ABSTRACT

PUBLIC CONTROL SYSTEMS IN THE USSR:
THE PEOPLE'S CONTROL COMMITTEE

BY

Janet S. Adams

The special focus of this study is upon the nationwide
cfixizens' inspectorate in the Soviet Union known as the
"Panfle's Control Committee," a network of committees
designed to enlist the voluntary efforts of Soviet citizens
in determining just how well party and government directives
are being carried out in practice. The organization's
antecedents, origin, structure, and functions are examined,
and where sufficient evidence is available efforts are made
1x>evaluate the success with which the People's Control
Gmmuttee is fulfilling its many assigned tasks. The broader
focus of the study examines the hypothesis that "people's
mnmxol" in particular and public participation in general
perfinmlessential functions in the post-Stalinist, Soviet-
type SYStem, that is, in an advanced, industrial society
cflmracterized by a syndrome of attributes including highly
mammalized political and economic structures, single-party

rule, and social orientation of the individual toward the

Collectivity ,

Janet S. Adams

Evidence concerning these matters has been culled
primarily from Soviet sources, from the speeches of Soviet
leaders, from books by inspectors or staff officials of
the various control committees, and from articles appearing
in the pages devoted to "People's Control" published regular-
ly since March of 1963 almost twice a month in Izvestia and
only slightly less frequently in Pravda, and in various

periodicals, such as Partiinaya zhizn, Kommunist, and Sovety

 

deputatov trudyashchikhsya. In addition, relevant information

 

has been drawn from the extensive literature, by both Soviet
and Western scholars, dealing with the Soviet political and
social systems, and more particularly with such special but
diverse tOpics as the administrative machinery of state
control, and the post-Stalinist resurgence of citizens'
participation in the Soviet Union. Finally, current studies
of political scientists concerned with bureaucracy, bureau-
cratic behavior and administrative controls have been examined
for relevant hypotheses which might throw light upon the
operations of public control systems in the Soviet Union.
Since antecedents for today's People's Control Committee
clearly existed in the first post-revolutionary attempts of
the Bolsheviks to transform tsarist state control into a new,
peOple's or "socialist" control, an historical treatment of
the evolution of Soviet control organizations was essential
to this study. The path of almost constant reorganization of
Soviet control institutions throught the years has been

briefly traced and analyzed on the basis of two chief formative

Janet S. Adams

factors: ideological concerns and political power consider-
ations.

A major conclusion of this dissertation is that the
present, chief significance of the PeOple's Control Commit-
tee is its role in the socialization of the Soviet citizen.
During the post-Stalinist era, public participation has
been intended to help fill the functional void left by
destalinization and the substantial reduction of terror with
followed Stalin's death. Instead of being guided by coer-
cion, the Soviet citizen has been expected to internalize
party-approved norms of behavior and belief, of conduct
and commitment, through subject-participant activity, that
is, through the party-guided active involvement of the
individual in civic duties. However, participation in any
form is difficult to keep within bounds. Another conclusion
of this study is that the present volume of participation,
including millions of citizens taking part in the control
activities of the three largest public organizations--the
Komsomols, soviets, and trade unions--is creating new forms
of public participation on a scale that may be increasingly
difficult for the party leadership to channel. Thus, despite
the party's zeal, intentions and dominance, the potential
of public control systems to effect change in the Soviet
social system over time may well find unprecedented
Opportunities to develOp in the years ahead upon the ground
being prepared by the many and varied forms of citizen

participation in the Soviet Union today.

PUBLIC CONTROL SYSTEMS IN THE USSR:

THE PEOPLE'S CONTROL COMMITTEE

BY

Janet Steckelberg Adams

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of Political Science

1970

(7

(I

- 95w)"

/'— '2. ‘7— 7/

AC KN OWLEDGMENT S

I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Professor
Ellen PrOpper Mickiewicz, Chairman of my Dissertation
Committee, for her meticulous, perceptive criticism of this
dissertation throughout its preparation, and for her unfail-
ing, enthusiastic support. The other two members to the
Committee, Professor Rufus Browning and Professor John N.
Collins, also contributed valuable advice and criticism,
for which I am most grateful.

In addition, I want to thank Professor Alfred G. Meyer
for guiding and encouraging my first exploration of this
tOpic at the master's level. Above all, I am deeply indebted
to my husband, Dean Arthur B. Adams, whose long-time scholar-
1y interests in Soviet studies sparked and fed my own and
first suggested the possible fruitfulness of an inquiry into

Soviet public control systems.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . i i
IJST OF ABBREVIATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . iv
Chapter
I. THE MEANING OF "PEOPLE'S CONTROL" ACTIVITIES
IN THE USSR 0 O I O O O O O O O O l
The Meaning of "Subject—Participant" . . 14
Some Theories of Bureaucratic Behavior
Applied to the Soviet Case. . . . . 17
Solutions Offered by Mass Participation . 28
II. THE HISTORY OF "SOCIALIST" CONTROL, 1917-
1953. O O I O O O C O O O O O I 41
Beginnings of People's Control, 1917-
1923 O O O O O I O O O O O I 44
Unified PeOple's Control, 1923-1934 . . 52
People's Control Suspended, 1934-1953. . 64
III. KHRUSHCHEV'S REORGANIZATION OF CONTROL . . 76
The Destalinization of Control, 1953-
1964 O O O O O O C O O O O O 76
Genesis of the Party-State Control
Committee (KPGK) . . . . . . . . 86
UL THE PARTY-STATE CONTROL COMMITTEE . . . . 117
Formal Structure. . . . . . . . . 117
Operation . . . . . . . . . . . 131
V. THE COMMITTEE OF PEOPLE'S CONTROL . . . . 152
VI. PUBLIC CONTROL SYSTEMS OF THE SOVIETS, TRADE
UNIONS AND THE KOMSOMOLS . . . . . . . 194
VII. CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . 238
BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276

FZMK
KNK

KP

KPGK

MGK

NK

NK GK

NK RKI
PGK

TskK
TSKK-RKI

VTsSPS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Fabrichno-zavodski i mestny komitet [profsoyuza]
(Factory Committee of the Trade Union)

Komitet narodnovo kontrolya (Committee of PeOple's
Control)

Komsomolski "Prozhektor" (Komsomol "Searchlight")

Komitet partiinc-gosudarstvennovo kontrolya
(Committee of Party-State Control)

Ministerstvo gosudarstvennovo kontrolya (Ministry
of State Control)

See KNK

Narodny kommissariat gosudarstvennovo kontrolya
(PeOple's Commissariat of State Control,
"Goskontrol")

Narodny kommissariat raboche-krestyanskoi
inspektsii (PeOple's Commissariat of WOrkers'
and Peasants' Inspection, "Rabkrin")

See KPGK

Tsentralnaya kontrolnaya kommissiya (Central
Control Commission)

Central Control Commission and Workers' and

Peasants' Inspectorate

Vsesoyuzny tsentralny sovet sovetskikh profsoyuzov
(All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions)

iv

CHAPTER I

THE MEANING OF "PEOPLE'S CONTROL"

ACTIVITIES IN THE USSR

And how much quicker Communism could be built if
it were not for the soulless bureaucrats . . . the
loss of grain in the fields, overexpenditure by book-
keepers, thievery at warehouses, swindling by managers.

. . . Stalin's stream-of-consciousness, in A.
Solzhenitsyn, The First Circle, p. 89.

 

The subject of this study is the nationwide citizens'
inspectorate in the Soviet Union known as the PeOple's
Control Committee. The following chapters examine the
organization's antecedents, origin, structure, and func-
tions. In addition, where sufficient evidence is available,
efforts are made to evaluate the success with which the
People's Control Committee is fulfilling its many assigned
tasks. Such substantive analysis of this relatively new
control organization is essential to an understanding of
the present Soviet political system. However, an additional
aim of this study is to generalize from the history of
Soviet experimentation with public control systems and
attempt to discover and explain the most important functions
that mass control systems appear to perform in the Soviet-
type society, that is, in'a society characterized by a

syndrome of attributes including highly centralized political
2

and economic structures, single-party rule, and social
orientation of the individual toward the collectivity. In
brief, the examination of the People's Control Committee
is intended as a case study in the evolution of Soviet
socialist techniques of control that involve public par-
ticipation on a wide scale.

Before proceeding further, the nature of the control
which is being investigated here must be clearly defined.
In the discussion of the meaning of "control" which follows,
two points are emphasized. The first concerns the strict
limitations of the Russian term "control" as it applies to
the activity of the People's Control Committee; the second,
perhaps disconcertingly, points out ambiguities (inherent
inboth the word and the activity) which tend to give
"control" a wider than dictionary meaning in practice.

The precise sense in which the Russians use the term
"control" is stated very simply by the Bolshaya sovetskaya

entsiklopediya.1 This source describes "control" as "the

 

checking of something, as for example, the execution of
laws, plans, and decisions." A fuller dictionary defini-
tion of the verb form still clearly preserves the limita-
tions of this meaning. Thus, according to the Tolkovy

slovar russkovoyazyka,2 "to control" means "to verify

 

[check, examine, audit] or observe [superintend, put under
surveillance] someone's action [work, operation]." By con-

trast, English usage is generally broader, often suggesting

relationships of authority and power. For example, while
Webster3 defines "control" as checking, testing or verifying
by evidence or experiments, the English definition also
includes the "exercise of a restraining or directing influ-
ence," and even further asserts that control may mean "to
have power over." While action by the People's Control
Committees can and does result in follow-up actions involving
restraint and disciplinary measures, and while the super-
vision and checking are bound to impose certain restraints
upon those supervised, such follow-up actions and side
effects are not, in the Russian sense, strictly a part of
the control activity itself.

Yet, while by definition the Russian term is shown to
be thus restricted in meaning, its use at times has seemed
to imply much more. For example, the Bolsheviks, in the
early experimental months of their regime, spoke and legis-
lated in favor of something they called "workers' control
over production."4 Surely, in the spirit of immediate post-
revolutionary oratory this phrase was intended, if not to
promise the workers a direct hand in management, at least
the power to exercise a "restraining and directing role."
And, when Lenin addressed the workers and peasants in
Izvestia the day after the Bolshevik seizure of power, with
the assurance that the new Workers' and Peasants' Government
would "create workers' control over the production and dis-

tribution of goods and establish public control over the

banks, together with their transformation into one state
enterprise," his audience must have understood this as
promising something very close to workers' self-management
of the economy.5 The proletariat, having seized political
power in name at least, was now being promised a role in
directing the economic life of the country as well.

But workers had not been trained as managers. They
needed education for this role, as Lenin himself admitted
a year later in his speech to the Sixth All-Russian Extra-
ordinary Congress of Soviets, on November 6, 1918, when he

declared that "until workers learn to manage . . . socialism

 

is only a wish."6 Thus, to speak of workers' management,
he admitted, was at this point premature. Workers' control,
on the other hand, Lenin described as having already been
instituted. Here, "workers' control" has lost its self-
management overtones and once again reflects its narrow,
dictionary meaning, for in this later context, Lenin is
referring to a supervisory kind of action, which he hoped
might instruct the workers in the business of management,
while safeguarding the gains of the revolution.

The shift of terms just illustrated is paralleled by
a similar ambiguity in the activity of control. The source
of the latter ambiguity is the thin line which may exist
between the managerial role (of decision-making) and the
supervisory role of the inspector who is empowered to check

upon the manager. Given certain circumstances, the second

 
 

role may easily preempt the powers of the first.7 In any
case, it is clear that in order to guard against such a
shift of authority the inspector must be carefully kept

from exceeding his authority. And in the Soviet Union today,
not only the Russian definition of the citizen inspector's
control duties and the careful organizational safeguards of
the Communist Party, but even certain aspects of Russia's
political culture tend to discourage such shifts of authority.
One aim of the present study will be to document this asser-
tion; another aim will be to explore the implications and
possible consequences of ambiguity in the public inspector's
role.

"Control" has been defined. The particular type of
control activity in the Soviet Union with which this study
is concerned now needs further definition, both in terms of
its chief functions and its institutional forms. Throughout
the Soviet era, such control has meant principally checking
upon the economic performance of ministries by a group of
supervisory organizations which may be collectively iden-
tified as the agencies of control of the Soviet apparatus.8
Chief among these supervisory groups have been a Ministry
of Finances, a State Planning Committee, and a Ministry of

9

State Control. The Ministry of Finances customarily audits

the accounts of all enterprises and scrutinizes their staff

arrangementS, while Gosplan (the State Planning Committee)

10

keeps track of plan fulfillment. It was the state control

agency (Gosudarstvenny kontrol or Goskontrol) which became

 

the institutional basis of the present People's Control
Committee, and its first duty traditionally--inherited from
the tsar's State Controller's Office--was the official
auditing of government accounts.11

The advent of Soviet power was to have certain impli-
cations for Goskontrol, adding new functions, creating new
organizational forms, and increasing its membership. The
most significant new element in the Bolsheviks' early
experiments with "socialist" forms of control was the effort
to involve ordinary Soviet citizens on a large scale in the
activities of Goskontrol. This new, independent variable,
mass participation, was to have far-reaching implications
for control, but perhaps most significant was the new educa-
tional role which it added to Goskontrol's traditional one.
The citizen-participant himself became an object of social-
ization in the process of carrying out Goskontrol's tasks
of supervision.

Public participation in control activities was pro—
posed at an early date by Lenin. In 1917 he wrote: "Up to
the advent of the highest phase of communism, socialists
will demand the strictest control on the part of the public
and the state over standards of work and expenditure."12
And he carefully designed the blueprints of a Workers' and

Peasants' Inspectorate, involving the public, to maintain

a watch over the bureaucracy. Under Khrushchev, by the time

the 1961 Party Program appeared, a well-rounded and elaborate,
"Leninist" theoretical tapestry had been woven to depict the
universal significance of mass participation in the march
toward communism, within which the subsidiary tasks of con-

trol were clearly delineated. As Kommunist put it quite

 

succintly, "The Party Program states that the chief direction
in the development of socialist statehood in the period of
the full-scale construction of communism is the comprehensive

unfolding and improvement of socialist democracy, the active

 

participation by all citizens in the administration of the

 

state and in the guidance of economic and cultural construc-

tion, in improving the work of the state apparatus and in
13

 

strengthening popular checkup on its activity.

 

Today, even the most cursory examination of the Peo—
ple's Control Committee reveals that this agency is meant
to be far more than simply a citizen's policing system,
designed to check on the economic and administrative per-
formance of Soviet bureaucracy. Indeed, citizen participa-
tion in control is viewed by some party leaders and Soviet
theorists as one key to the creation of a more democratic
society in which the erstwhile passive and irresponsible
Soviet citizen will transform himself by participation into
an active and responsible human being to such a degree that
coercion from above will be, for the most part, unneces-
sary.14 This body of theory looks ahead to the day when

Soviet society may come to be run from below, by its citizens,

rather than from the top, by a party—state structure imposed
on the people. Harkening back to Lenin's words about the
necessity for workers to "learn to manage," the People's
Control Committee is hailed as a school of self-management,
training these "New Soviet Men" of the future, today.

The evolution of public participation in control during
the Soviet era would seem, from the preceding discussion, to
have been continuous from the Leninist to the Khrushchevian
model. Such was not the case, however. During the Stalin
era, public participation in control was gradually curtailed
until a Stalinist model of Goskontrol, closely resembling
the earlier tsarist agency, emerged. Interesting questions
consequently arise, concerning the very nature and func—
tions of public control in the Soviet social system: Why
was the public excluded from state control activities and
organizations during the Stalinist period? How did their
exclusion affect the nature of state control? Were there
economic and political reasons, related to the problems of
control, for reviving public participation in the post-
Stalinist period? Or did the Soviet leaders have other
motives? How were the changes in participation related to
the development of the Soviet economy and its organization?
The answers to these and related questions will require a
more detailed account of the organizational transformation
of state control agencies through the Soviet period, which

will be the subject of the next two chapters.

