that these stipulations were written into
the law in large part to quell suspicion that charters were intended to “cream off"
affluent, white, and high-achieving students from traditional public schools. The
law also requires that a charter school must abide by a court-ordered
desegregation plan should such a plan exist in the school district within which the
charter school is located. Desegregation, of course, is perhaps the best example
of the Equity value in action, as it attempts to rectify inequality of educational
opportunity and outcome that occurs along racial/ethnic lines by working toward
a more even distribution of students (Arsen, Plank, 8 Sykes, 1999; Vergari 8

Mintrom, 1996).

63

The Commission on Charter Schools

In October 2001, the Michigan Legislature established a special commission
charged with conducting a complete and objective review of charter schools in
Michigan. This group, known as the Commission on Charter Schools (hereafter
referred to as “the Commission”), was chaired by Michigan State University
President M. Peter McPherson. State Superintendent of Public Instruction Tom
Watkins and six additional members appointed by key political leaders at the time

also served on the Commission:

. Michael Addonizio, Associate Professor of Educational Policy, Wayne State
University; appointed by then-Senate Majority Leader Dan DeGrow, R-Port
Huron

0 Lu Battaglieri, President, Michigan Education Association; appointed by then-
Senate Minority Leader (and current Lieutenant Governor) John Cherry, D-
Flint

o Sheri Thompson, charter school parent from Reed City; appointed by
Speaker of the House of Representatives Rick Johnson, R-LeRoy

. Carmen N’Namdi, Principal of Nataki Talibah Schoolhouse (a Detroit charter
school); appointed by then-House Minority Leader (and current Detroit mayor)
Kwame Kilpatrick, D-Detroit

. Louann Bierlein Palmer, Assistant Professor of Educational Leadership,

Western Michigan University; appointed by then-Gov. John Engler

64

0 Richard McLellan, attorney for the Lansing law ﬁrm Dykema Gossett,
P.L.L.C.; appointed by then-Gov. John Engler (Commission on Charter
Schools, 2002).

Among the initial activities conducted by the Commission were two public
hearings intended to provide a forum for testimony related to charters. The ﬁrst
was held in Detroit on December 11, 2002, and the second in Grand Rapids a
night later. A complete transcript of each hearing is available from the
Commisson’s website (Commission on Charter Schools, 2003a; 2003b); a
sampling of the comments aired at these meetings provides a rich source of
information regarding the competing values that have inﬂuenced the policy
process related to charter schools. The analysis below provides a summary of
selected remarks organized by each of the four instrumental values in

educational policy.

The majority of those testifying, and by all appearances the majority of the
audience at both sessions — and particularly the ﬁrst one, held in Detroit -
consisted of charter school founders, leaders, and parents. The dominant theme
expressed in the comments of this group, which were frequently interrupted by
applause from the audience, was unabashed support for the Choice value. A
charter school principal noted (p.5) that among the “compelling reasons for
creating charters” was “to give parents a broad range of choices within the public

sector,” while another stated (p.8) that “...I am defending the belief that parents

65

should have the freedom to choose the public school that they want their child to

attend" (Commission on Charter Schools, 2003a).

Subsequent comments from the Grand Rapids forum included the belief that

“. ..The community should have the opportunity to make, and I believe that
parents can make, informed [and] intelligent decisions about what is in the best
interest of their children, and that’s why charter schools exist.” A charter school
parent pleaded with the Commission to “. . .don’t put a stop to charter schools.
Take the cap away, whatever we've got to do...l implore you not to stop it"

(Commission on Charter Schools, 2003bz18).

In some cases, testimony in support of charters and the Choice value was fused
with pro-Equity viewpoints. A Detroit charter school principal declared (p.9) that
“...the civil rights movement of the 21St century is educational choice for our
families, for our parents, for our children...,” and described his school (p.10) as
“...getting children who are falling through the cracks...and changing their lives.”
A Detroit charter school parent“ stated (p.34) that “. . .People with money have
choices...what do you do if you haven’t got the funds? I think choice is the

solution” (Commission on Charter Schools, 2003a).
Others testifying wrapped their support for Choice around the Quality value,

making the case that having the former promotes the latter. A former state board

of education member noted at the Detroit hearing (p.17) that “...we need

66

competition to promote quality,“ while a current state board member commented
that charter schools are “...a catalyst for change and innovation.” An
administrator from Ferris State University noted (p.26-27) that his institution
(which has authorized 16 charters) supports . .a lifting of the cap, but...within a
system that assures quality, so that the public can be assured...a quality
institution that provides a quality education.” An official from the Michigan
Association of Intermediate School District Administrators stated at the Grand
Rapids hearing (p.5) that lSDs “...do support quality charter schools,” but that
“...if schools are going to be chartered in the future, it’s about quality. It’s not

about quantity” (Commission on Charter Schools, 2003a; 2003b).

In addition to those whose testimony clearly advanced the Choice value, another
subset of Grand Rapids forum attendees spoke against the accountability
dimension of the Efﬁciency value, criticizing attempts to impose additional
oversight and regulations on charter schools. A board member from the
Michigan Association of Public School Academies, or MAPSA (the statewide
association of charter schools) stated (p.7) that “. . .The call for more regulation
and more control in Lansing, a gradual glacial movement forward, I see as an
insidious effort to preempt our movement and assimilate us [into the system of
traditional public schools] before the charter movement gets too well grounded.”
Another administrator from MAPSA declared (p.11) that “. . .You cannot regulate
public schools to success and improvement. . .[we must] reduce the regulatory

burden on charter public schools” (Commission on Charter Schools, 2003b).

67

Among the few comments made by those who questioned or opposed the
charter movement, the dominant themes were calls for increased accountability
and performance on the part of charters, reflecting the Efﬁciency and Quality
values. A traditional public school administrator urged the Commission (p. 3)

. .not to lift the cap [on university-sponsored charters] until issues of
accountability have been resolved...despite demand, quality must be the
prevailing consideration.” An official from the Michigan Federation of Teachers
noted (p.4-5) several studies that found low levels of achievement among charter
school students, and used them to raise the question of “are charter schools as a
whole doing a better job educating our children? I think in most cases the
answer is no.” The Equity value was also raised by skeptics of the charter
movement, as evidenced by accusations that charters do not adequately seek to
serve certain students, such as those with disabilities. An administrator from the
Michigan Association of Secondary School Principals noted at the Grand Rapids
hearing, for example (p.5), that “...What is most troubling [about the charter
movement] is that [targeted enrollment efforts] can be done by not offering
services needed by certain groups. It seems especially true in the area of

special education..." (Commission on Charter Schools, 2003a; 2003b).
After months of research, deliberation, and testimony received via mail, email,

and at the two public hearings, the Commission issued its report in April 2002. .

Following a brief history of charter schools in Michigan and a summary of the

68

state’s charter law, the bulk of the Commission’s report is organized around a

series of recommendations that are grouped into ﬁve major areas:

Academic standards

0 Operation, governance, and accountability

0 Special education

. The “cap” on the number of university-sponsored charters

. Research

It is perhaps most useful to analyze the recommendations of the Commission in
accordance with the instrumental value or values they reﬂect. The Choice value,
to begin, is clearly advanced by the recommendation that the “cap” on university-
sponsored charters be raised, although other values (namely Equity)‘are also
reﬂected in this recommendation. To review briefly, Michigan’s original 1993
charter law established no limit on the number of schools that could be
authorized. In response to concern over the disproportionate share of schools
that were being authorized by public universities, however, the Legislature in
1996 amended the law to limit the total number of charters authorized by
universities to 150, with no single university allowed to authorize more than half
(or 75) of the total number of university-sponsored charters. The 150—school limit
was reached in 1999, and given the relative lack of chartering activity among the
other three types of entities eligible to issue charters (community colleges,

intermediate school districts, and local school districts), growth in the state’s

69

charter movement virtually halted after 1999. Raising the cap on university-
sponsored charters quickly became a hot political topic, with numerous proposals
over the past several years to do just that (see for example, Durbin, 2002;
Harmon, 2000; Christoff, 1999), but no real progress in this direction had

occurred by the time the Commission was meeting in late 2001 and early 2002. '

Responding to pressure to raise the cap, the Commission upheld the Choice
value by recommending that the number of “conventional charters” (e.g., those
which did not plan to serve predominantly or exclusively at-risk students) which
could be authorized by “institutions of higher education with statewide
jurisdiction” would be raised by 5 in 2002 and by 10 in each year from 2003 to
2007, for a‘total of 55 potential new schools (p.22-24). The “institutions of higher
education with statewide jurisdiction” language was intended to distinguish public
universities from community colleges, which would continue to be restricted to
authorizing charters only in their geographic district. This terminology was also
signiﬁcant in terms of how it applied to Bay Mills Community College, a tribally-
controlled institution in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula that had created controversy
by using a perceived “loophole” to authorize charters in Bay City and Pontiac,

L12

outside of its distric The Choice value is also represented in the

 

u Michigan’s charter school law places no limit on the number of charters that can be issued by community
colleges, other than stipulating that these institutions cannot authorize charters outside their own
geographic boundaries. However, Bay Mills Community College, one of 29 American Indian institutions
of higher learning in the nation, differs from the other 26 community colleges in Michigan in that it is
authorized and charged by statute with serving Native American students across the state. Bay Mills
leadership used this authority to issue, starting in 1999, charters for several schools outside its geographic
district in the Upper Peninsula, including sites in Bay City and Pontiac, and argued that it could continue to
do so anywhere in the state with the exception of Detroit (Bell, 2003; Christoff, 2003). Following an

70

recommendation that two or more charter schools be allowed to form a joint high

school for their students.

The Commission’s use of the term “conventional charter” in its recommendation
for more charter schools is also signiﬁcant. This is because it advances the
Equity value by differentiating for the first time between “conventional” and
“special purpose” charter schools, with the latter intended to serve disadvantaged
student populations. The Commission recommended that in addition to the 55
potentially new “conventional charters," up to 15 special purpose schools per
year could be established over the five-year period from 2003-07. A special
purpose charter would be deﬁned as one whose enrollment consisted of at least
50% students who: were abused or neglected; were below grade level in reading
or math; were pregnant; were eligible for free or reduced price school lunches;
had “atypical behavior or attendance pattems;” had a family history of school
failure, incarceration, or substance abuse; had MEAP test scores not at the
satisfactory level; or qualified for special education services. The Commission
further recommended that beginning in 2008 and continuing for ten years, any
charters issued by institutions of higher education with statewide jurisdiction
could only be for special purpose charter schools (Commission on Charter

Schools, 2002:22-23).

 

opinion issued by Michigan Attorney General Jennifer Granholm in September 2001, the ability of Bay
Mills to issue charters statewide was generally upheld (Commission on Charter Schools, 2002).

71

The Equity value also emerges in the Commission’s recommendations regarding
special education services in Michigan charter schools. Speciﬁcally, the report
states the Commission’s belief that “it is essential that students with disabilities
are encouraged and welcomed to enroll and be educated in all charter schools”
(p.17), and calls for intermediate school districts (lSDs) to be required to assist
charters in providing special education services in the same manner that lSDs do
for traditional public school districts. It is also recommended that lSDs, working
in conjunction with charter-authorizing agencies, be required to ensure that
charter school personnel, including board members, are adequately educated

regarding federal and state requirements for special education (p.17-18).

The Commission’s report also reflects the Equity value in a third key way, in the
form of several recommendations governing the admissions process for charter
school students. Responding to concerns that some charters may not be
advertising themselves in a manner that ensures a fair admission process for all
students — particularly those with disabilities — the Commission recommended
that charter schools be required to demonstrate to their authorizing agency that
they have made “reasonable effort” to market themselves in “the expected area
from which students might primarily be drawn,” and “make special efforts” in
marketing themselves to students with disabilities (p.14). The report also calls
for additional research on charter schools, with one area of interest being how

disadvantaged and special education students are being served in charters.

72

The Quality and Efﬁciency values also emerge from recommendations contained
in the Commission’s report. In the section on academic standards, for example,
the report notes that the group “strongly supports the concept of uniform
academic standards and uniform systems for measurement for all public
schools... (p.7).” This provision reflects the dimension of the Quality value that ,
emphasizes the establishment of standards and the use of indicators to measure
progress toward such standards. A commitment to Quality is also evidenced by
the Commission’s call for annual testing for all charter school students in reading
and math in grades 3-8 (p.7). The Quality value also appears in the report’s call
for additional research regarding Michigan’s charter schools, with particular

attention devoted to student performance (p.25-26).

The Commission’s call for additional testing and reporting of test results also
reﬂects the accountability dimension of the Efﬁciency value, as the purpose of
this recommendation is for test results to be used as a way of holding schools
accountable for their performance. The Commission also called for additional
authority to be granted to the Superintendent of Public Instruction with respect to
monitoring charter schools; specifically, the report recommends that the
Superintendent be given the authority to establish a certification process for
authorizing agencies and to revoke the chartering authority of any agency that
fails to conduct adequate oversight (p.9-11). Authorizing agencies, in turn, were
to develop a process for holding the governing boards of the schools they charter

accountable for student performance, finances, and management (p.11-12). The

73

accountability aspect of the Efﬁciency value was also evident in the Commission
recommendation that charter school boards must adequately disclose any
potential conﬂict of interest related to management companies with which they
contract, the release of public information such as ﬁnances, personnel

information, and open meetings laws (p.12-13).

Similar to the two public hearings and the recommendations contained in the
report itself, the aftermath of the report’s actual release in April 2002 illustrated
the intense competition between the instrumental values as inﬂuences upon
charter school policy. Superintendent of Public Instruction Tom Watkins, one of
the Commission’s eight members, refused to sign the report, stating his belief
that the proposed increases in the number of new charters was “too much, too
soon,” and that the state needed to learn more about how well charters work
before allowing new ones (Terlep, 2002). Watkins’ prerogative, in other words,
was that the accountability dimension of Efficiency had been overshadowed by
an emphasis on the Choice value, in the form of the Commission’s

recommendation to raise the cap on university-sponsored charters.

A second illustration of the conflicting values contained in the Commission’s
report came in an exchange of press releases issued by interest groups with
competing views of. charter schools. The Michigan Education Association, whose
president, Lu Battaglieri, was a member of the Commission, praised the report,

and was particularly supportive of the recommendations that emphasized the

74

accountability aspect of the Efficiency value. Battaglieri noted that “We believe
the package [of recommendations] in its entirety is good public education
policy...it puts quality, accountability, and the best interests of Michigan students
ﬁrst. We hope the Legislature does the same.” In clear deference to the
accountability dimension of the Efficiency value, Battaglieri also noted that “...If
the Legislature accepts all of the Commission’s recommendations, charter school
growth will be limited and monitored...we will have all the checks and balances
necessary to ensure that charter schools follow the rules and exist first and
foremost to educate students — not to make money for authorizers or private

management companies” (Michigan Education Association, 2002).

A very different view of the Commission’s report was put forth by the pro-charter
school group The Center for Education Reform (CER), based in Washington,
DC. In brief, this organization rejected the Commission’s recommendations that
advanced the accountability dimension of the Efficiency value, arguing that these
provisions already exist in Michigan charter schools, and that the sole
recommendation of value in the report was the Choice-driven provision for more
charter schools. In a press release, the organization termed the Commission a
“politically-appointed body” that made “misleading and inconsistent conclusions."
The press release noted that the Commission included MEA President Battaglieri
and Addonizio from Wayne State University, . .which while authorized to do so
has only chartered one school” (p.1). CER President Jeanne Allen decried the

Commission’s recommendation for enhanced accountability provisions,

75

particularly the vesting of greater power in the state superintendent, noting that
“...if control at the state level were the solution to public school accountability, all
of Michigan’s public schools would be thriving” (p.2). In its conclusion, the CER
press release dismissed the Commission as being “...politically motivated by
special interests for whom charter schools create pressure, and [motivated]
against parents whose demands for better education has resulted in 61,000
children attending charter schools in Michigan...The Commission report should

be dismissed...” (p.4) (Center for Education Reform, 2002).

The report of the Commission on Charter Schools is signiﬁcant in a number of
ways, most notably the fact that it provides rich evidence of the competing
instrumental values that inﬂuenced the important work of this group. The
recommendations contained in the Commission’s report, as well as the public
hearings and reactions that accompanied it, provide illustrative examples of how
the four values - both individually and at times in combination with one another —
compete for influence upon the policymaking process asso‘ciated with Michigan’s
charter school experiment. The report of the Commission is also signiﬁcant, as
will be discussed below, in that the recommendations it made proved to be very
influential in terms of two key charter school-related bills introduced after the

report’s release, during the 2003 session of the Michigan Legislature.

76

Key Charter Bills from the 2003 Legislature: HB 4148 and SB 393

Beginning soon after the passage of Michigan’s charter school law in 1993,
numerous attempts to change this important legislation have been introduced,
debated, and in some cases voted on during sessions of the Michigan
Legislature. The following section analyzes two parallel charter school-related
bills introduced during the 2003 session of the Michigan legislature - House Bill

\ 4148 and Senate Bill 393 - for evidence of the four instrumental values and how
they have influenced the policy process involving charter schools. The language
contained within these two bills, as well as votes cast by individual legislators,
provides an illustrative source of information regarding the values that have

shaped the policy debate.

An overview of HB 4148 and SB 393, featuring a summary of their intent, a brief
history of proposed amendments and votes, and analysis that focuses on the
instrumental value or values that they promote, appears below. It should be
noted that while numerous bills related to Michigan’s charter law have been
introduced in previous sessions of the Michigan legislature, the focus in this
research will remain on these two key bills from the 2003 session. This is due to
the fact that legislators who introduced and voted on charter-related bills from
sessions prior to 2003 are in many cases no longer in office due to term limit
restrictions and Other forms of attrition. It should also be noted that while at least

three other bills speciﬁcally related to charter schools were introduced during the

77

2003 legislative session, they did not advance beyond the Education committee

in their respective legislative chamber.13

House Bill 4148

House Bill 4148 was introduced on February 5, 2003 by Rep. Brian Palmer,
Republican from the 36th District in Macomb County and Chair of the House
Education Committee. The key provision of this bill in its original form, which
reflects and even eclipses one of the major recommendations made in the
Commission on Charter Schools report, advances the Choice instrumental value
by eliminating altogether the “cap” on the number of charters that may be
authorized by public universities. The Choice value is also epitomized in three
additional provisions of HB 4148, the ﬁrst two of which reﬂect recommendations

made in the Commission report (Hunault, 2003; Bailey, 2003):

0 Establishment and clariﬁcation of a new chartering entity. HB 4148 proposed
that an “institution of higher education with statewide jurisdiction” which is
recognized under the “federal Tribally Controlled Community College
Assistance Act” be ofﬁcially allowed to issue charters on a statewide basis, as
it had been doing under a perceived “loophole” in the state’s charter law

described previously. This entity was understood to be Bay Mills Community

 

'3 A large number of bills pertaining to public education in general -including those related to school
funding - are typically introduced during each legislative session, and many of these have direct and
obvious implications for charter schools. My own analyses, however, will focus on proposed legislation
that speciﬁcally and directly targets charters.

78

College, the tribally—controlled institution located in Michigan’s Upper
Peninsula (Hunault, 2003; Hunault 8 Martens, 2003).

Creation of joint high schools: HB 4148 proposed to permit two or more
charter schools to operate a joint high school without the issuance of a new
contract - and, signiﬁcantly, without counting against the cap on university-
sponsored charter schools already in existence (Hunault, 2003).

Allowing community colleges to authorize charters in Detroit: Michigan law
forbade community colleges from issuing charters for operation in a school
district of the ”first class” (or one with 100,000 or more students, the only one
of which is Detroit); HB 4148 advanced the Choice value in proposing to

eliminate this provision (Hunault, 2003; Hunault 8 Martens, 2003).

HB 4148 also contained provisions which promoted instrumental values other

than Choice, however. The Efﬁciency value, and its accountability dimension in

particular, were advanced by the following two proposals:

Oversight responsibilities for chartering agencies: One of the major criticisms
of Michigan’s existing charter law, as identified in several evaluations (see, for
example, Horn 8 Miron, 1999; Arsen, Plank, 8 Sykes, 1999; Khouri et al,
1999) and addressed in recommendations contained in the Commission
report, is that it did not adequately deﬁne the oversight responsibilities of
charter-granting agencies, nor did the state provide any subsequent

guidelines or resources for this purpose. HB 4148 attempted to address this

79

perceived shortcoming by stipulating that authorizing agencies must provide
oversight that is sufﬁcient to (a) ensure compliance with the school’s charter
itself as well as all applicable state laws; (b) hold the charter school board
accountable for meeting performance standards specified in its contract; (c)
conduct its admission process in a fair and open manner, and (d) ensure that
the school maintained and released all appropriate data (Hunault, 2003).

. Due diligence and reporting requirements for educational management
companies (EMOs): A substantial majority of Michigan’s charter schools
(estimated to be at least 70%) have entered into contracts with educational
management organizations, or EMOs, of a for-proﬁt or non-proﬁt nature to
manage some or all aspects of their operations. This practice has been both
praised as a means of introducing greater efﬁciency into school operations
and criticized for reducing public accountability, especially as pertains to
finances. HB 4148 proposed to address these concerns by requiring that all
charters entering into new contracts with EMOs must (a) conduct sufﬁcient
due diligence into the EMO’s educational expertise and management
experience; (b) obtain independent legal counsel in all negotiations with the
EMO; and (c) provide the school’s board with all financial and other

information pertaining to state reporting requirements (Hunault, 2003).

The Equity value, ﬁnally, was upheld in the following provision of HB 4148:

80

. Encouragement of more schools for dropouts: HB 4148 encouraged
authorizing agencies to issue more charters for schools targeted at students

who had dropped out of school (Hunault, 2003).

Following its formal introduction in February 2003, HB 4148 was referred to the
House Education Committee for consideration. The committee made one
signiﬁcant revision to the bill: rather than eliminating the cap on university-
sponsored charters altogether, the cap would rise by 50 schools a year for seven
years, up to a maximum of 500 charters. This change reflects a more restrained
promotion of the Choice value than the original version contained, and was likely
made in order to counter anticipated criticism that the original bill was slanted
toward the promotion of unrestrained Choice. On March 20, when HB 4148 was
introduced to and debated by the full House, eight additional amendments for
which information regarding sub-amendments and voting records are available
were offered and voted upon. An analysis of each amendment in accordance
with the main value or values it promotes - or in some cases opposes - appears
below. As is true of the language in the original bill, these proposed changes to
the bill provide illustrative examples of the competing values promoted by their
backers, as well as the manner in which political party affiliation was generally —

but not always — correlated with certain values (Hunault, 2003).

The ﬁrst amendment, introduced by Rep. Doug Spade (Democrat from the 57"1

district in and around Adrian in southeastern Michigan), sought a nearly complete

81

transformation of the original intent of HB 4148. Spade’s proposal would have
restrained the Choice-laden expansion of the charter movement by removing
entirely the language pertaining to the increase in the number of university-
sponsored charters. Reﬂecting an Equity perspective, Spade’s amendment
would also have required charter schools to accept all students living in the
school district in which they are located, just as traditional public schools must
do, rather than holding a lottery if the number of applicants exceeded the
school’s desired size. This amendment failed on a 60-44 vote, with ﬁve
representatives not voting. All 42 Democrats who voted supported the bill, along
with two Republicans (Rep. Mike Pumford from the 100th district in Newaygo
County near Big Rapids and Rep. John Stewart from the 20‘“ district in the
northwest suburbs of Wayne County); the remaining 60 Republicans all voted

against Spade’s amendment (Michigan Votes, 2003a).

A second amendment, offered by Republican representative (and Education
Chair) Palmer, offered a somewhat reduced — yet still vigorous - promotion of
Choice in establishing the proposed new cap on university-sponsored charters at
30 new schools per year for 10 years, for a total of 300 new schools in addition to
the current 150 university-sponsored charters. Rep. Aldo Vagnozzi (Democrat
from the 37th district representing Farmington and Farmington Hills in suburban
Detroit) countered Palmer’s proposal with a series of stipulations advancing the
accountability dimension of Efﬁciency by requiring more rules for charter-granting

agencies. When this amendment, with its contrasting support of Choice

82

provisions offered by Palmer and Efficiency provisions advanced by Vagnozzi,
was called to a vote by the full House, it failed on a 59-48 vote. All 45 voting
[Democrats were joined by three Republicans (Pumford, Stewart, and Rep. Doug
Hart of the 73rd district in northern Kent County near Grand Rapids) in voting yes

while the 59 remaining Republicans voted no (Michigan Votes, 2003b).

Rep. Andy Meisner, Democrat from the 27th district in Oakland County in
suburban Detroit, introduced a third amendment to HB 4148 that would have
eliminated provisions in the original bill allowing charter schools to borrow and
bond. Meisner’s proposal can be interpreted as advocating restraint for the
Choice value in that it would have limited the ability of charters to act like
traditional public schools by raising funding for construction and operations. The
amendment failed on a 61-45 vote, with all 44 voting Democrats joined by
Republican Pumford with yes votes and all 61 remaining Republicans voting no

(Michigan Votes, 2003c).

The fourth amendment, offered by Rep. Hoon-Yung Hopgood (Democrat from
the 22"d district representing Taylor and Romulus in suburban Detroit), opposed
the Choice values clearly reflected in the original version of HB 4148 by
eliminating the provision allowing the establishment of joint high schools by two
or more existing charters. This amendment failed on a 61-46 vote, with all 45
voting Democrats joined again by Pumford in voting yes and the remaining 61

Republicans voting no (Michigan Votes, 2003d).

83

Pumford himself then introduced two amendments to HB 4148. The ﬁrst
ostensibly supported the Choice value in that it proposed to eliminate the cap on
university-sponsored charters altogether, as had Palmer’s original version of the
bill, but added an important and very much anti-Choice caveat: that the electors
in a school district must vote to approve any new charters within their district. It
stands to reason that Pumford was well aware that such public votes on charter
school establishment would be unlikely to succeed in many, if not most,
circumstances due to divided public opinion on charters as well as opposition
that would almost certainly be mobilized by local school districts and teachers’
union locals. This amendment failed on a 5848 vote, with all 45 voting
Democrats plus Republicans Pumford, Stewart, and Rep. Charles LaSata (from
the 79"1 district in and around Benton Harbor and St. Joseph) voting yes and the

remaining 58 Republicans voting no (Michigan Votes, 2003a).

Pumford’s second amendment, which also had the effect of opposing the Choice-
driven provisions contained in HB 4148, proposed a more restrictive funding
mechanism for charter schools that would have reduced the state aid received by
most charters. This vote failed on a very close 53-51 vote, with 44 Democrats
plus nine Republicans - Pumford, Stewart, LaSata, and Hart, in addition to Clark
Bisbee (from the 64‘“ district in Jackson County), Sandy Caul (from the 99th
district in and around Mount Pleasant), Larry Julian (from the 85th district in
Shiawassee County between Lansing and Flint), Jerry Kooiman (from the 75m

district in Grand Rapids), and Scott Shackleton (from the 107th district in and

84

around Sault Ste. Marie) — voting yes. A total of 52 Republicans voted no, and
were joined by a lone Democrat, Joseph Rivet of the 97"1 district representing

Clare, Gladwin, and a portion of Bay counties (Michigan Votes, 2003f).

The eighth and final amendment to H8 4148 before the final vote was taken was
offered by Republican Rep. LaSata. It promoted the accountability dimension of
the Efficiency value by proposing to prohibit for-profit educational management
organizations (EMOs) from operating charter schools, instead restricting the
involvement of EMOs to nonprofits. LaSata’s amendment failed on a 59-48 vote,
with all 45 voting Democrats plus Pumford, Stewart, and LaSata casting yes

votes and all 59 remaining Republicans voting no (Michigan Votes, 2003g).

Following the votes on the eight proposed amendments, the final House vote on
HB 4148 was called on March 20. Reflecting Rep. Palmer’s approved
amendment, the language in the bill promoted the Choice value in raising the cap
on university-sponsored charters by 30 per year for ten years, to a maximum of
450. Charters authorized by Bay Mills and any other community college would
be included in this cap, but community colleges would be allowed to authorize
charters in Detroit. With these decidedly pro-Choice provisions, the bill passed
by a 56-51 vote, with all 56 yes votes coming from Republicans. All 45 voting
Democrats cast “no” votes, and were joined by six Republicans, including three
(Pumford, LaSata, and Stewart) who had consistently voted with Democrats in

opposing the Choice-driven values contained in the eight proposed amendments

85

to the bill. Three additional Republicans — Lauren Hager from the 81St district in
and around Port Huron, Bruce Caswell from the 58“1 district in Hillsdale County,
and Gary Woronchak from the 15th district in Dearborn - also voted no. The bill
was then sent to the Senate, where it was officially received on March 25 and
referred to that Chamber’s Education Committee. Upon arrival in the Senate, HB
4148 essentially died, as key Senate leaders were in the process of formulating

their own charter bill - SB 393 — as discussed below (Michigan Votes, 2003h).

A number of interesting observations regarding instrumental values can be made
from looking at voting records related to H8 4148 and the legislators who
introduced amendments to this bill. Regarding the votes themselves, perhaps the
most obvious, although hardly surprising, ﬁnding, is the near-unanimity along
party lines, as only a smattering of Republicans — and not a single Democrat —
broke party ranks on any of the seven amendments for which voting data are
available, nor for the bill’s ﬁnal vote. Of particular interest was the fact that no
Democrats from Detroit or any of the state’s other urban areas voted for any of
the “charter-friendly” provisions that advance the Choice value. This is intriguing
in light of the fact that support for charters and ChOice has been shown to be
highest among urban and minority residents,“ in addition to the fact that several
key mayors -— including current Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick - have supported

the establishment and expansion of charters in their cities. This apparent

 

" Recent commentary on charter schools and‘school choice has investigated the extent of support these
new forms of education enjoy from various subgroups within the general population. A general trend
emerging from this body of work (see, for example, Olson, 2002; Shokraii, 1996; Lacayo, 1996) is that

86

discrepancy between the votes of urban legislators at the state level and the
wishes of a substantial portion of their constituents would appear to be an
excellent example of the power of party unity in modem-day politics, a
phenomenon which Kingdon (1995) and others have argued may be especially
true among parties (such as Democrats in both houses of the 2003 Michigan
Legislature) that are in the minority and seeking to hand their majority

counterparts a political defeat.

Democratic unity on HB 4148 can also be viewed through the observation that
the Michigan Education Association - not to mention four other non-education
unions, three local school districts, seven intermediate school districts, and four
interest groups representing traditional public schools - all testiﬁed in opposition
to the bill.15 All of these organizations, of course, are strong supporters of
traditional public schools and generally skeptical of charters, and have in some
cases been proliﬁc donors to Democratic politics. The MEA, for example, was
listed by the Michigan Campaign Finance Network (2002) as the third largest
political action committee in Michigan in terms of 2002 giving, trailing only the
House and Senate Republican Campaign Committees, respectively, with virtually

' all MEA donations going to Democratics. The MEA’s opposition to charters as

 

support for charters and choice is typically at least 10 percentage points higher among African Americans
than whites.

'5 In addition to the Detroit chapter of BAEO, other organizations listed by the House Legislative Analysis
Section as testifying in favor of HB 4148 included the Michigan chapter of the National Federation of
Independent Businesses, the Michigan Manufacturers Association, the Michigan Association of Public
School Academics, and ﬁve charter schools from around the state (Hunault & Martens, 2003).

87

they currently exist16 and as proposed in HB 4148 is well-documented, and it
stands to reason that the organization conducted a substantial amount of

lobbying to secure Democratic unity in advance of the votes on HB 4148.

The four Democratic representatives who offered amendments to HB 4148 -
Spade, Hopgood, Meisner, and Vagnozzi - are also an interesting lot. While all
are from southeastern Michigan, including three from Detroit-area suburbs, none
represents any portion of Detroit itself — despite the fact that the major provisions
of the bill are intended, either directly or indirectly, to impact Detroit more so than
any other school district in the state. Also of interest is the fact that three of the
four Democrats (Hopgood, Meisner, and Vagnozzi) are legislative newcomers,

having been elected to the Legislature for the ﬁrst time in November, 2002.

Several observations can also be made regarding Republicans who broke party
ranks in joining Democrats to oppose the Choice-driven provisions of HB 4148
and its amendments. A total of 12 GOP representatives broke party ranks in
voting with Democrats on at least one of the amendments and/or the ﬁnal vote on
HB 4148. Among these 12 legislators, Pumford was the most obvious

Republican maverick, voting with Democrats on all eight occasions; on two of

 

 

'6 The official position of the MEA with respect to charter schools has evolved over time, reﬂecting an
Ongoing compromise between the organization’s desire to safeguard the interests of its public school
Constituencies and the political reality that charters are likely here to stay. In the earliest stages of the
Charter debate, as legislation was being proposed back in 1993, the MEA’s outright opposition to the
Concept was clear. Following passage of the law and the subsequent growth of the charter movement,
however, the organization has gradually changed its tactics from outright opposition to “opposition by
Condition,” in which it proclaims general support for charters, but only under a series of conditions - most
Of which are bitterly opposed by charter advocates, who claim that any charters operating under all of these
conditions would have few, if any, differences from traditional public schools.

88

these votes, in fact, he was the only Republican to side with Democrats.

Pumford was followed, in decreasing order of GOP defections, by Stewart (6),
LaSata (4), and Hart (2), and then by Bisbee, Caul, Caswell, Hager, Julian,
Kooiman, Shackleton, and Woronchak (one GOP defection each). Republicans
who voted in opposition to at least one of the Choice-driven amendments to HB
4148 or the final bill itself are spread around the state, including districts that are
primarily rural in nature (Julian, Pumford) as well as those that include urban and
suburban areas (Bisbee, Kooiman), and have legislative tenure ranging from less
than a year in ofﬁce (Caswell, elected in 2002) to three-terrn legislators (Pumford,
Bisbee, Caul, Hager, Hart, Julian, LaSata, Shackleton, and Woronchak) who will

be term-limited out of office in 2004.

Perhaps the most interesting observation regarding the 12 Republican
representatives who opposed the most obvious manifestations of the Choice
value contained in H8 4148, however, is that five of them list a close connection
to public education (not counting being graduates of public schools or having
children enrolled in them) as part of their “bio” that appears on the Michigan
House of Representatives website. Pumford’s bio notes, for example, that he ‘
has 27 years experience as a high school teacher, counselor and basketball
coach at Newaygo High School (having taught high school government for 22
years), and is a member of the School Improvement Committee and the
Basketball Coaches Association of Michigan (Michigan House of

Representatives, 2004a). Caswell lists employment with North-Adams Jerome

89

High School, Onstead Community Schools, and Pittsford Area Schools on his
bio, as well as memberships in various athletic booster clubs and coaches’
associations (Michigan House of Representatives, 2004b). Hager had a 35-year
career as a special education teacher before entering the Legislature (Michigan
House of Representatives, 2004c).17 Hart’s bio indicates that he was a middle
school teacher before working in his family’s business (Michigan House of
Representatives, 2004d). LaSata, finally, has a wife who is an elementary school

teacher (Michigan House of Representatives, 2004e).

.The fact that these five legislators all have a close connection to public education
may in itself not be meaningful, as it is too small a number to draw any
conclusions from. It may also be the case that some Republican representatives
who did g9; vote with Democrats in opposing Choice-driven provisions of HB
4148 also have close personal connections to public education. However, given
Crano’s (1995) observation that vested interests can lead to the formation of
comparatively strong attitudes that are in turn more predictive of behavior than
instances in which no such vested interest exists, the involvement of these ﬁve
Republicans in public education, along with their opposition to at some of the
Choice-driven provisions contained in HB 4148 or its proposed amendments, is

at a minimum an interesting fact.

 

I71n addition to his opposition to charter-friendly amendments to H8 4148, it is worth noting that Hager, as
a member of the House Education Committee, was the only Republican member of that committee to vote
against SB 393 after it had been passed by the Senate and sent to the House; the bill passed the committee
by a 12-8 vote.

90

Senate Bill 393

Shortly after HB 4148 had been passed and sent to the Senate, a parallel bill
containing a number of similar provisions (and reﬂecting several key
recommendations of the Commission on Charter Schools) was introduced in the
Senate. SB 393, introduced on April 23, 2003, was given the title of the “Charter
School Oversight and Accountability Act” by its primary sponsor,18 Sen. Wayne
Kuipers: Republican from the 30th district comprising Ottawa and a portion of
Kent counties near Grand Rapids in western Michigan and Chair of the Senate
Education Committee. In the process of being introduced, amended, and voted
on, this bill would prove to be among the most contentious legislative proposals
of the 2003 session, and led to an intriguing power struggle involving the newly-
elected Democratic governor, the mayor of Detroit, legislative Republican
leaders, and heavyweight educational interest groups such as the Michigan

Education Association (Michigan Legislature, 2003).

