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CARROT SOUP FOR THE MIND:
CARROT GROWERS AND ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY

presented by
WIN KURLFINK

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CARROT SOUP FOR THE MIND:
CARROT GROWERS AND ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY

By

Win Kurlfink

A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology

2004

ABSTRACT

CARROT SOUP FOR THE MIND:
CARROT GROWERS AND ECOLOGICAL RATIONALITY

By
Win Kurlfink

Over the past decade, a number of factors have negatively impacted the Michigan
carrot industry and carrot growers have responded to the problems in various ways. I
examine growers’ use of various rationalities in making decisions about adaptive
strategies. I investigate the extent to which ecological rationality exists among Michigan
carrot growers and influences their strategic decision-making. I first elucidate the most
relevant analytical lenses of rationality presented in the literature, and focus finally on
several types of ecological rationality. Using material from interviews, I demonstrate that
Michigan carrot growers’ reliance on a practical ecological rationality provides a ground

for their farming practices as well as for their overall attitudes about the farming life.

To Craig Harris with Immeasurable Gratitude

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The work on which this thesis is based was undertaken with support from the
Michigan Agricultural Experiment Station, and from the USDA CSREES through a
RAMP grant entitled “Partnership Among Eastern US. Carrot Stakeholders to Develop
and Implement 1PM”. This article is a revised version of the presentation with a similar
title at the joint annual meetings of the Agriculture, Food and Human Values Society and
the Association for the Study of Food and Society at Chicago in 2002, and published in
the Human Ecology Review, 2003 (Vol. 10, No. 1). I would like to thank M. Suzanne
Sontag for encouragement in the investigation of this topic, and to thank Toby Ten Eyck,
Lawrence Busch, and Michelle Worosz for comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of
this paper. I would also like to thank Mary Hausbeck, Bernard Zandstra, George Bird,
Norm Myers, Jim Breinling, and John Bakker for advice and insight into Michigan carrot
production. Finally, Craig Harris provided extensive guidance and support throughout the
development of this paper. I alone, however, am responsible for the contents of this

thesis.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................. ix
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF RATIONALITY ........................................... 2
Weber’s Rationality Types ................................................................ 3
Diesing’s Decision Rationalities .......................................................... 6
Ecological Rationality ...................................................................... 9
Communicative Rationality .............................................................. 10
Practical Ecological Rationality ......................................................... 12
Ecological Rationality — A new Synthesis ............................................. l4
METHODS .......................................................................................... 19
DISCUSSION: RESULTS/FINDINGS ......................................................... 2O
Generative ecological rationality ........................................................ 22
Procedural Ecological Rationality ....................................................... 25
Outcome Ecological Rationality ......................................................... 29
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................... 31
REFERENCES ...................................................................................... 33

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure l. Weber’s rationality types as directly related to action .............................. 4
Figure 2. Sociological theories of rationality .................................................... 14
Figure 3. Types of ecological rationality ......................................................... 21

vi

INTRODUCTION

Over the past decade, a number of factors have negatively impacted the Michigan
carrot industry -- ( l) decline in the demand for carrots for the feeding and baiting of wild
deer due to changes in policies to reduce the prevalence of bovine tuberculosis among
wildlife in Michigan’s northern Lower Peninsula; (2) new restrictions on chemical
pesticides perceived by growers to be essential to profitable production; and (3) powerful
marketing strategies of the Canadian and California carrot industries. The Michigan
carrot industry has not been passive in the face of these adversities; carrot growers have
attempted to react to the problems in various ways. This situation allows one to ask what
decision-making strategies growers use in deciding how to adapt and respond to these
changing circumstances. In exploring this question I will examine growers’ use of
various rationalities in making decisions about adaptive strategies. I will particularly
explore the extent to which, among the several rationalities, a specifically ecological
rationality can be identified and delineated.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the extent to which ecological rationality
exists among Michigan carrot growers and influences their strategic decision-making. In
the face of formidable hardship, growers persevere with a sense of stewardship for the
sustained health of their farm as well as a matter of family and local history. While
certain chemical pesticides are considered to be necessary within Michigan’s “pest-
friendly” climate, growers would universally opt for economically feasible reduced-risk
alternatives (Worosz et a1 2001). Growers routinely seek information about, and adopt,
practices whose environmental benefits and efficacy have been demonstrated by

University agriculture research specialists. Growers sustain the health of their soils by

careful nutrient analyses, in cooperation with the MSU Extension Service and Michigan
Agriculture Experiment Station researchers.

Most notably, many growers voiced strong sensitivity regarding public
perceptions of chemical fertilizer and pesticide use by farmers. Often, these growers
articulated resentment regarding the “environmentalist” portrayal of farm life, suggesting
instead that the farmer has a strong desire to maintain ecological as well as economic
sustainability since the farm is often expected to be passed on to the family’s succeeding
generations.

I first elucidate the several analytical lenses of rationality presented in the
literature, and focus finally on several versions of ecological rationality that have been
discussed. Using material from interviews, I demonstrate that Michigan carrot growers’
reliance on a practical ecological rationality provides a ground for their farming practices
as well as for their overall attitudes about the farming life. Data was collected through in-
depth semi-structured interviews of Michigan carrot growers, and ethnographic content

analysis was conducted.

