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CONTEXTUAL FRAMES OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN
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FORWARD/BACKWARD — LOOKING NEGOTIATION PRIOR TO
OSLO I
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CONTEXTUAL FRAMES OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT:
FORWARD/BACKWARD — LOOKING NEGOTIATION PRIOR TO OSLO 1
By

Carsten Benjamin Tripscha

A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University
In partial fulﬁllment of the requirements
For the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS

Communication Arts and Sciences

2005

ABSTRACT
CONTEXTUAL FRAMES OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT:
F ORWARD/BACKWARD — LOOKING NEGOTIATION PRIOR TO OSLO I
By
Carsten Berij amin Tripscha
One of the aspects of the Israeli — Palestinian conﬂict that has as of yet remained

unexplored, is the rhetorical frame that is established by the statements of political
leaders. Using Zartman’s theory of Forward- and Backward — Oriented Negotiation, as
well as Donohue’s Relational Order Theory, this thesis examines speeches made by
Israeli and Palestinian leaders in the months preceding the Oslo I Accords. Three
hypotheses and one research question were postulated. The ﬁrst hypothesis, that the
discourse is signiﬁcantly more forward — oriented was not conﬁrmed. The second
hypothesis, that Palestinians use signiﬁcantly more backward — oriented rhetoric than
Israelis was conﬁrmed. The third hypothesis, expecting a positive relation between
forward — looking messages and afﬁliation messages, as well as between backward —
looking messages and power messages was strongly conﬁrmed. The research question

examined the ﬁequency of the use of various types of forward and backward looking

messages.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES .................................................................. iv
INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 1
HISTORICAL CONTEXT ......................................................... 3
FORWARD-fBACKWARD-LOOKING NEGOTIATION .................... 9
RELATIONAL ORDER THEORY .............................................. 14
HYPOTHESES ....................................................................... 16
METHODS AND DATA ANALYSIS ........................................... 18
RESULTS ............................................................................ 1 9
DISCUSSION ........................................................................ 22
LIMITATIONS ..................................................................... 25
APPENDIX A ....................................................................... 27
APPENDIX B ........................................................................ 31
REFERENCES ...................................................................... 33

iii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Variable Means .......................................................... 20

Table 2: Paired-Samples T-tests ................................................ 21

iv

INTRODUCTION

The Israeli-Palestinian Conﬂict has gone through numerous turning points in the
past two decades. The violent conﬂict of the Intifada of 1988 turned into the hope for a
peaceful coexistence aﬁer the Oslo Accords of 1993, which turned to doubt and
uncertainty after the assassination of Yithzak Rabin in 1995 and the more aggressive
policies of Benjamin Netanyahu. The second Intifada, which began in the fall of 2000
ﬁnally has turned into a sustained campaign of terror and violence by both sides, and a
peaceful solution to the conﬂict seems as far away as it did in 1988. The conﬂict itself,
as well as the negotiations that led up to the Oslo Accords, have been the subject of
numerous studies, books, and research projects.

Yet one of the aspects of the negotiations that has as of yet remained unexplored,
is the context in which Israelis and Palestinians conducted these negotiations. Donohue
has looked at the relational frame that was established by the rhetoric (Donohue 1998,
Donohue and Hoobler, 2002). This study will draw upon his works, and also attempt to
use Zartman’s theory of Forward- and Backward-Looking negotiation strategies, to
examine the context that was created by the rhetoric of Israeli and Palestinian leaders in
the months leading up to the Oslo I Agreements.

1 hypothesize that the use of rhetoric established a contextual frame in which
politicians on both sides operated, and therefore put constraints on the way the
negotiations occurred. Since the data collected by Donohue and Hoobler was available
for use in this study, I also decided to look for possible relationships between the

relational frame of the negotiations and the contextual frame established by the rhetoric.

Aﬁer an in-depth review of the history of the conﬂict, the theory itself will be examined,
as well as the work of other researchers regarding the conﬂict. A series of hypotheses will
be established, and a coding scheme and methods of testing the hypotheses will be

introduced and explained.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conﬂict reach back several decades. In 1897
Dr. Theodore Herzl published The Jewish State, which led to the foundation of the
Zionist movement. This movement aimed for the establishment of a Jewish state in
Palestine, by emigrating and purchasing land from Arab landowners. The ﬁrst Jewish
settlers in Palestine embodied a spirit that in many ways is carried on by the settlers of
today. Known as Halutz, one who goes before the collectivity, they formed the core of
the initial settlements, denying themselves material comforts, status or power, in order to
pave the way for the community to follow in their wake. Their ideology valued self-
defense and self-reliance, as well as celebration of Hebrew heritage and culture
(Eisenstadt, 1967.) In many ways these values are carried on not only by the settlers of a
Gaza or West Bank Kibbutz, but also by leading Jewish politicians (Inbar, 1998) who
believe that Israel cannot expect or depend on outside protection.

