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A TEST OF THE DUAL CONCERN THEORY AND
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A TEST OF THE DUAL CONCERN THEORY AND POWER DIFFERENTIAL
EFFECT ON INFORMATION SEEKING AND OUTCOMES IN A NEGOTIATION
WITH FULLY INTEGRATIVE POTENTIAL
By

Sachiyo Morinaga Shearrnan

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of Communication

2004

ABSTRACT
A TEST OF THE DUAL CONCERN THEORY AND POWER DIFFERENTIAL
EFFECT ON INFORMATION SEEKING AND OUTCOMES IN A NEGOTIATION
WITH FULLY INTEGRATIVE POTENTIAL
By

Sachiyo Morinaga Shearrnan

This study employed the Dual Concern Theory (DCT) to investigate the effect of
two motives (concern for self and concern for the other) and power differentials
between negotiators (equal and unequal power) on general strategic choices,
speciﬁc tactic usage, and negotiation outcomes. An experimental study was
conducted (N = 356) employing a three-person role-play negotiation scenario
with full integrative potential, where information exchange is needed in order for
the negotiators to achieve the integrative solution. Negotiation sessions were
videotaped, transcribed and coded for ﬁve strategic choices (integration,
accommodation, compromise, contention, and avoidance) posited by DCT and
nine Speciﬁc tactics including information seeking and information Sharing. The
results indicated that the previous ﬁndings of DCT were at best only partially
supported when using either manipulated and self-reported self-concem or other-
concern for the analyses. The occurrence of ﬁve major strategies and the
relationship between strategic Choices and negotiation outcome indicators were
consistent with Dual Concern Theory. Power difference did not signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence general strategic choice of integration or obtaining an integrative

outcome. Positive associations between information exchange behaviors and

two motives (HSC/HOC and M00) are observed. In addition, information
exchange was Signiﬁcantly positively related with the likelihood of obtaining an
integrative solution. The attainment of integrative solution was strongly and
positively related with reported outcome satisfaction, process satisfaction, and
relational satisfaction. Only about 12 percent of all the negotiation dyads
reached an integrative solution, while the majority reached a distributive solution.
This result suggests that a ﬁxed-sum view and win-lose orientation to negotiation
inhibits negotiators from achieving an optimal solution. Among the tactics
examined in the study, emphasizing self-concem, showing other-concem,
information seeking, information sharing, reacting positively, and indicating
problem solving attitude were Signiﬁcantly and positively correlated with the use
of an integrative strategy. Relationship between three personality measures,
dogmatism, perspective taking, and need for cognition with the strategic choices
and tactic usage were also reported. Implications and limitations of the study as

well as the possible agendas for the future study were discussed.

Copyright by
SACHIYO MORINAGA SHEARMAN
2004

To David,
and a serendipitous encounter
that brought us together

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Timothy Levine.
He has read drafts numerous times, providing me with constructive criticism and
constant encouragement. He helped transform my self-effacing attitudes toward
my own research into afﬁrmative and productive ones. He guided me through
the hardest time in my graduate studies with his constructive view of research
and insatiable pursuit of knowledge.

I would also like to thank my committee members, Dr. Mary Bresnahan,
Dr. William Donohue, and Dr. Stan Kaplowitz. Dr. Bresnahan mentored me from
the beginning of my graduate studies with her continual trust. Being a part of her
intercultural research and assisting her classes have been the most rewarding
experience for a researcher-to-be. Dr. William Donohue inspired me with his
research in conﬂict, negotiation, and crisis communication. He kindly let me use
books from his personal libraries, and his seminar on conﬂict helped me shape
the early stage of this dissertation. Dr. Stan Kaplowitz has been constantly
supportive of my preliminary research paper as well as this dissertation research.
His insightful comments and constructive criticisms had and will continue to
Challenge me, even beyond the completion of this project.

I am very thankful for ALL my fellow students, faculty members and staff
members in the Department of Communication at Michigan State University. The

faculty and many people in my cohort were helpful during the data collection

vi

process of my dissertation research. Many thanks to Dr. Hee Sun Park, Dr.
Janet Lillie, Dr. Kelly Morrison, Cat, Chad, Jonathan, Nythia, Rachel, and Susan.
I am thankful for the wonderful research assistants who were confederates and
coders, Leslie, Patrice, Aika, and Tim. I am also grateful with my students and
friends, Christine, Mrs. Douglas, Aimee, Amanda, Julian, Karen, and Sabrina for
their work with transcription and their supports.

I am indebted for the scholarship from the Rotary International
Foundation, which made it possible for me to start my graduate studies in the
United States. I am also thankful for the ﬁnancial support, research and teaching
experience I had with MSU Department of Communication, MSU Department of
Education and MSU graduate school. MSU graduate school’s dissertation
completion fellowship awarded for this project made it possible for me to carry
out time-consuming process of data collection and data analyses. The education
and experience at Michigan State University has truly been a blessing for me.

During my endeavor in the doctoral program, supports from my friends
both in the US. as well as in Japan, have been indispensable. There is nothing
more invaluable than to have friends to Share joys and pains in life. Thank you,
Keiko, Kimika, Kumi, Lynette, Maria, Rie, Hun, Jaemin, Jina, Heajin, Hiromi,
Terri, Johnny, Mari, Rieko, Ko, and Kyoko, for their friendship and
encouragement.

Lastly, I would like to thank both of my families in Japan and in the United
States. Thank you, David, Carol, Gary, Melanie, Kathleen, Teru, Satoshi,

Atsushi, and Ako, for being there for me.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................. xi
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................. xiv
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER 1: DEFINITION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR
NEGOTIATION .................................................................................................. 3
Negotiation in Our Lives .......................................................................... 3
Deﬁnition of Negotiation .......................................................................... 4
Theoretical Frameworks for Negotiation ................................................. 5
Theory of Cooperation and Competition ...................................... 6
Dual Concern Theory ................................................................... 7
Two motives ................................................................................. 9
Strategic choices .......................................................................... 9
Premises ..................................................................................... 11
Previous studies .......................................................................... 11
CHAPTER 2: NEGOTIATION CONTEXTS ...................................................... 13
Social Context in Negotiation ................................................................. 13
Power Differences in Negotiation ........................................................... 14
Power dependency ...................................................................... 14
Social Exchange Theory ............................................................. 15
Resource Theory ......................................................................... 16
Bases of power ............................................................................ 16
Power and communication behavior ...................................................... 17

CHAPTER 3: STRATEGIES, TACTICS, AND OUTCOMES IN NEGOTIATION

............................................................................................................... 20
Strategies and Tactics ........................................................................... 20
Strategic choices in Dual Concern Theory ............................................ 20
Tactics in negotiation study ................................................................... 21

Information exchange ................................................................. 23

Negotiation Outcomes ........................................................................... 26
Distributive solutions and integrative solutions ........................... 26

Beneﬁts of integrative solution .................................................... 27

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES ....................... 29

viii

CHAPTER 5:METHOD ..................................................................................... 36

Participants ............................................................................................ 36
Pilot data ..................................................................................... 36
Main data .................................................................................... 37
Design ................................................................................................... 37
Procedure .............................................................................................. 38
Recruitment ................................................................................ 38
Lab procedure ............................................................................ 38
Negotiation scenario .................................................................. 40
lnductions .................................................................................. 42
Confederate ............................................................................... 44
Confederate training process ..................................................... 45
Negotiation props ....................................................................... 46
Post-negotiation survey .............................................................. 46
Data coding ........................................................................................... 48
Coder training ............................................................................. 48
Coding tactics and strategies ..................................................... 49
CHAPTER 6: RESULTS .................................................................................. 51
Preliminary Analyses Result ............................................................................ 51
Measurement Validities and Reliabilities .............................................. 51
Inter-rater reliability on coding ................................................... 51
Unidimensionality of the Measures ...................................................... 51
Dogmatism scale ....................................................................... 52
Perspective-taking scale ........................................................... 52
Need for cognition scale ........................................................... 53
Self-report motivation for self and other ................................... 53
Satisfaction measures .............................................................. 53
lntraclass Correlations ........................................................................ 54
Effect of confederate's gender ............................................................ 56
Induction checks ................................................................................. 56
Main Analysis Results ................................................................................... 57
Negotiation Outcomes ........................................................................ 57
Types of negotiation outcomes ............................................... 57
Other negotiation outcome indicators ..................................... 58
Replications of Dual Concern Theory ................................................ 59
Strategic choices ..................................................................... 59
ANOVAs in equal power condition .......................................... 6O
Regression analyses in equal power condition ....................... 61
Information exchange .............................................................. 63
Integrative agreement ............................................................. 64
Power Differences ............................................................................. 64
Individual level analyses .......................................................... 64
Dyad level analyses ................................................................ 65

Strategies, tactics and negotiation outcomes .................................... 67

Solution types and satisfaction ............................................... 68
Strategies, tactics, and satisfaction ........................................ 69
Individual differences ......................................................................... 7O
Correlation among scales ....................................................... 70
Strategies and tactics .............................................................. 71
CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION ......................................................................... 72
Implications of the study .................................................................... 72
Limitations of the study ...................................................................... 77
Directions of the future study ............................................................. 79
CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 81
APPENDICES ............................................................................................... 83
Appendix A — Figures ......................................................................... 84
Appendix B - Tables .......................................................................... 89
Appendix C - Pre-negotiation documents, instructions, and negotiation
props ............................................................................. 111
Appendix D - Post-negotiation documents ......................................... 118
Appendix E - Coding sheet and coding schemes .............................. 126
REFERENCES ............................................................................................... 133

Table 1

Table 2

Table 3

Table 4

Table 5

Table 6

Table 7

Table 8

Table 9

LIST OF TABLES

Descriptive statistics for the measures included in the study ......... 90

Correlations among measures included in the study and reliability (a)
in the diagonal ................................................................. 91

lntraclass correlations and F test results on strategies, tactics,
outcome satisfactions, self/other concern, and personality
measures ....................................................................... 92

Means and standard deviations of self-report competitiveness
by four conditions with varying levels of concern for self and
concern for other ............................................................ 93

Means and standard deviations of self-report cooperativeness
by four conditions with varying levels of concern for self and
concern for other ............................................................ 93

Distributive statistics on the price (in dollars) per 1% prune share
by the types of agreement: no agreement, distributive solution,
equal distribution compromise, and integrative solution ......... 94

Time Spent (in minutes) to reach an agreement based on the types
of agreement: no agreement, distributive solution, equal
distribution compromise, and integrative solution ................. 94

Frequencies and percentages of the observed dominant strategies
among the DCT’S ﬁve general strategic Choices .................... 95

Correlations among dual concern theory’s ﬁve general strategic
Choices ........................................................................ 95

xi

Table 10

Table 11

Table 12

Table 13

Table 14

Table 15

Table 16

Table 17

Table 18

Table 18a

Table 19

Table 20

A Hierarchical regression results for MSC, MOC, MSC*MOC as
predictor variables on integrative strategy ........................... 96

A Hierarchical regression results for MSC, MOC, MSC*MOC as
predictor variables on competition strategy .......................... 96

A Hierarchical regression results for MSC, MOC, MSC*MOC as
predictor variables on compromise strategy ......................... 97

A Hierarchical regression results for MSC, MOC, MSC*MOC as
predictor variables on accommodation strategy .................... 97

A Hierarchical regression results for MSC, MOC, MSC*MOC as
predictor variables on avoidance strategy ............................ 98

Frequencies and percentages of reaching different types of solution
by four conditions ............................................................ 99

Frequencies and percentages of different types of solution by four
Conditions and by power difference .................................. 99

Three Way ANOVA with Self-Concern, Other-Concern, and Power,
on Integrative Strategy ................................................... 100

Three Way ANOVA with Self-Concern, Other-Concern, and Power,
on Competition Strategy ................................................... 100

Mean of cells for self-concern (high/low) and Power Difference
(equal/unequal) on competition strategy selection ................ 100

Three Way ANOVA with Self-Concern, Other-Concern, and Power,
on Compromise Strategy . .............................................. 101

Three Way ANOVA with Self-Concern, Other-Concern, and Power,
on Accommodation Strategy ........................................... 101

xii

Table 21

Table 22

Table 23

Table 24

Table 25

Three Way ANOVA with Self-Concern, Other-Concern, and Power,
on Avoidance Strategy ................................................... 102

Correlations between integrative solution, Speciﬁc tactics, and
general strategic Choices ................................................ 103

Descriptive statistics on outcome satisfaction, process satisfaction,
and relational satisfaction by the types of agreement achieved. 104

Correlations among the Dogmatism Scale, Perspective-Taking Scale,
and Need for Cognition Scale in the lower triangle, and corrected
correlations in the upper triangle .............................................. 104

Correlations among all the variables of the current study .......... 105

xiii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 The Strategic Choices posited by the Dual Concern Model based on
concern for self and concern for other .................................. 85

Figure 2 The Strategic Choices posited by the Dual Concern Model with
compromise as a ﬁfth strategy ............................................ 85

Figure 3 Distributive dimension and integrative dimension of the negotiation
outcomes explained by self-concern and other-concern ............ 86

Figure 4 The examples of negotiation outcomes based on the Dual Concern

Model, using the Peruvian Prune scenario .............................. 86
Figure 5 Frequencies of the negotiation dyads’ (N = 170) outcomes ........... 87
Figure 6 Frequencies of the negotiator’s (n = 170) strategic choices ............ 88

xiv

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that two companies are in competition for the same scarce
resource. The companies could be competitive attempting to obtain the resource
by whatever means necessary and no matter the cost. Alternatively, they could
agree to share the resources, or possibly come up with creative ways to Share
the resources. There are various paths the companies could take. Which path is
most productive for your own company as well as for the society as a whole?

When you are in a conﬂict, how important is it for you to get your way?
How much do you care about what the other person wants? How do these
concerns inﬂuence your behavior? Speciﬁcally, how are these concerns
communicated and does it inﬂuence the outcome of the conﬂict? Does the
power difference between the communicators impact how they interact? These
are the some of the questions this study attempts to examine.

This study employed the Dual Concern Theory to investigate the effect of
two motives (i.e., concern for self and concern for the other) and power
differentials between negotiators on general strategic choices and negotiation
outcomes. Speciﬁcally, ﬁve general strategic choices (i.e., integration,
accommodation, compromise, contention, and avoidance), and other speciﬁc
communication tactics (e.g., information seeking and information Sharing) that
may inﬂuence negotiation processes, negotiation outcomes, and negotiator’s

satisfaction are investigated.

The two main theories for negotiation behaviors, the Dual Concern Theory
and the Cooperation Theory, are revisited. Both general strategic choices and
speciﬁc negotiation tactics are discussed. Among these, the importance of
information exchange is emphasized. A conceptual framework for the concept of
power is provided. The present study examined the Dual Concern Model, where
parties have either equal or unequal power. Research questions and hypotheses
are provided based on the literature reviews. Methods for the experimental study
are explained in details. The results of the study are reported together with the
implications and limitations of current study as well as the possible agendas for

future studies.

CHAPTER 1

DEFINITION AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR NEGOTIATION

Negotiation in Our Lives

Negotiation is observed in many aspects of our lives. Instances of
negotiation may arise when deciding where to eat out, planning vacations,
scheduling a meeting, discussing a project, negotiating prices, and determining
international foreign policies. It is a common and often constructive mean to deal
with interpersonal conﬂicts, business transactions, and international disputes.

Given the importance and ubiquity of negotiation processes, various
aspects of negotiation processes have generated an enormous amount of
research in such ﬁelds as anthropology, communication, economics, labor
relations, political science, psychology, and sociology. On a micro level, inner
conﬂict, or the psychological conﬂict within a person has been studied (Homey,
1945). Game theory provided an economic and mathematical view of
competition and its dynamics (von Neumannn, 8. Morgenstem, 1947). On a
more macro level, Darwin’s theory of evolution based on natural selection
explained the evolution with the view that all the entities in the society are in
competition against each other and nature (Darwin, 1859; Darwin, 1871). Later
on, Danivin’s view was applied to the evolutionary psychological perspective of
competition in human society called Social Darwinism (Dawkins, 1986; Wright,

1994). The current study employs a social psychological and interpersonal

perspective on conﬂict and negotiation, especially examining Speciﬁc
communicative moves, observed in negotiation. First, negotiation is deﬁned,
and then two theories of negotiation are summarized.
Deﬁnition of Negotiation

Negotiation is deﬁned as a communication process in which two or more
parties that perceive themselves to have incompatible goals engage in an
attempt to reach a mutually agreeable solution (Putnam & Jones, 1982b; Wilson
& Putnam, 1990). Several characteristics of negotiation are discussed in the
literature (Lewicki, 1992; Lewicki, Saunders, & Milton, 1999; Rubin & Brown,
1975). First, two or more parties are involved in any negotiation. Second, the
parties face disagreement or conﬂict of interest caused by interdependent
relation between them. Third, negotiation is typically a voluntary process, where
each party intends to achieve a favorable outcome instead of letting the other
side impose a solution. Fourth, the search for a mutually acceptable agreement
is preferred to aggression by parties, at least in the beginning of the negotiation.
In this sense, negotiation is considered to be an effective way deal with conﬂict.
Fifth, to some extent, reciprocity between the parties is expected. Finally,
successful negotiation often involves intangible issues (i.e., rapport building or
outcome satisfaction) as well as tangible issues (i.e., resources, money, or terms

of agreement).

Theoretical Frameworks for Negotiation and Competition

Two major theories have been advanced to explain negotiation behaviors
in social psychology, Deutsch’s (1973) Theory of Cooperation and Competition
and Pruitt and Rubin’s (1986) Dual Concern Theory. These theories explain the
factors that inﬂuence how we behave and communicate during the negotiation.

Theory of Cooperation and Competition. Deutsch’s (1949, 1973, 2000)
Theory of Cooperation and Competition presented detailed analyses of two major
opposing forces in negotiation, cooperation and competition. The main thesis of
Deutsch’s theory examines the processes, characteristics, and effects of both
cooperation and competitive orientation as well as the factors that lead to these
two differing orientations to conﬂict. Several factors leading to competition and
cooperation are identiﬁed: the type of interdependency, type of actions, social
contexts, and other psychological elements.

In his recent book, The Handbook of Conﬂict Resolution, Deutsch (2000)
summarized “the surface effects of cooperation and competition are due to the
underlying type of interdependence (positive or negative) and the types of action
(i.e. effective or bungling), the basic social psychological processes involved in
the theory (substitutability, attitudes, and inducibility), and the social medium and
social context in which these processes are expressed (p. 29).” The major thesis
of his theory, cooperation orientation and competition orientation and types of
interdependency between parties involved in conﬂict are summarized here.

Cooperation orientation and competition orientation are contrasted in

many aspects of negotiation processes including, communication behaviors,

perception of issues at hand, task orientations and problem solving orientations,
and attitude toward others (Deutsch, 2000). The cooperative approach facilitates
honest and effective communication processes where each party is interested in
informing others and being informed. Alternatively, communication is often
impaired in competitive processes, characterized by misleading others,
unwillingness to communicate, and/or lack of communication. The cooperative
process leads negotiators to focus on similarities and common interests, while
minimizing the differences among parties. The competitive process tends to
emphasize differences and threats, while minimizing the awareness of
similarities. Individuals engaging in cooperative orientation can form trusting,
friendly relationships with the other party, whereas individuals with a competitive
orientation create suspicion, hostile attitudes, and distrust between the parties.
Cooperative orientation helps parties deﬁne their problems as mutual, whereas
parties with a competition orientation see negotiation as a power struggle. The
cooperative approach facilitates problem-solving processes, where mutually
beneﬁcial agreement is sought, and hence creates a constructive process and an
outcome of conﬂict resolution. On the other hand, competitive orientation
facilitates efforts toward a win-lose solution, which often results in a destructive
process and negative outcomes for both parties.

Conﬂict can only exist when there is some sort of interdependence
between parties, as no conﬂict arises when the participants are completely
independent of each other. Two types of interdependence are identiﬁed

(Deutsch, 2000, p 2). Positive interdependence occurs when the negotiators'

goals are related in such a way that one’s goal attainment facilitates the potential
for the other’s goal attainment. In contrast, negative interdependence involves
goals that are related in such a way that one’s goal achievement lowers the
potential of the other’s goal achievement. It is rare to encounter a situation that
exhibits purely positive or purely negative interdependence, and it iS common to
have a combination of the two in one situation. It is useful, however, to make a
distinction between the two, Since these two types of interdependence differently
affect the negotiation behaviors. Positive interdependence often facilitates
negotiators to engage in cooperative interaction; while negative interdependence
often leads to competitive interactions.

In summary, the theory of cooperation and competition speciﬁes two types
of orientations, cooperative and competitive, that inﬂuence negotiation
processes, psychological processes as well as outcomes in negotiation. In Short,
cooperation is equated with a constructive process of conﬂict resolution with a
problem-solving attitude to reach a mutually agreeable solution, whereas
competition is equated with a destructive process of conﬂict resolution. The
theory also explains that other factors such as the types of interdependence,
social context, and actions chosen during the negotiation also inﬂuence
negotiation orientations. This theory has inspired much research in negotiation
(e.g., DeDreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; Johnson 8 Johnson, 1989).

Dual Concem Theory. Although developed separately from Deutsch’s
(1973, 2000) Cooperation Theory, Dual Concern Theory can be considered as

an extension of Cooperation Theory (DeDreu, et al., 2000). The main thesis of

Deutsch’s theory focused on cooperation and competition orientations and how
these two diverging orientations inﬂuence negotiation processes and outcomes.
In addition to the cooperation and competition orientation explicated in the
Cooperation Theory, Dual Concern Theory introduced an additional factor,
concern for self, or the aspiration level of the negotiator.

Dual Concern Theory is a theoretical attempt to explain strategic choices
in negotiation using two factors: negotiation motives and perceived feasibility for
each strategic choice. Speciﬁcally, two motives, self-motives (concern for self)
and other-motives (concern for the other), are said to explain the strategic
choices in negotiation behavior. In addition, the perceived feasibility for each
strategic choice in negotiation is speciﬁed as a determinant of strategic choices.
Perceived feasibility perspective refers to the extent that certain strategies are
viewed as successful or costly in negotiation.

Dual Concern Theory originated from Blake and Mouton’s (1964) theories
of managerial behaviors. Blake and Mouton postulated that the bases of
managerial behaviors rest on three factors: concern for production (or task),
concern for people (or relation), and concern for hierarchy. The ﬁrst two
concerns are more central, because the managerial grids provide a range of
possible interactions between the two concerns and how they are represented in
managerial behaviors. Concern for production refers to “the amount of emphasis
supervision places on achieving production,” whereas concern for people refers
to valuing “the productive unit of organization" (Blake & Mouton, 1964, p. 8).