One important aspect of the reappearance of public
participation is pointed up by this examination of the
evolution of control institutions, and that is the timing
of Khrushchev's innovations. Why was public participation
revived in the post-Stalinist era? For example, was the
attempt to substitute "self-discipline from below" for
"coercion from above" a recognition by the Soviet leaders
that coercion had become dysfunctional at this period of
the Soviet Union's economic development? The fact is that
coercion as an instrument for effecting a revolutionary
transformation of Soviet society has always exhibited cer-
tain dysfunctions and that it has become increasingly
dysfunctional as this advanced industrial society has grown
more complex. Zbigniew Brzezinski speaks of terror as
appropriately characterizing that particular stage of a
system's development "when the old order is being destroyed
and the new erected."15 This is the stage when the govern—
ment can be considered in the terms of David Apter's model
of a developing society, as "the independent variable."16
But, as Apter's model predicts, the industrializing society
soon transforms the government into an "intervening variable,"
responsive to inputs and with its independent power "to act
. . . drastically curtailed by the complexity of the indus-

trial process itself."17

Coercion thus becomes to a degree\,-
self-defeating, even when viewed in the limited context of

this developmental scheme, for implicit in this scheme is

10

the assumption that modern industries, and highly indus-
trialized societies, require much decentralized decision-
making, limits on arbitrary central decisions, and a
responsiveness at the center to the evolving demands of
further modernization and complexity.18 When decision-
making and management become, of necessity, more and more
decentralized, then the business of checking performance
clearly requires adjustment to the new conditions. Mass
control techniques, because of their diffused character,
seem to provide a suitable substitute for coercion under
the new conditions.

But "control from below" raises its own problems, for
if authority is delegated more and more to lower levels,
then the moral commitment of both managers and controllers
at those levels grows more important. Two obvious ways of
ensuring such commitment are by close party guidance and
by allout direct efforts to achieve internalization of
party norms. Both approaches characterize the mass control
efforts in the Soviet Union today, and will be discussed at
length in later pages.

Because of the importance which is attached in this
study to the educational role of public participation in
control, the nature of this role needs to be examined more
fully at this point. The educational mission is concerned
with the internalization of party norms, with commitment to

communist goals, or, in Soviet parlance with "building the

11

New Soviet Man." The importance of this task is sometimes
underrated by Western observers, who are repelled by the
naive, Utopian-socialist flavor of Soviet descriptions of
their glowing future. Skeptics share D. MacKenzie Wallace's
irony, when he described mid-nineteenth-century Russian
revolutionary visions of the same Promised Land: "Their
heated imagination showed them in the near future a New
Russia, composed of independent federated communes, without
any bureaucracy or any central power--a happy land in which
everybody virtuously and automatically fulfilled his public
and private duties, and in which the policemen and all
other embodiments of material constraint were wholly super-

fluous."19

But myths and dreams are inevitably simplistic,
which is a part of their charm and endurance. And no one
at this date can convincingly deny that they are also
capable of exerting an influence over men's minds, of
moving men to action.

Moreover, myths and dreams may also be symptomatic
of seemingly unrelated but vital needs of men and societies.
In the present case, the new Soviet man is a clear neces-
sity not only for the communist society of the future, but
for the proper functioning of Soviet society today. Such
theorists as Mikhail Suslov have, in the present decade,
gone far toward spelling out in concrete terms how tomor-

row's realities (and even today's) can embody those dreams.

Along with increased material goods, increased relief from

12

terror and fiat, the common Soviet man is increasingly
expected to take his rightful place in a "highly-organized
and coordinated community of people of labor, distinguished
by a lofty communist awareness of their public duty and by
high discipline." This is the real meaning, according to
Suslov, of "the process of withering away of the state,

which is already taking place."20

And Khrushchev anticipated
this definition of the "withering of the state" with one of
his own, in a speech to the XXI Party Congress: "The ques-
tion of the withering of the state, if it is to be under-

stood dialectically, is a question of the development of

the socialist state system into communist, social [obshchest-
21

 

vennoe] self-administration."
The chief method whereby today's Soviet man learns
self-administration is mass participation. During the
Khrushchev era, mass participation was given tremendous
impetus. If Stalin feared and mintrusted the common man,
Khrushchev, by his policies, appeared to place great trust
in even the non-party masses, and initiated a groundswell
of voluntary participation in longstanding public organiza-
tions, such as the soviets, the trade unions, the Komsomols,
and the party itself, as well as in such new areas as
citizens' law enforcement agencies (police and courts),
organizations of public control, the adult political educa-
tion movement, and mass, nation-wide discussions of public

and party policies, such as the draft Party Program.

13

Public organizations in the Soviet Union, as, for
example, the unions, have always been considered "schools
of communism," where the participant receives training by
participation. As described by Emily Brown: "All union
activities are colored, or are supposed to be colored, by
this educational purpose. In fact, rank and file partici-
pation in administrative, welfare, and cultural programs
inevitably trains thousands, or millions, of people in the
spirit of collectivism and mutual aid for the good of

society."22

Even Soviet law embodies within itself what
Harold Berman describes as "this dynamic function . . . in
molding not merely the conduct of men but also their
morality and their very characters." Speaking of the
Khrushchev era, Berman adds, "One aspect of this [educative]
concept of the law is the greatly increased participation

of ordinary Soviet citizens--of society, the public,

obshchestvennost, as Soviet terminology has it--in the
23

 

administration of justice."
It is against the broad backdrop of theory concerned
with ultimate communist goals and the massive efforts to
:mobilize society to pursue them that the socialization role
of the citizen inspectorate needs to be viewed. Bringing
the masses into control during the Khrushchev era meant
iadding another important new "school of communism." More-
<Jver, the socialization function may ultimately prove to

kxe the most significant aspect of the public control effort,

14

partly because of the importance assigned to this normative
task by the Soviet leaders themselves and partly because
in the long run, of all its assigned tasks, mass control

may accomplish this one with the greatest success.

The Meaning of "Subject-Participant"

 

The subject of pOpular participation raises one fur-
ther problem of definition that should be clarified in these
introductory pages, for social "participation," as used
here, can be defined in two ways. It may mean "active
involvement," a sharing in a given activity, or it may
indicate a decision-making role in the activity. And only
if these two discrete aspects of participation--the "activist"
and the "decision-making"--are clearly distinguished from
one another, can the suggestive term "subject-participant,"
as used by Gabriel Almond, G. Bingham Powell, and others,
be accurately used to refer to the mass volunteer partici-
pation in the Soviet Union that is being studied here.24
These authors seem to imply "decision-making" in their use
of the term, whereas in the Soviet case, "activist" must
be understood. Frederick Barghoorn's use of the variants,
"participatory-subject pattern" or "enforced participation,"
emphasizes the important point that participation in the
Soviet Union is not intended to provide individuals with
decisionsmaking roles, but to train them to fill their

subject roles . 25

.y"
V.
w.‘

15

Other scholars have pointed out the "subject-activist"
nature of much social involvement in the Soviet Union.
Discussing the meaning of political modernization in the
Soviet Union, Fainsod, for example, says, "it involves
using all of the powerful instruments which modern science
and technology make available to enforce political unanimity
and to mobilize the energies of the nation to carry out the

26 "Enforced unanimity" and "mobilized

leadership's plan."
energies" thus indicate the character of the citizen's par-
ticipation, or to use Brzezinski's term, "pseudo-participa-

27 And Grey Hodnett, in his

tion," in the Soviet Union.
study of primary party organizations in the Soviet Union,
has tried to highlight the essential disregard of the par-
ticipant's personal interests implicit in Soviet mobiliza-
tion, by defining this negative aspect as "the process of
getting members of the primary party organization to behave
in ways detrimental to one or more of their basic interests.
When this objective is achieved, the 'activeness' of the
members is said to have been released."28
A distinctive feature of Soviet mobilization and
‘participation is, of course, the guiding role of the party.
(One of the basic principles influencing the structure and
aactivities of the party and other organizations in the
Soviet Union has long been the principle of "democratic

centralism." In practice, the centralist elements have

cxmnsistently negated the "decision-making" implications of

16

"democracy" in this principle. The party itself serves as
the centralizing agent with respect to the public organiza-
tions, so that even today it is as true as when Stalin said
it, that "not a single important political or organizational
question is decided by our soviet and other mass organiza-
tions without guiding directions from the party."29 Numerous
examples could be cited. The point is, however, that demo-
cratic centralism, meaning ubiquitous party guidance, defines
the rules of the game and limits the functions of public
participation very rigidly.

Yet, in spite of the limited "activist" meaning of
participation which has been insisted upon here as applying
in the Soviet Union, it must be pointed out that Soviet
theorists themselves do sometimes use the term in the
decision-making sense. "Participation" is so used, for
example, in the following statement from the Party Program:
"Under communism all peOple will . . . actively participate

30 "Actively par-

in the management of public affairs."
ticipate" is intended here to assure the common man that

he will someday share in decisions. In fact, this usage
strongly recalls the self-management promise of "workers'
control," implicit in some uses of that term. And both are
of a piece with the many democratic elements that are
enshrined in the 1936 Constitution, preserved for all to

see, like those foreign, living bodies fortuitously caught

in ancient amber. There is no reason to doubt that ordinary

17

citizens respond to these hopeful messages from the stony
recesses of official pronouncements, that such messages
have great psychological appeal, and that they perform
useful symbolic functions for the Soviet political system.

However, such messages must also pose certain problems
for the leadership by confusing the meaning of public par-
ticipation as understood by ordinary citizens. In the con-
text of the present study, perhaps the most important aspect
of the enduring promise of greater citizen self-management
is the constant pressure this promise exerts upon the party
to be vigilant in maintaining its guiding role over the
activities of the public inspectors.

Some Theories of Bureaucratic Behavior
Applied to the Soviet Case

Control systems are, of course, neither new nor
restricted to the communist scene. Some means of monitor-
ing performance is required wherever subordinates in a
social hierarchy are given commands to fulfill. Although.
one scholar of Soviet affairs, Barrington Moore, has gone
so far as to describe Soviet society itself as "one enormous
bureaucracy,"31 we need not generalize from.bureau to
society for the purpose of this study. The organization
'with which we are concerned is a bureaucratic one.32 Its
nfission, in large part, is to monitor other bureaus. There-
fore, it should be possible to select, from the considerable

body of literature by Western scholars related to bureaucratic

18

behavior, organization, and problems of control, some dis-
crete theories applicable to the Soviet scene and offering
useful insights into the behavior of Soviet monitoring
agencies. The following section will examine several such
theories and attempt to explore their implications for the
growth, transformation, and operation of control systems in
the Soviet Union.

While control systems are required by any administra-
tive hierarchy, to protect the system against the substand-
ard or deviant performance of lower participants in the
fulfillment of centrally—fixed, organizational goals, the
particular needs and pressures for control in a given
environment are the product of many factors. Of first
importance, undoubtedly, is the size of the organization.
The larger a bureau is, for example, the greater the amount
of performance checking and rechecking it requires. One
simple explanation of why this occurs has been offered by
Anthony Downs, in his discussion of the "rigidity cycle"
experienced by large bureaus.33 Rigidity sets in as an
organization grows because its operations become more and
more weighted down with "rules, regulations, and agonizingly
slow decisionmaking procedures," all of which hamper the
achievement of organizational goals and increase the need
to check on their fulfillment. Presumably, the longer a
large bureau exists, the more intractable become its pro-

blems of control .

19

In the Soviet Union, the bureaucratic organization
of government is not only large, but of long standing. The
problems of monitoring its performance are therefore of
similar vintage and magnitude. Even allowing for the
undoubted transformations which technical progress and
education have effected in producing the modern machinery
of government in the Soviet Union, the existence of a large
and corrupt bureaucracy stretching back at least 200 years
prior to the Bolshevik takeover of the government suggests
that there existed also a certain, well-established continuity
of bureaucratic deviant behavior calling for control, con-
tainment and reform. Historians of Russia's past have pro-
vided evidence concerning this behavior.34 Klyuchevsky,
for example, describes Peter the Great's efforts to reform
the bureaucracy of his day in a passage recently quoted by
Merle Fainsod. Peter was chagrined at finding that "bribery
and large-scale embezzlement persisted very much as before,"
and as a last resort, says Fainsod, Peter ordered the

"immediate publication of an ukase 'that whoever robbed the

 

state of so much as the value of a piece of rope would hang
for it.‘ According to Klyuchevsky, 'the Procurator-General
Yagushinsky, the sovereign's eye in the senate, exclaimed:
'Would your Majesty like to be a ruler without any subjects?
we all steal, only some do it on a bigger scale, and in a
more conspicuous way, than others." Peter laughed, and did

not publish the ukase.”35

20

Gogol's Inspector General, which was intended as a
mirror image of Russian provincial bureaucracy in Gogol's
day, attests to the continuity of similar bureaucratic
behavior in early 19th-century Russia. And in the 20th
century, Fainsod goes so far as to suggest that the wide-
spread incompetence of the tsar's bureaucracy was an impor-
tant factor in hastening revolution. More specifically, he
asserts that, "at a sheer technical level, the inefficiency
and venality of the bureaucracy helped to contribute to the
disastrous military defeats and the economic breakdown of
the home front which prepared the way for revolution."36
The advent of the Soviet era did not lessen the burden of
control, but added new burdens to traditional ones. For the
Bolsheviks did not cast aside the old bureaucracy. They
inherited it. And one of the first new tasks of the post-
revolutionary government was that of safeguarding the
revolution against sabotage by the "soulless bureaucrats"
inherited from the tsar. Not only corruption, but treason
now had to be ferreted out.

The Bolsheviks further multiplied the tasks of control
when they established public ownership of the major means of
production. The new faceless owner of economic enterprises
resembled in many ways the former absentee landlord, and
suffered the same kinds of systemic difficulties. The
"government"--a distant abstraction to the ordinary worker

at best-—could not realistically expect the latter to husband

21

resources in its behalf. Rather, like the absentee land-
lord, the government could expect to be "robbed blind"_by
the "tenant" worker, as well as by middle-level officials,
the new class of "official stewards." Consequently, the
tendency of bureaucrats to steal from the government, so
clearly understood by Peter's minister as a natural state
of affairs, was further encouraged as government ownership
and government administration reached into new economic
areas.37 As the business of government increased, the size
of the bureaucracy expanded, and the tasks of monitoring
the Soviet apparatus multiplied and grew more difficult.
Organizational growth not only magnifies the tasks
of control. It also creates pressures for more control.
In fact, control efforts by themselves create pressures for
more control. Downs has identified two "inevitable responses"
to control efforts, formulating these into "laws." One is
the Law of Control Duplication: "Any attempt to control

38 The

one large organization tends to generate another."
other is the Law of Counter Control. Of this, Downs says:
"the greater the effort made by a sovereign or top-level
official to control the behavior of subordinate officials,
the greater the efforts made by those subordinates to evade

39 Both of Downs' "laws" will

or counteract such control."
be extensively illustrated from the Soviet scene in later
pages, but for the present, some brief illustrations should

demonstrate their applicability.

22

Downs' Law of Control Duplication seems especially
helpful in explaining one aspect of the evolution of the
government apparatus under Stalin, which eventually pro-
duced a vast network of overlapping control agencies. Downs'
explanation involves the interesting concept of "leakage of

authority."40

As organizational growth increases, says
Downs, leakage of authority is experienced by officials at
the tOp, and a favorite remedy of officials suffering such
leakage is simply to create new and separate monitoring
devices. Separate monitoring devices tend, however, to be
somewhat self-defeating, since they, in their turn, lead to
more and more regulations, red-tape and rigidity: thus, in
the end they add their own pressures for new and better
systems of control. Both leakage of authority and a felt
need to "control the controllers" help to explain at least
in part the excessive and unprecedented proliferation of
monitoring agencies in Stalin's government. The qualification
"in part" needs underlining, however, for it would be a

vast oversimplification of Stalin's motives to suggest that
his excessive elaboration of controls resulted purely from
efforts to discipline his bureaucrats. Stalin's concern
with "leakage of authority" of course, extended far beyond-
the corruption and treason of "soulless bureaucrats." It
became a principle of administration, a style of rule. Thus,

it was for a variety of reasons, including those above, that

during the Stalinist era, control systems, backed by the

23

most frightening control system of them all--the secret
police--multiplied and overlapped one another, wrapping all
of Soviet society in an hysterical atmosphere of mutual
denunciations. A more direct and simple example of control
duplication in the Soviet Union is found in the common
habit of "calling for another controller" for each new
special job of inspection. As Berliner described this
practice: "If machine tools are not being economized, for
instance, someone advocates setting up an inspection com-
mission. If hoarding is excessive, another suggests sending
in an inspector."41

Downs' Law of Counter Control deals with the fact that
effective evasion of control provokes constant efforts to
reestablish it. In large bureaucratic organizations, even
the multiplication of monitoring devices cannot prevent the
evasion of control by certain subdivisions. Gordon Tullock
has called the situation that results, "bureaucratic free
enterprise."42 This phrase describes the existence of
pockets of freedom from surveillance where participants
escape real pressures to conform to orders from above.
"Between the tiger's claws" they find room to pursue objec-
tives which may even oppose or at least hinder the fulfill-
ment of some top-level directives, and they proceed to do
just that.

