

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND
POLITICAL CHANGE

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Nguyen Huu Chi
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This is to certify that the
thesis entitled

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE

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PhD degree in Political Science

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ABSTRACT

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE

by Nguyen Huu Chi

The problems of underdevelopment are seen in the general context of cultural change. They have persisted because the people who have been facing them are not socialized--psychologically and normatively--to deal with them.

Most of the characteristics commonly found in underdeveloped countries are more or less related to each other and form the "underdevelopment syndrome." The particular distribution of the syndrome traits makes one underdeveloped country distinct from another. In Vietnam, the three dominant traits are the anti-democratic tendency, nationalism, and mandarinism. These socio-political predispositions are postulated as the result of the political socialization process.

In this study three groups of Vietnamese students are selected: 156 Cantho High School seniors, 232 Saigon University freshmen and sophomores, and 59 students studying in America. Several scales are constructed: the Semantic Status Consciousness Scale, the Political Anti-Democratic Tendency Scale, the Self-Glorifying Nationalism Scale, the Self-Debasing Nationalism Scale, the Familism Scale (three sub-scales), the

Mandarinism Scales (seven Guttman-type scales), and the Occupational Preference Ordering Scale. In addition, Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale is used.

Vietnamese students are more authoritarian than American and English samples. The relationship between authoritarianism and familism is a complex one. Some significant correlations between authoritarianism and familistic attitudes are found.

The structural approach to the study of nationalism shows the limitations of the traditional approach. A nationalist tends to glorify and despise his nation-state at the same time. Structurally, nationalism is determined by psychological effects of socialization. The content of nationalism on the other hand, is determined by Westernization, i.e. normative effects of socialization.

In general, mandarinism is not significantly correlated with authoritarianism. It is found that mandarinism is significantly correlated with traditionalism. The preference of the civil service to other occupations is significantly correlated with the desire for power, for status, and for security. Entrepreneurial orientations are negatively correlated with traditionalism.

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION AND
POLITICAL CHANGE

By

Nguyen Huu Chi

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CHAPTER I

POLITICAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL
SOCIALIZATION

Introduction: Syndrome of
Underdevelopment

In this shrinking world, political isolation, national independence, and territorial sovereignty are becoming increasingly serious obstacles in international politics. A shooting in the jungle of Southeast Asia, a revolt in the desert of North Africa, an assassination or an inflation in Latin America sometimes entail serious consequences causing a great deal of headache to policy makers in Washington, London, Paris, as well as in Moscow or Peking. More and more, foreign policy of world powers depends on what is going on in emerging nations. The course of political change is a matter of crucial concern for those who are interested in world peace and international prosperity.

This raises a variety of questions. A liberal-minded Westerner might wonder why, after more than two decades of independence, the people of the emerging nations have experienced nothing but dictatorships or autocratic rule. Why is it so difficult for liberal democracy to be accepted in these countries? A United Nations official, on the other hand, searching for the bases of international cooperation

and understanding, might consider nationalism the greatest barrier to his goal. Attitudes conducive to international conflict are perhaps more widespread and stronger in the non-Western world than the West. What is the nature of these attitudes?

Finally, the problem of economic development constitutes the most important issue in backward countries. Some social scientists believe that low standard of living is one of the main causes of the highly nationalistic atmosphere and anti-democratic movements which are sweeping the emerging nations.¹ This state of economic underdevelopment has been interpreted as due to shortage of capital and "market bottlenecks," and the problem is reduced to the discussion of "balanced" and "unbalanced" growth.² However, experts in economic development have recently changed their approach, and increasingly believe that the problem of economic underdevelopment is a human problem rather than a purely economic and financial one. It is generally admitted that creativity and entrepreneurial spirit are more important than the amount of capital available.³


¹Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 45-76; G. A. Almond and J. S. Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 532-576; Eugene Staley, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 13-26.

²Albert O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 50-75.

³Simon Kuznets, Six Lectures on Economic Growth (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959); Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press Inc., 1962), pp. 30-35.

If entrepreneurial spirit is indispensable for economic growth, why is it lacking in underdeveloped countries?

All these apparently unrelated issues have something in common. All of them are relevant to the problem of socio-political change in the newly-emergent nations. They are parts of the "underdevelopment syndrome." In order to understand what constitutes this syndrome, let us first examine the "development" or "democratic syndrome." According to Lipset, democracy demands certain conditions and entails certain consequences which in turn reinforces its survival value. Lipset has analyzed this in the following diagram.¹



While the variables mentioned by Lipset may be considered separately for analytical purposes, they are, in practice, so closely related to each other that they can be considered

¹Lipset, Political Man, op. cit., p. 74.


as a single factor, or syndrome: the development syndrome. When any one of these variables is missing in a political system, all the others are in some degree affected. For instance, poverty is always accompanied by high illiteracy; the small literate classes monopolize political power and the poor remain politically apathetic. Normatively the society may or may not be open. In actuality, social mobility is greatly hampered by extreme poverty among the majority, and extreme concentration of wealth within a small minority. As a result, it is more difficult for an equalitarian value system to develop and persist.¹ Finally, democracy lacking its prerequisite conditions has a smaller chance of survival.

Given this interdependence of the variables, it is also possible to speak of an "underdevelopment syndrome." The variables, in this case, assume values at the opposite end of the scale (on following page).

There are two other variables which belong also in the "underdevelopment syndrome," but which have only indirect effect on democracy: nationalism, and lack of entrepreneurial spirit. Their existence tends to reinforce the effects of other factors. For instance, nationalism hampers the development of a rational plan of economic development, and consequently channel scarce resources to purposes (army, national

¹John T. Dorsey, Jr., "An Information-Energy Model," Papers in Comparative Public Administration, edited by Farrel Heady and Sybil L. Stokes (Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University Of Michigan, 1962), pp. 37-57.

CONSEQUENCES¹



status symbols other than the rising of the standard of living.¹ It also induces concentration of power into the hands of nationalist leaders in their international adventures. Thus we find ourselves in the presence of a series of vicious circles. Poverty and illiteracy favor the development of nationalist feelings which in turns slow down industrialization, which in return is the only way to get out of the vicious circles of economic backwardness.²

On the other hand, in most of these societies, the entrepreneurial class does not have a high status, and does not have opportunities to rise in the social hierarchy. Here we have another vicious circle: a pre-industrial economy co-exists with the lack of entrepreneurial spirit which in turn hampers industrialization. Hence poverty and illiteracy persist and reinforce discrimination against the entrepreneurial class. In addition, without the rise of a rival class of merchants and industrialists, the traditional elite (e.g. mandarins) continues to monopolize wealth and power. Consequently, the closed class system with its authoritarian values is preserved, and democracy, literacy and other traits of the "development syndrome" have little chance to emerge.

¹M. Friedman, "Foreign Economic Aid: Means and Objectives," The Yale Review, Vol 47 (1958), p. 505.

²H. W. Singer, "Economic Progress in Underdeveloped Countries," Social Research, Vol. 16 (1949), pp. 1-11; Ragnar Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953).

The "underdevelopment syndrome" has been found in most developing countries. Understandably, the distribution and relative strength of these traits varies in each developing country depending on their socio-cultural particularities. Yet, in general, it is not uncommon to find that these traits co-exist with each other in most, if not all, the emerging nations. Students of socio-political change have often tried to find the main causal factor (or factors) of the political situation in these newly independent countries. They frequently emphasize one or a few such traits and develop their own approach to the problem of socio-political change, then explain the remaining traits in terms of the one(s) chosen as the main factor(s). This results in a proliferation of approaches. Each of them considers the problem of socio-political change in a different perspective. There is no criterion to compare the value of each approach. However, any approach which puts an undue stress on one of the variable and leaves out others as insignificant would fail to present a balanced and total view of the country under study.

Before presenting the approach developed in this study, let us examine the point of view of some well-known students of underdevelopment. For the purpose of analysis, we label their approaches as the economic approach, the socio-economic approach, the historical approach, and the socio-psychological approach. To do justice to these

authors, I want to emphasize that this categorization is not absolute. No authors mentioned rigidly use one approach by choosing one of the numerous traits of the syndrome as the sole factor of underdevelopment. All of them realize that these traits are closely related to each other. Faced with this chicken-and-egg problem of causation they choose only some of these traits to serve as the point of departure for their analyses without playing down the importance of other factors. This is also the position I maintain in the sociolization approach developed herein.

The Economic Approach

Max Handman, stressing the economic factor, believes that it is the character of the economy which shapes the political characteristics of an underdeveloped country.¹ The oligarchic nature of the government, the high frequency of bloody revolutions among the elite (high politicization of the elite), and extreme apathy of the mass etc. are seen as corollaries of economic backwardness. The majority of the people, composed of poor and illiterate peasants have no voice in the political arena. The class of aristocratic land-owners is closed, and is politically more or less indifferent. Businessmen and industrialists are not highly respected. The political life becomes a fierce and bloody competition between the military and the bureaucrats. Thus, once this

¹Max Handman, "The Bureaucratic Culture Pattern and Political Revolutions," The American Journal of Sociology (1933), XXXIX, 301-313.

In a world where life-values are conceived in terms of hierarchical prestige and power, there intelligence and education can find only one outlet besides the army and the church, namely, state service, and where, unless they do find such service, there is literally nothing for them to do but face a period of respectable starvation, but starvation nevertheless; where the commitments of liberalism and civilization necessarily mean the maintenance of a school system whose business it is to prepare the young people for nothing else but state service; in such a world a Malthusian law of population increase of the educated in relation to the positions to be filled creates a situation of such tenseness as inevitable¹ to lead to the explosions of a political revolution.

political process induced by normative and economic factors has started, those who have gained political power will try to guarantee their own continuance in power against the former ruling elite. The latter being unemployed and having nothing to lose scheme another bloody revolution to get back their jobs. Lipset's condition for stable democracy--"relative moderate tension among its contending political forces"²--clearly is not met in such a revolutionary atmosphere.

The Socio-Economic Approach

Other social scientists like Lipset, and Coleman believe, like Handman, that the economic factor plays an important role in the politics of the underdeveloped areas. However, they place more emphasis on the sociological factor considered resulting from the economic factor. That is why

¹Max Handman, op. cit., p. 307. See also, Merle King, "Toward a Theory of Power and Political Stability in Latin America," The Western Political Quarterly, IX (1956), p. 33, Vol. 9 (1936), p. 33.

I call their approach, the socio-economic approach. According to Lipset and Coleman, standards of living explain the typical politics of underdevelopment--the upheavals and the absence of democratic processes. Their assumption is: the richer a country, the more democratic its political regime, and inversely, the poorer a country, the less competitive its political process.¹ The explanation offered is that in a poor country (1) the lower level of literacy breeds political extremism, (2) the higher inequality of income distribution intensifies the class struggle, and (3) there is a "greater pressure on the upper strata to treat the lower as vulgar, innately inferior, a lower caste beyond the pale of human society."² Besides the difference in emphasis on the sociological factor, there are two other differences between the approaches of Handman and of Lipset-Coleman. Handman emphasizes the economic structure of the country (agriculture vs trade and industry) while Lipset and Coleman point to the standard of living of the people and wealth distribution within the country as the generators of anti-democratic values. Also, Handman examines the political processes within the elite class (the in-power group vs out-of-power group) while Lipset and Coleman study the social relationships between

¹James S. Coleman, "The Political Systems of the Developing Areas," The Politics of the Developing Area, G. A. Almond, and J. S. Coleman (eds.), op. cit., pp. 536-544; S. M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review, LIII (1959), pp. 69-105.

²Lipset, Political Man, op. cit., p. 66.

classes and their political consequences. Yet both reach the same conclusion: the politics of the underdeveloped areas are characterized by violence, extremism, and absence of the democratic techniques of bargaining and compromise.

The Historical Approach

Belonging in this group we find social scientists like Thorstein Veblen,¹ or more recently, Vera M. Dean,² who look for historical explanations of socio-political change. They see political systems of the Western type as results of a long evolution of socio-economic foundations. The non-Western world, having just emerged from a medieval stage is not equipped to deal with problems of the industrial age. According to Vera M. Dean,

It is not magic but centuries of travail and sacrifice, marked by a series of bloody wars and revolutions, that saw the peoples of the Atlantic community gradually move from the feudal society and memorial economy of the Middle Ages to industrialization, universal suffrage, separation of church and state, . . . scientific invention, enlightened social legislation, and the continuing expansion of intellectual inquiry.

. . . While the Western peoples have taken several centuries to go through the major revolutions of modern times--the rise of nationalism, the gradual development of democratic institutions, the challenges of nazism and communism, the impact of industrialization--the peoples of the non-Western

¹Thorstein Veblen, Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (New York: Viking, 1939), "The Opportunity of Japan" in Essays in Our Changing Order (New York: Viking, 1934).

²Vera Micheles Dean, The Nature of the Non-Western World (New York: The New American Library, 1961).

areas . . . have had to telescope these revolutions into the span of a few years or a few decades in the twentieth century.¹

Thus the syndrome of underdevelopment is explained as due to the accumulation of unsolved social, economic, and political problems which arise immediately after a developing country's Independence Day. An atmosphere of crisis results and discourages the best intentions of establishing a liberal democratic regime at a time when solutions are badly needed for these accumulated problems. Zbigniew Brzezinski observes:

It is doubtful that all of the present and particularly the future leaders of these new Asian states, given their elitist and dedicated character, will be able to resist the temptation of employing the power at their disposal, both to organize society and to eliminate resistance. Opposition may even encourage the use of force because, once the process of internal revolution has been launched, resistance inevitably takes on the form of interference with the progress of new measures; this, in turn, seems to those in control an attempt to destroy the future so firmly outlined in their minds, and the charge of sabotage follows.²

The Socio-Psychological Approach

This approach stresses the importance of sociological and psychological factors in the process of socio-political change. The basic assumption underlying this approach is succinctly and cogently stated by the Vice President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development that

¹Dean, op. cit., pp. 17, 193.

²Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 62.

"development is a state of mind."¹ Political change involves a change of values a--change of world view. A democratic, open, stable, capitalist (or quasi-capitalist) regime is possible only if it is legitimized by a system of norms based on democracy, freedom, and equality. As long as that normative system has not yet been accepted and internalized, any attempt at building a democratic and open society has little chance to be successful. In effect

To the Western Intellectual, Communist totalitarianism means, after all, the destruction of values and standards built up through many years. To an Asian, Communism is merely an alternative to liberal democracy, and an alternative which produces the desired effects faster.²

For Mary Motassian, the socio-political difficulties met during the transitional period do not stem from the prevalence of traditionalist values but rather the "destruction of traditional institutions and values, sometimes even before the impact of industrialism is felt, and the challenge of the modern West."³ Anti-democratic impulses, nationalist feelings, and a sense of urgency reflect a loss of orientation by the "assaulted individual" of the non-Western world. The search for self-identity pushes him to look for an ideology

¹Guides for Point 4 (Washington, June 5, 1962), p. 3.

²Brzezinski, op. cit. p. 59.

³Mary Motassian, "Ideologies of Delayed Industrialization: Some Tensions and Ambiguities," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol.6 (1958), p. 217.

to reorient himself in a rapidly-changing environment. Thus,

all ideologies of delayed industrialization are essentially revolutionary . . . Pseudo-conservative or radical, these ideologies advocate the manipulation of the disagreeable Present . . . Something must be done, and done fast . . .¹

Thus disoriented, uprooted individual must seek refuge in ideology to parry the impact of the West. The ideology helps him to get rid of the present, to attain the dreamed future. This route of escape still cannot relieve his anxiety.

His ego needs protection which science and logic cannot provide . . . He scorns his kind (and by implication, himself) as "pseudo," "mongrel," neither truly native nor truly Western. In order to find self-respect, he goes in search for his "true self"; he tries to "discover India. . ."²

Thus, the search for self-identity and security and the fear of isolation have led to complete submergence of his self into his nation, a "symbiosis" between his self and his fatherland.³ In short, the anxiety, loneliness, and uprootedness of the "assaulted individual" puts him in an

¹Ibid., p. 219.

²Ibid., pp. 218-219.

³Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 158. Fromm defines "symbiosis" as the union of one individual self with another self (or any other power, or entity outside of the own self) in such a way as to make each lose the integrity of its own self and to make them completely dependent on each other.

uneasy relationship with his fellow countrymen, and the Westerners. Internal political processes becomes tense, and revolutionary. International relations are built on an emotional and irrational basis.

Once having immersed himself in a "cause," the individual in a developing country loses completely his self-identify.

Edward Shils has observed that:

When the intellectuals of the colonial countries were ready to engage in politics at all, they were willing to give everything to them. Politics became the be-all and end-all of their existence.¹

Shils sees the intense politicization of the intellectuals of the non-Western world (contrasted by relative political apathy noticed by Lipset in the West) as originating from "a deep pre-occupation with authority."²

Even though he seeks and seems actually to break away from the authority of the powerful traditions in which he was brought up, the intellectual of underdeveloped countries, still more than his confrere in more advanced countries, retains the need for incorporation into some self-transcending, authoritative entity. Indeed, the greater his struggle for emancipation from the traditional collectivity, the greater his need for incorporation into a new, alternative collectivity. Intense politicization meets this need . . .

This is one reason why the intellectual immerses himself, at least for a time, in intense political activities; it is why he seeks a "cause," an encompassing ideal. It is also the reason for the oppositional character of the politics of the intellectuals who themselves do not share in the authority.³

¹Edward Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of The New States," World Politics, Vol. 12 (1960).

²Ibid., p. 339.

³Ibid., pp. 339-340.

In short, this group of social scientists have stressed the value orientation, the psychological needs of the individuals as the main factor of the "underdevelopment syndrome."

Objective and Approach

The approach used in this study of political change is a socio-psychological perspective in combination with a historical orientation. We will select the main traits of the underdevelopment syndrome (namely authoritarian values, anti-democratic tendency, nationalism, and non-entrepreneurial predispositions) and treat them as functions of political socialization. On the fundamental assumption that "development is a state of mind," the socialization approach is a convenient tool to study the influence of traditional systems of ethics and values upon political behavior, and the effects of certain personality characteristics on political orientation. Several questions have been raised previously. We can pose them again in the socialization context. (1) Shils and Motassian's studies imply the prevalence of strong authoritarianism among the elite of the non-Western world; the few questions we would like to be able to answer include: Are the intellectual elite authoritarian? If so, is their authoritarianism the product of their traditional culture, and how is traditionalism related to authoritarianism? (2) Nationalism has been often found to be one of the factors hampering economic

development and international cooperation¹ for world prosperity. In the socialization framework, we may ask ourselves how the elite are socialized to become fanatic nationalists. Are traditional values or authoritarianism responsible for the development of this explosive attitude? (3) Finally, Shils points to an additional factor which is one of the main traits of the underdevelopment syndrome: the considerable value attached to the civil service, and "a derogatory conception of businessmen as either exploitative foreigners or money-grubbing, short-sighted, native manipulators of financial combination."² Handman and Kling have pointed out the fierce competition for civil service jobs, and its revolutionary and autocracy-breeding consequences. Those who have gotten a job in government become submissive to the ruler "by fear of the loss of their posts in government schools or colleges or by the material and psychological advantages of their jobs."³ This submissiveness makes the ruler more confident in his moral integrity and wisdom (e.g. Ngo Dinh Diem). In turn, the intellectuals outside the government have become convinced that the ruler must be overthrown since the peaceful voicing of constructive opposition seems futile. Thus, another sociological factor--non-entrepreneurial spirit--deserves our

¹Friedman, op. cit.; See also, Eugene Staley, op. cit., pp. 21-22, 182-183.

²Shils, op. cit.

³Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States," op. cit., p. 338.

attention. We wonder how the individual is socialized into this non-entrepreneurial predisposition. Is it due to the traditionalist orientation, or the need for power, status, and security?

This research is an attempt to provide some tentative answers to the above questions. The hypothesis offered here is that the intellectuals behave as they do because they are the product of their traditional culture and they are facing development problems which no one has experienced before. These problems have persisted and will persist for some time because the people who find themselves in this new situation do not have enough time to adapt to it. Consequently, the transition period remains bloody, chaotic, and unstable as long as the trial-and-error attempts have not been fruitful. In one word, the objective of this research to test the hypothesis that all sociological and psychological traits of the "underdevelopment syndrome" are but the behavioral result of a socialization process. In order to make this point clear in the development context, we need, first, to understand the mechanism of the socialization process. We then examine the sociological and psychological traits of the underdevelopment syndrome as having their origins in the socialization process.

Political Socialization

(a) Let us first consider socialization as a value-inculcating process. As Herbert Hyman states, "the socialization of the individual . . . [is] the learning of social patterns

corresponding to his societal positions."¹ Thus, more specifically, political socialization is the learning of a political role, and political values and norms. Political socialization, writes Gabriel A. Almond, results in the internalization of "a set of attitudes--cognition, value standards, and feelings--toward the political system, its various roles, and role incumbents."² This position is similar to that of Newcomb, who defines socialization as the process of "interiorizing social norms." The interiorized social norms give the individual a "frame of reference" to help him perceive different objects and develop attitudes towards these objects. Similarly, the interiorized social norms assign the individual to a position in the social system, to a role in dealing with other persons. Thus, a role is a set of interiorized norms which serve as a basis for the persistence of attitudes toward one's self and toward others and for the perception of one's self and others.³ Put in a political context, political socialization consists of (1) learning political frames of reference for perceiving, organizing, and evaluating political phenomena, and (2) learning political roles which serve as guidelines

¹Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), p. 25.

²Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," The Politics of Developing Areas, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

³T. M. Newcomb, Social Psychology (New York: Henry Holt, 1958), pp. 299-334.

for political behavior towards others within and beyond the political system.

(b) Secondly, socialization is related to personality development. It does not only provide the individual with a frame of reference, or a role pattern for dealing with the outside world. It also affects and guides the formation of his personality.¹ Socialization not only teaches the individual how to see, interpret, and evaluate reality, but also how to "organize his predispositions to behavior."² Socialization has a deeper ramification than simple learning a habit. As Allison Davis has put it, the

central characteristic of human social learning, namely that human beings always learn their social behavior in some type of relation to other personalities, and therefore in an emotional context, is the crucial principle underlying any systematic effort to understand adolescent social and personal development. That is every adolescent's social behavior bears the marks of his personal history in relation to his parents, his siblings, his playgroup, and his teachers, as well as the imprint of the culture control.³

Thus socialization involves not only the learning of a political role, and political values, norms and ideologies, but

¹Sees, for instance, Eric H. Erikson, "Reflections on the American Identity," "The Legend of Hitler's Childhood," "The Legend of Maxim Gorky's Youth," in Childhood and Society (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1950), pp. 244-258. Also, Alex Inkeles, et al., "Modal Personality and Adjustment to the Soviet Socio-Political System," in Studying Personality Cross-Culturally edited by Bert Kaplan (Evanston, Illinois: Row Peterson and Company, 1961), pp. 201-224.

²Newcomb, op. cit., p. 345.

³Allison Davis, "Socialization and Adolescent Personality," in Readings in Social Psychology, T. M. Newdomb, et al., eds., (New York: Henry Holt and Company), p. 39.

also the organization of predispositions toward political behavior. Gabriel A. Almond expresses the same point of view when he differentiates two types of socialization-- "Manifest socialization," and "latent socialization." Manifest socialization--the only type intensively dealt with by Herbert Hyman in Political Socialization¹--apparently consists of inculcation of political norms. The "latent" form of socialization is related to personality formation.

Latent or "analogous" political socialization, writes Almond, is the first and undoubtedly the most basic stage of the political socialization process. The first years of life in the family, the experience of authority and discipline and of the family "political process" and "public policy" constitute the most rapid and binding stage of socialization. More of an impact occurs here² than at any other point in the process. . . .
(emphasis added)

In short, in studying the end-result of political socialization we must take into consideration both political norms inculcated, and the type of personality developed during the socialization process.

(c) Thirdly, the socialization process prepares the individual to cope with his daily problems. This aspect of the socialization process can be examined from two perspectives: that of the socializing agents, and that of the individual undergoing socialization. For the socializing agents, the aim--conscious or unconscious--of the socialization

¹Herbert Hyman, op. cit.

²Almond, op. cit., p. 28.

is to prepare children to cope effectively with their problems as adults. Yehudi A. Cohen writes:

Parents in any society invariably bring up their children on the assumption that they are anticipating the future for these children. . . . Parents bring up their children so that the latter will be able to fit into a particular kind of social system when they become adults, and they invariably attempt to anticipate the particular kind of world in which these children are going to live and train them to live in that world, not necessarily the world for which they, themselves, were trained.¹

According to Newcomb, from the point of view of the individual undergoing socialization, his "motive patterns" are formed partially through his problem-solving attempts.²

The infant's first motive patterns are acquired as he learns to relate objects and events to the relief of his own drives A moment comes when the old motive pattern fails to relieve a present condition of drive Motive satisfaction is temporarily blocked, [and new patterns develop]. . . . The general principle here is that new patterns of relieving drive are not acquired except as they prove more satisfying than old ones, or more effectively in relieving drives.³

As a preparation for problem solving, the socialization process has two important limitations. The first stems from the human limitation in predicting the future, the second from limited human flexibility in adaptation. First, in saying that parents tend to anticipate the future of their

¹Yehudi A. Cohen, Social Structure and Personality; A Case Book (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 44.

²Newcomb, op. cit., pp. 345-350.

³Ibid., pp. 346-347.

children, Cohen does not necessarily assume that parents can predict the future correctly and accurately. It is obvious that in a stable or slowly-evolving society the error of prediction is minimal. But in political and cultural revolutions, or in rapidly-changing societies, the error in predicting the future is likely to increase drastically. In other words, the error is a function of the rate of social change. Where the old system is collapsing, and the new system has not taken a definite shape, it is impossible for the parents to make a prediction about the world that their children are going to live. They must socialize their children in the way they think best--most of the time the way in which they were themselves socialized.

Concerning the second limitation--that of human flexibility in adaptation--Newcomb writes:

New patterns of relieving drives, he writes, are most likely to be tried when old ones fail. . . . New motive patterns, then get started most commonly when old ones are blocked. . . . [The search for new patterns is not a systematic one.] New patterns may be discovered by, sheer, random exploration or "by accident."¹

In short, even though socialization is problem-oriented, it does not necessarily mean that once socialized, the individual is able to solve his problem. Where the problems are completely new, as in the case of sudden change, we cannot expect him to cope with these problems efficiently

¹Ibid., p. 347.

and quickly because (1) he is not equipped to deal with them, and (2) he needs time for "sheer random exploration" in his search for workable solutions.

Political Socialization and Political Change

Political Regimes and Political Socialization

Political socialization has, we said, a double result: (1) inculcation of political norms (political values, political roles), and (2) development of a personality characteristic viable within a given political system. The first point needs little clarification. A political regime, to have a broad popular support, must be "legitimate," i.e., accepted by the mass and the elite. A free and democratic regime, in order to survive, requires political norms which put a considerable value on freedom and democracy.¹ A dictatorial regime can be legitimate in the eyes of the majority of the people only if the latter highly value obedience to the ruler and all forms which obedience entails. In such countries as the United States, violence-oriented, extremist political movements can appeal only to a small minority. In the Soviet Union, political stability has been possible because only a small number of Russians question the legitimacy of the Party and the validity of Marxism-Leninism.

¹See Zevedei Barbi, "The Democratic Way of Life," Democracy and Dictatorship (New York: Grove Press, 1956), pp. 12-25.

As for the second point, some elaboration is needed. To say that any political regime requires specific personality characteristic among the mass and especially the elite, is not to postulate a one-to-one relationship between personality characteristics and political regimes. We merely suggest that some personality characteristics will be more suitable to a given regime than others. A democratic regime calls for willingness to compromise, and ability to tolerate ambiguity as a necessity for possible co-existence of a great diversity of political ideologies; obviously, these same traits would have low survival value in a society where the elite are authoritarian, intolerant, and motivated by threat-oriented attitudes toward social life. On the other hand, a dictatorial political regime where the party's political stand or the leader's political opinion manifests political truth and law would not last long if the great majority of the leading class had strongly individualistic and self-actualizing drives.¹

Zevedei Barbu summarizes the characteristics of the democratic and totalitarian regimes in the following terms:

Thus, I have found that the processes of social and cultural flexibility, of rationalization and of minimization of power are characteristic of all democratic societies. The processes of social and cultural rigidity, of the 'emotionalization' or super-rationalization of life and that of the concentration of power are, on the other hand, characteristic of all modern totalitarian societies.²

¹See A. H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper & Brother, 1954), p. 350. (The ideal political regime for the self-actualizing people, as described by Maslow is a free, loving, almost anarchist one.)

²Barbu, op. cit., p. 9.

In each of these regimes, he believes, a certain personality characteristic predominates.

Democracy is a way of life dominated by the feelings of ease and naturalness which arose from a certain harmony in the pattern of life. The Greek term eukosmia and what the French mean by douceur de mœurs are adequate expressions of this state of affairs. The totalitarian way of life is, on the other hand, pervaded by extreme emotions by the feeling of effort and rigidity, and by the tension aroused by an ambivalent attitude--the feeling of unlimited power alternates with the feeling of impotence, the feeling of insecurity is carefully covered by an inflated sense of adventure, the fear of chaos is strongly repressed by rigid organization.¹

In short, it seems that certain personality variables are more appropriate to one political regime than to another. To be sure, politics cannot be reduced to a simple function of psychology: the relationships which I have postulated between personality and political regime do not account for all of the variability in the characteristics of political regimes (e.g., structural variables, such as the distribution of personality types in various strata of society).

Human flexibility may be limited: nonetheless, in a "proper setting" a democratic regime could still function even though a majority of the population has authoritarian personalities. Lipset argues that democracy is possible even in cases where the majority of the population is authoritarian.²

¹Ibid., pp. 9-10.

²Lipset, Political Man, op. cit., Ch. 4, pp. 97-130.

A long tradition of democracy and a healthy economy might reduce the personality variable to secondary importance. Thus, "despite the profoundly anti-democratic tendencies in lower-class groups, workers' political organizations and movements in the more industrialized democratic countries have supported both economic and political liberalism." Lipset then analyzes several sociological and institutional factors preventing the rise of extremism. These are (1) democratic traditions, (2) the relative insignificance and isolation of extremist movements, (3) a high level of economic development, and (4) adherence to democratic norms by the elite. Similarly, David Riesman points out the importance of the institutions and the kind of leadership in guaranteeing democracy and freedom.

If America is not fascist, for example, it is not for want of sadists or authoritarians. There are plenty of these to staff the more benighted jails, mental hospitals, or to compete for the post of sheriff in many Southern communities; it is the institutional and juridical forms--and their own limitations--that make it difficult for these men to coalesce into a political movement. To be sure, these protections for liberty would collapse in the absence of men of appropriate character to run them.¹

That is what has occurred in underdeveloped countries--the lack of democratic institutions, values, and leadership. Lipset remarks that "in a country like Britain, where norms of tolerance are well developed and widespread in every social

¹David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. xxii.

stratum, even the lowest class may be less authoritarian and more 'sophisticated' than the most highly educated stratum in an underdeveloped country, where immediate problems and crises impinge on every class and short-term solutions may be sought by all groups."¹ Thus, in an environment where sociological and institutional guarantees of democracy are lacking, the personality variable becomes one of the main factors influencing the course of change in developing nations. A leader in a society where compromise means loss of face, or "to go to the people" implies an indignity, would be more inclined to use non-democratic practices in ruling his country, especially if he is an authoritarian person. On the other hand, if the political regime had an elaborate mechanism of checks and balances as in the United States,² the rise of a dictator would be very difficult indeed.

But in most underdeveloped countries where a system of elaborate and effective pressure groups is non-existent, and where the constitutional mechanism of checks and balances has not yet been solidly established, the fate of democracy and freedom depends on the predisposition of the ruling elite. We may say without exaggeration that whether political change

¹Lipset, op. cit., p. 100.

²See, David Truman, The Governmental Process; Political Interest and Public Opinion (New York: A. Knopf, 1951).

will take the democratic direction or not depends on the kind of political socialization received by the elite.

Political Change and Political Socialization

As generally observed, the non-Western world has been undergoing a drastic change. The impact of Western culture, urbanization, industrialization etc. have disrupted the rural, pre-bureaucratic, ascriptive, and hierarchical society. This total disruption has occurred in less than three decades. The individual undergoing shock of change is found disoriented in the new situation. He is not properly equipped to cope with new problems which have avalanches upon him because of sudden and brutal changes in which many centuries are telescoped into a few decades. The rate of change is so fast that it would be impossible for his socializing agents to anticipate the changing world in which he is now living. The fact is that he has not been socialized to live in his world, to cope with his numerous problems; in his childhood and early adulthood he was trained to live in the world of his parents, and to cope with the problems usually faced by them before the Western impact. That is:

1. The political values inculcated are those values suitable for a political life where individual rights were unknown, and freedom unrealized. Whereas now, the rights and freedoms to live, work, speak, and believe have been talked about, but rarely understood.

2. The political role formerly learned is the one appropriate for the kind of political activities of the past, i.e. political submission and domination. Whereas now democratic ideals, as widely spread in the East as in the West, require active participation from the citizens. Yet "active political participation" has been often understood as active participation in cheering a leader or in rebelling against him.

3. The personality formed is one at home in the closed and densely knit social system of their parents. While now urbanization and industrialization atomize the social life, the individual has been trained to live in the kind of Durkheimian "segmental society"¹ or to be "rooted in a structuralized whole."² In this kind of society, the individual had no freedom. "His individuality was nil," "his personality vanished," for there is no longer individual life "but collective life."³ In compensation of this lack of freedom and individualism, he was "not alone and isolated."⁴ Can he now stand the loneliness of urban life? Can he overcome the anxiety of being left to himself? Can he make his own decisions in mass society? The answer must be negative if he has not been prepared for self-determination, individualism, and self-reliance.

¹Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society translated by George Simpson (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press 1960), pp. 138-141.

²Fromm, Escape from Freedom, op. cit., pp. 41-43.

³Durkheim, op. cit., p. 130.

⁴Fromm, Escape from Freedom, op. cit., pp. 41.

Thus, whether the transitional period becomes less bloody, less painful or not depends on how the individual adjusts himself to the new situation. On the one hand, the greater the gap between the traditional and the transitional society the more difficult is the adjustment. On the other hand, the more he is socialized into the traditional system, the more painful is the transition. In short, if the accepted traditional values cannot be changed, and personality needs which had been developed in accordance with the social demands of pre-transitional system cannot be satisfied, the cost of change will be very considerable. Generally the end result will be a relapse into a traditional way of life more or less modified to meet the new situation.

Research Design and Hypotheses

Research Design

This research focuses on the study of the relationship between political socialization and some of the problems of adjustment in a non-Communist country which is trying to democratize its political regime and modernize its economic system. It has been assumed that the existence of these problems is due to the sudden and abrupt nature of the change. The individual is not socialized adequately to face these problems. He has been socialized to live in the society of his parents, trained to accept their ethical system.

as the fundamental premise of life, their scale of values as his guiding principle, and their personality characteristics as his motivational force. Yet, these systems of ethics, norms, and needs which were convenient instruments for his parents to deal with the problems of their age are of little use to the individual facing the problems of socio-political change. These problems, which remain unsolved in most underdeveloped countries, are considered for the simplicity of analysis, as forming the "underdevelopment syndrome." The main socio-psychological traits of this syndrome, which have been selected for study, are: (1) anti-democratic tendency, (2) nationalism, (3) lack of entrepreneurial spirit. These traits are rooted partially in the traditional value system, partially in the personality needs of the individual, and partially in his present socio-economic environment. Our task is to investigate how much each of these independent variables is responsible for the three above-listed traits which comprise the underdevelopment syndrome.

One further point needs to be made concerning the congruence of social norms and personality. I have postulated separate effects of personality needs and of the traditional value system on the process of political change; this is consistent with the assumption, at the beginning, that socialization results both in inculcation of values and in personality development. But the congruence between social norms and personality type is not necessarily complete. An

individual living in an authoritarian culture might accept authoritarian norms without necessarily becoming an authoritarian person. He accepts them for practical reasons, e.g., group pressure, unavailability of alternatives, etc.¹ Conversely, a person being authoritarian as a result of socialization in an authoritarian culture might not accept authoritarian traditional norms of that culture. For example a Chinese boy taught to obey and respect his parents blindly, later may become a fanatic Communist who does not hesitate to denounce the oppressive character of the traditional family system of his country. Socialized to be an authoritarian, he rejects his traditional cultural system to join another authoritarian system--the Communist Party--which aims at nothing but the overthrow of the traditional way of life.²

The first case is the case of an "only normatively socialized" individual. The second case is that of an "only psychologically socialized" individual. These two individuals obviously may have different predisposition toward political change. Thus we will differentiate between acceptance of the norms of traditional authoritarian culture on the one hand, and authoritarianism of the individual personality on the other. The double effects of socialization can then be

¹Gordon W. Allport has observed prejudice may be originated from the socio-cultural environment rather than simply caused by psychological factors. See The Nature of Prejudice (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1958), pp. 215-322.

²See Frank Robertson, "Family Affections Draw Peking Scorn," Christian Science Monitor (September 15, 1960).

[illegible]

evaluated in terms of their relative strength, that is, whether the problems of change are due more to personality formation or norm acceptance.


This conceptual dichotomization for the purpose of analysis is somewhat in congruence with the general theory of action proposed by Parsons and Shils. These authors postulate that human action can be examined as part of three systems: personality, social and cultural. This systemic distinction has only a heuristic purpose. In practice, it is difficult to separate them. Yet, they argue that these three systems, even though intimately interrelated, "are neither identical with one another nor explicable by one another."¹ If human behavior can be analytically viewed as part of these three distinct systems of action, socialization can understandably be related to this Parsonian tri-systemic frame of reference. For instance, "psychological socialization" can be viewed as the introduction of the child into a "personality system." "Normative socialization" results in his internalization of a normative system. And "role socialization" leads the child into a "social system." Thus a successful socialization means the development of a personality which is close to the "modal personality," the conformity to the existing cultural norms, and the acceptance of a role appropriate to the group.

¹Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 7.

In this study, I have only made a distinction between "normative socialization," and "psychological socialization." The first corresponds to the socio-cultural system, the second to the personality system. The assumption underlying this distinction is that the personality system and the socio-cultural system do not necessarily fit with each other. More specifically the acceptance of an authoritarian normative system does not lead, in every case, to the development of an authoritarian personality, nor is the acceptance of a democratic normative system necessarily conducive to the development of a democratic personality. The most obvious evidence of this point is that in any authoritarian culture there exist a number of open-minded people; and vice versa, in any non-authoritarian culture, there exist a number of authoritarian individuals.

In summary, the three socio-psychological traits of the underdevelopment syndrome selected for study are: democratic tendency, nationalism, and lack of entrepreneurial spirit. They are hypothesized to result from political socialization.

The following diagram represents schematically the overall relationships between political socialization and socio-political attitudes among a group of students in a transitional society. Only some of the relationships in the lower part of the diagram will be investigated in this study.



In this research, I propose to deal with the relationships between the socialization variables and the socio-political attitudes, i.e., R0, R1, R2, R3. These relationships are to be put in the form of experimental hypotheses for testing while relationships r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6 are postulated relationships, mentioned only in order to situate the research in a more general framework.