Blake and Mouton explicated ﬁve types of interactions based on the concern for

task and people, and termed the manner in which these two concerns are linked
together as managerial styles in the hierarchy.

Blake and Mouton's (1964) managerial grid was adapted to explain
conﬂict resolution by many researchers (e.g., Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Rahim, 1983;
1986; Thomas, 1976). Dual Concern Theory presents a cognitive motivational
model for explaining negotiation behavior (Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986;
Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994). The Dual Concern Model borrowed from Blake and
Mouton’s (1964) managerial grids to illustrate conﬂict styles in negotiation
behavior.

Two motives. Dual Concern Theory explains strategic choices in
negotiation employing two types of motivation to negotiation: self-concem and
other-concem (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Self-concem and other-concern deal with
the negotiator’s motivation, which varies from weak to strong. Other-concem
refers to the strength of concern for the other and is characterized by prosocial
motives rather than egoistic motives, and by cooperation rather than competition.
Self-concem refers to the strength of concern for self and is characterized by
egoistic motives and high personal aspiration. Different labels are sometimes
used interchangeably to refer to the two motives. Other-concem is labeled also
as cooperativeness, concern for people, or motivations for other, and self-
concem is labeled as assertiveness, concern for task, or motivation for self.

Strategic choices. Dual Concern Theory uses the combination of self and
other motives to predict preferences for strategies to deal with negotiation and

negotiation outcomes (Pruitt & Camevale, 1993; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Rubin,

Pruitt, & Kim, 1994). Speciﬁcally, four major strategic choices in negotiation are
predicted when employing different combinations of two motives: 1) problem-
solving, 2) competition, 3) accommodation, and 4) avoidance (Pruitt & Camevale,
1993; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). When concern for self is high and concern for other
is high, a negotiator is likely to choose a problem-solving approach, attempting to
achieve a mutually acceptable agreement. When concern for self is high, but
concern for other is low, one would likely choose a competitive approach in
negotiation. If a negotiator is high in concern for other, but low in concern for
self, he or she would likely choose to engage in accommodating the other’s
needs and making concessions. A negotiator with low concern for both self and
other would be doing as little as possible: avoiding, or withdrawing from the
negotiation. The different patterns of negotiator motives predict strategic choice
in negotiation as shown in Figure 1.

Some studies classify strategic choices into ﬁve categories, adding
compromise in the center of the ﬁgure, where moderate concern for self and
moderate concern for other intersect (e.g., Filley, 1975; Kilmann & Thomas,
1977; Thomas, 1976). Van de Vliert and Prein (1989) describe it slightly
differently, claiming that the compromising style can be placed between
integration and accommodation, but farther away from avoidance and
competition. This ﬁfth category of compromise is added to the four strategies in
Dual Concern Model shown in Figure 2. Pruitt and Rubin (1986) claim that
compromise as a ﬁfth category is not necessary, since it results from either half-

hearted or failed attempt at problem solving or Simple yielding from the both

10

sides. Alternatively, Pruitt and Camevale (1993) hold that compromise stems
from the combination of high other-concem and moderate self-concem.

Premises. Dual Concern Theory entails the assumption that individuals
hold different levels of aspiration. People vary in the extent they are committed
to achieving their own goals and in the extent that they are concerned with
other‘s outcomes and are motivated to be cooperative. Dual Concern Theory
also presumes that concern for self and concern for other are orthogonal or
independent dimensions. It has been reported that the social motive and egoistic
motive independently inﬂuence the strategic choices in negotiation both
theoretically and empirically (Blake & Mouton, 1964; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986;
Thomas, 1992; Van de Vilert, 1997). For example, Thomas (1976) points out
that it is erroneous to consider the two concerns in a single dimension,
selﬁshness on one hand and cooperativeness on the other, since it is possible to
have high concerns for both self and other. Empirical evidence in support of this
assumption that other-concem and self-concern are independent of each other is
also reported. For instance, both Butler (1994) and Van Lange (1990) reported
near zero correlations between the two dimensions.

Previous studies. There have been numerous empirical studies
examining the Dual Concern Model by manipulating self-concern and other-
concem (e.g., Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Camevale & Pruitt, 1992; Pruitt & Lewis,
1975, 1977; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Rhoades & Camevale, 1999). Other-concern
is often induced through the instruction to behave cooperatively rather than

competitively in negotiation (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975), through the induction of a

11

positive rather than negative mood (Camevale & Isen, 1986), or by creating
anticipation of future interaction with the other negotiator (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt;
1984). Self-concem is often operationalized as increased toughness or
resistance to yielding in negotiation, which is induced with the instruction to have
high vs. low limits, or aspiration (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975), low vs. high time pressure
(Smith, Pruitt, & Camevale, 1982), or high vs. low accountability to constituents
(Kramer, Pommerenke, & Newton, 1993).

Strong evidence consistent with the predictions of the Dual Concern
Theory has been obtained from a meta-analysis of the Dual Concern Theory
research (DeDreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000). DeDreu et al. (2000) summarized
the result of 28 negotiation studies testing both Deutsche’s (1973) Cooperation
Theory and Pruitt and Rubin’s (1986) Dual Concern Theory. Although their
meta-analysis was consistent with Cooperation Theory in general, DeDreu et al.
(2000) concluded that the Dual Concern Theory predicted integration behavior
better, because the level of aspiration moderated the effects of other motives on

problem solving behaviors.

12

CHAPTER 2

POWER DIFFERENTIAL AS A SOCIAL CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATION

Social Context in Negotiation

No negotiation exists free of a context. The preceding theoretical
discussion was based upon the context as a constant. In practice, however, this
is not the case. The negotiation is inevitably inﬂuenced by the various factors in
the social context and social systems in which the parties are situated (Rubin 8
Brown, 1975; Thompson, Peterson, 8. Kray, 1995). Whereas previous ﬁndings
have been consistent with the predictions of the Dual Concern Theory in that the
combination of high concern for self and high concern for other leads to higher
joint beneﬁt (DeDreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000), this theory needs to be
examined in differing negotiation contexts so that the generality of the theory and
its boundary conditions might be assessed.

Social power is among the most important structural variables affecting
negotiation behaviors and is therefore considered here. Bertrand Russell (1938)
claimed that power is a most fundamental concept in social science, in a same
manner as the energy is in physics. When there is power inequality between
negotiators, it is unclear how well the Dual Concern Theory predicts the
negotiators’ strategy choices and hence the negotiation outcomes. Thus, the

present study compares how the negotiators with unequal power behave

13

differently from the ones with equal power within the framework of Dual Concern
Theory. It is expected that power difference may differently inﬂuence the effects
of motivational concerns for self and other on tactical and strategic choices in
negotiation and negotiation outcomes.
Power Differences in Negotiation

It is important to examine negotiator power differences and its effect on
negotiation behaviors, message productions and its outcomes (e.g., Levine &
Boster, 2001 ). Oftentimes, negotiators are not equal at the negotiation table both
in terms of resource power or status power. Examples of negotiation with power
difference are rife, ranging from the negotiation between companies with different
revenue size, to the negotiation between powerful nations and less powerful
nations, negotiation between a member of majority group and a member of
minority group, the negotiation between a ﬁnancially independent husband and a
ﬁnancially dependent wife, and negotiation between parents and a dependent
child. Given that the negotiations between unequal parties are ubiquitous, it will
be beneﬁcial for both researchers and practitioners to gain an understanding of
negotiation between unequal groups. Understanding of how power and motives
interact, and hence inﬂuence communication in negotiation would be greatly
beneﬁcial.

Power dependency. Power is one of the primary concerns in human
relationships and communication, and it has been the subject of extensive
research (Burgoon and Hale, 1984; Shultz, 1958). The concept of power can be

explained in terms of the nature of the relationship between people rather than as

14

a quality that a person holds (Deutsch, 1973; Emerson, 1962). According to
Deutsch (1973), “power is a relational concept; it does not reside in the individual
but rather in the relationship of the person to his environment. Thus, the power
of an agent in a given situation is determined by the characteristics of the
situation (p. 15).” Emerson (1962) provided an analysis of degree of power and
the dependent nature of the two parties. If two people A and B are in
relationship, person A has power over B to the extent that B is dependent on A
for goal attainment. The same is the case for the amount of power that person B
has over person A. The level of dependency of one person on another is (1)
linearly related to the strength of one’s motivational investment in goals
controlled by the other, and (2) inversely related to the availability of other
options in accomplishing goals outside of the relationship (Emerson, 1962, p.31 ).
Using this power dependency concept, researchers conducted empirical
examinations of the effects of power on communication behaviors such as the
bargaining tactics between employee and employer (Bacharach & Lawer, 1981 ),
and bargaining simulations between sellers and buyers (Levine & Boster, 2001).
Social Exchange Theory. Social Exchange Theory employs an economic
metaphor in order to explain human interaction. The theory contains a general
assumption that individuals behave in ways that maximize the rewards and
minimize the costs they experience within their interactions (Blau, 1964; Homans,
1961 ). Although it is easy to think of power as if it is an individual quality as in
one's ability to get what one wants, many researchers working within the Social

Exchange Theory also deﬁned power in relational terms (Blau, 1964; Thibaut and

15

Kelly, 1959; 1991). Working within the social exchange theory, Thibaut and Kelly
(1959) deﬁned that A’s power over B as A’s ability to inﬂuence the rewards and
costs that B experiences. In other words, A's power over B increases to the
extent that A has an ability to inﬂuence the 8’s outcome.

Resource Theory. Researchers working within the Resource Theory, a
subset of social exchange theory, deﬁne power in terms of the control of
resources (e.g., Blood 8 Wolfe, 1960; Foa, Converse, Tomblom, 8 Foa, 1993;
Foa 8 Foa, 1974; Gamson, 1968; Shehan 8 Lee, 1990). The Resource Theory
explains the cognitive organization of resources and various aspects of the
mechanism of interpersonal resource exchanges. Based on the Resource
Theory, the concept of power in couples can be deﬁned as the differential control
of resources of values to others for need fulﬁllment (Blood 8 Wolfe, 1960).
Hence, a husband might be considered to be more powerful member of a couple,
because he controls more resources than his wife.

Bases of power. Power bases refer to the resources for power and/or
other methods to exert power to the other party or environment (Coleman, 2000;
Lewicki, Saunders, 8 Minton, 1999). Various typologies for power bases are
identiﬁed, including wealth, physical Strength, knowledge, expertise, and so on.
As the sources of power are created by the nature of the relationship and in the
contexts, French and Raven (1959) identiﬁed ﬁve major bases for power in a
relationship: reward power, coercive power, legitimate (status) power, referent
power, and expert power. Reward power occurs when person A has a control

over the reward that person B really wants. Coercive power exists when person

16

A can punish person B if person B does not do what person A wants. Legitimate
power refers to the status power where the position of person A is ascribed over
person B by the social system. Referent power occurs when person A identiﬁes
strongly with person B. Expert power refers to the knowledge, Skills and
expertise that person A has that are useful for person B. While these ﬁve types
of power bases are not exhaustive, it informs us of the complex aspects of
relational nature of power.

Power and Communication Behavior

Power plays a pivotal role in many communication behaviors. For
instance, an individual in an organization is expected to talk differently to his/her
boss, colleague, and subordinate, which will facilitate most effective interaction in
the contexts. Power has been shown to affect various communication behaviors
such as accommodating behavior (Giles, 1978; Wolfram, 1973), compliance
gaining behavior (Levine 8 Boster, 2001; Howard, Blumstein, 8 Swartz, 1986),
sensitivity toward others (Snodgrass, 1985), perspective taking (Tjosvold 8
Fabray, 1980; Tjosvold 8 Sagaria, 1978), and negotiation strategies (Tjosvold,
Johnson, 8 Johnson, 1984).

Research on communication accommodation theory (Giles, 1978; Giles,
Coupland, 8 Coupland, 1991; Giles, Mulac, Bradac, 8 Johnson, 1987) suggests
that individuals with less power, or those in a weaker group in society tend to
converge to those with power (Aboud, 1976; Wolfram, 1973). People with less
power engage in linguistic accommodation to people with more power. Wolfram

(1973), for instance, reports that in New York City, Puerto RicanS assimilate the

17

dialect of Black Americans far more than vice versa, since both Blacks and
Puerto Ricans agree that Blacks have more power and prestige in New York
City. Aboud (1976) asked Six-year-old Chicano and Anglo-American children to
“tell me how to play the game” in either Spanish or English. Seventy-one percent
of the Spanish-dominant Chicanos converged, but only 17% of English-dominant
Anglos accommodated.

Structural power, based on status or ability to control resources, is
reported to have inﬂuence on how we communicate and the cognitive variables
such as perspective taking (Levine 8 Boster, 2001; Snodgrass, 1985; Tjosvold,
et al., 1984; Tjosvold 8 Sagaria, 1978). Levine and Boster (2001) reported the
interaction between one’s power, target’s power, and message use. Speciﬁcally,
Levine and Boster (2001) reported that individuals in low power condition used
more compromise and negotiation strategy, while individuals in high power
condition employed more direct requests, making offers, and using threats.
Howard, Blumstein, and Swartz (1986) examined the effect of power on inﬂuence
tactics with relational partners, and reported that individuals with higher relational
dependence used weaker strategies, such as hinting, ﬂattering, pleading, and
acting helpless to their relational partner than those who were less dependent.

Tjosvold and Sagaria (1978) examined the relationship between power
and perspective taking, and reported that individuals with more power are less
interested in taking the perspective or others, compared to individuals with less
power. Tjosvold and Fabray (1980) investigated the effect of relational

dependence on motivation in understanding others’ intentions, and reported that

18

relational interdependence Signiﬁcantly increased motivations for the
perspective-taking Signiﬁcantly in the role-play decision-making experiments.
Snodgrass (1985) examined the effect of sex and status power on
sensitivity to others’ thoughts, feelings and reactions. Although it is commonly
believed that women are more sensitive to others than men, Snodgrass reported
that subordinates were more sensitive to others regardless of sex, and women in
superior roles were no more sensitive than men. Tjovold, Johnson, 8 Johnson
(1984) examined power in cooperative and competitive contexts. It was reported
that in competitive contexts, high power people used coercion while low power
people attempted to negotiate. Alternatively, when in a cooperative context, both
high- and low- power people used inducible tactics and demonstrated
understanding of each other’s perspectives. Given the previous research on the
effects of power on communication behavior, it is reasonable to expect that
power and power differences interacts with negotiator motives and inﬂuences

strategic choices and outcomes in negotiation.

19

CHAPTER 3

STRATEGIES, TACTICS, AND OUTCOMES IN NEGOTIATION

Strategies and Tactics

First, the distinction between tactic and strategy Should be noted. Tactic
refers an action or a method that you choose to achieve a Short-term goal.
Strategy refers to a general plan or set of plans in order to achieve a long-term
goal. Therefore, both tactic and strategy refer to the plans designed to achieve
certain goals, but the differences are in their generality and level of abstraction
(Quinn, 1991 ). This study examines certain tactics of importance in negotiation,
including information seeking and information Sharing, in addition to the general
strategic choices that are predicted by the Dual Concern Theory.
Strategic Choices in Dual Concern Theory

As discussed earlier, Dual Concern Theory speciﬁes ﬁve strategic choices
in negotiation; 1) integration, 2) competition, 3) accommodation, 4) compromise,
and 5) avoidance. The various combinations of negotiator motives predict
different strategic choices in negotiation and outcomes (Pruitt 8 Camevale, 1993;
Pruitt 8 Rubin, 1986). An integration strategy is characterized by a problem-
solving attitude toward the negotiation. Negotiators would attempt to deal with
the issue hoping to ﬁnd a mutually acceptable agreement, although it may be
difﬁcult. In order to solve problems, they would engage in information exchange

behavior, create positive relationship with one another, and search for the

20

possible options to solve the problem. A competition strategy is characterized by
a contentious and aggressive attitude toward the other negotiator. Negotiators
attempt to achieve what they want, by asserting their needs and goals with less
regard to those of others. A compromise strategy is characterized by the
relatively fair division of recourse, ﬁnding a middle ground through mutual
concessions. Negotiators would attempt to obtain what they want, while making
concessions to what the other wants at the same time. An accommodation
strategy is characterized by acceptance of the other’S way of dealing with
problem. Negotiators would accept, concede, yield to, give in, or accommodate
other’s needs or interests, the other’s suggestions, or other’s argument, rather
than focusing, proposing, or insisting on one’s own. An avoidance strategy is
characterized by withdrawal behaviors from the negotiation. Negotiators might
demonstrate the passive moves, such as Showing a lack of interest, or actively
withdrawing from the negotiation.
Strategies and Tactics in Negotiation Studies

In addition to the general strategies, speciﬁc tactics should be examined.
Whereas the Dual Concern Model describes the four or ﬁve general strategic
choices, negotiation behaviors can also be understood as various speciﬁc tactics.
In fact, previous studies testing the Dual Concern Model have used varying
coding schemes for tactics and strategic choices in negotiation.

For example, in the original test of the Dual Concern Model, Pruitt and
Lewis (1975) manipulated negotiation orientation (problem-solving and

individualistic orientation), aspiration (high and low), and communication type

21

(truthful communication and free communication) to examine the effect of
motivation on negotiation behavior and negotiation outcomes. Eight coding
categories were employed: 1) asking for truthful information, 2) giving truthful
information, 3) giving false information, 4) calling for concession, 5) using
pressure tactic, 6) proposing a general approach, 7) Showing concern, and 8)
coordinating proposals. Pruitt and Lewis (1975) found that problem solving
orientations and high limits are associated with certain negotiation behaviors
such as giving truthful information, proposing mutual coordination, and making
systematic concessions. Speciﬁcally, individuals with a cooperative orientation
provided signiﬁcantly more truthful information, expressed sympathy for the other
party’s welfare, and used fewer pressure tactics than people with an
individualistic orientation. The combination of high limits and a problem solving
orientation leads to an integrative agreement more often than do the other
conditions. I

In a second study, Pruitt and Lewis (1975) provided 6 categories: 1)
asking for truthful information, 2) giving truthful information, 3) in-role pressing
argument, 4) making a positional commitment, 5) using threats, and 6)
requesting reactions to a proposal. They examined the effect of aspiration level
and cognitive complexity on negotiation behavior and joint outcome. It was found
that making systematic concessions, requesting reactions to a proposal, asking
for information, and giving truthful information were positively correlated with
reaching an integrative solution, while pressing arguments and positional

commitment were negatively correlated with reaching an integrative solution. An

22

interesting ﬁnding was that individuals with high cognitive complexity engaged in
more information seeking and information sharing, which in turn was signiﬁcantly
related with the higher joint outcome.

Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, and Carroll (1990) reported a
categorization of tactics in negotiation and their relationship with negotiation
outcome analyzing both content and grammatical form of negotiation strategies.
Weingart et al. (1990) identiﬁed nine tactical negotiation behaviors; 1) single
issue offers, 2) multiple issue, or package offers, 3) suggesting tradeoffs, 4)
asking for information, 5) Showing concern for others, 6) providing information, 7)
negative reaction, 8) positive reaction, 9) threats or warning.

Each of the tactics was also classiﬁed into two higher-order strategies;
distributive strategies (i.e., single-issue offers, negative reaction, threats), and
integrative strategies (i.e., suggesting tradeoffs, asking for information, showing
concern for other party). Although some tactics are found to be clearly
distributive or integrative, others were categorized into both distributive and
integrative strategies. Thus, it is important to note that certain tactics can have
both distributive and integrative orientations and one maynot Simply associate
certain strategy to certain outcome.

Information exchange. One essential tactic in negotiation is information
exchange. Information exchange, which includes both asking for and sharing

information, has been claimed to be of great importance in negotiation (e.g.,

Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt 8 Lewis, 1975; Putnam 8 Jones, 1982; Thompson, 1991;

23

Walton 8 McKersie, 1965). There are several reasons why information
exchange is crucial in negotiation.

First, in the early phase of negotiation, exchanging information is essential
in order to have an efﬁcient beginning of negotiation. The phase model of
negotiation states that negotiation progresses over the general structure of three
phases, an initiation (beginning) phase, a problem-solving (middle) phase, and a
resolution (ending) phase (Holmes, 1992). The initiation stage is characterized
with establishing the range (Douglas, 1962), searching for agenda (Gulliver,
1979), formulating problems and deﬁning the agenda (Putnam, Wilson, 8 Turner,
1990), and establishing a relationship (Donohue 8 Roberto, 1993). To have
efﬁcient agenda setting, issue development, and relation formation, information
exchange between the negotiators in the initial stage of negotiation is
indispensable.

Second, sharing information about the position, interests, and priorities of
the other party is crucial for reaching an integrative agreement (Pruitt, 1981;
Putnam 8 Jones, 1982). Walton and McKersie (1965) emphasized the
importance of information exchange in integrative negotiation, stating that lack of
information exchange would result in “less adequate deﬁnition of the problem,
fewer alternatives would be generated, and the potential consequences of these
alternatives would be less explored,” and in turn would result in the “low-grade
solutions” (p 140). Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim (1994) identiﬁed strategies for

integrative agreements such as bridging, cost-cutting, and logrolling. These

24

strategies for integrative solutions often necessitate us to fully understand the
interest and positions of the negotiators.

Third, a cognitive bias called the “ﬁxed-pie belief" is identiﬁed as a
substantial barrier to reaching an integrative agreement in negotiation tasks (e.g.,
Bazerman, Thomas, Magliozzi, 8 Neale, 1985; Bazerrnan 8 Neal, 1983;
Thompson 8 Hastie, 1990). The “ﬁxed-pie belief" refers to the negotiators’
perception that an integrative solution, or mutually beneﬁcial solution does not
exist. People with ﬁxed-pie belief often face negotiation with a win-lose approach
and wrongly perceive that the issue at hand is distributive in nature, failing to ﬁnd
out an integrative potential, or a win-win solution to the negotiation (Fisher, Ury,
8 Patton, 1981, 1991; Neal 8 Bazerman, 1991; Thompson 8 Hastie, 1990).
Thompson and Hastie (1990) reported that signiﬁcantly more negotiators
assumed their upcoming negotiations were win-lose situations rather than win-
win situations. Information exchange is essential to overcome the ﬁxed-pie
belief, since the information exchange helps negotiators ﬁnd out the nature of the
negotiation, allowing them to explore others’ positions, values, underlying
interests, and priorities.