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF RATIONALITY
As social actors operate from culturally informed views (structural conditions)
about what the world is and how the world should be, and at the same time assert their
individual positions (agency) about what the world is and how the world should be, the
concepts of reason, rationality, and ideology are bound up within their actions. Reason is
a fallacious escape from ideology because it is ideologically defined. Reason has been the

ethos of western secularism since the Enlightenment and it arguably reaches back before

Aristotle. Ideology is commonly used as a rhetorical negative. As social beings we are
absolutely ideologically biased, for example by virtue of the language(s) we are born into
and adopt, or by virtue of our biophysical environment and the ways that we value
particular material items. The quality of our capacity for reason reveals itself in our
rationality, our style of rational expression. The criteria for rational action are determined
by ideological biases for rational/reasonable constructs. For example, ecologically
rational action should have ecologically beneficial outcomes; but what is perceived as
ecologically beneficial by one social actor may be perceived as ecologically detrimental
by another social actor (Geason and Harris Forthcoming). Finally, it is critical that we
recognize how and when a rationality, as a style of rational expression, produces
irrational outcomes. As I seek the expression of ecological rationality within the
Michigan carrot industry, and specifically among the carrot growers, I begin by looking
to the sociological theories of rationality to discuss where specific rationalities are useful
(produce intended consequences) and where they fail us (produce unintended

consequences).

Weber’s Rationality Types

Weber was one of the first sociologists to address rationality thematically
throughout his work. For Weber, rationality can be conceptualized in several ways. In the
general overarching concept, rationality is instrumental and “anchored in means-end
rational and value-rational action” (Kahlberg 1980, 1149). Weber delineated within this
instrumentalism four rationality types, each with its own character. Practical Rationality

characterizes the mode of action in ordinary life wherein action is informed primarily by

experiential practice. We do it this way because it’s always been done this way and
because it has worked. The accepted practice offers the most efficient means to the
intended end and the practice refers back to self-interest I do it this way because I have
found it to work best. I have something to gain or lose. I trust my own judgement. This is
differentiated from Formal Rationality, which is sometimes referred to as bureaucratic
rationality. Essentially, the same calculative means-end practice refers instead to the
given rules, standards, or regulations with the ideal of strict objectivity and universality.
The processes of industrialization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries provided
Weber with paradigmatic examples of formal rationality.

In contrast to the groundedness of practical rationality and the rigidness of formal
rationality, substantive rationality considers the ultimate aims of actions.

The concept of ‘substantive rationality’ ...is full of ambiguities, it conveys only

one element common to all 'substantive' analyses; namely, that they do not restrict

themselves to note the purely formal and (relatively) unambiguous fact that action
is based on ‘goal-oriented’ rational calculation with the technically most adequate
available methods, but apply certain criteria of ultimate ends, whether they be
ethical, political, utilitarian, hedonistic, feudal, egalitarian, or whatever, and
measure the results of the economic action, however formally ‘rational’ in the
sense of correct calculation they may be, against these scales of ‘value rationality’

and ‘substantive goal rationality’(Weber 1999, 214).

Substantive rationality, then, refers to the value stances of the actor. It will usually
be the case that these value stances are structurally conditioned, and that something
which is substantively rational can only be so in the appropriate cultural context. While
shamanistic medicine, for example, would appear irrational at the scale of a western
hospital as a whole, within the room of a particular patient, the practice of shamanism

might be fully rational. Action and decision are rationally informed by one’s relevant

“value postulate ...(which) implies entire clusters of values that vary in

comprehensiveness, internal consistency, and content” (Kahlberg 1980, 1155). Since the range of
possible value postulates is infinite, “radical perspectivism” (cultural relativism) is a key
component of substantive rationality (Kahlberg 1980, 1155). For Weber, then, rationality is both
an endowment of social organization (a function of structural conditions), and a phenomenon
driven by individual action (a function of human agency). The degree to which the individual act
is rational can only be determined in relation to its social context. Finally, given the complexity
of substantive rationality in particular, I illustrate these rationalities as distinct from each other,

but also consider the overlapping character of these rationalities as the diagram below suggests.

Figure l. Weber's rationality types as directly related to action

 

 

/ l \
/ Substantive Formal
Q Rationality Rationality
Practical /’
\ Rationality /
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Theoretical Rationality, or intellectual rationality, relates to abstract thought and

therefore only indirectly relates to action. This type emphasizes the cognitive processes

involved wherein patterns of meaning are interpreted from the world. The sociological

nature of this type of rationality may seem to be obscured. Again Kahlberg (1980, 1160):
Mental processes are of interest to Weber primarily in regard to the extent to
which they can be translated into patterns of social action. In some cases, such as
practical rationality, regularities of action follow so closely on the calculation in
relation to self-interests that the mental process itself is scarcely visible,
Theoretical rationality, on the other hand, illustrates the opposite extreme: here
cognitive processes often do not introduce patterns of action.

Further, for Weber, the rationality type may itself vary depending upon the cultural
context.

Constellations of historical and sociological factors determine, for Weber,
whether a particular type of rationality in fact found clear expression as mental
process alone or as regularities of action that became established as sociocultural
processes, whether at the level of groups, organizations, societies, or civilizations

as a whole (Kahlberg 1980, 1160).

For example, it may be that for a group of academics, the activity of discussing
theories is in fact a very practical activity.

Finally, a key component to rationality in general, as stated, regards the efficiency
of means-end action. While rationality remains an abstract concept, efficiency is, to some
degree, measurable. One may be unable to evaluate action as rational but instead one may
assess efficiency of action. Weber clearly resists this reductive and narrow definition of
rationality, so I turn to examine how Weber’s rationalities have been further developed.
This may lead one into the economic arena of the rational actor paradigm which holds
that humans are “rational beings motivated by self-interest and consciously evaluating
alternative courses of action. .. (at once) conceptualiz(ing) the social universe as an
aggregate of atomistic actors (and serving) as the basis of a social order that is

appropriate and good” (Jaeger et a1. 2000). Alternatively it may lead one into the social

arena which is analyzed by Diesing. It is to that approach that I now turn.

Diesing’s Decision Rationalities

Paul Diesing elaborated the discussion arguing that a narrow, economistic
rationality was being understood as rationality as a whole. To the contrary, he asserted
that social behavior could not be characterized as rational with a narrow economistic
view of rationality, suggesting instead that many activities are not reducible to technical
efficiency. In so doing, Diesing elaborates the ways in which several common substantive
orientations interrelate with instrumental rationalities.

