INSTITUTIONAHSM AND toughen. ~
AN mauunv INTO THE: IMPLICATIONS.
”THE PHILOSOWY or Tubman VEpLEN'

mm For a. a...» 9f Ph; D.
, MICHIGAN 5m: UN'Ikasi'rY  
tCharlo’s Chaney Chahidlor
' 1959‘ 7- ’ "

I‘HEus

This is to certify that the
thesis entitled

INSTITUTIONALISM AND EDUCATION: AN INQUIRY INTO
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THORSTEIN
VEBLEN

presented by

CHARLES CLARENCE CHAN DLER

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph.D. degree in Foundations of Education

Major professor

Date May 1: 19 59

0-169

 

 

 

 

=.=.-_-_-.-a.-_----_-_ -._-._ . -_..' . .

INSTITUTIONALISM AND EDUCATION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE IMPLICA-
TIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOBSTEIN VEBLEN

By

CHARLES CLARENCE CHANDLER

 

 

AN ABSTRACT

Submitted to the School for Advanced Graduate Studies of
Michigan State University of Agriculture and
Applied Science in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHI

Department of Foundations of Education

1959

 

Approved:

 

  

CHARLES CLARENCE CHANDLER

   
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
   
  
  
  
   
   
   
  

ABSTRACT

This study is concerned with the educational impli-
cations of the philosophy of Thorstein Veblen. Although
Veblen was a prominent economist, his philosophy has a
significance which transcends this area of knowledge. The
power of his thought is recognized by the anthropologist,
the psychologist, the historian, the legal theorist, the
sociologist, and the philosopher. Even his critics have
acclaimed him as one of America's most profound social
analysts.

In spite of his pervasive influence Veblen's writings
have been largely neglected by the professional educator.
Such a neglect cannot be defended since Veblen addresses
himself to the very issues with which the professional edu-
cator must ultimately be concerned. In the final analysis
a theory of education presupposes a social philos0phy. An
educational philosophy necessarily reflects the aims, values,
and ideals of the culture in which it is expressed. The
value of Veblen lies precisely in this quarter. He is not
merely an economist or a sociologist or an anthropologist.
Veblen is first and foremost a social philosopher.

Although Veblen wrote specifically on the problems
of higher education, he did not develop a general theory of
education. A theory of education is implicit, however, in

his speculations on philosophy, science, psychology, technology,

  

 

CHARLES CLARENCE CHANDLER 2
and economic theory. The particular conclusions which this
thesis reaches are derived through an examination and log-
ical extension of these speculations. The large body of
literature dealing with Veblen's thought is utilized exten-
sively in this respect.

Even a cursory examination of Veblen's writings re-
veals that his social philosophy does not provide an adequate
basis for a theory of education. In particular a democratic
philosophy of education must reject the totalitarian impli-
cations of his social theory. This, however, should not
obscure the importance of his analysis. Although Veblen
failed as a reformer, he had few equals as a critic of
American culture.

Veblen is remembered as the spiritual father of In-
stitutional Economics. He urged social scientists to study
institutions in their bearing upon patterns of behavior and
cultural evolution. An institution, he believed, should
be evaluated in terms of its manifest function. Implicit
in Veblen's Institutionalism is a theory of the proper re-
lationship between the individual and the society. Since
this issue is of crucial importance for the professional
educator, it is examined in this thesis in some detail.
Because Veblen denies the sovereignty of the individual, his
position is rejected. Nevertheless, Veblen is one of the

few social scientists who has recognized the full significance

of this issue. He recognized that even a democracy can give

 

 

 

 

CHARLES CLARENCE CHANDLER 3

no assurance that the claims of both the individual and the
society can be properly fulfilled.

In spite of the inadequacies of Veblen's philosophy
he provides the professional educator with brilliant in-
sights concerning a variety of problems and issues. Veblen
is remembered not for his particular solutions but for the
questions which he raised. He believed that education should
stimulate the instinctive curiosity of men. His writings
reveal the efficacy of this drive. Few social philosophers
have speculated on such a wide range of important issues.

Few men have had a more active "idle curiosity" than Thor-

stein Bunde Veblen.

 

 

INSTITUTIONALISM AND EDUCATION: AN INQUIRY INTO THE IMPLICA-

TIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THORSTEIN VEBLEN

By

CHARLES CLARENCE CHANDLER

A THESIS

Submitted to the School for Advanced Graduate Studies of
Michigan State University of Agriculture and
Applied Science in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Foundations of Education

1959

 

    

    

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This brief acknowledgment cannot adequately express
my gratitude to those who have made this study possible.
I am especially indebted to my doctoral advisor, Dr. Carl
H. Gross, who has given so freely of himself in directing
this thesis and who has been a constant source of inspira-
tion during the period of my graduate studies at Michigan
State University. I am also grateful to the other members
of my committee: Dr. Milosh Muntyan, Dr. John A. Fuzak
and particularly to Dr. John F. A. Taylor of the Department
of Philosophy who has given so unselfishly of his time and
whose critical insights and suggestions have been invaluable.
I also want to express my appreciation to Dr. Lloyd P.
Williams and Dr. H. Gordon Hayes, both formerly of the Ohio
State University, who inspired me to study Veblenism and
Institutional Economics. Finally, this thesis would not
have been possible without the encouragement and assistance
of my wife, Kathleen, with whom I have so often discussed

these matters.

CHAPTER

I.

II.

III.

IV.

V.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 0 o o a o o I 0 o o o t O o C o o

The Problem . . . . . . .
Content and Method of the Study . . . . . .

THORSTEIN BUNDE VEBLEN: THE MAN NOBODY KNEW .

A

THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF THORSTEIN VEBLEN

EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY

The Graduate Student . . . . . . . .
Veblen in Chicago . . . . . . . . .
Veblen at Palo Alto .

"In a Rotten Stump Called Missouri"
The Journalist . . . .
The New School for Social Research .
A self-portrait o o o n o o o o o o

D O O 0 O O D
O O 0 O O O O
o o a o C I o
a o a o I O o

SYNOPSIS OF THE MAJOR WRITINGS OF THORSTEIN
VEBLEN C O O 0 0 o o o o o I o o O o o o o o

From Philosophy to Economics . . . . . . . .
Veblen and Socialism . . . . . . . . .
The Economic Theorist: The Great Trilogy . .

Industry vs. Business . . . . . . . . . .
Keeping Up with the Joneses . . . . . . .
The Instinct of Workmanship . . . . . . .

The Reformer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Propagandist . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Critique of Orthodox Economics . . .
The Psychology of Orthodox Economics
An Evolutionary Economics . . . . .
Institutional Economics . . . . . .
Veblen's Theory of Human Nature . .
Veblen's Theory of Institutions . .
Veblen's Theory of Cultural Change .
Veblen's Theory of Value . . . . . .
Veblen and Dewey . . . . . . . . . .

o o O O o o O o O
t I o o a D o o o
O I I O C O O C O
a O o a o o o C o

O
’13

THORSTEIN VEBLEN 0 O O O O I O I 0 0 O C

The Locus of Educational Authority
The School and Society . . . . .
Education and the Individual . . .
The Idle Curiosity . . . . . . . .

o o o o
0 o o O
o o o a
D O O O
O O O O

111

I O D O O I 0

D a 0 0 O o O o o

 

PAGE

183
19“

212
223

 

 

I CHAPTER PAGE

Education and Institutionalism . . . . . . . . 229
Veblenism and Consumer Sovereignty . . . . . . 2&0

VI. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . 245

Strengths of Veblen's Philosophy . . . . . . . 2U6
Strengths of Veblen' 8 Philosophy for Education 249
Weaknesses of Veblen' s Philiscphy . 251
Weaknesses of Veblen's Philosophy for. Education 25h
The Value of Veblenis.n . . . . . . . . . . . . 25?

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

 

 

 

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Lewis Mumford, the distinguished American scholar,
writes that the great need today is for the "organic" person.
He continues:

The ideal personality for the opening age is a
balanced personality: not the specialist but the

whole man. Such a personality must be in dynamic
interaction with every part of his environment and

namely, life itself. His education, his discipline,
his daily routine must tend toward this wholeness.l

Since the Golden Age of Greece, this concept of the "organic”
Person has remained one of the abiding ideals of Western
civilization. There have been many detours and disappoint-
ments throughout the centuries, but the ideal has continued
t0 be reasserted by philosophers, social scientists, and
educators. Our present domocratic society rests its survival
upon the faith that this ideal can be attained by the mass
0f men.

Historically, the majority of mankind has not had
the Opportunity to achieve the ideal of a "balanced"

\.
lLewis Mumford, WM (Harcourt,

Brace: New York, 19414). P- 419'
1

 

 

 

personality. The ideal was first generated in societies
built upon the foundation of slavery. Aristotle, for ex-
ample, did not address his humanistic philosophy to the
slaves of the Greek society. Even in those societies which
abolished slavery the attainment of an integrated view

of life was appropriate only for the dominant classes. This
condition is reflected in the history of education. Edu-
cation for the masses was oriented typically to teaching
for literacy, whereas a relatively small minority received
a liberal education in a separate system of schools.

In the United States there was a distinct tendency
to imitate Old World ways in the implementation of mass
education. Teaching for literacy was emphasized. It was
of course recognized that education was something more than
a psychological process, but nevertheless the social function
of education was inchoate. Doubtlessly, the individualism
of early American life reinforced the reluctance of educa-
tors to develop an adequate theory of the relationship of
the school to the society. It was believed that the social
function of education in a democracy would be fulfilled by
other agencies in the community. In any case, it was not
the responsibility of the school to elicit from the in-
dividual the fully developed capacities of the citizen.

By the second decade of the twentieth century this
deficiency of American education was becoming increasingly

It was becoming evident that the liberalizing

evident.

 

 

 

 

 

3

function of education could no longer be considered a privi-

lege of a dominant class. Democracy, it was seen, assumed
that every citizen must be capable of forming independent
judgments based upon an understanding of the social, economic,
and political forces of the culture. The citizen in a demo-
cratic society has both the right and the responsibility to
participate in the formulation of the values under which he
and his fellow citizens must live. No longer could educators
assume that the social function of education was adequately
fulfilled by agencies other than the school. No longer

could education neglect its societal responsibilities.

John Dewey was a pioneer among those reformers who
attacked the divorce of the school from the social order.
Writing in 1922 Dewey stated in unequivocal terms:

If the average boy and girl could be walled off
from all ideas and information about social affairs
save those sequired in school, they would enter
upon the responsibilities of social membership in
complete ignorance that there are any social prob-
lems, any political evils, any industrial defects.
They would go forth with a supreme confidence that
the way lies open to all, and that the sole cause
of failure . . . lies in some personal deficiency
in character. The school is even more indurated
from a frank acknowledgement of social ills than
the pulpit--which is saying a good deal. And like
the pulpit it compensates for its avoidance of dis-

cussion of social difficultieg by a sentimental
dwelling upon personal vices.

In spite of Dewey's indictment education has continued

 

2John Dewey, "Education as Politics," -
nfihlig, vol. XXXII, No. #09 (October h, 1922), p. luo,

 

 

 

to be criticized for its failure to develop an adequate
social philosophy. Thus, Edwards and Richey write: "The
fruits of education in the United States have been largely
private and personal rather than public and social. . .
We have had in mind primarily the education of the com-
petent individual rather than the effective citizen."3 We
have been too exclusively concerned with individual de-
velopment, individual differences, and individual experience.

The professional educator in America today is dan-

gerously near being like an astronomer who trains

his telescope on a single planet with no great aware-

ness that it is a part of a solar system; he is so

preoccupied with the individual learner that he

tends to lose sight of the socialaorder of which

the learner is an essential part.

If it is granted that there is an element of truth
in these assertions, then there follow some definite impli-
cations for education. This is especially true in respect
to teacher training programs. The extent to which education
will develop a more adequate social purpose depends in large
part upon the professional training provided for prospec-
tive teachers. Social engineering must begin at this level.
We are not unmindful of the progress which has been

made since Dewey and others made their indictment. Even

8°"PSOPY examination of Harold Rugg's Ih§_2eachen_2£

Imfiafilfi indicates that professional educators are becoming

\

3Newto
n Edwards and Herman G. Richey, Ibe_§chggl_in
WW“ (Houghton: Boston, 191m, 13. 858.
a

M. , pp. 859-860.

 

 

 

 

increasingly concerned with the content and scope of the

so-called ”foundation” fields in professional training.
Progress has been especially rapid since 1920. According
to Rugg, there was no course in Social Foundations "worthy
of the name” before 1920. The courses in the Philosophical
Foundations were encyclopedic while the typical courses in
the Historical Foundations were "straight, slow-moving,
chronological accounts."5

Since the 1920's Foundations of Education programs
have mushroomed. The reciprocal relationship of the school
and the society has been increasingly emphasized in studies
of the philosophical, social, and historical foundations of
education. Student teaching programs have similarly stressed
the study of the community as an integral part of the train-
ing program. Prospective teachers frequently live in off-
campus communities during the period of their apprentice
teaching where they can more fully appreciate the impact
of the school on the community and of the community on the
school.

Although the groundwork has been laid, progress con-
tinues to be painstakingly slow. We still have not answered
Dewey's challenge of 1922. Our teachers are still pre-

occupied with a school environment consisting of "desks,

_——————

5 Harold Russ. W (Harper: New
York, 1952), p. 52.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

6
blackboards, and a small school yard."6 We are still overly
concerned with the minutiae and trivia in education. Why
haven't we developed a more adequate theory of society and
culture? Why can't we get "society into the school and the
school into the society?"7

W

This study grows out of the preceding discussion. It
is assumed in this thesis that the teacher of tomorrow will
need to be much more closely acquainted with his culture
than his colleague of today. He will need to understand
those political, economic, and social forces which are so
rapidly transforming our society. The extent to which the
teacher of tomorrow gains this competence depends upon the
teacher education programs of today.

It is further assumed that the major deficiency in
present teacher education programs is the failure to inte-
grate professional training with the knowledge acquired by
philosophers, psychologists, and social scientists during
the past fifty years. The divorce between professional edu-
cation and social philosophy is akin to the divorce between

the school and the community.

w
6John Dewey. W (Macmillan:
New York, 1938). p. 3 .

7Bugg. mun p. 170-

 

 

 

 

 

 

7

The implication for teacher education is evident. We
must reach out into the social sciences and philosophy and
gather the many insights which students of these areas have
acquired. We are, of course, already familiar with many of
these men and their writings. Some however, have been
largely neglected. Conspicuous among this latter group is
the name of Thorstein Bunde Veblen whose writings are the
particular concern of this thesis.

In the light of the foregoing discussion the writings
of Thorstein Veblen seem especially appropriate as the sub-
Ject of our inquiry. Here is a man who has had a tremendous
impact not only in his own field of economics but in nearly
all of the fields of the social sciences as well. Veblen,
who has been called the "last man who knew everything," is
the father of Institutional Economics and a pioneer in the
development of social psychology. He even took time to
write a highly controversial book on education entitled The
fl1£hfi£_L§fl£DlE£.lfl-Afl£li£flt although this work is almost
unknown among professional educators. Here perhaps is a
man who can contribute insights and understandings in the
development of a more satisfactory teacher education program.

But there are other important reasons for selecting
the writings of Thorstein Veblen. In the first place, his
writings have a timeless quality about them. His attack

on orthodox economics and his penetrating analysis of the

cultural incidence of economic forces are lasting contributions.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

As Eric Roll has stated:

To-day the power of his thought is widely admitted,
and his influence is sometimes acknowledged in the
most unexpected quarters. Indeed, what most forci-
bly strikes anyone approaching the study of Veblen
is the virtually unanimous chorus of admiration
which his work now evokes, and the surprisingly
large measure of approval which is joined to it.8
The contributions which Veblen can make to professional
education are not restricted by the particular period in
which he wrote. Veblen, more than most men, was able to
transcend the cultural milieu of his own time.

Secondly, Veblen is among those rare individuals who
refused to be blinded by the preconceptions of his own field.
When he had a problem under investigation, he roamed far
and wide in the sacred provinces of knowledge looking for
relevant material and refusing to respect those partitions
of knowledge which were established and sanctified by in-
tellectual chauvinism and a decadent tradition. He was
chastised and punished for this impudent conduct, but he
appears to have remained unperturbed even when his colleagues
suggested that he was really not an economist at all. Veblen
was one of the initiators in the movement toward the unifi-
cation of the social sciences. This is one of the features

of his social philosophy which makes his writings especially

significant for the student of education, for Veblen's

 

8121-10 Boll. W. rev. ed..
(Prentice-Hall: New York, 19u2), p. u39.

 

 

 

 

 

9

problem is our problem. Education is inescapably integrative

in its function. As Lewis S. Feuer has recently written:
"A philosophy of education is an applied social philosophy.
. . ."9 As an applied social philosophy, education must be
concerned with the integration of the various areas of
knowledge.

Finally, one of the most distinguished American edu-
cators, Harold Bugg, has acknowledged his indebtedness to
Veblen and has written at length on certain features of his
work. He has acclaimed Veblen as one of the four great
“seminal minds that stated the American philosophy and psy-
chology of experience."10 For a man whose works are not
well known among professional educators, this is giving
Veblen unusual prominence. Unfortunately, Professor Rugg
does not give us the kind of documentation which would sub-
stantiate his high regard for Veblen's contributions. He
makes no detailed analysis of either Veblen's philosophy
or social psychology. It is anomalous that no educator to
our knowledge has followed Rugg's lead. No one has devel-
oped the implications for education of Veblen's philosophy
through a detailed study of his writings. That such a

study is needed seems evident.

 

9Lewis S. Feuer, "The Aims of a Philosophy of Edu-
cation." Harssrd.£dunaiinnsl_Bsiiss. vol. XXVI. No. 2 (Spring,
1956), p. 112.

1°Haroid o. Rugg,
(World Book: Yonkers, 1947), p. 26h.

 

 

 

10

These then are the reasons for selecting the writings
of Thorstein Veblen as the subject matter of this thesis.
It is hoped that an analysis of his social philosophy will
contribute to a more insightful understanding of the culture
with which the school is organically related. It is hoped
that this study will assist in some small way to relate
education more effectively to the social sciences, thereby
furnishing the professional educator with whatever insights
his colleagues in the various disciplines may have to offer.
Ultimately, of course, it is hoped that this kind of study
will lead to the preparation of teachers who are students
0f the culture. Let it not be said of the teacher of
tomorrow that he has "too much psychology, and not enough
anthropology, or history, or sociology in his educational

doctrine."11

WW

”If Veblen is better understood as a person, his
p°1nt of view becomes clearer and the theories that stem
fPOm it are rendered more intelligible."12 Since the
cultUral environment is often an important determinant in
the intellectual development of a scholar, we are necessarily

\—

(P 11Joseph K. Hart. WWW
‘a’Per: New York, 1951). P- 55-

Afr 12Bernard Rosenberg, (Public
a11‘s: Washington D.C., 1956 , p. l.

 

 

 

concerned with the life of Thorstein Veblen. We are for-

tunate in this respect to have the definitive biographical
work of Professor Dorfman, WWW-l3
Veblen, who seldom referred to himself in either his writings
or his conversation, has in addition given us insight into
his characteristic animus in one of his brief essays.
Between 1884 and 1927 Thorstein Veblen contributed
more than one-hundred and thirty articles to journals. Over
forty of these were in the nature of reviews while the re-
mainder included a range of topics from ”The Mutation Theory
and the Blond Race" to the "Price of Wheat Since 1867."
During this same period he wrote nine books, completed two
EmSlish translations of important German studies, and trans-
lated and published an Icelandic saga},4 Except for some
01‘ his reviews, we have read, scanned, or are otherwise
familiar with all of Veblen's writings. Many of his con-
tI'lbutions to journals appear later in his books in only
8118ht1y altered form. Most of his other important articles
hWe been made readily available in works edited by his
disciples.
\w

( 13Joseph Dorfman. WW
Viking: New York, 1934).

1“A comprehensive bibliography of Veblen's writings
:3 111cluded in
° Douglas F. Dowd (Cornell University: Ithaca, 1958),
pp. 319-3260

 

 

 

In presenting a brief synopsis of Veblen's major

Writings we have three objectives in mind. In the first
place, it will give the reader an appreciation of the in-
tellectual growth and development of Veblen as this is
evidenced in his writings. For this reason these writings
are discussed in more or less chronological order.

Secondly, a synopsis of Veblen's writings will pro-
vide an overall view of the Veblenian outlook. It will be
seen that Veblen belongs to that movement in social sciences
which Professor Morton White has called "cultural organicism,"
"the attempt to find explanations and relevant material in
social sciences other than the one which is primarily under
investigation."15 The synopsis of Veblen's writings will
not attempt to present the mature Veblenian philosophy. In-
stead, the objective will be to indicate as directly as
Possible the major themes in his writings. Such a presenta-
t1°n seems especially advisable in the case of Veblen. It
was his technique to expound a basic theme and then to obscure
its simplicity with almost endless ramifications, repiti-
t1one, and speculativeexcursionsinto the esoteric provinces
°f knowledge. It is not unusual to find that his basic
ideas are best expressed in footnotes and afterthoughts.

A final purpose of a synopsis of Veblen's writings

v

15Morton White. W
W (Beacon: Boston. 1957). p. 12-

 

 

 

 

13
is to indicate the nature and content of his most important
and best known works. In particular, we shall give specific
consideration to his most popular work, Ih§_2h§9zy_9{_§hg
L§1§E££_Qlfl§fi. if only to give the reader an appreciation
of Veblen's unusual style and vocabulary.

Since education is a form of applied philosophy, we
are concerned with the Veblenian outlook as an integrated
and comprehensive system of social theory. Specifically,
we need to look closely at the philosophical assumptions
upon which his social theory apparently rests. We shall,
in addition, attempt to piece together the logic by which
Veblen arrives at his conclusions. We shall also be inter-
ested in the empirical evidence with which these conclusions
are verified. Finally, we shall examine the conclusions
themselves in respect to their cultural bearing.

In developing his social philosophy we shall rely
extensively on Veblen's many critics and interpreters. Un-
fortunately, many of these interpretations reach almost
diametrically opposed conclusions. One student, for example,
writes that "when his system is considered as a whole, and
its implications weighed, it is evident that, probably more
than any other prominent modern, Veblen has fallen into a

labyrinth of fundamental errors and muddled confusion."16

 

16Arthur Kent Davis, V ‘
PD. nus—uu9. Unpublished doctor's dissertation, Harvard
University. 19hl.

 

 

 

14

Max Lerner, on the other hand, states that the years since
Veblen's death have ”strengthened the conviction that Veblen
is the most creative mind American social thought has pro-
duced."17 Later in the same assay Lerner continues: 'Veblen‘s
system of thought is far-reaching in its scope, deep in its
probings, powerful in the degree to which its parts inter-
lock and its ends meet."18

In light of these contradictory interpretations some
independent judgment must be exercised in pulling together
and evaluating the component parts of Veblen's philosophy.
Those elements of his social thought which seem to have
particular significance for the educator will be emphasized.
This of course is the ultimate concern of our study. This
does not mean, however, that all other elements of Veblen's
philosophy will be excluded. We intend to present an
analysis complete enough to allow the reader to draw his
own implications for education.

Veblen's system of thought "has as much interest for
the educator as for the economist, for the artist as for
the revolutionist, for the legal theorist as for the political,
for the psychologist and anthropologist as for the historian
of ideas."19 In this quotation we are especially interested

—__——-——--———

17Max Lerner. ed.. Wan (Viking: New
York, 1948), p. 2.

18M” p. 29.
19111:.

!

 

 

 

 

 

15

in the inclusion of the educator. But Lerner's statement is

something to be demonstrated rather than asserted. This
"interest for the educator" is the ultimate concern of this
study. Veblen's writings on education are largely limited
to a chapter in The Ihggny 9f the Leisgne glass and a study
entitled Wins.“ In both of these
instances his primary concern is with college and university
education, although some of this material is highly relevant
to the general question of education. In addition to Veblen's
direct references to education, Dorfman's biography is
helpful in that it sheds light on Veblen as a pedagogue.
Most of our conclusions, however, must be reached by way
of implication. Through logical extension we shall attempt
to show the relevance of his social philosophy to an under-
standing of the educative process. This is a procedure
fraught with peril. It is a technique of which Veblen,
with his deep-seated antipathy toward deductive logic, would
perhaps not approve.

It is not the purpose of this study to determine
what Veblen would have said in fact about education. This
we can never know, and, while interesting, it is largely an
academic question. We are concerned with what he ought to

haVe said by way of implication. But even in this respect

W

20Some important material is also found in Tn§_2h§gnl
, Chapter X.

 

 

 

16

there is a caution to be observed. The determination of
what he ought to have said can also become an academic ques-
tion. We are concerned with this question only in so far
as it helps us gain a better appreciation of Veblen's sig-
nificance for education. It is entirely possible that what
Veblen ought to have said is sheer foolishness. This would
not imply, however, that his value to the educator is nil.
What significance, if any, do the writings of
Thorstein Veblen have for the professional educator? Should
the prospective teacher be acquainted with the Veblenian
or institutional approach to social and educational problems?
Is Ihg_High§z_L§anning_in_Amgriga a significant contribution
to educational literature? Can an adequate educational

theory be developed from Veblen's social philosophy? These

are among the questions which will occupy us in this study.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER II

THORSTEIN BUNDE VEBLEN: THE MAN NOBODY KNEW

And, unpleasant as it may be to admit it, it is at
last becoming evident that the enormous increase
in productive power which has marked the present
century . . . has no tendency to extirpate poverty
or to lighten the burdens of those compelled to
toil. It simply widens the gulf between Dives and
Lazarus, and makes the struggle for existence more
intense. The march of invention has clothed man-
kind with powers of which a century ago the bold—
est imagination could not have dreamed. But in
factories where labor-saving machinery has reached
its most wonderful development, little children
are at work. . .; amid the greatest accumulations
of wealth, men die of starvation. . . . The promised
land flies before us like the mirage.

Henry George penned these lines in 1879, six years after
the financial failure of Jay Cooke and Company. The panic
of 1873 not only ushered in a serious economic depression
but ended an unparalleled period of optimism.

In the years after the Civil War a wave of frenzied
economic activity swept the nation. Surely, men said, the
”promised land" must be drawing near. "Americans had always
believed their country the land of opportunity; the people

of the North had never been surer, never raised their sights

W.

lHenry George. W (Modern Library:

New York, n.d.), p. 8.

1?

 

_.-_———. ..

 

18

higher, than in the whirligig years of the late Sixties."2
The boom was fed by fabulous resources, men with faith in
the future, and by a rapidly expanding market.

Whereas the completion of the first intercontinental
railroad in 1869 was the symbol of the post-war economic
progress, George's Ezgg:ess_and_2g1gn§y became the symbol
of the unrest and discontent of the middle and late Seventies.
The nation had experienced economic hardship before. In-
dustrial stagnation, unemployment, and financial crises
were commonplace in the country's economic history. How—
ever, always before the nation had been primarily agricul-
tural. The depression of the Seventies was the first which
the new industrialism had experienced. It was difficult,
indeed impossible, for the hundreds of thousands of people
living in the slums of the great Eastern cities to move
West. The frontier seemed remote to these suffering masses.

The West, moreover, was having its own problems.

The Civil War, technological progress, and new land had
stimulated agricultural production. Following the Panic

of 1873 this increased production resulted in an oversupply
on the market. Agricultural prices fell precipitously.
Unrest and discontent became widespread as the depression

continued into the Eighties.

 

2Eric Goldman,

H
1956), p0 be

H D ' i r
m, rev. ed., (Vintage: New York,

 

 

 

19

These depression years were especially severe for
the Scandanavian farmers of Minnesota and Wisconsin. Know-
ing little English and heavily in debt for their recently
acquired land, they were frequently exploited by the com-
mercial interests of the surrounding towns. It seemed to
these Norseman that the real causes of their economic hard-
ship were the excessive charges made by banks, railroads,
and millers. They paid high prices for goods produced in
industries protected by high tariffs and received low prices
for their farm produce. The Scandanavian farmers had little
choice but to accept the rates dictated by the railroads
and millers.

Thorstein Veblen was born in 1857 on the Wisconsin
frontier. His family were Norwegian immigrants who belonged
to one of the many culturally isolated communities of the
region. When Thorstein was still a lad, the family moved
to a similar frontier settlement in Minnesota. These Nor-
wegian farmers were unusually self-sufficient. Their con-
tacts with the outside world were limited, especially their
contacts with the "Yankees" of the surrounding villages.

The New Englanders, who controlled these towns, considered
their immigrant neighbors as inferior to themselves. They
called the Norsamen "Scandahoofians" or ”Norwegian Indians.”

"In consequence the cultural isolation of the Norwegians

was intensified to an extent never surpassed in any large

 

 

 

20
immigrant group in this country."3

The Veblens were among the most proficient farmers
of the settlement. Intellectually active, they made numerous
innovations on their two hundred and ninety acre farm. They
were always prompt in utilizing the latest farm machinery.
Although they employed a tutor to instruct their twelve
children in Norwegian grammar and literature, the family was
not inclined to involve itself in the Norwegian chauvinism
of the region. The parochial school movement did not enlist
their enthusiastic support. Actually, the public schools
were often parochial in their educational policies. It
was not unusual to find Norwegian spoken in the classroom.
This is explained in part by the fact that children (in-
cluding the Veblen children) knew little if any English
when they enrolled in the district school.

Thorstein, who had five older brothers and sisters,
appears to have been his mother's favorite. She was "warmly
and electrically religious" and was a leader among the women
of the community. Thorstein regarded his father as cold
and distant, although he had a high regard for his father's
intellectual acuity. In later years he remarked that he
had never met his father's intellectual equal. Veblen, it
would seem, was never able to synthesize these two divergent

temperaments in the development of his own personality.

w—

3Dorrman. mix... p. 7.

 

 

 

21

Thorstein Veblen was not a popular young man. He
was regarded as odd and somewhat indolent. He did not always
respect the elders of the settlement and made the most of
his wit and sarcasm when ridiculing them. He was generally
regarded as brilliant but conceited. His natural aloofness
did not allow him to make friends easily, although he seems
throughout his life to have desired social intercourse. He
spent much of his time reading and enjoyed debating religious
questions with his father and other members of the community.
The evidence indicates that Veblen had a basic contrariness
in his personality makeup.

"The father's deepest ambition was to give the chil-
dren an education instead of exploiting them as was the
customary practice in all pioneering settlements."u In
18?“ the seventeen year old Thorstein was enrolled in the
academy attached to Carleton College. The elder Veblen was
criticized for sending Thorstein and the other children
to an ”American" school. The Veblens, however, disliked the
intense religious bias of such “Norwegian“ schools as St.
Olaf and Luther College. Although the Veblen's were rela-

tively prosperous, sending the children to college was a

_——————.—

"Mu p. 13. The elder Veblen was eminently
successful in realizing this ambition. All of the twelve
children received education at the secondary and college
levels. Andrew Veblen became a successful university pro-
fessor, and his son, Oswald, is one of the nation's most
brilliant mathematicians. Lev E. Dobriansky, ,
LJEI_§£1£lgn§ (Public Affairs: Washington D.C., 1957), p. 6.

 

 

 

22

serious economic burden during the depression years of the
Seventies. To lessen the expense, living quarters were
built near the campus by Thorstein's father who was a master
carpenter. Food was shipped from the farm to Carleton, and
the boys were permitted few luxuries.

Carleton College was "thoroughly Christian, and dis-
tinctly and earnestly evangelical.”5 It was a typical
Congregational school of the New England type. Student life
was closely regulated, church attendance being one of the
strict requirements. The faculty was dominated by Cengre-
gationalists; the curriculum emphasized religion, moral
philosophy, and the classics. Although many regarded
Thorstein as a brilliant student, he remained the iconoclast.
Some regarded him as an agnostic, others a complete cynic.

"He liked to corner some very religious student and
harangue him, sometimes for hours, on such questions as
the advisability of a club for the promotion of suicide."6
Thorstein gratified his sardonic sense of humor by nicknaming
his fellow students as well as members of the college staff.
These nicknames usually remained with the individuals for
years. Thus the strict dean of women became known as "Mater
Dolorosa.” Such conduct did not endear him to the faculty:

One member of the staff did recognize and cultivate the

 

5D0rfman, Mo, p. 17.
6M” p. 30.

 

 

 

23

intellectual potential of the young Veblen. He was John
Bates Clark who was to become a prominent economic theorist.
He was the first of a number of "traditional" economists who
were to influence Veblen's intellectual development. The
feeling of respect seems to have been mutual.

Although Veblen was not a sociable individual, he
was well-known through his public orations and term papers.
They were apparently prepared with full knowledge of the
reactions which they would induce among students and faculty.
Even their titles reflect a most unusual personality. Dur-
ing his stay at Carleton he wrote or delivered orations on
”A Plea for Cannibalism," "An Apology for a Toper," "The
Science of Laughter," ”The Face of a Worn-out Politician,"
“Noses,“ and "Mills Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy

of the Conditioned."7

Tha_firadnaisn§indeni

After teaching mathematics for one year at Monona

Academy in Wisconsin, Thorstein Veblen and his brother,

 

7LQQ‘_QL£., pp. 31-32, 35. The paper on Mill was
apparently motivated by the criticisms which his earlier
papers and orations had received. It was being said that
Veblen was clever but lacking in profundity. This oration
seems to have quieted the opposition. It was an unnecessar-
ily long and erudite paper delivered in a low, monotone
voice. The audience was stunned and completely bored at
the end of the performance. Although few understood what
he had said, all agreed that it was a ”profound" paper.

 

 

2’4

  

Andrew, enrolled in the recently established graduate school,

Johns Hopkins. During his stay of less than one year he

studied philosophy under George S. Morris, the well-known

idealist. He attended lectures by Charles S. Peirce and

enrolled in an economics course conducted by Richard T.

Ely. Although he found the course in economics unsatis-

factory, he seems to have been influenced by both Peirce

and Morris. But Veblen was unhappy at Johns Hopkins. He
felt that the circulars advertising the school had been mis-

leading, and he failed to obtain much needed financial

assistance from the University. Without completing the year

Veblen transferred to Kale. At least he was now free from

the supervision of his older brother, Andrew, who was study-
ing mathematics at Johns Hopkins.

After two and one-half years of graduate study at
Yale . Veblen completed a doctorate degree in philosophy.
He was fortunate in having two outstanding teachers during
thls period. He studied philosophy under the Common-sense
R(gal-let, President Noah Porter. His work in economics was
directed by the Spencerian, William Graham Sumner. Although
these two men were basically defenders of the W in
their social theories, 8 great controversy raged between
the“) concerning evolution. Porter attacked Sumner for
teaching the evolutionary theories of Herbert Spencer which

seemed to undermine certain religious doctrines held by the

rel 1glous realists .

 

 

 

25

  

William Graham Sumner was perhaps the leading spokes-

man for Social Darwinism in the United States. What do

social classes owe to each other? Nothing, replied Sumner.

Society owes no one a living; charity corrupts and prevents
the survival of the fittest. Sumner continues:

Now, we can never annihilate a penalty. We can
only divert it from the head of the man who has
incurred it to the heads of other who have not
incurred it. A vast amount of "social reform"
consists in just this operation. The consequence
is that those who have gone astray, being relieved
from Nature's fierce discipline, go on to worse,
and that there is a constantly heavier burden for

the others to bear.

The "forgotten men" of our civilization are not the poor but

In the hands of Sumner, Social Darwinism

"To

rather the wealthy.
became an apology for the existing economic order.
Some of them the Darwinian struggle for existence seemed to
pr°V1de a new sanction for economic competition, and the
BU‘15"71.val of the fittest a new argument in opposition to
state aid for the weak."9 Although the doctrine of evolution
becalne a cornerstone in Veblen's social philosophy, he used
it to support an entirely opposite point of view. In spite
of this fundamental difference in point of view, there is
much in Veblen's philosophy which suggests the influence of

\m

William Graham Sumner

FEW (Harper: New York, 1883), p. 131.

9Bichard Hofstadter. WW
Ga quoted in Alfred Kazin,_QxLNat_11§_Qrgmd§ (Doubleday:
x‘Clen City, 1956), p. 100.

 

 

 

26

Sumner. In his mum, Sumner emphasizes the directive

force of the customs of the society. "It results that all

the life of human beings, in all ages and stages of culture,

is primarily controlled by a vast mass of folkways handed

down from the earliest existence of the race. . . ."10 This

became one of the abiding themes in the Veblenian philos-
ophy.
Under President Porter, his doctoral advisor, Veblen

learned to appreciate elements of the Common-sense and

Kantian philosophies. He accepted the Common-sense emphasis

upon inductive reasoning. He adopted its empiricism but
rejected its dualism between mind and matter, body and soul.
These realists in general accepted the prevailing religious

sentiment of their day. President Porter, a pious man, must
haVe found the skeptical Veblen a perplexing personality.
NeVertheless, Veblen was called "Porter's chum", and the
“'0 were frequently seen strolling together on the Yale
Campus.

While at Yale, Veblen published his first article,

an analysis of Kant's W. He had first
becOme interested in the great German philosopher during
his course work under George S. Morris at Johns Hopkins.
German philosophy continued to be his major interest at Yale,

\______...

l("William Graham Sumner, , quoted in x:

1111191315 athias
W, ed. Oliver A. Johnson (Dryden: New York, 1958)
P. 14.60-

 

 

2?

although his interpretation of Kant suggests the influence
of Peirce as well as the common-sense philosophy.11

Having completed his degree in 188A, Veblen sought a
His scholarship was out-

teaching position in philosophy.

standing, and his recommendations were excellent. President

Porter, for example, wrote:

It is with great pleasure that I certify that Mr.
Thorstein Veblen, B.A., Carleton College, 1880,
Ph.D., Yale College, 188h, has been a student in
the Graduate Department in this college for 2 l/2
years and for the most of the time under my immedi-
ate instruction. He has prosecuted special studies
in Political and Social Science, and in Speculative
Philosophy, ethics, psychology, etc. I can give
confident testimony to his faithfulness and theo-
retical ability which he has evinced in all his
studies. I have in all my experience had few pupils
with whom I have had greater satisfaction or who
have made more rapid or more satisfactory progress.
lie is also an excellent scholar in German and other
languages. I can confidently recommend him as a
‘very accomplished scholar and a very able man who
<>ught not to fail to occupy a commanding position
111 some higher seminary of learning.

His efforts were to no avail as Veblen was repeatedly
h1r73¢3<3 down. Veblen was never a good salesman, seldom leav-
ing a good first impression. His speech was barely audible;
his ‘Icacabulary and syntax were awkward; his dress was pro-
V1n<>dleal; and he lacked confidence in his own abilities.

Dorrman's comment is probably more to the point, however.