Translated into operational terms, the above research framework can be formulated into the form of two general hypotheses:

General Hypothesis I: Those who are oversocialized into the traditional culture as compared to those who are less socialized into that culture tend to have socio-political attitudes related to the underdevelopment syndrome, that is, they tend (1) to be more anti-democratic, (2) to be more nationalist, (3) to lack entrepreneurial spirit.

General Hypothesis II: There are differences in socio-political attitudes between those who are normatively socialized and those who are psychologically socialized into the traditional culture.

Research Setting

The country selected for this study is Vietnam where Confucianism as the traditional way of life for the Buddhists as well as the Catholics still predominates. The authoritarian character of that culture is one of the main reasons for its being selected. The authoritarian elements of the Confucian culture will be analyzed later. For the time being, it is sufficient to say that "the authoritarian tradition"

is "the most glaring of the weakness of Chinese [i.e., Confucian] civilization."¹ The only characteristic taken into consideration in this research is authoritarianism. As the other independent variable--traditional norms--only authoritarian norms are selected for study. A further reason for choosing Vietnam is that it is a transitional country where the difficulties of change seem to reach a maximal proportion.

The groups of respondents selected for this study will consist of young people who are likely to assume leadership positions sooner or later. This research strategy is adopted in fact by practical necessity. But it also reflects Lipset's thesis that whether a democratic regime is workable or not depends on the attitudes of the elite. Our attention is consequently focused only on the Vietnamese elite. In Vietnam, as in any Confucian society, the intellectuals² have been accepted indisputably as the elite of the country. Among them, we must count the students. As Shils has cogently put it:

No consideration of the intellectual class in underdeveloped countries can disregard the university students. In advanced countries students are not

¹Vera M. Dean, The Nature of the Non-Western World, op. cit., p. 98. See also, Paul Giran, Psychologie du Peuple Annamite (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1904), especially pages 27-28, 80, 84, 167-168, ff.

²Shils, "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States," op. cit., pp. 329-368.

regarded as ex officio intellectuals; in underdeveloped countries, they are . . . [and that status¹ is conferred] derivatively on secondary-school students.

Thus in this study, our concern is limited to "ex officio intellectuals"--that is high school and college students.

There is another more practical reason for focusing the investigation on students. If all the problems of change are found in Vietnam, the task of studying them is not an easy one. The Vietnamese people have been undergoing oppression, war, and dictatorships for years. Their main and only concern is to survive frequent and violent political upheavals. Understandably, they are not well-disposed to answer the questions of a stranger who might be a member of a Vietcong assassination committee or of the government secret police. In this struggle for self-preservation, the best method is to keep one's socio-political thoughts to oneself, and when forced to speak, to speak in the way wanted by the questioner. This predisposition toward suspicion among respondents is the greatest barrier to any survey researcher, especially in a country where opinion polling is unknown. This problem reduces reliability by introducing another type of error which is difficult to control. One way to overcome it is to make the respondents understand the true intention of the researcher and his sincere desire for truth for science's sake. Unfortunately, most of the Vietnamese people who have never been in a school higher

¹Ibid., p. 336.

than the third grade cannot understand this position of the researcher. We might conclude, then, that the more illiterate a sample in a war-ridden country, the less reliable are the findings. Consequently to reduce this "suspicion error" to a minimum level, survey research was limited to high school and college students assumed to be more receptive to the notion of scientific study.

In actual practice, even among students familiar with scientific research, suspicion still persisted. Some students categorically refused to answer any question. Others expressed their "indifferent" attitudes by systematically checking all alternative answers to every question. Still others only answered those questions which they considered "politically neutral." This uncooperative attitude existed not only among high school students, but also among college students in Saigon, and even among Vietnamese college students in America.

This atmosphere of suspicion reached its climax when immediately after the coup d'etat of 1963; a questionnaire with a scale measuring political extremism was sent to Cantho for the high school students to answer. The majority refused to answer in spite of strong insistence of the part of their teacher whom they knew and trusted. After fifteen minutes of explaining the purpose of the research and begging for their cooperation the teacher succeeded in getting about half of the respondents to fill out the questionnaire. But the next day someone reported the incident to the police and spread

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a rumor around the school that their teacher was a CIA agent, a Vietcong who was trying to create disunity, a Diemist who wanted to overthrow the revolutionary regime (even though she is a well-known Buddhist) etc. The immediate consequence of this incident was that she was summoned to the police station for questioning which lasted for a whole day. When found innocent, she was released. But from that day on she has lost the confidence of her colleagues and her students because she had been a political suspect. The response sheets sent by her through the post office were inexplicably "lost" on the way to America.

Because of this general atmosphere of distrust coupled with limited financial resource, random sampling seemed to be out of the question. A subject would have been terribly frightened had he been selected from among his classmates for "questioning." Even with these limitations, the present urgency of the problems of change justifies some exploratory research rather than none. Thus the way respondents are selected in this study is dictated more by practical necessity than by statistical requirements.

Three different groups of respondents were available. The first and also the main one, consists of senior students of a high school where my wife is an English teacher. The second other group is one of students of the Faculty of Pedagogy (sections: English, French, and Sino-Vietnamese language and civilization) and students of the National Administration

Institute whose teachers helped me to administer the questionnaire. With their teachers as the "questioners" I hoped for some success in reducing the atmosphere of suspicion. The last group consists of students in America who participated in a summer camp in Chicago, and who attended a Christmas party in Washington D. C. Evidently this group does not represent the Vietnamese students in America. In order to check for sampling bias, I sent out one hundred Questionnaires to a sample of students in America selected randomly from the Vietnamese Students Directory, which lists the addresses of all students in America. Unfortunately no one answered my questionnaire. This uncooperativeness could be due to suspicion, laziness, or simply the respondents' lack of time. It might reflect a general individualistic attitude commonly found among the Vietnamese people. At any rate, it represents another serious obstacle for any survey researcher.

The group of respondents finally obtained are categorized as follows:

Cantho High School students:

1. 201 subjects participated in the first administration of the paper-and-pencil questionnaire.
2. 156 subjects participated in the second administration of the paper-and-pencil questionnaire.
3. 131 subjects participated in both the first and second administrations of the paper-and-pencil questionnaire.
4. 6 subjects are eliminated because of their unintelligible answers (Checking all alternative answers to each question).

Saigon University students:

1. 23 subjects from the second year class of the National Institute of Administration.
2. 61 subjects from the first year of the National Institute of Administration.
3. 29 subjects from the first year class of the Sino-Vietnamese Language and Thought Section of the Faculty of Pedagogy.
4. 26 students from the first year class of the Anglo-American Language and Thought Section of the Faculty of Pedagogy
5. 64 students from the second year class of the Anglo-American Language and Thought Section of the Faculty of Pedagogy.
6. 29 students from the first year class of the French Language and Thought Section of the Faculty of Pedagogy.

Vietnamese exchange students in America

1. 8 subjects from a Christmas party in Washington
2. 56 subjects from a summer camp meeting in Chicago.

It is frequently found that a subject skipped one or two questions in the written questionnaire. The following approximating method is used to fill these blanks. When the omitted question is part of a scale, the response to this question is assumed to be equal to the average of the individual's scores on all scale items to which he responded. If the omitted question is biographic, the answer to this question is considered as approximately similar to the modal score. Because of these multiple methodological shortcomings, caution must be exercised in interpreting the findings to be presented.

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Summary

In this introductory chapter we have considered the state of underdevelopment as a result of closely related factors which constitute "the syndrome of underdevelopment." Different approaches stressing the importance of one of these factors have been presented, namely the economic approach, the socio-economic approach, the historical approach, the socio-psychological approach, and finally the socialization approach to be used in this research. This last approach assumes that political attitudes are the result of political socialization which has only normative effects, only psychological effects, or both types of effects. Three important problems constantly faced by most of underdeveloped countries are selected for research: anti-democratic tendency, nationalism, and lack of entrepreneurial spirit. It has been hypothesized that these underdevelopment problems are the consequence of a traditional socialization.

Vietnamese students are selected as subjects in this study.

Before testing the hypotheses, Confucianism and Taoism in Chapter II will be discussed as constituting an authoritarian system, thus lending some plausibility to the postulate that Vietnamese culture has strong authoritarian features. This is, as a matter of fact, the logical point of departure for a "socialization approach." In the three following chapters, anti-democratic tendency, nationalism, and mandarinism shall be discussed as well as different scales and data presented.

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CHAPTER II

THE TRADITIONAL BACKGROUND

Every minute, hundreds of thousands of people die all over the world. The life or death of a hundred, a thousand, or of tens of thousands of human beings, even if they are our own compatriots, represents really very little . . .

Vo Nguyen Giap¹

Heaven-and-Earth is not sentimental;
It treats all things as straw-dogs.
The Sage is not sentimental;
He treats all his people as straw-dogs."

Lao Tzu²

You are the wind; the common people are the grass. For it is the nature of grass to bend when the wind blows upon it.

Confucius³

Introduction

At the beginning of the twentieth century a French colonial administrator depicted the Vietnamese national character in the following terms:

[L'Annamite est] pacifique, laborieux, frugal, intelligent, prudent, n'abandonnant rien au hasard, imitateur, conservateur, mais sans initiative. Attaché à la terre et au sol natal, il aurait des courtes vues, un besoin

¹Quoted by Bernard B. Fall, "Vo Nguyen Giap, man and myth," in Vo Nguyen Giap, People's War, People's Army; The Vietcong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. xxxvii.

²Lao Tzu, Tao Teh Ching, ch. 5. transl, John C. H. Wu, (New York: St. John's University Press, 1961).

³The Book of History, Book V, Ch. xxi, sec. 4.

d'uniformité, un esprit de routine qui le rend rebelle au progrès. Facile à diriger, aimant même à se laisser gouverner, de volonté peu énergique, il serait doué de l'esprit de troupeau, de l'esprit "grégaire" . . . Il faut . . . signaler encore leur défaut d'impressionnabilité qui les [Annamites] rend apathiques, insensibles à la douleur, durs au mal jusqu'au stoicisme, mais aussi parfois impitoyables jusqu'à la cruauté. Flégnatiques, peu nerveux, ils sont capables de commettre froidement les pires atrocités. Mais nous devons insister principalement sur la médiocrité de leur intelligence essentiellement pratique, terre à terre, susceptible seulement d'un développement borné. Chez eux, l'imagination est demeurée stérile; . . . d'une manière générale, tous les sentiments chez l'Annamite sont marqués au coin du plus pur égoïsme. Point d'élans généreux, d'expansive bonté; le cœur se replie sur lui-même, se dessèche, s'atrophie . . . Dans l'art Annamite, littéraire ou plastique, il n'y a pas de milieu¹ entre le réalisme grossier et le plus fol idéalisme.

If in this crude sketch of the Vietnamese character we leave out the unfortunate value-laden expressions and some ethnocentric exaggerations, we have a more or less accurate presentation of a people exhibiting the entire range of authoritarian traits in the modern sense of the word: lack of initiative and imagination, a predisposition toward imitation rather than creativity, the fear of novelty, the preference for uniformity and routine, the need to be led rather than to be self-reliant and independent, a conservative predisposition (either looking to past history or the teachings of past theoreticians for answers), practical value orientation rather than theoretical value orientation, the fear of ambiguity, and anomic tendencies (selfishness, cruelty, lack of empathy).²

¹Paul Giran, Psychologie du peuple Annamite (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1904), pp. 27, 28, 76, 121.

²A number of researches have been done to demonstrate the relationship between these above-mentioned traits and

What causes these authoritarian characteristics? Giran, following Montesquieu's ideas believed that they are partly generated by general poverty and a hot climate.¹ About thirty years later another anthropologist studying the Annamite civilization found the same personality traits and offered the same causal interpretation. She wrote,

Geographical and historical factors have been, as always, the two major influences on native character. The climate exhausts the nerves and stimulates the circulation of blood. . . The Tonkinese [i.e. North Vietnamese], thanks to their invigorating climate, show more energy and initiative than the other Annamites. The Annamite nervous system is certainly less sensitive than that of Occidentals. . . This apathy, insensitivity, and placidity are certainly forced on them by the climate and under-nourishment. . .²

authoritarianism. See for instance, Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961) Chapter V, pp. 132-206; Marshall B. Jones, "Authoritarianism and Intolerance of Fluctuation," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. L (1955), pp. 125-126 Patricia O'Connor, "Ethnocentrism, Intolerance of Ambiguity and Abstract Reasoning Ability," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology Vol. XXXVII (1952), pp. 526-530; Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, op. cit., and "Prejudice, Concreteness of Thinking and Reification of Thinking," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology Vol. XXXVI (1951) pp. 83-91; Elizabeth G. French and Raymond R. Ernest, "The Relation Between Authoritarianism and Acceptance of Military Ideology," Journal of Personality, Vol. XXIV, 1955, pp. 181-191; Ray R. Canning and James M. Bakes, "Effect of the Group on Authoritarian and Non-Authoritarian Persons," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. LXIV (1959), pp. 579-581; Leo Srole, "Social Integration and Certain Coloraries: an Exploratory Study," American Sociological Review, Vol 21 (1956), pp. 709-716; E. L. McDill, "Anomie, Authoritarianism, Prejudice and Socio-Economic Status: An Attempt at Clarification," Social Forces, Vol. 39 (1961), pp. 239-245. H. H. Roberts and M. Rokeach, "Anomie, Authoritarianism, and Prejudice: A Replication," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 61 (1954), pp. 355-358.

¹Pau Giran, op. cit., p. 25.

²Virginia Thompson, French Indochina, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1937), p. 43.

Or

A more subtle effect of the climate upon Annamite psychology is their inability to receive sharp clear-cut impressions. Perhaps it is the brilliant sunshine that has weakened their sensory reactions along with their will power. The Annamite dreams in a perpetual melancholy reverie uncontrolled by any critical faculty.¹

The same author then concluded in the same line:

Their unequal, life-long struggle with a violent nature, destructive diseases, and an autocratic theocracy, has created an apparent acceptance of superior force which covers a perpetual inward rebellion. . . Death is a release and a repose which is accepted with indifference, where there is no escape, and with contempt because it is the supreme manifestation of force.²

Climatological interpretations such as those by Giran and Thompson are so obviously contradicted by many known facts that no modern writers judge them worthy of serious consideration. Cultural traditions have, no doubt, more far-reaching impacts on human character.

In the following, I propose to examine the ethical foundation of Vietnamese culture which, I believe, is one of the forces which molds Vietnamese modal personality and serves as guideline for political action. This ethical foundation is the product of a limited Chinese influence which mainly consists of Confucianist and Taoist teachings.³

¹Ibid., p. 44.

²Ibid., p. 45.

³As for Buddhism, the Question whether it came from China or directly from India cannot be answered. See Vu Van Mau Dan Luat Khai Luan (Saigon: Vietnam Dai-Hoc Vien, 1957), pp. 178-181.

Confucianism and Taoism, the two pillars of the cultural heritage of Vietnam, strongly shape the world view of the Vietnamese. The striking characteristic common to both schools is their strong emphasis on harmony. The cosmos visualized by both of them is a monistic entity whose fundamental principle is fatalistic submission to Tao, the Law of Nature. Man is not the center of the world or the image of God as commonly believed in Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian traditions. He is only a part of the Cosmic Machine. To use Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's terms, in the West the man-nature value orientation is "Mastery-over-Nature." In Vietnam, the man-nature value orientation varies from "Harmony-with Nature" (Confucianism) to "Subjugation-to-Nature" (Taoism).¹ By virtue of this monistic conception of nature, the Confuciatist and Taoist world view oversimplifies the complexities of social life, and puts human behavior in a normative strait-jacket.

The philosophical reactions to this highly structured system are various. Confucianism preaches ritualistic conformity to an elaborate system of moral codes which become the life standard. Taoism preaches, on the other hand, retreatistic conformity to Nature. Even though the two philosophies are totally different in content, they have several important points in common (which is why a Vietnamese can be

¹Florence R. Kluckhohn and Fred L. Strodtbeck, Variations in Value Orientations (Evanston, Illinois; Row, Peterson and Company, 1961), pp. 1-75.

a Taoist and a Confucianist at the same time). Both rigidify their positions to the extreme by stressing strict harmony and intoleration of deviation. Both reject the belief that the individual left to himself can find his own way without heeding an outside standard for his life conduct. The importance of these points of similarity is that the world-view of a Vietnamese is colored chiefly by this traditional fear of conflict and by intolerance of deviation rather than by the concrete teachings of Confucius and Lao-tse. In order to understand the ethical background of the socialization process of the Vietnamese students, we will examine the general lines of Confucianism and Taoism and their influences on the habit of thinking of the Vietnamese people; fear of conflict and intolerance of differences have thus an origin in the ethical traditions of the country.

We will examine successively:

1. First, the limited character of the Chinese influence and the consequent monopolization of the Vietnamese mind by Confucianism and Taoism.

2. Secondly, harmony as the life ideal:

- a. the extreme concern for harmony in both ethical systems, Confucianism and Taoism.
- b. some behavioral evidences of a harmony-oriented socialization.

3. Thirdly, the Confucianist moral prescriptions:

- a. a hierarchical and authoritarian system.

- b. ritualistic and formalistic codes of conduct for living in harmony in the hierarchical and authoritarian system.
 - c. authoritarian socialization and its consequences.
- 4. And, fourthly, the Taoist moral prescriptions:
 - a. pessimism, and retreatistic withdrawal from social life.
 - b. Taoism interpreted as reaction against Confucianism.

Chinese Influence

Vietnam is a Southern neighbor of the Chinese giant. This geographical proximity, plus the great differences in size, population, and military power, has reduced Vietnam into "un prolongement de la Chine."¹ A Vietnamese scholar has noticed that "elle [China] fut pour les Annamites la source de toute culture et de toute civilisation."² In another essay, he writes: "L'Annam, poursuit-on, n'a jamais été qu'un élève de la Chine. En art, en littérature, en religion, en philosophie, il n'a jamais vécu que sur un fonds de concepts et d'idées qui dérivent en droite ligne de la Chine."³ A French professor has also the same opinion on the moulding force of the Vietnamese culture:

¹Pham Quynh, Essays Franco Annamites (Hue, Bui Huy, 1937), p. 160.

²Pham Quynh, La Poesie Annamite (Hanoi: Dong Kinh, 1931), p. 65.

³Quynh, Essays Franco. . ., op. cit., pp. 198-199.

Tandis que les autres nations de l'Indochine avaient bénéficié surtout de l'Inde, ils [the Vietnamese] étaient restés fidèles à la tradition de la Chine qui, de l'an 111 avant Jésus-Christ à l'an 939 après Jésus-Christ, les avait gouvernés. Ce grand empire n'avait jamais réussi cependant à leur faire perdre leur nationalité, l'une des plus vigoureuses du monde asiatique, et il n'aurait pu transformer l'Annam trop éloigné du centre à cette époque reculée, en une terre de colonisation, mais il lui transmit sa civilisation, sa technique rurale, son art, sa religion et presque tous les mots abstraits de sa langue.¹

The Chinese influence on the formation of the Vietnamese culture thus seems to be considerable. Yet, it would be an overgeneralization to say that Vietnamese culture is an exact photocopy of the Chinese culture. The flow of Chinese ideas into Vietnam has never been regular and smooth. It reached its maximum during the Chinese rule with such a Chinese Governor as Ma-Vien with his brutal policy of cultural assimilation. But during the independence period, the extent of Chinese influence was limited and rather selective. For instance, under the Ly dynasty (1010-1225), Confucian education had not yet been developed, and Buddhism was the state religion, while the Chinese Confucian teachings were not very significant. On the contrary, under the Le dynasty, order and prosperity permitted full development of educational institutions after the Chinese model, hence the spread of Chinese

¹Henri Bernard-Maitre, Pour la Comprehension de l'Indochine et de l'Occident (Paris: Cathasia, 1950), p. 24.

influence which later reached the maximum level under the Nguyen dynasty.¹ On the other hand, the borrowing was rather selective by intention or accident. First, significant Chinese influences reached Vietnam only after the Confucianist school had been completely victorious over other schools of thought, and Taoism had been widely accepted and integrated into the Confucian system. Therefore, the Vietnamese have never had a chance to get acquainted directly with such philosophies as Yangtze's individualism, Micius's utilitarianism, Chuangtze's relativism and scepticism, and (fortunately?) Han Fei-tze's state totalitarianism. The greatest disadvantage caused by the intellectual monopoly of Confucianism and Taoism imposed on, and imported into, Vietnam is that the Vietnamese people have never had an opportunity to experience the cultural pluralism of the "Hundred Philosophers" period as the Chinese did before the ultimate victory of the Confucian school. Secondly, even though there have existed a number of Confucianist "shadings," only few of them succeeded in filtering through the Sino-Vietnamese border to become the main authorities of Confucianism, the only voices of Truth. Consequently, the Vietnamese thought pattern became more one-sided, and more limited. All Confucianist instruction seemed to consist of

¹One of the best ways to estimate the degree of Chinese influence in Vietnamese culture is to compare the Vietnamese laws issued under different dynasties with the Chinese counterparts since under the ancient regime all customs and moral prescriptions were codified in law books. See, Vu van Mau, Dan Luat Khai Luan, op. cit., pp. 166-256.

"les quatre livres classiques, les cinq canoniques et le Tinh-ly dai-toan."¹ This kind of closed system of education had a double effect. On the one hand, the world view of the educated man was certainly much restricted. Pham-Quynh, a learned scholar, well-versed in Western as well as Eastern philosophies (and unfortunately a victim of ignorance and fanaticism) has eloquently deplored the limited intellectual horizon found in the Vietnamese heritage.

L'école de Wang Yang-Minh (en Annamite Vuong Duong-Minh), philosophe du XV^e siècle qui enseignait la théorie de l'identité de la connaissance et de l'acte, et qui a exercé une influence si profonde au Japon, était complètement inconnue en Annam jusqu'à ces derniers temps. . . . Regrettons que Vuong Duong-Minh n'ait pas eu d'influence chez nous, pas plus qu'en Chine d'ailleurs, et que le confucianisme n'ait été représenté jusqu'ici que par la seule école de Tchou Hi, plus experte à former des érudits et des fonctionnaires que des samourais et des artistes.²

On the other hand, if a person is convinced that what he learns is the Truth and the only Truth, since there is no other school to make him doubt what he has learned; and

¹"The Four Classics, the Five Canonical Books, and the Tinh-ly Dai-toan," Henri Bernard-Maitre, Pour la Compréhension de l'Indochine et de l'Occident, op. cit., p. 44; The five Canonical Books are: the Books of Rites, the Book of Change, the Books of Odes, the Book of History, the Spring and Autumn; The Four Classics are: the Analects, the Doctrine of the Mean, the Great Learning, the Works of Mencius. The Tinh-li Dai-toan is a book recording the teachings by Chu Hsi, a Confucianist of the 12th century; These works were introduced to Vietnam by order of the Chinese governor during a short occupation of Vietnam in the 15th century. See Pierre Huard and Maurice Durand, Connaissance du Vietnam, (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1954), p. 84.

²Pham-Quynh, Essais Franco-Annamites, op. cit., pp. 612, 279.

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especially when he studies without a sense critique, then it is not difficult for him to assume an attitude of self-importance. This effect of the Vietnamese traditional system of education has been aptly analyzed by another philosopher, Tran Trong Kim as follows:

The students were only concerned in memorizing the Chinese Classics in order to pass the literati exams and become mandarins. . . The mandarin training being totally based on Chinese literature and poetry, they were used to judging people on the basis of their knowledge of the Four Classics and the Five Canonical Books. Those who achieved some mastery of these matters thought they were superior to others and qualified to rule people. Completely unaware of reality, they were proud and arrogant, considering all other people as dirt and themselves as gods. . .¹

Thus the Chinese influence in Vietnamese civilization is considerable not only due to the ideas imported but also the amount of ideas imported, and the way these ideas are imprinted upon the Vietnamese mind. Interestingly enough, there is some relationship between the doctrine to be communicated and the method of indoctrination. If the doctrine constitutes an authoritarian system of thought, the method is based on blind reliance upon authority. The system of thought introduced into Vietnam is one which breeds intolerance of diversity, rigidity in thinking, and absolutism in action. In theory, it lauds harmony; in practice it prescribes submissiveness. In short, it is a paradoxical amalgamation of Confucianism and Taoism. The

¹Taan Trong Kim, Vietnam Su Luoc, (Saigon: Tau Viet, 1958), p. 484.

former teaches order and hierarchy, the latter urges anarchy and unconventionalism. Yet both teach complete submergence of the self, either into society or into nature. Both lead at best, to absolutist paternalism, at worst, to brutal despotism. To understand these two religions or philosophies of life,¹ and to facilitate our comparative analysis, we shall examine first their fundamental metaphysical assumptions about the life-ideal, and secondly the prescribed ways to realize that life-ideal.

Traditional World View: Harmony
as the Life-Ideal

The most striking characteristic of the Vietnamese and Chinese cultures is the strong emphasis on harmony as an ideal way of life. If we look closely at the foundation of their belief system related to the formation and mechanism of the cosmos we can understand somewhat their unconscious urge for harmony and unity rather than competition and diversity. Taoism and Confucianism, although apparently contradictory "systèmes philosophiques," metaphysical assumptions built upon the same metaphysical assumptions. Both

¹Leopold Cadiere after attacking the position that believes Confucianism and Taoism to be two religions, points out that they are not "des religions à proprement parler" but "systèmes philosophiques." See Croyances et Pratiques Religieuses des Vietnamiens (Saigon: Imprimerie Nouvelle d'Extreme Orient, 1958), pp. 26-29. I believe that his position is not more correct than the one he disagrees with. The problem with both sides is that they use the Occidental habit of thought to analyze the Oriental belief system. In the West the distinction between religion and philosophy, theology and science is taken for

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believe that the cosmic mechanism is operated by two opposite forces always in harmony. Both believe that the good is to attain a perfect harmony with nature called tao.

Tao (or The Way)

According to the Confucian Book of Change, one of the Classics, at first there is but one "Grand Terminus" (or Tai chi sometimes translated as the "Great Ultimate") which is the origin of all creations. Before the process of self generation of the Great Terminus (also called Yi) there was nothing. "In the Yi there is no thought, no action. It is itself still and calm."¹ The Grand Ultimate is, then, aroused and generates two different elementary forces, a male, or yang and a female, or yin (Book of Change, book 1, ch v). The qualities of the male force are activity, inflexibility, hardness, and firmness. The quality of the female force, or yin, are inactivity, flexibility, softness, and gentleness. These two forces through constant and harmonious interaction create movements from which springs life and a great variety of beings through differentiation and multiplication. To quote again from the Book of Change (Book of Change, "The Great Appendix," sec. I, ch. 2):

granted. In the East, it is believed that religion and philosophy are but two aspects of one problem. Religion is philosophy, science is theology. They are fused to each other. It is thus irrelevant to try to label Confucianism and Taoism as religions or philosophies. See discussion of this East-West difference later.

¹Book of Change, Section I, Chapter 10.

Therefore in the system of Change there is the Great Ultimate. It generates the Two Modes (yin and yang). The Two Modes generate the Four Forms (major and minor yin and yang). The Four Forms generate the Eight Trigrams. The Eight Trigrams determine good and evil fortunes.

These eight trigrams, further created sixty-four hexagrams. These sixty-four hexagrams are multiplied further into three hundred and eighty-four figures, and so on indefinitely (Book of Change, sec. I, ch. 9). Thus the whole universe is generated by the yin and the yang. Yin and yang are found in everything. For example, yang is found in Heaven, man, day, heat, life etc. Yin is found in Earth, woman, night, cold, death, etc.¹ The principle of the harmonious interaction and self-generation of yin and yang is the right principle, or usually called the Right way, or the Way of Heaven, or simply the Way or Tao (Chinese term) or Dao (Vietnamese term).

This cosmology is also found in Taoism. However, the Taoist explanation of the universe has greater mystic overtones and thus becomes less understandable. Before the creation of Heaven and Earth, according to Taoism, there is Tao which is a principle as void as the Confucian Yi. Lao Tzu describes this first stage of the universal evolution in these mysterious words:

¹In the Vietnamese language coi am (the Yin World) designates the world of the dead, and coi duong (the Yang World) the world of the living. (Am is the Vietnamese term for yin and duong for yang).

There was Something undefined and yet complete in itself,
 Born before Heaven-and-Earth.
 Silent and boundless,
 Standing alone without change,
 Yet pervading all without fail,
 It may be regarded as the Mother of the World.
 I do not know its name;
 I style it "Tao";
 And, in the absence of a better word, call it "The Great"¹

The evolution of Tao through the process of yin-yang harmonious interaction and self-generation is similarly conceived. It is written in Tao Teh Ching:

Tao gave birth to One,
 One gave birth to Two,
 Two gave birth to Three,
 Three gave birth to all the myriad things.
 All the myriad things carry the Yin on their backs
 and hold the Yang in their embrace,
 Deriving their vital harmony² from the proper blending
 of the two vital Breaths.

In short, both Confucianism and Taoism view the cosmos as the result of a harmonious evolution from the simple to the complex.³ Certainly the metaphysical details related to cosmic evolution are no longer believed seriously in Vietnam. However, its ethical implications are more difficult to overcome. The first implication is that harmony is the foundation of life. The second ethical implication is that there are only the Right Way (Chinh Dao) which leads to success,

¹Lao Tzu, Tao Teh Ching, Chapter 25.

²Ibid., Chapter 24.

³The influence of this cosmological conception on the Vietnamese culture can be seen in Pierre Huard and Maurice Durand, Connaissance du Vietnam, op. cit., Chapters 5, 6, 7, pp. 55-81.

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and the Wrong Way (Ta Dao) which certainly leads to failure. These two points will be examined in the following paragraphs.

The Urge for Harmony in
Confucianism and Taoism

The principle of Tao is not only a cosmological and metaphysical principle, but also a moral one. (Because of this moral overtone, the Vietnamese language makes a distinction of several Ways: the Right Way is Chinh Dao, or Hoang Dao, or Thien Dao which means the Way of the Confucianist or Taoist ethical system. The Wrong Way is called Ta-Dao, which embraces all the non-Confucianist or non-taoist, principles.) In what way does the Confucianist and the Taoist view Tao as the foundation of their moral systems? Since Tao is based on harmony, a relationship, to be productive, must be harmonious. Is it not true that everything including Heaven and Earth is generated by a harmonious interaction between yin and yang? This belief might be derived from daily observation of the husband-and-wife relationship. Whether this hypothesis is true or not is not important. The important thing is that productivity--hence life in an agricultural society where drought, flood, and famine have been common phenomena--has been associated with harmony. Harmony is good. Disharmony is bad. Thus Chinh-Dao leads to harmony. Ta-Dao leads to disharmony, which means death, disintegration. Harmony in nature brings good crops. Harmony in man brings peace and calm, since man, being a part of the Cosmos, is also the

result of the harmonious interaction of yin and yang. In the Doctrine of the Mean Confucius lauds the state of harmony of the mind as well as the outside nature:

While there are no stirrings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be in the state of equilibrium [which is equivalent to the primeval stage of the Grand Terminus before the two forces, yin and yang, are aroused]. When these feelings have been stirred, and they act in due degree, there ensues what may be called the state of harmony [corresponding to the yin-yang interaction stage, see above]. This equilibrium is the great root [the Grand Terminus, see above] from which grow all the human actings in the world, and this harmony [yin-yang relationship, see above] is the universal path which they all should pursue.

Let the states of equilibrium and harmony exist in perfection, and a happy order will prevail throughout heaven and earth, and all things will be nourished and flourish. (The Doctrine of the Mean, Chapter I, 4, 5).¹

This obsession with harmony in the Confucianist school can be seen almost in every work of Confucius and his followers. For instance, in another classic, the wonderful effects of harmony are eloquently extolled in these terms:

This great mutual consideration and harmony would ensure the constant nourishment of the living, the burial of the dead, and the service of the spirits (of the departed). However greatly these things might accumulate there would be no entanglement among them. They would move on together without error, and the smallest matters would proceed without failure. However deep some might be, they would be comprehended. However

¹Legge's translation of Chung-Yung as The Doctrine of the Mean is not close to Confucius's meaning. Chung means equilibrium. Yung means harmony. The first term designates a static state, the second term a dynamic state. Mean does not designate either static equilibrium, nor dynamic harmony. See James Legge, The Life and Teachings of Confucius (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Company, 1867), pp. 282, 283, 284.

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thick and close their array, there would be spaces between them. They would follow one another without coming into contact. They would move about without doing any hurt to one another. This would be the perfection of such a state of mutual harmony.

Therefore the clear understanding this state will lead to the securing of safety in the midst of danger.

Thus with the Confucianist school the same principle operates in Heaven and Earth, in social life, in individual life, in "myriad things,"¹ i.e., harmonious relationships between opposite and unequal elements (yin is believed to be superior to yang) mean social and moral order, life, and peace; lack of harmony means Ta-dao (the Wrong Way) and the consequences are calamities and death. The fear of disharmony is still very strong in Vietnamese society today. War, flood, famine, blight, etc., have always been interpreted as "am duong dao-lon," i.e. the yin and the yang being out of harmony.

The Taoists are no less concerned with harmony than the Confucianists. Even though their writings are full of obscurities any mysticisms, one still can perceive their extreme urge for harmony. First, harmony is the fundamental principle of Tao which has been differentiated into "myriad things" as a result of the harmonious interaction of yin and yang. However, this yin-yang interaction process is so harmonious that these differentiated "myriad things" at the end have become "one." This state of "oneness" is the evidence

¹See Chu Hsi, Chu Tzu ch'uan-shu, chapter 49, trans. Wing-Tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 638.

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of ideal harmony which in turn is the necessary condition for peace and order. The Tao is the antidote of all sources of friction and confusion. In effect,

It blunts all sharp edges,
It unties all tangles,
It harmonizes all lights,
It unites the world into one whole.¹

Thus "oneness," or perfect harmony, is the end we must strive for. Lao tzu believes that

From of old there are not lacking things that have attained Oneness.
The sky attained Oneness and became clear;
The spirits attained Oneness and became charged with mystical powers;
The fountains attained Oneness and became full;
The ten thousand creatures attained Oneness and became reproductive;
Barons and princes attained Oneness and became sovereign rulers of the world.
All of them are what they are by virtue of Oneness.²

If the essence of the Tao is harmony and "oneness," what are the effects of being in harmony with the Tao? First to be in harmony with the Tao is to know it. Since the Tao is the source of all things, to know the source of all things is to know everything (Chapter 52, p. 73) by sheer deduction. Thus the Sage "without going out of his door, . . . can know the ways of the world" (Ch. 47, p. 67). Or "To know harmony is to know the Changeless (i.e., the Tao). To know the Changeless is to have insight." (Ch. 55, p. 79). (See also Chapter 15, p. 19, Ch. 16, p. 21, Ch. 62, p. 89.) Secondly, for the

¹Tao Teh Ching, Ch. 4.

²Ibid., Ch. 39.

common people, to know everything permits them to avoid errors, calamities (Ch. 62, p. 89, Ch. 52 p. 75,) and even death (Ch. 16, pp. 22, 23). It has been said that "what is against Tao will soon cease to be" (Ch. 30, p. 43). For a ruler, to be in harmony with Tao means to have a peaceful and prosperous nation without trouble. "Tao never makes any ado, and yet it does everything. If a ruler can cling to it, all things will grow of themselves" (Ch. 37,). Thus the duty of the ruler is to bring society into harmony with Tao. This is the only way to peace and prosperity. Lao-tse writes

When the world is in possession of the Tao,
The galloping horses are led to fertilize the fields
with their droppings [i.e., horses are used for
farming].
When the world has become Taoless,
War horses breed themselves in the suburbs (Ch. 46).

Thus, both Confucianism and Taoism preach that to know the Right Way is to be able to solve all the problems of the world. On the practical plane, to know the Right Way implies the duty to bring the people into harmony with it.

The Urge for Harmony in Practice

A Monistic World View.--The traditional value system shaped by Confucianism and Taoism also emphasizes the importance of harmony as the foundation of social life. Professor Vu Van Mau also has noticed this strong emphasis on harmony in moral and legal systems of the Vietnamese and Chinese societies.¹

¹Vu Van Mau, Dan Luat Khai Luan, pp. 29-33.

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I think this world view which stresses harmony rather than antagonism explains somewhat the difference between the Eastern life-ideal and the Western one. For the West, antagonism rather than harmony is dominant in theology as well as in philosophy and literature.¹ The Greco-Roman gods are always in friction. Even the Judeo-Christian conception of God is not as monistic as the Confucianist or Taoist Tao. Tao is one, but the Christian God is three. Within the cosmic operation of Tao, there are spirits which form the religion for the mass. Even here, the world of the spirit is not different from the well-ordered and well-disciplined Confucianist ideal society. The spirits live in a system which is also structured hierarchically, on the top of which is Ngoc Hoang or Thuong-De who, like a Confucianist ideal king, has absolute power over all the spirits. In the West, man is conceived theologically as a battlefield between God and a Devil who is almost as powerful as God. In China or in Vietnam, there is no such conflict. All the spirits are well disciplined and in harmonious relationship with man (so long as he does not deviate from the established harmony). This dualistic world view of the West has been generalized in practice and has given rise to conflicting issues such as the relationship between the Emperor and the Pope, the Church and the State, the individual and society, etc. In the East

¹Ch'u Chai and Winberg Chai, The Changing Society of China (New York: The New American Library, 1962), pp. 21-24.

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there never existed (until recently) such distinctions: the king is the pope, the state is the church, the individual is the society.

Given this dualistic Weltanschauung, attempts to establish unitary domination have never been completely successful in the West. The antagonisms between the Pope and the Emperor, and later between the Emperor and the feudal lords, epitomize the conscious resistance of the Western people to the domination by one--either one idea, one school of thought, or one organization. In the field of political philosophy, totalitarian schools are always looked upon with suspicion.

Two Chinese professors in Chinese culture and philosophy have cogently pointed out this contrast between the Eastern world built on harmony, and the Western world built on antagonism:

The Westerners, they write, are impressed by the antagonism of the different factors in the world: the antagonism of human versus divine; of ideal versus real, of society versus individual, of authority versus liberty, and so forth. The Chinese, in contrast, are impressed not by the antagonism, but by the continuity of the world. To the mind of the Chinese, society and the individual are not antagonistic to each other; they are simply a continuous whole. . . . Although the whole is formed of many minor selves, yet the minor selves are not antagonistic to the whole; on the contrary, they form a part of it, just as the growing and expanding roots merge into the whole.¹

¹Ch'u Chai and Winberg Chai, The Changing Society of China, op. cit., p. 22.

