T HE Q UESTION OF R ADICAL G ENEROSITY : E THICS AND P OLITICS OF COSMOPOLITANISM By Ali Kashani A DISSERTATION Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Philosophy Doctor of Philosop hy 2015 ABSTRACT THE QUESTION OF RADICAL GENEROSITY: ETHICS AND POLITICS OF COSMOPOLITANISM By Ali Kashani This inquiry is about the following question: what conditions give rise to the possibility of cosmopolitanism. This study examines ethical a nd political conditions concerning cosmopolitanism, and argues that radical generosity is a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Generosity involves benevolence that expects nothing in return. It does not depend on reciprocity, duty, calcu lation, or following a rule. It is an unconditional practice. Radical generosity differs from random acts of generosity that may happen from time to time, but do not have profound social and political impact. Radical generosity is a social practice, which has the potential to transform ethical and political practices. The practice of radical generosity has a transformative aspect , that is to say, it is an everyday activity , which can become the ethos of society. In other words, radical generosity has the potential to challenge and transform existing values and norms. This study examines three distinct philosophical approaches to the possibility of cosmopolitanism. It exami in diverse ways, but lacking a political or institutional conception of cosmopolitanism. Then, - Habermas - Levinas) in the realm of unconditional ethical responsibility. It acknowledges the importance and necessity of these approaches to cosmopolitanism and extracts certa in ideas from these thinkers. It also problematizes and shows their limitations in certain respects in order to advance its argument. Finally, it attempts to develop a conception of radical generosity as a social practice in concrete terms , and underscore the idea of practice ( praxis ). The idea of practice ( praxis ) refers to human activities that transform material, social, and political conditions in historical terms. It attempts to show the relevance and importance of radical generosity as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Copyright by ALI KASHANI 2015 v T ABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................... 1 Thesis ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 1 M ethod ................................ ................................ ................................ ................................ . 5 Overview of Chapters ................................ ................................ ................................ .......... 6 CHAPTER 1 : T he O rigins of Cosmopolitanism ................................ ................................ ........... 16 Preliminary Remarks: The Question of Cosmopolitanism ................................ ................ 18 Cosmopolitanism Considered ................................ ................................ ............................ 19 Stoic Philosophy Considered ................................ ................................ ............................. 23 Ethics in Stoicism ................................ ................................ ................................ .............. 26 Is Stoic Ethics Politics? ................................ ................................ ................................ ..... 29 The Stoic and Cosmopolitan Vision ................................ ................................ .................. 31 Practice of Ethics as a Way of Life: Cosmopolitan Awareness and Intent ....................... 35 CHAPTER 2 : T he Possibility of C osmopolitanism in the Realm of Political Institutions of Cosmopolitanism: A Brief Historical Account .............................. 43 International Law ................................ ................................ ................................ ............... 54 The Difficulties with the Juridical - Political Approach to Cosmopolitanism ..................... 63 Proceduralist Paradig m ................................ ................................ ................................ ...... 6 4 CHAPTER 3 : T he Possibility of Cosmopolitanism in the Rea lm of Unconditional Ethics .......... 69 ................................ ... 74 ................................ ........................... 79 ................................ ................................ ........ 87 Derri da Reading Levinas: Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas ................................ ................... 94 ................................ ................. 101 CH A PTER 4 : The Practic e of Radical Generosity as a Condition for the Possibility of Cosmopolitanism ................................ ................................ ................................ ......................... 107 Generosity: Aristotle and Nietzsche ................................ ................................ ................ 109 Aris totelian Virtue Ethics and Generosity ................................ ................................ ....... 109 ................................ ................................ ....................... 113 Contemporary V iews of Generosity ................................ ................................ ................ 118 Praxis: According to Marx ................................ ................................ ............................... 12 0 The Practice of Radical Generosity as Ethical Politics ................................ .................... 131 CHAPTER 5 : Final Remarks and Conclusion ................................ ................................ ............. 140 The Mai n Argument ................................ ................................ ................................ ......... 140 The Logic of Positions and the Movement of Argument ................................ ................ 142 First Approach ................................ ................................ ................................ ................. 143 vi Second Approach ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 145 Third Approach ................................ ................................ ................................ ................ 147 Radical Generosity as a Transformative Praxis ................................ ............................... 148 The Final Remark ................................ ................................ ................................ ............ 1 50 BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................ ................................ ................................ ........................ 151 1 INTRODUCTION Thesis My inquiry in th is study begins with the following question: what conditions give rise to the possibility of cosmopolitanism? In order to answer this question, I will examine ethical and political conditions concerning cosmopolitanism and argue that radical generosity is a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Recent discussions of cosmopolitanism do not adequately acknowledge the importance of generosity as a practice for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. In fact, the idea of generosity as a practice ( pr axis) , with respect to cosmopolitanism , has been overlooked. Here , I present a brief description of it , but I will further develop my idea of radical generosity in chapter four and explicate what practice ( praxis ) in the context of radical generosity means . Generosity involves benevolence that expects nothing in return. It does not depend on reciprocity, duty, calculation, or following a rule. It is an unconditional practice. I make a distinction between random acts of generosity by individuals , generous singular acts which may ha ppen from time to time but do not have profound social and political impact, and radical generosity as a social practice, which has the potential to transform ethical and political practices. I suggest that the practice of radical generosity has a transformative aspect ; that is to say, I understand it as an everyday activity, which can become the ethos of society in concrete terms . In other words, radical gener osity has the potential to challenge and transform existing values and norms. It must be noted that , I am not proposing that radical generosity will address all the problems of the world. I n other words, radi cal generosity is not a panacea, rather within t he context of the possibility of cosmopolitanism, which involves the issues of immigration and re fugee c risis, 2 radical generosity can be considered as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. I argue that the current immigration and refugee crisis indicate that the existing policies are not sufficient and failing , and xenophobia is on the rise in an alarming rate. T hus, there is a serious need for rethinking these policies and values and practice s that inform and produce these self - intereste d and nationalistic policies. Thu s, political institutions can consider adopting generous policies with regard to the immigration and refugee crisis. It must be noted that ethical issues have political implications, in particular, within the context cosmop olitanism, citizenship, immigration, and refugee crisis. Thus, in my view, politics without ethical cons ideration could be blind. With the idea of radical generosity, we turn from individual acts of generosity within existing society to social acts that have transformative implications. Radical generosity is a social practice that transcends individual acts both by being the action of groups and by aspiring to create new ongoing social practices. Here generosity is not simply the application of existing rules but a challenge to existing practices. Thus, it breaks with exi sting paradigms but retains an ethical quality in part by pointing to new practices and norms. Furthermore, the potential for the practice of radical generosity is also a potential for th e possibility of cosmopolitanism. There fore, radical generosity understood as a transformative praxis has concrete implications, such as, generous policies with regard to immigration and refugee crisis. Now, I turn my attention to the idea of cosmopoli tanism. It must be noted that cosmopolitanism is a challenging concept to define. It has many definitions and interpretations. In other words, it is not a given, rather a possibility, and , as such, raises difficult conceptual issues. In general, cosmopolit anism is defined in two distinct ways, ethical cosmopolitanism and political cosmopolitanism. Ethical cosmopolitanism is concerned with the extension of the scope 3 o f ethical concern. This implies that every human being as a citizen of the world belongs to a world community and has an equal ethical worth, and this creates the idea of caring and responsibility for others, regardless of ethnicity, national, cultural, and political associations. Political cosmopolitanism seeks to develop political institutions that can create a cosmopolitan political order to both organize the world and address some political issues on global scale in a democratic and legal framework. But these two distinct conceptions of cosmopolitanism cross over strict ethical and political d efinitions and boundaries. It is difficult to conceive of a political cosmopolitanism without reflecting on ethical implications of such a view, and vice versa. In my view, cosmopolitanism is an ongoing project and a possibility. Conceiving it involves s ocial relations, a movement, a society, a worldview, and a way of life, by which we unde rstand both the nation - state idea of citizen and the exclusions that this idea implies. What distinguishes this v iew is that it treats cosmopolitanism in historical terms; it acknowledges the institutional requirements of cosmopolitanism , view ing it as openness to others and a way of life, and, in doing so , involves social and political transformation, w hich in turn involves the practice of radical generosity. Before going any further with the idea of cosmopolitanism, we need to answer the following question: why should cosmopolitanis m be considered, and why now? The short and simple answer is that the idea of na tion - state produced so many devastating wars and the refugee crisis in recent history. To name a few, World War - I, World War - II (the Holoca ust and the use of atomic bomb), the Israeli - Palestinian War, the Korean W ar, the Vietnam W a r, the Iraq - Iran W ar, the Balkan W ar (ethnic cleansing), and the most recent wars include the Afghan W ar, the Iraq W ar, the Ukraine War, the Yemen war, the Libyan War, and the Syrian W ar, most of these wars have caused massive refugee cr isis. 4 Fu rthermore, the influx of immigrants and refugees has caused a drastic rise in xenophobia and Islamophobia in Europe and the US. It seems existing worldview, political order , and policies cannot adequately address these crises , simply because it is based on the idea of nation - state I n my view, it is time to think about the possibility of a n alternative world view , and think about po tentials for a different future. How can we realize a different world and future, and cre ate a n alternative to the notion s of nati on - state and avoid the perpetual war and the refuge e crisis ? I suggest that a c osmopolitanism worldview can offer such an alternative and solution to the challe nges of war and the refugee crisis that the world is experiencing now , whic h has given rise to xenophobia. Therefore, conditions that give rise to the p ossibility of cosmopolitanism can be examined and considered. There might be objection to my suggestion . C ertainly , we can continue the sa me path that w e began 367 years ago when the treaty of Wes tphalia was established , which paved the way for the modern conception of nation - state. But as I argued above it has been a devastating experience so far, and it seems it is n ot getting better any time soon with current condition s of war and the refugee crisis in the world. Why not try an alternative worldview ? to transcend the idea of nation - state of something more inclusive, which promotes the idea , solidarity , and treats everyone equ ally ethically and politically, regardless of their place of birth, ethnicity, race, and culture? It seems to me it is a desirable alternative to consider, and try to examine the possibility of such a world. 5 Method A very brief rema rk about my method in this study : f irst, it must be noted that in this project I a m engaged in a creative inquiry, which means my reading of the texts and appropriation of concepts at times are unorthodox . I must ackn owledge that this approach may cause some difficulty. Nevertheless, this departure from the standard reading of the texts and occasional unconventional reading of the texts opens the possibility for a creative synthesis of ideas, and this innovativ e i nterp retation of the texts enables me to develop my concepts . I acknowledge that this is a novel approach but the compelling nature of this project to some extent requires such a novel approach. Therefore, innovative interpretations should be evaluated not fro m the position of their hermeneutic accuracy, rather from their ability to contribute to a creative project justified by the compelling nature of the crisis (e.g. the immigration and refugee crisis). However , in light of the difficulty that this approach ma y present, I attempt to provide the exposition of my positions in this project, and justify them in the best possible way. Second, i t must be noted that we cannot be engaged in a philosophical discourse outside of the history of philosophy, and , moreover, nothing is outside of history. As such, I focus on the history of cosmopolitanism and the relation between the history of cosmopolitanism and the contemporary discourse of cosmopolitanism. My method is historical in two senses : one regarding the hist ory of concepts, the other regarding the historical context of present discussion. I explore key historical figures and concepts in my discussion of conditions for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. I examine conditions for the possibility of cosmopolitan ism, from an ethical and political perspective, assessing the soundness of these ideas. The unfolding of chapters presents the movement of my argument by relying on historical concepts and thinkers in the context o f conditions of 6 cosmopolitanism, with e ach chapter examin ing the thinkers who have contributed to the possibility of cosmopolitanism. By close reading of the texts I extract and appropriate certain concepts from these thinkers in order to develop and advance my argument. Overview of Chapter s I wi ll examine three distinct philosophical approaches to the possibility of cosmopolitanism. I begin my discussion by examin ing Stoics thinkers in diverse ways but lacking a political or institutional conception of cosmopolitanism. It must be noted that my interest in the Stoics pertains to their ideas on cosmopolitanism. Moreover, Stoicism is not a monolithic school of thought. It has divers thinkers who belong to different hi storical periods and cultures. Then, I turn to two other approaches to cosmopolitanism : - (Kant and Habermas) in the fram ework of political institutions - (Derrida and Levinas) in the realm of unconditional ethical responsibility. I ackn owledge the importance and necessity of these approaches to cosmopolitanism and extract certain ideas from these thinkers. I also problematize and show their limitations in certain respects in order to advance my argument. Finally, I develop a conception o f radical generosity as a social practice and underscore the idea of practice ( praxis ). The idea of practice ( praxis ) refers to human activities that transform material and social conditions in historical terms. The practice ( praxi s ) in concrete terms mean s generous policies with regard to the immigration and refugee crisis. I attempt to show the relevance and importance of radical generosity as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. My study consists of five chapters. Chapter one begin s with a brief historical account of cosmopolitanism and its genealogy and its modern conception today. And then it moves on to a 7 historical examination, namely, the Stoic conception of cosmopolitanism. The Stoics offer a fruitful point of reference for co ntemporary discussions on cosmopolitanism. The focus here is For the Stoics, cosmopolitanism was a worldview, an ethical and political practice, which implie ideas that have not been examined and considered. According to the Stoics, cosmopolitanism refers to the idea that human beings belong to a global human community , regardless of their place of birth and country. And this idea of belonging to a global human community implies the concept of world citizen ( kosmou politês ). This Stoic understanding of the idea of citizenship in the context of the global human community transcends the limitation and exclusion presented by the idea of a city - state ( polis ) and in the modern sense the idea of nation - state. By close reading of Stoic texts, I examine key concepts in relation to the idea of world citizen ( kosmou politês ) and the practice of ethics and politics as a Stoic philosophy involves only t he love of wisdom but also the oikeiôsis ) and the idea of care for the wellbeing of others. Central to Stoic ethics is the concep oikeiôsis ). For the Stoics, oikeiôsis his or her environment and others, or self - awareness and being aware of others. The Stoic concept of oikeiôsis suggests that it is imperative to be generous, have affinity and solidarity with other fellow cosmopolitan citizens , and care for their wellbeing. 8 The Stoic tradition of practical philosophical reflection, which translates to philosophy as , he world means not only taking care of oneself and hav also taking care of others and having their wellbeing in mind. Drawing from the Stoics, I suggest that if we approach ethical and political practices as a then there is no need to be concerned about motivation for ethical conducts and practices, as this implies that we practice ethics not because we are obliged as a duty to be an ethical subject but rather that we p - being of others in mind. and inten t through the everyday p ractice of ethics and politics. These Stoic concepts provide a framework to develop my general claim with regard to consider the practice of radical generosity I conclu de chapter one noting that the Stoics offer original ideas, and leave certain questions unanswered, with respect to cosmopolitanism. The Stoics , considering their historical situation , did not offer a conception of cosmopolitanism in the framework of polit ical institutions, the way in which modern cosmopolitanism (e.g., Kant and Habermas) offers the possibility of cosmopolitanism in the realm of political institutions, which is the focus of my discussion in chapter two. In chapter two, following my su ccessive historical analysis, I turn my attention to two modern thinkers, Immanuel Kant and Jürgen Habermas, who have envisioned the possibility of cosmopolitanism in the framework of political institutions. My aim here is to examine the idea of political institutions as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Here, I examine to 9 - - . proposes the idea of cosmopolitan right and the league of nation - states, which nation - states will join voluntar il y based on self - ception of cosmopolitanism is situated with in the framework of social contract theory and the idea of self - interest. Kant equates the situation of individuals in the state of nature with the nation - states. There is no explicit focus on ethics. Kant propose s a cosmopolitanism that does not require ethical commitment. Habermas - interest based on social contract theory, and situates his vision of cosmopolitanism within the current politica l institutions, such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). Habermas proposes a world domestic politics without a world government ( Weltinnenpolitik ohne Weltregierung ) with democratic procedures and practices, with the idea of citizenship (constitutional patriotism) going beyond the ethnic and cultural realm. In the second part of this chapter, I turn my attention to Habermas, who seeks to pr Habermas suggests a procedural framework relying on democratic practices and rule of law, which implies transition from international law to the constitutionalization o f international law, that is to say, legitimatization and institutionalization on the transnational and supranational level s . For Haber m a s, this is an ongoing project for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. In the third part of this chapter, I examine - 10 explicit ethical consi deration. It does not adequately address what is required of an ethical consideration that would achieve a contemporary cosmopolitanism. communicative ethics (discourse ethics) indicates that all those affected should participate i n a dialogue. However, ethical discourses are highly improbable in everyday life, because the ideal expectations that they place on interlocutors are extremely demanding. There is no mechanism to check whether participants in discourse have equal chances t o speak freely and to see how inclusive discourses are. For example, immigrants that are seeking membership do not have an equal position as the nation - states who are offering (or are not offering) membership. This is purely on an empirical level. In other words, discourse ethics is not adequate in terms of dealing with certain real life practical issues such as immigration. It must be noted that, I am not concep tion of cosmopolitanism foc uses on political institutions not ethics. I do acknowledge the necessity of political institutions for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. mo tivation to moral action, because there is a gap between a universal pragmatic and everyday experience. Honneth addresses the issue of motivation in The Struggle for Recognition (1995), with the notion of struggle fo r recognition ( Anerkennung ) , has three crucial elements: love, rights, and esteem. Honneth notes that a theory of communicative action has to rely on a concept of morally motivate d struggle. It must be noted that I am not rejecting ndeed, radical generosity is a complement to his conception of cosmopolitanism. 11 I conclude chapter two by suggesting that hav ing an adequate ethical consideration in volves the practice of radical generosity as a transformative practice that has the potential to challenge and change existing values and norms and poi nt to new norms and practices . This implies that political institutions can exhibit radical generosity in their practices and policy making. Thus, in the following chapter I focus on an adequate conception of ethics as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism in order to advance my argument. in the cosmopolitan discourse : on the one hand, it seems that cosmopolitanism calls for some - itutions ; on the other hand, it also requires unconditionally an - - seems to overlook this unconditional ethical concern for others. The aim of chapter three is to focus on an adequate conception of ethics as a key the h to ethics. For Derrida and Levinas, ethics is not about knowing this and that rule and making ethical decision s based on some abstract formal rules. They offer an understanding of ethics, which is about unconditional ethical concern for the other. Theref ore, Derrida insists on the idea of infinite and uncond itional ethical concern , which he calls the a limitation of ethics and to a paradoxical ethical concern that he suggests is unavo idable for human beings. Here we have ideas how there can be the opening of an ethics even when political and institutional issues are unresolved. 12 Derrida and Levinas offer an understanding of ethics, which I take to involve an unconditional ethical c oncern for the other and ethics beyond following rules. I draw from their work on the ideas of unconditional ethical concern for the other and ethics beyond following rules to advance my argument regarding radical generosity. Radical generosity also involv es unconditional openness to others and concern for the wellbeing of others without following rules ; in particular, welcome as unconditional hospitality can be understood as radical generosity. It must be noted that while Levinas locates politics o utside of the ethical realm, Derrida insistence on ethics as the condition for politics , opens up the possibility for rethinking the relationship between ethics and politics. I suggest that the challeng e is to have ethical consideration in politics and t o politicize ethical issues toward an adequate ethical politics. By ethical politics, I mean politics with ethical concern that moves toward openness to others and considers the wellbeing of others. In concrete terms, means policies that consider ethical i ssues with regard to immigrants and refugees. It must be noted that, I am not suggesting ethics and politics are the same. Thus, I attempt to develop a conception of radical generosity as an unconditional ethical practice in the social realm that politiciz es the ethical concern in the context of cosmopolitanism. This understanding of radical generosity im plies that ethical politics exhibit s radical generosity concerning immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers and in general all world citizens. While Derr ses on individual (ethical subjectivity), my focus is on the social aspect of ethical response rather than an individual dimension of it. These ideas about ethical response help to define what I mean by radical gene rosity. Radical generosity as a practice is a social disposition and the ethos of society. It 13 must be noted that societies are not naturally self - interested or generous, rather, societies have the potential to become self - interested or generous based on va lues that inform and produce social practices. Thus, through social practices historically social and political change occurs. focus of this study is conce rned, be cause their arguments emphasize the individual responsibility for the other and do not address the relevant practical and social questions. The unconditi onal radical generosity is understood as a social and transformative practice. In chapter four, I ela borate and develop further what the practice of radical generosity implies beyond emphasiz ing and underscor ing the social and transformative aspect of radical generosity. More specifically, i n chapter four , I examine the ideas of generosity and praxis in order to develop a conception of the practice of radical generosity. First, I present and examine ( eleutheriot ês ) as part of his virtue ethics. For Aristotle, generosity ( eleuth eriotês ) is an important virtue, which needs to be in harmony with other virtues for ( eleutheriotês ) is conservative and does not focus on the transformative aspect of generosity. Seco nd, I focus on the transformative aspect of generosity by reevaluating existing ethical norms and challenging them. Third, I offer a brief overview of contemporary philosophical discussions about generosity in order to give a historical account of generosity and noting that only a few scholars have exp lored the concept of generosity but not in the context cosmopolitanism. Fourth, I turn to Marx , be cause radical gene rosity involves social and transformative practice. 14 praxis , in particular, because of praxis as a social and transformative activity that brings about social and political change in historical terms. For Marx, the interior and exterior mode s of life are interconnected, which implies that the material conditions of life need to change to improve the interior mode of life ; thus, praxis means revolutionary or radical practice that transforms the world. P raxis in the context of radical generosity refers to concrete practical - critical and transformative activities, and transformation implies social and historical change that take s place in society . I also emphasize that radical generosity as a social practi ce has political implications. In other words, radical generosity is not merely an ethical idea ; it involves politics, which means politicizing ethical issues and suggesting politics with ethical concern . Radical generosity as praxis embodies a concrete co ncern for the wellbeing of others. This begins by transforming social relations toward openness and solidarity with others that can give rise to a cosmopolitan worldview and intent. The practice of radical generosity i n concrete terms means generous immigr ation policies. Furthermore, Marx relies on his insights about social practices to provide a historical analysis of how new historical possibilities arise through evolution of social processes. Drawing tices within the context of historical and material conditions in order to understand present practices and the social and political relations, not necessarily in the orthodox Marxism sense of the historical determinism conflict but r ather i n the sense that we must consider the multiple historical and material conception of praxis , I suggest that radical generosity as a transformative practice ch allenges the existing social and political norms and has the potential to give rise to new ways of social and political practices. Finally, I present a discussion about the practical aspect of radical generosity 15 as ethical politics with respect to immigran ts, refugees, and asylum seekers. This discussion shows the emergence of solidarity and openness toward immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers by various social and political movements in the world. I suggest that the emergence of these social and politi cal movements indicates a gesture and potential for the practice of radical generosity. I conclude chapter four by suggesting that I have developed the necessary features of the practice of radical generosity as a key condition for the possibility of cosmo politanism. In the final chapter, I note that my argument may not be a perfect argument but one that requires developing and evolving in an ongoing mode. Nevertheless, I must emphasize that my thesis has potential, and it is my contention that this mo de of radical thinking is productive in its task of politicizing ethical issues and transforming social and political practices. Furthermore, we cannot reject a theory before considering and examining its potentials and putting it into practice, only the p assage of time and historical processes will reveal whether a theory is sound or not. Moreover, my conception of radi cal generosity is not a panacea but rather a novel contribution in the heterogeneous mode to other approaches that I examine in this study with respect to the possibility of cosmopolitanism as an ongoing project. 16 Chapter 1 : T he Origins of Cosmopolitanism In this chapter, I start with preliminary remarks on the idea of cosmopolitanism and its importance in recent times , and then I examine the origins of cosmopolitanism. I n order to articulate my argument, I begin my discussion with a historical examination of cosmopolit anism going back to the Stoics . The Stoics offer a fruitful point of reference for contemporary d iscussions on cosmopolita nism. It must be noted that most scholars agree that the idea o f cosmopolitanism originates fro m the Stoics. However, I am not sug gesting it is the only idea in the Stoic thought. Stoicism is not a monolithic school of thought. Stoicism has diverse thinker s who belong to different historical periods and cultures. My interest in the Stoics pertains to their ideas on cosmopolitanism. Some of these thinkers focused on ideas on cosmopolitanism (e.g., Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Hierocles). I attempt to ret hink Stoic cos mopolitanism and extract from it ideas that have not been examined and considered. Furthermore, my reading of the Stoics texts and appropriation of concepts may seem unconventional at times but this innovative interpretation of the texts enab les me to develop my concepts and advance my argument in this project. F irst , I present what the Stoics offer in terms of an idea of cosmopolitanism and corresponding practices of ethics and politics According to the Stoics, cosmop olitanism refers to the idea that all human beings belong to the human community, regardless of their place of birth and country. And this idea of belongin g to a global human community implies the concept of world citizen ( kosmou politês ) 1 . T his St oic unde rstand ing of the i dea of citizenship in the context of the global human community transcends the limitation 1 Stoic thinkers like Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, and Cicero discuss the idea of world citizen in their writings. 17 and exclusion presented by the idea of city - state ( polis ) and , in the modern sense , the idea of nation - state. Second, by close reading of Stoi c texts , I seek to rethink Stoic cosmopolitanism and extract from it ideas that have not been examined and considered. The key concept in rel ation to the idea of world citizen ( kosmou politês ) is the idea of the practice of ethics and politics as a life. Stoic philosophy requires the practice of ethics and politics as a way of life in the Greek tradition of the practice of philosophy as a way of life. This way of life implies not only love of wisdom but also the practice of wisdom, fe is transforming to a cosmopolitan wa y of life. The other important concept is oikeiôsis idea of care for the wellbeing of others. Central to Stoic ethics is the concept of oikeiôsis . For the Stoics, oikeiôsis is a technical co others, or self - awareness and being aware of others. The Stoic concept of oikeiôsis suggests that it is imperative to be generous, have affinity and solidarity with other fellow cosmopolitan ci tizens , and care about their wellbeing . Furthermore, I suggest that in order to grasp the cosmopolitan aspect of Stoic philosophy, it is crucial to understand the importance of these key concepts, such as life . F or the Stoics, what may render cosmopolitanism possible is the practice of philosophy as and awareness and, in turn , to be engaged in ethical and political life to transform social, ethical, and political practices. conception of the practice of radical generosity as a potential for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. 18 Finally, I conclude that to some extent the Stoics offer original ideas and leave certain questions unanswered with respe ct to cosmopolit anism . The Stoics , positioned as they were historical ly, did not offer a conception of cosmopolitanism in the framework of po litical institutions, the way in which modern cosmopolitanism (e.g., Ka nt and Habermas) offers the possibility of cosmopolitanism in the realm of political institution s , which is the focus of discussion in chapter two. Preliminary Remarks: The Question of Cosmopolitanism The idea of cosmopolitanism rai ses a series of fundamental issues , namely, birthplace, belonging A p lace of birth designates where one is born, but it does n o t necessar y imply belonging to a particular place place is simply an accident , but the issue of belonging to a specific place with certain interests in relation to others is a more complex matter. It would seem that the concept of cosmopolitanism might a ddress the se very issues that it raises . That is to say, co smopolitanism as a worldview ( Weltanschauung ) approach , and as a practice , may be able to provide an ethical an d political framework for living with others in the world. The cosmopolitan worldview ( Weltanschauung ) implies having ethical and political consideration for others, that is to say, caring for the wellbeing of others in the world . T he question is whether cosmopolitanism is a concrete social and political practice or a pos sibility . Perhaps , as Kant noted about enlightenment, at the present time we do not live in a cosmopolitan age, but we do live in an age of cosmopolitanism. 2 2 Kant in What is Enlightenment? , Immanuel Kant, translated by H. B. Nisbet, edited by Hans Reiss (Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.58. 