\fl—

11Stanley Mathew Daugert,

laugh. (King's: New York, 1950), pp. 5-25.

12
Dorfman. 9.91.91}... 19- 51+.

 

 

 

28

"No faculty wanted a 'Norskie', particularly one suspected
of agnostic leanings."13 Fifteen years after receiving his
degree Veblen described David Hume as a man who

was not gifted with a facile acceptance of the group

inheritance that made the habit of mind of his gen-

eration. Indeed, he was gifted with an alert, though

somewhat histrionic, ske ticism touching everything

that was well received.1£
This passage characterizes Veblen as well as Hume. In 188u
there was no place for a skeptic on the theologically domi-
nated faculties of philosophy. Veblen returned home a very
disillusioned young man.

For the next seven years (188h-1891) Veblen was un-
employed, defending his idleness on grounds of ill-health.
Although he continued to seek a position, his lack of
aggressiveness irritated his friends and family. It appeared
to them that he was satisfied to be dependent upon others.
It is unfortunate that so little is known concerning his
activities during these years. It is known that he read
Widely, especially in the social sciences. He nurtured his
interest in botany and continued to study foreign languages.
FOF a short time he seriously considered ph1101°8Y as the

field in which he would continue his advanced studies. but
I

he "as not proficient enough in the classical languages.

\__
13M” p. 55.

In
T f
horste1n Veblen: Huebsoh= New York, 1919 ,
P 96,

 

 

29

In 1888 he married his college sweetheart, Ellen

Rolfe, who was the niece of President Strong of Carleton
College. In many respects this was a strange match. Ellen
was from one of the distinguished families of the Midwest,

a family with extensive and powerful business interests. It
was the kind of family against which Veblen would rail in
his later writings. Still, the two had much in common.
Neither was popular among classmates, both being solitaries.
Both had literary talents, especially Ellen. Both had many

and diverse intellectual interests. Ellen was described by

classmates as a remarkable woman who was the most intellec-
tual of her class.15

 

Veblen apparently admired Ellen's many tenderhearted,
even maudlin, qualities; but he could never rationally ac-
cept them as a way of life. She was the romanticist, the
sentamentalist, the one could believe in a cause. Although
the match was not sanctioned by either family, they were
happy during their first years of marriage. Living in
StaceWills, Iowa, they shared their mutual interests.
Together they read Edward Bellamy's W9 an
experience which Ellen described as the "turning point in
our 11VeS-"16 In this utopian novel Bellamy pictured a
h18h1y centralized econOmy governed by the principle or
\_

15Dorf‘man, gp‘_gip., p. 3“.

16
: M.» p- 68°

 

 

3o
cooperation. Technological efficiency would be encouraged.
In this utopia there would be no social, political, or
economic inequalities. The state owned all of the means
of production and distribution. Bellamy endorsed the
machine process and believed that through state ownership
the machine could provide all of the economic needs of men.
Within a few years WW had sold over 500,000
OOpies, and Bellamy became a leading figure in the Nation-
alist movement. Bellamy's emphasis upon cooperation and
technological efficiency are ideas endorsed by Veblen.

In 1891 the Veblen family council decided that Thor-
stein should make something of his life. Andrew, who was
then on the staff of the University of Iowa, prevailed upon
his brother to return to school as a graduate student in
the social sciences. The elder Veblen provided financial
assistance, and Veblen enrolled in the Graduate School at
Cornell University. Professor Laughlin of the economics
department was highly impressed with Veblen's published
article, "Some Neglected Points in the Theory of Socialism."
"he“ Laughlin was called to the newly-founded University of
Chicago. he took Veblen with him.

mm

It was 1892 and Veblen was thirtyofive years of age
When Laughlin brought him to Chicago as a teaching-fellow.

In addition to teaching courses in agricultural economics

d_

 

 

 

 

 

 

31
and socialism, Veblen was the managing editor of the W

W. For this strenuous load he was paid
$520 per annum and was still officially classified as a
student. It was not until four years later that he advanced
to the rank of instructor. During these four years he con-
tributed numerous reviews and articles to the leading pro-
fessional Journals. It is understandable why Veblen developed
an antipathy toward the institutions of higher learning.
Nevertheless, Chicago had much to offer Veblen. The
University was building an outstanding faculty. Veblen had
the opportunity to become acquainted with the thinking of
Michelson in physics, Loeb in physiology, Dewey and head
in philosophy, Caldwell in economics, and Starr in anthro—
POIOB‘Y, to name but a few. Veblen unfortunately remained
aloof from the faculty. He was not one to engage in any
"give and take" with his colleagues, although their work
was a major influence in his own intellectual development.
For Veblen the city of Chicago was a vast laboratory
Where he could gain a first-hand knowledge of the workings
0f the industrial system. Shortly after his arrival the
second financial panic in twenty years crippled the nation.
Bu31nesses failed by the thousands, banks closed, railroads
Went into bankruptcy, and unemployment once more became a
serious problem. Discontent and unrest were widespread;
there were strikes, riots, and bloodshed. Chicago: stimu-

lated by the World's Fair, W88 85136019114 hard hit by the

 

 

 

 

 

32

four long years of economic paralysis.
Veblen was something more than a close observer of

these "boom and bust" periods. The continuing agricultural

depression threatened to reduce his parents to the status
of peasants. Grain prices continued to decline, and the
Panic of 1893 only added to their woes. It seemed to the
Veblens a question of unorganized agriculture versus organi-
zed business, the outcome of which was a foregone conclusion.

The depression did serve one useful purpose. The

people were becoming increasingly unwilling to accept the

natural beneficence of the business community. It was be-

coming evident that even during periods of prosperity and
"pregress" there was almost unbelievable corruption in both

eOOnomic and political life. Eric Goldman has observed that

in the period following the Civil War "a good deal of Ameri-

can business and political life was taking on the morals of

the gashouse."17 Writing of the same period, the conserva-

tive Wremarked: "The

Who 1e chapter is so dark a record of betrayal of corporate

truSt . . . that if we had the space and the data, we should

n°t have the desire to expose its details."18
It is not necessary to recount all of the sordid

details of the period. It was an era of the emerging trusts

\g—
17Goldman, M” p. 10.

181:13.

 

 

 

 

33

and holding companies, of monopoly power. It was an era
made infamous by the Credit Mobilier, watered stock, child
labor, unemployment, cut-throat competition, the Tweed Ring,
Tammany Hall, ostentatious living, profiteering, slums, the
Homestead and Pullman strikes, and chey's army. Veblen
was not unmoved by these events and circumstances. His
major intellectual asset was his ability to assess the sig-
nificance of the events of the contemporary world. His
social theory was developed with reference to the rapid
changes which were occurring in the nation's economic and
political life.

During his Chicago tenure Veblen formulated most of
his important ideas and theories. In addition to contribu-
ting articles to professional Journals, he published two of
his most important studies: Thg_Ihgg2y_g£_th§_Leisnz§_§la§§,
1899, and WM. 1904- The
former is by far his best known work. Its immediate popu-
larity was heightened by the favorable review of the dis-
t1"EM-shed literary critic, William Dean Howells. Over-
night, Veblen became the "god of all the radicals, although

he deSIDised them." Veblen himself was disappointed that
the boc>k was regarded by many critics as primarily a satire
°n the way of life of the aristocracy.

:If Veblen was misunderstood, he had himself to blame.

A
3 his disciple Wesley Claire Mitchell has written: "He

usually f t
‘Vrote with one eye on the scienti ic meri s of his

I

 

 

 

3i»

analysis. and his other eye fixed on the squirming reader.
. . . Instead of seeking to facilitate the reception of his
analysis by minimizing the reader's emotions, he artfully
stimulates them for his own delectation."19 Whatever else
Iha_2hegny_g£;1auLL@i§uns_gla§s might have been, it was
obviously a satire "worthy of Ph.D. dissertations in English
literature."20 It was perfectly natural that most critics
Would regard it as primarily a satire.

From the day he stepped on a college campus, Thorstein
Veblen was a legendary figure. His appearance and manner
were enough to startle the undergraduates. Fantastic
accounts of his erudition were heard wherever students con-
gregated. His classes usually started with a reasonable
number of students, but by the end of the semester only a
handful remained. One way or another the less able students
Were discouraged from further attendance. This did not
endear Veblen to those college officials concerned with
eGOnOmy. From their point of view Veblen was an expensive
luxury.

Joseph Dorfman has given an excellent portrayal of

vebler) as a teacher. By all conventional standards he was

a
n at3J~"c>cious teacher.

\\-—_—

l9
Wesley c. Mitchell. 211W;
”WW (McGraw-Hilh New York. 1937). p. 288.

:BoDorfman, gn‘_glt,, p. l7#.

 

 

 

Veblen's methods of teaching were often eccentric.
Once when he was tired of lecturing . . . he asked

a woman student, who was a church member, what was
the value of her church in kegs of beer. But she
did not appreciate this method of explaining the
theory of value. . . . Veblen felt that his students
should not take many notes. One meticulous old man,
trying to take down Veblen's exact words, asked him
to repeat what he had said, but Veblen answered:

"I don‘t think it is worth repeating."

Undergraduates were discouraged by his heavy assign-
ments in foreign languages. . . . Aspirants to Phi 1
Beta Kappa were under a disadvantage in his classes, 3
for he refused to give a grade higher than "C". . . .

All his mOVements, like his speech, were slow and

indolent. . . . He was more reserved than most of

the professors, and he never laughed or showed emo-

tion. . . .

Some of the graduate students found his apparently
philosophical courses too abstract. . . . There was

a belief that Veblen was too lazy to clarify his
ideas. . . . He appeared colourless and unimpressive,
with clothing that just escaped shabbiness, a carri-
age that barely missed being slouchy, and a voice that
spoke in a low monotone. . . . He never seemed to
raise his eyes from the seminar table. . . . Looking
thin and pale, he seemed to have insufficient strength
for the course. He appeared to pay little direct
attention to the class, and at times seemed almost
asleep. . . .2

Yet, Veblen had a tremendous impact on a select group of
Stl"dents. Although he was aloof, Veblen had a keen interest
in thEE welfare of many of his students. He appears to have
known tnore about them than they suspected. It was not unusual
to find him strolling on the campus with small groups of
graduate students. One of Veblen's colleagues, who was not

an admirer, remarked: ”One thing that impressed me about

\_._._.

21:99 “32., pp. M’s-2&9.

 

 

 

Veblen was his ability to develop a feeling of personal

respect and admiration for him as a teacher and a thinker,
one might almost say, personal loyalty, among his students."22
In 1906 Veblen was asked to leave the University of
Chicago following an unchaperoned voyage to Europe with a
woman other than his wife. This was the first of several
"episodes" which were to contribute to his ill success in
the academic world. Although he did not appear to take
these affairs too seriously, they undermined his marital
relationship. His wife left him on numerous occasions be—
fore their divorce in 1911. The marriage bore no children,
largely because of his wishes. Mrs. Veblen had not remained
idle during the years since her marriage. She had continued
her active interest in socialism and had published a book
for children, WM. Although she was
Perhaps emotionally immature, Mrs. Veblen seems to have been
d<‘3V7oted to her husband. He, on the other hand, displayed
a Streak of cruelty toward his wife. He seems to have en-
Joyed creating suspicions concerning his fidelity. In
Spite of their divorce they remained in contact with one
anotl’ler. Before her death in 1926, she became interested

in theopathy and attempted to interest her former husband

in 1‘38 possibilities.

\w
22M. . p. 252.

 

 

 

 

37
The University was undoubtedly happy to find a reason-

able excuse for dismissing Veblen. "The Philistines knew
that a giant was among them, but he was the wrong kind of
giant, whose strength they feared, and they were glad to
see him go packing before he pulled the temple down around
their heads."23 Before leaving Chicago, Veblen applied for
the position of Chief of the Division of Documents in the
Library of Congress. His work in economics, anthropology,
sociology, and languages seemed to give him the necessary
qualifications for the position. In spite of his demonstrated
competence as a research scholar, he was not offered the
position. It was said that a more "routine" person was

needed.

W

Although he was by now a recognized scholar, Veblen
f°uDd it difficult to secure another teaching position.
Fox‘tunately, President Jordan of Stanford University was
engaged in a dispute with his board of trustees and thought
Veblen would aid his cause. Jordan described Veblen as the
"most Subtle man in the business. What he cannot reverse

and make appear the opposite of what it purports to be isn't

worth I‘eversing."2h Veblen Joined the faculty of Stanford
\—
23Lerner, M” p. 10.
2Al’Dorfman, M” p. 269.

 

 

 

 

38

as an associate professor at a salary of three thousand
dollars. The terms of the contract were to his liking. He
was to teach as little as he desirei and he was given a tutor
to assist in the reorganization of the library. His home
was conveniently located in a secluded area on the Stanford
campus. Here he could practice his mechanical ingenuity

and care for his chickens and cows.

We are indebmfi.to Robert L. Duffus and his Innocents
at_§ggng for the many valuable insights concerning Veblen's
life during his three years at Stanford.25 The Duffus boys
lived with the Professor, helping with the house work. When
the boys' father became 111, he also was welcomed. The
family was completed when a Stanford student suffering from
tuberculosis pitched a tent on the property. One can appre-
CIate why scholars are hesitant in making generalizations
concerning Veblen's relationship to people. The Veblen
Personality remains an enigma. At times he appeared to be
orDel, cynical, anti-social, selfish, aloof, and conceited.
Onother occasions he could be sympathetic to the needs and
sufferings of others.26 He could be magnanimous in sharing
\_____._——

25B. L. Duffus. W
Wham. (Macmillan: New York. 194“).

hi 26David Biesman emphasizes Veblen's relationship to
in: Péizrents as a basis for understanding his personality and
th eJJleectual development. Although this is an interesting
sug°rarj. Riesman appears to rely rather heavily upon its pre-
faifd \ralidity. The weakness of this kind of theory is its
payiul‘ea to account for all of those who are not so affected.
(Sc d Riesman, b t n
ribuler's: New York, 1953).

 

 

 

 

__ .1”...—

his meager resources.

In this respect Duffus writes:

I think the intellectual and possibly the emotional
tragedy of Thorstein Veblen's life was that he did
have faith in the basic humanity of human beings,
did feel poignantly the sad position in which multi-
tudes of human beings found themselves, and yet
didn't really believe in any possible reform which
would enhance mass happiness. 7

For a short time at Stanford, Veblen’s matrimonial

life was unusually blissful. In a short time, however, he

and Ellen were again separated, Mrs. Veblen building a shack

near her husband's home. In spite of these difficulties

Veblen was unusually happy during these years. His writing

progressed satisfactorily, and he enjoyed riding horseback

to his mountain cabin where he had an unimpeded view of the

sea.
Although Veblen lived close to nature, he had no

Particular love for it. "What he had," writes Duffus, "was

amused tolerance. He got on well with nature, as he got on

M

27R. L. Duffus, "Veblen at Cedro," Amegig§n_§ghglgn,
3°1- XV, No. b (December, 1946), p. 463. To say that Veblen
didrl't really believe in any possible reform" is to empha-
812.3 the pessimistic strain in Veblen's thought to the neg-
lect tar equally optimistic elements. It seems unlikely that
h° Wolzld have spent a lifetime analyzing the defects of our
grltur‘e if he truly believed that no reform was possible.

13 interesting that even among those who knew Veblen
fiersOtieally there is considerable disagreement concerning his
aisle cautlook on life. Duffus implies that Veblen was basic-
ery I>eassimistic. Myron W. Watkins, on the other hand,
Griteig that "Veblen was not a cynic, as certain superficial
Mu t1<>£3 who never knew him nor understood him have alleged.

ch :leess was he a pessimist, a prophet of doom." Myron W.

Watkizns; , "Veblen's View of Cultural Evolution," ihgnfiigln
WM. pp. 258-259.

_./

 

 

 

to
with children, cats and horses. He didn't respect it as he
did the best work of workmanlike human hands. He regarded
it, I believe, as something that hadn't grown up. . ."28
As a teacher Veblen was even less popular than he had
been at Chicago. Working with undergraduates was especially
difficult for him. Classes continued to be extremely small,
although this appeared to please him.
The ideal situation for a professor, he appeared to
think, was not to have any students at all.
next best was to have few, and those few awake.e
Veblen took steps to make this possible. Each appli-
cant for registration had a personal interview with
him. During this interview Veblen would paint the
required work in the most horrific terms.
Veblen never referred to himself or his background
in any of his writings. Duffus reports a similar reticence
in his conversation. He mentioned his father only once.
"He said that when the elder Veblen went to town on a market
day and happened to meet his son on the street he did not
speak’to him or give any sign of recognition. I gathered
that the Professor thought this interesting but not extra—
ordinary...30
In December of 1909 Veblen was dismissed from Stan-

ford 1:1 consequence of another "affair." "What is one to do

if the: woman moves in on you?" he remarked to friends. Many
“\———_

28W. p. 159.
29

Mo. p. 60-
30M” p. 59.

 

-—-

 

#1

of his former womep students were devoted to him, and he
appears to have used them as confidantes. Although he
carried on an active correspondence with many of them, it
does not appear that he was the aggressor.

Before leaving Palo Alto, Veblen applied for a
Carnegie Foundation grant in order to study the derivation
and growth "of those free or popular institutions which have
marked off European civilization at its best from the great
civilizations of Asia and Africa."31 Since the project
would take three years and would cost between sixteen and
twenty thousand dollars, he needed substantial financial

backing. The usual recommendations were secured. Allyn

Young, who was head of the Department of Economics at

Stanford, wrote:

On the basis of a somewhat varied academic experience
I feel no hesitation in saying that Veblen is the
most gifted man whom I have known. His scholarship
is extraordinary. . . . Moreover, he carries it
lightly--he has none of the marks of methods of

the pedant. . . . I regret in many ways that Veblen
expects to abandon the teacher's profession, even
temporarily. He has never been very successful in
dealing with large numbers of under-graduates. . . .
IBut on the students of adequate preparation and range
<>f interests who have come under his influence he
lies had an extraordinary influence, and the same is
tzrue with reference to those of his colleagues who
have had the fortune to know him at all intimately.

\—
Ha 31Dorfman, gp._git., pp. 297-298. The proposed study
has I>I‘imarily concerned with the Cretan civilization. Veblen
nofedl to show that there was a high correlation between tech-
°E§J.cal proficiency and the development of free institutions.

32M” p. 299-

42

 

Although the Carnegie Foundation expressed an interest in
the project, the necessary funds were not available. This
was unfortunate since Veblen was not only interested in the
project but seems to have been well—qualified, although he
was not a scholar of the classical languages.

One of Veblen‘s former students, H. J. Davenport, was

 

head of the economics department at the University of

Missouri. When he heard of his teacher's plight, he came
to the rescue. At some personal risk he offered Veblen a
position in his department. After a year of unemployment

Veblen at last had secured a position.

L ‘ "WP”

Veblen spent seven years (l9ll-l918) at the Univer—

 

sity of Missouri. Although he intensely disliked Columbia,
he did have the companionship of several of his former stu-
dents. These devoted students not only handled many of his
personal affairs but provided shelter for him as well. For

a time Veblen lived in the basement of the home of his

former student, Davenport. Although his quarters were rather
modest (the entrance was through a window), Veblen was well~

satisfied. Two of his former Stanford students, William

 

33"The local Chamber of Commerce [in Columbia] offered
a prize for a slogan for the town, and Veblen told Walter
Stewart, a student and colleague, that it ought to be de-
scribed as a woodpecker hole of town, to which he later
added, 'in a rotten stump called Missouri.'" LQQ._QLL., p.
306.

 

 

 

 

I.I--E::___________________:J--------------------L

 

1—

1+3 \
Camp and Leon Ardzrooni, came to Missouri so that they might
continue their graduate work under Veblen.

These were productive years for Veblen. In 191“ he
published WW
Industrial_Azt§. This was soon followed by lmpenial_gezmany
WW (1915). AIL—W
WW (1917).
and WW
andggg Qfl flniygzsitigfi by Business Men (1918). The Eighgn
Lgagning had been completed in 1916, but its publication
had been withheld because of the controversial nature of
the study. In the years preceding this country's entrance
into World War I, Veblen became concerned with international

affairs. The titles of two of his works in this period

 

reflect this concern. Veblen, indeed, offered his services
in connection with the House Inquiry which was acting in

an advisory capacity to President Wilson in respect to the
terms of the impending peace. Although he submitted a pro-
posal, his services were not sought.

In l91b he was married to Anne Fessenden Bradley, 3
divorcee and mother of two daughters. She was a devoted
wife who took excellent care of Veblen, but a number of
friends and former students were puzzled by the marriage.

One former student attempted to prevent the match. The

second Mrs. Veblen was a radical but, unlike her husband,

 

f L

an
she was "impatient, explosive, and very doctrinaire"3u She
was amorous, argumentative, and definitely not "high brow."
In spite of their divergent temperaments, it was a satis-
factory marriage until her illness and subsequent death in
1920. She had been committed to a sanitarium in 1918
suffering from delusions of persecution.

Functionalism and efficiency were the fetishes of
the Veblen household. It was his belief that housewives
wasted most of their time. Therefore, the Veblen beds were
never made, and dishes were not washed after each meal.
When all of the dishes had been used, they were put into a
tub and washed with a garden hose. Veblen made his own
furniture ”out of dry-goods boxes which he covered with

burlap.” His home had no telephone, since the telephone like

 

the typewriter created more rather than less work. Inven-
tion, according to Veblen, is the mother of necessity.
Mrs. Veblen reared her daughters according to a
literal interpretation of,2ne_IheQ:y_g£_th§_§§1§gr§_§la§s.
Their clothing was made with little reference to current
styles. The children were permitted no "conspicuous con-

sumption."35 They were treated as adults while still

 

WM” p. 30“.

35A Veblenian term meaning consumption motivated by
the desire to emulate or impress others.

 

,1—

 
  
    
   
  
   
  
   
  
  
   
  
    
 
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
   
   
 
   

“5
children. In short they were not allowed to enjoy a normal
childhood. They were enrolled in the campus laboratory
school but frequently did not arrive until mid-morning or
later. In spite of protests from school authorities the
Veblens made little effort to get their children to school
on time. Veblen had an intense dislike for any kind of
schedule.

Veblen's position at Missouri was always precarious.
His appointments were for one year and always at the rank
of lecturer. His salary varied from $1920 to $2h00, con-
siderably less than the $3000 which he had received at
Stanford. Although Veblen considered President Hill as
good a college president as any, even the best become

"highly undesirable" after a few years.36

 

Although Veblen was now so well known that he was
an object of curiosity, his class enrollment remained
small. His unconventional pedagogical procedures continued.
He gave little attention to examinations, grades, or class
attendance, although the University had strict policies
governing such matters. As before, he seems to have

been most influential with a select group of graduate stu-

    

 

 

dents. An incident cited by Dorfman reveals that there
was a spirit of camaraderie between these students and

their teacher.

36L9£i_ni&.. pp. 306-307-

 

 

 

46

During the early years Davenport used to invite fre-

quently for supper four or five of the students who

attended his own and Veblen's courses, and Veblen

usually joined them. One of the members of this

group . . . writes that, "although we were a rather

impudent bunch of youngsters, I rather think he en-

joyed us. When he did not appear, we would frequent-

ly go down the basement and rout him out and bring

him upstairs to talk to us. The five of us had a

silly secret society to which we initiated Mr. Veblen

but we could never persuade him to wear a pin.

remember one of the occasions in which we grabbed

him and announced that we wanted to discuss reli-

gion. In his humorous and quiet fashion he in-

formed us that he knew nothing about religion but

would be delighted to discuss theology with us."37

Although his services had been previously rejected
by the Federal government, Veblen still yearned to be in
Washington. This is the only period of his life when he
took an active interest in reform. Although he viewed the
war as a great tragedy, it was also an opportunity. It
was an opportunity to destroy the status_gug and its decadent
institutions. The war had demonstrated the necessity for
peace as well as the latent productive potential of the
industrial system.
Having received a leave of absence from the University

Of Missouri, Veblen joined the Price Administration in
February, 1918. The loyalty of his friends and students
was again very much in evidence. He secured the position
through a former friend and while in Washington lived with

a former student. His stay in Washington of less than five

 

371.291.4241... p. 312.

 

1+7
months was disappointing. Since victory was in sight, few
were interested in his seemingly radical proposals. His
position was unimportant and involved statistics of which
he knew little. The memoranda which he submitted received
only scant attention.

One of his proposals involved the Industrial Workers
of the World, an organization under prosecution by the
Federal government for seditious activities. He proposed
that the indictments against the I.W.W. be quashed and that
the men be utilized in meeting the dire shortage of farm
labor in the grain producing areas. He had long been sym—
pathetic to the plight of this group. Along with John
Dewey and other liberals, Veblen signed a plea for public
funds in order to insure a just trial for members of the
I.W.W. Nevertheless, many members received long prison
sentences which Veblen took as evidence of "hysteria, bor-
dering on insanity."

Veblen had seen enough of Washington. His faith and
optimism were shattered. The world was again to be made
"safe for the vested interests." Although a former student

offered him a position with the War Labor Board at a hand-

 

some salary, Veblen was not interested. He had other

problems with which to contend. His studies on Imperial

’ Wallis—Mend WW I 1 to

P d th T m o t Pe tu t 0 were

under attack as subversive literature. It was charged that

 

 

 

f

I these writings constituted a threat to the war effort and

     
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
 
    
   
  
    
   

#8

that Veblen was a pacifist who was partial to the German
cause. The attack on lmnezlgl_§enmany became a tragicomedy.
The Post Office Department informed the publisher that
Impezial_gexmany could not be mailed under provisions of

the Espionage Act. At the same time the Committee on Public
Information was seeking to use the book for propaganda
purposes in support of the Allied cause. Those who attacked
Veblen had apparently not read the books in question.

The Universities of Missouri and Cornell had planned
to share Veblen's time when he returned from government
service, but the plan was quashed, perhaps because of the
unfavorable publicity. Instead, he accepted a position
with The Dial, a literary journal which intended to extend

its coverage to include a "discussion of internationalism

 

and a prOgramme of reconstruction in industry and education."38

 

 

 

W

Veblen assumed his duties on The 3151 in the fall of

1918. The financial arrangements, the terms of the contract,

 

‘ and living quarters were handled by Leon Ardzrooni. When
Mrs. Veblen became ill, another former student, Walter

J Stewart, cared for the children. During Ardzronni's absence

 

  

 

l—

. Isador Lubin came from Washington D.C. in order to care for

49

his former teacher. Wesley Mitchell, whom Veblen regarded
as his outstanding pupil, was also available. It is diffi-
cult to conceive of such personal loyalty as these out-
standing men demonstrated for their beloved teacher.

The Dial was undertaking a bold program. It had
gathered together an outstanding group of editors including
John Dewey, Veblen, Helen Marot, Randolph Bourne, Clarence
Britten, Scofield Thayer, and George Donlin. The Emersonian
21a; soon became known as the Veblenian Dial. The venture,
however, did not prove to be very successful. As for Veblen,

he was an impossible journalist. He had great difficulty

 

in presenting a simple, direct, and concise thesis; and he
found it almost impossible to keep within the limit of one-
thousand words per article. Moreover, he would not permit
3 anyone to edit his material. Lewis Mumford recalls the

first and last time that anyone ever tampered with Veblen's

copy.

Veblen had characterised Samuel Gompers as the
sexton beetle of the American labour movement. In
preparing the M88. for the printer, one of the edi-
tors had automatically changed this over to sexton
beadle, in order to make sense. Veblen was furious:
his white ashen face was more ashen than ever with
angeré-such anger as seemed especially terrible in
the mild and reticent person that Veblen always was.
.He wanted to know if the unknown dunderhead who had
Inutilated his copy did not realise that a sexton
taeetle was an insect that spent its life in storing
11p and covering over dead things? Besides, there
lies an overtong in the allusion: Gompers looked more
like a beetle. 9 ,

M
39M” p. 1:12.

 

I
i
i
.‘

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

so

During the year that Veblen was with gggapial he was
unusually productive, although his disciples were disappoint-
ed in his writing. They felt that Veblen the "agitator"
was taking precedence over Veblen the "thinker." Many of
his articles had a radical, even revolutionary, bent. They
no longer reflected the subtlety and critical analysis of
his earlier writings. The post-war period had apparently
embittered Veblen. He seems to have placed his remaining
faith in the success of the Russian Revolution.

Veblen was gaining recognition, although it was not
always favorable recognition. H. L. Mencken quipped:
“Veblenism was shining in full brilliance. There were
Veblenists, Veblen clubs, Veblen remedies for all the sorrows
of the world. There were even in Chicago, Veblen girls--
perhaps Gibson girls grown middle-aged and despairing."uo

After one year The Dial once more became a literary
Journal. The subsidies which had made possible the pro-
gramme of reconstruction were exhausted. Fortunately for
Veblen, the New School for Social Research was founded in

the fall of 1919, and he was offered a position.
1 " i R r

Veblen was now in the twilight of his career, although

w

“oLoc. cit., p. #23.

     
  
  
   
  
  
   
  
  
  
   
  
  
   
  
   
  
 

51
he continued to write. W
was published in 1921. and WW
WWW appeared
in 1923. These are not Veblen's best writings since they
add little to the fundamental themes of his earlier studies.
Veblen's position on the staff of the New School for Social
Research should have been ideal. His salary of six thou-
sand dollars, of which forty-five hundred dollars was con-
tributed by a former University of Chicago student, was
more than adequate. He lived with friends and former
students. He had outstanding colleagues, including James
Harvey Robinson, Charles A. Beard, Wesley C. Mitchell, John
Dewey, Harold Laski, Roscoe Pound, Leo Wolman, and Leon
Ardzrooni. In spite of the stimulation which his colleagues
could have provided,Veblen remained aloof. Only a handful
were able to pierce his mask. Among these was Harold Laski
who writes:

I first met Professor Veblen shortly after the open-

ing of the New School for Social Research. He was

very shy, and, in the first week of our acquaintance,

it was difficult to get on intimate terms with him.

But, once the initial barriers had been overcome,

he was an entrancing companion. . . . It would have

been easy to describe much of his talk as cynical;

but one saw quite early that this was in fact merely

a protective colouring beneath which he concealed

deep emotions. . . . I do not remember discussing

anything with him without receiving illumination;

and his kindness to a much younger teacher remains
one of the abiding memories of my years in America. 1

       
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
    

_——————-

“1M. . pp. l+50-u51.

  

 

   

 

 

52

Veblen was not happy at the New School. He was tired of
teaching. He was frequently absent from class, presumably
because of ill health. He looked forward to his vacation
periods. He no longer had the desire or energy for serious
work over prolonged periods of time. For reasons of economy
he was occasionally assigned large classes. His almost
total ineffectiveness in working with such groups caused
the students to rebel. He shared with John Dewey the
dubious distinction of being the worst teacher at the
school. Actually the New School did not fulfill its earlier
promise. Since it did not grant degrees, it was difficult
to attract superior students. Although the course work was
designed for students possessing the bachelor's degree,
many were enrolled without such a background. In consequence
of a financial crisis at the school, many of the faculty
resigned and a general reorganization followed.

In 1925 Veblen was offered the presidency of the
American Economic Association, but he turned it down remark-
ing: "They didn't offer it to me when I needed it." This
was the end of the trail for Thorstein Bunde Veblen. Ac-
companied by his daughter, Becky, he returned to his mountain
cabin near Stanford University where he could gaze upon the
sea and spend his last days in peace. "As the end drew on,
Veblen felt extremely lonely and neglected. He thought

that everyone had forgotten him. . . . Finally he would not

 

  

53
see even old and true friends.“2
He died on August 3, 1929. Before his death he had
prepared a statement concerning the final arrangements. It
read:

It is also my wish, in case of death, to be cremated,
if it can conveniently be done, as expeditiously and
inexpensively as may be, without ritual or ceremony
of any kind; that my ashes be thrown loose into the
sea, or into some sizable stream running into the
sea; that no tombstone, slab, epitaph, effigy. tablet,
inscription, or monument of any name or nature, be
set up in my memory or name in any place or at any
time; that no obituary, memorial, portrait, or bi-
ography of me, nor any letters written to or by me
be printed or publisheg or in any way reproduced,
copied, or circulated. 5 .

He left his estate to his two daughters, although the
royalties from his books did not pay his debts until 1932.
Four of Veblen's former students acted as pallbearers at the
funeral. Others were deeply moved by his death. Mitchell
gave a fitting tribute to his teacher. He said:

There was the disturbing genius of Thorstein Veblen

--that visitor from another world, who dissected

the current commonplaces which the student had un-

consciously acquired, as if the most familiar of his

daily thoughts were curious products wrought in him

by outside forces. No other such emancipator of

the mind from the subtle tyranny of circumstance has

been known in social science, and 0 other such
enlarger of the realm of inquiry.

”2.229.413... pp. 502-503.
“31:9“. “1!., p. 501‘.
“M” p. 505.

 

  

A_&al£:nartraii

 
 
  
   
  
  
  
   
   
  
   
  
  
  
  
 

Though Veblen never wrote specifically about himself,
he has given us a remarkable self-portrait in one of his
short essays entitled "The Intellectual Pro-eminence of
Jews in Modern Europe," first published in 1919.“5 Ostensibly,
the article is concerned with the advisability of an inde-
pendent Zionist state. Veblen first notes that the Jewish
people

have contributed much more than an even share to

the intellectual life of modern Europe. So also it

is plain that the civilization of Christendom con-

tinues today to draw heavily on the Jews for men

devoted to science and scholarly pursuits.U6
How does one account for this pre-eminence? Veblen rejects
any theory of native racial superiority, arguing that the
Jews are a hybrid race. The intellectual superiority of the
Jew is not the consequence of a fortunate intellectual
endowment.

This intellectual pre-eminence is manifested only when

  
    
 

the

   

gifted Jew escapes from the cultural environment
created and fed by the particular genius of his own
people, only when he falls into the alien lines of
gentile inquiry. . . . It is by loss of allegiance

. . to the people of his origin, that he finds
himself in the vanguard of modern inquiry.

 
   
     
   
 

m

“SBepublished 1n Essa13.12.922.9hansina_2rdez.
Leon Ardzrooni (Viking: New York, l93h), pp. 219-231.

“6LQQ. nge, po 22]..
“7199, gi§., pp. 225-226.

   

ed.

      
      

55
This alienation of the Jew from his cultural environment
produces a skeptical frame of mind which is the first requi-
site of significant work in science. It is the skeptic who
advances the frontiers of knowledge.
We can now fill in the details of Veblen's thesis.

The young Jew is born into a kind of sub-culture within the
larger gentile community. In this sub-culture he learns
what is true, beautiful, and good. This spiritual in-
heritance is traditional in the sense that it anticipates
modern science and scholarship. If, however, the Jew has
a thirst for knowledge, he must go forth into the gentile
community with its own peculiar outlook and institutions.

He comes forthwith to realize that the scheme of

traditions and conventional verities handed down

within the pale of his own people are matters of

habit handed down by tradition, that they have only

such force as belongs to matters of habit and con-

vention, and that they lose their binding force so
soon fig the habitually accepted outlook is given up.

This does not imply that the Jew will now accept the out-

look of the gentile community. On the contrary, the Jew

retreats to a kind of intellectual "no man's man." By the

force of circumstances the Jew becomes a skeptic and thereby

acquires the sun§_gug_ngn of intellectual pre-eminence.
While Veblen was not a Jew, the argument could

appropriately be applied to his own intellectual development.
M

48M” p. 22?-

 

 

 

56
He grew into manhood always conscious of the conflict between
his own people and the "Americans." Living on a cultural
island, he learned the lore and mythology of his own people.
It was an inheritance of which Veblen was proud. Indeed, he
spent years translating an Icelandic saga and visited the
native land of his ancestors. On occasion he even identified
{ himself as a Norwegian.

Like the Jew, however, Veblen could not remain in-
tellectually identified with his inheritance. He was con-
sidered a renegade by his own people. He hated their narrow
provincialism. He repudiated their lore and mythology. He
rejected their animistic thinking. 0n the other hand,
neither could Veblen accept the culture in which he was
to do his scholarly work. As Robert L. Duffus observed,
Veblen's Norwegian background gave him a "detachment from
American life. He was like an enlightened savage in a
civilized country.h9

Like the Jew, Veblen was a skeptic by force of cir-
cumstances. He belonged to no country, to no culture. "He
was a lone figure, the man nobody knew--not even his family

and friends, not even his warmest disciples.50

“9W. p. 58.
‘ 50hammer. we” 10. 1+8.

   

 

 

 

CHAPTER III

A SYNOPSIS OF THE MAJOR WRITINGS OF THORSTEIN VEBLEN

To appreciate a writer fully he must be viewed from
several vantage points. In the last chapter we presented
a brief biography of Thorstein Veblen in the belief that
such an account would contribute to our understanding of
his characteristic frame of mind. In the final analysis,
however, a man's point of view must be considered in terms
of its own intrinsic merits. We are concerned with what
Veblen wrote rather than in why he wrote it. It might be
demonstrated, for example, that Veblen's attack on the uni-
versities of his day reflected his mistreatment at the hands
of these institutions. While such a demonstration may shed
light on Veblen's motives, it does not resolve the question
of the truth or falsity of the beliefs which Veblen in fact
maintains. The beliefs which men hold reflect a wide variety
of motives and environmental circumstances. A true belief
is often associated with a dastardly motive while false
beliefs often emanate from angelic motives. The current
attacks on education, for example, may be directed by the
most sinister of motives, but this does not prove that the
beliefs upon which the attacks are based are false. The

truth or falsity of a belief is, in short, independent of
57

58
the baseness or the saintliness of the man who professes it.
We are concerned here with an exposition of Veblen's

major writings. Such an exposition will reveal the broad
range of his interests, his unusual literary style, and the

development of his more important points of view.1

Wm

For the sake of taxonomy Thorstein Veblen is usually
identified as an economist. His early training, however,
was in pure philosophy. At Carleton and later at Johns
Hopkins and Yale, he came under the influence of Scottish
Common-sense Realism, then the prevailing point of view in

American philosophy. This philosophical position was a

 

reaction both against Hume's skepticism and Berkeley's

idealism. These realists held that sensory impressions are
presented directly to consciousness. The knowledge gained
5 in this manner is to be accepted as reliable. Moreover,
since men have uniform sensations, everyone will react to
his environment in the same way. Although the realists
utilized both inductive and deductive reasoning, their

emphasis was upon the former.

 

1Not all of Veblen' 8 major writingsM will be discussed
in this chapter. P c ,
which contains important essays on 8economic and social theory,
will be discussed in Chapter IV, pp.107
, Veblen' s treatise on education, is
treated in Chapter V, pp. 183 at aeg.