In another article Ch'u Chai points out that the fundamental spirit of Chinese culture

may be looked at from two points of view: that of cosmic conception and that of attitude toward life. In the former the spirit of Chinese culture is manifested as a continuous whole, like a chain of natural sequences. In the latter the spirit of Chinese culture is manifested in the union of the individual with the whole.¹

In a sense, individualism, so cherished by the West, is unknown in the East because in the East the individual is never seen as separated from the system. We can even say without much exaggeration that in a Confucianist-Taoist society, the individual does not exist. He is an integral part of the social system (Confucianism), or of the cosmos (Taoism). To use Erich Fromm's words, the individual has not emerged "from the state of oneness with the natural world to an awareness of himself as an entity separate from surrounding nature and men."² The strong urge for perfect harmony in Confucianism and Taoism is just the rationalization of this fear of being cut off from the "primary ties." Freedom and individualism do not even exist when these "primary ties" have not yet been broken. Fromm writes:

These primary ties block his full human development; they stand in the way of the development of his reason and his critical capacities; they let him recognize himself and others only through the medium of his, or their, participation in a clan, a social or religious community, and not as human beings; in

¹"The Spirit of Chinese Culture," Social Research, Vol. XXIV (1957), p. 47.

²Fromm, Escape From Freedom, op. cit., p. 24.

other words, they block his development as a free, self-determining, productive individual.¹

The monistic world view and the strong concern for harmony hampers the "individuation process" and retards the development of freedom and individualism. Emile Durkheim in analyzing the "segmental society" stresses this point:

solidarity, which comes from likenesses is at its maximum [perfect harmony] when the collective conscience completely envelops our whole conscience and coincides in all points with it. But, at that moment, our individuality is nil. . . our personality vanishes. . . for we are no longer ourselves, but the collective life.²

The individual in the Confucianist-Taoist system is thus concerned more with social cohesion than freedom and individual rights. It has been noticed that

the sense of duty is stronger in [the East] than the love of liberty. In the West, duty and privileges are opposites, whereas in China they are merged together, forming the identification of nature (liberty) with destiny (duty) as well as the union of Heaven with man.³

Concerns for Harmony and Intolerance of Conflicts in the Vietnamese society

In Vietnamese society, this obsession with harmony still persists. Scigliano has noticed that this urge for "social harmony and the avoidance of disagreement"⁴ as a

¹Ibid., p. 35.

²Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, translated by George Simpson (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), p. 130.

³Ch'u Chai and Winberg Chai, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

⁴Robert Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), p. 37.

sociological factor harms the development of a modern, objective, and efficient public administrative system. More seriously, if the leader of a country is constantly concerned with harmony (i.e. total conformity to his political ideas), and feels abnormally anxious when disagreements arise, dictatorship is very likely to result. A number of dictatorial measures of the late President Ngo Dinh Diem can be understood in the light of this ethical concern. True to the teachings of Confucius, Diem did not hesitate to resort to all means to restore harmony in his family and his nation when it was threatened.

Let us first examine his attempt to save the harmony of his family. In Vietnam, it is widely believed that antagonism between family members, e.g., between brothers, cousins, etc., are sign of decadence in that family. The family is always viewed as an epitome of the cosmos. If harmony is wanting in the cosmos, calamity will certainly occur. Family relationships must be kept as harmonious as possible. Although this belief has been more or less rejected among the Westernized Vietnamese, harmony is still highly valued, much more than in a Western family. The bickerings within the family of the late President Ngo Dinh Diem with their legal and political consequences for the whole nation demonstrate again this strong need for harmony. When a brother-in-law of Mrs. Ngo Dinh Nhu wanted to divorce his wife, the whole legal and political machinery of South Vietnam

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was mobilized to prevent the scandal of disunity in the Presidential family. The Secret Police were ordered to lock up the rebel sister, who had to resort to a suicidal attempt to escape from the country. Her husband, believed to be a very capable young administrator and politician, was dismissed from the Diem cabinet, and fled to France. Furthermore, a family law was hastily drafted and passed to make divorce in general practically impossible. The Family Law has aroused strong opposition and resentment in Vietnamese society, where divorce has never been prohibited nor even strongly discouraged. These extreme measures which put the whole socio-political system in danger of disruption for the sake of maintaining the appearance of familial unity reflects the extreme obsession with harmony.

On the national political scene, the same obsession with harmony prevailed under the Diem regime and led to needlessly dictatorial measures. The Ngo brothers, strongly convinced that they were right became ruthless in forcing the people into harmony with the Right. Tran Van Chuong, the father of Mrs. Ngo Dinh Nhu, observed that "the Ngo brothers are very much like medieval inquisitors who were so convinced of their righteousness that they would burn people for their own sake, and for the sake of mankind, to save them from error and sin."¹ The methods used by Diem may have been like

¹Quoted by Denis Warner in The Last Confucian: Vietnam, Southeast Asia, and the West, (Baltimore, Maryland: Penguin Books, 1964), p. 107.

nose of "medieval inquisitors," but his "mentality" was that of a Confucian. Denis Warner supports this:

This dogged aspect of his character, his rejection of advice, reflected his Confucian, rather than his Catholic, background. He was always right. He was the father of the people. He knew what was good for the people. Only the father knew, for the people, were his total concern. How, then, could he be wrong?¹

If he was never wrong, those who opposed him could never be right, and it was his obligation to eliminate opposition for the sake of harmony and righteousness. This explains why political opposition was brutally and systematically eliminated. At the very beginning of his republican regime Diem was concerned with gaining, or forcing, the absolute support of his people. In the 1950's when Diem was still popular, the election of the Constituent Assembly of 1956 brought in an overwhelming Diemist majority, and a minority whose stand was more or less pro-Diem. When the work of the Constituent Assembly was over, it declared itself the First National Assembly. By this legal trick, Diem was able to avoid another election, and to be sure of having complete harmony--rather than checks and balances--between the executive and legislative powers.

The same obsession with harmony was even more obvious in later elections. During the 1959 election all tricks were resorted to overtly or secretly in order to secure a 100% Diemist majority in the Second National Assembly. All but two government-approved candidates were elected. Yet

¹Ibid., p. 91

Diem was still not satisfied with the result since two of his opponents--Dr. Phan Quang Dan (strongly anti-Diemist), and Mr. Nguyen Tran (only very mildly anti-Diemist)--were elected. For Diem, two Assembly members out of harmony with the other one hundred and twenty three constituted an intolerable flaw. Harmony was still not perfect. By various judiciary tricks, he had his two opponents' electoral victories declared illegal, and their rights of running in any election in the future canceled.¹ These measures were more than unnecessary. Even had there been a note of discord in the National Assembly, national unity believe to be indispensable for fighting Communism, would not have been endangered. In effect, possible disunity--supposedly harmful among the people which might have resulted from public debates on the legislative floor between two opponent members and the rest could have been very easily avoided, since all means of communication were well under the control of the government. As Denis Warner has put it:

On paper, the [1959] elections represented an overwhelming personal victory. Only one independent candidate and one opposition candidate won seats. In Diem's view, however, even this small intrusion of outsiders into the official family was not to be countenanced. As always, he did not regard the election as an example of democracy at work. Its intention, once again, was to demonstrate collective

¹See, Robert Scigliano, "Elections in a one-party state--Politics in an Underdeveloped State," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 4 (1960), pp. 138-161; Nguyen Tuyet Mai, "Electrioneering: Vietnamese style," The Asian Survey, Vol. 2 (1962), pp. 10-19.

loyalty. The function of the Assembly was to be the voice of Diem, not a forum for divisive and contrary opinions.¹

To recapitulate, we have argued that harmony is the highest goal in the Vietnamese ethical system. This ethical conception has been indeed equally lauded by the two main philosophical schools, Confucianism and Taoism. To conform to Tao, the Way of Heaven, means life and prosperity. To be out of harmony with Tao leads certainly to calamities and ultimately, death. In the modern context, the harmony oriented attitude is still preserved, and often leads to monism in world view and totalitarianism in politics.

In addition, the ethical heritage also moulds the attitudes of the traditional Vietnamese toward society and authority. They are taught to think in extreme terms: either total integration into the social structure (Confucianism) or complete withdrawal from social life (Taoism). The influence of these two philosophies on Vietnamese society has been considerable. In the following paragraphs, we will examine the Confucianist system first, then the Taoist system.

The Confucianist System: Harmony Through Ritualistic Conformism

Some generalizations are offered before we consider the Confucianist system in detail.

¹Warner, The Last Confucian, op. cit., p. 111

The more hierarchical a society, the more important is the social mechanism for securing status distinction. Also it seems that the higher the degree of hierarchization, the more one has to use formal conventions for social discrimination, and thus the more formalistic are social relations. On the other hand, the more rigid and elaborate an hierarchical system, the more conformity is required in the socialization process, and consequently the more conformist and the less creative and imaginative are the individuals.

The above generalizations seem to find some validity in the Confucianist system. It is a highly hierarchical, ritualistic, conformistic system devised to condition the individual to conform rather than to imagine, to follow rather than to create.

An Hierarchical System

The Confucianist system as an hierarchical one is but the result of harmonization of man with Tao. The Confucianist Tao, which is different from the Taoist tao is hierarchical in nature. The evolution of the Confucianist cosmos is but a process of hierarchization with the hierarchy becoming more and more elaborate with time. This process attains its maximum development in human society, and is why human society is an elaborate hierarchy. The Book of Change, in discussing the development of the human society, lays the foundation of the Confucianist system of hierarchical ethics.

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Heaven and earth existing all material things then got their existence, afterwards there came male and female. From the existence of male and female. From the existence of male and female there came afterwards husband and wife. From husband and wife there came father and son. From father and son there came sovereign and subjects. From sovereign and subjects there came high and low. Following the distinction between high and low came the arrangements of propriety and righteousness.¹

Thus the cosmic system is not an equalitarian one. There is a natural hierarchy everywhere. Is not yang superior to yin? Heave to Earth? Husband to wife? Father to son? and sovereign to subject? Consequently, if we follow this Universal principle, peace and order will result, calamities will be avoided. In another passage from the Book of Change, this conception of the social system as a highly hierarchical one is stressed again:

Heaven is high, the earth is low, and thus ch'ien (Heaven) and k'un (Earth) are fixed. As high and low are thus made clear, the honorable and the humble have their places accordingly. As activity and tranquility have their constancy, the strong and the weak are thus differentiated.² (Appendix, Part 1, Ch. 1).

From this premise--that hierarchical order is good--a social system is rigidly visualized as a hierarchy of statuses which is summerized into four unequal relationships between (1) sovereign and minister, (2) father and son, (3) husband and wife, (4) elder and younger brother, and one equal relationship, that of between friend and friend (Doctrine of the Mean, Ch. xx,

¹Book of Change, "Orderly Sequence of the Hexgrams," Ch. II.

²Ibid.

Sec. 8). All relationships except the last which is not important in a Confucian society¹ characterized by authority on the one side and obedience on the other² Inequality is the law of the universe, the foundation of tao. To be in harmony with Tao is the life-ideal. On the other hand, within the social micro-cosmos the law of harmony must also be respected since without a clearly delienated status system confusion, barbarism, and disharmony will result. Confucius considers a well-established system of statuses the fundamental prerequisite of an orderly country. When asked about government, Confucius answered: "There is government, when the prince is prince; and the minister is minister; when the father is father; and the son is son" (Analects, Book XII, Ch. xi, 2). Another day, asked what would be the first step to take in a government reform program, Confucius answered without hesitation:

What is necessary is to rectify names [that is to reform the status system in order to make it fit with the "natural"--i.e. Confucian--hierarchy]. . . If names be not correct, language is not in accordance with the truth of things. If language be not in accordance with the truth of things, affairs cannot be carried on to success. When affairs cannot be carried on to success, proprieties and music will not flourish. When proprieties and music do not flourish, punishments

¹In a Confucian society there is never true friendship in the Western sense of the world. Intimate friends are quickly integrated into one of the family relationships. Most of the cases, the older friend "becomes" the older brother of the other.

²See Analects, Book 8, Ch. 9. Mencius, VI, ii, x, 5, 6, and Mencius, III, i, iv, 6.

will not be properly awarded. When punishments are not properly, awarded, the people do not know how to move hand or foot.¹

What are the influences of this purely formalistic and ritualistic ethical system on actual behavior? The most important influence is the development of a strong status-consciousness in Vietnamese society. The potentialities and capacities of each individual are believed to reside in his "name," i.e., the title of his position in the hierarchy. In a Confucian society, titles always have a magic power. A Ph.D. is always believed to be better than a non-Ph.D. A man of high position is always addressed by a "name" or title which is appropriate to his position. This habit has caused humorous incidents when the government tried to democratize the society. In North Vietnam, with an egalitarian regime, conscious efforts have been made to erase "feudalistic remnants." But the fact is that a habit of mind from time immemorial cannot be easily given up by decree. In this egalitarian regime, the convenient word "comrade" is used to replace old titles. But people still feel ill at ease with this short title while talking to their superiors. A compromise is made. Instead of calling some party official "Comrade So and So," people start to attach lengthy and cumbersome titles to the word "Comrade."

In South Vietnam the situation is somewhat different. The old term quan lon (Your Highness) used to address a civil servants, this title is replaced by a more generally used ong

(grand father). For low-ranking civil servants, this title is adequate and used without arousing any feeling of discomfort in the speaker. But for high-ranking officials, the title ong (grand father) does not seem to be respectful enough. People tend to "promote" the addresses to a higher echelon by calling him cu (great grandfather). Such forms of address help to promote an atmosphere of "mutual understanding" between the people and the civil servant who may be only in his twenties or thirties.

In a hierarchy-conscious society, position must be in harmony with status derives power and legitimacy. Maybe this is the reason why Mr. and Mrs. Ngo Dinh Nhu were so unpopular. They had never been accepted by the Vietnamese people. His title "political advisor" was not important enough to legitimize his overwhelming authority. The more authority he assumed, the greater was the felt discrepancy between his title and his power position, is one of the many reasons why people resented him.¹ For Mrs. Nhu the resentment

¹This discrepancy between the "tremendous power" of Mr. Nhu and his title is bitterly attacked by Nguyen Thai who Westernizes the Confucian concept of "correct name" by believing in the magic power of formalism in administration. "From the strictly administrative efficiency point of view, he writes, the advantages of adopting an official, open and consistent position are obvious." He believes that if Mr. Nhu had had an official title commensurate with his power, his work would have become more efficient and his decisions more responsible. In another passage, Nguyen Thia shows a strong conviction that an Army major, simply because of his being a major, is incapable of handling the business of a higher ranking officer. It is inadequate, he writes to let "an Army major handle administrative and political issues of top

was greater because the gap between her official title-- member of the National Assembly and First Lady--and her power was more considerable. This gap became more conspicuous, hence more intolerable, because of her frequent public appearances. The question of "correct name" still seems to be a significant factor in the Vietnamese socio-political life.

Thus Confucianism has conditioned the traditional Vietnamese to accept the hierarchical order as one of the fundamental assumptions of life. He tends to relate himself to other people only through this highly structured system. Social complexities are reduced to a set of clear-cut "names." Individual diversities are replaced by a system of statues. Communication between individuals is simplified and stereotyped. Being socialized to be a part of the structure rather than a separate entity, these people lack the empathic ability to understand others as individuals, not only status holders.

Confucianism has taught them that the ideal society is based on hierarchy, and this teaching has been so deeply ingrained in their value system that the recent egalitarian influences of the West have not even begun to erase it. The

importance and compel a secretary of state to send confidential reports to an Army major." Here is another evidence of the strong urge for formalism which is the main characteristic of the Confucian ethical system. See Nguyen Thai, Is South Vietnam Viable? op. cit., pp. 196, 241, 242.

reason this belief could be so successfully inculcated is that it has behind it a strong philosophical foundation as well as an intensive and comprehensive system of socialization. Confucius has offered the Vietnamese scholar a sufficiently satisfactory philosophical rationalization of this belief in social hierarchy; he also provides him with useful means to put it into practice among the Vietnamese masses which are not particularly interested in philosophical subtleties. These means are li and music. The elaborate system of li and music validate our generalization that a highly hierarchical society requires a great deal of convention and ritual and strict socialization to preserve its hierarchical structure.

Li: External Criteria of Hierarchization

In many Vietnamese grade schools, it is not uncommon to find hanging on the wall, a card with the famous saying "Tien hoc le, hau hoc van" which means "first study li, then study letter." This concept of li, writes H. H. Dubs, is "one of the most important in Chinese ethics."¹ If Tao is the foundation of Taoism, li is that of Confucianism. Probably because of its crucial importance, the term li in Chinese (or lê in Vietnamese) resists any attempt at translation. Even though it has a religious meaning, it is loaded with ethical and philosophical connotations. (This may be seen as

¹H. H. Dubs, Hsuntze, The Moulder of Ancient Confucianism (London: Arthur Probsthain, 1927), p. 113, 114-120.

another evidence of the main characteristic of Oriental culture: complete fusion of religion, ethics, and science." It may be translated as religion, ceremony, deportment, decorum, propriety, formality, politeness, courtesy, etiquette, good form, good behavior, good manners, or the rules of proper conduct, the rules of propriety, etc.¹ In order to avoid any misunderstanding due to lack of an equivalent English term, I prefer to leave it untranslated; its full meaning can be grasped after our analysis of its nature and its function.

Nature of Li

Originally, li derives from tao. Li is a human creation of the Sages whose purpose is to maintain harmony with tao. Li is supposed to be the true representative cosmic principle in the human society. As a matter of fact, it results from the Sages' insight into the universal principle (Book of Change, The Great Appendix, Bk. I, Ch. iv). When asked about the "urgent importance" of li (translated by Legge as the rules of propriety), Confucius said "Those rules [li] are rooted in heaven, have their correspondences on earth, and are applicable to spiritual beings. . . it was by those rules that the ancient kings sought to represent the ways of Heaven [i.e. tao] and to regulate the feelings of men." Then he concludes on a threatening note: "Therefore he who

¹Ibid., p. 113.

neglects or violates them may be (spoken of) as dead, and he who observes them, as alive."¹ In another passage of Li ki, it is written:

rules of ceremony [i.e., li] must be traced to their origin in the Grand Unity [i.e., tao] This separated and became heaven and earth. It revolved and became the dual force (in nature). It changed and became the four seasons. It was distributed and became the breathing (thrilling in the universal frame). Its (lessons) transmitted (to men) are called its orders; the law and authority of them is in Heaven.

While the rules of ceremony (li) have their origin in Heaven, the movement of them reaches to earth. The distribution of them extends to all the business (of life). They change with the seasons, they agree in reference to the variations of lot and condition. In regard to man, they serve to nurture (his nature). They are practised by means of offerings, acts of strength, words and postures of courtesy, in eating and drinking, in the observances of capping, marriage, mourning, sacrificing, archery, chariot-driving, audiences, and friendly missions.

Thus propriety (li) and righteousness are the great elements for man's (character); it is by means of them that his speech is the expression of truth and his intercourse (with others) the promotion of harmony; they are (like) the union of the cuticle and cutis, and the binding together of the muscles and bones in strengthening (the body). They constitute the great methods by which we nourish the living, bury the dead, and serve the spirits of the departed. They supply the channels by which we can apprehend the ways of Heaven and act as the feelings of men require. It was on this account that the sages that knew the rules of ceremony (li) could not be dispensed with, while the ruin of states, the destruction of families, and the perishing of individuals are always preceded by their abandonment of the rules of propriety (li). (Li ki, Book VII, Sec. IV, par. 4, 5, 6.

Thus li originated from tao and was put into practice by ancient kings whose enlightenment permitted them a deep insight into tao. Since tao is not only the source of life

¹The Li-ki book VII, Sec. 1, Par. 4.

but life itself of all beings and the raison d'être of all things. From this source, li inherits all of the power of tao, and becomes consequently as comprehensive and indispensable for life as tao itself. To resist tao will certainly bring calamities and ruin, to counter li, similarly, will bring danger and death. (Li ki, Book 1, Sec. 1, Part 1, para. 24).

The Hierarchizing Function of Li

The characteristics of li--comprehensiveness and indispensability for maintaining life--derive from the all-inclusive and life-generating nature of tao. The crucial importance of li thus legitimatizes. Its function of social hierarchization which is simply derived from the hierarchical structure of tao. When asked about the function of li, Confucius answered:

. . . of all things by which the people live the rites are the greatest. Without them they would have no means of regulating the services paid to the spirits of heaven and earth; without them they would have no means of distinguishing the positions proper to father and son, to high and low, to old and young; without them they would have no means of maintaining the separate character of the intimate relations between male and female, father and son, elder brother and younger,. . . (Li ki, Bk, XXIV, Ch. 1, p. 261).

In another occasion, Confucius explained to one of this social-ordering function of li:

The object of all the ceremonies (li) is to rectify the relations between ruler and ministers; to maintain the generous feeling between father and son, and the harmony between elder and younger brother; to adjust the relations

between high and low; and to give their proper places to husband and wife. The whole may be said to secure the blessing of Heaven. (Book VII, Sec. 1, Ch. 100, p. 371).

Thus, with the creation of an extensive li system, that status-oriented structure is preserved. Each individual has a clearly-delineated position in the hierarchy. Li gives him a fixed guide of behavior for dealing with others. Role confusion is reduced to minimum. On the other hand, he becomes an automaton interacting with other automatons according to a welltraced path--li. When asked by Yen Yuen, one of his disciples, about perfect virtue, Confucius gave him a simple answer "to subdue one's self and return to propriety (li)" and a simple formula of action "look not at what is contrary to propriety (li); listen not to what is contrary to propriety (li); speak not what is contrary to propriety (li); make no movement which is contrary to propriety (li).". In this context, the answer of Yen Yuen is worth quoting: "Though I am deficient in intelligence and vigour, he said, I will make it my business to practice this lesson."¹ In effect, with so little freedom left for individual initiative, intelligence and creativity are no longer indispensable. Little needs to be understood. Before examining the authoritarian socialization mechanism of Confucianism, we shall look first at the influence of li on Vietnamese social life.

¹Li Ki, Book XII, Chapter 1, sections 1 and 2.

The Importance of Li and its
Ritualizing Effects

In the past dynasties, li was as important a matter as finance and defense. Until 1945, there was a Ministry of Li in charge of ceremonies and morality in the kingdom. In the law books, morality (li) is completely fused with laws as they are understood in the West. Immoral acts which would be considered in the West as belonging to each individual's private life were codified as criminal acts with appropriate punishments.¹ Recently, the influence of li in public life has been consciously erased. Yet the spirit of li still pervades every socio-political relation: for in France the ritualistic and unpolitical practices such as "the 'Suy Ton Ngo Tong Thong' the erection of altars on the streets with Diem's portrait when he went on inspection in the provinces; the necessity for the people to show the utmost deference to Diem; and the whole gamut of deferential attitudes which Diem liked and his syncophants exaggerated."² In a li-oriented society like Vietnam, these practices were not at all strange. Diem had the title of President of Vietnam, and according to li he deserved treatment appropriate to his status. For average Vietnamese, li--including proper names, titles, positions, seating order, flags, even being late

¹ Vu Van Mau, Dan Luat Khai Luan, op. cit., pp. 169-256.

² Nguyen Thai, op. cit., p. 102; Suy Ton Ngo Tong Thong ("Let us venerate President Ngo") was a song to be played every morning after the national anthem.

[illegible]

to an appointment--is of utmost importance. They can fight to death, or usually to bankruptcy by means of expensive lawsuits if li is not respected. Before the war, a village notable not properly seated in a village banquet could spend his whole fortune to pay lawyers to gain one piaster (worth a penny in US currency) as recompense for the damage to his honor. Thus the ritualistic character of Diem's regime was not inconsistent with common forms of behavior in Vietnamese society.

Unfortunately this stress on li also contributed somewhat to the downfall of Diem on the "flag issue."¹ Of course, the "flag issue" between Diem and the Buddhists was prompted by a number of other factors. Yet the immediate cause of conflict was over concern with li. Without this extreme concern with appropriate rituals, the Ngo brothers would have been less rigid in dealing with the Buddhists, and the latter would have been more willing to reach a peaceful settlement. But in a Confucian context, to ask them to disregard li would be like asking them to throw away all their value system. To make a concession in this issue would have meant "loss of face," i.e., losing status, and a person without status could not do anything in this status-conscious society.

¹Charles A. Joiner, "South Vietnam's Buddhist crisis: organization for charity, dissidence, and unity," Asian Survey, Vol. IV (1964), pp. 915-928.

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"Loss of face" is another aspect of the li system. In Vietnamese, it is mat the dien, mat thanh danh or mat danh gia which have the same meaning. "Face" is a poor translation of these semantic subtleties. Dien, and danh are untranslatable terms because they are two of the few key words whose connotations summarize the essence of the culture. Concretely, they mean "face" or "name." But in the abstract sense, they involve the whole "theory of correct names" (Analects, Bk. XIII, Ch. III, par. 5). Therefore in a society where ritualistic nominalism plays a dominant role, a man is what his "name"--or more correctly the title of his position--is. In the "flag issue," this quasi-religious attachment to the "name" rather than the essence of things was probably the main reason for failure of the many attempts of settlement between Diem and the Buddhists. The national flag was considered the symbol representing the central and ultimate national authority with which Diem strongly identified himself. Now if the national flag had had to be removed in favor of the religious flags, or at least to be put on the same level with them, the national authority represented by the flag would have been no longer ultimate. Nominalistically and ritualistically, Diem would have been no longer the ultimate authority of the country. In other words, he would have been overthrown--at least symbolically. The extent of his authority was ritualistically identified with the position of the flag. This strong urge for propriety ossified his position and made bargaining

impossible. Lack of political wisdom was, of course, one of the reasons for Diem's failure in this affair, but the fear of using "incorrect names" was the underlying force which pushed the regime toward its end. It is obvious from this incident, as from a great number of other incidents in the Vietnamese political arena, that the influence of li must not be overlooked if one wants a good insight into Vietnamese socio-political life. It is cogently observed that "Protocol and concern for status pervaded the system from the lowest levels to the very highest."

Authoritarian Socialization Into the Hierarchy

Method of Socialization based on
Blind Submission

The Confucianist system is based on li which is in turn a faithful imitation of tao. The method of socialization into the li system is characterized by a strong stress on imitation and submission. From the sage to the common man, this principle of imitation and submission is equally valid. The only difference between the sage and the common man is that the sage in imitating tao becomes the authority on everything, while the common man need only accept that authority blindly and totally.

Li is supposed to be the true imitation of the Cosmic Principle. A sage can find it himself by examining the Cosmic

¹ Scigliano, South Vietnam: Nation Under Stress, op. cit., p. 37.

system. In the Book of Change, it is written:

The wise man, looking up, contemplates the brilliant phenomena of the heavens, and looking down, he examines the definite arrangements of the earth. Thus he discovers the causes of darkness, or what is obscure, and the causes of light, or what is bright. He traces things to their beginning, and follows them to their end. Thus he discovers what can be said about life and death. He perceives how the union of essence and the breath of things, and the disappearance or wandering away of the soul produce the change of their constitution. Thus he discovers the characteristics of the anima and animus. Through the principle of evolution, the wise man comprehends natural transformation; and he uses them as a mould to make things by an ever varying adaptation. . . It is thus that principles are spirit-like, unconditioned by place. . .¹

A sage, thus, looks at the universe and understands it, then devises the li as "a mould" for others. Since "the course of things in the universe," and the "definite arrangements of the earth" are regular and permanent, the principles of the sage (li) are also permanent. Any other sage, if he does not know li, can look for it in the universe. The practical prescription is that to be a sage one must examine nature to find li, which is the solution to all personal, familial, national, international problems. In the Great Learning, Confucius said:

The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue throughout the empire, first ordered their own States. Wishing to order their States, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families they first cultivated their persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first extended to the utmost their

¹The Book of Change, "The Great Appendix," Book 1, Chapter 4.

knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things. (The Great Learning, The text of Confucius," Par. 4, 5)¹

The first duty of a sage is to study the principle of the Universe in order to discover tao which is then to be used as the standard of behavior.² Unfortunately, very few people can be a sage. Even Confucius had to admit that "I have been the whole day without eating, and the whole night without sleeping: occupied with thinking. It was of no use. The better plan is to learn."³ Thus "the thought of the individual must be subordinated to learning the wisdom of the past." It is also written in Mencius, another classic that

There are now princes who have benevolent hearts and a reputation for benevolence, while yet the people do not receive any benefits from them, nor will they leave any example to future ages; all because they do not put into practices the ways (tao) of the ancient kings . . . Never has any one fallen into error, who followed the laws of the ancient kings (Mencius, Bk. IV, Part 1, Ch. 1, Sec. 2, 4).

With Hsuntze--whom Dubs describes as "the founder of ancient Confucianism" and "a thinker who cannot be neglected in any picture of Confucianism or of Chinese ideals"⁴--reliance on the teachings of the Ancient Sages becomes the unique standard for all thinking.

¹The Book of Change, the Great Appendix, Pk. I, Ch. IV.

²Dubs, Hsuntze, The Moulder of Ancient Confucianism, op. cit., p. 182.

³Analects, Bk. XV, Ch. XXX.

⁴Dubs, Hsuntze, The Founder of Ancient Confucianism, op. cit., p. xviii.

The Sage, he writes, is the channel of the Way (Tao). The Way (Tao) of the world pervades the Confucian doctrine; the Way (Tao) of all the Kings is united in it; hence the Way (Tao) of the Odes, History, Rites, and the Music follows it. . . The Way (Tao) of the world culminates in it. He who follows it will be preserved; he who rebels at it will be ruined. From ancient to present times, there has not been known anyone who followed it and was not preserved, or who rebelled against it was not ruined. . .¹

Finally, for the massed, there is not question of thinking in the study of tao, or li. The duty of the sage to teach the people li is very simple, since they do not need to understand the philosophical and cosmological foundation of li "The people, Confucius said, may be made to follow a path of action, but they may not be made to understand it" (Analects, Bk, viii, Ch. xi). For average people, the function of li is not to infuse them with ancient wisdom, but simply to keep them in order. Li is used to "furnish the means of determining [the observance towards] relatives, near and remote; of settling points which may cause suspicion or doubt; of distinguishing where there should be agreement, and where difference; and or making clear what is right and what is wrong." (Li ki, Bk. 1, Sect. 1, Part 1, Ch. 5, Par. 8). "Therefore the instructive and transforming power of ceremonies (li) is subtle; they stop depravity before it has taken form, causing men daily to move towards what is good, and keep themselves farther apart from guilt, without being themselves conscious of it" (Li ki, Bk. xxiii, Ch. 9). In short, the

¹Ibid., p. 190.

function of li is to condition the mass so that it will follow the Confucian path. In this conditioning process, a variety of means are used. We read in Li ki:

And so [the Ancient Kings instituted] ceremonies to direct men's aims aright; music to give harmony to their voices; laws to unify their conduct; and punishments to guard against their tendencies to evil. The end to which ceremonies, music, punishments, and laws conduct is one, they are instruments by which the minds of the people are assimilated, and good order in government is made to appear.¹

Confucius mentioned "music" which should be understood in the Confucianist context. Music does not consist only of the harmonious arrangement of sounds, but includes songs praising the Ancient Kings and the values of Confucianism.²

"Thus we see that the Ancient Kings, in their institution of ceremonies and music, did not seek how fully they could satisfy the desires of the appetite and of the ears and eyes; but they intended to teach the people to regulate their likings and dislikings, and to bring them back to the normal course of humanity" (Li ki, Bk. xvii, Sec. 1, par.10)

Music is not a branch of esthetics, but ethics. When asked how the government of a country should be administered, Confucius advised five steps which should be taken, and one of them is "to banish the songs of Ch'ing. . . which are

¹Li ki, Bk. xvii, Sec. 1, Par. 14.

²For instance, it is written in the Li ki that "when the Ancient Kings had accomplished their undertakings, they make their music (to commemorate them) (Li ki, Bk, xvii, Sec. 1, Par. 26).

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licentious" (Analects, Bk. xv, Ch. 10, Par. 6).¹ Music is considered a means to promote harmony with tao among the people, i.e., complete conformity with Confucianist teachings. If li is used as a means to impose external Confucian morality, music can be seen as a means to impose internal Confucian morality. It is written in the Li ki

All modulations of the voice spring from the minds of men. When the feelings are moved within they are manifested in the sounds of their voice; and when those sounds are combined so as to form compositions, we have what are called airs. . . [Thus] music springs from the movement of the mind. . . Now there is no end of the things by which man is affected; and when his likings and his dislikings are not subject to regulation [from within], he is changed into the nature of things as they come before him; that is, he stifles the voice of Heavenly principle within, and gives the utmost indulgence to the desires by which men may be possessed . . . Therefore the Ancient Kings, when they instituted their ceremonies and music, regulated them by consideration of the requirements of humanity. . . In music the sages found pleasure, and [saw that] it could be used to make the hearts of the people good. Because of the deep influence which it exerts on a man, and the change which it produces in manners and customs, the ancient kings appointed it as one of the subjects of instruction (Li ki, Bk. xvii, Sec. 1, Par 4, 12, 13, and Sec. 2, Par. 23).'

Psychological Effects of the Authoritarian Socialization in Vietnamese Society

The Confucian socialization process is almost a "brain-washing" process with li as the absolute standard to follow

¹In the West ethics and esthetics are considered as two unrelated fields, but in a Confucian society they are completely fused. Here is another evidence of Eastern monism and Western pluralism. Thus, for a Westerner who is not familiar with the Confucianist tradition, the prohibition of twist music under President Diem cannot be easily understood.

without questioning, and music as an instrument of conditioning. The common man follows the example of the scholar, the scholar imitates the past. Thus submission to authority becomes a reflex. Deviation from established patterns or creation of new ones are almost inconceivable. I think this is the reason why Confucianism, once established as the state religion, has lasted unchallenged for more than two thousand years.

As to the psychological effects of this authoritarian socialization, Confucianism has left indelible marks on the mind of the Vietnamese people, especially those who are socialized chiefly in the traditional culture. The method of socialization used by the Confucianist conditions the individual to become living automat capable of rather than creation and invention. This "esprit d'imitation" has developed to the point of becoming one of the characteristics of the Vietnamese personality. This extreme reliance on the past cannot be better illustrated than in the following saying of King Le Hien Tong:

Kinh Thai To, he said, founded the dynasty. Kinh Thanh Tong did all the development works. As for me my duty is only to maintain the traditional path, and spread education to make the works of my ancestors illustrious.¹

If this was the manner of the kings, the people are no different. Paul Giran has observed:

¹Tran Trong Kim, Vietnam Su Luoc, op. cit., p. 250.

La morale annamite n'est pas intérieure, elle n'emané pas de la conscience, penser our agir selon soi-même serait un crime: la loi moral c'est le rite, la coutume, la religion; la vertu, c'est le scrupuleux accomplissement des rites;¹ le critère du bien absolu, c'est le passé.

This extreme stress on li, this attitude of strong reliance on the authority of the past have unfortunate psychological effects on the Vietnamese. "Les rites sacro-saints, writes C. Letourneau, ont tué toute imagination. . . , puisque tout est classé, catalogué, il est devenu irrespectueux de chercher du nouveau, il suffit d'apprendre du vieux"²

Among the intellectuals, the same "esprit d'imitation" prevails.

[Il] aime l'étude, les longues études même; c'est un travailleur patient et minutieux: mais il lui manque le sens critique, l'imagination inventive, l'esprit scientifique. Pour lui, la mémoire est toute l'intelligence, la science n'est qu'érudition, la philosophie n'est que formules.³

The artist is not better. "Denué d'initiative, dépourvu de toute esprit d'invention, il n'a jamais été un créateur."⁴ His works only reflect his mental predispositions. That is,

¹Paul Giran, Psychologie du Peuple Annamite, op. cit., p. 168.

²Ibid., p. 82.

³Ibid., p. 134.

⁴Ibid.

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L'uniformité est la règle; qui a vu une pagode anamite les a vues toutes; le palais impérial lui-même ne diffère pas du modèle général.¹

Other Far Eastern students also notice this general characteristic of Vietnamese artists. "Adapteurs étonnants plus qu'artistes créateurs, ils sont capables d'imiter de près tout ce qui se fait de plus curieux, soit à la Chine, soit au Japon, quand ils peuvent avoir les mêmes matières."²

At the present time, this predisposition toward imitation rather than creation can be seen in most of Vietnamese social life. The most conspicuous of all is the field of education. Students tend to parrot the lectures of their teachers rather than to think. They are even encouraged in that tendency by their teachers themselves. Two MSU faculty members assigned as advisors to the National Institute of Administration noticed that "most of the faculty did not have their students use the library, but limited their intellectual expansion to what could be gained by listening to lectures uninterrupted by questions or discussion."³ At the high school level, the situation is worse. In the oral examination of the Vietnamese Baccalauréat, passing or failing is sometimes a matter of luck. If the student happens to use

¹Ibid., p. 132.

²Pierre Huard and Maurice Durand, Connaissance du Vietnam, op. cit., p. 60.

³Robert Scigliano and Guy H. Fox, Academics in Vietnam: The Michigan State Advisory Project in Retrospect (draft, p. 40).

the textbook written by the oral examiner, he is sure to pass his exam. In the case of "bad luck," if he used other textbooks instead of the one written by the oral examiner, his chance of passing the exam is considerably reduced, no matter how well he knows the subject-matter. In an oral or written examination, the Vietnamese student is not required to think and to aim at originality, but to recite all he has learned by heart from his textbooks. This attitude is most deeply engraved in the Faculty of Law (even though some far-sighted professors have tried their best to curb this tendency). For instance, in the second session of the 1958 oral examination, the writer witnessed one of the law students recited the whole policy speech by one of the French Governor-Generals, word by word. He got the highest grade in that course. At the ministerial level, we find that the same "esprit d'imitation" prevails. Trained in the French system, these policy makers follow that system point by point. By the end of the 1950's the French changed their system by cancelling the oral examination for the Baccalauréat. One year later, no oral exam was required for the Tu-tai (Vietnamese Baccaureat). Again if we look closely at both French and Vietnamese high school curricula, this "esprit d'imitation" is more striking. Each time there is a change made in the curriculum in France, the same change is introduced in Vietnam one year later (especially those changes related to the physical science course). Similarly, we can safely

predict that the same tendency of indiscriminate borrowing without giving a second thought to the value and function of the things borrowed will persist when the "diplômes-à-Paris" retire and the new group of America-educated Vietnamese came to power.¹ Sensing the danger of this superficial over-conformism, an American political advisor must, ironically, stress the necessity of the "re-adaption" of American-educated technicians when they return to Vietnam.²

In summary, Confucianism is based on two fundamental assumptions: (1) the life-ideal is to be in harmony with tao and to imitate it, and (2) tao is a highly hierarchical system. From these assumptions, a social system is built

¹Some evidences of this tendency have been observed recently. For instance, the tea-break practice has already been well-accepted among American-educated intellectuals in Saigon. Ritualistically at 10 o'clock, they leave their offices and take their Volkswagons (introduced by MSU Group professors) to la Pagode (usually frequented by Westerners) and have coffee or iced tea with a lot of sugar and lemon (even though almost since their birth they had drunk only hot tea, or sometimes iced tea with sugar, but never with lemon). Another example of indiscriminate borrowing is the attempt to change the schedule of working time. Vietnam is hot at noon and relatively much cooler in the afternoon. The French perceived the value of the Vietnamese tradition of having a noon siesta, and made the two-hour siesta official, compensated by two hours of work in the later afternoon (for a total of eight hours a day). Yet the American-educated Vietnamese had seen that in US they don't have a siesta, so felt that the Vietnamese should not have it either. But the attempt fortunately was abandoned before the strong resistance of Vietnamese who had not had a chance to go to America. The interesting point is that the idea of abolishing the siesta originated with the Department of Defense--the first organization to try the new schedule--where overseas military training had accumulated the greatest number of American-educated personnel.

