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I l r max“: 1:555. .dnflgr‘... : “m? 3331.... :w..:xi. .1... y . . ..z . l a .... 4 5 ...-VI. .;}I°i 7": . p) LIBRARIES -‘ ,__- MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY R or) 5 EAST LANSING, MICH 48824-1048 gzkfififigg This is to certify that the dissertation entitled Educational Funding Reform in Michigan Since 1994: How Did the Big Winners Spend the Money? presented by Bert Emerson has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctoral degree in School Administration @ii 94 V Major Professor’s Signature x236 , J" 67 C70 5’ 7 Date MSU is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution o.-.-o-u-u-o----u-.-~---------.-— — —------:-.----------.- u-‘---‘J--—a-.-.-.-.- , A -—-v—--' fl‘r PLACE IN RETURN BOX to remove this checkout from your record. TO AVOID FINES return on or before date due. MAY BE RECALLED with earlier due date if requested. DATE DUE DATE DUE DATE DUE 1% P 5 130088 2/05 c:/ClFlC/DateDue.indd—p. 15 EDUCATIONAL FUNDING IN MICHIGAN SINCE 1994: HOW DID THE BIG WINNERS SPEND THE MONEY? By Bert Emerson A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University In partial fulfillment of the requirements For the degree of Doctor of PhilOSOphy School of Education Department of School Administration 2005 Abstract Educational Funding In Michigan Since 1994: How Did the Big Winners Spend the Money? By Bert Emerson On March 15, 1994, a constitutional amendment, known as Proposal A changed the way Michigan fimded its public school system. A major source of revenue was shifted from property tax to a sales tax. Distribution of school aid was also radically altered fiorn system rooted in local tax to a centrally controlled foundation grant. One of the goals of Proposal A was to narrow the per pupil funding variation existent in Michigan’s public school districts. During the seven-year term of this study, disproportionately large funding increases were granted to the low-spending schools relative to the modest revenue increases enjoyed by the highest spending school districts. With the exception of a small number of outliers, the range of per pupil funding variance was narrowed from more than $6,000 to $1,300. This dissertation’s population of interest is the group of school districts that gained the most from Proposal A, those districts that received less than $3,950 the year before the passage of Proposal A and $6,500 in the last year of this study. Two questions were addressed: 1. What did the big winners do with the windfalls? 2. Did decision-making processes change? Before the funding change, decision-makers in sample districts chose low taxes rather than advocating expensive educational program. In apparent anomaly, this did not change with the passage of Proposal A. Relying on quantitative data extracted from various Department of Education sources and qualitative data collected in a series of interviews, this study concludes that cautious decision- makers resisted massive Spending increases even though Proposal A ostensibly made money available without impacting local taxes. While the new Proposal A monies were allocated to restoration of program offered in previous years, times of relative affluence, much of the new money was not spent. Money was allowed to accumulate in funds equity. No material changes were perceived in the decision- making process. Dedication and Acknowledgements As with everything, this dissertation is dedicated to my family: Lynne (Dr. Mom) and Johnny and Mikey. I feel compelled to mention the Great Pyrenees as well, though truth be known, he was more hindrance than help on this project. As with so many things, writing a dissertation is a learned process that, one suspects, gets easier if done a second time. A lesson I learned in my first attempt is to enlist the very best person you can find as chairman. His name is David Plank. Those Saturday morning sessions were well above and beyond the call, most especially for those of us who needed more than a single year’s worth of coaching. David is the perfect combination of gentle critic, coach and friend. David also help recruit the rest of my committee: David Arsen, another friend, Douglas Robert who was there when Proposal A was conceived, and Christopher Dunbar, a gentle and dignified man. Thank you all for your help and patience. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS DEDICATION & ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................... iv LIST OF GRAPHS ................................................................ vii LIST OF TABLES ................................................................ viii INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 1 CHAPTER ONE History of Proposal A ....................................................... 5 CHAPTER TWO Conceptual Framework .................................................... 30 CHAPTER THREE Literature Review .......................................................... 38 CHAPTER FOUR Research Design ........................................................... 48 CHAPTER FIVE Financial Data & Superintendents’ Stories .............................. 59 CHAPTER SD( New Money Old Values ................................................. 107 APPENDD( A History of Foundation Grants ............................................ 1 l6 APPENDD( B 1994 Enrollments, Student Teacher Ratio & Operating Millage . . . 134 APPENDIX C History of Enrollments, Minimum Grant Schools ................... 147 APPENDD( D History ofFunds Balance, Minimum Grant Schools 150 APPENDIX E History of Funds Balance per Pupil, Minimum Grant Schools ...... 152 APPENDD( F History of Foundation Grants, Minimum & Hold Harmless Schools .155 APPENDD( G Proposal A Catch-up Premiums & per Pupil Fund Equity Growth .. 159 APPENDIX H History of Minimum Grant per Pupil Fund Balance re: Total Expense ..160 APPENDIX I ' History of Instructional Expense per Pupil ................................ 161 APPENDIX I History of Average Teachers’ Salaries ..................................... 162 APPENDIX K History of Pupil Teacher Ratio ............................................. 163 APPENDIX L History of Added Needs Expenses per Pupil ............................. 164 APPENDIX M. History of Administrative Expense per Pupil ............................ 165 APPENDD( N History of Operation & Maintenance Expense per Pupil ............... 166 APPENDIX 0 History of Basic Instructional Expense per Pupil ......................... 167 APPENDIX P History of Ending Funds Balance - All Schools .......................... 168 APPENDD( Q Per Pupil Spending - Total General Fund Uses .......................... 197 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................... 198 vi 8. 9. LIST OF GRAPHS . Average Annual Increases in Foundation Grant ..................... Funds Balance per Student .............................................. Sample Schools Increases in Foundation Grant Relative to Increases in Funds Equity Per Student ..................................... Growth in State Foundation Grant and in Equity per Student ...... Catch Up Premium & Annual Growth in Fund Equity ................ Average Instructional Expense per Student ............................... Teachers’ Average Salaries ................................................. Student / Teacher Ratios ................................................... Increase in Basic Instructional Expense ................................. 10. Increase in Added Needs Expense ....................................... 11. Increase in Operation & Maintenance Expense per Student ......... 12. Increase in Administrative Expense per Student ..................... 13. Summary Uses of Proposal A Increases ................................ vii 17 61 68 69 70 73 74 76 78 79 80 82 83 LIST OF TABLES 1. Variations in per Student Grants 1993-94 ............................. l4 2. Variations in per Student Grants 1994-95 ............................. 20 3. Variations in per Student Grants 1995-96 ............................. 21 4. Variations in per Student Grants 1996-97 ............................. 22 5. Variations in per Student Grants 1997-98 ............................. 23 6. Variations in per Student Grants 1998-99 ............................. 24 7. Variations in per Student Grants 1999 — 2000 ........................ 25 8. Variations in per Student Grants 2000 — 2001 ........................ 26 9. History of Proposal A Foundation Grant Growth ..................... 27 10. History of Variation Between Base & Minimum Foundation Grants ..28 11. Overall Funding Variation 1993-94 and 2001-2002 .................. 29 12. Sample Districts’ Pre-Proposal Funding & Enrollments ............. 53 13. Aggregate Enrollment Histories 1993-94 through 2000-2001 ...... 54 14. Aggregate Funds Equity ................................................... 60 15. Year-End Funds Equity ................................................... 63 16. Fund Equity as a Percentage General Fund Budget (FY 1994) ...... 64 viii Educational Funding Reform in Michigan Since 1994: How Did the Big Winners Spend the Money? Bert Emerson On March 15, 1994, Michigan voters approved, by referendum, an amendment to the state constitution that profoundly changed the state’s method for funding its public school system. Commonly known as Proposal A, the change addressed three major concerns: tax reform, distribution of educational dollars and funding equity between local districts.‘ Proposal A Shifted the primary source of funding for Michigan’s public school system from a local ad valorem property tax to a state sales tax and changed distribution of school monies from a localized system to a state-based, per student foundation grant program. Thus, under the terms of Proposal A, Michigan switched from a modified power equalized system to a modified foundation system2 and a three-tiered financing system was constructed to narrow funding differences between Michigan’s school districts. When the source of school revenue Shifted from local millage elections to the state legislature, so too went local control of the amounts of money available to local schools. Provisions in Proposal A were designed so that local public school boards could no longer significantly impact revenues. Districts suddenly had to ' See “School Finance in Michigan Before and After The Implementation of Proposal A,” Appendix A, The Michigan School Aid Act Compiled and AMices, prepared jointly by the Michigan House and Senate Fiscal Agencies, October 1994. 2 Courant, Paul N., Gramlich. Edward and Loch, Susanna, “A Report on School Finance and Educational Reform” from the proceedings of a Conference held at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, October 27-28, 1994 manage with the money that came from the state. This meant that districts that had historically enjoyed local voter support for many educational services could no longer respond quickly to new demands. On the other hand, Proposal A funding also meant that local school districts that had habitually approved little additional school tax suddenly discovered windfall revenue increases without the effort of persuading reluctant local electorates to raise local property taxes. Those who study change have found that, at the individual level, most people resist change. At the organizational level, most change occurs incrementally. At both levels, connection to past preferences and behaviors is common. But Proposal A forced significant change, change that could not be resisted. Funding rules were fundamentally rewritten and local school districts could only learn to manage within the new system. Once revenue constraints were loosened for those districts that enjoyed the greatest increases, it is rational to presume that spending would consume much of the new money. This presumption can be rationally tested. This dissertation studies a sample of school districts that experienced the largest funding increases as a result of Proposal A. It poses and answers two fundamental questions: 1. How did the big winners spend the money? 2. Was the decision making process affected when control of revenue levels shifted from local school boards to the state legislature? Financial data published by the Michigan Department of Education will be presented for the last year preceding Proposal A and for the first seven years of the new funding era (school fiscal years 1993-94 through 2000-01). Growth in spending and variation in proportionate spending will be compared with qualitative data collected in a series of interviews with decision makers in the study’s sub—section population. If no new Spending resulted from Proposal A revenues, additional revenues would accumulate in a district’s fluid equity. Such equity growth would appear in Department of Education data as reported in Form B. Interview responses would also reveal funds equity growth, most especially if local decision makers overtly decided to save new money rather than spend it. In districts in which Proposal A money resulted in additional spending, Department of Education data would indicate how districts spent these new funds whether in employing additional instructional staff, Spending more in non-instructional areas or in capital spending. Qualitative responses will color financial indication of districts’ intent in the use of new monies. Constant budget allocations and unchanged student teacher ratios may indicate that district status quos were not affected by new Proposal A monies. The proposal’s additional money may merely have caused the price of the status quo to rise. On the other hand, changed budget allocations may indicate local decision makers’ preferences. Insight relative to how new allocations were determined will be sought in the qualitative research. To help understand the results, studies of lottery winners and others who have experienced large, unexpected financial windfalls will be cited. As a constitutional amendment, Proposal A presented change that could not be resisted. The change in funding was sudden. This dissertation studies the 9 effect, if any, on the public school districts that stood to gain the most. Chapter I History of Proposal A Prior to Proposal A, Michigan schools were heavily reliant on local property I tax revenue. As a result, Michigan property tax levies were nearly the highest in the nation.3 At the same time, because revenue was local, there were also significant variations in per student revenues across the state’s 555 local school districts. In 1993-94, Michigan’s lowest-funded school district received local tax and state aid that combined to only a fifth the amount per student that the highest- funded school district received in local tax per student.4 This long-standing state of affairs changed suddenly and dramatically. Phillip Kearney, the unofficial historian of Michigan school finance, put it this way: In late July of 1993, in lightning-like fashion, the Michigan Legislature eliminated entirely the local property tax as a source of operating revenue for the public schools. The public school establishment awakened on the morning of July 22, 1993 to find, as a result of the Legislatln'e’s adoption of Public Act 145 of 1993, fully two thirds of its operating revenues wiped out and no immediate prospects for how that revenue was to be replaced. The Legislature not only had thrown out the local property tax asasourceofschoolfunding,it1mddonesowithoutmakingany provision whatsoever for replacing the $6.5 billion lost as a consequence of its action. Michigan had departed from the fold, becoming the only state in the nation other than Hawaii that apparently would not be looking to the local property tax as a major source of school operating revenues.5 3 “Michigan’s High Wire Act”, Addonizio, Michael F., Kearney, 0. Phillip, and Prince, Henry 1., Wm 20 (Winter 1995). p. 235 - 269- ‘ see Appendix A — Senate Fiscal Agency Data: History of Foundation Grants 5 “A Primer on Michigan School Finance,” Kearney, 0. Phillip, Educational Studies Program, University of Michigan, Third Edition, 1994, p.1 The ensuing crisis lasted several months. It was eventually resolved on March 15, 1994, with the passage of an amendment to the state’s constitution. That amendment is commonly known as Proposal A.6 While the new system brought profound change to the process of school funding, many of the disadvantages of the old system remained. Most specifically, even though the new system narrowed the disparity between best and lowest flmded of the state’s schools, Proposal A funding still reflected the funding hierarchy of the discarded system. School districts that had been the lowest funded before the passage of Proposal A remained the lowest funded. Those districts with the most revenue before Proposal A continued to receive the most money per student in the new system. Still, all of the state’s schools benefited financially in the proposal’s first year and the variation in funding was narrowed by disproportionately larger increases for the lowest funded school districts. Commitrrrents were also made for continuation of catch-up subsidies for those low-funded districts in future years. The goal was to have each of the state’s schools receive at least a “basic” per student foundation grant, initially established at $5,000. District Power Equalizing The Gilbert E. Bursley School District Equalization Act of 1973 (Bursley) had regulated the vast majority of funding for Michigan public schools for 18 ‘ qt. Cit. “Michigan’s High Wire Act” years.7 Bursley was a modified district power equalized funding system, the purpose of which was to combine local taxing efforts, as expressed in local millage elections, with state subsidies in order to equalize taxing efforts between school districts with high tax bases and those with little tax base. District Power Equalizing (DPE) represents tax base equalizing.8 In theory, DPE negates differences in local taxable wealth. Its primary purpose is to equalize the effect of differing tax bases. Low taxable values ought not prevent local school districts from producing as many dollars per student for education as any other district. Conversely, no district should be able, by virtue of high property tax value, to finance expensive educational programs at low tax rates. DPE is an arrangement between the state and its localities, the goal of which is to produce a one-to-one positive relationship between revenues per student and school tax rates, exactly in accord with the situation that would prevail if tax bases (per student) were equal throughout the state.9 Through a system of subsidies, a state legislature guarantees a specified number of dollars per student for each mil of local taxing effort. If local property tax values are not sufficient to raise the legislatively guaranteed amount, the state subsidizes the local taxing effort. Power equalizing for local schools is based on a guaranteed number of dollars for every 7 See “School Finance in Michigan Before and After The Implementation of Proposal A,” Appendix A, The Michigg School Aid Act Compiled and Amdices, prepared jointly by the Michigan House and Senate Fiscal Agencies, October 1994. 8 see Benson. Charles 8.. WM Housman Mimi!) Company, Boston, 1978 pages 350-351 9 Ibid. Pages 350-1 mil in local tax multiplied by the number of students in the local school. The more millage approved by local electorates, the larger the guarantee per student. Under Bursley, Michigan’s various school communities decided the rates at which they chose to tax themselves. Local tax was then levied at those rates. 9 Taxes were collected and the correct state subsidies were added to the tax until districts received the legislatively guaranteed amounts from the combination of those two somees - local tax and state subsidy. Subsequently, local schools received the legislatively guaranteed “yield” for the millage levied for each of their students, regardless of the taxable values in their districts. Differences in frmding per studentwere to result from the willingness and ability of local communities’ to tax themselves for educational services and not to be the result. of local property value DPE contains at least two weaknesses by which dollar equity can be subverted, possibly resulting in disparate funding. If DPE guarantees do not grow at rates that exceed the fastest growing tax values or, alternately if recapture provisions do not govern formulae, local tax yield may exceed the maximum guaranteed by the DPE formula. Secondly, various communities’ willingness to approve or ability to pay high local property tax levies for schools’ use can result in significant variation in local districts’ approved tax levels and, subsequently, in funding. Tax Eflort and Tax Yield The fundamental appeal of DPE lies in mollification of distinction between tax effort and tax yield. Tax effort refers to the number of mils, the level of tax ‘ rate, a community is willing to levy against its property. Tax yield alludes to the number of dollars that are raised in the arithmetic of tax rates multiplied by taxable value. A fundamental weakness in DPE lies in the responsiveness of the legislature to adjust DPE formulae as property values change at different rates in diflemnt parts of the state. prroperty values have grown faster than the DPE guarantee, more money can be raised in local tax than is guaranteed in the DPE formula. If left unchecked, DPE’S primary purpose, the equalization of disparate property values per student, is thwarted. If local tax yield exceeds the DPE guarantee, high valuation districts can receive more by actually levying less millage tlmn lower valuation school districts receive even when state aid is added to local tax revenues. As an example consider a district in which an extremely valuable property is located (e.g. a nuclear power plant). This district can levy a relatively low rate of millage and still collect tax revenue far in excess of the yield guaranteed in the DPE formula. A neighboring district, one without a similarly high value property, can levy a higher rate of millage, collect both local tax and the subsidies guaranteed by DPE, and still have fewer dollars in toto than the district with the single high valuation property. As a result of the high tax collected from the owner of the high valued property, the tax yield from the low levy is higher than the higher tax effort of all taxpayers in the neighboring community. The relationship between taxing effort, as expressed in the number of mils levied, and tax yield is inverted. Despite the DPE character of Bursley, it was not uncommon in the early 19903 for the tax effort and tax yield relationship to be inverted in Michigan. This inversion of local tax effort and yield is demonstrated by comparing the 1993-94 funding for the Mackinac Island Public Schools with the same year’s funding for the Taylor School District.lo Mackinac Island is a popular resort island with valuable business and residential properties but few resident school age students: Only 88 students were enrolled in 1993-94. The district levied less local tax for schools (7.8 mils in 1993-94) than any other school system in the state. That levy raised $8,514 per student.11 In contrast, suburban schools in Genesee County (Flint), Kent County (Grand Rapids) and the Detroit tri-county area levied millages in excess of 38 mils. Taylor School District, a Detroit suburb, levied 45.67 school mils, the state’s highest school millage rate. Taylor received $3,234 per student in local tax and $2,415 in state aid.12 Despite Mackinac Island’s ineligibility for DPE subsidy, local taxes per student exceeded Taylor’s total Bursley yield guarantee of $5,649 per student by almost $3,000 per student even to S t 1513 endix B, “1994 Enrollments, Ranking in State, Student'l‘eacher Ratios & Operating Millage” :; Michigan Department of Education Bulletin 1014, 1993.94 Ibid. 10 though Taylor’s taxing effort was more than six times the Mackinac Island tax rate. During the late 19708 and the 19803, local tax bases across the state grew at rates that varied greatly from community to community. DPE theory was allowed to founder when the Michigan legislature failed to adjust the formula guarantee to keep pace with the fastest growing valuations. By 1993-94, fully a third of the State’s school districts could raise more money in local property tax than the Bursley formula guaranteed. While those districts (said to be “out-of-forrnula”) received no general state aid, local taxes per student exceeded the amounts guaranteed to “in-formula” districts with less local property valuation. The common DPE alternative to fast growing valuations outdistancing formulae is to legislate recapture formulae that confiscate “excess” local tax. While attempts were made to recapture local taxes, they were not effective. Variation in Communities’ Taxing Capacities It is not accurate to say that school districts funded under a full-fledged DPE system have equal capacity to pay for schools. DPE does nothing in the short run to equalize the proclivity in some school districts for approving additional school millage and the predisposition in other school districts to prefer lower taxes even if that means less service. 