

A RHETORICAL STUDY OF SELECTED SPEECHES
OF DR. ALBERT SCHWEITZER

Thesis for the Degree of Ph. D.
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Lois A. Cheney
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
A RHETORICAL STUDY OF SELECTED SPEECHES
OF
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ABSTRACT

A RHETORICAL STUDY OF SELECTED SPEECHES OF DR. ALBERT SCHWEITZER

by Lois A. Cheney

This study develops a rhetorical analysis of the speaking of Dr. Albert Schweitzer. Within a framework of pertinent background factors that contribute to the general understanding of Schweitzer, an examination is made of his speaking in general and then of three specific addresses.

The basic plan of the first portion of the study is as follows: First, an examination is made of the cultural, environmental, and intellectual milieu which contributed to forming Schweitzer's personality and core of mental interests. Even though at times Schweitzer appears to be uniquely independent of background factors, it was discovered that, nevertheless, he was significantly molded and influenced by them. Therefore, his heritage of an Alsatian environment and of an intellectual background emphasizing German philosophy and theology, provide important guidelines for understanding Schweitzer.

This study then examines specific biographical and intellectual factors involved in Schweitzer's life. Here the chronology of Schweitzer's life provides necessary details which reveal the origins of many facets of his character and ideas, and indicate the substantial role which speaking has played in his life. These details, in turn, provide a perspective for studying Schweitzer's major intellectual interests. The development of his concepts is examined in the following areas:

- 1) The life and meaning of Jesus
- 2) The life and meaning of St. Paul
- 3) The role of Christianity today
- 4) The status of modern civilization
- 5) The influence of Goethe on Schweitzer
- 6) Music
- 7) Science

These are areas of Schweitzer's intellectual endeavors throughout his life, and all are represented by significant writings and activities.

The first portion of the study concludes with an examination of the growth of certain legendary aspects of Schweitzer's personality. The evidence indicates not only that such a legend exists, but that it appears to be

particularly in evidence in his speaking. It was discovered that this legend is an all pervasive element in his speaking; it is evident in the speech occasion, in the make-up and attitude of his audience, and probably in the effect of the speech on the audience.

The second portion deals exclusively with Schweitzer's speaking in the following manner: First, an over-all view of Schweitzer's speaking is developed. Here it was determined that within the three general areas of preaching, lecturing, and occasional speaking Schweitzer has spoken extensively for many years. Particularly, the procedure of sentence-by-sentence translation was discovered to be an integral part of his speaking in a great many of his speech situations especially in those in which he is speaking to the world.

Case studies are then made of the Selly Oak Lectures, the Aspen address, and the Nobel Peace Prize address, which were selected for their representativeness of Schweitzer's speaking and also for their revelation of his workmanship in the art of rhetoric. These studies revealed that Schweitzer's speaking is based upon careful, precise preparation, that his ideas always reflect personal convictions resulting from research and careful thought, and that in spite of the number and variety of speaking situations, his speech content always reflects the major areas of interest in his life. He employs

the logical, ethical, and psychological modes of proof throughout his addresses, with perhaps particular emphasis upon the logical mode. His ideas are arranged to suit the specific audience which he is addressing. Though Schweitzer's delivery is the least effective aspect of his speaking, the over-all reaction of both his immediate and remote audience to his speaking is affirmative and enthusiastic.

This study indicates that throughout a life time of attempting to convey his ideas to the world, Schweitzer has employed oral communication extensively with apparent effectiveness.

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A RHETORICAL STUDY OF SELECTED
SPEECHES OF DR. ALBERT SCHWEITZER

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INTRODUCTION

Title

"A Rhetorical Study of Selected Speeches of Dr. Albert Schweitzer."

Subject

. . . I settled with myself before I got up, that I would consider myself justified in living till I was thirty for science and art, in order to devote myself from that time forward to the direct service of humanity.¹

These words contain an historic decision of a young professor in Strasbourg. Fifty-five years later the world-wide results of that decision have culminated in a man referred to as "Greatest Man in the World," "God's Eager Fool," "Thirteenth Disciple," "The Great Men's Greatest Man," and "Prophet in the Wilderness."

This most unusual man was born on January 14, 1875, at Kayersberg in Upper Alsace. The family soon moved to the village of Günsbach, and it is in this village that Doctor Schweitzer still maintains a home. The title, Doctor,

¹Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1949), p. 70.

refers not to one degree but to four: Doctor of Philosophy, Doctor of Music, Doctor of Theology, and Doctor of Medicine.

This founder of the mission hospital in Lambarene, Africa, has become world renowned; and he is very much in demand as a lecturer, organ recitalist, preacher, and speaker. It is a regular experience for the Doctor to leave Lambaréné for a "rest" in Günsbach. Invariably, however, these "rest periods" are spent in exhausting tours, organ recitals, and speaking engagements on the European continent and in Great Britain. It is at these times, as well as in his profuse writings, that Albert Schweitzer speaks to the world.

Doctor Schweitzer is in demand as a speaker in several fields. The major areas are: Philosophy, Theology, Goethe, and his work in Lambaréné. Upon occasion he is also called upon to speak to medical societies.

Several of the better known philosophical and theological lectures are: the Dale Memorial Lectures, the Hibbert Lectures, the Gifford Lectures, and the Selly Oak Lectures.

Because Schweitzer feels that Goethe was one of the more important influences of his life, he has been called upon to speak at several of the important Goethe anniversaries, including the one held in the United States.

The hospital at Lambaréne has captured the interest of people throughout the world, and Doctor Schweitzer delivers many speeches and gives "lantern-lectures" on this subject.

Albert Schweitzer is now eighty-six years old; and whereas he has had to cut down on his work somewhat, he still puts in a day's work that would stagger most people.

Purpose of this Study

The purpose of this study is to examine the speaking life of Schweitzer and to make case studies of several speeches which present him as a world figure. More specifically, those speeches which will be examined in detail are those not particularly related to persons of any one nation, race, or language. Though given at a particular time to a particular audience, they are not exclusively for any one segment of the world.

The study of the extrinsic aspects of the speaking situations will seek answers to such questions as:

- 1) What were the social, religious, and intellectual "climate" factors in which the speech took place?
- 2) What persons constituted his immediate audience and why was he speaking to them?
- 3) To whom, besides his immediate audience, was his speech directed? (Who were able to hear or read the speech?)
- 4) What were the effects of his having spoken to them?

The study of the intrinsic aspects of the speaking situations will seek answers to such questions as:

- 1) What are the ideas in his speeches?
- 2) What are the lines of argument he pursued?
- 3) What are the types of appeal that he used?
- 4) What are the aspects of his delivery?

The careful study of the above items should provide an insight into Albert Schweitzer, providing information concerning those major influences that make him the man that he is, including his ideas and his way of life.

The method employed will be description, analysis, interpretation, and evaluation of Dr. Schweitzer's workmanship in terms of the principal topics and canons of rhetorical criticism.

Limitations

While Albert Schweitzer is a writer, a philosopher, a musician, a medical doctor, a missionary, a preacher, and a speaker, this study will be confined to his public speaking. Because this study is concerned with the speaking of Dr. Albert Schweitzer which was delivered either to a multilingual audience, or to peoples of many nations, the aspect of translation and language problems which evolve out of translations will not be investigated. These problems do not seem to have consequential relevance to the proposed research design other than causing the critic to remain aware of the limitations that are necessarily involved in working with a translation of a speech.

Because many biographies have been written about Dr. Schweitzer, it is not the plan of this study to delve intensively into this area. However, in order to understand more accurately Schweitzer's speaking, some insights into the nature of the man, his environment, and his background will be sought. The study will, then, include all of the pertinent information about the man that can serve to throw light on him as a speaker.

Justification

There is intrinsic merit in studying a man who has captured the imaginations of the ordinary man and the professional scholar as well. Also, there is merit in studying a man who has been established as an authority in many fields, and whose writings and works are respected by people the world over.

There is also intrinsic merit in studying the speaking of a man whose words have a strong effect on both his immediate audience and on the entire world. It is important to examine closely the speeches of a man who is called out from his African mission to all parts of the world for the express purpose of speaking to students, to church people, to university audiences, or to various professional societies.

Especially within the framework of rhetorical criticism, there is merit in studying the speaking of man who on

many occasions consciously and explicitly speaks through the immediate audience and occasion to the world at large--in fact the immediate audience and occasion are sometimes but the means by which he projects his message to his world audience. This purpose is illustrated by his words:

I raise my voice, together with those of others who have lately felt it their duty to act, through speaking and writing, in warning of the danger. My age and the generous understanding of so many people have shown of my work permit me to hope that my appeal may contribute to the preparing of the way for the insights so urgently needed.²

I therefore stand and work in the world as one who aims at making men less shallow and morally better by making them think.³

Especially within the framework of rhetorical criticism there is additional merit in studying the methods of a speaker who must adapt himself on many occasions to an audience whose native language is other than the one in which he is speaking, and who, therefore, makes the interpreter an integral part in terms of both preparation and presentation.

Distinctiveness

While Doctor Schweitzer has been the subject of a

²Albert Schweitzer, "A Declaration of Conscience" Saturday Review of Literature, XL (May 18, 1957), p. 17.

³Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 224.

number of biographies and studies, and his writings and thoughts have been examined and analyzed by numerous authorities, no rhetorical analysis or criticism has been made of the speaking of Schweitzer. Such a study, therefore, might offer new insights into Schweitzer the man and Schweitzer the communicator.

Organization

This study will be organized in terms of two major topics: (1) The study of the man, including the history of his environment, his intellectual background, major biographical factors, and the growth of the legend about him; and (2) the study of his speaking--both a general examination of his speaking and a specific examination of three selected speeches. On the basis of the findings of these two general areas, certain conclusions will be sought.

The chapters of the study will follow this general plan of organization. Chapters One and Two will endeavor to set forth the historical, cultural, and intellectual background of Albert Schweitzer. Chapter Three will seek to present both the biographical factors of Schweitzer and a general examination of the major intellectual interests of his life. Chapter Four will examine the aspects of the legend that has grown about Schweitzer and note its

influence upon Schweitzer as a communicator. Chapter Five will study the speaking life of Schweitzer in general. Chapters Six, Seven and Eight will present case studies of The Selly Oak Lectures, the Aspen Address and the Nobel Peace Prize Address. Chapter Nine will seek to summarize and make certain conclusions on the basis of the material in the preceding eight chapters.

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL BACKGROUND

On November 4, 1954, Albert Schweitzer delivered a fifty minute speech on the problem of world peace. The occasion was his acceptance of the 1952 Nobel Peace Prize. Facing a distinguished audience and standing erect for the entire time, the seventy-nine year old philosopher-theologian-missionary spoke as a world citizen on the pressing subject, "The Problem of Peace in the World Today." Within the hour the speech was reported in many countries as a major statement from an important world figure.

The world reception of this speech suggests the extraordinary position held by Schweitzer. Respected throughout the world as a theologian, philosopher, musician, and missionary, he also symbolized for mankind the realization of a life of stature endowed with spiritual meaning. Schweitzer appears to be a most unique person who stands as an individual above and beyond the influences of the world. However, though he is indeed unique, he is also a representative of his cultural and historical heritage; and only by

examining these background factors, can this Nobel address and other speeches be seen in their complete perspective.

Historical Background

The label "perennial battleground" describes the two small provinces, Alsace and Lorraine, from which Albert Schweitzer comes. The area has been fought over for centuries, ravaged, coveted, and claimed by first one power and then another.¹ This history of conflict extends as far back as there are any records or legends. Even before the Roman Empire came into being the tribes to the east of the Rhine and those to the west of the Vosges mountains placed great value on its agricultural and mineral products and its strategic military location, and they waged numerous wars over it.

During its early history, Julius Caesar conquered the region; and it remained under Roman rule for five centuries. Under Roman rule cities such as Strasbourg, Metz, Verdun, and Saverne came into being. Strasbourg is of special interest to this study for it was there that Schweitzer received his university education, and later

¹This general conclusion is held by most historians. The explanation given here is largely that as developed by Charles D. Hazen in Alsace-Lorraine Under German Rule.

taught and preached for a number of years. As a boy he saw the roads and monuments which had been constructed by the Romans; and at school he read how the Germanic tribes, referred to as the Alemanni, suffered defeat in a number of battles with the Romans, from 58 B. C. until 403 A. D.²

At that time the Romans abandoned Alsace to its fate; and the barbarian races moved in to take over the area with each succeeding tribe introducing new racial elements and new cultural ideas. Prominent among these tribes was the German tribe which dominated this land for over eight hundred years, and during the Middle Ages Alsace was the source for German thought, civilization, art and architecture.³ The point to be noted is that in the long history of racial and cultural characteristics which poured into Alsace and Lorraine, there was a blending from first one group and then another, producing an area inhabited by a unique people.

In the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, Alsace was ceded to France. France had been willing to use her force to keep Austria from gaining complete control in Europe. The change of administration from German to French did not,

²Information of the Roman occupation of the provinces was largely drawn from The True Story of Alsace Lorraine by Ernest Vizetelly.

³This point is made in Alsace-Lorraine Past, Present and Future by Coleman Phillipson.

however, affect the lives of the Alsatians a great deal, for in those days a change of overlord was not uncommon. Alsatian life continued much as it had before.⁴

The French attitude toward religion, however, did produce some interesting results which have significance for this study. Louis XIV decreed that in any town where there were at least seven Catholic families, the chancel of the town church must be available for Catholic use. Thus in a number of towns the same building was used for both Protestant and Catholic services. This practice persisted through the years and was true in the village of Günsbach, where Schweitzer grew up. The church in which his father was pastor served as both a Catholic and Protestant sanctuary, an arrangement that appealed very much to Albert Schweitzer. The meaningful symbols in the Catholic chancel helped to inspire his sense of worshipful devotion and caused him to record these comments concerning strictly Protestant churches.

The Catholic chancel, into which I used to gaze, was to my childish imagination the ne plus ultra of magnificence. . . . From these youthful recollections springs an inability to appreciate the efforts made to produce a Protestant type of church building. When I see churches in which modern architects have tried to embody the ideal of "a preacher's church," I feel a sinking at the

⁴This is developed by Bernard Newman in The New Europe.

heart. A church is much more than a building in which one listens to sermons; it is a place for devotions, and merely as a building it ought to keep people at a devotional level . . . The chancel, therefore, is not something exclusively Catholic; it is a part of the church as a church, and if Protestant services are from their very nature defective, there is no need for the building to be so as well.⁵

French administration from 1648 to 1871 established a groundwork for the building of strong, friendly relations between France and Alsace. This administration made as deep an impression upon Alsatians as had the previous eight centuries under German influence. Under French rule Middle Age feudalism in Alsace crumbled. Then with the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789 Alsace embraced republican ideals and she contributed soldiers, outstanding generals, and enthusiastic support.⁶ The ties between France and Alsace became so complete that Alsace was considered to be an integral part of France.

The completeness of this identification of Alsace with France explains in part the world-wide sentiment which was aroused when Germany claimed Alsace and Lorraine following the Franco-German war in 1871. This war and its results

⁵Albert Schweitzer, Memoirs of Childhood and Youth (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), pp. 47-48.

⁶This is detailed by Coleman Phillipson in Alsace-Lorraine, Past, Present and Future.

are important to this study, inasmuch as four years after its end, Schweitzer was born in Kayersburg in Upper Alsace. He thus grew up in a peaceful era strongly dominated by German authority.

There is some value, for this study, to take particular notice of the battle over Strasbourg, in the Franco-German war, for a number of reasons: it represents the kind of fighting that occurred in Alsace-Lorraine during the war; the city was a significant one and is a city that holds special interest for this study; and an incident involving an uncle of Albert Schweitzer marks it as a family touch bringing the history of battle-torn Alsace directly to Albert Schweitzer.

The city was heavily bombarded for days, the destruction being particularly vicious and violent. Among other things, for example, the library, one of the better ones on the continent, containing valuable collections of manuscripts, was destroyed. Eight thousand citizens were homeless because the bombardment had destroyed their houses; three hundred citizens were killed, and seventeen hundred were injured.⁷

During this time the pastor of the church of St. Nicholas in Strasbourg, was an Albert Schweitzer. He was

⁷The battles of the war are treated by Vizetelly in his True Story of Alsace-Lorraine.

the uncle of Dr. Albert Schweitzer, the subject of this study. This uncle made a deep impression on Albert Schweitzer and is the man for whom Dr. Schweitzer is named. Just before the siege, in anticipation of it, pastor Schweitzer went to Paris to get medical supplies so urgently needed in Strasbourg. General von Werder, the commander of the besieging army allowed the supplies to be sent into Strasbourg, but he kept Reverend Mr. Schweitzer as a prisoner for the remainder of the war. The depth of the impression which this man made upon Albert Schweitzer is reflected in these words of his.

The thought of how I could provide, as it were, a continuation of a man whom my mother had loved so much haunted me a great deal, especially as I had heard so many stories of his kindness.⁸

This war was of significance to all of Europe in that it marked the creation of a militaristic German Empire under the guidance of the ambitious Bismark.⁹ In many ways it marked the beginning of modern warfare and perhaps the beginning of a new age, according to some sources.¹⁰

⁸Schweitzer, op. cit., p. 27.

⁹This is based on the delineation of the war in The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 by A. J. P. Taylor.

¹⁰Henry W. Littlefield is one such source and he makes the point in his book History of Europe Since 1815.

As a result of the war tensions and rivalry were created between Germany and France which prevailed for many years. No small amount of this tension centered on Alsace-Lorraine, for the seizure of the provinces kindled ill feeling between the two countries; and thereafter, it was referred to as the "Alsace-Lorraine Question," though Germany refused to admit that there was any question about it. The resentment and hostility over the loss of Alsace-Lorraine contributed to the coming of World War I.¹¹ Later, Alsace-Lorraine was given back to France in 1919, then annexed by Germany in 1940, and returned to France in 1945. Such constant transference of authority naturally had its effect upon the Alsatian character and outlook.

In addition to the several specific influences of the war-torn history of Alsace-Lorraine upon the heritage of Albert Schweitzer already mentioned, another major factor needs to be noted. Because of the constant interchange of ruling authority through the years, the people of Alsace-Lorraine came to view prevailing nationalism and the struggles of the major powers with an attitude of futility. Though they have deep historical, cultural roots in their provinces, they do not have the long history of nationalist patriotism possessed by most people.

¹¹The Question of Alsace and Lorraine by Thomas Willing Balch is one such source that makes this point.

The loyalty of the Alsatians and Lorrainers to each nation as it ruled them is not called into question, but the history of changing ruling authority has not permitted them to be imbued with the nationalistic fervor so common in most countries.

Certainly Schweitzer stands as one example of this. His Alsatian background is German dominated, and generally he has Germanic traits; however, in a more general sense he is a citizen of the world. He has been both a French and a German subject, and has spent half of his life in French controlled Equatorial Africa. His lectures, writings, and interests in philosophy, theology, and music speak to the whole world, not to one nation or one race of people. Seldom does he express himself on an issue of partisan, political concern. An exception to this are his utterances, in later years, against nuclear testing, but even here he speaks as a world statesman, standing beyond national loyalties. His role as a world citizen, standing above rigid national patriotism, is not an altogether unique feature in the world today, but is a towering example of what world citizenship can mean, and it can be reasonably assumed that this was influenced by his Alsatian background.

The constant interchange of authority also affected the language habits of Alsace-Lorraine. At the close of the

Franco-German war, the German conquerors insisted upon the use of the German language in all official walks of life, such as the law courts and official assemblies, and it was ordered that the German language was to be taught in the schools. The result was a thorough mixture, because the provinces, having been alternately French and German several times over, developed a bilingual population.¹² As an Alsatian, Schweitzer has been bilingual since he was a child. This accounts, in part, for his speaking easily in either of the languages, both of which he handles equally well.

As a native of Alsace he was bilingual from his earliest years, but although in his home-letters he has always used French since this was the custom of his family, and German generally for his books and lectures, he regards the Alsatian dialect which is allied to German as his mother tongue, since this is the language in which he thinks, counts and also dreams.¹³

The teaching of the German language in the schools was one of the many educational reforms undertaken by the Germans which were to have an influence upon the life of Albert Schweitzer. The recreating of the university in

¹²The language characteristics of Alsace-Lorraine from which this is drawn are developed by Coleman Phillipson in Alsace-Lorraine Past, Present and Future. He points out that in addition to the bilingual characteristics of the Alsatians, there also developed an Alsatian dialect that is neither one nor the other.

¹³George Seaver, Albert Schweitzer The Man and His Mind (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955), p. 4.

Strasbourg is an example of the German interest in the educational system of Alsace-Lorraine and more than three million dollars were spent for the buildings alone. The aim was evidently to establish a German university of continental importance; and the University did grow in size and prestige, for between the years 1872 and 1900 its faculty increased from forty-six to one hundred and thirty-six, and its student body grew in size from two hundred and twelve to eleven hundred and sixty-nine.¹⁴

Albert Schweitzer went through the improved and Germanized system of education. He began his education at the village school in Günsbach; at the age of nine he walked to the Realschule at Münster; and later he went to the Gymnasium at Mülhausen. His university education began in 1883, when he entered Strasbourg University which had been so greatly developed by the Germans, and which evidently was much to Schweitzer's liking.

Strasbourg University was then at the height of its reputation. Unhampered by tradition, teachers and students alike strove to realize the ideal of a modern university. There were hardly any professors of advanced age on the

¹⁴The German Education reforms discussion is drawn from the detailed development of the subject by Charles Hazen in Alsace-Lorraine Under German Rule.

teaching staff. A fresh breeze of youthfulness penetrated everywhere.¹⁵

Schweitzer's schooling also took him out of the province to the Sorbonne in Paris and to the University of Berlin.

The educational reforms and the language restrictions were steps taken by the Germans to accomplish the aim of Germanizing Alsace and Lorraine. Another step was that military service was to be required of all Alsatians and Lorrainers, with the result that each Alsatian boy was thus obliged to serve in the German army for a designated period of time. This was especially distasteful for those having relatives who had so lately fought and died in the war against the Germans.

Schweitzer's brief reference to his obligatory military service does not indicate his feeling any particular resentment toward it, nor does it seem to have inconvenienced him.

On April 1, 1894, I began my year of military service, but the kindness of my captain, Krull by name, made it possible for me, during the periods of regular routine, to be at the university by eleven o'clock almost every day, and so to attend Windelband's lectures.¹⁶

¹⁵Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, trans. by C. T. Campion, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1949), p. 5.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 5.

Generally, the long war-dominated history of Alsace-Lorraine has left the provinces a land inhabited by people who are well acquainted with the meaning of war. Each family has its heritage touched with the influence of war, the Schweitzer family being no exception. Albert Schweitzer's family and his personal life have been involved in the atmosphere of war for years, and in this respect he reflects this common heritage shared by all Alsatians. His Uncle Albert, during the Franco-German war, has been mentioned. The First World War reached Albert Schweitzer in a number of ways: his mother was knocked down and killed by rushing cavalry; his hospital in Africa was shut down; he and his wife were interned as prisoners of war; and he finished out the war living at home in the Münster valley, where the roar of guns, the presence of brick machine gun emplacements, and the frequent bombardments were a daily reminder of the presence of the war. The Second World War also touched him, but not so extensively as had been true during the First. He remained at his hospital during this Second War and worked under the difficulties it imposed. In more recent years the effect and the potential of modern warfare, resulting from his own experiences, from observation, and from thoughtful study, have caused Schweitzer to speak out against war. He has become an eloquent spokesman for the forces that work

actively against nuclear testing and all its contingent dangers. As such, he expresses himself from the depths of his Alsatian heritage.

However individual Schweitzer's ideas may be, in many ways they are a reflection of his historical background as an inhabitant of one of the most fought over lands in the world.

Cultural Background

Both French and German cultural influences are to be found in Alsace and Lorraine, for although their pasts developed separately, they are now undeniably linked. In sharing a certain common history of events, the provinces have developed personality and character traits of their own, and these traits become the important factor in trying to grasp the nature and feelings of the people of Alsace and Lorraine.

It is important to note their coming together, and to mark the differences and likenesses between the two provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, which we now automatically link together. By no means were they always associated, and at one point in their history they were not even joined geographically as they are now.

Lorraine seems to have had an earlier and stronger connection to France, perhaps the major reason being that during the Middle Ages, when the feudal system was paramount the Dukes of Lorraine were frequently joined by marriage or by military alliances with the kings of France. It was in the sixteenth century that much of Lorraine was definitely annexed to France, not by conquest but by cession. Lorraine was thus more French in character and culture than was Alsace.¹⁷

As this statement suggests, in Alsace the Germanic traits dominate, though, of course, it too has an individual identity of its own. The following description provides a general look at the kind of person a typical Alsatian is apt to be.

The Alsations are an optimistic, merry, religious and industrious people, lacking in enthusiasm generally but with democratic and republican leanings. They are very practically-minded, and set great store by material well being. . . . The Alsatian peasantry do not regard with favour the ubiquitous dispensations of paternalism; neither they nor the agricultural workers of Lorraine are deeply concerned with the broad questions of politics; both classes alike would desire the burdens of taxation to diminish, and above all, they would like to be let alone to job along in their own quiet, cheerful, simple manner.

¹⁷The relationship between Lorraine and France here stated is taken from Hazen's exploration of the problem in Alsace-Lorraine Under German Rule.

Both French and German are spoken by the educated classes of the towns. Apart from these the great majority of Alsatians speak a Germanic dialect.¹⁸

This description is evidently true to this day, for Alsace has changed very little over the years, and the Alsatians have lived in much the same manner from generation to generation. It is important to keep these general Alsatian characteristics in mind when attempting to understand Albert Schweitzer, an Alsatian.

The geographical and cultural factors of Alsace-Lorraine have had their influence upon the formation of Albert Schweitzer. The provinces are basically a rural country made up of picturesque and peaceful mountains, valleys, plains, rivers, forests, and lakes. There are some industries in the larger cities such as spinning and weaving in Mülhausen, Colmar, and Münster (these are all cities familiar to Schweitzer); there is leather goods manufacturing also in Strasbourg. It is, however, for its rural products that it is well known, particularly wine and cheese. As a child Schweitzer took pride in the fact that he was born in a year that was considered to be a famous wine year, the grapes having been extraordinarily good that year.

¹⁸Coleman Phillipson, Alsace-Lorraine Past, Present and Future (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1918), pp. 38-39.

Schweitzer grew up in the peaceful atmosphere of the Münster valley, and he attributes to his environment his love of, and his closeness to, nature.

When it was decided during the holidays in 1885 that I should go to the Gymnasium at Mülhausen, in Upper Alsace, I cried over my lot in secret for hours together. I felt as if I were being torn away from Nature.

To the enthusiasm roused in me by the beauties of nature as I learnt to know them on my walks to and from Münster, I tried to give expression in poetry.¹⁹

Schweitzer shared the rural and small village life that had been the way of life for many Alsatians for centuries.

The Alsatian history of being subject to various authorities has given them an air of independence, although, as has been indicated, they constitute a blending of a number of cultures. Their religious life, touched on briefly previously, is devout and sincere, being more concerned with a sense of daily application of Christian principles than with doctrinal delineation. Schweitzer's deep and spiritual approach to his religion is directly attributable to the religious environment of his family and of the provinces. Often in his book Memoirs of Childhood and Youth, he acknowledges his religious debt to his childhood environment.

The general nature of Albert Schweitzer reflects the provincial traits of Alsace. For example, his directness,

¹⁹ Schweitzer, Memoirs of Childhood and Youth, p. 22.

his good humor, and his sometimes blunt way of expressing himself, all reflect his Alsatian background. Another example is his tie to the land which has manifested itself in his work in Africa.

These many, seemingly small, cultural factors are a part of the man Schweitzer. Though he towers above his Alsatian heritage, though he goes far beyond the historic and cultural molding factors of Alsace-Lorraine, still, he reflects them in a most decided way. Those very traits which seem to set him apart from so many men, such as world citizenship, his attitude on war, and his simplicity and directness, are, in a very real sense, his heritage factors extended and developed.

This chapter has synthesized those historical and cultural factors stemming from the Alsace-Lorraine provinces in which Schweitzer grew, which seem to have had an influence in the molding of his personality and character. They provide a backdrop against which his ideas and his actions can take on meaning. These factors plus an examination of the intellectual heritage of Schweitzer, to be considered next, will provide the study with a more thorough understanding of Albert Schweitzer.

CHAPTER II

IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

Because this study is primarily concerned with the expression of Albert Schweitzer's ideas, it is important that his intellectual world be examined. This chapter proposes to examine this ideological background and to note its impact on Schweitzer. This examination will include major philosophical and theological forces of the seventeenth and eighteenth century and their relevance to Schweitzer and his ideas. More specifically, it will note Schweitzer's intellectual training, the ideological forces that were paramount in his day, and the men and ideas that profoundly influenced his thinking.

When organizing the theological and philosophical thought which influenced Schweitzer, one finds that it is difficult to make a clean-cut distinction between the two fields of inquiry inasmuch as each influenced the other. Important figures in the history of philosophy, at this time, are often equally important in the theological world. The concepts of the nature of God, the purpose of religion, and

the source of ethics are all part of the dynamic intellectual revolution which was also concerned with world views, concepts of knowledge, and systems of reason. Therefore, although there will be an attempt to give separate treatment to the phases of the philosophical and theological currents, it will be necessary to blend the two at various points and to view them as parallel developments.

As has already been indicated, Albert Schweitzer's education took place at a time when German influence dominated the Alsatian schools. It is not surprising, then, to find that his interests and his ideas were decidedly German. His primary interests, theology and philosophy, involved him in an era in which German thinking dominated these fields the world over. It is German philosophy and German theology that provide a background for understanding Albert Schweitzer's thinking. Especially is he influenced by the outstanding eighteenth century German thinkers who represent the German Enlightenment, Aufklärung. From this period came a number of major figures who profoundly affected the thinking of all Western Civilization.

The seeds that flowered into philosophical and theological fervor in Germany were planted by the forces of the Reformation according to many authorities. Germany responded to this intellectual impetus with enthusiasm, and

some of its greatest intellectual figures were produced in the Reformation and post-Reformation period.¹

While it was the spirit of the Reformation that opened some new doors of thought, criticism, and scholarship in both philosophy and theology, it should be noted that the Reformation did not open the floodgates of rationalism. Quite the contrary, it felt that reason was blind in certain matters, such as salvation and personal faith. The Reformation thinking emphasized the Bible as the final authority and in revelation from God as a source of truth. In direct contrast Descartes and Spinoza looked to human reason. This does not negate, however, the achievements of the Reformation in encouraging more critical thinking. "A growing deference to the claims of reason as against the demands of authority characterized the post-reformation period."² This deference to reason was especially illustrated in the new surge of philosophical thought in Germany.

Philosophy

Rene Descartes represents the beginning of an age of dependence upon the power of reason to answer all questions,

¹This is emphasized particularly by Heinrich Heine in Religion and Philosophy in Germany.

²George Leopold Hurst, An Outline of the History of Christian Literature (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926), p. 421.

an age which marks the beginning of modern philosophy after the demise of scholasticism.³ A man with a French background and a firm adherent of the Catholic faith, Descartes is referred to by some as "the father of modern rationalism," for, relying completely upon reason, he was interested in reforming the concepts of philosophy with rational thought as its foundation. Taking mathematics as his model, Descartes sought to construct a system of thought that would have the same certainty as mathematics. In attempting to found "a body of certain and self-evident truths, such as everyone endowed with common sense and the faculty of reasoning will accept,"⁴ he was led to a mechanistic interpretation of the world.

The one absolutely certain proposition with which he started was, "I think, therefore, I am." From this self-evident proposition he proceeded to develop a complete system of knowledge which became the jumping-off place for thinkers for centuries to come.

From Descartes' time on, philosophers began to follow more and more the path of rationalism. This approach

³The discussion of Descartes and his role in the history of philosophy is drawn primarily from two sources: John Nicholson's Philosophy of Religion and Thilly and Wood's A History of Philosophy.

⁴Frank Thilly and Ledger Wood, A History of Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1957), p. 305.

to knowledge developed in a number of ways; and though there was a wide range of degrees of acceptance of it, basically, rationalism had certain general characteristics with which all of its adherents agreed. First, the rationalists looked to reason, not authority, as the standard for knowledge. Also, based on the deductive reasoning of mathematics, the rationalists aimed at developing a system of truths in which different propositions would be logically related to each other. Extending this idea, the rationalists were willing to accept as valid truths, only those factors which originated in the mind itself. The antithesis of rationalism is empiricism, in which pure thought is conceived of as impossible, only that knowledge which is based on experience being acceptable knowledge. Tremendous advances were made in thought and in the sciences during the seventeenth century when the rationalistic way of thought, advocated by Descartes, dominated. These advances encouraged reliance on man's reason and caused man to have faith in the inevitable progress of civilization.

In Germany Gotthold Lessing became a leading exponent of these new views. Henrich Heine, outstanding German poet and scholar,⁵ said later that whereas Luther had freed

⁵Heine develops this point in his Religion and Philosophy in Germany.

man from the power of traditional authority, Lessing liberated man from the literalism that had arisen after Luther. Certainly Lessing stirred up a storm of controversy through his wit and his attacks, and was hated by German zealots of more orthodox convictions. Lessing viewed religion as a progressive revelation of truth and rejected the orthodox concept of the Bible as the final truth.

As a man of letters he sought to bring more freedom of expression to Germany, and his example became a progressive impulse to German intellectual efforts.

He rehabilitated wrongly depreciated or condemned thinkers of the past, he struggled against wrong authorities of his time, he tried to secure liberty of expression for a German literature that did not yet exist when he wrote his principal works.⁶

His lead was followed by such great men of German literature as Goethe and Herder.

Lessing died in 1781, a year made auspicious by the publication of Immanuel Kant's book, Critique of Pure Reason. Although this book did not become generally known for about a decade, it was destined, along with its author, to win over academic thought in Germany, and to dominate thought throughout Western Civilization. "Modern German Philosophy

⁶Dagobert D. Runes, ed., Treasury of World Philosophy (New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams and Company, 1959), p. 700.

may be said to have actually started with Kant."⁷

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and his Critique of Practical Reason caused an intellectual revolution in Germany. Just as Descartes' theory of knowledge had revolutionized thought for centuries with his rationalistic approach to truth, so Kant was destined to revolutionize thought with his theory of knowledge which accepted limitations in the realm of reason and which looked to truth as being founded on sense experience. Kant's dualism, based on separating mental faculties, became a problem with which philosophers wrestled for many years. Whereas the rationalists had assumed self-evident propositions to be possible, and the human mind to be capable of conceiving genuine knowledge, Kant first turned his attention to analyzing and criticizing the very method of human reason.

Philosophy, he thinks, has hitherto been dogmatic: it has proceeded without previous criticism of its own powers. It must now become critical, or enter upon an impartial examination of the faculty of reason in general.⁸

This was the task to which Kant applied himself, and the results of his efforts were felt in all human thought. After Kant, a galaxy of German philosophers who advanced philosophy

⁷W. Tudor Jones, Contemporary Thought of Germany (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1931), Vol. I, p. 1.

⁸Thilly and Wood, op. cit., pp. 413-414.

by explaining Kant, criticizing him, or extending his ideas, came to the fore.

In Kant we find the bridge between the complete, unqualified faith in rationalism and the approaching age of Romanticism.⁹ Kant's theory of knowledge realized and accepted limitations to reason, acknowledging it as insufficient to solve all problems. It was part of his rationale that the phenomenal world, the world of objects, is the only world that is knowable to any degree. In this world, knowledge is based on experience in the following manner: An object is first perceived by the sense, and then the mind brings previous associations and experiences to the perception, and the result is knowledge. Knowledge is thus a combination of concepts and percepts, limiting it to the phenomenal world. The understanding that we gain of this world is never complete, for we never can know an object as it "actually" is, but rather as it "appears" through our senses with the concurrent creative and interpretative role of our minds. This world is unknowable; it is where reason cannot enter. Kant's conclusion was then, that reason was

⁹The term "romanticism" as used in this study, does not refer to that interpretation which suggests sentimentality; rather it connotes a different approach to life from rationality; it goes beyond rationalism for its source of truth.

limited to a particular sphere of inquiry, the phenomenal world. This interpretation of reason was a blow to the rationalists who held that reason was sufficient to solve all problems; for the thorough-going rationalist, anything that could not stand the test of reason was rejected.

This difference between Kant and the rationalists can be illustrated by the application of Kant's thinking to the realm of religion. The rationalists could not, through reason, prove the existence of a transcendental God. They, therefore, either denied the existence of God or relegated the God concept to being either an "infinite substance," or a pantheistic nature force. Kant opened the way for belief in a transcendental God, for although "pure" reason (which was restricted to the phenomenal world) could never prove the existence of God, "practical" reason could substantiate such a belief.

This practical reason which is identified with morality, is different from pure reason, which is identified with scientific knowledge in the following ways. Practical reason deals with the noumenal (unknowable) world; pure reason deals with the phenomenal (knowable) world. Practical reason works in the inner life of men, giving order and meaning to his actions; pure reason works in the life of a man in establishing its relation to the external world.

It was through practical reason that Kant offered proof for the existence of God. This was moral proof, not scientific proof. Thus, practical reason led Kant to believe that the source of religion is in moral experience. "He was sure that anyone who reflected upon the facts of morality would be convinced of the necessity of God's existence."¹⁰

Practical reason, however, does more than prescribe the moral law. It also formulates the ideal of a perfect good. In this ideal, virtue and happiness are conjoined. The ideal demands that a man's happiness should be proportionate to his virtue. It would harmonize the ends prescribed by nature and by the moral law. It is in this idea of practical reason that Kant found the source of the idea of God. God is the power which insures the happiness of man shall be proportionate to his virtue. Without this belief in God, the unconditional demand of the moral law would appear arbitrary. On the other hand, without the moral law the religious idea of God would never have come into existence.¹¹

From this practical reason Kant evolves his system of ethics, in which man finds the cause of ethical behavior to lie in an innate sense of duty; he acts ethically because he "ought" to do so.

Kant's conviction that reason is limited to the phenomenal world is illustrated by these following elements of his thinking: his separation of pure and practical reason,

¹⁰John A. Nicholson, Philosophy of Religion (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1950), p. 125.

¹¹Ibid., p. 125.

his theory of knowledge in general, and his moral proof for the existence of God. His interpretation of reason caused subsequent philosophy to take his conclusions into account, whether they agreed with them or not. The impact of Kant's thought is summarized by George Boas in The Major Traditions of European Philosophy as follows:

We need not go into the details of Kant's arguments; what is important is their foundation. We see in them clearly and unmistakably asserted the proposition that we have a right to believe in the truth of things for other than logical reasons. It makes very little difference what things Kant asserted were therefore true; what makes a difference is that the principle of the practical nature of at least some kind of truth was asserted. For after that time it will be an easy step to extend the principle to all kinds of truth. And that step will be taken. Up to the time of St. Thomas the Socratic tradition of the primacy of the reason in matters of conduct had been dominant in spite of the Sophists and the Latin fathers. Now things were becoming reversed.¹²

Following Kant, Germany entered a period sometimes referred to as "post Kant idealism." Having freed himself from the mechanistic world-view of previous philosophers, which had ended in such conclusions as fatalism, hedonism, or atheism, Kant had indicated there was a higher truth than that founded on scientific proof. Kant was cautious as to how man could achieve this truth, for he was highly suspicious

¹²George Boas, The Major Traditions of European Philosophy (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1929), p. 298.

of mysticism in any sense of the word, but he had opened the door for others. This post-Kantian idealism can be represented, for this study, by Johann Fichte and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

Johann Fichte knew Kant and was profoundly influenced by him and his ideas. Being idealistic, Fichte's philosophy is identified with egoism, for he developed Kant's transcendental theories with highly personal connotations. His writings, especially his earlier ones, when he was still following Kant rather closely, are highly dominated with individualism.

It is the sincerity of my effort, the seriousness of my work, that alone makes or can make the external world a reality to me. And it is my Self and its demands which provide the only possible reason for believing in God.¹³

An example of Fichte's extension of Kant's thinking can be found in his development of the idea concerning man's moral worth as being an inherent quality. Fichte agreed with this concept, making the ego, the self, the factor of highest importance. We are active beings, he said; and we must construct our beliefs in accordance with this active ego. This also indicates, quite clearly, Fichte's position as a post-Kantian idealist.

¹³Henry D. Aiken, The Age of Ideology (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1960), p. 54.

Idealism, on the other hand, is an activist philosophy, which self-consciously makes its own assumptions and refuses to be bound by an external authority, even when it is asserted, impersonally, in the name of Reason itself. Any authoritative reason, so far as the idealist is concerned, must be his reason, and its laws are binding upon him only because they express the demands of his own ego. The rationalist uncritically presupposes an external of things in themselves to which our ideas are supposed to correspond. The idealist refuses to be bound, a priori, by any such presupposition. At the outset, he accepts only the reality of ideas as they are given in experience. If he then asserts the reality of a world beyond his ideas, this must be understood merely as a consequence of what he chooses to make of them.¹⁴

Fichte's views of God as simply the moral order of the universe, offended those who held the traditional concepts of a transcendental God. He lost his teaching position in Jena because of his religious views and his tactless manner of defending them. Fichte's ego idealism, in his later years, became transformed into a patriotic, almost fanatic belief in the German state, and his patriotic fervor was an inspiration to German nationalism. He is one of the few German philosophers who found himself and his ideas involved in practical matters.

A second example of post-Kantian idealism and one of the most influential philosophers of the nineteenth century is Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. He was in accord with

¹⁴Ibid., p. 56.

much that had gone before him; in fact one of Hegel's contributions is in his seeing all philosophical problems in essentially historical terms. His thought built upon the foundations that had been laid by such men as Fichte and Schelling.

Insisting that all reality is, at its source, rational, Hegel saw the task of philosophy to be to study things in order to understand the rational order within them.

Hegel's philosophic system is based on an active, ever developing principle,¹⁵ its dynamic quality coming from its ever-changing process of thesis and antithesis. This core idea states that all advancement is made by a series of contradictions. Every fact and thought has its contradiction; and the resolving of this conflict, which preserves that which is valuable in both the thesis and antithesis, is the synthesis. This synthesis then becomes a new thesis to be faced by another antithesis. Each advance thus contains within itself that which has gone before.

These contradictions on which he bases his philosophy are all part of the rational, scientific process of "becoming." The purpose of the philosopher is to describe and to rethink

¹⁵The discussion of Hegel's thought is drawn from Thilly and Wood's A History of Philosophy and Albert Schweitzer's A Philosophy of Civilization.

these concepts attempting to reach that position where he can grasp the meaning and operation of the universal dynamic process.

Hegel profoundly influenced thought in Germany and throughout the world. The concept of dynamic thought couldn't be ignored; it was picked up, modified, and altered for years by outstanding thinkers.

Another representative German philosopher of this important period was Arthur Schopenhauer. He, too, evolved his philosophy from the ideas of Kant. Basing his theory of philosophy on the importance of the will, he, too, set limitations upon reason; in fact he saw in reason nothing more than a servant of the will. He felt that the will had no value in itself and that in most people it was subservient to their desires.

Schopenhauer, usually classified as a romanticist, stood at the opposite end of the philosophical spectrum from the rationalists.¹⁶

This view of a few of the German philosophers, noting a few of their main ideas, is of value primarily when seen from a perspective that indicates general trends. German philosophy seems to flow from rationalistic thought to

¹⁶Gordon H. Clark clarifies this in his book Thales to Dewey A History of Philosophy.

Kant's criticism of the sufficiency of reason, on to a romantic outlook.

Another significant factor concerning German philosophy, in general needs to be noted. It is reasonable to think that a philosophy reflects a nation, and conversely that a nation will reflect its philosophy, for each nation has its own particular way of embodying its expression of ideas. It is interesting to note, however, that few German philosophers from this outstanding period were involved in a practical or pragmatic application of their ideas. Thinking was kept fairly abstract in Germany, which was not true in France and England, where the effects of Locke, Voltaire, Bacon, Hobbes, and Hume were evidenced in the actions of the country.

Philosophers have cultivated the inner life, and have been satisfied with the limitless freedom of thought. Lack of individual political freedom apparently irked them not at all; 'German philosophy had no martyrs.' Out of touch with external conditions, concerned only with abstractions, German philosophy deserved its reputation for pedantry and heaviness.¹⁷

This statement indicates the independence evidenced by the German philosophers in expressing their ideas.

¹⁷R. B. Mowat, The Romantic Age (London: George G. Harrup and Company, Ltd., 1937) pp. 33-34.

Eighteenth and nineteenth century German thought contributed fundamental concepts that continue to influence philosophic inquiry, and that were used by both Marxists and Nazis in their social and economic theories. But of major interest here is the fact that much of Schweitzer's thinking stemmed from the inquiries of these philosophers. He studied them as a student in Strasbourg, and as he prepared his own thinking. Particularly in his book, Philosophy of Civilization, Schweitzer analyzes the major philosophic figures, criticizing their contributions, and then presenting his own philosophic system. Thus the major trends of philosophy as discussed in this study are apparent in Schweitzer's intellectual make-up.¹⁸

Though Descartes and Schweitzer are not alike in their approach to knowledge, still Schweitzer's respect for the rational approach to the problem of knowledge and the problems of religion recall Descartes' faith in the power of reason. While Schweitzer does not go as far as Descartes in expecting all problems to be answered through rational processes, he does expect rational thought to be the source for man finding his place in the world. Time and again he admonishes mankind to ground its thinking in rational, elemental thought.

¹⁸The major ideas of Schweitzer that are mentioned in the following discussion are developed in more detail in the next chapter.

Since life is the ultimate object of knowledge, our ultimate knowledge is necessarily our thinking experience of life. But this does not lie outside the sphere of reason, but within reason itself. Only when the will has thought out its relation to the intellect, has come, as far as it can, into line with it, has penetrated it, and in it become logical, is it in a position to comprehend itself, so far as its nature allows this, as a part of the universal will-to-live and a part of being in general.¹⁹

Perhaps the most obvious difference between Descartes and Schweitzer lies in their view of scientific progress. From his mechanistic frame of reference, Descartes viewed the progress of civilization as an inevitable evolution toward perfection. Quite the opposite, Schweitzer's view of the world permits no such optimism; and for him, man must look elsewhere than the world for progress.

There are closer ties between Schweitzer and Kant. Kant's religious theories so attracted Albert Schweitzer that upon advice from a professor at Strasbourg he took his Doctoral degree in philosophy with a dissertation upon the religious philosophy of Kant. The dissertation was published under the title, The Religious Philosophy of Kant from 'The Critique of Pure Reason' to 'Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason.' Like Kant, Schweitzer sees limitations to the power of reason, and like Kant he finds the source for man's

¹⁹Albert Schweitzer, Philosophy of Civilization (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), p. 56.

meaning within man himself, there discovering the elemental ethical concept. This is the "will-to-live" concept of Schweitzer's which corresponds, to some degree, to Kant's moral impetus, in that both ideas project man outward to ethical activity in life, but Kant's falls short of the absolute ethic which Schweitzer's attains.

Like Kant and like the post-Kantian idealists, Schweitzer goes beyond reason to find meaning for life and to find a workable view of the world. Never, is reason slighted; rather it is used rigorously as far as it will go. Schweitzer seems to have sifted through the contributions of the philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and then extended his own thinking from them. Frequently in his writings he acknowledges his debt to those major figures, particularly pointing to the eighteenth century thinkers as giants in the world of thought.

No book has been written yet which fully describes their achievements, doing justice to their origin, their character, their number and their significance. We only really comprehend what they accomplished, because we experience the tragic fact that the most valuable part of it is lost to us, while we do not feel in ourselves any ability to reproduce it. They were masters of the facts of life to an extent which we are to-day quite unable to realize.²⁰

²⁰Ibid., p. 175.

Thus these major trends provide a background for understanding Albert Schweitzer.

Theology

In turning to the major theological forces of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, our attention is again first directed to the Reformation as it was at the beginning of the discussion of philosophy. Martin Luther stands as the representative of the stirrings of a new era, because by challenging the authority of the church as the supreme religious authority, he released man to protest against tradition and to think for himself.

In declaring that his doctrine could be refuted only by an appeal to the Bible or on grounds of reason, Luther conceded to human intelligence the right to explain the scriptures, and reason was acknowledged as the supreme judge in all religious controversies. Thus was established in Germany spiritual freedom, or, as it is also called, freedom of thought. Thought became a right, and the decision of reason became legitimate.²¹

While Luther was by no means a rationalist, in that he believed that in certain matters, such as personal salvation, that reason was blind, he did symbolize the general principle of releasing men from the unquestioned authority of the church. He was not the lone hero of this emancipation, but

²¹Heinrich Heine, Religion and Philosophy in Germany (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), p. 50.

was one of the leaders and is taken as symbolic of the spirit of the times. Encouraging man to rely upon the Bible, interpreted by reason, for the source of knowledge, Luther placed a considerable share of the responsibility for religious growth upon the individual. Man was to seek his salvation and his meaning in life not through the church, but through a personal, individual, religious experience. Justification by faith replaced "good works."

As was true in philosophy, theology in Germany breathed in the spirit of the reformation and produced men and ideas of eminence. An examination of the major trends in theology and their outstanding proponents, will provide a background from which to view Schweitzer's theological ideas.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz is a name that easily could have been the first mentioned in the preceding discussion of German philosophy, for he was a major contributor to German philosophic thought.

That Leibniz gave a rebirth to German philosophy as an early and influential follower of the Cartesian school of thinking is held by a number of sources. His system, based on a theory of monads (dynamic units of force), exemplified the beginnings of rationalistic interpretation of the two forces of spirit and mind, as opposed to the

theories of the atomists. Leibniz is discussed here, as a theologian, however, for his theological interpretations so clearly represent the early rationalistic approaches to religion and its forces. As did many persons who were to follow him, Leibniz had a causal explanation for the metaphysical aspects of knowledge. Observing the harmony and order of nature, he felt that a master harmonizer must exist, of necessity. His theological position, thus, was a type of pantheism; and his interpretation of religion is one that found many adherents in Germany.

Leibniz is representative of the tremendous impetus of scholarship in theology that paralleled the surge of intellectual effort in the philosophical world. In the eighteenth and nineteenth century this scholarship resulted particularly in painstaking and sometimes severe criticism of the scriptures.

The historical scholarship in Protestant theology was in keeping with the times when all thought was being subjected to historical criticism and re-evaluation. Many became involved in the search of the scriptures to ascertain their true historic authenticity. Though this study is primarily concerned with German thought, it should be noted that similar scholarship was going on throughout the western world. The intellectual forces were impelling all Protestant

theology to examine the traditional convictions about Jesus. Intensive effort to study the original documents about Jesus mark the period as one of unparalleled scholarship bent on understanding Jesus.

In Germany this scholarship can be divided into several categories such as lower and higher criticism. In this division, lower criticism refers to "the effort to arrive at as close an approximation as possible to the original texts as they had come from the pens of the authors."²² By the term "higher criticism" reference is made to the search for the authors of the texts, the sources of their materials, and the accuracy of their reports of the events of which they wrote. The higher criticism caused a great deal of controversy, for it attacked and often resulted in conclusions directly opposite to traditionally held truths believed by both Catholics and Protestants. A look at certain theologians who represent this type of scholarship will serve to illustrate the era.

One of the first persons to be associated with this scriptural study of the higher criticism was Hermann Samuel Reimarus, whose ideas were largely set forth in two treatises: A Treatise on the Principal Truths of Natural Religion and

²²Kenneth Scott Latourette, The Nineteenth Century in Europe (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 40.

An Apology for the Rational Worshippers of God. Reimarus believed that the scriptures, especially the New Testament narratives, were highly inconsistent. In his work, he came to the conclusion, to which several of the scholars of this time were to come, that religion had evolved from a deliberate fraud. His procedures were those of the scholarship of the day; he subjected the historical evidences of Christianity to minute scrutiny. Reimarus, thus, was one of the first scholars seriously to challenge the Bible miracles and similar Bible "truths" that had long been accepted.

Johann Gottfried Von Herder is considered by many to be the originator of the historical method of literary study during his day. He insisted upon the necessity of studying the documents of Christianity as one would carefully study any other documents, and his feelings can best be summed up by looking at one of his own statements. It characterizes the approach of the time.

The Bible must be read in a human manner for it is a book written by men for men. The best reading of this divine book is human. The more humanly we read the Word of God, the nearer we come to the design of its Author, who created man in His image, and acts humanly in all the deeds and mercies, wherein He manifests Himself as our God.²³

²³George L. Hurst, An Outline of the History of Christian Literature (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926), pp. 446-447.

The concept of the Bible as a human record, made by human beings, became a major tenet of theologians who followed Herder's lead. This clashed with the traditional view of regarding the Bible as holy and divine in nature excepting its contents from criticism or human evaluation. Herder's contribution, then, seems to have been to awaken the theologians of the day to an intensive study and examination of the Bible along historical lines.

One who followed Herder and who utilized his method of study was Johann Gottfried Eichorn. He undertook a comprehensive study which viewed the Old Testament as literature and he also did some work on the New Testament, following the rule of Bible scholarship which had been originally stated by Herder: "The New Testament writings are to be read as human books and tested in human ways."²⁴

The type of criticism which gave certain agreement to older, more traditional lines of thought while still branching out in new criticism is represented by Friedrich Daniel Schleiermacher. His study of the scriptures led him to the conclusion that they should not be considered as the foundation for faith in Christ.

Rather Christ must be presupposed before a peculiar authority can be given to the Scriptures.

²⁴Ibid., p. 450.

The New Testament is the first of a series of presentations of the Christian faith and constitutes the norm for all future presentations of that faith.²⁵

Certain scholars who were to follow Schleiermacher were not as tolerant as he, and they criticized all elements of faith. Such men were Strauss and Renan, who believed that every aspect of the Christian religion, with no exceptions, should be submitted to the most severe tests of historical criticism. They were not concerned with whether a thing "could" have happened, but strictly with whether it "did" happen.

Friedrich Strauss is representative of the new critics of the mid-nineteenth century. In his Life of Jesus, Strauss produced an uncompromising criticism of the traditional concepts concerning Jesus.

He started his criticism with the presumption that alleged supernatural events had never occurred. His object was to disengage from the Gospel narratives, which, according to his tests, appeared largely a collection of myths, the incontrovertible historical Jesus who was born, and lived and died.²⁶

His findings were brutal denunciations of traditional concepts, but they were the result of patient research, and were to find a number of followers. Typical of the kinds of

²⁵Latourette, op. cit., p. 14.

²⁶Mowat, op. cit., p. 168.

criticism which his work called forth upon him is the following statement.

. . . there is practically no attempt to appreciate the character or message of Jesus; the book is without poetry, imagination or religion. It is simply dry reasoning, painful collections and comparison of texts, unsympathetic criticism.²⁷

Thus, Strauss, who had studied under Schleiermacher, accepted the work of his teacher, but went far beyond him in his own work and in his own conclusions. His conclusions concerning the figure of Jesus were radical even for his own day, for although he would admit that there might have been a man called Jesus, he would not accept the concept of Christ as described in the New Testament. The New Testament Christ, according to Strauss, was the result of legends which had evolved over the centuries. It wasn't Christ, then, who founded the church; but rather it was the leaders of the early church who created Christ.

While the findings were, of course, radical, they are indications of the kind of scholarship that was beginning and his work well illustrates the historical-critical method as applied to the New Testament.

Joseph Ernest Renan, a French scholar, is interjected here for two reasons: He is parallel to Strauss in many ways;

²⁷Ibid.

and secondly, Schweitzer treats him extensively in his studies of Jesus. Renan, too, wrote a Life of Jesus and, although his book "shows a determination to sift every detail of the Gospel story and to establish incontrovertible facts of history,"²⁸ it is not as destructive in its findings concerning Jesus as Strauss' study had been. His conclusions made a significant contribution to New Testament scholarship and were of a nature more sympathetic to traditional concepts of Jesus.