19 The idea of cosmopolitanism is an ancient concept going back to the Stoics in ancient Greece and later the Roman Empire, and in the 18 th century it was revitalized by modern thinkers, such as Immanuel Kant . W hether it was actuall y practiced, there is, admittedly, not much concrete eviden ce. Furthermore, considering the historical facts and et hnic violence and wars t hroughout the history, there might be objections and even resistance to the idea of cosmopolitanism as a viable concept. However, precisely because of these conflicts and wars and , in particular , the rise of xenophobia in the world , cosmopolitanism becomes crucial . A lthough , the idea of cosmopolitanism may not be a concrete socia l or political practice, nevertheless , it is a possibility , and as such, it would seem reasonable to think that the idea of cosmopolitanism is a possibili ty as a concept for living with others in an inclusive world, in which we understand the concept of citizen with in the framework of world citizen, and the implications of such a view requires caring for the wellbeing of others. Not only as an ethical stand, rather as a political sta nd as well. Therefore, conditions t hat give rise to the possib ility of cosmopolitanism can be exami ned and considered. Cosmopolitanism Considered To situate and illustrate why cosmopolitanism should be considered as a vital idea and what condition s give rise to the possibility of cosmopolitanism, I begin with a brief history of discussions on cosmopolitani sm and suggest that recent discussions of cosmopolitanism may address cer tain aspects of this Stoic idea. Nevertheless , these discussions do not addres s the issues that my project seeks to examine and consider. Let us examine t he word cosmopolitan, which derives from the Greek word kosmou politês , which means world ci tizen . It refers to the idea that all human beings belong to the human community, r egardless of their place of b irth and country, and this human community 20 m ust be promoted and cultivated. In the 18 th century Kant , influenced by the Stoics , revived the idea of cosmopolitanism. 3 Cosmopolitanism can be viewed in the realm of an ethical comm unity, which implies that every human being as a citizen of the world belongs to a human c ommunity, and has an equal ethical worth, and this creates the idea of caring and responsibility for others, regardless of ethnicity, national, cultural, and politica l association. Cosmopolitanism can be construed in terms of politica l institutions that can create a cosmopolitan political order to organize the world and address some political issues on global scale in a democratic and legal framework. In my view , i t is difficult to conceive of a political cosmopolitanism without reflecting on ethical implications of such a view, and vice versa . It must be noted that, I am not suggesting ethics and politics are the same . Cosmopolitanism is a possibility and an ongo ing project. As such, conceiving it involves social relations, a movement, a society, a worldview, a way of life, by which we understand the idea of citizen in terms that transcend the nation - state idea of citizen and accept the exclusion s that this idea i mplies. As such , I suggest, it requires a rethinking of ethical and political pr actices within the framework of cosmopolitan discourse . Before going any further with the possibil ity of cosmopolitanism we need to answer the following question : why shoul d cosmopolitanism be considered , and why now? The simple answer is that because of recent wars in the Middle East and recent wave of immigrants and 3 Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteenth - Century Germany (Journal of the History of Ideas, 1999), pp. 505 - 524. Kleingeld writes that in late eighteenth - century Germany cosmopolitanism was not a single encompassing idea but rather came in at least six different varieties: moral cosmopolitanism; proposals for reform of the international political and legal order; cultural cosmopolitanism, which emphasizes the value of global cultural pluralism; economic cosmopolitanism, which aims at establishing a global free market where all humans are equal potential trading partners; and the romantic cosmopolitan ideal of humanity as united by faith an d love. According to Kleingeld, these six kinds of cosmopolitanism are not mutually exclusive. 21 refugee crisis the idea of cosmopolitanism seems to be an alternative worldview to the notions of natio n - st that cause war and refugee crisis. Furthermore, we live in a world that is becoming increasingly interconnected in various respects : socio - ec on omic ally , politic ally , and technolog icall y . In recent times 4 , as an alternative or neoliberal globalization and to the neoliberal globalizati may lead to cosmopolitanism , some thinkers , such as the sociologist Ul rich Beck and philosopher Jürgen Habermas , have revitalized the idea of cosmopo litan ism. For Beck 5 , cosmopolitanism offers an alternative capitalist gl and Habermas , following and superseding Kant, situates cosmopolitanism in the realm of law and political institutions, which he refers to as the constitu t ionalizatio n of international law. I will discuss Kant and s conce ption of cosmopolitanism in detail in chapter two. Other thinkers , such as David Held, Thomas Pogge, James Bohman, Daniele Archibugi, Seyla Benhabib, 6 and Martha 4 Of course, we must note that as early as 1965 H.C. Baldry discussed the idea of cosmopolitanism in his book The Unity of Mankind in Greek Thought (Cambridge University Press, 1965). Also, it is worth mentioning Benedict Imagined Communities , in which he critiques the idea of the nation - state and nationalism. See Imagined Communitie s, (London & New York: Verso, 1991). 5 smopolitan discourse is v aluable and in certain respects his project is informed by s olitanism as an alternative to remains a project in sociology ; that is to n o t examine and consider ethical practices that may have political implications with regard to cosmopolitani sm. He argues that his project is a sociologica l one, not a philosophical discussion. Cosmopolitan Vision , by Ulrich Beck, (Polity Press, 2006), pp. 1 - 14. 6 David which requires the c reation of regional parliaments. H e gives examples, such as Latin America, Africa, Asia, and European Parliament. It would seem th at political order . Habermas envisions cosmopolitanism as a legitimation requirements of a democratically constituted world society without a world government - assuming th at nation - states and their population undergo certain learning processes. Democracy: From City - States to a Cosmopolitan Order? (David Held, 2008), Cambridge: Polity.www.polity.co.uk/modelsofdemocracy/docs/democracy - essay.pdf. (Essay PDF), pp.13 - 52. Thoma s Pogge Insti which implies a human rights norm for global institutional order, and this norm will give rise to the global institutional reform toward a vertical dispersal of sovereignty. According to Pogg e, this reform on the global level will reduce poverty, oppression, and inequality and give rise to the possibility of peace. Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, The University of Chicago Press . Ethics, Vol. 103, No. 1 (Oct., 1992), pp. 48 - 75. James Bohman argues that contrary to cosmopolitan and communitarian proposals, good democratic governance needs both bigger and smaller units. Most important in this regard is not mere size, but the ways in which politics and subunits are organized and interrelated. Ac cording to Bohman, the proper solutions to the problems of democracy are not to find some optimal size or ideal democratic procedure, but rather to establish a 22 Nussbaum, have theorized ab out cosmopolitanism as well. I briefly discussion of cosmopolitanism, which is pertinent to my focus on Stoic cosmopolitanism in this chapter. Nussbaum by rediscovering cosmopolitanism ha s contributed greatly to the cosmopolitan discour se. In 1994, Martha N ussbaum published a short essay titled Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism ( 1994) . In this essay, Nussbaum evokes the idea of cosmopolitani sm drawing from the Stoic conception of cosmopolitanism. However, Nussb focus is on criti quing the communitarian view of patriotism , and she offers the cosmopolitan world view as an alternative. Nussbaum , in critiquing the communitarian view , writes the following passages in her essay : [T] his emphasis on patriotic pride is both morally dangero us and, ultimately, subversive of some of the worthy goals patriotism sets out to serve for example, the goal of national unity in devotion to worthy moral ideals of justice and equality. These goals, I shall argue, would be better served by an ideal that is in any case more adequate to our situation in the contemporary world, namely the very old ideal of the cosmopolitan, the person whose primary allegiance is to the community of h uman beings in the entire world Cosmopolitanism offers only reason and the l ove of humanity, which may seem at times less colorful th the life of the cosmopolitan, who puts right before country, and universal reason before the symbols of national belonging, need not be boring, flat, or lacking in love . 7 s between nation - states and international conceptions on the one hand and cosmopolitan democracy on the other. It is not nationalist or internationalist to the extent that argues for the feasibility of democracy outside states and the delegated authority o f state; it is not cosmopolitan and does not require a form of political organization at the apex of a hierarchy. See Democracy across Borders: from dêmos to dêmoi ( James Bohman, The MIT Press, 2007 ). Seyla Benhabib argues for the protection of weak social notion of the right to have rights, she argues that no human is illegal. The Rights of Others, Aliens, Residents and Citizens (Seyla Benhabib, Cambridge University Press, 2004), Another Cosmopolitanism (Seyla Benhabib, Oxford University Press, 2006). Daniele Archibugi argues for a major reform of the international system, his idea of institutional cosmopolitanism seeks to combine cosmopolitan obligation with the principles of dem ocracy. This can be done by reinforcing the existing international institutions, starting from the UN, and also by creating new ones. According to Archibugi, the project of cosmopolitan democracy gives a central role to the idea of a world parliament. Even if with limited powers such a parliament could be the institution on which the peoples of the world luenced by Habermas. The Global Commonwealth of Citizens, Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy (Daniele Archibugi, Princeton University Press, 2008). Also, see Otfried H (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 7 Mar - 15. Also, see For Love of Country, Debating the Limits of Patriotism , (Beacon Press, Boston 1996), pp. 3 - 20, Martha The Journal of P olit ical Philosophy, Vol.5. No.1, 1997, pp. 1 - 25. Martha Nussbaum, 23 Nu work has establish ed the consensus on the importance of Stoic cosmopolitanism, but she has concentrated more on developing current implications of a general cosmopolitan ideal , rather than examining precisely what the Stoic s meant, an d what conditions give rise to the possib ility of cosmopolitanism . Nussbaum published two more essays on cosmopolitanism focus ing on the Stoics and their influence in the current discourse of cosmopolitanism. In t he first essay , Kant and Stoic Cosmopolita nism (1997), Nussbaum argues Stoics and the idea of universal reason is central to the Stoic idea of world community , which Kant embrace d in his conception of cosmopolitanism. In t h e second essay , Duties of Justice, Duties of Material Aid: (2000), Nussbaum examines the legacy with respect to duties and justice. And , recently she has published texts focusing on human rights and g lobal justice 8 . Nussbaum contribution to cosmopolitan discourse is valu able and important, but her emphasis has be en on v irtue ethics and human rights, rather than on the condition s of the possibility of cosmopolitanism, or the practice of generosity. S toic Philosophy Considered Stoic philosophy offers an excellent historical reference for how one mig ht want to think and theorize about cosmopolitanism as a worldview ( Weltanschauung ) and a way of life . Stoic Duties of Justice, Duties of Material A , The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 8. No. 2, 2000, pp.176 - 206. 8 h is based on the social contract theory. She argues that in thinking about justice the contractarian theories have some structural defects that make them yield very imperfect results when we apply them on the gl this approach suggests that a set of basic human entitlements, similar to human rights, as a minimum of what justice requires for all. But The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, edited by Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005. Beyond the social contract: capabilities and global justice ( 2005 ) , pp.196 - 218. 24 philosophy is an alternative to Platonic and Aristotelian philoso phy, however to some extent Stoic ethics is similar to 9 . The dist in ction between Platonic and Stoic philosophy is twofold. F irst, the political aspect of Plato and Aristotle is not cosmopolitan in natur e. For Plato and Aristotle , a man is a citizen of the city - state ( polis ) with which he needs to identify and belong ; he must be loyal to that city - titutions , and he must read y to defend th at city from foreign attacks. The Stoics by contrast clai m that the world ( cosmos ) is the city - state ( polis ) , because human beings are part of the world ( cosmos ) , in other words, part of the whole. The Stoics claim that all human beings belong to the human community as a whole ; therefore , one does n o t belo ng to a particular city but rather one is a citizen of the world . Second, w hat is intriguing about the Stoics , in contr ast to Platonic philosophy , i s their emphasis on materiality : n amely , the idea that only physical bodies exist and things that do n o t have bodi es do not exist. The Stoics did n o t seem to have any metaphysica l principles in their ethics . In deed, Stoic eth ics is rooted in physics , the inquiry into the nature of sensible objects. The Stoics confined existence to bodies, meaning that only those thing s can be said to exist , which have threefold extension together with resistance (SVF II.381). 10 Almost all of Stoic philosophy can be categorized in logic (including epistemology and the study of method), ethics (including practical sciences and specially p olitics) , and physics. The most general tendency in Stoic physics is materialism, the re jection of incorpo real entities. Ultimately, the focus of logic, physics, and ethics is one thing, the rational universe, considered from three 9 It is worth noting that for Aristotle, ethics is b ased on virtue ( arête ), one must have right virtues in order to reach the final aim, and that is happiness ( eudaimonia ). For the Stoics, virtue is only one aspect of Stoic ethics and their conception of virtue is slightly different from Aristotle. For exam ple, Aristotelian virtue may have some affective aspect as long as is moderate in balanced and harmonized condi tion by way of doctrine of mean . The Stoics , on the other hand, do n o t allow any emotion in their conception of virtue, since they view emotion a s false belief, which must be ove rcome by reason. Also, S toic ethics has a cosmopolitan aim. 10 A.A. Long, Stoic Studies, (U niversity of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2001 ), pp.134 - 155. Arnim, H. von, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta(SVF), ( Leipzig , 1903 - 5 ) . 25 different but mutually c onsistent points of view. The Stoic practical approach to the practice of philosophy is in direct contrast to the Platoni c notion of forms, which places the practice of philosophy and understanding of ethics in the realm of metaphysics. The Stoics consider ed their philosophy to be coherent and rational. They thought that the world ( cosmos ) has a ration al explanation and has a rationally organized structure. For the Stoics, reason ( logos ) is the faculty that enables man to think, speak, and be engaged in t he activities of human life , which is embodied in the world ( cosmos ) . According to this logic, human being s in their nature belong to a whole . Since human being s are rational and the universe is ra tional, they are interconnected . For the Stoics, this implies living according to nature, or in agreement with nature, which accords with human rationality. Ultimately, the aim of human life is complete harmony between a the course of even ts in the universe. Zeno says , the real nature or physis of a man consists in his rationality (SVF i 179, 202) , a nd Diogenes says , a man needs nothing but physical and mental sel f - discipline to fulfill him - self, to live according to nature (D.L. vi 24 - 70). 11 For the Stoics, reason ( logos ) in a broader sense seem s to mean practical wisdom, a way of life in which a man acts in line with what is truly valuable to him, in terms of his inner well - being , not according to conventional social and moral judgments or changes of fortune ; thus , real freedom is achieved, and such a life would be natural since it is according to reason (D.L. vii 71). For the Stoics, philosophy is the practice of wisdom or the practice of appropriate science (SVF ii 35,36). 12 What is remarkable about this philosophy and logic in some sense is the practical approach to the practice of philosophy , and , at its core , ethics. 11 A.A. Long , Hellenistic Philosophy, ( University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1997 ), pp.108 - 110. H. von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta(SVF), ( Leipzig, 1903 - 5 ) . Also, see Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers , Boo ks VI - X, translation by R.D. Hicks, (Harvard University Press, 2005). 12 Ibid ., p.119. 26 Drawing from this Stoic approach to philosophy , and , e specially , ethics, i t wo uld be reasonable to assume that ethical conduct mo re than anything must rely on conducts an d practices , which relate to social and political relations and the formation of social re l a tions . This aspect of Stoic philosophy relates and to some extent is a starting point for my argumen t with regard to ethical conduct as a pra ctice and a way of lif e 13 with respect to the practice of radical generosity as a social practice. Nevertheless, it is important to note that it is not my aim to rely and focus on Stoic cosmology like some scholars , for example, A.A. Long , who suggests that there is an al l permeating divine drive which unites human beings, Stoics , which entails the idea of universal reason in human community, nor do I want to be engaged in a polemic. My aim is to be engaged in an inquiry, which is f o cused on certain aspects of Stoic philosophy, which has not been examined thoroughly and considered with respect to cos mopo litanism, namely, the Stoic practical appr oach to philosophy , as well as their focus on et h ical practices as a way of life . Ethics in Stoicism As I noted earlier it seems Stoic ethics does n o t focus on metaphysical framewor k, rather it appeals to practical experience ba sed on conducts and practices. Central to Stoic ethics is the concept of oikeiôsis . Scholars agree that this word i s hard to translate because of the multiplicity of its meaning. It has b een translated as well - disposed, related, akin, belonging, and having aff inity with others. F or the Stoics, oikeiôsis 13 I appropriate philosophy as a way of life in Philosophy as a Way of Life, ( Bla ckwell Publishing, Oxford, 1995), Ch. 11, and What is Ancient Philosophy? ( Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 2004 ) . I want to suggest that the practice of philosophy includes ethical and political practices , and , indeed, for the Stoics, practicing philosophy meant being engaged in ethical an 27 relationship to it s en vironment and others, or self - awaren ess and being aware of others. 14 This concept of relating and belonging to oneself and to other s seem s to be natural according to Stoic philosophy , but it has a n evolving process that begins with pure impulse in human bei ngs to protect and preserve themselves and progresses to a rational mode of existence in a mature human being , which accords with reason and becoming aware of the fact tha t all beings belon g to the human community . In the beginning , one is aware of its own existence and body , and the need to relate to one self and pre serve itself. But then the awareness comes that on e needs to relate to other beings as well. Diogenes Laertius, the third - century B . C . writer of the Lives of the Philosophers , reports Chrysippu s say ing : the first thing appropriate to every animal, is its own constitutio (SVF 3.178) . He also reports that Hierocles says : w e are an animal, but a gregarious one , which needs some one else as well. For thi s reason too we inhabit cities, for there is no human being who is not a pa rt of a city . Secondly, we make friendships easily. By eating together or sitting together in the theatre . 15 To articulate this Stoic concept with respect to cosmopolitanism , it is crucial to pay attention to other statements by the Stoics , which are more specific in terms of the formation of social relations and ethics . For example, John Stobaeus reports the following statement by the Stoics: T he Stoics say that all good things belong (in common) to the virtuous in that he who benefits one of his neighbors also benefits himself. That is why he who benefits someone else is also benefitted himself and he who harms someone also harms himself. All virtuous men benefit each other, even though th ey are not in all cases friends o f each other or well disposed ( to each other) or in go od repute ( with each other) or receptive (of each other), because they do not have a (cognitive) grasp of each other and do not live in the same place. They, however, ar e disposed to be well disposed and to be friendly to 14 A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, ( University of California Press, 1997 ), p.172. 15 A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, volume1, ( Cambridge Universi ty Press, Cambridge, 2008), pp.3 4 7 - 348. H. von Arnim , Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta(SVF), ( Leipzig, 1903 - 5 ). 28 each other and to hold (each other) in good repute and receptive (to each other). 16 F urthermore , Hierocles describes Stoic cosmopolitanism throug h the use of c oncentric circles combined with the idea of affinity ( oikeiôsis ). H i e rocles describes individuals as consisting of a series of circles: T h e first circle is the individual. The next circle is the immediate family, followed by the extended family, and t hen the loc al community. Next are the community of neighboring towns, followed by fellow citizens , and finally the whole human community . The task , according to Hierocles, is to draw the circles in towards the center, transferring people to the inner circles, making all human beings part of our concern. 17 This description captures the Stoic conception of cosmopolitanism with regard to sociality of human beings and having concern for the wellbeing of others. Cic e ro also states: It develops naturally that there is among men a common and natural congenialit y of men with each other, with the result that it is right for them to feel that other men, just because they are men, are not alien From which it naturally follows that we put the common advantage ahead of our own. For just as the law put the wel l - being of all ahead of the well - being of individuals, so too the good and wise man, who is obedient to the laws and not unaware of his civic duty, looks out for the advantage of all more than for that of any one person or his. 18 These passage s illustrate specifically what the concept of oikeiôsis means in the second phase of it s evolution ; the mature cosmopolitan citizen acts and conducts her self ethically toward other fellow cosmopolitan citizens who may or may not be a friend or family. Ultimately, for t h e Stoics, it is the community , which go verns the formation of social rel ations and care for the wellbeing of others. 16 Brad Inwood, and L.P. Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy , second edition, ( Hackett Publish ing Company, Indianapolis, 1997), pp. 219,224,242. (11b,11i), John Stobaeus Anthology 2, 5 - 12 (pp.57 - 116 W - H) (II - 95), Cicero On Goal 3.62 - 70 selections . 17 A.A. Long, and D.N. Sedley, The Hel lenistic Philosophers, volume1, ( Cambridge Un iversity Press, Cambridge, 2008), G Hierocles (Stobaeus 4.671,7 - 673,II), p.349. 18 Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerson, Hellenist ic Philosophy , second edition, ( Hackett Publish ing Company, Indianapolis, 1997), pp. 219,224,242. (11b,11i), John Stobaeus Anthology 2, 5 - 12 (pp.57 - 116 W - H) ( II - 95), Cicero On Goal 3.62 - 70 selectio ns . 29 The Stoic concept of oikeiôsis sugg est s that it is imperative to be generous, have affinity and so lidarity with other fellow cosmopol itan citizens , and care about their wellbeing. T here is nothing a ltruistic about these practices ; rather , according to the logic of oikeiôsis we all belong to the human community . In some sense, this concept is crucial to understand the idea of world citiz en ( kosmou politês ). In order to be a citizen of the world , we must realize the concept of oikeiôsis and practice it every day as a way of life , recognizing that caring for the wellbeing of others means caring for the wellbeing of the human community as a way of life . Ethics and ethical practice for the Stoics, implies living a good life, and living a good life is an ethical life, which involves cultivation of the self (the care of the self) and b eing engaged with others and caring for others , and pract icing and mastering the art of living . Having knowledge of ethics and rules of ethical conduct may be necessary to live a good life, which is an ethical life, but it is not sufficient to actually produce a good life and ethic al life : what is needed is the practice of ethics as a way of life , as an ethical life in which the care of the self implies caring for others and being engaged with others ; that is ethical conduct and prac tice with cosmopolitan aim . Stoic phil osophy offer s a framework with respec t to ethical practices , for example, the practice of radical generosity, as an ethical and political practice, as a way of life , which can provide optimal conditions for the possibilit y of cosmopolitanism . Is Stoic Ethics Politics ? Reading various Stoic text s one may think and perceive Stoic philosophy devoid of politics and perhaps even apolitical and mainly concerned w ith ethics. However, a close and careful reading and examination of the Stoic texts may suggest that indeed Stoic philosophy and ethics invol ves being engaged in p olitics , that is to say, politics is implied in Stoic philos ophy and ethics. The Stoic concept of cosmopolitanism raises ethical and pol itical questions at the same time. For 30 example, when Cynic Diogene 19 declared that he is a citizen of the world ( kosmou politês ) , he raised ethical and political questions at the same time . This is a cr ucial point in Stoic cosmopolitanism . To claim that one is a citizen of the world raises ethical and political questions. This claim has e thical elem ents, because it implies all the citizens of the world have eq ual ethical worth, and belong to the global human community wi thout exclusion. It raises political question, obl e crucial point is that it indicates tha t all citizens of the world have equal rights. According to the Stoics, one belong s to the local community as well as to the global community, and there should be no tension between the local and global communit y. Both of these views raise political and ethical questions. The questi on is: what is the nature of S toic cosmopolitanism? Is it strictly political or ethical? My reading is that, f or the Stoics , ethical issues within context of cosmopolitanism have polit ical implications. To elucidate this point we need to refer to reports on Stoic philosophy in which the Stoics discuss the concept of cosmopolitanism with respect to ethics. There will be more detail discussion on the concept of cosmopolitan ism with respec t to practice of ethics later in this chapter. Briefly , the discussion will focus on the St oic understanding of practice of ethics ba sed on practical approach to ethics , which has political implications. For example, Seneca in his letters talks about the m ateriality of good. He says: Our school holds that what is good is a body because what is good acts, and whatever acts is a body. What is good benefits; but in order to benefit, something must act; if it acts, it is a body. They say that wisdom is good. It follows that they must be speaking of 19 R. D. Hicks, Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Ph ilosophers ( Books VI - X) , (Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 65 (VI 63). 31 it too as corporeal. 20 This passage confirms two crucial points that my inquiry and argument relies on, namely, the Stoic practical approach to ethics a nd the importance of understanding ethics in terms of practice . For the S toics, ethics has meaning and value in the realm of practice . Stoicism views the idea of good and virtue in terms of practice . For instance, Sextus Empiricus says: Good is benefit or not other than benefit, meaning by benefit virtue and virtuous action (SVF 3.75, part). 21 It would se em that for the Stoics, if a concept or rule is theoretically formulated, it might offer a less direct concrete prescription. Stoic ethics is based on expe rience of the world and gaining knowledge through experience an d on what is good and beneficial to all cosmopolitan citizens in t he world in terms of ethical practices and conducts as a way of life . Th e Stoic and Cosmopolitan Vision How do the Stoics conceive of the concept of cosmopolitanism? Moreover, what did the Stoics mean by cosmopol it anism? In a general sense, the Stoic s consider all human beings part of the whole human community . T his understanding has ethical and political implic ations . T hat is to say , t he Stoics encourage and advocate discourses , contrar y to convention and ethical and political practices of their time. Greek culture and philosoph ers and , in particular, Plato and Aristotle focused on the idea of the city - state ( polis ) and defined citizenship in the realm of the Greeks and barbarians. O ne w as a Greek citizen or a barbarian , a non - cit izen. T he Stoic understanding of citizenship goes beyond a particular location and birthplace, which challenges the conventi onal discourse of Greek society and c ulture . To elaborate on this point , let u s 20 A.A. Long, and D.N. Sedley, The Hel lenistic Philosophers, volume1, ( Cambridge Un iversity Press, Cambridge, 2008), S Seneca, Letters 117.2, p.374. 21 A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The H ellenistic Philosophers, volume1, ( Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008 ), G Sextus Empiricus, Against the professors 11.22 - 6, p.317. , H. von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta(SVF), ( Leipzig, 1903 - 5 ). 32 examine a few texts that report on Stoic philosophy , which refer to the theme o f cosmopolitanism in Stoicism. Pluta r ch in his writing reports: household arrangement should not be based o n cities or parishes, each one marked out by its own legal system, but we should regard all men as our fellow - citizens and local residents, and there should be one way of life and order, like that of herd grazing together a nd nurtured by a common law (SVF I.262, part). 22 This comment by Zeno sets the foundation for the concept of cosmopolitanism to come . statement offers a new idea and way o f thinking in Greek culture and society, a wa y of life , which transforms the conv entional norms and ethics, mo ving away from Greek elitism and paving the way for rethinking t he concept of city and citizenship . For the Stoics, t he idea of world citizen ( kosmou politês ) and its boundaries go beyond the scope of legal and conventional framework of the cit y - state ( pol is ) and move into the realm of the global community . This Stoic idea o f world citizen is a crucial idea , which has a significant influence in the current understanding of cosmopolitanism as a possibility and with regard to living with others in the world . Ultimately, the claim of a ncient Greek philosophy is to offer a framework for ethics and politics, which is a way of life through excellence and virtue that leads o ne to a n ethical life, the good life, and happ iness . What is unique about Stoic phil osophy is the suggestion that not only the Greek citizens, the elite , can p ursue the good life and h appiness. I nde ed, the pursuit of the good life and happiness might be a possibility for all people, by way of becoming citizen s of the world and viewing the world from a cosmopolitan perspective. The Stoics ope n the possibility of a new way of thinking both about ethics and the politics of living together in the 22 A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic P hilosophers, V olume1, ( Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008 ). A Plutrach, On the fortune of Alexander , 329A - B . p . 429. H. von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta(SVF), ( Leipzig, 1903 - 5 ). 33 world and about the formation of social and political relations and institutions. In a sense, the Stoi cs reframe the old question of j ustice in a more concrete sense, situating it in everyday practices of ethics and politics as a way of life asserting that , indeed, a cosmopolitan way of thinking and practice s may lead to ethical and political activit ies that might render justice possible. Furthermore, Plutrach reports th By nature, as Aristo said, there is no native land, just so, or rather is so na med and called, always in re lation to the occupant and user (SVF 1.317, part) . 23 becomes a problematic notion, since they view the native land not as a fixed entity, rathe r as something that is in flux and relational . I n other words, the Stoics question the nature of sense, Stoicism questions the idea of citizenship, which is defined in relation to a particular location. This opens the possibility for the cosmopolitan view of the world . T he cosmopolitan view of the world defines citizenship, ethics, and politics not in terms of location but rather in terms of social relations that are be yond the notion of native land. Let u s examine the notion of native land further in terms of birthplace according to the Stoic concept of cosmopolitanism. Seneca reports the following: Let us take hold of the fact that there are two communities - the one, which great and truly common, embracing gods and men, in which we look neither to this corner nor that, but measure the boundaries of our state by the sun; the other, the one to which we have been assigne d by the accident of our birth. 24 23 A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, volum e1, ( Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008 ). H Plutrach, On exile 600E , p.431. H. von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta(SVF), ( Leipzig, 1903 - 5 ). 24 A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, volume1, ( Cambridge University Press, Cambr idge, 2008 ). K Seneca, On leisure 4.1 , p.431. 34 This pa ssage reinforces the idea that for th e Stoics , place of birth is not the only determining factor in bonding the social relations and interest s, rather, the true common interests are cosmopolitan, where the entire plan e rest , birthplace is only an accident and nothing m ore in terms of how one relates and conducts oneself ethically and politically in the world. Furthermore , Cicero defines the world ( cosmos ) as a city and republic : And yet, since there are gods ( if they really exist, as they certainly do) it is necessary that they be alive, and not only alive but also rational and bound to each other by a kind of political bond (i.e., congeniality) and society, governing this single cosmos lik e some shared republi c or city. For the cosmos is like a common home for gods and men, or a city which both (gods and men) inhabit. 25 The Stoics promote a unique understanding of community, poli tics, and ethics in which we can imagine the wor ld as united in accepting differen ce, because the human community as a whole has different parts and all the parts belong to the whole. Although the Stoics did not provide a detail ed framewo rk for the actualization of cosmopolitanism , they do , nevertheless, set the stage for the possibilit y of such a world. Stoic philosophy requires the practice of ethi c s and politics as a way of life in the Greek tradition of practic e of philosophy as a way of life . This way of life ne eds cultivation and every day practice t o become a commonplace in t he world, where life is becoming and tra nsforming from one mode of life to a new mode of life and where practices must have c osmopolitan awareness and intent. Next , I shall discuss what is meant by prac tice of ethics as a way of life and cosm opolitan awareness and intent. These concepts are crucial to my argument and to the articulation of the practice of r adical generosity as a way of life , which must be considered as a key condition for the possib ility of cosmopolitanism . 25 Brad Inwood and L.P. Gerso n, Hellenistic Philosophy , second edition, ( Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1997 ) . Cicero On the nature of the Gods 2, II - 23 selections , pp. 152, 159. 35 Practice of Ethi cs as a Way of Life : Cosmopolitan Aware ness and Intent For the ancient Greeks, philosophy and the practice of ethics begins with this ques tion: H ow should one live? This question is broad in scope and depth , as it cover s all aspects of human life includi ng social, ethical, and political life. To elaborate on this theme, I begin with Pie rre Hado philosophy as a way of life 26 as well as Michel Foucault the 27 in Stoic philosophy . I suggest th at in order to grasp the cosmopolitan aspect of Stoic philosophy, it is crucial to understand the importance o f these key concepts with respect to wha t I call cosmopolitan aware a In other words, for the Stoics , what may rend er cosmopolitanism possible is the practice of phi losophy as a way of life , which implies cultivation of the self as a means to t and awareness to a cosmopolitan awareness , and in turn to be engaged in ethical and political l ife to transform social, et hical, and political practices . These transformative pra ctices as a way of life are fundamental to my conception of the practice of rad ical generosity as a potential for the possibilit cosmopolit an awareness and , u ltimately, a cosmopolitan way of life . cosmopolitan aware recognition of the formation of social, political, and ethical relation s with respect to belonging to the human community I mean, social, eth ical, and political practices that will lead to a cosmopolitan way of life . These concepts are rooted in the everyday pract ices as a way of life , which aim s for the cosmop o litan way of thinking and life . 