The hard work of Jewish pioneers paid off, when in 1917 the British government
issued the Balfour Declaration, which supported a Jewish homeland in Palestine, and in
1922 the League of Nation gave the British Crown the mandate over Palestine.

Even though the Balfour Declaration speciﬁcally emphasized that the civil rights
of any existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine would not be infringed upon,
(Stoessinger, 1998) the Arabs, who had lived in Palestine for centuries, opposed the
Balfour declaration. The large inﬂux of Jewish immigrants, especially during the 19308
when Jews were persecuted in Germany, was seen as a threat to their own way Of life.
Clashes between Jews and Arabs became more and more common, as the numbers of

Jews in Palestine increased to hundreds of thousands.

In 1947 Great Britain announced that they would relinquish their mandate over
Palestine, and the United Nations formed a special committee in order to oversee the
partition of Israel and Palestine. The Jews were to receive 55% of the territory (even
though they only made up one third of the population), while the Arabs were to receive
the rest (Stoessinger, 1998). The Arabs vehemently opposed the decision, and aﬂer the
partition was approved by a vote of the United Nations General Assembly on November
29‘“, 1947, both sides prepared for the conﬂict they assumed would erupt as soon as the
British left the Middle East.

The Jews declared the establishment of the State of Israel on May 14‘“, 1948, the
day the British mandate over Palestine ended. The next day the armies of Transjordan,
Syria, Lebanon and Egypt invaded the newly-proclaimed nation. They had superior
numbers and ﬁrepower, but after several months of ﬁghting the Jews were in possession
of vast territories as well as part of the city of Jerusalem. They now occupied more land
than they would have under the UN partition plan. 1 million Arabs were displaced into
Egypt, Transjordan and Syria. Out of these refugees grew the seeds of the Palestinian
resistance, who would later form the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Hamas, and
Hizbollah.

Further wars between Israel and its neighbors, 1956, 1967, and 1973, left Israel
with even more occupied territory, such as the Sinai, the West Bank, and the Golan
Heights, and deepened the rifts between Israelis and Arabs, even though the Sinai was
eventually returned to Egypt.

In 1988 the resentment that the Palestinians living in the occupied territories felt

ﬁnally erupted into outright rebellion. The Intifada, as the uprising was called, disrupted

life in the West Bank and the Gaza strip as hundreds of thousands of Palestinians
demanded an independent state. Negotiations came to an impasse when the Palestinians
declared the PLO to be their only legitimate representative, and the Israeli government
refused to negotiate with a terrorist organization.

A breakthrough was made in 1993, with the Oslo Accords. Several
representatives ﬁom Israel and Palestine met informally in Norway in order to discuss
potential solutions for the conﬂict. The Norwegians did not take an active role in the talks
at ﬁrst, but acted as facilitators, providing a neutral setting for both parties. The leader of
the Norwegian delegation was available for private conversations with the delegates, but
did not initially attend the meetings between both sides. As both sides began to see him
as a trustworthy partner, they asked him to take a more active part in the negotiations.
They also began to trust the other side more, as they interacted with them on a regular
basis and got to know them better. Eventually the relationship between the Israelis and
the Palestinians became so secure that even the introduction of a more aggressive, less
compromising Israeli delegate, and several acts of violence in Israel and the occupied
territories could not shake their resolve to ﬁnd a solution that was acceptable for both
sides.

The talks in Oslo led to the creation of a Declaration of Principles, signed in
Washington in September 1993, which was designed to gradually transfer power in the
occupied territories to a newly-famed Palestinian Authority. It stipulated free elections
in the West Bank and Gaza, withdrawal of Israeli troops, negotiations about the
permanent status of the PA within two years, and ﬁnal status negotiations within a ﬁve

year transition period (Naumkin and Zvyagelskaya, 2005).

This Interim Agreement should be implemented in three stages:

1) Signing of an agreement on Gaza and Jericho in Cairo, May 1994. This
agreement laid out the plan for troop withdrawal and redeployment from Gaza
and Jericho, as well as the gradual transfer of power to the Palestinian
Authority.

2) Signing of an agreement that transferred jurisdiction over education, culture,
social security, tourism, and taxation to the Palestinian Authority, as well as
plans for gradual transfer of jurisdiction over labor relations, industry,
agriculture and other spheres of public life.

3) Signing of the Interim Agreement in September 1995. Known as Oslo II this
agreement divided Gaza and the West Bank into three zones of jurisdiction,
with Zone A being under full control of the PA, Zone B under Palestinian
administration but secured by Israel, and Zone C under full Israeli control.
Israel kept 71% of the West Bank and 35% of the Gaza strip.