Such activities characterize large-scale bureaucracy

43

everwhere, regardless of national setting. In the Soviet

24

Union, however, a variant of this phenomenon appeared in
economic enterprises and became so commonplace, at least
during the Stalinist era, that a description of the typical
Soviet factory manager would not be complete without it.
(Paradoxically, in fact, the smooth running of the economy
came in a large measure to depend on the effective opera-
tion of such "deviant" managerial behavior.) Joseph Berliner
has described with particular care how the excessive demands
and restrictions of the enterprise plan, and the govern-
ment's emphasis upon achievement of the plan, have forced
managers systematically to ignore other organizational
injunctions and to pursue plan fulfillment by "extra-legal
arrangements."44 Consequently, the question is rhetorical
when he asks, "How does one explain that in a totaliterian
regime, sturdily propped with all the murky paraphernalia
of a police state, managers go blithely about hoarding
materials, engaging in blat,and systematically evading the
intent of regulations?"45 Such activities are simply exam-
ples of that bureaucratic free enterprise which flourishes
in spite of controls. Inevitably, of course, a tip of this
iceberg of activity is exposed, and then, as Tullock and
Berliner both emphasize, the revelation of evasion calls
forth renewed efforts to control it. One final example,
which should be mentioned here because it is one of the

chief forms of Soviet control evasion, is the so-called

"web of involvement" or krugovayagporuka, whereby controllers

 

25

are drawn into a conspiracy with managers and workers to
hide defects or illegal practices where their disclosure
might endanger an enterprise's chances for plan fulfill-

ment.46

Such examples of bureaucratic behavior calling for
control and more control could be multiplied almost endlessly,
but the point should already be evident that establishing
effective control is as difficult as it is essential to
large bureaucracies, and that control contributes its own
problems to those of effective management by multiplying
tasks and duties for controllers and controlled alike.
Moreover, from the foregoing discussion, it would be logical
to infer that pressures for more and better control might be
a permanent feature in an already large and expanding bureau-
cracy, such as exists in the Soviet Union.

Two additional pressures for control that characterize
the Soviet-type society (or to quote Dawns, the "bureau-
dominated single-party," society) remain to be discussed
here. One is the relatively weaker feedback that Downs
ascribes to the communist, as opposed to the democratic,
nation, and the second is the absence of non-bureaucratic,
political factions in the one-party system. Though all
large societies suffer problems with communications and
feedback, special factors contribute to weak feedback in
the Soviet-type system. Among these are the active dis—

couragement from above of criticism at lower levels, the

26

consequent fear of subordinates to speak out, and the
existence of communications channels designed to pass
information chiefly one-way, from the top down.48 In a
society thus characterized by weak feedback and "enormous
hierarchies with dozens of levels," as Downs describes both
the Soviet Union and Communist China today, the officials
at the top must "establish giant monitoring bureaus that
develop complex hierarchies of their own (such as the

Communist party)."49

In other words, control mechanisms
are intended to substitute for the missing information
sources from below.

The second special factor mentioned above, that has
magnified the problem of control in the Soviet Union has
been the suppression, and eventual outlawing, of critical
factions, within and outside of the Communist Party, which
might otherwise naturally work to expose errors at all
levels of government operation. Opposing factions, which
in Western democracies seek to oust current office holders
by exposing their inefficiencies and weaknesses have no

50 The resultant

legal existence in the Soviet system.
"facade of harmony" serves actually to keep errors hidden
and to contribute to a pooling of interests that involves
incumbent officials and their controllers in conspiracies

to avoid detection.51

If such collusion is a natural out-
come, so too is the attempt to substitute multiple control

agencies for the missing critical opposition.

27

Summarizing briefly the special problems of control
facing Soviet leaders, it should be said that in addition
to inheriting an extensive and corrupt bureaucracy from
their predecessors, the first Bolshevik government com-
plicated and enlarged the tasks of this bureaucracy, thereby
creating new problems of control and multiplying old ones.
They did this first of all by attempting to establish and
protect their power in the face of both real and imagined
attacks, and secondly by attempting to implement their
socialist goals, for example, by extending the nationaliza-
tion of the nation's economy and thereby vastly increasing
the government's administrative responsibilities and by
attempting to centralize the direction of this enormous
economic empire in Moscow. And they did this, to an impor-
tant degree, by constructing a single-party monolith,
eliminating and thereby depriving themselves of the poten-
tial assistance of all those non—bureaucratic elements of
control that can be found in pluralistic societies, such as
an alert and watchful political opposition, an independent

52 The whole intolerable

judiciary, and an independent press.
burden of control thus came squarely to rest upon the state
administrative machinery itself, depending upon the inven-
tiveness of the party leaders to devise new ways to improve
its effectiveness.

It should not be surprising then that some Soviet

leaders, including Lenin and Khrushchev, facing this problem

28

squarely, actively proposed that the public shoulder some
of this burden. We might, in fact, expect, on the basis of
the theories and discussion presented above, to find more or
less constant efforts in the Soviet Union to reorganize
control, to multiply controls, and to design control agencies
to serve as channels for communication from below. The
post-Stalinist efforts to involve Soviet citizens in control
seem to bear out these expectations.
Solutions Offered by Mass
Participation

Perhaps the immediate motivation for experimenting
with public involvement in control in the post-Stalinist
period was the necessity of Soviet leaders, experiencing
the seismic tremors of destalinization, to find substitutes
for Stalin's terror, to find new ways to sharpen the effec-
tiveness of control instruments without terror. However,
in addition to substituting for terror, the recruitment of
masses of ordinary citizens as inspectors appeared capable
of reforming the post-Stalinist state control apparatus in
three important ways: by cutting down the size of the state
control apparatus and substituting volunteers for paid staff
members; by increasing the flow of information from below,
and by broadening the state inspectorate's field of vision.
Which of these was considered most important is not at all
aPparent from the public discussion of the time concerned

With reform of the state control apparatus.

V 1

l

\W TH____.--.._--_

29

Clearly, there are areas where public participation
might help to alleviate some of the problems directly
related to the vast size of the Soviet Union's paid bureau-
cracy by cutting down the size of that staff. For example,
some state-provided services, which in other countries are
provided by private agencies, might well be shifted to
volunteer workers. And in the post-Stalin era, efforts
have in fact been made to take some of the excessive weight
of service and administrative duties from both state and
party agencies by enlisting the aid of mass volunteers.
Volunteer inspectors are but one part of this larger effort.53

Public participation might also help to counteract
the weak feedback which Downs ascribed to the large, bureau-
dominated society, by enlisting public volunteers to solicit
complaints and proposals, to ferret out deficiencies and
poor performance at the grass roots level, and to publicize
these findings. Recent public control efforts have actually
demonstrated their capability to perform this low-level
"sounding-board" function.

Finally, mass volunteers certainly might improve the
state control system by widening the range of vision of its
inSpectorate, to bring within its view, for example, those
forgotten areas where bureaucratic free enterprise has been
allowed to flourish to the detriment of state plans and
SUbstance. As Berliner so clearly describes this control

Problem: "Despite the abundant resources at its disposal,

30

the Ministry of State Control is simply not large enough,
nor are its inspectors skilled enough, to cope with a situa-
tion in which violations are the normal practice of the
community of managers and in which concealment of violation
has become a highly developed art. . . . [Therefore,] the
Ministry understandingly concentrates on special problems,
an approach which is rather self-defeating, for it warns
managers about where caution must be exercised."54 Pre-
sumably, public inSpectors, being ubiquitous, would be capable
of foiling all such efforts at concealment. Khrushchev made
use of this argument, when he urged the establishment of the
Party-State Control Committee and the incorporation in it of
citizen inspectors: "Comrades," he said, addressing the
November 1962 Plenum, "we have 10 million party members, 20
million Komsomols, 66 million trade union members. If we
were to put into action all these forces, to make use of
them for the purposes of control, even a mosquito's flight
wouldn't escape notice."55
In conclusion, before leaving this discussion of the
potential positive contributions of mass participation to
control, a final point needs to be made concerning the
intended function of public controllers as a substitute for
terror. Public inspectors, as some Soviet leaders reason,
will not only substitute for coercion, but will improve upon

it. Mass participation has in fact been called upon to

prevent the very abuses it is supposed to expose. Thus it

31

is intended to improve upon coercion in achieving control
objectives by internalizing desired norms of conduct. As
Lenin has expressed this thought: "people will gradually
accustom themselves to observe the elementary . . . rules
of communal life . . . without coercion," in other words,

by harkening to inner voices.56

And more recently, Paul
Kecskemeti, commenting on the 1956 Hungarian uprising and
the effects of the Hungarian Communist Party's disciplinary
control of workers in their places of work, made the inter-
esting observation that in communist Hungary, "outward

57 Public control

pressure did not produce inner loyalty."
in the Soviet Union, it is hoped, will make up for the fatal
flaw in control by coercion, and will help to create a

responsible, inner-directed citizenry.

CHAPTER I--NOTES

Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya (Great Soviet
Encyclopedia), 2nd ed., Vol. 22 (September 1953), p. 472.

Tolkovypslovar russkovo yazyka (Explanatory Dictionary
of the Russian Language; Moscow, 1936).

Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary_(Spring-
field, Mass., 1965)}

4See, for example, the announcement of the Petrograd

Military—Revolutionary Committee, in Rabochi i Soldat
(Worker and Soldier), No. 8 (October 25 [November 7]_l917).

 

5Izvestia TsIK (News of the Central Executive Com—
mittee), No. 207 (October 25, 1917). Both this and the
preceding statement are reprinted in the collection of
Lenin's writing on control compiled by L. F. Nikolskaya
and E. F. Polkovnikova, o_partiinom, gosudarstvennom i
obshchestvennom kontrole (On Party, State, and Public
Control; Moscow, 1963), pp. 9-10.

6Ibid., p. 260, n. 3; italics added.

For example, the supervisor by ruling out or ques-
tioning certain alternative solutions the manager might
want to consider may virtually dictate the solution finally
chosen. Or supervision may encourage the "safe solution."
Inspectors, in fact, may "make management decisions" in
nmch the same way as administrators, implementing policy
by choosing among various "means," come to make policy
decisions themselves. The situation similarly seems to
parallel the thin line easily crossed between line and staff
functions, discussed by John A. Armstrong, The Soviet
Eggeaucratic Elite (New York, 1959); see especially, p. 82.

 

Barrington Moore, Terror and Progress USSR (Cambridge,
Mass., 1954), p. 8.

This nomenclature has altered through the years;
see below, Chs. II and III.

10Alex Nove, The Soviet Economy (New York, 1966): P-

98: Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass,
1963). p. 388.

32

 

33

11It should be added that these principal, specialized

agencies of control do not by any means complete the list
of Soviet control agencies. There are numerous other economic
"cross-checking" agencies, such as the State Bank, which is
the repository for the accounts of all economic enterprises,
the investment banks, under the Ministry of Finances, and
the tribunals of the State Arbitration Committee, where
cases involving contract non-fulfillment are settled. At
the local level, inspectorates are maintained by some minis-
tries, such as those for trade or agriculture, which, oper-
ating partly under the jurisdiction of local soviet govern-
ment, make on-the-spot checks of economic operations. And
in addition, many other organizations, including the Com-
munist Party, the trade unions, the local soviets, the
Procuracy, and the secret police, participate in the business
of control; Nove, Soviet Economy, p. 117.

12V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya (Works), 4th ed., Vol. 25,
p. 441; italics added.

13"Yuridicheskaya nauka v usloviyakh kommunisticheskovo
stroitelstva" (Juridical Science in Conditions of Communist
Construction), Kommunist (Communist; November 1963), No. 16,
pp. 28-29.

14Even crime will disappear, according to the prominent
Soviet scholar, G. Strumilin, in Man, Society and the Future
(New York, 1964): "With time public opinion willfibecome a
force sufficiently strong to exclude crime altogether,"
p. 108.

15Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet
Politics (New York, 1967), p. 80.

16‘David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago:
1965), p. 252.

171bid.

18Emily C. Brown, whose study of Soviet trade unions
Ins examined the changing character of the "web of rules
Inwer which managers and the managed Operate" in industry,
Fmesents interesting evidence that this process has indeed
affected the role and changing influence of the unions.
Labelling the 1930's and 1940's as "the low ebb of union
ixfiluence and the years of most compulsion in the labor
field," Brown adds, "Increasingly such an authoritarian
§YSUm1failed to meet the needs of the developing modern
irflustry. By 1957 the party had decreed enlarged rights
fom the unions in the plants, along with more sc0pe for

34

1
regional and local managements. It called for the workers (
'to take an active part in the administration of industry'"; '
Soviet Trade Unions and Labor Relations (Cambridge, Mass., 3
1966), pp. 311—12. 9

v

19Donald MacKenzie Wallace, Russia (New York, 1905),
p. 616.

20Pravda, October 23, 1961.

21

Vneocherednoi XXI sezd kommunisticheskoi_partii
sovetskovo soyuza. Stenograficheskii otchet (Extraordinary
XXI Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR. Steno-
graphic Record, Moscow, 1959), Vol. I, p. 102.

22Brown, Soviet Trade Unions, p. 317.

23Harold J. Berman, Justice in the USSR (New York,
1963), pp. 81-82.

24Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative
Politics (Boston, 1966), PP. 250, 259, 273-74. Lucian Pye
has referred to this kind of "subject participation" as
"a new form of mass response to elite manipulation" in those
states where "mass participation has not been coupled with
an electoral process"; Aspects of Political Development
(Boston, 1966). P. 39.

25Frederick C. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR (Boston,
1966), p. 15.

26

 

Fainsod, in LaPalombara, Bureaucracy, p. 234.

 

27Brzezinski, Ideology and Power, p. 114.

28Grey Hodnett, "Mobilization Within the primary
Party Organization in the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, 1945-1961," Columbia University Ph.D. Thesis, 1962,
P. 32.

29Joseph Stalin, "On the Problems of Leninism,"
Egpblems of Leninism, 11th ed. (Moscow, 1940), p. 135. The
Fmoper relationship of democratic-centralist elements in the
Cfimration of trade unions was described in a more recent
Ekwiet source as meaning both greater initiative (i.e.,
'Twery trade union organization can and should display its
(MHIinitiative") and uniform rules for all: "However, trade
lyfions united in a community of aims and tasks could not act
JJlone direction if--there were not in effect uniform rules
(Hithe chief questions of trade union life"; quoted from
F5 S. Petrov, ed., Organizatsionno-massovaya rabota

35

professionalnykh spyuzov (Moscow, 1961), pp. 18-27, in Brown,
Soviet Trade Unions, p. 64.

3oHerbert Ritvo, The New Soviet Society (New York,

1962). p. 111.

31Moore, Terror and Progress, p. 2.