 

59

At Johns Hopkins, Veblen studied Hegelian idealism
under George S. Morris. He attended lectures by Charles S.
Peirce, from whom he may have learned to appreciate induc-
tion as a ”guiding principle" in the search for reliable
knowledge. Under President Porter at Yale, he became versed
in the idealism of Kant. His doctoral dissertation was
entitled MW- It
is concerned with ”why we need not believe in God." Accord-
ing to Dorfman, Veblen "seems thoroughly to have examined
Spencer and Kant."2

The extent to which Veblen was influenced by these
philosophical movements is of course not known with accuracy.
Stanley Daugert believes that this early training in philos-
ophy conditioned many of Veblen's later points of view.3

In 188h Veblen published his first article: "Kent's
Critique of Judgment.” Since the W
had not yet been translated into English, this was no mean
accomplishment for a graduate student. According to
Veblen, the Qxitign§_g£_lndgment is an attempt by Kant to
mediate between his earlier Q2itigue_g£_fiune_fiea§gn and

WWI—Beam. The former was highly deter-

ministic in its emphasis upon causal necessity in the

2Dorfman, gn‘_git., p. #6.
3Dausert. Wu pp. 14+.
“W. pp. 175-193.

60
Phenomenal world, whereas the latter emphasized the moral
freedom of man. Kant, continues Veblen, saw the need of
reconciling this apparent inconsistency.

Man's moral freedom implies that he be able to choose
alternative plans of action. This in turn implies that man
be able to evaluate the consequences of projected plans of
action. The Kantians argued that empirical knowledge is

1Dadequate in this respect. Man’s moral freedom demands
something more.

This "something more" is the faculty of pure judgment
which , according to Veblen‘, is nothing other than inductive
PeaSotxing. Veblen appears to have interpreted Kant in terms
°f thie Common-sense emphasis upon induction. He now gen-
eralizes the value of induction for all areas of life.

Though Kant, in giving his reasons for undertaking
the ‘ , speaks mainly of the
1Cndispensableness of this power of inductive rea-
soning for the purposes of morality, it is evident
that it is no less indispensable in every other
Dart of practical life. Today any attempt, in any

Science, which does not furnish us an induction, is
<3ounted good for nothing. . . .

veblén recognized that induction does not give us knowledge
of: I‘1tnal causes, but for the purposes of everyday life in-
duction is sufficient. Veblen never lost his faith in

11:1un tive reasoning. It was to become a fundamental tenet

i
n his social philosophy. The support which he here claims

\________—.

5M” p- 177-

——

.1
from Kant, however, is not properly warranted. In most of
the reviews which he wrote he was less interested in the
author's point of view than he was in his own thesis. A
review was just another opportunity to eXpound his own
theory. Even in this early article there is evidence of the
use of this technique. As Daugert has pointed out, Veblen's
"emphasis upon pure judgment as inductive reasoning is not

truly Kantian."6
Wham

After a lapse of seven years during which Veblen
was unsuccessful in procuring a teaching position, he re-
turned to academic studies at Cornell. His major interest
had now shifted from philosophy to the social sciences.

One of Veblen's initial interests in economics con-
cerned socialism. Although he continually refused to be
identified with the socialist movement, his early writings
are sympathetic to many of its doctrines. While a student
at Cornell, he published his first article in economics:
"Some Neglected Points in the Theory of Socialism."7 In
this article he examined the current unrest among the peoples

of the world and concluded that they were suffering from a

 

6Daugert, gn‘_§1t., p. 8.

7W. pp.
387-408. .

 

 

62
feeling of "slighted manhood." Inequalities in wealth have
resulted in a feeling of envy among the less fortunate. This
"regard for reputation" is an instinctive trait which can
be satisfied in a variety of ways. In a competitive,
pecuniary society in which the individual has many impersonal
contacts with his fellow men, this trait is best satisfied
through evidence of pecuniary success. The struggle to keep
up appearances replaces the struggle for existence.8

The capitalistic economic system with its emphasis
upon free competition and private property rights is respon-
sible for the present unrest. Private property rights
generate inequalities in wealth. The poor envy the rich.
"Regard for reputation“ takes the form of pecuniary emula-
tion. Although emulation is justified from the viewpoint
of the individual, it does not promote the welfare of the
community. A large percentage of what is produced is wasted
in the effort to "keep up appearances." By eliminating
property rights and inequalities in income, a socialistic
society might conceivably channel this "regard for reputa-

tion" into more serviceable activities.

 

8One of the interesting and important characteristics
of Veblen's philosophy is the great consistency of the themes
which he maintains throughout his writings. Even in this
early essay, for example, he is aware of conspicuous waste
88 a motive in consumption. This theme is reiterated in
later writings. especially in W
Class

 

63
Fifteen years later Veblen presented his mature
statement on Marxism.9 During the intervening years he made
an exhaustive study of socialist literature. While he con-
tinued to be a sympathetic critic, he found many of its
doctrines wanting.
Veblen introduced his article on Marx by stating:
"The system of doctrines worked out by Marx is characterised
by a certain boldness of conception and great logical con-
sistency."10 He later reiterates this point and adds:
No member of the system, no single article of
doctrine, is fairly to be understood, criticised
or defended except as an articulate member of the
whole and in the light of the preconceptions and
postulates which afford the point of departure and
the controlling norm of the whole. 1
The remainder of the article is a criticism of the Marxist
philosophy. Paradoxically, Veblen is especially critical
of the logic employed.
The weaknesses of Marxism are its dependence upon
the Hegelian dialectic and the hedonistic calculus of the
English Utilitarians. Veblen agrees with Marx that economic
forces are important determinants of cultural growth and
change. But Marx asserts far more than this when he states

that the mechanism of change is the class struggle, and that

 

9"The Socialist sconomics of Karl Marx and His Follow-
ers," WWW. pp. “094456

”M” p. #09.
11M” p. 1‘11.

 

6h

this struggle inevitably leads to a classless society. In
Hegelian terminology the entire process is the working out
of an inner necessity, the dialectic of the historical pro-
case.

If Marx had been a devotee of Darwin rather than
Hegel, he would have developed his theory in terms of
"opaque“ cause and effect.12 There would have been no final
term, no inevitable goal. The class struggle, as viewed
by Marx, is not an evolutionary process but a metaphysical
assumption. Furthermore, it presupposes the validity of
the hedonistic psychology. Men presumably take stock of
their class position by rationally calculating the pleasures
smipains associated with their economic position in society.
Since the present condition of workers produces an excess
of pain, these workers consciously become instruments in
the class struggle. The evil inherent in this role becomes
a necessary condition for the achievement of the good society.
The class struggle becomes a conscious struggle driven for-
ward by human passions.

The dialectic is contrary tc what Veblen would call
the modern point of view. The Marxian philosophy is pre-

dicated on the assumption that progress inevitably results

 

12It is characteristic of Veblen not to define such
terms as "opaque," even though he implicitly attaches
esoteric meanings to such words. In Veblenian terminology,
for example, ”opaque" appears to denote "impersonal" or
"objective."

Te

65
from conflict. According to Veblen, this is contrary to
fact.

Veblen was equally critical of the utopian socialists, \
although he was profoundly influenced by the writings of
the utopian, Edward Bellamy. Generally, the utopians, like
the Marxists, assumed that the inherent goodness of man had
been corrupted by the institutions of society, especially
such economic institutions as private property. Unlike
the Marxists, however, these socialists argued that the
salvation of man could be achieved through an appeal to the
reasonableness of men. Man and his institutions are per-
fectible through knowledge. The evils of every society can
be traced directly to human ignorance.13 Although Veblen l
is obviously sympathetic to these views, he does not embrace
the sublime optimism which these views imply. Specifically,
he does not believe that a program of education can achieve
significant reform unless such a program takes into account
the "vested” interests, the realities of human nature, and

the rapidly changing character of the society. The selfish

because of ignorance. Men are by nature conservative, and,
furthermore, the selfish interests have a vested interest

I

I

I

interests of a society, for example, do not resist change
in the status_gug. In short, Veblen believed that the

 

' 13Harry W. Laldler. Eagial=Easn2mia_mnxaman£s (Crowell:
New York, 1948). ppo loo"117-

66
utopian was attempting to find his salvation outside the

realities and circumstances of life.

WW

Veblen formulated most of his important ideas during
his tenure at the University of Chicago. It was here that
he published two of his most important works: The Thegny 9:
W (1898) and WW-
pnxag (1904). The former work has been widely read and
discussed, whereas the latter is scarcely known to the lay
public. A third great study, The_1n§tingt_gfi_flgnkman§nln
and the State 9: the Industnial Ants, was published in 191“
while Veblen was on the staff of Stanford University.

We shall discuss the major themes in these three
studies. Much of the embellishment, embroidery, and ex-
traneous material will be eliminated. Our purpose is to
present a clear and concise verbal picture of the Veblenian
point of view. Veblen is a difficult writer in this respect.
He seldom gives the reader a brief exposition of his major
theme. A footnote may contain the most important idea in
any given chapter. He is rarely satisfied until he has
related a given topic to all of the cultural forces in the
society, or until he has shown the evolution of the theme
from a primitive state of culture. The basic theme is
further obscured by ramifications, qualifications, repeti-

tions, and speculations on seemingly irrelevant questions.

 

[r i,

67
The task is made even more difficult by the recondite langu-

age in which the basic thesis is often expressed.1u

We
Veblen is a critic of contemporary culture in spite
of his lengthy and speculative accounts of the evolution
of institutions from a primitive society. His anthropolo-
gical speculations are intended to reinforce and sustain
his evaluation of contemporary society. What did Veblen see
in his culture which motivated him to attack it with such
invectiveness?
In The Thegny of Business EDEQEDEJSQ Veblen states:
To a greater extent than any other known phase of
culture, modern Christendom takes its complexion
from its economic organization. This modern econ-
omic organization is the "Capitalistic System" or
"Modern Industrial System," so called. Its character-
istic features, and at the same time the forces by

which it dominates modern culture, are the machine
process and investment for profit.15

 

1”In this connection, Joseph Dorfman has written:
”As a writer, too, Veblen is full of whimsy and humor. He
loves to tease, to exaggerate, to present fantastic and
poetic images, to utilize symbolism and allegory, and to
mobilize folklore. He will even use archaic words and
phrases to fit the mood of an archaic economic and social
order." Joseph Dorfman, "The Source and Impace of Veblen's
Thought," W. p. 2.
Professor Dorfman was perhaps recalling such Veblenian
thought twisters as the following: "If we are getting rest-
less under the taxonomy of a monocotyledonous wage doctrine
and a crytogamic theory of interest, with involute, locu-
licidal, tomentous and moniliform variants, what is the
cytOplasm, centrosome, or karyokinetic process to which we

may turn . . . ?" The Plane of Sgieyge in MOQQEn gjx111-
23121911. p. 70.
15Thorstein Veblen, T e Th r B t

(Mentor: New York, 1958), p. 7.

 

68

 

This "machine process" involves more than mechanical contriv-
ances. It involves the substitution of reasoned procedure
for the rule of thumb. The machine process involves the
application of scientific methodology to technology. It is

exemplified in techniques of mass production.

The shortcoming of our society is the domination of
the industrial process by investment for profit. The machine
process has given civilization the means whereby all of the
subsistence requirements of all peoples could be fulfilled.
But investment for profit impedes the uninterrupted flow of
economic goods and services.

Industry is carried on for the sake of business, and
not conversely; and the progress and activity of in-
dustry are conditioned by the outlook of the market,
whichlgeans the presumptive chance of business pro-

fits.

The machine process, moreover, has created a highly
interdependent economy. What affects one part of the economy
necessarily affects every other part.

A disturbance at any point, whereby any given branch
of industry fails to do its share in the work of the
system at large, immediately affects the neighboring
or related branches which come before or after it in
the sequence, and is transmitted through their de-
rangement to the remoter portions of the system. The
disturbance is rarely confined to the single plant

. . . but spreads in some measure to the rest. A
disturbance at any point brings more or less derange-
ment to the industrial process at large.

 

16M” p- 19-
17M” pp. lu-ls.

 

 

 

69
If industry is to produce a maximum of goods and services,
it must be managed by those well versed in the causal re-
lationships of the machine process. Profit considerations
must not be allowed to sabotage the maximum utilization of
natural and human resources. The Great Depression of a
later decade has tended to give added force and meaning to
this viewpoint.

The function of industry is to make goods, not money.
The peoples of the world have economic wants that need to
be fulfilled. In a rational economic system these wants
would be satisfied as efficiently as possible. A maximum
of output would be produced with a minimum of input. In a
world of scarcity we cannot afford to waste our productive
resources. From Veblen's standpoint our society does not
meet these requirements. The irrationality of our system
lies in the control of industry by business. Business which
is largely ignorant of technology regulates this delicate
industrial mechanism. Business decides what is to be pro-
duced. It decides when, where, and how production is to
take place.

These business decisions are based upon profit con-
siderations. It was assumed by many economists of Veblen's
day that these decisions would in the long run automatically
enhance the welfare of all. Every man, it was asserted,
should seek his self-interest. In this manner the public

interest would best be served. Veblen challenges this view.

70

   
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
   
   
 
   
   
  

He argues that the public interest is in continual conflict
with the needs of business. The quest for profits in a
capitalistic industrial society results in the "sabotage”
of industry. This is a theme which runs through all of
Veblen's writings. No rational society would permit resources
to lie idle while her people suffered from hunger and
privation. Veblen argues that even during periods of pros-
perity there are unemployed resources. There are always
men who desire to work, there are resources available, and
there is the technological knowledge. Men, however, continue
to be denied the fruits of the potential wealth of the
society. “The promised land flies before them like a
mirage."

Moreover, the control of industry by business is

morally wrong.18 The wealth produced by modern industry

 

18Veblen disclaims any value judgments in his analysis.
He is the objective scientist investigating impersonal cause
and effect. No reader of Veblen can accept such a statement
at face value. His description of American business is
enlightening in this regard. "The typical American business-
man watches the industrial process from ambush, with a
view to the seiZure of any item of value that may be left
at loose ends. Business strategy is a strategy of 'watchful
waiting,‘ at the center of a web; very alert and adroit,
but remarkably incompetent in the way of anything that can
properly be called 'industrial enterprise.'" _he_flighgn
A A M m o -
B M (Sagamore: New York, 1957), p. 151.
The question of Veblen's amorality will be considered in a
later chapter. See below, pp. 166 §t__§§gL

71
results directly from technological competence. This com-
petence cannot be attributed to any man, nation, or period
of time. Technology is a group inheritance which properly
belongs to all of the people. Business contributes little

to technology but usurps its productivity.

IaamnuLJhLiquLihsahmuumm.
Ihs_Thearx_2f_ths_Lsisuns_&lass.continues to be

Veblen's most widely read study. In many respects this

book defies interpretation. Its unique style and vocabulary
often leave the reader bewildered. Critics have seldom
agreed as to its basic meaning and significance. Some have
treated it as a satire on the way of life of the aristocracy.
Others have viewed it as an analytical study of the economic
significance of the leisure class. Is Veblen serious? This
is perhaps the crucial question.

It is assumed in this thesis that Veblen was indeed
making a serious study of the evolution and value of the
leisure class in contemporary society. In the "Preface"
of his study Veblen indicates that the purpose of his inquiry
is to "discuss the place and value of the leisure class as
an economic factor in modern life. . . ."19 We accept this

statement at face value. It is evident, however, that the

 

19Thorstein Veblen, The Thegny o: the L§;§p:§ giggg:

I t (Modern Library: New York,
193a), p. vii.

 

 

72
study is also a satire. At times the satirical qualities
of the work dominate the otherwise objective analysis. This
has created the problems to which we have referred.

The central theme of Iha_Inggry_g£_nhe_L§1§nng_Qlafis
will be developed by utilizing an illustration from contem-
porary life. The system of personal transportation in the
United States should serve as an adequate example. This
illustration will be developed in terms of the Veblenian
methodology.

Although Veblen disclaims any interest in value judg-
ments,20 it seems certain that his major concern is precisely
in this area. He would be concerned with the exalnatign
of our present system of personal tranSportation. His first
task would be to establish the fundamental function of trans-
portation. According to Veblen, functions can best be
appreciated by analyzing primitive cultures which are close
to the subsistence level. Such cultures cannot afford to
waste natural or human resources. If their institutions
(such as transportation) are not in harmony with the funda-
mental requirements of life. the penalty of death awaits

them. We should expect, therefore, to find transportation

20See, for example, the following disclamations:

.xu 343£QELHLEMHLlfia£nMMI

, pp. 89. 161-162: Ihs_ihsszx_si_fissinss§_finisze

JILJUEEEKQE
0 184 n. n. P
nlflifiit P ’ C It; EQIDEEHEEIOD {Vikings New York, l9h5)

pp. 2-3.

 

 

73
fulfilling a more or less rational function in such a
culture.

After establishing the manifest function of transporta-
tion, its evolution from a primitive society is developed.
This involves extensive historical and anthropOIOgical in-
vestigations. It is seen that transportation cannot be
divorced from the other institutions in the culture. It
is seen that transportation interacts with a complex and
interdependent set of cultural and economic factors. The
particular mode of transportation depends upon certain in-
ventions and technological develoPments which in large part
cannot be credited to particular persons, periods of time,
or nations. A system of transportation cannot be appreciated
unless it is seen as evolving out of the past. Future
transportation must buiki upon present and past transporta-
tion. Indeed, transportation is an institution which has a
history of its own. Certain habits of thought and ways of
behaving are associated with it.

The prevailing mode of personal transportation in
the United States is the automobile. Let us assume that
the evolution and manifest function of the automobile has
been established. Presumably the automobile is designed to
transport its owner as efficiently and safely as possible
at a minimum cost to the individual and the society. This
presumably is the function of personal transportation in

any culture at any stage of development. The mode of

 

 

 

7h

 

transportation changes but the manifest or rational function
remains the same.

How well does the automobile fulfill its manifest
function? Does it represent a rational allocation of re-
sources? Does it best serve the welfare and needs of the
whole society? These are some of the questions which need
to be answered before the system can be adequately evalu-
ated. Before these questions can be adequately answered,
an empirical study of the transportation system must be
made. This would include an analysis of the production and
sale of new automobiles, of technological deveIOpments, of
the cultural incidence of the automobile, of alternative
modes of transportation, and of cost.

An analysis of cost, for example, would show that we
spend some ten billions of dollars annually for new automo-
biles, fifteen billions for gasoline,21 seven billions for
traffic accidents, and billions more for the upkeep and
maintenance of the sixty-five million registered automobiles.
Added to this cost are the billions spent annually on traffic
police, driver education, parking lots, garages, traffic

courts, highway tolls, and so forth. Certainly, the total

 

21New automobile and gasoline costs include taxes
paid to local, state, and federal governments. From the
viewpoint of the society, not all of this tax cost is to be
charged to the cost of transportation. From the standpoint
of the individual, however, it does represent a cost of
transportation. It reveals the preference which the in-
dividual has made in the allocation of his income.

   

g
i

 
  

    

75
ccast would exceed forty billions of dollars annually or well
over three times the total expenditure for all types of
fcxrmal education in the United States. This does not, of
course, prove that this expenditure on transportation is
necessarily wasteful as compared to our expenditure on
ecitzcation. An empirical study of relative costs must pre-
cede, nevertheless, an evaluation of these costs. Ultimately,
a1: evaluation depends upon the extent to whnfiitransportation
tarni education each fulfills its manifest function. This

we do not know, although the data suggests, perhaps, that

WE: are allocating an exorbitant share of our national in-
COme to personal transportation.

Other analyses would indicate that styling often
dc”Inmates engineering in the production of automobiles.
Ccanort, safety, economy, ease of handling, and durability
iare frequently sacrificed for the purposes of gaudy display.
Technological improvements seldom sell automobiles. These
stHatements are, presumably, not matters of theory but rather
are statements of fact. Veblen himself did not always
practice what he preached in this regard. He was much more
interested in speculation than in statistical and factual
1n"Vestigations. His disciples, however, have pursued many
Sui3h studies into almost every sector of the nation’s
economic life.22

\—-—____-

N 22For example, two of his outstanding disciples,
eesley Mitchell and Robert Hoxie, have conducted, respectively,
ustive studies of business cycles and labor organizations.

76

On the basis of such studies Veblen would conclude
that the present system of transportation serves some addit-
ional function other than transportation. Otherwise, how
can we account for the tremendous expense involved and the
domination of engineering by considerations of style? One
cannot determine this latent function by sampling consumer
Opinion. All men, according to Veblen, strive to rationalize
their behavior. They buy a longer automobile in order to
have a larger trunk. They want increased horsepower in
order to pass other automobiles more easily and safely. A
heavier car sways less in the wind. Wrap-around windshields
provide better vision while power window-lifts are more
convenient. In the Veblenian analysis these are rationali-
zations. They do not represent the basic motive.

All men have an instinctive regard for their reputa-
tions. Veblen argues that in some cultures this "instinct"
is satisfied in ways which are serviceable to the entire
community. In a pecuniary society this instinct is best
satisfied through symbols which give evidence of pecuniary
success. This instinct takes the form of pecuniary emula-
tion-—the striving to excel others in monetary terms.

Personal virtue and integrity still count for some-
thing in our culture. Veblen argues, however, that personal
integrity loses its effectiveness in a highly impersonal
and complex culture. Our regard for reputation can no

longer be satisfied'in this manner, although it sufficed in

 

 

77
the face-to-face relationships of certain primitive groups.
In our society the worth of an individual is increasingly
measured in monetary terms. "To a greater extent than
elsewhere public esteem is awarded to artists, actors,
preachers, writers, scientists, officials, in some rough
proportion to the sums paid for their work."23

The latent function of the automobile is its value
as a symbol of pecuniary standing.2“ It is a measure of our
worth in the eyes of others. We can now see why styling
dominates engineering. If the automobile is to give evi—
dence of ability to pay, the style must of course change
frequently. The new style gives evidence that we are
capable of more waste than our neighbors. Technological
improvements will of course count for something. But these
improvements are too often not visible to the eye. They
also give evidence that we hale to buy that which is segyigg,
.ahlg to our own needs. The goal is to show others that we
have a surplus which we can afford to waste. Style, there-

fore, is especially commendable.

 

23W. p. 130.

2“Although the distinction between a latent and mani-
fest function is clearly implied in Veblen, the terminology

is taken from Professor Robert K. Merton's ° 1 l T eo
and Sggial Structure (Free Press: Glencoe, 1957). p. 39.

 

78

The Veblenian analysis now moves swiftly. The key
concepts are "conspicuous consumption," "conspicuous leisure,"
and "conspicuous waste". A large percentage of our wealth
is wasted in impressing people that we have a surplus--more
than enough to provide a bare subsistence. These wasteful
expenditures do not enhance the welfare of the group or the
manifest welfare of the individual. Conspicuous consumption
is designed to inflate our own egos rather than to provide
useful and needed goods. Conspicuous leisure, which is
the "unproductive consumption of time," is similar in
nature. A life of leisure is evidence that we can afford
to waste time.

In Ihg_IhgQny_g£_1he_L§1§n:§_£la§§_Veblen illustrates
these concepts by utilizing data "drawn from everyday life."
Generally, his technique is to take some commonplace datum
such as women's dress and show that its manifest function
has gradually been corrupted. In primitive society, for
example, dress was highly functional. Clothing, of necessity,
was used primarily for protection from privation. In modern
society the "law of conspicuous waste guides consumption
in apparel." Dress in our society is evidence of ability
to pay. Women's attire must give evidence of a life of
leisure. It must not be strictly functional. Thus in
China women bind their feet as evidence of their unproduc-
tiveness. In this country high heels and corsets provide

similar evidence. Women's dress must not only be primarily

  

79

  

nonfunctional but obviously expensive. "Without reflection
or analysis, we feel that what is inexpensive is unworthy.
'A cheap coat makes a cheap man!"25

The conspicuous consumption and leisure of women in
our society is extremely important. According to Veblen,
American women consume vicariously for other members of the
household. The good repute of her family requires that she
waste both time and goods. In some households children may
assume some of this responsibility. They are deluged with
toys and clothing which can neither be consumed nor appre-
ciated. In the Veblenian analysis the parents are not dis-
playing affection but rather are using children for purposes
of conspicuous consumption. This inflates the parents'
ego, not the child's.

The actual volume of conspicuous consumption is de-
pendent upon our financial resources and upon the conspic-
uous consumption of those with whom we identify ourselves.
Typically, our standard of living is geared to that group
just above us in the economic hierarchy. There is no final
term since we continually strive to excel those who are more
successful economically.

Veblen finds his supporting data in the most unexpected

quarters. Some of his illustrations are hilarious, although

 

25mm Theory of LhLLfilfiilr‘LQlflEfi’ p. 169.

 

.m—r-.. .

80

often far-fetched. In order that the reader may appreciate
his masterful satire, his discussion of domestic pets is

quoted at length.

Apart from the birds . . . the animals which merit
particular attention are cats, dogs, and fast horses.
The cat is less reputable than the other two Just
named, because she is less wasteful. . . . At the
same time the cat's temperament does not fit her for
the honorific purpose. She lives with man on terms
of equality. . . .

The dog has advantages in the way of uselessness

as well as in special gifts of temperament. He is
often spoken of . . . as the friend of man, and his
intelligence and fidelity are praised. The meaning
of this is that the dog is man’s servant and that
he has the gift of an unquestioning subservience
and a slave's quickness in guessing his master's
mood. Coupled with these traits . . . the dog has
some characteristics which are of a more equivocal
aesthetic value. He is the filthiest of the dom-
estic animals in his person and the nastiest in

his habits. For this he makes up in a servile,
fawning attitude toward his master. . . . The dog,
then, commends himself to our favour by affording
play to our propensity for mastery, and as he is
also an item of expense, and commonly serves no in-
dustrial purpose, he holds a well-assured place

in men's regard as a thing of good repute. . . .

And even those varieties of the dog which have been
bred into grotesque deformity . . . are in good
faith accounted beautiful by many. These varieties
. . . are rated and graded in aesthetic value some-
what in proportion to the degree of grotesqueness.
. . . The commercial value of canine monstrosities
. . . rests on their high cost of production, and
their value to their owners lies chiefly in their
utility as items of conspicuous consumption. In-
directly, through reflection upon their honorific
expensiveness, a social worth is imputed to them;
and so . . . he! come to be admired and reputed
beautiful. . . . 6

 

26M. . pp. 140-142.

  

81

  

Veblen makes a more serious and significant analysis
of manners. He first notes that manners are deteriorating
as we shift from conspicuous leisure to conspicuous con-
sumption.

Many a gentleman of the old school has been pro-
voked to remark regretfully upon the under-bred
manners and bearing of even the better classes

. . . and the decay of the ceremonial code . . .
among the industrial classes proper has become

one of the chief enormities of latter-day civili-
sation. . . . The decay . . . testifies . . . to
the fact that decorum is a product and an exponent
of leisure class life and thrives in full measure
only under a regime of status.2

Manners originated in a desire to show good will and this
"initial motive is rarely if ever absent from the conduct

of well-mannered persons at any stage of the later develop-
ment."28 Manners, however, soon ceased to be considered as
means. They came "to be possessed of a substantial utility

in themselves; they acquired a sacramental character. . . ."29

There are few things that so touch us with instinc-
tive revulsion as a breach of decorum; and so far
have we progressed in the direction of imputing in-
trinsic utility to the ceremonial Observances of
etiquette that few of us, if any, can dissociate an
offence against etiquette from a sense of the sub-
stantial unworthiness of the offender. A breach of
faith may be condoned, but a breach of decorum can
not. "manners maketh man."30

 

27Lgc, git., p. #6.
28ng, git., p. #7.
29w. , p. as.
301211-

82
Veblen next analyzes the economic ground of good manners.

Their ulterior, economic ground is to be sought in
the honorific character of that leisure or non-pro-
ductive employment of time and effort without which
good manners are not acquired. The knowledge and
habit of good form come only by long-continued use.
Refined tastes, manners, and habits of life are a
useful evidence of gentility, because good breeding
requires time, application, and expense, and can
therefore not be compassed by those whose time and
energy are taken up with work. . . . In the last
analysis the value of manners lies in the fact that
they are a voucher of a life of leisure. Therefore,
conversely, since leisure is the conventional means
of pecuniary repute, the acquisition of some pro-
ficiency in decorum is incumbent on all who aspire
to a modicum of pecuniary decency.31

We are now prepared to return to Veblen's original

question. What is the value of the leisure class as an

 

! economic factor in modern life? Much of the discussion
until now has been in terms of individual behavior. We
must now shift the argument to the behavior of groups or
classes of individuals. The leisure class, according to
Veblen, is a class which specializes in unproductive pur-
suits. It specializes in conspicuous consumption and con-
spicuous leisure. As a class it is divorced from the
industrial pursuits. From the viewpoint of the society at
large, the leisure class is parasitic.

We can now appreciate the close relationship between
Wandw
L§u§32§_glg§§. The business man of the former study is a

_‘

31M. . pp. 48-119.

83
member of the leisure class. He seeks unlimited profits
for the purposes of pecuniary emulation. He too must "keep
up with the Joneses.” Moreover, the business man adds little
to production. His work falls more in the area of exploit
than production. This meets the requirements of the leisure
class mores.

The business man stands at the apex of the industrial
system. In modern society the business community is the
most powerful section of the leisure class. The business
class becomes the pacemaker in nearly all questions con-
cerning values, ideals, consumption and leisure standards,
and criteria of success. Although the business community
is parasitic from the society's viewpoint, it is regarded
as the finest flower of evolution. The important questions
of the society are taken to the business man for solution.
Even the academic community confers upon him their most
coveted honors in recognition of his unselfish devotion to
the common good. This is the picture which Veblen sketches
for the reader. Individuals themselves are not to be con-
demned, however. Individual behavior only reflects powerful
cultural forces in the society. The determination of behavior
is for the individual a process at the subliminal level.
That business should control modern life is simply a reflec-
tion of the pecuniary values of the culture.

If the Veblenian analysis is valid, than the Marxian

analysis is untenable. The Marxists postulate sharp class

8h

cleavages based upon irreconciable conflicts between the
economic interests of various occupational groups. They
further assume that an occupational group will become con-
scious of its economic interest and will identify itself
with other groups having similar interests. White collar
employees, for example, would in the Marxian analysis identify
themselves with other employees in the class struggle.32
Veblen recognizes the existence of economic classes but
denies that an occupational group will necessarily develop
a class consciousness and thereby ally itself with those
having similar economic interests. White collar groups do
not as a matter of fact identify themselves with other
employees but rather with employers and other members of
the leisure class. In the Veblenian analysis, one's ideals
and aspirations are borrowed from that social group which
is next higher in the social hierarchy. Social classes are
highly interdependent and cannot be closely correlated with
distinct economic classes.

The major evil of modern civilization, states Veblen,
is the right of private property. It is upon the basis of
this right that the leisure class achieves its control.

Without the right of private preperty business could not

 

320. Wright M1118, ~
W (Oxford: New York, 1956). PP. 2914-298, 32h-327.

 

85
exploit industry. Regard for reputation would not take its
present form of pecuniary emulation. Common labor and in-
dustrial pursuits would regain their reSpectability. No

longer would work be equated with drudgery.

W

The third book of the great trilogy is entitled:_

.; .: .. . ,. ..;.:. . ;.. .- ; - . .- ..-; ;
A:Ls.33 Veblen regarded this study as his only important
contribution. Dorfman states that "all his work seems to
merge tOgether in this book, and it combines in its sweep
all the basic concepts and devices for presentation he had
used before."3“ This study presents the positive side of
Veblen's thought. It develops his psychology and his views
of the nature of primitive man. It elaborates his earlier
thinking on the function and cultural incidence of the
machine process.

There is a Bousseauistic ring in the Instingt_gz,
Hgnkmanship, The savage stage of human culture is pictured
as peaceful. It is characterized by workmanlike efficiency
and group solidarity. The very survival of man depended
upon the primacy of these traits. The penalty of death

awaited those groups which did not place the welfare of the

 

3 3Thorste1n Veblen .‘ W
In: stagg g: the Industrial.A:&fi (Huebsch: New York, 1922).

3”WW. p. 325.

86
group above the welfare of the individual.

In the savage state man's nature was in harmony with
his environment and institutions. His instincts were well-
suited to the kind of activities in which he was engaged.
Man's regard for reputation was satisfied by activities
which served the group welfare. The potlach was perhaps
one such activity. Since social life was characterized by
face-to-face relationships, there was no need to advertise
one's success or social standing.

This peaceful state of savagery was short-lived. The
material circumstances of life changed. Man was no longer
confined to the subsistence level of life. His economic
surplus permitted him to "play fast and loose" with life.
The penalty of death no longer awaited the individual or
group which refused to follow the dictates of basic drives,
propensities, or instincts. Man's fundamental nature became
contaminated. Workmanship came to serve purposes no longer
in the best interests of the community. The regard for the
welfare of the group became sublimiral. This is ironical
of course that the achievement of an economic surplus should
eventuate in the corruption of man, but such is the case.

Actually these speculations concerning the original
state of man are highly controversial. Most of Veblen's
theories regarding primitive cultures have either been modi-
fied or completely refuted. Fortunately, these speculations

do not constitute a necessary element in his overall

 

87
theoretical scheme. Although he admired the primitive stage
of culture, he does not suggest that it is possible to return
to such a culture. Neither does he rest the validity of
his social theory upon the validity of his theory of primitive
culture.

Veblen views man as an active, purposeful organism.
His behavior is governed fundamentally by instincts. Veblen
does not use the term "instinct" to mean tropismatic behav-
ior. Instincts involve consciousness, intelligence, and
adaptation. The more precise nature of instincts will be
discussed in the following chapter. It will suffice here
to note that Veblen himself was not always precise in his
use of the term.

Although man's nature is literally a bundle of in-
stincts, three are important in the continued survival of
man. These include a regard for the welfare of the group,

a sense of workmanship, and a desire for knowledge. Al-
though these instincts can be contaminated, they cannot be
erased from human nature. Thus there is always hope for

humanity.

WW complements Veblen ' s

earlier writings. In discussing Tug Ihggzg 9: 3h: leisure
£1335 an important question was left unanswered. Why do

members of the leisure class engage in all kinds of activity
when their success has already been assured? Why are they

active in politics, business, esoteric sports, and community

 

 

 

 

 

88

projects? Anticipating his Wallis Veblen
observes in an early section of Ine_1negzy_g£_th§_L§i§nne
Elm:

As a matter of selective necessity, man is an agent.

He is, in his own apprehension, a centre of unfold-

ing impulsive activity--"teleological" activity. He

is an agent seeking in every act the accomplishment

of some concrete, objective, impersonal end. By

force of his being such an agent he is possessed of

a taste for effective work, and a distaste for futile

effort. He has a sense of the merit of serviceability

or efficiency and of the demerit of futility, waste,

or incapacity. This aptitude or progensity may be

called the instinct of workmanship.3
Why do members of the leisure class pursue an activity such
as hunting? It is not that they need food or exercise.
Rather, it is because hunting is a 2312232231 activity which
serves the canons of reputable waste as well. Hunting repre-
sents a contamination of the instinct of workmanship.

Although the instincts of man ultimately must govern

his behavior, an individual is more directly controlled by
institutions. In Veblenian terminology an institution is
not so much a physical entity as it is a way of thinking or
acting. An institution can be regarded as a prevailing
habit of thought in the community. Since an individual is
born into a society with existing patterns of thought, he
learns to make responses to the promptings of his instincts

in ways sanctioned by the institutions of the community.

 

35W. p. 15.

89
An institution can be regarded as a means by which man ac-
complishes his purposes. Unfortunately, institutions do not
always serve this function. They lag behind economic changes,
or they become ends rather than means.

Although the Instingt_g£_flgnkmgn§hip_provides a basis
for an optimistic philosophy of life, Veblen remains equivocal
concerning the future of man. The fundamental problem in
all ages is adaptation to change, especially to the changes
in the material circumstances of life. Men who live close
to change are likely to make the adaptation. In a sense
they are forced to adapt. The industrial engineer for
example adapts to the matter-of-fact requirements of modern
industry. He is forced to think in terms of impersonal
cause and effect. The leisure class, however, adapts only
with extreme difficulty, since it lives so far removed from
the sources of change. In this respect the leisure class
is a drag on the civilization of man.

Veblen's pessimism stems from his lack of faith in
the rationality of man. Unlike the Marxist, Veblen discounts
the factor of rational, human consciousness in cultural

change.36 Men often react blindly and impulsively to

 

36The Marxian theory, according to Veblen, implicitly
assumes that men will rationally calculate their self-interest.
Class solidarity is achieved in this manner. Many students of
Marx do not support this position. Professor Sabine, for ex-
ample, states that "whereas Hegel appealed to national patri-
otism, Marx appealed to the fidelity of workers to their class.
. . . It was addressed rather to loyalty than to self-interest,
to duties rather than to rights. . . ." George H. Sabine, A

, rev. ed., (Holt: New York, 1950),

90
changing stimuli. Their institutions are frequently imbe-
cilic. Frequently, men must be literally forced to modify

their habits of action and thought.
W

Veblen was fifty-seven when the Instingt_g£_flpnkmanp
.ship was published in l9lh. Until this time his writings

had what Max Lerner has described as a "cosmic and timeless
quality.” This perhaps accounts for the continued pOpular-
ity of his earlier writings.

Even Veblen, however, could not remain aloof from
the earth-shattering events of the First World War. An
examination of his articles and books between 1915 and 1919
reveals an intense interest in the war and the problems of

reconstruction. The very titles of these books and articles

suggest their contents. In 1915. We

W was published.37 Two years later.
t P d m t

Egnggngtign appeared. Near the close of the war and in the
early months of reconstruction, Veblen wrote on the problems
of peace. These articles include: "A Policy of Reconstruc-

tion," ”Passing of National Frontiers," " An Outline of a

 

pp. 753-75h. Professor Mills, on the other hand, supports
'Veblen's position. "Both Marxism and liberalism make the
‘ same rationalist assumption that men, given the opportunity,
will naturally come to political consciousness of interests,

of self or of class." C. Wright Mills, gpg_git., p. 326.

37Thorstein Veblen,
W (Huebsch: New York, 1918).

91
Policy for the Control of the 'Economic Penetration' of
Backward Countries and of Foreign Investments," and ”Immanuel
Kant on Perpetual Peace."

As a reformer Veblen did not contribute significantly
to the overall development of his theoretical system. The
old wine was put into new bottles. Yet, at times this made
for a rather heady drink. In this period Veblen is primarily
interested in the application of his previous speculations.

