RACE POLITICS: PERCEPTIONS OF RACE AND RACISM AND ITS IMPACT ON RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP IN CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN

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ABSTRACT

RACE POLITICS: PERCEPTIONS OF RACE AND RACISM AND ITS IMPACT ON RIGHTS OF CITIZENSHIP IN CONTEMPORARY BRITAIN
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Race is a political tool used by nation-states to make and deny claims to rights of citizenship for those who are racialized within that nation. In this dissertation I examine the relationship between race, nation and citizenship in contemporary Britain. Specifically, I explore the ways racial ideologies within the UK are internalized, reproduced, employed, and resisted by racialized actors as they exercise their civil, political and social rights of citizenship. This dissertation addresses three questions: How do racialized actors in Britain take part in constructing and accessing their rights of citizenship within civil society? What is the nature of British racialized citizenship that is made available to individuals and organisations that represent racial and ethnic communities? What are the narratives used by individuals, Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) groups and the state to negotiate issues of race and racism within the boundaries of citizenship?

I reviewed British immigration legislation and social policies directed at BME communities since 1945; conducted participant observations within a regional BME organization based in Bristol, England; and conducted one-on-one interviews with British citizenship living in England to answer my research questions. I develop a theory of "racialized citizenship" that utilizes Antonio Gramsci's concepts of hegemony, counterhegemonic resistance and contradictory consciousness within the realm of civil society, coupled with British sociologist T.H. Marshall's three-part classification of citizenship as civil, political and social alongside Du Bois' notion of "double consciousness."

Increased non-white immigration post-1945 into Britain led the British government to redefine Britishness in terms of "whiteness." This active racialized re-creation of British national identity constantly questioned the legitimacy of non-white communities. I argue that access for racial and ethnic minorities to rights of citizenship is always through a racialized lens that is both limited in nature and predefined/predetermined by the state, or what I call "racialized citizenship." Obtaining full rights of citizenship for racial and ethnic minority individuals is difficult due to the hegemonic constructions of race that are both produced by the British state and reproduced within BME organizations. Racialized citizenship requires agents to use race as a political platform to seek their rights as citizens. However, the contradictory nature of race allows for its contestation by racialized actors within the realm of civil society.

For racialized actors resistance occurs through the questioning of larger racial narratives that limit these organizations abilities to conduct the work they feel needs to be done for their communities through a subjugated position within society. This is seen in the strategies employed by BME leaders to raise awareness of their communities needs. Resistance also occurs in the ways BME organizations interpret mainstream funders aims and goals for money awarded. This is observed in the activism styles employed by BME members to access their rights. Finally, resistance occurs in the challenging ways everyday citizens questioned and reinterpreted racial classifications and discourse. But, resistance is slow and ongoing and there is always the risk of reproducing hegemonic constructs when mounting a resistance – the reproductions of "BME as disadvantaged" by the BME sector and the construction of race as biological by everyday citizens are just two examples. However, if we allow for the *possibility* of resistance to occur then there is a *possibility* that a new hegemony will emerge.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

ACAB	African and Caribbean Association of Bristol
BBMEO	Bristol Black and Minority Ethnic Organization
BCVS	Black Community and Voluntary Sector
BME	Black and Minority Ethnic
CRE	Commission for Racial Equality
NACCI	National Advisory Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants
RRA	Race Relations Act
VCO	Voluntary and Community Organizations
VCS	Voluntary and Community Sector

INTRODUCTION

> Race is an illusion. Racism is not.
>
> Anonymous

> I know perfectly well that in the scientific sense there is no such thing as race. As a politician I need an idea that enables the order, which has hitherto existed on a historic basis to be abolished and an entirely new order enforced and given an intellectual basis. And for this purpose the idea of race serves me well.
>
> Adolf Hitler

GENERAL OVERVIEW

I open with a quote from Hitler as a powerful way to illustrate the political nature and construction of race. Race is a not a biological concept rooted within the social world or merely a social construction with biological consequences. Instead race is a political tool that over time has been used by governments, dictators, leaders, communities and individuals to create divisions within society, build nation-states, form societal bonds and lead wars. Most importantly race, since the foundation of the Western nation-state, has been used as a tool for making and denying claims to rights of citizenship for those who are racialized within that nation. The racial classification scheme a nation-state uses is indicative of the ways in which that state understands and views its inhabitants. In this dissertation, I examine this relationship between race and citizenship in contemporary Britain through ethnographic fieldwork I conducted in Bristol, England. Specifically, I examine the impact perceptions and discourses of race and racism have on making and denying claims to British citizenship for everyday British citizens living in Bristol and for members of Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) voluntary and community organizations. Of particular interest to me are the ways in which racialized actors within British society access their rights of citizenship through a racialized and ethnicized framework. Furthermore, I explore how racial ideologies within the UK are created and then disseminated from a state to local level, comparing and contrasting the intricate ways these

ideologies are internalized, reproduced, employed, and resisted against by BME organizations and individuals in relation to different aspects of citizenship. I use Gramsci's (2005) concepts of hegemony, counterhegemonic resistance and contradictory consciousness within the realm of civil society alongside British sociologist T.H. Marshall's (1998) three-part classification of citizenship as civil, political and social and DuBois' (1995) notion of double consciousness to frame my discussion of racialized citizenship within the British nation-state.

Race and racial classification are contested spaces of identification rooted in a socio-historical and political past of colonization, scientific investigation, capitalism, and nation-state building projects, a process Omi and Winant (1994) call "racial formation" (55). In post-imperial Britain race and racial classifications are concepts rooted in these past events, formed during British imperialism and influencing British conceptions of citizenship and belonging. Since 1945, changes in population demographics due to the end of the British Empire, globalization and the mass immigration of former colonial subjects into the "motherland" resulted in a large non-white population settling in Britain who had claims to this citizenship. In response, the British government changed access to British citizenship through subsequent immigration acts since 1948, limiting the entry of non-white populations, mainly from the Caribbean, the Indian sub-continent and Africa.

For those racial and ethnic minorities within the country various governmental social policies and political acts simultaneously created, perpetuated and contested racial discrimination against these populations. Although these racial and ethnic populations came from different geographical, cultural, and linguistic backgrounds, in the eyes of the British state these heterogeneous populations were redefined and homogenized under the term "Black and Minority Ethnic," or BME. Within the spaces of racial classification and racism BME communities

formed local voluntary and community organizations to provide needed public services and support for their communities. Over time these organizations grew in numbers and strength, and formed various regional and eventually one national organization that campaign and advocate on behalf of the rights of BME communities.

Fundamentally, inequality limits full access to all rights of citizenship for populations within a society. I argue that access to rights of citizenship by the state for racial and ethnic minorities is gained through a narrow racial engagement that is both limited in nature and predefined/predetermined by the state. This racial engagement is then based on the state's definition of race and classification of racial identities. Therefore, access to the state and all rights of citizenship for certain segments of the population is mediated through a limited and confining racial ideology. But, in the creative realm of civil society this narrative is subject to interpretation, challenge, and redefinition by British citizens and BME organizations.

In this dissertation I address three questions in relation to access to citizenship rights for racialized populations. 1) How do racialized and ethnicized actors in Britain take part in constructing and accessing their rights of citizenship within civil society and how is this enacted? 2) What is the nature of British racialized citizenship that is made available to individuals and organisations that represent racial and ethnic communities? 3) What are the narratives used by individuals, BME groups and the state to negotiate issues of race and racism within the boundaries of citizenship?

To address these questions I use three types of ethnographic data: a historical review of British Immigration and Race Relations Acts since 1945; participant observations I conducted within a regional BME infrastructure organization that operates in Bristol, England; and one-on-one semi-structured interviews with 12 British citizens of different ethnic origins who lived in

Bristol. I focused on the narratives and language used by political parties and the media over time, by Black and Minority Ethnic leaders and organizational members, and everyday citizens as they define and construct race, racisms and citizenship. I was particularly interested in the different strategies racialized actors employed to engage with and resist against hegemonic constructions of race as a way to understand how racial ideologies are used to limit, transform and redefine British citizenship.

I conclude that attaining full rights of citizenship for racial and ethnic minority individuals is difficult due to the uncritical way hegemonic constructions of race are produced and reproduced by the British state, BME organizations everyday racialized and ethnicized British citizens. Within civil society two narratives – "BME as socially excluded" and "BME as disadvantaged" –help perpetuate this hegemonic discourse. However, the contradictory nature of race allows for its contestation by both British citizens and Black and Ethnic Minority (BME) organizations within the realm of civil society. Among the Bristol Black and Minority Ethnic Organization (BBMEO)[1] counterhegemonic resistance by BME leaders presented itself through two different activism styles, "pragmatic" and "opportunistic." For everyday British citizens, race is simultaneously contested and reified through narratives on the doubleness of race and British citizenship. In all instances resistance to race and racism is a slow and ongoing one, fraught with internal divisions and external pressures.

Outline of Dissertation

Cortazzi (2001) states, "narrating is, after all, a major means of making sense of past experiences and sharing it with others" (384). The way I "made sense" of the stories and experiences told to me, and of what I observed, is presented throughout the remaining chapters.

[1] All names have been changed to protect anonymity

In Chapter 1 I introduce the theoretical ideas of race and citizenship. I use theorist Antonio Gramsci's (2005) concepts of hegemony, counterhegemonic resistance and civil society alongside Du Bois (1995) notion of double consciousness to frame my overall discussions of race. In doing so I contend that race is a political tool used by multiple actors to maintain hegemonic power within a society.

In Chapter 2 I present my settings and methods. I concentrate on the events that led to the creation of the Bristol Black and Ethnic Minority Organization (BBMEO) in Bristol. I then give the background of my involvement with BBMEO. I also provide detail on the data collection and analysis I use for this study.

In Chapter 3 I bring in the concept of citizenship, conceptualized by T.H Marshall as civil, political and social. In this chapter I focus specifically on Marshall's first concept of citizenship – civil citizenship. I illustrate the ways in which race and racism emerged post 1945 and effected legal access to and rights of citizenship for black and ethnic minority populations. I show that the political mobilization around race and ethnicity amongst black and ethnic minority communities were in response to the lack of legal rights afforded to them by the state. As such, these communities saw the power of the political currency of race as a political tool for a large and diverse group of people to address grievances they had to the state. In this chapter I also explore the everyday ways race and citizenship are understood amongst British citizens. In doing so I am interested in the ways race is incorporated into daily understandings of Self and Other and how this illustrates the "staying power" of race.

In Chapter 4 I focus on Marshall's second aspect of citizenship –political citizenship. I use two events, a three-day conference and the Race Debate, as examples of the ways two dominate narratives – the narrative of "social exclusion" and "BME as disadvantaged" - affect

full access to political rights for BME organizations and the communities they serve. Both of these narratives are produced by the state and reproduced within BME voluntary and community organizations. Through these narratives race is reproduced in a contemporary form, which impacts on the political rights of BME organizations and communities and necessitates the two strategies of activism employed within BBMEO.

In Chapter 5 I examine Marshall's third concept - social citizenship, focusing on the issues of funding and capacity within the Bristol Black and Ethnic Minority Organization (BBMEO) and the narratives of everyday British citizens in relation to race, racism and citizenship. For BME organizations, obtaining funding is critical for the survival of small and medium size voluntary and community organizations. Yet, the bureaucracy, funder-led expectations, and lack of capacity within many BME organizations hinder these types of organizations from accessing necessary funds or obtaining quality capacity building skills. In this climate staff members of BBMEO utilized two different strategies of activism – "opportunistic" and "pragmatic" – to compete within this environment for access to political rights. I draw on conversations and observations I conducted regarding a specific funding scheme the BBMEO was awarded during my time at the organization.

Chapter 6 concludes this dissertation. I reintroduce my theoretical concepts and put them in conversation with my data. I argue that although race is a hegemonic construct, racialized actors are not passive individuals. Rather, counterhegemonic resistance is mounted through the various strategies BME leaders employ when interacting with governmental and mainstream bodies to access their civil, political and social rights of citizenship. It is in this interaction within civil society that hegemony becomes messy and disjointed and where counterhegemonic resistance can occur.

CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF RACE

> "Race" is a shorthand term for, as well as a symbol of, a "knowledge system," a way of knowing, of perceiving, and of interpreting the world, and of rationalizing its contents (in this case, other human beings) in terms that are *derived from previous cultural-historical* experience and reflective of contemporary social values, relationships, and conditions (emphasis added).
>
> Audrey Smedley

> Race is a concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by referring to different types of human bodies.
>
> Omi and Winant

> You know the world is going crazy when the best rapper is a white guy, the best golfer is a black guy, the tallest guy in the NBA is Chinese, the Swiss hold the America's Cup, France is accusing the U.S. of arrogance, and Germany doesn't want to go to war.
>
> Chris Rock

INTRODUCTION

The objective of this dissertation is to examine the ways racialized actors use civil society to access their rights of citizenship. In particular, I am interested in the various constructions, definitions, strategies and narratives constructed by these actors around issues of race, citizenship and belonging. At the heart of this dissertation is the concept of race – from its historical beginnings in the West to its modern articulations within the nation-state. I engage with the concept of race using Antonio Gramsci's (2005) notions of contradictory consciousness and counterhegemonic resistance within the realm of society. Since I am interested in access to rights of citizenship for racialized actors I also employ T.H. Marshall's (1998) construction of citizenship within the discourse of race and nation and W.E.B. DuBois' (1995) concept of "double counsciousness" as an illustration of the ways racial hegemonies are both reinforced and resisted against by racialized actors within civil society.

I first consider the concept of race. I then go on to introduce Gramsci's notions of contradictory consciousness and counterhegemonic resistance within civil society. In doing so, I draw on the interpretations of Gramsci's work by Omi and Winant (1994) and Sturm (2002) on race and nation and I highlight the limitations of Gramsci's work on modern understandings of racial hegemony and civil society. Next, I introduce the notion of citizenship within racialized nations, relying on the scholarship of Marshall (1998), Du Bois (1995) and Fanon (1967) to illustrate the ways in which racial hegemonies interfere and limit access to citizenship for racial minorities in the West. I conclude with a summation of major points addressed in this chapter.

RACE AND RACIAL WORLDVIEWS

"I didn't know I was black until I came to this country!" Fatima proclaims.

"What? You're kidding me." I reply looking at Fatima perplexed. It's a cold January day in 2010 and Fatima and I are in the office of the Bristol Black and Ethnic Minority Organization (BBMEO). It's a small voluntary and community organization in a diverse neighborhood on the East side of Bristol. I've been with the organization for the past three months, coming in three days a week to help with their grant writing and project reporting. Fatima has been with the organization for the past three years as their Policy and Logistics Officer. No one else is in and as usual Fatima and myself are talking away. Today, it's about her immigrating to the UK ten year ago.

"No, I mean it. Really!" Fatima excitedly yells back. " I mean before I came here I was Kenyan, I was African. I did not see myself as black. Why would I? Everyone around me is black. I saw myself as a Muslim, as a Kenyan, as a Somali Kenyan. But I would never say I was black."

"Ok… explain this to me," I say with a smile.

And explain Fatima did, in her lively way with hands flailing and smiles abounding. Over the course of the conversation Fatima described her first job in the UK – working at a warehouse in London at night while going to university in the day. While at this job Fatima began to notice that the white British workers and the black African-Caribbean workers did not talk to one another saying, "Anytime I talked to Nancy, this white woman, my two Jamaican friends would get mad at me, asking me why I was talking to them." Fatima went on to say she didn't get what the problem was until one day her two Jamaican friends "broke it down" for her.

"Well, what exactly did they break down?" I ask.

Fatima replies, "That we were black and that the white workers didn't have our same interests. And at first I thought they were crazy, but over time I began to see it. We were treated differently. I mean they even had separate break rooms for white workers and black workers. Not that they were assigned, but all the white people took their breaks together in one room and the black people in another room. I thought it was strange and I just didn't get it. But, over time I realized in this country I was black." Laughing she adds, "And now that I work here I think I have become more militant over the years because I can actually now see how racism operates. Crazy I tell you. I come to the UK from Africa, a black continent, and only then I not only discover that I am black, but I finally understand what racism is."

In this vignette Fatima's "awakening" to her blackness in the UK illustrates the ways race as a classification mechanism affects individual perceptions of self and Other. Race is a complex concept that challenges individual assumptions and provides a lens through which to "see" the world, or what Smedley (1999) calls a "racial worldview." In this context race is an ordering system that separates global populations into biological discrete and restricted groups.

Smedley's use of the term "worldview" illustrates the ingrained and subconscious imagery and thoughts the concept of race generates within a society. Fatima, over time, began to see this racial ordering in the UK and eventually incorporated it into her everyday understandings of herself in relation to those around her.

The ordering of this type of racial system is time and place dependent. Smedley (1999) situates her discussion of the "racial worldview" within North America, tackling the development, legacy, impact and influence of race on this landscape. Yet, as the opening vignette illustrates, race and the construction of a "racial worldview," is not limited to the shores of North America. In the British context this "racial worldview" takes on a different form, influenced by a specific socio-historical context and immigration history that I will consider in Chapter 3.

Race is a concept that matters (Alexander and Knowles 2005; West 2001). Race is an organic evolving concept deeply enmeshed within various socio-political institutions and ideologies (Smedley 1999). The various ways race matters emerge in studies focused on identity, gender, sexuality, nationalism, postcolonial studies, immigration and migration, and globalization (to name a few), illustrating the importance and influence of race as a concept (see Ali 2003; Bhabha 1997; Brodkin 2000; Castle and Miller 2003; Hall 1998; Omi and Winant 1994; Rattansi 2004; Solomos 2003; Stoler 1995).

By referring to race as a social construct I do not want to diminish its power and influence on social, political and economic institutions within a society. To the contrary, I agree with both Omi and Winant (1994) and Sturm (2002) when they argue the social construction of race in the West is a tool used to define difference, justify socio-political inequality and symbolize social conflicts and interests that rely on phenotypic variations. That is, race is used

to describe and inscribe difference and distinctions between people (Hartigan 2005). I situate my discussion of race within a Western context, which Harrison (1995) asserts has imbedded within it a racial hierarchy, premised on an ideology of whiteness into which particular individuals and groups are placed. That placement is in part politically motivated as a means to define who does and does not belong within a society.

To explain why race has such "staying power" in the West, and illustrate why I consider race to be a central line of enquiry for this dissertation, I start with a brief background on the historical creation of race in the West. I draw on the interconnected beginnings of the dominance of science in Western society and the prevalence of race as a defining marker of difference in various forms (ethnicity, culture, Other). I want to note that this history is not a linear one to tell – one event did not beget another. Instead different social events occurred at various times in various locations in the West that have intersected to create, maintain and give validity to the concept we call race.

Modern Beginnings

Race is a socio-political and historical concept that relies on biological terms and reasoning as a source of validity. A concept dependent on time and place, race is a discourse with multiple manifestations, articulations, and definitions. Within the discipline of anthropology the concept of race has a firm historical and contemporary hold. Anthropology's early years were predicated on scientifically perpetuating the idea of human races. Harrison (1995) points out that pseudo-scientific analysis mixed with socio-political agendas and prejudices define anthropology's early attempts at classifying human populations into discrete static races. In the present day most anthropologist would assert that race is a socially constructed concept with no biological validity. Others dismiss the concept all together, saying

races do not exist. Yet, the social, political and economic impact of race calls for a critical engagement with the concept at local, national and international levels.

Most scholars agree that that the concept of race is a modern idea created in the European mind at the end of colonial expansion as a way to describe and classify newly "discovered" populations (Brace 2005; Graves 2002; Smedley 1999; Wheeler 2000). Yet, dispute arises over understanding *why* Europeans made the invention (Boxill 2001). Was race created to justify the enslavement of Africans or was it invented beforehand to explain physical differences between European explorers and people they met in their travels and then later applied to the institution of slavery? Whichever position one takes on the debate the facts remain. Race was a vital and key concept used in European expansion and subsequent colonization of the New World, Africa, and Asia (Lieberman and Reynolds 1996); helped justify and continue the transatlantic African slave trade (Blakey 1999); aided in the rise of capitalism (Brodkin 2000); and was interlinked in scientific discoveries and advancements (Baker 1998) that all led to the classification, ranking, and belief in human populations as distinct races.

From the Middle Ages up until the 1700s religion and language were the most important criteria of identity in Europe (Smedley and Smedley 2005; Wheeler 2000). Spanish, French, and British colonizers initially categorized native peoples encountered in both the New and Old World as "savages" and "heathens" due to their unfamiliar religious and linguistic traditions (Brace 2005; Graves 2002). The colonial objectives of the Spanish and French were to convert and civilize Native North and South Americans to European ways (Smedley 1999). But for the British, building a strong empire and not conversion of native populations, was their priority. The British saw, and wanted to maintain, a clear distinction between themselves and others. Although historians debate over how "British" was defined, and how that changed over time,

many agree that this distinction first took place with the colonization of the "barbaric," "uncivilized," "Catholic" Irish in the early 1600s and continued with colonial ventures in the New World and India (Colley 1992; Wheeler 2000).

Wheeler (2000) argues these initial conceptions of "us" versus "them" had less to do with skin color and more to do with religious, linguistic and cultural differences observed by Europeans. Or as Rattansi (2007) says, "European colonizers saw not the cultures of the colonized as they were, but as they *expected* them to be" (emphasis mine: 21). In that expectation, notions of "the European nightmares of monsters and wild tribes, heathens, and those of impure blood" came to light, signaling the inception of race and racial aggression into the modern era. In this perception lies what Rattansi (2007) calls a "constitutive duality and ambivalence" (21) inherent within notions of race and racism that remain: notions like primitive vs. civilized, black vs. white, light vs. dark, human vs. inhuman. Dualistic notions and preconceptions pervaded throughout racial and racist thinking, shifting in language depending on socio-political landscape and time. Over time religious and cultural differences transformed into racial distinctions. This occurred once European explorations turned into colonial and imperial conquests. The economic and political interests of the transatlantic slave trade and colonial trading of goods from colonial outposts fueled these colonial and imperial conquests (Smedley 1999).

The impact of colonialism on our understandings of race and culture is immense (Back and Solomos 2009). The transatlantic slave trade began in the late 1400s with the Portuguese leading in the capture and selling of African slaves to the European and American market. The principles of supply and demand led to an increase in the sale of African bodies in the New World, from the 1500s up until the beginning of the 1800s. Europeans believed Africans were

well suited for agricultural work in hot climates, because of their skin color, proximity to the equator, and physical stature (Graves 2002). The vast amount of money generated from the slave trade for colonizers and slave traders, along with the cheap labor source it provided for plantations in the New World, gave incentive for the continuation of the brutal enterprise. But, how could one justify enslaving another human being? If, as religious doctrine teaches, humans are all made in God's image then how can one population subjugate another? Would not the act of enslavement, especially amongst those who converted to Christianity, be an abomination under God? Simply put, to allow both the continuation of the slave trade and colonization non-European populations had to be viewed as inferior, or subhuman, to the European oppressor. As colonization and the slave trade began to thrive in the 1700s "scientific" investigations of human difference began in Europe.

Colonial rhetoric took on a racialized tone as eighteenth century naturalists intertwined religious doctrine with supposed scientific studies (Graves 2002). Early naturalist adhered to "The Great Chain of Being" (the idea that all creatures are organized in a hierarchical manner with inanimate objects at the bottom and God at the top) in their theoretical writings (Brace 2005). Linnaeus, Buffon, and Camper were all famous naturalists who incorporated popular religious dogma into their scientific classification schemes.

Polygenism was a focal aspect to naturalist's conception of races (Brace 2005). From this perspective, different races of humans were primordially distinct and aboriginally adapted to specific geographic environments (Stocking 1994). Within this perspective native peoples of non-European origin became subhuman. The classifications purposed by naturalists like Linnaeus and Buffon served the purpose of supporting and legitimating European rule over non-European populations (Graves 2002; Smedley 1999). By the end of the 1700s this new scientific

discourse became the glue that bound together colonialism, slavery, and capitalist ventures, producing the beginnings of a cohesive ideology of race, or what Smedley (1999) terms the "racial worldview."

By the start of the 1800s Europe had experienced immense social, political, and economic changes, which would in turn shape the dominant Western "racial worldview." Fueled by the French Revolution, in the 1700s ideals of rationality and scientific rigor began to circulate throughout Europe, replacing religious and philosophical doctrines in Europe and the United States (Baker 1998; Brace 2005). The European Enlightenment placed emphasis on scientific rationality over that of religious "superstition," which paved the way for scientific classifications of human populations. These earlier classifications soon transitioned in the 1800s to scientific race studies. The taxonomic descriptions Linnaeus used to define human populations reveals more about "how Europeans understood their relationship with those groups than about these group's 'natural' character" (Blakey 1999:31).