Finally, empirical research shows a positive association between
information exchange and joint outcomes (e.g., Kemp 8 Smith, 1994; Muringhan,
Babcock, Thomson, 8 Pillutla, 1999; Pruitt 8 Lewis, 1975; Thomson, 1991).
Thompson (1991) reported that both mutual information exchange (both party

exchanging information) and asymmetric information exchange (one parties

25

seeking information) would result in more mutually beneﬁcial negotiation
solutions.
Negotiation Outcomes

Distributive solutions and integrative solutions. Negotiation outcomes are
inﬂuenced by the nature of the negotiation. Distributive conﬂict refers to the
situation where parties, who face scarce resources or opportunities, address
problems with a win-lose attitude. In other words, in distributive negotiation, one
party gains at the expense of the other. A buyer haggling over the price over a
rug at a market in Turkey is an example of a distributive negotiation, as the topic
is the price of the rug can go up or down at the expense of the seller (Fisher, Ury,
8 Patton, 1981; 1991). When two men want to marry the same woman, this
conﬂict is also a distributive in nature in monogamous society (Follett, 1942).

Some negotiations are purely distributive, but not all negotiations are
distributive in nature, Since some negotiations entail an integrative potential.
Follett (1942) originally introduced the notion of integration in conﬂict. Integration
is a creative effort to search for a solution that is truly satisfying for both parties in
the conﬂict. Thus, an integrative solution refers to an agreement where the true
interests of both parties are satisﬁed. Walton and McKersie (1965) described
"integrative potential” referring to the degree of the potential to develop the
integrative solutions. In other words, negotiation has high integrative potential
when parties in negotiation have high possibility of achieving a win-win, or a

mutually satisfying solution.

26

Reaching an integrative solution can be difﬁcult due to the unconscious
cognitive biases. One cognitive bias, called ﬁxed pie belief, refers to our
misconception that a negotiation is a ﬁxed pie to be divided and there is no
potential for the integrative solution, such as the mutually beneﬁcial trade-offs
other than the pie itself (Bazerman 8 Neale, 1983). It iS reported that an
overwhelming majority of people assume any upcoming negotiation is a
distributive one (Bazerman 8 Neale, 1992; Neale 8 Bazerman, 1991; Thompson
8 Hastie, 1990).

Follett (1942) provided a good example that illustrates an integrative
solution to conﬂicts. Two students at the library disagree about whether to Shut
or open a window. One student wants the window open to have fresh air, while
the other student wants the window Shut so the wind won’t disturb her papers.
AS they both do not want to move their seats, the two students seem to have
incompatible goals. A possible integrative solution they could ﬁnd, however, is to
open the window in the next room. This solution is not a compromise in a sense
that both of their real interests were truly met. One student has fresh air and the
other can study without having the wind blowing directly on him, while both
students kept their seats.

Beneﬁts of integrative solution. For very apparent reasons, an integrative
solution is more desirable than a distributive solution (Pruitt, 1981). First, an
integrative solution ensures the highest joint gain, which creates maximum
beneﬁts for both parties separately and as a whole. This maximized joint gain

will guide interactants to higher productivity and efﬁciency in task related

27

contexts. Second, positive relationships are likely to follow integrative solutions,
which then promote trust and attraction between participants. Third, stability
between the parties would likely be ensured. The stability of the parties is
important because oftentimes, especially when solution from earlier conﬂicts iS
not satisfying, similar conﬂict recurs or redevelops. Follett (1942) pointed out that
integrative solutions are less likely to invite later dissatisfaction with the
negotiation outcome, since compromise often provides a merely temporally
solution while integration satisﬁes the true interests of parties.

Thomas (1976) provided integrative and distributive dimensions in the joint
outcome space of the Dual Concern Model as shown in Figure 3. The integrative
dimension can be deﬁned as the joint gain and the total amount of satisfaction for
both parties, which runs diagonally between avoidance and integration (Thomas,
1976). Alternatively, the total distributive component is the proportion of proﬁts or
satisfaction distributed to each party, which runs diagonally between competition
and accommodation in the dual concern model (Thomas, 1976). In order to
examine the determinants of an integrative potential, the present study employs

a negotiation scenario that has full integrative potential.

28

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Avoidance, competition, accommodation, and problem solving are the four
main strategic choices originally speciﬁed by Dual Concern Theory. Previous
research, however, has tested the Dual Concern Theory using additional
categories for strategic choices and speciﬁc tactics (e.g., Pruitt 8 Lewis, 1975;
Wingart, et. al, 1990). The coding schemes have not been consistent across
studies partly due to different negotiation scenarios and diverging research
purposes. AS the current study aimed to replicate Dual Concern Theory using a
scenario with fully integrative potential, following questions were ﬁrst examined.

What tactics can be categorized as one of the four to ﬁve major conﬂict
strategy categories? Can most tactics be categorized into four or ﬁve major
strategic choice categories? The present study employed deductive approach by
employing the framework of Dual Concern Theory as well as tactic coding
schemes suggested in previous studies (e.g., Pruitt 8 Lewis, 1975; Rhoades 8
Camevale, 1999; Wingart, et. al, 1990). The following research questions
concerning strategic choice categorization are examined in the current
investigation.

Research Question 1: Can observed tactics be reasonably categorized

under four or ﬁve general strategic Choices predicted in the Dual Concern
Theory?

29

Assuming an afﬁrmative answer to research question 1, the following
hypotheses consistent with the prediction of Dual Concern Theory were
advanced (e.g., Pruitt 8 Lewis, 1975; Pruitt 8 Rubin, 1986; Rubin, Pruitt, 8 Kim,
1994). Replications of the Dual Concern Theory regarding two motives and
strategic choices in equal power conditions are posited in hypothesis 1a though
1d. Speciﬁcally, DCT predicts that negotiation dyads in high self-concern and
high other-concern condition would behave differently than those in other
conditions. Negotiators in high self-concern and high other-concem condition are
expected to take a problem-solving attitude toward negotiation using more
integrative strategies such as information exchange behaviors. On the contrary,
negotiators in other conditions would use distributive strategies such as
withholding information, making positional statements, and threatening the
opponent. Hence, negotiation dyads in high self-concern and high other-concern
conditions are predicted to ﬁnd integrative agreements than those in other
conditions.

Hypothesis 1a: In equal power conditions, individuals with high other-

concern and high self-concem will employ more integrative strategies

(e.g., problem solving strategies) than individuals in the other three

conditions.

Hypothesis 1b: In equal power conditions, individuals with low other-

concem and high-self concern will engage in more distributive strategies

(e.g., competitive behavior such as contending) than individuals in the

other three conditions.

Hypothesis 1c: In equal power conditions, individuals with high other-

concern and low-self concern will employ more distributive strategies (e.g.,

accommodating strategies such as concession making) than individuals in
the other three conditions.

30

Hypothesis 1d: In equal power conditions, individuals with low other-
concern and low self-concern will be more likely to engage in avoidance
strategies than individuals in the other three conditions.

Hypothesis 2: In equal power conditions, negotiation pairs in high other-

concem and high-self concern condition will be more likely to exchange

information than negotiation pairs in high other-concern/low self-concem,
low other-concern/high self-concern, or low other-concem/low self-
concem condition.

Hypothesis 3: ln equal power conditions, negotiation pairs in high other-

concern and high-self concern will be likely to reach an integrative

agreement than individuals with high other-concern/Iow self-concem, low
other-concern/high self-concern, or low other-concem/low self-concem.

In the previous research, power difference negatively inﬂuences
constructive communication behaviors. Research Show that power often
negatively affects the sensitivity toward others (Snodgrass, 1985), the motivation
to take perspective of others (Tjosvold 8 Fabray, 1980; Tjosvold 8 Sagaria,
1978), and the likelihood to take cooperative negotiation strategies (Tjosvold,
Johnson, 8 Johnson, 1984). Individuals with high relative power are by deﬁnition
less dependent on others, and thus need not be as concerned with others.
Having more relative power appears to magnify the effects of self-concem, while
having less relative power may diminish the effects of other-concem.
Alternatively, being in a powerless position might fortify motivation to have other
concern, while weakening concern for self in the process of negotiation.
Therefore, the following individual level hypotheses are posited.

Hypothesis 4: Individuals in high power conditions would be less likely to

engage in information seeking behavior than individuals in low power

conditions.

Hypothesis 5: Individuals in high power conditions would be less likely to

engage in integrative strategies (e.g., problem solving strategies) than
individuals in low power conditions.

31

Based on the effect of power on communication behavior documented in
the literature, it was predicted that power difference would inﬂuence the
communication in negotiation, hence impacting the outcome of the negotiation.
Speciﬁcally, it is predicted that power difference in negotiations would negatively
inﬂuence the likelihood of using integrative strategies and information exchange
behaviors, hence the integrative solutions. It follows then that fewer integrative
strategies would be observed among unequal power dyads. Similarly, individuals
with greater power difference would engage in less information exchange than
those with equal power. With this potential of power as obstacles for desirable
negotiation, it is reasonable to expect that negotiation outcome would be
hindered by the power differentials between negotiators. Hence, following
hypotheses on the dyad level are predicted.

Hypothesis 6: The equal power negotiator dyads will be more likely to
exchange information compared with the unequal power negotiator dyads.

Hypothesis 7: The equal power negotiator dyads will be more likely to

engage in integrative strategies (eg. problem solving strategies)

compared with the unequal power negotiator dyads.

Hypothesis 8: The equal power negotiator dyads will be more likely to

reach an integrative agreement compared with the unequal power

negotiator dyads.

Whereas Dual Concern Theory has typically investigated negotiation
under the conditions of equal power (e.g., Pruitt and Lewis, 1975; Rhoades and
Camevale, 1999), little research has tested the theory under both equal and

unequal power situations. AS the effect of power on varying degree of self and

other concerns and strategic choices are not clear based on the previous

32

literature review, research questions are posited. Questions are posited
regarding how motives affect strategic choices differently among negotiators with
equal or unequal power. Individuals in an unequal power relationship with high
other-concem and low self-concern might use fewer distributive strategies (e.g.,
accommodating strategies such as concession making) than those with equal
power negotiator dyads. Individuals in unequal power relationship with low other-
concem and low self-concem might use more distribUtive strategies (e.g.,
competitive behavior such as contending), compared with equal power negotiator
dyads of the same condition. In addition, individuals in unequal power
relationships with low other-concem and high self-concem might engage in more
avoidance strategies, compared with equal power negotiator dyads of the same
condition. Thus, the current study examined whether the interaction effect of
power with two motives would exist and if it does how it would inﬂuence
negotiators’ strategic choices.

Research Question 2: Are there differences in strategic choices in

negotiation between equal power and unequal power negotiation dyads
among individuals with varying levels of self-concern and other-concem?

The strategic choices and tactics used during the negotiation are expected
to have an impact on the types of solution, and levels of satisfaction. It is
predicted that the integrative strategies are associated with the likelihood to
reach an integrative solution, while other strategies are associated with the
distributive outcomes. In addition, a research question is posited in examining

the relationship between the integrative solution and the other strategies.

33

Hypothesis 9: The use of the integration strategy will be positively
associated with reaching an integrative solution in the negotiation.

Research Question 3: How are other strategies (i.e., competition,
compromise, accommodation, and avoidance) and tactics related to the
integrative solution?

Follett (1942) made a clear distinction between integration and distribution
and explained the distinct beneﬁts of obtaining integrative solutions rather than
distributive solutions, such as overall societal beneﬁts, relational satisfaction, and
stability. The current study examined the relationships between integrative
outcomes and other outcome variables including time, cost efﬁciency, and
satisfaction. Predictions were made, based on Follett’s (1942) analyses on
integration. Those who reach an integrative solution would have higher level of
satisfaction in terms of process of negotiation, outcome of negotiation, and
relationship between negotiators, compared to those who do not.

Hypothesis 10: Those who reached an integrative solution would have

higher outcome satisfaction (10a), process satisfaction (10b), and

relational satisfaction (1 Oc) than those who reached a distributive solution.

Studies indicate that personality differences likely to inﬂuence how people
respond to conﬂict. The current study, therefore, examines three individual
difference variables relating to negotiation behaviors. These are examined in
relation with negotiation strategies, tactics, and negotiation outcomes.
Rokeach’s (1960) dogmatism, or the concept of closed-mindedness as an

individual difference in cognitive style, has been reported to inﬂuence the way

people select and process information (Davies, 1993; Davies, 1998). Jones and

34

Melcher (1982) reported that dogmatism was signiﬁcantly correlated with the
preference for the "confronting strategy” in conﬂict. Need for cognition, or “the
tendency to for an individual to engage in and enjoy thinking” (Cacioppo and
Petty, 1982, p.116) was found to be an important variable for our cognitive
processes in information seeking and often crucial in maintaining problem solving
orientation throughout negotiation. Perspective-taking scale was also included,
as being in a conﬂict is the very situation where perspective taking becomes
difﬁcult yet needed. Lack of perspective taking or the tendency to be closed-
minded impedes the effective understanding of conﬂictual situation (Frantz 8
Janoff-Bulman, 2000). Thus, these three individual difference variables,
dogmatism, need for cognition, and perspective-taking, were included in the
study and examined in relation with strategic choices, tactical usage, and

negotiation outcome.

35

CHAPTER 5

METHOD

Participants

A total of three hundred and ﬁfty six undergraduate students were
recruited from Communication and Telecommunication courses at Michigan
State University, a large land grant state university in the Midwest. The data
collection was conducted over the course of two semesters, summer and fall of
2003. Extra credit was provided in exchange for the participation in this
research.

Pilot data. The ﬁrst eight pairs of students (sixteen participants), who
participated in this study, were used as a pilot data. Seven of them were male
and nine participants were female. Participants’ age ranged from 19 to 29 with
mean of 23 years old and standard deviation of 3.2. Ethnicity of participants
included ﬁve Caucasian or White American, six African American, four Asian,
and one mixed.

The pilot data were used in order for the experimenter and the
confederate dealer to be trained to behave consistently, and for the investigator
to adjust scenarios, instructions, props, and the setting of the room. The data
from the pilot study were not included in the main result of the study, but were
used as an aide to create a coding scheme and practice for the coder training.

After minor adjustments were made to the scenarios, instruction, and room

36

setting as well as the training for the confederate dealer, main portion of the data
was collected.

Main data. Three hundred and forty undergraduate students participated
in this negotiation study. Approximately 42% percent of participants (N = 144)
were male and 58% (N = 196) were female. The ages of the participants ranged
from 17 years old to 42 years old with mean of 21 years old and standard
deviation of 2.24 years old. A majority of the participants (68.8%) reported
themselves as Caucasian or White American, 13.8% as African American or
Black American, 7.8% as Asian American, 2.1% as Hispanic American, 6.7% as
International Students (eg. those from Asia and Eastern European countries),
the rest as mixed or unspeciﬁed.
Design

The present study employed an experimental study using a scenario
based negotiation game in a lab setting. Three independent-group independent
variables with two levels, other-concem (high and low), self-concern (high and
low), and power differential (equal and unequal) were included. A 2 x 2 x 2
factorial design was employed, with two levels of self-concem, two levels of
other-concern, and two levels of power differential. Dependent variables
included the speciﬁc tactics, general strategic choices, negotiation outcomes,
and satisfaction measures. Pairs of participants were randomly assigned to the
eight cells of this design with 20 to 24 dyads in each cell, and those pairs of
negotiators served as a unit of statistical analysis for the main analyses of this

study.

37

Procedure

Recruitment. Announcements regarding the study were made in the
individual communication and telecommunication courses during class time
and/or through the electronic mail messages. Brief explanations of the study and
general purpose of the study were provided, and participants were told that the
details of study would be explained after they completed their study. Interested
students signed up for the study at a convenient time. When they signed up,
students were told not to Sign up with the same time slot as their close friends.
Sign up sheets were posted at the Side of investigator’s ofﬁce door for the ﬁrst
half of the data collection. For the second half of the data collection period, the
Sign up Sheet was uploaded on the web, so that students can Sign up online at
their convenience.

At each time slot for the study, multiple students were asked to Show up at
the same time to pair up. There were four to six Slots to Sign up for each time
scheduled, so that two negotiation sessions could be held at the same time
without being affected by ‘no-Shows’, and so that students would not suspect that
the dealer was actually a confederate but ratherjust an another student who also
signed up for the study.

Lab procedure. The participants were asked to come to the G. R. Miller
Communication Lab located in the Communication, Arts, and Science Building at
Michigan State University for the time they signed up. Two identical rooms with a
table and three chairs were set up in the lab. The seats around the table were

arranged in a way that the dealer was in between the two buyers, and two buyers

38

faced each other. The dealer faced the video recorder and a timer, so that they
could conﬁrm that video recorder is working and stop the buyer’s negotiation
when time was up.

When participants arrived at the lab, the investigator herself welcomed
and invited them to be in the experimental room with a table and three chairs.
Whenever possible, a confederate who played the role of the dealer, was seated
already, before other participants would Show up. After they were seated,
participants were asked to read a consent form.

Permission for videotaping the sessions was obtained in the consent form.
If participants expressed concern about being videotaped, it was explained that
the videotape would be used solely for the purpose of research analyses, viewed
only by the investigators, and the recordings were strictly conﬁdential. A majority
of the participants agreed to be videotaped. Two participants objected to the
videotaping and were given an alternative survey study and dismissed. Those
who did not Show up on time were encouraged to Sign up again, and those
participants’ whose partner did not show up on time were given the alternative
survey study for their extra credit. Consent form is included in Appendix 0.1.

After reading the consent form and agreeing to participate in the study,
participants were asked to read the scenario, and then told to follow the
instructions and scenarios. They were asked to read the scenario and
instructions very carefully. Participants were asked if they had any questions
regarding the study. Questions regarding the general situation or structures were

answered. When the questions regarding the scenario were asked, they were

39

told to read the scenario carefully, so that the investigator’s explanation would
not inﬂuence how they would negotiate in the session.

Pairs of participants were randomly assigned to the conditions.
Individuals who were assigned in different conditions were given different
instructions, although the differences were not apparent by looking at the
instruction sheet. A unique identiﬁcation number was assigned for each
participant, which was also used as the label for negotiation dyads.

The Prune Dealer, who in fact was a confederate, also was given a Sheet
of instructions, which looked Similar to the ones for the two buyers. When they
were ready to start, participants were told that they would be given 15 minutes to
reach an agreement. They were instructed to stop after 15 minutes even if the
negotiation had not concluded‘. Investigator started a video recorder, left the
room, and then closed the door.

Negotiation scenario. A three-person role-play negotiation scenario,
called the Peruvian Prunes2 was adopted from Lewicki, Saunders, and Minton
(1999). The Peruvian Prune scenario has full integrative potential, and iS simiar
to the well-known orange and the two sisters scenario and its variation, “Ugli
Orange” scenario (Butler, 1994; Lewicki, Bowen, Hall, 8 Hall, 1988). The Orange
scenario involves two sisters ﬁghting over an orange. Both Sisters want to have

the orange, and they perceive the conﬂict as distributive in nature because of the

 

‘ Three negotiation pairs actually went over 15 minutes (18, 20, and 22 minutes
respectively). The time of negotiation ranged from 1.30 minutes to 22 minutes, and the
average time they spent in discussion was approximately 7 minutes with standard
deviation of 4 minutes.

2 The original scenario was called “Pakistani Prunes” but was changed to the “Peruvian
Prunes” because of the current political situation in the Middle East.

40

scarce resource (i.e., an orange in this case). However, the fact of the matter is
that they want the orange for different reasons. One sister wants to have the
juice of orange to make fruit juice, while other need to have orange peels to bake
a cake. This is an example of a conﬂict with fully integrative potential, as both
can fully obtain their desired outcomes. The sisters must ﬁnd out what exactly
they want to have (position), and what they want to use it for (interest), in order
for them to reach an integrative agreement.

Similarly, the Peruvian Prune scenario involves with two buyers and a
Peruvian Prune Dealer, who wants to sell his prunes. The two buyers were the
participants of this study and a Peruvian Prune seller was a trained confederate.
In the scenario, the two buyers are given the identity of researchers from
California. They both want to buy a scarce resource, the annual harvest of the
rare and precious Peruvian Prunes. While the two researchers seem to be in
conﬂict in obtaining Peruvian prunes, in fact they want different parts of the
Prunes. One negotiator wants to use the mash of prunes for a cholesterol
reducing medicine to save the lives of individuals with high risk of heart disease,
while the other negotiator wants to have the pits of prunes to make soil additives
for better farming to tackle the problem of malnutrition and starvation. As neither
negotiator knows the position and interest of their opponent, they have to
negotiate and exchange information in order to ﬁnd out that they actually have an
integrative potential. Examples of scenario for both sides are included in

Appendix C2 and C3.

41

This particular scenario was chosen for two reasons. First it has fully
integrative potential, which requires information exchange behavior to reach an
integrative agreement. This scenario helps us understand what are the factors
that facilitate discovery of integrative potential and to reach an integrative
solution. Second, this scenario will eliminate confounding roles of buyers and
sellers. If buyers really want to buy certain products, it is often the case that
seller would have power over buyers to the extent that buyer is in control of the
resources. Thus, buyers and sellers would have different perspective on the
negotiation. Since both negotiators are buyers in this particular scenario, it
prevents the negotiation behavior from confounding buyer-seller task framing
(Neal, Huber, 8 Northcraft, 1987).

Inductions. This study included three independent variables, other-
concern, self-concem, and power inequality. These three variables were
manipulated in the instructions for the two Prune buyers about the negotiation
settings given prior to the negotiation. The Peruvian dealer’s behavior was
consistent across conditions.

The concern for other was manipulated through the instructions to have a
cooperative rather than a competitive orientation in negotiation (Pruitt 8 Lewis,
1975), and by letting them anticipate the future interaction with the other
negotiator (Bem-Yoav 8 Pruitt, 1984). For the high other-concem condition,
participants were told that it is important to be cooperative with the other
negotiator in negotiation and that they should anticipate future interaction with the

opponents. Alternatively, participants using low other-concem were told that it is

42

often necessary to be competitive in a negotiation setting and that they will not
interact with the opponents in the future.

Self-concern was manipulated using the motivation induction as the high
or low accountability to the constituents (Kramer, Pommerenke 8 Newton, 1993).
High self-concem participants were told that they are the representatives of their
ﬁrm, and are accountable to their constituents (i.e., the boss in their organization
or company), while participants in low self-concem conditions were told that they
are in charge of the research team and not accountable to anybody. In addition,
in order to induce high motivation, high self-concern participants were told that it
is important to be concerned with their goals. On the contrary, low self-concern
participants were told that it is really not that important for you to be concerned
with their goals, as their work is to make a living and theirjob is secure.