2Several definitions of bureaucracy are used in the
following discussion, depending upon the source quoted, but
the referent in each case should be clear from the text. A
simple, broad definition has been framed by Joseph LaPalombara
(Bureaucrac and Political Development [Princeton, 1963],
pp. 6-7), For some purposes," he suggests, "it is reasonable
to think of bureaucracy as encompassing all public servants."
While it is true, as has been pointed out quite recently by
Jerry F. Hough (The Soviet Prefects [Cambridge, Mass., 1969],
p. 3f, that "public administratIEn in the Soviet Union . . . does
not contain 'every ideal element of a classical bureaucracy,'"
yet Weber's legal-rational model of bureaucracy has served
as a point of departure or reference point for much sub-
sequent model-building and theorizing. Downs' definition of
bureau, for example, so basic to his theory, departs in
specific ways from the Weberian model. "The omitted traits
are hierarchical organization, impersonality of operations,
extensive use of rules, complexity of administrative tasks,
secrecy, and employment of specially trained personnel on
a career basis." All these Downs calls "secondary char-
acteristics denoting a bureau." The four essential, iden-
tifying characteristics of a bureau, Downs lists as follows:
"1. It is large." "2. A majority of its members are full-
time workers who depend upon their employment in the organ-
ization for most of their income." "3. The initial hiring
of personnel, their promotion within the bureau and their
retention therein are based at least partly upon some type
of assessment of the way in which they have performed or
can be expected to perform their organizational roles,
rather than solely upon either ascribed characteristics . . .
or periodic election to office by some constituency outside
Of the bureau." "4. The major portion of its output is
not directly or indirectly evaluated in any markets external
to the organization by means of voluntary uid ro qug|

 

 

transactions"; Inside Bureaucracy (Boston, 67 , pp. 24-25.
33Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, pp. 158, 272.
34

Other scholars have commented upon the magnitude
andcxmruptness of the Russian bureaucracy. Alexander
(kushenkron, for example, discussing the "bigness" of plants
and enterprises established in the 19th century, during the
early period of Russian industrialization, comments: "The

36

state, promoting industrial establishments for good and not
so good reasons, showed remarkably little interests in small
businesses. Large enterprises were a much more lucrative
source of graft; and the corruption of the bureaucracy
tended to reinforce a tendency that was already present for
weightly economic reasons"; "Problems and Patterns of
Russian Economic Development," in Cyril E. Black, The_
Transformation of Russian Society (Cambridge, Mass., 1960),
p. 50; and in another similar passage, he describes the
behavior of the commercial manager during this period as
follows, "his relations with the government bureaucracy
called for special, often very devious, actions"; p. 51.
Alf Edeen discusses the continuity of certain bureau-
cratic behavior into the twentieth century: "All of the
evils and 'beauty patches' inherent in the old chinovnik
rule still exist, as is daily demonstrated in the Soviet
press: abuse of power, bullying, red tape, paper drill,
negligence, incompetence, and corruptibility. That these
traditions have lived on so obstinately is not especially
remarkable, considering the initial situation facing the
Bolsheviks: the extremely low level of education among the
population; the lack of qualified personnel; and the neces-
sity of accepting in administrative work 'alien' social
groups from the old regime, whose representatives became--
consciously or unconsciously--a connecting link in the
seemingly broken chain of continuity and who left their
mark on the present Soviet civil-service crops"; "The Civil
Service: Its Composition and Status," in Black, Transfor-
mation of Russian Society, p. 290.

35Merle Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The
Russian and Soviet Case," in Joseph LaPalombara, Bureaucracy
and Political Development (Princeton, 1963), pp. 242-43.

36Ibid., pp. 247-48. As LaPalombara notes, Fainsod
argues the interesting hypothesis from the Russian example
that "a bureaucracy can instill and implement economic
nmdernity without itself absorbing any of the changes it
seeks to disseminate;" Ibid., p. 12.

37In Alf Edeen's study of the civil service, he
Pmesents the following interesting figures concerning

growth, which, he says, give an indication of the general
trend:

 

 

37

Growth of Bureaucracy

 

 

 

 

 

Social Groups Percentage of Population
1897 1926 1956
The entire intelligentsia 0.7 2.7 15.5
Intelligentsia exclusive of
education and public health 0.4 1.9 10.3
Edeen further notes: "The expansion of the bureaucracy

in connection with industrialization is, however, indirectly
apparent in official statistics concerning the development

of the intelligentsia during the period between 1926 and 1956.
Selected occupational groups, which are of special interest
in this connection, are presented in the following table

(in thousands).

 

 

1926 1956
Leaders in enterprise (industry, agri-
culture, building construction, etc. 365 2,240
Technical engineering personnel (incl.
foremen) 225 2,570
Agronomists, veterinarians, land-
surveyors 45 376
"Plan economists" and bookkeepers 650 2,161
Others 575 2,609

 

"It might be assumed that the category of 'others' in
this table includes functionaries in the state administra-
'tion.proper (probably functionaries in the party apparatus,
too), in the police system, and in the officer corps";

Edeen, in Black, Transformation of Russian Society, pp.
76-77.

38

 

Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, pp. 148 and 271.

 

39Ibid., p. 147.

38

401bid., ch. x111.

41Joseph Berliner, Factory_and Manager in the USSR
(Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p. 294.

42Gordon Tullock, The Politics of Bureaucracy (Wash-
ington, D. C., 1965), pp. 167-70.

43See especially, Fred Riggs, Administration in
Develpping Countries (Boston, 1964), on the effects of
1Tover-centra’lization" in public administration, pp. 280-85;
see also, Tullock, Politics of Bureaucracy, pp. 167-70, and
Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 164.

44Berliner has dealt at length with this phenomenon
in Factory_and Manager in the USSR.

45Ibid., p. 230. Blat is the widely-used Russian
term for i'payoff" or "graft."

46

 

Ibid., pp. 243—45.

47Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 164.

481t should be noted, however, that the elimination
of those motivated by self-interest to act as "watchdogs"
in society does not mean that there are no actors to perform
this function. The communist state calls upon those
motivated by devotion to the collective interest to provide
this service. It is not our intention here to attempt to
evaluate the comparative effectiveness of self-interest and
the altruism of the devoted party member as motivations for
preserving civic morality. It is important, however, to
note that substitutes are provided in the communist system
to perform the critical functions of missing factions. One
of these "substitutes" is samokritika, "self-criticism."
"All citizens are encouraged to participate in self-
criticism and in 'criticism from below.'" Karel Hulicka
and Irene M. Hulicka, Soviet Institutions, The Individual
.and Society (Boston, 1967): P. 253.

A recent attempt to evaluate the positive effect of
the "so-called self-criticism (samokritika) letters addressed
to the editors of the domestic Soviet press," concludes:
"Insofar as the critical letters serve as an integrating
(device for Soviet society by permitting the release of
[system-induced tensions and concomitant diminution of per-
syanal resentment, by increasing the sense of mass participa-
‘tiorland by simulataneously acting as an additional control
cn: the massive Soviet bureaucracy, they become one factor
among the myriad to be weighted in assessing the continued

 

. a . 1 a.. .a. 6“ a I -

 
 

39

effective functioning of the Soviet system." Alex Inkeles,
Social Change in Soviet Russia (Cambridge, Mass., 1968),
pp. 291, 324.

49

 

Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 164.

 

50While it is true that factions have no legal
existence in the Soviet Union, it would be misleading to
imply that factions do not exist, both within the party
and without. For example, Khrushchev attested to align-
ments within the highest party circles Opposing Stalin's
policies, in his "Secret Speech" to the Twentieth Congress
of the Communist Party and in his speech to the Twenty-
Second Congress (1961). Attempts in the West to identify
political groupings that influence policy making in the
Soviet Union have produced growing amounts of evidence that
such groups do exist, based upon socioeconomic interests,
personality or power conflicts, professions, national and
regional interests, and so on. Among such studies, might
be mentioned, Barrington Moore, Terror and Progress
(Cambridge, Mass., 1954); Frederick C. Barghoorn, Politics
in the USSR (Boston, 1966), esp. ch. VII; Robert Conquest,
Power andPoligy in the USSR (New York, 1961); Roger
Pethyfidge, A Key to Soviet Politics (New York, 1962);
Sidney Ploss, Conflict and Decision-Making in§oviet Russia
(Princeton, 1965), and the article, "Interest Groups," 1
Allen Kassof, Prospects for Soviet Society (New York, 1968);
and Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist
Party (Princeton, 1967T7’to name only a few.

51

 

 

 

See above, the Berliner example, pp. 24-25.

52However, see above, n. 48.

53A real question does exist concerning the relative
effectiveness of amateurs attempting to substitute for
professionals. The lack of training, experience, authority,
and sense of responsibility which may easily characterize
ordinary citizen-volunteers strongly mitigates against their
effectiveness as replacements for staff personnel in many
situations.

54Berliner, Factory and Manager, p. 323.

 

55Nikita Khrushchev, "Doklad: Razvitie ekonomiki
SSSR i partiinoe rukovodstvo narodnym khozyaistvom" (Report:
Development of the USSR Economy and Party Leadership of
theeNational Economy), Plenum Tsentralnovo komiteta
kommunisticheskoi partii sovetskovo soyuza, 19-23 noyabrya
_l262 goda; stenograficheski otchet (Plenum of the Central

40

Committee of the CPSU, 19-23 November 1962; Stenographic
Record; Moscow, 1963), p. 90.

56V. I. Lenin, Osnovy marksizma-leninizma. Uchebnoe

sobie (Foundations of Marxism-Leninism. School Text;
Moscow, 1959), p. 720.

57Paul Kecskemeti, The Unexpected Revolution: Social

Forces in the Hungarian Uprising (Stanford, Calif., 1961),
p. 96.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORY OF "SOCIALIST" CONTROL,

1917-1953

This chapter and the next will survey the important
transformations of control institutions in the Soviet Union
from the "first" October, 1917 to the October of 1964, when
Khrushchev was retired. During this span of nearly fifty
years, the control agencies inherited from the last tsar's
regime were subjected to repeated efforts aimed at perfecting
their operation, redefining old missions and implementing
new ones. On the basis of Downs' theory alone, constant
restructuring could have been predicted, since efforts to
perfect existing control structures must continue as long
as there exist waste, inefficiency and the host of bureau-
cratic ills that inevitably attend "big government" of what-
ever kind. But if reorganization was predictable, the form
Ci the new structures was not, and it is a basic assumption
of this study that the particular institutional forms which
evolved were largely shaped by two sets of factors: ideo-
logical concerns and practical power considerations; or more
SFMKfifically, the differing concepts of Soviet leaders and

adnfimdstrators concerning the proper role of control agencies

41

42

in Soviet society, and the involvement of the reorganiza-
tion process itself in political power struggles.

As the following sections will attempt to show, the
sharply contrasting points of View held by Lenin and Stalin
directly affected the changing organization and activities
of Goskontrol. Lenin's broad concepts of a preventive kind
of administrative control, which would include the constant
and radical redesign of government machinery and would
enlist the common worker in the business of governing the
communist state, had endless implications for the reorgan-
ization of control agencies, particularly in widening the
field of their operations, compounding their missions, and
multiplying their ranks.1 On the other hand, Stalin's
narrow version of control activities (apparently shared by
many officials carried over from the old tsarist control
staff), tended to restrict the business of control to the
simple auditing of government accounts by official per-
sonnel.2

Even when guidelines of proposed reorganization seemed
to have been clearly laid out and agreed to, however, the
reorganization of control agencies often became so entangled
iIlpolitical struggles between government leaders or adminis-
trative factions that the emergent institutions were clearly
rust.the simple product of attempts to implementsome theories
atxnn:control, but were indelibly marked and "deformed“ by

the pressures of political struggle. One illustration of

43

this point is the curious evolution of the party control
commissions, originally conceived of by the Workers' Opposi-
tion and the Democratic Centralists as a means of protecting
the rank-and-file party members from being overwhelmed by
the bureaucratic elements of the party. Despite this con-
cept of their role, the committees, as will be shown below,
evolved into instruments of party bureaucratization and
early building blocks of Stalin's power position.3

This chapter's brief account of the early Soviet
experiments with state and people's control will be broken
into the following periods: 1917-1923 (Beginnings of
People's Control); 1923-1934 (Unified People's Control);
and 1934-1953 (People's Control Suspended), the subtitles
indicating the serpentine progress of efforts to involve
ordinary citizens in control work. While the party and the
state control networks were combined during the second
period, each had its own earlier history; therefore, in the
first period, the origins and evolution of workers' and
peasants' inspectorates and of party control commissions
will be separately traced, along with the transformation
of the state control machinery. The Office of State Control,
wTfleh had operated under tsarist regimes and the Provisional
Government, continued its "business as usual" in the early
Years of Bolshevik rule, providing continuity in control and
serving as the basis for the successive reorganizations,

reorientation, and institutional innovation.

44

Beginnings of People's Control,
1917-1923

 

 

In the first year after the Bolshevik leaders assumed
power, control reorganization clearly exhibited the effects
of their somewhat general notions about how to democratize
the autocratic state machinery. This preliminary vagueness,
however, was dispelled during the period of War Communism
by more concrete and radical experimentation. One Soviet
source dates the beginning of the socialist transformation
of control and the creation of a "people's" control apparatus
with a decree signed by Lenin on January 31, 1918. This
decree called for the formation of a Central Control Board,
local accounting and control boards and control commissions,
to "eradicate bureaucratic red-tape and create more vital
and rational forms of control," and to include wide par-
ticipation by the workers.4 In March 1918, a Provisional
Statute on State Control was issued,5 and in May the Office
Of State Control was renamed the People's Commissariat of

State Control (Narodny kommissariat gosudarstvennovo

 

kpptrolya or NK GK).6 However, a Draft Statute on State
Control, drawn up in August by the commissariat itself and
intended to outline its revised duties, revealed that the
comuissariat's staff at this time had no clear idea of how
"SOCialist control" was to be implemented.7

Despite the continuing Civil War and consequent general

disl<>cation, Soviet leaders were imbued with a crusading zeal

45

ro reform old institutions. The following March (1919),
therefore, the Eighth Congress of the RKP(b) took official
note of the continuing need for a radical reorganization of
the business of control in the Soviet Republic "in order

to create real, factual control of a socialist character."8
These party instructions were to have a more concrete impact
than the earlier pronouncements. Stalin, the newly designated
People's Commissar of Goskontrol (NK GK), drew up a set of
proposals for the reorganization of the Commissariat. The
ensuing decree of April 9, 1919, prOposed the transformation
of the NK GK from a "formal" organ "into an organ of Peo-
ple's Socialist Control, amassing experience of socialist
building and continuously perfecting the whole mechanism

9 The decree also called for the

of the Soviet government."
widest possible participation in the transformed control
agency of workers and peasants, both at its center and in
the localities, with the unification of all control elements
in one body.

A period of fruitful, innovative attempts to institu-
tionalize "socialist control" followed. One example, almost
coinciding with the April decree, though not formally
announced until May 4, was the creation of a radically new
inStitution, which is of particular relevance to this study,

10 This

the Central Bureau of Complaints and Declarations.
agency's work was, as a matter of fact, described in an

early report of the NK GK, as a kind of "people's control."

 

“

46

The bureau was intended to be "near to and accessible to

the broad masses of the population," and was to make use

of the widest publicity concerning its activities. -Its
paramount concern was to be "illegal activities and abuses
by officials."11 Local State Control organs were instructed
to form their own local bureaus of complaints, while set-
ting up similar bureaus in all other commissariats, executive
committees of soviets, and other local soviet organs. Pub-
lic response to these new bureaus was so immediate and over-
whelming that in barely five months of existence, that is,
by October 1, 1919, more than 20,000 complaints and declara-
tions had been received by the Central Bureau and its

branches.12

In fact, the very volume of the complaints
quickly outran the ability of the bureaus to process them,
so that the effectiveness of the bureaus seemed fated to
diminish over time. Nevertheless, this new institution
represented an important early effort to give the ordinary
citizen some formal means of self-protection against the
abuses of bureaucrats.

Two other major results of the April decree were the
resolution of the Politburo on January 31, 1920, and the
Statute of February, 1920. The Politburo resolution pro-
POSed the creation within Goskontrol of an entirely new
administrative component made up of committees of workers

and peasants, a "workers' and peasants' inspectorate."

This idea was revised somewhat by the statute which followed.

