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This is to certify that the
thesis entitled

USING THE HEALTH BELIEF MODEL (HBM) TO
UNDERSTAND THE BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES OF
ONTARIO BEEF PRODUCERS: THE CANADIAN BOVINE
SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) SITUATION

presented by
Michelle Marie Ruth McMullen

has been accepted towards fulﬁllment
of the requirements for the

MS. degree in Agricultural and Extension
Education

r Major Professor’s Signature

 

May 6, 2005
Date

MSU is an Afﬁrmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution

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USING THE HEALTH BELIEF MODEL (HBM) TO UNDERSTAND THE BELIEFS
AND ATTITUDES OF ONTARIO BEEF PRODUCERS: THE CANADIAN BOVINE
SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) SITUATION

By

Michelle Marie Ruth McMullen

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial ﬁJlﬁllment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Education and Communication Systems

2005

ABSTRACT

USING THE HEALTH BELIEF MODEL (HBM) TO UNDERSTAND THE BELIEFS
AND ATTITUDES OF ONTARIO BEEF PRODUCERS: THE CANADIAN BOVINE
SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) SITUATION

By

Michelle Marie Ruth McMullen

This study uses the Health Belief Model (HBM) as a framework to determine the
attitudes and beliefs of Ontario beef producers concerning the bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE) situation in Canada and to determine preferred producer sources
for agricultural information. Data from beef producers across four counties in Ontario
were analyzed using a coding scheme based on the HBM and knowledge categories.
Thought units (n=4974) gathered from questions asked in the four focus groups (n=28)
uncover beliefs and attitudes about severity, susceptibility, barriers, beneﬁts, and self-
efﬁcacy as well as knowledge concerning BSE, media preferences, behavior, and stigma.

Findings showed that participants perceive the BSE issue as very serious, but do
not feel that their own cattle are susceptible to BSE. Many said that they believed that
the BSE government protocols did reduce the risk of BSE and had the ability to follow
BSE protocols, but would weigh all options before following the recommended
behaviors. In addition, perceived barriers to complying with BSE protocols included a
lack of resources and the potential negative impact a BSE-positive animal would have on
the industry. Perceived benefits included increased awareness of consumers about food
safety, the availability of a safer beef product, and identiﬁcation of new export markets.

Implications for message design are discussed.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated
to my parents, Jim and Marie-Paule,
whose love, support, and encouragement
helped me achieve my academic dreams.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, my deepest thanks go to my parents, Jim and Marie-Paule.
Without your love, support, and words of encouragement, none of this would be possible.
Thank you for teaching me I can achieve my dreams through hard work and
determination. A special thanks to my sister, Melanie and her family, for everything they
have done for me along the way. To my little brothers, Martin and Mark, thanks for
always providing me with a welcomed distraction from university life — I loved hearing
about your hockey games, and guitar playing.

A special thanks goes to my ‘University of Guelph Dad,’ Dr. Rickey Yada, for
encouraging me to pursue a graduate degree and being there for me every step of the way
throughout this journey.

A big thank you goes to my major professor, Dr. Luke Reese, for his
encouragement, support, and guidance. I also would like to express my appreciation to
Dr. Kami Silk, for her advice and help over the past two years. To Dr. Kirk Heinze,
thank you for making me realize that Michigan State University (MSU) was the right
place for me and for your advice, guidance and support.

A big thank you to my ‘Guelph Girls,’ Michelle Luckhardt, Laura McConnack,
Stephanie Flanagan, Rachael Kay, and Ann McCordick for encouraging me to take this
journey and always brightening my spirits when I needed it the most!

To Charlene Whattam, thank you for all your help with the coding of all my focus

group data - I could not have ﬁnished this without you!

iv

To Courtney Stewart, thank you for making my decision to come to Michigan
State University easy. Your friendship and advice helped me get through the past two
years.

Thank you to my MSU friends, Courtnay McFeters, Mike Hogberg, Lourdes
Martinez, David Mather, Takia Lowery, Katie Klein, Cassie Bauer and Val Fournier. I
appreciate you always being there for me and making my MSU experience so enjoyable.

I’d also like to thank Laura Probyn, Robin Millsap, Sara Long, Barb Lehman,
Michelle Lavra, and F rancie Todd for their friendship, advice and their willingness to
always make time to listen to my crazy ideas or stories. A special thanks to Tim Polack
for his technical expertise.

To Mr. John Hargreaves, my grade 6/7/8 teacher at Westmeath Public School,
thank you for instilling in me with a love of learning. You made me realize that hard
work is the key to success.

To my Uncle Andre (AKA Bebe), Aunt Monica, Richard and Camille, thank you
for taking me in during my ﬁnal semester at MSU. Your support and love helped me
make it through the thesis writing process.

To Chara Coulter from the Ontario Cattlemen’s Association (OCA), thanks for all
your help with this project. A big thank you to the OCA county advisors from Grey,
Lanark, Renfrew, and Wellington counties for helping me recruit participants for this
study.

Last, but not least, thank you to the producers who participated in this study. I
appreciate you taking time out of your busy schedule to share your thoughts about this

sensitive issue.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER ONE 1
INTRODUCTION 1
What is Risk? .................................................................................................................. 3
BSE and Risk Communication ................................................................................... 3
Purpose of the Study ....................................................................................................... 4
Study Objectives. ........................................................................................................ 5
Research Questions ..................................................................................................... 5
Study Limitations ............................................................................................................ 6
CHAPTER TWO _ 8
LITERATURE REVIEW 8
What is Risk Communication? ....................................................................................... 8
The Canadian Beef Cattle Industry - An Overview ...................................................... 10
Importance of Trade to the Canadian Beef Industry ................................................. 12
What is BSE? ................................................................................................................ l3
Symptoms of BSE ..................................................................................................... 15
BSE risk to human health. ........................................................................................ 15
Background on the Canadian BSE situation ................................................................. 17
The First BSE-Positive Cow in Canada. ................................................................... 17
Canada’s Response to First BSE-positive Animal .................................................... 18
Canadian Publics’ Responses to BSE. ...................................................................... 19
Trade Restrictions. ......................... 19
Conﬁrmed BSE Case in Washington State ............................................................... 20
Second Conﬁrmed Case of BSE in Canada. ............................................................. 20
Third Conﬁrmed BSE Case. ..................................................................................... 21
Canada as Minimal Risk Country. ............................................................................ 21
Acts and Regulations Governing BSE in Canada. ........................................................ 21
The Health of Animals Act. ...................................................................................... 21
The Meat Inspection Act and Regulations. ............................................................... 22
The Feed Act. ............................................................................................................ 22
The Agriculture and Agri-Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act. ............... 22
Actions taken by Canada in response to conﬁrmed BSE case ...................................... 23
Feed Ban. .................................................................................................................. 23
BSE Surveillance in Canada. .................................................................................... 24
BSE Testing. ............................................................................................................. 25
BSE Testing Methods. .............................................................................................. 26
Removal of Speciﬁed Risk Materials. ...................................................................... 27
Canadian Cattle Identiﬁcation Program .................................................................... 28
The Health Belief Model .............................................................................................. 28
Perceived Susceptibility ............................................................................................ 29
Perceived Severity. ................................................................................................... 3O
Perceived Beneﬁts. ................................................................................................... 31
Perceived Barriers. .................................................................................................... 31

vi

Self-efﬁcacy. ............................................................................................................. 32

 

 

 

 

Knowledge and Farmer Behavior. ............................................................................ 33
CHAPTER THREE 35
METHODOLOGY ' 35

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 35

Focus Groups. ........................................................................................................... 36
Participants and Procedures .......................................................................................... 37
Moderator Guide ........................................................................................................... 38
Unitization ..................................................................................................................... 39
Coding ........................................................................................................................... 39

Threat. ....................................................................................................................... 40

Behavior .................................................................................................................... 41

Media. ....................................................................................................................... 41

Knowledge. ............................................................................................................... 42

Other. ........................................................................................................................ 42

Decision Rules. ......................................................................................................... 42

Intercoder reliability .................................................................................................. 43

Chapter Summary ......................................................................................................... 43
CHAPTER FOUR 44
FINDINGS 44

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 44

Demographic and Mediagraphic Results ...................................................................... 44

Preferred Sources of Agricultural Information. ............................................................ 48

Qualitative Data ............................................................................................................ 50

Health Belief Model Constructs .................................................................................... 51

Perceived Susceptibility. ........................................................................................... 51

Perceived Severity. ................................................................................................... 54

Perceived Beneﬁts. ................................................................................................... 56

Perceived Barriers. .................................................................................................... 58

Response-Efﬁcacy. ................................................................................................... 59

Self-Efﬁcacy. ............................................................................................................ 60

Knowledge Constructs .................................................................................................. 61

Science of BSE. ........................................................................................................ 61

Government Regulations. ......................................................................................... 62

Food Chain. ............................................................................................................... 62

Preferred Sources for Agricultural Information ............................................................ 63

Media accuracy/inaccuracy ....................................................................................... 63

Preferred Sources. ..................................................................................................... 64

Preferred Style. ......................................................................................................... 65

Behavior ........................................................................................................................ 66

Stigma ........................................................................................................................... 67

Summary ....................................................................................................................... 68

vii

CHAPTER FIVE 69

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 69
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 69
Objective One Conclusions ........................................................................................... 70

Perceived Susceptibility ............................................................................................ 7O
Perceived Severity. ................................................................................................... 7O
Perceived Beneﬁts. ................................................................................................... 71
Perceived Barriers. .................................................................................................... 72
Response-Efﬁcacy. ................................................................................................... 72
Self-Efﬁcacy. ............................................................................................................ 72
Knowledge. ............................................................................................................... 73
Behavior. ................................................................................................................... 73
Stigma. ...................................................................................................................... 74
Objective Two Conclusions .......................................................................................... 74
Implications for Future Communications Efforts ......................................................... 76
Implications for Beef Producers Disseminating Information to Media and Consumers
....................................................................................................................................... 80
Future Research ............................................................................................................ 82
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 82

APPENDIX A 84

APPENDIX B - 85

APPENDIX C 86

APPENDIX D 88

APPENDIX E 90

APPENDIX F - 94

APPENDIX G 95

BIBLIOGRAPHY 98

 

viii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Participant Demographics (n=28) ....................................................................... 45
Table 2: Participant Farm Size and Income (n=28) .......................................................... 47
Table 3: Participants’ Herd Demographics ....................................................................... 48
Table 4: Preferred Agricultural Information Sources ....................................................... 50
Table 5: Distribution of Thought Units Across Constructs .............................................. 53

ix

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Canadian Beef Cattle Population July 1995, July 1997, and July 2001 ............ 11
Figure 2: The Health Belief Model. .................................................................................. 29

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, risk communication has shifted to become a focal point of the
agriculture and agri-food production system (Scherer & Juanillo, 1992). Agricultural
risks related to food safety such as pesticides and genetically modiﬁed foods (Miles &
Frewer, 2001) and recent outbreaks of foodbome illnesses including bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE), dioxin, E. coli, and salmonella are all issues that may negatively
affect consumer conﬁdence in agricultural practices (Schlundt, 2002). Society’s
dependence on agriculture makes it a unique type of business and industry. The
relationship between agriculture and society are interdependent, best described as a two-
way street. In one direction, society is dependent on the agricultural community for food
production. While in the opposite direction, the agricultural community has become
more dependent on public perceptions, which, in turn, shape policy development and
control agricultural practices (Wimberley, 2002). Food safety is becoming an
increasingly important part of public health initiatives, which strengthens its link to
agriculture and other aspects of the food production chain from the primary producer to
the consumer (Schlundt, 2002).

Agricultural producers have become more susceptible to social risks in recent
years. Research in agriculture is needed to reduce the social risks associated with
production practices and to heighten or maintain agricultural sustainability for both the
farming and non-farming publics (Wimberley, 2002). Thus, it is important that risk
communication efforts also target primary producers. Primary producers are ﬁrst in the

food production chain, from ﬁeld to fork. BSE is a one of the social risks that is currently

facing Canadian beef and dairy producers. Other social risks facing the farming
community include: farm injuries and fatalities (Arcury, Quandt, 1998; Freeman,
Schwab, & Pollard, 2003), exposure to pesticides (Martinez, Gratton, Coggin, Rene, &
Walker, 2004; McDufﬁe, Pahwa, Spinelli, McLaughlin, Fincham, Robson, et al., 2002),
and access to appropriate health care (Martinez-Brawley & Blundell, 1991). Therefore,
theoretically driven formative evaluations about farmers’ attitudes about BSE are needed
to increase the effectiveness of risk communication efforts with farmers (W itte et al.,
1993).

One major issue facing the Canadian livestock industry, especially the beef and
dairy sectors, is the discovery of BSE in Canada. BSE is a rare fatal neurological disease
in cattle, ﬁrst diagnosed in the United Kingdom (U.K.) in 1986 (Animal Health Risk
Analysis (AHRA), 2002; Environmental Literacy Council (ELC), 2004; World Health
Organization (WHO), 2002a). Canada’s ﬁrst homegrown BSE case was discovered in
May 2003 on an Albertan farm. In December 2003, BSE was conﬁrmed in a cow in the
state of Washington, and two additional Canadian cattle were identiﬁed as BSE-positive
in January 2005. BSE is characterized by its long incubation period of approximately 5
to 6 years, which ends in the death of the animal. Currently there are no tests on live
animals to conﬁrm infection or treatment (WHO, 2002a).

BSE was recognized as a societal risk in 1996, during the BSE epidemic in the
U.K. During the epidemic in the U.K., scientists revealed a probable link between BSE
and the variant Cruetzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) in humans, making BSE a possible
threat to public health. Research has linked vCJD in humans to eating meat contaminated

by BSE (WHO, 2002b), which has implications for communicating about risks.

What is Risk?

‘Risk’ is a term with multiple meanings, and the deﬁnitions differ by contexts. In
the context of health and the environment, risk incorporates two principles: (3) the
probable risk situation has the potential for undesirable consequences, and (b) there is
uncertainty regarding the potential negative consequences. In other words, ‘risk’ in these
contexts embodies both the probability and the characteristics of the risk occurring
(Jardine & Hrudey, 1997). Social scientists also argue that risk is a social construct that
means different things to different individuals. The social context of risk issues should
be incorporated into all aspects of risk analysis (Lundgren & McMakin, 1998), and
should be considered in risk communication efforts.

BSE and Risk Communication. Risk communication is a relatively new area of
study, which limits the amount of empirical research available to risk communicators
(Lundgren & McMakin, 1998). Risk communication efforts in agriculture are based on
the transfer of information between regulators, stakeholders, and interested groups such
as the general public and primary producers (Schlundt, 2002). The National Research
Council (NRC) (1989) deﬁned ‘risk communication’ as:

“an interactive process of exchange of information and opinion among
individuals, groups, and institutions. It involves multiple messages about the nature of
the risk and other messages, not strictly about risk, that express concerns, opinions, or
reactions to risk messages or to the legal and institutional arrangements for risk
management” (p. 21).

Communicating uncertainty, especially in the food safety arena, has been debated

extensively in recent years. For example, BSE is a relatively new disease, and there is

much uncertainty concerning the science of BSE and other transmissible spongiform
encephalopathies. The threat to humans from BSE is largely unknown (WHO, 2002a).
Miles and Frewer (2001) state that risk regulators need to ensure that risk
communication efforts regarding food-related issues are relevant and salient to the
general public, by identifying and focusing on their concerns. Furthermore, Miles and
Frewer (2001) argue that the effectiveness of risk communication efforts must be

evaluated to determine the impact of messages on the salient concerns of the public.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to improve risk communication, paying particular
attention to making information-based messages accessible and understandable to
producers. Theoretically driven research will determine the factors that are important to
Ontario beef producers when assessing risks associated with BSE.

Food quality and safety are the responsibility of all components of the food
production chain, from production to consumption (NRC, 1998). This study will focus
on enhancing communication with the farming community and will help ensure high
quality, safe products reach consumers and maintain or improve animal health. Research
to guide health message design has been conducted to determine consumers’ beliefs and
attitudes about food safety such as risks and beneﬁts associated with BSE (Weitkunat et
al., 2003) and genetically modiﬁed foods (Silk, Parrott, & Dillow, 2003).

Little message design research has been conducted with beef producers regarding
the risks associated with BSE, and effective communication campaign development
targeted at producers is non-existent. Thus, this study, using the HBM framework, will

identify what inﬂuences farmers’ decision-making about BSE. Identiﬁcation of the HBM

constructs that inﬂuence decision-making will lead to improvements in risk message
design for the agricultural community. Improved message design will in turn, increase
the likelihood of accurate messages effectively reaching Ontario beef producers and may
result in the adoption of desired behavior. Furthermore, the ﬁndings from this study may
be beneﬁcial to guiding the development of appropriate messages in response to other
agricultural-based issues.

Study Objectives. The objectives of this study are:

1) To investigate and assess Ontario beef producers’ attitudes toward risk, using

the HBM as a framework.

2) To identify the information sources used by Ontario beef producers.

To gain insights concerning the HBM components that most influence message
appropriateness when communicating about risk issues, it is critical to understand the
attitudes, beliefs, and opinions of beef farmers to help determine communication
strategies for effective risk communication with Ontario farmers about BSE. Attitudes
are deﬁned as “positive or negative evaluations of a person, object, or event” (Murray-
Johnson & Witte, 2003, p. 485). Beliefs are deﬁned as “the thoughts about a person,
object, or event that are either true or false” (Murray-Johnson & Witte, 2003, p. 486).