One cannot read W
without soon realizing that the fundamental themes are similar
to those of his earlier works. This is illustrated in his
discussion of patriotism which he defines as a "sense of
partisan solidarity in respect of prestige."38 Patriotism
like other modes of behavior can be traced back to a funda-
mental drive, propensity, or instinct in human nature. Un-
like the instinct which seeks the welfare of the group,
patriotism seeks differential advantage. It seeks to injure,
humiliate, emulate, or destroy a competing group. Its value
to society is not in "keeping the peace" but in "breaking
the peace." Patriotism "makes for national pretensions and
international jealousy and distrust, with warlike enterprise

always in perSpective. . . ."39 As a habit of thought

 

38
W. p. 31-

39M” p. 78.

92
patriotism is not in harmony with the economic and cultural
realities of the modern world. It breeds particularism;
whereas science, technology, and scholarship are becoming
cosmOpolitan in scope. ”Into this cultural and technological
system of the modern world the patriotic spirit fits like
dust in the eyes and sand in the bearings."h0

WWWN
generally regarded as the most significant study of this
period. Max Lerner regards it as "one of Veblen's master-
pieces." In addition to being a refutation of German racism,
it is an analysis of the development of the German dynastic
state. In particular, it attempts to account for the rapid
rise to prominence of German industry. Why has Germany
been able to make such rapid economic progress? Why has
Germany been able to match British technological efficiency
in something like one-sixth of the time?

Veblen argues that Germany has benefited from the
"merits of borrowing", whereas Great Britain has suffered
from the "penalty of taking the lead." German technology
was not made in Germany but in England; it was borrowed from
the English. The Germans, however, did not borrow English

institutions.

 

no
N” p. “0.

93

What has been insisted on above is that British use
and wont in other than the technological respect was
not taken over by the German community at the same
time. . . . Germany combines the results of English
experience in the development of modern technology
with a state of the other arts of life more nearly
equivalent to what prevailed in England before the
modern industrial regime came on; so that the German
people have been enabled to take up the technological
heritage of the English without having paid for it in
the habits of thought . . . induced in the English
community by the experience involved in achieving it.
Moderflltechnology has come to the Germans ready-made.

Veblen argues that a nation which borrows suffers none of
the ”growing pains” associated with a nation which takes
.the lead. Germany, for example, is not retarded by customs
and conventions which have accompanied the development of
British industry. The Germans in a sense borrowed a fully
developed theoretical principle shorn of all cUmbersome
habits of thought.

The German peOple, who have lived close to a sub-
sistence level, know little of the fine arts of conspicuous
waste. This is a habit of action which has accompanied in-
dustrial advances in Great Britain. It constitutes one of
the "penalties" of taking the lead, as Veblen suggests in
the following passage:

It will be appreciated how serious a question this
may become, of the ways and means of reputable con-
sumption, when it is called to mind that in the com-
munities where the modern state of the industrial

arts has adequately taken effect this margin of pro-
duct disposable for wasteful consumption will always

 

“WW.
pp. 82-83 0

 

 

 

9h

exceed fifty per cent of the current product. . . .
So considerable a margin is not to be disposed of

to good effect by haphazard impulse. The due ab-
sorption of it in competitive spending takes thought,
skill and time. . . . It is also not a simple prob-
lem of conspicuously consuming time and substance,
without more ado; men's sense of fitness and beauty
requires that the spending should take place in an
apprOpriate manner. . . . It has, indeed, proved to
be a matter of some difficulty . . . in the industri-
ally advanced communities, to keep the scheme of
conspicuous waste abreast of the times; so that

. . . there have grown up an appreciable number of
special occupations devoted to the technical needs
of reputable spending. The technology of wasteful
consumption is large and elaborate and its achieve-
ments are among the monuments of human initiative
and endeavour; it has its victories and its heroes
as well as the technology of production."2

A nation such as Germany can divert a large percentage of
total output to producers' goods; whereas Great Britain,
under the canon of conspicuous waste, must divert most of
her production to consumers' goods.

A nation which borrows has another important advantage.
This can be illustrated by reference to the current rela-
tionship between the Soviet Union and the Western world.
The case of Russia is in many respects strikingly similar
to the case of Germany. Russia, like Germany, has borrowed
her technology ready-made. The Soviet Union borrows only
the most advanced technology of the West. In developing
its steel industry her technicians consider only the most
advanced processes. In this manner she has gained an in-

dustrial advantage in the world's economic community. A

 

”2M” pp. 33-34.

 

 

95

United States steel firm, for example, has far too much in-
vested in present facilities and processes to permit rapid
change. The past weighs heavily upon the present and future.

The present location of American industry is another
example of the penalty of taking the lead. A century ago
the transportation of resources and finished goods was not
a significant percentage of total cost. Thus, factories
were often located without significant regard for distance
from resources or markets. In the past fifty years, however,
the picture has changed drastically. Industrial efficiency
has increased at a fantastic rate, whereas transportation
efficiency has increased only modestly. Transportation has
thereby become a significant item in the total cost of
finished products. Does this mean that the automobile in-
dustry will be relocated in the immediate future? Obviously,
this cannot be done without extreme difficulty. Russia, on
the other hand, can learn from our experience.

The Veblenian thesis in respect to borrowing has
many applications. An illustration will make this evident.
Let us suppose that one of the illiterate peOples in the
world desires to establish a system of schools. Assuming
that the nation is sparsely settled, one of its first prob-
lems will concern the size and location of individual schools.
Knowing that the United States has devoted considerable
time and energy to this problem, it consults with our

specialists in this area. Having observed and studied our

 

96
consolidated school districts, these foreign educators
establish a system of regional schools in their own country.

Some years later we send a delegation of our own
educators to this country in order to observe its progress
in implementing our ideas. We are surprised to learn that
their schools are ideal in respect to size and location.
They have accomplished in five years what we have been
unable to accomplish in twenty-five. They borrowed our
"technology" without the accompanying institutional encum-
brances. This illiterate people had never heard of the
"little red school school house." They did not have to fight
the institutions or habits of thought generated in an earlier

period of educational development.

W

After the First World War a disillusioned Veblen
turned to Bolshevism. Again, the very titles of his articles
suggest their contents and their author's point of view.

As an editor of The Dial he contributed: "Bolshevism Is

a Menace--to Whom?", "Bolshevism Is a Menace to the Vested
Interests," "A World Safe for the Vested Interests," "The
Red Terror and the Vested Interests," and "The Red Terror--
At Last It Has Come to America."

Between 1919 and 1925, Veblen published his last
four studies. Of these, we shall not be concerned with

:0.:o "_ 0.1- so .0 :40. n: ‘7 ‘ o ‘ 9 R ’0 u‘:

 

97

Ih§_Qa§§_Q£_Amezima (1923) or The Laxdaela Saga (1925). The
former is a refined restatement of his earlier writings on
business enterprise. The translation of the Icelandic saga
does not fall within the scope of Veblen's major writings.

The remaining works include: In§_ye§t§g_lntgngsta
WW (1939)“3 and W.
‘ngg£§_fing_nhg_2:1§§_filfiigm (1921). The contents of these
works were originally published as articles in ihe Dial.
As such, they reflect the usual deficiencies of the Journal-
istic style. The depth and sublety of his earlier writings
are missing. In neither of these works is Veblen at his
best. The basic themes are the same, but the objective and
style have changed. He is now the prOpagandizer of his
earlier themes. Something is lost in the transition.
There is no longer the objectivity and suspended judgment
of his earlier essays. Bitterness, bias, narrowness, naive-
ness, and overstatement are the characteristics of many of
these articles. Bernard Rosenberg has made a fair evalu-
ation of Ihg_lefitgd_lgtgz§§§s. He has called it a "forceful
but unfortunately repetitious, garrulous, and bitter re-
statement of Veblenism. Its analogies are overdrawn: busi-
ness is simply reduced to blackmail or ransom, but the worker

is represented as an exemplar of honesty and industry."“u

 

“BThe title was changed in 1920 to The Vested Igtgzgstg
W.

““Rosenberg, QQ‘_§lL., p. 111.

 

98
The Vested Intgngats need not detain us further.
WW deserves extended

treatment. Although it suffers from the limitations already
described, it does present in rather concise fashion the
major Veblenian themes in respect to American capitalism.’+5
The reader should be aware, however, that it is a disillus-
ioned and bitter Veblen who is now writing. Moreover, it

is Veblen as a journalist. There are few qualifications,
ramifications, fine discriminations, or embellishments in
these essays. The journalistic style forced Veblen to
present his thesis in a direct and brief form.

Veblen was bitterly disappointed in the outcome of
the First World War. He concluded in one of his earlier
articles after the war that the common man had "won the war
but lost his livelihood." The war had demonstrated the
productive possibilities of modern technology. Peoples
everywhere were in deeperate need of goods and services.

The long war had diverted production into war materiel. Now
that peace had been won this great productive potential
could be unleashed for the benefit of all men. The goods

and services were not forthcoming. The reason for this

failure was the sabotage of industry by business. He argues:

 

usFor the reader who is unacquainted with Veblenism,
Wand tdIt
M provide an excellent introduction to the
major themes in Veblen's social phiIOSOphy.

 

 

 

99

In any community that is organized on the price system,
with investment and business enterprise, habitual un-
employment of the available industrial plant and work-
men, in whole or in part, appears to be the indispen-
sable condition without which tolerable conditions of
life cannot be maintained. That is to say, in no such
community can the industrial system be allowed to work
at full capacity for any appreciable interval of time.
. . . The requirements of profitable business will

not tolerate it. So the rate and volume of output
must be adjusted to the needs of the market, not to
the working capacity of the available resources,
equipment and man power, nor to the community's need
of consumable goods. . . . It is always a question

of more or less unemployment of plant and man power,
and a shrewd moderation in the unemployment of these
available resources, a "conscientious withdrawal of
efficiency," therefore, is the beginning of wisdom

in all sound workday business enterprise that has to
do with industry.

Under modern capitalism there is a basic and irreconciable
conflict between the making of money and the making of goods,
between business and industry. This is a frequently re-
iterated theme in Veblen‘s writings.

Having indicated the tremendous productive potential
of the modern industrial system, Veblen attempts to account
for this productivity. Traditionally, the economist had
analyzed production in terms of land, labor, and capital.
The contribution which each made to the productive process
was measured by the income received in terms of rent, wages,
and interest. In this classification profit represented

the wages of management.

 

“Thorstein Veblen. We
system,(fluebsch: New York, 1921). pp. 9-10.

100

Veblen finds this eXplanation of production unsatis-
factory. The productivity of industry is primarily a pro-
duct of the state of the industrial arts. Any adequate
explanation of productivity must include technological pro-
ficiency as a factor of production. Unlike land, labor, and
capital, technological proficiency is not privately owned.

The state of the industrial arts is a joint stock

of knowledge derived from past experience, and is

held and passed on as an indivisible possession of

the community at large. It is the indispensable

foundation of all productive industry, of course,

but except for certain minute fragments covered by

patent rights or trade secrets, this joint stock

is no man's individual property. For this reason

it has not been counted in as a factor in produc-

tion. The unexampled advance of technOIOgy during

the past one hundred and fifty years has now begun

to call attention to its omission. . . . 7
Productivity necessarily depends upon the technological
competence of the community. Business exploits this com-
petence for private advantage. Although Veblen is not
explicit, his position implies that productivity belongs
rightfully to the community which nurtures it rather than
to business which exploits it.

Although the community should control industry for
its own welfare, it obviously must delegate this responsi-
bility. Should not business logically exercise this re-
sponsibility? Veblen is unequivocal in rejecting this

possibility. Business men are too far removed from the

technological process. Modern business thinks in terms of

 

“7Loc. cit., p. 28.

 

lOl

prowess and exploit rather than in terms of impersonal cause
and effect. In an earlier period of industrial development
the business man was a competent technologist. He was the
owner of his shep, the financier, the foreman, the plant
manager, the innovator, and the master technician.

These captains of the early times are likely to be

rated as inventors, at least in a loose sense of

the word. But it is more to the point that they

were designers and builders of factory, mill, and

mine equipment, of engines, processes, machines,

and machine tools, as well as shOp managers, at

the same time that they took care, acre or less

effectually, of the financial end.LL
At this stage of industrial development there was no divorce
between ownership and management, between the financial
and technological aspects of industry. A community could
well entrust its technological knowledge to this kind of
individual.

Modern business does not possess the technological
proficiency of its predecessors. As industry became more
complex, the business man necessarily became increasingly
involved in financial affairs. He became an expert in
"prices and profits and financial maneuvers." In Veblen's
estimate the typical business man is ignorant of technology.
He is a financier with a cash-register mind rather than an
industrial engineer. In spite of this incompetence, however,

business men continue to make the final decisions governing

the utilization of the community's technological knowledge.

 

“8M” p. 32.

102
The ever increasing complexity of the industrial system makes
this control all the more odious and ill—advised.
It is the engineers who should control industry since
the modern industrial system is
eminently a system, self-balanced and comprehensive;
and it is a system of interlocking mechanical pro-
cesses, rather than of skilful manipulation. . . .
It is an organization of mechanical powers and mater-
ial resources, rather than of skilled craftsmen and
tools. . . . It is of an impersonal nature, after the
fashion of the material sciences, on which it con-
stantly draws. . . . For all these reasons it lends
itself to systematic control under the direction of
industrial experts, skilled technologists, who may
be called "pfioduction engineers," for want of a
better term. 9
The engineer not only understands technOIOgy but has no
vested interest in the industrial process. The engineers,
therefore, are the men to whom the community can delegate
responsibility. In point of fact the engineers already are
responsible for whatever industrial progress is made. Thus,
the overturn of business would not obstruct the efficient
operation of the economic system. On the contrary, such
an overturn would be a tonic to industry. This is Veblen's
"positive" contribution after a lifetime during which he
continually criticized American capitalism.
Although we are not primarily concerned with a
critical examination of Veblen's position at this juncture,
it must be pointed out that he has made an almost unbeliev-

ably naive proposal. The reader may wonder, as indeed many

 

“9M” p. 52.

103
have wondered, if Veblen was serious in preposing that the
engineers should take command of the industrial system.
Whether he was serious or not, his proposal is not a logical
consequence of his critique of American business.

Veblen criticizes business because it controls both
the ends and means of the industrial system without demon-
strating competence in either. The ends of business con-
flict with the ends of the community. While one may not
agree with Veblen, it is a position which he argues forcibly
and convincingly. He now turns to the role of engineers
in the industrial process. The logical consequence of his
position is that the engineers should take control of in-
dustrial means. This is the manifest function of an engineer.
He is a specialist in the determination of means relative
to given ends. Society, on the other hand, would determine
the ends of the industrial system. This is the preper
function of society in a democratic culture. Veblen almost
suggests this when he argues that production depends upon
the technolOgical knowledge of the community. The fruits
of industry belong to the community. The community, there-
fore, should decide which fruits it desires. This is the
logical consequence of Veblen's position.

Veblen, however, does not defend the point of view
which logically issues from his general position. Instead,
he asserts that the engineers should determine both the ends

and means of production. This, of course, is not a logical

104

conclusion of Veblen's attack on business. Engineers are
no more competent than business men in the determination of
the proper ends of society. Veblen's position is so absurd
that it is difficult to believe that he was entirely serious.
In any case, as R. L. Duffus has concluded, Veblen "was at
his best when he criticized human society not when he tried
to mend it."50

During the early years of the Great Depression The
Engineena end the Priee System became Veblen's most popular
work. It formed the philosophical basis of the notorious
movement, Technocracy. This movement proposed that the
engineers should seize control of industry. Veblen was
called the spiritual father of Technocracy. It was said
that the last chapter of Ihe_Ensine=£s_and_the_firise_$1stem.
entitled "A Soviet of Technicians," anticipated the movement.
Although Technocracy was short-lived, its radical nature
served to discredit Veblen in the eyes of many who had not
read beyond this single naive book.

There are important features of Veblen's writings
that are best appreciated when his work is considered in
its entirety. In the first place, there is a striking lack
of empirical evidence in support of his bold generalizations.
This is paradoxical, since Veblen is the spiritual father

of Institutional Economics, a movement which lays great

 

50W. p. 150.

 

 

 

105
emphasis upon empirical studies. Coupled with these bold
generalizations is a professed objectivity. We are asked
to believe that terms such as "waste" and "serviceability"
are morally neutral. Veblen's conclusions presumably rest
upon colorless mater-of-fact and impersonal cause and effect.

Veblen's writings are characterized by sharp dichotomies.
The most conspicuous of these is that between business and
industry. These categories are developed in terms of a
strict either-or opposition. Many of the dichotomies em-
ployed by Veblen transcend purely empirical generalizations.
They become tools which he employs in his analysis of Ameri-
can culture, although Veblen does not always distinguish
between these logical models and reality. This is an im-
portant point, for Veblen criticizes traditional economists
for confusing their abstractions of reality with reality
itself. Veblen, however, is at times equally guilty.

On the positive side, Veblen's writings reveal re-
markably consistent themes. He contradicts himself fre-
quently but is able, nevertheless, to relate nearly all of
human knowledge to certain prevailing points of view. The
result is a kind of grant synthesis of knowledge around a
central theme. Moreover, these major theses appear to in-
volve the significant problems and questions. He had that
rare ability to raise the "right" questions and issues.

One need not agree with him in order to admire and applaud

his work. Veblen is the direct opposite of those social

106
scientists who deal with insignificant problems by utilizing
insignificant correlations between insignificant data in

the hOpe that they can reach insignificant conclusions.

CHAPTER IV

THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF THORSTEIN VEBLEN

Although Thorstein Veblen did not write a systematic
treatise on social theory, the elements of such a theory
are found in scattered passages in his various studies. In
particular, his critique of classical economics rests upon
a rather comprehensive philos0phical position. After ex-
amining Veblen's attack on the orthodox economics, we shall
turn to a discussion of some of the more distinctive elements

in his social philosophy.

gripigue g: onpngdggl Egghgmies

This critique involves a comprehensive analysis of
the philosophical and psychological assumptions upon which
the orthodox position rests. In respect to the philosophical

assumptions of economics, Veblen is particularly critical

 

1Veblen makes no rigorous distinction between classi-
cal and neo-classical economics. Orthodox refers to the
economic theory of Alfred Marshall as well as to that of
Adam Smith. In this thesis, the terms classical, orthodox,
and traditional are used interchangeably to refer to all
economic theory which is conventionally labeled either
classical or neo-classical.

107

108

 

of its metaphysics, although the methodology is also found

wanting. In discussing the "invisible hand" of the health

92 Netionez Veblen states that Adam Smith

conceives the Creator to be very continent in the
matter of interference with the natural course of
things. The Creator has established the natural

order to serve the ends of human welfare; and he has
very nicely adjusted the efficient causes comprised

in the natural order, including human aims and motives,
to this work they are to accomplish. The guidance

of the invisible hand takes place not by way of
interposition, but through a comprehensive scheme
of contrivances established from the beginning. For
the purpose of economic theory. man is conceived to
'be 00nsistently self—seeking; but this economic man

is a part of the mechanism of nature, and his self-
seeking traffic is but a means whereby, in the natural
course of things, the general welfare is worked out.
{The scheme as a whole is guided by the end to be
'reached. . . . The benevolent work of guidance was
13erformed in first establishing an ingenious mech-
aiaism of forces and motives capable of accomplishing

'az: ordained result. . . .

 

" 2The passage to which Veblen refers reads as follows:
EVery' individual is continually exerting himself to find
out the: most advantageous employment for whatever capital
he Can command. It is his own advantage, and not that of the
SOCiety', which he has in view. But the study of his own
a(Wants-gs naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to
Fmefer ‘that employment which is most advantageous to the
5°019ty'- . . . By directing that industry in such a manner
as its Iatroduce may be of the greatest value, he intends only
his own egain; and he is in this, as in many other cases,
led by air: invisible hand to promote an end which was no part
3; his 1Jritention. Nor is it always the worse for society
f at it vusas no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he
requent:3_y promotes that of the society more effectually
Adam Smith,

“En whezg he really intends to pranete it."
t o , Vol. II (Clarendon: Oxford, 1869)

pp. 26, 28.

3Ihe Pleee oz: Seiehee in Medezh Ciyilieatieh, p. 115.

 

 

 

 

 

109
The orthodox economist argued that every man should pursue
his self-interest. Competition directs the individual's
self-interest to a social goal. The ”invisible hand“ works
through the mechanism of competition. The consumer is a
rational calculator in pursuit of pleasure. He registers
his economic wants on the market. The producers, who are
motivated by eXpectations of profit, are guided by the prices
which consumers have in part established.

Although the consumer is therefore sovereign, his
behavior is passive and mechanical. Human nature is conceived
to be a mechanism through which the "grand design" is worked
out. Nevertheless, man's relationship to the economic order
is not entirely deterministic. Man can meddle with economic
laws. In the short run at least, he can prevent the Provi-
dential Order from being realized. But man cannot alter
economic laws. Although he can interfere, he cannot render
a permanent change. As soon as he ceases to interfere with
the economic order, things "will right themselves."

This belief in the recuperative power of the economic
order is still a prevalent point of view. In our own day
it is exemplified by the exhortations to return to a free-
enterprise, competitive, laissez-faire economy. The laws of
economics, it is implied, are eternal. Therefore, the
cataclysmic economic changes of the past century are irrele-
vant so far as these laws are concerned. Although man has

meddled with the economic order, a return to free competition

 

 

 

 

110
will once again make society fully consistent with the
Providential Order.

The orthodox economists believed in a meliorative
trend in the operation of immutable economic laws. Society
not only moves toward fixed ends, but these ends are good
and worthy. The economic conflicts between individuals
eventuate in harmony and beneficence at the societal level.
This view cannot be justly evaluated or appreciated unless
it is seen in relationship to the culture in which it arose.
In its inception orthodox economics was forward looking. It
represented freedom as opposed to the oppressive practices
of feudalism and mercantilism. Capitalism thrived under
the institutions of free competition, private property, and
the profit motive. Industrial and commercial eXpansion were
rapid. The prevalence of the small firm gave credence to
the view that free competition would goad self-interest
toward a social good. The orthodox economist had reason
to believe that his theory represented a somewhat idealized
account of the actual state of affairs.

In postulating a meliorative trend, however, the
classical economists rationalized un-Christian conduct at
the individual level. The traditional sins now became
virtues. In the words of Lewis Mumford:

All the practices of the worldly life, which had

been hitherto banned by the Church, were now either
tacitly sanctioned or actively stimulated. Avarice
ceased to be a sin. . . . Greed, gluttony, avarice,

envy, and luxury were constant incentives to in-
dustry. . . .

111

The whole moral change that took place under capit-
alism can be summed up in the fact that human pur-
poses, human needs, and human limits no longer
exercised a directive and restraining influence upon
industry. . . .

Now, up to the emergence of capitalism, economic

life had had a strong moral foundation. It was

rooted in the motion that every act of life was

under the judgment of God. . . . Hence, the concep-

tion of a just price. . . . Against the Roman legal

motto, Let the buyer beware, the medieval economist

held rather, Let buyer and seller both fear God.

. . . Social justice was more important than private

advantage.

But the capitalist transvaluation of human values

went on steadily; and the supreme success was in mak-

ing pride and luxury the central virtues.“
Lewis Mumford has stated explicitly what is only implicit
in Veblen. Although Veblen claims to describe, not to
judge, his critique of classical economics was apparently
motivated in part by this "iransvaluation of human values."
Veblen writes like a man who literally hated pride, luxury,
greed, and envy. It is revealing in this connection that
in an essay on Christianity Veblen equates this religious
doctrine with humility and brotherly love, traits that
are not conducive to success in a highly competitive society.5

Explicitly, Veblen attacks the orthodox belief in a

natural economic order. This belief had obscured significant

aspects of economic reality. The classical economists knew

 

“Mumford, ep‘_eit,, pp. 162-163.

5"Christian Morals and the Competetive System,"

W. pp. 200-218-

 

 

112
their conclusions before undertaking their studies. Their
preconceptions controlled the entire range of their specu-
lations. The traditional economist knelt down before the
altar of the "normal" and the "natural." Data which failed
to support the normal were considered unreal or were attrib-
uted to a ”disturbing” cause. It was evident that change
took place, but change was equated with movement toward a
fixed state of equilibrium. This was in the best tradition
of the classical physics. Obviously, there was no room for
genuine novelty in this kind of Welpeheehehhng. The study
of institutions, social customs, and human wants were beyond
the pale of these economists.

Veblen concludes that the work of the orthodox econ-
omists was taxonomic in character. In the following passage
he gives us his interpretation of a taxonomic science:

The ways and means and the mechanical structure of
industry are formulated in a conventionalised nomen-
clature, and the observed motions of this mechanical
apparatus are then reduced to a normalized scheme of
relations. The scheme so arrived at is spiritually
binding on the behavior of the phenomena contemplated.
With this normalized scheme as a guide, the permuta-
tions of a given segment of the apparatus are worked
out according to the values assigned the several
items. . . . This is the deductive method. The for-
mula is then tested by comparison with observed permu-
tations, by the polaris00pic use of the "normal case".
. . . Features of the process that do not lend them-
selves to interpretation in the terms of the formula
are abnormal cases and are due to disturbing causes.
In all this the agencies or forces causally at work

in the economic life process are neatly avoided. The
outcome of the method, at its best, is a body of
logically consistent prepositions concerning the nor-
mal relations of things--a system of economic taxonomy.6

6w. p. 67.

113
Veblen cites the writings of John Elliott Cairnes (lBZU—
1875) as best exemplifying economic taxonomy. The earlier
classical economists had developed their theories in rela-
tionship to the common sense metaphysics of their time.
Economic theory was ostensibly concerned with the fulfill-
ment of human purposes. Thus there is an emphasis upon
"meliorative trends," "harmony of interests," "invisible
hand," and so forth. In Cairnes, however, the emphasis is
distinctly altered. Economics became a formal, abstract,
deductive science divorced from the life process. Starting
with a knowledge of ultimate principles concerning human
nature, the laws of economies are deduced. Economics came
close to being "taxonomy for the sake of taxonomy."

While Veblen recognized that there were differences
in emphases among the various traditional economists, he
does not regard these differences as substantial. Cairnes,
for example, still writes in terms of the "normal" case and
"natural" law. "Controlling" principles still determine
the outcome of the economic process. None of the orthodox
economists developed a theory based upon cumulative causation
and impersonal matter—of-fact. In general, the classical
economists were much more concerned with structure than with
function. The task of the economist was to fit dynamic
economic facts into static categories.

Arthur Kent Davis, a disciple of Talcott Parsons,

finds Veblen's criticism of classical economics ill-founded.

11a
He first argues that "Veblen's position rested upon some
profound misconceptions of the nature of scientific theory
and of economic theory in particular."7 Later, he continues:
Scientific theory is necessarily an abstraction. A
given science abstracts a certain abstract of action.
. . . The given empirical universe can be explained
in causal terms only by a synthesis of a series of
such abstract sciences8 each studying a given aspect
of the concrete world.
According to Davis, "economics is an analytical abstract
science which is not logically dependent upon any other dis-
cipline for its data."9 Finally, Davis finds that the "idea
of beneficence, concerning which Veblen makes such a fuss,
faded with Malthus and Bicardo."1o
Veblen's sin , according to Davis, was to criticize
traditional economics for not explaining all of reality.
Had Veblen understood scientific theory, he would have appre-
ciated the role and function of abstraction. In particular,
he would have seen that economics is an “analytical abstract"

science. Furthermore, he would have realized that sociology,

not economics, is the grand synthesizer of the social

sciences.

 

yDavis. an._eii.. p. 171.
8m.

9M” p. 17L».
lohgg, eit., p. 175.

115
There are many passages in Veblen which tend to
support Davis's contentions. Veblen was unduly critical
of the methodology of the orthodox economists. He did not
familiarize his readers with the fact that much of traditional
economics is written in the subjunctive mood. One can also
agree that Veblen's theory of science is superficial. In-
deed, his writings on scientific methodology are pitched in
the most general terms. Concepts such as matter-of—fact,
evolution, cause and effect, and animism are not adequately
defined. Yet, when Veblen's writings are considered as a
whole, one suspects that Davis is making a straw man out of
Veblen.11
Are we seriously to believe that Veblen did not appre-
ciate the function of abstraction in scientific inquiry?
That such is not the case is evident in the following
passages:
All this may seem like taking pains about triviali-
ties. But the data with which any scientific inquiry

has to do are trivialities in some other bearing than
that one in which they are of account.12

 

11In this connection it should be noted that Davis
has in recent years been much more sympathetic toward Veblen.
In a recent article, for example, he praises Veblen in the
following terms: "What can we say of Veblen that his writings
do not say better? What, indeed, except that with the pass-
ing of time he looms ever larger as one of the handful of
really great minds of the modern world. His is surely the
most original and prophetic figure in American academic cir-
cles; history may yet judge that he is the greatest social
thinker this country has so far produced." Mgnthlx gggigu,
vol. IX, Nos. 3-” (July-August. 1957), p. 93.

IZIDE EJEQQ 9f Sglgngg gn mggggg civilisatign, p. #2.

116

The habit of distinguishing and classifying the

various purposes and directions of activity prevails

of necessity always and everywhere; for it is indis-

pensable in reaching a working theory or scheme of

life. The particular point of view, or the particu-

lar characteristic that is pitched upon as definitive

in the classification of the facts of life depends

upon the interest from which a discrimination of the

facts is sought.13

What has just been said of the place which the uni-

versity occupies in modern civilization . . . may

seem something of a fancy sketch. It is assuredly

not a faithful description of any concrete case.

. . . Yet it is true to the facts, taken in a gener-

alized way. . . . It describes an institutional

ideal. . . .14

Although Veblen may have exaggerated the scope and

function of economics, it is evident that he was aware of
more than the economic interest in the determination of
behavior. Man has "aesthetic, sexual, humanitarian, and
devotional" as well as economic interests. The point is
that these interests cannot be isolated from one another.
Man as an agent acts with a single "complex of habits of
thought." Every interest therefore is influenced by the
economic interest. Indeed, Veblen argues that every inter-
est is,in some respects an economic interest. But it will
also be true that aesthetic, sexual, humanitarian, and
devotional interests influence the economic interest. To
abstract any one interest and treat this interest as the
substantial reality is to divorce that interest from the life

process.

 

13Ihs_Iha2zx_9f_ihs_Lsisuzs_Qlas§J p. 9.
”WWW. p. 32.

117
Although the orthodox economists were preoccupied
with abstractions, deductions, and taxonomy, these perhaps
were not their major shortcomings. Their primary sins were
two-fold. On the one hand, as Davis points out, they com-
mitted what Alfred North Whitehead has called the fallacy
of "misplaced concreteness."15 They treated their abstrac-
tions as the substantial concrete reality. Secondly, they
failed to abstract the most significant features of the
economic process. For example, they were unable to deal
with economic growth and deve10pment within the scope of
their abstractions.
Evidently an economic inquiry which occupies itself
exclusively with the movements of this consistent,
elemental human nature under given, stable institu-
tional conditions . . . can reach statical results
alone; since it makes abstraction from those elements
that make for anything but a statical result.16
Davis's contention that the "idea of beneficence . .
. faded with Malthus and Ricardo" is especially curious.
In the first place, Veblen states Specifically that this
idea played a less important role among many of the later
orthodox economists.17 Secondly, although there is a tone

of pessimism in many of the writings of the economic

theorists and social philosophers of the nineteenth century,

 

15A1fz~ed North Whitehead. W
hung“; (Mentor: New York, 1953), p. 52.

16W. p. 2h2.
17M” p. 159.

 

 

118
the doctrine of beneficence continued to be preached. Fred-

eric Bastiat (1801-1850) and Henry C. Carey (1793-1879)

18

perpetuated the doctrine. Furthermore, educated Americans

continued to read Adam Smith and his popularizer, J. B. Say.
Later in the century, it was the social philosophy of Herbert
Spencer which dominated the intellectual climate of the
United States. Spencer accepted the doctrine of beneficence
in its most blatant form. He writes:

Meanwhile the well-being of existing humanity, and
the unfolding of it into this ultimate perfection,
are both secured by that same beneficent, though
severe discipline, to which the animate creation at
large is subject: a discipline which is pitiless in
the working out of good: a felicity-pursuing law
which never swerves for the avoidance of partial and
temporary suffering. The poverty of the incapable,
the distresses that come upon the imprudent, the
starvation of the idle . . . are the decrees of a
large, far-seeing benevolence. It seems hard that
an unskilfulness which with all his efforts he
cannot overcome, should entail hunger upon the
artisan. . . . It seems hard that widows and or-
phans should be left to struggle for life or death.
Nevertheless, when regarded not separately, but in
connection with the interests of universal humanity,
these harsh fatalities are seen to be full of the
highest beneficence. . . .19

It is true, of course, that Spencer was not concerned with
beneficence as an economic doctrine p§z_§§J but it is also

true that neither Veblen nor the classical economists were

 

18Alexander Gray, T 1 Eco o: D t
Longmans: London, 1951), pp. 2&8—265.

19Herbert Spencer, 5991a; Statics (D. Appleton: New
York. 1865). PP- 353-35“-

 

119
concerned with beneficence as merely an economic doctrine.
It is also true that Spencer develops his thesis of bene-
ficence in relationship to the Darwinian theory of evolution.
His conclusion, however, is consistent with the position of
the orthodox economists. All interference by the state in
the social order is rejected, because it interferes with
man's natural tendency toward perfection. It seems likely
that Veblen's animosity toward the idea of beneficence was
generated at Yale where he studied the Spencerian philos0phy
as a graduate student.

Davis's definition of economics as a logically in-
dependent, abstract, analytical science appears to be in-
adequate. It emphasizes pure theory to the neglect of
"applied" economics. If we understand Davis correctly, his
definition implies that the science of economics should be
concerned with the derivation of laws and principles. Some
of these laws will have universal applicability such as the
Law of Diminishing Returns, whereas others will depend upon
certain institutional assumptions. Upon the bases of these
fundamental laws and principles the economist constructs
logical models with which he analyzes given wants in respect
to given resources and institutions. What is suggested by
Davis is valid so far as it goes. It is also true that
Veblen tended to neglect this area of economic science,
although his early essay on the price of wheat indicates

his acquaintance with both the function and value of

 

120

 

conventional analysis. Davis, nevertheless, seems to have
missed the central point of Veblen's argument.

Ultimately, economics must be concerned with appli-
cation. It is the concrete economic behavior of men which
must finally be the concern of the science. Men have wants,
the determination of which depends upon empirical investi-
gation. It cannot be assumed that the economic system
automatically fulfills these wants according to the dictates
of certain universal laws and principles. The validity or
the relevancy of an economic law is to be judged in relation-
ship tc economic action. The economist must know how, in
fact, the economic system operates before he can assess the
significance of given economic principles. This is what
Veblen seems to be asserting. He had witnessed the change
and development of economic life and did not believe that
the conventional laws and principles were relevant in under—
standing these changes. He implies, therefore, that the
principles of economics must be derived from an empirical
study of the character of the economic activities of the
culture. The science of economics, in other words, has
little meaning or validity apart from economic action. In-
deed, the very term "economic" is dependent for its meaning
upon a given type of human behavior. The economist cannot,
therefore, include certain kinds of behavior and exclude
other kinds a_n:igni. This, however, would appear to be

the consequence of accepting Davis's definition of economics.

 

121

WWW

One of the most important features of Veblen's
critique concerns the psychological assumptions of the
orthodox economists. He attempts to show that their philos-
Ophical speculations are integrally related to specific
psychological doctrines. The hedonistic psychology20 of
the English economists is described by Veblen in this much
quoted passage:

The hedonistic conception of man is that of a
lightning calculator of pleasures and pains,

who oscillates like a homogeneous globule of
desire of happiness under the impulse of stimuli
that shifts him about the area, but leave him
intact. He has neither antecedent nor consequent.
He is an isolated, definitive human datum, in
stable equilibrium except for the buffets of

the impinging forces that displace him in one di-
rection or another. Self-imposed in elemental
space, he spins symmetrically about his own spir-
itual axis until the parallelogram of forces
bears down upon him, whereupon he follows the
line of the resultant. When the force of the
impact is spent, he comes to rest, a self-contained
globule of desire as before. Spiritually, the
hedonistic man is not a prime mover. He is not
the seat of a process of living, except in the
sense that he is subject to a series of permuta-
tions enforced upgn him by circumstances external
and alien to him.

 

 

 

 

 

20This psychology states that the volitions of men
are inescapably determined by present and future pleasures
and pains. It is not to be confused with ethical hedonism
which states that men 93gb; to pursue pleasure and avoid
pain- See 0. D. Broad. Wm (Bout-
ledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1951), pp. 180-l8h.

ZIWWW. pp.
73-74.

 

 

 

 

122
Man is conceived to be an isolated, passive, inert organism
which reacts in predictable ways to given stimuli. Since
human nature is everywhere the same, the economist can treat
it as a "given" or constant in his Speculations.

Among the earliest orthodox economists the hedonistic
calculus fortified the mechanistic view of the economic
system. The teleological conception of the social system
required that man be a mechanism whereby the "natural course
of things" was worked out. Among these economists the Pro-
vidential Order was the substantial reality. Human nature
was the means through which this reality was realized. It
was reCOgnized by these economists that human behavior was
not always consistent with their ideal formulations. Human
behavior was perverse in many respects. It must have been
recognized, in addition, that man had other motives than
self-interest. Nevertheless, there was a tendency to equate
the abstraction of the hedonistic man with reality.

Subsequent traditional economists tended to de-emphasize
the teleological quality of the social order. Human nature
was no longer merely the means by which the natural order
was worked out. It was the purposeful behavior of men which
was emphasized. The pleasures and pains of men were viewed
as the active motivators of behavior. The conclusions of
these economists, nevertheless, were similar to those reached

by the earlier traditionalists.

123
Veblen's attack focused on the "individualism" of

the hedonistic psychology. The traditional economists viewed
man as an isolated being rather than as a member of a social
group. Man's nature was formed from within. Cultural forces
had no bearing upon his nature except in so far as he made
calculated and predictable responses to stimuli. Human
wants were abstracted from their institutional setting.
The prevailing habits of thought in the society could have

no economic bearing under these psychological assumptions.

W

A brief consideration of the major features of an
evolutionary economics will assist us in comprehending the
broader aspects and implications of Veblen's social theory.
The fundamental difference between the traditional and evo-
lutionary points of view in economics is described as a
"difference of Spiritual attitude. . . . To put the matter
in other words, it is a difference in the basis of valuation
of the facts for the scientific purpose, or in the interest
from which the facts are appreciated."22 An evolutionary
economics is not unique in being "realistic" or in emphasiz-
ing "facts.” Neither is it unique in its emphasis upon

development, process, or sequence. The orthodox economists

 

22W. p. 60.

12M
were noteamtirely oblivious to these features of economic
life.