Often, the manipulation for the self-concem is conducted with the
instruction to have either high or low limits (Pruitt 8 Lewis, 1975). High self
concern participants are told that they really need to obtain the entire harvest of
the annual Peruvian Prunes, while low self concern participants would be told to
obtain only a half at least two third of the annual Peruvian Prunes. This way of
manipulation for the self-concem confounds self-concem with “achievement
goal,” which would directly inﬂuence the negotiation outcome. The current study,
therefore, did not employ high or low limits as a way to induce the self-concern.

Power was manipulated using the status power (Burr, 1973; French 8
Raven, 1959; Rodman, 1972) and resource power (Foa, et al., 1993; Foa 8 Foa,

1974). In both conditions, both negotiators are identiﬁed as the researchers

43

either from a Biochemical Research Firm located in San Jose, CA or Biomedical
Research Firm located in San Francisco, CA. Resource power was manipulated
with varying amounts of money authorized to use at the negotiation table, and
status power was manipulated with varying experiences as a researcher.

In equal power conditions, both negotiators are assisted to roles with the
similar levels of expertise, and are authorized to use the same amount of money
(2 million dollars). In unequal power conditions, one of the negotiators is
identiﬁed as a young researcher with less experience, while the other negotiator
as a senior researcher with more experience (i.e., status power). A young
researcher was authorized to use one million dollars, whereas a senior
researcher was given three million dollars (i.e., resource power). Thus, those in
the high power condition could outbid the one in low power condition.

The identical instructions were prepared for the different roles, one for a
researcher who needs the mash of prunes, and the other for a researcher who
needs pits of prunes. The same Peruvian Prune scenarios with different
instructions for inducing self-concem (high or low), other-concem (high or low),
and power differences (equal, low, or high) were prepared. These scenarios with
instructions were randomly assigned to the participants of the study.

Confederate. The Peruvian Prune dealer was a confederate of the study
in order to control the responses of the dealer. The Peruvian dealer in the
scenario is a worker of an import export company in Peru, who is willing to make
a contract to sell Prunes at this negotiation table. The confederate dealer has to

sell the Prunes, and can sell the prunes in 5% increments out of 100% annual

44

prune harvest. The aim of the Prune dealer is to sell 100% of prune harvest for
no less than one million and to gain the highest amount of money possible for the
annual yields of Prunes. The dealer played the role of a fair and unbiased
dealer, who would not inﬂuence the buyer in any way. Instructions for the prune
dealer are also included in Appendix C.4.

Confederates Training Processes. Four research assistants (3 females
and one male) were trained in the role of the Peruvian prune dealera. First, they
went through the negotiation as a “buyer” as if they were the actual participants
of the study. The researcher herself played the role of the Peruvian prune dealer
in order to demonstrate an example. After the session was over, they were
debriefed and had a discussion regarding the study.

The confederate dealers were trained to behave consistently across
conditions and sessions. They were told to be passive and to react the buyer’s
moves consistently, so that the dealer would not inﬂuence the behaviors of the
buyers or if they did, the inﬂuence would be consistent. The confederate dealers
were trained to say same or similar phrases for certain situations and questions
from the buyers. The possible phrases that they could use were listed in their
instruction Sheet, which looked identical to the ones for negotiators. They were
asked to wait till the negotiators said something, but if they didn’t start to say
anything, the dealer would say, "I am a prune dealer. I work for an import/export
company in Peru, and I heard that you guys are interested in our prunes.” When

they were asked for the price, they would say, “I am authorized to sell 100% of

 

3 Two females were confederates in the ﬁrst half of data collection, and one male and
one female in the second half of the data collection. They were recruited from the
advanced communication classes.

45

prune shares for the minimum of $1 million. I can sell all of them," or “I can also
sell them in 5% increments.” When they were asked which one of the buyers
the dealer would like to sell to, the dealer would say “It seems like both of you
have a great cause, my goal is to sell all the prunes,” or “I just have to take the
best deal I can get.” After they could behave consistently and naturally and felt
comfortable playing the role of the Peruvian dealer as a confederate, they
participated in the data collection.

Negotiation props. In order to increase the realism in negotiation, several
props were prepared. The fake copies of $100,000 dollar bills and $50,000 dollar
bills were prepared for the two negotiators to use. Depending on the conditions
they are in, negotiators were given $1 million, $2 million, or $3 million dollars to
Spend in a manila envelop. For their convenience, $1 million bills were bundled
with a clip. Participants could not see how much money others had. Prune
shares of 5% and 10% with a picture of Prunes were prepared for the Peruvian
Prune dealer to sell. During the negotiation, participants were told to use the
props and to actually exchange the dollar bills and the Prune shares. A paper to
write the terms of agreement was provided for the dealer. At the completion of
the negotiation, the money used and prunes exchanged were tallied and reported
by the dealer. Negotiation money samples are displayed in Appendix 05, and
the prune Share samples are displayed in the Appendix C.6.

Post-negotiation survey. At the completion of the negotiation game, the
two buyer participants were asked to ﬁll out the post-negotiation survey. The

post-negotiation survey included the 5—item induction check for self-concem (i.e.,

46

perceived self-competitiveness and self-cooperativeness) and other-concern
(i.e., perceived other-competitiveness and other-cooperativeness), 3-item
measure for negotiation process satisfaction, 3-item measure for negotiation
outcome satisfaction, and 3-item measure for relational satisfaction with the other
negotiator. Individual difference measures were also included in the survey,
such as Shearrnan and Levine’s (2003) 11-item dogmatism scale, a modiﬁed
Davis’s (1980) 8-item perspective-taking scale, and modiﬁed Cacioppo and
Petty’s (1982) 15-item need for cognition scale. All items included in the survey
employed 5 point Likert scale format, except for the basic demographic questions
included at the end of the survey. Post-negotiation surveys for the negotiators,
the negotiation outcome Sheet for the dealer, and a debrieﬁng statement are
included in the Appendix D.1.

While participants were ﬁlling out the post-negotiation survey, the
confederate Peruvian Prune dealer was given a sheet to ﬁll in about the various
negotiation outcomes. The survey included questions regarding whether they
reached an agreement or not, the time they took to reach the agreement,
whether they have reached an integrative solution or not, what percentages of
prunes are bought by each negotiator, the price they paid, total prunes that they
sold, total money the dealer earned, and any special terms of agreements the
buyers had arranged. The post-negotiation report for the confederate is included
in Appendix 02.

When they completed the post-negotiation survey, participants were given

a debrieﬁng statement. The debrieﬁng statement explained the purposes of the

47

study, factors included in the study, possible and preferable solutions for the
negotiation and information, should they have any questions. Whenever
possible, the investigator herself and participants had a discussion about what
they thought about the negotiation they just participated in. Debrief statement
can be located in Appendix 03. Following the debrieﬁng, participants were
thanked and dismissed.

Data Coding

Coder training. First, two coders, who were the confederates of the study
in the second half of the study, transcribed the pilot data of the negotiation
sessions. Then, categories for coding scheme with the lists of possible
strategies were generated based on the strategies and tactics suggested in the
literature review. As for the main data, six research assistants who are blind to
the hypotheses and experimental conditions transcribed the videotaped
negotiation sessions‘.

Two additional coders, who were otherwise uninvolved with the study,
were recruited to code the entire data set. The two coders ﬁrst went over the
coding schemes, conceptual deﬁnitions for each category, and the possible
statements that would ﬁt in each category. After they understood each category
and what phrases should be included, two coders and the investigator tried
coding a negotiation session separately in order to examine the level of
agreement. The coders then compared results, Shared their perception of the

negotiator behaviors, and their reasons for coding. Disagreements on coding

 

4 Research assistants consisted of ﬁve students, who were recruited from the author’s
introductory communication class and a friend of an author who indicated interest in
transcribing the videotaped data. They were paid hourly for their transcription work.

48

were discussed, and an agreement on coding decisions and rules for coding
were reﬁned. This process was repeated until a consensus on coding of
strategies was reached. Then, the videotaped negotiation data were coded
individually.

Coding tactics and strategies. The coding consisted of two main parts:
speciﬁc tactics and general strategic choices. The coding scheme was created
based on the reviews of previous literature and observation of current data (Pruitt
8 Lewis, 1975; Weingart et al., 1990). The Speciﬁc coding categories were
created borrowing from Weingart et al.’s (1990) nine strategic uses of coding in
combination with some additional strategies that were observed in pilot data were
added. The speciﬁc tactics coding scheme included 1) emphasizing self-
concem, 2) Showing other-concem, 3) asking for information, 4) providing
information, 5) Showing positive reaction, 6) showing negative reaction, 7)
aggressive comments, 8) withdrawal, or passive, unmotivated move, 9) problem
solving orientation, and 10) other (the strategies that cannot be categorized
above categories).

The unit of coding was done at the individual level and a negotiator’s
behavior demonstrated in an entire negotiation session. The two negotiators in
dyads were coded separately. As these tactics were demonstrated in different
degrees during negotiation session, each tactic was coded using Likert scale.
These tactics were recoded using the 5—point Likert rating as in 1) not at all
present, 2) somewhat present, 3) moderately present, 4) fairly present, and 5)

very much present. The coding was based on how much of each strategies are

49

displayed (e.g., how much information seeking or information sharing are done
during the process) during the negotiation session.

The general strategic choices were coded based on the Dual Concern
Theory’s ﬁve strategies; 1) integration/problem-solving, 2)
accommodation/yielding, 3) compromise, 4) competition/contending, and 5)
avoidance/withdrawing. The general strategic choices were recoded as 1) not at
all present, 2) moderately present, 3) very much dominant approach used by the
individual negotiator in the dyad. Tactics categorization, deﬁnitions, examples for

tactics, and the coding sheet are included in the Appendix E1, and E2.

50

CHAPTER 6

RESULTS

Preliminary Analyses Results

Measurement Validities and Reliabilities

Inter-rater reliability for coding. Using Krippendorff‘s (1980) a, inter coder
reliability was calculated for all coded tactics and strategies. Coders were initially
trained in a two-hour session using the pretest tapes. Two raters, who were blind
to experimental conditions and hypotheses, coded the entire data separately
using videotapes and transcripts corresponding to the videotapes. For all nine
tactics and ﬁve general strategies, the measures of agreement were found to be
acceptable. The ordinal rating of the Krippendorff’s a for emphasizing self-
concem was .84, .78 for showing other-concern, .82 for information seeking, .83
for information sharing, .81 for positive reaction, .76 for negative reaction, .81 for
aggressive comments, .80 for passive withdrawal, and .84 for problem solving
orientation. As for the general strategies, the Krippendorff’s a for the ordinal
coding were .87 for integration, .89 for competition, .92 for compromise, .86 for
accommodation, and .84 for avoidance.
Unidimensionality of the Measures

Item analyses and conﬁrmatory factor analyses were conducted to ensure
the unidimensionality of the all measures included in the study. Based on the

item analyses, error analyses, and tests of internal consistency, an item that

51

correlated least with other items, and had the largest deviation was deleted. The
remaining items were subjected to the same processes, and items were deleted
one by one as needed. Through this iterative process, unidimensionality of the
scale was obtained.

All measures included in the study were subjected to these analyses
individually. Measures in the post-negotiation survey includes negotiation
outcome satisfaction, negotiation process satisfaction, perceived motivation for
self, perceived motivation for other, and three measures of individual differences
on dogmatism, perspective taking, and need for cognition. The results of the
reliability analyses and the descriptive statistics are reported for each measure in
Table 1, correlations between all scales included in the study with its reliabilities
are reported in Table 2.

Dogmatism scale. Five items were deleted from dogmatism scale based
on the item analyses and error analyses based on the internal consistency theory
of conﬁrmatory factor analyses. The remaining Six items were found to be
unidimensional and reasonably reliable, or. = .78, with mean (M) of 1.75, and
standard deviation (SD) of .53. The distribution of the scale was positively
skewed with majority of participants reporting low scores.

Perspective-taking scale. Two items were deleted from perspective-taking
scale, and remaining six items were consistent with unidimensionality. The
distribution of the scale was Slightly negatively skewed, indicating that more
participants reported to have higher perspective taking scores. The scale

reliability was reasonable, at = .78 (M = 3.81, SD = .30).

52

Need for cognition scale. After item analyses and conﬁrmatory factor
analyses, four items were removed from the Need for Cognition scale, and the
remaining 11 items were summed to as a measure of the construct. The scale
distribution indicated a bimodal tendency. The scale produced reasonably high
reliability, or = .85, with a mean of 3.46 and a standard deviation of .34.

Self-report motivation for self and other. The original ﬁve items for
perceived motivations for other were retained after item analyses and error
analyses of tests of internal consistency. Scores were almost perfectly normally
distributed having M = 3.00, and SD = .87 with a reliability of a = .84. As for
perceived motivations for other scale, the original ﬁve items were retained. The
distribution was strongly negatively skewed, in that participants in general
reported themselves that they have behaved cooperatively (M = 4.05, SD = .77,
a = .88).

Satisfaction measures. Three items for negotiation outcome satisfaction
were retained, and summed to have a ﬁnal score for the construct. The
distribution was negatively skewed, as majority of the participants indicated more
then average satisfaction for the negotiation outcomes. The reliability of the
scale was high, a = .93 (M = 4.14, SD = .97). Three items for negotiation
process satisfaction were retained. The distribution was also negatively skewed,
as majority of the participants indicated more than average satisfaction in terms
of their process of negotiation. The reliability of the scale was high, a = .90 (M =
4.09, SD = .98). The original three relational satisfaction items were also

retained. The distribution was strongly negatively skewed, as majority of the

53

participants reported to have higher relational satisfaction with their partner in
negotiation. The reliability of the scale was high, a = .92 (M =4.33, SD = .87).
lntraclass Correlations

When interdependence among the member of the dyad or a group is high,
individual level data analyses are not warranted and could yield misleading
results, because of violated assumptions of statistical analyses (Kashy 8 Kenny,
2000; Grifﬁn 8 Gonzales, 1995). Although it was expected that there would be
relatively high interdependence between individuals within dyad, as the
manipulations of this study were conducted at the dyad level, actual degree of
interdependence between the negotiators was numerically examined using
Kashy and Kenny’s (2000) formulas.

Strong positive and signiﬁcant intraclass correlations were observed
among general strategic choices of integration, ,3 = .89, compromise, ,6 = .59, and
competition, )3 = .76, but no intraclass correlations were observed for
accommodation, ,3 = .006, and avoidance, f) = .051. As for speciﬁc strategies,
except for being passive and uninvolved, ,8 = -.052, all the tactics indicated
signiﬁcant positive intraclass correlations; emphasizing self-concem, p = .44,
Showing other-concem, ,3 = .66, asking for information, ,8 = .58, providing
information, ,8 = .82, Showing positive reaction, 2) = .73, showing negative

reaction, ,3 = .76, making aggressive comments, ,3 = .59, and demonstrating

 

5 The intraclass correlation (,6) refers to the estimate of the relationship between scores
of members in dyads or a group was calculated in order to examine the interdependency
nature of the dyads for both coded and self-report variables. Positive intraclass
correlation indicates interdependence (or reciprocity) between the negotiators in the
dyads, while negative correlation indicates non-independence between the negotiators
in the dyads.

54

problem solving attitude, ,6 = .85. Three outcome measures found to have
signiﬁcant positive intraclass correlations, outcome satisfaction, )3 = .265, process
satisfaction, )3: .356, and relational satisfaction, ,3 = .538. Lastly, no intraclass
correlations were observed for the three personality measures included in the
study, dogmatism, ,3 = .083, perspective taking, ,6 = -.012, and need for cognition,
,3: .097. The results of intraclass correlation analyses and F test results for
each were reported in Table 3.

These strong intraclass correlations indicate the interdependence or the
nature of reciprocity of strategies, tactics, and outcome satisfaction among
negotiators. It is interesting to note that integration and competition obtained
stronger intraclass correlation than competition, while no interdependence was
observed for accommodation and avoidance. The nature of reciprocity and
strategic use in negotiation need to be further examined.

Given the strong intraclass correlations among members of dyads in this
study, the main analyses were conducted using the dyad as the unit of analyses.
There are generally two options available in order to make pairs of participants in
a negotiations session as the unit of analysis. One of the options is to create
mean score for each dyad, and the other option is to select one participant out of
each dyad were randomly selected. As former option would neutralize the
scores of two diverging behaviors displayed by the negotiators in a dyad, the
latter option is taken. Online randomization software was employed to create the
randomization plan, in order to select one negotiator out of a dyad (Dallal, 2003).

The following main analyses were conducted using those data.

55

Effect of Confederate ’s Gender

Series of one-way ANOVAS were conducted to examine if there were any
effect for confederates’ gender on strategies, tactics, and negotiation outcomes,
as three of the confederates were female and one was male. The ANOVA
analyses with contrast tests showed that there were no statistically signiﬁcant
effects attributable to the sex of the confederate on any dependent variables
included in the study.
Induction Checks

At the completion of the negotiation sessions, participants ﬁlled out the
post negotiation survey including their self-report motivations for self and other.
To examine whether the induction worked or not, two-way ANOVAS on self-
report competitiveness and cooperation were examined. The main effect of
other-concern on self-report competitiveness was statistically signiﬁcant, F (169)
= 4.25, p < .05, 772 = .024. The means of self-competitiveness in high other-
concern and low other-concern induction were Signiﬁcantly different in the
direction that was induced. However, no main effect was observed for the self-
concern induction, F (169) = 0.28, n.s. The interaction between self-concem and
other-concem was also non signiﬁcant both for competition, F (169) = 2.995, n.s.,
and for cooperation, F (169) = 0.733, n.s. The induction for other-concern
appeared to be moderately successful, but not for the self-concem. Self and
other-concern were orthogonal, and in the current study, two factors were

orthogonal, r (1 70) = .08, n.s. The means for self-report competitiveness and

56

cooperativeness were calculated for each of four conditions and are reported in
Table 4 and 5 respectively.

In addition to the planned analyses using manipulated self-concem (SC)
and other-concern (OC), supplementary analyses were conducted based on self-
reported (measured) self-concern (hereafter, mentioned as MSC) and measured
other-concern (hereafter, mentioned as MOC) as direct measures of each type of
concern.

Main Results
Negotiation Outcomes

Types of negotiation outcomes. Out of 170 negotiation dyads (340
negotiators), twenty-one pairs (12.4 %) reached an integrative solution where
they decided to share the entire Prune harvest by dividing the pits and mash of
the prunes. The rest, or 87.6 percent of participants (149 pairs, and 298
negotiators) did not realize the integrative nature of the conﬂict at hand while they
are in the negotiation session. The overwhelming majority of participants
(84.7%, 143 pairs) ended up with a distributive solution dividing the 100% of
annual prune harvest in some way. More than half of participants (52.4%, 89
pairs) chose to compromise by dividing the prunes into half. Some pairs quickly
decided to go with the compromise decision after they found out they both
wanted to obtain the prunes. Other pairs competed against each other and in the
end gave up believing that there is no way but to divide into half. If they did not
divide the harvest half, the rest of negotiators (32%, 54 pairs) divided the prunes

unequally as in 0%-100%, 10%-90%, 20%-80%, 30%-70% and so on. Six pairs

57

(12 negotiators, 3.5 %) ended up the negotiation with a deadlock. Ending the
negotiation in a stalemate is one of the worst outcomes for the negotiation
session. They kept arguing over the issue until time was up, or used up 15
minutes without reaching any forms of agreement. The rates of reaching these
three distinctive solutions (no agreement, distributive, and integrative) were
examined based the degree of concern for self and other, as well as power
differences. The frequency and percentage of types of agreement reached are
displayed in Figure 5.

Other negotiation outcome indicators. Price per share was calculated by
dividing the amount of money paid by the amount of prune share percentage
obtained. The percentage of prune shares obtained ranged from 0% to 100%.
The money paid for the prunes ranged from $0 to $3 million. The price per share
ranged from $5000 (50% for $500,000) to $30,000 (100% for $ 3 million). It is
naturally better for the buyer if the price per share is least possible in obtaining a
deal. There was a signiﬁcant main effect of type of agreement on price per prune
share, F (2, 338) = 46.617, p < .001. Mean price for 1% prune share was lower
for the negotiation dyads that reached integrative solution than ones did
distributive solution. This indicates that those who reached an integrative
solution made most out of the money spent on the prunes. The mean prices per
Share by the types of agreements, no agreement, distributive agreement
(including compromising) and integrative agreement, are presented in Table 6.

The time spent for the negotiation was also signiﬁcantly different by the

type of agreement they reached, F (2, 338) = 49.43, p < .001. The time spent for

58

the negotiation session was longest for pairs who could not reach an agreement,
followed by those reached distributive solution and integrative solution. The
average time spent for each type of agreements are listed in Table 7.
Replications of Dual Concem Theory

Strategies choices. The ﬁrst research question asked whether the
strategies observed in the data could be categorized under the ﬁve main
strategies speciﬁed in the Dual Concern Theory. The coding was done using ﬁve
general strategy categorizations posited by DCT. Nine percent chose integrative
as a dominant strategy, 30.6% chose competition, 51.8% chose compromise,
5.3% chose accommodation, and 2.4% chose withdrawal. In the current data,
the general strategies used by negotiators were categorized into one of the ﬁve
general strategies without major problems. This is evidence consistent with DCT
in that strategies demonstrated by the participants of this study were reasonably
categorized into the ﬁve general categories posited by DCT. In addition, the
correlations among those strategies were examined. One signiﬁcant positive
correlation was observed between the accommodation and withdrawal, r (169) =
.23, p < .001. All correlations among the strategies were signiﬁcantly and
negatively correlated, which indicates that these strategies do not co-occur.
Frequencies of strategic choices in percentage are displayed in Table 8 and in
Figure 6. The correlations among ﬁve strategies are shown in Table 9. Thus,
the ﬁve general strategic categorization posited by Dual Concern Theory were
found to be reasonable in the present data set. Therefore main analysis followed

using the ﬁve strategic Choice categorization posited by Dual Concern Theory.

59

ANOVAS in equal power condition. The hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, and
hypothesis 2 attempt to replicate the Dual Concern Theory in the data of the
present study. Hypothesis 1a predicted that in equal power conditions,
individuals with high other-concem (HOC) and high self-concem (HSC) would
employ more integrative strategies (e.g., problem solving strategies) than
individuals in the other three conditions. This hypothesis was not supported in
the present data. A contrast test of ANOVA assigning +3, -1, -1, -1 to HSC/HOC,
HSC/LOC, LSC/HOC, LSC/LOC respectively indicates that individuals in HSC
and HOC condition did not choose integration strategy more than those in other
conditions, t(83) = -0.760, n.s.