11 Districts with few low-income households are in a much better position to increase school tax rates than are districts in which the majority of households are poor. Park & Carroll (1979)13 examined the fates of millage requests in Michigan school districts between the 1971-72 and the 1975-76 school years. They ' estimated the responses of school districts’ to the fiscal incentives implicit both in the foundation plan that proceeded Blnsley and also in the first three years of Bursley. Park & Carroll concluded that the demographic characteristics of districts afiected the amounts of money available to the local schools: We find significantly higher expenditures in school districts serving populations tlmt are wealthier, higher-income, [and with residents] employed in higher-level positions” .and more urban. Expenditmes are significantly lower In school districts serving populations that tend to live In. ..."poverty A full-fledged DPE system does not compensate for disparate taxing capacities that are the result of resident voters’ proclivities and abilities to pay higher school tax. Tax price is also affected by the deductibility of state property taxes fiom federal income taxes. Michigan’s Property Tax Relief Act (known as a “circuit breaker”) provided tax credits to tax payers who paid high property taxes relative to their incomes, in efi‘ect potential price subsidies via income tax deductions or rebates. The likelihood for qualifying for such subsidies increased with the local :1--‘._ l; ' F25 fortheNatronalInstrtuteof EducauonalandtheUSDeparunentofHealth,Educauon&WelfareMarchl979 pageV (summary) " Ibid., page V 12 property tax bill and the level of taxpayer sophistication, qualities that were not evenly dispersed throughout the state. '5 Over a period of years, and, in some cases dozens of elections, levels of educational service and the amount taxpayers were willing to pay for them were I established in each of Michigan’s communities. In addition, people tended to move to communities that provided combinations of educational services and taxes that suited their preferences, given their incomes (see Tiebout"), subsequently reinforcing the diversity of districts’ tax levels and services. By 1993, the results of a poorly maintained DPE grant system and disparate tax capacities had combined to distort the relationship of tax effort and tax yield in Michigan public school finance. Consequently the amounts of money that districts could spend varied greatly. Local Funding Disparity the Year Before Proposal A In fiscal 1994, the last fiscal year of the Bursley system, the highest-funded pupils in the state attended the Bois Blane Pines School District, a small northern school district near the Mackinac Bridge.17 The per-student funding level in Bois Blane was $13,734. That same year, Sigel Township School District #3, another small district but in Michigan’s thumb, had only $2,762 available for each of its ls - Ibrd. '6 Tiebout, Charles, “A Prue Theory of Local Expenditures,” Journal of Political Economy 64 (Oct 1956): 422 '7 see Appendix A, History ofFoundation Grants, Senate Fiscal Agency Data 13 students. While both of these schools served small populations and neither offered high school instruction - resident students attended neighboring high schools as tuition students - variation in funding allowed Michigan’s highest-funded public school district to spend almost five times the number of dollars available to the ‘ state’s lowest-funded public school. The lowest-funded kindergarten through twelfth grade (K-12) systems functioned on approximately a third the number of dollars received by the highest- firnded K-12 programs. A rural northern Michigan K-12 school district, the Onaway Area Community Schools, had only $3,398 for each of its 1,025 students. A Detroit suburban school district, the Bloomfield Hills School District, was the highest-funded K-12 school district in Michigan with $10,294 to spend on each of its 5,582 students. In the initial year of Proposal A, school districts that received less than $4,200 per student in 1993-94 would receive either a $250 per student increase or $4,200, whichever was more. Thirty-nine school districts spent between Sigel Township’s $2,762 and $3,949 in 1993-94. Forty-seven school districts had more than $6,500 to spend on their students. Michigan’s remaining 468 school districts spent between $3,950 and $6,470 in fiscal 1994. (Table 1) - Variations in pg pppil we 4993-94" $2,762 > $3,939 40 school districts $3,951 > $4,198 65 school districts $4,206 > $4,998 257 school districts $5,008 > $6,470 146 school districts < $6,500 47 school districts " Developed fi'orn Appendix A, “History of Foundation Grants” 14 Bursley repealed By approving Proposal A on March 15, 1994, Michigan voters “overtume‘d the financial structure of school districts across the state and included provisions that would alter the revenue raising capabilities of cities, townships, counties and tax increment districts.” ‘9 In its summary description of the proposal, Moody’s Investor Service predicted that new emphasis would be placed on enrollment prediction and planning. At the same time the new system clearly de-emphasized local variables such as economy and voter supports - the very things that had driven Bursley - as major determinants of school district revenue growth.20 Districts would be challenged in their ability to manage the impact of enrollment on their existing cost structures while retaimng only limited control over the revenue stream. The legislative enactment of Proposal A, Public Act 336 of 1993 (enrolled House Bill 5123) eliminated the Bursley Act and replaced it with a three-tiered foundation grant system. Moody’s Invertors Service described the three-tiered system this way: First, rather than move all districts in which the 1993-94 per pupil revenues were under $5,000 up to $5,000 immediately, the legislature chose to move those districts up gradually. Districts below $4,200 per pupil in 1993-94 are raised to $4,200 per pupil in 1994-95, or by $250 per pupil, whichever is greater. '9 Tax Reform in Michigan: The Impact of Proposal A,” Moody’s Investor Service, 1997 Municipal Credit Research Bulletin, May 1997, page 1 ’° Ibid. Page 4 15 Second, the Legislature chose not to bring all remaining districts up, or down, to a $5,000 per pupil starting point in 1994- 95. Rather, it chose to use each individual district’s 1993-94 revenue per pupil level as the starting point and increase that level on a sliding scale. The district in which the 1993-94 revenue per pupil level was close to $4,200 received a larger increase for 1994- 95 than the district in which the 1993-94 per pupil level was closer to $6,500. Third, the Legislature chose not to “level down” but rather “hold harmless” those districts in which 1993-94 per pupil revenues levels exceeded $6,500 as long as voters in those districts are willigrlg to tax themselves at a rate in addition to the required 18 mill rate. Because the new grant levels were based on the old firnding system, the hierarchy of lowest-funded to best-funded did not change. The range was narrowed in the proposal’s first year and the authorizing legislation contained a formula by which the lowest-funded school districts (this study’s subject population) continued to receive larger increases as new yearly allocations were established. In each of the first seven years of the proposal, the state’s lowest- frmded schools received larger increases in their funding than did the state’s highest-funded schools. While the hierarchy of flmding did not change, Proposal A significantly and dramatically increased fluids available to the lowest funded of the state’s school districts, thus narrowing the range. 2‘ Kearney, op cit. “Primer on Michigan School Finance” pages 16-17 16 naM—%§§ Graph 1 Average Annual Increase In Foundatlon Grants -—-.——l — H . . , . a r r a e . . . g e r a r s . . r a a a s a . a o a - n 1 r s 9 o a a a 1 a . a p r . s r . . b - 4 r . e . a .4 1 a b . p o rrrtfifi'rv . a s . . a a a . r . a a u . - r o a o o . . a - a a [TI—rifflvvus ......aaa... .......... . 1995 1996 1997 1998 719999 2000 2001 Beverage/population $386 $306 $310 $308 $530 Llstate wlo population $221 $208 $204 $196 $1 $285 $301 17 “Minimum” grants of $4,200 were awarded to schools that received less than $3,950 per student in the year before Proposal A. (This was a single year increase of 52% - from $2,762 to $4,200 - for the state’s lowest funded school, Siegel Township School District #3.) Thirty-nine (39) other below-$3,950 school districts also received $4,200 in 1994.95.“2 “Minimum” grants between $4,200 and $5,000 and “basic” grants between $5,000 and $6,500 came to the majority of Michigan public schools. “Hold-harmless” grants of $6,500 plus additional taxing authority came to the 54 school districts that had been the state’s best-funded districts. Subsidies to the “minimum” grant school districts narrowed both the absolute dollar difl'erences and the percentage differences between highest and lowest funded of the state’s districts. In Spite of their continued status as the lowest-funded school districts in the state, many schools in Michigan enjoyed windfalls in the Proposal’s initial year and continued to receive disproportionately larger increases in revenue in the subsequent five years of implementation. Unlike Bursley’s reliance on local taxing authority, Proposal A established a foundation grant system that guaranteed levels of per student funding for operations while anticipating the same state property tax rate across Michigan. All of the state’s homesteads were taxed at a rate of six mils of the property’s taxable value. In order for school districts to receive their full foundation grants, local electors were required to pass a local property tax of 18 mils on all non-homestead 22 See Appendix A , History of Michigan Public Schools Foundation Grants (pages 1 8r 2) 18 properties in the school district. Proposal A foundation grants were computed on the presumption that 18 mils were approved and levied on non-homestead properties. Non-homestead properties were required to also pay the six mils in state school tax.23 Per Student Funding in 1994-95, Year One of Proposal A In the first year of Proposal A the hold-harmless school districts were granted authority to seek and, if approved by local electorates, to levy additional local tax to maintain their pre-Proposal A revenue levels. Those local property tax millages could continue historical funding levels by whatever dollar amount was approved by the legislature for increase in the basic foundation grant -- $200 in 1994-95.“ Fifty-four (54) school districts — the 47 pre-Proposal schools and seven other districts that in 1993-94 were within the sliding formula of the new “hold- harmless” level - used their new taxing authority to maintain per student funding above the $6,500 “hold-harmless” level.” The school revenue that exceeded the hold-harmless threshold was all local tax money. One hundred ninety-six (196) school districts received grants that varied between the $5,000 “basic” grant and the $6,500 “hold-harmless” grant.“ : Op. cit. School Finance Reform in Michigan Before and After Implementation of Proposal A Ibid :SeeAppendixA: “HistoryofFormdationGrants” Ibid 19 While the “basic” grant was the eventual goal for the 309 school districts that received less than $5,000 in 1994-95, those districts were not immediately awarded a “basic” grant. Instead they received a foundation grant of at least $4,200 or a Sliding scale increase that exceeded the $200 increase for school districts above the “basic” grant. 27 (Table 2 ) Variations in mt pupil gpapts -1 994-9528 (minimum) = $4,200 40 school districts $4,200 > $5,000 267 school districts (basic) = $5,000 2 school districts $5,000 > $6,500 194 school districts (hold-harmless) <$6,500 52 school districts In the first year, 267 school districts, almost half of the districts in the state, received a per student grant that was more than the $4,200 “minimum” grant but less than the $5,000 “basic” grant. Those less-than-“basic” schools also received catch-up subsidies, based in a sliding scale formula that, in turn, was based in annual legislative increases in school funding per student. Year 2 of Proposal A (1995-96): Catching up In 1995-96, the proposal’s second year, $153 was added to the foundation ’7 Op. Cit. “School Finance in Michigan Before and After the lmplernentation ofProposal A” a Developed from Appendix A: History of Foundation Grants (Senate Fiscal Agency) 20 grant. 29 A catch-up factor of exactly twice that increase was added to “minimum” foundation grants.30 The “minimum” grant therefore became $4,506 for the Proposal’s second year.” School district grants that exceeded the 1994-95 “minimum” grant ($4,200), yet were still less than the “basic” 5,000 grant in 1994-95, again enjoyed catch-up increases that exceeded the “basic” grant’s increase. The sliding scale awarded subsidies to some school districts that nearly doubled the $153 basic grant increase, while schools that were nearly at the “basic” level received only a few dollars as supplement to the foundation’s increase.32 (Table 3) Variations in my mil grams 4995-9633 (minimum) = $4,506 39 school districts $4,506 > $5,153 245 school districts (basic) = $5,153 25 school districts $5,153 > $6,653 194 school districts (“hold-harmless”) < $6,653 52 school districts In response to a desegregation order, the state was ordered to increase the foundation grant to the Coloma Community Schools from the first year’s “minimum” grant ($4,200) to $4,949 in 1995-96. The 39 remaining school 32: “State School Aid Update”, Michigan Department of Education, Vol. 3, No.8, May 1995 lbid 3' See Appendix A: History of Foundation Grants (Senate Fiscal Agency) 3’ Op. Cit. “State School Aid Update”, Michigan Department of Education, Vol. 3, No.8, May 1995 3’ Developed fi'om Appendix A: “History of Foundation Grants” 21 districts that received the 1994-95 “minimum” continued in the lowest bracket of the l995-96-grant array. The difference between the “minimum” grant and the “basic” grant was narrowed by $153, that year’s funding increase. Because 23 school districts were only a few dollars below the “basic” grant in 1994-95, the catch-up supplement for 1995-96 was sufficient to place them on the “basic” rung of Proposal A’s funding ladder. Twenty-five (25) schools districts were funded exactly at the “basic” level in 1995-96. Although the gap between lower and higher funded school districts decreased, makings did not change. The roster of districts between the “basic” and the “hold-harrnless” levels remained the same in 1995-96 as it was in 1994-95. Likewise, the same fifty-two (52) “hold-harmless” schools maintained that status in 1995-96. The “basic” foundation was increased by $155 in 1996-9734 and again in 1997-98.35 For both school years the same sliding scale formula was employed to Subsidize districts that were filnded below the new basic grant. (Table 4) Variations in 12 pupil we —1996-973‘5 (minimum ) = $4,816 39 school districts $4,816 > $5,308 220 school districts (basic) = $5,308 50 school districts $5,308 > $6,808 194 school districts (hold-harmless) < $6,808 52 school districts 3‘ “State School Aid Update,” Michigan Department of Education, Vol. 4, No 8, ere 1996 3’ Ibid. Vol. 5. No 8, May 1997 3‘ developed fiom Appendix A: “History of Foundation Grants” 22 As a result of the catch-up subsidy, 25 more schools moved from the below-“basic” status to “basic” status in 1996-97. The “rising tide” of the foundation grants floated 55 additional schools into a “basic” level in 1997-98. The roster of minimum grant schools and those above basic remained the same. (Table 5) Variations in my pupil gmts —1 997-9837 (minimum) = $5,124 39 school districts $5,124 > $5,462 165 school districts (basic) = $5,462 105 school districts $5,462 > $6,962 194 school districts (hold-harmless) < $6,962 52 school districts Only “minimum” foundation allowances were increased in 1998-99. They increased by $46 to $5,170.38 The 39 “minimum” grant schools and 17 other schools that received less than $5,170 in 1997-98 were increased to $5,170. Other districts’ grants were not changed from the 1997-98 levels. ’7 developed fiorn Appendix A: “History of Foundation Grants” 3' “State School Aid Update,” Michigan Department of Education, Vol. 7 No. 1, October 1998 23 (Table 6) Variations in pp; pupil wts 4998-9939 (minimum) = $5,170 56 school districts $5,170 > $5,462 148 school districts (basic) = $5,462 105 school districts $5,462 > $6,962 194 school districts (hold-harmless) < $6,962 52 school districts Year Six: All Rise to “Basic” The “basic” foundation grant was increased by $234 for the 1999-2000 school year40 and the sliding scale subsidies were again added to “below-basic” grants. The “minimum” grant grew, initially, to $5,696. However, in June 2000, just as schools’ fiscal years were ending, Enrolled Senate Bill 1044 added a late session supplement for 1999-2000 funding.4| When Signed into law as Public Act 297 of 2000 on July 26, 2000, that legislation’s “equity payment” elevated the 39 “minimum” districts and the remaining 49 “below-basic” schools to the new “basic” grant level.42 For the first time, all school districts in Michigan received at least the basic foundation grant in 1999-2000 school year. Three hundred nine (309) districts received that “basic” grant. One hundred forty-Six (146) schools 39 Developed from Appendix A: “History of Foundation Grants” ‘° “State School Aid Update,” Michigan Department of Education, Vol. 8. No. 1, October 1999 “ “State School Aid Update,” Michigan Department of Education, Vol. 8 No. 11, August 2000. ‘2 Developed from Appendix A: “History of Foundation Grants” 24 were still above the “basic” grant but below “hold-harmless” and the same 52 “hold-harmless” schools still levied operational millage to maintain their above “hold-harmless” status. (Table 7) Variations in la pupil wts 4999-2000“ (basic) = $5,700 309 school districts $5,700 > $7,200 146 school districts (hold-harmless) < $7,200 52 school districts In addition to eliminating the “minimum” and “below basic” categories, Public Act 297 of 2000 also included appropriations for 2000-2001, 2001-2002 and 2002-2003 foundation grants. Three hundred ($300) dollars were added to per student foundation grants for 2000-2001; three hundred dollars ($300) were also promised for 2001-2002; and $200 were promised for 2002-2003. Most importantly for narrowing the variations among districts, an additional $200 was added for “basic” grant districts for 2001-2002. With this last “equity payment,” the range between the “basic” schools and the “hold-harmless” threshold was narrowed fi'om the initial $1,500 range in the first years of the proposal to $1,300. While $1,300 still represents almost 25% of the per pupil funding for basic schools, differences of 300% and more had disappeared. ‘3 developed from Appendix A: History of Foundation Grants (Senate Fiscal Agency) 25 (Table 8) Variations in per mil grants - 2000-2001“ (basic) = $6,000 309 school districts $6,000 > $7,500 195 school districts (hold-harmless) <$7,500 52 school districts The $200 “equity” payment included in Public Act 297 of 2000 was the last of the proposal’s disproportionate increases to the state’s lowest-funded local school districts. Proposal A’s Seven Year History Before Proposal A, Michigan public school ftmding varied by more than $11,000 per student. By fiscal 2001, a majority of the state’s schools received a basic grant ($6,000 per student) which was more than twice the amounts received in the last year of Bursley. Bois Blane Pine’s School District retained its highest-in-the-state funding status. Its per-pupil grant had grown to $15,192. The difference between the absolute highest and the lowest funded educations had narrowed from $10,972 to $8,692“ or almost 20%. However, only the 54 school districts received grants above the hold harmless level and those hold-harmless premiums were all funded “ developed from Appendix A: “History of Foundation Grants” “seeAppendixA: “HistoryofFomdationGrants” 26 by additional local property tax. Excluding those 54 outliers, educations funded by state aid dollars varied by no more than $1,300. The funding gap was closed by granting relatively modest firnding increases to the state’s best-funded districts while adding larger amounts, both in dollar terms and percentage terms, to the state’s lowest-funded districts. (Table 9) History of Proposal A Foundation Grant Growth minimum basic hold-harmless 1994-95 $4,200 $5,000 $6,500 1995-96 $4,506 $5,153 $6,653 1996-97 $4,816 $5,308 $6,808 1997-98 $5,124 $5,462 $6,962 1998-99 $5,170 $5,462 $6,962 1999-00 $5,696“ $5,700 $7,200 2000-01 $6,000 $6,000 $7,500 ‘Increased retroactively to $5,700 in July 2000 All of the school districts that received the $6,000 “basic” grant ill 2000-01 had received less than the $5,000 “basic” grant in the proposal’s first year. For Sigel Township School District #3, the lowest funded school in 1993-94, the $3,238 increase was an increase of 117%. 27 Interestingly, with the promise of PA 297 of 2000 and its 2001-02 minimum grant of $6,500, the “minimum” grant had, in eight years, come to equal what in the beginning of Proposal A was the highest state supported grant. This advance caused then-Michigan Governor John Engler to boast in a letter to the legislature: “What was once considered extraordinary has now become universal?