26 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, ( Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1995 ). Ch. 11, pp. 264 - 275. 27 Michel Foucault , The History of Sexuality , Volume2, (Random House, 1990) and Volume 3, (Random House,1988), Volume2, introduction , pp. 1 - 33, V olume3, pp. 39 - 68. 36 For the Stoics, the practice of philosophy means a way of life , which has spiritual 28 and transformative dimension s ; that is to say that to practice philosophy implies leading an ethical life in both the private and social sph ere s. And to practice ethics as a wa y of life requires exercises , which have spiritual and transformative dimension s . To qualify and explain what is intended by the practi c e of philosophy as a way of life , one has to consider what the practice of philosophy meant in ancient Greece. Philos ophy ( philosophia ) love of wisdom implied a way of life that lead s one to the practice of wisdom and that was achieved by certain exercises to transform oneself ; for example, using reason and rationality philosophical di scourse . For the Stoics, however, philosophical discourse wi thout concrete practices does not lead to a spi ritual and transformative life . Stoic philosophy involves pay ing atte n which implies the exercise of self - mastery and self - awareness, as paying attention to oneself. For the Stoics, it means cultivation of the self or care of the self ( epimeleia heautou ) 29 , and this cultivation of the self has social and political aspects ; that is to say, the practice of care of the se lf and transforming oneself implies caring for others and being engaged in social and political activities in the worl d. Ultimately, the overarching obj ective of Stoicism is to offer a way of life which is an ethical life 30 with 28 It should be note d that although spirituality in a narrow sense may be understood in the religious realm, spirituality in a broader sense has a place in the social and political realm. The idea of spiritual experience with transformative dimension is rooted in the ancient Greek philosophy, and e specially the Stoics. For the Greeks, the spiritual experience with transformative dimension meant a necessary condition to access the tru th. Foucault suggests that the w estern notion of spirituality implies tha t the truth is never given and the subject must undergo a conversion and transformation in order to access the truth. This conversion may happen in the shape of a movement, which will in the process transform the subject and the social and political condit ions as well. The Hermeneutics of the Subject , ( Lectures at the College de France, 1981 - 1982, Michel Foucault, 2005 ) , pp.1 - 19. Also, Hadot not The philosophical way of life never entered into competition with religion in antiquity, because at the time religion was What is Ancient Philosophy? (Pierre Hadot, 2004), p.272. 29 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality , Volume3, (Random House, 1988), pp. 3 9 - 68. 30 philosophy, in particular, Stoicism, which refers to taking care of oneself and others as an ethical practice. For Hegel, full human fl ourishing depends on the existence of well established, ethical relations in particular, such as 37 cosmopolitan intent . The q uestion is: how does one cultivate oneself to lead to a transformation of the self from one mode of life to another mode , which is an ethical life with cosmopolitan intent? For the ancient Greek s, practice of philosophy involved the cultivation of the self or the self - mastery, which begins with self - awaren ess, know your self ( gnothi seauton ) 31 , for the Stoics, the cul tivation of the self and idea of kno wi ng oneself moves into the realm of self - awareness , w hich has transformative dimension s , that is to sa y, one becomes aware of oneself and the others by caring for oneself and fellow cosmopolitan citizens and by being engaged in ethics and politics that pro motes cosmopolitan intent . Ultimately, f or the Stoic s, the cultivation of the self mu s knowledge of oneself and the w o rld to a cosmopolitan awaren ess that promotes ethics and pol itics with a cosmopolitan intent. The Stoic understanding of the practice of philosophy as a way of life open s t he possibility for all cosmopolitan citizens to b e enga ged in exercises that transform not only th e individual but rather transform society and social and pol itical norms by transforming ethical and political practices in everyday life as a way of life . Ancient philosophy proposed t o mankind an art of living. 32 In particular, for the Stoics, the practi ce of philosophy as a way of life is not merely about knowing this and that subject ; rather, it is about living a certain way, which meant for them being engaged in ethics and politic s not as a matter of duty or obligation but rather as a way of life in the world , which implies a way of life that has cosmopolitan awareness and intent. As Hadot notes, the relations of family, state, law, and ethical life ( Sittlichkeit ), which can only be achieved through a conflict ridden developmental process specifically, thro ugh a struggle for recognition. In the Hegelian sense, ethical life ( Sittilichkeit ) means knowing and actualization of onese lf with others in social sphere, which manifests itself in the state. Elements of the Philosophy of Right , G.W. F. Hegel, translated by H.B. Nisbet, (Cambridge UP, 1991),pp. 189 - 274. 31 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality , Volume3, (Random House, 1988), pp. 39 - 68. 32 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, ( Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1995 ), Ch. 11, p.272. 38 Stoic do es not act in his own material and or even spiritual interest , but ac t s in a way which is always disinterested and in the service of the human community. 33 St oic philosophy as a way of life suggests that living in the world means not only taking care of oneself and in mind but also taking ca re of others and having their wellbeing in mind as well. I suggest that if we approach ethical and polit ical practices as a way of life , that is to say, as everyday practices, there is no need to be concerned about motivation for ethical conducts and pra ctices, this implies that we practice radic al generosity not because we are obliged as a duty to be a n ethical subject, rather, we pr actice ethics as a way of life , which lead s to a life having the well - being of others in mind. This , in turn , implies cos mo politan awareness, through every day practice of ethics and politics , which transform s our way of life to a cosmopolitan way of life , specifically a way of life with cosmopolitan worldview and intent. I conclude with the suggestion that if we remove co smological and mythical aspects of Stoic philosophy with respect to the practice of ethics , the fundamen tal and essential element of Stoic philosophy will be illuminated , which can offer a valuable framework to formulate a novel way for the pra ctice of ethics and politics , which can be situated in the context of the possib ility of cosmopolitanism . Certai nly, this novel approach to the practice of ethics and politics as a way of life rooted in Stoic philosophy can translate into the practice of radical generos ity, which I suggest is implicitly implied in the Stoic understanding of philosophy as a way of life , and the idea of the care of the self , and ca ring for the wellbeing of others . To conclude my discussion in this chapter, as I noted at the outset, the Stoics offer a fruitful point of reference for the contemporary disc ussions on cosmopolitanism. Nevertheless , it 33 Pierre Hadot, Wha t is Ancient Philosophy? , ( Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 2004 ), pp. 133 - 134. 39 must be noted that, the Stoics , within their historical context, did not offer a conception of cosmopolitanism in the frame work of political institutions in the way in which modern cosmopolitanism (e.g., Kant and Habermas) offers the possibility of cosmopolitanism in the realm of political institutions. Thus, in the following chapter, I turn to conception s of cosmopolitanism in the framework of political institutions. 40 Chapter 2 : The Possibility o f Cosmopolitanism in the R ealm of Political Institutions In chapter one, my discussion focused on how the Stoics conceived the idea of cosmopolitanism as a worldview ( Weltanschauung ), a way of thinking that included ethical and political practices as a way of life but the Stoics did not envision cosmopolit anism in the framework of political institutions. In this chapter, following my narrow successive hist orical analysis, I turn my attention to two modern thinkers, namely, Immanuel Kant and Jürgen Habermas , who have dealt with issues about cosmopolitanism, with special emphasis on political institutions. My aim here is to examine the idea of political insti tutions as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. - Habermas) approach advances Stoic cosmopolitanism. rnational scale. Kant proposes the id ea of cosmopolitan right and the league of nation - states , which nation - states will join voluntary based on self - interes t to avoid war. situated with in the framework of social cont ract theory and the idea of self - interest. Kant equates the situation of individuals in the state of nature with the nation - states. There is no explicit focus on ethics. Kant proposes a cosmopolitanism that does not require ethical commitment. Haberma - interest based on social contract theory, and situates his vision of cosmopolitanism within the current political institutions, such as the United Nations and European Union. Haberm as proposes a world domestic politics without a world government with democratic procedures and practices and the idea of citizenship (constitutional patriotism) beyond the ethnic and cultural realm. 41 I n the second part of this chapter , I turn my atten tion to Jürgen Habermas, who seeks to Habermas suggests a procedural fra mework relying on democratic practices and rule of law, which implies transition from international law to the constitutionalization of international law 34 , that is to say, legitimatization and institutionalization on transnational and supranational level. For Haber m a s, this is an ongoing project for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. In the t hird part of this chapter cedure, and democracy, is necessary, but not sufficient. explicit ethical consideration. It does not adequately address what is required of an ethical response that would achieve a contemporary c communicative ethics (discourse ethics) indicates that all those affected should part icipate in a dialogue . Howeve r, ethical discourses are highly improbable in everyday life, because the ideal expectations that they place on interlocutors are extremely demanding. There is no mechanism to check whether participants in discourse have equal chances to speak freely and /or to measure how inclusive discourses are. For example, immigrants who are seeking membership do not h ave an equal position as countries that are offering (or are not offering) membership. This is purely 34 Habermas argues for the legitimation requirement of a democratically constituted world society without a world government assuming that nation - stat es and their populations undergo certain learning processes. This implies the Weltinnenpolitik ohne Wel t regierung ). See Jü the Legitimation Problems of a Constitution Europe: The Faltering Project (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), trans. Ciaran Cronon. pp.109 - 130. Also, see The Constitutionalization of Internationa l Law and the Legitimation Problems of a Constitution for World Society , Jü rgen Habermas, (Constellations Volume 15, No 4, 2008). 42 on an empirical level. In other words, discourse ethics is not adequate in terms of dealing with certain real life practical issues such as immigration. cosmopolitanism. The question that follows is: how do we become motivated to practice ethics with cosmopolitan awareness and intent? For instanc e, with wars and the increa se of immigration and refugees in Europe, anti - immigrant sentiments are rising , despite the fact that there are international laws , which protect the rights of immigrants. These recent anti - immigrant sentiments indicate that there is no ade quate establishe d policy with respect to immigrants and refugees. A case in point is the deportation of the Roma people by the French government, and turning away refugees, a policy that ignores international and the European Union law. Another example , which shows a lac k of ethical practices with respect to outsiders , is the rise of xenophobia and Islamophobia in Europe , as well as in the United States. While there are laws that protect freedom of religious practices, these laws in current form alone may not guaranty eth ical conduct , the practice of hospitality, and /or the promotion of cosmopolitan awareness and intent. Therefore, I suggest that radical generosity as a transformative practice can challenge and change existing norms and poi nt to new norms and practices . Th us, s ocial and political institutions can exhibit ethical politics by implementing radical generosity in th eir practices and policy making with respect to immigrants and refugees. It must be noted that I am not s an application of his discourse ethics. Moreover, I am not indeed radical generosity is a complement to 43 : A Brief Historical Account As it was presented in chapter one, t he Stoics did not think of cosmopolitanism within the framework of law , procedure, or political institutions . F or the Stoics , cosmopolitanism was a way of life, in terms of ethical and political practices and how one should live in the world with others. Kant , on the other hand, frames the question of cosmopolitanism in terms of peace, state, right s , and law and adds a new dimension to the cosmopolitan worldview ( Weltanschauung ), namely, a juridical and political appr oach. 35 Kant belong ed to the Enlightenment (the Age of Reason) thinkers who believed in the idea of rationality that there is intellectual progress , and cosmopolitanism was a part of the Enlightenment ideal . Kant , like many of the Enlightenment thinkers , bel ieved that politics could be subjected to rational examination and political orders could be formally institutionalized according to rationality . 36 Furthermore, Kant was inspired by the US declaration of independ ence and the French revolution , and , within t his particular historical context , Kant developed his political theory about peace, rights, state, internat ional law, and cosmopolitanism. It is also worth noting that 35 Kleingeld. She argues that Kant is clearly a moral cosmopolitan and Kant also defends a political version of , (Kant - Studien 94. Jahrg., S.(pp.) 299 - 316, 2003), as well as her discussion of Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eight eenth - Century Germany, as the sy stematic union of rational beings under laws they give to themselves, seems to warrant that characterization, his essay on Perpetual Pe ace , the single most influential discussion of cosmopolitanism by a major philosopher, On Reconciling Cosmopolitan Unity and National Diversity , (2001). McCarthy in his essay Multicu ltural Cosmopolitanism Remarks on the Idea of Universal History (2009) goes further and argues that the demands of theodicy that Kant placed on history play no role in postmetaphysical and postontotheological frames of interpretation. There is no Endzweck of history; it does not have to make moral - rational sense. Along with theodicy goes the teleology of nature embedded in it. According huma n species is der letze Zweak der Natur , the ultimate aim of nature. 36 Immanuel Kant, , translated by H. B. Nisbet, edited by Hans Reiss, (Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 5 - 6. 44 framework of the social co ntract theory . Let us begin with Ideas toward a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784) . I n this essay , Kant formulates his first normative ideal of peace and its nec essary conditions. Kant articulates the ideal notion of a w orld federation of state s, and it is during this period (1780s) that Kant argues for a formal institution of a robust federation of states with coercive power s at the federal level. However, this the me goes through revision s later political writi ngs , notably in Perpetual Peace (1795) . 37 I n Perpetual Peace (1795) Kant proposes a modified version which advocates the esta blishment of a league of nations based on the idea that states will join the league voluntarily without co ercive powers, although, a s some scholars , including Habermas, argue, Kant continued to believe in the stronger version of a federation of states as an ideal notion for the possibility of a perpetual peace. It would seem that for Kant this weake r version of a league of states was a first step and transition, which w ould eventually lead to a stronger ideal of a federation of states . It is worth noting that in Perpetual Peace (1795) as well as in The Metaphysics of Morals (1797) Kant introduces the idea of co smopolitan right , which ha s been a topic of debate among scholars . I discuss the idea of cosmopolitan right briefly in this chapter as well as in the next chapter focusing on notion of cosmopolitan right and hospitality. 37 See ory of peace , in The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy , edited by Paul Guyer, (Cambridge University Press, 2006), as well as, Approaching Perpetual Peace: , ( European J ournal of Philosophy 12:3 ISSN 0966 - 8373 , 2004), pp. 304 - in his essay Immanuel Kant, Cosmopolitan Law and Peace , ( European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 1(4), 1995), pp. 429 - 456. 45 Kant in his early p olitical writings discusses the idea of a federation of states, namely, in Ideas toward a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784). Kant in this essay in the seventh proposition writes the following: The problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law - governed external relationship with other states, and cannot be solved un less the latter is also solved. What is the use of working for a law governed civil constitution among individual men, i.e. o f planning a commonwealth? The same unsociability which forced men to do so gives rise in turn to a situation whereby each commonwealth, in its external relations (i.e. as a state in relation to other states), is in a position of unrestricted freedom. Each must accordingly expect from any other precisely the same evils which formerly oppressed individual men and forced them into a law - finally, after many devastations, upheavals and even complete inner exhaustion of their powers, to take the step which reason could have suggested to them even without so many sad experiences that of abandoning a lawless state of savagery and entering a federation of peoples in which every state, even the smallest, could expect to derive its security a nd rights not from its own power or its own legal judgment, but solely from this great federation ( Foedus Amphictyonum ), from a united power and the law governed decisions of a united will. However wild and fanciful this idea may appear and it has been rid iculed as s uch when put forward by the Abbé St. Pierre and Rousseau ( perhaps because they thought that its realization was so imminent) it is nonetheless the inevitable outcome of the distress in which men involve one another. For this distress must force the states to m ake exactly the same decision ( how ever difficult it may be for them) as that which man was forced to make, equally unwillingly, in his savage state the decision to renounce his brutish freedom and seek calm and security within a law - governe d constitutio n . 38 In this passage Kant links the analogy of the state of nature among individuals to the states, which although they have civil laws internally , are externally in the state of nature with each other , which is the state of constant war. T her efore, Kant following Abbé St. Pierre and Rousseau before him , proposes a federation of states, although Kant acknowledges that Abbé St. Pierre and Rousseau similar ideas were ridiculed and perceived as fanciful, nevertheless , Kant thinks it is a positiv e idea and he is hopeful that it may be rea lized. There are two main aspects of that I will discuss here. The first is that he adopts the framework of social 38 Immanuel Kant, , translated by H. B. Nisbet, edited by Hans Reiss, (Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 47 - 48. 46 contract t heory drawing on t he Hobbesian the among states. T he second point is that Kant does not elaborate in detail how this federation of states will arise and be stable and peace will be perpetual . Kant seems to think that the states will be forced to join out of se lf - interest. It is later in Per petual Peace (1795) that Kant modifies his proposal of a federation of states and proposes the idea of a league of nations that states will voluntarily join or leave. N evertheless, as Habermas and other thinkers note, Kant until the end believed in the str onger versio n of federation as the ideal concept for a perpetual peace , and this modified version was a first step as a transition to a stronger federation as an ongoing proje ct. In Theory and Practice (1793) Kant , a nticipating his more elaborate art iculation of theory of state, constitution, international law, rights , and i n particular cosmopolitan right , writes the following: On the one hand, universal violence and the distress it produces must eventually mak e a people decide to submit to the coerci on which reason itself prescribes (i.e. the coercion of public law), and to e nter into a civil constitution. And on the other hand, the distress produced by the constant wars in which the states try to subjugate or engulf each other must finally lead them, even against their will, to enter into a cosmopolitan constitution. Or if such a state of universal peace is in turn even more dangerous to freedom, for it may lead to the most fearful despotism ( as has indeed occurred more than once with states which hav e grown too large), distress must force men to form a state which is not a cosmopolitan common wealth under a single ruler, but a lawful federation under a commonly accepted international right what the rel ationships between men and the states ought to be according to the principle of right. It recommends to us earthly gods the maxim that we should proceed in our disputes in such a way that universal federal state may be inaugurated, so that we should theref ore assume that i t is possible ( in praxi ) . 39 Kant in this essay promotes his idea of a c osmopolitan political order in the framework of a federation of states and international law and right s . He also warns about despotism under a single ruler, by which th at Kant means universal - mo narchy . L ater Kant elaborates on thes e 39 Immanuel Kant , translated by H. B. Nisbet, edited by Hans Reiss, (Cambri dge University Press, 1989), pp. 90 - 92. 47 ideas in detail. I n Perpetual Peace (1795) Kant argues that republican states are less prone to war and are not despotic . Also, i t is in Perpetual Peace (1795) that Kant recognizes the need to propose an intermediate form of a world organization, namely, a voluntary league of nations , because Kant doubted that states would give up their sovereignty and feared the concentration of power in the form of a universal - monarch y In Perpetual Peace ( 1795 ), Kant begins his discussion with the idea of promoting peace, which must be permanent and established formally in a legal framework. Thus, Kant moves in the concrete domain of state, law, and rights, to conceptualize his vision of world peace ( cosmopolitanism ) . In t his essay, Kant again refers to the s t ate of nature analogy. In the second section of the essay Kant writes: A state of peace among men living together is not the same as the state of nature, whic h is rather a state of war. For even if it does not involve active hostilities, it involves a constant threat of their breaking out. Thus the state of peace must be formally instituted, for a suspension of hostilities is not itself a guarantee of peace. And unless one neighbor gives a guaran tee to the other at his request (which can happen only in a lawful state), the latter m ay treat him as enemy . 40 Furthermore, in the footnote of the same page with respect to a lawful state and legal constitution, Kant articulates the following: But any legal constitution, as far as the persons who live under it are concerned, will conform to one of the three following types: (1) a constitution based on the civil right of individuals within a nation ( ius civitatis ). (2) a constitution based on the international right of states in their relationships with one another ( ius gentium ). (3) a constitution based on a cosmopolitan right, in so far as individuals and states, coexisting in an external relationship of mutual influences, may be regarded as citizens of a universa l state of mankind ( ius cosmopoliticum ). This classification, with respect to the idea of a perpetual peace, is not arbitrary, but necessary. For if even one of the parties were able to influence the others physically and yet itself remained in a state of nature, there would be a risk of war, which it is precisely the aim o f the above articles to prevent. 41 40 Immanuel Kant, , translated by H. B. Nisbet, edited by Hans Reiss, (Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.98. 41 Ibid .,pp. 98 - 99. 48 It is important to n ote that Kant here articulates three preliminary necessary conditions for the possibility of a perpetual peace and one of the import ant cond itions is cosmopolitan right , which scholars interpret as a basic international law and human rights. In Perpetual Peace ( 1795 ) Kant introduces three definitive articles. In these, Kant proposes the following: First D e finitive Article of a Perpetua l Peace: The Civil C on stitution of Every State shall be Republican. Second Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace: The Right of nations shall be based on a Federation of Free States . Third Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace: Cosm opolitan Right shall be limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality . 42 In the first article , according to Kant, the republican system of government is more inclin ed to seek peace rather than monarchy, because monarchy is despotic , also, citizen s in the republican system ar e free subjects and have rights and can decide whether to go to war or not. And, since war is costly and dangerous , the citizens will avoid war. In the second article, Kant advocates a federation of states without coercive powers , in other words, a league of states where states can join or leave voluntarily. Later in The Metaphysics of Morals (1797) Kant articulates his position more clearly: This association must not embody a sovereign power as in a civil constitution, but only a partnership or confederat ion. It must therefore be an alliance which can be terminated at any time, so that it has to be renewed periodically . 43 It would seem from this statement that Kant modifies his strong position of a federation of states to a voluntar y league of states, bec ause of the feasibility issue and fear of despotism, or perhaps , as Haberma s notes , the league of state s for Kant implied a gradual expansion and a n ongoing project to an eventual transition to the ideal of a greater feder ation. 42 Immanuel Kant, , translated by H. B. Nisbet, edited by Hans Reiss, (Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 99 - 105. 43 Ibid ., p.165. 49 It should be mentioned , as I noted in the beginning of this chapter, that i t would seem the main difficulty with project is the fact that his conception of cosmopolitanism is situated within the framework of social contract theory, in particular with the notion of the st ate of nature and idea of self - interest, which Habermas and ot her scholars rec ognize and seek to reformulate . For example, in The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Kant writes: Since the state of nature among nations (as among individual human beings) is a st ate which one ought to abandon in order to enter a state governed by law, all in ternational rights, as well as all the external property of states such as can be acquired or preserved by war, are purely provisional until the state of nature has bee n abando ned . 44 the state of nature is crucial to his theory of perpetual peace. As Habermas notes , the state of nature concept in the current global condition s is not a useful concept and it is misleading . This issue w ill be discussed in the second part of this chapter where I focus on Habermas political order. Let us examine the t hird definitive article in perpetual peace , cosmopolitan right, which has been a top ic of debate about basi c human right s and international law . It is important to note that cosmopolitan right for Kant is a crucial co ndition for the possibility of perpetual peace. Kant writes : The peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal commu nity, and it has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere. The idea of cosmopolitan right is therefore not fantastic and overstrained; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity. Only under this condition can we flatter ourselves that we are continually advan cing towards a perpetual peace. 45 Furthermore, Kant argues that cosmopolitan right implies universal h ospitality. In the third definitive article o f a perpetual peace, Kant notes, cosmopolitan right shall be limited to 44 Immanuel Kant, , translated by H. B. Nisbet, edited by Hans Reiss, (Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.171. 45 Ibid ., pp. 107 - 108. 50 conditions of u niversal hospitality 46 Thus, Kant defines the conditions in the realm of international law and right s . In order to underst s argument with respect to cosmopolitan right , conditions, limitations, and possibilities, it is crucial to pay attentio n to the following passage s in The Metaphysics of Morals (1797) and Perpetual Peace ( 1795 ), i n which he articulates his idea of cosmopolitan right in terms of international law. In The Metaphysics of Morals (1797) , Kant writes: The rational idea, as discussed above, of a peaceful (if not exactly amicable) international nto active relations with one so far as it affords the prospect that all nations may unite for the purpose of creating certain universal laws to regulate the inter course they may have with one another, may be termed cosmopolitan ( ius cosmopoliticum ). 47 In this passage Kant articulates the idea of cosmo politan right in terms of international law among nations (states), which can in turn regulate i nteraction among sta tes as well as the citizens of the world with states. Furthermore , in Perpetual Peace ( 1795 ) in the third definitive article of a perpetual peace , Kant writes the following: We are here concerned not with philanthropy, but with right. In this context, hosp itality means the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone death, but he must not be treated with hostility, so long as he behave s in a peaceable manner in the place he happens to be in. The stranger cannot claim the right of a guest to be entertained, for this would require a special friendly agreement whereby he might become a member of native for a certain time. He may only claim a right of resort, for all men are entitled to present themselves in the society of others by virtue of their right to disperse over an infinite area, but must necessarily no - one originally has any greater right than anyone else to occupy any pa rticular portion But this natural right of hospitality, i.e. the right of stranger s, does not extend beyond those conditions which m ake it possible for them to attempt to enter into relations with the native inhabitants. In this way, continents distant from each other can enter into peaceful mutual relations , which may eventually be regulated by public laws, 46 Immanuel Kant, , translated by H. B. Nisbet, edited by Hans Reiss, (Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.105. 47 Ibid ., p.172. 51 thus bringing the human ra ce nearer to a cos mo politan constitution . 48 It wou ld seem that to a certain extent cosmopolitan right might be limited. The main point of cosmopolitan right is the right t cosmopolitan right shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality Kant limits and defines cosmopolitan right as a negative right , in other words this right is not a right to visit , rather , it should be understood as the right of stranger not to be treated with hostility. According to Kant, this is only the right to present oneself and try to interact with other people and states around the world . Thus , this is a right to approach, not to entry ( Zugang not Eingang ), the stranger does not have a right to be a guest and supported, taken in, and even t olerated by the state. Therefore, the concept of right to hospitality, despite its positive connotation on the surface, it is not a right to be received as a guest. In fact, as Kant notes, the state can deny entry as long as it does not cause any harm to t he stranger. Ultimately, the stranger only has the right to present her self not the right to visit. This raises the question whether cosmopolitan right and right to hospitality might be too limited. Some scholars argue that Kant was aware of colonial pract ices by the Europeans and therefore wanted to limit in terms of cosmopolitan right , e an d other cultures and find his views problematic, notably those ex pressed by Kant in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic P oint of View (1798). 49 48 Immanuel Kant, , translated by H. B. Nisbet, edited by Hans Reiss, (Cambrid ge University Press, 1989), pp.105 - 106. 49 , (Kant - Studien 94. Jahrg., 2003), pp. 299 - to doubt whether Kant regarded members of non - - resolvable tension between what Kant Destiny of the Races. In: Civilization and Oppression , edited by Catherine Wilson. (Alberta: University of Calgary Press, 1999), pp. 99 - 125, and Robert Bernasconi: Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Racism. In Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays , edited by Tommy Lott and Julia Ward. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). 52 n his conclusion in The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), with respect to the possibility of a perpetual peace Kant writes: There shall be no war, either between individual human beings in the state of nature, or between separate states, which , although internally law governed, still live in a lawless condition in their external relationships with one another. For war is not the way in wh ich anyone should pursue his rights. Thus it is no longer a question of whether perpetual peace is really possible or not, or whether we are not perhaps mistaken in our theoretical judgment if we assume that it is. On the contrary, we must simply act as if it could really come about (which is perhaps impossible), and turn our efforts towards realizing it and towards establishing that constitution which seems most suitable for this purpose (perhaps that of republicanism in all states, individually and collec tively). 50 Kant sought to promote peace around the world. It would seem that what is most important for Kant is the i dea of the possibility of perpetual peace and cosmopolitan right as a necessary condition for peace within the framework of international l aw that all rational subjects who belong to the world community of reason as citizens of the world ( Weltbürger) ca n recognize and accept. tanism is placed with in a juridical and political framework . C onsidering the historical cont ext of the 18 th century, u ltimately, Kant proposes the condition s of the po ssibility of peace and cosmopolitani sm in the framework of rights and international law . As Habermas sug conception of cosmopolitan political order is that of a legal f ramework influenced by social contract theory . F or Kant, cosmopolitan order is possible only by legally binding contracts between s tates and through international law and rights. juridical and political conception of cosmopolitanism provides a n institutional framework for the Stoic vision of co s m opolitanism as a way of thinking and a way of life, and t his is a progress by Kant beyond Sto ic cosmopolitanism, which did not have a political institutional framewo rk. Ultimat ely, Kant suggests a wea ker fo r m of international legal order e of nations . To sum up, i n Perpetual 50 Immanuel Kant, , translated by H. B. Nisbet, edited by Hans Reiss, (Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.174. 53 Peace (1795) , Kant argues that cosmopolitan political order is possible only when states are structured int ernally according to republican principles, when the states are organized externally in a voluntary league for the purpose of keeping peace, and when they respect human rights not only of their citizens but also of other states. Kant suggests that the league of nation state s shall not have coercive military powers, because that will violate the internal sovereignty of states, constitute a potential danger to individual freedoms already established within those states , and , if the federal authority were less respectful of hum an rights tha n some of the member states, r educe the chances that states would actually join. Though the Stoics influenced Kant, his approach to cosmopolitanism differs from that of the Stoics. juridica l and political. cosmopolitanism , unlike the Stoics, does n o t promote a way o f life that encompasses ethical and political practices . For the Stoics, as I noted in chapter one, the question i H ow should one For them , cosmopolitanism is a way of life , which is transformatio nal in the sense of living an ethical life with a cosmopolitan awareness and intent that manifests on the individual and social level. Kant situates cosmopolitanism within the framework of state, law , and rights . Kant se eks to institutionalize cosmopolitanism in a formal juridical and political structure with a perpetual peace (legal peace) in mind. Despite the fact that Kant weaknesses and inconsistencies, nevertheless, w e must the cosmopolitan discourse from the philosophical and , in particular , historical perspective . cosmopolitanism as a political institution and the formation of a cosmopolitan political order within the framework of the constitutionalization of international law are the starting point s for the current discourse of cosmopolitanism. 