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THE *THIRD CHIMURENGA?* STATE TERROR AND STATE ORGANIZED VIOLENCE IN ZIMBABWE'S COMMERCIAL FARMING COMMUNITIES

By

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A DISSERTATION

Submitted to
Michigan State University
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Sociology

2004

ABSTRACT

THE *THIRD CHIMURENGA*? STATE TERROR AND STATE ORGANIZED VIOLENCE IN ZIMBABWE'S COMMERCIAL FARMING COMMUNITIES

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The purpose of this dissertation is to examine state terror and state organized violence associated with the land invasions prior to the parliamentary elections of 2000 in Zimbabwe. My primary research question is "under what conditions are different people exposed to different kinds of state terror and violence?" To that end, the dissertation focuses on commercial farming communities, the first targets of violence in Zimbabwe, as they represented a critical logistical and ideological lens with which to frame the violence as the *Third Chimurenga* or a popular uprising for land. Using a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, I ask four questions about this violence: (1) How does the state perpetuate its own interests through the use of state terror? (2) How does "the routinization of terror" function? (3) How do people in different social locations experience violence and terror differently? and (4) How do people in different social locations strategize under conditions of fear and insecurity?

Following the defeat of the Government of Zimbabwe supported draft constitutional referendum in February of 2000, veterans of Zimbabwe's liberation war began invading white-owned commercial farms. I argue that these invasions were part of an electoral strategy of the ruling party, ZANU-PF, who feared the emergent MDC in the coming parliamentary elections due to the declining popularity of ZANU-PF and President Mugabe. The Commercial Farmers Union, in an attempt to protect its members and ensure its own organizational survival, responded to the violence in ways which both

alienated its members and increased the vulnerability of farm workers. Ultimately, both farmers' and farm workers' experiences with state terror and violence, survival strategies, and the conditions implicated in their exposure to violence were all mediated by the race and gender hierarchy in Zimbabwe. Exposure to violence was mediated by conditions such as (1) the ecology of the farm, (2) normative social structures, (3) employment hierarchies, (4) proportional representation within the electorate, (5) political affiliation, (6) organizational access to resources and (7) geography.

This dissertation is dedicated to the memories of Christopher Vanderpool (!943-2001)
and Ruth Sims Hamilton (1937-2003).

ACKNOWLEDEMENTS

deeper in my analysis. I am thankful for his insights. I am very grateful to Dr. Aronoff who joined my committee late in my dissertation process. Dr. Aronoff provided critical feedback and suggestions for future publications. I am eternally in debt to Dr. Metzler, whose knowledge as a Zimbabwe scholar brought additional rigor and fine-tuning to my dissertation. Dr. Metzler has been a source of support throughout my years at MSU and it was a pleasure to work with him.

Dr. Christopher Vanderpool (1943-2001) joined my committee during my first year as a graduate student after I took a course from him in Classical Theory. From that point on, Dr. Vanderpool was a champion in my corner, providing critical feedback on grant proposals, and letters of recommendation whenever needed. He was never too busy to give advice, review something I had written, despite all the pressures on his time as Department Chair for most of the years I knew him. Dr. Vanderpool had a strong academic interest in political violence and had researched and written on the topic for many years. This dissertation is dedicated in part to him. Dr. Vanderpool's passing was and is a great loss to the Department of Sociology at MSU.

My dissertation is also dedicated to Dr. Ruth Sims Hamilton (1937-2003), who joined my committee following the death of Dr. Vanderpool in 2001. I first became academically engaged with Dr. Hamilton several years earlier through a course on Race and Politics. Later, I worked for Dr. Hamilton as a teaching assistant. Dr. Hamilton treated her students with respect and demanded the best from them. In her course, I worked hard, but learned immensely. Dr. Hamilton was an incredible teacher, offered intensive feedback, and had critical insight into thinking about race and ethnicity. I

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACHPR	African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
BSAC	British South Africa Company
CA	Communal Area
CAT	Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
CC	Constitutional Commission
CFU	Commercial Farmers Union
CIO	Central Intelligence Agency
GAPWUZ	General Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe
GOZ	Government of Zimbabwe
LAA	Land Apportionment Act
LOMA	Law and Order Maintenance Act
LSCF	Large Scale Commercial Farming
LTA	Land Tenure Act
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
NCA	National Constitutional Assembly
NLHA	Native Land Husbandry Act
OAU ACHPR	Organization of African Unity African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
RA	Resettlement Area
SSCF	Small Scale Commercial Farming
TTL	Tribal Trust Lands
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
ZANLA	Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZNLWVA	Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veteran Association
ZRP	Zimbabwe Republic Police

Map One: Administrative Provinces of Zimbabwe

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2000

Lake Kariba

Mashonaland West

Mashonaland Central

Harare

Mashonaland East

Matabeleland North

Midlands

Manicaland

Bulawayo

Masvingo

Matabeleland South

Map scale: 1 cm = 70 km
Source: SADC Regional Remote Sensing Project

Source: http://www.fao.org/giews/english/basedocs/zim/zimadm1e.stm

INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

This dissertation is not the one I expected to write when I set out for Zimbabwe in 2000 to begin my fieldwork. My arrival to the field in 2000 preceded the start of the land invasions and concurrent state terror and violence by only a few weeks. The immediacy of the violence in the context of commercial farms, the site of my originally planned research, along with my previous relationships with many of the major actors/ primary targets of violence, uniquely positioned me for the research reported in this dissertation.

The dissertation's purpose is to examine state terror and state organized violence associated with the land invasions prior to the parliamentary elections of 2000 in Zimbabwe. In this pursuit, I ask, under what conditions are different people exposed to different kinds of state terror and violence? The study focuses on commercial farming communities, the first targets of violence in Zimbabwe, as they represented a critical logistical and ideological lens with which to frame the violence as the *Third Chimerenga* or a popular uprising for land. I ask four questions about this violence: (1) How does the state perpetuate its own interests through the use of state terror? (2) How does "the routinization of terror" function? (3) How do people in different social locations experience violence and terror differently? and (4) How do people in different social locations strategize under conditions of chronic fear and insecurity? This dissertation thus explores meanings of state organized violence, state organized terror, and survival.

To answer my four questions, I draw on a variety of qualitative and quantitative methods. I analyze the data to trace the development of the violence over time and space,

and to explore organizational and individual responses to state terror and violence using data from key informant interviews, questionnaires, participant-observations, daily invasion violence reports, human rights violation reports, and newspaper accounts (see Chapter Three). Throughout, I attempt to show how the construction of difference – the creation of the *other* – provided a justification for the violence against certain members of Zimbabwean society.

I begin this chapter with a brief introduction to Zimbabwe and the role of commercial agriculture in society and the economy. Second, I discuss the process by which I defined and redefined my research questions in the field as the crisis emerged in 2000. Third, I briefly discuss the immediate research context and the events that led to the land invasions. Next, I discuss my conceptualization of violence and terror. Finally, I lay out where the remaining chapters will go.

Socio-historical Context – Zimbabwean Politics and Society

To contextualize the study, I begin by presenting basic demographic and economic information about Zimbabwe before highlighting briefly the significance of land and race historically and the politics of the 1990s. I include this socio-historical context in the introductory chapter because it provides critical information to understanding the background to the research scenario. While some issues raised here will be addressed in more detail in later analytical chapters, it is important to briefly trace recent historical trends as they relate to the crisis under study. These historical and social factors are not merely background, however, they also shape the context of doing

research in Zimbabwe due to the social import of land, the state's use of violence, and the climate of political intolerance.

Basic Information. Zimbabwe is a semi-arid land-locked country in Southern Africa. The country is divided into eight administrative provinces – Mashonaland West, Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, Matebeleland North, Matebeleland South, Masvingo, Midlands, and Manicaland – with a total land area of 390,757 square kilometers (see Map 1) (Ministry of Agriculture 1999).

In 2000, Zimbabwe's population was estimated at 13.5 million[1] (CSO 1997). Roughly 98.8 percent of the population is African, 0.8 percent is European, 0.13 percent is Asiatic, and 0.29 percent is of mixed ethnicity according to the Central Statistical Office (CSO) (1992:19) [see Table 1.1].[2]

Table 1.1
ETHNICITY, ZIMBABWE 1992 CENSUS

Ethnicity	N	Percent
African	10,284,345	98.77
European	82,797	0.80
Asiatic	13,386	0.13
Mixed	30,063	0.29
No response	1,957	0.02
Total	10,412,548	100.00

Source: CSO 1992:19

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[1] Population data are estimates based on a 1992 Census (Central Statistics Office 1997).
[2] The racial categories given here are based on the categories used by the Zimbabwean census. Although these categories are obviously *racial* rather than ethnic categories, the Government of Zimbabwe (whose table I am reproducing here) uses the term 'ethnicity,' I have left the term as such. In addition, use of categories such as "African" are problematic given the history of differing ethnic groups in Zimbabwe. However, I employ the categories used by the census itself.

Although the majority of Zimbabweans live in rural areas, the distribution of people by

ethnicity differs significantly. Whereas 70 percent of Africans live in rural areas, 78

percent of Europeans reside in the country's urban areas (see Table 1.2). Asiatic and

mixed Zimbabweans also predominately reside in cities and towns, 92 percent and 85

percent, respectively.

Table 1.2
DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION
BY ETHNICITY AND URBAN/RURAL

Ethnicity	Urban	Percent	Rural	Percent	Total
African	3,083,825	30	7,200,520	70	100%
European	64,889	78	17,908	22	100%
Asiatic	12,373	92	1,013	8	100%
Mixed	25,408	85	4,655	15	100%
Total	3,187,720		7,224,828		

Source: CSO 1992: 19-20.

Zimbabwe's economy relies heavily on the agricultural sector. Agriculture

dominates Zimbabwe's export earnings (approximately 40 percent annually), contributes

roughly 15 percent to the country's GDP (on average from 1975 – 1993), provides the

leading source of formal employment (around 20 percent annually), and supplies the raw

materials on which an estimated 50 percent of manufacturing is dependent (Rukuni

1994b). By 1996, agriculture's proportion of the GDP had risen to 18 percent (Bond

1998) and its share of export earnings had risen to 44.5 percent of Zimbabwe's total

(Ministry of Agriculture 1999).

Agricultural production in Zimbabwe is not uniform, however, with significant

differences in holding size and tenure separating agricultural sub-sectors. It is important

to distinguish between two critical sub-sectors within Zimbabwean agriculture: the Large

Scale Commercial Farm (LSCF) sector, and the small holder (SH) sector, which includes

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Small Scale Commercial Farms (SSCFs), Communal Area (CA) farms, and Resettlement Area (RA) farms. The agricultural sectors reflect the persistence of colonial race-based land policies. LSCFs are historically white-owned farms with freehold title. CAs and RAs are peasant farming areas without freehold title. While the LSCF sub-sector has declined since independence – from approximately 15 million hectares (HA) and 6,000 farmers in 1980 to approximately 11 million HA and 4,600 farmers in 1988 (Rukuni 1994b) – the agricultural sector remains geographically unequally distributed. Whereas 34.6 percent of LSCFs lie in the higher rainfall and better soil agro-climatic Natural Areas I and II, only 0.8 percent of CA and 0.9 percent of RA farms occupy these regions. CA and RA farms predominate in the less hospitable Regions IV and V, accounting for 74.2 percent of CA farms and 43.4 percent of RA farms as opposed to 43.9 percent of LSCFs (Roth 1990 cited in Rukuni 1994b).

The unevenness of access to prime agricultural land as well as restrictions in access to inputs and infrastructure for SH farmers translates into uneven contributions to national agricultural output. In 1993, for example, while the SH sector's total gross output (including production for own consumption) totaled Z$1358 million, the LSCF sector total output reached Z$5700 million (Government of Zimbabwe 1997). LSCFs constitute the majority of Zimbabwean agriculture's contribution to the GDP, export earnings, employment, and materials for manufacturing. Thus, the white-dominated commercial farming sector remains a significant force in Zimbabwe's economy.

Land and Race in Zimbabwe. Intimately related to the existence of a strong white-dominated commercial farming sector, is the braided history of land and race in

Zimbabwe. I will not give a complete account of this here (see Chapter 2). Rather, I would like to acknowledge the history of forceful appropriation of land from blacks for the purpose of the establishment of white large-scale agriculture. Through a series of legal measures, the colonial state systematically appropriated prime agricultural land for whites, placed constraints on black agricultural production to inhibit black/white competition, and compelled blacks to enter the labor force on farms and mines (Rubert 1998, Palmer 1977, Werbner 1990). Colonial legislation created dual land-tenure systems in Zimbabwe that entitled whites to freehold tenure or private ownership and relegated blacks to communal ownership. Although land played a critical role in mobilizing support for the liberation struggle (Lan 1985), following independence in 1980, little changed in terms of the structure of land ownership in Zimbabwe. At independence in 1980, roughly 6,500 white-owned farms[3] accounted for 39 percent of Zimbabwe's total land whereas 8,000 black small-scale producers owned or leased four percent, and 700,000 peasant households farmed on 42 percent of Zimbabwe's land (Tshuma 1997; Bowyer-Bower 2000). Despite efforts by the Government of Zimbabwe to enact land reform throughout the 1980s and 1990s, these racially based land inequities have largely persisted since independence (see Table 1.3).

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[3] For White-owned farms/ Large Scale Commercial Farms, it is important to remember that one farm does not equate to one family, as multiple farm ownership is not uncommon. I do not have access to exact numbers on multiple ownership, however.

Table 1.3:
Zimbabwe Land Classifications 1980 and 1997

Land Classification	1980 %	1997 %	% Difference
Large Scale Commercial Farms	39%	28%	- 11%
Communal Areas	42%	43%	+ 1%
Small Scale Commercial Farms	4%	3%	- 1%
National Parks / Urban Areas	15%	15%	0
Resettlement Areas	--	9%	+ 9%
State Farms	--	1%	+1%

Source: Bowyer-Bower and Stoneman 2000:51 (citing Takavarasha 1998).

In 1997, 4000 primarily white-owned Large Scale Commercial Farms (LSCFs) accounted

for 28 percent of Zimbabwe's total land area, 10,000 black-owned Small Scale

Commercial Farms (SSCAs) accounted for three percent; over one million families in

Communal Areas (CAs) accounted for 43 percent; 70,000 families in Resettlement Areas

(Ras) accounted for 9 percent; National Parks and urban areas accounted for 15 percent;

and state owned farms accounted for 1 percent (Bowyer-Bower 2000). Between 1980

and 1997, there was a decrease in land under LSCF control by 11 percent, an increase of

nine percent in RAs and one percent for CAs, respectively. While this did indicate some

improvement for those calling for land reform, population increases (700,000 households

in CAs to 1,000,000 households in CAs from 1980 to 1997) also called attention to the

insufficient nature of the reforms as CAs continued to become crowded.

Historical Background. A former British colony, Zimbabwe attained independence in

1980 after a prolonged guerilla war and nearly 100 years of colonial rule. The guerilla

war waged to bring about Zimbabwe's independence involved two guerilla forces. The

Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and its constituent political party Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) operated primarily in the Shona-speaking North while the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and its political party Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) operated primarily in the Ndebele-speaking South. Zimbabweans voted the self-proclaimed Marxist ZANU, led by Robert Mugabe, into power in the first multi-ethnic elections in Zimbabwe in 1980. Mugabe became Zimbabwe's first post-independence Prime Minister, a position he held until 1987. Constitutional reforms at that time created an Executive Presidency which Mugabe then took, an office he holds until this day.[4] Of the 80 seats up for grab in the 1980 election, ZANU took 57, ZAPU 20, and a third party, the United African National Congress (UANC), claimed three (Sylvester 1991:69). The Lancaster House constitution reserved the remaining 20 seats for whites until 1987 (Sylvester 1991). Therefore, in early post-independence years, Mugabe and ZANU held a strong majority of seats (71.25 percent), although ZAPU was still believed to represent potential political competition. In 1987, following five years of "anti-dissident" army and police actions against alleged ZIPRA dissidents in Matebeleland and Midlands, the ZANU and ZAPU parties merged into the present-day ZANU-PF. The anti-dissident campaign involved considerable violence and is considered by some (CCJPZ 1997) to have been genocidal (see Chapter Two).

In understanding 2000's events in Zimbabwe, one must look at several shifts in Zimbabwe's political terrain throughout the 1990s. The 1990s presented Zimbabwe with a series of crises. The end of Cold War politics required shifting ZANU-PF's former

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[4] In this section, I wish to contextualize contemporary Zimbabwe with brief historical, demographic, and economic information. In Chapter Two, I address the history of land and racial policy in more depth. Therefore, this section discusses primarily post-independence Zimbabwe in order to provide background to the study.

socialist programming to new neo-liberal realities. In 1990, Zimbabwe launched the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP – largely referred to by local Blacks as Extreme Suffering for African People). As Patrick Bond wrote (1999), the regime largely implemented ESAP, despite criticisms to the contrary. The civil service wage bill was reduced from 15.3 percent of the GDP to 11.3 percent from 1990 to 1994, foreign exchange was deregulated, tariffs and investment regulations were liberalized, price controls lifted, and labor markets were deregulated (Bond 1999:414). Declines in real incomes, combined with the reintroduction of school and clinic fees and an increased cost of living due to the lifting of price controls, resulted in economic hardship for rural as well as urban households.

In addition to ESAP, Zimbabwe confronted crises on multiple fronts in the 1990s. Severe drought struck Southern Africa in 1992, intensifying economic hardship. The seriousness of the AIDS crisis emerged during this period as well, with estimates of up to 25 percent of sexually active adults suspected to be infected with HIV in Zimbabwe. By early 2000, Zimbabwe also faced fuel shortages due to a corruption scandal in the government-run oil company, a cyclone which devastated many eastern communities, and foreign exchange shortages.

At the time of the constitutional referendum in February 2000, Zimbabweans were reeling from corruption allegations, long fuel lines, and a struggling economy. The defeat of the ZANU-PF backed referendum reflected a rejection of ZANU-PF leadership and the status quo. The defeat also energized opposition parties for the coming parliamentary elections and signified a possible change in government. These signs were not lost on ZANU-PF or its opponents. The campaign for parliament began in full swing

with ZANU-PF focusing on land and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)[5] highlighting the need for change.

Land became the battle cry for ZANU-PF and its supporters during the parliamentary elections of 2000 for several reasons. Farm invasions served the party both logistically as well as ideologically as "war vets" and party cadres evoked colonial struggles over land as justification for invasions while denying that violence was occurring on commercial farms and in the CAs surrounding them. Farm invasions were labeled the "third *chimurenga*" referencing what is commonly referred to as the first *chimurenga*, an uprising in 1893, and the liberation war that brought independence, or the second *chimurenga*.

Fieldwork Crisis or Sociological Serendipity

My proposed and accepted dissertation topic explored the relationship between globalization and changing social dynamics on Zimbabwe's commercial farms. Building on fieldwork in 1997-98,[6] I planned to compare the social relations of work in tobacco and horticulture production on farms, paying particular attention to shifting race and gender relations. Following the introduction of structural adjustment and pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank to liberalize the economy, the commercial farm sector in Zimbabwe offered a unique opportunity to explore the interplay between global relations of agricultural production, their national and local manifestations, and racialized and gendered experience. Originally, I proposed to

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[5] MDC is the opposition political party that emerged in 2000 to challenge ZANU-PF in the parliamentary elections.
[6] During 1997-98 I conducted pre-dissertation research on Zimbabwe's commercial farming sector with the support of the Social Science Research Council International Pre-dissertation Fellowship Program. In addition to language studies, I interviewed 75 commercial farmers, farm women, and farm workers.

examine how farmers and farm workers adapted in response to changes in agricultural

production brought about by globalizing forces in Zimbabwe as well as to examine

commercial farms as sites of changing social relations.

I arrived in Zimbabwe in January 2000 prepared to spend twelve months in the

field. Initially, I spent three months in Harare interviewing officials from the

Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), the General Agricultural and Plantation Workers

Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ), and non-governmental organizations concerned with

farm workers. During this time, I also planned to locate field sites in a commercial

farming community, where I would spend nine months conducting in-depth case studies

of two farms. However, by mid-February, the landscape of Zimbabwe's commercial

farming sector began to shift. Immediately following the rejection of the regime

supported draft constitution (February 14),[7] veterans of Zimbabwe's liberation war began

invading white-owned commercial farms.[8] Although initially I, as well as my informants

within CFU and GAPWUZ, hoped the issue would resolve quickly, within a matter of

weeks it became clear that the invasions were part of an electoral strategy of the ruling

Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) who feared the

emergent Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in the 2000 parliamentary elections

(Fieldnotes 2-26-00, 2-28-00, 3-13-00). By early March, the numbers of invasions were

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[7] As I discuss in more detail in later chapters, the draft constitution was supported by the regime, but many civil society groups campaigned against it. Late in the game, Mugabe pressured the Constitutional Commission (CC) to pass Clause 57, which would allow the regime to arbitrarily acquire any Large Scale Commercial Farm (LSCF) without compensation for the land. Clause 57 stated that white farmers wanting compensation should demand it from Great Britain. The commercial farming community and the larger community in Zimbabwe reacted negatively to Mugabe's strong arm tactics with the CC. "War vets" claimed that since white farmers manipulated voters to defeat the constitution, they were going to take "their" land through invasions (Fieldnotes 3-10-00)

[8] The war veterans targeted white-owned commercial farms for this exercise. While there were instances of invasions of black-owned commercial farms in 2000, these were brief and extremely rare. The invasions primarily represented a move against white farmers and black farm workers.

rapidly increasing (see Chapter Four) and turning violent, with assaults on farm workers the most common form of violence. The emergence of a viable opposition party, the MDC, which mounted the first serious nation-wide threat to the ruling ZANU-PF since independence, reflected Zimbabweans' general dissatisfaction with President Robert Mugabe and his party's rule. Despite the growing uncertainty, I attempted to proceed as planned, while also researching the effects of the crisis on commercial farming, farmers, and farm workers. I was uniquely positioned as an "outsider within" of sorts within the white commercial farming community due to my previous research and my resurfacing immediately prior to the crisis (see Chapter Three).

I began to observe the CFU to explore how the organization and its members responded to violence as a community. As I gained access to data gathered by the CFU on a daily basis about violence and invasion activity nation-wide, I began to shift my attention to questions regarding violence and the emerging crisis: how do organizations (such as the CFU and GAPWUZ) attempt to negotiate land reform under conditions of violence/ conflict? What are the strategies of survival that these organizations employ under conditions of violence to advocate for their clientele as well as to ensure for organizational survival? In early April, I relocated from the capital city of Harare to the commercial farming community where I planned to conduct my dissertation study. I had conducted fieldwork in the community in 1998, and thus had previous ties with local farmers and farm workers. On moving to the community, however, farmers, who had been key informants during my pre-dissertation research, advised against my settling in until the instability had resolved. Despite having rented a spare cottage to me in the past, one particular farm family refused to rent me accommodations due to their concern for

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my safety as a lone white woman and their unwillingness to assume responsibility for another person should a crisis emerge on their farm. Therefore, I arranged to rent a room in a local guest lodge. Although the election date was unknown, I still hoped that once the elections passed, disruptions to farming would cease.

The end of March and early April, however, saw a rapid increase in the number of invasions and the intensity of violence on invaded farms and against the opposition political party, the MDC. For example, one farmer survived two severe assaults including an attempt on his life. During a peace march organized by the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) on April 1, 2000, "war vets"[9] and ZANU-PF supporters descended on the march and beat anyone suspected of participating. Whites in particular appeared to be the targets as newspapers reported severe assaults against several white bystanders (Fieldnotes 4-3-00; BBC 4-2-00). Half-way through my third month of research (mid-April 2000), the first two white farmers were killed, making "war vets" threats of violence more ominous. In both cases, the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) made it clear to farmers and the CFU that they were under orders not to interfere in "political" matters. Farm invasions, and any subsequent violence against farmers or farm workers, were deemed "political" matters by the police. ZRP refused to intervene (Daily Mail & Guardian 3/1/00).

Despite this policy, in the cases of the first two murders of white farmers, the ZRP ignored its policy of non-intervention and actively intervened against Zimbabwean citizens and facilitated the violence. In the first case, neighboring farmers followed the

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[9] This is not to imply that all persons involved in land invasions were legitimate "war vets." Rather, this term was commonly used throughout the crisis to refer to those involved, despite the fact that many felt it inaccurately described the invaders. War vets rejected the term squatters, so the CFU and the press used the term war vets. I place it in quotations to highlight the contested nature of the term in this context.

"war vets" who had abducted Dave Stevens, the first farmer killed. The "war vets" fired upon and then chased the farmers who sought refuge in a local police station. They entered the police station and abducted the farmers in the presence of ZRP officers. The five abducted farmers were severely assaulted and required hospitalization (CFU 2000b).

In the case of Martin Olds, the second farmer killed, the police again intervened on behalf of "war vets." The ZRP established a roadblock near Olds' farm. Although the ZRP allowed a truck filled with over 100 "war vets" to pass en route to Olds' farm, when neighboring farmers attempted to respond to Olds' distress radio calls, ZRP refused to let them pass until after Olds' had been killed. Nevertheless, ZRP allowed "war vets" to remove their wounded from the gun fight that lasted for several hours, even though they had denied an ambulance access to the fatally injured Olds. The assailants burned Olds' farm house, shot him, and eventually bludgeoned him to death (CFU 2000a).

Shortly after the deaths of Stevens and Olds, two white farm women were brutally gang-raped on a farm outside of Harare. The women involved sought assistance in the nearest ZRP station. Although the police (and the CFU) classified the act as apolitical, the women's attackers shouted accusations of MDC affiliation at the women during the assaults. The women are relatives of one of the CFU's national leaders and, therefore, it is possible that the rapes of these two women were intended not only to terrorize the women, but also to communicate a message to their male relative (see Chapter Six).

The violence and insecurity on farms both was, and was not, racial. On the one hand, President Mugabe branded white farmers "enemies of the state" (Daily News 4/19/00), and white farmers felt targeted and unprotected due to their whiteness and the lack of response by the ZRP to incidents on farms. On the other hand, black farm workers

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and communal area (CA) residents experienced much more violence in sheer numbers than did whites (see Chapter Four). The number of whites killed during this spate of violence is highly disproportionate, however, relative to their population within Zimbabwe. As of the elections in June 2000, white farmers represented seven of the 32 deaths related to farm and election violence or roughly 22 percent of farm and election violence deaths, yet whites constitute only 0.8 percent of the Zimbabwean population as a whole (CSO 1992:19). As the weeks passed, hope waned among farmers that the regime would be *able* to halt the invasions after the elections, assuming the regime desired to do so. In other words, some farmers and observers began to suspect that Mugabe and ZANU-PF had unleashed a wave of violence that they could no longer control.

I discuss these events in detail because of the critical role they played in my decision to return to Harare in mid-April and continue my research while based there. The general decline of the rule of law and racial violence, combined with a growing contempt among "war vets" and ZANU-PF for foreign journalists who were accused of misrepresenting the situation in Zimbabwe, led me to feel increasingly insecure in a permanent domicile in a rural area. Stevens farmed in the farming community adjacent to that in which I worked, approximately 30 km from my field site. I decided to conduct my research from a base in Harare and focus my research efforts on documenting the farm crisis as it unfolded. At this point, in addition to my questions concerning managing violence and organizations such as the CFU and GAPWUZ, I also became interested in exploring issues such as: how are individuals affected by violence? How does their reaction vary by hierarchical social markers such as race and gender? How does the CFU

strategize to protect the interests of its members while maintaining unity in a time of extreme crisis?

The decision to focus my research on the emerging crisis presented a difficult research scenario. Zimbabwe's economy is firmly linked to global systems of production and consumption. It is a leading producer of tobacco for the world market, and in the past decade has been an increasingly important producer of horticulture and flowers for European and Asian markets (Cole 1994, Rukuni 1994). International tourism (prior to the crises of 2000) also accounted for a significant proportion of export earnings. In many ways, the crisis in Zimbabwe reflected the discourse of globalization as farmers engaged in a human rights discourse and appealed to international sympathy over the attacks on their property rights and racially motivated discrimination. As the invasions intensified, international donors and foreign governments withdrew aid pending the return of the rule of law. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) attempted to negotiate a land reform package that accommodated the ZANU-PF regime's need for land for resettlement purposes, white farmers' need for compensation, and organized funding for the project of land reform (ultimately it was rejected by Mugabe's regime). Therefore, it is not difficult to study the crisis through the lens of globalization.

Nevertheless, my lens became attuned to the overlapping issues of the state, state organized violence, and survival strategies as the crisis unfolded. In particular, how did the state-evoked crisis unfold differently in different regions? What survival strategies did farmers and their representatives in the CFU employ in the face of state organized violence and insecurity? In what ways did farmers, as individuals or as members of collectivities, negotiate with the state or other actors over land in the context of crisis?

How did social location shape an individual's experience with invasions/ violence? And, how did farmers and farm workers unite or divide in the face of this crisis?

The insecurity in rural areas (and research questions), however, required a shift in research methods. Rather than live in a farming community as I had planned, I based myself in the capital city of Harare making frequent short trips to various farming communities throughout the country. I began to follow the lead of many of my informants who lived nowhere and everywhere, relying on their cars and cell phones to shift their domiciles as needed due to death threats. Though obviously less dramatic in my case, I felt movement in and out of different communities and regions would provide me with more security than residence in one particular place.

As might be expected, the shift in my research design forced me to rethink my conceptual frame when I began writing my dissertation upon my return to the U.S. In the following section, I discuss the conceptual foundation of my dissertation. I discuss concepts such as the state, state terror and organized violence, political violence, the spatial dynamics of violence, gender and violence, and survival strategies as they relate to my research.

The State

In my discussion of the state, rather than offer a detailed overview of the concept, I draw on ideas from various thinkers that best inform this research and aid me in making sense of the state in this context. Weber argued that the state referred to "an institutional enterprise of a political character, when and insofar as its executive staff successfully claims a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in order to impose its

regulations" (Runciman 1978: 39). Weber further offers three modes of "pure" legitimacy of state power and rule: (1) rational; (2) traditional; and (3) charismatic (Weber 1970). Rational authority relies on a bureaucratic administration and legal authority. The second mode, traditional, rests on long-held belief systems and power is handed down historically. Charismatic authority relies on devotion to a leader due to the exemplary character or heroism he possesses (Weber 1970: 36). I highlight Weber's three modes of legitimate power and rule to note that Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe in 2000 and leader since independence, garnered his authority and power through his role as a heroic figure during the revolution that ended colonialism in 1980.

Drawing on Alfred Stephan and Theda Skocopol's conceptions of the state, Kohli (1987: 23) defines the state in the following way:

> The state to my mind then is best thought of as a set of administrative and coercive institutions headed by an executive authority, defining, at minimum, the territorial boundaries within which societies conceiving of themselves as a nation or competing nations exist. This view ... does not insist that control over coercion is either complete – centralized – or necessarily legitimate.... There is no reason to assume that the state normally acts as a collectivity. ... Reification of the state is therefore minimized by keeping in mind that the concept of the state refers to identifiable institutions, and that state actors do not always work as a cohesive force *vis-à-vis* civil society.

The lack of cohesion noted in the quote from Kohli above can be seen in discontinuities in the state, particularly the courts and, at times, Vice President Msika. Kohli's approach contradicts the perspective of Eric Nordlinger who argues that states are merely collections of individual actors. Kohli (1987: 22) acknowledges the importance of focusing on leaders, but also stresses the need to look at organizations and institutions within government, such as the army or civil bureaucracy. His conceptualization of the state raises the question, what does the contemporary state look like in Zimbabwe?

Further, Adrendt (1970: 427), writing on totalitarianism, notes the dual structures of the party and the state that contribute to a "peculiar 'shapelessness' of the old totalitarian government." She notes the difficulty in distinguishing who holds real power – government or the party. "Power, as conceived by totalitarianism, lies exclusively in the force produced through organization..." (Adrendt 1970: 432). The question arises, then, how does the state in Zimbabwe perpetuate its interest through violence?

State Organized Violence – State Terror and Torture Techniques

Just as changes in the research design required changes in my research methods, it also required changes in my conceptual approach. As such, I am exploring here a literature new to me, that on terror, violence and torture. An important theoretical question I ask is, *under what conditions are different people exposed to different kinds of state terror and violence?* I return to this question in my concluding chapter.

The meanings of *state terror, state organized violence* and *torture* have troubled scholars for some time. This dissertation wades into these muddy waters by exploring these concepts in what is, for some, the complicated terrain of Zimbabwe's current political crisis. In this section I review conceptualizations of state terror, state organized violence and torture that make the most sense in understanding state organized violence in Zimbabwe's unique context. I also review varied understandings of political violence that I use to analyze various forms of violence throughout the dissertation.

State Terror, State Organized Violence, and Torture: Searching for Meanings. My goal in this section is to relate literature on state terror, dimensions of control/ techniques

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of state terror available, and the relationship between state terror and violence to my research questions. According to Pion-Berlin and Lopez (1991: 63-64), "State terror is a premeditated, patterned, and instrumental form of government violence. It is planned, inflicted regularly, and intended to induce fear through 'coercive and life threatening action' [Gurr, 1986:46]." Included in the concept of state terror are acts committed by "death squads" (Mason and Krane 1989) and other state sanctioned paramilitary groups (Sloan 1984). Mason and Krane (1989:178) note that

> The term "death squad" denotes those military, paramilitary, and irregular units that engage in violent acts against a population in order to deter them from lending support to opposition groups. "Death squad violence"[10] is repressive violence intended to induce compliance through fear. It may be employed reactively or proactively. Its most critical distinguishing feature is that it is violence sanctioned by the regime, either explicitly through policy pronouncements or implicitly through lack of effort to curtail such acts.

There are several characteristics of state terror that can be teased out of this definition which are critical in thinking about the Zimbabwean case: (1) premeditation, (2) patterned state violence, (3) fear induced through coercion and life threatening behaviors, and (4) agents of state terror, i.e., para-state organizations such as the "war vets." These characteristics will be discussed in more detail in chapters to come as I demonstrate how state terror shapes forms of violence used by the state.

In a recent update to his 1969 classic work on terror, Walter (2001: 4) notes, "Violence may occur without terror, but not terror without violence." Terror should, therefore, be seen as a subset of violence. Walter (2001) notes that terror is often ambiguously defined as the psychic state of extreme fear *as well as* the terrifying item itself. He attempts to avoid confusion by referring only to organized terror, narrowing

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[10] I consider Mason and Krane's concept of "death squad violence" interchangeable with state organized violence.

this definition to systems of terror that involve various elements in the terror process.

First, either a political group in power or without power (a state or opposition party or guerilla group) is willing to use terror to achieve/ sustain power. Second, a specific act of violence is enacted to invoke fear. Building on Walter's concept, Lopez (1984: 70) outlines state terror tactics as the following:

Figure 1.1
Alternative Techniques Available to the State as Terrorist[11]

Information Control
Surveillance of personal activity via wiretapping, "bodyguarding," and so on
Attachments/falsification of personal documents and records
Press censorship
"Thought reform"

Law Enforcement
Legislation of a discriminatory bent
Expulsions/exile
No protection against the crimes and terrors of other citizens
Direct and arbitrary arrest

Economic Coercion
Economic discrimination
Extortion/bribery
"Guilt" due to one's economic associations or activities

Life Threatening
Direct attacks-beat/ bombing of home or business/ letter bomb
Kidnapping/disappearance
Threats on one's family
Torture and interrogation when under government control
Source: Lopez (1984: 70)

The range of behaviors included as state terror tactics emerged throughout the invasions.

The question becomes, then, in what ways did the Zimbabwean regime utilize such methods of state terror tactics – and which ones -- during the invasions? On which

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[11] Terrorist here refers to one who commits an act of terror.

populations did the Zimbabwean regime attempt techniques of "thought control" versus "expulsions" versus "threats on one's family" and why?

Embedded within the many systems of state terror are state sanctioned forms of torture (Rejali 1994). In *The Logic of Torture*, Tindale (1996) categorizes types of torture by the goals motivating the torturer (see Figure 1.2):

Figure 1.2
Type of Torture

Type of Torture	Goals
Interrogational torture	To extract information; victims limited to those who hold information
Deterrent torture	To discourage or encourage specific behavior of victim or others; victim chosen at random, randomization increases efficacy
Dehumanizing torture	To change self perception of victim; to demonstrate torturer's superiority or to change victims' understanding in eyes of community

Source: Tindale (1996)

Asad (1996) criticizes the Western bias in modern definitions of torture and cruelty inherent in international human rights law and is particularly interested in including psychological suffering in contemporary definitions. Torture enables the state to accomplish limited goals, according to Tindale (1996), but, as Asad (1996) warns, the state must consider international regulations to maintain in "good standing" in the global community. The question arises, then, what is the relationship between these conceptualizations of torture and state terror in contemporary Zimbabwe?

State terror includes a variety of intimidation tactics, as outlined in Figure 1.1 (information control, law enforcement, economic coercion, and life threatening). In addition, terror tactics include inducing a psychic state of fear and the routinization of fear through various forms of violence. In the following section, I discuss the overlap

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between state terror and violence and demonstrate how different forms of political

violence serve as instruments of state terror. As noted above, "Violence may occur

without terror, but not terror without violence" (Walter 2001: 4). Therefore, violence is

often an instrument of terror.

Political Violence. In everyday language, the three words 'aggression,' 'war' and

'violence' embody the harmful behavior that violence signifies (Riches 1991). The

language associated with 'aggression' suggests that those who become aggressive cannot

control their behavior and thus, according to Riches (1991:285), are both perpetrators and

victims. As with 'aggression,' soldiers, the perpetrators of harm in 'war,' also cannot

control their behavior, though for other reasons (following military orders) (*ibid.*) In both

cases, the linguistic connotation does not carry negative imagery that require perpetrators

to deny their association with their actions (typically), in contrast to in the case of

'violence' (Riches 1991:285-6):

> And in everyday usage, the perpetrators of harm rarely speak of
> "violence": it is rather a term enunciated by victims and witnesses (Riches
> 1986:3-5). Thus, the interpretive study of harming behaviour [sic] should,
> on the face of it, be reluctant to appropriate the notion. In victims' and
> witnesses' usage, what "violence" denotes is plain enough. "Violence"
> has strong pejorative connotations. Through it, the unacceptability and
> illegitimacy of harming behaviour [sic] is conveyed. "Violence," in this
> usage, clearly connotes a double distance from the harm-giving moment:
> not only is it invoked as *commentary* on the act, the perspective on this act
> is unequivocally twisted – from performer to observer. For their part,
> perpetrators – distancing themselves from the act – are reluctant to
> concede that what they have done is violence: *their* representation of what
> happened will be that it was self defense, unavoidable force, freedom-
> fighting, social control, and so on.

I quote Riches at length because he raises several critical points that I address below: violence as harmful behavior, the issue of violence and legitimacy, and the representation of violence survivors and perpetrators.

Violence as harmful behavior. In this section, I evaluate the various ways in which violence is defined by different scholars. In doing so, I follow Riches' (1991) outline which encompasses the views of many other scholars in his broad definition of violence. According to Riches (1991:293-4), violence is primarily a *"contested physical hurt"* [emphasis in original] but also includes (1) witchcraft and sorcery, (2) mental violence, (3) symbolic violence, (4) structural/ institutional violence, (5) ritual violence, and (6) violence where the victim is not fully human. These six (but primarily two, three and four) categories of violence present a framework for analyzing the forms of political violence employed by the regime.

According to Riches (1991: 293), the violence associated with magic and witchcraft "need not be doubted." In "Ways of Death: Accounts of Terror from Angolan Refugees in Namibia," Inge Brinkman (2000) recounts informants' tales of torture at the hands of Movement for the People's Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Union for Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) soldiers. According to Brinkman's informants, in cases where the torture involved severance of a body part, perpetrators often engaged in ritualistic behaviors to enhance their power (such as drinking their victim's blood). Witchcraft also was used as an accusation that resulted in executions by MPLA soldiers and burning at the stake by UNITA (Brinkman 2000). Further, one of the war's most infamous fighters claimed to have magical powers (Brinkman 2000). Additionally, K.B. Wilson's "Cults of Violence and Counter-Violence in Mozambique" also demonstrates

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the role of symbolic/ spiritual power in the organization of Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) forces. Wilson (1992) reveals how violence becomes a cultic mode of operation for RENAMO. Therefore, in the African context, witchcraft and magic as potential sources of violence are taken seriously throughout Southern Africa. I ask, then, are accusations of witchcraft used as a form of violence/ terror in Zimbabwe?

Mental violence, according to Riches (1991:293) refers to the infliction of "deleterious psychological impact." Mental violence is usually referred to as psychological violence by other scholars. In "The Concept of Violence," Degenaar (1990) notes that psychological violence represents a violation of a person's dignity. Judith Zur (1994:13) writes clearly of the psychological effects of mental violence in reference to her experience in the period of *La Violencia* in Guatemala: "Fear, suspicion and paranoia not only result from impunity but are the psychological mechanisms which help to maintain it." Zur goes on to describe the silencing, suppression and intimidation as well as anonymous symbolic measures designed to control the population in Guatemala.

> Sense organs were a common target of both symbolic and literal assault: ears and tongues were cut out, eyes gouged or burnt out. This was a potent meta-message: all sense is attacked, leaving the population without a "sense," without a means to perceive, reason, criticize or, most crucially, name the guilty (Zur 1994:14).

This is an example of 'deterrent' torture, a mechanism of torture designed not only to punish those involved in a particular act but more significantly to deter others from engaging in specific behaviors (Tindale 1996). As a form of political violence and torture, psychological violence usually leaves no physical scars on its intended victims.

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This leads one to ask, in what ways did the Zimbabwean State use psychological violence to dehumanize its population into submission?

Symbolic violence refers to what Bourdieu calls everyday "socially recognized violence" (1977:191, cited in Nagengast 1994:111). Galtung (1990:291) also defines cultural violence as "those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence."

The concept of structural or institutional violence represents the viewpoint that "violence inheres in social structures, especially ones with marked hierarchy" (Riches 1990:294). In *Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the 'Dark Forests' of Matabeleland*, Alexander, McGregor and Ranger (2000) demonstrate the structural (as well as physical) violence experienced by communities caused by forced migrations and a colonial system that degraded local communities and individual rights. The expropriation of land and forced migration out of the Shangani Reserves created competition for resources between 'evictees' and local residents and resulted in a malaria epidemic (*ibid*.) Degenaar (1990:78) acknowledges that the concept of structural violence started with Galtung's 1969 work, but he narrows his definition of violence here in the following way:

> Violence in the normative sense means extreme force carried out against
> X which violates X because it does not show respect for the value of X.
> This violence is structural when the force is not exerted willfully by a
> person but, for example, by custom or by law in a political context.

The final two forms of violence Riches considers include ritual violence in the form of festivals and games (think here of violent sports such as professional wrestling or

bull-fighting), and violence when the victim is not fully human, such as violence against very young infants, fetuses, animals and inanimate objects (Riches 1991:294).

Violence and Legitimacy/ Representation of Violence Survivors/ Perpetrators. According to Max Weber, the state monopolizes the legitimacy over violence (Runciman 1978). Riches (1991: 286) argues that "'Violence' has strong pejorative connotations. Through it, the unacceptability and illegitimacy of harming behaviour [sic] is conveyed." Thus, the very term, as Tilly (2002:17) writes, "almost always arrives with baggage of disapproval." Degenaar (1990), however, reminds us that the issue of justification, particularly for states, is always, problematic for social scientists. It is a question for which there remain gaps in the literature (see Tilly 1991, Nagengast 1994).

According to Riches, it is important for the perpetrators of violence to represent their actions as defensible (1991:285-6): "For their part, perpetrators – distancing themselves from the act – are reluctant to concede that what they have done is violence: *their* representation of what happened will be that it was self defense, unavoidable force, freedom-fighting, social control, and so on." Alternatively, Hayner's (2001) work on Truth Commissions speaks to the need for violence survivors to tell their stories as a form of catharsis. This forces social scientists to recognize an additional aspect of state terror tactics: the extraordinary use of state controlled media to dominate images and information in the attempt to alter individuals' sense of self in the world around them (rountinization of fear). The question arises then, how do war vets attempt to legitimate their actions and the violence surrounding Zimbabwe's commercial farms?

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In addition to noting the ways in which the above categories of violence are used to further the agenda of state terror in Zimbabwe, there are two final areas within the violence literature which may be useful for analysis of the Zimbabwean case: the spatial dynamics of violence, and the way gender intersects with violence.

Spatial dynamics of violence. While Riches work on violence provides a very useful framework for conceptualizing political violence, there are some gaps in his discussion. The first is the way in which violence alters a person's relationship to public spaces. Using violence in Colombia, Chilie, and Argentina as case studies, Schneider (2000) analyzed how the spatial dynamics of repression and resistance affect forms of contentious politics. In her conclusions, Schneider (2000:9) argues that "The spaces in which struggles were concentrated also shaped the identities and agendas of resistors." While Schneider's work looks at violence and space at the community level, Bonnin (2000) analyzes how political violence reconstructs space by examining they dynamics of gender and age. For example, Bonnin found that as political violence increased in Kwa-Zulu Natal, young girls increasingly became the targets of sexual assault as they walked to and from school, thereby requiring the escort of their older brothers for protection. At the same time, "the street became reconstructed as a site of masculine power" whether controlled by either political party (Bonnin: 2000: 6) Thus, I ask, how is geography reconstructed by violence and implicated in how people strategize in conditions of chronic fear?

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Gender and Violence. Linked to Bonnin's (2000) findings that demonstrate the role age and gender play in experience with political violence in South Africa, additional researchers have found a second gap in the literature that suggest differing experiences of women and men with political violence (Moser and Clark 2001; Jacobs, Jacobson, and Marchbank 2000; Trushen and Twagiramariya). As Cockburn (2001:22) writes,

> Men and women often die different deaths and are tortured and abused in different ways, both because of physical differences between the sexes and because of the different meanings culturally ascribed to the male and female bodies.

She goes on to cite Ruth Seifert's three explanations for the widespread use of rape during war and political violence. First, women are seen as the spoils of war and included amongst the conquered territory included with the conquered land for a short period of time following victory (Cockburn 2001:22). Second, Seifert argues that rape humiliates the woman, while sending a more important message from one man to another man, that is, the men in the community are unable to 'protect' 'their' women. Thus, a challenge to masculinity has also been accomplished through the act; power and dominance have been asserted over the men, according to Seifert, (cited in Cockburn, 2001:22). Third, rape (particularly gang rape or systematic rape) promotes solidarity among soldiers through bonding (Cockburn 2001). Thus, this leads one to ask, how do people in different social locations experience violence and terror differently?