Research Questions. This study will answer the following research questions:

1) What do Ontario beef producers report as their preferred sources for

agricultural information? (RQ 1)
2) What attitudes do Ontario beef producers have regarding their susceptibility or

vulnerability to BSE? (RQ 2)

3) What attitudes do Ontario beef producers have toward the perceived severity
of the BSE issue in Canada? (RQ3)

4) What do Ontario beef producers report as beneﬁts to discovering BSE in
Canada and following BSE protocols established by the Canadian
government? (RQ 4)

5) What do Ontario beef producers report as barriers to following BSE protocols
established by the Canadian Government? (RQ 5)

6) What attitudes do Ontario beef producers have toward the effectiveness
(response-efﬁcacy) of the BSE protocols established by the Canadian
government? (RQ 6)

7) What attitudes do Ontario beef producers report as their ability (self-efﬁcacy)
to comply with BSE protocols established by the Canadian government?

(RQ 7)
Outcomes of this study will help communicators develop effective risk messages
for BSE to enable farmers make informed decisions about BSE based upon their
knowledge and perceptions of the risk. Results from this study will also provide baseline

data for further research.

Study Limitations

This study will be geographically limited to beef producers in Grey, Lanark,
Renfrew, and Wellington counties in Ontario. Therefore, the data and results produced
cannot be generalized to farmers across Ontario or Canada. The conclusions from this

study will be used to provide a baseline understanding of the ways that farmers assess

risk. Baseline data from this study could be used to conduct survey research over broader

geographic areas.

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

What is Risk Communication?

Risk communication is deﬁned by Trautrnan (2001) as “a complex undertaking
involving multiple participants, perspectives, and messages” (p. 1130). Risk analysis is
typically more scientiﬁc in nature and technical experts such as scientists can
successfully interpret the issues (Palenchar & Heath, 2002). Risk communication
addresses technical or scientiﬁc evaluations of risks, the perceptions of the non-scientiﬁc
or lay public, and recommended behaviors to reduce or eliminate the risk and society’s
tolerance of the risk (Palenchar & Heath, 2002). Palenchar and Heath (2002) deﬁne risk
communication strategies as addressing actual risks, society’s perception of risks, and the
content of the society’s thoughts and comments. Risk analysis has three components: risk
assessment, risk management and risk communication. Typically, risk analysis is seen as
a linear progression moving from risk assessment to risk management to risk
communication. Risk communication appears he the ﬁnal component, but the most
effective risk communication efforts occur through the risk analysis process of evaluating
and managing risks and involving all stakeholders in the process (Trautman, 2001).

According the Ofﬁce International des Epizooties (OIE), World Health
Organization (WHO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (2001) risk
communication is a vital aspect of risk analysis because “safety is a negotiation about the

acceptability of risks by those who are the bearers of the risks” (p.15) and continue to

deﬁne risk communication as the “process by which this acceptance is established and
maintained” (p.15).

Traditionally, risk communication has been driven by experts’ perceptions of
public information needs. Speciﬁcally, in some cases experts seem to believe that the
public is unable to understand uncertainty and that providing them with the facts or
scientiﬁc information will have a negative impact on society’s perception of a risk and
attitudes related to the risk (Frewer et al., 2002).

Risk communication efforts cannot be effective without considering the emotions,
beliefs, and political stance of the target audience (Lundgren & McMakin, 1998).
Furthermore, perceptions of risks such as BSE, can differ considerably depending on the
stakeholder group, meaning that risk communication efforts should be based on a solid
understanding of the key aspects of the risk that are of greatest concern to the target
audience, through stakeholder involvement and consultation (OIE, WHO, & F A0, 2001).

Uncertainty is the deﬁning characteristic of most health scares, with the degree of
the risk varying depending on the length at which the uncertainty of the health risk lasts
(Anand, 1998). For example, the BSE issue illustrates the problems and challenges of
decision making and developing appropriate regulations under the condition of
uncertainty. A scientiﬁc link has been established between BSE and the new variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD), also known as the human form of BSE, but still little is
known about the science of this very recent public health issue. The medical community
ﬁrst classiﬁed the BSE issue as a veterinary issue, while veterinarians believed that it was

a government and public health issue (Ratzen, 1998). BSE has been examined and

discussed beyond the context of agriculture. The BSE issue has transformed into a social
and public health issue with increases in the number of cases of vCJD (Anand, 1998).
Scientists have found that the BSE agent (abnormal prion protein) has caused
similar diseases in other animals such as domestic cats and exotic animals, with
transmission most likely from the consumption of BSE-contaminated feeds. The spread
of spongiform encephalopathies across species has heightened concerns about possible
threat to human health (Harpold, Levy, & Savage, 1998). However, without complete
scientiﬁc knowledge about the biology of BSE and vCJD, it is not possible to accurately
predict the probability of an individual becoming exposed and infected (Harvard Center
for Risk Analysis (HCRA), 2003). It is necessary for risk communication efforts to be
theoretically grounded and appropriate for the target audience to ensure messages reach
the receivers and contain accurate information, including any uncertainties about the risk

issue.

The Canadian Beef Cattle Industry - An Overview

The Canadian agricultural and agri-food industry, valued at $130 billion (CDN) is
a key player in the economy, ranking second only to the manufacturing sector. One in
seven Canadian jobs are found in the agriculture and agri-food sector (Animal Health
Risk Analysis (AHRA), 2002).

In 2002, the beef industry accounted for more than $7.57 billion in farm cash
receipts (Canadian Beef Export Federation (CBEF), 2003), with over 3.4 million head of
cattle processed by Canadian beef and veal packers. Currently, Canada exports
approximately 50 percent of the cattle it produces, to key markets in the United States

(U .S.), Mexico and Asia. One million head of live cattle have been exported to the US.

10

annually (AHRA, 2002). Seventy-seven percent of exported Canadian beef was sent to
the US. Since 1970, total beef production in Canada has increased 78 percent to a level
of 1.51 million tons (AHRA, 2002).

The Canadian beef industry typically follows an 11-year grth cycle, which is
followed by contraction from market supply-and—demand pressures. Canada’s cattle
population has remained stable over recent years. In July 2001, 14.7 million cattle were
raised compared to 14.6 million cattle in July 1995 and 14.9 million in July 1997. The
Canadian beef production is concentrated in Western Canada, with Alberta and

Saskatchewan having the largest beef population (AHRA, 2002).

 

14.95 7 14.9
14.9 a * ‘——-1
14.85 J
14.8 A
14.75 4
14.7 .
“-65 i 14.6
14.6 ~ .___,
14.55 ~
14.5 -
14.45

14.7

 

Beef Cattle Population (Mllllons)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

July-95 July-97 July-01
Year

 

 

 

Figure 1: Canadian Beef Cattle Population July 1995, July 1997, and July 2001

In January 2003, the Canadian population of beef breeding cows and heifers was
5.27 million. Beef cattle represent 75 percent of Canada’s cattle population and for the
most part are not fed meat-and—bone (MBM); high producing dairy cattle are typically fed
protein supplements containing MBM (AHRA, 2002). Canada’s entire beef herd is based

upon Bos taurus animals, which includes breeds such as Herefords, Angus, Charolais,

ll

Simmental, and Limousin. Bos indicus cattle such as Brahna and Cebu are not part of the
Canadian beef herd (CBEF, 2003).

Importance of Trade to the Canadian Beef Industry. Before the trade restrictions
placed on Canadian beef, Canada was the third largest exporter of beef in the world. In
2001, Canada held approximately 15 percent of the world beef market. Following the
ban, Canada’s exports dropped to zero. (Statistics Canada, 2003)

Due to restructuring in the Canadian/US. market, trade has increased in both
directions, resulting in Canada developing a strong trade surplus of cattle and beef.
Canada’s export volume of beef and veal to Asia and Mexico increased 5 percent in 2001
and an additional 10 percent in 2002, meaning that approximately 70 percent of cattle and
beef production were exported. Roughly 72 percent of Canadian beef products are
shipped to the US. market (CBEF, 2003).

Canada is an important importing and exporting country for beef products and
live cattle. In 2002, Canada exported approximately $4 billion and imported
approximately $1 billion in beef products and livestock, respectively (Agriculture and
Agri-Food Canada, 2004). Canada’s exporting success has relied predominately on the
US. market. The US. is Canada’s top trading partner. The majority (99.6 percent) of
Canada’s livestock exports went to the US. in 2002 (Statistics Canada, 2003).

The continued population growth of beef cattle in Canada and the moderate
growth potential in the Canadian market for beef products, makes trade a very important
consideration, which can only be continued through market growth for beef products.
Canada has identiﬁed such opportunities in Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Taiwan, Hong

Kong, China, South East Asia, and the US. (CBEF, 2003).

12

Beef Slaughter in Canada. Ninety-ﬁve percent of Canadian beef slaughter
happens in federally inspected plants, which are the only mandated operators permitted to
transport meat products across provincial and international borders. More than 70
percent of Canadian beef slaughter in federally regulated plants occurs in Alberta.
Approximately, 2.6 million pounds of Canadian beef was processed from federally
inspected processing plants in 2002. The other 5 percent of animal slaughtering occurs in
provincially inspected plants. Alberta, Ontario and Quebec require that all cattle be
inspected before slaughter. In addition, Canada exported approximately 1.1 million
young beef cattle and 174,000 cull cows and bulls to the US in 2000 for slaughter
(AHRA, 2002).

Approximately 85 percent of cattle are slaughtered at a young age, under the age
of 30 months, meaning that it is less likely that the cattle will develop BSE, even if BSE

is present in Canada (AHRA, 2002).

What is BSE?

BSE is a fatal neurological disease in cattle that was ﬁrst diagnosed in the UK in
1986. BSE is part of a group of slowly progressive neurodegenerative disorders that are
classiﬁed as transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) (AHRA, 2002;
Environmental Literacy Council (ELC), 2004; Woodgate, 1996). Within herds, BSE is
not contagious and cannot spread from animal to animal. Isolated cases cannot ignite an
epidemic if infected cattle are destroyed and the carcass of the infected animal is not
rendered for use in feed (WHO, 2002a).

TSE are fatal diseases, with no method of diagnosis before death and no known

treatment. TSE are slowly developing diseases, where the infective agent appears to

13

move from peripheral tissues to the central nervous system. The TSE agent has been
located in all tissues of the body, but higher concentrations of the agent have been
identiﬁed in the brain and spinal cord areas (Dealler, 1998). Other diseases in the TSE
family include: scrapies in sheep, TME in mink, and Kuru, a TSE found in humans native
to Papua New Guinea (Woodgate, 1996).

Raiden, Sumner and Pierson (2001) reported that three cellular changes occur in
all TSE diseases. One change that occurs is the degeneration of neurons, which are
responsible for producing and sending out nerve impulses. This change explains the loss
in motor skills, which is a symptom of BSE. Another cellular level transformation is the
enlargement of astrocytes, which are the most abundant support cell found in the nervous
system. Astrocytes make exchanges between capillaries and neurons possible, which
presents antigens during immune responses and control the chemical environment of the
nervous system. The third cellular level change is the sponge-like appearance of the
brain.

There are aspects of the science of BSE and its emergence that are still unknown;
however, the theory that is most supported by the science community is the prion theory
(Ratzen, 1998). This theory suggests that BSE is caused by a structurally modiﬁed form
of the cell-membrane-associated prion protein, which has the capacity to promote
changes in additional normal prion molecules into an abnormal form. An increase in
these abnormal prion molecules in a cell interferes with normal cell function, which
contributes to the development of typical spongiform changes and eventually results in
cell death. This abnormal prion protein is resistant to heat, ultraviolet and ionizing

radiation and extensive range of common chemical disinfectants (AHRA, 2002).

14

Symptoms of BSE. BSE is very difﬁcult to diagnose because there are a number
of different symptoms and not all cattle display all symptoms linked to the disease
(Raiden, Sumner, & Pierson, 2001). BSE infected cattle can display a number of
symptoms including nervousness or aggressive behavior, abnormal posture, lack of
coordination or difﬁcult standing up from a lying position, decreased milk production,
and weigh loss accompanied with an increase in appetite. These symptoms may not be
observable to farmers and veterinarians until two to six months before the animal dies
(CFIA, 2003a).

In the early stages of this disease, infected cattle are mentally alert, but unusually
anxious and hesitant. Symptoms typical during the later stages of the disease include a
wide-base stance while standing still, drawing up of the abdomen, an elongated way of
walking, and splaying at the hind limbs when turning sharp comers. In addition, cattle
can display skin wounds, ﬁrm feces, vigorous and repetitive jerking of small muscles all
over the body, a change in the tone of the “moo”, and aimless head butting and other
frantic movements (Raiden, Sumner, & Pierson, 2001). The behavioral traits of advanced
BSE are widely recognized, meaning that only a farmer familiar with their herd may be
able to detect the early signs of BSE (Loader & Hobbs, 1996).

BSE risk to human health. There is a strong likelihood that the spread of BSE to
humans has occurred, but the link between BSE and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)
still has not been proven. The potential negative impact of this disease on animal health
and its probable transmissibility to humans is very important, as there are no known
treatments or tests to screen for TSE in humans (Dormont, 2002; Health Canada, 2003a;

Health Canada, 2004; Weitkunat et al., 2003; WHO, 2002a). Furthermore, other health

15

factors intensify the risk of BSE such as the invisibility of the disease - only aﬁer death
can a positive diagnosis of BSE and vCJD be conﬁrmed from brain tissue; the long
incubation period associated with transmissible diseases; BSE or vCJD are fatal diseases
with no known cure. Lastly, the potential spread of the disease across the global has lead
to subsequent trade restrictions with conﬁrmed BSE-positive nations, until the disease is
controlled or eradicated (Richardson, 2001; WHO, 2002b).

vCJD is a degenerative brain disease that affects the central nervous system in
humans, thought to be caused by an abnormal prion protein in the brain. Infectious
tissues include the brain, spinal cord, pituitary gland and parts of the eyes. In vCJD,
tonsil and appendix also have high infectivity (Health Canada, 2003b).

vCJD is mostly likely contracted from eating BSE infected beef products (Health
Canada, 2004; Weitkunat et al., 2003; WHO, 2002b). In order to contract vCJD, humans
must actually eat the brains of an infected cow. Due to the threat posed by BSE,
practices such as including brain and nervous system tissue in food products has been
largely discontinued (ELC, 2004). The majority of individuals diagnosed with vCJD
typically die within a year following the onset of the disease (Center for Disease Control,
2003).

The transmission of vCJD between people is not well understood and no cases of
this kind of transmission have been reported. Symptoms of vCJD included psychiatric
symptoms such as anxiety, depression, withdrawal, and behavioral changes; development
of persistent pain or odd sensations in the face or limbs; onset of motor difﬁculties,
involuntary movements and mental deterioration in later stages of the disease (ELC,

2004; Health Canada, 2004). The period between initial exposure to vCJD and the onset

16

of symptoms is thought to be 10 to 15 years, but could be longer (Harpold, Levy, &
Savage, 1998). Scientists speculate that vCJD in humans has resulted is approximately
145 deaths in the U.K. since the beginning of the BSE epidemic (ELC, 2004). In Canada,
the ﬁrst case of vCJD was conﬁrmed in August 2002. However, all evidence indicates
the individual contracting the disease in U.K. No other cases in Canada have been

conﬁrmed (Health Canada, 2004).

Background on the Canadian BSE situation

There have only been four conﬁrmed cases of BSE in Canada. The ﬁrst case was
identiﬁed in 1993 in a beef cow imported from the United Kingdom (UK), resulting in
the culling of the herd, all offspring and remaining cattle imported from the UK (AHRA,
2002). The ﬁrst domestic case of BSE in North America was conﬁrmed on May 20,
2003 (CFIA, 2004a). Two additional cows were conﬁrmed as BSE-positive in January
2005 (CFIA, 2005a, CF IA, 2005b).

The First BSE-Positive Cow in Canada. The ﬁrst BSE-positive animal was a six
to eight year old cow that was sent for slaughter in Alberta in January 2003 (OMAF,
2003). The animal came from a Saskatchewan farm and all animals from this farm were
culled during the investigation (CFIA, 2004b). The cow suffered from pneumonia and
was sent for rendering (OMAF, 2003), a process “where animal by-products are prepared
or treated for use in, or converted into fertilizers, animal food, fats or oils, other than fats
or oils used for human consumption, or where such substances are stored, packed,
marked, and shipped” (CFIA, 2003b). The cow was reported as not showing symptoms

associated with BSE (OMAF, 2003). The diagnosis of BSE in a single cow on a farm in

17

Alberta, which led to the disruption of Canada’s export markets, resulted in state of chaos
for the Canadian beef industry (Daynard, 2003).

In Ontario, the discovery of the Albertan BSE-positive case led to immediate and
direct producer losses estimated at approximately $4 million (CDN) per week, with
losses to truckers, packers, auction barn operators and other agricultural players totaling
approximately $23 million (CDN) (Daynard, 2003). This case led to trade restrictions
with the United States. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
immediately closed its borders to Canadian beef and ruminant-derived products (APHIS,
2003)

Canada ’s Response to First BSE-positive Animal. A comprehensive investigation
was conducted by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), which included trace-
back, trace-forward and feed investigations spanning four provinces. Approximately
2,000 cattle were tested, with negative results in all cases (CFIA, 2003b). The animal
was condemned at slaughter and no meat from its carcass entered the food system. The
animal’s remains were sent to a rendering plant. The rendered product revealed that
some of the remains of the infected cow were processed into poultry feed. The CFIA
identiﬁed three farms in British Columbia that had acquired the contaminated feed.
Consequently, these farms were quarantined because conclusive evidence was not
gathered to prove that ruminant animals were not inadvertently exposed to the feed
(CFIA, 2004b). More than 2,700 cattle were killed during the investigation (CFIA,
2003c). Investigations revealed that some herds where the cow resided had access to
feed concentrates and/or high energy feed blocks, which may have contained MBM prior

to the feed ban (CFIA, 2003e). In January 2003, the Canadian Government announced

18

that BSE surveillance testing would be increased to 8,000 cattle in the ﬁrst year and up to
30,000 annually in later years, which would calculate the prevalence of BSE in Canada
(CFIA, 2004c).

