THESIS This is to certify that the thesis entitled THE NAWINDA COURT AND BRITISH-LOZI-BALOVALE RELATIONS 1927-1941 presented by JOHN HENRY HANSON has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for __M;A_.___ degree in W my #6434“; Major professor DateM' Sf /(7\k‘y 0-7639 MS U is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution MSU LIBRARIES m RETURNING MATERIALS: Place in book drop to I remove this checkout from your record. FINES will be charged if book is returned after the date stamped below. THE NAWINDA COURT AND BRITISH-LOZI-BALOVALE RELATIONS 1927-1941 BY John Henry Hanson A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of History 1982 I ; (3’6; ngx'k' l ABSTRACT THE NAWINDA COURT AND BRITISH-LOZI-BALOVALE RELATIONS 1927-1941 by John Henry Hanson This is a study of African initiative and British policy during the years of "indirect rule." Many historians char- * acterize administrative practice during this period as inflex- ible. The history of the Naminda court in Balovale, a multi- ethnic rural District of Northern Rhodesia, corrects this overemphasis on British rigidity. The Lozi monarch Yeta III (1916-1945) exploited the opportunities for change inherent in British policy and established a new Lozi court at Nawinda in Balovale. Lozi judges used the Nawinda court to collect fines from residents who violated Lozi laws and to coerce dis- sident leaders who resisted Lozi authority. An assault on the steps of the court, however, drew British attention to colo- nial relationships in Balovale. The court was removed when Balovale was excised from.Barotse Province in 1941. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to express my gratitude to those who helped in the preparation of this thesis. David Robinson oversaw the project from.beginning to end. Countless numbers of drafts passed across his desk during the past year, each benefit- ting from his wise counsel and insightful commentary. Gordon Stewart and Jay Spaulding also have seen drafts of this the- sis. Their suggestions and encouragement were deeply appre- ciated. Amie Campbell, my wife, remained a friend throughout the entire process. She listened and discussed, and always extended a hand when it was needed. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES . O O O C O O C O C O 0 INTRODUCTION 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 Chapter I. BRITISH COLONIALISM IN BAROTSE PROVINCE . . . . . . . The Lozi Court System During the Colonial Period . Configurations of Power in Balovale District, 1907-1927 Agricultural Production in Balovale. . . . . . . . . II. THE HISTORY OF THE NAWINDA COURT Yeta's Initiative, 1927-1931 . Consolidation at Nawinda, 1932-1935 . . . . . Assault and Excision 1936-19410 0 o o o o o o o 0 CONCLUSION. C O O O O O O O C O O O O 0 LIST OF REFERENCES. . . . . . . . . . . iii Page iv 11 17 21 21 25 27 34 56 Figure l. 2. LIST OF FIGURES Barotse Province, c.1900-194l . Balovale District . . . . . . . iv INTRODUCTION Daniel Akufuna, a Lozi Judge, burst out of the court at Nawinda with a knife in his hand and lunged at Kasanda, a Ndembu leader who advocated the removal of the Lozi court. News of the attempted knifing quickly spread to Ndembu and Lu- vale villages in Balovale, a multi-ethnic rural District of Barotse Province, Northern Rhodesia. The court had been es- tablished in 1933, three years prior to the assault, as the cornerstone of British policy in Balovale; Yeta, the Lozi monarch and Paramount Chief of Barotse Province, had manipu- lated British officials into accepting the Lozi court as an integral part of their administrative reforms in the District. Lozi officials at Nawinda used the Judicial apparatus to col- lect fines from residents who violated Lozi laws and to intimi- date local leaders who resisted Lozi assertions of authority. The assault engendered expressions of popular support for Ka- sanda, however, and the British called a Commission of Inquiry to study the conflict. The Governor accepted the Commission's recommendation to excise Balovale from Barotse Province be- cause,in his words, "The experiment in Barotse rule of Balo- vale District has dismally failed."1 The Lozi court was lGovernor Maybin to co, 14 November, 1939, co 795/107/ 45080/6. removed in 1941 and Kasanda was placed in charge of one of several new courts created in the aftermath of the excision. This reversal of British policy in Balovale occurred at a time when "indirect rule" and its associated vocabulary had been adopted as the official idiom of colonial parlance. Bri- tish administrators throughout the African continent had imr plemented reforms during the twenties and thirties which were modelled after F.D. Lugard's triumvirate of local institutions-- the Native Authority, Native Treasury and Native Court.2 Most critics of British policy emphasize the rigidity of adminis- "3 Both trative practice during the years of "indirect rule. Yeta and Kasanda exploited the possibilities for change in- herent in the colonial situation, however, and British policy in Balovale was shaped by their activities. This is a study of African initiative and British reaction during the colo- nial period.4 2The literature on "indirect rule" and its implementation is quite extensive. See, for its initial formulation, F.D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in Tro ical Africa (London, 1922). See also: D.K. Low and RIC. Pratt, Buganda and British Over- rule: Two Studies (Oxford, 1960); K. Datta,‘"'fn"'“"""direet R—ule in Northern RhodesIa, 1924-1953" (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1976), cited in A. Roberts, A.Histogy‘2£ Zambia (New York, 1976), 264. 5This literature is also extensive. See, for example, W.R. Crocker, Nigeria: A Critique of British Colonial Admini- stration (London, 1936). See also, for a work which has para- IIeIs with the present study, T.O. Beidelman, "Intertribal Tensions in Some Local Government Courts in Colonial Tangany- ika," Journal of African p23, X, 2 (1966), 118-30 and XI, 1 (1967), 27-45. 4Or, in other words, this study reverses the standard The evidence for this study consists of published and archival materials. Most of the data is drawn from the Balo- vale Commission Report5 and relevant Colonial Office corres- pondence.6 The first chapter is an introductory discussion of British colonialism in Barotse Province which is based on the extensive literature concerned with British-Lozi rela- tions.7 The Lozi court system and the political and economic contexts of Balovale District are emphasized. The second chapter is a narrative of Yeta's initiative and the history of the Nawinda court. chronology of British action and African response as evi- dent in G. L. Caplan, The Elites of Barotseland, 1878-1969 (Berkeley, 1970). 