²Guy H. Fox, unpublished lecture on problems of public administration in Vietnam, 1963.

with strong emphasis on hierarchy. The latter is realized by means of an elaborate code of conventions and rituals, and is preserved by an authoritarian socialization which assign the highest value to submission and conformity. The effects of this socialization on Vietnamese patterns of behavior and personality have been presented by some behavioral evidence. In politics or in social relations, the stress on hierarchical rather than equalitarian values is common in Vietnamese society. These hierarchical values are characterized by the prevalence of formalism, conventionalism, and ritualism in socio-political life. Psychologically, the effects of Confucianism lead to the development of "l'esprit d'imitation," lack of imagination and inventiveness, love of uniformity, and predisposition toward conformity.¹ In short, the Confucianist socialization prepares Vietnamese individuals to be obedient and submissive to authority. Ritualistic conformity is the essence of the Confucianist system. Taoism, which coexists with Confucianism stresses on the other hand retreatistic withdrawal instead of ritualistic conformity.

¹Confucius preferred students who obeyed without questioning or hesitation. One of his favourite disciples was Yen Hwuy, who is now honoured in every Confucianist temple with the title "The Second Sage, the Philosopher Yen." One day Confucius told other students about Yen Hwuy in these terms: "I have talked with Hwuy for a whole day, and he was not made any objection to anything I said;--as if he were stupid. He retired, and I examined his conduct when away from me, and found him able to illustrate my teachings. Hwuy! He is not stupid." (Analects, Book II, Ch. IX.).

The Taoist System: Anarchist
Rebellion

Quite different from Confucianism which stresses social hierarchy, conventionalism, and conformism, Taoism rejects civilization altogether. Although assuming that harmony with tao is crucially important, Lao-tzu does not assume that tao is an hierarchical system. Thus, the ideal society is one in which the relationships between the ruler and the ruled, the superior and the subordinate, the age and the disciple are kept as much confused as possible--which is the opposite of the Confucian theory of "five relationships." A Confucian ruler must carry out all the rituals to distinguish himself sharply from the ruled (*Analects*, Bk. III, Ch. XIX, Bk. VII, Ch. XLIV, Ch. II), but the ideal Taoist ruler is different. According to Lao Tzu

The highest type of ruler is one of whose existence the people are barely aware. Next comes one whom they love and praise. Next comes one whom they fear. Next comes one whom they despise and defy (*Tao Teh Ching*, Ch. 17).

Or

the Sage reigns over the people by humbling himself in speech; and leads the people by putting himself behind. (*Tao Teh Ching*, Ch. 66).

It is the same with the teacher. A Confucian teacher must be "grave," "if the scholar be not grave," said Confucius, "he will not call forth any veneration, and his learning will be solid" (*Analects*, Bk. 1, Ch. VIII). A Taoist scholar does not need to put up a "grave appearance" to make himself ritually different from others. We read again in *Tao Teh Ching*,

The ancient adepts of the Tao were subtle and flexible, profound and comprehensive. Their minds were too deep to be fathomed. Because they are unfathomable, one can only describe them vaguely by their appearance (Ch. 15).

or

In the midst of the world, the Sage is shy and self-effacing. For the sake of the world he keeps his heart in its nebulous state. All the people strain their ears and eyes: the Sage only smiles like an amused infant. (Ch. 49),

These superficial differences between Confucianism and Taoism are the result of their fundamental divergences about the life-ideal. Their common belief in the necessity of harmony with Tao, constitutes only an insignificant similarity between the two schools, since they have totally different points of view on Tao. For the Confucianist, the principle of Tao reveals itself in the structural differentiation of the Great Ultimate. For the Taoist, the principle of Tao resides in the Great Ultimate itself. Starting from these premises, Confucianists believe that the social system should imitate the cosmic principle of differentiation by maintaining a highly hierarchical structure. Taoists, on the contrary, believe that the ideal is to go back to the Great Ultimate--"Tao," "The Mother of Things. . ."--the source of Goodness itself. For a Confucianist, wisdom consists of understanding the principle underlying the "brilliant phenomena of the heavens" and the "definite arrangements of the earth" (Book of Change, The Great Appendix, Bk. 1, Ch. IV) and transposes these phenomenal regularities and hierarchies into social

life. But a Taoist is somewhat more radical and wisdom, to him, is to know origins rather than developments (Ch. 14).

Lao Tzu wrote:

All-under-Heaven have a common Beginning.
This Beginning is the Mother of the world.
Having known the Mother,
We may proceed to know her children.
Having known the children,
We should go back and hold on to the Mother (Ch. 52).

The explicit recommendation is to go back to origins. Lao Tzu seemed to have a very pessimistic view of evolution, cosmic or social.

When once the Primal Simplicity diversified,
Different names appeared.
Are there not enough names now?

This pessimism results in a strong distrust of social life. Almost every chapter of Tao Teh Ching is a condemnation of civilization and a plea for going back to "infancy," to "Primal Simplicity," to Nature. For instance,

The world is a sacred vessel, which must not be tampered
with or grabbed after.
To tamper with it is to spoil it, and to grasp it is
to lose it. (Ch. 29).

Thus, civilization is something deplorable. It is the sign of human decadence rather than forward evolution. With the introduction of li man has reached the extreme end of his regression.

Failing Tao, man resorts to Virtue.
Failing virtue, man resorts to humanity.
Failing humanity, man resorts to morality.
Failing morality, man resorts to ceremony
Now, ceremony is the merest husk of faith and loyalty;
It is the beginning of all confusion and disorder. (Ch. 38).

Moral and law similarly are not only crude and ineffective means of dealing with this general decadence; paradoxically, they are the very cause of confusion and disorder. Lao

Tzu again wrote:

The more taboos and inhibitions there are in the world,
The poorer the people become.
The sharper the weapons the people possess,
The greater confusion reigns in the realm.
The more clever and crafty the men,
The oftener strange things happen.
The more articulate the laws and ordinances,¹
The more robbers and thieves arise. (Ch. 57)¹

In effect, all social institutions are artificial. Values and ideals are at best ephemeral, and at worst, confusion-breeding. All of these prevent the soul from having direct communion with Tao. These obstacles, including feelings and emotions, must be eliminated if one want to reach Tao, the source of wisdom. Even "our body is the very source of our calamities" (Ch. 13).

The five colours blind the eye.
The five tones deafen the ear.
The five flavours cloy the palate.
Racing and hunting madden the mind.
Rare goods tempt men to do wrong.
Therefore, the Sage takes care of the belly, not the eye.
He prefers that is within to what is without. (Ch. 12).

Thus in order to know Tao, it is not necessary to go to the past--as the Confucianist does--to look for it. It is not necessary to go anywhere to look for it. (Ch. 47). "How do I know about the world?" Lao Tzu asked himself, and found a simple answer to this question "By what is within me" (Ch. 54).

¹Tao Teh Ching, Ch. 57.

(See also Ch. 5). What did he find within himself? He found that the road to tao is the way back to his mother's womb. This is the basic tenet of his philosophy.

While all things are stirring together,
I only contemplate the Return.
For flourishing as they do,
Each of them will return to its root.
To return to the root is to find peace.
To find peace is to fulfill one's destiny (Ch. 16).

A Sage is nothing but a person who has succeeded in regressing to his babyhood.

All men are joyous and beaming. . .
I [the Sage] alone am placid and give no sign,
Like a babe which has not yet smiled.

. . .
All men are bright, bright:
I alone am dim, dim.
All men are sharp, sharp:
I alone am mum, mum.
Bland like the ocean,
Aimless like the wafting gale (Ch. 20).

or

. . . be the Brook of the World.
To be the Brook of the World is
To move constantly in the path of Virtue
. . . and to return again to infancy

. . . be the Pattern of the World.
To be the Pattern of the World is
To move constantly in the path of Virtue
. . . and to return again to the Infinite

. . . be the Fountain of the World.
To be the Fountain of the World is
To live the abundant life of Virtue,
and to return again to Primal Simplicity
(Ch. 28, See also Ch. 40).

In short, Taoism is a total rejection of Confucianism. Instead of complicated ceremonies and social rituals, he praises simplicity. Instead of progression toward a more

sophisticated law and li, he preaches the virtues of regression. Instead of strong central authority, he exhorts the value of anarchy. We wonder how Taoism and Confucianism, which are so diametrically opposite, can be simultaneously embraced by the Vietnamese as well as the Chinese. We might say without too much exaggeration that under the skin of every Confucianist hides a Taoist. Who quietly waits for good occasions to appear and dominate the Confucianist. (When I say "Confucianist" or "Taoist" I do not mean an individual who knows by heart the teachings of Confucius or Laotzu, but one who adopts the Confucianist or Taoist way of living). It is true that "in every Vietnamese's belly, there is a mandarin." It is equally true that "thu dien-vien" is generally considered as the ideal life.¹ For a mandarin, the ideal is to "retire" as soon as possible, to have a farm large enough for his living, a small garden and a small hut where he can spend the rest of his life admiring nature, writing poems, drinking rice wine and playing chess with his friends. The best illustrations of this Taoist life can be found in the lives of such well-known and admired scholars as Nguyen-Khuyen, Tan-Da, Tu-Xuong. In addition, it is not uncommon to find famous "an si" who are scholars who live a secluded and solitary life, and consider the mandarin life a burden to get rid of rather than a privilege to envy.

¹"Thu dien-vien" literally means "the pleasure of farming and gardening." In the Vietnamese society, it connotes a kind of Rousseauistic life.

One famous poet, Nguyen Cong Tru, complained that the striving for honor is nothing but a debt. (Tang-bong ho-thi nam-nhi trai. Cai cong-danh la cai no-nam). It is also commonly believed that wealth and honor (vinh-hoa, plu-guy) are nothing but ephemeral attractions (ba-phy-dung). The well-known legend of two scholars, Luu-Tham and Nguyen-Trieu, epitomizes this general retreatist tendency found in Vietnamese society. Songs and poems have been written to idealize their happiness in the fairyland where life was complete enjoyment of the Nature and time unknown, and to depict their deep disappointment when they came back to the earthly world where everything is transient.

In the political arena, the same Taoist attitude is not uncommon. Political retreatism, which usually takes the form of "chum tran," can be understood only as an attitude of "attentism," or "wait-and-see." I believe "chum-tran" is more than an opportunistic tactic of wait-and-see. Sometimes it means a rationalization for political withdrawal. The case of Nguyen Tuong Tam illustrates this common aspect of "chum-tran." Nguyen Tuong Tam was a well-known revolutionary patriot and novelist. He was one of the leaders of the nationalist party resisting French colonialism. Defeated by the French, betrayed in the Vietminh (Vietnamese Communist Party), he quit politics. While Diem was in power, he spent most of his time in the jungle near Dalat collecting rare orchids and writing novels and poems. When Diem asked for his participation

in the government, he declined the offer. People regarded him as a leader most capable of apposing the Diemist dictatorship. His complete withdrawal even on occasions most propitious for his assumption of the leadership of the nation, was really disappointing. For the Vietnamese it is a case of chum-tran. I think chum-tran involves attentism in some cases, but it means alienated withdrawal or retreatism in most of the cases, as it did for Nguyen Tuong Tam.

Now the question which perplexes us is: How is it possible that Confucianism, with its emphasis on active participation in social life through rigidly defined roles, and Taoism, with its preaching of total withdrawal, can exist side by side. Our tentative hypothesis is that the coexistence of two opposite ways of life is the result of an underlying psychological force generated by the value-system of the Confucianist society.

Taoism as an Anomic Reaction Outlet Against Confucianism.

In the Vietnamese society, Taoism does not have a significant role in the socialization process of the children. During childhood, they are raised to be in conformity with li. In school, the teacher-student relationship is strictly based on li. A rigid pattern of life is imposed on them. In general, the more rigid a social system, the more intense is the socialization process. Even though human nature is flexible, we still can safely assume that man can never be

reduced to an automaton living according to a rigid and well-drawn pattern. No matter how comprehensive the system of law, how effective the Confucianist music and teachings, how intense the childhood socialization, it is difficult to keep the pressure high enough to avoid deviation. Deviation and rebellion are encouraged by Taoism which systematically rationalizes this resistance against the restrictive system of Confucius. For an alienated individual, the appeal of the verses must be considerable:

All men settle down in their grooves:
I alone am stubborn and remain outside.
But wherein I am most different from others
is in knowing to take sustenance from my Mother!
(Ch. 20).

Thus Taoism offers him a rationalization of his revolt against the Confucianist ritualism and high conformism. It also gives him a sense of security when he deviates from Confucianism by "preferring what is within to what is without" (Ch. 72), and by attacking the traditional conception of "virtue," "humanity," "morality," "ceremony" (Ch. 38).

In addition, in the Confucianist system there is another source of tension and frustration which can never be adequately relieved; that is the mandarin system itself. Every Confucianist's goal is to become a mandarin system itself. Every Confucianist's goal is to become a mandarin (or a fonctionnaire in modern terminology). But the means to attain that widely cherished goal is very limited. Only few can pass the numerous examinations in order to become mandarins.

The discrepancy between the value of the goal and the availability of the means results in alienation.¹ These feelings of alienation are then translated into such ideas as (1) rejection of the value of education, (2) revolt against the traditional teachers, and (3) repudiation of the legitimacy of the mandarin system itself. Again, Taoism offers a well-organized thought system for rationalizing these tendencies of alienation. For instance, Lao Tzu teaches that knowledge is bad, the source of confusion,

Therefore, the Sage's way of governing begins by
Emptying the heart of desires,
Filling the belly with food,
Weakening the ambitions,
Toughening the bones.
In this way he will cause the people to remain without
knowledge and without desire, and prevent the knowing
ones from any ado (Ch. 3).

or

In the old days, those who were well versed in the
practice of the Tao did not try to enlighten the
people, but rather to keep them in the state of simplicity. For, why are the people hard to govern?
Because they are too clever! (Ch. 65).

As for the traditional sages, they are completely discredited by Lao Tzu, and seen as the main source of misery for the people. He asks them to "drop wisdom, abandon cleverness, and the people will be benefited a hundredfold" (Ch. 19, see also Ch. 22). The final coup de grâce delivered to the Confucianist is the Taoist attack against the mandarin system. The mandarins are supposed to be the "father and

¹Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1949), pp. 125-149.

mother" of the people. For Lao-Tzu, they are the source of calamities to the people. These triple attacks relieve the feelings of frustration among the group of failing students. Yet because of these, Taoism is not forgiven by the successful mandarins. That is why Taoism was not considered serious subject-matter under the ancient regime. This does not prevent its widespread popularity among the masses, even among mandarins who dissatisfied with their system do not hesitate to embrace Taoism as a means of escape.

Unfortunately, the Taoist reaction which somewhat relieves the anomic potentiality generated by Confucianism is pushed to the other extreme when it preaches mass ignorance and total dissociation from the social life. Its anarchist instructions against Confucianist totalitarianism are so excessive that, instead of becoming a primer for the establishment of a reasonable laissez-faire regime, they open the way for a brutal dictatorship without such humane restraint as are found in the Confucianist system. As a matter of fact, they gave rise to the "legalist school" which prepared the ground for the establishment of the Ch'in empire whose works consisted of burning all the books except Ch'in law books, medicine books and astrology books. Since all values, all social decadence, nothing remains to prevent the rise of power for the sake of power alone. The inhumane dictatorship

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of Emporor Ch'in illustrates this dangerous direct consequences of Taoist School.¹

We have seen that Taoism is the opposite of Confucianism, almost point by point. Yet these two schools of thought, or two religions, not only co-exist peacefully within a country, but are also simultaneously accepted. A Confucianist is paradoxically also a Taoist. Nguyen Binh Khiem, the well-known Taoist in Vietnamese history was also a Confucianist scholar. In pure logic, a Confucianist could not accept Confucianism. This paradoxical state of mind is indeed only apparent. In terms of social integration, the authoritarian system of Confucianism and the anomie-inclined system of Taoism are diametrically opposite: one stresses conformity, the other tends to social dissolution. Yet in terms of psychological predisposition, they are but two faces of the same coin. According to Durkheim, over conformity and the tendency toward extreme social isolation are two aspects of the general anomic tendency: the "altruistic suicide" characterized by total dissolution of the self into the social system, and the "egoistic" and "anomic" suicide characterized by compulsive escape from social life.² Recently, a number of researches have thrown some light onto that seemingly paradoxical

¹See H. G. Creel, "The totalitarianism of the Legalists," Chinese Thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-Tung, (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 139.

²Emile Durkheim, Suicide, a Study in Sociology, Translated by J. A. Spaulding and George Simpson (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1951), pp. 171-276.

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socio-psychological phenomenon. An individual who has undergone a restrictive and authoritarian socialization process tends to have an ambivalent attitude toward authority. He is constantly torn by two opposite tendencies: one--conventionalism, overconformity--is in the direction of extreme social integration, the other--rebellion and alientation--is in the direction of anarchism and social isolation which results from an unhealthy distrust of others and a strongly cynical outlook.¹ These two opposite tendencies have found their route of escape in Confucianism and Taoism. We may say that Confucianism is the conscious level of the psychological predispositions of the Vietnamese, and Taoism the unconscious level of their psychological predispositions.²

Conclusion

In this chapter I have tried to demonstrate that the national character of a country--hence the political orientation of its elite--can be partially explained by its value system and ethical foundation. In the case of Vietnam, Confucianism and Taoism have considerable influence on the formation of the socio-political thought pattern of the Vietnamese elite. Their life ideal is harmony. The concern

¹Durkheim, Suicide. . ., op. cit., Ch. 204, pp. 152-275.

²See, T. W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality, op. cit.; Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom, op. cit., p. 158. Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, pp. 75-78; Edward L. McDill, "Anomie, Authoritarianism, Prejudice, and Socio-economic status: an Attempt at Clarification," op. cit., pp. 239-245; H. H. Roberts and M. Rokeach, "Anomie, Authoritarianism, and Prejudice: a Replication," op. cit., pp. 355-358..

for harmony become sometimes an unhealthy compulsion toward conformism, and on the other hand anomic withdrawal and rebellion (at least on the unconscious level). In practice these contradictory tendencies result in general submissiveness with outbursts of social and political rebellion. In the modern ideological context, they push the individual either in the direction of rugged individualism or that of overwhelming collectivism.

CHAPTER III

THE ANTI-DEMOCRATIC TENDENCY IN THE VIETNAMESE CULTURE

Introduction

In the last chapter I presented a general sketch of the ethical foundation of the Vietnamese culture, and showed its anti-democratic nature. But, I suggest, socialization into an authoritarian culture does not necessarily result in the development of an authoritarian personality. This chapter will examine the relationship between cultural and personal authoritarianism. We will, first, compare Vietnamese students who have been raised in an authoritarian culture with English and American samples who have been socialized into a more democratic environment. Secondly, we will study the relationships between authoritarianism and several cultural, social, and economic factors which constitute part of the "underdevelopment syndrome."

Originally I had planned to use two distinct scales to measure the variable of authoritarianism: the Dogmatism Scale constructed by Rokeach, which measures the psychological force underlying anti-democratic tendency; and a special scale constructed for the Vietnamese students to measure

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anti-democratic behavior. The use of two independent scales should have yielded some estimate of validity. Unfortunately, the data collected by means of the second scale were "lost" on the way to this country. Thus due to the present circumstances in Vietnam (which are not favorable to political survey research) the Dogmatism Scale is the only means available to measure anti-democratic tendency. The validity of the Dogmatism Scale has been well established in the American populations; we are forced to assume that it also measures authoritarianism in Vietnamese culture. Since this assumption could not be validated, the findings presented in this paper must be considered with great caution.

Another methodological problem which is among the most serious ones faced by cross-cultural researchers is that of translation. The Dogmatism Scale is in English. It has to be translated into Vietnamese for the Vietnamese subjects. A translated version of a scale can never have the same meaning as that of the original version. A "literal" translation which uses Vietnamese words corresponding as closely as possible to the English terms risks conveying item-meanings inaccurately because words do not have the same connotations in the two languages. On the other hand, a "free" translation which attempts to convey the meanings of the American items without using the same terms leaves perhaps too much to the judgment of the translator and thus may be biased. Faced with these alternative sources of error, I

have compromised between literal and free translation. For the cross-cultural comparisons I use literal translations slightly modified to avoid obvious distortions of meaning. For "intra-cultural" comparison I use items translated by both methods. For each item difficult to translate literally I have added two or three versions in free and culturally more meaningful translation. In analysis, I have used the "best" version (or versions), i.e., those having the highest discriminatory power.

The main questions discussed in this chapter are:

1. How authoritarian are the Vietnamese students as compared to American and English samples?
2. How is Confucianism related to authoritarianism? In particular, I will discuss:
 - a. Confucianist familism
 - b. Familism and authoritarianism
 - c. Status-consciousness
 - d. Status-consciousness and authoritarianism
3. How is Westernization related to authoritarianism?

How Authoritarian Are the Vietnamese Students?

"Authoritarianism," writes H. H. Dubs, "has been one fundamental characteristic of Confucianism through all the ages."¹ If the ethical foundations of a culture are authoritarian, are the people authoritarian? The answer to this

¹H. H. Dubs, Hsuntze, The Moulder of Ancient Confucianism, op. cit., p. xxviii.

question is tentatively presented here by comparing the Dogmatism mean score of the Viet mean Dogmatism score of Vietnamese students with those of American and English samples. The translated version of the Dogmatism Scale, Form E, was administered to a group of students of Saigon University. The Vietnamese data were compared to those American and English data collected by Rokeach.¹ A one-tailed t-test was used. The findings are presented in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 shows that Vietnamese college students in Saigon are much more authoritarian than even English workers. From this, we are tempted to draw the generalization that Vietnamese culture when compared to those Anglo-American worlds tends to generate greater authoritarian tendency. However, we cannot be certain whether it is the backward economic state of Vietnam which breeds this anti-democratic tendency as Seymour Martin Lipset would argue,² or whether, as others have claimed, it is the Confucianist system which is responsible.³ The cross-cultural method, while giving us general profiles of cultures, does not explain what mechanisms within each culture account for observed differences between

¹Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, op. cit., p. 90.

²Lipset, Political Man, op. cit., p. 45-76.

³Dean, The Nature of the Non-Western World, op. cit., p. 98; Dubs, Hsuntze, The Moulder of Ancient Confucianism, op. cit., p. xxviii; Francis L. K. Hsu, Under the Ancestor's Shadows (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), p. 256-278.

TABLE 3.1.--Mean dogmatism scores of Vietnamese students as compared to various American and English groups.¹

| Group | N | Mean | S.D. | Difference between means | t value | p (one-tailed test) |
|------------------|-----|-------|------|--------------------------------|---------|---------------------------|
| Saigon Univ. | 232 | 206.2 | 26.0 | | | |
| English College | 80 | 152.8 | 26.2 | -53.4 | 80.90 | p<.0005 |
| English Workers | 60 | 175.8 | 26.0 | -30.4 | 42.08 | p<.0005 |
| Ohio State Univ. | 22 | 142.6 | 27.6 | -63.6 | 55.30 | p<.0005 |

¹For the mean scores of English and American Groups, see Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, op. cit., p. 90.

cultures. To understand these mechanisms it is necessary to probe inside a culture.

Confucianism and Authoritarianism

Familism as an Independent Variable

A culture is not monolithic. In a so-called authoritarian culture, there are individuals who are more or less authoritarian for one reason or another. This permits us to study different causal factors of authoritarianism in comparing one sub-culture with another. Is the normative system of the Vietnamese culture an important source of authoritarianism, or is it the economic level of the country? Thus we define two sets of variables--one related to the traditional norms, the other to the socio-economic level of the subject.

The socio-economic level of the subject is measured by the income and education level of his parents. As for the measure of his commitment to traditional norms, I use attitudes toward the Vietnamese extended family as an indicator of socialization into the Confucian system. As H. G. Creel has put it, "Confucianism might be defined as the philosophy of the Chinese family system."¹ Thus, the more attached an individual feels to the Confucian family system, the more he is socialized into Confucianism. In effect, familism is the crucial motivational force which shapes socio-political attitudes in the

¹H. G. Creel, Confucianism, The Man and the Myth (New York: The John Day Company, 1949), p. 125.

Vietnamese society--from the so-called nepotism which was most apparent in the case of the late President Ngo Dinh Diem to political paternalism widespread under the royalist as well as republican regime. The principle tu-than, te-gia, tri-quoc, binh-thien-ha¹ is well known among the Vietnamese elite, and still seems to be considered as a valid political guideline.

The importance of attitudes toward the extended family justifies the construction of a "familism scale." Familism consists of three main obligations: obedience to one's elders, respect for them, and support to needy relatives.

The first obligation aims at insuring the hierarchical character of the family system. In the past, the patriarch had power of life and death over his family and, in turn, was responsible for the political attitudes and behavior of his children. Recently his role has been greatly reduced. Yet compared to the American father, his authority over his children is still considerable. The hierarchy goes down with generation and age. The father of the extended family (which consists of several nuclear families) is the highest authority. Uncles supposedly have as much authority as the father (chu cung nhu cha), but in practice their role becomes significant only if the father dies while the children are still young. Aunts

¹This principle can be approximately translated as "in order to be able to rule the world one has to be able to rightly rule his country; in order to be able to rule his country, one has to be able to administer his family rightly which in turns depends on one's ability to rectify oneself." See The Great Learning, "The text of Confucius," par. 4.

play a minor role in this parriarchical system; yet, since they belong to the father's generation, the authority of the father somewhat enhances the position of the aunts within the family--especially if they are wealthy and help support the family.

Stepping down the hierarchical ladder one arrives at the children's generation. Here age is the decisive factor in the determination of the hierarchy among brothers and sisters. Younger brothers and sisters must obey and respect older brothers and sisters. Status derived from this birth-order is inherited. That is, the children of younger brothers must obey, or at least respect, the children of the older brothers even though the latter may be younger than the former.

Further down in the hierarchy we have the generations of grand-children, of great-grand-children, and so on. In each generation the same principle of determining status, first by means of generation, then by birth order, is respected.

The second familistic obligation--respect--serves to legitimize the hierarchical nature of the system. A true Confucianist must not only respect (in the usual Western sense of the word), but sincerely kinh-trong them. Kinh-trong means more than "respect;" it also has connotations of "admiration," "reverence," "awe," and "love."

The third obligation--financial support--is but an "applied" aspect of familism. It is the only one of the three obligations which works both ways. Elders are supposed to

support their younger relatives; but the latter, in turn, are expected to support their elders.

In this well-knit hierarchical system, each individual has a definite role to play. The extent to which he is willing to play his role, which consists in fulfilling the three obligations, corresponds to the extent to which he has been socialized into the system.

The familism scale used in this study was constructed on the basis of this obligational structure. It consists of three sub-scales: obedience, respect, and support. Each sub-scale consists of a set of items describing violations of these familistic norms and the strength of a subject's reactions against these violations represents the degree of his commitment to the Confucian familistic system. The Familism Scale takes the following form:

A person who does not fulfill his familial obligations is considered as having committed an act which is more or less "wrong" depending on each case. His act might be evaluated as "very wrong," "somewhat wrong," "slightly wrong," "very slightly wrong," or "not wrong at all." Now, examine the case of Mr. Ba and evaluate his acts according to your own conscience. Write 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 on the left margin depending on how you feel in each case:

- 4 Very Wrong
- 3 Somewhat Wrong
- 2 Slightly Wrong
- 1 Very Slightly Wrong
- 0 Not Wrong At All

(1) Obedience Duty Sub-Scale

1. Mr. Ba (18 years old) does not obey his parents.
2. Mr. Ba (18 years old) does not obey his grand-parents.
3. Mr. Ba (18 years old) does not obey his uncles, and aunts.
4. Mr. Ba (18 years old) does not obey his older brothers and sisters.
5. Mr. Ba (18 years old) does not obey his cousins "of higher ranks" (anh chi em ho).

(2) Respect Duty Sub-Scale

6. Mr. Ba does not respect his parents.
7. Mr. Ba does not respect his grand-parents.
8. Mr. Ba does not respect his uncles and aunts.
9. Mr. Ba does not respect his older brothers and sisters.
10. Mr. Ba does not respect his cousins of "higher ranks."

(3) Support Duty Sub-Scale

11. Mr. Ba has money but does not help his needy parents.
12. Mr. Ba has money but does not help his needy grand-parents.
13. Mr. Ba has money but does not help his needy uncles and aunts.
14. Mr. Ba has money but does not help his needy brothers and sisters.
15. Mr. Ba has money but does not help his needy cousins.
16. Mr. Ba has money but does not help his needy younger brothers and sisters.
17. Mr. Ba has money but does not help his needy nephews and nieces.

The familism score of each subject is the total of the points he assigns to each item. Table 3.2 shows the item analysis of the familism scale for a sample of 201 Cantho High School senior students; the highs are defined as those whose scores are in the fourth quartile of the distribution and the lows are those who have scores in the first quartile.

All the 17 items of the familism scale having a sufficiently high discriminatory power are kept for use. The corrected coefficient of split-half reliability is .934. The familism scale seems to be a highly reliable tool of measurement. When we break down the familism scale into three sub-scales, the item analyses show that the discriminatory power of each item increases considerably, and the reliability coefficients are not much different from that of the whole scale. The corrected, reliability coefficients of the Obedience Sub-Scale, the Respect Sub-Scale, and the Support Sub-Scale are respectively .895, .858, and .915. (See Tables, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5).

As the mean scores of this sample show, the extended family system weakens beyond the limit of the nuclear family. The three obligations become less and less urgent as one moves from the nucleus to the periphery of the system. The following graphs in Figures 1, 2, and 3 show this weakening tendency in the extended family system in Vietnam as found in this transition period.

The authority of the grand-parents--who were the supreme authority in the family in the past--has been considerably

TABLE 3.2--Item analysis of the familism scale. (Cantho High School students).

| Items | Total Group | | Highs | | Lows | | Diff. | <u>t</u> ¹ | |
|-------------------------|-------------|-------|--------|-------|--------|-------|-------|-----------------------|--|
| | N = 201 | | N = 50 | | N = 50 | | | | |
| | M | S.D. | M | S.D. | M | S.D. | | | |
| OBEDIENCE | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Parents | 2.955 | 1.006 | 3.34 | .823 | 2.70 | 1.065 | .64 | 3.329 | |
| 2. Grand- parents | 3.019 | 1.053 | 3.54 | .705 | 2.62 | 1.193 | .92 | 5.989 | |
| 3. Uncles | 2.199 | .992 | 2.76 | .959 | 1.66 | .917 | 1.10 | 5.804 | |
| 4. Older Brothers | 1.701 | .922 | 2.26 | .803 | 1.26 | .921 | 1.00 | 5.727 | |
| 5. Elder Cousin | 1.104 | .961 | 1.86 | .903 | .56 | .786 | 1.30 | 7.598 | |
| RESPECT | | | | | | | | | |
| 6. Parents | 3.611 | .817 | 3.92 | .444 | 3.02 | 1.133 | .90 | 5.178 | |
| 7. Grand Parents | 3.661 | .710 | 3.92 | .274 | 3.26 | .985 | .66 | 4.520 | |
| 8. Uncles | 2.855 | .850 | 3.50 | .614 | 2.14 | 1.903 | 1.36 | 8.718 | |
| 9. Older Brothers | 2.164 | 1.043 | 2.92 | .804 | 1.32 | .957 | 1.60 | 8.958 | |
| 10. Elder Cousins | 1.452 | 1.043 | 2.40 | .857 | .68 | .740 | 1.72 | 10.630 | |
| SUPPORT | | | | | | | | | |
| 11. Parents | 3.502 | .860 | 3.86 | .534 | 2.76 | 1.134 | 1.10 | 6.138 | |
| 12. Grand Parents | 3.164 | .968 | 3.82 | .522 | 2.30 | 1.092 | 1.52 | 8.786 | |
| 13. Uncles | 2.024 | 1.065 | 2.84 | .738 | .94 | 1.818 | 1.90 | 12.071 | |
| 14. Brothers | 2.288 | 1.089 | 3.18 | .849 | 1.12 | .824 | 2.06 | 12.182 | |
| 15. Cousins | 1.199 | 1.005 | 2.20 | .903 | .42 | 1.702 | 1.78 | 10.893 | |
| 16. Younger Brothers | 2.477 | 1.216 | 3.42 | .810 | 1.36 | .984 | 2.06 | 11.318 | |
| 17. Nephews | 1.646 | 1.170 | 2.62 | 1.007 | .78 | .910 | 1.84 | 9.484 | |

¹Employing a one-tailed t test, the values of t for the significance levels of .05 and .01 are respectively 1.651 and 2.358 for large samples.

TABLE 3.3.--Item analysis of the obedience sub-scale. (Cantho High School students).

| Items | Total Group | | Highs in Obedience | | Lows ¹ in Obedience | | Diff. | <u>t</u> ² |
|--------------|-------------|-------|--------------------|------|--------------------------------|-------|-------|-----------------------|
| | N = 201 | | N = 50 | | N = 50 | | | |
| | M | S.D. | M | S.D. | M | S.D. | | |
| 1. Parents | 2.955 | 1.006 | 3.68 | .551 | 1.86 | .926 | 1.82 | 11.818 |
| 2. G. Parent | 3.019 | 1.053 | 3.80 | .534 | 1.96 | 1.068 | 1.84 | 10.824 |
| 3. Uncles | 2.119 | .992 | 3.18 | .628 | 1.12 | .718 | 2.06 | 15.036 |
| 4. Brothers | 1.701 | 1.922 | 2.56 | .786 | 1.02 | .795 | 1.54 | 9.625 |
| 5. Cousins | 1.104 | 1.961 | 2.02 | .795 | .32 | .551 | 1.70 | 12.319 |

TABLE 3.4.--Item analysis of the respect sub-scale (Cantho High School students).

| Items | Total Group | | Highs in Respect | | Lows ³ in Respect | | Diff. | <u>t</u> ⁴ |
|---------------|-------------|-------|------------------|------|------------------------------|-------|-------|-----------------------|
| | N = 201 | | N = 50 | | N = 50 | | | |
| | M | S.D. | M | S.D. | M | S.D. | | |
| 1. Parents | 3.611 | .817 | 4.00 | .000 | 2.72 | 1.178 | 1.28 | 7.619 |
| 2. G. Parents | 3.661 | .710 | 3.98 | .141 | 2.98 | .999 | 1.00 | 6.944 |
| 3. Uncles | 2.855 | .850 | 3.68 | .471 | 1.90 | .762 | 1.78 | 13.906 |
| 4. Brothers | 2.164 | 1.043 | 3.26 | .443 | 1.02 | .820 | 2.24 | 16.842 |
| 5. Cousins | 1.452 | 1.043 | 2.66 | .658 | .62 | .752 | 2.04 | 14.266 |

¹The highs are defined as those who have scores falling within the fourth quartile. and the lows as those who have scores falling within the first quartiles.

²Employing a one-tailed t-test, t's of 1.64 and 2.33 are significant beyond the 5 and 1 per cent levels respectively, for large samples.

³The highs are defined as those who have scores higher than the third quartiles, and the lows as those who have scores falling within the first quartile.

⁴Employing a one-tail t-test, t's of 1.64 and 2.33 are significant beyond the 5 and 1 per cent levels respectively, for large samples.

TABLE 3.5.--Item analysis of the support sub-scale (Cantho High School students).

| Items | Total Group | | Highs ¹ | | Lows ¹ | | Diff. | <u>t</u> ² |
|----------------------|-------------|-------|--------------------|------|-------------------|-------|-------|-----------------------|
| | N = 201 | | N = 50 | | N = 50 | | | |
| | M | S.D. | M | S.D. | M | S.D. | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Parents | 3.502 | .860 | 4.00 | .000 | 2.66 | 1.117 | 1.340 | 8.428 |
| 2. G.Parents | 3.164 | .968 | 3.86 | .350 | 2.10 | 1.092 | 1.76 | 10.732 |
| 3. Uncles | 2.024 | 1.065 | 2.94 | .585 | .80 | .782 | 2.14 | 15.396 |
| 4. Brothers | 2.288 | 1.089 | 3.34 | .592 | .98 | .713 | 2.36 | 17.879 |
| 5. Cousins | 1.199 | 1.005 | 2.34 | .847 | .34 | .519 | 2.00 | 14.084 |
| 6. Young brothers | 2.477 | 1.216 | 3.60 | .534 | 1.18 | .873 | 2.42 | 16.575 |
| 7. Nephews | 1.646 | 1.170 | 2.94 | .818 | .64 | .802 | 2.34 | 14.356 |

¹The highs are defined as those who have scores higher than the third quartiles, and the lows as those who have scores falling within the first quartile.

²Employing a one-tail t-test, t's of 1.64 and 2.33 are significant beyond the 5 and 1 per cent levels respectively for large samples.




FIGURE 1.--The weakening of the extended family system: the obedience duty. (The maximum Score is 4) N=201 Average scores for Cantho High School students




FIGURE 2.--The weakening of the extended family system: the respect duty. (The maximum score is 4, N=201).




Figure 3.--The weakening of the extended family system: the support duty.
(The maximum average score is 4. N=201).

reduced, almost to the level of that of the parents. The weakening of the authority of the elders is also shown in the tendency of the individual to liberate himself from their authority. The reaction toward disobedience is not strong when compared to the reaction against disrespect. In other words, the Vietnamese students are more inclined to pay lip service in submitting themselves to the authority of their elders. They still respect them, but they are less motivated to obey them, (see Table 3.6).

In general, there is evidences that attitudes toward the extended family system are not uniform. They are more or less concentrated around the nuclear family circle. On the other hand, they vary from one sub-culture to another. Familism has a slight positive correlation with monthly income level of the parents. This correlation ($r: .132$) gives little support to the hypothesis advanced by Hsiao-tung Fei that "the big family (or the house) system and the clan are the gentry's organizations."¹ Familism is also found to be positively correlated with educational level of the father as measured by the amount of his knowledge, of a foreign language (Chinese, French, and English). It is positively correlated with the amount of knowledge of French and English, with coefficients of correlation

¹"Peasantry and Gentry: An Interpretation of Chinese Social Structure and Its Changes," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 52 (1956), pp. 1-17.

