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JAPANIZATION OF TOKYO DISNEYLAND

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**U.S. OCCUPATION AND RECONTEXTUALIZATION OF
AMERICAN CULTURE IN JAPAN:
JAPANIZATION OF TOKYO DISNEYLAND**

By

Reina Tanaka

A DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

U.S. OCCUPATION AND RECONTEXTUALIZATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE IN JAPAN: JAPANIZATION OF TOKYO DISNEYLAND

By

Reina Tanaka

I will consider how Japan recontextualized the American cultural influences during the U.S. occupation and created a unique Japanese culture and identity. This Japanization reflected local reactions to the ideological agenda of the United States during the postwar period, and is represented at Tokyo Disneyland (TDL) in Japan. The three stages of domesticating American culture in Japan will be examined: First, the influences of the hegemonic U.S. occupation policy focusing on the civil censorship with the radio program, *Truth Box*; secondly, cultural impact of the occupation policy on the Japanese interpretation of the American culture by looking at the comic *Blondie*, an example of a Japanese cultural construct of the American lifestyle; finally, Japanese cultural negotiation or Japanization of TDL. This part considers consumerism and the leisure boom, which contributed the popularity of TDL to see how TDL has been modified to satisfy the demands of the Japanese as a result of the U.S. occupation. This thesis examines the importation of American culture not from the point of American cultural imperialism, but how Japan has proactively domesticated both the U.S. occupation policy and American cultural products for their own good. It will conclude with an examination of Tokyo DisneySea to show the evolving example of the Japanization of American culture.

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INTRODUCTION

Japan has been importing cultures from other nations from the beginning of its history. Therefore, it is accustomed to recontextualizing exotic cultures and to recreating the unique culture and identity of Japan. Among the encounters with other cultures, the United States has had the biggest influence on Japanese culture in two historically significant moments in the past. Japan's first encounter with the United States was in 1853 when the Commander in Chief U.S. East India Squadron, Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry came to Uraga, Japan, to request that Japan end its closed-door policy and open trade. When Perry came in "Black Ships," it surprised and confused the Japanese because those warships seemed to "menace the idyllic peacefulness of the countryside."¹ After Perry's insistent negotiation and a threat of resorting to arms, Japan finally yielded to open the ports and signed US-Japan Treaty of Peace and Amity when he returned Japan in 1854. The Japanese were impressed to see the gifts they received from Perry which were "chosen for their utility rather than for their costliness": the quarter-size locomotive and tender with railway, the telegraph instruments and a wire, the agricultural implements, weapons, etc. The Japanese showed "insatiable curiosity not only about the mechanical devices of the Western world, but even about the dress and personal effects of the Americans."² This shows that the Japanese were extremely interested in the American culture, including both technology and the lifestyle, and they were eager to try and learn the new culture, even though Japan was forced to open the nation by the United States.

The second encounter with the United States was in 1945 when Japan lost World War II (WWII), beginning of the U.S. occupation policy led by the General Douglas MacArthur of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). Under the U.S. occupation, the Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) censored all the possible civil communication media from letters, telephones, newspapers, radio programs, etc. The Japanese were obviously controlled by SCAP to achieve its goals of democratization and demilitarization of Japan. However, Japan positively accepted the situation under the occupation and received and recontextualized the American influence in order to achieve the economic development and material affluence, such as electric appliances, of the United States. As a result, Japan became one of the biggest economic powers in the world.

I would like to examine the three stages of domesticating the American culture in Japan. First, I will look at the influences of the deliberate U.S. occupation policy in the postwar period especially focusing on the civil censorship policy with the radio program, *Truth Box*. Secondly, how the information control of the United States was interpreted by the Japanese and how it impacted the Japanese thoughts in catching up with the United States, will be considered. The comic *Blondie* which was introduced by the Japanese newspapers from 1949 to 1951 during the occupation is an example to portray the image that the Japanese had towards the American lifestyle as a result of the occupation policy. I would like to clarify what the Japanese mindset was when they were reading *Blondie* in postwar Japan. Finally, I will study how the influence of the U.S. occupation and postwar period are represented and domesticated at Tokyo Disneyland (TDL)

which opened in 1983. Since Disneyland is one of the biggest American cultural idioms along with McDonald's, many cultural critics study them from the point of American cultural imperialism: the American hegemony in its cultural exports that dominate less powerful cultures. Nevertheless, I would like to analyze Disneyland in Japan with the same approach that I look at the occupation policy of the United States in postwar Japan: how Japan imported Disneyland, the symbol of American culture; how it has been domesticated to suit the Japanese culture; how it has created a unique culture of Japan; and the reason for the huge success of Tokyo Disneyland. In this section, I will first consider the Disney generation who grew up with Disney in postwar Japan, and then theme parks and the original Disneylands in the United States. I will then talk about Tokyo Disneyland and the intentions of Oriental Land Co. Ltd., that introduced the Disneyland to Japan. Next, the two major demands of the Japanese in the 1980s – consumerism and the leisure boom– will be examined to see how TDL has been modified to satisfy the demands of the Japanese. In regard to consumerism, I will focus on four distinctive characteristics of the Japanese consumption culture which have been generated as a consequence of the combination of the newly emerged consumer society and the original Japanese culture: souvenir culture, commodified nostalgia, an age-governed system, and brand-name consciousness. I will also pay attention to the consumption culture of the new generation that dominates the large visitor's population to TDL today. Not only the arrangement to meet the cultural demands of the Japanese in the late nineteenth century as a consequence of the U.S. occupation, but also some modifications considering Japanese traits will be mentioned.

Finally, I will look at Tokyo DisneySea (TDS) which opened in 2001 and think of it as another good example of the Japanization of American culture. TDS has more interactive human communication than TDL while TDL is famous for its manuals to control everything from the theme of the park to employees. The criticism towards this manualized management of TDL will show another important reason of TDL's success in regards to the manualized Japanese society. The creation of TDS shows the necessity of creating a new type of theme parks to satisfy the new demands of Japanese society today. The main purpose of my thesis is to analyze how the influences of the U.S. occupation policy are represented at Tokyo Disneyland and how Japan has localized the American culture at the Park.

CHAPTER 1

HEGEMONIC U.S. OCCUPATION POLICY: CIVIL CENSORSHIP

Japan was placed under U.S. occupation in August 1945 with the end of WWII. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, was tasked to “rebuild a nation that had been almost completely destroyed by the war.” MacArthur notes that, “Japan had become the world’s great laboratory for an experiment in the liberation of a people from totalitarian military rule and for the liberalization of government from within.”³ Anticipating the surrender of Germany in June of 1943, the United States was already considering its censorship operation strategy in Japan.⁴ The Joint Chiefs of Staff told the Director of the U.S. Office of Censorship, Byron Price, who was the chief editor of The Associated Press, that the United States must launch the largest civil censorship in U.S. history that had ever taken place. That effort would be aimed at Japan. The Japanese communication system was complicated, the Japanese language was unique, and it was expected that military management, which included censorship, would be necessary for quite a long period after Japan’s defeat.⁵ The operations of the Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) were not MacArthur’s arbitrary decision but the order by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces, President Franklin D. Roosevelt.⁶ Jun Eto states that according to the U.S. War Department’s instructions to MacArthur, civil censorship used on the people under occupation was far more complicated than the military censorship used on military personnel. There were two functions of civil censorship: to gather information about the

public opinion and morale of the people in order to execute occupation policy smoothly; to be the vanguard of occupation policy. This meant to control information about the policy, stabilize the economy, and to prevent information leaks and underground activities.⁷ Roosevelt's executive order left all the censorship against mail, telegrams, radio programs, etc. to the discretion of the Director of the Office of Censorship.⁸ This order allowed the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) to censor all the possible means of civil communication in Japan. The CCD established thirty categories for deletion or prohibition of printing and publication with censorship policy. These categories included criticism of SCAP and the U.S. Occupation Forces, and the United States in general; mention of the censorship operation; and the use of propaganda for defending the war, promoting Shintoism and militarism, and exaggerating the food crisis.⁹

It was hard to find personnel in the United States who had a good command of Japanese. It was also difficult to train the Americans to be proficient in Japanese in a short period of time; hence, the U.S. Counter Intelligence Section employed Japanese American soldiers – Nisei. However, only 3 percent of the Niseis demonstrated a proficiency in Japanese because the majority of them had assimilated into American society more fully than the U.S. Army Forces had thought.¹⁰ Therefore, the CCD had no choice but to hire the Japanese as censorship examiners. Yet those Japanese examiners were not trusted completely by the CCD, so important works such as a word-for-word translation were sent to the Nisei soldiers. According to Eto, no Japanese censorship examiners showed either resistance or hostility, and if they did, they skillfully hid

these feelings. About 30 percent, or more than 1,500 Japanese examiners, worked in the Press, Pictorial and Broadcast Division (PPB) in the CCD section. Eto states that almost all the motives of the Japanese who applied to be examiners were economic. The Japanese were starving at that time, so it was necessary for them to make the best use of their ability to earn money and get food. The CCD paid them between 700 yen (about US\$2 of the time) and 1,200 yen (about US\$3).¹¹ Considering that the average monthly salary of the era in Japan was 212 yen, the job the CCD offered was extremely well paid. Over 10,000 Japanese worked for SCAP in both the CCD and Allied Translators and Interpreters Section (ATIS). Eto points out that it has become an open secret that some of these workers later became prominent figures such as company CEOs, professors and journalists, though none of them mention in their records that they once worked for the CCD.¹² They probably felt guilty to have worked for an enemy country, the United States, although there was no choice for them at that time in order to survive because the Japanese were starving. Eto interestingly points out the accomplice relationships between the censor and the censored. Once “the censored” were involved with the censor, whether the censored wanted it or not, the censored were under an obligation to cooperate with the censor and to hide the existence of the censorship. Accordingly, they were forced to share the values of the censor. This secret or taboo was something that both the censor and the censored shared.¹³ When the Japanese publishers of the newspapers, magazines and books etc. realized the existence and the details of the SCAP censorship through their publication, they were forced to conceal it. It is possible to say that SCAP took advantage of the psychological condition of the Japanese

who were involved with censorship because SCAP knew that it could make the censored take sides with the censor through the censorship operation.

As to postal censorship, the CCD made a "Watch List" based on information from the black list created by the U.S. Federal Government. All the letters received and sent with the names on the "Watch List" were subjected to be opened and censored.¹⁴ The CCD also minutely investigated private correspondence. The number of letters received by the postal service averaged from 19,000,000 to 20,000,000 a month, and of those CCD opened 4,000,000 private letters. Furthermore, it censored 3,500,000 wires a month, and wiretapped 25,000 phone conversations. As a result of censoring private conversations in letters and phones, SCAP succeeded in grasping the public opinion of the Japanese.¹⁵

Through the highly reliable information about the public sentiment of the Japanese collected by the CCD, SCAP felt the need of War Guilt Information Program (WGIP), the propaganda program to implant in the minds of the Japanese a sense of guilt and responsibility for starting the war. As the first stage of WGIP, SCAP Civil Information and Education Section (CIE) started to print "The History of the Pacific War" in all the newspapers in Japan from December 8th to 17th in 1945. It was prepared by CIE and proofread by the U.S. Army G-3, and they revealed the unknown facts and also emphasized the cruelty of the Japanese Military in Nanjing, China and Manila, Philippines.¹⁶ The second stage of WGIP began in early 1946. It emphasized democratization and hope for the future of Japan to become an orderly and peaceful member of international society. SCAP consistently kept mentioning the cause of the war, the guilt of the

Japanese who started the war, and war crimes.¹⁷ The third stage of WGIP reflected the tense situation in the final days of the Tokyo Trial which started in 1946 and ended in 1948. The Tokyo Trial was carried out to judge the war criminal, Hideki Tojo, who was the former Prime Minister of Japan. This third stage emphasized the political information and education against ultranationalism to avoid the possible revival of an ultranationalist movement.¹⁸ Among those three stages, the first stage of WGIP will be focused in the following because it had the strongest influence on the thoughts of the Japanese.

“The History of the Pacific War” was the American perspective on WWII, and it was a propaganda which strongly affected the Japanese. Eto discusses that “The History of the Pacific War” played an important historical role to change the name of WWII.¹⁹ The Japanese used to call WWII “Greater East Asia War,” because the Japanese government used a slogan during the war, “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere,” in order to justify Japan’s act of aggression in Asia.

The Japanese envisioned the Co-Prosperity Sphere to be an autarkic bloc of Asian nations led by the Japanese and free of Western powers. ... The idea of Japanese cultural superiority over other Asian races had been expounded as early as the late nineteenth century and steadily grew in intensity until the end of World War II. For example, the famous Japanese educator Fukuzawa Yukichi wrote “Japan’s Mission in Asia” in 1882 to support the idea of Japanese imperialism and the “manifest destiny” of Japan to be the leader of Asia. ... Japanese leaders used the Co-Prosperity Sphere in its propaganda for the people both in Japan and in other Asian countries. ... The Co-Prosperity Sphere turned out to be just another form of oppressive imperialism in place of the imperialism previously imposed by Western nations.²⁰

However, SCAP changed the name of WWII from “Greater East Asia War” to “Pacific War” from the second newspaper serial of “The History of the Pacific War.” By replacing the Japanese perspective on WWII with that of the American perspective, SCAP tried to inculcate the sense of guilt on Japanese imperialism in Asia into Japanese minds. One of the other purposes of “The History of the Pacific War” was to create a confrontation between the Japanese militarists and the Japanese citizens. Eto argued that by doing so, SCAP attempted to transform the idea of war from the war between Japan and the United States to the war between the Japanese militarists and the Japanese citizens. This would make the Japanese blame the Japanese militarists, and not the United States. For example, SCAP tried to have the Japanese denounce their own government and militarists for the present and the future sufferings and poverty, and also the consequence of the atomic bombs dropped in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.²¹ In other words, SCAP tried to shift the responsibility of the war to the Japanese government and the militarists so that it would make it easier for SCAP to carry out the occupation policy.