Hypothesis 1b stated in equal power conditions, individuals with high-self
concern (HSC) and low other-concern (LOC) will engage in more distributive
strategies (e.g., competitive behavior such as contending) than individuals in the
other three conditions. A contrast test of ANOVA assigning -1, +3, -1, -1 to
HSC/HOC, HSC/LOC, LSC/HOC, LSC/LOC, indicates that individuals in HSC
and LOC condition did not choose competition strategy more than those in other
conditions, t(83) = 1.14, n.s.

Hypothesis 1c stated that in equal power conditions, individuals with low
self-concern (LSC) and high other-concern (HOC) would employ more
distributive strategies (e.g., accommodating strategies such as concession
making) than individuals in the other three conditions. A contrast test of ANOVA

assigning -1, -1, +3, -1 to HSC/HOC, HSC/LOC, LSC/HOC, LSC/LOC, indicates

60

that individuals in LSC and HOC condition did not choose competition strategy
more than those in other conditions, t (83) = -0.542, n.s.

Hypothesis 1d predicted that in equal power conditions, individuals with
low self-concem (LSC) and low other-concem (LOC) would engage in avoidance
strategies than individuals in the other three conditions. A contrast test of
ANOVA assigning -1, -1, -1, +3 to HSC/HOC, HSC/LOC, LSC/HOC, LSC/LOC,
indicates that individuals in LSC and LOC condition did not choose competition
strategy more than those in other conditions, I (83) = -1.16, n.s.

Besides integration, competition, accommodation, and avoidance,
compromising is included as the ﬁfth general strategic category in the study.
Therefore, an additional analysis was conducted to investigate the relationship
between two motives (high self-concem and high other-concern) and the
compromising strategy usage. A two-way ANOVA result yielded the signiﬁcant
main effect on other concern, F (2, 86) = 10.42, p < .01, without the signiﬁcant
main effect of self concern and interaction of self concern and other concern.
This result indicates that higher other concern is related with the negotiators’
choice of compromise strategy in the present data.

Regression analyses in equal power condition. Hierarchical regression
analyses on ﬁve general strategic Choices, using MSC (measured self-concem),
MOC (measured other-concem), and interaction between MSC and MOC as
predictors were conducted. For all ﬁve strategic choices as criterion variables,
result summary tables for regression analyses are provided in Tables 10 to 14.

Integrative strategies were not explained by the three predictors, thus the data

61

were not consistent with hypothesis 1a, F (2, 86) = 1.27, n.s., R2 = .041. The two
motives and their interaction were not Signiﬁcant predictors of the integrative
strategy. Although not signiﬁcant at p < .05, other-concem was a marginal
predictor for the integration strategy (t = 1.89, p = .063). The more other concern
in evidence, the more likely the integrative strategy was to be employed.

MSC, MOC, and interaction of MSC and MOC were used as predictors in
hierarchical regression analysis for the competition strategy. The data produced
a statistically signiﬁcant multiple correlation, F (2, 86) = 5.77, p < .001, R2 = 1.73.
Both MSC, [3 = .344, t(86) =3.41, p < .001, and MOC, B = -.20, t(86) = -1.98, p <
.05, were found to be signiﬁcant predictors for the strategy, but the interaction of
MSC and MOC was not. Competition as the general strategic choice was
explained by the higher self-concern and lower other-concem, which is partially
consistent with Dual Concern Theory.

As for the compromise strategy, the data were only partially consistent
with the prediction, F (2, 86) = 3.44, p < .05, R2 = 1.11. Only MSC, [5 = -2.93, t
(86) = -2.84, p < .05 was a Signiﬁcant predictor, but not MOC or MSC*MOC.
Lower self-concem is associated with the choice of compromise as a general
strategy.

The use of the accommodation strategy was predicted only by the
interaction of MSC and MOC, [3 = 2.90, t (86) =2.84, p < .05, but neither MSC or
MOC. The regression model predicting accommodation strategy was found to be

signiﬁcant, F (2, 86) = 3.76, p < .05, R2 = 1.20.

62

The avoidance strategy was predicted by the MSC, [3 = -2.66, t (86) =-
2.54, p < .05. The model predicting avoidance strategy was found to be
signiﬁcant, F (2, 86) = 2.73, p < .05, R2 = .090. Avoidance strategy was
predicted with the lower levels of self-concem, which is again only partially in
support of DCT.

Information exchange. Hypothesis 2 predicted that in the equal power
condition, negotiation pairs in HSC and HOC condition would be more likely to
exchange information than negotiation pairs in other conditions. The information
exchange index was created by computing the sum of tactic ratings on
information seeking and information sharing. Both information seeking (i.e.,
asking for information or initiating information seeking) and information sharing
(i.e., providing or sharing information) were also examined separately. T-test
results indicated that individuals in HSC and HOC engaged in more information
sharing, I (83) =2.16, p < .05 than those in other conditions. No signiﬁcant
differences were observed neither in information seeking, t (83) = 0.814, n.s., nor
the information exchange, t (83) = 1.76, p = .083, n.s.

Regression analyses were conducted using MSC, MOC, and MSC*MOC
as the predictor variables and the information exchange as the criterion variable.
The overall model was found not to be signiﬁcant, but MOC found to be the
signiﬁcant positive predictor (B = .21, I: 1.98, p < .05) for the information
exchange, though not MSC or the interaction of MSC and MOC. Thus, the
present data provided moderate evidence that the concern for other is a predictor

for the information exchange behaviors observed in the negotiation session.

63

Integrative agreement. Hypothesis 3 asked, in equal power condition,
negotiation pairs in HSC and HOC will likely to reach an integrative agreement
than individuals in other conditions. A chi-square test was conducted to compare
the frequency of reaching an integrative agreement using four conditions as the
predictor variables. The condition was not a signiﬁcant predictor for the
integrative solution, X (3, N = 87) = 1.209, n.s. Contrast test of ANOVA among
four conditions was conducted assigning +3, —1, -1, -1, to the following conditions
HSC/HOC, HSC/LOC, LSC/HOC, LSC/LOC respectively. It was found that
HSC/HOC was not signiﬁcantly different from other conditions in terms of
. achieving integrative solutions, t (83) = -0.245, n.s. The percentages of reaching
integrative solution, distributive solution, and no agreement by four conditions are
presented in Table 15, and those collapsed by power differences are presented
respectively in Table 16. Hypothesis 3 was not supported in that four conditions
with varying degree of self and other motives did not predict the likelihood of
achieving the integrative solution.

Power Differences

Individual power difference. Hypothesis 4 predicted that the individuals
with high power would be less likely to engage in information seeking behavior
than individuals with low power in unequal power condition. Multiple t-tests were
conducted to compare the difference on how much information seeking is
initiated, how much information is provided, and how much information
exchanges were done comparing those negotiators with more power (more

resource power and high status power) and those with less power (less resource

64

power and lower status power). Individuals with more power (M = 1.91, SD =
.78) did not engage signiﬁcantly more in information seeking than individuals with
less power (M = 1.79, SD = .72), t (80) = - 0.762, n.s. In addition, negotiators
with more power (M = 3.31, SD = 1.13) did not share information more than
negotiators with less power (M = 3.04, SD = 1.06), t (80) = - 1.14, n.s. No
signiﬁcant difference is observed between participants with more power (M =
5.23, SD = 1.64) and participants with less power (M = 4.38, SD = 1.55) for the
information exchange, t (80) = - 1.12, n.s. The direction of the mean difference
was consistent with the prediction in that individuals with low power exchanged
information more than those with power. However, the mean difference was
minimal and there were no signiﬁcant differences on information exchange
behaviors.

Hypothesis 5 predicted that individuals with more power would be less
likely to engage in integrative strategies (e.g., problem solving strategies) than
individuals with less power in unequal power condition. This hypothesis also was
tested at the individual level and not supported with the t-test comparing those
with more power and less power in the unequal power condition. Individuals with
more power (M = 1.34, SD = .73) chose integrative strategy, signiﬁcantly more
than individuals with less power (M = 1.09, SD = .35), t (80) = -1.940, n.s.

Dyadic level analyses. Hypothesis 6 predicted that the equal power
negotiator dyads would be more likely to exchange information compared with

the unequal power negotiator dyads. No signiﬁcant difference was observed

65

between equal power dyads (M = 5.17, SD = 1.16) and unequal power dyads
(M = 5.00, SD = .93), t(167) = 0.681, n.s.

Hypothesis 7 predicted that greater power differential would inversely
related with the likelihood of negotiators choosing integrative strategy.
Speciﬁcally, it predicted that the negotiation pairs with equal power would more
likely to engage in integrative strategies than those with greater power
differentials. T-test indicated no signiﬁcant difference between equal power
dyads (M = 1.25, SD = .65) and unequal power dyads (M = 1.20, SD = .55), t
(167) = 0.619, n.s.

Hypothesis 8 predicted that the equal power negotiator dyads would be
more likely to reach an integrative agreement compared with the unequal power
negotiator dyads. This hypothesis was not supported. T-test indicated no
signiﬁcant difference between equal power dyads (M = 1.14, SD = .35) and
unequal power dyads (M = 1.11, SD = .31 ), t (168) = .581, n.s.

Research question 2 asked the general effect of power differentials to the
Dual Concern Theory, are there any differences among strategic choices in
negotiation with power equality and negotiators with power inequality. A series of
3-way ANOVAS were conducted to examine overall effect of variables, self-
concern, other-concern, and power difference on ﬁve general strategic choices.
The respective ANOVA result tables are presented at Table 17 to Table 21.

The only interaction effect for power was observed for the competition
strategy. The interaction of power and self-concern had an inﬂuence on

competition strategy selection, F (1, 168) = 7.29, p <. 01, n2 = .038. Comparison

66

of the means in each cell indicate that the HSC and unequal power condition
worked like a magic cell, having highest mean for competition as a dominant
strategy (Table 18a). The combination of HSC and unequal power would likely to
cause selection of competition as a general strategy.
Strategies, tactics, and negotiation outcome

Hypothesis 9 stated the selecting the integration strategy would positively
associate with reaching the integrative solution in the negotiation. Hypothesis 9
is supported. Correlation analyses indicated that integrative strategy is positively
and signiﬁcantly correlated with reaching to the integrative solution, r (169) =
.811, p <.001, n2 =.657. Additional correlation analyses were conducted to
examine the relationship between integrative solution and the rest of the general
strategies (i.e., competition compromise, accommodation and avoidance) as well
as the nine tactics (i.e., emphasizing self-concem, showing other-concem, asking
for information, sharing information, positive reaction, negative reaction,
aggressive comments, passive reaction, and problem solving orientation).
Correlations among general strategies, tactics uses, and integrative solution as
well as other outcomes are displayed in Table 22. Signiﬁcant negative
correlations were found between integrative solution and competition strategy, r
(169) = -.158, p < .04, n2 = .025, and compromise strategy, r (169) = -.287, p
<.001, n2 = .008. No correlation was observed for the accommodation strategy
and avoidance strategy with integrative solution.

As for the nine tactics coded in the study, several signiﬁcant correlations

were observed with the degree of integration of the negotiation outcome.

67

Signiﬁcant positive correlations were observed with emphasizing self-concern, r
(169) = .235, p < .01, showing other-concem, r (169) = .431, p <.001, information
seeking, r (169) = .251, p <.01, information sharing, r (169) = .438, p < .011,
reacting positively, r (169) = .365, p < .001, and indicating problem solving
attitude, r (169) = .788, p < .01. No signiﬁcant correlations were observed for
showing negative reaction, using aggressive comments, and being passive and
uninvolved.

Solution types and satisfaction. Satisfaction was measured in three
dimensions, satisfaction of negotiation outcomes, satisfaction of negotiation
processes, and satisfaction of negotiator relationships. Overall, it was reported
that all the participants are generally satisﬁed with all three indicators of
satisfaction: outcome satisfaction (M = 4.05, SD = 1.03), process satisfaction (M
= 4.11, SD = .98), and relational satisfaction (M = 4.28, SD = .86)6.

It was predicted that those who reached an integrative solution would
have higher 10a) negotiation outcome satisfaction, 10b) negotiation process
satisfaction, and 10c) negotiator relational satisfaction than thoSe who reached a
distributive solution. Differences on satisfaction levels were examined based on
the negotiation solutions (i.e., integrative solution or not) that they reached.
Levene’s test for equality of variances indicated that variance are not equal,
perhaps since fewer subjects reached an integrative solution. Therefore,

separate variance t-tests (equal variances not assumed) are examined.

 

6 Descriptive statistics for three satisfaction measures using the individual level data (N
=340) were almost identical, indicating outcome satisfaction (M = 4.12, SD = .97),
process satisfaction (M = 4.09, SD = .98), and relational satisfaction (M = 4.33, SD =
.87).

68

Hypothesis 10a, 10b, and 100 were supported. Pairs of negotiators who
reached an integrative solution had signiﬁcantly higher outcome satisfaction (M =
4.81, SD = .37), t (71) = 6.92, p < .001, than the negotiators who reached a
distributive solution (M = 4.01, SD = .98). Signiﬁcantly higher process
satisfaction, t (66) = 7.31, p < .001, was observed for dyad reached an integrative
solution (M = 4.89, SD = .27) than those did a distributive solution (M = 4.03, SD
= .97). A signiﬁcant mean differences on relational satisfaction was observed, t
(73) = 6.66, p < .001, among those who reached an integrative solution (M =
4.81, SD = .33) and those did a distributive solution (M = 4.21, SD = .89).

In addition, the negotiation pairs who reached a unequal distributive
sOlution indicated signiﬁcantly high outcome satisfaction, I (83) = 3.773, p < .001,
process satisfaction, t(85) = 3.157, p < .001, and relational satisfaction, t(85) =
4.869, p < .001, compared to the negotiators who reached a compromise, or an
equal distributive solution. Descriptive statistics on the levels of satisfaction by
the types of agreement reached are presented in Table 23.

Strategies, tactics, and satisfaction. The relation between the general
strategic uses (i.e., integration, avoidance, compromise, competition, and
avoidance) and satisfaction indicators (i.e., outcome satisfaction, process
satisfaction, relational satisfaction) were examined. Integrative strategy
correlated with all three satisfaction indicators, outcome satisfaction, r (169) =
.223, p < .001, process satisfaction, r (169) = .275, p < .001, and relational
satisfaction, r (169) = .195, p < .001. Compromise strategy also were

Signiﬁcantly positively correlated with outcome satisfaction, r (169) = .273, p <

69

.001, process satisfaction, r (169) = .235, p < .01, and relational satisfaction, r
(169) = .351, p < .001. On the contrary, competition was negatively correlated
with outcome satisfaction, r (169) = -.368, p < .001, process satisfaction, r (169) =
-.302, p < .001, and relational satisfaction, r (169) = -.289, p < .001. Avoidance
was also negatively correlated with outcome satisfaction, r (169) = -.156, p <
.001, process satisfaction, r (169) = -.228, p < .001, and relational satisfaction, r
(169) = -.298, p < .001.
Individual Differences

Correlations among scales. The present study included three individual
differences variables, dogmatism, perspective taking, and need for cognition,
which were previously reported to be inﬂuencing the cognitive and behavioral
aspects of information processing, which would directly inﬂuence in negotiation
setting. The relationships between these individual differences and strategic
Choices, tactics, as well as negotiation outcomes were examined. Correlations
among the personality measures are displayed in Table 24. Consistent with the
theoretical explanations for each construct and its relation, the correlations
among the individual difference measures were Signiﬁcantly correlated7.
Dogmatism scores correlated negatively with perspective taking, r (170) = -.553,

p < .001, corrected r = -.67, and need for cognition, r (170) = -.331, p < .001,

 

7 Similar results were obtained for the correlations among scales using the individual
level data (N =340). Dogmatism score are signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with
perspective taking scores, r (339) = -.552, p < .001, corrected r = .67, and need for
cognition, r (339) = -.332, p < .001, corrected r = .356. Simultaneously, perspective
taking score and need for cognition score was signiﬁcantly positively correlated, r (340) =
.292, p < .001, corrected r = -.395.

70

corrected r = -.536. Simultaneously, perspective taking and need for cognition
score correlated positively, r (170) = .328, p < .001, corrected r = .488.

Strategies and tactics. The perspective-taking scores and integration
strategy yielded signiﬁcant positive correlation, r (169) = .174, p < .05. Need for
cognition was negatively correlated with accommodation strategy, r (337) = -.141,
p < .05. The integrative strategy was also positively correlated with need for
cognition, r (169) = .16, p < .05. As for speciﬁc tactics, information seeking was
signiﬁcantly positively correlated with the perspective-taking score, r (169) = .162,
p < .05. Being passive and uninvolved was positively correlated with dogmatism
scale, r (169) = .203, p < .05, and negatively correlated with need for cognition, r
(169) = -.163, p < .05. Showing problem solving attitudes were positively
correlated with perspective taking, r (169) = .193, p < .05, and need for cognition,
r (169) = .197, p < .05 and negatively with dogmatism, r (169) = -.179, p < .05.
The correlations among all the variables included in the study are displayed in

Table 25.

71

CHAPTER 8

DISCUSSION

Implications of the study

The current study investigated negotiation behavior by testing the Dual
Concern Theory. Speciﬁcally, this study examined how two motives (concern for
self and other) and power differences inﬂuence the way people negotiate in an
attempt to achieve what they want when there is full integrative potential.
Previous ﬁndings for Dual Concern Theory were not fully replicated in the current
data set either with induced self-concem and other-concem or with self-reported
motivations for self and other as predictors.

Only partial support was observed in predicting the strategic choices using
manipulated concern for self and other (SC and 00) as predictors. A statistically
signiﬁcant positive relation was observed between concern for other and the use
of competitive strategies. Also, a Signiﬁcant effect for self-concem on
compromising strategy selection was observed. However, no effect was
observed for either self-concem or the interaction between the self-concem and
other-concern on the ﬁve strategic choices. The combination of HSC and HOC
was related positively with the use of information sharing behaviors, though not

information seeking and information exchange.

72

Likewise, the data were only partially consistent with DCT using self-report
or measured concerns for self (MSC) and other (MOC). Higher other concern
was associated with obtaining an integrative solution and less use of the
competitive strategy. Higher self-concem predicted the competitive strategy,
while lower self-concem was associated with compromise and avoidance. The
measured other-concern was positively correlated with information exchange.

Generally, the data regarding the effect of main determinants of DCT, self-
concern, other-concem and its combination were not consistent with the
predictions posited based on DCT. However, evidence consistent with DCT was
observed in terms of the strategic choice categorization in coding and the relation
between strategic choices and the negotiation outcome variables. General
strategic choices were strongly related with the negotiation outcome as
predicted. Speciﬁcally, selection of integration as a general approach to the
negotiation was strongly and positively associated with the integrativeness of the
outcome. Alternatively, compromise and competition as general strategic
approaches were negatively associated with the integrativeness of the outcome.
In addition, integrative solutions were strongly related with reported outcome
satisfaction, process satisfaction, and relational satisfaction.

Among the nine tactics coded in the study, emphasizing self-concem,
showing other-concern, information seeking, information sharing, reacting
positively, and indicating problem solving attitude were signiﬁcantly and positively
correlated with integrative strategy. On the other hand, three tactics, showing

negative reaction, using aggressive comments, and being passive, were not

73

correlated with integrative solution. These results are intuitive, providing the
evidence that certain communication tactics are desirable, as they are associated
with the potential to reach an integrative solution. The data regarding the tactic
usages, strategic choices, negotiation outcomes, and outcome satisfaction were
consistent with Dual Concern Theory.

Slightly different relations between self-concem/other-concem and
information exchange (information seeking and information sharing) are
observed when using SC/OC and MSC/MOC. The combination of HSC and
HOC leads one to engage in more information seeking, using manipulated SC
and OC. HOC was found to be a signiﬁcant predictor for information exchange,
using measured other-concern. How two concerns would inﬂuence information
seeking behaviors remains inconclusive, but the consistent positive associations
between the motives and information exchange were observed. lnforrnation
exchange was crucial in the current study, and both information seeking and
information sharing did associate strongly with the attainment of the integrative
solution.

Power differences were predicted to interact with the two motives to
inﬂuence the strategic choice. Current study hypothesized the effect of the
power with the view of the power as a spoiler, or as a hindrance to achieve
integrative solution. Power difference, however, did not constantly inﬂuence the
general strategic Choice of integration and the integrative outcome in the current

data set. In addition, there were no signiﬁcant differences caused by the power

74

differences on the use information seeking neither at the individual level nor the
dyadleveL

Interestingly, the only statistical interaction that was observed was the
interaction between self-concern and power inequality on the use of competition
strategy. Individuals with high power and high self-concem are more likely to
choose competition strategy. This result is consistent with the previous literature
on power as a corrupting force (Kipnis, 1972; Snodgrass, 1985; Tjosvold, et al.,
1984; Tjosvold 8 Sagaria, 1978).

It should be noted here that some studies indicate an opposing effect of
power where powerless people rather than powerful people behave more
aggressively (e.g., Donohue 8 Hoobler, 2002; Goodstadt 8 Hjelle, 1973). The
weak effects in the current study might be attributable to the complex nature of
social, relational, and structural power and power attribution (Kaplowitz, 1978).
The induction of status and resource power used in the study might not have
actually caused some negotiators to perceive the attribution of the power, or the
perceived potential power over the outcome.

Only 12.4 % of the participants reached an integrative solution where they
decided to Share the entire Prune harvest by dividing pits and mash of the
prunes. The rest of participants could not reach an agreement or reached some
sort of distributive solutions (either equal distribution or unequal distribution).
Among the rest of those who chose distributive agreement, 53% of the
participants choose to compromise, equally dividing the prune shares and the

cost for the prunes. This result suggests that one factor inhibiting the attainment

75

of integrative solution is the prevalence of a ﬁxed-sum view held by many
participants facing the negotiation. The win-lose orientation to negotiation would
likely hinder the potential to reach an integrative agreement, even when it’s
entirely achievable with information exchange.

Types of the agreements were signiﬁcantly correlated with the quality
indicators for the negotiation outcomes; negotiation outcome satisfaction,
negotiation process satisfaction, relational satisfaction, time spent for negotiation,
and price per 1% Prune Share. The negotiation pairs who reached an integrative
solution had a shortest time spent for negotiation session and achieved best
price per prune shares. In addition, consistent with the theoretical explanations
for the beneﬁts of integration, the participants who reached an integrative
solution demonstrated higher outcome satisfaction, process satisfaction, and
relational satisfaction.