Survival Strategies

Das (1990: 29) refers to Lifton's (1968) classic work on the survivors of Hiroshima for a definition of survivor as "someone who has been touched by annihilating violence and death." Nevertheless, Das maintains (1990: 29), that Lifton portrays

survivors as individualistic, classless, genderless people, untouched by social structures. More recent studies suggest the need to unpack the individual survivor. Kanapathipillai (1990), for example, emphasizes three issues in her work with survivors of violence in Sri Lanka. First, social class is an important intervening factor in dealing with the aftermath of violence. Second, women play an important role in reorganizing family life under times of extreme pressure. Third, narratives by different women are organized around different themes and symbols. Srnivasan (1990) studied the riots in Delhi following the assassination of Indira Gandhi on October 31, 1984 in which thousands (mostly Sikh males 20-50 years old) were killed or injured. Srnivasan (1990: 310) found that the violence crystallized the "survivor's past as distinctive time and space. ... as a 'minority' within the secular Indian nation." In other words, Sikhs began to feel like a "marked community" (Srnivasan 1990: 311); they became the other. Kanapathipillai (1990) and Srnivasan (1990) speak to the need to examine the social context of violence survivors and to allow violence narratives to emerge from informants in different ways. I ask, then, how did farmers and farm workers become "marked" communities as the violence began?

Several authors have continued to explore the impact of terror on the psychic state of individuals, analyzing in various ways how people cope with extreme fear (i.e., Brinkman 2000, Nordstrom 1997, Zur 1994, Wilson 1991, Skurski 1991). A primary issue I explore in this dissertation is the use of terror tactics by the regime against its populace, but I also consider how people respond to these terror tactics. According to Green (1995:105-6), "Fear is the arbiter of power -- invisible, indeterminate, and silent. ...Fear is the reality in which people live, the hidden 'state of (individual and social)

emergency' that is factored into the choices women and men make." Writing about her

experience conducting fieldwork in Guatemala, Green (1995:108-9) reports:

> Gradually, I came to realize that terror's power was, its matter-of-factness,
> its exactly about doubting one's perceptions of reality. The *routinization*
> of terror is what *fuels* its power. Routinization allows people to live in a
> chronic state of fear with a facade of normalcy at the same time that terror
> permeates and shreds the social fabric. A sensitive and experienced
> Guatemalan economist noted that a major problem for social scientists
> working in Guatemala is that to survive they have become inured to the
> violence, training themselves at first not to react, then later not to feel
> (see) it (emphasis added).

Therefore, as Green (1995:106) writes, "The 'routinization of fear' undermines one's

confidence in interpreting the world."

The issue of domination and resistance (Scott 1990) or agency in the context of

surviving violence is also a complex and contested issue. According to Mertz

(2002:355), in the context of instability and fear, victims/ survivors search for the basic

humanity in their oppressors: "...if we cannot impute some core regularities or structures,

some fundamental humanity, some measure of certainty to the external indicia we are

given, then how is any kind of social connection or understanding possible?" Victims/

survivors of violence lack an accurate view of themselves and their situation. They

refuse to accept that they are in imminent danger and may lack power; to continue

functioning "...they must imagine themselves inhabiting a world in which there is some

hope, in which there is some possibility of reaching, reasoning, or connecting with the

people who hold the power of life and death" (Mertz 2002: 357). Therefore, I ask, in

what ways does the routinization of fear/ terror function in Zimbabwe?

The instability caused by the routinization of fear or terror, the inaccurate

perception of connecting with oppressors (Stockholm syndrome), leads to an ethnography

of instability that forces us to reconceptualize agency. "What sort of agency is this, then, that refuses to acknowledge its own powerlessness--that insists on finding a 'normal order' where none exists, a 'human' response where inhumanity is prevailing, safety where there is danger?" (Mertz 2002: 357). This leads me to ask, how do people strategize under conditions of chronic fear and insecurity? In particular, how do people in differing social locations strategize?

Nordstrom (1997: 204) emphasizes the creative ways people defy violence through circulating "knowledge about surviving and resistance, about world-making and self-affirmation" which she terms "*symbologues:* dialogue though symbols." "Symbologues" include poems, songs, sculptures and jokes that transmitted information about the war drama in Mozambique where Nordstrom conducted fieldwork. Nordstrom (1997: 198) concludes that in the midst of war and chaos, most people/ communities work to find creative solutions to rebuild:

> Yet this spark of creativity is not a light in an otherwise darkened horizon. It s attended by the minutia of daily acts that take place within a field of cultural possibilities; it works amid processes of cultural selection and recombination that hone the day-to-day manifestations of the creative process.

For Nordstrom, survivors of violence are agents reclaiming their world through creative voice. The question becomes, then, what "symbologues" do farmers develop to enable them to survive under conditions of chronic fear and insecurity?

Research Questions

In my focus on state terror and survival, I refer to Nordstorm's (1997) concept of *warscapes*[12] to indicate cultures of war referring to the landscape of goods, services, and people required to sustain the cultural and material flows of war. This dissertation focuses on the first targets of violence in Zimbabwe, commercial farming communities, as they represented key sites of conflict both logistically and ideologically in the regime's attempt to frame the violence as a popular movement for land, as the *Third Chimurenga*. My research questions are:

- How does the regime perpetuate its own interests through the use of state terror?

- How does "the routinization of terror" function?

- How do people in different social locations experience violence and terror differently?

- How do people in different social locations strategize under conditions of chronic fear and insecurity?

Outline of the Dissertation

In Chapter Two, "Colonial and Postcolonial Imaginations – Land, Race, *Chimurenga* and the State in Zimbabwe," I explore Zimbabwe's history as a tapestry into which land, race and violence are interwoven. From the outset of the colonial period, the state in its various manifestations over time has "imagined" the Zimbabwean nation according to various definitions of racial groups and their links to land. In this chapter, I

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[12] Warscapes draws on Appadurai's landscapes of globalization.

explore the interlinked histories of land, race and violence in Zimbabwe. Specifically, in addition to looking at the violence wrought by colonialism, I reexamine the literature on the second *chimurenga* and discuss the role of coercion used by liberation fighters to elicit peasant support. I also trace the post-independence government's use of violence. Additionally, I explore the intersection of these histories with the development of the commercial farming sector in Zimbabwe. Drawing on written histories of Zimbabwe as well as previous interviews with farmers and farm workers, I conclude by discussing the historical role of farmers and farm workers in Zimbabwean society as well as their contemporary position.

Chapter Three addresses the fieldwork context in more depth than in the introduction and describes the methodology used. Specifically, I discuss the challenges of confronting violence in the field in terms of researcher and informant safety. I highlight the importance of reflexivity in qualitative research and stress the importance of interrogating power and identity in the field. Finally, I discuss the methods employed in this study as a combination of quantitative secondary data analysis, participant observation and semi-structured interviews. I also discuss the development of my coding scheme and the limitations of the data. In this chapter I also introduce the groups under study including the predominately white Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), the General and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ), and the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA).

Following the defeat of the constitutional referendum in February of 2000, ZANU-PF awakened to the reality of potential defeat in the coming parliamentary elections. Chapter Four, "'Enemies of the State' – Elections, Invasions, and Crisis,"

analyzes the beginning of the farm invasions and argues that they represent not a war veteran led movement to take back the land but rather the desperate attempt of an unpopular party to remain in power. Through an analysis of daily invasion reports gathered by the CFU, I trace the development of the invasions over time and space while situating this deployment within the context of broader electoral violence. Based on interviews as well as secondary data, I highlight the regional differences particularly in reference to the levels of violence associated with invasions. I compare these data to an analysis of the statements of ZANU-PF and the war veterans association. Through these statements, ZANU-PF and ZNLWVA leaders seek to define whites and political opponents as the "neo-colonial" *other* in an attempt to justify their actions.

While Chapter Four analyses what happened and how different regions were affected by invasions and violence, in Chapter Five, "Managing State Terror and State Organized Violence – Strategies of the CFU, GAPWUZ and Farming Communities," I focus on how these communities survived the violence and insecurity on farms. The invasions brought farmers and workers into new kinds of relationships as they sought to defend their livelihoods, but CFU strategies conflicted with these proactive solutions. I explore the strategies of both the CFU and GAPWUZ to work together at the national and international levels to manage the violence. The varied strength and capacity of the CFU and GAPWUZ significantly impacted their abilities to advocate on behalf of their members and shaped their ability to employ strategies such as negotiation with government, lawsuits and engaging the press. I examine the fractures in the temporary alliance between GAPWUZ and the CFU, unions that typically stand against each other

in wage negotiations and labor disputes. In addition to the strategies of the unions at the national level, I also examine local farming community responses.

In Chapter Six, "Intersection of Race, Gender and Violence – Experiences with and Strategies for Farm Invasions," I explore how individuals experienced and survived the invasions, and concurrent terror and violence. Based on interviews and human rights violation reports, I analyze the intersection of race and gender in individuals' experience with invasion violence and their response to it.

In my concluding chapter, I return to my major research question: *"Under what conditions are different people exposed to different kinds of state terror and violence?"* In doing so, I organize my findings around this question rather than summarizing the major points of my previous chapters. I then discuss the implications of my research for theory, policy implications for the crisis in Zimbabwe, and point to potential areas of research that have emerged from the dissertation. To end, I address the position of fieldworkers in the context of violence.

CHAPTER TWO:

COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL IMAGINATIONS – LAND, RACE,

CHIMURENGA AND THE STATE IN ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe's history is a tapestry into which land, race and violence are

interwoven. From the outset of the colonial period, the state in its various manifestations

over time has "imagined" the Zimbabwean nation according to various definitions of

racial groups and their links to land. In this chapter, I explore the interlinked histories of

land, race and violence in Zimbabwe. Specifically, in addition to looking at the violence

wrought by colonialism, I reexamine the literature on the second *chimurenga* and discuss

the role of coercion used by liberation fighters to elicit peasant support. I also trace the

post-independence government's use of violence. Additionally, I explore the intersection

of these histories with the development of the commercial farming sector in Zimbabwe.

Drawing on written histories of Zimbabwe as well as previous interviews with farmers

and farm workers, I conclude by discussing the historical role of farmers and farm

workers in Zimbabwean society as well as their contemporary position.

"White Man's Country" – the Colonial Period (1888-1980)

The history of contemporary Zimbabwe is one of racial domination primarily

achieved through the alienation of black controlled land and restrictive legislation of

racial preference. In 1888, the relationship between indigenous blacks and whites in

contemporary Zimbabwe changed significantly. Throughout the 19th century, contact

between blacks and whites centered on relations of trade, limited confrontations with

Portuguese and/or Afrikaners and contact with scattered missionaries (Sylvester 1991).

In 1888, Ndebele leader and Mzilkazi's successor Lobengula signed the Rudd

Concession granting Rhodes mining and mineral rights which Rhodes used to procure a

royal charter for his British South Africa Company (BASC) in 1889. The royal charter

empowered BSAC to rule the colony and enabled the company to oversee mining

activities as well as create and enforce laws and treaties (Sylvester 1991, Phimister 1988).

The following year, Rhodes returned with a contingent of 700 settlers (200 young men

and 500 company soldiers) that became known as the "Pioneer Column" and holds

special significance in white Zimbabwean lore. As Weiss (1994:18) wrote, "The Pioneer

Column was the Rhodesians' *Mayflower*, their descendants the planter aristocracy of the

territories of Northern and Southern Rhodesia." Believing the area to be home to a

"Second Rand" rich in mining potential, the settlers headed into Mashonaland and

dispersed in search of mineral wealth (Sylvester 1991, Phimister 1988). In 1891, Britain

declared Mashonaland a British protectorate administered by BSAC, a status that

remained until 1923.

Although Rhodes and Great Britain considered the Rudd Concession an

agreement that also transferred all land under Lobengula's control to BSAC, Tshuma

(1997) has noted that the idea that Lobengula held sovereign leadership over the entirety

of Mashonaland and Matabeleland is problematic. Lobengula's sovereignty at the time

was more tenuous (Ranger in Tshuma 1997:14). Furthermore, Tshuma (1997) argues

that in pre-colonial Zimbabwe, land was not a commodity that could be owned. In 1891

Lobengula signed the Lippert Concession, granting land rights to a German financier in

what Tshuma (1997) described as an attempt to play the Europeans against each other.

Therefore, the notion that Lobengula was entitled to or willingly signed over title to

Southern Rhodesian land is a contested fact in Zimbabwean history (Tshuma 1997).

However, land concessions and agriculture soon came to play a critical role in the

colony's economic prospects. After then-Southern Rhodesia's failure to provide another

mineral-rich colony like that in neighboring South Africa, in the late 1890s, BSAC

slowly turned its attention to the agricultural potential of the landlocked colony. Though

still promoting the colony with claims of discoveries of new gold fields daily and as

containing "'an uninterrupted gold belt'" (Phimister 1988:9), in the early 1890s,

extensive land concessions in Mashonaland were granted to companies and individuals to

stabilize the nearly bankrupt BSAC (Rubert, 1998, Sylvester 1991, Phimister 1988).

Following a small Ndebele uprising on Fort Victoria in 1893, additional land concessions

were granted to settlers, this time in the Matabeleland region. By 1896, concessionary

companies controlled one-sixth of the country (Sylvester 1991).

Violence marked the early colonial period of Southern Rhodesia. Throughout the

early 1890s, BSAC and local black chiefs engaged in small armed skirmishes as the

BSAC sought to establish it's sovereignty and demonstrate "the sacredness of white lives

and property" (Phimister 1988:12). According to Phimister (1988:12), "Murder, theft

and what the whites perceived as insolence and insubordination were promptly countered

by murder and theft on an intimidating scale, most spectacularly by the para-military

police expeditions of 1892." Schmidt (1992) found that complaints against the brutality

of the native police at this time and the raping of African women and girls by the native

police were common. Additionally, blacks were caught and forced into labor (referred to

as *chibaro*) as needed by the nascent mining and agricultural sectors.

Alienation from land, violence at the hands of whites, raiding of African livestock and the imposition of taxes compelled the 1886-87 uprising referred to as the first *Chimurenga[1]* (Schmidt 1992, Sylvester 1991, Phimister 1988). The uprising caught BSAC and the settlers off-guard and unprepared. Initially, the combined Mashona and Amandebele uprising was successful. The insurgents had control of the major towns and roads, held white prisoners and killed over 100 settlers in Mashonaland alone (Phimister 1988). Ultimately, BSAC army forces joined with British Imperial Army forces to defeat the uprising. Following the uprising, white settlers pushed for increased representation in the colony's governance, blaming BSAC for inadequate protection during the rebellion.

The Establishment of "Responsible Self-Rule" and Segregation (1923-45).
The early 1900s marked a shift in Southern Rhodesia's economic interests from mining to farming, though the transition was slow. Farmers began lobbying the government hard for protections from competition from black producers and the need for labor (discussed below). In 1923, the settlers (and blacks who met the "Jim Crow"-like voting requirements) voted to either join with neighboring South Africa, or establish "responsible self government." The settlers voted to transfer administrative rule from BSAC to responsible self government (Sylvester 1991). Though whites held control over most issues of government in Southern Rhodesia from 1923-1945, Britain retained veto power over legislation concerning "Natives". Great Britain did not, however, use this power to enforce racial equality in Southern Rhodesia, nor did it do much to protect the interests of blacks. For example, Britain allowed literacy testing and other discriminatory means to keep the majority of blacks disenfranchised (Sylvester 1991).

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[1] *Chimurenga* literally means rebellion.

The establishment of self rule was also the beginning of the institutionalization of racial segregation in Southern Rhodesia under the rubric of racial non-competition. With the emergence of competing class interests among whites in the early 1920s, racial discrimination became increasingly important. For example, in the mining sector, white workers placed high value on the informal system of racial segregation in which blacks were excluded from higher paying positions. Mining owners (sometimes multinational corporations), however, recognized the potential advantage of racial competition in lower wages overall (Phimister 1988, Sylvester 1991). White mine workers therefore established the Rhodesian Mining and General Workers' Association in the 1920s and effectively struck against racial job competition (Sylvester 1991). The implicit racial solidarity of conceding to white union demands while simultaneously resisting black union demands became explicit in the 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act (ICA) which formalized racial job categories and ended white-black job competition (a primary concern for white mining workers) in exchange for whites forfeiture of the right to strike (Phimister 1988, Sylvester 1991). This legislation demarking white and black employment possibilities contributed to segregationist policies of the time. Whereas the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 which demarcated white and black land (discussed in detail below) racially defined space, the ICA racially distinguished employment and limited the potential of socio-economic gains for many blacks. Though white workers and employers ultimately closed ranks around race, class (among other) divisions did exist among whites at this early time and remained throughout the colonial and post-colonial history.

The Development of White Agriculture

Contrary to beliefs of many white farmers that white agriculture in Zimbabwe developed through their predessors' hard work, tenacity and capitalist savy, a review of land and agricultural policy reveals a different picture. White agricultural development relied heavily on state intervention in land policy and agricultural research, subsidies, and protection from black competition.

Begining in 1888 with the Rudd Concession, the colonial powers began appropriating land from black Zimbabweans for white settlers. Through a series of land policy measures, the BSAC and later Southern Rhodesia implemented policies that divided the country into "black" and "white" agricultural lands (see Table 2.1 at end of this chapter for a history of land policy). By 1898, the British government evoked the Native Reserves Order to protect native land rights in the face of increased alienation of land for whites in the colony through the creation of Native Reserves. The order created dual agrarian and tenure structure in which blacks are crowded into the more ecologically marginal areas of the country (Rukuni 1994a). Native Commissioners in charge of creating the Native Reserves (now known as Communal Areas) "basically allocated those remaining areas which were felt unsuited for white settlement" (Rukuni 1994a:9).

In the early 1900s, the BSAC had only begun to realize that the development of the colony depended on the development of white agriculture. Given the company's initial hopes of finding a "Second Rand" in the country, early legislation subordinated agricultural to mining interest (Phimister 1988). The mining industry had preferential access to water, wood and grazing, and rights to enter privately owned land for mining purposes. Black small-holder producers had responded to the new markets that the

colony's mining towns had created – in 1904, blacks accounted for over 90 per cent of

the country's total marketed output (Phimister 1988:68). Additionally, white farmers

needed increased access to black labor. Phimister (1988:64-65) notes,

> Peasant competition had to be curbed, distinguished visitors were told, because 'if he["the native"] can work for himself to a great profit he is not likely to work for the white settler for wages. ... For farmers and their allies, the solution was simple: 'put ...the native cultivator...in reserves...so far away from railways and markets that the white trader will not be able to buy from him and compete with the white farmer.'

White farmers responded to these unfavorable conditions by creating the Rhodesian

Agricultural Union (RAU) in 1904 to lobby for farmer interests. Over the ensuing years,

the RAU would successfully lobby for a variety of supports for white agriculture.

Though the Native Reserves Order separated land racially, many blacks continued

to live on land designated as white or Royal Crown land through the early 20th century.

The actual process of removing blacks from white lands was slow. However, by the

early 1920s, white farmers had achieved one of their primary goals -- eliminating black

competition through restricting blacks' access to markets:

> Only 30 per cent 'of the land assigned to Africans, as against 75 per cent of that alienated to Europeans ... was within 25 miles of a railway', and as contemporaries usually agreed that 'grain crops would not bear more than about 15 miles of ox-wagon transport when railway transport was to be added', African competitiveness on produce markets was significantly reduced. By 1922, 63.5 per cent of all blacks lived in reserves (Phimister 1988:67).

Combined with the doubling of the hut tax in 1904 and the introduction of a series of

additional taxes over the next ten years, the state simultaneously increased pressure on

African families for cash income and reduced their ability to earn income outside of

waged labor (Phimister 1988).

Despite these early efforts to facilitate white agriculture, white farmers struggled throughout the 1920s and 1930s. A small minority of large scale white producers employed modern farming techniques and produced the bulk of agricultural output. For example in 1933, 1.4 per cent (4 ranchers) of the Stockowners Association owned 54 per cent of the cattle, while in 1923 17 farmers or 8 per cent of the Maize Association members produced 45.4 per cent of the total white produced crop (Phimister 1988:126). The majority of white farmers, in contrast, were short of both capital and agricultural training and skills. Many white farmers lived hand to mouth throughout the 1920s (Phimister 1988).

In 1930, the Land Apportionment Act (LAA) formalized the dual agrarian structure established in the Native Reserves Order. Areas in Southern Rhodesia with high rainfall and better soils became white farm areas and black land in poorer ecological areas became held in trust by the state. The racial division of land also contributed to the evolving transformation of pre-colonial land use and rights patterns (Tshuma 1997). Native Commissioners became responsible for the administration of the Reserves and were "required to control natives 'through their tribal chiefs and headmen'" (Tshuma 1997:21). As Tshuma (1997:21) writes,

> The policy sought to replace the traditional system of rule by chiefs with the direct rule of central government (Palley 1966:497). Chiefs became minor state functionaries appointed by, and answerable to the administration with their tenure contingent upon good behavior as defined by the colonial state.

The Native Commissioner now, not the chief, held the power to assign land for settlement, cultivation and grazing, and grant access to water (Tshuma 1997).

White agriculture at the beginning of the 1930s suffered from successive crises in the industries of cotton, tobacco, maize and cattle (Phimister 1988). As the Great Depression worsened, by 1934 white farmers constituted the largest proportion of white unemployed (Phimister 1988:174). During the decade of the 1930s, therefore, state intervention to assist farmers intensified. Starting with the Maize Control Act of 1931, the state introduced a series of acts to protect white settler agriculture so that by 1937 "'of the principle agricultural products from European farms only poultry and eggs remained outside the system of control'" (Phimister 1988:174). The state tripled the capital of the Land Bank between 1924 and 1930, implemented subsidies and relieved farmers' debt, and expanded rural roads to facilitate marketing (Phimister 1988).

By the end of the 1930s, the state intervention paid off, particularly among tobacco producers whose fortunes "were soaring" (Phimister 1988:225). Tobacco cultivation and production rose steadily and British markets for Southern Rhodesian tobacco secured. The shift from foodstuffs to tobacco cultivation is reflected in the fact that the colony had to ration both meat and mealie-meal during 1947-48 (Phimister 1988:233). The loss of self-sufficiency in food production during this period led the state to convert the existing producer control boards to marketing boards aimed at overseeing the supply and distribution of agricultural produce (Phimister 1988:231). During this period, environmental concerns arose over soil degradation. Therefore, further state intervention developed in the form of subsidies for white maize producers engaged in ecologically sound farming practices (Phimister 1988:230). At the end of World War II, the state also continued to promote white agriculture through offering land and other enticements to British soldiers (Mlambo forthcoming).

By the time of the introduction of the Native Land Husbandry Act (NLHA) in 1951, the Southern Rhodesian state had clearly established an interventionist policy towards protecting white agricultural interests. With NLHA, the state sought to limit the size of black land under cultivation and the number of cattle owned. NLHA enforced de-stocking as well as conservation practices and led to considerable resistance among blacks. During this same time period, the government shifted land policy from settling more whites to removing blacks from white areas. The law was eventually repealed in 1961 when the then liberal leaders sought to amend the LAA to create a nonracial category of land – unreserved. The move mobilized white conservatives, particularly farmers and contributed to the election of the conservative Rhodesian Front (RF) party in 1962.

Under the conservative leadership of the RF in the 1960s, black access to land further diminished. The Native Reserves were renamed Tribal Trust Lands (TTL) under the Act of 1965 and the land came to be vested in a board of trustees (Rukuni 1994a). In 1969, the government instituted the Land Tenure Act (LTA) which created "parity" among blacks and whites and divided the land 50-50 according to race. During the UDI period, the RF further consolidated their support among white farmers through a new series of measures designed to keep farmers afloat and on their farms despite the economic sanctions of the time (Rukuni 1994b). The government financed a tobacco stockpile, established a short term loan facility, and established an agricultural diversification scheme (Rukuni 1994b:27). Interventions under UDI advanced Rhodesia's production in soya beans and wheat resulting in the self-sufficiency in the

latter by 1976 (as opposed to producing 2 per cent of its requirements in 1965) (Rukuni 1994b:29).

Farmers and farm workers in farming communities. Commercial farms in Zimbabwe represent a unique position in Zimbabwean society. While farms (and society) remain largely segregated, in farming communities, blacks and whites live and work together in ways different than in other parts of Zimbabwean society.

Historically, in addition to accessing cheap land, white farmers relied on the state to curb competition from black producers, compel the populace into farm labor, and when necessary source labor from outside the colony's borders (Sylvester 1991; Rubert 1998). For black laborers, farm work meant long hours, difficult work, and low pay compared with work in mines or in the developing urban areas. In the early 1900s, white farmers had difficulty recruiting and keeping local black laborers. Labor from nearby countries such as Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique were recruited and brought to Zimbabwe for farm work. According to Amanor-Wilkes (1996), approximately 40 percent of contemporary black farm workers (or their parents or grandparents) hail from countries other than Zimbabwe.

Relations between whites and blacks on farms during the colonial period mirrored those of other sectors in Zimbabwe and reflected the racial politics of the times. Zimbabwe institutionalized segregation through policy, and restricted black workers' rights through the Masters and Servants Act. The Act prohibited any workers from leaving a place of employment if they had not completed the duration of their service contract.

Further, segregation has been, and continues to be racially defined through the organization of space in farm life. White families live in homesteads, typically behind security fences, whereas black workers live in open farm villages on the farm. Some farmers, but not all, provide beer halls, schools, or clinics on their properties for their workers. In many farming communities, the center of social life for farmers revolves around the farmers' club. The clubs are locales for sport, drinking, potlucks and meetings of various natures. While blacks are not officially prohibited from the clubs, informal mechanisms maintain racial segregation patterns. The psychological role of these clubs will be discussed below.

Chimurenga – Rebellion (1971-79)

From African Resistance to *Chimurenga*. In the early 1920s, rising inequalities in Rhodesian society lead to the establishment of black unions and political organizations. One such union, the Industrial and Common Workers Union (ICWU), struck in 1925 over declining wages and shut down several mines. However, the mine owners united and refused to acquiesce to African demands (Sylvester 1991). Early African nationalism focused on redressing social and economic inequalities and power sharing rather than a total transfer of power (Nyangoni 1978).

The post WWII era saw a dramatic rise in African nationalism. Sylvester (1991) notes that prior to the 1950s, acts of resistance were individual and incremental. However, the decades following WWII marked the emergence of coordinated and sustained political organization and struggle with numerous political organizations and parties emerging among Africans. In 1957, the Bulawayo African National Conference

(BANC) and Harare based City Youth League merged to create the Southern Rhodesian

African National Conference (SRANC), led by Joshua Nkomo. SRANC called for land

use and distribution according to farming ability, the full participation of Africans in

Rhodesian government, universal suffrage (now), and social integration (Sylvester

1991:42). Predictably, in 1959 the Rhodesian government banned SRANC. The

National Democratic Party replaced SRANC, and was soon also banned. In 1962, the

Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) was established, also headed by Nkomo; and

in 1963, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) split from ZAPU due to the

dissatisfaction of some members who desired armed confrontation.

The African nationalist movements prior to the 1960s relied on a liberal agenda

which sought to utilize European institutions and logic to achieve its goals. Although by

1961 the African nationalists' goal was majority rule, the methods employed still

reflected a liberal mind-set, calling for Britain to pressure Rhodesia to change. This

liberal influence predominantly disappeared in the late 1960s and the 1970s during

Zimbabwe's armed struggle for independence.

Cliffe (1982:23) argues that the Zimbabwean nationalist movement followed the

pattern of many African nationalist movements to date: "The pattern was to build up a

formal and visible network of branches, to enlist a wide membership, to hold rallies,

demonstrations, protests and boycotts - even some civil disobedience or sabotage, a few

riots." However, Cliffe (1982:24) notes, the Unilateral Declaration of Independence

(UDI)[2] period and Rhodesian stubbornness required re-thinking of "both the *methods* of

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[2] In 1965, Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith announced Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Great Britain as a result of increasing pressure from Britain to establish majority rule in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia). Almost immediately, Rhodesia faced international trade sanctions which forced the country into an import substitution policy and further development of Rhodesia's manufacturing sector.

struggle (guerrilla war) and the *form* of organization (a clandestine but popularly based movement)." Initial efforts at armed resistance failed tactically, and by the end of the 1960s political fighting between ZANU and ZAPU became submerged under ethnic tensions as ZANU solidified its membership of predominately Shona and ZAPU of predominantly Ndebele (Cliffe 1982). Cliffe (1982) argues that the introduction of 'tribal' difference in the nationalist movements reflects opportunistic leadership rather than historical intra-movement conflict: "...the history of the movements suggest there is nothing natural or inevitable about such distinctions becoming the basis for political division" (Cliffe 1982:26). The 'tribal' split in African nationalism, however, coincided with the intensification of the struggle and eventual victory. In this period, ZAPU received military training and aid from the Soviet Union, while ZANU received its military aid from China. The ethnic identifications developed during this period around political organization remain significant to this day.

Cliffe accurately described a critical shift in late 1960s to early 1970s to guerrilla tactics and mass mobilization. The peasantry was mobilized through guerilla forces entering villages, offering political education (including the promise of access to land), involving local spiritual leadership, holding political rallies at night (*pungwes*), and recruiting young boys and girls to assist in the movement (Lan 1989). Rhodesian military efforts also contributed to solidifying guerilla support at this time. When the liberation movement threatened to control rural areas, the Rhodesian government forcibly placed villagers in "Protected Villages" commonly called "keeps" which greatly increased mass resentment to the Rhodesian government. Several women highlighted in

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Staunton's (1990) collection of war experiences demonstrate the importance of this shift in solidifying rural support. Seri Jeni recalls her initial exposure to ZIPRA[3] combatants:

> The comrades talked to us a bit. They said that they were our children and that they were fighting for our country. They said they were not fighting for their own freedom, but for the freedom of everyone in the country. Then they said, "Please make us some food; we, your children, are very hungry," and they left and went into the bush (Jeni, in Staunton 1990:5).

Sosana Marange recalls a similar scenario: "Then, in 1974, a group of eight comrades came into our area. ... They said they had come to free parents from oppression. They said that we were very oppressed..." (Marange, in Staunton 1990:13). Some, however, experienced the result of the tensions between the two forces. Elina Ndlouv describes the entrance of first ZAPU, then later ZANU into her community. The two parties both requested food and assistance, but also inquired into villagers' cooperation with the other party, taking names and punishing villagers who associated with the "wrong" freedom fighters.

The UDI and war period saw the consolidation of African nationalism behind a common goal of freedom, but a movement fractured by politics. The fractured movement maintained its unity through its mobilization of the peasantry behind socialist ideals. By 1964, Rhodesia had detained both ZANU and ZAPU leaders. Although armed struggle began in 1966, it remained disorganized until 1972. Throughout the 1970s, the guerilla movement attacked white farmers and mobilized increased support among the peasants. Allan Savory, a liberal Rhodesian in parliament accurately warned that the side (Rhodesian or African) which won the hearts and minds of the black majority would win the war (Godwin and Hancock 1994:100).

Although African nationalism professed Marxist-Leninist goals and achieved the support of the majority of Africans, some of its internal practices suggest the need for

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[3] ZIPRA was the military wing of ZAPU; ZANLA was the military wing of ZANU.

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critical analysis of who comprised "nationals" in the war years. In *Mothers of the Revolution: The War Experiences of Thirty Zimbabwean Women*,[4] many women describe their dual feelings of support for and fear of the guerilla fighters. One woman described her experience as a *chimbwido*, in which guerilla forces recruited, often by force, adolescent girls to run errands, cook, and provide sex for the liberation fighters. Juliet Makande told of how she tried to leave, but remained under threat to her family's safety and farm:

> It was unfortunate that we had to sleep with the comrades because sometimes we had sex with them. You couldn't even tell a friend about it because it might be said you were a prostitute or because the story would reach the freedom fighters and you would be in trouble. They always told us that we should never tell anyone. "We don't want sell-outs," they said. So if a group came today, you might have to 'go to the *poshito*'[5] with one of them - that meant you had to sleep with him; and then if another group came the next day you might have to 'go to the *poshito*' with someone else. Some of the girls fell pregnant. The unfortunate thing was that we didn't know the real names of the freedom fighters (Makande in Staunton 1990:49).

Although Makande does not denounce the behavior of the freedom fighters, she reports her desire and continued efforts to be freed from her duties as a *chimbwido*.

White Perceptions of *Chimurenga*. Rhodesian nationalism following World War II had become quite a nebulous coalition. Post WWII immigration decreased the African to European racial ratio from 19.6:1 in the 1940s, to 13.4:1 in the 1950s. However, by the 1960s the ratio had risen to 17.2:1 (Kinloch 1978). The census of 1969 revealed that 59.3 per cent of Rhodesians were not born in Rhodesia (Godwin and Hancock 1993:16). Therefore, Rhodesian nationalism rested on an illusion of a united

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[4] Mothers of the Revolution: The War Experiences of Thirty Zimbabwean Women edited by Irene Staunton consists of edited oral narratives of the 30 women included. Therefore, these are the words of the women themselves.

[5] *Poshito* means hut or tent.

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and harmonious racial group that in reality did not share much of a history. While Godwin and Hancock (1994:19) note that racial solidarity did exist in Rhodesia, they emphasize its tenuous nature:

> ... the alliance was always an uneasy one. Conflict within the support base... helps explain the ultimate failure of a race-based nationalism to preserve the unity of White Rhodesia during the war years. The shared experience of race increasingly had to compete with the specific experience of occupational groupings trying to protect their own interests.

Although Godwin and Hancock argue that Rhodesian nationalism was maintained by fear of majority rule rather than racism, it is precisely racism which engendered the fear of majority rule. During the war years, Rhodesia clung to its myth of the true Rhodesian as the tough, Rhodesian-born Christian fighting to preserve civilization in the face of communist terrorists (Moore-King 1989, Godwin and Hancock 1994 and Weiss 1994). This imaginary Pioneer Column descendant actually reflected only a small portion of the population, but presented a unified image of Rhodesian resistance to "terrorism." Moore-King (1989) reveals his "tribe's" stated mission for going to war: "We must know what we are defending. This is nothing less than the survival of what is left of Christian Civilization and its values and standards, the belief in right and wrong, which Communism exists to destroy" (1977 Rhodesian Christian Pamphlet quoted in Moore-King, 1989:51).

The heightened white nationalism of the war years also gave rise to increasing Rhodesian intolerance and a process of internal exclusion in defining its true nationals. Conscientious objection and draft dodging were considered un-Rhodesian and were not accepted: "It was also un-Rhodesian to accuse the Security Forces of brutality, to oppose

the arrest of Africans without a warrant, and to pronounce an intention to emigrate"

(Godwin and Hancock 1993:114). Moore-King (1989:129) confirms the social pressure

to conform to the myth of Rhodesia:

> Looking back with eyes that seek reality, not masturbatory myth, it seems
> to me that those of my tribe who showed the greatest courage were the
> very few who said, not that they were right, but that we were wrong. For
> it is much easier to run with the herd, much easier to pick up a rifle and
> shoot someone, than it is to endure the isolation, the ostracism, the ridicule
> of your own people.

Rhodesian nationalism also demonstrated the potential unifying force of language,

particularly concerning the usage of the term "terrorist" to refer to the freedom fighters:

"opposition to 'terrorism' could unite all except a handful of Rhodesians whereas their

racial policies divided them into opposed camps" (Godwin and Hancock 1993:11).

Farmers, however, lived the war on the front line. While all males between the

ages of 17-50 could potentially be conscripted at one point (Godwin and Hancock 1993),

whites farming communities experienced daily attacks. According to Godwin and

Hancock (1993:289),

> ...the farmers themselves were convinced that Salisbury never really
> understood what it was like living in the war zone. The Vice Chairman of
> the Grain Producers' Association..... accused the planners in the Ministry
> of Agriculture of not knowing "what it is like to be constantly armed, to be
> always prepared to be under attack...to wake up in the middle of the night
> to the sound of gunfire and rockets and the smell of burning...to see one's
> fields alight...to face the tired and frightened labour force in the morning
> when all their possessions have been burnt, and to see the dead being
> carried away."

Several "normal" activities associated with farm life became dangerous. Farmers were at

risk traveling on rural roads which were often laced with landmines. Visiting the

workers' village for any reason could prove hazardous. Those who lived alone and the

elderly were at particular risk, though no one was safe (Godwin and Hancock 1993).

Farming communities responded by changing work patterns, curtailing entertainment

activities, developing area response team, and a variety of other measures.

Godwin and Hancock (1993) describe how farmers' homesteads converted into military-like fortresses. Farm homes were often surrounded by alarm systems, security fences, attack dogs, external lighting, blast walls, grenade and rocket launchers (some operational by remote control). Inside, houses contained "safe areas," bullet screens, emergency rations and emergency power. The Rhodesian National Farmers Union (the predecessor to the Commercial Farmers Union) advised farmers in a variety of strategies to safeguard their homes, farms, equipment and workers if they came under assault. In this new era of farm life, farm women's lives were transformed from running the household to participating in staffing the Agric-Alert radio operations rooms and wearing guns around their waists. The war took its toll on farming communities, many of which were ready for the war to end after roughly 14 years of being on the front lines.

Independent Zimbabwe (1980-2000)

In 1979, the British government invited the various political party leaders to London for the Lancaster House Conference which would settle the conflict in Rhodesia and establish the Lancaster House Constitution that remains in effect (though amended) to this day. The constitution provided for majority rule through general elections, yet provided significant guarantees against radical changes to white interests. White were reserved 20 seats (out of 100) in the House of Assembly, and the constitution required that land reform must proceed on a "willing-buyer, willing-seller" basis. Under Lancaster House, farmers had the right to payment in foreign currency and the British and the U.S. agreed to finance land reform (Sylvester 1992, Sithole 1987).

In March 1980, Zimbabweans elected Robert Mugabe as their first Prime Minister and his party ZANU-PF captured 57 of the 80 seats in the House eligible to black voters (Sithole 1987:83). Nkomo's PF-ZAPU won 20 seats, while the Rhodesian Front (RF) swept all 20 seats in the white constituencies (Sithole 1987:83). The election of Mugabe

into office shocked most whites who were terrified of his radical Marxist perspective (Goodwin and Hancock 1993). Allegations of violence and intimidation by all parties were reported, however, election observers pronounced the elections fair.

In his Address to the Nation on March 4, 1980, Mugabe (1980) projected a commitment to peace, stability and racial reconciliation:

> ...I wish to assure you that there can never be any return to the state of armed conflict which existed before our commitment to peace and the democratic process of election under the Lancaster House Agreement. Surely this is now time to beat our swords into ploughshares so we can attend to the problems of developing our economy and our society. ...

In addition to stressing the importance of a government that upholds the rule of law and fundamental civil rights, Mugabe declared,

> ...it is not the intention of our government ... to drive anybody out of this country; nor do we intend to interfere unconstitutionally with the property rights of individuals. I urge you, whether you are black or white, to join me in a new pledge to forget our grim past, forgive others and forget, join hands in a new amity, and together, as Zimbabweans trample upon racialism, tribalism and regionalism, and work hard to reconstruct and rehabilitate our society as we reinvigorate our economic machinery. ... Let us truly become Zimbabweans with a single loyalty.

Mugabe soon after appointed two whites to his cabinet in the positions of ministers of commerce and agriculture as well as appointing the former head of the Rhodesia Forces to oversee the integration of the three armies (Sylvester 1991).

Post War: Land and Resettlement. Following independence in 1980, changes in the structure of land ownership in Zimbabwe have not met the expectations of many. While Zimbabwe has undertaken considerable reforms and research reveals that resettlement households compare favorably to their communal counterparts (Kinsey 2000), the racially based land imbalances have remained (see Table 1.3). The regime's

early stated goals of resettling 162,000 families (as stated in 1982) proved tremendously overly ambitious. By 1996, roughly 71,000 families had been resettled on 3.5 million hectares of land, 93 per cent in family-based holdings (Kinsey 1999).

While the initial goals of the resettlement program focused on poverty alleviation, welfare enhancement and national stability, by 1990 redistributive justice no longer dominated land policy (Kinsey 1999). Selection criteria shifted to emphasize farmer experience and capital and the "state ... appears happy to preserve a dualistic structure through transferring title in large holdings from white to black owners" (Kinsey 1999). The Zimbabwean state preferred state run resettlement and quashed any attempts by peasants to resettle themselves on white farms (Herbst 1990, Tshuma 1997).

Following independence, significant changes occurred that impacted farmer – farm worker relations. Legal changes required that farmers shift compensation from a combination of foodstuffs and a small salary to wages only by monetizing the rations system. During the 1980s, GAPWUZ formed, slowly increasing its membership and representing permanent black farm workers in contract negotiations and labor disputes.[6] Despite such changes, as Blair Rutherford (1996) notes, the system of domestic government on farms remained and "development" for black farm workers lay outside modern bureaucratic state-led development efforts. In other words, during the period of extensive expansion of social infrastructure such as rural health clinics and schools, the regime considered commercial farm areas and black farm workers as outside of the boundaries of state development and the responsibility of private landowners. Therefore, while independence has increased access to clinics and schools in CAs and RAs, for black farm workers, access to such facilities remains marginal in many areas.

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[6] GAPWUZ does not represent seasonal contract farm workers, overwhelmingly women.

Black farm workers have long been perceived by the ZANU-PF state as second-class citizens. Commercial farms were the sites of much of the struggle during the war for liberation. During the liberation struggle, Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA)[7] forces were often frustrated by their attempts to compel black farm workers to abandon farms or join in arms against farmers. Farm workers have been perceived to have aligned themselves with farmers rather than with liberation forces and therefore have not been seen as an important political constituency following independence.

Additionally, despite the fact that many contemporary farm workers were born in Zimbabwe, there remains a perception in Zimbabwe, by citizens as well as the state, that farm workers are "foreigners." This perception fuelled the regime to state in 1997 that farm workers displaced by the then proposed acquisition of nearly a third of commercial farms could simply return home to Malawi, Zambia, or Mozambique. The statements prompted the recently formed (1997) Farm Worker Advocacy Group (FWAG) to mount a public awareness campaign on behalf of farm workers to combat this and other stereotypes about farm workers.

Requirements to prove citizenship often disadvantage farm workers, an issue that FWAG, GAPWUZ and the Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe (FCTZ) have attempted to reconcile with the regime. The final factor which deems farm workers as unreliable in the eyes of the regime is the assumption that by the nature of their affiliation with GAPWUZ, a trade union, farm workers *en mass* support the trade union backed opposition party MDC. MDC emerged in late 1999/ early 2000 out of the political activism of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) which had become

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[7] ZANLA was the liberation army wing of ZANU-PF's then ZANU political wing.

increasing vocal in its criticism of the regime in recent years. Farm workers thus elicit mistrust from the regime due to the combination of a perceived historical lack of unity as well as contemporary stereotypes about foreignness and allegiance to MDC. The marginal position of farm workers translates to a vulnerable population easily targeted by a state aiming to attack non-supporters in a campaign focusing on "indigenous" rights.

Similar to farm workers, white farmers' credentials as "true" Zimbabweans have also inspired distrust in the ZANU-PF state. Whites in general and farmers in particular are not seen as Zimbabweans by the regime, despite the fact that many were born in the country. In the years following independence, farmers were allowed to prosper, given they did not endorse opposition politics. White farmers continued to lobby government through their farmer union on agricultural issues, which changed its name from the Rhodesian Farmers' Union to the Commercial Farmers' Union (CFU) following independence. Although the CFU does not prohibit black farmers from joining, the union remains overwhelmingly white.

The numbers of white farmers in Zimbabwe decreased throughout the war. White farmers, as well as Black farmers, lived on the front lines of the liberation struggle. During the war, communities instituted various security measures such as daily roll calls, and armed patrols. Farmers leaving Zimbabwe often sold their farms to neighbors for whatever they could get in order to keep their farm from falling into the "terrorists'" hands, as whites referred to liberation fighters. Several farmers who remained, thus, were able to consolidate their land holdings and wealth after surviving the war.

Farmers' clubs, a tradition in farming communities, flourished after independence. Farmers relied on farmers' clubs for sports, drinking, and social events in

a setting that resisted post-independence desegregation. Though blacks are not prohibited from joining the clubs or visiting a club's bar, farmers' clubs remain farmers' escape into a world of whiteness. In one community I studied in 1998, a wealthy farmer donated land and built a new farmers' club for the community following independence. The farmer explained to me that after 1980, local blacks began frequenting the previous club which was located in a small town. White farmers did not feel comfortable in this new interracial social setting, according to my informant. The farmers needed a place of their own, a place where white culture dominated, the farmer explained. The new club location deterred black patronage. Located roughly ten kilometers from the township, the new farmers' club was not serviced by public transport and a distance that few would walk simply to have a beer or a game of tennis. White farmers have therefore, preserved separate communities within Zimbabwe, a factor that contributes to their outsider status within the country. My research in three farming communities in different regions of the country in 1998 revealed that few white farmers socialized with black Zimbabweans citing "cultural differences" as the primary factor. They believe, however, that their children's attendance in desegregated schools holds much hope for a more racially integrated future for the country.

Farmers and farm workers share commonalities in their identities that make them easy targets for a state aiming to cast political opponents as the *Other*. Their position as "perpetual foreigners" facilitates the ZANU-PF regime's branding of white farmers as "enemies of the state" as it did on April 18, 2000. Farm workers' association with the labor movement, their questionable nationality, and perceptions about their role during the liberation war similarly contribute to the ZANU-PF regime's ideological project of

casting opposition as "sell outs" to the cause of liberation. Couching the liberation of the land from non-nationals such as whites, enables the ZANU-PF regime to label the farm invasions the final phase of the liberation war, the third *chimurenga.* "Sell outs" or those suspected of not supporting liberation now or in the past become victims of the ZANU-PF regime's attempt at political hegemony. Thus, the ZANU-PF regime legitimizes its employment of violence through processes of delegitimizing the *other.*

Economic Decline, ESAP & Return of Land as Political Issue. During the 1980s, many countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America experienced macro-economic problems such as growing balance of payment deficits and rising inflation combined with low or stagnant growth rates. The causes of these problems include global trends such as rising oil prices and declining prices for primary products, as well as internal policies which may have been inappropriate. These external and internal forces joined to create the debt crisis. In response to the increased pressures on limited foreign exchange that these and other factors created, many governments agreed to World Bank and IMF sponsored stabilization and structural adjustment programs as conditions to additional loans. SAPs seek to increase exports, rationalize or decrease government expenditures, and facilitate loan repayment (Elson, 1995).

According to P.G. Kadenge, H. Ndoro and B.M. Zwizwai (1992), at independence, Zimbabwe inherited a troublesome economy marked by government control of critical sectors such as interest rates, wage rates, exchange rates, and the repatriation of profits. The colonial economy was highly regulated, particularly as it emerged from the Ian Smith UDI years and its policies of import substitution. The economy was also highly dependant on agriculture and primary product exports.