Yet, many of these initial "scientific" studies passed subjective characteristics off as objective behavioral traits (Blakey 1999), rooted in a supposed biological framework. This biological determinism, the belief that biology determines cultural differences, gained popularity throughout the 1800s amongst scientists and social scientists in their attempts to explain physical and cultural differences between populations (Caspari 2003; Gould 1996). Blood was the main medium through which races were created, maintained, and passed on (Gould 1996, Stocking 1994). This racial worldview conflated biology with culture, mixing evolutionary ideas with pre-Darwinian naturalist thought. In popular and scientific rhetoric race was understood as primordial, rooted in an evolutionary past, passed down through the generations (Stocking 1994).

In examining the history of the concept of race one is struck by the way phenotypic traits like skin color and facial features are intertwined with notions of class, gender, sexuality, masculinity and femininity, nationalism, religion, and mental illness (Rattansi 2007). According to Back and Solomos (2009), in the Victorian era imperial expansion into Africa and India greatly shaped British views of race. It was during this time Empire became a central aspect of British society and culture. Since Victorians had no personal contact with colonized peoples their opinions were formed about them through the popular press and literature. By the end of the 1800s into the early 1900s the links between colonialism and racism in Britain grew in the articulation of nationalism and patriotism as the defining aspects of Britishness and Englishness (Back and Solomos 2009). Said (1979) reminds us that Europeans imagined the Orient as a means to understand, represent, and define "Europeaness." Just as the Orient came to signify a system of representations framed by political forces that brought the Orient into Western thought, racial classification became a systematic means to define and distinguish the British from its colonized populations.

According to Smedley (1999) by the end of the 1800s the racial worldview was in order, placing Western European ancestry and appearance above all others, with the black body signifying all that was *not* acceptable within society. Smedley goes on to maintain that those conquered in the New World, and other "colored people" around the world, did not participate in the invention of race or race classification. Instead it was imposed upon themselves and others by the dominant European powers of the time. Freedom of personal racial identity was not a reality because race was forced onto black and brown bodies, making race classification a powerful tool of subjugation.

While exploration, colonization, slavery, capitalism, imperialism and Western science all informed this racial worldview, these processes also contributed to the building of the modern nation-state. It is this process that I turn to next as a way to understand the interlinked histories and formations of race and the nation-state. In doing so I intend to show that in order to conceptualize race historically and in the modern moment it is necessary to take into consideration the nation-state and nationalism. How does national identity inform spatial and temporal discussions of race? In what ways are nations raced? Who does the racing and how does this change over time?

The Nation State, Race and Blood

Benedict Anderson (1981) argues that the rise of nationalism coincides with the emergence of capitalism, technological advancement though print media, and the spread of vernacular language. These basic ingredients produce "imagined political communities" that allow individuals within a bounded geographic space to feel an affinity to one another even if they never met. To create this affinity a nation needs to tell its own story, use its own materials, and produce its own styles which appeal to the inhabitants within that bounded space (Anderson 1981; Spencer and Wollman 2005).

What are these stories, materials and styles and who produces them? When trying to define national identities many features used to identify nations are the same features used to identify ethnic groups (Spencer and Wollman 2005). Barth (1969) contends that ethnic groups and identities are created and maintained across geographical boundaries because of the need to dichotomize between members and outsiders. According to Barth, ethnic identity, in poly-ethnic societies, supersedes all identities. The existence and maintenance of ethnicity will depend on how well an individual's ethnic identity conforms to the social reality he or she faces.

In this assessment Barth neglects to consider how power and domination play into initial creations and recreations of acceptable ethnic identities. Barth also neglects the similarities between ethnic identity and national identity, and how the two identities interact with one another. The nation is both a racialized and ethnicized construct (Spencer and Wollman 2005). According to Harrison (1995), when ethnicity is used, in favor of race, culture tends to be the dominant discourse invoked within public discourse of Otherness that essentializes difference and redefines race.

In no way am I suggesting that race takes precedence over ethnicity, or that studies of ethnicity and ethnic group formation are in vain. But, there is a difference between the voluntary and symbolic ethnic identification of whites, and the more social exclusionary aspects of racialized identities and social locations (Harrison 1999). This difference in imposed identification illustrates the impact race thinking has on ethnic and nation group formation, both publically and privately. The ways in which individuals and groups become "raced" or "ethnicized," indicates the ways in which those groups are viewed by the state in the public sphere, which then influences (and conversely is influenced by) national identity. This labeling informs rhetoric around the rights of belonging within that nation-state and amongst its racial and ethnic populations. To neglect these processes creates a gap in the realization of how the concept of race changes to fit current demographic, geographic, political, economic and social situations. Therefore "depending on the context, one dimension (of race) may modify or take precedence over the other" (Harrison 1995:48). For example, Fatima is seen as "Kenyan" in Africa but "black" in the UK.

Spencer and Wollman (2005) contend that in practice nationalism is racialized and difference essentialized through supposed biological and cultural differences. The medium

through which nations tend to view these biological and/or cultural differences is blood. Barzun (1965) argues that belief in bloodlines led to the conception of races in Europe. Focusing on the construction of race-thinking in France and Germany, he contends the creation of the historical past in Europe after the Middle Ages into the Age of Romanticism and Nationalism brought about the Nordic myth and racial beginnings. Through supposed "pure" bloodlines the Aryan race was created. Williams (1994) and Sturm (2002) also trace the intersections of race and nation through the idea of blood. Williams (1994) presents a theoretical argument on discourses of nation-state formation. She argues that these discourses produce ideologies that conflate race, culture and class, producing ideas that cultural differences are located internally - in the blood. Sturm's 2002 ethnography *Blood Politics: Race, Culture and Identity in the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma* presents a similar argument. Sturm (2002) argues that essentially all nations have some type(s) of normative racial ideologies that homogenize cultural diversity and influence larger discourses of belonging. Within the Cherokee nation Cherokee and American racial ideologies and national identities articulate with one another to produce a complicated racialized Cherokee nation within the racialized nation of the US.

Race then is one ideological underpinning of the nation. Belief in the idea of race is not solely a personal choice, but rather it is an ideology rooted in social institutions and practices that help create and perpetuate, within structures of power, racial oppression and discrimination (Omi and Winant 1994; Rattansi 2007). Although race is only one aspect of human representation, it is still a dominant player in the way the social world is structured and represented (Omi and Winant 1994). However, racialized individuals are not solely passive actors with little to no agency. Race is still a contested idea that is constantly challenged, defined, redefined, neglected, and remade within the realm of civil society by various actors. Though race is premised on

ideological domination, resistance to this domination is not a separate entity. Instead, ideological domination and resistance interlace with one another and with socio-economic and political conditions of lived experience (Sturm 2002). To examine the dynamics of structure and agency in the construction of race I turn now to the work of Italian theorist Antonio Gramsci. I use his concepts of "hegemony," "contradictory consciousness," and "counterhegemonic resistance" and situate them within the larger debate of the impact of race on rights of citizenship.

RACIAL HEGEMONIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Gramsci (2005) argues that the dominant elites within a society maintain their power through coercion and consent. Coercion is in the form of force, but most ruling bodies cannot maintain power through force alone. Instead, these bodies must win rule of order through consent from the masses. This consent occurs by the ruling power incorporating some interests of the subordinated classes into their agenda while still maintaining power within a society. This is Gramsci's notion of hegemony – the uncritical and unconscious absorption of ideologies and notions of the world that becomes "common sense." Therefore, hegemony is a way to understand the relationship between dominant and subordinate classes within a society (Davis 2004).

The modern nation state is a racial conception embedded with racial ideology. This racial gaze will influence the ways individuals consciously and subconsciously think about one another and about ones self. For Omi and Winant (1994) this is their theory of racial formation in the US: "the sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, transformed, and destroyed" (55). Racial formation occurs through racial projects – hegemonic interpretations of racial dynamics connected with distribution of resources along racial lines. At the everyday level these racial projects become "common sense" as individuals utilize race to

classify and identify themselves and others around them. Racial projects mediate between the discursive means in which race is identified and signified, on one hand, and the institutional and organizational forms in which it is routinized and standardized on the other. But, Omi and Winant (1994) argue that not all racial projects are racist. A racial project can be labelled racist only if essentialist categories of race are used to reproduce structures of social domination. Racism is therefore both structural and ideological. Opposition to such forces necessitates a consciousness about race while also challenging the common sense rule of race within society.

Omi and Winant's (1994) concept of racial hegemony is a sound and useful theory to explain the creation and perseverance of hegemonic notions of race within the US that is transferable to the racialized state of the UK. Specifically, I will use this concept to frame the historical discussion of racial formation within Britain post-1945 in Chapter 3. However, Sturm (2002) argues the theory of racial formation neglects the place of contradictory consciousness and counterhegemonic resistance within the discussion of racial hegemony and racial projects. According to Gramsci (2005), every person has two consciousness, or one contradictory consciousness: one side is counterhegemonic "good sense" and is implicit, based on shared lived experience while the other side is hegemonic "common sense" as it is inherited and uncritically absorbed, influenced by larger ideological discourse from the dominant class. Resistance to hegemonic rule is possible because hegemony is unstable and therefore must constantly be won and re-won by the ruling power. It is the contradictory nature of consciousness that makes hegemony unstable, incomplete and messy, which allows for the possibility of counterhegemonic resistance. (Gramsci 2005; Sturm 2002).

Since hegemony is achieved through consent, this control is exercised primarily in the sphere of civil society where consensus is created. For Gramsci (2005), civil society is located

within society's superstructure – its institutions, forms of consciousness and political and cultural practices (Williams 1978). This superstructure consists of two levels, that of civil society and political society. Although Gramsci (2005) did not formulate a single thesis on "civil society" or the "State," his most concise expression of both concepts appears in the form of an equation: "one might say that the State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armor of coercion" (263). Civil society then is the arena where prevailing hegemony in the modern state is reinforced. But it is also in the arena of civil society that hegemony can be truly contested. Gramsci conceived of civil society as a creative space where subordinate, or what he called subaltern, groups could unite and engage in counterhegemonic resistance as a way to alter society. Essentially, where there is hegemony there is the possibility of resistance because both are dialectical movements that reciprocally shape one another (Davis 2004).

This conception of civil society by Gramsci was designed as a strategy to hinder the coercive nature of the state and allow subaltern groups to gain political power. In doing so subaltern groups can create conditions that could allow for a society where no individuals or groups are subjugated (Anderson 1976). For subaltern groups to generate hegemonic change these groups need to assume leadership within the cultural sphere. Leadership is achieved through intellectual elaboration, education on a mass scale and systematic organization. These activities are only possible within the realm of civil society.

To allow for hegemonic change, subaltern groups need to create a coalition that bridges the differences between and among groups disadvantaged by larger forces within society at a specific historic moment, or what Gramsci (2005) calls the creation of a counterhegemonic "historic bloc" (322-25). Next, there needs to be a development of a shared counterhegemonic

ideology amongst the subordinated class. Finally, the elements of counterhegemonic historic bloc need to take action and become agents of hegemonic change. But, this action is not a full-on assault of the hegemonic structure. Instead, Gramsci envisioned counterhegemonic action as a "war of position" where there is a prolonged intellectual and political struggle at numerous levels of the social order that slowly builds the social foundations for a new regime to emerge (Rupert 1993).

According to Gramsci (2005), in order for the subordinated class to create and sustain successful counter hegemony the class must develop from within its ranks their own intellectuals. Gramsci believed all men are intellectuals, but not all are intellectuals by social function. There are two types of intellectual within society, the traditional and the organic. Where the traditional intellectual is rooted in past and present class relations and historic class formations, the organic intellectual is the "thinking and organizing element of a particular fundamental social class" (Gramsci 2005: 3). Organic intellectuals are distinguished by their function as representatives for their class interests. These intellectuals recognize their place within the dominant ideology and understand their function in perpetuating that ideology. They use their position to help formulate for their community a consciousness that all can share. The organic intellectual needs to come from within the subordinated group and act as the intermediary between their class and the dominant group, helping along the way to achieve a counterhegemonic resistance in the realm of civil society. Through the generation of organic intellectuals it should be possible for a class to advance to a position of power and influence (Davis 2004).

Omi and Winant (1994) engage with this aspect of Gramsci's work when they speak about the development of racial movements in the US. The authors contend that within a racial

state, the creation of racial movements occurs when intellectuals lead political interventions that challenge dominant racial ideology. Groups are created along specific racial identity lines, which creates a collective identity and subjectivity by offering these heterogeneous groups a different view of themselves and the world around them. These social movements and new collective identities demand change within society, moving away from the violence of racism and oppression in favor of recognition and legitimacy in the social, political and economic structures of that state.

Miles and Torres (1999) argue that Omi and Winant's (1994) stance on race and racial formation is an example of the problem of the US academy trying to racialize the world. As a US researcher examining issues of race and access to citizenship I could be accused of doing the same. While the statement may have some truth (as race and racism are especially ingrained aspects of US society and make their way into larger discussions of US social, political and economic structures), Miles and Torres replace race with an over reliance of class and class analysis to explain systems of domination and power within the UK. This can also be seen as a reluctance to address the different ways in which race, racism, and race-making have manifested themselves within the British context, especially post 1945. This, along with the subsequent immigration and legislative laws enacted by various political parties will be explored in more depth in Chapter 3.

I use Gramsci's framework to explore two aspects of racial hegemony within British society: the ways in which race is a "common sense" discourse amongst everyday citizens; and how racialized actors use the creative space of civil society to formulate counterhegemonic resistance against these common sense discourses. However, there are limitations to Gramsci's work when applied to modern understandings of civil society. While Gramsci understood civil

society to be a creative space in a society where resistance to hegemonic rule can occur, he neglected to take into account the influence and power the State may have over this creative space. In the modern formation and use of civil society the State, as a coercive power, has integrated, influenced and incorporated various aspects of civil society under its control. This is readily seen in New Labour's involvement and use of the Third Sector during their time in office between 1997 and 2010 – I will expand on this further in Chapter 5. But, to take into account the ways hegemonic notions of race integrate into civil society I need to understand how racialized actors both resist and incorporate the concept of race into their "common sense" understandings of race and nation. Therefore, I expand on Gramsci's concepts by integrating T.H. Marshall's (1998) three-part understanding of citizenship with W.E.B Du Bois' (1995) concept of "double consciousness." In doing so I examine the contradictory nature of access to citizenship within racialized nations in the realm of civil society, or what I call "racialized citizenship."

Racialized Citizenship

Membership within a nation-state is granted through citizenship. Rights of citizenship are supposed to give equality to all who gain such membership. Yet, formal equality does not necessarily lead to equality in practice. Marshall (1998) illustrates this point with his socio-evolutionary depiction of the development of civil, political and social citizenship in Britain from the eighteenth-century to post WWII. According to Marshall, citizenship is the architect of social inequality due to a lack of access to those rights in the law, through politics, and in the social realm for different social classes in society. For analytical purposes Marshall divides citizenship into three components - civil, political and social. Marshall uses these concepts as a way to illustrate the various socio-political and economic process that occurred in Britain which granted the working class certain rights while denying them others because of their class.

Marshall (1998) defines "civil citizenship" as rights needed for personal freedom; "political citizenship" as the right to participate in the political process either as a member of a political party or as the elector of that body; and "social citizenship" as the whole range of rights, from social and economic welfare and shared heritage to the right to live a life in accordance to the standards within a society. Tracing a history of the concept of Western citizenship that at first combined then separated and then combined again these three elements, Marshall illustrates the contention between the equality aspects of citizenship and the inequality inherent within capitalism. The two concepts arose at the same time, impeding on the social aspect of citizenship. This only gave full equality of citizenship to selected groups at specific times in history. One is only a full citizen when one posses the rights of all three types of citizenship. For Marshall, the ability to possess all three types is linked to ones social class. Critics of Marshall contend his historical account is narrowly defined, to evolutionary and conservative in its historical developments and only pertains to white working class men, neglecting the role of women and minorities in accessing citizenship (Turner 1990). However, although Marshall is focused on the position of the male white working class in this article, the basic premise of the social stratification inbuilt within democratic citizenship is just as relevant in today's environment as it was at the time Marshall was writing.

Marshall conceived of citizenship as a contract between the state and its citizens, where the state guarantees certain rights and the citizen has a duty to obey laws and pay taxes. As Meer (2010) points out this classic approach "upholds the promise of formal equality while passing over the sources of inequality that require an account of cultural differences" (11). Nonetheless, this liberal conception of citizenship viewed the state as the embodiment of social democracy, expressed through universal citizenship. Citizenship takes a legal form and "operates socially

through the reciprocal balance of rights and responsibilities that confer upon its bearers a civic status that affords those bearers equal opportunity, dignity, and confidence" (Meer 2010: 8). Within the construction of a citizen lies a "dialectical tension between notions of exclusion and inclusion" (Meer 2010:9). Even though citizenship has an inherent democratic undertone, the criteria for that citizenship may not be open to all, especially when race and racism underpins the national identity of a nation-state.

W.E.B. Du Bois was one of the first scholars to understand the relationship between race and nation. In *The Souls of Black Folks* Du Bois (1995) introduced the concept of "double consciousness" as a way to explain the dialectical relationship between national identity and race. For Du Bois "doubleness" represented his contentious status as both an American and a Negro. I use Du Bois' own words to express this tension.

> "the Negro is…born with a veil, a gift with a second sight in this American world - a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's souls by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness – an American, a Negro: two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder." (Du Bois 1995: 45).

In this passage Du Bois brought to light the inherent racial nature of the nation and national identity. Through birth Du Bois was "American," a citizen with certain rights and obligations. However, Du Bois' "negroness" negated those rights, his dark body somehow incompatible with American identity. Du Bois (1995) did not want to become white in order to be accepted in society as American, but rather he wanted the possibility to be both American and Negro. In this context to be American has connotations of being composed of racial subjects, and within that racialized nation, the American Negro did not fit into this imagined community.

Double consciousness is a complex dance between the segregating conditions of racialized social structures and the psychological and cultural strategies used by racial groups to understand and resist against racial discrimination (Goldberg and Essed 2002). In Du Bois (1995) "strivings" to be both American and Negro he did not want to give in to a unitary identity, but rather he wanted to embrace this doubleness without societal abuse and lack of access to rights and opportunities afforded to his white countrymen. Du Bois' racial identity, one that is imposed upon him, does not coincide with the national identity of America with its own racial and ethnic undertones, leaving him with a double consciousness that he hopes will one day transcend this duality.

The concept of doubleness does not stop at the American context but rather extends to the present day as racialized and ethnicized populations negotiate their place within different nations around the world during this age of migration (Castles and Miller 2003), multiculturalism and the racalization of religious groups (Meer 2010; Moddod 2007), and post-imperial melancholia (Gilroy 2004, Goulbourne 2009). In the British context the renegotiation of British national identity post-1945 resulted from the large influx of Commonwealth immigration, incorporating a distinct racial and ethnic overtone not seen before 1945. I will expand this concept in more depth in Chapter 3.

Du Bois (1940) argued that racial identification is created through the experience of racial discrimination, or racism. For Du Bois, kinship for African-Americans was defined through the experience and history of slavery rather than through blood. Visweswaran (1998) expands on this notion referencing specific historic acts of discrimination enacted against different racialized groups. Through the experience of that discrimination social racial groups were created. According to Visweswaran (1998) African-Americans experienced slavery;

Native Americans genocide and placement on reservations; Asian-Americans shared a history of legal exclusion and relocation; and for those from various Hispanic backgrounds conquest and subjugation "created" Puerto Ricans and Chicanos as races. Hartigan (2005) argues that Visweswaran's approach runs the risk of reproducing racial thinking and leads to an assumption that all groups who have suffered ill treatment should be recognized as "races." Yet, in social and political settings lived experiences do help constitute racialized groups. In the US and the UK socially defined racial and ethnic minority groups have formed political alliances due to shared experiences of racism perpetrated against them by the state (Goulbourne 1998; West 1993).

Du Bois (1995) spoke openly of the experience of racism in *The Souls of Black Folks,* best exemplified with his oft-quoted question of "How does it feel to be a problem?" Specifically, the problem was his skin color and what that skin color invoked in the social world Du Bois inhabited. Generally the problem was racism, in all of its brutal forms – physical, psychological, emotional, spiritual, social. Du Bois recounted his awakening to his difference, his "problem," as a schoolchild when a white female classmate refused his valentine card. In this encounter he found himself shut out from their world through a "veil." But, Du Bois did not want to tear that veil of racial difference down because he used it as a form of motivation and contempt to overcome this lived discrimination.

Fanon's 1967 "psychoanalytical interpretation of the black problem" in *Black Skin, White Mask,* presents the "facts" of inherent racism within society where he claims the double process of economics and epidermalizaton affects the acceptance of blackness within white society. In his analysis Fanon, through a clinical study of the black man, illustrates the brutality and psychological damage of racism. In his "corporeal scheme" Fanon (1967) gained implicit

knowledge that his skin color is a "corporeal malediction" (111). Below this corporeal scheme Fanon sketches a "historico-racial schema," outlining the conditions of racism and racial identity formation that are both placed upon him and that he reacts to (Fanon 1967:111). Similar to Du Bois' account of his awakening to his "difference," Fanon recounts a little girl yelling "Look a Negro," and the subsequent interactions in which his "Negroness" was on display for others to comment on and judge him for (112-115). It is in those interactions where race is inscribed onto the body, and through which racial discrimination limits full access of rights within society through systems of domination and subordination, due to perceived physical and cultural differences. Economic, political and social power is used, and allows for, the continual exploitation and/or exclusion of targeted groups (Castles and Miller 2003).

CONCLUSION

In the opening narrative Fatima spoke about her "revelation" of becoming/being black. In her home country of Kenya Fatima saw herself as Somali-Kenyan, and assumed others around her did as well. Her "fact of blackness" only emerged once she reached the shores of the UK and worked in an environment where others placed blackness upon her as a defining marker of her social identity – thus she became a racial, not ethnic, subject. Back and Solomos (2009) remind us that one must situate race and racism in specific moments, and within these moments one can see the various kinds of racialized identities formed within those contexts. In Fatima's case working in a warehouse in London with other co-workers who understood themselves and others through a racial lens helped form, over time, her own "black identity" that sits alongside (and sometimes replaces) her Somali-Kenyan roots. Speaking further with Fatima on the matter of her "becoming black" she said she figured her "dark skin," "African heritage," and "Somali looks" played a large part in others seeing her as "black." This dominant sociodiscursive scheme

associates phenotypic traits and cultural traits with racial categories, allowing for the continuation of racial projects within British society.

Yet, racialized actors are not passive recipients of racial hegemonic discourses. Although race is a "common sense" way of seeing the world I read Gramsci's notion of contradictory consciousness as allowing for the possibility of resistance by racialized subordinated groups. It is within the creative space of civil society that this resistance can take place over a long period of time. Although Fatima "became black" once she entered the UK, uncritically absorbing larger discourses of race, she also said it was through "seeing" race in this way that she understood the processes of racism within her home country. As Gramsci (2005) argues, one must be conscious of hegemony in order to resist against it. Or, the messiness of hegemony allows for counterhegemonic resistance to occur.

I use Harrison's (1995) and Smedley's (1999) assertions that the Western "racial worldview" is embedded within a discourse of white supremacy alongside Gramsci's (2005) notions of hegemony and counterhegemonic resistance. Race is hegemonic in the ways it is a "common sense" discourse used as a political tool to distinguish between populations based on arbitrary phenotypic and cultural traits and distributes resources within a society (Omi and Winant 1994). While ideas of race are "uncritically absorbed" they are still powerful concepts that allow for the continuation of inequality within a nation-state. According to Du Bois (1995), Fanon (1967) and Marshall (1998) this inequality manifests in the lack of access to civil, political and social rights of citizenship. Due to the contradictory nature of race and the unstableness of the definition within society counterhegemonic resistance can occur once a group of individuals under the same struggle come together to overturn that system. This process is a slow one, but it can be accomplish with strong "organic intellectuals" operating within the realm of civil society.

In the next chapter I situate these processes through the introduction of my ethnographic settings and methods.

CHAPTER 2: LOCALIZING RACE AND CITIZENSHIP IN BRITAIN: SETTINGS AND METHODS

> In anthropology, or anyway social anthropology, what the practioners do is ethnography
>
> Clifford Geertz

THE "THICK DESCRIPTION"

Clifford Geertz (1973) defines ethnography as the intellectual effort of "thick description" - describing in detail the context and methodology behind research conducted by an anthropologist. In this chapter I present the setting of my research and the methods I used to address my research questions. I conducted a historic analysis of immigration laws in Britain post-1945, participant observations within a Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) voluntary and community regional organization, and interviews with British citizens of different racial/ethnic identities in Bristol, England. I used this data to examine the ways racialized actors within British society access their rights of citizenship in the realm of civil society. Through participant observations I captured the everyday interactions and narratives between and amongst various BME Voluntary and Community Organizations (VCOs) leaders in Southwest England. The one-on-one interviews provide insights into "everyday" perspectives of race and citizenship. Interpreting this data through an anthropological lens I address three research questions: How do racialized and ethnicized actors in Britain take part in constructing and accessing their rights of citizenship within civil society? What is the nature of British racialized citizenship that is made available to individuals and organisations that represent racial and ethnic communities? What are the narratives used by individuals, BME groups and the state to negotiate issues of race and racism within the boundaries of citizenship?