A decision or action is rational when it takes account of the possibilities and

limitations of a given situation and reorganizes it so as to produce, or increase, or

preserve, some good. This definition includes two points: the decision must be an
effective response to the situation in that it produces some possible good, and the

effectiveness must be based on intelligent insight rather than luck (Diesing 1962,

3).

Diesing borrows from Mannheim (1940) to distinguish between different types of
individual and organizational rationalities. “Mannheim distinguishes between substantial
and functional rationality, the former applying to individual decisions and the latter to
organizations” (Diesing 1962, 3, emphasis added). Social actors must often navigate
decision processes alone (substantial) but functionally rational decisions take place
communicatively as groups face collective decision processes.

Diesing initially criticized economism as an inappropriate frame for the rationality
of social behavior. In so doing, he further extended Weber’s work on rationality by
outlining five distinct rationalities. Each of these distinct modes of rationality ground the

decision processes in the five respective realms: technical, economic, integrative (social),

judicial, and political.

Each rationality has its order. This order results from the ongoing interrelationship
between materiality and ideation — between ideas and the patterned behaviors which
implement those ideas. (1) Out of necessity and survival, one, one’s community, and/or
one’s society engages in production. Efficiency is the order of production, i.e., technical
rationality. (2) Out of necessity, these human systems, to a degree of effectiveness,
engage in value measurement. Economic order is that of measurement and comparison of
values, i.e., economic rationality; as Busch (2000) argues, valuation and standards are
what make exchange and/or markets possible. (3) Social order (integrative rationality) is
an order of interdependence or solidarity, but also control; and (4) judicial order (legal
rationality) is that of a fairly distributed availability of resources - a concept usually
associated with politics (e.g., Lasswell 1936). To some degree, individuals and groups
coexist (perhaps with degrees of conflict) and develop the judicial sense toward fairness.
As one among others in a community, one relies on others for survival and a social order
develops. The complexity of that order necessitates a judicial order, i.e., Legal
rationality. Finally, (5) out of necessity, these human systems creatively evaluate
alternative ways to approach decisions. Necessity begets the development of a rational
order of decision structure. Political order (Political rationality) is the order of discussion
and decision.

I should note that the language offered here, despite its deterministic flavor,
intends to emphasize the interplay between action (agency) and necessity (structural
processes). Specific strategies for decision and action can be grounded in appropriate

rationalities depending on the immediate as well as structural circumstances.

The question left open, then, regards environmental processes. I suggest that
Diesing’s model neglects the biophysical environment within which humans are
immersed, as many environmental sociologists have accused sociology in general (Catton
and Dunlap 1976; Dunlap and Martin 1983). Diesing’s argument specifically attempted
to lend credibility to decisions based on human relationships at a time when the
environmental movement was a glimmer on the horizon. So, as he pointed to a social
rationality in 1962 (the same year that Silent Spring was published), others have argued

for the rationality of environmental sensitivity. Bartlett was one of the first to do so.

Ecological Rationality

Bartlett added to Diesing’s framework the concept of ecological rationality.
“Ecological rationality may be thought of as a rationality of living systems, an order of
relationships among living systems and their environments... [ecological rationality]
draws extensively from the science of ecology” (Bartlett 1986, 229). It draws on
principles of holism and environmental dynamism. Time horizons tend to extend far
beyond those afforded economic rationality.

Bartlett, following Simon (1974), differentiates between procedural ecological
rationality and substantive ecological rationality. Substantive ecological rationality is
grounded in the Weberian concept (substantive rationality) but it refers more simply and
specifically to the capability to analyze situations in the interest of the ecosystem.
“Ecological rationality may be an attribute of behavior or actions, denoting the extent to
which such actions are ecologically appropriate within the limits imposed by given

conditions and constraints (substantive rationality)” (Bartlett 1984, 239). Procedural

ecological rationality refers to rational strategy for action and decision; this can refer
either to individuals as with Diesing’s substantive rationality or to organizations as with
Diesing’s functional rationality and ultimately Weber’s formal rationality. It refers to “the
effectiveness, in light of human cognitive powers and limitations, of the processes and
procedures used to make ecologically important choices (procedural rationality)”
(Bartlett 1984, 239).

Building nicely on Diesing, then, Bartlett also hints at the prescriptive; Bartlett
suggests that in certain situations ecological rationality will provide the most appropriate
guide to conduct. In addition, he acknowledges human cognitive limitations in dealing
with the complexity of the ecological phenomena to be brought into the equations for
rational discourse. This problem may be effectively approached from the perspective of
bounded rationality — born of the rational actor paradigm — as a psychological approach
to examining adaptive thinking to complex situations with limited information
(Gigerenzer 2002; Todd 2000). In fact the idea of bounded rationality and the resources
available within one’s “adaptive toolkit” serve to remind us of our reliance on historical
experience — on ideological penchants. Nevertheless, Bartlett offers a useful conceptual
analysis. He helps to open up a rational environmental discourse of Weberian lineage.
Habermas, however, requires us to investigate the character of those ideological
penchants as well as the character of environmental discourse in order to recognize the

degree of its rationality.