The fundamental characteristic of the modern point
of view is its refusal to "go back of the colorless sequence
of phenomena and seek higher ground for its ultimate synthe-
ses."23 The cumulative nature of impersonal cause and
effect commands the attention of the modern economist. An
evolutionary economics finds no place for normality, opti-
mism, natural rights, absolute truths, Providential Order,
controlling principles, or natural laws. Whereas the class-
ical economist viewed the economic process from the stand-
point of "ceremonial adequacy," the modern economist develops
his theory in terms of an impersonal cause and effect which
seeks no final term. The economic life process must be
stated in terms of the process itself.

Veblen hastens to point out that this "later method
of apprehending and assimilating facts . . . may be better
or worse, more or less worthy or adequate, than the earlier;
it may be of greater or less ceremonial or aesthetic
affect. . . ."Zn

From the phiIOSOphical standpoint the evolutionary

approach has no intrinsic or absolute merit. A preconception

 

23M” p. 61.

24M. 3 P0 810

 

 

125
of a Providential Order may represent a more adequate view
of the life process. Such a preconception, however, is beyond
the scOpe of an evolutionary science. It is an ”extra-ovo-
1utionary preconception” which lies beyond the scope of an
inquiry into processes characterized by cause and effect
relationships.

Although the evolutionary approach has no absolute
validity, such an approach must prevail under present con-
ditions of life.

Under the stress of modern technological exigencies,
men's everyday habits of thought are falling into
the lines that in the sciences constitute the evo—
lutionary method; and knowledge which proceeds on
a higher, more archaic plane is becoming alien and
meaningless to them. The social and political sci-

ences must follow the drift, for they are already
caught in it.25

I EIJEIII: . F I

The evolutionary approach to economics involved much
more than a ”change in Spiritual attitude." The additional
aspects and characteristics of the Veblenian point of view
will be developed within the more inclusive context of the
so-called Institutional Economics, a movement of which
Veblen is often reCOgnized as the spiritual father. Although
Institutionalism has never been endorsed by a majority of

economists, it does include within its ranks such outstanding

 

25:11:.

126
men as Veblen, John R. Commons, John M. Clark, Rexford G.
Tugwell, and Wesley C. Mitchell.26

Generally, an Institutionalist is more readily
identified by what he opposes than by what he endorses. This
is particularly true of Veblen who was initially concerned
with the inadequacies of the traditional outlook. It is
perhaps for this reason that there is no general body of
theory which defines the position. Indeed, the movement
has been described by its Opponents as "anti-theoretic.“27
While not a popular movement, it has had a marked and lasting
effect upon economics. The majority of economists have
attempted to incorporate its main doctrines into their own
eclectic positions.

What is the fundamental position of contemporary
analytical economics?28 Like the orthodox economist, the
contemporary analyst makes certain assumptions regarding
human nature. It is assumed that men behave rationally,
that they seek to maximize pleasure, that human wants are
insatiable. In addition to such assumptions, the scope of
the science is defined. Economics is a science which

studies the "organization through the operation of which

 

26A11an G. Gruohy..flsdsnn_ficonomis_1houzhi (Prentice-

Hall: New York, 19h?)

27Gray, W09 pp: 366-367-

28The following discussion is based in large part
upon Kenneth Bouldins's Esonsmie_dnalxsis. 3rd. ed., (Harper:
New York, 1955), especially Chapter I.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

127
the utilization of scarce resources in the satisfaction of
human wants is controlled.”29 We live in a world of scar-
city. This is the fundamental concept. It is not the task
of the economist to judge the quality of human wants or the
manner in which wants develop. Neither is it the primary
task of the analyst to study the means by which scarce
resources are either increased or diminished. Human wants
and scarce means are "givens." This establishes the limits
of the science.

What we have said applies generally to any economic
system. But our economy is capitalistic and so the analyst
makes further assumptions. He assumes maximization of pro-
fits on the part of entrepreneurs, consumer sovereignty,
private property, full employment, perfect competition,
and so forth.

The analyst is now prepared to deveIOp a logical
model upon the basis of these assumptions. He can show,
for example, how prices are established in a perfectly com-
petitive market. He can Show how resources are allocated
among various producers. Various functional relationships
can be established and treated mathematically. Thus one
can plot consumption curves in respect to income; investment

curves in respect to the rate of interest; price curves in

 

29John S. Due. W. rev.
ed., (Richard Irwin: Chicago, 1950), pp. 2-3.

128
respect to the quantity of money in circulation; etc. There
is no limit to the logical extensions of economic analysis.

The modern economist is cognizant of the limitations
of his analysis. He professes to recognize that his logical
models are only abstractions of reality. At best he has
drawn a rough map of the significant features. Therefore,
he qualifies his logical models in order to make them rele-
vant to actual economic realities. Assume, for example,
that his model is constructed in terms of a perfectly com-
petitive market. Since no such market exists, he must make
allowances for various degrees of monopoly behavior. A
purely competitive market becomes a frame of reference.

Such are the premises of the contemporary analytical
point of view. It is these premises which Veblen and the
Institutionalists who have followed him have called into
question.

All Institutionalists are impressed by change, pro-
cess, development, growth, and evolution. It is the dynamic
rather than the static qualities of economic experience
which commands their attention. This is their frame of
reference in economic speculation. Whereas the traditional
economist treated human wants as given, the Institutionalist
centers his analysis on their changing character. Likewise,
he studies the growth and development of industry, capital,
and natural resources. In short, the Institutionalist

studies the economy through time, whereas the orthodox

129
economist makes a cross-sectional analysis divorced of time
considerations.

Among the important contributions of the Institution-
alists are their empirical studies of the economic system.
They have made exhaustive studies of prices, monopoly, labor-
management relations, business cycles, legal statutes, etc.
Much of this work has involved the collection of data in
the belief that the reconstruction of economics must rest
upon a more comprehensive knowledge of the realities of
economic life. This emphasis upon empirical studies was
preached by Veblen but practiced by his disciples. They
have stressed content rather than form, function rather
than structure, and induction rather than deduction. They
have asserted that economics must narrow the gap between
theory and practice. This can be achieved only to the
extent that economists will study the details of the economic
life process.

Of Special interest to the educator is the Institu-
tionalist emphasis upon economic action as a mode of behavior.
Economics is a cultural science concerned with the behavior
of man in satisfying his economic wants in a world of
scarcity. As a way of thinking and acting, economics cannot
be divorced from the other social sciences, since economic
behavior cannot be divorced from behavior in general. An
individual is a single organism. His behavior in one di-

rection influences his behavior in every other direction.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

130
The formal, abstract, deductive approach to economics has
obscured the fact that economic science must be focused on
man and his activities. The problem of scarcity arises
because of the wants of man. It is man's pursuit of the
material means of life which constitutes the subject matter
of economics. The traditional study of market mechanisms
tended to disguise this fundamental and obvious fact.

Veblen and his disciples were especially impressed
by the extent to which behavior is culturally conditioned.
They rejected the orthodox conception of an isolated, rational
individual. Man is a social being whose behavior is as much
controlled by habit as by reason. From birth the individual
learns to make appropriate responses to a variety of
stimuli. Customs, conventions, and prescriptions are power-
ful molders of behavior. When a particular response to a
stimulus has become habitual among large nunbers of people,
it is said that the response has become institutionalized.
This is the derivation of the term ”institutional." The
institutional economist believes that in the past the role
of institutions in economic behavior has been neglected. He
believes, for example, that the quality and quantity of
economic wants as well as the means of their attainment are
determined by the prevailing institutions.

In the light of this discussion it is not surprising

that the Instititutionalists are more concerned with the

131
psychological foundations of economics than their predecess-
ors. "We need to know more than we do, and vastly more than
economics has generally permitted itself to try to know,
about the human material of which a community must be built:
about its motives, reactions, capacities, and needs."30 To
what extent is the nature of man well—suited to the compe-
titive character of our economic system? Does human nature
demand more security than a competitive society can furnish?
These are the kinds of questions which direct the inquiries
of the Institutionalists.

One of the most revolutionary features of contemporary
economics is its methodology. The orthodox economist de-
veloped his theoretical schemata by arguing from the simple
to the complex, from the part to the whole. This methodol-
ogy, which was endorsed by the natural and biological sciences
of that period, was an integral part of the abstract, de-
ductive approach. The traditional economist deve10ped the
simple, but idealized, case of pure competition before con-
sidering the complex, but realistic, case of imperfect com-
petition. His concept of a public interest was developed
from an analysis of private interests. A society became a
mere collection of individuals, aggregated together like

the grains of sand in a sandtrap.

 

 

 

 

30John Maurice Clark. AW (Alfred
A. Knopf: New York, 19b8), p. 27.

132

Spurred on by the Institutionalists, contemporary
economists have tended to adopt an almost opposite point of
view. The whole is conceived to be greater than the sum of
its component parts. To a degree, the behavior of the whole
governs the behavior of the parts. It is the general level
of wages, prices, employment, and profits which are important
in understanding the economic behavior of the individual
firm or industry. This shift in methodology has its corre-
late in the physical and biolOgical sciences. According to
the physicist, the electron behaves differently within an
atom than when isolated. Similarly, the atom probably be-
haves differently within man than when isolated. In each
case the pattern of the whole or the "field" governs the
behavior of the constituent parts. The current emphasis
upon Gestalt psychology also illustrates this shift in
methodology.

Although economics is a social science, the above
analogy is useful in indicating the methodological approach
of Institutional Economics. An illustration will make this
evident. One of the virtues preached by the orthodox econ-
omists was thrift. From the viewpoint of the individual,
thrift does indeed serve his self-interest, especially during
periods of economic distress. If we assume that the public
interest is a summation of private interests, then thrift

becomes a societal virtue.

133

Yet, when thrift is considered a societal virtue,
paradoxical results ensue. It is a matter of factual record
that the more a society attempts to save the poorer it be-
comes. One man's saving is another man's 1255 of income.
The cumulative nature of this process results in the im-
poverishment of all. The "paradox of thrift” becomes
strikingly evident when individuals attempt to save at com-
pound interest. Although this makes sense for the individual,
it is irrational from the viewpoint of the society. ”One
cent compounded yearly at six per cent from the year one
A.D. to the end of l9hh would have amounted to approximately
$156,531,ooo,ooo,ooo,ooo,ooo,ooo,ooo,ooo,ooo,ooo,ooo,ooo,
000,000."31 This is "equivalent to the value of balls of
pure gold the size of the earth to the number of more than
6,000,000,000,ooo,ooo,ooo. . . ."32

The paradox of thrift is a consequence of the tendency
to equate money with real goods and services. In sharply
differentiating money from the goods and services which it
commands, the Institutionalists have made a major contribution.
It becomes evident that a society, unlike an individual, has

no interest in saving money. Rather, it desires to save

 

31H. Gordon Hayes, d a E 0
(Alfred A. Knopf: New York, l9h7), p. 39.
32

£211-

13h
goods and services. Unfortunately, this kind of saving is
impossible to any significant degree.

Many contemporary economists of the orthodox position
would strongly disagree with any suggestion that their views
are anachronistic or unrealistic. There is a very real
sense in which they would be Justified in such a reaction.
Institutionalist thought has not annihilated the validity
of orthodox economics, although some economists write as if
this were the case. It is not the purpose of this discussion
to resolve this dispute between economists. Such an under-
taking would be pretentious and outside the SCOpe of this
thesis. It does appear, however, that each school of thought
has a valid contribution to make toward the understanding
of economic behavior and, thus, of behavior in general.

To assert that the orthodox theory is anachronistic does not
reveal the positive value of this position. A science of
economics is impossible apart from a utilization of the tools
of orthodox analysis. Moreover, the abstract models developed
by the orthodox theorists are invaluable in ordering the
multitude of facts with which the economist is concerned.

Similarly, to refer to Institutionalism as ”anti-
theoretic" does not point up the positive features of this
position. Institutionalist thought should be viewed as

complementing, rather than contradicting, orthodox theory.

As the term suggests, Institutionalists have made extensive

studies of the bearing of institutions upon the economic

 

135
behavior of men. They have demonstrated that the relevancy
of an economic theory is dependent upon the validity of its
institutional assumptions. This has permitted economists to
define the limits within which orthodox analysis is useful
and valid.

All Institutionalists agree that the present economic
system has serious deficiencies. They all prOpose some form
of governmental interference in the economic system, although
their specific proposals vary widely. Few would agree with
Veblen that the business community should be purged and re-
placed by engineers and economists. In general their pro-
posals are much less sweeping in nature.

Since Institutionalists are all reformers in some
degree, they are faced with the question of what pngnt to
be done. Generally, they agree with their orthodox colleagues
that the economist should remain neutral in respect to the
intrinsic values of a people. They do not conclude that
such values are unimportant in economic analysis. It is at
this juncture that they disagree with many of their colleagues.
They argue that an economic system should serve to implement
whatever values a society does in fact hold. The economist
must determine both the values a people hold and the extent
to which the economic system serves these values. Two im-
portant values in our society appear to be freedom and
securrity. To what extent does our economic system expedite

the realization of these values? Does the fear of unemployment

 

 

 

 

 

 

136
threaten man's quest for security? Would socialism threaten
man's quest for freedom? These are the kinds of questions
which the Institutionalists ask prior to making specific

prOposals for reform.
b ' H

Veblen assumed that there is an intrinsic relation-
ship between social and psychological theory.33 His criticism
of orthodox economics centers in part upon its psychological
premises. Likewise, an evolutionary economics must be
evaluated in terms of its view of human nature. Since
psychological theory is a fulcrum of Veblen's social philos-
ophy, we shall consider his view of human nature before
examining other features of his social theory.

In dealing with pedagogical problems and the theory
of education, current psychology is nearly at one in
saying that all learning is of a "pragmatic" char-
acter; that knowledge is inchoate action inchoately
directed to an end; that all knowledge is "functional";
that it is of the nature of use. This, of course, is
only a corollary under the main postulate of the
latter-day psychologists, whose catchword is that The
Idea is essentially active. There is no need of
quarreling with this ”pragmatic” school of psychol-
ogists.3u

Man is essentially an active rather than a passive organism.

33Louis Schneider, W
W (King's: Morningside Heights, , p. .

BhWWW. p. 5.

 

 

137

He seeks in every action the accomplishment of a specific,
concrete end. Man is "in his own apprehension, a centre of
unfolding impulsive activity--'teleological' activity."35
This teleological character of behavior is, however, an
”hereditary trait settled upon the race by the selective
action of forces that look to no end. The foundations of
pragmatic intelligence are not pragmatic, nor even personal
or sensible."36

Although Veblen’s position is somewhat paradoxical,
he is apparently attempting to reduce the teleological
character of human intelligence to the unteleological charac-
ter of evolution. ”Mind" has emerged as a product of evo-
lutionary forces. The forces of natural selection proceed
in terms of impersonal cause and effect. There is no initial
or final term but only endless sequence. Evolution moves
blindly, without reason or purpose. Human activity, on
the other hand, proceeds in terms of the interest and in-
tention of an agent. Puproses direct man's behavior to the
accomplishment of Specific goals.

Veblen appears to argue that the teleological bent
of intelligence had a high survival value at an early stage

of man's biolOgical evolution. The activities of savage man

35 T

0 ' a 9 Do 15-

%W. p. 5.

 

 

 

 

138
were almost exclusively devoted to his quest for survival.
Only those men survived who were able to adapt readily to
the changing circumstances of life. This ability to engage
in intelligent behavior had led to man‘s dominant position
in the animal kingdom. That man should have developed this
particular trait is presumably a matter of pure chance.

That this trait should have persisted is exPlained in terms
of the character of evolution.

The teleological character of intelligence is only
one of many abiding traits which the biological forces of
evolution have produced. Veblen calls these traits of human
nature "instincts." Thus, the trait which we have described
is termed the Instinct of Workmanship. Man has a "sense of
the merit of serviceability or efficiency and of the demerit
of futility, waste, or incapacity."37 Workmanship is also
akin to the proclivity for construction. Other important
instincts include the Parental Bent, Idle Curiosity, and
Self-regard.

Before discussing these, it must be pointed out that
considerable confusion and controversy has centered about
Veblen's theory of instincts. Contrary to the usual meaning
of the term, Veblen defines all instinctive behavior as

”intelligent in some degree.”38 Instinctive action involves

 

37W. p. 15-
38 ‘3 O C .
W. p. 30.

0 .uso:¢ 0 god 4‘ c s. “ 0-1‘

139
"consciousness and adaptation to an end aimed at."39 It is
teleological in the sense that it aims at the fulfillment
of specific ends. Instincts set both the ends of life and
the means by which they are fulfilled.
An instinct is not an irreducible trait of human

nature. Workmanship, for example, can be reduced to still

simpler traits and tropisms. In the Veblenian psychology
3 tropism is what the contemporary psychologist would define
as an instinct. An instinct in Veblenian terminology comes
close, perhaps, to the current conception of a drive. Veb-
‘ len considers hunger both tropismatic and instinctive. It
is tropismatic to the extent that the individual‘s response
to its promptings is automatic. It is instinctive to the
extent that intelligence is involved in fulfilling the end
which hunger prompts. Since man acts as a whole, instincts
are not found in isolation. Instead, instincuzblend, over-
lap, and fuse with one another. They are even capable of
mutual contamination. In no sense are instincts discrete.
Human behavior can never escape from the scOpe of
man's instincts tak§n_a§_a_whple. This is what Veblen
apparently means when he writes that the human race is

ultimately at the mercy of its instincts. Nevertheless,

within the limits prescribed by this conglomeraticn of

 

39M” p. it.

lho

instincts man has a considerable measure of freedom. This
seems to be the meaning of Veblen's statement that instincts
are "subject to development and hence to modification by
habit.” Instincts can be fused and combined in various ways
so as to produce modes of behavior which are only indirectly
related to particular instincts. Actually, Veblen's sugges-
tion that instincts are subject to "modification by habit"
is an unfortunate choice of terminology since Veblen does
not mean that particular instincts can be modified. To
suggest that particular instincts can be modified contra-
dicts Veblen's belief in the "giveness" of human nature.
In summation, although man can never escape the limits im-
posed by his heredity, he can synthesize his instincts in
such ways as to produce novel forms of behavior.

Although man is literally a bundle of instincts,
Veblen discusses only those important for economic theory.
The Parental Bent is the regard which one generation has
for the upcoming generation. It is much broader than the
solicitude which parents show for children. It is not to
be equated with the drive to procreate. The Parental Bent
is the instinctive regard for the welfare of mankind in
general. It is the conscience of a people.

The Idle Curiosity is a "more or less urgent propen-
sity to inquire into the nature of things, beyond the ser-

viceability of any knowledge so gained. . . ."uo It is,

 

WWW. p. 7.

 

 

141
”perhaps, closely related to the aptitude for play, observed
both in man and in the lower animals.""’1 This instinct has
produced two ranges of knowledge. It accounts for the myths
and legends of primitive man as well as the matter-of-fact
knowledge of modern science.

Workmanship, Idle Curiosity, and the Parental Bent
are closely related. In human behavior they support and
reinforce each other. David Biesman has suggested that
Workmanship is the central instinct in Veblen's analysis.""’2
When Workmanship is viewed as a regard for craftsmanship
for its own sake, it approaches the Idle Curiosity which is
the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. On the other
hand, Workmanship can be viewed as a regard for what is use-
ful, serviceable, or constructive. In this reapect it
approaches the Parental Bent.

These three instincts, proclivities, or propensities
form the basis of the optimistic strain in Veblen's thought.
He regarded these instincts as more basic than the acquisitive,
predatory, self-regarding instincts. In the savage state
survival depended upon traits which promoted the welfare of
the race. Men who were inefficient in their work, who were
not curious about their environment, and who had no interest

in the welfare of others were eliminated in the quest for

 

“WWW. p. 7.
”Zniesman. We: pp. 51-52.

1&2
survival. Thus these traits became deeply imbedded in human
nature.

At a later stage of civilization the heretofore
latent selfish instincts became manifest. Mankind no longer
lived close to the subsistence level. Self-regarding be-
havior no longer eventuated in extinction. Economic pro-
gress resulted in the fall of man. It is ironical that
Veblen, an eXponent of technological progress, should take
this position. It is the pessimistic side of his philosophy.

In spite of Veblen's detailed speculations on the
nature of primitive man, his theory of instincts does not
play as important a role as a reading of the Inspingp_gfi.
flgzkmanghip would suggest.“3 Much fruitless controversy
has raged around this aSpect of Veblen's psychology. Bernard
Rosenberg for example has roundly criticized Arthur Kent
Davis for ”textual carelessness."uu Rosenberg however is
not always enlightening either. He argues, for example,

that Veblen regarded intelligence as providing the "motivation

 

uBVeblen's theory of instincts does have an important
bearing upon his theory of value. See below, pp. 157 at
sea. Otherwise, Veblen seems intent upon demonstrating
that heredity counts for something in the determination of
human behavior regardless of the terms employed to describe
that ”something." Veblen chose the unpOpular term "instinct,"
whereas contemporary psychologists prefer such concepts as
”drive," "need," "emotion," and so forth.

unBosenberg, Qp‘_git., pp. nu-u5.

 

1&3
for instinctive behavior."u5 He bases this conclusion upon
Veblen's statement that an instinct ”involves consciousness
and adaptation to an end aimed at." It is difficult to
follow Rosenberg's reasoning on this point. It would appear
that he has read too much into Veblen's statement. To say
that instinctive behavior involves consciousness and adapta-
tion is not to say that intelligence provides the motivation.
We believe that Veblen intended only to indicate the flexible,
malleable character of instincts. Intelligence is the
regulator rather than the motivator in the Veblenian scheme.

For the purposes of Veblen's social philosophy three
characteristics of human nature are important. In a physio-
logical and anatomical sense the nature of man is relatively
constant. Veblen believed that the savage man had pretty
much the same physical equipment as modern man. The differ-
ence between primitive man and modern man is a difference
in habits of thought. Veblen accepts the pragmatic emphasis
upon the teleological character of human behavior. Man is
an active, purposeful organism whose behavior is directed
toward the achievement of a specific, concrete end.

The behavior of man is both a product of heredity
and environment. Heredity sets both the limits and ultimate

goals of human action. Within these limits human nature is

 

”5M. . p. 41h

1&4
highly malleable. Instincts can adapt to a wide range of
environmental conditions.”6 Although Veblen emphasizes adap-
tation of man to the environment, he recognizes that the
relationship is reciprocal. Man induces changes in his
environment as well as adapting to a given environment.

There is one element in Veblen's theory of instincts
which is important in his social psychology. Basically,
modern man has inherited two conflicting sets of tendencies
or instincts. Those instincts which enhance life are
exemplified by the Instinct of Workmanship, whereas those
which lead to mankind's destruction are exemplifed by the
Instinct of Predation. Veblen‘s view of primitive man
leads him to regard Workmanship as the more generically
human. Although Veblen is not explicit on this point, it
would appear that Predation is more of a contamination of

Workmanship than a separate cluster of instincts. If

 

“éThis appears to contradict the usual conception of
instinctive behavior. Veblen, himself, was not always con-
sistent in this matter. At times he emphasizes the "giveness"
of instincts while on other occasions he stresses their
malleability. If, however, instincts are likened to drives,
his position becomes more meaningful. Instincts, like drives,
cannot be extirpated from human nature. Ultimately they set
the ends of life. In this sense they represent the "give-
ness” of human nature. On the other hand, men can and do
manipulate their drives or instincts. Some drives are en-
couraged while others are suppressed. The experiences of
men will tend to heighten the promptings of some instincts
or drives while diminishing the activity of others. No
instinct or drive, however, can be permanently eliminated
from man's nature. A change in the circumstances of life
can cause a previously suppressed instinct to be reasserted.

1h5
Predation is viewed as an instinct, then Veblen must argue
that one instinct is more fundamental than another. This,

however, would appear to violate Veblen's professed object-

ivity.

In any case, modern man has inherited both sets of
instincts, although these traits are not Spread evenly among
men. The predatory instincts may be more prevalent in
certain ethnic types than others. Within specific ethnic
groups there will be similar variations, although every in-
dividual has some degree of both. In certain groups one or
the other of the sets of instincts may become dominant in
behavior. The successful business man, for example, must
manifest the predatory instincts if he is to survive in
business. The engineer, on the other hand, tends to suppress
these instincts in favor of Workmanship. The occupations

of men become both selective and conditioning factors.

MW

It has been suggested that Veblen's theory of primi-
tive human nature is not as important in understanding modern
man as Veblen sometimes leads us to believe. This is im-
plied by Veblen in the following passage:

The forces which have shaped the development of
human life and of social structure are no doubt
ultimately reducible to terms of living tissue
and material environment; but proximately, for
the purpose in hand, these forces may best be
stated in terms of an environment, partly human,

 

lh6

partly non-human, and a human subject with a more

or less de£%nite physical and intellectual con-

stitution.
Taken in conjunction with other passages it seems evident
that Veblen has shifted the ground of his analysis. Through
empirical observation it is seen that man has a ”more or
less definite physical and intellectual constitution." Fur-
ther observation reveals that man is confronted with an
environment which is both physical and human. The evolution
of a culture is the product of the interaction of man with
this changing environment. This is the point of departure
in Veblen's social philos0phy. Instincts will reappear but
in a somewhat different light.

Proximately, human behavior is governed by insti-
tutions rather than instincts. The theory of instincts is
rapidly transformed into a social psychology or theory of
institutions. An institution, according to Veblen, is a
prevailing habit of thought or action in the society. It
is of the "nature of an habitual method of responding" to
the stimuli of the environment.“8 An individual is born
into a society with existing habits, conventions, customs,
mores, folkways, attitudes, canons of truth, and bodies of
knowledge. Upon the basis of these, the individual learns

the acceptable modes of behavior in his culture.

 

WWW. p. 189.
“8M” p. 190.

1h?

Since it is commonplace to identify institutions with
physical entities, Veblen's definition needs to be examined
closely. Moreover, it reflects a significant theme in his
social philosophy. Veblen argues that banks, churches,
schools, etc., are primarily ways of thinking and acting in
respect to certain objectives and functions. This con-
ception of institutions is always implicit in our thinking
but rarely explicit. By identifying habits of thought with
institutions we can include such non-physical entities as
science and technology within the scope of institutions.

Veblen would agree that a school is an institution,
although he would substitute the term "education” for
”school.” A school signifies something physical, whereas
education implies process and relationship. As an institu-
tion a school cannot be adequately defined in terms of black-
boards, laboratories, students, teachers, buildings, and
books. An institutional definition would be stated in
terms of relationship, process, habits of thought, and
function.

Likewise, a factory is an institution when we define
a factory in terms of technology. The machines and tools
are physical embodiments of specific functional relation-
ships. They must be operated with precise and exact habits
of thought and action. Modern industry is characterized
by impersonal, matter-of-fact thinking in terms of cause

and effect. No other habit of thought is appropriate to

1&8
modern technology.

It is difficult to overemphasize this conception of
an institution. Veblen argues that the most important
possession of a culture is its habits of thought. This is
where the orthodox economist went astray. He tended to
define wealth and capital in terms of money, or at best,
in terms of labor, land, and capital. These definitions
exclude the most important ingredient in production, wealth,
and capital; namely,certain ways of acting and thinking in
respect to the material circumstances of life. A machine
is of no value unless we know how to use it. A tool is
worthless unless we know the purpose for which it was de-
signed. The very evolution of a society is an evolution
of habits of thought.

An institution controls behavior. This is fairly
obvious in the case of modern technology. In those industries
characterized by assembly line production every worker must
perform a specific Operation in a precise and exact manner.
The overall process controls the behavior of individual
workmen. The process itself is characterized by precise
cause and effect relationships. The individual workman
must ”fit," so to speak, into this process. The exact
nature of the process permits machines to be utilized. The
workman now becomes a tender of a machine. His behavior is
now completely regulated in terms of the character of the

machine. Although this is an extreme case of the manner

 

 

1&9
by which institutions control behavior, Veblen seems to argue
that much the same condition prevails in other sectors of
life. The prevailing habits of thought in the community
control the behavior of the individual.

How would institutions operate in a perfectly static
and unchanging universe? Ideally, habits of thought provide
for an exact adjustment of inner relations to outer relations.
An institution is a means by which basic human nature is
brought into perfect harmony with the circumstances of the
environment to which it is addressed. It is the function
of institutions to mediate between instincts and the ulti-
mate ends of life. Institutions provide us with habitual
responses to impinging stimuli. In a static world, there-
fore, institutions would serve man rather than enslave him.

Unfortunately, man does not live in a static world.
The tragedy of life, in Veblen's view, is that man cannot
readily adjust his habits of thought to the rapidly changing
circumstances of his existence. The "outer relations”
change more rapidly than the habits of thought. Institutions
lag behind the exigencies of life. Veblen describes the
dilemma of man in the following passage:

The situation of to-day shapes the institutions of
tomorrow through a selective, coercive process, by
acting upon men's habitual view of things, and so
altering or fortifying a point of view or a mental
attitude handed down from the past. The institutions
. . . under the guidance of which men live are in

this way received from an earlier time. . . . In-
stitutions are products of the past process, are

150

adapted to past circumstances, and are therefore

never in full accord with the requirements of the

present. In the nature of the case, this process

of selective adaptation can never catch up with

the progressively changing situation. . . .

It is to be noted then . . . that the institutions

of to-day . . . do not entirely fit the situation

of to-day. At the same time, men's present habits

of thought tend to persist indefinitely, except as

circumstances enforce a change. These institutions

which have so been handed down, these habits of

thought, points of view, mental attitudes and

aptitudes, or what ngt, are therefore themselves a

conservative factor. 9
One of the persistent traits of human nature is conservatism.
Men change their habits of thought only under duress. If
an individual or group is sheltered from the forces of the
environment, then that individual or group will respond
only tardily, if at all, to changes in the environment.

Veblen's theory of institutions is'a major theme in

all of his writings but, particularly, in Ing_1hggzy_g£_§ng
‘Lgiguze_gla§§, The leisure class is guided in its activities
by institutions or habits of thought which are no longer
apprOpriate in respect to the exigencies of life. It is a
sheltered class which is not forced to adapt to a changed
environment. From the viewpoint of the society this class
is parasitic. It makes no contribution in respect to the
adjustment of man to his environment.

In one sense Veblen is more concerned with the

 

”9M. . pp. 19o=191.

 

 

 

151
influence of the leisure class than he is with the leisure
class pgz_§§. No doubt the leisure class values its in-
stitutions. From its viewpoint leisure class institutions
are right and just. Although Veblen believes that the
leisure class must adapt to the realities of economic life
or face extinction, he is reluctant to argue the intrinsic
worth of its institutions. In attacking the influence of
the leisure class, Veblen points out that its institutions
become the institutions of society at large. Moreover, al-
though this class is divorced from economic reality, it
controls the activities of mankind.50 Thus, the leisure
class influence jeopardizes the well-being of the entire
society.

It is important to note that the leisure class Opposes
change largely because of psychological inertia rather than
self-interest. In this respect Veblen disagrees with the
Marxist position.51 According to the Marxist, the leisure
class is conservative because it has a vested interest in
the spatu§_gng. While not denying that self-interest is
an important element in conservatism, Veblen believes that
the Marxist has overemphasized it. The Marxist has postulated
more rationality in human behavior than the facts would seem

to warrant. Men, according to Veblen, are conservative by

 

50Thus business controls industry. This is the theme
of WW-

511n Veblen's later writings he approaches the Marxist
position in this regard.

152
nature. Although reason can produce a change in a habit of
thought, this is infrequent. Habits of thought change only
under duress. Even the force of circumstances will not
always produce the needed change in institutions.

History records more frequent and more spectacular
instances of the triumph of imbecile institutions
over life and culture than of peoples who have by
force of instinctive insight saved themselves alive
out of a desperately precarious institutional situ-

ation, such, for instance, as now faces the people
of Christendom.52

WW

Veblen's theory of institutions is integrally related
to his theory of cultural change. Essentially, the dilemma
of man grows out of the constant changes in the "outer"
relations of the environment, both human and non-human.

What is the nature of the forces inducing these changes?

In W Veblen states
that the "forces which make for a readjustment of institu-
tions . . . are, in the last analysis, almost entirely of
an economic nature."53 Habits of thought change in response
to economic change. An economic change involves the material
circumstances of life. It is a change in the manner by
which the material circumstances of life are turned to

account. Veblen believed that a habit of thought or an

 

5W
W. p- 25-
53W. p. 193.

153
institution reflected a habit of action. Institutions,
then, grow out of the activities of man.

In a primitive culture man's activities are dominated
by his quest for survival. It is a quest for food, clothing,
and shelter. The dominance of these economic activities
is reflected in the institutions of primitive man. Modern
man, of course, lives well above the subsistence level. He
has many interests that are not specifically economic in
nature. He engages in many activities that are not prinarily
concerned with sheer survival. One might suppose, therefore,
that economic activities would not loom as large in his life.

Yet, the first requirement of life is survival. This
activity undergirds and interacts with all other interests,
pursuits, drives, and activities. All institutions are
partially economic in nature. It was the failure of the
orthodox economists to recognize this fact that led to
Veblen's devastating criticism. The subject matter of
the economist is as broad as life since the economic interest
is pervasive in its influence. Veblen could have pointed
out that the interdependent character of modern society
reinforces and maintains the importance of economic activity
in the lives of men. Although we live above the subsistence
level, security for most of us is dependent upon our continu-
ed employment. Few of us own the tools of production or
substantial property. Modern man is an employee working

for wages.. His security rests almost entirely in the hands

 

 

 

 

 

15&
of a relatively small group of employers. For this reason,
men are still forced to occupy their thoughts with economic
considerations.

Are we to conclude then that Veblen is an economic
determinist? There is certainly a wealth of evidence to
support such a conclusion. For example, Veblen writes:

For the present it is the vogue to hold that ec-
onomic life, broadly;conditions the rest of social
organization or the constitution of society. This
vogue of the preposition will serve as excuse from
going into an examination of the grounds on which
it may be justified, as it is scarcely necessary to
persuade any economist that it has substantial
merits. . . . What the Marxists have named the
"Materialistic Conception of History" is assented
to with less and less qualification by those who
make the growth of culture their subject of in-
quiry. This materialistic conception says that
instigutions are shaped by economic conditions.

0 O

In other passages, however, Veblen seems to deny what he

has just affirmed. In the luggingp_gfi_ugnkman§hip he main-
tains that the

facts of technological use and wont are fundamental
and definitive, in the sense that they underlie and
condition the scope and method of civilisation in
other than the technological respect, but not in

such a sense as to preclude or overlook the degree

in which these other conventions of any given civili-
sations in their turn react on the state of the
industrial arts.5

 

“WWW. p.

313-

55W
W. p. v11.

155
The state of the industrial arts is, in other words, not
always an independent causal factor.

Moreover, Veblen's psychology and theory of human
nature have non-deterministic elements. We would agree with
Paul T. Homan who holds that the "element of rationality,
or intelligence, is never quite ruled out."56 Although
Veblen was a pessimist, he was also a reformer, at least
during a part of his life. Unless we assume that man can
intelligently manipulate his environment for human purposes,
many of Veblen’s later writings become meaningless. If
Veblen were a strict determinist, why would he propose that
the engineers take command of the industrial system? Why
would he make prOposals for a lasting peace?

That Veblen is not a strict economic determinist is
evident in his theory of instincts. Although instincts can
be traced back to the relationship between man and his
material environment, these instincts nevertheless assert
themselves in modern man as partially independent of economic
activities. The instincts of Idle Curiosity, Workmanship,
and the Parental Bent continually reassert themselves even
when confronted with an environment not conducive to their

realization.

 

“Paul T. Homan. WM (Harper:
New York, 1928), p. 1890

156
Barring repressive conventionalities, reversion to
the spiritual state of savagery is always easy; for
human nature is still substantially savage. The
discipline of savage life . . . has been by far the
most protracted and probably the most exacting of
any phase of culture . . . ; so that by heredity
human nature still is, and must indefinitely con-
tinue to be, savage human nature. This savage
spiritual heritage that ”springs eternal" when the
pressure of conventionality is removed or relieved,
seems highly conducive to the two main traits of
Christign morality [brotherly love and renunci-
ation]. 7

It would appear that Veblen's theory of instinctive
behavior is not consistent with a strict economic determinism.
One could maintain, however, that Veblen's psychology is
deterministic in a more general sense in that behavior, in
his view, is ultimately controlled by instincts. While this
assertion has unquestioned merit, it does not eXplain the
functioning of the idle curiosity. This instinct produces
genuine novelty in the world. As a quest for knowledge
for its own sake, idle curiosity is a creative act. Al-
though idle curiosity is not divorced from the culture, it
does by its very nature become an independent causal factor
in cultural evolution.

In spite of this evidence Veblen is frequently called
an economic or technological determinist. If the terms are
used in a rather loose sense, then there is no reason to
quarrel with these critics. It is certainly true that

Veblen regarded the material circumstances of life as

 

57W. p. 209.

 

 

 

 

157
extremely important in cultural evolution. In the words
of Abram L. Harris, Veblen believed that the prime movers
in history are the "conflicting social habits induced by
the different types of occupations in which men are engaged.”58
Moreover, Veblen tends to neglect sexual, aesthetic, and
moral factors in civilization, although he does not deny

their existence. Finally, Veblen's lack of faith in human
intelligence supports the view that he is a determinist.

Yshlsan_Ihsszx_9£_Yslns

It has been frequently observed that critics of
Veblen are sharply divided in their evaluation of Veblen's
social theory. An important cause of this division of
opinion is to be traced to Veblen's theory of value. Al-
though value assumptions play an important role in any
philosophical position, they are a pivotal concern in a
social philosophy. A theory of value, especially of ethical
value, is implied in any social theory.

Characteristically, Veblen never eXplicitly developed
a theory of value. Although he was trained in philosophy,
he devoted very little of his analysis to a consideration
of ethical, religious, aesthetic, moral, social, or even

economic value. He seldom discussed questions of the nature

 

58Abram L. Harris, "Veblen As Social Philosopher--A
Reap raisal," Emhigg,'vol. LXIII, No. 3, Part II (April,

1953 9 P0 10

 

158

of beauty, duty, evil, ought, right, or the summnm_bgnum.

Nevertheless, Veblen's most popular work, Th§_2hegzx
g£_1n§_L§;§nzg_Qla§§, is in Veblen's own words a discussion
of the ”value of the leisure class." Moreover, the vocabulary
in this study is suggestive of an ethical position. Terms
such as ”conspicuous,” "waste," " invidious," and "predatory,"
have ethical overtones. It is difficult for the reader to
accept Veblen's eXplicit denial that he is using these terms
in a way which implies an ethical position. He tells us
that he is making an impartial, objective, scientific, matter-
of-fact, descriptive study of the economic bearing of the
leisure class in modern society. It is little wonder that
students of Veblen have been engaged in almost endless con-
troversy concerning what Veblen actually taught, believed,
or said.