Three individual difference measures included in the study all Signiﬁcantly
related with some of the speciﬁc strategic choices and general approaches to the
negotiation. Showing a problem-solving orientation, a crucial tactic to reach an
integrative solution, was correlated with all three of the personality measures
included in the study. Dogmatism was signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with the
problem solving orientation, while both perspective taking and need for cognition
were signiﬁcantly positively correlated with it. An especially interesting ﬁnding is
that the perspective taking was positively associated with the use of speciﬁc
strategic choices such as providing information, indicating problem solving

orientations, and likelihood to choose integrative strategy as a general selection

76

in negotiation. A very intuitive ﬁnding is that those who are high in need for
cognition are less likely to be passive and uninvolved in negotiation and less
likely to choose accommodation strategy as their general strategic choice.

These results regarding the individual difference variables in the present
data set are modest in Size, but intuitive and consistent with the previous
literatures (Caccioppo 8 Petty, 1980; Davies, 1993; Frantz 8 Janoff-Bulman,
2000; Jones 8 Melcher, 1982; Rokeach, 1960). In lab experiments, random
assignment should results in individual differences equaling out across cells.
Nevertheless, individual difference variables are not something that should be
disregard completely in the study of human behavior because of their potential
interaction with the variables included in the study.
Limitations of the Study

The weak inductions for active variables, especially for the self-concern,
Should be noted. The induction employed in the study was not strong enough.
Although a test of other-concern induction yielded signiﬁcant difference in the
direction consistent with manipulation, the effect sizes were weak to moderate at
best. The disconﬁrming data for DCT may be explained by the failure to induce
self-concern in the current study. Several possible explanations for the weak
support for DCT in the current data are discussed. It may be that the nature of
the negotiation required participants to have moderate level of ‘Self-concern,’
which could have caused the weak effect. Second, the implication of the
unsuccessful induction for self-concern might be contributed to the nature of the

negotiation scenario. In the conﬂict of interest scenario employed in this study,

77

participants are expected have moderate levels of self-concern. Third, the
induction check was not appropriate and could not capture self-concern, as the
self-report on competitiveness in negotiation might not necessarily relate with
motives.

Power differences were induced by resource power and status power. No
induction check for power difference was included in the study. In the present
study, power difference was considered as a structural factor between the
negotiator and not the perceived power differences and induction was considered
not necessary. In the hindsight, it would be better to examine a self-report
measure of perceived power difference and/or attributions of potential power to
capture perceived structural power in the dyads (Kaplowits, 1978).

Training coders in an attempt to obtain the high agreement between the
raters was a big challenge. The process of coding occupied the most important,
and most time consuming portion of the current study. Some messages seem to
be multi-dimensional and multi-channeled. One communicative move does not
necessarily serve only one function. Some strategic moves are clear-cut but not
others. For this reason, it Should be noted that coding complex communicative
moves necessitates emphasis on certain aspects of communication and cannot
capture all aspects of it. For example, we did not include the nonverbal
communication in the consideration of our study, although it is an important part
of negotiator communication. Process oriented and interaction perspective for
the negotiation research using micro level unit for negotiation analyses Should

further be examined (Donohue, 2003).

78

Directions of the future study

A strong interdependence observed between the negotiators in a dyad in
itself is an interesting data. Except for three personality measures, use of
accommodation strategy, use of avoidance strategy, and use of a tactic of
indicating uninvolved and being passive, all the rest of strategies, tactics, and
other satisfaction measures indicated a strong positive intraclass correlation.
Strong intraclass correlations were observed for positive strategy and tactics
(e.g., integrative strategy, showing positivity, seeking information) and also for
negative strategy (e.g., competition strategy, showing negativity, making
aggressive comments). Accommodation and avoidance strategies seemed to be
not reciprocated by the negotiation partner, but so were the case of the rest of
the strategies. This is an interesting insight into reciprocity of communicative
moves in conﬂict and negotiation situation. Differing levels of reciprocity based
on the type of communicative moves and other factors leading to higher
reciprocity would be worth examining.

A substantial percentage of the negotiators reached a distributive solution,
with either unequal distribution or equal distribution (i.e. compromise). This may
be because of the nature of the scenario, which emphasized conﬂict of interest,
regardless of the hidden integrative potential. The other possible reason is the
effectiveness of the fairness argument. In the negotiation session, it seemed that
suggestion or argument for compromising is ovenrvhelmingly effective to win over
the negotiating partner. The apparent ease and fairness of the compromise

solution together with a ﬁxed-sum belief seemed to push negotiators to settle

79

with the compromise solution. The compromising solution might be more
preferable to the unequal distributive solution, however, clearly less than an
integrative solution. Factors pushing people to settle for a compromise solution
rather than trying to negotiate to obtain integrative solution are worth examining.

One reservation for interpreting this study comes from the dynamic nature
of the negotiation. Like studies on conﬂict style, DCT assumes that the
negotiators would use a general strategy throughout one negotiation session.
Naturally, however, some negotiators could shift their general approach
dramatically as the negotiation goes on. It is crucial to understand the interaction
among negotiators and how it inﬂuences negotiation process.

Process-oriented researchers focus their analyses on the effect of
interactions between negotiators and the negotiation processes (McGrath, 1984;
Olekalns, Brett, 8 Weingart, 2003; Putnam, 1990). Oftentimes, micro level unit of
analyses in negotiation such as thought units, utterance units, or negotiation
phase are employed (e.g., Donohue 8 Roberto, 1996; Putnam, 1990; Putnam 8
Wilson, 1989). In the current data, the early stage where negotiators engaged in
the assessment of the relationship and direction of the negotiation seemed
crucial in determining the general approach they would take in the negotiation.
The addition of the negotiation stages or phases in analyses might be able to
complement and strengthen the explanatory power of the Dual Concern Theory.
Combining DCT with the interactionist view of the research using micro level unit

of analyses could be one direction for future study.

80

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

The present study tested Dual Concem Theory in equal power and
unequal power dyad condition. The current data were only partially consistent
with the Dual Concern Theory, which employ two motives as the determinants for
general strategic choices. Various effects of two motives using both manipulated
and measured self-concern and other-concem on different general strategies is
documented.

DCT has been previously tested and empirically Shown to have
explanatory and predictive power (e.g., DeDreu et al., 2000). I believe that the
Dual Concern theory’s exploratory power is intriguing in that it captures the two
most crucial determinants in negotiation, motivation for self-interest and concern
for the other party, which then would explain strategic Choices and outcomes of
negotiation. The DCT can also be tested using different manipulation for self-
concern and in other scenarios to eliminate the potential explanation for the
disconﬁrming data that was obtained in this study.

The use of the integrative strategies were not well predicted in this study
on the basis of the two motives; concern for self and other. However, the present
data evidenced some of the factors that inﬂuence the selection of the integrative

strategy, such as self-report other-concern, being less dogmatic, taking

81

perspective of other, having a need for cognition. The data also indicated
communicative tactics such as emphasizing self-concem, showing other-
concem, seeking information, sharing information, reacting positively, and
indicating problem solving attitude, are associated with an integrative solution.

Positive associations between information exchange behaviors and two
motives (HSC/HOC and MOC) are observed. In addition, information exchange
was Signiﬁcantly positively related with the likelihood of obtaining an integrative
solution. View of the power as corrupting is partially observed as an interaction
effect between power and self-concern leading one to employ competing
strategy. However, the effect of power differentials on the strategic choices and
integrative solution was observed only minimally in the current data set, and its
comprehensive effect on negotiators could further be examined.

Even though a very simple scenario with a fully integrative potential was
employed in the study, only roughly one tenth of the participants achieved
integrative solution for the scenario. Integrative solution is Clearly desirable in
many ways, and beneﬁts of further knowledge on integrative solution are
immeasurable. However, it is not easy for people to achieve an integrative
solution. Further examinations on factors that facilitate us to reach an integrative
solution as well as factors that hinder us to reach an integrative solutions or to

take problem solving orientations are needed.

82

APPENDICES

83

APPENDIX A
FIGURES

84

Figure 1

The Strategic Choices posited by the Dual Concern Model based on concern for
self and concern for other

 

Concern for the other’s outcomes

 

 

 

Figure 2

High

Low

 

Accommodation Collaboration
(Yielding/ Concessions) (Problem solving)

Avoidance Competition
(lnaction/ Withdrawing) (Contending)

 

Low High

Concern for one’s outcomes

 

 

 

 

The Strategic Choices posited by the Dual Concern Model with compromise as a

ﬁfth strategy.

 

Concern for the other’s outcomes

 

 

 

High

Low

 

Accommodation Collaboration
(Yielding/ Concessions) (Problem solving)

Compromise (Compromise)

Avoidance Competition
(lnaction/ Withdrawing) (Contending)

 

Low High

Concern for one’s outcomes

 

 

 

 

85

Figure 3
Distributive dimension and integrative dimension of the negotiation outcomes
explained by self-concern and other-concern.

 

 

 

 

 

 

U)

“2’

O

.3 High Integrative
o dimension
_(D

313

5

O

2

g Distributive
“5 Low dimension
'5

0

C

8

Low High

 

Concern for one outcomes

 

 

 

Figure 4
The examples of negotiation outcomes based on the Dual Concern Model, when
the Peruvian Prune example is used

 

High Dividing resources Integrative Solution
(1/3 or 2/3 of Prunes) (Annual Production of Prunes)

Compromising

 

Concern for the other’s outcomes

 

 

 

 

(Half of Prunes)
Low No agreement Dividing Resources
(Stalemate) ( 2/3 or 1/3 of Prunes)
Low High

 

Concern for one outcomes

 

 

 

86

Figure 5
Frequencies of the negotiation dyads’ (N = 170) outcomes

No Agreement

Distribution

/
31.8%

  
 

Compromise j .

52.4%

\_ Integration
12.4%

87

Figure 6
Frequencies of the negotiator’s (n = 170) strategic choices

Avoidance

2.4%

 

Accomodation Strateg Integrative Strategy

     

o
o 990

o o.
0¢V$¢ 0.4%
0 00¢ coo
o. ooo~
~‘p 60.
o 0.0..
90 ooo‘poc
0.0 .«
~ 00..
¢vbo%%ﬁ3
.0900
o 0000
coo

5.

Competition Strategy
30.8%

Compromise Strategy

52.1%

__1

88

APPENDIX B
TABLES

89

Table 1

Descriptive statistics for the measures included in the study

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

N Mean SD Variance Kurtosis Skewness Items
Self-Report Self 170 3.02 .89 .80 -.46 .11 5
Concern iSSC)
Self-Report Other 170 4.04 .74 .55 .57 -.63 5
Concern (SOC)
Negotiation 170 4.06 1.0 1.06 .91 -1.21 3
Outcome
Satisfaction
Negotiation 170 4.10 .98 .97 .64 -1.11 3
Process
Satisfaction
Relational 170 4.28 .86 .74 1.18 -1.19 3
Satisfaction
Dogmatism Scale 170 1.76 .56 .31 .03 .62 6/11
Perspective- 170 3.86 .56 .31 .11 -.20 6/8
Taking Scale
Need for 170 3.48 .60 .36 -.22 .06 11/15
Cognition Scale

 

90

 

Table 2

Correlations among measures included in the study and reliability (a) in the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

diagonal
MSC MOC OS PS RS DM PT NC
Measured Self (.84)
Concern (MSC)
Measured Other .09 (.99)
Concern (MOC)
Negotiation .04 .45" (.93)
Outcome
Satisfaction (08)
Negotiation .09 .52" .84** (.90)
Process
Satisfaction (PS)
Relational .07 .57“ .64** .77** (.92)
Satisfaction (RS)
Dogmatism -.02 -.35** -.12 -.22** -.19* (.78)
Scale (DM)
Perspective-Taking .09 .27** .12 .16* .13 -.55** (.79)
Scale (PT)
Need for Cognition .31“ .18* .19* .22** .16* -.33** .33** (.85)
Scale (NC)

 

 

** Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

91

 

Table 3
lntraclass correlations and F test results on strategies, tactics, outcome

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

satisfactions, self/other concern, and ersonalih measures
_ 6 F Sig. N
General Integration .89 18.74 .00 337
Strategic Cometition .59 3.95 .00 337
Choices Compromise .76 7.49 .00 337
Accommodation .00 1 .01 .47 337
Avoidance .05 1.13 .22 337
Specific Emphasizing self- .44 2.61 .00 337
Tactics concern
Showing other— .66 4.93 .00 337
concern
Information seekigg .57 3.74 .00 337
Information sharing .82 10.12 .00 337
Positive reactions .73 6.48 .00 337
Negative reactions .76 7.63 .00 337
Aggressive .59 3.91 .00 337
comments
Passive withdrawal -.05 .901 .75 337
Problem soIanQ .85 13.25 .00 337
Outcome Outcome .27 1 .69 .00 339
Satisfaction Satisfaction
Process .36 - 2.18 .00 339
Satisfaction
Relational .54 3.33 .00 339
Satisfaction
Self-report Concern for Self .33 2.00 .00 339
c°"°°"' '°' Concern for Other .34 2.03 .00 339
Self and
Other
Personality DoLmatism .08 1.18 .14 339
Measures Perspective takin -.01 .98 .56 339
Need for Cognition .10 1.22 .10 339

 

Note. 6 = intraclass correlation

92

 

Table 4
Means and standard deviations of self-report competitiveness by four conditions
with varying levels of concern for self and concern for other

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Concern for Other (OC) Marginal
High Low Means
Concern High M = 2.75 M =3.27 M = 3.00
for Self SD = .86 SD = .84 SD = .88
(SC) Low M = 3.01 M = 3.06 M = 3.04
SD = .72 SD = 1.08 SD = .90
Marginal Means M = 2.88 M = 3.16
SD = .80 SD = .97

 

Table 5

Means and standard deviations of self-report cooperativeness by four conditions
with varying levels of concern for self and concern for other

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Concern for Other (OC) Marginal
High Low Means
Concern High M = 4.04 M = 4.07 M = 4.03
for Self SD = .87 SD = .65 SD = .88
(80) Low M = 4.12 M = 3.95 M = 4.05
SD = .72 SD = .71 SD = .74
Marginal Means M = 4.08 M = 4.00
SD = .80 SD = .68

 

93

 

 

Table 6

Distributive statistics on the price (in dollars) per 1% prune share by the types of
agreement: no agreement, distributive solution, equal distribution compromise,
and integrative solution

 

 

 

 

 

 

Types of Price per N SD [Minimum] Maximum
Agreement Prune Share (5) (5) (5)
43)
No Agreement 0 12 0 0 0
Distributive 10595 1 08 7648 0 30769
Solution
Compromise 10399 1 78 2880 0 20000
Integrative 5048 42 216 5000 6000
Agreement
9433 340 5408 0 30769
Total

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 7

Time spent (in minutes) to reach an agreement based on the types of agreement:
no agreement, distributive solution, equal distribution compromise, and
integrative solution

 

 

 

 

 

 

Mean N SD IMinimum1 Maximum
(min.) (min.) (minL (min.)
No 15.6 12 1.36 15.00 18.50
Agreement
Distributive 8.4 108 4.33 2.00 22.00
Solution
Compromise 6.0 178 2.87 1.30 15.00
Integrative 4.4 42 1 .65 2.00 8.00
Solution
6.9 340 3.90 1.30 22.00
Total

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

94

Table 8

Frequencies and percentages of the observed dominant strategies among the
DCT’s ﬁve general strategic choices

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Frequency Percent (°/o)
Integration 16 9.4
Competition 52 30.6
Compromise 88 51 .8
Accommodation 9 5.3
Avoidance 4 2.4

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 9
Correlations among dual concern theory’s ﬁve general strategic choices
Integration Competition CompromiseIAccommodationl Avoidance
(681) (682) (683) (684) (685)
681
682 -.181*
683 -.360** -.506**
684 -.081 -.260** -.130
685 -.083 -.217** -.179* 208*

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

*

Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

** Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

95

 

Table 10
A Hierarchical regression results for MSC, MOC, MSC*MOC as predictor
variables on integrative strategy

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Beta t Sig. F Sig. R
Model (Constant) .917 .362
1 MSC .021 .198 .843 1.785 .174 .272
MOC .202 1 .887 .063
Model (Constant) .910 .365
2 MSC .023 .212 .833 1.272 .290 .273
MOC .202 1.879 .064
MSC*MOC .056 .525 .601

 

Note. MSC = Measured self-concern, MOC = Measured other-concern

N = 86 (Equal Power Condition)

Table 11

A Hierarchical regression results for MSC, MOC, MSC*MOC as predictor
variables on competition strategy

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Beta t Sig. F Sig. R
Model (Constant) 3.005 .003
1 MSC .344 3.441 .001 8.278 .001 .406
MOC -.198 -1.982 .051
Model (Constant) 3.007 .003
2 MSC .341 3.412 .001 5.769 .001 .415
MOC -.198 -1.980 .051
MSC*MOC -.089 -.890 .376

 

Note. MSC = Measured self-concern, MOC = Measured other-concern

N = 86 (Equal Power Condition)

96

 

 

Table 12

A Hierarchical regression results for MSC, MOC, MSC*MOC as predictor
variables on compromise strategy

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Beta t Sig. F Sig. R
Model (Constant) 4.110 .000
1 MSC -.293 -2.835 .006 5.027 .009 .327
MOC .131 1.265 .209
Model Constant) 4.097 .000
2 MSC -.294 -2.838 .006 3.440 .020 .333
MOC .131 1.260 .211
MSC*MOC -.061 -.587 .559
Note. MSC = Measured self-concern, MOC = Measured other-concern
N = 86 (Equal Power Condition)
Table 13
A Hierarchical regression results for MSC, MOC, MSC*MOC as predictor
variables on accommodation strategy
Beta t Sig. F Sig. R
Model (Constant) 4.623 .000
1 MSC -.043 -.405 .687 1.551 .218 .189
MOC -.186 -1.733 .087
Model Constant) 4.794 .000
2 MSC -.036 -.345 .731 3.759 .014 .346
MOC -.186 -1.800 .075
MSC*MOC .290 2.814 .006

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Note. MSC = Measured self-concern, MOC = Measured other-concern

N = 86 (Equal Power Condition)

97

 

 

Table 14

A Hierarchical regression results for MSC, MOC, MSC*MOC as predictor
variables on avoidance strategy

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Beta t Sig. F Sig. R
Model (Constant) 9.306 .000
1 MSC -.267 -2.562 .012 4-105 -020 298
MOC -.148 -1.419 .160
Model Constant) 9.253 .000
2 MSC -.266 -2.540 .013 2.731 .049 .300
MOC -.148 -1.411 .162
MSC*MOC .029 .273 .785

 

Note. MSC = Measured self-concern, MOC = Measured other-concern

N = 86 (Equal Power Condition)

98

 

Table 15

Frequencies and percentages of reaching different types of solution by four

 

 

 

 

 

conditions
HSC/HOC HSC/LOC LSC/HOC LSC/LOC Total
No Agreement 0 4 0 6 10
(0%) (1.2%) (0%) (1.8%) (2.9%)
Distributive 76 69 79 64 288
Agreement (22.4%) (20.3%) (23.2%) (18.8%) (84.7%)
Integ rative 1 2 1 2 6 1 2 42
Agreement (3.5%) (3.5%) (1 8%) (3.5%) (12.4%)
88 85 85 82 340
Total (25.9%) (25.0%) (25.0%) (24.1%) (100.0%

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Note. HSC = High self-concern, LSC = Low self-concern, HOC = High other-
concern, and LOC = Low other-concern

Table 16

Frequencies and percentages of different types of solution by four conditions and

by power difference

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PD HSC/HOC HSC/LOC LSC/HOC LSC/LOC Total
No 0 2 0 4 6
ﬂeement (0%) (1 .1 %) (0%) (2.3%) (3.4%)
Distributive 42 31 41 30 144
Equal Agreement (24.1%) (1 7.8%) (23.6%) (17.2%) (92.8%)
Integrative 6 8 4 6 24
Agreement (3.4%) (4.6%) (2.3%) (3.4%) (13.8%)
48 41 45 40 174
Total (27.6%) (23.6%) (25.9%) (23.0%) (100.0%)
No 0 2 0 2 4
_A_greement (0%) (1 2%) (0%) (1 2%) (2.4%)
Un- Distributive 34 38 38 34 144
equal Agreement (20.5%) (22.9%) (22.9%) (20.5%) (86.7%)
Powen Integrative 6 4 2 6 18
_Agreement (3.6%) (2.4%) (1.2%) (3.6%) (10.8%)
40 44 40 42 166
Total (24.1%) (26.5%) (24.1%) (25.3%) (100.0%)

 

99

 

Table 17

Three-way ANOVA with Self-Concern, Other-Concern, and Power, on Integrative

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Stateev

Sum of df Mean F Sig.

Squares Square
SC .000 1 .000 .001 .97
OC .285 1 .285 .757 .38
DPW .163 1 .163 .434 .51
SC * OC .001 1 .001 .003 .95
SC * DPW .000 1 .000 .000 .99
OC * DPW .001 1 .001 .002 .96
SC * OC * DPW .438 1 .438 1.165 .28
Model .871 7 .124 .331 .93

Residual 60.584 161 .376

 

 

 

 

Note. SC = Self-concern, OC = Other-concern, DPW = Power Differentials

Table 18

Three-way ANOVA with Self-Concern, Other-Concem, and Power, on
Competition Strategi

/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sum of df Mean F Sig.
Squares Square
SC 1 .098 1 1 .098 1.656 .20
00 11.891 1 11.891 17.934 .00
DPW 1.019 1 1.019 1.536 .21
SC * OC .050 1 .050 .075 .78
SC * DPW 4.833 1 4.833 7.290 .01
OC * DPW .229 1 .229 .345 .55
SC * OC * DPW .061 1 .061 .091 .76
Model 19.939 7 2.848 4.296 .000
Residual 106.748 161 .663

 

Note. SC = Self-concern, CC = Other-concern, DPW = Power Differentials

100

 

 

Table 18a
Mean of cells for self-concern (high/low) and Power Difference (equal/unequal)
on comgetition strategy selection

 

 

 

 

 

I Power Difference
Equal Unequal
Concern for Low 1.84 1.68
Self (N = 43) (N = 41)
High 1.66 2.20
(N = 44) (N = 44)

 

 

 

 

 

Table 19
Three-way ANOVA with Self-Concern, Other-Concern, and Power, on
Compromise Strategy

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sum of df Mean F Sig.