The most signiﬁcant provisions of SB 393 are those that support the Choice
value. Speciﬁcally, the bill directly advanced Choice through the following

stipulations (Summers-Coty, 2003):

0 Increasing from 150 to 450 the total number of charter schools that can be

authorized by public universities (this figure was later reduced by a substitute

 

'8 Eleven of Michigan’s 22 Republican senators from the 2003 legislative session are also listed as co-
sponsors of SB 393 (Michigan Legislature, 2003).

91

amendment to 350, with the cap rising by 20 schools each year beginning in
2003 to a total of 350 in 2012)

Allowing community colleges to authorize charter schools in Detroit (although
charters authorized by Bay Mills Community College would be counted
toward the limit on university-sponsored charters, rather than as schools
authorized by community colleges

Permitting public universities to authorize up to five new charters at the high
school level each year for the next five years (up to a total of 25) that would
not count toward the cap on university-sponsored charters

Allowing two or more existing charter schools to form a joint high school that
would not count against the proposed five-school limit on new charters at the
high school level

Allowing two or more existing charters to form a joint high school that, if the
schools seeking to form the joint high school were chartered by a public

university, did not count against the cap on university-sponsored charters.

In addition to direct manifestations of Choice that pertain to establishing more

charters, SB 393 also advanced the Choice value through two stipulations

related to the ﬁnancing of charter schools (Summers-Coty, 2003):

Allowing charters to Count in their membership (and thus receive state funding
for) a limited number of students (up to 5% of total enrollment) who were

enrolled in a distance learning format; these students (pursuant to pending

92

HB 4719) must meet certain criteria such as being physically unable to attend
a school due to health reasons or having been expelled

Permitting charters to issue bonds: the primary significance of this provision is
that while charters would still not have taxing authority, they would very likely
gain decreased capital costs through increased borrowing flexibility

(SUmmers-Coty, 2003).

Yet another provision in the bill advanced Choice in conjunction with Equity

(Summers-Coty, 2003):

Permitting, in addition to the 25 new university-sponsored charter high

schools and the joint high schools described above, the creation of up to 15
“urban high schools academies,” also authorized by universities, that would
be operated within the boundaries of the Detroit school district; language in
the substitute amendment made clear that these schools would be ﬁnanced

by wealthy Detroit-area businessman and philanthropist Robert Thompson.19

Completing the range of values incorporated by SB 393, two provisions of the bill

also promote the accountability dimension of Efﬁciency (Summers-Coty, 2003):

 

'9 The speciﬁc language stipulates that in order to be chartered by a public university, an urban high school
academy would need to demonstrate a ﬁnancial commitment to construct or renovate the facilities that the
school was to occupy (Summers-Coty, 2003). Prior to this time, retired road construction executive Robert
Thompson had pledged to donate $200 million for the establishment of new high schools in Detroit that
would reduce dropout rates (Heinlein & Hombeck, 2003; Christoff, 2003).

93

. A requirement that authorizing bodies hold a charter school’s board of
directors accountable for the school’s academic performance

0 A requirement that a charter school’s board of directors make available to the
public information regarding its membership, operation and management,

ﬁnancial standing, teacher salaries and certiﬁcation, and health and safety.

After receiving Kuipers’ version of SB 393, the Senate Education Committee
made two amendments to the bill: the proposed cap on university-sponsored
charters was reduced from 450 to 350, and the ability of Bay Mills Community
College to authorize charters statewide was effectively removed by proposing to
count charters issued by this institution as part of the university-sponsored total.
On June 19, 2003, the full Senate passed this version of the bill by a 21-16 vote
that fell strictly along partisan lines, with all 21 voting Republicans casting “yes”

votes20 and all 16 Democrats voting no (Michigan Votes, 2003i).

Following its passage in the Senate, SB 393 was sent on June 19 to the House,
which in March had passed its own charter bill (HB 4148) that essentially died as
the Senate took up 393. The: House Education Committee reported SB 393 back
to the full House without amendment. Following a series of negotiations and
compromises, the provision allowing for 25 new charter high schools was

removed, but the stipulation for the 15 new high schools in Detroit (which had

 

20 One Republican senator, Ron Jelinek (R-Three Oaks in Berrien County), was excused from voting on SB
393 on June 19 (Michigan Votes, 2003i). Although the reason for Jelinek’s absence is not known, it is
interesting to note that his biography describes 30 years as a teacher in the River Valley School District
(Michigan Senate, 2003)

94

become known as the “Robert Thompson schools” remained. The full House
passed the bill by a 57-50 vote on July 17, 2003; all 47 voting Democrats, as well
as three Republicans (Pumford, Stewart, and Woronchak) cast “no” votes, while

57 Republicans voted yes (Michigan Votes, 2003j).

After passage in the House, SB 393 was sent back to the Senate, as the removal
of the 25 new high schools constituted a different version than had been passed
by the Senate in its June 19 passage of the bill. The Senate unanimously
rejected, by a 29-0 vote, the House-passed version of the bill, sending it to a joint
House-Senate conference committee to work out differences. This committee,
appointed by Senate Majority Leader Sikkema, consisted of himself, Republican
Sen. Kuipers (the sponsor of the original bill), and Democratic Sen. Bob Emerson
of Flint. The conference committee made no changes to the House-passed
version of the bill, however, and referred it back to the full Senate for a vote — still
containing the provision for the 15 new high schools in Detroit - on August 13,
the last day before the Legislature’s summer recess. Along straight party lines,
the bill passed by a 22-16 vote; all Republicans were in favor and all Democrats

were opposed (Michigan Votes, 2003k).

Public comments following the August 13 Senate vote on SB 393 provide a rich
and illustrative source of information regarding the instrumental values that
motivated legislators’ votes on this bill. One theme voiced by African American

senators from Detroit invoked the accountability dimension of the Efﬁciency value

95

in calling for local control over school-related decision-making in Detroit, free of
outside (read: white) inﬂuence. Comments to this effect equated SB 393 with the
1999 takeover of the Detroit school system led by then-governor John Engler and
Republican legislators; in this action, the elected Detroit school board was
replaced by a seven-member board appointed by the mayor of Detroit and the
governor. The takeover was bitterly opposed by Detroit’s legislative delegation
and many in the city, who viewed it as an unwarranted intnision by the
Legislature into the affairs of the predominantly black Detroit school system
(Christoff, 2003). A related theme from comments on SB 393 also questioned
whether the expansion of the charter school movement was the best way to
promote Quality. In explaining his “no” vote on SB 393, African American Detroit
Sen. Samuel “Buzz” Thomas had this to say:

“. . .I don't understand why this legislative chamber can't respect the wishes of the
folks who are elected to serve and represent that community in question
[Detroit]...We are telling you there is not the appropriate local accountability to
make this work... Simply imposing another mandate on Detroit is not going

to. . .make the dream [of high-quality education] a reality for all of Detroit kids... so
let’s not delude ourselves into believing that this is the savior of education...l
support charter schools. . .I want to be able to support charter schools,
however...in a way that allows my community and people from my community
with kids in those schools to participate, and this simply is not the answer"
(Michigan Votes, 20031).

Another African American senator from Detroit, Brenda Scott, echoed Thomas’s
comments, and did so in a manner that questioned philanthropist Thompson’s
motives in donating the funding for construction of the 15 new charter high

schools. Scott declared that

“...I am really concerned that this Mr. Thompson is so concerned about our
children in the Detroit area. If he wants charter schools, why doesn't he open

96

them up to all the cities in this state? Detroit can take care of its own. We don’t
need a Mr. Thompson coming in...Charter schools have not done all that they
should do...l have asked that we be given back...our right to vote for the Detroit
school boards. We haven't been able to get that bill to pass yet. . .[but] we are
ready to reconsider this and to tell Detroit what they have to do.” (Michigan
Votes, 2003m).

A third African American senator from Detroit, Inna Clark-Coleman, stated that
“...When I look at this bill, it reminds me of...when the so-called [Detroit school
board-related] reform efforts were jammed down the throats of the people of the
city of Detroit. 1 don’t see this [SB 393] as being any different...This Legislature -
I should say a certain group of legislators - decided what was best for Detroit
...Don't sit there and vote for something for our district when you don’t know what
we want. We don't do that to your districts, so why should you do it to ours? Mr.
Thompson should. . .see what the community wants...Don't sit there... and [then]
say “this is what's best for you.’ How would you feel if someone did that to your
community? (Michigan Votes, 2003n).

Clark-Coleman also attacked what she viewed as the lack of appropriate
accountability provisions in SB 393:

“...this bill does nothing to address accountability for our current charter
schools...[it] does not follow the recommendations of the McPherson
[Commission on Charter Schools] report...[which stated] that additional oversight
is needed if the Legislature increases the number of charter schools. So what is
this about?” (Michigan Votes, 2003n).

On the other side of the political aisle, key Republican legislators voiced support
for competing values in seeking to frame SB 393, as they had with previous
attempts to create and expand charter schools, as a decision between a failed
status quo (Detroit’s traditional public schools) and a new alternative (more
charters) that promised all four of the instrumental values. Passage of SB 393

would promote Quality and Equity by creating additional opportunities for Choice

in Detroit, proclaimed Senate Majority Leader Ken Sikkema (R-Grandville):

97

“...l have heard today...what we are against. It is time to say what we are for,
and we are for opportunity. This is an opportunity of a Iifetime...for good schools
in the city of Detroit...One of the great criticisms that l have heard [of charter
schools] for many years...is that there are so few high schools. This
initiative...proposes to locate 15 high schools in the city of Detroit where the
emphasis of those high schools is on graduation and higher education. How can
we possibly be opposed to that? [The Granholm administration has] basically
challenged this body and the Legislature to produce a good charter bill that gives
opportunity to children. We are doing that today for the children of Detroit...”
(Michigan Votes, 2003c).

Sikkema also sought to blunt Democratic criticism regarding SB 393 that it would
further undermine the accountability dimension of the Efﬁciency value in Detroit
by creating even more schools whose governing boards weren’t popularly
elected. To make this point, he reminded his colleagues that parents, and not
elected officials or state bureaucrats, would have ultimate oversight
responsibilities in deciding whether the new schools were doing their job. In
effect, Sikkema attempted to use anticipated demand on the part of Detroit
parents for new charters to discredit the claims of Thomas, Scott, and Clark-
Coleman that Detroiters were more interested in restoring local control than in
having high quality choices in education. He stated that

“...I just heard that this legislation is opposed by everyone from the city of Detroit.
Well, if that is true, then no one will enroll in any of these...schools. I suspect,
though, that the truth is different...l suspect this is opposed by the political
establishment in. . .Detroit for their own, largely political reason. Time will prove
to us that it is not opposed by [Detroit] parents...l am willing to wait and see the
truth of that matter...l will remind you again that no one in Detroit will be forced to
send their children to these schools; that will be up to them. I have heard that
there is no oversight. That isn't true. This legislation puts these high schools, like

any charter school under, the authority and the oversight of an authorizing body
in this state” (Michigan Votes, 20030).

98

Sen. Nancy Cassis, Republican from the 15th district in western Oakland County,
added this:

“. . .With all due respect, before us today are two options: to continue to support a
failing status quo, or to welcome a new day of hope for parental and student
choice in a city resurrecting itself. For me, the choice is choice” (Michigan Votes,
2003p)

The aftermath of the passage of SB 393 in August quickly became one of the top
political stories of 2003, with a series of events over the course of some two
months illustrating the complexity of the issue and the values and politics that
inﬂuence it. Prior to the bill’s approval, Democratic Gov. Granholm had sent
somewhat mixed signals regarding her views of its provisions. She had indicated
support for charters (and the Choice value) in general, but initially pledged to
veto SB 393 on the grounds that it did not include sufﬁcient accountability
measures (Efficiency) to oversee the new charters it proposed to create (Higgins;
2003; Christoff, 2003). Granholm's spokesperson also indicated that the bill’s
support for Choice went too far in its failure to limit the statewide chartering
authority of Bay Mills Community College (Heinlien 8 Hombeck, 2003).
Philanthropist Thompson’s support for Choice was clear, but he also sounded the
Efficiency (accountability) value by rejecting the idea that his new charters be
overseen by the Detroit school system; Thompson also let it be known that he
was considering walking away from the deal in order should he be contacted by
other Midwestern cities (Bell, 2003). Detroit teachers, predictably, lobbied

intensely against Choice and the Thompson deal, charging that it would

compromise Quality in their city by hurting existing schools and offering false

99

hope only to a select few students (Pratt 8 Christoff, 2003). In mid-September,
as negotiations between the governor and legislative Republicans continued to
avert a Granholm veto, news stories indicated that Thompson had given nearly
$900,000 to Republican candidates in elections of 2001 and 2002, making him

the largest independent political contributor in the state (Christoff, 2003).

In the midst of an increasingly acrimonious process, a deal was announced on
September 16 following meetings between Senate Majority Leader Sikkema,
House Speaker Rick Johnson, and Granholm. The gist of the compromise was
that 125 new university-sponsored charters would be allowed (upholding
Choice), in addition to the 15 Thompson-funded high schools in Detroit (Equity);
schools authorized by Bay Mills would be subject to the cap on university-
sponsored charters (restraining Choice to some extent), and enhanced
accountability measures for charters would be enacted (Efﬁciency). Additional
provisions promoting Efficiency and Equity while restraining Choice somewhat
were that the Detroit school board would return to being an elected body; all new
charter schools would be required to have at least one board member from the
community in which it was established; schools authorized by community
colleges (including Bay Mills) would count against the university-sponsored cap;
and the state would provide some reimbursement to school districts that lost

students (and funding) to charters (Christoff, 2003).

100

Just a few days later, however, the deal was off. Detroit Mayor (and former
Representative) Kwame Kilpatrick, Detroit Public Schools CEO Kenneth Bumley,
and members of Detroit’s legislative delegation protested that they had shut out
of negotiations between Granholm and legislative Republicans, and stated that
the city’s Lansing delegation should decline Thompson’s money unless the new
charters were authorized by the Detroit district. Granholm then called off the
deal, sending the bill back to the Legislature. Kilpatrick proclaimed that “...The
debate over school reform [in Detroit] has been hijacked...” While Granholm
declared that Sikkema and Johnson had attempted to revise the deal they had
made by inserting language that would allow for more charters than had been
agreed upon (a charge dismissed by Sikkema), the Republican leadership
blasted Granholm for letting Kilpatrick determine charter policy. Detroit had to
cancel classes for a day when nearly half of the district’s teachers went to
Lansing for a rally to protest SB 393 (Elrick 8 Bell, 2003; Christoff, 2003; Bailey,

2003; Pratt, 2003; Hoffman, 2003).

As Granholm and legislative Republicans traded accusations in the press, the
issue abruptly became moot when Thompson withdrew his $200 million that was
to have financed the 15 new charter high schools in Detroit. In a released
statement, Thompson noted that he had become “...disappointed and saddened
by the anger and hostility that has greeted our proposal.” Detroit Mayor Kilpatrick
proclaimed to not be saddened “because I know there is another day,” and

mimicked a goodbye wave during a televised town hall meeting in response to

101

his own rhetorical question of what Thompson should do if ”...he can’t abide by
the rules.” Senate Majority Leader Sikkema lamented that while Thompson had
merely wanted ”...to make a contribution...to help the City of Detroit...people
kept throwing roadblocks in front of him.” Detroit Sen. Irma Clark-Coleman
stated that “...Detroiters are distrustful of any legislation that comes down from
Lansing that is only meant for Detroit,” and said she felt “disrespected” when
Sikkema and Johnson left Detroit legislators out of negotiations. A Detroit Free
Press editorial lamented the “bumblers” whose actions led to the disintegration of
the deal, including Kilpatrick’s “dismissive posture” and "politicization in Lansing”
between Granholm and Republican leaders (Pratt, 2003; Christoff 8 Pratt, 2003;

Detroit Free Press, 2003).

Summary

Each of the four public records and legislative acts discussed in this section
provides an illustrative source of information regarding the competing values that
have influenced the policy process associated with Michigan’s charter schools.
The state’s original charter law, passed in 1993, introduced Choice as a large
scale guiding principle in public education for the first time, but also promoted
aspects of the other three values. The 2002 report of the Commission on
Charter Schools was significant largely through the recommendations it made,
particularly those that advanced Choice by calling for additional charters to be

authorized by public universities. This recommendation became perhaps the key

102

component of HB 4148 and SB 393, which were among the most publicized and
contentious bills of the 2003 legislative session. In the end, no legislative
changes were made during the 2003 session, but the charter issue is one that
almost certainly will reemerge in upcoming sessions due to pent-up demand for
additional charters and disagreement over which values should be upheld most

strongly by charter legislation.

Chapter 3: Data Collection Process and Response Rates

This chapter describes the process used to select the sample of respondents for
the research involved in this study, the different subgroups of respondents that
were contacted, and the response rates of results of the subgroups in terms of

completed surveys received.
Selection of Sample and Data Collection Process

The following subsection of discussion describes the process used to select and
contact the sample of respondents who received and completed the survey on

instrumental values and Michigan charter school policy.
Description of Sample Selection Process

A sample of more than 200 potential respondents for the survey was initially
identiﬁed based upon their status and involvement as policy elites involved in
education and charter schools. Respondents were identified in a variety of ways.
Legislative leaders, including formal leadership positions and education
committees in both legislative houses, were identiﬁed from State of Michigan
websites, as were leaders of well-known education-related interest groups. The

names of other prospective respondents came from newspaper or journal articles

104

related to charter schools or educational policy from daily monitoring of sources

such as the Detroit Free Press and Lansing State Journal.

From the initial list of over 200 respondents, some were eliminated in order to
obtain a reasonably balanced and representative sample. Approval of the list of
respondents and the survey instrument was granted by the University Committee
on Research Involving Human Subjects (UCRIHS) in October, 2003. The ﬁrst
actual contact with 171 potential respondents occurred in early October. Policy
elites were sent an information form (a copy of which appears as Appendix C)
describing the nature of the study and advising them that the survey itself would
be sent shortly. Contact information for respondents, including email addresses
and/or telephone numbers, was obtained in most cases from websites. The
majority of respondents were contacted via email, while a much smaller group
was contacted using regular mail due to lack of available email address. Several
potential respondents, upon receiving the information form, identiﬁed another
person within their office or organization that the survey should be sent to, while
seven people indicated that they preferred not to complete the survey due either

to time constraints or a lack of knowledge or interest regarding charter schools.

Approximately ten days after receiving the information form, the sample of 171
potential respondents received the survey itself. Those that did not return a
completed survey within 10 days to two weeks were sent an initial “reminder”

message, which was followed by a second reminder approximately 10 days to

105

two weeks after the ﬁrst. A third and ﬁnal reminder message was ’sent out about
a week after the second, or around November 20. All three reminder messages
contained another copy of the survey in the event the respondent had misplaced
earlier versions. Each of the respondents who ultimately completed the survey

received a brief thank-you message.
Description of Potential Sample

The sample of 171 potential respondents can be divided into six major groupings,

as described below.

A. Current and Former Legislators

The largest numerical group of potential respondents was the 73 current
legislators who were invited to participate in the survey. They include the ﬁve
members of the Senate and 19 members of the House Education Committees,
the 11 formal leadership positions in the House and 20 formal leadership
positions in the Senate, the 20 members of the Legislative Black Caucus (who
come from both legislative houses), and 13 legislators who either introduced or
proposed amendments to two key bills related to charter schools taken up during
the 2003 legislative session (Senate Bill 393 and House Bill-4148; see discussion
in “Legislative Summary” section). Several legislators belonged to more than

one of these subgroups (e.g., a senator could be on the Education Committee

106

and also be the Majority Floor Leader and/or a member of the Legislative Black
Caucus); thus the totals of the individual subgroups described above add up to
more than 73. Instructions to legislators indicated that a knowledgeable member
of their staff was welcome to ﬁll out the survey on their behalf, but there is no
indication based upon names voluntarily provided on most of the completed

surveys that this actually happened.

In addition to current legislators included in the sample, records from the 2002
legislative session identiﬁed several legislators who had introduced or been
prominently involved in charter-related bills during the 2002 legislative session,
but were no longer in ofﬁce for the 2003 session for reasons that included term
limits and retirement. Reliable contact lnfonnation for ﬁve former legislators was
found, and after contacting each of them by telephone and/or email, three

surveys were sent.

The perspective of a few key former legislators was of interest for several
reasons. First and foremost, these were legislators who, prior to not running for
office or being term—limited out of ofﬁce between 1998 and 2002, had participated
in the debate over passage of Michigan’s original charter school law in 1993 and
1994, as well as numerous proposed and actual changes to the law. As such,
they had a unique and valuable perspective that was of interest for this study. An
additional reason for contacting ex-legislators was a recommendation from a

current legislator who made a comment to the effect of “you should talk to former

107

Senator X, who really played a key role in developing that legislation.” As it
turned out, an additional (if somewhat unplanned) beneﬁt of seeking out former
legislators was that they proved much more willing to provide their thoughts, and
to do so in a candid manner, than did current legislators, for possible reasons

discussed in more detail below.

B. Education-related subgroups within state government

A second major grouping of 15 prospective respondents consisted of agencies,
departments, and individuals within state government that have been involved in
the formation of educational policy and/or charter schools. One sub-category
within this group was the ofﬁce of the Lieutenant Governor, who was contacted
with the (ultimately incorrect) thought that this ofﬁce would be more likely to
respond than the Governor’s ofﬁce. A second sub-category was the Michigan
Department of Education, in the form of the State Superintendent, and staff from
the department that oversee charter schools and other school choice programs.
A third sub-category was the State Board of Education, with its eight elected
members. The fourth and ﬁnal sub—category includes ﬁve of the eight members
of the Commission on Charter Schools, a working group appointed jointly by
then-governor John Engler and the Legislature in October 2001 to study charter

schools and develop policy recommendations for their improvement.

108

C. Education-related interest groups and professional associations

A third group of prospective respondents included 25 leaders of interest groups
and professional associations that are directly involved in education and/or
charter schools. These organizations represent a diverse range of constituencies
within education, including associations of charter and private schools, school
administrators (principals, school boards, business ofﬁcers, etc.), teachers,
higher education, and students with disabilities. Also included in this group were
two private, for-proﬁt companies known as educational management
organizations (EMOs) that have received contracts to manage many charter

schools in Michigan and other states.
D. Business, advocacy, and civic organizations

A set of 22 organizations under a broad category of business, advocacy, and
civic organizations is the fourth major group of prospective respondents.
Included in this group are organizations whose interests are not exclusively in
education, but have signiﬁcant interest and involvement in education-related
issues such as school reform and charter schools. One subset of this group
consists of organizations that represent business interests or organized labor, a
second includes civic associations and coalitions of governmental entities, and a
third consists of advocacy organizations that have been actively involved in

school-related policymaking, research, and charter schools.

109

E. Charter School Authorizers

A fifth and ﬁnal grouping of prospective respondents consisted of representatives
from the four types of public entities that authorize and oversee charter schools
in Michigan: public universities, community colleges, intermediate school districts
(lSDs), and local school districts. The Michigan Department of Education has
published a list of 26 entities, including eight public universities, three community
colleges, 11 1305, and four local school districts that had authorized at least one
charter school as of June 2003, and 25 of these were contacted. I was unable to
locate an appropriate contact person for the 26th authorizer, a district in the
Detroit metropolitan area that was known to be experiencing signiﬁcant difﬁculty
due to financial issues and a potential state takeover. The eight public
universities had authorized by far the highest number of charter schools listed as
being in operation in June 2003, with 148 (or nearly 75% of the state total of
200). The 11 lSDs had authorized a total of 28 schools (14% of the state total),
while the three community colleges and the four local school districts had each
authorized 12 schools, or 6% of the state total (Michigan Department of

Education, 2003).

F. Urban and Minority Advocacy Organizations

The sixth grouping of prospective respondents was to have included state-level

and/or local afﬁliate chapters of the NAACP and the National Urban League,

110

which are two organizations that advocate speciﬁcally for the interests of urban
areas and/or minority residents. Four local chapters of the NAACP and three
local NUL affiliates were in fact contacted, as was the state-level leadership of
the NAACP, for a total of eight prospective respondents. Unfortunately, no
responses were received from any of these organizations, leaving the sample

with five groupings from which completed surveys were actually received.

Throughout the process of selecting potential respondents and monitoring their
rates of survey completion, one methodological issue that arose was whether a
minimum number of responses were required in order to accurately reﬂect the
views of the larger population of that subgroup (all legislators or charter school
authorizers, for example). This was a particularly salient issue for current
legislators given the small response rate among this group, discussed and shown
below in Table 2. A related question was whether views expressed by any
subgroup of respondents — with legislators again serving as a good example —
were meaningful given that survey and opinion research has found that some
respondents, particularly those who are elected and/or have multiple
constituencies to which they are accountable, often find it difﬁcult to give honest
and candid views on controversial topics (see, for example, Tetlock, Peterson, 8

Lerner, 1996; Babble, 1995).

Upon further consideration of these two issues, several decisions were made.

Regarding response rates and a possible minimum number of completed surveys

111

from any one subgroup, it was decided that no such minimum threshold Should
apply, and that all responses - including those of current legislators, who had the
lowest response rate — would be included in the reporting of ﬁndings. Part of the
rationale for this decision is that all completed surveys add something to the
overall analysis in terms of providing larger numbers of countable responses as
well as diversity of opinion, as no two respondents viewed issues regarding

charters and the instrumental values in the exact same way.

Additionally, preliminary analysis of several key variables showed that excluding
the nine legislators who completed the survey (six current and three former, not
counting a 10th legislator who answered only portions of the survey) made little
difference in terms of shifting most major findings in any discernable direction.
Among the nine legislators who completed surveys, five were Democrats and
four Republicans. In terms of concerns regarding and support for charter schools
(Questions 1,3, and 5 on the survey; see Appendix B), the nine were fairly evenly
divided in their opinions, and also were not appreciably different from the overall
sample of respondents in terms of rank-ordering of the four instrumental values
(Question 9). As such, removing legislators from the analyses made little, if any,
difference with respect to many of the most significant variables in the analysis.
A possible exception here is Question 7; differences between legislators and
other respondent subgroups on this question are discussed in Chapter 4. The
fact that legislators were somewhat different from other subgroups on this

question, however, only validates the decision to keep legislators in the analysis,

112

Q

because uncovering these kinds of differences would be impossible if legislators
or other subgroups were excluded. As it turned out, the number of completed
surveys received from the five respondent subgroups (see Table 2) turned out to

be distributed fairly evenly, even if their response rates differed.

Regarding the extent to which the responses of any subgroup can be generalized
to the larger population they represent, and the potential problem of respondents
not being able to give honest answers due to wanting to please multiple
constituencies, this is acknowledged as a possibility. It does not, however,
appear to be an issue that is unique to any specific subgroup; rather, it could
potentially affect most, if not all, subgroups within this study, as well as survey
research in general. Legislators may indeed have been reluctant to provide
honest answers in an attempt to satisfy their multiple constituencies (voters,
interest groups, their colleagues, etc.), but this same argument applies, for
example, to charter school authorizers, who are accountable (at a minimum) to
the schools they have chartered (which are free to approach other chartering
entities), to the State Board of Education (for paperwork and compliance with
regulations), and to legislators and the governor (who make the laws that
authorizers must follow). As such, potential difficulties in terms of respondents
not being able or willing to provide honest responses is acknowledged as a
limitation of this research, but not one that warrants the exclusion of any

subgroup of respondents more so than others.

113

Completed Surveys and Response Rates

A total of 51 completed surveys were received from the 171 respondents who
were sent a copy of the survey, for an overall response rate of 29.8%. The
response rate improves substantially, however, to almost 50% if current
legislators — who proved not nearly as likely as other subgroups to respond to the
survey, for reasons discussed below — are excluded. In addition to the 51
completed surveys, two other respondents declined to complete the survey itself,
but did provide a number of insightful comments regarding charter schools that

are included in Chapter 6.

Approximately half of the 51 surveys received came via email, with just less than
half received by regular mail and the remainder by fax. Among those received
via regular mail were four in which the respondent declined to identify
himself/herself _a_n_g the postmark does not permit positive identiﬁcation of the
sender.21 Telephone conversations were also held with six current and former
legislators in which open-ended survey questions and other topics of interest
related to charter schools were administered. An analysis of key ﬁndings from
these telephone interviews appears in the “Telephone Interviews with Current

and Former Legislators” section.

 

2' In addition to the four surveys returned via regular mail in which the respondent declined to self-identify,
a number of respondents who returned their surveys by email also declined to identify themselves. In the
email cases, however, I had the benefit of knowing who the respondent was by using their email address;
accordingly, I have included responses from these “unknown” email surveys in the analysis of survey data.

114

Embedded within the overall reSponse rate are substantially different rates
among the five major groups of policy elites, as shown in Table 2. Current
legislators comprised the largest numerical group of potential respondents who
were sent surveys (73), but had the lowest overall response rate (with seven
completed surveys, for a response rate of 9.6%). Several explanations for the
low rate of response among current legislators are known. One is that several
legislators or their staff members explicitly stated that their office has a standing
policy against completing surveys. Time constraints are undoubtedly another
explanation, as legislators clearly have many demands upon their time. The
timing of the survey may have been particularly unfavorable in retrospect, as it
came prior to the holiday season during prolonged deliberations over Michigan’s
budget shortfall and other important end-of-session business. Aside from
explanations related to time, many legislators may seek to avoid taking a public
stand on complex and divisive issues such as charter schools beyond what is
required by the casting of votes. Methodological issues related to the survey,
such as perceptions that it oversimplified the charter school issue and forced
respondents into false choices (see Babble, 1995; Allan 8 Skinner, 1991; Rossi

et al, 1983), might also explain the reluctance of current legislators to respond.

Regardless of reason, response rates for current legislators were clearly low in
comparison with other subgroups. However, when current legislators are
subtracted both from the number of potential respondents (171 - 73) and from the

number of responses received (51 — 6 + the four “unknown” surveys + the two

115

respondents who did not complete the survey itself but did provide comments on
charter schools), theoverall response rate rises to 48.0% (see “Total C" in Table
2). The growing body of recent research on email surveys and response rates
seems to indicate that this is a good rate of return; a meta-analysis of 49 email
surveys conducted by, Cook, Heath, 8 Thompson (2000), for example, revealed

an average response rate of 39.6% (see also Shannon 8 Bradshaw, 2002).

116

Table 2: Response Rates among Respondent Subgroups

 

Respondent Subgroup: Potential Responses Response
Respondents Received Rate
(survey sent)

 

Other Government:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

State Board of Education 8 4r 50.0%1
Commission on Charter School 5 22 40.0%2
Other 2 1 50.0%
Subgroup total 15 7 46.6%
Interest Groups 25 1 1 44.0%
Charter School Authorizers: -
Public Universities 8 - 33 37.5%3
Community Colleges 3 24 66.7%:
Intermediate School Districts 11 5 45.4%
Local School Districts 3 1 33.3%
Suggroup total 25 1 1 44.0%
Business/Advocacleivic 22 9 40.9%
Legislators:
Current 73 7 9.6%
Former 3 3 100.0%
Subgroup total 76 10 13.2%
Urban/Minority Advocacy Groups 8 0 0.0%

 

Total A (not counting 4

 

 

., ,, 171 47 ' 27.5%
unknown surveys)

Total B (countrng4 unknown 171 51 29.3%

surveys)

Total C (excluding current

legrslators, Includrng 4 98 47 48.0%

“unknown” surveys and 2

ﬁgeneral’f’

 

 

 

 

 

 

‘ Four members of the State Board of Education completed the survey in its entirety, of whom
three chose to identify themselves and one (who was one of the four “unknown” respondents)
preferred not to. Additionally, a ﬁfth board member did not complete the survey due to time
constraints, but did provide insightful comments of a general nature on charter schools.

2Two Commission members completed the survey and identiﬁed themselves. Additionally, it
appears from the way in which survey questions were answered that the second of the four
“unknown” respondents who completed the survey but elected not to identify himself/herself may
have been a Commission member. This possible respondent is not counted as a third response
received within this subcategory.

3Three public universities submitted completed surveys, and it appears that a fourth (which was
not counted here) was the third of the four “”unknown surveys.

Two community colleges returned completed surveys, and it appears that the third (which was
not counted here) was the fourth and ﬁnal "”unknown respondent.

5The two ”general” respondents are those that did not complete the survey itself, but provided
general comments regarding Michigan educational policy and charter schools.

117

Regarding response rates among former legislators, all three ex—legislators who
were sent a copy of the survey returned it, for a response rate of 100% among
this very small subgroup. While it is difﬁcult to compare response rates among
current and former legislators due to the very small number of the latter, one
explanation for the apparent willingness of former legislators to share their
thoughts on charters is that no longer being in ofﬁce (and thus directly
accountable to various voting constituencies) makes these former public ﬁgures
less reluctant to share views on controversial issues. A telephone conversation
was held with one of the remaining two former legislators, who was very cordial
but indicated despite being listed as a sponsor or cosponsor of several key bills
related to charter schools, he actually didn’t know much about the topic and thus

preferred not to complete the survey.

Among the subgroup of 15 respondents who were either employed by or
associated with agencies of state government other than the Legislature, seven
returned completed surveys, for a response rate of 46.6%. Responses were
received from the Michigan Department of Education, elected members of the

State Board of Education, and the Commission on Charter Schools.22

 

22 Commission chairman Peter McPherson was not contacted, and a survey was completed by other
personnel from the Michigan Department of Education on behalf of Commission member Tom Watkins,
State Superintendent for Public Instruction. The eighth member of the Commission, Michigan Education
Association President Lu Battaglieri, was contacted as a representative of an education-related interest

group.

118

Officials from eleven of the 25 organizations representing education-related
interests and professionals responded to the survey, for a response rate of
44.0%. It was somewhat surprising and disappointing that one of the interest
groups that did not respond was the Michigan Education Association, given its
intense involvement and interest in charter school policy, but a completed survey
was received from an educational management organization (EMO) that

operates several charters across the state.

Among the 22 organizations that represent Michigan business interests, civic
associations, and advocacy/research groups, nine leaders returned completed
surveys, for a response rate of 40.9%. Of interest is that many responding
organizations within this subgroup are headquartered and involved in
southeastern Michigan (and Detroit specifically); given the importance of the
Detroit metropolitan area in the economy of Michigan and the concentration of
charter schools in and around Detroit, these represent ideal organizations from

which to seek input on charters.

The overall response rate among charter school authorizing agencies was
44.0%, although there were notable differences between the four types of
authorizers. Response rates were highest among community colleges, followed

in order by lSDs, public universities, and local school districts.

119

Summary

From an initial sample of more than 200 potential respondents, 171

Michigan policy elites were contacted and sent surveys for this research. The
sample consisted of ﬁve distinct groups of respondents: current and former
legislators; education-related subgroups within state government, including the
State Board of Education and Commission on Charter Schools; interest groups
involved in educational policy; business, advocacy, and civic organizations; and
charter school authorizers. A sixth subgroup, urban and minority advocacy

groups, was also sent surveys, but none were returned.

The overall response rate was 29.8%, although it is nearly 50% if current
legislators (who were the largest numerical group of respondents, at 73, but had
the lowest response rate, at 9.6%) are excluded. Four of the ﬁve groups of
respondents had response rates of at least 40%, and the number of completed
surveys received each group was fairly equal, including 11 each from interest
groups and charter school authorizers, ten from current (7) and former (3)
legislators, nine from business/advocacylcivic groups, and seven from
governmental agencies, for a total sample of 51 completed surveys. In addition,
two respondents who declined to complete the survey provided comments .
related to charter schools, and six respondents who completed surveys were
also interviewed by telephone to elaborate upon issues of values within

educational policy and charter schools.

120

Chapter 4: Summagy of Major Findings

This chapter, which presents major findings from completed surveys, is divided
into four main sections. The first presents a “proﬁle” of respondents in
accordance with several key variables. These include the political afﬁliation of
respondents as well as key characteristics of their districts or constituencies in
terms of geography, political tendencies, and race/ethnicity. The second section
investigates the extent of respondents’ involvement, or “personal stake,” in
education-related activities and organizations. Together, the ﬁrst two sections
establish a basis for subsequent analyses by providing key independent

variables for examining attitudes toward charter schools and instrumental values.

The third section explores the core research objective of this study by examining
respondents’ comparative preferences for, and deﬁnitions of, the four
instrumental values in educational policy. This analysis uses three distinct
measures to assess Michigan policy elites’ preferences for the four values in
direct comparison with one another. It then examines the extent to which
respondents’ own deﬁnitions of the four values agree with ways in which they
have been deﬁned and Operationalized in previous research. Independent
variables from the ﬁrst two sections are used to help explain differences in
respondents” preferences for the four instrumental values, as well as ways in

which ﬁndings differ from those of Marshall et al and Garn.