Veblen's theory of instincts appears to be related
to his theory,of value. Instincts, it will be remembered
are the ultimate determinants of human behavior. Man is
literally composed of a bundle of these prOpensities, drives,
bents, or impulses. Although these instincts set the ends
of activity, man is more directly governed by habits. In-
stitutions intervene between the basic drives and the goals
of life. Instincts become contaminated, modified, or
thwarted in their drive toward realization.

Since institutions govern behavior proximately,

Veblen dispenses with instincts in his analysis of

159
contemporary society. What, then, is the function or purpose
of his theory of instincts? We believe that instincts are
the guiding principles of Veblen's analysis. They are dis-
guised values which constitute the criteria by which con-
temporary culture is evaluated. There is evidence in Veblen
to support such a view.

The instincts of man can be roughly divided between
those which conserve life and those which destroy life,
between the constructive and the destructive instincts.
Contemporary life can be viewed as a perpetual conflict
between these two sets of instincts. Thus, business is
opposed to industry, predation conflicts with workmanship.
This is the recurring theme.

A theory of value is clearly implied in Veblen's
defense of the constructive instincts. He attempts to
avoid an ethical position by arguing that the constructive
instincts are more "generically" human since they are more
deeply imbedded in human nature. The instincts of work-
manship, idle curiosity, and the parental bent developed
during the extended period of savage life. The instinct
of predation, on the other hand, is of more recent vintage.
The present scheme of life has not yet been of sufficient

duration to establish this trait as an abiding instinct of
human nature. In W Veblen

writes:

160

But why are apologies needed? If there prevails a
body of popular sentiment in favour of sports, why
is not that fact a sufficient legitimation? The
protracted discipline of prowess to which the race
has been subjected under the predatory and quasi-
peaceable culture has transmitted to the men of
today a temperament that finds gratification in
these expressions of ferocity and cunning. So, why
not accept these sports as legitimate eXpressions
of a normal and wholesome human nature? What other
norm is there that is to be lived up to than that
given in the aggregate range of propensities that
express themselves in the sentiments of this genera-
tion, including the hereditary strain of prowess?
The ulterior norm to which appeal is taken is the
instinct of workmanship, which is an instinct more
fundamental, of more ancient prescription, than the
propensity to predatory emulation. The latter is
but a special development of the instinct of work-
manship, a variant, relatively late and ephemeral
in spite of its great absolute antiquity. The
emulative predatory impulse-~or the instinct of
sportsmanship, as it might well be called-~18 es-
sentally unstable in comparison with the primordial
instinct of workmanship out of which it has been
developed and differentiated. Tested by this ul-
terior norm of life, predatory emulation, and
therefore the life of sport, falls short.59

We do not find Veblen's argument convincing. His

view of primitive life is highly speculative in nature.

There is little empirical evidence with which to support

this position. ENen if his account of primitive life be

accepted, it does not adequately account for the fall of

Presumably, the contamination of the "generically”

human is a consequence of the fact that man no longer lives

close to the subsistence level. In the primitive state

the quest for survival eliminated those men who manifested

 

5W. p. 270.

161
a predatory bent. With an economic surplus man can ”play
fast and loose" with life.

Veblen's argument raises as many questions as it
answers. It doesn’t explain why, in the final analysis,
man's nature should develOp destructive tendencies. In-
stincts are the products of natural evolutionary forces. As
long as man was directly controlled by the environment, his
basic nature remained uncontaminated. The predatory in-
stincts arise in conjunction with economic progress. The
struggle for life shifted from interaction of man with a
physical environment to an interaction with a human environ-
ment. But this still does not account for the development
of the predatory instincts.

Veblen was apparently aware of the difficulties in
accounting for the sudden deve10pment of the destructive
instincts. Frequently, he attempts to resolve this diffi-
culty by postulating a basic human nature in which both
types of instincts inhere. Thus, in respect to the "patriotic
animus" he states:

To anyone who is inclined to moralize on the singu-
lar discrepancies of human life this state of the
case will be fruitful of much profound speculation.
The patriotic animus appears to be an enduring trait
of human nature, an ancient heritage that has stood
over unshorn from time immemorial. . . . It is archa-
ic, not amenable to elimination or enduring suppres-
sion, and apparently not appreciably to be mitigated

by reflecgion, education, experience or selective
breeding. O

 

“W. p. in.

162
If this position is accepted, then Veblen cannot argue that
one instinct is more generically human than any other in-
stinct. Apart from a theory of value, every instinct has
an equal claim to be considered fundamental. The construc-
tive instincts cannot, therefore, be logically utilized as
criteria with which to evaluate the culture.

Veblen is now forced to argue that the constructive
instincts, by enhancing life, are more generically human
than those instincts which destroy life. This is clearly
a statement of value. Indeed, predatory behavior may en-
hance the life of the individual. It is apparent that
Veblen's theory of value is oriented to the welfare of the
society. Individual behavior is to be Judged by its re-
lationship to the group.

It will be noted how readily Veblen's theory of in-
stincts becomes a theory of value. The fundamental fact
of life is man's struggle with the material environment.
The economic problem looms large in every society. For-
tunately, man is endowed with a nature which makes him
potentially able to manipulate this environment for human
purposes. Man's instincts are malleable, purposeful, and
intelligent in some degree. They can be modified by habit.
Unlike other animals man can foresee the consequences of
his action and can, thereby, adapt to a wide range of
environmental circumstances.

Man in other words has all of the necessary means

163
to overcome his economic problems. If he would c00perate
with his fellow man, if he would use his intelligence, if
he would reorganize his institutions, if he would develop a
sense of efficiency, and if he would be curious about his
environment, he could achieve an economic welfare undreamed
of by previous generations.

Man, however, is often perverse and stupid. He is
a creature of habit, superstition, and narrow self-interest.
He wastes the means of life in a conspicuous display of
prowess and economic success. He becomes enslaved to his
institutions. He is frequently too indolent to be curious
about his environment. Instead of cooperating with his
fellow men, he manifests behavior characterized by ferocity,
cunning, cheating, and self-seeking. Fortunately, not all
men are equally addicted to predatory behavior. It is
possible to appeal to the reasonableness of some men, al-
though the majority of men cannot be reformed in this
manner. The particular behavior which an individual mani-
fests is to be traced ultimately to the kind of economic
activity in which he is engaged. At least economic activity,
as it is expressed in institutions or habits of thought, is
a major determinant of behavior. As a creature of habit,
man can be manipulated either toward destructive or con-
structive behavior. Such a manipulation involves the
reorganization of institutions. Veblen never rules out the

possibility that man can be reformed in this way.

16h

Veblen's theory of science has led some of his readers
to conclude that he is a positivist, a philosOphical position
which exalts science and matter-of-fact thought while deny-
ing the separate existence of values. From the positivist
standpoint a value statement is either reducible to a state-
ment of fact, is meaningless, or has only an emotive appeal.61
In respect to science Veblen observes:

Modern civilisation is peculiarly matter-of-fact.
It contains many elements that are not of this
character, but these other elements do not belong
exclusively or characteristically to it. The
modern civilized peoples are in a peculiar degree
capable of an impersonal, dispassionate insight
into the material facts with which mankind has to
deal. . . . This characteristic of western civili-
sation comes to a head in modern science, and it
finds its highest material expression in the tech-
nology of the machine industry. . . . Whatever is
not consonant with these opaque creations of
science is an intrusive feature in the modern
scheme, borrowed or standing over from the bar-
barian past. 2

Later in the same essay he continues:

On any large question which is to be disposed of
for good and all the final appeal is by common
consent taken to the scientist. The solution
offered in the name of science is decisive so long
as it is not set aséde by a still more searching
scientific inquiry. 3

 

61A. J . Aver. We (Oxford Uni-
versity: London, 1936); Charles L. Stevenson, Ethigg_gng
Langnag§,(Yale University: New Haven, l9uh).

62W. pp.
1-2.

”LN” pp. 34*.

 

 

 

165
Modern science assumes that reality is characterized by
process, change, and development. It is a metaphysics of
evolution in which the process is to be explained in terms
of itself. There can be no appeal to a higher ground which
lies outside the process. The fundamental metaphysical
assumption of modern science is that change is characterized
by impersonal cause and effect. Science is, in other words,
the dispassionate study of the relationships which subsist
between facts. This is Veblen's view of the nature of
science.

In describing what he conceives to be the nature of
science, Veblen is not thereby joining the positivists. He
explicitly rejects this position.

This latterday faith in matter-of-fact knowledge

may be well grounded or it may not. It has come

about that men assign it this high place, perhaps

idolatrously, perhaps to the detriment of the best

and most intimate interests of the race. There is

room for much more than a vague doubt that this

cult of sciengfi is not altogether a wholesome

growth. . . .
While Veblen unquestionably admires the instrumental value
of science, he does not preach that science is ultimately
true and good. He does not preach that science will allow
humanity to achieve a millenium. He does preach that the

scientific point of view dominates modern culture. Whether

men like it or not, science is giving its tone and color to

 

641953.911... p. 4.

166
modern civilization. This is precisely the reason why
economics must become evolutionary. Otherwise, it will not
be intelligible to men imbued with the scientific animus.

In Bacon's phrase, nature can be commanded only if she be
obeyed. Science is a lesson in obedience; it does not
teach us what to command.

If Veblen did have a theory of value disguised as
a theory of instincts, why does he lead us to believe that
his theory is amoral? Veblen's reply to this query is
implicit in his attack upon the orthodox economists. The
traditional economist refused to separate value from fact.
His thinking was dominated by such value concepts as "Pro-
vidential Order," ”natural," "normal? and "progress." He
did not recognize an independent tribunal of facts. In-
stead, he manipulated facts in ways which would support his
preconceptions. If the traditional economist had seen that
values reside in the activities of men, he would have realized
that his preconceptions rationalized many of the evils of
the society.

Veblen assumes that it is possible for the social
scientist to make something approaching an objective study
of society. Like the natural scientist, the social scientist
can make certain statements about the world which are not
value statements. This is not to say that value statements
are meaningless or inapprOpriate. The error of the orthodox

economist was in confusing the realm of fact with the realm

167
of value. There are empirical statements which are in no
sense value statements. Had the orthodox economist recog-
nized this, he would have been committed to an examination
of the ”seamy side of life" as well as those facts which
reinforced his preconceptions.

By implication Veblen argues that an evolutionary
economics must emphasize empirical investigations at the
expense of value analysis. This is indeed what he has
attempted to accomplish. The social scientist must assign
a high priority to instrumental as contrasted with intrinsic
values. It is not the function of the economist to evalu-
ate the intrinsic values of a society. Like every other
individual, the economist holds values, but these values
should not prevent him from an examination of the impersonal,
irreducible, ”Opaque" facts. Although Veblen never achieved
his ideal, this appears to be his position.

Veblen's disclaimer of any moral judgments has led to
much criticism of his writings, especially of Ihg_2negzy_g£,
‘§h§_Lg;§yng_glg§§. Clarence E. Ayres, for example, charges
that Veblen's analysis leads to cultural relativism. ”By
his ironical disclaimer of any moral judgment he misled a
whole generation of students into supposing that he really
did regard waste and usefulness as morally neutral categories,

and that his whole analysis was therefore rudderless.”65

—_

65Clarence E. Ayres, "The Coordinates of Institution-

3118msn WW: V010 XLI, N0. 2 (May. 1951):
p. 52.

168

This criticism seems unwarranted. In the first place, no
one could seriously read any of Veblen's works and conclude
that Veblen pgzsgnally regarded "waste" as morally neutral.
Secondly, although Veblen has indeed ”misled" students, this
is not a necessary consequence of his philosophy. Veblen
does not argue that "waste" is ultimately morally neutral.
Indeed, the very concept of waste reflects the values which
men hold. Waste is morally neutral only in respect to a
scientific analysis of the culture. Veblen was attempting
to apply the methods of science to a study of the culture.
It was a descriptive, impersonal study which excluded his
personal values. Veblen believed that an empirical study
of the culture would show that certain activities and
institutions were wasteful as determined by the canons of
waste which the society has established. What Veblen per-
sonally regards as waste has no bearing upon the validity
of this proposition. He believed that his conclusions were
true apart from his personal values. Although Veblen was
not successful in divorcing his analysis from value con-
siderations, his attempt should not have misled students.
It does not destroy the logical validity of his approach.

An illustration will perhaps clarify the above argu-
ment. An important economic activity of a capitalistic
society is competitive advertising. The orthodox economists
frequently argued that advertising served the people by

informing them. Veblen and other economists scrutinized

169
the details of this activity and found that advertising
generally misinforms. The function of advertising is to
sell the product. If this can be achieved through mis-
informing the public, then the public will be misinformed.

Veblen calls this kind of activity "wasteful," but
claims that no value judgment is intended. Why then call
it wasteful? It is wasteful in the sense that it does not
serve the interest of the people as a whole. Morton White
points out that Veblen is clearly making a value judgment
in establishing this criterion by which the wastefulness of
an activity is established.

When he said that it was wasteful he meant that it
did not serve "human life or well-being on the
whole." He was squeamish about implying that those
who indulge in conspicuous consumption don't value
it individually, but in calling it wasteful he did
not refrain from making a value judgment in one
clear sense of that phrase.

Although Veblen has clearly made a value judgment
in defining waste in terms of the welfare of the people an
g_nhglg, he is otherwise presumably making an analysis free
of value judgments. Competitive advertising is wasteful
since it does not serve human life as a whole. The generality
of men, in Veblen's view, ultimately determines what is
wasteful. It so happens that men define waste as activity
which does not serve life. If the public understood the

nature and consequences of competitive advertising, it too

 

66White, gp‘_§it., p. 207.

170
would caD.it wasteful. The concept of waste has a widely
accepted meaning among people. It reflects the values of the
society. The term "waste," in other words, does not so
much reflect Veblen's values as the values of the culture.67
There is evidence in Veblen to support such a position. In
a reply to the criticisms of John Cummings, Veblen wrote:

Exception is taken . . . to my attempted definition
of waste. It should be said that the definition in
question aims to promulgate no novel doctrine; the
aim being to state discursively what is the content
of a judgment concerning waste or futility. The de-
finition may be unfortunate, but its ineptitude

does not eliminate the concept of waste from men's
habits of thought. . . . Men do currently pass opin-
ions on this and that as being wasteful or not waste-
ful.. .. Sumptuary legislation and the much preaching
of the moralists of all ages against lavish habits

of life is evidence to this effect. There is also

a good deal of a consensus as to what manner of
things are wasteful. The brute fact that the word

is current shows that. Without something of a pass-
able consensus on that head the wcrd would not be
intelligible. . . . As Mr. Cummings earnestly con-
tends . . . it is always the individual that passes

 

67Veblen, however, is not advocating cultural relativ-
ism as Professor Ayres has argued. Veblen's position appears
to be simply this: A scientific analysis of a culture will
reveal that the generality of men do in fact regard certain
types of behavior as wasteful. The scientist evaluates the
culture in terms of this prevailing conception of waste. As
a scientist, this is the extent of his function. In his
capacity as a scientist he cannot determine what men ought
to regard as wasteful. He cannot advocate any particular
ethical position. He cannot even conclude that wasteful
activities ought to be abolished. A scientist, in short,
cannot tell us what we ought to value. He can only describe
what men do actually value. The confusion in Veblen's po-
sition arises, because Veblen does not maintain this pro—
fessed objectivity. Moreover, the values which he imputes
to the generality of mankind seem identical in nature to
the values which he holds personally.

 

 

171
an opinion of this kind. . . . But the consensus that
prevails shows that the opinions of individuals on
matters touchingg"the generically human" passably
coincide. . . . '

What is Veblen's view of the good society? Surely,
it would be a society characterized by peace, cooperation,
efficiency, workmanship, rationality, humility, and know-
ledge for its own sake. It would be a society in which the
institutions would provide a perfect adjustment between man
and his environment. Institutions would serve to expedite
the fulfillment of the basic needs and drives of man. These
basic needs and drives are primarily economic in nature.
Veblen is obsessed with production. He comes close to the
prototype of David Hiesman's concept of the 'inner-directed,"
production man.69

Veblen gives surprisingly little attention to the
relationship between production and consumption. He appears
to take the nature of this relationship for granted. Pro-
duction is valuable for consumption; consumption is valuable
for the maintenance of life; and life in any form is valuable
in itself. Nevertheless, the problems related to production

cannot be divorced from the problems concerning consumption.

This is particularly the case where the industrial system

—_._..A

69David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Beuel Denney,

WW.&£.LMW We 0
(Yale University: New Haven, 1950), Chapter V.

 

172
is able to provide all of the subsistence requirements. Veb-
len apparently could not envisage a society where the problem
of production would be secondary to the problem of dis-
tribution. Veblen is primarily concerned with sheer physical
quantities of goods and services. It is to be noted in
this reSpect that Veblen develOped no theory of leisure.

His world is largely devoid of literature, fine arts, music,
and recreation. He allows the individual no consumption
other than that which directly provides for his physical
needs.

If one were to isolate that cluster of values which
is most characteristic of Veblen, it would be those instru-
mental values associated with technology. The machine pro-
cess not only leads to unlimited production but also to
increased rationality. The machine process forces men to
adapt to the requirements of contemporary life, although
Veblen does not explain why such an adaptation is desirable.
Finally, the machine process refuses to be manipulated by
conventional truths or the personal whims of men. Veblen's
admiration for technology is implicit in the following
passage:

The machine throws out anthropomorphic habits of
thought. It compels the adaptation of the work-
man to his work, rather than the adaptation of
the work to the workman. The machine technology
rests on a knowledge of impersonal, material
cause and effect, not on the dexterity, diligence,
or personal force of the workman, still less on

the habits and propensities of the workman's sup-
eriors. . . . It inculcates thinking in terms of

 

173

Opaque, impersonal cause and effect, to the nega-
tion of those norms of validity that rest on usage.

0 O O

The machine process gives no insight into questions
of good or evil, merit or demerit, except in point

of material causation. . . . The machine technology
takes no cognizance of conventionally established
rules of precedence; it knows neither manners nor
breeding. . . . Its metaphysical basis is the law of
cause and effect, which in the thinking of its adepts
has displaced even the law of sufficient reason.70

nglennang Dguey

One of the anomalies which has perplexed us in this
study is the almost complete neglect of the writings of
Thorstein Veblen by American educators. This is not nec-
essarily to imply that Veblenism provides an adequate foun-
dation for a philosophy of education. The neglect is
anomalous only in the sense that Veblenism is an integral
part of a broad movement in American social philosophy from
which professional education has borrowed heavily. Whereas
John Dewey has had a tremendous influence upon American
education, his spiritual brother, Thrstein Veblen, has
literally been a voice in the wilderness.

Morton White has noted the intellectual kinship of
those who pioneered in the "revolt against formualism." He

writes:

 

70
W. p. 148.

 

 

 

 

 

17a
Pragmatism, instrumentalism, institutionalism, econ-
omic determinism, and legal realism exhibit striking
philosophical kinships. They are all suspicious of
approaches which are excessively formal; they all
protest their anxiety to come to grips with reality,
their attachment to the moving and the vital in social
life.71
A comparison of Dewey and Veblen will increase our under-
standing of the latter's social philOSOphy. We shall see
Veblen as one of the early pragmatists who applied the
principles of this philosophy to the study of economics.
Although there are major differences between Veblen and Dewey,
these differences are overshadowed by large areas of agree-
ment.
Even the intellectual backgrounds of Veblen and
Dewey are similar. Both men were initially students of
philosophy. They were students of idealism, of Kant and
Hegel, before they were pragmatists. Both rejected British
empiricism early in their writings. Darwin's evolutionary
thesis looms large in the works of both men. Neither man
respected either received knowledge or conventional truths.
They were both pioneers in the application of scientific
method to the problems of society. They were pioneers
in advocating a unified social science.

Whereas Veblen applied the evolutionary principle to

the subject matter of economics. Dewey made a similar

 

71Wh1te, Qp, gl§., p. 6.

175

application in philos0phy and education. Veblen attacked
the deductive, abstract, taxonomic character of the classical
economics. Dewey at the same time was launching an assault
upon the fortress of traditional philosophy. He argued that
philosophy was preoccupied with metaphysical disputes. For-
mal logic prevented philosophy from coming to grips with
reality. Likewise, education was dominated by outmoded
ideals which prevented it from coming into contact with the
actualities of life. Both Dewey and Veblen charged that.
traditional psychology and social science were inadequate
in dealing with the rapid changes in American life.

Both men campaigned for a more realistic study of
the American culture. To veblen and Dewey this meant an
increased emphasis upon factual studies rather than theoret-
ical speculations. It meant an increased emphasis upon the
study of anthropology, biology, sociology, economics, history,
psychology, and scientific method. It meant a decreased
emphasis upon formal logic, mathematics, and classical
philosophy. Although both men preached a philosophy of
science, their influence was primarily in the social sciences.
Indeed, neither man demonstrated any degree of competence
in natural science. Their writings reflect only a super-
ficial acquaintance with the subject.

Veblen and Dewey are pragmatists in the sense that
they conceive of reality in terms of process, change, growth,

and development. It is for this reason that they are

176
critical of the statics of formal logic, mathematics, and
economic analysis. They are similarly suSpicious of ab-
straction, since an abstraction is divorced by its nature
from some aspects of reality. In particular, an abstraction
rarely does justice to the dynamic, changing aspects of
reality. The inadequacy of static theory is perhaps best
expressed by the institutional economists of our own day.
Both Veblen and Dewey would enthusiastically support the view
expressed in the following passage:

But logic is static; it has to do with known factors
~—it is not creative.

The inability to discuss dynamic problems is an
aspect of the well-known timelessness of static
theory--equilibrium theory. A dynamic process is
one in time, in the sense that we cannot go back
from a later moment to an earlier moment except
by outright destruction; the process changes the
data, while the equilibrating process only re-
arranges them. In equilibrium theory the time
element is, as it were, denatured; it is again,
purely legical, not historical.74

Although Dewey was by nature more optimistic than
Veblen, he nevertheless recognized that there were powerful
forces of destruction in society. He was sensitive to the
great waste of human and natural resources. He was conscious
of the powerful vested interests which were opposed to any

change detrimental to their pecuniary interests. Unlike

 

72Eduard Heimann, "Developmental Schemes, Planning,
and Full Employment." WWW.
ed. Abba P. Lerner and Frank D. Graham (Princeton University:
Princeton, 19h6), p. 100.

177
Veblen, however, Dewey had great faith in human intelligence.
Through education man can find salvation. He can learn to
control his environment for human purposes. Veblen, on the
other hand, had no such optimistic faith. He did not have

a high regard for the intelligence of the mass of men. He
therefore emphasized the forced adjustment of man to his
environment. Human nature being what it is, the hope of
humanity lies in the adjustment of man to the machine pro-
cess. In a way it is paradoxical that Dewey,.rather than
Veblen, should be the optimist. Veblen's social phiICSOphy
implies an Optimistic view of life, yet he is a pessimist;
whereas Dewey's social philosophy could easily lead to deSpair,
yet he is an optimist.

In respect to the area of values, both men placed
great faith in the methods and fruits of science and tech-
nology. They rejected all moral absolutes. Dewey, in
particular, rejected all hierarchies of value and attempted
to include axiOIOgy within the empirical sciences. Veblen's
writings are characterized by suspended judgment in respect
to this question. He appears to have regarded ethics as
outside the scope of economics and the empirical sciences
generally. Ethical considerations are extra-evolutionary.

He could point out that competitive advertising conflicts
with the values of our society but refused to conclude that
competitive advertising ogght to be abolished. Dewey would

show no such reticence. He would, indeed, defend such a

178
conclusion. The question of "ought" is in other words
reducible to empirical investigations. It is within the
province of scientific method. The scientist cannot only
trace the consequences of various plans of action but can
also indicate what ought to be done.

Dewey's definition of education will serve to illus-
trate both the agreements and differences between the two
men in reSpect to value theory. Dewey defines education
as growth which is relative only to more growth. Taken
literally, this definition has little meaning, since people
in fact cherish various values. From the viewpoint of the
society some forms of growth are malignant. We cannot
imagine an educational philcscphy in which all forms of
growth were given equal value. Implicit, therefore, in
Dewey's definition is the concept of education as desigaple
growth. But how do we determine what is desirable? Is
what is desirable to be determined scientifically?

Dewey first observes that there is a distinction
between desiring and desirable. That an individual desires
something is a statement of fact. But the mere fact that
something is desired does not constitute "desirableness."
Thus far Veblen and Dewey are in general agreement.

How do we distinguish between desired and desirable?
Dewey deals with this question in the following passage:

To declare something satisfactory or desirable is

to assert that it meets Specifiable conditions. It
is, in effect, a judgment that the thing "will do."

 

179

It involves a prediction; it contemplates a future
in which the thing will continue to serve; it will
do. It asserts a consequence the thing will ac-
tively institute; it will dd. That it is satisfy-
ing is the content of a prOposition of fact; that
it is satisfactory is a judgment, an estimate, an
appraisal. It denotes an attitude tg_h§_taken.

Values (to sum up) may be connected inherently with

liking, and yet not with eyerz liking but only with

those that judgment has approved, after examination

of the relation upon which the object liked depends.

A casual liking is one that happens without knowledge

of how it occurs nor to what effect. The difference

between it and one which is sought because of a judg—

ment that it is worth having and is to be striven for,

makes just the difference between enjoyments which

are accidental and enjoyments that have value and

hence a claim upon our attitude and conduct.73
Dewey has made a distinction between impulsive action and
reasoned conduct. In order for an action to be desirable
it must be reasonable in the sense that the consequences of
the action have been thought out. The action must 'fit," so
to Speak, into the stream of experiences of the individual.
If education is to further desirable growth, it must assist
students in examining alternative plans of action. It must
train students to think before they act. In taking this
position Dewey has avoided the postulation of a hierarchy
of values. Yet, it is difficult to see just how his position

solves any problems in respect to values. Reasoned conduct

is surely not equivalent to desirable conduct. Dewey, perhaps,

 

7‘3Jorm Dewey, _I-;;tel,l._ig.en.c_e. in that. d w M. ed.
Joseph Batner (Random House: New York, 1939), pp. 7?“, 785,
786.

180
meant that reasonableness is a necessary condition of de-
sirable conduct. This, however, leaves the problem of
desirable conduct unresolved, for that which is reasonable
will not necessarily be desirable.

Veblen was much more reluctant than Dewey in conclud-
ing that "desirableness" can be scientifically determined.
As Morton White has shown, Veblen appears to have believed
that certain areas of value are beyond the scOpe of an

oi
empirical science.‘$

The question of "ought", for example,
cannot be determined on purely scientific grounds. It is
significant that Veblen never suggested that the leisure
class ought to be abolished. Such a suggestion would have
involved a comparison between the worth of the values held
by the society and those held by members of the leisure
class. Veblen pointed out that from the VieWpoint of the
society the leisure class was parasitic. From its own
vieWpoint, however, the leisure class values its activities.
Therefore, Veblen refused to take an ethical position.75
This chapter will be concluded with several short
passages from the writings of John Dewey. These passages
reflect the intellectual kinship of the two men. Curiously,

neither Veblen nor Dewey makes any reference to the writings

 

7“White, op, cit., pp. 210—211.

75As an individual, as distinct from a scientist,
Veblen would have abolished the leisure class!

18]
of the other, although they were unquestionably acquainted
with each other's work. It will he noted that even the
vocabulary is similar.

Anthropologically Speaking, we are living in a money
culture. Our materialism, our devotion to money mak-
ing . . . are not things by themselves. They are the
product of the fact that we live in a money culture;
of the fact that our technique and technology are con-
trolled by interest in private profit. There lies the
serious and fundamental defect of our civilization.

. . . The evasion of fundamental economic causes by
critics . . . seems to me to be an indication of the
prevalence of the old European tradition. . . . The
development of the American type . . . is an expres-
sion of the fact that we have retained this tradition
and the economic system of private gain on which it

is based, while at the same time we have made an in-
dependent develOpment of industry and technology that
is nothing short of revolutionary. . . .

[The captains of industry and finance] exercise lead-
ership surreptitiously and, as it were, absent-
mindedly. They lead, but it is under cover of im—
personal and socially undirected economic forces.
Their reward is found not in what they do . . .

but in a deflection of social consequences to pri-
vate gain.

It is not too much to say that the whole significance
of the older individualism has now shrunk to a pe-
cuniary szale and measure. The virtues that are sup-
posed to attend rugged individualism nay be vocally
proclaimed, but it takes no great insight to see that
what is cherished is measured by its connection with
those activities that make for success n business
conducted for personal gain.

Every occupation leaves its impress on iniividual
character and wodifies the outlook on life of those
who carry it on. No one questions this fact as re-
spects wage~earners tied to the machine, or busi-
ness men who devote themselves to pecuniary manip-
ulations.

I want here to call attention rather to the act
that the present method of dealing with the prob-
lem is restrictign_of productive capacity. For
scarcity of materials and surplus of those wh

want to work is the ideal situation for profit on the
part of those situated to take advantage of it. 3e:
MW at the very time when expans—
ign_of production is most needed has long been the

rule of industrialists.

The ultimate problem of production is the production
of human beings. To this end the production of goods
is intermediate and auxiliary. It is by this stan-
dard that the present system is condeined.

Back of the appropriation by the few of the material
resources of society lies he appOpriation by the
few in behalf of their own ends of the cultural, the
spiritual, resources that a’e the product not of the
individuals who have taken possession but of the
cooperative work of humanity.76

 

l

"K . . , ,
"John Dewey, op. cit., pp. nos, “03, fill, hl2, MZQ
t:

:30, H6 ,ure.

CHAPTB R V
EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THORSTEIN VEBLEN

The distinguished educator, Harold Rugg, has called
Thorstein Veblen America's "first social psychologist and
pioneer student of the economic system.”L In a later
passage he continues:

While John Dewey was documenting the social nature
of the Self and the human act of knowing, his socio—

logical colleagues were applying the action-psychology
to the changing industrial society itself. tlhgin

d V a .. t
WW
h 10 p e c . Among a score of major stu-

dents of our social institutions he stands first, com—
parable in the field of social analysis to Peirce and
James and Dewey in the psychOIOgy of behaving and
knowing. As Dewey led his group in the study of the

psychology Qfl the individual act g: benaging and Kngm-
ing, Veblen led students in applying the new action-

psychology tOzthe study WWW
mm
In spite of this acclaim Rugg's analysis of Veblen's con-
tribution is surprisingly brief. Since Veblen is rarely
assigned such an important role in the development of the
American phiIOSOphy of experience, an extended analysis

seems to be in order. Using Rugg's statement as a point of

 

1W. p. 75.
2M” pp. Zéu-Eés.

183

IBM
departure, some of the more important educational impli-

cations of Veblen's phiIOSOphy will be examined.

Since both 2h: Theggy 9f the Leisure glass and The
W contain important material on

education, these two studies will be considered before turn-
ing to the more general implications of the social philoso-
phy. The last chapter of the former study is specifically
directed to college and university education. As one might
surmise, the analysis is concerned with exhibiting the in—
fluence of the leisure class upon education. It is an
application and extension of the more general thesis of this
study.

The higher learning, it is argued, continues to bear
the marks of its ancient origins. Initially, learning was
closely associated with the"devotional"function. "In great
part, the early learning consisted in the acquisition of
knowledge and facility in the service of a supernatural agent.
It was therefore closely analagous in character to the
training required for the domestic service of a temporal
master."3 The ancient learning was concerned with the
ritual by which service is rendered to the "supernatural
leisure class." Such learning bore little relationship to

the industrial function of the community. It did not

 

3Th: iheony 92 the Leisure 91353, p. 36h.

185
contribute to the economic welfare of the society. Those
who pursued this useless learning were generally men divorced
from the industrial pursuits. In short it was a leisure
class activity.

Learning, Veblen continues, has also been tradition-
ally associated with sympathetic magic. The goal of learn-
ing was the evocation of the occult forces. The pursuit of
knowledge has been the pursuit of the "unknowable." "By
those whose habits of thought are not shaped by contact
with modern industry, the knowledge of the unknowable is
still felt to be the ultimate if not the only true know-
ledge."4 By virtue of his presumed mastery of the occult
forces, the savant was able to impress and coerce the un-
lettered or uninitiated. This close relationship between
learning and magic, between learning and religious sorcery,
accounts for the continued prevalence of excessive ritual,
ceremony, tradition, and pageantry in the higher learning.

Veblen's discussion of the origins of the higher
learning is only a preliminary to his major theme. Stated
briefly, he argues that the leisure class, under the canons
of conspicuous consumption and conSpicuous leisure, controls
the content and aims of the higher learning. The leisure

class has little regard for knowledge which is useful or

 

4
Mo. pp. 366-367.

 

 

186
serviceable to the community. It rejects educational inno-
vations. It refuses to contribute to the development of
new areas of knowledge. It sneers at such practical studies
as technology and even relegates ssience to the "lower"
schools.

Thus, there has arisen a division in knowledge between
the theoretical and the practical, between the "higher"
and the "lower." The best education is one concerned with
the esoteric, theoretical, abstract, "cultural," non-in-
dustrial knowledge. The leisure class pursues the study of
the ancient languages, the humanities, the fine arts, and
other "cultural” studies. The leisure class gentleman
does not acquire such knowledge for its own sake, although
this may be his rationalization. Neither does he acquire
culture for its serviceability to the welfare of the com-
munity.

What, then, is the function of a leisure class edu-
cation? The first requirement is that it give evidence of
a life of leisure. It must give evidence that the individual
can afford to waste the means of life. Thus, a knowledge
of form, manners, and ritual becomes extremely valuable.
Likewise, the acquirement of recondite knowledge serves as
a symbol of wasted effort and hence of good pecuniary stand-
ing in the community. Veblen illustrates his thesis with
a reference to the conventional spelling of the English

language.

187
A breach of the prOprieties in Spelling is extremely
annoying and will discredit any writer in the eyes
of all persons who are possessed of a developed sense
of the true and the beautiful. English orthOgraphy
satisfies all the requirements of the canons of repu-
tability. . . . It is archaic, cumbrous, and ineffec-
tive; its acquisition consumes much time and effort;
failure to acquire it is easy of detection. There-
fore it is the first and readiest test of reputabil-
ity in learning, and conformity to its ritual is in-
dispensable to a blameless scholastic life.5
What kind of learning does Veblen advocate? We have
seen that he rejects all learning which is motivated by a
desire for good repute or pecuniary success. On the basis
of The Theory 9: the Leisure 91333 he seems to endorse learn-
ing which is "serviceable" to the welfare of the community,
eSpecially its economic welfare. Here as elsewhere Veblen
appeals to a community or societal standard in evaluating
the higher learning. Education is not rightfully pursued
for the sake of the learner but rather for the sake of the
society. The society is interested, presumably, in such
areas of study as will contribute directly to the further-
ance of life. Thus, the society supports the study of
engineering, science, mathematics, and the social studies.

It rejects such areas of study as the humanities and the

fine arts as cultivating waste rather than efficiency.6

 

5M. . p. 399.

6Veblen would protest that he is not making a value
judgment concerning the curriculum of the higher learning.
He is, instead, assessing the higher learning from the
standpoint of the economic welfare of the community. There
may be other and more substantial grounds for cultivating

 

 

188
Although Veblen has a marked bias in this essay against
cultural studies, it appears, nevertheless, that he is
primarily concerned with the motive rather than the content
of learning. Any area of knowledge is legitimate if it
contibutes to the welfare of the community. This at least

would seem to be the prOper consequence of Veblen's position.

When W is examined. we

find a marked change in emphasis from Veblen's earlier views.
In the "Introduction" to this study he states:

Men instinctively seek knowledge, and value it. The
fact of this proclivity is well summed up in saying
that men are by native gift actuated with an idle
curiosity,--"idle" in the sense that a knowledge of
things is sought, apart from any ulterior use of the
knowledge so gained.

For good or ill, civilized men have come to hold that
this matter-of-fact knowledge of things is the only
end in life that indubitably justifies itself. So
that nothing more irretrievably shameful could over-
take modern civilization than the miscarriage of this
modern learning, which is the most valued spiritual
asset of civilized mankind.7

 

"culture." Certain studies are called "wasteful" only in
the sense that they do not contribute to economic well—
being. As far as Veblen's personal beliefs are concerned,
there is no problem, for it is evident that he did not have
a high regard for culture. This, however, does not comprom-
ise the logical validity of his position. It is legitimate
to examine education from the viewpoint of the economic
interest. Certain studies can be called "wasteful" in re-
spect to their economic bearing. This does not, of course,
eliminate value judgments from Veblen’s analysis since he
makes society his frame of reference.

7Winainmmisa. pp. 4. 8.

 

 

189
Veblen states that the pursuit of knowledge for its own
sake is the most cherished ideal of the race, although he
makes no effort to substantiate this questionable assumption.
The preservation of this ideal is in the keeping of the uni-
versity. Veblen contrasts this ideal with knowledge which
is useful in gaining individual success. He equates this
latter knowledge with the "pragmatism of the market-place."
In characteristic fashion Veblen chooses to employ the term
"pragmatism" in a very special Sense. In'Veblenian terms
the self-seeking business man is the prototype of the
pragmatist.

The ideal university should, according to Veblen,
promote pure research. It must not be contaminated by under-
graduate students, professional schools, or any of the prac-
tical interests of the society. This is a curious reversal
of the views expressed in The Theeny e: the Leiseze glass.
The ideal university, as it is conceived in this later
study, would have no place for the engineer, the doctor,
the lawyer, or the professional educator. It would have
no college of commerce, agriculture, or journalism. In
short it would have no direct contact with the world of
affairs.

Veblen has made a sharp distinction between the
theoretical and the practical, between pure and applied
knowledge. ostensibly, he does not intend to disparage

practical or applied knowledge.

190

Doubtless the larger and more serious responsibility

in the educational system belongs not to the univer-

sity but to the lower and professional schools. Cit-

izenship is a larger and more substantial category

than scholarship; and the furtherance of civilized

life is a larger and more serious inte est than the

pursuit of knowledge for its own sake.
The university should pursue the idle curiosity, because
this is the manifest function of the university. It is not
its function to train lawyers or teachers. It is not its
function, continues Veblen, to serve as a correction house
for delinquent and untamed boys and girls. When the uni-
versity attempts to assume a multiplicity of presumably
divergent functions, the consequence is that no function is
adequately served. In particular, the pursuit of knowledge
for its own sake is suppressed.

If the generality of men regard the pursuit of the
idle curiosity as the sole manifest function of the univer-
sity, why is that function not fulfilled? The answer is
that business controls education. This which is conducive
to good business is not conducive to the search for truth.
Business and education do not mix. The business man is a

calculator of the "main chance." He Operates in the spirit

of "quietism, caution, compromise, collusion, and chicane."9

 

8Loe eit., p. 15. As a matter of fact, the tone of
Veblen's discussion on practical education does suggest
disparagement.