Ludwig Feuerbach is often associated with Strauss. In his particular development of a theory of knowledge, he placed a good deal of emphasis upon sensibility as identifiable with truth and reality. That is, factors that are known through the senses are those factors which can be classified as being true, whereas abstract philosophizing, which depends upon reason alone, does not provide truth. The application of this to religion resulted in his negating much of the content in traditional Christianity. For example, he denies the existence of God, for a transcendental God is a being beyond time and space:

. . . this means that He is unknowable in a human sense; and this means nothing other than that He is not, for existence can be ascribed only to what

²⁸Ibid., pp. 173-174.

is perceived. And as with God, so with the after-life.²⁹

This dependence upon sense experience, as the path to truth, is a reflection of some of the important philosophers of the time.

Bruno Bauer is mentioned in this overview of German theologians as illustrative of the most extreme theologians of the period. Because of his radical views, he lost his teaching license. He wrote a good many books, most all of which deal with criticism of the New Testament, and as he progressed, he became more extreme in his conclusions. Historically, Bauer felt that he could find little basis for many of the fundamental beliefs of the New Testament and early Christianity as expounded in the New Testament.

In the end he declared that there never had been an historical Jesus, that even the Gospel of Mark and the so-called Pauline epistles were undependable as accounts of Him and of the beginnings of Christianity, that the genesis of the Christian religion was late in the second century as from a Judaism in which Stoicism had become dominant.³⁰

Although it often resulted in radical and sometimes widely opposed conclusions, this scholarship of the eighteenth and nineteenth century made itself felt the world over. The survey of names in this chapter does not pretend to be

²⁹Jones, op. cit., pp. 105-106.

³⁰Latourette, op. cit., p. 51.

exhaustive, nor does it imply that scholarship was limited to Germany; it does indicate the type of scholarship that was taking place, and it also indicates that Germany was academically outstanding at this particular time.

These theological forces and their representatives influenced and inspired Schweitzer's own theological studies. Often his relationship with the leading figures is that of adverse critic, seeking to refute their conclusions, but this does not negate their value to him. In a very real sense, Schweitzer reflects Martin Luther, the spirit of the Reformation, and the German New Testament criticism.

Luther led the protest against church authority and emphasized the personal nature of religion; Schweitzer represents this Protestant tradition as started by Luther. Schweitzer, insisting upon each man's working out his own salvation with his God, like Luther views religion as a personal religious experience. Also, like Luther, though extending beyond him, Schweitzer urges man to live an independent life, working out his actions through personal, rational introspection, free from the dictates of some higher authority or institution.

Every being who calls himself a man is meant to develop into a real personality within a

reflective theory of the universe which he has created for himself.³¹

Schweitzer's entire life stands as an example of this Protestant tradition. His home life, as the son of a Lutheran pastor, encouraged a personal and reverent development of his religious consciousness. Schweitzer's decision to go to Africa, instead of following a promising academic career, is the outstanding example of his nonconformity and independence from the material world, in order to realize his religious purpose in life. His academic studies, too, led him to conclusions that support the Protestant tradition. Schweitzer stands as an example of the long development of this tradition.

Through his studies Schweitzer entered the realm of New Testament criticism, and his writings received a good deal of recognition. The basic study, his Quest of the Historical Jesus: A Critical Study of its Progress from Remarus to Wrede, follows the same historical method of inquiry that the outstanding men of the period followed. Additional extensive studies by Schweitzer in this area are: The Mystery of the Kingdom of God, Paul and His Interpreters, and The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle. These and other of his writings and lectures have made their impression upon

³¹Schweitzer, op. cit., p. 57.

the world and, in some cases, have stirred up no small amount of controversy.

His methodology in these studies reflects the historical-critical methodology of the typical New Testament criticism of the times. Examining previous studies and various texts, his studies proceed on the basis of exhaustive surveys of the historical background of his subject.

Thus, although Schweitzer's contributions are individual and unique, his ideas and his methodology reflect the age of superior German scholarship.

This chapter has indicated that springing theoretically from the same foundation of Luther's Reformation and the intellectual freedom which it implied, philosophy and theology enjoyed a surge of interest and activity that drastically altered old and traditional ideas. Parallel with the scientific age and its developments, these fields developed methods of inquiry and criticism that called forth remarkable progress. Germany played an impressive role in this intellectual revolution. This was the atmosphere and these were the trends in force when Albert Schweitzer was a student and they are the factors that entered into, and inspired his thinking and contributed to his development. Schweitzer embodies the intense personal piety of the old

Lutheran tradition and the zealous spirit of inquiry that characterized German philosophy and higher New Testament criticism.

With the analysis of both the historical and ideological background factors that impinged upon Albert Schweitzer, it is next necessary to examine him from a biographical standpoint, noting his personality, his family life, and, most important, the evolution of his own ideas. The combination of the historical heritage with the personality and mind of Schweitzer will aid in understanding him as a man and in studying him as a communicator.

CHAPTER III

ALBERT SCHWEITZER - THE MAN

Just as the cultural, historical, and geographical elements bear upon a man and his mode of expression, so do biographical forces such as his family, his early environment, his developing interests, and his basic ideas. These provide additional clues to understanding his speaking. The purpose of this chapter is to present a general picture of Schweitzer the man, noting particularly those factors which seemed to influence his speaking. The chapter does not intend to present a detailed account of Schweitzer's life.

The procedure will be to view his life chronologically, selecting especially such factors that seem to be significant in the development of his character. Following this view of his life, a brief examination will be made of those areas of interest in which Doctor Schweitzer has spent considerable time expressing his ideas through writing and speaking. They will include his work and ideas concerning: (1) the life and meaning of Jesus, (2) the life and meaning of St. Paul, (3) the role of Christianity today, (4) the status of modern civilization, its problems and needs,

(5) the influence of Goethe on Schweitzer, (6) music, and (7) science. The chapter will conclude with an attempt to generalize and to draw together the influences of Schweitzer's biographical factors upon his oral expression.

Albert Schweitzer was born January 14, 1875, at Kayersberg in Upper Alsace. While he was very young, his family moved to Günsbach in the Münster Valley, and it is here that Schweitzer spent his childhood. He has often written with affection of his childhood years in Günsbach.¹ The quiet village, the surrounding hills, the unhurried, pastoral atmosphere have special meaning for him.

Schweitzer's father was the pastor in the village church, which was used by both Catholics and Protestants. Schweitzer's comments in later life indicate the deep impression which the religious life of his family, and the role the church played, made upon his imagination.

But what I loved best was the afternoon service, and of these I hardly ever missed a single one when I was in Günsbach. In the deep and earnest devotion of those services the plain and homely style of my father's preaching showed its real value, and the pain of thinking that the holy day was now drawing to its close gave these services a peculiar solemnity.²

¹In 1930 he had a house built there for his family and the nurses and doctors on their way to and from Lambaréné. Many of Schweitzer's friends have found their way to this home and Schweitzer goes to it when he returns to the continent.

²Albert Schweitzer, Memoirs of Childhood and Youth (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), p. 45.

The reverent and dignified aspects of religion were nurtured in this atmosphere surrounding the church in Günsbach. He suggests this relationship himself.

From the services in which I joined as a child I have taken with me into life a feeling for what is solemn, and a need for quiet and self recollection, without which I cannot realize the meaning of my life.³

Schweitzer traces the influences of his childhood even more precisely when he says:

It is to the afternoon services at Günsbach that I attribute my interest in missions.⁴

Thus, Schweitzer feels that his initial interest in missions, which later led to his spending over forty years in Africa, was encouraged and developed by his religious experiences as a boy.

Schweitzer's youth, his family life, and his boyhood activities reflect a happy, normal childhood. Although he was at first a rather sickly child, he quickly became robust and healthy, a factor that has contributed to his success in many of his undertakings. For example, in his university days, he often pursued several lines of study at once and frequently went with very little or no sleep. His excellent health has permitted him to withstand the rigors of the tropical climate of Lambaréné more satisfactorily than is

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

usual for a Caucasian. Often a white man cannot remain there for more than a year or two, and sometimes a much shorter time, for the climate saps his strength.

It is in Schweitzer's relationships to other children that his attitude of respect for life appears and later it developed into an intrinsic part of his philosophy. He tells of accompanying a friend with homemade slingshots to shoot birds and just as it was time to shoot, the church bells began to ring.

It was the warning bell, which began half an hour before the regular peal-ringing and for me it was a voice from heaven. I shooed the birds away, so that they flew where they were safe from my companion's catapult, and then I fled home.⁵

Schweitzer feels that this incident helped to drive home the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill." It also indicates that Schweitzer's respect for life concerned all life, including animal life.

Another incident concerns a habit of the village boys of following after and jeering at an old Jewish man by the name of Mausche, as he went through town with his donkey cart. Mausche's reaction to this was one of patience "except that he several times turned around and looked at us with an embarrassed but good natured smile."⁶ This left a deep

⁵Ibid., p. 28.

⁶Ibid., p. 8.

impression upon Schweitzer, who reflected on the incident:

From Mausche it was that I first learnt what it means to keep silent under persecution, and he thus gave me a most valuable lesson.⁷

Thereafter Schweitzer made it a point to speak politely to the man and to walk along with him.

Another incident illustrates Schweitzer's awakening consciousness of the needs of others and his relationship to that need. One day he became engaged in good natured wrestling bout with a schoolmate. Although the other boy was larger than Schweitzer, Schweitzer got him down, whereupon the boy shouted to him, "Yes, if I got broth to eat twice a week as you do, I should be as strong as you are!"⁸ This incident burned its way into Schweitzer, and afterwards he aggressively strove to be like the village boys. He refused to wear an overcoat made for him because other boys did not have one. In order not to appear superior to the other boys, he caused more than one row in his family by stubbornly refusing to accept the comforts of life that his home was able to give him.

Albert Schweitzer attended the village school from 1880 to 1884. In 1885, he moved in with an aunt and uncle in Mülhausen, in order to attend the Gymnasium there. The

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid., p. 9.

atmosphere of this house was kindly but stern. Schweitzer was a dreamy scholar at best until he came under the influence of a teacher, Dr. Wehmann, whose scholarship, discipline, and class preparation inspired Schweitzer to become a more conscientious student.

That a deep sense of duty, manifested in even the smallest matters is the greatest educative influence and that it accomplishes what no exhortations and no punishments can, has thanks to him, become with me a firm conviction, a conviction the truth of which I have ever tried to prove in practice in all that I have had to do as an educator.⁹

Albert Schweitzer passed his examination at Mülhausen in June of 1893 with little outstanding success except in history, his favorite subject.

In October, 1893, Schweitzer entered Strasbourg University. He has nothing but the highest praise for this university. The high calibre of teaching impressed him and made him critical later of the Sorbonne, where he did not find the same enthusiasm for seeking out truth. At Strasbourg his main fields of inquiry were theology and philosophy and he also fulfilled his military service obligations during these years. His curiosity was spurred at this time in regard to inconsistencies which he saw in the traditional concepts of Jesus's attitude toward his messiahship. This

⁹Ibid., pp. 39-40.

interest was of major importance to him, and during his student years at Strasbourg he indulged in a good bit of independent study on the synoptic question and Jesus' life. This was to culminate later in his controversial studies regarding the life of Jesus.

In these Strasbourg years he received formal education in philosophy, theology, musical theory, and the organ. His organ teacher was Ernest Münch, the brother of his Mülhausen teacher. In 1898, Schweitzer passed his first theological examination. It is of interest to note that at this time he was living in the same house that Goethe had lived in while he was a student at Strasbourg. After receiving a scholarship as a result of his theological examination, Schweitzer determined to undertake a dissertation for his Doctor of Philosophy degree. In 1898, he studied philosophy at the Sorbonne; studied the organ with the renowned Charles Marie Widor as well as with Marie Jaell-Trautmann; studied piano with J. Philipp; and studied for and wrote his doctorate thesis, which dealt with the religious philosophy of Kant. (The Religious Philosophy of Kant from the "Critique of Pure Reason" to "Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason")

Similar tests of endurance were to be made of Schweitzer's strength and energy, time and again, for during

many years he was involved in strenuous activity in several areas at one time. In the summer of 1899 he was back in Berlin continuing his studies in philosophy, theology, and music; and in July he completed his degree in philosophy and set about to complete his theological licentiate.

It is significant for our purposes to note that he decided against the suggestion to continue solely in philosophy and that he returned, instead, to theology. He felt that people might not be willing for him to preach if he continued only in philosophy, and preaching was all-important to him.

But to me preaching was a necessity of my being. I felt it as something wonderful that I was allowed to address a congregation every Sunday about the deepest questions of life.¹⁰

Dr. Schweitzer started to preach in 1899 when he obtained the post of deacon at the St. Nicholas Church. Later, after passing his second theological examination, he became curate of that church. He received his licentiate degree in theology on July 21, 1900. While associated with St. Nicholas, Schweitzer's specific responsibilities were the afternoon services, the children's services, and the Confirmation class.

The activities thus allotted to me were a constant source of joy. At the afternoon service with only a small group of worshipers present I could use the intimate style of preaching which I had inherited

¹⁰Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1933), p. 25.

from my father and express myself better than I could at the morning service. Even today I am never quite free from shyness before a large audience.¹¹

The method of sermon preparation employed by Dr. Schweitzer, whenever he was called up to preach in the morning service, indicates painstaking care which is representative of his preparation for oral expression throughout his life.

I used to write my sermons out in full, often making two or three drafts before beginning the fair copy. When delivering the sermons, however, I did not tie myself to this outline which I had carefully learned by heart, but often gave the discourse in quite a different form.¹²

In 1902 Schweitzer became a lecturer at Strasbourg. He continued his interest in the life of Jesus during these years, and in 1906 the first edition of the highly controversial The Quest of the Historical Jesus from Reimarus to Wrede was published. In 1905 Schweitzer's definitive biography of Bach was published and in 1906 his important essay on organ building, which had a far reaching effect, was brought out. Here again is Schweitzer's extraordinary energy being pushed to the uttermost as he led a life that produced major contributions in several areas at once.

¹¹Ibid., p. 26.

¹²Ibid., p. 26.

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This period of intense intellectual and cultural activity marks that time when Schweitzer made his decision to turn his back on his intellectual pursuits in order to pledge himself to a life which was the complete antithesis of his first thirty years. On October 13, 1905, he mailed letters to friends and relatives announcing his decision to become a medical student so as eventually to go to Equatorial Africa as a doctor. Upon first view, the decision seems startling and radical; upon closer scrutiny, however, it seems natural, almost inevitable. Albert Schweitzer's unusual, vigorous health has already been noted; his concern for others has been indicated; his sensitivity to all life about him has been pointed out. These factors did not escape the conscious realization of Schweitzer himself.

The thought that I had been granted such a specially happy youth was ever in my mind; I felt it even as something oppressive, and ever more clearly there presented itself to me the question whether this happiness was a thing that I might accept as a matter of course. Here, then, was the second great experience of my life, viz. this question about the right to happiness. As an experience it joined itself to that other one which had accompanied me from my childhood up; I mean my deep sympathy with the pain which prevails in the world around us. These two experiences slowly melted into one another, and thence came definiteness as to my interpretation of life as a whole, and a decision as to the future of my own life in particular.¹³

¹³Schweitzer, Memoirs of Childhood and Youth, pp. 60-61.

At twenty-one while a student in Strasbourg, Schweitzer made the decision to dedicate the first thirty years of his life to intellectual pursuits.

If by that time I should have done what I hoped in science and music, I would take a path of immediate service as man to my fellowman.¹⁴

During his student years, Schweitzer explored several avenues of possible service and though he tried his hand at various kinds of social work, none seemed to be satisfactory. In 1904 he casually noted a copy of the Paris Missionary Society magazine containing an article on "The Needs of the Congo Mission" and immediately after reading it, the matter seemed closed and settled. He determined to go to Africa. As might well have been expected, friends tried to dissuade him from his decision, for to those who knew and respected him, it looked as if a talented intellectual was throwing everything to the winds. He relates that to his friends he was "a precocious young man, not quite right in his head, and treated me correspondingly with affectionate mockery."¹⁵

The decision was final, and from 1905 to 1912 Albert Schweitzer pursued medical studies at Strasbourg. Again, he pushed his endurance to the utmost, continuing to deliver

¹⁴Ibid., p. 61.

¹⁵Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 90.

his theological lectures and preaching nearly every Sunday. During these years he also continued his connection with the Paris Bach Society, playing the organ parts in all of the society's concerts, necessitating a number of trips to Paris each year. He increased his concert work at this time as it provided a needed source of income. After his examinations and while doing his required year of practical work, he wrote his Psychiatric Study of Jesus for the thesis required for completion of his medical doctorate. In June of 1912 Schweitzer married Helen Bresslau, who had taken up nursing in order to be a help to him in Africa. That spring he studied tropical medicine in Paris and began the practical preparations for his sojourn to Africa.

In order to get permission from the Paris Missionary Society to establish his hospital, Dr. Schweitzer had to promise not to preach and to confine his activities to healing the sick.

The majority assured me that my theological standpoint made them hesitate for two chief reasons: I might be tempted to confuse the missionaries out there with my learning, and I might wish to be active again as a preacher.¹⁶

Given the deep satisfaction to be derived from preaching, this marked a real sacrifice.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 115.

Finally all preparations were completed; and on Good Friday of 1913 Dr. Schweitzer and his wife left Günsbach for Lambaréné. Fortunately, after being in Africa a short time, the other missionaries released him from his promise not to preach. It had been made clear to them, by Dr. Schweitzer's actions, that he had no intention of preaching any radical doctrine. He responded eagerly to the release from this promise.

I found preaching a great joy. It seemed to me a glorious thing to be allowed to preach the sayings of Jesus and Paul to people to whom they were quite new.¹⁷

It is with the Dr. Schweitzer of Lambaréné that most of the world is familiar. Though he returned to the continent often and made many lecture and concert trips to European countries, England, and the United States, it is with Africa that he is hereafter identified. Just two years after the Schweitzers' arrival in Africa, war broke out in Europe; and they were told that they were prisoners of war and were forbidden to continue their work at the hospital. During this enforced leisure Schweitzer worked on one of his important books, The Philosophy of Civilization. In the fall of 1917 Schweitzer and his wife were ordered to a prisoner of war camp in the Pyrenees. Here the European

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 143-144.

intellectual, the African medical missionary, led a strange life. At first he was forbidden to practice his medicine; but as he was the only doctor interned, this restriction was lifted.

Thus I was once more a doctor. What leisure time I had left I gave to the Philosophy of Civilization (I was then drafting the chapters on the civilized state), and practicing the organ on the table and floor.¹⁸

The Schweitzer's were transferred to another camp at St. Remy and then included in a group of exchange prisoners and were able to return to Strasbourg. Here he underwent two operations in the next several years for disabilities caused by the physical strain of his work in Africa. He worked on the Philosophy of Civilization, was employed as a doctor at the municipal hospital in Strasbourg, and was once more made curate at St. Nicholas. In 1921, resolving "to depend in the future for my living on my pen and my organ playing,"¹⁹ Dr. Schweitzer resigned his posts in Strasbourg and returned to Günsbach.

In February of 1924, Schweitzer was able to return to Lambarene, this time without his wife, who was in poor health. His absence of seven years had taken their toll,

¹⁸Ibid., p. 169.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 195.

and his hospital needed to be completely rebuilt. The growing demands upon the hospital caused Schweitzer later to decide to build the hospital yet again, further up the river; and he undertook the supervision of this job himself. The work was so demanding that Schweitzer had practically no time for intellectual pursuits such as the Mysticism of St. Paul, upon which he was working.

The years 1927 to 1937 saw Schweitzer alternately at Lambaréné, in England, and on the continent. From 1927 to 1929, for instance, he was in Europe giving lectures and organ recitals. In December, 1929, he returned to Lambaréné, as did his wife, remaining there until 1932. That year was filled with lectures and concerts on the continent and in England, including the Goethe Memorial oration. This major address was delivered on March 22 upon invitation from the city of Frankfurt; they were celebrating the one hundredth anniversary of Goethe's death. Returning to Lambaréné in March of 1932, Schweitzer remained there barely a year, traveling back to Europe in February, 1934, and for one year he lectured extensively, especially in England and Switzerland. February to November in 1935 were spent in Lambaréné, then he returned to give more lectures and organ recitals in Europe. After his return to Lambaréné in January, 1937,

World War II seemed to be threatening. Dr. Schweitzer began to accumulate substantial stocks of supplies foreseeing the possibility of the European supply sources being cut off. Prior to the war, Madam Schweitzer made two lecture tours in America in order to raise funds and develop friends for the hospital's support; during the war both Dr. and Mrs. Schweitzer remained at Lambaréné.

After ten years in Lambaréné, Schweitzer returned to Gunsbach in 1948 for a much needed rest and then traveled to the United States to speak at the Goethe Bicentennial in Colorado in 1949. In November, 1949, he returned again to Lambaréné remaining there for two years. There were more brief visits to Europe in 1951 and 1952. Although he was announced as recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize of 1952, he couldn't get away from his work at the hospital to receive it and to deliver the required address until 1954, after which, in December, he returned to Lambaréné. At the present time he is in Lambaréné; his wife's ashes are buried there; and from all indications Dr. Schweitzer may remain there the rest of his life.

In this preceding chronological survey of Schweitzer's life, the major areas of interest in his life have made themselves apparent. These interests are of concern for this study because they have molded the thinking of Dr. Schweitzer

and have been found in his consequent written and oral works. These basic elements of his intellectual activity may be set forth as: (1) the life and meaning of Jesus, (2) the life and meaning of St. Paul, (3) the role of Christianity today, (4) the status of modern civilization, its problems and needs, (5) the influence of Goethe on Schweitzer, (6) music and (7) science. From each of these interest areas intellectual activity fuses with the seemingly paradoxical physical activity in the jungle hospital, and together they make up the stature of Albert Schweitzer, the man.

The Life and Meaning of Jesus

Incidents of Schweitzer's life and many of his publications indicate that, in a sense, his life has been a continual endeavor to understand the life of Jesus and how it affects the present age. This interest led by an inherent curiosity and nurtured by a deep sense of religious consciousness joined with scholarship of the highest order, has resulted in major and controversial works. An illustration from his childhood will indicate the early stirrings of this absorbing interest.

When I was eight my father, at my own request, gave me a New Testament, which I read eagerly. Among the stories which interested me most was that of the Three Wise Men from the East. What did the parents of Jesus do, I asked myself, with the gold and other valuables which they got from

these men? How could they have been poor after that? And that the Wise Men should never have troubled themselves again about the Child Jesus was to me incomprehensible. The absence, too, of any record of the shepherds of Bethlehem becoming disciples, gave me a severe shock.²⁰

Schweitzer's general reverence for life and his deep respect for the role of religion in his life have been noted. As he progressed in his education, his capable mind developed and he became an exacting scholar. With his inquiring mind, his inherent sense of religion and with his rigorously developed intellect, it seems almost inevitable that much effort would be applied eventually to religious problems.

In his early university days at Strasbourg, Schweitzer fulfilled his required year of military service. When he went on military maneuvers in the fall of 1894, he took with him his Greek New Testament to study during whatever spare time he might find. During this particular time, his attention was directed to the tenth and eleventh chapters of Matthew, in which Jesus sent his disciples out into the villages to proclaim the coming of the Kingdom of God. In his instructions, Jesus forewarned the disciples that the appearance of the Son of Man would occur before they would have completed their mission. Historical knowledge indicates

²⁰Albert Schweitzer, Memoirs of Childhood and Youth, p. 14.

that this prophecy was not fulfilled. Schweitzer turned this curious phenomenon over in his mind. This and other enigmatic actions of Jesus in the synoptic gospels caused Schweitzer to search out a hypothesis that would suggest a new interpretation of the life of Jesus. Thus was Schweitzer launched into a study which was to produce a number of major contributions to the field of New Testament theology.

During my remaining years at the university I occupied myself, often to the neglect of my other subjects, with independent research into the Synoptic question and the problems of the life of Jesus, coming ever more and more confidently to the conviction that the key to the puzzles that are awaiting solution is to be looked for in the explanation of the words of Jesus when He sent out the disciples on their mission, in the question sent by the Baptist from his prison, and further in the way Jesus acts on the return of the disciples.²¹

In preparing to take his first theological examination in 1907, Schweitzer returned to this problem of the Gospels and the life of Jesus, for each candidate for the degree had to write on the thesis: "Schleiermacher's teaching about the Last Supper compared with the conceptions of it embodied in the New Testament and the Confessions of faith drawn up by the Reformers." His research and contemplation concerning this topic led Schweitzer to dissatisfaction with the current interpretations of the meaning of the last

²¹Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 9.

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supper ceremony. He was particularly disturbed with the concept of the last supper as a symbolic ceremony to be repeated, as it has come down to modern Christianity. He was concerned as to when and how this view got started. Because the two oldest Gospels (Matthew and Mark) did not record Jesus's giving the command for repeating the meal, Schweitzer reasoned that it was done on the initiative of the early church. He felt they were twisting the sayings of Jesus to make them conform to their way of thinking.

But since no explanation of the Last Supper which has been current hitherto makes it intelligible, how it could be so adopted in the primitive community without a command from Jesus to that effect, they all alike, so I had to conclude, leave the problem unsolved. Hence I went on to investigate the question whether the significance which the meal had for Jesus and His disciples were not connected with the expectation of the Messianic feast to be celebrated in the Kingdom of God, which was to appear immediately.²² [sic]

These questions which Schweitzer was raising concerning the life of Jesus, and the inconsistencies which he noted between the accepted current beliefs and the historical incidents as recorded in the New Testament text point to the approach and resultant explanations at which he arrived. His approach was to be a rigorously historical one in which the life of Jesus was viewed and interpreted in its historical context, and his resulting explanations

²² Ibid., p. 14.

were based on the Jewish eschatological milieu in which Jesus moved and lived.

When Schweitzer returned to his studies in theology after completing his degree in Philosophy, he immediately tackled the problems again. In 1900 he received his Licentiate degree in theology with the study, "The Problem of the Last Supper, a study based on the scientific research of the nineteenth century and the historical accounts." This was followed by a second study in 1902, "The Secret of the Messiahship and Passion. A Sketch of the Life of Jesus." He lectured in this area consistently; and a third publication was proposed, but it never got beyond the lecture manuscript stage. It was to be called, "History of the Last Supper and Baptism in the Early Christian Period." Efforts on the Bach biography and medical studies prevented turning it into book form. Though each of these studies represented substantial contributions in the area, they did not receive the acclaim and criticism of his formidable study appearing in 1906, The Quest of the Historical Jesus. A Critical Study of its Progress from Reimarus to Wrede. A final study concerning Jesus was written in 1913 to fulfill the requirement of the thesis in order to receive his medical doctorate. It was a study made to refute three medical writers who had undertaken a psychiatric interpretation of Jesus. His study

was titled, The Psychiatric Study of Jesus.

As was indicated in the first chapter, Schweitzer falls quite naturally into the German intellectual surge of activity in philosophy and theology in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. He has high praise for the nature and the efforts of this activity.

But it is impossible to over-estimate the value of what German research upon the Life of Jesus has accomplished. It is a uniquely great expression of sincerity, one of the most significant events in the whole mental and spiritual life of humanity.²³

In his studies on the life of Jesus, Schweitzer made a thorough survey and analysis of this work done by other New Testament scholars. Progressing from a comprehensive history of what had been done previously, is an approach used by Schweitzer in several of his major studies. His work on the life of Jesus refuted the rationalistic and modern historical views of Jesus and set forth his own findings. For purposes of this study, it is important to be aware of the general conclusions developed by Schweitzer concerning Jesus. The significance lies in their reflection of Schweitzer, the man, for they are a major area of both intellectual and personal interest for him, thus making up an integral part of his life.

²³Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), p. 399.

Schweitzer's autobiography and his book The Quest of the Historical Jesus, present his method and findings in his study of Jesus. In noting certain inconsistencies between the scripture texts and the traditionally held beliefs, Schweitzer records that he was led to seek out a view of Jesus from the vantage point of the historical-religious context of the times in which Jesus lived. Accepting Matthew and Mark as the two oldest and historically most accurate Gospels, Schweitzer concluded that this eschatological concept was the religious milieu and the motivating factor in Jesus' life. He believed that Jesus was looking for and expected an immediate realization of the Kingdom of God. From Jesus' warnings and preachings came what Schweitzer referred to as "interim-ethics." The basic context of these interim-ethics rested on the ethical concept of love, which was to be followed until the coming of the Kingdom of God which Jesus expected soon.

In the case of the two older Synoptists, however, it is not at all a question of the proclamation of the new morality of the Kingdom of God, where serving is ruling; rather it is a question of the significance of humility and service in expectation of the Kingdom of God. Service is the fundamental law of interim-ethics.²⁴

²⁴Albert Schweitzer, The Mystery of the Kingdom of God, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), pp. 40-41.

Schweitzer feels that Jesus erred, when, with certain predictions, he sent his disciples out to preach for the first time. Jesus warned his disciples that they would have to undergo severe persecutions while on this mission, and he further prophesied that the Son of Man would appear before they had completed their mission. When these phenomena did not occur, Jesus saw the need for taking upon himself the task of forcing the eschatological incidence, that is, to force his death and the resulting Messiahship.

But Jesus must somehow drag or force the eschatological events into the framework of the actual occurrences.²⁵

Thus, Schweitzer continues, Jesus walked deliberately to his death, taking upon himself the suffering for the many that he had previously thought his disciples must suffer with him. He went to Jerusalem, provoked attack by the Sanhedrin, and admitted to his being the Messiah, thus validating the charge of blasphemy. Jesus, he believed, did not simply conform to literal acts, but caused them to happen thus rising above his time and the world. Schweitzer's paragraph explaining this sacrifice of Jesus is often quoted. It not only vividly depicts his conclusion as to the meaning of the crucifixion, but it provides an outstanding example,

²⁵Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, p. 376.

for this study, of Schweitzer's use of metaphor and imagery.

There is silence all around. The Baptist appears, and cries: "Repent, for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand." Soon after that comes Jesus, and in the knowledge that He is the coming Son of Man lays hold of the wheel of the world to set it moving on that last revolution which is to bring all ordinary history to a close. It refuses to turn, and He throws Himself upon it. Then it does turn: and crushes Him. Instead of bringing in the eschatological conditions, He has destroyed them. The wheel rolls onward, and the mangled body of the one immeasurably great Man who was strong enough to think of Himself as the spiritual ruler of mankind and to bend history to His purpose is hanging upon it still. This is his victory and His reign.²⁶

In seeking out the Jesus that is historically accurate from the scripture texts. Schweitzer threw off long-held, traditional concepts. His conclusions presented Jesus as a man, superhuman, but still a man. Schweitzer's approach placed Jesus' activities and their initial meaning within the historical context of Jesus' own times. Further, Schweitzer's view acknowledged Jesus as capable of error. By Schweitzer's emphasizing the eschatological influence upon all of Jesus' life and acts, Jesus was removed from modern day meaningfulness for many. Schweitzer did not agree with this, feeling that his approach had released Jesus from the artificial context in which modern theology had placed him and had returned him to his own age. Schweitzer

²⁶Ibid., pp. 370-371.

determined that Jesus then rose above his own historic period and released a spirit that is available for all time. For Schweitzer, then, Jesus is more meaningful by our viewing him more accurately.

Jesus means something to our world because a mighty spiritual force streams forth from Him and flows through our time also. This fact can neither be shaken nor confirmed by any historical discovery. It is the solid foundation of Christianity.²⁷

But the truth is, it is not Jesus as historically known, but Jesus as spiritually arisen within men, who is significant for our time and can help it. Not the historical Jesus, but the spirit which goes forth from Him and in the spirits of men strives for new influence and rule, is that which overcomes the world.²⁸

Viewing Jesus from a completely eschatological vantage point, Schweitzer gave new interpretations to traditionally held concepts concerning the life of Jesus, including his Messiah consciousness; the Kingdom of God; the meaning of the parables; the significance of the last supper; and the process of the passion. Schweitzer's findings are highly controversial, but they have formed a very integral part of his life. For example, as was noted earlier, Schweitzer's study of Jesus and his resulting reverence for the ideas of Jesus influenced his decision to serve the

²⁷Ibid., p. 399.

²⁸Ibid., p. 401.

natives in Africa. Dr. Schweitzer's views on Jesus are also reflected in the parallel between Jesus' world negation and world affirmation concepts and Schweitzer's world affirmation and negation, a basic plank in his own philosophical system. Thoughts, conclusions, and their applications which evolved from Schweitzer's study of Jesus, are to be found throughout his writings, his lectures, and certain major addresses.

The Life and Meaning of St. Paul

The concept of viewing the Jewish life view following the death of Jesus from an historical eschatological vantage point was used again by Dr. Schweitzer in two books concerning St. Paul: Paul and His Interpreters, published in 1911, and The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle, published in 1930. Schweitzer intended his studies of Paul to form companion studies to his Quest of the Historical Jesus. The results and understanding which he gained from his studies of Jesus and the peculiar nature of the times in which he lived, served to throw light on the life and writings of Paul. The two books on Paul constitute a massive contribution to the area of New Testament theology and Pauline inquiry. Proceeding in the same method which he had followed in his study of Jesus, Schweitzer explained his original thoughts only after a thorough and comprehensive analysis of previous

work done in the field. In Paul and His Interpreters he referred to over one hundred and fifty other studies. The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle follows the same method of development.

The number of years separating the two Pauline books was caused by other demands upon his time such as several sojourns in Africa and pressing studies in other areas. However, the two studies make up one comprehensive work and both flow quite naturally and immediately from his study of the life of Jesus.

Immediately after completing the Quest of the Historical Jesus, I had gone on to study the teaching of St. Paul. From the very beginning I had been left unsatisfied by the explanations of it given by scientific theology, because they represented it as something complicated and loaded with contradictions, on account of it which seemed irreconcilable with the originality and greatness of the thought revealed in it. And this view became thoroughly questionable to me from the time when I became convinced that the preaching of Jesus was entirely determined by the expectation of the end of the world and the supernatural advent of the Kingdom of God. So now, I was faced by the question, which for preceding investigators had not come into sight, whether the thought world of St. Paul as well was not rooted entirely in eschatology.²⁹

Schweitzer found this same approach to be valid. He discovered the answers to the Pauline riddles by a

²⁹Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, pp. 118-119.

thorough-going eschatological approach. For example, Schweitzer determined that whereas Jesus' eschatology was based on the concept of an immediate coming of the Kingdom of God. Paul's eschatology suited his own age and was a little different. Schweitzer then continued to interpret Paul from this vantage point in the following manner: According to Paul, the Messianic kingdom had commenced with the death of Jesus. Paul's time, then, was in an interim or temporary period also. His interim period, however, was between the death and resurrection of Jesus and the Parousia. Paul's ethics, the religion we find in the epistles, and his actions all stem from his belief in his eschatological world view.

Through the eschatological view, the inconsistencies in Paul's Christianity seem to be resolved; and Paul's thought emerges as a product of its time though it is original thinking on the part of the extraordinary apostle.

. . . endeavoring to understand the doctrine of the Apostle of the Gentiles entirely on the basis of Jewish primitive Christianity. That implies in the first place, that the Pauline eschatology must be maintained in its full compass, as required by the utterances of the letters.³⁰

³⁰Albert Schweitzer, Paul and His Interpreters (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956), p. 240.

Schweitzer viewed Paul within the unique, early Christian setting and determined that Paul's ethics, his mysticism, his concept of freedom from the law, his expressed need to spread the gospel to the elect among the Gentiles, all can be more clearly understood only within this unique setting. This is summarized in a paragraph from The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle.

Paul is the only man of Primitive-Christian times whom we really know, and he is a man of profound and admirable humanity.

Although he lives in the expectation of the imminent end of the world, an expectation in view of which all earthly things lose their significance and value, he does not in consequence become an ascetic zealot. For the external abandonment of the things of the world he substitutes an inner freedom from them. As though he had an intuition that it might be the fate of Christianity to have to make terms with the continuance of the natural world, he reaches by his spirituality that attitude towards earthly things by means of which Christianity must henceforth maintain its place in the world. Though living and thinking in his own day, he is at the same time preparing the future.³¹

Schweitzer continues by setting forth the implications of the eschatological view of the present day, saying that contrary to some nineteenth century criticism Paul's religion, then, does stem from the concepts preached

³¹Albert Schweitzer, The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle, trans. William Montgomery (New York: the Macmillan Company, 1956), p. 332.

by Christ. The differences, Schweitzer feels, arise in that Paul's age was different from Jesus' in its eschatological outlook. Our own present day, in turn, views it even differently, for our eschatological concepts are now weakened to the point that they refer to a vague and gradual ethical evolution toward a Kingdom of God. Schweitzer is saying, then, that each age has its own motivating religious milieu, but the spirit and universal concepts remain the same for each and every age.

By his eschatological mysticism Paul gives his ethic a relation to the Person of Christ, and makes the conception of the Spirit an ethical conception. By his eschatological thought he grasps ethics as life in the Spirit of Christ, and thereby creates a Christian ethic valid for all time to come.³²

According to Schweitzer's study, Paul, believing in the death and resurrection of Jesus, looked for the end of the Messianic period which he believed had started with the resurrection of Jesus. He, like Jesus, built his concepts on the unique character of his own age. For Paul, then, the day by day activities of Jesus would not be important factors on which to dwell. Because the arrival of the Kingdom of God is not a literal fact as yet, modern day theology puts a great deal more importance on the physical acts of Jesus and on interpreting his words as being

³²Ibid., p. 333.

directed to the eventual realization of the Kingdom, not the immediate one that was part of the eschatological context of Jesus' time. For Schweitzer, this is a misinterpretation. He explains that, with the progress of history, when the Kingdom of God had not become a literal historical fact, the concept of the Kingdom of God has had to undergo further development. It has become an eventuality to be arrived at as a result of a slow progression and victory of ethical life. It is not necessary, however, to force Jesus or Paul into believing this modern view.

Schweitzer maintains that Paul, as a representative of the highest religious thinking of his time, achieves this greatness by being allowed to remain in the milieu of his own lifetime and that the spiritual greatness which emanates from his teachings is for all time. The greatness of Paul lies in the example he holds out for us; he lay hold of the spirit of Jesus and created a powerful ethic for his age based on Jesus' ethic.

Three things make up the power of Paul's thought. There belong to it a depth and reality, which lay their spell upon us; the ardour of the early days of the Christian faith kindles our own; a direct experience of Christ as the Lord of the Kingdom of God speaks from it, exciting us to follow the same path.³³

³³Ibid., p. 396.

Schweitzer's writings indicate that he admires Paul as a rational man of deep spiritual insight. He finds his writings logical and closely knit when viewed in their proper setting; and in his study, Schweitzer indicates the power of Paul's example for modern times.

Having a personality at once simple and profound, he avoids the abstract and unnatural idea of perfection, and makes perfection consist in the complete adjustment of spiritual with natural reality. So long as the earthly world with all its circumstances still subsists what we have to do is so to live in the spirit of unworldliness that truth and peace already make their influence felt in it. That is the ideal of Paul's ethic, to live with the eyes fixed upon eternity, while standing firmly upon the solid ground of reality.³⁴

In this preceding paragraph will be recognized the same world negation and world affirmation mentioned earlier in the chapter in connection with the life of Jesus. As we stated then, it is a principle that Schweitzer continues and delineates in his own philosophical system.

George Seaver sees Schweitzer's work on St. Paul as a greater work than that of the Quest of the Historical Jesus. He feels that it

represents the fullness of Schweitzer's intellectual powers as a New Testament scholar at their maturity, co-extensive with his experience as a labourer in the vineyard of Christ.³⁵

³⁴Ibid., p. 333.

³⁵George Seaver, Albert Schweitzer: The Man and His Mind (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 253.

As Seaver further indicates, the study of Paul covers a period of many years and illustrates Schweitzer's scholarship at its best, thus providing a substantial portion of Schweitzer's thinking and his personality.

The Role of Christianity Today

The scrutiny which Schweitzer made of the lives of Jesus and Paul provided also enlightening contributions to the understanding of early Christianity. In view of his findings, Schweitzer then provided pertinent criticism of modern day Christianity. Because of our present day misinterpretations of Jesus and early Christianity, Schweitzer found present day Christianity substantially weak and unable to meet the tests of the times. As was to be expected, his findings drew criticism from many sources. To some observers it seemed as if he had taken the very core out of Christian belief by his studies concerning New Testament figures.

The satisfaction which I could not help feeling at having solved so many historical riddles about the existence of Jesus, was accompanied by the painful consciousness that this new knowledge in the realm of history would mean unrest and difficulty for Christian piety. I comforted myself, however, with words of St. Paul's which had been familiar to me from childhood: "We can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth." Since the essential nature of the spiritual is truth, every new truth means ultimately something won.³⁶

³⁶Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 51.

This gain in truth mentioned by Schweitzer lay in his thought that Christianity remained, in essence, the same from era to era, but also varied from era to era in its form. Schweitzer indicated this by showing how the religion of Jesus conformed to the conditions of his time as Paul's religion conformed to his age. Christianity's present difficulties then, are caused by not viewing Jesus historically and by not grasping that which could be univervally accepted from Jesus for all ages. Also, Schweitzer felt that errors had crept in by accepting all of the books of the New Testament as being accurate, apostolic recordings. He indicated that some of them were constructed by the early church, under the name of an apostle, in order to lend authority to their particular views. Rather than looking upon his work in these areas as destructive, however, Schweitzer viewed it as a needed, constructive contribution.

Because, while I was busied with the history of earlier Christianity, I had so often to deal with the results of its sins against the truth in history, I have become a deep worker for honesty in our Christianity today.³⁷

Schweitzer concludes that because of its errors, Christianity has weakened and impoverished itself since the death of Jesus, and he continues his criticism along the following lines: With the loss of the intensity and

³⁷Ibid., pp. 52-53.

immediacy in the concept of the Kingdom of God, as it was in Jesus' time, Jesus' ethics, directed toward that Kingdom lost their vitality for today. Schweitzer would have Christianity redominated by the Kingdom of God. It must undergo changes, for we do not, as Jesus and Paul did, expect to see an immediate realization of the Kingdom through supernatural phenomenon. But we do need to have at the core of our belief the conviction that the Kingdom of God will come into being and that it will do so by the working of the spirit of Jesus within the hearts of men. This then, for Schweitzer, becomes the significance of Jesus in Christianity today.

Christianity, on the other hand, lives by the glowing hope of a better world. Redemption, according to the Christian conception, is the action of God, who brings this better world, the Kingdom of God, into existence and receives into it those men who have proved themselves to be of an honest and good heart.³⁸

This "glowing hope" can be realized, says Schweitzer, only with the aid of the Spirit of Jesus and he states that the historical Jesus provides for present day Christianity a sound and active ethical basis from which comes a power that it has failed to grasp. In Jesus we find a world negation in that his preaching emphasized man's need to rise above

³⁸ Albert Schweitzer, Christianity and the Religions of the World, trans. Johanna Powers (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1923), pp. 23-24.

and separate himself from the world. Living in the expectation of the end of the world, he advocated separating oneself from the ways of the world. The new order of the Kingdom of God was to reverse completely the temporal, earthly order and that the present world values would no longer count. This is vividly illustrated in the reversal of values suggested in the Beatitudes. At the same time, however, the ethics of Jesus advocated a world affirmation, for the key to the behavior of those who would enter the Kingdom of God is service to others through love. Thus, although you rise above and reject the world and are not subject to it, still you serve it and are active in it. The combination of world resignation and world affirmation constitutes the uniqueness and the greatness of Christianity, for these are factors of pessimism and optimism operating at the same time. This makes Christianity unique from other religions, for they are either optimistic or pessimistic -- world negating or world affirming -- not both.

To arrive at this conclusion, Schweitzer referred to other religions, which he analyzed later in greater detail in his study, Indian Thought and Its Development. In Dr. Schweitzer's Selly Oak Lectures, "Christianity and the Religions of the World," he made a brief comparison between Christianity and Hinduism, Brahmanism, and Buddhism. Though

not of the depth of his later studies of various religions, still, these two lectures present the comparison sufficiently to indicate that Christianity is unique in its combination of world-affirmation and world-negation.

The Brahmins and Buddha say to man: "As one who has died and to whom nothing in the natural world is of interest any longer, you should live in the world of pure spirituality." The gospel of Jesus tells him: "You must become free from the world and from yourself, in order to work in the world as an instrument of God."³⁹

Dr. Schweitzer develops his criticism and suggestions for strengthening Christianity from the basic ethic of Jesus in the following manner: The spirit of Jesus which reaches through the centuries lies in the ethic of love. Christianity needs to be infused with the spirit of Jesus. This spirit will be its strength against the evils of the times, and this is the only way one can achieve communion with God and influence the coming of the Kingdom of God. The inability of Christianity to grasp this spirit has accounted for its weaknesses and ineffectiveness.

What has been passing for Christianity during these nineteen centuries is merely a beginning, full of weakness and mistakes, not a full grown Christianity springing from the spirit of Jesus.⁴⁰

³⁹Ibid., p. 46.

⁴⁰Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 239.

Schweitzer is severe in his criticism of present day Christianity and its failure to meet the test of the nineteenth and twentieth century pressures. He cites the occurrence of major warfare during this century as a manifestation of the failure of Christianity, for it failed to educate men to keep peace. In the Hibbert lectures delivered in England in 1934, Schweitzer leveled this attack quite precisely.

"Is religion a force in the spiritual life of our age?" I answer in your name and mine, "No!" There is still religion in the world; there is much religion in the church; there are many pious people among us. Christianity can still point to works of love and to social works of which it can be proud. There is a longing for religion among many who no longer belong to the church. I rejoice and concede this. And yet we must hold fast to the fact that religion is not a force. The proof? The war!⁴¹

Continuing his argument, Schweitzer views religion as consumed in outward activity, in over-organization. He feels that it is busy being more efficient, but that it is not cognizant of the inner need to have its efforts based on the love ethic propounded by Jesus. Rather than center its efforts on being a real influence in modern spiritual life, it is absorbed with itself and attention is turned inward, concerned only with its own ideas and their propagation. The order of the day is activity, practical success, more

⁴¹Albert Schweitzer, "Religion in Modern Civilization," Christian Century, LI, No. 47 (November 21, 1934), p. 1483.

powerful organization, and effective propagandizing. Religion has joined the scientific materialistic concept of the age, rather than trying to change or modify this concept, where it is in error. The spirit of love, and its accompanying power, is missing.

Christianity has a need of thought that it may come to the consciousness of its real self. For centuries it treasured the great commandment of love and mercy as traditional truth without recognizing it as a reason for opposing slavery, witch burning, torture, and all the other ancient and medieval forms of inhumanity.⁴²

In Schweitzer's reinterpretation of the traditionally held concepts of Jesus, he feels that his unusual findings have not weakened the Christian concepts, but rather have released a more powerful religious consciousness which can strengthen Christianity. Schweitzer's conclusion that Jesus had been artificially constructed by the centuries of tradition and centuries of forcing Jesus into a modern mold indicated that Jesus had become weakened and impotent as a force in the world. The status of civilization today, in Schweitzer's argument, the horror of war, the inhumanity of man against man indicate the powerless plight of Christianity. The need, according to Schweitzer, is to reach through the centuries and to grasp the universal core of Jesus' teaching

⁴²Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 236.

which is the love ethic, and thus release its power into modern life.

Thus Jesus' religion of love which makes its first appearance within the framework of late Jewish eschatological expectation, finds a place later on within the late Greek, the medieval and the modern views of the world. Nevertheless, it remains through the centuries what it is essentially. Whether it is worked out in terms of one system of thought or another is of only relative importance. What is decisive is the amount of influence over mankind won by the spiritual and ethical truth which it has held from the very first.⁴³

The Status of Modern Civilization,
Its Problems and Needs

Albert Schweitzer planned to record his philosophical and ethical convictions in four books. The first two were combined and published in one of his better known works, The Philosophy of Civilization. The first part of this book concerns "The Decay and Restoration of Civilization" and the second part, "Civilization and Ethics." Work was started on this in 1914 at the time the French authorities had refused to let Dr. and Mrs. Schweitzer continue their work at the hospital.

When I was forbidden to work in the Hospital, I thought at first that I would proceed to the completion of my book on St. Paul. But another subject at once forced itself upon me, one which

⁴³Ibid., pp. 43-54.

I had had in my mind for years, and which the war was now making a real live issue: the problem of our civilization.⁴⁴

Schweitzer traces the inspiration of this core idea to his university days when he had doubts concerning the idea that civilization was continually developing and progressing.

My own impression was that in our mental and spiritual life we were not only below the level of past generations, but were in many respects only living on their achievements . . . and that not a little of this heritage was beginning to melt away in our hands.⁴⁵

Using this idea as a starting point, he developed his thinking steadily for a number of years midst his many other activities. In addition to those parts already mentioned, the study was to include also the development of the concept of Reverence for Life and then an exposition of the civilized state. In developing the "Civilization and Ethics," he employed the same type of historical-critical plan he had used in his studies of Jesus and Paul. His first efforts on the Philosophy of Civilization were entrusted for safekeeping with an American missionary when Dr. and Mrs. Schweitzer were interned in Europe as prisoners of war in 1915, for Dr. Schweitzer feared for their safety.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 145.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 147.

He worked on other portions of the book while he and his wife actually were interned and continued to work on it, finally completing it in the spring of 1923. The second and third volumes have not yet been published because of the press of the work at the hospital and his many other demands.

In attempting to understand Schweitzer the man, one finds that his views on civilization, the development of his philosophy, and his concept of ethics as found in The Philosophy of Civilization and various other writings and lectures are most significant, particularly because they represent his own philosophical system and because Schweitzer has spent much of his life acting on the principles he recorded on this subject. His actions stand as the most effective argument for his thoughts.

In the Decay and the Restoration of Civilization, Schweitzer quite bluntly envisaged that civilization was bent upon its own doom, that "the suicide of civilization is in progress."⁴⁶ In this decay of modern civilization he sees man so overworked and hurried that he has no time for the meditation and "recollectedness" needed for fulfilling his worth as a human being. Thus, free hours become searches

⁴⁶Albert Schweitzer, Philosophy of Civilization, trans. C. T. Campion (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), p. 2.

for idleness and complete diversion, not for thought and self-improvement. Under the economic system of today, where man must follow a specialized task in a major operation, he has lost the independence of working out products or thoughts to their completion on his own. He then begins to think less like a whole man and loses the chance for all around development. With the grotesque and rapid growth of nationalism, man is in danger of losing his humanity, for he excuses and rationalizes atrocities and inhumanities when they are done in the name of patriotism. Parallel to Schweitzer's criticism of all-consuming nationalism is the danger he sees in the individual man's becoming swallowed up in the over-organization of his life.

The modern man is lost in the mass in a way which is without precedent in history, and this is perhaps the most characteristic trait in him.⁴⁷

Schweitzer continues by pointing out that this is especially so in the loss to man's spiritual life within the over-organized church and within the rigid confines of public opinion. Schweitzer sees mankind entering a new medieval period and he feels it is being done willingly and in the attitude of real accomplishment, for our scientific gains seem to indicate that mankind is progressing. For Schweitzer, thoughtful man, man thinking elementally about

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 73.

life and its relation to the universe, is the basis for all progress; therefore, all these facets of modern society which hinder thought are marks of real failure of civilization.

Dr. Schweitzer's argument continues in a similar vein, blaming much of civilization's difficulties on its false hope that scientific progress automatically would mean that civilization was progressing. For instance, he indicates that with unbounded success materially, civilization has expressed optimism and a facade of enthusiasm toward its progress. The belief seemed grounded in the idea that if we could only perfect our material life and could perfect our public and social life with its institutions, that progress of civilization would be insured. But, as he points out, this did not occur, and without a spiritual basis which would give man an understanding of his relation to the world and which would show man how to work out his worth in that world, man floundered. He didn't know where he was going; he was just busy and because science had produced so many tangible advances to look upon and use, he felt sure that he must be progressing. The age-old questions remained unanswered however: What are we? What is our purpose in this universe? The problem then, as Schweitzer posed, is this:

We want to find the world- and life-affirmation
and the ethical system which we need for that
serviceable activity which gives our life a

meaning, based on such thought about the world and life as finds a meaning in them also.⁴⁸

In this statement Schweitzer is indicating that man needs a theory of the universe. He sees this as the indispensable foundation on which civilization can keep itself from its impending suicide. His definition for this basic core is:

It is the content of the thoughts of society and the individuals which compose it about the nature and object of the world in which they live, and the position and the destiny of mankind and of individual men within it.⁴⁹

For individuals as for the community, life without a theory of things is a pathological disturbance of the higher capacity for self-direction.⁵⁰

This theory, according to Schweitzer, must be a product of thought, for elemental thinking is the responsibility of all men. That is why, so often in many of his writings, Schweitzer refers with pride to the thinkers of the eighteenth century. Whatever the faults in their conclusions may be, he feels that their many attempts at elemental thinking which resulted in humanitarian urges unparalleled in civilization make the age one to be respected and emulated.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 17.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 49.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 57.

Schweitzer feels that only elemental thinking can release the spiritual power capable of influencing civilization and he grounds his faith in this type of thought. Elemental thinking is the job that Schweitzer sets out for all men.

Every being who calls himself a man is meant to develop into a real personality within a reflective theory of the universe which he has created for himself.⁵¹

Thus Schweitzer sees each man participating in real, elemental thinking. He is to contemplate and work these problems over until his will and his actions have a real meaning. They will have this meaning, Schweitzer continues, when the man's actions are shown to be in accord with his interpretation of life within his theory of the universe.

For Schweitzer, civilization must, of necessity, be grounded in ethics, for he feels that the future of civilization must lie in inner convictions. Schweitzer develops this line of thought in the following manner: We must draw from the spiritual power available to create new conditions in the world. The answer then, to our problems, lies in a change within the spirit of man. This idea is pronounced by Schweitzer not only in his Philosophy of Civilization, but also in his lectures and other publications. Man's faith

⁵¹Ibid., p. 57.

in the material world, according to these publications, his faith in its institutions and in the advances of science, have obviously not brought civilization to any kind of progress. Rather, it has brought the world to the point of possible self-annihilation. And even before the advent of possible nuclear warfare, two world wars showed only too graphically what inhumanity man had trained himself both to inflict and to accept.

The crowning phrase for Schweitzer's theory of the universe (worldview) is "Reverence for Life." From it stems his entire philosophic contemplation of modern civilization. The phrase is to be found in Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, of which Schweitzer was aware, but for him it came in the depths of the African jungle as a flash of inspiration. He was taking a long river trip in order to attend the sick wife of a missionary.

Lost in thought I sat on the deck of the barge, struggling to find the elementary and universal conception of the ethical which I had not discovered in any philosophy. Sheet after sheet I covered with disconnected sentences, merely to keep myself concentrated on the problem. Late on the third day, at the very moment when, at sunset, we were making our way through a herd of hippopotamuses, there flashed upon my mind, unforeseen and unsought, the phrase, "Reverence for Life." The iron door had yielded: the path in the thicket had become visible. Now I had

found my way to the idea in which affirmation of the world and ethics are contained side by side.⁵²

Schweitzer's explanation of Reverence for Life in his Philosophy of Civilization and other writings and addresses is essentially as follows: The basic element in Reverence for Life is the "will-to-live;" this is the most basic concept or thought at which one can arrive; whatever doubt can be cast on fundamental life thoughts, the one thing a person can rely upon with utmost certainty is that mystical feeling within himself that says, "I want to live;" as man becomes aware of his will-to-live, he looks about himself and sees that he is in a world full of creatures who share with him the will-to-live; it is mysterious . . . all have it and it binds man to all life.