TABLE 3.6.--The differences between reactions against disobedience and disrespect toward elders. (N = 201) Cantho High School Students.

| Elders | Respect | | Obedience | | Diff. | t | p two tail test |
|----------------|---------|-------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|-----------------------|
| | M | S.D. | M | S.D. | | | |
| Parents | 3.611 | .817 | 2.955 | 1.006 | .656 | 7.208 | p<.001 |
| Grand Parents | 3.661 | .710 | 3.019 | 1.053 | .642 | 7.133 | p<.001 |
| Uncles | 2.855 | .850 | 2.119 | .992 | .736 | 8.000 | p<.001 |
| Older Brothers | 2.164 | 1.043 | 1.701 | .992 | .463 | 4.585 | p<.001 |
| Elder Cousins | 1.452 | 1.043 | 1.104 | .961 | .348 | 4.630 | p<.001 |

TABLE 3.7.--Simple correlations of familism with socio-economic status as measured by income level, the amount of knowledge of Chinese, French, English, and the number of years spent in the rural areas. (N=131; Cantho High School Students).

| Familism Correlated With | r | Significance Level |
|-----------------------------|-------|--------------------|
| Income | .132 | .10>p>.05 |
| Chinese | .000 | NS |
| French | .136 | .10>p>.05 |
| English | .189 | .05>p>.01 |
| Years in countryside | -.061 | NS |

respectively .136, and .189. Interestingly, familism is not correlated with the amount of knowledge of Chinese ($r = -.000061$). It is also insignificantly correlated with the number of years spent by the subjects in rural areas ($r = -.061$). (See Tables 3.7)

In short, the extended family system in Vietnam during this transitional period exhibits some signs of beginning disintegration. Even though it is still regarded as a legitimate institution, its authority is being undermined in practice. The speed of this process varies with different social classes. It is highest among poor families in the urban area of Cantho. Paradoxically, the familistic norms are well respected in the so-called Westernized families: the more the father knows the Western languages (English, French), the more traditionalistic are the children. This fact might be interpreted as an indication that in uneducated and poor families, the children are alienated from the social system.¹ This rejection of the familistic system might be one of several forms of rebellion against the society itself. Because of differential socialization and environment, certain individuals are more "familistic"

¹It has been found, at least in the U.S.A., that alienation, or anomie, is more frequent and higher among the people of the lower class than the upper class. See for instance, D. L. Meier, Wendell Bell, "Anomia, and Differential Access to the Achievement of Life Goals," American Sociological Review, 24, (1959), pp. 189-202. Wendell Bell, "Anomie, Social isolation, and the class structure," Sociometry, Vol. 20, (1957), pp. 105-116. E. H. Mizruchi, "Social Structure and Anomia in a Small City," American Sociological Review, Vol. 25, 1960, pp. 645-654.

than others. We shall see how this difference is related to the anti-democratic tendency as measured by the Dogmatism Scale.

Familism and Anti-Democratic Tendency

Social scientists and sinologists have hypothesized that the Confucianist system is the breeding ground of authoritarianism. This hypothesis is partly supported by the findings that a sample of Saigon University students are more authoritarian than American and English college students, even more authoritarian than English workers. With the Familism Scale and the translated version of the Dogmatism Scale¹ we will examine the relationship between the degree of commitment to the Confucianist familistic values, and authoritarianism.

Since familism has been found to be correlated with other socio-economic factors, we will use partial correlations to test the hypothesis of a relationship between Familism and Dogmatism. In computing the partial correlation coefficient between Familism and Dogmatism, we hold constant all socio-economic variables, i.e. numbers of years spent in the rural area, income, and education level of the parents (knowledge of foreign languages). The findings for the Cantho High School sample are shown in Table 3.8.

¹The item analysis, and reliability of the translated version of the Dogmatism Scale are included in the Appendix. In intra-cultural studies, a 43-item translated version of the Dogmatism Scale is used. In the above cross-cultural study, the translated version of the Dogmatism Scale, D Form (Ho itiu) was used.

TABLE 3.8.--Partial correlations between authoritarianism as the dependent variable, and familism, income, parental knowledge of Chinese, French, and English, and number of years in the countryside as independent variables (Cantho High School students, N = 131, df = 124, two-tailed test).

| Independent Variables ¹ | Partial Correlation | F _{6,124} | Significance Level |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Familism | -.042 | .222 | NS |
| Income | -.207 | 5.584 | p<.001 |
| Chinese | -.207 | 5.581 | p<.001 |
| French | -.146 | 2.733 | .05>p>.01 |
| English | -.036 | .168 | NS |
| Yrs. in countryside | .014 | .027 | NS |

¹Dogmatism is correlated to each of the six independent variables while the remaining 5 independent variables are held constant.

Among Cantho students, it appears that familism is not related to authoritarianism. However, we are still not in the position either to reject or accept the hypothesis that familism breeds authoritarianism. The relationship between familism and authoritarianism may be more complex than linear. As we have indicated previously, in this transitional period between individualistic independence and familial dominance, alienated individuals tend to reject the whole social system and with it the familistic system; yet at the same time it has been found that alienation is positively related to authoritarianism--at least with American samples.¹ Thus, those who strongly reject the well-established extended family system are likely to be authoritarian. It is not surprising, then, that the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists have developed a strong hate for their familistic institution. On the other hand, if the hypothesis of the previously mentioned social scientists and sinologists about the authoritarian nature of the Confucianist extended-family system is correct, those who have a favorable attitude toward that system are also authoritarian. The authoritarian individual torn by those two opposite tendencies consequently tends to behave unpredictably.

¹Alan Roberts and Milton Rokeach, "Anomie, Authoritarianism, and Prejudice: A Replication," The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 61 (January 1956), pp. 355-58; Edward L. McDill, "Anomie, Authoritarianism, Prejudice, and Socio-economic Status: An Attempt at Clarification," Social Forces, Vol. 39 (1961), pp. 239-245.

The three other partial correlations are very significant. Wealth is negatively correlated with authoritarianism. So is parental education. (See Table 3.8).

Among Vietnamese students in America, familism is also found to be uncorrelated with dogmatism. The same previous interpretation is applicable in this case. (See Table 3.9).

Thus, we have adequate evidence showing that familism is not correlated with dogmatism. In line with the above interpretation (authoritarian subjects tend to strongly conform to familistic values or to strongly reject them), this low correlation may be due to the curvilinear relationship between dogmatism and familism, and the regression line may take the form shown in Figure 4. In order to test this hypothesised U-shaped relationship between familism and authoritarianism) we compute the new coefficient of correlation on the basis of the following equation: $Y = f(X - \bar{X})^2$ in which Y is the dogmatism score, X is the familism score, and \bar{X} is the mean familism score of the sample. The partial correlation technique is also employed. Table 3.10 shows that the hypothesis is only partly supported. Thus among Cantho students, there is no relationship between familism and dogmatism. In contrast, among Vietnamese exchange students in America, the relationship between familism and dogmatism is parabolic, i.e. an authoritarian student either tends to conform (conventionalism) or to reject (alienation) the familistic values.

If familism is not found to be conclusively related to authoritarianism, we wonder whether the three components of

TABLE 3.9.--Partial correlation between dogmatism as the dependent variable and familism, numbers of years in USA, and parental income as independent variables (Vietnamese exchange students in America; N = 59, df = 55, two-tailed test).

| Independent Variables Dogmatism | r | F _{3,55} | Significance Level |
|------------------------------------|-------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Familism | .065 | .239 | NS |
| Years in USA | -.330 | 6.471 | p<.001 |
| Income | .019 | .021 | NS |




FIGURE 4.--Hypothesized U-shaped relationship between familism and dogmatism.

TABLE 3.10.--Parabolic relationship between familism and dogmatism with dogmatism as the dependent variable and familism the independent variable while other sociological factors (income, parental education, years in USA for exchange student group, and years in the countryside for the Cantho High School student group) are held constant.

| Samples | N | r | df | F | Significance Level |
|----------------------|-----|-------|-----|--------------------|--------------------|
| Cantho students | 131 | -.007 | 124 | $F_{6,124} = .007$ | NS |
| US Exchange Students | 59 | .255 | 55 | $F_{3,55} = 3.824$ | $p < .05$ |

of familism taken separately--"Obedience," "Respect," and "Support"--have any relationship to authoritarianism. To investigate this point, each subscale of the Familism Scale is used separately as a whole scale.

Among Contho High School students, some very significant correlations are found (See Table 3.11).

Obedience has no significant correlation with authoritarianism. Respect and Support are very¹ significantly correlated to authoritarianism--the former negatively, the latter positively. Otherwise the correlational pattern is approximately the same as previously. The point which deserves our attention is that authoritarian and democratic subjects have opposite attitudes toward the extended family system. Authoritarian individuals are less inclined to respect their elders and more inclined to support them and other relatives than are democratic individuals. This can be interpreted as meaning that the authoritarians do not accept the legitimacy of the system (superficial conventionalism or alienation), and this rebellious attitude might generate some feelings of insecurity which they try to erase by financial means. The democratic subjects, on the contrary, are related to their families through emotional ties rather than through money since "respect" (kinh) connotes the whole gamut of warm emotions involving in family relationships. Confucius has made a good point in saying that "the

¹A correlation is said to be "very significant" when it is significant beyond the .01 level of significance.

TABLE 3.11.--Partial correlations between authoritarianism as dependent variable, and obedience, respect, support, income, Chinese, French, English and years in countryside as independent variables (Cantho High School students, N = 131, df = 122, two-tailed test).

| Independent Variable | Partial correlation coefficient | F _{8,122} | Significance Level |
|----------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Obedience | .058 | .413 | NS |
| Respect | -.298 | 11.947 | p<.001 |
| Support | .207 | 5.456 | p<.001 |
| Income | -.227 | 6.628 | p<.001 |
| Chinese | -.198 | 4.985 | p<.001 |
| French | -.125 | 1.950 | .10>p>.05 |
| English | .014 | .026 | NS |
| Yrs. in countryside | .035 | .154 | NS |

filial piety of now-a-days means the support of one's parents. But dogs and horses likewise are able to do something in the way of support;--without reverence [i.e., kinh] what is there to distinguish the one support given from the other?"¹

For the Vietnamese students in USA, the findings are somewhat different, but not unexpected. Table 3.12 shows that the more obedient the subject, the more authoritarian he is. Among Cantho High School students, this relationship exists in the same direction, but is not significant. On the other hand, the negative correlation between "respect" and "authoritarianism" found in the Cantho High School sample still persists somewhat in the US-exchange students. The "support" variable is not significantly related to authoritarianism among the US-exchange student group. These differences may be due to sample fluctuations or due to differences in socialization. Further research is needed to investigate the effects of Western acculturation on attitudinal changes.

These differences in attitudes toward the extended family system between the authoritarian subjects and the democratic subjects can be analyzed directly in the following manner. The score that a subject assigns to each item represents the strength of his indignation over disobedience, disrespect, and failure to support relatives.

The order of priority of the three familistic obligations depends on the relative emphases put on them in each family. For example, if a subject is socialized to believe that

TABLE 3.12.--Partial correlations between authoritarianism as dependent variable, and obedience, respect, support, income, years in USA as independent variables. (Vietnamese exchange students in USA, N = 59, df = 53, two-tailed test).

| Independent Variables | Partial correlation | F _{5,53} | Significance Level |
|-----------------------|---------------------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Obedience | .298 | 5.185 | p>.001 |
| Respect | -.170 | 1.581 | .05>p>.10 |
| Support | -.021 | .025 | NS |
| Yrs. in USA | -.383 | 9.132 | p>.001 |
| Parents' Inc. | .048 | .124 | NS |

is more important than respect, the strength of his indignation toward disobedience as greater than toward disrespect. The differences of the strength of the reactions toward these three obligations are the differences between the Obedience Score, Respect Score, and Support score. Thus, for each subject, three new scores are computed: reaction-strength differences between Obedience and Respect, Obedience and Support, and Respect and Support. In order to avoid negative scores, a constant (2) is added to each differential reaction score. Tables 3.13, 3.14, and 3.15 show the relationships between authoritarianism and differential reactions toward the three familistic obligations.

As shown in Table 3.13, the more democratic a person, the greater is his indignation reaction toward disrespect than toward support. The authoritarians, on the contrary, are more related to their relatives through financial ties than through emotional ties. Stated differently, the authoritarians in general are as familistic as the democrats. The only difference between them is that the authoritarians are more emotionally uprooted from their extended families than the democrats, and artificial means (money) is used to relieve the feelings of loneliness and insecurity resulting from this emotional uprootedness.

Table 3.13 shows another difference in attitudes toward the extended family system among authoritarian and democratic subjects. Authoritarian subjects tend to react more strongly

TABLE 3.13.--Partial correlation between respect-support reaction difference as dependent variable, and dogmatism, income, Chinese, French, English, and years in countryside as independent variables. (Cantho High School students, N = 131, df = 124, two-tailed test.)

| Independent Variables | Partial Correlation with (R-S) | F _{6,124} | Significance Level |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| Dogmatism | -.222 | 6.452 | p < .001 |
| Income | -.111 | 1.565 | .05 < p < .10 |
| Chinese | -.033 | .135 | NS |
| French | .049 | .307 | NS |
| English | -.096 | 1.166 | NS |
| Yrs. in countryside | .051 | .330 | NS |

TABLE 3.14.--Partial correlations between obedience-respect reaction difference as dependent variable, and dogmatism, income, Chinese, French, English, and yrs. in countryside as independent variables. (Cantho High School students, N = 131, df = 124, two-tailed test).

| Independent Variables | Partial correlation with (O-R) | F _{6,124} | Significance Level |
|-----------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Dogmatism | .182 | 4.278 | p<.001 |
| Income | .042 | .218 | NS |
| Chinese | -.050 | .319 | NS |
| French | .046 | .265 | NS |
| English | .069 | .593 | NS |
| Yrs. in countryside | -.018 | .040 | NS |

TABLE 3.15.--Partial correlations between obedience-support reaction difference as dependent variable, and dogmatism, income, Chinese, French, English, and years in countryside as independent variables. (Cantho High School students, N = 131, df = 124, two-tailed test).

| Independent Variables | Partial Correlation with (O - S) | F _{6,124} | Significance Level |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Dogmatism | -.070 | .621 | NS |
| Income | -.066 | .555 | NS |
| Chinese | -.060 | .454 | NS |
| French | .071 | .637 | NS |
| English | -.036 | .165 | NS |
| Yrs. in Countryside | .031 | .123 | NS |

against disobedience than against disrespect. The general attitude of the authoritarians toward the extended family system thus appears to be ritualistic and conformistic. They are familistic without conviction. They feel obliged to support and to be entitled to support without emotional involvement in their familial relationships. In regard to parental authority, the same attitude prevails. They blindly obey the established authority of the parents which they unconsciously reject. Thus, the hierarchical nature of the Confucianist family system deprives familial relationships of their human character. For the authoritarians, the Confucianist family institution becomes simply a coercive social security organization. On the contrary, the democratic subjects, placing more emphasis on respect than obedience, accept the legitimacy of parental authorities without being blindly submissive. They are well-adjusted members of the extended family system which is undergoing disintegration during the transitional period.

In summary, the relationship between Confucianist familism and authoritarianism is more complex than is usually thought. During the transitional period the old normative system is broken down and a new normative system has not yet been established. Social values are confused, the individual is normatively disoriented, and sometimes feels emotionally uprooted. This feeling of emotional uprootedness induces him to react in an authoritarian manner, i.e. to overconform to the old normative system or to reject it, to adhere to the traditional values ritualistically (obey, support) without emotional involvement.

Now let us examine another characteristic of Confucianism--status consciousness--and investigate the hypothesized relationship between Confucianism and Authoritarianism from another point of view.

Status-Consciousness as an Independent Variable

Confucius has said that the first thing to do in a social and political reform program is "to rectify names;"¹ that is, the status system must be well-differentiated and maintained. This doctrine has become part of the Vietnamese culture, and is deeply ingrained in the Vietnamese language itself. The very structure of Vietnamese grammar reflects a strong tendency to assign to every person a definite status in the social hierarchy. For instance, in Vietnamese personal pronouns and adjective possessives are considerably influenced by this traditional status-consciousness. A student of Vietnamese linguistics writes: "We wish to emphasize strongly that most Vietnamese 'personal pronouns' carry not only the meaning of substitution, but also and chiefly that of status."² It is rather inaccurate to describe as "personal pronouns" the Vietnamese terms which are usually translated into English as I, you, he, she, it, we, they, etc. In a sense, Vietnamese has no "personal pronouns;" it does have a few quasi-pronouns most of which (except toi) are not commonly used (e.g.

¹Analelects, Book XIII, Chapter 3.

²Nguyen Dinh Hoa, Verbal and Non-Verbal Patterns of Respect Behavior in Vietnamese Society, Doctoral Thesis (New York: New York University, 1956), p. 74.

may, no, etc.) and which are still carry with them their original meanings (toi means servant, no is probably derived from no which means that one, etc.). All other terms usually translated as personal pronouns are really nouns, mostly borrowed from the nomenclature of family relationships. It is evident that these terms are not personal pronouns, for when taken out of context it is impossible to determine whether they refer to the first, second, or third person in the sense of Indo-European grammar. Anh which means brother can be translated as I, He, You according to the context in which it is found. Similarly, con which means son in English can function as either a first, second, or third person pronoun. Chu (uncle), co (aunt), em (younger brother or younger sister), and other kinship terms are similarly used.

The reason for this state of linguistic underdevelopment of personal pronouns (and by the same token, possessive and demonstrative adjectives and pronouns) is the strong concern about status in the Vietnamese culture. A personal pronoun is by nature more or less status-free; for instance "you" can be applied to the President of the United States as well as to a janitor. A status-conscious people would therefore avoid personal pronouns or similar status-free terms as inappropriate to social relations. For the same reason, relative or possessive pronouns as well as possessive adjectives are non-existent in the Vietnamese language. There is no way to translate directly such English terms as "who," "whom," "which,"

"mine," "my," "your," "yours," etc. These terms are even more "status-free" than personal pronouns; and that is why they are entirely lacking while the personal pronoun category is only underdeveloped in the Vietnamese language.¹

This linguistic peculiarity of the Vietnamese language can be utilized to construct a scale which measures commitment to the traditional status system whose close relationship to the family system is documented by the (kinship) meanings of the terms used to designate status positions. This is, thus, another measure of traditionalism, similar but not identical to the Familism Scale.

The test consists in eliciting reactions to two versions of a story, identical in all respects except the status connotations of the Vietnamese terms used in the positions of personal pronouns and possessive adjectives. The Semantic Status Scale is constructed as follows:

The following are biographical sketches of two persons. Please try to judge the character of each person on the basis of facts revealed in the text that I am going to read to you. To help your evaluation, eight scales are

¹Because of the lack of these terms, translation of a Western language into Vietnamese is very difficult. For example, this sentence "His car is red, hers is green," when translated, would sound like this "the car of that brother (cua anh ay) is red, the car of that sister (cua chi ay) is green." If it happens that the man who has the red car is old, anh ay (that brother) is no longer proper; ong ay, or chu ay (that grand father, that uncle) should be used instead.

drawn on your answer sheet. Look at the first one as an example. If you think that the person is very intelligent, make a checkmark as follows:

: ✓ : : : : : : :

INTELLIGENT FEEBLE-MINDED

If, on the contrary, you think that he is very feeble-minded, place the checkmark on the right end :

: : : : : : : ✓ :

INTELLIGENT FEEBLE-MINDED

In other words, the more certain you are that the person is intelligent the closer to the left end you should put your checkmark. And on the other hand, the more certain you are that the person is feeble-minded the closer to the right end you should put your checkmark.

Now listen carefully:

"Soan" (the name of a Vietnamese boy) was run over by a car in Tu-Do street in Saigon last month. He (no) was seriously wounded. They carried him (no) to the hospital. To establish his (cua no) identity, they looked into his (cua no) pockets, they found his (cua no) identification card carrying the number 894838. It was also found that he (no) was born in My-tho. His (cua no) parents sent him (no) to Saigon to study. He (no) was 25 years old.

(After reading this paragraph, the experimenter waits for a while, then reads another story.)

By coincidence, "Toan" was also run over by a car in Tu-Do street in Saigon last month. He (anh ay) which literally means "the older brother") was also seriously wounded. They carried him (anh ay) to the hospital. To establish his (cua anh ay) identity they looked into his (cua anh ay) pocket, they found his (cua anh ay) identification card carrying the number 985836. Surprisingly enough, he (anh ay) was also born in My-tho. His (cua anh ay) parents sent him (anh ay) to Saigon to study. He (anh ay) was 25 years old.

The two stories are almost similar, even the name has the same sound and the same status-indifferent connotation. The only important change in the second text is the use of different personal pronouns and adjectives which are of higher status than those used in the first text. The subjects are then told to check the following scales twice, once for Toan, once for Soan.

| | | | | | | | |
|-----------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|---------------|
| : : : : : : : : | | | | | | | |
| INTELLIGENT | | | | | | | FEEBLE-MINDED |
| : : : : : : : : | | | | | | | |
| HARD WORKING | | | | | | | LAZY |
| : : : : : : : : | | | | | | | |
| NICE | | | | | | | OBNOXIOUS |
| : : : : : : : : | | | | | | | |
| HONEST | | | | | | | DISHONEST |
| : : : : : : : : | | | | | | | |
| TRUSTWORTHY | | | | | | | TREACHEROUS |
| : : : : : : : : | | | | | | | |
| WEALTHY | | | | | | | POOR |
| : : : : : : : : | | | | | | | |
| "GOOD SON" | | | | | | | "BAD SON" |
| : : : : : : : : | | | | | | | |
| PATRIOTIC | | | | | | | UNPATRIOTIC |

The score given by each subject to Toan, and Soan on each scale vary from 1 to 9. The semantic-status sub-scale score for each of eight characteristics is the score given to Soan minus the score given to Toan plus a constant of 9 (to avoid negative scores). The general semantic-status score is the total of eight semantic-status sub-scale scores. The item

analysis of the semantic-status scale is presented in Table 3.16. The corrected split-half reliability coefficient is .844.

The means of each item of the total group show some interesting patterns. The maximum score for each item is 17, and the minimum score for each item is 9. The above table shows that wealth and patriotism are the main criteria for status distinction. Wealth, according to Confucianist traditions, is not an important determinant of status. A wealthy person might be categorized as troc-phu ("uneducated rich"), and a troc-phu is not as highly regarded as a poor farmer. As for patriotism, the recent history of the Vietnamese resistance movement has evidenced it is more frequent to find poor and low-status farm boys dying bravely than high-status individuals. The most discriminatory characteristic is intelligence. Intelligence in Vietnam is associated with erudition. Probably it is due to the strong traditions of mandarinism: a mandarin--a well-educated civil servant--has always been regarded as occupying the highest status no matter how poor or rich he is.

Status-Consciousness and Anti-Democratic Tendency

Using the Semantic-Status score as a measure of status consciousness, and correlating it with the Dogmatism score, we find that there is no significant correlation. However, there are some significant correlations with other variables. The negative significant correlation between parental knowledge

TABLE 3.16. Item analysis of the Semantic-Status Scale. (Cantho High School students).

| Items | Total Group | | Highs ¹ | | Lows ¹ | | Diff. | t ₂ |
|------------------|-------------|-------|--------------------|-------|-------------------|-------|-------|----------------|
| | N = 111 | | N = 25 | | N = 25 | | | |
| | M | S.D. | M | S.D. | M | S.D. | | |
| Intelligent | 11.432 | 2.668 | 13.952 | 1.687 | 9.238 | 2.142 | 4.714 | 7.734 |
| Hard Worker | 11.297 | 2.739 | 13.142 | 2.455 | 9.000 | 2.144 | 4.142 | 5.683 |
| Nice | 10.090 | 2.298 | 12.809 | 2.135 | 8.190 | 1.436 | 4.619 | 8.117 |
| Honest | 10.531 | 2.719 | 13.809 | 1.990 | 7.904 | 2.071 | 5.904 | 9.197 |
| Trust- worthy | 10.351 | 2.824 | 13.952 | 2.312 | 8.523 | 1.860 | 5.428 | 8.175 |
| Wealthy | 9.972 | 2.278 | 10.857 | 2.725 | 9.285 | 2.148 | 1.571 | 2.025 |
| Good son | 10.324 | 2.370 | 12.190 | 3.043 | 8.619 | 2.224 | 3.571 | 4.236 |
| Patriotic | 9.801 | 2.181 | 12.238 | 2.447 | 8.857 | 1.851 | 3.381 | 3.470 |

¹The highs are defined as those who have scores higher than the third quartiles, and the Lows as those who have scores falling within the first quartile.

²Employing a one-tailed t-test, t's of 1.64 and 2.33 are significant beyond the 5 and 1 per cent levels respectively for large samples.

TABLE 3.17.--Simple correlations of Semantic-Status score and dogmatism, familism, income, Chinese, French, English and length of rural residence. (Cantho High School students, N = 76).

| Semantic-Status correlated with | r | Significance Level |
|------------------------------------|-------|--------------------|
| Dogmatism | .028 | NS |
| Familism | -.251 | .025 $p < .01$ |
| Income | -.094 | NS |
| Chinese | -.108 | NS |
| French | -.031 | NS |
| English | -.191 | .05 $p < .025$ |
| Yrs. in countryside | .035 | NS |

of English (Westernized environment) and status consciousness is easily understandable. However, the negative significant correlation between familism and status consciousness is more difficult to interpret. One possible explanation is that the Semantic-Status Scale does not measure the general tendency of status consciousness. Probably, the thought habit moulded by a language is not as important a sociological or psychological factor as is sometimes considered.¹ The negative correlation between "English" and Semantic Status score may be due to the subject's awareness of the linguistic particularity of the Vietnamese language and his conscious reaction to the Semantic-Status Scale. Further research is needed to investigate the socio-psychological effects of language.

General Interpretation

Among the Cantho High School students and Vietnamese students in the United States selected for this study, a rather complex relationship appears to exist between Confucianism and authoritarianism, when Confucianism is operationalized either by the Familism Scale or the Semantic-Status Scale. The hierarchical structure of the Confucian system does not appear

¹Leslie Spier, A. Irving Hallowell and Stanley S. Newman (eds.), Language, Culture, and Personality; Essays in Memory of Edward Sapir (Menasha, Wisconsin: Sapir Memorial Publication Fund, 1941); John B. Carroll (ed.), Language, Thought, and Reality; Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf (Cambridge; Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1956).

to be responsible by itself for the high level of authoritarianism found among Vietnamese students. Rather, the way this structure is imposed on the individual, or the extent to which he feels uprooted from a disintegrating system, seem to be more important. If the child is brought up to obey and support his kin rather than to love and to respect them, his attitudes toward his family in particular, and toward the world in general, are focused upon considerations of money and power. During this transitional period, when the extended family system is undergoing a disintegration process, the attitudes towards the family system are particularly ambivalent and determined mainly by the way the individual is socialized. Even though the relationship between authoritarianism and familistic attitudes is not particularly high (the highest correlation coefficient is .298), there is some indication that authoritarian and democratic subjects react differently to the disintegrating family system. For the authoritarian, with his cynical and exploitative outlook and a world-view based on dominance and submission, the family system is a set of cold relationships based on power and geared to economic security. For the democratic subject, the extended family system is similarly on the point of disintegration, but the movement away from the old system takes a different direction while he moves toward greater individual freedom emotional ties are still preserved. The authoritarians are emotionally uprooted from their families. They try to relieve their unbearable

feelings of loneliness and uprootedness by means of "bribery," in the form of financial support, and blind submissiveness. The democratic individuals still maintain meaningful relationships with their families without losing their newly-gained freedoms.

In Chapter I, we have made a distinction between the "psychological aspect" and "normative aspect" of the socialization process. The above findings lend some validity to this conceptual distinction. It is evident that being socialized into an authoritarian value system does not necessarily lead to the development of an authoritarian personality. If the Confucian extended family system appears to be authoritarian, Confucianist familism does not necessarily mean authoritarianism. Both authoritarian and non-authoritarian subjects are born and raised in this system. Yet their socialization is rather selective. The former are socialized into a more authoritarian structure while the latter are socialized into a more open one.

On the other hand, in the case of Cantho High School students, the socio-economic status of the parents (education, income) has a strong effect on the personality of the children. Apparently, the nature of the normative system is not the crucial determinant of personality development.

In the following we will examine the effect of Westernization on personality.

Westernization and Authoritarianism

Westernization is defined as the process of attitude change through contact with Western cultures. Contact may be direct or indirect. Indirect contact occurs when the individual is in contact, not with a Western culture, but with a Westernized urban area like Saigon, etc. Direct contact is exemplified by the cases of Vietnamese students in France or America. In the case of indirect contact, it can be assumed that the more Westernized the environment, the greater the extent of Westernization. In the case of direct contact, the assumption is that the longer the period of contact, the greater the effect of Westernization.

Our general hypothesis is: Westernization is negatively correlated with authoritarianism. More specifically, in the case of indirect contact, it is hypothesized that the more Westernized the environment, the less authoritarian the subjects. The findings presented in Table 3.8 and 3.9 support this hypothesis. The more the father knows French (a Westernized socializing agent) the less authoritarian are the children (with other socio-economic variables held constant). Interestingly, there is no significant correlation between authoritarianism and the amount of parental knowledge of English. Probably the Anglo-American Westernization influence, being recent and still limited to the linguistic area, does not have any deep noticeable effects.

For exemplification of direct contact with a Western culture we use a sample of Vietnamese students in the United States. The number of years they have spent in this country is used as a Westernization variable. This hypothesis is also supported. Table 3.9 shows a very significant negative correlation between authoritarianism and number of years in America. (In this sample, the correlation between income and authoritarianism is not significant, near zero.) The very significant correlation between authoritarianism and length of residence in America may be interpreted as the effect of education rather than mere cultural contact. Unfortunately, due to unavailability of data we cannot control the factor education in our present analysis. We could say without too great a chance of error that both education and cultural contact have some effects in decreasing authoritarianism. Another interpretation has been offered by Professor Pinner; he assumes that a personality characteristic (e.g. authoritarianism) has some persistence, and is more or less change-resistant. By the same token, the change in the direction toward less authoritarianism among Vietnamese students in America could be due to "the change in the interpretation of the test items": it could then be a semantic change rather than a personality change. Professor Rokeach offers a third interpretation: "these students who come to America were less authoritarian to begin with, due to selective factors," thus, when they come to this country they are more predisposed to take a democratic orientation.

Further researches in this area are needed in order to have a more specific and accurate interpretation.

The hypothesis that Westernization reduces authoritarianism is somewhat supported when we compare dogmatism scores of different groups of students. For instance, Saigon University freshmen living in a Westernized urban area are found to be significantly less authoritarian than Cantho High School seniors who are raised in an isolated small rural town (see Table 3.18). This difference in dogmatism might be due to (1) a difference of one year's education, (2) difference in age, (3) a change from high school to college. The first interpretation is not supported by data. Table 3.19 shows that the democratization effect of one year's education among groups of Saigon University students is not significant. From these findings we can only infer--due to lack of data--that the differences between the Dogmatism Scores of Cantho High School seniors and Saigon University freshmen are due either to environmental Westernization (Westernized Saigon vs isolated Cantho) or to selective factors deriving from the fact of passing the Baccalauréat and of being in college. Only direct comparison between Saigon High School students and Cantho High School students could give us a more accurate interpretation.

Finally, as expected, the mean dogmatism score of Vietnamese exchange students in America is much lower than that for any group of Vietnamese students in Saigon or Cantho. This is interpreted as due to differences in levels of education,

TABLE 3.18.--Comparison of mean dogmatism scores of Cantho High School seniors and selected groups of Saigon University freshmen.

| Groups | N | Mean | S.D. | Diff. | <u>t</u> | Significance Level |
|-----------------|-----|---------|--------|--------|----------|--------------------|
| Senior Cantho | 131 | 231.503 | 28.220 | | | |
| 1st Yr. NIA | 61 | 211.278 | 31.297 | 20.225 | 4.44 | $p < .0005$ |
| 1st Yr. English | 26 | 216.384 | 26.150 | 15.119 | 2.37 | $.01 > p > .005$ |
| 1st Yr. French | 29 | 213.896 | 31.227 | 17.607 | 2.96 | $.005 > p > .0005$ |
| 1st Yr. Chinese | 29 | 215.931 | 34.933 | 15.572 | 2.55 | $.01 > p > .005$ |

TABLE 3.19.--Comparison of mean dogmatism scores of selected groups of Saigon students having one year's difference of education.

| Groups | N | Mean | S.D. | Diff | <u>t</u> | Significance level |
|-----------------|----|---------|--------|-------|----------|--------------------|
| 1st Yr. NIA | 61 | 211.278 | 31.297 | | | |
| 2nd Yr NIA | 23 | 206.434 | 29.595 | 4.844 | .68 | $p > .50$ |
| 1st Yr. English | 26 | 216.384 | 26.150 | | | |
| 2nd Yr. English | 64 | 212.296 | 29.826 | 4.088 | .60 | $p > .50$ |

and to the direct exposure to a Western culture of the Vietnamese students in America (see Table 3.20).

Summary

In this chapter, the data we collected among groups of Vietnamese students in Vietnam and in America show that Vietnamese students exhibit a greater anti-democratic tendency, as measured by the Dogmatism Scale, than American and British subjects. The hypothesis that this high level of anti-democratic tendency is generated by Confucianist values cannot be conclusively supported. There are some evidences that authoritarian subjects tend to be either strongly familistic or strongly anti-familistic, while democratic subjects have a more balanced attitude toward the extended-family system. When familism is broken down into its three main components, we find that for the authoritarians, the system has lost its legitimacy. This emotional defection (disrespect, bat-kinh) is replaced by submissive and ritualistic conventionalism (obedience and support). For the democratic subjects, their attitudes toward the extended family system are more liberal, yet emotionally uprooted. Probably, this emotional tie which is indispensable for individual adjustment during the period of cultural disintegration has a "democratization" effect on the individual.¹ For the authoritarians, emotional relationships

¹Erich Fromm, The Sane Society (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1955), pp. 27-66.

TABLE 3.20.--Comparison of dogmatism mean scores of Vietnamese exchange students in USA and different groups of Saigon University students.
(one-tailed test).

| Groups | N | Means | S.D. | Diff. | t | Significance Level |
|-----------------|----|---------|--------|--------|------|--------------------|
| US students | 59 | 185.389 | 32.257 | | | |
| 1st Yr. NIA | 61 | 211.278 | 31.297 | 25.889 | 4.42 | p<.0005 |
| 2nd Yr. NIA | 23 | 206.434 | 29.595 | 21.045 | 2.68 | .005 p<.005 |
| 1st Yr. English | 26 | 216.384 | 26.150 | 30.995 | 4.26 | p<.0005 |
| 2nd Yr. English | 64 | 212.296 | 29.826 | 26.901 | 4.77 | p<.0005 |
| 1st Yr. French | 29 | 213.896 | 31.227 | 28.507 | 3.89 | p<.0005 |
| 1st Yr. Chinese | 29 | 215.931 | 34.933 | 30.542 | 4.01 | p<.0005 |

are replaced by financial and power-based relationships. They are consequently more "isolated," more "lonely," and more "uprooted" during this transitional period. This "unbearable situation" may be the main factor causing their high authoritarianism.¹

While familism, in general, is not related to authoritarianism, other sociological factors--such as income, education, Westernization--have more or less significant effects on the development or reduction of authoritarianism. The thesis of Lipset and others that authoritarianism results from backwardness and ignorance finds consistent support.

On the other hand, semantic status consciousness is not found to be related to authoritarianism. Probably language has no deep effect on the development of personality.

In short, some general conclusions are tentatively advanced:

1. Anti-democratic tendencies in Vietnam are not mainly due to the authoritarian structure of the traditional family system, but rather result from the disintegration of the traditional system and the consequent state of "uprootedness" of the people during the transitional period.

2. These tendencies are also related to socio-economic status level and the amount of exposure to Western influences.

In the following chapter we will examine nationalism as another important component of the underdevelopment syndrome.

¹Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 140-141.

CHAPTER IV

NATIONALISM

Introduction

After World War II, the destruction of Western empires in Asia and Africa has given birth to a multitude of new nations. The process of "nation-building" as part of the socio-political change occurring in these countries is one of the daily concerns of people of the developing areas. More often than not, it is accompanied by highly emotional outbursts which endanger world peace and drain developmental efforts. The threats of mutual destruction exchanged between the Indians and the Pakistanis, the Cambodians and the Vietnamese, the Israelis and the Arabs. . . highlight the explosive and widespread nature of nationalism. Internally, also, nationalism, instead of being a driving force of economic development is sometimes a dissipating force, a cause of waste of capital and inefficient investment. Economic planning whose objective is the attainment of a higher standard of living is sometimes motivated by the need for national status symbols. In every developing country, it seems the first "five-year plan" must include the construction of a hydro-electric dam or a steel-mill, no matter how low the expected returns when compared to the exorbitantly high costs of

construction. Sometimes such industrial plants are wanted only because they serve as symbols of industrialism and, as such, help to eradicate the humiliation of being a backward country.¹

Nationalism, a component of the underdevelopment syndrome, has played an important role in international and national politics during the transitional period. Some of the questions we would like to answer are: What is the nature of nationalism? Does it grow out of traditional values, or is it a consequence of the Western impact? In other words, is it the result of the normative or of the psychological socialization process? In addition, we want to know whether education, contact with the West, and economic status have any influence on nationalism.

This chapter includes three main sections:

1. What is Nationalism?
 - a. Two types of nationalism.
 - b. Operational definition: scales, reliability.
2. Correlates of Nationalism
 - a. Nationalism as a state of mind, the structural approach, nationalist ambivalence, interpretations.
 - b. Nationalism and dogmatism.
 - c. Nationalism and other sociological factors: self-glorifying nationalism, self-abasing nationalism.
3. Summary and conclusion.

¹See M. Friedman, "Foreign Economic Aid: Means and Objectives," The Yale Review, Vol. 47 (1958), p. 505.

What is Nationalism

Hans Kohn terms nationalism "a state of mind."¹

Analyzing this state of mind among developing nations, one foreign relations expert describes it in the following words:

If the West gives aid, it will be feared for its imperialism; if it withholds aid, it will be denounced for its indifference. . . If it expresses no political preferences. . . it will be accused of siding with reaction and status-quo; if it supports progressive forces, it will be condemned for intervention. In other words, we are damned if we do and damned if we don't.²

This colorful, dramatic, and perceptive description of nationalism in developing countries gives us some clues to its nature and its importance as an obstacle to the promotion of international understanding and cooperation. The most evident characteristic of nationalism is its irrationality. Nationalists are not aware of the contradictions in their thinking. For instance, attitudes toward the West are "frequently ambiguous, embracing the polar extremes of xenophobia and xenophilia."³ Attitudes toward their own cultures are of the same character. It is a mixture of self-hatred and self-glorification, both pushed to the extreme.

You English, writes Gandhi, who have come to India are not good specimens of the English nation, nor can we,

¹Hans Kohn, Nationalism (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1955), p. 9.

²R. C. North, "Asian Violence in a Cold War World," Pacific Spectator, Winter (1951), p. 12.

³Mary Motassian, "Ideologies of Delayed Industrialization: Some Tensions and Ambiguities," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 6 (1958), p. 219.

almost half-Anglicized Indians, be considered as good specimens of the real Indian nation. . ."¹

This ambivalent attitude toward the nation with which the nationalist identifies sometimes becomes intolerable and turns itself into general hatred and aggression. This strong feeling of national powerlessness is but the projection of the strong feeling of powerlessness and urgency inside the individual.

One feature of the history of old Russia, writes Stalin, was the continual beatings she suffered for falling behind, for her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her--for her backwardness: for military backwardness, for cultural backwardness, for political backwardness, for industrial backwardness, for agricultural backwardness. She was beaten because to do so was profitable and could be done with impunity. . .