Communicative Rationality

10

In contrast to Bartlett and predecessors who saw the problem as cognitive
limitation, Habermas views human and social actors as ideologically limited. In
Habermas’ view the obstacles to rational action are not cognitive incapacity; rather, we
are challenged to resolve, or at least recognize, ideological differences. In the first
instance (Bartlett’s view), social actors are limited by the quantity and complexity of
manageable information regarding decisions in the interest of an ecosystem. In
Habermas’ view, social actors are limited in their ability to reconcile ideological
(structural) conditions with the interest of an ecosystem. Those ideological challenges are
equally present at the broadest level of advanced capitalism, as well as the micro level of
rural communities, friends, loved-ones, competing growers, input salespersons, buyers,
etc. In short, ideology interpenetrates all relational levels (scale) in the life-world of the
grower. Each of these groups of actors brings different understandings about what works
or does not work, what is right or wrong, what is important and reasonable, and each is
set against the background of a society which, as Habermas describes, places science and
technological growth in the driver’s seat. “The progressive ‘rationalization’ of society is
linked to the institutionalization of scientific and technical development” (Habermas
1970,81)

Habermas speaks, then, of a kind of perilous rationalization which encourages
ecologically irrational outcomes. Industrialization, for example, may continue to appear
economically rational, particularly given an ideological faith in the seemingly dependable
development of scientific and technological solutions for ecologically harmful

consequences, but is it rational to assume that such solutions will always be possible?

ll

Looking back to Weber’s substantive rationality, we oblige the local culture, as
one location of the value complexes of the actor, to provide the yardstick by which to
measure the rationality of the action; this measurement may coincide, or conflict, with the
macro-cultural context (e.g., shamanism in the western hospital).

Habermas, then, emphasizes the irrationality of the scientistic and technocratic
character of advanced capitalism. In so doing, he manages to tease out the rational
possibilities existing where actual people communicate and act together as members of
groups within or against the larger cultural setting. As he notes (1973):

(A)n evolutionary trend. . .is taking shape under the slick domination [by]

technology and science as ideology. Above all, it becomes clear against this

background that two concepts of rationalization must be distinguished. At the
level of subsystems of purposive-rational action, scientific-technical progress has
already compelled the reorganization of social institutions and sectors, and
necessitates it on an even larger scale than heretofore. But this process of the
development of the productive forces can be potential for liberation if and only if
it does not replace rationalization on another level. Rationalization at the level of
the institutional framework can occur only in the medium of symbolic interaction
itself, that is, through removing restrictions on communication (118, emphasis in
original).

Within the context of advanced capitalism wherein science and technology
characterize societal ideology, ecological rationality, indicative of Weber’s substantive
rationality, would be irrational - actions motivated by ecological sensitivities are
incommensurate with those motivated by potential economic benefits. However, broad
cultural norms do reflect the decisions and actions of actual individuals, typically policy
makers and power elites, but also (sometimes) the voices of active dissenters. The

institutional framework requires intelligible discourse among participating players. While

pessimism may rule the day for environmentalism, it can be possible, for Habermas, to

12

shift the macro-cultural conditions of technocratic advanced capitalism into conditions

wherein environmentally sensitive value complexes can hold sway.

Practical Ecological Rationality

As Bartlett builds on Diesing, Dryzek too calls for ecological rationality to be
given primacy among Diesing’s rationality types. In contrast to the abstract and value
laden notion of substantive rationality in Weber, ecological rationality for Dryzek is very
programmatic and procedural. Ecological rationality is implemented through lexical
(hierarchically ordered) procedures. Institutional decisions regarding environmental
matters require the strategy of ecological rationality in order to prevent “the tragedy of
the commons” (for example), and lexical priority lends tangibility to such a strategy.
“Lexical priority means that lower values come into play only when designs in pursuit of
higher value are totally complete” (1987, 59). Lexicality provides participants with a
common vocabulary which becomes important when considered relative to
communicative action — a key component in Dryzek’s well-developed tactics for
collective environmental problem solving. However, in focusing the development of
ecological rationality on strategic collective decision-making, Dryzek moved it out of the
realm of practical individual decision-making and into the realm of practical societal
decision making.

Perhaps the most relevant (and most satisfying) discussion regarding ecological
rationality is offered by Murphy (1994, 2002). Rather than appealing to Diesing,
Murphy’s ecological rationality draws directly from Weber. As many (e.g., Merchant

1980) have suggested, a primary consequence of the Enlightenment has been a scientistic

objectification of, and alienation from, the natural world. Murphy’s argument (2002, 83)
outlines the consequential direct correlation between the increased technological
manipulation of nature and global environmental hazards. Similarly, Beck (1994, 176)
refers to “unintentional self-endangennent” of modern society - a condition which fosters
anomie. For Murphy, as for Beck, this anomic response is a form of ecological
irrationality.

Ecological rationality, for Murphy, consists of the reunification of the social and
the material. Whereas the Enlightenment separated society from the biophysical
environment, the project of ecological rationality is to provide tools for decision-making
which simultaneously accomplish both social and ecological ends. Not only do we have
to accomplish both social and ecological ends but we have to recognize that they are one
and the same. Ecological rationality may simply be a substantive rationality wherein
value complexes regarding the social and the material are integrated. Further, ecological
rationality, in keeping with Bartlett’s suggestion, accomplishes this integration by
expanding our temporal scale far into the future.

In a sense, the extended range of ecological rationality is a perceptual shift. What
have been otherwise lofty idealizations — the benefit of future generations, the well-being
of the natural environment and wildlife, etc. — become very tangible concerns as the risks
become tangible. Ecological rationality becomes a matter of practice, of practical action.
Here, I reintroduce the term practical only partly in reference to Weberian rationality. If
Weberian practical rationality refers (for the actor) back to personal interest, experience,
and benefit, and substantive rationality refers to the value complexes so culturally

embedded in the actor’s world, then practical ecological rationality binds together both

14

the tangible consequences the actor anticipates for her/himself and the impacts s/he

anticipates for the biophysical environment.

Ecological Rationality — A new Synthesis

In light of the theoretical outline of types of rationalities. I offer several
conceptual issues which ecological rationality can address.