121

The fourth section describes respondents’ views of several key issues K-12
education that are signiﬁcant in the debate over charter schools, as well as their
assessment of charters themselves. This section begins by investigating
Michigan policy elites’ views of an appropriate role for state government in
establishing educational policy, and then turns to respondents’ assessment of the
effectiveness of key educational policymaking agencies such as the Michigan
Department of Education, the State Board of Education, and their local school
district. Discussed next are perceptions regarding the performance of different i
types of K-12 schools in Michigan, including public, private, and charter schools.
Attention then turns to respondents’ views of charter schools and other forms of
school choice, including how successful charters have been in providing intended
outcomes, level of concern with key issues related to charters, the level of
support for various forms of school choice other than charter schools, and

whether charters are serving as a “stepping stone” to other forms of choice.

The primary format for reporting of survey ﬁndings within these four sections is
frequency distributions for items on the survey instrument. Additional analysis is
also provided for several survey questions which solicited respondent comments

in an open-ended format.

122

Proﬁle of Respondents: Key Non-Education Characteristics

It is useful to begin by describing several key characteristics of respondents that
are not specifically related to education or charter schools. Speciﬁcally,
Questions 22-25 on the survey instrument (see Appendix B) investigated four key
variables: the geographic nature, political tendencies, and racial/ethnic
composition of policy elites’ district or principal constituency; and their own self-

identiﬁed political affiliation.

Characteristics of Respondents’ Home Districts/Constituencies:
Geography, Political Tendencies, and Race/Ethnicity

A series of three questions (22-24 on the survey instrument) asked respondents
to describe key characteristics of their political district (in the case of legislators)
or their primary constituency, organization, interest group, or department (for all
other respondents). These questions are obviously of varying relevance to
respondents, depending upon the nature of their role as policy elites; legislators,
for example, have a clearly-deﬁned district and constituency, while other
respondents such as the State Board of Education, Department of Education,
and most interest groups represent the entire state rather than a speciﬁc
geographic district. Separate questions might have been asked of respondents
based upon the nature of their district or constituency (for example, questions
only for legislators asking them to describe their district, but it was ultimately

decided that having a common set of questions answered by all respondents was

123

desirable in order to compare across subgroups. It is also true that even
respondents without a specific geographic district were able and/or willing in a
majority of cases to characterize their primary constituency or organization. As
such, the directions for these questions 22-24 indicated that they should be

completed by “state legislators/staff and all others, as applicable.”

More than six in ten respondents (60.8%) elected to identify what they perceived
as the geographic nature of their district or constituency. An interesting and
varied distribution emerged, with the modal response category being
“urban/suburban mix,” followed by “all or mostly urban” (see Table 3). In
retrospect, after reviewing written comments provided by several respondents,
two other response categories should have been added to this question,
including “urban, suburban, and rural mix” and “statewide.” It might also be
possible, although seemingly unlikely, for a district or constituency to have an

urban/rural mix without a suburban component.

Table 3: Geographic Nature of Respondents’ District/Constituency

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Percentage of Respondents,
by Geographic Category

Geoggphic Category:
Urban/suburban mix 32.3%
All or mostly urban 25.8%
All or mostly suburban 19.4%
All or mostly rural 12.9%
Suburban/rural mix 9.7%

100.0%
Total (n=31)

 

 

 

124

Regarding perceived political leanings of respondents’ districts/constituencies, a
somewhat conservative trend emerged (see Table 4). More than half of
respondents (55.8%) indicated that their district/constituency was on the
conservative side of the political spectrum, compared to only 26.4% on the liberal
side. Just less than 18% of respondents identiﬁed no discernable political

leaning for their district/constituency.

Table 4: Political Tendencies of Respondents’ District/Constituency

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Percentage of Respondents,
by Political Tendency Category

Political Tendency Category:
Very Conservative 2.9%
Somewhat Conservative 23.5%
Lean Conservative 29.4%
Neither/Middle 17.7%
Lean Liberal 14.7%
Somewhat Liberal ' 8.8%
Very Liberal 2.9%

100.0%
Total ("=50)

 

 

 

A third demographic question asked respondents to characterize the racial/ethnic
composition of their district/constituency in accordance with its percentage of
white and non-white members. Four response categories were provided: “All or
predominantly white” was deﬁned on the survey as being approximately 90% or
more white, “Significantly white” was defined as approximately 70-89% white,
“Majority white” was deﬁned as 51-69% white, and “Majority non-white” was
deﬁned as 50% or less white. Among the respondents who answered this

question (see Table 5), identical shares indicated that their district/constituency

125

was “all or predominantly white” or “signiﬁcantly white” (30.3% each), while

21.2% selected “majority white” and 18.2% “majority non-white.”

Table 5: Race/Ethnicity of Respondents’ District/Constituency

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Percentage of Respondents,
by Racial/Ethnic Category

Racial/Ethnic Category:
All or predominantly white (90% or more) 30.3%
Significantly white (70-89%) 30.3%
Majority white (51 -69%) 21.2%
Majority non-white (50% or less) 18.2%

100.0%
Total (n=34)

 

 

 

Self-Reported Political Afﬁliation

A large majority of respondents who completed the survey was willing to
characterize their own political afﬁliation, and a fairly even distribution emerged
(see Table 6). The largest share of respondents (21.6%) self-identiﬁed as
“neither Republican nor Democrat,” while 39.3% identiﬁed on the Democratic
side of the spectrum (either “strong Democrat,” “Democrat,” or “lean Democrat”)
and 29.4% placed themselves on the Republican side. Just under 10% of
respondents declined to self—identify their political afﬁliation at all, while a single
respondent described himself as a “small ‘I’ Iibertarian...There are more of them
in the GOP, but most GOP are “statists” too. It is interesting to note that in

comparison with how they described the political tendencies of their

126

district/constituency, elites’ own political inclinations were more centrist and left of

center.

Table 6: Self-Reported Political Afﬁliation of Survey Respondents

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Percentage of Respondents,
by Political Afﬁliation

Political Afﬁliation:
Strong Republican 3.9%
Republican 13.7%
Lean Republican 11.8%
Neither Republican nor Democrat 21.6%
Lean Democrat 11.8%
Democrat 15.7%
Strong Democrat 11.8%
Other/No Response 9.8%

100.0%
Total (n=51)

 

 

 

Involvement in Education and Charter Schools

Questions 15 and 17-19 on the survey instrument asked respondents to describe
the amount and the nature of their involvement in activities related to K-12
education and charter schools. The primary purpose of these questions was to
provide a means for testing the hypothesis that a “personal stake” in education -
such as being a member of, having worked for, and having a child attend, various
types of K-12 schools - might impact respondents’ attitudes toward charter
schools and/or the four instrumental values in educational policy involvement in

some demonstrable way.

127

Question 15 asked if respondents are a member of, or represent, any group or
organization that has a direct involvement with traditional public schools, private
schools, or charter schools. Table 7 shows that nearly two-thirds of respondents
(64.7%) are in fact a member of, or represent, a group or organization involved
with traditional public schools. More than half (52.9%) are involved with charter
schools in this capacity, while just over one-fourth (25.5%) are involved with

private schools.

Table 7: Survey Respondents’ Involvement in K-12 Education

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Percentage of Respondents Reporting
Involvement, b Type of School:
Traditional Public Private Charter
Type of Involvement:
Respondent is member of or 64.7% 25.5% 52.9%
represents (n=33) (n=1 3) (n=27)
Res ondent or famil has worked in :
or been member of grganization 70;6% 179% 31;4%
. (n-36) (n—9) (n-15)
supportIng
Respondent's children have 66.7% 17.6% 3.9%
attended (n=34) (n=9) (n=2)

 

 

 

 

Several respondents, such as those from the State Board of Education and

intermediate school districts, indicated membership/representation involving two

or more types of schools (usually traditional public and charter), while a few

others (such as leaders of education-related interest groups) indicated that they

are involved in all three types.

128

 

Interestingly, however, only 7.7% of respondents who indicated involvement with
private schools was not also involved in either (or both) of the other two types of
schools (e.g., only 7.7% were “private-only” policy elites). By contrast, 35.1% of
those reporting involvement in traditional public schools were “traditional public
school only" elites, and 18.5% of those involved in charter schools were “charter-
only” elites. In some cases, involvement in only one type of school makes
perfect sense (e.g., a charter school authorizing official from a public university

whose job duties involve only charter schools).

On the other hand, the fact that 64.9% of elites involved in traditional public
schools are not otherwise involved in K-12 education (in either private or charter
schools) may be evidence that some degree of “balkanization” has occurred as a
result of charters and competition, with the traditional public school establishment
distrustful and resentful of competition and its employees perhaps less likely to
be involved in private (and especially charter) schools. To test this hypothesis,
one would need involvement data for policy elites in private schools prior to the

emergence of charters, which is not available to my knowledge.

Returning to Table 7, a second question (#17 on the survey instrument) asked
whether respondents or any member of their immediate family had worked in a
traditional public, private, or charter school, pr had been a member of an
organization that supports one or more of these types of schools, within the past

10 years. More than two-thirds (70.6%) of respondents indicated that they or an

129

immediate family member had in fact worked in a traditional public school or an
organization that supports this type of school within the past decade. This was
higher than the combined involvement in charter schools (31.4%) and private
schools (17.6%). Nearly one-fourth (23.5%) of respondents reported no
involvement on the part of themselves or family members in any of the three

types of schools during the past decade.

Having had a child in attendance at any of the three types of K-12 schools
(Question 18) was a third measure of a “personal stake” in education.
Speciﬁcally, this question asked whether any child in the respondent’s household
had attended a traditional public, private, or charter school within the past 10
years. Not surprisingly, traditional public schools were by far the most common
type of school attended by the children of policy elites, as 66.7% of respondents
indicated at least one child having attended such a school in the past decade.
Far fewer (17.6%) reported a child having attended a private school, while only
3.9% have had a child attend a charter school. Just over one-fourth (25.5%)

reported no child having attended any of the three types of schools.

A fourth and final measure of “personal stake” in education (Question 19) was
whether respondents have engaged in six different forms of involvement for, or
on behalf of, any of the three types of K-12 schools. As shown in Table 8,
respondents were more likely, by wide margins, to report having participated in

each of the six involvement roles on behalf of traditional public schools than on

130

behalf of private or charter schools. In comparing involvement in charter vs.

private schools, respondents were more likely to have donated money to private

than to charter schools, but more likely to have engaged in each of the other ﬁve

forms of involvement on behalf of charters as opposed to private schools.

Contacting legislators, interestingly, was nearly as popular with respect to

charters as it was to traditional public schools, perhaps indicating the contentious

nature of the topic.

Table 8: K-12 Support/Advocacy Activities of Survey Respondents

 

Percentage of Respondents Reporting

Selected Support/Advocacy
Involvement, by Type of School:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Traditional Private Charter
Public
Type of Support/Advocacy:
O O O
Contacted legislator regarding @2333 18:5? (5:13;;
65.3% 16.3% 16.3%
Volunteered (n=32) (n=8) (n=8)
0 0 O
Served on decision-making body 81:46; 15:9? 3:35
0 0 0
Donated money to 81%;; Era-£63 12:25?
. 49.0% 10.2% 28.6%
VotIng member of (n=24) 01:5) (n=1 4)
0 0 0
Wrote letter to media regarding $21203 31:13 5331/;

 

The most common form of involvement on behalf of traditional public schools

was contacting a legislator (with 72.9% of respondents reporting having done

so), followed in order by volunteering (65.3%), serving on a decision-making

body (61.2%), and donating money (59.2%). Among those involved with private

131

 

schools, by contrast, the most common form of involvement (with 32.7% of
respondents reporting having done so) was donating money, while involvement
regarding charter schools resembled traditional public schools in that the most
common form of activity was contacting a legislatOr (56.2%). It would have been
interesting, in retrospect, to have had a much larger sample of legislators to
serve as a “check” on these findings by asking how often they heard from
constituents regarding the different types of schools, and how education-related

comments compared to other issues in terms of volume of constituent comments.

Contrasting Measures of Value Preference among Policy Elites

The third section of findings below summarizes and discusses respondents’
comparative preferences for, and deﬁnitions of, the four instrumental-values in
education policy as used in research conducted by Marshall, Mitchell, 8 Wirt
(1989) and Garn (2000). These preferences and definitions were measured in
four distinct ways on the survey instrument: paired statements representing each
of the four values within three “policy domains” (Question 7), direct comparison of
preference for each of the four values against the other three (Question 8), rank-
ordering of preference for the four values (Question 9), and level of agreement or

disagreement with two different definitions for each value (Question 10).

132

Comparison of Paired Statements Representing Instrumental Values

The ﬁrst measure of Michigan policy elites’ preferences for the four instrumental
values (appearing in Question 7) attempted to replicate the research conducted
by Marshall, Mitchell, 8 Wirt (1989), who had policy elites in their six-state study
from the mid-19803 assign preferences to 18 pairs of value statements in a
forced choice format. One statement appeared on the left on each line and the
other on the right, separated by six dashes designed to measure strength of
preference for one value in comparison with the other (see Appendix D for the

instrument utilized by Marshall and colleagues).

The 18 pairs involved combinations of 12 unique statements, each of which was
intended by Marshall and colleagues to represent one of the four instrumental
values (Quality, Efﬁciency, Equity, or Choice) within one of three “domains,” or
major policy areas, within education (Program, Finance, or
Organization/Governance; see Table 9). The Program domain was deﬁned as
control of “program planning and accreditation, or...what schools must teacher
and how long they must teach it.” Finance involved “how education funds are
distributed and how human and fiscal resources are allocated to the schoOIs,”
and Organization/Governance involved “the assignment of authority and
responsibility to various groups and individuals” (Marshall, Mitchell, 8 Wirt, 1989:
60-1). It is important to note again that while Marshall and colleagues.deﬁned
the four values and three domains as described above, respondents in their

study were po_t made aware that the statements they were being asked to choose

133

between were intended to represent any values or domains; indeed, neither of

these terms appeared on the survey instrument used in the Marshall study.

Table 9: Statements Representing Values and Policy Domains

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Program Finance Organization/Governance
Statement Statement Statement

Value:

Setting higher Increasing the Developing quality-
Quality academic level of funding conscious leadership

standards for schools

Making Improving the use More efﬁcient school
Efficiency programs more of education tax management

cost-effective dollars

Giving more Greater Broader participation in
Equity attention to equalization of decision-making

children with resources

special needs

Increasing Reducing Providing more choices for
Choice program restrictions on .families and children

flexibility local eyenditures .

 

 

 

 

Source: Marshall, Mitchell, 8 Wirt, 1989293.

Marshall and colleagues offer little description of how they developed the

statements used to represent the four instrumental values within the three

domains. As such, it is not clear whether the face validity of the statements had

been validated in previous research, or what type of vetting process (if any) was

used if the statements were developed by Marshall and colleagues for the

purposes of their own work. As noted, respondents were also not made aware

that the statements they were choosing between in Question 7 were intended to

represent the four values, and were given no opportunity to agree or disagree

134

 

with the statements in accordance with their own beliefs p[ to offer alternatives.

These issues clearly represent methodological limitations of the Marshall study.

The lack of explanatory information provided by Marshall and colleagues in terms
of how they chose statements to represent the four values also provides ample
opportunity to wonder how results might have differed had different statements
been used, or how. contextual differences such as the time period involved might
affect results. The Equity statement within the Program domain, for example, is
“Giving more attention to children with special needs.” How, if at all, would elites’
preferences for this value have differed if a statement such as “using busing to
integrate schools" had been used instead? It seems plausible, giventhe
contentious nature of busing, that overall preference for Equity would be lower in
this hypothetical case than if “greater attention to children with special needs”
was used, as Marshall et al did. It is difficult to know for sure, however, and
some elites would likely be more likely, rather than less, to value Equity using the
busing example. Similarly, would the use of a statement such as “allowing
schools (including parent representatives) greater autonomy in choosing
teachers and staff” to represent Choice within the Program domain have
changed results? It is again difficult to know, although this research offers some
perspective by presenting (in Question 10) two distinct deﬁnitions for each of the

four values to investigate how policy elites may operationalize them differently.

135

By developing statements to represent the four values within each of the three
domains, the Marshall study could then indirectly measure policy elites’
preferences for each of the four instrumental values within, but not across, the .
three domains. In other words, the statement representing Quality within the
Program domain (“setting higher academic standards”) was paired against both
the Efﬁciency statement (“making programs more cost-effective”) and the Equity
statement (“giving more attention to children with special needs”) in that same
domain — but mt against the other three statements within the Program domain.
The statements representing Quality within both the Finance and
Organization/Governance domains, similarly, were paired against the statements

in those same domains that represented Efﬁciency, Equity, and Choice.

For purposes of measurement and scoring, Marshall and colleagues directed
respondents to place an X on one of the six dashes for each pair of statements,
which was to correspond with their preference for one statement or the other. An
X closest to the statement on the left represented strong preference for that
statement, an X on the second dash in from the left represented somewhat less
preference, and an X on the third dash in from the left represented slight
preference. The Marshall study assigned a ranking of +1, +2, or +3 to the value
statement in each pair that was chosen by the respondent as being more
important. A score of-+1 was assigned if the statement was chosen as “slightly
more important,” a +2 score was assigned if it was “somewhat more important,”

and a +3 score was assigned if the chosen statement was “much more

136

important.” Corresponding negative scores (-1, -2, or —3) were assigned to the
statement in each pair that was not preferred by the respondent. Thus, a total
score for each respondent can be calculated, as can total scores for each of the

four values and the three policy domains.

The 18 pairs of value statements used in this study, in terms of wording and the
order in which the pairs of statements appeared on the survey, were identical to
that used by Marshall and colleagues. In order to provide more clarity for
respondents, however, the physical appearance of the statements and the
directions that accompanied the question were modified slightly. Question 7 was
placed into a chart format, and the six dashes used in the Marshall study were
replaced by boxes that described more precisely what each represented: the box
closest to the value statement on the left was labeled to indicate that the
statement on the left was “much more important” than the one on the right, etc.
Appendix E shows the same information in Question 7 as it appeared on the
survey, but adds (in italics and bold type) the instrumental value (Q=Quality,
EFF=Efﬁciency, EQ=Equity, C=Choice) and the domain (P=Program, F=Finance,
OG=Organization/Govemance) represented by each statement in order to

facilitate interpretation and comparison of results.
The primary ﬁnding emerging from the work of Marshall and colleagues with

respect to policy elites’ preferences for value statements was that the Quality

value was by far the most important of the four values (with a mean score, across

137

all three domains, of 8.85), followed, in order, by Efﬁciency (-0.28), Equity (-0.68),
and Choice (-7.89).23 They note that Quality items were ranked ﬁrst in all three
domains, and conclude that “...educational Quality is the dominant concern of
state policy leaders in the 1980s.” The Marshall study also notes that there were

“consistently negative scores for all three Choice items” (p.94-5).

At the outset of this study, it was hypothesized that the rapid growth of charter
schools in Michigan and the support for the Choice value that this growth
seemingly represented would predict that Michigan policy elites would express a
stronger preference for Choice than did those in the six-state sample (Arizona,
California, Illinois, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Wisconsin) studied by
Marshall and colleagues. It was expected, in fact, that Choice would have the
highest score among the four instrumental values in the minds of policy elites,
followed (in order) by Efﬁciency, Quality, and Equity, with this same pattern
holding true across each of the domains (Program, Finance, and

Organization/Governance).

Actual survey results, however, differed substantially from this hypothesis.
Among the 51 completed surveys that were received, 92.2%, or 47, included

appropriate responses to Question 7; one respondent left this question blank and

 

23 It is not clear, from the brief description of methodology provided by Marshall and colleagues, how
overall scores for the four values that were not even numbers could have resulted. For each pair of
statements, a score of I, 2, or 3 was assigned to the “preferred” statement and a corresponding score of -—1 ,
-2, or —3 was assigned to the statement not preferred. They obviously divided total scores for each value by
something to arrive at sums of mean scores that were non-even numbers (8.85 for Quality, -0.28 for
Efﬁciency, etc.), but it is not clear what this divisor was. Presumably the divisor was the total number of
respondents (n=140) in their study, but this is not speciﬁed in their brief discussion of methodology.

138

three others completed it incorrectly (by placing an X in more than one box on
each line). Additionally, the total number of responses within each value pair
varies from 47 (the maximum possible) to 42, as some respondents did not rank

all 18 pairs (as noted by the term “missing” in cells shown in Appendix F).

Table 10 summarizes the overall results from Question 7, while Appendix F
shows the preferences and corresponding scores for each individual respondent.
The “total score” shown in Table 10 is the overall score for each of the four
values as assigned by all respondents. Since each of the four values appeared
in 9 different pairs, and the maximum score that could be assigned was +3, the
highest possible score a value could have received was 1269, which would have
occurred if all 47 respondents answering Question 7 had given that value a +3 in
each of the nine value pairings in which it appeared. This would mean that every
respondent perceived that value as “much more important” than the value it was
contrasted against in each of the nine value pairs in which it appeared in
Question 7. The corresponding lowest possible score, which would have

occurred if a value was given a -3 rating each time it appeared, was -1269.

The “mean responses” statistic in Table 10 and Appendix F is the average
number of respondents who provided rankings for each value. It serves as a way
of correcting for the fact'that not all 47 respondents made selections for all 18
value pairs in Question 7. It is calculated as follows: the total score for each

value was divided by the mean number of respondents who provided rankings of

139

the value. Each value appeared in nine different value pairs, with a maximum of
47 potential responses for each value. Since some respondents didn’t rank
certain value pairs, however (as shown in cells labeled “missing” in Appendix F),
the actual number of responses is sometimes less than 47. The mean
responses are thus the total number of responses for each value divided by 9; as
shown in Table 10 and Appendix F, the ﬁgures are 46.33 for Quality, 46.11 for
Efﬁciency, 45.00 for Equity, and 45.44 for Choice. The mean score, which is the
key statistic in the table and in this analysis, is simply the total score divided by

the mean responses.

The data show quite clearly that Quality, with a mean score of 6.32, was the most
important value in the minds of Michigan policy elites, just as it had been in the
work of Marshall and colleagues. Quality was also the only value that had a
positive overall score in addition to positive values in each of the three domains,
both of which again mirrored what the Marshall study found in the 19803. The
overall order of the remaining three variables in this study also matched the
ﬁndings of Marshall at al: Efﬁciency ranked second (albeit still with a negative

score of -1.28), Equity a close third («1.40), and Choice a distant fourth (-3.76).

140

Table 10: Value Preferences of Michigan Policy Elites by Domain

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Scores by Value and Domaln: Total Mean Mean
. Score Responses Score
Program Finance Organization!
Governance
Value:
Setting higher Increasing Developing
academic the level of quality-
Quality standards (151) funding for conscious 293 46.33 6.32
schools (5) leadership
(137)
Making Improving the More efﬁcient
programs more use of school
Efficiency cost-effective education tax management -59 46'" '1'28
(-104) dollars (80) (-35)
Giving more Greater Broader
attention to equalization participation in
Equity children with of resources decision- -63 45.00 -1.40
special needs (20) making
(7) (-90)
Increasing Reducing Providing more
program restrictions choices for
Choice ﬂexibility on local families and -171 45.44 -3.76
(-54) expenditures children (-12)
(-105)

 

 

 

 

Findings related to the value preferences of Michigan policy elites did differ,
however, in several ways from those of Marshall and colleagues - perhaps most
importantly with respect to the distribution of value preferences across the three
domains of Program, Finance, and Organization/Governance. In addition to '
calculating total and mean scores for each of the four values, as shown in Table
10, it is possible to look at respondents’ preferences within each of the three
domains. Since each statement representing Quality appeared three times
(against Efﬁciency, Equity, and Choice) within the Program domain, for example,
a score for Quality within the Program domain (or a “Quality/Program” score) can i
be obtained by adding the three Quality/Program scores and then comparing it

with the totals for the other three values within this domain.

141

In looking at results from the Program domain, for example, the Quality
statement (“Setting higher academic standards”) had an overall score of 151 (see
Appendix F; 67 from pair 4 against Efﬁciency + 27 from pair 9 against Equity + 57
from pair 12 against Choice). This was much higher than the Efﬁciency/Program
statement (“Making programs more cost-effective”), which had an overall score of
—104. The Equity/Program statement (“Giving more attention to children with
speCial needs”) did somewhat better against Quality/Program, with a score of 7,
while the Choice/Program statement (“Increasing program ﬂexibility”) fell in

between Efﬁciency/Program and Equity/Program with a score of —54.

Table 11: Value Preference Scores of Michigan Policy Elites, by Domain

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Domain:
Program Finance (3332:3222, Total Score
Value:
Quality 151 5 137 293
Efﬁciency -104 80 -35 -59
Equity 7 20 -90 -63
Choice -54 -105 -12 -171

 

 

 

It is also notable, as seen in Table 11, that Quality was _n_c_)t the highest-ranked
value in all three domains, as it had been in the Marshall study. Quality ranked
highest in both Program (with a score of 151) and Organization/Governance
(137), but ranked only third within the Finance domain (with a score of 5) behind
Efﬁciency (80) and Equity (20). The Marshall study also found that the same
rank order held true in both the Finance and Organization/Governance domains:

“. . .Quality was given top priority, followed by Efﬁciency and Equity, with Choice

142

ranked a distant last” (p.93; review from Table 1). Among Michigan policy elites,
by contrast, Quality was third within the Finance domain (with a score of 5,
trailing Efﬁciency and Equity, with Choice indeed a “distant last”); and while
Quality was first in the Organization/ Governance domain (137), Choice was not

at all a distant last, but second (albeit still with a negative score of -12).

Within the Finance domain, the Quality statement (“Increasing the level of
funding for schools”) was much less popular among Michigan policy elites, with
an overall score of 5. It fared particularly poorly against the Efﬁciency statement
(“Improving the use of education tax dollars”), which had a score of 80, and the
Equity statement (“Greater equalization of resources”), with a score of 20. The
Quality statement was much preferred, within Finance, however, to the Choice

statement (“Reducing restrictions on local expenditures”), with a score of —105.

Within the Organization/Governance domain, the Quality statement (“Developing
quality-conscious leadership”) was again the preferred value, with a score of 137.
The strength of preference against the other three values differed once again,
however, as the Choice statement (“Providing more choices for families and
children”) had an overall score of -12, ahead of both the Efﬁciency statement
(“More efficient school management”), with a score of ~35, and the Equity

statement (“Broader participation in decision-making”), with a score of -90.

143

Also of interest is that the four values were perceived somewhat differently by the
ﬁve subgroups of respondents. To measure this, the scores of all respondents
within a subgroup within each of the four values were added to get a total score
for that subgroup. I then divided by the number of respondents in each subgroup
who completed surveys ﬂ answered Question 7 correctly and completely (to

' correct for the fact that different subgroups had different numbers of

respondents).

Using legislators as an example, nine respondents from this subgroup completed
surveys containing full data for Question 7. Each of these nine respondents had
an individual total score, calculated by adding their nine scores for each of the
four values. Quality, for example, appeared in nine different value pairs, and an
individual legislator might have had a total Quality score of 6, for example. This
score of 6 was added to the Quality scores of the other eight legislators to arrive
at an overall total score for legislators on the Quality value of 60. This was then
divided by nine (the number of legislators) for a mean score of 6.67 for legislators
on the Quality value. Likewise, the overall total score for legislators on the

Efﬁciency value was -11, divided by nine for a mean score of -1 .22, etc.

Using these data, it is possible to make some comparison across respondent
subgroups with respect to value preferences, as shown in Table 12. Each of the
ﬁve subgroups rated Quality as the most important value, although

business/advocacy/civic groups had it tied with Efficiency (perhaps illustrating the

144

cost-conscious manner in which business organizations view public education)
and had far lower preference ratings for Quality than the other four subgroups.
Equally interesting was that business/advocacy/civic respondents were the only
subgroup to assign a positive overall rating (1.25) to Choice. It might have been
predicted that charter school authorizers would also rate Choice highly; the fact
that they did not — but rated Quality and Equity quite highly — may indicate that
these respondents view charters as a means of producing Quality and Equity
rather than existing solely to further Choice. Legislators as a group expressed a
notable distaste for Choice (822) relative to the other values and to the other

four subgroups, but were comparatively more inclined to favor Equity (-1.22).

Table 12: Value Preferences by Respondent Subgroup

 

Mean Scores, by Vaﬁue:
Quality Efficiency Equity Choice

 

 

Respondent subgroup and
number of surveys with correct
and complete response to

 

 

 

 

Question 7:

Legislators (n=9) 6.67 -1.22 2.78 -8.22
Other Government (n=7) 7.43 -1.71 -3.29 -2.43
Interest Groups (n=11) 6.09 0.36 -3.36 -3.09
Charter Authorizers (n=12) 7.42 -5.42 2.67 -4.67

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

BusinesS/Advocacy/Civic (n=8) 3.13 3.13 -7.50 1 .25

 

A ﬁnal comparison that can be made using data from Question 7 is to look at
individual respondents in an attempt to ascertain the range of preference across
the four values and how many respondents had negative overall impressions of

each value. To provide a measure of this, each individual respondent’s scores

145

for Question 7 (using data which appeared previously as Appendix F) were
added them within each value to get a total score for each respondent by value.
For example, Respondent #1 had sums of mean scores totaling 15 for Quality, -
15 for Efficiency, 13 for Equity, and -13 for Choice (note that four of the 51
respondents — 12, 43, 43, and 43 - answered Question 7 incorrectly, leaving a
total of 47 respondents for whom appropriate data are available). Each
respondent has nine individual scores within each value; thus, Respondent #1 ’3
score for Quality was calculated as follows (using data as they appeared
previOusly from Appendix F): 3 from value pairing 4 (VP4) + (-1) from VP7 + (-1)
from VP9 + 3 from VP10 + 3 from VP11 + 2 from VP12 + 2 from VP15 + 2 from

VP17 + 2 from VP18 =15.

Viewing the data in this manner, as shown in Appendix H, reveals a number of
interesting ﬁndings. With respect to the range within each of the four values,
Quality had a range of 35 (from a high score of 20 for Respondent 43 to a low of
515 for Respondent 17). Only six respondents assigned overall negative scores
to Quality. Efficiency had a range of 29 (from a high of 12 to a low of -17), with
24 negative scores. Equity had a range of 31 (high of 13 and low of -18), with 26
negative scores. Choice had the largest range of 41 (high of 16 and low of -25),
and also the largest number of negative scores with 32. The overall pattern from
these data is consistent with previous findings in that Quality is the preferred
value (as illustrated by the fewest negative scores) and Choice ranks far behind

with a much higher number of negative scores.

146

Returning to the overall hypothesis regarding the value preferences of Michigan
policy elites - that Choice would be a stronger value in the minds of-Michigan
policy elites than it had been in the work of Marshall at al, and the most preferred
value oVerall - there are several explanations for why this turned out n_ot to be
supported by the data. One possibility involves sampling error, in that the
sample of Michigan policy elites is simply not large enough and/or representative
of the state in general. It is conceivable, for example, that among all Michigan
policy elites involved in education, most would self-identify as conservatives - in
contrast to this study, in which conservatives were a slight minority. This might
make a difference in that previous research, including public opinion polling in
Michigan, has shown at least somewhat higher support for charter schools
among conservatives than among liberals. The State of the State Survey
conducted by the Institute for Public Policy and Social Research at MSU, for
example, found in its Summer 2002 and Spring 2001 surveys that while 72.1% of
all Michigan residents polled indicated support for charter schools, support was
somewhat higher among self-identiﬁed conservatives (76.7%) than among

liberals (67.0%) (Institute for Public Policy and Social Research, 2001, 2002).

To test the significance of differences between the mean scores for each value
shown previously in Table 10 (6.32 for Quality, -1.28 for Efﬁciency, -1.40 for
Equity, and -3.76 for Choice), paired samples T-tests were performed for eaCh of
six possible pairs of values. The objective was to determine the likelihood that

the observed differences in sample means would have resulted in a population

147

where no differences in fact exist (e.g., a population in which all policymakers
prefer all four values equally). The null hypothesis being tested for each value

pairing is as follows:
Mean of Value 1 (e.g., Quality) — Mean of Value 2 (e.g., Efﬁciency) = 0
The alternative hypothesis is that
Mean of Value 1 — Mean of Value 2 <> 0.

Results shown in Table 13 indicate that four of the six value pairs are in fact
statistically signiﬁcant at the .05 level. Quality, which had the highest mean
score in Table 10, is signiﬁcantly different from each of the other three values,
and Choice is significantly different from two of the other three values at the .05
level. The only pairing that does not approach statistical signiﬁcance, in fact, is
Efﬁciency-Equity, which are the middle two values that are clustered closely

together in terms of mean scores.

Table 13: T-Tests of Signiﬁcance between Mean Scores of Values

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Pair Number: Values: Df Sig. (2-tailed)
Pair 1 Quality-Efﬁciency 407 :000
Pair 2 Quality-Equity 399 .000
Pair 3 Quality-Choice 400 .000
Pair 4 Efficiency-Equity 396 .934
Pair 5 Efficiency-Choice 398 .038
Pair 6 Equity-Choice 390 .056

 

 

 

 

 

148

Correlations between the means of the four instrumental values also produce
some interesting results in relation to Marshall and colleagues’ assertion (see
research hypothesis 2 in Chapter 1) that some pairs of values reinforce one
another (e.g., are supported simultaneously by policy elites, and positive
correlations exist ) while others oppose one another (e.g., negative correlations
exist). In particular, the Marshall study found that Choice and Efﬁciency opposed
one another, whereas it was hypothesized in this study (in support of Garn’s
ﬁndings in Arizona) that. these two values would reinforce each other and that

Choice and Equity would oppose one another.

Results in Table 14 show correlations that are relatively weak overall, but
interesting nonetheless. The expected positive correlation between Choice and
Efﬁciency did not emerge at all from the data, while the expected negative
correlation between Choice and Equity was nearly signiﬁcant at the .05 level, but
still relatively weak at -.099. The only correlation that was signiﬁcant at the .05
level was a negative relationship between Efficiency and Equity, which may
make sense in retrospect in that policy elites concerned with cost-beneﬁt aspects
of education (the economic dimension of Efﬁciency) would perhaps not be

predicted to be concerned with issues of Equity.

149

Table 14: Paired Samples Correlations

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Pair Number: Values: N Correlation Si .
Pair 1 Quality-Efﬁciengy 408 -.078 .1 16
Pair 2 Quality-Equity 400 .065 .192
Pair 3 Quality-Choice 401 -.083 .096
Pair 4 Efficiency-Equity 397 -.220 .000
Pair 5 Efficiency-Choice 399 .055 .272
Pair 6 Equity-Choice 391 -.099 .052

 

 

 

 

 

 

Returning to possible explanations for differences between the ﬁndings in this
study and those of Marshall and colleagues, it also seems plausible that the
wording of the statements used in the Marshall study to represent the four
instrumental values inﬂuenced the choices made by respondents. In essence,
some statements might be more strongly or favorably worded than others that
they are being compared to, and/or strike a favorable chord in terms of the
political pressures, policy initiatives, and budgetary context of any given point in
time. This might also help explain some of the variation across domains (e.g.,
why Quality was the most popular overall value, but was much less popular

within the Finance domain than it was in the Program domain).

In looking at the three statements that Marshall and colleagues used to represent
the Quality value, for example, one might argue that at the present time, the
wording of the statement in the Program domain (“setting higher academic
standards”) is much stronger (e.g., more difﬁcult for policy elites to not agree
with) than is the statement representing Organization/Governance (“developing
quality-conscious leadership”). One would imagine that present-day policy elites

hear quite often, in fact, that we need to set higher academic standards, but are

150

less likely to hear someone say, at least directly, that what we need to do to
improve education is to develop quality-conscious leadership. Developing quality
leadership ranked ahead of setting higher academic standards in the ﬁndings of
Marshall and colleagues during the 1980s, but just the opposite appears to be

true from this research, with standards clearly an important policy topic.

Similarly, the Organization/Governance statement in Choice (“Providing more
choices for families and children”) is inherently somewhat stronger, at least at the
present time, than the Choice statement in Finance (“Reducing restrictions on
local expenditures”), and much stronger than the Choice statement in Program
(“Increasing program ﬂexibility"). Those who are inclined to support Choice, in
other words, would be more likely to do so in the form of a statement that
provided Choice to families and children rather than to schools. This hypothesis
appears to be supported by data from Questions 109 and 10h (see discussion
below), which showed that the sample of Michigan policy elites was much more
inclined to define Choice in terms of the ability of parents and students to choose
schools than the ability of schools to choose a mission, curriculum, and staff.
While the original hypothesis that Choice would be the most important value
among Michigan policy elites was not correct, then, neither is it the case that
Choice is altogether unimportant. It may be notably less important overall than
the other values, and Quality in particular, but enjoys comparatively high support
when provided to parents and students — which is perhaps the single most

important theoretical construct underlying the charter school movement.