Squares Square
SC .000 1 .000 .000 .987
06 16.445 1 16.445 24.127 .000
DPW .341 1 .341 .501 .480
SC * GO .692 1 .692 1.016 .315
SC * DPW .778 1 .778 1.142 .287
OC * DPW .219 1 .219 .321 .572
SC * OC * DPW .047 1 .047 .069 .794
Model 18. 796 7 2. 685 3.940 .001

Residual 109.736 161 .682

 

 

 

Note. SC = Self-concern, OC = Other-concern, DPW = Power Differentials

101

Table 20

Three-way ANOVA with Self-Concern, Other-Concern, and Power, on

Accommodation Strategy

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sum of df Mean F Sig.

Squares Sware
SC .013 1 .013 .053 .818
OC .031 1 .031 .123 .727
DPW .102 1 .102 .410 .523
SC * 00 .010 1 .010 .041 .839
SC * DPW .135 1 .135 .543 .462
OC * DPW .139 1 .139 .559 .456
SC * OC * DPW .125 1 .125 .502 .480
Model .552 7 .079 .316 .946

Residual 40.134 161 .249

 

Note. SC = Self-concern, OC = Other-concem, DPW = Power Differentials

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 21
Three-way ANOVA with Self-Concern, Other-Concern, and Power, on Avoidance
Strategy
Sum of df Mean F Sig.
Squares Square
SC .046 1 .046 .394 .531
00 .058 1 .058 .492 .484
DPW .176 1 .176 1.496 .223
SC * 00 .282 1 .282 2.387 .124
SC * DPW .124 1 .124 1.047 .308
OC * DPW .234 1 .234 1.986 .161
SC * OC * DPW .083 1 .083 .701 .404
Model 1.008 7 .144 1.220 .294
Residual 18.992 161 .118

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Note. SC = Self-concern, OC = Other-concern, DPW = Power Differentials

102

 

 

Table 22

Correlations between integrative solution, speciﬁc tactics, and general strategic

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

choices
Integrative Distributive Compromise No
Agreement Agreement (03) Agreement
(01) (02L (04)

ST1 .24" 0.06 -.27** .18*
ST2 .43" -.34** 0.13 -.26**
ST3 .25“ -0.12 -0.09 0.1
8T4 .48" -0.12 -.23** 0.06
ST5 .37** 0 -.20** -0.1 1
ST6 -0.05 0.07 -.18* .40**
ST7 -0.09 0.1 -.19* .42**
ST8 -0.14 .21" -0.08 -0.07
ST9 .79** -.18** -.33** -0.05
681 .81“ -.19** -.35** -0.02
682 -.16* .39" -.34** .22"
G83 -.29** -.42** .65" -.20**
684 -0.12 0.11 0 -0.06
G85 -0.08 .18** -0.1 -0.04

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Note. 8T1 = emphasizing self-concern, 8T2 = emphasizing other-concern, ST3 =
information seeking, 8T4 = information sharing, ST5 = positive reaction, ST6 =
negative reaction, 8T7 = aggressive comments, 8T8 = passive withdrawal, 8T9
= integrative solution, G81 = integration, 682 = competition, 683 = compromise,
GS4 = accommodation, G85 = avoidance.

103

Table 23
Descriptive statistics on outcome satisfaction, process satisfaction, and relational
satisfaction by the types of agreement achieved

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Outcome Process Relational
Satisfaction Satisfactlon Satisfactlon
No Agreement Mean 2.61 2.95 4.06
(N = 6) so 1.67 1.24 .78
Distributive Solution Mean 4.00 4.03 4.21
(N = 143) so .37 .96 .89
Unequal distributive Mean 3. 59 3. 70 3. 78
(N = 54) so 1.15 1.12 1.00
Equal Distribution / Mean 4.26 4.25 4.46
Compromise (N = 89) so .78 .80 .71
Integrative Solution Mean 4.81 4.89 4.81
(N = 21) so .37 .27 .33
Total Mean 4.05 4.11 4.28
(N = 170) so 1.03 .98 .86
Table 24

Correlations among the Dogmatism Scale, Perspective-Taking Scale, and Need
for Cognition Scale in the lower triangle, and corrected correlations in the upper
triangle

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Dogmatism Perspective Need for
Taking Cognition
, Dogmatism -.67 -.395
Perspective -.524** .356
Satisfaction (339)
Need for -.322** .292“
Cognition (339) (340)

 

 

** Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

104

Table 25
Correlations amogg all the variables of the current study

 

SC

00

SSC

SOC

DPW

ST1

ST2

ST3

3T4

ST5

 

SC

1.00

0.00

-0.02

0.01

0.00

0.07

-0.06

-0.05

-0.01

-0.03

 

CO

0.00

1.00

-0.16*

0.05

-0.06

-0.18*

0.19*

0.02

-0.07

-0.04

 

SSC

-0.02

-0.16*

1.00

0.09

0.12

0.31“

-0.17*

0.04

0.12

-0.03

 

SOC

0.01

0.05

0.09

1.00

-0.04

0.03

0.28"

0.13

0.18*

0.10

 

DPW

0.00

-0.06

0.12

-0.04

1.00

-0.07

0.03

-0.10

-0.01

0.00

 

ST1

0.07

-0.18*

0.31"”r

0.03

-0.07

1.00

-0.11

0.21“

0.46“”r

0.20"

 

ST2

-0.06

0.19*

-0.17*

0.28“

0.03

-0.11

1.00

0.31**

0.32“

0.31"

 

ST3

-0.05

0.02

0.04

0.13

-0.10

0.21"

0.31“

1.00

0.50"

0.20"”r

 

8T4

-0.01

-0.07

0.12

0.18*

-0.01

0.46“

0.32“r

0.50“

1.00

0.38“

 

ST5

-0.03

-0.04

-0.03

0.10

0.00

0.20*

0.31**

0.20“

0.38“

1.00

 

ST6

-0.01

-0.24**

0.33“

-0.14

-0.08

0.34"“r

-0.39**

0.12

0.19*

-0.09

 

ST7

-0.05

-0.24**

0.33"”r

-0.09

-0.08

0.24“

-0.40**

0.04

0.07

-0.07

 

ST8

0.01

0.01

-0.20**

-0.45**

0.07

-0.28**

-0.17*

-0.08

-0.16*

-0.04

 

ST9

0.03

-0.02

0.01

0.26“

-0.03

0.31“

0.45"

0.37"

0.55"

0.41**

 

681

0.00

-0.07

-0.04

0.21“

-0.05

0.29"

0.44*

0.28"

0.50"

0.40"

 

GSZ

0.09

-0.32**

0.36“

-0.11

0.11

0.58"

-0.51**

-0.08

0.04

-0.08

 

683

0.00

0.36“

-0.20**

0.11

-0.07

-0.35**

0.32“

0.04

-0.10

-0.08

 

684

-0.01

0.03

-0.08

-0.18*

-0.05

-0.35**

-0.06

-0.09

-0.22**

-0.11

 

 

GSS

 

0.05

 

-0.06

 

-0.24*

 

-0.27**

 

0.09

 

-0.41**

 

-0.15*

 

-0.08

 

-0.23**

 

-0.06

 

105

 

Table 25 (Cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SC 00 SSC SOC DPW ST1 ST2 ST3 ST4 ST5
01 0.05 -0.06 -0.05 0.24* -0.05 0.24“ 0.43“ 0.25“ 0.48”r 0.37“
02 -0.03 -0.27** 0.14 -0.21* 0.29“ 0.06 -0.34** -0.12 -0.12 0.00
03 0.02 0.36“ -0.17* 0.04 -0.22**-0.27** 0.13 -0.09 -0.23**-0.20**
04 -0.07 -0.20* 0.20" —0.02 -0.06 0.18* -0.26** 0.10 0.06 -0.11
S1 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.45Mr -0.09 -0.10 0.44** 0.06 0.12 0.13
82 -0.06 0.8 0.09 0.52“ -0.03 -0.03 0.41"”r 0.10 0.17* 0.14
S3 -0.06 0.20* 0.07 0.57“ -0.09 -0.04 0.38“ 0.15* 0.21" 0.11
P1 0.10 -0.06 -0.02 -0.35** ~0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.13 -0.13
P2 -0.03 0.00 0.09 0.27“ 0.06 0.12 0.09 0.07 016* 0.13
P3 0.02 0.06 0.31** 0.18* 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.00

 

106

 

Table 25 (Cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ST6 ST7 ST8 ST9 GS1 GSZ 683 684 685
SC -0.01 -0.05 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.09 0.00 -0.01 0.05
CO -0.24** -0.24** 0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.32** 0.36“Ir 0.03 -0.06
SSC 0.33“ 0.33“ -0.20** 0.01 -0.04 0.36“ -0.20* -0.08 -0.24**
SOC -0.14 -0.09 -0.45** 0.26“ 0.21** -0.11 0.11 -0.18* -0.27**
DPW -0.08 -0.08 0.07 -0.03 -0.05 0.11 -0.07 -0.05 0.09
ST1 0.34“ 0.24** -0.28** 0.31 ** 0.29" 0.58“ -0.35** -0.35** -0.41**
ST2 -0.39** -0.40** -0.17* 0.45" 0.44" -0.51** 0.32" —0.06 -0.15
ST3 0.12 0.04 -0.08 0.37“ 0.28“ -0.08 0.04 -0.09 -0.08
ST4 0.19* 0.07 -0.16* 0.55"”r 0.50" 0.04 -0.10 -0.22** -0.23**
ST5 -0.09 -0.07 -0.04 0.41 ** 0.40" -0.08 -0.08 -0.1 1 -0.06
ST6 1.00 0.75** -0.08 -0.04 -0.05 0.40" -0.32** -0.13 -0.04
ST7 0.75" 1.00 -0.06 -0.11 -0.12 0.40** -0.30** -0.11 -0.09
ST8 -0.08 -0.06 1.00 -0.14 -0.10 -0.05 -0.12 0.33“ 0.42"
ST9 -0.04 -0.11 -0.14 1.00 0.91" -0.15* -0.32** -0.12 -0.10
681 -0.05 -0.12 -0.10 0.91 1.00 -0.18* -0.36** -0.08 -0.08
682 0.40“ 0.40" -0.05 -0.15* -0.18* 1.00 -0.52** -0.26** -0.22**
683 -0.32** -0.30** -0.12 -0.32** -0.36** -0.52** 1.00 -0.13 -0.18*
684 -0.13 -0.11 0.33" -0.12 -0.08 -0.26** -0.13 1.00 0.21 **
685 -0.04 -0.09 0.42" -0.10 -0.08 -0.22** -0.18* 0.21" 1.00

 

107

 

 

Table 25 (Cont’d)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ST6 ST7 ST8 ST9 681 682 683 GS4 685
01 -0.05 -0.09 -0.14 0.79" 0.81** -0.16* -0.29** -0.12 -0.08
02 0.07 0.10 0.21“ -0.18* -0.19* 0.39" -0.42** 0.11 018*
03 -0.18* -0.19* -0.08 -0.33** -0.35** -0.34** 0.65“ 0.00 -0.10
04 0.40" 0.42" -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 0.22" -0.20** -0.06 -0.04
S1 -0.36** -0.23** -0.31** 0.23" 0.22" -0.37** 0.27"“Ir -0.02 -0.16*
82 -0.31** -0.20** -0.30** 0.29“ 0.28“ -0.30** 0.24** -0.05 -0.23**
S3 -0.26** -0.15 -0.34** 0.20** 0.20" -0.29** 0.35" -0.23** -0.30**
P1 0.09 0.01 0.20* -0.18* -0.14 -0.09 0.11 0.10 0.08
P2 -0.06 -0.02 -0.11 0.19* 0.17* 0.08 -0.10 -0.12 —0.09
P3 -0.01 0.02 -0.16 0.20 0.13 0.04 -0.08 -0.16* -0.11

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

108

 

 

Table 25 (Cont’d)

 

O1

02

O3

O4

S1

82

S3

P1

P2

P3

 

SC

0.05

-0.03

0.02

-0.07

-0.01

-0.06

-0.06

0.10

-0.03

0.02

 

OC

-0.06

-0.27**

0.36""r

-0.20**

0.03

0.08

0.20“

-0.06

0.00

0.06

 

SSC

-0.05

0.14

-0.17*

0.20“

0.04

0.09

0.07

~0.02

0.09

0.31“

 

SOC

0.24"

-0.21**

0.04

-0.02

0.45"

0.52"

0.57“

-0.35**

0.27**

0.18*

 

DPW

-0.05

0.29**

-0.22**

-0.06

-0.09

-0.03

-0.09

-0.08

0.06

0.07

 

ST1

0.24“

0.06

-0.27**

0.18*

-0.10

-0.03

-0.04

-0.07

0.12

0.10

 

ST2

0.43“

-0.34**

0.13

-0.26**

0.44”

0.41**

0.38“

-0.06

0.09

0.08

 

ST3

0.25“

-0.12

-0.09

0.10

0.06

0.10

0.15*

-0.07

0.07

0.10

 

ST4

0.48"

-0.12

-0.23**

0.06

0.12

0.17*

0.21"

-0.13

0.16*

0.12

 

ST5

0.37“

0.00

-0.20**

-0.11

0.13

0.14

0.11

-0.13

0.13

0.00

 

ST6

-0.05

0.07

-0.18*

0.40"

-0.36**

-0.31**

-0.26**

0.09

-0.06

-0.01

 

ST7

-0.09

0.10

-0.19*

0.42“

-0.23**

-0.20**

-0.15

0.01

-0.02

0.02

 

ST8

-0.14

0.21"

-0.08

-0.07

-0.31**

-0.30**

-0.34**

0.20"

-0.11

-0.16*

 

ST9

0.79“

-0.18*

-0.33**

-0.05

0.23"

0.29“

0.20"

-0.18*

0.19*

0.20“

 

681

0.81**

-0.19*

-0.35**

-0.02

0.22"

0.28"

0.20"

-0.14

0.17*

0.13

 

682

-0.16*

0.39"

-0.34**

0.22"

-0.37**

-0.30**

-0.29**

-0.09

0.08

0.04

 

683

-0.29**

-0.42**

0.65“

-0.20**

0.27"

0.24**

0.35“

0.11

-0.10

-0.08

 

684

-0.12

0.11

0.00

-0.06

-0.02

-0.05

-0.23

0.10

-0.12

-0.16*

 

GSS

 

-0.08

 

0.18*

 

-0.10

-0.04

 

 

-0.16*

-0.23**

 

 

-0.30**

0.08

 

 

-0.09

 

-0.11

 

109

 

Table 25 (Cont’d)

 

O1

02

O3

04

S1

82

S3

P1

P2

P3

 

01

1.00

-0.26**

-0.39**

-0.07

0.28“

0.30"

0.23"

-0.14

0.15*

0.08

 

02

-0.26**

1.00

~0.72**

-0.13

-0.31**

-0.29**

-0.39**

-0.11

0.06

0.05

 

O3

~0.39**

~0.72**

1.00

-0.20

0.21"

0.15*

0.23"

0.21*

-0.16*

-0.08

 

04

-0.07

-0.13

-0.20**

1.00

-0.27**‘

-0.23**

-0.05

-0.03

0.04

-0.07

 

S1

0.28“

-0.31**

0.21"

-0.27**

1.00

0.84“

0.64"

-0.12

0.12

0.19**

 

82

0.30“

-0.29**

0.15*

-0.23**

0.84“

1.00

0.77**

-0.22**

0.16*

0.23“

 

S3

0.23“

-0.39**

0.23"

-0.05

0.64“

0.77**

1.00

-0.19**

0.13

0.16*

 

P1

-0.14

-0.11

0.21"

-0.03

-0.12

-0.22**

-0.19*

1.00

-0.55**

(0.33"

 

P2

015*

0.06

-0.16*

0.04

0.12

0.16*

0.13

-0.55**

1.00

0.33"

 

 

P3

 

0.08

 

0.05

-0.08

 

-0.07

 

0.19

 

0.23“r

 

0.16*

 

-0.33**

 

0.33"

 

1.00

 

 

 

Note. SC = Self Concern, CC = Other Concern, SSC= Self-report Self Concern,
SOC = Self-report Other Concern, ST1 = emphasizing self-concern, ST2 =
emphasizing other-concern, ST3 = information seeking, ST4 = information
sharing, 8T5 = positive reaction, ST6 = negative reaction, ST7 = aggressive
comments, ST8 = passive withdrawal, 8T9 = integrative solution, G81 =

integration, G82 = competition, G83 = compromise, GS4 = accommodation, GSS

= avoidance, 01 = Integrative Solution, 02 = Distributive Solution, 03 =
Compromise, 04 = no agreement, 81 = Outcome Satisfaction, 82 = Process
Satisfaction, 83 = Relational Satisfaction, P1 = Dogmatism, P2 = Perspective-
taking, P3 = Need for Cognition.

110

APPENDIX C
Pre-negotiation documents, instructions, and negotiation props

111

Appendix C.1
Consent form
Negotiation behavior and its outcomes

The purpose of this study is to examine the negotiation behaviors. You will be given a
scenario, and you are going to engage in a negotiation. The total time needed is approximately 30
minutes. You will be given the maximum of 15 minutes to negotiate, and then asked answer the
brief surveys.

We would like to videotape your negotiation, if that is acceptable with you. You can
choose to be or not to be tape-recorded. If you choose not to be videotaped, an alternative study
for equal credits is available. All negotiation behaviors and answers to the surveys will be
CONFIDENTIAL. We simply are interested in analyzing the negotiation behaviors, and data will
only be analyzed in aggregate level by authorized researchers. We will keep your identity
conﬁdential, without disclosing any information, which might lead to reveal your identity. The
videotapes will be erased, once the study is complete. Your privacy will be protected to the
maximum extent allowable by law.

Participation in this study is completely voluntary and you may withdraw your consent to
participate at any time with no penalty. There are no risks anticipated by participating in this
study. While this study is not expected to yield any immediate beneﬁt to the individual
participants, it will contribute to our knowledge about human behavior.

If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a human subject, please
feel free to contact:
Ashir Kumar, M.D.,
University Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects (UCRIHS)
Michigan State University, 246 Administration Bldg.,
East Lansing, MI 48823; 517-355-2180 / ucrihs@msu.edu

 

If you are interested in the results of the study or have any questions or concerns, please
call or e-mail one of the following investigators. You have the right to receive an explanation of
the study to your satisfaction.

Sachi M. Shearrnan: Telz517-355-2165 / morinaga@msu.edu
Timothy R. Levine: Tel: 517-432-1 124 / levinet@msu.edu

 

 

I voluntarily agree to participate in this project by signing below.

 

 

 

 

I agree to have my interview video recorded. Yes No
Print your name Negotiator ID
Your signature Date

112

Appendix 02
An instruction for the negotiator (Mash) in high self-concem, high other-concern,
and equal power condition

Peruvian Prune Negotiator

Please read the following negotiation role very carefully.

You are a researcher at the Biomedical technology ﬁrm located in San Jose, California. You have
been working to develop a new drug that can signiﬁcantly reduce blood cholesterol levels and
cholesterol buildup in their bodies. This new drug could treat high-cholesterol-risk Americans,
who suffers high risk of heart attack as well as millions of people around the world, if you are
successful in developing this product.

The substance for this drug can only be found in the Peruvian Prune, which grows on trees in
certain parts of Peru. The trees are in a deserted and remote part of the country, making them
highly inaccessible for harvesting. All efforts to transplant trees to the different regions of the
world where production would be easier and cheaper have failed. There seems to be some
combination of the trees themselves and the quality of the agricultural and weather conditions that
only allow the trees to thrive in this area. Moreover, efforts expand the production in this area
have been unsuccessful, since the climate and soil conditions appear to change just enough in
neighboring regions to yield healthy trees but no fruit!!!

The process for obtaining the substance from the prunes requires picking them, washing them,
and then extracting the pulp (“meat”) from the prunes. This pulp “mash” is then biochmically
treated through genetic engineering processes to develop a new treatment drug. It had been
estimated that the mash extract of an entire harvest would be sufﬁcient to produce enough
compound to treat more than 50,000 high-cholesterol-risk people.

You have learned that a researcher in other department of your ﬁrm also wants to buy prunes.
You have met the researcher before and you anticipate that you are going to interact with him for
future research collaboration. You are going to have a meeting from now with him/her to
negotiate at the same time in front of the Peruvian dealer.

You were assigned as a negotiator to obtain prunes for your research project and are accountable
to your company for the result of the negotiation. You have been authorized by your ﬁrm to
spend up to $ 2 million to obtain the prunes. Naturally, of course, you do not want to spend all
your money and want to have a good deal on prunes.

Please remember that it is very important for you to be concerned both with your own goals and
with the goals of the other negotiator. After all, you both work for the same company.
Negotiation should be problem solving between two parties. So, work cooperatively, but also be
sure to get a good deal for your self.

113

Appendix C.3
An instruction for the negotiator (Pits) in high self-concern, high other-concern,
and equal power condition

Peruvian Prune Negotiator

Please read the following negotiation role very carefully.

You are a researcher at the Biochemical technology ﬁrm located in San Jose, California. You
have been working to develop methods to increase production of the world’s food supply in
fertile soil and drought areas. This new soil additive could help advance farmers efﬁciency in
certain part of United States as well as to help millions of people around the world where they
suffer malnutrition and starvation, if you are successﬁJl in developing this product.

This new substance can only be found in the Peruvian Prune, which grows on trees in certain
parts of Peru. The trees are in a deserted and remote part of the county, making them highly
inaccessible for harvesting. All efforts to transplant trees to the different regions of the world
where production would be easier and cheaper have failed. There seems to be some combination
of the trees themselves and the quality of the agricultural and weather conditions that only allow
the trees to thrive in this area. Moreover, efforts expand the production in this area have been
unsuccessful, since the climate and soil conditions appear to change just enough in neighboring
regions to yield healthy trees but no fruit!!!

The process for obtaining the substance from the prunes requires picking them, washing them,
and then extracting and grinding the pits of the prunes into a ﬁne powder. This grounded prune
pit power will be processed to develop the new soil additive. It had been estimated that the
powder from the pits of an entire harvest would be sufﬁcient to produce enough soil additive to
reclaim the land that would support a population of 50,000 people.

You have learned that a researcher in the other department of your ﬁrm also wants to buy prunes.
You have met the researcher before and you anticipate that you are going to interact with him for
future research collaboration. You are going to have a meeting from now with him/her to
negotiate at the same time in front of the Peruvian dealer.