Bristol

Bristol is a port city in the Southwest of England. A large metropolitan city with 551,066 people, Bristol is England's sixth most populous city. According to 2005 estimates, Bristol's population is 89.3% white, 3.9% Asian or Asian British, 2.8% black or black British, 2.2% 'mixed race,' 1.2% Chinese, and 0.6% other. This is similar to national averages in England for the same groups, which are 89.1%, 5.3%, 2.7%, 1.6%, 0.7%, and 0.6% respectively (National Statistics 2007). Because Bristol has a demographic profile that is reflective of England's diversity, it provided an ideal location for this study.

Historically, Bristol was a major trading and slaving port for the British Empire in the eighteenth-century. Slave produced goods like sugar, tobacco, rum and cocoa were large commodities merchants and traders brought into the country via Bristol. Although the slave trade was a minor part of Bristol's export trade, the city was Britain's second largest slaving port during the 1700s (Dressler and Fleming 2007). As the Atlantic slave trade economy declined in the late 1800s, other industries emerged to keep the city alive – namely architecture and aerospace in the early 1900s and the revival of the harbourside in the 1970s and 80s as a cultural center point of the city.

Ethnically and racially few people from Bristol came from beyond the British Isles before the 1940s. According to Dressler and Fleming (2007), class and not color was the defining social marker that mattered to Bristolians during the inter-war periods. But, in the 1950s and 1960s immigration from the Commonwealth began to impact Bristol, just as it was throughout different cities in the country. Most non-white immigrants during this time came from the Caribbean. In subsequent years, immigration from the Indian-sub continent, Hong Kong, Africa and Eastern Europe increased the diversity throughout the country and within Bristol. In Bristol,

many African-Caribbean's, Asians, and later Africans faced "rejection" and discrimination from the majority (Dressler and Fleming 2007:140). In particular, harassment from the police and a lack of access to public services and resources for these groups led to the development of local grassroots organizations within these different communities to meet their needs.

In 1967, the National Advisory Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants (NACCI) created a guidance that recommended the formation of local groups to promote good relations between ethnic minority groups[2]. In response to this guidance, Bristol established the Voluntary Liaison Committee, although who exactly created the committee and under what circumstances is not entirely clear (Dressler and Fleming 2007). Over the years the name of the committee changed from The Community of Relations Council in 1971 to the Bristol Council for Racial Equality in 1978 to finally the Bristol Racial Equality Council in 1991. But, until its end in 2005 this committee served as the only civic forum open to a number of different public bodies, the city council and representatives from different ethnic minority organizations to engage with one another over issues affecting these groups in the city.

Yet, this committee did little to ease the racial tensions within the city during the 1970s and 80s that escalated due to increasing layoffs in key industries in the city and mounting anti-immigration sentiments. Immigration was a key issue of the 1979 general election. Both political parties thought limiting immigration would help create good race relations within the country. Dressler and Fleming (2007) argue that Margret Thatcher's hard line stance on immigration and race relations trickled down to the local level and created a social environment where those from the Caribbean and the Indian sub-continent felt under siege.

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[2] Refer to Chapter 3 for the discussion on the creation and role of NACCI within race relations issues and politics in the UK.

Under this hostile environment, political party rhetoric and the media subsumed all non-white immigrants under the label of "black and ethnic minority." Due to the shared experience of racial discrimination and a lack of access to public services and resources, the term "BME" helped foster a sense of solidarity between the Caribbean and South Asian representative groups on the Community Relations Council. Throughout the 1980s race relations in Bristol took on a politicized tone as a series of "uprisings" occurred between the police and mainly black and Asian youths throughout different racial and ethnic neighborhoods in the city. Slowly, over time local authorities began to respond to issues of racial discrimination within Bristol. However, many within these communities still saw the lack of available resources to them a problem and held little trust in public institutions (Dressler and Fleming 2007).

By the 1990s as the second and third generation of people born in Britain from parents of the new Commonwealth grew the term "immigrant" was replaced by "ethnic minority" in public and political language. Within the city, issues of racial discrimination and harassment against black and Asian people in central Bristol, along with others living on council estates outside the center, single mothers with mixed-race children, and asylum seekers and refugees continued to be a problem (Dressler and Fleming 2007). Local authority bodies were slow to react to the discrimination, thus the need for local Black and Minority Ethnic voluntary and community organizations to provide services and advocate on behalf of their communities within the local city council and nationally. Although local BME VCOs had functioned in Bristol since the 1950s, it was during the 1990s that their numbers increased as the number of BME individuals and communities within the city grew. In 1992, the African Caribbean Association of Bristol (ACAB) formed as a larger Bristol focused BME infrastructure and capacity-building

organization. Their purpose was to help organize and work with smaller BME organizations in the city to increase their capacity to deliver necessary services and support to their communities.

In 1999, the director of ACAB wanted to establish a regional Black and Ethnic Minority organization for the Southwest that could further build the BME infrastructure and capacity in the region. When the Bristol City Council (BCC) announced there were funds available for the development of regional organizations for voluntary and community organizations, ACAB applied and was awarded funding. In 2000, ACAB established the Bristol Black and Minority Ethnic Organization (BBMEO) as the region's BME regional infrastructure and capacity-building organization. It was in BBMEO where I conducted a majority of my fieldwork.

The Bristol Black and Ethnic Minority Organization (BBMEO)

I arrived in Bristol on September 4, 2009. I began to recruit individuals from different ethnic and racial backgrounds who lived in Bristol and were over the age of 18 for my interviews. I worked through contacts I had made in Bristol during a pre-dissertation trip in 2008 and used a snowball sampling method to locate potential interviewees. One contact I had made during this previous trip was with an older mixed-race man named Jeremy. In October 2008 I, by chance, ended up staying with Jeremy, the CEO and director of BBMEO, and his wife while I was collecting more pre-dissertation data in Bristol. Once I arrived back in Bristol in September of 2009 I was invited over to Jeremy's house for dinner. At that dinner Jeremy asked if I would be interested in interning at his organization – the Bristol Black and Ethnic Minority Organization (BBMEO) – three days a week and help them with their fundraising, project development, policy briefing and social media. I accepted the offer and began to work officially for the organization in late October of 2009. Over time I focused my research on the various

events, tasks, and priorities of the organization in relation to issues of race, racism and accessing rights of citizenship for BME organizations and the communities they served.

BBMEO is a regional Black and Ethnic Minority Voluntary and Community Organization based in Bristol. They concentrate on increasing the infrastructure and capacity of the BME Voluntary and Community Sector (VCS) throughout the Southwest. Starting in the late 1990s New Labour was focused on restructuring the government through devolving powers from the central government to different regional bodies around the country and within local communities. I elaborate on this point further in Chapter 3. For government[3], this devolution involved the VCS serving as the facilitators of governmental policies and public services for their respective communities. In this environment, the voluntary and community sector established a parallel national-regional-local network to the government's that catered to the needs of various communities in England (Tacchi and Williams 2006).

The BBMEO operates within civil society and has four main priorities: representing the interests and concerns of the BME in the Southwest at a national, regional and local level; building the capacity of the Black Voluntary and Community Sector (BVCS) through trainings and workshops; improving the opportunities available to the network; and communicating through Information Communications Technology (ICTs) (Tacchi and Williams 2006). Currently, BBMEO engages with these priorities through campaigns on democratic rights and civic participation of BME and disadvantaged communities; through trainings for small BME

[3] I use the term "government" to mean the political government and all its corresponding departments in the UK. Official policy briefs and white papers from different government departments use the overarching term "government" to describe these bodies and so I use it as well in my description of policies and papers from governmental departments and the ruling political party.

community organization in various capacity building skills like assets management, grant writing, and business management; and through meetings and conferences held regionally around race, racism, human rights, economic disadvantage and civic participation. The organization works through five sub-regional BME infrastructure hubs in Bristol, Gloucester, Plymouth, Devon/Cornwall and Swindon to help deliver there trainings and events and to collect information on pressing issues within the Black and Minority Ethnic voluntary sector.

Funding for BBMEO to support these types of events and engagements has been through various governmental programs, aimed at increasing the infrastructure and capacity of local and regional voluntary sector organizations. The first five years of BBMEO's funding came primarily through the Bristol City Council. The African Caribbean Association of Bristol (ACAB) acted as the managing body over BBMEO under this funding scheme. In 2006, Jeremy was hired as the new director of the Bristol Black and Minority Ethnic Organization. At this time Jeremy was successful in obtaining funding from various different governmental and private sector bodies that allowed the organization to become independent. In 2007, BBMEO was awarded a large five-year grant, along with subsequent smaller and short-term funding, from different governmental programs, which aimed at increasing the infrastructure of the BME voluntary sector in the Southwest. These grants provided support to meet the priorities of BBMEO in relation to the BME community in the Southwest, and allowed for an increase in staff.

Five individuals are employed with the organization. Of them two are full-time, Jeremy the director and Marsha the office administrator. Fatima is the policy and logistics officer and is employed four days a week. Said, the Information Technology manger and Matt, the finance manager, are both part-time employees on contract with the organization. I worked 20 hours a

week as well with two days a week spent in the office and the other day working from home. Initially my position focused on developing a research project around the construction of identity within the BME VCS in the Southwest. Jeremy wanted to create a more unified identity of the BME VCS that encompassed what he called the "trans-nationality and trans-identity of the network." However, in early January my position changed to focusing on grant writing and social analyst, as Jeremy wanted to bring additional funding into the organization. Therefore, Jeremy put the identity project on permanent hold in order to focus on other projects BBMEO was funded for.

BBMEO's office is located in a predominantly black and ethnic minority neighborhood just off of a main street in an upper office of the African-Caribbean Association of Bristol (ACAB). A narrow small space, the office is set up with Marsha's desk at one end of the room when you first walk in. Fatima's and my desks are up against the wall on one side of the room and Jeremy's desk is on the opposite end of the wall facing into the room. The last wall is lined with binders and folders full of reports, brochures, different projects and past grants complied over the course of 10 years. The floor along that wall is lined with more boxes, overflowing with marketing materials regarding online digital technology, past research reports commissioned by BBMEO, and promotional flyers for past and upcoming events and trainings.

ACAB is one of the sub-regional hubs for BBMEO and the local BME infrastructure organization for Bristol. They work closely with the local city council and grassroots organizations and communities to help increase the capacity and infrastructure of local BME communities through local trainings like project planning and management, funding, and human resource management. ACAB also operated a "hot desking" policy that allowed individuals to come into their office and utilize the available five computers to do work or use the Internet. A

majority of people that used this service were from smaller Somali, African-Caribbean, Asian, Middle Eastern and/or refugee and asylum focused BME organizations in the area. During the time of my fieldwork ACAB had six members of paid staff and anywhere from three to six volunteers at any give time.

As a regional organization BBMEO has a large geographical and demographic area to cover. A majority of the communication with the Black and Minority Ethnic Voluntary and Community Organization (VCO) network in the Southwest is conducted through the organizations website and online communication. BBMEO disseminates important and pertinent information to the network like current policies, available funding and upcoming events and trainings through their website, group emails and mass mail outs. Besides this online format Jeremy and Fatima attend a number of different regional events hosted by various voluntary and community organizations and governmental departments as a way to stay informed of current issues and policy changes and to network across the region. For organizations that are more locally based BBMEO also operates a walk-in service for those in need of help, advice or support in terms of advocacy, campaigning, policy, funding, or legal issues. A majority of those who came into the office for these services were themselves members or directors of smaller BME organizations in the Bristol area. Essentially, BBMEO functions as an intermediary between frontline BME organizations in the Southwest and larger mainstream voluntary and community organizations and local and national government bodies as a means of advocating on behalf of the interests of BME communities in the Southwest.

METHODOLOGY

The overall aim of this research is to examine the impact of race on accessing rights of citizenship for racial and ethnic groups in Britain. Of particular interest to me are the strategies

used and employed by racialized actors to understand and engage with a state that uses race to distinguish and classify its citizens. To address these aims I collected three types of data: a literature review of legislative acts and social policies aimed at BME immigrants and communities, interviews with British citizens, and participant observations within the BBMEO.

Literature Review

I completed a historical review of British immigration laws and social policies focused on racialized and ethnicized populations since 1945. After 1945 various British political parties passed numerous Immigration Acts that aimed to control and limit the number of immigrants from non-white countries. I focused on the language used in these acts and the affects it had on particular communities both inside and outside of Britain. I also concentrated on Race Relations Acts and various social policies since the 1960s that aimed to control and "integrate" racial and ethnic populations within the country with the mainstream. I accessed all of these documents online through various government websites and social policy institutes. I also relied on the work of different British sociologists and social policy scholars. In doing so, I was able to construct the ways in which race entered the British socio-political and legal discourse and how that framed the government's engagement with these communities.

Interviews

I recruited 12 individuals for one-on-one interviews. Using a purposive snowball sampling technique, I began with two contacts I initially made in Bristol during pre-dissertation fieldwork conducted in the summer and early fall of 2008. My criteria for potential interviewees were that they had to be British citizens - either by birth, through naturalization or permanent residence – over the age of 18, of any ethnic/racial or racial background, and living in Bristol

(see Table 1). I wanted a diverse set of subjects who were willing to answer questions on the topics of race and citizenship.

TABLE 1

Selected Characteristics for 12 Interviewees	**No.**
Sex	
Male	5
Female	7
Race/Ethnicity	
White or White British	6
Black or Black British	2
Asian	1
Mixed-Race	3
Age	
20-30	6
30-40	1
40-50	5
>50	1
Education Level	
High school (A or O Levels)	3
College	6
Post Graduate	3
Citizenship	
British born	11
Naturalized/Permanent Resident	1

I interviewed five males and seven females. Six identified as "White or White British," two people classified themselves as "Black or Black British," one classified themselves as "Asian" and three individuals as "Mixed Race." The participants ranged in age from 20 up to 55: six between 20 and 30, six between 30 and 50 and one was 54. Everyone I interviewed had gone through the English education system. Three individuals stopped their schooling at either his or her A-levels or O-levels, which is roughly the equivalent of graduating from high school in the US and then attending community college for an Associates Degree. Two were currently enrolled in university. Four had completed their Bachelors degree and the remaining three

participants have a post-graduate degree. Everyone but one participant was a British born citizen.

I began interviews in September of 2009. I used an open-ended, semi-structured, focused interview guide for all interviews. Questions I used were structured in a way that allowed the subjects to fully express their opinions while also allowing for systematic comparisons between the respondents. I tape-recorded and video-recorded all interviews, and each lasted approximately an hour to an hour and a half.

Questions focused on three main areas: respondent's background and life histories; their opinions on the criteria and meaning of citizenship and the Citizenship Test required of new immigrants who wish to become new British citizens; and their opinions and attitudes about race in Britain. In regards to the Citizenship Test, I asked the respondents to answer and evaluate four sample questions taken from the British Citizenship Test. The British government requires all migrants wishing to either remain in Britain as a permanent residence or gain full British citizenship to take and pass this test.

This is a small sample size of twelve so I use these interviews in an exploratory nature, to raise some issues on the ways discourses of race and citizenship are understood and conceptualized in the everyday. In doing so I hope that the issues and questions raised might be explored further in future studies with a larger sample size.

Observations

I conducted participant observations while working within The Bristol Black and Minority Ethnic Organization (BBMEO) from October 2009 to early July 2010. While at work I would engage in conversation with the other workers from BBMEO and the African Caribbean Association of Bristol (ACAB) about various topics of interest. From my fieldnotes, most topics

revolved around funding issues with BME organizations; the impending government elections that took place on May 6, 2010; the effects of a new governmental budget on voluntary and community organizations; perceived issues of race and racism within the voluntary and community sector and the government; and relationships between and amongst BME organizations within the Southwest. Most days Jeremy, Fatima, and Marsha were in the office and the interactions between these three and myself comprised a majority of my observations in the office. I took detailed fieldnotes after every workday, by hand, in my field notebook and later typed all of my notes into a Word document.

I participated in a number of key events and trainings BBMEO hosted from November 2009 until July 2010. I attended the organizations annual conference. I also participated in various trainings, offered free of charge to the community, such as: training for using social media as a tool for advocacy, using human rights as a framework in the voluntary and community sector, and understanding the new Single Equalities Bill in policy and practice. Many of the participants of these workshops were from various voluntary and community organizations who worked on other "strands" of inequality– gender, disability, or religion/belief; were from "generic" organizations that covered all forms of inequality and worked across different communities. Other participants were local government body employees.

I also helped organize a three-day strategic planning conference with sub-regional BME organization leaders in May 2010. During these three days, eight BME VCO leaders convened at a Manor house in the English countryside to discuss future campaigns and projects they would like to engage in. The national election was also a pressing concern at this meeting as national elections were held and a new government was elected over this weekend as well. I took

detailed notes over the three days during the morning discussion sessions. I also tape-recoded these proceedings. In the evenings I took further notes in my field notebook.

In addition in July 2010, I attended a Race Debate in the Southwest, which BBMEO co-hosted with a national race equality think-tank. The event was held in Bristol and open to the public. Over 60 individuals from various BME third sector organisations, political party groups, and other community and voluntary organisations were in attendance. The panel was comprised of five individuals and one moderator. Panelists represented various political parities and all had some interest of work within the BME third sector. I will discuss the panelists and the topics covered in more detail in Chapter 5. I tape-recorded the event while other staff members of BBMEO video-recorded. After the event I took additional notes. I transcribed both events and digitized the accompanying field notes. I will go into further details about this event, and the away day, in Chapter 5.

Data Analysis

I used standardized qualitative data analysis techniques to analyze the interviews and the fileldnotes. I used an inductive coding process to code all fieldnotes and transcripts from events and interviews using the qualitative software Hyperresearch version 3.0. I chose this software because I was able to upload text, video and pictures for analysis, along with being able to search for key words and code all forms of media. From these codes I was then able to generate reports based on different criteria as a way to test various hypotheses, or propositions in relation to my research questions. From the codes I looked for overarching themes to place different codes into. I looked for evidence in the ways individuals and BME organizations constructed and managed issues of race and racism; how staff members of BBMEO dealt with conflicts amongst themselves and with funders in relation to implementing and delivering on funded projects; and

the ways in which BME organizational members and leaders resolved and/or created issues around access to rights of citizenship for themselves and their communities they serve as a way to find overarching themes.

I then generated a data display matrix using Marshall's (1998) three-part concept of citizenship as civil, political and social, in order to focus my analysis on how racialized actors access rights of citizenship. This process lies somewhere in-between inductive and deductive coding (Bernard 2002). I placed examples from my fieldnotes and transcripts of events and interviews into one of the three columns that depicted the "type" of citizenship represented: civil, political and social. Next, I took each column separately and looked to see if the themes I identified earlier were predominant in each column. From this I was able to narrow my themes even further and apply those themes to each type of citizenship, which I used to arrange my data chapters in a way to answer my research questions.

In the following chapters, I focus on my interpretation of this material. Specifically, I use Marshall's concepts of civil, political and social citizenship, and frame the discussion within Gramci's notions of hegemony, contradictory consciousness and counterhegemonic resistance within civil society. I examine the ways racialized actors in British society work within and against a framework of citizenship that is constructed around notions of race, nation and belonging.

CHAPTER 3: CIVIL CITIZENSHIP IN POST-IMPERIAL BRITAIN: IMMIGRATION, RACE AND THE LAW

I swear to the Lord
I still can't see
Why Democracy means
Everybody but me.

Langston Hughes

As the global expansion of Indian and Chinese restaurants suggests,
xenophobia is directed against foreign people, not foreign cultural imports.

E. J. Hobsbawm

It is not always the same thing to be a good man and a good citizen.

Aristole

June 22, 1948 the *S.S.Windrush* arrived at Tilbury, England carrying 492 Jamaican passengers. World War II had ended and Britain was in dire need of workers to help rebuild the war-torn country. To fill this need the British government recruited workers from Ireland, mainland Europe and the newly formed Commonwealth. Under the European Volunteer Workers (EVWs) scheme thousands of European workers arrived and settled throughout Britain, with the largest number of workers originating from Ireland (Kushner 1994; Solomos 2003). Yet, the arrival of the *Windrush* and subsequent immigration from the New Commonwealth (West Indies, Pakistan and India) caused concern for British policy makers and governments. Allowed the right to work and settle under the 1948 British Nationality Act, black and brown workers from the Commonwealth were viewed as "dark strangers" by politicians and larger society and seen as a threat to the customs and traditions of Britain (Waters 1997:208). Although European workers faced discrimination and alienation from native-born British citizens, and their numbers were far greater than those from the New Commonwealth, their status as "legitimate" was never questioned to the extent of those whose origins were from Commonwealth countries and whose skin tone was darker than the majority (Waters 1997).

Solomos (20003) argues that from an early stage the British governments' policies and encouragement towards European migration contrasted sharply with their concern over the social and political consequences of small-scale migration from former non-white colonies. This contrasting perspective between European and Commonwealth migration can be seen as a reflection of Britain coming to terms with its post-war status, or what Gilroy (2004) calls "postcolonial melancholia." No longer was Empire, or the struggles against fascist Germany during World War II, enough to sustain a national unity or identity. Britain, as a nation in its "post-war imperial decline" had to attempt to "reconfigure the meaning of citizenship in a new, multiethnic Commonwealth where questions of race became central to questions of national belonging" (Waters 1997:208).

In this chapter I use Marshall's (1998) concept of civil citizenship, the rights needed for personal freedom, to frame my discussion on the development of the British "racial worldview" in post-imperial Britain. Specifically, I examine key Immigration and Citizenship Acts from 1948 to the present, focusing on the purpose of the ever-changing immigration and citizenship laws and their effects on non-white immigrants and their children. In doing so I intend to show how race and racism influence the ways the British government, political parties, and larger society define the boundaries around Britishness. I will also explain the response Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) communities took to challenge the larger hegemonic constructs of Britishness that constantly questioned their legitimacy and right to stay within Britain.

BRITISH CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

> "I am not interested in picking up crumbs of compassion thrown from the table of someone who considers himself my master. I want the full menu of rights."
>
> Archbishop Desmond Tutu

According to Linda Colley (1992) national identity is a product of boundaries drawn up to distinguish between the collective self and the other. Race is one aspect used by nation-states to make this distinction (Miles and Brown 2003). The dismantling of Empire as a defining maker of the nation, coupled with increased immigration from the Commonwealth and Europe post-1945 and the entry into the European Union in 1971 has left Britain trying to understand its place as a nation within the larger global world. In this negotiation over *legitimacy* of citizenship, British national identity is constantly made, contested and re-made. Goulbourne (2009) reminds us "the most powerful and influential of the attempts to redefine the post-imperial British national community is such that membership excludes non-white minorities who have settled on these shores since World War II" (1). As Britain shifted out of the post-war period and into a more multiethnic age the language of race, and racism, emerged in political and social discussions over defining who does and does not belong to the nation. In these discussions citizens whose backgrounds lie in Africa, the Caribbean and Asia were always questioned over their legitimacy, presence, and participation within Britain (Waters 1997).

I turn now to examining post-imperial Britain through the lens of immigration laws and Race Relations Acts as a means to understand how the British "racial worldview" affected British citizenship. I will highlight how members of BME communities were denied access to civil citizenship, thus denying them full citizenship and all the rights associated with that citizenship. When confronted with this ever evolving and changing British "racial worldview" those from BME communities choose the political currency of mobilization around race as one means of legitimating their place within British society.

1945-1962: The Arrival of the "Dark Strangers"

The 1948 Nationality Act gave formal citizenship to all members of the former British colonies. Although the Act distinguished between Commonwealth citizens and British subjects who were citizens of the UK and its colonies, all who fit under this category were allowed to enter the UK, settle and work (Solomos 2003). Following the passing of the Act individuals did arrive, mostly from mainland Europe and Ireland. However, the Home Office expressed more fear and concern over the social and racial problems they perceived would happen with the modest arrive of immigrants from the West Indies and the Indian sub-continent.