On December 9 in 1945, the day after “The History of the Pacific War” began in the newspapers, another step of the first stage of WGIP began: the radio program *Shinsō wa kō da* (*Now It Can Be Told*).²² Radio broadcasting was made subject to SCAP supervision and guidance. SCAP took advantage of broadcasting as a powerful medium for implementing the occupation policy on democratizing and demilitarizing Japan. SCAP made full use of the radio particularly because of its capacity for pervasive influence among the general public. SCAP continued to censor broadcasts until October 1949, two months

before NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) established its own broadcast program standards, and ensured that the programs content was in line with the occupation policy.²³ The radio program was a part of the U.S. occupation policy. It was a dramatized version of “The History of the Pacific War” and was broadcast once a week for ten weeks until February 1946.²⁴ It was basically “a campaign denouncing the prewar and wartime governments and the actions of the Japanese military, and criticizing those responsible.”²⁵ The plot is that a boy asks questions about the war and an anti-militarist Japanese writer answers and teaches the boy the crimes and collapse of militarist Japan, and the beginning of the democracy. The scenario was written by the SCAP Civil Information and Education Section (CIE) and they directed it in every detail; however, SCAP hid the fact that it was involved with it. Any news about the Allied Forces was strictly restricted under the occupation, and reporting that the radio program was made by SCAP was also forbidden.²⁶

As Eto reports, American journalist Paul Vincent Miller wrote that SCAP was aware that although the attitude of the Japanese toward SCAP and its occupation policy was favorable in general, repugnance was aroused by censorship of newspapers and mail. Even within the United States, the existence and the details of the censorship operation had to be kept a close secret, even though the establishment of the Office of Censorship was officially announced. This was because SCAP knew that some Congressional representatives and citizen groups were opposed to the censorship operation because censorship goes against the very idea of the nation of freedom – the United States.²⁷

MacArthur does not refer to the SCAP censorship in his *Reminiscences* at all. He

instead states that the Japanese were given the freedom of speech by SCAP:

The shackles of militarism, of feudalism, of regimentation of body and soul, have been removed. Thought control and the abuse of education are no more. All now enjoy religious freedom and the right of speech without undue restraint. Free assembly is guaranteed. The removal of this national enslavement means freedom for the people, but at the same time it imposes upon them the individual duty to think and to act on his own initiative. The masses of Japan now have the power to govern and what is done must be done by themselves.²⁸

The national enslavement by the Japanese government was removed when the war ended, but the Japanese were then enslaved by SCAP. However, MacArthur writes as if SCAP did not control any information. Also, more directly, the censorship violated Article 10 of the Potsdam Declaration:

We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.²⁹

Miller continues that the United States tried to restrict the activities of special correspondents in Japan, which made it difficult for the American public to know what was happening there.³⁰ Yet SCAP could not fully control American or other international journalists in Japan because they were not the people under occupation, and it would be inconsistent with the democratic ideals of the United States. Thus, some of the international journalists who came to Japan like Miller were obstructive to the CCD, and their criticism, being uncontrolled, became

important proof of the essence of the CCD censorship.³¹

Since the radio program, *Now It Can Be Told*, was presented as a program of NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation), Japan's public broadcasting, people thought that NHK was independently responsible for the program. For example, NHK's use of "our nation," meaning Japan, was scripted by SCAP.³² While trying hard to disguise the agent of the radio program, SCAP sometimes had its defects exposed. The Japanese non-fiction writer Masayasu Hosaka indicates that it is bizarre when a Japanese announcer talks about the intention of the United States regarding Pearl Harbor: U.S. military authorities felt it necessary to retaliate immediately against Japan when they had a tremendous damage in Pearl Harbor.³³ The other example of SCAP's trick was to use the word *tennōheika* (His Majesty the Emperor) instead of just *tennō* (the Emperor) suggesting that SCAP was not involved; Americans normally called the Emperor of the Showa era just "the Emperor" or "Hirohito."³⁴ SCAP used both media, the newspapers and the radio, to try to control the thoughts of the Japanese by vision and sound.³⁵ It is important to know that the radio was the only source of entertainment at that time and that the radio programs of the era brought people relief and hope amid the hardships of the postwar era.³⁶ Under such a circumstance, the program was broadcast and rebroadcast repeatedly five days a week, so there were only two days when SCAP did not air it on the radio. Sakurai argues that it is obvious from this that SCAP clearly intended to let as many Japanese as possible listen to the radio under the excuse of enlightening them.³⁷ NHK reevaluated radio programs produced under CIE direction and began planning and producing original programs when the peace treaty between Japan

and the Allied Powers came into effect and Japan's independence was restored with the end of the occupation in April 1952.³⁸

The radio program *Now It Can Be Told* provoked the strong antipathy of the Japanese, especially those who believed in militarism during the war when it first started. Intellectuals such as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the era, Shigeru Yoshida, displayed the strong opposition to the radio program because they believed that Japanese history should be made by the Japanese, and not presented from the American perspective.³⁹ When *Now It Can Be Told* ended on February 10, 1945, it changed its name to *Shinsōbako (Truth Box)* and continued from the following week for the next three years until January of 1948. Having learned from the strong objection toward *Now It Can Be Told*, SCAP changed to a softer tone in *Truth Box*.⁴⁰ From 900 to 1,200 letters were sent to *Truth Box* every week. This shows the people's great interest in the program.⁴¹ Sakurai states that Japan under U.S. occupation was like a socialist nation because all the information was controlled and a certain ideology was formed under SCAP during the occupation period.⁴² Through these radio programs, SCAP spread propaganda for Japanese demilitarization and democratization, and told the Japanese how Japanese militarism was evil and how the United States endeavored for peace.⁴³

The radio program *Truth Box* not only negated everything about Japan but also approved some Japanese culture such as *Kyōiku Chokugo* (the Imperial Rescript on Education). The Imperial Rescript on Education signed by the emperor of Meiji was distributed to every school in Japan in 1890 along with the *goshinei* (imperial photograph) to be enshrined. It was the imperial message on

moral and civil instruction, emphasizing traditional values of Confucianism.⁴⁴ By approving the Imperial Rescript, SCAP was skillfully telling the Japanese that the sign of democratization was already rooted in Japan, so the U.S. occupation policy was not something completely unfamiliar to them; indeed, the United States was just trying to help lead Japanese history in a better direction. Furthermore, SCAP did not mention a suicidal attack by the Japanese soldiers, being afraid of the war bereaved burning with vengeful thoughts toward the United States.⁴⁵ Also, *Truth Box* emphasized that Japan lost the war because of technology rather than political and military strategies. According to Hosaka, the United States was trying to tell the Japanese that Japan was defeated not by its spiritual weakness but by a more realistic reason: inferior technological power. Hosaka points out that the idea of Japanese defeat in WWII caused by inferior production power and fewer amounts of materials is the origin of materialism in postwar Japan. The Japanese may have lost important values because of this.⁴⁶ SCAP propaganda was effective because of their technique of weaving some truth into the falsehood. Since truth was also included there, it was hard for listeners to distinguish what was truth and what was false.⁴⁷ One of the truths the Japanese were sure of was that their nation and its government had been telling them a lie by saying Japan was winning the war when it was not. Because of this one big lie, the Japanese general public came to believe by listening to this radio program that the Japanese government and militarists were the cause of all the evils that were deceiving them. "Idolatry for their feudalistic masters and the warrior class was transformed into hatred and contempt, and the hatred and contempt for their foe gave way to honor and respect," notes MacArthur.⁴⁸ Also, with the information

obtained from the radio program, the Japanese were likely to think that the United States which was the symbol of the most powerful and wealthy nation of the time was honest and telling them the truth.⁴⁹

General MacArthur's food policy convinced the Japanese of their idea of the United States as a reliable nation who seemed to help Japan. The Japanese were starving when they lost in the war in 1945. The first big problem SCAP and MacArthur confronted was Japan's food situation. Diseases caused by undernourishment reached their peak in the summer of 1946. As the country was driven by the fear of starving to death, more than one million Japanese participated in a demonstration march to call for food on May 1, 1946.⁵⁰ Eating was the priority for three years from 1945 to 1947.⁵¹ This is the social background of the postwar period in Japan. Iwamoto indicates that Japanese did not only tighten their guard against America that they had immediately after the end of the war, but it had transformed to be more than the favorable impression, and it unsurprisingly led to the good image toward the United States.⁵²

MacArthur tried very hard to get food for the Japanese. In order to keep the burden of American citizens to a minimum, it was stated in the Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper that SCAP would not be responsible for the economic poverty of Japan. However, according to Iwamoto, MacArthur ignored this clause and insisted on the necessity of the food exportation from the United States to Japan. MacArthur even sent out a warning to the president of the United States that refusing the food exportation would surely be denounced in the future.⁵³ MacArthur recalls in his *Reminiscences*:

The Appropriations Committee of the United States House of

Representatives wanted to know how I could justify the expenditure of Army appropriations to feed our late enemy. I explained. ... To cut off Japan's relief supplies in this situation would cause starvation to countless Japanese – and starvation breeds mass unrest, disorder and violence. Give me bread or give me bullets. I got bread.⁵⁴

The U.S. army released their food packets in 1946, and many Japanese local authorities sent a letter of appreciation to MacArthur.⁵⁵ MacArthur's food policies succeeded in increasing food in Japan, and the people paraded a float and celebrated the urgent help by the United States and a good harvest: "My Dear Mr. GI. Thanks Giving. Gratitude for Saving One's Life. Thank you, Mr. America!" Also, there was a festival entitled "In Appreciation of General MacArthur's Sincere Aide for Japan's Food Crisis" in 1946.⁵⁶ MacArthur realized the feeling of the Japanese, stating that they came to regard him "not as a conqueror, but as a protector".⁵⁷

The effect was instantaneous. The Japanese authorities changed their attitude from one of correct politeness to one of open trust. The press, which had been dubious at first, now began to voice unanimous praise.⁵⁸

The food policy succeeded in giving the Japanese good impression about MacArthur and the occupation policy, which made it easier for SCAP to operate the policy.

Food policy was one example which was appreciated by the Japanese under occupation. Another example is that some Japanese people felt that they were given the freedom as the result of the information control by SCAP. These people were those who were dissatisfied with the speech control by the Japanese government before and during the war. For example, the Emperor of Showa

visited MacArthur on September 27, 1945. The picture of the small Emperor in striped trousers and formal morning coat, and tall open-shirted MacArthur shocked the Japanese because they had never seen the Emperor except in the Imperial Photograph (*goshinei*) distributed along with the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890. When this picture appeared in newspapers, the Japanese government prohibited the sale of the newspaper, but SCAP removed the ban. According to Daizaburo Yui, the Japanese writer, Jun Takami, was very glad but ashamed at the same time to be given a freedom to write whatever he wanted not by his own nation but by the occupation army.⁵⁹ According to the Japanese author, Rinjirō Sodei, since thought control by the military and secret police had been pervasive under wartime regimes in Japan, public criticism had been completely banned, and it was impossible for the Japanese to appeal directly to the ruling authorities. Therefore, when this oppressive burden was lifted, the Japanese were suddenly free to express themselves, and many seized the opportunity.⁶⁰ As examined above, it was clear that all the information was skillfully controlled to benefit the SCAP occupation policy. Yet, the example of Takami shows that there were people in Japan who were pleased with the measure taken by SCAP. Many Japanese wrote letters to MacArthur and SCAP to show their appreciation, and according to Sodei, many of them also sent gifts to him such as flowers, fruits, his portraits, sticks, a canary, traditional Japanese textile fabrics, etc. Sodei continues that the estimate of 500,000 letters sent to MacArthur and SCAP were not only read but also prepared in English summaries by SCAP. When the Japanese knew that their opinions and requests would be heard if they wrote to MacArthur, the flow of letters increased until an average of

several hundred letters were arriving every day.⁶¹ Here is one example of those letters:

Ever since you entered Japan, the face of the country has been changing. Your leadership is truly godlike. Your vision penetrates every corner of Japanese society, and every one of your directives is superbly on target. We are all deeply grateful that your guidance is humanitarian, and that your directives are good government that Japanese politicians will never match.⁶²

The Japanese government even gave MacArthur honorary citizenship when he left Japan, and many Japanese were very sad that he left.⁶³ The SCAP occupation policy was successful in persuading the Japanese to think that the United States was trying to help Japan, accordingly making it easier to let them follow the policy. MacArthur wished to be called an “educator” or a “missionary” and not a military leader or an occupation ruler.⁶⁴ Thus, he must have been satisfied with his job as the supreme commander of SCAP.

Japan controlled the information before and during the war as well to raise the morale of the Japanese. In August 1937, the cabinet of Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe adopted guidelines for building national morale:

This was a sweeping, nationwide campaign to spur Japan’s war effort under the slogans of “indomitable fortitude” and “national unity” to encourage frugality and curb consumption. In October the same year, the government carried out a “Mobilization of National Morale Reinforcement Week,” during which radio stations carried out special programming. The program *kokumin chorei no jikan* (National Morning Meeting) included to broadcast of Kimigayo (Japan’s national anthem), an appeal for listeners to pay obeisance in the direction of the Imperial Palace, a lecture on current affairs, the radio calisthenics routine, and the song *Umi yukaba* (Going Out to Sea), a ballad of the traditional warrior ethos.⁶⁵

When the war began, daily radio broadcasting time was extended and the Japanese listeners were urged to leave their radios on throughout the day in order to serve the country through broadcasting. Recording of military marchers preceded news reports on Japan's successes in the war, and morale-boosting programs of music and entertainment were also aired. The works of composers of enemy nations such as the United States and Britain disappeared from music programs. Also, the study programs of foreign languages were all suspended prior to the outbreak of the war, in line with the Japanese military's policy of banning foreign languages.⁶⁶ With regard to speech control, the Japanese government used asterisks to delete certain expressions but it was possible to read and understand what was censored. More importantly, people in Japan knew that the Ministry of Interior was censoring. However, SCAP censorship was more cunning because it, for example, deleted a few sentences and inserted other sentences; the Japanese did not even realize the existence of the censorship.⁶⁷ Eto writes that Japanese censorship before and during the war prohibited the people from dealing with tabooed topics such as the Emperor, national policy and any dangerous thoughts which would put the community at risk. For example, the Japanese government prohibited the Japanese from desecrating the Emperor's dignity. Contrary to this Japanese censorship, SCAP censorship intentionally involved the Japanese in their censorship operation as an "accomplice" through its secrecy, so that those Japanese could be censoring other Japanese.⁶⁸ The Japanese censorship examiners were fired in some occasions if they violated the SCAP policy. Some examples of this were to discuss the publication censorship, to forget asking about the use of a picture on newspapers, etc. In this way, SCAP

censorship policy first permeated the Japanese censorship examiners, and then the other Japanese through them.⁶⁹

SCAP censorship policy distorted the story of how Japan lost the war. Namely, the Potsdam Declaration did not prescribe Japan's "unconditional surrender," but they prescribed the "unconditional demilitarization of Japanese military." However, SCAP and radio programs continuously used the expression "unconditional surrender" and the Japanese believed this. SCAP tried to occupy Japan as "unconditional surrender" because it would make it easier to control Japan. Sakurai insists that whether "unconditional surrender" or not is critical because it is about whether Japan loses its sovereignty or not. Therefore, Japan was supposed to be able to decide how to reconstruct Japan by negotiating with SCAP instead of being controlled thoroughly by them.⁷⁰ Hosaka also suggests that Japan was defeated by its military power, and not by its politics, ideology, and culture. However, many Japanese felt that the loss made all aspects of their ideas seem erroneous.⁷¹

Then why did Japan only have to do as SCAP dictated without resisting and doubting it? The problem lies on the side of the Japanese as well. Hosaka argues that they lack the awareness of being citizens of Japan, that is, they lacked an idea of nationalism.⁷² Unlike the United States, Japan is a relatively homogeneous nation where most of the people are from the same background on the small island. The Americans become "Americans" by sharing the same ideas such as democracy, freedom, and the American dream no matter where they come from. Anyone can be an American if they agree with American ideals. On the contrary, the Japanese are already "Japanese" when they are born in Japan.

The Japanese were manipulated by the Japanese government during the war to have nationalism and to believe that Japan was the nation of God (Shintoism) and that Hirohito, the Emperor of Showa, was a God. However, the Japanese originally have a much smaller sense of belonging and also much less nationalism because of the geographic condition than the Americans do. The Japanese were not aware of Japanese identity. They had never thought about themselves and their country deeply or questioned themselves because they did not need to. Hosaka continues that the other big weakness of modern Japan was that Japan did not have any knowledge with regard to colonial rule.⁷³ That is why Japan did not know what to do when SCAP came to control everything in Japan. The Japanese did not even know about their nation well enough to resist SCAP when they were given the wrong information about their own country.