“5 (Table 10) History of Variance Between Base & Minimum Foundation Grants 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98 1 998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001 -02 Base $4,200 $4,506 $4,816 $5,124 $5,170 $5,696" $6,000 $6,500 Minimum $5,000 $5,1 53 $5,308 $5,462 $5,462 $5,700 $6,000 $6,500 difference $800 $647 $492 $338 $292 $ 4 $ 0 $ 0 For those erstwhile low-funded schools, funding levels had doubled. ‘6 Engler, John, in letter to Michigan House of Representatives, September 28,2001 (Table 11) Overall Fund_m' g Variation 1993-94 and 2001-2002 1993-94 2001-2002 ‘Vogrowth Lowest Funded $ 2,762 $6,500 135.3% Highest funded $13,734 $15,195 10.6% Difference $ 10,972 $8,695 29 Chapter II Conceptual Framework Prior to Proposal A, the political pushing and pulling of the Bursley School District Equalization Act of 1973 defined the economic status quo in which the state’s local school districts existed. Revenues were determined by politics — by the amounts the state legislature guaranteed in the per mil formulae and by the level of local taxes (millages) that local electorates approved. In effect, the local millage elections were public auctions in which communities determined how much they would tax themselves for various arrays of educational services. District school boards proposed new tax levels coupled with promises to provide defined levels of service. The electorate either approved or disapproved the proposed tax levels and, subsequently, the level of educational service that was provided. It is important to acknowledge the variation in services and tax levies under Bursley because Proposal A altered a fundamental connection between funding and local politics. While Proposal A maintained the hierarchy of Bursley spending variation in assigning the new foundation grants, the amounts of funding and the local control of fimding were gone. Conceptually framed in terms of how pre- proposal funding was decided, this paper will explore how new monies were spent 30 when the Bursley equilibriums were disrupted by the proposal’s alteration of funding, and subsequently, spending constraints. The public finance literature ofiem two dominant theoretical explanations for how communities reveal their level of demand for local governmental service, the median voter model" and the Tiebout model.48 Pre-Proposal A patterns of school district taxation and expenditures can be interpreted as a reflection of these two theories. Both define what may be regarded as equilibrium tax/spending combinations across districts, given local residents’ income, tax prices and preferences. Both theoretical mechanisms operate through voter decisions in local school millage elections. Conceptual framework - The Median Voter Model The median voter model supposes a hypothetical citizen whose taste for desired service at an acceptable tax cost is located at the mid-point between those willing to pay more for still more service and those willing to accept less service for lower tax. The median voter is that hypothetical voter on the margin. It is this theoretical voter who casts the deciding vote in local millage elections - the fifty- percent-plus-one consumer who must be satisfied with the proposed array of services at the proposed cost. In theory, the median voter may be the only truly satisfied voter, other voters either willing to pay more tax for more service or ‘7 See Black. Anthony Domes, in Mussmve & Musgnve: WW (Chapter 6) " Tiebout, op cit 31 preferring still less tax even though the lower tax means less service. This median voter determines the level of service in every school district. Each school district determines its educational service level as a firnction of the median voter’s expression at the millage polls. According to this theory, a millage package that is approved by a single vote has perfectly identified the preferences of the median voter. The model assumes that everyone votes or that the voters who do vote somehow represent the wider preferences of all community members. If a large majority of voters approve a new tax array, the newly proposed services have not exploited all of the tax capacity of the district. If the millage is not approved, the proposal was not properly sized for the district’s tastes. The median voter model presumes competing packages of goods and services at varying prices. Demand for education is a function of both income and price. Those with higher incomes can afford more education. On the other hand, the higher the price, the less education can be afforded”9 In the provision of public goods, local voters either accept the new price for the proposed array of services or communities declare the new prices too high and reject the proposals. Periodically, millage authority expires. If voters refuse to renew millages - that is, if the tastes of the median voter change - services must be cut. Over a period of time, the median voter model predicts that each taxing entity establishes an array of services at a specified price that is acceptable to a ‘9 See Addonizio, Michael, “Equity or Choice? School Finance Reform and the Income- Expenditure Relationship,” Journal of Educational Finance, Association of School Business Officials International, Vol. 23, No. 1, summer, 1997, p. 38 32 majority in the community. Equilibrium is established between those who want more and are willing to pay more and those who want to pay less and are willing to accept fewer governmental services. As a result of many elections in many communities, these public auctions determine the matrix of tax levels and services. Each community establishes a status quo that defines the median tastes of the community. Conceptual framework - The Tiebout Models0 The Tiebout model suggests that people choose where they live on the basis of the local services that are provided as a function of local tax price. Households select packages of services that communities have established at the prices that households are willing and able to pay. Preferences for governmental services are expressed by where people choose to live. In essence, the Tiebout model is the flip side of the median voter model. Of course the amount of money available to schools is not the only factor that people consider when deciding where to live. Other quality-of-life factors may be important as well. Change in the availability of service may occur. If desired public sector “products” are no longer available in a community, Tiebout would expect households to move to communities that provide acceptable levels of service at acceptable prices. The values of homes are affected by the level of service and by the tax that is paid to support that array of service. Spatial mobility ”Tiebout,opcit. 33 provides the local public school-goods counterpart to the private market’s shopping trip. 5 ‘ Communities vary in their abilities to afford tax. Taxpayer sophistication relative to the net cost for school tax (after income tax deductions) is also greater 1 in some school districts than in others. Preference functions for school services differ greatly between communities. Whether by virtue of elections or by choices made by mobile consumers, both the median voter model and the Tiebout model anticipate that, over time, consumers’ tastes will be matched to governmental services at acceptable prices. Over time, communities attract like-thinking people and, subsequently, develop identifiable characteristics. Conceptual framework - Local Efl'ects of Proposal A & the Proposal’s Consequent Disruption of the Funding Status Quo Proposal A affected local decision-making in three fundamental respects: 1. There is less local autonomy for determining the amounts of revenues. 2. Independent of local effort, there are differential increases in foundations. 3. The proposal altered the spending constraint in every school district. 5| [bid 34 Proposal A changed the relationships between local tastes and prices. When tax level was determined by the median voter, in theory, services were suggested which were subsequently rejected because the price was too high or accepted because the community was willing to pay for that desired service. Proposal A changed the tax price of education in every school district. It did so by eliminating the connection between local referenda (millage elections) and local funding levels. In districts in which more money became available as a result of the proposal, services could be offered that exceeded the median voter’s taste as determined at the price-desire nexus. The opposite sides of this disconnect deve10ped in districts in which the median voter would have supported higher spending than Proposal A funded. It altered the direct effect local voters’ tastes could exert on available public money. Because local school districts no longer had authority to affect school tax levels, tax capacity was no longer relevant. Frustrated consumers could neither approve additional taxes to provide more services in their local schools nor could they lower their homestead tax by rejecting school millage requests. The preference of the median voter mattered only hypothetically because the bulk of school spending no longer depended on approval of local millages. In communities in which Proposal A allowed less operating money than the median voter would have approved, Proposal A has resulted in the reduction or elimination of programs. In other communities, those of interest in this study, Proposal A has provided more money than was likely to have been available under 35 Bursley. Except for the cultural history of school communities and the expectations that those old agreements may have imposed, the preferences of local voters have became largely irrelevant in determining how much money is available to local school districts. If considered through the lens of Tiebout, Proposal A has altered the range of choices. Price tolerance has become extraneous. School districts are all funded at similar levels, although different districts may choose to spend similar revenues differently. Tiebout-like, consumers can choose among options such as private schools, schools of choice in other communities, charter schools and the like to remedy dissatisfaction. If those alternatives come closer to matching the consumer’s taste at a desired price, Tiebout theory predicts a migration of students from school districts that do not match family preferences to alternatives that better match their taste. Some families may no longer find the services they desire while others may find themselves with more services than they would have supported in pre-Proposal millage elections. Proposal A limits the range of spending, and, subsequently limits the options that competing districts could offer. Given time, the Tiebout effect may redefine each district’s unique array of services. Local governments will have to decide the direction of their spending and the array of services they will offer. Households will then have to react — to move or not to move — in response to the array of services offered. Proposal A has changed the dynamic of decision-making in local school districts. Decisions are no longer directly linked to local voter preferences. 36 Because school decision-makers are not dependent on the next local millage election, citizen influence on local decision-making may have been weakened as there is no longer a local public referendum to validate or repudiate the decisions of district leaders. The dynamic has changed in high-spending districts where the likely approval of more Btusley millage money has been replaced by limited resources that must now be allocated in competition with other local interests. This is also true in school districts where spending was low and Proposal A provided more money than the local voters historically provided. 37 Chapter 111 Literature Review Prior to Proposal A, Michigan’s median voters had established levels of tax and service that were acceptable in every school district. The Tiebout model asserts that people had moved to commrmities that offered services and price levels they wanted, subsequently reinforcing median voter choices. Proposal A upset the status quo of each district however, when finance reform suddenly and irresistibly changed local revenues, and broke their connection to local resident preferences. Proposal A exchanged local control of revenue for the promise of increased revenue without the need of locally approved operational millages. Loss of the connection between revenue and local voter approval signaled a fundamental change for Michigan school districts relative to how much money there was to spend. Well-ftmded districts could no longer propose new programs that required still higher spending. Instead, all programs had to compete within narrowly defined financial constraints. On the other hand, Bursley’s low-funded districts were provided with increases in revenues that made it possible to provide more program than a cost-conscious local electorate would likely have funded locally — atleasthadfundedinthepast. 38 Passage of Proposal A may also have changed how spending decisions were made. Bureaucratic response to windfall gains as reviewed in recent publications offer insight into this paper’s primary topic of interest. Change The literature on organizational behavior recognizes change as an inevitable cultural phenomenon. However, the literature also anticipates that successful, durable change must be firmly rooted in and connected to the old, established status quos. Resistance to change is also well documented as a characteristic of well-established institutions. ’2 ’3 5‘ In order to succeed change must respect its context in history and must be cognizant of the social situations in which the entity must exist. It is important to determine the degree to which an innovation is compatible with existing values and past experiences. On one hand, people rely on predicable controls (norms, traditional values, predictions that help identify who one is) while, on the other hand, change is an irresistible and unavoidable part of life. The literature suggests that there must be a connection between the past and adaptable change. However, when Proposal A changed Michigan school finance, the change was not gradual, nor was there opportunity for participation in a diffusion process before the new system was implemented. Proposal A was imposed on an historic Teacher Edu on and Researc Teachers College Press, New York, 1991 3 Rogers,E. M,Qjflu§i m at lnnovations, The Free Press, New York, 1933 “Marris, P., W Pantheon Books, New York, 1974 39 status quo. Regardless, the change was essentially irresistible and irreversible. Proposal A is cemented in the state’s constitution. Politics A status quo evolved over two decades of Btu'sley era millage elections in which median voter choices decided the levels at which each of the state’s local school districts were funded. Median voter theory suggests that each school district’s constituency was marginally satisfied before Proposal A. Proposal A disrupted that status quo and created a disruption between preferred and imposed levels of ftmding.SS Finally, high-funded school districts could no longer spend as they had habitually spent - and as their constituencies expected that they would continue to spend. Even those districts that had cooperative electorates and large tax bases were suddenly without new money or means to control their revenues.’6 At the same time, the Proposal produced windfalls for low-funded districts and an anomalous, obverse problem. These big winners had more money than their communities collectively expected them to spend. If those communities were content with lower funding levels (and lower spending), how would windfalls be managed and the money spent? ’5 See Addonzio, 1997, op cit 5‘ See Moody’s Invertors Service, op. cit. pages 3 - 6 40 Political models predict that bureaucracies will fight to retain and preserve the established status quo. A primary response of all bureaucracy is to preserve itself. Sudden Wealth Syndrome Until now the literatme has generally dealt with change as a methodical process and a political response that protects status quo. Behavior predicted in the literature on change is fairly consistent with the findings in studies of lotto winners and those who have experienced other sudden, dramatic receipt of wealth: Newly wealthy subjects attempt to reconcile their new situations of wealth to their pre- wealth values, expectations and relationships. While not unprecedented in human experience, the financial windfalls experienced by this study’s sample population changed collective financial circumstances much as if the sample school districts had won a lottery or were recipients of large insurance settlements. A six-year study by the Ontario Lottery Corporation (conducted by Toronto’s Goldfarb Consultants)” found that 93% of the people who won more than $500,000 put most of the money in a bank. A large majority (75%) shared some of the winnings with family or fi'iends. Minor purchases, vacations and paying off debts were also documented in the study. Only 15% of the respondents were said to have affected an over-all change in lifestyle. ”CanadianPressNewswire,S23, 1997 41 Eckblad and von-de-Lippess reported similar findings in their University of Oslo (Institute of Psychology) study of Norwegian lottery winners. Two hundred sixty-one (261) winners of $150,000 or more between 1987-91 were studied. Subjects were described as cautious realists who expressed few emotions aside from moderate happiness and relief. Winners emphasized caution, emotional control and inconspicuous spending. A wish for anonymity was frequent, together with fear of envy from others. Betting was modest both before and after winning. Experiences with winning were predominately positive, and life quality was said to be stable or improved. An age trend was observed, accounting for more variance than any other variable. Older winners seemed to represent a puritan subculture of caution, modesty and emotional restraint. A slightly more impatient pattern of spending was characteristic of younger winners. H.R. Kaplan59 described lottery winners as self-controlled realists rather than as gamblers. While people who experience sudden wealth recognize that spending constraints have shifted, they are wary of the effect their new wealth may have on social relationships. That some of the rules seem to have changed while many other rules may or may not lmve changed was documented in a British Columbia study of lottery winners. Few among us have not dreamt of winning the lottery, spending imaginary millions and fantasizing how different and better life would be. But the couple that recently became British Columbia’s 5' ‘Norwegian Lottery Winners: Cautious Realists”, Eckblad, Gudren-Fleischer and von-de-Lippe, Anna-Lousie, Journal of Gambling Studies, University of Oslo, Winter, 1994, vol. 10 (4), pages 305 -322 ’9 Kaplan, H. Roy, “Lottery Winners: The Myth and Reality,” Journal of Gambling Studies, Winter, 1994, Vol. 10 (4), pages 305 - 322 42 biggest-ever [lottery] winners insists the money will not two their lives upside down . . . ‘A sense of normalcy is the only way to stay sane’ [the couple said]. . . . The couple was reported to have “exceedingly modest dreams.” They planned to buy new shock absorbers for their eight-year-old car and they hope to go skiing. When asked what they planned to spend the money on, the couple responded: “Not much. We want to put the money in the bank and invest it and do what’s needed as the situation presents itself. We don’t want to alter our lives. We want things to stay the same.60 According to a 1996 survey conducted by the British Columbia Lottery Corporation, the most common use of lottery winnings is to bank it. Next most common uses are buying recreational vehicles, paying off debts, buying a boat and donating to charity. Sharing winnings with family came seventh. The study concluded with the observation from spokesperson Elizabeth Bruce: “Generally I don’t think [winning] has a mq'or impact as far as a change in life style?“ Games of change are not the only way people become rich suddenly. The Money Meaning & Choices Institute offers counseling services to California Silicon Valley entrepreneurs who have experienced great financial success.62 Their common profile of clients is a young person who has parlayed an e-based idea into a fortune and then faces life with a new set of rules: Sudden Wealth Syndrome sounds positively awful - until you remember the cause. A lot of the reaction is, ‘you have problems because you have money?’ What a joke! And if talking about money is taboo, then talking about going to therapy because you have too much of it is social suicide — especially in the US, where the pursuit of the mighty greenback is the national pastime and ‘0 ibid. 6| ibid. ‘2 see: “Money, Meaning & Choices,” Canadian Business, vol. 73 (14) August 7, 2000, page 34 - 36 43 striking it rich the ultimate fulfillment of the American Dream. The people we see are very sensitive to these issues. They feel stupid or guilty or humiliated and they’re reluctant to use this kind of service . . . A lot of these people spend 90% of their time at the office . . . Then they wake up wealthy - with more money than they imagined, after less work. . . . After the excitement wears off, they say, ‘Gee, I’m confused.’63 In an unpublished dissertation, Van Wormer64 studied recipients of government grants that were spurred by Sputnik. His research determined that initially grant recipients were confused by the availability of money but, subsequently, they spent money in many of the same ways as they spent money before grants were available. While the National Science Foundation budget grew almost 100 fold in 15 years, from $1.5 million in 1952 to more than $121 million in 1967, Van Wormer reported that not one critic suggested an alternative approach to teaching - such as adopting the Soviet curriculum as an educational model.“ The rise in educational expendittu'es during [the period of] 1957- 1962 was part of a long established trend since the Depression and the Second World War . . . An analysis of the results of public school bond elections in the period 1957-1970 reveals similar results . . . no influence upon education by Sputnik can be established.”66 ‘3 Ibid. “ “Sputnik & American Education” Ph.D. Dissertation. Michigan State University, James William Van Wormer, 1976 ‘5 Ibid, page 74 6‘ Ibid, pages 175 - 6 Van Wormer concludes: “Judged on the whole, no significant change in American educational theory and practice can be directly related to Sputnik and subsequent Soviet space achievement.” 67 Sputnik inspired a lOO-fold increase in federal funding for education and yet it was not powerful enough to affect significant change in the educational status qua. The new money was spent in much the same way that educational money had always been spent. The sudden wealth syndrome defines an identity crisis, a crisis of meaning and purpose. Newly found wealth changes some of the rules, yet it doesn’t necessarily change the culture. Relationships that were important continue to remain important. Family is the same. Friends are often the same. Hobbies and passions still have appeal. Yet the money, the “fulfillment of the American Dream,” has made only dreamt-of options available. Dreams seem to be available for the taking, yet, as the literature on change clearly predicts, change is difficult, oftenresistedand,tobefidlyacceptedmustbeconnectedtothepastwithan umbilical of accepted historical experience. While sudden wealth may inspire a period of euphoria that engenders initial, wild spending, recipients of windfalls often experience confusion, which, after initial exhilaration, matures into an accommodation of old values with new money. Very often the suddenly wealthy return to old life styles that are only modestly enhanced by the windfalls. Factory workers begin living as factory foreman; middle managers adopt life styles similar to their senior management ‘7 Ibid, page 180 45 employers. Sudden wealth doesn’t generally change what is inherently important, nor do the suddenly wealthy wander too far from what has always been familiar and comfortable. Church memberships don’t change. Family and friends don’t change because they are hportant links to the past and to a person’s identity. While it would have been bad television for the Beverly Hillbillies to move back “home” before the series was cancelled, sudden wealth syndrome predicts that, while Jed and Granny may not have moved back to the drafty shack they were living in when fortune befell them, it is highly unlikely that they would have stayed in Beverly Hills. Even before a season of bad ratings, they would likely have moved back to Bug-Tussle; to a house with central heat and running water where they could sit on the front porch and live out their days with people they’d known all their lives, undoubtedly talking about the peculiarities of people in Beverly Hills. Predictions Three hypothesis are proposed for what Proposal A’s biggest winners did with new monies. 