The colonial period also developed a political economy which was characterized by great inequality in which the majority of Africans remained poor small-holder farmers and the majority of whites achieved high standards of living. This basic structure

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persisted throughout the 1980s as the Zimbabwean government attempted to redress

social inequities through (1) placing price controls on food to ensure the majority's ability

to purchase basic commodities and (2) increasing state expenditures on education and

health care. The early years of independence benefited from good rains and removals of

trade sanctions which resulted in high rates of economic growth. For example, between

1980 and 1982, real GDP grew by 26 per cent. However, the 1982 fiscal year reported no

growth in real GDP and in 1983 the economy contracted (Stoneman 1988:47). After

1982, Zimbabwe embarked on an IMF advised stabilization plan. The plan had little

success in improving the country's economy due to the continuation of falling commodity

prices and an unexpected drought. The agreement collapsed in 1984 (Kadenge, Ndoro,

and Zwizwai 1992). By the end of its first decade of independence, Zimbabwe faced an

economic crisis involving a "shortage of foreign exchange; growing unemployment; low

levels of investment; high levels of inflation; escalating debt and infastructural decay"

(Kadenge, Ndoro and Zwizwai 1992:1).

This declining economic reality led to the introduction of the Economic Structural

Adjustment Program (ESAP) in 1990, although some (Bijlmakers, Basset and Sanders

1995) argue ESAP was not fully in effect until March 1991. ESAP primarily involves

trade liberalization, but also cutting backs in civil service, reducing income taxes, making

parastatals more efficient, and removing price controls (Kadenge, Ndoro and Zwizwai

1992:10). Bijlmakers, Basset and Sanders (1995:215) summarize ESAP's features in the

following clear and concise manner:

> The ESAP package...contains the standard features of IMF/World Bank
> economic reform strategies, including, inter alia (Zimbabwe Government,
> 1991a): reduction of the budget deficit, through a combination of
> reduction of public enterprise deficits and rationalisation of public sector
> employment; trade liberalisation, including price decontrol, and
> deregulation of foreign trade, investment and production; phased removal
> of subsidies; devaluation of the local currency; and
> enforcement/introduction of cost recovery in the health and education
> sectors.

While Zimbabwe's structural adjustment program in many ways reflected typical World Bank economic strategies, Peter Gibbon (1995b:11-12) argues that ESAP contained two elements which distinguished it from previous adjustments: (1) ESAP was not accompanied by an agreement with the IMF for funding;[8] (2) ESAP was accompanied by a report on the Social Dimensions of Adjustment. According to Gibbon, the absence of an IMF agreement probably resulted in Zimbabwe's ability to set the adjustment period for five rather than the usual three years as well as allowing the privatization of parastatals to proceed with goals of semi-commercialization rather than complete privatization. The Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA) report frankly addressed many of the hardships to be expected and discussed a compensatory program for retrenched government employers and a reserve fund to ensure food for the poor. SDA also included a broad yet vague commitment to preserving expenditures on health and education, although it did mention the introduction of cost-sharing mechanisms (Gibbon 1995a and 1995b).

Critiques of SAPs in general and ESAP in particular demonstrate the unequal share of burdens and benefits of adjustment programs in both international and domestic dimensions. Najmi Kanji, Nazneen Kanji and Firoze Manji (1991) argue that SAPs maintain the international status quo of the North exploiting the South. Elson (1995) and others note the disproportionate burden that women share under adjustment as the policies focus on macro economic factors and exhibit gender blindness. Lucia Hanmer (1994:4) notes varied reactions of scholars to the impacts of SAPs on social services:

> On the one hand stabilisation programmes [sic] invariably require reductions of government budget deficits which have led to concern about the vulnerability of social sectors to ensuing cut backs. ...On the other hand it is argued that by over combating the long term barriers to growth SAPs will allow higher social spending as government revenues will increase with improved economic performance.

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[8] The IMF loan would come later.

Furthermore, the inclusion of SDA and its claims of protecting the poor in Zimbabwe

under ESAP reflects an implicit knowledge of the potentially harmful effects of SAPs on

the poor, as noted by Gibbon *et al.* (1995a).

In addition to the above criticisms of ESAP, the seriousness with which the

government pursued its SDA program came under scrutiny. The Zimbabwean

government claimed those hit hardest would be protected through its SDA program which

was designed in 1991. Protection from ESAP would come through targeting employment

and training, food subsidies, cost recovery in social services, and monitoring and

evaluation of its programs while also emphasizing the increased involvement of third

parties (non-governmental organizations, employee organizations, employer

organizations, and local authorities) to decrease government involvement (Bijlmakers,

Basset and Sanders 1995). UNICEF (1994) reports that although ESAP included SDA at

its origination, SDA was not announced until a year after ESAP. Another 16 months

passed before a full-time SDA officer was appointed to administer the small budget

accorded to SDA (UNICEF 1994). According to Bijlmakers, Basset and Sanders (1995)

SDA did not work, and by 1993, the government had instituted a new program to handle

Zimbabwe's poor, the Poverty Alleviation Action Plan. The inability of the Zimbabwean

government to alleviate the hardships of ESAP contributed to a growing sense of

disillusionment of the populace with ZANU-PF and contributed to the heightened

political tensions of the 1990s.

The 1998 Donors Conference. Following the publication of preliminary notices of

acquisition of roughly 1,400 farms in November 1997, which were later de-listed through

appeals in court, in 1998, the Zimbabwean government, the CFU and donors laid out a

plan to address the land issue in Zimbabwe. The donors required accountability and transparency in land reform in exchange for the provision of financial support to pay for the improvements to land and resettlement programs. A major point of contention for the regime remained the issue of donor funding to pay for the land itself, a condition that donors would not accept, yet the ZANU-PF regime desired. At the donor conference, the parties agreed to a phased plan of land acquisition and resettlement that aimed to acquire and resettle 5 million ha over 5 years (GoZ Inception Phase Framework Plan). Under the agreement, during the Inception phase of two years, 118 farms, approximately 200,000 ha would be offered initially, with a target of 1 million ha throughout the Inception Phase beginning in 1999 (Bowyer-Bower and Stoneman 2000). However, little progress was made with regard to the donor conference plans between 1998 and 2000. The need for land reform is widely accepted in Zimbabwe among both Blacks and Whites. The persistence of racial inequities in land distribution remains divisive and symbolic of the country's colonial history. However, despite the agreement reached at the conference and the willingness of international donors to fund the project, Mugabe ignored this route, knowing that if the land question was finally resolved in Zimbabwe, he would have no political cards left to play.

The ZANU-PF Regime – Understanding the State in Zimbabwe.

Perspectives on intrastate conflict tend to locate causal factors either internally or externally. Internal causes of conflict include political process and transition, regime strength, economic grievance or greed, elite instability and identity. Alternatively, external causes center on global structural inequality, dependency, and the world system

(see Jenkins and Schock 1992 for discussion of these perspectives). However, binary approaches often limit our understanding of the issue at hand. In terms of the causes of intrastate conflict, global structures operate through, but not entirely determining, intrastate dynamics (Jenkins and Schock 1992). Therefore, a synthesis of several approaches follows in an attempt to deepen our understanding of causes of conflict relating these to the case of Zimbabwe's land invasions and shedding light on the nature of the Zimbabwean state.

The transformation of the global political sphere post-1989 resulted in a "global crisis of authoritarianism" (Pye cited in Joseph 1999:60). Largely authoritarian regimes throughout Africa have undergone shifts to what Richard Joseph (1999) termed "virtual democracies." Virtual democracies are characterized by (Joseph 1999:61):

- A formal basis in citizen rule, but with key decisionmaking [sic] (especially economic) insulated from popular involvement
- Manipulation of democratic transitions by political incumbents, including the use of violence and electoral fraud, to relegitimize their power
- Wider popular participation, but narrow policy choices and outcomes
- External encouragement of multiparty elections on the premise that they will not threaten vested domestic and foreign interests if incumbents act adroitly.

Joseph's (1999) virtual democracies reflect the limited opening of political space that democratization has brought to African states, while highlighting incumbents' proclivity to authoritarian governance and the vulnerability of semidemocracies to intrastate conflict. Hegre *et al.* (2001) recently duplicated previous findings that semidemocratic regimes are more likely than either democracies or autocracies to experience civil conflict. Hegre *et al.* (2001:33) wrote,

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Semidemocracies are partly open yet somewhat repressive, a combination that invites protest, rebellion, and other forms of civil violence. Repression leads to grievances that induce groups to take action, and openness allows for them to organize and engage in activities against the regime.

In their quest to answer "does democratization also lead to civil peace," Hegre *et al.* (2001:33) related their former findings to other research indicating that semidemocracies also experience more regime change. Regime consolidation, whether democratic or autocratic, "is less destabilizing and therefore less likely to generate political violence" (Hegre *et al.* 2001: 34).[9] Ultimately, Hegre *et al.* (2001) argued that semidemocratic states are more likely to experience domestic political violence even when stabilized following a regime transition, such as regime consolidation in post-independence Zimbabwe.

In addition to the vulnerability of semidemocratic stated above, Ted Gurr (1991) and Karen Barkey and Sunita Parikh (1991) have cited the role of elite instability and "weak" states in undermining civil peace. Referring to states born often out of revolutionary or anti-colonial struggles, such societies "entered the postcolonial era as highly differentiated entities where traditional categories such as ethnicity, tribe, and various cross-cutting clientelistic networks predominated" (Barkey and Parikh 1991:537-8). The inability of weak states to promote economic growth results in states which are usually most concerned with keeping ruling elites in power. It is in this arena of maintaining elite power that Gurr (1991:173) stresses the need to understand "why some regimes and rulers rely mainly on coercion and violence as instruments of rule." In

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[9] Hegre *et al.* (2001) noted, however, that autocratic states are inherently contradictory and most likely will not consolidate.

Zimbabwe, the state *is* the ZANU-PF regime, and ZANU-PF *is* Mugabe. Party members who challenge Mugabe's views are simply thrown out of the party.

The ZANU-PF/ Mugabe regime's record since independence easily fits the combined picture presented here as a semidemocratic, weak state concerned with the maintenance of elite power. While independence brought about majority rule and voting rights to all Zimbabweans, Zimbabwe has effectively been a *de facto* one-party state. Early in Zimbabwe's independence, ruling ZANU-PF filled key administrative and governmental positions with ex-combatants and kin of top officials (like Robert Mugabe). Technocrats only began filling such positions in the late 1980s. Furthermore, the many repressive mechanisms put in place by the colonial regime remained, such as the state-controlled media and the Law and Order Maintenance Act. As International Financial Institutions (IFIs) in the 1990s pushed for economic reforms, increasingly political reforms and transparency have been mandated as well. As will be discussed below, increased activism within civil society developed in this period as well. Therefore, independence increased the political space within Zimbabwe for blacks, but it has not brought about an entirely open society. Post-independence violence within Zimbabwe, such as the *Gukurahundi* or dissident violence in the mid-1980s (discussed below) or the current political conflict should not be surprising.

Neither should it be surprising to find that in both these cases, the targets of state violence represent groups that the state can cast as the *other*. Nagengast (1994:122) reminds us that state violence also serves a critical role in defining legitimate members of a society as well as ensuring compliance of citizens to state goals:

> ...the goal of state violence is not to inflict pain; it is the social project of creating punishable categories of people, forging and maintaining boundaries among them, and building the consensus around those categories that specifies and enforces behavioral norms and legitimates and de-legitimates specific groups. Torture has another, only partially successful function – to terrorize people into conformity.

Nagengast (1994) further argues that perpetrators of torture categorize their victims as Others, who represent an evil, a threat to the existing order. She writes (1994:122),

> It is largely underclass status that makes certain people(s) susceptible to violent abuses and it is their ambiguity – as both less-than-human brutes and super-humans capable of undermining the accepted order of society – that allows elites to crystallize the myths about the evil they represent, hence, justifying the violence perpetrated against them.

For Nagengast, identities and appropriate images of the nation are significant in understanding states' use and justification of violence and torture against its own populace. As Stephan (1999) found in her research on indigenous "suspects" in southern Mexico, existing cultural understandings of indigenous groups shape perceptions of human rights abuses. In contrast to scholars who challenge the universalist discourse of human rights as Western biased, Stephan (1999) argues that it is more important to analyze "... how dominant representations of the dangerous, the subversive, the worthless, the marginal, and the unimportant become linked to making particular groups of people susceptible to violent abuses that allow them to be treated with less than human respect and dignity." Identity and otherness become key factors in states' attempts to justify their actions. In Zimbabwe, white farmers and black farm workers epitomize the Other to the ZANU-PF state. White farmers and black farm workers are perpetual foreigners in their country of birth; they were on the wrong side of the liberation struggle;

and, they have allegedly aligned themselves with opposition politics. As Stephans (1999) notes,

> In each situation of human rights abuses, the key to what actually happens lies not do much in a deliberate neglect of universal human rights declarations but in particular ideological interpretations that permit and justify the use of violence for particular ends, often political.

Defining the intrastate conflict in terms of violence and torture here serves two purposes. First, it bridges the above discussions of causes of conflict, state transformation, and elite power to specific actions carried out by the state or its agents. While the ZANU-PF regime continues to argue the justification of invasions as "peaceful protests" over land, an analysis of farmers' and farm workers' experiences with farm invasions and violence demonstrates otherwise. Torture and human rights abuses must be seen not only as crimes against humanity or persons, but also as social processes through which states attempt to legitimize their own actions by delegitimizing specific categories of people. Second, clarifying the nature of farm invasions as torture and conceptualizing torture in terms of identity and *Otherness* further links internal causes of intrastate conflict to external causes. In other words, the development of "virtual democracy" in Africa following the political transformations marked by the end of the Cold War, weaken African leaders' ability to rule autonomously, therefore increasing their reliance on coercion and violence when faced with political challenge. In this context, states seek to justify their actions through the creation of the subversive *other*.

Violence as political tool. To contextualize the 2000 invasions and the ZANU-PF regime, it is important to also mention the historical use of violence by the regime. The current use of violence in response to a challenge to power should not surprise anyone who has followed Zimbabwe's history. Mugabe/ZANU-PF's competition has

historically either been eliminated or attacked (*Gukurahundi*). The clearest example is

the violence that dominated the mid-1980s in the Midlands and Matabeleland, known as

Gukurahundi locally, which means the rain that cleanses all (CCJPZ 1997). During this

period, the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace of Zimbabwe (CCJPZ) cites 7,246

reported human rights offenses for the period 1982-87, the vast majority of which were

committed by agents of the state or ZANU-PF (CCJPZ 1997). Table 2.2 summarizes the

nature of *Gukurahundi* human rights violations with detentions, assaults, and deaths

emerging as the most prevalent abuses (see below).

Table 2.2
Gukurahundi Human Rights Violations, 1982-85

Type of Violation	Number
Deaths	1437
Missing	354
Destruction of property	680
Torture	365
Detention	2713
Assault	1537
Rape	159
TOTAL	7246

Source: CCJPZ 1997

In addition to the *Gukurahundi* period, Zimbabwean scholars, novelists, and others have

begun to uncover the violence of the liberation war perpetrated against villagers not only

by the Rhodesian Front forces, but also by the two liberation armies, Zimbabwe African

National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army

(ZIPRA) (see Moore-King 1988, Kanengoni 1997, Staunton 1990, and Kriger 1992). The

brutality and violence committed by liberation fighters against villagers during the war is

a topic that many Zimbabweans do not want to integrate into their historical memory. It

seems difficult for people to face the duality of a movement that simultaneously coerced

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and liberated a nation. In recent years, Zimbabwean historians, novelists, filmmakers, and academics have begun to uncover this much ignored aspect of the liberation history of Zimbabwe and have stressed that all sides of the war (the Rhodesian Front, and guerilla forces ZANLA and ZIPRA) committed acts of terror against the populace (Moore-King 1988, Kanengoni 1997, Staunton 1990, and Kriger 1992).

I raise this issue here to highlight the consistent use of violence by ZANLA and the ZANU-PF regime in response to political challenge as well as to point to the similarities in the strategies of violence and intimidation over the years. Human rights organizations have begun to trace the tactics used during the current crisis to both tactics used in *Gukurahundi* and the liberation war (NDI 2000, ICRT 2000).

Decline in ZANU-PF Regime Popularity

The rise in civil society. The late 1990s marked a transition in civil society organizations' criticism of the ruling ZANU-PF government in Zimbabwe. Beginning in the late 1980s, the labor movement in Zimbabwe became increasingly vocal about not only the plight of workers, but also broader political issues such as corruption and governance (Sachikonye 1997). The early 1990s saw a wave of public sector strikes that continue to occur in Zimbabwe to this day. Strikes in the early 1990s included Railway Workers (1992), Postal and Communication Workers (1992 and 1994), Bank Workers (1993-4), and Civil Service Workers (1996) (Raftopoulos and Phimister 1997:145). More and more frequently, the target of the strikes was government itself. Following the widespread strikes in the early independence period, the regime took the lead in establishing the ZCTU as a coordinating body for the various trade unions (Sachikonye

1997). Sachikonye (1997) argued that despite its initial closeness to government (exemplified by the fact that the ZCTU's first General Secretary was a relative of Mugabe's), throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, the ZCTU became increasingly more independent and critical of government. As evidence of the increased politicization of the labor movement during the 1990s, Sachikonye (1997) highlighted ZCTU's criticism of the one-party state and corruption, and its legal challenge to the arrest of union demonstrators under the Law and Order Maintenance Act over protests to the Economic and Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in 1992. The ZCTU played an additional critical role in the rise of Zimbabwe's civil society through its organization of the mass stay-aways and protest of late 1997 and 1998, which will be discussed below. It is out of these mobilizations that the opposition political party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) would later form.

Also during this period, the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans Association (ZNLWVA) became increasing organized and politicized. In response to pressure from the ZNLWVA over corruption in the War Victims Compensation Fund, in August 1997, Mugabe announced an unbudgeted allocation of funds to compensate war veterans – a lump sum of Z$50,000 each plus monthly increments of Z$2000 for life. The move brought severe criticism both domestically and internationally (Financial Gazette 28 August 1997, Mail and Guardian 2 November 1997, Mail and Guardian 12 December 1997). Despite the overwhelming evidence that War Veteran Leader Dr. Chenjerai "Hitler" Hunzvi facilitated the looting of the War Vets Compensation Fund by party "chefs" or big shots, Mugabe's relatives and others, Hunzvi emerged unscathed and did not implicate his co-corruptors (GoZ 1998a). In the end, ZNLWVA successfully

pressured the government for monetary demands, and the groundwork was laid for Mugabe to call on "his" war veterans during the 2000 elections.

The decision by the government to introduce a series of taxes to finance the war vet payouts culminated in the ZCTU organized stay-aways and riots of December 9-10, 1997. During these two days in December 1997, ZCTU effectively brought the nation to a standstill and pressured government to scrap many of the tax measures introduced (Financial Gazette 11 December 1997, Mail and Guardian 12 December 1997). The ZCTU built on the momentum gained during this period of anti-government sentiment throughout the remainder of the 1990s and ultimately spawned the opposition party, the MDC, ZANU-PF's primary challenger in the 2000 parliamentary elections.

Weakening support for ZANU-PF. In addition to the rise of civil groups critical of government, the ZANU-PF regime had fallen out of favor with the populace and appeared to be out of touch with the needs of the Zimbabwean population. Initial findings of the Southern African Democracy Barometer (or Afrobarometer) revealed that the majority of Zimbabweans were dissatisfied with how democracy works in Zimbabwe (Mattes, Bratton, Davids, and Africa 2000).[10] Specifically, 56.9 percent of Zimbabweans surveyed felt "not very satisfied" or "not satisfied at all" with democracy in Zimbabwe, while 16.8 percent responded that "Zimbabwe is not a democracy" (Mattes, Bratton, Davids, and Africa 2000:28). According to Mattes, Bratton, Davids, and Africa (2000:6), "there is a widespread sense of disillusionment and cynicism about the political system.

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[10] The Afrobarometer research "measures public attitudes on democracy and its alternatives, evaluations of the quality of governance and economic performance, perceptions of the consequences of democratic governance on people's everyday lives, and information about a range of actual and potential economic and political behaviors" (Mattes, Bratton, Davids and Africa 2000:1). The research included multi-stage, stratified area cluster probability samples of approximately 1200 respondents from each of the study countries of Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The research was conducted in 1999.

... the public mood is not just 'anti-Mugabe,' but expresses a generalized discontent with the larger system of one party dominant ZANU-PF rule." Only 19.4 percent of Zimbabweans evaluate the current regime as less corrupt than the previous regime (Ian Smith's UDI government); while only 20.8 percent consider the ZANU-PF government more trustworthy than the Smith regime (Mattes, Bratton, Davids, and Africa 2000:39). The Afrobarometer's findings on Zimbabweans' dissatisfaction with the current regime are supported by the findings of a public opinion poll conducted January 14 – February 9, 2000 by the Helen Suzman Foundation (Johnson 2000). According to the Suzman survey of 1000 rural and 900 urban households, 63 percent of Zimbabweans responded that they felt it was time for a change in government from ZANU-PF (Johnson 2000:4).[11]

In addition to dissatisfaction with ZANU-PF rule, several studies (including one conducted by the Zimbabwean government itself) suggest that the preeminence of land as *the* social issue in Zimbabwe needs to be rethought. In the Afrobarometer survey conducted between September and October 1999, only 1.1 percent of Zimbabweans said land was an issue needing governmental attention. Zimbabweans identified the economy (74 percent), job creation (37 percent), and health (18 percent) as the nation's top problems (Mattes, Bratton, Davids, and Africa 2000:46-47). The Suzman research also found land was less of a priority than economic issues to Zimbabweans as a whole. When asked to state the most important issues the government faces in the Suzman research, Zimbabweans prioritized (1) rising prices, (2) unemployment, (3) fall in the Z$, (4) poverty, and (5) land (Johnson 2000:13). Zimbabweans also expressed their dissatisfaction with the government's handling of the land issue and placed the

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[11] Admittedly, unlike the Afrobarometer research, the Suzman report offers little discussion of their sampling methods in their final report. However, taken with the Afrobarometer findings, there is a clear suggestion of the political attitudes of the Zimbabwean people.

responsibility for the lack of resolution over the land issue primarily with government

(74%) (Johnson 2000:34). In addition to the Afrobarometer and Suzman research, the

GoZ's 1995 Poverty Assessment Survey Study (PASS) data suggest that economic

issues, rather than the land issue, rate attention from government. According to the PASS

(GoZ 1997), Zimbabweans do not perceive 'poor quality land' or a 'shortage of land' as a

primary cause of poverty, nor do they perceive 'provision of land' as a solution to

household poverty (PASS 1997). Respondents linked poverty to unemployment,

drought, low paying jobs and rising prices while they felt employment creation, wage

increases, and access to agricultural loans and irrigation were potential solutions to

poverty (GoZ 1997). Combined, these studies suggest not only the need for the regime to

rethink its political platform that so narrowly focuses on land, they also suggest the need

for social scientists to challenge our assumptions about "the land issue" in Zimbabwe.

The research reveals that the changing demographics of a country with a significant

youth population that has benefited from the expansion of the education system in

postcolonial Zimbabwe has perhaps subsequently expanded their career aspirations

beyond communal farming.[12]

The Draft Constitution and Clause 57. While the labor movement continued to

challenge the regime over diminishing living standards and the rising cost of living under

ESAP, other civic groups pushed for democratization through constitutional reform. The

National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) formed in 1997 with the express purpose of

seeking nation-wide dialog on the issue of drafting a new constitution. Throughout the

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[12] My research with farm workers in 1997-1998 supports this. Many of the farm workers I interviewed had completed their O levels (and some their A levels) and saw farm labor as transitional. Particularly younger farm workers aspired to formal employment rather than communal farming and hoped to save money from working on a farm towards technical training and hopefully a job elsewhere.

late 1990s and early 2000, NCA organized meetings nation-wide in Zimbabwe to solicit views on constitutional reform. Ultimately, the regime created a parallel organization, the Constitutional Commission (CC), which was tasked with canvassing public opinion and drafting a new constitution for the February 2000 referendum. Media reports suggested, however, that the constitution presented in the referendum had been rushed through the CC debate and approval phase. In the end, Mugabe added Clause 57 which enabled the state to compulsorily acquire white-owned land without compensation. The Clause further stated that if farmers desired compensation, they should approach Great Britain, the "former colonial power." The famous land clause caused tremendous controversy throughout Zimbabwean society and was added to the Constitution without the CC commissioners' consent.[13] Despite the parallel processes, the NCA continued to develop its own draft constitution and campaigned heavily against the CC draft constitution. The NCA claimed that the CC draft further entrenched presidential powers against the wishes of citizens (NCA meetings). Ultimately, the citizens of Zimbabwe rejected the regime's Constitution and its Land Clause, leading to the launch of the land invasions.

Therefore, what we see in the 1990s is the simultaneous rise in civil society and democratic organizations, the waning of Mugabe's popular support, and the consolidation of Mugabe's power with the ZNLWVA. These events occurred against a backdrop of economic decline under structural adjustment and intense scrutiny by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Notably, ZANU-PF announced in early 2000, that it had hired the ZNLWVA to

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[13] Clause 57 of the draft constitution granted the government the right to appropriate land from white farmers for resettlement without compensation.

"campaign" for the coming election to the tune of Z$2 million, a move largely regarded

in Zimbabwe as payment for the campaign of terror (NDI 2000).

Table 2.1
Zimbabwe: History of Land Policy, 1891-1990

Year	Land Act/ Commission	Purpose	Result
1888	*Rudd Concession*	*Lobengula signs over mineral rights*	*Rhodes uses this as the basis for the Royal Charter establishing BSAC and granting administrative control*
1889	The Lippert Concession	White Settlers to acquire land rights from native Zimbabweans	BSACo buy concession and uses it as basis for land appropriation
1898	Native Reserves Order	To create Native Reserves in the face of mass land appropriation by white settlers	Native reserves created haphazardly in low potential areas and which subsequently become Communal Areas (CA)

Year	Land Act/ Commission	Purpose	Result
1930	Land Apportionment Act	To separate by law, land between black and white	The high potential areas become white large scale privately owned farms. *Creates dual tenure systems by which whites can privately own land and black land is held communally in trust by the state. The Act also allowed for Native Purchase Areas, but again blacks who purchased land here did not enjoy freehold title.*
1951	Native Land Husbandry Act	To enforce private ownership of land, destocking and conservation practices on black smallholders	Mass resistance to legislation fuelling nationalistic politics. Law scrapped in 1961.
1965	Tribal Trust Lands (TTL) Act	To change the name of Native Reserves and create trustees for the land	Because of population pressure TTL became degraded "homelands"

Year	Land Act/ Commission	Purpose	Result
1969	Land Tenure Act (LTA)	To replace LAA of 1930 and finally divide land 50% white and 50% black	Combined with the TTL Act Rhodesia had equivalent of apartheid
1979	*Lancaster House Constitution*	*Protected private property ownership. Required that land reform follow "willing-buyer, willing-seller" basis and that farmers may be paid in either local or foreign currency*	*Resulted in resettlement of 56,000 families on 3.3 million hectares of former LSCF. "Willing-seller, willing-buyer" clause blamed for GoZ's failure to reach goal of 162,000 families resettled in the first five years.*
1981	Communal Lands Act	To change Tribal Trust Lands to Communal Areas	Change of land authority from traditional leaders to District Councils
1985	Land Acquisition Act	To give Government first right to purchase large scale farms for resettlement	Limited impact on resettlement programme

Year	Land Act/ Commission	Purpose	Result
1990	Land Acquisition Act	To acquire 5 million ha. of land for resettlement	Implementation underway

Table adapted from Rukuni (1994b:14). Italicized items added by author for clarification.

CHAPTER 3:

METHODS

Introduction

My training as a sociologist instructed me to begin by defining a problem to be studied, formulating research questions, identifying a research site, conducting research, analyzing the results, and finally writing it up. However, this chapter is not typical, because the research process and methodology on which it is based is not typical. Sociology teaches us that we should start the research process with a clearly defined question and then adopt methods that will produce the data to answer them. In preparation for my dissertation fieldwork in Zimbabwe during 2000, I did all this. However, fieldwork is messy and unpredictable. It would be insincere to present this research as if the theoretical focus, methods, and research design guided the study of Zimbabwe's land crisis and the associated violence and insecurity. Rather, what happened was nearly the opposite – my research process evolved into the art of the possible. What was "possible" was a complex conglomeration of sociological serendipity, risk assessment, and crisis. My methodology emerged out of a creative blend of ethnographic methods, pragmatism, and my own personal assessment of risk in the field.

Therefore, in *this* methodology chapter, I address various issues surrounding the "doing" of this study. I begin with a brief discussion of sociological serendipity and answer the question of how I came to study farm invasions and political violence in Zimbabwe. Next, I address issues surrounding studying violence and conflict and what Behar (1996) terms "the vulnerable observer." I follow this with a section that pays

special attention to the issues of power and identity in shaping the fieldwork experience. These discussions serve to contextualize the approach of ethnographic methods in relation to studying violence. I follow these contextualizations with a discussion of the specific methods used in this research. I discuss the participant-observation and interviewing techniques, informant selection, and triangulation as research strategies.

Sociological Serendipity

While I originally planned to study the implication of globalization on commercial farming communities, changes in Zimbabwe's political context made it impossible to pursue my initial course of study. Due to my existing access to the commercial farming community, the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU), and the General Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ), I proceeded to research the evolving political crisis. My dissertation, therefore, focuses on how commercial farming communities survive under political violence and terror. How does the state use terror to further its own interest? How is violence and terror experienced differently by persons of different social positions? Ultimately, I am asking what Linda Green (1995:111) frames as the way "the routinization of terror functions?" How do people in different social locations strategize and cope under conditions of chronic fear and insecurity?

Violence and Vulnerability[1]

The decision to study the invasions plunged me into a world of researching violence and insecurity that required an approach to methodology that centered on my

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[1] I draw here on Ruth Behar's The Vulnerable Observer: Anthropology that Breaks Your Heart, (1996).

own and my informants' safety and psychological well-being. Prior to this study, I had

studied Zimbabwe's commercial farming sector and land disputes, but I had not studied

violence. In the course of this study, I came to see how violence and insecurity become

normalized in society; how violence and insecurity exist as one of the many threads

woven into society, rather than events that stand outside society (Robben 1995). In their

introduction to *Fieldwork Under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival*

Robben and Nordstrom (1995:3) write:

> ... The everydayness of war is a never-ending stream of worries
> about the next meal, the next move, and the next assault. This immediacy
> of action characterizes not only war but any form of violence. There are
> few social prescriptions on how to cope and survive in violent situations.
> This emphasis on how people come to grips with life under siege,
> on the experience, practice and everydayness of violence, makes attention
> to fieldwork conditions necessary. The emotional intensity of the events
> people studied, the political stakes that surround research on violence, and
> the haphazard circumstances under which fieldwork is conducted entwine
> fieldwork and ethnography. These tensions weave their way through the
> whole of the anthropological endeavor – coloring the lives and perspective
> of the researchers and those they study alike.

In the course of my research, I was presented with a variety of graphic and

emotional accounts of violence. I gathered daily land invasion updates from the CFU

(CFU 29). Through these reports, each day, I received information that recounted, by

region, community, and farm, details of invasions, and often, the violence involved. My

interviews with farmers, CFU executives, and GAPWUZ executives often included

detailed accounts of assault, abduction, intimidation, and threats. I attended funerals of

farmers killed due to farm invasion violence; reviewed human rights violations incident

reports; and perused graphic photographs of torture survivors. In a situation that

resembled low-grade war, the research was risky and personally intimidating. In the

course of researching violence for this dissertation, I not only had to alter my research

questions under conditions of uncertainty, but I also had to confront my (and my family and friends') fears and concern for my safety. This is reflected in my decision to focus primarily on white farm women and men for primary interviews. Quite simply, it was less conspicuous and suspicious for a white woman such as I to visit rural whites than to visit black farm workers. The assumption of ZANU-PF supporters was that all whites were MDC supporters; therefore, I felt that farm workers, already hard hit by violence, would be further at risk by talking about invasions with a white person.

Robben and Nordstrom (1995:4) write that "...the ontics of violence – the lived experience of violence – and the epistemology of violence – the ways of knowing and reflecting about violence – are not separate. Experience and interpretation are inseparable for perpetrators, victims, and ethnographers alike." What Robben and Nordstrom highlight here is how the researcher's experience shapes what is known and the importance of reinterpreting events once one is removed from the immediacy of the violence. On returning to Michigan from Zimbabwe, it was several months before I could review interviews and fieldnotes without intense emotional reactions. Life in Zimbabwe during the farm and election violence was bifurcated and ironic, a confusing fusion of *Animal Farm* and *Alice in Wonderland,* an advisor and I used to joke. Initially, life in urban areas remained protected from the electoral and farm violence, but even that was mediated by social geography – as high density suburbs became targets of political violence when elections neared.

Negotiating violence and insecurity in the field can be illustrated in an example from my fieldwork experience. The decision of whether to return early and curtail my

grant[2] was fraught with intensity and confusion. Living in conditions of generalized

insecurity shifts one's reality and alters notions of acceptable risk in fieldwork. I had

always held the belief that a dissertation did not merit life-threatening risks – that

fieldwork risk had finite and clear boundaries. When faced with conflict and violence,

however, such boundaries become obtuse and difficult to gauge. When I returned from

fieldwork briefly in June 2000, a group of close women graduate students held a

barbeque to welcome me back. In the course of the meal and our discussions, I explained

that the situation in Zimbabwe "wasn't really that bad." I had determined, I explained,

that most likely, I would not be killed or raped if I encountered "war vets" unhappy with

my research. Rather, if confronted, I might be abducted and possibly tortured for a few

hours before being released, as had happened to others often throughout the invasions. I

felt that to kill a US researcher would call negative international attention that the "war

vets" wanted to avoid and, therefore, I thought my danger was not too serious. My

colleagues, all of whom have done research overseas, reacted with amazement and I

slowly came to realize how my perceptions of "acceptable risk" had been altered. Each

day, with each account of beatings and abductions, one redraws the line in shifting sands

as one tries to make sense of the incomprehensible and simply keep going. The ontics of

violence (Robben and Nordstrom 1995) or the daily efforts to survive under conditions of

insecurity impact a researcher's (or survivor's) ability to perceive the ways in which

violence and insecurity begin to shape how we view and define the world around us. In

other words, risks become relative to what is going on around you -- in the context of

rape, death, loss of home and livelihood, merely being temporarily abducted or beaten become normalized and defined as "lucky."

The importance of acknowledging the position of the researcher and the call for reflexivity in fieldwork reflects what Ruth Behar (1996) terms the vulnerable observer. Behar (1996) stresses the need for anthropologists to write about their subjective experiences in the field as they relate to the subjects of their research. Cautioning against confessional revelations for revelation's sake, Behar emphasizes the need to bring the detached social observer to her/his own experience, while bringing the intensity and emotion to her/his writing of fieldwork. Behar notes that writing vulnerably is risky, both personally and professionally. In this writing, I hope to reflect on my own experiences in the field with the detachment and intensity that Behar inspires. I hope to highlight rather than hide the conflicting desire I had both to witness and document events in Zimbabwe and to struggle with my desire to return to the safety of the US.

Power and Identity in Fieldwork

I attempt to write reflexively about my own position within the research context of violence and intimidation in the conclusion of this study. While I write about the experiences of white farm women and men, I write also about my own situatedness in the research. The fears, uncertainty, and strategies of the white farming community will be presented briefly with my own. While such reflexivity has a stronger tradition in the discipline of anthropology than in sociology, feminist sociology provides a home for such writing within the discipline. Feminist research methods inform my research process and are a useful starting point to explore issues of power and identity in fieldwork.

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Feminist social scientists writing about power in research settings usually begin by lamenting the power of the researcher to define the research subject as "object" (Acker 1996, Gorelick 1991, Stacey 1985; Stacey 1988, Cancian 1996). In critiquing the unequal relationship between researcher/ researched in traditional social science, feminist researchers highlight the need to invoke more participatory methodologies through which research subjects participate in the research process. Scholars attempt to redefine research "subject/objects" as "informants" and seek to break down the power relationships inherent in the research process. The desire for "participatory" research, however, has not remained solely in the realm of feminist scholars. Interdisciplinary researchers in the field of development studies also have emphasized participation and the deconstruction of the research relationship to incorporate local knowledge, the perspectives of development beneficiaries, and the definition of research goals (Parpart and Marchand 1995, Rahman 1993, Chambers 1983).

While such attention to issues of power and exploitation within the research process are indeed critical for researchers to address, discussions of power relations in the field remain incomplete. Put simply, researchers do not possess *total* power in the field, and research "subjects" are not entirely powerless. If we consider fieldwork to consist of social relations that blend research and personal relationships (Stacey 1988), then we must acknowledge a more complex power dynamic. Informants have the power to refuse to talk to researchers, to avoid answering certain questions, or to provide misinformation. Informants can attempt to manipulate research outcomes to their own ends, discredit a researcher in the community's eyes, and in extreme situations, threaten researchers.

Discussions of the "powerful researcher" in fieldwork relationships disguise the role of gender, sexuality, and race in shaping the research process, a "dirty little secret" that many Western women experience during fieldwork. Gender and sexuality represent not only social markers and identities, but also reflect power relationships themselves. Western women rarely acknowledge their experiences of sexual harassment, denied/ restricted access, or assault during fieldwork.[3] How is the researcher/ researched power dynamic affected when an informant (so-called powerless) propositions a researcher (so-called powerful)?

Throughout my fieldwork experience, power was a contradictory concept. The need to gain access to sensitive information, a pervasive feeling of personal insecurity, and my position in a social hierarchy that intersected race/gender/class/nation mediated my "power" as a researcher. I often felt more vulnerable than powerful. In addition to the vulnerability associated with researching violence (see above), my position within the CFU as an "outsider" established a power dynamic in which my ability to continue research obviously could be revoked at any time. My approach to studying the land invasions involved "studying up" on social relations and relied on immersion into the overwhelmingly male world of white commercial farmers. Given the context of insecurity and terror in Zimbabwe, my entry into the CFU depended on a previous relationship with a CFU leader. Entry into confidential meetings required assurances that I would handle sensitive information with care. It also required that I not publicly challenge the social norms of the institution that included an overwhelmingly white membership, entirely white representatives within the union, and only one woman in the

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[3] For an exception to this, see "Ethnography of the Ethnographer" by Cathy Winkler, with Penelope J. Hanke in which she uses ethnographic methods to analyze her own rape attack in the field.

CFU's leadership structure. My whiteness and my position as a young woman facilitated the reassurances of my trustworthiness that I made. I came to realize that I was perceived as "one of them" (whites) as well as unthreatening due to my position as a young woman. At some CFU meetings, I was introduced as a "lovely young woman from America" first and as a researcher second, an introduction I felt did not highlight my position as a serious researcher, yet a representation I did not feel comfortable challenging.

My feelings of powerlessness, however, were often interwoven with feelings of powerfulness. Racial privilege remains strong in Zimbabwe and white women possess a status of an almost untouchable quality. White women in Zimbabwe cultivate a formal distance – exemplified in the term "Madam" – to both Black women and men that insulates White women from everyday sexual harassment. Embedded in formalized terms of respect such as "Madam," is a not so subtle reference to the colonial racial hierarchy. For example, in settings such as taxi rides or shopping, White women establish their difference from Blacks through the insistence on the usage of "Madam" while referring to their domestic workers as "house girls" and "garden boys." Throughout the invasions, abductions, beatings, and murders of white men were frequent, while White women escaped largely unscathed from the most severe physical violence (until mid-2001). Additionally, while rape and sexual assault of Black women was pervasive during the farm and election violence, the previously mentioned gang-rape of two White farmwomen remains the only such case involving White women to my knowledge. Therefore, my position as a White woman afforded some level of security and personal power with which I struggled during this (and other) stays in Zimbabwe. Thus, although I desired to break-down the social distance surrounding White women

through refusing to use racially charged terms such as "Madam" and "house girl" and by attempting to break down the social barriers erected through language, to do so as a foreign woman opened me up to a myriad of unwanted sexual advances and propositions that ranged from benign to threatening. Racial privilege and gender subordination are thus intertwined in complicated ways. The desire to work against white privilege while "doing" race becomes complicated when to do so exposes one to gendered forms of vulnerability.

The most significant source of power I possessed, however, lay in my status as a US national with financial support. This status provided me with the means to travel by personal car versus public transportation, to live in low-density and relatively safe suburbs within Harare, and ultimately, to leave Zimbabwe when the conditions of insecurity appeared to have no end in sight. My ability to return home to a place where laws were more or less enforced and to a position in a web of social relations where I was privileged represents a "global" system of stratification based on social and racial power and privilege. In the US, feelings of protection by police rather than profiling or dismissal are a privilege most Whites take for granted. I never fully appreciated the power of feelings of police benevolence rather than a feeling of indifference or hostility until I returned to the US following my fieldwork in 2000. These privileges accorded by my nationality and race created alternatively feelings of relief to be able to return home and guilt over "abandoning" informants and friends who could or would not leave Zimbabwe.

Ethnographic methods rely on both formal and informal research settings to generate data. Following formal settings such as CFU meetings or semi-structured

interviews, informants often retired to a break room for drinks, snacks and additional discussion, to which I was invited. This informal setting surrounding drinking is acknowledged among fieldworkers as an important opportunity for establishing rapport and as an informal source of data. In the course of my research, such situations often arose.

At the end of a long day of interviews and meetings at the CFU, a CFU leader with whom I had been trying to arrange an interview approached me and said he could "squeeze me in" while waiting for the negotiating team to return from meetings with the war veterans. I recognized an opportunity to interview a busy informant and the potential to talk informally with the team when it arrived. I proceeded with the interview and on completion my informant asked if I would like to wait and hear about the team's negotiations. I stayed. When the team arrived my informant reached to the liquor cabinet and began mixing drinks as the team members began to recount their day. The men broke open a bottle of rum and began drinking. I accepted a rum and coke, hoping to nurse it slowly as we talked. As we sat reviewing the day's events, the men drank more and more, and with every drink they took, they pressured me to take another. Interwoven with their reports, were sexually explicit jokes regarding their wives, and eventually suggestive comments about me. I became acutely aware of being the only woman present, after hours, with a group of men quickly becoming inebriated – a situation most women would acknowledge as uncomfortable. For male researchers, such an encounter is an opportunity for comradery and building rapport. For female researchers, the research opportunity is complicated by the sense of unease such an environment produces. I did not feel powerful.

I highlight these various experiences to demonstrate how our identity shapes our fieldwork experiences in multiple ways. Identity filters how informants receive and perceive us, determines our access to research opportunities, and defines the research power dynamic. Research relationships cannot be viewed narrowly through the lens of the power dynamic that privileges the researcher over the informant. Research relationships must be viewed as an intersection of a complex web of social relations of power in which the research relationship is but one. Power in the research context, must be viewed as fluid, rather than zero sum, a relation that moves and transforms as settings and participants shift. Just as it would be inaccurate to privilege race, gender, or nation as the *primary* relation of power that overrides all others at all moments, it is inaccurate to define the research relationship as *the* primary power relation in all places at all times.

Methodology

The study employs a range of qualitative and quantitative methods aimed at providing a rich understanding of the experiences of the commercial farming sector with farm invasions and violence and exploring the position of white farmers relative to the Zimbabwean state. In the following sections, I will discuss my sources of data, how I gained access to the sources, and what the data contribute to the study. Next, I will address the methods I chose to employ in this study. Finally, I discuss the forms of analysis used in the study.

Sources of Data

My data sources include participant-observation at CFU meetings, key informant interviews, self-administered surveys by CFU farmer association chairs, interviews with farmers and farmwomen, self-administered questionnaires by farmers, a farm family's invasion diary, daily invasion reports from the CFU, human rights violation reports gathered on behalf of farm workers by the Agricultural Labor Bureau, and newspaper articles.

Participant Observation at the Commercial Farmers' Union. Through my contacts at CFU from preliminary research in 1997-98, I gained access to confidential CFU meetings. One key informant who is a leader within the CFU introduced me to other CFU leaders and invited me to attend CFU Council meetings for my research purposes. I attended my first CFU Council meeting in March 2000, a meeting that lasted over ten hours as council members discussed the emerging invasion crisis and potential responses. At this first meeting, my informant introduced me as a guest to the meeting and asked me to say a few words about myself and my research. He emphasized that I was to be trusted and that those present could speak freely in my presence, an introduction that would be repeated in other CFU contexts by CFU council members I would meet on that day. Very quickly, I became an accepted attendee at the monthly scheduled Council meetings and several unscheduled emergency meetings. I attended other CFU meetings including one of several "Stress Management Seminars" organized by the CFU for farmers; workshops with Farmer Association leaders and the national leadership; and staff meetings.

CFU Council meetings include the national CFU leadership (elected and permanent positions), regional CFU representatives (elected and permanent), and representatives of commodity associations. At the various meetings I attended, council members discussed the varied characteristics of local invasions, debated farmers' differing strategies in response to invasions, and began to attempt to form a national strategy. Competing interests among farmers due to regional and commodity differences resulted in emotional disagreements; the way forward through this crisis was neither clear, nor necessarily unified. As I followed these debates through the crisis, I began to trace the fractures in unity, regional tensions, and the efforts of the CFU leadership to balance intra-union politics with their strategies and concerns for the preservation of commercial agriculture in Zimbabwe. This led me to also explore how the CFU maintained consensus under crisis. In what ways did local farmer concerns inform national CFU strategies? And, can the overwhelmingly white CFU survive as the dominant farming association in a postcolonial multiracial society?

My introductions to regional CFU executives at the CFU Council meetings provided entry to regional and community meetings as well. Through attending such meetings and interviewing regional leaders and farmers from different communities, I was able to develop an understanding of the varied experiences with and responses to farm invasions throughout the country. Unlike the national meetings based in Harare, the regional and local CFU meetings were less formal and allowed for diverse viewpoints to be heard and debated. The regional and local meetings also helped reveal to me some of the discontinuities between the feelings of local farmers on the ground and the national leadership in Harare. Such local CFU meetings also provided introductions to farmers in

various parts of the country with whom I could speak about their invasion experiences. I began interviewing farmwomen and men about their farming histories and their experience with the current invasions.

Key Informant Interviews. Participant-observation and key informant interviewing are important qualitative tools often used in tandem. Whyte (1984) stresses the value of reinforcing our observations through interviewing participants for "insider" interpretations of events. In this study, I relied on participant-observation and key informant interviews within the CFU and, to a lesser degree, GAPWUZ (six interviews), to gather data on strategies of the unions and their constituents in the face of invasions, regional variation, and interpretation of on-going events. For both unions, I interviewed representatives at the national, regional and local levels. In the case of GAPWUZ, communication, transportation disruptions and security threats eventually hindered my ability to interview union leaders based outside of Harare.[4]

Due to my access to the CFU Council Meetings, I was quickly introduced to all of the CFU Regional Representatives who are required to attend Council Meetings. The CFU President introduced me and my research purposes to everyone and asked everyone to help me. Within the CFU I was able to interview five of the seven regional representatives.[5] Additionally, I attended several CFU Council meetings where regional representatives submitted oral and written reports of activities in their regions. Data

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[4] GAPWUZ leaders became targets of the "war vets" over time. The leader of GAPWUZ was abducted and subjected to psychological torture before release, as were several of his regional leaders attempting to visit farm workers.