47

The latter, calling for the transformation of the existing
Commissariat of State Control itself into a Commissariat of
WOrkers' and Peasants' Inspection (NK RKI or Rabkrin),
studiously outlined a number of new methods for drawing
ordinary workers and peasants into the commissariat and
opened membership in Rabkrin to all workers having voting
rights under the Constitution of the RSFSR.13 The new
inspectorate was explicitly advised to unify all control
units then in existence, including those workers' control
groups dating from an early, November 1917 decree.l4 In
addition, new workers' groups were to be invited in as
Delegated Members, members of Assistance Groups, and par-
ticipants in Mass Investigations. Delegated Members were
workers and peasants chosen to leave their regular work for
extended periods and assigned to work directly in the con-
trol apparatus; some of these were expected to become per-
manent staff members of the commissariat, thus filling its
ranks with "fresh faces" from the people. Assistance Cells,
however, were created and Operated in the workers' and
Peasants' places of work and consequently did not require
their members' lengthy withdrawal from regular work. For
this reason, as well as a variety of others, the Assistance
C€113 proved more popular and successful than the device of
"Delegated Membership" in drawing the public into control

aCtivities.15

48

The clear ideological intent of this early reorganiza-
tion was to create, in the form of the new commissariat, a
school where workers and peasants could learn to administer
the state. As Lenin phrased this concept in a letter of
January 24, 1920, the aim was "to pass the whgle_of the

toiling masses, both men and (particularly) women, through
16

 

participation in workers' and peasants' inspection.
It is only in retrospect, perhaps, that the expanded
powers which accrued to Rabkrin's Commissar, Stalin, as a
result of this reorganization, stand out in sharp relief.
In addition to the old duties, the expanded operations of
the new Rabkrin now specifically included the implementa-
tion of control over "all the organs of state administra-
tion, the economy, and social organizations," supervision
Of the Operations of the Bureau of Complaints, and the
examination of the government's entire administrative
machinery for suggested reform--a considerable sphere of
influence.17
While Rabkrin was being "democratized" with the addi-
tion of worker and peasant participants, party control was
also being critically scrutinized by Soviet leaders, who
hoped to reform and democratize its Operation. Efforts
were underway in 1920 to create a party inspectorate, which,
like Rabkrin, would include elements of popular participa-

tiorn In September 1920, a Central Control Commission

(TSKK) of the party was established. Isaac Deutscher,

49

discussing the early development of the TsKK, found similar-
ities between the two major inspectorates. He likens the
role of the TsKK "vis-a-vis the party--to that of the Com-
missariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate vis-a-
vis the governmental machine: it audited party morals."
The method involved criticism from below. Open meetings,
held by the local control commissions, provided forums where
the individual citizen--party member or non-party--could
openly criticize the conduct of party members. The quixotic
aim of these early "purges," says Deutscher, "was to enable
the people to crack periodically a whip over their rulers,"
to draw the party closer to the people, and to "remove
corrupted members, without removing the party, from power,"
thus serving as a kind of "substitute for real e1ections.'18
But, while Rabkrin showed a healthy growth of par-
ticipation by workers and peasants in 1920 and 1921 (i.e.,
8,692 Assistance Cells were reported for July 1, 1921, with
65,000 memberslg), all efforts taken in the early 1920's to
reorganize and improve the party control apparatus and to
increase participation of rank-and-file party members ended
only by moving the party control apparatus toward less
democracy and greater bureaucratization. Although the
iUtentof establishing both central and local control com-
missions had been to provide a sounding board for complaints

against party "bureaucrats," the commissions soon became

50

transformed into instruments acting to silence complaints
from below and to enforce party unity from above.20
This was done, first of all, by undermining the inde-
pendence and authority of the local control commissions.
Local boards, locally elected, had been intended to be
independent of the central apparatus so that as representa-
tives of the general membership they would scrutinize
central party operations with impunity. But local control
boards could not effectively oppose their own party secre-
taries, who were not locally elected, but were appointed
by the central party apparatus, dedicated to its preserva-
tion, and powerful enough themselves to stifle any locally-
inspired criticism. After the Tenth Congress of the party,
in 1921, even the pretense that lower control organs should
criticize the higher party apparatus was dispelled when the
congress pointedly charged party control commissions to
direct their efforts toward "strengthening party unity."21
In March 1922, the Eleventh Party Congress moved to
bring the local control organs directly under the super-

vision of the TsKK.22

The significance of these instruc-
tions was that they opened the way to placing the entire
Party control mechanism under the easy domination of the
Secretary General of the party. Even before Stalin assumed
the latter post on April 3, 1922, it was clear, by the ease

With which Stalin's candidates were "elected" to the TsKK

at the Eleventh Congress, that he had already begun to

51

secure personal leadership of the party control machinery.23

Also of significance was the fact that his close associate,
Valerian Vladimirovich Kuibyshev, had remained chairman of
the TsKK since its formation.

By 1922, therefore, the efforts of the previous two
years to create a democratic party control agency had failed.
As for Rabkrin, where experiments with the involvement of
the public had been proceeding with success, the year 1922
brought a decline in the numbers of workers and peasants
participating not only in Assistance Cells and in Mass
Investigations, but especially as Delegated Members. In
part this appeared to result from the introduction of the
New Economic Policy and also from a general staff reduction
carried out across the board for all state administrative
agencies in August 1922, which set the staff limits for
Rabkrin at 12,000 (down from 34,000 in mid-1921), plus
2,000 Delegated Members, to be paid by their employers.

By December 1922, 73.3% of Rabkrin's central apparatus was
still staffed by employees with service dating back to the
NK.GK or the prerevolutionary control apparatus, that is,
to 1919 or earlier. Of this central staff, 87.5% of the
members had "employee" backgrounds; only 12.5% claimed to

be workers or peasants.24

52

Unified People's Control,
1923-1934

 

Lenin's writings, during the last active months of
his life, reveal his preoccupation with control. Not only
was he concerned with the necessity Of finding an efficient
cutting instrument to prune away ever-present pockets of
disease and corruption attacking party and government, but
he was acutely mindful of the accumulation of administrative
power, noted above, which Stalin was quietly effecting. In
two articles, "How We Should Reorganize Rabkrin," and
"Better Less, But Better" (the first published in Pravda,
January 5, 1923, and the second, March 4, 1923), Lenin
Offered his solutions for the reorganization of the central
party and state control organs. These proposals were to
be considered at the forthcoming Twelfth Congress.

In his articles Lenin, while repeating his own sharp
criticisms of Rabkrin's operation, defended Rabkrin from
some of its attackers, including Trotsky, who branded it
a "powerful factor of muddle and wantonness" and wished to

disband it.25

Lenin felt that Rabkrin needed to be revised
in such a way as to become a model organization, an instru-
ment for building socialism. His solution was to unite
state and party control in one organization--that is, to
merge the apparatus of Rabkrin and the TsKK at the top--and
to enlarge the TsKK by the addition of a great number of

outstanding workers and peasants. The resulting benefits,

he anticipated, would be twofold: On the one hand, Rabkrin

 

53

would gain in prestige and authority by union with the
party; while the introduction of new representatives of the
people into the party organ would draw this party body
closer to the people. In his opinion, this would achieve
a.more effective "control from below," which would serve
to withstand the growing tendencies in the party toward
bureaucratization, and, coincidentally, to weaken the con-
centration of power in Stalin's party secretariat. An
added advantage would be the education of more and more
workers and peasants in the tasks of socialist building.
When the Twelfth Congress assembled in April 1923,
Lenin was not present to influence personally the implemen-
tation of his ideas, for his third, most crippling stroke
luad occurred in March. The Congress acted, however, accord-
irn; to his suggestions, to unite the state and party control
oI‘gans and to enlarge the TsKK, from 7 to 50 members. While
‘DTI the surface this action appeared to accede to Lenin's
w'ishes, it had less apparent but important implications for
Stalin's power position. The enlargement of both the TsKK
Eirhi the Central Committee, Leonard Schapiro notes, was
"Shaiinly to the benefit of officials in the party network
‘911<> owed their careers to the Secretariat which Stalin con-
t:3‘1‘Qlled," and thus "considerably strengthened his sup-
E><>Itters."26 Moreover, the presidium of nine members of
tzllee enlarged TsKK was empowered to sit with the newly-

er11arged Central Committee, and at least four strong

an.

a.-

 

 

54

Stalinist supporters have been identified among these pre-
sidium members: Kuibyshev, Yaroslavsky, Stoltz, and

Shkiryatov.27

Three presidium members were admitted to
Politburo sessions. And Kuibyshev, who, it has been noted,
had headed the TsKK since its creation, as Stalin's trusted
lieutenant, now assumed the dual leadership of the new
TsKK-RKI . 28

Acting upon the instructions of the Twelfth Party
Congress, the Presidium of the TsKK and the Council of Minis-
ters Of the USSR legally ratified the reorganization of the
new TsKK-RKI, in two decrees on September 6, 1923, and in
the statute of November 12, 1923, "On the NK RKI USSR."29
These measures also expanded the duties and sphere of
authority of Rabkrin. Not only were all state and public
organizations to be examined, as in the past, for inefficient
cm maliciously negligent operation, but new forms of better
operation, of better accounting were to be worked out, and
a wide-ranging study of better methods was to be made of
such matters as labor productivity, the scientific organiza-
tion of labor and management, and the root causes Of bribery
and other illegal practices in state enterprises. And for
the first time, state controllers were empowered to receive
from enterprises examined, full information and all docu-
ments, records, and accounts pertinent to their investiga-

tions. If administrative heads failed to carry out reforms

Suggested by the inspectorate, they were to be summoned

55

before boards of the inspectorate or even before plenary
sessions of the TsKK.

The powers of the Central Control Commission were
also expanded, for it was now made responsible for guiding
the NK RKI (Rabkrin). As already noted, its chairman became
the PeOple's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspec-
torate; members of its presidium largely made up the staff
of the boards of Rabkrin; and members of the TsKK were given
chief responsibilities on the new administrations, sections,
and inspectorates of Rabkrin. From these posts of authority,
the TsKK was commissioned to "secure the execution of the
party line in the activity of soviet organs, to struggle
against bureaucratic corruption, and to draw the masses
into the work of the state apparat."3O

When Khrushchev proposed the establishment of a new
party-state (and public) control committee at the November
Plenum of the party in 1962, he suggested that it should
return to the Leninist principles incorporated in this
earlier body: the TsKK-RKI, created by the Twelfth Party
Congress in 1923. Among the "Leninist principles" he
Stressed were unity of overall control and the enlistment
of wide public participation in this Leninist prototype.
Certain real parallels do exist between these two organiza-
tions, despite the span of some forty years between their
birth dates. It is essential, therefore, that we consider

in detail the structure and operation of the antecedent

56

organization. Particular attention will be focussed on
those characteristics of the TsKK-RKI which the later
institution appears to have borrowed, and upon the various
experiments in drawing the public into control work that
were initiated or encouraged during the organizational life-
time of TsKK-RKI.

Perhaps of first interest is the extent Of the merger
between TsKK and RKI and the care with which the party
secured, in addition to its guiding role, the clear independ-
ence of the party control mechanism. While for the most part
separate executive apparatuses for the TsKK and RKI were
maintained at the center,31 it is clear that the overlapping
membership in key executive bodies of leading officials,
illustrated by Kuibyshev's dual leadership, accomplished
an informal but effective merger in much the same way as
the party and state interrelationship have accomplished it
in other leading bodies, such as the Politburo. Yet, within
the joint framework of the TsKK-RKI, a careful, tri-partite
subdivision of the party's TsKK was formed, each of the
three party control groups having separate assignments.
flfim mission of the first group was to carry out orders of
the party Central Committee; the second was intended to
work exclusively with Rabkrin; and the third group comprised
the party boards that dealt with infractions of the party
Rules.32 The separation of the last group from the other

two was specifically designed to ensure the continued

57

independence of the work of party boards from other types
of control work and controllers. At local levels, too,
party control was performed by a separate section Of the
local party commission, whose members were selected by the
party plenum specifically for this work. When the Party-
State Control Committee was formed, in 1962, the same
separation of party control duties from the main body of
control work was scrupulously maintainedthrough the con-
tinued existence of a party Control Commission, as a small
but discrete organization with sole responsibility for
infractions of party rules. Thus, the party has constantly
{flaced itself "Off limits" for the people's inspectors.
Formal procedures for such matters as staffing the
TsKK-RKI at all levels preserved a further degree of separa-
tion. All staff of the party control commissions, central
and local, were selected and assigned by the party. Rabkrin
assignments, on the other hand, were supposed to be made,
at least formally, by the respective executive committee

0f the soviet at each level, subject to confirmation by

higher Rabkrin authorities.33

Measures taken at the Thirteenth Congress, in May
1924, and subsequently on the basis of its instructions,
served to enlarge the scope Of activity of TsKK-RKI, to
hmmease its contact and experimentation with many types
Ci Public control bodies, and to enhance the role of the

{arty in control work. In the latter connection, however,

58

while the threefold increase in the size of the TsKK (from
50 to 151), at the Thirteenth Congress, may have indicated
a larger role for this body in control work, its much
greater significance was the added support it provided
Stalin in his maneuvers to buttress the power position of
his party Secretariat.34 Nevertheless, there is evidence
that the influence of the party in the work of the joint
TsKK-RKI agencies was growing. In fact, a circular letter
of the TsKK, in mid-October 1924, cautions control com-
missions against going too far in domineering over and
stifling the initiative of Rabkrin, and reminds the party
commissions that their role should be limited to general
guidance only.35 Such guidance was nevertheless acknow-
ledged to include the definition of the most important
Objects Of control.36
The efforts to widen citizen participation in control
very soon involved the TsKK-RKI with other existing public
organizations, namely, the trade unions,'the soviets and
the Komsomols. Out of these eXperiments with various types
of control groups came many of the antecedents and proto-
tYpes for today's public inspection groups. For example,
one of the new types of contact with public control bodies
which the Thirteenth Party Congress specifically instructed
the TsKK-RKI to pursue was interaction with factory com-
mittees.37 The method worked out by the central control

organs and the VTsSPS (the All-Union Central Council of

59

Trade Unions) enlisted the part-time efforts of control
commissions of the factory committees to carry out assign-
ments for Rabkrin.38 Use of publicity in this connection
helped to establish another precedent. Rabkrin members

were increasingly urged to publicize their work by reporting
directly to meetings of workers, in factories and elsewhere,
and by publishing accounts of their control activities.
Thus, Moscow's inspectorate published more than 170 articles

and notes in the periodical press in 1925.39

And for two
years, beginning on March 15, 1928, Pravda on an average
Of every sixth day published an "R.K.I. Sheet," called, like
the present People's Control Sheet, "Under Control of the
Masses." While such efforts to inform the public about
control work and its results were small in comparison with
the large-scale publicity campaigns lanched in the 1960's,
the early pioneering efforts clearly established patterns
and precedents that were to be useful later.

The soviets especially during this period developed
a variety of new opportunities for public participation in
control, based in part upon a general expansion of the
Powers of soviets at lower levels. The TsKK-RKI, attempting
to carry out its mission of perfecting the structure and
oPeration of the state administration and the so-called

40 shifted some

“liquidation of bureaucratic arrangements,"
State functions to the lower soviets. Legislation through

the 1920's, some of it initiated by the TsKK-RKI, also

60

encouraged the local soviets themselves to become gradually
more and more involved in control work and to include more
citizens in performing state administrative tasks at this
level. An example of such legislation was the 1924 "Statute
on g§§§_Congresses Of Soviets and 923g Executive Committees,
on Volost Congresses of Soviets and Volost Executive Com-
mittees, and on Rural Soviets," which gave to the Head and
volost congresses of soviets the right to receive reports

on the work of organs and organizations not directly sub-
ordinate to their executive committees, but located within

the area of the volost or uezd, and gave the uezd ispolkom

 

(soviet executive committee) the right to supervise the
legality and expedience Of the work of all organs and
establishments within the territory of the 235d, with the
exception Of Red Army units and the Procuracy.41 This

statute urged ispolkomy to meet more widely with representa-

 

tives of trade unions from factories and workships in their
area and to draw the latter into such control work.