According to Hickman (2000), in the 1950s and 1960s one of the British government's primary concerns was unifying the British Isles into one geographical, historic, and cultural unit. Again, this was in response to the increasing Commonwealth and European immigration into the country. One means the government sought to achieve this goal was through the legal decision to make the Irish, on paper, the same "race" as the English. Socially the Irish were discriminated against by the English in the same vein as blacks and Asians. When looking for housing many were met with signs that read "No Irish, no blacks, no dogs." However, the Irish were excluded from race relations debates. Cabinet papers from the 1950s reveal that the English/British government still perceived the Irish as different, but for reasons of expediency they were included in the same race. Hickman (2000) argues this decision allowed the Cabinet to assert that the British Isles was one cultural unit.

The Irish were rendered politically, and later socially, invisible due to what Hickman (2000) calls the "myth of homogeneity" (55). This myth of homogeneity made two assumptions: those with white skin would assimilate easy into the British life style (same skin tone equals same culture) and those immigrants who did face problems did so because of their

skin tone (different skin color meant different culture). Socially and politically what ensued was a denial of difference amongst the majority white population alongside the development of a belief in a myth of a British "*homogenous indigenous population*" (emphasis mine, Hickman 2000: 55).

Waters (1997) contends the 1950s reimaging of the national community depended on reworking tropes of Englishness against Commonwealth migrants. These migrants were perceived as "strangers" to the customs and traditions thought to be the heart of Britishness. For Waters the representation of black people to Britain as non-British gave security to this imagined community during this period of rapid change and uncertainty. In response to the perceived threat of these "strangers," the British government turned to the language of race. In doing so the government formed a dialectical relationship with these perceived "strangers" - the perceived "Other." The "Other" was defined based on skin tone and perceived cultural differences. By using these criteria the collective Self (the British government and policy makers) also needed to define itself in those same terms. In relation to the "dark strangers" present within the country the British government then defined British in terms of whiteness.

To keep Britain's indigenous population homogenous successive government debates (Labour and Conservative) in the 1950s focused on controlling colored immigration. According to Solomos (2003), within these parliamentary and media debates two themes emerged which influenced future policies and laws around immigration and race equality. First, these debates linked immigration to black[4] immigrants, even though most immigrants that came to Britain in the 1950s under the 1948 Nationality Act were from mainland Europe or Ireland. Second, non-

[4] I use the term "black" to mean those individuals and groups whose ancestry is not from Britain or Europe. This is in accordance with how the term was first used in that time period. Starting in the 1980s academics, politicians, and activists began to redefine the concept of "black," separating Asian (individuals from the Indian sub-continent) from its meaning.

white immigrants already in the country were seen as the cause of social problems. I will expand on both these points through the chapter. This argument parallels with Hickman's (2000) case that black immigrants, due to their cultural and physical differences, could not fit into the British[5] homogenous indigenous culture. The media and government targeted black immigrants, branding them as a burden, especially in relation to housing, employment and crime. These two debates reiterated themselves in various ways over the course of the 1950s in political and social debates. As a result the state turned to direct intervention in order to halt black immigration and resolve the social problems the majority felt were caused by this immigration (Solomos 2003).

The rhetoric and tone of these debates helped to reinforce an exclusive racialized construction of Britishness, based on race as defined by color. An increase in immigration from the Indian sub-continent and Caribbean in the 1950s coupled with events like the 1958 Nottingham and Notting Hill race riots only helped to reinforce the image that blacks were the cause of Britain's social woes. Even after the riots were shown to have been caused by hooligan bands of whites named "Teddy's boys" attacking blacks and Asians in mostly non-white areas, politicians and the media still portrayed blacks as the cause of a "race problem" in Britain (Kushner 1994; Gilroy 2009; Solomos 2003). By the end of the 1950s these political and social debates led to the government passing legislations to control black immigration in the 1960s and 1970s.

The 1960s: "A River of Blood"

Both the 1962 and 1968 Immigration Act sought to limit immigration from the Caribbean, Indian sub-continent and Asians fleeing East Africa. The Conservative Party passed

[5] I use the term British and English interchangeably. There is much debate on the differences or similarities between the two terms, but that debate is far beyond the scope of this dissertation.

the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act in response to the perceived threat of colored immigration. This Act permitted only those with government issued employment vouchers the right to settle within Britain and made a distinction between citizens of independent Commonwealth countries and citizens of Britain and its colonies. Unless a person either possessed a British passport issued by the British government, was born in Britain or was included in the passport of someone who met the criteria of points 1 and 2, that person was subject to immigration control – even if they were from the Commonwealth. Commonwealth citizens had to obtain a work voucher from the Ministry of Labour. There were three types of vouchers: Voucher A was for those who already had work in Britain. Voucher B was given to those who did not have jobs but possessed special skills that could benefit British society. Voucher C was for those who did not fit into the first two categories and was administered on a first come first served basis. The Labour Party subsequently abolished Voucher C in 1965 when they passed the first Race Relations Act (Solomos 2003).

The 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act aimed at controlling Asians coming from East Africa. The 1962 Act exempted British citizens living in independent Commonwealth countries from immigration controls. At the time there were a large number of Asian British citizens residing in various countries in Africa, especially Kenya and Uganda. During the late 1960s a sizeable number of Asians from Kenya began to arrive in Britain due to the "Africanization" in Kenya that economically persecuted citizens of the UK and its colonies. The Labour Party argued for firmer immigration controls as a result and in 1968 the new Immigration Act passed. Under this Act only those British citizens who had one parent or grandparent born, adopted, naturalized or registered in Britain as a citizen of Britain or its colonies would not be subject to

immigration controls. All other citizens, including those with a passport issued by the British government, would be subject to immigration control (Solomos 2003).

1968 was also the year Enoch Powell, Conservative MP (Member of Parliament), gave his infamous "River of Blood Speech" in Birmingham. In the speech Powell (2004) argued that immigrants entering the country were changing the British landscape at such a rate that white Britons would eventually become "strangers" in their own land. I use Powell's own words to describe this phenomenon.

> "They (white Britons) found their wives unable to obtain hospital beds in childbirth, their children unable to obtain school places, their homes and neighborhoods changed beyond recognition, their plans and prospects for the future defeated; at work they found that employers hesitated to apply to the immigrant worker the standards of discipline and competence required of the native-born worker; they began to hear, as time went by, more and more voices which told them that they were now the unwanted. On top of this, they now learn that a one-way privilege is to be established by Act of Parliament: a law, which cannot, and is not intended, to operate to protect them or redress their grievances, is to be enacted to give the stranger, the disgruntled and the *agent provocateur* the power to pillory them for their private actions " (Powell 2004: 16).

Powell advocated for the repatriation of immigrants already in Britain and warned about the dangers of an American-style racial tension finding its way to the British shores.

> "As I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see 'the River Tiber foaming with much blood'. That tragic and intractable phenomenon which we watch with horror on the other side of the Atlantic but which there is interwoven with the history and existence of the States itself, is coming upon us here by our own volition and our own neglect" (Powell 2004: 18).

The content of Powell's speech remained in public and political debates in the ensuing years leading up the 1970 general election, where the Conservative party won. According to Solomos (2003) the Labour Party's stance on tighter immigration controls in the 1960s led to the 1971 Immigration Act. Under this new Act all Commonwealth citizens and aliens who were

non-patrials needed permission to enter Britain. Whereas before the possession of a voucher entitled workers to settle in Britain, under this new Act Commonwealth citizens right to entry depended on their possession of an annually renewable work permit. This Act based British citizenship on kinship where one parent or grandparent had to be British born or naturalized. Non-white citizens of the Commonwealth usually found this difficult and so resulted in more white Commonwealth citizens having the right to enter the country without immigration controls, but highly restricted black and Asian immigration (Cesarani 1996). The same day the 1971 Immigration Act passed Britain also entered into the European Union (EU), which allowed for the free movements of goods, workers and their families across all member states.

The politicalization of race and immigration in the 1960s and 70s, especially in relation to Enoch Powell's popularized notions of Englishness being hereditary and ethnic in nature, only increased in the 1980s under Thatcher and the Conservative Party. But before Thatcher became Prime Minster the state did not solely focus its efforts on controlling non-white immigration. For those BME communities that resided within the country the state saw it as their duty to address growing social and economic worries about the "effect" these new communities would have on the national character (Solomos 2003). This state intervention, and the reactions to it by BME communities, is where I turn to now.

Race Relations Acts and Racial and Ethnic Mobilization

In a previous section I argued that political and social discourse on black immigration in the 1950s had two effects: immigration and immigrants were equated with blacks, thus always defining those groups as outsiders and the effect of black immigration on the character of British identity was first and foremost a concern for politicians and the media. Therefore, the government saw state intervention as the primary means to deal with issues of racism and racial

discrimination (Goulbourne 1998). The Labour government passed the Race Relations Acts (RRA) of 1965 and 1968. These Acts set up bodies that would deal with issues of discrimination, social adjustment and welfare faced by immigrants and aimed to educate the public about race relations. The basic assumption of these measures was that too many black immigrants would cause racial conflicts. This notion was tied to the idea that cultural differences between the new migrants and native population were a course of conflict (Solomos 2003).

This second point is important to remember once discussions turns to the place of race and racism in political mobilization regarding rights of citizenship for non-white Britons. In 1962 the government established the National Advisory Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants (NACCI) in conjunction with the 1962 Immigration Act. In 1965 the RRA established the Race Relations Board. The NACCI was supposed to coordinate all local multi-racial organizations and lend support to those organisations while the Race Relations Board, and subsequent Community Relations Commission, was supposed to enforce the RRA (Afridi and Warmington 2010; Solomos 2003; Kushner 1994).

During the 1950s, in the wake of discrimination in employment and housing, BME communities began to organize (Afridi and Warmington 2010). Local voluntary organisations were already a part of BME communities. Starting in the 1950s, with limited avenues to address grievances and obtain basic needs like housing, credit, or employment some BME communities established their own local voluntary organisations to meet the needs of their communities with little to no public funding. Between 1964 and 1965 the NACCI toured the country, encouraging local authorities and others to support these existing community organisations and helped form other organisations where they did not exist. According to Afridi and Warmington (2010) by

the middle of 1965 thirty such committees existed, with one-third of them having full time officers and funding from local authorities or social services departments.

While many questioned the motivations and commitment of the state in tackling racial discrimination with the first two RRAs boards, others were more critical of these boards saying: "To ordinary blacks, these structures were irrelevant: liaison and conciliation seemed to define [black people] as a people a part who somehow needed to be fitted into the mainstream of British society – when all they were seeking was the same rights as other citizens" (Afridi and Warmington 2010: 17). Nonetheless, these initial organisations over time were able to provide more welfare services for the communities they served. The start of an independent voluntary sector provision had begun, paving the way for the future of the Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) Voluntary and Community Third Sector that emerged in the 1990s.

Goulbourne (1998) uses Karl Deutsch's notion of political currency to explain mobilization around ethnic or racial affinity saying: "Ethnic mobilization involves leaders seeking to transform into political currency those social and natural characteristics generally regarded as defining an ethnic or racial group. The political currency so created is for use in the political marketplace of competition" (16). Under this notion the political system has currencies just like an economic system. These currencies are such items as voting or confidence in the governmental system. But unlike in economics, political currencies are only partly quantifiable. The state's use of money, tax, credit, etc… is always paralleled by their assurance of its citizen's security and guarantee of rights through the threat of force.

For Goulbourne (1998) the use of the term political currency in relation to ethnic or racial mobilization is relevant for two reasons. First, mobilization around race or ethnicity is in itself a political phenomenon, especially when racial and ethnic affinity is transferred into an interest

worth mobilizing around for political gain. Second, ethnic and racial mobilization is unusual and not an everyday occurrence. Mobilizing around ethnic or racial identity is an open currency available to any group (minority or majority), although it is utilized for different ends. When there is conflict within a democratic society over certain issues there will then be conflicting interests. Therefore, Goulbourne suggests this is why ethnic or racial mobilization "becomes a political currency in the socio-political marketplace" (Goulbourne 2009: 19). In these circumstances affinity around race or ethnicity changes into an interest like any other interests in the market.

In Britain "the mobilization of majority ethnic solidarity has stimulated new minorities to become aware of themselves as distinct communities and in turn this has led to their active participation in political affairs" (Goulbourne 2009:20). The Caribbean and India are both large landmasses with various ethnic and national identities. But once on the shores of Britain peoples from these different areas of the world were condensed into larger racial-ethnic groups (black, African-Caribbean, Asian, African) by the state in relation to the imagined homogenized "white" country of Britain (Goulbourne 1998; Hickman 2000). Initially the majority within Britain used the term "black" to refer to all non-white immigrants. Later, Afridi and Warmington (2010) say the term arose as a political and conscious reclaiming of derogatory terms. In the UK the usage of black as a political term indicates affiliation and solidarity for those who suffered oppression by the British statee. In this case BME communities used their racial and ethnic identities as a form of political currency in response to, and as a means to engage with, the British state on a political and social level.

In the 1970s while the government enacted stricter immigration controls to keep out unwanted populations within the country they revisited the RRA as a means to enact more

effective legislation against racial discrimination occurring within the country (Goulbourne 1998). According to Wrench and Solomos (1993) problems of racial discrimination in employment, along with the criminalization of black youths prompted the reformulation of the 1965 and 1968 RRA. The 1976 RRA strengthened and extended racial discrimination policy by: covering both direct (blatant) and indirect (discriminatory in effect) discrimination; creating the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) which replaced the previous two bodies of the first two RRAs; and allowing individuals direct access to tribunals or courts to raise complaints under the Act instead if having to go through the CRE to file a grievance (Small and Solomos 2006; Solomos 2003). Although subsequent British governments created and enacted RAAs, the social, economic and political environment within Britain during the 1980s and early 1990s saw the rise of blackness as a political currency by BME and working class communities in response to actions by the state.

1980 to 1997- Thatcherism, Race, and the BME

From 1979 to 1997 the Conservative Party was in power. Solomos (2003) contends that leading up to this election the Conservative Party, under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, emphasized supposed dangers black and ethnic minority people brought to British cultural and social values with their "new" cultures. This rhetoric introduced race as a symbol for Tahtcher's neo-Conservative ideology. During this era parliamentary debates focused both on further tightening of immigration from the Commonwealth and constructing nationality around racial lines. One of the first Acts of Parliament under Thatcher was the passing of the 1981 British Nationality Act. This Act created three categories of citizenship. British Citizenship: reserved for those who qualified for right of abode according to 1968 and 1971 Immigration Acts. Under this designation only British citizens and European Union Citizens are free of immigration

control. Citizenship of British Dependent Territories: reserved for those with a close connection to the UK dependent territories. British Oversees Citizenship: reserved for all others who are citizens of the UK and its colonies. This Act placed in limbo the status of second-generation British citizens as children born in the UK could not become British citizens unless they satisfied the requirements of patriarchy (Kushner 1994). With the passing of the 1981 Nationality Act British citizenship changed from a tradition of *jus soli* (birth) to one of *jus sanguinis* (blood). Later amendments to the Act allowed individuals like children of Commonwealth citizens who were residents in the country and children born outside of the UK to registered British citizens to apply for citizenship after ten years of residence within the country (Goulbourne 1998).

Kushner (1994) presents an argument where Powell's vision of an exclusive notion of "Englishness" came to fruition during the reign of Thatcher. During an opening of a national speech in 1978 Thatcher said she was "really rather afraid that this country might be swamped by people with a different culture" (422). During the 1980s cultural critics of Thatcher charge her government with creating an "insular English nationalism" (Kushner 1994: 423), most aptly seen in the new National Curriculum where subjects emphasized a mono-cultural interpretation while downplaying any pluralistic approach. While ethnic and racial minorities were pushed to assimilate and conform to national standards, they were still viewed and portrayed in the media and through political rhetoric as aliens and un-English.

The neo-liberal economics of Thatcher's government had drastic effects on various segments of society. In particular the Northern industrial cities and working class communities around the country felt the economic and social pinch the most with the privatization of industries. Rising unemployment, a lack of jobs, lack of affordable housing, and a decrease in benefits led to widespread unrest in the inner cities. Throughout the 1980s riots broke out in

various cities around the country, most notably in St. Paul's in Bristol, Brixton in London and Liverpool in 1981 and Birmingham, parts of London, and Liverpool again in 1985. Although there were high levels of white participation in these disturbances the media coverage and political response to them focused on black youth and second and third generation blacks and Asians born in the UK (Gilroy 2009; Kushner 1994; Solomos 2003). Media outlets racialized the disturbances during this time, casting black hooligans as the problem rather than the endemic social and political climate. Essentially, overall sentiment throughout the Thatcher, and her predecessor Robert Major, years was one of placing blame for social unrest and discomfort on immigrants and British born and established ethnic and racial minority communities (Gilroy 2009; Kushner 1994).

In response, one sees at this same time the mobilization of BME populations at the local level around community specific issues such as housing, the police, unemployment and other pressing issues (Solomos 2003). In the wake of the 1981 riots in London, Bristol, and Liverpool the government commissioned Lord Sarmon to make a public inquiry into the matter. In his report Scarmon found evidence of disproprtinate and indiscriminate "stop and search" procedures by the police against blacks (Afridi and Warmington 2010). The Scarmon Report drew attention to the issues of racial disadvantage and the effects this had on black populations in the UK – especially in terms of employment and housing within the inner city. While the government under the rule of the Conservative Party refused to strengthen the RRA of 1976 to tackle issues of racism and racial discrimination (especially within the police force), this government did increase funding to BME-led organisations, initiatives and programs (Afridi and Warmington 2010). In this respect the state could no longer ignore the place of race or the impact of racism upon specific segments of its population. In this capacity the BME third sector

developed, primarily as a response to racism as well as representing the interests of BME people. I will return to the role of the third sector and the place of BME organisations within that sector in the next section.

By the 1990s political and social debates on immigration shifted towards asylum seekers and refugees. The dismantling of the Eastern European Bloc along with the war in former Yugoslavia created a new population of people seeking asylum or refugee status within the EU. This led the government to pass the Asylum and Immigration Acts of 1993 and 1996. The aim of both Acts was to reduce the number of asylum seekers and refugees seeking sanctuary within Britain (Solomos 2003). However, the legacy of the Thatcher and Major era is one where concerns on immigration, immigration and asylum seekers and refugees mixed with larger perceptions about the socio-cultural impact of migrant communities. This led to the " institutionalization of an exclusionary framework that sough to restrict immigration" (Solomos 2003: 68). Thatcher helped revive the myth of the homogenous population by reifying the idea that the British way of life needed protecting from the "enemies" from within (Back et al. 2002). This view influenced the way larger society and social institutions viewed the British born second and third generation of those immigrant groups, especially through the targeting of black and Asian youth by the police in urban areas in the 1980s and early 1990s. To gain political currency in this climate more BME organisations formed throughout the country, again in order to tackle racism they faced within their communities and as a means of forming group solidarity.

New Labour: From Multiculturalism to Community Cohesion

In 1997 the Conservative Party lost the general election to Tony Blair and his New Labour Party. In contrast to the Labour Party of old where socialist ideals dominated the parties ideology, the New Labour Party derived its policies and ideology based on a "Third Way

rhetorical commitment to enhance inclusivity within the social order whilst remaining fiscally prudent in terms of overall public expenditure" (Back et al., 2002: 3.1). Labour included the issue of race in this inclusive vision in a problematic way that celebrated diversity through a commitment to address longstanding forms of racial discrimination.

When New Labour entered office the Party did so on a platform that emphasized the plurality of British society (Modood 2007:10). This platform was one that celebrated diversity and embraced modernization - Britain was to celebrate being a modern multicultural society. According to Back et al (2002) this should come as no surprise due to the influence of Third Way ideology on PM Tony Blair, and later PM Gordon Brown. In this ideology the focus is on self-government with de-evolution of power from central government. Responsibility is divested from central government and onto individuals, communities, cities and regions. For individuals, responsibility is situated around the contractual obligation of citizenship – "learning democratic mores, learning to be civilized… learning English" and communities are responsible for "being the arbiters of moral worth" (Back et al.: 3.6). In that construction of citizen and community, issues arise when that community is both multi-ethnic and multi-faith but operating under a homogenous formation of community.

Within New Labour's modernization of Britain emerged, initially, a strong language of multiculturalism as a means of constructing both what the nation is and is not. Within the literature and in the public sphere there are different constructions and definitions of multiculturalism. According to Modood (2007) multiculturalism is "the political accommodation of minorities formed by immigration to Western countries from outside the West" (15). Hesse (2000) says multiculturalism is the particular discourses or social forms that

include cultural difference and ethnicities. In this form multiculturalism can be named, celebrated, valued, or dismissed from different socio-political differences.

For New Labour, multiculturalism was a political process where particular group(s) asked for accommodation, recognition, and/or political and social acceptance by larger bodies/society.

Soon after Labour came to power the party placed on its agenda the issue of tackling racism. First, the government commissioned Sir William Macpherson to investigate the 1993 murder of 18 year-old Stephen Lawrence. Lawrence was a black student who was stabbed to death in South London. The crime was thought to be race related and five white boys were brought in for questioning by the police. Two were eventually charged with the crime, but when they went to trial the court ruled there was insufficient evidence to hold them accountable for the crime. Even when additional evidence surfaced the police refused to re-open the case. The Lawrence family and other supporters accused the police of incompetence and racism. When Labour entered office they launched an inquiry into the case.

The 1999 Macpherson Report was a scathing indictment of the Metropolitan Police force. The report concluded that the unsuccessful investigation of the murder of Stephen Lawrence was due to the presence of "institutional racism" among the police, defining the term as "the collective failure of an organization to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin" (Back et al., 2000: 6.34). The reported noted a breakdown in trust between ethnic minority community communities and the police and criminal justice system. In particular the report noted that the implementation of "stop and search" by the police was disproportionately directed against black, Asian and ethnic minority groups.

In 2000 Labour passed the Race Relations (Amendment) Act (RRAA). Under this Act public authorities had a duty to endorse racial equality by trying to: prevent racial discrimination

and when performing public functions public authorities need to promote equality and good relations between people of different racial groups (Solomos 2003). Also in 2000 Bhikhu Parekh published *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain*. This commission was initially set-up by race equality think-tank Runnymead Trust to investigate the current issues affecting race in Britain and propose ways of countering racial discrimination and disadvantage to ease Britain into its diversity. The report spoke frankly about the issues of British race relations, pointing to the idea that the concept of Britishness invoked visions of whiteness and racism as a key problem. The report went on to critique terms like "minority" and "majority", "integration" and "ethnic group" as a means of exploring how Britain can understand itself and its citizens within the modern multi-ethnic world. Throughout the report recommendations were made about how various institutions, most notably the police and education, and public bodies in Britain could effectively tackle race equality.

Yet, the multicultural society New Labour initially embraced as the face of Britain at the beginning of its tenure in the late 1990s quickly shifted after events that occurred nationally and globally at the turn of the twenty-first century. Parekh's (2000) recommendation that "what it means to be British needs to be rethought in light of Britain's increasing multiculturalism" was met with harsh criticism by members of the press, politicians, and segments of British society (Solomos 2003: 240). Civil unrest between racial groups in northern cities in England during the summer of 2001, the 9/11 terrorists attacks in the United States and the 7/7 bombings in London, all contributed to a social media and political campaign that moved away from multiculturalism and diversity as a defining marker of modern Britain and its citizens, and towards what Back et al (2002) call an "assimilationist language of the sixties" (2.2).

After the civil unrest in the North in 2001 between South Asian and white communities and the 9/11 bombings politicians and the media took great offense to the analysis and recommendations made by the Parekh report. Multiculturalism and diversity were ridiculed in the papers and seen as the cause of Britain's social problems (Modood 2007). The 2001 Cantle Report on the Northern riots concluded that polarized communities existed in many parts of England and "operate on the basis of a series of parallel lives. These lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges" (9). Furthermore, the report suggested that a lack of cross-cultural contact in neighborhoods coupled with a supposed lack of a shared notion of Britishness or national identity was breeding extremism, especially within the Muslim community throughout England (McLauhlin 2010).

While the Parekh (2000) report supported multiculturalism as a social tool for inclusion, Cantle (2001) recommended policy that focused instead on civic integration and "community cohesion" among different racial and ethnic communities around shared values. Cohesion and integration became the dominant policy employed by the government in relation to engaging with black and ethnic minority communities, especially the Muslim population (Cheong et al., 2007).

According to Modood (2007), by 2005 a post-multiculturalism perspective made its way into larger social discourse, especially after the 7/7 bombings. Prominent centre-Left commentator David Goodhart's 2004 essay "Too Diverse" takes this stance, evoking what Meer (2010) calls a "monocultural-nationalism" (25). In the essay Goodhart (2004) argues that Britain is becoming too diverse of a country, saying, "most of us prefer our own kind." (31). Goodhart presented a negative association between ethnic diversity immigration, solidarity, social cohesion and the viability of the welfare state. Trevor Philips (2005), then chair for the

Commission for Racial Equality, echoed these sentiments in a speech when he warned that Britain was "sleepwalking" into a US style of segregation due to an over reliance on multiculturalism that would undermine common British values. In order to curb this activity Philips argued policies should focus on "liberal democratic values and mechanism to integrate migrants into a stronger notion of Britishness" (McLaughlin 2010: 97). These positions aided in public debate and policy discourse on the need for less multiculturalism and more social cohesion (Coeong et al., 2007).