151

Other than noting that each statement “. . .was phrased in such a way as to reﬂect
the application of one of the core values to a particular school program or policy
issue,” (p.92), Marshall and colleagues provide little description of how they
chose the value statements that they did. Personal preferences for any
statement over anotherare certainly subjective and inﬂuenced by time-speciﬁc
factor, but the wording of statements seems a likely, albeit not readily
measurable, explanation for differences in the value preferences of elites.

It also makes sense that differences between this study’s ﬁndings and those of
Marshall and colleagues illustrate very real shifts in policy priorities within
education — not to mention the budgetary contexts within 'which educational

decision-making occurs.

The ranking of the Quality statement within the Finance domain (“Increasing the
level of funding for schools”) would appear to provide an instructive example
here. While Marshall and colleagues’ respondents found this statement
preferable by a wide margin over the other three values within that domain, the
current ﬁndings among Michigan policy elites were considerably different, in that
this statement was preferred only to the Choice statement. One reading of this
difference is that few policymakers in Michigan, at least at the moment, subscribe
to the theory that schools simply need more money in order to improve.

Michigan policymakers were instead more inclined to support the view that the
use of education tax dollars be improved (the Efficiency statement within the

Finance domain) or equalized (Equity) rather than increased across the board, as

152

the Quality statement advocates. The ﬁnancial difﬁculties being experienced by
state government in Michigan at the time of this writing cannot be overstated,
given the massive shortfalls being faced by legislators and the competing

demands for shrinking state resources that have resulted.
Direct Preferences for Ins trumen tal Values

Further examination of respondent preferences for the four instnimental values
using a different type of forced-choice format took place in Question 8. This
question, which was not used by Marshall and colleagues nor by Garn, used six
paired arrangements of the four values to contrast respondent preferences for
each value against the three others, without the use of policy statements to
represent the four values as in Question 7. Results summarized below show
which values appeared in each pairing and how many of the 51 respondents who

completed the survey preferred each value:

. Pairing 1: Quality (46) or Efﬁciency (1); 4 blank/no response
. Pairing 2: Quality (35) or Equity (10); 6 blank/no response

. Pairing 3: Quality (41) or Choice (5); 5 blank/no response

. Pairing 4: Efficiency (15) or Equity (32); 4 blank/no response
0 Pairing 5: Efﬁciency (23) or Choice (22); 6 blank/no response

0 Pairing 6: Equity (31) or Choice (14); 6 blank/no response

153

The total number of times each of the four responses was selected, which

provides another way of looking at value preferences, is as follows:

0 Quality 122
0 Equity 73
. Choice 41

. Efficiency 39

Data from Question 8 conﬁrm a major ﬁnding from [Question 7, in that Quality is
the preferred value by a wide margin in direct comparisons, with the three others.
Interestingly, however, Equity is the value that fares best against Quality in the
head-to-head format used in Question 8, followed by Choice and then Efﬁciency;
this differs from Question 7, where the overall order of preference after Quality

was Efficiency followed by Equity and Choice.

The limitation, or perhaps the strength, of the format and presentation utilized in
Question 8 is that it does not attempt to represent the four values with statements
reflecting potential policy actions g to break down each value into the three
policy domains, both of which are used in Question 7; Question 8 instead
contrasts the four values directly against one another. It is difﬁcult to say which
format provides a more accurate measure of value preference. For those able
and inclined to formulate their own deﬁnition of a value and react to it accordingly

(e.g., without the use of statements that operationalize the value into speciﬁc

154

policy arenas, as in Question 7), the simple comparison format used in Question
8 was probably preferable. For those who needed or wanted a specific example
of how a value can be applied within a policy context, Question 7 (and perhaps
Question 10, discussed below) may provide a more accurate assessment of
preferences. In the end, it may be the case that value preference has multiple
aspects, with certain measures, such as the use of statements to represent the
four values, serving as more accurate gauges of value preference for some
respondents while other measures more accurately assess other respondents’

preferences.

Rank-Ordering of Values

A third comparative measure of preferences for the four instrumental values in
educational policy is provided by Question 9, which asked respondents simply
and directly to rank-order the four values in order of priority (with 1 the most
important and 4 the least important). Table 15 afﬁnns once again the
comparative popularity of Quality, as this was the lowest (e.g., best) rank-ordered
value of the four. Quality’s mean rank of 1.25 was half as large as that of Equity,
the next lowest at 2.50. Additional evidence of the popularity of Quality was that
nearly three-fourths of respondents ranked it ﬁrst, and none ranked it lower than
second. Equity, with a somewhat surprising mean rank of second, had the
second-most rankings of 1, although these were counterbalanced by 11 rankings

of 4. (One respondent registered the following unsolicited comment next to

155

Equity: “If you have the others for everyone, who cares about this one?”)
Efﬁciency, which ranked third overall, and Choice, ranked fourth, had very similar
mean scores, although Efficiency received no rankings of 1. Choice was
somewhat of a polarizing value, with ﬁve rankings of 1 but also the largest
number of 4 rankings (22). One respondent ranked Quality ﬁrst, and then

provided no rankings for the other three values.

Table 15: Rank-Ordering of Values

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Number of Respondents Total Mean Rank
Providing Ranking of: Responses
1 2 3 4

Value:

Quality 38 13 0 0 s 51 1.25
Equity 8 20 1 1 1 1 50 2.50
Efficiency 0 12 22 16 50 3.08
Choice 5 5 17 23 50 3.16

 

 

 

 

Several summary measures of rank-ordering preference in Question 9 are also
possible by calculating mean preferences for the ﬁve subgroups of respondents
as well as for individuals, as done for Question 7 above. Looking ﬁrst at rank-
ordering preferences of the five subgroups, Table 16 illustrates how the
subgroups differed with respect to preferences for the four values. Legislators,
for example, ranked Choice (3.70) much lower as a priority than the other
subgroups (lower scores reflect higher preference for each value), while other
state government policy elites favored Quality (1.13) even more than other

subgroups. Business/advocacylcivic groups, perhaps not surprisingly, ranked

156

Choice (2.56) more highly than the other subgroups, and were much less inclined

to support Equity.

Table 16: Rank-Ordering Value Preferences of Subgroups, by Value

 

Mean Rank-Ordering
Preference, by Value:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Quality Efﬁciency Equity Choice

Respondent Subgroup and

Subgroup n for Question 9:

Legislators (n=10) 1.20 2.90 2.20 - 3.70
Other Government (n=8) 1.13 3.13 2.50 3.25
Interest Groups (n=11) 1.27 3.09 2.45 3.18
Charter Authorizers (n=13) 1.23 3.08 2.15 2.85
Business/Advocacy/Civic (n=9) 1.44 2.89 3.11 2.56
Overall Mean Rank 1.25 3. 08 2. 50 3.16

 

Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix of Validity

To test the construct validity of using three different measures of value
preference (paired statements representing the four instrumental values in
Question 7; the forced-choice format in Question 8; and rank-ordering in
Question 9), the Multitrait—Multimethod (MTMM) Matrix was used. This method,
developed by Campbell 8 Fiske (1959) and described more recently by
Sawilowsky (2002), provides a means of measuring the validity of different traits
using different methods. In this study, there are four traits (the instrumental
values of Quality, Efficiency, Equity, and Choice) and three methods (described

above from Questions 7-9).

157

Two types of validity are provided by MTMM matrices: convergent validity
between different methods involving the same trait (e.g., the three different
methods in this study for assessing preferences for Quality) and discriminant
validity between different methods and different traits. One would expect to ﬁnd
higher correlations between different measures of the same trait (convergent
validity), as measures of the same trait should be in agreement even if they are
gathered using different measures. Stated differently, policy elites who favored
Quality in the paired statement format used in Question 7 would also be
predicted to favor Quality in the forced-choice format from Question 8 and in the
rank-ordering format from Question 9. Using different measures and different
traits (discriminant validity), one would expect smaller, yet still positive,

correlations to emerge.

To measure both types of validity, SPSS was used to run correlations between
the different traits and methods. Results shown in Appendix 1 demonstrate the
construct validity of using three different measures of value preference, as
positive (and often statistically signiﬁcant) correlations emerge from all twelve
correlations of convergent, or same trait/different method, validity. Within the
Quality trait, for example, the first method (represented by “Qual1,” or the paired
statement format from Question 7) has a correlation of .157 with the second
method (“Qua12,” the forced-choice format from Question 8) and .250 with the
third method (“Qual3,” the rank-ordering format from Question 9). Neither of

these correlations is particularly strong, however, nor signiﬁcant at the .01 or .05

158

levels. The correlation between Qua12 and Qual3 is somewhat stronger, at .344,
and is signiﬁcant at the .05 level. Convergent validity is notably higher, however,
for the Other three traits (Efﬁciency, Equity, and Choice) — and Equity in
particular, with all three correlations involving this trait signiﬁcant at the .01 level.
The average of the 12 same trait/different method correlations (e.g, those of
“Qual1 ” against both “Qua12” and “Qual3,” “Eff1” against both “Eff2” and “Eff3,”

etc.) was .502.

It is also interesting to note that the highest correlations within all four traits were
between the second and third methods of measuring value preference (Question
8 and Question 9). This is seen in the correlations between “Qual2 and Qual3”
(.344, signiﬁcant at the .05 level), between “Eff2” and “Eff3” (.773, signiﬁcant at
the .01 level), between “Eq2” and “Eq3” (.781, also signiﬁcant at the .01 level),
and between “Ch2” and “Ch3” (.917, also signiﬁcant at the .01 level). One
interpretation of this result is that correlations involving the ﬁrst method (“Qual1
“Eff1,” “Eq1,” and “Ch1”) against the second and third methods were weaker
because the statements used in this method (Question 7) to represent the four
values caused respondents to perceive the values differently than they did when
the values appeared on their own (e.g., without the use of representative

statements) in Questions 8 and 9.

Measures of divergent, or different trait/different method validity, were, as

predicted, lower than the convergent validity correlations described above - and

159

many were negative. Appendix I shows that the average of the 36 correlations of
this type was -.169, and 26 of the 36 were negative. This is contrary to
conventional MTMM analyses, where negative correlations are typically few, and
results from the nature of the methods used in this study. In each of the three
methods (Questions 7-9), the rating or preference by an individual policy elite for
one of the four traits (values) gave that trait a positive score, with the non-
preferred trait receiving a corresponding negative score. This feature of the
methods used, along with the fact that individual respondents varied in terms of
the strength of their preference for the traits in the three different measures used,
resulted in an unusually high number of negative correlations. The overall result
emerging from the convergent validity (same trait/different method) correlations is
unaffected, however, and conﬁrms the overall construct validity of using three

different methods to measure value preferences.
Contrasting Deﬁnitions of the Four Instrumental Values

Questions 7-9 provided survey respondents with three different formats for
indicating their preference for each of the four instrumental values in relation to
the others. In developing the survey instrument, however, a question arose that
Marshall and colleagues apparently chose not to address in their design of
Question 7: how would one know whether policy elites completing the survey
were defining and operationalizing the four values in a similar manner, given their

diverse professional backgrounds and involvement in education?

160

Further complicating this question is that working deﬁnitions that Marshall and
colleagues developed, but did not explicitly attach to each of the four values,
were in some instances very general, abstract, ambiguous, and/or multi-
dimensional. Quality, for example, was defined rather vaguely as “the use of
public resources to match professionally-determined standards of excellence,
proficiency, or ability.” Efﬁciency was characterized as two-dimensional, with
both economic and accountability components. Equity was deﬁned perhaps a bit
more clearly as “the redistribution of resources to meet morally or societally-
deﬂned needs within schools,” although the Marshall study noted that this value
can take a number of different forms in terms of policy action, ranging from
desegregation to requirements for educating students with disabilities. Choice,
finally, is perhaps readily understood in a general sense, but its deﬁnition as
provided by Marshall and colleagues is quite vague: “the presence of a range of
options for action, as well as the ability to select a preferred option.” Does this
refer to a range of options for parents and children in choosing schools, for
schools in being able to choose their mission and curriculum, or something else

entirely?

With these considerations in mind, it was thought desirable to develop some
basis, however imprecise and incomplete, of determining how respondents were
defining and operationalizing the four values. To this end, two deﬁnitions for
each value were developed based upon the deﬁnitions and/or examples gleaned

from Marshall et al; in some cases, these were re-wordings of the paired value

161

statements they had used that were re-tested in Question 7. Respondents were
asked, in Question 10, to assess the extent to which each of the deﬁnitions
developed for this research corresponded to their own understanding of the four

values.

The two deﬁnitions of each value that were developed and presented to

respondents were as follows:

0 Quality 1: Quality means that the state deﬁnes standards for excellence, and
develop methods (such-as standardized tests) for measuring progress

0 Quality 2: Quality means that the state, after establishing standards and
methods for measuring progress, allocates public resources to achieve these
goals

. Efficiency 1: Efﬁciency means that schools should attempt to minimize costs
while maximizing gains in performance and outcomes.

0 Efficiency 2: Efﬁciency means schools should be accountable for their
performance and outcomes.

0 Equity 1: Equity means fairness in the allocation and use of resources for all
K-12 education.

. Equity 2: Equity means providing additional resources and support to
overcome identiﬁed disadvantages and deficiencies among K-12 schools

0 Choice 1: Choice means the ability of students and parents to choose

schools in accordance with their personal goals and interests

162

. Choice 2: Choice means the ability of a school to choose its own mission,

curriculum, textbooks, and staff

Table 17 illustrates respondents’ reactions to these contrasting deﬁnitions for
each of the four values. In the case of Quality, the data show that respondents
did not identify particularly strongly with either deﬁnition, although there was a
slight preference for Quality 2, which spelled out that the state would allocate
public resources to achieve the goals and standards it had established. Some of
the difference in reaction to the two definitions of Quality may be attributable to
respondents having a visceral and negative reaction to the “standardized test”

example that appeared in the definition of Quality 1.

Table 17: Respondents’ Agreement with Deﬁnitions of Values

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Percentage of Respondents Total
Agreeing “Rather Closely” or “Very Responses
Closely,” by Value and Deﬁnition:

Value and Deﬁnition:

Quality 1 41.2% 51
Quality 2 49.0% 51
Efficiency 1 88.2% 51
Efficiency 2 55.0% 51
Equity 1 84.3% 51
Equity 2 62.8% 51
Choice 1 92.2% 51
Choice 2 39.2% 51

 

 

 

Respondents expressed a clear preference, however, for the ﬁrst deﬁnition of

Efﬁciency, which corresponds to the economic dimension of this value identiﬁed

163

 

by Marshall and colleagues. A very high share of respondents (88.2%) indicated
that their understanding of Efficiency matched the first deﬁnition either “rather
closely” or “very closely,” and Efficiency 1 was close behind Equity 1 as the
deﬁnition with the highest share of respondents selecting “very closely” as their
level of understanding. Maximizing performance and minimizing costs (Efficiency
1) is clearly an important policy goal for Michigan elites, even though the
accountability dimension (Efficiency 2) is not unimportant, and may become even
more significant due to the emphasis on accountability at the federal level

through the recent No Child Left Behind act.

A discernable pattern of preference also emerged with respect to the contrasting
deﬁnitions of Equity, as 84.3% respondents were in agreement (either “rather
closely” or “very closely”) with Equity 1 compared to only 62.8% for Equity 2. I
would theorize that the primary difference in reaction to the two definitions is that
Equity 1 suggests a more equitable and fair distribution of existing resources
without raising the notion of additional resources that appears in Equity 2. Data
from Question 7 showed that the Quality statement within the Finance domain
(“Increasing the level of funding for schools”) was by far the least popular of the
three statements representing Quality, and it makes sense that the present-day
budget difficulties being faced by Michigan policy elites would make many at
least-somewhat reluctant to advocate for additional spending, even on popular

and important programs such as K-12 education.

164

Perhaps the most interesting ﬁnding that emerged from contrasting deﬁnitions of
the four values involved Choice. As shown above in Table 17, Choice 1 (“Choice
means the ability of students and parents to choose schools in accordance with
their personal goals and interests”) had a far higher share of respondents
(92.2%) who identiﬁed with it either “rather closely” or “very closely,” compared to
just 39.2% for Choice 2 (“Choice means the ability of a school to choose its own
mission, curriculum; textbooks, and staff”). Choice 1, in fact, had the highest
share of respondents in these two categories combined of any of the eight
deﬁnitions. Michigan policy elites, in other words, were much more inclined to
deﬁne Choice in terms of the ability of parents and students to choose schools
than the ability of schools to choose a mission, curriculum, and staff. This ﬁnding
is consistent with a principal conclusion from Question 7: despite the negative
scores for all three forms of Choice, respondents were much more likely to
support this value in its Organization/Governance form (“Providing more choices
for families and children”) than in its Program and Finance forms. To the extent
to that Choice is supported by Michigan policy elites, then, how it is deﬁned
appears to make a big difference, with support rising considerably when this
value is defined in terms of providing choices to parents-and students as

opposed to schools.

165

Views of Education and Charter Schools

The fourth section of analysis in this chapter turns to Michigan policy elites’ views
regarding a number of key issues in K-12 education, including charter schools
themselves. Examined ﬁrst are three issues that help to establish a context for
interpreting respondents’ views toward charter schools and the four instrumental
values in educational policy: how respondents view an appropriate role for the
state in setting educational policy, the perceived effectiveness of educational
policymaking agencies at the state and local level, and the performance of
various types of K-12 schools, including traditional public, private, and charter
schools. This is followed by an analysis of respondents’ views of charter schools
themselves, including perceptions of their successes and shortcomings as well

as overall level of support for charters and other forms of school choice.

In addition to reporting frequency distributions, this section also reports
information obtained from three open-ended questions that invited respondents
to comment on several issues related to educational policy and charter schools.
These include perceptions of the effectiveness of state educational agencies
(Question 13 on the survey instrument), perceived benefits that charter schools
are successfully providing (Question 2), and concerns related to charter schools
(Question 3). The-general format for reporting on these open-ended questions is
that respondent comments are summarized within this section and then

reproduced verbatim and in their entirety in Appendix G for reference.

166

Deﬁning an Appropriate Role for the State in Educational Policy

One issue that is clearly of great importance in the debate over charter schools
and school choice is the extent to which the state should be involved in public

education. Historically, the state’s role in this policy arena has been signiﬁcant,
as the U.S. Constitution delegates most authority for establishing and operating
public schools to the states, yet advocates of charters and choice have become
increasingly vocal in arguing for a reduced state role in favor of greater parental

choice. How would this key question be viewed by Michigan policy elites?

To measure this issue, respondents were asked whether a limited, moderate, or
active role reﬂected their view of the most appropriate role for state government
in establishing educational policy. Table 18 shows that responses were almost
evenly split between those preferring an active role (49.0%) and those preferring
a moderate role (43.1%). It was somewhat surprising that only 7.8% of
respondents selected a “limited” role for state government; this development is
probably attributable to policy elites’ comparatively Iow'preference for the Choice

value, which would tend to advocate a more limited state role.

167

Table 18: Views of an Appropriate State Role in Education

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Percentage of Respondents
Preferring, by Type of State Role:
State Role:
Active 49.0%
Moderate 43.1%
Limited 7.8%
Total 100.0%

 

 

 

Perceived Effectiveness of Educational Policymaking Agencies

Michigan policy elites’ perceptions regarding the effectiveness of key agencies
entrusted with formulating educational policy at the state and local level were
another area of interest. Speciﬁcally, how did policy elites view the effectiveness
of the Michigan Department of Education (MDE), the State Board of Education

(SBE), and their local school board?

Table 19 shows that policy elites were generally quite skeptical about the
effectiveness of educational policy agencies, particularly in the case of MDE and
SBE. They assigned much higher ratings to their local school board than to MDE
and SEE, although even the perceived effectiveness of local school boards was
rather modest. Over half of all respondents (52.9%) judged their local board to
be either “very effective” or “mostly effective,” compared to just 21.6% assigning
similar ratings to MDE and 15.7% to SBE. Local school boards, in fact, were the

only educational agency that received any “very effective” ratings at all.

168

Table 19: Perceived Effectiveness of Educational Policymaking Agencies

 

Percentage of Respondents Total
Perceiving Policymaking Responses
Agency as “Mostly Effective” or
“Very Effective,” by Agency:

 

Educational Agency:
Local school board 52.9% 51
Michigan Department 0

of Education 21'6 /° 51
State Board of Education 15.7% 51

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

An open-ended question (#13 on the survey instrument) allowed respondents to
provide additional written comments regarding MDE, SBE, and their local school
board. A summary of these comments follows below; a full listing in their entirety
appears in Appendix G. It should be noted that several who provided written
comments were members or employees of agencies being evaluated (MDE and
SBE), so they are in essence commenting on (and in some cases defending)

their own performance.

One theme clearly emerging from comments regarding the effectiveness of
educational policymaking agencies was negative perceptions of MDE and
especially SBE, which certainly matches that which was shown in the frequency

distributions above. A sampling of respondent comments included the following:

. “[SBE] is a non-entity in educational policymaking...”
. “[SBE] appears isolated and seldom works within the legislative process. .
. "MDE and SBE are confusing and conflicting organizations...”

0 “[SBE] is a flawed concept...”

169

o ”[SBE] is largely irrelevant as a policymaking and oversight body..."

. “SBE is highly politicized...”

Several other comments were critical of the effectiveness of SBE and MDE, but
cited lack of staff and resources, as well as administrative reorganization, as the
primary reasons. Written comments were generally more complimentary of local
school boards, with a number of respondents indicating that education-related
issues are most effectively addressed on a local level. Two responses made
suggestions or criticisms of the wording and/or intent of Question 12 and/or 13,
with one indicating that “effectiveness” should have been spelled out more clearly
(“effective at what?”), and another suggesting that the Legislature should have
been included as an agency to be rated. One brief and cryptic response, finally,
stated simply "Read the newspaper!” — leaving it unclear whether the intended
message was (a) that members and employees of educational policymaking
entities (and perhaps the researcher involved in this study) don’t read the
newspaper (and are thus ignorant and uninformed), or (b) all one needs to do in
order to judge the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of educational policymaking

agencies is to read the newspaper.

170

Perceptions of K-12 School Performance

It was also desired to know how Michigan policy elites perceived the
performance of various types of K-12 schools in Michigan. Specifically, policy

elites were asked to assess the performance of the following types of schools:

Public schools in general

. Public schools in urban areas
. Charter schools

. Private, religious schools

0 Private, non-religious schools

Table 20 shows that the performance of public schools in general is perceived
quite well by policy elites in the sample, with 82.3% of respondents selecting
either “somewhat good performance” or “very good performance" (although only
9.8% were in the latter category). This compares favorably to elites’ assessment
of the performance of private schools, both of a religious and non-religious
nature, although private non-religious schools had by far the highest number of
“very good performance” ratings. Urban public schools received the lowest
performance evaluation, with only 29.5% of respondents selecting either
“somewhat good performance" or “very good performance.” Assessment of
charter school performance was divided much more evenly, with roughly equal

numbers of respondents on each end of the performance spectrum.

171

Table 20: Perceptions of K-12 School Performance among Policy Elites

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Percentage of Respondents Total
Perceiving School Responses
Performance as “Somewhat
Good” or “Very Good,” by
Type of School:

Type of School:
Private, religious schools 90.2% 48
Public schools in general 82.3% 51
Private, non-religious schools 80.4% 45
Charter schools 45.0% 50
Public schools in urban areas 29.5% 50

 

Perceived Benefits/Successful Outcomes of Charter Schools

Turning to policy elites’ views of charter schools themselves, the first question on
the survey instrument asked respondents to describe how successful Michigan’s
charters have been in providing six intended outcomes that were used to argue
for their legislative approval in Michigan and other states in the 19905. Table 21
shows the frequency distribution of the six intended outcomes across the four
different potential levels of agreement. Respondents were most likely to identify

three outcomes as benefits that charters have successfully provided (as

 

measured by the percentage of respondents who chose either “mostly
successful” or “very successful”): stimulating high levels of parental involvement
(45.1%), providing new educational opportunities to families who lacked such
Opportunities previously (43.2%), and providing smaller learning environments
(43.2%). The latter two outcomes in particular had the highest share of

respondents (21.6% in each case) who felt that charters had been “very

I72

successful" in meeting this goal. Respondents were least likely, by contrast, to
identify serving as laboratories of innovation (13.8%) and improving academic

achievement (17.7%) as outcomes that charters have successfully delivered.

Table 21: Intended Benefits of Michigan Charter Schools

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Percentage of Respondents Total
Perceiving Charter Schools as Responses
“Mostly Successful” or “Very
Successful,” by Intended
Beneﬁt of Charters:
Intended Benefit:
Stimulating high levels of 45 1% 51
parental involvement '
Providing new educational 43 2% 51
opportunities for families '
Providing smaller learning 43 2% 51
environments '
Providing opportunities to
focus on the needs of a 29 4% 48
particular group of '
students
Improving cost
effectiveness of public 23.5% 51
educaﬁon
Improving academic 17 7% 51
achievement ‘
Serving as ‘laboratories of 13 8% 51
innovaﬁon’ '

 

 

 

 

 

It is also useful to use data regarding respondents’ perceptions of the successes
of charter schools to investigate how these perceptions are distributed across the
five subgroups of respondents. Appendix J shows this distribution. Each of the
51 respondents received a total score for Question 1, based upon their

perception of the success of charters in providing each of the seven intended

I73

beneﬁts. For each intended benefit, a respondent received a score of 1 if slhe
felt that charters had been not at all successful in providing this intended beneﬁt,
2 if charters had been somewhat successful, 3 for mostly successful, and 4 for
very successful. As such, a higher total score indicates a higher degree of belief

that charters have been successful overall in providing intended beneﬁts.

Appendix J shows that respondents varied considerably in their perceptions of
charter school success, from a high ranking of 27 provided by Respondents 38
and 50 (a businessladvocacyl civic representative and an “other government
official,” respectively) to a low ranking of 9 (from Respondent 47, a state
legislator). Among the top seven total scores (25 or higher), four of the ﬁve
respondent subgroups are represented (all except legislators), although
businessladvocacyl civic respondents comprise three of the seven top spots and
“other government” ofﬁcials another two spots. The highest total score provided
by a legislator, by contrast, is only the 11th highest score among the 51, whereas
two of the ﬁve lowest total scores were provided by legislators - indicating that
the sample of Michigan legislators was as a group comparatively skeptical about

intended beneﬁts provided by charters.

Also shown in Appendix J is one measure of which intended beneﬁts Michigan
charter schools are perceived as being the most and the least successful in
providing. This measure is simply the total score for each of the seven intended

benefits, using the same scoring system (1 =not at all successful, 2=somewhat

174

L"... -.-

successful, etc.) described above. By this measure, Michigan charter schools
have been most successful in providing smaller learning environments,
stimulating parental involvement, and providing new educational opportunities.
Charters have been least successful, by contrast, in serving as “laboratories of
innovation,” improving academic achievement, and improving the cost

effectiveness of public education.

Question 2 on the survey asked respondents for open-ended comments
regarding perceived beneﬁts that charter schools are successfully providing.
Twenty-two respondents provided comments that are listed in Appendix G. The
most common themes emerging from these comments are that charters are
providing two key beneﬁts: additional choices and opportunities for parents, and
competition that spurs traditional public schools to improve and/or innovate. The
virtues of having additional choices were described by respondents both in
general terms (e.g., for all consumers of education) as well as for disadvantaged
and urban populations in particular. Competition, similarly, was seen as a
positive for improving public education in a broad sense ﬂu! because it spurred
specific improvements or innovations in traditional public schools such as all-day
kindergarten, better communication with parents, and themed focus areas. Other
benefits of charters cited by respondents included greater safety, the formation of
a “nationally unique partnership” between public schools and a tribally-controlled
community college (obviously referring to Bay Mills Community College; see

discussion in “Legislative Summary” section), and the alleged “...uncovering of

175

evidence that many intermediate school districts (lSDs) serve only their member

school districts rather than all students within the ISD.”

Several respondents also “jumped the gun” in using Question 2 for the purpose
that Question 4 was intended to serve (see discussion below): identifying
elements of concern and dissatisfaction related to charters. Speciﬁcally,
Question 2 elicited a number of negative comments regarding charters, including
perceptions that they have mt been successful, that they “ﬁlter out unwanted
elements” who are then left for traditional public schools to educate, and that they
create community animosity and resentment. One respondent also indicated that
one outcome of charters seen as a beneﬁt to some — a “focus on a particular
curricular interest or cultural speciﬁc curriculum” - is not in the best interest cf

students, and should therefore not be considered a beneﬁt.
Concerns Regarding Charter Schools

Question 3 probed the extent of respondents’ concerns regarding eight areas of
charter school operations identified in previous studies of charters (see Horn 8
Miron, 1999; Khouri etal, 1999; U.S. Department of Education, 1999, 2000,
2001, 2002). Table 22 shows that the greatest areas of concern, as measured
by the highest percentage of respondents indicating that they were either
"concerned” or “very concerned” about an issue, were “providing services to

students with disabilities” and “causing ﬁnancial hardship for local school

176

districts.” Respondents were least likely, by contrast, to be concerned about
charters “’creaming off’ high-achieving students” and “providing transportation to

all students.”

Table 22: Perceived Concerns Regarding Michigan Charter Schools

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Percentage of Total

Respondents “Concerned” Responses

or “Very Concerned” About

Selected Issues Related to

Charter Schools, by Issue
Charter-Related Issues:
Providing services to 0
students with disabilities 64'? /° 50
Causing financial hardship
for local school districts 569% 5°
Disclosure of finances 52.9% 51
Oversight by authorizing 52 90/ 50
agencies ' °
Training of teachers 51.0% I 51
Teacher pay 45.1% 51
Providing transportation to 0
all students 33'3 /° 50
“Creaming off" high- 0
achieving students 27'5 /° 50

 

As was done for Question 1 dealing with intended benefits of charters, it is
possible to show the distribution of respondent concerns regarding charter
schools across the ﬁve subgroups of respondents. Appendix K offers one
portrayal of this distribution. Each of the 51 respondents again received a total
score, based upon their level of concern with each of the eight potential issues
associated with charters identified in Question 3. A respondent received a score

of 1 if slhe was not at all concerned about that issue, 2 for being somewhat

177

concerned, 3 for being concerned, and 4 for being very concerned. Thus, a

higher total score indicates greater level of concern regarding these eight issues.

Appendix K shows that the 51 respondents again varied in their concerns related
to charters, from total scores of 32 (indicating the highest overall amount of
concern) to 8 (indicating the least overall concern). Legislators and other
government ofﬁcials each occupied two of the top five “most concerned” slots
(with scores of at least 30), while at the other end of the spectrum the ﬁve lowest
slots (with scores of less than 10) had two scores that were provided by
businessladvocacy/civic representatives. Using total scores for each of the eight
concerns, the issues of the greatest concern to the sample as a whole included
providing services to students with disabilities, causing ﬁnancial hardship to local
school districts, and oversight by authorizing agencies. The issue of the least
concern by far was the creaming of students, followed by teacher pay and

providing transportation to students.

As in the case of perceived beneﬁts of charter schools, survey respondents were
also given an open-ended opportunity (in Question 4) to provide comments on
charter school-related concerns. A total of 28 respondents provided interesting

and varied comments on this topic (see full listing in Appendix G).

One subset of comments sought to refute the intent of Question 4 by arguing that

there were no concerns about charter schools, and/or that alleged concerns had

178

been blown out of proportion by charter opponents. One response argued that
“. . .Any problems [with charters] lie in the continued ‘anger’ from traditional district
personnel toward charter schools,” while another decried “...the many untrue
statements that have been used by the education establishment in their
relentless attack on charter schools” and still another proclaimed that “charter
schools have been given a bad rap.” Another sidestepped the question in a
sense by seeking to apply concerns regarding charters to traditional public
schools as well; this respondent argued that “...Poor schools are poor schools
whether they are PSAs [public school academies] or traditional.” A ﬁnal
“concern” expressed by two respondents had nothing to do with the list of
possible concerns provided in Question 4; these policy elites were instead

concerned about not having enough charters.

Yet another respondent, in a comment that raises a valid point about potential
bias in the survey instrument, described Question 4 as a “loaded question”
whose (false) premise was that each of the possible concerns regarding charters
was true. This respondent stated that the wording of the question “...assumes
that the underlying premise of the question is true and that charter schools are
“not living up to expectations.’ It asks how concerned we are; not whether the
statement is true. For example, it assumes that there were expectations about
teacher pay when the law was passed; that was never an issue in the debate.” It

is not clear, in retrospect, how Question 4 (as well as Question 3, which also

179

dealt with charter-related concerns) could have been worded to avoid this

perception of'bias, but the comments of this respondent do raise a valid point.

A larger subset of open-ended responses addressed charter-related concerns
directly, agreeing with many of the listed concerns and adding others in several
cases. A perceived lack of oversight on the part of authorizing agencies was a
common theme, as were ﬁnancial disclosure and the involvement of private and
for-proﬁt companies in the management and operation of charters. Several
respondents expressed concern about allegations of religious involvement in
charters, low performance by charter students on standardized tests, the hiring of
uncertiﬁed teachers, and charters not serving appropriate numbers of special
needs students. Others stated their concern that charters are engaged in
sending children with disciplinary problems back to traditional public schools,
while another made the interesting observation that charters “...are starting to
offer the same excuses for failure as traditional public schools - ‘we get all the
kids who have problems’ or ‘we don’t get the resources that traditional public
schools get.” A ﬁnal respondent offered the interesting - and perhaps
patronizing — argument that “Parents who send their children to charter schools
may not be well-equipped to make educated decisions on whether or not a

student should attend, and/or remain in a charter school.”

180

General Support for Charters and Choice-Related Initiatives

Question 5 on the survey investigated respondents’ overall level of support for
charters and several other forms of school choice that either exist or have been
proposed in Michigan and other states. Table 23 shows that the form of choice
that respondents were most likely to be either “supportive” or “very supportive” of
were allowing more inter-district transfers and development of more magnet
schools. They were least likely to favor three forms of choice that do not exist in
Michigan at the present time: a general statewide voucher system, a voucher
system open to low-income students, and tax credits for private school tuition.
Support for charters was mixed, with a small majority of respondents (53.1%)

either “supportive” or “very supportive” of this type of school.

181

Table 23: Support for Charter Schools and School Choice

 

Percentage of Respondents Total
“Supportive” or “Very Responses
Supportive” of Charter Schools
and Other Forms of School
Choice, by Type of Choice:

 

Level of Support For:
Development of more
magnet schools by public 85.9% 49
school districts
Allowing more inter-

 

 

 

 

0
district transfers 81’6 /° 49
The charter school 53.1% 49
movement In MIchIgan
Tax credIts for prIvate 22.5% 50

school tuition in Michigan
A voucher system open ‘
only to low-income 20.4% 49
students in Michigan

 

 

A general statewide
voucher system open to 18.4% 49
all students in Michigan

 

 

 

 

 

It is again useful to show some measure of the distribution of support for charter
schools and other forms of school choice across the ﬁve subgroups of
respondents as well as by individual respondent. A measure of this distribution
can be obtained by calculating a total “choice support” score for each of the 51
respondents based upon their expressed level of support for each of the six
forms of school choice appearing in Question 5 on the survey instrument. A
respondent was assigned a score of 1 if slhe was very opposed to a particular
form of choice, 2 for being opposed, 3 for being supportive, and 4 for being .very
supportive. As such, a higher total score indicates a higher overall level of

support for these six forms of school choice.

182

As shown in Appendix L, there is considerable variance in respondents’ support
for charter schools and other forms of school choice. Individual total scores
ranged from a high of 24 (indicating the highest level of support) to a low of 6
(indicating the lowest level of support). Among the ﬁve highest scores (21 or
higher), two were provided by interest groups, while among the ﬁve lowest
scores (four scores of 7 and a single 6), two were from business/advocacylcivic
groups. Looking at total scores for each of the six forms of school choice, two
distinct groupings are evident. One consists of three forms of school choice
(magnet schools, inter-district transfers, and charter schools, in declining order of
support) that received high support ratings. At the other end of the spectrum, a
second group included the three remaining forms of school choice - a general
(statewide) voucher program, a voucher program targeted toward low-income
students, and tax credits for private school tuition, again in declining order of

support - which were supported to a far lesser extent than the ﬁrst group.

Although Question 5 did not solicit respondent comments, one person who
strongly supported all forms of choice (with the curious exception of magnet
schools) remarked that “Choice and competition are the key to improvement in

every realm of human life.... Education is no exception.”

183

Charter Schools as a “Stepping Stone” to More School Choice?