5The Balovale Commission Report quotes extensively from oral testimony collected in 1938 and 1939 as well as from District, Provincial and Secretariat files. The Com- missioner did not find a "uniform state of affairs" and, consequently, did not hesitate to document conflicting opin- ions or material which he did not understand: Re ort of the Commission Appointed to Examine and Report Upon Ego PaEE'EHH Present Relations of the Paramount _Chief'g£ the BEFotse Ng- tion and the Chiefs _Resident in the Balovale District both ET—Eas 5'53 We_st—0T the Zambezi RIver with s eolar'R'T'e erence —"’to 556 Owners 51p 3? EEHd and the'NetHod'Ei w c. the Tribes '_- HEFe Been Governed and to mare Recom endatIons_?3r L56 Future (Lusaka, 1939), hereafter BER. 6"Jurisdiction in Barotseland" and "Barotse Rule in Balo- vale" are two multiple year files contained in CO 795. VI have also consulted the growing literature on Luvale and Ndembu history. Since there are gaps between and within these various historiographies, my argument is speculative at times. These areas are indicated in the text. CHAPTER I BRITISH COLONIALISM IN BAROTSE PROVINCE Converging economic and strategic interests compelled the British South Africa Company (BSAC) to establish an ad- ministrative presence on the upper Zambezi.1 The BSAC ini- tially obtained a mineral concession in 1890 frothewanika, the monarch of Bulozi (Barotseland). This concession provided the incentive for British strategists in the Foreign Office to secure an enlarged territorial sphere in central Africa zig.g .Zlfl the Portuguese. The BSAC cooperated with the Foreign Office and employed one of its agents, Robert Coryndon, to establish an official British Residency in Bulozi. Although Coryndon was under the charge of the High Commissioner in Pre- toria, he served BSAC interests in the region. He negotiated several new concessions at the turn of the century which es- tablished favorable terms for the BSAC in the region. The 1British encroachment on the upper Zambezi is analyzed from.various points of view. The following reconstruction is drawn from: G. Prins, The Hidden Hippopotamus; Rea raisal in African Histo : The EEFI CoIonial Experience In fiestern ZEmEIa (Cam r ge, 19897; . . Clarence-Smith, "SIaVEs, Come moners and Landlords in Bulozi, c.1875-1906," Journal 3; African Histo , XX, 2 (l979),219-34; P. Duignan, "Sir Robert Coryndon (I879-l925)," in African Proconsuls, eds. L. Gann and P. Duignan (New York, I979}; JTS. Galbraith, Crown and Charter (Berkeley, 1974); Caplan, The Elites 23 Barotseland. concessions effectively divided the upper Zambezi into two British spheres, both of which were under the administrative control of the BSAC. One sphere corresponded to the heartland of Bulozi and was known as the Barotse Reserve. The BSAC agreed to restrict white settlement and to withdraw its mineral claims in this sphere. Lewanika was recognized as the Paramount Chief of the Reserve and given a measure of autonomous control over the indigenous population. The other administrative sphere in- cluded sections of Bulozi's eastern periphery. The BSAC elim- inated all forms of Lozi control in this sphere.2 Colonial policies in Barotse Province (the administra- tive unit which was roughly coterminal with the Reserve) encouraged the migration of African laborers to European mineral and agricultural enterprises. The BSAC administra- tion imposed a hut tax in non-Reserve areas beginning in 1902 and extended this policy with Lewanika's consent into Barotse Province in 1905.5 BSAC officials also convinced Lewanika in 1906 to abolish all forms of slavery except twelve-days unpaid labor services controlled by the political elite. The former slaves joined the ranks of freeman who were forced by the BSAC hut tax in increasing numbers to migrate to European 4 labor centers outside of Bulozi. Colonial labor policies 2K. Vicke , "The Making of a Peasantry: Imperialism and the Tonga P ateau Economy, 1890-1936" (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1978), especially ch. 2. 5Vickery, "The Making of a Peasantry," ch. 2; Caplan, The Elites g; Barotseland, 86-87. 4Clarence-Smith, "Slaves, Commoners and Landlords,” 232. (21“ ”057%;RN L RHOD S;A Figure 1 Barotse Province, c.1900-1941 7 remained relatively unchanged until 1924, the year in which the Colonial Office assumed control of Northern Rhodesia from the BSAC. The new Governor convinced Yeta, Lewanika's succes- sor, to abolish the twelve-days labor services in exchange for a British subsidy. These Colonial policies established Barotse Province as an important labor pool for the C0pperbelt as well as for enterprises south of the Zambezi.5 The productive capacities of Barotse Province were altered as a result of the loss of labor to European enterprises. 0c- casional food shortages in the southern and central Districts attracted colonial attention to the problem.during the forties,6 although the decline in agricultural productivity had begun much earlier. The loss of increasing numbers of males from.the agricultural labor force was a critical factor because agricul- tural techniques in this region were labor intensive.7 The ma- gration of males also contributed to changes in social relation- ships in the Province. Unfortunately the existing work on so- cial change during the middle colonial period is inadequate.8 5L. Van Horn, "The Agricultural History of Barotseland, 1840~1964," in The Boots 2; Rural Povert in Central and South- ern Africa, eds. R.-P§Ifier and N. Parsons TBerEeIey, I576}, " o 6M. Gluckman, Econo of the Central Barotse Plain, Rhodes- Livingstone Papers, No. 3 (finch-Ester, I94I)—;_D'.'U.Peters, Land Usage in Barotseland, ed. N. Smyth, Rhodes-Livingstone Communi- cation—T9 (Livingstone, 1960); E.L. Hermitte, "An Economic His- tory of Barotseland, 1800-1940" (Ph.D. thesis, Northwestern University, 1975). 7Van Horn, "The Agricultural History of Barotseland," 149-151. 8M. Gluckman's studies are limited by his political and There were important changes in political relations with- in the Lozi state during this period. The first two monarchs of colonial Bulozi, Lewanika (1886-1916) and his son Yeta (1916-1945), controlled annual British subsidies given in come pensation for the abolition of slavery. These two monarchs distributed this income to a small group of Lozi officials who congregated at the royal court at Lealui.9 Lewanika and Yeta also proved adept at manipulating British support for Lealui interventions into local politics.10 The Lozi court system was a particularly effective instrument for these initiatives. The Egg; 92353 System.Durigg the Colonial Period The Lozi court system.was virtually unencumbered by BSAC restrictions during the early colonial period. Lozi Judges retained jurisdiction over all legal disputes except cases which involved a European, the death penalty or a Lozi custom particularly repugnant to British mores.11 Although British officials frequently complained about the activities of Lozi judges, the BSAC relied on informal constrainuaand did not conceptual biases. His work has drawn criticism.from scholars of various intellectual traditions. See, for example, Prins, The Hidden Hippopotamus; Clarence-Smith, ”Slaves, Commoners and EEHdIords;"fiR. Brown, TrPassages in the Life of a White Anth- ropologist: Max Gluckman in Northern Rhodesia," Journal 22, African Histogz, XX, 4 (1979), 525-41. 