As MacArthur felt it a mission to “educate” the Japanese by demilitarizing and democratizing Japan, the ethnocentric attitude of the United States can be seen everywhere in *Truth Box*. When talking about the dropping of the atomic bomb in Japan on the radio, they tried to show the Americans’ sympathy. Yet, at the same time, they told the Japanese that there was no other way to end the war except to drop the bomb, and that the cruel weapon was used by the people who protected the civilization the most – the Americans. According to Hosaka, it can be inferred from this passage that the United States dropped the atomic bomb on Japan because they despised the “Jap.” He goes on to say that this logic exists even within the United States by quoting from *The New York Times* saying that the atomic bomb would be a stain in U.S. history. The perplexity of the United States can be seen in SCAP censorship. They were most sensitive to the news

about the atomic bomb and completely forbade making any reports about it.⁷⁴

When Hosaka entered elementary school in 1946, he was educated that Japan did a wrong thing, and the United States was right in the war and justice always won.⁷⁵ "The History of the Pacific War" was published after it finished serializing in newspapers in 1946, and it sold over 100,000 copies because it was ordered by SCAP to use as a text in school. Therefore, the War Guilt Information Program (WGIP) became infiltrated in the area of education.⁷⁶ Japanese history was changed by SCAP after Japan lost the war, and the Japanese were forced to believe the American perspective on WWII. The influences of the American perspective can still be seen in education today. The Japanese who were educated to think that Japanese militarism and imperialism were evil by SCAP respond sensitively about showing nationalism and patriotism. This is because nationalism and patriotism were intensely related to the militarism and imperialism of Japan during the war. These people are opposed to any kind of activities that remind them of the patriotism during the war. For example, the official visit of the current Prime Minister Jun'ichiro Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine aroused severe criticism in both domestic and other Asian nations such as China and Korea:

Koizumi has also provoked controversy by announcing his intention to worship at the Yasukuni Shrine to Japan's war dead in an official capacity on August 15 – the anniversary of Japan's surrender in World War II. Wartime leader and convicted war criminal Hideki Tojo, as well as five other hanged war criminals, are buried in the shrine. Japanese politicians have shunned official worship due to the perception in both Japan and Asia that it amounts to commemorating the wartime regime. A definite logic is contained in the various efforts to legitimize and resurrect the history and symbols of Japanese militarism. It amounts to clearing

the ideological decks for an aggressive reassertion of the interests of Japanese imperialism in Asia and elsewhere against those of its rivals.⁷⁷

Moreover, those Japanese even indicate a strong refusal to sing the Japanese national anthem and hoist the national flag. The Japanese national anthem, *Kimigayo* (The Emperor's Reign), praises the emperor. The translation of the lyrics is as follows:

May the reign of the Emperor continue for a thousand, nay, eight thousand generations and for the eternity that it takes for small pebbles to grow into a great rock and become covered with moss.⁷⁸

Both the anthem *Kimigayo* and the national flag of Japan, *Hinomaru* (Rising Sun), are the symbols of painful wartime militarism which are associated strongly with colonialism and war.⁷⁹ Thus, some people who were educated to hate the Japanese militarism which led to the war strongly oppose to these two symbols.

On the other hand, there are also some people who want to express patriotism toward their nation – Japan. These people regret that Japanese history was distorted under SCAP occupation by being forced to adopt the American perspective. It resulted in a strong sense of guilt and rejection of patriotism. Therefore, some Japanese try to recover nationalism and patriotism today. Prime Minister Koizumi's official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine is one form of representing his wish to revive patriotism. With regards to the anthem and the flag, controversy erupted in 1999 when the *Kimigayo* and *Hinomaru* were legalized as the national anthem and the flag of Japan: "The formal recognition of these two symbols – holdovers from World War II – has sparked a debate between Japan's many pacifists and its small but growing number of nationalists. One high-school

principle was so torn over the issue that he committed suicide.”⁸⁰ Furthermore, the Governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, began imposing harsh penalties on defiant teachers who do not honor the flag, stand up and sing the anthem at school ceremonies:

The board of education of the Tokyo metropolitan government has decided to reprimand about 180 teachers at metropolitan senior high schools and schools for disabled children. The government claims the teachers disobeyed the board's orders and behaved “unprofessionally” during graduation ceremonies held in Marcy – simply by refusing to stand while the national anthem was being sung and other actions. ... Here is a list of things the board required of all metropolitan schools: The national flag must be placed at the front of the auditorium stage; all teachers must stand and face the flag; all must sing the national anthem.⁸¹

The board even sent officials to schools to monitor teachers if they followed the flag-and-anthem routine at the graduation ceremonies. This law enforcement is another expression to show the patriotic attitude toward Japan though some critics call it “forced patriotism” and say that it does not belong in Japan's modern democracy.⁸² Enforcing people to respect the anthem and the flag and punishing those who disobey the law may go too far, but citizens of a nation are supposed to naturally respect their own country. Thus, it is possible to say that this strong opposition toward the anthem and the flag of Japan is a result of the education operated by SCAP which skillfully made the Japanese believe that Japan was such a cruel nation which committed many horrible deeds in the past. The ambivalent attitude towards Japanese nationalism is one example of the U.S. occupation which can still be seen in Japan today.

Those Japanese who have feelings of regret regarding Japan with no nationalism and patriotism formed “The Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform.” They try to create “The New History Textbook” based on their own Japanese perspective, which was authorized by the Ministry of Education in 2001. According to the Society’s website,

After its defeat in World War II, Japan was occupied by US troops. To render it incapable of attacking them a second time, the Americans forced Japan to reorganize all of its institutions, even its constitution. Not content to stop there, they attempted to alter the Japanese perception of history. They expunged Japan’s history, injecting in its place a history fabricated by the victors. Japan became the source of all evils in accounts of wars subsequent to the Manchurian Incident.⁸³

The Society’s attempt leads to the justification for militarism and the revival of the imperialist. It is a rebound to the “masochistic” perspective on history forced by the United States during the era of occupation.

A conservative movement toward reform in the Japanese history curriculum ... set out to “correct history” by emphasizing a “positive view” of Japan’s past and removing from textbooks any reference to matters associated with what he calls “dark history.”⁸⁴

However, the attempt to revive patriotism by modifying the “American-made” history became the focus of harsh criticism in Japan and in other Asian nations. The complaints of Japanese historians and history educators centered around “the text’s presentation of Japan’s foundation myths as historical fact and its characterization of wars launched by modern Japan as wars to liberate Asia.”⁸⁵ Asian countries responded the following ways:

China Radio International announced that the Chinese government and people were “strongly indignant about and dissatisfied with the new Japanese history textbook for the year

2002 compiled by right-wing Japanese scholars.”

[A]ngry Koreans continued to stage anti-Japan protests ignited by the new Japanese “textbooks that allegedly gloss over atrocities by Japanese soldiers during World War II.”⁸⁶

Since both the Japanese citizen and the media has become too sensitive to nationalism and patriotism and also anything which may sound contradictory to democracy because of the control by WGIP, it is generally considered by the Japanese today that being nationalistic and patriotic is dangerous. Citizens are scared of being called ultranationalists. One of the reasons of their unwillingness to be called ultranationalists is that most of the right-wing organizations in Japan are related to *yakuza* (Japanese gangsters). As a result, the new textbook has been shunned and nearly all of Japan's school districts rejected it.⁸⁷ Yet, the objective of The Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform is “not to expose the role of imperialism in Asia but to replace one set of historical distortions with another.”⁸⁸ The purpose of the debate over the textbook here is not to argue whether it is correct or wrong to modify Japanese history, but it is significant to understand that both viewpoints the Japanese have today are polar opposites due to the influence of the U.S. occupation policy. Eto insists that the reason why the Japanese still repeat the words of the CIE propaganda is because the postwar generation who were educated with “The History of the Pacific War” is beginning to form the backbone of Japanese society.⁸⁹

The information control by SCAP, the first stage of the U.S. occupation policy in Japan, was examined in this chapter. The control was a starting point of constructing a new Japanese identity in postwar Japan. While controlled systematically by the occupation policy, the Japanese formed their own ideology

and values by domesticating the condition under the occupation. The new values and ideas they constructed as a consequence of the influence of the occupation, such as the ambition to become a developed nation like the United States where people can enjoy a pleasurable life enabled by material affluence and the leisure culture will be considered next.

CHAPTER 2

CULTURAL IMPACT: JAPANESE INTERPRETATION OF THE AMERICAN CULTURE

Yui points out that postwar U.S. occupation was the second wave of westernization in Japan. The same spiritual structure of *datsua nyūdō* (out of Asia, entering in to the West) was seen both in the *Bunmei kaika* (civilization and enlightenment) in the Meiji era and the postwar Japan.⁹⁰ In 1868, the Meiji era began with the end of Tokugawa shogunate, and it entered the era of modernization with the *Meiji Ishin* (Meiji Restoration). Since Japan was culturally behind other modern nations because of the closed-door policy, the Meiji government made desperate efforts to absorb western culture in order to become a member of modern nations. It encouraged changing the old lifestyle of a feudal society to the westernized modern nation focusing on aspects such as hairstyle, dress, food, etc. In the early Meiji era, Japan and the United States were not turning against each other, so there was no economic or political obstacle for the Japanese to accept the American culture. In the late 1880s, when the nationalist movement to revive traditional Japanese culture started, and the Japan – U.S. relationship had become tense because of the racial discrimination of the Japanese in California, the American culture seemed to have less influence. Nevertheless, as Kamei explains, the American materialistic culture kept flowing into Japan. The United States was the very model of *Bunmei kaika* for Japan in its material progress and the liberated, rational ideology.⁹¹ U.S. occupation in the postwar period was not the first time Japan faced and admired American

civilization. In other words, wishing to be a modern and technological nation like the United States has been rooted in Japanese history. Thus, when Japan faced the second stage of modernization with the U.S. occupation, the Japanese knew what it was like to be modernized, and they recalled the Meiji Restoration in the Meiji era. Kamei claims that it may be natural to see that the Americanization in Japan from the Meiji era was discontinued because of the war, and it resumed when the war ended.⁹²

The ideal state that Japan was trying to achieve in postwar time can be seen in many things from textbooks to advertisements, according to Iwamoto. Japan used various media to penetrate the Japanese with the ideal image of the predominant nation – the United States. “The American Fair” was held in Japan in March 1950 for three months sponsored by the Japanese newspaper company, the Asahi Shimbun Company. Two million tickets were sold in advance. The project of the fair was to lay emphasis on the United States which occupied the most interest of the Japanese of the time, and to show its history, politics, economics, education, arts, culture, and lifestyle.⁹³ Iwamoto provides some examples of children who went to the fair. A sixth grade student paid attention to the many home electric appliances and recognized that these appliances would realize the rationalization of housework and give his mother spare time. The other middle school student stated that the technology was what enabled the United States to be the top nation in the world, and he felt the necessity of Japan to learn from the United States. Children of the era recognized that the United States was the most advanced nation in technology, and that democratic living could be possible if the technology was reflected at home.⁹⁴ The fair was successful in

giving the children who would be constructing the future Japan the recognition of what was necessary to be a modern nation like the United States. Iwamoto quotes from Yojiro Ishizaka, the author of the first postwar bestseller *Green Mountains*, and shows Ishizaka's objective of the book as describing the democratic lifestyle which the Japanese would have to construct. Newspapers and the Japanese famous comic *Sazaesan* referred to Dagwood, the husband of Blondie, in the famous American comic *Blondie*, to set an example of an ideal husband who helps with the housework.⁹⁵ The important point here is that the American Fair was held under the aid of SCAP, and it was also sponsored by the Asahi Shimbun Company.⁹⁶

The Asahi Shimbun brought *Blondie* to Japan, which ran in serial from 1949 to 1951 in *The Asahi Shimbun* newspaper. It is a comic which often appears in discussion among the Japanese today for its impact of introducing them the American lifestyle. Interestingly, *Blondie* stopped appearing in newspapers suddenly along with MacArthur's departure without any explanation.⁹⁷ Since Mr. Hasegawa of the Asahi Shimbun Company who introduced *Blondie* has passed away, there are no exact materials. Therefore, it is impossible to clarify whether *Blondie* was a part of U.S. occupation policy or not.⁹⁸ Yet, Eto notes that the Japanese journalism had completely become the "CCD-made journalism" by the end of 1946 because of the censorship on all the possible publicity media. He also gives an example of the article in *The Asahi Shimbun* newspaper to prove that the author of the article was surely contacted by CIE and, thus, played a part of the SCAP propaganda project.⁹⁹ Moreover, an American journalist Miller commented in 1947 that the Japanese had the impression that the newspapers in Japan had

become the media which reflected the SCAP occupation policy.¹⁰⁰ Considering these factors, it seems quite probable to think that the Asahi Shimbun Company was related to SCAP and that both the *American Fair* and *Blondie* were a part of the occupation policy to make the Japanese admire American culture. At least, by analyzing the responses to them, it is possible to see the occupation policy's influence on the Japanese and to say that the policy convinced them that the United States was a nation of justice, and also a nation of technology which was the reason of their victory in the war.

The general agreement on *Blondie* is that it influenced the Japanese admiration of American culture because of the lifestyle of the Bumsteads, the family in *Blondie*. Shunsuke Kamei states that *Blondie* imprinted an enjoyment of an American lifestyle on the Japanese.¹⁰¹ Iwamoto insists that although there may not be many people who directly feel nostalgia when they hear the word "Blondie," repeated appearances of *Blondie* today on television and in people's conversations reconstruct it as the comic which induced the Japanese to admire the American lifestyle. For the young generation who do not know *Blondie*, the comic has become a myth that played a historical role to introduce the American culture to the Japanese.¹⁰² Iwamoto gives examples of *Blondie*'s image today as the device to increase the actuality of the postwar era by picking up one scene from the Japanese television drama which was produced in 2000. The scene is in 1949 where children at elementary school state their thoughts on *Blondie* in front of soldiers of the SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) who came to school for an inspection. One of the students says that "there is an electric refrigerator and vacuum cleaner in *Blondie*. They also have a private car. I do not

even have an icebox at home. I think that the United States is great and I wanted to be born there.” Then, one student states, “I envy when they eat such a thick sandwich,” and the other says, “When I grow up, I will study English and want to go to the United States.” The name of the drama was *Hyakunen no Monogatari*, meaning *A Story of One Hundred Years*. It was broadcast by Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS) for three consecutive nights from August 28, 2000 in Japan. Iwamoto points out that *Blondie* was used in this drama to produce the postwar atmosphere in Japan.¹⁰³ The scene explains that the children in a class are impressed to learn American lifestyle in *Blondie* and admire the American culture because it is very different from Japanese culture. This is the common perception of *Blondie* by the general public and critics of today. Other than above mentioned Kamei’s statement, Iwamoto also cites other cultural critics of today to show this viewpoint.

However, Iwamoto argues that admiration towards the United States like this is a perception from the stance of Americanization, which is accepting the American culture rather passively. Namely, it is to think that the Japanese came to think of America as a great nation as the result of the occupation policy. Iwamoto challenges the previously recognized idea of *Blondie* and tries to propose that Japan enthusiastically used the positive aspects of American culture to better create their own Japanese culture. According to him, there are two very opposite perceptions of *Blondie* between the general readers and the former cultural critics of the time. There are three images readers received from *Blondie*: “home electric appliances,” meaning that technology has infiltrated the home; “wealthy life” symbolized in food; and “democracy” which can be seen in the initiative of

housewives at home.¹⁰⁴ Then Iwamoto analyzes the numbers of the appearance of each electric appliance in *Blondie* statistically, and compares it with that of other non-electric appliances in the story. He contrasts the difference between the numbers of the actual appearance of these appliances in *Blondie* and the people's imagination of their appearances. He concluded that the analysis does not prove that *Blondie* gives the readers an impression of "wealthy life surrounded by home electric appliances" because in spite of the readers' strong impression, the total numbers of electric appliances, except electric refrigerators, which appeared in the newspapers, does not tremendously exceed other non-electric appliances. Also, he points out that the readers of the time who did not even own an icebox could not possibly identify the simple illustration in the comic to recognize electric appliances correctly. Furthermore, even some objects such as a car and a television which are not shown at the Bumsteads in Japanese newspapers, are owned in the representation of *Blondie* in *Hyakunen no Monogatari*, and also in some former studies, according to Iwamoto.¹⁰⁵ These inaccurate perceptions show that the readers were imagining the lifestyle in *Blondie* based on the positive view toward the American culture instilled during the occupation. Iwamoto calls it a "social perception," meaning a socially constructed perception.¹⁰⁶ As shown earlier, the Japanese were told by SCAP that the reason of their defeat in World War II was the inferior technological power of Japan, so they naturally looked at the United States as the nation with superior technology. Therefore, when they read *Blondie*, they equated the United States with technology. They admired the United States for its technology because it was the victorious nation and Japan was the defeated nation.