CONCLUSION

New Labour, under PM Tony Blair and then PM Gordon Brown, was determined to modernize ideals of Britishness, and thus notions of British citizenship, as a means of bringing Britain into the twenty-first century. The party focused on "issues of democratic accountability, community, and diversity with new communitarian concerns that attend to marginalized groups" (Jones 2000: 241). Under this rhetoric a *modern* society is one that practices *inclusion* of all segments of the population. For New Labour "cosmopolitan nationalism" was a "necessary condition of a multicultural society in a globalizing order" (Jones 2000: 242). Constitutional modernization entailed pushing legislation that incorporated everyone within the geographical boundaries of Britain. However, Britain for the last 40 years actively excluded members of its society deemed unfit based on skin color and perceived cultural differences.

Under New Labour's vision of independent working individuals and communities, third sector organizations became the enactors of state centered policy. This policy wanted to achieve greater civic participation and democratic renewal amongst the British population as well as create an enabling role for the state (Lewis 2005). Individuals had a moral and social duty, as citizens, to be engaged, be active, and be responsible. Yet Gilroy (2004) argues that the legacy

of Empire, and the postcolonial melancholia of that loss as a defining marker British national identity, affected the way(s) in which the state constructed citizenship for non-white immigrants and their children. Changing from a policy of jus *soli* to one of *jus sanguinis* further solidified the place of race and racism within national constructions of British citizenship. In the present day the backlash against multiculturalism and diversity as both a social or political campaign, and rising xenophobia in the wake of terrorist attacks, makes embracing a multicultural or multi-ethnic future as a nation difficult (Back et al. 2002).

In this chapter I have presented the history of Britain post-1945 as a story of both local and global movement where former colonies turned into Commonwealth states and colonial subjects became British citizens. In this history Empire never fully displaced itself from modern imaginings of Britishness, evidenced in the resistance of numerous governments to include and incorporate non-white immigrants into the idea of Britishness, instead favoring a myth of a homogenous indigenous population. In the following chapters I take a closer look at this idea of British citizenship through an ethnographic account of working within a BME third sector organization in Bristol, England. Specifically I engage with Marshall's (1998) two other forms of citizenship, political and social, in relation to the issues of race and racism. I use participant observations I conducted in the Bristol Black and Ethnic Minority Organization (BBMEO) and one-on-one interviews with British citizens to frame this discussion.

CHAPTER 4: POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP: NARRATIVE OF SOCIAL EXCLUSION

> Achieving an inclusive globalization, one that can combine economic dynamism with social justice in a sustainable way for all is the key political challenge facing this generation of leaders and politicians.
>
> Gordon Brown

> Our very survival depends on our ability to stay awake, to adjust to new ideas, to remain vigilant and to face the challenge of change.
>
> Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

Marshall (1998) argues that political rights of citizenship entail the right to exercise ones political power as either a member of a political authority or as someone who elects a member to such a body. In this political system rights of citizenship are supposed to protect those with "little power" like "minorities of race, gender, class and religious affiliations who (supposedly) need shelter…from the elites" (Janowski and Gran 2002: 13). In return, those who partake in these rights and protections have a responsibility to work in and endorse that political system as needed.

However, inequality within that system means there will still be an unequal balance of power in that relationship. Individuals and organizations, like Black and Minority Ethnic organizations, who use race and ethnicity as a form of political currency to engage in the political process still have to contend with underlying issues of racism and unequal access to resources based upon that racial and ethic affiliation. Based on my analysis of observations and interviews I argue that political rights for BME voluntary and community organizations (VCOs) and the communities they represent are limited due to their status as racial and ethnic groups. These rights are constrained because the hegemonic construction of race is defined and determined by the state - an institution that BME organizations operating within civil society are

trying to resist against. Resistance in this instance is through political campaigning and advocacy for BME representation in government and access to rights and services.

In this chapter I focus on the contradictory consciousness of BME leaders in relation to accessing political rights of citizenship for BME communities they represent. Specifically, I am interested in the ways these elites try to frame their counterhegemonic resistance against larger hegemonic narratives of race: the narrative of "social exclusion/inclusion" as presented by the government through various social policies under New Labour and the narrative of "disadvantage" that produces and reproduces itself within the BME community and voluntary sector as a response to these policies. I contend these are both competing and complimentary narratives that emerge within discourses around political rights for and within black and ethnic minority communities in the UK. They are also examples of how socio-political structures and discourses help reproduce and remake essentialist categories of race – or what Omi and Winant (1994) would call racist racial projects. I use two events I attended while working for BBMEO, a three-day conference in Devon with eight BME leaders from the Southwest and a Race Debate in Bristol, to frame the construction of these narratives in relation to race, racism and political rights.

NARRATIVE OF "SOCIAL EXCLUSION"

In this section I develop the narrative of "social exclusion" that emanates from governmental policies and is incorporated into discussions within BME organizations as a way of engaging with these policies. I use the three-day conference held in Devon, England where eight BME leaders from different organizations in the Southwest to both situate and illustrate the ways these elected leaders, or what Gramsci (2005) would call organic intellectuals, respond to these policies. Specifically, I look at the strategies employed by these leaders in relation to

redefining an identity around race as a means to engage with the policy of community cohesion and its affects on equalities legislation. Inherent within these policies is the notion that "being labeled BME" has some inherent exclusionary quality to it.

Race As An Identity

It's a crisp Saturday morning in early May in the Devon countryside and I am sitting in the library of an old English manor house at a strategic planning meeting. Around me are eight BME leaders from different BME organizations in the Southwest sat in a semi-circle around a large table. Only Board of Trustee members for BBMEO and directors of other BME organizations in the Southwest were invited to this three-day event. Jeremy wanted to assemble this group in order to strategize and select specific campaigns the Black and Ethnic Minority Voluntary and Community Sector (BME VCS) would undertake in the upcoming year.

The general election has just taken place and as of now the country is waiting to see which parties will align to form the first Coalition government since WWII. The outcome of this election will determine the future of the voluntary and community sector as a whole, and the BME sector in particular. Light chatter and PowerPoint handouts floated around the table as Jeremy throws out a question for the group to discuss.

"What are we saying is identity? If we want to talk about the BME in relation to equalities legislation then what is that identity that we are talking about and trying to portray to the mainstream? Personally, I see it more as an issue of social deprivation and poverty."

Stacey replied,

> "Well, I think it's the fluidity and experience of identity. How has one's experience shaped their understanding of themselves? This is the problem I have with the government's use and misuse of concepts like diversity and multiculturalism. The critique of diversity in the media and in government since events like 7/7 hasn't taken into account experience

> enough – their focus has rather been on numbers. Numbers don't mean a lot when you start talking about identity. You can't just talk about yourself as being black because some aspects don't come into play when looking at barriers in life. Focus needs to be on particular experiences that influence life experiences."

Stacey is a black woman in her mid 40s and an organizational consultant and recent Board of Trustees member for BBMEO. For Stacey, experiences dictated the direction of her life. She was born and raised in the British countryside and hers was the only family of color in the village. She talked about her experiences of facing both overt and covert racism within different social and work contexts. These experiences led her to study organizational development in university and she received her Masters in this field in the late 1990s. Since then she has marketed herself as a diversity and organizational consultant and sits on a number of different voluntary and community boards. Stacey also lectures at universities on issues of diversity and equality within the voluntary and community sector. She first met Jeremy in late 2009 at BBMEO's national conference and since that time Stacey has been an active member within the network.

Danny jumped in and said,

> "Well that's the thing isn't it…is race equality talking about legislation or personal experience? I mean Caucasian appearance, that can't fit into that model so only our identity fits into a race agenda. The new Equalities Bill is just one bill government wants so it can just tick the boxes. Race equality needs to be a separate issue. Only strong laws around race discrimination will work."

Danny is a black man of Ghanaian descent who is British born. He is in his mid 50s and is the director of BME Action Plymouth, one of BBMEO's sub-regional infrastructure hubs, and is co-chair of the Board of Trustees for BBMEO.

Vince, a Sheikh man in his late 60s and the chair of the Board of Trustees for the African Caribbean Association of Bristol added, "Race underpins every other inequality and this new

equalities bill they are bringing in just dilutes the race part. We need to challenge the black elite about the race equality agenda, because this black elite tends to be the voice of the BME community. It's who we are as a people and we need to keep it on the agendas of government."

The implications of the perceived disregard of race on the government's agenda towards equalities legislation had a tremendous affect on the BME sector as a whole and was an issue I heard spoken about since my arrival to BBMEO in October 2009. For Stacey, the problem was the limitations of the government's understanding on issues of diversity, multiculturalism and identity. She attributes the 7/7 attacks as an influence on governmental policy decisions around diversity and difference that led them to further classify people into individual boxes, thus separating them from the mainstream and furthering classifications of difference. This classification, or what Stacey calls numbers, neglects the multifaceted nature of identity that everyone possesses. Stacey admits that not all barriers in life can simply be reduced to ones ethnicity or race as other issues like an individuals gender, socioeconomic status, disability, etc…can factor into disadvantage.

Danny and Vince view race as the underpinning aspect in equality legislation. For Danny the language of diversity by the government is exclusive in nature, reserved only for those who are black and/or ethnic minority. It is outside the realm of "Caucasians" because their "appearance" is external to the diversity model. Thus, the historic narrative of race-as-color interacts with current social policies meant to embrace difference. This is internalized within the political language used by BME leaders to campaign and advocate for their rights. Furthermore, for both men the government's agenda to subsume race equality within a larger generic framework dilutes race as a political agenda for BME groups. Interestingly, Vince places partial blame on the "black elite" for not strongly backing the voice of the BME community, which

Danny and Jeremy both agree with as the conversation continues. Yet, this meeting is a gathering of BME leaders who serve as the elected "voice" for their communities, or what Gramsci (2005) would call the "organic intellectuals." This internal division between grassroots BME organic intellectuals and national "black elites" within civil society illustrates the contentious nature of the term BME as a unifying identity for a heterogeneous population with diverse sets of issues, which Stacey references in her response.

The conversation continued with Rosie.

> "Well young people don't even recognise race as an issue, so if we push that back what happens if they experience that later on in life? Racism is done differently than it was in the past. We need to acknowledge that, not sweep it under the rug so politicians feel better about themselves."

Rosie is a black woman in her mid 40s of Jamaican descent, but was born and raised in Britain. She has been the manager for Gloucester Communities Together (GCT) since 2002. GCT is a BME capacity building infrastructure organization for Gloucester and another sub-regional hub for BBMEO. Rosie's background is in education and community development, focusing mainly on working with and empowering young people in the community. She has a university degree in youth and community organizational planning and she also sits on a number of local BME boards in the Gloucester region.

For Rosie, her work with young people influenced her perception of the race agenda; illustrating the ways racial discourse changes through time to fit current socio-economic and political environments and personal interests. Stacey agrees with this, saying racism is sophisticated in its longevity. Although historically created concepts, race and racism manifest themselves in the present through various social and political formats. For those in the BME sector the perception of this manifestation occurs through policies like the community cohesion

policy and Equalities Act 2010, which I address later on, and their underlining exclusive/inclusive language.

Fatima was not excited to be at this meeting and did not understand its point. Fatima is the logistics and policy person for the Bristol Black and Minority Ethnic Organizations and is on a 4-day a week contract. She is in her early 30s and is Somalian, originally from Kenya. Fatima has been with BBMEO for over three years and is in charge of the delivery for most projects the organization is funded for. Fatima is also on the Board of Trustees for two different BME organizations based in Gloucester, a city 40 minutes to the North of Bristol, and she has a close relationship with different Somali and African-Caribbean organization in both cities.

With these relationships with different types of black and ethnic minority organizations Fatima has become a little disenchanted with what she calls "the older BME rhetoric." For her every time a group of BME leaders convened to strategize about future endeavors discussion always seemed to digress back into issues and problems. Furthermore, she was critical of the outcomes of this weekend due to the fact the "same people were talking around the same issues", which made it difficult for new ideas or opinions to enter into these debates. Before arriving at the manor Fatima, Jeremy and myself all had a heated discussion in the office over the agenda for the weekend. Jeremy left things to the last minute and was unprepared for the first day's session, leaving him stressed and argumentative on the planning of the entire weekend. Fatima suggested to Jeremy that he should have had an independent person facilitate the weekend in order to assure everyone had an equal say in matters. However, Jeremy's need to assert his influence and control rebuffed this idea. But, Fatima was hopeful that the addition of Stacey to this group would help to bring the discussions forward towards more solutions-based practical outcomes. However, with Jeremy facilitating for the whole weekend Fatima was only hopeful.

Jeremy agreed that the language used by government was a major issue for BME political and social advancement within the government's agenda. But, Jeremy was less clear about his position on race as a defining marker for the BME sector. For both Jeremy and Stacey relying solely on race or ethnicity to create policy that is suppose to unite communities in actuality divides and excludes then. In this contradictory framework lies a disjuncture where resistance can occur. Yet, there is no a consensus amongst these BME leaders on how to manifest that resistance. For Stacey, it is through acknowledging and using multiple identities. For Jeremy, it is through the language of poverty and social deprivation. Vince and Danny still want to use race as a platform and Rosie sees young people as the way forward in these debates. Fatima remained silent, as she says she has heard all of this before. She tells me later on that day that her hopes for a solution-focused session were out the door.

From Multiculturalism to Community Cohesion

The discussions continued amongst the BME leaders, focusing heavily on the social policies of "multiculturalism," "community cohesion," and equality legislation. Many felt these policies excluded the BME sector from participating fully in their political rights because each failed to address inherent racial discrimination within British society. The discussion of these topics began on Friday when the BME participants began to analyze the language used by the government and media to identify and label different black and ethnic minority groups – in particular the change in policies by government from "multiculturalism" to "community cohesion." Many felt this was a concern because it "targeted particular communities" and created more of an "us versus them mentality" in society.

The consensus amongst the group was that society as a whole, and voluntary and community organizations in particular, needed to "take back" multiculturalism as a social

concept. Jeremy led this discussion saying, "Multiculturalism and equality are dynamic processes that are at odds with the static nature of cohesion and fundamentalism. While the concepts can coexist they cannot belong in the same social and political agenda that seek to rectify inherent inequalities. Cohesion is not about equality, but about fixing things in place. Multiculturalism is being used by the state as a policy instrument. You can't make it into a policy or run a government with multiculturalism."

For others in the group "multiculturalism" was seen as a discredited term in larger society that needed to be re-evaluated. The government's attempts to achieve equality through the policy of community cohesion was viewed by the group as a meaningless gesture, and one that actually separated communities based on race/ethnicity instead of uniting people under one main identity. As Vince commented, "Community cohesion adds nothing to the discussion on equality."

To understand the reasons behind the participants concerns about community cohesion as a policy one must look at key events, and the subsequent reports generated from those events, that influenced the government's decisions to implement the policy of community cohesion. The multiculturalist society New Labour initially promoted and supported as the face of Britain at the beginning of its tenure in the late 1990s quickly shifted after events that occurred nationally and globally at the turn of the twenty-first century (Modood 2007). Civil unrest between racial groups in northern cities in England during the summer of 2001, the 9/11 terrorists attacks in the United States and the 7/7 bombings in London all contributed to a social media and political campaign away from multiculturalism and diversity as a defining marker of modern Britain and its citizens, and towards a policy of "community cohesion."

The concept of "community cohesion" first entered into the national language of the UK after the 2001 riots in numerous cities in Northern England. The New Labour government asked Professor Ted Cantle to lead the independent Community Cohesion Review Team (CCRT) and examine the reasons for the riots, held mostly in large, Northern, urban cities between working class Asian and white male youths. In the report CCRT (2001) concluded the disturbances were a result of communities living "parallel lives" (9). The team argued interactions between different ethnic communities was non-existent, which allowed mistrust and misunderstandings to flourish. CCRT made 67 recommendations to government, addressing the issues of supposed segregated and polarized communities living side by side with one another. These uprisings were seen as a cultural problem that needed to be dealt with by focusing on issues of citizenship, nationality and belonging (Burnett 2004). The mechanism the CCRT team recommended the government to use to combat this problem was the policy of "community cohesion."

Community cohesion emerged from this report as a term to encompass a new way of dealing with ethnic minority communities. Political leaders fuelled the discourse of social exclusion through political speeches that followed the 2001 riots. In a 2002 speech Home Office minster John Denham propagated the notion that Britain needed to cultivate a set of shared common values so that everyone felt that they were full citizens. For Denham, a cohesive society was the only way to help include excluded communities into the mainstream (Barnett 2004). "Official" response to the uprisings in the north was to focus on a set of societal common values that communities could adopt and implement. Government first began to focus on community cohesion as a policy tool after the 2005 London bombings (Communities and Local Government 2009). In 2006, they created the Commission on Integration and Cohesion (CIC) "to explore how different communities and places in England are getting along, and what more

might be done to bring people together - respecting differences, but developing a shared sense of belonging and purpose" (Institute of Community Cohesion, 2010).

By June 2007 the CIC produced its final report "Our Shared Future." In this report the CIC used the cohesion debate to frame larger discussions around bigger social changes like migration patterns and population dynamics. They drew on the success of multiculturalism, but recommended government needed to do more to increase a sense of shared values, mutual respect and civic responsibilities across cultures within the UK. Since 2008 various government departments have adopted the policy of community cohesion in various frameworks, from education to housing and employment to immigration.

For the BME leaders at this meeting "community cohesion" was seen as a divisive policy. Vince expressed this sentiment during a heated discussion at the meeting around the language used by the government in relation to issues faced by the BME sector:

> "What I see is this change in jargon by the white community to me is to feel more comfortable within the jargon of say racism. Then anti-racism came in and that's promptly disappeared and now its community cohesion and diversity. Ok, and then the equalities lot. The problem is racism and how do you think we can reclaim uh that, this jargon that is changing with our... I'm saying this jargon, which has been changed over the years; it has been changed by the white establishment here, as you know."

Vince saw the change in terms over time in relation to race and different ethnic communities as a tactic by the "white community" to mask what Vince perceived to be racist policies. From the anti-racist agenda to the diversity model and now the community cohesion policy Vince understood these all as ineffective means the government used to combat racism. In Vince's eyes racism was the major issue facing BME communities and one that the government was not willing to truly engage with in an effective manner. Originally from Indian, Vince came to the UK in his 20s. Soon after his arrival Vince became heavily involved in

community activism around race and ethnicity because of the racism he experienced once he arrived in this country by what he calls "the white establishment." Although Vince is a Sheikh, he still identified with the term "black" as a political platform to help combat a "system of racism" he felt discriminates against different ethnic and racial communities.

Jeremy felt that the terms used by the BME voluntary and community sector to engage with the policy agenda were regulated and formulated by the government and did not fully represent the issues and concerns faced by BME organizations in general. Instead of focusing on social policies that placed different communities in certain boxes, Jeremy felt that the voluntary and community sector needed to engage with the older terminology of multiculturalism as a *social* platform for the betterment of society as a whole. Addressing the rest of the BME leaders Jeremy said,

> "…some of the things that became apparent is that the language if you like, that we use in our campaigns to try and achieve equality has been taken away from the BME sector. And concepts like cohesion and diversity are policy positions that are effectively in opposition to achievement of equality and in opposition to the concepts around multiculturalism. Cohesion is a fixed state and multiculturalism is a dynamic thing. It's not a service. It's not really possible to build a policy around something that's dynamic cause it's constantly changing, and it's really a state of being rather than a...uh...its a sense of identity. A sense of understanding how we identify with each other in this country. And not something that belongs only to black and ethnic minority communities. But actually multiculturalism is something that belongs to the nation."

For Jeremy, issues of creating a sense of belonging amongst various ethnic communities in the UK went beyond integrating BME communities into a homogenous sense of "Britishness." By the government relying on policies like community cohesion and diversity they actually do not achieve their goals of equality. He saw the move away from multiculturalism as a social agenda as a "racist agenda that turned multiculturalism away from what it was, a social and civil platform that we all shared as a nation at one point." But, Jeremy again portrays his

contradictory consciousness by saying multiculturalism is social platform all should use to create a sense of belonging within the nation. Instead of relying on a platform of race that is limiting in nature Jeremy understands that individuals have their own multiple identities. Instead of difference being exclusionary in nature Jeremy wanted difference to be open.

Underlying the government's promotion of "British values" is a racialized notion of the nation, which favors a historical myth of white homogeneity and forever excludes communities who sit outside that "imagined community." When various governmental departments and larger mainstream organizations focus on "socially excluded" populations, inherent racialized notions of the nation emerge. Fatima expressed her issue with the idea of "social exclusion" in relation to "community cohesion" when she mentioned to the group a report she received from a national organization on strategies organizations can use when working with black and ethnic minority "hard to reach" communities.

Fatima was perplexed and slightly angered by the report. When she first received it we were both sitting in the office of the Bristol Black and Minority Ethnic office. It was sometime in March, right before the end of the fiscal year. The whole building was in a frenzy as BBMEO and the African Caribbean Association of Bristol (ACAB) had numerous reports to finish on projects completed throughout the year. Fatima was at her desk sorting through mail when she came upon the report. Flipping through the pamphlet Fatima looked up at me and let out an exasperated sigh. Just then the door opened and Simone, the director of ACAB, walked into the office with the same report in her hand.

"Did you see this mess? Since when are we hard to reach?" Simone asks to no one in particular. Simone is a petite, Rastafarian, African-Caribbean woman in her mid 50s of Gambian descent. She has been director of ACAB for the past 7 years and sits on the Board of Trustees

for BBMEO. Although petite in stature, Simone's presence and voice make her an imposing figure in the office. Simone frequently would come into the office making complaints or ascertains about various issues she had either with Jeremy, other members of her staff, other directors/government officials in the area, or anything else. Today it was about the "hard to reach" report.

Fatima replied, "I was just reading it."

For the next thirty minutes both women went back and forth, ripping the report to pieces. The reason behind their outrage was a perceived disregard for the work BME organizations like BBMEO and ACAB do with black and ethnic minority disadvantaged communities. The recommendations posed in the report were seen by both women as "common sense" and "derogatory" in nature. The notion that BME communities were difficult to reach for mainstream organizations to provide services for was because of their status as black and minority ethnic bothered both women. For Simone, this just perpetuated the idea that BME communities were isolated backwards places.

At the strategic meeting Fatima felt it was necessary to address the issue of "social exclusion" and BME communities within the community cohesion policy. When she brought to the group's attention the "Hard to Reach. Easy to Ignore" report Danny assumed it was joke. In response Fatima said,

> "No! I'll read you something it says. This was based on a workshop done to address barriers faced by organizations who want to work with BME communities, right. So the second barrier people said they faced with BME communities was 'Overcoming inertia, lack of confidence, fear and anxiety.' One of the solutions was to "Put your shoes on, get your car keys and go!' I mean this is just commonsense. But for some reason BME communities are seen as these desolate, backwards, isolated communities that need saving from some big organizations – but those big organizations are too afraid, or lack some sort of special knowledge, to engage with these communities. I just don't get it."

Fatima's concerns over the labeling of BME communities as "hard reach" is another example of the narrative of social exclusion that permeates throughout the discussion around BME communities and organizations. The report that Fatima mentions was based on an interactive workshop hosted by a mainstream organization and came about due to responses from members that they faced difficulty in communicating with BME groups. Ten barriers were presented and accompanied by practical solutions to address those barriers faced when working with BME groups. However, the practical nature of the solutions left Fatima perplexed, and slightly angry, as she said, "It makes it seem like BME communities are some foreign aliens who no one outside those groups can talk to."

The images used to portray these "hard to reach" communities were stereotypical and heavily loaded – two pictures of dark skinned black men with dreadlocks sitting in public spaces looking dejected and alone as people walked by. For Fatima these images, along with the content and language used in the report, were representative of the image mainstream organizations and government have of the BME sector and BME communities. In this instance "hard to reach" was another way of saying, "socially excluded."

In this environment the narrative of "BME as socially excluded" portrayed in governmental social policies like "community cohesion" relies on hegemonic constructions of race and nation. To work within and resist this dominant narrative these BME "organic intellectuals" situate their resistance in the disjuncture of this hegemonic construction. By this I mean these BME elites use the language of "multiculturalism," a government produced policy, to redefine and challenge the newer policy of "community cohesion" – a policy seen by these elites as inherently static and divisive in nature. Yet, the state is not the only body that produces these types of limiting narratives. They are also reproduced within BME groups. I turn now to one of

those limiting narratives of "BME as disadvantaged." This narrative sits alongside, and helps support, the narrative of BME communities and organizations as "socially excluded."