The term Substantive entered our discussion in two specific ways. For Weber,
substantive referred to the value postulates of a given cultural setting. The rationality of
actions must be evaluated in terms of its consistency with the value complexes of the
setting. For Bartlett, substantive indicates, in a sense, the motivational component of
rational action as he differentiated substantive from procedural, the rational strategy to be
implemented. Certainly, Bartlett’s conception is consonant with that of Weber. I will stay
with a conceptual understanding of substantive rationality, but to emphasize the
motivational aspect I will use the term generative. A generative rationality can motivate
action; actions can be evaluated to identify the generative rationality of that cultural
context. While this concept leans toward the structural, and seems to suggest that actions
are motivated merely by cultural conditions, I do not intend to suggest that actions are
strictly the consequence of structural conditions. In fact, such a suggestion would entirely
negate the notion of rationality which implies the degree of alignment between one’s
actions and one’s societal value complexes. Social actors, with some degree of
rationality, affect outcomes through action.

The second component of ecological rationality that I wish to emphasize I will

label Procedural. Bartlett, as stated, specifically differentiated the procedural from the

IS

substantive (generative). Generatively, one is ecologically rational in terms of one’s
motivations, and procedurally, one is ecologically rational in terms of one’s actions.
While Bartlett offers little in the way of specific strategies, Habermas and Dryzek, on the
other hand, offer more specific approaches. While Habermas calls for careful attention to
the mode of communication in order to create intelligible discourse without the trappings
of actors’ ideological biases, and therefore enable collective rational action, Dryzek
offers lexicality as a means of prioritizing issues - a checklist of communicative action.

Outcome, in the most common sense usage, suggests the consequence of action.
Whether intended or unintended, consequences result from the act (procedure) which
may or may not be generatively intended. I must emphasize caution regarding our usage
of outcome. With Murphy squarely in mind I maintain that material (bio-ecological)
outcomes are inextricable from the outcome as social experience. If one understands
outcome merely as produced material things — an automobile as an outcome of economic
rationality — it would follow that I absurdly suggest such things to be, to some degree,
endowed with rationality. Rather, the carrot field (for example), as a functioning
ecosystem, is a tangible characteristic of rational expression. Therefore, outcome
ecological rationality is a manifestation of socio-bio-physical consequence.

Thematic throughout this paper, though often only through implication, I have
touched on the issue of scale. Rationality as a concept is equally relevant as a macro-
systemic phenomenon as it is relevant at the micro level. Weber emphasizes both the
value complexes inherent in particular cultural settings and the individual’s choice to act

in accordance with or against such conditions.

l6

Habermas, as well, articulated rationality as the function of society — as he spoke
of advanced capitalism — yet rationality is equally a function of personal interaction. For
both, the degree to which actions are rational (or irrational) can be assessed only by
examining the action within or against its cultural conditions. Murphy, then, adds
materiality. We act with some degree of consistency to our cultural conditions, and our
various cultural settings inform and motivate our actions, al the while our actions are
fundamentally contingent upon the biophysical environment.

Our actions take place in biophysical space, shaping, transforming, preserving, or
in other ways affecting material stuff. That stuff, therefore, is central to our cultural value
complexes, to our motivations for action, hence to actions themselves, and the outcomes
of those actions. Diagram (2) illustrates the paths from these theorists to the concepts
offered here. I turn then to the question of the ways in which Michigan carrot farmers use
practical ecological rationality in deciding on adaptive strategies for their farming

operations.

e 2. Sociolo ical Theories of Rationali

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18

METHODS

In order to better understand the ways that Michigan carrot farmers make
decisions regarding the specific problems they, and the industry, face, I undertook a
series of semi-structured in-depth interviews. The interviews lasted between one and one-
half to two and one-half hours and revolved around issues such as the changing
challenges within the industry, general farm management practices, and decision-making.
More specific topics were covered such as the reduced deer-feed market, changes in
pesticide availability and pest management practice, overall changes in the market,
satisfaction with current pest management techniques, and ideal fixture pest-management
strategies. I also discussed general carrot industry questions regarding, for example,
market conditions, consumer demand regarding carrot quality and appearance. I inquired
about family and farm history. Overall, the range of questions was intended to create an
overview of how growers viewed themselves within the Michigan carrot industry during
a time in which market conditions and environmental regulations were in flux.

I conducted individual interviews with sixteen growers and processors. Interview
transcriptions were analyzed using the Nudist Vivo qualitative analysis package to
identify major themes concerning adaptation to adversity and decision-making in the face

of political, economic, and biological pressures.

DISCUSSION: RESULTS/FINDINGS
Types of Practical Ecological Rationality
In light of the literature on Ecological Rationality outlined above, and through

ethnographic content analysis of our ongoing conversations with the Michigan carrot

l9

growers, I identified three types of practical ecological rationality within several topic
areas —pest management practices, organic production, interest in information regarding
current agricultural research, land stewardship, and the tensions between productivist
agriculture and environmentalism. It is through these specific topic areas where the three
rubrics, or types, of ecological rationality were articulated by the Michigan carrot
farmers. First, I identify what I call the generative or motivating function. This is the
causal character of ecological rationality, leading one toward what one intends to be
ecologically beneficial actions/decisions. This is the explicit, deliberate intention to
accomplish ecologically sensitive action.

Secondly, I identify the procedural component. When faced with a decision, some
growers will follow a standard operating procedure. Procedures may be developed on the
basis of long-term, perhaps even multi-generational, experience, or procedures may be
based on various sources of external advice (e.g., chemical company representative,
extension agent).

Regarding the third component, outcome, I reiterate the caution stated above.
While my conceptualization does not resolve the problem of equating rational processes
of mind with external events and things, I nevertheless view outcome as a practical
expression of socio-bio-physical consequence. Outcome is the realization of the
ecologically rational act. The ecologically beneficial outcome may not necessarily have
resulted from deliberately ecologically rational motivations or explicit strategies but it
represents ecological rationality if, in fact, it is ecologically beneficial. The actor may

perceive ecologically beneficial outcomes, or the outcomes may go totally unrecognized.

20

If the outcome is not seen as a consequence of one’s action, one has the situation

described by cognitive anthropologists as emic models (Rappaport 1984; Dryzek 1987).