That is why we must no longer lag behind. . . We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or they crush us.²

Sometimes this national aggressiveness becomes national paranota. The fear of losing national identity which is either debased or glorified by the nationalist becomes the greatest obstacle in international relations. During the Eleventh Conference of the Colombo Plan, Sukarno expressed this intense fear of being helplessly swallowed by the powerful, and frightening Western culture:

¹Ibid., p. 220.

²Ibid, Joseph Stalin quoted, p. 222.

Do not think that assistance will produce a nation in your own image. . . Remember that in dealing with countries such as Indonesia you are dealing with a people whose interest, values, and requirements. . . are products of our history, and environment. Make no mistake about it, please, or all your invaluable efforts can go for nothing.¹

In short, nationalism is an ambivalent state of mind concerning the status of the nation-state. The measure of nationalism used in this study takes cognizance of this ambivalent nature of nationalism. Two nationalism scales are constructed. The Self-Glorifying Nationalism Scale is intended to probe the nationalist attitudes which are projections of the self-aggrandizing tendencies onto the national plane. The other nationalism scale--the Self-Abasing Nationalism Scale--is intended to probe the nationalist attitudes which are projections of self-inadequacy onto the national plane. It is these two opposite tendencies which give nationalism its ambivalent character.

The items of these two scales are selected attitudes toward the three element constituting the nation-state: racial, geographical, and cultural. In the questionnaire sheet they are interspersed with items of other scales. The introduction of the scales is the same as that of the Dogmatism Scale. So are the answer form and the scoring method. That is, the responses can vary from "I AGREE VERY MUCH" to "I DISAGREE VERY MUCH." The score for each item has a minimum value of "1" (I DISAGREE VERY MUCH) to "7" (I AGREE VERY MUCH).

¹The New York Times, November 12, 1958, p. 34.

The Self Glorifying Nationalism Scale

1. The Vietnamese culture is over 4,000 years old, thus it is much better than most of the Western cultures which are both younger and less spiritual.
2. The first obligation of each citizen is to use all his efforts to enrich and propagate the noble cultural heritage that our ancestors have left to us.
3. Our music is on the way toward extinction because foreign influence has been destroying its purely Vietnamese character.
4. Vietnamese musicians should return to our cultural heritage as a source of inspiration, and explore and propagate the purely Vietnamese music rather than imitating Western music and creating a kind of "mongrel" music without any artistic value.
5. The ultimate duty of a government is to make its country occupy the highest position of honor in the world at any price.
6. Those Vietnamese who make their country "lose face" in front of a foreigner should be severely punished.
7. We are now classified as belonging to the group of backward nations because we have been the victims of the colonial policy of obscurantism. Fundamentally, the Vietnamese race is among the most intelligent, bravest, and the most energetic in the world.
8. If it had not been dominated by the French, Vietnam would be a nation as rich and as powerful as Japan.
9. Aid given by a world power is only a bait to lure small countries into its sphere of economic, cultural, and political control.
10. The Vietnamese people should make all the necessary sacrifices in order not to receive foreign aid.
11. The government should not let the French exploit Vietnamese soil, because Vietnam is no longer a French colony.
12. Those Chinese who refuse to take Vietnamese citizenship should be expelled from Vietnam.
13. If the Cambodians invaded Vietnam, I would be willing to give up my life to destroy these invaders.

14. Half of the Lao and Cambodian territory formerly belonged to Vietnam and was taken by the French and given by them to the Cambodian and Lao kings. Our government should send troops to Cambodia to take it back.
15. Egypt has nationalized British and French firms; this was a wise action.

The Self-Abasing Nationalism Scale

1. The culture of Vietnam has a feudalistic and primitive character and is not compatible with the industrial age.
2. The Vietnamese civilization is poor and backward. It has nothing to be proud of.
3. The music of the advanced countries has reached a point that our music can never attain.
4. There is nothing to be said about the Vietnamese music. "Modern" music is full of awkward imitations, "traditional" music is dull and repetitive.
5. National honor is meaningless if the people have to starve and live a miserable life for it.
6. The honor of the nation should not be put above the happiness of each citizen.
7. When a country has been conquered by a foreign power, this proves only that its inhabitants are stupid, lazy, and cowardly.
8. Even though we have been exploited by the French, we must honestly admit the fact that during the colonial period the French contributed something to the economic and cultural development of our country.
9. Receiving foreign aid from a great power is not a national "loss of face," but must be considered as a precious chance of economic development.
10. There are more advantages than disadvantages in receiving foreign aid.
11. We should encourage rich countries to invest in Vietnam so that our unexploited resources can be put to use, and Vietnam become richer.

12. Rubber is the greatest resource of our country. The government should encourage and help all existing planters to develop it without discriminating between Frenchmen and Vietnamese.
13. We must admit the fact that the Chinese in Vietnam have contributed something to the economic development in our country.
14. Thailand and Cambodia are both silly in arguing about an old, valueless, small temple in the middle of the jungle at the risk of a war and mutual destruction.
15. If our neighboring countries' demands are not unreasonable, the government should make some compromises for the best of both countries.
16. The problem of Vietnam at the present time is shortage of capital and experts; thus we should encourage foreign industrialists to open industrial plants in Vietnam.

Only thirteen of the original sixteen items of each scale had discriminatory power high enough to be retained. Table 4.1 and 4.2 present the item analysis of each scale.

The corrected split-half reliabilities of both scales are unfortunately not very high. Table 4.3 shows the coefficient of reliability computed for three samples.

One or more of the following three factors may be responsible for this low level of reliability:

- a. The scales may not be well-constructed.
- b. The respondent may either not have had consistent attitudes because of the ambivalent nature of their nationalistic feelings, or
- c. They may not want to reveal their real attitudes.

Further research is needed to find the relative influence of each of these three factors in order to better our tools of measurement.

TABLE 4.1.--Item analysis of the self-ratings nationalities scale.

| Items | Total Item | | High | | Low | | Diff. | t | Significance Level |
|--|------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|--------------------|
| | N | Mean | N | Mean | N | Mean | | | |
| *1. The culture of VN is primitive. | 4,167 | 1.113 | 4,167 | 1.333 | 3,150 | 1.519 | 2.545 | 6.158 | p <.0005 |
| *2. VN civilization has nothing to be proud of. | 4,167 | 1.113 | 4,167 | 1.333 | 3,150 | 1.519 | 2.545 | 6.158 | p <.0005 |
| *3. Vietnamese music is too backward. | 4,167 | 1.113 | 4,167 | 1.333 | 3,150 | 1.519 | 2.545 | 6.158 | p <.0005 |
| *4. Vietnamese music is dull, repetitive, or imitative. | 4,167 | 1.113 | 4,167 | 1.333 | 3,150 | 1.519 | 2.545 | 6.158 | p <.0005 |
| *5. National honor is meaningless. | 4,167 | 1.113 | 4,167 | 1.333 | 3,150 | 1.519 | 2.545 | 6.158 | p <.0005 |
| *6. People's happiness is more important than national honor. | 4,167 | 1.113 | 4,167 | 1.333 | 3,150 | 1.519 | 2.545 | 6.158 | p <.0005 |
| *7. People conquered by colonialists are lazy, stupid, cowardly. | 4,167 | 1.113 | 4,167 | 1.333 | 3,150 | 1.519 | 2.545 | 6.158 | p <.0005 |
| *8. French colonialists have developed VN. | 4,167 | 1.113 | 4,167 | 1.333 | 3,150 | 1.519 | 2.545 | 6.158 | p <.0005 |
| 9. Nothing wrong in receiving foreign aid. | 4,167 | 1.113 | 4,167 | 1.333 | 3,150 | 1.519 | 2.545 | 6.158 | p <.01 |
| *10. Foreign aid is good. | 4,167 | 1.113 | 4,167 | 1.333 | 3,150 | 1.519 | 2.545 | 6.158 | p <.005 |
| *11. We should encourage foreign investment in VN. | 4,167 | 1.113 | 4,167 | 1.333 | 3,150 | 1.519 | 2.545 | 6.158 | p <.0005 |
| 12. We should support French planters. | 4,167 | 1.113 | 4,167 | 1.333 | 3,150 | 1.519 | 2.545 | 6.158 | p >.05 |
| *13. The Chinese have developed VN. | 4,167 | 1.113 | 4,167 | 1.333 | 3,150 | 1.519 | 2.545 | 6.158 | p <.0005 |
| *14. It is silly to fight for an old agenda. | 4,167 | 1.113 | 4,167 | 1.333 | 3,150 | 1.519 | 2.545 | 6.158 | p <.0005 |
| 15. We should make compromises with our neighboring countries. | 4,167 | 1.113 | 4,167 | 1.333 | 3,150 | 1.519 | 2.545 | 6.158 | p <.005 |
| *16. We should encourage foreigners to open plants in VN. | 4,167 | 1.113 | 4,167 | 1.333 | 3,150 | 1.519 | 2.545 | 6.158 | p <.005 |

NOTE: The items marked with an asterisk are selected for the final 20 items of the scale.

TABLE 4.3.--Reliability of the nationalism scales.

| Scales | Sample | N | Coefficient of reliability |
|-------------------|--------------------|-----|-------------------------------|
| Self-Glorif. Nat. | Cantho High School | 156 | .627 |
| | Saigon NIA | 85 | .666 |
| | Vietnamese in US | 59 | .615 |
| Self-Abasing Nat. | Cantho High School | 156 | .683 |
| | Saigon NIA | 85 | .619 |
| | Vietnamese in US | 59 | .773 |

Correlates of Nationalism

The proceeding discussion of the nature of nationalism has led us to some issues which deserve investigation. The first issue related to nationalism as "an ambivalent state of mind" was: is there one kind of nationalism or are there two? More specifically, are self-glorifying and self-abasing nationalisms different from one another? Do they constitute opposite ends of one and the same continuum, or do they constitute different dimensions?

The second issue is somewhat related to the "content" of nationalism. Is nationalism related to traditionalism, or is it an expression of a personality characteristic, namely, authoritarianism? Or, put in developmental terms, does nationalism result from normative or from psychological socialization?

Our final question deals with the effects of socio-economic factors on nationalism. If they exist, what are they? We will try to answer these questions with the data we have collected among Vietnamese students.

1. Nationalism as a "state of mind"

I hypothesize that nationalism as "a state of mind" reflects the structural characteristic of the system of beliefs about the nation-state rather than the content of these beliefs. First, let us examine the generally accepted thesis that nationalism is only a set of beliefs related to a nation-state rather than a structural characteristic. If this thesis is

correct, we must expect some consistency in attitudes toward the nation-state. For instance, if a person believes that the culture of his country is the best in the world, he cannot simultaneously believe that the culture of his country has nothing to be proud of. If water is believed to be wet, it cannot be believed to be dry at the same time. The "content approach" to nationalism--viewing nationalism as a set of consistent and favorable beliefs toward the nation-state--will consider as nationalists only those who overestimate the value, the potentialities, the strength, etc. of their nation-state; those who take the opposite views toward their nation-state will be considered anti-nationalists; and the two will be considered totally different creatures.¹ By the sheer logic of the concepts, nationalism and anti-nationalism in the generally accepted sense can never coexist with each other. Yet, experience throws serious doubt upon this logic. Who is more aggressively international-minded than the Communists? Who are more communist than the Communist leaders themselves? Yet, communist leaders such as Stalin and Mao Tse Tung are no less concerned about their national interests, the prestige of their national cultures than are the most "reactionary" elements. It appears that to the nationalist mind, water is at the same time wet and dry. The content approach in the study of

¹See an example of the "content approach" in Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1953), pp. 139-160.

nationalism can cover only a limited range of cases, and it cannot explain the instances in which "les extrêmes se touchent."

Because of the theoretical shortcomings of the "content approach," a "structural approach"¹ seems preferable. The structural approach is more interested in the arrangement of beliefs toward the nation-state than in the beliefs themselves. The content approach would be satisfied with the definition of nationalism in Webster's New World Dictionary (1960) as "devotion to one's nation; patriotism; excesssive, narrow, or jingoist patriotism; chauvinism." With the structural approach, a nationalist individual is defined as the one whose beliefs about his nation-state are (1) highly differentiated, and (2) highly isolated. First, he is a person who is very conscious of the status of his nation-state. Every incident is evaluated in terms of national status. His extreme concern about the relative status of his nation-state makes him over-conscious of the most insignificant differences in power and status between his country and others. In Lewin's and Rokeach's terms, his nation-state would occupy a place near the central area of his belief system, and thus have a considerable influence on other areas. Secondly, this area of his belief system has a high level of isolation. The nationalist is not uninformed; when his country is poor, he knows about its economic backwardness; when other countries are powerful, he

¹See Milton Rokeach, "The Organization of Belief-Dis-belief Systems," The Open and Closed Mind, op. cit., pp. 31-53.

is aware of their power. His very over-consciousness about his nation-state increases his estimate of the gap in status or strength separating his country from others. Yet, at the same time, he wishes his country to be better, to be larger, to be greater, to be richer, to be more powerful than others. This wish is so strong that it becomes reality itself (autistic thinking); that is, it becomes another set of beliefs about his country, which is now seen as a glorious country rather than a backward one. Because of the high degree of isolation of the parts of his belief system, the two contradictory sets of beliefs about his nation-state do not interfere with one another. Yet the wall between them is fragile and constantly challenged by facts which he cannot reject. This creates tensions which drive him to do everything to improve the status of his nation-state in order to eliminate the dissonance. The more he is conscious that his country is poor and backward, the more he wants to make it rich and advanced, and the more he believes that his country--or at least, his culture--is rich and advanced. Thus, what makes him believe his country is great is his awareness that other countries are greater than his. What makes him uncomfortable aware that other countries are greater than his is his extreme consciousness of the relative power and status of his country as compared to others. Thus it is inadequate to say that a nationalist is an individual who believes that his country is greater--at least morally--than others. Rather, in this structural context, a nationalist

is an individual who is too much concerned about the relative power of his country and of other countries

This structural approach to nationalism leads us to expect that "nationalism" (in the usual sense of the word) and "anti-nationalism" (in the usual sense of the word) do not necessarily correlate negatively with each other. In order to avoid the semantic confusion resulting from these two terms with their opposite connotations, I prefer to call them "self-glorifying nationalism" and "self-abasing nationalism." These are measured by means of the two scales mentioned above.

The construction of two separate scales of nationalism implies that (1) there are two types of nationalism, and (2) they are not two faces of the same coin. They are two pre-dispositions which are more or less related to each other. In a word, self-glorifying nationalism is not just the opposite of self-abasing nationalism and vice-versa. As Table 4.4 shows, the correlation between these apparently opposite variables is not negative; on the contrary, it is significantly positive in two samples, and almost zero in the third sample. Our data adequately proves the ambivalence of the nationalist's state of mind. Our structural approach has been found of great value in the interpretation of this paradoxical phenomenon of human-behavior.

Table 4.4 shows some interesting facts. Vietnamese students in America are less inconsistent in their nationalistic attitudes ($r: -.007$) than Saigon University students ($r: .209$),

TABLE 4.4.--Simple correlations between self-glorifying
and self-abasing nationalism.

| Samples | N | r | Significance Level |
|--------------------|-----|-------|-----------------------|
| Cantho High School | 131 | .251 | p <.001 |
| Sagion University | 232 | .209 | p <.001 |
| UN students in US | 59 | -.007 | N.S. |

and the latter more consistent than the Cantho High School students ($r: .251$). Certainly some of the last two groups contradict themselves by either agreeing or disagreeing with two sets of contradictory items. Several factors may be responsible for these attitudinal inconsistencies. The following three are probably the most obvious:

- a. The amount of information related to the nation-state
- b. The level of ambiguity of social norms concerning the nation-state
- c. The degree of compartmentalization of the belief system.

As for the first two factors, it has been demonstrated that when the stimulus-situation or the normative system are ambiguous, people tend to change their attitudes easily.¹ In other words, when the norms are conflicting and information unavailable, attitudinal inconsistencies are likely to occur. If this hypothesis is correct, the differences between the three groups of students presented in Table 4.4 can be more easily understood. Students in Vietnam who have never been abroad certainly do not have the opportunity to make accurate estimates of the "gap" between their country and those of the West, yet they are aware of their country's backwardness. The ambiguity of their cognitive field increases their tendency to agree (double-agreement response set) with the items of the questionnaire. On the other hand, Vietnamese students in

¹E. L. Walker and R. W. Heyns, An Anatomy For Conformity (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), pp. 12-53.

America have received a greater amount of first-hand information about their country as it compares to the West. The backward state of Vietnamese economy cannot be overlooked because of the striking evidences they see in the United States; consequently the double-agreement tendency is more minimized.

As for normative ambiguity, there is also a difference between Vietnamese students in Vietnam and in the United States. Vietnamese society is under three influences: one from the West and the Westernized elite who believe that "nationalism" (in the usual sense of the word) is not "progressive"; one from the traditional elite stressing the value of the nation-state; and finally one from the Communists who have mixed feelings toward the nation-state. This confusion of social norms in Vietnam leads to normative uncertainty, and makes the double-agreement response-set more likely to occur. On the contrary, in the United States the Western influence predominates all others, and thus reduces normative ambiguity to a low level. The result is that Vietnamese students in America are less inconsistent about nationalism than the Vietnamese students in Vietnam because the situation is less ambiguous both factually and normatively¹ for them.

The third factor which is conducive to nationalistic inconsistencies--compartmentalization of the belief system--

¹Lee J. Cronbach, "Further Evidence on Response Sets and Test Design," Educational and Psychological Measurement, Vol. 10 (1950), p. 4, states that "response sets become most influential as items become difficult or ambiguous."

can be investigated directly. In using the Dogmatism Scale to measure it, we can hypothesize that if dogmatism is held constant, nationalistic inconsistencies will be reduced, i.e., the algebraic value of the correlation between the two nationalisms will decrease. The findings in Table 4.5 support this hypothesis. When dogmatism is held constant, the coefficient of correlation between the two kinds of nationalism decreases considerably. The absolute value of decrease is .253 for Cantho High School students, .234 for Saigon University students, and .227 for exchange students in America. Thus, when the compartmentalization effect is cancelled, the correlation between the two kinds of nationalism become negative as expected, but still of low value.

This low value may be due to (1) the nature of the scales which are not truly opposite, (2) the unwillingness of the respondents to reveal their real attitudes, and (3) the ambiguity of the stimulus-situation and social norms related to the issue. The differences between the three correlation coefficients presented in Table 4.5 add some weight to our previous argument. In Cantho where isolation and normative ambiguity are highest, the students are more inconsistent in their nationalist attitudes; that is why the absolute value of the coefficient of correlation between the two nationalism scales is lowest ($r: -.002$). In Saigon, Western exposure and Western influence are higher; thus, uncertainty about the relative status of Vietnam and the West is lower, and consequently the absolute value of the correlation is higher.

TABLE 4.5.--Partial correlation between self-glorifying nationalism and self-abasing nationalism when dogmatism is kept constant.

| Samples | N | r | $F_{3,N-4}$ | Significant Level |
|--------------------|-----|-------|-------------|-------------------|
| Cantho High School | 131 | -.002 | .001 | N.S. |
| Saigon University | 232 | -.025 | .143 | N.S. |
| VN students in US | 59 | -.220 | 2.867 | .05 > p > .01 |

Vietnamese students in America who are more exposed to Western contact and influence have the least ambiguous attitudes about nationalism; their consistency is shown by a negative correlation between the two nationalism scales.

In general, we have found that nationalism as "a state of mind" is more complex than is usually thought. Apparently it is a contradictory state of mind. Yet, this state of mind is more or less "contradictory" depending upon several factors such as education, exposure to Western influences, and dogmatism. In the following we will examine the effect of dogmatism more closely.

Nationalism and Authoritarianism

We have seen that dogmatism has the effect of rendering the nationalist more likely to maintain contradictory beliefs regarding the position of his nation-state in relation to other nation-states. Now we examine the effect of dogmatism on nationalist feelings themselves. Several studies have shown that authoritarianism is positively related to "nationalism" in the usual sense of the word.¹ This approach stressing only the positive feelings toward the state is not adequate enough as we have seen previously. An authoritarian person has a very complex set of attitudes toward human society in general, and his nation-state in particular. His relationship

¹See, for instance, T. W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), pp. 107 ff., and Daniel Levinson, Jr., "Authoritarian Personality and Foreign Policy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1 (1957), pp. 37-47.

to other human beings is always ambivalent. It varies from one extreme to another, from "symbiotic" identification, to anomic rebellion.¹ It is reasonable to assume that he has the same uneasy and ambivalent set of attitudes toward his nation-state. Thus we hypothesize that nationalism, defined as a set of attitudes and beliefs toward one's nation-state, is related to dogmatism. More specifically, dogmatism is hypothesized as positively correlated to both self-abasing and self-glorifying nationalism. The findings presented in Table 4.6 and 4.7 support this hypothesis.

We have conclusively demonstrated that dogmatism is a powerful factor related to nationalism. An individual who strongly discriminates against other nation-states in favor of his own is very likely motivated by his authoritarian predispositions. On the other hand, an extremely negative attitude toward one's own country is also an evidence of authoritarianism. Apparently, a democratic-minded individual tends to have a balanced and realistic view of his country. He may see his country as backward without feeling alienated from it and without aggressive attitudes toward more advanced nations. Also, he may through ignorance, believe that the civilization of his country is superior to others without any Messianic ambition to impose his "superior" civilization

¹Fromm, Escape from Freedom, op. cit. Also Eric Hoffer, The True Believer (New York: Harper, 1951).

TABLE 4.6.--Partial correlation between dogmatism and self-glorifying nationalism with self-abasing nationalism held constant.

| Samples | N | r | F | Significance Level |
|--------------------|-----|------|--------|--------------------|
| Cantho High School | 131 | .387 | 22.641 | $p < .001$ |
| Saigon University | 232 | .451 | 58.459 | $p < .001$ |
| VN students in US | 59 | .560 | 25.611 | $p < .001$ |

TABLE 4.7.--Partial correlation between dogmatism and self-abasing nationalism with self-glorifying nationalism held constant.

| Samples | N | r | F | Significance Level |
|--------------------|-----|------|--------|--------------------|
| Cantho High School | 131 | .518 | 47.098 | $p < .001$ |
| Saigon University | 232 | .430 | 51.949 | $p < .001$ |
| VN students in US | 59 | .384 | 9.683 | $.01 > p > .001$ |

on other people. Now let us examine closely which socio-cultural factors impel the individual to hold either of these two alternative sets of beliefs.

Nationalism and Other Socio-Cultural Factors

So far we have demonstrated that dogmatism is correlated with self-abasing and self-glorifying nationalism and that the apparently paradoxical positive correlation between the two nationalism is also caused by dogmatism. In this section we test the hypothesis that individuals who are more "Westernized" (i.e., more exposed to Western influences) are more inclined toward self-abasing nationalism than others (with dogmatism held constant), and those who are more socialized into the traditional culture have a greater tendency toward self-glorifying nationalism. First we have to define "Westernization" and "traditionalism." Traditionalism is measured by the Familism scale (composed of its three sub-scales), and the number of years the respondent has been living in the countryside. Direct Westernization, in the case of Vietnamese exchange students in America, is measured by the number of years in the United States. Indirect Western exposure is measured by the education of the parents (knowledge of foreign languages). In addition, we are also interested in the effect of social stratification on nationalism. The socio-economic status is simply measured by the income level.

(a) First we examine self-glorifying nationalism in the three main samples (Cantho High School students, Saigon University students, and Vietnamese exchange students in America).

Data collected from the Cantho High School sample show that none of the cultural, economic, and social factors have any effect on self-glorifying nationalism (see Tables 4.8 and 4.9).

With the group of Vietnamese students in the United States, in general, the correlational pattern is the same. Income and familism are not related to self-glorifying nationalism, but the number of years in this country has a negative effect on self-glorifying nationalism. The longer a student stays away from his home and in a more advanced nation, the less he is inclined to think favorably about his own country (with dogmatism held constant) (see Tables 4.10 and 4.11). Western exposure tends to give him a more realistic picture of his culture and his fellow countrymen. The relatively high correlation between dogmatism and self-glorifying nationalism proves that an authoritarian student would need longer exposure to get a realistic image of his country than a democratic student.

Among Saigon University students, the same correlation pattern is repeated. That is, only dogmatism is significantly correlated with self-glorifying nationalism. Other sociological variables have practically no effect on self-glorifying nationalism (see Table 4.12).

In summary, the hypothesis that self-glorifying nationalism varies directly with the extent of exposure to Western influence, and inversely with the extent of socialization into the

TABLE 4.8.--Partial correlations between self-glorifying nationalism as the dependent variable, and dogmatism, familism, income, French, Chinese, English, years in countryside as dependent variable. (Cantho High School sample N = 131, df = 123, two-tailed test.)

| Independent Variables | r | F _{7,123} | Significance Level |
|-----------------------|-------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Dogmatism | .422 | 26.756 | P < .001 |
| Familism | .070 | .614 | N. S. |
| Income | -.091 | 1.033 | N. S. |
| Chinese | .030 | .114 | N. S. |
| French | .077 | .743 | N. S. |
| English | -.063 | .489 | N. S. |
| Years in countryside | .082 | .831 | N. S. |

TABLE 4.9.--Partial correlations between self-glorifying nationalism as the dependent variable, and dogmatism, obedience, respect, support, income, Chinese, French, English, years in countryside as independent variables. (Cantho High School sample N = 131, df = 121, two-tailed test.)

| Independent Variables | r | F _{9,121} | Significance Level |
|-----------------------|-------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Dogmatism | .399 | 22.968 | p < .001 |
| Obedience | .044 | .238 | N. S. |
| Response | -.012 | .020 | N. S. |
| Support | .046 | .264 | N. S. |
| Income | -.093 | 1.068 | N. S. |
| Chinese | .031 | .119 | N. S. |
| French | .077 | .720 | N. S. |
| English | -.065 | .521 | N. S. |
| Years in countryside | .083 | .845 | N. S. |

TABLE 4.10.--Partial correlations between self-glorifying nationalism as the dependent variable, and dogmatism, familism, parental income, years in U.S. as independent variables. (Exchange student sample, $N = 59$, $df = 53$, two-tailed test.)

| Independent Variables | r | $F_{4,53}$ | Significance Level |
|-----------------------|-------|------------|--------------------|
| Dogmatism | .461 | 14.576 | $p < .001$ |
| Familism | -.120 | .793 | N. S. |
| Income | .047 | 123 | N. S. |
| Years in U.S. | -.304 | 5.499 | $p < .001$ |

TABLE 4.11.--Partial correlations between self-glorifying nationalism as the dependent variable, and dogmatism, obedience, respect, support, parental income, years in U. S. as independent variables. (Exchange student sample $N = 59$, $df = 51$, two-tailed test.)

| Independent Variable | r | $F_{6,51}$ | Significance Level |
|----------------------|-------|------------|--------------------|
| Dogmatism | .431 | 11.879 | $p < .001$ |
| Obedience | .039 | .080 | N. S. |
| Respect | -.031 | .050 | N. S. |
| Support | -.117 | .727 | N. S. |
| Income | .057 | .173 | N. S. |
| Years in U. S. | -.311 | 5.568 | $p < .001$ |

TABLE 4.12.--Partial correlations between self-glorifying nationalism as the dependent variable, and dogmatism, parental income, parental knowledge of foreign languages as independent variables. (Saigon University students, N = 232, df = 226, two-tailed test.)

| Independent Variables | r | F _{5,226} | Significance Level |
|-----------------------|-------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Dogmatism | .482 | 68.570 | p < .001 |
| Income | -.071 | 1.168 | N. S. |
| Chinese | .059 | .795 | N. S. |
| French | .053 | .647 | N. S. |
| English | -.034 | .262 | N. S. |

traditional culture is only partially supported. Direct exposure to Western influence and dogmatism are the main factors significantly correlated with self-glorifying nationalism.

(b) We now examine the correlates of self-debasing nationalism. With the Cantho High School students, self-abasing nationalism is correlated significantly with dogmatism only (See Tables 4.13, 4.14).

Among the exchange students in the United States (see Table 4.15) self-abasing nationalism is not only positively correlated with dogmatism, it is also significantly correlated with income level and the number of years in the United States. Concerning the **relationship** between self-abasing nationalism and income level, it is probable that wealthy families are more Westernized than poorer families, and Westernization has been hypothesized as having some effects on self-abasing nationalism. An individual raised by rich parents may be more frequently in contact with luxuries which are, most of the time, products of Western advanced technologies; this focuses his attention on the gap between his backward developing country and the more industrialized West; consequently self-abasing nationalism stems from this more realistic appraisal of his country in relation to the West. On the other hand, we also found that the longer his stay in America, the more unfavorable the picture he has about his country. Apparently, the direct contact with a more industrialized country makes

TABLE 4.13.--Partial correlations between self-abasing nationalism as the dependent variable, and dogmatism, familism, income, Chinese, French, English, years in countryside as independent variables. (Cantho High School students, N = 131, df = 123, two-tailed test.)

| Independent Variables | r | F _{7,123} | Significance Level |
|-----------------------|-------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Dogmatism | .529 | 48.002 | p < .001 |
| Familism | -.055 | .374 | N. S. |
| Income | -.056 | .387 | N. S. |
| Chinese | -.022 | .063 | N. S. |
| French | -.012 | .018 | N. S. |
| English | .070 | .616 | N. S. |
| Years in countryside | -.007 | .007 | N. S. |

TABLE 4.14.--Partial correlations between self-abasing nationalism as the dependent variable, and dogmatism, obedience, respect, support, income, Chinese, French, English, years in countryside. (Cantho High School students, N = 131, df = 121, two-tailed test.)

| Independent Variables | r | F _{9,121} | Significance Level |
|-----------------------|-------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Dogmatism | .523 | 45.730 | p < .001 |
| Obedience | -.045 | .249 | N. S. |
| Respect | .046 | .256 | N. S. |
| Support | -.063 | .485 | N. S. |
| Income | -.050 | .304 | N. S. |
| Chinese | -.023 | .067 | N. S. |
| French | -.013 | .022 | N. S. |
| English | .075 | .689 | N. S. |
| Years in countryside | -.011 | .016 | N. S. |

TABLE 4.15.--Partial correlations between self-abasing nationalism as the dependent variable, and dogmatism, familism, income, years in U.S. as independent variables. (Exchange students in U.S., N = 59, df = 53, two-tailed test.)

| Independent Variables | r | F _{4,53} | Significance Level |
|-----------------------|-------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Dogmatism | .401 | 10.387 | p < .01 |
| Familism | -.059 | .189 | N. S. |
| Income | .248 | 3.563 | .05 > p > .01 |
| Years in U. S. | .277 | 4.504 | .01 > p > .001 |

the individual more aware of the painful differences between his country and the United States.

Among Saigon University students, self-abasing nationalism is similarly correlated with dogmatism and parental income level. As in the previous case, self-abasing nationalism is related partially to authoritarian predisposition, and partially to Western exposure (it has been assumed that wealthy people are in more direct contact with Western cultures than poor people).

To recapitulate, we have found that self-abasing nationalism is consistently related to dogmatism. In regard to other factors, the findings are less uniform. Income and exposure to Western influences are found to be slightly related to self-abasing nationalism. This fact has been interpreted as due to the broadening of knowledge about Western cultures. The gap between the "have" and the "have not" nations is more realistically evaluated by children from rich families, and by those who have contact with the West--provided that dogmatism is kept constant. On the other hand, dogmatism prevents any kind of realistic evaluation, and tends to impel the individuals to see the "gap" as much bigger, and especially as much more threatening than it actually is.

Summary

In this chapter we introduced a new approach to the study of nationalism. Traditionally, nationalism is viewed as a set of favorable attitudes toward one's own nation-state

TABLE 4.16.--Partial correlations between self-abasing nationalism as the dependent variable, and dogmatism, obedience, respect, support, income, years in U.S. as independent variables. (Exchange students in U. S., N = 59, df = 53, two-tailed test.)

| Independent Variables | r | F _{6,51} | Significance Level |
|-----------------------|-------|-------------------|--------------------|
| Dogmatism | .401 | 9.989 | p < .001 |
| Obedience | -.061 | .198 | N. S. |
| Respect | .074 | .291 | N. S. |
| Support | -.081 | .347 | N. S. |
| Income | .246 | 3.360 | .01 < p < .05 |
| Years in U. S. | .283 | 4.535 | .001 < p < .01 |

TABLE 4.17.--Partial correlation between self-abasing nationalism as the dependent variable, and dogmatism, income, Chinese, French, English as independent variables. (Saigon University students, N = 232, df = 226, two-tailed test.)

| Independent Variables | r | F _{5,226} | Significance Level |
|-----------------------|-------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Dogmatism | .472 | 65.030 | p < .001 |
| Income | .216 | 11.077 | p < .001 |
| Chinese | -.023 | .125 | N. S. |
| French | -.057 | .740 | N. S. |
| English | .075 | 1.301 | N. S. |

and culture at the expense of other nation-states and cultures. This "content" approach stressing the more obvious aspect of nationalism has been found inadequate for an understanding of the dynamic force underlying nationalism, particularly in the newly-emerging nations. Nationalism has been more broadly defined as a state of overconsciousness about the relative position of one's nation-state with respect to other nation-states. A nationalist is an individual who is extremely concerned about the status of his country, or his culture. He maintains a set of ambivalent beliefs about them. He tends to have unrealistically extreme images of his country as being either very "advanced" or very "backward," or as simultaneously "advanced" and "backward."

Put in the developmental context, we have found that nationalism is mainly related to a personality characteristic--authoritarianism, i.e., it is the result of psychological socialization. The normative effects of socialization play some role in determining the kind of nationalism an individual is inclined to. More specifically, how nationalistic an individual is depends on the level of his authoritarianism; and secondly, how much he is a self-abasing nationalist depends on the extent of his socialization into a Western culture. Interestingly, direct exposure to a Western influence has a greater effect on nationalism than traditionalism.

CHAPTER V

"MANDARIN MENTALITY"

Introduction

Poverty plays a very important socio-political role in newly-emerging nations. It is a part of the underdevelopment syndrome. It seems that if poverty were eliminated, most of political headaches would be cured. Yet the simplicity of the problems does not guarantee a simple solution. People want to have a higher standard of living, but are they sufficiently motivated to pay the emotional cost of economic growth? According to Everett E. Hagen, economic change requires creativity, entrepreneurial spirit the courage to venture into the unknown.¹ Daniel Lerner emphasizes the co-existence of "empathic personality" and modernization.² Are the Vietnamese students adequately prepared to play the role of modernizing agents in Vietnam? Are they willing enough to step out of the traditional grooves to become independent artisans, small merchants, shopkeepers, or farmers, rather than unproductively competing with each other for a civil

¹Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1962), pp. 30-34.

²Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe, Ill.: Fress Press, 1958), pp. 43-75.

service post? In other words, are they socialized to live in an industrial and business age?

In this chapter we will examine the effects of socialization on the occupational preference of Vietnamese students in Vietnam. It has been generally observed that in a Confucian society like Vietnam, to be a mandarin is the highest ambition of each individual. Paul Giran writes that the Vietnamese is "bureaucrat dans l'âme."¹ This strong desire to become a bureaucrat has withheld from the industrial field the country's most capable human resources. An even more important consequence of this general drive for mandarin's posts is the social unrest it generates. Fierce competition by a great number of high school and university graduates for a limited number of governmental posts may lead to frequent political explosions.

In the past, an equilibrium was easily maintained. If a student failed his examination, he lived a miserable life and tried again and again. When finally all hope of becoming a mandarin evaporated, he stayed in his village as a farmer, resigning himself to his fate. At the present time, this fatalistic resignation no longer exists. After the French colonial administrators had been ousted, mass recruitment into the government aroused hopes among many people of getting into the civil service. Secondly, for years governmental propaganda

¹Paul Giran, Psychologie du Peuple Annamite, op. cit., p. 80.

has promised prosperity and happiness. For a Vietnamese student, this is interpreted as an easy access to the civil service since, given the country's state of economic backwardness, there is hardly any other way of earning a decent living. Private employment is limited. Farming has been difficult because of political insecurity in the rural areas; it is not highly regarded; and the Communist's equalitarian propaganda as well as that of the governmental land-reform agency, makes dia chu (land owner) a title not to be envied. The last outlet for an ambitious Vietnamese youth is trade, which traditionally is not regarded as a respectable occupation (besides, one needs capital to be a merchant). Even though the status of the merchant has improved in modern times, this advancement in the social hierarchy is made more problematic by daily attacks in the newspaper against blackmarketing, a general and perennial economic disease in every developing nation. Thus a student graduated from high school or college has little choice but to hope for a government post. A Vietnamese may be a born bureaucrat, but he may also be a bureaucrat faute de mieux.

Thus the main questions to be investigated in this chapter are: How general is the "mandarin mentality?" Is it the consequence of normative socialization or psychological socialization? In other words, we are interested in learning how Vietnamese students are socialized into the pattern of mandarinism. Are mandarin attitudes merely part of the

traditional value system, or are they the result of authoritarian desire for power, status, and security--the three main components of mandarinism?

These points will be discussed in the following sections:

1. Mandarinism
 - a. Scale
 - b. Its widespread extent in the Vietnamese society.
2. Mandarinism and its correlates
3. Occupational preference in general
 - a. Psychological and sociological correlates for preference of mandarin and non-mandarin type occupations.
 - b. Socialization of "entrepreneurial spirit."

Mandarinism

Mandarinism is a set of attitudes which assign a higher value to a governmental post than to any other occupation. In addition, a post in the Vietnamese government in the past as well as in the present has generally been associated with a position of power and high status in Vietnamese society. It also promises a secure future. Thus, mandarinism can also be defined as a predisposition to seek power, status, and security through occupational selection. The scales used to measure mandarinism were constructed with these general characteristics in mind.

Mandarin mentality or mandarinism is measured by several Guttman scales. The subject is presented with two alternative

occupations. The income level of the more prestigious occupation is constant, while the income level of the less prestigious occupation represents the mandarinism score. The questionnaire takes the following form:

Following is a list of several pairs of occupations at ten different income levels. For each income level select one of the two occupations according to your personal preference by putting a checkmark in the blank space.

(Scale I)

Occupation A is in the civil service. Occupation B is employment in a private firm. Check the one you prefer in each of the ten following cases:

| | OCCUPATION A | OCCUPATION B |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Income level 1 | VN \$5,000_____ | VN \$5,000_____ |
| Income level 2 | VN \$5,000_____ | VN \$5,000_____ |
| Income level 3 | VN \$5,000_____ | VN \$5,000_____ |
| Income level 4 | VN \$5,000_____ | VN \$5,000_____ |
| Income level 5 | VN \$5,000_____ | VN \$5,000_____ |
| Income level 6 | VN \$5,000_____ | VN \$5,000_____ |
| Income level 7 | VN \$5,000_____ | VN \$5,000_____ |
| Income level 8 | VN \$5,000_____ | VN \$5,000_____ |
| Income level 9 | VN \$5,000_____ | VN \$5,000_____ |
| Income level 10 | VN \$5,000_____ | VN \$5,000_____ |

The income levels are the same for all the mandarinism scales. Only the instructions at the head of each scale are different.

Following are the headings for scales II-VIII.