54 Cosmopolitanism in the R ealm of the Constitutionalization of International Law Habermas seeks to supe he expands on K the constitutionalization of international law. He suggests a procedural framework within the realm of law and democracy, which implies transition from international law to the constitutionalization of international law, that is to say, legitimatization and institutionalization on the transnational and supranational l evel s . Habermas argues for the legitimation requirement of a demo cratically constituted world society without a world government assuming nation - states and their populations undergo certain learning processes. T world domestic po licy without a ( Weltinnenpolitik ohne Weltr egierung ). 51 For Haber m a s, this is an ongoing proj ect for the possibility of cosmopol itanism . Habermas is a philosopher who has been deeply influenced post - metaphysical philosophy , developed within the framework of c ritical social theory, defends what he calls the unfinished project of enlightenment and modernity. H is conceptio n of cosmopolitanism draws on opolitan program , recast in a procedur al approach to the institu tionalization of a cosmopolitan politi cal order . Habermas seeks to cosmopolitanism by avoiding the weaknesses and Habermas argues that a is that it is d eveloped within the framewo rk of social contra ct theory. Thus, Kant applies social contr act theory to 51 See Jü nal Law and the Legitimation Problems of a Europe the Faltering Project (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), trans. Ciaran Cronon. pp.109 - 130. Also, see The Constitutionalization of Internationa l Law and the Legitimation Prob lems of a Constitution for World Society , Jü rgen Habermas, (Constellations Volume 15, No 4, 2008). 55 relations between s tates within a state of nature . 52 Habermas argues that the state of nature model in social c ontract theory with respect to s tates is misleading. He points out that condition seems to have conceptual difficulty, because our historical conditions and experiences are differ It would seem t hat , according to Habermas, had Kant conceptualized the idea of a cosmopolitan condition in abstract terms he would have avoided some of the conceptual difficulties it is faci ng now . 53 to reformulate and situate the idea of a c osmopolitan condition within current global conditions. Habermas proposes a procedural method of constitutional democracy and rule of law in which the constitutionalization of international law can be realized to b ring about the transition from an international to a cosmopolitan political order. It is important to note that Habermas , by the constituionalization of international law , does not mean a world republic ; rath er, for Habermas, this is an on going project b ased on discursive examination and deliberative politic s , which is a procedural model of democracy framed in the rule of law. Habermas notes that the Kantian project only found its way onto the political agenda with the League of Nations after two centurie s , and the idea of a cosmopolitan order only became institutionalized with the foundation of the United Na tions. Thus, Habermas is hopeful that the proposed reforms in the UN will be a learning process for the direct political will toward a continuation of the Kantian project. , provided that we construe it 52 Jü rgen Habermas, The Divided West , edited and translated by Ciaran Cronin. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), p.129. 53 Jürgen Habermas , The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory , edited and translated by Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff. (Ca mbridge: The MIT Press, 1998), p.166 . 56 in sufficiently abstract terms , still is a viable option to begin to formulate a cosmopolitan order conditions. 54 Habermas remarks: Kant recognizes that the democratic will has its roots in the ethos of people. But that does not necessarily imply that the capacity of a democratic constitution to bind and rationalize political power must be restricted to a specific nat ion - state. For the universalistic thrust of the constitutional principles of a nation - state points beyond the limits of national traditions which are no doubt also reflected in the local features of a particular constitutional order. 55 A ccording to Haberma s, this recognition by Kant that the universalistic features of the constitutional principles of a nation - state, such as democr acy and rule of law , lead Kant to propose the bürgerliche Verfassung a constitution that moves from the n ational onto the globa l level, which was inspired by the American and French revolution s , which signifies the birth of the idea of a constitutionalization of international law for Kant. Habermas remarks that this shows K conceptual innovation, whic h implies that international law as a law of states w ould be transformed into cosmopolitan law as a law of individuals. That is to say, individual s are not merely citizen s of a nation - state and enjoying the legal status of a nation - state, they also become member s of a politically constituted world society as individual world citizen s . 56 Habermas suggests that Kant , to the ve ry end, promot ed the idea of a stronger cosmopolitan political order, even though he proposed a weaker league of natio ns ( Völkerbund ) as a first step toward a commonwealth of nations ( Völkerstaat ). H abermas seems weaker version of a voluntary association of states that are willing to coexist peacefully while keeping their s overeignty seems to sugges t a transitional step to a stronge r 54 Jü rgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion , edited and translated by Ciaran Cronin . (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2 009), pp. 312 - 313. 55 Jü rgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion , edited and translated by Ciaran Cronin . (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009) , p.314. 56 Ibid ., p. 314. 57 cosmopolitan order . 57 Habermas the Kantian cosmopolitan project with league of nations as a trans ition to a legal and political cosmopolitan order reflects on Hab vision. Habermas questions and analyzes what prevented Kant from conceptualizing a in abstract te rms rather than a world republic and then later why Kant consider ed a weaker version of a Habermas notes that what prevented Kant conceiv ing of the cosmopolitan condition in sufficiently abstract terms wa s the fear for loss of cultural specificity , identity , and , possibly , both independence and sovereignty of nation - states. Habermas argues: Had Kant read th is conception of divided sovereignty from the US model, he would have realized that peoples of independ ent states who restrict their sovereignty for the sake of a federal government need not sacrifice their distinct cultural identities. 58 Furthermore , Habe rmas notes This fear may explain his [ ] though not yet why he felt compelled to conceptualize a cosmopolitan condition in the shape of an all - encompassing state in the first place. 59 osmopolitan condition by on social contract theory social contract theory, which implies that the state and the constitution are one , because both arise from the will of the people. Habermas ar gues that in relying on this idea, Kant neglected a different, competing constitutional tradition that rejects any such conceptual linkage of state and constitution. 57 Jü rgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion , edited and translated by Ciaran Cron in . (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), p.314. 58 Jü rgen Habermas, The Divided West , edited and translated by Ciaran Cronin. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), p.128. 59 Jü rgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion , edited and translated by Ciaran Cronin . (Ca mbridge: Polity Press, 2009) , p.315. 58 According to Hab ermas, in the liberal tradition the constitution does not have the fun ction of constituting authority but only that of constraining power. Pointing out the current world conditions, Habermas ex tols the cooperation between different nations in multilateral networks or in transnational negotiation systems, which has in many ca ses produced the legal forms of a constitution of international organizations without state characteristics which dispense with familiar forms of legitimation through the will of an organized citizenry. Relying on the liberal type of constitution that limi ts the power of the state without constituting it p rovides a conceptual model for a constitutionalization of international law in the form of a politically constituted world society without a world government. 60 It would seem that ic Habermas is proposing deliberation and neg among nation - states rather than the model of a world government and direct democracy through the citizens of the world . To illustrate his cosmopolitan legal order further, Habermas states: With the transition from state - centered international law to a cosmopolitan legal order, nation - states will be restricted in their scope of action without being robbed of their status as subjects of a global legal order by the individual world citizens, who now acquire the additional status of subjects of cosmopolitan law. Rather, republican states can remain subjects of a world constitution without a world government alon gside the individual world citizen. 61 In other words, the constitutionalization of international law may not require a world governme nt. Furthermore, Habermas contends that the institutionalization of international law as a long - term process is driven not by revolutionary masses but rather by nation - states and regional alliances of states. Ultimately, Habermas suggests that the gradual progress in the constitutionalization of internationa l law began with support of governments rather than by 60 Jü rgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion , edited and translated by Ciaran Cronin . (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), p. 316. 61 Ibid., p.317. 59 citizens by th e grad ual internalization of anticipatory legal construction. To further his argument and provide an alterna tive to the idea of republic , Habermas proposes the following steps, which must be taken: a) the concept of national sovereignty must be a d apted to the new forms of governance beyond the nation - monopoly on force and compulsory law in favor of the idea that supranational law is backed up by the sanctioning powers that remain the preserve of nation - states ; c) we must identify the mechanism that explains how nations can change their self - understanding. 62 These steps are onl y possible within the framework of the constitutionalization of international project is committed to the rule of law as a condition for the possib ility of cosmopolitanism . For Habermas, it would see m the legal norms are the only via ble medium for integrating modern complex societies. He argues that the laws must be the result of pu blic deliberation, which means deliberative democracy, and the legitimacy of laws is determined in public deliberations where all those possibly affected by the laws have an equal say. This deliberative method , accordingly , will be implemented in the cosmo politan order in the form of glob al institutions at all levels ( UN, WTO, IMF, World Bank, Municipal, National , and Supranational) through the s e discursive procedures with legal norms legitimated legally and institutionali zed . 63 Habermas sugges ts, the idea o f a c osmopolitan constitution , the distinction between the supranational and the transitional level points to the reform of the United Nations , and to the dynamics triggered b y an awareness of the lack of legitimacy of current forms of global governance. 64 It would seem that the road to the constitutionalization of international law 62 Jü rgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion , edited and transl ated by Ciaran Cronin . (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), p. 319. 63 Jü rgen Habermas, The Divided West , edited and translated by Ciaran Cronin. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), pp.140 - 143. 64 Jü rgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion , edited and transla ted by Ciaran Cronin . (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), p. 334. 60 for Haber m a s, leads to a major reform in the structure of the United Nations, which will empower it to secure the world peace. He argues: [I] nternational relations as we know th em would continue to exist in the transnational arena in a modified form modified for the simple reason that under an effective UN security regime even the most powerful global player would be denied recourse to war as a legitimate means of resolving confl icts. 65 Furthermore , Habermas notes: Thus reformed, the world organization could count on a worldwide background consensus in a threefold sense. The agreement would be geared, first, to the political goal of a substantively expanded conception of securit y, second, to the legal basis of the human rights pacts and conventions of international law passed by the General Assembly and already ratified by many states, and, third, to the procedural principles in terms of which a reformed world organization would tackle its problems. 66 According to this vision, c osmopolitan order will be an on going project, which relies on principles, procedures, long - term democratic learning process, and constituti onal laws on the global scale. This seems to be a formidable task f or Ha Habermas is optimistic that his procedural method based on his theorie s of communicative action , discourse ethics, deliberative democracy, and the rule of law can provide a viable framework for cosmopolitan order. To saf eguard cosmopolitanism within the framework of the constitutionalization of international law, Habermas suggests the use of the public sphere on the national as well as on su pranat ional level s . The idea of the public sp here plays a crucial role in Habermas s project, which will provide a framework for the democratic legitimation of the transnational and supranational institutions. In the public sphere citizens of the world will discuss the issues at hand democra tically through different media and have a cri tical voice in the political discourse. 65 Ibid., p. 325. 66 Ibid., p. 343. 61 ro ject within the framework of the constitutionalization of international law, we have to pay attention to the backdrop in which he is theorizing and con ceptualizing, namely, the European Union. It would seem that for Habermas, the European Union 67 as a political and economic institution provides an empirical and practical model for his cosmopolitan vision. T hrough democratic practices the European Union ca n be a successful model for a cosmopolitan order. He notes : The European Union could provide a model for other regions because it harmonizes the interes ts of formally independent nation - states at a higher level of integration, th ereby creating a collective actor on a new scale. However, European unification can serve as a model for constructing regional political alliance s only if it achieves a level of political integration that enables the EU to purse democratically legitimized common policies both at hom e and abroad. 68 Furthermore, Habermas argues that the European Union experience suggests that nationality and citizenship can be understood beyond the framework of the nation - state. Therefore, he def ines citizenship within the fr amework o f co nstitutional law, which he calls constitutional patriotism . He contends that: Nationalism provided the basis for what is by any standard a highly abstract form of civic solidarity. This national consciousness must now be raised to an even higher lev el of abstraction in the process of integrating nation - states into continental regimes. A mobilization of the masses through religious, ethnic, or nationalist agitation will 67 It should be noted that although the European Union may offer an empirical and practical model, it is not perfect by any means. For example, Turkey, a long ti me member of NATO and relatively in good economic standing, has been waiting to become a member of the EU for many years, and its membership has been opposed strongly by France and Germany. On the other hand, some eastern European countries have become mem bers or are being considered as potential members without any difficulty, although these countries have not been a part of NATO nor have they a strong economy. Critics accuse the EU of practicing a double standard, because Turkey is a Muslim country and it s population is not considered white European. If the European Union is being considered as an empirical and practical model for a cosmopolitan order, then perhaps the issue of race, ethnicity, and religion needs to be addressed more seriously by the Europ ean Union. Furthermore, as Will Kymlicka argues, European citizenship still remains derivative of national citizenship and the directly elected European parliament remains subservient to the nationally delegated European Commission. According to this view, the EU so far has failed to transcend national citizenship, national legislatures, and national identities as the main locus of political practices. Therefore, politics in Europe remains too nation centric and the moral value of the EU depends on changing this. See Will Another Cosmopolitanism , edited by Robert Post, (Oxford Press University, 2006), pp. 128 - 144. 68 Jü rgen Habermas, Between Naturalism and Religion , edited and translated by Ciaran Cronin . (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), p. 326. 62 gradually become less likely the more the expectations of tolerance inherent in a liberal civic ethos permeate political culture also at the national level. 69 Habermas is aware that such understanding of nationality and citizenship depends on the insti tutionalization of international law and on creating regional alliances. Therefore, he is proposing the constitutionalization of international law . Habermas is hopeful that the European Union model and experience can be a good example for his project of the constitutionalization of international law, which will provide a framework for the s low historical process of working toward a project of cosmopolitan vision. Habermas notes : Philosophy can try to clarify certain basic conceptual features of the development of law in the light of both existing constellations and valid norms. Only at this level can it contribute to the discussion of whether the Kantian project still has a future . 70 It would seem, ultimately , for Habermas, that the future of a cosmopolitan project is rooted in the procedural and legal order on the global level. The question is constitutionalization of international law can address the complex ethical issues that emerge with globalization. Habermas addresses these concerns in the following statement: Hobbesians both of the left and the right, namely, that law, even in the modern guise of constitutional democracy, is merely a reflex and mask f or economic or political power. On this assumption, legal pacifism, which seeks to ex tend law to the international state of nature, is a sheer illusion. In fact, the Kantian project of con s titutionalizing international law is nourished by an idealism free from illusions. The form of modern law as such has an unambiguous moral core that pro (Koskenniemi) whenever law is employed as the medium in which a constitutio n is formed . 71 Habermas thinks that democratically implemented constitutional law can provide the necessary framework addressing th e various issues that may arise in a cosmopolitan condition, including 69 Ibid., p.327. 70 Jü rgen Habermas, The Divided West , edited and translated by Ciaran Cronin. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), p.117. 71 Jü rgen Habermas, The Divided West , edited and transl ated by Ciaran Cronin. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), p.106. 63 ethical issues related to immigration. F or Habermas , the possibility of cosmopolitanism calls for the rule of law, of course, within the realm of democracy. vision and commitment to an institutional project within the realm of law and democracy. He based o n self - interest of nation - states. According to Haber mas, the cosmopolitan project is on going based on change and progress. Despite its certain limitations, i t w ould seem that of the constitutionalization of international law is the most com prehensiv e proposal for the possibility of cosmopolitanism as a political institution. The Difficulties with the Juridical - Political Approach to Cosmopolitanism sufficie ntly addressing , according to som e of his critics. These criticisms raise doubts about address cultural and national identity issues. These critics are known as multi culturalists , such as Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka , as well as communitarians , like Michael Walz er. - individual These groups , according to multicultur alists , can be distinguished as those of , such as a people involuntarily incorporated into a larger state as a result of colonization, conquest, or the ceding of territory from one imperial power to another, like, for example , the Kurdish people. O ther example s within the western democracies include the Quebecois and Native Americ an people in Canada, as well as the Catalans and Basques in Spain, and the Scots, and the Wels h in the United Kingdo m . Communitarian s argue that demo cracy needs to be anchored in the political culture of a country. In particular, Walzer argues 64 that if the decision on membership were no longer the sovereign right of communities, but that of individuals with their basic right to migr ate, then s uch a righ t would destroy the specific character of political communities. 72 Habermas acknowledges the issues that these thinkers raise but argues that the decisive alt ernatives lie not at the cultural question is not whether human ri ghts, as part of an individualistic legal order, are compatible political and societal integration can be reasserted against, or must instead be adapted to, the ha rd to resist imperatives of economic modernization. 73 Habermas argues that because of modernization in the form of globalized market economy and loss of cultural identities , the traditional social and polit ical order , such as nation - state based on culture and ethnicity , is no longer viable. The alternative is a cosmopolitan poli tical order beyond the nation - state . It seems that, given the recent political uprising s in North Africa as well as in the Middle East where people demand social and political freed om, universal human rights, and the practice of democracy , to some exte hypotheses might be correct : that aspiration for social and political freedom, universal human rights, and democracy transcend s cultural differences, and , ultimately, the root cause of these uprisings is socioeconomic c onditions on the global scale. Proceduralist Paradigm 72 Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights , (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) as well as Charles Tay Multiculturalism , edited by Amy Gutmann, Princeton Press University, 1994), pp. 25 - 73. Also, see Alternative Modernities , edited by D. P. Gaonkar, (Durham, NC, 2001), pp. 172 - Multicultural Cosmopolitanism: Remarks on the Idea of Universal History , (Publisher of Stephen Schneck, ed., Modest Harmonies, 2009), pp. 1 - 29. For discussio The Moral Standing of States , in (Philosophy and Public Affairs 9, pp. 209 - 229, 1980) and Spheres of Justice , (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1983). 73 Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights, in The Post national Constellation , trans. and ed., Max Pensky, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 113 - 129, in p. 124. 65 A t this point I must make a brief remark on the proceduralis t paradigm, as David Ingram terms it in Habermas : Introduction and Analysis (2010). Ingram wr ites : Deliberation , not decision, is its preferred method for legitimation. Confronting problems of collective choice head on, it explains how conflicting preferences can be transformed and harmonized into laws that all can freely accept. Doubts, however, remain regarding four philosophical concerns that merit special attention. First, one mig ht object that sufficient normative substance to constrain the outcome of democratic deliberation, in which case they violate autonomy of deliberators by imposing a philo sophically predetermined result; or they do not, in which case they permit them to make irrational and discriminatory decisions. A related concern is that procedures only provide a subset of conditions that are necessary for deliberation to be just and rat ional. Other conditions above all, a more equitable distribution of economic and cultural assets seem arrow focus on law and politics to the exclusion of the workplace as the focal point of democracy. Of related interest is the mundane struggle against technical elites and technological hierarchy in pursuit of more institutionalized revolution provokes the further objection that it canno t justify revolutionary actions that aim to overthrow the political forces that prevent democracy from being institutionalized in the first p lace . 74 practical possi bility , as well as its philosophical assumption with respect to discursive deliberation and democratic practices, in particular, especially the idea of democracy as an institutionalized revolution, which seems to prevent the revolutionary practices that mi ght be required to institutionalize democracy in the first place . For example, the recent social movem ents around the globe against undemocratic economic practices by globalized neoliberal market forces is a good evidence that revolutionary pr actices are n ecessary for establishing democratic practices, like those that Habermas advocates. 74 David Ingram, Habermas Introduction and Analysis , (Cornell University Press, 2010), pp. 258 - 259. 66 On the issue of immigration and group rights with respect to procedural paradigm Ingram writes the following: [W] hen the proceduralist paradigm is applied to multicul turalism or immigration; in neither of these instances does the paradigm obviously favor the solutions that Habermas tries to draw from it. Group rights that are intended to provide equal protection for discrete classes of persons appear to constrain ident ities in ways that seemingly violate the inherent openness, fluidity, and hybrid nature of identities set in motion by discursive procedures. The paradigm provides no definitive guidance in specifying what constitutes a legitimate group that is worthy of e effort a rights classifying this or that group as falling into either one of these categories presumes that it does. The sa me applies to immigration. When it comes to deciding membership, the paradigm at once supports and undermines terri torially bounded national self - determination, so that the answer to the question about what distinguishes ascriptive from nonascriptive quali fications for membership and what decides the legitimacy of appealing only to the latter depends on what perspective one adopts . 75 shortcoming s of procedural method in the sense that in it Habermas fails to adequately address the i ssue of multiculturalism or immigration. In particular, because of the lac k of clear guidance in terms of determining what is a legitimate group right that needs equal protection. Furthermore, when it comes to discursive deliberation, immigrants who are se eking membership do not have an equal position as the nation - states who are offering membership , on purely the empirical and practical level. In other w ords, procedural method is necessary, but it is not sufficient in terms of dealing with certain real lif e practical matters , such as immigration. The other difficulty with the juridical and political approach to cosmopolitanism seems to be the lack of motivation with regard to ethical practices. For example, Axel Honneth argues that ethics lacks an adequate account of motivation to moral action, because there is a gap between universal pragmatic and everyday experience. Honneth addresses the issue 75 David Ingram, Habermas Introduction and Anal ysis , (Cornell University Press, 2010), p.260. 67 of motivation in The Struggle for Recognition writings, with the notion of struggle for recognition ( Anerkennung ) , Honneth notes that a theory of communicative action has to rely on a concept of morally motivated struggle. 76 Also, Daniel Munro argues that: the tension between norms and motives in either normatively or practically compelling ways. G iven that political discourse in existing capitalist societies is characterized by power inequalities and the existence of unattractive preferences, expectations and motives, it is hard to see how norms that are the outcome of a real deliberative procedu re could be protected from objectionable features of the social and political status quo. 77 According to this argument, it would seem ideal norms that are meant to be the outcome of a deliberative procedural discourse , may not be prot ected by political ins titutions , because of the lack of motivation or objectionable motivation. We can conclude that political institution s may be necessary for the possibility of cosmopolitanism, but they may not be sufficient. Therefore , there seems to be a lack ethical respo nse and consideration with regard to the juridical and political conception of cosmopolitanism. Ultimately, the juridical and political approach to cosmopolitanism addresses the issue of international law, considering the rights of citizens within the framework of cosmopolitan political order, which is an important part of cosmopolitan condition. Thus, s 76 The Struggle for Recognition, Axel Honneth, (The MIT Press, 1995), pp.1 - 6. And, The Fragmented World of the Social, Axel Honneth, (S UNY Press, ,to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discours - deliberative discourse combined with institutional organizations may make possible the ideal moral awareness, which will develop motives that could stabilize the normative ideal of radical democracy and simultaneo usly maintain the normative integrity of the ideal. However, critics find it doubtful in particular in the EU. 77 For a detail discussion on Norm, Motives and Radical Democracy: Habermas and the Problem of Motivation, (The Journal of Political Philosophy: Volume 15, Number 4, 2007), pp. 447 - 472. 68 proposed legal and political institutional framework for the possibility of cosmopolitanism is necessary , but it is not sufficient. What is p roblematic with the juridical - political approach to cosmopolitanism hinges upon the answer to the following question: what will motivate people to practice cosmopolitanism and acknowledge and accept cosmopolitan laws and rights? What is ical - the pos sibility of cosmopolitanism. Ha and explicit ethical consideration. W hat is needed is an adequate ethical response by p oliticizing ethical issues, whic h will lead to ethical politics. I suggest that political institutions can exhibit radical generosity in th eir practices and policy making with re gard to immigrants and refugees. In the next chapter , I will focus on an appropriate concep tion of ethics as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. The emphasis will be on Jacques Derrida and s the 69 Chapter 3 : The Possibility of Cosmopolitanism in the Realm of Unconditional E thics In the preceding chapter the focus of discussion was on political institutions as a key condition - Habermas) to cosmopolitanism. I n c hapter two, I argued that Kant and Habermas propose political institutions as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism ; however, what is missing in this approach is an adequate ethical response that would achieve the possibility of cosmopolit anism . icit ethical response, such as radical generosity as a trans formative practice by social and political institutions. From Derrid a aradox here in the cosmopolitan discourse . O n the on e hand, it seems that cosmopolitanism calls for some kind of - ; on the other hand, it also requires an ethic of welcome and ic al - - approach to cosmopolitanism , as promoted by Kant and Habermas , seems to overlook this unconditional ethical concern for others. Thus , the aim of this chapter is to focus on an adequate conception of e thical consideration as a key condition for the possibil ity of cosmopolitanism. Namely, Jacque s Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas the For Derrida and Levinas, ethics is not about knowing this and that rule and making e thical decision s based on abstract formal rules. They offer an understanding of ethics, which is about an unconditional ethical concern for the other. Therefore, Derrida insists up on the idea of infinite and unconditional responsi bility in ethics, which he calls ethical approach points both to a limitation of ethics and to a paradoxical ethical concern that he 70 suggests is unavoidable for human beings . Here we have ideas about how there can be the opening of an eth ics even when political and institutional issues are unresolved. For Derrida, ethics is the conditi on for politics and for Levinas ethical concern is not in the realm of politics. Derrida and Levinas offer an understanding of ethics, which I will take to involve an unconditional ethical concern for the other and ethics beyond following rules. F rom their work I draw up on the ideas of unconditional ethical concern for the other and ethics beyond following rules in order to advance my argument regarding r adical generosity. Radical generosity also involves unconditional openness to others and concern for the wellbeing of others without following rules ; in particular, welcome as uncon ditional hospitality can be understood as radical generosity. Howe es on i ndividual responsibility, while my focus is on the social aspect of ethical response rather than the individual dimension of it. These ideas of Derrida and Levinas about ethical response will help t o define what I mean by radical generosity. Radical generosity as a practice is a social disposition and the ethos of a society . It must be noted that communities are not naturally self - interested or generous, rather, societies have the potential to become self - interested or generous based on social practices. Thus, through social practices historically social change occurs. In chapter four, I elaborate upon and a pproach to ethics. Moreover, drawing from Derrida and Levinas, here , I give an account of an ethical response that is not a matter of following rules and present the idea of an ethic that is unconditional. Thus, we have here a sense of ethical concern for the wellbeing of others that involves radical generosity . Furthermore, radical generosity involves transformational ethics, 71 which implies challenging social norms and producing new ways of thinking and ethical practices. radical generosity, I, nevertheless, move beyond their ethical concern for the other and introduce the idea of the practice of ethics based on historical and social practices of ethics as a way of life, which involves the practice of radical generosity on both the individual and social level to transform social and ethical relations. In this attempt to articulate and develop these ethical aspects for the possibility of cosmopolitanism, this chapter will proceed as follows: later work , on the ideas of cos appropriation of responsibility as unconditional hospital ity . I will also refer to his criticism of me agreement on practical political issues, such as European foreign policy on the eve of the Iraq war. In fact, on February 15, 2003, Habermas published an article on this issue and Derrida was a co - signatory. 78 Second, I read Levinas through Derrida with respect to ethical concern, infinite responsibility for the other, and ical subjectivity) realm to a social domain, and, thus, remains marked by significant lacunae. Thus, I move beyond their ethical concern for the other and introduce the idea of the practice of ethics 78 T Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung , May 31, 2003. Also, in Constellations , 10, 2003, as well as in The Derrida - Habermas Reader (The University of Chicago Press, 2006) ed., Lasse Thomassen. pp. 270 - 277. 72 based on concrete everyday life practices as a way of l ife, which must include the practice of radical generosity on the singular and social level to transform social and ethical relations. As I mentioned at the outset, Derrida and Levinas present a different e thical and political approach with respect to the possibility of cosmopolitanism, which is beyond the framework of norms , procedure, and political institution s. According to Derrida, ethics and politics are marked by un - decidab ility 79 , and ethical - political decisions , therefore , can not follow a norm or procedure, rather ethical concern involves infinite responsibilit y. Derrida says: I believe that we cannot give up on the con cept of infinite responsibility I would say, for L evinas and for myself, that if you give up the infinitude of responsibility, there is no responsibility. It is because we act and we live in infinitude that the responsibility with regard to the other is irreducible. If responsibility w ere not infinite, if every time that I have to take an ethical and political decision with regar d to the other this was not infinite, then I would not be able to engage myself in an infinite debt with regard to each singularity . 80 Furthermore, Derrida argues: Habermas t hinks that in the idea of infinite responsibility there is an ethical overload (surcharge), but the ethical overload has to be overwhelming (surchargeant), it overwhelms (surcharge), and the arrival of the other is the overload. One cannot eliminate the overload and control things by norms within discourse. When there are norms, it i s finished, everything is done , everything follows from the norms. There is no 79 n or the tension between two decisions. Undecidable - this is the experience of that which, though foreign and heterogeneous to the order of calculable and the rule, must ( doit ) nonetheless - it is of duty ( devoir ) that one must speak - deliver itself over to th e impossible decision while taking account of law and rules. A decision that would not go through the test and ordeal of undecidable would not be a free decision; it would only be the programmable application or the continuous unfolding of a calculable pro Acts of Religion (New York: Routledge, cannot consist in following, applying, or carrying out a norm or rule. Wherever I have at my disposal a determinable rule, I know what must be done, and as soon as such knowledge dictates the law, action follows knowledge as a calculable consequence: one knows what path to take, one no longer hesitates. The deci sion then no longer decides anything but is made in advance annulled. It is simply deployed, without delay, presently, with the automatism attributed to machines. There is no longer any place for justice or responsibility (whether juridical, political, or Rogues: Two Essays on Reason - 85. 