Canadian Publics ’ Responses to BSE. Canada is the only country worldwide
known to have an identiﬁed single case of BSE and actually observe an increase in the
consumption of beef products. In July 2003, consumption statistics indicate that
Canadians were conﬁdent in buying beef, with record sales and consumption of beef
products. The consumption rate of beef increased 62 percent in July 2003 in comparison
to July 2002 ﬁgures (Daynard, 2003).

Trade Restrictions. The conﬁrmation of one-BSE positive animal in 2003,
initially led to trade restrictions for all live ruminants, ruminant-derived meat and meat
products, and other ruminant products from Canada by more than 30 countries including
the US. and Mexico (CFIA, 2004b; OMAF, 2003). This trade restriction had a deep
economic impact on the Canadian beef industry and individual beef producers (Ontario
Agricultural Economics and Business Research and Services Committee (OAEBRSC),
2004)

In the Fall 2003, the opening of the US. border to limited imports of beef
products, temporarily strengthened beef prices and increased optimism among the
Canadian Agri-food system (OAEBRSC, 2004). Mexico also lifted restrictions on
certain beef imports. However, live cattle are still not eligible for export to the US. and
Mexico (CFIA, 2004b). In September 2003, Canada was able to ship boneless beef from
animals under the age of 30 months to the US. under a special permit (Statistics Canada,

2003). Additionally, a number of Canada’s smaller export partners, Antigua and

19

Barbuda, Barbados, Jamaica, Philippines, Russia, and Trinidad and Tobago have partially
lifted their trade bans on Canadian beef products (Statistics Canada, 2003). To re-
establish active trade, Canada is required to demonstrate a low prevalence of BSE
through progressive surveillance and BSE testing (OMAF, 2003).

Conﬁrmed BSE Case in Washington State. In December 2003, a cow in the state
of Washington was conﬁrmed as having BSE. Through a comprehensive investigation,
the animal’s origin was traced back to a farm in Alberta. The animal was born in April
1997. The CF IA conducted an investigation of the feed to identify all feeds fed to the
animal to determine if any feed containing MBM was included in the animal’s diet. The
investigation determined that MBM exposure through feed acquired prior to the feed ban
was responsible for this case (CF IA, 2004d). Following OIE guidelines, all animals born
one year before and after this case were culled. In total, 12 animals were killed and
tested for BSE. All tests came back negative (CFIA, 2004d).

Second Conﬁrmed Case of BSE in Canada. On January 2, 2005, the CF IA
conﬁrmed Canada’s second homegrown BSE-positive cow. The animal was identiﬁed
through Canada’s BSE Surveillance Program. The infected animal was born in 1996,
before the implementation of the 1997 feed ban. The CF IA suspects that the animal
contracted BSE from contaminated feed acquired before the feed ban (CFIA, 2005c).
The animal was an eight-year old dairy cow from Alberta (CF IA, 2005a).

No part of the animal entered the Canadian food supply or animal feed system.
The animal’s farm origin was identiﬁed and all cattle on the farm were quarantined. The
farm operator provided detailed records for all animals on the farm to the CF IA, which

may have contributed to a quicker investigation. The CFIA investigation will identify the

20

location of the cow’s most recent offspring and all animals on the farm that were born
within a year of the infected cow (CF IA, 2005a).

Third Confirmed BSE Case. On January 11, 2005, the CF IA announced that BSE
was found in an Alberta beef cow just under the age of seven. No part of the animal
entered the Canadian food supply. The CFIA has speculated, based on preliminary
information that the source of infection was most likely from feed containing MBM, prior
to the feed ban (CFIA, 2005b).

Canada as Minimal Risk Country. Canada is classiﬁed as a minimal risk country
as deﬁned by the Ofﬁce International des Epizooties’ (OIE) Terrestrial Animal Health
Code. According to the OIE, a nation is classiﬁed as minimal risk based on the primary
criteria that there have been less than two BSE-positive animals per one million animals
in each of the last four consecutive 12-month periods in cattle over the age of 24 months

(CFIA, 2003c).

Acts and Regulations Governing BSE in Canada.

The Ministry of Agriculture and Agri-Food is responsible for providing overall
direction to the CF IA, who is responsible for administering and enforcing the acts and
regulations designed to prevent and eradicate BSE in Canada. The acts and regulations
relevant to the BSE issue are: the Health of Animals Act and Regulations (1990); the
Feeds Act and Regulations (1985); the Meat Inspection Act and Regulations (1985); and
the Agriculture and Agri-Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act and Regulations
(1995).

The Health of Animals Act. The Health of Animals Act regulates animal diseases

and toxic substances and works to prevent the introduction of new animal diseases into

21

Canada or to control or eradicate disease that may negatively affect public health or
adversely impact the Canadian cattle industry. Furthermore, this act ensures the humane
treatment of animals during transportation. The Health of Animals Regulations spells out
the requirements related to preventing, controlling and eradicating animal diseases and
the humane handling of animals during transport (AHRA, 2002).

The Meat Inspection Act and Regulations. The Meat Inspection Act and
Regulations controls international trade and trade between provinces of meat and meat
products; the registration of abattoirs, processing/packaging plants and cold storage
facilities; federal inspection of animals and meat products at registered abattoirs,
processing/packing plants and cold storage facilities; and standards for slaughtering and
any meat products produced in these locations (AHRA, 2002).

The Feed Act. The Feed Act regulates any animal feed manufactured, imported
or sold for livestock consumption. In Canada, feeds can only be manufactured, sold or
imported if they are registered (with a few exceptions), meet approved standards, and are
properly labeled. In addition, this Act also controls the ingredients that can be used in
livestock feed (AHRA, 2002).

The Agriculture and A gri-F 00d Administrative Monetary Penalties Act. The
Agriculture and Agri-Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act creates a reasonable
administrative monetary penalty system used to enforce the Agriculture and Agri-Food
acts and regulations. This Act is designed to increase compliance and provide immediate

enforcement and remedial action (AHRA, 2002).

22

Actions taken by Canada in response to conﬁrmed BSE case

Experts concluded through epidemiological evidence that the ﬁrst homegrown
case of BSE was the result of the animal being exposed to the BSE infectious agent
through contaminated feed, prior to the 1997 feed ban. Actions taken by the Canadian
government to prevent, control or eradicate BSE include: implementing a feed ban on
ruminant-to—ruminant feeding in 1997; creating a National BSE Surveillance Program;
requiring the speciﬁed risk materials are removed to reduce the risk of BSE to human
health (CFIA, 2003d); and implementing a Canadian Cattle Identiﬁcation Program
(CFIA, 2003f).

Feed Ban. In August 1997, the CFIA banned ruminant-to-rurninant feeding, in
response to recommendations made by the World Health Organization (WHO).
Ruminant-to-ruminant feeding is assumed to be the leading factor in the spread of BSE.
The feed ban states that feed containing banned material cannot be feed to ruminants.
Equine, swine, chicken, turkey, duck, geese, ratite or game bird feed containing banned
mammalian material must be clearly labeled with a cautionary statement indicating that it
cannot be fed to ruminants. Renders, feed manufacturers and primary producers must
take steps to reduce the chance of cross-contamination between different types of feed.

In addition, primary producers feeding prohibited materials must keep labels and invoices
for all purchased feed for a two-year period (AHRA, 2002).

Feed manufacturers and retailers are inspected under the National F eed Inspection

Program to determine if feeds are being manufactured, distributed and managed in

compliance with government regulations (AHRA, 2002).

23

BSE Surveillance in Canada. In 1990 BSE became a reportable disease, meaning
that any suspect BSE cases must be immediately reported to a veterinarian at the CFIA.
CFIA veterinarians have the authority to send suspect animals for testing. This policy is
designed to prevent the entry and establishment of BSE (CF IA, 2003 g). Non-compliance
of this policy by producers may result in prosecution and monetary ﬁnes or imprisonment
(CF IA, 2003b).

The CFIA describes effective BSE surveillance as requiring “testing of an
adequate number of samples from an appropriate target population in a laboratory system
with the required diagnostic capabilities. Education and awareness programs for
veterinarians and producers facilitate identiﬁcation and reporting of suspect cases, and
effective compensation programs also support reporting. Animal identiﬁcation facilitates
trace-back to the herd of origin (CF IA, 2003b).”

Surveillance is one of the BSE measures that the Canadian government has
established to control the spread of the disease. The Canadian BSE surveillance program,
a national initiative was enacted in 1992 and is based on testing brain tissue that is
submitted to federal, provincial, and university laboratories (CFIA, 2003 g). In 1990,
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada had initiated continuous monitoring of animals
imported from the U.K. before a ban on imports in 1992 (CFIA, 2003b).

As part of its surveillance program, Canada has tested the brains of cattle for BSE
since 1990. Initially, the surveillance program was designed to determine the presence of
BSE in Canada. However, following the discovery of one BSE-positive animal in 2003,
the objectives were modiﬁed and the testing protocol was increased. Now, the

surveillance system has two objectives: 1) to conﬁrm the level of BSE in Canada and 2)

24

to track the effectiveness of the BSE risk management measures that Canada has
established (CFIA, 2004c).

Since Canada’s surveillance program was ﬁrst implemented in 1992, it has been
revised and updated to ensure that efforts are based on the most current scientiﬁc
information (CFIA, 2003b). Since its induction, the surveillance program has been
administered through the shared responsibility of federal and provincial governments,
universities, and veterinarians (CF IA, 2004c).

Enhanced and continually updated surveillance measures illustrate Canada’s
commitment to actively identifying BSE cases and demonstrate the prevalence of the
disease in Canada. Another aim of the surveillance system is to help maintain consumer
conﬁdence in Canadian produced beef products and work to reestablished weakened
international markets, following the conﬁrmation of one BSE-positive cow in May 2003.
Furthermore, increased surveillance will indirectly help improve the tracking of BSE in
Canada (CFIA, 2004c). The effectiveness of this program relies on the participation and
cooperation of the agri-food industry and the members of the animal health community,
federal and provincial government, and stakeholders. Primary producers are viewed as a
vital component of Canada’s surveillance efforts (CFIA, 2004f).

BSE Testing. BSE testing began in early 1991, with the development of a
program to test rabies-negative mature cows for BSE. In 1992, a national program was
implemented based on collected samples from mature cattle with neurological signs from
federally inspected abattoirs and provincial and university laboratories. Before the BSE

Surveillance Program, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) had started

25

monitoring animals imported from the UK before the ban was enacted in 1990 (CFIA,
2003b).

Currently, BSE surveillance testing is located in federally inspected
slaughterhouses to target surveillance and neurological cases. Surveillance cases refer to
“mature animals that are non-ambulatory, downer or unable to stand up, emergency
slaughter, dead on arrival, or found dead” (CF IA, 2003b). Neurological cases include
“BSE suspect” cases that do not ﬁt the deﬁnition of a BSE suspect. A BSE suspect is “a
mature bovine that on clinical examination exhibits all of the following signs: poor body
condition, ataxia, abnormal head carriage, nervousness, apprehension, hyperaesthesia,
and tremors” (CFIA, 2003b).

BSE testing is used to measure the incidence of disease and determine the
effectiveness of the surveillance program in controlling the spread of BSE in Canada.
BSE testing is not used as a method to protect human health (CF IA, 2004g).

The prevalence of BSE is estimated as being extremely low and only through
continued and increased BSE surveillance can its prevalence be conﬁrmed (CFIA,
2003i). de Koeijer, Schreuder and Bouma (2002) reported that if the prevalence of BSE
in a nation is classiﬁed as low, a large quantity of animals should be tested to accurately
detect the prevalence of the disease. The number of tests conducted annually can be
reduced if groups with high BSE risk are identiﬁed. If the surveillance program is
designed to determine the presence of BSE, targeting a surveillance program to the high-
risk groups can lower the number of animals needed to establish the presence of BSE.

BSE Testing Methods. Testing focuses on the high-risk cattle population, with a

heightened probability of becoming infected with BSE. Currently, no live animal test is

26

available to determine BSE in cattle. BSE testing can only be conducted on the brains of
dead cattle following slaughter (CF IA, 2004b; Dormont, 2002; Loader & Hobbs, 1996).
Samples are screened using rapid testing techniques that can accurately detect the BSE-
positive sample. Inconclusive results are sent to the National Centre for Foreign Animal
Disease, Canada’s national BSE reference laboratory for conﬁrmation (CFIA, 2004b).

In 2004, the Canadian government aimed to test approximately 8,000 cattle. In
upcoming years, testing levels are anticipated to increase to 30,000 animals annually.
Currently, cattle samples are available from the following sources: farms,
slaughterhouses (federal, provincial, and territorial levels), rendering and deadstock
operations, veterinarians, and diagnostic laboratories (CFIA, 2004b).

Removal of Specified Risk Materials. The Canadian Government deﬁnes the
speciﬁed risk materials (SRM) in regulation as “skull, brain, trigeminal ganglia (clusters
of nerve cells connect to the brain and closed apposed to the exterior of the skull), eyes,
tonsils, dorsal root ganglia (clusters of nerve cells connected to the spinal cord and
closely apposed to the vertebral column) of cattle aged 30 months or older, and the distal
ileum (part of the small intestine) of cattle of all ages” (CFIA, 2003j). These tissues,
excluding the skull have been found to contain the infective agent responsible for
transmitting BSE. The skull has been included in this classiﬁcation due to the high
probability of it becoming contaminated from stunning and during the removal of other
high risk SRM tissues. SRM tissues are removed during slaughter, with the exception of
the dorsal root ganglia, which is removed during the cutting/boning process (CFIA,

2003j).

27

 

lll

ant
Pal:

Int/u

Canadian Cattle Identiﬁcation Program. Improved risk surveillance for animal
diseases such as BSE, tuberculosis and brucellosis are not effective without a national
cattle identiﬁcation program that can trace-back the source of the problem. Especially in
today’s society, it is critically important to protect industry markets by maintaining
consumer conﬁdence in food safety and on-farm practices (CFIA, 2003f).

Cattle trace-back occurs when any reportable disease, which represents serious
health risks for animals and/or humans, is reported to the Canadian Government.

Farmers will apply ear tags that are registered in a national database to cattle leaving their
operation. If a serious disease is reported, the CF IA will be notiﬁed regarding all the
origin of all tagged cattle involved (CFIA, 2003f).

Investigations will be conducted at the site where the problem was discovered and
at the location where the animals were originally housed. The two investigations will
uncover where the animals were since they left their herd of origin. This system can help
veterinarians determine the source of the disease and how to eradicate the problem

(CFIA, 20030.

The Health Belief Model

The Health Belief Model (HBM) (Rosenstock, 1990), a social-psychological
model and the value—expectancy theory offers a theoretical framework for explaining
health-related behaviors. The HBM has been used to explore a variety of health
behaviors such as getting immunized, using health and dental services, disease screening
and diagnostic testing, assessing risk behaviors, following medical advice, etc. (Chew,
Palmer, Slonska, & Subbiah, 2002). Thus, it could be applied in other risk contexts

including BSE.

28

 

be
the
Char
audi

audit

IOUnd

The HBM was developed in the 19505 to explain the widespread failure of
individuals to participate in programs to prevent or detect disease. The model was later
extended to apply to people’s responses to symptoms and to their behavior in response to
a diagnosed illness. The HBM explains change and the maintenance of a desired
behavior change. There are ﬁve components to the HBM: perceived severity, perceived

susceptibility, perceived beneﬁts, perceived barriers, and self-efﬁcacy (Volk &

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Koopman, 2001).
Beneﬁts and
Perceived Barriers
Severity
Perceived Health Behavior
Threat
Perceived
Susceptibility Efﬁcacy
Expectations

 

 

 

Figure 2: The Health Belief Model.

Perceived Susceptibility. This component of the HBM refers to an individual’s
subjective perception of the risk of contracting the health condition. If individuals
believe that the threat is serious, but do not believe that they are at risk they will ignore
the threat. However, if they believe themselves to be at risk, they will be motivated to
change their behavior to avoid the threat. Message designers must persuade the target
audience that the potential harm is real and severe to maximize the response of the target
audience (Murray-Johnson & Witte, 2003).

In a study on preventing tractor-related fatalities in rural Texas, Witte et al. (1993)

found that farmers believed that farm machinery accident were serious and dangerous,

29

 

ltl'e

but felt that they were invulnerable to being a victim of such as accident. In addition,
farmers believed that recommended safety measures could help reduce the prevalence of
accidents and prevent farm equipment-related accidents (Witte et al., 1993).

Furthermore, Parrott, Steiner, and Goldenhar (1996) in a study about farmers and
sun safety practices found that farmers are well informed about the risk of skin cancer,
but do not use sun screen because they reported that their skin had toughened to the sun
and felt that they did not need to use sunscreen. The ﬁndings from these two studies can
be paralleled to the BSE issue, as it is possible that farmers are very aware and
knowledgeable about the threat but may feel invulnerable to the risk. Speciﬁcally, this
perceived might be low because there have only been three conﬁrmed BSE cases in
Canada and one BSE-positive animal in Washington state, making it less likely that they
will adopt recommended behaviors.

Perceived Severity. This construct of the HBM refers to an individual’s feelings
regarding the seriousness of contracting an illness or leaving it untreated include
evaluations of both medical and clinical consequences and possible social consequences
(Rosenstock, 1990). Greater perceived severity should improve both attention to the
message and heightened motivation for self—protection against the threat (Murray-
Johnson & Witte, 2003). Perceived threat is the combination of perceived susceptibility
and perceived severity.

Thu et al. (1997), in a study exploring stress as a risk factor for agricultural
injuries, found that stress plays a signiﬁcant role in agricultural injuries. The analysis of
the Iowa Farm and Rural Life Poll reveals that farmers who reported suffering from high

levels of stress were 1.7 times more likely to experience a serious farm-related injury

30

than farmers who report low to moderate stress levels. This can be paralleled to the
farmers facing the BSE situation in Canada, as the current economic losses taken by
farmers may have increased their perception of the seriousness of the issue, compared to
the BSE crisis in the U.K. in the 1990’s.