9 Caplan, The Elites oLBarotseland, chs. 4-6. 10 11M. Gluckman, The Judicial Process Among the Barotse 2; Northern Rhodesia (Manchester, 19355, 5- . Prins, The Hidden Hippopotamus, 97-105. amend the concessions which guaranteed Lozi Judicial auton- omy.12 Since Lozi judges benefited from British support, they were careful not to act in ways which would have eroded their working relationship with the BSAC. Lozi judges used this working relationship to exploit the opportunity provided by increasing numbers of adultery accu- sations in Barotse Province. An increase in adultery accusa- tions was a common occurrence among African groups whose males became involved in labor migration or military service for ex- tended periods of time. In some cases indigenous groups pressed 15 In colonial administrators for changes in adultery laws. Barotse Province these social demands provided an opportunity for Lozi judges to secure alternate means of support in an era when the British had eliminated dependent labor. One of the first laws promulgated by Yeta during the colonial period per- tained to adultery: adultery was redefined from a civil to a criminal offense for the convicted female, who was required thereby to pay a 5 1 fine to the court.14 If the woman was unable to pay this fine in cash, Lozi judges accepted seven days of labor services in their gardens instead.15 The abolition of lBCaplan, The Elites of Barotseland, chs. 4-5. 15 A. Phillips (ed.), Surve of African Marria e and Famil Life (London, 1955), 55, §§§. See also, H.F. Morris, "Indirect Rule and the Law of Marriage," in Indirect Rule and the Search for Justice, eds. H.F. Morris and 3.3. Read ltEndon, I972}, 515-250. 14Gluckman, The Judicial Process Among the Barotse, 37, 65. 1536s, as. 10 twelve-days labor obligations in 1924 increased the need among the Lozi political elite for such a new source of in- come. Many Lozi officials thereafter became itinerant judges travelling a regular circuit to find enough adultery cases to support themselves.16 By the forties the overwhelming majority of cases heard by Lozi judges pertained to adultery.l7 Yeta's initiative into Balovale occurred within this con- text of declining state revenues and increasing numbers of adultery accusations. Although Yeta was compensated for the abolition of twelve-days labor obligations, he soon found the sum inadequate to cover his expenditures.18 Yeta took matters into his own hands and used his position as the Lozi monarch to establish a new court staffed by htison and others from Lealui. The choice of location was Balovale, a northern Dis- trict of Barotse Province, which was officially under Yeta's jurisdiction as Paramount Chief. Balovale was attractive be- cause colonial officials ' diffused power to several groups in the District and an organized political challenge would be difficult. Also, Balovale agriculturalists were increasing production at a time when most of the Province was in decline. 16Report of the Resident Magistrate of Barotse Province, 1928, cited in Van Horn,‘ 'The Agricultural History of Barotse- land," 158. 17Gluckman, The Judicial Process Among the Barotse, 64-65. 18Caplan, The Elites of Barotseland,133-58. Indeed, Yeta accumulated a debt of L 2, 500 by 1934: see Caplan, The Elites of Barotseland, 148. ll Configurations g£_§g!gg in Balovale District, 1907-1927 Balovale District was a colonial creation whose boundaries were set by international negotiation and colonial fiat during the first decades of the twentieth century. The initial Anglo- Portuguese border in the region ran along the Zambezi and up the Kabompo River: the Portuguese controlled the territory which was to become Balovale. British negotiators used Lozi claims of hegemony over the Luvale and Ndembu to press for an extension of the British sphere north and west of the Zambezi- Kabompo line.19 The Portuguese had made contact with Luvale groups much farther north, however, and disputed British claims for an extension. The arbiter to the dispute awarded the Bri- tish in 1905 with an extension of territory to 22°E and 13°S. A BSAC official was sent up the Zambezi with a contingent of armed Lozi Messengers in 1907 to establish an administrative presence.20 The boundaries of Balovale were set in two sepa- rate actions by the BSAC: the region west of the Zambezi was placed in the Barotse Reserve in 1909 and the region east of the Zambezi was designated Crown Territory under the jurisdic- tion of the Lozi monarch in 1913.21 Balovale was subsequently administered as a District of Barotse Province. 19C.M.N. White, "The Ethno-history of the Upper Zambezi," 20J.H. Venning, "Early Days in Balovale," Northern Rhodesia Journal, II, 6 (1955), 55-57. 21The first action was effected thro h the Concession of 1909; the second action was promulgate in two Ordinances. The Administrator of Northern Rhodesia justified placing this 12 '22° I V‘ .7 I ‘25) I c“ 6/ I3° I \\ . K“““'J“IS Vtuajg \fl ' / < (4 . baht/ale Dts4rl‘gf FJP‘egc “(44 any ‘0' \)~ \>< 6 a, $ HQ§3 LI 69 i, ’D (L s q 06, ’3, ' \ V M?0 S Abo ’< (4 Figure 2 Balovale District 13 Balovale was inhabited by agriculturalists who identified themselves with one of several ethnic groups. The Ndembu and the Luvale constituted the two most numerous groups in the District. Ndembu agriculturalists lived in small villages on the east bank of the Zambezi north of the Kabompo.22 Luvale villages were situated on the west bank of the Zambezi and in areas east of the Ndembu-25 This latter area was inhabited during the early colonial period when Luvale groups fled from Katanga labor recruiters Operating in Angola.24 Luchazi groups territory under Lozi jurisdiction because it simplified admini- stration. Wallace to BSAC, so November, 1912, cc 795/97/ 45080/6. 22The ethnography of Ndembu groups living in a District north of Balovale is provided in works by V.W. Turner. See, for example, Turner, Schism and Continuit in an African Soci- et : A Stud of Ndembu Villa e Life (Manchester, 1957) and em, The Drums—offfifliction: A Study of Bali ious Processes Amon the NHembufEf Zambia‘TOxf3rd, 9687. See a so M. McCul- 1005, The Southern Lunaa and Related Peoples (London, 1951). 