In 1947, SCAP showed the educational documentary film in Yamanashi prefecture in Japan to show how American citizens chose government officials, congressmen, presidents, etc., and tried to explain American democracy. However, children's interests were focused on the wealthy and comfortable life the Americans lived. Girls dreamed to have a big electronic washing machine someday, and boys wanted to have the American car. Adults were also impressed by the American material living standard.¹⁰⁷ One SCAP officer states that the Japanese had misunderstood about the living standard of the Americans in the late 1940s. They asked questions as follows: "Does everybody have a jeep or a car?" "Do families go out for dinner every night?" "Do the Americans travel overseas every year?" "Does every family have a maid?"¹⁰⁸ These are the preconceived opinions about the wealthy American society the Japanese had when reading *Blondie*.

As mentioned earlier, the Japanese were starving immediately after the war, and therefore appreciated MacArthur and his food policy, and accordingly the United States, for giving them food. As a consequence of this favorable attitude, readers of the time read *Blondie* and interpreted that everything about the American culture was splendid by especially focusing on the food and electric appliances in the kitchen in the comic. This impression resulted in the belief that they saw a car and a television as well along with all the electric appliances, despite the fact that these were not actually owned by the family in the part of the comic printed in Japan. According to Iwamoto, while the readers perceived *Blondie* favorably, the cultural critics in the 1950s pointed out the negative side of capitalism such as the loss of humanity and the sorrows of workers in *Blondie*.

Iwamoto states that there are only a few studies about *Blondie* from those days. To take examples, the film critic, Taihei Imamura, mentioned in 1953 that the life of the Bumsteads brought the miserable salaried worker as wage slave in relief. He showed no material admiration or affluence as shown in the general impression of *Blondie* today. Similarly, a philosopher, Isaku Yanaihara, emphasized the problem of the machine civilization which dehumanizes the people, although unlike Imamura, Yanaihara apprehended the material affluence. From these, Iwamoto discusses that there is no analysis by the cultural critics of the time to define that the Japanese learned what the American affluent life was like from reading *Blondie*, and dreamed of having such a lifestyle.¹⁰⁹ The philosopher, Tetsuro Watsuji, displays an anti-American sentiment with regards to modernization, writing in 1944 that the American machine civilization does not mean that the Americans have morally or artistically improved; rather, it means that the mechanical power has made their lives easier and their entertainment more exciting. No civilization exists without machines for the Americans. There exists no culture for the "slaves of machinery."¹¹⁰

While the social perception of the readers was the favorable attitude toward the United States, the perception of the cultural critics was influenced by Marxism, states Iwamoto. They analyzed *Blondie* with an intension to criticize the social structure of the capitalism which exploited workers.¹¹¹ Marxian criticism towards the American capitalism in *Blondie* can be seen in the analysis of the Soviet Journalists' Union twenty years later in 1975:

Cruel reality more and more invades the limited little world of their family, and their main concern is the worrying thought of how to make ends meet in conditions of ... growing exploitation.... The

worried and concerns of Dagwood and his wife are shared by tens of millions of workers in the countries of capital.¹¹²

However, Dean Young, the son of the author of *Blondie*, Chic Young, and Rick Marschall, the comics scholar, insist that those critics forget that Dagwood forsook a millionaire's inheritance years ago to marry Blondie, and that both of them have been happy ever since.¹¹³ That is to say, the perception of both readers and former cultural critics of the era were preoccupied. Then why has the perception of the readers beat the perception of the critics of the time and become the common recognition of today's critics and the general public? There were various images of American culture, both positive and negative as shown in the reaction to *Blondie*. However, the image of the United States as an affluent nation surrounded by electric appliances has become the general perception today. This is because Japanese society supported that image.¹¹⁴

It was true that the Japanese saw what the American lifestyle was like through *Blondie*. In spite of the common perception, however, *Blondie* was not the medium which made them admire the United States. Before reading *Blondie*, they had some knowledge about the American culture and already had a favorable feeling toward it. The image of *Blondie* shows the reflection of the social attitude in Japan toward the American culture as a result of experience to be under the U.S. occupation. Namely, the Japanese society at that time was encouraging the readers to admire the American lifestyle and culture, and this social background is reflected in the image of *Blondie*. The analysis of Iwamoto shows that the Japanese in the postwar era were looking at American culture in their own Japanese way, which can be considered as preconceived. He concludes that the

postwar Americanization in Japan was the Japanese version of Americanization; Japan projected its ideal on the United States, and then Japan looked at itself from its projected image of the United States.¹¹⁵ This type of Americanization can be called the “Japanization” of American culture, which will be examined in detail later with Tokyo Disneyland in Japan. Kamei also calls the Americanization in Japan “Japanization of the United States,” saying that accepting the American culture does not collapse the value system of the Japanese culture, but rather it enables the Japanese culture to be expanded and enriched.¹¹⁶ For example, Japan has absorbed the positive aspects of American culture and achieved the technological development of the United States. Therefore, by imagining American culture in *Blondie*, it is possible to find the subjective attitude and the policy of Japan regarding how to deal with the United States and its culture under the U.S. occupation. In other words, Japan was not just passively accepting the American culture as they were forced to by the United States during the occupation period. On the contrary, as MacArthur frequently advised the Japanese in public statements to seek “a healthy blend between the best of theirs [the Japanese] and the best of ours [the Americans],” the Japanese proactively interpreted the situation and encouraged the people to have a favorable impression on the American culture under the supervision of the United States so that Japan could be a modern, democratic, and technological nation like the United States.¹¹⁷ Sodei claims that the Japanese were willing to be reformed by SCAP because the Americans looked attractive and the American democracy did not seem so bad:

... the Japanese “went to bed with the occupation.” The American

occupation and its subsequent reforms were the equivalent of consensual sex, not rape, at least to the majority of the ordinary public.¹¹⁸

The Japanese made the most of the situation given for its own development.

Another medium which was used to spread the idea of constructing a democratic and technological Japan was through “education.” CIE also consulted with NHK and the Ministry of Education and used radio program for school broadcasting as a tool in rebuilding the Japanese education system.

Broadcasts for teachers were first resumed in October 1945 and broadcasts for elementary school students in December. Program content and scripts had to be translated into English and approved by the CIE. Lines such as, “If you’re a man, don’t cry” were cut because they encouraged gender discrimination, while the expression “Kodomo wa kaze no ko” (children should play outdoors even when it’s cold) was avoided as a careless statement lacking any scientific basis. On the advice of the CIE, straight talk shows were avoided and content increasingly included discussions, plays, quizzes, and live broadcasts.¹¹⁹

Iwamoto suggests that the history textbook in Japanese middle school inspected by the Ministry of Education in 1951 indicates that although industry was rationalized by technological development, domestic duties of the housewives had been the same as before, and that it was necessary for Japan to change the situation of the era by introducing the electric appliances which the Americans owned.¹²⁰ Shiba analyzes the guidelines for the high school home economics course published in 1949. CIE of SCAP was deeply involved in making the guidelines focusing on home management, consumer education, and family relations.¹²¹ Shiba also inspects the educational film *For a Bright Home Life* which was used in high school home economics classes during the occupation. It

is clearly specified that the film was produced by SCAP CIE.¹²² Thus, the U.S. occupation policy was widely infiltrated in the area of education as well.

Advertisements are also an effective manner to give the products a positive image of American technology. As stated by Iwamoto, those advertisements put the word either “in America” or “technology,” and tried to add the value of the products with the image of the highly technological, democratic, and modern American lifestyle.¹²³ Yet, all the advertisements Iwamoto takes up are the ones from 1949 to 1951, during the occupation period. Thus, it is appropriate to see the influence of SCAP on advertisements as well. While influenced incredibly by the U.S. occupation policy, the Japanese proactively sought their own way of accepting and interpreting the American culture. Kamei argues that it was the reflection of the extraordinary situation of the U.S. occupation that postwar Japan was influenced by the United States in almost all aspects. However, this nationwide Americanization in Japan could not be fully explained by the situation under the occupation. He explains the reasons of the phenomenon as: the longtime accumulation of the American culture in Japan, and a feeling of liberation that they can legitimately enjoy the American culture.¹²⁴ Various media has been influenced by the occupation policy and promoted the Japanese to consume American culture with the purpose of letting them become aware that Japan should break down the old customs if they want to have an American lifestyle. Consumer culture is one of the biggest influences the Japanese received from the American culture. Consequently, the Japanese competed with others in buying home electric appliances.

A lifestyle full of electric appliances like the one in the United States had

become the ideal for the Japanese and they thought that they could achieve the dream of an American lifestyle by purchasing the appliances. According to Iwamoto, the highest two income earners in 1954 in Japan were both company presidents of the household electric appliances.¹²⁵ A black-and-white television, electric washing machine, and electric refrigerator were the “Three Sacred Treasures” for the Japanese from 1960 to 1965. A color television, air conditioner, and their own car replaced the three previous “Treasures” from 1965 to 1970. These commodities were what they dreamed of and also the goal they wanted to achieve.¹²⁶ This process of consumption in order to acquire the added value in their life was the beginning of the domestic consumer society, which lasted about twenty years from mid 1950s until the end of Japan’s high economic growth. Japanese children were also educated how to become consumers at school. People who have gone through this period of U.S. occupation and the rise of consumption culture enjoyed Disney animation which was broadcast in 1950s, and went to Tokyo Disneyland (TDL) when it was opened in 1983. These people are the generation who have learned how to enjoy the leisure time with all the family members because housewives were released from the burden of housework, thanks to home electric appliances. The impression of *Blondie* is one representation of the images the Japanese had toward the United States in those days.

CHAPTER 3

CULTURAL NEGOTIATION: “JAPANIZATION” OF TOKYO DISNEYLAND

Tokyo Disneyland (TDL) opened in Japan in 1983, and it attracted 9.9 million visitors in its first year. The next year, the number of visitors was a little over 10 million, and this has grown to around 16 million in each of the years since 1990, according to sociologist Aviad E. Raz. Moreover, TDL saw 125 million visitors in its first ten years, a number nearly equal to the entire population of Japan, and the number of visitors to TDL is almost the same as the sum total of visitors to all the other theme parks.¹²⁷ TDL has achieved the greatest success among the whole Disneylands in the world both in the number of visitors and in store sales at the Park. The reasons for TDL's huge success are profoundly related to the influences of the U.S. occupation period in Japan: consumerism and the leisure boom. These two were what had been growing in Japan's high-growth period from the late 1950s for twenty years after the end of the occupation era. Then in the 1980s, the period of stable economic growth, TDL opened and fulfilled the cultural demands of the Japanese of the time. Thus, consumerism and the leisure boom were the important factors of TDL's success. In order to match what the Japanese wanted in the 1980s, there were many modifications of Disneyland at TDL, which demonstrates the Japanization of American Disneyland and American culture.

As examined above, the Japanese positively accepted the condition under occupation to recontextualize and add the new aspects of the Japanese culture, and they treat TDL, the symbol of the American culture, the same way.

There is an idea to look at American cultural artifacts in other nations as Americanization or cultural imperialism. For example, Disneyland in France, EuroDisney, is the only example of failure of Disneyland, which a French critic termed a “cultural Chernobyl.” However, there are some studies which have examined TDL from the point of Japanization and not from Americanization or cultural imperialism. Masako Notoji, a Japanese pioneering analyst on TDL, discusses that “American imports were quickly absorbed into the indigenous system of values and practices in Japan” by being “reconstructed and redefined within the contexts of the importing societies,” and Japan digests and domesticates American cultural symbols into “powerful vehicles of its own social change.”¹²⁸ Also, Mary Yoko Brannen refers to it as “the *importation* of the artifact rather than its *exportation*” or “Japanese form of cultural imperialism.”¹²⁹ Brannen argues that the recontextualization of Disneyland takes two forms: “making the exotic familiar” and “keeping the exotic exotic.” The former is to make the park “more comfortable and accessible to its primary client base, the Japanese,” and the latter one is to distance the self from the other by maintaining the distinction between inside and out.¹³⁰ Raz uses Brannen’s idea of “making the exotic familiar” and “keeping the exotic exotic” and attempts to analyze the “active appropriation of Disney by the Japanese” by “translating and editing it to project a Japanese national identity and consuming it in unique ways,” which he calls “Japanization of Disneyland”:¹³¹

TDL represents a case study where the acculturated – the Japanese – are not passively dominated but rather make an active and manipulative use of Western culture (i.e., Disneyland). ... By focusing on the active role of the Japanese in importing,

modifying, and consuming Disney, this study undermines the taken-for-granted premise that a Disney park is the same everywhere and hence a model of cultural imperialism.¹³²

These previous studies look at domestication of Disneyland in a Japanese way by investigating how TDL has made the exotic familiar and also kept the exotic exotic. In this chapter, I would like to analyze how the influences of the U.S. occupation era are represented at TDL, and how American Disneyland is arranged for the Japanese visitors based on the influences. First, I would like to begin with the Disney animation which was the first contact of the Japanese people with Disney.

The generation that has gone through the U.S. occupation in postwar Japan watched Disney animation in the 1950s and 1960s, at the very early stage of the development of television broadcasting in Japan. The first television drama was broadcast in 1940, but few people were able to see it since television sets were not yet on sale to the Japanese public. NHK (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) began its early experiment in television in 1939, but NHK suspended all television experiments to prepare for the coming war in 1941. Because of the defeat in the war and the U.S. occupation, television broadcasting did not reappear in Japan until the 1950s. The first official television broadcast to the Japanese public was an NHK production in February 1953.¹³³ However, still not many people could afford to buy a television because an average 17-inch set retailed at 245,000 yen (under US\$700) when the starting salary for a college graduate in 1953 was only US\$42 a month.¹³⁴ By 1956, private ownership of a television was rising as rapid economic growth was generating higher personal income and mass production was bringing the price of television sets down. Nevertheless, Japan did not have enough technology to produce many programs

and also it was much cheaper to pay for the rights to broadcast foreign shows than to produce equivalent entertainment programs domestically. Therefore, Japan imported broadcasting from the United States, which had a ten-year-old industry. The first American series to be shown on Japanese television was the ten minute Cartoon series *Superman* in 1955, soon followed by *Popeye*, *Huckleberry Hound*, and *The Flintstones*. The color television appeared in 1960, and the flood of foreign program imports slowed in the late 1960s when Japan had established many traditions of modern television drama. At the time of the Royal Wedding of Crown Prince Akihito (current Emperor) to Michiko Shoda (current Empress) in April 1959, television ownership had jumped rapidly to watch the wedding. Japanese television reached a state of maturity at the end of the 1950s.¹³⁵ In the beginning of the 1960s, national per capita income in Japan was not especially high, but the number of television sets owned was 100 per thousand persons, which was an extremely high figure compared to other countries.¹³⁶ This is how television has penetrated the home. The postwar generation in Japan, also known as the baby boomers, grew up along with the development of television in a newly emerging consumer society. As noted in the beginning of this chapter, Japan aired many imported television programs from the United States. When Germany surrendered in May and Japan in August of 1945, the Walt Disney Company (WDC) held great hopes for the reopening of the foreign markets for its films.¹³⁷ Thus, WDC seemed to be enthusiastic in exporting cartoons and films to Japan.