The Oslo Accords were seen as a breakthrough in the peace process by some,
while others vehemently opposed them. Israeli opponents of the agreements saw them as
capitulation before the Arab world, a betrayal of the idea of a Greater Israel, and as a sign
of weakness which would lead to more conﬂict (Lustick, 1997). Radical settlers, the
Likud opposition party, and conservative Jews protested against the agreement. To them
Arafat was nothing but a terrorist, and his return to Palestine in 1994 was met with
demonstrations of protest in Israel, which included pogroms, acts of vandalism and
assaults on Arabs. Violent opposition against Oslo I manifested in incidents such as

Baruch Goldstein’s massacre of Muslim worshippers in a mosque in Hebron in February

1994, and especially in the religiously motivated assassination of Prime Minister Rabin
by Yi gal Amir in November 1995 (N aumkin and Zvyagelskaya, 2005).

Palestinian opponents of the Oslo Accords argued that Israel was not making any
substantial or sufﬁcient concessions, that the status of East Jerusalem and Palestinian
refugees was not resolved yet, and that accepting the agreement would acknowledge
Israel’s right to exist on land that the Arabs considered stolen from them. Hamas and
Islamic Jihad in particular, increased their attacks on Israel in an attempt to derail the
peace process, and in retaliation for the Hebron massacre (N aumkin and Zvyagelskaya,
2005)

Since forces on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides systematically sabotaged
implementation of the agreements, tensions continued to rise, and trust in the peace
process declined with every passing year. A narrow vote of acceptance for Oslo II in the
Knesset, and continued building of settlement in the West Bank, as well as constant
attempts to renegotiate the agreements by the Israelis, alienated the Palestinians, who had
hoped for more autonomy at a faster pace. Continued attacks by Islamic radicals on the
other hand, combined with what Israelis perceived as insufﬁcient action taken against
them by Arafat, made the Israelis doubt the validity of Palestinian commitment. The
work of anti-Oslo groups such as Peace Watch and Independent Media Review and
Analysis (IMRA), whose main work consisted in cataloging Palestinian ‘violations’ of
the peace agreements (Lustick, 1997) did not help to improve relations. Subsequent
negotiations at Wye River, Camp David and Sharm al-Sheik never managed to recapture
the spirit of Oslo 1, in which both parties negotiated in good faith and established a

working trust that allowed them to create an atmosphere in which it was possible for

them to come to mutually satisfying conclusions. Finally, in the fall of 2000, Ariel
Sharon provoked the second Intifada by visiting Temple Mount, disregarding Muslim
sentiment. The backlash has escalated into a spiral of violence which has claimed
hundreds of lives, and made it extremely unlikely that either side will be open to
negotiation in the near ﬁIture.

The Israeli-Palestinian Conﬂict has been studied for decades. It would be beyond
the scope of this study to list all the theories and approaches that have been used to
examine the conﬂict and its implications. Researchers have looked at the historical events
of the conﬂict (Quandt, 2001; Naumkin and Zvyagelskaya, 2005), the rhetoric of leaders
(Donohue and Hoobler, 2002), changes in Israeli security policies and how the peace
process impacted them (Gazit, 1998; Smooha 1998), and in recent years the failure of the
Oslo Accords (Lustick, 1997; Rabbani, 2001).

The main focus of this study will be Forward- and Backward-Looking rhetoric, as
postulated by Zartman (2005). I will also draw upon the work of Donohue and Hoobler
(2002) who used Relational Order Theory in order to analyze the rhetoric of political

leaders in the months leading up to Oslo II.

F ORWARD-lBACKWARD-LOOKING NEGOTIATION

Zartman’s (2005) theory of Forward- and Backward-Looking negotiation
strategies assumes that there are two approaches to resolving a conﬂict. One approach,
which he calls ‘Negotiating Backward-Looking Outcomes’ is focused on ending the
violent stage of the conﬂict, accountability for past wrongs, and compromise outcomes,
that do not resolve the underlying conﬂict. The symptoms will be addressed, while the
cause will still be there, ignored or denied beneath compromise outcomes. Backward-
looking negotiation is characterized by a focus on the other side, and a zero-sum
mentality, which assumes that any gains made by one side, come at the expense of the
other.

Forward-looking negotiation on the other hand is characterized by an attempt to
resolve the underlying causes of the conﬂict, in order to create a new framework in which
both sides cooperate in order to maintain a positive relationship. Its main characteristics
are a focus on similarities between both sides, the acknowledgement of mutual
responsibility, and an awareness of the underlying reasons of the conﬂict, which
backward-looking negotiation either ignores or denies.

Zartman’s work on Forward- and Backward-looking negotiation strategies ties in
with the works of several other researchers, as well as the two major paradigms of
international relations theory. Backward-looking negotiation is very reminiscent of
Realism, a school of thought which can be traced as far back as the works of Thucydides
in ancient Greece. Realists assume that states are unitary actors in an anarchic system.
Within this system there is no regulating authority, and each state or nation’s goal is to

maximize power, or in the neo-realist school developed by Kenneth Waltz, security. This

strive towards power or security, however, will leave other states with a feeling of
insecurity or weakness, which they will attempt to remedy by increasing their own
power/security. Realism states that negotiations between nations take the form of zero-
sum games, and that both sides are more concerned with relative, rather than absolute
gains. That means that they will accept outcomes that will give them a lesser payoff than
alternative solutions, if the alternative solution gave their opponent a marginally larger
payoff than themselves (Hopmann, 1995).