The most important organizational form of volunteer
aid to the soviets, the sections, or "standing commissions,"
of soviets, appeared at this time and began to play a special
role in control. As early as 1922, standing commissions of
apperniya, uezd, minor city and village soviets had been
given the statutory right to supervise the correct operation

42

of other sections of the ispolkom. In 1925, the standing

 

Commissions of city soviets received the same rights of

61

control over the work of the various sections of the city

ispolkom, reporting their findings to the plenum or presidium

of the respective soviet.43

At first these standing com-
missions were composed only of members of the soviets, plus
an aktiy chosen from a restricted list Of representatives
Of FZMK (fabrichno-zavodski i mestny komitety [profsoyuzov]:
the trade union factory committees), and factory managers
and directors of the trade unions. However, in 1927 this
list was considerably lengthened by statute44 to include
a broader public--not only managers and leading personnel
of factories, but also representatives of factory, shop and
local committees, members of trade unions, Of party and
Komsomol organizations, workers of other public, cooperative,
economic organizations, and Of rural peasant associations,
and even selected women delegates.

In addition to standing commissions the RKI developed

its own sections attached to some rural and city soviets,

and to the ispolkomy of raion and volost soviets.45 These

 

RKI sections claimed a wide participation of the public in
their investigations of state establishments, enterprises,
cooperative organizations, sovkhozy and kolkhozy, to expose
and help eliminate shortcomings in the work, to check for
the prompt and correct fulfilling of party directives,
Sovermment decrees and the decisions of local state organs,
and finally to receive and investigate complaints from the

general public. Notices concerning violations (or "signals,"

62

as they are still called) were referred by the RKI sections
to the higher organs of TsKK-RKI for appropriate action or
advice. The nature of these control tasks appropriately
concerned the public. Local RKI sections investigated such
matters as the progress of housing construction, local
sanitary conditions, and the operation of stores, dining
rooms, hospitals, and nurseries, frequently claiming success
in devising ingenious solutions to many problems affecting
the living and working conditions of the city's inhabitants.46
Sections of RKI attached to rural soviets appropriately
made checks of the accounting of sown acreages, of the
business and accounting apparatus of the rural soviets
themselves, and sought to prevent losses in the harvest,
pilfering, and similar violations Of socialist legality on
the rural scene.

A third public organization which was called upon
during this period to help with public control was the Kom-
somols. With its support, TsKK-RKI was able to mobilize
youth groups for control activities in factories and other
enterprises and for "mass" control activities. These groups
were known as the "Light Cavalry," and were the predecessors
cm the present-day Komsomol units of "Prozhektor" (Search-
light). By 1930, 250,000 young people were said to be
ixwolved in the "Light Cavalry."

The chief form of public recruitment which Rabkrin

orSanizers developed and encouraged was at the enterprise

63

level, where RKI actively urged the formation of "Groups
(or Cells) of Assistance to the RKI," to participate in
checking on the work of economic enterprises. A recent
Soviet source claims that these Groups of Assistance had
become practiCally universal after a decree of the Presidium
of the TsKK on August 3, 1931.47

Finally, an attempt was made during this period to
improve the effective operation Of the Bureau of Complaints.
Local complaint boards were generally attached to the
respective RKI body, while Komsomols and trade unions aided
the RKI in setting up Bureaus of Complaints in factories
and other enterprises. In 1928, the bureaus began organiz-
ing lists Of volunteers to follow up complaints, and growing
thousands of volunteers joined this effort. Since, as
already noted, the Bureau's success in attracting complaints
had very soon outstripped its ability to investigate them,
the enlistment of volunteers to help in the investigation
pmocess was a promising effort to remedy what was perhaps
the Bureau's greatest weakness.

This brief description Of the TsKK-RKI from its begin-
ning in 1923 into the 1930's indicates that Soviet reformers
were successful during this period in stimulating, both by
organization and practice, a rising crescendo of public
Participation along the general lines proposed by Lenin.48

In fact in certain respects the picture of TsKK-RKI which

emerged through these years closely corresponded to the

64

Leninist model of socialist control: The TsKK-RKI was a
unified organization of control, with a wide variety of
tasks and with the responsibility of coordinating a multi-
plicity of agencies. In 1934, this picture was abruptly

altered, and the trend reversed.49

People's Control Suspended,
1934-1953

 

 

Stalin presaged the changes to come in a speech to
the Seventeenth Party Congress, in January 1934, in which
he expressed his own limited concept of the proper function
and scope of control. He said, "A well performing checking

of fulfillment is that searchlight (prozhektor) which helps

 

to throw light on the condition of the work of the apparat
at any time and brings into God's light the bureaucrats and
clerks." And he further Observed that what was needed at
that moment of the Soviet Union's development was "not

supervision, but [simply] checking of the fulfillment of

 

the center's decisions."50 He might have clarified this

 

statement by further defining control agencies as mere
executive agents Of central authority. But while the
implications of his view of control were not spelled out
at the time, they soon began to surface in many ways.

The first evidence of the restrictions Stalin intended
to place upon control operations and membership came with a
radical reorganization of TsKK-RKI. The joint party-state

organ was split into two: a Commission of Party Control

65

and a Commission of Soviet Control, both with restricted
assignments. The statute on the new Commission of Soviet
Control described its duties as concerned "only with check-
ing the factual fulfillment of the most important government
decisions." NO longer was it to concern itself, for example,
with perfecting the state apparatus.51 The tasks of the
Party Control Commission were similarly limited to "strength-
ening control over the fulfillment of decisions of the party
and Central Committee, the enforcement of party discipline,
and punishment of violations of party ethics."52

Ties between the two commissions still existed, but
they were ties designed to ensure the leading role of the
party in control activities. The work of the Soviet Control
Commission was to be accomplished in close contact with the
Commission of Party Control. Members of the Soviet Control
Commission were to be nominated by the Party Congress, and
subsequently confirmed by the Central Executive Committee
and Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

Just as Stalin's definition of control resulted in
limiting the Soviet Control Commission's Operations and
area of competency, so too it limited public participation
in control. All public participation was not immediately
halted, however, for the statute continued to call for
Sections of the soviets, of trade unions, sections of

engineers and technicians, Komsomols, kolkhoz activists

and the press to take part in the work of the new commissions

66

of state control. However, after 1934, with the reorganiza-
tion of the local organs of the TsKK-RKI, both the Groups
of Assistance to the RKI committees and the sections of RKI
attached to local soviets were abandoned. Subsequently,
new restrictions were applied by the Statute Of 1939 on the
Commission of State Control, specifying clearly that worker
participation in control should be limited to those workers
Of soviets and economic organizations checking the fulfill-
ment of government directives.53 And a year later, in the
1940 statute creating the People's Commissariat of State
Control, the involvement of the public was pointedly
ignored.54
As it emerged from the 1930's, the Commission Of
Soviet Control was greatly reduced in size, complexity of
organization and mission, and in the scope of its operation.
Basically, its job was now only disciplinary: the simple
operational checking of the fulfillment of decisions of the
government. In March 1939, the Eighteenth Party Congress,
placing new emphasis upon the economic tasks of the state,
had called for a moderate enlargement Of the economic tasks
0f control, though not for a widening of its membership.
The new People's Commissariat of Goskontrol (NK GK) was
instructed to conduct control of the accounting and expendi-
ture Of funds and materiel in state, cooperative, and other
Public organizations, institutions and enterprises.55 Thus,

state control by 1940 had assumed the character of a vast

67

auditing organ, which inspected books, accounts and similar
bookkeeping records, and which reviewed orders, requisitions

and estimates.56

The separate Party Control Commission,
drawn even more closely than before into the apparatus Of
the Party's Central Committee, retained the task of keeping
"a check on the fulfillment of the directives of the Central

Committee. . . . "57

In this restricted capacity, NK GK and its successor
after March 1946, the Ministry of State Control (MGK),

Operated throughout the 1940's and early 1950's.58

During
the years of World War II, its tasks, of course, included
checking for sabotage and helping to fulfill the orders of
the State Committee on Defense. But in essence these tasks
did not widen its competency or membership. By 1948, the
instruction of L. 2. Mekhlis, then Minister Of State Control,
made clear the position which had been Officially reached
on public involvement in control: "All auditing and check-
ing," he said in his directive, "is to be conducted only by
the powers of the controller-personnel of the Ministry of
Goskontrol of the Soviet Union and the Union Republics. I

forbid . . . for whatever pretense, the involving of workers

0f other organizations in any kind of auditing and check-

ing. " 59

To summarize briefly, the history of state control
from 1917 until 1953 followed two courses of reorganization.

The first, a feverish and fruitful era of experiment,

68

reflected until 1934 Lenin's broad vision of control pos-
sibilities in providing safeguards for the little man
against bureaucracy, in perfecting state administration,
in educating a New Soviet Man, and in building a new com-
munist society. Stalin, on the other hand, made clear by
his early actions in building the bureaucratic power of
the party and his own secretariat, that control was, in
his mind, properly a function by and for the bureaucracy,
not the people. During Stalin's regime, control reorganiza-
tion was a gradual retreat from Lenin's vision, until all
the control mechanisms in the Soviet state became simple
instruments to enforce the will of the dictator. Once the
Ministry of State Control had reached this point, there
was little need for further radical reorganization, only
the self-perpetuating need to create new control agencies
to check the old. The Stalinist state system came to
operate within rigid lines. Only in the post-Stalinist
era were these shattered. And in the fluid situation that
followed, new or forgotten formative influences and ideas

once more surfaced.

CHAPTER I I --NOTES

lLenin developed his ideas on control most completely
in two articles, written a few months before his last fate-
ful stroke. In "Kak nam reorganizovat Rabkrin" (How We
Should Reorganize Rabkrin), and "Luchshe menshe, da luchshe"
(Better Fewer, But Better), he provided the Twelfth Party
Congress with a full outline of his proposals for the
transformation of Rabkrin into a unified organization of
party-state and peOple's control. Both articles appeared
in Pravda (the first on January 25, 1923, the second on
March 4, 1923), and in Lenin's collected works, Sochineniya
(4th ed., Moscow, 1941-1962), XXXIII, pp. 440-44, 445-60.
They also appear in the volume of selected writings from
Lenin on control, collected by L. F. Nikolskaya and E. F.
Polkovnikova, O partiinom,pgosudarstvennom i obshchestvennom
kontrole (On Party, State, and Social Control, Moscow, 1963),
pp. 238-58. A "capsule statement" of Lenin's ideas on
control and management by the workers, which sees national
accounting and control in the hands of the people as the
doorway to the "higher phase" of communism and the withering
Of the state, is found in State and Revolution, written and
first published in August 1917 (New York, 1932, pp. 83-85).

2Stalin's views on control only became apparent some
years after his assumption of the country's leadership, and
even then more through the shape of the control apparatus
than through his own writing or speeches. However, see his
definition of control (n 53 below). With this hindsight,
it seems ironic that Lenin's proposals to democratize the
Operation and widen the bases of participation in the state
inspectorate of Rabkrin were entrusted to Stalin, who was
appointed to head this new commissariat from March 1919
until April 1923. It seems also somewhat surprising that
the commissariat did make some progress at this time toward
implementing some of Lenin's ideas.

As for the inclinations Of the early commissariat
personnel, Philip Scott Spoerry has concluded: "What
became officially known, in May 1918, as the People's Com-
missariat of State Control continued for the most part the
same sort of auditing and verification of financial accounts
Of other governmental organs that it had performed under
both Tsarist and Provisional Government regimes. Not only
did it continue to perform such functions, but because of
the post-audit nature of most of its work, a large share
Of its activity for a very long period was focussed on the

 

 

 

 

69

. s‘nlu.

I\— .-

.‘HT

 

70

accounts of pre-revolutionary governmental institutions."
And he adds, "The year 1919 . . . does not appear to have
been a 'turning-point' in State Control. The vast majority
of employees were still of a pre-October type, the vast

bulk of work performed was still of a financial-accounting
nature. There does seem to have been slightly more emphasis
placed on the idea of 'rationalizing' the state apparatus,
in decrees and statements, but little in practice was either
attempted or accomplished"; Philip Scott Spoerry, "The
Central Rabkrin Apparatus: 1917-1925," Ph. D. Dissertation
(Harvard, 1968), pp. 209-10.

Merle Fainsod comments on this turn Of events,
describing it as "a curiOus paradox," How Russia is Ruled
(Cambridge, 1963), p. 183.

4"Pyatdesyat let organov kontrolya" (Fifty Years of
Control Organs), Partiinaya zhizn (Party Life), NO. 3
(February, 1968), p. 22; the decree appears in Sobranie
uzakonenii i rasporyazhenii Rabochevo i Krestyanskovo
pravitelstva (Collection of Laws and Ordinances Of2the
Workers' and Peasants' Government; Moscow, 1918), NO. 18,
Item 264 (cited hereafter as Sobrgnie uzak. 1918); Dekrety
Sovetskoi vlasti (Decrees of the Soviet Authofity; Moscow,
1957), I (October 25, l9l7--March 16, 1918), PP. 267-68.

 

 

5According to Spoerry, "Rabkrin," p. 217, No. 10,
the Provisional Statute was only published in Izvestia
Gosudarstvennovo kontrolya (News Of State Contr61), 1918,
NO. 1-2, pp. 206.

 

6"Narodny komissariat Gosudarstvennovo kontrolya,
Prikaz No. 1, May 15, 1918" (People's Commissariat of State
Control, Order No. l), Izvestia VIsIK, May 18, 1919, p. 3.

 

7Izvestia VTsIK, August 18, 1918, and Byulleten 1918
(Bulletin , Supplement to No. 5, August 20, 1918.

 

8Vsesoyuznaya kommunisticheskaya partiya (b) v
rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh sezdov, konferenstii i plenumov
TsK (1898-1924) (The All-Union Communist Party [Bolshevik]
IH_Resolutions and Decisions Of the Congresses, Conferences
and Plenums of the Central Committee), I (6th ed.: Moscow,
1941), p. 306 (hereafter cited as: VKP(b) v rezolyusiyakh);
Bolshaya sovetskaya entgiqupedi a (Great Soviet Encyclopedia),
2nd ed., Vol. 12 (May 1952), p. 0.

Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporyazhenii Rabochevo i

Brest anskovo pravitelstva, 1919 (Moscow, 1919), No. 12,
Item I22; Izvestia VTsIK, April 12, 1919.

71

10Sobranie uzak., 1919, No. 23, art. 271; Izvestia

VTsIK, May 4, 1919. The decree establishing the Central
Bureau of Complaints and Declarations (published on May 4,
1919) is undated, but Spoerry cites evidence that the
Collegium of the Commissariat of State Control "approved
Stalin's suggestion to establish, attached to the Otdel

of Surprise Inspections, a Bureau of Complaints and Declara-
tions" on April 10, 1919; "Rabkrin," pp. 68, 224.

llSpoerry, "Rabkrin," p. 68.

12Kratki obzor deyatelnosti Narodnovo komissariata
Gosudarstvennovo kontrolya za pervye dva goda (oktyabr
1917 g--oktyabr 1919 g.) (A Short Survey of the Activity
OfSEhe People's Commissariat of State Control for the First
Two Years, October l9l7--October 1919; Moscow, 1919), p. 43.

l3Sobranie uzak., 1920, NO. 16, Item 94.

14On November 14 (27), 1917, the All-Russian Central
Executive Committee (VTsIK) approved the "Polozhenie o
rabochem kontrole" (Statute on Workers' Control), which
was published November 16 (29), 1917, in Izvestia TsIK,
NO. 227. Lenin's "Proekt polozheniya o rabochem kontrole"
(Draft Statute on Workers' Control), written October 26 or

27 (November 8 or 9) is presented in Lenin, O kontrole,
pp. 12-13.

15See Spoerry's meticulously documented evaluation,

"Rabkrin," pp. 100-09.

16Decree of February 7, 1920, Sobranie uzak., 1920,

NO. 16, Item 94.

17"I. v. Stalinu" (To J. V. Stalin), appears in Lenin:

0 kontrole, pp. 147-48, and in Lenin, Sochineniya (4th ed.),
Vol: 30, pp. 276-77.

18Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography
(New York and London, 1949), pp. 233-34. Paul Cocks, whose
doctoral dissertation meticulously examines the entire
history of the TsKK to the present, states that "the control
commission was conceived as an independent organ designed
to check the growth of bureaucracy in the Party. It was to
function primarily as a court of complaint and appeal to
vflfich a dissatisfied and wronged Party member could turn to
cnmein a fair redress and Party justice. It was also to
serve as a forum in which shortcomings and malpractices in
the Party could be exposed, impartially aired and corrected";

 

 

 

72

"Politics of Party Control: The Historical and Institutional
Role of Party Control Organs in the CPSU," Ph. D. Thesis
(Harvard University, 1968), pp. 11-12.

19Spoerry, "Rabkrin," pp. 106, 109.

20Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, 1963, pp. 183-84.

 

21VKP(b) v rezolyutsiyakh, I, p. 434, see also, Cocks,
"Politics of Party Control," pp. 21-25.

22VKP(b) v rezolyutsiyakh, I, p. 523.
23Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, 1963, p. 185; Leonard

Schapiro, The Communist Party Of the Soviet Union (New York,
1960), PP. 256-57.

 

 

 

24Spoerry, "Rabkrin," pp. 138, 148; Cocks, "Politics
Of Party Control," p. 69.

25L. Trotsky, Stalin (2nd. ed.; New York, 1946), pp.
346-47; Deutscher, Stalin, p. 236; Narodny kontrol v SSSR
(People's Control in the USSR), edited by V. I. Turovtsev,
Institute of State and Law, USSR Academy of Sciences
(Moscow, 1967), p. 53; V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya (4th ed.)
Vol. 33, pp. 440-60, and see n. 1 above.

26From 25 members and 15 candidates at the Tenth
Congress to 40 members and 17 candidates at the Twelfth
Congress. The new membership greatly strengtnened the
Stalinist caucus in the Central Committee; see Fainsod,
How Russiais Ruled (1963), pp. 185-86; Schapiro, Communist

Party, p. 274.
27

 

 

 

 

Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (1963), PP. 185-86.

 

28A Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya edition pub-
lished during Stalin's lifetime says that the 1923 merger
was made with the guidance of "Leninist-Stalinist principles"
(2nd ed.; Moscow, 1952, Vol. 12, p. 320); but according to
Khrushchev's pointed editing, the union came "under Lenin's
leadership"; N. S. Khrushchev, "Doklad" (Report), Plenum
Tsentralnovo komiteta Kommunisticheskoi_partii Sovetskovo
soiuza, 19-23 npyabrya 1962 goda: Stenpgraficheskii otEhet
(Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of—
the Soviet Union, 19-23 November 1962: Stenographic record,
Moscow, 1963), p. 83. As we have seen, Stalin had no reason
to Oppose the merger, but only to manipulate it in.such a
‘way’as to make more secure the hold of his party secretariat
over the united structure of party and state control.

 

 
 

73

29Both decrees appeared in Izvestia, September 8,
1923, and are published in Sobranie uzak., 1923, No. 99,
Items 983 and 984; the statute may Be found in Sobranie
uzak., 1923, Nos. 109-10, Item 1,042.

30

 

 

 

 

Narodny_kontrol v SSSR, pp. 55-56.

 

31A joint organ, serving mainly to direct and coordinate
the activities of union republic control commissions (KK-RKI)

was set up in 1924 as a general, organizational-instruction
section; ibid., p. 56.

321bid., p. 56.

331bid., pp. 56-57.

34Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (1963), p. 187.

35Byulleten TsKK RKP(b) i NK RKI (Bulletin of the
Central Control Committee of the Rus§ian Communist Party
(Bolshevik) and the People's Commissariat of Workers' and
Peasants' Inspection), (1924), No. 22, pp. 40-41.

36

 

 

Narodny kontrol v SSSR, p. 59.

 

37KPSSy rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh sezdov,
konferenstiidlplenumov TsK (The Communist Party Of the
SOviet Union in the Resolutions and Decisions of the Con-
gresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee),
(Moscow, 1954), p. 30.

38

 

Trud (Labor), May 22, 1924.

 

 

39Narodny kontrol v SSSR, pp. 58-59.

40Bol. sov. ents. (2nd. ed.), Vol. 12 (May 1952),
p. 320.

41

Narodny kontrol v SSSR, p. 43; Sobranie uzakonenii
RSFSR (Collection of Laws of the RSFSR), 19247 No. 82,
Items 825, 826, 827; hereafter quoted as, SU RSFSR.

42

 

 

 

Ibid., Item 827.

43Norodny kontrol v SSSR, p. 44.

 

44IEEQ3; SU RSFSR, 1927, NO. 38, Item 250.

 

45"Postanovlenie VTsIK i SNK RSFSR ot 21 yanvarya
1929 g. o sektsiyakh RKI" (Decree of the All-Russian
Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's

74

Commissars of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist
Republic on Jan. 21, 1929, concerning the Sections of
Rabkrin), SU RSFSR, 1929, No. 13, art. 146; also cited in
Narodny kontrol v SSSR, p. 64.

46Narodnykontrol v SSSR illustrates this point with
two examples: in the first, an RKI section attached to the
Sormovsky District Soviet of Nizhegorod Territory is
described as helping to build a streetcar line to a local
factory in its district; the second told how a section of
the Uman city soviet, in the Ukraine, with the help of
Komsomols, investigated conditions in the city's public
dining rooms; p. 65, n 73.

47KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i reshenniyakh, II, p. 442;
see also, Narodny Kontrol v SSSR, p. 65.

48More details on the development of mass participation
in control during this period can be found in Cocks, "Poli-
tics of Party Control," pp. 440-59.

49The account Of Paul Cocks of the changing functions
Of TsKK-RKI during its lifetime suggests that the trans-
formation effected in 1934 had been long in preparation:
"The span of control activity of the C.C.C.—R.K.I. steadily
narrowed as many of its functions were usurped by others
or were diluted of any meaningful substance. In the Party
the C.C.C. gradually lost its functions to Stalin's Secre-
tariat and the Party apparatus. In the state and economy,
the work previously performed by the C.C.C.-R.K.I. was
increasingly taken over by the Orgburo and Secretariat,
the secret police, and the developing commissariat system";
Ibid., p. 176.

50J. V. Stalin, Sochineniya, XIII (Moscow, 1952),
pp. 372-73; italics added.

5leornik zakonov SSSR (Collection of Laws of the
USSR), 1934, No. 12, Item 75; cited in Norodny kontrol v
SSSR, p. 68.

52XVII Sezd Vsesoyuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (b):
Stenograficheskii otchet (Seventeenth Congress of the A11-
Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) Stenographic record),
(Moscow, 1934), p. 674.

 

 

 

 

 

 

53Narodnykontrol v SSSR, p. 68.
54Order of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR, September 1940: "Ob obrazovanii Narkomata

gosudarstvennovo kontrolya" (On the Organization of the

75

People's Commissariat of State Control), Vedomosti Verkhov-
novo Soveta SSSR (Official Journal of the USSR Supreme
Soviet), 1940, no. 31.

SSIbid.

 

SGIbid.

57The'Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow: Reports
and Speeches at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist

Part of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) (Moscow, 1939), p.
202; Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (1963), p. 198.

58Fainsod (How Russia is Ruled [1953], p. 333) points
out that "this reversion to traditiOnal nomenclature
involved no redefinition of functions"; Vedomosti Verkhov-
novo Soveta SSSR, no. 10 (419), March 28, 1946.

59Plenum TsK KPSS 19-23 noyabrya 1962: Stenograficheski
otchet, p. 85; see also, Mekhlis, "Tridtsat let sotsia-
1isticheskovo Gosudarstvennovo kontrolya" (Thirty Years of
Socialist State Control), Pravda, April 9, 1949, p. 6.

 

CHAPTER III

KHRUSHCHEV'S REORGANIZATION

OF CONTROL

The Destalinization of Control,
1953-1964

 

 

The preceding chapter has described Stalin's narrow
concept of the proper sphere of the duties of the State
Control Ministry, and the implications this concept had in
restricting the membership and sphere of action of the
ministry. Stalin's style of rule and his multiplication
of watchdog agencies to check on one another had other,
far-reaching implications for control, and especially for
the direction in which control agencies evolved after
Stalin's death.1 Stalin himself, which using the secret
police as the ultimate weapon of control, was a kind of
linchpin that held together the conglomerate structure of
bureaucratic watchdog agencies. Removal of the linchpin,
therefore, was a kind of instant, inadvertent destaliniza-
tion, which at once destroyed the basic cohesion of the old
order while setting off a struggle for political leadership
among men and factions with conflicting ideas about how to

rebuild the new one.

76

77

With destalinization came a reorientation of Soviet
thought and society, a self scrutiny that pierced to the
very "foundations of Marxism-Leninism." So great had grown
the gap between the original utopian visions of Marx and
Lenin and the existing Stalinist reality that the most far-
reaching reforms seemed to be called for: reforms of
ideology, reforms of the economy, reforms of the government
and social institutions, and reforms to revitalize the
party itself and its missions. Yet while the need for
reform was generally recognized in the immediate post-
Stalinist era, the correct course could not be so clearly
seen, unanimously approved or single-mindedly followed.
Just where the process of destalinization should or could
stop would long remain an open question, but one which
possessed a special urgency during those first moments,
when the ship of state, constructed to obey the command of
one helmsman, floundered while many hands sought to grasp
the wheel. Against the backdrop of almost a decade of
such uncertain, fluid conditions, emerged phoenixlike, a
"new TsKK-RKI," the Party-State Control Committee (Komitet
partiinovo-gosudarstvennovo kontrolya, KPGK).

In the present context, it is expedient to oversimplify
the complex events of 1953—1964, by focussing first of all
upon Khrushchev's struggle to achieve and maintain power,
and by further acknowledging this period as one during which

he achieved varying degrees of ascendancy over his enemies,

78

perhaps enjoying his greatest power during the last few
years.2 Important, too, were Khrushchev's ideas about
reforming state and party control agencies, but these could
seldom have been uppermost in his mind, concerned as he was
successively with more compelling schemes to reform agri-
culture, to reorganize the entire Soviet economic, state,
and party administrative machinery, to reorient foreign
policy, and to revitalize ideology. Nevertheless, it is
clear from the final form in which the KPGK emerged that
Khrushchev had definite notions about how the Stalinist
control agencies should be transformed. And his inability
to push through his intended reforms without considerable
delay and opposition during most of this period would
indicate that the power struggle played a large role in
the evolution of the control organs. Thus, as in the
previous history of Soviet control organs, the vacillating
course of reform during the post-Stalinist decade (as well
as the changes made in control since Khrushchev's own
removal) continued to illustrate the important formative
effects Of both practical power considerations and ideo-
logical concerns.

There were certain key events in the immediate post-
Stalinist period indicating that changes were already taking
place within the structure of control institutions and pre-
saging much greater changes. Of first importance was the

weakening of KGB power in the months following Stalin's

79

death. In December 1953, when V. N. Merkhulov was removed
from his post as Minister of State Control, tried and con-
demned as an accomplice of Beria, he was replaced by a
longtime party official, Vasily Gavrilovich Zhavoronkov.3
Thus the tie between the KGB and the Ministry of Control

at the highest level was effectively severed. The following
year, articles in the Soviet press suggested that there was
a need for reinvigorating control of the government's admin-
istrative apparatus. Administrative work, they said, was
characterized by shortcomings and "bureaucratism," which
needed to be eradicated by a steady, systematic control,
involving not only the most active party guidance, but the
help of the masses. Lenin's ideas on the reform of Rabkrin

were recalled.4

And in 1956, at the Twentieth Congress of
the Communist Party, Khrushchev launched an open attack
upon the Ministry of State Control in his address.5

At the same time, there was other evidence of opposi-
tion to Khrushchev's proposed reform of state control. The
fact that in spite of his attack, the final resolution of
the Twentieth Congress failed to mention needed reform of
the ministry seems an indication of resistance to his
charges.6 The ensuing pattern of events surely reflects
the side effects of power struggles for higher political
stakes. On November 22, 1956, Molotov (who, in consistent

opposition to Khrushchev's policies, had lost his position

as Foreign Minister in June) replaced Zhavoronkov as

80

Minister of State Control, providing an added target for
Khrushchev's attacks upon the ministry. Earlier the same
month, Kommunist, discussing the past shortcomings of the
Ministry of Control, had predicted their imminent correction
and the transformation of the ministry in the image of
Rabkrin.7 However, the Central Committee Plenum in December
passed without recording any criticism of the ministry.

But within a few months, criticism was again openly
voiced. At the February 1957 Plenum, a complete reorganiza-
tion of the ministry's work was called for.8 Khrushchev
reiterated this request in his "March Theses," noting that
control had to be adjusted to the newly reorganized economic
order, and urging that it become instrumental in the removal
as well as the discovery of the shortcomings. He also
scolded the ministry for meddling too much in economic and
cultural affairs with which it was incompetent to deal.9
In his Report to the Supreme Soviet, May 1957, he repeated
his charges and demands for reform.10

In June 1957, the most crucial confrontation between
Khrushchev and the "Anti-Party Group" (in which Molotov
figured prominently) ended in defeat for the latter.
Molotov was replaced as Minister of State Control by G. V.
Enyutin. New demands for control reorganization in line
with Lenin's ideas appeared in the press in July and
August,11 but the reforms of the ministry that actually

took place on August 23, transforming it into the Soviet

81

Control Commission, and making the republic commissions
independent of the central commission, were hardly in line
with Leninist prescription.12 They did, however, accord
with a general reform of all state agencies which was
underway at that moment, aimed at weakening state and
strengthening party agencies.13
The party control mechanism also received the atten-
tion of reformers during this period. At the May 1958
Plenum, the TSKK was called upon to take wider interest
in checking economic shortcomings, especially at the local
levels, and to enlist the aid of rank-and-file members and
even non-party volunteers in revealing misconduct on the
part of administrators or party officials.14
The unusual interest in making both state and party
control agencies work more effectively increased during
the years from 1958 to 1961, when one of the shocking
results of Khrushchev's decentralization of the economic
administration and his setting of excessive goals for
agricultural production was a sharp and widespread increase
in "localism," falsification of reports, and economic
crimes.15 Leninist prescriptions dominate the literature
of suggested reform during these years. The revised
version of Khrushchev's report, "On the Control Figures
of the Development of the National Economy of the USSR,

1959-1965," adopted by the Twenty-First Congress, on Febru-

ary 5, 1959, called upon the soviets and trade unions to

82

strengthen their ties with the masses in combatting red
tape and bureaucracy, and in reducing the cost of government
and economic management while improving its operation.16
At the June 1959 Plenum Khrushchev noted that in this
"period of develOped construction of a Communist society,
public control over fulfillment of the directives of the
party and government acquires enormous significance."17
This plenum approved the setting up of party control com-
missions within party cells to achieve grass-roots par-
ticipation in the business of checking enterprise manage-
ment. Articles in the press urged the enlistment of
volunteers by the Commission of Soviet Control and coopera-
tion between the Commission and trade union groups,
Komsomols, and "Groups of Assistance" to Soviet Control
Commissions.l8
A more pressing and immediate need for reform was the
existing decentralized organization of the Commission of
Soviet Control itself, which had apparently allowed the
republic agencies of state control to become quite isolated
from the central apparatus.19 Under the existing system,
coordination of the work of the republic and local agencies
and the supervision necessary to ensure unified forms and
methods of work were in effect impossible. To make an
immediate correction in this situation, therefore, a "stop-

gap" reform was effected, which, as an ad hoc measure, made

no attempt to incorporate Leninist reforms. In July 1961,

83

the Commission of Soviet Control and its counterpart
agencies were transformed into union—republic organs.20
Henceforth, local state control organs in oblasts, krais,
and autonomous republics were to be coordinated by their
respective Union Republic Control Commissions, which in
turn were to be supervised by Moscow. Thus, according to
its organizational chart, the revised hierarchy of commis-
sions, to be known as the Commission of State Control, was
assured of a new cohesion and unity.