Perceived Beneﬁts. While perceived susceptibility and perceived severity
produce a force leading to a desired behavior, they do not deﬁne the particular action that
is most likely to be taken. It is thought to depend on the beliefs regarding the
effectiveness of the available actions in reducing the threat, or perceived beneﬁts in
adopting the recommended action. Perceived beneﬁts can help deﬁne the behavior or
action that the target audience should adopt, and specify: how, what, where, and when.
The perceived beneﬁts should also clarify the positive effects of the adoption of the
recommended behavior (Rosenstock, 1990).

Witte et al. (1993), in a study exploring reducing tractor-related injuries through
theoretically-based communication efforts, found that farmers reported farm safety
measures as effective in reducing incidents of farm fatalities and injuries involving farm
machinery. This study’s ﬁndings also indicated that respondents failed to incorporate
farm safety precautions on their farms. This case can be compared to the BSE situation
in Canada, as farmers may be knowledgeable about the beneﬁts of knowing about BSE
and the beneﬁts of complying with recommended surveillance protocols. However, in
the event that perceived barriers outweigh the beneﬁts, farmers may opt to not follow
recommended practices.

Perceived Barriers. Potential negative aspects of a particular action may be

obstacles to adopting a suggested behavior or action. An unconscious, cost-beneﬁt

31

analysis is thought to occur where an individual weighs the effectiveness of an action
against the perception that it may be expensive, dangerous, unpleasant, inconvenient,
time-consuming, and so forth (Rosenstock, 1990).

In a study conducted by Wadud, Kreuter, and Clarkson ( 1998) regarding disease
prevention in a farm setting, farmers reported a number of reasons for not incorporating
breathing protection when working. Farmers claimed they didn’t need protection
because: (1) they worked in an open area (57 percent); (2) they didn’t think of it (41
percent); (3) and that they felt that protective gear was inconvenient (40 percent). In the
same study, farmers reported that the main reasons for not using skin protection measures
included (1) it was too hot to wear long sleeved shirts (67 percent); (2) sunscreen was
messy (43 percent); and (3) recommended clothing was too restrictive or uncomfortable
(31 percent).

Self-eﬂicacy. In 1977, Bandura introduced the concept of self-efﬁcacy to the
model. Self-efﬁcacy is the belief that an individual can successfully perform the
behavior or action required for the desired outcome (as cited in Rosenstock, 1990).

In a formative study assessing farmers’ understanding of sun safety procedures,
Parrott et al. ( 1996) found that nearly three fourths of participants selected wearing a
wide-brimmed straw hat as being more protective than wearing tightly woven cap with a
neck flap. This ﬁnding afﬁrms that farmers lack speciﬁc knowledge regarding the
procedures for proper sun protection. The less aware farmers are about such procedures
the more unlikely it will be that they will adopt the recommended behavior or action. In
comparison to the Canadian BSE situation, Ontario farmers’ self-efﬁcacy may be

dependent on their understanding of the surveillance measures implemented by the CF IA,

32

uncertainty about how to begin the testing process for suspect animals, due to a lack of
direction, or they may lack knowledge or awareness of the established surveillance
measures.

Knowledge and F armer Behavior. Accurate knowledge is commonly deemed as
necessary, but not strong enough to stimulate the adoption of recommend behaviors.
However, knowledge does play an important role in lifestyle decision-making and
continued compliance with recommended behaviors. Knowledge, as well as other
demographic variables such as education, age, and ethnicity are modifying factors of the
HBM, which are also believed to have an indirect effect on behavior by inﬂuencing the
perceptions of the following HBM constructs: perceived susceptibility, perceived
severity, perceived beneﬁts, perceived, and barriers (Rosenstock, 1990). If individuals
lack knowledge of risks, their ability to maintain or promote the recommended behavior
is reduced (Rudd & Glanz, 1990).

Knowledge of an issue can be conceptualized as “awareness, consciousness
raising, familiarity, recognition or recall” (Salmon & Atkin, 2003, p. 466). However, for
the purpose of this study, knowledge is conceptually deﬁned as the factual knowledge of
BSE held by farmers.

In an evaluation study of the impacts of education regarding integrated pest
management (1PM) on perceptions of pesticides and pesticides application practices,
Kishi (2002) found that farmers’ knowledge about the health risks associated with
pesticides, following attendance at an 1PM school was not sufﬁcient to change or

motivate behavioral changes.

33

Most communication approaches designed for the farming community assume I
that a knowledge deﬁciency is to blame for their heightened susceptibility to health
problems and it is presumed that if farmers are knowledgeable about the risks, they

would adopt the recommended behaviors (Thu, 1998).

34

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Strauss and Corbin (1998) deﬁne qualitative research, as “any type of research
that produces ﬁndings not arrived at by statistical procedures or other means of
quantiﬁcation. It can refer to research about person’s lives, lived experiences, behaviors,
emotions, and feelings as well as about the organizational functioning, social movements,
cultural phenomena, and interactions between nations” (p. 10).

There are a number of reasons for conducting qualitative research, perhaps the
most valid reason being that the nature of the research problem is best suited to
qualitative research methods. Qualitative research methods are used to explore
substantive areas where little is known about an issue or to gain novel understanding.
One might think of formative research in this context (Strauss & Corbin, 1998).
Formative research helps “develop targeted, culturally appropriate health risk messages
that work” (Witte, Meyer, & Martell, 2001, p. 52). Formative research helps identify the
characteristics of a target audience, develop prototypical members and determine the
important demographic variables, past experiences, attitudes, beliefs, opinions, and
perceptions toward the risk and the recommend behavior to be promoted (Witte, Meyer,
& Martell, 2001). Furthermore, qualitative research methods are also used to obtain
details about feelings, thought processes, and emotions that are oﬁen difﬁcult to obtain

using quantitative research strategies (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This study will use focus

35

groups to better understand the attitudes, beliefs, opinions and thoughts of Ontario beef
producers regarding BSE.

Focus Groups. Focus groups were used to conduct this formative research because
they provide a comfortable environment where participants can share and discuss their
attitudes and beliefs (Krueger, 1994). Focus groups promote “self-disclosure among
participants” (Krueger & Casey, 2000, p. 7). Focus groups are used to determine “what
people really think and feel” (p. 7).

According to Krueger and Casey (2000), focus groups have the following
characteristics: (a) involve similar individuals in a social setting; (b) gather qualitative
data from a focused discussion between participants; (c) gather inductive and naturalistic
information; and (d) can provide valuable baseline information that can guide the
collection of large-scale quantitative data.

Focus groups are used to collect data dealing with an issue of interest to the
researcher, with a goal of ﬁnding a range of opinions across a population. Data collected
from each group are compared and contrasted. It is important to create an environment
where participants feel comfortable sharing what they think and feel (Krueger & Casey,
2000). Krueger and Casey (2000) described the beneﬁts of including food (i.e., light
dinner) at the session as a helpful tool in promoting conversation and communication
between the participants, which helps establish a comfortable environment. Food can
also act as an incentive to recruit potential participants. Usually, focus groups consist of

seven to ten participants (Krueger, 1994).

36

Participants and Procedures

A total of 28 participants in four focus groups participated in the study approved
by the University Committee for Research Involving Human Subjects (UCRHIS)
(Appendix A). The number of participants ranged from 5 to 11 participants in each
group. Potential participants were recruited through county advisors of the Ontario
Cattlemen’s Association. Advisors for Grey, Lanark, Renfrew and Wellington counties
provided a list of potential candidates interested in participating in the study.

All potential participants were recruited through an invitation letter (Appendix B)
explaining the purpose and goals of the study. Participants also were informed that the
discussion would take approximately an hour and a half to two hours. As an incentive to
participate, participants also were told that they would receive a $10 honorarium and
dinner for participating in the study.

The focus group discussions were conducted in January 2005 in four geographic
areas in Ontario: Grey, Lanark, Renfrew and Wellington counties. These four counties
were selected with guidance from the OCA, based on involvement in the BSE issue and
to cover the general scope of ideas and feelings that Ontario beef farmers have about the
current Canadian BSE situation and to determine the factors that inﬂuence their opinions,
attitudes, behaviors and motivations.

A tape recorder was used at each focus group sessions for transcription purposes.
Participants were reminded that the discussion would be recorded at the beginning of the
focus group discussion. Before dinner was served, consent forms, approved by UCRIHS,

were signed and returned (Appendix C).

37

A brief survey also was administered prior to dinner at each focus group sessions
to collect demographic data and media related questions. Items that were included on the
survey include age, gender, educational level attained, farm size and preferred sources for
agricultural information (Appendix D). The Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS)
11.0 was used to analyze demographic and mediagraphic responses gathered in the

survey.

Moderator Guide

Typical focus groups include approximately 12 questions. Asking questions to a
group can stimulate a discussion that can last for a number of hours. As participants
answer questions, their responses generate ideas from other participants. Participant
comment can trigger memories or thoughts of other participants that can stimulate the
sharing of a wide range of perceptions (Krueger & Casey, 2000).

A moderator guide was developed based on the information gathered from the
literature review (Appendix E). The moderator guide was developed to facilitate
discussion and obtain information, thoughts, feelings, perceptions, and opinions about the ,
issue. Questions and probes were developed using the components of the health belief
model (HBM) (Rosenstock, 1974): perceived severity, perceived susceptibility,
perceived beneﬁts, perceived barriers, and efﬁcacy. Media-related and BSE knowledge
questions also were included.

Members of the researcher’s Thesis Committee and faculty members from the
Department of Agriculture and Extension Education reviewed the moderator guide for
face and content validity. Ary, Jacobs and Razavieh (2002) deﬁne validity as “the extent

to which an instrument measures what it claimed to measure” (p. 242). Validity is

38

necessary to ensure that questions are appropriate to the topic and will generate accurate

responses. The same moderator guide was used at each of the four focus group sessions.

Unitization

The commentary from each of the four focus groups was transcribed verbatim,
and participant numbers were given to each participant to ensure conﬁdentiality. The
unit of analysis was a thought unit, which was deﬁned as a subject/verb pairing or a
simple sentence (e.g., “The only media coverage that you get is negative.” and “I think
they’ve done a good enough job of this surveillance testing”) (Appendix F). All data
were unitized with the exception of questions and statements made by the moderator.

The data resulted in 4974 thought units for analysis. (Silk, Parrott, & Dillow, 2003)

Coding

Data were analyzed using the HBM (Rosenstock, 1974). Perceived severity,
perceived susceptibility, self-efﬁcacy, perceived barriers, and perceived beneﬁts provided
the framework for assessing the perceptions, thoughts, beliefs, and opinions of Ontario
beef farmers regarding the BSE issue in Canada. Furthermore, additional categories and
subcategories were identiﬁed based on the major concepts and themes that surfaced in
participant responses to the questions asked in the four focus groups; Knowledge and
media questions also were included in the focus group and were coded to help better
understand participants’ knowledge of BSE and uncover preferred media sources
accessed by the farming community.

A codebook (Appendix G) was developed. The data were coded by two coders

using the QSR Nvivo software. QSR Nvivo was used as an organizational tool in this

39

study to help code thought units into their appropriate category. Data were coded into six
main categories, with 15 sub-categories: (a) Threat, severity [SEV-l], susceptibility-own
herd [SUS-ZA], susceptibility-other herds [SUS-ZB], susceptibility-humans [SUS-2C],
(b) knowledge, BSE [BSE-3A], government regulations [GOV-4], food chain [FC-S],
stigma [STIG-6], (c) efﬁcacy, perceived beneﬁts [BEN-7], perceived barriers [BAR-8],
self-efﬁcacy [SE-9], response-efﬁcacy [RE-10], (d) behavior [BEH-l l], (e) media,
accuracy/inaccuracy of media sources [MED-12], preferred information sources [INFO-
13], preferred message style [STYL-14], and (f) other [OTH-IS]. The subcategories
were created based on themes that emerged from the discussions and were clear to the
researcher (Mayan, 2001). Using the categories and subcategories included in the
codebook, nodes were created in QSR NVivo for coding and organizational purposes.
The QSR NVivo software allowed the researcher to easily identify common themes
mentioned by participants and to retrieve representative statements that depict the main
themes that resonated across the six main categories and 15 subcategories.

Threat. Threat was deﬁned as any statement suggesting a source of danger.
Threat was broken down into two subcategories: perceived severity and perceived
susceptibility to the danger. (Perceived severitﬂresponses were coded for any statements
about the signiﬁcance or magnitude of the threat of BSE (e.g., “One cow destroyed the
whole country.”)Eerceived susceptibilith’yZlx was further broken down into three sub-
categories: susceptibility-self responses were coded using any statements referring to the
likelihood of a farmer’s herd contracting BSE (e.g., “I don’t feel that my herd is at risk”);

susceptibility-other responses were coded according to statements about the likelihood of

other farms in Ontario/Canada contracting BSE (e. g., “I think that the probability is very

4O

high”); and susceptibility-human responses included any statements about the likelihood
of humans contracting vCJD (the human form of BSE) (e. g., “We don’t eat brain here”).
Eﬂicacy. Efﬁcacy was conceptualized as a farmer’s ability, beliefs, and
perceptions about the actions and behaviors used to prevent, control or eradicate BSE in
Canada. This category was further divided into four subcategories: perceived beneﬁts,
perceived barriers, self-efﬁcacy, and response efﬁcacy. [Perceived beneﬁtgwere coded
for any statements about advantages gained from adopting the advised action to reduce

risk or serrousness of BSE (e. g., “. ..ma1ntarn consumer conﬁdence”). {Perceived barriers {

a ’1

a

were coded by statements made regarding a farmer’s belief about obstacles (either
tangible or psychological costs) to adopting the recommended behavior (e.g., “And every
time we report on [BSE-positive cow] look what happens”). Self-efﬁcacy was coded by
any statements made relating to the ability of farmers the do the recommended behavior
(e.g., “I’m not sure that we would report them [suspect animals].”). Response-efﬁcacy
was coded according to statements made regarding a farmer’s belief that a recommended
action will help reduce, control or eradicate BSE (e.g., “Taking out SRMs, that’s going to
prevent transmission”).

Behavior. Behavior responses was coded according to statements made about any
actions or current on-farm practices used by farmers to lower risk the risk of BSE and
other animal diseases (e.g., “I have written records of every health treatment I’ve done in
the last ﬁve years”).

Media. Media responses were coded for statements made about he
accuracy/inaccuracy of media reports, preferred media sources, and preferred message

style (e.g., “Media sells by sensationalizing.”).

41

Knowledge. Knowledge was conceptually deﬁnedas the factual knowledge about
BSE held by farmers. Knowledge was further broken down into four sub-categories: the
science of BSE, familiarity with government regulations, the role of any aspect of the
food production chain, and stigma. BSE knowledge was conceptualized as any
statements about BSE symptoms, cause, infection, diagnosis or treatment (e.g., “A prion
in the meat source”). Knowledge of government regulations was conceptualized as any
statements about the BSE Surveillance Program, testing, removal of speciﬁed risk
materials (SRMs), the feed ban and other applicable regulations (e. g., “They are putting
extreme pressure on us to report these cows”). Knowledge of the food chain was deﬁned
as any statements about the role and responsibilities of producers, slaughterhouses,
packers, processors, consumers, etc. (e.g., “Everybody has to be prepared to do a 100
percent job right up to the store that’s got meat in the cooler.”). Stigma was
conceptualized as any statements about societal attitudes and potential discrimination
stemming from a particular characteristic or afﬁliation with a particular group or behavior
(e.g., “I’m a bit concerned about how the public views us.”).

Other. Other was deﬁned as any statement that could not be clearly deﬁned by
the ﬁve other categories. Coders were instructed to use this category in moderation.

Decision Rules. The amount of data collected and the six categories and 16
subcategories in the codebook resulted in researchers needing to develop decision rules to
help coders code the units of analysis into the appropriate category. Since the HBM
(Rosenstock, 1974) was being used to analyze the data, the constructs of the model,
perceived severity, perceived susceptibility, perceived beneﬁts, perceived barriers and

self-efﬁcacy had precedence over the knowledge and media categories. For example, if a

42

unit could be coded as both knowledge and perceived severity, the unit would be coded
as perceived severity. This decision rule seems justiﬁed given the objectives of this
study.

Intercoder reliability. Overall, two coders spent approximately six hours
reviewing the codebook and resolving through discussion any discrepancies. Using the
codebook, two coders individually coded a total of 4974 though units. Cohen’s Kappa
assesses intercoder reliability when coding qualitative or categorical variables was used
to establish intercoder reliability, as it compensates for agreements by chance. Initially,
reliability based on ﬁve percent of the data was somewhat uneven over the six categories
(Cohen’s Kappa = 0.59). In order to resolve discrepancies and clarify the rules for units
that may fall into one or more categories, another 2 percent of the data was coded
(Cohen’s Kappa = 0.71). Reviewing and modifying the coding rules further improved
the coding scheme, and approximately another three percent of the data was coded and an
acceptable level was established (Cohen’s Kappa = 0.85). Upon further examination of
the units of analysis, in both attempts to establish intercoder reliability, the thought units
were not evenly distributed among the six categories, which may account for the
difﬁculty in establishing intercoder reliability. Coders then divided the remaining data

and coded it independently.

Chapter Summary

Chapter three provided an overview of the mixed methodology used to conduct
this study. The chapter provides rationale for the use of a mixed methods approach and
outlined the procedures involved in focus group and survey aspects of the study. Data

analysis was also described. Chapter Four will highlight the study’s key ﬁndings.

43

CHAPTER FOUR

FINDINGS

Introduction

This chapter reports the results of the study and presents the data gathered to
answer the research objectives:

1) To investigate and assess Ontario beef producers’ attitudes toward risk, using the

HBM as a framework.

2) To identify the information sources used by Ontario beef producers.

Two individuals unitized the data. Two coders coded the data, with an
established intercoder reliability of 0.85 (Cohen’s Kappa). Coded data was entered into
the qualitative software program, QSR Nvivo. Demographic and mediagraphic data
gathered from a short survey was analyzed using the Statistical Package for the Social

Sciences (SPSS) version 1 1.0.