23The ethnography of Luvale groups in Balovale is pre- sented in works by C.M.N. White and A. Spring. R. Papstein has worked with Luvale oral traditions in an effort to recon- struct the precolonial history of the Luvale. See: R. Pap- stein, "The Upper Zambezi: a History of the Luvale People, 1000-1900" (Ph.D. 13116818, UOCOLOAO, 1978); A. Spring, "womn's Rituals and Natality Among the Luvale of Zambia" (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1976); C.M.N. White, An Outline of Luvale Social and Political Or anization, Rhodes-Livingstone Paper No. 35 (Manchester, 19 ; idem, Elements of Luvale Beliefs and Rituals, Rhodes-Livingstone Paper No. 32 (Manchester, I961); idem, Tradition and Cha e in Luvale Marriagg, Rhodes-Livingstone Paper No. 34 (Manchester, 1962). Other relevant works by White are cited throughout this study. 246. Perrings, "'Good Lawyers But Poor Workers': Re- cruited Angolan Labor in the Copper Mines of Katanga, 1917- 1921," Journal 2; African History, XVIII, 2 (1977), 245-44. 14 also migrated into Balovale during the colonial era.25 These groups lived among the Luvale and in scattered settlements in Ndembu areas. There were Lozi communities in Balovale which had been established prior to the colonial period. The first group moved from.Lealui to Lukwakwa, a site in eastern Balovale, in retreat from the mid-nineteenth century Kololo invasion of Bulozi. The Lukwakwa Lozi did not support Lewanika's candid- acy to the restored Lozi throne and remained at Lukwakwa.26 A second group of Lozi were sent as emissary chiefs in 1892 to both Luvale and Ndembu chiefly villages. Lewanika was trying to create a tributary region within greater Bulozi in the after- math of a Lozi raid into the region.27 Although some Luvale and Ndembu communities initially sent tribute to Lewanika, the practice was never institutionalized and the Lozi who remained lived among their hosts with no special political status.28 25This immigration was part of a larger population shift from eastern Angola to Barotse Province as a whole. Hellen estimates that approximately 100,000 Angolans migrated into Northern Rhodesia during the first half of the twentieth cen- tury. Clarence-Smith argues that population pressures caused the movement. A second wave of immigrants responded to the opening of the Copperbelt in the late-twenties. See: J. Hellen, Rural Development in Zambia, 1890-1964 (Munich, 1968), 255; Clarence-Smith, Slaves? Peasants and Ca italists 12 Southern An ola, 1840-1926 (Cambridge, 1979), 95-6; C.M.N. e, otes on the Political Organization of Kabompo Dis- trict," African Studies, IX, 4 (1950), 186. 26M. Mainga, Bulozi Under.§ng Luyana Kings (London, 1973), 65-87, 100-101. 27White, "The Ethno-History of the Upper Zambezi," 20-26; Papstein, "The Upper Zambezi," 192-97. 28Harding to F0, 5 February, 1901, cited in Caplan, The Elites of Barotseland, 81, 113n; Tour Reports 3 and 4, 1937, 56—753767713626737'263, 52-54. 15 The arrival of BSAC colonial officials altered the poli- tical relationship of these Lozi groups to their non-Lozi neighbors. The change was a result of British perceptions of 30 and Lozi hegemony in Balovale,29 the use of Lozi messengers the linguistic training of the British officials, who often knew the language spoken by the Lozi but did not know any of the indigenous languages of Balovale.31 The Lukwakwa Lozi extended their control over hmmigrant Luvale and Luchazi com- munities in eastern Balovale during the colonial period. Lozi Messengers used force to coerce immigrant communities whenever they resisted incorporation into the Lukwakwa sphere of con- trol.32 Resident Lozi along the Zambezi had fewer opportuni- ties for expansion since the number of immigrants was smaller and the District headquarters was closer for thosewho wished to complain. .There were a few cases of Lozi expansion:‘ Njekwa and Mwenda had each secured headmanship over thirty Luchazi and Luvale communities by the thirties.55 The increase in Lozi power was paralleledby similar changes in the power of Ndembu chiefs. The Ndembu had been colonized zgggg, 69, 74. See also, Venning, "Early Days in Balovale." 30See, for a discussion of the use of Lozi Messengers, W.V. Brelsford, “The Boma and His Uniform," Northern Rhodesia Journal, II, 5 (1954), 54-42. 5130B, 5. 32903, 57, 95-97, 100, 122; Keith to co, 4 November, 1938, cc 795797/45080/6. 33 Tour Report 3 1937 cc 795/97/45090 6° BCR 122-4 130-1, 135. ’ ’ / ’ "" ’ 16 during the early eighteenth century by groups led by Ishinde and Kanongesha, two putative sons of the Lunda chief Mwaant Yaav.34 Although political power among the Ndembu was quite decentralized during the precolonial period, Kasanda, the holder of the Ishinde title, used British support to create an ordered political structure under his control. Kasanda had been recruited as a Messenger prior to his succession to the Ishinde title in 1912. Thereafter, he moved his village from Angola to a site close to the Balovale District headquarters. Kasanda and his followers expanded the judicial role of Ndembu chiefs and established a hierarchical structure with the Ishinde's court at the apex. Although some Ndembu leaders challenged Kasanda's actions, the British continually supported Kasanda's position.35 Luvale chiefs were not able to consolidate their positions as effectively as their Ndembu counterparts. Although Luvale ohiefship was authoritative in areas where the Luvale had en- gaged in the slave trade during the precolonial era, the Luvale in Balovale had not participated in these changes and, conse- 56 quently, their chiefs had few mechanisms of coercion. The British attempted to recruit Luvale chiefs, although their 34R. Schecter, "History and Historio rthy on a Frontier J of Lunda Expansion: the Origins and Ear evelopment of the Kanongesha" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1976). 55Tour Report 4, 1937, cc 795/97/45080/6; BCR, 39-41, 75, 84, 90-910 36Papstein, "The Upper Zambezi," 252. 17 intervention in the succession to the most senior Luvale title in Balovale backfired. The candidate they had supported died and the title was secured by the other candidate, a woman who did not meet the expectations of the British officials. While the British did not completely out ties with titled Luvale authorities, they often recruited non-titled headmen and tac- itly accepted the growing power of resident Lozi such as mwenda and Njekwa. Political decentralization did not prevent Balovale resi- dents from.establishing links with the colonial economic order. Once a.motor-route to the Copperbelt was completed in 1941 Balovale District was intimately connected to large markets for foodstuffs and labor. Prior to the forties Balovale producers sent their surplus foodstuffs down to the markets near Lealui. Balovale's productive vitality was in stark contrast to the other Districts under Yeta's control. Agricultural Production 3n Balovalg Balovale producers dominated cash-crop production of cas- sava for the markets of Barotse Province by the early forties. Gluckman observed canoes filled with cassava meal descending down the Zambezi from Balovale and suggested that differential rates of productivity exacerbated the Lozi-Balovale conflict/3‘7 The Lealui court passed an ordinance in 1940 which encouraged producers to shift their activities from.the flood-plain to the 57Gluckman, Economy 23 the Central Barotse Plain, 122. 