The fundamental idea in our conscience, to which we come back each time we want to reach comprehension of ourselves and of our situation in the world is: I am Life wanting to live, surrounded by life wanting to live. Meditating upon life, I feel that obligation to respect any will-to-live around me as equal to mine and as having a mysterious value.⁵³

Thus, the will-to-live is not just the urge to stay alive; it has responsibilities to others. It is a general

⁵²Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 156.

⁵³Albert Schweitzer, "Problem of Ethics in the Evolution of Human Thought," Address to French Academy of Moral and Political Science, October 20, 1952.

respect for all wills-to-live, and for Schweitzer this includes animal as well as human life. In fact, for him it includes all life in whatever form it may be found.

It includes, together with active will to the perfecting of one's own life, spontaneous respect for other will-to-live and cooperates with its efforts. This attitude and the conception of the value of life which it implies do not have theoretical grounds, but are inherent in the nature of being.⁵⁴

The relationship between one's will-to-live and other wills-to-live is acknowledgment of the spirit. It is the recognition of the Infinite Will, which is observable everywhere in the universe.

Just as the wave cannot exist for itself, but is ever a part of the heaving surface of the ocean, so must I never live my life for itself, but always in the experience which is going on around me. It is an uncomfortable doctrine which the true ethics whisper into my ear. You are happy, they say; therefore, you are called upon to give much. Whatever more than others you have received in health, natural gifts, working capacity, success, a beautiful childhood, harmonious family circumstances, you must not accept as being a matter of course. You must pay a price for them. You must show more than average devotion of life to life.⁵⁵

Schweitzer continues the development of this concept and indicates that men can then see their relationship to the universe and its active dynamic aspects; it is life- and

⁵⁴John D. Register, Albert Schweitzer: The Man and His Work (New York: Abingdom Press, 1931), p. 133.

⁵⁵Albert Schweitzer, Philosophy of Civilization, p. 32.

world-affirming. It is important to note that this life- and world-affirmation is founded on the mystical Reverence for Life, not on an observation of the world as it is.

Schweitzer points out that knowledge of the world manifests no teleological view in which man's actions can take on meaning. Man's inhumanity to his fellow man, and nature herself, shows destruction going on beside creativity which makes an optimistic world-view impossible when one views the world as it is. Hopes had been centered on the inherent evolution of progress and were disappointed. Man had become spiritually stunted by turning from a basic ethics to looking for the answer ready-made by the world. Thus freed from the responsibility of ethical thought, man expected ever more effective institutions to take care of such things. But in reality man could not see a purpose for his activities.

Schweitzer continues by showing that man, therefore, had to resign himself to a negative attitude toward the world. This principle of resignation is important, for it is man accepting the fact that his purposiveness cannot be found in the world as he finds it. He then is cast back upon himself, and here he finds his purposiveness within himself in his will-to-live and his acknowledgment of all will-to-live. He is not dependent upon the world any longer, but is above it. His purpose, his meaning in life, are unaffected basically

by the world and its daily happenings.

Its world- and life-affirmation carried its meaning in itself. It follows from an inward necessity, and is sufficient for itself. By its means my existence joins in pursuing the aims of the mysterious universal will of which I am a manifestation. In my deepened world- and life-affirmation, I manifest reverence for life. With consciousness and with volition I devote myself to Being. I become of service to the ideas which it thinks out in me; I become imaginative force like that which works mysteriously in nature, and thus I give my existence a meaning from within outwards.⁵⁶

Schweitzer, then, views the will-to-live as the core of life's purpose; and he develops his answer for the needs of civilization in the following way: Will-to-live determines to live life to its fullest out of respect for all life. This becomes the ethical basis for all life. Through it, progress in political and economic life can be made, not otherwise. In the relation of one will-to-live to another will-to-live there is a joining with the infinite Will. The absolute ethic which springs from the concept of the Will-to-live is the urge to manifest to all wills-to-live the same reverence which I have for my own will-to-live.

There we have given us that basic principle of the moral which is a necessity of thought. It is good to maintain and to encourage life; it is bad to destroy life or to obstruct it.⁵⁷

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 283.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 309.

The answer for civilization, then, lies in the working out of a world-view grounded in ethics. It feels itself in constant elemental thinking in which the relation of man to his purposive activity in all life, is the basic concern. Resigning himself to the fact that his purpose cannot be found in the world, man then finds his purpose in the mysterious bond he has with all life -- the will-to-live. In reverencing his own will-to-live, he must reverence all wills-to-live, and he then becomes committed to responsible activity in helping all wills-to-live.

Schweitzer continues to express these ideas in relation to modern times and its primary problem of peace. With the two world wars and the advent of potential nuclear warfare, Schweitzer addresses himself to the problem with more and more urgency, knowing that annihilation of civilization is now possible. His Nobel Peace address centered on this danger and the need for a spiritual change in man. In 1957 he released three radio broadcasts to the world on the subject, and has expressed himself over and over in letters concerning the need for peace. He stresses the fact that the undue emphasis on nationalistic pride which has stunted man's individual moral growth can lead man to unthinking acts such as nuclear war. Schweitzer further indicates that his concern is with the distortion of nationalism which has

been allowed to take over man's thinking.

This nationalism can only be overthrown by rebirth, in all mankind, of a humanitarian idea; attachment to one's fatherland would then become natural, healthful and ideal in character.⁵⁸

In his writings Dr. Schweitzer offers his concept of Reverence for Life as the cure for failing civilization, and it is in Schweitzer's life itself that Reverence for Life is seen in action. He stands as a strong argument that it is possible to live a life based upon his particular world-view.

The Influence of Goethe on Schweitzer

It seemed strange to Schweitzer, while he was studying philosophy at Strasbourg, that he should find Goethe, a major figure, that remained loyal to a simple, nature philosophy while living in the shadow of the complex speculative systems propounded by the great philosophic minds of his age. Inspired by Goethe's example, Schweitzer thought through more critically the rationalistic-oriented philosophers. He came to respect and admire Goethe as a man, a poet a fellow scientist and as an original thinker.

At that time, when everyone was blinded by a world prostrate before thought, there was one man who was not blinded, who remained loyal to the elementary and humble nature philosophy, aware that it

⁵⁸Albert Schweitzer, "The Problem of Peace in the World Today," The Nobel Peace Prize Address, November, 1954.

had not been able to think its way through to an affirmative conclusion in that eighteenth century in which he lived, but certain that it would have to do so; and he worked toward that end in the simple way which was his inner nature.⁵⁹

Schweitzer credits Goethe with being an influence on his life in many ways, but in his several addresses on Goethe he referred most often to the kinship founded in Goethe's nature philosophy. A keen student of the natural sciences, Goethe devoted much of his time and efforts to investigating nature in all its aspects. His contributions resulting from his studies in botany, geology, chemistry, physics, and anthropology are by no means trivial. It may be said that Goethe's life was determined and guided by his dedication to nature. His biographers seem to agree that it permeated his poetry and his novels; that it commanded his intellect; and that it formed his philosophy and religion. Goethe's own writings substantiate the conclusion, further, that his approach to nature was simple and direct. He believed that the direct concentration on nature might induce her to reveal some of her secrets. He did not approve of prying nature's basic concepts from her with instruments and scientific devices.

⁵⁹Albert Schweitzer, "Goethe Prize Address - Frankfort, 1928" Goethe Five Studies, trans. Charles R. Joy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), p. 23.

Goethe's letters, novels, plays and poetry indicate and develop the idea that for him nature is everything. Therein rests all reality and knowledge; they will be true insofar as they are arrived at by delving deeply into nature. One does not impose a system of thought upon nature nor try to add to what he sees in nature out of his own imagination, but rather reality can be discovered only by observing nature clearly and without prejudice. Schweitzer stresses this aspect of Goethe in his addresses. For example in the Memorial Address he states:

Systems of speculative philosophy are also a violation of nature to him.

His inner relationship with nature and his sense of reality do not permit him to treat her in this way. He approaches her with reverence hoping that she may reveal to him some of her secrets, and may permit him to find that understanding in which strength for life lies. He is striving for a realistic, ethical nature philosophy.⁶⁰

Continuing the view of Goethe as dominated by his nature dedication, Schweitzer, as well as other Goethe scholars, indicate that Goethe's religious convictions stem from his reliance upon nature. For him, God and nature are one and studying natural science instructs one as to the nature of God. This God-Nature is a pantheism that brought

⁶⁰Albert Schweitzer, "The One Hundredth Anniversary Memorial Address," Goethe: Five Studies, trans. Charles R. Joy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), p. 85.

the label of pagan to Goethe. Obviously, Goethe's religion would not agree to any traditional dogma, for he saw God and Nature as one. This, in itself, was sufficient for him; and he had little use for additional doctrinaire principles. Excerpts from Goethe's letters will help to substantiate this view.

"To hear people talk," said Goethe, "you would be inclined to think it to be their opinion that God had retired to utter stillness since those days of old, that man was forced to stand on his own feet alone and do the best he can without God and the daily breathing of God through him. In religious and moral matters God's influence is grudgingly admitted. Matters of science and of art are accepted as purely mortal and the mere products of human forces.

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 "Look about you in the world! God did not withdraw after those well-known six days of creating. Rather he is continuously among us as on that primal day. To construct this clumsy world out of simple elements and to let it roll year in and year out beneath the rays of the sun, would have been a crude enough jest, had it not been for the Divine Plan to found upon this material substructure the nursery for a whole world of spirits. Thus God continues to work through the higher natures, in order that the lower ones may attain to the level of the higher.⁶¹

Albert Schweitzer emphasizes Goethe's philosophy, based on nature, in each of his addresses along the following lines. Goethe's nature-philosophy implied his ethical

⁶¹Ludwig Lewisohn, Goethe: The Story of a Man, Vol. II (New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1949), pp. 446-447.

foundation. He saw the ethical, the impulse to goodness in man, as an inherent element of the spirit. God was the first cause of being and at one with that was the impulse of love. He does not pretend to see love in nature but does believe it to be there, thus bringing together pantheism and Christianity.

The maximum of love and consequently the maximum of well-being will not be attained unless each individual develops within himself in the most perfect and personal way the love which nature has put into his heart.⁶²

The relationship between Goethe and Schweitzer is set forth by Charles Joy in his book Goethe: Five Studies by pointing out some of the following things. Goethe the philosopher, the scientist, the poet, the man, all appeal to and have their influence upon Schweitzer. Each of the two men makes major contributions in several areas during their lives. The many-sidedness of Goethe is approved by Schweitzer, for this he sees as a full, rounded development of an individual which is so important to him.

More and more, not only in this country but throughout the world, he has become a chosen one among poets. Why? Because this great poet is at the same time a great master of the natural sciences, a great

⁶²Albert Schweitzer, "Goethe The Philosopher," Goethe: Five Studies, trans. Charles R. Joy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961), p. 122.

thinker, a great man. This many-sidedness commands respect and strikes people as something quite special.⁶³

He does not see a perfect man, nor one without contradictions, for Schweitzer frankly acknowledges this in his speeches and writings about Goethe. Goethe is a man of many sides, many temperaments, some seeming to be in direct opposition to others.

Schweitzer feels a kinship in Goethe's devotion to daily duties in the practical, everyday world as Minister of Weimer. He became absorbed in like matters in the building and running of his hospital at Lambaréné. At one time, at Lambaréné, famine almost overtook the hospital, and Schweitzer set about to clear land and to plant food that would forestall the possibility of famine again in the future. As he set about this back-breaking task, his thoughts went to Goethe, who had spent many years in such practical work. "So Goethe stood beside me in the gloom forest as the great smiling comforter who understood me."⁶⁴

Both men were products of their respective ages and yet at the same time both men stood in contradiction to their times. Goethe was a contradiction of the too rigid philosophic

⁶³Albert Schweitzer, "Goethe: His Personality and His Work," Address to Goethe Bicentennial Convocation, Aspen, Colorado.

⁶⁴Albert Schweitzer, "Goethe Prize Address," p. 127.

systems of the eighteenth century enlightenment. He was familiar with the great speculative thinkers of his time and yet he stood comparatively untouched by these thought systems.

Goethe represents one type of reaction against a too clear, too mechanical and too rationalistic conception of the cosmos.⁶⁵

Schweitzer, in a similar manner, takes modern concepts of the world view into himself and then rejects them. He comprehends them and then transcends them. His theory of the universe stands in contradiction to the scientific materialism of the age. Both men put their intellectual pursuits into the background in order to tackle practical everyday tasks and both approach the mysteries of nature with reverence. An undogmatic approach to the spirit of God is sought by both.

There were vital differences, of course, for in many ways Dr. Schweitzer is significantly different from Goethe. For purposes of this study it is important to note these few likenesses and to understand that Goethe was an influence on Schweitzer's life. He has pursued the study of Goethe through the years, and his addresses and articles indicate that Schweitzer is considered an authority. In all he

⁶⁵"Goethe and Schweitzer," Christian Century LXVI, No. 29 (July 20, 1949), p. 862.

sincerely acknowledges this influence.

Goethe is the personality with which I have been most deeply concerned. St. Paul, who, I think, has had a decisive influence upon me, belongs to an epoch too far away and too different from our own. The details of his life are too little known for me to converse with him and commune with him, as I can with Goethe, who seems to me so alive even in the contradictory facts about him. What attracts me in him is that he is a man of action at the same time that he is a poet, a thinker, and in certain domains a savant and a man of research. And what binds us together in the deepest depths of our beings is his philosophy of nature.⁶⁶

Music

Another interest which began in childhood and blossomed forth to become a major force in Schweitzer's life is music. He had a strong family heritage in musical interests. For example, Schweitzer's maternal grandfather, Pastor Schillinger of Mühlbach, had an intense interest in organs and organ building. Not only his grandfather but his grandfather's two brothers were organists. It was the German and Alsatian tradition that a schoolmaster should have studied music, and usually played several instruments; the Schweitzer family contained many schoolmasters. "It was as natural for Albert Schweitzer to become an organist

⁶⁶Albert Schweitzer, Goethe Five Studies, trans. Charles R. Joy, p. 3.

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as it was for Bach, with his ancestry, to become an organist."⁶⁷
 It is interesting to note that Albert Schweitzer's daughter married an organ builder and that his grandson is an apprentice in organ building.

Schweitzer notes in his autobiography the introduction of music early in his life and goes on to provide details concerning his musical training. His music lessons began at the age of five when he was taught by his father.

At eight, when my legs were hardly long enough to reach the pedals, I began to play the organ.

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I was nine years old when for the first time I took the place of the organist for a service at Gunsbach.⁶⁸

Music was an emotional and personal experience with Schweitzer from the beginning. He recalls hearing two-part harmony for the first time.

I had to hold on to the wall to prevent myself from falling. The charm of the two part harmony of the songs thrilled me all over, to my very marrow, and similarly the first time I heard brass instruments playing together I almost fainted from excess of pleasure.⁶⁹

The years of study, experience and discipline channeled this musical enthusiasm into the formation of a musician who made

⁶⁷Charles R. Joy, Music in the Life of Albert Schweitzer (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951), p. 2.

⁶⁸Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 2.

⁶⁹Albert Schweitzer, Memoirs of Childhood and Youth, p. 15.

major contributions to the musical world.

The early association with the organ blossomed into a lifetime devotion and study. As a student in the Gymnasium at Mülhausen, Schweitzer studied the organ with Eugéné Münch. It is with Münch that Schweitzer began his lifelong absorption with Bach.

I owe it to him that I became acquainted in my early years with the works of the cantor of St. Thomas and from my fifteenth year onwards enjoyed the privilege of sound instruction on the organ.⁷⁰

In 1893 Schweitzer began a long and warm relationship with Charles Marie Widor, whom he credits for a substantial portion of his musical development. Both were Bach enthusiasts, and it was through Widor's urging that Schweitzer later wrote his classic biography of Bach.

This instruction was for me an event of decisive importance. Widor led me on to a fundamental improvement of my technique and made me strive to attain perfect plasticity in playing.⁷¹

While a student at Strasbourg, Schweitzer worked closely with the organist of the St. Williams Church, Ernest Münch, the brother of his teacher at Mülhausen. When Schweitzer studied at the Sorbonne, in 1898, he again studied with

⁷⁰Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 3.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 4.

Charles Widor. At the same time he also studied the organ with an Alsatian woman, Marie Jael-Trautman, who had been a pupil of Franz Liszt.

Under Marie Jaell's guidance I completely altered my hand. I owe it to her that by well directed practice taking but little time I became more and more completely master of my fingers with great benefit to my organ playing.⁷²

Though he returned to Strasbourg to preach and teach, Schweitzer continued his study of music, returning each spring vacation to Paris to work with Widor.

In 1905 Schweitzer published his book on Johann Sebastian Bach. What had started out to be an essay had resulted in a four hundred and fifty-five page definitive study of Bach and his music. One almost automatically links Bach's name with Schweitzer, so closely has Schweitzer been identified with him. It is not that Schweitzer concerned himself exclusively with Bach, for he is an admirer and appreciative student of many musicians, especially Richard Wagner and Beethoven, but he rose to prominence in his study of Bach. In Charles Joy's authoritative book, Music in the Life of Albert Schweitzer, he indicates the identity of Schweitzer with Bach.

Bach, however, took possession of him from his boyhood on. . . . He recognized the Leipzig

⁷²Ibid., p. 18

cantor as a symbol of something very deep within his own soul, something that was perhaps more spiritual than musical. So Bach became to him "the Master," and he became from that time on a Minister of Music, trying to interpret to the world the religious significance of the cantatas and the Passions, himself more and more an embodiment of the man whose works he reproduced.⁷³

From Schweitzer's interest in interpreting Bach on the organ stems another musical activity, organ building, which involved Schweitzer's time and energy. The same year that the French edition of the Bach book was published, Schweitzer published his essay on organ building, "The Art of Organ Building and Organ Playing in Germany and France." As new organs were being built around the turn of the century, Schweitzer joined the fight against those organs, which instituted modern innovations at the expense of the beauty of the older ones. Famous and historic organs were being destroyed, and new instruments being put in their places. While some felt that his ideas, expressed in the essay, were strange and that he was old fashioned, he persisted and for thirty years worked and carried on a vast amount of correspondence relative to the preservation of the better elements of the old theories of organ building. His general argument centered on the idea of modernizing organs at the cost of the music.

⁷³Joy, Music in the Life of Albert Schweitzer, p. xi0.

I should like to raise the question whether in general we have not paid more attention to the visible changes in our consoles and less to the important thing, the effect upon the tone. Are the advances in organ building beneficial to the tonal quality?

No! Not at all! Our organs were indeed more powerful than the old ones, but no longer as beautiful. Our old organs, even those built twenty years ago, are more beautifully and more artistically voiced than those of today.⁷⁴

Schweitzer continued this interest until his principles realized substantial success. This was represented by the formation of the "International Regulations for Organ Building," drawn up by the third Congress of the International Society of Music at Vienna in 1909, in which he played a major role.

Schweitzer's substantial talent and education in music placed him in the foreground as one of the most celebrated organists on the continent, and he played on the famous organs of Europe and England. The concerts he gave helped to finance his education and to raise money for the establishment of his hospital. As a parting gift when he went to Africa, the Bach Society of Paris gave him a zinc lined piano with pedals attached; it was to be his one link with the cultural life in which he had been so thoroughly involved for many years. In the tropic heat of Lambaréné Schweitzer pursued his study of Bach.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 155.

The piano with pedal attachments, built for the Tropics, which the Paris Bach Society had presented to me, and the triumph of my health over the tropical climate had allowed me to keep up my skill on the organ. During the many quiet hours which I was able to spend with Bach during my four and a half years of loneliness in the jungle I had penetrated deeper into the spirit of his works. I returned to Europe, therefore, not as an artist who had become an amateur, but in full possession of my technique and privileged to find that, as an artist, I was more esteemed than before.⁷⁵

One can trace the very molding of Schweitzer's personality to the deep vein of music that is so much a part of him. It is significant for this study that in attempting to understand him, one recognizes the personality of an artist with the discipline, the sensitivity, and the awareness of beauty that are demanded from an artist. Often it is to music that he goes for the needed imagery to put across a point he is making. In speaking of the "artist" (Bach), Schweitzer declared that an artist is actually many artists in one. The medium is merely the channel, the means chosen to express the artist's creativity. He supports his thesis by showing that in Bach's music are found both poetry and moving vivid pictorial emotions (contrary to traditional thought, which for so many years thought Bach to be the creator of pure music). Seaver makes the observation that the same is true of Schweitzer.

⁷⁵Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 196-197.

A philosopher and musician, his academic works abound in pictorial metaphors, and had he turned his artistic talent to painting, his pictures would have been drawn on a wide canvas. Readers of the Quest, for example, may forget his elaboration of the argument for eschatology derived from a multitude of minutiae in the sacred text; but they cannot forget his majestic image of the Man who lays hold of the Wheel of the World to set it moving to its final revolution and then throws Himself upon it to be crushed.⁷⁶

Perhaps one of the reasons why Dr. Schweitzer's criticisms and philosophic concepts command so much respect is that he is not an ascetic closed off in an ivory tower, inaccessible to the flow and currents of the world. Although Lambaréné seems remote for the modern world, periodic trips to the continent, a constant flow of visitors to the hospital, and Schweitzer's characteristic pursuit of thought do not permit Lambaréné to be a retreat in any sense of the word. While in Lambaréné, also, Dr. Schweitzer is consumed with day-to-day living problems that do not permit him to remain remote from life. Also, along with his other identities, he is a man of science living in a world that is scientifically oriented. As a medical doctor and surgeon he is a full participant in the world of concrete phenomena as well as the world of abstract theorizing.

⁷⁶Seaver, Albert Schweitzer The Man and His Mind, p. 267.

Science

His interest in science can be traced, as were his other interests, to his childhood, especially to his student days at Mülhausen, where he first met with formal schooling in science. His almost inherent love of nature helped him to be naturally curious about natural science and the life one sees abounding in all of nature. His environment in the Münster valley provided many happy hours for a boy who loved to wander about enjoying the beauty and secrets of nature. He found his first contact with science under a Dr. Forster stimulating, and he felt it unfortunate that "the number of lesson-hours devoted to science was at that time far too small."⁷⁷ The profoundest impression from these early contacts with science was his awareness of how little was actually known about the forces and processes of nature.

It hurt me to think that we never acknowledge the absolutely mysterious character of nature, but always speak so confidently of explaining her, whereas all that we have really done is to go into fuller and more complicated descriptions, which only make the mysterious more mysterious than ever.⁷⁸

Schweitzer returned with enthusiasm, as a medical student to the study of science. He felt that in the areas

⁷⁷Albert Schweitzer, Memoirs of Childhood and Youth, p. 52.

⁷⁸Ibid.

with which he had been dealing there was a real danger of becoming absorbed with truth that was bound up in opinions set forth in imaginations and thought processes, certainly not set forth as being self-evident. There was, thus, the danger of losing all touch with reality.

Now I was suddenly in another country. I was concerned with truths which embodied realities and found myself among men who took it as a matter of course that they had to justify with facts every statement they made. It was an experience which I felt to be needed for my own intellectual development.⁷⁹

His studies seemed to re-emphasize, however, his convictions that thought leading to truth is on a higher plane than truth established by merely facts.

The intensive study of medicine, together with his other extensive activities at this time, caused Schweitzer to fight a constant battle with fatigue. However, on October 11, 1911, Schweitzer passed the state medical examination and set out, after his year of practical work, to establish his hospital.

In Lambaréné, his medical and surgical knowledge was put to immediate and practical use and under the most primitive of conditions. Having decided not to practice medicine under European circumstances, but rather to travel

⁷⁹Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 104.

to where the need was dire among African natives, it was perhaps not so unusual that his first operation was performed in a freshly whitewashed chicken house. In Schweitzer's life, medicine is the tool for alleviating the pain in the world with which he feels such an identity. It is of the Doctor of Lambaréné that the majority of people think when they consider Albert Schweitzer. There, the European intellectual has been absorbed in and is involved with healing the myriad of jungle diseases: malaria, leprosy, sleeping sickness, dysentery, frambesia, phagedenic ulcers, pneumonia, hernia, and elephantiasis tumors. Cut off from European culture, thought and friends, lonely, living in a strange environment, and worked to the point of exhaustion, he remained faithful to his decision to go to Africa.

Thus I had during the very first weeks full opportunity for establishing the fact that physical misery among the natives is not less but even greater than I had supposed. How glad I was that in defiance of all objections I had carried out my plan of going out there as a doctor.⁸⁰

He was a doctor in the morning, an architect, gardener, and builder in the afternoon. The hospital became the dominating force in his life; all else was, and is, secondary to its demands. His books, African Notebook and On the Edge of the Primeval Forest record his life of service through the science of medicine at Lambaréné.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 139.

Conclusions

From the preceding biographical view of Dr. Schweitzer's life and some of his major ideas, the general outline of the man emerges. From his childhood on, there appears a sensitive, artistic man endowed with the assets of a happy home, robust health, deep religious consciousness and wide intellectual capacities. In whatever light one studies Dr. Schweitzer, his biographical-intellectual factors indicate that he must be evaluated as a total being with all his many attributes fusing into a unity. This means that for purposes of this study, his total being must be considered when studying and evaluating him as a speaker. The close knit unity of daily actions, intellectual beliefs, and relationships with all life are manifested in every phase of his life. In a sense then, there is no Schweitzer, the theologian; Schweitzer, the philosopher, or Schweitzer, the speaker. There is an Albert Schweitzer, each activity being a manifestation of the total personality. Judgment pronounced in viewing him out of this context would seem to run the danger of gross misinterpretation.

This general observation implies an interrelation in his various fields of interest and activities. An awareness of this should prevent one from being confused by seeming inconsistencies. In the philosopher will be found

the musician. In the musician will be found the theologian. In the doctor to the natives will be found traces of the European cosmopolitan. In his relations with others will be found the simplicity of the Alsatian. These must be carefully noted as parts of a unified whole.

The general assumption might also be made that whatever facet of Dr. Schweitzer is examined, one must be prepared to meet a massive intellectual capacity, a precision and vividness of expression, and a sympathy with all life about him. This will have significant meaning for understanding him as a speaker.

The chapter has thus attempted to note the biographical factors of significance in Albert Schweitzer's life: his family, his environment, and his friends. It has noted the general views as expressed in his major interests: Jesus, Paul, Christianity, Philosophy and Civilization, Goethe, Music, and Science. These ideas and conclusions drawn from them will guide the continuing study of Schweitzer in the following chapters.

CHAPTER IV

ALBERT SCHWEITZER: THE MAN AND THE LEGEND

The preceding chapter indicated the several facets of Albert Schweitzer that make him an extraordinary man. There have been, and are, equally great musicians, philosophers, theologians, and doctors. Many an individual has sacrificed a more comfortable life to live a life of sacrifice to those less fortunate than themselves. It is, however, the combination of all of these factors into one man that makes Albert Schweitzer unique. He has published over twenty books most of which are scholarly contributions. His publications reflect profound thought in each of several fields. He has lectured, by invitation, in universities throughout Europe and England. He has received many honorary doctoral degrees from universities throughout the world. He has received innumerable awards, citations, and honors from nations, from cities, and from organizations. Scores of individuals testify concerning personal, sometimes revolutionary, effect he has had in their lives. Within this environment of world acclaim, Albert Schweitzer has spent most of his time healing natives, building and supervising his jungle hospital in the

tropical heat of Africa. His life and accomplishments appear phenomenal in our present times. They cannot be denied.

In the face of such accomplishments, there is perhaps a danger in one's becoming overcome with the extraordinary features of his life and losing sight of the real contributions, the real meaning, and the real man. Understanding motivations, evaluating personality and character, and judging actions and ideas is subjective and tenuous at best. Knowledge of the "real" person is always an approximation. However, it is important that judgments and criticisms be based upon as accurate information and as sound judgment as possible. Therefore, it would seem necessary to acknowledge and examine the growing legend about Albert Schweitzer which may blur an understanding of him.

This chapter intends to note the ways in which Dr. Schweitzer is known to people and also the growth of a legendary attitude toward him. It then will examine the disenchantment that can follow from such a view and the resulting distorted picture of the man. From this, the factors that constitute a clear view will be set up and finally the implications of this examination for the study of Schweitzer the speaker will be set forth.

Under the assumption that there may be some important differences to be discovered between Schweitzer the man and Schweitzer the legend, a review of how people know him is needed. First, Schweitzer is known by his actions. Students who have heard him lecture, who have studied music with him, or who have attended his confirmation classes know him as a kindly but exacting teacher. He records that some who attended his confirmation classes in Strasbourg later expressed their appreciation to him.

Men have thanked me for having then brought home to their hearts the fundamental truths of the religion of Jesus as something to be absorbed into one's thought, and having thus strengthened them against the danger of giving up all religion in later life.¹

A person who studied the organ with Dr. Schweitzer records that, "everything about Schweitzer was gentleness and tenderness."² Also the student reports his sense of responsibility to his students.

I think Schweitzer was the most thorough teacher I ever knew. He was particular about everything, no matter how tiny.³

¹Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 28.

²Lucie Chenevert Lawson, "Albert Schweitzer was my Teacher," Etude, Vol. 68, No. 12 (December, 1950), p. 13.

³Ibid., p. 49.

As his students knew him from his actions as a teacher so his congregation at St. Nicholas knew him as a preacher. It has been noted how important preaching was to him. He preached often at Günsbach and at various churches in Europe and England. The natives of Lambaréné have heard Dr. Schweitzer often as it was his custom to conduct Sunday services for them. Therefore, those whom he has served as a minister or preacher know him and his ideas from having observed his activities in this capacity.

Dr. Schweitzer has long been acclaimed as one of the world's most outstanding organists, he has played on the best organs of Europe and England and many know him from having heard him play the organ. Recordings of his organ playing have been made by Columbia records and they are popular items for those whose interest is in organ music, particularly that of Bach.

As a doctor he is known intimately by the natives of Africa. His hospital stands as silent testimony to his actions as a doctor, an architect, and a general supervisor of his jungle medical station. The hospital at Lambaréné has become a popular pilgrimage for great and common people alike, where they watch him, his hospital, and its staff in action. Indeed, Dr. Schweitzer has said, "No one knows me

who has not known me in Africa."⁴ Since his increased popularity and the growing interest in him, every time he has left Lambaréné to return to Günsbach to rest or to travel about Europe and England giving concerts, lectures and speeches, his actions are viewed and followed by many.

Therefore, there are numbers of people who know Schweitzer by his actions. They have witnessed him as a teacher, a preacher, a doctor, an organist, or a hospital supervisor. Although his growing popularity has undoubtedly greatly increased the number of persons who know Schweitzer by his actions, in the overall picture of viewing him as a world figure this group would remain comparatively small. Also, their knowledge of him may rest upon having heard him speak for an hour; on having heard him play for several hours on the organ; or on having visited his hospital for several days or weeks.

Another way of knowing Schweitzer is through his many writings. Because he is a fairly prolific writer, his ideas may be read, reread, and digested. His works are translated into many languages: English, French, Dutch, Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, Polish, Hungarian and Japanese. His style is fairly clear, for the most part; and his ideas

⁴Herbert M. Phillips, Safari of Discovery (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1958), p. 161.

are vividly expressed. Of general interest, his books concerning his African activities (African Notebook, On the Edge of the Primeval Forest and More from the Primeval Forest) are enjoyable accounts of his work at Lambaréné. His small book, Memoirs of Childhood and Youth, introduces one quickly and easily to a picture of Schweitzer. His autobiography Out of My Life and Thought provides a view of his major ideas and the scope of his life. However, in this latter book, and in most of his others, a general reader may become enmeshed in his scholarly approach. As has been noted earlier, for instance, his approach to three of his major studies was an historical-critical one where works of many other thinkers were examined and analyzed with care. This detailed approach is difficult for the general lay reader to follow, for he can become involved in Dr. Schweitzer's exhaustive historical argument and lose sight of his basic ideas. Therefore, though his many writings stand as a long-lasting representation of his thought, their technical and academic nature makes them unapproachable for many. Knowing him through his writings, therefore, is limited somewhat to an educated, intellectually curious audience.

Many people, then, must know Schweitzer through a third channel, the reports of others: through biographies; through newspaper reports; through magazine articles; and

through reports of those who have visited or heard him. In order for the average person to speak out about his experiences with Dr. Schweitzer he is apt to be either very enthusiastic or adversely critical and thus the auditor may receive a distorted picture.

For example, Schweitzer was comparatively unknown in America until the 1940's. Since that time newspapers and magazines have abounded in articles about him and his life. A sampling of the titles of these articles will indicate the generally enthusiastic and favorable nature of their content. "Schweitzer--Man of God."; "The Greatest Man In The World"; "A Master In Darkest Africa"; "God's Eager Fool"; "The Greatest Christian"; "Great Man In The Jungle"; "A Man of Mercy"; "The Great Men's Greatest Man"; and "God's Chosen Man". There are articles which present some of his ideas or describe his work or report his activities. There are also, however, many articles which praise his life and activities and seek to embellish the already glowing image of Schweitzer, the man. The following selected paragraphs will provide a few examples of this.

There are many people who hold that Albert Schweitzer is the greatest man in the world today. It would probably be more correct to say that he is the great men's choice for 'greatest man.'

However divergent the definitions of greatness, Albert Schweitzer is certainly a man without parallel in our generation.⁵

Albert Schweitzer is perhaps the twentieth century's outstanding example of a man who claimed and justified citizenship in humanity and the human spirit.⁶

Their appeal for us today lies not so much in the text itself as in the life and work of the extraordinarily gifted man who wrote them. Albert Schweitzer has been called an authentic genius, one of the really great men of our era, his name has been linked with Gandhi's as a saint of the twentieth century.⁷

By what we deduce from his books--his gentle temperament--Albert Schweitzer seems to have been born a natural disciple of Christ; but equally fundamentally, he was born the questioner, the searcher who venerated finally only demonstrable truth.⁸

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Dr. Schweitzer may be looked at as a thinker and as a saint.⁹

In another day and generation, Dr. Albert Schweitzer physician extraordinary, theologian, missionary and one of the world's finest organists, would be a candidate for canonization. Dr. Schweitzer readily might have the choice of occupying any one of a

⁵Kees Van Hoek, "Albert Schweitzer The Great Men's Greatest Man," The Rotarian, LXXX, No. 2, p. 6.

⁶"Renunciation of Thought," Saturday Review of Literature, Vol. XXXII, No. 3 (June 15, 1949), p. 22.

⁷Robert Bierstedt, "Hospital in the Jungle," Saturday Review of Literature, Vol. XXXII, No. 2 (January 8, 1949), p. 18.

⁸Frank Kendon, "Albert Schweitzer," The Fortnightly, Vol. CLXIII (January, 1948), p. 60.

⁹Ibid., p. 63.

thousand important and remunerative positions in America or Europe.¹⁰

There is a small group of men today, mostly educators, who believe the title of "greatest man in the world" should go--if it goes to anyone--to the broad shaggy, gray-mustached man above. He is Albert Schweitzer, Ph.D., Th.D., Mus.D., M.D., a seventy-two year old medical missionary . . .¹¹

Among the non-political world figures, Albert Schweitzer, eminent doctor-philosopher-musician who has devoted most of his life to missionary work among the natives of Africa, was at the head of the Saturday Review of Literature balloting.

Outside the area of political power and public affairs two transcendent men of the mind and spirit were voted "greatest in the world" by SRL readers. Next to Albert Schweitzer was Albert Einstein.¹²

For many persons their knowledge of, and touch with, Schweitzer is not based upon seeing his actions or reading his books, but on reports such as the preceding. There have been critics and criticism, to be sure, but the overwhelming majority of reports are of a highly favorable, even glowing, nature. The point is not that these articles are wrong or necessarily unfounded in their judgments, but rather that for

¹⁰"A Master in Darkest Africa," Etude, Vol. LXII, No. 1 (January, 1944), p. 10.

¹¹"The Greatest Man in the World," Life, Vol. 23, No. 14 (October 6, 1947), p. 95.

¹²William D. Patterson, "The Hour and the Man," Saturday Review of Literature, Vol. XXIV, No. 1 (January 6, 1951), p. 10.

many persons, the only channel of knowing Schweitzer is through these articles; and the image then formed is of a saint, a giant, and a genius. They contain highly favorable, general statements which note the climax, the most glamorized portion of his career, its last twenty to thirty years. The real Schweitzer as revealed in his actions and writings may thus be obscured.

There is an obvious danger which lies in an image formed by misleading information. This danger is the rapid disenchantment which follows when the glowing image is disturbed by contradictory, less flattering, or at least, more realistic accounts of Schweitzer's actions and ideas. His highly unorthodox theological position; his sharp criticism of nationalistic pride; his old fashioned, seemingly unsanitary hospital; his curt manner in handling natives; his sometimes abrupt conversational manner; his out-dated ideas in certain matters seem to clash with the saint, the man of mercy image; and scorn and debunking can follow. Here again the more accurate view of the man becomes obscured.

Certainly, Dr. Schweitzer is not above criticism. He is human, and he makes mistakes and, as is true in all personalities, he has positive and negative elements. Criticisms of Dr. Schweitzer seem to fall into one of two categories: personal criticism of him and his work, or scholarly criticism

of his ideas. He has been familiar with the latter for many years. The publishing of his controversial works in theology and philosophy called forth criticism of those who disagreed with his findings. Especially his studies of Jesus brought admiration and adverse argument from Europe and England. His study had subjected so many of the other studies of Jesus to such critical scrutiny that it was to be expected that the reception from many would be chilly. In England the reception met with a great many adverse critics, for his work challenged many traditionally held concepts of doctrine and dogma. As to be expected, the attitude of Catholic reviewers was negative. Oskar Kraus, though an admirer of Schweitzer, roundly argued against his philosophy in his book Albert Schweitzer His Work and His Philosophy. He found his philosophy inconsistent. "I definitely reject his system of philosophy, which in my opinion belongs to the mystic-speculative phase of modern thought."¹³ The type of criticism here indicated was inevitable in the wake of his ideas which were so contrary to traditional thought.

The other type of criticism is that which finds quarrel with his personality, his actions, and his hospital. It seeks out inconsistencies and human foibles that contradict

¹³Oskar Kraus, Albert Schweitzer His Work and His Philosophy (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1944), p. viii.

or call into question the image of him as a world great.

For example, critics of his hospital abound in reports of the unsanitary conditions, the lack of modern equipment, the almost unhealthful conditions that seem to prevail. It would indeed be a strange experience for an American or European who knew Dr. Schweitzer only by articles and from enthusiasts, not from his writings or his actions, to arrive at the hospital. Goats, chickens, dogs, and children run freely about. The heavy, humid atmosphere holds the mingling odors of animals, outdoor cooking, open latrines, and sickness close to the hospital. There is no white, anti-septic atmosphere of the usual hospital. The operating room is partly open air; the beds have no sheets. Gasoline generated electricity operates an x-ray machine and provides light for the operating room. It often breaks down, and it is not unusual for operations to be completed under the lights of powerful flashlights. When a patient arrives, he brings his immediate family and sometimes other relatives. Though food is provided by the hospital, the natives must cook it themselves. Patients live in small wooden cubicles with their family and animals. All of this is a disappointing picture to some visitors to Lambaréné and leaves them confused. It is a picture that cannot be denied.

They come to Lambaréné with an image of sweet saintly St. Thomas feeding the birds and they see instead a driving man fighting the jungle and African lethargy and they do not remain for a sufficiently long period to see or sense the goodness and saintliness underneath. They go away feeling hurt and unhappy.¹⁴

There would seem to be little excuse for outdated equipment and unsanitary conditions to exist in modern twentieth century. Up-to-date, efficient hospitals have been set up in Africa; and it would indeed seem strange that Dr. Schweitzer would not insist upon like conditions in his hospital. Whether conditions at his hospital can be defended as compared to modern day gleaming, antiseptic standards is not the point. Under such comparison his hospital is sure to be out of place. The judgment, however, needs to be made on an accurate understanding of Schweitzer through his actions and his writings.

Schweitzer's purpose in going to Africa was to help and heal the African. This he has done. Records of the thousands of patients that have been treated at his hospital testify to that. It must be remembered that Dr. Schweitzer's venture was an individual one; he was not financially supported in any way other than his books, his concerts, and lectures. When the hospital was built in 1926, he records:

¹⁴Norman Cousins, Dr. Schweitzer of Lambaréné, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 20.

"Buildings of stone or brick are unthinkable; they would cost us too much time, and far too much money."¹⁵ The building was built for the patient's comfort, not for comfort as it is understood by the more civilized European or American. It needed to be a place in which the native would feel at home, a place to which he would not be afraid to come. Its very arrangement was planned with such factors as this in mind.

The hospital will spread out along the river, having to be built near it because the natives are accustomed to live near the water. They like, too, to have their canoes within sight.¹⁶

So I shall be a modern prehistoric man and build my hospital like a lake-dweller's village, but of corrugated iron.¹⁷

Perhaps "village" is a more accurate term than hospital, for the atmosphere and arrangement and the daily routine give the picture of a village. This has been noted by several who have attempted to answer the criticisms directed against Dr. Schweitzer's hospital.

The difficulty, of course, is with the term 'hospital' as applied to the Schweitzer colony. It creates false images and expectations by outsiders. The proper term should be 'jungle

¹⁵Albert Schweitzer, On the Edge of the Primeval Forest and More From the Primeval Forest (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956), p. 197.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 198.

clinic.' Dr. Schweitzer did not come to Africa for the purpose of building a towering medical center. He came in order to meet the Africans on their own terms.¹⁸

The reality struck me with clarity: Albert Schweitzer's so called hospital was designed essentially as an African forest village to suit his 'clients.' All the daytime functions that occur between birth and death in African villages--gathering firewood, hunting food, fetching water, cooking in soot-blackened utensils, unceremonial eating of staples like bananas, manioc, imported rice, and river fish, desultory working, resting, mending, and baby sitting--were here occurring in complete candor.¹⁹

Whether these comments are sufficient explanations for the type of hospital Dr. Schweitzer has built and operates is up to individual evaluation. The hospital clearly reflects the context of Schweitzer's purpose, his available means, and his thinking. For those who do not know these purposes or his thinking, the make-up of his hospital would indeed seem incongruous, especially if the image they held of him was as one of the "greatest men of the world."

Similar severe criticisms are delivered against Dr. Schweitzer's attitude toward, and his treatment of, the natives. Many know of Schweitzer's commanding concept,

¹⁸Norman Cousins, "Lambaréné and the Image of Schweitzer," Saturday Review of Literature, XL, No. 52 (December 28, 1957), p. 18.

¹⁹Phillips, op. cit., p. 21.

Reverence for Life, and many have been subjected to an image of him as a man of gentleness, kindness and mercy. Therefore, a view of him or a report describing his berating the natives, speaking harshly to them, locking tools away from them, referring to them as lazy or untruthful, keeping a constant eye on their work, and being critical of it would seem a harsh contradiction to what one expects from him. His writings, however, indicate a profound respect and sympathy for the native. They also, however, reveal forty years of experience with the native which has taught him the difficulties of working with an undisciplined, primitive mind.

That one can never leave them alone in a room, that one keeps everything locked up and does not trust them with more than the exact amount of foodstuffs, is not taken by the black servants as an insult. They themselves expect us to observe these precautionary measures strictly, in order that they may not be held responsible for an occasional theft.²⁰

Worse still, however, than this, the negro steals not merely what will be of value to him, but anything that attracts him for the moment. Mr. Rambaud, of Samkita, lost in this way part of a valuable work in several volumes, and there disappeared one day from my bookshelf the piano edition of Wagner's 'Meistersinger' and the copy of Bach's Passion Music (S. Matthew), into which I had written the organ accompaniment, which I had worked out very carefully! This feeling of

²⁰Ibid., p. 43.

never being safe from the stupidest piece of theft brings one sometimes almost to despair, and to have to keep everything locked up and turn oneself into a walking bunch of keys adds a terrible burden to life.²¹

When one recalls the precision with which Dr. Schweitzer's mind works, the driving force he has within himself and the amount of energy he expends, it seems quite natural for the lethargic child-like behavior of the native to be a source of irritation to him.

Sometimes I have half a dozen workers, sometimes a couple; often when I come down in the morning I cannot find a single one. They have gone fishing, or have left to visit their village and get a supply of food, or they had to go somewhere to take part in a great palayer. Then the work is at a standstill for days.²²

Noting this incident and then recalling his student days, when he drove himself day and night for years, and being aware of his working himself to sickness and exhaustion in Europe and in Africa, one can easily see that the easy going manner of the native would prove exasperating. Also, when one remembers that Dr. Schweitzer sacrificed a successful, intellectual life in Europe to serve the native, then his behavior does not seem so incongruous in this strange and primitive environment which he has adopted.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid., p. 129.

But this is only half the story. His writings and actions also manifest a warmth and affection for the native.

Anyone who has once arrived at knowing the inner personality of the African knows that he has a fine nature in spite of his curious weak points and faults. During the many years in which I have had to do with Negroes, although I have had so many occasions for anger, I have learnt to respect and value them, and I believe this will be the experience of every European who associates with them not alone as a superior but as a human being.²³

Beyond this basic respect for the native, suggested by this preceding statement, he also has found an intellectual and reflective capacity in them that would not seem apparent from most of the actions and concepts of the native.

I am also astonished at the reflective powers which I so frequently meet with in Negroes. They are preoccupied with the questions of existence in a direct and living fashion, although they seldom say anything about such things to us. But on the occasion when this does happen, it becomes evident that they have an inner life which we should never have suspected in them. I have had conversations with Africans that affected me deeply.²⁴

Dr. Schweitzer points out that all too often the white man's only relationship with the Negro is that of employer to laborer. Labor is new to the African, for little work, if any, is needed for survival in Africa, and therefore

²³Albert Schweitzer, African Notebook (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1958), p. 136.

²⁴Ibid., p. 135-136.

he is used to freedom. With vegetation, fish and game usually in abundance, work is looked upon as an infringement of this freedom. Thus, his relationship with his employer is not that which shows the employer the better aspects of his nature.

I do not deny that they are undisciplined and in many ways unreliable, and that many of them give way to the temptation to appropriate other people's property and that all too often they are untruthful. But I think I may add in extenuation, that the relationship of employee in which we commonly make their acquaintance, is still unusual for people who are accustomed to freedom, and they have not yet settled down to the position.²⁵

Again, whether these are sufficient reasons for Dr. Schweitzer's general approach and behavior toward the natives is a matter of individual evaluation. His personality, his background, and his experiences with the natives need to be considered in the evaluation. However, to a person unfamiliar with him and his ideas, who knew him as the "Great Man in the Jungle," his behavior could seem unjust.

Whether one can rationalize all points of contradiction within Schweitzer is not the significant factor. Whether one can, with accuracy, substantiate his criticisms of Dr. Schweitzer is not significant. The point to be noted is that an accurate evaluation of Dr. Schweitzer needs to be

²⁵Ibid., pp. 131-132.

made on the basis of knowing him as accurately and completely as possible. His extraordinary accomplishments have made him a legend in his own time. Extravagant praise and use of knowledge based on brief eulogistic articles have built an aura of saintliness about him that obscures the real man and his ideas. Disenchantment is sure to follow when accurate reporting, then, does break through.

Albert Schweitzer will not be immune from attack. There will be a period in which his weaknesses and his faults will be exposed and exploited, much of it with an air of fresh discovery and all of it in a mood of disillusion. But in the long run the inconsistencies and paradoxes will be as nothing alongside the real meaning of Albert Schweitzer and his place in history. For Albert Schweitzer has done more to dramatize the reach of moral man than anyone in contemporary civilization.²⁶

In striving for a clear view of Albert Schweitzer it is necessary to recognize both extremes in the reactions to him. A man who has risen to such world renown is bound to have legends of both adverse criticism and worship clinging to him. Evaluations must be made with care, ascertaining whether or not they are based on taking full cognizance of the entire man in complete and accurate context. In acknowledging reaction to him and what he has said or done, one must be watchful for those who overdo their enthusiasm for him,

²⁶Cousins, "Lambaréné and the Image of Schweitzer," p. 20.

thus, perhaps, throwing his true significance out of focus. Similar caution is needed in viewing the scoffers who deny him significance because of their disenchantment upon seeing the man through the legend. Contradictions should be carefully scrutinized to ascertain whether in the revealing light of the surrounding context they are truly contradictions. Dr. Schweitzer should not be over estimated nor underestimated.

The problems which evolve from viewing Schweitzer as a legend have significant ramifications for this particular study. Looking upon him as a legend affects the examination and evaluation of the following: him as a speaker; his audiences; and his speaking occasions.

The legend and the clear view might clash when viewing Schweitzer as a speaker in the following manner. The clear view of Schweitzer indicates that as a speaker he will almost always be precisely and thoughtfully prepared. His writings and actions indicate that his efforts are all executed with thoughtful and purposive intent. The legend around him, however, might not necessarily indicate these qualities. For example, Dr. Schweitzer heard of his receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953, but he did not feel that he could leave his work at the hospital to accept the prize until a year later.

Dr. Dchweitzer expressed his pleasure at the distinction bestowed on him, but he said, 'No man has the right to pretend that he has worked enough for the cause of peace or to declare himself satisfied.' Then he explained that he was much too busy to reply to the congratulatory messages he had received or to go to Oslo to receive his prize. And then, cabled the correspondent, he 'abruptly broke off the interview to tend to the broken leg of an African patient who had arrived by dugout canoe.'²⁷

This report might imply that Dr. Schweitzer's reaction, upon being informed about his receiving one of the highest distinctions the world can bestow on a man, was abrupt, perhaps even ungrateful. However, knowing his painstaking responsibility to the details of his hospital, indeed to all his efforts, his preoccupation with the job at hand seems quite natural. He spent six months preparing his Nobel acceptance speech: "developing my theme with great care."²⁸ This indicates appreciation, respect and a full understanding of the responsibility involved in the award.

The audiences which hear Albert Schweitzer can be affected by the legend in several ways. For example, the audience may alter in make-up and size. Dr. Schweitzer faces a variety of audiences depending upon the purpose of his speaking. For example, as a lecturer he speaks primarily

²⁷"News of Nobel Award Reaches Schweitzer in Lambarene," Christian Century, Vol. LXX, No. 46 (November 18, 1953), p. 1316.

²⁸Cousins, Dr. Schweitzer of Lambarene, p. 186.

before students and academic audiences. This was true, for instance, when he delivered the Selly Oak Lectures, the Hibbert Lectures, and the Gifford Lectures. When he preaches, on the other hand, his audiences may consist of villagers, European or English middle class persons, or African natives. As a musician his audience would be comprised of Bach and organ enthusiasts. With the upsurge of his popularity, the numbers of those who make up his audiences has increased. More and more people, who know less and less about him, flock to hear him speak. This can be illustrated by this statement concerning his arrival at Oslo to deliver his Acceptance Address.

Never before has the winner of this award aroused such public interest here. The railway station was crowded and police had to escort the seventy-nine year old philosopher and humanitarian to a car. A line formed last night for tickets to tomorrow's presentation ceremony.²⁹

Another example would be his trip to the United States to deliver the Goethe Address at Aspen, Colorado. It is infamous for its stories of the constant interruptions to which he was subjected. The kind of attention paid to him during his entire trip and while he was in attendance at the Convocation imply how emotionally charged the atmosphere can

²⁹New York Times, Vol. CIV, No. 35,347 (November 3, 1954), p. 6.

be when he is present. It also suggests that his audience was quite possibly influenced by this atmosphere and, in part, made up of these kinds of admirers. Even his meals were interrupted, and he was sought after constantly for his autograph. He has received similar treatment on trips to Europe when he is to give an organ concert. For example, people would troop to the churches while he was practicing; go to the loft and ask questions and seek autographs. When he would leave the organ to sit elsewhere to check the tone of the organ, he would be followed by the train of his admirers. Pilgrimages are made to his hospital and to Günsbach by fans and enthusiasts. Those who travel with him try in vain to protect him from some of the inconsiderateness of those who crowd around him. This kind of adulation may increase the size of his audience; it can affect the make-up of the audience; and it also affects the general atmosphere surrounding any situation that includes Dr. Schweitzer's presence, and this in turn can influence the atmosphere surrounding his audience.

This attention and popularity indicate that Schweitzer's audiences, at present, are apt to be filled with rapt admirers. Their accurate knowledge of him and his ideas is open to question. Undoubtedly some members of the audience are acquainted with him and his ideas; and then, undoubtedly,

others are not. The Nobel Address was delivered in French to an audience speaking mainly Norwegian, though many undoubtedly understood the French. The Selly Oak Lectures were given in German to a largely English speaking audience. The Aspen speech was delivered once in French and then once in German to a largely, not entirely, English speaking audience. These indicate that on a number of occasions not all in his audience understand the language in which he speaks. Often, as previously noted, it is translated sentence-by-sentence on the spot. For his audience to remain attentive under such circumstances suggests that a number of influences may be operating. One such influence is the respect which his audience may have for his life; another influence probably is respect for his ideas and what he is saying; and then another influence, undoubtedly is that of looking on him as a living legend, to be viewed with awe.

The growth of Schweitzer's popularity would also influence the occasions of his speaking. Because of his extensive knowledge in various areas, often the reason for asking him to speak is that he speaks with authority on the subject involved. In past years, however, when he has been flooded with invitations to address groups, cities, universities, and classes, it is reasonable to assume that the growth of the Schweitzer legend has contributed to the large

number of invitations. For example, he has been invited repeatedly to America, to visit, to lecture, and to speak. Twice he declined to speak at the Goethe Bicentennial in Aspen, before finally accepting when he "realized what the fee offered might do for his hospital."³⁰ It would seem reasonable to assume that the growth of the Schweitzer legend has been the reason for his being asked to speak at an increasing number of occasions; it would be a contributing reason if not the sole one. When discussing the effect of the legend upon his audience, it was suggested that the atmosphere of an occasion is affected by the strong reaction to his presence. Thus, with the growth of the Schweitzer legend, the very nature of the occasion is molded, in part, by his presence.

This chapter has attempted to acknowledge the growth of a Schweitzer legend. It has indicated the need for a clear view and has examined means of achieving that view. The implications of seeing Schweitzer, the man and the legend, were suggested as they affected this particular study. Several general conclusions may be noted: (1) For an accurate study and evaluation of Albert Schweitzer, each item involved should be viewed in its rightful context,

³⁰Joy, Music in the Life of Albert Schweitzer, p. 247.

noting its many implications, (2) A clear view of Schweitzer will depend in no small measure on not relying upon extreme views of him. In other words, one must be careful not to make excuses and rationalize his ideas and behavior, and one must be careful not to overestimate his actions or ideas on the basis of extremely favorable reports. When dealing with Schweitzer, the speaker, one can expect both accurate criticism and unthinking adulation to be taking part in the reactions to his speeches, in his audience's behavior, and in the setting of the speech. Summarily stated, then, this chapter is a caution to keep evaluation of Schweitzer sound and accurate in the face of the legend that has grown about him.

CHAPTER V

THE SPEAKING OF ALBERT SCHWEITZER

Speaking has played a prominent role in Dr. Schweitzer's life since his days as a young professor at Strasbourg; and as the years progressed, this speaking activity increased. After resigning from his hospital and church responsibilities in Strasbourg in 1921, Dr. Schweitzer decided to depend entirely upon his writings, concerts, and lectures for his life support. The maintenance and expansion of his Lambaréné hospital resulted from these lecture-concert-writing activities, and today Dr. Schweitzer is in constant demand as a lecturer and speaker. It is reasonable to assume that if he were not at his hospital in Africa, he would be kept busy, constantly fulfilling speaking requests.