Demographic and Mediagraphic Results

A total of four focus groups were held in four different counties in Ontario, which
attracted a total of 28 participants. All participants completed a short, l7-question survey
that asked demographic and media related questions before the focus group. Twenty-one
surveys were completely ﬁlled out.

Table 1 shows that the majority of the participants were male (89.2 percent; n =
25) and women (10.8 percent; n=3) participated in the study. Participants ranged in age
from 18 to 71 and the average age of respondents was 49 years. Participants were asked

to identify their highest level of education completed. Of the participants, 21.6 percent

44

(n=6) completed high school, 7.1 percent (n=2) completed some college, 32.1 percent

(n=9) were community college graduates, 7.1 percent (n=2) had completed some

university, and 32.1 (n=9) percent were university graduates.

Table 1: Participant Demographics (n=28)

 

Variable

 

Gender
Female
Male
Total

Age
Under 30
30 —55
56-69
70 and over
Total

Education
Some high school
High school graduate
Some community college
Community college graduate
Some university
University graduate
Total

Involvement in farming
Full time
Part time
Total

Responsible for decision-making
Yes
No
No response
Total

Number of years farming
0-10 years
11-20 years
21-30 years
Over 30 years
No response
Total

 

n %
3 10.7
25 89.3
28 100.0
2 7.1
8 28.6
14 50
4 14.3
28 100.0
6 21.4
2 7.1
9 32.1
2 7.1
9 32.1
28 100.0
25 89.3
3 10.7
28 100.0
23 82.1
4 14.3
1 3.6
28 100.0
2 7.1
7 25
8 28.6
9 32.1
2 7.1
28 100.0

 

45

Table 1 also shows that 89.3 percent (11 = 25) of participants were full time
farmers and 10.7 percent (n = 3) were part time farmers. Participants also were asked if
they were responsible for the decision-making on their farm and 82.1 (n=23) reported
themselves as making the decisions on their farm and 14.3 (n=4) said that they were not
the decision-makers. Participants were asked to identify the number of years they had
farmed, 7.1 percent (n=2) had farmed under 10 years, 25.0 percent (n=7) had farmed 11
to 20 years, 28.6 percent (n=8) had farmed for 21 to 30 years, and 32.1 percent (n=9) had
farmed over 30 years.

The remaining demographic questions included: farm acreage (owned and rented
land), income generated from farming, income generated from beef cattle and herd size.
These demographic questions are depicted in Tables 2 and 3. The participants were
asked to report their farm acreage, including both owned and rented land. The acreage
was distributed into 5 categories, 0 to 500 acres, 501 to 1000 acres, 1001 to 1500 acres,
1501 to 2000 acres, and over 2000 acres. Approximately, 40 percent (n=11) reported
farming 1 to 500 acres, 28.6 percent (n=8) farmed 501 to 1000 acres, 17.9 percent (n=5)
farmed 1001 to 1500 acres, 7.1 percent (n=2) farmed 1501 to 2000 acres, and 7.1 percent
(n=2) report farming over 2000 acres.

Approximately 7 percent (n=2) reported that 25 to 49 of their income was
farming, 14.3 percent (n=4) said that 50 to 74 percent of their income was from farming,
and 75 percent (n=21) said that over 75 percent of their income was from farming. Of
participants’ farm income, 50 percent (n=14) said that over 75 percent of their income
was from beef cattle, 32.1 percent (n=9) shared that 50 to 74 percent of their farm income

came from beef cattle, 10.7 percent (n=3) reported that 25 to 49 percent of their farm

46

income came from beef cattle, and 7.1 percent (n=2) said that under 25 percent of their
farm income came from beef farming.

Table 2: Participant Farm Size and Income (n=28)

 

 

aw .- - *n . .- —.- - - ---_-vv ---—.¢-—~m—-“.-o— ~—~ -

 

Farm acreage (owned and rented land) '
0-500 acres 1 1 39.3
501-1000 acres 8 28.6
1001-1500 acres 5 17.9
1501-2000 acres 2 7.1
Over 2000 acres 2 7.1
Total 28 100.0

Income from farming
Less than 25 percent - -
25-49 percent 2 7.1
50-74 percent 4 14.3
75-100 percent 21 75.0
No response 1 3.6
Total 28 100.0

Income from beef cattle
Less than 25 percent 2 7.1
25-49 percent 3 10.7
50-74 percent 9 32.1
75-100 percent 14 50.0

-Total -223 190.0.

Table 3 shows that approximately 68 percent (n=l9) had 0 to 3 bulls over the age
of one on their farm, 17.8 percent (n=5) had 4 to bulls, 3.6 percent owned 8 to 11 bulls
and 10.7 had 11 or more bulls on their operation. In regards to the number of cows
(including heifers that had calved) on their farm, 53.6 percent (n=21) of the participants
had 0 to 75 cows, 28.6 percent (n=8) had 75 to 150 cows, 10.7 percent (n=3) owned 151
to 225 cows, and 7.1 percent (n=2) owned over 225 cows. Seventy-ﬁve percent (n=21) of
participants reported that they had 0 to 50 heifers, 10.7 percent (n=3) had 51 to 100
heifers, and 7.1 percent (n=2) had over 150 heifers. Approximately 79 percent (n=22) of
participants reported that they had 0 to 25 steers on their farm, 3.6 percent (n=1) had 26

to 50 steers, 3.6 percent (n=1) owned 51 to 100 steers, and 10.7 percent (n=3) reported

47

that they owned over 100 steers. Sixty-four percent (n=18) of the participants had 0

tolOO calves, 17.8 percent (n=5) had 101 to 200 calves, 3.6 percent (n=1) owned 201 to

300 calves and 10.7 (n=3) farmed over 300 calves

Table 3: Participants’ herd demographics

 

Number of bulls one year or older
0-3 bulls
4-7 bulls
8-11 bulls
Over 11 bulls
Total
Number of cows (including heifers that have calved)
0-75 cows
76-150 cows
151-225 cows
Over 225 cows
Total
Number of heifers one year or older
0-50 heifers
51-100 heifers
101-150 heifers
Over 150 heifers
No response
Total
Number of steers
0-25 steers
26-50 steers
51-100 steers
Over 100 steers
No response
Total
Number of calves
0-100 calves
101-200 calves
201-300 calves
Over 300 calves
No response
_ Total-

Preferred Sources of A gricultural Information.

67.9
17.8
3.6
10.7
100.0

53.6
28.6
10.7
7.1
100.0

75.0
10.7

7.1
7.1
100.0

78.5
3.6
3.6

10.7
3.6

100.0

64.3
17.8
3.6
10.7
3 6

.-. 100:9-

One quantitative research question (RQl) asked, what do Ontario beef producers

report as their preferred sources for agricultural information? In Table 4, participants

48

were asked to select their ﬁve most preferred agricultural information sources from a list
of 12 and rank the ﬁve from most preferred to least preferred. Seven participants were
classiﬁed as no-response because they did not rank ﬁve of their most preferred sources
for agricultural information. Weighted mean values closer to one showed greater
preference, while weighted mean values closer to six indicated no preference.
Agriculture information sources for participant ranking included: farm publications,
newspapers, Internet, commercial literature, radio programming, televisiOn programming,
farm shows, government publications, commodity group literature, government
commodity specialists, neighbors, and other farmers.

Participants ranked farm publications as their most preferred agricultural
information source (mean ranking=1.62), the Internet as their second most preferred
(mean ranking=2. 48), commodity group literature was ranked third (mean ranking=41.9),
newspapers were ranked as fourth most preferred (mean ranking=4 71,) and government
publication was ﬁﬁh most preferred (mean ranking=4 .76) Radio (mean ranking=5. 95),
television (mean ranking=5.76), neighbors (5.57), and government commodity specialists

(n=5.52) were not ranked as preferred sources of agricultural information.

49

Table 4: Preferred ”Agricultural Information Sources

.. ..... W--.—. «A ~ ..-—.—

 

Agricultural Information Source Weighted Mean Ranking
Farm Publications 1.62 1
Internet 2.48 2
Commodity Group Literature 4.19 3
Newspaper 4.71 4
Government Publications 4.76 5
Farm Shows 4.95 6
Other Farmers 5.00 7
Commercial Literature 5.38 3
Gov ernment Commodity Specialists 5.52 9
Neighbors 5.57 10
Television 5.76 1 1
Radio 5.95 12

 

~4. .- .-— 44-..- -.—-—-.- .- n—‘ - —- o-- m.- — ....-.—.- a-.. -_u-.—u--.—.- -.—- — . ----_ -—v-.———

(1;mOSt faE’fEEEd, 2=seCOnd most preferred, 3=Ihird mosdtlpfeferred, 4=fourth most

preferred, 5=ﬁﬁh most preferred, 6=no preference)

Qualitative Data

Results of the quantitative data reﬂect all the data unitized and coded for the
transcripts from the four focus groups discussions. For the qualitative aspect of the
results, examples were selected from the transcripts to illustrate the key themes from each
of the six categories and 15 subcategories. Thematic examples were selected that
captured the essence of the main ideas shared by participants, which will combine
multiple thought units from the same category. Six qualitative research questions were
posed in this study to determine the attitudes that Ontario farmers have regarding the
severity of the BSE situation, their susceptibility to BSE, the barriers to effectively

dealing with BSE, and the beneﬁts of effectively dealing with BSE. One qualitative

50

research question was posed to determine beef producers’ preferred sources of

agricultural information.

Health Belief Model Constructs

Thought units coded as HBM account for 46.2 percent (n =2298) of the data. Table 5
highlights the frequency distributions of the thought units across all categories (perceived
severity, perceived susceptibility, perceived beneﬁts, perceived barriers, self-efficacy,
and response efﬁcacy).

Perceived Susceptibility. The one qualitative research question, “What attitudes
do Ontario beef producers have regarding their susceptibility or vulnerability to BSE?”
determined the perceived susceptibility of Ontario beef producers. Thought units for
susceptibility accounted for 11.3 percent (n=569) of the data. Overall, farmers’
discussions regarding susceptibility dealt with how “other farmers”, such as dairy and
beef farmers that feed supplements to their animal are more susceptible to contracting
BSE. Furthermore, many farmers shared that they did not believe that their own herds
were at risk because they had a closed herd or grew their own feed for their animals.
Farmers also discussed the probability of BSE showing up in other nations such as the
United States, which have strict trade restrictions on Canadian beef products. Farmers
also discussed the possibility of humans contracting the variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
(vCJD) by eating Canadian beef.

For example, one participant stated, “Beef farms, I don’t think it’s — it’s almost
impossible. If it only comes from that ruminant type feed in their feed. It’s almost
impossible and since it’s also been banned since ’97.. .(Group 1).” Another farmer

supported this view by stating, . .People with closed herds are at much lower risk than

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people who are constantly bringing in new breeding stock because they don’t know what
they’ve been fed and where they came from. So, the closed herds that don’t get much
supplements are at less risk (Group 2).”

Participants also provided explanations as to why they felt that their herds were
not susceptible to BSE. One participant shared, “I don’t feel that my herd’s at risk. I
hope someday that I don’t ship a cow or 20 months old animal or something and all of a
sudden I get a report back that I’ve got it, cause I’d feel like the guys that called the vet
out the farm. I’d say no, if I ever shipped something that had it. I’d totally be blown
away from it. I don’t think it’s possible (Group 1).” In addition, another participant
shared, “ The thing with myself, I have 130 cows and the only reason I would ever be
concerned about BSE coming in my herd, is an animal I bought in from another
somebody else. Like, a bull for breeding purposes. I don’t know the feed that that bull
had with the previous owner, bought feed from the feed store and I don’t know the
protein that was fed to that animal, but basically with my cows, I don’t purchase any
feed, I just make my own. So, that’s the only way that it would come into my herd

(Group 4).”

52

Table 5: Distribution of Thoughtynits Across Constructs

 

- . I---” _ __._.,.___- _....-___--.-. ”___, ._ .. ___... __ _-_ w11...“...‘1/9.
Health Belief Model Constructs
Severity 838 16.8
Susceptibility — Participant’s Own Herd 131 2.6
Susceptibility - Other Farms/Areas 364 7.3
Susceptibility — Contract vCJD 74 1.5
Self-Efﬁcacy 324 6.5
Response 1 84 3 .7
Beneﬁts . 197 4.0
Barriers 186 3.8
Subtotal 2298 46.2
Knowledge
BSE 233 4.7
Government Regulations 343 6.9
Food Chain 143 2.9
Subtotal 719 14.5
Media
Accuracy/Inaccuracy 458 9.2
Preferred Sources 469 9.4
Preferred Style 91 1.8
Subtotal 1018 20.4
Behavior 197 4.0
Stigma 243 4.9
-cher ._ 1-. .. _- . _. -_ _ - -__ -_ 51.92.4940.
TOTAL 4974 100.0

 

 

Another participant explained how any animal in North America is susceptible to
contracting BSE, “. . .There’s as much chance of you ﬁnding it in Michigan as there is us
ﬁnding it in Ontario. We’re closer to the state of Florida then we are to Alberta, in my
eyes. So, the question is basically, anywhere in North America has as much exposure to
it as we have, with international trade and the way cattle move across the 49‘h parallel for
the last hundred and some years. The risk in North America and Mexico, any place is

every bit as high as — there’s no differential. It can show up anywhere (Group 3).”

53

One participant shared information he received from his family physician about
the likelihood of Canadians contracting vCJD, the human form of BSE, “. . .you’ll have a
better chance of getting hit by lightning than you’ll ever have of coming down with BSE
from related — eating infected beef (Group 3).”

Perceived Severity. One qualitative research question, “What attitudes do Ontario
beef producers have toward the perceived severity of the BSE issue in Canada?”
determined participants’ perception of the severity of the BSE situation. Thought units
coded as severity accounted for 16.8 percent of the data (11 =83 8). Overall, participants in
each focus group spoke at length regarding the severity of the BSE issue for Canadian
beef farmers. Key ideas reported by participants regarding the severity of the BSE
situation included: economic losses to all aspects of the food production chain, political
pressures (e.g., length of trade restrictions); health risks to farmers (e. g., stress and health
risks); the number of producers exiting the industry; and the impact that this situation will
have on potential young farmers and their commitment to the industry.

Many participants provided personal accounts about the effect that the
conﬁrmation of BSE has had on their operation. For example, one participant stated,
“Your equity is gone. I’m almost back to where I was 20 years ago because of this right
now and if things can turn around may we can recover a fair bit of that, but if I was to
exit the business right now, it will cost me two farms that I paid for (Group 3).”

Similarly, another participant mentioned, “. . .You can’t survive on what you’re
making now. Everyone’s losing money. They’re eating up whatever equity they have.

Like, the people that are hanging it up are putting everything on the line (Group 1).”

54

Another participant compared the severity of this situation to the discovery of foot

6

and mouth disease in the 1950’s, ‘. . .I said that it will be something like foot and mouth
and he said that it’s not like foot and mouth at all. He said that in ’52 when we had foot
and mouth, he said we had 50 or 60 cattle and we played around with them. But he said
we milked cows, we had sows, we had chickens, we had sheep. He said we could work
our way out of it because we were diversiﬁed. Where now, we take it and specialize
something, so you have your eggs too much in one basket, but it’s the only way that you
can be in business anymore because you can’t be in agriculture in Ontario. You cannot
be in a whole bunch of things because you can’t do it. It’s not economically viable. So,
if you talk to some of the older guys that talk about it, realize that this is a lot worse than
the foot and mouth. . .(Group 3).”

One participant explained his views concerning the severity of BSE from a
political standpoint of the US. border not opening to Canadian beef products and
livestock. “It’s also political because it has been proven that it is not a high-risk thing.
So, all of it is politics and from there on in. As soon as that’s been proven that’s it’s not a
high-risk health problem than the whole thing is political. Has been right from day one
(Group 1).”

Another participant stated, “Politically it looked like it’s a short-term problem. A
lot of us carried on business as usual. In hind sight, it was the wrong thing to have done,
but anybody as I said earlier, anybody can second guess that, so there’s no point in
looking back, we’ve got to worry about what’s ahead. . .(Group 3).”

In regards to how the BSE situation has affected the health of farmers, one

participant shared, “Stress. There’s always health risks that stress causes people (Group

55

1).” Another participant agreed, . .you go to farm meetings, you always get a lot of
bitching, but now, it’s not just the bitching, but you know, guys have been getting sick,
things that have been going on that you’ve never heard of before (Group 4).”

Many participants spoke about the effect that the severity of this situation has had
on the number of farmers deciding to exit the beef industry. One participant reports, “I
was on the phone to a guy and we thought of 4 producers that are out of their business in
the last six months that will never be back in the business and it’s a week and a half kill at
Better Beef. So, that’s ﬁnancial reasons and another one was age factor and another one
was just that they decided that they weren’t going to take the risk any more. Why expose
yourself if you don’t have to and they could get out (Group 3).” Another participant
talked about the seriousness of the issue as it applied to future generations of farmers, “I
think that this is so serious that this is going to cause a lot of younger people, say in their
205 that are thinking - we’re thinking of getting into this business. I’m sure that it’s
going to cause a lot of them some second thoughts (Group 2).”

Perceived Beneﬁts. One qualitative research question, “What do Ontario beef
producers perceive as beneﬁts to discovering BSE in Canada and following the BSE
protocols established by the Canadian government?” determined participants’ perceived
beneﬁts of BSE. Thought units for perceived beneﬁts accounted for 4.0 percent (n=l97)
of the collected data. Many participants agreed that beneﬁts to the farming community
were minimal, if any. After some consideration and discussion, participants did share a
number of beneﬁts about knowing about BSE and the Canadian surveillance measures
ﬁnding BSE in Canada included: the outcomes gained from having an efﬁcient

surveillance system; highlighting Canada’s export dependence on one market -— the North

56

American market; the Canadian slaughter and packing industry grew to meet the needs of
beef farms; the Canadian public was made more aware of the Canadian food safety
system; new protocols will result in a safer beef product; the lessons learned from living
through a Situation of this magnitude; and the highlighted need for proactive risk
management to effectively deal with future risks.