1. School districts brueaucracies were slow to act because of institutional inertia and internal disagreement about how to allocate the new resource. More positively put, educators had no idea what investments would best increase student learning and have simply not expended money. “Extra” money from Proposal A was put in the bank pending a thoughtful review 46 and assessment process for changes in resource allocation. As corollary, cynical decision makers boarded the new money. . Windfall increases were negotiated away to the stakeholders. Salaries were increased to employees, more employees were hired and the money was 7 otherwise dribbled away over time, essentially maintaining the status qua. Having more money doesn’t make a difference: More money was spent procuring the same goods and services. . Infiastructures were re-built; buildings and equipment that were long lefi neglected were repaired or replaced. Textbooks and technology were procured to support expanded program for students. The big winners otherwise tried to catch up to the better-financed districts’ programs. 47 Chapter IV Research Design The Michigan Department of Education requires school districts to submit financial data in conformance with the state’s mandated accounting code. Those locally produced data reconcile to independently conducted annual audits and combine in a report commonly known as F orm B. These data are published by the Department of Education in various formats. Form B data may be reviewed on the department’s web site in detail or in compilation, as presented in the Department’s Bulletin 1014. Bulletin 1014 arranges Form B data from individual districts in ranking order to facilitate comparison of the state’s school districts. School districts that gained the most fiom Proposal A were identified through foundation grant histories published by the Michigan Senate Fiscal Agency. Form B data were analyzed to determine how new monies were spent (of not spent). Data from Bulletin 1014 were used in comparing fund uses by the sample districts relative to all of the state’s districts. Enrollment and financial data were gathered from the Michigan Department of Education web site. Case study interviews with decision-makers were conducted in the selected school districts. These qualitative data were gathered in a series of personal interviews, all performed in the 22 original minimum pants school districts that enrolled more than 1,000 students. Those interviews were tape-recorded. Notes andtranscriptsarereferencedinthisstudy. 48 The results of those interviews were compared to Michigan Department of Education accounting data. The research desipl combined quantitative data collected from various Department of Education sources with qualitative data collected from interviews of the big winners’ decision-makers. Sample Population Proposal A established a foundation pant system that relied on pre- proposal levels of per student funding. In its first year (1994-95) the Proposal guaranteed $4,200 per student or an increase of $250 per student for each school district that receipted less than $4,200 in 1993-94, whichever was more. Forty (40) Michigan public school districts received increases that exceeded $250 while qualifying for the “minimum” $4,200 threshold pant. These minimum pant school districts received increases that ranged fi'om $268 to $1,438 per student, in the proposal’s first year.68 These school districts comprise this study’s base population. In 1993-94, 31 school districts in Michigan offered less than kindergarten through pade 12 curricula. These were “primary” districts in the nomenclature of the state. Eleven, more than a third of these primary districts were among the 40 minimum pant schools. As a general practice, primary districts pay tuition to send their secondary students to neighboring districts’ high schools. In 1996, legislation changed the flow of state money for primary districts’ high school students who attended a neighbor’s high school. Instead of sending state aid to the resident, primary district, in 1996 the state began sending state aid directly to the non-resident, educating district. This change in state cash flow and the skewed 6' See Appendix A, Roster of Michigan Public Schools, History of Foundation Grants 49 structure of spending without secondary curricula made data comparison impractical. Further, primary district data are not included in the state’s Bulletin 1014. For all of these reasons, the 11 primary districts that began the Proposal A era as minimum pant districts were excluded from this study’s sample population. The average enrollment of all 555 school districts in Michigan in 1994 was 3,175.9 frrll time equivalent students.69 The average enrollment of minimum pant districts that offered K-12 curricula was 1,713 students for the seven years that were studied. Seven of the minimum pant school districts enrolled fewer than 1,000 students during one or more of the years studied. Three of the districts with more than 1,000 students enrolled fewer than 1,500 students in one or more of the years studied. More than half of the sample population, 13 of the 22, enrolled fewer than 2,000 students in one or more years of this study. Only one of the minimum pant school districts, Hudsonville, had a population larger than the state’s average. 70 The minimum pant districts had small student bodies relative to the average Michigan public school district. Because data were examined on a per student basis, modest changes in enrollments in srnall-enrollment districts result in major changes in the data that this study examines. The 7 minimum pant districts that enrolled fewer than 1,000 students in one or more years during the period studied (1994.95 through 2000-2001)71 were excluded fiom the sample. Twenty-two districts with combined state membership aid and per pupil ‘9 See Appendix B, 1994 Enrollments, Enrollment Ranking in Michigan, Teacher Ratio & Operational Millage (source: Michigan Department of Education, Bulletin 1014, 1993-94) 7° See Appendix c — History ofEnrollments — Minimum Grant Schools 7' See Appendix c 50 local tax ofless than $3,950 in fiscal 1994 and more than 1,000 students in the first seven years of Proposal A — 22 of the 40 original minimum pant school districts — comprised the initial roster of this study. Two Additional School Districts Are Excused From the Study Subsequent to initial data collection, two additional school districts were excluded from the studied population. Both of these districts received extraordinary federal assistance that minimized the affect ofthe new state funding procedure. One of the school districts, Coloma Community Schools, was subject to school intepation, court ordered acceptance of neighboring district’s residents. In 1997, a federal court ordered the State of Michigan to “blend” Coloma’s foundation pant with that of the neighboring, sending school district. With this altered foundation, Coloma left the ranks of “minimum” pant districts. Dining interview in the district, court intervention was cited as a major factor in district decision-making. The funding changes in Coloma that were attributable to Proposal A were said to be minimal by comparison. Another district, Gwinn Area Community Schools, was home to a large air force base. Gwinn qualified as a minimum pant school because it levied little local millage. Subsequently, under Bursley the district received little in local tax 51 and little in state aid. However, the district’s status as a minimal pant school was misleading because the district’s revenues were subsidized by the military (special federal revenue) while the base was operational. Two years after Proposal A became the state’s educational funding structure, the base was closed and Gwinn lost more than half of its enrollment. Again federal subsidies cushioned the financial shock. Coloma and Gwinn were not affected by Proposal A as much as they were by the factors that qualified them for federal attention. Subsequently, they were excluded from the studied population. The School Districts Studied While Proposal A has imposed change on all of Michigan’s public school districts, a study of Proposal A’s effects on the erstwhile better-funded districts would be a study in coping with stagnant revenues rather than a study of active change in exploring new spending options. This study examines a sample population of 20 school districts that experienced the biggest gains in per student funding as a result of Proposal A. All of the studied districts offered kindergarten through pade twelve curricula. This study has identified the following 20 Michigan public school districts as its sample of interest. 52 (Table 12) Sample Districts’ Pre-Proposal A Funding & Enrollment Range 1993-94 enrollment range funding 1994-95 thru 2000-01 Benzie County Central Schools $3,836 1,775 - 1,953 Farwell Area Schools $3,890 1,634 — 1,754 Harrison Community Schools $3,905 2,278 — 2,375 Crawford Ausable Schools $3,843 2,165 — 2,374 Maple Valley School District $3,889 1,635 - 1,726 Beaverton Rural Schools $3,779 1,790 — 1,919 Kingsley Area Schools $3,834 1,135 — 1,338 Public Schools of Calumet $3,858 1,665 - 1,763 Bad Axe Public Schools $3,590 1,416 - 1,651 Kalkaska Public Schools $3,920 1,916 — 2,139 Manistee Public Schools $3,923 1,770 - 2,054 Lake City Area School District $3,935 1,328 — 1,409 Hudsonville Public School District $3,887 3,472 — 4,637 Crosswell Lexington Com. Schools $3,934 2,381 - 2,570 South Haven Pubic Schools $3,819 2,552 - 2,935 Mattawan Consolidated Schools $3,891 2,842 - 3,260 Paw Paw Public Schools $3,825 2,152 - 2,314 Munising Public Schools $3,875 1,037 — 1,140 Allegan Public Schools $3,949 2,962 - 3,031 Standish-Sterling Com. Schools $3,738 1,980 — 2,201 The average funding for these 20 districts was $3,814 per student in 1993-94. These “minimum” pant school districts, therefore, received, on average, an increase of $386 in the proposal’s first year. The average Bursley guaranteed funding received by all other districts in the state was $5,017 per student in 1993- 94. That average rose by $222 in the proposal’s first year. The $386 increase for the population districts was $164 per student more than it was for the rest of the 53 state; an amount that was 174% of the average increase received by most of the state’s school districts in that first year.72 None of the 40 districts was wealthy and only one was arguably urban. The minimum pant districts were, with the exception of Hudsonville, all out-state schools that served relatively low-income populations. (Table 13) Aggmgate Enrollment Histories 1993-94 thror_rgh_ 2000-0173 State Minimum Grant Minimum Grant Enrollment Enrollment . % of Stgt_e 1993-94 1,569,351 42,067 2.7% 1994-95 1,548,817 41,721 2.7% 1995-96 1,607,296 42,265 2.6% 1996-97 1,632,421 42,621 2.6% 1997-98 1,649,769 42,716 2.6% 1998-99 1,659,691 42,438 2.6% 1999-2000 1,663,901 42,526 2.6% 2000-01 1,633,890 42,373 2.6% Neither the state public school enrollment nor the agpegate of the sample population changed peatly during the term of the study. The average size of the 20 districts that were studied was 2,013 students in 1994. That average pew to only 2,048 by 2000—01 . Nine of the sample’s enrollments changed less than eight neeeAppendixA,“l-IistoryofFormdationGrants” 7’ State of Michigan Department of MMM Web Site, Data Base 54 percent (up or down). Six districts lost more than 8 percent of their populations during the term of the study. Five districts pew by 8% or more. The agpegate number of students in the study varied little during the term of the study (low = 41,721 in 1995 and high -—4 42,716 in 1998). Munising Public Schools’ 1994 enrollment of 1,105 students made that district the smallest of the sample districts. While the Munising enrollments pew by 103 students during the period of this study, Munising’s enrollment remained the smallest of the sample school districts. The Hudsonville Public School District was unique in the sample for several reasons. Hudsonville had, by far, the largest student body in 1994 (3 ,472 students). Its enrollment increased by a third during the study to 4,637 students, making it nearly half again the size of the next largest district in the study. Hudsonville also was the only district that served a suburban population. Hudsonville is a powing bedroom community for Grand Rapids, the second largest city in Michigan. The other minimum pant schools served small towns or villages and surrounding rural areas. The minimum pant districts shared a defining characteristic: None levied sufficient millage under Bursley to generate more than $3,950 per student in combined local tax and state aid. These school districts were minimum pant districts because voters did not approve high local millage rates. None of the minimum pant districts levied more than 30.5" mills for school support under Bursley. By contrast, the districts in the state that levied the highest operational 7‘ See Appendix B, 1994 Em'ollments, Enrollment Ranking in Michigan, Teacher Ratio a Operational Millage (source: Michigan Department of Education, Bulletin 1014, 1993-94) 55 millage rates levied millages that exceeded 40 mills. While 28 school districts in the state levied less millage than the 24.79 mils levied by the lowest levying minimum pant school district (Kalkaska), all of these low-levying districts had sufficient property value per student to generate more in local tax than Bursley guaranteed. They were out-of-formula and generated more than $3,950 in 1993-94 local tax. Most of these low-millage districts were either large urban districts or were very small, primary school districts located in resort communities with very high property value per student. They were transformed from “out of formula” districts in Bursley to hold-harmless districts when Proposal A was enacted. Quantitative analysis This study began with an assessment of financial data published by various state agencies. Spending patterns for the 20 sample school districts were established from financial data published by the Michigan Department of Education (primarily Form B and Bulletin 1014). Spending was tracked from 1993-94 through the 2000-01 school year. For each district, spending was tracked over time, and then compared with other districts in the sample. Composites and per student averages of the sample were compared to state averages. Staff costs were examined relative to teacher census. Other selected spending and funds equity were measured relative to student enrollments. This study’s focus of interest is how the minimum pants schools spent the gains of Proposal A. Attendant to that primary inquiry are the following: 56 1. Did reserves (funds equity) increase? If so, were increases in reserves a function of indecision or of overt decision-making? Were increases a function of peater cash need because cash from state aid payments slowed relative to pre-Proposal A when coming primarily fi'om localtax?Doesanincreaseinreserveindicatethe district’s anticipation of future hard times (hoarding)? 2. Did money spent on teachers’ salaries increase? If so, were more teachers hired or was existing staff simply paid more? 3. Was more money spent on capital goods and building infrastructure (equipment and building repair) or was the money spent in student services, either directly in classroom services or indirectly in support services? Interviews collected data in a number of qualitative areas, such as what the decision-making process was, whether that process had changed as a result of Proposal A, what the time trend was, whether there were unique circumstances and whether there was a long range strategic plan (established or still in the process of evolving). Were these decisions responses to strong union power, strong local interest poups other than employees, conservative school board members or something else? Twenty-six people were interviewed in 22 school districts. The currently sitting superintendents in 19 of the original 22 districts were interviewed. In one district, an assistant superintendent who had directed curriculum in her district for 17 years was interviewed in the company of the district’s business manager. Two recently retired superintendents agreed to participate in the study on behalf of the 57 districts they had superintended during the time frame studied. The currently sitting superintendents in those three districts were not interviewed. The longest sitting of the superintendents had been with his district for 35 years, including 21 years as superintendent. The most recently hired superintendent had only been with her district ten months at the time of her interview. District business officials accompanied her and another recently hired superintendent in interviews. Both business managers had been part of their districts’ decision making during the entire Proposal A era. Review of the data revealed patterns across time within each of the districts. Qualitative remarks were evaluated in light of related quantitative data The data were analyzed for patterns between districts in the study’s sample and state wide spending patterns. 58 Chapter V Financial Data & Superintendents’ Stories Chapter IV of this study predicted three uses for the new Proposal A monies: 1. Windfalls were not spent; 2. Windfalls were negotiated away to stakeholders so that more money was spent for similar levels of service; 3. Windfalls were spent on expanded services for students, including improvements to facilities and infrastructure. What the Quantitative Data Tell About the Districts in the Sample If increased revenues precipitated higher spending, that spending would have been reported in Forms B and in Bulletin 1014. However, if districts did not spend the additional money, increased Proposal A revenues would have accumulated as funds equity, also reported in Forms B. 59 As shown in the tables below,” the agpegate fund equity of this study’s population districts, the minimum pant school districts, increased each of the seven years of the study. Therefore, at least some of the new money was not spent. (Table 14) Agggggge Funds Quity Minimum All of the other Grant State’s Schools Schools 30-Jun % growth % growth 1994 $16,029,680 $679,698,895 1995 $20,023,604 24.9% $868,456,949 27.8% 1996 $27,854,615 39.0% $1,011,156.685 16.5% 1997 $31,970,019 14.7% $1,146,880.308 13.4% 1998 $43,405,894 35.7% $1,642,590.365 43.3% 1999 $51,687,354 19.0% $1 .799.635.826 9.6% 2000 $61,113,276 18.2% $1 ,767,056,103 -1.8% - 2001 $67,961,413 11.2% $1,746,251.689 -1.2% total growth 323.9% 157.2% Between July 1, 1994 (the first day ofProposal A) and June 30, 2001, the agpegate fund equity of the 20 school districts included in this study more than tripled. In the first seven years of Proposal A, the sample’s agpegate equity pew fi'om $16 million to almost $68 million.76 While the rate of powth slowed for the minimum pant school districts in the last two years of the study, the agpegate fund equity of the sample districts increased each year of the study. Every one of the 20 minimum pant districts had more in fund equity on June 30, 2001 than on July 1, 1994. In fact, with two exceptions, the districts studied more than doubled their funds equity. Two increased equity by a factor of ten. : See Appendix D, History of Funds Balance, Minimum Grant Schools Ibid. 60 The agpegate frmd equity of all of Michigan’s public school districts (excluding the sample) pew 157.2% during the same time period, about half as much as the sample districts. 77 Agpegate equity for all of the state’s districts did not increase as much proportionately, nor did it increase for the entire period ' studied. State agpegate equity pew each of the first five years of the proposal, and then stood virtually unchanged for the last three years of the study. It actually declined slightly in 1999-2000 and 2000-2001. When equity is expressed in per student terms, minimum pant school districts reported steady powth. While equity per student at the onset of Proposal A was peater for the state than for the sample districts, under the new funding mechanism equity per student pew faster in the studied population tlmn in the state as a whole. By the third year of Proposal A, equity per student in the sample districts had passed the state per student average. By the seventh year, equity per Graph 2 Funds Balance per Student $21000 I 31.500 $1.000 e e o r a o a p. ... ... ’a' u n a a e e a a l e s u a a a a e 0 DC . ... p.- o u a n n . . a )e a . u a p o e a e u e r . . Sm q . ... ... ... ... ... ... y... .... ... ... ).. . . .. . a L'. ... 'e ... p... e- ... ... ‘0'. e u e e e . . . . a ). a e u a u a so a a a c )1 J . . FY94FY95FY96FY97FY98FY99FYOOFYO1 Eipopulation $381 $480 $659 $756 $1.01 $1.21 $1.43 $1.60 [Istatew/o population 3419 $576 $646 $721 $1.02 $1.11 $1.09 $1.09 AU.-- 61 student for the population districts exceeded the state average by a third. This change in fund equity was especially dramatic in the three studied districts that had negative funds balance on the last day of Bursley. The negative $335,253 fund equity of the Farwell Area Schools’ shrank by a third to a minus _ $248,764 in the first year of Proposal A. In year two, equity climbed over zero. Remarkably, by June 30, 2001, F arwell reported equity of nearly $1.5 million. The Kalkaska school district corrected its $386,799 debit equity position after a single year of the new system. It continued to receipt more than it Spent until, by June 30, 2001, Kalkaska reported equity in excess of $1.7 million. The third school district with negative fund equity in 1994, the Croswell Lexington Schools, went fiom its negative $39,234 in fiscal 1994 to over $5 million by 2001. 62 (Table 15) Year End Funds Eula" FY 94 FY 95 FY 01 Munising $82,250 $381,956 $1,925,766 Allegan $1,458,277 $1,581,506 $2,363,716 Standish-Sterling $1,395,049 $1,826,136 $10,989,210 Benzie Central $692.5 83 $708,041 $2,224,560 Farwell -$335,253 $-248,764 $1,453,952 Harrision $519,413 $1085.968 $3,357,703 Crawford-Au Sable $355,749 $253,666 $1 .559,648 Maple Valley $568,649 $695,307 $2,985,436 Beaverton $456,201 $594,467 $1,057,696 Kingsley $1,284,227 $1,454,855 $3,120,978 Calumet $641,351 $1,101,204 $2,315,806 Bad Axe $1,830,989 $2,820,867 $3,667,053 Kalkaska $-386,799 $101,188 $1,735,612 Manistee $479,408 $513,951 $1,027,385 Lake City $809,896 $886,661 $1,612,205 Hudsonville $1,944,267 $2,830,757 $8,793,854 Cros—Lex $-39,234 $320,467 $5,151,323 South Haven $2,359,468 $974,801 $2,798,769 Mattawan $1,526,241 $1,661,476 $5,286,525 Paw Paw 406,948 $479,094 $5 34,214 $16,029,680 $20,023,604 $67,961,413 Of the 20 studied school districts, the Bad Axe Schools added the fewest dollars to fund equity during the study. Growth, however, is relative: Bad Axe had almost $2 million in fund equity before Proposal A was initiated. It still had one ofthe largest funds equity in FY 2001. (It should also be noted that Bad Axe ended the Bursely era with the lowest funding per student of any of the 20 school districts studied.) For Bad Axe, the relative powth attributable to Proposal A’s " lbid 63 first seven years was “only” 100%: Bad Axe Schools’ fund equity “only” doubled. (Table 16) Fund Eguig as % of FY 1994 Budget: Minimum Grant Schools79 6130/1994 District name total revenue total expense fund balance MUNISING $4,805,645 $4,257,565 $82,250 1.9% ALLEGAN $12,654,425 $12,248,271 $1,458,277 11.9% STANDISH STERLING $8,517,870 $8,667,538 $1 ,395,049 16.1% BENZI E CO CENTRAL $7,000,600 $7,085,800 $672,583 9.5% FARWELL $6,944,253 $7,008,720 $335,253 4.8% HARRISON $9,287,406 $9,093,776 $519,413 5.7% CRAWFORD AUSABLE $8,768,250 $9,103,825 $355,749 3.9% MAPLE VALLEY $6,876,384 $7,023,094 $568,649 8.1% BEAVERTON $7,462,991 $7,906,280 $456,201 5.8% KINGSLEY $5,024,190 $4,545,186 $1,284,227 28.3% CALUMET $7,029,942 $6,614,735 $641,351 9.7% BAD AXE $6,046,926 $5,562,105 $1 .830,989 32.9% KALKASKA $8,466,162 $8,846,904 $386,799 -4.4% MANISTEE $8,251,953 $7,758,420 $479,408 6.2% LAKE CITY $5,915,052 $5,705,856 $809,896 14.2% HUDSONVILLE $13,464,416 $13,311,648 $1,944,267 14.6% CROSWELL $10,021,857 $10,017,063 439,234 -0.4% LEXINGTON SOUTH HAVEN $11,640,210 $12,447,335 $2,359,468 19.0% MATTAWAN $10,753,050 $10,479,336 $1 ,526,241 14.6% PAW PAW £522.53 W m we $187,754,032 $167,015,507 $16,029,680 9.6% Just as powth is relative. so was the financial desperation of many of the minimum pant schools. As stated above, three districts had negative funds equity on June 30, 1994. The other districts in the study ranged from solvent to flush. 