It is the purpose of this chapter to provide an overview of the speaking of Albert Schweitzer principally in order to provide as complete a context as possible. It will survey the general types of speaking which Dr. Schweitzer does, and within these types will provide a description of the occasions and the nature of the audiences. Dr. Schweitzer's speaking seems to fall naturally into three general

categories: (1) Preaching, on the continent and in Africa; (2) Lecturing, in the classroom and as a guest lecturer in various universities; and (3) Occasional Speaking, such as his informal speeches on Lambaréné, his more formal Goethe addresses, and the acceptance of awards. Each of these types will be generally examined; and, insofar as it is possible, the occasion, the audience, the general content of the speech its delivery and Dr. Schweitzer's adaptation to each situation will be described. Special problems which Dr. Schweitzer faces will then be analyzed. These will include, especially, the problems involved in translation and the problems caused by the effect of the Schweitzer legend upon the speaking situations. Certain conclusions will then be drawn which will be helpful in establishing the relationship between Schweitzer's speaking in general to the several speeches selected for more intensive study. Also, conclusions will be drawn as to how Schweitzer's speaking, in general, reflect the man and his ideas.

Schweitzer: The Preacher

The importance of preaching, to Schweitzer, has been noted several times. It is also evidenced by the sadness he felt when he decided to give up preaching and teaching to go to Africa.

Not to preach anymore, not to lecture anymore, was for me a great sacrifice, and till I left for Africa I avoided, as far as possible, going past either St. Nicholas' or the university, because the very sight of the places where I had carried on work which I could never resume was too painful for me.¹

As it turned out, the preaching ban that had been placed on Schweitzer by the Paris Missionary Society was lifted soon after he arrived in Africa. Also, whenever he returned to Europe to visit, he found ample opportunity to preach. Therefore, although going to Africa meant giving up the day-by-day, week-by-week preaching life that meant so much to him, it did not mean a final end to this activity. From these statements, then, it appears that Schweitzer's preaching falls into two divisions: (1) that done in Europe and (2) that done in Africa.

Dr. Schweitzer's love for preaching and his sincere religious enthusiasm are revealed in his European preaching, more especially at St. Nicholas and in Günsbach. As is true of his other interests and activities, this desire to preach, to participate in meaningful religious activity, stems from his childhood and from his family heritage. He recalls how he missed his father's preaching when he first went to Mülhausen as a young boy.

¹Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, pp. 111-112.

In my first years at Mülhausen I suffered from a homesick longing for the church at Günsbach; I missed my father's sermons, and the services I had been familiar with all my life.

The sermons used to make a great impression on me, because I could see how much of what my father said in the pulpit was of a piece with his own life and experience. I came to see what an effort, I might say, what a struggle, it meant for him to open his heart to the people every Sunday. I still remember sermons I heard from him while I was at the village school.²

Beyond the immediate influence of his father, there had been a number of pastors in his family background. For example, there was his Grandfather Schillinger, who has been mentioned before. Of particular influence was his mother's brother, Schweitzer's Uncle Albert, after whom he was named. This Uncle had been pastor of St. Nicholas church in Strasbourg and had performed rather heroically during the siege of Strasbourg in 1870. Schweitzer recalls his feeling of responsibility to live up to his namesake.

The thought of how I could provide, as it were, a continuation of a man whom my mother had loved so much haunted me a great deal, especially as I had heard so many stories of his kindness.³

It would seem, then, most natural for Schweitzer to become a preacher. He has preached extensively much of his life, ever

²Albert Schweitzer, Memoirs from Childhood and Youth, p. 44.

³Ibid., p. 27.

since he first became associated with St. Nicholas. Also, he often preached at Günsbach, and later he preached in many churches in England and Europe.

It was in 1899 that Schweitzer first began his preaching at St. Nicholas, and he records that his responsibilities there were a joy to him. Also, he seems to have received the approval of his congregation, the only adverse criticism to be discovered being that in his first months, some of the congregation complained that his afternoon sermons were too short. Telling about this situation in his autobiography, Schweitzer reports that he looked upon these afternoon services more as a devotional exercise than full sermons. He suggested to the Inspector in Spiritual Matters at St. Nicholas that the congregation be informed that Schweitzer "was only a poor curate who stopped speaking when he found he had nothing more to say about the text."⁴ The general, overall opinion, however, seems to have been that Schweitzer was well liked in his capacity of preacher. A letter from Charles R. Joy, an authoritative writer on Schweitzer reports:

He seems to have been a very popular preacher at St. Nicholas in Strasbourg from 1901 to 1913. He was a Vicar there for the two older Pfarrer

⁴Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 27.

(preachers). And it is said that when he preached he talked about Strasbourg and Illgraben, not about remote places like Jordan and Jerusalem.⁵

Schweitzer's European congregations have varied somewhat. At St. Nicholas it is reported to have been made up of "intelligent, deeply devout middle class people, small traders and craftsmen and a few academics."⁶ In the same letter, Dr. Naish, who heard Dr. Schweitzer preach several times at St. Nicholas, recalls that the congregation numbered approximately one hundred and fifty persons. In Günsbach, on the other hand, Schweitzer's congregation included villagers, peasants, and laborers, according to Mr. Seaver's various descriptions. Dr. Naish describes the English congregations to whom Dr. Schweitzer preached as "the small, independent, middle class, just comfortably off, but quite not rich [sic.]; are the thinking people who read philosophy, poetry and religious books in the evening."⁷

The general characteristics of Schweitzer's sermons seem to have been simplicity and directness. These characteristics were implied by Mr. Joy's statement which

⁵Letter from Charles R. Joy, February 13, 1961.

⁶Letter from Dr. J. P. Naish, first translator of Schweitzer's Dale Memorial Lectures, June 26, 1960.

⁷Ibid.

mentioned Schweitzer's application of his ideas to the immediate occasion and audience. Parables often form the text and basis for the sermon, whether he is preaching at St. Nicholas, in Günsbach, or in England. This is illustrated by the following sermon subjects: a morning sermon in Günsbach preached on the parable of the tares; an evening service at a neighboring village on a plea to return to the old fashioned manner of honoring Sunday; and a sermon at a Guildhouse in England on the theme of "Forgiveness."

Dr. Schweitzer's delivery, in his preaching, corresponds to this simplicity and directness found in the content of his sermons. Dr. Naish recalls Schweitzer's delivery of a sermon at St. Nicholas as follows:

It's thirty-five years since I heard my old friend, but I remember perfectly clearly on Easter Sunday, 1921, in the St. Nicolas Kirche at Strasbourg his most impressive appearance in Geneva gown, white bands, black hair, thick black moustache, careful, slow, clear, attractive enunciation, pregnant with earnestness, shot through with intense vitality - few gestures, very quiet dignified stance (no outward "tricks" will take the place of deep inward conviction) few gestures, but never wooden - alive intensely.⁸

This same simplicity is indicated by Joy in his description of Schweitzer's delivery of a sermon to the St. Nicholas congregation:

⁸Ibid.

The people of St. Nicolas said he was no orator but he spoke to their hearts and the pews began to fill up. It seemed to them he was meditating in the pulpit, but often he was answering some question that one of them had put to him in the week preceding.⁹

The same atmosphere is suggested in Mr. Seaver's several descriptions of sermons at Günsbach.

The next morning is Missionary Sunday in the village, a rare coincidence. He is asked to speak in the church of his native village, which is crowded to its utmost capacity. The people flock from distant places to hear him. They consist mainly of peasant and labourers, young and old; but how simply the learned Doctor imparts his thoughts to them.¹⁰

Later all the household goes with the Doctor to morning service. He is in the black gown and Geneva bands worn by his father and carries the "toque" (cap) which belonged to his grandfather. That day he is taking the service and preaching and the organist plays a prelude by Bach carefully practised for this occasion, for Dr. Schweitzer does not often preach. The sermon on the Parable of the Tares among the Wheat is full of the power of the love of God, a power that will burn up what is wrong and sinful as the sun burns up the weeds.¹¹

The evening service is held in the village of Gresbach on the other side of the valley, in the village hall, because Gresbach has no church. It is filled with villagers, men and women, and children. One of them plays a voluntary on the little harmonium and the Doctor reads the Lesson and preaches with admirable clearness, directness and simplicity.¹²

⁹Letter from Charles R. Joy, February 13, 1961.

¹⁰Seaver, op. cit., p. 130.

¹¹Ibid., p. 134.

¹²Ibid., p. 135.

The sermons in England are reported to have these same qualities. In this report of an English sermon, there is the first mention of Schweitzer's holding an audience "spell-bound," but this is a phrase used more and more by reporters in later years.

The same quality of artistic perfection was remarked in his sermons. These, delivered with the utmost simplicity of phrasing and directness, were in much request at the Guildhouse, packed as it always was almost to suffocation on these occasions by a spell-bound audience. 'He never gave us a long sermon, but we always wished he had . . .'¹³

In England translation of the sermon is an additional feature of his process of oral presentation. Schweitzer used his method of sentence-by-sentence translation which he had developed.

These descriptions of Schweitzer's preaching in Europe either directly state or imply that he adapts the content of his sermons directly to his specific audience. This is a significant factor in Schweitzer's speaking. Even in sermons and speeches which are of a more universal nature and which apply to all of Western Civilization, there are found phrases, personal references, and examples which indicate that Dr. Schweitzer is always conscious of his audience and speaks directly to them. This is emphasized by

¹³Ibid., p. 108.

observations made by those who have heard him speak on the same topic on different occasions and to different audiences. His four major addresses on Goethe offer examples of his discussing the same subject while at the same time adapting it to his specific audience. Seaver notes this factor in Schweitzer's preaching.

One of the many sermons that he has preached on at the Guildhouse, perhaps the best remembered is the one on the subject of Forgiveness. This affords one of the most striking examples of Schweitzer's faculty of adapting his treatment of the same subject to accord with his hearer's understanding; for he has preached on Forgiveness in a very different manner to his negroes in Lambaréné, and has written upon it in his *Civilization and Ethics* in a manner suitable to the comprehension of philosophers and psychologists alike.¹⁴

This adaptation is vividly exemplified, as suggested by Seaver, by examining the second general classification of his preaching, that to the natives in Africa.

Soon after arriving in Africa, it was clear to Schweitzer that preaching to the natives would have to be of a most simple and direct nature. Matters of doctrine and dogma held no meaning for the African native. Schweitzer reports this observation in his autobiography when he is referring to the mission preachers.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 108-109.

If they wanted to be understood by their hearers they could do nothing beyond preaching the simple Gospel of becoming freed from the world by the spirit of Jesus, the Gospel which comes to us in the Sermon on the Mount and the finest sayings of St. Paul. Necessity compelled them to put forward Christianity as before all else an ethical religion.¹⁵

As described by Schweitzer and a number of those who have visited him in Africa, the atmosphere of the preaching occasions, for the presentation of this basic Christianity stands in sharp contrast to the warm, dignified occasions depicted in his European and English occasions. There are no altars, no pews and no organ. An old gramophone provided music at one time, but it no longer operates. The congregation sit on the ground wherever they please. Dr. Schweitzer offers a description of this kind of African congregation in an essay, "A Sunday in Lambaréné" in Seaver's biography.

I overlook the fact that those who have their fireplaces between these two wards cook their dinners while they are listening, that a mother washes and combs her baby's hair, that a man mends his fishing net, which he has hung up under the roof of the ward, and that many similar things take place. Even when a savage makes use of the time to lay his head on a comrade's lap and let him go on a sporting expedition through his hair, I do not stop it. For there are always new people there, and if I were to continually keep on admonishing them during the service, its solemnity would be much more disturbed; so I leave things alone. Nor do I take any notice

¹⁵Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 142.

of the sheep and goats who come and go among my congregation, of the numerous weaver-birds which have nests in the trees near by and make a noise that forces me to raise my voice.¹⁶

In the Africa of Albert Schweitzer by Charles Joy and Melvin Arnold, another general description of the hearers provides further illumination as to the variety of persons Dr. Schweitzer faced as he preached in Africa.

And the people! What a study in black humanity! Some of them have come long distances by river and jungle trail. Many have never heard Christian preaching before. They roll the whites of their eyes as they watch everything with inscrutable faces. What magic will the white fetisher perform? Others come from the vicinity. They know what to expect, but their faces are as impassive as those of the others. Some of them have been at the Christian missions, and the Catholic converts wear a little medal hanging from their necks. Some come from the once-ferocious Pahouin tribes. Others come from the coastal tribes, the Galoas. Some of the congregation are awaiting operations. Others are convalescing from them. A scrawny old man dances and sings at the end of the little street. He chuckles and laughs. He is very happy. He is insane. A boy limps up and sits on the ground, a huge phagedenic ulcer on the side of his leg. A woman with a goiter sits beside him.¹⁷

Joy and Arnold describe further, that, in front of this unusual congregation stands a Schweitzer who is also a marked contrast to the European preacher of St. Nicholas. He wears

¹⁶Seaver, op. cit., p. 120.

¹⁷Charles R. Joy and Melvin Arnold, The Africa of Albert Schweitzer (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), pp. 146-147.

no robe but is clad simply in his usual, mended khaki trousers and a white shirt which is open at the collar. They point out that the two native interpreters standing on either side of him "are much better dressed than Albert Schweitzer."¹⁸

Preaching to those who do not have the religious, moral heritage that one can assume in a European audience means reducing the subject matter to its most basic elements. Schweitzer points this out.

While preaching I must take pains to be as simple as possible. I must assume nothing. My listeners know nothing of Adam and Eve, of the Patriarchs, of the People of Israel, of Moses and the Prophets, of the Law, of the Pharisees, of the Messiah, of the Apostles . . . I must let the Word of God speak to them almost without reference to Time. Since I must avoid so much while I am speaking, I feel as if I were playing the piano without being allowed to touch the black keys.

If I utter the word 'Messiah,' I explain it at once as 'the King of our hearts, who was sent by God.'¹⁹

He further indicates that once one gets used to this, it does not seem to impose a hardship. He explains that the thrill of presenting Scripture for the very first time to persons, more than compensates for the difficulties involved. He explains how he picks his brief text carefully and repeats

¹⁸Ibid., p. 147.

¹⁹Seaver, op. cit., p. 121.

it several times before the close of the sermon, in hopes that the listeners will remember it. Most of the sermon concerns an application of the text to the lives of those who hear him.

How careful one must be in preaching not to speak of things of which the Africans can have no notion! There are a number of parables of Jesus one either cannot use or must rewrite because the natives of the Ogowe region do not know what a vine or a cornfield is.²⁰

Thus, his sermons usually consist of a simple Biblical truth with many examples of it drawn from the daily life of the native. The sermon on Forgiveness, for example, which has ideas expressed with real meaning for the congregation in England, and is examined in Schweitzer's book Philosophy of Civilization, becomes for the African native a description of his forgiving others for seven wrongs done to him during the day. For example, he forgives another when he is insulted by him, a neighbor whose goat eats his bananas; a man who lies during a banana transaction; the person who steals his firewood; someone who steals his bush-knife; someone who takes his torch, and finally someone who borrows his boat without telling him. All these he must forgive, and thus the native learns about a saying of Jesus through his own experiences.

²⁰Albert Schweitzer, African Notebook (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1958), pp. 120-121.

The sermons to the natives are delivered through the help of two interpreters. Seaver mentions that it is curious that Dr. Schweitzer has never learned to speak any of the native languages fluently enough to preach in it. Instead, using interpreters, he employs his method of sentence-by-sentence translation. One interpreter speaks the Pahouin dialect, the other the Galoan dialect. Joy and Arnold indicate that there are probably many more dialects represented in the congregation, "but more interpreters would bring confusion into the service."²¹ Schweitzer explains that the night before, the interpreters have gone over the sermon with him to make certain that it would be translated with greater ease on Sunday. Thus even the jungle sermons manifest his careful preparation. While delivering the African sermon, Schweitzer uses few gestures; and these are of a simple nature, according to various observers.

Schweitzer works to adapt his preaching to the occasion, to the special environment of the jungle, and to the particular needs of the native audiences. Joy corroborates this.

I have listened to him preach to the African natives in these later years. I've noticed the same thing. His imagery comes out of their own experience. He

²¹Joy and Arnold, op. cit., p. 147.

talks to them about the river, about the tornado, about the season, about their own lives and habits and problems.²²

This adaptation to the natives seems to result in their attentiveness to Schweitzer's speaking, for he reports that in spite of the many distractions while preaching, he feels that the people listen and comprehend, at least somewhat, what he is saying to them.

I need not complain of any want of attentiveness among my hearers. One can see in their faces how their minds are occupied with what they have heard. I often break off in order to ask them whether their heart and their thoughts agree that what they have heard of the Word of God is right, or whether anyone has anything to say to the contrary. Then in a loud chorus they reply that what I have said is true.²³

These reports and comments concerning Schweitzer's preaching in Africa refer primarily to a few years ago, for he does not preach at Lambarene anymore, as a regular rule. It is now done by one of the other workers at the hospital.

These two widely differing circumstances of preaching -- Europe and Africa -- indicate a number of consistent factors concerning Dr. Schweitzer's speaking. In both circumstances his preaching appears to be simple and directly to the point. In both circumstances he makes a very

²²Seaver, op. cit., p. 124.

²³Ibid.

conscious effort to adapt his ideas specifically to his audience and the occasion.

Interpreters are often used, and he takes care to work through them. His preaching noticeably avoids dogma; he consistently speaks through the simple-profound concepts of Jesus and Paul.

Schweitzer: The Lecturer

Dr. Schweitzer's family heritage is strong in both preaching and in teaching. It has been indicated previously that his family contained many schoolmasters; therefore, again, it was most natural for Schweitzer to find his way into the academic world as a lecturer and professor. He comments upon this briefly when describing his procedures and purposes in conducting the confirmation classes at St. Nicholas: "In these religious lessons I first became conscious of how much schoolmaster blood I have in me from my ancestors."²⁴

Albert Schweitzer's lecturing appears to fall into two categories: The first division comprises the teaching done in Strasbourg with the teaching of the confirmation classes at St. Nicholas, starting in 1899 and lasting until

²⁴Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 28.

he left for Africa; and also from 1902 on, his lecturing in Theology at the University. A second natural division seems to fall during the period from 1920 on, and comprises lectures given in many universities and in many countries. This second division began after he returned from his first stay in Lambaréné and after regaining his health. At that time he began to receive invitations to lecture in universities throughout Europe and England, and this continued during his frequent visits to Europe for the next thirty to forty years. In fact, he became constantly in demand as a lecturer throughout the world.

Dr. Schweitzer's teaching activities in Strasbourg fall in that period of his life when he was most active intellectually. The years 1899 to 1913 not only mark his lecturing and teaching days in Strasbourg, but also include the years when he received his theological licentiate, wrote his book on Bach, wrote his Quest of the Historical Jesus, carried on his struggle for the old organs of Europe, and was active with the Paris Bach Society. It is important to note that the first division of his lecturing takes place against this background of intense intellectual exertion.

It has been noted already that Dr. Schweitzer's role of teacher to the confirmation classes at St. Nicholas was of singular importance to him. He tried to make these

classes a meaningful experience for the students, and his description of his purpose indicates his basic and practical approach.

The aim of my teaching was to bring home to their hearts and thought the great truths of the Gospel, and to make them religious in such a way that in later life they might be able to resist the temptations to ~~im~~religion which would assail them. I tried also to awake in them a love for the Church, and a feeling of need for a solemn hour for their souls in the Sunday services. I taught them to respect traditional doctrines, but at the same time to hold fast to the sayings of St. Paul that where the spirit of Christ is, there is liberty.²⁵

Schweitzer's responsibilities as a lecturer at the university began in the summer term of 1902, his first lectures being course in the Pastoral Epistles. In 1905 he began to lecture on the history of previous study and research on the life of Jesus, and he became so involved in this that his Quest of the Historical Jesus resulted. In 1903 Schweitzer was made principal of the Theological College at Strasbourg; and even though he later resigned from this post when his medical studies demanded more of his time, even then he continued to deliver his lectures in Theology.

Careful preparation and attention to detail are characteristic of Schweitzer and are apparent in his lecturing. This painstaking care had been brought home to him

²⁵Ibid., pp. 27-28.

during his schooldays at Mülhausen by his teacher Dr. Weheman. This man's example became a guideline for Schweitzer's educational philosophy.

That a deep sense of duty manifested in even the smallest matters, is the great educative influence, and that it accomplishes what no exhortations and no punishments can, has, thanks to him, become with me a firm conviction, a conviction the truth of which I have ever tried to prove in practice in all that I have had to do as an educator.²⁶

Schweitzer appears to have had very fine relationships with his students, receiving their respect and admiration. The general reaction of his biographers is that he was a popular lecturer. Seaver provides an example of this opinion.

We know, though without his telling us that he was immensely popular with the students and with his colleagues alike. His sanity and normality, his modesty and quiet geniality, his ready sympathy, his transparent sincerity and simplicity, his tremendous vigour and vitality, his love of fun and sense of humour, his bigness of mind and of body, and the fact that a man of such erudition and artistic attainments could wear his learning so lightly--all these qualities endeared him to young and old, and the college took him to its heart.²⁷

The comment made by Schweitzer, quoted earlier in this chapter, concerning his sadness at having to give up

²⁶Albert Schweitzer, Memoirs of Childhood and Youth, pp. 39-40.

²⁷Seaver, op. cit., p. 24.

preaching and teaching, indicates how happy and satisfactory this role as teacher was to him. Although, after a very few months in Africa, Schweitzer was permitted to preach again, the life of lecturer and teacher seemed to have decidedly come to an end when he left Strasbourg.

The second division of Dr. Schweitzer's role as a lecturer does not begin until after his return from his first stay in Lambaréné. The advent of this lecturing activity came as a surprise to him, for he had been out of the academic climate for five years and had returned in poor health. He felt that he was pretty much forgotten.

Ever since the war I had felt, in my seclusion at Strasbourg, rather like a coin that has rolled under a piece of furniture and has remained there lost.²⁸

In learned circles I could have believed myself entirely forgotten but for the affection and kindness shown me by the theological faculties at Zurich and Bern.²⁹

In 1919, however, he was invited by the University of Upsala in Sweden to deliver lectures for the Claus Petri Foundation. Here he lectured on "the problem of world acceptance and ethics in philosophy and world religions."³⁰

²⁸Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 184.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid.

The Swedish atmosphere and the enjoyment he felt in lecturing had a positive affect upon Schweitzer. While there, he went on a lecture and organ recital tour in order to raise funds to pay the debts which had accrued in the operation of the hospital at Lambaréné. Using the talents of a translator, who traveled with him, he employed his system of sentence-by-sentence translation for these speeches.

Standing near me on the platform or in the pulpit he translated my lectures on the Forest Hospital sentence by sentence in such a lively way that in a few moments the audience had forgotten that they were listening to a translated discourse. What an advantage it was to me now that in the services at Lambaréné I had mastered the art of speaking through the mouth of an interpreter.³¹

He received enough money in a few short weeks to pay off his more pressing debts. Schweitzer had nearly given up the idea of returning to Lambaréné, but the rejuvenating effect that Sweden had upon him turned his thinking hopefully in that direction.

After he returned from Sweden, he began to receive invitations to lecture at various universities. These lectures often concerned the Philosophy of Civilization, which he was writing at the time; also, he lectured on the Lambaréné hospital in order to raise funds for its continuance. From 1920 to 1924, when he returned to Africa, Schweitzer

³¹Ibid., pp. 185-186.

delivered a significant number of major lectures as well as presenting an untold number of organ recitals and informal talks. In 1921 he lectured in Switzerland, Sweden, and England. While in England he delivered the Dale Memorial Lectures at Mansfield College in Oxford, the Selly Oak Lectures at Selly Oak College at Birmingham; and he lectured at Cambridge and in London to the Society for the Study of the Science of Religion. In 1922 he lectured in Switzerland, at the University of Copenhagen, and in Sweden. In 1923 he lectured at Prague at the invitation of Oscar Kraus, author of the book mentioned earlier, which adversely criticized Schweitzer's philosophy. Though these lectures often concerned his Philosophy of Civilization, other subjects which will indicate the general nature of his topics are: "Christianity and the Religions of the World" (Selly Oaks); "The Significance of Eschatology" (Cambridge); and "The Pauline Problem" (London).

. . . by this time he had emerged, almost unwittingly, from obscurity into general recognition once again not only as a scholar and writer and musician, but as a personality of international repute, and was in much demand for lectures.³²

When Dr. Schweitzer returned to Europe in 1927, he again followed a heavy lecturing schedule. The years 1927

³²Seaver, op. cit., p. 80.

through 1929 find him lecturing in Sweden, Denmark, Holland, England, Switzerland, Germany, and Czechoslovakia. In 1932 he lectured and gave concerts in Holland, England, Sweden, Germany and Switzerland. In 1934 and 1935 Dr. Schweitzer made extensive tours of England delivering several major lectures. From October 16 to the 25th in 1934, for example, he delivered the Hibbert Lectures at Manchester College of Oxford, his subject being "The Religious Factor in Modern Civilization." The same lectures were repeated on alternate days at the University of London. In November of 1934, Dr. Schweitzer delivered the Gifford Lectures, presenting a series of ten lectures, speaking three times a week; his subject was "The Problem of Natural Philosophy and Natural Ethics." A year later he delivered a second series of Gifford Lectures.

During this visit to England, in 1935, he lectured and gave organ recitals constantly for two months. He lectured during these two months at the following places: Harrogate, Ashville College, Edinburgh, Glasgow University, Armstrong College, Silcoates School, Peterborough, Winchester, Abbey Hall in Plymouth, Aberystwyth College, Sheffield, Birmingham, London, St. Botolph's Bishopsgate, and the Royal Institute of International Affairs. Schweitzer was a popular speaker and visitor in England during these years. He made

many friends and received substantial support for his hospital from England. In 1936, he lectured and gave recitals in Switzerland. After the war, Dr. Schweitzer pretty much limited his lecturing activities; however, when, in 1948, he returned to Günsbach to rest, he found invitations to speak from a number of different groups and universities and accepted the invitation to speak in America.

The years of extensive lecturing activity throughout Europe and England made Dr. Schweitzer quite well known, and the international extent of his speaking indicates that his ideas and his expressions had a universal appeal. The audiences for his more formal lectures during these years were primarily academic in nature: students, faculty, and scholars. Joy comments upon these audiences in general.

The audiences who heard him in the lectures you are studying were all exceedingly intelligent, largely academic audiences, audiences interested in ethics, philosophy and religion.³³

Dr. Naish concurs in this general audience description. The audiences of the more informal lectures concerning Lambaréné, delivered in the cities and churches of England and Europe, were briefly described by Naish earlier in this chapter, as being generally middle class, thoughtful people.

³³Letter from Charles R. Joy, February 13, 1961.

The content of these lectures most always came from one of two basic sources: (1) His experiences at the hospital in Lambaréné or (2) his theological and philosophic thought and writings concerning: Ethics, Primitive Christianity, Modern Day Religion and Civilization, and various New Testament problems.

Schweitzer prepared for his formal lectures with his usual care and precision. This is not only because it is in his nature to be precise, but also because he found it necessary to do this in order to work more effectively with his translator.³⁴ In a letter to a friend, he comments upon his procedure.

I have it in written form and speak it word for word as I have written it. The translator studies the written text and goes over the lecture with me, sentence by sentence, so that when we stand before the public, there is no need of his searching what I say in order to interpret it. He knows it all by heart just as I do myself, and the lecture runs off so smoothly in two languages that the auditor shortly forgets that he is listening to a translated lecture. Naturally this practice represents a great deal of effort on my part and on the part of the interpreter; but it enables me to speak in foreign countries in a manner that is not annoying to the listeners.³⁵

³⁴The procedure of sentence-by-sentence translation has been noted previously in connection with Schweitzer's lectures in Sweden in 1919, and prior to that, while preaching in Africa. It is developed here in more detail.

³⁵Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 248.

Schweitzer's care and painstaking effort in preparing his lectures is further substantiated by reports from various persons who have interpreted for him. For example, Dr. C. H. Dodd, who translated for him a number of times, writes:

I have no means of knowing how long he spent on the preparation of his lectures, but it was clear that they were prepared with extreme care. His words were well chosen, his sentences always carefully turned, and the whole argument as clear as it could possibly be made.³⁶

Dr. Naish, who also translated for Schweitzer, reports:

Albert Schweitzer always prepared at great length and with meticulous care and wrote out every word, ...³⁷

Mr. Joy notes:

Of course, Dr. Schweitzer sometimes speaks extemporaneously but you have selected formal addresses, for which he makes careful preparation.³⁸

As these quotations indicate, there is little disagreement as to the extensive preparation Schweitzer makes for his speeches; but it is not altogether clear whether he speaks directly from this carefully prepared manuscript, word for word, during actual delivery. Seaver in his biography records that Dr. Schweitzer does not use a manuscript, and that he changes the lecture as he delivers it.

³⁶Letter from Rev. Charles H. Dodd, June 18, 1960.

³⁷Letter from Dr. John P. Naish, June 26, 1960.

³⁸Letter from Charles R. Joy, February 13, 1961

Although Schweitzer spends many hours in marshalling his thoughts before a lecture, and even in committing them to paper, yet he delivers them entirely without notes and never in the same form as that in which he prepared them. If his listeners express surprise at this apparent feat of memory, he playfully reminds them that he has a good exemplar in Cicero, whose orations were not written out until after he had delivered them.³⁹

Dr. Naish concurs with this idea: "He never read from a M.S. or a typescript to my knowledge. He relied entirely on his memory and left his M.S. (most carefully prepared) at home."⁴⁰ However, Mr. Joy reports: "His formal lectures are always read word for word from a manuscript."⁴¹ Mrs. Julian Rogers, Chairman of the "Friends of Albert Schweitzer" organization writes: "Dr. Schweitzer does speak from a manuscript."⁴² The New York Times report of Schweitzer's delivery of the Nobel Peace Prize states that he "read" the manuscript.

This divergence of opinion concerning Schweitzer's use of his manuscript suggests several factors. It is possible that those who stated their opinions one way or the other might be generalizing from having observed Dr. Schweitzer's speaking on one or two occasions. Reports concerning several of Schweitzer's major addresses describe his speaking

³⁹Seaver, op. cit., p. 144.

⁴⁰Letter from Dr. John P. Naish, June 26, 1960.

⁴¹Letter from Rev. Charles R. Joy, February 13, 1961.

⁴²Letter from Mrs. Julian Rogers, July 22, 1960.

both with and without a manuscript. For example, the Nobel Peace Prize Address was delivered from a manuscript; the Selly Oak lectures were delivered without any manuscript; and the Goethe Address at Aspen was delivered from a manuscript. It should be pointed out that Dr. Schweitzer's extensive preparation for his speeches suggest that his speech plan is so firmly fixed in his mind, that one might reasonably conclude that he does speak from his carefully planned manuscript whether it is before him on the speaker's stand or in his mind. (Whether using the manuscript method of delivery which involves speaking from the manuscript that is literally before him, or using the memoriter method of delivery which involves speaking from the manuscript from memory, the result is the same--he speaks the ideas in the words as they appear in the manuscript.) A further point supporting his use of the manuscript lies in his careful preparation with his translators. A number of sources mentioned have pointed out that Schweitzer usually goes over his manuscript in detail with his interpreters prior to its delivery. There are no reports of his confusing his interpreters with new or unexpected material. On the contrary, they often refer to the pains he goes to, in facilitating their task.

Schweitzer's delivery appears to have impressed his audiences. Reverend C. H. Dodd describes his presence on the platform while delivering a lecture in England.

He was an immensely impressive speaker. He is a big man, in every way. In those days the impression of energy he gave was overwhelming. His head was massive - lion-like, as many have observed - with shaggy hair, moustache and eyebrows; his eyes deep-set and piercing . . . He spoke directly to his audience, using almost no gestures, but standing upright and looking at his hearers, with lively changes in expression.⁴³

The Dean at Canterbury, in 1935, records his impression upon hearing Schweitzer lecture at Peterborough:

Of course, the visit of Dr. Schweitzer was outstanding. He addressed some 150 or 200 people in my large drawing room . . . and his robust personality illuminated all he had to say . . .⁴⁴

A newspaper reporter recorded Schweitzer's personality while speaking:

Schweitzer is a large man, physically as well as spiritually. With his great frame, commanding presence, a shaggy head of hair, prominent muscles, penetrating eyes, and directness of manner, he impresses one as a champion of humanity who is as fit to wrestle with nature or with the problems of the intellect, as with the forces of evil.⁴⁵

Noting particularly Schweitzer's lack of gesture, Joy does not find him an impressive speaker, especially in these later years.

⁴³Letter from Rev. C. H. Dodd, June 21, 1960.

⁴⁴Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 255.

⁴⁵Seaver, op. cit., p. 146.

Dr. Schweitzer is not in my opinion an impressive speaker, though I imagine he used to be much better than he is now. His voice is weak and does not carry far. He keeps his eyes fixed on his manuscript. He does not gesture. He knows none of the tricks by which a real orator wins his audience. (I'm speaking of course, solely of his formal utterances.)⁴⁶

As Joy indicates, and it should be emphasized, his reaction is of the speaking of Schweitzer of the present day whereas the preceding comments were largely concerning Schweitzer as a lecturer in the 1920's and 1930's.

Schweitzer's delivery changes noticeably in regard to the occasion. Formal utterances, as has been indicated, are delivered with reserve and dignity, though in an easy manner. His informal speaking is more lively and apt to be filled with humor.

On the other hand in his informal talks he often tells funny incidents, and in his table-talk he is a fascinating raconteur.⁴⁷

As was found to be true in his preaching, he adapts his lecturing content and style of delivery to the specific audience and occasion.

The two periods and categories of Dr. Schweitzer's lecturing further indicate such general characteristics as the following: He always prepares carefully. He consciously

⁴⁶Letter from Charles R. Joy, February 13, 1961

⁴⁷Ibid.

adapts his content and style of delivery to his audience. His topics for speaking center on several basic themes. He does not usually discourse on subjects other than: Lambarené, Philosophy, Ethics, Theology and Christianity. His indefatigable strength is manifested in his extensive tours and the schedule of activity he maintains while on tour. The responses to his lectures indicate that he is popular and effective. The procedure of speaking through an interpreter is a common practice used by Schweitzer, and is one that definitely affects his preparation.

Schweitzer: The Speaker for Special Occasions

Many who have heard Schweitzer speak have not heard him preach or give a formal lecture, but rather have heard him deliver speeches for various special occasions. Because of his activities and knowledge in several areas, he is in a position to be very much in demand, not only as a preacher or a philosopher/theologian, but also for a number of special occasions, which call for speaking of a different nature. By occasional speaking is meant, for this study, that speaking which has, beyond its purpose of persuading or informing, the additional purpose of responding to the needs of a specific occasion, such as receiving an award or an honor, or delivering a memorial address. The occasional type of

speaking done by Dr. Schweitzer might be divided into four general areas: (1) informal speeches delivered to groups concerning Lambaréné, (2) addresses concerning Goethe, (3) addresses given upon receipt of various honors or awards and (4) addresses concerning the problem of peace. In these categories are to be found the characteristics of his other types of speaking plus some additional ones that fit these situations more precisely.

It was noted that Schweitzer's more formal lectures were often delivered as part of an extensive tour during which he also gave organ recitals and numerous more informal talks. These less formal talks have some of the aspects of lecturing and some aspects that make them special occasion speeches. Schweitzer, himself, usually refers to them as "lectures."

It was necessary, too, to raise by lectures on the Hospital at Lambaréné funds for continuing the work . . .⁴⁸

Scarcely was I home when I went again for weeks to give lectures and concerts in Switzerland.⁴⁹

Although mentioned in the section concerning lectures, they are also taken up in this division of informal speaking for several reasons: They were usually given to smaller, more

⁴⁸Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 195.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 196

informal groups and were often in response to invitations to speak at a specific occasion. It was not unusual for them to be delivered extemporaneously, and they exhibited an aspect of Schweitzer, the speaker, which is not found in the more formal addresses.

These talks concerning the hospital were often accompanied by lantern slides and it is through them that Dr. Schweitzer raised much of the money for his hospital. Although figures are not available, the continued maintenance of the hospital attests to the persuasiveness of these talks. An illustration of this is that Reverend G. W. Hudson Shaw, while Rector of St. Botolph's, Bishopgate, was so moved by one of Dr. Schweitzer's addresses on Lambaréné that he put his valuable gold watch into the collection. (Because of its personal value, he later asked for it back, and then contributed a much larger amount of money.)

The setting of these informal talks must be seen in the context of a full lecture and organ recital schedule. Every moment of these tours is full of activity; and, in addition, with his increased popularity, interviewers, autograph seekers, and admirers have to be dealt with constantly. His endurance and strength are pushed to the uttermost. Everett Skillings suggests the pace of these tours in his post script to Schweitzer's autobiography.

In his prime, Schweitzer worked on a sixteen hour schedule when he was on tour. His pace was fast and furious, but his immense reserves of energy were such that he could keep going on a minimum of food and sleep. After he had been working until four o'clock one morning a friend said to him, 'You cannot burn a candle at both ends.' But Schweitzer replied, 'Oh yes you can if the candle is long enough.'⁵⁰

Those who accompany him on these tours report that it is a rewarding but exhausting experience for he makes, in addition to the heavy demands upon his own time and energy, similar demands of his companions. An observer once remarked to him that "indefatigable himself he would work others to exhaustion."⁵¹

Reporters of these informal talks indicate that Schweitzer's delivery of them was more lively and easy going than in his formal lectures. In spite of their more casual nature, however, the informal talks were still carefully worked out. Reverend C. H. Dodd, who translated some of them, makes the following comment on Schweitzer's preparation.

When he lectured on his work at Lambaréné, he did not give me a MS to read, and I doubt whether in that case he wrote it out; but it was no less carefully prepared.⁵²

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 247.

⁵¹Seaver, op. cit., p. 140

⁵²Letter from Reverend C. H. Dodd, June 21, 1960.

He often talked informally to student groups while on lecture tours, and these talks usually consisted of stories and descriptions of Lambaréné. Although he was willing to answer questions and take part in informal conferences, it is interesting to note that he did not care to argue his position at length.

In answering questions he was always charming and courteous, but he did not much care to engage in discussion, or at any rate, in controversy. His attitude seemed to be that he had stated what he thought, and was prepared to clarify it, but it was for his hearers to make what they could of it and form their own views; he would not take issue with them.⁵³

His audiences upon these occasions were thoughtful middle class persons and the impression Dr. Schweitzer made upon them seems to have been a very commanding one. One reporter describes him in the following manner.

Unlike some romantic figures, Dr. Schweitzer does not disappoint those who see and hear him. He suggests massive power, and Nature has fashioned him for arduous labours. In his pronunciation there is a touch of his native Alsace but this is too slight to hinder understanding. A more serious obstacle to an English listener is the way in which his final words of sentences are spoken on high thin tones. His language is free from philosophical jargon.⁵⁴

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Seaver, op. cit., p. 147.

The skill of the interpreter obviously plays an important part in the effect Schweitzer has upon his audiences. Mrs. C. E. B. Russell, who often translated for him on these occasions and whose skill is favorably commented upon by several reporters, evidently was very adept in this translation procedure.

The short crisp sentences, vivid gestures, and play of epigram were all characteristic of the speaker . . . The lectures were translated into English sentence by sentence. Dr. Schweitzer and the lady who interprets are perfectly attuned. Not a fraction of a second is lost between the delivery and the translation . . . Interpreters are often automatic in style and fail to convey emotional values. This one modulates her voice to the lecturer's mood and borrows from his a thrill in the voice. While speaker and interpreter are so well attuned mentally, they differ greatly in pose and demeanour. The translator's statuesque attitude is a foil to Dr. Schweitzer's constant liveliness. It is a marvel how they keep in unison. In such performances concentration achieves a triumph . . . The listener soon forgets that he is hearing a lecture in two tongues.⁵⁵

Miss Maude Royden, administrator of the Guildhouse in Kensington, where Schweitzer spoke many times, also translated some talks for him. When she first learned that she must translate sentence by sentence, she was apprehensive; however, after doing it she felt it was the better way, and she reports Schweitzer's obvious recognition and adaptation to the translator's situation.

⁵⁵Ibid.

The address was composed with such a perfect understanding of the difficulties, and so great a master of the construction needed for each sentence by itself and its relation to the whole, as to leave one convinced that it was the ONLY right way of speaking through an interpreter.⁵⁶

The Schweitzer who speaks informally on his work in Africa thus appears to be, from these reports, an effective, congenial speaker, who presents an impression of commanding presence. With the help of effective interpreters these addresses reveal a speaker of energy, humor, and adaptability and they comprise a substantial portion of his speaking.

The speaking which Schweitzer has done on Goethe is of a more formal nature. He has delivered a number of minor addresses and informal talks, but has given four major Goethe addresses which clearly reflect his approach to this subject. The first major address was given, upon the invitation of the city of Frankfort, on August 28, 1928. He had been awarded the first Goethe prize which had been established by the city. At the centennial celebration of Goethe's death, Schweitzer delivered a second address at the University of Frankfort in 1932. In the same year he spoke in Ulm, Germany on "Goethe as Thinker and Man." In 1949, Schweitzer was invited to the United States to address the Goethe Bicentennial Convocation and Music Festival. This address was

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 108.

delivered twice: once in German on July 8 and in French on July 6. These four addresses reflect Schweitzer's study and deep understanding of Goethe. Though there is some repetition in the speeches, each one presents a fresh approach adapted to his specific audience.

Schweitzer delivered the 1928 address as the recipient of the first Goethe Prize, awarded in recognition of his "service and humanity." Seaver reports the speech briefly: "Like all his utterances it is distinguished by its own high literary quality."⁵⁷ In this address he describes his first meeting and subsequent identification with Goethe in the realm of nature philosophy. He then draws several parallels between Goethe's ideas and life and his own, such as the combination of intellectual and practical activity, and the intense interest in natural science. He also points out the application of Goethe's ideas to the present age. Basically, the speech is a personal acknowledgment of the meaning of Goethe in Schweitzer's life and the role that Goethe should play in the world today. This personal approach was a deliberate choice by Schweitzer, for this is the way he felt the subsequent addresses should respond to the award.

I should like in this way to establish a precedent,
so that everyone whom you honor here should also

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 111.

in turn bear witness to his experience with Goethe, and tell what Goethe has meant to his inner life.⁵⁸

This direct appeal and the direct approach followed throughout the oration are typical characteristics of Schweitzer's speaking on special occasions.

The 1932 oration was delivered at the very hour of the anniversary of Goethe's death. Mrs. C. E. B. Russell, who was present, reports that the occasion was an exceptional one.

The great opera house in the poet's birthplace was packed to its utmost capacity with listeners so spellbound by the gravity of the speaker, that for sixty-five minutes one could, as the phrase goes, have heard a pin drop, but for the sound of his voice.⁵⁹

In this address he vividly describes the many aspects of Goethe's life, analyzing and examining the facets of his personality, his character, and his writings. Schweitzer emphasized over and over the relationship of Goethe to nature and the resultant nature philosophy which the German poet developed. One of the most striking phases of this oration and an example of Schweitzer's powerful imagery in oral discourse, is Schweitzer's comparison of the Goethe tragedy of Faust with modern day conditions in the world.

⁵⁸Albert Schweitzer, Goethe, Five Studies, p. 21.

⁵⁹Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 245.

After all, what is now taking place in this terrible epoch of ours except a gigantic repetition of the drama of Faust upon the stage of the world? The cottage of Philemon and Baucis burns with a thousand tongues of flame! In deeds of violence and murders a thousandfold, a brutalized humanity plays its cruel game! In a thousand different ways mankind has been persuaded to give up its natural relations with reality, and to seek its welfare in the magic formula of some kind of economic and social witchcraft, by which the possibility of freeing itself from economic and social misery is only still further removed!⁶⁰

Using more biographical detail than he used in the 1928 speech Schweitzer constructs high points of Goethe's life, giving the entire oration a personal, moving atmosphere.

Little information is available concerning the circumstances surrounding the address given the same year at Ulm, Germany. Again, the content stresses the nature philosophy of Goethe; and he examines Goethe's position in relation to the thinkers of the Enlightenment and those of his own age. This speech illustrates Schweitzer's historical-critical approach to a subject as applied to oral expression. Concentrating on viewing Goethe as a profound thinker in his day, the address follows Goethe's meeting with, and his reaction to the outstanding intellects of his lifetime. Though the address contains personal references, it emphasizes a more scholarly approach to the

⁶⁰Albert Schweitzer, Goethe, Five Studies, p. 96.

subject than did the 1928 oration. This is partially explained by the fact that this address followed a definitive article published by Schweitzer in April of 1932.

After writing the article, Dr. Schweitzer devoted much time to a further study of Goethe's relations to the philosophers and philosophy of his age, a matter which greatly interested him. The Ulm address was the result of these studies.⁶¹

This address seems to be particularly significant in showing how thoroughly Schweitzer develops his subject.

In the address given at Aspen, Colorado, Dr. Schweitzer repeats much of what he said in the previous speeches. Basically this oration describes Goethe as a poet, a natural scientist and a thinker and again it is to Goethe's philosophy that Schweitzer gives the greater emphasis. Also throughout the oration he acknowledges his debt to Goethe as an influence on his life.

Although he was only one of a number of speakers at Aspen, Schweitzer was treated as being especially important. Mr. Joy reports that "I believe that the general impression of the audiences at Aspen was that Dr. Schweitzer was the highlight of the conference, but that there were a dozen more important speeches than the one he gave."⁶² This

⁶¹Ibid., p. 127.

⁶²Letter from Charles R. Joy, February 13, 1961.

particular speech, which will be examined in more detail in a later chapter, includes a number of facets of Schweitzer's speaking: It used his sentence-by-sentence method of translation; it was given under circumstances in which the Schweitzer legend made its influence felt upon the occasion; it dealt with one of the major interests of Schweitzer's life; and it recognized Schweitzer as one of the prominent authorities of the world on Goethe.

Schweitzer spent several months preparing each of these four Goethe addresses which indicates that they were constructed with his usual care. The content of the speeches not only reflects Schweitzer's grasp of the material, but also they indicate the many similarities between Schweitzer and Goethe. As has been true in his other speaking, these, too, reflect his adaptation to his particular audiences. Each speech contains references to the particular occasion, and in each he refers to his specific audience. The four speeches, taken chronologically, present a progression in which the speech content becomes more and more philosophy-oriented. Never is the personality of Goethe lost; but increasingly it is Goethe, the philosopher, who receives emphasis. Each speech, to some degree, illustrates the historical-critical approach used in his more extensive studies (St. Paul, Jesus, Civilization, Religions of the World) as adapted to a

speaking situation. All of the speeches, but more especially the 1932 address at Frankfort, illustrate his use of vivid imagery and graphic description.

In addition to his informal talks and his addresses concerning Goethe, Schweitzer is often called upon to deliver talks to special groups in connection with the reception of honors and awards. As his fame and popularity developed, he received numerous distinguished honors, many of these of an academic nature. For example, he has received degrees from the following institutions: Oxford, Edinburgh, St. Andrews, the University of Chicago, Zurich, University of Prague, and Cambridge University. Other awards include: The Goethe awards already mentioned; an award as a Chevalier of the Legion of honor; a prize from the German Book Publishers in recognition of his efforts of world peace; election to membership in the French Academy of Moral and Political Sciences; the Prince Charles Medal from King Gustav Adolf; the Nobel Peace Prize; an honorary membership in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences; the Gold Medal of the City of Paris; honorary membership in the British Order of Merit by Queen Elizabeth; and the Order Pour le Merit from President Heuss of the West German Republic. Some of these awards called for simple, brief acceptance speeches, while others required more extensive orations.

An example of the former, the brief, more informal acceptance speech, is that speech he delivered upon being made an honorary member of the International Rotary Club. In this he gave a brief description of the work of his hospital, drawing an analogy between its work and the charitable works of the Rotary Club, which then made him and the Rotarians brothers. His opening paragraph of this speech indicates adaptation to his audience and his direct approach to the occasion.

Yes, I am happy to be with you today and to accept the honor you have given me. I feel that I am in a sympathetic group. I feel that I am among men who sincerely desire to give to our civilization more spiritualité, a deepening of thought and of human ideals, and a will to save the world from ruin. I am, therefore, one of you and I believe in your great and splendid goal.⁶³

Examples of the more formal type of acceptance speech would be that given upon his election to the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences and the Nobel Peace Prize Address. The French Academy of Moral and Political Science speech, delivered on October 20, 1952, was titled "The Problem of Ethics in the Evolution of Human Thought." As the most recent pronouncement of Schweitzer on his concept of ethics, it is an important speech. This was indicated by Schweitzer himself, for when he referred to it, he said: "This is very

⁶³Albert Schweitzer, "I Am One of You," The Rotarian, LXXX, No. 3 (March, 1952), p. 8.

important to me, as it expresses the dominating idea in my thinking."⁶⁴

The content of the address briefly traces in Schweitzer's characteristic historical-critical approach, the evolution of ethics in mankind, from the Chinese and Indian thinkers through the Greek systems to the present day. Though somewhat technical, the address clearly argues Schweitzer's basic concept of ethics founded on Reverence for Life. His concluding paragraph summarizes the theme of the address.

In the world, the will to live is in conflict with itself. In us it wants, by a mystery that we do not understand, to be at peace with itself. In the world it manifests itself; in us it reveals itself. To be other than the world is our spiritual destiny. By conforming to it we live our existence instead of submitting to it. By practicing reverence for life we become good, deep and alive.⁶⁵

The other example of a more formal acceptance speech is the Nobel Peace Prize Address delivered November 4, 1954, two years after the award was announced. Reports indicate that Schweitzer caused an unusual amount of stir by his presence in Oslo and the New York Times records the enthusiastic reactions of the immediate audience.

⁶⁴Albert Schweitzer, "The Problem of Ethics in the Evolution of Human Thought," (Chicago: Albert Schweitzer Education Foundation) p. 68.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 73.

Even those who did not understand French appeared spellbound by this remarkable man in an old-fashioned black suit, wing collar and four-in-hand tie, who stood absolutely erect for the fifty minutes it took him to read the paper.⁶⁶

Again using his historical approach, Schweitzer constructed a tightly knit argument and plea for a change of heart among men before civilization destroys itself. A full analysis of the speech and the occasion will be made in a later chapter.

The topic of world peace, as developed in the Nobel Address, marks one of the first departures of Dr. Schweitzer from his traditional array of subjects. Since that time, however, it has become a major interest and concern for him. Because this concern is a natural outgrowth of his thoughts concerning civilization, it is not a radically new topic for him to take up. With the advent of the atomic and nuclear bombs, thus giving civilization the potential for self-destruction, this subject has taken on a new urgency. Norman Cousins, in his book. Dr. Schweitzer of Lambaréné, describes his efforts in urging Schweitzer to express himself further on the problem of peace to the world; and although it had been the life long custom of Dr. Schweitzer not to speak on matters connected with politics, he agreed that this was an exceptional problem.

⁶⁶"Oslo Hails Schweitzer," The New York Times, Vol. CIV, No. 35.347 (Wednesday, November 3, 1954), p. 6.

. . . the problem goes beyond politics. It affects all men. All men must speak. Some way must be found to bring about an increased awareness of the danger. Anything that is done should above all be simple and direct. It should not be ponderous or academic.⁶⁷

This comment by Schweitzer suggests his concern with the problem, and the result of this concern was a carefully worded pronouncement given as three radio broadcasts from Oslo on April 28, 29 and 30, 1958, which were read by a Norwegian and carried by many nations.

The statement which was published under the title, "Peace or Atomic War?" follows the approach of a tightly constructed argument for the abandonment of nuclear testing. On the basis of scientific reports, Dr. Schweitzer points out the inevitability of the holocaust of atomic warfare if testing continues.

An atomic war is therefore the most senseless and lunatic act that could ever take place. At all costs it must be prevented.⁶⁸

After analyzing some of the arguments put forth in favor of nuclear testing, Dr. Schweitzer proceeds to look at the political advantages and disadvantages in which the major nations (United States, Great Britain and Russia) find themselves in the arms race. It is to public opinion and the

⁶⁷Cousins, Op. cit., p. 176.

⁶⁸Albert Schweitzer, Peace or Atomic War? (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958), p. 27.

force of public demands that Schweitzer looks to bring about the necessary pressure upon the East and West governments to cease testing. As was true in his Nobel Address and expressed many years earlier in his Philosophy of Civilization, Dr. Schweitzer looks to a change in the spirit of humanity as the ultimate solution.

We cannot continue in this paralyzing mistrust. If we want to work our way out of the desperate situation in which we find ourselves, another spirit must enter into the people. It can only come if the awareness of its necessity suffices to give us strength to believe in its coming. We must presuppose the awareness of this need in all the peoples who have suffered along with us. We must approach them in the spirit that we are human beings, all of us, and that we feel ourselves fitted to feel with each other; to think and to will together in the same way.⁶⁹

This statement was broadcast to over fifty nations, and responsive letters indicate much favorable agreement with his thoughts.

Dr. Schweitzer has continued this interest, and in 1954 he published a letter urging scientists to speak out against nuclear testing.

The occasional speaking done by Albert Schweitzer indicates the variety of speaking required from him and it also illustrates his approaches to the specific occasions. As was found in the other types of speaking which he does,

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 44.

certain characteristics were apparent in preparation, adaptation to his audiences, and wide knowledge of his subject. They also indicate the consistency with which he has developed his ideas over the years.

This survey of the three general types of speaking of Albert Schweitzer indicates a number of general characteristics of his speaking which can be summarized in the following manner: Though he speaks often and is in demand as a speaker on widely varying occasions, his subject matter is limited to about seven general areas: Lambaréné, Goethe, Ethics, Problems of Civilization, Christianity, Religions of the World, and Peace. Schweitzer speaks with ease at both formal and informal occasions, adjusting his material and delivery to meet the specific situation. He tends to speak directly to the point irrespective of his audience, though in his more formal lectures and addresses his method is more detailed and sophisticated, his plan of speaking being more detailed and indicating his vast knowledge of historical detail. As mentioned several times in this chapter, in these more formal lectures Schweitzer's organization often follows an historical approach to the problem which he is discussing, as illustrated by the Selly Oak Lectures, the Nobel Peace Prize Address, the Goethe orations and the Address to the French Academy. The audiences which Schweitzer faces range

from the savage native of Africa, to the middle class citizen, to the sophisticated academic audiences of the continent and to royalty. The responses to his addresses, as evidenced by reported observations, financial contributions to his hospital, and the ever-growing requests for his speaking, indicate that he is an effective speaker.

Special Problems

The description of Schweitzer's speaking evidences certain problems which he faces that decidedly effect the speaking occasions and in some cases the speeches themselves. Two of these problems that need to be considered are:

(1) The problem of translation and (2) the effect of his growing world popularity upon his speaking.

The problem of translating his speeches sentence-by-sentence has already been noted in his preaching to the natives and in his extensive speaking throughout Europe and England. The sentence-by-sentence method of translating was developed and practiced by Schweitzer in Africa, and he employed it on the continent first in 1920 when he lectured and gave organ recitals in Sweden. Earlier in this chapter Schweitzer's description of his sentence-by-sentence translation through his traveling companion at this time, Elias Soderstrom, was cited. In his autobiography, he elaborates

upon the method which he and this interpreter developed.

What is most important in that is to speak in short, simple, and clearly constructed sentences, to go through the address with the interpreter with the greatest possible care beforehand, and to deliver it in the shape which he expects. With this preparation the interpreter has to make no effort to understand the meaning of the sentence to be translated; he catches it like a ball which he throws on at once to his listeners. By following this plan one makes it possible to deliver through an interpreter even scientific addresses and it is a much better way than for the speaker to inflict torture on himself and his hearers by speaking in a language of which he is not fully master.⁷⁰

Schweitzer practiced this method of sentence-by-sentence translation in Africa and then used it first in Europe in 1920. He explained to an English audience during a speech that he had seen it employed for the first time many years previously while he had still been at Strasbourg.