(Scale II)

Occupation A is twice as respectable as occupation B. Check the one you prefer in each of the ten following cases.

(Scale III)

Occupation A is twice as powerful as occupation B. Check the one you prefer in each of the ten following cases.

(Scale IV)

Occupation A is twice as secure as occupation B. Check the one you prefer in each of the ten following cases.

(Scale V)

Occupation A is in the civil service. Occupation B is in trade. Check the one you prefer in each of the ten following cases.

(Scale VI)

Occupation A is in the civil service. Occupation B is in farming (after the war). Check the one you prefer in each of the ten following cases.

(Scale VII)

Occupation A is in the civil service. Occupation B is that of an independent craftsman. Check the one you prefer in each of the ten following cases.

The mandarinism questionnaire was given to 131 senior high school students of Cantho. Their average scores¹ are presented in Table 5.1. The average scores in the table show that the attractiveness of the civil service is still considerable: the Cantho High School students prefer poorly-paid civil service job to any other kind of occupation.

Let us first examine the social hierarchy of occupations. Working for a private business company is clearly considered the least attractive. In Vietnam, where many private business or industrial firms belong to foreigners (Chinese, French, and Americans), unwillingness to work in these firms may be due

¹These average scores may be lower than is realistic since many subjects prefer occupation A to occupation B to the end of the Grettman-type Mandarinism Scale.

TABLE 5.1.--Average "mandarin mentality" scores of a group of Cantho High School students (N = 131).

| Scales | Average | S.D. | Last Income Level of B when A with an Income of 5,000 is Still Preferred | | |
|--|---------|-------|---|----|-------|
| I. Civil Service vs Private Employment | 5.183 | 3.210 | 7,091 | vs | 5,000 |
| II. Status vs High Income | 6.763 | 3.238 | 7,881 | vs | 5,000 |
| III. Power vs High Income | 5.206 | 3.378 | 7,103 | vs | 5,000 |
| IV. Security vs High Income | 7.992 | 2.813 | 8,496 | vs | 5,000 |
| V. Civil Service vs Trade | 4.221 | 3.762 | 6,610 | vs | 5,000 |
| VI. Civil Service vs Farming | 3.435 | 3.784 | 6,217 | vs | 5,000 |
| VII. Civil Service vs Craftsmanship | 4.511 | 3.661 | 6,755 | vs | 5,000 |

to unwillingness to work under a foreigner. Even if the firm is owned by a native Vietnamese, the situation is scarcely better—for a merchant or businessman is not highly regarded in the Vietnamese society. In the traditional occupational hierarchy, the merchant occupies the lowest rung of the ladder (Si, Nong, Cong, Thuong: Scholar, farmer, craftsman, merchant). Up to the present this hierarchy does not seem to have changed much. In Table 5.1, the rankings place civil servants at the head of the list, followed by farmers, merchants, and finally craftsman. The merchant has been promoted one rank, but the difference in status between the merchant and the craftsman is not statistically significant, while the differences in status between the farmer and the merchant, and between the farmer and the craftsman are significant ($.01 < p < .05$). In general, traditional values related to occupational preference are still strong among Cantho High School students.

In looking at the motivating forces guiding the choice of occupations, we find that the need for security is the strongest. The Cantho students prefer a secure 5,000-piaster job to a less secure one even if the latter yields 70% more income. The next factor influencing occupational choice is respectability. Power is also a very important factor, but not as important as security and status.

We shall now investigate certain socio-cultural factors which may be responsible for the development of the mandarin mentality during this transitional period in Vietnam. The

socio-cultural factors selected in this study are: authoritarianism (as measured by the Dogmatism Scale), familism with its three constituent elements, parental income, parental knowledge of foreign languages (Chinese, French, English), and length of residence in the rural area.

Correlates of Mandarinism

Socialization of Mandarinism

How are Vietnamese students socialized into a mandarin-oriented society? Table 5.2 gives us a tentative answer to this question. First, it is consistently clear that dogmatism is related to mandarinism in only one case: the need for occupational security is positively correlated with dogmatism ($r: .143$). On the contrary, familism (or more specifically "Obedience") is generally correlated with mandarinism. Thus, we can conclude that mandarinism developed as a consequence of normative rather than psychological socialization. In other words, Vietnamese students have a mandarin mentality, not because of their authoritarian tendency but because of traditional values attached to a governmental post.

The first case of mandarinism--civil service vs private employment--presents some interesting correlations. It is found that the more the father knows English, the less the child feels attracted toward the civil service. On the contrary, the more the father knows French, the more the child would prefer to become a bureaucrat. These two relationships

TABLE 5.2.--Partial correlations between each of seven measures of nationalism as the independent variable and dogmatism, familism, income, Chinese, French, English, and years in country as dependent variables. (Dante High School students, N = 131, two-tailed test.)

| Dependent Independent ¹ | Civil Service vs Private Employment | Civil Service vs Trade | Civil Service vs Craftsmanship | Civil Service vs Familism | Income vs Income | Status vs Income | Security vs Income |
|---|--|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| Dogmatism | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | r=.143 (p<.05) |
| Familism | r=.193(p<.001) | r=.147(p<.05) | N. S. | N. S. | r=.019 (p<.001) | N. S. | N. S. |
| Income | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. |
| Chinese | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. |
| French | r=.167(p<.01) | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. |
| English | r=.192(p<.001) | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | r=.131 (p<.05) | N. S. | N. S. |
| Yrs.in countryside | r=.264(p<.001) | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. |
| (With Familism broken down into its three components) | | | | | | | |
| Dogmatism | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. |
| Obedience | r=.216(p<.001) | r=.117(p<.05) | N. S. | r=.138 (p<.05) | r=.019 (p<.001) | r=.032 (p<.001) | r=.1347 (p<.001) |
| Respect | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | r=.232 (p<.001) |
| Support | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. |
| Income | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. |
| Chinese | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. |
| French | r=.251(p<.01) | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. |
| English | r=.264(p<.001) | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. |
| Yrs.in countryside | r=.161(p<.01) | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. | N. S. |

¹Each of the independent variables is partially correlated with each of the seven dependent variables, while the remaining independent variables are held constant.

are difficult to explain. Probably, the French bureaucratic traditions, originated during the Napoleonic period and spread to Vietnam by French colonial administrators, have encouraged the survival of the Vietnamese mandarinal system. On the other hand, the anti-bureaucratic traditions of the Anglo-American cultures (Napoleon once contemptuously called Britain "the country of shopkeepers") has the opposite effect. The third positive correlation ($r: .26$) between mandarinism and the number of years spent in the rural area is relevant to understanding the dilemma of the people of rural background and the policy-makers of Saigon. Rural enculturation increases the value placed on civil service occupation. Yet rural people are not prepared to compete for a governmental post with more-educated urban dwellers. This dilemma for rural people is a potential threat to the social order itself. For these people, the goal (becoming a civil servant) is much too high to reach--given the means available to them (low level of education in rural areas). This considerable discrepancy between means and goal is conducive to anomic behavior. Probably, at the beginning some attempt is made to reach the highly cherished goal, but if the goal proves not to be attainable, it may be abandoned altogether. Actually, the "retreatism which was the traditional way of escape under the form of thu dien-vien (the pleasure of gardening and farming)" is no longer acceptable because the Vietcong in the rural area have provided

hope of a new and more gratifying way to reach the goal--rebellion.¹

Finally, we want to point to another interesting fact--the negative correlation ($r: -.323$) between the need for occupational security and the desire to respect elderly relatives. In Chapter 3, the inclination not to respect elderly relatives has been interpreted as an attitude of rebellion against authority or an act of alienation away from the system. The rebellious or alienated individual's act of rejecting the legitimate authority is accompanied by some feelings of discomfort, if not guilt. This state of normative uprootedness generates tension and insecurity. The strong need for security which is positively correlated with rebellious attitudes is probably the manifestation of this general state of insecurity.

Motivating Forces Underlying Occupational Choice

By definition, we have designated the needs for power status, and security as components of "mandarinism." Now we will investigate to see how these needs affect the occupational choice in specific cases. We have seen that civil service is preferred to trade, farming, and craftsmanship. What are the motivations underlying this preference in each of these three

¹To understand different anomic reactions, see Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1961), pp. 130-194.

cases? To find an answer to this question, we successively correlate the Mandarinism Scales I, V, VI, and VII (civil service vs private employment, civil service vs trade, civil service vs farming, and civil service vs craftsmanship) and the Mandarinism Scales II, III, and IV (status vs high income, power vs high income, security vs high income). The results are presented in Tables 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6.

Table 5.3 shows that the motivations which make the students prefer working in the government to working in a private business or industrial firm are the needs for status and security. On the other hand, the need for power has no influence in their occupational choice.

As to the preference for being a civil servant over being a merchant, we find that status consciousness is the main driving force, while the need for power has a secondary effect. The need for security does not significantly determine this occupational choice of the students (See Table 5.4).

In the third case, the preference for working in the government to being a farmer is mainly motivated by the need for security. The concerns about power and status surprisingly do not have any effect at all (see Table 5.5).

Finally, the preference for being a civil servant to being a craftsman is dictated equally by the needs for status and security. Again, the concerns for power are not a strong motive in the selection of an occupation.

TABLE 5.3.--Partial correlations between "preference for civil service to private employment" as the dependent variable, and needs for power, security, and status as independent variables. (N = 131, df = 127, two-tailed test.)

| Independent Variables | r | F _{3,127} | Significance Level |
|-----------------------|------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Status | .291 | 11.793 | p < .001 |
| Power | .019 | .045 | N. S. |
| Security | .176 | 4.062 | p < .001 |

TABLE 5.4.--Partial correlations between "preference for civil service to trade" as the dependent variable, and needs for power, security, and status as independent variables. (N = 131, df = 127, two-tailed test.)

| Independent Variables | r | F _{3,127} | Significance Level |
|-----------------------|------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Status | .186 | 4.585 | .005 > p > .001 |
| Power | .144 | 2.693 | .05 > p > .01 |
| Security | .107 | 1.471 | N. S. |

TABLE 5.5.--Partial correlations between "preference for civil service to farming" as the dependent variable, and needs for power, security, and status as independent variables. (N = 131, df = 127, two-tailed test.)

| Independent Variables | r | F _{3,127} | Significance Level |
|-----------------------|------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Status | .037 | .180 | N. S. |
| Power | .077 | .758 | N. S. |
| Security | .151 | 2.991 | .05 > p > .01 |

TABLE 5.6.--Partial correlations between "preference for civil service to craftsmanship" as the dependent variable, and the needs for power, security, and status as independent variables. (N = 131, df = 127, two-tailed test.)

| Independent Variables | r | F _{3,127} | Significance Level |
|-----------------------|------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Status | .233 | 7.317 | p < .001 |
| Power | .079 | .800 | N. S. |
| Security | .234 | 7.380 | p < .001 |

In summary, the motivational forces underlying the occupational choice patterns of Cantho High School students examined here are needs for power, status, and security. Surprisingly, these students seem not to be interested in power. According to their responses, they are mainly motivated by a desire for high status and a secure position. These consistent needs for status and security are not in disagreement with their traditional normative system. In effect, the Confucianist Li system is based on the assumption that a clear-cut and highly differentiated status structure is the indispensable element of a good society. As regards the love of security among the Vietnamese, Paul Giran at the beginning of the 20th century observed that "l'annamite n'aspire qu'aux carrières toutes tracées qui lui ménagent un minimum d'imprévu, qui lui demandent le moindre effort d'originalité."¹

Scale of Occupational Preference

The above study of general "mandarinism" throws some light on the occupational preference of Vietnamese students. They are motivated by needs for status and security, and do not appear to be able to meet the crucial shortage of entrepreneurial skills during the transitional period when innovation rather than security, and deviation rather than conformity to mandarinist traditions constitute the main driving power of change. By using a different method of research--ranking specific occupations

¹Giran, Psychologie du Peuple Annamite, op. cit., p. 80.

according to one's preference--we also find that the value-orientations in the occupational area are not propitious for economic development because occupations which are of "entrepreneurial nature" are not highly valued (See Table 5.7). Instead the first four occupations are of "mandarinal type." It is interesting to note that "high-ranking civil servant" is ranked lower than "import-export businessman" and "industrialist," while businessmen in the field of transportation and construction are not so highly regarded. The reason top civil service positions are not preferred might be due to political risks involved (the questionnaire was administered after the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem and dismissal of several top civil servants). In general mandarinal occupations are preferred to entrepreneurial occupations. In addition, Vietnamese students have different attitudes toward different kinds of entrepreneurial occupations. Transportation and occupation business compared to importation-exportation or industrial businesses are not highly esteemed. Probably, the status of an occupation depends on how closely it is related to manual labor. In effect the transportation and construction businesses require at least as commonly found in Vietnam closer involvement with the blue-collar class, is thus looked down on; while the owner of an industrial company or an importation-exportation company is moved far away from the manual labor which has always been considered as the symbol of low status. On the other hand, to be a giam-doc of an industrial plant or

TABLE 5.7.--The order ranking of nineteen occupations by Cantho High School students.

| Occupations | Rank Order | Ranking Mean Score | S. D. |
|--------------------------------|---------------|-----------------------|-------|
| Medical Doctor | 1 | 6.149 | 5.566 |
| Famous Writer | 2 | 6.681 | 5.554 |
| Lawyer | 3 | 6.890 | 4.777 |
| Military General | 4 | 7.472 | 5.404 |
| Import-Export Business | 5 | 7.567 | 4.312 |
| Owner of an Industrial Company | 6 | 7.965 | 4.098 |
| High Ranking Civil Servant | 7 | 8.502 | 4.456 |
| Rubber Plantation | 8 | 9.184 | 4.051 |
| Tea Plantation | 9 | 9.278 | 4.472 |
| Famous Painter | 10 | 9.865 | 5.590 |
| Coffee Plantation | 11 | 10.029 | 4.144 |
| Transportation Business | 12 | 10.442 | 4.215 |
| Famous Musician | 13 | 11.069 | 5.180 |
| Construction Business | 14 | 11.333 | 4.228 |
| Famous Singer | 15 | 11.791 | 5.767 |
| Famous Movie Star | 16 | 12.059 | 5.700 |
| Large Land Owner | 17 | 12.592 | 4.963 |
| Owner of Houses for Rent | 18 | 15.303 | 4.041 |
| Loan Company | 19 | 15.711 | 3.984 |

an importation-exportation company is not too different from being a high-ranking civil servant. In Vietnam, the importation-exportation business consists of getting an import-export licence; once it is obtained, the profit is maximally insured. Similarly, running an industrial plant incurs almost no risk at all. The policy of the government is to help keep the plant running, and so far there has never been a case of bankruptcy or great loss. Thus, the image of an importation-exportation businessman or an industrialist in Vietnam is more or less that of a wealthy bureaucrat who does not run the risk of being downgraded by multiple coups d'état that other high ranking civil-servants face. This may be the reason why Vietnamese students prefer these occupations.

Now we examine more closely to see what socio-cultural factors affect the development of this quasi-mandarinism. I will use the ranking scores of each occupation as the dependent variable, and authoritarianism, familism, and other sociological factors as independent variables. The main hypothesis is that traditionalism is positively correlated with mandarinism. More specifically, it is positively correlated with the degree of preference for mandarin occupations (or negatively correlated with their order ranking scores). On the other hand, it is negatively correlated with the degree of preference for non-mandarinal-type occupations (or positively correlated with their order ranking scores). In other words, the more traditionalist the student (psychologically or normatively), the more he

likes mandarinal-type occupations and the more he dislikes non-mandarinal-type occupations. Among the nineteen listed occupations, the mandarinal-type occupations (i.e. those occupations which were traditionally considered as belonging to the "scholar" class, si), are: medical doctor, writer, lawyer, military general, and public administrator.

Table 5.8 shows a weak trend supporting our general hypothesis that traditionalism (i.e. traditional values or traditional environment) is positively related to mandarinal vocations. For instance, the more authoritarian an individual is, the more he prefers to be a civil servant. However, he does not prefer to be a medical doctor (traditionally was considered to belong to the scholar class); apparently, in this case, his authoritarian approach to life makes this humanitarian occupation less attractive. There is another deviation: even though to be a movie star is not generally considered as respectable, the authoritarian likes this occupation more than the democrat; understandably, his need for self-glorification makes him envy the cheering and applause that a movie star usually receives from the audience.

The pattern is more consistent with familism as a measure of traditionalist orientation. The more familistic an individual, the more he wants to be a medical doctor, or a military general. On the other hand, the more familistic he is, the less he prefers to be a businessman (importer-exporter), or an artist (painter)--traditionally not classified as the si

TABLE 5.8.--Partial correlations between the ranking scores of each of the 19 occupations as the dependent variable, and each of the psycho-sociological factors as independent variables.

| Dependent Variables | Independent Variables | | | | | Years in Country-side | |
|---------------------|-----------------------|----------|--------|---------|--------|-----------------------|-------|
| | Dogmatism | Familism | Income | Chinese | French | English | |
| Medical Doctor | .126 | -.137 | .155 | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. |
| Writer | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | -.169 | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. |
| Lawyer | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | -.155 | N.S. | -.134 |
| Military General | N.S. | -.128 | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. |
| Import-Export | N.S. | .162 | -.129 | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. |
| Industrialist | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | .202 | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. |
| Civil Servant | -.152 | N.S. | N.S. | -.181 | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. |
| Rubber Plantation | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. |
| Tea Plantation | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. |
| Famous Painter | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. |
| Coffee Plantation | N.S. | -.129 | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. |
| Transportation | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | .142 | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. |
| Famous Musician | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | .163 | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. |
| Construction | N.S. | -.180 | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | .145 |
| Famous Singer | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | .169 | N.S. | .171 | N.S. |
| Movie Star | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | -.130 | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. |
| Land Owner | -.144 | N.S. | -.130 | -.187 | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. |
| Houses for Rent | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | -.141 | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. |
| Loan Company | N.S. | -.148 | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. |
| | | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. | N.S. |

¹ Each of the independent variable is partially correlated with each of the dependent variables while the remaining independent variables are held constant.

(or scholars). Here also, we find some unexpected findings: familistic subjects show a stronger desire to be a musician or to have houses for rent as an occupation than non-familistic subjects.

The effects of traditionalist environment on the choice of occupations come out as expected. Students having Chinese-educated fathers, on the one hand, tend to prefer mandarinal occupations such as writing and working in the government. They tend, on the other hand to be biased against landowners coffee planters, businessmen (construction, transportation, industry)--in general, the entrepreneurial class. Table 5.9 and 5.10 show the influence of traditional-oriented environment against entrepreneurial-type occupations. The nineteen selected occupations are grouped into two categories. One group is composed of non-entrepreneurial occupations (medical doctor, writer, lawyer, military general, civil servant, painter, musician, singer and movie star). The other includes the remaining entrepreneurial occupations (importer, exporter, industrialist, planters, businessmen in the fields of transportation, construction, real-estate, and banking). The more traditionalist his environment, the more the subject tends to reject entrepreneurial occupations. Familism has some effects in the same direction, but they are not significant beyond the level of 5%.

TABLE 5.9.--Partial correlations between the total ranking score of non-entrepreneurial occupations as the dependent variable, and other socio-cultural factors as independent variables. (N = 131, df = 123.)

| Independent Variables | r | F _{7,123} | Significance Level |
|-----------------------|-------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Dogmatism | -.028 | .103 | N.S. |
| Familism | -.096 | 1.145 | N.S. |
| Income | .001 | .000 | N.S. |
| Chinese | -.214 | 5.955 | p < .001 |
| French | .000 | .000 | N.S. |
| English | -.042 | .220 | N.S. |
| Years in countryside | .010 | .012 | N.S. |

TABLE 5.10.--Partial correlations between the total ranking score of entrepreneurial occupations as the dependent variable, and other socio-cultural factors as independent variables. (N = 131, df = 123.)

| Independent Variables | r | F _{7,123} | Significance Level |
|-----------------------|-------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Dogmaism | .031 | .120 | N.S. |
| Familism | .094 | 1.096 | N.S. |
| Income | .000 | .000 | N.S. |
| Chinese | .207 | 5.547 | p < .001 |
| French | -.012 | .019 | N.S. |
| English | .044 | .240 | N.S. |
| Years in countryside | -.002 | .001 | N.S. |

Summary

In this chapter, we have studied a sociological variable-- a strong and widespread desire to earn a living in the government--which, according to Max Handman's theory, is the main unrest-generating agent among Vietnamese students to the fierce competition for governmental posts. Its anti-entrepreneurial nature is also an unsurmountable obstacle to economic development since, in agreement with E. E. Hagen's thesis, entrepreneurial innovation is the main driving force to overcome economic backwardness and stagnancy.

This variable--mandarinism--has been found to be mainly the result of familistic socialization. More specifically, it originates from strong familistic submissiveness. Mandarinism as measured by six different scales is positively correlated with "obedience" five out of six times. Ruralism is also found to be somewhat responsible for this tendency.

In a different and more concrete manner, mandarinism was studied in the context of nineteen main occupations commonly found in the Vietnamese society. The general trend is that entrepreneurial occupations are not highly esteemed by those who have been socialized into the traditionalist value system, or who are living in a traditionalist environment.

In general, it seems very difficult for Vietnamese society to follow the model of the West. On the one hand, in the Western economic system, founded on the free enterprise principle, the entrepreneurial class is functionally the most important and

socially the most highly valued. In Vietnam, entrepreneurial spirit is lacking, and human resources are channeled into non-entrepreneurial activities. Consequently, a class of imaginative, innovative private entrepreneurs cannot fully develop, due to lack of social encouragement and the tendency of talented individuals to be attracted into the governmental, or non-entrepreneurial, fields.

On the other hand, the Western model of democracy can survive only in a relatively stable atmosphere made possible because each one of its talented and ambitious young person has more than one outlet for self-realization, where his need for achievement and his imagination can find many fields for their development and satisfaction besides the civil service. In Vietnam all other fields, except the government, are normatively closed to him. When all governmental posts are filled, there is no other ways to attain his cherished goal. He can (1) painfully give up his goals and become apathic and alienated, or (2) keep his cherished goal and find more or less legitimate new means to reach it. At best, he will cheat at the entrance exam, bribe his way into the government, or induce nepotism among relatives who are already in the government. At worst, he will join the rebels to get into the government through coup d'état or violent revolution. The result is either open corruption or civil instability. This situation greatly hampers stable, orderly, and democratic political process.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Culture and Political Behavior

Linton defines a culture as "the configuration of learned behavior and results of behavior whose component elements are shared and transmitted by the members of a particular society."¹ Ogburn and Nimkoff put more stress on the inter-relationships of cultural elements: "a culture," they write, "consists of inventions, or cultural traits, integrated into a system, with varying degree of correlation between the parts."² In these broad conceptions of culture are implied that

1. Any persistent patterns of political behavior of a country is part of its culture.
2. As part of the "configuration" and "correlated" to other parts, the patterns of political behavior of a country can have a more or less permanent change only when other "parts" of the culture are also changed in the same direction.

¹Ralph Linton, The Cultural Background of Personality (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1945), p. 32. See also Victor Barnouw, Culture and Personality (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1963), p. 5.

²W. F. Ogburn and M. F. Minkoff, Sociology (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1940), p. 63.

3. The patterns of political behavior like any other cultural patterns are the result of the socialization process.

Thus, political change has been viewed in the broader context of general cultural change. Similarly, the problem of political underdevelopment has been seen as the complex result of interrelated cultural traits. Indeed, it has been very difficult to determine which of them might be considered causes and which others effects. As S. M. Lipset puts it, the political system is "a mutli-variate system," in which democracy is both a cause and an effect of socio-cultural traits, with feedback processes further complicating the picture.¹

In view of this multi-variate character of the system, I consider all factors more or less related to underdevelopment as forming a syndrome--the "underdevelopment syndrome." This syndrome includes a number of traits which are generally found co-existing with each other in most underdeveloped countries. Certainly, because of the diversities of cultural backgrounds, the distribution of these traits are not uniform in all underdeveloped countries. Some traits play a crucial role in one country but not in another, and lend a special color to the political system of that country. In the case of Vietnam, the political behavior patterns are considerably influenced by anti-democratic tendencies, nationalistic feelings, and mandarinism.

¹S. M. Lipset, Political Man, op. cit., p. 75.

Thus, in considering the underdeveloped state of a country as a whole (the underdevelopment syndrome) and concentrating ourselves on the relations between certain crucial traits, we can get some insight into the political system as a whole. This methodological viewpoint, however, does not imply that the traits selected (dependent variables) are simply (or uni-directionally) the effects of other traits (independent variables) as causes. There are always feedback processes which cannot be easily isolated, and whose effects cannot be easily measured.

In short, failure to look at a political system as part of a culture sometimes results in falsely regarding one of the many interconnected factors as the main determinant of political behavior. The socialization approach employed in this study, bringing the political system closer to the cultural environment, may consequently be considered as more balanced and realistic.

Socialization and Patterns of Political Behavior

We have assumed that political behavior is partially determined by the culture in which the individual has been socialized. The mechanism of the political socialization process has been generally inferred, but has not been systematically analyzed because of its considerable complexities and in the lack of data. This study is an exploratory attempt to investigate how political behavior patterns emerged from

socialization. In order to simplify our task, we have dichotomized the effects of socialization: normative socialization, and psychological socialization.

This dichotomy is based on two assumptions. First, personality and social norms are two different concepts, which cannot be reduced to one another. Secondly, political behavior patterns of a people, as part of their way of life, are partly determined by their normative system, and partly by their personality characteristics.

The validity of this approach depends on the legitimacy of these two assumptions. As regards the first assumption, the demarcation line between "modal personality" and "social norms" is not clear-cut. In general, when a culture has been in a static condition for a long period, there may be some fusion between the two.¹ However, in a period of sudden change, given the fact that certain personality characteristics are more resistant to change than certain social norms and vice-versa, we can safely expect a considerably discrepancy between modal personality and social norms.

As for the second assumption--that political attitudes are determined both by social norms and personality characteristics--we are on a more familiar ground. Increasingly,

¹This is the approach used by Ruth Benedict in her description of the "Dionysian" and "Appollonian" types of culture, which are opposite not only in their "psychological states" but also in their "social values." See, Patterns of Culture (New York: Penguin Books, 1946), pp. 72-73.

it has been found that democracy or communism depends on the people's general value orientation and psychological predispositions, rather than simply on a well-drafted constitution.¹

The data presented in this paper strengthen our conviction that we have not been heading in the wrong direction. The traditional system of ethics and values in Vietnamese society suggest that this system is the source of authoritarian tendencies among students. In using the dogmatism score as a measurement of authoritarianism, we have found that Vietnamese students are significantly more authoritarian than American and English subjects.

However, the relationship between normative authoritarianism and personal authoritarianism is more complex during the transitional period. Assuming that familism measures the extent to which the individual has been socialized into the traditional normative system, we have found that traditionalism is not significantly correlated with authoritarianism. Similarly, the Semantic Status score based on the Confucian concept of li is not correlated with authoritarianism either. On the other hand, authoritarianism is negatively correlated with income level and the length of direct contact with a Western culture.

¹See, for instance, Carl Cohen (ed.), "Democracy as a Way of Life," Communism, Facism, and Democracy (New York: Ramdom House, 1962), pp. 631-689.

Two interpretations are possible depending on the assumptions about the validity of the Dogmatism Scale. If the Dogmatism Scale is assumed to be as valid for Vietnamese as for American samples, we have to conclude that the apparent authoritarian value system does not necessarily co-exist with an authoritarian personality. On the other hand, since there is no clear evidence for the validity of the Dogmatism Scale when it is applied to Vietnamese subjects, the possibility of defects in measurement cannot be entirely discarded. However there is some reason for believing that the Dogmatism Scale measures some personality variable of Vietnamese subjects similar, in some respects, to dogmatism among Western subjects (e.g., the relationship between nationalism and dogmatism commonly found in the West also exists in Vietnam). Because of the lack of data concerning the validity of the Dogmatism Scale as applied to Vietnamese subjects, we venture out to assume it to be valid for the time being.

The lack of relationship between dogmatism and traditionalism, as measured by the Familism Scale and the Status Semantic Scale, lends some support to our postulate that modal personality and social norms cannot be reduced to each other, especially in a period of sudden change. During a transitional period, an authoritarian person may retain a part of the value system and reject other parts. Thus the personality-social norms relationship becomes extremely complex. This complexity is related to the unstable state of

the transitional period. Certain social norms have become ambiguous, and more or less unsuited to meet the daily needs of the individual. Some of his personality characteristics (in this case authoritarianism)--relatively more stable than these social norms--play a more important role in the search for solutions to his new problems than they do usually. Those social norms which are congruent with the pre-dispositions of individual are maintained, others which do not meet this requirement are discarded.

To be sure, we do not know whether those social norms he retains are to be regarded as causes or effects of his personality traits. But there is some selective process operating in normative change, evidence for which are the significant correlations obtained between authoritarianism and familism subscales. Authoritarians tend to be more obedient to their elders, less willing to respect them, and more inclined to support their relatives than democratic subjects. This selective conformity to familistic values has been interpreted as the result of their authoritarian orientation. The authoritarian individual is submissive to authority figures (obediency) while unconsciously revolting against them (lack of kinh which is roughly translated as "respect"). This attitude of rebellion probably arouses some feelings of guilt that he tries to relieve through financial means. In other words, during the period of transition, authoritarians are emotionally uprooted, and this uneasy feeling of uprootedness is compensated by greater dissolution

of their individuality into the family system. On the contrary, democratic subjects are more emotionally rooted into the system; hence, their transition from the restrictive extended family system to a more individualistic nuclear family system is facilitated.

On the other hand, normative change is not always merely selective; sometimes there is a radical change. The intolerance of ambiguity commonly found in authoritarian persons renders the relationship between social norms and modal personality more complex. They tend to be either conformists or rebels against their society. In our research, we have found the same tendency among authoritarians: they tend to either conform to familistic values or reject them altogether.

For all of these reasons, we think it legitimate to study political behavior patterns in relations to both the psychological effects and normative effects of socialization. The value of this dichotomic approach is proved in the analysis of nationalism and mandarinism. It is unfortunate that data collected by means of the Political Anti-Democratic Tendency Scale were "lost" on the way to America.

The structural approach to nationalism has revealed some unexpected relationships. Traditionally, nationalism is defined as a set of attitudes favorable toward one's nation, generally at the expense of other nations images. In this paper, nationalism has been defined as the mental state

of overconsciousness about the status of one's nation, culture, and race in relations to other nations, cultures, and races. Two types of nationalism have been distinguished: self-glorifying nationalism and self-debasing nationalism. The significant positive correlation found between self-glorifying nationalism and self-debasing nationalism highlights the limited value of the traditional approach. A nationalist does not only glorify his nation-state unrealistically; he also despises it unrealistically at the same time. Thus, it is not surprising that nationalism, as a state of mind, has been definitely found as the result of psychological socialization: both types of nationalism are correlated to authoritarianism. Normative socialization, on the contrary, has a more differential consequence. Direct Westernization has been found to induce self-debasing nationalism. In short, psychological socialization in an authoritarian culture prepares the ground for nationalistic feelings, while normative socialization determines the content of the nationalistic feelings.

As for mandarinism, interestingly, authoritarian socialization has no significant correlation with mandarinism in general, or with desire for occupational security, status, and power in particular. Normative socialization into the traditional culture, on the contrary, has more significant positive effects on mandarinism, and significant negative effects on entrepreneurial orientations.

Conclusion

In this paper we have made an attempt to study the three dominant traits of the underdevelopment syndrome as found in Vietnamese society. The data collected falls into two sets of relationships that have been postulated: familism, mandarinism, status consciousness and nationalism as the result of normative socialization; dogmatism and nationalism as the result of psychological socialization. Thus, the dichotomic socialization approach in the study of socio-political change has given us some insight into the effects of social norms and personality characteristics on socio-political attitudes of Vietnamese students during the transitional period.

However, the real contribution of this research is in the number of questions that have not been answered in this paper. The socialization approach in the study of political change deserves more attention than it has received so far. More effort should be spent in investigating the process of socialization before and during the transition period.

We have postulated in Chapter 1, that the individual has been socialized to live in the society of his parents (i.e., the static traditional society of the past prior to the Western impact), and that, consequently, he is more or less handicapped--psychologically and normatively--in dealing with new problems of the transition period. The questions which need investigation are: How "handicapped" is he? How

does he proceed during the trial-and-error period? Which cultural factors hamper or facilitate his re-adjustment to the new situation? Returning to our specific case (Vietnam), we may similarly ask ourselves: Are authoritarianism and nationalism a liability or an asset in the work of nation-building? How is familism changed to meet the socio-political problems created by quick industrialization and urbanization? How does mandarinism affect the nature of the economic and political systems of South Vietnam? How could this occur? What are the political consequences? In short, it is suggested that further study be devoted to a more thorough investigation of the "causal" socio-cultural factors, the nature and the political effects of the anti-democratic tendency, nationalism and mandarinism, and their mutations in response to the ever-changing situation of the transitional period.

Furthermore, in this study we have concerned ourselves only with one personality characteristic (authoritarianism), directly with one set of values (familism), and indirectly with some sociological variables (income, Westernization). This limited scope does not permit us to make any broad generalization or to study political change in depth. Besides authoritarianism, there are a number of other personality characteristics which may have a more crucial role during the transitional period (e.g., inner and outer directedness, need for affiliation, need for achievement etc.). On the

normative side, familism, status consciousness, etc. are but a few of a multitude of other social norms (for instance the most relevant one is the Taoist rebellion ethics), which may be more significant in affecting the process of socio-political change than those selected in this study. Consequently, with the view that political change is part of cultural change as a whole, it is not legitimate to disregard these cultural traits in a systematic study of the underdevelopment syndrome.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THE DOGMATISM SCALE (Forms D and E)

APPENDIX A

THE DOGMATISM SCALE (Forms D and E)¹

Items Involving the Belief-Disbelief Dimension

ISOLATION WITHIN AND BETWEEN BELIEF AND DISBELIEF SYSTEMS

- (1) Accentuation of differences between the belief and the disbelief systems.²

- *1. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.
- 2. Communism and Catholicism have nothing in common.
- 3. The principles I have come to believe in are quite different from those believed in by most people.

- (2) The perception of irrelevance.

- 4. In a heated discussion people have a way of bringing up irrelevant issues rather than sticking to the main issue.

- (3) The coexistence of contradictions within the belief system.

- *5. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.
- *6. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

¹Items of Form E are preceded by an asterisk.

²In the study of authoritarianism among Vietnamese students, an item is added: "Eastern and Western civilizations are completely different."

7. While the use of force is wrong by and large, it is sometimes the only way possible to advance a noble ideal.
8. Even though I have a lot of faith in the intelligence and wisdom of the common man I must say that the masses behave stupidly.

RELATIVE DEGREES OF DIFFERENTIATION OF THE BELIEF AND THE DISBELIEF SYSTEMS.

(1) Relative amount of knowledge possessed.¹

- *9. It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes.

(2) Differentiation within the disbelief system.

10. There are certain "isms" which are really the same even though those who believe in these "isms" try to tell you they are different.

Items Involving the Central-Peripheral Dimension

SPECIFIC CONTENT OF PRIMITIVE BELIEFS

- (1) Beliefs regarding the aloneness, isolation, and helplessness of man.
 - *11. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.
 - *12. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place.
 - *13. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.
 - *14. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.

¹In the study of authoritarianism among Vietnamese students an item is added: "When I like a writer I would try to read all his works. When I dislike a writer I would not bother myself to read his works even though they are well-known."

2 Beliefs regarding the uncertainty of the future.

(a) Fear of the future.

*15. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.

(b) A feeling of urgency.¹

*16. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.

(c) Compulsive repetition of ideas and arguments (self-proselytization).

*17. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop.

*18. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.

*19. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I am going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying.

20. In a discussion I sometimes interrupt others too much in my eagerness to put across my own point-of-view.

(3) Beliefs about self-adequacy and inadequacy.

(a) Need for martyrdom.²

*21. It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.

(b) Conflict within the self.

22. My hardest battles are with myself.

¹In the study of authoritarianism among Vietnamese students two items are added: "When I decide to do something, I do it right away; I don't like hesitation," and "I don't like people who take too much time to make a decision when they should act immediately."

²Two items are added: "Life is meaningful only if one is to die for a cause," and "If I had to sacrifice my life for humanity, I would not regret anything."

(c) Self-depreciation

23. At times I think I am no good at all.

24. I am afraid of people who want to find out what I'm really like for fear they'll be disappointed in me.

(4) Self-aggrandizement as a defense against self-inadequacy.

(a) Concern with power and status.

*25. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.

*26. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.

*27. If given the chance I would do something of great benefit to the world.

28. If I had to choose between happiness and greatness, I'd choose greatness.

(b) Moral self-righteousness.

29. It's all too true that people just won't practice what they preach.

(5) Paranoid outlook on life.

30. Most people are failures and it is the system which is responsible for this.

31. I have often felt that strangers were looking at me critically.

32. It is only natural for a person to have a guilty conscience.

33. People say insulting and vulgar things about me.

34. I am sure I am being talked about.

FORMAL CONTENT OF THE INTERMEDIATE BELIEF REGION

(1) Authoritarianism

(a) Beliefs in positive and negative authority

*35. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful of really great thinkers.

*36. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they stand for.

(b) Belief in the cause.

*37. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really lived.

*38. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.

*39. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct.

*40. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person.

*41. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

*42. When it comes to differences of opinion in religion we must be careful not to compromise with those who believe differently from the way we do.

*43. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he considers primarily his own happiness.

*44. To compromise with our political opponents is to be guilty of appeasement.

(2) Intolerance.

(a) Toward the renegade.

- *45. The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly the people who believe in the same thing he does.
- *46. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard against ideas put out by people or groups in one's own camp than by those in the opposing camp.
- *47. A group which tolerates too much differences of opinion among its own members cannot exist for long.

(b) Toward the disbeliever.

- *48. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.
- *49. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong.
- *50. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath contempt.
- *51. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.
- 52. I sometimes have a tendency to be too critical of the ideas of others.

INTERRELATIONS AMONG PRIMITIVE, INTERMEDIATE, AND PERIPHERAL BELIEFS

(1) Tendency to make a party-line change.

- *53. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.
- *54. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.

¹An item is added: "When a person has been shown the right cause and still does not embrace it he must be a stubborn and selfish person."

(2) Narrowing ¹

- *55. In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.
- 56. There's no use wasting your money on newspapers which you know in advance are just plain propaganda.
- 57. Young people should not have too easy access to books which are likely to confuse them.

Items Involving the Time-Perspective Dimension

ATTITUDE TOWARD THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

- *58. The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts.
- 59. It is by returning to our glorious and forgotten past that real social progress can be achieved.
- 60. To achieve the happiness of mankind in the future it is sometimes necessary to put up with injustices in the present.

KNOWING THE FUTURE

- *61. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it is sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all."
- *62. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems don't really understand what's going on.
- *63. Most people just don't know what's good for them.

¹Three items are added: "I don't like to have as friends people whose tastes and beliefs are different from mine," "People of different tastes and beliefs cannot be friends to each other," and "We should not permit importation of books which damage the 'national spirit'."