The survey instrument posed the following question (#6) to respondents: “Please
describe your level of agreement with the following statement: ‘Charter schools in
Michigan represent a ‘stepping stone’ on the path to other forms of school

choice. This question was intended to test a popular hypothesis regarding
charter schools, namely that they are not a ﬁnal goal in and of themselves, but
rather represent a “stepping stone” toward more advanced forms of school
choice such as vouchers and/or tax credits for private school tuition. A clear
majority of Michigan policy elites who completed the survey responded to this
question, with most either agreeing (52.9%) or strongly agreeing (11.8%) with the
statement. As was true for Question 5, one respondent provided an unsolicited

comment for Question 6: “While that [charters serving as a “stepping stone”] may

be true in other regions, I do not believe that is the case here [in Michigan].”

In retrospect, the pattern of responses on a few surveys made me wonder
whether some respondents may have interpreted Question 6 in different, and
unintended, ways. Speciﬁcally, the response patterns of some policy elites
suggest that they perceived Question 6 as asking whether charters were serving
as a stepping stone to other forms of school choice (the intended interpretation of
the question), while a few others may have interpreted Question 6 as asking

whether charters should serve such a role. To the extent such confusion actually

184

Isn't...

existed, the question could perhaps have been worded differently (to emphasize

the intended interpretation), or even broken out into two separate questions.

A retrospective comment regarding questions related to charter perceptions is
that it would have been useful to include one additional question that measured
respondents’ level of knowledge of, and familiarity with, charters. This is
because the diversity of the sample of respondents, in terms of the amount and
the nature of involvement and interest in education and charter schools, quickly
became apparent in reading their responses and comments. Some are involved
in charter policy on a regular basis, following the issue closely and debating its
progress and problems, while others - despite an active involvement in
education either in a general sense or in issues other than charter schools -
were clearly much less knowledgeable and well-informed about charters. Having
respondents describe their role in education (e.g., a legislator, leader of an
interest group, member of the State Board of Education, etc.) provides some
description of the amount and nature of respondents’ involvement, but it was
clear that both within and across these subgroups of elites there existed a wide
range of involvement and interest in charters in terms of how closely the issue is
monitored and thought about. A simple question asking respondents to
characterize their level of knowledge regarding charters would have had obvious
limitations, such as the possibility of trying to appear more knowledgeable than
they actually are, but such a question might also have provided an additional

variable for comparing attitudes toward charters and the four instrumental values.

185

Chapter 5: Key Relationships and Supplemental Information
from Surveys and Telephone Interviews

The preceding discussion of major ﬁndings relied primarily on frequency
distributions from survey questions and responses to open-ended questions in
order to report the views of Michigan policy elites. The original intent of Chapter
5 was to move next to an analysis of expected relationships between key
independent and dependent variables as examined through the use of
crosstabulations. In particular, variables involving elites’ views of charter schools
and the four instrumental values in educational policy were expected to vary in
accordance with independent or “predictor” variables such as an appropriate role
for the state in setting educational policy (Question 11 from the survey),
perceptions regarding the effectiveness of educational policymaking agencies
such as the Michigan Department of Education and the State Board of Education
(Question 12) and a “personal stake” in education and charter schools
(Questions 15 and 17-19). The chapter would then summarize supplemental
information emerging from the survey and from telephone interviews with current

and former legislators.

Following an analysis of completed surveys, however, relatively few expected
relationships between variables turned out to be of interest in terms of
noteworthy differences between respondent subgroups. This appears due to
several factors, including the relatively small overall sample size as well as small

subgroup cell sizes within many of the crosstabs (as one example, only 7.8% of

186

the 51 total respondents selected “limited” as their preferred role for the state in
education). In other cases, such as respondents reporting involvement in
charter schools vs. traditional public schools, there was simply little variation
among respondents with respect to issues such as perceived beneﬁts that

charter schools provide (Question 1) and charter-related concerns (Question 3).
Relationships Involving the Political Affiliation of Respondents

One of the few examples of noteworthy relationships between variables that
emerged from the survey data involved the self-identiﬁed political afﬁliation of
Michigan policy elites. As noted previously (see Table 6), 29.4% of respondents
described their own political afﬁliation as Republican, 39.3% as Democrat, and
21.6% as neither Republican nor Democrat. Specific relational hypotheses
between political affiliation and views of charter schools and the Choice value
were not obvious at the start of this research, as those on both ends of the
political spectrum have been shown to support these concepts - albeit for
somewhat divergent reasons. Republicans have perhaps been the most ardent
backers, stemming from their belief in limited government and the power of
market forces and competition. Democrats, given their traditional base of
support among organized labor - and teachers’ unions in particular - have been
somewhat more reluctant to embrace charters and Choice, although the dismal
performance of urban public schools, coupled with the strong support Democrats

have traditionally received from the urban and non-white constituencies whose

187

children attend low-performing urban schools, has placed many Democrats in an

uncomfortable position on this issue.

To further explore these relationships, the political affiliation of Michigan policy
elites was crosstabulated against three key dependent variables representing

views on charters and Choice:

. The extent to which charters are delivering intended beneﬁts (Question 1)
. Concerns relatedto charters (Question 3)

. Support for charters and other forms of school choice (Question 5)

With respect to perceived benefits of charter schools, Republican respondents
appear more likely than Democrats or those with no political allegiance to believe
that charters having'been successful in delivering intended outcomes (see Table
24). With the exception of “charters serving as laboratories of innovation,” in fact,
Republicans were substantially more likely than Democrats to perceive charters
as successful in providing each of the seven intended beneﬁts. Discrepancies
between Republicans and Democrats were particularly notable in the case of
“charters bring new educational opportunities" (with a difference of 35.1
percentage points between the two groups) and “charters provide smaller
learning environments” (with a difference of 33.6 percentage points). There was
no clear pattern among those identifying as neither Republican nor Democrat;

this group was closer to Republicans on some intended beneﬁts (such as

188

“charters improve academic achievement”), closer to Democrats on others (such
as “charters stimulate parental involvement”), and more likely than either
Republicans or Democrats to view some intended beneﬁts (such as “charters

serve as laboratories of innovation”) as having been provided.

Table 24: Intended Beneﬁts of Charter Schools by Political Afﬁliation

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Political Afﬁliation:
Republican Democrat Neither Republican
nor Democrat
Percent of Respondents
Perceiving Charters as
“Mostly Successful” or
“Very Successful,” by
Intended Beneﬁt:
Charters bring new 66.7% 31.6% 36.4%
educational opportunities (n=15) (n=19) (n=1 1)
Charters serve as 6.7% 5.3% 27.3%
laboratories of innovation (n=15) (n=19) (n=1 1)
Charters improve 26.7% 0.0% 18.2%
academic achievement Jn=15) (n=19) (n=11)
Charters focus on needs 40.0% 10.5% 36.4%
of student groups (n=15) (n=19) (n=11)
Charters stimulate 53.3% 36.8% 45.5%
parental involvement (n=15) (n=19) (n=11)
Charters improve cost 26.7% 0.0% 36.4%
effectiveness (n=15) (n=19) (n=1 1)
Charters provide smaller 60.0% 26.4% 45.5%
learning environments (n=15) (n=19) (n=1 1)

 

Regarding concerns associated with charter schools (see Table 25), the

 

predicted relationship would be that Republicans were less likely than Democrats
to be concerned about each of the eight issues associated with charters. The
data support this hypothesis, as large differences emerged between Republicans

and Democrats along each of the eight issues; particularly large discrepancies

189

were seen in “services to students with disabilities” (difference of 54.7

percentage points between the two groups) and “disclosure of finances”

(difference of 52.2 percentage points). Respondents with no political preference

fell between Republicans and Democrats on each of the eight issues, and were

closer to Republicans on some (“oversight by authorizer,” for example) and

closer to Democrats on others (“teacher training,” for example).

Table 25: Concerns Involving Charter Schools by Political Afﬁliation

 

Political Afﬁliation:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Republican Democrat Neither Republican
nor Democrat
Percent of Respondents
“Concerned” or “Very
Concerned,” by
Potential Issue:
. . 26.7% 78.9% 45.5%
DIsclosure of ﬁnances (n=15) (n=19) (n=1 1)
. . 40.0% 73.7% 45.5%
OverSIght by authonzer (n=15) (n=19) (n=1 1)
. . 33.3% 63.2% 54.5%
Teacher traInIng (n=15) (n=19) (n=11)
13.3% 68.4% 45.5%
Team” pay (n=15) (n=19) (n=1 1)
Financial hardship to 33.3% 78.9% 63.6%
existing public schools (n=15) (n=19) (n=1 1)
Providing transportation to 6.7% 47.4% 45.5%
students (n=15) (n=19) (n=1 1)
Services for students with 40.0% 94.7% 54.5%
disabilities (n=15) (n=19) (n=1 1)
.. . .. 13.3% 36.8% 27.3%
CreamIng of students (n=15) (n=19) (n=11)

 

The predicted relationship between political afﬁliation and support for charters

and other forms of school choice would find Republicans more likely than

190

 

Democrats to support all four forms of school choice. This pattern did in fact
emerge from the data shown in Table 26, although it is also true that majorities of
Republicans joined Democrats in opposition to both forms of vouchers as well as
to tuition tax credits. Those with no political afﬁliation fell between Republicans
and Democrats on three of the four forms of school choice, although they were

more likely to support statewide vouchers.

Table 26: Support for Charters and Choice by Political Afﬁliation

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Political Afﬁliation:
Republican Democrat Neither Republican
nor Democrat
Percent of Respondents
“Supportive” or “Very
Supportive,” by Type of
School Choice:
66.7% 36.8% 45.5%
Charter Schools (n=15) (n=19) (n=11)
. 20.0% 0.0% 27.3%
StateWIde Vouchers (n=15) (n=19) (n=1 1)
33.3% 0.0% 18.2%
Low-Income Vouchers (n=15) (n=19) (n=1 1)
. . . 40.0% 0.0% 18.2%
TUItIon Tax CredIts (n=1iﬂ (n=19) (n=11)

 

 

Why Charter Legislation was Passed and Ofﬁcial Positions on Charters

Survey questions 20 and 21 asked respondents to provide additional information
regarding charter schools and instrumental values by describing, in an open-
ended format, (a) their understanding of why Michigan’s charter school legislation

was passed, and (b) their organization’s position on charters, if one exists.

191

Almost all of the 51 completed surveys contained comments to one or both of
these questions; a summary of comments appears below, with a complete listing

in Appendix G.

Regarding respondents’ understanding of why charter school legislation was
passed in Michigan (Question 20), the most common perception by far was that
charters were created to promote the Choice instrumental value by providing
parents with additional options in public education. Many within this group listed
Choice by itself as the main reason for charter legislation, while others described
Choice within a context of additional benefits that this value would provide, such
as encouraging traditional public schools to innovate and/or improve, making
choices available specifically to low-income parents, or reducing bureaucracy

within K-12 education.

A smaller subgroup of respondents, however, perceived very different reasons
for the passage of charter legislation in Michigan. Several stated that the true
intent of charters was to siphon public money to private interests and schools.
One noted that while promoting Choice was the stated reason for the law, it was
really “. . .a thinly veiled attempted [sic] to provide support (dollars and/or
vouchers) for private schools. . Another stated that some backers “. . .saw a way
to get public funds into traditional private schools without having to go to
vouchers. . .For others it was a way to make money...” Others perceived charters

as an attack on the traditional public school establishment, and teachers’ unions

192

in particular; one declared that the purpose of charters was “to bring demise to
the MEA,” while another noted that “Governor Engler was not happy with the

teachers’ union...”

The vast majority of respondents who described their organization’s position on
charters (Question 21) characterized it as supportive of the movement. Some
expressions of support were unconditional and unequivocal, and in several
instances voiced their support for the recent issue of raising (or eliminating) the
cap on university-sponsored charters. One respondent noted that his/her
organization favors charters “. . .as a step on the road to full school choice"
(presumably in the form of vouchers and/or tuition tax credits for private schools).
Other respondents took a more conditional position on charters. While only one
ﬂatly stated that his/her organization is opposed to the concept, others couched
their support with conditions that included opposition to increasing the cap (or
continuing to have a limited number of charters), a desire for “sufﬁcient oversight
and financial disclosure” (implying that such conditions do not currently exist),
and encouraging local school boards and 180s to do the chartering as opposed

to universities and community colleges.

Telephone Interviews

To gain additional insight into values that have inﬂuenced the policy process

related to Michigan charter schools, telephone conversations were held with

193

three current and three former legislators between late December 2003 and early
February 2004. The three current legislators were among a group of 13 who
agreed to talk with me regarding their involvement in Senate Bill 393 or House
Bill 4148, the two major charter school-related bills from the 2003 legislative
session. The three former legislators had proposed or co-sponsored key
amendments related to charter schools during legislative sessions prior to 2003.
The interviews ranged in duration from approximately 15 minutes to more than

one hour.

Since it was not practical in terms of interviewees” time to administer the entire
survey by telephone, given the need for respondents to actually be looking at
what information questions were asking for and how they should respond
(placing an X in the appropriate box, etc.), the general format of the telephone
interviews was to begin by asking for thoughts on three open-ended questions
from the survey instrument (20, 2, and 4, usually in that order). Question 20
generally provided a good starting point, as it asked interviewees to describe
their sense of what kinds of values were being promoted by the passage of
Michigan’s charter school law and who was doing the promoting. Questions 2
and 4 were a logical next step, as they were readily fashioned into queries about
what has gone well and not so well in the charter school experiment. Depending
on the time availability of the respondent and their level of interest in charters,

discussion moved next into any number of topics related to charter schools and

194

public school performance. Only two of the six interviewees agreed to and

actually did complete the survey instrument itself, however.

Four of the six interviews could be characterized as very informative, with
interviewees providing insightful commentary regarding their own views of
charter schools and the values that have inﬂuenced the policy process in this
area. Among the two that proved to be less informative, one former legislator
shared a few general thoughts about charters (all of a positive nature), but only
after beginning with the acknowledgement that “I wasn’t really all that involved in
the process...my name was just listed as a sponsor" of charter-related
legislation. In the case of the second less informative interview, it is not clear
why this particular legislator agreed to be interviewed in the ﬁrst place, as he was
very brief and curt in his responses and provided few additional details even

when prodded.

In terms of specific findings from the more informative interviews, respondents
identified several key reasons for the passage of charter school legislation in
Michigan. One line of thinking can be thought of as “global” in nature, in that
decisions to support or oppose charters are based upon the extent to which one
believes in providing additional choices to parents and students within publicly-
funded K-12 education. One interviewee continually referred to education as “the
most fundamental decision that parents make on behalf of their children,” while

another described charters as “providing new opportunities to parents to make

195

decisions for their children’s education.” This second respondent, as had several
in the open-ended questions from the survey, drew analogies between education
and other consumer products; he noted that “we have a choice between

shopping at Wal-Mart and going to Meijer, so why shouldn’t we be able to choose

schools for our children?”

For two other interviewees, however, decisions regarding charter school
legislation are made almost entirely in terms of local impact within their district.
One described his opposition to charter-related legislation as being motivated in
large part by political pressure received from the largest school district in his
political district, which he described as having lost substantial amounts of money
to charters. This particular legislator was also annoyed by the fact that the
authorizing agency for several schools in his district was located far away, thus

infringing upon the notion of local control.

A second legislator, who stated that he was “proud to be a moderate” within his
party, described his opposition to charters as stemming largely from local
concerns. “I vote my district,” he declared, and described beginning
consideration of charter-related legislation with the question of “how does this
help my district?” He rattled off numerous statistics about the high test scores
and graduation rates of traditional public schools within his district, described
high levels of interest and involvement in school board politics, and noted that it

was considered “a sin” for parents to miss parent-teacher conferences. On the

196

financial side, he declared that “the K-12 school budget is a pie,” and that the
charters located in his district “don’t give one penny back” to the local schools; he
also asked rhetorically why he would ever vote “to send money to management
companies located across the state or the country?” Perhaps not coincidentally,
this legislator also noted that immediate family members were current or retired
public school teachers, and described “a very close relationship” with institutions
of higher education around the state, having had relatives who enjoyed long
careers as administrators. This particular legislator acknowledged that his
stance on charters have made him somewhat unpopular within his party, but
unapologetically stated that he had no interest in being “Mr. Good Guy” to others

in his party if it meant slighting local school districts.

Another thoughtful response to the question of why charter legislation was
enacted was provided by an interviewee who commented that “charters meant
different things to different people” and that there were “lots of different agendas”
at work. For some, it was the promotion of choice, while for others (whom he
described as “enemies of public education”) it was an opportunity to experiment

with moving public education into the private sector.

As far as perceived successes and problems associated with Michigan’s charter
school experiment, telephone interviewees expressed a range of opinion.
Several indicated that they had few, if any, concerns related to charters; one

characterized the negative publicity received by some charters as ”completely

197

overblown,” and wondered why greater attention wasn’t devoted to traditional
public schools “where failure has been tolerated for years.” Some charters have
done well and others haven’t, remarked another interviewee, but the beauty of
the charter movement is that parents are free to remove their children at any time
from schools that don't meet their expectations. “Charters must be doing
something right,” he stated, pointing out that most charters have waiting lists and

that “nobody is forcing parents to send their kids there.”

Other interviewees were more cautious in their praise of charters. One indicated
that “charters serve a niche,” particularly in urban areas for students who have
fared poorly in traditional public school settings, but “I still don’t think we know
enough about how they’re doing in terms of academics.” This former legislator
acknowledged some “nice success stories” among charters, but also pointed to
“dreadful failures” within the experiment, and was particularly concerned about
charters not serving - and not even attempting to serve — students with
disabilities. Another indicated his view that “there’s a need for charters for some
students,” particularly those in need of alternative education, but that “we ought
to concentrate our efforts on educating all students” rather than the small number
enrolled in charters. Still another described his concerns about accountability
and oversight on the part of authorizing agencies, and was especially cautious

about having private sector management companies involved.

198

A final insight from one telephone interview was perhaps noteworthy more for its
commentary on the political process than anything specific to charter school
policy. This particular interviewee stated that his vote on a charter school bill
was a “trade” with another legislator for his vote on another bill unrelated to
charters. “This business is all about relationships,” the legislator stated, and
went on to describe geographic differences in the Legislature, declaring that the
delegation from urban areas (and Detroit in particular) as “very, very weak” in
terms of introducing legislation and getting it passed. This particular legislator
defined success in terms of numbers of bills introduced and passed, and quoted
numerous statistics in this regard. These comments illustrate yet another
perspective on legislators’ stances toward charters: for some, the issue is
“global” but still rooted in education; for others, the issues are very much local;
and for others, political considerations and relationships not necessarily related

to education take precedence.

Information from Incomplete Surveys

As indicated in Chapter 1, two respondents that were contacted and invited to
complete the survey declined to do so (citing time constraints), but were willing to
provide some general commentary regarding their thoughts on charters. These
comments were generally similar in nature to those made during telephone

interviews, and thus are included here.

199

One such respondent indicated that he is “generally pro-charter,” but then
described a series of conditions for his support similar to those identiﬁed by
several telephone interviewees above. These included having charters
developed locally (by school boards and other authorizing agencies located in
the community) and only by non-profit entities. This respondent noted that
“Michigan and other states with free booting charter regimes” (presumably
referring to authorizing agencies that issue charters far from their headquarters
and then experience difficulty overseeing them) have “seen the spread of good

charters, bad charters, and indifferent charters. . .”

The second respondent - a legislator who has voted against charter expansion -
provides a nice contrast to the ﬁrst. His primary motivation, similar to several of
the telephone interviewees, is local and ﬁnancial interest. He stated “...My votes
against charter...expansion are based on...the fact that my local (traditional)
public school district has grave concerns about charters drawing students (and
revenue) from them. If we lose two kids per classroom, we still have to have a
teacher in that classroom, lights, heat, custodial service, etc. I have a strong
relationship with my school district and administrators and teachers, and my
votes are in part a reflection of that support.” This respondent also questioned
whether charters are in fact offering a viable alternative to traditional public
schools in terms of student achievement: “...I also remain unconvinced that
charter schools have demonstrated that they are a better alternative to traditional

public schools. As soon as it's proven to me that charters provide consistently

200

better education, I'll be more open to expansion. It seems irresponsible to just
open the door to many more charter schools and risk damaging the traditional

public schools without strong evidence that it’s better for education.”

201

Chapter 6: Discussion and Review of Hypotheses

The principal research objective of this work has been to learn more about the
value preferences of selected Michigan policy elites with respect to charter
schools and the instrumental values that influence educational policy. In this
respect, perhaps the most signiﬁcant findings emerging from this work inform the
ﬁrst major hypothesis, involving the relative preferences of Michigan policy elites
for the four instrumental values in educational policy. Specifically, this
hypothesis predicted that in contrast to the ﬁndings of Marshall and colleagues —
and consistent with the ﬁndings of Garn - the Choice value would emerge as the

most important in Michigan, followed in order by Efﬁciency, Quality, and Equity.

What emerged, however, largely confirms, rather than contradicting, the central
thesis of the Marshall study, in that the importance of Quality relative to the other
three values was veriﬁed. In each of the three measures used on this survey
instrument to compare preference for one value against the others (paired
statements in Question 7, direct preference in the paired comparison format of
Question 8, and the rank-ordering format of Question 9), Quality was the clear
preference of policy elites in Michigan. In Question 7, Quality was the only value
to receive positive scores across each of the three “domains” in educational
policy, and was the favored value for all five subgroups of respondents by wide
margins. The overall “order of finish” among the four values in Question 7 was

identical to the order of the Marshall study as well: Quality a clear favorite,

202

followed by Efﬁciency and Equity grouped closely in second and third place, with
Choice a distant fourth. Statistically signiﬁcant differences at the .05 level were
also found between Quality and each of the other three values using paired

samples T-tests, as well as between Efﬁciency and Choice (Table 13).

At the same time, however, it is by no means the case that this study’s ﬁndings in
terms of value preferences are identical those of Marshall and colleagues. Most
notably, the order in which the instrumental values were preferred by Michigan
policy elites behind Quality varied considerably in accordance with the type of
measure used. Using the comparison of paired statements format (Question 7),
which was the only measure employed by Marshall and colleagues, the order of
preference in this work was, as noted, identical to the Marshall study. In the
second and third measures of preference from this study that were go_t used by
Marshall and colleagues, however, the order of preference looks somewhat
different. In the second format, with values contrasted against one another
without the use of policy statements (Question 8), Equity is the value that fares ‘
best in head-to—head competition with Quality, followed by Choice and then
Efﬁciency a distant last. In the third format, using rank-ordering of the four values
(Question 9), Equity again ﬁnishes in second place behind Quality, with

Efficiency third - slightly ahead of Choice (see Table 15).

Another notable contrast of this work to the Marshall study was that Quality was

not the highest-ranked value for Michigan policy elites across all three policy

203

domains in Question 7. While Quality was highest in both Program and
Organization/Governance in these ﬁndings, it ranked third in Finance, behind
Efﬁciency and Equity. While Marshall and colleagues found Choice ranked “a
distant Iast” in Finance, this value ranked second (albeit still with a negative

score) within this domain in this work (see Tables 10 and 11).

Similarly, while Quality was the preferred value among all ﬁve subgroups of
respondents, notable differences in value preference among the groups emerged
from Question 7 (Table 12). For example, Business/AdvocacyICivic respondents
had Quality tied with Efﬁciency as its most favored value, and this same group
rated Choice more highly than the other four subgroups while decisively rejecting
Equity. Legislators as a group were much more inclined to reject Choice, while
charter school authorizers soundly rejected Efﬁciency and somewhat surprisingly
did not embrace Choice. In Question 9, which asked respondents to rank-order
the four values in accordance with their preferences (see overall results in Table
15), differences again emerged among the ﬁve subgroups, as
Business/Advocacy/Civic respondents again ranked Choice (along with
Efficiency) comparatively highly, while Equity was relatively popular among

charter school authorizers (Table 16).
In terms of what can be inferred from findings involving these three distinct

measures of value preference, it should be reemphasized that the overall

construct validity of using three different measures of value preference (jumping

204

momentarily ahead to the fourth major hypothesis) was validated by the
Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix (MTMM) correlations discussed in Chapter 4. As
noted, the 12 correlations of convergent validity, involving different measures
(Questions 7, 8, and 10) of the same “trait” (each of the four instrumental values)
produced an average correlation of .502. This was the expected result, since it
was predicted that elites who preferred the Quality value in one measure would
do likewise for the other measures. Particularly high correlations were found
within all four traits between the second and third measures of value preference,
Question 8 and Question 9 — perhaps because the use of statements to
represent the four values in Question 7 caused respondents to evaluate the
values differently than when the values appeared on their own in Questions 8

and 9.

In explaining differences in findings between this research and the Marshall study
specific to Question 7, it seems likely that the wording of the statements chosen
to represent the four values, combined with the political, ﬁscal, and educational
contexts of their work and this research, is a key factor. Simply put, it is logical
that the statements chosen to represent the four values, combined with
contextual factors such as political climate and the ﬁscal status of government
and school districts, is responsible for at least some of the differences in how the
values were perceived in the Marshall study from the mid-19803 and this
research in Michigan in late 2003. It is quite plausible, for example, that a

statement which calls for “increasing the level of funding for schools” (the Quality

205

statement within the Finance domain) would be received more favorably by
policy elites at the time of the Marshall study than by their counterparts today,

with states facing multi-billion dollar budget shortfalls.

Regarding differences in this research that emerged with respect to the order in
which the values finished (behind Quality) across the three measures, several
potential explanations appear to have some merit. The “strength of wording”
issue discussed above, when considered in conjunction with contextual factors
such as time, political climate, and ﬁscal environment, is one possibility, as
certain values may have beneﬁted from having statements that deﬁned and
operationalized them while others suffered from this format. It is possible, in
other words, that statements used to represent the four values in Question 7
might have made some values (notably Efﬁciency) preferable in a way that
disappeared when the values appeared on their own, without Statements to
represent them as in Question 8. This might help explain why Efﬁciency ﬁnished

second in Question 7, but fourth in Question 8 and third in Question 9.

Another possible explanation for differences across the three measures of value
preference involves their “directness.” More speciﬁcally, while policy elites did
not explicitly know that the statements they were comparingand choosing
between in Question 7 were intended to represent the four instrumental values,
since the statements were not labeled as such on the survey instrument, they did

know in the other two questions that they were making “direct” choices between

206

the values, either in a paired format (Question 8) or in a rank—ordering format
(Question 9). In other words, a respondent might not immediately identify the
statement “increasing the level of funding for schools” with the Quality value (if
they had thought at all about what this value meant in terms of policy initiatives),
but would have little choice but to compare Quality directly with the other three
values in Questions 8 and 9. As such, Question 7 might be considered a
somewhat “indirect” measure of value preference in contrast to the more direct
measures employed in the other two questions, with this difference accounting

for an unknown portion of the apparent discrepancy in ﬁndings.

It may well be the case, then, that Question 7 was substantially different from
Questions 8 and 9 in terms of how value preference was measured, and that the
real question in explaining differences in findings is why the order of preference
behind Quality was different in Questions 8 and 9. There is no obvious answer to
this apparent discrepancy, other than to note that numerical differences in the
order of finish between the two questions are quite small and perhaps
attributable to measurement error. In Question 8, the relative size of the gap
between Quality (using the 122 score discussed on page 157) and Equity (73) is
roughly proportional to the gap between these two values in Question 9 (a mean
rank of 1.25 for Quality and 2.50 for Equity) from Table 15. Choice and
Efficiency, similarly, are grouped closely enough together (a score of 41 for

Choice vs. 39 for Efﬁciency from Question 8, and 3.08 for Efficiency vs. 3.16 for

207

Choice in Question 9 shown in Table 15) to be considered virtually
indistinguishable, even though their order ﬂip-flops across the two measures.
Question 10, which measured respondents' level of agreement with two
contrasting definitions for each of the four values, provides additional insight into
how the values were defined and preferred by Michigan policy elites. There was
little difference in preference for the definitions of Quality (see Table 17), with
fewer than half of respondents agreeing with either of these deﬁnitions - both of
which emphasize an active role for the state in education (for Quality 1, in
defining and measuring standards through the use of tests, and for Quality 2, in
allocating resources in pursuit of these goals). Regarding Efﬁciency, there was a
somewhat surprising preference for the Efﬁciency 1 deﬁnition (advocating a
minimizing of costs and maximizing of educational gains) over Efﬁciency 2 (which
called for holding schools accountable for performance and outcomes). This
ﬁnding perhaps illustrates the depth of the budgetary difﬁculties being confronted
by policymakers in Michigan at the time of this writing in 2003-04. An even larger
discrepancy existed between policy elites’ preference for Choice 1 (emphasizing
the ability of students and parents to choose schools) over Choice 2
(emphasizing the ability of schools to choose their own mission, curriculum,

textbooks, and staff).

Several themes emerge from Question 10. A ﬁrst is that Michigan policy elites

rejected value definitions (associated with Quality) that promoted or emphasized

an active role for the state in education. In the two instances in which resource

208

allocation was a key element of the contrasting deﬁnitions, they took a decidedly
cost-conscious approach, preferring Efficiency 1 (with its cost-benefit emphasis)
over Efficiency 2 (which promotes accountability in a general sense) and Equity 1
(advocating for fairness in resource allocation) over Equity 2 (which calls
explicitly for additional resources provided to schools). Perhaps most notably,
they associate the Choice value much more strongly with educational choices
provided to students and parents than to schools in the ability to select their own

mission, curriculum, and staff.

In the end, ﬁndings with respect to the value preferences of Michigan policy elites
are somewhat ambiguous, yet also quite informative. Marshall and colleagues
concluded that each of the four instrumental values had been emphasized at
various points in the history of educational policymaking, and that Quality was the
primary value driving the policy process in their six-state sample in the mid-
19803. The current study of Michigan policy elites in late 2003 and early 2004
largely confirms that central conclusion, although the ﬁndings simultaneously
suggest that the other three values — including Choice — are also very much
present within the policy process in Michigan. The fact that the state has nearly
200 charter schools, many of which have waiting lists, in addition to other active
forms of school choice at the state and local levels, hardly suggests that Choice
is an unimportant or forgotten value, even if it does not emerge as such on a

survey using direct, forced-choice comparisons with Quality and the other values.

209

A second major hypothesis identiﬁed prior to beginning this research was that
notable differences would emerge with respect to the value preferences of policy
elites, particularly across the different “clusters” of elites used in the Marshall
study. In the Marshall schematic (see Appendix A), policy elites were divided
into ﬁve distinct groupings based upon the amount of inﬂuence they wielded
within the educational policy process. The focus in this research was on the ﬁrst
four clusters (the “insiders,” “near circle,” “far circle,” and “sometimes players”),
with the primary hypothesis being that the “insiders” cluster (consisting of
legislators) would be more supportive of Choice than the “near circle” (which
included education-related interest groups such as teachers’ unions). It was also
speculated that appreciable differences in value preferences would emerge
within clusters, however, that would perhaps be attributable to other variables

such as political party affiliation.

In considering the cluster schematic and the results of the Michigan policy elite
survey further, however, it became evident that the idea of comparing value
preferences across clusters was of limited use, and that the notion of clusters as
used in the Marshall study is somewhat flawed. The limited utility of the cluster
schematic stems largely from the fact that this study had fewer than half the
respondents than did Marshall and colleagues, and that the number of informants
within some clusters was too limited to permit any substantive analysis. Within
the “insider” cluster, for example — which consisted of Michigan legislators and

was found by Marshall and colleagues to be the most inﬂuential in educational

210

policy - only seven completed surveys were received. The “far circle” was even
more limited, as it consisted exclusively of the State Board of Education (from

whom completed surveys were received from four of the eight members).

Perhaps even more problematic than limited numbers of respondents within
some clusters, however, was that the entire cluster schematic used in the
Marshall study did not seem to apply particularly well to the sample of Michigan
policy elites. In part this was because nearly half of the respondents did not ﬁt
intuitively into the groupings and clusters used by Marshall and colleagues.
While a clear match between the two studies existed for some respondents, such
as legislators, teacher organizations, and the state board of education, it was not
clear where to place respondents such as charter school authorizers, civic
associations, business interests, organized labor groups not directly involved in
education, educational management organizations that operate charter schools,
and advocacy/research organizations involved not just in education, but other
policy areas as well. All of these were either policy elites that the Marshall study
did not include at all (which seems inappropriate for study in present-day
Michigan, given the influence wielded by these groups in educational policy), 91
were included in the cluster schematic, but were effectively lost within one or
more groupings (such as “non-education groups”) whose name did not

- adequately describe its membership. As such, charter school authorizers and
other respondents could have been removed from the study altogether, or a “best

guess” made about where to situate them within the cluster framework of the

211

Marshall study - but either of these actions seemed speculative and may have

jeopardized the comparability of findings between the two studies.

A related issue involving the cluster schematic and the second research
hypothesis was that the order of importance rankings developed by Marshall and
colleagues for the different clusters did not seem to match particularly well with
the situation in Michigan at the time of this reSearch. Having individual legislators
and the Legislature as a whole comprise the “insiders” cluster, representing the
most important policy elites, seems sensible, but ranking the Chief State School
Officer third overall and placing teacher organizations within the “near circle” of
influence are more questionable — as was the placement of the state board of
education into the “far circle” and the vaguely-worded “non-education groups”
into the distant “often forgotten players” cluster. Findings from this research
pertaining to the perceived effectiveneSs of the Michigan Department of
Education and State Board of Education (in Questions 12 and 13) suggest, in
contrast, that the Chief State School Officer and the State Board are ranked too
highly by the Marshall schematic, in that these policy elites are not nearly as

influential in Michigan in 2003 as the Marshall study found in the mid-19803.

Conversely, business interests and their influence in educational policy also
appear misplaced -— or perhaps ignored entirely - in the Marshall schematic.
Marshall and colleagues did not list this group in their chart at all; they

presumably judged the influence of this group of policy elites as limited, and may

212

have intended to lump them into the generic-sounding “non-education groups”
category which was placed within the “often forgotten players” cluster. In either
case, it seems clear that n_ot having a category for business interests - or placing
it in the “often forgotten players” cluster, if that was what Marshall and colleagues
did in fact intend to do — represents a substantial ﬂaw in the cluster schematic. It
seems clear, from present-day educational policy debates. in Michigan and other
states, that the influence of business interests such as Michigan Manufacturers
and Commerce in educational policy matters is signiﬁcant. Business interests, it
could be argued, should constitute their own grouping within the cluster
schematic, and they should rank much higher than the “often forgotten players”
cluster — arguably as highly as the “near circle,” just below legislators. When
policy changes ranging from school funding and curriculum to the availability of
choice-based options are proposed, business interests such are tremendously
influential players — arguably more so than the Michigan Department of 1
Education and even the State Board, which many respondents in this research

judged to be largely ineffective and non-influential.

A final issue with the cluster schematic used in the Marshall study was that the
distinction between “education interest groups (combined)” and “teacher
organizations” within the “near circle” cluster, and between “school boards
association” and “administrators’ associations” groupings in the “sometimes
players” cluster, were not clear. Speciﬁcally, it was not clear which groups of

policy elites other than (associations of teachers, school boards, and

213

administrators were included in “education interest groups (combined),” and why
Marshall and colleagues listed these three types of policy elites separately. It
might also be argued, although this research in Michigan did not explicitly
measure this, that the influence of these groupings of educational professionals
(and teachers’ unions in particular) is substantially lower in Michigan circa 2003
than at the time of the Marshall study. This argument has been made by a
number of recent studies (see, for example, Boyd, Plank, 8 Sykes, 1998), and to
the extent it is true, the influence of these educational professionals may be

overstated in the cluster schematic used in the Marshall study.

More interesting than the differences in value preferences found by Marshall and
colleagues between clusters of policy elites are differences between the ﬁve

. subgroups of Michigan elites: legislators, interest groups, charter school
authorizers, businessladvocacylcivic associations, and other education-related
professionals within state government. While only one of these five subgroups
corresponds neatly to the cluster schematic developed by Marshall and
colleagues (with all legislators located within the “insiders” cluster), a number of
interesting differences between the ﬁve subgroups appeared in terms of value
preferences. Quality, for example, was the preferred value among all subgroups
(as shown in Table 11), but received much higher scores from other
governmental officials and charter authorizers than from businessladvocacylcivic
groups, who were comparatively more inclined to favor Efficiency and Choice

while rejecting Equity in a resounding manner. This same pattern showed up in

214

Question 9 (as displayed in Table 15), with Quality rank-ordered comparatively
highly by other governmental ofﬁcials, Efﬁciency by businessladvocacylcivic
groups and legislators, Equity by charter authorizers, and Choice by
businessladvocacylcivic groups and charter authorizers. Despite the fact that the
cluster schematic from the Marshall study proved to be of limited use, then,
differences with respect to value preferences among the five subgroups of

respondents in this research produced several interesting findings.