It was before an English audience several years later that Schweitzer first explained in public whence he had originally learnt this method. He opened his Hibbert Lectures at Oxford in 1934 with the following little apologie: 'I first learned that it was possible to talk to others whose language I could not speak when, many years ago, I heard your General Booth speak through an interpreter at Strasbourg. This gift I had from him I now return to the country that gave it.'⁷¹

Schweitzer remarks that when this translating is done well, the audience forgets that it is listening to two languages. Several instances have already been noted, where,

⁷⁰Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 186.

⁷¹Seaver, op. cit., p. 80 (footnote).

evidently, his interpreters were able to create this atmosphere of listening to only one language. For example, the Dean of Peterborough records his impression of the interpretation procedure.

. . . and of a lecturer who aided by the remarkable skill of his interpreter, could hold his audience spellbound, creating the illusion that we heard him speak in our own tongue.⁷²

Reverend G. W. Hudson Shaw records a similar impression:

When Dr. Schweitzer was in Oxford, I went to hear him and was deeply impressed . . . And his interpreter, reproducing his German in terse English, was an ideal accompanist. I shall never forget those two -- playing a duet, as it were, on the low dais of Arlosh Hall -- every word listened to with rapt attention by a crowded audience. The interpreter made herself Schweitzer's instrument, and reproduced his short sentences with precision and suppressed emotion -- subordinating herself wholly to him and yet herself transfigured.⁷³

Not all reports, however, agree that the result is as fluent and easy as Dr. Schweitzer and the quoted statements indicate. The present librarian of Selly Oaks College expresses a contrary opinion in a letter:

I myself heard Dr. Schweitzer lecture in Oxford during the 1930's, where the same method of translation sentence by sentence was used. It was certainly a very awkward and tiresome method, both to the listener and to the speaker.⁷⁴

⁷²Albert Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 255.

⁷³Seaver, op. cit., pp. 147-148.

⁷⁴Letter from Mrs. J. M. Leonard, Librarian of Selly Oak Colleges, January 18, 1960.

Mr. Joy concurs with this opinion, in his letter.

Dr. Albert Schweitzer is convinced that when you have a speech interpreted in this way, it loses very little. Personally, I disagree. The professional interpreters translate passage by passage and I think that is much more effective than the broken Schweitzer method.⁷⁵

Much seems to depend upon the ability of the interpreter. Dr. Naish, who has been an interpreter for Schweitzer, points out that the method is good only if the interpreter is experienced. He further points out that what is needed is not an exact translation, but one that uses ideas which are meaningful for the audience, but which retain the meaning of the speaker.

This is not at all difficult to do if your translators are old hands at the job and understand your way of thought, favorite idioms, above all are old and intimate friends -- otherwise most uncertain and dangerous.

Immediate translation is a splendid method if well done--otherwise totally useless and usually to cause confusion even anger and distress and perplexity . . . It even should be used with careful preparation and sympathetic scholarly, thoroughly competent bi-lingual assistants.⁷⁶

Reverend C. W. Dodd expresses his method of procedure when he translated for Dr. Schweitzer.

I always translated sentence by sentence making the translation as continuous as possible. As

⁷⁵Letter from Charles R. Joy, February 13, 1961.

⁷⁶Letter from Dr. Naish, June 26, 1960.

I have said, I am sure he had in mind the need to help his interpreter as much as possible. I found that if one let the German just trickle into one's mind, and the English trickle out, without thinking over much about words, it was not too difficult; if one stopped to think, one began to hesitate. Occasionally I had to ask him to repeat a sentence, but not often, because he was so clear.⁷⁷

When dealing with Schweitzer's speeches in English translation, several cautions need to be noted. Most interpreters agree that translation, in the most precise sense, is impossible. Several of Schweitzer's addresses have more than one English version because of the variations in translations. Although English texts will not be exactly what Dr. Schweitzer said, however, they will be (if the text is by the translator) what the English audience heard when he spoke, for when speaking to an English audience, he speaks through immediate translation. Acknowledging the fact that the text will not be an authentic, exact replica of the speech certain qualifications for speech analysis must of necessity be noted. The most accurate text to work with will be that which is made by the translator who did the sentence-by-sentence translation. The English texts of Schweitzer's speeches have various sources. Sometimes the published English text is made from this delivered text as was true in the case of the Nobel Peace Prize Address; sometimes the

⁷⁷Letter from Rev. C. H. Dodd, June 21, 1960.

English text is made from a corrected copy of the text, as was true in the case of the Dale Memorial Lectures; sometimes the English text is made by someone in the audience, as was true in the Selly Oak Lectures.

Although it is a decided disadvantage not to be able to work with the precise wording and style of a speaker, it should be noted that a great deal of Schweitzer's speaking, particularly from 1921 on, has been done through interpreters. Many people, then, have heard him only under such circumstances. However imperfect a translation is, it is the only way that much of the world knows him. Since he has achieved such world renown, any major statement which he now makes is quickly translated into many languages, as was true with his Nobel Peace Prize Address and his three radio broadcasts on Peace in 1958.

A further significance of the problem of translation to speech analysis is that Schweitzer's handling of the problem shows that he meets, and is familiar with, the factors involved in translation, and that he adjusts his speaking, both content and preparation, to facilitating speech delivery through interpretation.

The general implication to be drawn from this discussion of the problem of translation involved in analyzing Schweitzer's speeches in their English texts, is one of

caution. The text will not be what he said but, rather, the translator's English equivalent of what he said; in some cases the English text will be what Schweitzer's immediate audience heard as his speech. In being constantly aware of the disadvantages, one should keep in mind that this is the only way by which a great many people know Schweitzer.

With his becoming a world figure, a second problem arises in dealing with Schweitzer as a speaker. As was pointed out in Chapter Four, his overwhelming popularity encouraged more people to want to hear him -- a circumstance which may decidedly affect his speaking. Dr. Naish points out that this "legend effect" had begun as early as the 1930's. Included in his description of the audiences who heard Schweitzer speak at the various English universities, was his response to a question as to how immediate translation affected the attention of the audience.

I don't think that the audiences were affected except the undergraduates who didn't know French or German might be inclined to stay away except the lovely girls who adored him and thought it a privilege to see him and breathe in his spirit and see his calm, vivid, intelligent eyes and feel his dominating personality even if they couldn't understand.⁷⁸

Reverend Dodd further substantiates this in his letter.

⁷⁸Letter from Dr. Naish, June 26, 1960.

In any case, his personality impressed itself through his speech whether or not he was precisely understood at the time.⁷⁹

Over the years, as the popularity and the legend of Schweitzer has grown, the feeling of being impressed with everything he may say or do has increased. Mr. Joy points this out.

It isn't what he says or how he says it, it's because it's Dr. Schweitzer who is speaking. He is very impressive looking, as you know. He is a symbol of something that is very precious to the human race. He represents what we all would like to be. He's doing what we all would like to do. He represents our ideal.⁸⁰

This same attitude is reflected in a letter from Reverend Allen Hunter, who heard Dr. Schweitzer speak at Aspen, Colorado.

He's such a great man you don't count the details. You are almost frozen instead. After all, he's got presence. Sheer awe shows through that presence.⁸¹

In response to the question whether the process of immediate translation seemed to make the audience restless, Reverend Hunter replied:

. . . politely so. Just as you are when you have to look standing, at a masterpiece in the Louvre you're supposed to admire.⁸²

⁷⁹Letter from Reverend Dodd, June 21, 1960.

⁸⁰Letter from Charles R. Joy, February 13, 1961.

⁸¹Letter from Reverend Allen Hunter, Summer, 1961.

⁸²Ibid.

The unusual amount of attention received by Schweitzer at the Aspen Bicentennial was a little disturbing to others there. He proved to be such a popular figure that the constant attention paid to him may have caused some ill feeling among others. For example, one report indicated the following:

I must say I don't think the other speakers at Aspen or the people who planned the convocation were quite as pleased . . .⁸³

Thus it would seem that the legend of Schweitzer does effect his audience in that some persons attend his speaking because of their awe of him as a great man, not necessarily because of what he is saying. The tremendous crowds and the demands which they make upon him, especially at such places as Aspen and in Oslo, are apparent; and these affect the occasion of his speaking.

The danger in worshipping Schweitzer the legend, rather than hearing and understanding what he is saying, seems to be a factor to take into consideration when analyzing and evaluating his speaking; it is especially important to be aware of this when examining his audience.

⁸³Letter from Mrs. Herbert Phillips of Albert Schweitzer Education Foundation.

Conclusions

This overview of Dr. Schweitzer's speaking suggests a number of characteristics which can be looked for when examining specific speeches in detail. Care and precision in the preparation of his speeches are major descriptive factors of Dr. Schweitzer's speaking. Thus, his ideas, it can be assumed, are selected, developed, and expressed with exactness. The three major divisions of Dr. Schweitzer's speaking reflect three important facets of his life. Each one, especially preaching and teaching, are natural outgrowths of his personality and his family heritage. The view of Dr. Schweitzer's speaking in general, in this chapter, demonstrated his conscious awareness of his audience and illustrated that he adapts his speech content and its form to each specific audience. In relation to the special problems discussed, it was indicated that Dr. Schweitzer shows a full understanding of the translation problem, developing and adapting a system to meet the need. The problem posed by his popularity requires special attention to the circumstances surrounding his speeches. The overview of his speaking further indicates that, for the most part, the response to his speaking is positive in terms of response for reports indicate that his audiences are enthusiastic and responsive to his ideas.

In addition to these various characteristics, the overview also indicated that Schweitzer's speaking reflects his personality and his ideas. All speaking occasions examined showed that Schweitzer speaks out of a deep need and a desire to communicate his ideas. The several topics on which he speaks are all profound convictions with him, established by thorough examination of all sides and aspects of the idea. His careful preparation and painstaking exactness reflect his life of attention to detail. When speaking at special occasions, as the recipient of an award or honor, he still reflects the same basic ideas that have motivated his life. The speaking of Dr. Schweitzer would thus seem to constitute one of the important factors that go to make up the closely integrated whole of his personality.

CHAPTER VI
SELLY OAK LECTURES

The previous chapters have examined the following factors concerning Albert Schweitzer: his historical and cultural background; his biographical and intellectual characteristics; his role as a legend in the world; and his speaking life. These various elements concerning Schweitzer provide a general setting from which to examine particular speeches. This chapter will now present a rhetorical analysis of Schweitzer's Selly Oak Lectures as developed through the application of the case study method. The analysis will include the following elements: an inquiry into the setting and occasion; a discussion of the text, along with its preparation; an examination of the elements of invention, arrangement and style of the lectures; and a treatment of the delivery of, and the response to, the lectures.

The Selly Oak lectures were selected for particular treatment and emphasis because of their representativeness and their significance. The lectures are representative of Schweitzer's lecture type of speaking; of his meeting the

translation problem; and of his extensive speaking tours in England. The significance of these lectures is based on two factors: first, they treat subject matter that has been a lifelong interest and concern of Schweitzer; and second, they have proved very popular, having been translated into a number of languages. Another reason for selecting these lectures for particular study concerns the text on which the analysis is based. Many of the texts of Schweitzer's speeches in England, and elsewhere, are far removed from the oral delivery of the speeches; often they exist either in the form of an abstract or in book form, the latter often constituting a complete revision of the spoken text. The nature of the text of the Selly Oak Lectures will be dealt with in more detail within the case study itself, but generally, it can be said that it represents a more accurate record of Schweitzer's oral discourse than many of the other available texts of his speaking. For these reasons, plus the additional factor that the lecture came at a time when Dr. Schweitzer's international reputation was being developed, the Selly Oak lectures are deserving of analysis.

Background

Occasion

When Albert Schweitzer made his first lecture and organ recital trip to England in 1922, he was already well

known, both as an organist and as an original thinker in theology and philosophy. His major theological contribution, The Quest of the Historical Jesus published in England in 1910, had made a significant impact there. Other of his important works which had been available in English translation prior to this first trip were: J. S. Bach (1911), The Mystery of the Kingdom of God (1914), and Paul and His Interpreters (1912). These studies, coupled with the reputation of his hospital in Lambaréné, had made Schweitzer a man of international reputation.

The initial reason for making the 1922 visit was an invitation from Mansfield College of Oxford to deliver the Dale Memorial Lectures, which were later published as part of his major study, Philosophy of Civilization. During this six week tour, Schweitzer also lectured at: Selly Oak College in Birmingham on "Christianity and the Religions of the World"; Cambridge on "The Significance of Eschatology"; and in London to the Society for the Study of the Science of Religion on "The Pauline Problem." He also gave a number of organ recitals and informal talks. Thus, an analysis of the Selly Oak Lectures needs to be viewed within the context of a busy lecture tour such as was described in Chapter Five.

Setting

Dr. Naish, who was affiliated with Oxford at the time, wrote to Selly Oaks of Schweitzer's impending visit to

Oxford, and asked whether they would care to have him speak on their campus. Their response, as is indicated in a letter from Dr. Naish, further emphasizes the reputation that preceded Schweitzer's first trip to England.

. . . naturally I wrote to my old training school at Selly Oak and they were enthusiastic as soon as they knew it was THE Schweitzer of the Jesu-Forschung (von Remarus zu Wrede) and the Bach (Schweitzer and Widor). So it was arranged.¹

When the Central Council of Selly Oak invited Dr. Schweitzer there to lecture, the college had been in existence only nineteen years. Located in a suburb of Birmingham, Selly Oak College consisted of five schools: Woodbrook, which concentrated on religious and social studies; Kingsmead, a school for further education of missionaries; Westhill, a school for religious education; Fircroft, a sort of technical school; and Carey Hall, a school for the training of women who wished to become missionaries. A common organization united these schools. Dr. Schweitzer accepted the Council's invitation and made his short visit to Selly Oaks in February of 1922 at which time he delivered two lectures and gave an organ recital. The two lectures were combined and published, a year later,

¹Letter from Dr. John P. Naish, August 27, 1961.

in book form under the title, Christianity and the Religions of the World.

The respect with which Selly Oaks received Dr. Schweitzer further suggests his international fame. This is reported by Dr. R. N. Micklem, who was secretary of the Central Council at Selly Oaks at the time, and who also translated one of the lectures.

We welcomed Dr. Schweitzer on his brief visit to the Selly Oak Colleges with interest and enthusiasm, qualified by awe and anxiety; for being a young institution we have not yet learned how to receive the great as though we were accustomed to their company and proof against it. But if our reverence increased, we soon forgot all about our anxiety.²

Audience

The nature of the institution of Selly Oak College suggests the type of person who heard Dr. Schweitzer speak. They were such persons as were interested in foreign missions, and consisted for the most part of missionaries or those who planned on becoming missionaries. More specific characteristics of the audience can be mentioned. They were largely an academic group, made up of students, faculty, and missionaries of some training and experience. The audience undoubtedly contained young people. Their interests would

²Albert Schweitzer, Christianity and the Religions of the World, Foreword by Nathaniel Micklem (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1911), p. 8.

vary, but nearly all in the audience were planning and preparing for, or already involved in, some type of religious vocation, inasmuch as each college had this as its underlying purpose. The student body was quite international in make-up, as missionaries on furlough and future missionaries came there from all parts of the world for training. No doubt they were favorably predisposed to Schweitzer's subject as it concerned the problem of defending Christianity which they had either already faced or would face in the future.

The specific need of this audience to which Dr. Schweitzer addressed himself was its task of having to defend the Christian religion against other world religions, such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and Chinese religious thought. Schweitzer's purpose was to provide these people, through his lectures, with an understanding of the uniqueness and special depth of Christianity in comparison with the other world religions. Thus Schweitzer and his audience at Selly Oak College met upon a specific occasion bound by a common interest and a common problem.

The Speech

The Text

An essential factor, important in laying the foundation for a rhetorical analysis of a speech in an accurate

text from which to work.

If a speaker is to be judged by what he said, it would seem proper that his words be quoted with as much fidelity to original utterance as possible.³

It is the critic's obligation to determine textual authenticity--to establish the best possible text through such processes of investigation and collation as may be open to him.⁴

The analysis of the Selly Oak Lectures is based on the single English translation of those lectures which was published in London in 1923. Because of the problems for rhetorical analysis inherent in dealing with a translation of a speech, certain qualifications should be noted at the outset. The general nature of these difficulties was presented in Chapter Five, which stressed the fact that the English text is necessarily that which the translator puts forth as what Schweitzer said, not what Schweitzer actually said.

The Selly Oak Lectures were delivered without a manuscript and translated sentence-by-sentence from German into English. There were two lectures, each with a different translator. While ordinarily a text based on the utterances of the direct translators might seem to be the

³Lester Thonssen and A. Craig Baird, Speech Criticism (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948), p. 311.

⁴Ibid., p. 308.

most authentic text from which the critic might work, this would not appear for several reasons to be the case in this instance. First, Schweitzer did not go over his planned speech with his translators prior to delivery, as was his usual custom. This means that the interpreters had no chance to discuss any confusions concerning intended meanings with him, and decisions had to be made on the spot by the translator himself. Second, a factor implied in the first reason, these interpreters never had access to Schweitzer's manuscript for these speeches. Thus these translations, representing two different minds and personalities as they reflected Schweitzer's spoken ideas, would present many difficulties for the critic.

The published English text was translated into English by Mrs. Joahanna Powers, who had two sources from which to draw, as she developed her text. First, she was present at both lectures, and she

. . . took down a transcription of the words spoken--probably in German, as she herself was a German--and made a translation from that.⁵

Second, she had the use of Schweitzer's manuscript, and Dr. Micklem refers to Mrs. Powers' using this manuscript in her translating.

⁵Letter from Mrs. J. M. Leonard, January 18, 1960.

The revised German manuscript has been translated with great patience and care by Mrs. Powers of Kingsmead, to whom our thanks are due.⁶

The relation of Schweitzer's manuscript to the lectures as he delivered them is suggested by him in his reference to the manuscript in his autobiography.

Before leaving for Africa I also got ready for the press the lectures which I delivered at Selly Oak College in Birmingham, on "Christianity and the Religions of the World." . . . Unfortunately, I was obliged to confine within too small a compass this epitome of my examination of these religions, since I had to publish it in the form of those lectures.⁷

Thus, the text used in this study is a translation made by a person who not only heard and understood Schweitzer's German delivery of the lectures, but also had the use of Schweitzer's manuscript. After acknowledging the inherent limitations imposed by working with a translation, one finds the English text of the Selly Oak Lectures to be close enough to Dr. Schweitzer's oral delivery to permit a fair and thorough analysis of his speaking. The basic ideas and their support and arrangement as developed by Schweitzer can be examined even though the translation limitation will not permit quite so specific an inquiry into stylistic matters, especially in matters regarding word choice.

⁶Albert Schweitzer, loc. cit., p. 13.

⁷Schweitzer, Out of My Life and Thought, p. 202.

Preparation

Schweitzer's preparation of the Selly Oak Lectures was in his usual careful manner. Though he did not speak from a manuscript, his thoroughness in preparation is attested to by the detailed completeness of the ideas within the speeches themselves. He had been giving much time to the study of world religions, with special emphasis on the comparison of basic factors as found in these religions with the same factors in Christianity, and the lectures represented conclusions evolving from this study. Summarily stated, Schweitzer's preparation for these lectures exemplifies his customary thoughtful planning, based on previous extensive study in the area.

Abstract of the Speech

The following abstract of the Selly Oak Lectures is entirely in the words of Albert Schweitzer. Because the published English text of the lectures does not indicate at what point the break between the two lectures came, but rather treats them as one continuous text, this analysis will proceed on the same basis.

Selly Oak Lectures

Introduction

You and I are concerned with preaching the Gospel of Jesus in the world. We need to have a clear conception of

of the reasons why this gospel is for us the highest wisdom.

In this our time there is special need for clear thinking on this question, for the religious mind as such is the object of much serious investigation, and the non-Christian religions of the past as well as the world-religions of the present day are being studied in an objective way.

Let us together try to find out whether Christianity, simple though it is, can really maintain its claim to be the deepest expression of the religious mind.

Do not expect me to furnish an apologetic of the type that is, unfortunately, so frequently met with--an apologetic which consists in the assertion that Christianity contains truths which are above all reasoning, and which, therefore do not have to enter into contest with philosophy. From my youth I have held the conviction that all religious truth must in the end be capable of being grasped as something that stands to reason.

Body

In the first place I have to touch upon the results obtained by those who have carried on research work in the sphere of history of religions as to the past of Christianity. You know that some have gone so far as to cast doubt upon its originality. The first to do this was Bruno Bauer. Arthur Drews, at present professor of philosophy at the School of Technology in Karlsruhe, considers Christianity to be the offspring of a myth about a dying and rising Saviour-god. Others, again, assume that there really was a Jewish teacher called Jesus, who was crucified on account of his teaching, but that Paul was the real author of Christianity.

How can men who think seriously come to the conclusion that the ideas of Christianity do not go back to Jesus, but merely represent a transformation of the ideas which stirred religious circles in the then heathen world?

In the beginning of our era the longing for redemption sought satisfaction in cults which had originated in Greece or in the Orient or in Egypt, and which claimed the power to mediate redemption to men through mysterious initiations. The attempt to prove that Christianity is derived

from these mystery-religions of redemption does not lead to positive results. They are concerned solely with the bestowal of immortality upon men through magic. The ethical element, which plays such a predominant part in Christianity, they contain in words, at best, but not in reality.

A fundamental difference between the redemption-idea found in the cults of the Hellenistic period and that of Christianity lies in this: the one knows nothing of the conception of the Kingdom of God, whereas the other is dominated by that conception. Hellenistic religion is exclusively concerned with the destiny of spirit in the world of matter. Christianity, on the other hand, lives by the glowing hope of a better world. Redemption, according to the Christian conception, is the action of God, who brings this better world, the Kingdom of God, into existence and receives into it those men who have proved themselves to be of an honest and good heart.

In determining what is the difference between Christianity and the Graeco-Oriental religion, let us try to discover what Christianity essentially is. Graeco-Oriental piety is merely pessimistic. The only question with which it concerns itself is how the spiritual element is set free from the world of matter. Christianity, however, is not so consistent. In the bedrock of its pessimism there are optimistic veins, for it is not only the religion of redemption but the Kingdom of God. Therefore, it wishes and hopes for a transformation of the world. Connected with this is the fact that its ethic is quite different from that of the Graeco-Oriental religions. The only experience the religious mind of the Graeco-Oriental type knows is the longing after the spiritual; but according to the teaching of Jesus men are to be gripped by God's will of love, and must help to carry out that will in this world, in small things as in great things, in saving as in pardoning.

Wherein does the difference lie? In the Graeco-Oriental religion there is no living conception of God. The God of Jesus is an active God, who works in man. Thus, the religious philosophy of Jesus is not unified. His judgment of the natural world, it is true, is pessimistic; but to him God is other than the sum-total of the forces at work in the world, other than a pure spirituality, of which part was lost into the world and has to be restored. In the contrast between the world and God, who is an ethical Personality, and in the peculiar tension between pessimism

and optimism lies the uniqueness of the religion of Jesus. The fact that it is not a unified system constitutes its greatness, its truth, its depth, its strength.

At this point I must observe that we modern men are inclined to interpret the thoughts of Jesus in a modern way. In reality Jesus does not speak of the Kingdom of God as of something that comes into existence in the world and through a development of human society, but as of something which is brought about by God when He transforms this imperfect world into a perfect one. For about a century and a half the modernizing interpretation of the ideas of Jesus has ruled in Protestant theology as a matter of course. Only quite recently have we ventured to admit that he, living in the late-Jewish expectation of the end of the world, holds views of the Kingdom which differ from ours.

There is a deep significance in the fact that Jesus does not establish the organic connection, which to us seems so natural, between the ethical acts of men and the realization of the Kingdom of God. It signifies that we are to be ethical, not in the expectation of thereby fulfilling some purpose but from inward necessity, so as to be children of God's spirit and in this world already to enter into His will. Because he thus turns away from the utilitarian, he attains to the absolute ethic.

Having thus ascertained that Christianity is something original, and, in comparing it with the Graeco-Oriental religions, having seen something of its peculiar character, we now proceed to set it over against the world-religions which to-day strive for spiritual supremacy. Which are they? Brahmanism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and that type of religious thinking which goes back to the Chinese philosophers, Lao Tsz and Confucious (Kung Tsz).

Let us get at a guiding principle for our discussion. We cannot attempt more than a comparison of the characteristic fundamental ideas of the various types of religion. We shall measure the world-religions as to the ideals they stand for. How much each of them in reality falls short of its ideal will not be considered. When examining the fundamental ideas of the higher religions, we notice three lines of distinction which are determinative for the character of each religion. The first is that between optimistic and pessimistic; the second that between monistic and dualistic; thirdly, there is the greater or lesser extent to which

ethical motives are present. It is the ethical content, however, that determines its inner nature.

Let us first consult Brahmanism and Buddhism. Both are monistic and pessimistic. Buddhism is only a specific expression of the Brahmanistic thinking.

The teaching of Brahmanism is as follows: The whole world, as I see it when looking round, and as I experience it, is nothing but an imperfect appearance of the pure Being, of which the essence is the Brahma, the world-soul. From this most universal, most pure Being all beings spring. The natural world is imperfect, because it is a round of coming into existence and perishing, of perishing and coming into existence. To die to the world and to his own life is his spiritual calling. Entering more and more into the eternal pure being, he gives to his life its true meaning.

Buddhism is based on the same fundamental ideas as Brahmanism. It differs on the following points: In the first place, it is much more indifferent, in principle, to the polytheistic cult than is Brahmanism. Further, it deprecates the learned investigations and discussions concerning the nature of existence. It contents itself with knowing that all that happens within the cycle of coming into existence and perishing is suffering, and that the one thing of importance is to pass outside this cycle and to enter into the passionless state, the Nirvana. Unlike Brahmanism, too, Buddhism rejects all asceticism, all self-torture and the voluntary parting with life.

How, then, does the Gospel of Jesus compare with Brahmanism and Buddhism? When meeting them, it becomes first of all conscious of its own simplicity. The few points of contact between Christianity and this Indian religion with its negation of life and of the world have been so over-emphasized by some that they came to believe Christianity had its origin in thought-movements which had come from India. The decisive factor, however, is that there is no relation of content between the ideas of Jesus and those of the Brahmans and of Buddha.

Here we come to the fundamental difference. Brahmanism and Buddhism, really, attain to an ethic in words only, but not to an ethic of deed. The battle between Brahmanism and Buddhism on the one side and Christianity on the other is a battle between the spiritual and the ethical.

In the Indian mind intellectualism consumes the ethical element, just as sometimes a cloud which was to have given rain is consumed in a sultry atmosphere. The Gospel of Jesus, on the contrary, knows nothing of a cold superiority with which to look upon things, but creates enthusiasm for activity within God's will of love.

One more point, which reveals a significant difference--the Brahmins' and Buddha's doctrine of redemption is for priests and monks only, for they alone are in a position to live out this religion of withdrawing from the world. The Gospel of Jesus, on the other hand, deals with man as such, and teaches him how, though living and working in this world, he should be inwardly free from it.

One thing, however, we must acknowledge: the Indian religions train men to recollectedness. We are too much inclined to imagine that Christianity is merely activity. We do not have enough inwardness, we are not sufficiently preoccupied with our own spiritual life, we lack quietness; and this not only because in our exacting, busy existence it is difficult to obtain, but because, ignoring its importance, we do not take pains to secure it, being too easily content with living our lives as unrecollected men who merely aim at being good.

In fine, Brahmanism and Buddhism make an impression because they represent a type of religion that is unified in itself, being the result of consistent reasoning on the world and on life. But it is a poverty-stricken religion. Its God is mere empty spirituality. Its ethical content is meagre. It is a mysticism which makes man lose his individual existence in a god that is dead. Thus, although we know the charm of the logical religion, we stand by Christianity with all its simplicity and all its antinomies. It is indeed true and valuable, for it answers to the deepest stirrings of our inner will to live.

Let us leave Hinduism on one side for the moment, and let us go across the Himalayan mountains into China. All the leading religious thinkers of China are at one in holding the conviction that the forces which are at work in the world are good. Therefore, in their opinion, true piety consists in understanding the meaning of the world and in acting in accordance with it. Being consistent, monistic thinkers, they, like the Brahmins and Buddha, do not attain to the conception of a personal God; but whereas for the

Indians God remains absolute, lifeless spirituality, he is to the Chinese the mere sum-total of the forces at work in the world. This Power, which they conceive as being above all things and in all things, they call "Heaven."

What does it mean to think and to live according to the meaning of existence and in harmony with Heaven? It means to become like the forces of Nature. And which are the characteristics of the forces of Nature? They work in unobtrusive, unselfish ways, not appearing to be busy outwardly, but solely in inward strength. That is why they accomplish such great things. We are to become forces of that type.

We must say, Chinese piety is built on sand. It is based on the assumption that in the working of the forces of Nature we may read all that we believe and affirm in the religion of love, and that, therefore, meditation on the nature of the universe leads us to that religion. It is an illusion. Knowledge of the world does not lead so far.

To the Brahmins and to Buddha we said: Religion is more than a pessimism which denies life and world. To the religious minds of China we say: Religion is more than ethical optimism. And to both types of thinkers, we say: Religion is not a knowledge of the divine which springs from the contemplation of the universe. God, we believe, is more than merely the spiritual force underlying this world. Monism and pantheism, however profound and spiritual, do not lead into the ultimate problem of religion. That problem is, that in ourselves we experience God as different from the God we find in Nature: in Nature we recognize Him only as impersonal creative Power, in ourselves we recognize Him as ethical Personality.

Let us now return to India, and deal with Hinduism. It is with Hinduism that the missionaries in India have chiefly to do. And it is Hinduism which sets out to present itself to the world in general as a religion that is superior to Christianity. Hinduism is a popular religious movement, which rose alongside of the Brahmanic philosophy, yet more or less depending on it. Hinduism is a polytheism which carries within it the desire to become ethical montheism but does not venture to take the decisive step. Its method is to raise one of the chief gods, generally Vishnu (Krishna), in some way to the position of the universal God, who includes all the other deities in Himself.

What, then, is Hinduism, judged by the highest thoughts that stir within it? It is a reaction against the absolute, pessimistic negation of life and of the world, as found in the Brahmanist and Buddhist philosophy, and at the same time it is an attempt to rise from dead monism and pantheism to the conception of a personal, living, ethical God. But in order to become a living ethical religion, Hinduism gives up the consistency and self-containedness of the older schools of Indian religious thought. In every respect it is a religion of compromise. Polytheism and monotheism, pantheism and theism, intellectual mysticism and personal piety of heart, spiritual religion and popular cults --all these it tries to unite, without acknowledging the evident impossibility of their being thus united. It lives on imperfect conceptions and on half-truths. Therein lies its strength--its weakness too.

Religion, I said, is the search for a solution of the problem how man can be in God and in the world at one and the same time. The answer by Brahmanism and Buddhism is this: "By dying to the world and to life, for God is mere spirituality." Hinduism says: "By performing every action as something decreed by God, for God is the power which works all in all." In thus making God and the world coincide, Hinduism blurs the difference between good and evil, which it otherwise feels with elemental vividness. Why? Because it desires to be a religion which explains everything, a consistent religion which issues from logical thinking on the world.

Religion, however, has not only to explain the world. It has also to respond to the need I feel of giving my life a purpose. The question on which ultimately the decisive judgment must be based is, whether a religion is truly and vitally ethical or not. When it comes to this final test, the logical religions of the East fail. At this bend of the road we meet the Eastern religions, and here we speak the decisive word. Their proud attitude can no longer intimidate us. We speak the decisive word, not as the defenders of a traditional religion but as religious thinkers who prove in convincing terms that their religion has depth, naive though it may appear to be.

Every rational faith has to choose between two things: either to be an ethical religion or to be a religion that explains the world. We Christians choose the former, as that which is of higher value. We turn away from the

logical, self-contained religion. To the question, how a man can be in the world and in God at one and the same time, we find this answer in the Gospel of Jesus: "By living and working in this world as one who is not of the world."

Compared with the logical religions of the East, the Gospel of Jesus is illogical. Christianity accepts all the difficulties of the dualistic view; it is ethical theism and apprehends God as a Will that is distinct from the world and compels us not to conform to the world.

Neither can Christianity definitely choose between pessimism and optimism. It is pessimistic, not only because, like Brahmanism and Buddhism, it realizes that imperfection, pain, and sorrow are essential features of the natural world, but for this additional and still more important reason, that in man it finds a will which does not answer to the will of the ethical God and which, therefore, is evil. Again, Christianity is optimistic, because it does not abandon this world, does not, as do Brahmanism and Buddhism, withdraw from it in negation of life and of the world, but assigns to men a place in this world and commands him to live in it and to work in it in the spirit of the ethical God.

All problems of religion, ultimately, go back to this one--the experience I have of God within myself differs from the knowledge concerning Him which I derive from the world. Now, which is the more vital knowledge of God? The knowledge derived from my experience of Him as ethical Will. The knowledge concerning God which is derived from Nature is always imperfect and inadequate, because we perceive the things in the world from without only.

It is true that Christianity, too, has always sought to explain as much as possible. The first Christians expected the solution of the problem to lie in a speedy transformation of this natural world into the perfect world of the Kingdom of God. Since then, Christians have tried again and again to make of Christianity a doctrine in which the activity of the ethical God and the course of events in the natural world are brought into harmony with each other. Never has the attempt been successful. Thus we go on our way through the world, not troubled about knowledge, but committing to God what we hope for, for ourselves and the world, and possessing all in all through being apprehended by the living, ethical God.

Conclusion

When you preach, you must lead men out of the desire to know everything to the knowledge of the one thing that is needful, to the desire to be in God, and thus no more to conform to the world but to rise above all mysteries as those who are redeemed from the world. Wherever it is your task to speak for Christianity in its contest with the other world-religions, you must use none but these untainted spiritual means of defence.

Preaching the Gospel in foreign lands to-day we are the advance-guard of an army that suffered a defeat and needs to be made fit again. Let us be courageous advance-guards. The truth which the Gospel of Jesus carries within itself cannot be impaired by men's errors nor by their lack of faithfulness. And if only our lives, in genuine nonconformity to the world, reveal something of what it means to be apprehended by the living, ethical God, then something of the truth of Jesus goes out from us.

After having spent these hours together in concentrating our thought on the work to which we are called, we now go forth, some to this field and some to that, to do the work. Though scattered far and wide we are united in spirit, as those who desire to enter into God's will, and who believe that it is their calling to kindle in men a longing for that same experience.

Invention

This portion of the case analysis is concerned with the inventional factors involved in the Selly Oak lectures. These involve the examination of all those factors which relate to the discovery of the materials of the lectures and to their analysis and development. The general purpose of this section will be accomplished by first noting the major ideas of the lectures and their source, and then by describing and analyzing the three modes of proof: logical, psychological

and ethical. The purpose is to gain an understanding of the theme of the Selly Oak lectures and its various forms of support.

Ideas: Their Sources and Relevance to the Audience

The basic ideas involved in the Selly Oak lectures concern the source and significance of the basic Christian concepts. These had been a major concern of Schweitzer's since his student days in Strasbourg. Research and conclusions concerning New Testament problems had involved the examination of early Christianity, and over the years, Schweitzer had made thorough studies of various major world religions. The Selly Oak lectures represent the results of Schweitzer's studies in these areas, at the time of these lectures.

Specific ideas concerning such things as the eschatology of Jesus' times, the Christian superiority in the concepts of ethics, and the origin of Christian concepts are to be found in The Quest of the Historical Jesus and Paul and His Interpreters. His views concerning the Christian view of the universe were expounded in his Dale Memorial Lectures and later in his study The Philosophy of Civilization.

The method of approach in the lectures reflects the usual procedure of scholarship used by Albert Schweitzer

in his various major works. This procedure is as follows: the studying of the various ideas by other scholars in the area; an historical developing of the subject in which its strengths and weaknesses are noted; the comparing of the results of previous research with his own theory; and resulting conclusions of that comparison.

Thus the ideas in the Selly Oak lectures and their presentation reflect matters of deep and lasting concern to Schweitzer; reflect his usual method of inquiry; and reflect his firm convictions within the area of the subject.

An Analysis of the Basic Lines of
Thought in the Selly Oak Lectures with
Particular Emphasis on Logical Proof

This section proposes to examine the Selly Oak lectures, analyzing especially the logical proof offered as support for the ideas in the lectures. More specifically an analysis of the lines of argument, their development through evidence, and reasoning from that evidence will be made.

Schweitzer opens his lectures with a short introduction in which he not only forecasts the nature of his subject and his general approach to it, but also suggests the type of argument upon which he intends to base his thinking. The general nature of the lectures is stated frankly and immediately and is phrased as a problem based

on a common need faced by Schweitzer and his audience.

We need to have a clear conception of the reasons why this gospel is for us the highest wisdom. Why do we consider it to be the leaven which is to leaven the thought, the will and the hope of all mankind. In this our time there is special need for clear thinking on this question, . . .

In a few short sentences Schweitzer then establishes the reasons why this need is such a pressing one. He bases this contention on three factors: (1) Religions are now being studied in an objective way. (2) We can no longer dispose of other religions as just so much heathenism. (3) The other world religions have many attracting features and are beginning to claim to be superior to Christianity.

Having set forth the nature of the idea which he intends to develop by clearly establishing his thesis on a felt need, Schweitzer then implies his general approach to the problem. He does this by stating what he does "not" intend to do.

Do not expect me to furnish an apologetic of that type that is unfortunately, so frequently met with--an apologetic which consists in the assertion that Christianity contains truths which are above all reasoning, and which, therefore do not have to enter into contest with philosophy.

After developing his statement with an analogy comparing the usual apologetic with a fortress that is strictly for defense, but impractical for active wielding of power, Schweitzer then states his approach in a more

positive way, phrasing it in a tight syllogistic manner.

From my youth I have held the conviction that all religious truths must in the end be capable of being grasped as something that stands to reason. I therefore, believe that Christianity, in the contest with philosophy and other religions, should not ask for exceptional treatment, but should be in the thick of the battle of ideas, relying solely on the power of its own inherent truth.

From this we see Schweitzer's general approach which can be expected throughout the discourse. We can expect him to place Christianity beside the other world religions and to require it to establish its superiority on its own merits, without any special consideration.

The third item which is accomplished in the introduction to the lectures is his presentation to his audience of a sample of the kind of logical development on which they can expect him to base his arguments. Both of the main points which he develops in his introduction--why he is speaking and how he intends to develop his idea--are substantiated with clearly stated, self-evident reasons. For example, the "need" is established by stating eight contributing factors which make the need a pressing one. These factors touch on common knowledge of his audience, helping to make his generalization seem necessary. The statement of his proposed methodology is now simply stated; it is demonstrated to be a necessary factor essential for successfully

accomplishing his purpose in the lectures. Thus the two main points in the introduction state that Schweitzer expects each idea to be capable of logical support, regardless of its abstract or mystic connotations.

Because so many of Schweitzer's studies follow an historical plan of development, it is not surprising to find the logical development of his arguments embedded in a chronological, historical background. Therefore, we discover his first line of thought in the body of his speech preceded by a prefatory passage which briefly outlines the basic ideas which have been developed in the past by those who have studied the history of religions, especially in regard to the origin of Christianity. Schweitzer touches on the main results of some of these studies. He then proceeds to give three examples of this type of research: (1) Christianity originated in the piety of the Graeco-Roman world. (2) Jesus was a myth. (3) Paul was the real creator of Christianity.

This brief passage sets the stage, so to speak, for the further development of his ideas, and each of these three conclusions, resulting from previous research, is now analyzed in detail and refuted. In other words, Schweitzer proceeds to clear away any underbrush of doubt concerning the origin of the core of the Christian religion before he

puts it up against the major world religions. This procedure lays a firm foundation of just what Christianity is, before it is sent to the battlefield to prove its worth.

Schweitzer seeks to refute the idea of Christianity evolving from religions popular in the Hellenistic circles by pointing out the following factors: the difference of the two thought developments; the strictly Jewish history of Christianity; the similarities found in the two religions are not causally connected. First, admitting that both Christianity and Hellenistic religions deal with redemption and its attainment connected with sacramental rites, Schweitzer then proceeds to point out that Christianity and the Hellenistic mystery cults differ widely in their delineation of the idea. Fundamentally, the difference is this: Christianity is dominated by the concept of the Kingdom of God, while the Hellenistic cults knew nothing of this idea. Schweitzer points out that the mystery cults were concerned solely with how man can release his spirit from this world of matter and return to the all-important spiritual realm. Thus, the mystery cults were not at all concerned with mankind and the world. The implication here is that these mystery cults lacked an ethical element.⁸

⁸This is a significant point, for as Schweitzer progresses in his argument throughout the discourse; the ethical element becomes his major line of thought on which he bases his conviction of the superiority of Christianity.

Schweitzer seeks to strengthen his position at this point by pointing out and refuting the importance of the one example that contradicts his generalization that the mystery cults lacked any ethical content. This exception is the Mithras cult derived from the popular religion of Zarathushtra. Schweitzer points out that in his judgment this example is not significant to the argument for it didn't come into the Graeco-Oriental world until after Christianity had attained its full development.

Over against the redemption concept of the mystery cults, Schweitzer places the Christian interpretation of the idea which is grounded in the hope of a better world. The eschatological foundation on which Christianity rests teaches men to live lives of virtue and integrity, thus making themselves fit for election to the Kingdom of God. This idea is not to be found in the Graeco-Oriental mystery religions. Thus Schweitzer attempts to refute the link between the mystery religions and Christianity on their common concept of redemption. The evidence for this refutation is a demonstration of the wide difference in the way in which redemption is viewed by the two religions.

The argument is further strengthened by Schweitzer's pointing out the historical development of the "Kingdom of God" belief through Jewish history, starting with the Jewish

prophets of Amos and Isaiah down to its perfection by Jesus.

Having thus supported his assertion that Christianity was not evolved from the Graeco-Oriental mystery cults by pointing out their fundamental differences and the Jewish origin and development of the Kingdom of God concept, Schweitzer concludes this basic line of thought by pointing out that Christianity was later influenced and subsequently impoverished by the mystery religions.

Next, Schweitzer pulls together further evidence and argument in order to refute those arguments that challenge the origin and uniqueness of Christianity. Schweitzer seems to repeat some of his first arguments, although, at the same time, introducing new evidence and strengthening the overall argument. In this line of thought he begins to refer more frequently to sayings of Jesus. For example, in this particular portion of his argument Schweitzer quotes words of Jesus and paraphrases his ideas for a total of twelve times. The following are examples of his use of this technique: "According to the teaching of Jesus . . ." "The God of Jesus . . ." "The religion of Jesus . . ." and "In the thought of Jesus. . ."

This use of argument from sign also seeks to refute the third challenge to Christianity: that Paul was its real

founder. By stressing the founding of Christianity by Jesus Schweitzer weakens the argument that it was created by Paul. It is constructive in building a case for Jesus as the founder of Christianity; it is destructive in refuting the idea that Paul was the founder.

The constructive development follows a deductive pattern in which Schweitzer's general assertion is supported by examples, statements of chronological, historical facts, plus opinion evidence. Beginning with an acknowledgment of a similarity between Christianity and Graeco-Oriental religions in the fact that both are pessimistic, he proceeds to show the wide differences in the interpretation which each has of pessimism. Defining Graeco-Oriental pessimism as consistent thought resulting in a concern of liberation from the material world, Schweitzer is then in a position to point out that the resulting ethic from such pessimism is nearly non-existent, for it denies any responsibility in the material world. Having made this point, Schweitzer then devotes most of the argument to pointing out the strength of Christianity in its dynamic ethical foundation, regardless of the fact that this means that Christianity is inconsistent in its pessimism.

Through the use of example, definition, and ample reference to the authority of Jesus, Schweitzer stresses the

Christian's dynamic role in the world as he prepares himself for the Kingdom of God. Based on the inconsistent factor that a Christian must be both free from the world and active in it, Christianity offers a concept of a living God, not one who is pure spirituality. The result of this argument is that the view of the inconsistent Christianity is the stronger for its make-up of dualism.

In the contrast between the world and God, who is an ethical Personality, and in the peculiar tension between pessimism and optimism lies the uniqueness of the religion of Jesus.

In what seems to be almost an abrupt interpolation, Schweitzer switches from his main argument to a digression that adversely criticizes the modern view of interpreting the meaning of Jesus. As the argument develops, however, it turns out that it is not a digression, but that it serves the overall argument in two ways. First, it points out a fallacy in the modern-day interpretation of Jesus that could cause difficulty later when Christianity is compared with other world religions. Second, it adds further support to Schweitzer's contention that Christianity is unique and that its origin was in a living Jesus.

Schweitzer opens this line of thought with a rather blunt accusation.

At this point I must observe that we modern men are inclined to interpret the thoughts of Jesus in a modern way.

Schweitzer then defines just what this modern misinterpretation is. Using his central idea, which had formed the core of his approach in The Quest of the Historical Jesus, that of the eschatological emphasis of Jesus' day, he points out that Jesus must be allowed to speak from his own historical background. From this vantage point, then, the Kingdom of God becomes . . .

something which is brought about by God when he transforms this imperfect world into a perfect one. In the thought of Jesus, the ethical activity of man is only like a powerful prayer to God, that He may cause the Kingdom to appear without delay.

Supporting this interpretation with the authority of a Biblical quotation, Schweitzer then indicates the increased significance of Jesus in this light. Schweitzer contends that by not forming a utilitarian connection between ethical acts and the realization of the Kingdom, Jesus' ethic became an absolute ethic. This absolute ethic, which preaches nonconformity to the world, is both active in the world and superior to it.

Schweitzer now pulls his argument together quickly, and it appears clear that all that has been said thus far has lead progressively to this conclusion of the originality of Christianity. This conclusion, in turn, becomes his transition for stating his next main line of thought.

Having thus ascertained that Christianity is something original, and, in comparing it with the Graeco-Oriental religions, having seen something of its peculiar character, we now proceed to set it against the world-religions which today strive for spiritual supremacy.

Schweitzer declares his basic plan to compare Christianity with Brahmanism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Chinese thought, and then digresses in order further to establish his methodology. Therefore, we find him first listing those religions which he will not discuss. He then restates his intent to compare Christianity to the world religions, but first he sets up further guide lines for his discussion. It is not until he has accomplished this that he enters into the actual discussion of world religions.

In his discussion of those religions which he does not intend to take up, Schweitzer follows a pattern of deductive argument; he first states the generalization that he will not discuss a particular religion and then proceeds to list particular reasons why he will not do so. In this manner he excludes Zoroastrianism, Islam, and Judaism from his discussion. Zoroastrianism is excluded because it is no longer a religion of force or importance in the world. Islam is not considered for discussion because Schweitzer feels that it lacks profundity and that it continually suppresses its deeper, ethical elements. Judaism is denied

discussion because its basic ideas have been adopted and developed by Christianity.

After again restating the problem, Schweitzer proceeds to set up more guiding principles for his discussion. First, he determines to discuss the ideal, fundamental ideas in each religion, waiving any discussion or qualification of the corrupt practice of these ideals. Though these corruptions are found in all religions, he feels that discussion of them would be beside the point and would distract from the main line of thought in the lectures.

Next, Schweitzer sets up three basic distinctions upon which each religion will be examined and then compared with one another. These fundamental ideas are:

- 1) Is the religion optimistic or pessimistic?
- 2) Is the religion monistic or dualistic?
- 3) To what extent is the religion ethical?

Schweitzer carefully defines each of these terms as he intends to use them in the lectures, and he obviously emphasizes the importance of the third item, underlying this belief that the ethical element of a religion is its most distinctive factor.

Schweitzer now plunges into the core of his theme by proceeding to set forth Brahmanism and Buddhism, doing so by placing them in their historical perspective. Each

one is traced, by means of its fundamental characteristics, from its origin to the present day, noting idea modifications along the way. The setting forth of these historical facts is largely a matter of exposition, in which Schweitzer narrates the history of each specific religion. Within his exposition he often uses arguments from sign to indicate some particular development. His other general type of argument within the narration is that of deduction, wherein he states his generalization and then proceeds to support it by listing examples and historic illustrations.

Schweitzer begins by quickly stating that Brahmanism and Buddhism are both monistic and pessimistic; he then indicates their interrelationship, stating that Buddhism is one expression of Brahmanistic thinking. Schweitzer then moves abruptly to an historical progression of the development of Indian religions. Quoting the Vedic hymns and the Brahman Sutras as his authority, Schweitzer moves into a delineation of the teachings of Brahmanism dividing the religion into three basic concepts.

- 1) The whole world is nothing but an imperfect appearance of the pure Being.
- 2) The natural world is imperfect.
- 3) All natural existence is continued in the cycle of transmigration.

In the development of these three basic concepts are found a number of examples of Schweitzer's use of sign reasoning to indicate how the Brahmins' arrive at particular conclusions. One example of this is as follows:

The natural world is imperfect, because it is a round of coming into existence and perishing, of perishing and coming into existence.

Shifting to a delineation of Buddhism, Schweitzer proceeds to describe and define Buddhism by showing how it differs from Brahmanism. He finds three basic differences.

- 1) Brahmanism is more indifferent to polytheism.
- 2) Brahmanism deprecates learned investigations and discussions concerning the nature of existence.
- 3) Brahmanism rejects the necessity of asceticism and self-torture.

The exposition of these major differences consists of making a general statement and then supporting it with examples and illustrations.

Following this general explanation of Buddhistic thinking, Schweitzer then sets up its historical background. In this exposition, which is largely a matter of his making general assertions and then supporting them with historic facts, is found one example of inductive thought pattern, which lends some variety to his usual deductive pattern. It

occurs in his narration of how Buddha arrived at the general principle of redemption without asceticism or self-torture. In this narration Schweitzer ennumerates a number of particular steps which led Buddha to his conclusion.

In a sense all of the preceding material has been introductory to the next line of thought, for here, Schweitzer for the first time undertakes to fulfill his purpose of placing Christianity against these Indian world religions. In the development of his argument to show Christianity superior to the Indian religions he discusses three basic and distinctive differences between the two ideologies. Within this argument Schweitzer also supports his belief that Christianity is in no way evolved from Indian thought; and at the same time he admits one point of Indian superiority over the Christian religion. His argument leads progressively to his conclusion that the Indian religions have points of strength but that when they are compared to Christianity they become "poverty stricken."

Schweitzer begins his argument by pointing out the first basic difference between Christianity and the Indian religions, a difference which underlies the other differences. Stated simply, this is that Christianity is simple in its claims. Its simplicity leads it to seek its truths in humility and Schweitzer supports this point by quoting Paul.

Jesus does not lead us into such presumption, but into humility. He wakens in us a longing to get a glimpse of the mystery of the Kingdom of God. In I Cor. xiii the apostle Paul uses powerful words to express the thought that at best "we know in part."

Opposed to this simplicity, he says, are the Indian religions, which claim to have "found the solution of the riddles of the world and human life."

Interrupting this main line of argument, which is comparing Christianity with the Indian religions, Schweitzer digresses to detail his arguments against the hypothesis that Christianity had its origin in Indian thought. Pointing to the research that has been done in this area, Schweitzer seeks to refute the theory, first by indicating the difficulties which the theory has from the outset because of the wide differences it finds in the religions. As one continues to follow the argument the second method of refutation seems to become involved for Schweitzer interrupts his line of argument in order to admit and support the idea that Indian and Christian thought could have come into contact. This interruption becomes a narration concerning the modes of travel and exchanges of ideas in the early times. Leaving this narration, Schweitzer comes back to his business of seeking to refute any causal link between the Indian and Christian religions. He selects one of the

more prominent theories which states that Christ was possibly a member of a Jewish sect called the Essenes and that this sect advocated certain Indian beliefs.⁹ Schweitzer seeks to refute this contention largely by simply pointing to the lack of sufficient evidence on which to base the claim. This digression and the digression within the digression, are examples of Schweitzer's thoroughness, but at the same time they make his line of thought quite involved and complex.

Schweitzer now returns to his argument concerning the relationship between Christianity and the Indian religions. Restating that any such relationship could not be causal, he supports his contention further with analogical argument comparing the differences between Christianity and Indian religions with the same differences that were found between Christianity and the Graeco-Oriental religions. Again it is the contrast between the ethical concepts that becomes the most significant factor according to Schweitzer. This is emphasized by quotations from the authorities of Jesus and Buddha which point up the difference at this point.

This leads into Schweitzer's second basic argument which proposes to indicate the differences between the two religions. This major difference, based on the differences

⁹It would be interesting to note Schweitzer's reaction to evidence later found in the Dead Sea Scrolls.

in the ethical content of the religions, is stated in a number of different ways. He restates it by means of illustration, by simple changes in the phrasing, and also by comparing the positions of the two religions regarding ethical matters. He supports his contention, first, by setting up an Indian fundamental premise and then proceeding to destroy it. Stating the Indian claim and then pointing out its inner inconsistency, Schweitzer makes his point of the weakness of the Indian religion in the realm of ethics. This Indian inconsistency is this: Indian religions intellectualize compassion, but because they negate the material world entirely--the only value for man is to find release from this world--there is no need for any ethical action in the material world.

The Indian weakness becomes Christianity's strength. Making no attempt coldly to shut out the material world, Christianity reaches a dynamic ethic of deed. This conclusion leads Schweitzer into his third line of argument, aimed at comparing Christianity and Indian religions, and that is the fact that the Brahman and Buddhist doctrines of redemption are for monks and priests. They offer nothing for the common man. Basing his support on the Indian doctrine itself, Schweitzer points out that the only circumstances which enable the ordinary man to achieve

redemption lie in his devoting his entire life to strict religious growth leading to an ascetic way of life. Again, Christianity rises superior to the Indian religion, for it speaks to everyone.

Having sought to make three significant points which would place Christianity as superior to the Indian religions, Schweitzer then admits to one point of comparison in which Christianity is inferior, the Christian's lack of "recollectedness." Believing in a religion of activity to the neglect of inner quietness, the Christian is weaker for it. This lack of recollectedness is an effect which Schweitzer points out has its cause in our being content with merely being good, while ignoring our need for inner quiet.

Schweitzer's summary of this first clash between Christianity and other world religions restates the basic arguments, concluding with the judgment that the Indian religions are poverty stricken in the face of Christianity.

Following a brief transitional statement, Schweitzer takes up immediately Chinese religious thought as the next world religion with which to compare Christianity. After a short exposition of the monistic-optimistic nature of Chinese thought, Schweitzer proceeds to explain and define it by pointing out its main thesis and indicating briefly its origin and the progress of its ideas through history.

Asserting that Chinese piety is weak in its ethical foundation, Schweitzer supports his contention in the same way that he argued the similar point in the Indian religions, by reasoning that their basic assumption is inconsistent and self-contradictory. Schweitzer then concludes his line of argument with a comparison of Christianity and Chinese thought, again stressing what he terms the ethical superiority of Christianity.

Schweitzer begins this argument declaring Chinese religious thought to be monistic and optimistic. Developing these points only briefly, letting definitions of each suffice, Schweitzer proceeds to draw conclusions which later serve his contention that the thinking of the Chinese is not sound. For example, being optimistic thinkers, Chinese religious leaders have looked upon the world as being made up of forces working for "good." This means that their idea of ethics will consist in understanding the meaning of the world and in acting in accordance with it, quite the opposite of the Indian religions. This idea Schweitzer seeks to refute later in the argument.

Having stated the two basic ideas in Chinese religious thought, Schweitzer next develops the history of the religion continuing to delineate the teachings of the religion as he provides its history. The two factors are intertwined, and

the points are stated in a narrative style. Several places within the narration Schweitzer lends support to his thinking by referring to passages from sacred literature of the Chinese religion for authority. Other than that the names and historical facts are made to stand as self evident.