80 Deconstruction and Pragmatism , ed., Chantel Mouf fe, (New York: Routledge, 1996), - The Derrida - Habermas Reader (The University of Chicago Press, 2006) ed., Lasse Thomassen, p.81. 73 more responsibility when there are norms. Thus, if one wants to normalize, to norm the ethical overload, it is finished, there is no more ethics. 81 For Derrida, the idea of in finite responsibility is always marked with an ethical overload. 82 an eth ical - political theme . D errida says that an openness towards the other. 83 However, this statement do es not imply that Derrida has a no rmative ethical or political t heory. Rather , he is concerned with ethical and political questions , with respect to difference, the singularity of the other, and the relation to the other, which according to Derrida, is marked by asymmetry. To a certain ext ethical concern is informed an s first philosophy, 84 particular ly 85 which is focused on justice, law, and cosmopolitanism. However, it is important to note that unlike Habermas , who is a post - me taphysical philosopher and is concerned with formal so cial and political institut ions in the tradition of social theory, k of metaphysics and trad itional 81 - The Derrida - Habermas Reader (The University of Chicago Press, 2006) ed., Lasse Thomassen, p. 113. Also, for a good On Deconstructi on: Theory and Criticism after Sructuralism (Cornell University Press, 1983), by Jonathan Culler, Ch. 2 and 3 pp. 85 - 227. Modern French Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1980), by Vincent Descombes, Ch. 5 pp.136 - 152. The Ethics of Deconstruction (Purdu e University Press, 1992), by Simon Critchley. Deconstruction and Philosophy (The University of Chicago Press, 1988) ed., John Sallis. 82 83 Dialogue with Contemporary Continental Thinkers (Manchester University Press, 1984), ed., Richard Kearney, pp. 112 - 13, in p. 124. This quotation is in Richard J. Berns The Derrida - Habermas Reader (The University of Chicago Press, 2006) ed., Lasse Thomassen. p.81. 84 ove an abstract reflection on See in Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity (Duquesne University Press, 1985), translation by Richard A. Cohen, p.77. 85 The Gift of Death Specters of Marx (1993), Politics of Friendship (1994), On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness (1997), Of Hospitality (1 997) Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (1997), and Rogues (2003). Some scholars has been concerned with ethics - Remarks The Derrida - Habermas Reader (The University of Chicago Press, 2006) ed., Lasse T homassen, p.99. 74 philosophical discourse, n evertheless al ways deconstructing the m etaphysical framework in the - 86 Contrary to Habermas, Derrida does no t provide a systematic conception of procedu ral rationality that is developed in terms of norms in ethics, politics, and law. Rath er, he intervenes in the discourse of cosmopolitanism in the tradition of deconstruction and , in doing so, shows the limits and possibilities of cosmopolitanism. Derrida calls for examining norms, laws, politics , and e thics; for going beyond norms and rule s ; and for seeking new openings. He calls for a new ethical - political order and democracy , which he refers to as democracy to come. s Cosmopolitan Right and Hospitality hospitality, w idea of cosmopolitan right and hospitality in the paradox of possibility and impossibility. He argues that the very cond itions that Kant proposes for the possibility of hospitality limits hospitality. For Derrida, hospitality must be unconditional which means pure and absolute hospitality. Derrida says that ri ght, not of morality, and this right is related to citizenship, the state, and the subject of the state, even if it is a world state ; therefore , it is an issue of an international right. According to Derrida, 86 Dialogue with Contemporary Continental Thin kers (Manchester University Press, 1984), ed., Richard Kearney, pp. 112 - 13, in p. 111. This The Derrida - Habermas Reader (The University of Chicago Press, 2006) ed., Lasse Thomassen. p.81. 75 as Derrida in Per petual Peace (1795) focuses on its contradictions and limitati and hospitality in the paradox of possibility and impossibility. He argues that the very conditions that Kant proposes for the possibility of h ospit ality limit hospitality. For Derrida, hospitality must be unconditional , which means a pure and absolute hospitality , which, ultimately , renders idea of hospitality impossible. The possibility of hospitality is, in effect , a paradox of the poss ibility of impossibility. 87 Derrida begins his discussion on hospitality with K definitive article of perpetual p eace, which Derrida quotes to conditions of Universal Ho the question of conditionality, 88 Furthermore, De rrida notes that t wo words are u n derlined by Kant in this title , ( Weltbü r g er r ec ht : the right of world citizens) , which indic ates that we are in the domain of right, not of morality, and this right is related to citizenship, the state, the subject of the state, even if it is a world state ; therefore , it is a n i ssue of an international right. hospi ( der Allgemeinen Hospitalität , 87 comes or happens. It is the exposure (the desire, the openness, but also the fear) that opens, t hat opens itself, that opens us to time, to what comes upon us, to what arrives or happens, to the event. To history, if you will, a history to e - in all sorts of ways (for example, around questions of gift, forgiveness, hospitality, and so on), by trying to Philosophy in a Time of Terror (The University of Chicago im - possible , of what must remain (in a nonnegative fashion Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (Stanford Unive - - Luc Marion mod erated by Richard Kearney in God, the Gift, and Postmode rnism (Indiana University Press, 1999), ed., John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon, p. 38. 88 The Derrida - Habermas Reader (The University of Chicago Press, 2006), ed. , Lasse Thomassen. p.209. 76 universal hospitality) , which, according to Derrida , defines the conditions of a cosmopolitan right, a right that its terms would be defined by a treaty between states, by a kind of a UN charter. 89 Derrida all on that universal hospitality is not concerned with philanth ropy , but rather with right , away, if 90 footno te : The stranger can pass through but cannot stay. He is not given the ri ghts of a resident. In order for there to be a right of residence, there must be an agr eement between states. Everything and this is what cosmopolitanism means is subject to an inter - state This is the challenge today, too: a hospitality which would be more than co smopolitical, which would go beyond strictly cosmopolitical conditions, those which imply state authority and state legislation. The foreigner cann ot claim a right to residence ( that would require a special friendly agreement which would make him the membe r of a native household for a certain period of time), but can claim a right to visit, a right of resort. 91 Accordi universal hospitality of man as a sentimental motive. 92 Thus, a ccording to Kan , universal hospitality arises from an obligation, a right, a nd a duty all regulated by law. Derrida suggests that hospitality understood in the Kantian sense is formalized as a law of hospitality that violently imposes a contradiction on the very concept of hospitality by limiting it. Derrida says: Hospitality is a self - contradictory concept and experience which can only self - destruct ( put otherwise, produce itself as impossible, only be possible on the condition of its impossibility) or pro tect itself from itself, auto - immunize itself in some way, which is to say, deconstruct itself precise ly in being put into practice. 93 89 Ibid., p.209. 90 Ibid., p.211. 91 The Derrida - Habermas Reader (The University of Chicago Press, 2006) ed., Lasse Thomassen. p.228, note 11. 92 Ibid., p.210. 93 Ibid., p.211. 77 It would seem that institutional conception of cosmopolitan right and universal hospitali ty, thus, situates it in the paradox of impossibility as soon as it is formalized, known, experienced , and put to practice in a conditional Kantian sense. Derrida suggests that , we do not know what hospitality is. This not knowing is not necessarily a deficiency, an infirmity, a lack, which might ordinarily be a negative statement , but, for Derrida, hospitality is not in the domain of being or an object of knowledge. 94 Derrida explains his o wn conception of hospitality this way: Hospitality, if there is such a thing, is not only an experience in the most enigmatic sense of the word, which appeals to an act and intention beyond the thing object, or present being, but is also an intentional experience which proceeds beyond knowledge toward other as abso lute stranger, as unknown, where I know that I know nothing of him. 95 Furthermore , Derrida says: I am not claiming that hospitality is this double bind or this aporetic contradiction and therefore wherever hospitality is, there is no hosp must be overcome ( it is the impossibility which must be overcome where it i s possible to become impossible. It is necessary to do the impossible. If there is hospitality, the impossible must be done). Hospitality can only take place beyond hospitality, in deciding to let it come, overcoming the hospitality that paralyzes itself on the threshold which it is. It is perhaps in th is sense hospitality is always to come ( l à ven ir present itself as such. 96 , justice, democracy, forgiveness, and hospitality are never ( es gibt ) , rather one awai in a non - re ligious messianic sense ( messiancity without messianism ), and I will el and messianism in the next section where the focus of discussion is on democracy to co me. does not imply that hospitality is deferred to some future time, according to Derrida . R ather , it points t o the notion that hospitality as such, do es not 94 Jacques Derrida The Derrida - Habermas Reader (The University of Chicago Press, 2006), ed., cognition and being, contra Husserl and Heidegger. 95 Ibid ., p.216. 96 Ibid., pp.225 - 226. 78 exist and cannot be present, and therefore pure and unconditional hospitality must remain open 97 to not i n a pragmatic, practical, and formalized institutional sense but bey ond the norms and rules and law , which becomes infinite ethical responsibility for the other, which is always infinite and more than one can think of. 98 Furthermore, on the theme of pur e and unconditional hospitality, Derrida says the following: Pure and unconditional hospitality, hospitality itself, opens or is in advance ope n to someone who is neither expected nor invited, to whomever arrives as an absolutely foreign visitor, as a new arrival, non - identifiable and unforeseeable, in short, wholly pure hospitality can have no legal or political status. No state ca n write it into its nal hospitality, which is neither juridical nor political, is nonetheless the condition of the political and the juridical. 99 Derrida recognizes that perhaps pure and unconditional hospitality may be practically impossible and moves beyond the juridical - p olitical realm and is situated in the domain o f ethical responsibility for the unknown other. N evert heless, Derrida suggests that withou t the thought of unconditional hospitality we would not have the idea of hospitality itself ; therefore , the unconditiona l hospitality , which is not in the realm of politics and law , is the very condition for the political and the juridical. 100 Derr cosmopolitan ethics must move 97 in The Derrida - Habermas Reader (The Unive rsity of Chicago Press, 2006) ed., Lasse Thomassen. p. 229, note17. For further discussion of unconditional Of Hospitality (Stanford University Press, 2000). 98 r as I welcome the face of the other, insofar as I welcome infinity. For Levinas, the welcoming of the other is the welcoming of the other who is infinitely other and who consequently extends beyond me infinitely, when I consequently welcome beyond my capa city to welcome. In hospitality I welcome an other greater than myself who can consequently overwhelm the space of my in The Derrida - Habermas Reader (The University of Chicago Press, 2006) ed., Lasse Thomassen. p. 229, note 20. 99 Philosophy in a Time of Terror (The University of Chicago Press, 2003), pp.128 - 129. 100 Philosophy in a Time of Terror (The University of Chicago Press, 2003), p.129. 79 beyond politics and law, and indeed it is the condition for politics and la w with respect to relation to the other in the cosmopolitan discourse. ritique of Juridical - political approach to cosmopolitan right and cosmopolitanism is compelling. Ultimately, D errida is skeptical about the Kantian idea of hospitality and cosmopolitan right in terms of political institutions, which limits the unconditional notion of hospita lity and cosmopolitanism . Derrida introduces an ethical move beyond the Kantian Juridical - politi cal approach to cosmopolitanism. Cosmopo litics and Democracy to Come ions . Derrida argues that ethics is the condition for politics, and political institutions such as cosmopolitanism and democracy are 101 not present. Nevertheless, Derrida acknowledges that cosmopolitanism and democracy are needed in the face of tyranny, and political civilization remains better than barbarism. In c ontra st to Habermas, Derrida does not provide a systematic conception of procedu ral rationality that is developed in terms of norms in ethics, politics, and law. Rather, he shows the limits and possibilities of cosmopolitanism. Derrida calls for examining norms, laws, politics, and ethics ; going beyond norms and rules ; and seeking new openings, a new International Law, a nd a new ethical - political order and democracy , which he refers to as Drawing from this discussion, I argue that we should begin with ethics, and , indeed , ethics should not be separated from politi cs, and the idea of ethical politics can be achieved through the practice of radical generosity in politics. 101 which tomorrow, later, next century will be. There is a future, which is predictable and foreseeable. But th ere is a future (to come), which refers to someone who comes, whose arrival is totally unexpected. For me, that is the real future, that which is unpredictable. The Other who comes without my being able to anticipate their arrival. So if there is a real future beyond this other known future, it is in that it is the coming of the Other when I See the documentary film Derrida (2002), made by Kirby Dick and Amy Ziering Kofman, 2002. 80 Like Habermas , Derrida argues that cosmopolitanism calls for moving beyond the nation - state s , because nation - states function within the framew ork of nat ionalism. Derrida like Habermas supports international cooperation and reform and transformation in the UN. 102 However, where Habermas is hopeful that through reform in both the UN and other democratic formal institutions cosmopolitan political ord er may be a possibility, Derrida is skeptical about the prospect of cosmopolitan political order , not just fo r practical difficulties but also because , for Derrida, concepts such as cosmopolitanism and democracy remain a promise therefore, h e re According to Derrida, his interest in international cooperation and cosmopolitanism is to some extent in the spirit of Kant, but he has some questions (reservations) s concept ion of cosmopoli tanism. 103 to I begin with a lengthy quote from preface to Rogues (2005), where Derrida, invoking Plato, Benjamin, and Levinas, writes: We think a t once the unforeseeability of a n event that is necessarily without horizon, the singular coming of the other, and, as a result, a weak force. This vulnerable force, this force without power, opens up unconditionally to what or who comes and comes to affec t Timaeus had named Khôra (which means locality in general, spacing, interval) another place without age, anot - the the cosmos, or the globe But what would allow these to take place, without, however, providing any ground or foundation, would be precisely Khô ra. Khôra would make or give place ; it would give rise without ever giving anything what is called coming of the event. Khôra receives rather than does not exist f or itself. being Khôra that there is es gibt 102 Derrida Justice to Come: An Interview The Derrida - Habermas Reader (The University of Chicago Press, 2006) ed., Lasse Thomassen. p. 261. 103 The Derrida - Habermas Reade r (The University of Chicago Press, 2006) ed., Lasse Thomassen, p.262. 81 the name Khôra, a call might thus be taken up and take hold: the call for a thinking of the e vent to come , of the democracy to come , of the reason to come . This call bears every hope, to be sure, although it remains, in itself, without hope. Not hopeless, in despair, but foreign to the teleology, the hopefulness, and the salut of salvation. Not fo reign to the adieu nonetheless heterogeneous and rebellious, irreducible, to law, to power, and to the economy of redemption. 104 This passage can be read in terms of what Derrida refers to as which in a certain sense relat es to the coming of the event ( the other, democracy , justice , and cosmopolitanism ). When Derrida re fers to coming of the other as a he is invoking Benjamin 105 and interprets it as messianicity without messiani sm , and for Derrida, this messianicity without messianism refer s to a call and a promise of an independent future f or what is to come, in the shape of peace and justice, a promise and hopefulness, independent of religion, a promise beyond three Abrahamic r eligions and without relation to revelations or to the history of rel igions, in a s ense a faith without a religion . I n other words, it is a secular call with no universal t elos . However, it is important to n ote that, is not something that is ce rtain to happen tomorrow or in the future in concrete formal terms, rather it remain s a promise to come. 106 Nevertheless , Derrida gives a surprisingly concrete e xample of this messiani sm wit tion of a weak and uses it to describe the alter - globalization movements that are heterogeneous, unformed, and full o f contradictions. According to Derrida, these weak forces will prove to be strong in the end and r epresent the future. Furthermore , he asserts that we must very cautiously, give force and form to this messianicity without messianism and not give in to the old politics of sovere ignism and 104 See Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (Stanford University Press, 2005), pp. xiv - xv. 105 s, we have been endowed with a weak in Illuminations: Walter Benjamin Essays and Reflections (New York: Schocken Books, 1985), ed., Hannah Arend t, p.254. 106 Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (Stanford University Press, 2005), p.85. 82 territorialized nation - state. 107 This is Derrida the possibility of cosmopolitanism, democracy , and justice, despite the fact that for him these concepts remain as a promise to come. Let us with respect to international law and his critique of the current understanding of international law and democracy , or , at least, perhaps , his ideal notion of it. The fo issue: As at the end of the social contract , questions of foreign policy, of war and peace, wer e still excluded , marginalized or deferred in the treatment of the concept and stakes of democracy. This democracy remained and still remains a model of international and intrastate political organization within the city. Despite some appearances, it is not certain that t hings have changed. Whether we follow the guiding thread of a post - Kantian political thought of cosmopolitanism or that of the international law that governed throughout the twentieth century such institutions as the League of Nations, the United Nations, the international Criminal Court, and so on, the democratic model (equality and freedom of sovereign state subjects, majority rul and the question of universal, international, interstate, and especially trans - state democratization remains an utterly obscure question of the future. It is one of the 108 e of the Habermasian conception of democracy and cosmopolitanism that assumes that democracy is being practiced today and has been practiced before, however imperfect , and it is the only hope for peace and the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Derrida questi ons this assertion and insists that this is only an appearance and it is misleading. will never exist, in the sense of present existence, and not because it will be deferred but because 107 S ee The Derrida - Habermas Reader (The University of Chicago Press, 2006), ed., Lasse Thomassen. pp. 268 - 269. 108 R ogues: Two Essays on Reason (S tanford University Press, 2005), pp.80 - 81. 83 it will always remain aporetic 109 in it s structure. 110 Moreover, i n The Politics of Friendship (1994) , Derrida writes the following about : For democracy remains to come; this is its essence in so far as it remains: not only will it remain indefinitely perfectible, hence always insufficient and future, but, belonging to the time of the promise, it will always remain, in each of its future times, to come: even when there is democracy, it never exist s , it is never present, it remains the theme of a non - presentable conce pt. 111 Furthermore, Derrida writes: interminable political critique. A weapon aimed at the enemies of democracy, it protest s against all naïveté and everyday political abuse, every rhetoric that would present as a present or existing democracy, as a de facto democracy, what remains inadequate to the democratic demand, whether nearby or far away, at home or somewhere else in th e world, anywhere that a discourse on human rights and on democracy remains little more than an obscene alibi so long as it tolerates the terrible plight of so many millions of human beings suffering from malnutrition, disease, and humiliation, gross ly dep rived not only from bread and water but of equality or freedom, disposed of the rights of all, of as subject, human person, or consciousness, before any juridical determi nation as compeer, compatriot, kin, brother, neighbor, fellow religious follower, or fellow citizen). 112 Despite his critique and skepticism regarding democracy and cosmopolitan political order in the Habermasian sense, Derrida offers a certain gesture and sugge stion toward conception of democracy and cosmopoli tanism, however, not in terms of norms, rules, law , 109 110 S ee R ogues: Two Essays on Reason (Stanford University Press, 2005), p.86. For further discussion on democracy by Derrida see Roué Acts of Religion (New York: Routledge, 2002), ed., Gil Anidjar, pp. 230 - 298, wh yle, revolutionary in a Marxist and messianic sense. It is worth noting that Derrida has a certain reservation about this essay and mentions that Benjamin was influenced by Heidegger, admired Carl Schmitt and had correspondence with him in which Schmitt co - 263. For a better understanding of this issue see Walter Benjamin Selected Writings: Volume 1, 1913 - 1926 (Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 231 - 234 and pp. 236 - 252. 111 Jacques Derrida, The Politics of Friendship (New York: Verso, 2005), translated by Gorge Collins, p.306. 112 R ogues: Two Essays on Reason (Stanford University Press, 2005), p.86. 84 procedure, and formal institutions. Nevertheless , it is important to note that Derrida does not reject democracy and cosmopolitanism in principle neither does he reject formal democratic institutions . Derrida writes the following in support of democratic institutions and cosmopolitan political order , q uote d here in length : But, beyond this active and interminable critique, the expressi e takes into account that absolute and intrinsic historicity of the only system that welcomes in itself, in its very concept, that expression of autoimmunity called the right of self - critique and perfectibility. Democracy is the only s ystem, the only constitutional paradigm, in which, in principle, one has or assumes the right to criticize everything publicly, including the idea of democracy, its concept, its history, and its name. Including the idea of the constitutional paradigm and t he absolute authority of law. It is thus the only paradigm that is universalizable, whence its chance and its fragility. But in order for this historicity unique among all political systems to be complete, it must be freed not only from the Idea in the Kantian sense but from all teleology , all onto - theo - teleology the democratic beyond nation - state sovereignty, beyond citizenship. This would come about through the creation of an international juridico - political space that, without doing away with every reference to sovereignty, never stops innovating and inventing new distributions and forms of sharing, new divisions of sovereignty. ( I refer to inventing here because the to - come gestures not only toward the coming of other but toward invention invention at the end of World war II remains an essential democratic reference for the institutions of international law, especially the Un Rights that one tries, most often to no avail, to impose limits on the sovereignty of nation - states. One example of this, among so many others, would be the laborious creation of an International Criminal Court. 113 Derrida in his double 114 gesture of deconstruction , on the one hand , critiques and insists on ongoing critique of democratic paradigm, and on the other hand , supports the very idea of fo rmal democratic institutions in principal. I t seems Derrida recognizes that the only recourse to democratic and cosmopolitan practices is through democratic means and institutions. In some 113 R ogues: Two Essays on Reason (Stanford University Press, 2005), pp.86 - 87. 114 See V Modern French Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1980), Descombes claims the tyrannical system of rules while simult aneously laying traps for it in the form of problems which it is at a loss to - 139. 85 sense , post - metaphysical discourse in terms of democrat ic institutions, international law, and cosmopolitan political order , which goes beyond the nation - state s paradigm. Derrida insists on the ongoing renewal (the New International and the New Declaration of Human Rights) and invention of democr a tic practices and institutions, because according to Derrida, formal democratic institutions are always insufficient and remain a promise to come. T o some extent , Habermas agrees wit ongoing process of renewing normative, systematic , and has a procedur al framework with discursive and democratic deliberation which is ongoing and subject to critique and improvement. critique and sup port of international law and , in particular , his call fo r the by taking a certain position 115 in Specters of Marx (1993). Here again Derrida makes a r emarkable double gesture toward Marx , by critiquing certain aspects of Marx and a certain Marxism 116 , on the one hand , and by acknowledging the importance of renewing the Marxian critique and analysis , on the other hand, in calling for a reform and transformation of international law and , more importantly, the new international. Derrida writes: Just as the concept of human rights has slowly been determined over the course of centuries through many socio - political upheavals (whether it be a matter of right to work or economic rights, of the rights of women and children, and so forth), likewise international law should extend and diversify its f iel d to include, if at least it is to be consistent with the idea of democracy and of human rights it proclaims, the worldwide appearances, what we are saying here is not simply anti - statist: in given and limited conditions, the super State, which might be an international institution, may always be able to limit the appropriations and violence of certain private socio - economic forces. But without 115 position - taking than to the work such a position calls for, presupposes, or prefigure Specters of Marx (New York: Routledge, 1994), Marx Through Post - Structuralism (London: Continuum, 2010) Ch. 3 pp. 66 - 93, 116 Derrida argue - philosophers and calls for a political and radical Marx. See Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 32. 86 necessarily subscribing to the whole Mar x is t discourse ( which, moreover, is complex, evolving, heterogeneous) on the State and its appropriation by a dominant class, on the away of the State, and, on the other hand, without to criticize the presumed autonomy of juridical and denounce endlessly the de facto take - over of internationa l authorities by powerful Nation - States, by concentration of techno - scientific capital, symbolic capital, and financial capital, of State capital and private alrea dy denounces the limits of a discourse on human rights that will remain inadequate, sometimes hypocritical, and in any case formalistic and inconsistent with itself as long as - scientific, military, and economic development maintain an effective inequality as monstrous as that which prevails today , to a greater extent than ever in the history of humanity. 117 In this passage , Derrida argues for the extension of international law and its ref orm , to the extent that it limit s the power of nation - states and private e conomic forces in the world, as well as calling for cosmopolitan political order when he mentions the super - state or an international institution as a kind of a world governing body that functions within the framework of international law . At the same time , though, Derrida suggests that we must critique the juridical - political autonomy of powerful nation - states as well as the forces of the free market economy th at undermine internatio nal law. Derrida is skeptical about law 118 especially in the framework of international law and the power ful nation - states that abuse international law and use it to their advantage. This comment by Derrida t ical economy useful , and he seems to agree with it to a certain extent. Moreover, Derrida writes: link of affinity, suffering, and hope, a still discreet, almost secret link, as it was around 1848, but more and more visible, we have more than one sign of it. It is an untimely link, without status, without title, and without name, barely public even if it is not clandestine, 117 Jacques Derrida, Specters of M arx (New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 84 - 85. 118 Acts of Religion always an authorized force, a force that justifies itself or is justified in applying itself, even if this justification may p p. 233 - 244. 87 without contract, without national commun ity (International before, across, and beyond any national determination), without co - citizenship, without common belonging to a class. The name of ne w international is given here to what calls for the friendship of an alliance without institution among th ose, who even if they no longer be lieve or never believed in the S ocialist - Marxist International, in the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the messiano - es chatological role of the universal union of the proletarians of all lands, continue to be inspired b y at least one of the spirits of Marx or of Marxism ( they now know that there is more than one) and in order to ally themselves, in a new, concrete, and international, but r ather of a kind of counter - conjuration, in the (theoretical and practical) critique of the state of international law, the concepts of state and nation, and so forth: in n still be fruitful if one knows how to adapt it to new conditions, whether it is a matter of new modes of production, of the appropriation of economic and techno - scientific powers and knowledge, of juridical formality in the discourse and the practice of national or international law, of new problems of citizenship and nationality. 119 Derrida suggests the new international , a new alliance and friendship, which invo kes Marx and cosmopolitanism and moves beyond the formal and institutional idea of these conce pts and beyond international law and the nation - states . Derrida insi sts that the Marxian critique can still be useful in terms of providing a framework for analysis of international law and issues of citizenship, if this Marxist critique is adjusted to the new socio - economic and political conditions of today. Ulti mately, Derrida remains skeptical about the prospect of formal institutions , such as international law and cosmopolitanism, despite the fact that in principle he believes in them. Ethical Concern Beyond Norms notion of beyond norms, which begins with the ide a of infinite responsibility for the other. For Levinas, ethics begins with relation to the other and the subjectivity and freedom is called into question and is hostage to the other prior (primordial) to cognition and 119 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx (New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 85 - 86. 88 knowing the other ; therefore, one is responsible for the other infinitely in an asymmetrical - one - for - the - other, ethics of infinite responsibility, and for Levinas, this infinite responsibility and e thical concern is primordial. infinite responsibility is the beginning of ethical response, which is more than one can think of and a responsibility which canno t be met. Therefore, this ethical responsibility is infinite. My ethical subjectivity ; rather , my focus is on the idea of unconditional welcome and hospitality as radical generosity. Levinas does not offer a historical a nd social c onception of ethics and does not provide an account of how the problem of ethics of infinite responsibility for the other, locating politics outside of the ethical realm, while, for Derrida, ethics is the condition for politics. Nevertheless, drawing from the idea of unconditional ethics of infinite responsibility and the idea of unconditional welcome as hospitality, I translate these ideas of concern for the other into the language of radical generosity. I develop a conception of ethics that involves radical generosity as a social practice , transcending , and mov ing it into the realm of social and historical transformatio n. The focus must be on the social and collective aspect of ethics. As I mentioned in the beginning of this chapter , Derrida ethical concern is, to some extent , influenced by his engagement w , in particular, Totality and Infini ty (1961) and Otherwise t han Being (1974) 120 . Derrida with Levinas 120 Levinas in Otherwise t han Being Hegelian dialectic, Husserlian phenomenology, and the Heideggerean philosophy of Being (ontology), despite the fact that Levinas tries to distance himself and critique all three in Totality and Infinity (1961). 89 begins with two important essays (1980), critiquing and . on L Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (1997), in which Derrida a welcome as I t is noteworthy that with explicit ethical concern regarding cosmopolit anism and hospitality seems to have a Levinasian undertone that mo 121 s Levinas says: My task does not consist in constructing ethics; I only try to find its mean ing. In fact I do not believe that all philosophy should be programmatic. 122 , it would be best to writes the following about what eth ics mean s in the Levinasian sense: [L] et us not forget that Levinas does not seek to propose laws or moral rules, does not seek to determine a morality, but rather the essence of the ethical relation in general . But as this determination does not offer it self as a theory of Ethics. 123 rk and s ethics with a great insight. It is clear is not a normative ethics based on prescribed rules and norms, like the Kantian deontology and categorical imperative and util itarian ethics begins with relation to the o ther, the - one - for - the - other, 121 Derrida, in a conversation with André Jaco objection. I am ready to subscribe to everything that he says. That does not mean that I think in the same way, but in this respect the differences are very difficult to determine; in this case, what do differences of idiom, language or writing mean? I tried to pose a certain number of questions to Levinas whilst reading him, w here it may have been a question of his relation to the Greek logos, of his strategy, or of his thinking with respect to femininity for example, The Ethics of Deconstruction (Purd ue University Press, 1992), Simon Critchley, pp.9 - 10. Here Derrida suggests that for the most part in principle he is in 122 Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity (Duquesne University Press, 1985), translation by Richard A. Cohen, p.90. 123 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference , (The University of Chicago Press, 1978) trans. Alan Bass, see 90 ethics of infinite responsibility, i nfinite responsibility for the o ther, and , for Levinas, this i nfinite responsibility and ethica l concern is primordial and beyond self - consciousness, master - slave dialectic, negation , recognition of the other, consciousness (cognition) , essence , and B eing , contra Hegel, Husserl , and Heidegger. 124 In other words, Levina s as first philosophy critiques the totalizing philosophy of Hegel and Heidegger, and , to some extent , phenomenology. 125 Totality and Infinity (1961), Levinas writes: This book will pre sent subjectivity as welcoming the other, as hospitality; in it the idea of this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics. The strangeness of the Other, his irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accomplished as a calling into question my spontaneity, as ethics. 126 For Levinas, subjectivity and ethics begin with relation to the other and the realization tha subjectivity is called into question and is hostage to the other prior (primordial) to cognition and knowing the other ; therefore, one is responsible for the other infinitely in an asymmet rical relation. The other in the face to face relation , cann ot be reduced to an alter ego or another se lf, or , as Levinas calls it , (self, I, the knowing subject, self - consciousness) ; the other 124 en with the philosophy of the Neuter: with the Totality and Infinity (Duquesne University Press,2004), tran s. Alphonso Lingis, p.298. 