The other major paradigm, Liberalism, corresponds to Zartman’s ideas about
Forward-looking negotiation. Liberalism sees states as compositions of various forces
and interest groups, each with their own agenda. Nations can cooperate in order to
overcome the anarchy of the system, and it is possible for regulatory institutions to insure
compliance with treaties and agreements. Negotiations are not necessarily zero-sum, and
while states still act in their own best interest, it is absolute gains that are important to
them, rather than relative gains (Hopmann, 1995).

Both paradigms can be used to illustrate events regarding the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process. Israel certainly focused on security, as would be expected under Realism,
yet the inﬂuence of minority groups and special interest groups on the peace process, as
well as changes in Israeli policies under Likud and Labor governments are something that
is explained by Liberal thinking, rather than by Realism. Neither side can fully explain
the policies and processes involved, therefore it seems that both paradigms are necessary
in order to understand the situation.

Another distinction between negotiation strategies can be found in the works of

Bartos (1995), who distinguishes between the integrative and the distributive negotiation

10

process. To him, the distributive process is concerned with concession-making,
bargaining, and reciprocity. Each side makes a concession that is met by the other side,
and the larger the concession one side makes, the larger the reciprocal concession it
receives. Integrative negotiation processes on the other hand, are not only concerned with
concession-making, but also with ﬁnding alternatives with allow both parties to proﬁt. .
Bartos found that integrative processes can be more productive, but only if both sides
work together in ﬁnding new solutions. This is similar to Zartman’s Forward-looking
processes, in which both sides attempt to ﬁnd solutions which are beneﬁcial and mutually
satisfying to both sides. Here as well, both sides need to cooperate, because if one side
uses Backward-looking strategies, while the other side uses Forward-looking strategies,
ﬁnding mutually satisfying outcomes will be unlikely.

One ﬁnal researcher whose work is relevant to the use of Forward- and
Backward-looking strategies is Herbert Kelman. Kelrnan’s work focuses on what he calls
the ‘Interactive Problem-Solving Approach’ (Kelman 1996, 1997). The Oslo I Peace
Accords are an excellent example of this approach. Kelman argues that ofﬁcial
negotiations are important, but that participants are under pressure from their
governments, their constituents and the world community, to reach an agreement, which
does not allow them to develop a working relationship with the other side. His suggestion
is independent and inofﬁcial workshops in which representatives from two conﬂicting
parties meet in informal settings. Participants are people who can inﬂuence the decision-
making process and have shown a desire to engage in negotiations with the other side.

Such a group was assembled by the Norwegians in 1993, and since they met informally

ll

they were not under as much pressure to reach an agreement as they would have been in
an ofﬁcial setting.

Kelman further argues that informal workshops allow participants from both sides
to overcome their cultural stereotypes about each other, and see the other representatives
as people with a desire for peace as strong as their own. Accordingly they can develop a
working trust, and begin solving small problems ﬁrst, ﬁnding joint solutions that satisfy
both sides and ways of implementing them. Eventually, the theory goes, they can discuss
the underlying causes of the conﬂict and ﬁnd mutually satisfying solutions for them as
well. Oslo I showed the development of a working trust and personal relationships
between representatives. It also showed an effort by both parties to ﬁnd solutions for
problems. It fell short in solving all the issues that concerned the Israelis and Palestinians,
however, postponing negotiations about full Palestinian autonomy, the status of
Jerusalem, and the problems of refugees and settlements in the occupied territories. These
issues were to be addressed during the Oslo H negotiations several years later.
Unfortunately this meant that the Oslo II negotiations were constrained by the problems
that according to Kelman impact ofﬁcial negotiations: a set agenda, international and
governmental observation and the pressure to reach an agreement that pleased a
constituency at home. Therefore both sides approached Oslo II with very different
expectations than Oslo I.

To Kelman conﬂict is driven by the needs and fears of a collective, in this case
the Israeli and Palestinian communities respectively, which can pervade all levels of
society. Because members of each community are confronted with the conﬂict on a daily

basis, they establish certain opinions of the other side. They see the other side as a threat

12

to their fundamental needs, such as physical safety and security as well as autonomy and
national identity.

It is because of these fears that negotiators must ﬁnd a balance between demands
and concessions. Making too many concessions can be perceived by their own side as
compromising essential needs, while making too many demands will be seen as a threat
by the other party of the conﬂict.

Kelrnan’s work is important because it shows a practical application of Zartman’s
theories. His informal workshops allow the exploration of Forward-looking strategies,
and make it possible for both sides to ﬁnd ways to implement these strategies. They allow
for a reframing of the issues, which allows both sides to see the roots of the conﬂicts,
rather than the mere symptoms. By refraining the problem, new and alternative solutions
can be found, which is what happened in Oslo 1.

In order to analyze statements for Forward- or Backward-looking content, a
coding scheme was developed, and later revised by Druckrnan. This revised coding
scheme will be used in this study. It allows for statements to be coded according to their
orientation (Forward-, Backward- or Neutral) as well as for their focus (Cause, Process,
and Outcome). By using this coding scheme, it will be possible for coders to analyze a
statement and assign to it one of seven conditions: F orward-Cause, Forward-Process,
Forward-Outcome, Backward-Cause, Backward-Process, Backward-Outcome and
Neutral. This way it will not only be possible to analyze content regarding the use of
Forward- and Backward- looking strategies, but also to ﬁnd out what elements of the
conﬂict the parties focused on in their negotiation. A detailed coding manual is included

in Appendix A.

13

RELATIONAL ORDER THEORY

An additional theory that will be used in this study is Relational Order Theory
(Donohue and Roberto, 1993). ROT was used by Donohue and Hoobler (2002) who
analyzed interviews and statements by leading Israeli and Palestinian ﬁgures in the
months just prior to Oslo H. Relational Order Theory has two dimensions, one measuring
interdependence, and one afﬁliation. This allows the creation of four potential conditions
for a relationship, high interdependence/high afﬁliation, low interdependence/high
afﬁliation, high interdependence/low afﬁliation, and low interdependence/low afﬁliation.

In a ﬂame that is both high in interdependence and afﬁliation, parties interact
regularly and have positive feelings about each other. They will actively help the other
side achieve their goals, out of a genuine concern for the other party’s well-being. Parties
in a low interdependence/high afﬁliation ﬂame generally approve of each other, but do
not generally interact with each other. They do not have a problem with the other side
achieving their goals, but they will not actively assist them in doing so. A low
interdependence/ low afﬁliation ﬂame means that neither side has strong positive feelings
for the other, but since they do not generally interact with each other, they do not usually
come into conﬂict with each other. The fourth frame, high interdependence/low
afﬁliation means that two parties that do not like each other have to interact on a regular
basis. This leads to conﬂicts, due to the close proximity of both parties.

In his analysis of the negotiations leading up to Oslo 1, Donohue (1998) found
that the relational ﬂame changed ﬂom the conﬂict/aggression ﬂame of low afﬁliation and
high interdependence to the unconditional peace ﬂame of high afﬁliation and high

interdependence. Regarding the rhetoric of leaders in the months leading up to Oslo II,

14

however, Donohue and Hoobler (2002) found that Israeli rhetoric mostly showed high
afﬁliation, but varied in interdependence, while Palestinian rhetoric was low in afﬁliation
and ﬂuctuated between high and low interdependence. Thus the Israelis shifted between
the ﬂames Donohue called Conditional and Unconditional Peace, while Palestinians
moved between Conﬂict/Aggression and Isolationist Peace

The goal of F orward-looking negotiation then, if applied to Relational Order
Theory, is to create a ﬂame of high afﬁliation and high interdependence. Both parties
work together, cooperating to create a system in which both sides can fulﬁll their goals.
The goal of Backward-looking negotiation on the other hand, appears to be to move away
ﬂom the ﬂame of low afﬁliation/high interdependence. Rather than move towards a goal,

it aims to move away ﬂom the status quo which is characterized by open conﬂict.

15

HYPOTHESES

After reviewing the salient literature, I propose the following hypotheses:

H1: There will be more forward than backward orientation in the pre-Oslo I
public discourse.

Even though the Oslo negotiations were held in private, the conﬂict between
Israelis and Palestinians had come to the point where both sides were open to agreements

in order to end the conﬂict.

H2: Palestinians will use more backward-looking rhetoric than the Israelis, while
the Israelis will use more forward-looking rhetoric than the Palestinians.

Since the balance of power in the Israeli-Palestinian cOnﬂict clearly favors the
Israelis, it is reasonable to assume that the Palestinian rhetoric is more reﬂective Of a
ﬁght-or-ﬂight pattern. Donohue and Hoobler have found that the rhetoric in the
Palestinian statements they examined featured a low level of afﬁliation and mostly
moved between the isolationist peace and the aggression ﬂames. Therefore they appear
more likely to use backward looking rhetoric as well. The Palestinians’ ultimate goal is to
reestablish their position in the region, a clearly past-oriented ambition. The Israelis on

the other hand focus on a new political reality, with opportunities for joint cooperation.
H3: Forward-looking negotiation is more likely to be used in frames of high

afﬁliation, whereas backwards-focused rhetoric is more likely to contain power

messages.

16

This is due to the psychological constraints described by Kelman, which make it

difﬁcult to cooperate with an adversary that is distrusted and disliked.

RQl: Is any of the three focuses (Causes, Process, Outcome) used signiﬁcantly

more often than the others?

17

METHODS AND DATA ANALYSIS

In order to answer these research questions, the same documents collected by
Donohue and Hoobler (2002) for their research on power and afﬁliation in the rhetoric
leading up to the Oslo I Accords were used. This selection of articles consists of
statements made by ofﬁcial representatives in interviews and newspaper editorials. There
are a total of 40 articles, 20 ﬂom Palestinians and 20 from Israeli sources. The time-
ﬂame of the documents ranges ﬂom the beginning of January 1993 to July 1993, two
months before the agreement was signed.

Donohue and Hoobler scored the articles for power and afﬁliation, to ﬁnd the
relational ﬂarnework that each side operated in. I did something similar, in order to ﬁnd
the negotiation strategy and focus of each speaker. Statements were coded for
forward/backward orientation, and causes/process/outcome focus. A second coder
analyzed several documents, so that I could calculate intercoder reliability. Using
Cohen’s formula (1960) I calculated kappa to be .918, A forward-backward ratio was
established for each document, and intensity was calculated by controlling for the length

of each document.

18

RESULTS

To test for Hypothesis 1, a paired-samples t-test was conducted, comparing the
use of forward-looking and backward-looking rhetoric, regardless of nationality. The
paired-samples t-test showed that contrary to my hypothesis, backward-looking rhetoric
was used more often than forward-looking rhetoric (total forward: M = .231, SD = .167,
total backward: M = .293, SD = .187). However, this relationship was not signiﬁcant (t =
-1.305, df = 39, p = .2). Thus Hypothesis 1 was not conﬁrmed.

In order to test for Hypothesis 2, paired-samples t-tests were used, in order to
examine the ratio of forward-looking to backward-looking statements in relation to the
nationality of the speaker. The tests found that Israelis speakers used more forward- than
backward-looking rhetoric in their speeches (total forward: M = .322, SD = .146, total
backward: M = .232, SD = .167). However, as with hypothesis 1, the relation was not
signiﬁcant (t = 1.567, df = 39, p = .133). The Palestinians used more backward- than
forward-looking rhetoric (total forward: M = .139, SD = .030, total backward: M = .355,
SD = .042). This relationship was found to be signiﬁcant (t = -3.556, df = 39, p = .002).

Comparing the use of forward- and backward-looking rhetoric by nationality, an
independent-samples t-test was used, utilizing nationality as a grouping variable. The test
found that Israelis used signiﬁcantly more forward-looking rhetoric than Palestinians (t =
4.085,df = 38, p < .001), and that Palestinians used signiﬁcantly more backward-looking
rhetoric than Israelis (t = -2.148, df = 38, p = .038). Thus Hypothesis 2 is conﬁrmed by
the data.

To test for Hypothesis 3 I looked for correlations between power messages and

backward and forward orientation, as well as correlations between afﬁliation messages

19

and backward and forward orientation. The variables used were the power and afﬁliation
ratios calculated from Donohue and Hoobler’s data, and forward and backward ratios
derived ﬂom my own data set. I found signiﬁcant positive correlations between forward-
looking rhetoric and affiliation (r = .425, p = .006) as well as backward-looking rhetoric
and power (r = .694, p < .001). I also found a signiﬁcant negative correlation between
forward-looking messages and power messages (r = -.476, p = .002) and a negative but
non-signiﬁcant correlation between backward-looking messages and afﬁliation (r = -.217,
p = .179).Thus Hypothesis 3 is conﬁrmed.

In order to test for my research question, a series of paired-samples t-tests was
conducted to compare the means of the ratios in the subcategories. The results can be
seen in tables 1 and 2. They show a clear emphasis on backward-cause statements, which
were used signiﬁcantly more often than any other non-neutral statement. This focus on

backward-cause statements means that a lot of the rhetoric is accusing and blaming the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

other party.
Ratios N Mean Std. Deviation
Neutral 40 .474024 .1850867
Forward Cause 40 .090443 .0798031
Forward Process 40 .098665 .0938175
Forward Outcome 40 .042122 .0491807
Backward Cause 40 .170938 .1348136
Backward Process 40 .071489 .0909698
Backward Outcome 40 .051186 .0640881
Valid N (listwise) 40
Table 1: Variable Means
I I Sig. (2-
t df tailed)
Pair 1 Forward Cause - Forward Process -,517 39 .608
Pair 2 Fomard Cause - Fon~ard Outcome 3.518 39 .001

 

 

 

 

 

2O

 

 

Outcome

Table 2: Paired-Samples T-tests

 

 

 

Pair 3 Forward Cause — Backward Cause -2924 39 .006
Pair 4 Fonrvard Cause - Backward Process .886 39 .381
Pair 5 Forward Cause — Backward Outcome 2,104 39 .042
Pair 6 Forward Process - Forward Outcome 4,294 39 .000
Pair 7 Forward Process — Backward Cause -2453 39 .018
Pair 8 Forward Process - Backward Process 1203 39 .234
Pair 9 Forward Process - Backward Outcome 2,530 39 .012
Pair 10 Forward Outcome - Backward Cause .4942 39 .000
Pair 11 Forward Outcome — Backward Process -1333 39 .074
Pair 12 Forward 033213;; Backward -.816 39 .419
Pair 13 Backward Cause - Backward Process 3942 39 .000
Pair 14 Backward Cause - Backward Outcome 5,030 39 .000
Pair 15 Backward Process — Backward 1.393 39 .171

There is high focus on forward cause and process statements, which express recognition

of causes for the conﬂict and afﬁliation for the other side, but there is an equal focus on

backward process statements, which show an interest in justice and accountability. There

is not much use of outcome statements, forward- or backward- looking. The rhetoric used

in these statements is less concerned with ﬁnding solutions than with demanding justice

or placing blame on the other side.

21

 

DISCUSSION

The data collected for Hypothesis 1 indicates that the rhetorical ﬂame at the time
prior to the Oslo Accords was ambiguous. The collected data shows that disregarding
nationality, there is no signiﬁcant difference in the use of forward- and backward-looking
rhetoric. A signiﬁcant forward-orientation would have indicated a genuine desire and
willingness to transform the relationship between both sides. A signiﬁcant emphasis on
backward-looking rhetoric on the other hand, would have indicated that both sides had
grown tired of the conﬂict, and therefore willing to reach a compromise agreement. This
is not the case in the general rhetoric, which indicates that neither side sees negotiations
as more desirable than conﬂict.

The results of Hypothesis 2, which take a closer look at the rhetoric used by the
respective sides, help to make the picture a little less ambiguous. The Israelis use both
forward and backward-looking rhetoric in their speeches, with a slight and non-
signiﬁcant tendency towards forward orientation. The Palestinian rhetoric is dominated
by backward-looking rhetoric. This indicates that while the Israelis sent mixed signals,
reaching out and rejecting at the same time, while the Palestinians were more openly
hostile towards the Israelis.

The data collected for Hypothesis 3 also shows that there is a deﬁnite correlation
between forward-looking rhetoric and afﬁliation, as well as backward-looking rhetoric
and power messages. The correlation is strong enough to be signiﬁcant, yet not so strong
that both concepts would appear interchangeable. The concepts established by Zartman

also allow for a slightly more reﬁned analysis, since there are seven categories rather than

22

three. This way it is possible to discern potential goals and motivations by the type of
statement that are predominant in a document, instead of just a general ﬂame.

The results of the research question show the dominance of backward-cause
statements, which indicates that both sides saw responsibility for the conﬂict with the
other side. The low use of forward-outcome oriented statements shows that neither side
was willing to seriously consider mutual cooperation and a transformation of the
relationship in the future. The rhetoric shows that both parties are well aware of their role
in the conﬂict, as evidenced by the relatively high use of forward-cause statements, but
see the other side as more responsible.

The results could be explained by events that occurred in the period the speeches
were given. News of the talks in Oslo had not been made public, and therefore politicians
might have felt it imprudent to appear too soft on the opponent. This would tie in with
Kelman’s idea of politicians being constrained by public Opinion. They could not afford
to appear close to the other side, since the public was not yet ready for such a stance. This
indicates that there were two levels of dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians. On the
one hand there were the secret, informal negotiations in Oslo, in which both sides
established a relationship which allowed them to ﬁnd solutions to their problem. On the
other hand there was public discourse, which was aggressive on part of the Palestinians,
and ambiguous on part of the Israelis.

Another factor is that at this point of time the Palestinian Intifada had been going
on for ﬁve years, disrupting the everyday life of many Israelis. Thus many Israelis
demanded a hard line in dealing with the Palestinians, and that the government provide

for their security, while others were more willing to make concessions in order to achieve

23

peace. Thus Israeli politicians needed to be responsive to both points of view in their
constituency, and sent mixed messages. To the Palestinians, however, the Intifada was a
tool that gave them power at the negotiating table. While the Intifada was going on, they
had to be taken seriously, and were able to make demands. Thus it was in the best
interests of Palestinian leaders to be appear as aggressive, anti-Israel, and fan the ﬂames
of rebellion with their speeches. To appear conciliatory towards Israel, would appear to
undermine the efforts and sacriﬁces that those engaged in the Intifada had made.

To ﬁnd out more, studies using speeches ﬂom the time period immediately after
the announcement of the Oslo Accords, as well as following years would have to be
conducted, in order to see whether the rhetorical ﬂame shifted towards either
predominantly forward- or predominantly backward-looking statements. Especially
interesting would be studies of the rhetoric surrounding major events, such as the Hebron
Massacre, Rabin’s assassination, and the various peace accords, such as Oslo II and
Camp David. A transformation of the conﬂict into a more cordial relationship, which
according to Zartman occurs as a result of successful forward-looking negotiation, would
be reﬂected in a shift of the rhetoric. A shift in the rhetoric towards a more backward-
looking orientation on the other band, would signal that the Oslo Accords failed, and that
the relationship between both sides has deteriorated to a point where mutually satisfying

solutions are even harder to ﬁnd.

24

LIMITATIONS

A potential limitation of the study, is that it focuses on speeches and interviews,
rather than actual negotiation dialogue. There was only one speaker in each document,
representing the views of one side. There was no actual dialogue between the involved
parties. Rather than work out solutions to potential problems, speakers gave a
commentary on the negotiations conducted. Most of the speakers were not actively
involved in the Oslo negotiations, and some of them might have been unaware of them.
An analysis of a transcript of a summit meeting, for example, might ﬁnd a higher ratio of
outcome-oriented rhetoric, and less talk about causes. It also would allow us to examine
sequences in the rhetoric, by looking at points at which the dynamic shifts ﬂom forward-

to backward-looking, and by analyzing whether there are signiﬁcant patterns to such

shifts.

25

26

APPENDIX A

Coding Manual
Forward-looking Negotiation

Forward-looking Negotiation refers to statements that propose cooperation,

resolving the underlying issues, ﬁnding common ground, and solving the root problem,
rather than the symptoms. The role of both parties in the conﬂict is acknowledged and
responsibility for own mistakes is taken. It lays the groundwork for future cooperation
and peaceful coexistence, proposes institutions and political systems to ensure the
implementation of the agreements, and attempts to prevent future conﬂict between both

parties.

Backward-looking Negotiation

Backward looking Negotiation places responsibility and blame on the other party.
Demands for reparations and accountability are part of backward-looking strategies, as
are calls for justice or punishment. Only the actions and mistakes of the other side are
pointed out, and little or no concessions are made. The solutions are usually compromise
agreements, in which neither side gives up much, and neither side gains much. A zero-
sum mentality pervades the negotiation process, and the underlying causes of the conﬂict
are not addressed. There is no real resolution, and no real way to assure compliance with

the agreements.

27

Causes

In forward-looking negotiation, Causes address the underlying root of the
problem, the responsibility both sides have and the commonalities between both parties.
The general attitude shifts towards the positive. Backward-looking negotiation, however,
focuses on actions by the other side, and demands accountability and punishments for
past atrocities and injustices. The focus is on ending the conﬂict, rather than managing or

resolving it.

Processes

Forward-looking statements that focus on processes express afﬁliation and
emphasize commonalities between the two sides. Visions of the future after the conﬂict
are discussed, as well as visions on how to achieve this ﬁrture. Backward-looking rhetoric
on the other hand, focuses on accountability, on justice for past wrongs, and addresses the

symptoms of the conﬂict, but evades the underlying cause.

Outcomes

Forward-looking negotiation is concerned with transforming the relationship
between the two sides. In order to develop this new relationship, both parties commit to
work together for a common goal, in order to allow both sides to coexist peacefully.
Backward-looking negotiation, however, does not resolve the underlying conﬂict. Gains
are made at the loss of the other party, either side only makes small gains if at all. A

cease-ﬁre is the proposed way to end the ﬁghting, rather than a lasting peace.

28

Examples:
Forward-Causes
1) Sending youths with explosives strapped to their chests is a way to make martyrs,
but it will not help our cause in the long run
2) It is clear that our presence in the Gaza Strip is creating problems.
3) Islamist radicals undermine the work that has been done by the Palestinian

Authority.

Backward-Causes
l) The ﬁghting has to stop, no matter what started it
2) The Israelis need to stop building settlements and killing our people
3) Arafat needs to crack down on insurgents, and punish those that would hurt Israel

4) Sharon cannot continue to kill our children and destroy our houses

Forward- Processes
l) Israelis and Palestinians both want the ﬁghting to stop.
2) I think you are making a very valid point.

3) We once lived here peacefully, we can do so again
Backward-Processes

1) Israel has to remove the settlers and give us full autonomy in the occupied

territories

29

2) We will withdraw part of our forces ﬂom the Golan Heights, provided Arafat
takes more action against Hamas

3) There is no problem, it is just a bunch of fanatics that hate everything we stand for

Forward-Outcomes
1) We can work together and build something bigger, something better

2) There will be a day when Israelis and Palestinians are no longer enemies

Backward-Outcomes
1) We have stopped the violence by killing off the terrorists
2) We will have Jerusalem, and we will have Temple Mount, because they are ours
3) We will allow limited autonomy in select areas, provided the Palestinians agree to

limited military presence of our forces.

30

APPENDIX B
Coding categories for forward and backward-looking approaches
A) Causes — Theory/Frame for the Conﬂict
M
1) Acknowledge responsibility, recognize role in conﬂict
2) Awareness of reasons or sources of conﬂict
Backward
3) Focus on ending the conﬂict
4) Blaming: other side, past injustices, recognizing impasse
B) Processes
EQLWEIQ
1) Express afﬁliation, focus on commonalities
2) Visions of the future discussed
Backward
3) Accountability/promise of justice
4) Evade the presence of underlying issues
C) Outcomes/ Proposed Outcomes
M
1) Joint gains/mutual cooperation, proposed outcomes
2) Proposals about forming a new relationship
Backward
3) Cease ﬁre

4) Relative gains - claiming

31

E

N C

E

32

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