One of the popular television shows imported from the United States was the *Mickey Mouse Club*. It was broadcasted during the 1950s in Japan, and many

Japanese in their late fifties watched this Disney show on television as children.¹³⁸

In the United States, the *Mickey Mouse Club* was a variety television series originally conceived as a way to promote and raise funds for Walt Disney's new Disneyland theme park which opened in July 1955. The television show ran from October 1955 to September 1959.¹³⁹ The *Mickey Mouse Club* was the popular children's television program of the 1950s in the United States. The show, which aired daily, featured a variety of entertainment such as singing, dancing by the cast of teenage performers called the "Mouseketeers" and various guest stars, along with Disney cartoons and serials.¹⁴⁰ The Japanese baby boom generation born in late 1940s was influenced by the *Mickey Mouse Club*, and this strongly affected the popularity of TDL when it opened in Japan in 1983. One of the interviewees of Raz made the following comment regarding the memory of Disney, which reflects the typical opinion of the interviewee's generation:

Our generation probably received the biggest Disney influence because of the popular TV show. We later became parents when TDL was opened. So naturally, we wanted to take our children to TDL.¹⁴¹

With regard to Disney cartoons, the first Disney feature animation film, *Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs*, was released in Japan in 1950, and then *Pinocchio* and *Bambi* followed. The Disney studios had produced these movies during the war, but they were banned in Japan, as was everything American. Then, the "Japanese children became fans of both the Disney television show and Disney feature animation films," continues Raz.¹⁴² A Japanese animator and a critic of cartoon and comics, Kosei Ono, says:

Walt Disney cartoons charmed the Japanese. My father's generation was amused by the jovial adventures of a mouse full of

fighting spirit who challenges an opponent much bigger than him out of concern for his girlfriend's safety. From Disney's cartoon characters the Japanese came to grasp the image of America and its jovial, cheerful national traits.¹⁴³

As examined with *Blondie*, the people in Japan already had a favorable attitude toward the United States as a result of the U.S. occupation policy, so the Japanese children were watching the Disney shows and animations favorably as well. The children did not recognize the SCAP censorship or what Japan was going through at that time. To the Japanese children, American soldiers were people who looked very cool in neat uniforms and jeeps and who were very kind to give them chocolates. Watching the Disney cartoons had a bigger impact than simply enjoying the popular children's television shows, and the children were also quietly influenced by SCAP to have favorable feelings toward the United States. This is deeply associated with the enormous popularity of Disneyland in Japan.

Now I would like to talk about theme parks. Theme parks originate from Disneyland which was first built in Anaheim, Los Angeles in 1955 by Walt Disney. A "theme park" is a specialized environment with a particular theme, and project leaders are responsible for maintaining and developing this basis. That is to say, they must keep offering the exotic environment of the happy atmosphere that customers expect. Consequently, theme parks exclude everything that is not within the theme. For example, at Disneyland, visitors cannot bring musical instruments or lunch boxes.¹⁴⁴ The guests are not even allowed to disturb the theme by bringing outside substances or by behaving inappropriately to utilize the effects of the mechanisms at the Park to create an exciting experience for all

visitors. There are also many other devices to enable artificial themed environments such as Disneyland “[m]ore real than the real” by maintaining the theme.¹⁴⁵ This is what Jean Baudrillard calls “hyperreal”:

It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal. The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes the territory – *precession of simulacra* – that engenders the territory, and if one must return to the fable, today it is the territory whose shreds slowly rot across the extent of the map.¹⁴⁶

Hyperreality of Disneyland results from the elaborate details. For example, there is a hidden passage for “cast members” which cannot be seen by “guests” in Disneyland.¹⁴⁷ Besides, Disneyland has a special painting technology named “aging,” which enables new buildings to look dark and dull, to appear dirty and have repair marks.¹⁴⁸ They maintain everything to look the same as it was when the park opened. Nothing will change, but at the same time, it keeps providing the new excitement and discovery every time people visit. Walt Disney stuck to expressing the actual presence and was absorbed in developing technology from sound, to lights, to animatronics, etc.¹⁴⁹ The modern world has depended too much on the visual and auditory senses, so devices which appeal to senses of smell and taste should be provided to add depth of the themed environments.¹⁵⁰ Customers can give full scope to their imagination and experience hyperreality more if they use their senses. Film can only tell the story or atmosphere to the audience through vision and sound, but Walt Disney realized a strong medium to control five senses by adding smell, touch and taste to sight and sound in the actual existing space – Disneyland.¹⁵¹ Accordingly, with all the efforts and devices to create hyperreal environment in Disneyland, it becomes “more real

than the real,” which Baudrillard calls a “simulacrum” as to the world created at Disneyland.

Disneyland is the realization of a three-dimensional world of the two-dimensional Disney animation films. People can not only “see” but also “experience” there, and it broke into the new theme park industry period. Disneyland was constructed with Walt Disney’s clear intension of creating a thoroughly different recreation facility from amusement parks. The biggest difference of theme parks from amusement parks is this “experience.” Following is the dedication of Disneyland on July 17, 1955 by Walt Disney:

To all who come to this happy place: welcome. Disneyland is your land. Here age relives fond memories of the past ... and here youth may savor the challenge and promise of the future. Disneyland is dedicated to the ideals, the dreams and the hard facts which have created America ... with the hope that it will be a source of joy and inspiration to all the world.¹⁵²

Disneyland was the world’s first space designed of splendid landscape which realized “the happiest place on earth.” Walt created a new field and also the new culture as well.¹⁵³ What Walt meant by “happy place,” is the world of fantasy which completely blocks off the routine life.¹⁵⁴ Because of this entire utopian “fantasy,” Disneyland becomes “hyperreal.” Baudrillard explains the hyperreality of Disneyland which reproduces the nostalgic good old days of the United States:

Disneyland is a perfect model of all the entangled orders of simulacra. It is first of all a play of illusions and phantasms.... But what attracts the crowds the most is without a doubt the social microcosm, the *religious*, miniaturized pleasure of real America, of its constraints and joys. ... Thus, everywhere in Disneyland the objective profile of America, down to the morphology of individuals and of the crowd, is drawn. All its values are exalted by

the miniature and the comic strip. Embalmed and pacified. ...
[Disneyland is] digest of the American way of life, panegyric of
American values, idealized transposition of a contradictory
reality.¹⁵⁵

Disneyland is after all a utopia because it is created to be “the happiest place on earth.” Disneyland has been considered a technological utopia by many cultural critics because it is perfectly controlled by technology to make it look “real.” Raz cites Stephen M. Fjellman that transportation, energy, waste disposal, and water control systems of Walt Disney World (WDW) are a model of technological utopia.¹⁵⁶

The theme park era began with Disneyland in 1955 in the United States, and thirty years later it went to Japan with Tokyo Disneyland in 1983. The purpose of TDL was to create something that would contribute to the happiness of the Japanese, according to Toshio Kagami, the current president of Oriental Land Co., Ltd. (OLC), the company which introduced Disneyland to Japan.¹⁵⁷ OLC is a partnership between Mitsui Real Estate Development and Keisei Electric Railway, and it was formed in order to reclaim a part of Tokyo Bay near Urayasu City in Chiba prefecture. OLC was licensed by Disney in return for 10 percent of admission fees, and 5 percent of stores sales such as food and souvenirs.¹⁵⁸ As to license agreement, WDC insisted on forty years, and OLC twenty years. Both made a compromise agreement and settled in forty-five years. Such a long-term license agreement was very exceptional. Royalties reached 20 million dollars in its first year including various other payments. Yet, the president Kagami now thinks that forty-five-year agreement was a right decision because OLC can acquire and absorb the technology and information from WDC.¹⁵⁹

OLC tried to avoid creating a Japanese version of Disneyland and insisted on constructing an exact copy of American Disneyland. According to the spokesperson of TDL, "We wanted the Japanese visitors to feel they were taking a foreign vacation by coming here, and to us Disneyland represents the best that America has to offer."¹⁶⁰ TDL created a "foreign village" park boom in Japan in 1980s. It is a type of a theme park that reproduces old streets and introduces its culture and history based upon the theme of a particular country: Holland, Spanish, and Russian villages etc. It is surprising to find almost no "foreign village" theme parks in the world except in Japan, though there are theme parks that deal with the history of their "own" country.¹⁶¹ Raz explains the background of this "foreign village" boom:

The upsurge of foreign lands was facilitated by certain economic trends. These included governmental support projects, such as the 1987 law on resort zones and the provision of "100 million yen for every hometown project"; the spread of the five-day workweek during the 1980s; and the bubble economy of the late 1980s.¹⁶²

Since overseas travel has become extremely popular in Japan today, Japanese have the chance to look at different cultures in abroad; therefore, these "foreign village" theme parks are no longer popular for the Japanese. At any rate, the remark of the TDL spokesperson is understandable considering the boom to offer foreign experiences to the Japanese people at that time. Brannen analyzes the OLC's intention to construct an exact copy of the original with the theory of keeping the exotic exotic by denying to familiarize TDL for the Japanese:

The process of assimilation of the West, the recontextualization of Western simulacra, demonstrates not that the Japanese are being dominated by Western ideologies but that they differentiate their identity from the West in a way that reinforces their sense of

their own cultural uniqueness and superiority, or what we might call Japanese hegemony.¹⁶³

In spite of OLC's claim that they constructed the exact copy of the American Disneyland, there are actually many modifications done at TDL to meet the needs of the Japanese in the 1980s when it opened. I would like to investigate how TDL has been appropriated from the next chapter.

3.1 CONSUMERISM

One of the biggest social changes in postwar Japan is consumerism. With high economic growth, developed nations such as Japan and the United States have become wealthy, and filled with consumer objects. The concept of "consumption" has changed; it used to mean to buy daily necessities, which Baudrillard referred to as the "use-value" of objects.¹⁶⁴ Now, Baudrillard argues, postindustrial nations have entered "a fundamental mutation in the ecology of the human species" in which "the humans of the age of affluence are surrounded not so much by other human beings, as they were in all previous ages, but by **objects**"¹⁶⁵.

Few objects today are offered *alone*, without a context of objects which 'speaks' them. And this changes the consumer's relation to the object: he no longer relates to a particular object in its specific utility, but to a set of objects in its total signification. Washing machine, refrigerator and dishwasher taken together have a different meaning from the one each has individually as an appliance.¹⁶⁶

The "specific utility" is what he calls "use-value," while the object in its signification is called "a social function," "a symbolic value" or "exchange-value" of signs.¹⁶⁷ In

another way, Mark Gottdiener calls it “value-consumption” with a comparison to “price-consumption.”¹⁶⁸ According to Baudrillard, in the consumption society, objects are consumed not by their “use-value” but by “sign exchange-value.” What people in developed nations seek today has changed; today people would like to consume for pleasure rather than necessity. That is, the value of commodities is different from before: commodities people want now are not inevitable for living like food and water, but people enjoy the added value of objects. They can obtain the added value with “distinctive signs.” People want to distinguish themselves from others by “acquiring the status of distinctive signs and class (or caste) privileges.”¹⁶⁹ Then “distinctive signs” are often appeared as “a surplus” and “a superfluity”:

All societies have always wasted, squandered, expended and consumed beyond what is strictly necessary for the simple reason that it is in the consumption of a surplus, of a superfluity that the individual – and society – feel not merely that they exist, but that they are alive.¹⁷⁰

Therefore, new rights which can be acquired only by those with “distinctive signs” have been emerging. For example, even the “right to leisure” and the “right to clean air” which apparently seem like the equal rights to everyone have become one of the privileged statuses.¹⁷¹ Those new rights mean that the contemporary society makes any “sign exchange-values” into objects to be consumed: “The ‘right to clean air’ signifies the loss of clean air as a natural good, its transition to commodity status and its inegalitarian social redistribution.”¹⁷² Baudrillard gives another example of “distinctive signs”:

Now, admittedly, the rich man who drives a 2CV no longer bedazzles. What he does is more subtle: he super-differentiates

himself, super-distinguishes himself by his manner of consuming, by style. He maintains his privilege absolutely by moving from conspicuous to discreet (super-conspicuous) consumption, by moving from quantitative ostentation to distinction, from money to culture.¹⁷³

In the consumer society, people “never consume the object in itself (in its use-value)”:

... you are always manipulating objects (in the broadest sense) as signs which distinguish you either by affiliating you to your own group taken as an ideal reference or by making you off from your group by reference to a group of higher status.¹⁷⁴

The above mentioned society where people consume signs has led to the era of the theme parks in the United States in the 1950s and then in Japan thirty years later when the nation has become postindustrial. The consumerism is a legacy of the U.S. occupation. Notoji notes that the coming of Disneyland to Japan was a “natural evolution of the Americanization of postwar Japan”:

During this period of rapid economic growth, the idea of democracy was strategically tied to consumerism by both government and corporate sectors, and America has played a significant role as a model of the good life and an equitable middle-class society.¹⁷⁵

According to Raz, consumption plays an important role in Japan in “shaping tastes, desires, lifestyles, and ultimately identities.” He continues to say that it is a means of self-discovery and it is particularly effective in the context of “consuming ‘things Western’ (especially American) which are ‘re-made in Japan.’”¹⁷⁶

Looking at adjustments at TDL, “we begin to get a sense of the difference between consumer capitalism in Japan and the United States,” states Brannen.¹⁷⁷

Like Brannen says, Japanese consumerism has been blended with Japanese

traditional culture and has evolved uniquely and different from the American consumerism, and the huge adaptations are made according to this consumerism in Japan. Main Street, USA in Disneyland in the United States is replaced with World Bazaar at TDL. Main Street, USA reconstructs the good old days of America and it produces nostalgia, which is the main theme of Disneyland in the United States. According to Raz,

DL's Main Street, USA has a red-brick Victorian train station, a "real" carriage drawn by a real horse, a city hall, a firehouse ... and a barbershop All these are lacking at TDL's World Bazaar, which is basically a glass-covered mall.¹⁷⁸

Brannen calls it "a large suburban shopping mall rather than a quaint town center":

Tokyo Disneyland has more commercial space than the Disney complexes in Anaheim or Orlando, and the owners complain that it still is not enough. There is much more emphasis on shopping....¹⁷⁹

One of the most pleasurable things the Japanese come to TDL for is shopping as well as popular attractions. Many Japanese spend a large amount of money for souvenirs both for their friends and themselves. Average visitors to TDL spent about 3,290 yen (US\$30) at shops in 1991. Per capita expenditure at TDL is the highest among all Disneylands in the world.¹⁸⁰ Furthermore, gifts at TDL are of higher quality and consequently cost more.¹⁸¹

There are four types of unique Japanese consumption culture: souvenir culture, commodified nostalgia, age-governed system, and brand-name consciousness. These four consumption cultures influence the highest sales of the store revenue at TDL among all the Disneylands in the world.

First of all, there is a peculiar “souvenir culture” in Japan. Brannen points out that “World Bazaar serves the gift-giving needs of the Japanese.”