125 however, his method is phenomenological. Levinas writes: The relation between the same and the other is not always reducible to knowledge of the o Totality and Infinity (Duquesne University Press,2004), Emmanuel enology, the point where moral encounter precedes and under girds intentionality itself, that he breaks with phenomenology in a way that establishes the decisive Levinasian Meditations: Ethics, Philosophy, and Re ligion (Duquesne The Cambridge Companion to Levinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), eds. S. Critchley and R. Bernasconi, God as Otherwise Than Being (Northwestern University Press, 2002), Calvin O. Schrag, Ethics and Infinity (Duquesne University Press, 1985), Emmanuel Levinas, translation by Richard A. Cohen, To the Other: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (Pur due University Press, 1993), Adriaan Theodoor Peperzak, and The Ethics of Deconstruction (Purdue University Press, 1992), Simon Critchley. 126 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity (Duquesne University Press,2004), trans. Alphonso Lingis, pp. 27 - 43. 91 remains the stranger in its alterity and singularity. Levinas refuses to reduce the other to univers alize and t otalize mode of Levinas insists on the singularity of the other that resists totalizing and remains infinitely transcendent and foreign, and for Levinas that defines the ethical relation to the other in the mode of exteriority , as the other rem ains different in her alterity, rather than seeking to overcome difference. Levinas insists on difference, and this exteriority manifests itself in the Levinasian sense in the face to face relationship, but the face can not be thematized, known , and reduced to some specific physical appearance, such as color of the eye and so on ; rather , for Levinas the face is tied to discourse and language in terms of speaking and saying Levinas says the foll owing with respect to the face: describes what appears. So, too, I wonder if one can speak of a look turned toward the face, for the look is knowledge, perception. I think rather that access to the face is of his eyes! When one observes the color of the eyes one is not in social relationship with the Other. The relation with the face can surely be dominated by pe rception, but what is its relation to another thing. Here, to the contrary, the face is meaning all by itself. You content, which your thought would embrace; it is uncontainable. The face is what one cannot kill, or at least it is that whose mea possible and begins discourse. I have just refused the notion of vision to describe the authentic relationship with the Oth er; it is discourse and, more exactly, response or responsibility which is this authentic relationship. 127 For Le vinas, the face opens the relationship with the other and in turn establishes ethical relation s in terms of responsibility for the other in the context of language and discourse by the , by presenting oneself through language and discourse, and this 127 Emma nuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity (Duquesne University Press, 1985), translation by Richard A. Cohen, pp. 85 - 87. 92 presentation is only possible in relation to the other in terms of infinite responsibility for the other in an asymmetric question and defines it as a hostage to the other, in which the only recourse seems to be receiving this infinite ethical responsibility for the other prior to knowing (cognition) or any rules or calculation. Furthermore, in Otherwise than Being (1974), Levinas writes: The recurrence of the self in responsibility for others could never mean altruistic will, ne, the responsibility for everyone goes to the point of substitution. A subject is a precedes essence in it, has not awaited freedom, in which a commitment to another wou ld have been made. I have not done anything and I have always been under accusation p here I am , answering for everything and for commitment, is human fr aternity itself, and it is prior to freedom. The face of the other in proximity, which is more than representation, is an unrepresentable trace, the way of responsibility b eing hostage that there can be in the world pity, compassion, pardon and proximity even hostage is not the limit case of solidarity, but the condition for all solidarity. 128 Here again Levinas articulates his understanding of subje ctivity in terms of this infinite responsibility for the other primordially. For Levinas, this responsibility is an unconditional and fundamental structure of subjectivity, because he defines su bjectivity in terms of the relation to the other as ethics, which , in turn , implies responsibility. And , this responsibility is for the other, although the subject never asks for thi s responsibility, n evertheless, the subject is responsible. Levin as refers . R ather , the subject is chosen and the subject cannot refuse this responsibility once he encounters the face of 128 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being (Duquesne University Press, 2006), trans. Alphonso Lingis, pp. 111 - 123. 93 the other. According to this Levinasian understanding of the subjectivit y, the subject is hostage in an asymmetrical relation to the other in terms of his responsibility for the other, whether he is able or not able to do something. For Levinas, this un - conditionality and infinity renders his ethical concern possible , and , acc ording to this Levinasian logic, this hostage situation is not a limit ; rather, responsibility for the other is the condition fo r the possibility of compassion and solidarity in this world, and , ultimately , the condition for the possibility of ethics. Moreover, Levinas says: I am responsible for him, without even having taken on responsibilities in his regard; his intersubjective relation is a non - symmetrical rela tion. In this sense, I am responsible for the Other without waiting for reciprocity, were I to die for it. Reciprocity is his affair. It is precisely insofar as the relationship between the other and me is not reciprocal that I am subjection to the Other; exclusively, and what, humanly, I cannot refuse. This charge is a supreme dignity of the unique. I am I in t he sole measure that I am responsible, a non - interchangeable I. I can substitute myself for everyone, but no one can substitute himself for me. Such is my inalienable identity of subject. 129 Levinas insists on a singularity of ethical responsibility refu sing any totalizing reduction of difference in terms of relation to the other and responsibility for the o ther. This idea of the one - for - the - other cannot be reduced and defined in reciprocity or universal terms. No one can replace this singularity of respo nsibility for the other. I am the only one who is responsible , and no one else can replace me. This also implies that the other must remain in her alterity ; therefore , the asymmetrical relation remains in place, as not overcoming difference but rather main taining difference is the aim of Levinasian ethics, which renders his approach to ethics unique and remarkable ; it As I argued at the beginning of this rs a new open ing beyond ethical rules and rule 129 Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics a nd Infinity (Duquesne University Press, 1985), translation by Richard A. Cohen, pp. 96 - 101. 94 following ; nevertheless, there is a need to move this ethical responsibility toward a social and historical transformation. The emphasis must be on a collective aspect of ethics in concrete terms Derrida Reading Levinas: Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas a ppropriating responsibility for t getting caught up in calculation and evaluation of interests, whereas political respon sibility is about actual laws, which require a time for analysis and calculation. Here Derrida reads - Derrida makes : ethics must be the condition for the pol itics , not the other way around. Therefore, I argue that political practices inevitab ly have ethical implications . Drawing from this discussion, that radical generosity constitutes both unconditio The challenge is not to separate ethics from politics. Rather, ethics must be politicized to open to the possibility for a deeper understanding of ethical politics. Such an understanding implies that pol itics must exhibit radical generosity concerning immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees , and , in general , all citizens of the world. I suggest that the practice of radical generosity has the potential for a paradigm shift and social and historical transforma tion, which can render cosmopolitanism a possibility. Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (1997), with respect to welcoming the other as hospitality respect to cos mopolitanism. Before we proceed , it is important to unde rstand what Levinas 95 implies by infinite responsibility for the other, and , by exten sion , because the concept of infinite is crucial As I mentioned at the begin ning of this chapter Derrida says that for him and Levinas, without infinite responsibility there is no responsibility and this infinite responsibility is an ethical overload, and it is precisely because of this infinite responsibility as an overload that overwhelms that there can be ethical concern for the other ; therefore which is an asymmetrical relation with the other beyond norms and rules. Levinas says: T he idea of t he inf inite implies a thought of the U nequal. I start from the Cartesian idea of the Infinite, where the ideatum of this idea, that is, what this idea aims at, is infinitely greater than the very act through which one thinks it. For Descartes, this is one o f the this something had to be put into us. But it is not the proof Descartes sought that interests me here. 130 Levinas refers to Des in t he third Meditation, but it seems he is less interested in the proof itself than in ment. Here he focuses on the idea that the infinite is more than can be thoug ht of. 131 Levinas develops this idea of infinite in his e thical thought and his conception of the relation to the other as an infinite responsibility . According t o Levinas, this idea of the infinite is more than one can think of and so is the responsibility for the other, that is to say that this ethical relatio nship with the other is an ethical overload , because it y to think of or even fulfill this responsibility . T herefore , this responsibility is infinite. F ollowing Levinas , Derrida insists on this 130 Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity (Duquesne University Press, 1985), translation by Richard A. Cohen, p.91. 131 Simon Critchley quotes Hilary Putnam in Infinit ely Dem anding , saying argument, so interpreted. The significance is rather that Levinas transforms the argument by substituting the Other Infinitely Demanding (New York: Verso, 2007), Simon Critchley p . 25. Also, see Hilary Putnam, The Cambridge Companion to Levinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), eds. S. Critchley and R. Bernasconi, p. 42. 96 idea of infinite responsibility, wh ich is the starting point for ethical concern beyond norms and rules. Let us read Levinas through Derrida in order to understand how welcome can be read as hospitality. Derrida reads Levinas against Kant with r espect to cosmopolitan ri ght, hospitality , and peace . He begins his discussion with a quotation from Totality and Infinity (1961), which I cite here to articulate the idea of welcome and hospitality in Levi discourse , again through : [I s ] to welcome (I take the liberty of emphasizing this word) his expression, in which at each instant he overflows the idea a thought would carry away from it. It is therefore to rec exact ly: to have the idea of infinity. But this also means: to be taught. The relation with the Other, or Discourse, is a non - allergic relation, an ethical relation; but inasmuch as it is welcomed (my emphasis again) this discourse is a teaching. But teaching d oes not come down to maieutics; it comes from the exterior and brings me more than I contain. 132 Derrida emphasizes the which implies for him a particular interpretation o f welcome that renders welcome in to hospitality . Derrida admits that Levinas does n ot explicitly refer to welcome as hospitality, but he notes that Levinas does mention welcome and hospitali ty in his ethical discourse, though hospitality. Nevertheless, Derrida reads that is beyond politics and law . In this respect it contrasts with - political approach to cosmopo litan right and hospitality, which Derrida describes Derrida writ es: On the horizon of these preliminary reflections, I will be guided by a question that I will in the end leave in suspense, being content simply to situate some of its premises and points of reference. It would concern, on first view, the relationship b etween an ethics of hospitality (an ethics as hospitality) and a law or a politics of hospitality, for example, in the tradition of what Kant calls the conditions of universal hospitality in cosmopolitical law me, concesso non dato , that there is 132 Jacques Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (Stanford University Press, 1999), trans. Pascale - Anne Brault and Michael Naas, p.18. 97 no assured passage, following the order of a foundation, according to hierarchy of founding and founded, of principal origina l ity and derivation, between an ethics or a first philosophy of hospitality, on the one hand, and a law or politics of hospitality, on the hospitality a law and a politics, some particular law or politics in some determined How, then are we to interpre t this impossibility of founding, of deducing or deriving? Does this impossibility signal failing? Perhaps we should say the contrary. 133 Derrida suggests provide a political or lega l framework with respect to cosmopo litan right and hospitality. Nevertheless, Derrida does not think that failing to derive political and legal conclusion from ethical discourse is a failure. Instead it may indicate that Lev exceeds politics and law, though it has political implications nonetheless. Derrida readi ng of Levinas against Kant poses a series of questions about hospitality and peace. He writes: Now, how can this infinite and thus unconditional hospitality, this hospitality at the opening of ethics, be regulated in a particular political or juridical practice? How might it, in turn, regulate universal, cosmo - political , and thus political and j uridical hospitality, the hospitality that Kant reminds us must be instituted in order to interrupt a bellicose state of nature, to break with a nature that knows only actual or virtual war. Instituted a s peace, universal hospitality must, according to Kan t, put an end to natural hostility. For Levinas, on the contrary, allergy, the refusal or forgetting of the face, comes to inscribe its secondary negativity against a backdrop of peace, against the backdrop of a hospitality that does not belong to the orde the Kantian concept of peace is apparently juridical and political, the correlate of an inter - he that A distant but faithful echo of the declaration of peace that opens the Preface of Totality and Infinity 134 133 Jacques Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (Stanford University Press, 1999), trans. Pascale - Anne Brault and Michael Naas, pp. 19 - 20. 134 Jacques Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (Stanford Univer sity Press, 1999), trans. Pascale - Anne Brault and Michael Naas, pp.48 - 49. 98 Derrida criti of a state of nature in Perpetual Peace (1795) , in which the possibilit y of peace depends on political and juridical measures to surmount a warlike state of nature. Derrida argues that unconditi o nal hospitality and unconditional peace may only be possible beyon d the framework of juridical and political discourse. Derrida notes that the face is hospi tality and peace at the same time , going beyond the Kantian conception of peace in terms of juridical and political discourse. Furthermore, Derrida writes: The Kantian argument is well known: if I make peace with the thought in the back of my mind o f reopening hostilities, of returning to war, or of agreeing only to an armistice, if I even think that one day, more or less in spite of myself, I should let myself be won over by the hypothesis of another war, this would not be peace. There may then, nev er be any peace, one might say, but if there were, it would have to be eternal and, as an instituted, juridic o - this without any play on words, peace now , and he prefers universali ty to t a e could not but retain the trace of a warlike state of nature, in Levinas the inverse is the case, since allergy, the rejection of the other even war, appear in a space marked by the epiphany of intentional subjectivity, as responsible, traumatized, obsessed, and persecuted, first off ers the hospitality that it is. When Levinas affirms that the essence of language is goodness, d hospitality an interruption: an interruption of both symmetry and diale ctic. He b reaks with both Kant and Hegel , with both a juridico - cosmopolitanism that, in spite of its claims to contrary, could never succeed in interrupti are the final pages of Totality and Infinity . They declare peace, peace now, before and beyond any peace process, 135 Derrida reading of Levinas against the Kantian cosmopolitanism suggests that the Levinasian ethical discourse rejects the concept of state of nature, because the Levinas ian ethics is against 135 Jacques Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (Stanford University Press, 1999), trans. Pascale - Anne Brault and Michael Naas, pp.90 - 91. 99 violence and war, sym metry, dialectic, or formal institution s in the juridi cal - political framework. Derrida insists that the Levinasian ethics offers welcoming, hospitality, and peace, because the subject is the host and hostage at the same time and respons ible for hospitality and peace. This hospitality and peace in the Levinasian sense, according to Derrida, cannot be reduced to a dialectical process aiming at an this logic and demands peace now through lan gu age, offering welcome, hospitality, friendship, and peace. Concluding his discussion on Kant and Levinas, Derrida reading of Levinas against Kant critiques the Kantian notion of peace and justice in the domain of the state. Derrida invokes ritique of the state in Totality and Infinity (1961) and ref ers the tyranny of the S tate as well as anonymous universality of the State. 136 This is what Levinas writes , according to Derrida : Metaphysics, or the relation to the other, is accomplish ed as service and as hospitality . Insofar as the face of the Other relates us to the third , the metaphysical relation of the I to the Other moves into the form of the We, aspires to a State, institutions, laws, which are the source of universality. But pol itics left to itself bears a tyranny within itself ; it deforms the I and the other who have given rise to it, for it judges them according to universal rules, and thus as in absentia (par contumace). 137 Furthermore, Derrida asserts that the political dissi mulates because it brings light , making the face visible and seen in the public, but at the same time it makes the face invisible. According to Derrida, the violence of the political mis treats t he face to the point of destroying its uniqueness rendering it to generality. 138 This is a radical assertion by Derrida that echoes 136 Jacques Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas ( Stanford University Press, 1999), trans. Pascale - Anne Brault and Michael Naas, p.97. The emphasis on hospitality , third , politics , tyranny , deform, and absentia emphasis. Also see, Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity (Duquesne University Press, 2004), trans. Alphonso Lingis, p.300. 137 Ibid., pp. 97 - 98. 138 Ibid., p.98. 100 insistence on the singularity of the other, with respect to having ethical responsibility for the other , which implies that the state may no t be able to replace this infinite re s ponsibility, because the state is prone to tyranny and violence. Derrida asserts: It is necessary to deduce a politics and a law from ethics. This deduction is necessary in rks: 139 Derrida echoes his own commentary on politics in Specters of Marx (1993) and acknowledges the relation between ethics, l aw, and politics and the fact that politics is necessary. H owever, Derrida in his tradition of double gesture is quick to note that politics and law are necessary, but they are not sufficient with respect to ethical concern. Derrida writes: Ethics enjoins a politics and a law: this dependence and the direction of this conditional derivation are as irreversible as they are unconditional. But the political or juridical content that is thus assigned remains undetermined, still to be determined beyond knowledg e, beyond all presentation, all concepts, all possible intuition, in a singular way, in the speech and the responsibility taken by each person, in each situation, and on the basis of an analysis that is each time unique - unique and infinit e. 140 Derrida , on t he one hand, recognizes that ethical concerns have political implications and so, therefore , ethical concerns are conditions for the political and j uridical discourse. On the other hand , Derr ida is not willing to accept the role of politics completely , bec ause according to him , juridical - politic al content remains undetermined. Ultimately, Derrida remains skeptical about the juridical - poli tical institutions , contra Kant and Habermas. Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas ( 1997), with 139 Jacques Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (Stanford University Press, 1999), trans. Pascale - Anne Brault and Michael Naas, p.115. 140 Ibid., p.115. 101 Kan t and Levinas, which will illuminate t he juridical - political institutions . Derrida writes: Our task here is simp ly between Kant and Levinas to sharpen a difference that matters today more than ever with regard to this right of refuge and all the most urgent matt ers of our time, everywhere that in the world mi llions domicile fixe), call out for another international law, another border politics, another humanitarian politics, indeed a humanitarian commitment that effectiv ely operates beyond the in terests of Nation - States. 141 Derrida makes a sharp distinction between the Kantian juridical - political approach to cosmopolitanism and his own approach . He reads an ethic of welcoming the ot her as hospitality and accepts the Levinasian i dea of infinite responsibility . This offers a notion of ethical subjectivity that calls into question the idea of subjectivity , by referring to the subject as a host and hostage, which insists on difference a nd singularity and resists universality and tota lity. This Levinasian ethical concern moves beyond state, international law, and politics. point of view, i t would seem there might be a paradox here in cosmopolitan discourse : on the one hand, it seems that cosmopolitanism c al ls for some ki nd of formal juridical - political institutions ; on the other hand, it also necessitates welcoming the other unconditionally as singular in her a lterity beyond juridical - political practices . The Kantian approach to cosmopolitanism seems to overlook this radi cal ethical concer n for the other beyond politics, law, duty, recognition, cognition, Being and totality, which Derrida calls for through his reading of Levinas . The Limits of Derrida In this section, I criticize certain a such as lack of practical and social perspective in their conception of ethics. Nevertheless, I acknowledge 141 Jacques Derrida, Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (Stanford University Press, 1999), trans. Pascale - Anne Brault and Michael Naas, p.101. 102 and draw on their ideas to d evelop my conception of of radical generosity. I acknowledge this r adical move by Derrida and Levinas in terms of unconditional ethical concern for the other in cosmopolitan discourse. But for the Levinasian ethical concern to maintain its radical position (unconditional ethical concern for the other) it must move beyond the individual, with respect to ethical concern, and address ethical concern in the realm of everyday life practices in the historical context of social relations . Ethical concerns arise in historical and social context s in everyday life practices of ethic s, and while to some extent ethical relation s maybe an individual matter, they are not a private matter. It is important for every individual to have ethical concern for the other ; however , at some point this ethical concern must move into the everyday lif e practices in concrete historical and social terms. Ethical concern in the context of radical generosity and cosmopolitanism involves our relation to others who we do not know but nevertheless we have concerns about their wellbeing . In other words, ethica l concern must be a social concern and an everyday life practice that transforms social relations and becomes which move beyond the individual . Derrida distinct and radical in its demand fo r unconditional responsibility, which is infinite and cannot be met. This distinction is marked by emphasis on the difference and alt erity that must remain in place, which defines this ethical subjectivity . , a host age , and prepa red to substitute for any distress , and suffering ; in other words, the subject is marked by disruption that demands infinite ethical responsibility that the subject cannot escap e. As Simon Critchley puts it , Levinas ethical subjectivity. 142 T his s remain in the framework of subjectiv ity . T his Levinasian ethical concern moves beyond norms, procedure, and 142 See Infinitely Demanding (New York: Verso, 2007), Simon Critchley p.62. 103 calculation. I acknowledge this radical move by Derrida and Levinas in terms of ethical concern for t he other ; however, the Levinasian ethical concern , in order to maintain its radical position , must move beyond the ethical subjectivity , with respect to ethical concern , and address ethical concern in the realm of everyday life practices in the histo rical context of social relations and social . E thical concern s arise in historical and social contexts in the everyday life practices of ethics . In orde r to articulate my point better , it is crucial Critchley points to a ethical concern: [W] thinking is a full theorization of the passage from care to justice. That is to say, an account is needed of the passage from the quasi - phenomenology of ethical asymmetry to a full - other to the third ( le tiers ), or from ethics to justice, leaves open the place for such a be seen from his recent arguments for the necessity of international law, this place is, in my view, fatally underdetermined in their work. 143 Lev inas attempts to address this issue by the idea of the third party 144 that can bring justice in the form of formal institutions ; however, he does not fully develop this idea of the third party and 143 The Ethics of Deconstruction (Purdue University Press, 1992), Simon Critchley, p.269. enterprise, the ethical dominance of the Other over the theoretica l ontology of the same is entirely bound up with a every effort to turn ethics into the principle of thought and action is essentially religiou Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil , (Verso, 2002), pp. 22 - 23. 144 he face of the Other relates us with the third party, the metaphysical relation of the I with the Other moves into the form of We, aspires to a State, institutions, laws, which are the source of universality. But politics left to itself bears a tyranny wit hin Totality and Infinity (Duquesne University Press, 2004), trans. Alphonso Lingis, pp. party is other t han the neighbor, but also another neighbor, and also a neighbor of the other, and not simply his Otherwise than Being (Duquesne University Press, 2006), trans. Alphonso Lingis, p. 191, note 2 and p. 157. Finally, Levinas say establish with other men; there is thus a necessity to moderate this privilege of the Other; from whence comes 104 justice, and sometimes he r efers to the third party as my ne igh bor and neighbor of my neighbor, so perhaps this idea of the third p arty and justice could be put under the rubric of what Derrida describes as fraternity, humanity, and hospitality heteronomous ethics. Nevertheless, t he question remains whether the Levinasian ethics has anything to say about the formation of ethical practices beyond the framework of ethical subjectivity. It would seem that the Levinasian ethics remain s i subjectivity , despite the fact that Levinas seeks to first , present the subject outside the realm of autonomy and consciousness , con tra Kant, Hegel, and Husserl , and second , give substance to the subject as an empirical and ethical subject in relation to the other , a living bre athing individual , not just an ideal notion. It would seem that n individual real m to a social domain , and thus, it remains marked by significant lacunae. It is imp ortant for every individual to have ethical co ncern for the other ; however , at some point , this ethic al concern must move in to the everyday life practices in concrete historical and social terms. In other words, ethical concern must be a social concern and an everyday life practice that t ransforms and T ransformation al Ethics or , to put it vigorously , R evolution ary Ethics or Ra which subjectivity. The idea of T ransformation R evolution ary Ethics , or focuses on what people p ractice in social and historical context as everyday life practices that form social rel ations and inform and produce ethi cal practices. The prac tice of radical generosity as a way of life and justice. Justice, exercised through institutions, which are inevitable, mu st always be held in check by the initial Ethics and Infinity (Duquesne University Press, 1985), translation by Richard A. Cohen, p. 90. Sometimes Levinas mentions justice in terms of formal institutions, but it is not quite clear how one should understand the idea of the third party and justice together. It seems the third party suggests a move from the ethical to the political realm. However, Levinas is always skeptical about politics, as is clear in quotatio n above. 105 ethical practice offers such a n opportune transformational an d revolutionary opening in to the formation of a social and political discourse with regard to the p ossibility of cosmopolit anism. To sum up my di scussion here, draw ing from Derrida and Levinas ethics , despi te the certain limitations that presents, I develop a conception of ethical politics that that move s L generosity calls for social and collective openness to others ; th at is to say, moving beyond subjectivity and situating radical generosity in the realm of sociality and collectiveness. This social and collective reading of unconditional welcome and hospitality as radical generosity implies openness to others in concr ete ethical and political terms by implementing politics and policies that are generous to ward immigrants. s unconditional welcome and hospitality as radical generosity attempts to formulate a conception of ethical politics that can deal with the complexity these concepts present and include radical gen erosity in the politic al life. In my view, ethics play s insistence on ethics as the condition for politics emphasizes t he importanc e of unconditional ethics, which opens the possibility for rethinking the relation between ethics and politics concerning radical generosity. Drawing from this idea, the challenge is to understand the relation between ethics and politics and politicize ethical issues in concrete terms and to open the discourse to the possi bility for ethi cal politics. Ethical politics implies ethical consideration in politics and policy making, which includes exhibiting radical generous policies conce rning immigrants , and refugees , in general , all citizens of the world. Furthermore, radical generosity has the potential for both a paradigm shift and social and historical transformation. Radical 106 generosity can be fruitful in its political task of transforming both the individuals and the social world. T hus, political institutions can consider adopt ing radical generous ethical politics an d implement policies that are based on cosmopolitan awareness and inten t . In the following chapter , I will discuss the idea of practice ( praxi s ) reading Marx to articulate the idea of the practice of radical generosity as a way of life and everyday life practice, which focuses on the historical and social dimen sion of ethical practices . Therefore, as I have argued throughou t my dissertation my attempt here is to develop a concept of ethical politics based on practical phi losophical reflection, which focuses on the idea of practice ( praxis ). In the next chapter, drawing from Marx , I develop my concept of practice ( praxis ) with respect to radical generosity. I also define what is involved in the concept of generosity by exam ining , drawing from their ideas , develop the concept of radical g enerosity . The practice of radical generosity involves social transformation and ethical politics in concrete terms with respect to the i ssues of immigrants, asylum seekers, refugees, and , in general , all citizens of the world facing war, refugee crisis, and neoliberal globalization to which cosmopolitanism is an alternative worldview and practice. 107 Chapter 4 : Th e Practice of Radic al Gen erosity as a Condition for the P ossibility of Cosmopolitanism In chapter three, I focused on a conception of ethics as a key condition for the possibility of The generosity are the following: infinite responsibility as unconditional ethics, ethics beyond following rules, and welcome as hospitality. I suggest ed that welcome as unco n ditional hospitali ty is constitutive of radical generosity , and I also acknowledged that radical generosity is situated in the idea of unconditional ethics. As I argued in the previous chapter, w ave l imitations as far as the aim of this dissertation is ethical concern and responsibility for the other but do not address the relevant pra ctical and social questions. Here I want to emphasize and und erscore th e social and transformative aspect of radical generosity. The practice of radical generosity in concrete terms manifests itself in politics with ethical concern, which means implementing generous immigration policies with respect to immigrants an d refugees. In this chapter, I outline a conception of radical generosity as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. C osmopolitanism implies including and having concern for the well be ing of others , especially those we do not know, an d includes the idea of social bonds, citizenship, and ethical and political concern that transcends the idea s of - - . As I argued at the outset of this study my focus is on ethical politics as a social practice, which imp lies that radical generosity is not a random individual act but rather a social practice. Thus, the possibi lity of cosmopolitanism implies that the world community and its social and political institutions consider ethical concern for the wellbeing of the citizens of the 108 world. And, this begins with the practice of radical generosity, which has the potential to challenge and transform existing norms. This implies that norms and policies - be challenged by the practice of rad ic al generosity, which will open the possibility for a paradigm shift. Of course, we must recognize that soc ial change does not happen over night , rather, it accrues historically by new ways of thinking and social practices. Therefore, the concept of practice ( praxis ) becomes crucial for radical generosity as a mode of transformat ion and a way of life. Radical generosity combined with the concept of praxis can develop as a transformative activity to challenge existing social norms with respect to the possibili ty of a cosmopolitan world. In this chapter , the idea s of generosity and praxis will be examined in order to develop a conception of the practice of radical generosity. This chapter will proceed as follows: first, I a of generosity ( eleutheriotês ) as part of his virtue ethics. For Aristotle, generosity ( eleutheriotês ) is an important virtue for building an excellent character. of generosity ( eleutheriotês ) is conservative and does n ot focus on t he transformative , because in contrast to Aristotle, Nietzsch e emphasizes the transformative aspect of generosity by reevaluating existing ethical norms and challenging them. My conception of radical generosity includes this particular aspect of of generosity. Third, I have a brief overview of contemporary philosophic al discussions about generosity in order to give a historical account of generosity , noting that only a few scholars have explored the concept of generosity , but my approach differs, because my discussion of generosity situates it as a radical social practice and a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Fo urth, I turn to Marx beca use I attempt to develop my conception of radical generosity a s a social and transformative 10 9 practice. Here I focus on praxis praxis as a social and transformative activity that brings about social and poli tical change. Finally, I discuss the practical aspect of radical generosity as ethical politics with respect to immigran ts and refugees . This discussion and its subsequent examples will show that I have developed the necessary features of the practice of r adical generosity as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Generosity: Aristotle and Nietzsche I want to clarify my aim here . I am interested in developing a conception of radical generosity as an ethi cal political practice that can tra nsform social relations with respect to the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Thus , since my method is historical in a narrow and limited way, it is appropriate to examine the genealogy of the concept of generosity. It must be noted that my examination is no t exhaustive but, rather , is limited in scope to a few important concepts and philosophers such as Aristotle, Nietzsche, and a few other contemporary thinkers. Aristotle offers a conception of generosity ( eleutheriotês ) as a virtue among other important vi rtue s that are required for developing a virtuous character in his virtue ethics. Nietzsche generosity , on the other hand , focuses on the transformative aspect of generosity and calls both for a reevaluation of values and for a creation of new v alues that challenge the existing norms. I Nietzsche presents a conception of generosity with a transformative perspective that is compatible with my understanding of gener osity as a transformative practice. Aristotelian Virtue Ethics and Generosity It must be noted that my reading of Aristotle is limited and brief with a narrow focus on I begin with an hics and 110 generosit y ( eleutheriotês ) in order to understand the basic definition of generosity ( eleutheriotês ) . ( eleutheriotês ) as an element of virtue ethics in his ethical w ritings, namely, his Nicomachean Ethics , 145 which is considered an important text with respect to ethics, especially as in recent times philosophers have examined and appealed to Aristotelian virtue ethics to develop new approaches to ethical questions. 