Figure 3. Types of ecological rationality

 

        
 

   
 

Procedural

   

Generative

Ecological Ecological
Rationality//~ —}-~~~\\ Rationality
\ /
\ / \
Outcome
Ecological
Rationality /

\ \\ ///

These three components of ecological rationality are only partially integrated as the
diagram (3) illustrates. It is possible for a grower’s behavior to be purely generative,
purely procedural or purely outcome oriented. But perhaps more interesting
sociologically are the questions of the extent to which and the ways in which the three
components are integrated. How does the generative component influence farm operation
procedures? What monitoring is done of the outcomes of carrot raising procedures? How
do perceived outcomes feed back into the generative function; can outcomes drive future
ecologically rational action? If so, an outcome may be understood as a consequence of
the grower’s actions and valued as ecologically important, and may come to drive future
ecologically rational action. Finally, I note the strong resonance between the ecological

rationality types and those rationality types Weber described as directly related to action

21

as illustrated below. Generative ecological rationality is strongly rooted in Weberian
substantive rationality as they share the contextual component. Weberian formal
rationality provides the rules and standards by which procedures are followed and
Weberian practical rationality shows us what works to our own ends. Outcomes, in a
practical sense, speak for themselves.

Each of the three forms of rationality was expressed in several contexts. Since the
interviews were loosely structured around a number of discussion topics, each of the
following examples emerged relative to those topic areas. Examples of each type of
ecological rationality, therefore, are described with respect to the topic areas. Topic areas
include (1) stewardship, (2) micro/macro level rationality, (3) recognition of
environmental harms, (4) organic production, (5) pest management practices, (6) land-
grant agricultural research, and (7) tensions between productivist agriculture and
environmentalism.

At this point, then, I offer discussion and examples of the three types of ecological

rationality.

Generative ecological rationality

There were many instances in which growers articulated forms of generative
ecological rationality, illustrating their motivations and intentions for environmentally
sensitive action.

With regard to stewardship, one grower discussed his own visceral discomfort

when he sees evidence of poor soil management.

22

You get a Windstorm around here in the spring, the sands blowing, (and) I’d like
to go bury myself in the basement... ‘cause I don’t want to watch it. It’s
sickening. . .I mean, you can see plumes going up in the air.
Certainly, this grower offers an ideological expression of an environmentally sensitive
behavior, both as he carries it, and as he experiences it among the growers in his region.

Another grower expressed his sensitivity differently, and while this example is
relevant to stewardship it also grows out of the theme regarding micro/macro level
rationality. His is a pragmatic interest in stewardship, both in terms of the production of
food and the stability of American agriculture (macro level), and as steward for the
wildlife with whom he, in a personal sense (micro-level), cohabits.

If we can go to the moon and build a space lab, I guess it’s time to work on our

food program, and work on taking care of our wildlife. We’re not here to turn our

back on them. They’re here for us to take care of.

This grower, within a single sentence, juxtaposes two positions which he feels
may be irreconcilable. He offers a moral position about how growers should behave. Yet
he says as much about good grower behavior as he says about an agro-industrial
production system that constrains such behavior. He places responsibility on consumers
to care about how and where carrots (and all American food items) are produced
suggesting that consumerism jeopardizes the rural landscape and lifestyle. This grower
suggests that to assume responsibility as steward of land and wildlife (micro-level
rationality) is irrational in the context of macro-cultural conditions (macro-level
rationality) whose obstacles to ecological rationality are agro—industrial production and
consumerism.

Also relevant to micro/macro level rationality, another grower suggested that

ecological rationality (not his choice of words) is shared by some groups of carrot

23

growers as a cultural collectivity. His perception of the ecological sensitivities of the
growers in his county, one of the major carrot producing counties in the state, was that he
and many of the other county carrot producers are more concerned with the ecological
well being of the region than are growers in other regions.

We’re more concerned; this area is very concerned about it. I don’t know why

that is. It’s just the way agriculture happened in this area and it’s part of the crops

we grow, too. When you go outside of this area... we’re. . .more concerned about
it than other growers... I think we are more concerned about it than others,
outside the area.

This example also illustrates the ways in which some growers manifest a
generative ecological rationality through the recognition of environmental harms that are
caused by some carrot production practices. Many members of this particular group of
growers communicate and encourage ecological sensitivities.

Concerning, then, the recognition of environmental harms, one grower discusses
the Michigan agricultural technique of decades past in which wetlands were drained and
converted into very fertile muck fields. He expresses concern for the negative
environmental consequences resulting from the disappearance of wetlands.

It’s a filter. Muck that has not been (drained), is swampland. Swampland doesn’t

drain really fast. You take all this water that runs off this open farm ground and

runs into this muck area, it really gets filtered before it gets into the streams. I

think it makes a big difference.

We can debate the accuracy of his statement, a debate which becomes relevant to
the ecological rationality of the strategies he employs, and the ecological rationality of
the outcomes of that procedural rationality. At this point, however, it serves as a sound

example of generative ecological rationality by illustrating genuine concern for

environmental matters.

24

Another important topic area regards grower perceptions about organic
production in the Michigan carrot industry. I was interested in how they characterize
organic production and what the barriers might be for their own transition to organic
production if they were interested in making such a transition. Ecological rationality
emerged in interesting ways through this topic.

The issue of organics is perceived to be unrealizable as a sustainable practice with
current techniques. This grower is open to organic production but feels that current
techniques would be harmful. Generative ecological rationality regarding organic carrot
production in Michigan, for this grower, rejects chemical free practices for IPM
(Integrated Pest Management) —a presumably sustainable alternative.

I was on an organic farm in Colorado two years ago and they grew at that time, I

think it was around 300 acres, maybe more, 500 acres of organic carrots. You

know, there’s a lot of talk out there about organic but what I seen in Colorado,
they were organic but they’re weren’t sustainable. I mean, that soil, what I seen
there and it was windy but they said it was windy there all the time, I seen plumes
in the air that were 300 feet tall from dust blowing and dirt blowing away in these
fields when I was there.