The third major hypothesis involved the issue of “value pairs.” This was an issue
examined by Marshall and colleagues, as well as by Garn (2000), who theorized
that none of the four values by itself was strong enough to drive school reform,
but that pairs of values could serve this purpose. Certain values, they argued,
were more likely to reinforce one another (e.g., to be supported simultaneously
by policy elites) while others opposed one another (e.g., elites favored one while
rejecting the other). In particular, the Marshall study found that Choice and
Efficiency oppose one another, while Garn’s work in Arizona reached just the
opposite conclusion in ﬁnding that policy elites in that state favored both Choice
and Efﬁciency. The hypothesized relationship among Michigan policy elites was
that results would resemble Garn’s findings in that Choice and Efficiency are

mutually reinforcing goals that are supported simultaneously.

Data emerging from correlations between the four values, however (see Table

14) appear to refute the hypothesis that Choice and Efﬁciency reinforce one

215

another. The correlation between these two variables is indeed positive, but is
weak (.055) and not statistically signiﬁcant. An expected negative (opposing)
relationship between Choice and Equity that had been hypothesized for Michigan
policy elites was confirmed by the data to some extent, but this relationship was
again rather weak (-.099). The only statistically signiﬁcant relationship, in fact,
was of a negative nature between Efficiency and Equity, which may make sense
in retrospect in that policy elites concerned with inputs and outputs (the
Economic dimension of Efﬁciency) and with accountability might not be as

concerned with issues of Equity.

In considering the implications of findings related to value pairs within a context
of charter schools and the Choice value, one interpretation that seems quite
plausible is that the whole “value pairs” idea at best presents only part of the real
story. The data in both this research and the Marshall study suggest, on the one
hand, that those who support charters and the Choice value view these new
schools as a way of achieving Quality first and foremost. This makes sense, and
is in fact supported by many of the arguments made by those who advocate for
these schools (e.g., by providing Choice, we will provide better schools, higher
levels of achievement, and greater prosperity on both an individual and societal

level).

It also seems plausible, however, that the notion of value pairs is incomplete to

the extent that it portrays the four values as mutually exclusive combatants within

216

a zero-sum policy arena, where some values “win” and others “lose.” One thing
that is known about charters — both from previous research as well as from this
research in Michigan - is that they are supported for a wide variety of reasons,
some of which can correctly be viewed as pursuing Quality while others can just
as legitimately be interpreted as working toward Efficiency and/or Equity. The
fact that charters are located disproportionately in urban areas and serve large
numbers of poor and non-white students, for example, strongly suggests that
these schools are serving as a means of promoting Equity. They can with equal
justification be viewed as promoting Efﬁciency since parents are free to remove
their children if their needs are not being met (the Accountability dimension of
this value) ml by the fact that charters typically have lower per-pupil
expenditures than the traditional public schools they compete most directly
against (the Economic dimension of Efﬁciency). One can argue that any of these
are the wrong reasons to support charters, or that m defensible reason for
supporting them exists, but the point here is that the value pairs hypothesis may
well be incomplete to the extent that it presumes each of the four values must
oppose at least one of the other three. The case of charter schools and the
many reasons people support them, it would seem, shows that a policy initiative
can be a way of pursuing all four values, even if its supporters perceive the

relative importance of the values differently.

The ﬁfth major hypothesis was that the value preferences of Michigan policy

elites would be distributed unevenly across variables such as political affiliation

217

and the racial/ethnic and geographic characteristics of elites’ districts or
constituencies. In the end, this hypothesis was perhaps the least interesting and
least testable, due to not having enough data (for variables such as the
race/ethnicity of respondents’ districts/constituencies) and a lack of noteworthy

relationships in cases where data were available.

The one variable where noteworthy relationships did emerge was across the self-
identified political affiliation of respondents. As reviewed from Table 6, the
sample of Michigan policy elites was 39.3% Democrat, 29.4% Republican, and
21.6% favoring neither political party. Republicans were more likely to view
charters as successful in providing intended benefits of their existence (Table
24), with particularly large discrepancies between Republicans and Democrats in
the case of two intended benefits: “charters bring new educational opportunities”
and “charters provide smaller learning environments.” As predicted and
consistent with ﬁndings from Table 24, Republicans were also less likely than
Democrats to be concerned with key charter-related issues (Table 25),
particularly in the case of “providing services to students with disabilities” and
“disclosure of ﬁnances.” Republicans, ﬁnally, confirmed the expected
relationship in favoring all four forms of school choice (charters, low-income
vouchers, statewide vouchers, and private school tuition tax credits) more so
than did Democrats, although fewer than half of Republicans favored both forms
of vouchers and tuition tax credits. Respondents with no political preference fell

between Republicans and Democrats on most of these issues, as predicted.

218

Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Research

The value preferences of policy elites and the ways in which these preferences
impact the educational policymaking process represent an important and
relatively new area of study. Similar to the findings in a pioneering study
conducted by Marshall, Mitchell, 8 Wirt (1989) - and in partial contrast to what I
had expected to ﬁnd - Michigan policy elites expressed a clear, although not
exclusive, preference for the Quality instrumental value in relation to the other
three values in educational policy, including Choice. Quality was the preferred
value in each of three distinct formats: forced choice pairings of values using
statements to represent and operationalize the four values across three “policy
domains,” forced choice pairings without the use of statements, and rank-

ordering of the four values.

It was also the case, however, that the order of preference of the four values
varied somewhat in accordance with the format used. In the forced choice
pairings using statements employed by the Marshall study, results mirrored
theirs: Quality, followed in order by Efficiency, Equity, and Choice. In the forced
choice pairing format without the use of statements, Quality was followed by
Equity, Choice, and Efﬁciency. In the rank-ordering format, finally, Quality was
followed by Equity, Efﬁciency, and Choice. Although differences in the order of
ﬁnish were slight in some instances, variation in the order of ﬁnish suggests that

value preferences may be sensitive to the method of measurement as well as to

219

differences in contextual factors such as time, geography, political climate, and

ﬁnancial conditions.

A number of areas in which additional research would be helpful in identifying the
value preferences of policy elites, both in Michigan and on a broader level, are
suggested in this work. One such area would be additional (and perhaps larger)
studies that use all three of the measures of value preference utilized in this
work, as opposed to the single measure employed in the Marshall study.
Particularly useful would be research that was more successful in gaining the
participation of larger numbers of legislators, who are cf unquestioned

' importance in educational policy but proved reluctant to share their thoughts with
me for reasons that included time constraints and (presumably) reluctance to
divulge lnfonnation on a sensitive topic such as charter schools. It would also be
instructive to research distinctive periods in the history of a state with respect to
political and ﬁnancial climate (e.g., during periods of both Republican and
Democratic dominance in state government, and during times of relative financial
prosperity as well as more austere circumstances), in order to see if (and how)

the value preferences of policy elites varied accordingly.

These same questions could be revisited by re-examining the six states involved
in the Marshall study, or any other combination of-new and old states, at some
point other than the mid-19805. One of the more interesting aspects of the work

of Marshall and colleagues was uncovering state-by—state variation with respect

220

to the value preferences of policy elites, and determining which factors within the
political, cultural, and economic context of each state were most responsible for
these preferences. As noted, the assumption would be that some states in a
multi-state study such as the Marshall work would remain largely the same over
time, proving largely oblivious to contextual influences, while others would prove
more susceptible to factors such as budgetary conditions (shortfalls vs. surplus)

and political context.

The interesting characteristic that ties all of these actual and potential ﬁndings
together, and could be informed even further with additional research, is that
decisions regarding educational policy are the result of a competition of values
that often have little, if anything, to do with education itself. In education, as in
other policy arenas, Marshall and colleagues observed that whichever initiatives
prevail at any given point in time within the policy process are largely a function
of the values that elites, who formulate policy either directly or indirectly, bring
with them. In some instances, the value preferences of policy elites are
pervasive enough to resist the inﬂuence of contextual factors, while other
circumstances illustrate that a host of factors such as political and economic

climate can and do inﬂuence values.

221

APPENDICES

222

Appendix A: Inﬂuence Rankings of Policy Actors in Education

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6-State Cluster
. . Ranking,* in
PoIIcy EIIte or Group Order of
Importance

Individual members of legislature 1 .
State legislature as a whole 2 lnsrders
Chief State School Officer 3
Education interest groups (combined) 4
Teacher organizations 5 Near Circle
Governor and executive staff 6
Legislative staff 7
State board of education 8 Far Circle ‘
School boards, association 9 Sometimes
AdmInIstrators assomahons 19 Pla

. . yers
(prInCIpals, etc.)
Courts 1 1
Federal policy mandates 12
Non-education groups 13 Often
Lay groups 14 Forgotten
Education researcher organizations 15 Players
Referenda 16 l
Production of educational materials 17

 

 

Source: Marshall, Mitchell, 8 Wirt (1989:23)

*The six-state sample included Arizona, California, Illinois, Pennsylvania, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin.

223

4

Appendix B: Survey Instrument

Michigan Educational Policy and Values:
Instrumental Values and the Formation of Charter School Policy

This survey instrument is intended to explore some of your views regarding (a)
the values that influence educational policy in Michigan, and (b) the state’s

charter school experiment.

I. Views Regarding Charter Schools and School Choice:

1. How successful do you think charter schools in Michigan have been in
providing each of the following intended beneﬁts?

 

Not at all
Successful

Somewhat
Successful

Mostly
Successful

Very
Successful

 

Providing new educational
opportunities to families who lacked
such opportunities previously

 

Serving as ‘laboratories of innovation’
for new instructional approaches

 

Improving academic achievement

 

Providing opportunities to focus on
the needs of a particular group of
students

 

Stimulating high levels of parental
involvement

 

Improving the cost effectiveness of
public education

 

Providing smaller learning

 

environments

 

 

 

 

 

2. Please describe any other beneﬁts not mentioned above that you feel charter

schools are providing (use additional space if necessary):

224

 

3. How concerned are you that charter schools in Michigan are experiencing
problems, or not living up to expectations, in the following areas?

 

Not at all Somewhat Concerned Very
Concerned Concerned Concerned

 

Disclosure of finances

Oversight by authorizing agencies
Training of teachers

Teacherpay

Causing financial hardship for local
school districts

Providing transportation to all
students

Providing services to students with
disabilities

“Creaming off“ high-achieving
students

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

4. Please describe any other concerns you have related to Michigan charter
schools (use additional space if necessary):

5. How would you describe your level of support for the following education-
related initiatives or goals? (Very Opposed, Opposed, Supportive, or Very
Supportive)

 

Very Opposed Supportive Very
Opposed , Supportive

 

The charter school movement in
Michigan

A general statewide voucher system
open to all students in Michigan

A voucher system open only to low-
income students in Michigan

Tax credits for private school tuition in
Michigan

Allowing more inter-district transfers
Development of more magnet schools
by public school districts

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6. Please describe your level of agreement with the following statement: “Charter
schools in Michigan represent a ‘stepping stone’ on the path to other forms of
school choice.”

Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree

225

 

 
 
 
 

29.38.30.850. .m... :. o.o>on_

 

£858 .2 £95. .0 .O.>o.. O... c.3205

 

EO=OO x2 8.3038 .0 mm: o... m.:.>o..mE.

 

9.833 «80 EOE wEEmoa mains.

«use: 6.8%
5.? 5.2.20 O. cozcmam O.OE 9.3.0

  

 

 

EEOOOO. 30.09.00. 5 O.O>On_

 

EoEo acmE .0028 EO.O.te 0.05.

 

mc.meco.m.OO.u c. conseoﬁmn .2305

c.2220
w 35E“. .0. 30.9.0 EOE 9.6.3:.

 

 

3.2.9.. xoﬁoo. co 2.0.8.58. EOOOOI

 

WOBDOmwu *0 COZMN=ND 0 .0uﬂ0..0

 

...n.xm..Em. O. c.3905

muﬁucﬂm O.Eouwom .29... 9.2.8

 

5.2.5
a mm...Ew. .O. 30.9... EOE 9.6.5....

95.2.3. m:0.0chO.>...m:O 9.30.300

 

 

$09.8 .2 9.6.5. .O 65. 9... 9.822..

  

3.2.9.0 x0
.80. ..O 30.8.23. 9.6.63.

 

muaucﬂw O.Emumom .Osm... 955m

memo: _a.OOmm

5.3 ..O.O....O o. :2...sz EOE 9.3.0

 

I _OOr_om «CEO-tm 0.02

 

mc.v.mEco.w.OOO c. cone .O.tm .OUOO.m.

 

2828 .0. maﬁa... .o .O>O. O... £899..

 

.o . .235

 

..mOOO: .989.
5.; 5.2.20 O. concoum EOE 9.3.0

3:5..8: Emacs. 9.388...

 

Egon .8. cozmozuw .O Om: O... ac.>o.OE.

8.265me

.80. co 2.0.858. 9.62.2...

 

 

wuﬁucﬂw 2:538 .9. .2 Stew

9.82558 EOE mEEmEm mains.

 

 

5.2.6
w mw._.Em. .2 30.9.0 EOE ac.u.>o.n.

EOEOOOOOE .0058 Ew.o.to 90$.

 

 

 

80.386. .0 c2856: O .235

23.8 .8. 5.688 .0 cm: 9.. c.>o. E.

 

 
 

0>_«Umtm-~m00 9.0:. WEN. 0..

 

 

 

 

EOEOOE. .cmtOmE .cmtOOE EatomE. .cmtOmE.
EOE EOE Soc. 20:. EOE
53... .2558 2296 2.8.5 .2558

 

 

 

na. «2 E :o 300

 

.catomE.

9.0;.
6:5.

 

 

 

 

”a. :0.— co .3.

u

 

 

 

 

 

.OE ..cmtoqE. EOE .chOEOm m. to. on. co .mom O... t to. 9.. E2. :. .82 9.89... o5 {OE .29. 9.. co $5

 

can. 30> o. EOEOOE. EOE ESE m. to. o... co ion 9.. .. :2. a... O. 59...... xon. O5 Ems. diam .m:o..mo:to .O cOmtOOEOO
Ocean some .o. 3.6... x_m 2.. .O 9.0 c. ..x. :a 3.8:. .3 2.9.8.2. :0.» O. .cmtOOE. EOE O. :3 some c. m.mom 3:2. 92
9.. .o 50.5.. 28%.... 88.... ESE. .mcozaosuo .0 96.382“. O. can: Eu .2. Emom >O._OO 3:27.630 .0 2.3 2m 32% K

m:...aE>o=oa co.«ao=um new 2.23m o:_a> .3239.— .=

226

8. Below are four values that are used in discussions of educational reform:
Choice, Efﬁciency, Equity, and Quality. Please indicate which of the two values
in each pair is more important to you personally:

Choice or Efﬁciency
Efﬁciency or Equity
Quality or Efficiency

Equity or Quality
Choice or Quality
Equity or Choice

9. Of the four educational policy values below, please indicate that which you
give the highest priority to (1), that which is your second highest priority (2), that
which is your third highest priority (3), and that which is your fourth highest

priority (4):

Quality

Efficiency

Equity

Choice

10. Here are various definitions of the terms used in questions 2 and 3 that you
have just rated and ranked. Please indicate how closely each deﬁnition ﬁts your
understanding of the terms (Not at all; Not very closely; Rather closely; Very

closely):

(a) Quality means that the state will deﬁne certain standards for excellence, and
develop methods (such as standardized tests) for measuring progress

Not at all Not very closely Rather Closely Very Closely

 

 

 

(b) Quality means that the state, after establishing standards and methods for
measuring progress, allocates public resources to achieve these goals

Not at all Not very closely Rather Closely Very Closely

 

 

 

227

(c) Efﬁciency means that schools should attempt to minimize costs while
maximizing gains in performance and outcomes.

Not at all Not very closely Rather Closely Very Closely

 

 

 

(d) Efﬁciency means schools should be accountable for their performance and
outcomes.

Not at all Not very closely Rather Closely Very Closely

 

 

 

(e) Equity means fairness in the allocation and use of resources for all K-12
educaﬁon.

Not at all Not very closely Rather Closely Very Closely

 

 

 

(f) Equity means providing additional resources and support to overcome
identified disadvantages and deficiencies among K-12 schools

Not at all Not very closely Rather Closely Very Closely

 

 

 

(9) Choice means the ability of students and parents to choose schools in
accordance with their personal goals and interests

Not at all Not very closely Rather Closely Very Closely

 

 

 

(h) Choice means the ability of a school to choose its own mission, curriculum,
textbooks, and staff

Not at all Not very closely Rather Closely Very Closely

 

 

 

Ill. Views Regarding Educational Roles and Performance

11. Which of the following statements reflects your view of the most appropriate
role for state government in establishing educational policy?

A limited role __ A moderate role _ An active role

228

12. How effective do you feel the following Michigan educational policymaking
agencies are? (Not at all Effective, Somewhat Effective, Mostly Effective, or Very

 

 

 

Effective)
Not at all Somewhat Mostly Very
Effective Effective Effective Effective
Michigan Department of
Education
State Board of
Education

 

 

Your local school board

 

 

 

 

 

 

13. Please discuss reasons for this view (use additional space if necessary):

14. How would you rate the performance of the following educational entities in

Michigan?

 

Very Poor Somewhat Somewhat
Performance Poor Good
Performance Performance

Very Good
Performance

1

 

Public schools
in general

 

Public schools
in urban areas

 

Charter schools

 

Private,
religious
schools

 

Private, non-
religious
schools

 

 

 

 

 

 

229

 

IV. Your Participation in School-Related Activities

15. Are you a member of, or do you represent, any group or organization that has
direct involvement with the following kinds of K-12 schools? (please mark either
yes or no for eaCh type of school)

 

Yes No

 

Traditional public schools
Private schools
Charter schools

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

16. If you marked “yes” for any of the three types of schools in question 15
above, please list all groups or organizations of which you are a member or
which you represent that have direct involvement with that type of school:

Traditional public schools:
Private schools:
Charter schools:

 

 

 

17. In the past ten (10) years, have you, your spouse/signiﬁcant other, or any
other immediate family member worked for any of the following types of K-12
schools 91 been a member of an organization (such as a union, professional
group, or lobbying/interest group) that supports one or more of these types of
schools (please mark either yes or no for each type of school)?

 

Yes No

 

Traditional public schools ,
Private schools
Charter schools

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

18. In the past ten (10) years, has any child in your household attended any of
the following types of K-12 schools (please mark either yes or no for each type of
school)?

 

Yes No

 

Traditional public schools
Private schools '
Charter schools

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

230

19. Over the past ten (10) years, have you engaged in any of the following types
of activities (please mark either yes or no for each type of activity)?

 

A Traditional A Private A Charter
Public School School School

 

Donated money to

Participated as a volunteer at
Wrote a letter to the media
expressing support for or
criticism of

Contacted a legislator
expressing support for or
criticism of

Served on any type of decision-
making body regarding

Voted as a member of a
decision-making body regarding

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

V. Open-Ended Questions:

20. What is your interpretation or recollection of why charter school legislation
was passed in Michigan? (e.g., what were the primary arguments made in favor
of this legislation, and who was making them? Use additional space if
necessary)

21. (For respondents who represent education-related interest groups): Does
your organization have an ofﬁcial position on charter schools? If so, what is it?

VI. Demographic Information

22. (For state legislators/staff and all others, as applicable): Which of the
following most accurately describes the geographic nature of your home political
district/interest group/constituency/department/company:

___All or mostly urban
_All or mostly suburban
__All or mostly rural
_Urban/suburban mix
_Suburban/rural mix

231

23. (For state legislators/staff and all others, as applicable): Which of the
following most accurately describes the political tendencies of your home political
district/interest group/constituency/department/company:

_Very conservative
_Somewhat conservative
_Lean conservative
_Neither/Middle
_Lean liberal
_Somewhat liberal
_Very liberal

Do not know

_Refused

24. (For state legislators/staff and all others, as applicable): Which of the
following most accurately describes the racial/emnic compositign of your home
political district/interest group/constituency/department/company:

_All or predominantly white (approximately 90% or more white)
_Signiﬁcantly white (approximately 70-89% white)

_Majority white (approximately 51%-69°/o white)

_Majority non-white (50% or less white)

25. Which of the following best describes your own political affiliation?

_Strongly Republican
_Republican

_Lean Republican

_Neither Republican nor Democrat
_Lean Democrat

_Democrat

_Strong Democrat

26. (For state legislators/staff): When were you ﬁrst elected to the Legislature?

27a. (For state legislators/staff): To the best of your knowledge, how many
charter schools are currently in operation in your home district?

27b. (For all non-legislative respondents): To the best of your knowledge, how
many charter schools are currently in operation in the school district in which you
reside?

232

28. Please indicate which of the following best describes your professional
position:

Member of the Michigan legislature or legislative staff
Member or employee of state agency other than the Legislature (State
Board of Education, Department of Education, Governor’s ofﬁce, etc.)
Interest group directly involved with K-12 education
Interest group representing businesses
Advocacy group for urban and/or minority constituencies
Charter school authorizing agency

Name of person completing survey (optional):

 

Title:

 

Date:

 

233

Appendix C: Information Form Sent with Survey Instrument
Information Form

Michigan Educational Policy and Values:
Instrumental Values and the Formation of Charter School Policy

By completing the enclosed survey, you have agreed to participate in a study by
Michigan State University graduate student Bradley Carl investigating the role of
key values in the formation of charter school policy. The objective of this
research is to gain further understanding of the following questions of interest:

. Four “instrumental values” - Quality, Efficiency, Equity, and Choice - have
been identiﬁed and studied in previous research. Which of these values,
either individually or in combination with others - are valued the most (and the
least) by Michigan policymakers who have played an active role in shaping
the state’s education agenda and charter school policy?

. How, if at all, do policymakers' relative preferences for certain instrumental
values, or combinations thereof, appear to be correlated with key status
variables such as their political party affiliation and demographic
characteristics (race/ethnicity, geography, etc.) of themselves and/or their
constituents?

o What relationships, if any, appear to exist between policymakers' preferences
in terms of the four instrumental values on the one hand and their views
regarding Michigan’s charter school experiment on the other?

0 How are value preferences evident in Michigan’s charter school legislation, as
well as a selected set of attempts to modify this legislation over the past
decade?

0 What do the value preferences of Michigan policymakers suggest about
possible future directions for the state’s charter school movement?

The survey, should you agree to complete it, should take approximately 30-40
minutes. Your participation is voluntary, and you may decline to answer any
questions or discontinue your participation at any time. Your privacy will be
protected to the maximum extent allowable by law. Your responses to questions
on the survey will be confidential. While your name is requested and will be
known to the researcher, no one else will be informed as to who agrees to
participate in the study and who does not, and neither decision will have any
consequences for your future employment or work in the policy area.

Any information about you, or an organization you are afﬁliated with, will come
from publicly available information such as voting records, newspaper articles,
and Web sites. However, no specific information will be attributed to you by
name in the dissertation or any subsequent publications. Findings will be
presented as follows: "...a legislative committee member who voted against '
House Bill 123 stated that he was completely opposed to charter schools...” or

234

"...63.8% of those who indicated that Choice was a high priority value voted for
the legislation." All data will be kept on password-protected computer for no
longer than three years following completion of the study.

Although the ﬁndings of this study may not beneﬁt you directly, by participating in
this study you will be contributing to a better understanding of the policy making
process with regard to charter schools.

If you have any questions about this research, please contact Bradley R. Carl at
(608) 310-9843, or by email at trahancarl@aol.com. My mailing address is: 13
Fraust Circle, Madison, WI 53711.

 

My dissertation chairperson is Dr. Harry Perlstadt, who can be reached through
the Department of Sociology, Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI 48824-
1 1 11; phone (517) 353-5089 and email perlsgﬂamsucdu.

In addition, you may contact Michigan State University’s University Committee on
Research Involving Human Subjects (UCRIHS) with questions regarding your
role and rights as a subject of research. This project has been reviewed and
approved by the committee, which can be contacted as indicated below:

Ashir Kumar, M.D., Chair

University Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects
202 Olds Hall

Michigan State University

East Lansing, MI 48824-1046

(517) 355-2180

email: UCRIHS@msu.edu

website: http://www.humanresearch.msu.edu

235

Appendix D:'Survey Instrument Used by Marshall, Mitchell, 8: Wirt

 

Appendix

Individual Value Systems

and Education Policy-making. 'What do
You Feel Are The Important Education
Policy Problems In Your State?

 

Indicate your views by placing an ‘x’ on the line nearer to the phrase in each
paIr that you feel is more important. Mark the space closest to the end of the
line if that item is much more important than the other; mark the next space
if it is somewhat more important; and mark the space close to the center of
the line if it is only a little more important.

INCREASING
PROGRAM
FLEXIBILITY

IMPROVING THE
USE OF

EDUCATION TAX ‘1

DOLLARS

MORE EFFICIENT __

SCHOOL
MANAGEMENT

MAKING
PROGRAMS
MORE COST- '
EFFECTIVE

REDUCING

RESTRICTIONS —:

ON LOCAL
EXPENDITURES

236

MAKING
PROGRAMS '
MORE COST-
EFFECTIVE

’ GREATER

EQUALIZATION

OF RESOURCES

PROVIDING
MORE CHOICES
FOR FAMILIES
AND CHILDREN

SETTING HIGHER
ACADEMIC
STANDARDS

IMPROVING THE
USE OF
EDUCATION TAX
DOLLARS

INCREASING
PROGRAM
FLEXIBILITY

INCREASING THE
LEVEL OF
FUNDING FOR
SCHOOLS

BROADER

PARTICIPATION —:

IN DECISION-
MAKING

GIVING MORE
ATTENTION TO
CHILDREN WITH
SPECIAL NEEDS

REDUCING
RESTRICTIONS
ON LOCAL
EXPENDITURES
SCHOOLS

DEVELOPING

QUALITY —;

CONSCIOUS
LEADERSHIP

SETTING HIGHER __
ACADEMIC
STANDARDS

GREATER
EQUALIZATION
OF RESOURCES

PROVIDING
MORE CHOICES

237

GIVING MORE
ATTENTION TO
CHILDREN WITH
SPECIAL NEEDS

GREATER
EQUALIZATION
OF RESOURCES

MORE EFFICIENT
SCHOOL
MANAGEMENT

SETTING HIGHER
ACADEMIC
STANDARDS

INCREASING THE
LEVEL OF
FUNDING FOR
SCHOOLS

PROVIDING
MORE CHOICES

_FOR FAMILIES

AND CHILDREN

INCREAsiNG
PROGRAM
FLEXIBILITY

REDUCING
RESTRICTIONS
ON LOCAL
EXPENDITURES

BROADER
PARTICIPATION
IN DECISION-
MAKING

MORE EFFICIENT
SCHOOL
MANAGEMENT

GIVING MORE
ATTENTION TO

CHILDREN WITH —

SPECIAL NEEDS

IMPROVING THE
VUSE OF

EDUCATION TAX *3

DOLLARS

DEVELOPING
QUALrTY
CONSCIOUS
LEADERSHIP

238

DEVELOPING
QUALITY
CONSCIOUS
LEADERSHIP

MAKING
PROGRAMS
MORE COST-
EFFECTIVE

INCREASING THE
LEVEL OF
FUNDING FOR
SCHOOLS

BROADER
PARTICIPATION
IN DECISION-
MAKING

Modified Version of Survey Used In Marshall Study

Appendix E

 

00
.00. 2.058.280 c. 800.028 .8020

.00 .0»
020.0000. 030.088.5000 0:30.260

 

E

.0» 0.09.00 .0. 050:... .0 .30. 0.... 05000.05

a .llm
20:00 .8. 00000000 .0 00.. 0... 0:30.08.

 

8 Eu. 3.8.0.08 22.. 2.202... 20......

l m. .00. gnaw. a.

5.... 5.0.20 0. 5.20:0 0.0:. 0:.20
GO

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

.0» 0.09.00 .0. 050:... .0 .90. 0:. 05000.05

g .
.0» 00.0.0000. 0:0.00:oo.>...0=c 0500.030 tum» .:0Eoo0:0E 30:00 20.0.00 0.05.
.00 .00 .0. 8.2.5
.OW» m:0.0E:0.0_000 :. 5000.00.00 .00005 a 00......0. .0. 000.20 0.0.: 9.0.3....
0. .0»
00.3.0500 .000. :o 0:28.300. 050300: E .OW» 000.3000. .0 5005.03.00 5.00.0
m 0 .308: E0. £000.00. at 0 00:00:80 0.600000 .0: .: :28
.00 .0» , .00 .0»
:0.0..:0 a 02:60. .0. 000.0..0 0.0.... 9.0.5.... 02.0.0000. 000.028.3030 0:30.050
0 E .0» I

.000. :0 0:28.000. 050303.

 

E .0» 00.09.80 Eons... .20... 9.0.00

E .00. 38.. 3g...

5.3 :0.0..:0 0. 5.2000 0.0.... 0:50

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

~00 .0U
«00 mum» 20500090... 60:00 0.0.0.00 0.0.2 0:...0Eco.0.000 :. 5000.00.00 .0035
E .0»
E .0m» 000.0000. .0 503.0200 0.00.0 0.09.00 .0. 050:... .0 .00. 050500205
E .03 0000:
0.0000 5.; :0.0..:0 0. 0000000 0.0.: 0520 «1 .0» 3:508: E050... 05000.05 ,
Q .lkm E .0» 00......0ca0
0.0..00 .8. :0000300 .0 00: 0... u:.>0....E. .000. :0 0500.500. 050300...
E mum»
E .0» 00.0050 0.:.00000 0:0... 0:53 025000.000 0.05 0E0.uo.0 0:0.02
00 0 ~00
:0.0....0 a 00......0. .0. 08.9.0 0.0:. 05030.“. mum» .:0E000..0:. 30:00 0.0.0.00 0.0.2
E ...EN»
9 .cm» 000.3000. .0 3002.03.00 0.00.0 20:00 .8. 5:00:00 .0 00... 0... 0:30.05.

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

gccﬁoo 0.0.... 060.00... 9.0.0.2 C 0 £000.05
E00006. Eugene. E0009... 6000...... 605%. £008....
EOE 9.9.: 0.0:.— QOE 0.0:. 9.0....
5...... 3.0.0500 2.59.0 229.0 3.30600 .03..
.0. E E :0 .80 .0. a... :0 .000

 

..0: E.0.0.:. 0

.05 .u

   

 

 

    

   

00. 00.05

:0 .000 0... .. :0. 0.... E2. :. .80 0:030 05 000E £9. 0... :0 .0... :0... 30.. 0. .ﬁtan. 0.0:.308 0. c0. 0.... :0 .000 0... .. =0. 0.... o. .0055. x00 0.... .002
0.000 0:800:00 .0 80:00:30 02.00 :000 .0. 08.0.. 0.0 0.0 .0 0:0 :. ..r :0 0500... .3 02.05 .00.. 0.8.0:. 0000.... 02.05000 30.. 0. ESE. 0.0:.
0. ..0... :000 :. 0.000 5.00 0.... 0... .0 5...; 0.3.0:. 0000.... ..E0.0. 300000300 .0 0:200:00... :. 000.. 0.0 .0... 0.000 5.00 3:008:00 .0 2.00 0.0 2.0.3 K

.2:~E§.o...:o.§=uu 0..- 0.5.2.0 3.; .0:0.>.0.......

239

ran 7

Individual Responses to Survey Quest

Appendix F

 

 

 

 

NNNN

 

..

F-

NNv-NN

‘—

 

NI

N

N

0')

 

0.500....

m:.00.:..,

N

9.00.8

9.00.5 F.

Fl

 

N

m:

'—
I

N

F

F

Fv-NNv-(‘ONOO

 

E00 :000 .0. 09.0.:

0.. 02... 2.09.005 0:00 - 0.:

 

Nu

m

 

Fl

 

NNN

F0

 

 

 

 

 

 

v—v-Q'lv-v—CO

Fl

 

NFv-Nv-NCOOV-N

F:

N

 

0. 0...... ...0

9.00:. 0:00 - 0.:

 

Fl

w

 

m

 

m

 

PI

 

 

 

 

 

PI

:.00.E

9.00....

m:.00.E

9.00::

 

9.00....

o:.00.:.

Fl

 

Fl

N

 

N

N.

v-v-v-v-v-NNv—

o
FNQJVIO‘DNQOF

 

n.0m

no

u. “Em

 

".0

m0

 

000

uOm

 

Q

 

n. “Em

m0

".00.:02

 

 

uﬂOﬂp—O GOG

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

.=_0> .0 .00:...0w...

 

 

240

 

 

 

mud.

86:0

3&9:

86:0

mow

86:0

KP.

86:0

 

ov. F-

3:5

00.?»

3:5

mov

3:5

mm.

3:5

 

MN. 7

3:225

3.9:

3:225

m;

3:225

mm-

3:225

 

de

33:0

mmbv

35:0

n5:

33:0

mmN

36:0

 

 

”mgoom cams.

“mmwconamm S82

“wmmcoqwmm :28.

6905 .90.:

 

 

we

we

we

we

we

320321 _0 u

 

he

 

he-

m

OI

o

...am >2 9.00m

 

NI

2 N

”I

NI

N

Fm

 

MI

_ m

OI

m

 

om

 

N

NI

N

mv

 

NI

NNCOCONN
CD?

v—(‘OC‘O

 

PI

 

N

 

NI

 

Wm

mv

 

Ema comm :2 mac}:

9 028 38

960E ween . Sc

Du

 

'—

PI

N

F

PI

9:

 

NI

m

N

 

NI

mv

 

22an0 8: Eu

3

 

 

mo

mv

 

NI

Nv

 

'—

w

I:

 

 

w

9»

 

NO)

N

mm

 

mm

 

mm

 

om

 

mm

 

vm

 

mm

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONNv-NNV-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nm

 

 

241

 

FI

'—

 

928::

9.3.2:.

 

 

 

meﬂE

@537:

 

NI

 

Fl

 

 

 

9528

058::

 

N
a
NURNI-FN

F-

 

 

952E

mEmﬂE

my

 

 

M mm
\ﬂ N: :4
I

 

 

 

 

 

 

7PMN¢¢

 

PI

 

 

 

 

 

I
m M n.
kl v.1 \v

 

 

 

 

(0
I
('3 v—

f‘l \‘ \—

mans-Ann-

 

F
FI
N
N
N
N
N.
F
NI
_.
NI

JM.
m
N

 

N
N
I

NI

 

N
I
N

NI

 

7"
'—
I

oEwwE.

meﬂE

 

9528

952E

 

PI

‘—

 

NFNMNNC‘ONCONN

m. m

waNNF

Fwwwwrmvwww

 

n_o

QC

.000

000

 

m0

m0

n_Om

n_Om

n_O

 

 

 

E.

 

 

 

 

_

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

242

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

o > 05 8F. :N EH «N- h o > 05
0 > :5 NF:- 8 0 > :5 «N. 2:- 0 > :5
0: > :5 :N :N 0: > :5 F x:- 05 > :5
9,0 2:. N 05 ..N- FNF 0:0
05>0 NN N 05>0 .F :NF 05:0
:5 > 0 :N N :5 > 0 2:- FNF :5 > 0
Uzmucwmgo ”WOLOOW QOerzl “WGLOOW EN; OLE
_
t. S m: N.- 8 N: t. S 3. 3. N: 8
hm. Fm om”.- mn On 00- NN NN- a m. N- N
m- m m. n F- F F. F F F- F. F
N. N F- F m- m m m. m m- m m-
N- N N N- N- N N N- N N- N N-
N N. N- N N N. m- n F- F N- N
F F. F. F F F- F F- N N- F- F
N- N N N- N N- N N. N- N N- N
N- N N- N N N- . N N. N. N N- N
F- F F- F F F- F- F N N. N- N
F F- F F- F- F F F- F- F F F-
N- N N- N N N. N N- F- F F. F
F- F F- F F F. F F. . F- F F.
N. N N N- N. N N N- N N. F F.
N- N N. N N N- F F. N. N N N-
N. N N- N N N. F- F N- N N N-
N- N N- N O n. F. F F. F F F-
N- N F- F F. F N N. N N- N N- -
N- N N N. N. N N N. N N- N N-
m- m F F- N- N N N. N N. m m-

 

 

243

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

             

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

. F. F. N. _N F. _ F. _ F 2:25 5:25
F- F N. : F F. F F-

m- m. N F. F F- F

N. N N F F- N N-

F- F F- F F F-

N- . N N. .N- N F- F

Eme: c_ww_E F. m. m N N-

F- F m N N- N N.

N. N N- N m m- N N-

F- F N F F F- N- N

F- F N N- N N- N- N

N- N N N. N N. 932:: 525
N- N m N. N. N F- F

c_wm_E 55:: m m- N F. F

N. N N. F F. F F.

F - F- F- F F- F F.