18 land along its banks in order to increase production and push Balovale producers out of the market.38 The rationale behind this ordinance was sound: Balovale agriculturalists used less labor intensive techniques than flood-plain producers and were able to increase production even When the number of available males was reduced by labor migration.39 The productivity of Balovale agriculturalists attracted the attention of C.M.N. White, a colonial researcher who studied the Luvale and Luchazi during the forties and fifties; Balovale producers were upheld in colonial circles as Africans particularly receptive to the (market-principle.4o Although Balovale producers did not receive much attention until the forties, there is circumstantial evidence which points to expanding productivity during the early thirties. White attributes Balovale productivity to the adoption of techniques initially practiced by the Luchazi immigrants who arrived in Balovale during the first decades of the twentieth century.41 Although it is difficult to envision such a change in the ab- sence of evidence, it is reasonable to assume that the new tech- niques were initially adepted in multi-ethnic communities and later embraced by other producers when there were incentives for 38Gluckman, Econonz n; the Central Barotse Plain, 55. 59See C.G. Trapnell and J.N. Clothier, The Soils, Vege- tation and A ricultural Systems ng’North-Western.HESHEsia, (rusaka, I9 , . 4oC.M.N. White, n,Preliminagy Surve ‘33 Luvale Rural Eco- nong, Rhodes-Livingstone Paper No. 29 (Manchester, 1959), 37-55. 41White, A Preliminagy Survey 93 Luvale Rural Econonz, 23-25. 19 such a change. The first incentive may have been the British willingness after 1925 to accept tax payments in cassava as well as cash.42 A District Officer reports that there were surpluses of cassava coming in during tax collection in the early thirties.43 Since agricultural production in the central and southern Districts was beginning to decline by this time, the markets down river were an added incentive for surplus cas- sava production. Although Balovale had been considered a poor District in the early twenties, expanding production in the early thirties altered that situation dramatically. Agricultural expansion was possible because the Balovale work force had not been depleted through labor migration. Balo- vale District was situated outside recruiting areas for Katanga mines, on the one hand, and southern African mines and planta- tions, on the other. Katanga recruiters were discouraged from operating in Northern Rhodesia because they had to pay the workers in British sterling.44 Recruiters for enterprises from.the south avoided Luvale laborers because they were 42After a visit to Balovale the new Secretary of Native Affairs recommended changes in the tax structure because the District Commissioners were unable to collect the tax. The Secretary attributed the problem to the District's distance £50m.Eurgpean labor centers. The rate of tax was reduced from /- t /- in Balovale while the rest of the Province remained at 10/-. See Tour Report, Secretary of Native Affairs, 00 795/6/106. 43"If there was a market a large surplus of cassava meal would be forthcoming." See R.S. Hudson, "The Human Geography of the Balovale District, Northern Rhodesia," Journal 23 222. Royal Anthropological Institute, LXV (1955) , 241. 44Perrings, "'Good Lawyers but Poor Workers,'” 20 45 perceived as unsuitable for heavy labor in the mines. Con- sequently, Balovale males were not forced to work at European labor centers during the early colonial period. When the Copperbelt opened in the late twenties Balovale residents were able to make more choices than most rural Afri- cans in the region. Balovale farmers could stay in the District and produce for the cassava markets downriver. Another option included migration to the Capperbelt as a means to obtain cash for subsequent investment in the agricultural sector of Balo- vale District. There was also the option to engage in petty trade in the District or on the Copperbelt.46 This situation contrasted with the central and southern Districts where agri- cultural production was declining and the number of males mi- grating out of the district continued to increase. Yeta's decision to establish a new court in Balovale may have been a recognition that the productive bases of the Province were shifting northward. Balovale was at the very least an at- tractive prize for Yeta and the Lealui Lozi. 45This stereotype emerged from the experiences of Angolan Luvale recruits on Katanga mines. They were marched from.An- gola to Katanga and lived in crowded and unsanitary housing. Consequently a large proportion of the Luvale contingent died and a stereotype of Luvale weakness emerged. This stereotype was still extant among British recruiters in the thirties. See: Perrings, "'Good Lawyers But Poor Workers'"; Report on the Native Labor Association Conference, 1950, CO 795/59/ 55600; Annual Re ort Upon Native Affairs for the Year 1955 (Lusaka, I951), g7. 46 Annual Re ort Upon Native Affairs for the Year 1956 (Lusaka, ), 89. CHAPTER II HISTORY OF THE NAWINDA COURT Yeta's Initiative, 1927-1951 Noyoo Luchanana, an elderly member of the Lealui court, stood on the steps of Balovale District headquarters in July, 1927, and announced the extension of the Lozi Adultery Ordi- nance into Balovale. District Commissioner Sharratt-Horne had initially discouraged this assertion of Lozi authority and implored the Lealui court to establish a regular court instead.1 Yeta did not establish a court at the time because he had ex- tended the Lozi Adultery Law in order to facilitate the activi- ties of itinerant judges outside his patronage network. These judges, however, made infrequent visits to Balovale in the years that followed Luchanana's proclamation.2 The opening of British-Lozi negotiations for administrative reform in 1929 pre- sented Yeta with an opportunity to expand his initiative along the lines Sharratt-Horne had initially suggested. Governor J.C. Maxwell (1927-1952) was given the orders by the Colonial Office to rationalize the inherited BSAC ad- ministrative structure. He established a Native Authorities 1130R, 86, 105. Yeta had the right to extend the Ordinance as the Paramount Chief of Barotse Province. 