A participant shared his insights into the beneﬁts of Canada’s surveillance system,
. .if an animal has a problem, it’s traceable. . ..every animal is traceable to where it came
from (Group 1).”

One participant shared in respect to the Canadian beef industry’s dependence on
the North American markets for its exports, “We will have a strong industry when we are
doing this because we’ve realized that we cannot depend on the United States for a
marketplace for 50 or 60 percent of our Canadian product. So, yeah we will have
packing capacity hopefully, then we’ll help develop markets in other parts of the world
that we can maybe reduce our dependency on the — being on the North American market.
We can develop world markets (Group 3).”

To further illustrate the beneﬁts gained by different segments of the industry from
the Canadian BSE situation, another participant shared, “There’s beneﬁts to certain
segments of the industry, but nobody would ever say that anybody beneﬁt from it. . .The
United States beneﬁted immensely, they had the best cycle of the cattle industry that they
ever had. The packing industry in Canada ﬂourished. The government spent some
money to try and sustain us. Taxpayers were made more aware of their health - of the
food safety system, but as far as we — as the primary producers, the beneﬁts are minimal

(Group 3).”

57

Another participant shared similar insights stating, “But the general public is
going to understand our inspection systems and probably have an understanding of how
our food is checked and the cautions that are in place. One of the things, you know, these
three animals never got into the food chain and that’s our system working (Group 4).”
Another participant echoed the same belief saying, “Public conﬁdence is high. . .beef
consumption went up. . .(Group 1).”

In regards to lessons learned, one participant shared, “. . .From within the industry,
BSE has taught us a lot of things. A lot of organization problems that need to be boned
up, funding problems, PR problems that need to be addressed when this is over — alliance
problems is a nice way of saying the big word of who was on our side and who
wasn’t. . .intemational affairs and negotiations (Group 4).”

In a different discussion, another participant echoed a similar view, “We should
have learnt for this that you have to be prepared for the worse case scenarios of what
could happen. Be prepared (Group 2).”

Perceived Barriers. One qualitative question, “What do Ontario beef producers
report as barriers to following BSE protocols established by the Canadian government?”
determine perceived barriers to following BSE protocols. Thought units for perceived
barriers represented 3.8 percent (n=186) of the data. Common themes mentioned by
participants regarding barriers limiting their ability to follow BSE surveillance protocols
established by the Canadian government (e. g., reporting a downer animal) included,
ﬁnancial costs, the economic threat to their business and livelihood, and lack of resources

(such as equipment).

58

One participant explained that the ﬁnancial cost of associated with submitting an
animal for testing would discourage him from doing so. “If they want to test more, they
should fund the dead livestock removal. We don’t call them anymore. If they want to
test more, we’d call them. It costs us an arm and a leg to get rid of them. We bury them
now. Then they would have their test (Group 2).”

Another participant stated that ﬁnancial threat to farmers would limit them from
reporting a suspect animal. “If it affects too many — if it affected just us, as ourselves,
then that’s okay, but we’ve seen what it did to a whole industry. . .and every time we
report one, look what happens (Group 2).”

In regards to having a lack of resources needed to follow BSE protocols, one
participant said, “If they don’t have a head gate and chute to put them in [cows], some
guys aren’t equipped to do it [tag cattle] (Group 1).”

Response-Efﬁcacy. One research question, “What attitudes do Ontario beef
producers have toward the effectiveness (response-efﬁcacy) of the BSE protocols
established by the Canadian government?” determined participants’ perceptions about
whether BSE protocols to work Thought units regarding response-efﬁcacy accounted
for 3.7 percent (n=197) of the analyzed data. Many participants believed that the policies
and protocols established by the Canadian government were necessary and were
effective, as long as everyone followed them. Participants seemed to believe that the
future strength of the Canadian beef industry depended on following these protocols, as
they realized that Canada’s classiﬁcation as a minimal risk country is dependent on

annual testing of an appropriate number of animals in the hi gh-risk category.

59

“It is critical that they be followed. If we ever lose the right number and be
reclassiﬁed, we’re back to square one (Group 3).”

Another participant agreed, saying “It’s a very good supporting statement to the
proactive approach that Canada has — their ear tagging system, the feed ban, even though
it’s a bit in the press about it now and ﬁnally the way they investigated the ﬁrst case. If
you compared all those to what they’ve done in the US, you would see that Canada is
the leader. They set the standard for the rest of them to follow (Group 3).”

Another participant shared in respect to the protocols, “It’s actually going to make
our beef safer because we are testing for it, we are going to catch it. It’s going to make it
safer (Group 2).”

Self-Efﬁcacy. One research question was posed to determine producers perceived
ability to follow BSE protocols, “ What attitudes do Ontario beef producers reports about
their ability (self-efﬁcacy to comply with BSE protocols established by the Canadian
government?” Thought units coded under self-efﬁcacy total 6.5 percent (n=184) of the
total data. The primary focus of response from participants were beliefs about the their
ability to control the risk of BSE and suggestions about the behaviors they could do to
reduce the risk. Participants felt that they were unable or minimally able to control the
threat of BSE. Many farmers admitted that some of these behaviors did not follow the
protocols established by the Canadian Government. Fewer farmers said that they would
report suspect animals to be submitted for testing.

One participant admitted, . .it’s a helpless feeling because it’s out of our control

(Group 2).” Another participant shared the same sentiments, “Agriculture has to be the

60

only business in the damn world cannot — absolutely no control over what you’re going to
get for your ﬁnished product (Group 1).”

Another participant stated, “Basically, if I have a sick animal, I’m not going to eat
it and I’m not going to sell it to someone else (Group 4).”

In regards to following surveillance protocols, one participant admitted that they
didn’t believe couldn’t do so, “If we had a cow that went down and look suspicious. I

doubt it very much —I’m sure we wouldn’t [report it] (Group 2).”

Knowledge Constructs

Thought units coded as knowledge accounted for 14.5 percent (n=719) of the
data. Knowledge statements were not coded for accuracy, but were coded as statements
about farmer understanding and beliefs about the science of BSE, government
regulations, and the role of members in the food chain.

Science of BSE. Units coded as knowledge regarding the science of BSE
accounted for 4.7 percent (n=233) of the data. Participants in most groups had a basic
understanding of the science of BSE, but were unsure about what it all meant. Many
participants speculated about alternative causes of the BSE and the most accepted theory
of the origin of BSE. Few participants mentioned common symptoms of BSE or how to
identify a suspect animal.

One participant shared his view of, “I know what the technical stuff they’ve
talked about, but I don’t understand it, but I know it’s about the disease in their brain. I
don’t exactly know what that means. I haven’t ﬁgured it out. It’s infuriating. It can be

passed to humans if you eat the wrong parts. . .(Group 4).” Another participant added,

61

. .From the brains or the spine of an animal, any ways. Sheep or something like that
(Group 1).”

Another participant shared, . .From the information that I’ve got anyways that
the transmission of BSE came with imported cattle from the UK where this disease ﬁrst
showed up (Group 2).”

One participant characterized the symptoms of BSE as, “So, there’s some type of
quivering or unsteadiness (Group 2).”

Government Regulations. Units coded as knowledge of government regulations
represented 6.9 percent (n=343) of the data. Of the three knowledge categories, the
majority of comments made pertained to government regulations. Overall, participants as
a whole were very knowledgeable about the regulations governing the BSE issue in
Canada. One participant shared, “To keep our minimum risk status we have to test about
30,000 cattle a year that are 30 months of age and older (Group 3).”

Another participant was familiar with the how to gain the minimal risk
classiﬁcation, . .but the minimal risk, the World Organization, the OIE, minimal risk is
category is 2 cases per every million head of cattle per every 12 months (Group 1).”

Food Chain. Units coded as knowledge of the responsibility of other members of
the food chain accounted for 2.9 percent (n=143) of the data. Participants comments
centered around the fact that the responsibility of food safety in Canada was the
responsibility of not just the farmer, but all members of the food chain.

A participant said, “Everybody has to be prepared to do a one hundred percent job

right up to the store that got meat in the cooler (Group 3).”

62

Another producer put some of the responsibility of ensuring food safety on

consumers, “The consumer is part of the picture too (Group 3).”

Preferred Sources for Agricultural Information.

One research question was posed to determine what sources Ontario beef
producers prefer for agricultural information, “ What do Ontario beef producers report as
their preferred sources for agricultural information?” Thought units coded as media
accounted for 20.4 percent (n=1018) of the data. The media category was subdivided
into three categories: media accuracy/inaccuracy (9.2 percent; 45 8), preferred sources
(9.4 percent; n=469) and preferred style (1.8 percent; n=9l).

Media accuracy/inaccuracy. Thought units regarding the accuracy/inaccuracy of
media represented 9.2 percent (n=458) of the data. Main themes shared by participants
revolved around the media not presenting the whole story, media sensationalism, the
media not understanding the science that they are communicating, and the accuracy of the
farm media, and the media’s role in increasing the negative impact on the farm
community.

For example, one participant shared regarding the inaccuracy of the media, “The
only media coverage that you get is negative. You don’t get the positive side, when
things are good. You get a bad case, bang second story, third page of the paper or ﬁrst
page when it came out, but other stuff when things start to turn around like, you hear
nothing (Group 1).” Similarly, another participant shared, “The media, all they do is
highlights. The night it was on the news, of course, that’s the night when the tsunami had
hit. 80, I was just sitting there watching that, and all of a sudden, ‘oh another case of

BSE’, and that was it. And so, it wasn’t described more fully. So, even you know, what,

63

where is it? All these unanswered questions and I’m a producer. So, imagine what the
public thinks (Group 2).” In addition, another producer shared, “So much information is
out there that’s inaccurate, or omits points that could - key points that wouldn’t be so
harmful to the industry. For example, the Mad Cow, ﬁve seconds, whatever was said, we
have another case of Mad Cow, but no details. You know, those types of headlines don’t
help if they don’t have the facts right. They should have all the facts (Group 2).”

Another participant felt that the media did not do a good job of getting the whole
story out to consumers, “. . .They [the media] haven’t been unfair [to the beef producers],
but what I’m saying is their synopsis is not enough to properly inform them [consumers]
(Group 4).”

Media sensationalism to sell news was another key theme mentioned by
participants. For example, a participant claimed, “. . .media is just sensationalism selling.
That’s all media is (Group 1).” Another participant shared, “Media sells by
sensationalizing (Group 2).”

Many participants commented about their use of farm media publications. One
participant stated, “Farm publication are really good. . .our own publication 5 are
excellent, but unfortunately the public don’t have access to it (Group 2).

In regards to the role of media in increasing the severity of the BSE situation, a
participant shares, “We could stress enough how it’s so media related (Group3).”

Preferred Sources. Comments regarding preferred sources for agricultural
information accounted for 9.4 percent (n=469) of the data. Participants’ responses

regarding their preferred sources for agriculture information varied depending on the type

of information they were seeking. Furthermore, participants shared characteristics and
personality traits that made a source more creditable.

One participant admitted, “I read two or three papers and everyone has a different
angle on it and you try to decide what is the truth out of it and usually you can come up
with a good idea of what it is. And then you talk to some other people about it — other
farmers or somebody that lcnows more about whatever the topic is. . .I think read as much
as you can — any information that you can get your hands on (Group 1).”. Another
participant shared in regards to preferred agricultural sources, “I. would say the Internet
and perhaps farm newspapers and publications (Group 2).

For example, one participant shared the characteristics that are important in a
source, “Age and experience. I’d turn to an older farmer in the area any day before I
want to a government source or anybody else (Group 1).”

Preferred Style. Thought units coded as preferred style of messages accounted
for 1.8 percent (n=91) of the data. Comments focused on the format and length of
communication pieces and ideas to increase dissemination of information to farmers
through preferred communication channels.

With regards to the media message that was included in the focus group activity,
one participant shared, “It’s easier to understand cause you can go to the question you
want and there’s the answer (Group 3).” In another session, another participant shared a
similar opinion, “. . .it’s just the format. It’s in a question/answer format. It’s typical
questions that we as producers may be asking (Group 2).”

Another participant commented that attracting producers to a farm/town hall type

meeting might enhance communication efforts with producers about BSE, “If you could

65

attract them [producers] to a meeting and go over it, face-to-face or with a movie or
something - visual communication would be far better. But, written - any of us involved
in any organizational type thing, it just does not get read. It sits on the comer of their
desk and they may or may not ever get to it (Group 4).” Another participant felt that
communication efforts should rely on just one channel to disseminate information,
“You’ll get a certain percentage of people, but you’re not going to get them all. I don’t
think that you can effectively ask one media to - - get your message out to everybody. It

just doesn’t happen that way.

Behavior

A research question was not posited regarding current behaviors; however current
behavior and agricultural practices used by participants was a common theme that
emerged from the discussion. Data coded as behavior accounted for 4 percent (n=197) of
the gathered data. Overall, participants’ comments about current behaviors they
implement on their operations to reduce risk revolved around issues of animal health,
keep veterinary records for their animals, ﬁnding alternative avenues to market their beef,
and the need to do so to ensure the continued viability and sustainability of their farm
operations.

For example, one participant shared, . .we can take you and show you every
animal. . .any animal that has been doctored, the date, when it’s repeated and where that
animal came from, what sale it come from, what day it was marketed, what day it went
on feed. It’s just part of what we have to do to be in business in the feedlot sector

anymore because it’s part of our efﬁciencies, we have to have. . .(Group 3).”

66

Another producer talked about his successes at ﬁnding a new market to sell his
beef as a product rather than a commodity, “We just started last year to market beef

directly to the consumer in Ottawa (Group 2).”

Stigma

Data coded under the stigma category accounted for 4.9 percent (n=243) of the
data. Data coded as stigma included any statements made regarding the perceptions of
consumers and other farmers about the BSE issue and fears about being blamed for the
collapse of the Canadian beef industry. Key themes emerging in this category included,
consumer perceptions about the BSE situation and the support of the Canadian public
toward beef products.

For instance, one participant mentioned, “Most consumers think that it’s over.
They think the big problem is over (Group 1). Another participant added, “Most
consumers think that their food comes out of the back of the grocery stores, the don’t
even realize that it’s on-farm (Group 1).”

In another focus group session, a participant shared, “There’s lots of perceptions
that are the same. That everything is back to where it was [before BSE] (Group 3).”

Another participant shared his views regarding the Canadian public support of
Canadian beef producers,“. . .But we have to give the general population the credit, really.
I mean the fact that beef consumption has gone up in this country in some ways is sort of
a miracle and in the small world that I circulate in, I mean I’ve heard nobody say, well
you know, I’m not going to eat beef anymore. Now, the odd vegetarian, you know, may

say, you know, I’ve been right all along. You know, I was thinking of maybe having

67

some snip-it of beef, but I will never, ever. You know, these peOple didn’t eat beef

anyhow (Group 4).”

Summary

Chapters Four presented the ﬁndings gathered from four focus groups, with a total
of 28 participants. Findings for the HBM, knowledge, media and stigma categories were
thoroughly discussed. Participant quotes were included to demonstrate the common
themes that surfaced for each of the categories. Chapter Five will share the implications

and recommendations for these formative research results.

68

CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

In this chapter, conclusions, recommendations and implications for future
communication strategies targeting BSE will be presented based on the ﬁndings of the
study’s two objectives:

1) To investigate and assess the degree to which the main components of the HBM
inﬂuence Ontario beef farmers’ attitudes toward risk. ’
2) To identify the information sources used and trusted by Ontario beef farmers.

The goal of this study was to investigate Ontario beef farmers’ attitudes and
beliefs about bovine BSE using the health belief model (HBM). Findings could be used
to direct future message design and dissemination. Focus groups provided the setting for
an open discussion among farmers affected by the current BSE situation in Canada.
Open discussion amongst farms helped identify the relevant concerns of this community,
which will help communicators to develop more effective messages. By developing
messages that encourage appropriate behaviors that reduce the risk of BSE, increasing the
accessibility of reference material, and taking into consideration the barriers limiting the
adoption of recommended behaviors, communicators can play a vital role in reducing or

eradicating the risks associated with BSE.

69

Objective One Conclusions

This study assessed the degree to which the components of the HBM (perceived
susceptibility, perceived severity, self-efﬁcacy, response-efﬁcacy, perceived beneﬁts, and
perceived barriers) inﬂuenced farmers’ perceptions of the risk of BSE.

Perceived Susceptibility. Approximately 11 percent of the thought units were
coded under the perceived susceptibility construct. The majority of comments shared by
the participants illustrated that they were knowledgeable about the factors that make
herds more vulnerable to contracting BSE. On average, fanners in the focus groups
perceived their own herd to not be at risk of exposure to BSE. Farmers believed that their
herds were not at risk because they had closed operations, meaning that they did not bring
in cattle from other herds and did not feed protein supplements to their animals. For
example, one participant explained that his herd was not at risk because he grew
everything he fed to his cattle and he did not feed ruminant-derived feed to his animals.
Many of the comments shared revolved around the factors that make other farms, e.g.,
dairy farms or farms in Western Canada susceptible to BSE. Other comments shared
revolved around the likelihood of BSE occurring in Ontario and in the US. and how the
probability of infection is equally likely anywhere in North America.