9LQQ‘. glt‘O, p. 51.

 

 

 

 

191
Whereas the pursuit of knowledge involves an analysis of
impersonal cause and effect, business operates in terms of
the personal equation. Business is interested in knowledge
which is narrowly expedient for the learner, in knowledge
which is profitable, in knowledge which is useful for the
purposes of coercion and manipulation.

Veblen notes that the control which business exer-
cises is focused in the governing boards of the universities.
Although these boards delegate a major share of responsibil—
ity to the "Captains of Erudition," they maintain a signifi-
cant control through the budget. The captain selects a
group of advisors who are in ”sympathy with his own ambit-
ions."10 This cabinet or "junta" carries out faithfully
the directives of the captain. Deans, department heads,
etc., are selected by the "chief" and his personal staff.
Every individual in the hierarchy must meet the test of
obedience and orthodoxy. Every dean and department head
must be able to sense the direction in which the captain is
about to move. Those who possess this kind of insight are
destined for rapid advancement within the "corporation of
learning."

Where does the faulty belong in this bureaucracy of
learning? They are the captain's employees who are ”hired

to render certain services and turn out certainzscheduled

 

10M” p. 67.

192
vendible results."11 The chief administrator must have the
power to "appoint and dismiss, and to reward and punish"
members of his staff. The successful faculty member will
obediently publicize the institution through numerous pub-
lications and personal appearances. The administration,
guided by the canons of business, is more interested in the
quantity rather than the quality of production. A university
is a factory operating in terms of inputs, outputs, and turn-
over. Learning is graded, classified, and evaluated in
quantitative terms. The successful teacher is one who is
willing and able to "administer" to large groups of stu-
dents. What transpires in the classroom seldom meets the
public eye. The teacher, therefore, who desires advancement
must be a good administrator and advertiser. The supreme
virtue is an ability to be all things to all people.

So long as our culture is dominated by pecuniary
values, education will continue to reflect business prin-
ciples. A university president or a superintendent of
schools is to a large extent a victim of circumstances. He
may undertake his duties as a chief administrator with a
dedicated spirit but soon learns the limits within which
honesty is the best policy. In order to survive he must
learn the fine art of hypocrisy. The functions of business

and education do not mix. This is the theme of Ihg_fl1gh§;

 

lllhlio

 

 

 

 

193
W93-

In the businesslike view of the captains of erudition,
taken from the standpoint of the counting-house, learn-
ing and university instruction are a species of skilled
labour, to be hired at competitive wages and to turn
out the largest merchantable output that can be ob-
tained by shrewd bargaining with their employee; where-
as, of course . . . the pursuit of learning is a
species of leisure. . . . Its aim is not the increase
or the utilization of the material means of life; nor
can its spirit can employment be bought with a price.12
It is the faculty, continues Veblen, which is ulti-
mately responsible for fulfilling the function of the uni-
versity. It is the faculty, therefore, which should have a
voice concerning the policies and Operation of the university.
The chief function of the administrative bureaucracy is to
“cater to the needs and idiosyncrasies” of the community of
scholars. Indeed, most administrative work in the higher
learning could well be eliminated. Education has little
interest in spectacular ”sideshows", in impressive enroll-
ment figures, in salesmanship and publicity, in student
dissipation, in pious and hypocritical public utterances,
in building personal empires, in ostentatious buildings and
grounds, or in sensational educational innovations. Such
matters, however, are of very grave concern to the adminis-
trative "Junta." A university is in competition with other
corporations of learning. The goal is to capture as much
of the trade as possible without offering a better product

than the market demands. Advertising, entertainment, and

 

12M” p. 85.

 

 

 

19h

publicity play an important role in achieving this objective.

WW

Having presented a brief exposition of Veblen's writ-
ings on education, we shall now examine the educational
significance of the more pervasive elements in his social
philosOphy. It is impossible to evaluate his specific
writings on education apart from a consideration of his more
inclusive social philcsOphy. In a very real sense Veblen's
social philosophy raises the issues which are of crucial
concern to the educational philosopher. In particular, the
crucial issues concern the preper relationships between the
individual, the society, and education.

In Thg;1heQzy_2£_the_L§i§une_Qlafis,Veblen points out
that an educational system derives its authority from the
society which it serves. "To the end that suitable habits
of thought on certain heads may be conserved in the incoming
generation, a scholastic discipline is sanctioned by the
common sense of the community and incorporated into the
accredited scheme of life."13 This is an important, even
though obvious, truism. In every society, fascist or demo-
cratic, the functions of the school are finally determined
by the society which it serves. An educational system never

exists by its own authority. The school is, in the final

 

13W. p. 363.

 

 

195
analysis, not free to determine its own ultimate goals.

A public school exists at the pleasure of the society
or of those groups which control or represent the society.
This is obvious when formal and informal education are con-
trasted. Veblen recognized the broad scOpe of education.

He implicitly agreed with Dewey that education is life in
all of its manifestations. Men are educated by what they
do. Men are educated by the institutions under which they
work and play. The school is only one among many institu-
tions which is engaged in the educative process.

The school, however, has a unique function in the
educative process. It is commissioned to inculcate certain
habits of thought and action which are considered valuable
by those who control the educational enterprise. The so-
ciety, in other words. is unwilling to leave the acquisition
of certain skills and values to mere chance. ?ublio education
is a conscious process by which the young are prepared to
engage in the activities of the society. This is the basic
function of education in every culture. Although Veblen
bitterly attacked the higher learning, he was well aware
that educational authority rested outside the confines of
the university. He proposed to abolish university adminis-
trations and governing boards but did not seriously believe
that this was possible so long as educational authority
rested in the hands of business. He attacked the curriculum

of higher education but observed that the ”dominant practical

 

 

196
interests of the day will . . . govern the detail lines of
academic policy, the range of instruction offered, and the
character of the personnel. . ."lh

This argument concerning the authority of the edu-
cational enterprise is summarized in the assertion that
every society utilizes its educational system for the purpose
of establishing and maintaining consensus. Without some
kind of consensus a collective life is impossible. Even
the ancient civilizations recognized this function of edu-
cation. Aristotle, for example, writes:

Now nobody would dispute that the education of the
young requires the special attention of the lawgiver.
Indeed the neglect of this in states is injurious to
their constitutions; for education ought to be adapted
to the particular form of constitution, since the par-
ticular character belonging to each constitution both
guards the constitution generally and originally es-

tablishes it--for instance the democratic spirit pro-
motes democracy and the oligarchic spirit oligarchy.

Whereas the goals of individuals and, hence, of
societies change, the fundamental objective of education
is conservative. It exists to fulfill whatever objectives
are sanctioned by the society. An educational system, in
other words, indoctrinates certain skills, values, and

habits of thought. The term "indoctrinates” is used with

”W. p. “5.

15Aur'istotlfin Salinas. quoted in W
g1_£%ngg11gnfil_fllfifigm, ed. Robert Ulich Harvard: Cambridge,
19b? , p. 65.

 

 

197

some hesitancy since there is a tendency to associate in-
doctrination with all of the sinister connotations which
the term can convey. In point of fact, however, all educa-
tion by its very nature involves a considerable element of
indoctrination. The important problem for education does
not involve indoctrination nez_§g, but rather it involves
the purposes on behalf of which indoctrination is undertaken.
While a public school never exists by its own author-
ity, it is equally true that the school need not derive
its authority from society taken as a whole. Veblen objects
not only to the values and beliefs which individuals hold
but also to the fact that a segment of society controls the
institutions of the culture. Business controls education
and industry. Education, therefore, does not serve a truly
public function. Business represents a segment of the public
interest to the exclusion of other legitimate interests.
This problem leads into the more general question of the

preper relationship between the society and education.

W

The relationship which exists between the school and
the society will depend upon the values and ideals of the
culture in which the school functions. It will reflect the
values of the culture in respect to the proper relationship
of the individual to the state. Although the school derives

its authority from without, this does not specify the proper

 

 

198
relationship of the school to either the individual or the
society. To assert that the ultimate function of the school
is to serve the culture is not to define what in fact con-
stitutes a fulfillment of that function.

A brief examination of four of the many possible
relationships which can exist between the school and the
social order will assist us in understanding and evaluating
Veblen's position. The first or totalitarian position makes
education entirely subservient to the interests, values,
and objectives of the society. The school mirrors the
culture. It is not an agency which is instrumental in
social change but an instrument which conserves and per-
petuates a professed consensus in the society concerning
aims, values, and ideals. Since this position usually
assumes that the society is the substantial reality, there
is a tendency to treat the ends,values, and objectives of
the society as fixed and eternal. Thus, the educational
program similarly emphasizes the static aspects of reality.

While this position is not necessarily contrary to
the tenets of a democratic ideology, it is not an appro-
priate philosophy for a culture in the process of rapid
change. Such a position necessarily emphasizes the static
and fixed rather than the dynamic and changing. It assumes
that the aims and objectives of "society” can adequately
express the multitude of aims, values, and objectives which

individuals in a democratic society do in fact seek. In

199
other words, this concept of society assumes more consensus
than a dynamic culture can realisitically have.

In practice, this position has found its readiest
application in totalitarian societies. The totalitarian
state utilizes the educational system to achieve objectives
which are desired by those power groups in control of the
political institutions of the culture. The state, it is
argued, has aims, values, and objectives which do not nec-
essarily depend upon the aims and objectives of the governed.
The society is an organism with a life history of its own.
It transcends and necessarily dominates the individuals
under its sway. The individual exists for the fulfillment
of the destiny of the state rather than the reverse.

It is evident that this position need not be asso-
ciated with totalitarian societies, for in one sense edu-
cation ia always a function of society. The danger in
making education wholly the function of society is that it
tends to invest society with a great deal more reality than
it does in fact possess. This is particularly true in
a rapidly changing democratic culture.

A second position, as exemplified by the educational
Reconstructionists, would make society the outcome of edu-
cation. Society is in the process of becoming; it has no
being. The school, therefore, cannot look to society for
its aims and objectives. What is called society is nothing

more than a coalition of special interests within the

200
culture. Some of these interests promote the values in-
herent in the democratic ideology, whereas other groups
attempt to destroy these valies. The most extreme wing of
this position argues that teachers have the responsibility
of determining the proper ends and values of a democratic
culture. The peOple of the culture have commissioned edu-
cators to locate and establish those values which are intrin-

sic to democracy.

Flora A. Philley, a member of the Chicago Federation
of Teachers, has given the most uncompromising version of
this position. She writes:

The preservation of democracy is in the hands of
the teachers of America. No heavier statement was
ever penned. It is imperative that the teachers

of America recognize the foes of democracy. It

is imperative that they meet those foes with bold-
ness and courage, making no compromises, preserving
no masks, accepting no palliatives.1

The foes of democracy are business interests. They cppose
federal aid to education, increased taxes; they control

state assemblies.

Big business binds and gags our school superin-
tendents, controls our universities through their
boards of trustees, dictates our educational poli-
cies. Big business wants a populace educated to
Spend, not save, to flounder, not think, to endure,
not protest. . . . 7

 

16Flora A Phnley. W2 (American

Federation of Teachers: Chicago, 19h8), p. 145.

17M” p. xvm.

201
Concludes Philley:
Ten years of teacher unionism has given me the cour-
age to pen these lines. And so I say to the teachers
of America, you have the preservation, yes, the zggtgne
atign_of democracy in your hands. Come out of your

dingy, sequestered caves before it is too late. We
can be the mightiest force the world has ever known.

In this extreme form this position is totally un-
acceptable in a democratic society. It makes the school a
vested interest in the same category as the vested interests
of labor, business, and religion. It assumes that the
school has an autonomy which it neither has nor ought to
have in this or any other society. The school is not free
to establish the ends of education. Teachers do not have
the legal or moral right to determine what ends the people
of a democratic society ought to seek, yet this is the log-
ical consequence of Philley‘s thesis. It is true, of course,
that the school must appeal to the intrinsic values of the
democratic ideology when it operates in areas where there
is conflict rather than consensus. Nevertheless, it is the
citizen who holds the veto power. The governed ultimately
determine which interests in the society are to be con-
sidered democratic. It is not the function of the school
to determine arbitrarily that the interests of business
conflict with democratic philosOphy and should, therefore,
be repudiated in the school. Business interests are in

fact a part of this culture and must be represented in the

 

18M” p. 156.

202
school so long as these interests are not repudiated by the
generality of men.

A third position denies that a democratic society
can or ought to have objectives. Individuals have desires,
values, aims. and objectives, but society has none. Society
does not establish schools in order to achieve societal
goals, as this statement is normally understood. Schools
are established by the collective action of citizens in
order to provide equal Opportunity for the young. The goal
of education is to cater to the needs, interests, values,
and aspirations of individuals. Education is a process by
which individual potential is released and nurtured. The
objective of education is to prepare individuals for the
competitive struggle by which the public interest is realized.
The fruits of education are not public but private. It
is the individual, through competition with other individuals,
who is responsible for the achievement of a social good.

This is the laissez-faire approach to education. The
educational program takes on the character of a cafeteria
where individuals select whatever intellectual food suits
their own purposes. Since the society has no objective, the
school can have no social objective.

The weakness of this position is that it neglects
the social nature of man. The individual is molded from
without as well as from within. Furthermore, a society has

a measure of reality of which the school must take cOgnizance.

203
A society is not adequately understood apart from an under-
standing of the multitude of human relationships which de-
fine it. Education, therefore, must be concerned both with
the individual as a unique personality and with the indiv-
idual as a social being.

What should be the proper relationship between the
school and the society? The position which seems most ade-
quate for a democratic society involves elements of the
three previous positions. It is assumed that the school
and the society both exist for the welfare of the individual.
Individuals, moreover, determine what constitutes their wel-
fare. All conceptions of society as a kind of mystical
organism are rejected. The society has no objectives which
conflict with the objectives of the generality of men.

It is assumed that the individual, the school, and
the society are in constant interaction. The individual is
not to be understood or adequately educated apart from his
social relationships. Society, likewise, is not to be under-
stood apart from the aims and aspirations of individuals.

The school and the society have a reciprocal impact on one
another. In one sense, education is a function of society

in that both its authority and its objectives are established
by the collective action of men. 0n the other hand, society
is a function of education. In education rests the hope of
the future. Education is a developmental project which

should always attempt to transcend the present limitations

20“
of the culture. For this reason, education never merely
reflects a culture.

Where does Veblen‘s philosophy belong in this class-
ification? It is evident that he would repudiate the
laissez-faire position. He rejects its values, its psychol-
ogy, its view of human nature, its theory of motivation, and
its feasibility under the circumstances of modern indus-
trial life. The details of this criticism need not be
reviewed here. Veblen's attack on education, however, can
be viewed as an attack on the laissez-faire philosophy. In
practice this philosOphy often resulted in the survival of
the fittest. It often became a philos0phy of might makes
right. As Veblen suggests, it often resulted in the control
of education by various special interest groups. Veblen
was especially concerned with the control of education by
business. While this control represented a corruption of
the ideals of the laissez-faire philosophy, it represented
to Veblen the usual outcome, especially under the circum-
stances of modern life.

Education, according to Veblen, has not been a func-
tion of the whole society but only of a segment of the so-
ciety. Thus. he criticizes colleges of commerce which, in
his view, serve the interests of business rather than the
interests of the community.

A college of commerce is designed to serve an emula-

tive purpose only--individual gain regardless of, or
at the cost of, the community at large--and it is,

205

therefore, peculiarly incompatible with the collec-

tive cultural purpose of the university. It belongs

in the corporation of learning no more than a de-

partment of athletics. Both alike give training that

is of no use to the community,--except, perhaps, as

a sentimental excitement.19
In this passage Veblen not only reveals his animosity toward
business but also his characteristic frame of reference for
evaluating the institutions of the culture. A college of
commerce is repudiated, because it presumably does not serve
the interests of the "community at large.” Leisure c1333
activities and institutions are parasitic, because they

do not serve ”society as a whole."

Leisure class activities are wasteful as seen from
the viewpoint of the society. What does Veblen mean? He
obviously does not mean that the members of the leisure
class view their activities as parasitic or wasteful. Ne-
ither does he mean that the majority of men in the culture
consider these activities wasteful. Witness the following
statement he makes concerning the influence of business upon
education:

The fact remains, the modern civilized community
is reluctant to trust its serious interests to
others than men of pecuniary substance, who have
proved their fitness for the direction of academic
affairs by acquiring . . . considerable wealth.

. . . Business success is by common consent . . .

taken to be conclusive evidence of wisdom even in
matters that have no relation to business affairs.20

 

19W. p. 154.
20M” p. 50.

 

 

206
The generality of men do look to business for guidance. The
majority of men do in fact support activities which are
wasteful from the ”viewpoint of the society." The determin-
ation of waste, therefore, is not to be determined by the
generality of men.

Since Veblen professes to make a scientific, impartial,
objective, impersonal study of the culture, he cannot define
waste in terms of his own preferences and biases. How, then,
is waste to be defined? How does "society" determine a
parasitic or wasteful activity or institution? In attempt-
ing to resolve this question, Veblen utilizes a distinction
between latent and manifest functions. Every institution
is to be evaluated in terms of the function it serves. If
an institution fulfills its rational or manifest function,
it thereby serves the welfare of the society. The manifest
function of industry is to produce goods and services as
efficiently as possible. The fulfillnent of this function
contributes to the organic unity and sustenance of the
society. Any other function which industry serves is para-
sitic and wasteful from the standpoint of the society.
Similarly, the manifest function of the university is to
preserve and extend human knowledge. Any other activity in
which the university engages is wasteful.

Although Veblen's distinction between a latent and a
manifest function is a brilliant insight and a valuable

tool of analysis, it does not resolve the question posed.

207

How does one determine the manifest function of an insti-
tution? How does the educator determine the preper function
of the public school? Ostensibly, the rational function of
an institution is determined through an analysis of the ends
of life in relationship to the circumstances of life. An
institution such as the school fulfills its proper function
when it expedites man's adjustment to the exigencies of the
environment, both physical and social. But how does one
determine the prOper ends of life?

This is the decisive question for the educator. It
is also the vital question for Veblen's philosophy, for his
entire analysis revolves around it. Clearly, the ends of
life cannot be determined in the Veblenian analysis by the
will of the peeple. The salient point of Veblen's argument
is that the behavior of the generality of men is governed
by institutions which are not fulfilling their manifest
functions. The influence of business in modern life is not
sustained by force but by consent. Leisure class activities
are not scorned but are praised. Wasteful activities are
endorsed by the population at large. Thus, the proper ends
of life cannot, in the Veblenian analysis, be decided by a
popular referendum.

We can now see the fundamental inadequacy of Veblen's
social philosophy. It gives us little insight into either
the content or the determination of the ends of life. Veb-

len was aware of the necessity for a determination of ends,

208
for he attempts to derive them from a study of human nature.
The instincts of man set the ends of life. The educator or
the social planner must analyze human nature if he hOpes to
evaluate the institutions of the culture. Veblen's theory
of human nature does not, however, establish an adequate
ground for a determination of ends. In general, his view
of human nature emphasizes the plasticity of man. It empha-
sizes man's ability to seek purposes and to adapt to a wide
range of environmental circumstances. While the instincts
set certain limits to human action, man enjoys a great measure
of freedom within these limits. Moreover, Veblen's theory
of instincts contains important normative elements. The
educator must be concerned with only those aspects of human
nature which are "generically human." The educator must
develop the ”constructive“ side of human nature. Finally,
the ends which Veblen derives from his study of human nature
are totally inadequate. He suggests at times that survival
is the ultimate end of life. This does not do Justice to
man's nature, for there is no evidence that men have ever
been ultimately concerned with sheer physical survival.

We can now return to the original question concerning
the proper relationship of the school and the‘society. The
logical consequence of Veblen's position is to make education
a function of society. Only the society can determine the
proper ends of life and, thus, the manifest function of

education. But note that Veblen's philosophy must necessarily

 

 

209
invest society with the substantial reality of the life pro«
cess. Society has aims, values, and objectives which trans-
cend and conflict with the values and objectives of individ-
uals. The society, in other words, is an organism with a
destiny of its own. In short, society is autonomous. While
this is the logical consequence of Veblen's philosophy, he
did not in fact develop such a conception. As one who hated
restraint, he could not accept this Fascist solution to his
dilemma. Society remains an undefined term in the Veblenian
philosophy. He seems to use this concept as a screen for
his own value assumptions. Of course, Fascists must also
use the concept for similar purposes. Society is a concept
invested with those particular values which those in control
of the state desire to seek.

Veblen's philosophy has been examined in respect to
two possible relationships between the school and the soci-
ety. Whereas he rejects the laissez-faire approach, he
appears to endorse the position that education is a function
of society. This would not preclude the possibility, how-
ever, that society is also a function of education. Veblen's
emphasis upon change and evolution would seem to support
this position. Although his concept of the idle curiosity
would seem to support this latter position, the general
implication of his social philosophy rejects it. His lack
of faith in human intelligence prevented him from viewing

education as a developmental process.

210

Thorstein Veblen is among those social philosophers
who discount the educative influence of the school. A con-
temporary eXponent of this position is Reinhold Niebuhr who

writes in NW:

Since reason is always, to some degree, the servant
of interest in a social situation, social injustice
cannot be resolved by moral and rational suasion
alone, as the educator and social scientist usually
believes. Conflict is inevitable, and in this con-
flict power must be challenged by power. That fact
is not recognized by most of the educators. . . .
Modern educators are, like rationalists of all the
ages, too enamored of the function of reason in life.
The world of history, particularly in man's collective
behavior, will never be conquered by reason, unless
reason uses tools, and is itself driven by forces
which are not rational.21
Dr. Niebuhr's statement stands unqualified as a concise
summary of the Veblenian position. For this reason, Veblen
has little faith in the possibility that the good or effic-
ient society can be the outcome of education. Cultural
change cannot be eXpedited through the school. The proper
functions of institutions cannot be realized through the
educational program. The school, in other words, is not
an effective agency or instrument of reform.
Men according to Veblen, are by nature conservative.
They act by impulse and custom but rarely by reflection.
Men do not readily change their habits of thought unless a

change is forced upon them by the circumstances of life.

 

21midnhold Niebuhr. Wm
WM (Scribner'a= New York. 1936)

PP o xiv-XV 1 e

211

To make society the outcome of education is to place a great
measure of faith in the rationality of men. Society is not
fixed, but it is in the process of becoming. What society
will, in fact, become is dependent upon the collective action
of the rational men who compose the society. Veblen rejects
this approach, because there is no reason to believe that
the preper ends of life would be fulfilled. Since men are
currently enslaved by irrational institutions, it is naive
to suppose that significant change can be instigated through
a direct appeal to human intelligence. Reason is, indeed,
a slave of the social situation in which it is expressed.22
Religion is annng those institutions which Veblen would
reform. Religion, according to Veblen, promotes irration-
ality and thus prevents man from adjusting to the circum-
stances of life. Yet, the mass of men cannot reform re-
ligion, because their habits of thought are controlled by it.

What is the consequence of this view for education?
In the first place, it severely restricts the scope and

function of the educative process. The school is not the

 

22Thus, in respect to religion Veblen asserts: "The
propaganda of the Faith is quite the largest, oldest, most
magnificent, most unabashed, and most lucrative enterprise
in sales-publicity in all Christendom. . . . None other have
achieved that pitch of unabated assurance which has enabled
the publicity-agents of the Faith to debar human reason from

scrutinising their pronouncements." Ahggnggg Qunsxsnin and

O , _
o : c‘.:: a 2 0 :; l R 0;. H‘:' 0‘ :3; o ,n "

Viking: fiew York, 1923), pp. 319-329;

 

212
primary instrument for social amelieration. Reform must be
instigated in those institutions which directly control
human behavior. The school program must complement insti-
tutional reform by providing information, teaching certain
skills, and inculcating appropriate habits of thought. The
important point is that the school would not appeal directly
to human intelligence but would work by indirection. The
minds of students would be manipulated through a systematic
control of the school environment. The objective would be
to instill certain responses to given stimuli. All educa-
tion, of course, involves the inculcation of certain habits
of thought. A democratic education, however, inculcates
the habit of rational, critical, or reflective thought. This
is precisely the habit of thought which Veblen de-emphasizes.

Veblen's position in respect to the relationship be-
tween the school and the society is incompatible with the
ideals and values of a democratic culture. This, perhaps,
must always be the consequence of any social philosophy
which assumes that the generality of mankind are incapable

of self-government.

W

In the senses in which individualism and socialism
have gained currency, both are mythological dis-
tortions of the underlying facts of community life:
the processes of individuaticn and socialization.
In actuality, these terms are alternatives only in
the sense that north and south are alternatives.
They indicate directions of motion, without giving

 

 

213

any descriptive reference to the goal to be reached.

No human society is conceivable in which, to some de-

gree, both tendencies did not play an active part.23
Similarly, the question of the proper relationship between
the school and society cannot be divorced from the question
of the proper relationship between the individual and the
school. Both of these questions in turn rest upon the more
fundamental question concerning the proper relationship be-
tween the individual and the society.

In summarizing the four major philosophies of Ameri-
can education, Professcr Brubacher concludes that "reapect
for personality i§_the democratic theory of education.”2u
A democratic education is, in the final analysis, concerned
with individuals and their values, goals, and aspirations.
The individual personality is the focal point toward which
the educative process is directed. An individual, however,
is not an isolated datum. In the words of John Donne:

No man is an Iland, intire of itselfe; every man
is a peace of the Continent, a part of the mains;
if a Clad bee washed away by the Sea, Europe is

the lease, as well as if a Promontorie were. as
well as if a Mannor of thy friends or'of thine owne

 

23Lewis Mumford, Ihe_flnman_£zgapeg§, eds. Harry T.
Moore and Karl W. Deutsch (Beacon: Boston, 1955), p. 284.

2“John S. Brubacher, ”Comparative Philosophy of Edu-
cation," Ehilgsgphi§§_gf_fidnggtign, Forty-first Yearbook of
the National Society for the Study of Education. Part I,
The Forty-first Yearbook of the National Society for the
Study of Education (Public School Publishing: Bloomington,
111., l9h2), p. 316.

21h

were; any man '3 death diminishes me, because I am in-
volved in Mankinde; And therefore never send to know
for whom the bell tolls; It tolls for thee.25

An individual achieves many of his objectives through col-
lective action. His personality and values are in part de-
rived through his interaction with other individuals. The
school, therefore, must view personality and individuality
as in part the outcomes of a socialization process. Never-
theless, the claims of individuals must take precedence
over the claims of the state or society.

Democracy can be viewed both as a political system
and a way of life. These standpoints are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. As a political system, democracy is a
process wherein a majority of the electorate determine who
is to rule and, broadly, to what ends.26 While it is not
assumed that public opinion is always right, it is assumed
that the majority are more likely in the long run to be
right. As a way of life, democracy is a system in which
every individual has both the right and the responsibility
to participate in the formulation of the values under which

individuals must live.27 Individuals, taken collectively,

 

25John Donne. "DevotionS.".Ths_£2mnlata_zasizx_and.

; - *0, 9:; vac .oao‘ zoo .— one - :. ’o.

willjgm_filgkg (Modern Li‘crary: New York, 19h1), p. 332.

26R. M. MacIver, Ing_Kgp_Q£_figy§znmgnt (Macmillan:
New York, 19b7), pp. 198-199.

27John Dewey. Intalliaanca_in_iha_flcdazn_flenldi p. #00.

 

 

215
establish the rules and regulations by which they agree to
conduct themselves. These rules reflect the values held by
the citizens of the culture. Both of these conceptions
place a large measure of faith in the capabilities of the
average man. It is assumed that the generality of men will
make such decisions as will enhance both their own welfare
and the welfare of the larger community. It is assumed that
the average man is capable of a self—discipline which will
permit him to manage his own affairs and guide his own
destiny.

What is Veblen's view of the proper relationship
between the individual and the school, between the individual
and the society? As we have seen, he appears to make the
community the primary datum. He would deny, however, that
he is unconcerned with the individual. His entire social
philosophy, he would argue, is directed toward the fuller
realization of man's nature. The society exists for the
welfare of the individual.

Granted that Veblen is a humanist, his philosophy,
nevertheless, represents a narrow and seemingly truncated
form of humanism. It is not the kind of humanism which is
associated with a democratic society. Veblen is concerned
with the welfare of man. He desires to release the potential-
ity of human nature so that the child can blossom forth into
full manhood. This objective can be achieved only through

a reform of institutions. An institution should serve man

216
by expediting the adjustment of human nature to the circum-
stances of life. Many institutions, however, thwart and
hinder man's growth and development. Men become enslaved
to institutions which were initially designed to serve them.

Although Veblen is concerned with man, he has no
respect for the individual as such. The Veblenian in-
dividual is completely socialized. He has no independent
being. He is an abstraction from the reality of the society.
Thus, when Veblen writes of the individual, he is in fact
writing of the community since in his terms the community
and the individual are but correlative ways of looking at
society.

Veblen's position rests upon the assumption that
within the limits prescribed by human nature, man's person-
ality, individuality, and selfhood are social phenomena.
Man has no being apart from his social interactions. This
standpoint was a needed reaction against the atomistic con-
ception of man. Man is not an isolated, self-sufficient
individual whose behavior is unconditioned by his social
environment. Like so many reactions, however, Veblen's
conception of a social individual overstates the case.
Selfhood does originate in a social context, but this does
not necessarily imply that selfhood cannot transcend its
social nature. The community is a necessary condition for
selfhood but does not thereby define the nature of self-
hood.

217

The school in a democratic society is necessarily
concerned with the social nature of man. It also assumes,
however, that an individual is something more than a summa-
tion of its social interactions. The individual is assumed
to have a measure of being which cannot be adequately defined
in terms of social intercourse. The emphasis which demo-
cracy places upon individuality, rationality, and personality
reflects a faith that the individual can in some degree
transcend the limitations of his social and natural environ-
ment. The school has both an obligation to the individual
as a social phenomenon and to the individual as an inde-
pendent center of conscious experience. It is this latter
function of education which Veblen's philosOphy neglects.
Veblen appears to have believed that the average individual
can never transcend his environment. Selfhood not only
arises in a social context but remains a slave to it.

What is the proper balance between the claims of the
individual and the claims of the society? This is the
standing problem of education in a democratic culture.

Veblen provides us with a good deal of insight into man as

a social phenomenon but tells us little about man as a unique
personality. American education has increasingly emphasized
the social nature of man. In this respect it has tended to
follow Veblen's lead. We profess, however, to be concerned
also with the individual as a unique personality. It is

this claim that needs to be examined.

218

The current emphasis upon individual differences,
needs, interests, and so forth indicates that American edu-
cation has a conception of the individual which is largely
foreign to Veblen. Unlike Veblen, we do assume that the
majority of individuals are capable of self-government. We
do assume that every individual is to be treated as an end.
We assume, therefore, that the basic function of education
is to develop fully the potentiality of each individual.
Since the Veblenian individual is an abstraction, he has no
theory of individual uniqueness.

In one respect, however, American education may be
in danger of committing the same error of which Veblen was
guilty. Our current conception of the individual seems to
have two sources. On the one hand, child growth and develop-
ment studies have indicated the importance of heredity in
the constitution of individuality. On the other hand, we
have increasingly emphasized selfhood as a social phenomenon.
Thus, individuality, selfhood, and personality are seen as
products of heredity and social interaction. The danger
lies in confusing the conditions of selfhood with selfhood
itself.

An individual appears to have some measure of inde-
pendent being arising out of a synthesis of his heredity and
environment. This is the miracle of life. The whole man
is never fully comprehended until he is viewed as a center

of conscious experience. An individual is capable of an

 

 

 

 

219
intellectual freedom which transcends the limitations of his
environment. He is capable of reflecting upon his own
existence. He is capable of synthesizing the entire universe
to his own life process.

This view of selfhood or personality or individuality
has an important bearing upon the educative process. It
suggests that we ought to be much more concerned with the
problems of individual existence. It is the individual who
ultimately faces the problem of death. This problem concerns
man's relationship to the universe and to himself rather
than his relationship to society. It is the individual who
must make his peace with the universe. It is the individual
who creates or discovers value. It is the individual who
must make the final decision when faced with alternative
plans of life. It is the individual, in short, who must
ultimately discover whatever meaning and value life does or
can possess. Such matters as these cannot be restricted
to a religious education, for they lie at the very center
of any adequate educational program. Society has a legiti-
mate concern and interest in such matters, for ultimately
this kind of education will have a profound effect upon the
quality of social life.

This view of education does not in any sense diminish
the importance of the school's relationship to the society.
On the contrary, education continues to lag behind the

realities of our collective existence. What it does suggest

220
is that a philosOphy of education must be based upon some
view of the nature of man. What does it mean to be a per-
son? What does it mean to have being? What is the nature
of value? How does the individual determine, in the final
analysis, what he ought to do? These are the kinds of
questions which Veblen avoids but which must concern the
educator, for these are the questions which ultimately con-
cern the individual.

Democracy, it would seem, must assume that individuals
as such are capable of guiding their own destinies. This
is the sacred right of the individual. Individual liberties
are restricted but only so that the freedom of others can
be increased. Society justifies its existence through this
activity. The final objective is to maximize the total
amount of freedom for individuals. In placing its faith
in the individual, democracy assumes that the individual
will not only behave rationally, in a narrow sense of that
word, but will manifest self-discipline and wisdom. It is
assumed that the individual will relate himself effectively
to all aspects of his environment. He will be the master
rather than the slave of his emotions. He will commit
nothing in excess. Although he be a specialist, he will
not be a slave to his specialty. He will forever aspire to
synthesize as well to analyze. In short, he will attempt
to be a perfect individual in harmony with all facets of

existence.

221

What is the value of Veblen in respect to the proper
relationship between the individual, the school, and the
society? In the first place, Veblen is not entirely un-
sympathetic to the views which have been eXpressed. He is
not fundamentally a Fascist in his basic outlook on life,
although his philosophy frequently points in that direction.
Veblen had a great compassion for the common man. He be-
lieved, however, that much of the faith which democracy
places in the educative process is unjustified by the current
circumstances of life. It is this realism in Veblen which
is valuable for the educator. It tempers the excessive
sentimentalism which educators sometimes manifest concerning
the power of education.

Although Veblen seldom discussed the democratic
ideology, his social philoSOphy implies that democracy is
caught in a great dilemma. On the one hand, democracy views
itself as an ideal to be achieved. Democracy is in a process
of becoming. Veblen's analysis of institutions substantiates
this point. Many of our institutions enslave man. These
institutions contradict the democratic ideology. On the
other hand, democracy views itself as an accomplished fact.
Thus, it is assumed that education should appeal directly
to the individual's presumed rationality. Our great faith
in the intelligence of the average man reflects our belief
in democracy as an accomplished ideal. Veblen argues

implicitly that these points of view are inconsistent and

222

imcompatible.

Veblen agrees that man is potentially capable of
rational behavior. Under the present circumstances of life,
however, man is incapable of developing this potentiality.
Man's behavior is controlled by institutions which promote
irrationality. It is futile, therefore, for the school to
appeal directly to the intelligence of man without at the
same time creating the conditions for rationality within
the culture. A democratic society can be achieved only
through a reconstruction of undemocratic institutions. It
is only in this way that the potential rationality of men
can be realized. But the institutions of the culture cannot
be reformed within the democratic process itself. The ma-
jority of men do not view themselves as enslaved by their
institutions. They regard their institutions as good and
worthy. They therefore have no desire to reform their in-
stitutions. Veblen argues that this is necessarily the case
since men‘s minds are in fact controlled by the very in-
stitutions in need of reform. This is the dilemma of the
democratic ideology.

Few educators are as pessimistic as Veblen. This
should not prevent us, however, from giving serious thought
to Veblen's position. We have not yet proved him wrong.
Democracy is still a relatively recent development in the
history of civilization. In many cultures democracy has

failed for reasons not unlike those suggested by Veblen. It

223
is sometimes said that these nations were not yet ready for
democracy. Veblen should not be represented as repudiating
democracy. Instead, he wants us to distinguish our faith
in democracy from the actual reality. Faith, he implies,
has never saved a culture from destruction. Democracy re-
quires not only faith but a conscious and deliberate recon-
struction of archaic institutions. A culture must always
distinguish what it would like to find in its institutions
from what in reality exists in those institutions. This

is the value of Veblenism.

W

Although this concept has an important bearing upon
the preceding discussion, its examination has been inten-
tionally postponed. In some respects it represents an ex-
traneous element in Veblen's philosophy, although it is one
of the most interesting and challenging elements of his
educational theory. To some extent, this discussion will
qualify our analysis of Veblen's views concerning the
preper relationship between the individual, the society,
and the school.

Idle curiosity prompts the individual to seek know-
ledge. Whatever creativity emerges in the culture can be
traced to this instinct. Mythology as well as science
ultimately rests upon man's instinctive quest for the

truth. Although men seek knowledge for its own sake, such

22h
knowledge will be turned to account by society. Since men
work under the prevailing canons of truth and reality, their
idle Speculations will have useful applications.
The habits of thought induced by workday life impose
themselves as ruling principles that govern the quest
of knowledge; it will therefore be the habits of
thought enforced by the current technological scheme
that will have most . . . to say in the current
systemization of facts. The working logic of the
current state of the industrial arts will necessarily
insinuate itself as the logical scheme which must,
of course, effectually govern the interpretation and
generalizations of fact in all their commonplace re-
lations.28
The instinct of the idle curiosity creates the in-
tellectual capital of the culture. This intellectual capital
is as essential to cultural growth and development as econ-
omic capital is to economic development. The idle curiosity
is not directed to the fulfillment of particular objectives.
Its relationship to the practical concerns of the culture
is similar to the relationship which basic industrial de-
velopment has to the production of particular goods and
services.
In developing this concept of the idle curiosity
Veblen is in fact conceding that some men at least can trans-
cend the limitations of their environment. Some men are
capable of rational thought. Furthermore, he implicitly
concedes that society is and ought to be a function of edu-

cation in some degree. Unfortunately, Veblen believes that

 

28W. p. u.

225
only a small percentage of men can pursue their idle curios-
ities. The circumstances of life prevent the mass of men
from realizing this potentiality of human nature.

The university has the unique function of nurturing
the idle curiosity. It is in the interest of the society
that this instinct is cultivated. Without a continually
fresh supply of intellectual capital a society would soon
become static and inert. Although Veblen admired the engi-
neer, he reGOgnized that even the engineer is dependent
upon new ideas. It is the manifest function of the univer-
sity to provide these new ideas. Veblen argues that this
objective can be achieved only if the university is divorced
from the practical concerns of the culture. For this reason
the Veblenian university would have no undergraduate or
professional students. It would have no engineers, journal-
ists, or educators.