This example illustrates how the grower thinks about organic production relative
to his own practices and therefore illustrates generative ecological rationality. He reflects

on his feelings evoked by evidence of poor (ecologically detrimental) farm management

practices.

Procedural Ecological Rationality
One of the primary foci of the research has been to better understand the ways
that growers make pest management decisions and how they think about available

alternatives. Ecological rationality, then, becomes evident in grower desires to limit

25

chemical inputs to the minimum effective application. Certainly, they quickly offer the
obvious benefit. Less input saves money as the products become increasingly expensive.
Nevertheless, the growers often move right into the “more important” benefits of
chemical input reduction.

Regarding pest management practices, the following examples reflect the
ecologically rational strategies regarding specific pest management procedures. In
particular, there is a great deal of concern for effective soil management and the
minimization of chemical inputs into the soil. While discussing these issues, several
growers offered their strategies for reducing inputs into the soil for the sake of soil health.
As one grower stated:

I haul water to wherever I’m spraying and I fill up in several spots... If it’s really
concentrated in one spot, that spot will never be alive again, just never.

Another grower spoke of his method of “banding” rather than “broadcast” spraying as a
means to limit the chemical inputs into the soil between the rows of carrots.

We got Sprayers, banders we rigged up to go behind you. We’ve got a five foot

wide row, you’re spraying a 12 inch wide strip, your concentration is the same on

that 12 inch wide but guess what, on a broadcast spray, it’s 150 product per acre.

Instead of putting a 1/4 [ratio] on ‘em, we’ll put 1/5 [ratio] on ‘em on a broadcast

basis and we’re getting the job done... at that much of a reduced rate.

Certainly, there are economic incentives for these practices. It would be foolish to
suggest the absence of economic rationality within these examples. However, they serve
as useful examples of the procedural component of ecological rationality as they were
described primarily as methods for managing soil health. Economic rationality would
apply when good soil health were merely a means to the economic gains of maximizing

yield. Certainly, this is not overlooked as a desired outcome, but here the grower is

concerned with healthy soil as the primary desired end.

26

One area of discussion regarded the degree to which the growers read and follow
the suggestions of land-grant agricultural research offered through Extension Services
from Michigan State University. Certainly, their willingness to participate in these
interviews suggests a more general openness to University research. It seems that such an
interest may be motivated in a variety of ways. While there may be economic benefits
which result from the ongoing research, there may be perceived environmental benefits
as well. In my discussions regarding these kinds of benefits, the following examples
surfaced.

The “Tom-cast” crop disease-forecasting device is a product currently being
tested in cooperative research with a number of growers and Michigan State University
researchers. The following example illustrates the procedural component of ecological
rationality relative to the implementation of Tom-cast as a method for reducing pesticide
applications.

Our program with the Michigan State consultants, they monitor the sensors once a

week and they come and give us a printout of the leaf wetness numbers and then

we base our sprays off that, they do it on a Tuesday and then kind of project when
to spray. With asparagus we’ve used 15 for a trigger point but I guess in all reality
it’s new enough in the carrots we don’t know what that trigger point is gonna be,
if it’s gonna be 15 or 20. You know, if you break it in the center and do 17 or
something, you know, we need a couple of years to fine-tune it.
This example, then, illustrates strategy. This is something the grower is currently trying
and therefore procedural ecological rationality is exemplified.

Indicative of procedural ecological rationality through a sense of environmental

responsibility and land stewardship, one grower spoke of his plans to remove an

underground gasoline tank despite the considerable cost of removal.

I’m probably gonna pull a gas tank out of the ground this year just because I’m
afraid of, well, I watched it put in and it was covered with tar. It was a certified

27

tank. If it had any scratches they sent you another thing of tar to cover the

scratches before you covered it up... I doubt that it’s leaking. It’s been there for

probably 15 years.
This grower reveals his environmental sensitivity and sense of responsibility in a very
direct way through this description of his intended procedure.

Many of the growers spoke candidly about their discomfort regarding their
perception of an adversarial relationship with “environmentalism”. Environmental groups
are perceived to be targeting agriculture as the cause of environmental degradation.
Specifically, growers perceive a “public perception of growers” to be one of careless
abusers of chemical pesticides. In fact, most voiced the suggestion that growers have
more interest in careful pest management and the sustainability of their land than does
anyone else. For this reason there is considerable resentment toward environmental
groups in general. Through discussion of the topic of tensions between productivist
agriculture and environmentalism, ecological rationality revealed itself and I offer the
following examples.

This grower discusses the quantity of chemical inputs he perceives the EPA to
expect him to apply versus the quantity of pesticides he actually does apply.

Well, go to the EPA, they go to the, they go to a spray book, you know, and

somethin’ like this, look through it. Oh, Bravo, okay. Every 5 days or every 7

days or every 10 days, these guys are puttin’ on the equivalent of a pound and a

half of Bravo for eight weeks, 10 weeks. Holy cow. That’s 15, 20 pounds of

Bravo. That’s not what we do. I’ve got one, two, three, three Bravo sprays on

there all summer long on carrots.

The procedural component of ecological rationality is expressed through his actual
strategy of chemical application relative to those he perceives to be EPA expectations.

Recalling the example regarding organic production under the generative

category, I illustrate the connection between types of ecological rationality. The grower

28

moves from feelings evoked by perceived detrimental practices (generative ecological
rationality) to the relationship between those feelings and his own resulting practices.
Here, the grower refers back to an experience on a Colorado organic carrot farm.

I seen plumes in the air that were 300 feet tall from dust blowing and dirt blowing

away in these fields when I was there. They have no cover crop ‘cause they don’t

know how to control ‘em. They don’t, you know, how do we control a cover crop
in the spring? You know, you either do it with chemicals or you do it with tillage.