Perceived Severity. Overall, statements concerning the perceived severity of the
situation dominated the four focus group discussions. Approximately 17 percent of
thought units were coded under this category. One common theme emerging from the
focus group discussion dealt with participants believing that the severity of the situation
has been magniﬁed due to political pressures limiting the distribution of Canadian beef

into export markets for the past two years. The majority of farmers felt that this situation

70

was political because if the science is correct and Canada is still classiﬁed as a minimal
risk country, then export markets should have opened their borders to Canadian beef a
number of months ago. They also believed the severity of this situation was far reaching
because the farming community was not the only sector feeling the impact of BSE in
Canada. Participants shared that farming is a traditionally stressful occupation, but the
BSE situation was unlike any they had ever experienced and knew other farmers who
were experiencing a wide range of health issues. Participants’ comments~ focused on the
number of that had or may soon exit the industry due to the impact that BSE has had on
the Canadian beef industry. In addition, participants felt that the impact of BSE would
prevent some future farmers from entering the industry, due to the uncertainty of the
future and Canada’s lack of export markets to Canadian livestock and beef products.
Furthermore, participants mentioned that this situation was affecting other industries,
such as farm equipment dealers and trucking companies.

Perceived Beneﬁts. Four percent of thought units were coded under this
construct. Participants brieﬂy mentioned beneﬁts that have been gained from living
through the BSE situation and the beneﬁts to establishing and following BSE protocols.
Some of the beneﬁts shared by participants included: 1) that the Canadian beef industry
was too dependent on the North American market and establishing a diverse market was
critical to the continued viability of the industry; 2) the Canadian public became more
aware of food safety initiatives; 3) the protocols developed in response to the treat of
BSE will result in safe beef products reaching the consumer; 4) and there were important

lessons to be learned from this situation.

71

Perceived Barriers. Overall, farmers did not spend much time discussing
obstacles to following recommended protocols, e. g., reporting a suspect animal.
Comments pertaining to perceived barriers accounted for approximately four percent of
the data. Farmers were candid about the factors that would limit them from incorporating
the recommended protocol established by the Canadian government. The main factors
shared that would limit participants’ ability to follow these measures, e.g. reporting a
suspect animal for testing included the potential negative impact it may have on the
industry and lengthening the amount of time that export markets keep borders closed to
Canadian livestock and beef products. Furthermore, participants shared that they were
concerned about the potential negative impact on their livelihood and the livelihood of
other farmers. Many participants reported that how members of the farming community
and non-farm public would view them could impede their ability to follow recommended
protocols.

Response-Eﬁ’icacy. Discussion concerning the effectiveness of BSE protocols
was limited. Approximately 4 percent of thought units were coded as response efﬁcacy.
Overall, the majority of participants believed that the recommended protocols such as
BSE testing and the removal of speciﬁed risk material (SRM) were necessary and did
work. In addition, the majority of participants agreed that the feed ban established by the
Canadian government in 1997 was an effective way to control the spread of BSE in
Canada.

Self-Efﬁcacy. Thought units surrounding the issue of self-efﬁcacy accounted for
approximately 7 percent of the data. Overall, many participants shared their beliefs about

how they could possibly control or reduce the risk of BSE infecting their herds. On

72

average, participants felt they were helpless and had little control over this situation. In
addition, many farmers admitted that that some of their behaviors did not follow the
recommended practices. Many farmers reported that they would have to really think
about all their options before they reported a suspect animal. Few participants said that
would deﬁnitely report a suspect animal.

Knowledge. Statements made by participants showed they were knowledgeable
about the risks associated with BSE. Participants were familiar with leading scientiﬁc
explanations for the cause of BSE. However, many farmers shared other theories about
alternate causes of BSE, such as “naturally-occurring” BSE or BSE being caused by
environmental factors. Farmers felt that this other causes of BSE were possible because
BSE cases in Canada have only been conﬁrmed on farms in Alberta. This uncertainty
regarding the cause of BSE seemed to make some participants speculated if the protocols
based on the “ruminant-derived” feed, along with the SRM removal, were enough to
eradicate the disease, especially if there are natural occurrences of the disease.
Participants were knowledgeable about the regulations and protocols established by the
Canadian government, such as the feed ban, removal of speciﬁed risk materials (SRM)
and testing protocols as part of the National Surveillance Program.

Behavior. Thought units about current behaviors practiced by farmers accounted
for four percent of the data. Comments regarding current behaviors focused on animal
health practices, keeping up-to-date veterinary records for all animals in their herds, and

ﬁnding alternative ways to market beef products.

73

Stigma. Approximately ﬁve percent of the data was coded under stigma. Key
themes emerging from the four focus groups included consumer perceptions about the

BSE situation and the support of the Canadian public since the discovery of BSE.

Objective Two Conclusions

In the mediagraphic questionnaire, participants were asked to rank their ﬁve most
preferred sources for agricultural information from a list of 12 sources. The majority of
participants ranked farm publications (mean ranking=1.61) as their most preferred source
of agricultural information. The second most preferred source was the Internet (mean
ranking=2.48). Commodity group information was ranked in third (mean ranking=4. 19).
Newspapers followed in fourth (mean ranking=4.71), and government publications were
ranked ﬁfth (mean ranking=4.76). This preferred channels reported by the participants
could be impacted by other demographic variables such as the age and education level.
For example, with the average age of participants in the study being 49 years of age may
explain the popularity of farm publications, commodity group information, newspapers,
and farm shows among the participants. Unexpectedly, the Internet ranked second most
preferred source of agriculture, but this could have been inﬂuence by the fact that the
majority of participants had (64.3 percent, n=18) pursued and completed post-secondary
education at the community college or university level. In addition, the majority of
participants stated that they were responsible for the decision-making on their farm (82.1
percent, n=23). These results illustrates that many of these farmers may use these
information sources to gather the information they need to make decision regarding their
farm operations. Therefore, farm publications, the Internet, commodity group

information, newspapers, and government publications should be considered for

74

disseminating BSE information to the farming community, which may result in the
message reaching the target audience. Furthermore, participants shared that-they access a
number of different sources before coming to a decision. Therefore, in order to
disseminate agricultural information effectively to producers, a number of sources should
be used.

Approximately 9 percent of thought units centered on the accuracy/inaccuracy of
the media regarding the BSE issue. Many participants spoke at length about the
inaccuracy of the media in reporting the BSE issue and the accuracy of the farm media in
communicating the issue to farm publics. Participants did realize that information
channels such as radio and television did not devote the time needed to accurately cover
the issue. Perhaps, this is linked to participants not ranking radio and television among
their preferred sources for agriculture information, as they did not receive adequate
information about the issue from these sources compared to other sources.

During the focus group discussions, thought units regarding preferred sources for
agricultural information accounted for approximately 9 percent of the data. The majority
of participants shared that they looked to a number of different agricultural information
sources before making decisions regarding their farm operations. Furthermore,
participants shared that they access different information sources depending on the
situation. This has implications for disseminating information to farmers, as risk
communication efforts should use a number of information channels to ensure that the
message will reach producers.

In regards to the style of messages, thought units accounted for 1.8 percent of the

data. Participants shared that there was more than enough information available about

75

BSE; however, they preferred the information be in a form, such as question/answer
format that could be easily accessed or placed on the fridge or tack board. Perhaps,
future communication efforts should attempt to deliver messages in this type of format to
help disseminate important information such as BSE symptoms and the steps needed to

report a suspect animal to ensure this information reaches beef producers.

Implications for Future Communications Efforts

This section will discuss the implications of the results found in this study and
how they can be applied to help guide future BSE communication efforts.

Witte, Meyer and Martell (2001) state that the threat (perceived susceptibility and
perceived severity) and the efﬁcacy of the recommended response are among the aspects
of a health-related risk message that remain consistent regardless of the health issue,
characteristics of the target audience, and the type of message.

Participants in this study felt that their herds were not susceptible to contracting
BSE, but feel that the threat of BSE is severe for the Canadian beef industry. Since
participants’ perceived susceptibility is low, it is important that messages focus on
increasing beef producers’ perceived susceptibility to BSE to increase beef producers’
perceived threat. Witte, Meyer and Martel] (2001) recommend that the threat component
of messages should focus on how vulnerable the audience is to a threat that is severe in
nature. To increase participants’ perceived susceptibility to their herd becoming infected
with BSE, communication efforts should emphasize to all Canadian beef producers, even
those classiﬁed as ‘low-risk,’ that they must be diligent in reporting suspect animals to
the Canadian Food Inspection Agency. Communicators will have to create messages that

motivate the farming community, especially beef producers, to take a proactive approach

76

to managing BSE and reducing or eliminating the threat of the disease in Canada. For
example, the threat component of a message could say, ‘My herd is at risk to contracting
BSE and I could lose my farm’. Increasing farmers’ perceived susceptibility to the risks
associated with BSE may lead producers to proactively deal with and follow
recommended protocols for other potential animal diseases such as bovine tuberculosis
and foot and mouth disease.

Because the majority of the comments made by participants highlighted the
seriousness of this situation to Canadian beef farmers, communication efforts should
depict the seriousness of BSE. However, messages should focus on efﬁcacy components
to illustrate how following the recommended protocols and anticipating and preparing for
potential risks can lessen the severity of the impact. For example, the efﬁcacy component
of a BSE message could say, ‘It’s critical that BSE protocols are followed. They will
only work if every farmer follows them. By submitting a suspect animal for BSE testing,
I can help the Canadian government track the spread of BSE in Canada’.

Although participants did not discuss beneﬁts of ﬁnding BSE in Canada, living
through the Canadian BSE situation and following the BSE protocols, communication
efforts should attempt to illustrate and promote these beneﬁts to Canadian beef
producers. For example, a message about the beneﬁts of discovering BSE and following
BSE protocols, could say, ‘Finding BSE in Canada has strengthened our food safety
system and made consumers aware of the protocols that are in place to ensure that a safe
beef product reaches the consumer. By following BSE protocols, we’ll have a safer beef

product for our consumers’.

77

Farmers in this study were very much aware of the risks associated with BSE and
the cause of the disease, but many barriers seem to limit their ability and desire to follow
recommended protocols, even though they believe that the protocols were necessary and
worked. Future messages must acknowledge the barriers farmers face and will again
have to provide efﬁcacy components to illustrate the positive impact that following these
protocols will have on individual farmers and the beef industry as a whole. For example,
a message acknowledging the barriers to following the recommended BSE protocols,
could say, ‘Financial costs to tag all animals for the National Cattle Identiﬁcation, and the
risk of ﬁnding another BSE-positive animal will have on the opening of exports markets
are valid reasons for not following BSE protocols, however, not following the BSE
protocols is putting the Canadian beef industry at risk, as it will make it much for difﬁcult
for the Canadian government to determine BSE levels in Canada. By following BSE
protocols we can offer a safer product to consumers’.

Communication efforts will have to motivate farmers to follow recommended
protocols and provide them with the conﬁdence and belief to successfully adopt the
behavior. For example, one farmer admitted that he was not conﬁdent that he could
determine if an animal fell under the classiﬁcation of “suspect animal” because he was
not familiar with the symptoms of BSE and would have to get a more knowledgeable
person to help make the decision. Another participant added that he only had one BSE
animal in the news- - the Holstein cow in England, as a reference. Therefore, future
communication efforts should attempt to further educate farmers in a concise manner and
reﬂect their knowledge and level of involvement. Perhaps, town hall type meetings in

each county, featuring a veterinarian, who is knowledgeable about the symptoms of BSE

78

and the types of animals that should be reported for testing, should be held to help
disseminate this information to the beef producers. In addition, incorporating a producer
panel of top beef producers in Ontario at an annual convention or conference to discuss
practices that have been implemented to reduce the risk of their livestock contracting
diseases such as BSE may help get the message to other producers and evoke change in
on-farm practices.

In addition, messages will need to accurately present scientiﬁc evidence and take
into account that, on average, farmers are very involved in this issue and knowledgeable
about the Canadian BSE situation. However, there is a lot of uncertainty concerning
BSE, which makes communication efforts challenging. Communicators will want to
consider a number of different communication channels, such as the ﬁve preferred
information sources reported by participants (farm publications, the Internet, commodity
group literature, newspapers, and farm shows). By using these preferred information
sources, communicators can target messages to increase perceived threat based on the
severity and susceptibility of BSE and to provide efﬁcacy components to illustrate how
producers can reduce the risk on their farms.

To increase the dissemination of accurate information to the farming community,
communication initiatives to beef farmers will have to clearly and concisely dismiss the
myths or alternate theories about the cause of BSE and focus on explaining the most
widely accepted theory that BSE is caused by contaminated, ruminant-derived feed.

Some farmers also expressed concerns about the transmission of BSE through the
feed. Reassurances will have to be included in messages to illustrate how other members

of the food chain are working to reduce BSE in Canada. For example, one participant

79

mentioned that ruminant-derived feed has not been banned for poultry and swine use.
Could contamination of cattle feed occur if a load of poultry feed was shipped before a
shipment of cattle feed and the transport was not properly cleaned?

Although farmers were familiar with the protocols, many shared that they were
uncertain about all the steps that were required to submit a suspect animal for testing.
The majority of the participants said that there was ample information about BSE in
Canada available to them. However, they felt that they needed information to be in more
accessible form. They suggested information could be placed on the refrigerator or
placed on a bulletin board, rather than having to dig through piles of publications or surf
the Internet. Perhaps the government, industry, or commodity groups could allocate
dollars to developing a reference tool that farmers could quickly refer to that has all the
key points.

By increasing farmers’ perceived susceptibility and perceived severity to the risk,
and providing efﬁcacy components and acknowledging the barriers that participants

reported, messages will successfully reach beef producers and evoke positive changes.

Implications for Beef Producers Disseminating Information to Media and Consumers

An unexpected result gained from this study was that many participants admitted
that the farming community was not effective in communicating their message to non-
farrn publics. For example, one farmer mentioned that he was surprised at the level of
commitment that Canadian consumers held for Canadian beef products - - as beef
consumption in Canada has grown since the discovery of BSE. Canadian consumers
seem to be very supportive of the Canadian beef industry. However, in saying this, the

industry should not take for granted the consumers level of commitment. For example, a

80

number of participants shared that the majority of consumers are unaware of the plight of
the Canadian beef farmer, do not realize that the US. border continues to restrict beef
imports from Canada, which is intensifying the severity of the situation for the farming
community. Therefore, money and communication efforts should be directed by the
farming community to ensure that the Canadian public has access to their message.
Furthermore, participants’ also spoke at length about the media not adequately presenting
all angles of the BSE story. It can be argued that farming community has an equal
responsibility in insuring that they communicate their stance on the BSE situation to
media to ensure that accurate and balanced information is disseminated to consumers and
other non-farm publics.

For instance, agricultural commodity groups at the national, provincial, and
county level may consider allocating a percentage of their operating expenses into
communication initiatives and public relations, to get their message out and heard by the
non-farm publics.

In addition, some participants mentioned there are deﬁnite lessons that can be
learned for this situation. The area of risk management and risk communication has
seemed to move to the focal point of the agricultural industry. In recent years, industry
and government have been working to incorporate risk management strategies into the
agricultural sector, such as implementing on-farm HACCP programs and requiring farms
in Ontario to develop nutrient management plans (OMAF, 2002). Perhaps, in the same
token, commodity groups and farmers should invest in proactive risk management or
contingency planning for future animal and public health issues. Such an approach may

reduce the negative impacts of futures, as steps will be in place to immediately handle

81

potential agricultural risk that may hit the beef industry such as bovine tuberculosis, foot

and mouth disease, and environmental and nutrient management issues.

Future Research

This study was conducted to gather baseline data about the attitudes and beliefs of
farmers from four counties in Ontario hold regarding the BSE situation they are currently
facing. Because a convenience sample was used in this study and not allcounties in
Ontario were included, the ﬁndings cannot be generalized to all beef farmers in Ontario
or to all farmers in the counties were the focus groups were held. Therefore, further
research should be conducted, perhaps using a mail questionnaire, based on the ﬁndings
from this study and using a random sample of beef farmers in Ontario. In addition, it
would be interesting to conduct similar focus groups in the Michigan or other high beef
producing states to compare the beliefs of farmers in the North American market.

As mentioned by many participants, a number of aspects of the food production
chain have been negatively impacted by the BSE situation. It would be beneﬁcial to
conduct focus groups with individuals representing various components of the food

production chain to better understand their attitudes and beliefs about BSE.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this study provides insight using the HBM to organize and code
data about the beliefs and attitudes of Ontario farmers about the BSE situation. The
scientiﬁc community is still working to uncover more about the science of BSE. As
scientiﬁc knowledge about BSE grows and uncertainty decreases, it will be necessary to

further understand how farmers perceive the threat of BSE and assess their risks to help

82

create effective communication campaigns targeted at beef farmers. This research study
provides preliminary insights that can help direct future message development around the
issue of BSE. Additionally, this study may prompt government, industry and commodity
groups to assess the effectiveness of their communication efforts toward farmers and
reconsider priorities regarding BSE and other potential threats that may negatively impact

the industry after BSE.

83

 

OFFICE or
RESEARCH
ETHICS AND
STANDARDS

University Committee on
Research lnvolvmo
Human Subjects

Michigan State Unive'rtiry
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APPENDIX A

MICHIGAN STATE Revision

 

U N l V E R S i T T App'ication
December 13. 2004 Approval
70' Luke Reese

409i Agriculture Hall

Re IRB I 04-592 Category: EXPEDITED 67
Revision Approval Date: December 10. 2004
Project Expiration Date: August 11, 2005

Title USING THE HEALTH BELIEF MODEL lHBMI TO DETERMINE THE BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES
OF ONTARIO BEEF FARMERS CONCERNING THE CANADIAN BOVINE SPONGIFORM
ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSEi SITUATION

The Unwersrty Committee on Research involving Human Subiects {UCRIHS} has completed their rewew of
your proiect l am pleased to advise you that the revision has been approved

This letter notes approval for changes made in the informed consent, instrument(s),
and subject incentive.