[5] Coordinating interviews was extremely difficult. In more than one instance, interviews were cancelled at the last minute due to unforeseeable circumstances such as unavailability of fuel, farmer assaults or deaths in a particular region, or emergency meetings. Such cases emerged repeatedly and ultimately I ran out of time to interview the representatives from the final two regions.

obtained through key informant interviews were thus cross-checked with Council

regional reports as well as compared with the daily invasion reports.[6]

Further, I interviewed or received self-administered surveys from eleven farmer

association chairs from various regions. Such interviews provide community

perspectives on invasions and local strategies. I gained accessed to farmer association

chairs at CFU Regional Meetings. At these meetings, I was allowed an opportunity to

introduce myself and my research. In some cases, I distributed surveys, in others, I made

appointments for interviews. The interviews and surveys both served to generate

comparable data, however. I sought out community-based information such as number of

farms invaded/total number of farms; types of damage done to invaded farms; types of

violence & frequency of violence; and community responses to invasions.

Through visits out to CFU Regional offices and interviewing regional officers, I

gained introductions to some farmers who were willing to be interviewed. Some

informants I met at the CFU headquarters on days when the CFU brought in farmers for

seminars on stress management, or simply in the lobby. Others, are farmers who I had

met on from previous visits to Zimbabwe. Interviews with farmwomen and men provide

case studies of how invasions impact a particular location. The fourteen case studies in

the study include interviews with 21 farm women and men.[7] Ten case studies are based

solely on interviews, while three rely on self-administered questionnaires,[8] and one

emanates from an invasion diary. One farmer's family allowed me to utilize their diary

of invasion activity for research purposes. The cases involve at least one farm in each of

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[6] These daily reports are discussed in detail below.
[7] While I collected data from 14 case studies, in Chapter Six I highlight three cases which are representative of the perspectives and experiences of the women and men I interviewed.
[8] The questionnaire includes basically the same questions as the open-ended interviews; it is slightly more structured. See Appendix.

the following regions: Mashonaland West, Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, Manicaland, and Masvingo. Though I attempted to interview husbands and wives in all cases, it was not always possible. The settings of farmer and farmwoman interviews varied – of the nine cases involving interviews, four cases involved interviews in Harare (either at CFU offices or in homes of relatives); four involved interviews on farm; one interview took place at a club following a CFU regional meeting; and one at a neighboring farm to the farmers being interviewed. The interviews ranged from 45 minutes to three hours depending on the detail with which individuals recounted events and whether respondents were interviewed alone or together as couples. Following an open-ended semi-structured format, interviews gather biographical information, farm histories, relations with nearby CA or RA communities, farm labor conditions, and invasion descriptions (see Appendix for interview schedules). In some cases, informants shared invasion diaries and poetry inspired by events on their farms. In all cases, these stories tell how farmers and farm women strategize in conditions of violence and insecurity; the ways in which they attempt to negotiate a normal existence in completely abnormal circumstances.

I also had one interview with a leader in the Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veteran Association (ZNLWVA). I met my informant at a conference on the invasions held in Harare in March 2000 and interviewed him later that month. In addition to looking to get ZNLWVA's perspective, I was also hoping to get a letter of introduction to the local "war vet" leader in the area where I planed to work so that I might interview war vets there also without difficulties. The interview did not go as planned. I had to pass through a very intimidating body guard before gaining access. During the interview, my

informant began yelling very aggressively at me about whites taking the land, colonialism, and this being "the *Third Chimurenga*." As for my letter of introduction, he would not give me a letter for the region where I'd be working, but kept offering a letter for the adjacent region. I kept pressing that I needed a different region, but eventually gave up and accepted the letter for the incorrect region. This was one of my first indications that the national leadership did not have influence over all of the local regions; this would become very clear later. Otherwise, there was not much useful that came from this interview.

CFU Daily Invasion Reports. To cross check and supplement some information provided from interviews and participant-observation, I also utilize the daily invasion reports gathered and distributed by the CFU. My contacts at CFU headquarters allowed me free-access to the daily invasion reports for my research purposes. Through email, CFU headquarters maintained a daily account of invasion updates organized by region, community, and farm to keep its members abreast of the latest events.[9] These reports provide data with which to analyze the movement of invasions, the intensification in particular areas at particular times, and the relaxation of events in others.

Agricultural Labor Bureau Human Rights Violation Reports. In addition to the CFU daily reports, I also gained access to 187 human rights violations reports through the Agricultural Labor Bureau (ALB), an agency that gathered reports in hopes of maintaining a record of wrongs for future restitution. The ALB allowed me confidential access to the reports for research purposes. These reports allow me to characterize the nature of violence associated with invasions. Admittedly, such reports are a questionable

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[9] The invasion reports began weekly, shifted to daily or near daily for about ten months, and then resumed a biweekly and then weekly frequency.

data source. They were filled out and collected during on-going conditions of violence and insecurity and therefore must be considered incomplete. The reports do not inquire about a respondent's gender (however it is often evident in the completion of the form by a gendered term), and were distributed via farmers and GAPWUZ. Despite these flaws, the reports do facilitate a generalized characterization of the violence and speak to farm worker experiences that I otherwise was not able to collect. The violation reports portray the variations in experience with violence and terror that individuals in differing social locations experience under conditions of routinized terror.

Newspaper Articles. My final data source consisted of news articles produced between March and September 2000. This source highlights the ZANU-PF regime's attempt to characterize the invasions and electoral period through a propagandistic light. This data source allows me to explore the discourse of political elites as well as average citizens through public statements and letters to the editor. I clipped articles and letters from five primary sources over a six month period: *The Daily News, The Herald, The Zimbabwe Independent, The Sunday Mail, and The Financial Gazette.* The first two papers are dailies, the latter three weeklies. *The Herald* and *The Sunday Mail* are state owned and controlled papers, while the remaining three are independently owned and tend to be critical of The Mugabe regime. The state owned papers provided the Regime's perspective on events in Zimbabwe, while the other papers provided varied critiques.

Methods

In this section I will discuss the strategies I used to generate data from my sources. My methods include participant-observation, key informant interviews, self-

administered questionnaires, case studies and content analysis. I will briefly discuss why I utilized each method.

Participant-Observation. Participant-observation is a time consuming method. Several of the CFU Meetings that usually would last four hours prior to the invasions, now lasted ten or more hours during my fieldwork. While I could have opted to simply interview those in attendance for summaries of key events, I learned early that as Whyte (1984) notes, participant-observation can provide surprising data. For example, at the first meeting I attended my informants revealed rifts within the CFU leadership, implied threats they had received from President Mugabe's office, and then one member read scripture from the Bible. Observation played a critical role in understanding the different interest groups farmers represented based on regional differences and crops planted. At the various meetings I attended, I took copious notes, and read them over, filling in any details at night. I observed CFU Council Meetings at the CFU Headquarters' Offices in Harare; Regional Meetings in the CFU Matebeleland, Masvingo, Mashonaland West South, Mashonaland North, Mashonaland Central, and Manicaland offices.

Key Informant and Semi-structured Interviews. As Carolyn Nordstrom (1997: 81) wrote in *A Different Kind of War Story*, interviewing informants during times of violence and terror involves listening on multiple levels – listening to validate people's experience, "listening well," and listening to silences that signify danger. Interviewing in a context of violence involves greater risks and greater need for assurances for informants than in other situations. Whyte (1984: 98) writes, "Like the therapist, the research interviewer listens more than he [sic] talks, and listens with a sympathetic and lively interest." Interviews with farmers and farm women (see Appendices B and C) focus on

their experience with land over time, relationships with workers and neighboring black smallholder black farmers, and their invasion experience. Interviews with leaders of farm worker organizations and CFU representatives (see Appendices A and D) center on the impact of the crisis on members of their respective organizations and violence against their members.

Self-administered Questionnaires. Due to time constraints, I was unable to interview farmer association chairs in all the Regions; therefore, I distributed questionnaires to the chairpersons at meetings I attended for their completion (see Appendix E). I also distributed a questionnaire to farmers designed to gather comparable information that the semi-structured interviews developed and distributed them through a "snow-ball sampling" approach while visiting farmer association meetings (see Appendix F).

Case Studies. In this study, case studies of particular farms are used to illustrate the varied strategies and responses of farmers and farm women to violence and insecurity surrounding commercial farming in Zimbabwe in 2000. The case studies compile information taken from interviews with husband and wives from a particular farm (if both were available) as well as any information available from the daily invasion reports and the human rights violation reports. Case studies rely on inductive theories and "explanation[s] that develop during naturalistic or qualitative research," (Creswell 1994: 94). Therefore, the data collected for the case studies have been used to develop my current understanding of how violence and terror is experienced differently by people in different social locations and how people strategize under conditions of chronic fear and insecurity?

Content Analysis. I use content analysis as a method for studying the daily

invasion reports (see Appendix G) and newspaper articles. For the daily invasion reports,

I coded each line of each daily report accounting for over 160 variables (see Appendix

G). These variables helped me track the nature of the invasion activities on a daily basis

throughout the country so that I could then analyze later. I clipped and coded newspaper

articles according to similar topics – invasions, elections, violence and organized the

articles accordingly.

Analysis

The purpose of this dissertation is to answer four questions (1) how does the

regime perpetuate its own interests through the use of state terror; (2) how do people in

different social locations experience violence and terror differently; (3) how does "the

routinization of terror function"[10]; and (4) how do people in different social locations

strategize under conditions of chronic fear and insecurity? My analysis brings together

several disparate sources of data (see above) to begin to answer these questions.

Strauss (1987) advocates the use of grounded theory for materials such as field

notes (from participant-observation) and interviews. Grounded theory is an approach to

qualitative data with a focus on the developmental aspects of theory, "without any

particular commitment to specific kinds of data, lines of research, or theoretical interests"

(Strauss 1987: 5). I draw on this approach and its attention to the development and

constant revision of a coding scheme for my analysis of my field notes from CFU

meetings and interviews. Through use of the qualitative data analysis program NVIVO,

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[10] Linda Green (1195: 111).

daily invasion report data can be organized and coded (see Appendix G) in a similar

manner. The information was then summarized and exported into a spreadsheet program

to create tables.

For the human rights reports, the information was entered into a spreadsheet

program and summarized. The human rights information was also analyzed and coded in

terms of types of violence and torture involved, and against whom. The surveys were

entered into a spreadsheet program and analyzed through comparing respondents

answers. These were drawn upon while discussing the case studies or communities in

general.

Conclusion

My dissertation is a study of violence, terror and the way in which different

members of Zimbabwe's commercial farming community respond to the routinization of

state terror. In this chapter, I have addressed how my study transformed from my

original plans to the dissertation that it has become. Further, I addressed the importance

of discussing the positionality of the fieldworker in conditions of violence and insecurity

and how this alters research agendas and opportunities. Finally, I discussed the sources

of data to which I was able to gain access, how they contribute to my study, and how they

are analyzed.

CHAPTER FOUR:

ENEMIES OF THE STATE: ELECTIONS, INVASIONS, CRISIS

Introduction

In this chapter I examine the unfolding of the violence on farms during the

parliamentary electoral period of 2000 (February – June). Based on an analysis of the

timeline of invasion related events and the nature of invaders' behaviors, I argue that the

invasions were a form of politically motivated violence, rather than a movement for land

reform. The defeat of the ruling party ZANU-PF backed (and opposition MDC opposed)

Constitutional Referendum in February 2000 suggested that the opposition MDC party

might have potential success in the elections scheduled for March 2000. The threat to the

party's continued maintenance of power after 20 years of rule resulted in state-organized

political violence intended to intimidate and terrorize voters into continued support of

ZANU-PF. With rifts emerging within the ruling party, Mugabe called on the allegiance

of the war veterans which he had solidified in 1998 with the procurement of lifetime

monthly pensions and a substantial payout.[1] War veterans dominated the state security

organizations, agencies which also played significant roles in facilitating the violence.

The regime used its resources to spread political violence both extensively (over space)

and intensively (over time). Violence became the key strategy in a parliamentary election

that focused on the rhetoric of land and neo-colonialism. Violence also quickly emerged

as the predominant feature of the farm invasions, which became a key strategy within the

electoral campaign as sources of ideological and practical support for the violence that

swept the nation on and off farms (ZHRNGOF 2000).

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[1] War veterans received payments of Z$50,000 in 1998 in addition to monthly stipends.

The purpose of this chapter is to begin to answer the questions (1) how does the state perpetuate its own interests through the use of state terror, and (2) under what conditions are different people exposed to different kinds of violence. I will do this by first discussing the role the 2000 Constitutional Referendum played in the emergence of the political crisis within the ruling ZANU-PF. Second, I will discuss the allegedly spontaneous emergence of the land invasions that coincided with the election campaign. Next, I will analyze the intensification over time and space of the invasions as the campaign proceeded, the violence increased. I will compare the regional variations both in terms of numbers of farms occupied and severity of experience. Next, I compare the nature of violence experienced by farm workers and farmers during the election invasion period. Finally, I discuss the parliamentary elections and violence as an electoral strategy before summarizing and concluding the chapter.

The Constitutional Referendum and Political Crisis

On February 12-13, 2000, Zimbabweans voted to reject the ZANU-PF government backed Draft Constitution. Although a Constitutional Commission had been created to solicit input from Zimbabweans on the new constitution, the Draft Constitution was largely criticized for not incorporating the views of the people (ZNRNGOF 2001). In addition to objections to elements of the Draft Constitution which expanded rather than limited presidential powers, the public objected to last minute revisions of Clause 57 which granted the government permission to acquire white-owned land for resettlement without compensation to farmers for the land or for improvements to the land. Clause 57 furthermore laid responsibility for paying compensation to white farmers in the hands of

former colonial power, Great Britain. ZANU-PF promoted the Draft Constitution based primarily on the land issue, whereas the opposition MDC and other groups campaigned against it, citing its lack of attention to the people's will.

Fifty-three percent of votes cast (excluding spoiled ballots) rejected the referendum (see Table 4.1). Of Zimbabwe's ten provinces, six (primarily rural) voted for the draft referendum as a whole, while four (two rural, two urban) rejected it. At the level of constituency, people in fifty urban and twelve rural districts voted against the draft constitution. Urban voters rejected the constitution, including those in most small towns and peri-urban areas. The two urban provinces of Harare and Bulawayo overwhelmingly voted No, as did rural provinces Manicaland and Matebeleland North (though with narrower margins). Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland West, and Mashonaland East had among the smallest proportions voting against the ZANU-PF backed constitution, a point I return to below. In short, rural voters were more likely to vote for the referendum than were urban voters. Moreover, in Mashonaland white farmers would later be openly blamed by politicians for the defeat of the referendum and therefore deserving of the invasions (see below).

Table 4.1
Constitutional Referendum Results by Province, February 2000[A]

Province	Yes	No
Harare	25%	73%
Bulawayo	23%	76%
Masvingo	53%	43%
Manicaland	34%	63%
Matebeleland North	45%	52%
Mashonaland East	58%	38%
Matebeleland South	50%	47%
Midlands	61%	35%
Mashonaland West	58%	38%
Mashonaland Central	68%	30%
Total	44%	53%

Source: GoZ website

[A] Percentages based on total votes cast. Difference between Yes and No totals is due to spoiled ballots.

The defeat of the referendum alerted the ruling party and Mugabe to the dangers

of potential shifting political opinion in Zimbabwe in the parliamentary elections

originally scheduled for March of 2000. Mugabe blamed the referendum's defeat on a

conspiracy between white commercial farmers, urban-middle class elites (represented by

MDC) and their foreign supporters (ZHRNGOF 2001:19). Additionally, at a meeting of

the 220 member central committee of ZANU-PF, intended to strategize for the

parliamentary elections, rifts within the party emerged. Whereas Mugabe attacked

ZANU-PF party leadership for the referendum loss, reports from the meeting indicate

party elite blamed Mugabe for ZANU-PF's declining support and asked him to step down

as the party's leader (*Daily Mail and Guardian* 2-24-00).

Mugabe's political crisis intensified as early 2000 brought several damaging

events that threatened ZANU-PF continued supremacy. In addition to the defeat of the

Constitutional Referendum, Mugabe faced a lawsuit by human rights activists seeking the

the mid-1980s. Major corruption scandals emerged implicating senior ministers in the

Ministry of Lands Agriculture and the Ministry of Transport and Energy as well (*Herald*

3-17-00; *Daily* News 5-1-00). The ZANU-PF Central Committee asked Mugabe to step

down as the party leader and rid his cabinet of corrupt ministers. Mugabe had other

plans. Following the defeat of the referendum, Mugabe declared he would take back the

land from whites regardless of law or international opinion. In an interview on his 76th

birthday on the state-run local television station, Mugabe said,

> We (can) take the land under presidential powers and nobody should
> rejoice over (our) defeat. The land question has not been resolved. The
> people are angry and if we let the people vent their anger, they will invade
> the farms and then they (farmers) will come to us for protection (*Daily
> Mail and Guardian* 2-22-00).

This statement by Mugabe is the beginning of government statements, policy

pronouncements, and actions by various Zimbabwean leaders that sanction the violence

and demonstrate the regime's role in organizing state terror in 2000. The statement also

raises the terror to the level of what Mason and Krane (1989:178) define as "death squad"

violence (see Chapter One), as demonstrated later in this chapter. Farm invasions began

immediately.

ZANU-PF, ZNLWVA and the Election Campaign

The war veterans initially claimed that the invasions were spontaneous reactions

to the rejection of the referendum and the land clause contained within it. According to

veterans and government, the invasions were unplanned, peaceful demonstrations.

During the first week of invasions (late February 2000), a leader of the ZNLWVA and a

spokesperson for invaders in one area made the following statement to the state-run
television station news crew.

> We fought for the land and would therefore like to warn those that might
> be thinking of fighting us off the land that we trained to be soldiers, and
> are still soldiers. ... Our tractors are moving on to the farm to prepare land
> for our people and we will not like to hear that any of our comrades has
> been moved [sic] (*Daily Mail & Guardian* 2-29-00).

The television crew had been given advance warning and thus captured the invasion at its
height with hundreds cheering as they marched on the farm. At one of the earliest
invasions, the spokesperson stressed that the invaders were prepared to fight if
challenged, referencing what Lopez (1984:70) calls a "life threatening" state terror
technique. Additionally, the use of the state media was an attempt at information control
of the Zimbabwean population, as increasing hostility towards the independent and
foreign press emerged over time.

My fieldnotes (2-28-00) from a visit to the community this group had invaded
revealed a different story. Contrary to the image of a spontaneous uprising of hundreds
of restless, landless peasants and war veterans that the state-run media projected, I
witnessed invaders approach the local leader, who did not realize that I understood the
local language, and request the daily payment and money promised to them for
transportation back to their homes in the city. The invasion did not seem spontaneous,
and the participants were being paid.

In the early phase of the invasions, the collusion between the ZANU-PF regime
and the war veterans became clear. In late February, the commissioner of police
announced that he would not order the police to remove farm invaders stating, "'It is
above the police. It is a political issue. What do you expect police to do?'" (*Daily Mail*

& Guardian 3-1-00). Once again, death squad violence, or what I term state organized

violence, as Mason and Krane (1989:178) note, contains "a distinguishing feature ...that

it is violence sanctioned by the regime, either explicitly... or implicitly through lack of

effort to curtail such acts." Mugabe announced plans on March 1, 2000 to amend the

constitution to incorporate the content of the land clause from the rejected referendum,

thereby allowing the government to acquire farms without compensation unless Great

Britain provided the funds (*Daily Mail & Guardian* 3-2-00). In invaded communities,

farmers observed invaders being transported via government vehicles (Fieldnotes, 2-28-

00; 3-28-00).

In Mashonaland Central, the connection between the government, the referendum

results, and elections was made more explicit. In a meeting between Governor Border

Gezi and Mashonaland Central CFU regional leaders, Gezi openly blamed farmers for the

role their involvement in opposition politics played in the referendum's defeat and stated

that the invasions had ZANU-PF's full support (CFU 2000d). Gezi warned that farmers

known to support (currently or in the past) opposition and those deemed "socially

unacceptable" would be targeted for invasions. The Governor also noted the role of farm

workers in causing the "No" vote against the constitution and said there would be an

"anti-farm worker" campaign (CFU 2000d:2). Finally, Gezi concluded that "'this is the

beginning of the Third *Chimurenga* to take land and this time we will succeed and will

not be thwarted'" (CFU 2000d:3). It was clear early in the invasions that not only was

the regime explicitly and implicitly sanctioning the farm invasions and the violence that

characterized them (see below) (Mason and Krane 1989), but also that the regime

attempted to legitimate its actions, as do most perpetrators of violence, by drawing on the liberation cause and the notion of fighting to free the land (Riches 1991).

On March 2, 2000, however, confusion within the regime surfaced. That same day, President Mugabe affirmed his position that the invasions were the result of colonial land imbalances, the role played by white farmers in the defeat of the referendum, and the maintenance of land inequities He therefore insisted that he would not act to remove invaders from farms. Less than three hours later, Minister of Home Affairs Dumiso Dabengwa, under whose authority the police force fall, announced that since a new constitutional amendment would allow the government to seize the land, the invasions were moot. Dabengwa therefore ordered all invaders off all farms within 24 hours (*Daily Mail & Guardian* 3-3-00). The police commissioner Augustine Chihuri, a war veteran himself, aligned himself with Mugabe and refused to act. On March 5, 2000, Mugabe announced increases to war veterans' monthly pensions of 41 percent (*Standard* 3-5-00). In addition to increases in their monthly pensions, in mid-March ZANU-PF hired ZNWLVA to "campaign" for the coming elections and vowed to pay Z$20 million for their services in this regard (*Financial Gazette* 3-16-00).

The Zimbabwe Economic Society (ZES) and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) hosted a seminar titled "Socio-economic Implications of the Current Farm Invasions in Zimbabwe" on March 16, 2000. ZES-FES invited the Minister of Agriculture and Lands, ZNLWVA leader Chenjerai "Hitler" Hunzvi, CFU, ZFU, GAPWUZ and local academics to speak. The Ministry of Lands and Agriculture representative did not attend, nor did Hunzvi. ZNLWVA sent another representative, however, who distributed a short position paper (ZNLWVA 2000). The paper began by describing a letter the association

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alleged to have sent to the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain (UK)

demanding that the UK provide funds for land reform or

> Allow us, Your Majesty, to say that we can foresee another short-lived
> bloodbath coming very soon. It will be the most appropriate decision of
> Her Majesty's Government to avoid such an eventuality. The small
> encounters ... as we envisage them, will not be fought anywhere else, but
> in the commercial farms, against those who are refusing to let go our land.
> These will be clashes against Commercial Farmers, and which, if Her
> Majesty's Government does not take heed, will later be misinterpreted as
> racial (ZNLWVA 2000:1).

The paper cited three problems which hindered speedy resettlement since independence,

all of which were in its view ultimately the responsibility of white farmers. First, the

paper argued that the CFU had deliberately formed a conspiracy among white farmers to

raise the price of farms intentionally to keep "indigenous Zimbabweans" landless.

Second, appeals to courts of law by the CFU to challenge designation of farms for

resettlement had stalled land reform. Finally, the paper blamed the "mobilisation for the

'NO' vote in the draft constitution by the farmers" [sic] (ZNLWVA 2000:2). The paper

went on to state its position *vis-à-vis* the invasions:

a. **that the occupations have been/ and are spontaneous,**

b. **our Association, to avoid being overtaken by events, has/ and is encouraging the prevalence of peace during the occupations,**

c. **an escalation of this volatile situation can only be avoided if affected farmers, and those to be affected, realise that indigenous Zimbabweans are waging the Third Chimurenga for their LAND which was forcibly grabbed from them by the British, and subsequent colonial settler governments. They should realise that after having refused to meet the needs of the landless people of this country in a more civilised way, they have been moulding a bomb for their own peril,**

d. **The Commercial farmers, particularly members of the notorious and self-centered CFU, should realise that, even if they inherited farms**

from their forefathers, they inherited stolen property. If they bought those farms, they bought stolen property. The land was stolen from the indigenous Zimbabweans by the British. Now, indigenous Zimbabweans are recovering their property,

e. The firing of weapons at unarmed War Veterans and civilians who are moving in to occupy their LAND, as was affirmed at [farm name deleted], near Norton, on 29 February 2000, will only add fuel to fire. Those armed farmers should not underestimate what is happening. We are peace-loving, but there comes a time when a people stands up and say 'ENOUGH IS ENOUGH'. [all emphasis in original] (ZNLWVA 2000:3).

I have quoted the position of the war veterans at length to highlight several important themes within it as well as inconsistencies with on-going invasion events. First, ZNLWVA stressed the spontaneous nature of the invasions. However, as noted above, the government-controlled media (television and newspapers) often appeared to have had advance notice of several large or otherwise notable invasions and arrived on farms prior to or just as invasions began. The arrival of state-run media at large invasions suggests coordination of war veteran activity with state-owned media. Second, war veterans' reference to the "Third *Chimurenga*" also undermined their alleged dedication to "peace" during farm invasions. The first and second *zvimurenga*[2] were violent wars; any movement labeled as the third following two violent wars presumably would also involve violence. In fact, in a press statement on the day before the presentation of the ZNLWVA's position paper to the public, an association spokesperson said the war veterans would never allow the opposition party to take office if elected into power (*Daily Mail & Guardian* 3-16-00): "We will never allow people who oppressed us to come to power. It means we will go back to the bush. We will declare a military government." Clearly, the farm invasions were politically motivated retribution for

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[2] *Zvimurenga* is plural for *chimurenga*.

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farmers' alleged involvement in the 'No' vote and to ensure future ZANU-PF rule. Land was not central, the ruling party's continued power was. Finally, the ZNLWVA statement's emphasis on "indigenous Zimbabweans" raises important questions about national identity and the intersection of identity and violence, issues that will be explored in Chapter Six.

On March 17, 2000, the CFU successfully petitioned the High Court of Zimbabwe to compel the government to end the invasions and restore law and order. Specifically, the court order declared the occupations unlawful and mandated that all persons engaged in squatting must vacate the farms within 24 hours. The order required that Governor Gezi, Dr. Hunzvi, and the ZNLWVA cease and desist from encouraging invasions. Furthermore, Dr. Hunzvi was required to appear on television, radio, and in newspapers and announce that such invasions were unlawful and encourage invaders to move off farms. The court order directed Police Commissioner Chihuri to order all ZRP to investigate and arrest invaders from farms after the 24-hour period elapsed. The order also specifically directed the Police Commissioner to ignore any orders from the executive branch that were contrary to the court order. The decision was reached by consent of the applicant, the CFU, and those opposing the order, Governor Gezi, Dr. Hunzvi, ZNLWVA, and Police Commissioner Chihuri (High Court of Zimbabwe Case 3544/2000). War veterans ignored the court order, however, remaining on farms and instigating new invasions in the days following the judgment (*Daily News* 3-20-00). Commissioner Chihuri refused to comment on the "political" matter and Home Affairs Minister Dabengwa said the matter was between the High Court and Chihuri (*Herald* 3-

22-00*)*. Once again, the government's complicity with paramilitary groups demonstrated the regime's role in terror and violence.

CFU's court case resulted in a series of appeals and judgments throughout the election invasion period which all were decided in favor of the union. The judiciary rejected Commissioner Chihuri's request to limit the police's duties from evicting invaders to simply maintaining the peace and rejected his claims that the police lacked the resources to restore the rule of law. Mugabe and Hunzvi continued to make public statements supporting war veterans' right to stay on farms. For example, Hunzvi said despite the passing of the amendment to the Constitution empowering the government to compulsorily acquire land for resettlement without paying compensation, the war vets would not move off before the elections: "We are here to stay – it is our land and why should we move out?" (*Sunday Mail 4-9-2000)*. The persistent rulings declaring the invasions unlawful and demanding police actions demonstrated the collusion of the ZRP with the ZNLWVA and Mugabe. Eventually, the judiciary itself became targets of war veterans who through threats, successfully forced several judges to resign.

Over the course of the invasion period, Mugabe called in key figures in state security organizations such as the police, the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), the army, and ZNLWVA leader Hunzvi to his aid. Organized through existing ZNLWVA structures, the paramilitary force set out to systematically target key MDC organizers and to intimidate the population at large (see NDI 2000, IRCT 2000, ZHRNGOF 2000). With ZANU-PF's popular support waning, MDC emerged as the first real threat to Mugabe/ ZANU-PF's rule since ZAPU/ ZIPRA. ZANU-PF responded with violence, intimidation, and accusations that MDC was a puppet party for neo-colonialist white

Zimbabweans and foreign destabilizing forces (NDI 2000, Daily News). For example, in

an Election 2000 advertisement run by ZANU-PF, the text reads

> While our hard won democracy should be deepened to economically
> empower the indigenous community, it is shocking that the sellout
> individuals do not even acknowledge the democratic achievement of our
> continuing revolution. Instead, they have decided to be **WHISTLES OF
> FOREIGN INTERESTS** and are misleading you that they are offering
> transparency and that they have power in their hands **AND NOT IN
> YOURS.**... [emphasis in original] (*Sunday News* 3-26-2000).

Mugabe and his war veterans (within/ without official state security

organizations) targeted commercial farms for both symbolic and practical reasons. In

symbolic terms, Mugabe clearly hoped to rally supporters behind "the liberation of the

land" from "foreigners," the third *chimurenga*. Practically, targeting farmers attacked

any real or imagined financial support they offered to MDC. As ZHRNGOF (2000:3)

noted, "political violence has been practically and ideologically sustained by the farm

invasions, with the invaders themselves taking a leading role. Farms have been a source

of food, and support for the attackers, and centers for the organization of violence

targeting farm worker and rural communities." Commercial farms thus served as strategic

logistical bases from which war veterans could mount a broader "campaign" of state

organized violence in Zimbabwean society to terrorize the electorate into voting for

ZANU-PF . Through tactics of intimidation, threats, and physical abuse, war veterans

could demand other forms of logistical support – provision of food and transportation to

ZANU-PF rallies being foremost. ZHRNGO (2001) concluded that ZANU-PF engaged

in a systematic campaign of violence, advocated through campaign speeches and carried

out by the "war veterans."

Intensification over time

The invasions began immediately following the defeat of the ZANU-PF regime supported February 2000 constitutional referendum and continued through the parliamentary elections held June 25-26, 2000.[3] From the beginning of the invasions, the CFU compiled detailed farm invasion updates (CFU FIU) which were distributed on a near daily basis.[4] In a short amount of time, the invasions spread nation-wide. As Table 4.2 indicates, within the first month (early March 2000), invasions had spread to over 400 farms, or roughly 7.8 percent of the CFU's 1999 membership of 3,950 farmers who owned a total of 5413 farms (CFU 2000c). By the end of March, the number had doubled to approximately 846 farms or 15.6 percent. The number of farms invaded increased to 1,190 or 21.9 percent in early May and leveled out at 30 percent in June 2000, the month in which the parliamentary elections occurred.

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[3] At the time of this writing, war veterans have also invaded businesses, foreign and locally owned, as well as nongovernmental organizations under the guise of settling labor disputes.

[4] See Chapter Three for a discussion of the limitations of these data. Most significantly here, the reports do not always report incidents on individual farms. In many cases, the reports indicated (for example) that there were many demands for transportation by the war veterans throughout the FA. The numbers are under-representative, therefore, but do suggest trends in the experience that are also supported by key informant interviews with CFU regional leaders as well as through my own fieldnotes and participant observation of CFU meetings.

Table 4.2[B]
Progression of Farm Invasions, Zimbabwe, 2000

Date	Number of Farms Affected	Percent of Farms Affected
March 9	427	7.8%
March 30	846	15.6%
April 14	1056	19.5%
May 4	1190	21.9%
June 19	1631	30.1%
June 26	1649	30.4%

Source: CFU Daily Sitreps (CFUe).

[B]Table 4.2 relies on data collected by the CFU through the daily invasion reports. Shortly after the invasions began, the CFU organized each region to gather information on invasions in their region for the purpose of establishing a detailed record of events to both keep the national CFU leaders appraised of local events and for potential use in legal matters. The invasion reports rely on farmer reporting to local farmer association chairs, and chairs forwarding the information on to the CFU headquarters. There is a bias toward the reporting of "events" that farmers and leaders feel are significant. Therefore, the reports are more likely to recount hostile encounters than peaceful ones, though there are many such peaceful invasions recounted in them. The reports, therefore, must be taken as a partial record of invasions from farmers' perspectives. While they most certainly can not be seen as recording "the truth" of what happened on farms, they do offer a fairly comprehensive account of invasions from a farmer perspective. From interviews with CFU leaders (national and regional), I have concluded that the reports attempt to be as accurate as possible, though not complete. Unfortunately, there are no similar detailed reports about the invasions compiled by agencies such as AGRITEX, or even the ZNLWVA, at least to my knowledge.

The first priority of war veterans early in the election invasion period[5] involved the deployment of war veterans throughout the countryside and attempts to recruit farm workers into the war veterans' cause, according to interviews with GAPWUZ representatives (5/23/00; 5/18/00) and the ALB Chairperson (Interview 5/16/00). War veterans moved out to farming communities and began "visiting" or "walking-on" farms to initiate the occupation. War veterans usually "walked-on," demonstrated, or talked to workers and/or the farm owner, demarcated land with pegs, and then moved on to the next farm leaving a very small number of people resident on the farm. The point seemed to be to establish a presence on as many farms as possible as quickly as possible,

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[5] I distinguish the election invasion period as February – June 2000, the period I address in this study.

hopefully recruiting local farm workers and villagers to the cause. While Table 4.2

clearly shows the war veterans' success in their first goal, their ability to accomplish their

second goal is unknown. Typically, farmers received advanced warning (usually from

neighboring farmers) that war vets were coming before a contingent, ranging between

five and over 100 war veterans and others, arrived. Although many farmers' early

invasion experiences were relatively peaceful (late February – early March), in some

cases, the advance party might demonstrate and/or threaten the farmer, as the journal of

one of my informants, a farmer in Mashonaland Central, described the invasion of his

farm in late February:

> Work started as normal. At +/- 1300 hours we got word that the mob was
> approaching and [we] could see them coming across lands in front of the house.
> Joe Smith arrived here a couple of minutes before the crowd arrived. All work
> was stopped ... barn loading and curing was stopped. One trailer full of reaped
> tobacco was dumped on the ground and the tractor and trailer commandeered for
> the mobs use. ... Labour incited to join the mob. Mob approached the house and
> using the foreman's radio called to say the leaders wanted to speak to me. Joe
> and I went out to the gate and spoke to leaders surrounded by +/- 150 people.
> We indicated we understood the reason they were here and requested that we be
> allowed to continue with the work. This was being discussed fairly positively
> when a Chief Munhu arrived on the scene and said nobody with a black skin
> would be allowed to work. He also made threats to myself and Joe. We were
> told if we wanted to work we had to use white people.... They indicated that they
> wanted to enter the security fence and dance etc. We said this was private
> property but they were welcome to do so outside the gate but this led to shouting
> of threats and general disorder.... Drumming, singing, shouting of threats
> continued for +/- 2 ½ hours ... we were then told we had 1 ½ hours to leave the
> farm. We said that was an unreasonable request and that we needed to at least
> stay the night. .... they camped and beat drums and sang until 0200 hours... At
> about 0600 hours the mob came back....

The above passage reflects several ways in which state terror tactics became

systematic in the election invasion period. Examples indicated in the excerpt above

include war veterans quickly attempting to involve farm workers in their cause and

threatening farmers. Also, war veterans disrupted work processes, damaged crops and

property, attempted sensory over-stimulation and demanded that the farmer cited above

vacate his farm. These tactics would be repeated in varying degrees throughout the

nation over the election invasion period and would worsen. In early March, war veterans

moved on and off farms daily. Nationwide, the level of terror tactics employed by war

veterans varied by region. War veterans had begun pegging land, building temporary

housing structures, and cutting trees. However, CFU FIU reports from this period also

indicated the beginnings of intimidation and threatening behavior directed at farmers and

farm workers (as described in above diary), work stoppages at the demand of war

veterans, and war veterans' addressing farm workers about politics (CFU FIU 3/17/00;

CFU FIU 3/29/00; CFU FIU 3/31/00). By the end of March, farmers more consistently

reported "tense" situations on farms, including death threats, assaults of farmers and farm

workers, aggressive war veterans and hostage situations. For example, in March 2000

CFU FIU reports recorded 52 incidents of violence against farmers and farm workers, 16

disruptions to farm work, and one forced political rally against the opposition MDC (see

Figure 4.1). One CFU FIU report reflects both the law enforcement and life threatening

state terror tactics (Lopez 1984) through its inclusion of both death threats and the lack of

protection from the crimes of others: "Death threat if farmer starts ploughing, [sic] ZRP

not reacting" (CFU FIU 3/19/03).

By the end of March, 21.4 percent of all CFU farms had been affected. Although

the war veteran's leaders and Mugabe described the invasions as a demonstration over

land inequities, an analysis of invasion behavior over the period of March through June

reveals otherwise. Using NVIVO to code for various activities, throughout all the CFU

FIU reports March – June 2000, the pattern of violence and political intimidation of farm

workers becomes clear (see Figure 4.1) .

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Figure 4.1^C

Figure 4.1[C]

Number and Type of Primary Invasion Activities by Month, Zimbabwe 2000

Source: CFU 2000e.

[C] The chart and analysis here are based are reported incidents in the CFU FIU reports. The data are under-representative of total numbers, however, due to the fact that in some cases incidents reported were for an entire Farmer Association, rather than at the farm level. This affects the variables of Demands for Land, Demands for Money, Provisions, and Transportation, and Disruptions to Farm Work. In such cases, even though the report referred to several farms, it was only counted once. Violence is discussed in the text below. Forced Attendance to ZANU-PF Rallies counts the number of farms on which workers and/or farmers were forced to attend rallies. This does not include *pungwes* (to be discussed below).

Table 4.3

Election Invasion Activity Timeline, Zimbabwe 2000

Timeline					
	March	April	May	June	Total
Demands for Land	5	3	67	21	96
Demands for Money, Provisions, and Transportation	1	13	161	116	291
Violence	52	263	336	258	909
Disruptions to Farm Work	16	51	204	146	417
Forced Attendance to ZANU-PF Rallies	0	15	116	77	208

Source: CFU 2000e.

As the numbers in Figure 4.1 and Table 4.3 indicate, violence dominated the landscape of the farm invasions. Items included as "violence" range from assaults and threats (psychological violence) to confrontations between workers and war veterans, deaths, and hostage/ abductions. Indeed, only one week after the invasions began, the war vets unleashed on farming communities the wave of violence that has characterized these invasions. The first reported assault on a farm involved a farm worker in Mashonaland Central, a cook who was assaulted on February 28, 2000 (CFU 2000e). Early in the invasions, violence and politics were linked. According to one human rights violation complaint submitted on behalf of a farm worker by a human rights organization early in the election invasion period, "War Veterans called a meeting then pulled people out and beat them accusing them of having MDC papers and stealing. Victim sustained a broken arm." (Human Rights Violation Reports 2000). The following picture captured by BBC World News in early April graphically depicts the political nature of the land invasions as a farm worker is assaulted for wearing an MDC T-Shirt:

Figure 4.2
Photo One

Source: BBC World News cited in NEC 2000.

The importance of including the above photo (as well as the photo below in this chapter) is to demonstrate the power of deterrent torture within and without farming communities. Within farming communities, farm workers, and to a lesser degree, farmers, were exposed to this type of violence – or threats thereof – on nearly a daily basis. Further, the images captured by the press, independent, foreign, or state-owned, places the images of state terror in the urban areas and throughout the country for all communities to "witness" (CCJP 1997). The images contributed to the state of terror.

Within a month of the beginning of the invasions, the paramilitary force's pattern became clear: invade farm, identify and assault high profile farm workers in front of other workers, and warn workers that "sell-outs" would be dealt with accordingly (CFU 2000e, Interviews CFU, and GAPWUZ 2000).

The frequency of violence rose through March and April before peaking in May

and declining slightly in June. A more detailed analysis of these trends are presented in

Figure 4.2, based on CFU FIU data. Whereas in Figure 4.1 I collapsed various forms of

violence into one category, in Figure 4.3 I separate the different forms by type of

violence. While the low numbers in March and April partially reflect the development of

the FIU reporting system and partially some farmers poor reporting of invasion activity,

the analysis presented here are also consistent with key informant interviews with CFU

officials and data derived from participant observation at CFU meetings; there are sharp

rises in reports of violence from March-April, and April-May, when the violence peaked.

In the case of abductions/ hostage situations and deaths, incidents reflect the number of

farmers and/ or farm workers reported to have been abducted or detained by war veterans

during a specific month. Assaults and confrontations, however, reflect reported events

rather than numbers of persons affected. In several cases, FIU noted assaults on multiple

farm workers in a single report, therefore, the numbers of persons affected is not clear.

The confrontations included here involve a number of instances in which farm workers

confronted war veterans and attempted to drive them off the farm. On several farms

where such confrontations occurred, war veterans returned in greater numbers and

instituted more intense violence at a later date.

The data in Figure 4.3 reveal the overwhelming fact that the primary targets of

physical violence were farm workers. The CFU FIU reports include 363 assaults on farm

workers, representing 39.9 percent of the invasion violence. Farm workers also were the

targets of threats or intimidation in 180 cases or 19.8 percent of the violence.

Additionally, farm workers accounted for 55 confrontations between workers and

invaders (6 percent) and three deaths (0.3 percent). For farmers, threats were the most commonly reported form of violence with 193 cases, or 21 percent of invasion violence attributed to this. Twenty –five farmers were assaulted (27 percent) and five farmers[6] were killed due to invasion violence (0.5 percent). Eighty-five farmers and or farm workers were held hostage or abducted during the invasions, accounting for 9.3 percent of invasion violence.

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[6] This number is based on what was reported in the CFU FIU daily invasion reports. I know of two other farmer deaths through newspaper and other sources.

Figure 4.3

Violence Associated with Invasions, March – June, 2000

Figure showing a bar chart of "Number of Incidents" for March, April, May, June, and Total, with categories: Hostage/ Abductions, Threats to/ Intimidation of Farm Workers, Threats to Farmers, Assaults of Farmers, Assaults of Farm Workers, Confrontations Between Invaders and Farm Workers, Farm Worker Deaths, Farmer Deaths.

In mid-April, as Zimbabwe neared the 20th anniversary of her independence (celebrated on April 18, 2000), CFU FIU revealed a worsening crisis (CFU 2000e). On April 14, war veterans abducted and murdered one farmer and abducted and seriously assaulted five others. Following a confrontation between workers and invaders on another farm in which farm workers chased war veterans away, the invaders returned in greater numbers and burned down the entire workers' village, the tobacco barns, and half of the farmer's homestead (CFU 2000e). War veterans attempted to burn houses with workers locked inside, causing several workers to sustain serious burn injuries. The farm supervisor's wife depicted in the photo below, was severely burned and beaten by farm

Figure 4.4
Photo Two

invaders and ZANU-PF supporters on April 24, 2000, demonstrating several critical ways state terror and violence are organized to inflict violence both physically on the burn victim herself, and psychologically on those who witnessed the assault (CCJP 1997).

A second farmer was killed in Matabeleland on April 19, and a farm worker died under questionable circumstances in Midlands on April 17. On April 24, 2000, the CFU FIU from one community summarized the

conditions on farms throughout April, noting numerous cases of "skull bashing of labor."

Throughout the politically motivated and generalized violence throughout April, war

veterans continued to coerce farm workers into participating in the invasions (CFU

2000e):

> Yesterday farm workers were told to leave Gold Farm and go to Bronze
> Farm where they had to peg plots and build huts. The war vets threatened
> to assault them if their huts were not built.

In all regions, farmers and farm workers experienced increased assaults, threats, and

detentions. Reports of rape and sexual assault of female farm workers and wives of male

farm workers begin to surface, though evidence was limited.[7] Overall, the levels of

violence and intimidation were extremely high on farms and ZHRNGOF (2000) has

stated that violence against farm workers was the most prevalent, yet most underreported

type of assault. As indicated above, one provincial governor stated to CFU leaders that

there would be an "anti-farm worker" campaign coming due to their suspected voting

"no" votes on the Constitutional Referendum. Additionally, the association of the

opposition MDC with the labor movement in Zimbabwe put farm workers in an even

more precarious situation as farm workers were represented by a union, GAPWUZ. The

underreporting reflects the fact that farmers, despite their best efforts, probably were not

made aware of every assault or threat that occurred on their farms due to factors such as

farm workers' fear of reporting, or feelings that reporting such events brought no change.

In early April, war veterans attempted to murder a farmer in Mashonaland East

following an attempt on his life two weeks previously. The CFU FIU for April 4

recounted the events as follows (CFU 2000e):

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[7] Sexual assaults are not reported at all in the CFU FIU reports during this period. They surfaced in my
interviews with farmers, GAPWUZ leaders, and in reports of human rights groups.

At 10:30 a.m. on Monday 3 April, Mr. Black went to a part of the farm near the school to get a signal for his cell phone. 25 invaders attacked him with sticks, fan belts and 8 gauge wire, beating him severely around the head and back. They tied him up with barbed wire and dragged him into the bush. While they discussed what to do with him next, he managed to free himself and ran into the nearby dam. His son, Josh, arrived and the attackers left. Mr. Black was taken to hospital in [a nearby town]. It was established that he had no broken bones but severe cuts and lacerations. He is due to be discharged from hospital today. The Police have arrested three assailants, including Maruva, who was involved in the first assault. The invaders set his [Black's] motorbike alight and stole his hand held radio.

In an interview, Mr. Black said the war veterans had discussed how to kill him and where they should dump his body. A longtime supporter of another non-MDC opposition party, Mr. Black felt he had been particularly targeted for his vocal political views.

Politicization during farm invasions began early and was linked to invasion violence. In February and March, some farmers had openly supported MDC financially and either transported workers to MDC rallies or invited MDC (and other parties) to campaign on their farms. ZANU-PF responded harshly, with Ministers of the government and key army leaders telling CFU leaders that white farmers must stay out of politics or they would not be protected any longer by government (Fieldnotes 3-28-00). In March, farmers and farm workers were subjected to searches by war veterans for MDC paraphernalia and weapons. By April, war veterans appeared to have been joined on farms by ZANU-PF youth. Together, war veterans and ZANU-PF youth targeted farmers and farm workers suspected to be linked to MDC. Invaders demanded that farm workers hand over MDC party cards and T-shirts, and began "re-educating" farm workers. Political rallies dominated weekends, particularly after April. War veterans began making considerable demands on farmers for food, accommodation, and transportation.