You were assigned as a negotiator to obtain prunes for your research project and are accountable
to your company for the result of the negotiation. You have been authorized by your ﬁrm to
spend up to $ 2 million to obtain the prunes. Naturally, of course, you do not want to spend all
your money and want to have a good deal on Prunes.

Please remember that it is very important for you to be concerned both with your own goals and
with the goals of the other negotiator. After all, you both work for the same company.
Negotiation should be problem solving between two parties. 80, work cooperatively, but also be
sure to get a good deal for yourself.

114

Appendix C.4
Instruction for the confederate, Peruvian prune dealer

Peruvian Prune Dealer
Please read the following negotiation role very carefully.

You work for the World Peru 00., a major import/export company in Peru.
Your company deals with the rare and precious Peruvian Prunes directly from
farmers in a remote region of the Andes Mountains.

You have learned that two researchers are interested in buying the entire
annual yield of Prunes for their research respectively. The two researchers are
from leading Biochemical and Biomedical research ﬁrms (they could be from the
different company or different department of the same company) in the United
States.

Your goal is to sell the entire annual yields of Prunes for the maximum
proﬁts without inﬂuencing the negotiators in any way. Currently, there are two
buyers who offered the best deal for you, minimum $1 million for 100% share of
annual harvest of the Prunes. At this negotiation table, therefore, you can start
selling at $100,000 per 10% shares and $1mil|ion for 100% share.

0 You are given up to 15 minutes to reach an agreement on the amount of
Prunes to sell and prices for the Prunes with both or one of the
researchers. Please cut off and end their session, 15 minutes is passed
after the negotiation is started!

0 You are allowed to sell by 5% increments out of 100% annual harvest of
Peruvian Prunes.

0 You always have to take best offer. Often, best offer can be judged in
terms of price, but you can consider lowering the price when they offer you
the alternative creative offers (e.g., advertising Peruvian prunes, sharing
the research information, etc.) that has some value for your company.

0 When two people are competing for the Prunes, please let them discuss.
You should NOT determine which side to take! You can only provide
neutral response such as, “You both offer me the same amount of price,”
or “You guys both have a great cause too.” It is entirely acceptable for
them to not being able to reach an agreement within the given time.

0 Do NOT inﬂuence the buyers in any way. Please be passive as much as
possible. Do NOT “milk” buyers or try to up the prize.

At the completion of the negotiation, you will be in charge of ﬁlling out the
negotiation outcomes. Thank you very much for your cooperation.

115

Appendix C.5
Negotiation Props: Dollars

 

One Hundred Thousand Dollars

$ 100, 000

 

 

 

 

 

Fifty Thousand Dollars

 

 

 

 

116

Appendix 06
Negotiation Props: Prune Shares

 

    
  
    
 

 

5% Prune Share

 

 

 

10%Prune Share

 

 

117

APPENDIX D
Post-negotiation documents

118

Appendix D.1
Post-negotiation Questionnaire for Negotiators

Negotiator ID __

Post-negotiation Questionnaire

I. We would like to ask you some questions regarding the negotiation outcome and
satisfaction. Please answer following questions about negotiation outcome by circling
the number that ﬁts you most.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Not at Not so Neu- Some- Very
all much tral what much
50

1. How satisﬁed are you with the 1 2 3 4 5
outcome of the negotiation?

2. How happy are you with the terms of 1 2 3 4 5
the agreement?

3. How satisfactory is your negotiation 1 2 3 4 5
outcome in general?

4. How satisﬁed are you with the process 1 2 3 4 5
of negotiation?

5. How content are you with how you 1 2 3 4 5
reached an agreement?

6. How happy are you with how you and l 2 3 4 5
your jartner deal with the problem?

7. The relationship between you and your 1 2 3 4 5
partner in negotiation was extremely
positive.

8. You and your partner had a positive 1 2 3 4 5
atmosphere throughout the
negotiation.

9. Overall, you and your partner had a 1 2 3 4 5
good interaction in the negotiation.

 

II. We would like to ask you how you think YOU acted in negotiation setting. Please answer
followig questions about negotiation outcome by circling the number that ﬁts you most.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Not at Not so Neu- Some- Very
all much tral what much
SO
1. How tough do you think you were in 1 2 3 4 5
the negotiation?
2. How competitive were you in the 1 2 3 4 5
negotiation?
3. How aggressive were you at the 1 2 3 4 5
negotiation?
4. How strongly did you pursue your own 1 2 3 4 5
goals in the negotiation?

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

119

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

negotiation?

 

 

 

 

 

5. How hard did you try to out bargain the 1 2 3 4 5
other negotiator?

6. How cooperative were you at the 1 2 3 4 5
negotiation?

7. How collaborative were you at the 1 2 3 4 5
negotiation?

8. How approachable were you at the 1 2 3 4 5
neatiation?

9. How accommodating were you at the 1 2 3 4 5
negotiation?

10. How obliging were you at the 1 2 3 4 5

 

III. We would also like to ask you what you thought about YOUR PARTNER was acting
at the negotiation. Please answer following questions about negotiation outcome by
circling the number that ﬁts you most.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

partner was?

 

 

 

 

 

Not at Not so Neu- Some- Very
all much tral what much so

1. . How tough did you think your partner 1 2 3 4 5
was?

2. How competitive did you think your 1 2 3 4 5
partner was?

3. How aggressive did you think your 1 2 3 4 5
partner was?

4. How strongly did you think your 1 2 3 4 5
partner pursued his/her own goals in the
negotiation?

5. How hard did you did you think your 1 2 3 4 5
partner try to out bargain the other
negotiator?

6. How cooperative did you think your 1 2 3 4 5
partner was?

7. How collaborative did you think your 1 2 3 4 5
partner was?

8. How approachable did you think your 1 2 3 4 5
partner was?

9. How accommodating did you think 1 2 3 4 5
your partner was?

10. How obliging did you think your 1 2 3 4 5

 

120

 

 

IV. Please answer the following questions regarding your communication style by using
the scale below. Please circle the number that ﬁts you best when 1 = strongly disagree, 2
= disagree, 3 = neutral, 4 = agree, and 5 = strongly disagree.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SD D N A SA
1. People who disagree with me are 2 3 4 5
usually wrong.
2. Having multiple perspectives on an 1 2 3 4 5
issue is usually desirable.
3. There is a single correct way to do 1 2 3 4 5
most of things.
4. Diversity of opinion and background 1 2 3 4 5
is valuable in any group or
organization.
5. It is important to be open to different 1 2 3 4 5
points of view.
6. I am a “my way or the highway” 1 2 3 4 5
type of person.
7. There are often many different 1 2 3 4 5
acceptable ways to solve a problem.
8. I consider myself to be very open- 1 2 3 4 5
minded.
9. Different points of views should be 1 2 3 4 5
encouraged.
10. People who are very different from 1 2 3 4 5
us can be dangerous.
11. I am “set in my ways.” 1 2 3 4 5
12. Before I criticize somebody, I try to 1 2 3 4 5
imagine how I would feel in their
place.
13. I sometimes try to understand my 1 2 3 4 5
friends better by imagining how
things look from their perspective.
14. I believe that there are two sides to 1 2 3 4 5
every question and try to look at
them both.
1 5. I try to look at everybody’s side of a 1 2 3 4 5
disagreement before I make a
decision.
1 6. When I’m upset at someone, I l 2 3 4 5
usually try to “put myself in his/her
; shoes” for a while.

 

 

121

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SD A SA

17. Sometimes I ﬁnd it difﬁcult to see 1 4 5
things from the other person’s point of
view.

18. IfI am sure I am right about 1 4 5
something, I don’t waste much time
listening to other people’s arguments.

19. I would prefer complex to simple 1 4 5
goblems.

20. I like to have the responsibility of 1 4 5
handling a situation that requires a lot
of thinking.

21. Thinking is not my idea of fun. 4 5

22. I would rather do something that 4 5
requires little thought than something
that is sure to challenge my thinking
abilities.

23. I try to avoid situations where I will 1 4 5
have to think in depth about something

24. For the most part, I only think as hard 1 4 5
as I have to.

25. I prefer to think about short-term 1 4 5
projects to long-term ones.

26. I like tasks that require little thought 1 4 5
once I’ve learned them.

27. I really enjoy a task that involves 1 4 5
coming up with new solutions to
problems.

28. Learning new ways to think doesn’t I 4 5
excite me very much.

29. I prefer my life to be ﬁlled with l 4 5

uzzles that I must solve.

30. The notion of thinking abstractly is l 4 5
appealing to me.

31. I would prefer a task that is intellectual 1 4 5
to one that does not require much
thought.

32. I feel relief rather than satisfaction 1 4 5
after completing a task that required a
lot of mental effort.

33. It’s enough for me that something gets 1 4 5

 

the job done; I don’t care how or why
it works.

 

 

 

 

 

 

122

 

V. Finally, we would like to ask you information about you.

 

Your gender: 1) Male 2) Female

Your age: years old

Ethnicity:
l) Caucasian/White 4) Asian American 7) Asian
2) African American/Black 5) Native American 8) Mixed
3) Hispanic American 6) Paciﬁc Islander 9) Other

 

Thank you very much for your participation!

If you have any comments regarding the negotiation or the survey, please feel free to
write them down in the space below.

 

 

 

 

 

123

Appendix D.2
Post-negotiation Report for the confederate

Post-Negotiation Report

 

 

 

NEGOTIATOR lD# 8.

1. Did they reach an agreement? 1. YES 2. NO
2. How long did they take to reach an agreement? Minutes
3. Could they ﬁnd the integrative solution? 1. YES 2. NO

4. How long did they take to ﬁnd that their interests are not incompatible?

Minutes

 

5. How many times did negotiators offer you? Times

 

6. Please let us know the agreement the two negotiators reached. Please be
speciﬁc and let us know what you gained and what your partner negotiator
gained.

Peruvian Prune Dealer

% Prunes Sold
Dollars earned

 

 

Negotiator A:

% Prunes Obtained
Dollars Spent

 

 

Negotiator B:

% Prunes Obtained
Dollars Spent

 

 

Speciﬁc Terms besides what are achieved:

 

 

 

 

124

Appendix D.3
Debrieﬁng Statement

Negotiation behavior and its outcomes

This negotiation game was a part of research to examine the factors affecting
information seeking behaviors, problem solving behaviors, and outcomes in negotiation
when there is the ﬁll] integrative potential.

Distributive negotiation refers to win-lose approach to the negotiation, where one
party gains and the other party loses. Alternatively, the negotiation with the integrative
potential refers to the negotiation where it is possible to have a mutually satisfying
solution with both parties’ interests being met. The negotiation game you just completed
had complete integrative potential, because one of you wanted to have pits of prunes,
while the other wanted to obtain mash of prunes. If you had engaged in information
exchange as to which parts of the prunes each of you want, you would be able to ﬁnd an
integrative solution.

We wanted to examine factors that inﬂuence the information exchange behaviors,
distributive strategies, integrative strategies, and outcomes in negotiation. Speciﬁcally,
the scenarios were intended to induce different level of motivation and power level. This
study, therefore, examines whether two motives (self-concern and other-concern) and
power inﬂuence information seeking behaviors, problem-solving behaviors and the
integrative agreement as posited in the Dual Concern Theory.

If you prefer your videotaped negotiation not to be used at this point, please let
the experimenter or the research assistants know about it.

If you have any questions about your role and rights as a participant of research,
please contact Dr. Ashir Kumar, University Committee on Research Involving Human

Subjects (UCRH-IS) at Michigan State University by calling 517-355-2180 or emailing
ucrihs@msu.edu.

For any further questions, concerns, or cormnents, regarding this study, please

feel free to contact Sachi Shearrnan at morinaga@msu.edu / 355-2165 (Ofﬁce: 552
CAS), Dr. Tim Levine at levinet@msu.edu / (517) 432-1124 (Ofﬁce: 482 CAS) or ask

the experimenter in the lab.

Thank you very much for your participation!

125

Appendix E
Coding sheet and coding schemes

126

Appendix E.1
Coding Sheet for Negotiation Strategies and Tactics

Coder’s Name (Coder #)

Dyad ID

Negotiation Coding Sheet

 

Condition

Tape #

Negotiator: A or B Location: L or R

Speciﬁc Tactics: Please circle the one that describes the how much these following

behaviors were present in each negotiation session, choosing the number from 1 to 5,

when 1 = not at all present, 2= somewhat present, 3 = moderately present, 4 = fairly
resent, and 5 = very much present.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Not at Some- Moder- Fairly Very
all what ately present much
present present present present
1. Concern for Self 1 2 3 4 5
2. Concern for Other 1 2 4 5
3. Information Seeking 1 2 3 4 5
4. Information Sharing 1 2 3 4 S
5. Positive Reaction 1 2 3 4 5
6. Negative Reaction 1 2 3 4 5
7. Aggressive Comments 1 2 3 4 5
8. Passive Withdrawal 1 2 3 4 5
9. Problem Solving Orientation 1 2 3 4 5
10. Other (If any, please write):

 

General Strategies: Please rate each one of the ﬁve categories based on how dominant
or present each strategy was during the negotiation session, when 1 = not at all present, 2
= moderately present, and 3 = very much dominant.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Not at all Moderately Very much
present Present dominant
1. Integration / Problem Solving 1 2 3
2. Competition / Contending 1 2 3
3. Compromise 1 2 3
4. Accommodation / Yielding 1 2 3
5. Avoidance / Withdrawing 1 2 3
6. Other (If any, please write):

 

 

127

 

Appendix E.2
Coding Scheme: Deﬁnitions and Examples

Coding Scheme: Deﬁnitions and Examples

Please be familiar with the deﬁnition for each strategy and tactic. Examples and
deﬁnitions for each are provided. You will be coding one negotiator at a time, based on a
negotiator’s behavior toward the other negotiator during the negotiation session. Speciﬁc
tactic coding is based on the frequency and intensity of a used tactic, while general
strategy is based on the general presence and dominance of a strategy.

1. Concern for Self: High concem for self has two elements. 1) Wanting to have Prunes
as much as possible. For example, attempting to obtain the entire Prune share (100%)
would be demonstrating high self-concern, while wanting to have at least a quarter (25%)
would be low self-concern. 2) Insisting strongly and persistently to obtain the Prunes.
High concern for self would be expressed by emphasizing one’s own interests, goals, and
positions, or insisting that their needs should be met, and that it’s more important than the
other negotiator’s need. Contrary, low concern for self would be characterized with the
low aspiration or not insisting on and giving up what they want.

 

 

Examples:
Amount:
High Self o I need to have all of the Prunes for my research.
Concern o How about 70-30? How about I get 75% and you get 25%.
I o I would like to have at least half of the Prunes.
o I would be happy to have just half.
0 Could I have 10% of the Prunes?
Low Self 0 You win. You can have them all if you like.
Concern

 

 

 

 

Emphasis on their needs:

High Self a I really believe that I should get all the prunes because I can

Concern save a lot more people than you can.

0 My research is more important than yours, as my research is
proven to be successful.

0 Don’t you think starvation is more important than the

 

 

 

 

cholesterol?
LOW Self 0 Maybe my issue is not as important as yours, because they
Concern (high cholesterol patients) should just exercise more.

 

128

2. Concern for Other: High concern for others has two elements. 1) Indicating that
negotiators are a team and they are working together to achieve the same goal. 2)
Showing recognition, understanding, and empathy on other negotiator’s claims, needs, or
positions. Contrary, low concern for other is characterized by the emphasis on
competition, ignoring, or disregarding the claim or need of the other negotiator.

 

Examples:

“We”, “us”, and a team
High Self c We are working on the future, aren’t we working for the same
Concern company, right?

 

0 We are on the same team, the dealer is just trying to scam up.
0 I think we need to discuss before we talk to the dealer.
0 We will combine/collaborate our research in some way.
Low Self o No, we are from different ﬁrms and we are against each other.
Concern .

You are saying “we,” but we two different parties.

 

 

 

Showing understanding

 

High Self 0 I understand that your research is important.
Concern o I see what you mean... You are also helping people too?
0 I think you should have some prunes too.
I 0 My ﬁrm can do better job than you do.
0 There is no proof that your research works.
Low Self o Ignoring the other, disregarding what’s said.
Concern

 

 

 

 

3. Information Seeking: High level of information seeking behavior is characterized by
a negotiator asking for information about other’s interest, position, research process, and
anything related to the topic. Low level of information seeking is characterized with the
negotiators who never ask questions, be rather quiet, or talk only limited issues of
negotiation. Focus only on the information seeking to other negotiator (buyer) and not
the information seeking to the dealer.

 

High 0 What do you need the Prunes for? / What are you trying to do
with it? / How much do you need it? / Do you need all of them? /
How much would you like to spend? / Why do you need them? /
What is your research for? / What processes are involved with
using Prunes? / How many people can you save with your
research?

LOW - Not asking any questions to the other negotiator.

 

 

 

 

129

4. Information Sharing: Providing information about your own interest, position,
research process, and anything related to research. Low information sharing is
characterized with rejection of answering to a question and dismissal to share their
information.

 

High 0 I need prunes, but all I really need is pits (or mashes) of prunes.
I need the prunes to make drugs. The cause of our research is to
save people who have high cholesterol.

Well, I do have enough money, but don’t want to spend all of it.
I don’t think I am supposed to tell you that.

The information is conﬁdential, so I cannot tell you.

Hey, don’t tpyto look at what’s in my pocket.

 

 

Low

 

5. Positive reaction: Creating positive atmosphere (e. g., greeting, introducing
themselves, shaking hands), showing positive affects (e. g., use of positive tone of voice,
engaging in the task, smiling, joking), and indicating positive reactions to the other buyer,
other’s statements, ideas, or arguments. Contrary, the low level of positivity would be

. categorized as neutrality without showing much sign of positive reaction.

 

 

High 0 Hi, I am Nick from a Biochemical ﬁrm in San Jose, CA. It is very
nice to meet you. (Greetings with shaking hands, Smiling, etc.)
Listening to others carefully and rephrasing what other said.
Welcoming posture, smiling and laughs.

Prunes would give you diarrhea. (J oking)

You’ve got to trust me on this, like you would on Ebay. (J oking)
Being neutral, indifferent to what others’ are saying.

 

 

Low

 

 

6. Negative Reaction: Creating negative atmosphere (e.g., interrupting other’s statement,
ignoring others’ comments), showing negative affects (e.g., use of negative tone of voice,
etc.), and indicating negative reactions to the other buyer, other’s statements, ideas, or
arguments. High level of negativity is characterized with many of the negative
indicators, while low level of negativity is characterized with the neutrality without the
negative reactions.

 

High 0 You are lying!!! Don’t listen to her. (To dealer)
0 Excuse me? What did you say? (Ignoring what others said, and
asking back impolitely.)
0 You are saying “we” but we are two different parties! (Using a
negative tone of voice)
I don’t think your drug will be safe. What about the side effect?

L Using neutral expression and reaction to the other negotiator.
ow

 

 

 

 

130

7. Aggressive comments: Threatening the other negotiator to appeal to the power,
indicating the potential of using the power, or using personal attacks.

 

High 0 Well, I don’t care what you want, I am about to buy all of them.
I have more money than you do, so you know that I can out bit
you. I CAN buy it all if I want to!! (Threatening the other. )
o I will pay $100,000 more than whatever he is paying. (Ignoring
what others said.)
“Assuming that your research works”!!! (implying that it doesn’t)
Low 0 Not appealing to the power or the personal attacks.

 

 

 

 

8. Passive withdrawal: Withdrawing physically or psychologically, walking away from
the negotiation, or giving up to continue negotiation. Individuals who just accept what
others suggested, followed whatever others are saying, and also not interested in pursuing
their goal future.

 

High Being quiet for the whole time.

Since you have more money, I cannot do anything.

I cannot match your offer, so you win.

Okay, that’s ﬁne. I don’t really care what you do. (Just agreeing
to what other buyer are suggesting.)

Actively involving in the negotiation.

 

 

Low .

 

 

9. Problem Solving Orientations: Dealing with negotiation as if it is a problem solving,
attempting to ﬁnd a mutually satisfactory solution in some way, being persistent in search
for being creative. Not giving up on ﬁnding a way to “solve” the problem not to just
“deal with” the problem.

 

Hi 0 Could we do the collaboration research in some way so we could
make some sort of contract on this together?

0 If you need pits, I need mash of the prunes, so can we work
something out?
Why don’t you take next year’s harvest? Can we take turns?
We have to ﬁgure out the ways that we can work together to share
this Prunes. There should be a way so we both get some of them.

I No indication of attempting to ﬁnd a mutually satisfactory
solution or a creative offer.

 

 

 

 

10. Possible other strategies: Any other strategies observed in the negotiation that are
not clearly categorized as ones above.

131

General Strategy Categorization: There are ﬁve categories for general strategy:
integration, competition, compromising, accommodation, and avoidance. Please select a
dominant strategy that is used by one negotiator. If the other strategies are present, or
moderately used, please indicate such.

 

General
Stratgy

Definition

 

1 Integration /
Problem-Solving
Approach

This general strategy is characterized by the problem-solving
attitude, attempting to deal with the issue hoping to ﬁnd a
mutually acceptable agreement. Negotiators would engage in
information exchange behavior, create positive relationship
with one another, and search for the possible options to solve
the problem.

 

2 Competition /
Contending

This general strategy is categorized by the competition against
other negotiators, attempting to obtain what they want. They
often insist on their needs and goals, not giving as much
regards to other’s needs and goals in negotiation. Negotiators
would pursue their interests, by emphasizing self-interest,
justify their positions, needs, and interests and ignoring those
of other’s.

 

3 Compromising

This general strategy is characterized by the compromising
what they want in some way, while at the same time
requesting the other to do the same. Negotiators would
attempt to or suggest dividing the resources with each other
and taking equal responsibility for the costs.

 

4 Accommodation
/ Yielding

This general strategy is characterized by neutral acceptance of
the other’s way of dealing with problem. Negotiators would
quietly accept, concede, yield to, give in, or accommodate
other’s needs or interests, the other’s suggestions, or other’s
argument, rather than focusing, proposing, or insisting on
one’s own.

 

5 Avoidance /
Withdrawing

 

 

 

This general strategy is characterized by the passive,
withdrawal behaviors by the negotiator. Negotiators would
demonstrate passive moves, such as showing lack of interests,
giving up on the negotiation, and withdrawing from the
negotiation.

 

132

 

 

 

References

Aboud, F. E. (1976). Social development aspects of language. Papers in
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