F F- F 95%.: 9526 F. F

F. F N- F- F N- N

F- F F F. F N. N

N- N N- N- N N- N

F. F N- N N- N- N

N- N N m- N F. F

m- m N. N- N m. m

N. N F- m. m m- N

F. F N- N N. N- N

F- F N F F- m- n

F- F F- F F- N. N F F-

F.. F 952E DEN-2E F- F F- F 962:: Emmi:
N. N m. m N N. N N. N- N

00 Om 00 O a “Em a Cu 00 0 GO “Em 00 Om 00 0 u. o u Om

NF JF mF 3 NF
J!

 

244

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NF- :5.
NF- WN-
oN- NN-
N F. :N
o:- E”
8- N

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

NF. F S t. N: NF. 2 FF. 3 N:

3. 3 5. N 8. NN NN m. FF- NN

N- N N N- F. F N N- N N.

N. N N- N N- N N N- N. N-

N- N N- N N. N N- N N. N

N- N N N- N- N N N- F N

N- N F- F F F. F- F N- N F F-

N- N N. N N- N F. F N. N N N.

N N- N N- F. F N N- N- N N- N

F- F F F- F- F F F- F F- F. F

F. F F- F F- F F F- F. F F F-

F. F F F- F F. F F. F F- N226 932::
F. F F F- F F- F- F 932:: N:_N2E F. F

N. N N. N N N- N N- N. N F F.

N- N N- N F. F N N. N N. N- N

F. F N N. F. F N N- F. F N52: 932:
N. N F F- F- F N N. N N- N. N

N- N N- N F F- F F. N- N N- N

F- F N- N F- F F F- N- N F. F

N. N N. N N- N N N- N N- N. N

 

 

 

245

Appendix G: Open-Ended Responses to Questions 2, 4, 13, 20, and 21

Remndent Comments to Open-gndgi Survey Questions

This appendix contains responses to five open-ended questions that appeared
on the survey instrument. These questions were intended to allow and
encourage respondents to provide additional thoughts regarding a range of
topics such as the effectiveness of charter schools and concerns regarding their
operations, the effectiveness of other (non-charter) educational policymaking
entities in Michigan, interpretation of why charter school legislation was passed,
and official positions on charters taken by respondents’ organizations.

The number and wording of each of the ﬁve open-ended questions appears
below, followed by verbatim versions of all respondent comments to that question
as they appeared on the completed survey. No attempt has been made in this
appendix to edit, correct, or interpret respondent comments, except as necessary
to protect the identity of the respondent or understand his/her comments.

For reference, a copy of the original survey appears as Appendix B.

2. Please describe any other benefits not mentioned above that you feel
charter schools are providing (use additional space if necessary):

Charter schools allow children in disadvantaged areas to attend a school that
helps ﬁlter out unwanted elements from the school surrounding. The parents are
already involved simply based on the fact that they made this decision. Cost
effectiveness can’t be determined until they have a teaching staff that has been
employed for 20 to 30 years. Charter schools offer a safer environment for
learning and more controlled than certain public schools can offer. Of course this
then leaves what is left for the public school.

Providing real educational opportunities for kids in urban areas, as well as
waking up some of the rural and Suburban school districts.

The fact that charter schools offer an alternative to K-12 LEAs has spurred LEAs
to initiate some of the same services as well. That has been very successful.
Example—full day kindergarten program.

often safer
First, you make a mistake grouping all charter schools together. As a group they
have been grossly unsuccessful. In most cases, a private ﬁrm is skimming as

are the charter organizations before the money even gets to the school or
classroom. Most of these look just like the school the child left because the

246

parents (who were already involved) moved the child. We have seen very little
improvement in learning as most or many of the charters are receiving students
that have failed in most other settings.

There are a few charter efforts that are providing students something they could
not have gotten in their home schools. The most outstanding of these is the High
School at the Henry Ford. They have worked to ensure that students represent
the entire student population of Wayne County. But these different learning
environments are few and far between.

provides an additional educational opportunity for families not satisfied with
traditional neighborhood public schools

I believe they are providing a measure of competition which will drive
improvement in traditional public schools.

Inducing non-charter public schools to communicate more with their
communities. However, increased public relations isn’t an absolute beneﬁt.

I feel that the focus on particular curricular interest or cultural speciﬁc curriculum
found in most charter schools are not in the best interests of students and
therefore cannot list other “beneﬁts”.

When regular public schools feel the spur of competition, they do better.

a. Forced K-12 school districts to treat their students and parents as
customers rather than the property of the district.

b. Provided opportunities for non-religious values to be taught in
public schools.

c. Experimented with ethnic-centered public schools as an option for
parents who wanted the experience.

d. Created a nationally unique partnership of a state public school
system and an Indian tribally controlled community college.

e. Helped uncover evidence that many lnterrnediate School Districts
(lSDs) do not serve all the students in the ISO, but primarily exist to
serve the school districts that are members.

Creating a competitive environment in public education which forces traditional
public schools to get better.

Provides a choice for parents who believe there children have not been

adequately served by the traditional system or that the needs of their children
have been pushed aside to focus on the average achiever.

247

Related to item one is the fact that some parents and students now have found a
reason to hope. Before they were limited to the school in their area. Good, bad
or ugly, it was their only choice.

Public schools are responding to some extent to charter competition, at minimum
through increased marketing. Some innovation in traditional public schools has
also occurred, such as setting up themed academies, etc.

It must be understood that the benefits shown above relate to schools that are
allowed and encouraged to provide those beneﬁts. Requiring public school
academies to adhere to all of the rules, regulations, and policies of the State of
Michigan for K-12 sort of flies in the face of innovation, creativity, and
development of new techniques.

Chartered academies provide parents more opportunity to control their children’s
education in their neighborhoods.

Charter public schools are providing educational choice for families of children
who are in failing schools or who are in schools that are failing to meet their
unique needs — choice that had been available prior to their inception only to
those who could afford either to move or to enroll in private schools. Charter
public schools have infused competition into an otherwise monopolistic
educational system which has improved quality and parent involvement for all
students, not just those who have exercised their right to choice.

Suppose to provide local control, innovation, and creativity.

Challenge traditional schools to evaluate themselves, and plan for improvement.
Provide choice

Additional incentive to traditional public schools to operate more

creatively...competition for students. (Of course, there’s negative aspects to that
benefit too. . .creates community animosity and resentment, too)-

4- Please describe any other concerns you have related to Michigan charter
schools (use additional space if necessary):

The schools are doing ﬁne (as a whole). So are the authorizers. Any problems
lie in the continued “anger” from traditional district personnel toward charter
schools. Also the law is flawed in that it gives no real reason for local districts to
want to charter schools. Most other “real” charter laws provide freedom from
some rules, etc., which make the law more attractive to local school boards.

Structural issues especially around board membership and understanding of their

248

Roles as well as a lack of standardization around management companies-

There is not sufficient oversight of the charter schools by their authorizers. The
charters do not have to hire teachers with appropriate certiﬁcation. They do not
seem to have nearly as many “special needs” students as traditional public
schools.

0 lack of accountability- FOIA regulation
0 diverting public funds for private profit of management companies
a possible religious entanglement

There are huge gaps in the law with regard to responsibility for closure of
schools. The legislature has refused to provide the Michigan Department of
Education (MDE) with authority to promulgate rules for development of formal
procedures and clear delegation of responsibility for closure, wind-up and
dissolution of schools. Also, the legislature has not proVided authority to the
Superintendent of Public Instruction, or the MDE, to promulgate rules for
suspension of an authorizer’s ability to authorize new PSAs. Failure of the
legislature to allocate resources to the MDE sufﬁcient to provide the oversight
necessary to effectively monitor authorizing bodies is another clearly intentional
lapse in legislative responsibility.

By their nature, providing an alternative public school, they adVocate a failing
public school system. . .that’s my greatest concern.

This is a loaded question. It assumes that the underlying premise of the question
is true and that charter schools are “not living up to expectations.” It asks how
concerned we are; not whether the statement is true. For example, it assumes
that there were expectations about teacher pay when the law was passed; that
was never an issue in the debate.

Charter academies in Michigan have a higher level of oversight than the
traditional public schools. Also, traditional public school associations do not
allow charter school participation. As a result, charter schools have created their
own associations for administrators, boards, etc.

Parents who send their children to charter schools may not be well-equipped to
make educated decisions on whether or not a student should attend, and/or
remain in a charter school.

Creaming exists, regardless of claims otherwise. Locally, one charter is obviously
connected to church — founder, board members, students. Special needs,
handicapped students are told by charter that traditional public school can better
meet their needs than charters. Charters send disciplinary problem students back
to neighborhood with “three strikes” rules. Traditional public schools cannot do
this!

249

There is anecdotal evidence (people have told me this but there is no ofﬁcial
document that I know of) that many charter schools send a number of students
(often those with special needs) back to their regular school am the count day
and without pro-rated funding. This results in overcrowding and underfunding at
the regular public school.

Acquiring facilities

Current limits on the number of charter schools that can be established deprive
students in failing districts of choice and, possibly, of a successful future.

They have been sold to parents as an improvement in learning for children and
parents have little to judge this on as charters are allowed to disappear in the
process the state uses to support public information on public schools.

My concern is charter schools often produce students that perform lower on
standardized test than students attending traditional public schools. Parents are
led to believe charter schools are the answer to the academic challenges
presented by low performing schools. Unfortunately, in most cases charters
schools fall well short of the promised beneﬁts.

There are not enough of them to make the experiment produce deﬁnitive results.
The reason not to be concerned on accountability is that parents can vote with
their feet. To the extent there are not enough charters, and those have waiting
lists, this ability is reduced (only alternative is their dysfunctional public school).

What about the schools who are doing all that is asked in Question 4. How many
traditional schools would receive low scores in the same areas? Poor schools
are poor schools whether they are PSA’s or traditional.

In our region, we charter one of the schools and have an opportunity to monitor
and review what is taking place at the charter school. We also have another
school chartered by an entity a distance from our region. We have no
involvement in review of what is taking place. I am unaware if that school is
being monitored or reviewed on a regular basis.

For-proﬁt management of some charter schools creates some negative
incenﬁves.

Not always a level playing field. Should have to disclose ﬁnancial information.
Feeding white flight in urban districts.
Charter schools are not bound by the same rules as public schools.

Questionable use of funds for beneﬁt of students.

250

My greatest concern is found in the many untrue statements that have been used
by the education establishment in their relentless attack on charter schools. It is
truly a shame.

They are starting to offer the same excuses for failure as traditional public
schools — “we get all the kids who have problems” or “we don’t get the resources
that traditional public schools get”. The authorizers need to get much tougher
with non performing schools. Also, I don’t have a problem with management
companies per se, but I think the charter school agenda is being driven too much
by a few low performing management companies.

I am concerned that private for profit companies are cashing in on the opportunity
at the expense of the students.

Charter schools have been given a bad rap. They attract students who are
typically underachieving. Critics and the press have expected charters to close
that achievement gap in an unrealistic period of time.

All of the areas listed are of “concern” in that they are important but not because
they are necessarily problems unique to or caused by charter public schools.
Proper disclosure of ﬁnances and oversight is important. Training of teachers is
important to all schools. “Creaming off" high-achieving students is not of concern
because the lottery enrollment requirement prohibits it, just as it ensures that
students with disabilities are provided for. Should we be concerned about
ﬁnancial hardship for local school districts as students exercise their right to
choose to attend a charter public school? Our priority should be to provide
educational options that will meet the needs of all children; to protect the rights of
children not a “system”. Should one child’s needs or the needs of many children
be dismissed by taking away their right to educational choice to ensure that the
school that failed them can continue to fail other children with no incentive,
ﬁnancial or otherwise, to improve? If a school experiences dwindling enrollment,
should that not be a signal that they need to reach out to parents and ﬁnd out
what changes they need to make to be able to retain the students they have and
attract additional students to protect their ﬁnancial viability? If we hold schools
“harmless” by providing them with public dollars to offset the foundation grant
that leaves with every child that goes to a charter public school (which has been
proposed by charter school opponents), we would be giving them more dollars
to educate fewer children, which I am sure they would like but which would
create a huge disincentive for change.

251

13. Please discuss reasons for this view [followup question to #12, which
asked for respondents’ effectiveness ratings of the Michigan Department of
Education, the State Board of Education, and their local school board:

As a citizen and parent, the State Board’s role is not clear at all. I can better
understand my local school board’s impact on education in my community. The
MDE is not adequately staffed and I’m not sure it fully understands all the issues
facing urban communities.

While my local school board is quite effective in setting the policy direction for
[our local] schools there are still some areas I would like to see strengthened
such as inclusive education, individual education plans and transition plans for all
students. The State Board of Education has not fully utilized its constitutional
powers which remain to be operationalized despite the efforts of Gov. Engler to
diminish the State Board’s role through a series of executive orders transferring
powers to the State Superintendent and to other state department directors
through the distribution of tasks (e.g., adult education, Asian studies, MEAP) to
their departments. The Michigan Dept. of Education is mostly effective in
addressing the tasks which remain in its domain. It has had to do much, e-g.,
implementing requirements of the ESEA amendments of 2001 (No Child Left
Behind) with few resources. Staff have worked diligently with State Board
members to craft policies and meet federal requirements. Policy regarding
charter schools is discussed and data gathered. As time and resources permit, I
expect further action and oversight.

#12 is a poorly worded question — affective [sic] at what?

The Michigan Department of Education has been seriously disabled by the
reduction of staff and resulting reduction in effective services to local school
districts. While quality individuals do work there, they are challenged by the
enormity of the work and the diminishing resources. The State Board of
Education has been a non-entity in educational policy-making. Local school
boards are hampered by political maneuvering, overstepping their appropriate
roles, and lack of training on what constitutes an effective board member.

I believe each of the groups work very hard to be effective but there are other
factors that get in their way. NCLB is admirable in its aims but many factors will
make it almost impossible to do -' we cannot change the society our children live
in — (a) parents who do not parent, (b) poor economical climate — no one home
when a youngster comes home — (c) not enough nutritious food, (d) transient
population, (e) continual turnover of limited English speaking or non-English
speaking students, etc. However, I do believe we in education must continue to
work hard to try to meet NCLB’s goals.

MDE has no standards for charter schools

252

Positive feelings coupled with belief that many improvements can still be made.

You left out the Legislature, which is even more ineffective. There are too many
efforts to quick ﬁx or now follow the misguided path of the federal government.
Generally the local school board knows the community and this is always true
when the schools are successful. Passing policy down from the state level just
lowers the standard and moving to the federal level lowers the standard even
further. We need to understand that each school is different as each exists in a
different community. We need to set the standards high and support all to reach.
This will mean that some students need more resources, especially state, than
others.

State board appears isolated and seldom works with the legislative process. Its
goals and objectives are not shared with the public.

The State is process rather than outcome oriented. As long as you ﬁle reports,
provide proscribed programs etc., you can fail to educate kids and not have a
problem with anyone in the State. On the other hand, if educate kids
successfully but run afoul of the State, you can be hounded and relentlessly (I’ve
seen this ﬁrst hand from the Board of a charter school). It will be interesting to
see if the States accreditation system or No child Left Behind changes this.

MDE and SBE are confusing and conflicting organizations.

The SDE doesn’t have sufﬁcient resources or staff to provide worthwhile services
to local districts. The state board spends too much time talking philosophy and
not enough setting policy.

Policymaking agencies closer to the problem or issues can move faster to bring
aboutchange.

The Michigan Department of Education and the State Board of Education were
negatively impacted by the previous (Engler) administration. The most resent
appointed school

Only local boards know the specific cultural and academic needs of their
particular students.

Lack of school choice. IF everyone was forced to only go to their assigned
grocery store, that store would be lousy, no matter what kind of management
situation it had. .

The State Board of Education is a flawed concept. It protects the education

establishment. It is not subject directly to the political leadership of the Governor.
It is an invisible agency to most of the public. It does not, and probably cannot,

253

provide “leadership and general supervision over all public education” as set forth
in Art. Vlll, Sec. 3 of the Michigan Constitution.

The current budgetary crisis stalls progress and will likely result in loss of state
school aid funds for all K-12 education. Federal mandates dominate much of the
energy and effort at the state and local level. Partisan politics at both the federal
and state levels drives the agenda for much of what we do. Charter school
issues are driven by Republican politics in both the House and Senate in
Michigan, blocking reform that would result in real oversight of the authorizing
bodies and the capacity of the MDE to provide technical assistance to the smaller
authorizing bodies.

I believe all involved in education are sincerely interested in improving education.
Current federal regulations are cumbersome and there is a struggle at all levels
to incorporate accountability.

Able to decide on initiatives and implement them — example EDYes!

Dept of Ed does good job of implementing policies established by the Legislature
and Governor. State Board of Education is largely irrelevant as a policymaking
and oversight body. My local schools board seem rather week and is not setting
high enough expectations or demanding results and accountability.

MDE is not funded nor does it have enough “bodies” to check on school
compliance. School Board wants to do a good job but is limited by the fact that
the legislature controls schools through funding. Our local Board is selected by
the school (PSA) and is very supportive of improving the educational program for
all students.

The State DOE and Board have many agenda and constituencies. The local
boards are better prepared to react to local needs.

Local school boards are rubber stamps and really do not know educational
policy. The State Board gets caught up in politics and is really not effective in
directing educational policy at any level; k-12, community college or 4 year
institutions. MDE is understaffed, does not pay enough to attract competent
people and is splintered ie, career and technical education is not even in the
department.

Many responsibilities have been moved from the State Board to the State Supt.
This move has, in my opinion, eroded their effectiveness

Elected boards represent a fundamental democratic policy. It is not infallible, but
it’s a partnership with our citizens.

254

Local board can be very effective, depending on those serving. Currently
individuals on our local board are self-serving and out of touch...but that’s not
always the case. MDE & state board sometimes have same issues as local
boards — our state supt. Does a fine job, but state level boards are political
agencies, not educational ones!

SBE is highly politicized. Due to candidate selection process and election results
linked to “top of ticket” wins - coupled with its control of the superintendent’s
position and eight year terms — its membership and actions are rarely reﬂective
of the state’s population, political. . ...[response cut off]

Read the newspapers!

20. What is your interpretation or recollection of why charter school
legislation was passed in Michigan? (e.g., what were the primary ,
arguments made in favor of this legislation, and who was making them?
Use additional space if necessary)

The governor wanted to provide educational options.

To provide public school choice for those unable to afford it otherwise; to
encourage school innovation in whatever form it might take, with local control.

Greater choice for parents — Gov. Engler
To provide parental choice

It was poorly thought out to allow for choice and equity for (mainly) urban
students and (ideally) to raise standards in traditional public schools as well. It
was urban generated, with little concern as to what presence of charters would
mean in less populous areas.

Competition model to improve public schools; parental choice; improve
educational opportunity; innovative teaching, curricular designs, parental choice
(option).

I expected charter schools to: create and promote innovative educational
methods, provide new professional opportunities for teachers, improve student
achievement, and provide more parental choice.

Supposedly charter legislation was passed to provide “choice” for parents and
students. Actually, it was a thinly veiled attempted to provide support (dollars
and/or vouchers) for private schools. Most support came from right wing
republicans on the West side of the state.

255

TO PUSH PUBLIC SCHOOLS TO GET BETTER AND TO GIVE PARENTS
CHOICE.

Charter Public School legislation was enacted to provide parents with a choice in
their child’s education — especially for parents who did not feel that the public
school their child was assigned to attend adequately met their needs but could
not afford to send them to a private school. We had choice in our educational
system before the Charter School legislation, but it’was only available to those
who could afford it. The legislation was enacted to give EVERY parent the right
to choose the school that their child attended, regardless of their income, but the
cap on the number of Charter Public Schools has prevented that goal from
becoming a reality. MORE parents have choice, but as long as the cap exists,
not EVERY parent will have choice.

Choice and flexibility

To create innovation, look at new methods, and to disseminate information to
traditional public schools. The argument were made by educators interested in
looking at new ways to educate students.

As a means to prohibit laboratories of innovation and to provide competition to
traditional public schools. Persons and groups traditionally opposing public
schools advocated for charter schools as a way to set up an alternative publicly-
funded school system.

The steady decline of academic achievement and the lack of response by the
traditional public system spurred the need for alternatives. Parents that lack the
economic power to move to better schools were being denied access to
opportunity. Choice and freedom, when ever it is allow to occur, always changes
things for the better.

Competition' In public educational choice. Returning power of education back to
parents.

0 To provide parental choice in public education

0 To attempt to reduce the bureaucracy in and regulation in public education
(it didn’t work)

. To develop innovation in teaching and learning methods

With the Republican majority in the Michigan Legislature a conservative view
took over and there was enough support for it - the belief was that competition
would make public schools better.

Charter schools were created in Michigan to provide increased parental choice
and to offer public school options with reduced regulation.

256

To improve public education by providing choice and innovation

1) ...the original charter school law. ...was part (actually a minor part at the
time) of Gov. Engler’s school choice initiative. The original proposal
included cross-district choice which the K-12 establishment opposed even
more than charter schools. The charter school bill had broad bi-partisan
support on final passage. Charter schools were a fad in the early 19905.
Michigan’s law was unique in that it allowed any school district, lSD,
community college or university board to authorize charters. Most other
states allowed very few charters.

2) The charter school bill was adopted at the same time as the per pupil
funding approach which benefited many school districts. The education
establishment was more focused on the increased funding for schools and
did not focus as much on what they later argued was a “loss” of funding
when parents have options other than the local school district.

3) There was some discussion that charter would lead to more creative
approaches to public schooling and that they would have a positive impact
on existing school districts.

4) There was strong interest in making sure the schools were public schools
and language was included to prevent unconstitutional linkages with
churches. Both the proponents of the bill wanted this (to assure its
constitutionality) and liberal, public school interests wanted the restrictions
because of their opposition to public funding of religious education. The
MEA, ACLU at al still challenged the law claiming that charter schools
were private schools. They made the preposterous argument that the only
“public school” could be one in a district with an elected school board.
They lost. '

5) The charter school legislative debate never focused on charter school
management companies, whether for proﬁt or nonproﬁt. Since they did not
exist in Michigan, little notice was paid to them and the bill had no
provisions relating to oversight of management companies.

It was the best deal school choice advocates could get passed in a legislature
overly inﬂuenced by the public school establishment.

More choice for parents and help for under achieving students that did not ﬁt into
traditional public schools.

Charters were established to provide parents with “choice” or an alternative to
“failing public schools”.

Choice

To provide choice for parents and independence for the schools to develop
unique programs and curriculum.

257

To bring demise to the MEA.

Provide schools that provided higher academic achievement and distinct
educational choices for families and competition to traditional public schools

Charter schools would provide choice to parents/students, and would provide for
innovative practices in education.

Some who supported believed it would offer alternatives but had no research to
support such beliefs. Others saw a way to get public funds into traditional private
schools without having to go to vouchers. For others it was a way to make
money, no much research here either.

Republicans wanted a bill, governor was not opposed. Mayor of Detroit wants to
be associated with improving education and average citizens were not asked
their opinions.

Drive reform in the traditional schools
To provide innovative programs, to increase parent choice

Governor Engler was not happy with the teachers’ union and I believe he wanted
to help students in underperforming schools have a choice of a school to attend.
The Republicans worked together to push through the legislature to have charter
schools.

To provide choice

To provide an alternative to failing traditional public schools

To give choice to parents; improve public education by providing competition
Attempting to improve the overall system.

Legislation was supported by Gov. Engler and Legislature which followed his
lead. Central Michigan and Wayne State also supported it and realized ﬁnancial
beneﬁt (especially CMU) as authorizers. Legislation [was] opposed by
MEA/MFT/ACLU and many public education advocates. ACLU sued - results in
additional clarifying legislation which propelled the movement. Many public
education advocates see charter schools as the segue to vouchers. Disability
advocates see them as discriminating unlawfully. Arguments in favor: ﬂexibility,
parental choice, smaller is better, competition is good. Arguments against:
potential for discrimination against students with disabilities and severe
reputations, less accountable to public & taxpayers, will drain the high performing
students from traditional public schools, leaving those schools to do more with
less (a reality since Proposal A passed in 1995).

258

Competition; choice by parent

They are an alternative to urban schools, in the hope that those that care can
succeed.

Provide choice for parents

Competition - Choice

21 - (For respondents who represent education-related interest groups):
Does your organization have an ofﬁcial position on charter schools? If so,
what is it? ‘

Yes. [Our organization] supports the concept of charter schools as an alternative
form of education as long as they are held to the same accountability criteria as
public schools.

Yes / support educational opportunity for all children

Yes — support (limited)

Yes — opposed to increasing cap!

Yes. We support “innovation and creativity in the delivery of public education
services to the children in the State of Michigan.” We support legislation that
ascertains that educational mandates are adhered to appropriately and that
provides for sufﬁcient oversight and ﬁnancial disclosure.

My ISD has sponsored. .special interest charter public school academies

Support the charter movement

We support good and effective charter schools just as we support good and
effective traditional schools

We strongly support the expansion of public school academies and believe the
State of Michigan should lift the cap.

Yes - we are pro-charter.

Yes. The organization will grant charters to applicants who have a unique
mission that cannot be easily done by the local district.

Support

259

Charter schools are an integral part of the system of public education in
Michigan.

No [ofﬁcial position on charters]
Yes - we favor them as a step on the road to full school choice.

I am not associated with an organization at this time with an ofﬁcial or un ofﬁcial
position on charter schools. The opinions given in this survey are mine.

No [ofﬁcial position on charters].

Supportive with encouragement for K-12 and ISD boards to do the chartering vs.
universities and community colleges.

We support.
We favor limited expansion of charters. Basically, we would like to see quality

authorizers/operators given the opportunity to expand and exclude those with
poorly performing schools until they had improved them. ,

Support

Very supportive!

...Charter schools are public school academies and we support their concept.
Yes, we support lifting the cap on the expansion of charter schools.

I am unaware of a public position.

Support limited number that have equal requirements as public schools

[My organization is an] authorizer.

Opposed

260

Appendix H: Individual Scores for Survey Question 7

 

Total Scores b individual and Value:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Respondent Political Affiliation
Number Quality Efficiengy Equity Choice

1 7 15 -1 5 13 -13
2 4 -7 3 4 0
3 2 6 3 -8 -1
4 3 5 -3 3 -5
5 6 14 -4 6 -16
6 3 9 -13 4 O
7 4 4 -1 1 1 -14
8 4 1 1 7 -18 O
9 4 7 4 10 1 1 -25
10 2 8 3 -4 -7
11 2 1 1 2 -6 -7
12 5 n/a - done incorrectly (two rankings for each pair)

13 5 10 -16 7 -1
14 7 -3 -3 '5 1
15 4 3 -8 O 5
16 2 6 2 O -8
17 1 -15 1 1 -6 10
18 3 1 1 -8 6
19 8 8 3 -6 -5
2O 6 19 -13 5 -11
21 __ 2 6 1 0 -7
22 3 13 12 -13 4'5
23 5 n/a - done incorrectly (two rankings for each pair)
24 4 1 1 1 -10 __ -2
25 8 -1 2 -8 7
26 1 7 8 -10 -5
27 4 4 -3 -1 0
28 4 10 ~10 2 -2
29 6 4 -1 1 -4
30 6 6 2 -3 -5
31 3 0 -4 -2 6
32 6 4 -3 9 -10
33 2 1 2 -8 5
34 4 3 9 -5 -7
35 7 1 1 -2 1 1 -2O
36 8 10 ~13 6 -3
37 4 9 -8 9 -1O
38 8 4 9 -17 4
39 6 2 3 -2 -3
40 6 15 -3 -6 -6
41 5 -1 -3 -3 7
42 5 6 8 -2 -12
43 2 20 -5 1 416
44 4 did not complete

45 6 7 -7 -6 6
46 4 4 4 -7 -1

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

261

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

47 7 n/a - done incorrectly (two rankings for each pair)

48 7 9 -17 10 -2

49 3 -2 5 -2 -1

50 8 6 -9 -13 16

51 5 16 -6 -7 -3
TOTALS BY VALUE 293 -59 -63 -171

 

 

Political Affiliation Codes:

 

1=STRONG REPUBLICAN

 

2=REPUBLC|AN

 

3=LEAN REPUBLICAN

 

4=NEITHER [

 

5=LEAN DEMOCRAT

 

6=DEMOCRAT

 

7=STRONG DEMOCRAT

 

 

8: NO RESPONSE

 

 

 

 

 

262

 

thod Matrix (MTMM) Correlations

Multitrait-Multime

Appendix I

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

     

 

 

 

 

  

 

  

 

  

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

     

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

$3,.“

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

.too coming

on N: m: S N: N: on N: N: 8 N: N: 2
8o. :8. 8o. 8:. :8. F8. :6. SN. N8. 32.2.2 :5
....:N:.- ....FNF. 5:3. CNS.- C:NN.- F...NN:.- CNN.- o:F.- NS. :30 828: Nam
N: m: N: N: N: N: o: a: N: 2
F8. . :8. NF:- NNN. :8. F8. mFN. :2. 32.8.2 .2:-
WFENNYH ENS.- mFNc - F 2.59.. :2. ::F.- FLNFN; CNN.- 89. NNN. :80 528: New
N: N: F: m: N: F: N: N: F: F: N: F: 2
:No. 8:. 8:. :8. m8. :8. FNN. N:N. FF:. 32.2.2 .ma
“ﬂunk-”t «...F-NN... 2:83.- mFN.. F...No:.. FLNNN; N8: 2? 2:. :30 528: F5
o... N: N: N: N: m: S N: N: 2
8:. F8. 2:. . :8. F8. :8. NF... NFN. 32.2.2 :5
:8:- F FLNFF. F.-.NF:. 5:8. 8.... :8. ...oo 82%: 25
N: N: o: N: m: a: N: 2
N8. 8:. F S. 8 F. 8:. 32.2.2 2m
..F.LN..:.... FEFN. CNNN. :8. :8: 50.0 .828: N5
N: F: F: N: F: 2
. N8. 8:. 8:. 32.2.8 .2:-
.. 33. :FN.. «:38... 2.93%.... PENN.- 08. :FF- 2...: :.- :80 822.: 5
N: F: on a: F: F... a: F: 2
N 8. F8. FNN. :8. FFN. . :8. :8. 32.2.2 .5
ES? CNN.- NENNNE .. 2:58. 228:... F 3::N. SN. :80 52.8: 280
N: N: a: N: N: a: N: a: N: m: z
8:. 8F. 8:. . :8. 32.2.3 85
.too com-ion N330
z
32.5-3 .2:-
. a. -. :aac

 

 

 

 

 

263

.00..- 0. 00000.9..00 0000. .0 000.0>0 00-: 0.00. 00. 0. 02.0.. 0. .00000 000
.90 .00.. 0. 000000 0.0 .00000E E90...0 0.0.. E90...0. 3.2.0., E00.E..00.0 00.3000 00000.0..00 mm 00 .- .mom. 0. 00000.9.8 0000. .0
000.0>0 00 H .0>000 x...0E 00. 0. .90 2.00 0. 000000 0.0 .00000E E90...0 0.0.. 0E00. >..0._0> E00.0>000 00.3000 000029.00 N. 00...

.0 00.0000 E9. .0E.0. 05.00.0200. 00. 0. 000 0 0000000 E9. .0E.0. 00600-0090. 00. 0. 3:000 .0>0. 0. 090.090

00 00.0 0.00.... F 00.00000 0. 0000 .0E.0. EOE90.0 09.00 00. 0. 3.0000 090>0. 00.5 000.0 5:00 0000.0...0 00.06 .090000E E0.0...0
00.00 0900.00 0.0 >00. .. 00>0 00090900 0. 00 0.0000 ..00 0E00 00. .0 00.0000E 00 ..>..0..0> 0000.028. 0.0.. 0E00 00. .0 090000E
E90...0 0002000 000020000 .000.0 00.. 0. .000x0 0.003 000 ..0 00.0000 E9. .0E.0. 00:090-000. 00. 000 .0 00.0000 E9. .0E.0.
000..00E00 89.0 00. .F 00.00000 E9. 009.0. 0.009990 09.00 00.. 00.0000. 0.0. 0. 0900000. 0.03 09:0 >0..00 000.00.... .0 000090.90
00_0> 00. 00.03 0. 0.03 E0.0...0 00.0. 00. E00900. 800 .000 .20 :00. 0.0.. 0000 00.000 0.00.000 00..- .00.000 u .5 5.00m. H Um
$000.0...m. n ..m. 5:000 u .000 .0>000 0.00. 00. 0.. 00.039000 00 $2.00 .000000000 0. 000_0> .0E0E0000. .00. 00. 0.0 .090009 0.0. .0
0000.00 00. .0. .0090 .009. E90...0 000 0000.0E E0.0...0 000.200 5.0.000 .000..E.000..0 000 3:000 .0. 000090.90 00.000000 .0. 000.0
0.0. 0. 0000.0E E0.0...0 00.0. 00. :00. 00.. 0E00 00. 00.>.0>0. 0000.0E E0.0...0 0095.00 5.000.. 0.00.9600 00.0000E 0.02000 2.20-s.

. 00.02

 

32.2-5 .26. No.0 05 .0 0.02.8.0 0. 02.22.00 .
.32.2.5 .92 5.0 2.. .0 0808.0 0. 02.22.00 ..

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

   

 

 

     

 

 

 

 

 

 

  

 

 

 

 

00 N: N: 00 N: N: 00 T: N: . 00 . N: ,. N: z
. 80. NS. 80. 8. :8. N8. 80. 8:. . N8. . 0:0. . 02.. 32.2.5 0.0
r 0550. ...NNN. ....:N:.. ....FN:.- ...NNN. ....FN:.. ....N.:.. N... . ...:NN.. . :o. . 2:. ...00 000.30 20
N: N: . N: N: . N: N: N: N: . N: _ N: N: N: z
.108. F8. . N8. 0:0. 8. «8. . ::F. 8°. FNN. 03. 32.2.5 0.0
. ....N..0. ....:Nn.. . ....N~:.. 3:8. 053:. 053:. . 000. ....N.:.. F00. ...NNN; ...00 000.80 5.0
. F: N: N: . F: . N: N: . F: F: N: . F: 2
.. . F:0. ~00 , 08. NS. «00. . SN. 08. SN. . 80. 32.2.5 0.0
030.00% ...wBNammﬂm F .00.. 0.5. 08:0; , ::~.. 80. ., :Fo.. . N0... 00.. . 0.50.. ...00 000.000 20
000 % Em . 2.0 . . 22.0 , 02.0

 

 

 

 

 

264

Ividual

Question 1 Scores by Ind

Appendix J

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

0. m N N m N F 0 220.03 NF
NF 0 F N 0 F F 0 2228.. F F
N. N F F N F m 0 60.2.5... .0026 F
2 N F 0 m 0 0 0 2.050260 2.6 N:
:F N F N N N m m 08.0 .0020. F:
:F N F N 0 F 0 0 52.8.3: .820 00
:F N F 0 F N m N 08.0 .0022 F0
2 0 F N 0 F 0 0 9.6.0 .0220. NF
3 0 N m 0 N .o. 0 000.5080 .050 OF
3 N 0 0 N 0 N 0 220.00.. 0
NF 0 F N N F 0 0 220.00.. 8
NF 0 F N N N m 0 $2.25.: 52.0 0:
N. N N N N N N 0 22930832009000 NF
N. N N 0 0 0 0 0 220.00.. 0
FF 0 N 0 0 0 m : 08.0 .0022 0:
FF 0 F N 0 F 0 N 08.0 .0020. mm
9 : 0 N 0 N 0 N 502.5,: 22.0 F0
N. N N N 0 0 0 0 22930833082000 00
NF 0 N m N 0 0 . : 82.9.2: .0020 F
N. N N N N 0 N : 52.25:. .0020 NF
00 : N : m m 0 0 220.00.. FF
Fm : N N 0 N N N 02.85.: 22.0 F0
F0. : : N N N 0 0 52.9.3: 2.2.0 00
R : F : : , m N : 000.5060 .050 00
.0 N N N N N N : 0.290008320002000 0
Nu : : : N : N : 08.0 .002... 00
Nm : : : : N 0 : 2.050.080 .050 N -
Nu : : N : N : : 52.052 502.0 0:
Nu : : : : 0 N : 0.203008330002000 :0
N0 0 N N 0 F N N 220.008220002000 :F
F... : : : : : N : Ewes-26.0 2.6 00
F0 : : : : : N : 22030892082000 NN
0LOOW smack 5cm =mEm ...m $00 .2... ..mn. .wUZ 2000....— .co< 0606. $05.. mam.— .wQQO >>®Z "Q3050 .OZ «coucommmc

 

 

 

n: 0030000 >0E0m .00... 0.0003 .2300 .0 F..000m 00000.0.