Farm vehicles were routinely commandeered by war veterans for the purpose of ferrying farm workers and villagers to and from ZANU-PF rallies. Farm workers and farmers were required to attend political rallies, or suffer further intimidation and assault. The escalation of violence on farms from February through May reflects the height of the campaign period for the 2000 parliamentary elections. By early May 1,190 farms had been invaded and by mid-June, 1,631; terror and intimidation had been well established among the farm worker and farm owner communities by this time. War veterans began to use farms as base camps to also move into Communal Areas to "re-educate" rural voters (Interviews Regional CFU Representatives 6/1/00; 5/8/00). Additionally, international election monitors began arriving in June 2000 to observe the elections to ensure they were free and fair, which may also account for some of the decrease in farm invasion violence.

Beginning in April, war veterans started to represent themselves as playing a policing role on farms, though these incidents were not common throughout the invasions. In one case, veterans challenged the firing of a farm worker, claiming he had been dismissed for being a war veteran. In another incident, a farm foreman was assaulted in front of the other workers for ejecting a prostitute from the farm village. War veterans asked farm workers if farmers treated them well and stated that any disputes or wrong-doings should be brought to their attention. As part of their new policing role, war veterans conducted property searches of cars and farmers' homes, usually looking for weapons. Many farmers were asked to turn over their weapons to local authorities for safe-keeping (CFU 2000e, Fieldnotes).

The election period (June 26-27) itself passed with few events except in Mashonaland West North where a war veteran attempted to intimidate farm workers on one farm and in another area where an election monitor was temporarily abducted. Following elections in June 2000, farmers reported that war veterans who may have moved off to vote, appeared to be returning to previously invaded farms. Several areas experienced increased numbers of invaders, and some areas noted increased hostility and potential retribution for voting patterns. Many farmers expressed the sentiment that by June, the presence of election monitors in Zimbabwe quieted violence somewhat. Nevertheless, the state terror and organized violence of the previous four months had already terrorized the population into voting ZANU-PF (February – May 2000) (CFU 2000e; Farmer Interviews).

By the time of the elections in late June 2000, nearly one third of all commercial farms had been invaded at some point (Table 4.2). It is important to note that while 30.4 percent of farms had been invaded as of June 29, 2000, this does not mean that there was a continuous presence of squatters on these farms. Rather, in most cases, invasions involved movement on and off the farm following the initial invasion. However, even though most farms did not experience continuous occupation, the national situation on farms deteriorated rapidly, and reports of violence increased with torture of farm workers and farmers, abductions, hostage/ detentions, rape and death becoming more prevalent. Instilling terror, not taking back the land, clearly was the primary motive of the paramilitary groups involved in land invasions. Throughout the country, the ZRP were reluctant to react to cases of violence on farms under orders from local and national police officials not to respond, because they were told, the matter was "political" (CFU

2000e). Therefore, farmers and farm workers lived under extreme conditions of insecurity throughout the election period invasions.

Aside from violence and intimidation, the data in Figure 4.1 and Table 4.3 also record "Demands for land,"[8] that is, any instances in which invaders claimed the land belonged to them, demanded the farmer sign over his title deed or that he sign a document giving part of his property to individuals, or informed the farmer they were taking the farm. For example, "War Vet Ch—visited [name] farm and thanked the farmer for ploughing the land for him and told him he would be moving the war vets on and if the farm was not big enough for all of them he would also be taking over [name] farm too" (CFU FIU 6-29-00). In another case, the invaders' demands for written proof of ownership came with threats. "Also on [name] had a group of about 40 broke down the chain to the homestead gate and demanded that 850 ha of the farm be signed over to them otherwise they would kill the farmer and burn the farmhouse down. Had to sign under the circumstances" (CFU FIU 5-7-00).

Throughout the election invasion period, war veterans steadily engaged in a variety of strategies to disrupt farm life and work. "Disruptions to farm work" included war veteran instigated work stoppages, setting up roadblocks on farms and in rural areas to disrupt farm delivery/supply routes, poaching on farms, and selling plots of land to nearby villagers or other war veterans. Disruptions to work took many forms, including interference with tobacco curing as in the example cited above. Many farmers were prevented from planting winter wheat crops, though exact numbers of farmers affected

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[8] I did not include all invasions with demands for land. There was a distinct qualitative difference that emerged from the CFU FIU (as well as interviews) between invaders establishing a presence through pegging land and war veterans/ invaders who attempted to force farmers (usually under threat) to sign over the title deed or who indicated a serious intention to take over the land and farm it.

were unknown at the time of research (Fieldnotes, interviews). Workers were told not to report to work and threatened with violence if they did. War veterans moved on and off properties as they expanded the number of farms under their control, leaving farmers uncertain day to day whether veterans would be physically present on the farm or not. Theft, property damage, poaching, building houses, work stoppages, and prevention of the planting of winter crops (particularly wheat) persisted throughout the period. War veterans demanded that farmers move their cattle off many farms, and brought in CA cattle to the farms. Additionally, war veterans moved into farmers' homes, and established base camps on farms from which they directed further farm invasions and excursions into neighboring communal and urban communities.

As early as March, "Demands for Money, Provisions, and Transportation" surfaced in invasion reports on invaded farms and steadily increased until the election. War veterans/ invaders asked for money, food and water (sometimes beer) and, most frequently, transportation to ZANU-PF rallies. For example, many farmers reported pressure to donate money and food toward ZANU-PF rallies. The week of the elections, one war veteran telephoned two farmers threatening assaults if they did not stop work and supply the transport to send their workers to a ZANU-PF rally (CFU FIU 6-23-00). In another case, a farmer refused to serve tea to 20 invaders who came to his house demanding to be fed and that transport be provided to a rally. On refusing the tea but granting the transport request, "the farmer was given a harsh verbal reminder that farmers are being killed" (CFU FIU 6-18-00).

All instances when farmers or farm workers attended ZANU-PF campaign rallies under coercion by invaders were coded as "Forced Attendance at ZANU-PF Rallies."

Such rallies included the large "Star" rallies that usually featured a prominent national politician and which were organized by ZANU-PF at the national level, as well as smaller rallies organized by local ZANU-PF supporters and war veterans. Many of these smaller rallies occurred on farms and involved threats and violence, sometimes directed at particular farmers or farm workers. For example, in late May, a CFU FIU report states that 100 percent of farmers in the area attended two rallies over the weekend under duress. At the rallies, speakers emphasized that the parliamentary election ballots would not be secret. Following one rally, ZANU-PF youth descended on one farm and beat up two female farm workers due to their non-attendance at the rally, throwing their infants on the ground in the process. As the data in Table 4.3 indicate, farmers and farm workers were forced to attend 209 ZANU-PF rallies between March and June.

All invasion activities reported in Figure 4.1 and Table 4.2, rise dramatically in April and peak in May. All activities taper off slightly in June, despite the fact that elections were held June 25-26. This pattern reflects several factors. First, the low number of incidents reported in March reflects both the gradual development of the CFU information gathering system, as well as the nascent development of war veteran strategy and increasing anger among war veterans over farmer (and farm worker) strategies in response to invasions early on (see below and Chapter 5). In March, many farmers and farm workers united in what came to be termed "football teams" and ran invaders off farms (see Chapter 5 for discussion; fieldnotes, interviews). At the same time, the CFU pursued legal cases against the war veterans' leader and the commissioner of police and received court orders requiring that invaders move off farms or be arrested (fieldnotes). The early strategies of farmers and farm workers of resisting farm invasions legally and

in some cases through force intensified ZNLWVA and ZANU-PF anger, which leaders of both groups openly expressed.[9]

Second, the invasions intensified as elections drew closer. April and May were key "campaign" periods. ZANU-PF's campaign centered on the slogan "Land is the Economy and the Economy is Land" as well as anti-white/ anti-colonial rhetoric. The government-owned press published a wave of articles in favor of ZANU-PF that blamed Britain for promoting civil war in Zimbabwe (*Sunday Mail* 4-2-00); declared opposition parties were "agents of foreign power" (*Herald* 4-5-00); claimed the MDC was propping up the interest of white settlers and would bring neo-colonialism (*Herald* 4-7-00); and applauded democracy within the ruling party (*Herald* 4-3-00) and the government's successes in building a nation out of a racist and divisive former colony (*Herald* 4-6-00). These inflammatory statements by the government reflected the regime's effort to incite anti-white sentiment through their campaign. In April and May commercial farms became key resources, providing logistical and financial support to the ZANU-PF campaigns in rural areas and urban areas. War veterans coerced money, food, and transportation from farmers that enabled them also to begin campaigns in neighboring CA and urban and peri-urban areas. The Z$20 million in campaign funds from ZANU-PF ran out in mid-May, which is when demands for money and food significantly increased according to CFU FIU reports and my own fieldnotes. The need to rely on farmers for financial support is further evidenced by a "demonstration" by war veterans at the ZANU-PF headquarters in Harare over the party's lack of payment of daily rates for farm invaders (Fieldnotes).

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[9] Chapter Five deals with CFU and farmer strategies in more detail.

The tapering of invasion activity in June reflects two factors. First, in June election observers arrived in Zimbabwe and began touring the country. The presence of international observers resulted in slightly less intimidating behaviors by invaders (ZHRNGOF 2001). Second, in June, war veterans' campaigns had significantly spread to the urban areas (ZHRNGOF 2001), thereby limiting their activities on farms.

The intensification of invasions began immediately after the Constitutional Referendum in February 2000 and quickly spread nationwide. Ten percent of CFU members were affected in early March, and by the time of the election on June 26, 30.4 percent were invaded (Table 4.3). Terror tactics began early in the invasions and became a consistent pattern by March, continuing to escalate through May. In all months studied, violence was the most commonly reported invasion activity (Figure 4.1). Farm workers experienced the highest levels of violence, with 363 reported assaults, as compared to 25 reported assaults of farm owners (Figure 4.2). Farmers experienced more threats, however, 193, while farm workers received 180 (Figure 4.2). The terror and violence on farms was explicitly linked to politics. Farm workers and farm owners were being punished for their alleged "no" vote in the referendum and for their association with and support of the opposition MDC. Further, farm workers were subjected to "re-education" and forced to attend political rallies to which farmers were required to provide transportation and refreshments.

Extensive Spread over Space and Regional Variation

As highlighted in the previous section, the invasions varied by region. Nationally, 27 percent of farmers reported hostile or violent invasions. As the data in Table 4.4

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suggest, there was significant regional variation both in terms of the percent of farms

invaded in a particular region, and in terms of the percent of invasions considered violent

or hostile by farmers. Whereas 38 percent of farms in Mashonaland Central were

reportedly invaded and 40 percent of these invasions were judged violent, in

Matabeleland, only 16 percent of farms were invaded and 20 percent considered violent/

hostile (CFU 2000c). Mashonaland East had the highest percentage of farms invaded, 39,

and farmers labeled 23 percent of invasions in the region as violent/ hostile. In

Mashonaland West North, 24 percent of farms were invaded; 32 percent were reported as

violent/ hostile. Mashonaland West South reported 32 percent farms invaded and 22

percent were recorded as hostile/ violent. While in Masvingo 24 percent of farms were

invaded and 21 percent reported the invasions as violent, in Manicaland 20 percent of

farms were invaded and 20 percent were considered violent or hostile. In Midlands, 23

percent of farms were invaded with only 14 percent of farmers reporting the invasions as

violent. Overall, 28 percent of farms were invaded and 27 percent considered violent as

of June 29, 2000, according to the report generated from the CFU Membership survey

(CFU 2000c). In general, farms in the Mashonaland provinces experienced higher rates of

invasions and farmers more frequently labeled the invasions hostile than in Masvingo,

Midlands, or Matabeleland (see Table 4.4). (The reasons for these differences are

analyzed below.)

Table 4.4[D]

Farm Invasions by Region and Violence, Zimbabwe 2/2000-6/2000

Region	Percent Farms Invaded	Percent Invasions Violent/ Hostile
Mashonaland Central	38%	40%
Mashonaland West North	24%	32%
Mashonaland East	39%	23%
Mashonaland West South	32%	22%
Masvingo	24%	21%
Manicaland	20%	20%
Matabeleland	16%	20%
Midlands	23%	14%
TOTAL	28%	27%

Source: CFU 2000c.

[D] Table 4.4 is based on data from the CFU Invasion Impact Assessment. The assessment evaluated responses of 56 percent of the CFU's 1999 membership of 3950 farmers who own 5413 farms (CFUc). Those who completed the survey are not therefore, a representative sample. In comparison with the daily invasion reports, the survey included 1525 farms that had been invaded, while the daily invasion reports counted 1637 farms invaded at the time of the survey (CFUc). This suggests that 93 percent of farmers with invaded farms responded to the survey and suggests that the results reflect a fairly reliable account of the invasions. The data rely on self-reporting by farmers to a CFU sponsored assessment of (primarily) the economic impact of the invasions. Though not perfect, the data do give a general picture of invasions.

A similar picture emerges when one considers the incidents of violence reported in the CFU FIU. Whereas the three CFU regions of Mashonaland East, Mashonaland Central, and Mashonaland West North each recorded over 200 incidents of violence, the five remaining regions of Masvingo, Midlands, Matebeleland, Manicaland and Mashonaland West South combined totaled only 244 (see Table 4.5). Notably, in the CFU Farm Invasion Survey (CFU 2000c), only 94 (23 percent) farmers in Mashonaland East characterized their invasions as violent or hostile (Table 4.4), whereas in my analysis of violence reported in the CFU FIU, Mashonaland East records the highest number of violent incidents, 229 (Table 4.5). This difference could be explained by the inclusion of farmers' description of "hostile" invasions as equivalent with violence in the CFU survey. Hostility reflects farmers' perception of invaders' attitudes and may not

characterized their invasion as "hostile/ violent" in the CFU's survey based solely on

hostile attitudes alone, whereas my analysis of the CFU FIU reports was based only on

reported incidents of violence. Further, my analysis includes all incidents of violence,

including violence against farm workers, which may not factor as highly into farmers'

assessments of whether the invasion is hostile or violent.

Table 4.5
Number of Violent Incidents by Region
Zimbabwe, 2/2000-6/2000

Region	Incidents
Mashonaland East	229
Mashonaland Central	224
Mashonaland West North	206
Mashonaland West South	61
Masvingo	61
Midlands	42
Manicaland	43
Matebeleland	37
Total	903

Source: CFU FIU 2000e

Differences also emerged in the types of violence most commonly experienced in

the various regions. In Matebeleland, Masvingo, Mashonaland West South and

Midlands, threats against farmers ranked highest, whereas in Manicaland, threats and

intimidation against farm workers were more prevalent. In Mashonaland Central, farm

worker assaults (117) and threats against farmers (30) were the most common forms of

violence. Mashonaland Central also had 24 cases of abductions/ hostages and 18 cases of

confrontations between workers and war veterans, the highest numbers recorded in a

CFU region for these types of violence (CFU 2000e). Mashonaland Central reported no

assaults of or deaths among farmers, however. Similar to Mashonaland Central,

Mashonaland East and Mashonaland West North both reported high levels of assaults on

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farm workers (102 and 98, respectively). Mashonaland East also reported 20 cases of abductions/ hostages and 17 confrontations, with Mashonaland West North having 15 and eight, respectively. Mashonaland East and Mashonaland West North have slightly higher incidents of threats to farmers (36 and 33, respectively) than Mashonaland Central (30) (*ibid*). The primary difference between Mashonaland East and Mashonaland West North lies in the numbers of farmers assaulted and killed during invasions. Matebeleland reported one farmer assault and one farmer death and Manicaland one farmer assault, according to the CFU FIU (CFU 2000e). Mashonaland West South reported four farmer assaults. However, Mashonaland East reported 13 farmer assaults and three of the five total farmer deaths during the election invasion period. Six farmer assaults and one farmer death occurred in Mashonaland West North.

Obviously, war vets' use of violence and intimidation were not equivalent across regions. Several explanations underlie this variation. First, local leadership and provincial support for invasions were closely linked to the intensity of violence. In Mashonaland Central, the province experiencing the most intense invasions and the highest number of hostile/ violent invasions (Table 4.4), former Governor Border Gezi made numerous public and private statements supporting the invasions and the use of violence (CFU 2000d). Second, farmers in Mashonaland Central also cited the development of fights among local war lords over territory and refusals by local war veteran leaders to acknowledge national war vet leaders as reasons why farm violence was more intense in their region than elsewhere (interviews 2000). For example, the Task Force convened by President Mugabe consisting of war veteran leaders (including Hunzvi) and a CFU team set out to visit "hot spots" throughout the country where

violence had been most intense. The task force set out with the national leaders to meet with local war veteran and farmers to negotiate peace in particular communities. In some cases, however, local war veterans refused to attend meetings called by Hunzvi, suggesting Hunzvi's authority over war vets nation-wide is tenuous at best.

Third, in general, farms in former ZIPRA areas (Midlands, Masvingo, and Matabeleland) reported less violence and disruptions to farming activities (CFU 2000c, interviews 2000). One farmer in Matabeleland told me that the veterans on his farm approached him and explained that they were only invading his farm to protect him from the potential of an invasion by ZANLA ex-combatants (interview 2000).[10] The invasion appeared to have been a front to deter other potential invaders and the war vets actually helped the farmer police poachers and other squatters. Historical factors also played a role in which areas experienced most violence. Masvingo, Manicaland, Midlands and Matebeleland are areas that traditionally have been less supportive of ZANU-PF than the Mashonaland provinces.

Fourth, Masvingo, Matebeleland and the Midlands are more arid areas and the commercial farming enterprises there typically are larger ranches with fewer workers. The targets of the invasions (farmers and farm workers), were thus fewer and farther between in these provinces. Therefore, the local experiences of invasions varied, reflecting differing strength in war vet organization, local relationships with farmers, response of farmers and farm workers to invasions, and a host of other variables. These local articulations of invasions however, were staged on a foundation of state-sanctioned

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[10] ZIPRA war veterans were associated with the ZAPU political party following independence and were rivals of ZANLA war veterans' ZANU.

violence, ZANU-PF financed "campaigning" by ZLWVA, and a general absence of rule of law.

Strategies of State Terror and State Organized Violence

The situation in Zimbabwe reflected terror and organized violence, sanctioned, and, I argue, organized, by the regime, against the population in an attempt to intimidate and coerce citizens either not to vote, or to vote ZANU-PF in the parliamentary elections (NDI 2000). According to data gathered by the Zimbabwe Human Rights Nongovernmental Organization Forum (2001), of the 704 victims of human rights abuses reported to the Forum, only five were affiliated with ZANU-PF.[11] Furthermore, ZANU-PF supporters (which includes war veterans) and government officials made up 93 percent of the perpetrators of violence (Amani Trust in ZHRNGO 2000). The National Democratic Institute (NDI) Pre-Election Delegation to Zimbabwe concluded, in May 2000, that conditions for free and fair elections in Zimbabwe did not exist, noting that "violence has created an atmosphere of anxiety and fear" (NDI 2000:1-2). In addition to noting irregularities in the electoral process and an unlevel playing field in which the ruling party ZANU-PF enjoys access to government resources, NDI (2000) highlighted specific forms of intimidation and violence in rural areas (both in LSCF and CA/RA communities), including,

❖ "...the deployment of war veterans wearing red berets, the trademark of the North Korean trained 5th Brigade, suggesting a renewal of the

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[11] The data gathered by the Forum was not restricted to abuses relating to farm invasions but included all political violence reported to their organization.

'Gukurahundi' campaign if elections do not favor the ruling party..."

(NDI 2000: 10-11);

❖ beatings of supporters of ZANU-PF opposition parties;

❖ documented cases of torture and rape; and

❖ 're-education' camps where farm workers, and in some cases villagers, are

forced to chant pro-ZANU-PF slogans (NDI 2000:10-12).

In most cases, the violence against and hostility on farms was targeted most

severely at farm workers. According to the CFU's Invasion Impact Survey (CFU 2000c),

of the 7,220 human rights violations recorded prior to June 29, 2000, farm workers

accounted for 91.6 percent of the total victims, while farmers accounted for 8.4 percent

(see Table 4.6).[12] The most prevalent abuses or violations against farm workers involved

illegal searches (45.9 percent), followed by minor assaults (26.7 percent) and verbal

death threats (16 percent). Verbal death threats, however, were more commonly reported

by farmers representing 74 percent of their human rights violations, followed by illegal

searches (12 percent) and minor assaults (6.4 percent). The murders of two farmers in

one week in early April 2000 caused many farmers to take death threats seriously (CFU

2000c). Though sexual assault represents less than one percent of violations according to

CFU data, it is widely believed by farm worker union and human rights organization

leaders that the percentages of such incidents were severely underrepresented due to fear

of reporting by farm workers.

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[12] It is important to recognize that the CFU survey information is not perfect. Due to the on-going nature of the crisis at the time of the survey, many of the statistics are underrepresented here. The information does however, give a rough picture of the situation on farms. Most of my narrative focuses on farmers due to the fact that I was unable to interview farm workers, as noted in Chapter Three.

Table 4.6
Farm Invasion Human Rights Violations, Zimbabwe
February-June 2000

Type of Violation	Farmers		Farm Workers		TOTAL
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	
Illegal Searches	70	12%	3039	45.9%	3109 (43%)
Abductions	7	1.1%	329	5%	336 (4.4%)
Minor Assaults	39	6.4%	1763	26.7%	1802 (25%)
Serious Assaults (requiring hospitalization)	17	2.8%	380	5.7%	397 (5.5%)
Verbal Death Threats	449	74%	1069	16%	1518 (21%)
Written Death Threats	22	3.6%	18	<1%	40 (.6%)
Rapes	1	<1%	13	<1%	14 (<1%)
Deaths	1	<1%	3	<1%	4 (<1%)
TOTAL	606	100%	6614	100%	7220 (100%)

Source: Report on Invasion Impact Survey, CFU. 7 July 2000. (CFU 2000c).

A common strategy among invading war vets was to hold political rallies known as *pungwes* (interviews 2000; see also NDI 2000). The discourse used by black and white Zimbabweans to describe these rallies or *pungwes* originates from people's experiences during the war for independence in the 1970s. *Pungwe* is the term used to describe political meetings or re-education rallies that the ZANLA liberation fighters held in villages during the war. While *pungwes* provided villagers and guerilla fighters the opportunity to build solidarity and offer mutual support, *pungwes* often involved forced or coerced participation by local people, mandatory singing/ dancing/ chanting ofrevolutionary songs, and the disciplining of those termed "sell-outs." Sell-outs during the war for independence were persons proven or suspected of supporting the ruling colonial government; during 2000, sell-outs were persons proven or suspected of being affiliated with MDC. Sell-outs were often beaten, their homes burned, and they sometimes were killed in front of others. *Pungwes* also provided the fighters with access to women and teen-aged girls for what was often coerced or forced sex (see Staunton

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1992, Moore-King 1988, Kriger 1992). The violence and coercion associated with *pungwes* intensified during 2000. Whereas during the liberation period, *pungwes* served both a coercive and solidarity-building function, in 2000, *pungwes* appear to be solely instruments of violence and intimidation (interviews with GAPWUZ officials 2000; NDI 2000).

Pungwes were commonplace in the period prior to the elections and, as during war time, coercion played a major role in participation in the rallies. Farmers received threats that if they did not provide transportation for workers to the *pungwes*, their homes would be burned, they would be killed or beaten, as well as a myriad of other threats such as threats against their families and threats to burn down their workers' village (farmer interviews 2000). Farm workers and villagers were also threatened into participating and attending. Informants indicate that the *pungwes*, in many cases, ended late in the night with the war veterans sending home the male farm workers and remaining with women and girls for sex (interviews with GAPWUZ officials 2000).

Pre-election violence in Zimbabwe in 2000 served as a coercive force through public forms of violence which was used to discipline not only those physically tortured, but more importantly as a form of deterrent torture, to serve as a threat to those who escaped such physical violence (Tindale 1996). For example, in one particularly gruesome case, the bodies of two victims of political violence were displayed on the porch of a store front in a small resort town (Daily News). The two individuals had been among a group severely assaulted on an invaded farm which local farm workers were forced to observe. Among farmers, the deterrent torture emerged through the beatings

and deaths of fellow farmers, notably, MDC activists or supporters. For farm workers, it came much closer, in their villages, communities and homes.

It is important to note that the numbers in both Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 (below) should be considered rough estimates. It is widely believed by CFU and GAPWUZ that the human rights violations reported here represent the tip of the iceberg. The data included in both tables were produced by surveys conducted in situations of on-going violence, in communities where many workers fled violence, and research was conducted with a sample of commercial farmers. Therefore, it is expected that the data on farm workers is grossly under-represented, particularly in the case of rapes. Table 4.7 includes data on human rights violations recorded by the National Employment Council for the Agricultural Industry (NEC) and includes pre-election human rights violations both on farms and in Zimbabwe at large. According to NEC (2000) research, 26 deaths occurred related to political violence, and there were 1,593 reported assaults, and 11 cases of rape. Property destruction accounted for 620 violations, while 427 persons were detained or abducted. NEC found 1,383 cases of threats of assault, and 225 death threats. Over 3,000 people were displaced from their homes as of May 29, 2000 due to political violence prior to the parliamentary election in Zimbabwe in 2000(NEC 2000).

Table 4.7
Pre-election Human Rights Violations

Human Rights Violations as of 29 May	
Deaths	26
Assaults	1593
Rapes	11
Property destruction	620
Detention/ abduction	427
Assault threats	1383
Death threats	225
Displaced people	3000+
Total number of people affected by violations	10,419

Source: NEC, 2000

The data in Tables 4.6 and 4.7, give us a rough sense of the election violence. As of 29 May, 2000, over 10,000 persons had been affected by human rights violations that had been reported (NEC 2000). Given the significance of the *Gukurahundi*[13] period in creating a political culture dominated by fear, it is worthwhile to note that during the three-year period documented by CCJPZ, 7,246 human rights violations were documented; in the three month period documented by NEC, 10,419 violations occurred. While the political violence in four months in the year 2000 involved more reported cases to date than was reported for the *Gukurahundi*, during the latter, mass executions and disappearances were commonplace (CCJPZ 1997) whereas during the former, the majority of abuses involved assaults, threats, and destruction of property. Clearly, the *Gukurahundi* period represents a much more intense and severe period of violence than the invasions of 2000. I include a discussion of the *Gukurahundi* violence here in an

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[13] *Gukurahundi* refers to the period of political violence in Zimbabwe in the mid-1980s. See Chapter Two.

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attempt to show a pattern of the use of violence for political intimidation by ZANU-PF as well as to indicate the scale of violence in such a short period of time.

In farm worker communities, violence and intimidation severely impacted livelihoods. Disruptions to farm activities resulted in loss of wages and in some cases retrenchment of jobs. Farm workers have been forced out of their homes to make room for war veterans on some farms. NGOs working with farm workers report that farm workers have pulled children out of school out of fear that they will be assaulted or abducted while traveling to school (interviews 2000). School children have been raped and abducted. Farm worker housing has been destroyed, including the minimal property farm workers may own. Humanitarian organizations are expecting thousands of displaced persons due to the invasions (Zimbizi 2000).

Parliamentary Elections and State Terror and State Organized Violence as an Electoral Strategy

Though the invasions tamed slightly during the elections (June 24-25), the desired effect had been accomplished. Voters in provinces with high levels of farm invasions and farm violence voted for ZANU-PF (Table 4.4 and 4.8 below). In Mashonaland Central, while 68 percent of voters supported the ZANU-PF-backed constitution, 79 percent voted for the ruling party in the parliamentary elections, an increase of 10 percent. Mashonaland East showed more dramatic increases in ruling party support: from 58 percent in the referendum to 72 percent in the election. In the province with the third highest proportion of voters (64 percent) supporting ZANU-PF in the elections (Mashonaland West), only 58 percent voted for the referendum. In the provinces with the

highest levels of farm invasion violence – Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, and

Mashonaland West – the proportion of voters voting for ZANU-PF significantly

increased between the referendum and the election.

In the areas with lower levels of invasion violence, the outcome was less clear. In

Midlands the proportion of 'Yes' voters and those voting for ZANU-PF remained similar,

61 percent and 58 percent respectively. Although Manicaland experienced little violence,

ZANU-PF support actually increased in the region between the referendum and the

elections from 34 percent voting 'Yes' to 44 percent voting for ZANU-PF. Matebeleland

North increased its support for MDC between the referendum and the elections from 52

percent to 71 percent, whereas in Matebeleland South voters showed increased support

for ZANU-PF, voting 'Yes' at 50 percent (over 47 percent voting 'No') and 56 percent

voting for ZANU-PF (only 39 percent voting MDC) in the parliamentary elections.

Masvingo also increased its support for ZANU-PF – 53 percent on the referendum and 57

percent during the election. While the terror experienced in these farming communities

was not as significant as in others, only in two provinces (Midlands and Matebeleland

North) did support for ZANU-PF decline. Voting patterns suggest that even in areas with

low levels of state organized violence and terror the electorate were effectively affected.

Overall, slightly more voters supported ruling ZANU-PF in the elections than in the

referendum.

Table 4.8
Referendum and Election Results by Region, Zimbabwe 2000

Province[E]	Referendum 2/2000		Election 6/2000		
	Yes	No	ZANU-PF	MDC	% Difference No - MDC
Harare	25%	73%	27%	71%	-2%
Bulawayo	23%	76%	13%	84%	-8%
Masvingo	53%	43%	57%	35%	-8%
Manicaland	34%	63%	44%	47%	-16%
Matebeleland North	45%	52%	23%	71%	+19%
Mashonaland East	58%	38%	72%	24%	-14%
Matebeleland South	50%	47%	56%	39%	-8%
Midlands	61%	35%	58%	36%	+1%
Mashonaland West	58%	38%	64%	33%	-5%
Mashonaland Central	68%	30%	79%	20%	-10%
Total	44%	53%	47%	46%	-7%

Source: www.gta.gov.zw/President%20speeches/Statistics;
www.dailynews.co.zw/daily/2000/June/June28/1568.html

[E] The Provinces here are those defined by the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ). In previous tables on invasion violence, the provinces are based on provinces as defined by the CFU for their organization and differ slightly from the GoZ provinces. Specifically, CFU excludes the urban provinces of Harare and Bulawayo, as there are no farms in those provinces. Additionally, the CFU has collapsed the two Matebeleland provinces into one, and divided Mashonaland West into Northern and Southern provinces.

The final column in Table 4.8 reflects how state terror and organized violence worked to deter voters' support of MDC. By comparing the percentage difference between those voting 'No' on the referendum with those voting for MDC, I argue that we can see the effects of the violence and fear created by the state campaign of terror. In all provinces except for Matebeleland North and Midlands (which increased support by 19 percent and one percent, respectively), support for the MDC decreased, overall by seven percent. In the urban regions of Harare and Bulawayo, the decreases were two percent and eight percent respectively. In Manicaland, there was a 16 percent decrease in support

for MDC, while in Mashonaland East the decrease reported was 14 percent. Matebeleland South recorded an eight percent decrease in MDC support, while Mashonaland West and Mashonaland Central decreased five percent and 10 percent respectively. These changes reflect the overall success of the campaign of violence and terror waged by ZANU-PF utilizing the paramilitary force of war veterans to terrorize voters into voting for ZANU-PF or not voting at all. The changes also reveal why the campaign was more successful in some regions of the country and less so in others.

For example, the Mashonaland regions have historically been strongholds for ZANU-PF politically. A ZANU-PF supported referendum to garner support as low as 45 percent in the Mashonaland regions alerted Mugabe and the regime that he had lost his primary support base. Farms and later communal areas experienced more violence for two reasons: (1) it was critical that Mugabe re-establish a base in his historical stronghold by whatever means necessary, and (2) as discussed previously in this chapter, farms in the Mashonaland regions were smaller in size, closer in proximity, and employed more workers than game and cattle ranches in the Matebeleland regions which were distant from each other and employed few workers; these geographical factors made violence in the Mashonaland regions more efficient. In addition, historically, the ZANU-PF regime lacked support in the Matebeleland regions, as well as in Manicaland. The *Gukuruhundi* period of the mid-1980's deeply scarred the historical memory of Zimbabweans living in Masvingo, Matebeleland, and Midlands.

Regions which experienced low-levels of physical violence demonstrate the nature of how state terror operates. As Walter (2001) notes, terror includes the notion of extreme psychic fear – a state which the regime in Zimbabwe intended to create through

its utilization of state terrorist techniques (Lopez 1984: 70). These included disappearances, torture, extortion, lack of protection against crimes of others, and 'thought reform' (Lopez 1984: 70). Individuals did not have to experience the physical violence personally – it was present in the daily newspapers, accounts of the torture of farmers and farm workers. Through this, the media, whether implicitly or complicity becomes an actor in perpetuating the state of terror as the entire nation witnesses, every event, every horror, and the level of terror rises.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have traced the origins and timeline of the parliamentary election invasions of 2000 that engendered the period of state terror and state organized violence I am studying. I have demonstrated how the land invasions do not represent a movement to take back the land, but rather represent a desperate act by a despotic leader in political crisis. This chapter demonstrated the regime's desire to maintain its own power and the use of state terror to perpetuate that interest. Through state organized violence and terror conceived by Mugabe and carried out by the war veterans on farms and in rural and urban communities, Mugabe managed to terrorize voters into maintaining ZANU-PF's dominance. In the following chapter, I focus on strategies used by the CFU, GAPWUZ, and farming communities to respond to the violence.

CHAPTER 5:

MANAGING STATE TERROR AND STATE ORGANIZED VIOLENCE:

THE COMMERCIAL FARMERS' UNION (CFU),

THE GENERAL AGRICULTURAL AND PLANTATION WORKERS UNION OF

ZIMBABWE (GAPWUZ) AND COMMERCIAL FARMING COMMUNITIES

Introduction

In this chapter, I explore how organizations such as the CFU, GAPWUZ, as well

as commercial farming communities responded to state terror and state organized

violence during the invasions of 2000. Toward this end, I address three questions. First,

how did farmers and farm workers unite or divide in the face of this crisis? Second, what

were the strategies of survival that these organizations employed under such conditions of

violence to advocate for their clientele as well as ensure for organizational survival?

Third, in what ways did farming communities respond to the violence on farms or war

veterans in their communities? I argue that the land invasions brought farmers into new

forms of relationships with their workers under a common goal, while the CFU, through

its strategies, undermined those relationships, as well as one of its primary goals,

organizational survival.

I begin by examining the proactive coalition of farmers and farm workers united

in opposition to the farm invaders. Next, I turn to the CFU and describe how the

organization intervened both to protect its members and to ensure its own survival, in the

process placing a wedge between farmers and farm workers and abandoning the farm

workers to the violent invaders. Abandoned by the CFU and farmers, I demonstrate how

GAPWUZ lacked the organizational capacity to act on behalf of its constituency. Finally, I turn to farming communities to examine the varied responses to invasions. These community level responses illustrate the CFU's impact on how farmers' responded to farm invasions. In my conclusions, I focus on the concept of survival.

Historical Relationships Between CFU/ GAPWUZ and Farmers/ Farm Workers

Prior to the farm invasions, the CFU and GAPWUZ operated primarily in opposition. GAPWUZ and the CFU's bargaining team, the Agricultural Labor Bureau (ALB), met yearly to determine farm worker wages. GAPWUZ and the ALB jointly investigated worker complaints of wrongful termination, violations of occupational health and safety standards, and complaints about working conditions on farms (see Chapter Two for a full discussion of these organizations). Additionally, relations between farmers and farm workers were often tense. My interviews with farmers and farm workers in 1997-98 revealed poor working and living conditions for workers, as well as a volatile work environment (see Chapter Two for a detailed discussion). The farm invasions, however, brought a new – if temporary – alliance between the previously often antagonistic relationship between farmers/ their workers and the CFU-ALB/ GAPWUZ.

Farmers/ Farm Workers Strategies

"Football Matches." One of the first reactions to invasions and the violence associated with them represented a response of cooperation between farmers and farm workers as they united to defend farm workers, and ultimately, the farm -- the home and source of income for both farmers and workers. In early March, farmers and farm

workers in four of the eight CFU regions united in a strategy identified as "football teams." Although the CFU advised farmers not to engage in confrontational behavior, initially some farmers, primarily in the Mashonaland provinces, ignored the message. In these communities, farmers responded to reports of on-going beatings of farm workers by sending groups of neighboring farmers to observe events taking place. Farmers hoped that their presence as non-interfering witnesses would encourage war vets to stop the beatings and, according to farmers, usually it did. These response teams came to be called "football teams" after a farm worker approached one of the farmers and asked if he could join the farmers' "football team" (Interview 6-1-00). Thus began the alliance between farmers and farm workers. Though at first the teams were sent to observe only, as farmers and farm workers worked together, a more aggressive position developed. Farmers and farm workers united to defend their communities. Soon, male farm worker youth were climbing onto lorries, supplied and sometimes driven by the farmers, by the hundreds and riding from farm to farm to forcibly evict war veterans who they often outnumbered. The farm workers arrived on invaded farms and chased the squatting war vets away.

According to one CFU regional representative, the "football teams" offered farmers and farm workers a way to defend themselves from the violence against farm workers that had begun in March. One CFU regional representative described the approach in the following way.

> ... [W]hat happened is then the farm workers were quite pleased because they saw this as a way of defending themselves, and said, well can't we go together, literally, can we join the football team, and the actual phrase came from the farm workers saying can we join the football team. But, it got a little bit out of hand. In some cases there were 300 people walked onto a place where there were 50 invaders and say time to move off, and

the most difficult time I had in this whole phase was actually persuading farmers that that was not the right thing to do. ... I had to go to the farmers who were orchestrating this and say this is not the way to handle it. And because of the natural cycle of violence, we would go there with numbers, intimidate them [war veterans] off. Their first reaction would be to come back with bigger numbers, they would fail in the numbers game. You know, there are 350,000 workers, that's before you start taking the unemployed people who are living on farms. The war vets would fail in the numbers game. So, it would be an escalation until the farm workers contingent were bigger than the war vets could muster and then the only option is to take out weapons and that's what we started to see. It started with some petrol bombs being thrown around. Only when that happened, did farmers realize that they'd overstepped with starting a cycle of violence that they couldn't see through to its conclusion (Interview 5-1-00).

Although eventually the "football team" approach was flawed, in the short term it brought immediate success in that several farms were instantly free from invaders. In some areas, entire communities were cleared of invasions in a couple of days as trucks of predominately farm workers, and some farmers, swept through the community, chasing off veterans farm by farm. The strategy was, however, short-lived and short-sighted as it provoked further anger and violence from war vets. Farms where the "football teams" evicted war vets were later re-invaded, often by greater numbers of veterans with increased hostility (Interview 5-1-00; 6-7-00). Notably, the region in which the strategy first emerged (Mashonaland Central) has one of the highest rates of invasions and reports of violence (see Table 4.4 in Chapter 4). This strategy is unique in that farmers and farm workers worked together toward a united goal of preventing violence on the farms where they live and work. Once the CFU convinced its members to abandon this approach, however, the situation of workers became more precarious.

Several of my informants noted, that in their interactions with state officials, the trustworthiness of farm workers had come under question by regime leaders following

the referendum. As indicated in the CFU affidavit cited in Chapter Four, ZANU-PF

regime leaders promised an "anti-farm worker campaign." The regime perceived farm

workers to be aligned with the opposition and considered them foreigners (Fieldnotes 3-

28-00). ZANU-PF/ regime leaders quickly seized on the "football team" approach as

evidence of "the white man's army" (Fieldnotes 3-28-00). While farmers and farm

workers united to form "football teams" in March to drive out invaders, by the end of

March the limitations of that strategy had begun to surface and the CFU brought

considerable pressure to regional and local leaders to quit the "football matches." Once

the CFU convinced farmers not to engage in "football teams," farm workers were on their

own to defend themselves. As I discuss in more detail in Chapter Six, farm workers

engaged in a variety of survival/ resistance strategies.

Farmer/ Farm Worker Unity – The Case of Dave Stevens.[1] The landscape of

farm invasions changed on April 15, 2000 when a white farmer and his black farm

manager in Mashonaland East were abducted and eventually killed. According to Dave

Steven's wife Maria, war veterans on their farm, Arizona farm, had sexually assaulted

(possibly raped) a young woman (as was common on many invaded farms) (*Zimbabwe

Independent* 4-28-00). During the assault, when the brother of the young woman

intervened, the veterans assaulted him. Other farm workers and Stevens responded to the

assault and the workers ultimately drove the war veterans off the farm on the evening of

Friday April 14, 2000. The following morning, the ZRP responded to war veteran

complaints that farm workers had assaulted them, detaining several farm workers and

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[1] This case is well known publicly and the information here draws from public sources, therefore, I do not use a pseudonym.

leaving a police presence on the farm. Later that morning, the war veterans returned, armed and with their numbers buttressed. The veterans overwhelmed the ZRP on the scene and abducted Dave Stevens and his farm manager at gunpoint (CFU FIU 4-17-00).

A team of five farmers from the community had responded to Stevens' radio calls when the situation intensified and encountered the three war veteran vehicles on the road as they approached Stevens' farm. The farmers saw that Stevens was handcuffed, and they proceeded to follow the war veterans to a nearby town. The vehicles headed straight to the local ZANU-PF headquarters where the war veterans fired upon the farmers' vehicle, causing the farmers to seek refuge in the local police station. The veterans entered the station and abducted the five farmers from the station with no interference or resistance from the police. The men were then split into three groups – one individual farmer, and two groups of two. The two groups of two men were each detained and severely assaulted through Sunday. The individual farmer and Stevens were driven away from the town and severely assaulted in front of a small group of locals. Eventually, Stevens was shot and killed at point blank range. The remaining farmer's life was spared when a woman in the crowd pleaded for him, based on the assistance he had offered to the local CA in the past. The farmer and Stevens' body were delivered to a hospital on Sunday the 16th (CFU FIU 4-17-00; Fieldnotes 4-30-00). The farm manager's body was found about a week later.

In the case of Stevens, the relationship between a farmer and his workers, and their joint opposition to abuses by invading war veterans resulted in the deaths of Stevens and his manager. Stevens was known for the strong relations he had with his workers and his innovative approaches to on-farm worker incentive programs. He had

experimented with offering workers profit-sharing in the farm and was constantly trying to improve conditions on the farm for his workers. His vision for an improved society also included political involvement. Stevens was a rural district council member and active in the MDC in his community (Fieldnotes 4-23-00).

One CFU Regional Representative expressed the pressure of decision-making while living under the routinization of fear (I will return to this concept in Chapter 6).

> When Dave Stevens was killed, it was then life-threatening, by realizing the extent to which this group was willing to go. ... Our normal principals are compromised and we've had to get into survival mode. And this is what is most, I think this is psychologically going to be the biggest damage, all the principles we're used to, stand up for your rights, right and wrong, law and order, have all been compromised and to survive, we had to compromise our own principles because to make a stand about shooting a *mombe* [cow] could cost you your family, your life it's as simple as that (interview 6/1/00).

Green (1995:105-106) notes that "Fear is the arbiter of power – invisible, indeterminate, and silent. ..." In the quote above, the CFU Regional Representative revealed how the power of fear controlled many farmers' decision-making following the death of Stevens.

Stevens' death signaled an important shift in farm invasions. War veterans were now prepared to act on the numerous death threats they had given to farmers. On April 18, 2000, only days after Stevens' death, the second farmer, Martin Olds, was killed, this time in Matebeleland. Olds was also active in MDC. Three weeks later, Alan Dunn and John Weeks were killed. Dunn was active in MDC, and the Weeks' murder was classified as political by the CFU. The war veterans and ZANU-PF were making examples of farmers active in MDC, similar to the killings of MDC activists in other communities within Zimbabwe. Stevens, Olds, and Dunn – all MDC activists – most likely were targeted for their political activity, as were many other farmers who were

active in opposition politics and experienced attempts on their lives in the election invasion period.

On the day of Olds' murder (April 18), two white women on a farm on the outskirts of Harare were gang-raped. The rapists shouted political slogans at the women during the rapes. The two women were relatives of a CFU leader (*Daily Mail & Guardian* 4-20-00).

Beginning in mid-April and coinciding with the first killings, farmers became more willing to concede to demands by veterans, and these demands intensified. With the "football team" approach a forgotten strategy, the situation for workers rapidly deteriorated. From the start, the CFU put pressure on regional CFU leaders to stop the "football teams," despite their initial success and the demonstration of solidarity with farm workers that has not been seen since. Many farmers were sympathetic to their workers' vulnerable position, but the CFU increasingly stressed the importance of meeting veterans' demands (interviews). The continued emphasis on meeting war veteran demands under conditions of violence as a form of local negotiation represents what Mertz (2002: 357) considers violence survivors' inaccurate view of themselves: "they must imagine themselves inhabiting a world in which there is ...some possibility of reaching, reasoning, or connecting with the people who hold the power of life and death." The CFU must envision a world in which it still maintains a position of political and economic power and influence in Zimbabwe. The leaders of the CFU could not concede that there were no real negotiations taking place, that every negotiation was followed with increasing numbers of farm invasions and violence against farmers and, even more so, against farm workers.

CFU Strategies to Manage State Terror

From the outset of the invasions, the CFU was concerned with two primary objectives: (1) advocating for, and protecting, their clientele; and (2) organizational survival. The CFU played on the farmers' fears for their and their families' lives to ensure that its goals were met. In its attempt to safeguard commercial farming (and thus its *raison d'etre* for existing), the CFU abandoned farm workers by creating a wedge between them and farm owners. In pursuing its objectives, the CFU took the approach that the leadership based in Harare understood how best to handle the crisis rather than its members on farms throughout the country who were living the invasions on a daily basis. What emerged amidst the crisis of state terror and organized violence, was a crisis within the CFU about how to handle the invasions.

Since the beginning of the farm invasions of 2000, the CFU has engaged in multiple strategies on multiple fronts in their attempts to resolve the state terror and organized violence. As such, the CFU has instituted numerous strategies including legal challenges, engaging with domestic and international press, negotiating with war vets, government officials and international actors in their attempts to manage insecurity on farms, quelling internal dissent in an attempt to sustain the loyalty of its members, and organizing stress management workshops.

The Courts. First, the CFU from the outset has attempted to demonstrate the illegality of the land invasions and subsequent acquisitions for the Fast Track resettlement plan. In various cases they have sought to establish that (1) the invasions were illegal and required that individuals (such as war vet leader Hunzvi and former

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Mashonaland Central Governor Border Gezi) refrain from encouraging further invasions; (2) the police commissioner had responsibility to instruct local police to protect farmers and farm workers from invasion violence and prevent further invasions; (3) the Fast Track plan was unconstitutional due to the conditions of violence and insecurity existing on farms; and (4) the government had not followed Zimbabwean law regarding the acquisition process. In 2000, the CFU had prevailed in all its court cases, despite threats by war vets against judges involved in such cases. Despite the favorable rulings for the CFU, the court cases did not effect any changes on the ground. The regime refused to comply with the rulings. In Harare, the leaders pursued this course relentlessly, not recognizing how the social rules and fabric of society had been altered by violence and terror. As Green (1995: 108-109) notes, "Routinization [of terror] allows people to live in a chronic state of fear with a façade of normalcy at the same time that terror permeates and shreds the social fabric."