Before directing his argument against the weaknesses of this Chinese thought, Schweitzer notes a common ground between Chinese thought and Christianity which is a similar belief in a Kingdom of God to be attained on earth through the force of love. Schweitzer then enters the basic line of argument that seeks to point up the ethical weakness in the Chinese religion. The argument is developed by attacking the basic assumption of Chinese piety as faulty.

It is based on the assumption that in the working of the forces of Nature we may read all that we believe and affirm in the religion of love and that, therefore, meditation on the nature of the universe leads us to that religion. Thus they attempt to pretend that the essence of the religion of love is knowledge of the world.

Schweitzer's main idea is that knowledge of the world will not allow such conclusions as those drawn by the Chinese thinkers. This idea is a predominant one in Schweitzer's philosophic thinking and forms a central point in his Philosophy of Civilization. Rather than lend lengthy support to his belief, Schweitzer here seems to rely upon his audience remembering that he inferred and supported the

inability of the knowledge of the world to support a reason for ethics in his previous lines of thoughts.¹⁰ Schweitzer does strengthen his basic argument here by referring to the authority of the Chinese leaders, indicating that they must agree with him and he provides specific examples of their thinking.

After a brief transition Schweitzer undertakes to show the wide separation between Christianity and Chinese thought in the realm of ethics. Based directly on his argument that Chinese optimism leads it into a false belief in the logical working of nature for good, Schweitzer points out that any logical knowledge of the world cannot support a dynamic concept of ethics. Again he supports his conclusion by use of the testimony of chinese thinkers whose statements, he believes, reflect that they too had to arrive at a result of dimly conceived ethics.

Ending his argument with a constructive picture of the Christian strength on just this point, Schweitzer emphasizes that the Chinese weakness is the Christian strength. Using Biblical testimony as authority to strengthen his evidence, Schweitzer concludes that Christianity is superior

¹⁰The point was made when comparing Christianity with the Graeco-Oriental religions and again when analyzing the pessimism of the Indian religions.

to the Chinese religions, in that the former provides answers to the fundamental questions of religion upon which Chinese thought with its unified, logical religion cannot touch.

Schweitzer abruptly moves into his next line of thought which deals with Hinduism.¹¹ After a few statements which underline the need for comparison between Christianity and Hinduism, the argument follows the expository style of development in which the historical growth of Hinduism plus an explanation of its basic ideas are intermingled. This narration is provided very little logical, argumentative support. Basically, Schweitzer lets the historical facts stand by themselves. For example, when stating a general principle of Hinduism, he will show how it came about or what caused it, supporting his statement from the authority of Hindu religious literature. Concluding this narration with an exploration of the possibility of Hinduism and Christianity influencing each other, Schweitzer then moves into the development of an argument which undermines the superiority of Hinduism in relation with Christianity. As was true with the other religions, it is the ethical concepts in Hinduism that come under attack. The basic line of reasoning is done from the evidence of a lengthy passage

¹¹There is some reason to believe that it is here that the second of the two lectures began.

from Hindu sacred literature, which Schweitzer feels points up its confused ethical position. Continuing to drive this weakness home, Schweitzer implements the causal form of argument to make his point. The basic position of Hinduism implies its dilemma.

It is a reaction against the absolute, pessimistic negation of life and of the world, as found in the Brahmanist and Buddhist philosophy, and at the same time it is an attempt to rise from dead monism and pantheism to the conception of a personal, living, ethical God.

In order to try to achieve its purpose, Hinduism, he says, is forced to link certain incompatible ideas together, thus forcing it into a series of compromises. Thus the method Schweitzer uses to refute Hinduism is to point out the inevitable effects caused by its claims when carried out to their logical conclusions. Schweitzer feels it is thus guilty of inconsistency. For example, its ethical concepts demand that it merge polytheism and monotheism and pantheism and theism. Because they are contradictory concepts, they cannot unite. This dilemma is supported by a story from the Bhagavadgita, in which this unanswerable predicament is illustrated and the concept of a dynamic ethic suffers because of it.

The argument is concluded by a reemphasis of the point that he has made. Here Schweitzer refers his audience

to the basic requirement of religion that was set up at the beginning of the lectures in which he stated that religion must show a man how he can be in God and in the world at the same time. The Hindu answer, which claims that every action is something decreed by God, only blurs the difference between good and evil and the ethical content is lost.

Now Schweitzer enters a passage of setting up the outstanding qualities of the Eastern religions. This not only serves as a summary for the world-religions, but it brings them into sharp focus. Schweitzer points out where they are attractive to the West and how their logical consistency makes them appear unassailable. This brief passage serves as a transition to the last portion of the lectures in which Schweitzer, through the building of a strong, constructive line of argument for Christianity, demonstrates Christianity as the victor on the battlefield with other world religions.

In this portion of the speeches, Schweitzer returns to those basic concepts of religion which he set forth at the very beginning. He places Christianity and the other world religions to the test of these concepts and then draws his conclusions. Schweitzer's logical proof in his concluding line of thought makes use of deductive and causal methods of reasoning. Many of the assertions in this argument,

however, go unsupported at this point, for they are pulled from previous arguments in which they were amply supported. Thus, the logical proof of this portion of the lectures gives a cumulation effect; that is, his assertions and conclusions are based on the total effect of his logic throughout the entire discourse.

Schweitzer enters this line of thought with a reemphasis of his initial idea that religion must do more than explain the world, a factor which he has demonstrated that the Indian religions do, and do well. Religion must also, according to Schweitzer, provide an ethical purpose for a man's life. It is on this crucial matter that Schweitzer claims the Eastern religions fail and Christianity stands superior. For support Schweitzer refers his audience to the Bhagavadgita story quoted previously. Pointing to the fact that he has demonstrated over and over in the lectures that logical, consistent thought cannot reach a dynamic ethic, Schweitzer concludes with a restatement that here Christianity speaks the decisive word.

Returning to a basic idea set forth at the beginning of the lectures which involved the assertion that every rational faith has to make a decision between either being ethical or being capable of explaining the world, Schweitzer states that Christianity has chosen the former. This decision

causes the formation of a profoundly ethical religion which admits to an imperfect knowledge of the world. Schweitzer reasons that this naiveté is a profound naiveté which leads Christianity to great ethical heights. In one of the most telling arguments of the lectures, Schweitzer generalizes that Christianity, too, has tried in the past to arrive at knowledge of the world which would harmonize with ethical and philosophical conceptions of God. Using a progression of historical examples, Schweitzer leads his audience to the conclusion that the very attempts to arrive at this knowledge led Christianity to the admission of the impossibility of the task, and thus caused Christianity to become aware of its own, profound inner nature. The result was an illogical religion based on a dualistic view of the concept of God. Choosing to ground their knowledge of God in the ethical inner experience of him, Schweitzer feels that Christians developed a religion far superior to its eastern counterparts.

Having arrived at this conclusion, Schweitzer then supports the decision of Christianity, of choosing the ethical knowledge of God, by pointing to the application of the generalization to particular instances, such as its being the most decisive single element within the life of the individual. Reasoning from analogy, he points out the

similarity to the mystery of the warm gulf stream in the middle of the ocean. Having supported the importance of the personal, ethical knowledge of God, leads Schweitzer to the further conclusion that all profound religion is mystical. Schweitzer states that the intellectual knowledge of God which the Indian religions profess results in a dead spirituality and he continues this line of thought by restating Christianity's superior position.

Schweitzer's concluding remarks offer no new line of argument calling for extensive logical proof, however, although the conclusion is not a mere summary. Instead, he directs the conclusions of the lectures to the audience, challenging his hearers to apply these conclusions in their work. Prefacing a number of these challenges with, "When you preach . . ." Schweitzer brings the issues into a sharp and final focus. His support for these challenges is usually one or two illustrations which point up their need. The final remarks of the lectures combine appeals to humility, strength and urgency which support these challenges.

Summary

This analysis of the Selly Oak lectures emphasizing the logical development of proof found in the lectures, indicates generally that Schweitzer depends heavily upon logical proof for accomplishing his purpose. His purpose

was to place Christianity on the battlefield with other world religions and to see if it could logically hold its own. This examination suggests that that purpose was accomplished. Relying upon authority, testimony, historical progression of facts, examples, and illustrations for evidence, Schweitzer reasoned from that evidence, generally in a deductive manner. Within his deductive pattern there were instances of causal arguments and arguments from sign. In his efforts to be thorough and not to allow any loose arguments, Schweitzer made a number of digressions to indicate tangential matters. Although this undoubtedly made his argument more complete, it seemed unduly to complicate his lines of argument.

In addition to these elements of his argument this analysis pointed up the objectivity with which Schweitzer approached his arguments, for the same care in support and reasoning from that support was applied to all sides of the argument. The analysis further reflected the usual careful, historically oriented, type of thought pattern which Schweitzer's other studies have indicated. The general conclusion can be stated that on the basis of this analysis that it is logical proof upon which Schweitzer relies.

An Examination of the Psychological
Proof in the Selly Oak Lectures

For purposes of this study the phrase "psychological proof" will include all those extra-logical factors which have their source in the psychological tendencies of the audience, employed by Albert Schweitzer to support his lines of argument. The purpose of this analysis is to discover in what manner Schweitzer adapted his speech to the needs of his particular audience. The philosophy behind this method of proof is stated by Aristotle as follows:

. . . and hence the speaker must not merely see to it that his speech shall be convincing and persuasive, but . . . get his judge into the right state of mind.¹²

Psychological proof, as used in this examination, includes both those factors designed to arouse various emotions and those factors which profess to satisfy various needs and "reaction tendencies" in persons. No sharp distinction is made between the two. The division of drives into "physiological needs" and "social dependency needs" developed by Wayne Minnick in The Art of Persuasion will be used in order to maintain consistency. The psychological drives which constitute the bulk of this discussion of psychological proof in the Selly Oak lectures are used with

¹²Lane Cooper, The Rhetoric of Aristotle (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1932), p. 91.

the following meaning:

Certain basic wants are shared by all men. One may modify such wants, suppress them, disguise them, and dream perhaps of extirpating them; but they remain, nonetheless, urging men to discover satisfactions or substitute satisfactions the minute they are deprived of them.¹³

The plan of development for this portion of the analysis is first to provide a general overview of Schweitzer's psychological proof and then to discuss each particular approach and give examples of it.

Because of Schweitzer's emphasis on logical proof in the Selly Oak lectures, one would expect the psychological proof to be much less extensive. However, it will be noted that these psychological proofs play a significant part in the construction of the lectures.

First, using the division of motivational factors set up by Minnick, all of Schweitzer's psychological appeals fall in the "social dependency" category; none of them deals with fulfilling physiological needs. Second, looking at the lectures as a whole, the critic can make the generalization that all of Schweitzer's psychological appeals are dependent upon his audience's initially identifying themselves with Schweitzer's idealization of the term Christian. He safely

¹³Wayne C. Minnick, The Art of Persuasion (Boston: Riverside Press, 1957), p. 204.

makes this basic assumption on the basis of prior knowledge of his audience, for their religious vocations and aspirations suggest the assumption. Directing his appeals to the motivations of his audience as Christians permits him to appeal to lofty aims and desires.

Third, Schweitzer's general pattern of psychological appeals is as follows: At the beginning and at the very end of the lectures, there are a series of statements directed specifically to the drive of his audience to acquire a deeper understanding of Christianity (self-realization) in order that they may believe and act on its principles confident that it is worthy of respect from all (esteem). Within the body of the lectures, two basic approaches are employed. The first is to pose questions or make assertions which appeal to esteem and self-realization. This is done through constructing a view of the uniqueness of Christianity. The second device is to build up the opposing religion as a threat to the Christian esteem and self realization; the subsequent refutation of this threat restores and intensifies the satisfaction of esteem and self-realization drives. There is then the additional accomplishment of having seen Christian concepts meet the test of a threat and having survived the test (group preservation).

A fourth generalization needs to be mentioned. The very emphasis upon logical proof, the detailed, exhaustive support of argument, noted in the preceding analysis can be viewed as an underlying psychological device. Primarily, it satisfies the desire to have respect for the logical solidity of Christianity. A sense of pride in the ability of Christianity to stand up philosophically to the other world religions satisfies the drive for esteem.

Schweitzer's first device of identifying his audience with Christianity's ideals is established at the outset of his speech with a series of sentences in which the audience is referred to as Christians. Often a sentence will use the noun "Christian," and later in the sentence the reference to it will be through the personal pronoun "we." These opening sentences of the lectures suggest the pattern that is followed throughout the discourse.

You and I are concerned with preaching the Gospel of Jesus in the world. We need to have a clear conception of the reasons why this gospel is for us the highest wisdom.

This identification of the audience with Christianity includes Schweitzer as exemplified by the following phrases:

"We Christians on the other hand. . ."

"We, however, have a longing for another kind of union . . ."

"We, as Christians . . ."

Although this identification of his audience with Christianity is, in a way, a stylistic device, it is also the foundation on which he builds his psychological appeals. As Christians, his audience can be appealed to on the basis of Christian ideals. One such example of this is when he points out that Chinese religious thought contains many religious concepts found in the Christian religion. He asks his audience to accept truth wherever it is found.

Let us not minimize what we thus find of Christian ideals among non-Christians of remote centuries in a far-off country. To do so would not be in accordance with the spirit of Jesus.

The pattern of general psychological proof has been stated as including a cluster of direct appeals to the audience at the beginning and at the end of the lectures. Appealing to the need for his audience to understand more thoroughly and thus realize the potentialities of the Christian religion when it finds itself in competition with other world religions (self-realization), Schweitzer makes the following kind of statement.

We need to have a clear conception of the reasons why this gospel is for us the highest wisdom.

In our time there is a special need for clear thinking on this question.

Here, early in the introduction, Schweitzer uses a device that he is to use often in the lectures. He offers a threat

to the present position of Christianity which emphasizes the drive for self-realization.

Several of these world religions--notably Buddhism and Hinduism, are beginning to claim to be superior to Christianity.

Just prior to entering the body of his speech, Schweitzer appeals to the pride of his audience by declaring that Christianity will enter the clash of ideas without any special consideration.

Similar appeals as these just enumerated are made at the conclusion of the lectures. Having supported his thesis that Christianity proves to be superior in the battle with other world religions, Schweitzer offers a series of challenges, all of which serve to satisfy the needs of fulfilling one's potentialities as a Christian (self-realization). As Christians, this self-realization is to take the form of humility, simplicity, and courage. Having undertaken to establish the fact that Christianity is worthy of faith, Schweitzer points out that it becomes the job of his audience to realize its and their potentialities.

Within the body of the lectures the basic psychological appeals are to the motivations of esteem and self-realization. An example of his appeal to esteem is:

Christianity is much richer than they, for it comprises elements of a very different type.

However much one may idealize the Graeco-Oriental mystery-religions . . . they are still poverty-stricken, compared with Christianity.

An example of his use of the appeal to self-realization is as follows:

Let us not be satisfied with having ascertained that Christianity cannot be traced to the religious mind of the Graeco-Oriental type, but is something original and goes back to the personality of Jesus, who worked in Galilee and died at Jerusalem.

The second method of psychological proof employed by Schweitzer in the body of his speech is to set up a threat to the esteem of Christianity by detailing the strength of an opposing world religion. He then compares Christianity with the world-religion, showing it to be superior. Though his support is usually logical, the effect of reestablishing the esteem, after posing a threat to it is a further appeal to the drive for esteem of his audience. An example of this comes early in the lectures when Schweitzer states that there are certain analogous factors between Christianity and the early religions evolving from the mystery cults of the Graeco-Roman world. He points to research that casts doubt upon the origin of the Christian religion, suggesting that it came from the magic cults of the heathen world of the time. Having posed the threat and supported its foundation, Schweitzer proceeds

to indicate points of decided difference between the mystery cults and Christianity, demonstrating that there are no causal factors existing between them. His conclusion is not only a satisfaction based on logical proof, but one based on psychological motivation.

From every point of view, therefore, the contention that Christianity can be explained by being traced back to Graeco-Oriental religious thought, has to be regarded as phantasy introduced into the sphere of the comparative study of religions.

This particular appeal is used repeatedly.

As is apparent from this discussion, Schweitzer's psychological appeals are almost entirely involved in the satisfaction of the desire for esteem and for self-realization. There are a few instances of his appealing to group preservation, in which he suggests certain decisions a Christian must make in order to maintain the power and continued existence of Christianity. There are also several examples of appealing to the need for love. Again, depending upon the identity of his audience with the ideal of Christian love, Schweitzer appeals several times to the Christian ethic of love. He makes a telling point of the fact that Buddhism and Brahmic religious thought is for monks only, and then he compares the Christian religion on this score and concludes that Christianity is superior because of its appeal to all. The appeal to

the audience at this point is to the love ethic of Christianity. For example.

The Gospel of Jesus, on the other hand, deals with man as such, and teaches him how, though living and working in this world, he should be inwardly free from it.

Summary

Schweitzer employs psychological appeals extensively throughout the lectures. His use of them demonstrates a keen awareness of his audience, for all of his psychological appeals concern his audience's relation to their Christian ideals. Although Schweitzer does not emphasize psychological appeals to the degree that he does logical proof, he does employ them consistently and they add to the support of his main theme.

An Examination of the Ethical Proof Employed in the Selly Oak Lectures

It would be difficult to over-estimate the importance of ethical proof in the delivering of a speech, and this is especially true in the case of Schweitzer. Previous discussion pointed out the effect of the Schweitzer legend on the building of a powerful aura of source credibility around him. The principle was declared by Aristotle in his Rhetoric.

On the contrary, we might almost affirm that his character is the most potent of all the means to persuasion.¹⁴

¹⁴Cooper, op. cit., p. 9.

An examination of the ethical proof of the Selly Oak lectures will basically be a study of all those factors which are brought to bear on the lectures which have their source in Schweitzer himself. These factors may occur prior to the speech, thus involving the advance reputation of the speaker; they may occur during the speech which would entail the speaker's manifesting competence within the content of the speech itself; or they may occur before, during, and after the speech in his attitude toward both his speech and his audience.

More specifically, ethical proof during the speech itself will be noted in the following way. Any visible manifestation which indicates to the audience that they may have confidence in the speaker's character, such as dress, approach, or argument, will be referred to as "good character." Any feeling of confidence which the speaker evokes from the audience by empathizing or identifying himself and his ideas with his audience will be referred to as "identification." Any visible manifestations and devices used by the speaker which might evoke confidence from the audience--how he states his idea--so that they are impelled to believe what he says, will be called "competence."

Schweitzer's ethical mode of proof began prior to his visit to the Selly Oaks College, for his reputation

as an outstanding theologian, philosopher and organist preceded him to England. The reactions of the college to his arrival as discussed in the section on the setting and occasion imply their respect and awe of him. Thus when Schweitzer arose to deliver his lectures, he faced an audience already probably predisposed to believe his ideas.

The content of the lectures themselves manifests several modes of ethical proof. Schweitzer's demonstration of his ability to handle his material probably encouraged a feeling of competence toward him; the manifestation of an affirmative attitude toward his audience by an awareness of his good character; and his identification with them undoubtedly encouraged a feeling of readiness to accept his thoughts. Particularly the mode of identification was used extensively.

Schweitzer's competence in all probability was manifest primarily through his detailed and thorough handling of his arguments. His very completeness probably encouraged faith in his competence. Schweitzer's pains to present both sides; his lack of hesitation to point up any weaknesses in Christianity; his willingness to grant strengths and attractiveness of other religions in all probability convey the impression that, within his

arguments, he is striving for the utmost objectivity. This encourages faith in his competence and suggests his reputation as a man of good character; these probably lead his audience to a more ready acceptance of his conclusions. This general pattern of ethical proof is followed in each of the world religions: A detailed, objective explanation pointing up significant strengths and weaknesses is set forth. Comparison is then made with Christianity. Weaknesses and strengths are pointed out and conclusions are then drawn. All this appears to build faith in his competence, giving more strength to his conclusions.

Schweitzer sought to establish his good character largely through his arguments themselves. Because he is speaking to Christians, his constant profession of his faith in the strength of Christianity enhances his good character in the eyes of his audience, rendering them more readily in accord to his conclusions. He uses this method early in the speech and repeats it a number of times throughout the speech.

I, therefore, believe that Christianity, in the contest with philosophy and with other religions, should not ask for exceptional treatment . . .

Another device, which Schweitzer uses a number of times, that appears to enhance his good character, lies in his sharing of responsibility when Christianity is

adversely criticized. Every time Schweitzer levels adverse criticism or points out faults in Christianity, there is always an acceptance of his role, as a Christian, to share the blame. He does not stand aloof. For example when Schweitzer points out the lack of "recollectedness" in Christianity, he always uses the pronoun "we" when referring to this weakness. This willingness to share the adverse criticism leveled at Christianity would probably enhance his good character in the eyes of his audience.

Another way of emphasizing his good character is through obvious references to his relationship to Christianity. As a Christian audience they probably would think well of a person who speaks in the following manner.¹⁵

The God of the Gospel of Jesus is a living, ethical Will, desiring to give my will a new direction.

He says to me: Strike out courageously.

The same device is used in the conclusion with even more telling directness

I have, in so doing, followed my conviction; for Christianity as the most profound religion, is to me at the same time the most profound philosophy.

One last approach to establishing his good character is

¹⁵Underlining is mine.

Schweitzer's frequent use of Bible quotations to support, emphasize, or clarify a point. Especially in speaking to a Christian audience this would further establish his good character.

Perhaps the most often used mode of ethical proof employed by Schweitzer is "identification." Overlapping somewhat in his establishing both competence and good character, identification is also significant in itself. This mode of proof consists of Schweitzer's projecting certain identifications designed to evoke confidence in his argument. The combinations which are employed with especial effectiveness are as follows:

- 1) Identification of Schweitzer with his audience.
- 2) Identification of Schweitzer with his subject and with Christianity.
- 3) Identification of his audience with the conclusions of the speech (Schweitzer is already identified with these conclusions).

Schweitzer identifies himself with his audience immediately in the introduction and continues to do so throughout the lectures. Examination indicates that he uses this particular identification more often than any other form of identification. His very first sentence is, "You and I are concerned with preaching the Gospel of

Jesus in the world." Schweitzer's method of maintaining this identification is through frequent use of "we" and "our." Particularly important to note is that nearly every time Schweitzer branches into a new line of thought, the transition or prefatory statements reestablish the identification. For example

"Let us together try to find out . . ."
"Let us not be satisfied . . ."
"Let us try to discover . . ."
"We now proceed . . ."
"Let us get at . . ."

These examples not only represent an identification of Schweitzer with his audience, but also impress upon his audience the idea that together with Schweitzer they are working on a common problem. Continuing this mode of identification throughout the entire course of the lectures, Schweitzer's last sentences are a reemphasis of the identification.

Schweitzer often identified himself with his subject. Having professed in his introduction his faith in the ability of Christianity to meet the other religions, he continues to identify himself with his subject in general. He identifies himself with each conclusion which establishes Christianity's superiority by the use of personal pronouns.

Examination indicates that each time Schweitzer moves from his objective argument and comparison into a conclusion demonstrating the superiority of Christianity he increases the identification of himself, his audience and Christianity. For example, as Schweitzer concludes his comparison of Christianity with Brahmanism and Buddhism, in which he seeks to demonstrate the superiority of Christianity, he identifies himself, his audience and Christianity through the use of "we" and other personal pronouns twenty-one times in three paragraphs.

At the conclusion of the lectures Schweitzer identifies his audience with the results of the arguments. The conclusion of the lectures consists of a series of challenges in which Schweitzer asks his audience to act on the conclusions of the arguments.

When you preach the Gospel, beware of preaching it as the religion which explains everything.

Summary

The ethical proof of the Selly Oak lectures started prior to Schweitzer's arrival on their campus, and in all probability it continued through his speaking, both in what he said and how he said it. It was basically through the mode of identification that Schweitzer used ethical proof most effectively. The analysis indicates that his

ethical proof probably decidedly contributed to his line of thought.

Arrangement

Following the processes involved in Invention, an orator proceeds to plan the order in which he will present his materials. This is referred to in the classical sense as "disposition of the materials of a speech." In this study, after the basic divisions of introduction, body, and conclusion are determined, the question that needs to be answered is how did the speaker order his ideas and their support in order to try to achieve his purpose? A general picture of the speech which notes the broad sweeps of his arguments provides the answer to the question.

In this section, Albert Schweitzer's arrangement of his materials in the Selly Oak lectures will be referred to under three headings: logical arrangement, analogical arrangement, or motivational arrangement. The use of these terms will facilitate the discussion of the overall view of the lectures. In this study "logical arrangement" will refer to any plan of ordering materials within the lectures based on the patterns of reasoning such as causal reasoning, reasoning from particulars or reasoning from general principles. "Analogical arrangement" will refer to the pattern

of arranging materials so as to note likenesses or differences between two items. "Motivational arrangement" will refer to any pattern geared to disposing the audience to a favorable frame of mind regarding a proposal, an argument.

The basic divisions of the Selly Oak lectures (introduction, body, conclusion) are quite clear and distinctly set off from one another with clearly stated transitions. The audience could have little doubt as to what part of the speech they are hearing.

The key to the arrangement of the speech as a whole, as well as to the ordering of various lines of thought within the speech, is "analogical arrangement." Within this over-all pattern are scattered various other patterns which serve to break up any monotony in his approach.

The introduction of the speech has a basically logical arrangement in which a problem is posed, its causes are noted, its relevance to the audience examined. Within this general pattern, the introduction consists of two general assertions which are then supported by particular statements that lead the audience inescapably to the conclusions first stated. The content of the introduction, which states that Christianity needs to defend itself against rival world religions, implies to the audience that

that comparisons and analogical arrangement can be expected. Thus, the basic plan of arrangement is determined by the nature of the subject itself as stated in his purpose sentence.

Let us together try to find out whether Christianity, simple though it is, can really maintain its claim to be the deepest expression of the religious mind.

Within the body of the speech itself, the procedure which Schweitzer follows is a general statement that announces the opening of a line of thought, and at the same time indicates the proposed procedure of analogy. Several examples of this are:

Having thus ascertained that Christianity is something original, and, in comparing it with the Graeco-Oriental religions, having seen something of its peculiar character, we now proceed to set it over against the world-religions which today strive for spiritual supremacy.

How then, does Christianity fare, set over against Brahmanism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and the Chinese religion, in all of which we find profound and unique ideas about God and the world?

What, then, is Hinduism really? In what relation does it stand to Brahmanism and Buddhism?

So no doubt can enter the minds of his audience, Schweitzer restates his plan of comparison often within the arguments themselves. Even more specifically, he often announces that he is now examining a likeness, now

a difference. These guidelines keep his general arrangement plan constantly in front of his audience.

With each of the world-religions, he first defines and outlines the basic historical development of the religion noting its strengths and weaknesses. He then indicates certain points of contact between its ideas and similar ones of Christianity. Moving into his argument in earnest, Schweitzer then compares Christianity with the specific religion on certain vital points showing where he feels the world-religion falls short of measuring up to Christianity. Each of these patterns ends with the world-religion failing in the realm of a dynamic ethic.

Schweitzer's arguments appear to have a cumulative effect, and after each of the world religions has been analyzed and compared with Christianity, Schweitzer ends his lectures with a return to basic principles and the building of a strong case for the worth of Christianity. Within this basic analogical development, Schweitzer's patterns of support for specific arguments vary. Often he masses historical facts and arranges them so that the particular factors lead progressively and logically to his general statement. This logical arrangement is repeated throughout the speech, the effect of the pattern providing the impression that his facts lead inescapably to his conclusion.

This cumulative effect is based somewhat on acquiring affirmative response early in the speech and continuing it so that it is almost habitual by the end of the speech.

One final point, though not used with as much frequency as the analogical and logical pattern, is that Schweitzer does make effective use of motivational patterns at times. For example, he urges acceptance of an argument or a point by appealing to his audience's Christian ideals and Christian responsibilities.

Style

The style of a speaker refers to his handling of the language factors of his speech in such a way that they reflect him and the effective use of style increases the possibility of his purpose being accomplished. We have noted a number of times that the discussion of stylistic factors in connection with Schweitzer's speeches is severely hampered by the fact that we are dealing with a translation.¹⁶ Therefore, matters concerning word choice, sentence structure, or sentence arrangement cannot be touched upon without running the danger of analyzing the style of the translator, not the style of Schweitzer.

¹⁶These difficulties were discussed in Chapter Five.

However, there are a number of distinctive stylistic factors which can be mentioned which demonstrate certain stylistic procedures followed by Schweitzer in the Selly Oak lectures. In the discussion of these factors we are mainly concerned with clarity, vividness as evolved from imagery and other devices, and conciseness.

Without mentioning the choice of words or sentence structure, it is very evident that there is a decided effort on the part of Schweitzer to obtain as much clarity as possible in the expression of his ideas. This is evidenced by the frequent use of procedural sentences, the use of guidelines that inform the audience exactly where he is and where he is going. This is further accomplished by clearly stated transitional statements or transitional passages. The lectures are filled with frequent internal summaries that bring previous information sharply into focus. At the beginning of the lectures, Schweitzer goes to great pains to set up "ground rules" for his discussion, stating precisely what he will discuss and precisely what he will not discuss. All this preparatory material has the effect of presenting his audience with as clear a statement of his arguments as he can.

The thoroughness of Schweitzer's thought sometimes results in a lack of conciseness in the development of his

arguments. He digresses frequently, each digression carrying with it its full support and detailed explanation.

Although Schweitzer makes every effort to be clear, his desire to be as thorough as possible sometimes leads him off the main argument into pertinent, but not absolutely necessary, ideas.

The Selly Oak lectures manifest, to some degree, Schweitzer's gift for vividly expressing himself. His use of illustration and example is a device which he uses in seeking to make his point forceful and vivid. For example, his references to the war and to his teaching days at Strasbourg help to make more forceful his contention that Christianity must not try to explain everything.

Schweitzer makes fairly frequent use of similes and metaphors. Having noted this in his writings, an audience expects him to use them in his speaking too. Several examples of his use of metaphors in the Selly Oak lectures are:

The Indian idea of the divine is, that it is pure, spiritual essence. It is the ocean into which man, tired of swimming, wishes to sink.

In the Indian mind intellectualism consumes the ethical element, just as sometimes a cloud which was to have given rain is consumed in a sultry atmosphere.

An example of his use of simile is,

This appears to me like a retiring into a mountain fortress, which is excellent indeed for defense, but useless as far as exercise of power over the surrounding country is concerned.

A device used by Schweitzer to successfully bring more force and vividness to his ideas is to slip abruptly into a method of direct discourse. A number of times, as he approaches a significant point in an argument, the audience is confronted with a personification of the idea with direct discourse: "Buddhism says . . ." "The religion of Jesus answers . . ." This has the effect of making the conclusion seem more dynamic and more a part of the active discourse.

The Brahmans and Buddha say to man: "As one who has died, and to whom nothing in the natural world is of interest any longer, you should live in the world of pure spirituality."

The gospel of Jesus tells him: "You must become free from the world and from yourself, in order to work in the world as an instrument of God."

A variation of this same device is to direct his statements directly to his audience, thus establishing an intimacy and a sense of real communication with them.

Those among you who in India have to do with Hinduism are perhaps astonished to find that I say so little . . .

The use of dialogue, of direct address, and the setting up of an intimate feeling between himself and his audience are

stylistic devices which should create a feeling of communicativeness between him and his audience.

In addition to the above factors, Schweitzer makes frequent use of a rhetorical question, the answer to which has already been suggested. Often this question brings an argument to a conclusion or opens a particularly significant point.

These general stylistic factors are apparent regardless of translation difficulties, and they represent a conscious effort on the part of Schweitzer to bring himself and his ideas closer to his audience.

Delivery

The Selly Oak Lectures were delivered in two parts. Each lecture was translated sentence-by-sentence from German one by Mr. W. E. Wilson and the other by Dr. Micklem, who was secretary of the central council of Selly Oak College. Contrary to his usual procedure when delivering a lecture, Schweitzer did not have a manuscript for the translators to work from and he did not have an opportunity to confer with them prior to the delivery of the lectures. This probably helps to account for Dr. Micklem finding the task of translating the lecture a difficult one.

I did not know in advance what he was going to say, and I daresay I was sometimes uncertain what he had actually said . . .¹⁷

As indicated, the lectures were delivered extempore without a manuscript. The tightly knit logical structure of the lectures suggests that this is one of the instances in which the manuscript was in Schweitzer's head, though not on the speaker's stand before him.

There is little direct evidence concerning the delivery of the lectures but reasoning from reports made of similar speaking in England, the following general statement can be safely made. Dr. Schweitzer probably did not gesture much and, speaking in his tenor voice, Schweitzer would rely upon the force of his ideas to convey his convictions.

Effect

There are no reports indicating how those who heard the Selly Oak lectures reacted to them. Dr. Micklem, in his introduction to the published edition of the lectures, implies that the general feeling of Selly Oak College during the entire stay of Albert Schweitzer was one of awe and reverence, indicating that the general response to the lectures was complimentary.

¹⁷Dr. Micklem, personal letter, October 31, 1960.

Since the publication of the lectures, the response has been favorable. The popularity of the text, mentioned by Mr. Seaver in his biography of Schweitzer, is evidenced by the fact that it has been translated into six different languages. Though Seaver does not feel that the lectures do justice to Schweitzer's developed thoughts on the subject, he does agree that they have real value.

Its value lies in the differentiation which Schweitzer makes between Christianity and the others, as being the sole and ultimate law of life, ethically and spiritually; the only faith which provides a real answer to the question: How ought I to live?¹⁸

The lectures are typical of the kind of speaking Schweitzer was doing to seemingly receptive audiences throughout the continent and England.

Conclusions

This study of the Selly Oak lectures suggests that in most respects it is typical of the type of Schweitzer's lecture type of speaking. It reflects his usual care in preparation, his typical method of approach to a subject, his development of ideas, and his methods of adaptation of his subject to his specific audience. The speech is atypical of his relationship with his translators, for he did not work with them in any manner prior to delivery. It

¹⁸Seaver, op. cit., p. 85.

should be pointed out that this was the very first instance of his using sentence-by-sentence translation to the English language, and this factor, plus the pressure of the lecture-organ recital tour, might have influenced the circumstances surrounding the translation of the lectures.

Not offering any new or startling ideas, the content of these lectures state long held convictions of Dr. Schweitzer, and these ideas can be traced to previous studies and previous conclusions. The particular arrangement and adaptation of his ideas to the Selly Oak audience are simply new approaches to his basic beliefs.

The speaking occasion and the surrounding circumstances of these lectures are typical of lecture situations in which Dr. Schweitzer has spoken through the years. Within this occasion (and others of the time) it appears that the legend had already begun to develop around Schweitzer and was a factor in the speech situation.

Summarily stated, the Selly Oak lectures evidence Schweitzer presenting to the Selly Oak audience ideas of crucial concern to him. They illustrate Schweitzer's oral mode of expression under circumstances which he faced many times in his life.

CHAPTER VII

GOETHE ADDRESS: ASPEN, COLORADO

Both Albert Schweitzer and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe seem to transcend their respective times and their nationalities and stand as world figures making outstanding contributions in a number of areas. Schweitzer's interest in Goethe stems from his university days in Strasbourg,¹ and this outstanding German poet has been Schweitzer's subject for various major speeches since 1928, when he spoke at Frankfurt as recipient of the Goethe prize.² Certainly Schweitzer is only one of the vast number of scholars who has studied and analyzed Goethe and this thought.

There is no poet whose life is better known . . .
The mere titles of the works written about him
fill two large octavo volumes; twenty-two thousand
of them by 1912.³

¹Detailed explanation of Schweitzer's relationship to Goethe was given in Chapters Three and Five.

²This occasion was described in Chapter Five.

³Jeanne Ancelot-Hustache, Goethe, trans. by Cecily Hustings (New York: Grove Press Inc., 1960), p. 7.

Because of Goethe's importance as a man, a poet, a natural scientist, and a profound thinker, it is not unusual to find that the bicentennial of Goethe's birth was celebrated at various places around the world. The Bicentennial Convocation at Aspen, Colorado was one such celebration and Albert Schweitzer, as well as various other outstanding persons, was invited to the Convocation as a guest lecturer.

This particular address of Albert Schweitzer's is worthy of analysis from a number of standpoints. The occasion, an international, twenty-day festival drew persons of importance from throughout the world. Also, because Goethe is one of Schweitzer's major interests and he had delivered a number of addresses on him, it is significant to examine one of them. This speech is also representative of Schweitzer's expository type of speaking. That is, it is a speech designed primarily to impart information to his audience. In addition, because of the nature of the occasion and because of Schweitzer's deep respect for Goethe, the speech in some ways is an epideictic speech. The speech situation provides another example of Schweitzer's speaking through a translator. The presence of the Schweitzer legend in the speech situation, as we shall note, provides an illustration of its effect upon an audience; the speech also offers an interesting example of Dr. Schweitzer's

audience adaptation. Each of these factors contributes to making this a speaking situation worthy of examination. This case study will follow the procedure employed in the Selly Oak study, using its same basic divisions.

Background

Occasion

The plan to commemorate the bicentennial of Goethe's birth originated in a proposal to provide an English language edition of Goethe's works.⁴ The editors of this planned ten volume edition were: Arnold Bergstraesser, Professor of German Cultural History at the University of Chicago; Victor Lange, Professor of German Literature at Cornell University; and Carl Schreiber, Professor of German at Yale University. The interest which their project created encouraged the group to expand their plans to include a festival consisting of a twenty-day inquiry into Goethe and his ideas by outstanding world scholars within a framework of musical works representative of Goethe's time or reflective of his world stature.

The purpose, as announced by the Goethe Bicentennial Foundation in a brochure, was:

⁴This information concerning the setting up of the Convocation is found in the program of the Goethe Convocation and in Goethe and the Modern Age edited by Arnold Bergstraesser.

To interpret Goethe's wisdom in terms of the problems of ethics and morality confronting nations and their peoples in the fourth year following Hiroshima, the Goethe Bicentennial Foundation has invited the leaders of contemporary world thought to gather in the United States for participation in an International Goethe Convocation.⁵

The music for the Festival was provided by such outstanding artists as⁶ Herta Glaz, Mezzo Soprano; Jerome Hines, Bass-Baritone; Erica Morini, Violinist; Dorothy Maynor, Soprano; Arthur Rubenstein, Pianist; Nathan Milstein, Violinist; Gregor Piatigorsky, Violoncellist; Mack Harrell, Baritone; Victor Babin and Vitya Vronsky, duo Piano team; and the Minneapolis Symphony Orchestra under the direction of Dimitri Mitropoulos. Daily concert and recital programs featured the music of Brahms, Mozart, Beethoven, Schumann, Schubert, Wagner, Liszt, Bach and others. An effort was also made to play those compositions which were based on Goethe's writings. Examples of these are: "Songs from 'Wilhelm Meister'" (Schumann); "Egmont," (Beethoven); "A Faust Overture," (Wagner); "A Faust Symphony in Three Character Pictures," (Liszt); and "Overture to Egmont," (Beethoven). This musical programming endowed the Festival

⁵Goethe Bicentennial Convocation and Music Festival, 1949 (Chicago: Goethe Bicentennial Foundation), p. 10.

⁶Information concerning the music of the Festival is taken from the Souvenir Program of the Convocation.

with musical stature contributing to the high cultural atmosphere.

The program of the Festival consisted of lectures, in addition to Schweitzer's, delivered by such outstanding men as Jose Ortega y Gasset, international philosopher and presently associated with the Institutio de Humanidades, Madrid; Guiseppe Borgesse, Goethe scholar; Barker Fairley, Chairman of the Department of German at the University of Toronto; Karl Reinhardt, Professor of Classical Philology at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University and others.⁷ In addition to the speeches there were various kinds of discussion groups. Believing that Goethe's example had relevance to the present day, the lectures and discussion sought to explore that relevance.

But it is pertinent to celebrate our own recognition that the human spirit, which he apotheosized, is the locus of our difficulty. We are not gathered here in an antiquarian or academic mood; still less in a sentimental. We are gathered here to search out in ourselves the depths of the spirit that sustained the optimism of Goethe. If he had reason to be optimistic, we have need. We need his spirit more than he did.⁸

⁷Hermann J. Weigand, Willy Hartner, Stephen Spender, Jean Canu, Elio Gianturco, Halvdan Khot, Ludwig Lewisohn, Thornton Wilder, Martin Buber, Ernst Robert Curtius, William Ernest Hocking, T. M. P. Mahadevan, Ernst Simon and Gerardus Van Der Leeuw.

⁸"Goethe Bicentennial Convocation and Music Festival," Souvenir Program, p. 5.

The speeches were developed independently, each reflecting the speaker's own particular interest in Goethe, so that the lectures and discussions reflected many cultures as they examined various aspects of Goethe. This variety can be indicated by a few examples of the titles: "The Message of Goethe," "Goethe--the Man and the Myth," "Goethe and the Natural Sciences," "The European Spiritual Crisis," and "Goethe and the English Mind."

The location of the Festival in the Aspen area was chosen with deliberate care by the Goethe Bicentennial Foundation. Aspen, Colorado, a "silver town" in the late 1800's, very nearly became a ghost town in the first part of the twentieth century. However, it took on new life in 1940 when the Aspen Corporation, led by Walter P. Paepcke, a Chicago industrialist, was founded and set about to rebuild and refurbish Aspen into an active community. Already a winter resort, well known to skiers, Aspen became a year round resort for those seeking relief from the tensions of big city life. Aspen was chosen for the Goethe Convocation for its peaceful atmosphere and for its remoteness from the distractions of any metropolitan atmosphere. Its comparative inaccessibility meant that

. . . people would have to make a pilgrimage because they wanted to be there; in a large metropolitan center visitors could have dropped

in casually, more or less out of curiosity. At Aspen, however, everyone who attended had come solely, specifically, and exclusively to participate in the Convocation.⁹

Therefore the Convocation enjoyed the summer beauties of the Rocky Mountains and the peaceful valley of the Aspen area. The canvas amphitheatre, constructed for the Convocation, was designed so that those within could always have a view of the surrounding countryside. The atmosphere of the twenty-day festival into which scholars, musicians, and interested persons entered was thus one of culture, intellectual inspiration and relaxed enjoyment.

Dr. Schweitzer was invited to share and participate in this experience. Twice he refused the invitation to give the principal speech at the convocation; but he finally accepted, realizing that the promised fee of over six thousand dollars was enough to be of real service in facilitating his work with lepers in his hospital.¹⁰ Brochures advertising the Convocation capitalized on Schweitzer's promise to attend in their attempts to encourage people to travel to Aspen.

⁹Arnold Bergstraesser, ed., Goethe and the Modern Age (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1950), p. vii.

¹⁰Information concerning Schweitzer's initial reaction to the invitations are found in Seaver's book Schweitzer The Man and His Mind.

To provide a central orientation to Goethe's place in the twentieth century, Dr. Albert Schweitzer, philosopher-doctor-musician-theologian acknowledged throughout the civilized world as the foremost disciple of Goethe--has consented to journey to the United States for the first time in his life. He will present the main lecture at the International Goethe Convocation.¹¹

Setting

The amphitheatre in which Dr. Schweitzer spoke was a large canvas tent-like structure designed by the late Fero Saarinen.¹² The audience sat in a semi-circle on backless wooden benches facing the orchestra. The speaker's platform and stand were in front of the orchestra, so that the speaker was projected almost into the center of the amphitheatre. Dr. Schweitzer delivered his speech twice: On Wednesday, July 6, he spoke in French, his talk being read in English by Dr. Emory Ross. On Friday, July 8, Schweitzer delivered the same talk, which was given in English by Thornton Wilder. It is the speech as read by Thornton Wilder with which this analysis deals.

The address which was delivered in the afternoon followed a concert program performed by the Minneapolis Symphony Orchestra under the direction of Dimitri Mitropoulis

¹¹Goethe Bicentennial Convocation and Music Festival, 1949 (Chicago: Goethe Bicentennial Foundation), p. 12.

¹²The amphitheatre is still used for summer concerts at Aspen.

with the guest pianist, Arthur Rubenstein.¹³ The atmosphere during this concert was casual, almost gay, with friendly interplay between the director and the pianist. Selections by Schubert, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, and Beethoven were presented. Approximately two thousand spectators filled the amphitheatre to capacity. The sun was shining brightly, and the amphitheatre was open to the weather which was comfortable.

Following the concert and its casual atmosphere, Dr. Schweitzer, dressed in his traditional, old fashioned black frock coat and black tie, followed by Thornton Wilder, entered and walked to the speaker's platform. The audience reacting spontaneously as a body, rose in absolute stillness, indicating their respect to this world figure. There was a brief introduction, and then Dr. Schweitzer began to speak.

Audience

The location of the Convocation and the high intellectual and cultural level of the program were determining factors in the make-up of the audience. For one

¹³Information concerning the details of the occasion of the speech are taken from personal letters from Mrs. Walter Paepcke, Thornton Wilder, and Mr. Robert Hutchins, and also an interview with Reverend Roy J. Schramm all of whom were present when the speech was given.

thing, those who were in attendance had to make a decided effort to be there. The Board of Directors of the Bicentennial Foundation, composed of educators, businessmen, scholars, artists, and professional men, in a very real sense reflected the type of person who attended the Convocation and Schweitzer's speech. In addition there would probably be local persons interested in various parts of the Festival, plus a scattering of tourists. Schweitzer's audience included all of these plus those of his admirers who came simply because he was there. Descriptions of these listeners from persons who were there will provide a general view of the audience that Schweitzer faced.

People came from all over to hear him and they were of all kinds.¹⁴

There were some 2,000 people in the audience from all over the world. I cannot say that they came from all walks of life; most of them were intellectuals, i.e. lawyers, professors, publishers, writers, theologians, and a light scattering of cranks plus fervent, lady disciples.¹⁵

Audience: from all over the country, sprinkling of tourists, Goethe scholars, sightseers, and Schweitzer followers.¹⁶

It can be said that Schweitzer seems to have spoken to a fairly intellectual audience many of whom were probably

¹⁴Letter from Robert M. Hutchins, June 22, 1960.

¹⁵Letter from Mrs. Walter Paepcke, September 25, 1961.

¹⁶Interview with Dr. Roy Schramm, September 12, 1961.

fully conversant with his subject matter. The attitude of the audience, from all reports and from the description of his entrance into the amphitheatre, was a receptive and friendly one.

There are numerous reports of Dr. Schweitzer's being constantly interrupted during his stay at Aspen. He was constantly asked to sign autographs and to answer questions; and people followed him around, interrupted his meals, generally causing quite a commotion about him wherever he went. This adulation had started before he ever got off the boat in New York, for as his ship steamed into the New York harbor, newspaper reporters boarded and started asking questions and taking pictures of him. This was true throughout his entire two week visit here in the United States. Undoubtedly, Schweitzer's Aspen audience were mostly interested, respectful persons, however, the publicity of his visit and the constant attention paid him while at Aspen, indicate that the sort of person who worshipped the Schweitzer legend was also probably represented in the audience.

The Speech

The English translation of Dr. Schweitzer's speech was the same for both Thornton Wilder and Emory Ross with

only one or two minor word changes.¹⁷ The speech was originally translated by some friends of Schweitzer's; and although Thornton Wilder didn't particularly like the translation, he writes that

in the short time of about 12 hours, I was able only to recommend a few alterations.¹⁸

The English text on which this analysis is based is that published in Goethe and the Modern Age, which is an anthology of all the lectures given at the Aspen Convocation; the accuracy of their texts to the speeches as spoken in Aspen, is suggested in the Foreword by Walter P. Paepcke.

The lectures were not prepared for publication, but it is good that they do appear in book form exactly as given, not only to preserve the spirit of unity which consideration of the message of Goethe evoked, but to commemorate a really unique and memorable occasion.¹⁹

The Schweitzer address in this book is from the recording made of his German speech and as spoken in English by Thornton Wilder.

There is another English translation of this speech, which appears in Charles Joy's Goethe, Five Studies. This text contains additional material that did not appear in the

¹⁷Based on information from the Albert Schweitzer Education Foundation, that compared the text with the recording.

¹⁸Letter from Thornton Wilder, June 25, 1960.

¹⁹Bergstraesser, op. cit., p. viii.

Bergstraesser book. Evidently the French and German manuscripts differed, although the two English versions varied not at all.²⁰ It appears that Joy was probably dealing with the manuscripts as polished and revised by Schweitzer after their delivery. Joy, seeking the best from both manuscripts, combines the two into a composite text.

Of the two English texts available, it would thus seem that the text by Bergstraesser is a closer approximation to what Albert Schweitzer said (as read by Thornton Wilder) and is thus the better choice of text for use in this study.

Preparation

Dr. Schweitzer worked on the Aspen speech in Günsbach prior to leaving for America and then worked unremittingly at the speech while on board the ship The Nieuw Amsterdam, "scarcely emerging except at meal times."²¹ His preparation continued in America while he traveled toward Aspen on the train. Working with Thornton Wilder on the translation the evening prior to the delivery of the speech, Schweitzer carried the actual preparation of his speech right up to the day before its presentation.

²⁰According to letters from Mrs. Paepcke and Mrs. Herbert Phillips.

²¹Seaver, op. cit., p. 167.

An interesting comment by Mrs. Walter Paepcke concerning Dr. Schweitzer's preparation, foreshadows, somewhat, the manner in which he was to approach his subject.

Dr. Schweitzer, who had never been in this country before, was led to believe that we were a naive and ignorant people who would not know who Goethe was. Dr. Schweitzer told me that, as a result of the above advice, he tore up the erudite speech he had written and rewrote it in the terms a child might understand.²²

The advice given to Schweitzer undoubtedly affected the approach he made to his subject and also his adaptation to the audience he expected to face.

Abstract

The following abstract of the Aspen speech is entirely in the words of Albert Schweitzer.

Introduction

We are gathered together to commemorate the second centenary of the birth of Goethe. Let us devote this hour to taking stock of his life, of his work, of his thought, of what he means to us.

At the time of his death Goethe was famous, but not known. His own people had little comprehension of his work. To Eckermann, the devoted companion who was with him from 1823, he expressed his conviction that his writings were not popular and never could become so.

In this he was mistaken. With the years they have found their way to the hearts of men. More and more, not only in his country but throughout the world, he has become

²²Letter from Mrs. Walter Paepcke, September 25, 1961.

a chosen one among the poets. Why? Because this great poet is at the same time a great master of the natural sciences, a great thinker, a great man. This many-sidedness commands respect and strikes people as something quite special.

What is it that constitutes the special charm of his creations?

Consider first of all his language. Goethe is a man of visions and he possesses the secret of a word painter. Another special quality lies in the fact that he does not express himself in solemn language. Characteristic also is the rhythm of his poems. The rhythm of his phrase is usually not fashioned like the meter of verse. It is even in tension with the latter. With Goethe, the contrast between the rhythm appropriate to the phrase and that appropriate to metric verse has the effect of giving his written and spoken verses a kind of proselike quality which is at once simple yet solemn and noble.

As to the content, the distinction and charm of his works reside in the fact that he writes of what he has experienced and of thoughts which are his own. It is not for him, as it is for Schiller and some others, to choose just any subject and to make something out of it by familiarizing himself with it and setting it off to advantage. Let us first examine his attitude towards the subject of "Faust." It suits him, because he feels himself akin to Faust and likewise to Mephistopheles. The subject, however, offers difficulties that are almost insurmountable, because of the fact that it has already been solidly shaped by tradition. In order to find himself in the traditional "Faust," he has to do violence to the traditional material by introducing into it the completely foreign episode of Gretchen. Faust has to render himself guilty by wronging a trusting young girl. Goethe has to let him become guilty in this way because he himself had become guilty by his actions against Friederike of Sesenheim.

Goethe's penchant for the natural sciences was innate. As a student at Leipzig and Strasbourg he sought the company of those who devoted themselves to the natural sciences. In Strasbourg he began to study anatomy. His first discovery was made in the field of comparative anatomy. His research shows him that the intermaxillary bone has rudimentary existence also in man, being fused with the neighboring bones. In 1786 he makes public his proof.

Little by little the anatomists found themselves obliged to recognize the validity of his proof.

As to botany, he made his first acquaintance with it in a practical way, through administrative work which led him to take up agricultural matters. In 1788, while in Sicily he finds that all the organs of a plant have their common origin in the leaf, and that they are merely transformations of it.

In 1790 he resorts to the principle of transformation to explain the formation of the skull. He puts forward the hypothesis that the skull is made up of transformed vertebrae. A few years later, the anatomists on their side put forward this hypothesis. But it is Goethe who has priority in this discovery.

It was the practical approach, as in botany, which led him into the scientist's field of mineralogy and geology. In the course of his research over a period of years he arrived at the idea that although volcanic activity has something to do with the formation of the earth's crust, that formation is above all the result of a slow evolution. As to the matter of erratic blocks, he was the first to express the opinion that they had been moved to their positions by the glaciers which formerly covered Europe.

Again by the practical approach, he is led to the explanation of the phenomena of colors. His study leads him to declare himself against the theory which Isaac Newton had put forth in 1704 that white light was made up of rays of different colors, and that a narrow beam of white light passing through a prism was broken up into those rays. From 1791 until his death, Goethe contended for his theory, but in vain did he make these sacrifices of time and effort. The studies of Fresnel, Maxwell, and Lorenz on the nature of light, continuing those of Newton, established the correctness of the latter's theory.

Goethe represents a natural science which wishes to proceed only by direct observation. He disapproves of the use of research instruments. He asserts that man, knowing how to make good use of his senses, is the greatest and most precise instrument of observation imaginable. And Goethe is not only against instruments of precision, but also against mathematics. In his view, mathematics has no business coming in except in mechanical problems. Of the natural

sciences still based on direct observation, Goethe is one of the great representatives.

What is Goethe's conception of the world and of life? To which philosophy does he belong?

There are two kinds of philosophy: the doctrinal and the non-doctrinal. Doctrinal philosophy does not start from observation of nature but applies to nature those concepts it has formed about nature, and interprets nature in accordance with them. Non-doctrinal philosophy starts from nature, attaches itself to nature, and strives to interpret nature in accord with ever-widening and deepening observations and experiments. This is natural philosophy.

The young Goethe came under the influence of Giordano Bruno and of Spinoza. Devoting himself to the natural sciences, he became, as a thinker, the representative of natural philosophy at a period when the great systems of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel were the fashion and claimed each to be the complete and definitive philosophy.

Brave and modest as he is, he starts studying this doctrinal philosophy certain that it has something to teach him. In the end, however, he has to confess that the manner of thinking of Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, as well as of Schopenhauer, is alien to him, and that he does not know what to do with it, really because their thinking does not start from the study of nature itself, but applies to it some prefabricated theories. How an individual by himself and through his own study can arrive at convictions capable of guiding him on the right road throughout his existence: that to Goethe is the question that matters.

The fundamental idea which is of the utmost import is that in nature there is matter and spirit, the two together. The spirit acts upon matter as an organizing and perfecting force. The whole philosophy of Goethe consists in the observation of material and spiritual phenomena outside and within ourselves, and in the conclusions that can be drawn from this. The spirit is light, which struggles with matter, which represents darkness, What happens in the world and within ourselves is the result of this encounter.

This philosophy of nature seems quite modest beside the perfect cognition of which the great systems boast. It must resign itself to remaining always incomplete because of

the fact that we have at our disposal only an incomplete knowledge of nature. Knowledge, thus obtained, incomplete though it be, suffices to lead us through life.

What are those elements of the idea of the world and of life to which natural philosophy leads?

First and foremost, Goethe acknowledges that elementary and obscure forces, trying to manifest themselves in their own way, are at work both in nature and in ourselves. He calls them "demoniac." This fundamental natural element that man bears within himself by birth is his fate. He cannot release himself from it. We are in the situation of those who play a game where draughts are maneuvered on a checkerboard according to the cast of the dice. The result depends largely on the cast of the dice, yet the way the player handles the draughts also means something in the outcome of the game.