The revrew by the committee has tound that your reViSion is consistent With the continued protection of the
rights and welfare of human subjects. and meets the redoirements of MSU's Federal Wide Assurance and the
Federal Goidelines i45 CFR 46 and 21 CFR Part 501i The protection oI human subiects in researcn is a
partnership between the IRS and the investigators We look forward to working With you as we both fulfill our
responSibilities

Renewals UCRIHS approval is valid until the expiration date listed above, It you are continumg your proiect.
you must submit an Application for Renewal application at least one month before expiration It the proiect is
completed. please submit an Application for Permanent Closure

ReViSions UCRIHS must rewew any changes in the proiect. prior to initiation of the change Please submit an
Application for Rewsion to have y0ur changes reViewed It changes are made at the time of renewal please
include an Application for Revision With the renewal appiication

Problems ll issues should arise during the conduct of the research such as unantiCipated problems. adverse

events. or any problem that may increase the risk to the human subjects. notify UCRIHS promptly Forms are

avaiiable to report these issues.

Please use the IRB number listed above on any forms submitted which relate to this proiect or on any
COrrespondence With UCRIHS

Good lucx in yOur research if we can be oi further a35istance. please contact us at 517-355-2180 or we email
at UCRIHSQmSuegg Thank you for your cooperation

Sincerely

Peter VaSilenko PhD

UCRIHS Cha-r

c Michelle Marie Ruth McMullen
1404 Spartan Vlg
APT H

East Lansmg MI 48823 5705

84

APPENDIX B

<date>

Michelle McMullen

Graduate Student

406 Agriculture Hall

Agriculture and Extension Education
Michigan State University

East Lansing, MI 48823

Dear <name of Ontario Cattlemen’s Association Member>,

My name is Michelle McMullen and I am a graduate student at Michigan State University. My
Master’s research project is related to improving agricultural-based risk communication efforts
with farmers in Ontario. I am writing to invite you to a focus group interview to discuss your
insights, views, beliefs and attitudes regarding the BSE issue currently facing Canadian farmers.
Your time and honest comments will provide valuable insights into the important factors that
guide farmers decision-making related to agricultural-based risk issues, such as BSE and will be
beneﬁcial to the design of future communication campaign initiatives and research projects.

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. You can choose not to participate or not
answer certain questions. This study will consist of a 1.5 to 2 hour group interview (focus group).
The focus group will be tape-recorded to ensure that no participant comments are missed and
increase the accuracy of the data collection. If you are uncomfortable with being tape-recorded,
please do not agree to participate in this study. At any point during the focus group, you can
request to have the tape recorder turned off for a question or elect not to respond.

Dinner will be served at the beginning of the interview. You will receive an honorarium of $10
(Canadian) for participating in this study.

The focus group session will be held on [date] at [time] at [location].

All comments shared during the interview are conﬁdential. I will be solely responsible for
analyzing the data and writing the report, which will be completed by December 2004. At the
end this study, all documents with your name or address will be destroyed. Your privacy will be
protected to the maximum extent allowable by law. If you are interested in participating please
contact <name> at the Ontario Cattlemen’s Association by <date>. If you have any questions,
please contact me at (517) 420-0448 or at mcmull30@msu.edu.

Thank you in advance for your consideration. Please feel free to contact Dr. Peter Vasilenko,
Chair of the University Conunittee on Research Involving Human Subjects at (517) 355-2180, if
you have questions concerning your role and rights in this study.

Sincerely,

Michelle McMullen
Graduate Student

85

APPENDIX C

Informed Consent

Project Title: Using the health belief model (HBM) to determine the beliefs and attitudes
of Ontario beef farmers concerning the Canadian BSE situation

Participation in BSE Focus Group <date, location>

This focus group interview will address your thoughts, beliefs and attitudes about the
Canadian BSE situation. By signing this form, you give the researcher your permission
to share reports from the comments shared in the focus group discussions with the
extension education and agricultural communication research communities, via
professional journals, conferences and / or conference proceedings. Names of
participants will not be used in any reports. Your comments will be very beneﬁcial in
future agricultural-based risk communication efforts with farmers and direct further
research opportunities.

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you will receive an
honorarium of $10 Canadian for participating in this study. Focus group sessions will be
audio taped to increase accuracy of transcription, and the audiotapes will be destroyed at
the end of the research study. At any point during the focus group, you can request to
have the tape recorder turned off for a question or elect not to respond. The focus group
will last for approximately 1.5 to 2 hours depending on the length of the discussion. You
may refuse to respond to any questions that you feel uncomfortable with and we can stop
the taping anytime at your request. The researcher will be the only person to see your
remarks and all input will be kept conﬁdential. Electronic data will be stored on a
password-protected computer and / or in a locked cabinet.

My involvement in this study includes moderating the focus group session and analyzing
data generated from the focus groups. A scribe will be present during the focus group to
record key themes and comments shared during the discussion. Again, your information
will be kept strictly conﬁdential and your comments will not be identiﬁable in any reports
or ﬁndings.

Your privacy will be protected by the maximum extent allowable by law.
Your cooperation will help increase our knowledge regarding the beliefs and attitudes of

Ontario farmers about BSE, which will lead to enhanced communication efforts with the
agricultural community about risk issues such as BSE.

86

If you have any questions, please contact:

Michelle McMullen

406 Agriculture Hall

Michigan State University

East Lansing, MI 48823
mcmull30@msu.edu

(517) 355-6580 ext. 234 or (517) 420-0448

If you have any questions about your role and rights in this study, please contact:

Peter Vasilenko, Chair

University Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects(UCRIHS)
202 Olds Hall

East Lansing, MI 48824-1046

ucrihs@msu.edu

(517) 355-2180

 

I, voluntarily agree to participate in the focus groups about
the Canadian BSE issue conducted by Michelle McMullen and agree to have my voice
audio—taped.

 

Signed
Date

 

 

87

10.

APPENDIX D

Demographic and Mediagraphic Questionnaire

. Are you? (Please check one)

[3 Male El Female
How old are you? years

Identify the highest level of formal education you have completed. (Please check
one)

[3 Some high school [3 High school graduate

Cl Some community college [I] Community college graduate
Cl Some university El University graduate

Where is your farm located? County

 

. Please describe your involvement in farming. (Please check one)

El Part time [I Full time

How many years have you been farming? years
Are you responsible for the decision-making on your farm?
El Yes i: No

How many acres of land do you farm (Include both rented and owned land)?
acres

Approximately what percent of your gross income comes from farming? (Please
check one)

El Less than 25% Cl 25 to 49%
El 50 to 74% El 75% or more

Approximately what percentage of your gross farm income is earned from raising
beef cattle? (Please check one)

[I Less than 25% El 25 to 49%
l] 50 to 74% El 75% or more

88

11. How many bulls are currently on your farm that are one year or over?
bulls

12. How many cows (including heifers which have calved) are there on your farm?
cows

13. How many heifers are currently on your farm that that are one year old and over?
heifers

14. How many steers are currently on your farm that are one year and over?
steers

15. How many calves are currently on your farm that are under a year old?
calves

16. Do you raise other livestock?
D Yes [1 No

If yes, please identify the other types of livestock on your farm.

 

 

 

17. How do you prefer to receive agricultural information? (Please rank your top five,
please put a 1 beside the information source you most prefer, 2 beside the
information source you prefer second most, and so on.)

_ Farm publications __ Newspaper

_ Internet _ Commercial literature

_ Radio programming _ Television programming

_ Farm shows __ Government publications

_ Commodity group literature _ Government commodity specialists
__ Neighbours _ Other farmers

89

APPENDIX E

Moderator Guide

Section A — INTRODUCTION

Good evening and welcome to tonight’s session. Thank you for agreeing to participate in
tonight’s discussion about the Canadian BSE issue. My name is Michelle McMullen and
I am a graduate student at Michigan State University, studying agriculture and extension
education. I am interested learning about how you feel about the BSE issue in Canada.
Farmers from across Ontario have been invited to share their perceptions, beliefs and
attitudes about this issue.

Before we begin, let me share some ground rules for tonight’s session. Please speak up
and only one person should talk at a time. This session will be tape recorded because we
don’t want to miss any of your comments. If several people are speaking at one time it
will make transcription more difﬁcult and we may miss some of your comments. We
will be one a ﬁrst name basis tonight. No names will be will be included in any of the
reports. Your comments are conﬁdential. Keep in mind that your comments — both
positive and negative will help us in our efforts to improve communication about
agricultural-based risk issues with the farming community.

There are no right or wrong answers. We want everyone to feel comfortable sharing their
ideas, thoughts, beliefs and feelings. Please do not be afraid to tell the group what you
think, even if it sounds that you are disagreeing with others or if it sounds strange. We
expect that you will have different points of view. Please feel free to share your opinions
even if it differs from what others have said. Sometimes it might seem hard to speak up,
but everyone should try to talk if they have something to say. Next, do not interrupt each
other. Finally, be respectful of others comments, even if you don’t agree with what has
been said.

Feel free to get up and get more refreshments if you would like. Finally, if you need to
use the washroom, please get up quietly and come back so we can hear more of your
thoughts. Are there any questions? Okay, let’s begin.

SECTION B — WARM UP

I’d like to begin by having everyone tell us their name and the number of years they have
been farming.

9O

1.

Probe:
Probe:
Probe:
Probe:
Probe:

Probe:

Probe:
Probe:

Probe:
Probe:

4.
5.
Probe:

Probe:
Probe:

6.

Probe:
Probe:

SECTION C - ACTIVITY

We’d like you to take a look at a media message about an agricultural-based
risk issue. Please take a moment to look at it.

What do you like about it?

What do you dislike about it?

Is there anything that is “important” to remember about this message?
Do you understand the content of this message?

Do you like the style in which the message was presented?

Where do you usually look for advice or information to make decisions
regarding your farm?

Whom would you prefer to talk to about agricultural issues that may
inﬂuence or impact your proﬁtability (or long term viability) of your
farm? Why?

What makes someone or a source better than another? Why?

Are there certain agricultural-based issues or situations where one source
would be better than another?

How often have you discussed mass media coverage with a) family members
b) other farmers c) extension agents (TV, newspaper, farm publications, radio,
etc.) about the BSE situation currently facing farmers in Canada?

What kinds of things did you talk about?
Are there others who you have discussed this issue with?

SECTION D - KNOWLEDGE OF BSE

What does BSE stand for?
What is it?

How do cows become infected with BSE?

How is BSE passed onto other cattle?

What steps should be taken if a farmer thinks one of their cows is infected
with BSE?

SECTION E - PERCEIVED SUSCEPTIBILITY

How likely do you feel that it is for cattle from Ontario farms to get BSE?

Can BSE be passed from one animal to another animal?
What symptoms do BSE infected cows display?

91

Probe: Do you feel that your herd is at greater risk of contracting BSE following
the discovery of the BSE-positive cow in Alberta in 2003 than during the
BSE epidemic in the UK?

7. What makes one herd more at risk to BSE than another herd? Why?

SECTION F - PERCEIVED SEVERITY

8. In your opinion is BSE more than just an animal health issue?

9. How serious is the BSE issue for beef farmers in Ontario?

Probe: What does the conﬁrmation of one BSE-positive cow mean to you and
your farm operation?

Probe: Other than economic risks of BSE to farmers, can you think of any other
risks that are associated with BSE?

Probe: Have you ever worried about your herd becoming exposed to BSE?

Probe: What does BSE mean to you and your farm operation?

Probe: Do you think that Ontario beef farmers should be concerned about BSE?
SECTION G - PERCEIVED BENEFITS

10. What are the beneﬁts of knowing about BSE?

Probe: Are you familiar with BSE surveillance measures at the federal and
provincial level?

Probe: What are the beneﬁts of following surveillance measures established by
the Canadian Food Inspection Agency?

Probe: Are there any beneﬁts to the Canada’s Surveillance System discovering a

BSE-positive animal?
SECTION H - SELF—BF F ICACY
l 1. Can you control the chance of your herd becoming exposed to BSE?
12. What can you do to protect your herd from BSE?

13. What can farmers do to reduce the risk of BSE?

Probe: Does the BSE surveillance measures adequately reduce the risk of BSE in
Canada?

Probe: What role does the farming community play in ensuring safe food reaches
consumers?

14. How conﬁdent do you feel that you can follow BSE surveillance measures?
Why?

92

SECTION I - BARRIERS

15. What factors would limit you from incorporating the recommended
surveillance protocols developed by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency
(i.e., reporting of a downer cow or suspect animal)?

Probe: Do you think that you will worry less, more or the same about BSE in the
future?

Probe: Are the recommended BSE surveillance measures clear and easy to
understand?

SECTION J — CONCLUSION

We have completed the focus group questions. Do you have any other comments or
questions that you would like to share with the group? Thank you for your taking time
out of your busy schedule to participate in this study. Here is my business card if you
need to get in touch with me with any questions, concerns or other input. Thanks again.

93

Unitization

APPENDIX F

Approach: To use a level of analysis that allows the researchers to capture the richness
and complexity of the data. Researchers are seeking 100% coder agreement on
unitization.

Unitization rules

Unit of analysis is a thought unit. Typically, a thought unit consists of a
subject/verb pairing or a simple sentence.

Example: “The only media coverage that you get is the negative.”
Example: “I think they’ve done a good enough job of this surveillance
testing.”

Example: “I think producers are waiting to see what happens with the
latest case.”

Example: “The style is good.”

Within compound and complex sentences, multiple thought units will exist and
should be coded individually as thought units.

Example: Yeah, so. If it hadn’t been BSE, it would have been something
else. / I think that the timing was really bad for us. / As Participant [X]
says it’s a political issue / and it unfortunately, BSE we had a case / and it
was just really bad timing / and once again the media, / it’s from the
sensationalism / and the psychological...

Key words to look for between thought units: but, because, and as well as, so,

etc...

Do not allow punctuation to guide coding, as it is subjective to the transcriber.

Qualiﬁers should not be coded as an individual thought unit.

Example: You know, so what you’re say, in other words

94

APPENDIX G

 

Coder Deﬁnitions

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

OVERALL SECONDARY CODE EXAMPLES

CATEGORY CATEGORY

Threat: Any Severity: How bad is BSE? SEV—l o “, , .most serious issue we’ve
statement ever faced. .

suggesting a 0 “We’re hanging by our
source of ﬁngertips and it looks like
danger they’re going to break.”

0 “It’s cost me equity...”

0 “One cow destroyed the
whole country.”

0 “We’ll always think about
this equity erosion for the
problems we’re facing.”

Susceptibility: Self: How SUS-ZA o “I don’t feel that my herd is
How likely is likely is at risk.”
your herd to your herd
contract BSE? to get it?
Other: SUS-ZB o “I think that the probability
How likely is very high.”
are other 0 “But, I think that it was a
farms to Western [Canada]
contract problem.”
BSE?
How likely SUS-2C 0 “We don’t eat brain here.”
are people 0 “Taking out the SRM’s
to contract that’s going to prevent
vCJD? transmission.”
Knowledge: BSE: What is BSE? What BSE-3A o “A prion in the meat
Any statement are the symptoms? How do source.”
or belief about cows become infected with o “_ _ .you could come down
BSE BSE? with Creutzfeldt-Jakob
Disease.”
Government regulations: GOV-4 0 “They’re putting extreme

 

Familiarity with

government regulations (i.e.

surveillance and risk
reduction)

 

 

pressure on us to report
these cows.”

0 “The surveillance has
nothing to do with the
risk...”

 

95

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Food chain: Any statements F C- 5 0 “Everybody has to be
about the role of producers, prepared to do a 100
slaughter houses, packers, percent job right up to the
government, etc. store that that’s got meat in
the cooler.”
o “The consumer is part of this
picture too.”
Stigma: Fear of being STIG-6 a “I’m a bit concerned about
blamed for collapse of how the public views us.”
Canada’s beef industry, fear 0 “, , .the consumer thinks BSE
of consumer perceptions, is over...”
Perceptions 0f other farmers - “. . .is it safe .now to eat
beef?”
Efﬁcacy: Perceived Beneﬁts: BEN-7 o , ,ﬁ-om a health perspective
Any statement Advantages gained as a maybe.”
about a belief result of following 0 “Keep it [BSE] out of our
about whether surveillance protocols or foods.”
or not you can knowing about BSE or . “. , .maintain consumer
do something ﬁnding BSE in Canada conﬁdence.”
0 “. . .every animal is traceable
to where it came from.”
Perceived Barriers: Things BAR-8 o “Might be fear of
that stop farmers from community or public
following recommended response...”
practices (i.e. reporting 0 “And every time we report
suspect animals) on [BSE-positive animal]
look what happens.”
Self-Efﬁcacy: Ability of an SE-9 o “If we had a cow that went
individual to do the down and looked
recommended behavior suspicious, I doubt it very
much [reporting it to
authorities]. . .”
0 “I’m not sure that we would
call them.”
0 “I’d report it.”
Response-Efﬁcacy: Will RE-lO 0 “Taking out the SRMs,

 

the recommended behavior
work?

 

 

that’s going to prevent
transmission.”

0 “It’s actually going to make
our beef safer...”

 

96

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Behavior: Statements of behaviors that BEH-ll e “We did more to value add
Any farmers are actually doing. to them...”
statements This includes knowledge of 0 “I’ve written records of
about things BSE symptoms and every health treatment I’ve
being done to prevention. done in the last 5 years.”
prevent/protect
Media Statements about MED- o “The media all they do is the
accuracy/inaccuracy of 12 highlights.”
media sources. 0 “Media sells by
sensationalizing.”

- “The only media coverage
that you get is the
negative.”

Statements about preferred INFO- - “Other farmers, vets.”

information sources. 13 o “1 read and talk to farmers
too. A combination of the
two.”

0 “I’d say the Internet and
perhaps farm newspapers
and publications.”

Statements about preferred STYLE- 0 “It be nice to see the media

message style. 14 put something like this in
plain form like that for the
general public. . .”

o “I like it better when there
are questions.”

Other: Any OTH-lS 0 “Along with most colleges
other don’t care. . .”

statement that

does not

explicitly ﬁt in

the above

categories

 

 

 

 

Note: Each thought unit is only to be coded into one category.

Decision Rules: any unit that could ﬁt into a knowledge category OR threat, efﬁcacy, or
behavior category will be placed in the category that is not knowledge. In other words,
threat, efﬁcacy, or behavior categories take precedence over knowledge.

97

 

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