Their comment to us when we asked ‘em about it, they said we have no good way

to control our cover crop so we don’t plant cover crop.

Cover—crops are perceived to be a very important component in maintaining
topsoil and managing soil erosion. This grower plants a winter wheat cover on his fields
after harvest to manage soil erosion. This is tilled under prior to planting. Of greater
interest here is the practice of planting rye between rows of carrots to protect seedlings
from soil and wind damage. When the carrot leaves grow to approximately nine inches
the rye must be removed for the carrot to thrive. Tillage is not an option for this cover
crop as it would damage the carrots, so an herbicide is used to remove the rye. Organic
production, would be ecologically less rational than chemical application because the
cover crop with chemical inputs is perceived to be more sustainable than no cover crop,
no chemical inputs, and increased soil erosion. Further on, I will again return to this

example as I illustrate outcome ecological rationality, and as one example where each of

the three types of ecological rationality occasion the others.

Outcome Ecological Rationality
The outcome component is exemplified by the processes which have proved
themselves. In the following example which concerns pest management practices, the

grower notes the effectiveness of scouting, the practice of walking through the field and

29

visually scanning for insect, disease, and weed pests, and Tom-cast. These practices help
growers spray chemical pesticides only “as needed” rather than the customary timed
sprays.

Well, scouting is working very well. I mean, the scouting tied in with the Tom-

cast. You know, you tie that all together... I talk to other growers in the State that

don’t use any of this and. . .they’re goin’ way overboard of what they need to do.
This example serves to illustrate how the outcome informs the generative. The process
proves effective through outcome and motivates continued practice.

Regarding the use of “Tom-cast”, relative to land-grant agricultural research,
one grower has settled on a higher than recommended humidity reading which enables
him to wait slightly longer than recommended between applications.

Well, I don’t have it (Tom-cast) on this farm but there’s several within a quarter

mile, really important I think, but I also have my own theory. They say spray at,

say they say spray at 15 points. I’m gonna go to 18 and I don’t see worse results.
The process has proven itself for him and offers an illustration of the outcome component
of ecological rationality.

Regarding both [and stewardship and organic production, I return to the grower
whose soil management practices via cover crops create a practice perceived to be more
sustainable than organic practice. Further into the discussion regarding cover crops and
the perceived negatives associated with organic practices, he pointed to the field across
the road from his shop. It was early spring and the field was green with winter wheat.
Cast against organic production, his practices result in what he perceives to be truly
ecological outcomes as a matter of his responsibility to the sustainability of his land. The

use of cover-crops throughout the year help to reduce soil erosion. As earlier mentioned,

cover-crops also protect newly emerging carrot leaves from wind damage.

30

In this area, cover crops, like right across the road, that field is green now. Most
areas, agriculture areas you go into do not do that. They can’t deal with it. We can
deal with it here so it’s accepted here. We don’t go through one year, I mean,
when our crop comes off it gets a cover crop put in and it’s growing through the
winter. It’s green. It will be plowed down in the spring. But it protects that soil
out there, you know, over the winter, over the snow-belt, over the wind erosion
that can take place. I got more ...wind erosion from this ditch I got dug out from
my house than I got in 40 acres out here.

Out of a deliberate sense of stewardship, this grower illustrates the outcome component

of ecological rationality as soil and wind erosion is, and has been, managed via the use of

cover crops.

Further, regarding organic production, the following grower, like the previously
cited grower, has not adopted fully organic production practices. He has however adopted
some of the practices, has found them to work, and they have become part of the overall
practice. Therefore, they represent the outcome component of ecological rationality.

We’re starting to deal more with organic fertilizers now instead of a straight

fertilizer. You know, we’re using compost and both my brother and I think we’re

seeing a result from it but we don’t know that for a fact but we, I just, I got to
believe it’s better for the soil. So we’re gonna continue playing with it.
This quote serves as another example of the outcome feeding back into generative and
procedural functions of ecological rationality. “We’re seeing a result” implies outcome.

“I’ve just got to believe it’s better for the soil,” suggests generative rationality. “We’re

gonna continue playing with it” points to the strategy.

CONCLUSION
A central theme in Environmental Sociology is the relationship between human
and social dimensions, on one hand, and environmental and ecosystemic dimensions, on

the other (Goldman and Schunnan 2000). A central theme in Agricultural Sociology is

31

change and stasis in farm management practices (Buttel, et al. 1990; Fleigel and Zuiches
1993). Ecological Rationality is broadly relevant to both of these concerns.

Also of particular relevance to sociological inquiry is the indivisibility of structure
and agency. This indivisibility manifests itself both in the ideological realm and in the
sphere of action. Thus, what strikes me when I look over the types of ecological
rationality, is the ways in which the agency/structure dynamism emerges out of my
conversations with the growers.

So as I begin to understand the ecological rationality of Michigan carrot growers,
I must ask about the practical relevance to the Michigan carrot industry — a central point
which has yet to be fleshed out. I must now look to the character of rationality at the
structural level — carrot growing and the carrot commodity system — so that I may better
explicate ecological rationality across scale dimensions.

Further, what I have yet to do effectively is clarify ecological rationality across
the time dimension, and chart it more explicitly through from the generative, the
procedural, as outcome, —as a dynamic interaction among the three types. The examples
regarding organic practice serve only to begin this discussion. In Michigan, there are no
growers “within the industry” growing organically. As I identify growers “in the fringes”
I can describe both dimensions more comprehensively. I then ask if “Organic” practice is
ecologically rational in the Michigan Carrot Industry. And if not now, can it become
rational? Ultimately, is the trajectory (across time) of carrot production in Michigan
(across scale) an ecologically rational process? The theories outlined may allow us to
conjecture about the scientistic and technological leanings of agro-industry in general.

Yet the absence of clear empirical description of ecological rationality as the societal and

historical contexts against which to evaluate the ecological rationality of the growers

provides me with exciting possibilities for future investigation.

33

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