The two basic ideals of a profoundly human attitude are purity and kindness, Goethe believes. Purity, to him, means that man frees himself from hypocrisy, from cunning, from falsehood, from anger and transforms himself into a simple and honest being. Kindness is the supreme manifestation of the spirit in man. The spirit does not let man simply assert and impose himself over other beings, but obliges him to have consideration for them. For each one of us, he believes destiny reserves an ethical activity conformable to his own character and to the circumstances of his life. By this individual practice of good on the part of a great number, the well-being of society is realized more naturally and more completely than by making men slaves to a single and identical utilitarian principle. Every one of us has his particular task to fulfill in this world.

The notion of the world and of life also includes for Goethe, the idea of forgiveness. By serving, man can obtain the grace of redemption.

If love is the very essence of spirit, God can only be conceived as the fullness of love. Goethe confesses "I consider faith in the true love of God the only foundation of my salvation." This idea of the world and of life men must translate into action. Even a slight inclination toward a fundamentally contemplative attitude Goethe considers an aberration. Unceasingly, Goethe exalts action.

Let us now take up the question of Goethe's religion. His religion is identical with his conception of the world and of life which of and in itself is ethical and religious. Jesus, in announcing and incarnating God's love, only reveals to us, Goethe feels, that at which we must arrive by our own reflection. The true religion for Goethe is not dogmas about Jesus and his work, but the love which he proclaimed. That Goethe, at times, especially in the years following his first stay in Italy, took pleasure in calling himself a pagan does not mean that he considered himself irreligious but only that he was satisfied with a religion which was not dogmatic Christianity. His principal complaint about dogmatic Christianity is that it thinks of God as being outside of nature instead of being in nature and manifesting Himself in nature. As to immortality, Goethe confesses: "I have the firm conviction that the spirit is a being of an indestructible nature."

Such are the elements of Goethe's philosophy. During his lifetime it did not attract attention. More and more, Goethe's philosophy gains in importance, although he did not expound it, save in fragments. It represents the type of philosophy that has a future. It reckons with the fact, that, since our knowledge of the universe remains incomplete, this is why Goethe was bent on making the experiment as to whether man, setting out from reality and continuously keeping reality in mind, can by his study and reflection reach convictions which will permit him to work out his existence in true spirituality.

A final question: Are the thoughts that Goethe has communicated to us also supported by the weight of his personality? What exactly is his personality?

Those who undertake to criticize Goethe will find things to criticize. He made mistakes. His way of living was strange and disconcerting for us in many ways. We do not understand for instance, why living with Christiane Vulpius as her husband, he let eighteen years pass before making her legally his wife. How, in general, can we understand the spirit of indecision that he showed on more than one occasion? And that lack of naturalness of which he also gave proof. And why, having the kindest of feelings in his heart, does he sometimes like to affect coldness? What is Goethe's own opinion of himself? He believed that he possessed within him the total of all contradictions which

human nature can gather together in itself. He was therefore neither a harmonious personality nor an ideal personality.

As to us who, thanks to the great mass of information we possess about him, can see his existence spread out before us in a way not equaled in the case of any other of the remarkable men of the past, we cannot do otherwise than consider him a great, deep, imposing and, despite all his peculiarities, sympathetic personality.

What first of all strikes us in him is that profound seriousness which marks him from his youth on. He has it at heart to overcome that quick-tempered nature which always wants to get the upper hand. Through this continuous control of himself, however, his behavior at length takes on something stiff and artificial which is susceptible of interpretation as pride.

Another fundamental feature of Goethe's character is his truthfulness. In everything, including his daily business with men, he tries always to remain absolutely true and sincere. Enamored of truth as he is, this man is at the same time a humble man, not only before God but also before his fellows.

Testimonies of his kindness abound. In many cases Goethe gave sacrificially of his time and effort to serve those whom circumstances revealed to him as needing his brotherly love. This need to serve dominates him.

Conclusion

Such is Goethe, the poet, the scientist, the philosopher, and the man, towards whom our thoughts are particularly directed at this time. Among us here and among those who are afar off there are those who think of him with gratitude for what he has given them in his so ethical and religious wisdom, so simple and so deep. With joy I acknowledge myself to be one of their number.

Invention

This portion of the case analysis is concerned with the inventional factors involved in the Aspen speech; it

will follow the traditional procedure of examining the inventional elements as exemplified in the study of the Selly Oak Lectures.²³

Ideas: Their Sources and Relevance
to the Audience at Aspen

The basic ideas involved in this lecture on Goethe are biographical factors plus thoughts and interests of Goethe as revealed in his life and his writings. Schweitzer's interpretation of these basic ideas are the result of his research since being a student in Strasbourg. The ideas that Schweitzer chooses to emphasize are of a general nature and would be available in the basic works on Goethe; they had been familiar to Schweitzer for years, and he had expressed them in the other major Goethe addresses which he had previously delivered in Europe.²⁴

The approach of Schweitzer to the ideas in this address followed his usual historical method, for often he develops an idea by indicating its historical development. Thus the ideas of this speech reflect Schweitzer's life research on the subject, and are developed in his usual method.

²³The general nature of these inventional factors was explained on page 239 of the previous chapter. See also pages 241, 270 and 279.

²⁴These speeches were described in Chapter Five.

An Analysis of the Basic Lines of
Thought in the Aspen Speech with
Particular Emphasis on Logical Proof

This section will examine the Aspen speech, analyzing the logical proof offered as support for the ideas in this address.²⁵

Schweitzer opens this address with two clear statements referring to the occasion and also stating his specific purpose.

We are gathered together to commemorate the second centenary of the birth of Goethe. Let us devote this hour to taking stock of his life, of his work, of his thought, of what he means to us.

The remainder of Schweitzer's introduction fulfills two purposes. First, its content provides a brief historical outline of the change in the degree of the extent of the reputation of Goethe's works. Schweitzer notes, that, at his death Goethe's works, though admired in some places, were not generally, nor widely acclaimed; and Schweitzer supports this statement by citing several examples. One such example is a reference to Frankfort's denial of a centenary celebration of Goethe's birth because of Goethe's political views. A second example is a reference to a statement of Goethe's that "his writings were not popular and never could become so."

²⁵See pages 241 and 242 of Chapter Six for an explanation and delineation of just what this logical proof involves.

After indicating the seemingly lack of promise of Goethe's works becoming known, Schweitzer then asserts that, nevertheless, Goethe's works "have" become internationally known. This is developed by indicating its cause.

Because this great poet is at the same time a great master of the natural sciences, a great thinker, a great man. This many-sidedness commands respect and strikes people as something quite special.

The introduction concludes with a second reference to the occasion of the address.

The second purpose Schweitzer seeks to accomplish in the introduction is a foreshadowing of the type of logical proof that the audience can expect in the remainder of the speech. Schweitzer's historical approach is recognized, for he cites incidents from the past to support his first generalization. The deductive pattern of reasoning is employed in the introduction, and appears perhaps to be particularly suited to this type of speech. Therefore, the introduction not only sets the stage for the purpose of the speech, but also implies the method of proof Schweitzer intends to use as he seeks to support his ideas.

In the main body of his speech, Schweitzer moves first to an examination of Goethe's significance through his writings. Opening this first line of thought with a brief question, he proceeds to develop this idea by providing

answers to the question: "What is it that constitutes the special charm of his creations?"

He divides his answer to the question into two general categories: First, he examines the uniqueness of Goethe's handling of language; and second, he studies the distinctiveness of the content of Goethe's writings. Both of these general areas are developed primarily through examples after he has taken special care to define precisely what he means in each instance.

In discussing Goethe's language, Schweitzer first mentions Goethe's particular skill as an imagist. This trait, for the most part, is simply mentioned and elaborated upon only in a few sentences. The lack of detailed proof indicates that perhaps, as a language trait, it is pretty much self-evident, or at least it is generally well enough known, that it can be put forth without further support. In like manner Schweitzer mentions and briefly develops two other language traits: the lack of sombre and sonorous language in Goethe's writings and Goethe's distinctive use of rhythm in his writings. In developing this latter point, he observes that the rhythm of Goethe's language is similar to the rhythm in Bach's music.

Having mentioned these three language factors, Schweitzer next discusses the distinctiveness of Goethe's

subject matter. Here he makes only one main point and then explains and seeks to support it with elaborate care and by means of an extended example.

As to the content, the distinction and charm of his works resides in the fact that he writes of what he has experienced and of thoughts which are his own.

Schweitzer defines what he means by this statement by comparing Goethe with Schiller, who had the ability to write on most any subject; when Goethe tried to do the same thing he was out of his element, "like the swan which has left the water and goes waddling on dry land." Schweitzer now seeks to support his generalization with an extensive example of just how this was brought to bear upon the construction of "Faust." Pointing out that Goethe was confined by the fact that the narrative was already firmly shaped by tradition, Schweitzer indicates that Goethe had to alter this tradition in several instances in order to make the story conform to Goethe's own life experiences. One such instance is the Gretchen episode which is inserted in Goethe's "Faust." In this episode Faust is guilty of wronging a young girl; and later he is saved from this guilt. This change is necessary because Goethe himself had been guilty in his actions to Friederike of Sesenheim, and had later felt that he was forgiven.

Schweitzer concludes this line of thought by pointing out that the difficulties imposed by Goethe's having to insert himself into "Faust" contributed to its taking a life-time for him to complete.

Schweitzer's next main idea is opened with the short assertion, "Goethe's penchant for the natural sciences was innate." The development of this idea is accomplished by citing Goethe's activity in anatomy, botany, geology, and physics (in regard to light and color theories). With these as examples, Schweitzer then defines the kind of natural scientist that Goethe was.

Beginning with Goethe's efforts in anatomy, Schweitzer outlines his first discovery, the intermaxillary bone in man, and his second discovery, a theory concerning the formation of the skull. Schweitzer, in seeking to support his generalization concerning Goethe's contribution to the study of botany, again uses his method of historical development. Schweitzer points out that as a result of certain practical administrative duties assigned to Goethe in Weimar, he became interested in botany and in 1789 published his theory that all plant organs had their origin in the leaf. Moving to geology, Schweitzer points out that as a result of having been assigned to reopen the Ilmenau copper and silver mines, Goethe began research which resulted in theories concerning

the formation of the earth's crust. Also Goethe was one of the first men to place importance upon the effect of massive glaciers upon the earth. Finally, Goethe's research in light and colors resulted in a theory concerning the formation of colors. Not so fortunate this time, Goethe's theory was later disproved.

After citing and explaining each of these areas of the natural sciences which interested Goethe, Schweitzer discusses the kind of natural scientist that Goethe was. Beginning with a general statement concerning Goethe's characteristics as a scientist, Schweitzer then details his support.

Goethe represents a natural science which wishes to proceed only by direct observation.

Using a statement which presents a causal relationship for this generalization, Schweitzer explains that Goethe felt that the use of instruments to understand nature was only a means of torturing nature to extort answers from her, whereas, direct observation was a method of leading her to yield her secrets willingly. This kind of thinking also indicates Goethe's general attitude toward nature. Schweitzer then points out that Goethe holds a negative view towards mathematics. Although this insistence on direct observation may appear strange to us today, Schweitzer does

not feel that this in any way negates Goethe's significance.

But of the natural sciences still based on direct observation Goethe is one of the great representatives.

He concludes his development of this argument by referring the listeners to the previously mentioned contributions of Goethe in the various natural sciences as further evidence of Goethe's value as a scientist.

The next line of thought is opened with the questions: "What is Goethe's conception of the world and of life? To what philosophy does he belong?" In order to lead historically to an explanation of Goethe's philosophic thought, Schweitzer first defines the two kinds of philosophy and briefly sketches the growth of each through history. Then identifying Goethe with one of these types, he seeks to emphasize the strength of Goethe's philosophy. The remainder of this line of thought is developed largely through a series of causal elements, which attempt to support the core idea of Goethe's philosophy.

First, Schweitzer divides philosophy into two types: doctrinal and non-doctrinal. Defining doctrinal philosophy as that "which applies to nature those concepts it has formed about nature, and interprets nature in accordance with them," he identifies this philosophy with Plato, Aristotle, Fichte, and Hegel. Schweitzer then explains

non-doctrinal philosophy, which he defines as that which "starts from nature, attaches itself to nature, and strives to interpret nature in accord with ever widening and deepening observations and experiments." Labeling this as "nature philosophy," Schweitzer traces its history from the Greek world through the Epicureans and Stoics, into the Renaissance and Spinoza.

It is at this point that Schweitzer identifies Goethe with non-doctrinal philosophy. Pointing to Goethe's modesty, Schweitzer indicates that Goethe faithfully studied the great doctrinal philosophers of his time, but then he returned to maintain his faith in nature philosophy. This brief section also serves as an introduction to Goethe's philosophical thought, and for the most part is supported with quotations from Goethe indicating his position as a nature philosopher.

Schweitzer opens his examination of Goethe's philosophy with three sentences in which he seeks to give the foundation of Goethe's philosophic thinking. The opening statement is

How an individual by himself and through his own study can arrive at convictions capable of guiding him on the right road throughout his existence: that to Goethe is the question that matters.

In addition to opening the discussion of Goethe's philosophy, this section is also a culmination of the ideas

made thus far by Schweitzer in reference to Goethe's faith in nature based on individual experiences. Next, Schweitzer makes the general statement that, according to Goethe, in nature we find both matter and spirit together; Schweitzer then supplies a series of minor ideas which seek to support the generalization; each of these ideas is based on causal relationships. An example of this is the following:

This philosophy of nature seems quite modest besides the perfect cognition of which the great systems boast. It must resign itself to remaining always incomplete because of the fact that we have at our disposal only an incomplete knowledge of nature.

This line of thought is concluded by Schweitzer's indicating Goethe's conviction that his simple nature philosophy, incomplete though it must be, "suffices to lead us through life."

The next basic line of thought is introduced by posing a question; it answers, seeking to explain Goethe's philosophy further and seeing where such a philosophy leads. Schweitzer takes up five major ideas in Goethe's philosophy.

- 1) Those elements, obscure "demoniac" forces which are in nature and man.
- 2) The ideals of purity and kindness.
- 3) The idea of forgiveness.
- 4) The idea of love
- 5) The idea of action

These ideas, as they affect our lives, are developed at the conclusion of this line of thought. Some of the ideas

are only briefly mentioned; some are rather elaborately supported. The general deductive pattern of reasoning continues, and within that pattern are examples of causal reasoning and the use of testimony evidence.

The first idea concerns the "demoniac" forces which are in men and nature and which control the lives of men. Schweitzer indicates that in the Walpurgis night episode, Goethe described these forces in nature. The description of these forces in men, according to Schweitzer, is described in "Goethe's Poetry and Truth." This force within man, according to Schweitzer's interpretation of Goethe, is man's "fate" and Schweitzer develops this Goethean idea with a quotation from "Maxims and Reflections." He refers to another Goethean work "Elective Affinities" as further evidence of Goethe's holding this idea. Such a belief in fate raises the question of destiny vs. liberty and Schweitzer points out Goethe's answer to it in a reference from a conversation of Goethe's.

We are, as he expresses it in a conversation with Eckerman, in the situation of those who play a game where draughts are maneuvered on a checker-board according to the cast of the dice. The result depends largely on the cast of the dice, yet the way the player handles the draughts also means something in the outcome of the game.

Leaving this point, Schweitzer next undertakes to indicate the elements of purity and kindness as they are

found in Goethe's philosophy. Purity is touched on only briefly by indicating its importance in Goethe's life and by defining it as a freeing oneself from hypocrisy, cunning, falsehood, and anger. Schweitzer seeks to support this as a Goethean principle by referring the audience to "Iphegenie" and "Tasso" as embodying this ideal. Kindness, which Schweitzer seems to equate with ethics in this argument, is given more detailed development. Schweitzer supports the idea that kindness is "the supreme manifestation in man" according to Goethe, by indicating that Goethe feels that this spirit of kindness in man is what brings order into the chaos of the world. Further evidence is Schweitzer's quoting a hymn by Goethe which exalts kindness.

Schweitzer interrupts his delineation of Goethe's philosophy to comment to the audience that Goethe's ethics seem to refer only to man; apparently Goethe regarded moral sentiment in animals as being vastly inferior to that of man.

Schweitzer continues his explanation of Goethe's ethical concepts by employing reason from analogy. His analogy is between Goethe's ethics and Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism: Whereas Bentham is for the good of society (the greatest good for the greatest number) as a guiding principle, Goethe emphasizes the individual, indicating that

the good of the society will automatically follow. Goethe's ethical concept, "Do good for the pure love of doing good" implies his thinking that each person has ethical potential in accordance to his character and circumstances. The result of this thinking in nature philosophy is that each person is faced with his individual tasks; he is led to find out in what way he can serve others. Support for this is offered in Schweitzer's reference to Wilhelm Meister's decision to become a physician, which is an example taken from Goethe's literature.

The idea of forgiveness is only briefly mentioned as a part of Goethe's philosophy. "Iphegenie" is referred to as an example from Goethe's writing which embodies this idea.

The concept of love is treated even more briefly; it is simply stated and a quotation from Goethe is offered as support indicating his belief in this idea.

The concept of action is developed further, and in a sense, it is a result of these previous concepts being translated into action. Quoting Goethe and his writings six times in a few paragraphs, Schweitzer seeks to emphasize Goethe's faith and insistence upon acting on these principles.

From this application of Goethe's philosophy to daily life, Schweitzer moves into the next major line of

thought, which is fairly brief examination of Goethe's religion and is developed in an historical-biographical manner. Through this development Schweitzer seeks to clarify Goethe's particular religious convictions, and he compares part of Goethe's beliefs with traditional Christianity. Employing quotations from Goethe for support, Schweitzer indicates the basic lines of Goethe's religion.

Opening with a general statement, Schweitzer sets forth two major premises on which he intends to discuss Goethe's religion.

- 1) The religion is identical to his philosophy.
- 2) Jesus, as an incarnation of God's love reveals what we, through our own reflection, must arrive at.

With a detailed example from Goethe's student days in Leipzig, Schweitzer seeks to emphasize Goethe's belief in religion as it is pronounced by Jesus. Later in life, Goethe often refers to himself as pagan, but Schweitzer points out that Goethe's dissatisfaction is with dogmatic Christianity, not a confession of non-belief. Goethe's plea is for a return to "pure religion," which for him, according to Schweitzer, is an understanding of God manifested in nature. Schweitzer tells his audience that Goethe's religion includes a belief in immortality, for Goethe feels that "the spirit is of an indestructable nature."

The division of spirit and matter in Schweitzer's view is manifest in Goethe's religion and in his theory of knowledge: he believed that there are certain questions which only God can answer, but he also rebels against Christianity's underestimation of knowledge which is based on rational thought. Schweitzer attempts to drive this point home with a quotation from Goethe.

It would not be worthwhile, he says, to attain to seventy years if all the wisdom of the world were but foolishness before God.

Schweitzer continues to use Goethean quotations for support, as he concludes this argument.

Schweitzer now summarizes his discussion of Goethe's works, his philosophy, and his religion by opening a brief line of thought in which, reasoning from analogy, he argues the superiority of Goethean nature philosophy over the more elaborate doctrinal philosophies. Schweitzer likens Goethe's philosophy to a small tree which began its growth under the shadow of the great doctrinal systems. As the natural sciences developed, these systems crumbled; and "the little tree of Goethe's philosophy remains standing."

The strength of Goethe's philosophy, according to Schweitzer, lies in its foundation in the natural sciences, for the essence of Goethe's thought lies in his faith that man "setting out from reality and continuously keeping

reality in mind" can work out his life in truth. Schweitzer concludes with his own conviction that Goethe is successful; he points to Goethe's life and writings as evidence for this.

The final line of inquiry in the address is the seeking of answers to these questions:

Are the thoughts that Goethe has communicated to us also supported by the weight of his personality? What exactly is this personality?

Schweitzer's answers to these questions lie in his development of two basic ideas:

- 1) Goethe is a contradictory man.
- 2) Goethe is a remarkable man.

The first point is developed by examples of this contradictory nature of Goethe, by Goethe's own opinion of his character, and by the opinions of others. The second main idea is developed by delineating and suggesting those characteristics of Goethe's personality which make him worthy of respect.

Noting briefly that Goethe "made mistakes," Schweitzer makes the general statement that, "His way of living was strange and disconcerting in many ways." He seeks to support this statement by referring to examples of these contradictory elements and by enumerating some of Goethe's peculiarities. Moving from this enumeration, Schweitzer asks the question, "What is Goethe's opinion of himself," and the answer, according to Schweitzer, is that Goethe

believed himself full of contradictory qualities. Concluding that "He was therefore neither a harmonious personality nor an ideal personality" as indicated by his discussion, Schweitzer states that he was nonetheless well thought of by his contemporaries. He quotes Knebel and Schiller, friends of Goethe, in support of this.

Having presented and developed the contradictory aspects of Goethe, Schweitzer moves into his second main point in this argument, which is begun with a declaration that "we cannot do otherwise than consider him a great, deep, imposing, and despite all his peculiarities, sympathetic personality." Schweitzer's support for this generalization is developed through an examination of five personality characteristics that combine to make Goethe a unique person.

- 1) He is serious about the development of his personality.
- 2) He is truthful.
- 3) He is humble.
- 4) He is kind.
- 5) He serves others.

Each of these traits is developed as being characteristics of Goethe, by Schweitzer's referring to Goethe's biographical factors which manifest these characteristics, by quoting testimony of those who knew him, and by quoting Goethe. Goethe's seriousness is illustrated by his long struggle throughout his life to control his quick tempered

nature. Schweitzer points out that this control often made Goethe appear cool and distant to those about him. Schweitzer feels that even Goethe's facial features convey this impression and he cites a quotation from an observer as he seeks to support the existence of this trait in Goethe.

Goethe's truthfulness is indicated by Schweitzer's mentioning the integrity of Goethe's daily dealing with others. This truthfulness according to Schweitzer encouraged Goethe's humbleness, and he provides examples of Goethe's relationships to those whom he respected, as support for the existence of this characteristic.

The trait of kindness is evidenced by Schweitzer with a selection of four examples of this quality as found in Goethe, and this seems to lead naturally into the statement concerning Goethe's need to serve others.

Thus the deductive pattern of reasoning is rigorously followed in this examination of the apparent greatness of Goethe's personality. And within the main pattern each particular example mentioned in support of Schweitzer's generalization is in turn supported by examples. Schweitzer concludes this line of thought by stating that all the qualities which he has mentioned were developed by Goethe by continuous effort to perfect himself and that this is rarely noted in those who are constantly in public attention.

Schweitzer concludes his address with a few brief remarks. He does not summarize his ideas, but simply refers to the subject matter in general.

Such is Goethe, the poet the scientist, the philosopher, and the man, towards whom our thoughts are particularly directed at this time.

The audience is left with Schweitzer's presenting the thought that he considers himself to be one of those who has reason to be grateful for Goethe's influence on his life.

Summary

This examination indicates that the speech combines both exposition and advocacy. The elements of advocacy are evident in Schweitzer's attempts to prove the truth of his six main propositions through deduction, causal reasoning, and reasoning from analogy. The expository element enters as his principal method by which he seeks to support his propositions concerning Goethe through his traditional historical approach.

It seems apparent from this analysis that Schweitzer constructed his speech with the understanding that his audience was naive and comparatively unfamiliar with Goethe. His ideas were simply put forth; there are no involved or complex arguments, and he adhered to a strict exposition of his subject. Schweitzer appears to adapt his logical proof to his audience as he had been led to believe they were.

An Examination of the Psychological
Proof in the Aspen Speech

This examination of the psychological proof of the Aspen speech will be based on the interpretation of such proof as was outlined in the Selly Oak case study.²⁶

As was true in the Selly Oak lectures, all of Schweitzer's psychological appeals in the Aspen speech fall in the "social dependency" category of motivational factors. Viewing the speech as a whole, the critic discovers that Schweitzer relies far less upon psychological proof in the Aspen speech than he did in the Selly Oak lectures. It would seem that because the Aspen speech was largely an expository speech, and because Schweitzer faced an audience that was probably well disposed toward his subject and toward any line of thought complementary to Goethe, he did not feel the need to employ psychological proof extensively. He was seeking, therefore, to reinforce the opinions that were probably already held by the audience concerning Goethe.

An examination of the speech indicates that the psychological proofs that Schweitzer did employ were largely aimed at appealing to a sense of pride in the audience, as exemplified by his attempt to reinforce their respect and admiration both for Goethe himself and for those who admire

²⁶See pages 270 and 271 of the preceding chapter.

and respect Goethe (appeal to esteem). Occasionally, Schweitzer employed the device of posing a threat to that esteem and then reestablishing the esteem, a method which would probably serve to strengthen it.

The application of the "esteem appeal" appeared early in the speech when Schweitzer, in his introduction, after having indicated a history of inattention to Goethe's works, concluded with a forceful statement that nevertheless Goethe had become the "chosen one among the poets" not only in Germany but throughout the world. This also sought to justify there being a Bicentenary Convocation. "And thus it is that in this year 1949 the bicentenary of his birth is a date for the whole world . . ."

Schweitzer's purpose in each of the lines of thought which he chooses to develop appears to serve the over-all function of reemphasizing pride of the audience in such a man as Goethe. Thus Schweitzer's development of the "special charm of his creations," "his penchant for the natural sciences," and the other main ideas, all appear to have a cumulative effect of showing off Goethe to his best advantage and thus serving Schweitzer's attempt to enhance both the esteem of Goethe and the esteem of those who are concerned with Goethe.

Specific examples of Schweitzer's appeal to this esteem are scattered throughout the speech. It is interesting to note that some of these examples refer to situations in which Goethe serves as a type of "underdog," and his subsequent rising to heights in spite of difficulties further emphasizes his success. This device is used especially in Schweitzer's description of Goethe's work in the natural sciences. Looked upon by the scientists as "the poet meddling with the natural sciences," Goethe is made to look especially good through his various valuable discoveries. The device is used again by Schweitzer when he describes Goethe as humbly studying and seeking to see the value in the doctrinal philosophies of the time; his subsequent renunciation of them for his nature philosophy appears the more significant for his having dutifully approached the elaborate doctrines. Some examples of Schweitzer's use of the various psychological appeals are as follows:

Little by little the anatomists found themselves obliged to recognize his proof. [underdog]

He was destined, indeed, to become a truth seeker in the whole domain of the cultural sciences. [esteem]

This time it is the botanists who, in the course of years, are brought to bow before the poet meddling with the natural sciences. [underdog]

Brave and modest as he is, he starts studying this doctrinal philosophy, certain that it has

something to teach him. . . . In the end, however, he has to confess that the manner of thinking of Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, as well as of Schopenhauer, is alien to him, and that he does not know what to do with it really because their thinking does not start from the study of nature itself, but applies to it some prefabricated theories. [underdog]

One affirmation which he feels able to risk after his own experience of the simple philosophy of nature is that knowledge, thus obtained, incomplete though it be, suffices to lead us through life. [esteem]

As to those of us who, thanks to the great mass of information we possess about him, can see his existence spread out before us in a way not equaled in the case of any other of the remarkable men of the past, we cannot do otherwise than consider him a great, deep, imposing and, despite all his peculiarities, sympathetic personality. [esteem]

Summary

This examination indicates that whereas psychological appeals were not used extensively throughout the speech, there is evidenced a constant awareness of the position of his audience as Goethe admirers, indicated by frequent appeals to their self esteem and to their pride in Goethe.

An Examination of the Ethical Proof Employed in the Aspen Speech

This discussion of the ethical proof of the Aspen speech will be based on the interpretation of such proof as was delineated in the study of the Selly Oak Lectures.²⁷

²⁷See pages 278 and 279 of the preceding chapter.

As was found to be the case regarding psychological proof, there is not extensive use of ethical proof within the composition, however, he did employ ethical proof prior to the address. Again, because the speech was largely expository, Schweitzer perhaps did not feel the need to employ a great deal of ethical proof, for the ideas he presented did not demand as extensive use of proof as other speeches dealing with more controversial material.

As was true in the Selly Oak lectures, Schweitzer's mode of ethical proof probably began prior to his arrival as evidenced by the following factors: The brochures advertising the convocation obviously used Schweitzer as a drawing card for encouraging attendance; his arrival in the United States and his trip across the country to Aspen were followed and heralded by leading magazines and newspapers, such as Life, Time, Newsweek, The New York Times, Christian Century and others; while in Aspen he was followed about by reporters, admirers, and friends; his walk to the speaker's stand was greeted with awesome respect. Attired in his old fashioned coat and black tie, that are almost a landmark with him, he seemed to present the image of humbleness, frugality, and simplicity. All these factors combined seemingly to envelope him in an aura of "good character."

Within the speech itself, Schweitzer employed "identification" frequently as he sought to employ ethical support for his thoughts; also there are evidences of a variety of efforts to further build "good character" and "competence."

Identification was employed immediately in the introduction of his speech and continued throughout the address. Usually this identification took the form of personal pronouns identifying Schweitzer with his audience and with the speaking occasion. For example,

We are gathered together to commemorate . . .
 In his bitterest work "Elective Affinities," he
 sets before us . . .
 Are the thoughts that Goethe has communicated
 to us . . .
 Among us here . . .

Frequently, Schweitzer's identification apparently links Schweitzer, his audience, and Goethe's thinking all together. For example,

Looking with the eyes of the spirit upon nature
 as it is within ourselves, we find that in us
 also there is matter and spirit.

Goethe wrestled with the problem of destiny and
 liberty as we all must.

We are, as he expresses it in a conversation . . .

It is not uncommon for Schweitzer to identify himself with his audience when he is pointing out a weakness or error in Goethe's thought. For example,

Actually, as we know today, mathematics has been called upon to play a more and more important part in the natural sciences.

As to us who, thanks to the great mass of information we possess about him, can see . . . we cannot do otherwise than consider him a great, deep, imposing, and despite all his peculiarities, sympathetic personality.

Along with the mode of identification, Schweitzer seeks to manifest competence in a variety of ways. His willingness to acknowledge both the strengths and weaknesses of Goethe seem to indicate to his audience that he is giving them a faithful picture of Goethe, not a biased view. For example,

But in vain did he make these sacrifices of time and effort. The studies of Fresnel, Maxwell, and Lorenz on the nature of light, continuing those of Newton, established the correctness of the latter's theory.

Those who undertake to criticize Goethe will find things to criticize. He made mistakes.

He was therefore neither a harmonious personality nor an ideal personality.

Schweitzer's competence seems to be further suggested by his constant quoting of Goethe and his constant reference to his works as he seeks to support his conclusions about the poet. This seems to indicate competence in that he supports his beliefs about Goethe with direct references from Goethe's writings; it also appears to display good character in demonstrating to his audience his ready

familiarity with Goethe's works. The address abounds with such references.

According to a conversation with Eckerman in 1827 . . .
 Let Goethe speak:
 Goethe confesses . . .
 He sums up in these words . . .

Both competence and good character are apparently evidenced by Schweitzer's objectivity in providing both the strengths and weaknesses of Goethe in analogies with other thinkers in which Goethe's thought is compared both favorably and unfavorably.

It is not for him, as it is for Schiller and some others,

In this there exists an affinity between Goethe and Bach.

This philosophy of nature seems quite modest beside the perfect cognition of which the great systems boast.

Summary

Though not making particularly extensive use of ethical proof, Schweitzer does demonstrate in the Aspen speech, through identification, good character and competence, that he was seeking to establish a basis of ethical proof which appears to have extended from prior to his arrival at Aspen through the content of the speech.

Arrangement

This discussion of arrangement is based on the interpretation of such elements as was used in the

Selly Oak study.²⁸ Generally speaking this speech was arranged by logical modes of proof, following primarily a deductive pattern. The speech was arranged in this manner as a whole, with each individual line of thought being further arranged in the same way. This can be seen by looking at the general plan of the speech. In Schweitzer's announcement of his purpose, he made a general statement that was to be developed by six individual lines of thought.

Statement of purpose:

Let us devote this hour to taking stock of his life, of his work, of his thought, of what he means to us.

Individual lines of development:

What is it that constitutes the special charm of his creations?

Goethe's penchant for the natural sciences was innate.

What is Goethe's conception of the world and of life?

What are those elements of the idea of the world and life to which natural philosophy leads?

Let us now take up the question of Goethe's religion.

Are the thoughts that Goethe has communicated to us also supported by the weight of his personality?

²⁸See page 286 in the preceding chapter.

Within each of these six lines of thought the same deductive pattern was used. The ideas were opened with a question or a general statement that called for development and this development most often consisted of a number of particular statements which in turn were supported by examples, historical data, or causal statements. An example of this is:

General statement:

What is it that constitutes the special charm
of his creation?

This is supported by two main ideas:

Consider first of all his language.

As to the content, the distinction and charm of
his works reside in the fact that he writes of
what he has experienced and of thoughts which
are his own.

Looking at the first of these particular ideas, one finds
it developed by three specific statements.

- 1) Goethe is a man of visions.
- 2) Another special quality lies in the fact that
he does not express himself in solemn language,
laden with sonorities . . .
- 3) Characteristic also is the rhythm of his poems.

Each of these elements is explained and developed by an
observation of Goethe's life, a reference to his works or an
analogy with another person.

This logical pattern of arrangement is followed
rigorously throughout the speech. Its repetition and

consistency help to give his ideas a simple, straightforward presentation.

Within this pattern there is some variety in the presenting of support occasionally through analogous reasoning. For example he compares Goethe's rhythm with that of Bach, and he argues the elements of natural philosophy by comparing it with certain elements of doctrinal philosophy. He also uses numerous instances of causal statements within the deductive pattern. An example of this is,

He disapproves of the use of research instruments.
 . . . To use complicated instruments is, in his
 view, to torture nature in order to extort
 confessions from her . . .

The pattern remains logical (plan of ordering material according to patterns of reasoning) throughout the speech, however; little use is made of analogical arrangement (pattern of arranging materials so as to note likenesses or differences between two items); and no examples of motivational arrangement (any pattern geared to disposing the audience to a favorable frame of mind regarding a proposal) are apparent.

Style

The discussion of style follows the interpretation and procedure as developed for the Selly Oak study.²⁹

²⁹See page 290 of the preceding chapter.

Schweitzer seeks to achieve clarity in this speech through a number of factors. The very consistency of his arrangement pattern leads his audience easily from one idea to another, through his thinking. His purpose is clearly stated and his lines of thought are all briefly set forth. His frequent device of introducing a line of thought with a question, and the developing of his ideas as answers to that question, appears to keep his ideas clearly before his audience.

His transitions are not involved or complex, and there are very few interruptions in the development of his ideas. His frequent use of illustrations helps to clarify points that might have been difficult to grasp. For example, when stating that Goethe must make every subject a part of himself, (it must reflect and confess his own life) Schweitzer clarifies the point with an extended illustration of just how this affected one of his most important writings, "Faust."

Clarity is also sought through ample use of definitions, so that there might not be any doubt in the minds of his listeners just what he is talking about. For example,

Doctrinal philosophy does not start from observation of nature, but applies to nature those concepts it has formed about nature, and interprets nature in accordance with them.

Purity, to him, means that man frees himself from hypocrisy, from cunning, from falsehood, from anger, and transforms himself into a simple and honest being.

It is difficult to talk of conciseness without getting into a discussion of word choice, a situation which is not possible when discussing a translation of a speech. It may be stated in passing, though, that this speech gives the over-all impression of being devoid of complex, involved thoughts, implying that they are stated with considerable conciseness.

Schweitzer's style in the address is most apparent in the devices he uses to achieve vividness and force for his ideas.

As has been mentioned a number of times, Schweitzer employs comparisons, which help to make his ideas more vivid. For example, he compares Goethe to Bach in the matter of rhythm; and he compares Goethe's ethics with Bentham's ethics.

He makes some little use of similes. An example of this is:

When he tries to produce in this fashion he is like the swan which has left the water and goes waddling on dry land.

In like manner he uses metaphors occasionally, an example being his comparison of Goethe's philosophy to a small tree beside the great doctrinal philosophies.

It was a small tree growing in the shadow of the great systems . . . The little tree of Goethe's philosophy remains standing. Freed from the shadow that had retarded it, it now thrives and grows.

In line with the best practices to achieve clarity force Schweitzer's constant use of illustrations and examples throughout the speech seeks to add to the clarity of the speech, but also attempts to increase its vividness and force. This is evidenced in the development of the six main ideas of the speech, for there is not one idea that does not have at least several examples or illustrations, and most of them have many. Thus it would seem that Schweitzer relied heavily on illustration and example to convey his ideas.

Another device for vividness and force is Schweitzer's frequent use of quotations from Goethe; from his writings, from his conversations, and from his letters.

Summary

Within the realm of stylistic methods, this analysis indicates that Schweitzer employed a variety of factors in his attempt to present his ideas in the most effective manner possible.

Delivery

The Aspen address delivered on July 8 took approximately one hour to present. Reports indicate that Schweitzer

read his speech slowly and carefully from his manuscript; and Thornton Wilder, who was translating it sentence-by-sentence, remarks that "Dr. Schweitzer did not depart in any point from his German text."³⁰ In a description of how he and Dr. Schweitzer planned the delivery, the manner in which it took place is suggested.

. . . here he would say four sentences in German, then pause, while I gave the English equivalent. Sometimes we broke the flow with a single word (Dr. S. Warum? T. Wilder? Why?).³¹

Reports also indicate that Schweitzer's voice was rather high pitched and did not always carry well. During his delivery, the public address system did not always work effectively, and some could not hear him at all.³²

As has been found to be true in almost all of his speaking, reports indicate that Schweitzer gestured very little during his delivery, and yet his delivery seemed to have carried an atmosphere of force and vitality. Thornton Wilder's comment on this indicates, at least in part, how this force is manifested.

Dr. Schweitzer gestures very little, but by pause, and glance and emphasis and variation in

³⁰Letter from Thornton Wilder, June 25, 1960.

³¹Ibid.

³²Dr. Roy Schramm pointed out that this was the case where he was sitting.

tempo (as would a musician) creates a profound impression.³³

Also, his "large and craggy"³⁴ appearance undoubtedly helps to create this impressiveness in his delivery. Thus Schweitzer's delivery seems to be typical of that kind that has been noted generally in all his speaking.

Effect

The effect of this address must be discussed from two points of view. Generally speaking, the reports indicate that the content of the speech was a little disappointing to some of those who heard him. Examples of this kind of reaction are,

The audience was not so moved by what Dr. Schweitzer had to say as by the way he said it.³⁵

Delivery was effective because of the personality of the speaker. The content was clear and instructive, though not particularly new or original.³⁶

I believe that the general impression of the audiences at Aspen was that Dr. Schweitzer was the highlight of the conference, but that

³³Letter from Thornton Wilder, June 25, 1960.

³⁴Letter from Robert Hutchins, June 22, 1960.

³⁵Letter from Mrs. Walter Paepcke, September 25, 1960.

³⁶Letter from Robert Hutchins, June 22, 1960.

there were a dozen more important speeches than the one he gave.³⁷

. . . and rewrite it in terms a child might understand. This was a disappointment to everyone; but what was not a disappointment was the personality of the man--this was overwhelming.³⁸

These comments suggest two factors that need to be taken into consideration. They support what seemed to be apparent in the analysis of the speech itself--that Schweitzer's treatment of his subject was quite simple, and that it did not provide any startling or dramatic information. This can probably be explained, in part, by advice he received concerning the naiveté of his audience.

The second factor that these comments suggest is that despite the comparative simplicity of the content of the address, the outcome was considered extraordinary in consequence of Schweitzer's personality; so much so that Seaver reports Robert Hutchins' reaction to the address as "the greatest cultural event ever held in the United States."³⁹

Here is evidently a case where the tremendous power of the Schweitzer personality, as developed through his life

³⁷Letter from Charles Joy, February 13, 1961.

³⁸Letter from Mrs. Paepcke, September 25, 1961.

³⁹Seaver, op. cit., p. 168.

of work and service, is in full evidence. The effect of the speech upon his audience would seem, in part, to have been made simply by his presence, as well as, or in spite of, the content of the address. The following comments, in addition to the ones already stated, indicate that this factor was in force during the address.

Before us stood an old man in a tired black frock coat, and a black tie. His hair never seemed in place. He made no gestures. He emphasized no words. He was humble; he was simple; he just seemed good.⁴⁰

He is such a great man you don't count the details. You are almost frozen instead; after all he's got presence. Sheer agape shines through that presence.⁴¹

The audience was deeply impressed by the address. . . . the audience listened as intently to the foreign-language as to the English.⁴²

Thus the effect of the Aspen speech must be seen as both a reaction to the speech itself and a reaction to the personality (or legend) of the speaker, and in either case the reaction is generally favorable.

Conclusions

This study of the Aspen speech suggests that in many respects it is typical of Schweitzer's speaking in general.

⁴⁰Letter from Mrs. Walter Paecpke, September 25, 1961.

⁴¹Letter from Reverend Allan Hunter, September, 1961.

⁴²Letter from Thornton Wilder, June 25, 1960.

It reflects his careful preparation, his typical method of approach to a subject, his development of ideas, and his methods of adaptation of his subject to his specific audience. It also provides an illustration of the manner in which Schweitzer works with his translators both before and during the speech.

The speech did not offer any new or startling ideas; and the content of the speech was not considered, by those who heard him, to be particularly exceptional. Schweitzer's delivery reflected his usual procedure, exhibiting few, if any, gestures.

The speech is notable for its manifesting the effect of the Schweitzer legend upon a speech situation. Within this there was made apparent the extraordinary respect with which Dr. Schweitzer is held by persons from around the world.

Summarily stated, the Aspen speech exemplifies Schweitzer's speaking to an audience on a subject that meant a great deal to him. It particularly illustrated his adaptation to that audience, as he understood them to be; and it also exemplified the power of his personality over his audience.

CHAPTER VIII

NOBEL PEACE PRIZE ADDRESS

When Alfred Nobel drew up his will in 1895, there was a brief paragraph in which he stated that he wanted to donate part of his fortune

to the person who had done most to promote the fraternisation of the nations and for the abolition or reduction of standing armies and the formation and increase of peace congresses.¹

This section of Nobel's will contained the idea for what was to become one of the most significant international awards that a person can receive. Albert Schweitzer was recipient of this award in 1952 and in November, 1954, he journeyed to Oslo, Norway, to deliver the address expected from the Nobel Peace Prize winners.

It is significant to examine this speech, for not only is it an event of world-wide importance, but it also illustrates Schweitzer as a world figure talking, in a sense, to a world audience. The speech is typical of his

¹Fritz Hennrickson, The Nobel Prizes and Their Founder Alfred Nobel (Stockholm: Alb. Bonniers Boktryckeri, 1938), p. 46.

speaking in that it exhibits his usual preparation and historical method of approach in a major address. Also, the speech situation provides an exceptional example of the world respect with which Schweitzer is held. The speech is unique in that in the content of the speech Schweitzer addresses himself to people and governments on an issue of imminent concern. This is different from his usual, more academic or specialized topics, such as were noted in the Selly Oak lectures and the Aspen address. The situation, the topic, and the role of Schweitzer in the world at this time make this Nobel Peace Prize address worthy of examination.

Background

Alfred Nobel's will which contained his idea for the establishing of a foundation for distributing prizes for outstanding achievement in various areas, was hotly contested, and for a time it appeared as though his wishes would never be realized. Through the work of dedicated persons, however, the conditions of the will were fulfilled; and on June 29, 1900, the Swedish government approved the statutes necessary for the regulation of its prizes. On April 10, 1905, the Norwegian Nobel Committee adopted its regulations for the handling of the Peace Prize.² Since that time,

²This is explained in Nobel: The Man and His Prizes by H. Schuck, et. al.

the awards have been given yearly,³ and their prestige has mounted with the passing years to the point where their significance far outweighs the financial stipend that accompanies it.

The distribution of the Peace Prize basically follows this procedure.⁴ The names of those to be recommended must be submitted to the committee before the first of February of the year in which the award is to be given. The recommendations can be made by any of the following: members and past members of the Nobel Committee or the Norwegian Parliament; members of the governments of the different states; members of the Interparliamentary Union, of the Hague International Court, of Council of International Peace Bureau, of the Associates of the Institute of International Law; University Professors of Law, Political Science, History, and Philosophy; and any who have previously received the prize.

The Peace Prize Committee does not issue any official reason for its choice of recipient. The prize winner is presented the award in a dignified and solemn ceremony,

³Except for the years 1940, 1941, 1942, during the Second World War.

⁴As outlined in Nobel: The Man and His Prizes by H. Schuck, et. al.

and if the winner cannot attend, the award is accepted in his name by the diplomatic representative of his country. Those attending the ceremony, in addition to the recipients of the prizes, are: members of the Royal Family, members of the Government, members of the Diplomatic Corps, and leaders in the intellectual world. The Prize Winner is expected to present a lecture, which is followed by an official dinner.

News of Schweitzer's being chosen for the award reached him in his jungle hospital. Though appreciative, he did not feel that he could leave his work at that time in order to receive the award, which necessitated the award being accepted in his name by the French Ambassador to Norway. Two years later, when Dr. Schweitzer felt that he could leave his hospital for a short time, he traveled to Oslo where he delivered his address at a "public meeting arranged by the Nobel Committee of the Norwegian Parliament."⁵

Although the reasons for the choice of the Peace Prize recipient are not made public, it is fairly clear that Schweitzer did not receive the award for any efforts he has made through peace organizations, it being part of his philosophy to work out his convictions through individual effort, not within a group.

⁵Letter from August Schou, Director of Nobel Institute, June 23, 1960.

Rather, it is a recognition, well merited that what a man IS can be more far-reaching in its effects than what he says or even what he does. What Dr. Schweitzer has done has made the Christian conception of responsible brotherhood concrete to an entire generation and across all barriers of race and culture.⁶

Occasion

Albert Schweitzer arrived by train at Oslo on November 1, 1954, having agreed to travel first class, as a concession to the desire of the Nobel Prize Committee.⁷ Carrying his battered metal suitcase and wearing his traditional antique bow tie, he was greeted at the station by a large crowd.⁸ His official reception was proffered by: Gunnar Jahn, Chairman of the Nobel Prize Committee; August Schou, Director of the Nobel Institute; Baron d'Halloy, French Charge d'affaires; and Dr. Carl Semb, internationally known professor of surgery. Stepping onto the platform, midst enthusiastic applause, Schweitzer greeted the people smiling and shaking their hands. The type of adulation paid him upon his arrival can be exemplified by this incident.

⁶"Schweitzer and Marshall Nobel Prize Men," Christian Century, LXX, No. 45 (November 11, 1953), p. 1283.

⁷As a rule Schweitzer insists on riding third class; reports indicate that he felt uncomfortable going first class at this time.

⁸Descriptions of Schweitzer's stay in Oslo are taken from Seaver's Albert Schweitzer: The Man and His Mind, Charles Joy's "With Schweitzer in Oslo," and from accounts in the New York Times.

A little old lady pushed her way through the journalists crowding around him and placed one finger lightly on the back of his coat before slipping quietly away again.⁹

Police escorted Schweitzer through the crowd to an awaiting car, and he was taken to a luxurious suite in the Grand Hotel, which was filled with cut flowers (Schweitzer soon had these removed). The entire stay in Oslo was hectic, the few days being filled with many incidents in which people, usually simple, humble people, tried to express their admiration of Schweitzer in one way or another. Examples of such incidents are:

One middle-aged man knocked at the door. He was clutching a copy of Schweitzer's My Life and Thought. He told us that he had come all the way from Denmark to ask the Doctor to autograph the book for him, and then burst into racking sobs.¹⁰

Then a poor old lady came along with an offering of two hundred kronen. She saved the sum, she told us, to pay for a decent funeral, but now she wished to give it to the doctor for his work.¹¹

At the entrance to the station another old lady bowed low before him, offering him a single flower, and saying simply: "Thank you from all my heart."¹²

⁹Charles R. Joy, "With Schweitzer in Oslo," The Christian Register, 134, No. 11 (January, 1955), p. 16.

¹⁰Seaver, op. cit., p. 179.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Joy, "With Schweitzer in Oslo," p. 16.

On November 4, the day of Schweitzer's address, people began lining up beginning at 2:00 a.m. to secure tickets for the address scheduled for 5:30 that afternoon. All tickets were gone within a few minutes after they became available.

Setting

By 5:15 the Festival Hall of Oslo University was filled, "and hundreds of people stood at the back of the stately, white-marbled hall."¹³ Accompanied by his wife, Dr. Schweitzer entered wearing an afternoon coat, and was greeted by a barrage of flashing bulbs from hundreds of cameras. "He stood there as if made of granite; eyes closed, until the flashing and clicking were over,"¹⁴ reports Mrs. Clara Urquahrt, one of his companions at Oslo, and an old friend of Dr. Schweitzer. At 5:30, King Haakan with Princess Astrid, her companion, and a military escort entered.

After an introduction by Gunnar Jahn, Schweitzer walked to the speaker's stand with his manuscript which was tied together, as usual, with a piece of string.

Audience

Schweitzer's audience consisted of such distinguished persons as the King, his granddaughter, and persons

¹³Ibid., p. 171

¹⁴Seaver, op. cit., p. 179.

of importance from the government and embassies. A number of seats having been made available to the public, there were Oslo citizens present; and because the speech took at the University, his audience was also partially made up of students. In addition to these, there were numerous journalists and reporters.

In a very real sense, the audience that Schweitzer faced was only part of his over-all audience. Within a few days, his address was translated into many languages, and then made available to people throughout the world. As we shall note, Schweitzer's address, itself, indicates that he was aware that he was speaking to this world audience, in addition to his immediate audience.

Because not everyone in the audience could understand French, the language in which the speech was delivered, and because the speech was not translated sentence-by-sentence at the time of delivery, it would appear that the purpose of various members of the audience for being present was something beyond the speech they were listening to. His reception at the station, the interrupted and busy schedule which continued while he was in Oslo, and the world attention which was directed to Norway at this time, all indicate the influence of Schweitzer's personality upon the occasion. It is reasonable to assume that some of

the adulation and acclaim that existed generally during the days of his Oslo visit were present specifically in his audience while he was speaking. Joy, after noting some of these factors, concludes that "Albert Schweitzer has become in his own day a living legend,"¹⁵ and it would certainly seem apparent that the Schweitzer legend was manifest during this particular speech occasion.

The Speech

Text

The English text of the Nobel Peace Prize Address used for this study is that published by the A. & C. Black Publishing Company of London, which received Schweitzer's manuscript from him "in its final corrected form as delivered."¹⁶ It was then translated by the publishers. Later, Harper and Brothers published an English text also, but it was in the translation as made by A. & C. Black Company. The Christian Century and the "Albert Schweitzer Education Foundation" also printed the speech, both using the A. & C. Black Publishing Company translation.

As far as can be ascertained then, the English text published by the A. & C. Black Company of London is the only

¹⁵Joy, "With Schweitzer in Oslo," p. 18

¹⁶Letter from A. & C. Black Ltd., August 15, 1961.

complete English text available.¹⁷ It is an accurate record of what was said, subject, of course, to the limitations of a translation, and it can be satisfactorily used for the purposes of this study.

Preparation

In his usual thorough manner, Schweitzer prepared this address over a period of months. He told Norman Cousins that he had developed his "theme with great care,"¹⁸ and he also explained that his original manuscript would have taken him seventy to eighty minutes to read, but to his consternation, when he arrived in Oslo, he was informed that he was to be given only thirty-five minutes to speak. This disturbed Schweitzer, for he felt that the original manuscript, having been as closely knit as he could make it would suffer by being made shorter--ideas would necessarily be more inadequately developed. He complied with the wishes of the Norwegian committee, however, and proceeded to shorten the speech between the time of his arrival and the time of its delivery. Joy reports observing Schweitzer at work on the revision saying it over to himself half-aloud as he worked on it. This is the first instance of anyone's reporting

¹⁷The New York Times carried excerpts of the speech from what appears to have been a different translation than that used by the A. & C. Black Company; the main difference seeming to lie in a number of word choices.

¹⁸Cousins, op. cit., p. 186.

this as a procedure of Schweitzer's speech preparation and whether it is part of his usual procedure, or just one to meet this particular situation is not ascertainable from the available evidence.

The printed text of the speech is the shorter version as he delivered it, and is thus the product of both the preparation done in Lambarene and that done in Oslo.

Abstract of the Speech

The following abstract of the speech is in the exact words of the English text.

THE PROBLEM OF PEACE IN THE WORLD TODAY

Introduction

In choosing for my subject "The Problem of Peace in the World Today," I felt that I was fulfilling the wish of the founder of the Prize; it was with the object of furthering the cause of peace that he first founded the Nobel Prize.

I shall begin by describing the situation which faces us as a result of the two wars which we have recently lived through. Each of these wars was followed by a period of negotiation; but the statesmen who reshaped the world during the course of these negotiations were not blessed with good fortune. They did not aim to create situations which might, in time, have resulted in an era of general prosperity; their main object was to exploit the consequences of victory. They were obliged to reckon with the wishes of their victorious peoples, and to consider themselves as the executors of those wishes. There was no place for reflection on dignity and justice.

That the present situation is impossible, alike for victors and for vanquished, is due to our neglect of historical reality. The historical problem of Europe is conditioned by the fact that in the distant past invaders from the East penetrated farther and farther towards the west and the

southwest, and took possession of one country after another. New boundaries were formed, and within their limits there arose new and relatively homogenous "nations." This evolution gradually resulted in what may broadly be considered a definitive grouping.

In the east and southeast, on the other hand, this evolution has not progressed so far. In these regions many nationalities live side by side; but there has been no fusion comparable to that which occurred in Europe. The only practical solution would be for them to agree to live together, in the same territory. But this state of affairs would have had to be reached before the middle of the nineteenth century. For, from that period onwards, national self-consciousness became more and more intense; nations could no longer be guided by reason and historical truth.

In this way, the first world war had its origins in the conditions obtaining in eastern and southeastern Europe. And in the new organization which has been created after two world wars we have the germs of a third conflict.

Any reorganization which ignores historical reality must bear within itself the seeds of war. The only solution which can be guaranteed to last is one which aims at a just and objective solution in the light of historical reality. This reality is flouted and scorned, if, when two nations have conflicting historical claims to a piece of territory, the claim of one is discounted altogether. History is also flouted by any reorganization of Europe which fixes frontiers without regard to the realities of economics; if, for instance, we draw a new frontier in such a way that a port is deprived of the hinterland which Nature has designed for it.

The most flagrant violation of the rights of History occurs when a people is deprived of the right to the land on which it lives and has to move elsewhere. At the end of the second world war the victorious powers decided to impose this fate upon hundreds of thousands of people.

Our present situation is summed up in one fact: that the second world war has not been followed by any treaty of peace; and it is because we are not able to reach any satisfactory formula for reorganization that we have to content ourselves with uncertain truces.

Body

And now--what exactly is the problem of peace in the modern world? Its conditions are quite new--as different from those of former times as is the war which we seek to avert. Modern warfare is fought out with weapons which are incomparably more destructive than those of the past. It was once possible to regard it as an evil to which we could resign ourselves, because it was the servant of progress--and was even essential to it. Modern warfare on the other hand is such that one would hesitate a long time before claiming that it contributes to progress.

It is worth remembering that for the generation which grew up before 1914, the enormous increase in the destructive power of modern armament was regarded as advantageous to humanity. It was argued that the outcome of any future conflict would be settled much more quickly than in previous ages. It was also thought that the harm done by any future conflict would be relatively slight, since a new element of humanity was being introduced into the rules of war. This arose from the obligations established by the Geneva Convention of 1864, as a result of the efforts of the Red Cross. But these advantages are trifling when set beside the immeasurable harm which has been inflicted by modern methods of death and destruction. Such was our faith in the brevity and relative humanity of any future war that the outbreak of war in 1914 was regarded as a storm that would clear the political air--and also as something that would put an end to the armament race that was ruining every nation in Europe. Some took the war lightly, and even welcomed it for the profits which it would bring them. Others took a loftier view: the war was to be the last of its kind.