The Press. Second, the CFU has strategically engaged the domestic and foreign press as a means to convey their side of the story to Zimbabweans and the international community. The use of the media was a delicate dance for the union, however. While the union hoped to convey the urgency of the situation on farms, it was also concerned about scaring off international buyers for its important tobacco producers. Through the media, the CFU sought to demonstrate to government officials and war vets that it was an apolitical organization, while also seeking to demonstrate to fellow Zimbabweans that "apolitical" does not imply support for the current regime. In this light, CFU repeatedly discouraged national, regional and local leaders from using their position within the

union or union meetings to express support for opposition politics, a move which angered some within the union's membership.

"Jaw-Jaw." Third, the CFU attempted to negotiate – formally and informally – with government officials, war vets, and international donors and governments regarding the land invasions. Shortly after the invasions began, CFU leaders recognized the need to "jaw-jaw" rather than to allow members to respond in kind with violence. CFU leaders began meeting with government officials and, under the advice of President Mugabe, put forth a negotiating team to meet with war vet leaders to diffuse "hot spots" throughout the country. The union communicated with regional and international leaders, and negotiated with donors and the UNDP in attempts to create a solution to the land problem agreeable to the CFU, the Zimbabwean regime, and donor agencies. Throughout the various levels of negotiation, the CFU continued to stress the importance of maintaining a viable large-scale agricultural industry and the safety of farming communities. While the CFU continued to defend this position, their perpetual negotiation with a state negotiating in bad faith reflected an unstable view of themselves created by the routinization of fear or terror. As Mertz (2002:357) puts it, "What sort of agency is this, ... that refuses to acknowledge its own powerlessness—that insists on finding a 'normal order' where none exists, a 'human' response where inhumanity is prevailing, safety where there is danger?" CFU leaders could not acknowledge the limitations of their agency as an organization within the context of state terror and organized violence.

Manage internal strife. Fourth, the CFU attempted to quell dissension within its own ranks and maintained the position that it was critical that farmers represent a united front in the invasion crisis (field notes). One of the early areas of contention between the

CFU leaders and members (as represented by their elected regional officers at CFU

Council Meetings) during invasions was the issue of politics. In negotiations with CFU

leaders, regime leaders accused farmers of coordinating the activities of the MDC, the

opposition party. Vice President Msika, the CIO, and army officials warned CFU leaders

that if farmers continued to support the opposition party, farm invasions would "explode"

(*Standard* 4-2-00). Farmers accused CFU leaders of allowing themselves to be

blackmailed by the regime and expressed anger toward them for pressuring CFU

members to disassociate themselves from the MDC (*Standard* 4-2-00). As one farmer I

interviewed said in response to CFU pressure that its members remain apolitical, "I'm

MDC and anyone who wants to get on the fence I'll shake it so bloody hard they'll fall

off" (Fieldnotes 3-28-00). Another farmer also questioned the CFU's warnings to its

members (Fieldnotes 3-28-00):

> The question of MDC is important. We're between a rock and a hard
> place. We're playing in a so-called democracy. Individuals should be
> able to get involved – members should stand for whoever they want. The
> problem is ZANU-PF threats. CFU is an apolitical organization, but we'll
> get the fallout anyway. We're damned if we do and damned if we don't so
> we might as well do it.

Farmers' concerns over CFU directives to withdraw from political activities also centered

on concerns over being perceived as aligning themselves with ZANU-PF and abandoning

farm workers and the nation at large (interviews). Farmers expressed concern that

despite CFU claims of being an apolitical organization, the CFU historically has "leaned

to ZANU-PF and appeasement and expediency rather than what's right. ... We've

prostituted ourselves to keep our land. The old establishment in agriculture don't give a

damn about the country, they only want to continue farming. ...[CFU] is all crisis

management" (Interview 5-16-00). These farmers' concerns over hiding their political

views simply because they were CFU members demonstrated one aspect of frustration farmers felt towards the CFU leaders in Harare. While advising farmers to minimize participation in and support of MDC, the CFU also advised farmers to heed war veterans' demands, out of concerns for "safety." Increasingly, these demands involved transportation for workers to ZANU-PF rallies. The CFU was complicit in the political intimidation of farm workers and did nothing to encourage alternative perspectives.

At one CFU meeting in mid-May after several weeks in which farmers had been providing material support to invasions by responding to war veteran demands (for food, transport, and the like, see Chapter Four), a farmer challenged the union leadership and farmers present at the meeting by talking about the impact of the violence on farm workers and the need to stand in solidarity with workers. He noted that GAPWUZ had expressed willingness to support a nation-wide strike on farms in unity with farmers because the group was concerned over the inaction of the CFU to protect workers and to ameliorate the impact of invasions on farmers and farming. The suggestion, however, was overlooked by CFU. Concerns about farm workers were repeated at various meetings over the invasion period, but never taken seriously by CFU leaders. CFU pressed on with its key message, keep farmers on the land and respond to demands for provisions and transport for ZANU-PF rallies as long as farmers were under duress. Once again, the routinization of terror functioned to alter CFU leaders' perceptions and kept them believing that the individuals with whom they negotiated, did so in good faith.

Despite several pleas from representatives within the CFU Council to take a more radical approach, the leadership continued to attempt to persuade members of the wisdom of its approach and to deny more aggressive actions. In April, following the death of the

third farmer, the exchange during one Council meeting demonstrated the delicate situation of an organization attempting to both protect its members' lives and maintain a large membership base for organizational survival:

> Leader A: Our primary objective has got to be keeping people on farms farming. We've talked about farming shut downs, that'll go against us. If guys chuck their keys[2]– our job is to keep farmers on the land.
>
> Council Member A: The War vets want us to chuck our keys in.
>
> Leader A: The banks aren't going to be aggressive, they're owned by London, New York.
>
> Council Member B: We have these quiet areas; how many farmers are going to be taken out before something gets done? ***** was a quiet area until yesterday.
>
> Leader A: I understand—
>
> Council Member C: I don't want to be negative, but it appears we are being strung along until that *** [Mugabe] is back in power. What are the costs to bear? Is it a farmer a fortnight? If so, for how long? You've said there are two heads: government and the CFU. The head of government has a plan. He's adhering to it and he's winning. He's winning ZANU-PF votes all over. He's moving into areas, we've said, touch wood[3] [sic], not here. He'll move into the suburbs, he's not going to take no for an answer this time. He is stringing us along. The minister at Stevens' funeral said, "This is not an incident, this is a murder." Again, yesterday, [Dunn][4] was not breathing, there was damage to his arms, they were broken to pieces. All the blows were aimed at his head. He was an exceptional man. He stood up for principles. He was prepared to do jobs in his district that no one else wanted to do. They're stringing us along. I'm finding it difficult to accept that these guys, the good guys are, why in deaths. Two weeks ago we felt a little better, ah, again, sorry no solutions. We're dancing to that evil man's tune. It's a horror. The 1000 keys on the table are coming (Fieldnotes 5/8/00).

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[2] It had been suggested previously in the debate that all farmers turn in their keys to the banks as a form of protest and to attempt to force the banking community to publicly support farmers as had other sectors of the economy and society.

[3] The farmer meant "knock on wood" for good luck.

[4] Alan Dunn was the third farmer killed. His name is on the public record, therefore I do not use a pseudonym.

Council Member C pointed out that the CFU was being strung along by Mugabe while he went around the country collecting votes, and asked how many farmers had to die before CFU was prepared to take a radical step. The CFU leader never answered his question and the debate continued until members ultimately returned to the position of the CFU leadership (Fieldnotes 5/8/00). Through this and other Council meetings, the CFU leadership continued to repeat their position and recommended course of action until it was adopted. The CFU Council was a place for regional leaders to voice concerns, but, ultimately, the leadership guided the decision-making process (Fieldnotes). On more than one occasion, disagreements with Council decisions resulted in the resignation of Council Members due to conflicting views over the proper course of action (Fieldnotes, interviews). Therefore, several dissenting voices were driven out of the CFU Council through sheer frustration.

The CFU used several strategies to silence dissenting voices within the CFU Council. In one instance, a CFU leader questioned the constitutionality of a regional councilor reading aloud a resolution from his province during members' privilege.

> Council Member A: I would like to put forward a resolution that I would like to be addressed. Can this be discussed so I can go back to my people and tell them something? ...
>
> CFU Leader A: Can I read it? (He reads it silently.) How was this voted for?
>
> Council Member A: 100%
>
> Council Member B[5]: All Farmer Association Chairmen voted for it.
>
> CFU Leader A: This is not a signed document, has it been seen by all the Farmer Association Chairmen?
>
> Council Member A: They agreed in principle. ...

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[5] Council Members A &B are both from the same region in this case.

CFU Leader A: This is not a legal resolution according to our constitution (Fieldnotes 8-22-00).

The CFU leader then proceeded to explain that the resolution could not be debated because first, it had not been properly submitted as a formal agenda item, and second, it was improper to submit a resolution as representing a regional perspective based only on verbal communication with FA Chairs (Fieldnotes 8-22-00). The resolution proposed that the CFU appoint a task force to investigate:

1. Rescinding all title of Agricultural land to the state subject to compensation by foreign donors.
2. Actively negotiate with donors and Government methods by which compensation can be paid directly to members and to their best advantage.
3. Encourage an all embracing and independent Land Commission to oversee any transference of land.
(Resolution to Council 8-22-00).

The authors of the resolution hoped that such actions would depoliticize and de-racialize the land issue, force the regime to reconsider its strategy of state violence, and offer farmers choices (emigrate, lease back their farm, or change careers) (Resolution to Council 8-22-00). This was not a proposal which the CFU leadership approved because included in its solutions were options for farmers to sell their land in foreign currency to the regime, an option the CFU did not want as it would decrease its membership base. Further, according to this resolution, all agricultural land would be state owned and leased to large scale farmers. The resolution would challenge the current role of the CFU if many farmers opted to leave Zimbabwe. Additionally, the CFU could not be sure how changes in land ownership patterns – from ownership of large farms to leasing arrangements – might alter farmers' participation with the CFU. Therefore, the CFU attempted to keep the resolution off the floor for debate.

In an attempt to at least appear to be including more farmers in the decision-making process, CFU invited all FA Chairs to two day-long workshops to strategize about the land invasions. Each FA Chair was told to bring one or two other farmers from his FA to the workshops. The first workshop, held May 24, 2000, focused on gaining support for a CFU press release, sending FA Chairs back into their communities in the hope that inroads had been made into solving the invasion violence, and convincing farmers (via FA Chairs) to submit to war veteran demands to avoid violence (Fieldnotes 5-24-00). In this meeting, the need to bring relief to the farm workers was raised only by farmers. CFU responded that they were negotiating with police about the forced attendance at ZANU-PF rallies, but advised farmers to provide the transportation should war veterans demand it to ferry workers to meetings against their will. Thus, the CFU was willing to sacrifice farm workers as primary targets of violence.

The second workshop, on August 8, 2000, was structured differently. The workshop was participatory with debate centered on whether to continue to pursue the CFU's approach of lawsuits and negotiations, or to force the union to consider a more radical stance. Several FAs had proposed resolutions including withholding tobacco from the tobacco selling floors until after August 15, 2000,[6] threatening not to plant next season's crops unless there was a return to law and order, and sending a task force overseas to lobby for donor support and assistance in resolving the land issue. The CFU leaders split the farmers into four groups to discuss the issues and to come up with alternative courses of action than those the CFU had taken thus far before reconvening. The four different groups proposed different options ranging from participating in a

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[6] Tobacco was Zimbabwe's largest foreign exchange earner at the time and the country was short of forex. August 15, 2000 was a significant date in many resolutions because banks required farmers to provide a letter of "no interest" from the GoZ by this date in order to secure seasonal loans for the coming year.

national shutdown/ strike (which had been called for by some human rights organizations) to "drastic" measures such as not paying taxes and closing all bank accounts (to get the banks to support them) and to grassroots lobbying by farmers among CA residents about the need for every farmer to receive a letter of "no interest" by August 15, 2000 (Fieldnotes 8-8-00). Ultimately, at the end of the day, the leadership effectively argued against the alternative proposals from break-out groups, as well as the resolutions proposed at the beginning of the meeting, and the larger group "voted" for the same CFU agenda that had been in place from the beginning – to continue with lawsuits and negotiations (Fieldnotes 8-8-00).

Even this surface level democratic decision-making within the CFU did not last long. Within less than two weeks, the CFU leadership withdrew one of the lawsuits that directly implicated President Mugabe, causing a flurry of unrest among farmers within the provinces. Farmers in one FA drafted a resolution and emailed it to other FA Chairs asking that their FA sign on to the resolution for the CFU Executive Council Meeting scheduled for August 18, 2000. The resolution expressed concern for the "seemingly unilateral decision taken to withdraw the legal proceedings instituted by the CFU" and demanded that the lawsuit continue to be pursued or the FA Chairs would demand the resignation of two leaders of the CFU (Resolution to CFU Executive Council 8-18-00). The email resulted in an emergency CFU Council Meeting at which an apologetic CFU leader explained his reasoning for the change in the CFU's course of action, and said he would change the course back, if that was so desired. No such changes were called for. Again, the CFU leaders convinced the Council Members that the CFU's perspective was the correct one.

The CFU faced internal strife over its handling of the invasions almost immediately. First, the CFU was criticized for attempting to dictate its members' political involvement. Ultimately, the result of its advice to members resulted in *de facto* political support for ZANU-PF by farmers. Second, the CFU ignored suggestions by its members in the CFU Council to take a more proactive/ radical stance, as well as to consider how the invasions were impacting farm workers. Third, dissenting voices were silenced by a variety of means including talking around their point until they gave up, frustrating them until they resigned, and using the union's constitution to keep a resolution off the floor. Finally, the attempt at participatory decision-making was an exercise in the leaders' abilities to effectively argue their original perspective, as the leaders ignored all suggestions made by the farmers and convinced the farmers of their original perspective. When the CFU leadership changed course less than two weeks later, without consulting the membership, members were furious and attempted to overthrow the top leaders. An emergency meeting was called at which the CFU leaders explained their actions and convinced the Council Members that their new course of action was the correct one. The experience, however, still left a bitter taste in the mouth of many farmers.

Workshops. Finally, the CFU organized a series of Stress Management Workshops for CFU members. Originally, only one workshop was scheduled, but the response was so overwhelming, the CFU scheduled several additional workshops to accommodate the demand. The workshops emphasized how families should cope with the stress of living under farm invasions and how living under chronic fear impacted personal relationships (Fieldnotes 6/9/00). In this way, CFU attempted to strategize to

maintain unity as well as protect its members from the psychological impact of invasions. By bringing farmers and their families together to discuss stress management, the CFU encouraged a national sense of community among farmers, a feeling that was important in a period when the ZANU-PF regime had labeled white farmers "enemies of the state" and many white farmers' sense of national identity was challenged (see Chapter 6).

Overall, the CFU maintained the attitude that the "expert" leaders were most competent to make the decisions regarding how to handle the invasions, rather than trusting their own members who were living it daily. This attitude lead to tensions within the CFU Council. Additionally, the CFU leadership centered its attention so narrowly on advocating for farmers and preserving the union that it did little to advocate for farm workers.

GAPWUZ

It was difficult for GAPWUZ to craft survival strategies to advocate for their clientele. GAPWUZ representatives were barred from going to many farms by war veterans and risked abduction/ torture on entering others (interviews). Given the small remittances of dues by its members, GAPWUZ also had limited financial means for general operations. Therefore, throughout the invasions the organization attempted to support its members by issuing press releases, but GAPWUZ was not invited to negotiations with war vets and the CFU by the ZANU-PF regime.

GAPWUZ expressed support for the CFU initially during the invasions as evidenced by statements of the farm worker union leader. In a press statement released in March (GAPWUZ 2000), GAPWUZ leader Philip Munyanyi said,

GAPWUZ the trade union registered and certified to represent farm workers expresses its solidarity with them [CFU] and notes with great concern what has been happening on commercial farms in Zimbabwe. Our Field Representatives have reported numerous cases of intimidation, assault, theft and destruction of property. These senseless acts not only threaten our very fragile agro-based economy but also the jobs of thousands of farm workers and the livelihood of the people behind them.

GAPWUZ have always supported land reform but not at the expense of farm workers. Farm workers are the backbone of the economy and are not pawns to be played with. They are people who should always be treated with dignity and respect and this is the stance that we have taken in the past and will continue to take in the future. ...

... in the strongest terms we urge those people interfering with [farm workers] to stop doing so immediately.

In this statement, the leader of GAPWUZ carefully worded his concern for commercial farming as an industry and for farm workers in particular. GAPWUZ field representatives throughout the nation received reports of violence and/or intimidation from farm workers. Under the guise of investigating workplace complaints as the organizations previously had, the ALB and GAPWUZ began attempting to investigate farms with cases of extreme violence against farm workers. Soon, GAPWUZ's efforts to investigate were stopped following the abduction and torture of an ALB/GAPWUZ investigating team. The team members' lives were threatened and they endured mild assaults (Interviews 5-18-00, 8-4-00, and 4-28-00).

In late-April, the position of farm workers in the face of invasions was exacerbated further as evidenced by the establishment of a negotiation team of war veterans and the CFU at the suggestion of President Mugabe. GAPWUZ representatives were absent from the table. The government, war veterans, and CFU formed a task force to deal with "flash points," but GAPWUZ representatives were not invited to participate.

According to GAPWUZ representatives I interviewed, the union felt its members' interests were not represented in the task force and they felt abandoned by the CFU. Farmers' provision of transport and other material goods for war veterans, at the advice of the CFU leadership, only further exposed farm workers to invasion violence (interviews).

GAPWUZ had difficulty advocating for its clientele in the face of invasions due to financial limitations. The union attempted to appeal to Zimbabweans through the media. Additionally, GAPWUZ aligned itself with the ALB in a way that altered their relationship by investigating the violence as a team. Historically, ALB and GAPWUZ representatives jointly investigated farm worker or workers complaints on commercial farms. While the representative would work together to find resolution to the situation, GAPWUZ represented the interests of the farm worker and the ALB represented the interests of the farmer. In short, they occupied adversarial roles. The farm invasion violence and terror transformed this relationship as ALB and GAPWUZ joined forces to investigate the violence on farms, particularly violence against farm workers.

Community Responses

Although initially farmers responded to invasion violence in solidarity with farm workers, pressure from the CFU to alter these strategies resulted in many communities following CFU advice that benefited them and disadvantaged farm workers. At the local level, white farming communities responded to the immediate threats and insecurities in a variety a ways. These responses varied by community and over time. Factions of war veterans who competed over the same farms complicated the responses of farmers.

Throughout the crisis, farmers attempted to manage violence relying on strategies, many

recommended by the CFU, that include negotiation and strengthening community ties.

Despite the proactive approach in Mashonaland provinces early on which united

farmers and workers (i.e., the "football team" approach), most farmers and farming

communities responded to the invasions through negotiation. Negotiations involved a

variety of actors depending on the local circumstances. In some areas, a farmer

negotiated directly with war vets who invaded his farm while in other areas, specially

appointed security teams negotiated with war vets without the affected farmer's

involvement. Farmer Association chairs led negotiations in other areas (CFU Regional

Interviews; FA Questionnaires; interviews).

For example, as one Farmer Association (FA) Chair from Mashonaland Central

noted, in his FA, the farmer usually negotiated with war veterans with the aid of one to

two additional farmers (FA Questionnaire 6/9/00). Specifically, he noted,

> It depends on the individual farmers and the War Vets in question.
> With the "shock" tactic used by W.V. arrival unannounced – usually with
> a crowd of 10-50 chanting, singing, drum beating (sometimes drunk)
> supporters – some farmers were visibly shaken.
>   In these circumstances, one/two/three farmers will go to their
> assistance. Sometimes this is merely moral support in the form of a
> presence; as certain WV will not speak to anyone other than the farmer
> whose farm they have invaded.
>   But the norm is to get at least one other persons [sic] to the scene
> for moral support....
>   We believe that is has helped to "keep the lid on it." This is a
> numbers game. You stir it up and they come back treble the numbers of
> supporters.
>   We have dealt with four different groups in this area. The mood of
> any one group can differ from on [sic] a day to day basis – depending on
> what sort of support gallery they are play too [sic], and whether they are
> under the influence of drugs/ alcohol (FA Questionnaire 6/9/00).

The outcome of different community responses was as varied as the responses themselves. While the FA Chair in Mashonaland Central reported that he felt the strategy in his FA was successful, this was not the case for a FA Chair from Matebeleland who noted that in his FA negotiations were generally not successful. According to the Chair from Matabeleland, individual farmers negotiated with war veterans by him/ herself during invasions. The Matabeleland FA Chair noted, "Each group of invaders has different agenda no common rules to work to [sic]" (FA Questionnaire 8/21/00).

By using negotiation, communities established agreements that they hoped would secure temporary peace and security from war vet hostility. Negotiation included both elements of compliance to war vets' demands and the subversion of war vets' activities. For example, one farmer in the low-veldt established an arrangement with war vets in his area in which he provided the invaders with mealie-meal and *kapenta* in exchange for the invaders remaining camped on an abandoned farm adjacent to his and did not interfere with his farming.[7] In Midlands, one FA chair took a non-confrontational approach from the beginning of the invasions. In his community, farmers and war vets worked together to find local solutions and policed farms for illegal poaching. Following the regime's publication in early June of a list of 804 farms to be acquired by the government, the FA chair and farmers collectively decided to concede the hectares designated by the list in their community. The farmers proposed different lands than those listed, but created a plan that offered the same hectares to the local war vets. On presenting the plan to the local war vets, invasions stopped and farmers and war vets worked together to resettle the assigned land (interview 8/5/00). It was unclear whether this strategy would be respected at the national level as the regime continued with resettlement when I left Zimbabwe.

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[7] Mealie-meal is the staple food in Zimbabwe. *Kapenta* is a dried fish used for relish.

In one community I visited, a group of farmers openly began courting a relationship with the neighboring Government of Mozambique to explore the option of settling there and establishing tobacco farms with the financial backing of tobacco companies. While this strategy appealed to some farmers, others worried that they would spend 20 years building up a farm and then have something similar to what happened in Zimbabwe take place (Fieldnotes 5/25/00).

The final strategy used by farmers has been strengthening community ties. In recent years the CFU has stressed the importance of communities expanding both their communications and security networks. Through the installation of farm community two-way radio systems, the expansion in cellular phone lines, and the internet, distant farming communities are able to communicate among themselves and with the national CFU headquarters on a daily basis. Farming communities instituted daily radio roll calls and security briefings to ensure that local members remained informed about the situation in their community and nationwide.

Conclusion

First, overall the invasions brought workers and farm owners into new relationships as they struggled to defend a common goal, the farm, which represented the economic livelihood and homes of both groups. Farmers and workers united, albeit briefly, under the "football team" approach, and in cases such as that of Dave Stevens in support of their common interest. Second, the CFU relied on multiple strategies to confront the invasion. Specifically, the CFU engaged the courts, the press, and negotiated with war veterans and the regime. Further, the CFU attempted to resolve

disputes within the union and conducted a variety of workshops for members. GAPWUZ, on the other hand, lacked the institutional capacity to advocate for its members. GAPWUZ issued press releases, but was not invited to the negotiating table by the regime or the CFU. Third, farming communities negotiated in a variety of ways with war veterans.

CFU strategies designed to preserve the union and protect/ advocate for farmers did not necessarily aid farm workers. CFU leaders advised farmers to cede to war veteran demands which ultimately put workers at more risk for violence. Additionally, CFU strategies for organizational survival through conservative approaches to the crisis alienated many members and resulted in the creation of a splinter farming organization late that year.

In this chapter, I have highlighted three white farmer community approaches to survival following CFU intervention to the proactive responses early in the invasions: (1) negotiation, (2) migration and (3) community ties. Two of these community based responses to the invasions were the products of CFU advice – negotiation and community ties. The strategy of negotiation, stressed by the CFU, again reflects the need to rethink the concept of agency in the context of terror and violence as survivors do not acknowledge that they are in danger and lack the power to negotiate any real solutions (Mertz 2002). The farmers considering migration experienced doubt; as survivors of violence they began to see themselves as a "marked community" (Srnivasan 1990:311). Survival strategies reflect an intersection of the routinization of fear, social location, and communities. Violence survival strategies exist at the community level as well as at the individual level (as will be explored in Chapter Six).

Community based survival strategies demonstrate the need to expand not only the concept of violence survivor in terms of social location (Das 1990), but also the need not to characterize all perpetrators of violence in a particular conflict as acting in similar, consistent ways. Differing groups of war veterans responded differently to negotiation, making it impossible for farmers nationwide to develop a standard approach to dealing with the veterans. Perpetrators of violence, and the times and ways in which they act in concert with each other in state organized violence, also requires unpacking. The differing responses of war veterans impacted the community-based survival strategies of farming communities.

CHAPTER SIX:

THE INTERSECTION OF RACE, GENDER, AND VIOLENCE –

EXPERIENCES WITH AND SURVIVAL STRATEGIES FOR FARM

INVASIONS

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I explored the responses of organizations and

communities to the farm invasions and violence. Here, I examine the experiences with

state terror and violence and survival strategies developed by individuals. Farm life was

marked by extreme circumstances of insecurity and terror for white farm owners and

black farm workers, and both their families. In this chapter, I build on the historical

reasons why farmers and farm workers emerged as the first targets in the wave of state-

sponsored terror discussed in Chapter Two. Since independence, government officials

and many others in society have believed that farm owners and workers are not "true

Zimbabwean" citizens and, thus, they consider them the "other." As a result, both

farmers and farm workers have been particularly vulnerable to political assault. Farmer

and farm worker experiences with invasions have not been universal, however. The

experience with farm violence and terror is complicated by a race and gender system

marked by intersecting hierarchies.

While Chapter 4 focused on the development of the state terror and state

organized violence that led to the land invasions in 2000, Chapter 5 centered on the

response of the CFU, GAPWUZ and farming communities to the political crisis. In this

Chapter, I address two primary questions. First, how do people in different social

locations experience state terror and organized violence differently? Second, how do people in different social locations strategize under conditions of chronic fear and insecurity? Toward this end, I first analyze invasion violence against farm workers using human rights violations reports. Second, I examine invasion violence against farmers and farm women using human rights violations reports and vignettes based on interviews. [1] Next, I analyze farm worker and farmer and farm women's survival/ resistance strategies. Finally, in the conclusion, I discuss farmers' survival strategies.

The Experience of Violence

The varied experience of white farmers and black farm workers was demonstrated briefly in Table 4.6 in Chapter 4. To summarize, of the 7,220 Farm Invasion Human Rights Violations recorded between February and June of 2000, violations against farm workers accounted for 6,614 of the total (CFU 2000c). Of these violations against farm workers, 45.9 percent were illegal searches, 26.7 percent minor assaults, 16 percent verbal death threats, 5.7 percent serious assaults (requiring hospitalization), five percent abductions, and less than one percent written death threats (18), rapes (13) and deaths (3). For white farmers, the picture was very different. The leading violation against farmers was death threats (74 percent), followed by illegal searches (12 percent). Farmers experienced 6.4 percent minor assaults, 3.6 percent written death threats, 2.8 percent serious assaults (requiring hospitalization), 1.1 percent abductions, and less than one percent rapes (1) and deaths (1) (CFU 2000c). Whereas these data reveal that farm

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[1] Due to the limitations of my research, as discussed in detail in Chapter 3, I was only able to interview farmers, CFU leaders and GAPWUZ leaders. I will use interviews from 1998 to give a voice to farm workers where data are available.

workers were subjected to illegal searches of their homes and physical assaults as the primary forms of state terror and state organized violence, farmers overwhelmingly were subjected to death threats. The illegal searches of farm workers' (and farmers') homes should be classified as, what Lopez (1984) considers, "surveillance of personal activity" given that in the majority of cases the purpose of the searches was to find MDC paraphernalia that would indicate a MDC supporter lived in the household (see accounts drawn from human rights violations reports below). The physical violence directed against farm workers represents torture; however, the nature and goals of the torture were unclear based on the limited information given in Table 4.6 (Tindale 1996). Death threats received by farmers reflected both what Lopez classifies as a "life threatening" form of state terror technique, as well as psychological violence that can result in fear, paranoia, and a violation of a person's dignity (Degenaar 1990, Zur 1994).

Farm Workers and Invasion Violence

    Community Terror and Violence. The data in Table 6.1 lay out the gender and racial breakdown of the human rights violations reports included in this analysis. The majority of complaints involve black males (n=83), followed by white males (n=38), and blacks of both genders (n=24).

Table 6.1:
Human Rights Violation Reports by Gender and Race

RACE	GENDER				
	Male	Female	Both	Unknown	Total
White	38	3	1	3	45
Black	83	12	24	21	140
Both	0	0	1	0	1
Unknown	1	0	0	0	1
Total	122	15	26	24	187

Source: NEC 2000

Despite the regime's attempt to characterize the invasions as mass uprisings over land imbalances, the duplicity of such statements is revealed in the accounts of farm village terror reported in the NEC complaints. In this section, I analyze the cases involving blacks of both genders or general assaults on farm villages or compounds. In the 24 cases included here, 14 specifically described the invasion as involving pro-ZANU-PF/ anti-MDC activity of some kind. Fifteen cases described the perpetrators in their assault as "ZANU-PF" or the "ZANU-PF Youth" while the remaining identified their assailants as simply "war veterans," or "mob." The following case exemplifies these types of complaints (NEC 2000).

> All farm workers were forced to go to a ZANU-PF Meeting. They were asked about their working relationship with the foreman. When they did not respond they had water thrown over them and were beaten with fists, sticks and kicked.

Other complaints noted the enforced attendance at ZANU-PF rallies, forced purchase of ZANU-PF party membership cards, the surrender of any MDC material (T-shirts, party membership cards, printed materials), forced singing and chanting, forced physical training, and beatings for lack of attendance at ZANU-PF rallies. For example, one

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report stated, "Verbal threats. Made to dance and sing ZANU-PF slogans. Workers beaten with rubber truncheons, then doused with cold water." Such actions took place under the threat or the actual imposition of assault and death and, in several cases, workers suspected as "sell-outs" or as MDC members were publicly beaten or humiliated. Workers were often required to observe public beatings and humiliation of their counterparts. In some cases, workers' children were targeted.

The war vets/ invaders used multiple forms of intimidation to create community-wide fear on farms. One violation report read (NEC 2000),

> Homestead occupied on 4th May 2000. Farm workers issued with ZANU-PF cards and pegged the entire farm. Severe intimidation and death threats to workers. Forced to sing from 8pm to 2am each day and are carefully watched. Occupiers take meat, eggs, and vegetables. Owner forbidden access to the farm. The keys for the abattoir are held by war Veterans [sic]. Some items stolen during farmer's furniture removal.

In this case, workers were forced to join a particular political party under conditions of intimidation and death threats. They were forced to sing until late hours of the night, a requirement that doubtless caused sleep deprivation given the typically early working hours of commercial farms (sensory over-stimulation [CCJP1997]). The farmer was denied access to the farm, and the workers' movements and activities were subjected to close scrutiny (surveillance [Lopez 1984]).

A further type of community-based terror tactic involved the destruction of entire communities. In the case cited below, war vets were retaliating an attempt by farm workers on the previous day to oust the invaders from the farm (NEC 2000).

> On 18 April 2000 plus or minus 150+ people (war vets etc.) arrived, supposedly from Harare. They torched the African Village and beat up any labourers they managed to catch. The rest evacuated to nearby farms and further a field. They torched burley tobacco barns and stored tobacco. Attempted to torch a field of soya beans. They abducted a church worker

> residing on the farm – damaged and looted his house. Torched the farm owners managers (his sons) house and looted property from it. Supposedly support unit [police] helped him remove things from house. Farmer prohibited from returning to farm for seven days. He was then called to a meeting with war vets and his labor, humiliated in front of his labor and war vets and labour forced to sing/shout party slogans. Since then on a regular basis they have been called on pain of death to attend meetings where they have been "reeducated."

In addition to the description given above of the torching of workers homes' and farm property, the complaint includes a detailed list of all property lost in the fire on this occasion. In total, 70 workers reported *all* their personal belongings destroyed, including their national identity cards (required to vote) and cash equivalent of over two months salary in some cases. In total, 94 huts were burned down. Newspaper accounts of the incident provided further disturbing details. Several farm workers suffered severe burns in the attack as war veterans attempted to barricade workers inside their homes while setting the workers' homes on fire. The above case involved several forms of state terror tactics including kidnapping (abduction), lack of police protection from other citizens, thought reform, and torture (Lopez 1984). In a similar case involving the burning of another farm worker village, workers were made to sleep in the war vet camp and perform chores for the war vets before being forcibly marched to another farm and forced to destroy the farm and assault workers there.

Finally, several violation reports simply listed community-wide physical assaults of various kinds: "Skull bashing, search for MDC material and supporters;" or "Farm labourers beaten up, 14 went to hospital, 1 broken arm, 1 damaged eye and swollen face. The rest had beaten backsides." These reports offered few details about the circumstances surrounding the violence, merely noting the violence itself. In many invasions, war veterans attempted or forced farm workers out of their housing.

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Additionally, disruptions to farm work impacted farm workers' wages and, in some cases, employment.

Black Male Farm Workers. The most numerous of the reported incidents involved black male farm workers. Eighty-three (44.4 percent) of the 187 cases affected black men. A significant number of the cases involved the targeting of farm worker community leaders for abuse. Foremen (farm worker supervisors), school teachers, domestic workers, drivers – farm workers with positions of some authority who were generally better compensated than other workers – were often singled out for beatings, in several cases in front of other workers. One complaint reads, "50 war vets invaded. 3 attacked the foreman, punching him with fists and sticks, claiming he was an MDC supporter." In several complaints, foremen went into hiding after receiving death threats from war vets. The following case revealed how the war vets used terror and violence to interrogate community leaders, as well as to profit from their violence more directly, by expropriating farm workers' possessions and money. The foremen wrote (NEC 2000),[2]

> It was ten to one pm when ZANU-PF supporters came to my house. They told me to give them farm radio and mountain bike. I refused at first and one of them gave me one hard strick [strike] to my back. I then went inside my house to take radio and gave them.
> They went with me to the church hall and told me to remove my shirt and watch. They said lay down and tie my hands and legs together with bark fiber and gave me two hard strick [strikes] on my back.
> They went on asking me where is your boss. I said I don't know were [where] he have gone. They forced me to surrender M.D.C. T shirt and card. I said I don't have. After forty-five minutes they then untie me and charged me a fine of ($800.00) eight hundred dollars for not surrendering farm radio in time. I paid the money in afraid of my life.

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[2] The worker's position as a foreman in revealed through his possession of a farm radio. Farm radios are two-way radios used by farmers for communications with their farm foremen in distance fields. Due to their cost (approximately US $800 each), farmers only allow trusted workers in senior positions to possess them. Therefore, the complainant's possession of the farm radio indicates his position of authority on the farm.

> The war veterans were supervising ZANU-PF youth to beat me
> and forced me to attend ZANU-PF meetings.
> INJURY TO VICTIM: Bluezzing [bruising] and pain.

In this case both interrogational and deterrent torture were combined. The war

veterans sought specific information regarding the farmer's whereabouts, as well as tried

to identify any potential MDC sympathizers and discourage participation in opposition

politics. Other examples designed to discourage participation in MDC activities

included, "Public beating and humiliation of victim in front of compound because of

being a suspected MDC supporter." In another case, the torture was simple but severe,

"feet cut with knife," but, the cause of the violence was unclear. The vast majority of

reports included accounts of physical violence, most linked to MDC/ ZANU-PF conflict,

or to the suspicions of MDC association on behalf of the invaders. One report read, "Jon

taken to rally [ZANU-PF] by war vets and never returned – killed."

The lowly status of black male farm workers in Zimbabwean society and their

status as "others" in the eyes of society and the regime were further revealed in the

brutality of their experiences with farm invasions. While three cases involved

"humiliation" or threats only, each of the eighty remaining reports included some form of

physical violence. The reports detail violent acts such as beatings, electrocution, dousing

with water, abduction, stripping combined with beatings, and one disappearance

(believed dead) and two deaths. The invaders beat male farm workers using a variety of

devices that included thorny branches, sticks with protruding nails, stones, rope, clubs,

and tree branches. The violence against male farm workers represents several forms of

state terror techniques including thought reform through the persistent attempts to enforce

ZANU-PF loyalty, lack of police protection against the crimes and terrors of other

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citizens, extortion, threats, kidnapping (abductions), and torture (Lopez 1984). Further, the humiliation, public beatings and enforced stripping in front of others are forms of psychological violence which violate a person's dignity (Degenaar 1990).

Black Female Farm Workers. Aside from the cases involving farm villages as a whole, reports of violence against black female farm workers or the wives of farm workers numbered only 12. Although only a limited number of cases were reported in the human rights violations reports, the overwhelming majority involved sexual assault or attempted sexual assault. Of the 12 reports of violence against women, eight revolved around sexual crimes: two confirmed rapes, four cases of sexual assault (not further explained), one attempted rape and one case of "propositioning" by a war veteran that required the intervention of a male farm worker who was standing nearby. Rape represented a particular form of torture for black women on farms (NEC 2000).

> ZANU-PF + war veterans came unannounced at night to hold a meeting in the compound to which the parents went to attend. Some of the youth left the meeting and went through the houses - one of the youths grabbed Virginia [pseudonym] and pulled her outside and raped her.

While the number of cases of reported rapes and sexual assaults remain low, GAPWUZ as well as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and human rights organizations believe the numbers to be much higher. GAPWUZ officials received reports of widespread rape, similar to that described above (Interviews 5-23-00, 5-18-00). Girl children have been specifically targeted according to one NGO that works with farm workers (Interview 7-6-00). Parents have pulled children out of school due to harassment by war veterans as their children walk to school. One farmer I interviewed told me about the cases of three daughters of farm workers on his farm: one girl was raped by resident war veterans while two were abducted by war veterans (Interview 6-9-00). The abducted

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girls had been missing for over a month when we spoke. In another case involving

female farm workers not included in the human rights violations reports data set, six

black women who were raped on a farm tried to report the crimes to the police. The

police, however, refused to take down the report because it implicated war veterans

(interview). A director of one human rights organization claimed the group had received

reports of up to 15 rapes per day (Interview 8-1-00).

The cases involving black females on farms also often involved their children. In

one report, four women were sexually assaulted, one woman raped, and six children

under the age of twelve were beaten. A more disturbing case involves a group of women

who remained at their farm village rather than attend a ZANU-PF rally (NEC 2000).

> 28 ZANU[PF] members returned to compound whilst rally was on, beat
> women, two of whom had babies on their backs. one baby beaten and
> other trodden on. All four women and two babies treated at *** Hospital.

Attacks on black women, thus, highlighted their vulnerability as women. They were

subjected to assaults on their persons, on their and their partner's children, and their

sexuality. Women's cultural responsibility to care for young children makes them more

vulnerable than men due to the fact they would be less able to flee a farm village under

invasion attack. Further, in 1998, my research revealed a large number of young single

mothers living and working on farms. Cockburn (2001) notes that women and men

experience different forms of torture due to differences in their physical bodies and the

cultural meanings ascribed to male and female bodies.

Farm Workers, Violence, and *Othering*. Farm workers in Zimbabwe have been

labeled "the forgotten people" because of the lack of public awareness and concern for

their living and working conditions prior to farm invasions, as discussed in Chapter 2

(Mugwetsi and Balleis 1994). The *othering* of farm workers did not begin with farm invasions. Farm workers represented unique targets of political violence as they have historically been viewed by the government, and often by much of Zimbabwean society, as foreigners. A farm worker I interviewed in 1998, Phiri, argued that skilled individuals and farm workers should be given preference in resettlement, noting the particular effects of displacing farm workers whose parents originated outside Zimbabwe.[3]

> ...if I was the one who had started the whole thing I think this farm, if it has been acquired, I prefer to give preference to the people on this farm because some of them do not have any relatives in this country and some of them come as far as Tanzania. Where would you expect such a person to go or otherwise he would end up in the streets?

Phiri's case highlights the experience of many farm workers I interviewed in 1998. Many younger farm workers had a high school education and aspirations of jobs off farm and outside of subsistence farming in CAs or RAs. Like Phiri, economic pressures drove many individuals to seek farm work in what they hoped would be a temporary situation, but the conditions on farms and the Zimbabwean economy made it difficult for them to save money and move off the farm to find other jobs. Farm workers often did not have communal area homes to return to either because of their parents' or grandparents' national heritage, or, in the case of many women, the loss of access to land due to divorce or the death of their husbands. In the view of farm workers, the land acquisition program proposed by the ZANU-PF regime excluded the needs of farm workers and ignored the reality of their dependence on farms for their and their families' livelihood. Many farm workers explained that the government only cared about farm workers at election time

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[3] In 1997 the GoZ published a list of approximately 1,400 farms that it planned to compulsorily acquire for resettlement. The CFU successfully fought back in court resulting in the delisting of the vast majority of the 1,400 farms.

when it came around to register people to vote for ZANU-PF. The regime's lack of concern for farm workers in the land exercise of 1997/98 was most succinctly stated in the *Herald* where the government said that farm workers need not be taken into account because they could all simply return to Malawi or Mozambique, from where they came (*Herald* 12/8/1997). In the Fast Track Resettlement Plan of 2000, farm workers again were not included among those targeted to receive land. Farm workers, like farmers, were seen as outsiders, not true nationals.

White Farming Communities and Invasion Experience

Community Terror and Violence. There are a total of only 45 human rights violation reports submitted by whites, and only one was by both a male and female complainant. While the number of reports is small, the reports indicate that the experience of community terror and violence varied by region and community (see Chapter Four).

White Male Farmers. Whereas black male farm workers experienced primarily physical forms of torture, white male farmers' experiences centered on threats, physical violence, abduction, psychological torture, as well as destruction of property. The thirty - eight reports involving white male farmers also described instances of disruptions to farm production, threats/ intimidation, and deaths. White farmers experienced physical violence, including seven cases of violence, one death, and five abductions out of a total of 38 human rights violations reports analyzed. War vets threatened death to farmers (seven), a threat made real by the deaths of five farmers due to invasions (though only

two were reported in the set of human rights violations); they also issued nine generalized

threats.

In the case that follows, the farmer was threatened, told to leave the country, and

his workers were subjected to torture (NEC 2000).

> Upon approaching the workshops the perpetrators and leaders with
> approx. 50-60 vets and landless were singing and chanting *Chimurenga*
> songs – *hondo* [war] etc. There was a very hostile atmosphere, axes and
> sticks were wielded and abuse was shouted. Among the shouting and
> singing he explained in a very aggressive tone that I, Joe, will sacrifice
> with my life if [I] carry on doing what I am doing. Apparently, it had
> something to do with MDC. There after he said they were going to peg
> and that we must f**k off where we came from, and that we must go and
> keep ourselves confined to the residence. A week later I went on vacation.
> They came back enforce, [sic] camped on the premise for three days,
> howling and singing, dancing throughout the night. The workers were
> interrogated and disciplined all night. For that period (1 week) they were
> looking for me. Subsequent to this a formal meeting was held in ZRP
> presence. There the death threat was lifted.

Among the types of state terror techniques employed against this farmer were, death

threats (life threatening and psychological) and sensory over-stimulation (Lopez 1984,

Zur 1994, CCJPZ 1997). Threats to "sacrifice" their lives were taken seriously by

farmers. One farmer was told his name was on a list that included one of the murdered

farmers. Another was forced by war veterans to sign his own death sentence. The case

cited above, however, reflected the way in which war veterans sought to *Other* whites by

implying both affiliation to MDC (possibly true) and the demand that the farmer "f**k

off to where we came from." Invaders thus reinforced the outsider status and

vulnerability of white male farmers by highlighting their lack of loyalty to the party and

their perpetual foreign status. War veterans on another farmer's farm put it more directly

as the following excerpt from the Human Rights Violations Reports (NEC 2000)

illustrates. "Owner was confronted by war veterans who accused him of being too cheeky

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and told him to go back to England. They asked him if he owned the land and told him he was not wanted there and he must leave the country within 24 hours." War veterans here, as well as in the case mentioned above, attempted to utilize the state terror technique of "expulsions" of white farmers.

White men also experienced a fair share of physical violence as a result of farm invasions, according to the violation reports. The deaths of two of the five farmers killed during invasions were among the reports included in the human rights violations files. In both cases, the farmers were attacked by a group of invaders intent on killing their victim. Four additional complaints emanated from the circumstances surrounding Stevens' death, noting the four farmers' abductions and beatings at the hands of war veterans. The four men sustained several serious injuries requiring hospitalization.

In addition to deaths and beatings, white farmers suffered psychological torture. Five complainants cited the forcible signing over of land to war veterans. Seven farmers were threatened with death, or the death of a family member; another two were threatened with destruction of the farm property if they did not sign a paper ceding their property rights to war veterans. Several farmers also complained of being forced to attend ZANU-PF rallies, where they were made to sing, dance and chant party slogans. In addition, farmers were verbally harassed, and accused of stashing weapons.

White Women on Farms. Only three cases involving white women on farms were included in the human rights violations reports. The farm invasions appeared to have involved far fewer physical forms of human rights abuses of white farm women than other survivors.   Two cases recounted the gang-raping of a farmer's wife and her younger sister following the attempted murder of her husband. This case remained the

only case of rape against white women during the election invasion period of which I am aware. While the data base offered only a limited account of the rapes, a more detailed account is presented in a newspaper article and in interviews with CFU leaders. In the words of the farmer who witnessed his wife's and sister-in-law's rapes, the assailants beat him until he pretended to be dead.

> "They took my wife through to the bedroom and tied her feet and hands behind her back and they gagged her. They found [my sister-in-law] in the spare room and they only tied her arms and legs behind her. ... They kept on asking her who she was going to vote for. She told them she didn't know any party." The men then raped the sisters (*Daily Mail & Guardian* 4-20-00).

The rapes appeared to be politically motivated, both in terms of the MDC and potentially in terms of the CFU. The two women are nieces of one of the CFU's most prominent leaders. As Seifert (cited in Cockburn 2001:22) notes, the rape of women during wartime can serve a dual purpose: (1) to humiliate a woman and (2) to emasculate another man by proving that he cannot protect the women in his community, thus also asserting power over the man. No other rapes of white women were reported in the period under study to my knowledge.

The last of the three cases involving white farm women included in the human rights violations reports reflect the feelings of many white farm women with whom I spoke (NEC 2000).