146 Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics argues that, every activity, every enquiry, every practice and decision aims at some good, and by the good we mean that at which human beings characteristically aim. Thus, the highest human good is happiness , or, to be e xact , human flourishing ( eudaimonia ) and living well and doing well. 147 Furthermore, Aristotle argues that eudaimonia is an activity according to virtue ( aretê ), and, in turn , virtue is the character, which , according to Aristotelian ethics , i mplies excellence; in other words, virtuous character me ans excellence. The question is how does one acquire a virtuous character? in to two kinds : namely, intellectual virtues and virtues of ch aracter (moral virtues). Intellectual virtue arises mostly from teaching, and needs experience and time, whereas virtue of character ( êthos ) comes from habit ( ethos ), . 148 Aristotle notes that character o r moral 145 Eudemian Ethics rather than Nicomachean Ethics , but MacIntyre thinks that Nicomachean Ethics is the canonical The Aristotelian Ethics Theory of the Will , by T. Irwin in Journal of Philosophy , 77, 1980, pp. 338 - 354. 146 For example, Alasdair MacIntyre in his book After Virtue , (University of Notre Dame Press, 1981, 2 nd edition, 1984), argues that because of the failure of the Enlightenment project with respect to morality, Aristotelian virtue e thics must be reconsidered as a viable answer to the Nietzschean critique of the Enlightenment project with respect to morality. See chapter 5, 6, 9, and 18. 147 Nicomachean Ethics , translated by Terence Irwin, (Hackett Publishing Company, 1 985), (1094a1, 1095a, 1139b3, 1140a28, 1140b7). 148 Ibid., (1103a20). 111 virtue does not come to us by nature ; rather, it is a matter of habituation or practice. In other words, the aim of Aristotelian ethical theory is practical. Aristotle says that , examination is not to know what virtue is, but to 149 This shows that knowing the no rms and rules alone will not guarantee ethical activity. Furthermore, Aristotle defines virtue as a mean, 150 which aims at what is intermediate. For Aristotle, ultimately, virtue is a state that has element of mean, which implies finding a balance between tw o vices, namely, 151 For Aristotle, the virtues are those qualities in character that will enable an individual to achieve eudaimonia. In his definition of the virtues Aristotle lis ts some important virtues and gives a description about their scope. He names justice, intelligence, wisdom, temperance, friendship, magnanimity, and generosity, which is the focus of my examination in this section , as important virtues . In describing the scope of generosity ( eleutheriotês ) Aristotle says that generosity ( eleutheriotês ) is a mean about wealth, because generosity ( eleutheriotês ) is about excess and deficiency involving wealth. And un - generosity is about taking wealth more seriously than is right. Accordingly, generosity ( eleutheriotês ) is about giving rather than taking. For it is more proper for a virtuous pers on to do good than receive good. T hus , giving implies doing good. People are called generous who give rightly and are praised fo r justice. Generous people are 149 Nicomachean Ethics , translated by Terence Irwin, (Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), 1104a, fuge in arguments, thinking that 150 mesotês ) has been criticized by many philosophers, because it seems vague and confusing and it is relati 151 Ibid., (1107a). 112 loved for their virtue of giving, giving to the right people, in the right amounts, at the right time, and for the right reason. Moreover, they take pleasure in giving and do not ask for favors, and give without stint and are not concerned with wealth, because it is not easy for generous people to become rich. However, the generous person does not give indiscriminately. 152 Ultimately for Aristotle, the practice of generosity ( eleutheriotês ) is to be based on deliberate choi ce , according to the right reason , without self - serving motives, just for the pleasure that the act of generosity brings to the giver and receiver. According to Aristotle, the act of generosity ( eleutheriotês ) must be a noble act in itself, rather than a means to some other end. He also mentions that it is not the value of the gift that matters but rather the desire for the noble act itself is what is valuable. Aristotle provides a basic definition of gen erosity ( eleutheriotês ) as a good virtue and practice, which needs to be in harmony with other virtues to build a virtuous character. However, ( eleutheriotês ) seems to be conservative and situated in the realm of indivi dual excellence and character 153 and does n o t address the social and political implications of a generous act in historical and material terms. As MacIntyre argues, there is a an essenti ally metaphysical being, and , furthermore, MacIntyre notes, Aristotle did n o t understand the transie nt nature of the polis , because Aristotle had no understanding of historicity in general. 154 G enerosity as a practice 152 Nicomachean Ethics , translated by Terence Irwin, (Hackett Publishing Company, 1985), (1119b15 - 1122a25). 153 MacIntyre argues that Aristotle believes in the unity of virtues without elaborating on detailed interrelationships between different virtues in the character of the individual the good man , because the virtues are all in harmony with each other and the harmony of individual character is reproduced in the harmony of the state. See Alasdair After Virtue , (University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 157. Also, it must be noted that, for Aristotle, only free men could acquire virtues; women, non - Greeks (barbarians), slaves, craftsmen, and tradesmen were of an inferior class and, therefore, incapable of becoming virtuous, as only affluent and people with high status can achieve virtues and participate in ethics and politics in the city - state ( polis ), since virtuous man must be a good citizen of the polis . 154 After Virtue , (University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), pp. 158 - 159. 113 must be situated in historical and mater ial context as a radical social and political practice, not merely as an ahistorical individual act , in order to be valuable as a condition and transformative process to render cosmopolitanism a possibility. My understanding of radical generosity moves bey ond exis ting practices and institutions and calls for the transformation of values that existing institutions cannot provide. Thus, it is the transformative ethic of generosity that challenges existing norms. Ni e Ethic of Generosity I must note that my reading and int erpretation of Nietzsche is brief I extract and appropriate certain elements of Niet (e.g., re e valuation of values and transformation) with regard to generosity in order to develop my concept of radical generosity. Let and his conception of generosity. Nietzsche presents a conception of generosity with a transformative perspective that is attuned with my understanding of generosity as a transformative practice. hammer suggests a radical shift in understanding ethics and calls for the a ( Umwertung ) of what it means to practice ethics and becoming ethical. Nietzsche does not provide a normative ethical theory. , or his overcoming of the normative ethics , is a radical departu re from the normative conception of ethics . He calls for a historical examination of values , arguing for a reevaluation of ethical values. hat it means to practice ethics . My interes t here is approach to ethics, which interrupts the norms and social order and creates ruptures in ethical practic es. It is this idea of transfor m a tion that opens the possibility for the practice of ethics from a di fferent perspective, 114 which does not operate on utility, self - interest, duty, or responsibility but rather shifts the focus to an everyday life practice of radical ethics as a way of life as an interruption of social order. This Nietzschean ethic of ( Umwertung ) , to some extent invokes an anarchist approach to ethics by interrupting the social order, norms, and rules of traditional conception of ethics. , in particular, as a radical practice, refers to a process of transformation, which is life affirming, providing an active force of life against resentment, guilt, duty, and self - interest. This implies an everyday life practice of the ethics of radical generosity and magnanim ity 155 , to put it more boldly in the Nietzschean language. Furthermore, the practice of radical generosity can ethics that he develops as transformative ethics . Nietzsche is interested i n generosity as a way of life that challen ges a self - interested and utilitarian mode of existence. For Nietzsche, the ethic of generosity presents a new mode of 155 conception of magnanimity ( magnanimitas ), Aristotle says the following: onour, because a sort of crown the virtues, because i t enhances them and is never found apart from them. This makes it hard to be truly magnanimous, because it is impossible without all - around excellence rate one, because he will feel that he is getting no more than his due, or rather less, since no honours can be enough for perfect excellence. Nevertheless he will accept such honours, on the ground that there is nothing greater th ey can give him. But honour conferred by ordinary people for trivial reasons he will utterly despise, because that sort of thing is beneath his dignity. And similarly with dishonour, because be moderately disposed to wealth, power, and every ashamed to accept them, because the one is the act of a superior and the other that of an in ferior. When he repays a service he does so with interest, because in this way the original benefactor will become reluctantly, makes a reque st, whereas he is eager to help others. He is haughty towards those who are influential and successful, but moderate towards those who have an intermediate position in society, because in the former case to be superior is difficult and im pressive, but in the latter it is easy; and to create an impression at the expense of the former is not ill - bred, but to do so among the humble is vulgar - s beneath magnanimous man to remember things against people, especially wrong; it is more like him to over - Nicomachean Ethics , translated by Terence Irwin, (Hackett Publishing Company, 198 5). 115 thinking and being. What does Nietzsche mean by generosity ( magnanimity )? Nietzsche tells us that magnanimity involves the inexpedient an d that it is incredible. Therefore, it raises the question why magnanimity is being practiced, that there must be some advantage in this act. However, according to Nietzsche, magnanimous practice requires no reason for being unreasonable , and it is an act of unreason : idiosyncra tic , incomprehensible, and impractical. Nietzsche says that when people engage in exceptional practices they do not see themselves as an exception ; therefore they cannot arrive at a fair evaluation of the rules and follow the norms. Rather, they interrupt the norms. 156 This Nietzschean understanding of ma gnanimity as generosity is crucial to my claim that the practice of radical generosity should not be understood as an exception but rather as an everyday practice , which breaks the rule s and transforms the social norms . Furthermore, Nietzsche describes magnanimity as rising above oneself and overcoming egoism . H e says that a 157 This Nietzschean conception of mag nanimity to some extent relates to his notion of nobility and creating values beyond the normative values of a social order of conformity, which regulates, manages, disciplines, and governs our everyday life to the extent that we do not question the validi ty of the norms that we are practicing. For Nietzsc he, nobility implies creating and practicing new values. He says: [V] alues for which no scales have been invented yet; offering sacrifices on alt a rs that are dedicated to an unknown god, a courage without and a lack of awareness of this rarity that made a person noble. 158 156 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science , translation by Walter Kaufmann, (Vintage Books, 1974), Book I - 3, pp. 77 - 78. 157 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science , translation by Walter Kaufmann, (Vintage Books, 1974), Book I - 49, p.114. 158 Friedrich Nietzsche , The Gay Science , translation by Walter Kaufmann, (Vintage Books, 1974), Book I - 55, p.117. 116 This Nietzschean ethics call s Umwertung ), interrupts and transforms social norms , and creates new values and practices that p lace the practice of radical generosity at its core. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra ( 1883 - 1885 ), Nietzsche talks about generosity in the context of the gift - giving virtue as the highest virtue ; he says: Uncommon is the highest virtue and useless; it is gleamin g and gentle in its splendor: a gift - faithful to the earth, my brothers, with the power of your virtue. Let your gift - giving love and your knowledge serve the meaning of the ea rth. 159 Furthermore, Nietzsche in a poetic style declares what he considers to be the highest virtue: That the mountain should descend to the valley and the winds of the height to the low plains - oh, who were to find the right name for such longing? Gift - g iving virtue thus Zarathustra once named 160 I read this idea of - unnamable in the conte rather, indicates that it is a practice beyond knowledge toward othe rs th at we do not know. It would seem, this might be an impossible act but according to Derrida, we attempt to overcome this impossibility and do the impossible . Nietzsche also says that to practice magnan imity (g enerosity) involves overcoming egoism and rising above one - self, which suggest s overcoming the impossible. Furthermore, Nietzsche , through Zarathustra , the ultimate gift - giver, names the un - namable by pronouncing the value and importance of the gift - giving virtue as the highest virtue and a gesture to practice generosity. It must be noted that always moves beyond self - interest, obligation, du ty, and sacrifice. It opens up the possibility for ethical practic es that are 159 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra , in The Portable Nietzsche , edited and translated by Walter Kaufmann, (Viking Penguin, 1982), I - 22, pp. 186 - 188. 160 F riedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra , in The Portable Nietzsche , edited and translated by Walter Kaufmann, (Viking Penguin, 1982), III - 10, p. 302. 117 considered imp ossib l e and unpractical. For Nietzsche, ethi cs is not about a rational exchange of what is given to me, I a squanderer with a thousand hands; how could I call 161 Here , again , Nietzsche emphasize s that generosity is not about sacrificing but rather about the gift - giving virtue as the highest virtue, I read this - as radical generosity. To conclude this brief reading of Ni etzsche of generosity, it is important to note the relation between generosity and the concepts of welcoming and hospitality, which is pertinent to cosmopolitanism and was examined in previous chapters on (Kant, Derrida, and Levinas), where the idea of hospitality and welcoming were conflated. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra (188 3 - 1885) Nietzsche has Zarathustra s peak about welcoming and hospitality: To encourage one who despairs - for that everyone feels strong enough. Even to me you gave this strength: a good gift, my honored guests! A proper present to ensure hospitality! Well then, do not be angry if I offer you something of what is mine. This is my realm and dominion; but whatever is mine shall be yours for this evening and this night. My a nimals shall serve you, my cave shall be your place of rest. In my home and house nobody shall despair; in my region I protect everybody from his wild animals. And this is the first thing I offer you: security. The second thing, however, is my little finge r. And once you have that, by all means take the whole hand; well, and my heart too! Be welcome, my guests!...From the manner, O Zarathustra, in which you offered us hand and welcome, we recognize you Zarathustra. You humbled yourself before us; you almos t wounded our reverence. But who would know as you do, how to humble himself with such pride? That 162 The Nietzschean ethics offers generosity in its broadest sen se, which moves beyond the gift economy of give and take and reciprocity, which may create obligation, anger, and even hostility conditional notion of hosp itality, which limits the possibility of hospitality and , in effect , ren ders 161 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra , in The Portable Nietzsche , edited and translated by Walt er Kaufmann, (Viking Penguin, 1982), IV - 1, p. 350. 162 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra , in The Portable Nietzsche , edited and translated by Walter Kaufmann, (Viking Penguin, 1982), IV - 11, p. 392. 118 it impossible. The Nietzschean ethics welcomes and offers hospi tality not out of duty but out of generosity, and it is a humbling act not wanting to offend and anger the guests. I t gives not mere gifts ; rather, it offers sanctuary, strength, courage, honor, and heart and uplifts the guests. - overcoming) involves immediacy within the social world. This self - overcoming seems to be an individual practice based on generosity, however, another reading of Nietzsch ( Selbstüberwinddung ) meaning s elf - overcoming has the potential to become a social Umwertung ) and transformation. Later in this chapter, I turn to Marx to further develop the idea of radical generosity as a social and transformative practice ( praxis ), because Nietzsc transformation and generosity are not explicitly w ithin the context of praxis and social transformation. In my view , to practice radical generosity is to interrupt and transform social relations , which implies radical transformation in rethinking what it means to practice radical generosity from a s ocial perspective and to embrace the sociality of this practice. Contemporary V iews of Generosity Following the historical movement of my argument regarding the history of concepts, it is crucial to examine the contemp orary philosophical discussions on g enerosity. My aim here is to show that the contemporary discussions about generosity are im portant but that they are limited in the sense that the transformative aspect of generosity is not discussed , nor is the idea of generosity as a social praxis and a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism advanced . Let us consider very briefly some recent philosophical discussions on the concept of generosity, which to some extent will illuminate my argument with respect to generosity. With the excep tion of a few scholars who have paid attention to the concept of g enerosity, generosity has 119 not been extensively discussed among scholars in recent times. Lester Hunt in his 1975 essay Generosity osity , argues that generosity is not altruism, sacrifice, or justice. He suggests that generosity is very different from altruism, because the generous act does not involve subordination of interest and, as such, is not sacrifice. Furthermore, Hunt notes t hat there is a radical difference between generosity and justice. Justice involves bringing about a state of affairs , which is fair. In other words, justice is about a fair outcome, calculation, and exchange. However, this is not the main element in genero sity as a virtue. 163 I think Hunt makes a crucial point that generosity differs from altruism , the subordination of in terest, sacrifice, and j understanding of gene rosity seems to be close to James Wallace in Virtues and Vices (1978), following the Aristotelian conception of generosity suggests that generosity is a kind of benevolence, and a direct concern for others, which is primary. 164 Certainly, the idea of benevolence and having a concern for the wellbein g of others is an important aspect of the ethic of generosity, which I have suggested throughout my discussion in this study. In more recent years , nservative point of view, argues that generosity is possible only within a libertarian political system rather than a welfare state. Machan supports the idea of generosity as an individual virtue, which defines the individual independent of social processe s. 165 Effectively , his approach to generosity is an individualistic counter to the sociality of generosity as an ethical practice. Refuting Machan, Rosalyn Diprose in Corporal Generosity (2002) ntributes to human well - being, but that it is an openness to others that is fundamental to human existence, 163 American Philosophical Quarterly Vol.12, No. 3, (July, 1975), pp. 235 - 244. 164 Virtues and Vices , (Cornell University Press, 1978), chapter V, Benevolence, pp. 128 - 158. 165 Journal of Applied Philo sophy , Vol. 7, No. 1, 1990, pp.61 - 73. 120 166 while understanding generosity as a pre - reflective corporeal openness to otherness may not 167 Diprose understanding of generosity in social terms to some extent is similar to my claim that as a potential for the possibility of cosmopo lita nism radical generosity implies a social practice. I t is crucial to point out that one of the main elements of radical generosity, as a social practice is the idea of transformation. As I mentioned above , the contemporary philosophical discussions on generosity do not focus on the transformative aspec t of generosity nor do they discuss the idea of praxis . E transformational ethics and concep tion of generosity, I have suggested that radical genero sity interrupts the contracts establ ished by social and poli tical order. In other words, radical generosity does not fit existing categories or social understandings. Thus, radical generosity has the potential to transform existing soci al norms. To some extent, there are some similarities be tween radical ge nerosity ethics in general, namely, the idea of transformation and the necessity of interrupting existing social and polit ical norms. Therefore, the concept of praxis is crucial for radi cal generosity to become a concrete action as a social practice in order to transform social norms. Praxis: According to Marx It must be noted that my reading of Marx is not exhaustive and limited to the idea of praxis . It is also crucial to note that , I am not reading Marx in th R ather , I read the idea of praxis in a broad sense of 166 Rosalyn Diprose, Corporal Generosity , (State University of new York Press, 2002), p. 2. 167 Ibid., p.5. 121 social activity with transformative and critical elements, which challenges existing norms and brings about social and political change in concrete terms. conception of praxis is crucial to my idea of radical generosity as a social and transformative practice. As I argued at the outset, radical generosity is not an individual act, rather, a social practic e and has transformative potential in concrete terms, such as, generous policies with respect to immigrants and refugees. My aim here is to situate radical generosity in idea of praxis , which gives concreteness to the idea of radical generosity. Before I begin my discussion here it is important to note that, in the pr eceding chapter Derrida emphasized that, for him, ethics is the condition for politics. This re mark opens the possibility to rethink the relation between ethics and politics . In my view, political positions have ethical implications. In other words, politics w ithout ethical consideration could be blind. It must be noted that , I am not suggesting tha t ethics and politics are the same. What I am suggesting is that if ethics is about values that inform and shape our practices in life. Then, these values determine and produce policies. Consider the following example s ; if laws are passed to prevent women to have reproductive rights, these laws are expression of certain values. If laws are passed to prevent gay and lesbian people having equal rights, again these laws are the indication of certain values. If laws are passed to cut social services and benefit s, it raises questions with regard to justice and fairness. If policies are such that, women and children are deported and the notion that immigrants and refugees do not have equal ethical worth and equal rights. 122 The practice of radical generosity in concrete terms is a move toward ethical politics that challe nges th ese exclusionary policies by transforming them to generous poli cies of openness and welcoming with regard to immigrants and refugees. Indeed, generous policies open the possibility to rethink the current political order with respect to citizenship, immigration, and refugees. praxis conception of praxis . kinds of human activity : namely, praxis and po iê sis. Praxis is an activity that is good for its own sake and an end in itself, and poiêsis is an activity that is good as a means to an end, not for its o wn sake. For Aristotle, praxis has more value than poiêsis , because ethical and politi cal activities are considered as praxis that are good for their own sake, while activities performed as a means to end are less valuable. Central to Ari ethics and politics seeking to answer the what is the good life? According to Aristotle, humans as political animals ( zoon politikón ) and social animals must seek the good life in praxis of ethics and politics in the city - state ( polis ) and be good citizen s attending to civic duties , and praxis cultivates the virtues that are vital for good citizenship, such as justice, friendship, courage, temperance, and wisdom. Thus , a good citizenship facilitates a good city - state ( polis ) , which exists not merely for the sake of life but rathe r for the sake of the good lif good citizen excludes women and slaves, because they do not have the leisure time to develop vital virtue s needed for a good citizenship; only free males can be good citizens. 168 168 - 1103a) and Politics (Book I,1252a - 1253b, Book III, 1280a - 1 280b,VII, 1328a - 1329a) in The Complete Wor ks of Aristotle, Vol. II, edited by Jonathan Barnes, (Princeton University Press, 1995). 123 s understanding of praxis . A s Etien n Marx praxis and poiêsis . 169 F or Aristotle and the Greeks in general, praxis meant a free activity that one is engaged in to transform the inte rior mode of existence and not necessarily the exterior mode of existence, because poiêsis means making and production (means to an end) that takes care of material mode of existence, which is distinct from praxis (end in itself). For Marx, the interior and exterior mode s of life are interconnected, which implies that material conditions of life need to change to improve the interior mode of life ; thus, praxis means revolutionary or radical practice that transforms the world. Marx arti culates his conception of praxis in These s on Feuerbach (1845) 170 and The German Ideology (1845) 171 . Next we will turn our attention to these texts to unders tand what Marx means by praxis . In these texts Marx is attacking idealism , which show s his great insigh t into the material facts and activities that define human life. Let us consider theses eight al life is essential practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human pr 172 169 The Philosophy of Marx , translation by Chris Turner, (Verso: New York, 2007), p.40. 170 These eleve The Holy Family (1845) was completed. In this short text, Marx wants to distance himself from Feuerbach by summarizing his disagreements with Feuerbach. Here Marx crit 171 Marx and Engels could not find a publisher to publish this manuscript. It was first published in 1932. This text is The E go and its Own (1844) and The Es sence of Christianity (1841), as well as a critique of the Hegelians such as Bruno Bauer and Young Hegelians. This text represents for the 172 Karl Marx Selected Writings , edited by David McLellan, (Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 156 - Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx , (University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), also, Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity , (University of f Spirit ( Geist ) , pp.14 - 83. 124 Marx emphasi zes the significance of praxis as a defining concept t o understand the world and social relations in material terms and to recognize that revolutionary and critical activity must transfo rm both the world and the mate rial conditions of huma n life. The concept of praxis is further developed within the contex t of materialism and the materialist conception of history in The German Ideology (1845) and later works. 173 As Richard J. Bernste in puts it: for grasping production; it is the basis for com re volutionary 174 The ensemble of social relationships is a phrase quoted from the fourth thesis on Feuerbach refers to the third thesi praxis is fruitful to formulate a conception of the practi ce of radical generosity in everyday life as a way of life , as well as a revolutionary (radical) practice, which has the potential to transform social relations and , consequentl y , the social and political life and render cosmopolitanism a possibility. Of c ourse, it must be noted that the concept of practice must be unders tood in concrete terms in 173 It must be noted that there is a controversy between Marxist - Humanism and Anti - Humanism with respect to Economic a nd Philosophical Manuscripts ( 18 44 ) , translated by Raya Dunayevskaya in the Soviet Union, in which Marx, influenced by Hegel, discusses his theory of alienation, arguing that the conditions of capitalist production alienate the worker from his essence, and so, thus, he is not a free huma n being and not able to live up to his potentials. The other texts that influence Marxist - History and Class Consciousness (1923) and Karl Marxism and Philosophy (1923), in which both present a Hegelian - Marxi sm view. Marxist - humanists in - at based history and politics on an essence of man. This unique rupture contained three indissociable elements. (1) The formation of a theory of history and politics based on radically new concepts: the concepts of social formation, productive forces, rela tions of production, superstructure, ideologies, determination in the last instance by the economy, specific determination of the other levels, etc. (2) A radical critique of the theoretical pretensions of every philosophical humanism. (3) The definition o philosophy of the subject and argued that social relations have primacy over the subj ect - consciousness; for him, the - The Humanist Controversy and Other Texts , Louis Althusser, edited by Francois Matheron, translated by G.M. Goshgarian, (Verso: New Y ork, 2003). 174 Praxis and Action: Contemporary Philosophies of Human Activity , (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p.13. 125 order to be radical and revolutio nary. praxis as a key concept in the analysis of human life presents the social character of human life, whic h produces social relations in accordance with practices and material productivity. As Balibar puts it , i n the Thesis on Feuerbach (1845) Marx attempts to dismantle philosophy by rejecting the idea of theory ( theôria ), which is understood as contempla tion , and by identifying the criterion of truth with praxis . 175 And in The German Ideology (1845) , Marx equates theôria (production of consciousness) with ideology. 176 Marx argues that the production of ideas and consciousness is indeed interconnected with mat erial activity of men and that is the language of real life. And men are producers and product of their ideas as much as actual life - process itself. Marx famous Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. 177 As stated in t he first thesis on Feuerbach, Marx interpretation of praxis , which should be understood as an aspect of praxis He argues that philosophy must be a practice of i deas rather than contemplation of ideas and empty talk about consc iousness. Here it is crucial to remember this famous passage by Marx in The German Ideology (1845), which is a Consciousness can never be anything else t han conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life - process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside - down as in a camera obscura , this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life - process as the inversio n of objects on retina does from their physical life - process. 178 175 This point is indicated on the second thesis on Feuerbach. 176 The Philosophy of Marx , translation by Chris Turner, (Verso: New York, 2007), p.41. 177 Karl Marx Selected Writings , edited by David McLellan, (Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 164. 178 Karl Marx Selected Writing s , edited by David McLellan, (Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 164. 126 emphasis on material activity of real life as well as the historical aspect of real life practices that de termine social and political relations. Moreover, Marx emphasizes the social aspect of Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product, and remains so as long as men exist at all. 179 Furthermore, i n order to connect the concept of praxis with history and radical historicity, Marx states that to make history requires the first historical act of production of material li fe itself. Part of the focus in The German Ideology (1845) is on the production of r eal - life and history, which involves praxis , of course . But more importantly, it must be noted that for Marx , praxis is understood in the context of social relations. To illuminate this point , i t is b est to quote Marx directly from his later text , namely, Wage - labor and Capital (1849) , in which he states: [T] he social relations within which individuals produce, the social relations of production, and change , are transformed, with the change and development of the material means of production, the productive forces. The relations of production in their totality constitute what are called the social relations 180 For Marx, social relations are a process and an activity in the material s ense, which can be understood in terms of work (labor) and other a ctivities that define human life. It is importa nt to note that thoug h economic categories play a central his main aim is to is not a reified abstraction r ather it is a concrete form of human activity and social relations and praxis , thus, the focus must be on practices that define social relations. As Nicholas Lobkowicz notes ion of praxis : All the seemingly 179 Karl Marx Selected Writings , edited by David McLellan, (Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 167. 180 - Karl Marx Selected Writin gs , edited by David McLellan, (Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 256. This text was first published in the German newspaper called Neue Rheinische Zeitung in April 1849. 127 definite sociopolitical relationships, even the economic relationships whi ch underlie them, are a result of human practice. 181 Furthermore, as Lobkowicz puts it , by Marx means more than only labor or even production in the broad sense of the term. He adds that it seems that there is no exact definition of the term praxis it seems Marx uses this term relatively seldom. However, Lobkowicz argues that it is not too difficult from reading The German Ideology (1845) to understand what Marx means by using the word praxis . It could be desc ribed as a human activity, which can have many different modes. It can be a physical activity and political , critical, revolutionary activity , and many other human activities. However, Lobkowicz notes that there is a certain ambiguity as to how Marx uses t he expression praxis what m I suggest, we can read the term praxis in a technical (specific practices, such as revolutionary and critical prac tices) or in a broad sense , which refers to activ ities that have everyday materiality beyond the ideal notion of contemplation. Therefore, one can argue that , for Marx, in concrete terms praxis is indeed a practical and matter not merely a theory , s ince Marx claims that all economic, legal, political, an d social structures are results of human practices. Let us consider the famous eleventh and the last of the These s on Feuerbach (1845) with respect to praxis : The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various w ays: the point is to change world, which does not affect the world nor change it , one needs to change the world. Thus , critical and revolutionary praxis is required to change the world and transform so cial order and relations. 181 Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx , (University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), p. 417. 