7’ op cit. Michigan Department ofEducation, Bulletin 1014, 1994 Munising had less than $100,000 in reserves while Bad Axe had a June 30, 1994 fund balance of $1.8 million. As a percent of total expenditures, Bad Axe Schools’ fund equity was the highest in the study: With a budget of only $5.6 million,80 the Bad Axe’s fund equity amounted to nearly a third of annual spending. Several of the other districts had similarly healthy year-end balances to begin the new funding era. While most of the districts in the study were solvent to begin the Proposal A era, and seven had funds balance in excess of a million dollars, all 20 of study’s population had funds equity in excess of $1 million on June 30, 2001. The holder of the population’s largest fund equity at the end of the study, Standish-Sterling Community Schools, entered the Proposal A years with equity of $1.4 million, equal to 16% of its annual expenditure budget. That reserve had increased five- fold by June 30, 2001. This end-of-study equity was virtually equal to the district’s annual budget. For perspective, Michigan School Business Ofiicials Association suggests maintaining reserves of 15-20% of general fund budget." Statewide, 34 school districts ended the Bursley era with negative funds balance. In other words, roughly six percent of the schools in the state were insolvent on the eve of Proposal A, compared to 15% of this study’s sample. After a year of Proposal A, only 11 districts reported more in liabilities than assets. Only one of those 11 districts - Farwell - was a minimum grant school district. By June 30, 2001 only two percent of the state’s schools had negative firnds ”SeeAppendixP,HistoryothmdsBalance " See Michigan School Business Officials Association web site (www.MSBO.org), School Finance, MSBO Guidelines, Fund Balance & Related Issues 65 balance82 and none of those school districts started the new funding era as a minimum grant district. Fund Equity Accumulation as a Function of Funding While it is an unexpected finding, analysis of district funds equity reveals little relationship between funds equity per student on June 30, 2001 and Proposal A’s variable increases in district per student funding. Proposal A neither strengthened nor weakened the relationships between what school districts reserved in equity and the total amounts - or increases via Proposal A — received in per student funding. As noted above, the lowest funded of the studied schools, the Bad Axe Schools, enjoyed one of the state’s highest rates of equity per student before Proposal A was initiated. Funding notwithstanding, sample school districts (chosen because of their low rates of fiscal 1994 funding per student) ranged from insolvent to flush, from negative funds equity to reserves that exceeded a third of annual budgets. The range of equity of the sample schools as a percentage of their budgets was typical of all schools in the state. Some school districts operated without accumulated equity while others reported large funds balance per student, independent of finding levels.83 This curious lack of correlation between per student funding and funds equity neither began with nor was greatly affected by the new funding mechanism. ”SecMiehiaunDepuunentot‘Bducntion—Bkepondamfotzoot ”seeAppendhtP,“Histotyorrtmdquuity" 66 When the 1994-95 per student funding grant for each school district in the state is compared to June 30, 1994 funds balance per student, the resulting correlation coefficient (—. 081) indicates virtually no relationship between funding per student and accumulated fund equity. The correlation is, in fact, slightly negative. While the funds equity per student increased for most of Michigan’s schools by 2001 and the rankings of the districts changed somewhat, the relationship between the June 30, 2001 fund equity per student and the 1994 funding per student is not statistically significant. The correlation coeflicient is —0.088. District rankings of funds equity per student remained remarkably consistent during the period studied, suggesting that there is little relationship between per student funding and accumulated equities per student. School districts that had healthy equities in 1994 generally had still healthier equities in 2001, regardless of their places in Proposal A’s funding array. When Michigan school districts are rank-ordered by fund equity per student for both 1994 and 2001, those relative rankings correlate strongly (correlation coefficient = 0.542).84 The relationship is not as strong, yet is still statistically significant, when the sample school 1994 rankings are compared to 2001 rankings. The positive correlation coefficient is .405.85 These findings indicate that districts that habitually allocated all of current year revenues to current year spending before 1994 continued to do so afier Proposal A. Similarly, districts that traditionally saw savings as legitimate :see Appendix E, Funds Balance Per Student, Change in State-wide Ranking 1995 to 2001 ibid 67 appropriation and so allocated portions of current year funding to funds equity continued to do so after Proposal A was initiated, regardless of how the proposal affected them. Funds Equity Growth & Foundation Grant Growth The average 1993-94 firnding base received by the studied population was $3,814.“ Because an increase of $250 would have resulted in grants of less than $4,200 in the proposal’s inaugural year, the sample districts all received the $4,200 minimum grant. The average increase for those districts was $358. By contrast, the average increase in foundation grant for all districts in the state, excluding the Graph 3 Sample School Increases In Foundation Grant Relative to Increases in Funds Equity per Student $600 $500 $400 $300 $200 $100 FY 01 $300 $215 FY 00 $530 $204 FY 99 $46 $180 FY 98 $308 $255 FY 97 $310 $79 FY96 $306 $1 89 FY 95 $358 $1 19 68 sample districts, was $221 in the first year of Proposal A.87 During the seven-year term of this study, the average increase in foundation grant for the sample districts was $308 per year. Average funds balance growth per student was not as consistent as foundation grant growth but, i as described above, the sample population’s aggregate ftmd balance increased each year of the study: average per student funds equity growth ratio was almost 2:3 for the sample districts ($184: $308). Foundation grants did not grow as quickly for the state as a whole as they did for the sample. Not surprisingly, neither did funds equity per student. The average yearly increase in funds equity per student was $9788 while average growth in foundation grants for the state was $202. The ratio of equity growth to foundation grant growth was slightly less than 1:2. State average frmd equity per student was lower than the sample’s ratio even though, in fiscal year 1998, the State of Michigan paid $212 million to 83 Graph 4 Growth In State Foundation & EquityIStudent FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 [am balance 9M 3157 :70 $75 3301 :91 423 $7 llfoundatlonJgrowm $239 $216 $212 $204 $4 $302 $301 69 plaintifl‘ school districts and smaller amormts to the state’s other school districts in settlement of Durant v. State of Michigan. 89 As a result of the extraordinary gain received by the 83 plaintiffs (none of which were districts in this study’s sample) unusual funds balance growth was reported statewide. 'Ihus state averages were . skewed while the studied population’s averages were not. Ifthe FY 1998 accumulation of equity is disregarded, increase in funds equity per student for the state (without the sample districts) averaged $63 for the remaining six years of the study. The $63: $202 ratio of equity to foundation growth is approximately 1:3, halfthe 2:3 ratio savings growth to foundation grant growth compubd above for the sample schools. Simply put, without Durant, fund equity per student grew twice as fast in sample districts as in the rest of the state’s school districts. Graph 5 CatchoUp Premium 8. Annual Growth In Fund Equity $350 $300 $250 $200 $150 1 $100 4 s50 . so _ - - - 5 FY FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 FY 99 99 FY 00 FY 01 beaten up premium $179 $153 $155 $154 $46 $292 so [i_growth in FBlstudent $99 $179 $91 $266 $202 $219 $197 Chapter 1 described the catch-up subsidies that went to the below-basic districts for the first six years of Proposal A. This study’s sample population '9 see House Fiscal Agency, “Legislative Brief’ Fiscal Forum, Vol. 8 # 2, January 1999 70 received both the increase and the subsidy. 9° Those catch-up premiums nearly equaled the foundation grant increases enjoyed by the basic grant schools. This analysis clearly shows that even though the sample schools continued to receive fewer dollars per student, their funds equity per student grew at twice the state average. The savings can be explained by recognizing that, with the catch-up subsidies, the revenue increases were twice the increases enjoyed by the rest of the state. Over the same period, however, the sample district increased spending at rates similar to increased state spending. This analysis suggests that, instead of being spent, the catch-up subsidy dollars were salted away into the accumulated funds equity of the sample districts. 9' Additional Spending If 60% of the new Proposal A money going to sample schools was retained as equity - not spent - then the other 40% must have been consumed. Chapter 3 predictions propose two additional possible uses of the new money: 1. More money was spent providing substantially the same programs as were provided at lower cost before Proposal A (same quantity of service at higher prices) or; 2. Additional programs were provided for students and/or money was spent to upgrade facilities and equipment. ”seeAppendixG-GrowthlnFotmdationGrants&FundsBalancePerStudent 9' see Appendix H - Total General Fund Spending (adapted from Bulletin 1014) 71 Additional Services — Average Instructional Expense Per Student Total Instructional Expenditures are those expenses incurred providing three types of classroom instruction: basic, added needs and adult education. They do not include capital outlay.92 Generally, instructional expense is the cost of the in-classroom teacher - her salary and the cost of her fringe benefits. The costs of supplies, textbooks, in-service training or conferences attended by the classroom teacher are also part of total instructional expense but rarely constitute a large portion of that spending. Instructional expense also includes the cost of substitute teachers (again people providing instruction to students). The data from the years studied indicate a steady growth in instructional expense for all schools in the state.93 The cost of providing instructional services in the minimum grant schools grew by an aggregate of 56.95% between 1994—95 and 2000-01. The increase for the state was similar: 48.29%. 9’ Michiganoepumnentorsdncation Bulletin 1014, April 2002,, page ii ”seeAppmdixLHistoryofAvaagemsnuaiomlExpmsePaSmdemhnumGnmSchmk 72 Graph 6 Average Instructional Expense/Student $5,000 FY94 FY95IFY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 4,089 Logical explanations for this increase are straightforward. Either instructional expense increased because people who had always been in the classrooms cost more to employ or more people were hired. Increase in instructional expense could also result from a combination of the two: higher costs for salaries and benefits and also additional staff. To determine whether the same number of employees cost more money or whether additional people were hired, two sets of data are examined: average teacher salaries and the ratio of students to teachers. 73 Additional Spending - Teacher Average Salaries Average salaries are computed by dividing total salaries of certified staff ’ by the corresponding teacher count from the Department’s FT'E Staffing Report IM-4204.94 As can be seen in the graph below, average salaries paid to teachers in sample districts rose horn $36,952 in FY 94 to $44,937 in FY 01,95 an increase of 21.61% in eight years. During the same period, teachers throughout the state (including teachers in minimum grant school districts) saw their average salaries rise fi'om $41,247 to $51,317, an increase of 24.41%. This analysis makes two things clear: Not only are minimum grant employees paid less than teachers in other districts, their percentage increases were slightly less during the term of this Graph 7 Teachers' Average Salaries $60,000 $50,000 $40,000 $30,000 $20,000 $10,000 $0 FYFYFY 199920002001 FY 1998 1 7,1 FY 1997 1 FY 1996 ,1 FY 1 995 FY 1994 state 1,24 7, 1,31 9‘ Bulletin 1014, April 2002, page iii 74 study. The first year’s growth for both the sample and all districts was larger than growth in subsequent years. After the initial year for the state and the second year for the sample districts, neither instructional salaries nor total instructional expenditures suggest that higher compensation consumed large portions of the new revenues. Decline in Teacher-Student Ratios More spending on teacher salaries per student without a reduction in student - teacher ratios suggest higher prices for the same number of teachers, and thus arguably for the same levels of service. Higher instructional costs per student that are coupled with a reduction in the student - teacher ratio suggest that higher spending may at least be partially attributable to more people providing services to students. The ratio of students to teachers that was reported in Bulletin 1014 remained virtually unchanged in all Michigan public schools between the years 1994-95 and 2000-2001. (This ratio is calculated by dividing the fall pupil count, 9’ see Appendix 1, Average Teachers’ Salaries 75 not including special education students, by the total number of K-12 teachers”) The ratio of Michigan students to their teachers was 22:1 for the first two and the last two years of the period studied.” The data were not available for 1996-97 and the average rose only to 23:1 for the 1997-98 and 1998-99 school years. In contrast, there was a change in the pupil-teacher ratio for the population Graph 8 Student - Teacher Ratios 25 20 -— r 15 1'— 1° .— 5 .L. I 0 FY 1994 FY 1995 FY 1990 FY 1997 FY 1993 FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 baample average 23 23 23 22 22 22 22 20 [’3th average 22 22 0 23 23 23 22 22 districts. For the first three years of Proposal A fimding, the average ratio of students to teachers was 23: l . In 1997-98, the ratio dropped to equal the overall state average of 22:1. In the last year of the study, the minimum grant schools’ ratio dropped to 20:1 while the state school ratio remained at 22:1. Department of Education, April 2002, page iii. 9“'See Appendix .1, History of Pupil/Teacher Ratio: Minimum Grant Schools 76 Seventeen (1 7) of the studied districts had lower pupil teacher ratios in FY 2001 than in FY 1994. The general pattern of a gradual decline began in years two and three of the Proposal. However, three of the school districts in the sample - Kalkaska, South Haven and Mattawan -- maintained their 1994 ratios, all of which were already at the population’s 2001 average of 20 students per teacher.98 All of the state’s school districts increased classroom spending during the first seven years of Proposal A. While the sample districts did not increase spending enough to exceed state per student spending, they did increase their classroom spending by a greater percentage than the state average. This apparent anomaly is explained by considering both the growth in average teacher salaries and the relative changes in student - teacher ratios. More money was spent in the minimum grant districts, yet the average paid to each teacher was less — and increased less during the term of this study than did average salaries throughout the state. The additional spending went to increasing the number of staff. These increases in the cost of instruction per student suggest that districts across the state negotiated away some of Proposal A’s new money to current employees in the first year. The minimum grant school districts afforded increases in salaries and benefits in the second year, but those increases were smaller. In addressing the study’s primary query, use of Proposal A revenue increases by sample school districts, the data suggest that, while some of the increase went to employees in the form of increased salaries and wages, those holding stakes in the minimum grant schools still faced labor negotiators unwilling to pay salaries ”Ibid. 77 common in better-funded schools. It is reasonable to conclude that some of the new money went to current employees in the minimum grant school districts. However, much of the increased spending on staff went to additional staff members rather than to large increases in compensation to already-employed educators. After three years of the proposal, one of the uses of the windfall money by minimum gent schools was to increase the number of teachers relative to the number of students. Basic Instruction Basic progern costs refer to instructional progams such as preschool, elementary, middle and high school programs but not to capital outlay.99 The cost of employees is the primary component of this function and the data indicate that Graph 9 Increase In Basic Instructional Expense $800 $700 - $600 « $500 . $400 — $300 - $200 . $100 1 . .. . ._ , . $0 J 1;.3: ;: :3: ;:;:; I} :33. ._:;: 3: »: FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 Insample averages $266 $106 $143 $66 $152 $190 $194 [estate averages $684 $36 $142 $36 $65 $130 $231 ’9 Michigan Department of Education, Bulletin 1014, p.ii 78 salaries and fringe benefit costs jumped in the Proposal’s first years for all districts in the state. Because student teacher ratios did not change in either the first or second year of the proposal, the data also suggest that the new spending initially benefited already-employed staff. Beginning in the Proposal’s second year, costs rose at slower rates, rates that approximated the increases in the foundation gent. Statewide spending increased by 44% and by an average of 56% in the sample schools.loo Added Needs Spending Graph 10 Increase in Added Needs Expense $1,200 $1,000 $800 $600 $400 $200 FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 FY 98 FY 99 FY 00 FY 01 $449 $545 $610 $655 $703 $745 $808 $875 $511 $723 $805 $853 $874 $916 $963 $1,049 '°° see Appendix 0. 79 Added needs instructional costs include special education, compensatory education and vocational education. 101 Spending on added needs more than doubled during the term of this study for all ofthe state’s school districts. ”2 Spending in sample districts increased from $449 per student in FY 1994 to $875 in FY 2001, an increase of 952%. During the same period, state averages increased by 105.3%, fi'om $511 to $1,049 per student. Thus, the data show that teachers were paid slightly more, there were more teachers employed and many of those additional teachers provided services to students in pullout, non-traditional classroom settings. Additional Service - non-instructional As with added needs spending, the total cost of general administration, school administration, business services, central services and other support services”3 per student virtually doubled during the period ofthis study. Business Graph 11 Increase in Operation 8- Maintenance Cost/Student $1,000 $900 $500 3200* 25:3 3323: sis? w‘flm fi% mm mm mm mm mm mm [creams $363 $401 $429 $475 $485 $519 $556 $594 [Istate $532 $644 $695 $712 $723 $750 $799 $843 80 and administrative spending by the minimum gent school districts increased fiom $439 per student in FY 94 to $784 per student in FY 01.'04 There was a similar increase in operation and maintenance expense per pupil: $363 in FY 94 to $594 in FY 01.105 While this doubling of spending is notable, the proportion of total spending consumed by non-instructional expense changed little relative to total spending. After the first two years of increased instructional spending, spending on those support functions increased at rates that were parallel to instructional spending. Operation & maintenance expense per student was 9% of total expense per student in fiscal 1994 ($363 of $4,087). That proportion of total expense per student remained unchanged ($594 of $6,639) in 200001. Administrative expense per student for minimum gent schools was 11% ($439 of $4,087) of the total expense per student in the last year of Bursley. Administrative expenses per student as a percentage of total expense per student increased to 12% in fiscal 2001 ($784 of $6,639). '“ see Appendix M: History of Administrative Expense Per Student: Minimum Grant Schools “’5 see Appendix N: History of Operation & Maintenance Cost/Pupil: Minimum Grant Schools 81 The data indicate that administrator salaries increased at rates that were similar to teacher salary increases, and that operation & maintenance costs also maintained a consistent proportion of the total budgets. Spending for these non- Graph 12 Increase in Administrative Expense/Student $1 .000 $800 $600 $400 $200 FY 00 FY 01 $723 784 $904 $942 FY 94 FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 FY 98 FY 99 $439 $509 $534 $475 $618 $662 $582 $683 $759 $766 $793 $855 instructional categories increased at rates that were virtually identical to the increase in revenues. Because spending increases paralleled the revenue increases and because districts continued to allocate similar proportions of their budgets to administrative and operations and maintenance functions, it is reasonable to conclude that people paid fiom those functions benefited from the proposal. This lends further support to the assertions that stakeholders claimed some of the increase in the form of salaries and benefits but services also were added. 82 As foundation grants gew, districts had the opportunity to choose how that new money would be used. Sample school district uses of the new revenues are summarized in the graph and table below. Except for the first year of Proposal A, the year in which increases were negotiated away to stakeholders, the most prominent use of new Proposal A money by the sample population was to enhance Graph 13 Summary Uses of Proposal A Increases $700 $600 $500 $400 $300 $200 $100 $0 -$100 FY 97 $46 -$60 $46 $143 $79 $10 $38 $70 $97 $266 $1 19 & maintenance $47 $66 $255 needs instructional in funds balance 83 funds balance. (Spending increases that exceed foundation gent increases were possible because of increases in state categorical funding and the settlement of Durant.) Chapter 2 postulated that new monies either were not spent (money was saved), that more was spent providing substantially similar services (prices for similar services rose to consume new monies as windfalls were negotiated away to stakeholders) or that windfalls were spent on increased services for children and on improvement of facilities and equipment. Quantitative data indicate that Proposal A monies were directed to all three of these uses. Specifically: > Funds equity were increased. Funds equity increased from $16 million to almost $68 million for the 20 sample school districts. > Compensation to stakeholders increased in all of the state’s schools. Average teacher salaries, administrative costs and the costs of operation & maintenance increased in the same proportion to other increases in expenditure budgets. > Services were increased for children in several forms: 1. The number of instructional staff members increased, reducing class sizes. 