> I have no serious complaints, but I do feel that my human rights have been violated. I find it an infringement on my rights to arrive home to find ZANU-PF posters displayed around the farm. This is private property and I do not feel that they can actually put up posters on our property especially when the opposition party can not for fear of retribution on the labour or ourselves. My freedom of choice has been taken away. Since having "war veterans" on our farm, I have not felt it to be expedient to run or walk or ride as I always used to, as they are camped right on my normal route. Although we had threats "blood will be spilled" etc, things have calmed down and are now peaceful; is this because we complied, to keep the peace? I think so. My husband had a death threat through the police and an MDC representative. This was to intimidate us and our labour to stop supporting MDC. This is against our democratic right of choice. I find it extremely difficult not to stand up for what I believe for fear of putting my family in danger. I think of Daniel who was not prepared to compromise and I feel like a coward.

In the excerpt, the woman highlights what she sees as less severe human rights violations, namely freedom of political participation and expression. She also complains about her restricted movement due to the war veteran presence. Her statement continued with her frustration over the dismissal of her national identity.

> My heart broke when I was called "an enemy of the state" by my President on 18 April 2000. True I am white and I am a farmer's wife, but in all my 39 years I have never done anything to betray my country, to deserve being classed "an enemy of the state." Yes, it may have been rhetoric but it was said and meant at the time. This surely is a violation of many people's rights as it's a generalization and a very serious accusation. One that will stay with me for years. In the light of so many serious, life-threatening violations, I realize that all of this sounds petty but for too long have we been quiet about simple violations. Enough! I wish to be treated as a Zimbabwean, born and bred who chose to live here after Independence because I believe in democracy and my country. ...

The above statement reflects the sentiments of many farm women and men I interviewed. The challenge to their loyalty to their country, to their nationalism, though not constituting a human rights violation, highlighted the position of whites as the perpetual *Other* in what they consider their homeland.

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In addition to the human rights violation reports, my interviews with farmers and farm women revealed a variety of experiences with farm invasions as the following three cases reveal.

The Case of Mike and Jane Smith,[4] Mashonaland North West. The Smiths were both born in Zimbabwe. In their early 40s, Mike and Jane have three daughters, who range in age from 6 to15. They own one farm, which they purchased in 1986, and produce a variety of produce such as snap peas, coffee, fresh green beans as well as a significant amount of wheat. The Smiths employ135 male and 30-40 female workers on a permanent basis and utilize up to 600 seasonal workers (mostly female) at peak production periods. The Smith farm borders one of Zimbabwe's largest RAs, a community with which the Smith's had close ties until the farm invasions began in March.

Jane expressed anger, because of their historical ties to the RA community, over RA residents who participated in the invasion on their farm.

> Well that's what makes me very resentful because we have helped them, tremendously. I mean Mike has bent over backwards trying to help these people. We've fertilized for them. We've plowed for them. We've reaped for them. When they very first moved into the area, government literally dumped them there with nothing, and just rocks, and that was it. We were actually asked to provide them with water, so we'd send them water carts every day. We got the boreholes drilled for them. That whole lot, I mean, the millions I think we spent into that resettlement area is frightening. You know, anyone when they come to the farm, OK we'll help you. You know, some of them *We* pay their school fees. ... But you know, you help them and help them and help them and this is the thanks you get. And I'm really mad. ...

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[4] Based on interviews on May 9, 2000 (Mike) and May 16, 2000 (Jane).

You see, when they moved on to the farm it was all resettlement people that came out to the farm. Okay, I know they probably were intimidated, but not to that extent. I mean they were quite chucked [excited]. Singing and chanting and "Yea we'll just take this farm." They can't see it. Like Mike tried to say to them as well, it's not fertile. It's a difficult farm that we've actually got ... even the maid Elizabeth, you know she was recognizing resettlement people, she said you, you've got land, you've got land, you've got land. I mean what are you doing here? Like she says to them, in fact sitting on Mike's desk right now is electrification for a growth point there which we had got organized since the government is doing nothing about it. We've gone to meetings for them, well that's all stopped now we don't do anything. And we had this electrification plan, all drawn up in our name we were prepared to pay for the damn thing and we'd have loved to get electricity, well I'm sorry were not going to do anything with it now. It's, we, well I know Mike feels very betrayed. Very, very betrayed. He's helped them, and bent over backwards to help them and then they come and they do this. And the threats that he is getting as well and it's frightening, we just don't actually know where to go.

Mike said he felt he had been targeted precisely because of his close ties to the RA community. He said he felt the death threats directed at him reflected fear among members of the ruling party that farmers helping their black neighbors and demonstrations of racial unity would threaten ZANU-PF's power (Interview 5-9-00). In addition, Mike was active in the MDC.

Despite their unhappiness over the participation of their RA neighbors, when the invasion on the Smith farm began in late February 2000, the Smiths did not feel threatened immediately. Rather, they felt inconvenienced. As Jane recalled,

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[They] pitched at our house eight at a Monday night. Singing and dancing and they wailed and beat their drums all night. All day and all night, they wouldn't speak to Mike or anyone. And then, but we never felt threatened, you know because Mike recognized most of the people that were there, so we didn't actually feel threatened and we were quite happy. I mean they'd bang away daily, until eventually you sort of, they realized they actually weren't irritating us that much. You feel violated, you know, but you can't, you know that they're watching you continuously and you know I wouldn't now let the kids go ride their horses; they couldn't ride their bikes, you know, because I just felt that it was unsafe. But we never felt threatened until about two or three weeks ago, the whole thing changed. A whole new group moved in, and they were very, very aggressive. And then you get these death threats as well. But, you know when they were there, it didn't really make that much difference, we're still paying workers and they are just there banging away on their drums – which you actually get used to after a while as well (Interview 5-16-00).

The invasion turned ugly, however, when Mike's name kept coming up in negotiations between Mike's security guard, the police, and the war veterans in mid-April. According to Jane, shortly after warnings from both the police and Mike's guard, reporters and photographers from the government owned newspaper *The Herald* arrived and began taking photos for the "before and after" pictures of the farm. The Smiths knew something was going to happen, so they left for a scheduled trip to Harare earlier than planned. Soon after they left, approximately 140 invaders arrived on the farm *en mass*. On realizing Mike and Jane weren't there, the crowd dispersed. From that point on, the death threats began. The Smiths returned to the farm again for one night, but Mike left early in the morning on the following day. Again, 140 veterans arrived *en mass* demanding to see Mike and threatening to kill him. Once again, they left upon realizing that Mike was not there. They remained off-farm throughout the remainder of the

invasions, other than occasional brief day visits lasting for just a few hours. Mike and Jane's experience reflect high-key violence, not uncommon for farmers active in MDC.

The Case of John Miller, Manicaland. Mr. Miller owns a farm in the Manicaland Province.[5] He and his wife are in their late fifties and have three adult children who do not live on the farm. They employ 85 male and 76 female farm workers on a permanent basis, and approximately150 temporary laborers during peak seasons. The farm produces tobacco, cut flowers, maize, and cattle. Miller's farm is deeply embedded within a commercial farming community geographically and does not have CA or RA farmers residing within 15 km. He meets with CA and/or RA farmers seasonally and assists them by providing the farmers with subsidized seed, free fertilizer and farming advice. In the farm worker village on the farm, all 290 units of farm worker housing are made from brick and/or cement blocks and each unit has its own blair toilet.[6] Miller's workers have access to a borehole for potable water and there is a primary school and a rudimentary health clinic with a trained farm health worker on the farm. Miller regularly helps his workers with money for funerals, and he grows the staple food, mealie-meal, which he mills and sells at cost to his workers.

Prior to 2000, Miller's farm never had been affected by squatters. The farm, which he purchased in 1972, is his only agricultural land. Since March 2000, roughly 90 invaders, all male, have intermittently invaded his farm. The invaders were predominately peaceful, though they made minor threats against both Miller's workers and him and his family. They engaged in considerable political campaigning, however.

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[5] This story is based on interviews with John Miller in 1998 as well as a questionnaire he filled out in 2000.

[6] On many farms, housing is a mixture of brick/ cement houses and pole and dagga huts. Blair toilets are pit latrines uniquely designed to lessen the spread of disease by trapping and killing any flies that wander into the pit.

Following the murder of Dave Stevens, Miller and his family left the farm for two weeks for safety.

Miller's case represents a relatively low-key invasion. Although, a few farms in his immediate community were occupied by a small group of war veterans, disruptions to farm production were minimal. Though Miller had not experienced any serious threats, the invasions had forced him to question his position in Zimbabwean society. Miller's political rights had been denied and his identity as an African challenged.

The Case of Nancy and George Loft, Manicaland.[7] Both Zimbabwean born, George and Nancy grow tobacco, potatoes and keep cattle on their farm in Manicaland. They both have been active in their farming community trying to raise awareness among farm workers about AIDS. They have four children ranging in age from 6 to17, all in boarding school.

George talked about his local community, saying many people were gone, a result of a combination of holidays and decisions to relocate (particularly women and children) to towns. During the time of our interviews, he was concerned that things were peaceful in his community thus far, and believed that the violence eventually would come there as well. Although council members and local people told him he was protected because of his good relations with his workers, he said it doesn't matter. He felt that the situation was deteriorating to a point where who you were and what kind of relationship you had with your workers and your local community was irrelevant because as soon as you left your immediate community, you were targeted and vulnerable just by being a white

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[7] Based on informal interviews on 4-4-00, 4-23-00 and 11-97. These interviews were very informal, and not tape recorded, therefore, I do not have exact quotes. The Lofts were aware that the conversations were part of my on-going research project. For much of the time during the conversations, Nancy was not available.

farmer. Therefore, in April George and Nancy rented an apartment in Harare for themselves and their children (for weekends and holidays). George commuted to the farm on a regular basis to manage farming affairs.

George and Nancy's farm was not invaded in 2000. Despite the lack of disruption to their farm, as was the case of many farmers, the insecurity of the climate of invasions created difficulties in continuing farming. Banks began requiring that farmers offer a letter of proof from the government that their farm would not be acquired before approving seasonal loans for the coming year, letters that the government would not provide. Therefore, farmers such as George were placed in the position where they had to try to convince their banks to risk loans in a climate where the regime ignored its own laws regarding property rights. Thus, finance became another serious problem that accompanied the invasions.

For George and Nancy, the invasions included no violence, but they still threatened their livelihood. Without finance, farmers could not plant for the coming season. As with Miller's case, less intensity of invasion experience was not accompanied by a sense of security.

These three different cases reflect the varied intensity of invasion violence across different contexts. Further, I highlight Jane's voice in detail because her interview exemplified the views of the white women with whom I spoke.

State Terror, Organized Violence, and Social Location

Not all debates on human rights originate in the West. The Organization of African Unity African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (OAU ACHPR)

represents an African led definition of basic human rights and outlaws torture. According to the definition, war veterans acting on behalf of and in collusion with the ZANU-PF regime have impinged on the rights of white farmers and black farm workers in Zimbabwe, violating their individual rights to political freedom, equal protection under the law, personal and national security and, most significantly, their inviolability, dignity, and protection from torture. Though both white farmers and black farm workers have been subjected to various forms of physical and psychological torture, the nature of their position in a race and gender hierarchy shapes their experience with farm invasions, human rights abuses, and torture. This hierarchy reflects social and political processes of *othering* that place black farm workers in positions of vulnerability that white farmers do not experience.

Black farm workers live outside the protected spaces on farms in which whites live and operate. Whereas white farmers and their families live inside security fences and move about their farms in vehicles, farm workers live in farm villages that are typically unprotected and thus they are more vulnerable to invasion. Farm workers have been subjected to community based terror tactics that include forced attendance at ZANU-PF rallies, destruction of property, public beatings and assaults, and abuse of their children. Furthermore, as invasions have seriously disrupted farm productivity, farm workers have experienced disruptions to their employment. Some farmers have been unable to pay workers when crops are destroyed, and several have had to trim their labor force to remain viable. Male farm workers have experienced severe physical brutality, while female farm workers have experienced high levels of sexual assault. Suspected of supporting the opposition, farm workers can do little to prove otherwise to ZANU-PF war

veterans who demand compliance with fines, requests for housing, and attendance at rallies. The abuse of blacks on farms focuses on their questionable loyalty to the party and blatant attempts to beat them into compliance. The government, via its paramilitary forces on farms, considers farm workers to be untrustworthy, and this view requires the ZANU-PF state to coerce submission through violent intimidation.

Whereas black female farm workers and farm workers' wives experience high levels of sexual violence in addition to community terror and forced attendance at political rallies, white women were overwhelmingly spared from sexual (excluding the two rape cases mentioned earlier) and other forms of physical violence. Again, this reflects the geography of commercial farms and the protected spaces white women lived within during the invasions. In comparison, black women lived in open villages subjected to easy infiltration by war veterans.

White farmers and farm women have also experienced physical violence due to farm invasions. The proportion of deaths of whites compared to blacks in pre-election violence reflects the increased likelihood that white farmers could face death compared to all other groups in Zimbabwean society. While whites represent only 0.8 percent of Zimbabwe's population, of the 26 deaths due to pre-election violence, five or 19 percent of those killed were farmers. While more blacks were killed overall (21), given the fact that whites represent less than one percent of the total Zimbabwean population, the fact that whites (all men) account for 19 percent of those murdered in invasion violence was disproportionate to their percentage of the total population.[8] Their position as outsiders and a relatively small proportion of the population made whites easy political targets for

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[8] This is of course not to say that I think more black should have been killed. Rather, my statement is intended to highlight the differences in forms of violence experienced.

intimidation, but, because of their small numbers, less likely to contribute to ZANU-PF's electoral goals. Therefore, whites' experiences with farm invasion reflect more attempts at revenge against particular individuals for specific grievances (e.g. open support of the opposition) and general dehumanization through persistent denial of their nationality than intimidation to vote a particular way or not to vote at all.

Farm Worker Survival Strategies/ Resistance

While the extremity of the physical violence against male farm workers is disturbing, there is evidence among the complaints that male farm workers were not passive recipients of violence. Despite the community terror tactics of the war vets and police inaction, farm workers attempted to defend each other and to defy political intimidation, to the best of their ability, as several cases reveal. In Chapter 5, I introduced the first example of farm worker strategies – the "football teams" – i.e., farm workers actively encouraged farmers to provide transportation for farm workers so that they could chase war veterans off farms.

Other examples emerge from the human rights violations reports. The first case documents the efforts of farm workers to aid a fellow worker, despite personal risk, during an assault on the farm village by war veterans (NEC 2000).

> Victim was at home and heard that a friend was being assaulted by war
> vets. He and others from compound went to plead on friend's behalf when
> they encountered war vets & ZANU-PF supporters approaching
> compound. War vets et.al. began using slings & stones. People ran for
> their lives, that was when victim was injured. Farmer gave victim
> transport to clinic & police station where victim saw war vets making false
> statements. Police accused farm workers of maltreating war vets and took
> no action. Victim went to clinic where he was attended to for: Multiple
> lacerations on upper part of body head and mouth i.e. left side back of
> head left side mouth lip, left upper jaw and left eye. He lost three teeth
> (premolars).

Although the farm workers found themselves outnumbered and suffered injuries, this

case reveals two important facets of the farm invasions. First, farm workers were not

passive victims in the assaults on farms. They attempted to defend each other, their

property and their livelihoods. In some cases (as in the village destroyed by fire

mentioned in the section on community violence), farm workers engaged in direct

confrontation with invading war veterans. Secondly, this case highlights the

unwillingness of the police to conduct proper investigations into farm violence and their

alliance with war veterans, an example of a form of Lopez's (1984) "law enforcement"

state terror technique.

The second case involved black male farm workers' activism under state terror

and state organized violence and demonstrates farm workers' refusal to completely

acquiesce to war veterans' demands for ZANU-PF loyalty (NEC 2000).

> Victim was wearing an MDC t-shirt and was handcuffed, tied to a tree and
> beaten - he was told to denounce his party. Left eye injured and stomach
> which was "electrocuted" to the live wires of fence of [farm name].
> Farmer saw in progress and reported to police, but police did not respond
> until much later.

In a climate of politically motivated violence and the anti-MDC attitude of war veterans, wearing MDC clothing constituted a highly visible rejection of war veterans' intimidation tactics. The disobedience resulted in severe discipline from the war veterans, and the farm worker was lucky to survive.

In another human rights violation report, the male farm worker was "Told to take off shirt and lie down on back and was slapped a few times and had cold water thrown over him every +/- 30 minutes for 8 hours because of shouting anti ZANU-PF slogans." According to another report, a male worker was "Beaten by 15 ZANU-PF Youths sustaining severe injuries for being an MDC Chairman." Peppered throughout the violation reports were additional examples such as moments when farm workers refused to chant ZANU-PF slogans, or shouted anti-ZANU-PF slogans, despite consequences of personal violence. In addition, workers were beaten for not attending ZANU-PF rallies or for wearing MDC T-shirts (see above).

Farm workers also acquiesced to, rather than resisted, invaders' demands in order to survive. They attended multiple ZANU-PF rallies *en mass* with transportation provided by farmers (CFU 2000c). In some cases, farm workers were pressured to join the war veterans in invading other farms and they did so as a survival strategy (interviews). In other cases, farm workers fled farms and added to the 3,000 displaced persons caused by the state violence (see Table 4.7). Resistance, like power, is multiple in its forms, a point I return to in my conclusions.

Farmer Survival Strategies[9]

In the following sections, I draw on my interviews with white farm women and men to highlight individual survival strategies and experience with rural white identity in the context of invasion violence. I begin by highlighting patterns of individual survival strategies I uncovered in my interviews and participant observation with farmers and farm women. Next, I draw on the experiences of three families with varied experiences with invasions to highlight how race and gender intersect to shape the experience of invasions.

Symbologues. Part of survival under conditions of violence and terror is the way in which survivors creatively transmit knowledge about surviving and resisting through what Nordstrom (1997: 204) calls "*symbologues*: dialogue through symbols." Symbologues include poems, songs, sculptures, and jokes that pass on information about war drama. In this section, I discuss a few of the symbologues that I encountered during my fieldwork studying state terror and state organized violence in Zimbabwe.

Early in the invasions, jokes began to emerge surrounding the occupations. The first joke I recall hearing, but then heard repeatedly, was the following, "Have you heard Zimbabwe's new National Anthem? Old MacDonald *had* a farm!" At one regional council meeting I attended, a member shouted from the back of the room, "Can the Vet. [veterinary] Department do anything about rabid war vets?" (Fieldnotes). Farm women also expressed their concerns through humor. As one farmer's wife explained to me, the

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[9] This section draws on interviews with farmers and farm women from 1998 and 2000. It focuses solely on the experiences of white farmers and farm women due to the limitations of my research as discussed in Chapter 3.

wives in her community had come up with a response to the oft-asked question, "How are you?": FINE, F**king Insecure, Neurotic, and Emotional (interview).

The majority of farming communities have social clubs where farmers and their families meet for sports, drinks, and farmers association meetings. According to my informants, during the invasions, there were an increased number of social events at clubs throughout the country, including sports events organized for children and adults, and often increased alcoholic drinking among men (interviews). The clubs themselves hold symbolic meaning as a cultural refuge for white farmers in Zimbabwe who vowed to stay after the war ended in 1980 (interviews).

At CFU Council meetings, Council members began quoting from the bible and/or making biblical references, something I was told had never been done before by one informant (interview). Additionally, fliers with religious content were distributed to commercial farms and printed in both Shona and English.

The final symbologue I heard was a dream one farmer related to me. In the dream, he is walking down a path and meets two lions. The lions are big and fierce and he knows they could easily devour him. He also knows, however, that he must confront them. Usually, he said, you would try to walk around lions rather than meet them head on, but not this time. So in his dream, he walks straight toward them. As he approaches the first, he comes right up to its face and then feels himself propelled forward by a force from behind. WHOOSH! He walks right through the lion. As he approaches the second, he feels the same propulsion, and again the force causes him to walk right through the second lion – WHOOSH! "Now, one of those lions is politics, and the other is the bank,"

he explained to me. "What do you think it means," I asked. "I don't know what it means," he replied. "But I'm not afraid anymore."

The Dialectic of Agency and Powerlessness: The Case of Mike and Jane Smith, Mashonaland North West.

Jane and Mike disagreed about their future in Zimbabwe. Mike is descended from some of Zimbabwe's earliest white settlers and has never considered leaving Zimbabwe, which he considers his homeland. Jane, however, also born in Zimbabwe, had begun making inquiries into immigrating to Australia and attributes their different perspectives to gender.

> It's their [women's] home and their children suffer. You're just living in limbo. For Mike, he is the land, he lives for it. For him to have the farm threatened is one thing, but for me, it's my home. Where do I go, I've got to have a home for my children. ...
>
> I don't see a way out of this one. I want to go home [to the farm]. I'm making inquires into immigration to Australia. So, that's the next stage. Not that we want to, but we've got to have an option. If I go, I won't go to another African country. Mike thinks this will be resolved. If it is resolved, things are changed. He believes there is a chance, until he's firmly told, no way, get off, he won't go. But we've got to have a plan.

Despite having left his farm for over two months due to persistent death threats, when I last spoke with Mike, he grinned while telling of a series of activities he used to subvert or frustrate the war vets on his farm. On one occasion, he opened the watering system in the field in which the squatters had built their shelters, drenching their property and causing the war vets either to leave or to remain wet during the cold months of winter. On another occasion, in a confrontation with war vets threatening to destroy his irrigation system, he said fine, go ahead, rather than beg for a reprieve. He then refused to plant his winter wheat crop despite the fact that the war vets had backed down and spared his equipment, a move that further angered the war vets occupying his farm. Mike joked that

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he had his own *mujibas* (or informants) who warned him of threats by the war vets, inverting the use of *mujibas* during the liberation war who warned guerrilla liberation fighters when Rhodesian forces approached. Such strategies are inherently risky, and he received numerous death threats. Yet, Mike's experience exemplified the non-violent warfare (on the part of farmers) that emerged throughout Zimbabwe's commercial farm sector as a form of resistance, negotiation, and struggle over power on farms.

Mike and Jane's invasion experience revealed a variety of ways in which farmers creatively survived the intrusion into their lives, disruptions to their production, and threats of violence. They developed a variety of strategies to cope with the pressure of the invasions. Early in the invasion, the Smiths demonstrated the tension between agency and powerlessness and maintaining a normal order that Mertz (2002) discusses. Despite their frustration with the involvement of their RA neighbors, Jane claimed the Smiths continued with their normal activities and basically ignored the 24 hour a day singing and drumming outside their house. Yet, she follows this statement shortly thereafter acknowledging how she had restricted her children's activities due to safety concerns, thus contradicting her earlier claim that they "didn't feel threatened" and felt "happy." In addition, the rape of the two young women mentioned above had a ripple effect among white farm women. According to my interviews, many white farm women curtailed their movement on farms and scaled back their interactions with farm workers in the farm villages due to concern over their safety because of the war veterans' presence on farms. White women's use of space on farms, in short, was reconstructed due to the presence of war veterans and women's fears about exposure to rape and violence (Bonin 2000).

Jane's interview also revealed the significant role women play in maintaining and restructuring family life under conditions of violence (Kanapathipillai 1990). On receiving death threats in April, the Smiths moved into Harare for safety. When farming neighbors told them the threat that the veterans would kill Mike "wherever he is" had been repeated, the Smiths began to shift locations every couple of nights to avoid putting anyone else in danger. Despite their desire to remain in Zimbabwe, Jane explored immigration possibilities. For Jane, her first concern was having a safe home for her children, not letting her children suffer. This perspective was overwhelmingly shared by the women I interviewed who had children living at home with them. In my interview with Mike, he focused on his farm and subverting the invaders. He engaged in a variety of activities designed to make the invaders on his farm uncomfortable and demonstrate his unwillingness to run away. While Mike's actions can be read as a form of resistance/ agency, as Mertz (2002) reminds her readers, in the context of chronic fear and violence, survivors of violence lack an accurate perspective of themselves and their situation. Mike and Jane's case symbolizes the dialectic of agency and powerlessness. In order to continue functioning, they must envision a world with hope, with humanity, even where one does not exist (Mertz 2002). This envisioning represents the synthesis of the dialectic of agency and powerlessness carved out of violence survivors' inability to recognize the limitations of their own situations in the context of chronic fear.

Identity, *Othering* and Politics: The Case of Jon Miller. The anti-white discrimination of 2000 has caused Miller to consider leaving Zimbabwe, though he doesn't know where he would go. According to Jon, he does not feel free to participate in politics. The invasions and concomitant political violence and racial antagonism by

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the ZANU-PF regime, raised again in 2000, also raised nagging questions for Miller about his own identity and place in the world. A descendant of German migrants to the Cape colony in South Africa in the mid-1600s, Miller's grandfather immigrated to Rhodesia in 1891, four years prior to Rhodesia's Pioneer Column. During the war for liberation, Miller felt disillusioned by the policies of the white government and uneasy about the prospects of living under a Marxist regime. In an interview in 1998, Miller lamented being conscripted by the Rhodesian government to fight a war he didn't support and the difficulties of the postwar period.

> You know after the war, one can imagine that there was a lot of bitterness and antagonism towards whites because the whites had been the government in power. ... And like I said, I didn't support the local, the white government as it was then and so there were differences among the whites anyway. White farmers in particular were labeled as people who supported the government and that was largely due to the fact that the white farmers defended themselves when they were attacked. When people came to shoot up a farm during the war, the guerrillas came onto the farm to shoot the place up; the white farmers would defend themselves in a kind of a rough and rugged kind of way. The government saw that as opposition to the, the guerrillas saw that the white farmer as being the spearhead of white oppression because they fought back and they defended themselves [sic]. So that's an oversimplification of the thing but that's how it was put across. And basically, obviously there were a lot of farmers that supported the white regime at that time, but the situation after independence was difficult for whites. ...

In the post-independence period, white identity was threatened both personally and politically. While the transition government ensured white participation in government for a short period, whites quickly withdrew from political life. The ZANU-PF government viewed white farmers as supporters of the regime they had fought to overthrow. Whites felt unsure where they belonged. Miller continued,

> You see the biggest problem that you have in that changing situation [post-independence] is that you don't have a sense of belonging. In one way in your head you know that this is where your roots are and this is

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your place, you've been here and you know nothing else and this is home; but somehow because of the way things are, the way things have happened. People being arrested all of the time, there was an undercurrent and a suspicion all the time, and people felt "where's my identity" and it's really hard to find an identity with people there and to feel at home, and to feel confident, and to feel that you've got any rights. ...

Miller's concerns evaporated with time. After independence, he continued to invest heavily in his farm, despite his insecurities about the future for a capitalist venture under a Marxist state. When ESAP came into effect, Miller's doubts about his future in Zimbabwe lessened. Throughout the first 20 years of independence, in his view, racial tensions waned as opposed to their immediacy during the post-war period.

Later in the interview in 1998, we discussed the 1997 gazetting of farms for acquisition by the ZANU-PF regime. Miller again spoke of his ancestry and identity and the possibility of leaving Zimbabwe.

> ... I'm not young anymore, so when I think of my farm being taken away, my whole life has been given up for farming and farming in this country and so on. It is like I have invested everything that I am as a person into the land and into the country to try and preserve the land and to look after it so that it can be handed on in a better condition than when I took it over and I just feel angry and upset and I think it's grossly unfair that there should this kind of legislation that can just take away my land and give it to somebody else, because I'm white and somebody else is black and it must be given to somebody else because he is black and not because he is really good for the country and I'm not good and I'm not doing a very good job or anything like that. So I just, the whole thing is really unfair and I don't see myself as a foreigner, you know, I see myself as a Zimbabwean, I mean I don't even know my ancestors in Germany, that was over three hundred years ago, I mean what do I know about that? So I see myself as an African and I see myself as African as any other person that sees themselves with 300 years in America or Australia or whatever.
> ... I just believe that I'm just as indigenous as anyone else but as far as the government is concerned, because I'm white, I'm not indigenous and I think that is really unfair to have that interpretation and I feel very insecure to know that our leaders think like that and they can legislate to discriminate against me and so yeah I do feel insecure and frightened. ...

In the face of the 2000 invasions, Miller considered leaving the country due to anti-white sentiment, political intimidation, and lack of freedom. The invasion of his farm did not disrupt his farming operations, but he only sees a future in Zimbabwe with a change of government. In Miller's view, Mugabe has backed himself into a corner and is desperate to stay in power to avoid charges of war crimes, human rights abuses, and corruption. While Miller believed farmers should have a right to their opinion, he felt it was better to politically "to be a bit low key" during the invasion period.

Throughout Miller's experience in post-independent Zimbabwe, he has struggled with his white African identity. This struggle intensified during the farm invasion in 2000 due to openly hostile anti-white sentiment from the Mugabe's regime, politically motivated violence and terror, and political intimidation. Srnivasan (1990) notes how minority groups that survive violence become "marked communities," they become *othered*. Miller's experience demonstrates how state terror and violence attempted to *other* whites. For Miller, survival strategies included maintaining a low profile politically, and potentially emigrating.

The Heterogeneity of Identity and *Othering*: The Case of Nancy and George Loft, Manicaland. When I interviewed them in April a few days after the deaths of Stevens and Olds, the Lofts had been renting their cottage in Harare for just a couple of weeks. The weekend of Stevens' abduction and death, George and the children all came to town to meet Nancy at the airport. George had a headache, so they stayed in their apartment in Harare that night. This was the day that Stevens, the farmer in Macheke, was killed. They started receiving calls and learned what happened. They headed out of town on Sunday, but then before they reached the Mutare road (which goes through

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Macheke to their community in Manicaland), George got a feeling that Nancy and the kids should stay in town. So, they turned around and he left the family in their apartment in town.

After Stevens' death, George visited his former school, St. Paul's. He went to the chapel where his father's funeral had been held. The chapel had been built after he had finished school, he explained. He went in and found that the chapel had been decorated with hundreds of small crosses. The students must have been given a project to make their own cross, he said. George sat there for some time, looking at the crosses, about 500 he estimated. What was amazing, he said, was that each cross was unique, no two looked alike. He said he was thinking about the coming Easter holiday and the cross that Christ chose to bear. He said he realized that like the crosses that the students had made, we each have our own unique cross to bear, our own issue that we need to confront in our lives. He felt the conflict in 2000 in Zimbabwe was his cross to bear.

In George's view, the only people considered citizens in Zimbabwe are people who are supporters of ZANU-PF. In a meeting with his workers, he stressed to them that in 2000, ZANU-PF was not an option; they don't see me and they don't see you, he told his workers. He stressed that people are not running to MDC because of the MDC, but because ZANU-PF was simply not an option for farmers and farm workers at this point in time, because they are not protected by the government.

Throughout his life, George said, he has always been searching for his Zimbabwean identity. During the Rhodesia days, he insisted, even as a child, he never felt a part of Rhodesian culture with its emphasis on separation. He remembered that as a child, visiting the farmers' club, he always felt different from other whites, he didn't fit

into the Rhodie culture. Since independence, he's longed for a sense of belonging in Zimbabwe. He said he was someone who never thought about leaving Zimbabwe, although all of his siblings have. It never appealed to him. However, the current crisis has made George think about leaving Zimbabwe. George wonders how far he can let things go, when should he take his family and leave. He and Nancy were concerned about the impact of the invasions on their kids, how they were being affected psychologically by this conflict.

In an interview in 1997, George talked about his feelings as a white Zimbabwean during the contemporary era. Relating his own experiences to Shona culture, George described the concept of *unhu*. *Unhu* (from which the word *munhu* or person is derived) refers to more than just a person's physical self. According to George, *unhu* includes the physical, the personality, the core of who a person is. If another person can see or recognize your *unhu*, that is a great thing.[10] He explained that, historically, whites in Zimbabwe did not see the Africans' *unhu*, did not recognize them as human. In his view, African nationalism grew out of this non-recognition in the 1950s and 1960s. Describing the regime's decision to compulsorily acquire 1,400 white-owned farms in 1997, George reported that he felt that his *unhu* was not being seen by the men in government. He said the experience of having their (some government officials) own *unhu* unacknowledged by whites while they were growing up and as young adults had so scarred many black Zimbabwean leaders, that they now are unable to see the *unhu* of the whites. Lamenting the fact that Zimbabwe had never had reconciliation in a manner similar to South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (which was on-going at the time), George felt that

[10] I later confirmed George's interpretation of *unhu* with my Shona tutor at University of Zimbabwe who said it was very well defined by George.

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the reconciliation after Independence was simply to say to whites "We're not going to kick you out." He felt that in 2000, Zimbabwe truly needed reconciliation. Nancy added that what hurts her was consistently being referred to as "white settlers." Both she and George were born in Zimbabwe, yet they are not considered "Zimbabwean."

George wondered if the family should leave, temporarily, or to wait and see if things got better or worse. He thought many young farmers will relocate to Australia soon, regardless of how things turn out and he anticipated farmers forming informal trading groups and selling products outside the normal means, splitting the foreign exchange, defaulting on bank loans, and running. Why should people pay back their loans, he asked. George explained that banks aren't going to loan farmers money on collateral in the future, so why would a farmer feel loyalty to pay back what they owe. People will feel pressured to gather foreign exchange by any means and emigrate. Australia doesn't appeal to George because of the Rhodesian lifestyles people have created there. In the UK, you can always find a job, he said. He went to university there, so he knows a bit about the place, and has friends and relatives who'd help them. He said he doesn't know what he'd do there. "Maybe I'd become a housewife, and Nancy could support us," he joked, referring to Nancy's professional degree.

George's brother in the US reminded him not to be a hero. His brother said that their family had already lost two members to the conflict in Zimbabwe 20 years ago and had never gotten over that trauma; they could not face losing another person in such a way. George noted in one conversation that he was tempted to approach the war vets and confront them, to challenge them to kill him. He was tempted to offer his own life as a sacrifice to bring peace. But, he said, "I have a family and I can't do that." He wanted so

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much to build up his farm, and leave it in perfect condition, if he must leave, as a monument to his life's work here. He has put everything, his whole life into his farm and if he must leave it, he wants to leave it pristine, in perfect condition.

In thinking about leaving, George said he's trying to figure out how to go about it. One solution would be to leave his farm manager and a few foremen in charge. He would try to provide them with enough seed and fertilizer for the next season and tell them to do their best; if things improve, he'll return in a few years. George wondered if there will ever be a future for LSCF in Zimbabwe again, if the industry can recover from this. The lack of confidence of the individuals as well as the finance sector worried him.

Nancy said that when Stevens was assaulted, his black farm manager tried to intervene. The war vets beat him up, and since then he has been missing. The police discovered recently that he had been killed the very day of the attack. As punishment for defending his boss, the thugs cut off his penis in front of the farms' workers and he bled to death. She noted that these were the same tactics used during the war.

George noted in a situation of war, there are still rules that govern warring behavior. He said farmers weren't the targets as a group, though some individuals were. The target was the farm workers. During the war, you could contact the police, the army, and your neighbors. Everyone was armed and would come to your defense if you were under attack. But in this situation, George said, there are no rules to which the war vets abide. Farmers can't call on their government to defend them and can't defend themselves.

George and Nancy Loft responded to the invasions in a variety of ways. Despite the fact that their farm was not invaded and they lived in Manicaland, the province with

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the second lowest invasion rate (20 percent – see Table 4.4), the Lofts rented an apartment in Harare for a back-up plan. This survival strategy reflects the routinization of terror as individuals come to doubt their ability to interpret the world around them, a theme also consistent in George's voice. Religion stands out as a survival strategy, as indicated in George's suggestion that the invasions were his cross to bear and that he should offer his life to the war veterans as a sacrifice for peace. Like other farmers discussed above, George and Nancy felt their identity as Africans, for George in particular, his *unhu*, was under attack by the invasions. The couple discussed emigrating as a survival strategy. In George's view, leaving his farm for his workers was central to that plan if it came to that. Finally, George also openly engaged in resistance, promoting MDC and denigrating ZANU-PF in speeches to his workers, despite the risks of political involvement.

Conclusion

The survival strategies of farm workers that emerged from the human rights violation reports represent a small indication of the complexity of farm workers' experiences with farm violence, and the ways in which farm workers negotiated survival under routinized terror. In some cases, farm workers acquiesced to invaders' demands, under persistent threats, as a survival strategy. In other cases, despite the known consequences of challenging ZANU-PF, in this small sample of farm workers' experiences, several cases stand out in which workers do just that, whether it be through refusing to attend a rally, shouting anti-ZANU-PF slogans, or wearing MDC clothing, or becoming a local MDC leader. These moments highlight the need for additional research

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focusing on the moments of resistance in this story of political tyranny. Additionally, the human rights violations do not include enough examples of women to explore differences among women and men's survival strategies. Resistance is multiple and includes both direct confrontation and acquiescence. In some cases, it was likely a combination of alternating between the two as the intensity of the violence permitted confrontation on some days, but not on others.

For farmers and farm women, survival strategies centered on themes of religion, migration (internal and external), and humor. Resistance ranged from continued participation in or open support of MDC to harassing invaders. All three families highlighted here questioned their futures in Zimbabwe and expressed concern over the government's inability to recognize their *unhu*. Women in particular highlighted the need to prepare to migrate.

The three families presented in this chapter reflected three very different experiences with farm invasions and violence – all three responded in different ways. Mike and Jane, who experienced the highest level of violence, moved off their farm. While Jane insisted on exploring overseas migration possibilities, Mike refused to consider it, remained active in MDC, and harassed his farm invaders. Jon Miller experienced a low key invasion and only moved his family off the farm for a two week period. Jon thought about leaving Zimbabwe, but felt conflicted because he considered Africa his home and he was being forced to deny his heritage. He chose to remain silent on politics and hoped things would improve politically. Finally, although George and Nancy's farm was not invaded, they relocated their family to Harare for safety. They considered relocating overseas, and relied on religion as a survival strategy. The

contrasting survival strategies of these three families reflect differing responses to varied intensities of violence, and highlights the way violence and survival is shaped by racial privilege and gender.

First, the intensity of invasion experience (high, low, no) did not necessarily correlate with farmers survival strategies, such as to move off farm. As indicated by George and Nancy, whose farm was never invaded in 2000 and who moved to Harare nonetheless, there are no set rule for how individuals cope under situations of extreme fear and insecurity (Robben and Nordstrom 1995). Second, in all of the three farmer families, overseas migration had been discussed and possibly applications made. Such movement was impossible for farm workers whose economic insecurity made migration to the UK, the US, or Australia to escape the violence and start over an unrealistic survival strategy. Third, it was predominately women who expressed concern for the future of their children, while men predominately highlighted different approaches to open resistance.

As elections neared in June of 2000, violence against farmers and farm workers quickly spread to other segments of Zimbabwean society. ZANU-PF used the land issue to justify violence against farmers and farm workers and as a starting point for a broader campaign of rural terror. Farm violence was a strategic starting point; however, as the ZANU-PF state felt the marginal positions of farmers and farm workers would alienate them from the broader Zimbabwean population and bring support to the party's re-election campaign based on land.

CHAPTER SEVEN:

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

Rather than summarize my findings as they appeared in the dissertation, I return in this chapter to my major question that I introduced in Chapter One: "*Under what conditions are different people exposed to different kinds of state terror and violence?*" There, I also explained how I had come to study this issue as a result of events in the field. My original research plans were cast aside when Zimbabwe's commercial farming sector erupted into violence and terror as ZANU-PF regime paramilitary groups invaded farms to intimidate the electorate. My theorizing of the data, therefore, is post-hoc. In fact, in Chapter One, I reviewed selected theories on violence, thereby showing how I formulated the sub-research questions my data could address.

I begin this chapter, by organizing my major findings around a discussion of conditions that expose different people to different kinds of terror and violence. Seven conditions emerged from the data: (1) the ecology of the farm, (2) normative social structures, (3) employment hierarchies, (4) proportional representation within the electorate, (5) political affiliation, (6) organizational access to resources and (7) geography. I conclude the findings section by addressing how social location is implicated in survival strategies. Second, I move to a discussion of implications of my research for theory. In particular, I address the way theorists address violence, as well as how we think about agency and resistance. Third, I reflect on the policy implications of my study for ending the crisis in Zimbabwe. Fourth, I point to future areas of research

that have emerged from the dissertation. In conclusion, I discuss the position of researchers in states of conflict and violence.

Major Findings

Varied conditions affected the kinds of state terror and violence different people experienced in Zimbabwe in 2000. First, the ecology of the farm – whether individuals lived in fenced areas (white farmers' homesteads) or open, unprotected (black farm worker villages on farms) made farm workers much more vulnerable to assault than farmers. Following the defeat of the constitutional referendum in February of 2000, which many political analysts interpreted as a demonstration of decreasing support for the ruling party ZANU-PF, the regime embarked on an "anti-farm worker" campaign, exposing thousands of farm workers to terror by war veterans and ZANU-PF youth militia. According to the human rights violation reports, black male farm workers experienced the highest levels of physical forms of violence and terror, whereas the primary violation against white male farmers was threats. The majority of violence against black female farm workers and the wives of farm workers involved some form of sexual assault. There were very few cases (three) of white farm women included in the human rights violations reports; however, white farm women largely stayed within the protected space of their fenced homesteads, thereby lessening the likelihood that they would be assaulted. Thus, the ecology of the farm, living and working in protected or unprotected spaces, created conditions in which white farm women were least exposed to violence, followed by white farmers, while black farm workers, male and female, were

exposed to greater violence due to the lack of protection offered in the open villages on farms.

Second, normative social structures were also implicated in the terror and violence of 2000, exposing Black women to sexual violence. For example, in Shona culture, women have primary responsibility for child care, especially for young children. In the case of farm violence when many farm workers may have fled, women with young children would have been constrained and slowed, possibly unable to flee, thus exposing them to what was often sexualized forms of violence. White women were less vulnerable, but their responsibility for the family restricted their use of space and movement on farms. In addition, in both Black and White cultures in Zimbabwe masculinity is linked to providing for the family's livelihood. Therefore, when war veterans threatened their livelihoods, men responded and became targets of more violence than women in general.

Third, employment hierarchies also shaped the experience of violence. On commercial farms, there are several jobs which have a higher status due to a combination of more responsibility and, typically, employment "perks." Included in these positions are foremen (farm worker supervisors), "house girls" or maids, cooks, gardeners, and farm health workers. These employment hierarchies exposed farm workers in positions of relative authority and privilege on the farm to greater risk of violence at the hands of war veterans than that of farm workers in general. Foremen, "house girls," cooks, gardeners, and farm health workers were disproportionately affected by violence. They were often branded as "sell-outs" and beaten or humiliated in front of other workers.

White men, the highest in the employment hierarchy on farms, were also exposed to threats and often humiliation.

Fourth, proportional representation within the Zimbabwean electorate played a role in the experience of state organized terror and violence. Whites, representing less than one percent of the total population, were simply not a major enough voting block to warrant an "anti-farmer" campaign. They did, however, represent access to farm workers, transportation, and supplies that facilitated ZANU-PF "electoral campaigning." Commercial farms provided ZANU-PF with both the ideological and logistical support to wage its electoral campaign – the farms were the focus of the key political platform, take back the land – and farm owners provided food, transportation, housing and often money for the invaders orchestrating the terror and violence. From the farms, war veterans could move into neighboring CAs and RAs to "campaign" as well. Farm workers represented a large voting block and, as noted above, had been blamed for the defeat of the referendum. The regime was determined to gain farm workers support for the parliamentary elections. Following four months of nation-wide state terror and state organized violence, support for the recently emerged MDC opposition party wavered.

Fifth, political affiliation shaped different people's exposure to different forms of state terror and violence. Among farmers and farm workers, those aligned with MDC were more likely to experience violence than those who were not. Only specific farmers were targeted for physical violence, typically those openly affiliated with the opposition MDC, although in some cases, violence against farmers occurred due to the eruption of hostilities. The majority of white farmers killed during the invasion period were associated with MDC, as were many farmers who received death threats. The two white

women who were raped appeared to have been targeted for political motives on two levels. First, the assailants accused the women of involvement with MDC. Second, the women were relatives of one of the CFU's national leaders. In addition, farm workers were targeted and tortured for their known or suspected association with MDC.

Sixth, organizational access to resources was implicated in the experience of violence. Farmers and farm workers historically have lived and worked on farms in a contentious relationship. The invasions and state sponsored violence, however, altered those relationships as workers and farmers united to defend the farm, albeit briefly. The CFU developed several survival strategies during the invasion crisis, focusing its attention on two primary goals, protecting the lives of its members and safeguarding the future of commercial farming, thus ensuring organizational survival. The CFU relied on communications technology to keep farmers in touch with nationwide events, court cases, and discouraged the use of "football teams" to make farmers less vulnerable. While these efforts may have protected farmers temporarily, the measures increased farm workers' vulnerability to invasion violence. As GAPWUZ lacked the organizational capacity to advocate for its clientele, farm workers became increasingly vulnerable as the farm invasions progressed. Ultimately, farm workers had no one to help them in the crisis.

Finally, seventh, geography affected people's experience with terror and violence. In the Mashonaland Provinces, commercial farms are smaller, closer in physical proximity, and produce labor-intensive crops requiring much larger labor forces than in other parts of the country. In particular, in the low-veldt (Masvingo and Matabeleland Provinces), farms are more likely to be cattle or game ranches, occupying extensive pieces of land, and employing few workers. Farmers and farm workers alike in the

Mashonaland Provinces were exposed to more invasions and invasion violence than in other parts of the country.

Most of these conditions are linked to an individual's position in the hierarchy of race and gender within Zimbabwe. The ecology of the farm exposed blacks to more violence than whites due to the protected spaces within which whites live on farms. White women were more protected than men in this ecological context, due to their ability to limit their movement on farms. Normative social structures in which men, both black and white, held more responsibility for the family's livelihood exposed men to more violence than women. While both black and white women had primary responsibilities for child care and the family, the resultant exposure to violence varied as black women were unable to flee invaded villages, whereas white women remained in the protected spaces of the homestead.

Employment hierarchies also exposed farm workers with positions of authority or privilege, and white farmers, as employers, to risk of violence as well. Further, racial proportion within the electorate demonstrates the intersection of race with the conditions exposing individuals to violence. Although whites represented a small proportion of the electorate, the access to resources on farms that was critical to the ZANU-PF campaign put them at risk for violence. They became targets of violence, even though they were not the primary targets; these were the large voting block of farm workers to which war veterans gained access by invading white-owned farms. Political affiliation with the MDC, real or suspected, resulted in an individual's being a target of violence regardless of race or gender. Finally, white farmers had better access to organizational resources to protect their interests and themselves than farm workers during the invasions and

violence. In short, vulnerability to risk was shaped by Zimbabwe's hierarchical structure of race and gender.

Survival strategies also were shaped by an individual's social location. Farm workers' survival strategies took a variety of forms. Some workers gave in to war veterans' demands that they join the veterans' cause, and they aided them in invading nearby farms. Others resisted by openly shouting anti-ZANU-PF slogans, wearing MDC T-shirts, becoming active in MDC politics, or refusing to attend ZANU-PF rallies. The dearth of data, however, made it impossible to explore farm workers' survival strategies fully. Nevertheless, because they occupied the lowest position within the hierarchical structure of race, their options were more limited than those of white farmers and farm women. Responding to violence from a more privileged position, white families migrated from the rural to the urban area to escape farm violence and terror. In addition, white farm women, much more than their husbands, pursued immigrating to other countries out of concern for their children. Only their deep concern over the future for white farmers in Zimbabwe and the continued challenge to their identity as Africans, induced farmers to reluctantly consider emigration as a possibility – an option that was impossible for farm workers to envision.