2BCR, s4, s7. 21 22 and Courts:5 system in 1929 which was modelled after Lugard's recommendations. Since the various concessions signed by Lew- anika had safeguarded Lozi authority against British interven- tion into African affairs, these administrative reforms were not implemented in Barotse Province. Maxwell was not satis- fied, however, with the British-Lozi status gnp because the Governor had no formal control over Lozi judges. He ordered the Provincial Commissioner of Barotse Province, C.R. Rennie, to approach Yeta with the idea of extending the Native Authori- ties and Courts system into the Province. Maxwell encouraged Rennie to explore the possibility of using the‘initiative to create non-Lozi Native Authorities for the largestethnic groups under Lozi control.4 The negotiations began in June, 1929, and continued throughout the following year. Rennie and Yeta used a draft of the Native Authorities and Courts Ordinance as a working model for reform. 'Yeta agreed that the new system was attrac- tive, although he expressed his reservations about the clauses which gave the British total authority to appoint and dismiss African officials. Yeta also asked for British support for a new court in Balovale District. Rennie would not compromise on Yeta's first point, since Maxwell's intent was to obtain 5Since Maxwell did not authorize the Native Authority to collect tax, there was no Native'Treasury. 4Maxwell included a selection of the most important com- munications between Yeta, Rennie and himself in a despatch to the Colonial Office. This discussion is drawn from.Enclosures I - XIV, Maxwell to 00, 26 May, 1931, 00 795/47/56170. 25 legal recognition of British authority in the Province. In- stead, Rennie altered the wording of the relevant clause to acknowledge "the recommendation of the Paramount Chief" prior to British decisions. Rennie and Yeta compromised on the sec- ond issue; Rennie agreed to recognize Lozi-staffed First Class Native Court in Balovale in exchange for Yeta's acceptance of Luvale and Ndembu Native Authorities in Balovale. The agree- ment was finalized in March, 1951, approved by the Governor's office and sent on to the Colonial Office in London.5 Consolidation np Nawinda, 1952-1955 members of the Colonial Office were surprised when they received the 1951 agreement. They feared that Maxwell's zeal for administrative reform had violated the special status ac- corded the Lozi in the various concessions of the early peri- od.6 Although Maxwell received a negative response from.his London superiors, he was not cowed. The Governor‘wrote back in defense of the 1951 agreement, arguing that administrative reform was a British obligation which was in the interest of the Africans.7 Maxwell's assertiveness did not succeed in persuading the Colonial Office to accept the 1951 agreement, although his action forced his superiors into a debate on the appropriate 5Maxwell to CO, 26 May, 1951, CO 795/47/56170. 5Tomlinson, Minute, 6 July, 1931, 00 795/47/56170; w.E.s. to Wilson, 18 October, 1951, CO 795/62/5584. 7Maxwell to 00, 22 March, 1932, 00 795/52/56564. 24 administrative arrangement for Barotse Province.8 The ques- tion of amalgamation lurked behind the Colonial Office debates. The chairman of an earlier Colonial Office study on this ques- tion had advocated a plan which included the creation of a Lozi "native reserve" partially autonomous from.a single Bri- tish colony which combined Northern with Southern Rhodesia.9 Some officials argued that Maxwell's initiative would stan- dardize the administrative structure throughout Northern Rho- desia and make a Lozi reserve more difficult to create. Other officials argued that the Lozi required preferential treat- ment similar to the Baganda. Since the debate was not quickly resolved, Maxwell's successor, Governor R. Storrs (1952-54), was ordered not to act on the Lozi question until given further instructions. British inaction on the 1951 agreement did not prevent Yeta from.astablishing a court in Balovale. The Lozi monarch toured Balovale in May, 1952, to secure local support for his initiative. The District Commissioner heartily approved of Yeta's plans, although he cautioned against infringing upon the rights of Ndembu and Luvale chiefs.10 ‘Yeta consequently ap- proached Ishinde Kasanda and obtained his consent to the 8The following discussion is drawn from the file "Juris- diction in Barotse Province": 00 795/47/56170; 00 795/52/ 56564; CO 795/62/5656; CO 795/64/5645; CO 795/69/25580. 9Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Depend- encies In EEsEErn and CentralfATFHca.(SIr'HIIEon Youn :_EEEIr- man), 1929, Cmd. 525E. l°BCR, 106-7. 25 creation of the Lozi court. Yeta did not reveal at that time that the court would be located at aninda, a site less than ten miles north of Kasanda's capital. Although Kasanda later objected to the location of the court, the protest was dis- missed and Kasanda was reprimanded for his hostility toward the Lozi during the opening ceremonies at Nawinda on April 4, 1933.11 The'Nawinda court consisted of eighteen members only seven of whom.actua11y resided on the premises. The residen- tial group, the Nawinda Lozi, included Yeta's son, Daniel Akufuna,and six other Lozi originally from.Lealui.12 Among this group of advisers was Kalonga Wina, a close personal friend of Yeta.15 The non-resident judges included the sons of the emissary chiefs, the most powerful of which were Njekwa and Mwenda. Finally, there were three non-Lozi officials to represent the Liuwa, Mbume and Luchazi communities. The Naw- inda court had jurisdiction over the entire District except the eastern portions of Balovale which were under the juris- diction of the Lukwakwa Lozi. The Nawinda Lozi quickly moved to consolidate their posi- tion in Balovale. These Lozi attracted a following through the authorization of subordinate courts created by Ndembu and llBCR, 110. 1290B, 109, 124. 13Wins married into the royal family and later served as n acting monarch during Yeta's prolonged capacitation after 1959. See Caplan, The Elites n; Barotseland, 156-7. 26 Luvale leaders willing to send appeals and adultery cases to the Nawinda court. The Nawinda Lozi also instructed the Lozi Messengers to bring all adultery cases to their court. The judges offered the women convicted of adultery the option of working on the Lozi farms in lieu of the L 1 fine. Balo- vale residents who objected to the new relations of power were intimidated into submission.14 There were a few cases of physical abuse, although the Lozi operated the court sys- tem.and easily coerced dissidents under the guise of enforc- ing the law. The British tacitly supported the Lozi, often referring cases directly to the Nawinda Lozi.15 One District Commissioner refused to hear Ishinde Kasanda's com- plaints against the Lozi and referred him to the Nawinda court, the source of his problem. Kasanda described his situ- ation in a letter to the Ndembu chief in another District, conceding that the Lozi had completely deceived the British and usurped his power.16 Indeed, the Nawinda Lozi had suc- cessfully transformed Yeta's initiative into a working opera- tion. Since the 1951 agreement had not been approved by the Colonial Office, Yeta pressured Governor Storrs at every pos- sible occasion to implement the agreement and thereby assure British support for the Nawinda court.17 Storrs made no 14ggg, 112-115, 117, 122, 135-37, 140-41. 