- 64. There is nothing new under the sun.
- 65. To one who really takes the trouble to understand the world he lives in, it's an easy matter to predict future events.

BELIEF IN FORCE AS A WAY TO REVISE THE PRESENT

- 66. It is sometimes necessary to resort to force to advance an ideal one strongly believes in

APPENDIX B
ITEM ANALYSIS OF THE DOGMATISM SCALE

| Items ¹ | US Total Group ^a (N = 137) | | VN Total Group ^b (N = 100) | | Difference between US and VN | | VN Highs (N = 40) | | VN Lows (N = 40) | | Diff. <u>t</u> ⁴ | |
|--|--|------|--|------|------------------------------|----------------|----------------------|------|---------------------|------|--------------------------------|------|
| | M | S.D. | M | S.D. | U ³ | t ⁴ | M | S.D. | M | S.D. | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| *1. US and Russia have nothing in common. | 2.88 | 1.77 | 4.91 | 1.41 | 1.13 | 8.07 | 3.47 | 3.13 | 3.93 | 1.94 | 0.42 | 0.92 |
| 1b. The East and the West are completely different. | | | 4.86 | 2.00 | | | 4.43 | 1.42 | 3.85 | 2.22 | 0.97 | 2.07 |
| *5. Belief in democracy run by most intelligent. | 4.73 | 2.03 | 6.44 | .79 | 1.73 | 16.15 | 6.73 | 0.46 | 6.23 | 0.89 | 0.50 | 3.12 |
| *6. Belief in free speech but not for all. | 4.16 | 2.08 | 6.66 | .91 | 2.50 | 17.57 | 6.86 | 0.43 | 6.59 | 0.92 | 0.26 | 1.52 |
| *9. Better knowledge of beliefs than disbelievers. | 4.94 | 1.85 | 6.65 | 1.61 | .94 | 4.71 | 6.06 | 0.67 | 4.60 | 1.98 | 1.86 | 5.90 |
| *9b. (Second version of translation) | 4.94 | 1.82 | 6.63 | 1.42 | 1.15 | 7.89 | 6.06 | 0.46 | 6.59 | 2.00 | 1.36 | 3.75 |
| *9c. Better knowledge of works of writers one likes. | | | 4.29 | 0.87 | | | 6.37 | 0.37 | 3.86 | 2.18 | 0.67 | 4.51 |
| *11. Man on his own is helpless and miserable. | 3.43 | 0.18 | 4.91 | 1.42 | 1.48 | 18.97 | 6.17 | 1.79 | 4.23 | 2.06 | 0.97 | 2.22 |
| *12. World a lonesome place. | 3.23 | 1.96 | 5.90 | 1.75 | 2.67 | 11.17 | 6.60 | 1.37 | 5.37 | 2.04 | 1.13 | 2.84 |
| *13. Most people don't give a damn for others. | 3.75 | 1.67 | 4.85 | 1.86 | 1.10 | 7.36 | 6.73 | 1.30 | 4.32 | 2.05 | 1.40 | 3.59 |
| 13b. (Second version) | 3.75 | 1.87 | 5.36 | 1.73 | 1.61 | 16.75 | 6.66 | 1.81 | 4.60 | 2.00 | 0.80 | 1.99 |
| *14. I want to find someone to solve my problems. | 3.61 | 2.22 | 6.40 | 1.67 | 2.79 | 14.93 | 6.77 | 0.63 | 6.02 | 1.52 | 0.75 | 2.90 |
| *15. Natural to fear future. | 3.79 | 1.81 | 5.75 | 1.60 | 1.95 | 14.00 | 6.07 | 1.28 | 5.63 | 1.61 | 0.60 | 1.76 |
| *16. So much to do, so little time to do it in. | 5.86 | 1.63 | 5.91 | 1.63 | 0.05 | 0.33 | 6.06 | 1.56 | 5.92 | 2.21 | 1.43 | 3.42 |

| Items ¹ | US Total Group ² (N = 137) | | VN Total Group ³ (N = 156) | | Difference Between US and VN | | VN Highs (N = 40) | | VN Lows (N = 40) | | Diff. | t ₄ |
|--|---|------|---|------|------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------|------|---------------------|------|-------|----------------|
| | M | S.D. | M | S.D. | US and VN | t ⁴ | M | S.D. | M | S.D. | | |
| 16b. (Second version) | 5.86 | 1.69 | 5.95 | 1.80 | 0.09 | 0.64 | 6.25 | 1.69 | 5.35 | 2.14 | 0.90 | 2.05 |
| @16c. No time for hesitation. | | | 5.95 | 1.56 | | | 6.47 | 0.96 | 5.32 | 1.85 | 1.15 | 3.43 |
| 16d. I don't like those who are slow in deciding. | | | 3.88 | 1.29 | | | 4.92 | 2.47 | 3.70 | 2.07 | 0.82 | 1.59 |
| @*17. Once I get wound up, I can't stop. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 3.34 | 1.94 | 5.73 | 1.94 | 2.39 | 17.07 | 6.95 | 0.61 | 4.82 | 1.94 | 1.73 | 5.10 |
| @17b. (Second version) | 3.34 | 1.94 | 5.39 | 1.84 | 2.05 | 14.14 | 6.95 | 1.12 | 4.32 | 2.14 | 1.93 | 4.96 |
| @* 18. I repeat myself to make sure I'm understood. | 3.50 | 1.91 | 5.40 | 1.68 | 1.92 | 13.71 | 6.90 | 1.30 | 4.60 | 1.82 | 1.40 | 3.90 |
| @* 19. I don't listen. | 3.44 | 1.80 | 3.45 | 2.23 | 0.01 | 0.67 | 4.05 | 2.33 | 3.00 | 2.01 | 1.65 | 3.34 |
| @ 20. I interrupt others to put across my own views. | 4.43 | 1.86 | 5.36 | 1.84 | 0.93 | 6.64 | 6.12 | 1.48 | 4.52 | 2.09 | 1.60 | 3.88 |
| * 21. Better be dead hero than live coward. | 3.26 | 1.94 | 6.99 | .95 | 3.73 | 23.50 | 6.80 | 0.40 | 6.30 | 1.16 | 0.50 | 2.50 |
| 21b. Main thing in life is to die for an ideal. | | | 6.47 | .99 | | | 6.42 | 0.26 | 6.10 | 1.31 | 0.82 | 3.83 |
| 21c. Willing to die for humanity. | | | 6.48 | .91 | | | 6.82 | 0.50 | 6.62 | 0.54 | 0.20 | 1.69 |
| 22. Hardest battles are with myself. | 4.70 | 2.01 | 6.72 | .69 | 2.12 | 15.14 | 6.90 | 0.30 | 6.80 | 0.46 | 0.10 | 1.21 |
| @ 23. I am no good. | 4.60 | 2.02 | 5.39 | 2.07 | 0.79 | 5.64 | 6.37 | 1.39 | 4.07 | 2.26 | 2.30 | 5.39 |
| @ 24. I'm afraid people will find out what I'm really like. | 2.83 | 2.03 | 5.39 | 1.80 | 2.56 | 15.78 | 6.02 | 1.49 | 4.35 | 2.08 | 1.67 | 4.08 |
| * 25. Secret ambition is to become a great man. | 5.02 | 2.05 | 5.78 | 1.94 | 0.76 | 5.42 | 6.12 | 1.97 | 5.47 | 1.70 | 0.65 | 1.74 |
| @* 26. Main thing in life is to do something important. | 4.92 | 2.04 | 5.33 | 1.79 | 1.11 | 7.37 | 6.05 | 1.41 | 4.20 | 2.16 | 1.85 | 4.46 |
| * 27. If given chance I'd benefit world. | 5.51 | 1.03 | 6.21 | 1.25 | 0.70 | 5.00 | 6.47 | 0.78 | 6.00 | 1.55 | .47 | 4.65 |

| Items ¹ | US Total Group ² (N = 137) | | VN Total Group ³ (N = 156) | | Difference Between US and VN | | VN Highs (N = 40) | | VN Lows (N = 40) | | Diff. | t ⁴ |
|--|---|------|---|------|------------------------------------|-------|----------------------|------|---------------------|------|-------|----------------|
| | M | S.D. | M | S.D. | US | VN | M | S.D. | M | S.D. | | |
| 28. Greatness is more important than happiness. | 2.05 | 1.74 | 5.90 | 1.61 | 3.85 | 27.00 | 6.25 | 1.44 | 5.52 | 1.86 | 0.73 | 1.83 |
| @ 29. People won't practice what they preach. | 5.55 | 1.36 | 5.49 | 1.63 | 0.06 | 0.42 | 6.40 | 0.63 | 4.65 | 1.92 | 1.75 | 5.52 |
| @ 31. Strangers look at me critically. | 4.10 | 1.94 | 5.46 | 1.60 | 1.36 | 9.71 | 5.80 | 1.13 | 4.50 | 1.79 | 1.30 | 3.81 |
| @ 33. People say insulting things about me. | 2.68 | 1.71 | 5.46 | 1.60 | 2.78 | 19.20 | 5.82 | 1.53 | 4.72 | 1.85 | 1.10 | 2.85 |
| @ 34. I'm talked about. | 3.25 | 1.99 | 5.59 | 1.64 | 2.34 | 10.71 | 6.27 | 1.08 | 5.17 | 1.73 | 1.10 | 3.35 |
| @* 35. Just handful of great thinkers. | 4.85 | 2.05 | 4.96 | 2.10 | 0.11 | 9.78 | 9.90 | 1.78 | 3.65 | 1.91 | 2.25 | 5.37 |
| @* 36. I hate some people because of what they stand for. | 3.07 | 2.14 | 4.60 | 1.97 | 1.53 | 10.30 | 5.80 | 1.47 | 3.60 | 1.90 | 2.20 | 5.69 |
| @** 37. A man without a cause hasn't lived. | 4.52 | 2.09 | 5.89 | 1.48 | 1.37 | 9.76 | 6.50 | 0.67 | 5.40 | 1.67 | 1.10 | 3.79 |
| 37b. (Second version) | 4.52 | 2.09 | 5.42 | 1.88 | 0.90 | 6.42 | 6.00 | 1.46 | 4.55 | 2.15 | 1.45 | 3.46 |
| @* 38. Life meaningful when there is devotion to cause. | 5.34 | 1.66 | 6.30 | 1.24 | 0.96 | 6.89 | 6.75 | 0.49 | 5.92 | 1.28 | 0.83 | 3.73 |
| @* 39. There is only one correct philosophy. | 2.66 | 2.23 | 3.46 | 2.17 | 0.80 | 5.71 | 4.30 | 2.27 | 2.57 | 1.75 | 1.73 | 3.75 |
| @* 40. Person believing in too many causes is wisny-washy. | 3.20 | 1.95 | 5.35 | 1.89 | 2.15 | 16.35 | 6.35 | 1.18 | 4.60 | 2.02 | 1.75 | 4.65 |
| @* 41. To compromise is to appease. | 2.23 | 1.48 | 4.75 | 1.91 | 2.52 | 18.00 | 5.55 | 1.48 | 3.47 | 1.93 | 3.08 | 5.32 |
| @* 42. We should not compromise. | 2.58 | 1.87 | 5.56 | 1.74 | 2.98 | 21.28 | 6.57 | 0.71 | 4.50 | 2.10 | 2.07 | 5.84 |
| * 43. To consider only one's own happiness is selfish. | 4.21 | 2.01 | 5.87 | 1.50 | 1.66 | 11.50 | 6.70 | 0.51 | 5.15 | 1.86 | 1.55 | 5.00 |

| Items ¹ | US Total Groups (N = 137) | | VN Total Groups (N = 136) | | Difference US and VN | | VN Highs (N = 49) | | VN Lows (N = 40) | | Diff. | t ⁴ |
|---|---------------------------------|------|---------------------------------|------|-------------------------|----------------|----------------------|------|---------------------|------|-------|----------------|
| | M | S.D. | M | S.D. | U ² | p ³ | M | S.D. | M | S.D. | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| @*45. Worst crime is to attack those of similar beliefs. | 2.74 | 1.54 | 6.15 | 1.17 | 1.14 | 0.005 | 6.57 | 0.72 | 6.17 | 1.25 | 0.50 | 2.14 |
| @*46. Guard against subversion from within. | 3.07 | 1.73 | 5.35 | 1.70 | 1.3 | 0.007 | 6.10 | 1.15 | 4.75 | 1.90 | 1.35 | 3.79 |
| @*47. Groups tolerating diverse opinions can't exist. | 3.30 | 1.75 | 4.46 | 0.91 | 3.11 | 0.002 | 6.77 | 0.47 | 6.30 | 0.88 | 0.47 | 2.95 |
| @*48. Two kinds of people: those for, those against truth. | 2.58 | 1.53 | 5.43 | 1.13 | 3.85 | 0.001 | 6.07 | 0.93 | 4.97 | 1.58 | 1.10 | 3.21 |
| @*49. My blood boils when others won't admit they're wrong. | 4.00 | 1.76 | 5.57 | 1.15 | 0.41 | 0.001 | 6.13 | 0.91 | 4.77 | 2.00 | 1.50 | 4.39 |
| @49b. Not following the right cause is stubborn, selfish. | | | 6.73 | 1.03 | | | 6.43 | 0.94 | 6.57 | 0.10 | 1.15 | 4.23 |
| @*50. One who thinks of own happiness is beneath contempt. | 4.17 | 1.93 | 6.80 | 1.41 | 1.63 | 0.007 | 6.57 | 0.63 | 4.53 | 1.70 | 1.70 | 5.92 |
| *51. Most printed ideas aren't worth paper printed on. | 3.80 | 1.74 | 6.21 | 1.37 | 2.41 | 0.001 | 6.60 | 0.63 | 6.20 | 1.30 | 0.40 | 1.71 |
| @*53. To know what's going on, rely on leaders. | 3.80 | 2.14 | 5.36 | 1.52 | 1.56 | 0.001 | 5.97 | 1.02 | 4.77 | 1.94 | 1.20 | 3.40 |
| *54. Reserve judgment until you hear leader's opinion. | 5.20 | 1.93 | 6.26 | 1.00 | 1.06 | 0.007 | 6.45 | 0.87 | 5.85 | 1.64 | 0.70 | 2.34 |
| @ 55. Pick friends who believe as you do. | 3.98 | 1.98 | 6.46 | 1.03 | 2.48 | 0.001 | 6.65 | 1.02 | 5.03 | 1.35 | 0.75 | 2.75 |
| @55b. I don't want as friends those of different beliefs. | | | 4.59 | 1.17 | | | 6.02 | 1.16 | 3.92 | 2.06 | 2.50 | 6.57 |
| @55c. People of different beliefs cannot be friends. | | | 5.87 | 1.91 | | | 6.60 | 0.63 | 5.59 | 1.89 | 1.95 | 4.84 |
| 56b. Books damaging national spirit should not be imported. | | | 6.23 | 1.15 | | | 6.35 | 1.38 | 5.97 | 1.49 | 0.38 | 1.14 |

| Items ¹ | US Total Group ² (N = 137) | | VN Total Group ³ (N = 156) | | Difference Between US and VN | | VN Highs (N = 40) | | VN Lows (N = 40) | | Diff. | t ⁴ |
|--|---------------------------------------|------|---------------------------------------|-------|------------------------------|-------|-------------------|------|------------------|------|-------|----------------|
| | M | S.D. | M | S.D. | US | VN | M | S.D. | M | S.D. | | |
| *58. Present unhappy. The future is what counts. | 3.15 | 1.90 | 5.77 | 16.61 | 2.62 | 15.71 | 6.52 | 0.64 | 5.17 | 1.95 | 1.35 | 3.9 |
| 60. For happiness in future present injustice necessary. | 4.57 | 1.75 | 6.03 | 1.39 | 1.46 | 11.43 | 6.62 | 0.92 | 5.60 | 1.41 | 1.02 | 3.7 |
| *61. To accomplish, gamble all or nothing. | 5.04 | 1.82 | 4.39 | 2.18 | -0.65 | 4.64 | 5.57 | 1.53 | 3.72 | 2.23 | 1.85 | 4.2 |
| @*62. Most people don't understand what is going on. | 4.70 | 1.77 | 5.63 | 1.50 | 0.93 | 6.64 | 6.30 | 1.22 | 5.27 | 1.50 | 1.03 | 3.3 |
| @*63. Most people don't understand what's good for them. | 4.10 | 2.12 | 4.76 | 1.24 | 0.66 | 4.71 | 6.35 | 1.71 | 3.95 | 1.97 | 1.40 | 3.3 |
| @65. If you understand, it's easy to predict future. | 2.72 | 1.78 | 5.66 | 1.44 | 2.94 | 21.02 | 6.17 | 0.90 | 5.00 | 1.89 | 1.17 | 3.4 |
| @66. Force necessary to advance ideal. | 3.71 | 2.00 | 6.11 | 1.51 | 2.40 | 17.14 | 6.50 | 1.45 | 5.42 | 1.92 | 1.08 | 2.7 |

¹The Dogmatism Scale, Form E, is composed of items preceded by *. The Dogmatism Scale, Form V, is composed of items preceded by @. In cross-cultural studies of dogmatism, Form E was used. In intra-cultural studies among Vietnamese students, Form V was used.

²Data related to the US group are borrowed from Rokach. See Milton Rokach, "Political and Religious Dogmatism: An Alternative to the Authoritarian Personality," Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, Vol. 70 (1956), pp. 16-17.

³The VN group is composed of 156 Cantho High School seniors.

⁴Employing a one-tailed t test, t's of 1.64 and 2.33 are significant beyond the 5 and 1 per cent levels respectively, for large samples.

APPENDIX C

POLITICAL ANTI-DEMOCRATIC TENDENCY TEST

Following are ten problems with several alternative solutions. Read all the alternative solutions of each problem, then select the one which you think is the most appropriate.

- A. Regarding collaborators of MM. Nhu and Diem, we will:
 - 1. condemn them to death and confiscate their property.
 - 2. imprison them, and confiscate their property.
 - 3. confiscate their property.
 - 4. discharge them from the civil service.
 - 5. discharge only those who are not useful for national reconstruction, and keep those who are able technicians.
- B. Regarding members of the Personalist Labor Party, we will:
 - 1. disband the Party, and put all the members in jail.
 - 2. disband the Party and imprison only the leaders of the Party.
 - 3. disband the Party; we do not imprison the members of the Party, but we prohibit them from meeting, writing articles, and running National Assembly elections.
 - 4. leave the Party free to carry on political activities.
- C. Regarding Mrs. Nhu (suppose we could get hold of her), we would:
 - 1. torture her to a slow death.
 - 2. send her to a firing squad.
 - 3. condemn her for a life imprisonment.

4. confiscate her property, and condemn her for a few years imprisonment.
 5. only confiscate her property.
 6. not do anything to her, but prohibiting her from any political activity.
- D. Suppose there is a journalist who writes an article in a newspaper in the defense of Mr. Nhu, we will:
1. condemn him to death, destroy the newspaper office and confiscate the property of the publisher.
 2. put the writer in jail, close down the newspaper, and fine the publisher.
 3. close down the newspaper and fine the publisher.
 4. close down the newspaper.
 5. do nothing.
- E. Regarding National Assembly members, we will:
1. put them in jail, and confiscate all their property.
 2. confiscate all their property, and forbid them to do any political activity.
 3. confiscate part of their property, and prohibit them from carrying any political activity.
 4. prohibit them from doing any political activity.
 5. do nothing to them.
- F. Regarding Catholic priests, we will:
1. chase all Catholic priests (Vietnamese or foreign) out of Vietnam.
 2. chase foreign Catholic priests out of Vietnam. We will heavily tax Vietnamese Catholic priests, and draft all of them into the Army.
 3. tax them as we tax other citizens, and draft those who are in the draft age group.

4. tax them, but we will exempt them from the military service.
 5. exempt them from tax and military service.
- G. Regarding the property of the Catholic Church, we will:
1. confiscate all the property of the Catholic Church (including churchers).
 2. confiscate all the property (but churches) of the Catholic Churches.
 3. confiscate all lands and house bought or built during the Diem rule, and tax the rest.
 4. tax the property of the Catholic Church
 5. make all the property of the Catholic Church tax exempt.
- H. Regarding Catholic schools, we will:
1. confiscate them, discharge all Catholic teaching faculty, and assign non-Catholic teachers to these schools.
 2. leave these Catholic schools free to operate, but we will prohibit them from giving Catholic instructions in class, and tax them heavily.
 3. tax them heavily, and we will not give permission for opening new schools.
 4. do nothing.
- I. Regarding the Catholic religion, which of the following statements do you agree with the most?
1. Catholicism is dangerous for the nations because Catholics betray their country very easily.
 3. Catholicism is not dangerous for the nation but is harmful for the Vietnamese people; it makes them stupid due to superstition.
 4. Catholicism like any other religion teaches people to be good.

J. Regarding Catholic Vietnamese, we will:

1. prohibit them from going to church, meeting, praying, or preaching.
2. leave them free to practice their religion, but we will discharge all Catholics from the army or civil service.
3. We will not discharge them from the army or government, but we will not assign them to positions of leadership.
4. consider them equal to Buddhists.

APPENDIX D

BIVARIATE DISTRIBUTION

TABLE A.1.-- Bivariate distribution of dogmatism and familism.

| Fam. Dog. | Low | | High | Total |
|-----------------------------|-------|-----------|-----------|--------|
| Cantho High School Students | | | | |
| Low | 11.00 | 7.00 | 15.00 | 33.00 |
| | 9.00 | 11.00 | 11.00 | 31.00 |
| | 7.00 | 9.00 | 17.00 | 33.00 |
| High | 15.00 | 9.00 | 10.00 | 34.00 |
| TOTAL | 42.00 | 36.00 | 53.00 | 131.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 6.482$ | | .50 p .30 | C = -.077 | |
| U. S. Exchange Students | | | | |
| Low | 9.00 | 8.00 | 5.00 | 22.00 |
| | 2.00 | 8.00 | 9.00 | 19.00 |
| High | 6.00 | 5.00 | 7.00 | 18.00 |
| TOTAL | 17.00 | 21.00 | 21.00 | 59.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 5.807$ | | .30 p .20 | C = .136 | |

TABLE A.2.--Bivariate distribution of dogmatism and obedience.

| Fam. Dog. | | | | |
|-----------------------------|-------|-----------|-------|----------|
| | Low | | High | Total |
| Cantho High School Students | | | | |
| Low | 12.00 | 12.00 | 9.00 | 33.00 |
| | 7.00 | 16.00 | 8.00 | 31.00 |
| | 10.00 | 11.00 | 12.00 | 33.00 |
| High | 14.00 | 9.00 | 11.00 | 34.00 |
| TOTAL | 43.00 | 48.00 | 40.00 | 131.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 5.605$ | | .30 p .20 | | C = .005 |
| U. S. Exchange Students | | | | |
| Low | 17.00 | 5.00 | | 22.00 |
| | 11.00 | 8.00 | | 19.00 |
| High | 12.00 | 6.00 | | 18.00 |
| TOTAL | 40.00 | 19.00 | | 59.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 1.769$ | | .50 p .30 | | C = .101 |

TABLE A.3.--Bivariate distribution of dogmatism and respect.

| Dog. Resp. | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| | Low | | High | Total |
| Cantho High School Students | | | | |
| Low | 6.00 | 12.00 | 15.00 | 33.00 |
| | 12.00 | 8.00 | 11.00 | 31.00 |
| | 6.00 | 12.00 | 15.00 | 33.00 |
| High | 17.00 | 10.00 | 7.00 | 34.00 |
| TOTAL | 41.00 | 42.00 | 48.00 | 131.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 12.607$.05 p .02 C = -.194 | | | | |
| U. S. Exchange Students | | | | |
| Low | 10.00 | 7.00 | 5.00 | 22.00 |
| | 4.00 | 10.00 | 5.00 | 19.00 |
| High | 5.00 | 9.00 | 4.00 | 18.00 |
| TOTAL | 19.00 | 26.00 | 14.00 | 59.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 3.332$.70 p .50 C = .102 | | | | |

TABLE A.4.--Bivariate Distribution of dogmatism and support.

| Dog. | Sup. | | | |
|----------------------------|-------|-------------|-----------|--------|
| | Low | | High | TOTAL |
| Cantho High School Student | | | | |
| Low | 12.00 | 7.00 | 14.00 | 33.00 |
| | 9.00 | 12.00 | 10.00 | 31.00 |
| | 6.00 | 12.00 | 15.00 | 33.00 |
| High | 12.00 | 11.00 | 11.00 | 34.00 |
| TOTAL | 39.00 | 42.00 | 50.00 | 131.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 5.355$ | | .50 p = .30 | C = -.006 | |
| U. S. Exchange Students | | | | |
| Low | 8.00 | 9.00 | 5.00 | 22.00 |
| | 3.00 | 9.00 | 7.00 | 19.00 |
| | 7.00 | 4.00 | 7.00 | 18.00 |
| TOTAL | 18.00 | 22.00 | 19.00 | 59.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 4.692$ | | .50 p = .30 | C = .080 | |

TABLE A.5.--Bivariate distribution of self-glorifying nationalism and dogmatism.

| Dog. | S-G.N. | | | | Total |
|-----------------------------|--------|--------------|-------|----------|--------|
| | Low | | High | | |
| Cantho High School Students | | | | | |
| Low | 21.00 | 9.00 | 3.00 | | 33.00 |
| | 8.00 | 12.00 | 11.00 | | 31.00 |
| | 10.00 | 12.00 | 11.00 | | 33.00 |
| High | 7.00 | 9.00 | 18.00 | | 34.00 |
| TOTAL | 46.00 | 42.00 | 43.00 | | 131.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 21.780$ | | .01 p < .001 | | C = .350 | |
| Saigon University Students | | | | | |
| Low | 30.00 | 15.00 | 10.00 | 2.00 | 57.00 |
| | 14.00 | 17.00 | 16.00 | 10.00 | 57.00 |
| | 10.00 | 18.00 | 13.00 | 18.00 | 59.00 |
| High | 4.00 | 14.00 | 16.00 | 24.00 | 58.00 |
| TOTAL | 58.00 | 64.00 | 55.00 | 54.00 | 231.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 48.575$ | | p < .001 | | C = .427 | |
| U. S. Exchange Students | | | | | |
| Low | 10.00 | 8.00 | 4.00 | | 22.00 |
| | 8.00 | 4.00 | 7.00 | | 19.00 |
| High | 3.00 | 5.00 | 10.00 | | 18.00 |
| TOTAL | 21.00 | 17.00 | 21.00 | | 59.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 7.375$ | | .20 p > .10 | | C = .318 | |

TABLE A.6.--Bivariate distribution of dogmatism and self-debasing nationalism.

| Dog. | S-D.N. | | | |
|---|--------|-------|-------|--------|
| | Low | | High | Total |
| Cantho High School Students | | | | |
| Low | 23.00 | 7.00 | 3.00 | 33.00 |
| | 11.00 | 13.00 | 7.00 | 31.00 |
| | 6.00 | 12.00 | 15.00 | 33.00 |
| High | 6.00 | 12.00 | 16.00 | 34.00 |
| TOTAL | 46.00 | 44.00 | 41.00 | 131.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 29.906$ $p .001$ $C = .429$ | | | | |
| Saigon University Students | | | | |
| Low | 24.00 | 18.00 | 10.00 | 57.00 |
| | 15.00 | 21.00 | 13.00 | 57.00 |
| | 13.00 | 9.00 | 17.00 | 59.00 |
| High | 8.00 | 6.00 | 19.00 | 58.00 |
| TOTAL | 60.00 | 54.00 | 59.00 | 231.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 42.482$ $p .001$ $C = .382$ | | | | |
| U. S. Exchange Students | | | | |
| Low | 12.00 | 7.00 | 3.00 | 22.00 |
| | 4.00 | 7.00 | 8.00 | 19.00 |
| High | 4.00 | 5.00 | 9.00 | 18.00 |
| TOTAL | 20.00 | 19.00 | 20.00 | 59.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 9.072$ $.10 p < .05$ $C = .351$ | | | | |

TABLE A.7--Bivariate distribution of self-glorifying nationalism and familism.

| S-G.N. \ Fam. | | | | |
|---|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| | Low | | High | Total |
| Cantho High School Students | | | | |
| Low | 16.00 | 9.00 | 21.00 | 46.00 |
| | 12.00 | 18.00 | 12.00 | 42.00 |
| High | 14.00 | 9.00 | 20.00 | 43.00 |
| TOTAL | 42.00 | 36.00 | 53.00 | 131.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 7.766$ $.20 > p > .10$ $C = .014$ | | | | |
| U. S. Exchange Students | | | | |
| Low | 6.00 | 7.00 | 8.00 | 21.00 |
| | 3.00 | 6.00 | 8.00 | 17.00 |
| High | 8.00 | 8.00 | 5.00 | 21.00 |
| TOTAL | 17.00 | 21.00 | 21.00 | 59.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 2.916$ $.70 > p > .50$ $C = .126$ | | | | |

TABLE A.8.--Bivariate distribution of self-debasing nationalism and familism.

| S-D.N. \ Fam. | | | | |
|-----------------------------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| | Low | | High | Total |
| Cantho High School Students | | | | |
| Low | 15.00 | 15.00 | 16.00 | 46.00 |
| | 13.00 | 10.00 | 21.00 | 44.00 |
| High | 14.00 | 11.00 | 16.00 | 41.00 |
| TOTAL | 42.00 | 36.00 | 53.00 | 131.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 1.917$ | | | | |
| $.80 p .70$ | | | | |
| $C = .016$ | | | | |
| U. S. Exchange Students | | | | |
| Low | 5.00 | 8.00 | 7.00 | 20.00 |
| | 4.00 | 7.00 | 8.00 | 19.00 |
| High | 8.00 | 6.00 | 6.00 | 20.00 |
| TOTAL | 17.00 | 21.00 | 21.00 | 59.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 2.064$ | | | | |
| $.80 p .70$ | | | | |
| $C = -.103$ | | | | |

TABLE A.9.--Bivariate distribution of self-glorifying nationalism and self-debasing nationalism.

| S-D.N. | | | | |
|-----------------------------|-------|-----------|-------|-----------|
| S-G.N. | Low | | High | Total |
| Cantho High School Students | | | | |
| Low | 18.00 | 18.00 | 10.00 | 46.00 |
| | 18.00 | 11.00 | 13.00 | 42.00 |
| High | 10.00 | 15.00 | 18.00 | 43.00 |
| TOTAL | 46.00 | 44.00 | 41.00 | 131.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 6.654$ | | .20 p .10 | | C = .18 |
| Saigon University Students | | | | |
| Low | 15.00 | 17.00 | 17.00 | 59.00 |
| | 20.00 | 16.00 | 19.00 | 64.00 |
| | 14.00 | 15.00 | 10.00 | 55.00 |
| High | 11.00 | 7.00 | 13.00 | 54.00 |
| TOTAL | 60.00 | 55.00 | 59.00 | 232.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 18.517$ | | .05 p .02 | | C = .17 |
| U. S. Exchange Students | | | | |
| Low | 7.00 | 4.00 | 10.00 | 21.00 |
| | 7.00 | 6.00 | 4.00 | 17.00 |
| High | 6.00 | 9.00 | 6.00 | 21.00 |
| TOTAL | 20.00 | 19.00 | 20.00 | 59.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 4.244$ | | .50 p .30 | | C = -.073 |

TABLE A.10.--The effects of contact with the West among U. S. exchange students.

| Years | Low | | High | Total |
|--|-------|------------------|-------------|-------|
| Years in U. S. and Dogmatism | | | | |
| Low | 4.00 | 9.00 | 11.00 | 24.00 |
| | 11.00 | 6.00 | 3.00 | 20.00 |
| High | 7.00 | 4.00 | 4.00 | 15.00 |
| TOTAL | 22.00 | 19.00 | 18.00 | 59.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 8.652$ | | $.10 > p > .05$ | $C = -.274$ | |
| Years in U. S. and Self-Glorifying Nationalism | | | | |
| Low | 2.00 | 8.00 | 14.00 | 24.00 |
| | 9.00 | 6.00 | 5.00 | 20.00 |
| High | 10.00 | 3.00 | 2.00 | 15.00 |
| TOTAL | 21.00 | 17.00 | 21.00 | 59.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 16.367$ | | $.01 > p > .001$ | $C = -.503$ | |
| Years in U. S. and Self-debasing Nationalism | | | | |
| Low | 7.00 | 10.00 | 7.00 | 24.00 |
| | 9.00 | 6.00 | 5.00 | 20.00 |
| High | 4.00 | 3.00 | 8.00 | 15.00 |
| TOTAL | 20.00 | 19.00 | 20.00 | 59.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 4.805$ | | $.50 > p > .30$ | $C = .103$ | |

TABLE A.11.--Bivariate distribution of mandarianism and Dogmatism.

| Mand. | Dog. | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|-------|-------------|-------|----------|--------|
| | Low | | | High | Total |
| Civil Service vs Private Employment | | | | | |
| Low | 7.00 | 15.00 | 12.00 | 6.00 | 40.00 |
| | 16.00 | 8.00 | 10.00 | 19.00 | 53.00 |
| High | 10.00 | 8.00 | 11.00 | 9.00 | 38.00 |
| TOTAL | 33.00 | 31.00 | 33.00 | 34.00 | 131.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 11.819$ | | .10 p < .05 | | C = .027 | |
| Status vs Income | | | | | |
| Low | 12.00 | 11.00 | 11.00 | 9.00 | 43.00 |
| | 11.00 | 10.00 | 10.00 | 10.00 | 41.00 |
| High | 10.00 | 10.00 | 12.00 | 15.00 | 47.00 |
| TOTAL | 33.00 | 31.00 | 33.00 | 34.00 | 131.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 1.760$ | | .05 p > .90 | | C = .106 | |
| Power vs Income | | | | | |
| Low | 10.00 | 11.00 | 12.00 | 11.00 | 44.00 |
| | 16.00 | 7.00 | 12.00 | 12.00 | 47.00 |
| High | 7.00 | 13.00 | 9.00 | 11.00 | 40.00 |
| TOTAL | 33.00 | 31.00 | 33.00 | 34.00 | 131.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 5.636$ | | .50 p > .30 | | C = .018 | |
| Security vs Income | | | | | |
| Low | 7.00 | 5.00 | 9.00 | 6.00 | 27.00 |
| | 9.00 | 14.00 | 8.00 | 9.00 | 40.00 |
| High | 17.00 | 12.00 | 16.00 | 19.00 | 64.00 |
| TOTAL | 33.00 | 31.00 | 33.00 | 34.00 | 131.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 5.108$ | | .70 p > .50 | | C = .033 | |

TABLE A.11.--Continued

| Dog. | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-------|-----------------|-------|-------------|--------|
| Mand. | Low | | | High | Trade |
| Civil Service vs Trade | | | | | |
| Low | 9.00 | 11.00 | 9.00 | 12.00 | 41.00 |
| | 14.00 | 12.00 | 13.00 | 7.00 | 46.00 |
| High | 10.00 | 8.00 | 11.00 | 15.00 | 44.00 |
| TOTAL | 33.00 | 31.00 | 33.00 | 34.00 | 131.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 5.308$ | | $.70 > p > .50$ | | $C = .046$ | |
| Civil Service vs Farming | | | | | |
| Low | 9.00 | 14.00 | 11.00 | 14.00 | 48.00 |
| | 12.00 | 11.00 | 11.00 | 9.00 | 43.00 |
| High | 12.00 | 6.00 | 11.00 | 11.00 | 40.00 |
| TOTAL | 33.00 | 31.00 | 33.00 | 34.00 | 131.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 4.065$ | | $.70 > p > .50$ | | $C = -.040$ | |
| Civil Service vs Craftsmanship | | | | | |
| Low | 8.00 | 6.00 | 9.00 | 10.00 | 33.00 |
| | 11.00 | 17.00 | 14.00 | 9.00 | 51.00 |
| High | 14.00 | 8.00 | 10.00 | 15.00 | 47.00 |
| TOTAL | 33.00 | 31.00 | 33.00 | 34.00 | 131.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 6.668$ | | $.50 > p > .30$ | | $C = -.020$ | |

TABLE A.12.--Bivariate distribution of mandarinism and familism.

| Fam. | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|--------|
| Man. | Low | | High | Total |
| Civil Service vs Private Employment | | | | |
| Low | 12.00 | 14.00 | 14.00 | 40.00 |
| | 17.00 | 14.00 | 22.00 | 53.00 |
| High | 13.00 | 8.00 | 17.00 | 38.00 |
| TOTAL | 42.00 | 36.00 | 53.00 | 131.00 |
| $X^2 = 2.005$.80 > p > .70 C = .025 | | | | |
| Status vs Income | | | | |
| Low | 17.00 | 17.00 | 17.00 | 43.00 |
| | 14.00 | 11.00 | 16.00 | 41.00 |
| High | 11.00 | 16.00 | 20.00 | 47.00 |
| TOTAL | 42.00 | 36.00 | 53.00 | 131.00 |
| $X^2 = 3.398$.50 > p > .30 C = .094 | | | | |
| Power vs Income | | | | |
| Low | 15.00 | 12.00 | 17.00 | 44.00 |
| | 16.00 | 10.00 | 21.00 | 47.00 |
| High | 11.00 | 14.00 | 15.00 | 40.00 |
| TOTAL | 42.00 | 36.00 | 53.00 | 131.00 |
| $X^2 = 2.185$.80 > p > .70 C = .026 | | | | |
| Security vs Income | | | | |
| Low | 8.00 | 9.00 | 10.00 | 27.00 |
| | 20.00 | 8.00 | 12.00 | 40.00 |
| High | 14.00 | 19.00 | 31.00 | 64.00 |
| TOTAL | 42.00 | 36.00 | 53.00 | 131.00 |
| $X^2 = 9.567$.05 > p > .02 C = .137 | | | | |

TABLE A.12.--Continued

| Man. | Fam. | | | |
|--------------------------------|-------|-------------|----------|--------|
| | Low | | High | Total |
| Civil Service vs Trade | | | | |
| Low | 13.00 | 10.00 | 18.00 | 41.00 |
| | 15.00 | 17.00 | 14.00 | 46.00 |
| High | 14.00 | 9.00 | 21.00 | 44.00 |
| TOTAL | 42.00 | 36.00 | 53.00 | 131.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 4.280$ | | .50 p = .30 | C = .020 | |
| Civil Service vs Farming | | | | |
| Low | 12.00 | 17.00 | 19.00 | 48.00 |
| | 18.00 | 11.00 | 14.00 | 43.00 |
| High | 12.00 | 8.00 | 20.00 | 40.00 |
| TOTAL | 42.00 | 36.00 | 53.00 | 131.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 5.631$ | | .30 p = .20 | C = .018 | |
| Civil Service vs Craftsmanship | | | | |
| Low | 10.00 | 9.00 | 14.00 | 33.00 |
| | 20.00 | 11.00 | 20.00 | 51.00 |
| High | 12.00 | 16.00 | 19.00 | 47.00 |
| TOTAL | 42.00 | 36.00 | 53.00 | 131.00 |
| $\chi^2 = 2.908$ | | .70 p = .50 | C = .021 | |

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