128 conception of praxis is one of the most important concepts of our times, which can provide a fruitful framework to understand and critique present reality and pr actices that are unjust and unethical . Thus, it is a remi nder that human life is defined in concrete terms of practice and t hat is what it means to be an active social and historic al citizen of the world with transformational power. F or Marx , practice and social relations de fine human life, and, thus , radical ge nerosity in concrete terms can be understood as a social practice. T herefore , the practice of rad ical generosity can be understood as a social practice with transformational potential that can change social relat ions from non - cosmopolitan practices to cosm opolit an practices. I must note that my understanding of praxis stresses the idea of social practice in general and in particular the idea of transformative prac tice . For Marx, this implies individual and social change, which leads to changing the social c onditions in the world, which includes political institutions. T he con cept of praxis is crucial to understand radical generosity as a transformative practice and a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Thus, we can rely on emph asis on praxis in concrete terms, and situating praxis in the social and politic al realm to argue that the pra ctice of radical generosity can be understood as a social pra ctice in order to t ransform social and political norms and implement generous policie s with respect to immigrants and refugees. For Marx, what defines human life is practice. Perhaps it could be argued that Marx starts with the premise that his materialist and historical analyses b egin with human beings that produce themselves in mate rial, historical, and social processes. Marx emphasizes the importance of praxis , which produces the possibility of conditions for the concrete socio - praxis , 129 which provid es a fra mework for practical reflection and action in the world to criticize and challenge the existing norms and institutions, in order to transform and change current social and political conditions. f praxis , we could indeed understand radical generosity as a social and political activity that challenges norms and institutions which function to promote a self - the Marxian idea of praxis as a practical - crit ical and revolutionary activity and refers to the social and transformative aspect of generosity, which offers historical transformation and solidarity in social relations that , in turn , translates to transformation in material co nditions and gives rise to a new way of life. Moreover, while the economy is the base structure of society, it does not mean that everything in history is determined by the economy. In other words, the social and political activity of people plays a c entral role in the formation of discourses in society. For instance, the dominant political theory in the world is neoliberal globalization, which promotes the idea of self - interest, which indicates th . H owever, recent events in the world, such as solidarity with the refugees from Africa and the Middle East, migrant workers in the US and elsewhere in the world , and stateless people (e.g., Palestinian), show the emergence of social and political practices t hat are generous in nature, which is in direct conflict with the perception of self - interest . These kind of social movements point to the move toward a new historical development and possibility that gives rise to the emergence of radical generosity. These acts of solidarity and the practice of radical generosi ty by the citizens of the world tells us that the citizens of the world are transcending the ideas of - national interest, and borders , in general, by caring about the well be ing 130 of others in the world who are suffering and are in need of help. These social movements have the potential to influence political institutions in the world to pursue and adopt new policies that are radically generous toward the immigra nts, refugees, asylum seekers, and stateless people. This gives rise to the conception of cosmopolitanism as a viable option to reorganize the world and social relations in new terms, which is inclusive and open to the idea of citizenship beyond the nation al borders. Finally, i eq uality, and solidarity . Thus, it is reasonable to claim that the practice of radical generosity at its core is ethical politics. In the next section, I discuss why c onsider radical generosity and practical implications of radical generosity as ethical politics. To conclude my discussion on Marx, I draw attention to the relevant aspects of radical generosity explicitly of praxis . In my discussion on the idea of radical generosity, I have arg ued that radical generosity can be understood as a social practice rather than a random individual act. I have also emphasized two concepts, namely, practice ( praxis) and transformation. Praxi s refers to concrete practical - critical activity, and transformation implies social and historical change that take place in society through the practice of radical generosity. I have also stressed that radical generosity as a social practice has political implications. In other words, radical generosity is not merely an ethical idea; rather, it involves politics within the context of cosmopolitanism, which me ans politicizing ethical issues, and moving toward politics with ethical consideration. Radical gen erosity as praxis embodies a concrete concern for the wellbeing of others. This begins by transforming social relations toward openness and solidarity with others that will give rise to a cosmopolitan worldview and intent. Radical generosity as a 131 social pr axis in concrete terms means, implementing generous policies with respect to immigrants and refugees. Furthermore, Marx relies on his insights about social practices to provide a historical analysis of how new historical possibilities arise through ev olution of social processes. Drawing material conditions in order to understand present practices and social and political relations, not necessarily in the orthodo x Marxism sense of the historical determinism Rather , we must consider multiple historical and material conditions that give rise to the formation of new social and political practices. The Practice of Radical Generosity as Ethical Politics I must acknowledge that my argument with regard to considering radical generosity as a condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism raises many questions, such as; why consider generosity and cosmo politanism? Are we generous or not? Why and wh y not? What would have to change? How can we promote and implement generous policies? What is involved in this process? I must admit that my argument may not provide all the answers to these questions. N evertheless , the fact is the current wo rld conditions such as, economic crisis, climate change , wars, refugee crisis, and the rise of xenophobia and Islamophobia compels us to ret hink our worldview and values that inform and produce the social and political discourse in the world. And, that begins with imagi ning that another world is possible, which calls for alternative idea s and values, that could open the possibility to form social and political movements based on these alt ernative values and worldview s . The reason to consider this alternative vision is th e fact that existing values and policies are not able to deal with the crisis (e.g., the immigrants and refuge e crisis ) that the global community is grappling with. 132 Here I attempt to address why consider the practice of radical generosity with re spect to the possibility of cosmopolitanism. And, what is the scope of radical generosity within the context of my project. I begin by asserting that, my understanding of radical generosity as far as this project is concerned is within the context of cosmo politanism . In other words, radical generosity is not a panacea for all the problems in the world. As I stated above this project may not be able to address all the aspects of generosity (e.g., giving money, goods, and food), and I do not claim addressing those issues in this project. Within the context of cosmo politanism, the practice of radical generosity involves , openness, solidarity with othe rs, and welcome and hospitality, which means implementing ethical politics by exhibiting generous policies (e.g. , welcoming immigrants, refugees, and stopping deportation) with respect to immigrants and refugees. In cosmopolitan worldview. With the transformation of va lues and formation of social and political movements change is possible. That does not mean transformation will happen overnight but it is in the realm of possibilities, because human existence is about possibilities. Let us briefly examine the lo gic of my argument with respect to radical generosity . It must be noted that radical deontological categorical imperatives (ought). An imperative is a command to do something; it is categorical when is applied without excep Radical generosity is a consideration and condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. In order to clarify this further, I put my argument in a formal logic structure: 1. If radical generosity is pract iced, then cosmopolitanism is possible. 2. R adical generosity is practiced. 3. Therefore, cosmopolitanism is possible. 133 The symbolic logic form: p ( radical generosity practiced ), q (cosmopolitanism possible) 1. If p , then q. 2. p . 3. Therefore, q. It follows, that the logic of my argument for radical generosity is a conditional argument not in generous. We can certainly not be generous and continue the path of - intere rise to xenophobia and Islamophobia. We may ask ourselves experience of World War II. Scientific reasoning asserts th at, if we experiment based on some theories and assumptions, and keep getting the same negative results. Then, we need to consider alternative theories and set of assumptions and put them to test. The point is that, it would be absurd to repeat the same ex periment with same theories and assumptions and expect different results. I am not suggesting that that my conception of radical generosity is scientific. I merely suggest that, it is worth considering and trying. If existing theories and assumptions are p roblematic and failing, and if we want to avoid war and the refugee crisis and live in a better and just world, then why not consider radical generosity and cosmopolitanism, and put it through the test of time and history. It must be noted that ethical, so cial, political, and economic theories are based on certain assumptions. These assumptions are not scientifically justifiable, nevertheless, based on these assumptions theories are conceptualized and practiced. Consider the elf - The questi on is whether human beings are always - interested . There is no empirical eviden ce to suggest that, we always act based on our 134 - Why we do things that are not to our best interest (e.g., eating too much food, drink ing, and smoking, etc.)? Why are we destroying the environment that we live in? Why people risk their lives to save another life without even knowing the person? Why people sacrifice their lives for valu es and ideal s that they believe in? Why should we acc ept these - - - organizing society and political order based on those assumptions and values. Thus, I suggest, it is not outside of the realm of possibi lity to consider radical generosity and cosmopolitan worldview. In my view, societies can become generous and accept cosmopolitan way of life through social and historical processes. For example, when some European citizens welcomed refugees (refugees welc ome), it indicates tha t social movements have the potential to transform - int , societies can become generous and cosmopolitan . Of course, one can object to my assertion, and demand proof and justificat ion. As I argued, there is no scientific proof for ethical, social, political, and economic theories. Conversely, I can argue that we have tried the other assumptions and they are failing us, why not consider and try alternative assumptions. Furthermore, o ne can certainly argue that the ideas of - in are problematic assumptions and not good for humanity, because these ideas produce wars and the refugee crisis, why should we accept them. Therefor e, I contend, we tri ed these ideas and assumptions for a long time, and they are failing humanity miserably and producing d evastation and crisis in the world. Consider, the recent refugee crisis, the EU is failing to deal with the crisis, instead of finding a proper solution 135 the EU is closing its borders, while refugees are stranded and dying on the sea. The question is states in the EU. In the meantime the war in Syria intensifying, the US, F rench, and German weapons are us ed in the Syrian war, and the Russians recently sent weapons and troops too. It seems there is no comprehensive EU immigrat ion policy and different member states pursue their own policies rants and refugee s . In fact, the EU has agreed to improve border control and Hungary closed its borders to Croatia and putting razor - wire fence along the border. If refugees try to cross the border s they would be arrested and sent to prison. This will lead to encampments of stranded refugees behi nd closed borders, which will produce a humanitarian crisis in massive scale since Wor l d War II. There is also a discussion of setting up refugee centers (internment ca mps) outside of the EU to keep the refugees out and deter them from coming to Europe. This closing of the borders is a clear violation of human rights, because most of these refugees fleeing war zones in their countries. It is worth mentioning that the EU has a policy of visa requirement for countries that are prone to produce refugees and enforces it through so called carrier sanction, which means imposing fines on airlines that carry passengers not having the required visa. This particular policy forces t he refugees to take dangerous voyage by the sea, which has caused many deaths. In addition the EU has a policy called third country rule, which means not accepting refugees who had entered from countries considered safe, which includes all the neighboring countries. Furthermore , new figures show that the number of refugees is at its highest level since World War II. The United Nations says more than 51 million people are displaced worldwide, half of them children . António Guterres, the U.N. high commissioner for refugees says , have for the first time since the Second World War more than 50 million people displaced by 136 war or persecution, it is because we are witnessing a multiplication of new conflicts in the world. And the global conflict generates global displacement. And at the same time, old conflicts seem 182 At the same time , t here has been a rise in the , and, in particular, in the U . S . in recent times . The Obama administration responded to the surge in child migrants with increased detention and speedier deportations. Thousands of children were held in U.S. detention centers after f lee ing violence and poverty in Central America. More than 47 , 000 unac companied children have been caught at the U.S. border since October 2013. The U.S. government plans to open additional detention facilities and fast - track immigration trails to allow for quicker deportation . The U.S. I mmigrati on and Customs E nforcement de ported more than 72 , 000 parents of the U.S. born children in 2013. The plight of parent s with American children has been a key issue in the immigration reform debate. Many immigrants come to the U . S . fleeing violence and poverty to find a better life and to work and send money to their families in their home countries. There are 11 million . S. , in spite of the fact that t he U . S . has deported 2 million people as of April 2014. The US Congress has not passed a comprehen sive immigration reform bill for two reasons; the first reason is economic interest, which implies cheap labor helping profits to grow, and the second reason is self - interested reelection politics by politicians who are seeking reelection. Therefore, some politicians take a tough stance on the issue of immigration to be reelected. 182 The data in this section were collected from the following sources : http://www.unhcr.org ( the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), http://www.democracynow.org/2014/4/10/as_deportations_top_2_million_should . 137 In terms of refugees, countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine, and Syria, have the largest numbers of refugees in the world. According to the Bureau for Aliens and For eign , as of October 2011 the number of refugees registered with the authorities stood at over 882 , 000 (over 840 , 000 Afghans and some 42 , 000 Iraqis). And the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports, overall, that Afghanistan remains the biggest producer of refugees (2.7 million), followed by Iraq (1.4 million), Somali a (1.1 million), Sudan (500 , 000) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (491 , 000). Syria's refugee crisis is being described as the most catas trophic humanitarian disaster since the Rwandan genocide. The UN estimates (UNHCR) that there are now 2.7 million Syrian people For many Syrian families, leaving their home is the only option to stay safe. As millions of refugees make the long, treacherous journey across the border, neighboring countries are struggling to cope with the arrivals. The UN and Syria's neighbors are appealing to the international community for more help in housing the mill ions of people who have fled the fighting. While the EU is a leading contributor of humanitarian aid to the region, the amount donated by each of its member states has varied greatly. The estimated Syrian refugees is about 4 million the EU accepted only 10 % of the refugees and the rest are in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. Moreover, xenophobia and Islamophobia are on the rise. For example, the prime minster of Hungary said; Syrian refugees are Muslim therefore his country will not accept them. Slo vakian government announced; they will only take Christian refugees. Ben Carson the republican presidential candidate said; a Muslim cannot be a president of the US. Donald Trump the republican candidate proposing to deport all the undocumented immigrants (11 million) in the US, and build a wall along the US - Mexican border. These xenophobic and Islamophopic 138 senti ments show a dangerous trend on the rise in terms of extreme politics of nationalism and exclusionary policies, which represents certain values bas - counter these extreme xenophobic and nationalistic values and politics. Thus, the question is: can we with a good conscience argue that the current ethical and political practices are sufficient and there is no need to consider alternative ideas and values . It seems to me the answer cannot be affirmative, at best it would b e maybe. The fact is, we are exper iencing a humanitarian crisis on a massive scale since World War II, which cannot be ignored. The calamity of the self - ts and open the possibility for the transformation of values that inform and produce policies. Furthermore , in my view, the transformation of values begins with imagining that another world is possible, if we think about alternative ideas and values , then social and political movement s can be realized in concrete terms. For instance, if slaves in the US did not imagi ne that they could be free some day, then slavery would not be abolished. If women in the US did not think about having equal rights, the n they would not be able to vote today. They struggled for 100 years and in 1920 they achieved the right to vote. If civil rights leaders did not imagine another world is possible, then there would not be a civil rights movement. If gay and lesbian people did not think alternative values and politics are possible, then they would not attain their civil rights today. In my view, history does not move in a linear way and the transformation of values and policies does not happen overnight but we certainly can think about alternative ideas and practices that could put the idea of another world in the realm of possibility. 139 As I argued above, the challenge here is that nation - states govern and implement policie s al interest . These policies give rise to nationalism , exclusion, extremism, and xenophobia . The important issue with the idea of world citizen , immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers is the complex relation between ethics and politics. If we accept the claim that cosmopolitanism and the idea can be an alterna - , then we can indeed consider politicizing ethical issues and respond with an adequate ethical politics that considers the practice of radical generosity. I suggest the practice radical generosity has the potential to challenge these policies and give rise to a different mode of thinking and norms, which promotes a cosmopolitan worldview and inten t . 140 Chapter 5 : Final Remarks and Conclusion The Main Argument My aim in this project was to make a contribution to the philosophical discourse on cosmopolitanism. Thus, I set out to examine the conditions that give rise to the possibility of cosmopolitanism . In order to achieve my goal, I proposed a novel idea of radical generosity as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. This final chapter will proceed in the following way: firs t , I restate my argument and give an account as to why th e theme of this study is important. Here, I review how my conception of r adical generosity was developed and present its relation to cosmopolitanism. Second, I explicate the logic and movement of my argument by showing the links between key ideas in the ea rlier chapters. Third, I summarize the key concepts in each chapter, detailing how each chapter advanced my argument. Fourth, I show both how radical generosity was developed in the context of praxis as a social and transformative practice and how the emer gence of radical social and political movements in recent times points to the direction of transformation and radical generosity. Finally, I acknowledge that my concept and argument present a novel approach, but they do not provide the final word ; rather , my hope is to make a modest contribution to the ongoing cosmopolitan project. I began my discussion in this study with the question hat conditions give rise to the possibility of cosmopolitanism? In order to answer this question, I examined ethical and political conditions and argued that radical generosity is a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. I noted that recent discussions of cosmopolitanism do not adequately acknowledge the 141 importance of generosity as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism , and that, i n fact, the idea of generosity as a practice with respect to cosmopolitanism has been overlooked. Furthermore, I defined what radical generosity means namely that it differs from random acts of generosity th at may happen from time to time. Radical generosity is a social practice with a transformative aspect, which involves a paradigm shift and social and political transformation. Moreover, the practice of radical generosity challenges existing social and poli tical norms and is not an application of rules but a projection of a new way to act in the world and transform a non - cosmopolitan way of thinking and life in to a cosmopolitan way of life . In addition, I suggested that ethical practices have political impli cations. It can be argued that if we accept the premise that all human beings have equal ethical worth, we also must acknowledge tha t all human beings have equal rights. This is the spirit of the cosmopolitan way of thinking and life. M ore over , in my view , cosmopolitanism is an ongoing project, a possibilit y, a social relation , a movement, a society, and a worldview, by which we un derstand the idea of citizen as both the nation - state idea of a citizen and the exclusions that this idea implies. What distinguishes this view is that it treats cosmopolitanism in historical terms; it acknowledges the institutional requirements of cosmopolitanism, views it as openness to others and a way of life, and, in doing so it involves so cial and political transf ormation, which in turn implements the practice of radical generosity. To justify the importance of cosmopolitanism, I contended that we live in a world torn by war s that is producing refugee crisis in massive scale since Worl d War II, and two factors have - in addition by the processe s of neoliberal - globalization the world is becoming increasingly interconnected in various respects: ecology, socio - economic, finance, and technology. The 142 processes of neoliberalization (e.g. , austerity measures) and globalization (which involves the displacement of workers) have created conditions under which a great number of people have been moving ar ound the globe as immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers. Further, it has contributed to a rise in xenophobia and Islamophobia in Europe and the US. I have argued that cosmopolitanism can offer a solution to the challenges of war s , the refugee crisis, an d neoliberal - globalization that the world is experiencing. The Logic of Positions and the Movement of Argument Having stated in the introduction a key condition, namely, radical generosity for the possibility of cosmopolitanism, and presented my prelimina ry understanding of cosmopolitanism , I then, in order to articulate and develop my argument further, examined three distinc t philosophical approaches to as developed b y Stoic thinkers in diverse ways but lacking a political or institutional conception of cosmopolitanism. For this, I turned to two other approaches to cosmopolitanism, - (Kant and Habermas) in the framework of political inst itutions - responsibility and ethics as a condition for politics. While I acknowledged the importance and necessity of these approaches to cosmopolitanism and extracted ce r tain ideas from these thinkers, I also problematized and showed their limitations in certain respects in order to advance my argument. Finally, I develop ed a conception of radical generosity that views it as a social practice and underscores the idea of pr axis . The idea of praxis refers to human activities that transform material, social , and political conditions in historical terms. The formulation and movement of my argument relied on a historical method in this study. I have noted that we cannot be engaged in a philosophical discourse outside of the history of 143 philosophy, and that, moreover, nothing is outside of history. As such, I have emphasized the history of cosmopolitanism and the relation between the history of cosmopolitanism and the contempo rary discourse of cosmopolitanism. My method was historical in two senses : one regarding the history of concepts and the other regarding the historical context of present discussion. I have explored key historical figures and concepts in my discussio n of conditions for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. I examined conditions for the possibility of cosmopolitanism from a political and ethical perspective, assessing the soundness of these ideas. The unfolding of chapters presented the movement of my ar gument by relying on historical concepts and thinkers in the context of conditions of cosmopolitanism. Each chapter examined the thinkers who have contributed to the possibility of cosmopolitanism. My argument articulated these conditions and examined the adequacy of each approach for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. First Approach By close reading of Stoic texts and thinking through them to formulate my argument, I extracted certain ideas from the Stoics to develop my argument with regard to my under standing of cosmopolitanism and my conception of radical generosity. I acknowledged that the Stoics , because of their historical situation , did not offer a conception of cosmopolitanism in the framework of political institut ions. Part of my argument relies on a basic Stoic principle, namely, oikeiosis ) with others and the idea of care for others. These concepts suggest that , within the context of cosmopolitanism, it is the world community , which governs the formation of social relations, and the idea of caring for the wellbeing of others is crucial for the conception of this world community. These Stoic concepts 144 have provided a framework to develop my general claim wi th regard to the practice of radical Furthermore, in order to emphasize the idea of practice, drawing from the Stoics , I showed that ethical life is not some metaphysical notion of knowing this and that rule but , rather, such can be considered as part of the ethos of a cosmopolitan citizen and soci ety as a whole. I focused on the concept of practice, because of its concreteness. Later in chapter four, I elaborated on the idea of practice , specifically in relation to generosity. Moreover, practice defines human life in concrete terms. I emphasized t hat the term practice does not y that the practice of ethics is not based on some self - interested motivation, c alculation, or rule - following ; rather , the practice of ethics must be based on historical and practical reflections on openness and social relations. With regard to my discussion on the Stoics, it must be noted that by calling attention to the Stoics and ancient Greek thinkers, I did not intend to suggest that ancient Greek society was exactly like modern society of today. T here are obviously many differences between ancient Greek society and the complex modern society of today , the global social and political issues of today being far more complex than those of ancient Greek society. Nevertheless, certain aspects of the concepts and approaches that were developed by the Stoics and ancient Greek thinkers can be useful in terms of the ethical issues of today , s uch as the practice of ethics and politics as a way of life, which includes the social understanding of those practices. I suggested that this approach to ethics and politics rests on a tacit assumption that humans are social beings and th eir socia lity manifests itself in ethical and political practices in terms of living with others. 145 To underscore the importance of practical philosophical reflections , I emphasized that the practice of radical generosity challenges the familiar conventional pr ecepts of ethical practices and interrupts norms, rules, and calculation s , and offers ethical practice beyond self - interest. As such, the appropriate treatment of others must be addressed by practical philosophical reflections. Radical generosity understoo d as a social and transformative practice diverges from some accepted values and practices. The practice of radical generosity has the potential to transform social and political conditions. I suggested that it is this potential for transformation that pro vides the potential for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, to be a cosmopolitan citizen involves a practice of ethical politics , which is beyond self - interest and in the context of a more inclusive society. Second Approach I have noted that the Stoics did not envision cosmopolitanism in the framework of political institutions. Thus, to advance my argument, I t - approach (Kant and Habermas), which deals with cosmopolitanism in the framework of poli tical institutions. While I acknowledged the necessity of political institutions for the possibility of cosmopolitanism , I also raised some concerns - . In order to addr ess this, I noted that cosmopolitanism , situated in the framework of social contract theory and the idea of self - interest , is problematic. Kant equates the situation of individuals in the state of nature to the nation - states. According to t his assumption, it follows that the nation - states out of self - interest wanting peace will join a world federation. Furthermore, I have contended that there is no explicit focus on ethics , as Kant proposes a cosmopolitanism that doe s not require ethica l consideration . 146 I have suggested that Habermas , difficulty, namely, the idea of self - interest based on social contract theory. Habermas situates his vision of cosmopolitanism within current pol itical institutions , such as the UN and the EU. He proposes a world domestic politics without a world government with democratic procedures. I because it l acks motivation and explicit ethical consideration. It does not adequately consider what is required of an ethical response that would achieve a contemporary cosmopolitanism. I should participate in the discourse. Nevertheless, ethical discourses are highly implausible in everyday life, because the ideal expectations that they place on participants are enormously difficult. There is no mechanism to inspect whether participants in discourse have equal opportunities to speak freely and/or to measure how inclusive discourses are. For example, immigrants and refugees who are seeking citizenship do not have an equal position relative to the countries that are offering citizenship. This is purely on the empirical and practical level. In other words, discourse ethics is not adequate in terms of dealing with certain real life practical issues such as immigration and asylum seekers. While I have acknowledged Haber ma s iscourse of cosmopolitanism, speci fic ally the importance of political institutions for the possibility of cosmopolitanism, I have suggested that to have an adequate ethical response involves the practice of radical generosity as a transformative practice t hat has the potential to challenge and change existing values and norms and point to new norms and ways of life. This implies that political institutions consider exhibit ing radical generosity in th eir practices and policy making with respect to immigrants and refugees. 147 Third Approach - adequate ethical response concerning cosmopolitanism , I then focus ed on an appropriate conception of ethics as a key condition for t he possibility of cosmopolitanism. Thus, I turned my attention to the idea of unconditional ethical response, which is the integral part of my conception of radical generosity. x in the cosmo politan discourse; - institutions, while, on the other hand, it also necessitates an ethic of welcome and hospitality - framework. paradoxical ethical concern that is unavoidable for human beings. I suggested that this could be the opening of an ethics even when institutional (juridi cal - political) issues are unresolved. In constituted in radical generosity. Drawing from Derrida and, to some extent, Levinas, I develop ed a conception of rad ical generosity both as uncond itional welcome and hospitality and a s a social practice , t ranscending ethical subjectivity and moving into the realm of social transformation. I contended that if for Derrida and Levinas unconditional ethics impli then in concrete historical terms. 148 Furthermore, I noted that while Levinas locates politics outside of the ethical realm, Derrida insist s on ethics as the condition for politics, which opens the possibility for r ethinking the relation between ethics and politics. I a rgued that ethical issues have political implications and politics without ethical consideration could be blin d. The challenge is to politicize ethical issues toward an adequate ethical politics. I suggested t hat a cosmopolitan society implies an open and generous society that values the social capacity of radical generosity. Thus, I attempted to develop a concept ion of radical generosity as an unconditional ethical practice in the social realm that politicizes ethical concern s in the context of cosmopolitanism. This understanding of radical generosity im plies that ethical politics implies exhibit ing radical genero sity concerning immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers and , in general , all world citizens. Radical Generosity as a Transformative Praxis understanding of generosity as a good virtue, which needs to be in harmony with other virtues for cultivating an excellent character, we must focus on the transformative potential of generosity as , in contrast to Ari stotle emphasizes the transformative aspect of generosity by reevaluating existing ethical norms , challenging them , and creating new values. Throughout my discussion in this study, I emphasized that radical generosity is a social practice, which im plies that the social life is essentially practical activities in historical processes that define the ethical and political life. Therefore, the concept of praxis is crucial in order for radical generosity to become a concrete action as a social practice in order to transform social and political norms. 149 Thus, I attempted to develop a conception of radical generosity in the context of praxis . I praxis , in particular praxis as a social and transformative ac tivity that brings about social and political change. I suggested that the idea o f idea of praxis as a practical - crit ical and revolutionary activity and that radical generosity is in line with the transformative aspect s of praxis , which provides historical transformation and solidarity in social relations that in turn translates to transformation in material conditions and gives rise to new ways of life. Furthermore, I noted that Marx relies on his insights about soc ial practices to provide a historical analysis of how new historical possibilities arise through the evolution of social and in the EU suggest that new social and political movements are developing by the radical left , such as Syriza ( a coalition of the radical left) in Greece, Podemos (we can) in Spain, and Die Linke (the left) in Germany. What these radical political movements have in common is solidarity and cooperation in oppos ition to the neoliberal austerity program s based on self - interest and national interest, as well as acting to stop the xenophobic sentiments and the rise of the extreme right, such as PEDGIDA (the patriotic Europe and against the I slamization of the West) in Germany and Golden Dawn in Greece. The emergence of these radical left movements indicates that there is a reevaluation of values taking place, which is politicizing ethical issues and moving toward an ethical politics of o penness to others, in particular, with respect to immigrants and refugees. Thus, o pposing neoliberal austerity program s by embracing solidarity demonstrates a transformation in social and political norms and implies a move toward th e practice of radical generosity. If the EU is a model for the cosmopolitan project, then it would seem that anti - 150 immigrant sentiments and policies combined with the neoliberal austerity program is giving rise to the extreme right politics and diminishing the possibility of cosmopolitanism. O n the other hand, the emergence of these radical movements suggest , that the potential for the practice of radical generosity is the potential for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. The Final Re mark Finally, my position in this study has been a radical position with regard to radical generosity as a key condition for the possibility of cosmopolitanism. My argument may not be a perfect one and is certainly one that must be developing and evolving in an ongoing mode. Nevertheless, I must emphasize that my thesis has potential, and it is my contention that this mode of radical thinking is productive in its task of politicizing ethical issues and transforming social and political practices. Such a ra dical idea does not fit in the liberal mode of thinking. Furthermore, we cannot reject a theory before considering and examining its potentials and putting it into practice ; only the passage of time and historical processes will reveal whether a theory is sound or not. 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