15ngn, 112, 119-20. 15pgg, 117. 17Record of Interview, 30 August, 1934, cc 795/62/5584. 27 promises to Yeta, although his despatches sympathetically conveyed the monarch's desires to the Colonial Office.18 Since the chances for the amalgamation of Northern and South- ern Rhodesia seemed remote during the mid-thirties, members of the Colonial Office were persuaded by Storrs' opinion and finally agreed to extend the Native Authorities and Courts system in Barotse Province.19 Storrs' replacement, Governor H. Young (1954-58), was given orders to renew negotiations with Yeta.20 Provincial Commissioner Lane-Poole reopened discussions in 1955 and a new agreement was quickly obtainedgl The 1955 agreement was not significantly different from.the earlier proposal: the Nawinda court was still recognized as a First Class Native Court. Assault nnn Excision, 1956-1941 Governor Young toured Barotse Province in late May and early June, 1956, to reassure Yeta that the 1955 agree- ment woudd‘be implemented later that year. 'Young visited Balovale District prior to his meeting with Yeta. Kasanda 18Storrs to 00, 25 September, 1933, 00 795/62/5584; Storrs to 00, 27 June, 1933, 00 795/64/5645. 19See: 00 795/69/25580; c0 795/76/45080/1. 2°Young to 00, 7 May, 1935, 00 795/76/45080/1. 2J'Yeta used the conciliatory mood of the British to push for the extension of the Barotse Reserve into eastern Balovale, the area under his jurisdiction but designated Crown Territory. He also pushed for another piece of terri- tory, the Kasempa Salient. See: S. Shaloff, "The Kasempa Salent: the Tangled Web of British-Kaonde-Lozi Relations," International Journal p§,African Historical Studies, V, 1 (1972), 22-40. 28 took advantage of the occasion to renew his protest against the Nawinda court. Young stood firmly behind the Lozi and did not reprimand any of the Nawinda Lozi.22 Young's visit dismissed any doubt about British support of the Lozi in Balovale. Akufuna's assault of Ishinde Kasanda took place within a week after Young's departure. Kasanda and his son travelled to Nawinda and intimated a desire to fight. Some members of the court tried to avoid a confrontation and sent both Kasanda and his son away. Akufuna continued the argument, chased after Kasanda with a knife and assaulted him outside the court. When the District Commissioner was informed of the incident he im- mediately ordered the Ndembu to avoid Nawinda and to bring all legal cases to Balovale headquarters. Additionally, the Dis- trict Commissioner sent all the parties of the dispute to Pro- vincial Commissioner Lane-Poole at Mongu.2:5 Provincial Commissioner Lane-Poole acted on this case in July, assessing fines on both Akufuna and Kasanda's son. Mean- while, the assault had precipitated an uproar in Balovale. Lane-Poole travelled to Balovale in August in an effort to defuse the growing crisis. Luvale leaders joined Kasanda and his fol- lowers in formally rejecting recognition of the Nawinda court.24 22BCR, 125. 2350R, 133. 24The DC eventually ordered the Luvale to avoid the Nawinda court and bring all apeals to the Balovale headquarters. 29 Lane-Poole offered the Luvale and Ndembu leaders positions on the Nawinda court in exchange for their acceptance of Balo- vale's subordinate relationship to Lealui. Luvale and Ndembu leaders rejected all compromises and refused to accept Lozi authority. Although Lane-Poole left these meetings with no resolution, he encouraged Young to pass the Ordinances which would designate the Nawinda court as the First Class Native Court of Balovale.25 The Ordinances which were signed in September had been altered by the Governor to give the British freedom of action in Balovale. Young rewrote the relevant clauses so that he had the sole authority to remove personnel and to rescind de- cisions of Native Courts in Barotse Province.26 Young and his advisors also became less conciliatory toward Yeta in their 27 subsequent attempts to reach a settlement in Balovale. When it became obvious that a compromise could not be obtained, Young's secretary wrote to the Colonial Office with two 0p- tions: the excision of Balovale or the use of British force to support the Lozi position. He advocated an excision because the Lozi had failed to keep the peace.28 25BCR, 128-51; Young to 00 September, 1935, 00 795/92/ 45080/I". 26Dundas to Co, 21 March, 1937, 00 795/89/45080/1. 27The records of the interviews that occurred in April, July and October, 1932, are contained in to 795/89/45080/6. 28Dundas to c0, 22 April, 1937, 00 795/89/45080/6. 50 The change in British attitude was noted by Yeta and his close circle of advisors. They began to question their deci- sion to sign the British-Lozi agreement. Kalonga Wina lament- ed after a session with the Governor in October, 1957: If indirect rule is granted in Balovale, tribes other than Marosi in Bulozi will claim indirect rule also; this will lessen the authority of the Paramount Chief. We do not want indirect rule in any part of the reserve.29 Although the Lozi had initially manipulated the British to their advantage, they sensed that the British would now use the policy of indirect rule against their position. Yeta sent let- ters to several ex-BSAO officials in Britain and encouraged them to lobby the Colonial Office on behalf of the Lozi.50 Governor Young asked the Colonial Office to initiate a Commission of Inquiry on the Balovale crisis.51 The Colonial Office agreed and selected Sir Phillip MacDonell, an official who had previously served in Northern Rhodesia as a judge on the High Court during the twenties. He gathered oral and archi- val evidence in Northern Rhodesia from October, 1958, to March, 29Minutes of a discussion, 22 April, 1937, 00 795/97/ 45080/6. 30R. Worthington, the BSAC Secretary of Native Affairs from 1904-1914, had been in contact with the Colonial Office throughout their debate on the future administration of Baro- tse Province. His Memorandum on Barotse Administration is a classic statement on the territorial basis of Lozi authority. See: 00 795/62/5656. He increased his interest in the Colo- nial Office debates after Yeta's letter. C. Harding also pres- sured the Colonial Office after a letter from Yeta. See: then, Minute, 20 May, 1958, and Harding to CO, 28 August, 1958, CO 795/97/45080/6. 