2. More was spent on basic and added needs instruction. 3. Administrative services were added and buildings & g'ounds spending increased. 84 Presentation of Qualitative Data: The Superintendents’ Stories Data reported by the school districts and published by the state provides an opportunity to compare uniform, objective data on dollars received, dollars spent and the numbers of people performing similar tasks. Nevertheless such data are similar to the artifacts of archeology, evidence of a culture but lacking the voice of the people who created them. To confirm the story suggested by the quantitative data, and to add nuance and motivation to them, leaders in each of the sample districts were interviewed for this study. What was asked? In a preamble, participants were told: PmoseiA changeddistrlbution ofschooimonies from alocalizedsystem to e state-based, per student foundation grant program. One of the stated purposes of the Proposal was to narrow funding differences between Michigan 's school districts. For local school districts which had habitually raised little money, Proposal A provided significant increases in state generated revenues. Your districtwas one ofthe iow-fundeddistricts diattheProposaisoughttobringcioeer to the best-funded districts. Since 1994, your revenue per student has almost doubled. Participants were then invited to answer the following 4 questions: 1. How didyou spendthe money? 2. Except for enhancement millages, the proposal stripped local schools of their authority to ask for additional millage levies - formers money. Did that shift in authority change how budgetary decisions were made in your district? How? 85 3. According to the data, your fund equity rose, you hired additional teachers and you paid everyone more. a. Was there a conscious eifort not to spend the new money? b. Who decided the priorities? (You? The Board? Other groups?) 4. is education in your district better for kids because of Proposal A? if so, how? Interview Question fl 1: How did you spend the money? Respondents confirmed that funds equity were built, employees were paid more, more teachers were hired and those people were better supplied. The change most often mentioned first was that plant and facility needs were addressed. Ten of the 24 respondents initially described neglected conditions of their buildings and their bus fleets. Rather than directly answering the question of how money was spent, seven of the district leaders began by referring to their district’s weak financial condition when the proposal was initiated. “We were ready to go down the tubes,” one superintendent said before he launched into a list of catch-up measures in the Proposal’s first years. “Proposal A was a Godsend for us.” Another superintendent noted that when Proposal A passed, his district was in the red. “We had a negative [exact dollar amount recited] fund equity. The first of the Proposal money went into fund equity. It [the Proposal] helped us get out of a big hole!” Another superintendent said. “It helped us immeasurably. We’d lmd no salary increases. We’d done a lot of other 86 cost savings things. Proposal A saved us.” Clearly these superintendents faced significant financial challenges on the eve of Proposal A. Afier initial allusions to the desperation of pre-Proposal finances, respondents generally affirmed that curricula and program were restored that had been part of districts’ recent histories. Typical of such responses, one superintendent shared, “When the Proposal passed, we were so far in the hole, we had to use all of the first two years’ catch up money just to get legal.” [Michigan law prohibits deficit spending by local government] He added, “It took five years of the Proposal before we had added back what had been cut in the late 19808.” In some cases modest enhancements were described. Broadened curricula came in the forms of early childhood programs, including all-day every-day kindergarten and preschool programs. Advanced placement classes were provided for secondary students. Art, music and physical education offerings and elementary librarians were added or were restored to elementary programs. Additional counseling and social work services for at-risk populations were added. Computer-based learning was added both as a subject of itself and also as learning assistance in other curricula. Six respondents alluded to additional administrative help in planning curricular change, providing in-service to staff and tracking student achievement. The comment fi'om one of the retired superintendents typified the responses that were received from many: 87 We allocated some of that money for program expansion in terms of academic offerings, which consequentially led to increasing our staff as we expanded programs. We did not have any counseling in the middle school. We hired a middle school counselor. We expanded our curriculum work by hiring a director of curriculum and instruction. Technology received a pretty good chunk of that money. Technologically we were deficit. The initial infusion of money, immediately after passing Proposal A, was over a million dollars. We expanded our professional development effort in the form of teacher training. . . . [Conferences were] non-existent before Proposal A. Superintendents also indicated that more teachers were hired to lower class sizes and to expand curricula horizontally. This confirmed the observation made in the quantitative data analysis'that class size ratios fell for the minimum grant schools. “No debate,” a superintendent said. “people here believe that their kid will do better if there aren’t as many kids in their child’s class.” Touching thumb to each of the fingers on his hand as he enumerated pre— proposal problems faced, then solved with Proposal A money, another long time superintendent started his answer to the survey’s first question by describing his district before Proposal A: We had no fund balance; limited curriculum: limited support; the bus fleet was neglected and salaries were low. So, in combination, we had a lot of places to put the new money. Proposition A was good for us. Our fund balance is now $2.4 million. We can fix and maintain our buildings. We’ve addressed all of our facilities. We’ve addressed the bus fleet. Om buildings are all barrier fiee. We just renovated the auditorium. We’ve added staff to transition [sic]. We have re-built boilers. We have an alternative program in am secondary. (It’s off site.) Improvements have benefited our schools. Now the issue for us is not to go back. One superintendent responded to this question by saying: 88 I think a lot of our so-called “extra” money (if there is such a thing) is spent on trying to meet some of the needs that through parenting or through lack of finances just don’t get done at home. He then described additions to staff and student support programs. Facility needs were addressed with Proposal A money and also with bonded debt. In those districts that had passed bonded debt — a rarity in minimum grant schools before the proposal - district leaders credited the proposal’s lowering of local school tax as vital in the approval of the long-term debt. Districts that had not passed new debt millage in spite of the proposal’s lower local tax burden alluded to their community’s historical aversion to all school tax. The facilities that were observed during interviews appeared to be in very good repair. One of the districts had built a huge, extremely impressive new building that became part of an all-afternoon tour. Several superintendents mentioned the condition of their buildings and the need to upgrade wiring infrastructure that could support new technology. Technology held a prominent place in the list of additions made by all but one of the respondents. At the same time, district leaders expressed concern for now-aging computers and acknowledged that they don’t know how they can replace the equipment purchased with the catch-up money. In literally every interview, either the term “conservative,” the term “frugal” or a variation (like “responsible”) was used in reference to the community’s tastes in educational spending and its school board’s decision- making posture describing the uses of new Proposal A monies. 89 Interview Question # 2: The Proposal stripped local districts of their authority to ask for additional revenues (via local property tax). Did this shift in authority from local school boards to the state legislature change the way decisions were made in your district? Responses to this question consistently identified a fimdamental change in the dynamics of collective bargaining strategies as a result of the Proposal. Respondents perceived that the Proposal’s shift in funding authority had narrowed local bargaining parameters. Because increases in the foundation grant were predictable, there was little room to argue about how much money was available. Grant funding was publicized, making total dollar revenue increases easy to compute. Both sides knew what monies were available to negotiators and, perhaps more importantly, that there were few options for increasing those funds. Unions could no longer force districts to the millage polls. One long veteran superintendent said: We don’t find ourselves hearing from across the negotiations table that this is our community’s problem and the parents need to solve it by passing more money. We’ve been able to say: This is what we have [and] we’ve been able to say that very clearly. More than one respondent alluded to the predictability of legislative increases. Reliable continuation of funding made planning easier and long-range projects more realistic. 90 Proposal A was the best thing that ever happened to us. While the shift may bring state mandates, I don’t know any way to get around the switch because this community was not going to approve new operational money. Answers varied to follow-up questions that sought to establish who made budgetary decisions for this more predictable funding. Successful millage elections had been rare in the histories of minimum grant districts. Strategies for passing millage, such as building political coalitions among interest groups, promising program changes, proposing upgrades in athletic facilities or committing proposed new money to purchase band uniforms, were not successful before the proposal. Decision-making based in political coalition was not part of the pre-Proposal culture of minimum grant schools. Subsequently, formal loss of local operational millage options did not affect decision-making practices because that local authority had not been exercised before Proposal A. Interviews yielded the consistent message that Proposal A’s elimination of local millage levies did not change the local budget process from wide-based coalition-building to narrower administrative or board-based decisions. Exercise of political power by minimum grant communities had been limited to rejection of millage proposals. In some districts, the school board dictated spending decisions. Other districts relied on a strong superintendent or an administrative team. No respondent acknowledged a change in his/her district’s habit as a result of the Proposal. Considered from the perspective of the median voter theory set out in Chapter 11, minimum grant community tastes were satisfied with little program and 91 little community participation before Proposal A. Low tax was the primary criterion. No strategy could overcome the aversion to higher tax. When the Proposal rendered the median voter model defunct, the median voter’s primary choice, lower tax, was no longer part of the political mix. One superintendent complained waggishly: “We have more than our share of people who would vote ‘no’ on fi'ee ice cream!” Another superintendent suggested, using present tense in his verbs, that Proposal A had changed little in regard to local attitudes toward taxes and educational services: “It’s really hard to get support here for anything educational. Our community has very low expectations and they don’t value education. One of the few superintendents who did acknowledge a change (of sorts) in decision-making approached the question from a managerial rather than a political perspective: This proposal has given us more stability and a better ability to project. In some senses we’ve been more cost effective because of that. Carry-over for our building budgets so we didn’t have a year- end spending fi'enzy on things that weren’t appropriate or dollars that weren’t well spent. ...We haven’t gotten loose in our spending habits. Part of the liability of Proposal A is to have a district become accustomed to a certain growth rate and to plan with that growth in mind. That same superintendent then went on to suggest that the real change in decision-making has been a shift in political power from local school boards to the state and even federal levels: 92 The board certainly came to understand that there is a certain degree of uncertainty in the way that has developed because of Proposal A. [Because of this shift in funding] the State’s level of micro-management of the local schools has just gone through the roof. We find ourselves subject to a lot of sanctions and dictates from the State that were far more gradual in their implementation in the past. But now, because of Proposal A, the state’s got the false impression that they now own the schools. And the legislature is saying that it’s giving schools money when the truth is that it is still taxpayer money. It’s just gathered in a different way. In the past when we would say that we would have three years to implement a change that the State would want to make, now we’re hearing things like -— next month this needs to be done. And if it’s not done in time, there are sanctions tied to it. There’s a lot of knee jerk leadership that’s happening now where we’re watching the legislature sort of like a stockbroker watches a ticker tape. The very stability that we’ve been able to offer our principals for a cleaner, more efficient, more well planned operation at the building level, we’ve had the very reverse of that at the district level. The new problem is that the Federal government is puppeting the State government that in turn was puppeting six hundred plus local schools. And little of it had to do with quality for kids. It all had to do with numbers - some kind of measurement. Even though his district did not use pre-Proposal local funding autonomy as this superintendent would have preferred, and while he was happy with the initial advantages his district enjoyed in the initial years of Proposal A, this superintendent was clearly uncomfortable with the strings that be perceived attached to the new funding mechanism. Three district respondents cited competition from parochial schools as reason for millage failures in the past and insisted that competition is still fierce in 93 spite of the Proposal. Resistance to proposed millages was evident not only in voting booths but in central offices as well. Public school administrators were leery of even proposing tax increases because of consequent local reaction to public education. Public school decisions were still tempered by anticipated reaction in the private school ranks. One superintendent offered a strange example of cooperation with a local private school in support of such a delicate political situation. The bleachers at the public school football field were not safe. The school board did not want to allocate operational monies to that project and the community would not approve higher tax when there was another football field in the community that the public school team could use - on nights when the private school’s team was away. Superintendents also reported that while collective bargaining had been affected, its role in the decision-making process was not greatly impacted by the loss of local millage referenda: These districts were rarely successful in gaining millage authority when it was available on a local basis. Interview Question # 3: According to the data, your district’s fund equity rose, you hired additional teachers and you paid everyone a little more. 1. Was there a conscious effort to accumulate equity - not spend all the new money? 2. Who decided that priority? 94 All of the districts acknowledged a conscious effort not to spend all of the money. Variations of three reasons were cited for accumulating funds equity: 1. Having a reserve is only prudent. Responsible school administrators save as a matter of habit. As a corollary to the , prudence of saving, three superintendents expressed aversion to borrowing operating capital that they anticipated would be necessary if they spent all the increases on expanded operations. 2. Proposal A prosperity will not last - hard times will return. Expanded operations would have required new construction in several districts. However, Proposal A did not equalize bonding authority. Very low taxable values require extraordinarily high rates of tax to service construction bonds. Because voter approval of millage to service bonds is as difficult to achieve as operational millage, several districts regarded fund equity as a capital savings account that eventually could be used to build classrooms and fund other large, capital projects. 5" Reasons to Accumulate Fund Equity - Frugality & Prudence During his interview, one superintendent shared that one of his community’s most valuable assets is its knowledge of what it is like to operate without money. This superintendent observed that the catch-up double increases were going to end and, when they did, he did not want to have to cut services that his school could no longer afi‘ord but that the community had become accustomed to receiving. Another superintendent alluded to “the culture of this community,” a community that was strongly represented by an ethnic group whose parsimony was said to extend well past sparing. As she put it, “Our community simply doesn’t spend all the money it has available: One of the legitimate uses of money it to 95 save it.” On the other hand, she continued, “We’ve always operated on the assumption that if someone needs something, we try to get it for them. If they don’t need something, then we don’t spend the money. This community is frugal and they expect us to be so. But what teachers need, they get!” She concluded, “The area we’re in is conservative.” Allusion to the conservatism of another district ended with a superintendent declaring that . . . “we squeeze nickels here until the buffalo bellows.” A similar reaction from Abraham Lincoln was alleged when another district pinched pennies. Still another superintendent, after describing the care with which spending decisions were made, administrative recommendations were reviewed by board committees and the critical expectations of the community were acknowledged, and while clearly recalling the difficulty the district had experienced passing pre-proposal millage elections, finally blurted: “[This community] isn’t frugal: It’s cheap!” Several superintendents alluded to the need to regain financial health with Proposal A funds. Typical of this attitude, one respondent began his interview by sharing, “Our board is still very gtm-shy. They vowed never to go back to those days {of negative funds equity].” Another veteran superintendent shared, “Our district has a history of living frugally. We’ve spent money where we see a need. We haven’t just gone and spent money for the sake of spending it. We’ve been able to build equity. We currently have a $2.8 million equity. Now we’re able to make adjustments and use that equity as a rainy day fund.” In answer to the 96 question about a conscious eflort not to spend, one of the business official respondents asserted with considerable force: “There sure was on my part!” He continued, “We were pretty stingy with the new money - didn’t want to give it all away.” A summary statement from a superintendent who had served his district as superintendent for 14 years declared, “I sweat blood for fund equity! We’re not going back!” Corollary to the “prudent management” explanation of where the money went, three superintendents alluded to their aversion to borrowing operational money. Consequent to borrowing is the need to pay interest on the borrowed money — money that could go to program. If enough fund equity is accumulated, borrowing can be avoided. Reason to Accumulate Funds Equity — Hard Times Will Return The inevitable return of hard times was an overriding concern of one superintendent in determining how new Proposal A money would be used: She did not want to add program that she would have to cut later. Much of that district’s initial increases went into supplies and capital outlay - “things that would be easier to cut,” in her words. This superintendent wanted to avoid spending so that “the stuff kids really need can be offered even when times get tough again.” Another superintendent compared her school district to “ people who lived through the depression. We just believe that the bad old days will be coming back. 97 That money [the accumulated equity] would carry us through. We also hired a business manager. We’re going to use fund equity to avoid making cuts.” Five superintendents alluded to keeping programs modest so that, when it came time to make painful cuts again, community expectations would not have evolved past “reasonable-ness.” “We just didn’t want to add things that we’d have to cut again,” one superintendent said, verbalizing the common sense of inevitability of hard times’ return. In recalling any number of finance meetings, still another superintendent said: I told them that the boom wasn’t going to last forever. We wanted to position the district so that if there was a decline in state revenue, like there is now, there would be a sufficient fund balance there to fund the program without cutting staff or cutting opportunities for kids. So those were the two basis principles that we used. No percentage of budget or anything. We just said we wanted to have a responsible fund balance so if there was a decline in economic activity that meant a loss of State revenue and we were dealing with executive order cuts or a reduction in the foundation - as you know many of the districts around here have gone through wholesale lay-offs — we wouldn’t have to do that...We wanted to get to a position where we could absorb at least a two-year decline in any state ordered reduction. Another superintendent reported that his district set percentage targets for funds equity. “We’ve worked towards building our fund equity for the last four years. The discussion was 15% then it went to 17%.” When asked the purpose of establishing that particular level of firnds equity, he replied: Just the need for us to have a greater resiliency in the district. So we didn’t find ourselves having to cut student programs as soon as 98 there was a fluctuation in the state level - That we could provide a stable program for our community. And that if the state was fluctuatingasithasbeeninthewayitfundsusthatwewouldbe able to absorb a lot of those things without having it affect us. In response to a probe about whether he distrusts the way the state funds schools, this superintendent said: We didn’t foresee this