 

 

 

 

265

 

6.5000 00\m0_NN_Enm

 

:33000030 b0>nv

 

3.0000020 2.00020

 

3.300030 602.00.on

 

3.000003 :0 .0 6ch

 

[

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

"00000
NNF NN NNF NNF NN NN NNF 0.80 .20..
N N F N F F F F 666610.. S
N. F F N N N F F 96.0 6625 FN
N. N F N F F F N 62653. 2.2.0 NN
N. N F N N F F F 96.0 622:. F.N
N. N F F N F F N 66660.. N.
.. N F N N F F N 6055260 2.6 3V
.. N F N N F F N 52:56.60 2.6 N
N. N F N N F F N 96.0 602... N9
N. N F N N N F N o_>_0.6866<68663m. .N
m. N F N N F F N 96.0 602... F.
N. F F N N N F N 220.968.064.6863 N
N. N N N F F N N 62653. 2.2.0 N6
N. N F N N F F N 62653. 2.2.0 NV
N. N N N F N F N 96.0 6625 NN
N. N .N N F F F N 66663 NN
N. N N N N F F N 66666.. ON
N. N F N N N N N 5255260 650 NN
N. N F N N N N N 220686633268 NN
N. N F N N 6 N N N 6265.... 2.2.0 NF

 

 

266

Question 3 Scores by Individual

Appendix K

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

N. N N N N N N N N 96.0 .62... FN
N. F N F N N N N N 62653. 6:26 NN
N. F N N N F F N N 0.220 662:. NF
N. F N N N N N N N 62653. 6:020 F
00 N N N F N N N N 62653. 22.0 ON
0N N N N N N N N N 66666.. F F
.N F N N N N N N N 6666660 650 NN
.N N N N N N N N N 96.0 .62... NN
.N F N N N N N N N 66666.. NF
00 N N N N N N N N 96.0 662... N0
N0 N N N N N N N N 662.660 650 NN
NN F N N N N N N N 66666.. NF
0N F N N N N N N N 96.0 .62.. FN
NN N N N N N N N N 66666.. NN
NN N N N N N N N. N 62653. 2.2.0 NN
NN. N N N N N N N N 96.0 662:. FN
NN N N N N N N N . N 66.666. ON
NN N N N N N N N N 62653. 26:0 NN
00 N N N N N N N N 96.0 662:. NN
NN N . N N N N N N N 2206866232630 NN
0N N N N N N N N N 265.660 2.6 o.
.N N N N N N N N N 62653. 6:26 NN
.N N N N N N N N N 6.20.6822665630 .N
.0 N N N N N N N N 62653. 2.2.0 NF
.0 N N N N N N N N 220.682.03.62230 N.
Na N. N N N N N N N 6.0663 ON
NN. N N N N N N N N 96.0 .66.... N
NN N N N N N N N N 2655660 2.6 NN
NN N N N N N N N N 66666.. .N
NN N N N N N N N N 96.0 .66.... NN
NN N N N N N N N N 66.26.. N
«N N N N N N N N N 6655260 650 N
9.0.00.0 00..._.00N.o .300... 0.50.0: $0000... 00.0.0... 5.90.90 00000.... "030.0 .02 000000000...
9.00m .50... "Am COmeac amt—am writes =3~ 003 03%». >3 £002.00 *0 .o>o._

 

 

267

 

000.00000 b0>uv

 

.

000.00000um

 

000.00000 .0030E00nm

 

000.00000 =0 .0 6ch

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

”00000
N0. 00. N.. NN. N.. NN. NN. N0. 0.80 .20.

N F F F F F . F F o_>_0...6866<.660630 NN
N F F F F F F F F 96.0 6625 NN
N F F F F N F F F 62653. 6:26 FN
N F F F F F F N F 220.686.,2660630 N
N F F F F F F F N 660.0660 650 N
N. F F F N N F F F 62653. 2.2.0 .N
0. F F N F N F F F 6.20.6893660620 NN ,
N. F N F F F F N F 66066.60 2.6 NN
0. F N N F . F F F 6.20.6892660630 NN
.. F N N N F F F F 96.0 662:. NN
. . F F N N N F F F 6265.... 6:26 NN
N. F N N N F F N F 60556.60 2.6 ON
N.. F N F F N N N F 66666.. ..F
N. F N F N N N F F 62653. 2.2.0 NF
N. F N N F N N F N 666.06.. N
N. F N N F F N N N 6.20.6892660630 N.
N. N N F N F F F N 62653. 2.2.0 NN
N. N N N N N N N N 6.20.689262660 N
N. F N F N F F N . 6265.... 6.600 N

 

 

268

“dual

IVI

Question 5 Scores by lnd‘

Appendix L

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

N. N N . F F N 6650660 2.6 NN
N F N N F F . N 62653. 2.2.0 0.
N. N N N F F N 22066.. NF
N. N N F F F F 6.202608630022030 NF
NF N N N F F N 66666.. 0

NF N N N F F N .02....660 2.6 NN
NF N N F F F N 6265.... 2.2.0 NN
NF N N F F F N 62653. 2.2.0 .N
NF F N F N N N 62653. 2.2.0 NN
N. N N F N . F N 6265.32.26 NN
N. N N F F F N 96.0 .62... FN
N. N N N N N N 62653. 2.2.0 NN
NF N N N N N N 96.0 .62... 00
N. N N . F . N 62653. 2.2.0 NN
N. N N N N N N 220.689.062.630 .N
N. N N . . F N 96.0 .062... N.
N. N N . . N N 62653. 2.2.0 N F
N. N N F N F N 22066.. ..
m. N N N N N N 62.05:... .00000 .0
N. N N N . N N 96.0 .0620. NN
N. N N N N N N 660.0660 2.6 N

N. N N N N N N 60.0689630060630 NN
N. N N N N N N 22068663060030 N.
N. N N N N N N 62653. 2.2.0 F

N. N N N N N N 20666.. ..F
NN N N N N N N o_>_0.6866<.002._030 NN
0N N N N N N N o.>_0.6866<.002..030 N

FN N N N N N N 62653. 2.2.0 NN
NN N N N N N N 6.206066630065020 NN
NN N N N N N i N 96.0 .62... NN
NN N N N N N N 660.0660 2.6 NN
NN N N N N N N 96.0 .62... NN

 

 

 

 

 

 

0.00005. 60.0.0000. 0.00.0 x0.. 0.000:0>.00_-30.. 0.000..0> 0.00000

6:000

".02 000002.00".

 

 

0.000 .20..

 

"Am 00:00.5 >350. 00.000 .3000 .0 8.0.... .3 £00000 .0 .0>0..

 

 

 

 

269

 

02000030 .0061...

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

0>.0000:0nm

0000000uN

0000000 b0>uF

"00000

00F 00F 00 N0 00 NNF 0.000 .80...
0 F F F F F F 06.0 60.0.0. ..N
N F F F F F N 0.2000000903000505 0N
n 0 F F N 5050.060 .050 o F
b 0 F F N 62.053. .00000 N
h m N N 0.>.0.>0000>0<.0000.0:m m
N N F . F N 6.0.0.00. N
0 N N F F F N 0080.060 .050 N..
0 m N F F F F 6.0.0.00... on
o. N N F F . F 96.0 .0025 NN
0. N N F F F N 6.0.0.00. ON
3 m N F F F N .00E0.0>00 .050 m
N. N . N F F . N 96.0 .002... N
FF 0 0 F F F N 0.6.0 .0060. F0
FF N 0 F F F F 6.0.0.00... mm
FF N N . . . N 6.0.0.00... N.
N. N N F . F N 96.0 .002... .N
NF 0 0 F F F 0 000.0660 .050 cm
NF N N . . . N 6.0.0.00. NN
NF N N N 6000530. .00000 0..

 

 

270

Sources Cited

Ajzen, I. & Fishbein, M. (1980). Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social
Behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Allan, G. & Skinner, C. (eds.) (1991). Handbook for Research Students in the
Social Sciences. London: Falmer Press.

Anthony, P. & Jacobson, S.L. (eds). (1992). Helping At-Risk Students: What Are
the Educational and Financial Costs? Newbury Park, CA: Corwin Press, Inc.

Arsen, D., Plank, D. N, & Sykes, G. (1999). School Choice Policies in Michigan:
The Rules Matter. East Lansing, MI: Center on School Choice and Educational
Change, Michigan State University.

Ascher, C., F ruchter, N., & Berne, R. (1996). Hard Lessons: Public Schools and
Privatization. New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press.

Babbie, ER. (1995). The Practice of Social Research (7th Ed.). Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth.

Bailey, A. (2003). House OKs charter school bill. Detroit Free Press. Retrieved
March 21, 2003, from
http://www.freep.com/newsleducation/chartg1 20030321.htm.

I
Ballantine, J.H. (1983). The Sociology of Education: A Systematic Analysis.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Ballatti, D. (ed.) (2001). Privatizing Governmental Functions. New York: Law
Journal Press.

Bast, J. L. &Wittmann, R. (1991). The Case for Educational Choice. Chicago:
Heartland Institute.

Bell, D. (2003). Weird charter school decision ignores Michigan law. Detroit Free
Press. Retrieved April 21, 2003, from
http://www.freep.comlnews/politicslpolcol21 20030421.htm.

Bennett, W.J. (1988). Our Children and Our Country: Improving America ’s
Schools and Affirming the Common Culture. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Berg, BL. (1995). Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences (2”
Edition). Boston: Allyn 8 Bacon.

Berliner, D.C. & Biddle, B.J. (1995). The Manufactured Crisis: Myths, (Fraud, and
the Attack on America’s Public Schools. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

271

Bloom, AD. (1987). The Closing of the American Mind. New York: Simon and
Schuster.

Bomotti, S., Ginsberg, R., & Cobb, B. (1999). Teachers in Charter Schools and
Traditional Schools: A Comparative Study. Retrieved May 14, 2001, from
http:llepaa.asu.edu_/epaalv712_;html. r

Boyd, W.L. & Walberg, H.J. (eds). (1990). Choice in Education: Potential and
Problems. Berkeley, CA: McCutchan Publishing.

Boyd, W.L., Plank, D.N., & Sykes, G. (1998). Teachers Unions in Hard Times.
Paper prepared for the Teachers Unions and Educational Reform conference,
Cambridge, MA, September 24-25.

Brown, F. (1997, February). Privatization and Urban Education: More Political
and Less Educational. Education and Urban Society, 29, 204-16.

Budde, R. (1989, March). “Education by Charter.” Phi Delta Kappan, 70:518-20.

Bulkley, K. (2001). Educational Perfonnance and Charter School Authorizers:
The Accountability Bind. Retrieved April 26, 2002, from
httpzllepaaasu.edulepaa/v9n37.html.

Bulkley, K. & Fisler, J. (2002, April). A Decade of Charter Schools. From Theory
to Practice. Philadephia: University of Pennsylvania, Graduate School of
Education: CPRE Policy Briefs.

Bunzel, J.H. (ed.). (1985). Challenge to American Schools: The Case for
Standards and Values. New York: Oxford University Press.

Campbell, D.T. & Fiske, D.W. (1959). Convergent and discriminant validation by
the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix. Psychological Bulletin, 15, 81-105.

Campbell, R..,F Cunningham, L..,L Nystrand, R..O, &Usdan, M. D. (1985). The
Organization and Control of Amencan Schools (5” Edition). Columbus: Charles
E. Merrill.

Carrasco, J. & Summers-Coty, K. (2000). Public SchoolAcademies in Michigan.
Lansing, MI: Senate Fiscal Agency.

Center for Education Reform (2000). Charter Schools Today: Changing the Face
of American Education. Washington, 0.0.: Author.

Center for Education Reform (2002). Michigan commission does hatchet-job on
chaner schools; conclusions appease education establishment, charter

272

opponents. Retrieved May 30, 2002, from
http:llwww.edreform.com/charter schools/micommission.htm.

Center for Education Reform (2003). Charter School Highlights and Statistics.
Retrieved September 16, 2003, from
http:llwww.edreform.com/pubs/chglance.htm.

Christoff, C. (1999). Teachers quash charter school plan. Detroit Free Press.
Retrieved December 10, 1999, from .
http:llwww.freep.comlnews/educationlmea1O 19991210.htm.

Christoff, C. (2003). Granholm says she’ll veto charter bill. Detroit Free Press.
Retrieved August 14, 2003, from
http:llwww.freep.com/newslmich/skuls14 20030814.htm.

Chubb, J.E. & Moe, T. M. (1990). Politics, Markets, and America's Schools.
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institute.

Coleman, J.S. (1966). Equality of Educational Opportunity. Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Coleman, J.S. (1990). Equality and Achievement in Education. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.

Commission on Charter Schools (2002). Charter Schools in Michigan: Report of
the Commission on Charter Schools to the Michigan Legislature. Lansing, MI:
Author. '

Commission on Charter Schools (20033). Governmental Affairs: Detroit Focus
Group. Retrieved March 19, 2003, from
http:l/charterschoolsmsu.eduldec1 1det.htm.

Commission on Charter Schools (2003b). Government Affairs: Grand Rapids
Focus Group. Retrieved March 19, 2003, from
http:l/charterschoolsmsu.edu_ldec120r.htm.

Cook, 0., Heath, F.M., & Thompson, R.L. (2000). A Meta-Analysis of Response
Rates in Web- or Intemet—Based Surveys. Educational and Psychological
Measurement 60(6), 821 -36. -

Cookson, PW. (1994). School Choice: The Struggle for the Soul of Amen’can
Education. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Coons, J.E. & Sugarman, SD. (1978). Education By Choice: The Case for
Family Control. Berkeley: University of California Press.

273

Council of the Chief State School Officers (1983). Educational Governance in the
States: A Status Report on State Boards of Education, Chief State School
Ofﬁcers, and State Education Agencies. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Education.

Crano, W. (1995). “Attitude Strength and Vested Interest." In Petty, RE. 8
Krosnik, J., eds. Attitude Strength: Antecedents and Consequences. Mahwah,
NJ: Erlbaum.

Detroit Free Press (2003). School Deal: What’s broken can be fixed — if all sides
talk it out. Retrieved September 26, 2003, from
http:llwwwfreep.com/voicesleditoriaIs/echart26 20030926.htm.

Devine, D. (1972). Political Culture of the United States: The Inﬂuence of
Member Values on Regime Maintenance. Boston: Little, Brown.

Durbin, D. (2002). Engler Promotes Charter Bill During Education Meeting.
Detroit Free Press. Retrieved December 18, 2002, from
http:l/www.freep.com/news/Iatestnewslpm12305 20021218.htm.

Dvorin, ER 8 Misner, A.J. (1971 ). Governments Within the States. Reading,
MA: Addison-Wesley.

Eagly, A.H. 8 Chaiken, S. (1993). The Psychology of Attitudes. Fort Worth, TX:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Easton, D. (1953). The Political System. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Elazar, DJ. (1984). American Federalism: A View from the States (3” Edition).
New York: Harper 8 Row.

EIrick, ML. 8 BeII,'D. (2003). Detroit schools deal falls apart. Detroit Free Press.
Retrieved September 24, 2003, from
http://ww.freep.com/news/Iocwavlkilr324 20030924.htm.

Fazio, R.H. 8 Zanna, MP. (1981 ). Direct Experience and Attitude-Behavior
Consistency. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology
(Vol. 14, pp. 161-202). San Diego: Academic Press.

Finn, C. E. 8 Rebarber, T. (eds) (1992). Education Refonn In the 19903. New
York: Macmillan.

Finn, C.E., Manno, B.V., 8 Vanourek, G. (2000). Charter Schools in Action:
Renewing Public Education. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

274

Fishbein, M. 8 Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior: An
Introduction to Theory and Research. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.

Fullan, M. (1991). The New Meaning of Educational Change (2“ Edition). New
York: Teachers College Press.

Fuller, B. 8 Elmore, RF. (1996). Who Chooses? Who Loses? Culture,
Institutions, and the Unequal Effects of School Choice. New York: Teachers
College Press.

Garms, W., Guthrie, J., 8 Pierce, L. (1978). School Finance: The Economics and
Politics of Education. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Garn, GA. (2000). Arizona Charter Schools: A Case Study of Values and School
Policy. Current Issues in Education 3(7). Retrieved June 5, 2002, from
http:l/cieedasu.edu/volume3/number7l.

Gewirtz, 8., Ball, SJ, 8 Bowe, R. (1995). Markets, Choice, and Equity in
Education. Philadelphia: Open University Press.

Gill, B.P, Timpane, P.M., Ross, KB, 8 Brewer, DJ. (2001). Rhetoric Versus
Reality: What We Know and What We Need to Know About Vouchers and
Charter Schools. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.

Harmer, D. (1994). School Choice: Why You Need It - How You Get It.
Washington, DC: The Cato Institute.

Harmon, S. (2000). House rejects charter school plan. Lansing State Journal.
Retrieved July 17, 2000 from http:llwww.Isixtra.com/newleHARTIiRhtml.

Heinlein, G. 8 Horbeck, M. (2003). Senate OKs charter schools. Detroit News.
Retrieved August 16, 2003, from
http:llwwwdetnews.com/2003/schooIs/0308l14ld01-244682.;htm.

Henig, JR (1994). Rethinking School Choice: Limits of the Market Metaphor.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hertz, R., 8 lmber, J.B. (eds) (1995). Studying Elites Using Qualitative Methods.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Higgins, L. (2003). Charter schools issue set to heat up. Detroit Free Press.

Retrieved July 8, 2003, from
http:llwww.freep.com/news/education/chart30 20030630.htm.

275

Hill, PT. (2000). “The Federal Role in Education.” In Ravitch, D. (ed.), Brookings
Papers on Education Policy: 2000. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute.

Hirsch, E.D., Jr. (1987). Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know.
New York: Vintage.

Hirsch, E.D., Jr. (1996). The Schools We Need and Why We Don’t Have Them.
New York: Doubleday.

Hirschman, A.O. (1971). Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms,
Organizations, and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

HodgsOn, G. (1973). Do Schools Make A Difference? The Atlantic Monthly, 3
(13).

Hoffman, KB. (2003). Attorney general says charter bill is now law. Detroit Free
Press. Retrieved October 2, 2003, from
http:l/www.freep.com/newsllatestnewslpm1656010031002.htm.

Horn, J. 8 Miron, G. (1999). Evaluation of the Michigan Public School Academy
Initiative. Kalamazoo, MI: The Evaluation Center, Western Michigan University.

House, ER. (1998). Schools for Sale: Why Free Market Policies Won’t Improve
America ’s Schools and What Will. New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia
University.

Hunault, J. (2003). A summary of House Bill 4148 as introduced 2-5-03. House
Legislative Analysis Section. Retrieved August 10, 2003, from
http:l/www.michiganleqislature.orgldocuments/2003-
_2ﬁ004lbillanalists/houselpdfl2003-HLA-4148—s.Ldf.

Hunault, J. 8 Martens, D. (2003). Charter School Revisions. House Legislative
Analysis Section. Retrieved August 6, 2003, from
http:llwww.michiganlegislature.orgldocumentsl2003-
2004/b"lanaivsis/houSe/pm/EOB-HLA-4148—a43df.

Institute for Public Policy and Social Research (2002). State of the State Survey
(SOSS-26). Retrieved September 6, 2003, from
http:llwwwghpsrmsu.edu/SOSS/SOSSdata.htm.

Institute for Public Policy and Social Research (2001). State of the State Survey
(SOSS-21). Retrieved September 6, 2003, from
http:llwwwippsrmsg.edulSOSS/SOSSdata.htm.

Jary, D. 8 Jary, J. (1991) HarperCoIlins Dictionary of Sociology. New York:
HarperPerennial.

276

Jencks, C. (1972). Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and
Schooling in America. New York: Basic Books.

Jencks, C. 8 Peterson, P.E. (eds). (1991). The Urban Underclass. Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institute.

Katznelson, l., 8 Weir, M. (1985). Schooling For All: Class, Race, and the
Decline of the Democratic Ideal. New York: Basic Books.

Kaufman, H. (1956). “Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public
Administration.” American Political Science Review, 50, 4:1057-73.

Khouri, N., Kleine, R., White, R., 8 Cummings, L. (1999). Michigan’s Charter
School Initiative: From Theory to Practice. Lansing, MI: Public Sector
Consultants.

Kingdon, J.W. (1995). Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (2” Edition).
New York: HarperCoIlins College Publishers.

Kolderie, T. (1990). Beyond Choice to New Public Schools: Withdrawing the
Exclusive Franchise in Public Education. Washington, DC: Progressive Policy
Institute.

Kolderie, T. (1998, February). What Does it Mean to Ask: Is ‘Charter Schools’
Working? Retrieved August 4, 2002, from , .
http:llwww.charterfriendsorg/working.htmI.

Kuttner, R. (1997). Everything for Sale. The Virtues and Limits of Markets. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Labaree, OF. (1997). Private Goods, Public Goods: The American Struggle Over
Educational Goals. American Educational Research Journal, 34, 39-81.

Lipset, SM. (1990). Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the United
States and Canada. New York: Routledge.

Lowi, T.J. 8 Ginsberg, B. (1992). American Govemment: Freedom and Power.
New York: WW. Norton.

Marshall, 0., Mitchell, 0., 8 Wirt, F. (1989). Culture and Education Policy in the
American States. New York: Falmer Press.

McGroarty, D. (1996). Break These Chains: The Battle for School Choice.
Rocklin, CA: Forum.

277

Michigan Association of Public School Academies (2000). Setting the Record
Straight: Giving Michigan ’3 Urban Children a Better Education. Lansing, MI:
Author.

Michigan Association of Public School Academies (2001). MAPSA Press
Release: New Study Chronicles Demand for, Lack of Charters and School
Choice. Lansing, MI: Author.

Michigan Center for Charter Schools (1994). Understanding Michigan’s Charter
School Law. Lansing, MI: Author.

Michigan Department of Education (2003a). Michigan Public School Academies
— Alpha by PSA. Retrieved December 16, 2003, from
http:llwwwmichiqan.gov/documentslAIpha 55488 7.pdf.

Michigan Department of Education (2003b). Michigan Public School Academies
- Alpha by City. Retrieved December 16, 2003, from
http:llwww.michigan.gov/documentleitL 55497 7.pdf.

Michigan Education Association (2002). Commission presents charter school
recommendations to Legislature. Retrieved April 21, 2002, from
httml/wwwmeaorﬂesiqn.cfm?p=4438. .

Michigan House of Representatives (2003a). Biography: From Basketball to
Hardball. Retrieved April 6, 2004, from http:llwophouse.com/pumford.1th .

Michigan House of Representatives (2003b). Biography: Bruce Caswell Hopes to
Educate, Train and Inspire. Retrieved April 6, 2004, from
http:llwwwgophouse.comlcaswell.htm.

Michigan House of Representatives (2003c). Biography: Lauren Hager Leads
Tire/ess Efforts to Save Abused Children. Retrieved April 6, 2004, from
http:llwww.gophouse.com/hager.htm.

Michigan House of Representatives (2003d). Biography: Doug Hart Remains a
Can'ng Public Servant. Retrieved April 6, 2004, from
http:llwww.@phouse.comlhart.htm.

Michigan House of Representatives (2003e). Biography: Making a Positive
Difference. Retrieved April 6, 2004, from http:llwww.gophouse.com/lasata.htm.

Michigan Legislature (2003). Senate Bill 0393 (2003). Retrieved August 10,
2003, from

http:llwww.michiganlegislatureogltnileg.asp?page=getObiect8oijame=2003-
SB-0393.

278

Michigan Senate (2003). Senator Ron Jelinek: About the Senator. Retrieved
August 18, 2003, from
http:llwwwsenatemichigan.gov/gop/senator/jelineklbio.htm.

Michigan Votes (2003a). 2003 House Bill 4148 (House Roll Call 31). Mackinac
Center for Public Policy. Retrieved August 10, 2003, from
http:llwww.michiganvotes.org/RollCaIl.aspx?lD=69896.

Michigan Votes (2003b). 2003 House Bill 4148 (House Roll Call 32). Mackinac
Center for Public Policy. Retrieved August 10, 2003, from
http:llwww.michiganvotesorg/RoIICaII.aspx?lD=69898.

Michigan Votes (2003c). 2003 House Bill 4148 (House Roll Call 33). Mackinac
Center for Public Policy. Retrieved August 10, 2003, from
http:llwww.michiganvotesorg/RolICalI.aspx?|D=69899.

Michigan Votes (2003d). 2003 House Bill 4148 (House Roll Call 34). Mackinac
Center for Public Policy. Retrieved August 10, 2003, from
http:llwww.michiqanvotes.org/RoIICaII.aspx?|D=69900.

Michigan Votes (2003e). 2003 House Bill 4148 (House Roll Call 35). Mackinac
Center for Public Policy. Retrieved August 10, 2003, from
http:llwww.michiganvotesorglRoHCaII.aspx?lD=69901 .

Michigan Votes (2003f). 2003 House Bill 4148 (House Roll Call 36). Mackinac
Center for Public Policy. Retrieved August 10, 2003, from
http:llwww.michiganvotes.org/RoIICaII.aspx?ID=69&.

Michigan Votes (20039). 2003 House Bill 4148 (House Roll Call 37). Mackinac
Center for Public Policy. Retrieved August 10, 2003, from
Imzl/www.michiganvotesorquolICall.aspx?lD=69903.

Michigan Votes (2003h). 2003 House Bill 4148 (House Roll Call 38). Mackinac
Center for Public Policy. Retrieved August 10, 2003, from
http:llwww.michiganvotes.org/RoIICaII.aspx?lD=69904.

Michigan Votes (2003i). SB 393 (Senate Roll Call 280). Mackinac Center for
Public Policy. Retrieved August 10, 2003, from
http:llwww.michiganvotes.(qulRoIlCaILaspﬂD=81441.

Michigan Votes (2003i). SB 393 (House Roll Call 501.). Mackinac Center for

Public Policy. Retrieved August 10, 2003, from
httgl/www.michiqanvotes.org/RolICaII.asp?lD=87566.

279

Michigan Votes (2003k). SB 393 (Senate Roll Call 420). Mackinac Center for
Public Policy. Retrieved August 10, 2003, from
http:llwwwmichiganvotes.oLglRollCall.asp?lD=88464.

Michigan Votes (2003i). Senator Thomas’ “no vote explanations” [Admin003,
SB393]. Mackinac Center for Public Policy. Retrieved August 10, 2003, from
http:llwwwmichiganvotesorg/comments.asp?lD=33998ActionlD=88463.

Michigan Votes (2003m). Senator Scott’s “no vote explanations” [Admin003,
$8393]. Mackinac Center for Public Policy. Retrieved August 10, 2003, from
http:llwww.michiganvotes.orglcomments.asp?ID=34008ActionlD=88463.

Michigan Votes (2003n). Senator Clark-Coleman’s“ no vote explanations”
[Admin003, SB393]. Mackinac Center for Public Policy. Retrieved August 10,
2003, from

http:llwww.michiganvotes.org/comments.asp?lD=34018ActionlD=88463.

Michigan Votes (20030). Sen. Sikkema’s “journal statement” [Admin003, SB393].
Mackinac Center for Public Policy. Retrieved August 10, 2003, from
http:llwwwmichiganvotesorg/comments.asp?l_D=34028ActionlD=88463.

Michigan Votes (2003p). Sen. Cassis' “journal statement” [Admin003, SB393].
Mackinac Center for Public Policy. Retrieved August 10, 2003, from
http:llwww.michiqanvotesorg/comments.asp?IQ=34048ActionlD=88463.

Miles, M. B. 8 Huberrnan, A. M. (1994). Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded
Sourcebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Mintrom, M. (2000). Leveraging Local Innovation: The Case of Michigan ’3
Charter Schools. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University.

Moe, T. (1980). The Organization of Interests. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.

Moe, TM. (2001). Schools, Vouchers, and the American Public. Washington,
DC: Brookings Institute.

Molnar, A. (1994). Education for Profit: A Yellow Brick Road to Nowhere.
Educational Leadership, 66-71. '

Molnar, A. (1996). Giving Kids the Business: The Commercialization of America ’s
Schools. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Moyser, G., 8 Wagstaffe, M. (eds) (1987). Research Methods for Elite Studies.
London: Allen 8 Unwin.

280

Nathan, J. (1996a, September). Possibilities, Problems, and Progress: Early
Lessons from the Charter School Movement.” Phi Delta Kappan, 18-23.

Nathan, J. (1996b, October). Early Lessons of the Charter School Movement.
Educational Leadership, 1620.

Nathan, J. (1996c). Charter Schools: Creating Hope and Opportunity for
American Education. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass‘

Nelson, B. (1997). The State of Charter Schools, 15‘ Year Report. Washington,
DC: Office of Educational Research and Improvement, U.S. Department of
Education.

Nelson, B. (1998). The State of Charter Schools, 2”" Year Report. Washington,
DC: Ofﬁce of Educational Research and Improvement, U.S. Department of
Education.

Nelson, B. (1999). The State of Charter Schools, 3’" Year Report. Washington,
DC: Ofﬁce of Educational Research and Improvement, U.S. Department of
Education.

Nelson, B. (2000). The State of Charter Schools, 4‘” Year Report. Washington,
DC: Office of Educational Research and Improvement, U.S. Department of
Education.

Nelson, B. (2001). The State of Charter Schools, Final Report. Washington, D.C.:
Office of Educational Research and Improvement, U.S. Department of Education.

Olson, L. (2002). Minority Communities Divided Over Charters, Vouchers.
Education Week on the Web 3(6). Retrieved March 24, 2003, from
(http:llwww.edweek.org/ew/ewstory.cfm?slug=33nas1 .h19).

Orfield, G. (1996). Dismantling Desegregation: The Quiet Reversal of Brown v.
Board of Education. New York: The New Press.

Orfield, G. 8 Yun, J.T. (1999). Resegregation in American Schools. Cambridge,
MA: The Civil Rights Project, Harvard University.

Paige, R. (2002). Unprepared Teachers. State Legislatures 28(8), 1-13.
Parsons, T. (1951). The Social System. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.

Peterson, PE. 8 Campbell, D.E. (eds) (2001). Charters, Vouchers, and Public
Education. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute.

281

Peterson, PE. 8 Hassel, B.C. (eds) (1998). Learning From School Choice.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institute.

Pratt, C. (2003). Teachers rally against charter school expansion. Detroit Free
Press. Retrieved september 25, 2003, from
http:llwwwfreep.comlnews/Iatestnewslpm16456 20030925.htm.

Pratt, C. 8 Christoff, C. (2003). Detroit could lose offer of charter schools. Detroit
Free Press. Retrieved September 16, 2003, from
http:/lwww.freep.com/news/education/thomp1530030915htm.

Public Purpose (2002). U. S. Public Schools: Number of School Districts and
Schools From 1930. Retrieved February 16, 2003, from
http://www.publicpurpose.COm/qf-edschd.htm.

Rasell, E., 8 Rothstein, R. (eds). (1993). School Choice: Examining the
Evidence. Washington, 0.0.: Economic Policy Institute.

Ravitch, D. (2001). Left Back: A Century of Failed School Reforms. New York:
Simon and Schuster.

Robelen, E.W. (2002). ESEA to Boost Federal Role in Education. Education
Week on the Web 6(13). Retrieved March 10, 2003, from
http://www.edweek.com/ewlnewstory.cfm?slug=16esea.h21 .

Rokeach, M. (1973). The Nature of Human Values. New York: Free Press.
Rosenthal, A. (1989). The Legislative Institution: Transformed and At Risk.” In C.
Van Horn (ed.) The State of the States. Washington, DC: Congressional
Quarterly.

Rossi, P.H., Wright, J.D., 8 Anderson, A.B. (eds) (1983). Handbook of Survey
Research. New York: Academic Press.

Sarason, SB. (1997). The Predictable Failure of Educational Reform: Can We
Change Course Before It’s Too Late? San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Sawilowsky, 8.8. (2002). A quick distribution-free test for, trend that contributes
evidence of construct validity. Measurement and Evaluation in Counseling and
Development 35, 78-88.

Schaefer, R.T., 8 Lamm. RP. (1997). Sociology: A Brief Introduction. New York:
McGraw-Hill.

Schuman, H. (1995). Attitudes, Beliefs, and Behavior. In Cook, K.S., Fine, GA,

8 House, J.S. (Eds). Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology (pp. 68-89).
Boston: Allyn 8 Bacon.

282

Schnaiberg, L. (2000). Charter Schools: Choice, Diversity May Be At Odds.
Education Week on the Web 2(6). Retrieved March 10, 2003, from
(http:llwww.edweek.org/ew/ewstory.cfm?slug=350hoice.h19).

Scott, J. (Ed.) (1990). The Sociology of Elites. Hants, UK: Edward Elgar.

Sergiovanni, T.J., Burlingame, M., Coombs, ES, 8 Thurston, PW. (1999).
Educational Governance and Administration (4"' Edition). Boston: Allyn 8 Bacon.

Shannon, 0M. 8 Bradshaw, CC. (2002). A Comparison of Response Rate,
Response Time, and Costs of Mail and Electronic Surveys. Journal of
Experimental Education 70(2), 179-92, Winter.

Shokraii, N. (1996, November/December). Free at Last: Black America Signs Up
for School Choice. Policy Review, 20-26.

Skidmore, M.J. 8 Tripp, MC. (1985). American Govemment: A Brief Introduction
(4“ Edition). New York: St. Martin’s Press.

Smrekar, C. 8 Goldring, E. (1999). School Choice in Urban America. New York:
Teachers College Press, Columbia University.

Smith, A. (1976). The Wealth of Nations: An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes
of the Wealth of Nations. In Cannan, E. (ed.). The Wealth of NationszIAn Inquiry
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.

SRI International (1997). Evaluation of Charter School Effectiveness. Menlo
Park, CA: Author.

SRI International (2000). Evaluation of the Public Charter Schools Program: Year
One Evaluation Report. Washington, DC: Author.

Summers-Coty, K. (2003). Bill Analysis: Senate Bill 393. Retrieved September 8,
2003, from http:llwww.michiganlegislature.orgldocumentsl2003-
2004/billanaIysis/senate/pdf/2003-SFA-0393-A.pdf.

Terlep, 8. Commission issues report for charter school reform. Lansing State
Journal. Retrieved April 11, 2002, from
http:llwww.lsf.com/newslschools/020411 cha_rter Ia-9a.html.

Tetlock, P., Peterson, R., 8 Lerner, J. (1996). "Revising the Value Pluralism
Model: Incorporating Social Content and Context Postulates.” Pp. 25 - 51 in C.
Seligman, J. Olson, 8 M. Zanna (eds) The Psychology of Values: The Ontario
Symposium (Vol. 8). Mahway, NJ: Erlbaum.

283

Tozer, S.E., Violas, PC, 8 Senese, G. (1993). School 8 Society: Educational
Practice as Social Expression. New York: McGraw—Hill.

Tyack, DB. (1974). The One Best System: A History of American Urban
Education. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Tyack, DB, 8 Cuban, L. (1995). Tinkering Toward Utopia: A Century of
PublicSchool Reform. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

U.S. Department of Education (1983). A Nation at Risk. Washington, DC:
Author. ’

U.S. Department of Education (2001). Paige Announces $182 Million in Support
for Charter Schools. Retrieved February 16, 2002, from
http:llwww.ed.gov/PressReIeases/10-2001/101 12001 a.html.

U.S. Department of Education (2002). Revenues and Expenditures for Public
Elementary and Secondary Education: School Year 1999-2000. Washington,
DC: Author.

Van Horn, C.E. (ed.) (1989). The State of the States. Washington, 0.0.: 00
Press. . '

Vergari, S., 8 Mintrom, M. (1996). Charter School Laws Across the United States
(1996 Edition). East Lansing, MI: Institute for Public Policy and Social Research,
Michigan State University.

Wells, AS. (1993). Time to Choose: America at the Crossroads of School Choice
Policy. New York: Hill and Wang. ~

Wildavsky, A. (1987). “Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A
Cultural Theory of Preference Formation.” American Political Science Review,

81 :3-21.

Wilgoren, J. (2000). Young Blacks Turn to School Vouchers as Civil Rights Issue.
New York Times on the Web. Retrieved March 14, 2002, from
(http:llwww.nytimes.com/2000l10/09/nationall09VOUC.html).

Winerip, M. (1998, June 14). Schools for Sale. New York Times Magazine, 42-9.

Wirt, F.M., 8 Kirst, M.W. (eds) (1982). Schools in Conﬂict: The Politics of
Education. Berkeley, CA: McCutchan.

Wirt, FM. 8 Kirst, MW. (1997). The Political Dynamics of American Education.
Berkeley: McCutchan.

284

Wirt, F., Mitchell, DE, 8 Marshall, C. (1985). “Perceptions of State Political
Culture by Education Policy Elites.” Peabody Journal of Education 62:3
(Summer), p. 48-61.

Witte, J.F. (2001). The Market Approach to Education: An Analysis of America’s
First Voucher Program. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

285

AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII