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POLITICAL SUPPORT IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES

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WONBIN CHO

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**INSTITUTIONS, PARTISAN STATUS, AND CITIZENS' POLITICAL
SUPPORT IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES**

BY

WONBIN CHO

A DISSERTATION

**Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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ABSTRACT

INSTITUTIONS, PARTISAN STATUS, AND CITIZENS' POLITICAL SUPPORT IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES

By

Wonbin Cho

Do political institutions affect political support? This dissertation takes political institutions into account to explain citizens' political support in emerging democracies. By combining individual-level survey data collected from 35 developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Asia, with national-level data on political institutions, this study demonstrates party systems have a significant impact on popular evaluations of political system performance. Popular satisfaction with democracy is increased in countries that have greater effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP), where citizens are likely to have more options to choose from. In addition, a person's status as a part of a political majority or minority is strongly associated with his or her satisfaction with democracy. The gap in people's view of how a given political system works is significantly large between people whose party is in government (winners) and those in opposition (losers). Winners are more likely to show higher levels satisfaction with democracy than losers.

The multilevel model, moreover, shows that party systems mediate the relationship between the partisan status (winners or losers) on one hand and popular satisfaction with democracy on the other hand. Greater ENPP is likely to mitigate the negative view of losers about the way democracy works and, in turn,

decrease the gaps in popular satisfaction with democracy between winners and losers in emerging democracies.

Finally, using Aftobarometer data collected before and after the 2002 electoral reform in Lesotho, this study explores how electoral system changes from the first-past-the-post (FPTP) to the mixed-member-proportional (MMP) system influence citizens' attitudes toward political systems. I find both direct and indirect effects. In the aggregate, Lesotho's electoral reform from a majoritarian to a mixed electoral system is directly associated with increased levels of citizen support for the country's state and regime. Importantly, however, formal institutions have only indirect effects at the individual level. Increasing the proportionality in translating votes into seat share narrows the difference in popular satisfaction with democracy between winners and losers. Because of the reform, opposition parties were able to win 40 seats in the National Assembly in 2002 elections and, in turn, their supporters' levels of satisfaction with democracy are increased.

This study sheds light on the general issue of whether institutions matter in emerging democracies. Constitutional debates – whether about electoral systems, executive-legislative relations, or unitarism versus federalism – have risen on the policy agenda to become very important issues in emerging democracies. If institutional arrangements influence political support, as this research finds, this may have important consequences for constitutional debates. The challenge for further research is to consider these issues in terms of the democratization process. If institutional designs can strengthen popular satisfaction with democracy this may provide significant lessons for the process of democratization.

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To All my family who kept faith and hope in me.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AD	Democratic Action
BAC	Barutoland African Congress
BNP	Basotho National Party
BCP	Basutoland Congress Party
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CN	Convergencia Nacional
COPEI	Organized Political Committee for Independent Election
CSES	Comparative Study of Electoral Systems
ENPP	Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties
FPTP	First-Past-the-Post
ID	Index of Disproportionality
IPA	Interim Political Authority
LCD	Lesotho Congress Democrats
LLA	Lesotho Liberation Army
LPC	Lesotho People's Congress
LWP	Lesotho Workers Party
MAS	Movimiento al Socialismo
MCP	Malawi Congress Party
MDC	Movement for Democratic Change
MFP	Marematlou Freedom Party
MMM	Mixed-Member-Majoritarian
MMP	Mixed-Member-Proportional
MPD	Movement for Democracy
MVR	Movimiento V Republica
NIP	National Independent Party
NPP	National Progressive Party
NRM	National Resistance Movement
PAICV	African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde
PAN	Partido Accion Nacional
PFD	Popular Front for Democracy
PR	Proportional Representation
PRD	Partido de la Revolucion Democratica
PRI	Partido Revolucionario Institucional
PT	Partido del Trabajo
PVEM	Partido Verde Ecologista de Mexico
SMD	Single Member District
SNTV	Single Non-Transferable Vote
SSD	Single-Seat District
TEDS	Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study
UDF	United Democratic Front
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front

Chapter 1: Introduction

Do political institutions affect popular satisfaction with democracy? This research takes political institutions into account to explain citizens' political support in emerging democracies. By combining cross-national survey data collected from 35 developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Asia, with data on political institutions in which people live, this study finds both constitutional arrangements and party systems have a significant impact on popular evaluations of political systems performance. In addition, a person's status as part of a political majority or minority is strongly associated with his or her satisfaction with democracy. Moreover, party systems mediate the relationship between a person's partisan status and his or her satisfaction with the way democracy works.

Democracy thrives on popular support and withers in its absence (Easton 1965). Since the mid of 1970s, we have witnessed an unprecedented and unanticipated wave of democratization around the world (Huntington 1991). With the collapse of communism, moreover, democracy has reached every region of the world for the first time in history. Most democratic theorists would argue that the success or failure of democratization is in large part a function of the support built among citizens. Citizens' support for the regime has proven to be a necessary condition for the regime's legitimacy. It is further asserted that legitimacy is strongly influenced by the performance of the regime (Lipset 1959). Political systems that are ineffective in meeting public expectations over long periods of time can lose their legitimacy. Stable or increasing levels of popular support

facilitate the consolidation of democracy, whereas declining levels of support undermine democracy and can even lead to its collapse.

Political support is a multi-dimensional concept. Easton (1965) distinguished between support for the community, the regime, and the authorities, while other scholars expand the classification into a fivefold framework: support for the political community; support for regime principles or democracy as an ideal form of government; evaluations of the regime's performance; support for regime institutions; and support for political actors (Norris 1999). This study focuses on evaluations of regime performance, measuring citizens' approval of how democratic political systems function in practice.

The underlying dynamics of a regime's performance approval in a fledgling democracy are potentially very different from those of an established democracy. In established democracies in which the structure and character of political institutions are constant within countries over extended period time, scholars emphasize the importance of policy performance, especially economic outcomes (Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi 2000). In addition, the nature of the regime does not change when an election results in defeat for the incumbent government and new party takes office. However, in an emerging democracy there can be competition between regimes (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998). Free elections give undemocratic as well as democratic parties the opportunity to compete for office. Some citizens may still demand the return of the old or the introduction of a new undemocratic regime. A new democracy has yet to institutionalize or even introduce all the features of an established democracy. In a new democracy, newly adopted political institutions can matter as much as policy

outputs, and political outputs can matter as much as economic performance. Emerging democracies, especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe, are suffering from limited public support for regime performance because they have to cope with simultaneous political and economic transitions (Bratton and Mattes 2001; Rose, Mishler and Maerpfers 1998; Lagos 2001). In these cases, popular satisfaction with democracy depends not only on political performance but also on economic performance. This research attempts to understand how citizens in emerging democracies evaluate their political systems' performance.

There are substantial cross-national variations in citizens' evaluations of how democracy works. For instance, Western European countries present relatively high and stable levels of popular satisfaction with democracy, while Latin American countries express lower levels of public evaluations of regime performance. Within the sub-Saharan African countries, Cape Verde and Nigeria show the lowest levels of the satisfaction with democracy. Why are there such major differences between countries? What accounts for the differences in political support across countries?

Three different theories attempt to explain significant cross-national variations in popular approvals of regime performance by focusing on cultural values, government performance, and political institutions. Democratic political institutions have relatively stable features that serve both to shape citizens' political experiences and to develop attitudes about the functions of the political system (Powell 1982, 1989). How democratic institutions treat citizens is very important for their development. This study focuses mainly on variance of constitutional arrangements, for example presidentialism

and parliamentarism, unitarism and federalism, a wide variety of party systems, and electoral systems.

Since the early 1990s, constitutional reforms have been the subject of debates in many democracies. Such debates have already led to a number of important reforms. Among established democracies, New Zealand reformed its electoral system from a First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) to a Mixed-Member-Proportional (MMP) system. Japan also changed its Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) to a Mixed-Member-Majoritarian (MMM) system. In Latin America, Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela undertook large-scale electoral reform in the 1990s, as did Lesotho and South Korea elsewhere in the world.

These debates about constitutional reforms concern the alleged effects of a given reform on the stability and endurance of democracy. Scholars assert that political institutions should be key in the efforts to expand democracy and reduce violent conflicts in divided societies where we observe sharp ethnic, religious, national, and/or linguistic cleavages (Reynolds 2002). The debates have focused only on macro levels, for example national or district levels. However, political institutions by themselves do not directly define the life of a regime. A regime's survival is also affected by citizen's perceptions toward the performance of the constitutional arrangement they live in. The same constitutional arrangement does not necessarily produce the same popular approval levels of regime performance in a different country. Citizens and groups in a particular country have conflicting preferences over political, economic, and social issues. Political institutions aggregate these preferences into specific political outcomes, and these in turn induce public policy decisions in different issues. Surprisingly, few

political scientists have addressed the question of constitutional effects on citizens' evaluations of a regime's performance (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Norris 1999; Farrell and McAllister 2003; Rohrschneider 2002), even though analyzing the effects of alternative constitutions has long been a main research topic in political science. The goal of this study is to understand the effects of constitutional arrangements on popular satisfaction with political systems in fledgling democracies.

The literature on political support discusses at least two different levels of analysis. First, a large number of studies concentrate on the individual level; these studies assess the nature and determinants of inter-individual differences in attitudes toward political systems (e.g., Anderson and Guillory 1997). Second, a sizable literature documents the nature of cross-national differences in political support (e.g., Weil 1989). Considering these two levels of analysis together, what emerges is a multilevel data structure: individuals are nested within countries. This research includes both individual level survey data and national characteristic data from 35 emerging democracies. I model this data structure through a two-level hierarchical analysis.

This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter Two reviews existing literature related to political support and provides the theoretical framework for the study. In Chapter Three, I detail the methods used to carry out this research. This project is divided into two separate inquiries. I created a multi-level data set to allow me to explore my research questions across 35 emerging democracies. Secondly, I conduct a cross-time analysis of Lesotho to explore my research question in much greater detail. Chapter Three includes a thorough discussion of the operationalization of key variables in the study.

Using Ordered Probit Analysis, I test the various explanations for satisfaction with democracy across 35 countries in Chapter Four. The results presented in Chapter Four support my hypotheses concerning the expected impact of partisan status (majority or minority) on popular satisfaction with democracy in emerging democracies. Equally important, the results show the importance of citizens' evaluations of economic performance to explain popular approvals of regime performance.

Using Multilevel Analysis, I demonstrate how political institutions affect popular satisfaction with democracy and how they mediate the relationship between partisan status (minority in politics) and satisfaction with democracy in Chapter Five. I find that political institutions have significant effects on citizens' evaluations of regime performance and party systems in particular mediate the relationship between partisan status and popular satisfaction with democracy. A Greater Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties is likely to reduce the gap in the satisfaction between political majority and minority in fledgling democracies.

In Chapter Six, using an analysis over time in Lesotho, I show how electoral system changes from FPTP to MMP systems influence popular satisfaction with democracy. Increasing the proportionality in translating votes to seat share narrows the difference in popular satisfaction with democracy between citizens whose party is in government and those whose party is in opposition. Finally, Chapter Seven summarizes the main findings of the study and suggests some implications.

Chapter 2. Theory

2.1 Introduction

Various theories have tried to explain significant cross-national variations in political support, incorporating social, cultural and economic variables. Political support is a complicated research question, since it is determined by a variety of different factors, including political, social, economic, institutional and historical factors. Yet, many scholars have focused primarily on either cultural characteristics or government performance (e.g. Putnam 1993; Inglehart 1997; Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg 1993). However, the explanatory power of those variables remains uncertain particularly in emerging democracies.

This chapter will review the relevant literature and assess the sufficiency of existing theories in explaining political support in developing countries and propose several alternative explanations including political institutions.

2.2 Cultural Explanation

One can identify three separate schools of thought that seek to explain cross-national variation in political support for a regime. First, theories of cultural values emphasize deep-rooted social and political values in each country. A significant number of studies argue that social capital (or interpersonal trust) plays a crucial role in democracy (Putnam 1993; Norris 1999, Warren 1999). The theory of social capital emphasizes the importance of social trust for civic engagement. Social capital is regarded as a strong determinant of, or influence upon, political support of various kinds, including support for political community, confidence in institutions, and trust in

political leaders. With survey evidence of Europe, however, Newton (1999: 185) shows that “there is not a close or consistent association between social and political trust, between social trust and political behaviour, or between activity in voluntary associations and political attitudes of trust and confidence.” In other words, social capital is not necessarily translated into political trust. He argues that political trust should be more a product of political rather than social factors.

Using three decades of time-series data, Inglehart (1977, 1990, and 1997) shows an intergenerational shift toward Post-material values. Since members of the Post-material generation give high priority to protecting freedom of speech and to participation in making important government decisions, this trend should bring growing mass demands for democratization. Post-materialist theory emphasizes that the modernization process has undermined support for traditional, hierarchical institutions and authoritarian values, producing a crisis of confidence in government, but this should not be understood as a crisis of confidence in democracy per se.

Gibson (1998) has argued that tolerance of out-groups is essential to democracy: civil liberties and legitimate opposition require tolerance and forbearance toward groups with whom one disagrees and dislikes. Inglehart (2003) finds that the “Survival vs. Self-expressing values” syndrome including tolerance of out-groups, Postmaterialist values, political activism, interpersonal trust, and subjective well-being has a very strong association with democratization. However, it is not clear whether democratic institutions give rise to “self-expression values” or whether higher levels of “self-expression values” increase a society’s prospects for democracy. Muller and Seligson

(1994) argue that interpersonal trust appears to be a product of democracy rather than a cause of it.

These theories are most powerful when explaining persistent and long-term differences between nations and diffuse support, such as feelings of national identity. However, this research accounts for cross-national differences on the attitudes towards political systems.

2.3 Government Performance

Second, theories of government performance commonly focus on how regime support relates to government performance, particularly concerning the economy (Weil 1989; Weatherford 1984, 1987; Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg 1993; Lockertie 1993; Anderson 1995; Weisberg 1996; McAllister 1999; Miller and Listhaug 1999). Studies that examine the connection of system outputs with political support typically accept that the two are related because “the government is assumed to possess the tools and abilities to solve social problems” (Weatherford 1984: 189). Government takes a credit when performance is strong, and the blame when it is weak. Most of the studies have focused on the relationship between aggregate levels of economic growth, unemployment, or inflation, as well as individual- level retrospective and prospective evaluations of the economy, and satisfaction with governance in North America and Western Europe. A significant number of studies empirically demonstrate that economic performance is related to system support (Weatherford 1984, 1987; Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg 1993). Related evidence suggests that public perceptions of both personal and

national economic conditions are related to system support (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Citrin and Green 1986; Lockerbie 1993; McAllister 1999).

Nevertheless, the links between economic performance and satisfaction with government are not clear (Lawrence 1997). First, there is no consensus how to measure economic performance. For example, do measures of production or productivity accurately capture improvement in citizen's living standards? Second, there is uncertainty about how performance is perceived and appraised. Do people care about their absolute living standards, their relative living standards, or the rate at which these improve? Finally, people could well respond to poor economic performance by dissatisfaction with their current government, but not with political system per se. This distinction is more likely to occur in the established democracies where citizens draw a clear distinction between the operation of the system as a whole, and the activities of a particular party's government. In emerging democracies, which often do not enjoy widespread popular support, or where support is unevenly distributed across social groups, such distinctions are more likely to be blurred.

The empirical analyses do not show any strong or consistent evidence. McAllister (1999) finds and concludes that there is a modest yet consistent relationship between support for political institutions and subjective economic evaluations, but institutional support seems unaffected by objective indicators of economic performance such as GDP and unemployment. Neither Steenberg and Jones (2002) nor Rohrschneider (2002) find any significant relationship between an objective economic performance indicator at the national-level and "mass support for an EU-wide government."

If government performance is defined in purely economic terms, then this perspective seems to provide a poor fit for cross-country analysis. This theory becomes more convincing if non-economic aspects of government performance are included in the model. Miller and Listhaug (1999) argue that we need to broaden our evidence to include citizens' perceptions of the fairness of policy outcomes, as well as their expectations of government.

The empirical studies on public opinion in emerging democracies show that politics have more influence on citizens' attitudes towards democratic systems than economics (Evans and Whitefield 1995; Linz and Stepan 1996; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Shin 1999; Bratton, Mattes and Boadi 2005). After democratic transitions in new democracies, popular support for the new political regime would be maintained by providing political goods such as political order, civil rights, and good governance, in spite of governments' poor economic performance. Using three rounds of Afrobarometer data set collected in Nigeria from 2000 to 2003, Bratton and Lewis (2005: 34) find that "the delivery of political goods is not only *central* to the formation of mass opinion about democracy but also *durable* over time, at least in the medium term following regime transitions."

2.4 Institutional Explanations

Finally, institutional theories seek to understand the attitudes of citizens towards the political system within their broader constitutional context (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Norris 1999; Farrell and McAllister 2003; Rohrschneider 2002). These studies

focus on the linkages between representative elites and public opinion provided by the intermediary institutions of political parties, interest groups and electoral systems.

People form attitudes about politics in systemic structures whose institutional contexts mediate preference and define the choices available (Powell 1982, 1989).

There are many ways in which a democracy can be organized and run. Current democracies show a variety of political institutions, for example, presidentialism and parliamentarism, two-party and multiparty systems, majoritarian and proportional representation electoral systems, and federal and unitary systems. Among these political institutional arrangements, two patterns can be seen: majoritarianism and proportionalism (Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000). The essence of the majoritarian model of democracy is government by and for the majority of the people. The majoritarian model concentrates political power in the hands of a majority – often even merely a plurality instead of majority. The key of the proportional model, on the contrary, is government by and for as many people as possible. The proportional model is characterized by its inclusiveness, bargaining process, and compromise, whereas the majoritarian model is exclusive, competitive, and adversarial.

These two quite different visions of democracy lead to distinct kinds of relationships between citizens and government officials (Powell 2000). In the majoritarian model, citizens are more suspicious of the autonomy of elected representatives, less concerned about minorities, more desirous of seeing that government officials are clearly accountable to voters. However, in the proportional model, citizens are more suspicious of majorities (especially those created by elections), less worried about the autonomy of policymakers as long as citizens have had a role in

selecting them, and less worried about negotiated inaction. Thus, the different political institutional arrangements in which citizens live result in different attitudes towards the government.

An extensive literature has explored the consequences of alternative institutional designs, for example, the influence of presidentialism or parliamentarism on the stability of democracy (Powell 1982; Lijphart 1992; Linz and Valenzuela 1994). The definitional distinction between presidential and parliamentary regimes is the political independence or interdependence of the legislative and the executive branches (Linz 1994; Shugart and Carey 1992). Linz (1994) criticizes the stability of presidentialism to sustain democratic regime, arguing that presidential systems have no mechanism for the resolution of conflicts between the executive and the legislative, while parliamentary systems have such a mechanism.

Stepan and Skach (1993) focus on how key differences between pure presidentialism and pure parliamentarism affect democratic performance, which is operationalized using a variety of measures. In addition to democratic survival, the authors compare the relationship between institutional design and the following variables: the number of effective parties; Vanhanen's democracy prediction residuals; a scale of political rights; the susceptibility to military coups; the likelihood of legislative majorities; and cabinet stability. Across all these measures, pure parliamentary regimes perform better than pure presidential regimes.

Shugart and Carey (1992) compare up to forty-six different countries at different time periods in order to examine a range of important questions about presidential systems and democratic performance. They are interested in key aspects of presidential

democracies, including the elections of the president and assemblies, the formation of cabinets, the legislative power of the president, and the ways in which electoral systems produce different party systems. In addition, focusing on sixteen Latin American countries, Jones (1995) demonstrates that successful performance among presidential democracies relies on the degree to which the electoral system produces legislative support for the president.

However, few studies have looked systematically at the relationship between institutional arrangements and public support for the political system (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Norris 1999; Farrell and McAllister 2003). Democratic political institutions have relatively stable features that serve both to shape citizens' political experiences and to develop attitudes about the functions of the political system. How democratic institutions treat citizens is very important for their development. In following sections, I define and describe the various categories of key political institutions, including party systems, electoral systems, presidentialism and parliamentarism, and unitarism and federalism.

2.4.1 Party Systems

Political parties and the party systems they form constitute the major channels of interest aggregation and citizen input in both established and emerging democracies. They are the vehicles through which political elites supply policy alternatives, and they constitute the major route for citizens to organize the demand for such alternatives (Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge 1994). Parties also play a crucial role in the nature of democratic governance because they help legitimize the state by mediating between

citizens and the state. Parties have taken on the roles as simultaneous agents both of the state and its citizens (Mair 1997). In new democracies, especially those emerging from single party regimes, parties may also continue to be top-down agents of political mobilization (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005).

While virtually all democracies have political parties that compete for office, political systems differ in a number of important ways with regard to how they go about channeling inputs or providing policy alternatives. Moreover, the way in which political institutions condition the formation, functioning, and development of political parties and party systems varies as well. While there is an extensive literature linking electoral systems and the party systems, few researchers have investigated their link with how citizens feel about the way the political system works.

Party systems grant citizens greater or fewer choices. My assumption in this study is that citizens' satisfaction with the way democracy works should be higher in the political systems where they feel that their preferences are represented in the political arena by a party which reflects their interests. Multi-party systems may alleviate dissatisfaction with political system because these systems provide more options for the citizens. In theory, the issue differences and ideological distances between parties should exhibit greater variance and be clearer in a multi-party than a two-party system. In the latter, each party attempts to resemble its opponent as closely as possible (Downs 1957). It may be a critical issue for citizens in a two-party system whether any meaningful differences exist between the two parties. If citizen discontent with the inability of the parties to provide policies for social problems persists over an

extended period of time, this dissatisfaction may become generalized to other political institutions and the political system as a whole.

A multi-party system offers more possibilities that at least some party will represent one's interests, thereby moderating the overall growth of dissatisfaction with the political system. In a multi-party system the individual merely has more options when selecting a preferred party. In a multi-party system, especially one with a coalition government, citizens may consider the extent to which they are represented by coalition blocs rather than their own party or any particular party.

Miller and Listhaug (1990) argue that a smaller number of parties in a system is correlated with popular dissatisfaction with democratic governance. Based on comparable survey data from Norway, Sweden, and the United States, they find that structural differences in the party systems of the three countries are critical in determining the levels of popular satisfaction with democracy. For example, the authors show that "political discontent in Norway was reduced because new parties provided the disaffected with a means of representation, thus channeling dissatisfaction back into electoral arena" (Miller and Listhaug 1990: 357). In the inflexible party systems of the United States and Sweden, on the contrary, the results demonstrate that popular support for the regime was declining "because many people failed to see any of the parties as a viable alternative" (Miller and Listhaug 1990: 357).

In contrast to the research by Miller and Listhaug (1990), however, Weil's (1989) cross-national study of system support in western democracies finds that party system fractionalization – that is, an extremely large number of parties – is systematically associated with lower levels of regime support. Citizens' dissatisfaction

with political institutions may result from “an unresponsive *structure* of opposition, for example, a party system that generates extremism, or a governing coalition that does not reflect voters’ preferences” (Weil 1989: 683). In extremely polarized or fractionalized party systems, at least one extremist or antisystem party is in quasi-permanent opposition. Those extremist parties are sufficiently unacceptable to others that they cannot form alternative coalitions, but they are strong enough to block alternative coalitions that do not include themselves. Weimar Germany and Fourth-Republic France may be examples of extremely fractionalized party systems. Weil empirically demonstrates that fractionalized party systems lead to a decline of popular confidence in political institutions with survey data of six Western countries.

Jackman (1987) argue that because citizens’ vote is not directly connected with government formations in the multiparty system, people are less likely to turn out to vote in the multiparty system. With the data from 19 industrial countries, he empirically shows that multiparty system lowers voter turnout. Norris (1999) also finds that citizens in two-party or moderate multi-party systems exhibit higher levels of confidence in political institutions than those with both fragmented party systems and predominant one-party systems.

Using directly comparable survey evidence from about 20 democracies collected between 1993 and 1995, Anderson (1998) examines whether and to what extent party system performance explains differences in levels of satisfaction with the political system. The results demonstrate that there is no significant correlation between party systems and popular satisfaction with democracy at the aggregate level. His study does not include any individual level analysis. Anderson reports the results of correlation

analysis with the aggregate data set, while the data set under his study have two different levels, individual and national levels.

While those works present important hypotheses about the relationship between party systems and popular satisfaction with democracy, they do not show consistent empirical results. It may be not only because they are using different measurements of party systems but also because their methods to explore the impacts of different party systems on popular satisfaction with democracy do not represent the data structure in their study. Most of the works demonstrate the correlation analyses between the two variables with aggregate data, and some of them ignore the characteristics of the two-level data set by treating the national-level data as an individual-level data. This study examines whether, and how, cross-national differences in party system affect citizen's evaluations of their country's political system performance with a multilevel analysis. I argue that the greater effective number of parliamentary party (ENPP) should induce higher levels of popular satisfaction with the way democracy works (*H1*)

2.4.2 Electoral Systems

In addition to political parties, the electoral system is another important mechanism connecting citizens and the state. A large number of studies have classified the types of electoral systems and explored the relationship between electoral system and party system (Duverger, 1954; Rae 1967; Katz 1980 Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1994; Cox 1997; Reynolds and Reilly 1997). Electoral systems based on single-member districts tend to produce two parties while systems with proportional representation (PR) tend to produce multiple parties (Duverger 1954). Later scholars,

however, have considered the possibility that social cleavage and electoral structures may interact (Sartori 1968; Rae 1971; Riker 1982; Cox 1997). Duverger's institutional claims are conditioned by the nature of social cleavages. Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) find that increasing the proportionality of an electoral system in a homogeneous society does not proliferate the number of parties, whereas it does in a heterogeneous society.

But, few studies look at the impacts of different electoral systems on popular satisfaction with the political system (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Farrell and McAllister 2003; Norris 1999). Literature on electoral systems focuses on the degree of proportionality or disproportionality in the translation of votes into seats and on their effects on the number of parties. Lijphart (1994; 1999) introduces three main types of electoral formulas and a large number of subtypes within each of these: majoritarian formulas (including plurality, two-ballot systems, and alternative vote as the main subtypes), proportional system (classified further into largest remainders, highest averages, mixed member proportional formulas, and single transferable vote formulas), and semi-proportional systems (such as the limited vote, the cumulative vote, and parallel plurality-PR).

Many scholars who study political institutions would agree that the electoral system is one of the primary factors that constrains the development and nature of party system in a country. Some of the scholars, however, argue that social cleavages also condition the party system (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In addition to those macro-factors, different electoral systems induce different electoral strategies from both voters and political elites (Cox 1997). In his study of strategic voting, acting to reduce the

number of competitors, Cox (1997) finds that strategic voting fades out in multimember districts when the district magnitude is greater than five, as it gets harder for both voters and political elites to get information from each other. Thus, electoral systems may constrain both representativeness and policy making processes in a country and affect how citizens evaluate the way democracy works.

Proportional systems are more representative than majoritarian and semi-proportional systems because they facilitate the representation of all relevant societal and ethnic groups. Lijphart (1999) shows that, although no PR system is perfectly proportional and although there is a great deal of variation within the PR family, PR systems tend to be considerably less disproportional than plurality and majority systems. More proportional electoral system may make stronger linkages between political parties and voters and lead to citizens' higher levels of satisfaction with democracy.

Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data set of thirty countries, Farrell and McAllister (2003) examine the direct impact of the electoral system, specifically ballot structure, on levels of voter satisfaction with democracy. Because preferential electoral systems give voters more choice in the electoral act, it is argued that such electoral systems produce closer links between voters and politicians, which necessarily encourage a politics of accommodation between politicians. The authors conclude that these electoral systems generate higher levels of voter satisfaction with democracy. Their study empirically finds that electoral systems directly affect levels of voter satisfaction with democracy. Particularly, the levels of disproportionality and assembly size appear to be strong predictors among the national level measures of

electoral systems. Farrell and McAllister also show that political attitudes mediate the relationship between electoral system and voter satisfaction with democracy. For example, the disproportionality of the electoral system has an impact on popular perception of electoral fairness and via that to satisfaction with democracy.

Based on aggregate data collected in 19 European democracies, Anderson (1998) finds that there is a strong correlation between electoral systems and popular satisfaction with democracy, indicating that the more proportional the electoral system, the higher the level of satisfaction. However, Norris (1999), in a study including both individual-level survey and national-level data collected in 25 democracies, finds that majoritarian electoral systems produce higher levels of confidence in political institutions than proportional electoral systems. Whether and how electoral systems can affect levels of popular satisfaction with democracy is still unresolved. This study examines whether more proportional electoral systems could increase levels of popular satisfaction with democracy across emerging democracies (*H2*).

2.4.3 Presidentialism vs. Parliamentarism

Does the institutional locus of power within the regime affect citizens' satisfaction with democracy? Within political systems there is a major distinction between parliamentary and presidential systems. The merits of these systems have been widely debated (Lijphart 1992; Linz and Valenzuela 1994; Shugart and Carey 1992). Linz (1994) claims that presidentialism with a weak legislature has the advantages of executive stability, greater popular control, and more limited government, but the disadvantages of executive-legislative deadlock, temporal rigidity and winner-take-all

government. Parliamentarism, on the contrary, is claimed to reverse the pros and cons. For example, a parliamentary election might produce an absolute majority for a particular party, but more normally it gives representation to a number of parties. This means that the prime minister will be much more aware of the demands of different groups and much more concerned about retaining their support. Linz (1994) thus argues that presidential systems inevitably produce divided governments, deadlocks, institutional paralysis, and, ultimately, the breakdown of democratic regimes.

Lijphart (1999: 117-124) identifies three crucial differences between parliamentary and presidential systems of government. First, parliamentary systems have “collective or collegial” executives, whereas presidential systems have one-person, “non-collegial” executives. While the prime minister’s position in the cabinet can vary from preeminence to virtual equality with the other ministers, there is always a relatively high degree of collegiality in decision-making. On the contrary, the members of presidential cabinets are mere advisers and subordinates to the president. That is, the most important decisions in presidential systems can be made by the president with or without, or even against, the advice of the cabinet.

Shugart and Carey (1992), on the other hand, argue that all presidential regimes are not alike and that certain types of electoral and party systems may exacerbate the problems of presidentialism. They suggest that “the basic principles of presidential government may be worth preserving” (Shugart and Carey 1992: 54). Presidentialism offers the advantage of direct accountability between voters and an executive, while parliamentarism allows the assembly to remove the executive by shifting coalitions. The checks and balances inherent in presidentialism are also conducive to compromising

when majoritarian rule does not work. While the independence of the assembly generates the problem of immobilism, it prevents one party from ruling alone.

Empirical results on the difference between presidential and parliamentary regimes have not been consistent yet. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000) provide evidence in favour of a parliamentary system. Using data from both OECD and non-OECD countries during 1950-90, they find that presidential systems tend to last considerably shorter than parliamentary systems. Their empirical results also show that this difference is not due to the wealth of countries in which these institutions were observed, to their economic performance, or to the social conditions under which they emerged. Neither is it due to any of the political conditions under which they functioned.

Other studies that focus on the developing world produce somewhat different results. Power and Gasiorowski (1997) suggest that debates over presidential and parliamentary systems for the consolidation of democracy have missed the forest for the trees. Existing empirical works (Mainwaring 1993; Stepan and Skach 1993) exclude young democracies, although much of the choice of institutions literature is obviously studying the survivability of emerging democracies. Presidentialism is largely a developing country phenomenon: The only advanced industrial democracy using pure presidentialism is the United States. In their study of 56 transitions to democracy in developing countries, Power and Gasiorowski (1997) find no significant difference in the rate at which presidential and parliamentary regimes survive as democracies.

Cheibub (2002) supports the preceding argument by seeking to identify mechanisms that underlie the supposed greater fragility of presidential systems. In a

study of all presidential and mixed¹ regimes between 1946 and 1996, he finds that neither divided government nor deadlock affect negatively the longevity of presidential regimes or the survival in office of presidents and their parties.

Based on the arguments of Linz and Lijphart, Norris (1999) empirically shows that people who live in parliamentary systems have slightly higher levels of institutional confidence than those who live in presidential systems, while the difference is not significant. After more than a decade of theoretical and empirical debates, the fundamental question of “Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does it Make a Difference?” (Linz 1994) has not been conclusively resolved.

Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) identify (a) conflict of interest and (b) the necessity of joint agreement as essential features in the achievement of good governance. The competing bodies should keep each other honest, while being individually accountable to voters. Presidential systems have a deeper separation of powers and more direct accountability to the voters, compared to parliamentary systems (Linz 1994; Lijphart 1992; Shugart and Carey 1992; Tabellini 2000). While the latter invites collusion among politicians, the former induces conflict and competition among them. Thus, overall rents to politicians are likely to be larger in parliamentary systems. The theory predicts that presidential democracies have smaller governments, fewer rents, less public goods and more narrowly targeted redistribution, compared to parliamentary systems (Persson, Roland, and Tabellini 2000). Since voters are assumed to want rents as small as possible, while incumbent politicians want them opposite,

¹ Mixed regimes are those systems in which governments respond to both legislative assemblies and elected presidents are mixed.

presidential systems are likely to produce higher levels of popular satisfaction with democracy than parliamentary systems (*H3*).

2.4.4 Unitarism vs. Federalism

World-wide only 24 out of 192 states have a federal system (Derbyshire and Derbyshire 1996), although many more have adopted some degree of regional decentralization. Riker (1975, 101) defines that “federalism is a political organization in which the activities of government are divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions.” In contrast with Riker’s definition in terms of a guaranteed division of power, Elazar (1997, 239) prefers focusing on the “noncentralization” of power: he describes federalism as “the fundamental distribution of power among multiple centers ... , not the devolution of powers from a single center or down a pyramid.” In addition to these primary characteristics, political scientists identify several secondary characteristics of federalism: in particular, a bicameral legislature with a strong federal chamber to represent the constituent region and a written constitution that is difficult to amend (Lijphart 1999).

Riker (1975) stresses three factors present in the U.S. form of federalism that he claims to be true for federalism in general. First, Riker assumes that every long-standing federation is the result of a bargain whereby previously sovereign polities agree to give up part of their sovereignty in order to pool their resources to increase their collective security and to achieve other goals, including economic ones. Second, he assumes that one of the goals of federalism is to protect individual rights against threats from the

central government through a number of institutional devices, such as a bicameral legislature. Finally, as a result of the federal bargain that created the United States, each of the states was provided with the same constitutional competences.

However, although these three points are a reasonably accurate depiction of the political structures and normative values associated with U.S. federalism, most democratic countries that have adopted federal systems have chosen not to follow the U.S. model (Amoretti and Bermeo 2004). Indeed, American-style federalism embodied some features that would be very inappropriate for many developing countries, especially multi-ethnic polities. Most of the multi-ethnic democracies, for example, are constitutionally asymmetrical: in order to hold the multi-ethnic polity together, they assign different linguistic, cultural, and legal competences to different subnational units.

Federal institutions create, or at least reinforce, localistic politics: strong MP/constituency bonds and greater policy authority at local levels. Politicians are apt to be more aware of local conditions and more concerned with local-level results. Federalism is suggested to institute a closer connection between government units and the citizens they are intended to serve.

Federal institutions also create multiple veto points, thus raising the threshold level of agreement necessary for reaching any political decision. Within federal systems, decision must gain the consent of both houses within the legislature and local or state governments. Proponents of federalism argue that the existence of multiple veto points establishes a protective barrier against the passage of legislation representing special or local interests (Lijphart 1999). It should also lead to greater consensus, since each group is forced to seek the co-operation of at least most other groups.

In a unitary system, on the contrary, the state is one and indivisible, meaning that the central government exercises authority over the people directly. Unitary institutions lead to a more encompassing vision of public policy, where the logic of issue and constituency definition is national rather than local (Gerring and Thacker 2004). The more encompassing these policy issues are, the less susceptible to special interests and personalistic pressures they become (Crepaz 1996; Olson 1982). Local governments encompass small and homogeneous social groups, almost by definition, and are apt to be managed by close-knit power structures. In the absence of rival entities there may be no effective way to counter official malfeasance. In addition, it is often difficult to transfer corrupt officials out of local governments where they enjoy protection and political support if the polity itself is highly decentralized. It may be more difficult to find competent replacements since highly trained professionals often resist taking up posts in the periphery.

By contrast, national bureaucracies are large and interdepartmental transfers tend to be frequent. It is more difficult to maintain clientelistic networks under such circumstances (Wade 1985). Anti-corruption programs are more often the results of efforts by centralizing elites, whose orientation is national rather than local, whose training is extensive and professionally oriented, and whose self-identified political mission is to unify the nation rather than to represent local or particularistic interests. Thus, the quality of public service is likely to decline as one move from centre to periphery (Huntington 1968; Tanzi 1996). Using the data of 125 countries, Gerring and Thacker (2004) find that centralized constitutions help reduce levels of political corruption. The larger the setting, the more a policy is likely to rely upon universalistic

norms, ones conducive to general interests. Norris (1999) also finds that institutional confidence is likely to be greater in unitary state than federal state. Thus, we should expect higher levels of popular satisfaction with democracy in a polity that is unitary (H4).

2.5 Partisan status and Political Institutions

2.5.1 Partisan status: Winner, Non-partisan and Loser

Democracy is about winning and losing within a context of set rules: “Since the struggle for political office is bound to create winners and losers, this necessarily generates ambivalent attitudes towards authorities on the part of the losers” (Kaase and Newton, 1995: 60). As Ginsberg and Weissberg (1978) point out, every election represents a test and potentially a threat to support for the political regime. Electoral conflicts may strain public acceptance of legal and institutional processes. At the simplest level, if people feel that the rules of the game allow the party they endorse to be elected to power, they are more likely to feel that representative institutions are responsive to their needs so that they can trust the political system, and consequently, they are inclined to be satisfied with the government’s performance (Lambert, *et al.*, 1986) and with the way the system works (Kornberg and Clarke, 1994; Nadeau and Blais, 1993). On the other hand, those whose preferred party loses the election are more likely to feel that their voice is excluded from the decision-making process, producing dissatisfaction with political institutions. A growing number of studies empirically show that citizens whose party is in government (winners) are predisposed to evaluate the government’s performance positively and to be more supportive of the political system

than those whose party is in opposition (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Anderson and LoTempio 2002; Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Ginsberg and Weissberg 1978; Nadeau and Blais 1993; Norris 1999).

In a study of eleven European democracies, Anderson and Guillory (1997) find that respondents who voted for the winning party or parties are more likely to be satisfied with how well democracy works in their country than respondents who voted for the losing party or parties. As a result of elections, democracy produces winners and losers. Because the political system is more favorable for people whose party is in power, they argue, losers whose party is in opposition express lower levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works than do winners.

Anderson and LoTempio (2002) examine the effect of voting for the winners and losers of presidential and congressional elections on political trust. On the basis of survey and electoral data for 1972 and 1996, they argue and demonstrate empirically that presidential winner-loser status systematically affect citizens' trust in government. They find that Americans' trust in government is strongly affected by the presidential election, but not the congressional election. For example, voters for the losers of the presidential election show lower levels of trust. Moreover, they find that voting for the congressional winners does not attenuate this effect. Political trust is highest among voters who voted either for both the presidential and congressional winners or the presidential winner and congressional losers; trust is lowest among those who voted for both the presidential and congressional losers or congressional winners and the presidential loser.

Using 25 countries' survey data, Norris (1999) finds that people who endorsed the ruling party or parties exhibit significantly higher levels of confidence in political institutions than do those who backed one of the opposition parties, which is consistent with other works.

The differences in levels of political support between winner and loser in emerging democracies are wider than those in developed democracies. While citizens who live in Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, and Denmark show relatively narrow differences (less than 20 percentage points) in satisfaction with democracy between winner and losers, those in young democracies such as Portugal, Spain, and Greece, express significantly large differences of more than 30 percentage points (Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995). Citizens living under the former regimes do not have long enough experience with democracy. They have been watching just a few regular multiparty elections and only some of them have experienced the ruling party alternations in their country. In sub-Saharan Africa, most parties that won founding elections are still in power (Van de Walle 2003). Those losers in this area have lower expectations for their supporting party to win an election and more dissatisfaction with the political system.

Yet losers play a crucial role in the stability and continued functioning of political systems (Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan, and Listhaug 2005). Their regime support has greater impact on the stability of the regime than winners' regime support, because losers are more likely to reject the rules of the game that are not responsive to their interests and to look for alternatives assuring their needs. The disposition of losers toward the result of not only founding but also regular subsequent elections is critical to

democratization. Anderson et al. (2005) empirically show that losing has a more significant impact after the second rather than first loss.

The experience of losing in emerging democracies has more significant effects on citizens' attitudes towards political systems than the experience in established democracies. While citizens in the latter have become accustomed to the experience of losing as the fortunes of parties shift over time, those in the former will not have experienced winning and losing. Those losers in new democracies need more time to learn how to lose gracefully by alternations in power through consecutive elections. In addition, in a new democracy, being the minority and majority can be expected to weigh more heavily because citizens are less sure when and whether that there will be another opportunity to determine who has the power to rule and who does not. To achieve a consensus about the new rules of the game after a democratic transition, it is necessary that losers will not be permanently excluded from political power, but will have subsequent chances to contest and win elections. We saw several cases, like Cameroon and Kenya, in which an attempt to marginalize the opposition from any share of power was followed by a period of political conflict (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997).

Because democracies are inherently designed to create winners and losers through a series of elections, there must be a tension between those in the majority and those in the minority in democratic political life. That is, even when they perform satisfactorily, democracies, by their very nature, face the potential for instability due to the different preferences that those in the political majority and minority have for legitimizing the system. I therefore expect that, relative to those in the political majority (the winners), (*H5-a*) citizens who are in the political minority (the losers) should have

a diminished stake in the system. As a consequence, they are likely to express more negative views of the political system's performance. In addition, we are able to observe a significant number of citizens who support neither ruling nor opposition parties in emerging democracies. For non-partisans, this study expect that their levels of political support should be somewhere between winners and losers (*H5-b*).

2.5.2 Partisan Status in Different Political Institutions

The distinctions between winners and losers may be more complex than those discussed in the previous section. Different political institutions may also affect citizens' attitudes by providing incentives or disincentives for certain behavioral patterns in different ways. Winning and losing have different meanings in different political systems. Anderson and Guillory's study (1997) shows that the differences between winners and losers in consensual democracies are significantly smaller than in majoritarian democracies. Using cross-sectional survey data for eleven European democracies together with data on the type of democracy in which individuals live, Anderson and Guillory explain cross-national differences in public satisfaction with political system as the product of the type of democracy (majoritarian or consensual) and the distribution of winners and losers in each country. They demonstrate that the nature of representative democratic institutions mediate the relationship between a citizen's status (winner or loser) and his or her satisfaction with the way democracy works.

Combining public opinion surveys from twelve West European citizens with rating of nation's institutional quality, Rohrschneider (2002) explains how political

institutions mediate the relationship between popular perception of under-representation and mass support for the EU-wide government. Citizens would be likely to support a system that provides a fair articulation of one's interests. In particular, when national institutions are corrupt, or bureaucracies are ineffective, people can be less certain that their interests are considered properly. Empirical results of the study show that representational perception is a strong predictor of the EU support and the effect of the perception significantly varies across twelve countries. And, the quality of national institutions explains why the influence of perceived under-representation on EU support varies cross-nationally. Rohrschneider (2002: 470) demonstrates that "citizens are *especially* likely to penalize the EU for not representing them when they reside in nations with superior institutions." He also empirically shows that there is no significant direct effect of the institutional quality indicator on EU support.

Multiple political parties are able to represent a multidimensional citizens preference configuration in the legislature (Powell 2000). Multiparty systems can easily accommodate more issue dimensions than two-party or one-party dominant systems, because issue dimensions have been defined in terms of differences between instead of within parties. Lijphart (1999) finds that the effective number of parties in thirty-six democracies is significantly and positively associated with the number of issue dimensions. Citizens would have more chance to choose a party closely representing their interest about any given issue in multiparty systems. Since two-party systems are built on electoral systems discouraging to third parties, on the other hand, people whose policy preference deviates from those of the two dominant parties such as non-partisans will easily become alienated. They cannot find any political party for their own interest

among the established parties. In addition, any new party is unlikely to endure in two-party systems. This increases the levels of political marginalization among people whose party is not in government.

Opposition parties are one of the two main components of legislative representation in a democracy. For meaningful representation in policy-making processes, opposition parties representing minority's interest should have some significant role in the processes. The greater the opposition's size in the legislature, the greater, generally, its ability to challenge government policy proposals, offer amendments and alternatives, criticize the implementation of policies by the bureaucratic agencies. In a minority government, for example, the influence of opposition parties is significant (Powell 2000). Minority governments must negotiate with the opposition parties. In two- or one-dominant party systems, however, opposition parties may do little more than use the legislature for mobilizing public opinion. They have an indirect, limited impact on government decision-making. Under such a system citizens whose party is not in power are less likely to see the ruling party as providing viable alternatives to their own party. If they are dissatisfied with their own party but see nowhere else to go, they may become increasingly cynical about the system as a whole.

I therefore argue that the nature of representation in party systems systematically mediates the relationship between individual's partisan status (as a majority "winner" or minority "loser") and his or her political support. Greater ENPP is likely to decrease differences in popular satisfaction with democracy both between winners and losers and between winner and non-partisans. It is expected that (*H6-a*) losers (or non-partisans)

who live under greater ENPP should express higher levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works than those who live under smaller ENPP. Figure 2.1 describes this hypothesized interactive effect. The relationships revealed among party systems, partisan status, and popular satisfaction with democracy will shed light on the question concerning the effects of institutions on citizen attitudes toward how well their political systems work.

Figure 2.1 Hypothesized Popular Satisfaction with Democracy in Different Party Systems

Moreover, electoral systems may also play mediating roles. Proportional electoral systems are held to produce more equitable outcomes between political minority and majority and to encourage wider social group representation than majoritarian electoral systems (Lijphart 1999). These features of PR systems are likely to have a greater impact on losers than winners. Adopting a PR system increases the possibility to build an alliance among political minorities and induces protest parties into current political system that enhances political minority groups' perceptions of system legitimacy. Thus, minority groups feel that they are included and represented within the structures of government which make decisions affecting their interests. It should lead to increase their levels of satisfaction with democracy.

Majoritarian electoral systems, on the other hand, can reinforce the gap in popular satisfaction with democracy between winners and losers. Winners literally take all with maximum a half of votes. Majoritarian electoral systems create an incentive for

winners (political majority) to bring more pork to their region or ethnic group at the sacrifice of the numerically smaller population groups who lose elections. This substantive exclusion increases the degree to which a minority group feels that it is excluded from the system. This strengthens losers' dissatisfaction with democracy and threatens the stability of emerging democracies.

I therefore argue that the nature of representation in electoral systems systematically mediates the relationship between individual's partisan status (as a majority "winner" or minority "loser") and his or her political support. If an electoral system increases representation of political minority groups and causes people to have more favorable evaluations of political processes, we expect to see a shift particularly in political minority's attitudes that reflects greater satisfaction with democracy. The more proportional electoral systems decrease differences in satisfaction with democracy both between winners and losers and between winner and non-partisans. It is expected that (*H6-b*) losers (or non-partisans) who live under proportional electoral systems should express higher levels of political support than those who live under non-proportional electoral systems. Figure 2.2 describes this hypothesized interactive effect. The relationships revealed among political systems, partisan status, and political support will shed light on the question concerning the effects of institutions on citizen attitudes toward how well their political systems work.

Figure 2.2 Hypothesized Popular Satisfaction with Democracy in Different Electoral Systems

Figure 2.1 Hypothesized Satisfaction with Democracy in Different Party Systems





Figure 2.2 Hypothesized Satisfaction with Democracy in Different Electoral Systems



Chapter 3. A Model of Political Support

3.1 General Research Strategy

I adopt two research strategies in my efforts to explain different levels of political support. In this project, I utilize a cross-national data set composed of 35 fledgling democracies. This approach is complemented by a case study of Lesotho, which allows for an insight over time. This combined approach offers different methodological, empirical, and theoretical benefits, which are discussed further in this chapter.

Lijphart (1971) called comparing many countries using quantitative analysis the “statistical” method. Comparing many countries most closely approximates the experimental method of science, since it is particularly suited to quantitative analysis through measurement and analysis of aggregate data. The extensive coverage of countries allows for stronger inferences and theory-building, since a given relationship can be demonstrated to exist with a greater degree of certainty. Despite the advantages of comparing many countries, there are some distinct disadvantages, including the availability of data and the validity of measures (Landman 2000).

Single-country studies that merely describe or interpret political phenomena have been referred to as “interpretative” (Lijphart 1971: 691). These types of studies are not comparative but are useful for comparison purely for their information. Single-country studies are also useful for generating hypotheses on theories that have yet been fully specified. My study of Lesotho, however, does more than this. This study makes use of a quasi-experimental comparison across time in Lesotho (before and after institutional reform) to analyze the impact of political institutions to promote political

support among citizens. In this chapter, I introduce the multilevel analysis used to conduct this research and discuss the operationalization of key variables with hypotheses to be tested.

3.2 Multilevel Analysis

This research makes use of data measured at multiple levels, such as individual-level survey data from the Afrobarometer, Koreabarometer, Latinobarometer, and the Taiwan Election and Democratization Study, and national-level contextual data. Respondents are the level 1 units nested within nations, which comprise the level 2 units. Thus, this research combines multiple levels of analysis into a single comprehensive model by specifying predictors at different levels. The goal of multilevel analysis is to account for variance in a dependent variable that is measured at the lowest level of analysis by considering information from all levels of analysis.

This study adopts contextual analysis of political behavior. Multilevel analysis allows researchers to explore causal heterogeneity (Western 1998). By specifying cross-level interactions, it is possible to determine whether the effect of lower-level predictors is conditioned or moderated by higher-level predictors. In other words, is there a single, uniform relationship or does relationship vary across higher levels of analysis? The contextual analysis of political behavior assumes that environmental factors interact with individual factors to shape political behavior.

Contextual analysis focuses on general concepts applicable across many countries. It looks at general political attributes in many countries, for example whether the constitution is unitary or federal, or the system presidential versus parliamentary. In a contextual analysis, individuals' attitudes and behaviors are assumed to be affected by

their surroundings. People form attitudes about politics in systemic contexts whose institutional structures mediate preferences, define the choices available, and provide citizens with opportunities to be heard in the political process. This type of analysis goes along with the objective of comparative analysis to “reduce proper names to explanatory variables” (Przeworski, 1987: 38f). Explanatory variables are abstractions describing a context that can in principle be found in more than one country. Since political institutions are relatively stable phenomena, the most appropriate evidence concerns a cross-national comparison, which maximizes the variance in institutional arrangements.

Multilevel analysis can provide a test of the generalizability of findings (Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Because it allows researchers to explore causal heterogeneity, multilevel analysis can contribute to these generalizability tests. If the contextual units are randomly sampled, as multilevel methods typically assume, multilevel analysis may have the added benefit that it helps overcome case selection problems that often plague comparative research (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).

In addition to those substantive merits, there is also an important statistical motivation for explicitly accounting for multilevel data structure. Specifically, ignoring the multilevel character of data carries significant statistical costs in the form of possibly incorrect standard errors and inflated Type I error rates (Raudenbush and Bryk 2000; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). In the context of multilevel data structures, the correlation between observations within contexts is referred to as intra-class or cluster correlation. In most cases this correlation is non-zero, and it causes the estimated standard errors to be too low and the test-statistics too high if the intra-class correlation

is not accounted for in the statistical model. As a result, predictors appear to have a significant effect when in fact they do not. By using a multilevel analysis, I try to examine the influence of different political institutions on the level of political support across emerging democracies.

3.3 A Model of Political Support

3.3.1 Dependent Variable: Satisfaction with Democracy

The concept of political support, in its general meaning, “refers to the way in which a person evaluatively orients himself to a [political] object through ... his attitude” (Easton 1975:436). Political support is a multi-dimensional phenomenon: political support for the community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and political actors (Norris 1999). This study focuses attention on regime performance, measuring support for how democratic political systems function in practice. It is commonly measured by “satisfaction with the way democracy works in [the country].”² In other words, the question is concerned with how democracy functions in practice as opposed to the ideal.

The concept of political support on which my analysis is based requires only a “low level of generalization” (Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995, p. 330; see also Anderson and Guillory 1997, p. 70). The item of “satisfaction with democracy” is not intended to include any information on political leaders, parties, or policies. Therefore, this item dismisses the possibility to tap support for authorities. Fuchs (1993, p. 240) argues that because the question on “satisfaction with democracy” asks about the

² The question asks, “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?”

functioning of democracy, the item “refers to the informal structure of the regime; in the generalization hierarchy it is between attitudes in respect to the formal structure and those in respect to the authorities. In support of this claim, Fuchs shows that the item of “satisfaction with democracy” correlated with items that tap attitudes regarding the formal structure (0.49) and incumbent authorities (0.50).

There has been a debate regarding what dimension or dimensions of political support the measure of “satisfaction with democracy” represents. A number of scholars criticize it for its ambiguity, as it can tap multiple dimensions of political support, for example both support for democracy as a value and satisfaction with the incumbent government (Norris 1999; Canache et al. 2001; Linde and Ekman 2003). Instead, Norris develops an institutional confidence scale combining confidence in five major political and civic institutions, including parliament, the civil service, the legal system, the police and the army to measure support for regime institutions.

The question on “satisfaction with democracy,” however, has most commonly been used as a measure of system support (e.g., Anderson and Guillory 1997; Farrel and McAllister 2003; Fuchs 1999; Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995; Harmel and Robertson 1986; Klingermann 1999; Lockerbie 1993; Morlini and Tarchi 1996; Toka 1995; Weil 1989). While they criticize that the item of “satisfaction with democracy” represents multiple levels of political support, Canache et al. (2001) show that it is consistently and significantly related to system support in 17 Latin American countries. In addition, because this item has been included in various survey data, it fits very well for cross-country analysis. Using the Afrobarometer Round 1 data set, including 12 sub-Saharan African countries, Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) find that popular

satisfaction with democracy has significant correlations with the following three dimensions: support for democratic regime, trust in state institutions, and evaluation of government performance. Moreover, the evaluation of government performance has a consistently powerful relationship with popular satisfaction with democracy across 12 countries.

In addition, a significant number of studies find that satisfaction with democracy is clearly an indicator of actual system support and not conterminous with support for the incumbent government (Clarke and Kornberg 1992; Kornberg and Clarke 1994). Fuchs examines the validity of the satisfaction with democracy indicator and finds that the results constitute “a successful validation of the indicator as a measuring instrument for a generalized attitude towards the political system on the legitimacy dimension” (1993: 242). This study uses the item of “satisfaction with democracy” as a dependent variable to measure the levels of popular satisfaction with democracy across 35 developing countries because it refers to a certain institutionalized form of democracy in a particular country. This research is interested in understanding citizen’s responses to the process of democratic governance.

Figure 3.1 Satisfaction with Democracy, by country

Combining the percentage of respondents saying they are “very” or “somewhat satisfied” with the way democracy works, Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of satisfaction with democratic performance across the countries investigated in this study. Satisfaction ranged from 83 percent in Kenya in 2003 to 18 percent in Peru in 1998, with a mean of 49 percent, and a standard deviation of 17.2. Taking the 50 percent

threshold as a criterion, then a majority of people in 16 of the 35 countries reported that they were very or somewhat satisfied with the way democracy works in their country.

In 16 sub-Saharan African countries on the whole, more than half of all respondents (59 percent) said they were satisfied with democracy in the period between mid 2002 and mid 2003. An absolute majority was satisfied in 12 out of the 16 countries under study. In Cape Verde and Nigeria, only a third of the respondents were satisfied with democracy. For Nigerians, popular satisfaction with democracy shows significant change from 84 percent in 2000 to only 34 percent in 2003 (Afrobarometer Network 2004). The high level of satisfaction in Nigeria 2000 might reflect a honeymoon period for the restoration of civilian rule, but the extremely low level in 2003 showed that the new political system failed to reach to Nigerian expectation with real progress.

Unexpectedly, the Afrobarometer mean score is comparable with the Eurobarometer mean score on the same item in 1996 (56 percent). However, this high level of satisfaction with democracy among sub-Saharan African countries can be traced back to the late 1990s when almost 60 percent of the respondents said they were satisfied with democracy (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005).

In Latin America on the whole, only 38 percent of the respondents are satisfied with the way democracy works in 1998. Only in Costa Rica (61 percent) Guatemala (57 percent) and Uruguay (69 percent) were majorities of the respondents satisfied with democracy. In Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru, no more than a third of the public is satisfied. Since 1996, the regional figure has never

exceeded 41 percent. In 2000, only 37 percent of the respondents said that they were satisfied with the way democracy works (Lagos 2001).

The item of satisfaction with democracy is less stable than the item of support for democracy.³ For example, popular support for democracy in Nigeria has dropped from 82 percent in 2000 to 67 percent in 2003, while Nigerians' satisfaction with democracy has fallen by 50 percentage points (Afrobarometer Network 2004).

Figure 3.2 Satisfaction with Democracy, by Continent

Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of satisfaction with democracy across three regions. In both sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, almost one-third of respondents belong to extremes. On a 4-point scale, only 16 percent of sub-Saharan Africans said that they were very satisfied with democracy in their countries, and 12 percent of Latin Americans. Only 6 percent of the public was very satisfied with democracy in Asia, including South Korea and Taiwan. In a complementary manner, 16 percent of Latin Americans reported that they were very dissatisfied, and 15 percent of sub-Saharan Africans. Only 8 percent of the respondents were very dissatisfied in South Korea and Taiwan. Many citizens in both sub-Saharan Africa and Asia were moderately satisfied with democracy, while the majority in Latin America were moderately dissatisfied.

³ A standard question about support for democracy asks respondents whether democracy is always preferable to any other form of government, whether there are certain circumstances in which non-democratic form of government might be preferable, or whether the form of government really does not matter to a person like themselves.

3.3.2 Independent Variables

3.3.2.1 Party system: Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties⁴

H1: ENPP and satisfaction with democracy should have a positive relationship.

In this study I test whether various institutional characteristics are indeed systematically associated with levels of popular satisfaction with democracy in emerging democracies. First, I measure party system fragmentation with an index developed by Laakso and Taagapera (1979), which measures the effective number of parties (N) in a system as follows:

$$N = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^n s_i^2}$$

in which s_i is the proportion of seats of the i -th party (Lijphart, 1999: 68). This formula contains information about the number and relative size of the parties in the system. It helps to differentiate between two- and multi-party systems, but also offers a more subtle measure than simply counting the number of parties that gain representation or receive votes.

3.3.2.2 Electoral System: Index of Disproportionality⁵ (I.D.)

H2: More proportional electoral systems should produce higher levels of popular satisfaction with democracy.

⁴ Primary sources: Nohlen, Krennerich, and Thubaut (1999); LeDuce, Niemi, and Norris (2002); Election around the World available at www.electionworld.org

⁵ Primary sources: Nohlen, Krennerich, and Thubaut (1999); Election results around the World available at www.electionworld.org

Second, electoral systems are measured by the degree of disproportionality in the translation of votes into seats. This study uses an index developed by Michael Gallagher (1991) as follows:

$$\text{Gallagher's least-squares index} = \sqrt{\left(\frac{1}{2} \sum (v_i - s_i)^2 \right)}$$

in which v_i is vote percentage and s_i is seat percentage. The higher the figure the greater the disproportionality produced by the electoral systems. This factor tests whether or how increasing proportionality of electoral systems effects on citizens' attitude toward how well the system works.

3.3.2.3 Presidentialism

H3: Presidential systems should produce higher levels of popular satisfaction with democracy than parliamentary systems

Third, presidentialism refers to a system where policy-making power is divided between two directly elected bodies, the legislature and the president. Parliamentarism, by contrast, is a system of government in which the executive is chosen by, and responsible to, the legislature. These two concepts represent poles at each end of a continuum, which may be conceptualized along two dimensions: (a) the degree of separation between president and parliament, and (b) the relative power of the two players (the more power the president possesses the more “presidential” is the resulting

system). I create three categories: 1, parliamentary; 2, semi-presidential; 3, presidential.⁶

3.3.2.4 Unitarism

H4: Unitary systems should produce higher levels of popular satisfaction with democracy than Federal systems.

Fourth, this research hypothesizes that a unitary state structure, as opposed to a federal one, should lead to higher levels of popular satisfaction with democracy, all other things being equal. By unitarism this study refers to a political system where the national government is sovereign relative to its territorial units (if any). Following Gerring and Thacker's (2004) work, I conceptualize unitarism as a continuum that varies along two dimensions: (a) the degree of separation (independent) between national and subnational units, and (if any separation at all) (b) the relative power of the two players (the more power the center possesses, the more unitary the system). Of the many institutional factors that may determine variation along these dimensions, two predominate: federalism and bicameralism.

Federalism refers to a permanent and highly institutionalized sharing of responsibilities between a national authority and semi-autonomous regional units. Since this sharing of responsibilities takes a variety of forms and is not always formally prescribed, this study constructs three coding categories: 1, non-federal; 2, semi-federal (where there are elective legislatures at the regional level but in which constitutional

⁶ Primary sources: Delury (1999); Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996).

sovereignty is still reserved to the national government); 3, federal (elective regional legislatures plus constitutional recognition of subnational authority).⁷

Bicameralism refers to the sharing of policy-making power between two chambers at the national level. Since, like federalism, bicameralism is often a matter of degrees, I code cases into three categories: 0, unicameral (no or weak upper house); 1, weak bicameral (upper house has some effective veto power); and 2, strong bicameral.⁸

I construct the unitarism variable by adding the scores of each country together on these two components (federalism and bicameralism) and reversing the scale, thus creating a scale from 1 to 5. In a fully unitary state, federalism has no constitutional standing, no independently elected territorial legislature, and no specific policy purviews reserved for them. The opposite of a unitary state is a federal, bicameral one. In this study, I generally refer to this case as “federal”, although all constitutionally federal states are not necessarily bicameral.

3.3.2.5 Partisan status: Winner, Loser and Non-partisan

H5-a: Loser would express lower levels of satisfaction with democracy than winner.

H5-b: Non-partisan should show lower levels of satisfaction with democracy than winner.

Finally, this study classifies respondents as being a loser or non-loser with the help of an Afrobarometer survey question that asks which party, if any, the respondent

⁷ Principal sources: Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996); Watts (1997).

⁸ Principal sources: Patterson and Mughan (1999); Tsebelis and Money (1997).

feel close to or a Latinobarometer survey question that asks which party the respondent would vote for.⁹ This research then combines these responses with information about the party or parties that won the most recent presidential, legislative, or general elections to identify loser. I created a dummy variable of loser. If the respondent felt close to or would vote for an opposition party, I coded that individual as “1” in the loser dummy variable. Otherwise I coded a respondent as “0.” In addition, survey data shows that there is a significant number of respondents who did not feel close to any party, refused to answer the question of party affiliation or said “don’t know.” Thus, I created another dummy variable for non-partisan. Those two dummy variables show the differences of popular satisfaction with democracy both between winner and loser and between winner and non-partisan.

3.3.2.6 Partisan status and Party system

H6: Loser (or non-partisan) who lives in more ENPP party systems should express higher levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works than loser (or non-partisan) in less ENPP party.

To examine whether party system would mediate the relationship between minority-majority and popular satisfaction with democracy, I include two interaction terms - loser*ENPP and non-partisan*ENPP - from two different levels, partisan status from individual level and ENPP from country level. The coefficient of the two interaction terms would show whether and how party systems explain the different

⁹ The Taiwan’s Elections and Democratization Study (2003) and the Koreabarometer (2001) have the same question as the Afrobarometer has.

degrees of the relationship between partisan status and popular satisfaction with democracy across emerging democracies. I expect that the coefficients of the two interaction term should be positive. The greater the ENPP is, the smaller the differences in popular satisfaction with democracy both between winner and loser and between winner and non-partisan are.

3.3.2.7 Partisan status and Electoral System

H7: Loser (or non-partisan) who lives in more proportional electoral systems should present higher levels of satisfaction with democracy than loser (or non-partisan) who lives in less proportional electoral systems.

To examine whether and how electoral systems mediate the relationship between partisan status and popular satisfaction with democracy I create two interaction terms, i.e., loser * I.D. and non-partisan*I.D. in the model. The coefficient of the two interaction terms measures the effect of different electoral systems on the relationship between partisan status and popular satisfaction with democracy across countries in this study. It is expected that both interaction terms should have a negative coefficient. Increasing disproportionality of electoral systems should induce greater differences in popular satisfaction with political systems both between winners and losers and between winners and non-partisans.

Partisan status (winner or loser) is the product of electoral contests among political parties. Citizen's vote for a party or a candidate is collected and counted by a certain electoral rule on which members of a polity have agreed. Thus, we can expect

that party and electoral systems could have a mediate effect the relationship between partisan status and popular satisfaction with democracy. However, either the relationship between executive and legislative branches or the relationship between national and regional units does not have any close connection with partisan status. This study looks at neither the interaction between partisan status and presidentialism nor the interaction between partisan status and unitarism.

3.3.3 Control Variables

3.3.3.1 Democratization: Freedom House Index

For the purpose of this study, I adopt the Freedom House Index¹⁰ to control for the different degrees of democratization across the 35 emerging democracies in the model. The mean combined scores for political rights and civil liberties for the survey year of each country is used in the analysis. Across countries it would be expected that the existence of widespread political rights and civil liberties should be associated with higher levels of public satisfaction with democratic governance.

3.3.3.2 Economic Development: GDP per capita in 2001 (US\$)¹¹

To control for the level of economic development across the countries under this study, I introduce *GDP per capita* in 2001 (natural log in PPP US\$) in the model. Lipset (1959) observes that democracy is related to economic development. Because the

¹⁰ Freedom House, "Freedom around the World," 2001-2002. www.freedomhouse.com.

¹¹ UNDP. *The UNDP Human Development Report 2003* (New York: Oxford University Press).

intensity of distributional conflicts is lower at higher income levels, citizens are likely to show higher levels of satisfaction with democracy.

3.3.3.3 Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia: two dummy variables.

There are strong reasons to believe that geography might also correlate systematically with popular satisfaction with democracy. To capture geography, this study uses two dummy variables for continental location. They refer to countries in sub-Saharan Africa (sub-Saharan Africa) and eastern Asian (Asia). The base group of countries thus consists of countries in Latin America. Table 3.1 lists country-level data included in the study.

Table 3.1 Political and Economic Indicators in the countries under study

3.3.3.4 Interest in Politics

Many political scientists have demonstrated that interest in politics is related to political support (Almond and Verba, 1965; Anderson and Guillory, 1997; Weatherford, 1991). Citizens who understand the political process and believe that their participation can influence policymaking are likely to take a more optimistic view of democratic governance. In other studies, political interest has been taken as a direct measure of cognitive competence which stimulates a critical skepticism towards political system (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995). The survey question used here asked respondents how interested they are in public affairs. I expect to find that those who are more interested in politics are also more likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works.

3.3.3.5 Economic Performance Evaluations: sociotropic and egocentric evaluations

Citizen evaluations of system outputs can be one of the most important factors shaping the reputation of political institutions and of the political system as a whole (Weatherford, 1987). In particular, several studies suggest that economic performance, as well as public perceptions of both personal and national economic conditions, are related to system support (Clarke, Dutt, and Kornberg, 1993; Kornberg and Clarke, 1992; Listhaug and Wiberg, 1995; Weatherford, 1984, 1987). For this study, I use responses to two survey questions that asked respondents to evaluate national and personal economic conditions, that is, to form sociotropic and egocentric evaluations of economic performance. I expect that those who evaluate economic performance positively should be more satisfied with the way democracy works.

3.3.4 Demographic Variables: education, gender, and age

I control for the usual socio-demographic variables: education, gender, and age. Coding procedures and descriptive statistics for the individual-level variables used in this study are shown in Appendix A.

Figure 3.1 Satisfaction with Democracy, by Country (Africa and Asia)




Figure 3.1 (Continued) Satisfaction with Democracy, by Country (Latin America)




Figure 3.2 Satisfaction with Democracy, by Continent




Table 3.1 Political and Economic Indicators in Countries under Study

Country	Freedom House Index (survey year)	ENPP	Disproportionality	Political System	Unitarism (= 5)	GDP per capita (PPP US\$ 2001)
South Africa	1.5	2.15	0.245	Parliamentary	1	11,290
Cape Verde	1.5	2.07	6.432	Semi-Presidential	5	5,570
Taiwan	1.5	2.47	3.076	Semi-Presidential	5	12,588
Costa Rica	1.5	2.43	3.992	Presidential	5	9,460
Uruguay	1.5	3.14	2.231	Presidential	1	8,400
Botswana	2.0	1.42	21.163	Parliamentary	5	7,820
Ghana	2.0	2.17	5.113	Presidential	4	2,250
Mali	2.0	1.31	11.800	Presidential	5	810
South Korea	2.0	2.39	8.834	Semi-Presidential	5	15,090
Bolivia	2.0	5.36	8.402	Semi-Presidential	2	2,300
Lesotho	2.5	2.16	8.200	Parliamentary	5	2,420
Namibia	2.5	1.66	4.073	Presidential	5	7,120
Senegal	2.5	2.10	19.272	Presidential	5	1,500
Chile	2.5	5.18	4.767	Presidential	3	9,190
Ecuador	2.5	5.24	9.068	Presidential	4	3,280
El Salvador	2.5	3.50	4.851	Presidential	5	5,260
Honduras	2.5	2.20	2.282	Presidential	5	2,830

Table 3.1 (Continued) Political and Economic Indicators in Countries under Study

Country	Freedom House Index (survey year)	ENPP	Disproportionality	Political System	Unitarism (= 5)	GDP per capita (PPP US\$ 2001)
El Salvador	2.5	3.50	4.851	Presidential	5	5,260
Honduras	2.5	2.20	2.282	Presidential	5	2,830
Nicaragua	2.5	2.73	4.077	Presidential	5	2,450
Panama	2.5	2.92	12.054	Presidential	5	5,750
Venezuela	2.5	3.74	7.073	Presidential	1	5,670
Kenya	3.0	3.12	3.329	Presidential	5	980
Argentina	3.0	2.56	5.703	Presidential	2	11,320
Malawi	3.5	2.68	2.081	Presidential	5	570
Tanzania	3.5	1.21	19.925	Presidential	4	520
Mozambique	3.5	1.99	6.561	Presidential	5	1,140
Brazil	3.5	7.13	0.049	Presidential	1	7,360
Colombia	3.5	7.04	5.949	Presidential	2	7,040
Guatemala	3.5	4.57	7.676	Presidential	5	4,400
Mexico	3.5	2.66	5.539	Presidential	1	8,430
Paraguay	3.5	3.18	8.171	Presidential	3	5,210
Nigeria	4.0	1.17	5.652	Presidential	1	850

Table 3.1 (Continued) Political and Economic Indicators in Countries under Study

Country	Freedom House Index (survey year)	ENPP	Disproportionality	Political System	Unitarism (= 5)	GDP per capita (PPP US\$ 2001)
Zambia	4.0	1.31	14.595	Presidential	5	780
Peru	4.5	4.53	9.204	Presidential	5	4,570
Uganda	5.0	a	a	Presidential	5	1,490
Zimbabwe	6.0	1.92	9.063	Presidential	5	2,280
<i>Mean</i>	2.9	2.98	7.368	n.a.	3.9	5,085

a. In Uganda, National Parliament members were elected without party labels.

Chapter 4. Individual-Level Analysis

4.1 The Effects of Partisan Status on Satisfaction with Democracy at the Aggregate Level

In emerging democracies, political parties may be the most important and the only collective actors linking citizens with the political decision-making processes. The manner in which they link citizens depends decisively on whether the party is in or out of government. This difference may also have an impact on citizens' subjective perceptions. Citizens whose party is in power (winners) certainly have the feeling that their interests are considered in political decision-making, in contrast to citizens whose party is in opposition (losers). Moreover, supporters whose party is in power are likely to see the functioning of democracy in their country in a more positive light than those whose party is not in government.

Are losers less satisfied than winners with the way democracy works? Figure 4-1 offers some preliminary evidence at the aggregate level. To examine differences in satisfaction between losers and winners, I compare satisfaction with the way democracy works between these two groups across 34 countries, ordered according to the gap in popular satisfaction with democracy between winners and losers from the largest to the smallest.

Figure 4-1 Satisfaction with Democracy and Partisan Status

Figure 4-1 clearly illustrates that there are differences in satisfaction between winners and losers, regardless of the general level of satisfaction with democracy. The results are consistent with my expectation that winners should be more satisfied with democracy than losers. Winners show higher levels of satisfaction with

democracy than do losers in 33 of the 34 countries. While there is a certain gap between winners and losers, a significant number of losers are satisfied with democracy. In 11 countries 50 percent and more of opposition party supporters are satisfied with democracy. Although there is variation across countries in the strength of the relationship between partisan status and popular satisfaction with democracy, the differences exist also within every country examined. For instance, there is a strikingly large difference in popular satisfaction with democracy between winners and losers in the 5 countries: between 30 and 40 percentage points in Malawi, Nicaragua, and Tanzania, 47 percentage points in Uganda, and 58 percentage points in Zimbabwe.

The largest gap in popular satisfaction with democracy between citizens whose party is in government and those whose party is in opposition in Zimbabwe reflects the present political crisis in the country (Makumbe 2002). People in Zimbabwe had rarely been able to make an electoral choice until the 2000 elections, when the new party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) posed a serious challenge to the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), although Zimbabwe is one of the very few African states that have had a continuous multi-party system since majority rule in 1980 (Laakso 2002). Elections did not threaten the position of the ruling party, but rather confirmed this power in a ritualistic manner. In the parliamentary elections of June 2000, however, the MDC won almost half of the contested seats in the legislature.¹² The presidential elections of 2002 in which President Mugabe from the ruling ZANU-PF won with 56 percent against Tsvangirai from the MDC with 42 percent, increased the conflict between government and opposition parties. The elections were reportedly marred by

¹² MDC took 57 out of the 120 contested seats and the ruling ZANU-PF won 62 seats.

disenfranchisement of urban voters, violent intimidation against opposition supporters, intimidation of the independent press and other irregularities. The MDC alleged that Mugabe's victory was due to a number of irregularities and petitioned the High Court to declare the election invalid.

In Malawi, the United Democratic Front (UDF) has won the last three presidential elections, since its leader Bakili Muluzi replaced Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, the leader of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), as the head of state in the 1994 presidential elections. While there is no formal rule to hinder conduct of opposition parties after the transition to multi-party system, Malawi has been mostly ruled by a *de facto* one-party government (Englund 2002). The UDF government has retained the strong executive powers of the state president and promoted the exclusiveness of power through neo-patrimonial networks. Thus, opposition parties and their supporters express higher levels of dissatisfaction with democracy. In addition, people in Tanzania have experienced similar political processes. Although Tanzania has held multi-party elections since 1995, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) won last two presidential elections and still is *de facto* in power.

Thus, the big differences in popular satisfaction with democracy between those two political groups come from the fact that supporters of opposition parties have no positive experiences with the political systems over the past years. In sub-Saharan Africa, in particular, citizens have been experiencing only several regular multiparty elections and only a few have observed the government party alternation in their country. People with lower expectations for their party to win an election are likely to show lower levels of satisfaction with democracy.

On the other hand, the experience with relatively smooth electoral turnovers of ruling parties leads to smaller gap in popular satisfaction with between winners

and losers in emerging democracies. In Kenya, 80 percent of opposition party supporters said they were satisfied with the way democracy works. The timing of the Afrobarometer survey was unusual in Kenya in 2003 (Wolf, Logan, and Owiti 2004). The survey was conducted only eight months after the first electoral transfer of power in Kenya's history, overlapping with some researchers refer to as a "honeymoon period" of indeterminate length, during which citizens show some patience with the continuance of inherited problems (Aslund 1994; Balcerowicz 1995). As Figure 3-1 shows, 83 percent of the respondents said they were satisfied with democracy. The very high levels of satisfaction with democracy among the population at large suggests that satisfaction is high among the supporters of both ruling and opposition parties.

In Mexico, losers express even higher levels of satisfaction with democracy than winners. The 1997 legislative elections led to the first experience of divided government in Mexican politics since the 1920s (Weldon 1997). The polls failed the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). With just under 40 percent of the effective vote (the total vote for all parties above the 2 percent legal threshold), the PRI won 239 of 500 seats in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies. The Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) and the Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD) divided the opposition vote evenly. The former won 121 and the latter 125 seats. Two small parties, the Partido Verde Ecologista de Mexico (PVEM) and the Partido del Trabajo (PT), won 15 seats. Those respondents, supporters of opposition parties, might be pleased with the fact that their parties formed a majority in the Chamber of Deputies for the first time and had an influence on policy-making processes. In 2000 Vincent Fox Quesada from the PAN won the presidential election with 43.4% of valid votes.

In most countries under this study, it is possible to see a difference in the level of satisfaction with democracy between supporters of ruling and opposition parties. In one-third of the countries, a majority of losers are also satisfied with the functioning of democracy in their country. It suggests that there might be a legitimacy problem in the other two-thirds of emerging democracies under study.

4.2 Multivariate Single-Country Models

Next, I examine the performance of the individual-level variables in a series of multivariate single-country models. Linear Regression Models are commonly used for this type of analysis. However, when a variable is ordinal – a common outcome in a survey analysis – while its categories can be ranked from low to high, the distances between adjacent categories are unknown.¹³ Since the Linear Regression Model includes the implicit assumption that the intervals are in fact equal, it may not be the best tool for evaluating survey results. Instead, I use Ordered Probit Analysis (Long, 1997: 114-147) to obtain maximum likelihood estimates.¹⁴ Table 4-1 shows the results.

Table 4-1 Effects of Individual-Level Variables on Satisfaction with Democracy in 34 countries

I find that the effects of partisan status – loser and non-partisan – remain even when I control for a number of other variables. The effects are strong and

¹³ Researchers often treat ordinal dependent variables as if they were interval, numbering the dependent categories sequentially and using the Linear Regression Model, which assumes that the intervals between adjacent categories are equal. For example, the distance between strongly agreeing and agreeing is assumed to be the same as the distance between agreeing and being neutral on the survey statement. However, both McKelvey and Zavoina (1975: 117) and Winship and Mare (1984: 521-523) give examples where regression of an ordinal outcome provides misleading results.

¹⁴ There was no significant difference between the Ordered Probit model and the OLS one.

consistent with the expected direction. The relationship holds in 26 of 34 countries, indicating that losers are significantly less satisfied with the way democracy works than are winners. The results also show that non-partisans express significant lower levels of satisfaction with democracy than do winners in 29 of 34 countries. The effects of loser are strongest in Uganda and Zimbabwe among sub-Saharan African countries and in Chile and Peru of Latin America. In Cape Verde, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Venezuela, the effects of political minority are negative but are not statistically significant. In Mozambique, Honduras, and Paraguay, the effects are in the incorrect direction, but they do not even approach statistical significance.

In Uganda, the significantly large difference in popular satisfaction with democracy between winners and losers is not necessarily surprising given the fact that the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) established the present regime and has ruled the country for the past twenty years. Political parties are permitted to exist but are forbidden from electoral activities. While Uganda's referendum 2000 approved that Ugandans gave credit to President Museveni and the movement system for their achievements in government, opposition parties have been criticizing the system and advocating multiparty electoral campaigns.

There is an obvious regional cleavage between the north and the three southern regions in Uganda (Logan, Muwanga, Sentamu, and Bratton 2003). In addition, people's party affiliation is strongly associated with region. According to the Afrobarometer Round 2 data set collected in Uganda, 24 percent of the citizens whose party is in opposition are from the north, while 58 percent of ruling NRM party supporters are from the west, President Museveni's home area. In the 2001 relatively contested presidential elections, President Museveni from the NRM was selected to a second five-year term with 69.3 percent of the total vote, compared to

only 27.8 percent for Besigye. Logan et al. (2003) show that the differences between winners and losers – which authors describe as “insiders” and “outsiders” with reference to the patronage system -- emerge sharply on issues that are fundamental to the practice and consolidation of democracy, for example, evaluations of the nature and performance of the political system as a whole. This evidence confirms my results indicating that there is a large gap in popular satisfaction with democracy between winners and losers in Uganda.

Cape Verde is one of few African countries that have experienced a renewed change of government after successful founding elections. In January and February 2001, Cape Verde held its third parliamentary and presidential elections since its democratic transition in 1990. The result was that the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV), which had been ousted from office by the Movement for Democracy (MPD) in 1991, regained a majority in the National Assembly and saw its candidate win the presidency (Meyns 2002). The National Electoral Committee confirmed the victory of Pedro Pires as the new President by just 12 votes with 49.43 percent against the 49.42 percent of his opponent, Carlos Veiga (MPD).

Cape Verde is moving toward a two-party system, with the PAICV occupying the space left of center and the MPD to the right of center (Meyns 2002). The MPD has been pursuing policies of reducing state involvement in the national economy and encouraging greater privatization. The party enjoys the support of business interests, including those from Portugal, as well as the backing of the influential Catholic hierarchy. The PAICV, on the other hand, has been criticizing the MPD's neoliberalism and established itself as a social democratic party. The tiny margin of victory in the presidential election result and the alternation of

government would predict that the losers' effect on popular satisfaction with democracy should not be significant in Cape Verde. The empirical results show that there is no significant gap in satisfaction with democracy between supporters of ruling and opposition parties.

During the 1990s Venezuela had experienced big changes in party system (Penfold-Becerra 2004), due to the rapid decline in the dominance of Democratic Action (AD) and the Organized Political Committee for Independent Election (COPEI), coupled with an increasing fragmentation of the party system as a whole. The effective number of parties more than doubled from 2.24 to 4.8. In December 1993, a coalition of Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), Convergencia Nacional (CN) and other small parties elected former president and COPEI founder Rafael Caldera to the presidency. Although Caldera's decrees, which included substantial public intervention in the financial system, temporarily increased his popularity in 1994, the failure of the government's reforms to improve living standards led to widespread attacks on the president, Congress, and the party system after 1995 (Romero 1997). In December 1998, the ex-coup plotter Hugo Chaves from the Movimiento V Republica (MVR) was elected president with 56.2 percent of valid votes, the largest margin in Venezuelan history. Because the Latinobarometer survey took place during Venezuela's transitional period, we expect no meaningful difference between political majority and minority. The results in Table 4-1 clearly show that partisan status has no significant effect on popular satisfaction with democracy in Venezuela in 1998.

Economic performance evaluations also play an important role in satisfaction with democracy. The coefficients for national economic performance evaluation are consistently significant and are in the expected direction in most countries (31 out of

34 countries). The results show that citizens who evaluate their nation's economic performance positively also are more likely to show higher levels of satisfaction with democracy. In Ghana, Lesotho, and Guatemala, the effects of respondents' assessments of national economic conditions on satisfaction with democracy are not statistically significant. In addition, the effects of egocentric assessments are statistically significant in two-thirds (21) of the countries under study. Some countries, i.e., Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Argentina, and Chile, show that the effect of sociotropic assessments is greater than egocentric ones, while others show that the latter is much stronger than the former, for example, South Africa, Kenya, and Costa Rica. The strongest sociotropic effects are in El Salvador, Brazil, Nicaragua, and Nigeria. Egocentric evaluations are strongest in Nicaragua, Venezuela, Mexico, and Panama. In both Lesotho and Guatemala, neither of the two economic performance evaluations have any significant effect on popular satisfaction with the way democracy works.

Political interest was a statistically significant and positive predictor of satisfaction with the way democracy works in only 17 of 33 countries.¹⁵ These results suggest that most politically informed and involved citizens develop an allegiance to democratic performance, thus challenging the thesis that cognitive competence breeds dissatisfaction with political system. In Mozambique, however, people who are more interested in politics show lower levels of satisfaction with democracy.

Demographic factors had no consistent effects in countries under this study on popular satisfaction with democracy. An overwhelming majority of the coefficients are nowhere close to being statistically meaningful. In addition, the

¹⁵ Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS) 2003 survey questionnaire does not include the item of interest in politics.

signs of coefficients switch frequently from country to country, indicating a lack of cross-national consistency in the effects of these variables. For example, the results show that older people are significantly more satisfied with the way democracy works than younger people in only 14 out of 34 countries.

Table 4-2 Probability of Satisfaction with Democracy by Country

To ease the interpretation of the results, I compute the predicted probabilities of “very satisfied with democracy” for each country separately in Table 4-2. Predicted probabilities are given for the ‘average’ female respondent; all variables other than loser, non-partisan, and female, are held constant at the mean and the predicted probabilities calculated for both winner and loser. The substantive results of these analyses are summarized in Table 4-2. The results provide strong additional support for the hypothesis of partisan status. Changing from being a loser to a winner has a substantively meaningful effect on the likelihood of an individual being “very” satisfied with the way democracy works in 31 out of the 34 countries under study. Across these 31 countries, the average increase in the likelihood of being “very” satisfied with democracy as one moves from being a loser to a winner is 8.3 percent. In some countries, the increase is significantly larger: in Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, and Uganda, winners are about 20 percentage points more likely to be satisfied with democracy than losers. We can see the marginal increase of the probability of satisfaction with democracy as one moves from a loser to a winner in Mexico (0.3 percentage point), Brazil (0.7 percentage point), Panama (1.5 percentage point) and Cape Verde (1.8 percentage point). In short, the results provide significantly strong support for my hypotheses’ predictions, even controlling for demographic variables. While the differences in popular satisfaction with

democracy between winner and loser are various across countries, citizens whose party is in government are likely to show higher levels of satisfaction with democracy than those whose party is in opposition.

Figure 4.1 Satisfaction with Democracy and Partisan Status




Figure 4.1 (continued) Satisfaction with Democracy and Partisan Status




Figure 4.1 (continued) Satisfaction with Democracy and Partisan Status




Table 4.1 Effects of Individual-Level Variables on Satisfaction with Democracy in 34 countries

Country Independent Variables	Botswana	Ghana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	Nigeria	South Africa	Tanzania	Uganda
Loser	-0.528** (0.094)	-0.686** (0.119)	-0.605** (0.097)	-0.861** (0.093)	-0.472** (0.097)	-0.165** (0.066)	-0.334** (0.075)	-0.775** (0.119)	-1.051** (0.081)
Non-partisan	-0.369** (0.079)	-0.476** (0.090)	-0.518** (0.086)	-0.615** (0.079)	-0.304** (0.078)	-0.276** (0.057)	-0.416** (0.054)	-0.218** (0.082)	-0.501** (0.053)
Interest in politics	0.058 (0.038)	0.060 (0.041)	0.052 (0.042)	0.061 (0.041)	0.119** (0.038)	0.056** (0.026)	0.042* (0.023)	0.106** (0.042)	0.019 (0.028)
National economic performance	0.153** (0.038)	0.042 (0.041)	0.051 (0.040)	0.172** (0.035)	0.068* (0.036)	0.284** (0.023)	0.098** (0.023)	0.084** (0.041)	0.125** (0.024)
Personal economic performance	0.058 (0.038)	0.125** (0.043)	0.069 (0.047)	0.038 (0.037)	0.107** (0.033)	0.137** (0.024)	0.125** (0.024)	0.050 (0.042)	0.098** (0.026)
Female	0.027 (0.069)	-0.063 (0.083)	-0.027 (0.071)	-0.234** (0.072)	0.013 (0.066)	0.006 (0.047)	0.019 (0.048)	0.164** (0.073)	0.183** (0.050)
Age	-0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)	0.006** (0.002)
Education	-0.012 (0.048)	0.047 (0.049)	0.099 (0.051)	-0.114** (0.046)	0.113** (0.047)	-0.054** (0.026)	-0.004 (0.033)	-0.142** (0.045)	-0.117** (0.028)
Threshold (1)	-0.542 (0.261)	-0.857 (0.219)	-0.305 (0.259)	-0.759 (0.236)	-0.393 (0.243)	0.469 (0.153)	-0.467 (0.160)	-0.992 (0.245)	-1.233 (0.158)
Threshold (2)	0.069	-0.179	0.172	-0.007	0.473	1.406	0.390	-0.286	-0.284

Threshold (3)	(0.259) 1.451 (0.261)	(0.213) 1.037 (0.216)	(0.260) 1.074 (0.262)	(0.237) 0.762 (0.241)	(0.245) 1.800 (0.251)	(0.154) 2.777 (0.164)	(0.161) 1.638 (0.166)	(0.241) 1.202 (0.244)	(0.157) 1.333 (0.160)
Pseudo R	0.031	0.044	0.026	0.069	0.032	0.088	0.036	0.040	0.076
N	987	722	973	1030	1092	2273	2029	993	2148

Note: Ordered Probit Analysis. Standard errors are in parentheses. * = $p < .10$, ** = $p < .05$.

Table 4.1 (continued) Effects of Individual-Level Variables on Satisfaction with Democracy in 34 countries

Country Independent Variables	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Cape Verde	Kenya	Mozambique	Senegal	Argentina	Bolivia
Loser	-0.241** (0.099)	-1.073** (0.152)	-0.098 (0.094)	-0.116* (0.070)	0.033 (0.174)	-0.250** (0.107)	-0.415** (0.069)	-0.168* (0.088)
Non-partisan	-0.192** (0.084)	-0.503** (0.098)	-0.120 (0.079)	-0.150** (0.058)	-0.195** (0.077)	-0.202** (0.076)	-0.196** (0.066)	-0.321** (0.068)
Interest in politics	-0.024 (0.032)	0.309 (0.037)	0.099** (0.034)	0.046* (0.027)	-0.086** (0.038)	0.104** (0.036)	0.044* (0.023)	0.171** (0.038)
National economic performance	0.170** (0.031)	0.214** (0.042)	0.177** (0.048)	0.057** (0.028)	0.215** (0.041)	0.164** (0.044)	0.144** (0.028)	0.098* (0.055)
Personal economic performance	0.104** (0.032)	0.116** (0.042)	-0.004 (0.052)	0.149** (0.028)	0.058 (0.042)	0.033 (0.046)	0.054* (0.030)	0.014 (0.057)
Female	-0.155** (0.067)	-0.013 (0.079)	-0.085 (0.065)	-0.065 (0.051)	-0.177** (0.074)	-0.065 (0.073)	-0.061 (0.045)	0.096 (0.061)
Age	0.002 (0.003)	0.006 (0.004)	0.012** (0.003)	0.004* (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.003** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)
Education	-0.118** (0.046)	-0.094 (0.061)	0.068 (0.048)	-0.229** (0.031)	-0.165** (0.045)	-0.124** (0.039)	0.034 (0.034)	-0.082** (0.036)
Threshold (1)	-1.137 (0.239)	-0.300 (0.295)	0.167 (0.260)	-1.613 (0.188)	-1.063 (0.264)	-0.664 (0.236)	-0.602 (0.167)	-0.979 (0.243)
Threshold (2)	-0.229	0.442	1.579	-0.815	0.001	0.097	0.540	0.644

Threshold (3)	(0.238) 1.101 (0.241)	(0.293) 1.735 (0.298)	(0.265) 2.417 (0.272)	(0.185) 1.077 (0.185)	(0.263) 1.197 (0.266)	(0.234) 1.356 (0.237)	(0.167) 1.610 (0.169)	(0.243) 1.656 (0.247)
Pseudo R	0.037	0.086	0.023	0.030	0.041	0.024	0.020	0.023
N	1092	772	1104	2183	942	980	2308	1304

Note: Ordered Probit Analysis. Standard errors are in parentheses. * = $p < .10$, ** = $p < .05$.

Table 4.1 (continued) Effects of Individual-Level Variables on Satisfaction with Democracy in 34 Countries

Country	Brazil	Colombia	Costa Rica	Chile	Ecuador	Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Mexico
Independent Variables	EI								
Loser	-0.364** (0.064)	-0.335** (0.071)	-0.064 (0.099)	-0.722** (0.074)	-0.213** (0.064)	-0.264** (0.069)	-0.352** (0.101)	0.061 (0.153)	-0.047 (0.053)
Non-partisan	-0.300 (0.064)	-0.441** (0.066)	-0.074 (0.089)	-0.361** (0.053)	-0.128** (0.056)	-0.186** (0.066)	-0.214** (0.058)	-0.147** (0.056)	-0.047 (0.066)
Interest in politics	0.127** (0.029)	0.175** (0.028)	0.060** (0.030)	0.155** (0.028)	0.172** (0.026)	0.402** (0.036)	0.196** (0.029)	0.120** (0.033)	0.096** (0.031)
National economic performance	0.299** (0.030)	0.214** (0.030)	0.065** (0.034)	0.262** (0.037)	0.132** (0.028)	0.445** (0.043)	-0.013 (0.030)	0.101** (0.034)	0.262** (0.030)
Personal economic performance	0.167** (0.033)	0.090** (0.034)	0.139** (0.041)	0.116** (0.034)	0.012 (0.029)	0.087** (0.048)	-0.007 (0.037)	0.035 (0.032)	0.174** (0.027)
Female	-0.055 (0.052)	0.046 (0.047)	0.142** (0.059)	0.131** (0.047)	0.042 (0.046)	-0.080 (0.052)	-0.087* (0.051)	0.122** (0.055)	-0.006 (0.047)
Age	0.008** (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.003** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.002)	0.008** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Education	0.037 (0.035)	-0.037 (0.033)	0.082** (0.039)	-0.029 (0.040)	0.010 (0.028)	-0.066 (0.041)	-0.218** (0.044)	0.048 (0.034)	-0.090** (0.036)
Threshold (1)	0.898 (0.165)	-0.123 (0.190)	-0.246 (0.222)	0.071 (0.165)	-0.164 (0.181)	0.649 (0.196)	-1.912 (0.222)	-0.141 (0.173)	0.575 (0.176)
Threshold (2)	2.432	1.317	0.747	1.581	1.197	2.080	-0.697	1.211	1.779

Threshold (3)	(0.170) 4.072 (0.196)	(0.193) 2.218 (0.197)	(0.223) 1.620 (0.226)	(0.167) 2.958 (0.174)	(0.183) 2.195 (0.188)	(0.203) 3.438 (0.217)	(0.219) 0.534 (0.218)	(0.174) 2.242 (0.179)	(0.179) 2.799 (0.187)
Pseudo R	0.071	0.036	0.013	0.063	0.019	0.142	0.019	0.016	0.044
N	1938	2262	1342	2276	2220	1796	1860	1626	2244

Note: Ordered Probit Analysis. Standard errors are in parentheses. * = $p < .10$, ** = $p < .05$.

Table 4.1 (continued) Effects of Individual-Level Variables on Satisfaction with Democracy in 34 countries

Country	Nicaragua	Panama	Paraguay	Peru	Uruguay	Venezuela	S. Korea	Taiwan
Independent Variables								
Loser	-0.665** (0.105)	-0.094 (0.072)	0.130 (0.086)	-0.703** (0.084)	-0.425** (0.062)	-0.131 (0.133)	-0.590** (0.082)	-0.344** (0.082)
Non-partisan	-0.509** (0.087)	-0.166** (0.062)	0.148** (0.075)	-0.490** (0.072)	-0.121** (0.054)	-0.001 (0.139)	-0.359** (0.061)	-0.279** (0.079)
Interest in politics	0.025 (0.030)	0.162** (0.027)	0.123** (0.034)	-0.021 (0.028)	0.122** (0.027)	-0.016 (0.024)	-0.030 (0.030)	.
National economic performance	0.283** (0.037)	0.194** (0.034)	0.122** (0.036)	0.156** (0.035)	0.274** (0.035)	0.229** (0.028)	0.199** (0.039)	0.103** (0.040)
Personal economic performance	0.232** (0.037)	0.173** (0.043)	0.139** (0.048)	0.139** (0.042)	0.042 (0.035)	0.185** (0.029)	0.004 (0.035)	0.103** (0.032)
Female	-0.038 (0.052)	-0.102** (0.051)	-0.175** (0.065)	0.027 (0.051)	0.271** (0.046)	0.059 (0.046)	0.034 (0.053)	-0.019 (0.061)
Age	0.002 (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.005** (0.001)	0.004** (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	0.010** (0.003)
Education	-0.051 (0.034)	-0.122** (0.034)	-0.040 (0.048)	-0.128 (0.038)	-0.158** (0.043)	-0.056** (0.029)	-0.059 (0.040)	-0.086** (0.042)
Threshold (1)	0.084 (0.205)	0.020 (0.214)	0.243 (0.256)	-0.676 (0.217)	-0.769 (0.171)	0.268 (0.201)	-1.201 (0.246)	-1.466 (0.192)
Threshold (2)	1.444	1.456	1.531	0.807	0.368	1.384	-0.001	0.147

Threshold (3)	(0.208)	(0.217)	(0.258)	(0.216)	(0.169)	(0.202)	(0.245)	(0.191)
	2.365 (0.218)	2.371 (0.221)	2.567 (0.262)	1.644 (0.219)	1.515 (0.171)	2.170 (0.205)	1.431 (0.247)	2.203 (0.205)
Pseudo R	0.063	0.036	0.020	0.033	0.052	0.030	0.024	0.029
N	1780	1878	1160	1958	2288	2230	1928	1436

Note: Ordered Probit Analysis. Standard errors are in parentheses. * = $p < .10$, ** = $p < .05$.

Table 4.2 Probability of Satisfaction with Democracy by Country

Country	Botswana	Ghana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	Nigeria	South Africa	Tanzania	Uganda
Winners	0.249 (0.022)	0.396 (0.031)	0.323 (0.023)	0.295 (0.024)	0.308 (0.021)	0.052 (0.007)	0.158 (0.012)	0.266 (0.022)	0.234 (0.016)
Losers	0.115 (0.019)	0.172 (0.029)	0.144 (0.022)	0.081 (0.014)	0.167 (0.025)	0.037 (0.006)	0.091 (0.012)	0.082 (0.018)	0.038 (0.007)

Country	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Cape Verde	Kenya	Mozambique	Senegal	Argentina	Bolivia	Brazil
Winners	0.151 (0.019)	0.204 (0.027)	0.121 (0.017)	0.199 (0.013)	0.146 (0.017)	0.232 (0.023)	0.191 (0.017)	0.126 (0.014)	0.013 (0.003)
Losers	0.102 (0.018)	0.029 (0.010)	0.103 (0.015)	0.168 (0.018)	0.156 (0.039)	0.164 (0.026)	0.099 (0.009)	0.095 (0.015)	0.005 (0.001)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 4.2 (continued) Probability of Satisfaction with Democracy by Country

Country	Colombia	Costa Rica	Chile	Ecuador	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	Mexico
Winners	0.107 (0.014)	0.361 (0.035)	0.065 (0.007)	0.099 (0.010)	0.100 (0.012)	0.183 (0.017)	0.132 (0.012)	0.036 (0.005)
Losers	0.057 (0.007)	0.337 (0.027)	0.013 (0.003)	0.067 (0.008)	0.061 (0.008)	0.105 (0.017)	0.149 (0.047)	0.033 (0.044)

Country	Nicaragua	Panama	Paraguay	Peru	Uruguay	Venezuela	South Korea	Taiwan
Winners	0.129 (0.021)	0.099 (0.011)	0.029 (0.006)	0.096 (0.014)	0.370 (0.018)	0.147 (0.029)	0.126 (0.009)	0.072 (0.012)
Losers	0.036 (0.007)	0.084 (0.010)	0.039 (0.008)	0.022 (0.004)	0.225 (0.016)	0.118 (0.009)	0.042 (0.007)	0.036 (0.006)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

Chapter 5. Multilevel Analyses

5.1 Political Institutions and Satisfaction with Democracy

As seen in chapter 4, individual-level results show clear support of my hypotheses. Partisan status has a significant effect on popular satisfaction with democracy. Both losers and non-partisans show lower levels of satisfaction with democracy than winners. What remains to be tested, however, is whether political institutions uniformly and directly affect popular satisfaction with democracy or whether they mediate the effect of partisan status on popular satisfaction with democracy. For instance, do party systems or electoral systems help explain why citizens whose party is in opposition in Zimbabwe, for example, are about three times as likely ($b = -1.073$) than those in Brazil ($b = -0.364$) to be dissatisfied with the way democracy works?

This study combines variables of political institution with individual-level data in order to model their joint effect on popular satisfaction with democracy. Specifically, the political institutions used are ENPP for party systems, the index of disproportionality for electoral systems, presidentialism, and unitarism. I also include both the Freedom House index and a nation's GDP per capita, because prior research argues that those two factors have a strong influence on popular trust in political institutions (Norris 1999).

The data in this research have a multilevel structure in which respondents are nested within countries. Because the model merges data from two different levels, OLS creates a number of statistical problems, such as nonconstant variance and clustering. Failure to recognize the hierarchical nature of the data can lead to underestimating the

standard errors for country-level variables (Jones and Steenbergen 2002). This research therefore estimates the model using a software developed by Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) for multilevel models (HLM version 5).

Several specific issues may pose problems for inference because of the multilevel nature of the data. First, the intercepts may vary across countries; failure to control for this may result in biased estimates. Specifically, if intercepts are variable, we may be overestimating the effect of political institutions on popular satisfaction with democracy. A second concern is that individual-level variables may have unequal slopes across countries. In this case, a pooled estimator may be biased for each particular country. A third concern relates to the robustness of the inferences based on potentially inefficient standard errors resulting from potential clustering (Zorn 2001). To deal with these issues, multilevel modeling techniques allow for estimating varying intercepts and slopes, produce asymptotically efficient standard errors, and provide for a direct estimation of variance components at each level of the model.

Below, I show the coefficients of interest (constants and independent variables), as well as the variance components at each level of the data (individual- and country-level).

5.2 Analysis of Variance

To determine, first, whether there is significant variation in popular satisfaction with the way democracy works at the individual and country levels, I estimated an ANOVA model that decomposes the variance in the dependent variable, where

$$Satisfaction_{ij} = \beta_{00} + \delta_{0j} + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

In this model, β_{00} is the overall mean of popular satisfaction with democracy (i.e., the weighted mean across individuals and countries). The sources of cross-national variation, which cause a particular country to deviate from the grand mean, are contained in δ_{0j} . Finally, ε_{ij} captures inter-individual differences. The variances of these different sources of variation are given by τ_{00} and σ^2 , respectively.

Table 5-1 One-way ANOVA Model

Table 5-1 shows the Maximum Likelihood estimates of the overall mean and the variance components. The country-level variance component is statistically significant, suggesting that there is significant variance in popular satisfaction with democracy between countries. This is evidence that the multilevel character of the data should not be ignored.

In order to obtain a better sense of the importance of the two different levels of analysis, Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) suggest researchers to calculate the ratio of each variance component to the total variance in popular satisfaction with democracy, which is equal to $(\tau_{00} + \sigma^2)$. For example, the ratio of τ_{00} over the total variance indicates the importance of the country-level of analysis. Results of the ANOVA model show that country-level variance is proportionally much smaller than individual-level variance. About 12% of the variance in popular satisfaction with the way democracy works is

between countries.¹⁶ Given that the data are measured at the individual level, this is not surprising. The ratio also means the estimates of the intra-cluster at the country-level (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Thus, at the country level the results show an intra-cluster correlation of .115. This is a sizable positive correlation that suggesting a fair amount of clustering at the country-level. Clearly, to ignore these sources of variance is to miss out on important aspects of popular satisfaction with democracy. This could result in both incorrect statistical inference and improper substantive conclusions about the satisfaction with democracy (Steenbergen and Jones 2002).

5.3 Multilevel Model of Satisfaction with Democracy

The results of the ANOVA model indicate clearly that there is significant variation in popular satisfaction with democracy at the country-level analysis. How do we account for popular satisfaction with the way democracy works in the country?

Multilevel analysis requires the specification of following equations:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Satisfaction}_{ij} = & \alpha_{0j} + \alpha_{1j}\text{Loser}_{ij} + \alpha_{2j}\text{Noparty}_{ij} + \alpha_{3j}\text{Intepol}_{ij} \\
 & + \alpha_{4j}\text{Nateco}_{ij} + \alpha_{5j}\text{Pereco}_{ij} + \alpha_{6j}\text{Female}_{ij} \\
 & + \alpha_{7j}\text{Age}_{ij} + \alpha_{8j}\text{Educ}_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

¹⁶ $11.5 = 0.099/(0.099+0.760)$ This calculation is based on the ratio of country-level variance component relative to the total variance component in satisfaction with democracy (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).

$$\alpha_{0j} = \beta_{00} + \beta_{01}ENPP_j + \beta_{02}Disproportionality_j + \beta_{03}Presidentialism_j \\ + \beta_{05}FHI_j + \beta_{06}GDPpc_j + \beta_{07}Africa_j + \beta_{08}Asia_j + \delta_{0j} \quad (2)$$

$$\alpha_{1j} = \beta_{10} + \beta_{11}ENPP_j + \beta_{12}Disproportionality_j + \delta_{1j} \quad (3)$$

$$\alpha_{2j} = \beta_{20} + \beta_{21}ENPP_j + \beta_{21}Disproportionality_j + \delta_{2j} \quad (4)$$

$$Satisfaction_{ij} = \beta_{00} + \beta_{01}ENPP_j + \beta_{02}Disproportionality_j \\ + \beta_{03}Presidentialism_j + \beta_{04}Unitarism_j + \beta_{05}FHI_j + \beta_{06}GDPpc_j \\ + \beta_{07}Africa_j + \beta_{08}Asia_j + \beta_{10}Loser_{ij} + \beta_{20}Noparty_{ij} + \beta_{30}Intpol_{ij} \\ + \beta_{40}Nateco_{ij} + \beta_{50}Pereco_{ij} + \beta_{60}Female_{ij} + \beta_{70}Age_{ij} + \beta_{80}Educ_{ij} \\ + \beta_{11}ENPP_j \times Loser_{ij} + \beta_{21}Disproportionality_j \times Loser_{ij} \\ + \beta_{21}ENPP_j \times Noparty_{ij} + \beta_{22}Disproportionality_j \times Noparty_{ij} \\ + \delta_{0j} + \delta_{1j}Loser_{ij} + \delta_{2j}Noparty_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad (5)$$

The first equation models the influence of individual-level predictors on popular satisfaction with the way democracy works. The j subscript for the loser coefficient indicates that it is expected to vary across the j nations. Equation (2) models the influence of ENPP, electoral system disproportionality, presidentialism, unitarism, democratization, and GDP per capita on satisfaction with democracy. In order to control, equation (2) also includes two dummy variables for Africa and Asia. In HLM, this effect is modeled through the influence of macro-level factors on the intercepts from

equation (1). Equation (3) models that the effect of loser, which is given by α_{1j} in equation (1), varies as a function of ENPP and Disproportionality. I do not expect the two political institutions to explain all of the cross-country variation in α_{1j} . Equation (4) models that the effect of non-partisan, which is given by α_{2j} in equation (1), varies as a function of ENPP and Disproportionality. My model also does not expect the two variables to explain all of the cross-country variation in α_{2j} . The interactions in equation (5) are captured by estimating the effect of political institutions such as ENPP and Disproportionality on both loser (people in political minority) and non-partisan coefficients from equation (1). They show the mediating effects of political institutions on the relationship between partisan status and popular satisfaction with democracy. I expect two interaction terms with ENPP to have a positive effect and the other two interaction terms with Disproportionality to have a negative sign. Note that equations (2), (3), and (4) contain an error term; unlike OLS, multilevel estimation techniques do not assume that a contextual variable completely determines the coefficient from the individual-level variables (Jones and Steenbergen 2002). Thus, the model in equation (5) implies variance components σ^2 for ϵ_{ij} , τ_{00} for δ_{0j} , τ_{11} for δ_{1j} , and τ_{22} for δ_{2j} .

Table 5-2 Individual and Country-level Predictors of Satisfaction with Democracy

Table 5-2 shows the results of two models estimating the direct effects of political institutions and partisan status (minority or non-partisan) on popular satisfaction with the way democracy works. The second column in Table 5-2 gives the

ML estimates of the fixed effects and the variance components of this multilevel model.

This model is a significant improvement over the one-way ANOVA model:

$\chi^2 = 3747.584$, $df = 16$, $p < .05$, suggesting that at least a subset of the predictors has effects that are different from 0.

At the individual-level, the results show a strong effect of both loser and non-partisan on popular satisfaction with democracy. People in political minority significantly express lower levels of satisfaction with democracy than those in political majority (winner). The overall performance of the individual-level predictors is significantly powerful except for the effect of female on satisfaction with democracy. Economic performance evaluations play an important role in satisfaction with democracy. The coefficients for both sociotropic and egocentric evaluations of the economy are statistically significant and are in the expected direction. Citizens who evaluate their national and personal economic performances positively are likely to express higher levels of satisfaction with democracy. Interest in politics is a statistically significant and positive predictor of satisfaction with the way democracy works. Of the control variables, the coefficient of age is statistically significant and positive; education has a significant and negative effect on popular satisfaction with democracy.

As a group, the individual-level predictors explain small parts of the individual level variance in popular satisfaction with democracy. It is possible to assess this explanatory power by comparing the individual-level variance component in Table 5-1 to the same component in Table 5-2 (see Bryk and Raudenbush 2002). The difference in these variance components is $0.760 - 0.7077 = 0.0523$. Relative to the size of the ANOVA variance component, this is a reduction of $0.0523 / 0.760 = 0.069$. Thus, the

individual-level variance components explain about 7 percent of the individual-level variance in popular satisfaction with democracy.

At the national level, results show that political institutions have a strong power to explain popular satisfaction with democracy. Party system measured by ENPP has a significant and positive effect on satisfaction. The greater ENPP is likely to increase the level of popular satisfaction with democracy. Citizens in countries with a greater ENPP are more satisfied with democracy than citizens in countries with a smaller ENPP. I interpret this to mean that multi-party systems increase popular satisfaction with democracy because these systems offer more alternatives for citizens to choose.

In emerging democracies, political parties are one of the most important and influential organizations linking people's interests to decision-making processes. Due to the democratic transitions, people have been able to vote for a party closer to their needs in different aspects, for example, economy, ethnicity, region, and so on. For citizens in new democracies, it is very critical to evaluate their political system performance whether the system allows a party representing their interests to run for elections and to win seats in a parliament.

The coefficient of presidentialism is statistically significant at the level of .1 and positive in the model. People who live in presidential systems are likely to express higher levels of satisfaction with democracy than those who live in parliamentary systems. This result is not consistent with Norris' finding that institutional confidence is "slightly higher in parliamentary than in presidential systems" (1999: 232). Presidential systems have more direct accountability to voters than parliamentary systems. In particular, choosing a preferable candidate in presidential elections is still recognized as

an achievement of democratic transition among citizens in emerging democracies. They are not ready to delegate their right to directly vote for a presidential candidate to their representatives or party leaders. For example, people in Brazil decisively defeated a 1993 referendum on shifting presidentialism to parliamentarism, while many political scientists have been recommending the latter for political development in new democracies.

Unitarism is also a significant and positive predictor of popular satisfaction with democracy. Across emerging democracies, people who live in unitary systems are likely to show higher levels of satisfaction with democracy than those who live in federal systems. This is consistent with Norris' finding that institutional confidence is greater in countries that have a unitary system than federal one. Among emerging democracies, many countries are trying to unify the nation and increase the prospects of governability. Developing countries have limited financial and human resources to deliver to local governments. It is easier to maintain patron-client networks in local-level, because local governments include smaller and more homogeneous groups than national governments, by definition. In emerging democracies, in turn, federal systems does not seem to be successful to induce positive attitudes towards political systems performance from citizens.

However, electoral systems have no significant effect on popular satisfaction with democracy. In emerging democracies, the degree of the proportionality in the translation of votes into seats in assemblies does not have any impact on popular evaluations of political systems performance. This contradicts both Norris's (1999) finding that electoral systems *directly* affect institutional confidence and Farrell and

McAllister's (2003) finding that electoral systems have a *direct* effect on satisfaction with democracy. While existing two studies on influence of electoral systems on citizens' attitude towards political systems focus more on established democracies than on new democracies, this project is closely looking at the latter. Citizens in emerging democracies have been shortly experienced multi-party elections after their democratic transitions. For them, whether those elections have been held freely and fairly is critical to evaluate new political systems in transition.

The effect of Freedom House Index is statistically significant and is in expected direction (Norris 1999). Citizens who live in countries where there are higher degrees of civil liberties and human rights show higher levels of satisfaction with democracy.

Finally, the dummy variable for sub-Saharan Africa has a powerful effect on satisfaction with democracy. The result indicates that people who live in sub-Saharan Africa are likely to show higher levels of satisfaction with democracy than those who live in Latin America. There is no significant difference in the satisfaction between people in Eastern Asia and people in Latin America. These regional dummies essentially are a measure of our ignorance. They do not specify what it is about being a sub-Saharan African country or an Asian country that increase popular satisfaction with democracy. The dummy variable of sub-Saharan Africa just identify such effects, indicating that important variables remain that my model has not captured, which contribute to differentiating levels of popular satisfaction with democracy from those in Latin America.

The differences in levels of popular satisfaction with democracy between sub-Saharan African and Latin America can be explained by how long citizens have been

experienced the new political systems after their democratic transition. As I mentioned earlier, popular satisfaction with democracy is a volatile attitude. Comparing with Latin American country, on average, the majority of sub-Saharan African countries have relatively short experiences of multiparty elections after democratic transition. In a few of them, for example, Kenya and Senegal, alternations in government by multiparty elections strongly increase positive evaluations of political systems performance among citizens. National level predictors as a set account for about 60 percent of the cross-country variance in popular satisfaction with democracy.¹⁷

Importantly, the direct effect of electoral system is insignificant at the .05 level. This is inconsistent with existing studies (Norris 1999; Farrell and McAllister 2003; Anderson *et al.* 2005). Those works use OLS estimation. It is useful at this point to consider the implications of ignoring the multilevel data structure. Specifically, what inferences would we draw if we were to ignore the multilevel character of the satisfaction with democracy data? To answer this question I estimate an OLS regression model on the data. The last column in Table 5-2 presents the results from this analysis. With the exception of the variable of female, all predictors are significant. The differences are particularly significant at the national-level of analysis. All of the national-level predictors are statistically significant at least at the .1 level in the OLS regression analysis, while only five predictors out of eight are at the .1 level in the multilevel analysis. In the OLS model, the disproportionality is statistically significant at the .1 level and is a positive predictor of popular satisfaction with democracy. This result is consistent with Norris' (1999) finding with OLS estimation that majoritarian

¹⁷ The relative change in the national-level variance component is $(.097 - .039) / .097 = .598$.

electoral systems produce higher levels of institutional confidence than proportional ones. Also note that GDP per capita does not pass the conventional level of statistical significance in the multilevel analysis. This result is consistent with a few works using multilevel analysis (Steenbergen and Jones 2002; Rohrschneider 2002; Anderson and Tverdova 2003). Clearly, the inferences drawn from the regression analysis are different than those drawn from the multilevel analysis. These patterns indicate that previous analyses, which do not account for the multilevel nature of such data, overestimate the impact of these country-level characteristics on popular satisfaction with democracy. Steenbergen and Jones (2002) point out that these differences arise because the OLS analysis ignores the clustering of the data assuming that those individual-level observations are independent in the multilevel data set.

Now I closely look at the effect of partisan status, both loser and non-partisan, by accounting for possible “causal heterogeneity” (Western 1995; Steenbergen and Jones 2002). Up to this point I have focused on the simple additive effect of political institutions on popular satisfaction with democracy. I also hypothesized (*H6* and *7*), however, that the negative relationship between popular satisfaction with democracy and partisan status (loser or non-partisan) should be moderated by multiparty systems and proportional electoral systems. In short, an individuals’ partisan status and his or her institutional context should interact in shaping his or her satisfaction with democracy. By specifying cross-level interactions in Equation (5), it is possible to determine whether the lower-level predictors’ effect on the dependent variable of popular satisfaction with democracy is conditioned or moderated by higher-level

predictors. In other words, is there a single, uniform relationship or does the relationship vary across higher levels of analysis?

In Table 5-2, both loser and non-partisan have a fixed effect which is the same analysis as Norris (1999) has. However, my hypothesis suggests that the effect of partisan status varies across nations as a function of party or electoral system. Does ENPP or the disproportionality in changing votes into seats help explain the influence of political minority status (loser or non-partisan) on cross-national variations in popular satisfaction with the way democracy works?

Table 5-3 Model with Cross-Level Interaction

Table 5-3 provides the ML estimates of the multilevel model in Equation (5). The results are in part consistent with my predictions. Party systems significantly mediate the relationship between partisan status and popular satisfaction with democracy. The cross-level interaction between ENPP and loser is positive and statistically significant at the .05 level. The positive sign denotes that the negative effect of loser on popular satisfaction with democracy is moderated by greater ENPP. The result indicates that citizens in political minority are likely to express higher levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works when they live in a country with greater ENPP than smaller ENPP. Another cross-level interaction between ENPP and non-partisan is also positive and statistically significant. It demonstrates that while citizens do not support any existing political party, they are likely to show higher levels of satisfaction with democracy when they have political system with greater ENPP than

smaller ENPP. I find that greater ENPP alleviates the negative effects of belonging to a political minority on popular satisfaction with the way democracy works.

However, electoral systems have no significant mediating effect on the relationship between partisan status and popular satisfaction with democracy. The two interaction terms with the disproportionality are not statistically significant. The results are not consistent with Anderson and Guillory's (1997) work. Using eleven developed countries, they show that losers in systems that are more proportional express higher levels of satisfaction with democracy than losers do in systems with majoritarian characteristics.

In emerging democracies, whether elections are fairly and freely conducted is still a prominent issue among political elites as well as ordinary people, while citizens in developed countries are concerned less about free and fair elections than about how electoral systems count their vote. As Norris (1999) shows, democratization is significantly associated with people's confidence in political institutions. Emerging democracies still need more confidence in electoral systems from their ordinary people.

Note also that the model in Table 5-3 is a significant improvement over the multilevel analysis in Table 5-2: $\chi^2 = 251.004$, $df = 4$, $p < .05$, suggesting that at least a subset of the predictors has effects that are different from 0.

Figure 5-1 Predicted Probability of Popular Satisfaction with Democracy by Partisan status and ENPP

In order to estimate the magnitudes of the interactive effect between partisan status and party system, I employ the Table 5-3 multilevel model to examine the consequences of variation in both partisan status and ENPP variables while holding other independent variables constant. In Figure 5-1 I examine the effect of ENPP on the likelihood of popular satisfaction with democracy. Figure 5-1 clearly shows a mediating effect of party system between partisan status and popular satisfaction with democracy. Greater ENPP narrows the gap in popular satisfaction with democracy both between winners and losers and between winners and non-partisans.

As the ENPP increases, the largest party's seat share in the assembly decreases. The ruling party needs coalition with other parties to pass bills with a majority in the assembly. Thus, opposition parties can play more significant roles on decision-making in political system with greater ENPP. That is, it may be the case that greater number of people feel that their voice will be heard by the government. The political systems with greater ENPP produce generally fewer losers. Losers who live under the party systems with greater ENPP are likely to be more satisfied with the policy position of the government and, in turn, to express less negative evaluations on political systems performance.

In emerging democracies, the results show, it is critical for citizens to evaluate their political systems performance whether political systems have a party closely representing a given subgroup's interests or not and whether the party has a significant influence on government decision-makings. Citizens had a limited mechanism linking themselves with the state under authoritarian governments (or one party system). They were not able to choose a governing party, while some authoritarian governments held

formal elections. Those elections had worked as a way for authoritarian governments to demonstrate their legitimacy. The democratic transition has introduced multiparty elections to political elites and ordinary people. Those multiparty elections offer many opportunities both for elites to organize a political group, i.e., political party, and for ordinary people to express their interests and ideas by elections. Because of multiparty elections, people in political minority are able to have a voice in the government political and economic performance. Citizens in new democracies are still pleased with the new regime as a product of democratic transition. When they evaluate current political systems performance, people seem not to consider long-term effects of political systems. For example, an extremely fractionalized party system could increase the probability of regime collapse.

In sum, this study finds that some political institutions (e.g., party systems, presidentialism, and unitarism) have significant effects on popular view about the way democracy works in fledgling democracies. Greater ENPP increases popular satisfaction with democracy. Particularly, citizens in countries with greater ENPP are likely to show higher levels of satisfaction with democracy than those in countries with smaller ENPP or a dominant party. Presidentialism and unitarism also have a positive impact on popular evaluation of political system performance. In addition, party systems mediate the relationship between citizens' partisan status and their satisfaction with democracy. Greater ENPP is likely to alleviate the negative attitudes of people in political minority toward political system and reduce the difference in popular satisfaction with democracy both between winners and losers and between winners and non-partisans.

Table 5-1. One-way ANOVA Model

<i>Fixed Effect</i>		Coefficient	s.e.	P-value	
Average country mean (β_{00})		2.392	0.044	0.000	
<i>Random Effect</i>		Variance Component	df	Chi-square	P-value
Country mean (τ_{00})		0.097	31	6877.599	0.000
Individual effect (σ^2)		0.76			
- 2 Log x Likelihood		132462.073			

Table 5-2. Individual and National-Level Predictors of Satisfaction with Democracy

	Multilevel Estimate	OLS Estimate
<i>Country-level predictors:</i>		
ENPP	0.052** (0.023)	0.040** (0.003)
Disproportionality	0.003 (0.007)	0.002* (0.001)
Presidentialism	0.129* (0.072)	0.121** (0.010)
Unitarism	0.073** (0.020)	0.074** (0.003)
Freedom House Index	-0.100** (0.038)	-0.094** (0.005)
Log of GDP per capita	0.060 (0.049)	0.057** (0.007)
sub-Saharan Africa	0.342** (0.107)	0.313** (0.016)
Asia	0.196 (0.167)	0.188** (0.023)
<i>Individual-level Predictors:</i>		
Loser (minority)	-0.260** (0.011)	-0.251** (0.011)
Non-partisan	-0.192** (0.009)	-0.201** (0.009)
Interest in Politics	0.067** (0.004)	0.067** (0.004)
National Economic Performance	0.140** (0.004)	0.144** (0.004)
Personal Economic Performance	0.078** (0.005)	0.082** (0.005)
Female	0.009 (0.007)	0.010 (0.008)
Age	0.002** (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)

Education	-0.043** (0.005)	-0.051** (0.005)
Constant	0.696 (0.568)	0.749** (0.086)
<i>Variance of Random Effects:</i>		
Country-level	0.0385	
Individual-level	0.7077	
- 2 x Log Likelihood	128717.043	131176.688
R ²		0.134
F		501.089

Note: Multilevel table entries are maximum likelihood estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. Regression table entries are OLS estimates with estimated standard errors in parentheses. * = $p < .10$, ** = $p < .05$.


Table 5-3. Model with Cross-Level Interaction

	Multilevel Estimate
<i>Country-level predictors:</i>	
ENPP	0.031 (0.024)
Disproportionality	-0.002 (0.005)
Presidentialism	0.064 (0.039)
Unitarism	0.079** (0.017)
Freedom House Index	-0.106** (0.033)
Log of GDP per capita	0.021 (0.039)
sub-Saharan Africa	0.289** (0.100)
Asia	0.137* (0.074)
<i>Individual-level Predictors:</i>	
Loser (minority)	-0.420** (0.095)
Non-partisan	-0.300** (0.059)
Interest in Politics	0.067** (0.009)
National Economic Performance	0.137** (0.012)
Personal Economic Performance	0.078** (0.006)
Female	0.009 (0.011)
Age	0.002** (0.001)

Education	-0.039** (0.009)
Constant	1.312** (0.403)
ENPP x Loser	0.036** (0.014)
ENPP x Non-partisan	0.024** (0.008)
Disproportionality x Loser	0.003 (0.006)
Disproportionality x Non-partisan	0.003 (0.003)
<i>Variance of Random Effects:</i>	
Country-level	0.0400
Loser	0.0358
Non-partisan	0.014
Individual-level	0.7025
- 2 x Log Likelihood	128466.039

Note: Maximum likelihood estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses.
 * = $p < .10$, ** = $p < .05$.

Figure 5-1. Predicted Probability of Popular Satisfaction with Democracy by Partisan Status and ENPP



Chapter 6. Electoral Systems, Partisan status, and Citizens' Political Support in Lesotho

6.1 Introduction

Do electoral institutions affect citizens' political support? The previous chapter suggests that the proportionality of electoral systems has no effect on popular satisfaction with democracy across emerging democracies. However, existing works studying the impact of electoral systems on citizens' attitudes towards political systems show that there is a significant effect, while some of them use improper estimates to their data structure. To prove this anomaly, this chapter tries an alternative research strategy, switching from an analysis with a pooled cross-national data set to an investigation with a cross-time data set in one country. Studying one country across time provides researchers an experimental environment to hold many things constant but subjects to be investigated.

On the basis of survey data from Lesotho collected by Afrobarometer¹⁸ in both 2000 and 2003, this study examines the impacts of electoral system changes on citizens' political support. I closely look at changes in citizens' attitudes towards political systems "prior to" and "after" electoral system changes in Lesotho. The change of electoral rules in Lesotho in the context of "before" and "after" public opinion surveys offers a rare opportunity for a natural experiment to test the effect of electoral systems on citizens' attitudes. Further, this study also shows that the nature of representation in

¹⁸ The Afrobarometer consists of research partners in 16 African countries, and is coordinated by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa, the Centre for Democratic Development in Ghana, and the Department of Political Science at Michigan State University. See www.afrobarometer.org.

electoral systems mediates the relationship between a person's partisan status as part of the political minority or majority and his or her orientation to democracy.

Since the third wave of democratization started, there has been a growing interest in researching the institutional factors underlying citizens' attitude toward democratic systems (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Norris 1999; Farrell and McAllister 2003). Of all the institutions that may matter, electoral systems are a central institutional design issue for a new polity to resolve (Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Horowitz 1991; Lijphart 1995; Sisk and Reynolds 1998; Reynolds 1999 and 2002; Taagepera 2002). However, we have just a few works to explain how an electoral system actually makes an impact on citizens' attitudes toward political systems (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Norris 1999; Farrell and McAllister 2003). These works use cross-national survey data to test the role of proportional representation electoral systems in increasing popular satisfaction with democracy. Those empirical results are not consistent yet. Some studies show a positive relationship between proportional representation and popular satisfaction with democracy (Anderson 1998; Farrell and McAllister 2003), but others demonstrate less proportional institutions increase public trust in state institutions (Norris 1999). This research tries to arbitrate these debates.

Africa could not escape from the third wave of democratization (Huntington 1991; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). Between 1989 and 1996, twenty-nine of the forty-eight sub-Saharan African countries moved from non-democratic to multiparty competitive political systems (Reynolds 1999). Lesotho is one of the countries that experienced a democratic transition in the early 1990s and has since held several multiparty elections. Lesotho transformed its electoral system from a First-Past-the-Post

(FPTP) to Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) system before the 2002 elections, becoming the first parliamentary elections to adopt a MMP system in Africa (Elklit 2000). Because of the element of proportional representation of the MMP system, opposition parties have taken 40 seats in the parliament for the first time since Lesotho held multiparty elections in 1993.

What evidence is there that electoral systems matter for political support? I find that people whose party is in opposition are likely to show lower levels of political support than those whose party is in government. While the nature of the electoral system does not have any uniform effects on public attitudes, it mediates the relationship between a person's status as a part of the political minority (loser) or majority (winner) and his or her attitudes toward the regime. Increasing the proportionality of electoral system decreases differences in popular satisfaction with democracy both between winners and losers and between winners and non-partisans in Lesotho. Both losers and non-partisans who were disadvantaged by a previous majoritarian FPTP system are likely to express more positive attitudes toward political systems after electoral reforms increasing proportionality in the translations of votes into seats in parliament take place.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I begin with an historical description of Lesotho's parliamentary elections and the electoral results of both the 1998 and 2002 elections. Second, I review the literature on electoral systems and individual partisan status- minority or majority- to derive a number of testable hypotheses about the relationships among these two major factors and individual political support in Lesotho. I then develop a model of citizen political support that includes electoral systems and

individual-level variables, such as partisan status, economic performance evaluations, and interest in politics. Thereafter, I present empirical tests of the hypotheses utilizing survey data from Lesotho in both 2000 and 2003 with methods of analysis that are appropriate to the data. Finally, I offer some conclusions based on the results estimated here.

6.2 Background

Lesotho gained independence from Great Britain in 1966. Since this date, the government must be appointed through elections according to constitutional terms.¹⁹ The electoral system set out in the 1966 Constitution was a First-Past-the-Post (FPTP), single member district (SMD) system inherited from the departing colonial power. Perhaps as a result of this system, opposition parties were unable to take as many parliamentary seats as votes received in elections. In both 1993 and 1998 parliamentary elections, they did not gain any seat with significant number of votes but one. The results of every general election held in the country since independence have been rejected by the losing parties (Southall and Fox 1999; Makoa 2002; Fox and Southall 2002; Rule 2000; Southall 2003). For example, the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) attempted to overturn the results of the pre-independence election of 1965 in the courts. In addition, the then ruling Basotho National Party (BNP) declined to step down from power when it lost the election of 1970.

From 1970 to 1986, the BNP led by Chief Leabua Jonathan, maintained its control of the state with repressive force. The BCP, backed by the apartheid government

¹⁹ Both the 1966 Independent Constitution and the Constitution of Lesotho which came into effect in 1993.

in South Africa, established the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) to contest BNP's control. The BNP government was ousted in a coup in 1986, and the military ruled until 1993. However, the military was unable to resist both internal and external pressures for democratization which raised quickly after the start of the transition process in South Africa in early 1990. The military government allowed the BCP leadership to return from exile and to participate in the 1993 elections. It led to a dramatic win for the BCP with taking all 65 seats in the National Assembly, perhaps because Lesotho people punished the BNP for the years of dictatorship.

In the 1990s after the democratic transition in Lesotho, the opposition parties still found themselves unable to trust the electoral results, while international and NGO monitors endorsed those electoral processes as free and fair. Because Lesotho is an linguistically homogeneous society (apart from small Xhosa- and Ndebele-speaking minorities, all inhabitants speak Sesotho as a first language) and support for the major political party consistently spreads across most constituencies, the FPTP system produced extremely unbalanced election results in both 1993 and 1998. For instance, the BCP took all 65 parliamentary seats with just 74.7% of the total votes in 1993. Opposition parties therefore dismissed the BCP's victory in the election as rigged, and subsequently backed the king when, in 1994, he dismissed the new government (Weisfelder 1999; Rule 2000).

Moreover, in 1998 the Lesotho Congress of Democrats (LCD) took 79 out of the increased number of 80 seats with just 60.5% of the total vote (Southall and Fox 1999). Despite winning a combined total of 40% of the votes, the opposition parties were again left without representation in the parliament. The results were unbelievable to

opposition party leaders. They were expecting a close election in which no party would gain a parliamentary majority, because the LCD split from the then ruling BCP right before the election. Mokhehle, the then Prime Minister, lost control of his BCP machinery and created the LCD. Because it enjoyed majority support in Parliament, the LCD became the ruling party. While international and local observers estimated that the result of the election reflected the will of the electorate (Southall and Fox 1999), those losing parties repudiated the results. The rejection of the results by the opposition parties led to a major crisis that undermined the capacity of the LCD to rule. Opposition supporters burned down the central business district of the capital, Maseru. This crisis led South Africa and Botswana to use military force to intervene in the name of defending democracy and restore order.

The Interim Political Authority (IPA), composed of two members of all political parties which had participated in 1998 election, was established on the advice of the intervening powers. Protracted negotiations between the IPA and the government resulted in agreement on a Mixed-Member-Proportional electoral system (MMP) (Southall 2003).²⁰ In addition to 80 existing constituency seats to be elected by FPTP, 40 PR seats were allocated among parties, with PR being applied by total national list election votes cast divided by 120 to determine a quota per seat. The overall PR formula is Hare quota with no formal threshold providing for the highest level of proportionality (Lijphart 1995).

²⁰ There are two broad subtypes in mixed-member electoral systems, which they called mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) and mixed-member proportional (MMP) (Shugart and Wattenberg 2003). In the MMM systems, there is no linkage between single-seat district tiers and PR list tier in the allocation of seats to parties. In the MMP systems, however, the number of seats a party takes from its lists is determined partially by the number of seats it has won from the single-seat district tier.

On 25 May 2002 Lesotho became the first African country to test the MMP electoral model in a parliamentary election (Elklit 2000). 1,085 candidates from 18 parties, alongside 32 independents, were registered to contest the 80 FPTP constituencies. Sixteen parties presented full list of a total of 770 candidates for election via proportional representation (Southall 2003). The LCD again made virtually clean sweep of the constituencies, taking 77 out of the 78 seats²¹ contested on election day with 57.7% of the vote. It also took a very similar proportion of the PR vote (54.9%).

Table 6.1 summarizes both vote and seat shares in the elections of 1998 and 2002. The percentages show a much better correspondence between vote shares and seat shares in 2002 (the first MMP election) than was the case in 1998 (under the old FPTP system). An election's Index of Disproportionality (ID) measures the degree to which the distribution of parliamentary seats among parties diverges from the distribution of votes, with zero representing a perfectly proportional outcome (Gallagher 1999). While ID scores typically ranges from near zero to 20, the ID score for Lesotho in 1998 election was 31.5. The May 2002 election produced an ID of 8.2, a fourfold decrease. It clearly shows an increase in proportionality from the previous FPTP electoral system to the current MMP system.

Table 6.1 Vote and Seat Shares in 1998 and 2002 Elections

For the first time in Lesotho electoral history, the losing opposition parties accepted the results. Since multiparty elections were reintroduced in 1993, opposition parties had rarely taken any seat in the parliament. The new MMP electoral system

²¹ Constituency elections were postponed in Mt Moorosi and Hlotse owing to the deaths of candidates.

allowed opposition parties to take all 40 PR seats in the parliament. Thus, MMP performed well in the 2002 election, as the level of disproportionality between vote and seat shares declined dramatically compared to previous elections. This study investigates whether, and how, this increase in proportionality of electoral systems affects citizens' political support in Lesotho.

6.3 Electoral Systems and Citizen Attitudes

The electoral system is an important mechanism connecting citizens and the state. Electoral systems are conventionally divided into two categories, majoritarian and proportional (Lijphart 1995). Majoritarian systems usually employ single-seat districts with a plurality rule and tend to give greater representation to parties that receive the most votes. Proportional systems employ multi-seat districts, usually with party lists, and typically produce parliamentary representation that largely mirrors the vote shares of multiple parties.

Recently, however, there has been a marked tendency around the world to mix these two principles of electoral system design. Many newly adopted electoral systems, including those in long established democracies such as Italy, Japan, New Zealand, and Venezuela, have entailed various hybrids of the majoritarian and proportional principles (Shugart and Wattenberg 2003). Mixed-member systems employ two tiers: single-seat district (SSDs) and PR list. In the prototype of a mixed-member system, half of the seats in a legislative chamber are elected in single-seat districts while the other half are elected from party lists allocated by proportional representation. Lesotho's MMP electoral system has 80 seats for SSDs tier and 40 seats for PR list tier.

The literature on electoral systems focuses on the degree of proportionality or disproportionality in the translation of votes into seats and on their effects on the number of parties. Lijphart (1999) shows that, although no PR system is perfectly proportional and although there is a great deal of variation within the PR family, PR systems tend to be considerably less disproportional than plurality and majority systems. Proportional systems are more representative than majoritarian and semi-proportional systems because they facilitate the expression of interests by all relevant societal and ethnic groups.

While a large literature has classified the types of electoral systems and explored the relationship between electoral system and party system (Rae 1967; Katz 1980 Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1995; Cox 1997; Reynolds and Reilly 1997), few studies look at the influence of different electoral systems on citizens' attitudes toward political systems. Based on aggregate data collected in 19 European democracies, Anderson (1998) finds that there is a strong correlation between electoral systems and aggregate popular satisfaction with democracy, indicating that the more proportional the electoral system, the higher the level of satisfaction. Farrell and McAllister (2004) also demonstrate that electoral systems directly affect levels of voter satisfaction with democracy. Particularly, the disproportionality of electoral systems is a significant and negative predictor of voter satisfaction with democracy. With survey data set collected in 25 democracies, however, Norris (1999) finds that majoritarian electoral systems produce higher levels of confidence in political institutions than do proportional electoral systems. Thus, the questions of whether and how electoral systems can affect levels of popular satisfaction with democracy remains unresolved. Maybe this

discrepancy is due to the different ways in which these authors measure political support, with Anderson and others using satisfaction with democracy and Norris using trust in institutions. This study explicitly tests this possibility.

Lesotho's electoral reform offers a clear example of the effects of adding a list tier (40 PR seats). There has been a great increase in the number of parties physically present in the National Assembly, from an average of one in the 1993-1998 period to ten after the new MMP election in 2002. Because of the list tier and especially where voters cast two votes, minor parties were able to gain representation. Those small parties could act as genuinely national parties by focusing campaigns on gaining votes throughout the country to maximize their list representation. Given the absence of any formal mechanism for effective representation of small parties in the pre-existing FPTP system, the result of 40 seats of opposition parties in the parliament demonstrates a clear treatment of the role of list tier in facilitating the expression of minority interests. In this paper I look at whether increasing the proportionality of the electoral system could induce higher levels of popular satisfaction with the way democracy in Lesotho (*HI*).

6.4 Partisan status and Attitudes: Winners, Losers, and Non-partisans

Democracy is about winning and losing within a context of given rules: "Since the struggle for political office is bound to create winners and losers, this necessarily generates ambivalent attitudes towards authorities on the part of the losers" (Kaase and Newton, 1995: 60). At the simplest level, if people feel that the rules of the game allow the party they endorse to be elected to power, they are more likely to feel that representative institutions are responsive to their needs so that they can trust the

political system, and consequently, they are inclined to be satisfied with the government's performance (Lambert, *et al.*, 1986) and with the way the system works (Kornberg and Clarke, 1994; Nadeau and Blais, 1993). On the other hand, those whose preferred party loses the election are more likely to feel that their voice is excluded from the decision-making process, producing dissatisfaction with political institutions. In their study of 11 European democracies, Anderson and Guillory (1997) find that respondents who voted for the winning party or parties were more likely to be satisfied with how well democracy works in their country than respondents who voted for losing parties.

Yet losers play a crucial role in political development. Their regime support has greater impact on the stability of the regime than winners' regime support, because losers are more likely to reject the rules of game that are not responsive to their interests and to look for an alternative assuring their needs. The disposition of the losers toward the result of not only founding but also regular subsequent elections is critical to democratization. To achieve a consensus about the new rules of game after a democratic transition, it is necessary that losers will not be permanently excluded from political power, but will have subsequent chances to contest and win elections. We saw several cases, like Cameroon and Kenya, in which an attempt to marginalize the opposition from any share of power was followed by a period of political conflict (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997).

The differences in levels of political support between winner and loser in emerging democracies are wider than those in developed democracies (Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1995). While citizens who live in Belgium, Germany,

Luxembourg, and Denmark show relatively narrow differences (less than 20 percentage points) in satisfaction with democracy between winner and losers, those in young democracies such as Portugal, Spain, and Greece, express significantly large differences of more than 30 percentage points. Citizens living under the latter regimes do not have long enough experience of democracy. They have been watching just a few regular multiparty elections and only some of them have experienced the ruling party alternations in their country. In sub-Saharan Africa, most parties that won founding elections are still in power (Van de Walle 2003). Those losers in this area have lower expectations for their supporting party to win an election and more dissatisfaction with the political system.

Because democracies are inherently designed to create winners and losers through a series of elections, there must be a tension between those in the majority and those in the minority in democratic political life. That is, even when they perform satisfactorily, democracies, by their very nature, face the potential for instability due to the different preferences that those in the political majority and minority have for legitimizing the system. I therefore expect that, relative to those in the political majority (the winners), (*H2-a*) citizens who are in the political minority (the losers) should have a diminished stake in the system. As a consequence, they are likely to express more negative views of the political system's performance. In addition, we are able to observe a significant number of citizens who support neither ruling nor opposition parties in emerging democracies. For non-partisans, this study expect that their levels of political support should be somewhere between those for winners and losers (*H2-b*).

6.5 Partisan status in Different Electoral Systems

The distinctions between winners and losers may be more complex than as we see in previous section. Different electoral systems may also affect citizens' attitudes by providing incentives or disincentives for certain behavioral patterns in different ways. Winning and losing have different meanings in different electoral systems. Proportional electoral systems are advocated with producing more equitable outcomes between political minority and majority and encouraging wider social group representation than majoritarian electoral systems (Lijphart 1999). These features of the PR systems have a greater impact on losers than winners. Adopting a PR system increases the possibility to build an alliance among political minorities and induces protest parties into current political system that enhances political minority groups' perceptions of system legitimacy. Thus, minority groups feel that they are included and represented within the structures of government which make decisions affecting their interests. It leads to increase their levels of satisfaction with democracy. Anderson and Guillory's study (1997) shows the general pattern that in consensual democracies the differences between winners and losers are significantly smaller than in majoritarian democracies.

The neopatrimonialism pervasive across sub-Saharan Africa (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997) creates a divergent incentive structure for winners and losers through clientelism. Clientelism leads to increase state intervention in the economy. A large number of economic policies are motivated at least in part by the economic rents provided to the clients. In the elections, candidates commonly make a promise that they will provide better roads and social services to people who vote for them. Citizens often fear and realistically so that they will be deprived of these services if they do not vote

for the winning candidate. In Lesotho, the party identification card of the ruling LCD is often assumed as a ticket for ordinary people to gain resources from the government.

The high stakes of neopatrimonialism are reinforced by majoritarian electoral arrangements, which are more common in sub-Saharan Africa rather than PR system.²² Winners literally take all with maximum a half of votes. Majoritarian electoral systems create an incentive for winners (political majority) to bring more pork to their region or ethnic group at the sacrifice of the numerically smaller population groups who lose elections. This substantive exclusion increases the degree to which a minority group feels that it is excluded from the system. This strengthens losers' dissatisfaction with democracy and threatens the stability of emerging democracies.

I therefore argue that the nature of representation in electoral systems systematically mediates the relationship between individual's partisan status ("winner" or "loser") and his or her political support. If the new MMP system increases representation of previously excluded groups and causes people to have more favorable evaluations of political processes, I expect to see a shift particularly in political minority's attitudes from 2000 to 2003 that reflects greater satisfaction with democracy in Lesotho. The more proportional electoral systems decrease differences in popular satisfaction with democracy both between winners and losers and between winner and non-partisans. It is expected that (*H3*) losers (and, to a lesser extent, non-partisans) who live under proportional electoral systems should express higher levels of political

²² No more than one-quarter of the countries of the region – including Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Sierra Leone, and South Africa – have adopted various forms of PR.

support than those who live under non-proportional electoral systems. Figure 6.1 describes this hypothesized interactive effect. The relationships revealed among electoral systems, partisan status, and political support will shed light on the question concerning the effects of institutions on citizen attitudes toward how well their political systems work.

Figure 6.1 Hypothesized Popular Satisfaction with Democracy in Different Electoral Systems

6.6 A Model of Political Support

6.6.1 Dependent Variables: *Satisfaction with Democracy and Trust in Political Institutions.*

To assess levels of political support, this study focuses attention on both regime satisfaction and trust in political institutions from the Afrobarometer Round 1 (2000) and Round 2 (2003) data. The former is commonly measured by “satisfaction with the way democracy works in [the country].” Consistent with Anderson and Guillory’s (1997) approach, the question is concerned with how democracy functions in practice as opposed to the ideal.

A significant number of scholars criticize the concept of satisfaction with democracy for its ambiguity, as it can tap multiple dimensions of political support, for example both support for democracy as a value and satisfaction with the incumbent government (Norris 1999; Canache et al. 2001; Linde and Ekman 2003). Using Afrobarometer Round 1 data set, including 12 sub-Saharan African countries, Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi (2005) find that popular satisfaction with democracy has

significant correlations with all three dimensions such as support for democratic regime, trust in state institutions, and evaluation of government performance. Moreover, the evaluation of government performance has a consistently powerful relationship with popular satisfaction with democracy across 12 countries. While they have a relatively short experience of new democratic systems and rare alternations of government, Afrobarometer respondents consistently put more emphases on how an elected government functions in practice when they report on satisfaction with the regime of democracy.

Another dependent variable for analysis concerns trust in political institutions. Following Norris (1999), I combined trust in five major institutions, including the Prime Minister, the National Assembly, the army, the police, and the courts. These items refer to the confidence that citizens possess regarding the major institutions of the state. Responses to these five items are highly inter-correlated. Factor analysis extracts two factors (Eigenvalues are 2.38 for factor 1 and 1.19 for factor 2), which cumulatively explain 71.4 percent of the common variance. The scale has acceptable alpha reliability coefficient (Cronbach's Alpha = .72; $n = 2377$), suggesting that these five items reflected a general orientation towards political institutions. In terms of testing competing theories, this chapter will particularly look at whether any institutional effects are due to the way in which political support is measured.

6.6.2 Independent Variables

Electoral Systems (Index of Disproportionality): To measure the disproportionality of electoral systems, this study uses an index developed by Michael Gallagher (1991) as follows:

$$\text{Gallagher's least-squares index} = \sqrt{\left(\frac{1}{2} \sum (v_i - s_i)^2 \right)}$$

in which v_i is vote percentage and s_i is seat percentage. The higher the figure the greater the disproportionality produced by the electoral systems. Lesotho has experienced electoral system change from FPTP system to MMP system with adding 40 PR seats into the pre-existing electoral system. It has decreased the disproportionality of electoral system from 31.5 in 1998 to 8.2 in 2002. I expect disproportionality to have a negative effect on both popular satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions. Citizens who live under MMP system should show higher levels of satisfaction with democracy or higher levels of trust in political institutions than do those who live under FPTP system.

Partisan Status (Winners, losers and non-partisans): The Afrobarometer survey data set from Lesotho classifies respondents as being a winner, loser, or non-partisan with the help of a survey question that asks which party, if any, the respondent feels close to.

The data set then combines these respondents with information about the party or parties that did not win the most recent parliamentary elections to identify loser. This study treats as non-partisans all respondents who did not feel close to any particular political party, said “don’t know” or refused to answer the question of party affiliation.²³ Using winner as excluded base category, I created two dummy variables for both loser and non-partisan. Two variables show the differences in popular satisfaction with democracy both between winners and losers and between winners and non-partisans. I expect that both losers and non-partisans would have lower levels of satisfaction with democratic system or trust in political institutions than winners.

Two Interaction Terms between Partisan status and Electoral systems: To examine whether and how electoral systems mediate the relationship between partisan status and citizens’ political support I add two interaction terms -- loser * I.D. and non-partisan*I.D. -- into the models. I expecte that both interaction terms should have a negative coefficient. Increasing disproportionality of electoral systems should induce greater differences in popular satisfaction with political systems both between winners and losers and between winners and non-partisans. I expect that losers marginalized by previous majoritarian FPTP system should show higher levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works or higher levels of trust in political institutions after adopting a new MMP system. This study expects the electoral system change should have a similar effect on non-partisans’ political support in Lesotho.

²³ In the sample, 82 respondents (3.5%) refused to answer the question. I also run the same models without those respondents, but no significant change in the empirical results.

6.6.3 Control Variables

Interest in Politics: Many political scientists have demonstrated that interest in politics is related to political support (Almond and Verba 1965; Anderson and Guillory 1997; Weatherford 1991). Citizens who understand the political process and believe that their participation can influence policymaking are likely to take a more optimistic view of democratic governance. The Afrobarometer asked respondents how interested they are in public affairs. For the analysis, I created a dummy variable coded as one including “very interested” and “somewhat interested.” The other responses are coded as zero. I expect that those who are more interested in politics are also more likely to show higher levels of political support.

Economic Performance Evaluations (Sociotropic and egocentric evaluations): Citizen evaluations of government performance can be one of the most important factors shaping the reputation of political institutions and of the political system as a whole (Weatherford 1987). In particular, several studies suggest that economic performance, as well as public perceptions of both personal and national economic conditions, are related to system support (Clark, Dutt, and Kornberg 1993; Kornberg and Clarke 1992; Listhaug and Wiberg 1995; Weatherford 1987). For this study, I use responses to two Afrobarometer questions that asked respondents to evaluate national and personal economic conditions, that is, to form sociotropic and egocentric evaluations of economic performance separately. This study expects that those who evaluate economic performance positively should show higher levels of political support.

6.6.4 Demographic Variables

I control for the usual socio-demographic variables: education, gender, and age. Coding procedures and descriptive statistics for the individual-level variables used in this study are shown in Appendix B.

6.7 Results

6.7.1 The Effects of Partisan status on Satisfaction with Democracy at the Aggregate Level

At first glance, aggregate levels of political support appear to increase over time. Between 2000 and 2003, the proportion of Lesotho's citizens expressing satisfaction with democracy rose from 38% to 49%, a significant difference (Gay and Mattes 2004).²⁴ Afrobarometer Round 2 demonstrates that Lesotho is rather unusual in this regard, since popular satisfaction with democracy has been significantly decreasing in most African countries (The Afrobarometer Network 2004). In only three countries (Ghana, Lesotho, and Namibia) do respondents show higher levels of satisfaction with democracy in 2003 than 2000.²⁵ Similarly with institutional trust: Lesotho was one of only three African countries (the other two were Malawi and Mali) where this attitude is trending upward. And the statistically significant 14-point increase in institutional trust in Lesotho (from 40 percent to 54 percent average) was wider than for any other African

²⁴ Chi-square = 48.280, $p < .001$. "Satisfaction" combines respondents who are "very" or "fairly" satisfied.

²⁵ The increase was 17 percentage points in Ghana and 5 percentage points in Namibia. The change in Ghana was inflated, however by a change in question wording between Afrobarometer Round 1 and 2. Thus, I am confident that satisfaction with democracy increased more in Lesotho than in any other African country.

county studied. So far, therefore, the results for Lesotho are consistent with the expectation of *H1*.

Are winners more satisfied than losers with the way democracy works in Lesotho? What about non-partisans? To examine differences in satisfaction between winners, non-partisans, and losers, I compare satisfaction with democracy between these three groups across two different years.

Figure 6.2 Satisfaction with Democracy among Winners, Non-partisans, and Losers

Combining the percentage of respondents saying they are “very” or “fairly satisfied” with the way democracy works in Lesotho, Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of satisfaction with democracy for winners, non-partisans, and losers under two different electoral systems (FPTP and MMP systems). The results reported in Figure 6.2 provide largely consistent support for my hypotheses. There is a clear gap in the level of satisfaction with the democratic system between winners and losers in each electoral system. Non-partisans’ levels of satisfaction are somewhere between those for winners and losers. Losers show a doubling of satisfaction with democracy from 23 to 46 percent after electoral system changes.²⁶ While the vote losers cast under the old electoral system was not an effective choice to show their will, the vote under the MMP system has “real” effects on representing their interests in parliament with 41 seats of opposition parties. Thus, we infer that electoral reform induced opposition party

²⁶ $t = -2.31, p < .05$.

supporters to significantly upgrade their assessments of the performance of Lesotho's democracy.

On the contrary, there is an obvious, but relatively small decrease in winners' satisfaction with democracy from 75 to 67 percent.²⁷ Winners under the MMP system express lower levels of satisfaction than do winners under the FPTP system. Many LCD supporters complained about the 2002 election results, because their party took no PR seat with 54.9 percent of the PR vote. It was the first time for Lesotho people to experience the MMP electoral system. Ordinary people need more time to fully understand the new electoral system. Non-partisans did not show any changes in satisfaction with democracy between two different electoral systems. As Figure 6.2 shows, the difference in the level of satisfaction with democracy between winners and losers decreased from 52 to 21 percentage points as Lesotho changed the electoral system from FTPT to MMP system. This suggests that the MMP system reduced the proportion of voters who cast ineffective votes and incorporate marginalized political minorities into the political system.

6.7.2 Multivariate Models

Next, I examine the performance of the individual-level variables in a series of multivariate models. I use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimators in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2. Effects of Individual Characteristics on Satisfaction with Democracy and Trust in Political Institutions in 2000 and 2003

²⁷ $t = -4.51, p < .001..$

I find that the effect of loser (or minority) remains even when I control for a number of other influences, such as interest in politics, economic performance evaluations, and demographic factors. The effect is strong and consistent with the expected direction. Those coefficients for loser are consistently significant and negative in all four models of Table 6.2, indicating that citizens with preferences for opposition parties are almost always significantly less satisfied with the way democracy works than those with preferences for the ruling LCD. Losers have similar attitudes in terms of trust in political institutions. They significantly show a lower level of trust in political institutions than winners. Non-partisans express significantly lower levels of both satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions than do winners. Those coefficients for non-partisans are consistently significant and negative in all four models.

The absolute value of loser's coefficient is greater than non-partisan's coefficient in the model of satisfaction with democracy, indicating that non-partisans' levels of satisfaction are likely to be somewhere in between those for winners and losers. In the model of trust in political institutions, however, the results are not consistent between two different electoral systems. While the difference in popular trust in political institutions between winners and losers is likely to be greater than the difference between winners and non-partisans under FTPT electoral system, the former is likely to be smaller than the latter under the new MMP system. Because the new electoral system allowed opposition parties to take a significant number of seats (41) in the parliament, citizens whose party is in opposition might show relatively higher levels of trust in political institutions than those who do not support any established party.

Interest in politics is a statistically significant and positive predictor of trust in political institutions. Citizens who are more interested in politics are likely to show higher levels of trust in Lesotho political institutions. While interest in politics is a consistently powerful predictor of the trust in both 2000 and 2003, the degree of its effects relatively decreased after citizens experienced electoral system changes from FPTP to MMP system. This evidence indicates that introducing a proportional aspect into Lesotho electoral system reduces the differences in popular trust in political institutions between citizens who are interested in politics and those who are not. In 2000, it was a big issue among political elites what kinds of electoral system should be introduced in Lesotho after the 1998 political crisis. The discussion about a new electoral system among party leaders might draw ordinary citizens' attention into politics. However, after they agreed upon introducing the MMP system and held the 2002 elections under the new electoral system, political elites might not have any more interesting political issue to attract people's attention to politics.

The role of economic performance evaluations in both satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions is not clear in the result. The coefficients for national evaluation of the economy are consistently significant and are in the expected direction in 2000. Citizens who reported that the national economic condition was good were likely to express higher levels of both satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions. In 2003, however, neither national nor personal evaluations of the economy are statistically significant to explain both satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions. Lesotho's economic status is typical for an African country: its Gross National Income per capita of \$470 mirrors the sub-Saharan African

average of \$451 (World Bank 2004:5). People are largely dissatisfied with government performance on recent economic liberalization to attract foreign investment. In Afrobarometer Round 2, 82 percent of the respondents said that national economic condition was either “bad” or “very bad,” and 86 percent reported their own personal living conditions this way as well (Gay and Mattes 2004). This extremely unbalanced distribution may lead those effects of two economic performance evaluations on both popular satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions to being marginal in both 2003 models.

Apparently, however, the positive effects of institutional reform were sufficient to wash out the effects of economic pessimism on mass political satisfaction and institutional trust, at least during the post-reform honeymoon of 2003. Moreover, since there was no meaningful change in the country’s economic growth rate during the period of this study, I am confident that other events or trends – like a jump in the country’s economic fortunes - do not explain the public’s improved political mood.²⁸

6.7.3 Effects of Electoral systems on Political Support

I next test whether the electoral system reform from FPTP to MMP, increasing fairness in the transfer of votes to seats, has generalized effects on citizens’ attitudes toward political systems with the pooled sample. I then test effects of individual partisan status on popular satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions after controlling the effects of electoral system with other variables. Finally, I look at whether electoral systems mediate the relationship between citizens’ partisan status and

²⁸ Indeed, the growth rate dropped from 2.8 to 2.4 percent between 2002 and 2003 (World Bank 2005).

their attitudes toward democratic performance. I assume that political minorities disadvantaged by majoritarian rules will have relatively more positive attitudes toward the political system after a transition from a majoritarian system to proportional representation. To test whether losers who live under proportional electoral system (MMP system) exhibit higher levels of satisfaction and trust than do those who live under non-proportional electoral system (FPTP system), I estimate the pooled OLS model with an interaction term between loser and the Index of Disproportionality (ID). Table 6.3 shows the results of the pooled OLS models of Satisfaction with democracy.

Table 6.3. Effects of Electoral Systems on Satisfaction with Democracy:
Pooled Model Estimates

Electoral system change had no direct, generalized effects on citizens' satisfaction with democracy. The coefficient on ID is not statistically significant in Model 1. The result is not consistent with any of previous studies of the direct impacts of political institutions on citizens' attitudes (Anderson 1999; Farrell and McAllister 2003). This study shows that the electoral reform to resolve the long lasting conflict between ruling and opposition parties does not have any uniform impacts on levels of popular satisfaction with democracy in Lesotho, because, at the same time that losers and non-partisans saw benefits, winners perceived drawbacks. And, in the 2002 election and the 2003 survey sample, winners greatly outnumbered losers (see Figure 6.2). The slight drop-off in democratic satisfaction among 655 randomly selected winners interviewed in 2003 was sufficient to offset the doubling of democratic satisfaction among 208 randomly selected losers. Those LCD supporters (winners) were not

satisfied with the electoral results of the new MMP system, because they were accustomed to winner-take-all system (FPTP). When I interviewed LCD party leaders,²⁹ they said that after the 2003 parliamentary elections those ordinary party supporters complained how opposition parties took the 40 seats without no win in all constituencies but one and why the LCD didn't receive any seat from the PR tier. However, party leaders' evaluation of the electoral reform was more positive than the mass opinion of ordinary citizens.³⁰ Regardless of their party affiliation, all party leaders with whom I conducted an interview said that the 2002 elections produced more acceptable results than the 1998 elections because of the new MMP system and they were more satisfied with democracy after electoral reforms because the electoral system changes brought both peace and stability in Lesotho politics. In addition, those opposition party leaders emphasized that the future electoral system should be a pure (100 percent) PR system.

While there is no uniform shift in popular satisfaction with democracy, thus, I must emphasize that the results of Model 1 do not suggest that the change in electoral systems did not have any effect on citizens' satisfaction with democracy. Rather this finding suggests that electoral system changes had different effects on different political groups' attitudes toward democratic government. In Model 2, I include two dummy variables of partisan status, one for losers and the other for non-partisans.

Being an electoral loser is a strong determinant of satisfaction with democracy. Opposition party supporters are likely to express lower levels of satisfaction with

²⁹ Interview with Sephiri E. Motanyane, deputy speaker of the National Assembly; M.S. Lehata, MP; R.F. Shea, whip of the LCD, December 2004.

³⁰ Interviews with 10 party leaders from various parties in the National Assembly, December 2004.

democracy than are ruling party supporters. Non-partisan is a statistically significant and negative predictor of popular satisfaction with democracy. Moreover, evaluation of national economic performance is consistently significant and positively related to satisfaction with the way democracy works. So far, the individual-level analyses have provided support for my argument that both losers and non-partisans have systematically different attitudes about the way democracy works from winners in Lesotho, even when controlling for evaluations of personal and national economic performances, interest in politics, and a number of demographic factors.

Because both losers and non-partisans are less likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works than winners, and because, as shown in Figure 6.2 and Table 6.2, there are significant differences in the level of the satisfaction between losers under FPTP system and those under MMP system, I expect that the differences in satisfaction with democracy between winners, non-partisans, and losers can be explained by an electoral system difference (FPTP/MMP system). Those people most disadvantaged by the previous FPTP system are expected to show more positive attitudes toward the political system after the MMP election in 2002. The results are shown in Model 3, which includes two interaction terms between ID on the one hand and losers and non-partisans on the other.

I find that the electoral system mediates the relationship between partisan status and popular satisfaction with the way democracy works. The coefficient of the interaction term between loser and ID is statistically significant and negative in Model 3. More proportionality in electoral systems is likely to alleviate losers' dissatisfaction with democracy. Conversely, less proportional (or more majoritarian) electoral systems

increase differences of satisfaction with the way democracy works between winners and losers. Losers might feel disadvantaged or marginalized by the majoritarian FPTP system that failed to offer them credible chances for representing their preferences. For substantive interpretation, I calculate the simulated expected values of popular satisfaction with democracy.³¹ As Figure 6.3 shows, the expected values for losers increase from 1.96 to 2.20 after the electoral reform, while the values of winners decrease from 3.17 to 2.79. The results are consistent with *H3*.

Figure 6.3. Predicted Probabilities of Popular Satisfaction with Democracy

Electoral systems have a similar impact on non-partisans' attitude toward democratic system. The coefficient of the interaction term between non-partisan and ID is statistically significant and is in the negative direction. More proportional electoral systems decrease differences of satisfaction with democracy between winners and non-partisans. The results show that the gaps in popular satisfaction with democracy both between winners and losers and between winners and non-partisans are reduced following the adoption of MMP system. The MMP system mitigates the winner-take-all characteristics of the previous electoral system with 40 PR seats for opposition parties. It enhances citizens' perceptions of system legitimacy by incorporating opposition parties into the political system. Otherwise, opposition parties and their supporters could be severe threats to the survival of an emerging democracy. In this respect, the

³¹ Expected values are the mean of the 1000 simulated expected values generated by Clarify 2.1 (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003).

results from Lesotho are consistent with the argument about the advantages of consensual institutions made by Anderson and Guillory (1997).

In Table 6.4, finally, I run the same model with the different dependent variable of trust in political institutions as I do in Table 6.3 in order to look at whether electoral reforms have the same effects on citizens' trust in political institutions as they does on popular satisfaction with democracy.

Table 6.4. Effects of Electoral Systems on Trust in Political Institutions:
Pooled Model Estimates

Table 6.4 report results for the same model with trust in political institutions as the dependent variable. In this case, electoral system changes have effects on citizen's trust in political institutions in general. The ID coefficient is statistically significant and negative in Model 1. This implies that the increased proportionality resulting from electoral reforms is likely to boost citizens' levels of trust in political institutions. Note, however, that these effects disappear when partisan status and interaction terms are entered into the equation. For this reason, I offer interpretations of only the fullest set of the results, that is, Model 3.

The results show that popular trust in political institutions arises from multiple sources. Interest in politics is a statistically significant and positive predictor of trust in political institutions. Citizens who are more interested in politics are likely to show higher levels of trust in political institutions. Both national and personal evaluations of the economy play an important role in trust in political institutions. Their coefficients are statistically significant and positive all across the models. Assessments of national

economic condition are more influential than assessments of personal economic condition.

Gender and age variables are consistently significant in three models. The results indicate that the younger respondents are, the higher levels of trust in political institutions they express. Since the new MMP system is more complex than the old FPTP system, younger generation could be more confident about the democratic system than older generation. Women are likely to show lower levels of trust in political institutions than are men in Lesotho.

My main concern, however, is with electoral systems and their interactions with partisan status. The effects of both loser and non-partisan – which are statistically significant and in the expected (negative) direction – again survive controls for extraneous factors. And, the difference in trust in political institutions between losers and winners is greater than the difference between non-partisans and winners.

The electoral system change has a mediate effect on the relationship between non-partisans and their trust in political institutions. In Model 3, an interaction term between non-partisans and ID is a statistically significant and positive predictor of trust in political institutions. The less proportional electoral systems are, the higher non-partisans' levels of trust in political institutions are. While there is an overall increase in popular trust in political institutions in Model 1, citizens with no preference for parties are likely to express lower levels of the trust after the adoption of MMP system. Electoral reforms increased differences in levels of trust between non-partisans and winners, but did not have any impact on the differences between losers and winners. I calculate the simulated expected values of citizens' trust in political institutions. While

the expected values of the trust for both winners and losers increase after the electoral system change, the expected values for non-partisans decrease from 5.80 to 5.39.³² In other words, this group considers that political institutions are more trustworthy under an FPTP electoral system, which is consistent with the argument about the advantages of majoritarian institutions made by Norris (1999).

Electoral systems mediate the relationship between an individual's partisan status (winner, non-partisan, or loser) and his or her attitude toward political systems. This study shows that more proportional electoral systems are likely to induce narrower gaps of popular satisfaction with democracy between losers and winners as well as between non-partisans and winners. On the other hand, more proportional electoral systems are likely to increase differences in popular trust in political institutions between winners and non-partisans. The results suggest that various electoral systems affect citizens' attitudes by providing incentives or disincentives for certain behavioral patterns in various manners.

6.8 Conclusion

Electoral system changes have significant effects on citizens' attitudes toward their political system. These effects are not uniform as existing studies on institutional effects on citizens' political support demonstrate. I have found that winning and losing have distinctive meanings under different electoral systems. PR rules boost positive attitudes toward political system among political minorities who were disadvantaged or

³² The expected values for winners increase from 7.04 to 7.48 and the values for losers change from 5.33 to 5.71.

marginalized by winner-take-all electoral systems. After electoral reforms, both losers and non-partisans are likely to show higher levels of satisfaction with democracy than before. On the contrary, electoral reforms have negative effects on popular satisfaction with democracy among winners who benefited by previous majoritarian rules. Electoral reforms also affect citizens' trust in political institutions. PR rules increase levels of the trust among winners and losers, while non-partisans are likely to show lower levels of trust in political institutions after adding 40 PR seats to existing 80 district seats.

Lesotho is one of sub-Saharan African countries plagued by neopatrimonialism, in which resources are distributed to clients in return for political loyalty. Because private-sector economies remain underdeveloped, government executes its monopoly power to collect and distribute public resources. With no seat in the National Assembly, moreover, there is no way for opposition parties to influence and check government decision making, while they constantly receive a certain number of votes in elections. Those votes for opposition parties are not effective at all to elect representatives in the National Assembly. The ruling party enjoys and reinforces neopatrimonial network to secure winning next elections. Access to government resources is often critical to economic and political survival for both political elites and ordinary voters. People often are scared to be left away from the clientelistic network if they do not support the ruling party.

After electoral reforms, however, opposition parties have been able to watch what and how the LCD government is doing for people in Lesotho, because of their 41 seats in the National Assembly. The National Assembly has five sessional select

committees in which all chairs are from the opposition parties.³³ While the 41 seats are obviously small relative to 79 seats of the ruling LCD in the parliament, opposition parties are at least able to bring important issues to the public, for example, how the government executes the budget. Thus, people are more likely to acknowledge what the government is doing and have an opinion on given government policies. Citizens whose party is in opposition begin to feel their party has an influence on policy-making in the government only after their representatives take seats in parliament. Prior to the electoral reforms, opposition parties ought to be outside of the National Assembly and their supporters could challenge the legitimacy of the government. It led to an unstable regime as an emerging democracy in particular. As this study shows, however, after the reforms enhancing fairness in the transfer of votes to seats and increasing effective parties take place, both losers and non-partisans are likely to display higher levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works than before.

This study suggests that political reforms should focus on political institutions marginalizing or alienating certain groups of citizens in political systems. Increasing proportionality in the translation of votes into seats in parliament, for example, leads to increases in positive attitudes about political systems among people in the political minority. Electoral system changes are likely to enhance people's engagement in democracy and contribute to the democratic consolidation of a regime.

We have observed just a few cases of alternation of ruling party in sub-Saharan Africa. People in the political minority are likely to remain marginalized by both formal and informal institutions and they feel that political systems are not representing their

³³ Business Committee, House Committee, Committee on Standing Orders, Public Accounts Committee, Staff Committee, Committee of Privileges, and HIV/AIDS Committee.

interests. The gaps in political support between losers and winners are likely to grow in this area. Because of the relatively short experience of democratic institutions, however, emerging democracies necessarily need losers' consent and support for the democratic system to survive and develop for a long time. This study shows that in addition to their minority status in politics, losers are less likely to be satisfied with the way democracy works if there are few opportunities to influence a decision-making process, such as no parliamentary seat for opposition parties. For democratic stabilization, therefore, this study suggests that institutional reforms allowing the political minority to gain more access to the decision-making process in emerging democracies.

The final caveat concerns the object of inquiry in studies of political support. Leading analysts in this field have not adopted uniform constructs and measurements of this important dependent variable. Norris, who studies trust in state institutions, may not be fully justified in counter-posing her research results against Anderson and Guillory, who are concerned with popular satisfaction with the regime of democracy. The only way to resolve the debate over the relative advantages of majoritarian versus consensual institutions is with reference to the same dependent variables. Fortunately, the Afrobarometer measures both satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions. In this chapter, I have shown that proportional rules boost citizen political support when this concept is measured as satisfaction with democracy. But I have also found trace evidence among non-partisans in Lesotho that disproportional (i.e. majoritarian) rules are more conducive to political support, at least when this concept is measured in terms of institutional trust.

At minimum, then, analysts should explicitly identify the referents of political support. If the object of study is democratization, then satisfaction with democracy is clearly the preferable indicator; but if one is interested in the legitimacy of the state, then it is appropriate to measure trust in institutions. Divergent approaches and findings in the current research have substantive implications, including what we see as the relative sophistication of citizens in new democracies. I have shown that the citizens of Lesotho, especially those who previously lacked representation, report that electoral reforms improve the quality of their country's democracy. At the same time, however, these same citizens doubt that a change in electoral institutions will alter the day-to-day operations of the executive agencies of the state. They recognize that, even where electoral democracy and parliamentary representation have been attained, power still resides with leaders who are driven by formal and informal norms of "winner take all."

Figure 6.1. Hypothesized Satisfaction with Democracy in Different Electoral Systems




Figure 6.2 Satisfaction with Democracy among Winners, Non-Partisans, and Losers




Figure 6.3 Predicted Values of Popular Satisfaction with Democracy




Table 6.1. Vote and Seat Shares in 1998 and 2002 Elections

Parties	1998			2002		
	Votes (%)	Seats (%)	Seats (no.)	Votes (%)	Seats (%)	Seats (no.)
LCD	60.7	98.8	79	54.9	65.3	77
BNP	24.5	1.3	1	22.4	17.8	21
BCP	10.5	0	0	2.7	2.5	3
MFP	1.3	0	0	1.2	0.8	1
LPC	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	5.8	4.2	5
NIP	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	5.5	4.2	5
BAC	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	2.9	2.5	3
LWP	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1.4	0.8	1
PFD	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	1.1	0.8	1
NNP	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	0.7	0.8	1
Other/Independents	3	0	0	1.4	0	0
ID	31.5			8.2		
Total	100	100	80	100	100	118

Table 6.2. Effects of Individual Characteristics on Satisfaction with Democracy
and Trust in Political Institutions in 2000 and 2003

Independent Variable	Satisfaction with Democracy				Trust in Political Institutions			
	2000 (FPTP)		2003 (MMP)		2000 (FPTP)		2003 (MMP)	
	Coef.		Coef.	Beta	Coef.	Beta	Coef.	Beta
Loser (minority)	-1.199*** (0.121)	-0.363	-0.590*** (0.097)	-0.198	-1.712*** (0.338)	-0.160	-1.795*** (0.276)	-0.191
Non-partisan	-0.796*** (0.094)	-0.317	-0.510*** (0.085)	-0.201	-1.326*** (0.260)	-0.165	-1.970*** (0.237)	-0.248
Interest in Politics	0.043 (0.097)	0.015	0.181 (0.140)	0.041	1.140*** (0.255)	0.131	1.006*** (0.371)	0.076
National Economic Performance	0.137*** (0.035)	0.132	0.052 (0.038)	0.045	0.342*** (0.098)	0.102	0.180 (0.109)	0.049
Personal Economic Performance	0.053 (0.037)	0.049	0.071 (0.044)	0.053	0.349*** (0.102)	0.100	0.054 (0.125)	0.013
Gender (female = 1)	-0.063 (0.085)	-0.025	-0.013 (0.070)	-0.006	-0.729*** (0.232)	-0.091	-0.480** (0.198)	-0.067
Age	0.003 (0.003)	0.042	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.014	-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.116	-0.006 (0.006)	-0.032
Education	0.023 (0.027)	0.029	0.029 (0.023)	0.042	0.043 (0.080)	0.016	-0.139** (0.065)	-0.062

Constant	2.607*** (0.201)	2.372*** (0.215)	6.559*** (0.552)	7.406*** (0.589)
R2	0.162	0.066	0.105	0.100
N	779	992	1132	1189

Note: Ordinary Least Squares estimates; standard errors are in parentheses. All significant tests are two-tailed: ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Table 6.3. Effects of Electoral Systems on Satisfaction with Democracy: Pooled Model Estimates

<i>Independent Variable</i>	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Coef.	Beta	Coef.	Beta	Coef.	Beta
Index of Disproportionality	0.002 (0.003)	0.018	0.007*** (0.002)	0.066	0.016*** (0.004)	0.159
Loser (minority)			-0.840*** (0.076)	-0.269	-0.370*** (0.140)	-0.119
Non-partisan			-0.620*** (0.063)	-0.250	-0.388*** (0.119)	-0.157
Loser * I.D.					-0.027*** (0.007)	-0.191
Non-partisan * I.D.					-0.013** (0.005)	-0.139
Interest in Politics	0.188** (0.081)	0.057	0.100 (0.078)	0.031	0.089 (0.078)	0.027
National Economic Performance	0.116*** (0.027)	0.106	0.103*** (0.026)	0.094	0.101*** (0.002)	0.092
Personal Economic Performance	0.044 (0.029)	0.037	0.051 (0.028)	0.043	0.057** (0.028)	0.048
Gender (female = 1)	-0.043 (0.057)	-0.018	-0.032 (0.054)	-0.013	-0.030 (0.054)	-0.013
Age	0.001 (0.002)	0.018	0.001 (0.002)	0.015	0.001 (0.002)	0.012
Education	-0.010 (0.018)	-0.013	0.028 (0.018)	0.039	0.025 (0.017)	0.034
Constant	2.084*** (0.157)		2.100*** (0.139)		2.203*** (0.156)	
Adj. R ²	0.014		0.097		0.105	
N	1771		1771		1771	

Note: Ordinary Least Squares estimates; standard errors are in parentheses.

All significant tests are two-tailed: ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Table 6.4. Effects of Electoral Systems on Trust in Political Institutions: Pooled Model Estimates

<i>Independent Variable</i>	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Coef.	Beta	Coef.	Beta	Coef.	Beta
Index of Disproportionality	-0.018** (0.007)	-0.054	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.015	-0.019 (0.010)	-0.059
Loser (minority)			-1.781*** (0.216)	-0.177	-1.802*** (0.409)	-0.179
Non-partisan			-1.643*** (0.175)	-0.210	-2.408*** (0.343)	-0.307
Loser * ID					0.003 (0.018)	0.007
Non-partisan * ID					0.037** (0.015)	0.128
Interest in Politics	1.360*** (0.207)	0.140	1.116*** (0.205)	0.115	1.135*** (0.205)	0.117
National Economic Performance	0.290*** (0.074)	0.083	0.268*** (0.072)	0.077	0.264*** (0.072)	0.075
Personal Economic Performance	0.223*** (0.080)	0.059	0.242*** (0.078)	0.064	0.247*** (0.072)	0.065
Gender (female = 1)	-0.630*** (0.156)	-0.083	-0.591*** (0.152)	-0.078	-0.603*** (0.151)	-0.079
Age	-0.015*** (0.005)	-0.070	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.074	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.074
Education	-0.138*** (0.052)	-0.057	-0.056 (0.051)	-0.023	-0.052 (0.051)	-0.022
Constant	6.270*** (0.428)		6.951*** (0.425)		7.179*** (0.439)	
Adj. R ²	0.052		0.096		0.098	
N	2321		2321		2321	

Note: Ordinary Least Squares estimates; standard errors are in parentheses.

All significant tests are two-tailed: ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

This study provides clear support for the argument that political institutions, especially party systems, presidentialism or parliamentarism, and unitarism or federalism, strongly determine how individuals in emerging democracies view the way democracy works in their country at the national level. My analyses show that popular satisfaction with democracy is increased in countries that have greater ENPP, where citizens are likely to have more options to choose from. People in presidential systems are likely to show higher levels of popular satisfaction with democracy than those in parliamentary systems. Unitarism also increases levels of popular satisfaction with democracy across new democracies.

Those findings that both presidentialism and unitarism have positive effects on popular satisfaction with democracy are contrasted with consociationalists' points of view. Many consociationalists recommend parliamentarism and federalism for new democracies with divided society. A large number of existing studies on political institutions have focused on established democracies rather than emerging democracies, while one of the most important goals of such studies is the democratic consolidation for the latter. On the contrary, this study pays direct attention to both political institutions and popular opinions in fledgling democracies. The results show that people in presidential and unitary systems are likely to show higher levels of satisfaction with democracy than those in parliamentary and federal systems. This finding suggests that there exist differences in both how political institutions work and how citizens understand and evaluate the performance of political systems between established

democracies and new democracies. Citizens who live in new democracy have a relatively shorter experience with a new regime and, in turn, are less confident with political institutions than those live in established democracies.

This cross-national analysis of the impact of electoral system on popular satisfaction with democracy raises questions about the role electoral institutions play in both emerging and established democracies. The results of this study show that electoral systems, measured by disproportionality between votes and seats in parliament, have no significant direct effects on citizens' views about how a democratic system works. This finding suggests that citizens in emerging democracies still need more time to learn about an electoral system in order to evaluate how the system counts their vote. The question of whether elections were free and fair is still the most critical issue among people in a new democracy when evaluating a regime performance.

At individual level, a citizen's partisan status has a clear effect on his or her satisfaction with democracy. The gap in people's views of how political systems works is significantly large between those in a political majority and those in a minority across new democracies. The results confirm that people whose party is in government are more likely to show higher levels of satisfaction with democracy. In contrast, both losers and non-partisans are less likely to believe that the political system is responsive to their interests.

Losers' evaluation of political system performance, however, is critical for the consolidation of political institutions in emerging democracies and, in turn, ultimately for the survival of the regime itself. Without losers' consent and support for the system, those democracies hardly sustain their democratic consolidation process. Thus,

narrowing the gaps in popular satisfaction with democracy between winners and losers needs to be taken as a serious issue in emerging democracy to continue the functioning of the new regime as well as its life.

In addition, the results show that party systems mediate the relationship between citizens' partisan status and their satisfaction with democracy. Greater ENPP is likely to mitigate the negative view of political minority (losers and non-partisans) about the way democracy works and, in turn, decrease the differences in popular satisfaction with democracy both between winners and losers and between winners and non-partisans.

The empirical results support the new institutionalists' argument that individual behaviour is constrained and channeled by the institutional context. This research observed the variations in losers' satisfaction with democracy across countries. It has been shown that party systems explain differences across nations. Greater ENPP in political systems means that no party can be a dominant one in a parliament and that parties need agreements from each other in order to pass laws. Opposition parties in a polity with greater ENPP have more chances to influence the decision-making process than those in a polity with smaller ENPP. Thus, losers in greater ENPP are likely to express higher levels of popular satisfaction with democracy than those losers living in a smaller ENPP or in a one party dominant system.

Finally, this study demonstrates the effects of electoral system changes on citizens' political support in Lesotho. Particularly, electoral reform introducing PR seats in the National Assembly shows increased popular satisfaction with democracy and trust in political institutions. Because of the reform, opposition parties have been able to win 40 seats in parliament since democratic transition in 1993. Replacing FPTP with

MMP is likely to narrow the gaps in popular satisfaction with democracy both between winners and losers and between winners and non-partisans in Lesotho.

This study sheds light on the general issue of whether institutions matter in emerging democracies. Constitutional debates – whether about electoral systems, executive-legislative relations, or unitarism versus federalism – have risen on the policy agenda to become very important issues in emerging democracies. If institutional arrangements influence political support, as this research finds, this may have important consequences for constitutional debates. The challenge for further research is to consider these issues in terms of the democratization process. If institutional designs can strengthen popular satisfaction with democracy this may provide significant lessons for the process of democratization.

This study can also be extended to consider how political institutions manage ethnic conflict. New democracies have been establishing a set of political institutions in order not only to structure political competition but also to accommodate the incentives of different groups. Electoral rules, for example, are expected to manage the conflict and to contribute to political stability. Many arguments have been developed about this issue, but few studies have empirically tested these arguments. Future study will benefit from exploring whether and how political institutions mediate the relationship between people's ethnicity and their political support.

This study clearly shows how important formal institutions are in shaping people's views about their political system performance. This finding suggests that scholars should pay attention to both formal and informal institutions in order to improve institutional analyses. In emerging democracies, constitutions and state

institutions coexist with informal institutions, for example, clientelism, corruption, and neo-patrimonialism. Those informal institutions are argued to have a significant effect on shaping people's incentives and expectations in developing countries in particular. For political scientists, nevertheless, identifying informal institutions and measuring their effects in order to compare across nations are still challenging issues. This study demonstrates that formal institutions should be included to explain people's attitudes toward political systems.

More generally, this study explains popular attitudes toward political system by examining the contingent effects of an individual-level variable (political majority-minority status) and a contextual variable (various political institutions). By integrating both micro- and macro-level explanations of political support, this analysis enhances our understanding of how citizens form their attitudes toward the democratic systems in countries with different political institutions.

In methodology, it is important to emphasize that a statistical model must reflect the nature of the data being examined. For example, this study works with two-level data: respondents are nested within nations. Respondents in a given nation are not truly independent; they are clustered and duplicate one another to some extent. Ignoring this feature of multilevel data set is likely to lead to incorrect standards errors. The results demonstrate that OLS estimation is likely to underestimate the standard errors for national-level variables. When we test a cross-level hypothesis, such as whether the effect of lower-level predictors is conditioned or moderated by higher-level predictors, multi-level analysis is necessary. It allows researchers to estimate a model with varying intercepts and slopes. Thus, we can see whether there is a single, uniform causal effect

or whether the causal effect varies across higher levels of analysis. This study shows that the effect of partisan status on popular satisfaction with democracy significantly varies across nations and this variance is likely to be explained by party systems.

APPENDIX A

Coding

Satisfaction with Democracy. “Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in your country?” Response categories included: 1 = “not at all satisfied”; 2 = “not very satisfied”; 3 = “fairly satisfied”; 4 = “very satisfied.”

Partisan Status. “Which party do you usually think of yourself as close to?” If party choice matches with a government party (winner), if it matches with an opposition party (loser), otherwise (non-partisan).

National Economic Performance. “In general, how would you describe the present economic condition of your country?” 1 = “Very bad”; 2 = “Fairly bad”; 3 = “Neither good nor bad”; 4 = “Fairly good”; 5 = “Very good.”

Personal Economic Performance. “In general, how would you describe your own present living conditions?” 1 = “Very bad”; 2 = “Fairly bad”; 3 = “Neither good nor bad”; 4 = “Fairly good”; 5 = “Very good.”

Interest in Politics. “How interested are you in politics and government?” 1 = “Not at all interested”; 2 = “Not very interested”; 3 = “Somewhat interested”; 4 = “Very interested.”

Gender. 0 = Male; 1 = Female.

Education. 1 = No formal schooling; 2 = Primary school; 3 = Middle school; 4 = College or university; 5 = Post-graduate.

Descriptive Statistics

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Obs.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
Satisfaction with Democracy	59610	2.43	0.926	1	4
Loser	63663	0.22	0.413	0	1
Non-partisan	63663	0.47	0.499	0	1
Interest in Politics	60524	2.45	1.112	0	1
National Economic Performance	62821	2.48	1.056	1	5
Personal Economic Performance	63299	2.82	0.993	1	5
Gender	63108	0.50	0.500	0	1
Age	62965	37.80	15.085	16	105
Education	62376	2.74	0.915	1	5

APPENDIX B

Coding

Satisfaction with Democracy. “Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Lesotho?” Response categories included: 1 = “not at all satisfied”; 2 = “not very satisfied”; 3 = “fairly satisfied”; 4 = “very satisfied.”

Trust in Political Institutions. “How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?” 0 = “not at all”; 1 = “a little bit”; 2 = “a lot”; 3 = “a very great deal.” The combined institutional trust scale ranges from 0 to 15.

Partisan Status. “Which party do you usually think of yourself as close to?” If party choice matches with a government party (winner), if it matches with an opposition party (loser), otherwise (non-partisan).

National Economic Performance. “In general, how would you describe the present economic condition of Lesotho?” 1 = “Very bad”; 2 = “Fairly bad”; 3 = “Neither good nor bad”; 4 = “Fairly good”; 5 = “Very good.”

Personal Economic Performance. “In general, how would you describe your own present living conditions?” 1 = “Very bad”; 2 = “Fairly bad”; 3 = “Neither good nor bad”; 4 = “Fairly good”; 5 = “Very good.”

Interest in Politics. “How interested are you in politics and government?” 0 = “not interested”; 1 = “somewhat interested”; 2 = “very interested.” For the analysis, I create a dummy variable coded as “1” including “Very interested” and “Somewhat interested.” The other two responses are coded as “0.”

Descriptive Statistics

<i>Variables</i>	<i>Obs.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
Satisfaction with Democracy	1808	2.589	1.183	1	4
Trust in Political Institutions	2377	6.653	3.817	0	15
Loser	2377	0.171	0.377	0	1
Non-partisan	2377	0.380	0.486	0	1
Interest in Politics	2377	0.806	0.396	0	1
National Economic Performance	2377	1.863	1.088	1	5
Personal Economic Performance	2377	2.006	1.008	1	5
Gender	2377	0.497	0.5	0	1
Age	2377	43.025	17.376	18	92
Education	2377	2.659	1.593	0	9

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