The Japanese system of *senbetsu* obliges the traveler to repay this farewell gift money with a return gift, which must conform to three rules: it must be worth half the yen value of the original gift; be a specialty of the locale visited on the trip – a *meibutsu*; and have a legitimating mark – *kinen*, the tag or wrapper proving that it was purchased on site¹⁸²

This feeling of obligation in Japanese souvenir culture comes from Japanese concept of *on* and *giri*. American anthropologist Ruth Benedict explains this in her *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (1946), a report of an attempt to interpret Japanese culture during WWII. Benedict describes *on* as “a debt and must be repaid”:

Both the Chinese and the Japanese have many words meaning ‘obligations.’ The words are not synonyms and their specific meanings have no literal translation into English because the ideas they express are alien to us [Americans]. The word for ‘obligations’ which covers a person’s indebtedness from greatest to least is *on*. ... *On* is in all its uses a load, an indebtedness, a burden, which one carries as best one may. A man receives *on* from a superior and the act of accepting an *on* from any man not definitely one’s superior or at least one’s equal gives one an uncomfortable sense of inferiority. ... ‘Remembering one’s *on*’ may be a pure outpouring of reciprocal devotion.¹⁸³

She explains how to say “thank you” when receiving *on*. For instance, *arigato* and *sumimasen* both means “thank you” but the former literally means “Oh, this difficult thing,” and the latter, “Oh, this doesn’t end.” *Katajikenai* also means “thank you” but it is written with the character “insult” and “loss of face,” which means both “I am insulted” and “I am grateful.” She examines this and insists that “In this

phrase you explicitly acknowledge your shame in receiving *on*, and shame, *haji*, is ... a thing bitterly felt in Japan.”¹⁸⁴ As for *giri*, there is no possible English equivalent either and it is one of the most curious among all the strange categories of moral obligations which anthropologists find in the culture of the world:

It is a Japanese category and it is not possible to understand their courses of action without taking it into account. No Japanese can talk about motivations or good reputation or the dilemmas which confront men and women in his home country without constantly speaking of *giri*.¹⁸⁵

Benedict goes on to mention that the Japanese must avoid the dreaded condemnation: “a man who does not know *giri*.” They are very frightened of those obligations. Benedict maintains that to avoid shame the constant goal for Japanese is honor and it is necessary to command respect, and that the supreme task of life is fulfilling one’s obligations.¹⁸⁶ As shown in Benedict’s explanation above, *on* and *giri* culture is deeply related to souvenir culture, and this consumption culture is the main reason for the extremely high store sales at TDL.

The second characteristic of Japanese consumerism is “commodified nostalgia.” The Japanese tend to spend quite a large amount of money to buy souvenirs for themselves, too. They like to keep their happy memories in the form of commodities so that they can recall it after they go home. Nostalgia has become a commodity. A stereotypical figure of the Japanese tourists hanging a camera from their neck also shows that they want to keep their happy memory with the form of picture. There are also some services to commodify nostalgia for the Japanese at TDL. For example, if you mail a card or a letter in the mailboxes

within the Park, they can have a special Mickey Mouse stamp on them. Also, if you go to Photo Express at TDL, you can develop your pictures in three hours with the Disney illustration frame. It is safe to say that Japanese are sensitive to nostalgia, so theme parks or whatever business which deals with nostalgia as its concept is successful with the Japanese. The Japanese have a different feeling mechanism than Americans, and it is related to nostalgia as well. I cannot find the best translation which describes the Japanese word *jo-kan*, because there is no such thing in the West. It is close to the word “sentiment” or “feeling.” For example, Japanese are said to be the only people who become sentimental and lost in thought when they hear the murmuring of a stream, or the chirps of insects. Western people feel those sounds as just noise.¹⁸⁷ This is probably related to *wabi* (beauty of simplicity) and *sabi* (elegant and quiet simplicity) though it is hard to explain to those who are not raised in this culture. It can also be explained like this: the philosophy of transient beauty toward nature or people. For example, the Japanese feel deeply moved to see the falling cherry blossoms. They react sensitively to things disappearing and try to keep the memories and recollect them. Rides are not the only business in theme parks. After the excitement caused by attractions appears in the form of consumption at restaurants or shops, it finally becomes a business.¹⁸⁸ Thus, how to prolong the excitement is important in the theme park business. The Japanese are sensitive and are easily moved, so they can find much pleasure in themed environments, which leads to the sales revenue in shops at TDL.

Thirdly, I would like to talk about the “age-governed system” in Japan. TDL is one of the most popular destinations for children to visit on school trip. I

went to TDL on a school trip when I was in the ninth grade in 1992. Seven percent of the total number of visitors to TDL in 1994 was those children on a school excursion.¹⁸⁹ It is very unique about Japan but the students wear school uniforms in most of the schools and they move in groups of five or six students with their well prepared plan. Raz argues that consumerism and age groups are significantly linked in Japan: "In Japan, age cohorts tend to be more coherent in terms of behavior." Raz cites Millie Creighton that Japanese consumerism is "less a way of 'finding oneself' and more a way of linking selves to others."¹⁹⁰ The reason why linking selves to others in the same age cohort is important is because Japanese society is hierarchical, and there is a clear line between the older and the younger. The younger ones always have to use different polite language to the older, and this hierarchy is remarkable especially in a middle school and high school. Therefore, TDL functions to create "age-specific images of identity" by sharing the Japanese consumption in World Bazaar and also sharing to consume the happy memory of their childhood with their classmates.¹⁹¹

The last characteristic of Japanese consumption culture is "brand-name consciousness." It will probably surprising to non-Japanese to see how high brand-name products such as Chanel and Louis Vuitton are popular among the Japanese, even for the young university or high school students. As shown earlier with Brannen's idea of the gift-giving needs of the Japanese, the Japanese like to purchase something that has "a legitimating mark." Brannen refers that all TDL mementos have TOKYO DISNEYLAND marked on them, while Disneylands in the United States have no such identification.¹⁹² Raz points out that this identification comes from the brand-name consciousness of the Japanese: "All

these conscious references to Walt Disney, his vision, and his worlds obviously have a clear marketing rationale: showing off the brand name.”¹⁹³ When I was in a middle school, Disney products were very popular among students, but the authenticity of Disney brand was a topic of controversy. Authentic Disney products have a small 0.5 inch square sticker which changes its color if touched.

Besides World Bazaar, there is another gift shop called Promenade Gifts right outside the Park and visitors can buy souvenirs if they do not have enough time to shop before the park closes.¹⁹⁴ Moreover, the biggest Disney retail shop opened next to Maihama JR train station, the station nearby TDL, in 2001, which opens until 11:00 p.m. TDL is evidently focusing more and more to serve the Japanese consumer fever. The postwar Japan has achieved a rapid economic development. During the occupation era, the Japanese admired the American material affluence, and then they realized the wealthy life surrounded by electric appliances. Consumerism is one of the biggest factors of TDL's success because it satisfies the needs of the Japanese consumers, and this Japanese consumer culture is influenced greatly by the U.S. occupation era. World Bazaar and consequently TDL serving as a big shopping mall is a Japanization of the original Disneyland which is arranged for the Japanese in the age of consumer capitalism.

Four peculiarities of Japanese consumerism have been examined above. Now, I would like to add the new consumer phenomenon of the young generation. Sixty percent of the visitors consist of young women who are older than eighteen years. The largest age group who spends the most, 33 percent of the total, at the Disney retail stores in Japan is between twenty to twenty-nine years old, and that 53 percent are single females. Raz states that many Americans are surprised to

see the “inscrutable’ zeal of young Japanese women toward things Disney.”¹⁹⁵

Young women are definitely the most important customers for TDL who spend great deal of money at the Park. The young generation has a distinctive character different from former generations. Notoji states that “Disney culture has in general assumed a more feminine image in Japan than in the United States.”¹⁹⁶ This group has distinctive features, and it has produced a new type of consumption which results dominating a large part of store revenue. As Raz points out, many young Japanese women remain at home living with their parents as long as they are single. Therefore, they can use their income as they like for shopping and consumption. Raz continues that:

OLs [“office lady,” a female office worker who are not involved in professional or managerial tasks and just handling miscellaneous administrative tasks such as making teas and copying] therefore attract massive marketing efforts through the media, which in turn reinforce their image as easygoing, leisure-(and husband-) seeking “moratorium people.”¹⁹⁷

These moratorium people who stay with their parents and do not become independent are called “parasite single” because they are literally “parasite” of their parents. “Cute” (*Kawaii* in Japanese) has become a cultural idiom among those young women. Anything can be cute: cartoon characters, fashion, antiqueness, brand-name products, pets etc. Even Prime Minister Koizumi can be cute for them. Because of this “cute” boom, young Japanese women buy and wear cute paraphernalia, and Disney products are one of the most popular “cute” goods. The childishness and the innocence of trying to show cute are an important part of the original Disney appeal, says Raz.¹⁹⁸ Lately, there is a “Disney Princess” boom in Japan. All the princess characters of Disney such as

Ariel from the *Little Mermaid* to Belle from the *Beauty and the Beast* become stationeries, clothes, bags, comforters, interior goods, and everything. There was also a special event, "Disney Princess Days," from January to March of 2005 at TDL. These princesses and other Disney characters are originally for the little children, but today's "cute" boom targets the young women. When they have children, they buy their favorite cute things for them, so this is almost like a never-ending cycle of Disney consumption, which results in the ever-lasting popularity of TDL. Raz gives an account of this phenomenon of "cute" boom as "neoteny," "a retention of youthful characteristics in the adult form": Mickey Mouse embodies both the physical evidence of neoteny and the behavioral juvenilization, reflecting a "wish to recapture some aspect of lost childhood."¹⁹⁹ However, being this generation and consuming this boom myself, I do not think this is a reflection of "neoteny." Not many of them purchase goods of Disney and other childish characters such as Hello Kitty for the nostalgia for a lost childhood. Rather, this is simply a new form of consumption today. This "cute" boom can also be regarded as Japanization of Disney consumption, which is very different from the United States.

TDL features numerous kinds of events according to both Japanese and Western holidays and seasons. One of the most famous and popular one among the young Japanese is a countdown party on the New Year's Eve. There are also special events on Christmas, Halloween, Valentine's Day, New Years, and so on. There are always some events going on at TDL. On New Years, Mickey and Minnie appear in Japanese traditional costumes, kimonos, and there are Japanese New Year's ornaments as well.²⁰⁰ With each event, all kinds of new

souvenir lines are made such as Mickey and Minnie dolls in kimono, and this attracts many repeat visitors especially the young generation, who spends a lot of money in stores.

3.2 FAMILY LEISURE

Consumerism enables the people to enjoy “distinctive signs” by buying a surplus to their necessity in life. It brought a leisure boom in Japan in the 1960s in its high-growth period, and the Japanese people were looking for how to spend their leisure time. A leisure boom is one of the backgrounds of the theme park era in Japan. Many Japanese enjoy golf, ski, marine sports, but those aristocratic activities require time and money to practice, so they were calling for popular recreation which any consumer from kids to an elderly can enjoy. Theme parks are suited for their needs.²⁰¹ TDL was a new form of popular entertainment and it was what the Japanese needed in the 1980s when the leisure boom had ripened. Notoji states that TDL filled the cultural void as the Japanese were making the transition from work-oriented to leisure-oriented values.²⁰² Then, TDL has become “a kind of ‘secular ritual,’ a ‘post-modern leisure pilgrimage’ worked into everyday life,” says Raz.²⁰³ Brannen argues that a significant increase in per capita disposable income created a new attitude toward relaxation and recreation:

Another major factor in Tokyo Disneyland's success is that the Disney philosophy of creating a “dream world” coincides with the current consumer trend of *yuttarism* (from *yuttari*, meaning easy, comfortable, and calm), an attitude of attaching importance to relaxation and comfort.²⁰⁴

This *yuttarism* is another phenomenon of distinguishing themselves from others by acquiring the status of distinctive signs and class privileges with a surplus and a superfluity as shown before.

The leisure boom facilitated families spending their weekend in a family unit by going to leisure places by car, which was a symbol of consumerism of the era. The fascination of the Japanese with the home electric appliances during the occupation period was examined before. One of the main purposes of the U.S. occupation policy was democratization, and the policy democratized in a home as well. Housewives had become able to be liberated from all the domestic duties so that they could have time for their relaxation and recreation with their families. By purchasing home electric appliances, mothers could find a time with their families, and by purchasing cars, families could go out on weekends together.

Consumerism enabled family entertainment and this entertainment in family unit enabled them to feel more like a family. In this way, consumerism and family entertainment is well related. Disneyland was constructed with Walt Disney's clear intention of creating a thoroughly different recreation facility from amusement parks after he had seen Coney Island in New York. It looked dirty and degraded and was an inappropriate place for children to play. Raz explains that Walt wanted to create a place where family could enjoy safely:

Besides his fixation with cleanliness, Walt Disney also wanted a controlled family entertainment. Disneyland was intended to be a complete contrast to Coney Island's freak shows and libertarian seashores, which emphasized the grotesque and the sexual, and its many attractions that encouraged visitors to break away from social control.²⁰⁵

Therefore, anything that does not suit this concept of family entertainment such as

alcohol and tobacco must be excluded from Disneyland. To take another example, when TDL opened, there were tired fathers taking a nap in a sleeping bag on a sheet to reserve a seat for his family until the parade started. It is not an unusual scene for the Japanese, but it appeared strange to the head office of Disney Co. Now guests can reserve a seat only an hour before the show starts under the idea that the scene of father doing it does not match with the concepts of the park which offers a dream world, and which families should enjoy together.²⁰⁶ The opening of TDL offered housewives who had just been released from house chores to enjoy in the world of dream and magic with their families.

TDL was the most popular place to go with family. The main theme of Disneyland in the United States is nostalgia, and the Americans go to Disneyland to enjoy the theme park specifically designed for nostalgia. At TDL, the theme of nostalgia is modified so that people of various backgrounds can enjoy different experiences there. The founder, Walt Disney's childhood was full of craving and suppression, and he could obtain nothing he wanted. He built his utopia late in life in his mid-fifties, but his Disneyland project was greatly influenced by his sense of his lost childhood. Walt said that he included everything in Disneyland that he wanted but could not get when he was little.²⁰⁷ He regained his childhood at Disneyland, that is, Disneyland is realization of Walt's happy boyhood though he could not have it while he was a real kid.

Besides, Disneyland is also a reproduction of the American Golden Age. In the late nineteenth century the rural landscape of the United States was changing into an industrialized society with the advance of modernization and urbanization. Many social problems emerged with this change. Walt wanted to get

the United States back to the ideal situation as it was in the Golden Age.

The nostalgic model ... drew upon antiurban feelings and a yearning for the close community of past village life. Both metropolitan regional development and suburban sprawl were considered undesirable settlement patterns. Instead, it was the small town or village that fired the imagination of reformers who sought to regain the sense of human scale and community in the environment.²⁰⁸

At Disneyland, American history from the beginning of the nineteenth century when the vast wilderness was transformed into the civilized nation, to the early twentieth century is condensed in one hundred years. Guests are carried from Frontierland to the Tomorrowland by a steamship and a steam locomotive, the nineteenth-century leading transportation. Americans see the past symbols of the Golden Age and have nostalgic feeling at Disneyland.²⁰⁹ In other words, Disneyland expresses nostalgia for the two happiest moments that people want to remember – childhood and pastoral America – which embodies Walt's personal nostalgia as well.