NARRATIVE OF "BME AS DISADVANTAGE"

In this section I explore the ways this second narrative manifests itself within BME organizations as a way to describe the communities they serve. This narrative is contradictory in nature. On one hand BME organizations are supposed to advocate for the rights of their communities but in order to do so they must maintain a level of perceived disadvantage that gives validity to using a racial platform within society. Therefore, the narrative of "BME as disadvantaged" is reproduced from within BME organizations as well as resisted against, and this narrative helps perpetuate the notion of "BME as socially excluded."

To illustrate this point I focus on stories of racism told by BME leaders and issues of capacity within BME organizations. I use a Race Debate hosted by BBMEO in Bristol with six panelists from different political parties. This event was opened to the community and had over seventy attendees, mostly from different BME communities. Using this debate I focus on the construction racism and racial inequality by BME leaders and representatives. I also refer back to the strategic planning meeting. Within these constructions lie historically bounded stories that perpetually place BME individuals and communities in a disadvantaged position.

Stories of Racism

In an old converted Church in a predominantly African-Caribbean neighborhood in Bristol, BBMEO co-hosted a race debate with a prominent race think-tank from London. In the old Church vestibule chairs were lined up side-side as seventy people gathered to listen to, and question, the six invited panelists. On the panel were Jeremy; Alfred, a black Conservative

farmer and entrepreneur in his mid-50s from the Southwest; Stacey, a black woman in her mid-40s who is an organizational consultant who was also at the strategic planning meeting mentioned above; Bill, a white Liberal-Democrat MP for Bristol who is in his mid-30s; Deepak, an Indian Muslim male who is head of finance for a large international bank who is in his late-40s; and Travis, a black male in his late-30s and director of the race think tank from London that co-hosted the race debate.

It is early July 2010 and the head of government had changed from New Labour to a new Conservative/Liberal-Democrat Coalition government. The social and political climate at the time was riddled with speculation over the future of the voluntary and community sector as a whole, and with the BME sector in particular. In June, the new government announced an emergency budget plan designed to cut massive amounts of funding from the government to the public and third sector as a means "to rebuild the British economy based on the government's values of responsibility, freedom and fairness" (Direct Government, accessed January 25, 2011). Yet, many in the voluntary and community sector were dubious of the new government's plan. This race debate was one forum through which BME individuals, communities and organizations could address their grievances to a panel composed of members from different political and racial/ethnic backgrounds.

The format of the evening focused on the panelists answering five questions from the audience that were pre-written by a member of staff from the London based think-tank. Questions concentrated on four main topics: education attainments for BME communities; representation of the BME within Parliament; disproportionate impact of public sector cuts on BME communities; and the relationship between the police and BME communities. At the end

members of the audience were given the floor to make their own points about the topics covered or ask additional questions of the panelists.

The overall focus of the debate centered on examining the various ways racism affected access to social rights of citizenship for BME communities. Terms and phrases like "institutional racism," "disadvantaged" and "lack of access" resonated throughout the answers given by the panellists, as well as in comments made by audience members in response to those answers. But the topic that most occurred during the debate, and one that resonated throughout my time of working for BBMEO, was the idea of BME communities being disadvantaged because they are labeled as BME. An exchange between black Conservative Alfred and white Liberal-Democrat Bill illustrates this point.

In response to the question asked about the lack of representation of BME MPs in Parliament, white Liberal-Democrat MP Bill tried to "relate" to the BME community by telling his own story of hardship through poverty.

> "Just to dispel some myths about what you may perpetuate about what might be my background. My father was a road worker for the Council. Dug holds in the road and filled them in again. In the winter he drove a snow plough. Uh…my mother was a school dinner lady and a waitress. I'm the first person in my family to go university. I grew up in a house were we had three rented rooms. We had an outdoor toilet and no central heating. I know what poverty was and I know what it was to make a journey."

In response to this statement Alfred replied,

> "I'm sorry, if you're an ethnic minority we all know that story. The advantage that you had was that you are white and that's a big advantage growing up in circumstances like that. So don't give me that sad story cause mine is sadder than yours."

Bill attempted to engage with the other panelists and the members of the audience through the narrative of disadvantage. In this instance his way of connecting with the audience,

and "proving" himself, was though his own personal story of poverty. Bill equates his own economic disadvantage as a child with the issues facing the BME community in contemporary times. In doing so he unintentionally relies on a discourse that situates BME communities in a subjugated role – a role that perpetuates the image of the BME sector as one that lacks capacity, thus in need of state intervention. At the same time Alfred also perpetuates this image by replying that all ethnic minorities know this story of poverty because they are labeled BME.

As the night continued the language used by panelists consistently used interchangeably "disadvantaged communities" with "BME communities" as debates raged over the impending public sector cuts, BME parliamentary representation and the impact of various social policies on BME communities. Stacey responded to comments made by Bill over the possibility of public sector cuts disproportionately affecting BME communities. In her response the slippages between "BME" and "economically disadvantaged" appear:

> "I don't think it's very helpful to pretend that these um cuts are not going to have a disproportionate effect on Black and Minority Ethnic communities. And in my answer I would like to just link the first two questions to this question cause I think if we look at issues in isolation they don't make any sense. So when we link the issues of education to this what we know is poor children tend to have poor educational outcomes, which lead to poor employment outcomes, which leads to life long disadvantage. That's the reality. If we look at representation in Parliament, we've already said lack of representation means that certain voices don't get heard and therefore certain issued don't get addressed. And this debate is about race equality in the Southwest and we know that in the Southwest we haven't got that representation and that voice. Therefore there are certain issues that aren't going to be addressed. So let's not pretend that this isn't going to be a negative outcome for Black and Minority Ethnic Communities."

While each of the questions posed to the panelists focused on contemporary issues, the various members of the panel framed the larger story of racism in historical terms. This story relies on similar language used in the 1960s-80s, found in the state's narrative of social

exclusion. Although BME communities have historically bore the burden of state racism through legislation and social policies, the constant reference to BME as inherently disadvantaged communities fosters the narrative of disadvantage and keeps BME communities in a static state. This static state situates BME communities in a historical framework of race and racism in Britain and aids in the perception of BME organizations lacking sufficient capacity to service local communities effectively. Therefore, BME VCOs, and the communities they serve, are socially constructed as inherently disadvantaged because of some inherent nature with being black or ethnic minority.

Alfred echoed this sentiment when he spoke about the institutional racism experienced by members of the BME community upon arrival into Britain and the "victimization mentality" that ensued afterwards within that same community:

> "And it is one of the things that we in the black community should always recognize that we are descendants of people of great courage. And what happened when we came to this country with all that energy of trying to make things better for ourselves, we hit this bloody brick wall of racism. And then what it meant is that we have sort of retreated into our small communities, and we didn't sort of go out and claim the rest of Britain as our own. And what happened is that I feel that we then bought into what I call the victim mentality."

Alfred acknowledges the impact of racism on "his people" once they came to Britain. But, somehow the nature of racism gripped the black and ethnic minority community and left them "paralyzed" and falling prey to the "victim mentality." This victim mentality holds back the "potential" of BME communities and organizations from achieving more within society. The power of the label "BME" is then both an identity of pride and a hindrance for those it defines.

The Power of Labels: Issues of Capacity as BME

The label of BME is both a tool of mobilization for a community that has been historically ostracized by the state due to race/ethnicity (the narrative of social exclusion) and a source of continual stigmatization because of that historical connotation (the narrative of disadvantage). But labels do have power to them, due to the socio-political connotations associated with those terms. In Chapter 3 I outlined the impact of race and racism on immigration laws in the UK and the effect that had on black and minority ethnic communities within the UK. Various political parties and media outlets labeled BME as "dark strangers," "outsiders" and "immigrant." Over time this rhetoric attached itself to the term BME, even after blackness became a mobilizing tool to rally BME communities for a political purpose as a way to attain political and social rights.

At the three-day meeting Jeremy, Danny and Vince brought up the issue of the power of the BME label in a conversation about the implications of the state labeling black and ethnic minority groups as "BME," and the connotations associated with that label. During this conversation Danny was concerned with the government's push to change "BME" to "BAME" (Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic). Danny believed the government wanted to change the terminology in order to suppress the mobilizing political power behind blackness:

> "I think we need to defend the term black and minority ethnic, BME. We always have had a presence here and yet they deny us that thing. And now they want to add the word Asian to it. So now its Black Asian and Minority Ethnic. Now, I don't have any issues with what it's called as long as the fact black remains. We have an identity. But it's a political issues and a way of labeling people and putting us into neat little boxes."

Jeremy responded to Danny saying,

> "See that's where the BME thing comes in. We're down with the defense of race and ethnicity, but we also have to address the fact that a tool has

> been taken out of our box by the government and has been used to divide our communities rather than bring them together."

Although Danny and Jeremy see the term BME as a labeling, used by the government to put people into boxes, they also see the term BME as a mobilization tool needed for members of the BME community to have a voice, a place in British history, and to combat perceived actions of racism. Yet, Jeremy acknowledges that this is a double-edged sword since the labels used to uplift communities and rally them around a political and social agenda are the same labels used by the state to suppress those same communities. Danny is weary of the national dialogue over possibly officially changing the term BME to BAME. Larger national organizations are pushing to include "Asian" within Black and Minority Ethnic and modify BME to BAME, and many emerging governmental and political organizations at the national use the term BAME in reports. This is just another way of "labelling us" according to Danny, which he has no problem with as long as "black" is not dropped or ignored from BME. Vince agreed with Danny over this issue because for him "black" is a term that defines, identifies and encompasses "shared experiences" that brings together "*politically* BME communities and organizations."

However, the language used by the state to describe BME communities does influence and affect the ways in which BME organizations in the third sector view themselves within the sector and larger society. This, in turn, affects organizations capacity to provide effective and lasting services for their communities, and their confidence in obtaining necessary funding and support to provide those services. Jeremy argues, "The tool of racism was used to undermine the possibility of creating economic equality." This form of racism manifests itself through the subconscious ways BME TSOs incorporate the narratives of "social exclusion" and "BME as disadvantaged" in their own understandings of their capacity and reach as organizations. This

"historico-racial schema" is placed upon BME organizations and is enacted through those same organizations.

While capacity is a major issue for BME organizations in general, and smaller BME organizations in particular, the rhetoric used within the sector amongst members of BME organizations replicates and perpetuates a cycle of disadvantage. The most pressing issue faced by the BME voluntary and community sector is successfully obtaining funding – I will discuss this topic in more depth in the next chapter. In the vignette below I illustrate the ways in which larger discourses of disadvantage and social exclusion interplay to recreate and reproduce racialized notions of political rights within the sector, through an exchange had between Jeremy and Rosie in relation to obtaining funding.

Jeremy says,

> "So uh commissioning and procurement. We kind of know about this and it's a lot like banging your head against a brick wall. Yes, it's possible to get a commission. Yes, it's possible to be involved in the procurement process. But, most BME organizations haven't got the time, or the capability, to engage in that or the capital to engage in that. It's difficult if it's a small kind of off the wall operation but if you know...I know it's just not possible and that's my experience and my understanding."

Upon hearing this Rosie replies,

> "Yea in relation to BME organizations. The problem I think is capacity and that is very fundamental. And I think another thing is information for small organizations. They don't even understand the full process and it's really complicated. That is fundamental and I also think it's that age old argument that goes with this as well about building the sectors credibility. Public credibility."

Laughing Jeremy replied, "Oh yes well that's hard."

Rosie is taken aback by Jeremy's reply. Rosie has worked within the BME voluntary and community sector in Gloucester for over fifteen years. Her interests in BME youth empowerment and training runs deep within her veins and to have Jeremy flippantly disregard

the abilities of the BME voluntary and community sector to gain credibility has felt like a personal attack on her own abilities. Angrily Rosie responded,

> "Well you can sit there and laugh but at the end of the day we're wastin our time, you know. Cause at the end of the day as I said to you earlier, yes there's an element about organizations having the confidence to participate. But the man at the top don't see the BME sector as being a credible sector in the first place to even give him 5 pence."

In this exchange both Jeremy and Rosie agree that the lack of capacity within the sector affects BME organizations from obtaining contracts, commissions or general funding. But, Jeremy's response to Rosie's argument around building the credibility of the sector portrays the inherent idea that because these organizations are BME they will always lack the capacity – a sentiment expressed by governmental social policies like "community cohesion." The reason for this social exclusion lies in some inherent deficiencies within BME organizations. The dual narratives of "social exclusion" and "BME as disadvantage" interlock to create an overarching paradigm of contemporary racism that is both top-down and bottom-up.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this chapter I focused on the political rights of citizenship for BME organizations, utilizing T.H. Marshall's (1998) definition and conception of citizenship. I used two major events – a three-day conference with eight leaders from various BME organizations in the Southwest and a Race Debate co-organized by BBMEO in Bristol – to illustrate the lack of political rights available to those individuals and communities labeled BME within England, and the issues faced by BME organizations because of it. In my analysis, I focused on two dominate narratives I saw emerge that hinder full access to political rights for those who label themselves, and are labeled by the state as, Black and Minority Ethnic – the narrative of "social exclusion" and "BME as disadvantaged." Social policies like "community cohesion" coupled with

historical static discourses of race and racism aid in the creation of a larger discourse of "BME" communities and organizations as somehow inherently lacking the ability to fully integrate, participate and successful contribute to larger society. This discourse is one that both the state and BME organizaitons contribute to and participate in, through the language used to describe the abilities of these organizations and the creation of social policies aimed at BME communities.

Within the shift away from multiculturalism and towards community cohesion as a social policy by government lies the narrative of social exclusion. In this narrative certain BME communities are viewed by the state as perpetual "outsiders" who are excluded from mainstream society due to their racial and ethnic differences. This narrative relies on an ideology of nationhood rooted in a racialized past, which racial and ethnic others must integrate into in order to be considered by the state as "included." But, in actuality this narrative, and the policies that are created from it, perpetuates division instead of creating solidarity.

Burnett (2004) argues that the narrative driven by the media and government towards community cohesion has an underlying populist hysteria that identifies with a particular concept of nationhood. This concept supports a framework of citizenship that criminalizes particular communities. In this particular narrative certain ethnic minority communities are labeled as "cultural outsiders" who are marginalized, isolated and self-segregating from larger society. Through this mainstream perception, various ethnic minority communities are constructed as "socially excluded" from British society. This exclusion is heavily premised on the idea that particular ethnic and racial minority groups segregate themselves from the mainstream. Thus Burnett (2004) contends blame is placed on the communities themselves within the "political circle of exclusion, segregation and control" (9).

Essentially community cohesion is, as Worley (2005) argues, the new framework presiding over race relations policies in Britain. The focus on communities within the community cohesion framework has enabled "a deracialization of language" (Worley 2005: 484) as communities are talked about, but are not named. However, the underlying rhetoric is directed towards different BME communities, cloaked in terms like "diversity," "integration," and "culture" in relation to "communities."

The language used by government to identify particular communities is a coded racialized language that allows the narrative of social exclusion to permeate throughout policy. This affects the image of the BME voluntary and community sector because government views these organizations as the local enactors of national policy. In effect, government labels particular "communities" as "socially excluded," and government views "community cohesion" as the policy to best foster more "cultural understanding" through British "shared values." But the underlying issues for BME communities in relation to the state are never fully addressed. Burnett (2004) argues that by turning a deaf ear to particular voices makes those voices silent and conceals the issues they would speak about. This silence is then legitimated through policies that "simultaneously targets the beliefs and identities of particular communities while disregarding those same communities lived experiences" (Burnett 2004: 9)

The assumptions about the identities and beliefs of racial and ethnic communities drive the community cohesion agenda. This in turn affects the leverage BME organizations have to challenge perceived discrimination. Cultural diversity is then seen as an illegitimate social and political benefit in its own right. For Burnett (2004), the role of the government is then to both control and maintain community identity and regulate citizenship to achieve community cohesion.

However, it is not just the state in the form of government that perpetuates these narratives. The BME leaders, or the "organic intellectuals," who operate as the representatives for their BME communities are forced to resist against and incorporate within the notion that BME means disadvantaged, and therefore socially excluded. I illustrated this point using the conversations had during the Race Debate. The panelists were either members of BME community organizations or representatives of political parties who had a vested interest in BME issues. All feel victim to portraying BME communities as "poor" or "disadvantaged" because of their status as racial or ethnic minorities. As a way to "fit in" the white Liberal-Democrat MP Bill told the story of his impoverished backgrounds. But he was subsequently "called out" by Alfred for failing to realize that poverty is not the only experience that unites BME communities. Instead, it was the experience of racism and the lack of resources available to BME communities because of that racism that drew these communities together.

While Alfred acknowledged the role of racism in the development of the BME consciousness within the UK, he was quick to point out that the "victim mentality" is the downfall of this process This victimization mentality that Alfred spoke of can be seen as a by-product of the narrative of BME as disadvantaged, where unabsorbed hegemonic critical ideas about BME communities mix with the lived experiences of race and racism for BME individuals and communities (Sturm 2002). A cycle ensues whereby the majority view BME communities as "socially excluded" because of their ethnic and racial identities. Therefore, the way to promote social inclusion is through social policies like community cohesion. But these policies place blame on BME communities for not integrating into society, with "little attention given to challenging the hegemonic construction of White identities which simultaneously reinforce boundaries of community, belonging and notions of 'us' and 'them'" (Worley 2005: 489).

The two narratives described in this chapter contribute to racial projects that perpetuate a system of power and domination that uses race as a framework. In doing so racialized access to political rights is allowed to continue, fostered through political and moral debates around inclusion, cohesion, and community. The result is a continual lack of access to political rights for those groups that fall outside this dominate discourse. Yet, the language behind policies like "community cohesion" and the Single Equalities Act are supposed to include racial and ethnic minorities into society through an official recognition of difference. It is in this disjuncture, this slippage of theory and reality, within civil society that counterhegemonic resistance can begin to occur.

CHAPTER 5: SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP: FUNDING, CAPACITY AND THE "COMMON SENSE" OF RACE

You can't stop the revolution cause of a cold
Lee Jasper

Civil rights give those within society specific privileges under the law. Political rights allow individuals the ability to vote and participate in the political process. But underpinning, or backing, both types of rights are social rights that gives meaning to citizenship for all members within a community (Dwyer 2010). According to Marshall (1998), the creation of the welfare state in the late 1940s helped establish social citizenship. This citizenship was based on universal rights of citizens set against state-sponsored socio-economic provisions. For Marshall, social citizenship would allow even the poorest members of society full inclusion and participation. Dwyer (2010) finds Marshall's concept of social citizenship useful, saying social citizenship provides a standard that assess the capability of particular individuals or groups to access welfare rights and resources that are available to all citizens within a specific community. In this regard social citizenship offers the ability to examine the dynamics of social exclusion in relation to the causes and degree of inequality within a society. Social citizenship is then an important aspect to broader notions of citizenship with the rights of welfare a central aspect of "effective citizenship" (Dwyer 2010:4).

However, issues of race and racism within this system mean there will still be an unequal balance of power in that relationship. Individuals and organizations, like BME voluntary and community organizations, who use race and ethnicity as a form of political currency to engage in the political process still have to contend with underlying issues of racism and unequal access to resources based upon that racial and ethic affiliation. Within the BME sector this unequal

relationship is most readily seen in relation to accessing, and being awarded, funding from the government and through capacity building projects.

In this chapter I use participant observations I conducted while working as a grant writer and social analyst for the Bristol Black and Minority Ethnic Organization (BBMEO) between October of 2009 and July of 2010 to situate this discussion. Specifically, I focus on the dynamics of social activism enacted by two staff members, Jeremy the Director and Fatima the Policy and Logistics Coordinator, in relation to a digital inclusion project the organization was awarded funding for during my tenure. Their relationship is an example of the types of strategies BME organizations use to meet the needs of the organization, the communities serviced by these organizations, and the funders. In doing so I propose the political currency of using racial and ethnic identities to obtain political rights is a double-edge sword. On one hand BME organizations provide a service to their communities that the state has neglected to fulfill. They need to be strategically opportunistic when obtaining funding to stay in operation and deliver those needed services. On the other hand, using that political currency also puts these organizations at a disadvantage in obtaining funding from different bodies due to underlying assumptions, from funders and more "mainstreams" organizations, associated with being labeled a BME organization. But the relationship between what I call "pragmatic activism" and "opportunistic activism" can be seen as a form of counterhegemonic resistance to larger discourses of race that limit access to social rights of citizenship.

For the BME voluntary and community sector, the ability to interact with the political system in a way that is advantageous for them rests largely in the abilities of BME organizations, individually and collectively, to access and retain funding. In order to obtain funding these organizations must demonstrate they have the skills, capacity and track record to meet the

objectives, goals, and targets set forth by large funding agencies. Yet, recent research has found all too often that "the aims and objectives of capacity building are increasingly funder–led rather than user-led" (The Big Lottery Fund 2010: 11), especially in relation to BME groups. Although funding agencies are asking for more outreach and engagement with BME communities and their organizations, access to that funding tends to be out of reach for those targeted groups. The Big Lottery Fund (2010) research found the main reasons for this is due to a lack of capacity within BME organizations to obtain available funds and a lack of confidence from funder that BME organizations can and will deliver targets.

But these notions of race and citizenship are not just concepts that affect BME organizations. Instead race and citizenship are ideas that infiltrate into the everyday and become part of society's "common sense." Therefore, I also examine the everyday conceptualizations of race and citizenship in Britain through interviews I conducted with British citizenships living in the Bristol during the course of my fieldwork. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, I use these interviews in an exploratory manner to look at the various ways people uncritically absorb larger discourses of race and citizenship into their own worldviews. But, before I begin my discussion on the various ways racialized actors understand, incorporate and resist against raced notions of the nation, I first need to clarify the place of the Bristol Black and Minority Ethnic Organization within civil society. During the time of my fieldwork New Labour was still head of government and referred to civil society as the "third sector" and all organizations operating within this space as "third sector organizations" (TSOs). Therefore, I focus my discussions first on explaining the function and place of the third sector within British society under New Labour and the function of the Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) third sector within this space.

BBMEO and The Third Sector

Both Alcock (2010) and Evers and Laville (2004) argue there is no consensus amongst policy makers, practitioners or academics over a clear definition of the third sector. Yet, the sector does exist in many contexts and provides a number of needed and important services for various communities. Essentially, the third sector is the sector that is comprised of a number of different types of organizations - voluntary and community, charities, mutual's, co-operatives, non-profits and non-governmental. These organizations act in an intermediary nature in a "welfare pluralism or plural economy" and emphasize the importance of the sociopolitical and economic dimensions of society (Evers and Laville 2004: 10). Or, the third sector is a term that encompasses a number of different types of organizations and bodies who meet the needs of the social economy. In the UK, the third sector is not necessarily a demarcated sector distinctly separate from the public and private sector. Instead it is entrenched within a tri-polar system of market, state and informal communities and economies like private households (Evers and Laville 2004).

According to Haugh and Kitson (2007) political and governmental interest in the third sector in the UK occurred with the election of New Labour in 1997. Previous administrations acknowledged the sector, but their dominant philosophy was to use the private sector to restructure the economy. But, New Labour saw the state as having more than just public and private sphere. Influenced by Third Way philosophy, a combination of neoliberalism and renewal of civil society, New Labour promised to address the issues of economic inequality and social exclusion that plagued the country during the Conservative administration in the 1980s and early 1990s through an engagement with the third sector. Since that time the government has leant its support to the third sector, with the sector becoming instrumental in the deliver of

various governmental policies. This allowed the third sector to move from economic marginalization to the mainstream.

Haugh and Kitson (2007) assert in the UK three main groups comprised the third sector: the voluntary sector, which includes charities, community associations and groups, national campaigning associations and housing associations; the community sector, which includes local small organizations; and the social enterprise sector, which includes organizations with a business with social focus like credit unions and co-operatives. Organizations range in size from small community based groups to large charities like Oxfam. Income for these types of organizations comes from three sources: "voluntary income (fundraising, donations, legacies, lottery and money raised from sale of donated goods); investment income (share dividends and interest on savings); and earned income (trading, fees and contracts)" (Haugh and Kitson 2007: 979).

The dynamics of citizenship under New Labour focused around partnerships between local voluntary and community organizations and the state. Lewis (2005) states New Labour wanted to use voluntary and community organizations to improve the delivery of public services while also recognizing the independence of these organizations. New Labour's neo-liberal reforms on the relationship between the state and its citizens focused of modernizing the delivery and accessibility of public service through various third sector organizations (TSOs). This vision was supposed to promote partnerships to insure bottom-up change and not top-down deregulation associated with the Conservatives. New Labour assumed their partnership with TSOs would accomplish three overall goals: reinvigorate public services; work at local levels to revitalize local communities, thus furthering government policies; and promote social inclusion (Lewis 2005).