kind of recession but we did see the potential. . . .The fimding piece is just one part of the puzzle. You add to that the schools of choice. You add to that charter schools. You can see where a school district had better have a reserve if all of a sudden there is a need to become more competitive. If a charter school shows up and says we’re going to provide a laptop for every student, well what are we going to do? Are we just going to say goodbye to those kids or are we going to step up and say well, here’s what we can do and we’ll do it better. I think there is a point where you have to compete. In addition to the “hard times will return” motive, five respondents expressed concern for the enrollment declines that they anticipated for their districts. One superintendent anticipated a loss of approximately half of his current enrollment by the year 2010. His district hopes that ftmd equity accumulation will soften the effect of that loss of membership and the attendant halving of his revenue budget. Reason to Accumulate Funds Equity - Low Taxable Values In addition to reluctant constituencies and the inevitable return of hard times, some of the respondent schools used Proposal A money for capital improvements. Four superintendents of low-tax value districts observed during 99 interviews that even if local voters would approve a bond, higher tax rates still could not raise sufficient tax to service useful debt levels. Therefore, Proposal A money was boarded in what one superintendent called his “capital accounts” and another called his “public improvement fun ” until sufficient amounts accumulated to do major repairs and even build new facilities. The superintendent with the public improvement fund elaborated: We set up a public improvement fund. We set aside 5% of our state aid for maintenance, repairs and additional classrooms — that type of thing. We haven’t always been able to put 5% of our state aid in there, but that’s been our goal. Another superintendent said: “If we could get to the point where we can add classrooms without a bond, we’d do it. Our last two millages have not gone through here.” A superintendent of a district involved in a major building and renovation program credited Proposal A’s lower operating taxes and its infusion of cash as important for his district’s facilities makeover. Proposal A allowed us to go beyond what the bonded money would allow: Rubberized track, replace aging bleachers, addition to administrative building, bus garage improvements. We had an old bus fleet - lots of red tags. Now we’re on a lO-year replacement schedule. We had nothing but green tags this year which was the first time in the district’s history that that has happened. We now have a dispatcher and a mechanic. The biggest effect is the lowering of burden on local tax. When I got here, the buildings leaked, we were overcrowded. I had 16 buckets in my office and every time it rained I could hear the plunking. They couldn’t find the leaks. We’ve passed three bond issues since 1995. This is a totally new district. We’re now just finishing a $19.8 million project. When 100 it’s done, this will be an attractive place for upscale population. The elementary schools are all modernized. Each has a new library. We have equity between buildings. We have technology. We have a district owned fiber optic loop for phones, computers, and email. We have video in the high school. Without the Proposal none of this would have happened. Operations were an issue too. The proposal allowed us to put together an infrastructure and an upgrade in curriculum. In this district, the priority was on facilities improvement that will benefit students and families in years to come. The superintendent did not believe the improvements would have been funded had they relied upon community support for millage increases. Interview Question # 3: Who decided spending priorities while establishing funds equity? Consistently, responses to the question of setting district priorities identified conservative school board members led by strong recommendations from administration. One superintendent pointed out that the community and the boards were one and the same. Therefore, this superintendent argued, the community was involved. On the other hand, he, too, acknowledged that spending decisions were recommended by a central office cognizant of the conservative tastes of school boards and communities — the same formula that existed before Proposal A. 101 Interview Question it 4: Has education in your district improved because of Proposal A? Two superintendents shrugged indifferent, lukewarm endorsement” to the question of whether education had improved in their districts because of Proposal A. One of these alluded to his district’s longtime fiscal responsibility and an attitude that they would have continued providing the service that their community wanted without the Proposal. The proposal, however, made it possible for them to “add a few extras we probably wouldn’t have done otherwise,” and the ability to save a lot more. His district’s fund equity had risen fiom 22 percent to almost 48 percent of the budget. The other 18 districts saw Proposal A as “God-sen ,” a phrase actually used in three interviews. While respondents alluded to doubts for the future of the funding under the Proposal, enthusiasm for the first seven years was unqualified in most of the sample. Those school leaders said things like, “We couldn’t pass millage and we were going down the tubes,” and “Proposal A made it possible for us to stay in business and to put stuff back that we’d cut over the years.” Another said, “We’re poor and we don’t have much political representation in [our region in] Michigan. I think that Proposal A was a good thing for our school system. It could have been even better if we would have held our enrollment. We still end up better than we would have!” 102 Interview Question it 5: If your district had the $8,000 foundation grant that is the current hold-harmless level, what would you do with the money? Literature reviewed in Chapter III suggested that change is both a methodical process and a political response that protects status quo. School leaders’ response to this last question was consistent with predictions of sudden wealth syndrome as the respondents attempted to reconcile this hypothetical situation of additional wealth to their pre-wealth values, expectations and relationships: They simply had not spent much time imagining that more good fortune would visit them in their careers. This hypothetical question was the only one to which there were no immediate responses. Several of the superintendents reflected for several seconds before saying anything. When they came, answers tended to be variations of “we would do more of the same.” Respondents suggested more early childhood programs; more AP classes at their high schools; more money in capital funds. Three superintendents explained why it was a difficult question: They simply did not believe that was possible for the gap between the minimum grants and the hold harmless grants could ever narrow to zero. It would not happen because the state had neither the money nor the political will to attempt this level of equity. 103 Unanticipated Open-Ended Responses Several of the respondents completed their interviews by suggesting that i the “significant increase” alluded to in the interview’s preamble was not really so very much more money after all. They objected to interviewer use of the term ‘inndfall? The reasons repeated in several of the districts were: 1. 2. 3. It took a lot of money just to get out of the hole we were in. In addition to normal inflation, there were extraordinary increases in health care relative to the consumer price index. Michigan Public School Employees’ Retirement System rates had more than doubled from 5% of compensation since passage of Proposal A. In spite of Durants I, II and III there were still under-funding problems of the mandated programs. Declining student enrollments and the subsequent diseconomies of scale counteracted the growth in per student funding. Only one superintendent commented on the Headlee Tax Limitation’s effect on the 18 mils of local millage. The district continued to find it diffith to have this local millage approved and lack of local approval of this millage subsequently resulted in loss of a significant percentage of the district’s local match. So! How Was The Money Used? Both the quantitative data and the interview responses indicate that minimum grant schools spent money to restore programs that had once been offered but had been cut in recent years for budgetary reasons. Initially, this restoration centered on re-establishment of financial solvency via accumulation of funds equity. Qualitative comment established that there was pressure to grant modest increases in compensation to employees, but that there was also political 104 pressure to keep such increases “responsible.” The hiring of additional staff consumed new monies. The studied school districts also allocated money to repair buildings, add technology infi'astructure and to renovate bus fleets. Data indicate that new money was spent in manners consistent with past habits. Qualitative data indicate that, with the exception of preference for low tax, there was little public input in school matters before the proposal. Public interest in local schools did not increase as a result of the proposal’s passage. Respondents indicated that loss of local control of revenue impacted rhetoric at the negotiations table but not, apparently, to an extent that could cormterweigh political pressure to maintain “reasonable” compensation levels. In the initial years, much of the new money was not spent. In an accounting sense, capital was not only accumulated as fund equity, it was also allowed to accumulate in the forms of property. For example, buildings were repaired and up-graded and new buses were purchased. Early increases were allowed to trickle to stakeholders in the form of increased salaries and wages. In subsequent years, additions were made to curricular ofiefings. These curricular additions were mainstream educational offerings generally thought to be part of a standard public school education. Elementary music, art and physical education were restored. Advanced Placement opportunities were added for high school students. Student to teacher ratios were lowered. In many cases, personnel were added with sole responsibility for curriculum development. Elementary librarians and elementary counselors or social workers were added. Technology 105 was introduced. Funds equity continued to grow. Technology was arguably the only newcomer to minimum grants school offerings in that the general use of technology in education delivery came into vogue in the late 19808, just as the Bursley gaps began to grow. The last question in the qualitative survey invited respondents to imagine that the $1,300 gap between their basic grant and the hold-harmless grants was closed, that their schools would receive $8,000 for each of their students. How would the district use that money? Virtually all of the answers were variations of: “We’d do more of what we did with the initial money.” This answer was not only universally consistent with the population’s respondents, it is also consistent with the literature. Districts used their Proposal A money to expand what they had been doing and what was perceived in their communities as a fundamental public school education. What was firndamental for each district had been decided at the polls druing Bursley. The new money easily satisfied local tastes for program and also provided for the inevitable hard times. 106 Chapter VI New Money Old Values A singular characteristic shared by this study’s sample school districts was an historic aversion to school tax. In a power equalizing system such as Bursley, these minimum grant schools provided services to communities that chose low taxes and a willingness to accept lower educational services rather than the higher tax rates and greater power—equalized revenue enj oyed by other school districts in Michigan. Proposal A altered the external spending constraints in all districts. Formerly high spending districts found growth in their revenues restricted to levels that were less than had been custom. On the other end of the funding continuum, the minimum grant schools received significant increases in firnding that greatly surpassed the revenues that they in all likelihood could ever have garnered under Bursley. Proposal A changed the state’s school funding mechanism. Local cultures on the other hand did not change. Minimum grant school constituents still would have accepted lower levels of service if that had meant lower tax. One of the stated purposes of Proposal A was to reduce the funding differences between Michigan’s public school districts. Premiums were paid to the minimum grant school districts at the inception of the new system in July 107 1994. Disproportionately larger increases were also granted to the lowest funded districts during the first seven years after the new system’s initiation. The question addressed in this dissertation is: How did those minimum grant schools, the big winners, spend the new money? How was the Money Spent? Two answers. The first answer is: It wasn’t. Suspicious decision-makers doubted their good fortune and put much of the new money away for the inevitable return of hard times. Demands for additional services that failed local tests of fi'ugality also failed to force new spending. The demand to save was more pressing than the demand for contemporary new programs. The boarders spoke louder than those demanding program that exceeded traditional tastes. Local tastes were satisfied without spending all of the new money. As a result, the data indicate that funds equity in the sample districts more than tripled in the seven years studied. Prudent management suggested that new spending commitments needed to be modest. The school leaders that participated in this study argued that all kids deserved solid-but—devoid-of-fiills programs, including the restoration of basics that had deteriorated in recent years through lack of local support. The local definition of “all kids” included the children who would come along after the inevitable hard times returned. Again, hoarding money for the future outweighed new spending in the first years of the Proposal. 108 Given the size and sudden availability of Proposal A catch-up firnds, it can be presumed that while there were proposals for additional spending on “frills.” Through the lens of political pressure there simply was not sufficient political support in the studied districts for such proposals to carry the day. Conversely, as many of the survey’s respondents argued, development of fimds equity is a legitimate goal that their communities established as a buffer against leaner years. Declining enrollments and the subsequent effect that per pupil funding would lmve on aggregate revenues loomed large in five of the sample districts and further supported the argument for conserving firnds equity. The second answer ofi‘ how the money was spent is not inconsistent with how money was spent before the passage of Proposal A. In the initial years, respondents recalled spending money to just catch-up with spending that had been curtailed in recent lean times. The quantitative data confirm modest, “responsible” increases in employee compensation and spending to repair and upgrade buildings and bus fleets. Curricular offerings were expanded: early childhood additions and advanced placement classes extended curricula vertically while more support personnel, foreign language, technology and alternative programs broadened curricular offerings. Most notable in new spending was the hiring of additional staff and the subsequent reductions in class size. Qualitative data indicate that districts broadened their curricula to include educational offerings generally thought to be part of a standard public school education. Elementary music, art and physical education were brought back. Elementary librarians and elementary 109 counselors or social workers were restored or added. Many districts added advanced placement opportunities for high school students. In some cases personnel was hired with sole responsibility for curriculum development. In the last years of the study, the ratio of students to teachers dropped noticeably in the studied population. Quantitative data indicate that student- teacher ratios dropped 16 percent in the sample schools, from a 24:1 ratio the year before Proposal A was passed to a 20:1 ratio in fiscal 2001. This decline did not appear until the third and fourth years of the proposal but it was dramatic when it did begin. The statewide student teacher ration remained at 22:1 for the period studied. Comments during interviews support this interpretation of the Bulletin 1014 data and reveal a belief that these smaller class sizes would improve student learning. What none of those interviewed needed to say was that class sizes can easily be increased when hard times reappear. In short, as they increased funds equity, the study’s population school districts rebuilt their programs the levels enjoyed in the 1980s and added early childhood and other programs considered part of traditional curricula. Employees were paid better and more employees were hired relative to the number of students. Superintendents were careful to describe increased employee compensation as deserved but measured. Program additions were described in similar, cautious terms. Funds equity were built and highly touted. Technology was arguably the only newcomer to the budgets of the districts studied. 110 Consistently, the character of cru'ricular additions reflects each district’s historic acceptance of lower educational services even though the acceptance was no longer a trade-off for lower taxes. Vocal music was restored but string orchestra programs ubiquitous in the suburbs were not added. The need for pay- to-play sports was eliminated (“traditional” sports were fully funded) but new sports were rarely added. Advanced placement classes were made available to high school students, but languages other than Spanish for high school students were not. Money was spent in manners consistent with how money had been spent in the sample districts during past, more affluent times. Repairs to facilities that had delayed during recent lean years were scheduled. Bus fleets were upgraded. Arguably this continuation of spending pattern was restorative, not new spending. The last question in the qualitative survey invited respondents to imagine that the $1,300 gap between their basic/minimum grant and the hold-harmless grants was closed, that their schools would receive $8,000 for each of their students. How would the district use that money? Virtually all of the answers indicated that school leaders would do more of what we did with the initial money. This answer was not only universally consistent with the population’s respondents, it is also consistent with the literature on change. Districts used their Proposal A money to expand what the schools had provided during “good times.” There was a commitment to provide students with what was locally perceived to be solid, fundamental, basic public school education. “Frills” were suspect. Savings that could buffer hard times were subsequently seen as legitimate uses of the new 111 money. If the minimums grant schools were funded at the hold-harmless rate, much of the increased money would accumulate as firnd equity. An Apparent Anomaly An anomaly is suggested when “free” money becomes available yet recipients refuse to increase spending to match those new revenues. While it would seem logical to presume that “free” Proposal A money would be claimed by eager stakeholders, this study suggests that proponents of spending were bested by those who wanted to save. Hanushek argues that the price of governmental service rises to the amounts of money available without congruent increase in fimction. Data fiom the population schools support exactly the opposite point of view. In an apparent anomaly, Proposal A’s big winners did not spend half of the money made available by the new fimding system. The big winners added back program that had been available in recent, more aflluent years. They even added modestly to program ofl‘erings. Although money was available to begin to do so, they did not attempt to replicate the programs of their higher spending, suburban neighbors. Park & Carroll predicted in the early years of Bursley that demand for educational service would vary on the basis of household income and suburban/rural setting. That prediction is validated even when the relationship between price and service becomes tenuous. Independent of the apparent stability 112 of the price / service nexus, data imply that districts also adhere to old habits of consumption expectation. The not-spending anomaly is explained in the literature on change. Change is slow and is rooted in practices of the past. Programs and compensation that seemed sparse by suburban standards were a norm that was acceptable in the districts studied. The conservatism of suspicious decision-makers outweighed whatever pressure was exerted for more spending. Moreover, the sudden wealth syndrome predicts exactly the behavior that the data confirm. Sudden wealth may generate an initial fienzy of spending, but comfortable conservatism and long- established tastes and values will temper long-term life changes. In spite offtmding that was the lowest in the state, the districts in this study’s subset were well-managed and, with three exceptions, solvent before Proposal A. Proposal A windfalls were used to restore programs to levels enjoyed during these districts’ “better times.” Compared to state standards, only modest improvements to compensation and program were afl‘orded. Much of the new money was saved for an eventual rainy day. Whenendingfirndsbalanceperstudentforallofthe state’s schoolsare compared to beginning funds balance per student, a strong correlation indicates that district attitudes varied throughout the state but the attitudes locally did not change significantly. Those districts with a penchant for acctunulating funds equity continued that practice while districts that had habitually matched spending to revenues more closely either accumulated less equity per student or, in the cases 113 of non-population school districts, actually consumed equity in later years of the study. The Future of Proposal A The reason that minimum grant schools had the lowest frmding per student was political. During the Bursley era, those 40 communities did not support local millage referenda. They accepted lower educational services because it meant lower local tax. Exactly the opposite was true in the higher funded districts, particularly the hold-harmless districts. Those communities were willing and able to pay higher tax for higher service. The politics of the state allowed Bursley to evolve until per student funding varied by a factor of five at the extremes of the continuum. This disparate funding, while perhaps embarrassing, was acceptable politically tmtil property tax rates increased to levels that disadvantaged Michigan in a national business market. The politics of national business nurtured Proposal A’s concern for disparate firnding as much as the social politic of education. I Proposal A altered the funding rules. New constraints contradicted the political inclinations of the communities that preferred the extremes of the low tax/low service and high tax/high service continuum. While it is unlikely that politics will allow the state’s educational funding disparity to return to the 114 extremes of 1994-95, persistent rumbles about “tweaking Proposal A” suggest that changes will undoubtedly be made. While the median voter model is no longer operative in millage elections, districts that did offer and continue to offer high service are, according to the Tiebout model, still attracting high demand families. Funds equity in those districts have fallen. When the conflict between critical financial and wholesale reduction of favorite program arrives, the Park & Carroll presumption of political demand will assert itself. Newly elected Governor Jennifer Granholm was forced to implement an executive reduction in school aid funds in January 2003. The formula for dividing the reduction did not equally affect every school district. Districts that had prospered under Proposal A — still Michigan’s lowest funded schools — were forced to accept larger reductions per student than were assessed against the state’s best-fimded schools. It is suggested that the executive order is preview for future “tweaking” of the new funding mechanism. Politics accommodated the disparate array of Bursley funding. 