Brannen points out that the layout of the original Disneyland in the United States follows "a distinctly modern progression in which guests may relive the American romantic journey by heading 'out West' from Main Street" clockwise:

They first fight their way through the turbulent waters of Adventureland, encountering savages and beasts along the way. They relax for a while in the civilized settlement of New Orleans Square before they push forward on their quest for the American dream through the rough terrain of Frontierland. Finally, they reach Fantasyland, where their dreams come true. Tomorrowland is a fantasized extension of this limitless dream – the new frontier.²¹⁰

This nostalgic vision is the main theme throughout Disneyland. However, as

Brannen insists, things such as romantic narrative and nostalgic feeling toward American history are meaningless for the Japanese. Brannen calls this “the context-bound account,” meaning “what it means in the United States and therefore is meaningless when transferred to Japanese culture” while “the context-free account” is that either “Tokyo Disneyland means the same thing in Japan as in the United States” with regards to exported cultural artifacts.²¹¹ Under the U.S. occupation, the Japanese touched the American culture of around the 1950s both directly and indirectly, so they feel nostalgia when they see the United States of the period. To the Japanese, the American culture before the occupation does not induce in them any reminiscences but something unfamiliar simply because they do not know it. According to Notoji, the original Disneyland which opened in 1955 in Los Angeles has “freeze-dried the cultural vitality and dazzling youth imagery of fifties’ America, and the Japanese can thus daydream their own eternal youth and prosperity.”²¹² This is what the Japanese know about the United States and it is what they want to experience at TDL. Hence, some attractions and zones are renamed to be familiar to the Japanese. Main Street U.S.A. becomes the World Bazaar as discussed above. Frontierland becomes Westernland because the Japanese being islanders are not familiar with the concept of the frontier. Yet, they can identify with the West because they grew up with Westerns such as “The Rifleman,” “Laramie,” “Wyatt Earp,” and “The Lone Ranger.”²¹³ The Golden Horseshoe Revue becomes the Diamond Horseshoe because gold does not have much cultural significance in modern Japan whereas diamonds are a sign of wealth for the Japanese, says Brannen.²¹⁴ The railroads are also very different at TDL and Disneylands in the United States. While the

original Disneyland Railroad encircles the entire Park, TDL's Western River Railroad only surrounds Westernland and Adventureland. Brannen explains that this was the structural reason to maintain the sense of fantasy: if it had been constructed to encircle the entire park, "the elevation of the tracks at various points along the route would have allowed guests to catch glimpses of the surrounding Chiba area" which results in disrupting the foreign vacation experience of the visitors.²¹⁵ As shown in Leo Marx's *The Machine in the Garden* (1964), the railroad means a symbol of the civilization and the progress of the United States for the Americans: "In the popular culture of the period the railroad was a favorite emblem of progress – not merely technological progress, but the overall progress of the race."²¹⁶ Yet, the railroad does not mean anything to the Japanese, so limiting the railroad course at TDL is not a big problem. For the postwar Disney generation, TDL is where they can experience the nostalgic American atmosphere and Disney stories that they watched in Disney television shows and animations in the 1950s and 1960s.

The young generation who do not know WWII or the occupation period goes to TDL not to enjoy the American culture like their parents' generation, but for consumption and self-discovery. There are still some people who go to TDL for "a mini-pilgrimage to 'America'":

Tokyoites with whom I spoke claim that such visitors are usually from the countryside, an impression that is in line with OLC data. They refer to this group of "native repeaters" as *onoborisan* (literally, "Mr. Climber," or "people who 'come up' to Tokyo"). ... Even for *onoborisan*, however, TDL is gradually becoming a symbol of Tokyo – the big city – rather than of America.²¹⁷

The use of English after the war until about the 1960s could be viewed as a

symbol of a strong American influence, but now the Japanese have created the original Japanese-English vocabularies which are not understandable for the native speakers of English, according to Raz.²¹⁸ The loss of authenticity of English as an American influence can be seen in the change with the restaurant menus at TDL:

... once they had large English words for the food items, and below that there were smaller *katakana* [one of the two Japanese phonic alphabets]. ... Now the English is slowly coming down and replaced by larger *katakana*. The American experience is not that important anymore. TDL is no longer an American experience.²¹⁹

The young generation does not receive TDL as America, but as a fun “foreign land” which is “a total environment, complete-onto-itself ..., a spacious, clean, and safe utopian space.”²²⁰ As discussed above, TDL offers various kinds of experiences which suit each generation. This is an essential factor of TDL’s success. Among various age groups, according to Raz, 40 percent of TDL’s visitors are middle-aged.²²¹ They come to TDL to enjoy their nostalgic Disney experiences which they grew up with in the postwar era. They bring children but children enjoy different way from their parents.

Modifications of TDL made for the sake of the Japanese people based on their two demands of the 1980s, consumerism and family leisure, have been discussed above. These two are the artifacts of the U.S. occupation policy. There are also some other arrangements made at TDL considering the original Japanese culture. These are not the direct influences of the occupation period, but made to arrange TDL for the place for the family entertainment destination.

First of all, the Japanese restaurant Hokusai opened in the World Bazaar

in 1984, a year after TDL started. Since the restaurants at TDL originally served only Western food, there were too many complaints from visitors, especially the elderly, because they used to enjoy Japanese boxed lunch but they were banned from bringing it into the Park.²²² The restaurant Hokusai serves tempura, udon, sushi, and the Japanese formal cuisine consisting of fresh vegetables and fish, and the Japanese sweets as well. Now, all the family including the elderly can enjoy TDL together. Also, the Hungry Bear Restaurant in Westernland has added curried rice to its menu, which is a favorite item for the Japanese, according to Brannen.²²³ There is also the Chinese restaurant named China Voyager at TDL because Chinese food, especially ramen, is very popular among the Japanese. Brannen adds that there are not as many food vendors on the street at TDL as at the original Disneyland in the United States because the Japanese consider it impolite to eat while walking. There are many arrangements for the Japanese even only with regard to the food at TDL.

As to the attractions at the Park, a boat of Splash Mountain at TDL was improved to avoid too much splash because WDC thought that the Japanese customers would not accept it.²²⁴ In Jungle Cruise at TDL, the guides who pilot the boats use puns in the Japanese spiel – “the hallmark of Japanization” – according to Raz.²²⁵ There is the Sleeping Beauty Castle in Disneyland in Los Angeles while the Cinderella Castle is in the Magic Kingdom of Walt Disney World (WDW) in Florida. Then, at TDL, Cinderella Castle was constructed. Brannen notes, “it is no wonder that Tokyo Disneyland chose to feature Cinderella instead, whose rags to riches story relate more directly to the Japanese historical experience.”²²⁶ Nevertheless, her remark does not seem accurate. Unlike the

American society where the self-made man such as Abraham Lincoln is valued, the Japanese society is hierarchical and it tends to emphasize on the family background and despise a nouveau riche. It may be just because that Cinderella is much more popular than Sleeping Beauty in Japan. Cinderella Castle in WDW has no ride, but there is an attraction called the Cinderella Castle Mystery Tour at TDL. It is the only attraction which visitors walk by foot. Raz insists that the Mystery Tour is more close to the Japanese ghost-house, the most popular traditional amusements, rather than Haunted Mansion: the ghosts in the Haunted Mansion are foreign to the Japanese speaking in English, but in the Mystery Tour, the mirror, the guide, and some monsters all speak Japanese.²²⁷ Also, this walking type tour in a Japanese style haunted house reminds them of the popular Japanese entertainment in summer called, *kimodameshi*: a spooky walk through the cemetery or the woods at night to test one's courage. This is the popular attraction for children on their school trip. The Mystery Tour is the only attraction that visitors can take an active role, which gives them more excitement than just sitting in a moving ride.

The very unique Japanized attraction at TDL was Meet the World. According to Raz, there was nothing Disney in Meet the World. It was a free show, combined film and audio-animatronic technologies, with three mechanical figures as narrators explaining Japanese history through its relations with the world, China, Portugal, Holland, and the United States. The guides were wearing a kimono-like costume.²²⁸ The message of Meet the World was to show that "the Japanese, despite their numerous encounters with other cultures through trade, remain a unique people," says Brannen.²²⁹ For example, by showing that the

Japanese two syllabaries – *hiragana* and *katakana* – are stylized and abbreviated form of certain Chinese characters, it implies the following: “China’s gifts ... were imported and developed by the Japanese. They were seeds that, having been transplanted, grew to form a unique Japanese culture,”²³⁰ Raz argues that “Meet the World replicates in miniature the larger narrative of TDL as a whole, since TDL itself is a living proof of the success of, and the benefits inherent in, cultural importation.”²³¹ Meet the World gave a correct depiction of how Japan imported foreign culture and arranged into its original culture. This is applied to TDL on the whole, and to the U.S. occupation policy after the end of WWII. That is, the Japanese are used to domesticate the cultural artifacts from foreign countries. Raz states that national identity of the Japanese is not an essential part, but does exist within specific fragments of TDL such as Meet the World.²³² However, Meet the World closed in June 2002. From this, it is quite likely to think that Meet the World was too far away from the Disney theme; the Japanese no longer look for the “American” experience at TDL, but they obviously do not intend to have the “Japanese” experience, either. Still, this attraction was a good example to show the history of Japanizing foreign cultures.

Above mentioned domestications of Disneyland at TDL are examples of what Brannen calls “making the exotic familiar” which are recontextualized according to the Japanese culture. I would like to look at how Disney has been familiarized outside the Park in the daily lives of the Japanese because this influences the number of visitors at TDL. As Notoji mentions, Disney characters are the mascot of the Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank, and one of the most common gifts for babies are Disney products.²³³ Kindergarten teachers use Disney music and

characters for exercise, festivals, and so on. Children watch Disney animations and films. Disney products are flooded everywhere in Japan, so it is not surprising that many Japanese children believe that Mickey Mouse is Japanese, as Raz notes.²³⁴ This proves how much Disney has been localized in the context of the Japanese culture. Also, Disneyland is carefully designed about the size of the Park to have guests feel that they leave 20 percent unseen.²³⁵ These influence more than 90 percent repeat visitors to go back to TDL. The president of OLC, Kagami, says that theme parks are a living entity. When they stop evolving, it is a start of aging. Constant metabolism to make visitors excited by introducing new attractions, or discontinuing existing ones etc. is a key to successful theme parks.²³⁶

On the other hand, the other form of recontextualization of Disney, “keeping the exotic exotic” are as follows. According to Brannen, it is well shown in the treatment of foreign employees at TDL:

Although gaijin [foreigner] employees occupy high-status positions at Tokyo Disneyland, they are not integrated into the Disney experience of the customers like their Japanese counterparts. Instead they are treated as exotic specimens. ... To maintain their distinction as exotic, gaijin employees are asked to speak only in English and not to wear name tags, presumably so that guests do not relate to them as individuals.²³⁷

By keeping foreign employees as “foreign,” TDL can offer the visitors the foreign experiences.

The charge system of theme parks is different from amusement parks, too. There are two ways in which they are different: one is to collect admission fee and facility fee separately, and the other is to collect both in a lump sum. Although

some theme parks in Japan still use the former way, the latter way is normally adopted in the United States. Like TDL, there is a unified theme in every corner of theme parks from a path, plants to architecture and shopping, but customers are unwilling to pay for each attraction, so it is better to collect in a lump-sum system.²³⁸ While the main purpose of amusement parks is attractions, what is important in theme parks is to have an “experience” in a themed environment. Thus, elements which remind visitors of the world in which they live outside the park have to be removed. TDL adopts a passport system. Once customers pay at the entrance, they do not have to think about fees anymore every time they get on attractions, so exclusion of money at the Park is one of hyperreal elements, so as in utopia. The place where money does not exist is one of the conditions of a utopia as well as time, an ideal place.

There are other “keeping the exotic exotic” examples with regard to racism. As Brannen points out: while Meet the World emphasized on Japan’s uniqueness in relationship to China, any mention of Korea is completely absent. This was because Korea is “the Asian country most similar to Japan and therefore the one most difficult for the Japanese to differentiate themselves from,” says Brannen.²³⁹ The conflict between the Japanese and the Koreans both in Japan and Korea due to the history may be another reason of the complete omission in Meet the World. TDL employee interviewer says that a Korean is a less likely candidate for hiring even if he has a Japanese citizenship and lives in the area. The reason of TDL willing to hire on the Japanese is because they want to hire “a relatively homogeneous population, all Japanese, Tokyo accent, etc., another Asian type will stand out and interfere with the show.”²⁴⁰ In the Jungle Cruise,

almost all of the human characters are people of color in the original Disneyland in the United States. Then this is copied to Japan, and it seems to appeal to the Japanese as well because it gives visitors a notion of “exotic others.”²⁴¹

CHAPTER 4

FROM MANUALIZED SMILE TO MORE HUMAN SPACE: TOKYO DISNEYSEA

TDL is the most popular place for family entertainment. Parents like to take their children to TDL because it is clean, safe, and everything is controlled, so parents feel relieved. However, this perfectly controlled space is only possible through the manualized scenario and plot of TDL, and also manualized employees. Disneyland is famous for Disney manuals to control everything for maintaining the theme. Even the smile of employees is manualized. New employees are made to practice of the “Disney Smile” at the OLC’s orientation. They are told to smile, but smile honestly, and if they anyhow cannot smile, they have to remember that they “get paid for smiling.”²⁴² Disneyland considers employees as actors/actresses who perform on the stage. This is because they are called “cast members”:

It is a show, but it must look real, including the production of spontaneity and the stage-management of emotion-conveying behavior such as smiling, welcoming, or thanking.²⁴³

Cast members learn the basics of the service in Disneyland: “S·C·S·E,” Safety, Courtesy, Show and Efficiency. Moreover, they work each day as if they give the performance on the stage for the first time with a pride as a professional.

President Kagami says that the job of cast members is very natural thing, and they just have to wait on guests as if they invite their friend to their house.²⁴⁴ In consumer society where people consume signs, everything exists in the “fantasy” of consumers, argues Baudrillard. He states the connection between “the real” and “hyperreal”: “We may, admittedly, say that it is, then, our fantasies which

come to be signified in the image and consumed in it.”²⁴⁵ Manualization began with McDonald's. George Ritzer explains in *The McDonaldization of Society* (2000) about the “fantasy” fast-food restaurants like McDonald's give to consumers. Ritzer uses the word “illusion” instead of “fantasy”:

If it really isn't so efficient and it really isn't so cheap, then what does McDonaldization – more specifically, the fast-food restaurant – offer people? ... One answer: an illusion of efficiency and frugality. As long as people believe in the illusion, the actual situation matters little. ... McDonald's, for example, creates the illusion that people are having fun, that they are getting lots of French fries, and that they are getting a bargain when they purchase their meal.²⁴⁶

In the hyperreal world, it tries to give consumers the “fantasy” or the “illusion” of the “reality.” Baudrillard analyses that even the human relations have become signs and they are consumed “in the form of signs”:

The loss of (spontaneous, reciprocal, symbolic) human relation is the fundamental fact of our societies. It is on this basis that we are seeing the systematic reinjection of human relations – in the form of *signs* – into the social circuit, and are seeing the *consumption* of those relations and of that human warmth *in signified form*. The receptionist, the social worker, the public relations consultant, the advertising pin-up girl, all these apostles of the social machine have as their secular mission the gratification, *the lubrication of social relations with the institutional smile*.²⁴⁷

The “institutional smile” can be seen with the McDonald's manual not only for cooking, but also for making the “smile” of workers, which is too artificial. This is same as the Disney manual. Ritzer talks about “scripting interaction” between employees and customers:

Much of what is said in fast-food restaurants by both employees and customers is ritualized, routinized, even scripted. ... Not only

are general scripts given to employees but also a series of subscripts that can be followed in the case of unusual requests or behaviors. There might be a subscript for customers who object to being subjected to the same scripted interaction as everyone else. In fact, the subscript might be written to appear as if it reflects the “real” feelings of the employee and is not scripted.²⁴⁸

“Scripting interaction” functions to give consumers the “fantasy” of intimate human relationships. The “fake friendliness” of scripted interaction reflects the “insincere camaraderie” which characterizes not only fast-food restaurants but also all other elements of McDonaldized society, and this attracts customers to come back.²⁴⁹

Raz summarized things McDonald’s and Disneyland have in common:

the Disney and Hamburger universities are acclaimed as training centers; both are renowned for the excellence of their service; and they share a deep concern with order and cleanliness, a target audience of middle-class families, and worldwide success.²⁵⁰

Raz goes on to mention that the differences between “Disneyfication” and “McDonaldization” are as follows: “McDonald’s had tougher training, but the work is more boring. In Disney, it’s more important to show that you are enjoying yourself.”²⁵¹

Both Disneyland and McDonald’s require a “fanatical loyalty” of employers to strictly follow the manual, but the Japanese employees feel no paradox in their situation because they have already been used to the manual society since their childhood in school.²⁵² In Japanese schools, students usually wear the same uniforms, leather backpacks, shoes, and there are many strict school regulations about appearances from hairstyle, hair color, makeup, etc. Teachers even measure the length of girls uniform skirt with a ruler not to let them wear a short

skirt in high schools although many girls cut the hem of a skirt. It is common to hear that hair-dyed students are sprayed a black hair color spray by teachers. WDW emphasizes the importance of teamwork in orientation, but TDL does not because the Japanese employees also know about teamwork well in Japanese society.²⁵³ Japanese casts members at TDL accommodate more easily with the onstage – backstage line than their American counterparts because this dual distinction is a part of the Japanese society as well: *tatemaie* – *hon'ne*.²⁵⁴ Also, there is the “caste system” at TDL:

at the top of the pyramid are the tour guides, followed by those in operations (ride operators, ticket sellers, and custodians, in that order); below that are those who work in merchandising; at the bottom of the ladder are the hood workers.²⁵⁵

Yet, Japanese society is originally a class society, and this kind of the caste system in a part-time job in Japan is very distinctive. Hence, it is again not very extraordinary to the Japanese. Furthermore, the standard of the Japanese service culture in restaurants and stores is much higher than the United States, so making an “institutional smile” is not something very special for TDL workers. As Raz states that the TDL’s hiring and training procedures are another aspects of the Japanization of Disney, TDL manual called “Tips on Magic” is a translated version of a Disneyland manual in the United States but there have been many modifications to suit the Japanese culture.²⁵⁶ When Disney manuals are recontextualized into the Japanese culture which is manualized already, it created Japanese-style Disney employees who do not feel a paradox with Disney manuals and their work. This employee management is another big reason of TDL’s success.