Within the third sector there are numerous sub-sections based on organization type and focus. The Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) third sector is one of these sub-sections. Very little is written about the BME third sector in general owing to the sectors relatively recent and unwritten beginnings. Most of the information I could gather about this sector has come from informal conversations from various BME organizational staff in the Southwest coupled with short articles written on different BME and governmental organizational websites, a few publications produced by BBMEO, and one full length report from a national charity with BME interests.

In the BME sector there are national, regional, sub-regional and local organizations. Within that structure there are still more sub-structures dependent upon the focus of the organization. For example, BBMEO is a regional infrastructure organization. Therefore the organization's focus is on delivering infrastructure related projects based on capacity building for the region through trainings, events, networking, and engagement with policy-makers on behalf of the interests of the BME community in the region. In England there are eight such regional infrastructure organizations. Each of the regional infrastructure organizations is a partner with the one national BME infrastructure organization based in London. How each region is structured in relation to sub-regional and local BME organizations varies by location. For the Southwest region the Bristol Black and Minority Ethnic (BBMEO) operates through five sub-regional BME organizations, or "hubs." Each of those sub-regional organizations works with and amongst their local BME voluntary and community organizations (VCOs) and relays relevant information back to BBMEO. This information is then used to inform future trainings and events along with policy briefs and meetings with different governmental authorities.

As mentioned in Chapter 2, BBMEO is a small organization with a large responsibility. Most days I worked with Fatima and/or Jeremy in the office. Jeremy, the director, is a mixed-race male in his late 50s. He was recently married and is the father of a son from a previous relationship who was preparing to attend college. Jeremy has worked in BME grassroots organizations for over 20 years and was on the board that helped create the first national BME infrastructure organization in 2004. In his youth he was also a member of the Black section of the old Labour party and was heavily involved in black politics in England in the 70s and 80s in various ways. Jeremy likes to refer to his previous background involvement in other organizations and party politics as a means to validate his current decisions for the organization. As such, it is sometimes hard for Jeremy to take into consideration other views or opinions on various projects; he is quite dedicated to doing things his own way.

Fatima is the policy and logistics person for the organization. She is in her early 30s and is Somalian, originally from Kenya. She came to Britain 10 years ago and initially settled in London where she worked in a warehouse by night and went to university in the day. She graduated from university with a degree in finance and moved to the Southwest of England shortly after. Fatima works closely with Jeremy, delivering on various projects BBMEO is funded for. Her style of delivery is one that is direct and practical in nature. As a member of different local BME organizations in Gloucester and Bristol along with her connections to the Somali populations in both cities Fatima has a close connection to frontline BME organizations.

BBMEO is an organization with many different aims. On any given day BBMEO is 1) a non-profit NGO focusing on human rights; 2) an NGO focused on poverty and disadvantaged; 3) a charity that provides a business management service to other smaller organisations: 4) a company that is focused on selling websites to other smaller companies; and/or 5) a third sector

organization whose focus is on digital inclusion for BME and disadvantaged populations. The various visions Jeremy has about the direction of the organization are best summed up when he said to me on day at work: "We are a generic provider with a specialist audience."

According to Jeremy, the thread that holds all these aims together is the organization's focus on Black and Minority Ethnic communities and issues. For Jeremy, this mobilization around a racial and ethnic identity gives BBMEO, the African Caribbean Association of Bristol (ACAB) and other BME third sector organizations the political currency needed to lobby for their interests in relation to their political, legal and social citizenship rights.

BBMEO's work is premised on the idea that the ability to engage with the political system, as a means of exercising one's democratic rights, is largely dependent on possessing the necessary capacity and knowledge needed to understand how one can fully participate within civil society. Afridi and Warmington (2009) claim the BME third sector has been defined by three main characteristics: self-help and self-organizations, mutuality, and political resistance. When BME organizations lack the capacity to gain access to social service or engage in political action, local BME organizations are supposed to fill that need through necessary trainings, engagements, and events. The main way local organizations are able to support these types of activities is through consistent and community/user focused funding.

While most third sector organizations engage in public service delivery as their mechanism of income generation and focus, BBMEO is focused on creating a network infrastructure within the Southwest to help inform the sector about relevant and current policies that may affect them, announce funding opportunities they can benefit from, and provide necessary trainings to build up the capacity of smaller BME VCOs. For Jeremy, technology is the main tool to help achieve these goals. By the time of my arrival into the organization Jeremy

was focused on creating an interactive website that individuals and organizations could use to obtain current information about the sector and download toolkits around advocacy, campaigning, marketing, fundraising, grant writing, and basic project management. Overall, the main theme that rang from Jeremy's mouth was "technology as advocacy." This push for technology to be at the forefront of BBMEO's work led Jeremy to pursue funding focused on digital advocacy and campaigning.

DIGITAL INCLUSION

It's a cold grey December morning and I am at my desk completing a funding application for Jeremy. The government has set aside £30 million nationally to "support the development of the national Plan for Digital Participation to get more than one million people online in the next three years" (HM Government 2009: 9). Government wants to focus on "socially and digitally excluded" individuals and communities within this target, and empower them to become socially and digitally included in the movement to transfer all public services to an online format. The government awarded the contract for the distribution of these funds to the national UK Online organization. UK Online is the funding body I am now applying to on behalf of BBMEO.

But, as I look through the application I am finding the targets the funders have set too large of a number for a small organization like BBMEO to reach. I bring this point up to Jeremy and recommend that we consider applying for one of the smaller awards that has more manageable targets, instead of the larger grant.

In reply to this suggestion Jeremy tells me, "I think it is something we can deliver on. We're an online organization that services disadvantaged communities in the Southwest and we can work through our networks in key cities in the Southwest to deliver. We also focus on empowerment through online engagement, so it should work." But, I am still unsure. I tell him

2000 people is too large a number to achieve in twelve months with only 4 members of staff. Fatima, the logistics person, also agrees saying, "We need to be strategic with the projects we apply for and make sure they align with what we are already doing." But Jeremy is adamant. He says the organization needs the funding to sustain itself and we can "make it work" with what we already do. Fatima is still not convinced, but I finish the grant and submit it online before the Christmas break.

In early February Jeremy and I receive an email from UK Online congratulating us on winning one of the grants. BBMEO is now an official UK Online Champion Centre, and for the sum of £45,000 for one year the organization is responsible for signing up 2000 new users to UK Online's Internet tutorials. Jeremy is happy and sees this funding as an opportunity to expand the organizations own goals of digital technology as a form of social and political activism and empowerment. Fatima, on the other hand, is less optimistic and instead actually sees the project as a hindrance to the organization's goals saying, "What does government know about community empowerment?"

Over the course of the next few months Jeremy and Fatima would clash over the delivery of the project. Jeremy had grand visions of using the funding to add to the organizations website capabilities to recruit digital activists from the community. However, Fatima was the person actually delivering the project and she was concerned about reaching the targets each month in order for the organizations to receive its second payment. Both perspectives clashed with one another when the delivery on these targets began to overburdens the resources and capacity of BBMEO. In her "pragmatic activist" view Fatima understood the UK Online project to be a separate program that would take away resources from the small organizations. Yet, due to the competitive nature of funding and the lack of grants available for small infrastructure BME

organizations Jeremy, the "opportunistic activist," saw a chance to secure additional funding for the organization and allow BBMEO to remain in operations for another year. He believed he could "be creative" with the delivery of the funding by trying to align the project with the organizations goals. To understand this relationship I turn now to the specifics of the UK Online project as a means to illustrate these ideas of "pragmatic" and "opportunistic" activism in relation to issues of funding, capacity and race for BBMEO as a regional BME third sector infrastructure organization. This relationship is one that was common amongst different BME organizations pursuing government funding. I contend that the strategies of "pragmatic" and "opportunistic activism" emerge to combat the issues faced by BME organizations around funding and capacity.

Smarter Government: The Digital Citizen

The Smarter Government UK Online funding introduced in the opening narrative illustrates the competing understandings between the New Labour government and TSOs views on what constitutes empowerment. In 2009 the UK government published a report entitled "Putting the Front Line First: Smarter Government." This report presented the government's vision of the future relationship between citizens, civil society, along with a number of set plans they intend to enact to meet this vision. In the foreword to the report former Prime Minister Gordon Brown argued for the streamlining of public services and a diffusion of power from the government to the citizen through technology. Specifically, he wants the government and the public to embrace technology, particularly the Internet, as a way to "better inform the public; give citizens new rights to information; create a new dialogue between people and public service professionals; and reduce bureaucratic burdens" (HM Government 2009:7).

One action plan in this vision is the investment of £30 million over a three period with UK Online, starting in 2010, to have 1 million people online. The government intends to increase the number of public services available online, including claims to benefits, as a means to help streamline public services and reduce government costs. According to the "Smarter Government" report (2009) the aim is to empower citizens by increasing the use of online service deliver and free up the frontline by reducing the cost of delivering local services. The "frontline" is defined as any community organization that works directly with communities. BBMEO is not a frontline organization, but the organization works with frontline organizations within its network. In the creation of this new digital citizen the government has recognized there is a need to train its citizens in the use of technology, specifically using computers to access the Internet. Within this focus the government and UK Online are paying special attention to those segments of the populations that are classified as socially and digitally excluded, or disadvantaged populations.

Government selected the organization UK Online to disperse the allotted £30 million amongst organizations they felt could help them meet the target of 1 million new users online within three years. In 2000, government first created UK Online Centers as a way to provide the public access to computers. Each region has a regional UK online center with numerous local centers that regional base is in charge of and monitors. Within the Smarter Government digital inclusion scheme UK Online created a grant aimed at local and regional third sector organizations that work with "socially and digitally excluded" populations. For UK Online this includes BME disadvantaged populations, older populations, single mothers, asylum and refugee groups, and economically disadvantaged communities.

According to the funding call the objective of the grant was to recruit frontline organizations who work with digitally excluded people and have those organizations conduct specific UK Online training tutorials that teach an individual how to use a computer and surf the Internet. If the bid was successful the awarded organizations become a UK Online Center. As a center the organization was responsible for registering people with UK Online and then conducting different tutorials with them that were specific to the Internet and focused on accessing public services online, learning how to shop online, finding employment online, and online safety. Each module had specific targets, set by UK Online, that funded organizations needed to meet by certain times in the year of funding. Failure to meet a percentage of the targets would result in organizations not receiving the second portion of their funding.

As a Champion Center BBMEO was in charge of creating smaller local UK Online Centers throughout the region, using its network of sub-regional and local organisations. Each of those organizations then was suppose to sign-up a set numbers of individuals each month from its constituency, targeting individuals and communities who were in need of the services. However, as the year commenced the ability of BBEMO to meet these high targets and to continue to service disadvantaged communities through the organizations own trainings and events schedule became difficult at best. In late May 2010, at a staff meeting, the issues and tensions around the grant came to a head between Jeremy, the opportunist, and Fatima, the pragmatist.

Opportunistic Activism Meets Pragmatic Activism

It was a sunny day in Bristol in late May. Jeremy called for a staff meeting to discuss the UK Online project, the organizations content for the website, and to go over future funding opportunities. He decided to hold the meeting out of the office at a small conference room in the

city center so that we would not be disturbed. Fatima, Marsha- the administrative manager, Said –the IT officer, and myself along with Jeremy were all in attendance. We gathered in a small room on the top floor of the building and as we arrived in the room Jeremy was setting-up a projector and large sketchpad. By 10am everyone had arrived and Marsha distributed the agenda for the day. Glancing at the list I soon realized this would be a long day.

Jeremy began the meeting in his usual fashion, with a short monologue:

> "So we have been given funding my UK Online to deliver on their digital inclusion project. Uh… I think the best way to proceed is to lay out the processes and procedures we will implement so that our goals are being met alongside these targets. I don't want UK Online dictating how we run our operations so I want to integrate our website with UK Online's tutorials and have people who we are registering...uh…will register, go through our website. That way we can introduce them to our organizations, see if they want to become members and then meet the targets we need for UK Online."

In a rather annoyed voice Fatima asked,

> "Well who is going to be leading on this project? I don't see the point of integrating the website. It seems like that is going to be complicated and take too much time. All UK Online wants is targets. I think we should focus on the targets…meet the targets so we get the rest of the funding."

"Well I think we all have to take ownership for all parts of the project to be honest, ok?" Jeremy hastily replied. He went on to talk about everyone "taking ownership" with different parts of the project. I found this a confusing way to deal with the project. In essence Jeremy wanted Fatima, Marsha, Sammi and himself to take certain regions of the Southwest and work through their contacts to set up local UK Online Centers. But, he did not want one person to be the lead of the project because everyone had other responsibilities to attend to as well. In his mind this funding was supposed to be an opportunity to expand on the work BBMEO did with online activism and knowledge dissemination for the sector. It finally emerged that he wanted to

use the reputation of UK Online to bolster the name of BBMEO and give more exposure to the work of BBMEO. But Fatima did not view the project in the same light.

Fatima responded to Jeremy's vision saying,

> "Sorry, but I have to say that is not going to work. We need a lead that controls the project and delivers on the targets. Let's be real. We are a small organization and what we do is build capacity in the BME third sector. Now we have to deliver on the targets of UK Online with their trainings and tutorials on top of doing our own trainings and meet our own targets with four people? And no one is going to take lead? I don't see it working. I'm sorry."

In Fatima's view she wanted a straightforward plan of action. Although the targets were large and BBMEO was new to the UK Online format she believed that with a clear and concise plan the UK Online project could be achieved. But, overall she was always hesitant about the grant. On a number of occasions she voiced the fact that BBMEO should have applied for a smaller grant within the funding scheme so that the targets were more manageable for the organization. She was afraid of the funders dictating the direction of the organization, which obstructs the function and purpose of an organization like BBMEO that is suppose to help smaller BME TSOs build their capacity. But Jeremy did not understand Fatima's point of view.

The rest of the meeting was fraught with tension. Jeremy and Fatima continued to argue over the implementation of the UK Online project. For Fatima, the cost to the organization to implement the project far outweighed the funding received. She also knew that the project would end up being "dumped" into her lap once Jeremy's grand vision fell through. This concern of hers was based on past experiences with other projects the organizations failed to complete. Fatima voiced her concern that the organization needed to be more strategic in fundraising and apply for those grants that best suited the needs of the organization. Jeremy argued that overall funding was scarce and we needed to jump at opportunities that remotely fit

the organizations' needs. The election of a new Conservative-Liberal Democrat government in early May 2010 was predicted to hit the public and third sector hard. This new government had already announced their intention of cutting funding to the third sector, especially in areas around infrastructure. So for Jeremy the organization needed to look at all types of funding. If any were successful Jeremy said, "we all just need to make it work."

In this conversation issues of capacity and accessing funding were presented in the dialogue between Jeremy and Fatima over the reality on the deliver of the targets set by UK Online once the funding was approved. The demographic population BBMEO serve, and the way that service is provided, tended to conflict with the target driven funding scheme of UK Online. Jeremy's opportunistic view, in relation to funding for the organization, put in jeopardy the capacity of the organization to meet the needs of the community it serviced and meet the demands of the funding body for UK Online. But, BBMEO was in need of additional funding due to impending public sector and third sector cuts from the new government elected in early May 2010. After a tight race the results from the election left the country with a hung party as no one political party won the majority of seats in Parliament. After a few days of deliberations between the three main parties (New Labour, Tory Conservatives, and the Liberal-Democrats), the Conservative party and the Liberal-Democratic party formed a Coalition government which gave the Conservatives the majority of seats needed in Parliament to lead the government. By mid-May 2010 Britain had its first Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government, and the first Coalition government in 70 years.

By the time of this staff meeting in late May 2010 political and media debates were buzzing about impending spending cuts from the Coalition government to the public and third sector. In June 2010 the new government wasted no time announcing the implementation of an

emergency spending review that aimed to drastically cut excess spending from government in order to reduce the rising deficit the Coalition government blamed New Labour had created. Chancellor George Osbourne justified these impending cuts by saying he wanted to "restore sanity to public finances and stability to our economy" (BBC 2010). For the Coalition government, the main mechanism of achieving this stability was through a return to investment in the private sector and removing the "helping hand" of the government from the public and third sector.

In this shifting political environment the viability and longevity of the BME third sector was even more of a concern for those in the sector (Plummer 2010). The Third Sector Newsletter wrote on the fears many BME and other third sector organizations faced nation-wide with the change in government. Regionally and locally various BME organizations in BBMEO's network held meetings and conferences starting in April 2010, calling on black and ethnic minority communities to convene and strategize over ways to engage with a new government if New Labour did not win. But, even under New Labour accessing and obtaining funding for BME organizations was a pressing concern. Under New Labour there were a number of different funding avenues third sector organizations could apply for to deliver different services to communities. Although funds were created to help empower and engage with BME and disadvantaged communities, those funds were simultaneously out of reach for those same groups. The ability of BME organizations to access that funding was limited due to a number of issues around the capacity of developing and writing grants and tenders.

BBMEO exists to tackle the lack of capacity of BME organizations, help them obtain funding and deliver effective services to their communities. The trainings BBMEO provides and the projects the organization carries out are supposed to help increase the capacity of the sector

in the Southwest. Yet, the capacity within the organization to meet these demanding goals, coupled with BBMEO's need to raise its own capital to ensure its longevity leaves the organization in a constant cycle of need. Funders' preconception of the capacity, or lack thereof, of BME organizations in relation to mainstream organizations also leaves BME organizations at a disadvantage when competing for funds. Jeremy understood the double-edge sword of being a small BME organization and so engaged with all possible funding bodies and potential partners that could fit with the goals of empowering BME organizations and communities through digital advocacy and/or build the capacity of the BME third sector in general. Yet, Jeremy's understanding of the needs of the communities he was supposed to be serving did not necessarily align with the actual needs of these communities. This is where the tension between Jeremy and Fatima occurred. Fatima had to deliver on all projects BBMEO was funded for and so understood the practicalities, logistics and feasibility of meeting the outcomes. This tension is one indicative of larger complaints heard throughout the sector on a perceived disconnect between the interest of BME communities and representative BME "elites."

One day in late June 2010 in the BBMEO office Vadna, an Asian woman affiliated with different BME organizations in the Midlands of England, was waiting for a meeting with Jeremy. She wanted to discuss with him recent actions taken up by different BME leaders across the regions and nationally that she felt had "betrayed" the BME communities. Fatima knew Vadna so they began a long conversation, as Jeremy was late as usual. Vadna was upset that organizations she worked with were choosing to drop the term "BME" from their language in order to make themselves more "marketable." She felt many BME leaders, including Jeremy, were uncomfortable with the term "black" because it hindered organizations obtaining "big money" so they constantly "toned down" the racial justice aspects of their work. Fatima

protested, trying to defend Jeremy's actions by telling Vadna that he worked hard to promote and support BME organizations in the Southwest. "I am with Jeremy when he is attending different events in the Southwest and he does promote the work of BME organizations and interests to mainstream groups." But, Vadna did not believe it telling Fatima that Jeremy was "part of the group diluting the BME sector and not putting black communities first." Vadna saw BME leaders as fighting their own causes for their own personal gains because of the decline in funding aimed at BME communities. No matter what Fatima said to defend the actions of various leaders mentioned Vadna was not convinced. For Vadna the state of the BME elite was "like New Labour – all style and no substance." Without strong leadership Vadna feared for the future of the BME sector with the new Coalition government.

This exchange was not the only one I heard from other grassroots BME organization members about the interests of BME leaders. In the previous chapter I mentioned a conversation had between Vince, the Board member for the African Caribbean Association of Bristol, and Jeremy around BME "elites." During that conversation Vince was concerned about the lack of coherence between the interest and agendas of BME "elites" in relation to regional and local BME organizations. This same fear was felt by Vadna, but in regards to the interests of national and larger regional BME organization leaders like Jeremy in relation to more local frontline and grassroots organizations. Vadna felt a sense of betrayal by the BME leaders, the "organic intellectuals," elected by various BME communities to present their issues and grievances to the government.

After an hour of waiting Vadna eventually left. The following morning Fatima relayed most of the conversation back to Jeremy, emphasizing Vadna's concerns over representation of BME interests to mainstream organizations and providers. In replay Jeremy said, "Well, I have

to disagree. We have to be smart with how we market ourselves to others and that requires developing different narratives around disadvantage, social justice and human rights."

Fatima looked back at Jeremy and said, "Ok, but we still need to make sure we understand what is needed within the BME communities. I work with them on an everyday basis and they don't want to hear about complicated issues but want straightforward solutions."

"Yes," replied Jeremy. "But that is not our priority. Our priority is to engage with different public bodies and mainstream organizations to promote the issues around social justice, racial justice, and human rights. Whatever we need to do to stay afloat is what we do basically."

This contestation between different perspectives within the BME third sector over leader representation demonstrates the internal conflicts on issues of capacity and confidence. For Jeremy opportunities were few and so when one presented itself he felt the need to change the narrative of the work the organization did to fit different funding avenues. Once funding was secured Jeremy then tried to mould the projects around the digital advocacy he was interested in doing, being creative in the reporting of projects at the end of each year. However, the practicalities of implementing and delivering on the different projects BBMEO was awarded funds for gave Fatima a more practical perspective. For her, creativity should have been placed in the delivery of the projects and Jeremy need to more strategic with the grants to take into consideration the capacity of the organization. While both Fatima and Jeremy had similar aims, their differing styles of activism, Jeremy as opportunistic in nature while Fatima as pragmatic, demonstrates the complexity of mounting a resistance to larger discourse of race within the space of civil society using the same language of race.

"Common sense" notions of race and rights of belonging within a nation permeate throughout society. Through my one-on-one interview with British citizens I explored the ways

in which these discourses situated themselves within the everyday, outside of racial and ethnic organizations that use state defined racial and ethnic categories and language as a socio-political platform to access their rights as citizens. In the next section I focus on these "common sense" notions of citizenship and race as a way to examine how individuals within British society utilize and define these terms and incorporate them into their own worldviews.

"COMMON SENSE" NOTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND RACE

Ideas about race and citizenship are not solely issues discussed within BME voluntary and community organizations or governmental departments. They are concepts that are also a part of the "everyday." But, the ways in which people individually define, understand, interpret and reproduce notions of race and citizenship are indicative of the larger discourses of these concepts within a society. To explore some of these "common sense" notions of race and rights of citizenship in England I conducted one-on-one interviews with 12 British citizens in Bristol, during the course of my fieldwork. The demographics of this sample are described in Table 1 on page 43. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, I used these twelve interviews in an exploratory manner to raise issues and questions that can be investigated in future research. In the interviewee's answers the concepts of race and citizenship are interwoven with one another, demonstrating what Du Bois (1995) called the "doubleness" of the two concepts as they define and determine one another. Their interplay reflects the creation of the nation-state as an "imagined community" rooted in a socio-political past.

The Doubleness of Race and Nation

In my one-on-one interviews I spoke with 12 British citizens of different racial and ethnic backgrounds in order to explore "common sense" notions of race and citizenship. I interviewed

individuals who identified themselves to be white, black, mixed race, and Asian. When I asked each interviewee if they believed anyone had the ability the access to rights of British citizenship all replied in a positive response. All gave a positive "Yes!" or "Of course" as a reply. When I followed up and ask whom has the right to access this citizenship all responded by saying they believed any person had access to British citizenship. One white woman said as long as someone was born in England they had the right to live in the country and access all rights and benefits. Another mixed race man commented that as long as one was born in the country or came to Britain and worked and "paid his dues" then anyone would access rights under the law.

Yet discrepancies, or what I call slippages, occurred in the ways individuals described themselves in relation to perceived racialized "Others." In these slippages the doubleness of race and nation revealed its self as these individuals negotiated their place within British society. One example of this slippage came from a middle aged white male named Darien. Darien grew up in a village outside of a major city in the Southeast of England. Darien said he did not differentiate between individuals based on their race or ethnicity. For him it was a "non issue" that did not determine "who belongs" in Britain. Yet, throughout the interview he consistently differentiated between his "white British friends" and his non-white "colored" friends, even though his "colored" friends were British born. While relaying a story about an ex-girlfriend he described her by saying, "she is black but she was brought up in Swindon and speaks with no ethnic accent at all. She is very, very integrated into the society. You know. My grandmother was surprised when she met my ex-girlfriend because she was more British then most Brits in the way she talked and acted."

I asked, "Well where was your ex-girlfriend originally from?"

Darien replied, "Oh, well she was from London."

"Ok" I said, "Well then when you say British or Brit what or who are you referring to then if she was born in the UK."

"I mean whites, so white Brits I guess." Darien answered.

"So then does British means white for you?" I asked

After a long pause Darien replied, "Yes."