31Young to 00, 20 December, 1937, 00 795/97/45080/6. 51 1959. Both Yeta and Kasanda had prepared for the Commis- sioner and presented written documents to support their posi- tions. ‘Yeta's portfolio included A. Jalla's Histony p; 222 Barotse Nation, which was considered the official history of Bulozi.52 Jalla's passage concerning Lozi-Balovale relations stated that both the Luvale and the Ndembu submitted to Lewan- ika in 1892 after the.Lozi raid.33 Kasanda presented a typed history of the Lunda with special reference to the place of the Ishinde in Lunda expansion.34 Both Yeta and Kasanda were hop- ing that their "traditional" claims could be enhanced through appearance in a written form.55 The Commissioner's findings were published in November, 1959. macDonell was critical of Lozi interventions into Balo- vale affairs, although he argued that British administrators often encouraged Lozi initiatives.36 The Commissioner also noted that the Lozi elite was pressured into these actions by colonial policies: sgcaplan, The Elites pg Barotseland, 251-240. 55 I have not seen Jalla's Histony p§_the Barotse Nation, although all references to Jal a concur on thIs interpreta- tion of the raid. See, for example, Mainga, Bulozi Under the Luyana Kings, 160; EUR, 156-7. 34Political Statement of Chief Shinde of Mukandakunda, Balovale District, CO 795/97/45080/6; see also Thomas Chinyama, The Early Histonz‘ng the Balovale Lunda (Lusaka, 1945)- 35See M. Twaddle, "On Ganda Historiography," g33333y_ig Africa, I (1974), 85-100. 3550R, 142-44. 52 Time has yet to show how far by abolishing slavery and mulasa unpaid labor we have or have not shaken the foundations of native social economy: subsidies to chiefs on a scale as ample as circumstances and their several merits permit may help to hold struc- ture together.5'7 MacDonell was unaware that the subsidies had already proved insufficient to the task. He nevertheless recommended the excision of Balovale from Barotse Province because, in his words, "One Bantu tribe cannot rule another."38 MacDonell added that the Luvale and Ndembu should each have their own Native Authorities and Courts, staffed by the leaders who had resisted the Nawinda court. MacDonell recommended that the Lukwakwa Lozi remain in place as third Native Authority and Native Court for eastern Balovale. Both the Colonial Office and the new Governor, J.A. Maybin, rejected the argument of the Commissioner. Members of the Colonial Office noted that MacDonell's principle about Bantu overrule would undermine colonial relationships involv- ing the Baganda in Uganda.39 Maybin specifically wondered how MacDonell could use this principle to justify the excision when the Report itself recognized the Lukwakwa Lozi as the Native Authority and Native Court fer eastern Balovale. Maybin also rejected MacDonell's implicit criticism of Lozi over- rule in Barotse Province. He interpreted the Balovale crisis as an experiment which failed instead of an indication of 3750s, 79. 3850R, 163. 39Cohen, Minute, 10 June, 1940, co 795/115/45080/6. 55 widespread abuse.40 The Colonial Office supported Maybin's perspective and decided to limit distribution of the Balovale Commission Report to the upper echelons of the Northern Rho- desian administration. Although members of the Colonial Office rejected the reasoning of the Balovale Commission Report, they accepted excision as the most prudent course of action. The excision was implemented in 1941 according to the guidelines set forth by the Commissioner.41 4°Maybin to 00, 14 November, 1939, 00 795/107/45080/6. 41Cohen, Minute, 10 June, 1940, 00 795/115/45080/6; MacDonell to Boyd, 9 September, 1940, 00 795/115/45080/6. CONCLUSION Yeta used the opening of discussions on administrative reform with the British to secure approval for a new Lozi court in Balovale. Although local leaders such as Ishinde Kasanda protested this intrusion, the British supported the actions of Lozi judges. An assault on the steps of the court, however, was a rallying point for local resistors who, in time, forced the British to examine colonial relationships in Balovale. The British, confronted with a choice between the use of force or the excision of Balovale from.Earotse Pro- vince, opted for the latter. This study has offered a fresh interpretation of Yeta's role in the negotiations leading toward the extension of the Native Authority and Court system into Barotse Province. G.L. Caplan argues that the length of these negotiations was a re- sult of Yeta's reluctance to accept the British initiative.1 This reluctance supports Caplan's contention that the British were constantly forcing concessions of power from.the Lozi throughout the colonial period. Caplan concludes, therefore, that the final agreement was reached only after Yeta yielded to British pressure. While Caplan correctly senses'Yeta's reluctance to surrender the autonomy of the Lozi court systems 1Caplan, The Elites of Barotseland, 147-50. 34 55 he fails to appreciate Yeta's skillful manipulation of the British. Indeed, it was Yeta's own pressure on Storrs which reopened the stalled British-Lozi negotiations on administra- tive reform. Yeta pushed for the agreement because he wanted British support for the Lozi court in Balovale. He willingly conceded a role for non-Lozi Native Authorities in Balovale in exchange for control over the Native Court. Yeta was aware that effective Lozi power was based on the control of judicial institutions. British policy throughout the history of the Nawinda court demonstrates the pragmatism of colonial officials during the years of "indirect rule." Maxwell used the pretext of administrative reform.to bring the Lozi court system under greater British supervision. Members of the Colonial Office did not welcome Maxwell's initiative because it limited their options with regard to amalgamation. The conflict between the Governor and the Colonial Office was a result of differing perspectives based on their positions in the colonial hier- archy; they were not quibbling about alternate interpretations of Lugard. Later, both Governor Young and members of the C010- nial Office rejected MacDonell's argument for the excision when his general principles conflicted with the demands of local prac- tice. MacDonell's insights into the impact of colonial policies on "native social economy" were buried with his generalizations about "Bantu overrule" in the colonial files of Northern Rho- desia. LIST OF REFERENCES LIST OF REFERENCES Official Documents Great Britain. Colonial Office. Rhodesia, Northern. Origi- nal Corregpondence, 1924 pp 1940. CO 795 Rhodesia, Northern. Balovale Commission. 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