As discussed above, original Disneylands in the United States and also TDL are too manualized and employees are almost like a robot instead of a human. Although the manualized employee management is successful in Japan because the Japanese are used to the manuals in a society, Japan is trying to create more human space which is what people want today. OLC was formulating a plan for the second park from around 1986, and Tokyo DisneySea (TDS) opened in 2001. When TDL opened in 1983, the former president of OLC, Masatomo Takahashi, said that they would create something spectacular next time because the land they used to build Disneyland was from the Japanese national sea.²⁵⁷ He died in 2000 before TDS opened, but as his word promised, OLC achieved the completely new type of the theme park especially designed for Japanese. As we have looked above, TDL is a Japanization of the original American Disneylands. However, TDS is the very first one in the world, and all attractions but one were developed only for TDS.²⁵⁸ Namely, all the Japanization of the American culture from the U.S. occupation to TDL is compiled into TDS. OLC had an earnest wish to develop by themselves without depending on WDC this time. It had to be the place where visitors can have a different experience from TDL.²⁵⁹ The theme of TDS is “sea” against “land” of TDL. OLC liked the idea of the sea because it would be a familiar theme for the Japanese considering Japan’s location as an island.²⁶⁰ The concept of the second park is to create what pleases the Japanese.²⁶¹ OLC and WDC had many arguments due to the cultural difference between Japan and the United States. To give an example, they argued over the icon of TDS. WDC suggested a “lighthouse.” To the Americans, it is a symbol of a guardian angel of adventure. On the other hand, it is an image of

sorrow to the Japanese. Because Japan is an island nation, sea is always the place for a departure from homeland. Thus, a lighthouse could not be an icon of TDS because it had to be something jovial that attracts children and family.²⁶²

One of the most distinctive features of TDS is its target audience. It is often heard that TDS is a theme park for adults compared to TDL. The target is extended to more adults and the elderly, facing the aging society of Japan. TDL was best matched with the demands of the family entertainment of the late nineteenth century in Japan, but what is needed today is a place where the elderly can also enjoy. TDS is the world's first theme park for the elderly.²⁶³ The biggest difference from TDS is its serving alcohol. In order to attract its target audience, TDS employs diverse strategies. Other than alcohol, there is more live entertainment in TDS than TDL, and also guests do not see as many characters at TDS as in TDL.²⁶⁴ TDS provides a more luxurious time than TDL, which is probably influenced by the Park design that almost 20 percent of the Park is water. People feel calm on the shore.²⁶⁵ At TDS, people do not have to ride attractions; they can just have a relaxing experience on the seaside. The second park corresponds to the period in which people need to be healed or relaxed. Furthermore, there is an effort to prevent the elderly from getting tired. Some attractions function as transporting vehicles, and there are benches everywhere.²⁶⁶ Another different attempt is three types of guided tours, and one of them is an experience-style tour.²⁶⁷ TDS is a theme park carefully designed for the Japanese. Japan learned many things from constructing TDL by domesticating the American cultural artifact. Now at TDS, Japan has evolved into the next stage of creating the more original theme park culture produced in Japan

based on the experience at TDL.

In Japan, for example, visitors can have a wedding in the hotels of TDL and TDS though they cannot do this in front of the Cinderella Castle as in Los Angeles. Yet, there is a possibility that people will be able to do this in the near future. OLC calls TDL and TDS and the area around them “Tokyo Disney Resort” and they aim at completing it as “Destination Resort” as WDW in Florida. “Destination Resort” means the resort place as a final destination. Visitors do not have to go outside because it is their destination. They can get everything they want there. In order to embody the plan, the resort strategy section became independent in 2002 and OLC tries to offer the experiences of relaxation and healing.²⁶⁸ It matches with today’s Japanese relaxation boom. This is one of the new services. OLC is expanding their comprehensive entertainment facilities as a name of “Tokyo Disney Resort” including TDL and TDS. Raz shows the cultural flow which best explains the process of recontextualization of the American Disneylands at TDL: Jungle Cruise is the most American which stands for the “imported-modified model”; Cinderella Castle Mystery Tour is unique to TDL which illustrates “Disney made in Japan”; and Meet the World is an extreme case of Japanization which shows “‘Japan’ inside Disneyland.”²⁶⁹ TDS and Tokyo Disney Resort are similar to the Mystery Tour type – “Disney made in Japan.” Japan imported Disneyland from the United States, and now it has been evolving into the Japanese own unique culture.

CONCLUSION

U.S. occupation policy in postwar Japan controlled information and impacted the thoughts of the Japanese. The occupation period was not the first time to be influenced by the United States. In 1853, one hundred years before the end of WWII, Commodore Perry visited Japan which was under closed-door policy and urged to open the port for commerce. When Japan reluctantly decided to agree to end the isolation policy, the Japanese soon realized that Japan was long behind the times because of its isolation. The Japanese people were very interested in the American technology, and they were eager to learn and become a modern nation like the United States. Since then, the Japanese have always been influenced by the American culture.

When Japan lost WWII in 1945, it was placed under the U.S. occupation. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) operated a strict civil censorship on all the possible communication media and controlled the Japanese thoughts to achieve its goals of democratization and demilitarization of Japan. However, since Japan has been used to internalize imported cultural products to create a unique Japanese identity and culture, it positively accepted the situation under the occupation and recontextualized the American cultural influence as it did when Commodore Perry came. As a result, Japan succeeded in becoming one of the biggest economic powers in the world.

In my thesis, I have analyzed the three stages of the localization of the American culture: First, hegemonic operation of the U.S. occupation policy in Japan; secondly, Japanese interpretation of the American culture; and finally,

creation of the unique Japanese identity and culture in the process of domesticating the American culture. As discussed earlier, these three stages are well shown in Raz's gradient cultural flow of three attractions at Tokyo Disneyland (TDL): Jungle Cruise as the "imported-modified model"; Cinderella Castle Mystery Tour as "Disney made in Japan"; and Meet the World as "Japan' inside Disneyland."²⁷⁰ There are many modifications at TDL according to the Japanese interpretation of the American culture. Tokyo DisneySea (TDS) opened in 2001, which is the first theme park dealing with the theme of sea in the world, and the target audience is rather adults than children so alcohol is served at TDS. TDL has been arranged to fulfill the cultural demands of the Japanese of the 1980s, and it makes TDL unique and different from other Disneylands in the United States, and accordingly, very successful. In a larger sense, TDS is a compilation of all the knowledge that Oriental Land Co., has accumulated since first introducing Disneyland in Japan in 1983. It is actually not just a compilation, but it is a Japanese cultural artifact which is produced in the process of the Japanization of American Disneyland. Thus, examination of how Disneyland in Japan has been evolving from TDL to TDS gives a good clue to how to recontextualize a foreign culture while maintaining the Japanese identity and reflecting the demands of the Japanese society. For example, TDS is a reflection of the aging society and relaxation boom of Japan today.

Although there are many studies on Disneyland in the United States, there are few on TDL in English because of the language problem and also because of the common belief that the basic structure of Disneyland is the same in TDL because TDL is a copy of the original, as Raz points out.²⁷¹ Even in Japan,

most of the studies on TDL are about its management skills, such as employee education, and mostly about consumerism in cultural studies point of view. As I have shown in this thesis, the U.S. occupation policy influenced the mindset of the Japanese and this is profoundly related to the amazing popularity of TDL, but I have never seen any studies that connect U.S. occupation and TDL yet.

Therefore, I would like to develop this theme in my future research. I will start with investigating the following five points: the influence of the U.S. Cold War cultural policy and propaganda on the Japanese imagination towards the American culture; global manifestation of American culture in other countries; other deliberate policies of U.S. occupation which impacted the Japanese in forming their thoughts and identity; other representations which show the Japanese interpretation of the American culture in the postwar era; finally, other cultural phenomena of the new generation today which contribute the large numbers of visitors at TDL and TDS, and its connection with the U.S. occupation period. By clarifying these, I would like to narrow down my research theme, and contribute to the future studies on Tokyo Disney Resort as an example of Japanization of American culture.

NOTES

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- ²⁷ Eto, *Censorship*, 56, 59, 253-54.
- ²⁸ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 295.
- ²⁹ Eto, *Censorship*, 152; East Asian Studies Documents, "Potsdam Declaration, Article 10," UCLA Asia Institute, <http://www.isop.ucla.edu/eas/documents/potsdam.htm> (accessed January 20, 2005).
- ³⁰ Eto, *Censorship*, 254.
- ³¹ Ibid., 259.
- ³² Hosaka, *Dissolution*, 76-77.
- ³³ Ibid., 236.
- ³⁴ Ibid., 96-97.
- ³⁵ Ibid., 21.
- ³⁶ Sakurai, *Spell*, 14; Furuta, *Broadcasting*, 5.
- ³⁷ Sakurai, *Spell*, 14.
- ³⁸ Furuta, *Broadcasting*, 93.
- ³⁹ Sakurai, *Spell*, 50; Hosaka, *Dissolution*, 30.

- ⁴⁰ Sakurai, *Spell*, 14, 56.
- ⁴¹ Hosaka, *Dissolution*, 20.
- ⁴² Sakurai, *Spell*, 15.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, 17; Hosaka, *Dissolution*, 48.
- ⁴⁴ Hosaka, *Dissolution*, 129; The modern version of the translation of *Kyōiku Chokugo* (The Imperial Rescript on Education) is as follows: "I, the Emperor, think that my ancestors and their religion founded my nation a very long time ago. With its development a profound and steady morality was established. The fact that my subjects show their loyalty to me and show filial love to their parents in their millions of hearts all in unison, thus accumulating virtue generation after generation is indeed the pride of my nation, and is a profound idea and the basis of our education. You, my subjects form full personalities by showing filial love to your parents, by making good terms with your brothers and sisters, by being intimate with your friends, by making couples who love each other, by trusting your friends, by reflecting upon yourselves, by conveying a spirit of philanthropy to other people and by studying to acquire knowledge and wisdom. Thus, please obey always the constitution and other laws of my nation in your profession in order to spread the common good in my nation. If an emergency may happen, please do your best for Our nation in order to support the eternal fate and future of my nation. In this way, you are my good and faithful subjects, and you come to appreciate good social customs inherited from your ancestors. The way of doing this is a good lesson inherited from my ancestors and religion which you subjects should observe well together with your offspring. These ideas hold true for both the present and the past, and may be propagated in this nation as well as in the other countries. I would like to understand all of this with you, Our subjects, and hope sincerely that all the mentioned virtues will be carried out in harmony by all of you subjects." A Modern History of Japan, "The Imperial Rescript on Education," http://www.oxfordjapan.com/documents/imperial_rescript.html (accessed March 10, 2005).
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- ⁵⁷ MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 283.
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- ⁶⁹ Ibid., 236-37.
- ⁷⁰ Sakurai, *Spell*, 36-37, 179.
- ⁷¹ Hosaka, *Dissolution*, 39.
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- ¹⁹⁹ Ibid.
- ²⁰⁰ Ibid., 68.
- ²⁰¹ Nemoto, *Multi*, 29-33.
- ²⁰² Notoji, *Sousa*, 224.
- ²⁰³ Raz, *Black Ship*, 6.
- ²⁰⁴ Brannen, *Mickey*, 217.
- ²⁰⁵ Raz, *Black Ship*, 187.
- ²⁰⁶ Kagami, *Imagination*, 66.
- ²⁰⁷ Notoji, *Sacred*, 68-69.
- ²⁰⁸ Gottdiener, *Theming*, 24.
- ²⁰⁹ Notoji, *Sacred*, 85.
- ²¹⁰ Brannen, *Mickey*, 219.
- ²¹¹ Ibid., 218.
- ²¹² Notoji, *Sousa*, 225.
- ²¹³ Brannen, *Mickey*, 225.
- ²¹⁴ Ibid., 226.
- ²¹⁵ Ibid., 221, note 11 in 232.
- ²¹⁶ Leo Marx, *The Machine in the Garden* (1964; reprint, New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 27.
- ²¹⁷ Raz, *Black Ship*, 179.
- ²¹⁸ Ibid., 120.
- ²¹⁹ Ibid., 64-65.
- ²²⁰ Ibid., 179.
- ²²¹ Ibid., 176.
- ²²² Brannen, *Mickey*, 225; Raz, *Black Ship*, 63.
- ²²³ Brannen, *Mickey*, 225.
- ²²⁴ Kagami, *Imagination*, 77.
- ²²⁵ Raz, *Black Ship*, 36-38.
- ²²⁶ Brannen, *Mickey*, 222.
- ²²⁷ Raz, *Black Ship*, 46-47.
- ²²⁸ Ibid., 51-52; Brannen, *Mickey*, 227.
- ²²⁹ Brannen, *Mickey*, 227.
- ²³⁰ Raz, *Black Ship*, 54.
- ²³¹ Ibid., 58.
- ²³² Ibid., 200.

- 233 Notoji, *Sousa*, 223.
 234 Raz, *Black Ship*, 160.
 235 Ito, *Secret*, 257.
 236 Kagami, *Imagination*, 72, 84.
 237 Brannen, *Mickey*, 230.
 238 Ito, *Secret*, 271-72.
 239 Brannen, *Mickey*, 228.
 240 Raz, *Black Ship*, 86-87.
 241 Ibid., 38.
 242 Ibid., 80, 114-15.
 243 Ito, *Secret*, 71; Raz, *Black Ship*, 116.
 244 Kagami, *Imagination*, 65, 68.
 245 Baudrillard, *Consumer*, 33.
 246 George Ritzer, *The McDonaldization of Society* (California: Pine Forge Press, 2000), 126, 129.
 247 Baudrillard, *Consumer*, 161.
 248 Ritzer, *McDonaldization*, 88-89.
 249 Ibid., 90.
 250 Raz, *Black Ship*, 104.
 251 Ibid., 104.
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 257 Kagami, *Imagination*, 17.
 258 Ibid., 142.
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 260 Ibid., 109.
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 263 Yamada, *Mechanism*, 165.
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