Veblen has given a magnificent defense of intellec-
tual freedom. Moreover, he has convincingly argued the
necessity and value of intellectual detachment. Professional
education needs more men who would be willing to detach
themselves from the immediate and pressing problems of the
profession. Veblen, nevertheless, has grossly overstated
his case. He has made an unrealistically sharp division
between pure and applied knowledge. This rigid distinction
between the theoretical and the‘practical rests in part

upon the questionable assumption that the pursuit of knowledge

 

226
for its own sake is natural to man and hence of a different
order than practical knowledge. C. I. Lewis's comment upon
this point is worth quoting at length. He observes that

interest in truth for its own sake—~the pure and
undistracted purpose to know--is not the character-
istic final purpose of knowing. Knowledge for its
own sake, and the contemplative life, represent an
esthetic or near-esthetic ideal rather than one
normally attributable to cognition. It is merely

a professional fallacy of the scholar to impute his
own peculiar interest in finding out the truth to
human cognizing in general. . . . He who is disin-
terestedly interested in finding out and knowing;
who subordinates the desires and interests of action
to discovery of the truth, and to contemplation of it;
likewise divests knowledge of its natural and prag-
matic significance. By the same token, the ideal of
the contemplative life is mildly abnormal, however
valid and indubitable the values to which it is ad-
dressed. The ivory tower is characteristically the
refuge of the practically defeated and of those who
become disillusioned of the utilities of action.29

Veblen has assumed that the difference between
theoretical and practical knowledge is a difference in kind
rather than degree.30 It is for this reason that the prac-
tical studies are to be excluded from the university. Many
professional educators accept Veblen's assumption but draw
the opposite conclusion° namely,that the theoretical should
be suppressed on behalf of the practical. Neither position
is satisfactory. Although there is a legitimate distinction

between pure and applied knowledge, it would seem to be a

 

29Clarence Irving Lewis,
mm (Open Court: LaSalle, 111., was), p. uuz,

30W. p. 14.

-‘~._—

___."-—

 

227
difference in degree. Knowledge sought for the sake of
further knowledge is clearly theoretical, but this does
not imply that such knowledge is inherently different from
practical knowledge. It only indicates that such knowledge
has an application more general than the problem which insti-
gated its pursuit.

It could still be maintained that s sensible division
of labor requires that the university be concerned exclusively
with the more theoretical knowledge. This is indeed one of
the arguments by which Veblen defends his position. While
this position has merit, it also has a basic and fundamental
weakness. Barely is knowledge either wholly practical or
theoretical. Furthermore, the theoretical and the practical
are in constant interaction, each contributing to the devel-
opment of the other. No adequate education is exclusively
concerned with either. Although John Dewey was not a devouua
of idle speculation, he nevertheless writes:

Man must at least have enough interest in thinking
for the sake of thinking to escape the limitations
of routine and custom. Interest in knowledge for

the sake of knowledge, in thinking for the sake of
the free play of thought, is necessary to the gmgnr

gipatign of practical life. . . .

The outcome, the abstzggt to which education is to
proceed, is an interest in intellectual matters for
their own sake, a delight in thinking for the sake
of thinking.31

 

31John Dewey, non_ye_gning (Heath: New York, 1933).
pp. 22“, 2260

 

228
Similarly, rarely is the theoretical oblivious to the prac-
tical. The idle curiosity is not, in fact, idle, although
Veblen sometimes writes as if it were. He states for
example that "in aim and animus the technical and professional
schools are 'practical,' in the most thoroughgoing manner;
while the pursuit of knowledge . . . is not 'practical' in
the slightest degree."32 This is surely a false dichotomy.
The scholar is always oriented in his work by particular
problems to be solved. His speculations are never idle in
any accepted sense of that word. In a real sense all know-
ledge is practical in that it is at last directed at the
resolution of particular problems.

Veblen's theory of the idle curiosity was not a pro-
duct of idle speculation. He seems to have had a very
practical purpose in mind. He is concerned with the in-
trusion of business principles and interests into the higher
learning. He attempts to mitigate this evil by advocating
the divorce of the university from the practical concerns of
the society. This, however, is no solution. It perpetu-
ates the very evil which Veblen is attempting to cure. The
university is the logical agency to liberalize business.
This is one of the important functions of the unversity.

We need to make the practical more theoretical and the

 

32W. p. 19.

 

 

229
theoretical more practical. Each should liberalize the
other.

Veblen would exclude professional education from the
university, because the training of teachers is too practical.
It corrupts the proper function of the university. Veblen,
however, would not argue that the training of teachers ought
to be narrowly practical. Nevertheless, his exclusion of
the teacher from the university would tend to cultivate a
narrowness of outlook of which Veblen's philosophy is vehe-

mently critical.

WW

Professional education relies upon the various dis-
ciplines as sources from which its own principles are de-
rived. Traditionally, the educator has looked to the
psychologist, the sociologist, and the philosopher for the
sources of a theory of education. Apparently, education
and economics have had little in common. It has been the
opinion of the educator that both the methodology and the
principles of economics are only remotely related to the
educational enterprise. Even today there is a conspicuous
lack of communication between the educator and the economist.
So long as economics was preoccupied with a formal study of
market behavior, there was perhaps little basis for recipro-
cation between the areas. Modern economics, however, is

no longer primarily concerned with the market mechanism and

230
its related problems. Modern economics, especially Insti-
tutional Economics, can make a significant contribution to
the philosophy of education.

Thorstein Veblen inspired the deve10pment of Insti-
tutionalism. In many respects, however, Veblen, was not an
Institutional economist. His pessimistic and negative frame
of mind prevented him from appreciating the full significance
of his own social philosophy. This is particularly true in
reapect to education. The close relationship between In-
stitutionalism and education largely escaped Veblen. Nevere
theless, there is an Institutionalist conception of education
clearly implied in the social philosophies of Veblen and
his disciples. It is this conception of education which
needs to be examined.

It has been suggested that many of the tenets of In-
stitutionalism are best exemplified in such developmental
projects as undertaken by the Tennessee Valley Authority.
The nature and scope of such undertakings is described in
the following passage:

River developments . . . are at the beginning of
civilization. . . . For civilization is the gradu-
al organic growth of tradition; yet the ravages of
the rivers, the vagaries of the climate, and the

niggardliness of the soil eXposed to them make a
settled life and organic tradition impossible.

This is borne out by the swift penalty of decay
which attends man's negligence in regard to rivers
(and forests). It is easy for a short-sighted
generation to neglect them. . . . It does not take
long before the soil is washed into the ocean; the

 

231

land becomes a desert. . . . Among all the ravages
of human and natural wealth which the short-sighted
greed of capitalism has brought with it, none is so
merciless and ignominious as this. . . .

From such considerations the economic nature of
really dynamic works can be seen: they bring change.
. . . If the works are on a sufficiently large scale,
the change includes the scale of valuation in which
it is measured itself, and the framework of values
into which it is to be fitted. As one ponders the
extreme example, that of the works on the Nile and
the Euphrates, what strikes him is the utter impossi-
bility of figuring in advance the effects of the
planned structures. They built countries and civili-
zations. . . . While innumerable infinitesimally
small, and some perceptible, affects must follow
from the introduction of any new magnitude into a
system of strictly interdependent magnitudes such as
an economic system, what we have here is a change in
relative magnitudes so decisive as to amount to a
change in principle.33

This passage emphasizes change, growth, and deve10pment.
Whereas the traditional economist and social scientist
tended to treat human wants, resources, and institutions as
"givens", the Institutionalist is precisely concerned with
their change and development. A TVA project seeks to lay
the basis for a change in the quality and quantity of human
‘wants and resources. It seeks to lay the basis for a change
in institutions and men's habits of thought. A TVA project
¢Bannot be evaluated in terms of conventional analysis, for
as deve10pmental project seeks to change the very criteria

(NF valuation. The TVA in other words cannot be fully

33Eduard Heimann, ”Developmental Schemes, Planning,

and Full Employment." WWW.

PE). 107-108.

232

evaluated until it has worked itself out in the future.

Education is a kind of vast TVA developmental pro-
ject.3h Like the TVA, education is concerned with the
quality of human behavior. Education seeks to lay the basis
for a change in the quality and quantity of human wants and
resources. Like the TVA, or the St. Lawrence Seaway, edu-
cation is a projection into the future. It seeks to release
and cultivate a potential. Neither the TVA nor education
specifies the ends which their developmental projects will
serve. Instead, they seek to eXpedite the fulfillment of
whatever ends men do in fact pursue. In a real sense, how-
ever, a given generation can never know the final outcome
of its developmental projects. As a release of potential,
the Aswan Dam may come to serve ends undreamed of by the
present generation. This is as it should be. This is what
is meant in calling education and the TVA dynamic processes.
{The changes which they instigate are so grandiose as to
tnake feasible the accomplishment of new human ends by future
generations .

Education and the TVA are developmental undertakings.
As; such they cannot be adequately evaluated in terms of

‘

3“Education is compared to the TVA only for illustrative
Intrposes. Other examples such as the river develOpments of
a‘rilcient times, the Aswan Dam, or the St. Lawrence Seaway
W0 uld have served as well. Furthermore, it is not suggested
thzat developmental projects such as the TVA are more funda—
melntal than education. Indeed, the reverse is clearly the
case.

233
conventional economic analysis. This is obvious in the
case of the TVA. What is the economic value of land conser-
vation which, in the short run, is an irreplaceable resource?
What is the economic value of flood control, electric power
development, reforestation, improved navigation, and land
fertilization? As a developmental project, the TVA is in
the process of changing the very data which the economic
analyst would like to hold constant. A developmental pro-
ject cannot be fully assessed in terms of its economic value
until the current process of change has worked itself out
in the future.

When other consequences of an economic deveIOpment
project are considered, the problems of analysis are com-
pounded. What is the value of the increased dignity which
results from full employment and economic security? What
is the value of increased leisure and recreation opportun-
ities? What is the value of improved health, increased
beauty, stabilized community life, and pride in work which
has a social significance? While such consequences have an
economic value, this represents only a small fraction of
their total significance. It is perhaps a misnomer to refer
to the TVA as a program of eggngmig development, although
this it surely is. Economic development, however, is only
a proximate goal of such undertakings. The ultimate objec-
tive is cultural growth and development. A developmental

project is concerned with the quality of human life. While

 

234
it does not specify or guarantee final outcomes, it does
release a potential. It does provide the means by which a
people can achieve its objectives. Therefore, the TVA has
as much interest for the sociologist, the educator, and the
philosopher as it has for the economist. It has implica-
tions for every department of human life.

The problems of economic and social valuation are
essentially the same in education as they are in other de-
velopmental undertakings. Like the TVA, education cannot be
valuated in terms of static concepts since education changes
the very data with which the analyst works. Indeed, educa-
tion defies the conventional concepts of economic analysis.
Society, nevertheless, must make decisions concerning edu-
cation which must be based in part upon economic considera-
tions. What can and ought a society to spend on education
in order to insure economic well-being? What is the econ-
omic value of increased literacy? What is the economic
value of an increase in the period of compulsory education?
Where is the point of diminishing returns? Obviously, the
current data on national income are not sufficient criteria,
for education promises to change these data. A given ex-
penditure on education today may result in a multiple incre-
ment in national income in the future.

Like the TVA, education is a projection into the
future. Education creates, modifies, and develops human

wants, values, and resources. Although education has profound

 

235
economic consequences, these consequences represent only a
segment of the total significance of the educational endeavor.
Education has an impact in every sector of life. The full
bearing of this impact can be assessed only in the future.
Society, then, is in some degree an outcome of education
and other developmental projects. In education lies the
society‘s hope for improvement. In a democratic society
neither a TVA nor education can specify the nature of this
improvement. A deve10pmental project can only provide the
means. It can develop and release a potential but cannot
predetermine the ultimate purposes which this potential will
serve. In a democratic society the future belongs to the
future and not to the present or the past.

The TVA and education have been discussed as analagous
programs. In reality, however, they are complementary under-
takings. The interests of the educator and the social
planner must ultimately interact, for the success of a TVA
project is largely dependent upon the skills, values, under-
standings, and information of a people. As Veblen so brilli-
antly argued, the most valuable assets of a culture are its
intangible assets. The irreplaceable wealth of a society
consists in its accumulated knolwedge. All else could be
destroyed, yet the society would still have the means by
which to recover rapidly. It is for this reason that nations
which have suffered the ravages of war are able to make such

a rapid reclamation. ThezTVA can only provide an opportunity.

 

 

236
It is through education that people develop the skills and
'values necessary for the realization and fulfillment of
‘this opportunity. Education is an organic element in any
jprogram of economic or cultural development.

The philosophical issues which were raised in con-
:nection with Veblen's social philosophy are relevant to the
jpresent discussion. Economic and social planning have not
enjoyed the enthusiastic support of this society. Many
social critics have argued that planning inevitably leads
to totalitarianism. F. A. Hayek, a prominent economist,
asserts that every restriction of free enterprise brings
us one step closer to serfdom.35 Walter Lippmann fears the
same outcome.36 Who will control the planners, he asks.
These men are representative of an entire school of thought
which takes a pessimistic view of any extension of collec-
tive action. Perhaps the major assumption of these prophets
of doom is that social planning must destroy consumer
sovereignty. The educator has a vital concern in the nature
and validity of this assumption. Like the social planner,
the educator must answer to the charges of Hayek, Lippmann,
and others. To the extent that education adopts a social

philosophy, it is involved in planning. Education is a form

 

35F. A. von Hayek. Warn (University
of Chicago: Chicago, l9h5).

36Walter Lippmann, the
Qggd_§ggigtx,(8eacon: Boston, 1937 .

 

 

237
of collective action which restricts free enterprise. Lipp-
mann might well ask, who will control the educationists?

Consumer sovereignty is the crucial issue, for without
it democracy becomes a sham. Does it follow, however, that
economic, social, and educational planning must destroy the
sovereignty of the consumer? Certainly, it is not logically
necessary as some critics have implied. The citizens of
this society have always engaged in various forms of OOOp8r-
ative action through their government. The objective of
this collective action has been to increase rather than to
diminish freedom. The public school is, perhaps, the out-
standing example of this kind of cooperative action. Even
the most vociferous critics are not prepared to argue that
public education eventuates in serfdom.

Others have taken the position that collective action
is likely to restrict freedom. While planning does not
logically entail serfdom. it makes this outcome dangerously
probable. These critics argue that planning cannot tolerate
the vagaries of public opinion which characterize a democratic
society. Planning involves a projection into the future.
The probable future needs, values, and wants of the people
must be calculated before a developmental program is in-
‘itiated. If these calculations are in error or if the wants
and values of the peOple change, the planning which has been
undertaken is largely worthless. To resolve this difficulty

the planner must be given a considerable measure of authority.

 

 

238
When a TVA project is initiated, it must be completed. The
people of the society cannot suddenly decide that the TVA
is ill conceived.

Miscalculation and inflexibility are perhaps the
chief dangers in large scale planning. The educational
system misinterprets the educational wants of the consumer.
The TVA cannot readily adjust to a change in consumer de-
mand. Granted that social planning has these tendencies,
what is the alternative? Hayek and Lippmann would have us
place our faith in the free market of a laissez-faire econ-
omy. Democracy is possible only under the conditions of a
competitive market. Free enterprise, it is argued, can
achieve most of the objectives which the social planner
professes to seek. This position rests upon the assumption
that the free market is unbiased, that there are no quali-
tative differences. This, however, is clearly not true.
Agricultural production does not respond to the free market
in the same way as does industrial production. Develop-
mental projects lie completely outside the forces of the
free market. It makes little sense to speak of a market
demand for economic development.

Social and educational planners are chastised for
making miscalculations. But errors in judgment occur under
any social system. Fruits and vegetables epoil when grocers
miscalculate consumer demand. Industrial production is

frequently misdirected through a misinterpretation of the

239

market demand for particular goods and services. There is
no reason to believe that a system of free enterprise is
superior in respect to the anticipation of the economic
or social wants of the consumer.

The consumer is sovereign. This is the fundamental
concept in a democratic society. It is not the function of
the educator or the economic planner to determine what the
consumer must seek. The educator, as a specialist in the
area of means, informs the public concerning the feasibility
of given ends. He legitimately proposes visions of the
future. He prOperly defends those ends which seem most con-
sistent with the welfare of the entire society. Ultimately,
however, the consumers, taken collectively, must render the
decision; for they are sovereign.

Unfortunately, the educator seldom has a clear man-
date from the public. Although democracy is characterized
by the rule of the majority, this majority is composed of a
coalition of minority interest groups. Each of these groups
seeks to influence educational policy. Thus the educator
is faced with a multitude of conflicting demands. How can
he determine the proper and to be pursued? Traditionally,
educational policy has been viewed as emerging from the
conflict of private interests. The public interest is the
resultant of those forces which impinge upon the school.
Veblen recOgnized the weakness in this position. In prac-

tice, it often resulted in a philosophy of might makes right.

240

Thus Veblen believed that business dominated education in
part through its might in the society.

Education in a democratic society must serve the
whole society. It serves the interests of labor as well as
of business. It serves the poor as well as the rich. In
formulating educational policy the educator must appeal to
values held by the society as a whole. Nevertheless, the
consumer has the right to accept or reject the pleadings

of the educator. The consumer is ultimately sovereign.

Wall

To support the Ins when things are going well; to
support the Outs when they seem to be going badly,
this, in spite of all that has been said about
tweedledum and tweedledee, is the essence of popu-
lar government. . . . A community where there is
no choice does not have popular government. It is
subject to some form of dictatorship or it is ruled
by th§7intrigues of the politicians in the lobbies.

Although the language is Walter Lippmann's, the thought is
Veblenian. Unlike the Institutionalists who have followed
him, Veblen denies the sovereignty of the consumer. He
argues that the consumer has never been and never can be
sovereign under the existing institutions of this culture.
The consumer regards himself as free, but in reality he is

manipulated, coerced, and prOpagandized by those powerful

 

37Walter Lippmann. MW (Harcourt.
Brace: New York, 1925), p. 126.

 

 

2&1
forces which lurk behind the market. The choices to which
the consumer responds are determined by interest groups over
which he has little control.

These are not the confused mutterings of a disillu-
sioned old man. Veblen was poignantly aware of thg problem
of a democratic society. A good society is not only the
outcome of democracy but represents a condition for the very
establishment of democracy. In Veblenian terms a good so-
ciety is one in which each institution serves its manifest
or rational function. It is only in this kind of society
that man's potential for sovereignty can be achieved.

This position is implicit in Veblen's analysis of
the higher learning. Business controls education. Since
the consumers acquiesce in this control, it cannot be called
undemocratic, at least in one meaning of that concept.
Nevertheless, this control threatens to undermine the very
integrity of the democratic ideology. Whereas business re-
presents the interests of a segment of the society, the uni-
versity is committed to serve the interests of the whole
society. Moreover, the principles of business organization
are inherently autocratic, whereas education in a democratic
society ought to manifest a democratic organization.

Although Veblen has grossly exaggerated the influ-
ence of business in education, his thesis concerning the
autocratic administration of education has received sub-

stantial verification. One study, for example, concludes

 

 

2u2

with this finding:

In 1940, the typical college or university was one

that had no definite system for facilitating exchange

of Opinion between the faculty and trustees or re-

gents, that did not provide a definite procedure where-

by the faculty might consult the board of control in

the choice of a president, a dean, or departmental

chairman. . . . The teachers colleges, in general,

were more autocratic in their administrative proce-

dures.38
Veblen would have appreciated the full significance of this
finding. He would have argued thateauniversity is something
more than curricula, books, laboratories, students, and
buildings. The integrity of a university or of any other
institution is defined by a complex set of relationships
which exist between men and their environment, both human
and non-human. The integrity of a society is defined by
the relationships which exist between institutions. What
transpires in the university, therefore, has important con-
sequences in every department of life.

Education is committed to the democratic ideology,
but the institutional form of education is autocratic. Form
does not follow function. Since education, like every in-
stitution, influences behavior, this autocratic Spirit is
cultivated in those who will assume leadership roles in the

future. The unversity educates the future teachers, admin-

istrators, engineers, doctors, and public servants of all

 

38Richard Hofstadter and Walter P. Metder,

Thenc-
(Columbia
University: New York, 1955), pp. 55- 56.

 

2h}

kinds. We preach that teachers and administrators ought to
be more democratic, but we continue to educate them in an
environment which is autocratic in spirit. A university
ought to manifest the finest principles of democratic action,
for this is one of its most important educational responsi-
bilities. If a university cannot be a living example of

the democratic ideal, then democracy is impossible in the
society at large.

Veblen denies the sovereignty of the consumer, for
it is the consumer who allows business to corrupt the proper
function of education. If democracy is to be either achieved
or maintained, the university must cultivate the ideology
of freedom. Education must be dedicated to the search for
truth. It must embody the democratic ethos in all of its
activities and functions. In reality, the consumer is now
not free, for his behavior is controlled by evil institutions.
Until these institutions can be revitalized, the sovereignty
of the consumer must be denied.

The inadequacy of Veblen's position has already been
noted. In denying the sovereignty of the people he is in
fact denying democratic action. The facts, however, would
not seem to warrant such a pessimistic outlook. Veblen has
grossly exaggerated the influence of business in the Ameri-
can culture. He has almost entirely neglected the counter-
vailing power of such groups as organized labor. Veblen ex-

aggerated the inability of the consumer to engage in rational

 

2AA
action. Democracy can apparently tolerate a considerable
measure of irrational behavior. This is indeed one of the
great virtues of the democratic ideology. Democracy can
probably never achieve the degree of efficiency which char-
acterizes the totalitarian societies. It sacrifices a
measure of efficiency in the realm of means in order to
maximize freedom in the realm of ends. This is the point
that Veblen does not fully appreciate.

In Spite of this criticism Veblen remains one of those
few social scientists who has raised and examined the sig-
nificant problems facing a democratic society. He is one
of those rare phiIOSOphers who had the ability to raise the
right questions. Although he seemingly provides us with the

wrong answers, even these answers are instructive.

 

 

 

CHAPTER VI
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION

"In Veblen we have at least two men. There is the
economist, and there is the artist, a most unusual combi-
nation. Generally the two do not mix."1 This statement is
important in two respects. In the first place, this study
has not been primarily concerned with Veblen as either an
artist or as an economist. Indeed, it is misleading to
identify Veblen as an economist, for all of his writings
suggest that he was primarily a social philosopher, albeit
writing from the perspective of economics. Veblen was a
social scientist who studied the impact of the economic
interest upon cultural evolution.

Secondly, although we are not ultimately concerned
with Veblen as an artist, this aspect of his writings cannot
be entirely neglected. It is difficult, indeed impossible,
to separate Veblen the artist from Veblen the social philos-
opher. Any final evaluation of his philosophy is, therefore,

necessarily speculative and tentative. Is Veblen serious?

 

1Joseph Dorfman, "The Source and Impact of Veblen's

Thought." W. p. 2.

245

 

 

2&6
This is the question which the student of Veblen must con—
tinually ask. The contradictory interpretations of Veblen‘s
philosophy suggest that this question cannot be answered
with any substantial degree of finality. One can be reason-
ably certain, however, that Veblen was serious in respect
to certain salient points of view. This evaluation will be
restricted to a consideration of these prominent and pre-

vailing themes in the veblenian philosophy.
W

The Veblenian philoSOphy stresses change, process,
and development. A social theory, according to Veblen,
must deveIOp a theory of process if it is to have any sig-
nificance for life. Change and development are facts of man's
existence which cannot be explained away by the social phil-
os0pher. Veblen has been frequently criticized for his
preoccupation with an economic interpretation of cultural
evolution. While this criticism is justified, it tends to
obscure the important contribution which he makes; namely,
that change is a significant aspect of social reality. Veb-
len urges the social scientist to study empirically those
forces in the culture which are generating change. The
social philosopher cannot assume that the future will re-
semble either the past or the present. Still, the future
will grow out of the present through a process of cumulative

causation. The dynamic forces of the present will generate

 

 

 

247
the future. A social theory, therefore, is relevant to life
only to the extent that it can take account of cumulative
causation.

Veblen has been called one of America's first social
psychologists. This is perhaps an exaggerated estimate of
his contribution, but it does serve to indicate the impor-
tance of the studies which he instigated in the area of
social behavior. Veblen's theory seems commonplace today,
for it has received general acceptance. He argues that
behavior, like other aspects of reality, is in a process of
constant change. These changes in behavior cannot be under-
stood or eXplained in terms of a_pzigzi_principles, either
psychological or philosophical. In order to understand man,
he must be studied in his natural and social environments.
The details of human activity must be carefully examined.

Veblen's position is in direct contrast to the
view of man as an autonomous, isolated, self-sufficient in-
dividual whose behavior can be accurately predicted in terms
of a presumed rationality. According to Veblen, behavior
is in part a product of social interaction. This was an
important insight during a time when social scientists fre-
quently engaged in armchair theorizing concerning human
behavior.

An organic element of Veblen's social psychology is
his theory of institutions. This theory attempts to explain

the process of cultural evolution and its bearing upon man's

248

behavior. An institution is a prevailing habit of thought
or action in the culture. Ideally, an institution expedites
the adjustment of man to the changing circumstances of life.
Although institutions are constantly changing, they never-
theless frequently lag behind the realities of life. Veb-
len was one of the first social scientists to recognize that
institutions can enslave as well as serve mankind.

As a prevailing habit of thought, an institution is
a major determinant of behavior. Man is not an isolated,
autonomous individual who makes rational choices when con-
fronted with alternative plans of action. Human behavior,
according to Veblen, is largely controlled by the prevailing
habits of thought in the community. The responses which
the individual makes to his environment are in large part
determined by the institutions under which he works and
plays. If these institutions are not fulfilling their
manifest functions, then the responses which these insti-
tutions elicit will not expedite man's adjustment to the
circumstances of his environment.

The evolution of a culture is an evolution of its
institutions. To understand an institution is to study
that institution in relationship to the life process. There
is no substitute for an empirical examination of man and

his institutions.

rang
Stzanziha_af_1ahlenis_2hilssnnhi_fsr_Edunaiisn.

"Education,” writes Joseph K. Hart, “goes on whether
school keeps or not.“2 Although the educational function
of the school is unique, every institution is educative to
some degree. Every institution, argues Veblen, controls
some aSpect of behavior. The program of formal education
must, therefore, be integrally related to the informal edu-
cation of institutions. This position gives added meaning
to Dewey's dictum that education is life. The behavior
which an individual manifests reflects in part the insti-
tutions under which the activities of life are carried on.
An individual, implies Veblen, learns what he lives.

"The contours of education," writes Professor Stan-
ley, "are inevitably molded by the culture which it serves."3
Education is not only a moral and intellectual enterprise,
but it is also a social and political affair. Professor
Stanley continues:

The public school is a social institution not only
in the sense that it is supported and maintained by
the state but also in the more forcible sense that
the moral and intellectual choices inherent in educa-

tion are inevitably social choices which necessarily
entail significant social and political consequences.

 

2Hart. Mi... p. a.

3William 0. Stanley,
(Columbia University: New York, 1953), p. 22.

250

. . . All education . . . implies some social phil-
osophy, and promotes in effect . . . one political
ideal rather than another. . . .
Consequently, no society will be . . . indifferent
about the underlying and controlling conceptions which
determine the education of its children. The de-
finition of the final objectives of education in any
society, therefore, is not, and will not be, left
to the fixclusive determination of professional edu-
cators.
This conception of education is clearly implied in Veblen's
social philosophy. The school is a social institution in
constant interaction with the other institutions of the
culture. Although all institutions are educative, the
school has no other function but the educative. It seeks
to instill in the young certain habits of thought and action
which are not appropriately acquired elsewhere in the
culture.

An educational theory, therefore, is inescapably a
system of applied phillsophy. An educational program must
reflect the ideals and values of the culture which it serves.
Only in this way can the school serve its manifest function.
Veblen argued that the economist must be first and always a
social phiIOSOpher. He must be a student of the culture
which he serves. Likewise, the educator must be a student

of the culture. The decisions which the educator makes

have important consequences for the values and ideals of

 

“Mos p. 23.

251

the society. Since both the authority and the basic ends
of education are derived from the culture, the educator is
necessarily first and always a social philosopher.

The basic question confronting the social philosopher
and hence the educator concerns the proper relationship be-
tween the individual and the society. This is the question
with which much of Veblen's philosophy is concerned. His
detailed examination of this problem constitutes one of the

chief values of his philosophy for the professional educator.

WW

Although Veblen anticipates many of the theories of
contemporary psychology, he is guilty of emphasizing certain
aspects of human behavior to the neglect of others. His
view of human nature is unnecessarily pessimistic. Specif-
ically, he has little faith in human reason in so far as
the majority of men are concerned. In his view, the mass
of men are slaves to customs, habits, and institutions.

The masses of men are incurably conservative. Veblen‘s
position is strikingly similar to that of his teacher,
William Graham Sumner, who wrote:
The mores come down to us from the past. Each in-
dividual is born into them as he is born into the
atmosphere, and he does not reflect on them, or
criticize them any more than a baby analyzes the
atmosphere before he begins to breath it. Each
one is subjected to the influence of the mores, and

formed by them, before he is capable of reasoning
about them. . . . The masses oppose a deaf ear to

252

every argument against the mores. . . . We learn

the mores as unconsciously as we learn to walk and

eat and breathe. The masses never learn how to walk,

and eat, and breathe, and they never know any rea-

son why the mores are what they are. . . . The

mores contain embodied in them notions, doctrines,

and maxims, but they are facts. They are in the

present tense. They have nothing to do with ought

to be, will be, may be, or once was, if it is not

now.5

The behavior of men cannot be changed except by co-
ercion or prolonged conditioning. This presents a bleak
outlook for the social reformer. The implication is strik-
ingly evident. If significant reforms are to be achieved,
the human material must be ruthlessly manipulated, coerced,
and molded by the social engineer. Such a view of human
nature is inconsistent with the democratic ideology.
Traditionally, Western civilization has stressed the

free, rational, autonomous individual. If such a conception
neglected the claims of the culture, Veblen's philoSOphy
goes to the opposite extreme. He makes society the primary
datum. The individual as such has no substantial reality.
The society is ultimately real, whereas the individual is
an abstraction from this reality. This view of the in-
dividual contradicts the democratic faith which assumes that
the society exists for the sake of the individual rather

than the reverse.

 

468 5W. quoted in W. pp. 146?-

253

Most of the important limitations of Veblen's philos-
ophy can be traced to his inadequate theory of value. As
Professor Dobriansky has commented, Veblen's theory is pri-
marily in the area of "means to the exclusion of the ends of
human life."6 when Veblen does write of the ends of life,
he seems to be primarily concerned with mere physical sur-
vival. Such a conception of life restricts human activity
to the achievement of economic efficiency. Veblen is to be
criticized for tending to neglect the wide range of human
interests which are not primarily economic in nature.

The inadequacy of Veblen's theory of value is evident
in his writings on technology. One of the proposals in
these writings is that the engineers should have a signifi-
cant role in the determination of ends as well as means.

The engineer would not only tell us "how to build" but also
"what to build." It is implied that the rationality of the
engineer in respect to the utilization of means is equally
valuable in respect to the determination of ends. The
physicist, Philip Morrison, has pointed out the serious de-
fect in such a prOposal:

But there is a flaw in the argument. Veblen writes:

"The mechanical technology is dispassionate and

impersonal, and its end is very simply to serve hu-

man needs." Here is the rub. Veblen's humanity

enriched the dispassionate, impersonal, "unbusiness-

like" nature of the ideology with a human value.
But in this impersonality, in this analytic rationality,

 

6Dobriansky, gp‘_git., p. 279.

25h

there is no guarantee of human value. Man is com-
plex enough to build great machines, not only for

the venal goal of profit, but for the mortal crime

of murder in million-fold example. The differential
analysis, the goal of effective use, does not nec-
essarily imply a commitment to the constructive oper-
ation of the well-designed mechanism, however much
the7instincts of craftsman or philosopher suggest

it.

WWW

Veblen's social philosophy does not provide an ade-
qwmn basis for a theory of education in a democratic culture.
His psychological assumptions, his conception of the individ-
ual, and his theory of value are none of them adequate for
an educational phiIOSOphy. This is particularly evident
when one attempts to derive educational objectives from the
Veblenian philosophy.

Veblen’s social phiIOSOphy implies that the individual
is to be educated for the society. The aim of society is
to insure the survival of the largest possible aggregate of
human beings. Education, therefore, must be primarily con-
.xmumm.with production and economic efficiency. It must be
concerned with the education of the efficient workman rather
than with man as a free personality. In the Veblenian
school there would be little emphasis upon leisure, fine

arts, music, literature, and so forth. Veblen has no adequate

 

7Philip Morrison, "The Ideology of the Engineers,"
W. p. 243.

255

theory of personality, individuality, or self-enjoyment. He

is a man obsessed with the notion of sheer physical survival.

Any
end

the

the

the

activity which does not enhance the attainment of this

is wasteful and thus cannot be a legitimate concern of

school.
The emphasis in Veblen’s philosOphy is upon science,
machine technology, and collective behavior. He stresses

reality of the social organism at the expense of the in-

dividual personality. In terms of the period in which he

wrote this emphasis was perhaps justified. The problems of

the contemporary world, however, do not appear to have arisen

from a neglect of either the machine technology or society.

As Lewis Mumford writes:

The disease that threatens us is an organic one:
it is no localized infection that can be lanced,
cleaned, bandaged; on the contrary, it requires a
reorientation of our whole life . . .: fundamen-
tally, a change in religion, our total sense of
the world and life and time. . . . To make use of
our vitalities and energies . . . we must reassert
once more the primacy of the person.

The obstacle to renewal does not merely lie in the
fact that in so many parts of society the agents
of destruction have gained the upper hand. . . .
Worse than that: organization has become in it-
self destructive of human values: everywhere the
machine holds the center and the personality has
been pushed to the periphery. . . . The only way
to renew the forces of life is to begin once again
with the repressed and diaplaced elements: to
dismantle a large part of the physical structure,
to loosen up the automatisms of habit,tg challenge
even successful forms of routine. . . .

8W. pp. 393-391».

 

256

Although Mumford has been greatly influenced by Veblen's
writings, he nevertheless presents a point of view which is
almost entirely foreign to Veblen's philosophy. The values
which Veblen emphasizes are survival, technological effici-
ency, and the satisfaction of idle curiosity. These values,
however, are not adequate for a democratic education in the
contemporary world.

Education needs to re-examine its conceptions of in-
dividuality, personality, and self-hood. We must induce
youth to examine the basic questions concerning the meaning
and value of existence. The most important educational
objective seems to be the development of personality. It
is man's ability to reflect upon his own existence which is
ultimately significant for the educator. Education fails
to the extent that students are not induced to make commit-
ments concerning their own destinies and the destinies of
others.

Veblen suggests that salvation can be achieved, if
at all, through technology and a reorganization of institu—
tions. Education, he implies, should not be concerned with
individual personality as such. The school should not appeal
directly to human intelligence. Instead, education should
work by indirection. Its objectives are to be achieved
through institutional reform. A careful manipulation of
institutions will produce a human personality which is in

harmony with the circumstances of life. It is the function

 

 

257
of education to develop or "engineer" a personality which
the exigencies of life demand. This is a view of education
which this thesis has rejected as basically incompatible
with the democratic faith.

WW

It is just Veblen's irreverence which we stand in
need of in a day when total commitment is being
asked of everyone. . . . I would be willing to wel-
come a great deal of Bohemian irresponsibility
among professors if that were the price of genuine
detachment and unengagement. Increasingly, the
conscience of academic peOple is hooked on to some
social concern, some good cause or other. . . .
Whatever the theoretical shortcomings of his con-
cept of idle curiosity, or of Science, and whatever
the practical shortcomings of the model-T professor,
I am not sure that we have found a better concept
or a better model.

Veblen was the living example of the efficacy of the
"idle curiosity." Who but Veblen would have seriously studied
walking canes, women's shoes, and esoteric forms of leisure?
It is this heightened sense of curiosity which constitutes
Veblen's chief value. One ought not to read Veblen for the
particular panaceas which he defends, although these are
in themselves often enlightening. Veblen is much more in-
structive in the questions he raises than in the answers he
offers. These questions involve man's relationship to his
environment. What is the proper relationship between man,

society, and education? This is of chief concern not only

 

9Riesman, ng_211., p. 113.

 

258
to the educator but to the philosopher, the sociologist, the
political scientist, and the economist. The questions which
Veblen raises transcend particular subject matter fields.

It is precisely this quality which gives these questions
their crucial importance.

Every field needs its Thorstein Veblens. It needs
those who will transcend the preconceptions of their own
discipline. It needs those who will speculate and examine
those problems which are of common concern to all areas of
knowledge. It is just this quality of Veblen's thought
which attracts the reader. Veblen never viewed these funda-
mental questions from the standpoint of a mere economist or
a mere sociOIOgist or a mere educator. He attempted to
examine these questions from the viewpoint of knowledge taken
in its entirety.

Veblen had a heightened sense of curiosity. At the
same time he was able to detach himself from the immediate
concerns of the time. These are the qualities which made
Veblen a great teacher in spite of his grossly inadequate
pedagogical techniques. This fact is in itself instructive,
especially for the professional educator. A teacher can
make his mark in a variety of ways. Veblen's great virtue
was his ability to arouse the intellectual curiosity of
his students. Few teachers have had a more profound effect
upon their disciples.

Veblen regarded Wesley Claire Mitchell as his

 

259
outstanding student. Mitchell, on the other hand, regarded
his teacher as a "giant” among economists. This, however,
is not what most impressed Mitchell.

What drew me to him was his artistic side. I had a
weakness for paradoxes--He11 set up by the God of
Love. But Veblen was a master developing beautiful
subtleties, while I was a tyro emphasizing the ob-
vious. . . . There was a man who really could play
with ideas. If one wanted to indulge in the game
of spinning theories who could match his skill and
humor? 0

One should not conclude, however, that Veblen was an in-
tellectual dilettante. As we have seen, his contributions
have been many. Nevertheless, it would appear that Veblen
should not be read for the particular solutions which he
presents. This was not Veblen's forte. His writings are
far more significant for the problems which they raise. As
one student of Veblen has recently observed:

The greatest contributions of Veblen--as of Marx--

lie not in the answers he gained, but in the ques-

tions he posed, and in the approach he utilized to

gain his answers-~answers often correct, often in-

correct, often equivocal, but almost always stand-

ing in sharp contrast with those of his contempor-
aries.

 

10Lucy Sprague Mitchell, "A Personal Sketch," flgfiley,
, ed. Arthur F. Burns
(National Bureau of Economic Research: New York, 1952), p. 95.

llDoueuas Dowd. ed., WW-
annxaisal. pp. vii-viii-

A -
r...

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A selection of Veblen's writings with an introductory
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