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Em. ..20 .88 0.8.565 8.5. 8.0 .88 0.808.. .880 28.8 2.80 2.... .880 288 2.80 88.0 28.8 2.80 282.20 28.8 2.80 288...... 0.00000 3.000.060 0.000200 888 882.880 00.9.80 8.8.0 .88 ...0 828.0 .20 8 0.80.80 8.8.80 8.8.0 .88 08.8.... 0.00000 3.000.500 00.00 9.0.. 8.0 8.8 2.80 .88.. 28.8 2.80 8.88.. .20 8 0.8580 8.820 .32 8.8.0 8.8 8880 8.8.0 8.8 85 880 88 2.80 28...: 0.380 28.8 2.80 ....0 80.28.... 0.00000 000.802.000.000 28.8 8:. 8.820 .20 8.8 2.80 880.80 28.8 2.80 02.0 8> 8.8.0 .88 ....0 .28 < 8800... 133 Appendix B Michigan Public Schools 1994 Enrollments, Enrollment Ranking, Student:Teacher Ratio 8. Opertatlonal Millage source: Michigan Department of Education, Bulletin 1014, 1994 134 uperating . millage student enrollment student/teacher operating 1 MACKINAC ISLAND 88 521 11 7.8 2 BRIDGMAN 917 413 17 8.37 3 LELAND 390 495 17 10.9 4 NORTHPORT 299 508 17 13.38 5 HARBOR SPRINGS 1,013 392 21 13.99 6 CASEVILLE 284 510 16 14.76 7 GLEN LAKE 806 434 19 15.06 8 BEAVER ISLAND 87 522 12 15.79 9 MACKINAW CITY 239 513 13 17.76 ELK RAPIDS 1,337 338 19 18.79 ALCONA 1.011 395 19 19.22 JOHANNE-LEWISTON 811 432 20 19.75 NEW BUFFALO 644 456 15 19.84 F RANKFORT-ELBERTA 543 474 16 20.06 WATERSMEET TWP 195 516 10 20.5 JEFFERSON 2,639 178 20 21.75 GERRISH HIGGINS 1,869 258 18 22.18 WHITEFISH 74 524 9 22.26 ONAWAY 1,025 389 24 22.65 FAIRVIEW 486 482 22 23.48 EAST CHINA 4,973 71 21 23.52 BELLAIRE 616 461 20 23.55 NORTH HURON 722 445 20 23.76 CHARLEVOIX 1,335 339 20 23.77 PENTWATER 382 497 19 23.81 LES CHENEAUX 407 493 17 23.91 SUTTONS BAY 981 401 21 24.37 LUDINGTON 2,691 172 21 24.38 BLOOMFIELD HILLS 5,562 60 16 24.4 30 KALKASKA 2,139 225 21 24.79 31 WOLVERINE 374 499 22 24.85 32 OSCODA 2,229 214 18 24.95 33 BENZIE CO CENTRAL 1,775 268 26 25.03 34 INLAND LAKES 914 414 21 25.27 35 ENGADINE 362 501 18 25.27 36 GWINN 2.884 155 20 25.28 37 BALDWIN 893 419 19 25.35 38 DETOUR 279 511 13 25.42 39 PORT HOPE 124 519 16 25.5 40 NEGAUNEE 1,754 270 22 25.5 41 CENTRAL LAKE 486 482 18 25.64 Appendix B Michigan Public Schools 1994 Enrollments, Enrollment Ranking, Student:Teacher Ratio 8- Opertational Millage source: Michigan Department of Education, Bulletin 1014, 1994 nperating millage student enrollment student/teacher operating 42 BARAGA 666 452 - 18 25.69 43 FRANKENMUTH 1,103 377 21 25.73 44 ESSEXVILLE HAMPTON 1,796 264 20 25.76 45 HILLMAN 676 450 23 25.78 46 HALE 762 437 20 25.86 47 STANDISH STERLING 2,201 219 25 25.97 48 SOUTH HAVEN 2,935 149 21 25.98 49 AU GRES SIMS 577 466 21 25.99 50 HOUGHTON LAKE 2,074 233 23 26.19 51 TAWAS 1,710 281 23 26.24 52 SAUGATUCK 657 453 19 26.27 53 BRIMLEY 559 470 21 26.5 54 BEAVERTON 1,919 250 22 26.59 55 MID PENINSULA 427 492 22 26.69 56 CRAWFORD AUSABLE 2,165 224 25 26.72 57 MIDLAND 8,947 27 21 26.88 58 ARENAC EASTERN 523 477 21 27.06 59 COVERT 779 435 19 27.08 60 BURT TOWNSHIP 78 523 9 27.13 61 CRES'IWOOD 2.703 169 24 27.3 62 EAU CLAIRE 646 455 20 27.31 63 MlO AU SABLE 888 422 20 27.32 64 BAD AXE 1,569 307 23 27.39 65 PELLSTON 715 446 18 27.68 66 BIRMINGHAM 7,276 42 17 27.75 67 PAW PAW 2,275 21 1 23 27.76 68 COLOMA 1,932 245 21 27.78 69 WHl'lTEMORE PRESCOTT 1.931 247 23 27.88 70 LAMPHERE 2,285 208 19 28 71 ONEKAMA 482 485 19 28.03 72 BREITUNG TWP 2,215 216 24 28.12 73 MAPLE VALLEY 1,726 275 22 28.13 74 RIVER VALLEY 1,298 343 18 28.14 75 FOREST AREA 984 400 26 28.23 76 ATLANTA 555 471 20 28.25 77 MESICK 969 404 23 28.25 78 STEPHENSON 1,107 375 18 28.3 79 N.l.C.E. 1,692 284 19 28.36 80 DEARBORN 13,664 1 1 21 28.39 81 TAHQUAMENON 1,232 354 22 28.5 82 ALPENA 5,954 52 25 28.53 83 KINGSLEY 1,338 337 25 28.53 84 UBLY 971 402 30 28.59 135 Appendix B Michigan Public Schools 1994 Enrollments, Enrollment Ranking, Student:Teacher Ratio 8- Opertatlonal Millage source: Michigan Department of Education, Bulletin 1014, 1994 '96an millage an! 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 9.0% LAKE LINDEN HUBBELL BANGOR (VAN BUREN) POSEN ANN ARBOR PETOSKEY CALUMET SAGINAW TWP ELKTON-PlGEON-BAY PT GAYLORD CROSWELL LEXINGTON FARWELL w BRANCH ROSE CITY DOWAGIAC UNION RUDYARD GRAND HAVEN COOPERSVILLE NOVI HARBOR BEACH NORTHVILLE LAKE CITY HARRISON GODWIN HEIGHTS CALEDONIA MONROE FOREST PARK ST IGNACE ST JOSEPH HOPKINS LAKEVIEW (MONTCALM) MORLEY STANWOOD WHITE PIGEON MANISTEE ALLEGAN CARSONVILLE-PT SANIL KALEVA NORMAN DICKSO QUINCY MUNISING MATTAWAN TRAVERSE CITY NORTH ADAMS ONTONAGON MANCELONA GROSSE POINTE student M 617 1 .715 369 14,926 2,696 1,681 4,819 1,372 3,172 2,397 1,653 2,996 3,252 1,244 5,883 2,678 4,441 908 4,158 1,404 2,278 2,192 2,516 7,324 761 1,047 2,599 1,368 1,792 1,496 1 ,237 2,031 3,031 743 842 1,482 1,105 2,793 10,874 584 838 970 7,792 136 m 460 279 500 3 171 235 77 333 134 202 290 145 131 349 55 175 37 413 92 323 209 221 137 40 433 334 131 334 237 315 351 237 144 442 423 317 373 133 21 429 403 36 £91152 2 24 1 8 19 21 23 22 23 23 24 20 21 23 21 21 24 20 21 21 22 24 22 20 25 19 19 20 26 22 22 22 24 22 24 23 20 21 27 23 21 21 22 19 enrollment student/teacher operating @1129: 28.62 28.63 28.72 28.73 28.76 28.79 28.93 28.94 28.97 29 29.01 29.16 29.2 29.22 29.27 29.28 29.43 29.47 29.49 29.5 29.68 29.58 29.65 29.68 29.73 29.75 29.78 29.8 29.82 29.85 29.85 29.87 29.89 29.9 29.95 29.97 29.98 30.03 30.06 30.09 30.16 30.19 30.22 Appendix B Michigan Public Schools 1994 Enrollment, Enrollment Ranking, Student:Teacher Ratio 8 Operttional Millage source: Michigan Department 01 Education, Bulletin 1014, 1994 Iperating millage student enrollment student/teacher operating zan_k m m unkin :2th miles: 128 KENOWA HILLS 2,969 146 23 30.33 129 HUDSONVILLE 3,472 115 25 30.42 130 ROGERS CITY 962 406 21 30.45 131 BELDING 2,573 183 21 30.48 132 MARION 833 430 21 30.48 133 MCBAIN 1,035 386 23 30.5 134 HOLTON 1,218 356 22 30.5 135 DECATUR 1,259 347 22 30.52 136 OTSEGO 2,459 195 22 30.59 137 CARNEY NADEAU 298 509 18 30.7 138 CASS CITY 1,671 287 23 30.78 139 NORWAY-VULCAN 1,058 381 22 30.86 140 MARQUETTE 4,838 75 23 30.9 141 VANDERBILT 325 505 18 30.9 142 UNION CITY 1.399 327 21 30.93 143 MASON (MONROE) 1,992 242 19 30.93 144 BRONSON 1,460 322 24 31 145 lRONWOOD 1,795 265 22 31 146 EWEN-TROUT CREEK 577 466 19 31 147 MANTON 927 410 25 31 148 TRl COUNTY 2,030 238 24 31.02 149 LIVONIA 16,903 6 23 31.04 150 HANCOCK 1,061 380 21 31.05 151 VASSAR 1,929 248 24 31.05 152 TROY 11,487 18 20 31.06 153 lONlA 3,452 116 24 31.1 154 NEWAYGO 2,869 156 23 31.1 155 KINGSTON 774 436 26 31.11 156 DECKERVILLE 1,053 383 27 31.15 157 COLON 1,029 387 17 31.28 158 CHIPPEWA HILLS 2,630 179 23 31.29 159 SANDUSKY 1,527 311 20 31.29 160 BAY CITY 10,769 23 23 31.3 161 L'ANSE 847 427 21 31.33 162 SAULTSTE MARIE 3,537 113 23 31.34 163 FOREST HILLS 6,344 47 19 31.34 164 THREE RIVERS 3,246 132 24 31.35 165 HARPER WOODS 1,026 388 22 31.38 166 CHEBOYGAN 2,474 192 26 31.4 167 MARCELLUS 1,054 382 23 31.42 168 HESPERIA 1,577 306 24 31.43 189 BLOOMINGDALE 1,310 341 _ 23 31.44 170 WHITMORELAKE 1,146 369 22 31.47 137 Appendix B Michigan Public Schools 1994 Enrollment, Enrollment Ranking, Student:Teacher Ratio 8- Operttional Millage source: Michigan Department of Education, Bulletin 1014, 1994 Iperating millage student enrollment student/teacher operating 171 SARANAC 1,236 352 23 31.5 172 REEDCITY 2,135 226 23 31.5 173 BOYNE CITY 1,382 332 21 31.57 174 EVART 1,442 324 22 31.64 175 IMLAY CITY 2,272 212 26 31.72 176 BARK RIVER HARRIS 647 454 19 31.75 177 GREENVILLE 4,109 96 22 31.75 178 NORTHWEST 3,614 110 26 31.8 179 NORTH BRANCH 2,426 200 24 31.8 180 CHASSELL TWP 346 503 22 31.9 181 ALGONAC 2,550 185 21 31.9 182 HANOVER HORTON 1,239 350 22 31.96 183 ISHPEMING 1,473 320 25 31.96 184 HILLSDALE 2,643 177 23 32 185 READING 1,004 398 22 32 186 PECK 553 473 20 32 187 BENTON HARBOR 7,279 41 23 32.01 188 BOYNE FALLS 348 502 24 32.01 189 WALKERVILLE 452 488 22 32.01 190 VESTABURG 743 442 20 32.03 191 CEDAR SPRINGS 2,825 159 23 32.05 192 MASON CO. CENTRAL 1,878 257 26 32.1 193 BUCHANAN 1,897 253 18 32.11 194 MONTABELLA 1,341 335 23 32.13 195 ALMONT 1,310 341 22 32.16 196 CONSTANTINE 1,602 298 22 32.16 197 REESE 1,135 372 24 32.17 198 BRANDYVVINE 1,732 274 20 32.19 199 ADAMSTWP 490 481 21 32.31 200 BERRIEN SPRINGS 1,743 271 23 32.32 201 MANISTIQUE 1,393 329 22 32.33 202 AVONDALE 3,101 139 22 32.35 203 CLINTON 1,142 370 24 32.38 204 FREE SOIL 207 515 17 32.4 205 OWOSSO 4,632 79 24 32.4 206 HOUGHTON-PORTAGE TWP 1,234 353 22 32.41 207 WAYLAND UNION 2,847 158 21 32.43 208 MARTIN 860 426 19 32.44 209 CAMDEN FRONTIER 725 444 22 32.45 210 KENTWOOD 7,838 35 20 32.52 211 BANGORTWP(BAY) 2,781 165 26 32.55 212 NORTH CENTRAL 673 451 21 32.6 213 GOODRICH 1,621 295 25 32.61 138 Appendix B Michigan Public Schools 1994 Enrollment, Enrollment Ranking, Student:Teacher Ratio 8. Opertational Millage source: Michigan Department of Education, Bulletin 1014, 1994 Penning millage student enrollment student/teacher operating :33 9mm 5mm La__.anin [26.0 mm 214 HART 1,496 315 24 32.65 215 FREELAND 1,263 346 26 32.65 216 DUNDEE 1,476 319 23 32.68 217 LAKESHORE(BERRIEN) 2,938 148 24 32.71 218 NORTH DICKINSON CO 555 471 18 32.72 219 HUDSON 1,247 348 24 32.75 220 FARMINGTON 10,960 20 25 32.77 221 CAPAC 1,585 303 26 32.82 222 IRON MOUNTAIN 1,586 302 23 32.83 223 HAMILTON 2,111 228 24 32.84 224 PORTAGE 8,238 31 20 32.89 225 WAKEFIELDTWP 486 482 19 33 226 BROWN CITY 1,194 360 25 33 227 MASON CO. EASTERN 623 458 22 33.03 228 WEST OTTAWA 5,610 57 23 33.04 229 LAKE FENTON 1,390 330 23 33.05 230 SHELBY 1,606 297 21 33.05 231 WATERVLIET 1,320 340 20 33.07 232 REPUBLIC MICHIGAMME 220 514 12 33.13 233 BIRCH RUN 1,895 255 23 33.19 234 CADILLAC 3,923 102 25 33.2 235 BELLEVUE 1,089 378 22 33.22 236 EDWARDSBURG 1,921 249 23 33.25 237 MONTAGUE 1,607 296 25 33.25 238 WARREN 13,530 12 25 33.26 239 KENT CITY 1,698 282 17 33.3 240 STURGIS 3,084 140 23 33.3 241 SUPERIOR CENTRAL 468 487 18 33.31 242 PLYMOUTH CANTON 14,910 9 26 33.31 243 BIG RAPIDS 2,223 215 23 33.38 244 FENNVILLE 1,643 291 22 33.39 245 PINCONNING 2.476 191 22 33.39 246 GLADWIN 2,019 240 23 33.42 247 SOUTH LAKE 2,189 222 23 33.47 248 LAKEWOOD (IONIA) 2,816 160 24 33.48 249 MARENISCO 112 520 11 33.5 250 FREMONT 2,784 164 24 33.5 251 CARO 2,493 190 20 33.5 252 OAKRIDGE 1,907 251 23 33.51 253 WEST BLOOMFIELD 5,254 62 20 33.51 254 KELLOGGSVILLE 2,045 235 25 33.54 255 SUMMERFIELD 897 418 22 33.57 256 BEAR LAKE 513 478 21 33.58 139 Appendix B Michigan Public Schools 1994 Enrollment, Enrollment Ranking, StudentzTeacher Ratio 8 Opertatlonal Millage source: Michigan Department of Education, Bulletin 1014, 1994 Iperating millage student enrollment student/teacher operating m 901m 9%.! m mg m_i|lm§ 257 BIG BAY DE NOC 498 ' 15 33.63 258 AKRON FAIRGROVE 613 462 23 33.68 259 LINDEN 2,582 182 24 33.69 260 LAKEVILLE 2,509 188 27 33.7 261 HOLLAND 5,588 58 22 33.85 262 LAWRENCE 810 433 21 33.88 263 HOMER 1,081 379 19 33.9 264 BESSEMER 566 469 18 33.9 265 ROCHESTER 11,987 17 23 33.92 266 JONESVILLE 1,202 358 22 34 267 VANDERCOOK LAKE 908 416 21 34 268 VICKSBURG 2,630 179 22 34 269 SPARTA 3,170 135 23 34 270 JENISON 5,348 61 25 34.03 271 MERIDIAN 1,726 275 26 34.04 272 DEXTER 2,291 207 26 34.09 273 IDA 1,628 293 22 34.11 274 SPRINGPORT 1,130 373 21 34.15 275 SALINE 3,652 108 23 34.19 276 GLADSTONE 2,034 236 23 34.2 277 BEDFORD 5,047 69 24 34. 2 278 COLUMBIA 2,013 241 23 34.25 279 OSCEOLATWP 306 507 19 34.26 280 BRECKENRIDGE 1,223 355 23 34.28 281 HAMTRAMCK 3,426 119 24 34.31 282 CLARE 1,628 293 22 34.33 283 PORTLAND 1,864 259 24 34.33 284 ROCKFORD 8,047 51 22 34.37 285 AIRPORT 2,668 176 25 34.39 286 CASSOPOLIS 1,588 301 21 34.4 287 GRANT 2,108 229 26 34.42 288 NILES 4,455 86 24 34.45 289 YALE 1,900 252 23 34. 45 290 UNIONVILLE SEBEWAING 954 407 21 34.45 291 GALIEN TOWNSHIP 576 468 18 34.49 292 SOUTHFIELD 8,793 28 18 34.5 293 HOWELL 5, 948 53 24 34.53 294 SOUTH LYON 4, 520 83 22 34.57 295 PORT HURON 13 417 13 25 34.59 296 ST CHARLES 1,278 344 23 34.6 297 PINE RIVER 1,425 325 24 34.62 298 ZEELAND 3,575 111 23 34.63 299 MARLETTE 1,524 312 24 34.67 140 Appendix B Michigan Public Schools 1994 Enrollment, Enrollment Ranking, Student:Teacher Ratio 8 Opertatlonal Millage source: Michigan Department of Education, Bulletln 1014, 1994 Parenting millage student enrollment student/teacher operating 300 ADDISON 1,188 361 21 34.89 301 ONSTED 1,636 292 21 34.69 302 CENTRAL MONTCALM 2,448 196 24 34.72 303 RAPID RIVER 532 475 21 34.73 304 STOCKBRIDGE 1,764 269 24 34.76 305 SCHOOLCRAFT 1,011 395 21 34.8 308 TRENTON 3,148 136 18 34.88 307 LAPEER 7,958 34 27 34.89 308 DAVISON 4,965 73 27 34.9 309 SHEPHERD 1,932 245 21 34.91 310 PITTSFORD 867 425 21 34.92 311 MENOMINEE 2,439 198 21 34.94 312 MAYVILLE 1,341 335 23 34.94 313 LITTLEFIELD 512 479 18 34.97 314 COLDWATER 3,868 104 21 34.98 315 ITHACA 1,659 289 21 34.98 316 DURAND 2,308 206 24 34.98 317 OLIVET 1,269 345 25 35 318 MORENCI 1,012 394 21 35 319 MENDON 756 439 20 35 320 HARTFORD 1,569 307 21 35 321 BYRON 1,159 367 23 35.03 322 PERRY 1,939 244 20 35.03 323 DELTON KELLOGG 2,194 220 22 35.08 324 LOWELL 3,389 121 21 35.08 325 PINCKNEY 3.854 105 26 35.11 326 WALDRON 477 486 17 35.12 327 ESCANABA 3,945 101 24 35.13 328 CENTREVILLE 965 405 18 35.13 329 MTMORRIS 3,440 117 25 35.15 330 NAPOLEON 1,482 317 23 35.16 31 WHITE PINE 191 517 16 35.16 332 SWAN VALLEY 1,665 288 24 35.19 33 WHITE CLOUD 1,543 309 22 35.3 334 CLIO 3,949 100 24 35.33 335 GOBLES 944 409 23 35.33 336 LAWTON 1,171 363 21 35.35 337 COMSTOCK 2,686 173 18 35.41 338 DEARBORN HGTS NO 7 3.501 114 27 35.43 339 BLISSFIELD 1,591 300 24 35.44 340 LITCHFIELD 588 463 22 35.45 341 COLEMAN 1,137 371 22 35.47 342 BRANDON 4,124 95 27 35.47 141 Appendix B Michigan Public Schools 1994 Enrollment, Enrollment Ranking, Student:Teacher Ratio 8- Opertaflonal Millage source: Michigan Department of Education, Bulletin 1014, 1994 operating millage student enrollment studentlteacher operating 343 REETHS PUFFER 4,348 89 24 35.48 344 FLUSHING 4,079 97 24 35.5 345 FOWLERVILLE 2,779 166 23 35.53 346 BRIGHTON 6,154 49 21 35.61 347 LESLIE 1,579 305 23 35.62 348 CHELSEA 2,542 186 20 35.62 349 BENDLE 2,026 239 21 35.65 350 ST LOUIS 1,508 314 23 35.68 351 GRANDVILLE 4,967 72 25 35.7 352 HEMLOCK 1,511 313 27 35.72 353 WATERFORD 10,799 22 27 35.75 354 MERRILL 1,017 390 22 35.78 355 BRIDGEPORT-SPAULDING 2,797 162 26 35.85 356 SPRING LAKE 1,847 260 22 35.89 357 MICHIGAN CENTER 1,202 358 26 35.94 358 PLAINWELL 2,714 168 21 35.98 359 CARSON CITY CRYSTAL 1,389 331 21 35.99 360 ALMA 2,900 152 23 36 361 FULTON 1,006 397 21 36 362 BULLOCK CREEK 2,132 227 22 36.05 363 MILLINGTON 1,733 273 24 36.05 364 THORNAPPLE KELLOGG 2,418 201 23 36.1 365 GODFREY LEE 2,187 223 17 36.1 366 CONCORD 953 408 20 36.15 367 WYANDOTTE 4,865 74 23 36.15 368 ALBION 2,207 217 23 36.18 369 ATHERTON 1,116 374 21 36.19 370 MONA SHORES 3,710 107 25 36.24 371 ATHENS 923 412 20 36.25 372 BYRON CENTER 1,890 256 19 36.3 373 ROMEO 4,380 88 21 36.31 374 WHITEHALL 2,089 231 22 36.35 375 SOUTH REDFORD 3,346 126 24 36.38 376 PARCHMENT 3,310 129 22 36.42 377 WEST IRON COUNTY 1,536 310 23 36.43 378 HASTINGS 3,434 118 21 36.46 379 BEAL CITY 502 480 21 36.5 380 BUCKLEY 390 495 18 36.51 381 CHESANING UNION 2,442 197 24 36.55 382 GULLLAKE 2,749 167 20 36.59 383 PICKFORD 581 465 21 36.61 384 BURR OAK 330 504 19 36.68 385 WAVERLY 3,233 133 19 36.75 142 Appendix B Michigan Public Schools 1994 Enrollment, Enrollment Ranking, Student:Teacher Ratio 8 Operttlonal Millage source: Michigan Department of Education, Bulletin 1014, 1994 Iperating millage ELK 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 408 407 408 409 410 41 1 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 gm EATON RAPIDS HARPER CREEK NEW LOTHROP SWARTZ CREEK MEMPHIS CARROLLTON LINCOLN PARK WALLED LAKE ELLSWORTH DEERFIELD GROSSE ILE DRYDEN POTTERVILLE ASHLEY MARSHALL RAVENNA BATH GENESEE GIBRALTAR WAYNE-WESTLAND EAST JACKSON OXFORD MORRICE WESTERN MARYSVILLE WHITEFORD EAST JORDAN CHARLOTTE ADRIAN RICHMOND CORUNNA WARREN WOODS MILAN TEKONSHA MANCHESTER LAKEVIEW (MACOMB) RIVERVIEW WYOMING ALLEN PARK ANCHOR BAY DEWITT REDFORD UNION CHIPPEWA VALLEY student $32203 3.121 2,799 892 4,209 927 1 .445 5.899 10.995 278 405 1 .897 746 987 428 2,469 1 .187 1 .01 3 876 2.885 16.258 1.462 2,895 713 2.276 2.350 745 1 .210 3,541 5.036 1.809 2.063 2.429 2.465 449 1 .165 2.685 2.089 6,549 2,908 4,513 2,204 6,242 9.582 143 enrollment student/teacher operating rel—Wm 138 161 420 90 410 323 54 19 512 494 253 440 399 491 193 362 392 423 1 54 7 321 153 447 210 205 441 357 1 12 70 263 234 199 194 489 364 174 231 44 1 50 85 218 48 25 7.3m 23 23 22 23 23 24 22 22 20 16 19 24 18 20 21 25 22 23 27 23 20 24 19 23 24 20 22 23 24 27 26 25 21 1 7 24 23 23 22 24 25 24 29 28 HEN: 36.79 36.8 36.8 36.82 36.82 36.85 36.86 36.88 36.93 36.93 36.95 36.98 37 37 37.02 37.03 37.1 1 37.1 1 37.13 37.14 37.22 37.27 37.27 37.3 37.37 37.4 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.55 37.55 37.57 37.57 37.58 37.58 37.66 37.73 37.8 37.62 37.85 37.97 37.98 38.08 Appendix B Michigan Public Schools 1994 Enrollment, Enrollment Ranking, Student:Teacher Ratio 81 Operttional Millage source: Michigan Department of Education, Bulledn 1014, 1994 uperating millage student enrollment student/teacher operating £8.05 dam M Lula" £829 millage 429 LAKE ORION 4.837 76 23 38.09 430 MT PLEASANT 4.607 81 24 38.16 431 UTICA 23.309 4 24 38.18 432 WEBBERVILLE 873 424 22 38.2 433 FRUITPORT 3,761 106 25 38.2 434 NORTHVIEW 3.265 130 21 38.25 435 HOLLY 4.163 91 28 38.27 436 FENTON 3.059 142 26 38.35 437 GRASS LAKE 821 431 18 38.35 438 GRAND RAPIDS 29,795 2 26 38.39 439 ALBA 179 518 17 38.47 440 MADISON (LENAWEE) 621 459 18 38.5 441 GRAND BLANC 5.587 59 24 38.52 442 ALLENDALE 1,594 299 22 38.52 443 ST JOHNS 3.403 120 25 38.54 444 TECUMSEH 3.053 143 24 38.58 445 SOUTHGATE 4.605 82 25 38.6 446 HARTLAND 3.382 123 25 38.67 447 LANSE CREUSE 8.432 29 25 38.67 448 PENNFIELD 1.718 278 22 38.7 449 LINCOLN CONS 3.385 122 24 38.76 450 CLARKSTON 5.858 56 24 38.83 451 ECORSE 1.397 328 21 38.83 452 ROYAL OAK 7.553 38 19 38.87 453 OVID ELSIE 1.831 262 23 38.9 454 CLIMAX SCOTTS 678 449 20 38.91 455 WESTWOOD HEIGHTS 1.163 365 23 39 456 LAINGSBURG 1.148 368 22 39.03 457 MASON (INGHAM) 3.380 125 23 39.15 458 JACKSON 8,119 32 25 39.18 459 MELVINDALE ALLEN PK 2.105 230 22 39.21 460 ARMADA 1.676 286 22 39.23 461 COMSTOCK PARK 1.836 261 25 39.33 462 KEARSLEY 3.628 109 26 39.4 463 WILLIAMSTON 1.693 283 23 39.4 464 HURON VALLEY 10.622 24 24 39.43 485 EAST LANSING 3.969 99 20 39.6 466 MADISON (OAKLAND) 3.327 127 22 39.6 467 ORCHARD VIEW 2.858 157 21 39.7 468 OWENDALE GAGETOWN 322 506 19 39.73 469 CLAWSON 1.793 266 22 39.78 470 GALESBURG AUGUSTA 1.163 365 20 39.9 471 PEWAMO WESTPHALIA 638 457 19 40 144 Appendix B Michigan Public Schools 1994 Enrollment, Enrollment Ranking, Student:Teacher Ratio 8 Opeittlonal Millage source: Michigan Department of Education, Bulletin 1014, 1994 Ipemtins millage mm 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 NORTH MUSKEGON BRITTON MACON KALAMAZOO SAND CREEK WILLOW RUN GRAND LEDGE CARMAN-AINSWORTH NEW HAVEN DANSVILLE BATTLE CREEK FITZGERALD SAGINAW CENTER LINE LAKESHORE (MACOMB) BENTLEY PONTIAC LANSING HOLT OKEMOS HASLETT FOWLER MUSKEGON CLARENCEVILLE MONTROSE BEECHER HAZEL PARK DETROIT LAKEVIEW (CALHOUN) BERKLEY ROSEVILLE WOODHAVEN HIGHLAND PARK FRASER MUSKEGON HEIGHTS MT CLEMENS FLINT RIVER ROUGE HURON OAK PARK BUENA VISTA INKSTER VAN BUREN YPSILANT I student 9209! 697 443 12.019 912 3.980 5.098 5.254 1,016 891 9.238 2.903 14.414 2.553 2.955 1.039 12.968 21.948 5,097 4,144 2,698 526 7.700 1,713 1,721 3.128 7.430 182.916 3.326 5.199 6.141 4.647 5,112 4.515 3,065 4,617 27,442 2,369 1.991 3.381 1.734 2,378 6.797 5.195 145 enrollment student/teacher operating EM 448 490 16 41 5 98 67 62 391 421 26 1 51 10 1 84 147 385 14 5 68 94 1 70 476 37 280 277 1 37 39 1 128 £999 1 7 20 21 19 24 23 24 27 22 22 24 27 20 24 21 28 26 23 21 23 21 27 22 22 24 25 26 22 22 21 22 23 22 24 34 28 21 25 25 25 21 23 23 1.0111999 40.2 40.22 40.25 40.25 40.32 40.5 40.51 40.67 40.7 40.72 40.8 40.9 40.91 40.97 41.05 41.09 41.1 41.1 41.1 41.2 41.39 41.6 41.83 41.95 42 42.04 42.08 42.15 42.54 42.64 42.84 42.93 42.95 42.97 43.13 43.15 43.18 43.28 43.3 43.42 43.51 43.58 43.67 Appendix B Michigan Public Schools 1994 Enrollment, Enrollment Ranking, Student:Teacher Ratio 8 Opertational Millage source: Michigan Department of Education, Bulletin 1014, 1994 uperating millage ‘ student enrollment student/teacher operating 515 GARDEN CITY 6,368 45 25 43.67 516 EAST GRAND RAPIDS 2,501 189 20 43.75 517 EAST DETROIT 8,389 30 23 43.89 518 CLINTONDALE 4,150 93 25 44.25 519 FERNDALE 7.996 33 22 44.49 520 FLAT ROCK 1.582 304 23 44.58 521 WESTWOOD 2,266 213 29 44.79 522 ROMULUS 3.914 103 26 44.82 523 VAN DYKE 6.359 46 24 45.04 524 TAYLOR 13.015 15 25 4551 state average 3.176 22.00 33.39 146 aam. r v.3; mam. _. ac... v av... v 0mm. _. aa 9. w no... v mafia» mam... mam... mam... ava.—. ama... mva.—. ..oa.—. ..mm... mafia» 8a.a vmfia mafia mafia vaa.a mafia aafia mafia avm.a» mar ova v2. vmw amp aoa mar a: avm.a» ammJ vmm... mam.—. mam; amm... aam._. maa.—. maa... mam.a» ama. _. ..mfi —. vmfi v mafi w —. wfi w war. —. ma v. —. maa. r vam.a» vwa.a mafia amfia mvfia ova.a mafia am ...a mafia mam.a» amm.a avm.a maa.a mom.a ama.a vma.a mma.a mafia m—.m.a» aom Pam vam m5 mom ova o 3 ram vwmda mom mom ..mm mvm ova Pam amm mom mamd» mav. r mav. w 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F 5 30.03 90.3 mmad» Etna 03.3 36.5 EonBQanmm 3t 8t 8t at at 8t 3t 39 5.9.3 .358 m8: 9...“. .8260 .80... - 9.5:on .33. .an a 59.222 197 Bibliography Abrahamson, Mark, “Sudden Wealth, Gratification and Attainment: Durkheim’s Anomie of Affluence Reconsidered” American Sociological Review; 1980, 45,] Feb, 49 - 57 Becker, Gay, Disrupted Lives: How People Create Meaning in a Chaotic World, University of California Press, Berkley & Los Angles California, 1997 Bell, Derrick, And We Are Not Saved; The Elusive M For Racial Justice, Basic Books, Inc., 1987 Benson, Charles 8., The Economics of Public Education, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1978, pages 350 — 351 Beme, Robert & Stiefel, Leanna, Conc_e_pts of School Finance Quin. LB 2826.m5 B47.l984 Engler, John, letter to Michigan House of Representatives, September 28, 2001 Fisher. Ronald C., State and Local Public Finance Scott F oresman & Company, Chicago, 111., 1987 Kaplan, H. Roy, “1f1 were a Rich Man: Work in the Lives of Million Dollar Lottery Winners, North-Central Sociological Association (1987) Karr, Alphonse, Less Guepes, Janvier 1849: “Plus ca clmnge, plus c’est la meme chose” Ladd, Chalk & Hansen, Quin & Adgguacy in Educational Finance, National Research Council, National Academy Press, Washington, DC. 1999 LB 2825.E68.1999 Michigan Department of Education, “State School Update,” Vol. 8, No. 10, July 2000 Park, Rolla Edward and Carroll, Stephen J .; “The Search For Eguig in School Finance: Michigan School District Rmnse to a Guaranteed Tax Base,” Prepared for the National Institute of Educational and the US. 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