In this exchange Darien slips between the language of race and nationality in his understandings of Britishness and citizenship. For Darien, his ex-girlfriend's blackness negated her ability to claim "full" Britishness, even though she "acted" like a Brit and was born within the geographical space of Britain. Her accent and mannerisms "surprised" both him and his grandmother because they did not match the stereotypical conception of what a British person should both "look" and "act" like. Although Darien believed he did not "see" race and that all had the right to access British citizenship, he still relied on and used phenotypic traits to assess others nationality and sense of Britishness.

Such doubleness between race and nationality presented itself throughout other interviews. During my interview with Robert, a white male in his early 40s, the question of ethnic affiliation and identity emerged. Robert identified himself as white British-English, but when he began to speak about his background he acknowledged that his relatives consistently moved over the centuries between Southern England and Wales. Robert finally settled in England, but his parents were both born and raised in West Wales. When I asked Robert how he came to define his own race or ethnicity he stopped and looked at me and said, **"**You know, I don't even know now. I mean how long back must one go back to verify ethnicity and who decides? I mean am I mixed-race then since I am English and Welsh, am I just white? Am I

both or neither? Maybe it just means nothing and I am only British. But then, what the hell is British?"

Robert was questioning the place of race and ethnicity within the construction of national identity. He was unsure of "who gets to decide" where he is placed within society because he believed that an individual's race and/or ethnicity does have an influence on accessing social rights of British citizenship. In his "self talk" the slippage between race and nation presented itself when he asked if he was English, Welsh or just British. Yet, underlying this notion of British is a racialized engagement with the concept, best illustrated by Carol and Terry.

Carol, a white woman in her early 40s, is a single mother of a mixed race daughter in her late teens. She lives in a shared house in a working class neighborhood in South Bristol. Her current boyfriend is of Jamaican descent and lives in a large African-Caribbean neighborhood in another part of the city. From the beginning of the interview Jackie made sure to reiterate that she believed British citizenship was open to all. For her the term multiculturalism encompassed this belief the best as "British (people) come from all backgrounds." Yet, throughout the interview Carol said that I should actually be talking to her daughter or boyfriend as "they were more interesting" then her. When I asked her what she meant by that Jackie replied, "Well, I am just white British so I am quite boring I think. They would have more interesting things to say about citizenship and race."

I replied, "What makes them more interesting to talk to?"

Carol responded, "I don't know...I am from the ethnic majority so I haven't had that many negative experiences compared to what they could tell you. When I was growing up I didn't understand the seriousness of being from another race. I mean I am trying to escape the idea of race, as it doesn't seem to fit with modern society. I think ethnicity is more user friendly

because it reflects how you see yourself...I guess what I'm saying is I don't know how useful this interview will be for you since I am not raced, I'm just white British."

To Carol, although she was adamant that British citizenship was an open system available to all regardless of race or ethnicity she simultaneously closed herself off from speaking about that same system due to her own race. In doing so Carol tried to contest the impact of race on rights of citizenship. Yet, she slipped into racialized language to describe this process saying she is "not raced" but rather "just white British." Carol did not consciously recognize her doubleness, but she subconsciously reproduced dominant racial norms in her discussions of Britishness and race.

Terry, a mixed race male in his early 20s, also referred to Brits as "white" in passing although he said British citizenship was open to all. When talking about his experiences of growing up in Bristol as mixed-race Terry said he fit between two worlds, as he was "smart like whites but cool like blacks." When I asked him to explain what this meant he replied, "Well, see I have the cool walk and talk that most of the black kids at school have. For my white friends they see this, I guess, as more street. But, then I do well in school and so the black kids see this as being more white you know. I guess I have the best of both worlds." Within this construction he understood whites to be more "British" in nature and referred to blacks in terms of "Caribbean" culture.

In each individuals' narratives the "common sense" notions of race and nation emerge and demonstrate the power of racial ideology in the uncritical and unabsorbed ways race interferes with and influences notions of belonging. Through these narratives the various ways individuals questioned, rationalized, challenged and enquired about race and its impact on access to rights of British citizenship illustrates what Stuart Hall (Davies 2004) calls the "disjunctures"

of race where the "common sense" of race is uncovered and redefined at the individual level. In each of their individual ways Darien, Robert, Carol, and Terry attempted to "make sense" of the doubleness of race and citizenship while also challenging, and at times actively refuting, the concept of race. Interestingly, throughout a majority of the interviews individuals used biological and cultural notions of race as a way to challenge state definitions and use of race as criteria for inclusion/exclusion in social and political access of citizenship. In the next section I examine this phenomenon and I argue that the rationalization used by those I interviewed is an example of counterhegemonic resistance to socio-political constructions of race. But, as Gramsci (2005) noted, this type of resistance runs the risk of reproducing hegemonic constructs. In the interviewees' narratives many resisted the socio-political impact of race on rights of British citizenship by relying on hegemonic constructs of race-as-biological rooted in a primordial cultural past.

Race-as-Biological/Race-as–Social/Race-as-Culture

In the narratives given by the interviewees on the concept of race, phenotypic traits mixed with scientific and cultural connotations. Terry spoke of this dialectical relationship when I asked him what race meant to him: "Race is something you embrace, I think. But, I mean it is also something you are just born with." When I asked Terry to explain what that "something you are born with" was he physically became uncomfortable as he attempted to construct in words his understanding of race through a description of blackness: "See black people have black skin, hair, and an identity that is more racial by sight...like our identity is tied to those things mixed with cultural things like dancing and black power. It's how you identify blackness. You're just aware of it."

In his description Terry mixes phenotypic traits of skin color and hair texture with cultural stereotypes associated with those traits to define "black people." For Terry, race is a concept that is simultaneously biological and cultural in nature and the two types of race help form a bond between people who adhere to those "traits." Yet, as stated in the previous section, Terry is opposed to race impacting one's rights as a British citizen. Therefore, Terry finds race both useful and harmful.

Amanda, a white woman in her later 20s, defined race as both scientifically and culturally based. According to Amanda,

> "[race] refers to genetically different groups like Scottish versus English, darker skin and whiter skin, hair color and the physiology of the face all make up someone's race I guess. I mean I see it as race and culture. It's like asking someone where they're from when you ask them their race. I find it curious to know, but I can also see where it could be risky to ask."

In this conception Amanda relied on the influence of "scientific" language to make sense of racial discourse. Amanda has a Master's degree in environmental sciences and says she tends to see most things in the world through a scientific lens. Her construction of race as partly scientific/genetic in origins reflects this worldview. Yet, Amanda was aware of the multifaceted nature of race by saying, "...but really race seem to me to be a way we both group people and a made up thing white people created to make sense of other groups. I guess if your intent is good then the word is OK, but if not then the word becomes ugly."

Marsha, a white woman in her early 40s, used an evolutionary model to explain race. The single mother of a mixed-race son, Marsha taught her son that race is just a "genetic thing." She was concerned that her son would be "confused" since they physically look different. Marsha explained that she told her son all humans come from Africa and when early man first left the continent and settled in other parts of the world they adapted to the different

environments physically. People from Europe have white skin and straight hair, Asians are brown in skin with different textured hair and Africans are dark with course hair to protect them from the sun. Therefore, Marsha told her son that humans are from one race as race is just an adaptation and therefore biological and ancestral in nature.

Marsha, Amanda and Terry all used a biological model to simultaneously make claims for the existence and non-existence of race. All were from different ethnic backgrounds, ages, and genders yet they all adhered to a similar understanding of race. Race is genetic but it is also cultural. Race denotes physical difference but also helps explains modern society. Race is real, but it also does not matter. In these different articulations emerge the larger discourses and slippages of race within British society that interweave with personal experiences. This is an example of the contradictory nature of race consciousness within the everyday. Race is both there and not there in the way individuals both construct a sense of themselves and make a stance against larger socio-political constructions of race.

DISCUSSION

In this chapter I focused on two types of data to examine social rights of citizenship: the strategies employed by BME organizations to access their social rights and the narratives of everyday citizens in relation to negotiating their place within larger discourses of race and rights of citizenship. I examined the various ways racialized actors made "sense" of their ability to access social aspects of citizenship. I used the terms "pragmatic activism" and "opportunistic activism" to describe the strategies used by BME leaders in the BME third sector to access funding and address issues of capacity. In doing so I illustrated the ways in which race and racism help make and deny claims of social rights for members of the BME community. I also

examined the doubleness of race and nation in the everyday through the narratives of race by individuals I interviewed.

Hegemonic racial discourses of racial and ethnic minority groups impact perceptions of the abilities of BME organizations. The notion of what BME organizations "can do" is not only ingrained within funding bodies and governmental bodies, but also within BME organizations themselves. Social institutions and practices help perpetuate negative conceptions of the BME third sector, which invokes "opportunistic activism" as a form of counterhegemonic resistance. But this opportunistic activism also adds to the problems of BME organizations effectively obtaining and delivering on government and/or funder set targets effectively while also sufficiently servicing local communities. This then affects the prospects of securing future funding and risks the longevity of the organization. Therefore, more "pragmatic activism" is needed for sustainability. But, to ensure efficient and successful pragmatic activism an organization must have the capacity. This is the circular effect of the impact of race and racism on BME organizations and the communities they serve. Or, as Gramsci (2005) reminds us counterhegemonic struggles are always embedded within hegemony. This does not mean resistance will always be hegemonic in nature, but rather the struggle comes in mounting a resistance strategy that minimizes the influence of hegemonic thought and discourse. While Jeremy thinks that he must be "opportunistic" in his ventures as a way to continue his digital activism work, he falls victim to hegemonic constructions of race and capacity by overextending the capabilities of his organizations and being "out of touch" with the needs to the communities he is supposed to be serving.

Although I have shown obtaining funding for BME organizations can be very difficult these types of organizations still need to be strategic in the grants they apply for. This is where

Fatima's "pragmatic activism" is useful. In Jeremy's opportunistic endeavor to secure a financial future for the organization he overextended the capacity of the organization to handle the delivery of the project. Although BBMEO has the capacity to obtain funding and deliver training around capacity building for other organizations, the fear of loosing funding or support led to BBMEO actually loosing some of its capacity to effectively deliver on the organizations own targets. This was Fatima's concern from the beginning of the project.

BME organizations reproduce hegemonic constructions of race because they are forced to engage with the state in a racialized way using the racial language of the state. This reproduction also extends to the everyday as British citizens make sense of their "doublness" in being both British subjects and racalized bodies. In my one-on-one interviews state-sponsored notions of race and access to citizenship were consciously and subconsciously challenged by the individuals I interviewed. In the interviews this presented itself in the slippages between understanding British citizenship as a system open to all and then simultaneously questioning the status of non-white Brits. For many, British citizenship encompassed diversity. But, when I asked about their view of race what emerges is the idea that British means white and non-whites are constantly questioned about their status within the country. This is reflected in Darien's explanation of his ex-girlfriend, Terry's understanding of blackness and whiteness and Carol's unease with her voice in race discussions.

In the everyday resistance to the idea of race impacting one's access to rights of British citizenship many relied on biological and cultural notions of race – another hegemonic dimension of the concept of race. Race is a multifaceted concept with different articulations, understandings and definitions. While the interviewees all were opposed to racial differentiation in relation to rights of citizenship, the doubleness of race and nation allowed other dimensions of

race to emerge – namely the idea of race-as-biological and race-as-culture. Through resistance to dominant political conceptions and usage of race to make and deny claims to British citizenship the interviewees reproduced another hegemonic construction of race. This is similar to the reproduction of racial discourse seen in BME organizations when accessing funding. This hegemonic construct of race resides in the subconscious of the everyday and is an example of the ways race both creates social groups who share experiences relate to their racial and ethnic designation and disadvantages those same groups based on socio-historical definitions of race.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

Some white people Hate black people,
and some white people Love black people,
Some black people Hate white people,
and some black people Love white people.
So you see, it's not an issue of black and white,
it's an issue of Lovers and Haters

Eden Ahbez

THE POSSIBILITY OF COUNTERHEGEMONIC RESISTANCE

Race is a hegemonic construct rooted in a socio-historical past that is based on political and economic interests and agendas. Its Western beginnings were intertwined with nation-making projects developed out of colonial and imperial conquests, the profitable trans-Atlantic slave trade and scientific advancements that privileged European ideologies of the natural world. The product of these endeavors is a multifaceted, highly contestable and often-used concept that simultaneously means nothing and everything. Or, as Du Bois noted race is "a group of contradictory forces, facts and tendencies" (1940:133) that rationalizes the use of race within a society.

Within the creation of the modern nation-state race became a convenient and highly effective tool of defining boundaries around who can and cannot claim citizenship. According to Janowski and Gram (2002) citizenship has four main parts: it defines membership within a nation-state; it entails the capacities to legal rights and policy influence; rights are universal as they are legitimated through law and available for all citizens; and it is a proclamation of equality. The use of race as one criterion for membership within a nation-state denies equality within democracy. Instead race constructs a racialized citizenship where one's legitimacy as a citizen is constantly questioned and critiqued when that person is also a raced body –what Du Bois (1995) labeled his "double consciousness." Within democratic nations the promise of

equality is therefore challenged and unavailable because the "epidermalization" of raced bodies is consistently stuck within a "historico-racial schema" (Fanon 1967: 111) that restricts full access to rights of citizenship.

This dissertation has examined the impact being a raced body within the British nation-state has on racialized actors as they negotiate their rights as citizens through three major research questions: 1) How do racialized and ethnicized actors in Britain take part in constructing and accessing their rights of citizenship with civil society and how is this enacted? 2) What is the nature of British racialized citizenship that is made available to individuals and organizations that represent racial and ethnic communities? 3) What are the narratives used by individuals, BME groups and the state to negotiate issues of race and racism within the boundaries of citizenship?

In Chapter 3 I presented the historical basis for the re-imagining of Britain as a "white" nation by the British government that created a racialized citizens and citizenship. Post-1945 Britain went through an "identity crisis" brought on by the end of Empire and World War II (Gilroy 2004; Solomos 2003). Increased immigration from the former colonies into the UK led the British state to have fears and concerns over perceived social and racial problems they felt would occur from the mixing of the native British populations with non-white immigrants (Miles and Torres 1999). The British state viewed this non-white immigration as a threat to national identity. Hickman (2000) and Waters (1997) argue that in the 1950s and 1960s the national community reimaged tropes of Englishness. Whiteness became a defining marker of the nation, classifying non-white populations as "strangers" within the country and creating a hegemonic construction of race and nation. Therefore, race defined the state's understanding of who did and did not belong.

In response to the denial of legitimacy within Britain many racialized communities developed Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) organizations throughout the country. These organizations provided needed services and support for racial and ethnic communities. These were heterogeneous communities from different countries, cultures, languages and backgrounds homogenized under the racial label of "BME." With this designation class-consciousness developed around racial and ethnic identity, unifying diverse groups who had similar experiences of a lack of access to full rights of citizenship. According to Gramsci (2005) the first step in mounting a resistance to hegemonic rule to become aware of that hegemony and organize class-consciousness around it. Racialized identity united these diverse communities because the hegemonic nature of race homogenized them in within larger British society. In this instance race is used as a tool by the subjugated to access their rights as citizens and these communities used the space of civil society, through voluntary and community organizations, to formally engage with the state as active citizens.

The use of race as a mobilization device gives the concept a two-fold purpose as both a mechanism of domination and resistance and it grounds race within a political setting. The use of race to raise class-consciousness amongst racialized groups presented itself in two forms of activism styles – pragmatic and opportunistic - within BME organizations in respect to using race as a tool of accessing citizenship rights. In Chapter 5 I explained the ways two members of the Bristol Black and Ethnic Minority (BBMEO) used these two styles of activism to access social rights of citizenship for other BME organizations and communities they served. In the actual use of these styles Fatima's pragmatic approach of working within racial structures to produce the goals of the organizations she served proved more effective than Jeremy's opportunistic style that ended up alienating him from both mainstream and BME organizations.

Within this environment racialized actors are granted access to the rights of citizenship primarily through a racialized lens. This lens is constrained due to the limiting aspects of race and racial projects. Fundamentally, social rights of citizenship are supposed to help curb social exclusion because this exclusion weakens social bonds and prevents integration within contemporary society (Castles 2005). Practically, within a racial state those rights will be mediated through the unequal lens of race because race is historically predicated upon inequality. Yet, racial actors have at their disposal the creative space of civil society. Although race is hegemonic in nature Gramsci (2005), as discussed in Chapter 1, reiterates the notion that hegemony is unstable and needs to be constantly won and re-won by the dominant group.

British legislation and social policies reinforced the hegemonic nature of race and nation (Gilroy 2009). In this climate BME communities are faced with a "double consciousness" (Meer 2010). They are both British and BME, just as Du Bois (1995) spoke of being both "American and Negro." In this context the two concepts were mutually exclusive, as being British meant having full access to rights of citizenship and being accepted as a member of society. But the label and connotations behind "BME" took away certain rights and mitigated others through a narrowly define racialized lens. The "double consciousness" Du Bois (1995) spoke of in the late 1800s is what I call a "racialized citizenship," where rights and belonging to a nation in the West are dictated through a "racial worldview" premised on a hierarchy of white supremacy (Harrison 1995; Smedley 1999). Or, as Alfred the black Conservative speaker at the Race Debate said, " My color must mean that I am a problem."

Race is a hegemonic construct used to define the barriers around British citizenship. Citizenship can be viewed as simultaneously creating social solidarity through universal membership and social conflict through expectations of redistribution that cannot always be met

by the state. (Turner 1993). Within a racial state distribution of resources tends to fall along hegemonic racial lines, or what Omi and Winant (1994) call "racial projects." In this process race is a "common sense" discourse interwoven into everyday conceptions of Self and Other. Various individuals, BME groups and the state use different narratives to negotiate the issues of race and racism within the boundaries of citizenship. In one-on-one interviews, as discussed in Chapter 5, interviewees used the language of biological race to "make sense" of racial discrimination. While individuals discussed their distain of racial classification and racial discourses affecting anyone's rights as British citizenship, all fell victim to relying on these dominant discourses to understand Self and Other. This presented itself in individuals re-defining of race-as-biological and race-as-cultural to challenge the state's use of race-as-sociopolitical. In their narratives the doubleness of race and nation emerged between historical static notions of race, nation and belonging with contemporary understandings and challenges of these same notions.

Although race is hegemonic, the political currency of racial and ethnic identity provides those who are a part of the BME third sector a social and political voice and platform to address grievances to the state. But the term BME also elicits socio-historical connotations of the supposed limited capabilities of those who choose to identify with that political label. As I noted in Chapters 1 and 3, the ways in which individuals and groups are "racialized" and "ethnicized" indicates the ways in which the state views those groups in the public sphere. The historical construction of "blackness" and "ethnic Other" by the state through legislation laws and public discourse in the UK since 1945 viewed BME groups as perpetual outsiders (Waters 1997) who were socially excluded from mainstream society. In those constructions negative connotations of worth and belonging attached themselves to the term BME. This in turn creates an environment

were BME communities and organizations are constantly disadvantaged when compared to mainstream and generic organizations.

In Chapter 4 I present two narratives that dominated the ways in which BME organizations and communities were viewed by mainstream and governmental bodies and within BME organizations and communities themselves. I call these narratives "BME as socially excluded" and "BME as disadvantaged." In the first narrative governmental policies like "community cohesion" perpetually define racial and ethnic minorities as "socially excluded" due to their status and racial and ethnic minorities. These social policies are supposed to be the mechanism to aid in promoting and ensuring social inclusion of all groups, especially those groups that are deemed "outsiders" in a society due to some stigmatized status. Yet, the discourse around "communities" in the narrative of "social exclusion" harkens back to historical notions of "outsider" groups that are deemed incompatible with a homogenous, time-bounded, static notion of Britishness. Through social policies like "community cohesion" this image is reproduced through the racialized undertones of "socially excluded communities," where particular communities in particular places are over scrutinized by the state.

Counterhegemonic resistance is still available to those who choose to use "BME" as a political platform and the leaders of these movements must constantly be aware of the hegemonic structures at work in order to mount an effective counterattack. The mechanism employed by BME leaders within the Southwest to resist against these dominant ideas was to "take back" the term of multiculturalism and use it as a social campaigning tool for all of society. During the three-day strategic planning meeting eight BME leaders, or what Gramsci (2005) would call "organic intellectuals" convened to discuss the ways in which they could use the politically forgotten policy of "multiculturalism" in the social realm to illicit a new

understanding of Britishness and solidarity within society. The leaders wanted to use multiculturalism as an inclusive, and not exclusive, campaigning tool that would unite all of Britain, regardless of race. In these cases the contradictory nature of race emerged in the various ways race was used to both make and deny claims to British citizens.

Sitting alongside the state produced narrative of "BME as socially excluded" is another complimentary one that resonates both from the government and mainstream organizations and within the BME third sector itself – what I call the narrative of "BME as disadvantage." This narrative is also rooted in a time-bounded historical past that is influenced by a normative racial ideology, where BME equals disadvantaged. This disadvantage is rooted in some inherent quality that those who are labeled BME posses, and as such BME communities and the organizations that serve those communities are in constant need of state intervention. In order for BME organizations to have a place at the policy table and engage with other organizations as a representative of BME communities these organizations must fall within a "disadvantaged" framework. This discourse of race as somehow being inherent within bodies also emerged during my one-on-one interviews when individuals resisted against racialized access to citizenship by placing race within a biological framework. In both instances race is simultaneously denied and incorporated within the language of citizenship and belonging, forcing individuals and communities to engage with race – thus allowing the concept to maintain some hegemonic dominance within society.

In this climate where race, nation and citizenship intersect, create and define one another BME organizations use their racial and ethnic status as a socio-political platform to address the lack of access they have to all rights of citizenship. According to Marshall (1998), a group does not have full entitlement to citizenship unless they have access to rights of civil, political and

social citizenship. To lack one or more aspects of citizenship is to have unequal access within a nation-state. Marshall (1998) was trying to reconcile the issue of formal equality, inherent within the theory of democracy, alongside the continual problems of social class, inherent within capitalism. For the author, the welfare state was the answer to the clash between democracy and capitalism, as it would "limit the negative impact of class differences on individual life-chances. Thereby enhancing the individual's commitment to the system." (Tuner 1993:6). Britain was the historical backdrop to Marshall's theoretical analysis of citizenship in all its parts. Social forms of citizenship were represented by the welfare state.

One problem with Marshall's analysis is that he did not take into account the role of new social classes, social movements or social struggles outside of a class-based framework in the promotion of citizenship rights (Turner 1993). "Traditional" forms of citizenship adhere to a normative view of tradition that tends to be exclusionary and ethnocentric in nature (Castles and Miller 2003; Turner 1993). In relation to race, the place of racial and ethnic minorities within civic, political and social citizenship becomes highly contested. Yet, citizenship can be embraced and developed by such movements, even if that citizenship is repressive to minority groups (Turner 1993).

Yet, the ability to access and exercise ones rights as a citizen, and fully engage in civil society, depends upon ones knowledge of, and access to, those rights. Due to the impact of race and racism within rights of citizenship that knowledge and access has been limited for members of BME communities since the passage of the 1948 Immigration Act (Solomos 2003). As mentioned in Chapter 3, this lack of access facilitated the creation of legislation, the Race Relations Acts, to counterbalance the lack of inequality and rights of citizenship for BME individuals and communities. But, this also gave impetus to the development of local BME

community organizations and eventually the beginnings of the BME third sector. For organizations like the Bristol Black and Ethnic Minority Organization (BBMEO), the political currency of mobilizing around race and ethnicity gives them an entry into the socio-political system they feel they have limited access to.

This mobilization occurs within the realm of civil society, a space Gramsci (2005) called "creative" and where both hegemony and counterhegemonic resistance reside and co-occur. BME organizations operate within the realm of civil society. Using a racial and ethnic based consciousness BME organizations contest hegemonic constructs of race that are "uncritically absorbed" within larger society through socio-political actions. It is within this disjuncture that counterhegemonic resistance can occur by a unified group of individuals with similar interests, led by "organic intellectuals" elected from within that class to represent its interest to larger society. For racialized actors resistance occurs through the questioning of larger racial narratives that limit these organizations abilities to conduct the work they feel needs to be done for their communities through a subjugated position within society. This is seen in the strategies employed by BME leaders to raise awareness of their communities needs. Resistance also occurs in the ways BME organizations interpret mainstream funders aims and goals for money awarded. Again, this is seen in the activism styles employed by BME members to access their rights. Finally, resistance occurs in the challenging ways everyday citizens questioned and reinterpreted racial classifications and discourse. But, resistance is slow and ongoing and there is always the risk of reproducing hegemonic constructs when mounting a resistance –the reproductions of "BME as disadvantaged" by the BME sector and the construction of race as biological by everyday citizens are just two examples. However, if we allow for the *possibility* of resistance to occur then there is a *possibility* that a new hegemony can and will emerge.

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