Even my own social location shaped the strategies I devised to cope with violence and terror. In theory, my position as a "powerful Western researcher" placed me high up in the social hierarchy during my fieldwork in Zimbabwe. The position of western researchers is often reified as the more powerful in the dynamics of fieldwork. My research demonstrates the way in research on violence unpacks the notion of the "powerful Western researcher." My identity as a young female US national informed my

relationships with informants in the field and shaped power dynamics with informants, organizations, and in general in the context of fieldwork under conditions of violence (see Chapter Three). Terror and violence become normalized in fieldworkers' eyes, as well as violence survivors, in order to cope on a daily basis.

Implications for Theory

State terror and organized violence is characterized by (1) premeditation, (2) patterned state violence, (3) fear caused by coercion and life threatening behaviors, and (4) paramilitary organizations (Pion-Berlin and Lopez 1991, Mason and Krane 1989, Slone 1984). Lopez (1984: 70) outlines specific methods of terror utilized by the state to terrorize its citizenry such as information control, law enforcement, economic coercion, and life threats. Riches (1991) presents a typology of violence including (1) witchcraft, (2) mental violence, (3) symbolic violence, (4) structural/ institutional violence, (5) ritual violence, and (6) violence where the victim is not fully human.

Such outlines and typologies of terror and violence, while providing a useful starting point to think about state violence, assume that terror and violence impact individuals in similar ways. While there has been some research focusing on gender differences in the experience of violence (Moser and Clark 2001; Jacobs, Jacobson and Marchbank 2000; Trushen and Tagiramariya 1998), most of this research is actually research on women, and very little adopts a comparative approach and examines both men's and women's experiences. Though it is very important to understand women's experiences with violence, it is also important to study men's experiences with violence as gendered beings as well. Perhaps, more importantly, however, it is crucial to compare

men's and women's experiences with violence, thereby documenting how and why their experience may be similar and/ or different.

In addition to gendered differences in the experience of violence, my research revealed that the experience is mediated by a network of hierarchies. Race, gender, and even social standing intersect and different methods of torture and terror tactics were used on different people throughout the invasions. This finding suggests that a much more nuanced understanding of state terror and organized violence is needed, than typologies of violence can offer. More specifically, we need to move beyond the notion of "typologizing" violence and think about the heterogeneity of the experience of violence. Further, we need to interrogate the way different individuals interpret the experience of violence. As standpoint theory acknowledges, an individual's social location shapes the way she/ he perceives events. Those subjected to the most oppressive conditions are most able to understand those oppressive conditions, in this case, state violence. We, thus, need to look at how the positioning in a matrix of oppression creates differing understandings of state terror and violence.

Just as we need to move beyond typologies, we also need to reconsider the notion of agency/ resistance. My research shows that these concepts are more complex than often acknowledged. Agency is usually thought of as one's ability to act in the world, and, it is often juxtaposed against the notion of structure. Similarly, power is often considered a zero-sum game in which one individual is powerful and the other powerless. Such an approach fails to acknowledge, that, in Foucault's words (1980:142), "there are no relations of power without resistances." As my findings show, people are never

completely passive victims. "Rather, power is fluid [Villarreal 1992:256] and it involves struggle, negotiation and compromise" (Gallin 2002:74).

Throughout this research, during fieldwork and post-fieldwork, I have struggled with the concepts of agency/ resistance in the face of state terror and violence. I have acknowledged that resistance exists on multiple levels. Yet, the question remains, what constitutes resistance in the face of life-threatening violence? Is an act truly resistance when it is not transformative and can result in violence against yourself, your family and community? In other words, do actors truly possess agency in the context of state terror and violence?

Finally, Lifton's classic work on survivors of violence portrays the survivor as an individual untouched by social structures of any kind (Das 1990). Recent studies have demonstrated how class and gender shape an individual's experience with violence and survival (Kanapathipillai 1990, Srnivasan 1990). Differing experiences with terror and violence lead to different approaches to resistance and survival strategies by individuals in differing gendered and racial social locations. An important theoretical question becomes, then, what is the distinction between resistance and survival strategies?

Policy Implications

Throughout the crisis of 2000 (and in the years to date), the US, the UK, and the UNDP have all at times made attempts to negotiate an end to the crisis in Zimbabwe to no avail. The solution to the crisis lies in a change in political leadership in Zimbabwe – in both the Presidential Office and the ruling party. Ultimately, however, the solution lies with regional leaders and requires the political will to pressure Mugabe to establish law

and order and to step down. In 2000, Libyan leader Omar Qdaffai shipped fuel to

Zimbabwe for several months to solve the country's fuel crisis. South Africa continues

to provide electricity to Zimbabwe's electric grid, despite the fact that Zimbabwe has not

paid its bill in years. By bailing Mugabe out, these countries are exacerbating the crisis

in Zimbabwe -- a crisis which has resulted in a massive food shortage requiring food aid

that continues to be insufficient. Such a food crisis will have health implications,

particularly in terms of AIDS. Increased numbers of HIV positive patients with poor

nutrition are more likely to develop full blown AIDS, worsening Zimbabwe's

catastrophic AIDS crisis. Zimbabwe will require decades of aid to undo the damage

wrought in a short period of time. As the CCJPZ (1997:171) study found, the

psychological effects of violence extend from the individual to community levels --

"Costs must be measured in physical injuries, psychological disorders, economic damage

and social pathology." Only pressure from regional leaders will solve these crises.

Future Research

This dissertation is a starting point to understanding the state terror and violence

in Zimbabwe in 2000. Several areas of research remain untouched. First and foremost,

as noted in Chapter Three, the research climate did not permit me to gather direct

interviews from farm workers while I was in the field. Narratives of farm workers

experiences of violence and survival are a critical piece to this story.[1] What are farm

worker perspectives of their futures in Zimbabwe given the dissolution of commercial

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[1] I have heard from a colleague that a Zimbabwean researcher has interviewed farm workers on their experience and written on this, but I have not yet seen the document.

farming as an industry? What are their current survival strategies given the majority of farm workers' lack of access to land to cultivate?

According to my best information, there are approximately 500 commercial farmers who have remained on their farms in Zimbabwe. How are these farmers surviving? Why have they chosen to stay when so many farmers have left Zimbabwe? Many farmers ultimately made arrangements to migrate to neighboring countries such as Zambia and Mozambique. What kinds of relationships with workers/ neighboring communities/ governments are former Zimbabwean commercial farmers establishing to ensure safer futures? In sum, much more research is needed on the protagonists in the Zimbabwean crisis before the experience and response to violence is fully understood.

Conclusion

Despite the attempt to characterize the land invasions of 2000 and the associated violence as the "*Third Chimurenga*" by the regime and war veterans, my research reveals a dissonance in such characterizations. The first and second *Zvimurenga*[2] were uprisings by the people against an oppressive state. Contrary to these legitimately populous uprising against oppressive states, the so-called "*Third Chimurenga*" was quite literally the opposite – an oppressive state using violence in an attempt to quell populous uprisings against that very regime. In 2000, the state orchestrated terror and violence against its own populace and utilized war veterans as paramilitary groups to terrorize voters either to vote for ZANU-PF or not to vote at all in the parliamentary elections of June 2000. The regime capitalized on farmers' and farm workers' position as the *other* in Zimbabwean society in selecting these groups as the first targets of state terror and

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[2] *Zvimurenga* is plural for *chimurenga* in Shona.

violence in its electoral campaign. While both farmers and farm workers were subject to the characterization of the *other*, they experienced state sanctioned terror and violence differently.

As a different form of *othering*, researchers in contexts of state terror and violence, conflict, and war face enormous challenges. In addition to observing and studying informants' responses to the terror, violence and insecurity, the researcher must also manage her own reactions. Research on violence disrupts our notions of the "powerful Western researcher" and is shaped by our own identities. Most research on violence, I have discovered, emerged in a similar context as mine – a researcher in a position to follow carefully laid out plans crafted before entering the field, was forced to change plans when the field erupted into chaos. Research methods and questions become subject to an additional layer of scrutiny – what is possible and what is safe in this context? In the context of terror and violence, research often becomes a creative blend of methodology, risk assessment and the art of what is possible. Finally, perhaps the length of time it has taken to complete this dissertation is testimony to Linda Green's (1995: 106) argument that, "The routinization of fear undermines one confidence in interpreting the world."

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Appendix A

Appendix A:
Interview with ALB/GAPWUZ

1. Please describe your position & responsibilities.

2. From the perspective of workers, please describe what has been happening on farms.

3. How are workers being affected by invasions?

4. What is the impact on
    their jobs
    their livelihoods
    their families
    their communities
    their children

5. What has been the responses of farm workers?

6. Are male and female workers experiencing this differently? Describe.
    Do you have a sense of the prevalence of rape among farm worker women? Girls?

7. What has been the role of ALB/ GAPWUZ in this crisis?

8. Do farm workers have any representation at the negotiations? Describe.

9. In general, do you feel farm workers are supportive of invasions?

10. What has been the worst case of violence against farm workers (in your region) that you know of?

11. If the invasions result in a resettlement program, do you think farm workers will benefit? Why or why not?

12. Have members of your organization experienced intimidation or harassment? Please describe. Why do you think this happened?

13. What is your organization doing to advocate for farm workers during this period of crisis?

14. What do you see as the short term impacts of this on farm workers?

15. What do you see as the long term impacts of this on farm workers?

16.   Anything else? Questions for me?

Appendix B

APPENDIX B:
FARMER INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. Background – age, marital, nationality, kids, education, non-Zim citizenship

2. Farm Name, District, Farm Association

3. Farm Size (HA), crops, no. of workers: Permanent/ Seasonal; Male/ Female

4. How/ when acquire farm? Listed for acquisition? Ever approached to make land available – describe.

5. Relationships with black farmers – proximity of CA/ RA, assistance (CFU's "over the fence" informal assistance)

6. Relationships with workers – land for gardens, fields, Farm Health Worker, schools, clinic, housing, water source, workers' committee, other assistance

7. Referendum – did you provide your workers with : information, transportation to polls, time off to visit polls; election – did you provide your workers with information

8. Do you think your workers feel free to participate in Zimbabwean politics? (Why/ why not?)

9. Occupations/ squatters – current and any previous occasions: describe
    What was the period or length?
    What happened?
    How did it begin?
    Who was involved (squatters)?
    How impact workers?
    Outside intervention (police, army, other GoZ agencies)?
    Negotiations – who involved?
    Effects on productivity ?
    Losses?
    Why were you targeted?
    Did your family move off? Why/ why not? Describe.
    Did your workers move off? Describe.
    How have the invasions impacted your family – your spouse and kids?
    How do women and men experience the invasions differently in your opinion?
    Satisfied with CFU response?

10. Other crises – fuel, forex, interest rates, exchange rates – what has been their impact on your farming business?

11. What do you see for your future in Zimbabwe? Do you feel free to participate in Zimbabwean politics?

12. Have you ever considered leaving?

13. How can this be resolved?

14. Questions for me?

15. Anything else?

Appendix C

APPENDIX C:
FARM WOMEN INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. Background – age, marital, nationality, kids, education, non-Zimbabwean citizenship

2. Farm Name, District, Farmer Association

3. Farm Size (HA), crops, workers: Permanent/ Seasonal; Male/ Female

4. How/ when acquire farm? Listed for acquisition? Ever approached to make land available – describe

5. Please describe your relationship with black farmers – proximity of CA/ RA, assistance (CFU's "over the fence" informal assistance)

6. Please describe your relationship with workers – do you provide land for gardens, fields, a Farm Health Worker, schools, clinic, housing, water source, workers' committee, other assistance

7. Regarding the Constitutional Referendum –did you provide your workers with: information, transportation to polls, time off to vote;

8. Do you think your workers feel free to participate in Zimbabwean politics?

9. Occupations/ squatters – ever: describe
   What was the period or length
   What happened?
   How did it begin?
   Who was involved?
   How did it impact workers?
   Outside intervention (police, army, other GoZ agencies)?
   Negotiation – who involved?
   Effects on productivity ?
   Losses?
   Why were you targeted?
   Did your family move off? Why/ why not? Describe.
   Did your workers move off? Describe.
   How have the invasions impacted your family – your spouse and kids?
   How do women and men experience the invasions differently in your opinion?
   Satisfied with CFU response – why so few women in positions at CFU?

10. Usually what is your role on the farm? What do you do? What else?

11. Do you feel your children have a future in Zimbabwe? As farmers? Describe.

12. Do men and women experience this crisis differently? Describe.

13. How do you cope with the crisis day to day?

14. Other crises – fuel, forex, interest rates, exchange rates – what has been their impact on your business?

15. What do you see for your future in Zimbabwe? Do you feel free to participate in Zimbabwean politics?

16. Have you ever considered leaving?

17. How can this be resolved?

18. Questions for me?

19. Anything else?

Appendix D

APPENDIX D:
INTERVIEWS WITH CFU REGIONAL LEADERS

Date:

Region:

Total Number of Farmer Associations in Region:

Total Number of Farms in Region:

Total Number of Farms invaded to date:

Total Number of Farms currently occupied:

1. Please indicate if any of the following have occurred and whether most, many, few or none of the farms in your region have been affected by these activities:

Event	Most	Many	Few	None
damage to crops				
damage to farm equipment/ property				
disruption of farm activities				
violence against workers				
violence against farmer/ family				
threats against workers				
threats against farmer/ family				
forced political campaigning				

2. When did the occupations/ invasions begin in your region?

3. What was the first farm invaded/ occupied? What happened? Who was involved?

4. How did the farmer respond? Did the community respond? How? Did CFU respond? How? Did workers respond? How?

5. Were workers affected? How?

6. Why do you think this farm was the first affected in your region?

7. When did occupations spread to other farms in region? What happened? Who was involved? How did farmers respond? How did workers?

8. In the early stages of the invasions, as CFU regional chair, what advice did you give to farmers?

9. Has that advice changed? In what ways? Why?

10. Did you or CFU advise at some point that men, women, or children leave the farms? Please describe. When/ where/ circumstances/ did farmers comply/ have they moved back?

11. Are there/ have there been "football teams" in the region? Please describe. How did they form? Who was involved? Did workers join? When/ where?

12. What has been the impact of the actions of "football teams"? Are they still active? Why/ why not?

13. Would you say there has been a shift or shifts in the nature of occupations since they began? If yes, when did the shift/s occur? What happened? How have things been different?

14. In your region, is there a relationship between farms invaded and the list gazetted in 1997? Please describe.

15. Has there been violence in your region? Please describe. When did things turn violent? What happened?

16. What has been the worst case of violence in your region?

17. Do you know the total number of workers who have been assaulted in your region?

18. Do you know the total number of workers homes destroyed in your region?

19. How would you describe the feelings of farmers in your region?

20. How have the deaths of the three farmers affected farmers in your region?

21. Have you had negotiations with war vets? Please describe. Who initiated negotiations? Who participated? What kind of understanding/ agreement did the parties come to? Have parties lived up to the agreement? Were the negotiations successful?

22. What is the organizational structure of the war vets in your region? Who is in charge? Are there competing factions within the organization in your region? Are the war vets in control of the invaders?

23. Who is directing the invasions in your area? Who has been providing transport? Food? Water?

24. What has been the response of police in your region?

25. Do farmers in your region feel that CFU is adequately addressing the concerns of farmers in your region? Why/ why not? What would farmers like to see the CFU do?

26. What do you see as short term affects of this crisis on commercial farming in Zimbabwe?

27. What do you see as long term affects of this crisis on commercial farming in Zimbabwe?

Appendix E

Appendix E: Farmer Association Chair Questionnaire

Date:	
Region:	
Name of Farmer Association (FA):	
Total Number of FA Members:	
Total Number of Farms in FA:	
Total Number of FA members' farms invaded to date:	
Total Number of FA members' farms currently occupied:	

1. When did the occupations begin in your area (approximate if you do not know the exact date)? (ie 15 Feb)

_____

2. Which of the following best describes the **CURRENT** strategy of farmers in your area when responding to a new invasion for the first time? Please circle appropriate number.

    i.   The farmer negotiates with the war vets by him or herself.

    ii.   The FA security committee is alerted and goes to the farm to help the farmer negotiate.

    iii. A group of farmers are alerted and go to the farm to help the farmer negotiate.

    iv.   A group of farmers negotiate directly with war vets and the farmer is not directly involved.

    v.   The FA security committee negotiates directly with war vets and the farmer is not directly involved.

    vi.   A group of farmers confront the war vets and attempt to chase them away ("football teams").

    vii. A group of farmers AND workers confront the war vets and attempt to chase them away ("football teams").

    viii. Other (please describe)

3.   When war vets/ squatters first arrive are police notified?   Yes ☐

4. Do police usually come to the farm to help negotiations?

Yes ☐   No ☐

5. For how long has your area been responding to invasions in this way?

_____ weeks

6. Has this strategy been effective?

Yes ☐ No ☐

7. Why or why not?

8. Has this been the only response to new invasions in your area since the start of invasions?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, please go to question # 10. If no, please go to question # 9

9. If farmers in your area responded to a new invasion for the first time *differently* than the method indicated above at some point in the past three months, please indicate which of the following strategies were used and for how many weeks.

Strategy	Place X if ever used in your area	No. of weeks	Did police come? Yes or No	Was this strategy successful? Yes or No	Why or why not?
The farmer negotiates with the war vets by him or herself.					
The FA security committee is alerted and goes to the farm to help the farmer negotiate.					
A group of farmers are alerted and go to the farm to help the farmer negotiate.					
A group of farmers negotiate directly with war vets and the farmer is not directly involved.					
The FA security committee negotiates directly with war vets and the farmer is not directly involved.					
A group of farmers confront the war vets and attempt to chase them away ("football teams").					
A group of farmers AND workers confront the war vets and attempt to chase them away ("football					

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teams*).			
Other (please describe)			
Other			

In this section, I am attempting to document the different types of activities that squatters have used while occupying farms.

	Please circle the response that best describes the number of occupied/invaded farms in your FA that have been affected by the following activity:					Code (leave blank)
10.	pegging in fallow fields	Most	Many	Some	Few	None	
11.	pegging in fields under cultivation	Most	Many	Some	Few	None	
12.	pegging in fields under preparation for coming season	Most	Many	Some	Few	None	
13.	pegging other (describe)	Most	Many	Some	Few	None	
14.	selling plots	Most	Many	Some	Few	None	
15.	construction of temporary shelters	Most	Many	Some	Few	None	
16.	construction of permanent shelters	Most	Many	Some	Few	None	
17.	theft of farm property (non-livestock)	Most	Many	Some	Few	None	
18.	stock theft	Most	Many	Some	Few	None	
19.	cutting trees	Most	Many	Some	Few	None	
20.	poaching game	Most	Many	Some	Few	None	
21.	crop damage	Most	Many	Some	Few	None	

		Most	Many	Some	Few	None	Code (leave blank)
22.	destruction of *farm property (not housing or crops)*	Most	Many	Some	Few	None	
23.	presence of guns	Most	Many	Some	Few	None	
24.	presence of other weapons	Most	Many	Some	Few	None	
25.	coerced/ forced use of farm transport by invaders	Most	Many	Some	Few	None	
26.	work stoppages	Most	Many	Some	Few	None	

Please circle the response that best describes the number of occupied/ invaded farms in your FA that have been affected by the following activity: — Code (leave blank)

		Most / None	Many	Some	Few		Code
27.	crop thefts	Most / None	Many	Some	Few		
28.	demands for food	Most / None	Many	Some	Few		
29.	demands for water	Most / None	Many	Some	Few		
30.	moving into farm worker compound for accommodation	Most / None	Many	Some	Few		
31.	destruction of farm worker personal property	Most / None	Many	Some	Few		
32.	destruction of farm worker housing	Most / None	Many	Some	Few		
33.	workers beaten	Most / None	Many	Some	Few		
34.	workers threatened	Most / None	Many	Some	Few		
35.	sexual assault of female labor or laborers' female family members	Most	Many	Some	Few		

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	Response					Code (leave blank)
36.	death of farm workers	Most	Many	Some	Few	None
37.	abduction of workers who later returned	Most	Many	Some	Few	None
38.	abduction of workers who did not return & it is not known if alive/ dead	Most	Many	Some	Few	None
39.	evacuation/ desertion of farm workers	Most	Many	Some	Few	None
40.	female farm workers or female family members leaving farms	Most	Many	Some	Few	None
41.	farm worker children leaving farm	Most	Many	Some	Few	None
42.	demands to see workers' political membership	Most	Many	Some	Few	None
43.	forced/ coerced participation of workers in ZANU-PF rallies	Most	Many	Some	Few	None
44.	voluntary participation of workers in non-ZANU-PF rallies	Most	Many	Some	Few	None

Please circle the response that best describes the number of occupied/ invaded farms in your FA that have been affected by the following activity:

45.	forced/ coerced participation of workers in non-ZANU-PF political rallies	Most	Many	Some	Few	None
46.	voluntary participation of workers in non-ZANU-PF rallies	Most	Many	Some	Few	None

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		Most None	Many	Some	Few		
47.	forced/ coerced participation of workers in pegging	Most None	Many	Some	Few		
48.	voluntary participation of workers in pegging	Most None	Many	Some	Few		
49.	forced/ coerced participation of workers in invasions	Most None	Many	Some	Few		
50.	voluntary participation of workers in invasions	Most None	Many	Some	Few		
51.	forced/ coerced participation of workers in verbal intimidation of other workers	Most None	Many	Some	Few		
52.	voluntary participation of workers in verbal intimidation of other workers	Most None	Many	Some	Few		
53.	forced/ coerced participation of workers in physical intimidation of other workers	Most None	Many	Some	Few		
54.	voluntary participation of workers in physical intimidation of other workers	Most None	Many	Some	Few		
55.	moving into farmers' house for accommodation	Most None	Many	Some	Few		
56.	destruction of farmers' house	Most None	Many	Some	Few		
57.	destruction of farmers' personal belongings	Most None	Many	Some	Few		
58.	farmer beaten	Most None	Many	Some	Few		
59.	farmers threatened	Most None	Many	Some	Few		

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		Most None	Many	Some	Few	Code (leave blank)
60.	sexual assault of farmers' female family members	Most	Many	Some	Few	

Please circle the response that best describes the number of occupied/ invaded farms in your FA that have been affected by the following activity:

		Most None	Many	Some	Few	Code (leave blank)
61.	death of farmer or family	Most None	Many	Some	Few	
62.	abduction of farmer or family members who later returned	Most None	Many	Some	Few	
63.	abduction of farmer or family members who did not return & it is not known if alive/ dead	Most None	Many	Some	Few	
64.	evacuation of farmers	Most None	Many	Some	Few	
65.	evacuation of farmers' female adult relatives	Most None	Many	Some	Few	
66.	evacuation of farmers' children	Most None	Many	Some	Few	
67.	other (please describe)	Most None	Many	Some	Few	
68.	other (please describe)	Most None	Many	Some	Few	
69.	other (please describe)	Most None	Many	Some	Few	

70. Have *mhondoros* or spirit mediums encouraged occupations/ invasions in your area?   Yes ☐ No ☐

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71. If yes, please describe.

72. **Have chiefs encouraged occupations/ invasions in your area?**   Yes ☐ No ☐

73. If yes, please describe.

74. **Have chiefs discouraged occupations/ invasions in your area?**   Yes ☐ No ☐

75. If yes, please describe.

76. **Who participated in squatting/ invasions in your area: (tick all that apply):**
    Communal area residents   ☐
    Resettlement area residents   ☐
    Township residents   ☐
    farm workers   ☐

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former farm workers ☐

other (please describe) ☐

Do not know ☐

    Squatters were predominately _____

77. Do you know of farmers belonging to your association who have permanently left their farms?

Yes ☐ No ☐

78. If yes, approximately how many farmer families?

_____

79. Do you know of farmers belonging to your association who are considering permanently leaving their farms?

Yes ☐ No ☐

80. If yes, approximately how many farmer families?

_____

81. In general, are farmers belonging to your association satisfied with the response of CFU to the farm invasions/ occupations?

Yes ☐   No ☐

82. Why or why not?

83. What would farmers in your association like to see CFU doing to respond to the farm invasions/ occupations?

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84.   Additional comments:

THANK YOU!

Appendix F

Appendix F: Farmer Questionnaire

BACKGROUND

Marital Status: ❑ Married ❑ Unmarried

	Male/ Husband	Female/ Wife
Age		
Were you born in Zimbabwe?	❑ Yes ❑ No	❑ Yes ❑ No
What is your nationality?	_____	_____
Do you have claim to non-Zimbabwean citizenship? ❑ Yes ❑ No		❑ Yes ❑ No

Number of Children

	Age	Sex
Child 1		
Child 2		
Child 3		
Child 4		
Child 5		

Farm Name:

District:

Region:

Farmer Association:

Size (HA):

Please list all crops under cultivation on a typical year:

Number of Permanent Workers: Male Female

Number of Seasonal Workers: Male Female

RELATIONSHIPS WITH NEIGHBORING SMALL SCALE FARMERS

The CFU has actively promoted an informal "across the fence" assistance program for small-scale black farmers through its members. In this section, I am attempting to quantify this policy of good neighborliness. Please circle the response that best describes your situation.

20. What is the approximate distance from your farm to the nearest communal area?
    1   Share border
    2   5 km or less, does not share border
    3   6 km - 10 km
    4   11 km - 15 km
    5   16 km +

21. What is the approximate distance from your farm to the nearest resettlement area?
    1   Share border
    2   5 km or less, does not share border
    3   6 km - 10 km
    4   11 km - 15 km
    5   16 km +

22. What is the approximate distance from your farm to the nearest small-scale commercial farm area?
    1   Share border
    2   5 km or less, does not share border
    3   6 km - 10 km
    4   11 km - 15 km
    5   16 km +

23. How would you characterize your relationship with nearby black farmers?
    1   Very Good
    2   Good
    3   Fair
    4   Poor
    5   Very Poor
    6   Not applicable

24. How often do you talk with black farmers about farming methods?
    1   Daily
    2   Weekly
    3   Monthly
    4   Seasonally
    5   Yearly
    6   Never

Have you provided the following assistance to black farmers:

	Type of assistance	Frequency		
6.	seed for no cost	Sometimes	Frequently	Never
7.	seed for subsidized cost	Sometimes	Frequently	Never
8.	fertilizer for no cost	Sometimes	Frequently	Never
9.	subcontracting	Sometimes	Frequently	Never
10.	loans	Sometimes	Frequently	Never
11.	marketing	Sometimes	Frequently	Never
12.	farming advice	Sometimes	Frequently	Never
13.	transport	Sometimes	Frequently	Never
14.	plowing	Sometimes	Frequently	Never
15.	other (please describe)	Sometimes	Frequently	Never
16.	other (please describe)	Sometimes	Frequently	Never

WORKERS

In this section, I would like to assess the impact of threats to commercial farming on the livelihoods of farm workers.

9. How would you characterize your relationship with your workers?
    1   Very Good
    2   Good
    3   Fair
    4   Poor
    5   Very Poor

10. Do your workers have access to land for gardens on the farm?   ❑ Yes
                                                                     ❑ No

11. Do your workers have access to land for their own field crops (ie maize) on the farm?
          ❑ Yes   ❑ No

12. Is there a farm health worker on your farm?   ❑ Yes   ❑ No

13. Is she/he trained?   ❑ Yes   ❑ No

14. What is the distance to the nearest primary school for farm workers' children from your farm?
    1   On farm
    2   less than 1 km
    3   1 km - 5 km
    4   6 km - 10 km
    5   11 km - 15 km
    6   16 km +

15. What is the distance to the nearest secondary school for farm workers' children from your farm?
    1   On farm
    2   less than 1 km
    3   1 km - 5 km
    4   6 km - 10 km
    5   11 km - 15 km
    6   16 km +

16. What is the distance to the nearest clinic/ hospital for farm workers from your farm?
    1   On farm
    2   less than 1 km
    3   1 km - 5 km
    4   6 km - 10 km
    5   11 km - 15 km
    6   16 km +

17. Do you have a workers committee on your farm?   ❑ Yes ❑ No

18. If yes, how often do you meet with the committee or its' members?
    1   Daily
    2   Weekly
    3   Twice a month
    1.   Monthly
    2.   As needed

Do you help your workers with the following...

	Type of help	Frequency		
27.	Money for school fees	Sometimes	Regularly	Never
28.	Money for funerals	Sometimes	Regularly	Never
29.	Money for clinic/ hospital	Sometimes	Regularly	Never
30.	Subsidized mealie-meal	Sometimes	Regularly	Never
31.	Subsidized basic food	Sometimes	Regularly	Never
32.	Seed	Sometimes	Regularly	Never

33.	Chemicals	Sometimes	Regularly	Never
34.	Fertilizer	Sometimes	Regularly	Never
35.	Plowing	Sometimes	Regularly	Never
36.	Transport	Sometimes	Regularly	Never
37.	Other (please describe)	Sometimes	Regularly	Never
38.	Other (please describe)	Sometimes	Regularly	Never

10. Indicate the number of structures in your compound that are:
_____ Brick/ cement houses
_____ Pole/ dagga houses
_____ blair toilets

11. What is the water source for your workers? Circle.
1 Dam
2 River
3 Tap
4 borehole
9 other (describe)

12. Did you provide transport (or money for transport) for your workers to visit polls during referendum at their request? ❏
Yes ❏ No

13. At the request of your workers, did you allow workers time off to visit polls during referendum? ❏
Yes ❏ No

14. At the request of your workers, did you provide information about the draft constitution? ❏ Yes
❏ No

15. At the request of your workers, have you provided information about the 2000 elections? ❏
Yes ❏ No

16. Do you think your workers feel free to participate in Zimbabwean politics?
❏ Yes
❏ No

LAND

17. When did you acquire this farm?

18. How did you acquire this farm? Circle
1 Bought
2 inherited
3 leased

19. How many farms do you currently own? _____

20. Was your farm gazetted in 1997 for acquisition by government?   ❏ Yes
                                                                     ❏ No

21. If yes, was it later delisted?   ❏ Yes
                                                                     ❏ No

22. If no, did the government acquire it within a year of listing? ❏ Yes   ❏ No

23. Have you ever been approached by anyone about making some portion of your farm available for resettlement?

    ❏ Yes   ❏ No

24. If yes, please describe. (Who, when)

    How did you respond?

25. Do you support land reform?   ❏ Yes
                                                                     ❏ No

26. If you answered yes to question 54, what are the critical elements to a successful land reform program?

27. If you answered no to question 54, please explain.

FARM OCCUPATIONS

28. Has your farm been occupied/ squatted on ... (Y/N)
    this year   ❏ Yes   ❏ No
    in past 5 years   ❏ Yes   ❏ No
    in past 10 years   ❏ Yes   ❏ No
    since independence   ❏ Yes   ❏ No
    before independence   ❏ Yes   ❏ No

29. When did occupation begin? (ie 12 Feb)   _____

30. Has the occupation been
    1   Continuous presence
    2   Intermittent presence

31. Total number of squatters/ invaders best estimate _____

32. Have occupations involved:

	Activity	Extent		
61.	damage to crops	None	Minor	Severe
62.	damage to farm equipment/ property	None	Minor	Severe
63.	disruption of farm activities	None	Minor	Severe
64.	violence against workers	None	Minor	Severe
65.	violence against farmer/ family	None	Minor	Severe
66.	threats against workers	None	Minor	Severe
67.	threats against farmer/ family	None	Minor	Severe
68.	political campaigning	None	Minor	Severe
69.	Other please describe	None	Minor	Severe

85. Did the police intervene?   ❑ Yes
                                                 ❑ No

86. Did the army intervene?   ❑ Yes
                                                 ❑ No

87. Were there negotiations between farmer and squatters/ occupiers? ❑ Yes ❑ No

88. If so, who initiated the negotiations?
    1   Farm owner
    2   Farmer Association Chair
    3   Local police
    4   Representative of squatters/ occupiers
    5   Traditional Leader
    9   other (describe)

89. What happened with negotiations?

90. Did the invasions affect your productivity?   ❑ Yes

91. Best estimate, squatters included (%)
_____ men
_____ women
_____ children

92. Who participated in squatting: (tick all that apply):
❏ Communal area residents
❏ Resettlement area
❏ Township residents
❏ farm workers
❏ former farm workers
❏ other
❏ Do not know
Squatters were predominately _____

93. What was the age composition of the group?
❏ Mostly 35 years or under
❏ Mostly over 35 years

94. Did you or your family move off the farm for safety at any point during this
occupation?   ❏ Yes
❏ No

95. Who and for how long?

96. Did you advise your workers to leave the farm for safety at any point during
this occupation?
❏ Yes ❏ No

IMPACT OF CRISES ON FARMING
97. Since the fuel crisis began, have you had difficulties acquiring the fuel you
need for normal operations?
❏ Yes ❏ No

98. Please describe.

99. For the season ending in 2000, did you take out a seasonal loan?   ❏ Yes
❏ No

100. If yes, what was the interest rate?

101. Do you anticipate being able to pay it after this selling season? ❑ Yes
❑ No

102. If no, will you be able to roll the loan over? ❑ Yes
❑ No

103. Have you applied for loans for the coming season? ❑ Yes
❑ No

104. If yes, what has been the outcome of that application?
1   Denied
2   Accepted
3   No reply yet
9   Other (describe)

105. If unknown, when do you expect to hear?

———
—

Have the crises of this year (fuel, exchange rate, invasions) compromised your ability to:

	Difficulty	Extent			
91.	pay your workers	Not Applicable	None	Minor	Severe
92.	pay your monthly bills (non-wages)	Not Applicable	None	Minor	Severe
93.	pay your loans	Not Applicable	None	Minor	Severe
94.	pay your credit due on inputs (fertilizer, chemicals, seeds...)	Not Applicable	None	Minor	Severe
95.	prepare land for winter crop	Not Applicable	None	Minor	Severe
96.	prepare land for next season	Not Applicable	None	Minor	Severe
97.	secure finance for next season	Not Applicable	None	Minor	Severe
98.	secure markets	Not Applicable	None	Minor	Severe
99.	Other describe	Not Applicable	None	Minor	Severe

100. Are you satisfied with CFU's response to the invasions?   ❑ Yes ❑ No

101. Why/ why not?

FUTURE

102.   Have you felt free to participate in Zimbabwean politics?   ❑ Yes ❑ No

103.   Why/ why not?

104.   Prior to this year, have you ever considered leaving Zimbabwe? ❑ Yes ❑ No

105.   Why/ why not?

106.   Have you considered leaving Zimbabwe this year?   ❑ Yes
                                                              ❑ No

107.   Why/ why not?

108.   How do you think this situation could be resolved?

109.   Additional comments:

THANK YOU!

Please provide the following information for the person who completed this form:

Age _____

Sex _____

If you would like to receive information on the progress of my research, please write your contact details below:

Name:

Address:

Email:

Appendix G

Appendix:
Daily Invasion Report Coding
AS OF JUNE 17 2001

Note –
Categories/ variables for which I am coding are called 'nodes' by NVIVO. The first set called 'tree nodes' refer to nodes that are hierarchically organized (hence trees). For example, I am coding by region (1) which is then broken down by communities. The second set are called 'free nodes' which means they stand on their own. For example, "confrontations" and "abductions" are a couple I have created. At a later date, I can create tree nodes out of free nodes if I choose. I include descriptions of all free nodes and tree nodes that need description. Regions and local war vet names don't have descriptions as they are self-explanatory. I have 115 tree nodes and 45 free nodes.

I developed these codes using 10 sample CFU farm invasion reports from various points in the crisis. I went through and coded these 10 documents, continuously revising the coding categories to the ones included here. I'm sure that I will continue to refine the coding as I continue. The codes are pretty general and can be further recoded later. For example, if I call up all data for confrontation, I can recode into new categories for confrontations with police and confrontations with farmers, if I choose.

NODE LISTING

Nodes in Set: All Tree Nodes
Created: 11/22/00 - 4: 15: 19 PM
Modified: 6/17/01 - 3: 11: 54 PM
Number of Nodes: 115

1(1) /Region
Description: Code by farm region then farm association

2(1 1) /Region/Midlands
3(1 1 1) /Region/Midlands/Shurgwi
4(1 1 2) /Region/Midlands/Gweru
5(1 1 3) /Region/Midlands/Somhabula
6(1 1 4) /Region/Midlands/Gweru East~ Lalapanzi
7(1 1 5) /Region/Midlands/Mvuma
8(1 1 9) /Region/Midlands/Kwekwe
9(1 2) /Region/Matebeleland
10(1 2 1) /Region/Matebeleland/Nyamandhlovu
11(1 2 2) /Region/Matebeleland/Mzingwane
12(1 2 3) /Region/Matebeleland/Inyathi
13(1 2 4) /Region/Matebeleland/Gwaai

14(1 2 5) /Region/Matebeleland/Gwanda
15(1 3) /Region/Masvingo
16(1 3 1) /Region/Masvingo/Chiredzi
17(1 3 2) /Region/Masvingo/Gutu
18(1 3 3) /Region/Masvingo/Chatsworth
19(1 3 4) /Region/Masvingo/SAVE Conservancy
20(1 3 5) /Region/Masvingo/Masvingo East~Central
21(1 3 6) /Region/Masvingo/Masvingo West
22(1 3 9) /Region/Masvingo/Mwenzi
23(1 4) /Region/Mash West SO
24(1 4 1) /Region/Mash West SO/Selous
25(1 4 2) /Region/Mash West SO/Suri Suri
26(1 4 3) /Region/Mash West SO/Chakari
27(1 4 4) /Region/Mash West SO/Chegutu
28(1 4 5) /Region/Mash West SO/Kadoma
29(1 4 6) /Region/Mash West SO/Gadzima
30(1 4 9) /Region/Mash West SO/Norton
31(1 5) /Region/Mash West NO
32(1 5 1) /Region/Mash West NO/Chinhoyi
33(1 5 2) /Region/Mash West NO/Karoi
34(1 5 3) /Region/Mash West NO/Doma
35(1 5 4) /Region/Mash West NO/Banket
36(1 5 5) /Region/Mash West NO/Raffingora
37(1 5 6) /Region/Mash West NO/Mutorashanga
38(1 5 7) /Region/Mash West NO/Tengwe
39(1 5 8) /Region/Mash West NO/Umboe
40(1 6) /Region/Manicaland
41(1 6 1) /Region/Manicaland/Headlands
42(1 6 2) /Region/Manicaland/Nyanga~ Troutbeck
43(1 6 3) /Region/Manicaland/Chipinge
44(1 6 4) /Region/Manicaland/Odzi
45(1 6 5) /Region/Manicaland/Rusape
46(1 7) /Region/Mash Central
47(1 7 1) /Region/Mash Central/Mvurwi
48(1 7 2) /Region/Mash Central/Horseshoe
49(1 7 3) /Region/Mash Central/Shamva
50(1 7 4) /Region/Mash Central/Centenary
51(1 7 5) /Region/Mash Central/Bindura
52(1 7 6) /Region/Mash Central/Glendale
53(1 7 7) /Region/Mash Central/Mutepatepa
54(1 7 8) /Region/Mash Central/Mazowe~Concession
55(1 7 9) /Region/Mash Central/Harare West
56(1 7 10) /Region/Mash Central/Tsatsi
57(1 7 11) /Region/Mash Central/Victory Block
58(1 8) /Region/Mash East

59(1 8 1) /Region/Mash East/Harare South-Beatrice
60(1 8 2) /Region/Mash East/Bromley
61(1 8 3) /Region/Mash East/Ruwa
62(1 8 4) /Region/Mash East/Enterprise
63(1 8 5) /Region/Mash East/Marondera So~
64(1 8 6) /Region/Mash East/Wedza
65(1 8 7) /Region/Mash East/Virginia~Macheke
66(1 8 8) /Region/Mash East/Marondera
67(1 8 9) /Region/Mash East/Marondera North
68(1 8 10) /Region/Mash East/Marondera West
69(1 8 11) /Region/Mash East/Featherstone

70(2) /Demands
Description: demands made by invaders on farmers

71(2 1) /Demands/Land
Description: Demand for land by invaders including land for temp/perm settlement and signing over of farm or portion of farm

72(2 2) /Demands/Provisions
Description: Demand by invaders for provisions including (not limited to) food, water, clothing, housing; excluding money and transport

73(2 3) /Demands/Money
Description: Demands by invaders for money

74(2 4) /Demands/Transport
Description: demands by invaders for transportation

75(2 5) /Demands/Equipment Use
Description: demands vy invaders for equipment use

76(2 6) /Demands/Remove Cattle
Description: demands by invaders that farmer removes his cattle

77(2 7) /Demands/Farmer Leave
Description: demand by invaders that farmer leaves farm

78(2 8) /Demands/Meeting
Description: invaders demand meeting with farmers

79(2 9) /Demands/CFW leave
Description: invaders demand farm workers must leave farm

80(3) /Local WV Leaders

Description: specific names of war vet/ invasion leaders given

81(3 1) /Local WV Leaders/Hove
82(3 2) /Local WV Leaders/Marimo
83(3 3) /Local WV Leaders/Majuru
84(3 4) /Local WV Leaders/Chigwadere
85(3 5) /Local WV Leaders/Lovejoy
86(3 6) /Local WV Leaders/Mrs~ Rusike
87(3 7) /Local WV Leaders/Rex Jesus
88(3 8) /Local WV Leaders/Chinotimba
89(3 9) /Local WV Leaders/Mr Mawere~
90(3 10) /Local WV Leaders/Captain Zimuto
91(3 11) /Local WV Leaders/Prince
92(3 12) /Local WV Leaders/Gunpowder
93(3 13) /Local WV Leaders/Dos Carlos
94(3 14) /Local WV Leaders/Garwe
95(3 15) /Local WV Leaders/Chirinda

96(4) /Violence-CF
Description: Violence against farmer or farmer's family

97(4 1) /Violence-CF/Assaults CF
Description: assault of farmer or family

98(4 2) /Violence-CF/Deaths CF
Description: death of farmer or farmer family

99(4 3) /Violence-CF/Rape CF
Description: rape of farmer or farmer family

100(5) /Violence-CFW
Description: Violence against farm worker or his/her family

101(5 1) /Violence-CFW/Assaults CFW
Description: assaults against farm workers

102(5 2) /Violence-CFW/Deaths CFW
Description: death of farm worker

103(5 3) /Violence-CFW/Rape CFW
Description: rape or sexual abuse of farm worker

104(6) /Activity
Description: Activities of invaders related to settlement

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105(6 1) /Activity/Cattle
Description: invaders bring in their cattle

106(6 2) /Activity/Selling Plots
Description: invaders or others engaged in selling plots

107(6 3) /Activity/Building
Description: all building by invaders: cattle pens, housing, etc

108(6 4) /Activity/Pegging
Description: descriptions of invaders pegging lands

109(6 5) /Activity/Ploughing
Description: invaders engaged in ploughing

110(6 6) /Activity/Poaching
Description: livestock and wildlife

111(6 7) /Activity/Gardens
Description: invaders planting gardens

112(7) /Invasion
Description: reports of invasions

113(7 1) /Invasion/New
Description: codes all 'new' invasions

114(7 2) /Invasion/Re-
Description: codes all 're-invasions' or 're-visits'

115(7 3) /Invasion/Move
Description: movement of invaders on/off

Project: Dissertation
User: Default
Date: 6/17/01 - 3:20:11 PM
NODE LISTING

Nodes in Set: All Free Nodes
Created: 11/22/00 - 4:15:19 PM
Modified: 6/17/01 - 3:10:26 PM
Number of Nodes: 45

1Abductions
Description: all person/ cases of abductions; location unknown (ie kidnapping)

2Assaults
Description: physical assaults on any persons excluding CF or CFW

3Attitude of Invaders
Description: Invaders described as hostile or calm

4Break In
Description: break in of any home

5Building
Description: all building by invaders: cattle pens, housing, etc

6CF Mood
Description: any mention of feelings or mood of farmers

7CFU Leaders
Description: Mention of activities of CFU leaders: Grant, Hasluck, Henwood, Cloete, Amyot, Hughes

8CFW Involvement
Description: farm worker involvement in invasion activity, whether voluntary or coerced

9Children
Description: any mention of children; farmer, farm worker, or invaders

10Confront
Description: description of confrontation between invaders & others

11Deaths
Description: death of any person mentioned in reports

12Disappear
Description: disapperances; all persons considered missing; not known to be abducted

13Disrupt
Description: disruptions with normal farming activity; excluding spefic mention of work stoppages

14Election
Description: references to voting, voter registration, anything election related excluding rallies and campaigning

15End
Description: mention of belief that end of invasions is near

16Evacuations
Description: Farm or Community evacuations of farmers & their families

17Forced Participation
Description: any mention of forced/ coerced participation in rallies or invasion activities

18Forced Sloganeering
Description: forced chanting, singing, shouting slogans

19Government
Description: non-police; includes actions or persons in government

20Hostage
Description: persons prevented from leaving a known location; not abduction

21Hunzvi
Description: report mentions specifically

22Intimidation
Description: specific mention of "intimidation"

23Land Prep
Description: land prep activities engaged in by invaders

24Legal
Description: legal actions by/against CFU or farmers

25MDC
Description: specific mention of MDC

26Negotiations
Description: any time negotiations ensued, includes police, neg. team, and local units

27Noisy at night
Description: noise disruptions at nighttime that keep people awake

28Non-unity
Description: events suggesting conflict among local invaders, or between local invaders & national war vets

29Numbers
Description: when given, numbers of invaders

30Off Farm
Description: Farmers or farmer's family move off farm temporarily.

31Opportunistic Crime
Description: crimes that arise due to general lawlessness, suspected to not be directly related to invasions

32Ownership
Description: invaders claiming ownership of farm or other property

33Police
Description: any police involvement or note of lack thereof

34Property Damage
Description: any damage to farm property including farmer & farm worker property; excluding crop damage

35quiet
Description: description of area as peaceful or quiet

36Rally
Description: Political rally for any party

37roadblock
Description: illegal roadblock established in connection with invasions

38searches
Description: illegal searches of person or property

39Summary
Description: Summary of invasions to date

40Theft
Description: any theft occurring on farm including, crops, livestock, property

41Threats-CF
Description: specifically mentions "threats" aimed at farmer or farmer's family

42Threats-CFW
Description: specifically mentions "threats" aimed at farm workers or their families

43Weapons
Description: non-gun weapons mentioned

44 Women
Description: specifically mentions women in report

45 Work Stoppage
Description: any disruptions to work on farms

Additionally, every time a farm name was mentioned, it was coded separately so that activity on specific farms could be tracked. This alone produced additionally hundreds of codes which will not be provided for anonymity's sake.