In the event these two theories proved completely erroneous. The struggle, and the destruction, went on for years, and were waged with the completest inhumanity. The war was not fought out between two isolated peoples, but between two great groups of nations, so that the majority of the human race was drawn into it, and the triumph of evil was all the greater.

Now that we know how terrible an evil war is in our time, we should neglect nothing that may prevent its recurrence. Above all, this decision must be based on ethical values. Let us be brave and look the facts in the face. Man has become a superman, not only because he has at his

command innate physical forces, but because he now controls the latent forces of Nature and can bring them, if he wishes, into play. But this superman suffers from a fatal imperfection of mind. He has not raised himself to that superhuman level of reason which should correspond to the possession of superhuman strength. Yet it is this that he needs, if he is to put his gigantic strength to ends which are reasonable and useful, rather than destructive and murderous. For this reason the advance of science has become fatal to him, rather than advantageous.

The conquest of the air, thanks to the internal combustion engine, was a decisive step forward for humanity. But mankind at once took advantage of it to kill and destroy from a height. This invention forced us to acknowledge something that we had previously refused to admit: that the superman is impoverished, not enriched, by the increase in his powers.

A new stage began when it was discovered that the monstrous forces liberated by the disintegration of the atom could likewise be put to use. Only now does the full horror of our position become clear to us. We can no longer evade the problem of the future of our race. The essential fact which must now strike home to us is that inhumanity and the superman are indissolubly linked; the one progresses in step with the other. We tolerate mass-killing in wartime--just as we tolerate the destruction by atomic bombings of whole towns. We tolerate the use of the flame-thrower which turns living human beings into flaming torches. We learn of these things in the news, and we judge them according to whether they signify a success for the group of nations to whom we belong, or for our enemies. We admit to ourselves that they were the direct results of an act of inhumanity; our admission is qualified by the reflection that "war is war."

The important thing is that we should one and all acknowledge that we have been guilty of this inhumanity. The horror of that avowal must needs arouse every one of us from our torpor, and compel us to hope and to work with all our strength for the coming of an age in which war will no longer exist. These hopes, these determinations, can have one object: the attainment, through a change of heart, of that state of superior reason in which we shall no longer put to evil uses the great power which is now at our disposal.

The first man who had the courage to advance purely ethical arguments against war was Erasmus of Rotterdam, in his "Querella Pacis." Erasmus has had few successors. The idea that peace might be brought nearer by the affirmation of the necessity of ethics was dismissed as utopian. Kant was one of those who took this view. In his essay on "Perpetual Peace," and in others of his works, he asserts that peace will only come about when international law is powerful enough to appoint a court of international arbitration, and to see that its judgment is binding. Its authority would be based entirely on the ever-increasing respect with which mankind would come to regard the law as such.

Today we have a great deal of experience from which to estimate the efficacy of international institutions; the history, that is to say, of the League of Nations, and of the United Nations Organization. Such bodies can render substantial service and yet--these two institutions have not brought about a state of general peace. Their efforts were bound to fail, because the world in which they operated was in no wise bent upon the achievement of such a peace; and they themselves, being merely juridical institutions, had no power to create a more apposite state of mind. Ethics alone has this power. Kant was mistaken when he believed that ethics was unnecessary to his pacific activities. And, what is more, we no longer have the great length of time on which he was counting for the evolution of peace. The wars of our time, unlike anything he envisaged, are wars of total destruction. We must get decisive results, and get them soon. Only the spirit can do this.

But is the human spirit able to achieve those things which in our distress, we must expect of it? We must not under-estimate its strength. Through human history this strength has made itself manifest. It is to the strength of the human mind that we owe the humanitarianism that is at the origin of all progress towards a higher way of life. The full potentiality of the human spirit was revealed to us during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Those European nations in which it was active were dragged forth, by its agency, from the Middle Ages; superstition, witchcraft trials, the torture chamber and many another time-honoured folly and cruelty were abolished. In the place of the old the human mind created those new things which never cease to astonish those who witness them. This strength later diminished--above all because the researches of science failed to establish any ethical foundation beneath our

vastly increased knowledge of the world. But now today we must once again abandon ourselves to that pristine strength of the human spirit.

The human spirit is not dead: it lives on in secret. Compelled to live on without that knowledge of the world which would correspond to its ethical character. It has understood that it must base itself on nothing but the essential character of man. It has come to believe that compassion in which all ethics must take root, can only attain its full breadth and depth if it embraces all living creatures and does not limit itself to mankind. Ancient ethics had not this depth, this strength of conviction; but beside it there now stands a new ethic--that of respect for life, whose validity is more and more widely acknowledged. Once again we are venturing to address ourselves to the whole nature of man and to urge him to know himself and to be faithful to that knowledge.

Whether we secure a lasting peace will depend upon the direction taken by individuals--and therefore, by the nations whom those individuals collectively compose. Today our rulers are expected to consider themselves as the executors of the people's will. The "will of the people" is the will of a multitude; and, as such, it has not escaped the dangers of instability. Passions have turned it aside from the path of true reason; it has proved lacking in that feeling for responsibility which is vital to it. The worst kind of nationalism has manifested itself during the two wars and is at this moment the greatest obstacle to international understanding. This nationalism can only be overthrown by the rebirth, in all mankind, of a humanitarian ideal; attachment to one's fatherland would then become natural healthful and ideal in character. Nationalism of the evil variety is virulent also in many distant countries--above all in those which formerly were subject to the white nations, and have not long recovered their independence. They are running the risk of making this naive nationalism their sole ideal. These peoples, too, will only be able to rise above their simple-minded nationalism if they espouse some humanitarian ideal. But how will the change come about? Only when the human spirit grows powerful within us and guides us back to a civilization based on the humanitarian ideal. All men, even the half-civilized, even the savages, are endowed with the faculty of compassion and for this reason can develop the humanitarian spirit.

History shows several instances of people which give voice to the conviction that the reign of peace will eventually come to pass. It has been discounted as utopian; but the situation today is such that it must in one way or another become reality if humanity is not to perish.

Conclusion

I am well aware that there is nothing essentially new in what I have been saying about the problem of peace. The only originality which I claim for myself is that not only do I affirm this as true, but I am convinced that the human spirit in our time is capable of creating a new attitude of mind: an attitude based upon ethics. This conviction persuades me to affirm that truth anew, in the hope that my testimony may perhaps prevent its being set aside as a well-meaning form of words. More than one truth has long remained dormant and ineffective for no other reason than that nobody had imagined that it could ever have any application to reality.

May those who have in their hands the fate of the nations take care to avoid whatever may worsen our situation and make it more dangerous. And may they take to heart the words of the Apostle Paul: "If it be possible, as much as lieth in you, live peaceably with all men." May the nations in their efforts to keep peace in being, go to the farthest limits of possibility, so that the spirit of man shall be given time to develop and grow strong--and time to act.

Invention

Ideas: Their Sources and Relevance to the Audience

Although the Nobel Peace Prize is an example of Schweitzer's speaking out on a subject on which he did not ordinarily express himself, the ideas which the address contain are those that have been developed and expressed by Schweitzer for many years. Ideas such as his faith in the individual and his conviction that the world needs a new

foundation in ethics that stands independent from scientific knowledge of the world were developed with great care and detail in his Philosophy of Civilization. His convictions concerning the place of ethics in the world also reflect some of his conclusions concerning the ethics of Christianity as revealed in the Selly Oak Lectures, The Quest for the Historical Jesus, his studies on St. Paul, and numerous other addresses and publications. Thus the speech manifests some of Schweitzer's most profound convictions.

Speaking to a worried world that was looking into the fact of possible self-destruction, Schweitzer brings his ideas to bear upon the immediate problem of surviving in a world that needs peace. He uses his ideas to suggest a power and a change that are both needed and possible in the world today. The ideas of the address are made to appear to have imminent pertinence to each person, each government, each political organization--he appeals to the ethical conscience of mankind.

An Analysis of the Basic Lines of Thought in the Nobel Peace Prize Address with Particular Emphasis on Logical Proof.

Employing logical proof as defined and interpreted in the study of the Selly Oak Lectures, this portion of the case study will endeavor to examine the logical proof

aspects of the Nobel Peace Prize Address.¹⁸

Schweitzer opens the introduction of his speech with references to the occasion and to his subject. Acknowledging the honor which the Prize brings and the responsibility of the address, he then briefly defends his choice of topic, "The Problem of Peace in the World Today," stating that he feels it would fulfill the wishes of Alfred Nobel.

Following these brief remarks, Schweitzer spends the rest of his introduction laying groundwork for analyzing this problem of peace with which we are faced. He does this primarily through historical description, in which he explains that the causes of our present dilemma reside in our behavior in the past. His main argument developed in this first line of thought is that after each of the world wars, the peace negotiations were constructed without regard to historical reality. Schweitzer's definitions and examples of what constitutes historical reality and the manner in which mankind has been guilty of violating it, lead him to the present day conditions. His proof throughout this argument is basically logical, with ample use of causal and deductive reasoning. Relying upon historical description a great deal, the logical proof is developed within this

¹⁸This can be found on pages 241 and 242 Chapter Six.

historical approach. Each particular idea appears to fit into a pattern so that it seems to lead necessarily to Schweitzer's conclusion.

The first idea presented in this argument is a description of the errors made in the peace negotiations following each of the two world wars. Stating that "these statesmen who reshaped the world during the course of these negotiations were not blessed with good fortune," Schweitzer endeavors to defend this position by enumerating causes for the dilemma of the negotiators: (1) the situation was caused by the negotiators themselves whose main purpose was "to exploit the consequences of victory"; (2) even if they had been willing to negotiate with a keener awareness of the future, they could not have, for "they were obliged to reckon with the wishes of their victorious peoples, and to consider themselves as the executors of those wishes"; (3) they needed to work out reciprocal concessions between the Allies when their interests did not coincide.

The result of these negotiations, Schweitzer feels, was an impossible situation for all concerned, for throughout the negotiations there was a disregard for what he calls "historical reality." He begins an explanation of his precise meaning of this term by describing the historical situation in Europe resulting from the formation of nations

in Europe. According to Schweitzer, nations were formed in western Europe by a gradual unifying of immigrant groups, and in time fairly homogenous groups were formed. To him, though, this was not the case in eastern Europe, where many groups lived side by side with little or no unification, each laying claim to its land for various reasons. After the nineteenth century, when nationalism became such a dominating force in European civilization, it was no longer possible for the groups to merge naturally, and thus seeds of war were embedded in the faulty "reorganization" following each of the world wars. Schweitzer concludes with the thought, "and in the new organization which has been created after two world wars, we have the germs of a third conflict."

Restating his conviction that in faulty reorganization after a war lies the germs of another war, Schweitzer then further explains and defines, through three examples, what he means by "historical reality."

- 1) This reality is flouted and scorned if when two nations have conflicting historical claims to a piece of territory, the claim of one is discounted altogether.
- 2) History is also flouted by any reorganization of Europe which fixes new frontiers without regard to the realities of economics.
- 3) The most flagrant violation of the rights of History . . . occurs when a people is deprived of the right to the land on which it lies and has to move elsewhere.

These examples are developed further by Schweitzer's either pointing to instances where they have occurred, or providing illustrations of how they could occur.

This argument is concluded with Schweitzer's indicating that because we disregarded historical reality after each of the two world wars, we are now in a period of truce, not peace, and will remain so until a more satisfactory plan of reorganization is determined.

Having given the historical background for the present day problem of peace, as he sees it, Schweitzer now moves into the main body of his speech, opening a line of thought which proposes to examine and understand this problem as it is found today. His development of the idea stems from his conviction that the nature of modern warfare has so changed from the past that our problem of peace today is largely determined by the new type of war of which man is now capable. Specifically, Schweitzer indicates how different warfare has become and how man's attitude toward war must necessarily then become different. Schweitzer's implication is that this in turn must affect our attitude toward peace. In this comparison Schweitzer uses many examples of deductive and causal reasoning, employed in the framework of historical description.

Schweitzer's first argument develops from his opinion that "War is, in fact, a greater evil than ever before." Referring to history, he indicates, through examples, that it was once believed that war was not only not necessarily an evil, but that it was also a factor of progress. Schweitzer develops that idea by indicating examples from history when that idea seems to have been borne out; then he also points out that it was not always necessarily an element of progress and he provides examples that illustrate this. His conclusion therefore necessarily becomes: "in former times war was as often the servant as the enemy of progress." Schweitzer now quickly states, however, that this is not the case today, for modern warfare is a far greater evil than the warfare of the past.

Schweitzer seeks to lead his listeners to an acceptance of the idea of the evil of modern warfare by pointing to the state of mind of mankind during the First World War. He points out that many looked upon the war, before it got started, as one that would have to be quite brief. It was reasoned, he states, that with new and powerful weapons a war would be over more quickly, and, therefore, less evil would result. People also had great faith in the humanitarianism of mankind, Schweitzer states. The evidence for their believing that, he points out, were the obligations

established by the Geneva Convention concerning care of the wounded and treatment of civilian populations. Admitting that this convention was effective in certain instances, Schweitzer points out that these contributions were insignificant when compared with the immeasurable inhumanity caused by modern weapons. He feels that faith in the brevity and humanity of war caused men to enter the war in an almost lighthearted manner. To support this, four of these attitudes held during the war are provided. Basically they are as follows:

- 1) The war would clear the political air.
- 2) The war would put an end to the armament race.
- 3) The war would bring welcome profits.
- 4) The war would be the end of wars: the "war to end all wars."

Schweitzer ends this line of thought by simply stating that the two theories concerning the brevity and humanity of war were routed by the actual course of events. Not only were the wars waged with complete inhumanity, he states, they also drew in the majority of the human race, "and the triumph of evil was all the greater."

Schweitzer opens a new argument, basing it on the conclusion of his previous one.

Now that we know how terrible an evil war is in our time we should neglect nothing that may prevent its recurrence.

This becomes an extensive argument in which Schweitzer seeks to present his solution to the dilemma posed by modern warfare. Basing his convictions on the world's need to return to ethical values in order to establish any kind of peace in the world, Schweitzer argues that from the inhumanity which man has shown in the modern age has come the threat of self-annihilation. Inhumanity must be abandoned and ethical values must receive a re-emphasis, according to this view. The first idea presented in this argument is an examination of the "superman" that man has become through his scientific advances. Schweitzer explains the fatal imperfection in this superman, as he sees it, and leads his listeners toward his idea of peace based on ethical concepts. He winds up this idea by providing an historical development of the idea of world peace as exemplified by a few outstanding persons.

Opening this argument with the brief statement that "above all, this decision must be based on ethical values"; Schweitzer develops the thought very briefly (at this point) by indicating that in each of the preceding wars mankind was guilty of atrocities and in a future war, man would do yet more terrible things. To stop this, man must revert to ethical behavior.

Then Schweitzer plunges into a detailed development of the idea of man as a "superman." Personifying him as such, he explains and discusses this superman. First, he attempts to defend his statement that man "is" a superman, by indicating that man is caused to be one because he has at his command innate physical forces plus the control of certain latent forces in nature. This is further developed by his pointing out that when man had only his own physical power to count on, he could kill at a distance determined by the strength of his arm to pull a bow. Now that he has the power of nature behind him, man can kill at a far greater distance. According to Schweitzer, this suggests the great imperfection of this "superman" which is:

He has not raised himself to that superhuman level of reason which should correspond to the possession of superhuman strength.

Pointing out that this "superhuman level of reason" is exactly what is needed, Schweitzer then indicates that because he has not raised himself to this level of reason, man's control of the forces of nature threatens to be fatal rather than advantageous to him.

Schweitzer seeks to support this idea by citing the example of the discovery of the airplane, which was a decided forward step for humanity, but which was immediately taken advantage of to kill more people more effectively and

from a height. Thus we are brought to the fact, says Schweitzer, that "the superman is impoverished, not enriched, by the increase in his powers." Extending this thought, Schweitzer reasons that this impoverishment will eventually cause man to go underground for protection, and there will be a subsequent degradation of cultural values.

Schweitzer continues to drive the point home by immediately indicating that now, we have unleashed the power of the atom which can bring incalculable destruction. Having indicated the realization of the horror of our position, Schweitzer leads his listeners again to the conviction that "we can no longer evade the problem of the future of our race." This serves as a transition to his belief that we must admit that the superman and inhumanity are "indissolubly linked." To support his conviction, Schweitzer cites the growth of inhumanity through modern warfare. Pointing to our tolerance of the use of such things as the flame-thrower and the atomic bombings of whole towns, he further points out that when we learn of these things, we judge them according to whether they worked to the advantage of our side or the enemy's, and we are resigned that these things must be for "war is war." In Schweitzer's view, we thus become guilty of great inhumanity.

The admission of this inhumanity, he believes, should so arouse us that we would work with all our strength for "the coming of an age in which war will no longer exist." This must result in only one thing, Schweitzer feels, and that is a change of heart that will lead us to that superior reason necessary to enable us to cope with the superman created by the advancement of scientific knowledge.

To indicate that others have had these same hopes and ideals, Schweitzer discusses the hopes of Erasmus of Rotterdam and Immanuel Kant regarding world peace. Especially does he develop Kant's ideas in this area, noting that in the latter's view, ethical concepts were of no concern to the establishing of world peace. Rather, Kant feels that one must look for world peace in the slow evolution of a belief in a system of super-law, which would keep nations from war. Schweitzer points to a third example of a plan for world peace, that drawn by Sully, the minister of Henry the IV, the first plan for a world government.

Schweitzer continues to develop this idea of world government, without any foundation in ethical concepts, by opening a fairly brief line of thought which discusses our experiences with such institutions as the League of Nations and the United Nations. Admitting at the outset that "such bodies can render substantial service--" Schweitzer develops

it by enumerating examples of just how they can be of service. He selects the creation of the Nansen international passport as a particularly important contribution that came through the League of Nations.

After indicating the good that these institutions can do, Schweitzer states that as good as their contributions are, history indicates that "these two institutions have not brought about a state of general peace." Schweitzer points out that they were necessarily bound to fail in this general purpose, the causes being: first, the world in which they operated was in no way bent on peace, and second, being merely juridical institutions, they could not create any other state of mind in the world. At this point he again makes his assertion that "Ethics only has this power." Referring to Kant, Schweitzer asserts that he was mistaken in his lack of faith in ethics. Schweitzer ends this line of thought on a note of urgency, stating that we no longer have the time Kant was counting on for a long evolutionary process into a peaceful world. Modern warfare, through the power of the superman, makes it necessary, according to Schweitzer, for us to "get decisive results and get them soon."

Moving into a major defence of his faith in the need for an ethical basis for the foundation of peace in

the world, Schweitzer opens a line of thought with the question, "But is the human spirit able to achieve those things which, in our distress, we must expect of it?" His answer to this question is a detailed argument seeking to indicate that the human spirit is quite up to its task. Starting with an historical background, Schweitzer seeks to explain that the audience must not underestimate the power of this human spirit. He next indicates that in the present day this spirit is still here, but has been forced to "live in secret"; he seeks to support this by pointing to the cause for this "secret life," and then asserting that it is time for it to reestablish itself. Stressing the power of the spirit within the individual, Schweitzer states that we are not meeting our responsibilities. He then moves into a discussion of the job of this human spirit to replace the evil that is present in nationalism, as we know it today. His conclusion is a reaffirmation of his belief in the human spirit coupled with a threat of what will happen if it is not allowed to survive.

The historical background for faith in the human spirit is presented in two forms. First, Schweitzer argues that when man is faithful to himself, he becomes humanitarian and progresses to a higher way of life; when he is not faithful, he makes errors of every kind. To exemplify this,

Schweitzer points to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as being times when the human spirit triumphed and abolished such cruelty as superstition, witchcraft trials, torture chambers, and other "follies of civilization," and replaced them with new humanitarian institutions that revolutionized mankind. So much faith does Schweitzer have in these centuries that he asserts,

Whatever was and is true, and personal to ourselves in our civilization can be traced to that great manifestation of the strength of the human mind.

The loss of those humanitarian ideals, Schweitzer feels, was caused by our loss of an ethical foundation to undergird our increased knowledge of the world, but not dependent upon it. His call is to a renewal of the same "pristine strength of the human spirit" in order to bring about a miracle similar to that which lifted the nations of Europe above the Middle Ages.

Having sought to establish the power of the human spirit to accomplish the job that he sets for it, plus providing support for the need for this spirit, Schweitzer then asserts that this spirit is not dead, but has been living on in secret. The cause for this was that the spirit was living in a world that placed its faith in scientific progress. The human spirit can never, according to Schweitzer

be based on anything but the essential character of man; and the compassion which is the basis for all ethics will attain to its full breadth and depth only if it embraces all living creatures, not just man. This factor gives ethics a depth that the ancient ethics didn't have.

Schweitzer feels that the time has come for the human spirit, grounded in an ethic of deep and all pervading compassion, to make itself manifest. He seeks to support this assertion, that the time is ripe, by citing an example of a book that describes refugees being helped out of their misfortunes following the world war, by people belonging to enemy nations. Schweitzer then asks those who have lost their faith in humanity to read it.

Next, Schweitzer places the full responsibility of the job upon the shoulders of the individual man. He seeks to demonstrate the need for this by indicating that in the past it was princes and kings that had to be concerned with peace. This is not the case today, and now our rulers consider themselves executors of the will of the people, Schweitzer points out, and they are faced with the multitudes, full of people of instability who are ruled by passion. According to Schweitzer this irresponsibility is manifested in the kind of extreme nationalism that has been so prevalent, and which poses the biggest threat to

international understanding. The humanitarian ideal of Schweitzer's would not negate nationalism but would seek for the attachments which a person has to his native country to be "natural, healthful, and ideal in character."

Schweitzer then points to the dangerous nationalism growing in the new countries of Africa, which were originally under white rule and whose faith in naive nationalism, he feels, is throwing their futures into jeopardy. Claiming that the human spirit is present in all, including the savage, Schweitzer bases his hope entirely on a return to the human spirit, so that human reason can be strong enough to control its scientific progress. Schweitzer seeks to support the reasonableness of his contention by pointing to several examples in history of civilizations that have risen to give expression to this conviction.

The conclusion of this line of thought and the body of his address is in the form of an ultimatum, as Schweitzer seeks to refute the claim that such a desire for a change of heart is utopian.

but the situation today is such that it must in one way or another become reality if humanity is not to perish.

Schweitzer's conclusion to his address takes on the aspect of a sustained plea for nations and people to heed him and his arguments and to act upon what he has said.

Much of the plea is developed on the basis of lending the force of his personality to his ideas. Referring his listeners to their predicament as outlined in his speech, he restates his belief that only a change of human spirit will create an attitude based on ethics which will bring about a state of peace in the world.

Believing that he is a spokesman for the many who cannot speak out, as he is doing, Schweitzer concludes his address with a strong plea for the world to strive to live in peace.

This conclusion is opened with a personal reference in which Schweitzer says that he knows that there is nothing new in his ideas regarding peace. He then states his conviction bluntly and apparently with force:

I am profoundly convinced that the solution is this: we should reject war for ethical reasons--because, that is to say, it makes us guilty of the crime of inhumanity.

Citing the ideas of Erasmus as an example of this being an idea called for through the ages, Schweitzer then claims originality only in that he has faith in the human spirit's being capable of doing what he sets out for it to do.

Schweitzer counters the argument that it "won't work" with,

more than one truth has long remained dormant and ineffective for no other reason than that nobody had imagined that it could ever have an application to reality.

He then restates his convictions and adds that only if people will perform as he asks them to, will the institutions we have set up be able to perform their functions of making peace work.

Introducing the thesis concerning the need for trust between nations, Schweitzer suggests that the world is waiting for one sign--the reemergence of the human spirit, so that progress can continue and injustice be set right.

Schweitzer concludes the address with a direct appeal from himself to those who hear him (his immediate audience and his world audience) to understand his works "in their true sense." He directs his appeal to:

those who are haunted by fear
those who have in their hands the fate of nations
the nations themselves

Citing a quotation from St. Paul, Schweitzer asks the world to strive to achieve the place of fulfilling Paul's words: "If it be possible, as much as lieth in you, live peaceably with all men."

Summary

This examination of the basic lines of thought and their logical mode of proof manifest Schweitzer's development of an idea employing many forms of logical proof. The address contained ample examples of causal reasoning, deductive reasoning, and reasoning from analogy. This

extensive use of the logical mode of proof, indicates that this address relies extensively upon this mode of proof for support of its ideas. These modes of logical proof were used with variety, and appeared to make Schweitzer's arguments tightly knit.

An Examination of the Psychological
Proof in the Nobel Peace Prize Address

This examination is based on the interpretation of psychological proof as defined in the Selly Oak case study.²⁰

Looking at the address as a whole, a general statement can be made that Schweitzer appears to make ample use of various kinds of psychological appeals. In the address he employs psychological appeals that develop from both physiological and social dependency needs. From the introduction through the conclusion, these appeals are used consistently as he seeks to emphasize and develop his arguments. Within the general pattern of his use of psychological proof, Schweitzer appeals directly to such needs as self-realization and esteem, and also poses threats to these drives. Although a variety of appeals is used, there is a decided emphasis upon the physiological need to avoid injury, pain, and discomfort. Repeatedly Schweitzer strikes at the emotion of fear, urging acceptance of his ideas in order for his

²⁰See pages 270 and 271 in Chapter Six.

listeners to avoid the consequences of injury or pain implied behind the fear. The inspection of specific portions of the address will reveal these elements in more detail.

Because Schweitzer's address deals with a topic that has certain life-and-death aspects about it, it is not surprising to find his making appeals based upon the emotion of fear. Schweitzer capitalizes on man's self-destruction potential a number of times, urging the gravity of the situation. This can be illustrated with several examples from earlier portions of the address concerning the possibility of a new war.

And in the new organization which has been created after two world wars we have the germs of a third conflict.

. . . because we are not able to reach any satisfactory formula for reorganization that we have to content ourselves with uncertain truces which arise from the needs of the moment and cannot be regarded in any way permanent.

As the address progresses, this appeal by Schweitzer to a fear of future destruction appears to become even stronger.

Modern warfare, on the other hand, is such that one would hesitate a long time before claiming that it contributes to progress.

Now that we know how terrible and evil war is in our time we should neglect nothing that may prevent its recurrence.

Only now does the full horror of our position become clear to us.

In the final development of the address, this mode of proof based upon the emotion of fear appears to become even more strongly implied, and is combined with a real sense of urgency.

And, what is more, we no longer have the great length of time on which he was counting for the evolution of peace. The wars of our time . . . are wars of total destruction. . . . We must get decisive results and get them soon.

. . . but the situation today is such that it must in one way or another become reality if humanity is not to perish.

Thus this appeal to the need to avoid injury, based on fear, seems to be used in a progressive manner, beginning with simple references to it, and culminating in a sense of serious emergency. It would seem reasonable to conclude that Schweitzer seeks to use this appeal as a general and progressively more severe underlying motivation pervading the entire address.

Direct appeals to various social-dependency needs are primarily directed to the need for self-realization or esteem, with a scattering of appeals to group preservation. The appeal to self-realization is generally developed by Schweitzer's urging his listeners to understand truly the situation as they find it, and to have the courage to develop their individual potentialities in order to cope with present-day circumstances. Examples of this are:

Now that we know how terrible an evil war is in our time we should neglect nothing that may prevent its recurrence.

Let us be brave and look the facts in the face.

We can no longer evade the problem of the future of our race.

The important thing is that we should one and all acknowledge that we have been guilty of this inhumanity.

The appeal to esteem is generally developed by Schweitzer's providing examples that appear to give his listeners cause for respecting themselves and mankind in general. It seems that at times Schweitzer seeks to use this esteem to offset the grim aspects of the situation which he constantly sets forth. This is illustrated by Schweitzer's discussion of the League of Nations and the United Nations. Although his conclusion is to deny their value in promoting any kind of world peace, he nevertheless indicates their usefulness and makes a decided point of attempting to indicate that they are worthy of respect. It is significant that he seeks further to build esteem in the mind of his audience for these organizations by citing the Nansen international passport as a specific illustration of their usefulness. Because Nansen was a fellow Norwegian and received the Nobel Peace Prize for this passport, Schweitzer's choice of him as an illustration

would probably particularly inspire the esteem of his immediate audience.

Other examples of this appeal to esteem are as follows:

But is the human spirit able to achieve these things which in our distress, we must expect of it? We must not underestimate its strength. It is to the strength of the human mind that we owe the humanitarianism that is at the origin of all progress towards a higher way of life.

All men, even the half-civilized, even the savages, are endowed with the faculty of compassion, and for this reason can develop the humanitarian spirit.

I am convinced that the human spirit in our time is capable of creating a new attitude of mind.

Employing a method which we have observed in other speeches, Schweitzer, in a number of instances in this address, develops his psychological mode of proof in this manner: first, he poses a threat to a basic need, such as security or esteem; when he re-establishes the security or esteem, it appears stronger for having met and apparently survived the threat. On the other hand, when this threat is left unresolved, its implied danger appears to be more severe, thus apparently serving to undergird Schweitzer's emphasis on fear. A few examples of the method of posing a threat to a need are:

We have not taken proper notice of history; and, in consequence we no longer know what is just, --or what is useful. [threat to esteem]

And it is because we are not able to reach any satisfactory formula for reorganization that we had to content ourselves with uncertain truces which arise from the needs of the moment and cannot be regarded as in any way permanent. [threat to security]

In any future war, we shall do yet more terrible things. [threat to security]

But the essential fact which must now strike home to us . . . is that inhumanity and the superman are indissolubly linked: the one progresses in step with the other. [threat to esteem]

Their efforts were bound to fail, because the world in which they operated was in no-wise bent upon the achievement of such peace. [threat to esteem]

. . . but the situation to-day is such that it must in one way or another become reality if humanity is not to perish. [threat to security]

Summary

This examination of Schweitzer's use of the psychological mode of proof indicates a constant use of a variety of its forms throughout the entire address. Relying heavily upon a need to avoid injury and pain inherent in a potential third world war, he emphasizes time and again the horror of such a war. Schweitzer's extensive use of psychological proof seems to have been aimed at his trying to make his theory of a need for a change of the human spirit seem necessary for survival.

An Examination of the Ethical Proof
Employed in the Nobel Peace Prize Address

This examination is based on the interpretation of ethical proof as defined in the Selly Oak case study.²¹

In this speech situation Schweitzer's ethical mode of proof is evident in the circumstances prior to his uttering the speech and within the speech composition itself.

The circumstances surrounding the speech, such as noted in the examination of the "occasion" and "setting" earlier in the case study, indicate the seeming extraordinary rapport that appeared to exist between Schweitzer and the people of Oslo who made up, in part, his audience. During the course of Schweitzer's stay in Oslo, a number of persons were asked what they would do if they were to meet Schweitzer, and generally what they thought of him. A few of these answers will provide an idea of the awe in which Schweitzer was held there.

I should bow down into the dust. Among human beings he stands as number one.²²

He is the great man of the people in a troubled world. His unselfishness is unequalled in our time.²³

²¹See pages 278 and 279 in Chapter Six.

²²Joy, "With Schweitzer in Oslo," p. 18.

²³Ibid.

Assuming that there was some of this same feeling prevalent in the Festival Hall where Schweitzer spoke, one might reasonably say that as soon as Schweitzer entered the room, there was probably a disposition to accept what he might say. The image of a simple, sincere, and great man would probably be further enhanced by his manuscript tied with a string and with his tumbling, unruly hair.

Within the composition itself, Schweitzer appears to have relied extensively upon "identification" for the development of his ethical proof, although there is evidence of some use of factors to enhance belief in his competence and good character.

Schweitzer's development of identification was most often used in seeking to align himself with his audience, such as in the following statement of purpose:

I shall begin by describing the situation which faces us as a result of the two wars which we have recently lived through.

It is significant that within Schweitzer's frequent levying of "blame" upon mankind for the predicament of the world today, the use of the identification factor is particularly noticeable. Thus Schweitzer includes himself in the blame and this would also probably augment his "good character" in the eyes of his audience. Examples of this are:

That the present situation is impossible, alike for victors and for vanquished, is due to our neglect of historical reality.

During the last two wars we were guilty of atrocious acts of inhumanity. In any future war, we shall do yet more terrible things.

The important thing is that we should one and all acknowledge that we have been guilty of this inhumanity.

In a similar fashion Schweitzer identifies himself with his audience whenever he indicates the responsibility that is ours in the face of the present situation.

Now that we know how terrible an evil war is in our time we should neglect nothing that may prevent its recurrence.

The horror of that avowel must needs arouse everyone of us from our torpor; and compel us to hope and to work with all our strength for the coming of an age in which war will no longer exist.

It would seem that Schweitzer's competence would be enhanced in the eyes of his audience by such things as his frequent acknowledgment of opposing arguments; he would thus seem to be attempting to show both sides of those points he was seeking to support. This can be noted in his indication of the value of world peace organizations, though he denies their success as to establishing world peace. It is also apparent in his discussion of the future of peace in the world: while noting the plans, as they appeared in the past, without regard to any ethical

foundation, he insists that the opposite is true. Again, it is evident in his discussion of whether wars in the past fostered progress or not. He provides examples for both conclusions. This would also appear to serve to bolster his good character, although this was probably established more extensively by those ethical appeals active outside the composition of the speech.

One of the more significant uses of ethical proof by Schweitzer occurs in the conclusion of his address. The ideas in the conclusion appear extensively supported by the ethical mode of proof. For example, within it he constantly indulges in identification with his audience, his purpose, and his convictions.

I am profoundly convinced that the solution is this . . .

Today, once again, we live in a period that is marked by the absence of peace; . . . today, once again, we must concede to each the right to defend himself with the terrible weapons which are now at our disposal.

This conviction persuades me to affirm that truth anew . . .

If, in this way, we can begin to liquidate the war which has just finished, a new confidence may start to arise between nations.

Also, in this conclusion Schweitzer seems to acknowledge an awareness of the respect and awe in which he was held; he appears to employ his legend to help carry his

argument. This seems to be evidenced by such statements as:

This conviction persuades me to affirm that truth anew in the hope that my testimony may perhaps prevent its being set aside as a well-meaning form of words.

In the name of all those who are striving for peace, I venture to ask the people of all nations to take the first step upon this new road.

I believe that I have here given voice to the thoughts and hopes of millions of human beings.

These sentences seem to be spoken in an atmosphere of his knowing that he speaks with authority to all peoples, seeming to further evidence his awareness of his position as an elder world statesman.

Summary

This examination indicates that Schweitzer's ethical mode of proof was in ample evidence, apparently beginning long before he spoke and continuing through the composition itself. He relied heavily upon identification in the speech itself, and employed some factors to augment his good character and his competence. At the conclusion of his address he appeared to make use of the respect in which he is held in order to lend force to his argument.

Arrangement

This examination of the arrangement of the Nobel Peace Prize Address follows the interpretation of

arrangement as employed in the Selly Oak case study.²⁴

An examination of the arrangement of the Nobel Address seems to manifest no one, single, over-all pattern, but rather there are a variety of patterns adapted to individual arguments. A majority of the arguments do, however, seem to employ such logical patterns as inductive and deductive arrangements.

Early in the speech inductive arrangement is illustrated as it is used to arrive at this conclusion: "In this way, the first world war had its origins in the conditions obtaining in eastern and southeastern Europe." He arrives at this generalization with a progression of historical data that appear to lead necessarily to his conclusion.

The frequent use of deductive arrangement can be evidenced by Schweitzer's development of the assertion that "any reorganization which ignores historical reality must bear within itself the seeds of war." The support for this is a series of examples and illustrations from history, which caused the previous two wars, and would therefore cause a further war.

An example of deductive arrangement, based upon causal reasoning, is illustrated early in the speech when,

²⁴See page 286 in Chapter Six.

in the introduction, Schweitzer asserts that each of the world wars was followed with negotiations that were not "blessed with good fortune." He then proceeds to suggest three causes for this unfortunate situation:

- 1) The motivation of the negotiators was "exploitation!"
- 2) Their citizens made demands upon them.
- 3) They need to arrange reciprocal concessions.

Deductive arrangement is used more frequently than any other single pattern of logical arrangement.

Analogical arrangement appears to be used to advantage in Schweitzer's argument which compares the difference of modern warfare with wars of the past. Talking of killing with a bow as compared to the destruction that is wreaked by atomic bombs, he appears to support and strengthen his assertion that man's possession of superhuman strength is used for murderous purposes.

Schweitzer's conclusion seems to be arranged in a motivational pattern, for the most part. Recapping his basic idea and the need for its acceptance, the conclusion seems implicative in nature, as it appears to lead the audience necessarily to respond to his plea for peace.

Summary

Schweitzer's Nobel Address employed various kinds of arrangement, but appeared to use most extensively those patterns which stem from logical development of proof,

rather than those concerned with psychological development. He appeared to adapt the arrangement pattern to the needs of each major thesis which he developed.

Style

Within the restrictions necessarily imposed in the analysis of a speech from a translation, there are a number of significant factors which can be noted about the style of the Nobel Address. There appeared to be conscious effort upon the part of Schweitzer to strive for clarity, vividness, and forcefulness through the manner in which he presented his ideas.

Clarity seemed to be achieved particularly through the many illustrations and examples used throughout the speech. In addition to defining and supporting arguments, they also served the purpose of making the ideas more clear to the audience. In this latter purpose, they served as stylistic methods. An illustration of this is the following.

History is flouted by any reorganization of Europe which fixes the frontiers without regard to the realities of economics; if, for instance, we draw a new frontier in such a way that a port is deprived of the hinterland which Nature has designed for it, or if we erect a barrier between an area which is rich in raw materials and another that is able and ready to transform those materials.

Schweitzer's style, especially in the matter of bringing force and vividness to his ideas, is apparent in

his use of illustration and examples, and also in his imagery. Again, though these same elements are often his methods of seeking to prove an assertion, they also serve as stylistic factors in bringing force and vividness to his ideas.

One seemingly singular use of illustration to make an idea appear vivid is in Schweitzer's support for his assertion that the superman and inhumanity are indissolubly linked--a concept vividly expressed in such passages as these:

We tolerate the use of the flame-thrower which turns living human beings into flaming torches.

We tolerate mass killing in wartime--just as we tolerate the destruction by atomic bombing of whole towns and their populations.

In order to lend force and vividness to his idea concerning man's not being able to match his scientific progress with equal progress in developing the human spirit, Schweitzer personifies mankind in the term "superman," and refers to him thereafter in a very human sense, thus presumably making the idea more vivid to his audience. Within this personification, Schweitzer employs a comparison to emphasize the idea that modern warfare is far different from the warfare of the past, thus appearing to add further vividness to his expression of the idea.

. . . when quite on his own he could only kill at a distance by calling upon the personal strength which enabled him to draw his bow Superman, on the other hand, has contrived to unleash something quite different: the energy released by the deflagration of a particular mixture of chemicals.

Summary

Schweitzer's use of such stylistic elements as examples, illustrations, and imagery throughout the whole speech is evidence of his conscious effort to express his ideas in a vivid and forceful manner. There are also evidences of his striving for a high degree of clarity in stating his ideas.

Delivery

The emotional atmosphere surrounding Schweitzer's delivery of this address was undoubtedly effected by the simple, humble appearance of the man himself. Looking somewhat "old fashioned" in his morning coat, wing collar, and four-in-hand tie, the seventy-nine year old man approached the speaker's stand holding his hand-written manuscript, which was bound together with a piece of string. Though his hair had been neatly combed when he entered the hall, by the time he spoke it was tousled in its familiar disarray. He stood erect for the fifty minutes it took him to deliver the address in his high, thin voice that apparently had little resonance. Reading the address word-for-word in

French²⁵ from the manuscript before him, Dr. Schweitzer seldom lifted his eyes to his audience. In the absence of gestures and of vocal variety, the technical aspects of his delivery could hardly have contributed much to the effectiveness of his presentation. Rather it would seem that the favorable response to this presentation must have stemmed from other factors of delivery and/or from the other elements of the total speech situation.

Effect

From all indications, the reception accorded to the Nobel Address was enthusiastic in spite of the fact that not all of the audience could understand the French in which it was delivered, and in spite of the fact that his delivery did not appear to be effective.

Even those who did not understand French appeared spellbound by this remarkable man.²⁶

As was true in the Aspen speech, it appears that the force of the speaker's personality and character made a deep impression upon his audience, thus accounting, at least in part, for their initial reaction to his speech.

In the great hall where the speech was delivered

²⁵Joy feels that this was an unfortunate choice, and that more of his listeners would have probably understood German.

²⁶"Schweitzer Calls for Will to Peace," New York Times, p. 4.

he received a standing ovation and was cheered to the rafters.²⁷

This was perhaps due not only to the occasion, but also partially to the general enthusiasm apparent during the entire stay in Oslo, reported as being "equalled only by that accorded by the Norwegians to their own countryman Nansen."²⁸

The effect upon the world audience to this "impassioned plea for mankind to rise above the thoughts of war"²⁹ was apparently equally favorable. The Illustrated London News referred to it as a "notable speech."³⁰ Seaver points out that it "aroused profound interest throughout the free world."³¹ Within a few days the speech was translated into a number of languages and made available to countries throughout the world. Schweitzer, himself, was surprised at the extent of the favorable reception that the address received.

²⁷Robert Payne, The Three Worlds of Albert Schweitzer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), p. 230.

²⁸Seaver, op. cit., p. 178.

²⁹"Schweitzer Calls for Will to Peace," New York Times, p. 4.

³⁰The Illustrated London News, Vol. 225, No. 6030 (November 13, 1954), p. 835.

³¹Seaver, op. cit., p. 178.

From the available evidence, it appears that the speech was enthusiastically received by the immediate audience at the university, by Oslo, and by the world at large. It would seem reasonable to state that some of the enthusiasm for the speech was also due to the enthusiasm for Schweitzer the man and Schweitzer the legend.

Conclusions

This examination of the Nobel Peace Prize Address indicates that it is both typical and atypical in terms of its being representative of Schweitzer's speaking. It is typical in its extensive use of the method of historical development and in its detailed development of ideas that are personal convictions of Schweitzer. Likewise, it manifested his usual care in preparation. The examinations of the various modes of proof indicated Schweitzer's usual conscious development of each mode of proof to support his ideas.

The speech is also atypical in the following manner: Even though each of his speeches previously studied has reflected ideas of conviction and personal concern, the Nobel Address seems to carry an even greater sense of urgency throughout. Treating a subject that it was not his usual nature to develop, yet using ideas that had been

developed over a lifetime, Schweitzer wove his ideas together with seemingly special care and strength.

The address not only manifested the power of the Schweitzer legend upon a speech occasion, but also suggested Schweitzer's awareness of that legend and his seemingly conscious attempt to use it to his advantage to help develop his ideas.

Summarily stated, the address seems to be a particularly significant example of Schweitzer's intellect, his emotions, and his sense of conviction.

CHAPTER NINE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

An examination of Albert Schweitzer from a number of different vantage points in order to study his speaking disclosed certain findings and conclusions. These fall into the two general categories of the study: (1) An examination of relevant matter pertaining to Schweitzer the man: his historical and intellectual background, the essential features of his life, and his "real" and "legendary" personality. (2) An examination of his speaking in general, plus case studies of three specific speeches. Though treated separately here, these two divisions are interdependent and provide a total picture of Albert Schweitzer, with special emphasis upon him as a speaker. They also provide information for answering the question: Was Schweitzer an effective speaker?

Beginning with an examination of the background elements stemming from historical, cultural, and ideological factors, this study concluded that although Albert Schweitzer is a unique man, who often appears to stand independent of

his background he nevertheless is a product of many formative forces. As an Alsatian, for example, he is the inheritor of an attitude caused by centuries of war and turmoil in Alsace and Lorraine, which developed a position of independence from the extreme nationalism of the present day. Also, he acquired mannerisms, language, and cultural traits from the small provinces. Having grown up in Alsace at a time when the German influences predominated, Schweitzer's background, particularly in its intellectual aspects, was Germanic.

An analysis of this ideological background revealed Albert Schweitzer as an intellectual product of the German reformation and post-reformation influences, both in theology and philosophy. That these influences contributed to Schweitzer's general intellectual make-up was evidenced by his independent thought, his method of study, his belief in personal development of religion, and his particular view of reason. These general factors became dominant facets in all areas of his intellectual life. From these factors specific theologians and philosophers were noted that were particularly significant in their influence. Martin Luther, symbolizing the whole Protestant tradition, and Immanuel Kant, with his conviction that there were truths which human reason could not affect, were emphasized. It seemed that the

influence on Schweitzer of many of the historic German figures in these two areas was in their serving as touchstones for his developing his own thought, with the result that they often led to his rejecting their particular conclusions. Summarily stated, these various historical and ideological factors provided a general background against which specific biographical factors could take on meaningful significance.

The view of the biographical elements of Schweitzer led to the peaceful, pastoral setting of the Münster Valley, where Schweitzer grew up spending a happy childhood. The influences of his simple homelife were significant. This home life plus the fact that his father was the village pastor caused the influences of his childhood to revolve about a religious consciousness. In this atmosphere incidents were noted which foreshadowed Schweitzer's ethical view of reverencing all life. We can see the beginnings of interests, during these early years, which were later to develop into serious studies.

Much of Schweitzer's biographical background centers upon his education, for during these educational years Schweitzer's unusual intellect was developed and disciplined. From Mülhausen he went to Strasbourg, the center of his academic life, both as pupil and teacher, for many years.

During these years Schweitzer produced some important studies, such as the Bach biography, the Quest of the Historical Jesus the dissertation on Kant's religious philosophy, and the booklet on organ building. These works indicate that these years were filled with efforts in music, philosophy, and theology as exemplified by Schweitzer's constant performing, writing, studying, teaching and preaching.

These years were abruptly interrupted with Schweitzer's decision to go to Africa as a medical missionary. From that time on, Schweitzer led two lives. First, he was a tireless doctor building and running a jungle hospital; and second, he was a European intellectual, lecturing and performing throughout Europe and England.

This life of lecturer and musician grew out of his interests in seven areas: (1) The life and meaning of Jesus, (2) The life and meaning of St. Paul, (3) The role of Christianity today, (4) The status of modern civilization, (5) The influence of Goethe, (6) Music, and (7) Science. Each of these areas of interest is represented by significant writings, lectures, and activities on the part of Schweitzer. The examination of these areas revealed that each formed a part of Schweitzer the man, their influences overlapping one another. For example, in Schweitzer the theologian, there are evidences of Schweitzer the artist; in the

musician, there are evidences of the theologian. A major conclusion of this examination is that any understanding of Albert Schweitzer must stem from viewing him as a complex whole in which many factors are brought to bear. To examine him in only one aspect is to do an injustice to his personality, and would probably result in inaccuracies, or at least in a distorted picture of him.

The possibility of such a distorted view led to an examination of the legend that appears to have grown about Schweitzer. This inquiry indicated that since those who can know Schweitzer well through his writings of his works are relatively few, most persons must rely upon the reports of others for their knowledge of him. An examination of some of these indicated that the reports can often present misleading or distorted pictures of Schweitzer. From the more glowing, adulatory reports, for example, has come a legend that has presented Schweitzer as half-man, half-god. These reports carry certain dangers, all of which prevent the lay person from seeing Schweitzer clearly. The results of this examination suggested that any understanding or evaluation of Schweitzer needs to be made in the light of the legend about him--must make the effort to know him as accurately and as completely as possible. The legend has

particular significance in attempting to understand Schweitzer as a speaker, for it was found that the legend often affects the speaking occasion and the attitude of the audience faced by him. It is necessary to keep a clear view of Schweitzer--to avoid extremes--when striving to analyze any particular aspect of him.

The preceding material served as a backdrop against which the general speaking plus certain specific speeches of Schweitzer could be viewed in perspective. This was examined in the second portion of the study, which took special care to keep the background factors in mind, letting them come to bear upon Schweitzer's speaking where it seemed significant that they do so.

The speaking life of Schweitzer appeared to fall into three groupings: (1) preaching, (2) lecturing, and (3) occasional speaking. Analyses of these areas set forth Schweitzer's general speaking characteristics and provided an overview of his speaking life.

It was found, for example, that his speaking experience was extensive in these areas, with each manifesting specific speech characteristics indigenous to its particular demands, and also manifesting characteristics that were common to each area.

Schweitzer's preaching began in 1899 at St. Nicholas in Strasbourg, and from that time it expanded to include preaching in Africa and England. Sermons were found to be adapted in content and approach to each specific congregation; and his preaching in Africa and England involved, in addition, the development of his method of sentence-by-sentence translation. In terms of preparation Schweitzer's sermons manifested his usual, painstaking care; in terms of subject matter, they usually dealt with topics other than those concerned with theological or doctrinal problems.

Schweitzer's lectures, which frequently included theological problems, began when he was a young professor at Strasbourg and continued later when he was a guest lecturer invited to universities throughout Europe and England. In most instances these lectures called for his sentence-by-sentence method of translation. While their subjects varied in some respects, they generally dealt with matters pertaining to philosophy and theology. They manifested painstaking care in preparation, being the consequence of careful research and thought. A lighter type of lecture was noted--those informal lectures concerning his work in Africa--and it was found that they were equally carefully prepared, but were much less formal in their presentation.

The occasional speaking of Schweitzer covered a wide range of speech situations, such as extempore talks on his hospital, formal addresses concerning Goethe, addresses accompanying the reception of awards, and speeches concerning world peace. These various speeches revealed such characteristics as: care in preparation, careful adaptation of subject and delivery to audience and occasion, and the further use of sentence-by-sentence translation. In addition, they illustrated the growing adulatory feeling of audiences toward Schweitzer. They revealed both the variety of speaking situations in which he found himself, and at the same time pointed out the relatively few subjects to which he directs his attention.

The overview, in addition to the factors already mentioned, disclosed certain further significant insights into Schweitzer as a speaker. For example, his speaking life stems from a family heritage of teachers and preachers, and the contents of his speeches always reflect matters of personal conviction. The problem of translation was revealed as a constant matter that Schweitzer dealt with during most of his active speaking career. The variety of occasions and audiences manifested Schweitzer's skill at adapting his material to meet the specific demands of the situation.

These general speaking factors provided an immediate background from which to view Schweitzer's speaking in more minute detail, as revealed in the three case studies. These details were made evident by the analysis of the inventional elements, the arrangement, style, and delivery of the addresses, and by drawing certain conclusions from these findings.

The analysis of the inventional factors of each of the addresses revealed that Schweitzer's ideas always had their source in matters of personal conviction and concern to him resulting from years of study and thought. From these addresses and from the over-view of his speaking, the generalization can be made that he always speaks from a sense of need to express his feelings upon ideas of deep concern to him. He does not digress from these ideas, but rather refines them, and re-establishes them in address after address.

Each of the case studies revealed conscious employment of logical, psychological, and ethical proofs. Of the three types, there was a decided emphasis upon the logical mode, with the other two used in varying degrees to fit the occasion, audience, and argument.

Within the logical proof employed by Dr. Schweitzer there were various specific methods used, with emphasis upon deductive reasoning, developed particularly through causal reasoning and reasoning from analogy. Psychological proof was adapted to the specific audience and was generally based upon appeals to social-dependence needs that were particularly pertinent to the specific audiences. There were appeals to a wide variety of such needs with perhaps principal emphasis upon appeals to esteem and self-realization. Ethical proof in these addresses was viewed, in the broad sense, as dealing with all factors both outside the speech composition and within it which had the potential of effecting the audiences's concept of Schweitzer the man. Each speech situation manifested ethos factors stemming from Schweitzer's reputation prior to his delivery of a specific address. Within each speech composition, itself, there was substantial evidence of methods employed to enhance Schweitzer's good character, competence, and good will (identification). Of the three, identification was the most common method employed by Schweitzer to contribute to the ethical proof of his ideas, though there was also considerable evidence of his striving to augment his competence and good character in the eyes of his audience.

The inventional factors of Schweitzer's speaking reflect careful, painstaking effort to treat a subject fairly and completely within the time allowed. Arguments are devised with the specific audience and occasion in mind, and the basic ideas of those arguments evolved from Schweitzer's intellectual endeavors over the years.

Schweitzer's arrangement of his ideas within these speeches varied to fit the particular situation. Predominantly the arrangement pattern appeared to be based upon the various methods of logical development of his ideas, although he did use psychological and analogical patterns on occasion. The arrangement of ideas in the Selly Oak Lectures and the Nobel Peace Prize address manifested more variety and were more complex than those revealed in the Goethe address at Aspen.

The examination of Schweitzer's style was strictly limited, necessarily, to those factors which would not be seriously affected by the problems involved in working with a translation. Acknowledging these limitations, however, there remained ample evidence of Schweitzer's striving for clarity and vividness through the use of imagery, metaphors, and similes.

Schweitzer's delivery did not appear to be a major contribution to the effectiveness of his speaking. It

appeared devoid of any overt activity. His addresses are often read or memorized; and when they are read, as was true in the Aspen speech and in the Nobel address, he seldom establishes any eye contact with his audience. His delivery, then, appears to be simple and straightforward, even though not as direct as it possibly might have been.

The three case studies provide clues for answering the question whether Albert Schweitzer is an effective speaker. The Selly Oak lectures provide an example of Schweitzer's academic depth; the Aspen speech exemplified Schweitzer at his simplest--that is, his adaptation of a complex subject into its simplest, most easily understood component parts; the Nobel address exemplified Schweitzer in one of his more majestic situations--that is, it revealed a combination of Schweitzer's more impressive qualities such as: his profundity, his grasp of a major idea, his dramatic expression, and his personal involvement in a deep problem of mankind.

With the contributions which each of these case studies provides, the conclusion can be drawn that Albert Schweitzer, essentially, employs those methods of rhetoric which are necessary for producing good oratory. Exceptions to this would appear to lie in delivery and arrangement. The lack of communicativeness in his delivery, because of

the absence of eye contact and overt bodily involvement, might have prevented his delivery from being as effective as it might have been. Schweitzer's insistence upon a labored arrangement of his ideas involving extremely historical progression, might possibly, upon occasion, hinder his audience's concentrated attention upon the development of his thoughts. The enthusiastic responses to the addresses and the general acceptance of the validity of his arguments, though not determining factors, further contribute support to the conclusion that Schweitzer is an effective speaker. The study appeared to evidence that Schweitzer fulfills the general criteria of effectiveness set forth in Speech Criticism.

An effective address should bring out the moral and intellectual character of the speaker; it should elicit an early, favorable response; rhetorically it should conform, within certain limits, to the technical virtues; it should exercise a certain influence upon subsequent events.¹

On the basis of these findings concerning Albert Schweitzer's speaking, further conclusions and evaluation can be reasonably made. Schweitzer's speaking is a natural outgrowth of the many facets of his life. His speaking gives oral expression to those ideas which are of the deepest concern to him, and which have evolved from his intense and

¹Thonssen and Baird, op. cit., p. 460.

thorough research. His speaking reflects his dedication and his convictions as clearly as do his writings and activities, thus further evincing his tightly knit, thoroughly integrated personality. Each aspect of his life influences the other, and all contribute to his fulfilling his purpose in life. Therefore, Schweitzer's speaking reveals Schweitzer the preacher, the teacher, the philosopher, the theologian, the musician, and the doctor, not only in its contents, but in its approach and structure.

The study of Schweitzer's speaking provides, also, a careful look at the legendary factors that have come to cling to Schweitzer. It shows these factors in operation, and it helps to view them in their proper perspective.

A study of Schweitzer, the speaker, provides insight, therefore, not only into his effective oral expression, but also into his character and personality, thus contributing to a clearer understanding of him and his ideas.

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