Meanwhile, the debate over the best way to restore
Leninist ideas to control was being more frequently aired
in official speeches and the press, and opposing viewpoints
became clearer. The Draft Program of the Party, which was

Offered to the public for discussion in mid-1961, called

for a new kind of state and public control (omitting men-

 

tion of the party).21 The writer of a note in Kommunist,
in September 1961, called for reform of the party control
commissions to create an independent party purge agency,
free of local party influence from the republic level down,
maintaining its own single chain of subordination.22
Public discussion of the draft Program and Party Statutes
inevitably produced a number Of suggested changes in the

23 while Khrushchev's

control activities of the party,
control formula called for three basic ingredients: party,

state, and public control. This trinity appeared, for

 

example, in Khrushchev's speech to the Twenty-Second

84

Congress, October 17, 1961, when, speaking of control of
party members, he also added that "local party organs must
be accountable to those above and communists below."24
As Hodnett has pointed out, the support expressed in other
speeches at this congress for Khrushchev's idea Of a joint
party-state control agency was not overwhelming.25 Never-
theless, the final resolution of the Central Committee, as
adopted by the Twenty-Second Congress, did call for "party,
state, and public control," and mentioned as well the need
for accountability of local party organs, above and below.26
It was somewhat surprising, therefore, that the Party Pro-
gram, officially approved on October 31, 1961, did not
mention control.2.7
Thus, clearly, the great debate was not officially
settled in late 1961. Nonetheless, in early 1962, quiet
steps were being taken by the State Control agencies to
incorporate public participation, and party groups received
approval from the Central Committee Resolution Of January
11, 1962, to proceed with the formation of non-staff party
commissions, (i.e., of public volunteers).28 Meanwhile the
debate over state or party-state and public control continued

29

in the press, with Khrushchev's position appearing to gain

ground. In a Kommunist article, in May 1962, Frol Kozlov

 

publicly endorsed Khrushchev's ideas, by urging "broad mass

85

control from above and below. "The existing systems of
party and state control," he said, should be perfected
according to Leninist ideas of control, but on an "even
broader [social] base."30
The final settlement of the debate came at the

November Plenum of the Communist Party in 1962. Both
Khrushchev's speech and the Resolution of the Plenum called
for the creation of a unified party, state, and public con-

31 The moment

trol system, and the way ahead appeared open.
appeared at hand when Khrushchev's power was sufficiently
secure so that he might indeed dictate the rapid fulfillment
Of his plans. The slowness with which they were subsequently
implemented, however, and the fact that he was never fully
explicit concerning his Objectives, leaves it problematic
whether he actually achieved his intended goals in the PGK,
or whether in implementation his grand design was somewhat
distorted from the start by the continuing opposition of
state and party control Officials themselves at various
levels, or by covert political maneuvers of anti-Khrushchev
factions. The quickness and thoroughness with which
Khrushchev's own political sun set in October 1964, and

the equal dispatch with which the Party-State Control Com-
'mittee was transformed into the People's Control Committee

(dissociated by this sleight-of-hand from Khrushchev's

authorship), as well as its subsequent evolution, suggest

86

that there continued to be active opposition to Khrushchev's

many schemes, which included his ideas on control.32

Genesis of the Party-State Control
Committee (KPGK)

 

 

Our rapid survey of the decade of events which pro-
duced the Party-State Control Committee must now be slowed
to allow for a more detailed examination Of the background
and process of its creation. In attempting to explain why
this organ evolved as it did, several important formative
influences must be considered. The power nexus out of
which the organization took shape has already been briefly
described and must be constantly kept in mind. The shape
Of the existing building blocks for the new organization
and the availability from past experience of "sanctified"
patterns or prototypes for new structures are also important.
In addition, the following section will attempt to answer
three questions: First, what was the stated intent of the
organization's designers? Second, what were the objective
circumstances that favored or necessitated the creation of
the Party-State Control Committee? And third, what were at
least some of the unstated intentions and motives of its
architects?

What was the statedyintent of the
designers of the KPGK?

 

 

Khrushchev's clearest statements of what the proposed

control agency was intended to achieve were made in his

.n-h

IV.

‘-
-«o-

‘IA

b-vv a

“A,
b

you.

_ .
_:u.

.
--..
.

 

1
“a .

Ina.
.-

.~..,‘

 

.1-
...
r
. r
14"
v
.
.t
‘ ‘7
.._
a”
‘ n
_ \
..

 

‘A

87

speech to the Central Committee Plenum, November 19, 1962.33

This was a plenum preoccupied with economic matters, which
included the drastic bifurcation of the party's great
hierarchy into agricultural and industrial components.
Having outlined for his audience the major problems of the
national economy as he saw them, and the projected reorgan-
ization of the party's guidance of the national economy, he
then proceeded to describe how the existing control agencies
must be changed to fit the new conditions. The badly-
functioning State Control Commission and myriad discrete
agencies currently providing only partial and sporadic
surveillance Of the nation's economic and administrative
systems must be replaced by a new control organization with
new missions.

To detail the past failures, Khrushchev began by
posing the question: "What are the basic shortcomings of
our existing control system?" First of all, he said, "we
do not have a control center that would exercise unified
control along the party and state line both centrally and
locally." Because of this,

the central committees Of the communist parties of
the union republics and the territory and province
party committees are little concerned with inspec-
tion of the state of affairs in the localities and
do not adequately check up on the fulfillment of
party decisions, while in effect we do not have
special party control agencies. The Party Control
Committee under the Party Central Committee and

the party commissions in the localities primarily 34
hear charges against the defenses of party members.

88

Party control activities, in other words, deserved
criticism for concentrating all their attention upon
"housekeeping" duties of the party organization itself,
and for not watching over the "fulfillment Of party direc-
tives on economic matters, the fulfillment of the national
economic plan."

As for state control,

. . . its agencies still operate badly. They are poorly
linked with life, with the masses of the working people;
checkup is carried out chiefly by a staff apparatus
without drawing upon the communists at large. The State
Control Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers and
its agencies rarely submit major economic questions to
the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers
and often overlook serious abuses, cases Of deception,
account padding, bribery, the squandering of state
material values, etc. . . . At best, the State Control
Commission establishes the fact Of an abuse or a crime,
but it does not take measures to prevent the rise of
such phenomena.

As a result, "the major shortcomings in the organiza-
tion of control have a serious effect on the course of our
economic work, on the practical guidance of the development
Of the economy."36

The first step in remedying these shortcomings,
Khrushchev suggested, would be a reorganization of the party
and state control mechanisms based upon the Leninist idea
of "combining party and state control," the idea, which
Khrushchev noted, had earlier been achieved by the "merger
of the Central Control Commission and the Workers' and

Peasants' Inspection." The second step would be to copy

and expand another aspect of that "well-arranged" Leninist

-:a.
\

‘1..-

..o-

u.
'i
a.

uu

'vu.

 

a
6"

a,.

In.
(I!

P.

 

‘su

‘c

89

system of party and state control, by enrolling "the broad
masses Of the working people . . . in the organization of
control."37 In the 1960's, as Khrushchev pointed out,
"with the increasing complexity of economic life and the
vast development of productive forces," the role of mass
control was growing and must be further expanded. Only the
enlistment of the masses in a unified trinity of party,
state, and public control could provide the constancy and
all-pervasiveness of control needed in the present decade
for the proper functioning of the national economy.38 .
But control--especially mass participation in control--
as envisaged by Khrushchev, and by Lenin before him, was to
fulfill other functions. It was to educate the public, and
thereby create a great moral force for the maintenance of
socialist legality. To make this point, Khrushchev quoted
Lenin, saying that "the chief purpose of the organization

of control is 'to carry all the working masses, both men

and especially women, through [the school of] participation

 

in the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection."39 Thus partici-
pation in control would further the inculcation of civic
values and the creation Of a responsible citizenry. More-
over, in addition to its mass character, the new control
would make use of wide publicity in its work. Such publicity
also would help to fortify the public conscience, creating a
"revolutionary public opinion," informed and enlightened.

Recalling the effectiveness of the mass character of

90

TsKK-RKI and its use of the press, Khrushchev said, "the
enemies of socialism, parasites and bureaucrats trembled
before this great force of revolutionary public opinion."
Thus, following the lead of TsKK-RKI, the new Party-State
Control Committee would create "a social atmosphere in which
Swindlers, theives and bribe-takers will be unable to
engage in their criminal machinations."40
Finally, in closing his plenary remarks on the subject
Of control, Khrushchev tied the proposed reorganization to
a final, ultimate goal, that of building communist society:
By carrying out the measures proposed for reorgan-
izing party guidance of the national economy, for
perfecting party-state and public control in the
country, we will multiply the strength Of our party,
our people, in the struggle to accomplish the majestic

program Of puilding communist society. (Stormy
applause.)4

What were the objective circumstanges that
fgvored the creation of the Party-State
Control Committee?

 

 

 

Unquestionably, by 1962 there was genuine need for
better control of economic abuses. Khrushchev was clearly
not exaggerating when he emphasized this need. The existing
economic and administration conditions had resulted from a
number of factors. One of these, already mentioned, was
Khrushchev's efforts to alleviate the overly centralized
administrative pattern inherited from Stalin. As Fainsod
has remarked, Stalin's pattern "had more generalized
advantages as long as trained and experienced administrators

were scarce and the economy was not too complex," but in a

91

progressively more highly industrialized era, the Stalinist
structure "induced congestion at the center and a paralysis
of initiative below."42 Khrushchev's replacement of the
economic ministries by regional economic councils in 1957
had been partly a response to this need to decentralize the
central apparatus, partly an effort to undercut the strength
of the ministries, where opposition to his own power posi-
tion seemed to be focussed. But decentralization, along
with the decline of the secret police, tended to encourage
an increase in illegal practices, while at the same time
weakening the existing control mechanisms attempting to
deal with such matters. One result of these factors by
1961 was a substantial increase in the padding and falsi-
fication of reports as well as in various types Of "local-
ism"--practices which appeared to alarm Khrushchev when the
lower party apparatus became involved.43
In his Plenum speech of November 1962, Khrushchev
provided evidence of these widespread disorders, referring
to his examples as "isolated cases." There is, on the
contrary, every indication from numerous Soviet press
accounts that they were instead only the isolated peaks

44 One cause Of the situation was blamed

Of hidden icebergs.
upon the fact that even when State Controllers exposed
flagrant cases of large-scale report padding and falsi-
fication, no action to remedy the situation followed. A

case in point is described in Izvestia, November 23, 1961.45

 

92

Inspectors of the State Control Commission had criticized
the inflated administration of the Orenburg Economic Council

and previously published their charges in Izvestia on May 19,

 

1959. At that time the council's enterprises and construc-
tion organizations allegedly had one administrative Official
for every five or six workers, while the central apparatus
Of the council itself contained 460 employees. A reexamina-
tion over two years later showed that instead of reducing
their staff in the interim, the center had added 75 new
employees; administrative personnel in the regional units
had similarly increased, by 13%; and the volume of paperwork
had considerably expanded. "In the first nine months of
1961 alone, more than 33,000 decrees, instructions, orders,
etc., have issued forth from here," said the inspectors,
complaining in particular that this shuffling of many papers
"prevented the prompt discovery of report padding, falsi-
fications and deception of the state. In eight months,
report paddings at eight enterprises amounted to almost
750,000 rubles!"
Ruefully, the inspectors summed up:
One has the strange impression that the sovnarkhoz

[the economic council] is somehow reluctant to punish

deceivers of the state. The province statistical

administration has repeatedly, with facts in hand, as

the saying goes, directed the economic council's atten-

tion to cases of abuse and report padding, but nothing

has been done about these matters.

A similar complaint about the ineffectiveness of con-

trol agencies to eradicate shortcomings is recorded early

93

in 1962 in another Izvestia article. Thirty-five members

 

Of a lumber-stealing ring, which even included the director
of an administration of an RSFSR ministry, had been brought
to trial for stealing more than 36,000 cubic meters of
lumber. "How," ask State Controller Sustavov and Senior
Investigator Gitelman, of the Sverdlovsk Province Pro-
secutor's Office, "could such a large crime go undiscovered
so long by the extensive system of control agencies then
Operating in the lumber industry?"

According to approximate data that we have managed
to collect at the province center, the lumber industry
enterprises of the Central Urals were visited in 1961
by more than 4,000 controllers and auditors. They
requested 15,000 copies of various documents and
questionnaires and drew up about 3,000 acts.

It seems that with this "massive" control there
should be exemplary order in the lumber industry and
that thefts and violations of state discipline of
any kind should be completely excluded. Nevertheless,
the criminal case we have mentioned is a fact. Nor
are the barbarous destruction of valuable trees, mass
spoilage Of procured lumber and violations Of the
elementary rules Of conservation in the timberlands
Of the Central Urals isolated phenomena either. Where,
then, is this powerful control apparatus looking?
[Italics added.]

Their answer to the problem was that the existing
control agencies, while massive in scope, were powerless
and disconnected. While the Sustavov and Gitelman article
was very likely "planted" in the press by a group backing
Khrushchev's scheme for a party-state control organ, it
was just as likely not fabricating the real inadequacies

Of the existing system.

94

It is also clear from these and other Soviet materials
that Soviet inspectors were well aware of another striking
defect in their system of control, which has been repeatedly
mentioned by Western students of the Soviet economy.47 As
noted earlier, it is a fact Of Soviet economic life that
managers and administrators have found it necessary under
the conditions of Soviet operation to indulge in so-called
"Berliner practices," which range all the way from "cutting
corners" to downright illegal practices in order to accom-
plish successfully their economic missions Of fulfilling
the plan. Controllers, fully aware of this situation are
subjected to similar pressures, and are, as Joseph Berliner
has pointed out:

. . . compelled to abdicate their control functions
in some measure. Their attitude is revealed in the
theme Of "looking the other way." . . . Moreover
they Often engage in these very practices them-
selves. . . . Awareness of common interest in plan
fulfillment Often generates within the enterprise a
"family relationship: in which Party secretary, chief
accountant, and other control officials facilitate or
overlook the transgressions Of an enterprising and
successful director and share in the rewards and
prestige that come with plan fulfillment. It is a
fact that the control Officials perceive their own
fates as closely interwoven with the success of the
enterprise that explains the endurance of the
practices of management.

In this instance the "family relationship" Berliner
describes is within one enterprise and involves controllers
within that enterprise. But the pattern of mutual involve-
ment is repeated at many levels, and can cut across many

jurisdictional lines of enterprise, ministry or party

 

l"

“e

III

p-

It‘

(at

I.

J
a

1
~

'.

 

95

organization. Moreover, the membership of a high party
Official in these protective family groups can go far to
enhance their immunity to discovery or punishment, even by
State Controllers. A "cause celebre" of the year 1962

illustrates this point. In the summer of 1961, Izvestia

 

had first published some facts about this case, concerned
with the illicit use Of funds to build private dachas.

The large circle of quilty officials involved included two
members Of the Tadzhikistan Central Committee (who also
happened to be the republic minister of finance and the
vice-chairman of the regional economic council), the first
secretaries of the Kurgan-Tyube and Dushambe City Party
Committees, and the chairman of the Dushambe Ispolkom,

among others. Even after the 1961 "exposure" in Izvestia,

 

the only action taken against them was the exacting of an
official acknowledgment by the party burO of the Tadzhikistan

Central Committee that the facts published in the Izvestia

 

article were indeed ture. Only after a second Izvestia

 

article, in April 1962, was action finally taken to remove
the city officials from their jobs and to oust them from

49 The republic officials were reprimanded,

the party.
after vacating their dachas. What this denouement points
up is that even in disgrace the high party man is hard to
touch. Thus, clearly, those reformers in 1962 who hoped

somehow to design a more effective control against the

96

party official were attacking a real and central control
problem.

Another important article, which again would appear
to have been planted in the press by supporters of Khrushchev's
ideas for reforming control, attacks this same problem even
more openly and directly. I. Bolyasny, docent at the
Zaporozhski Machine-Building Institute, suggested in a

Kommunist article, of October 1961, that:

 

sometimes the irregularities permitted by Officials

in the state apparatus and by economic agencies have
their source in the actions of local party leaders.
This is very Obviously confirmed by the cases Of
hoodwinking and abuses disclosed by the Party Central
Committee in Tadzhikistan, Ryazan Province, and else-
where. In order tO ensure efficient and comprehensive
supervision locally, it is necessary to check simul-
taneously on both the work of managerial personnel

and the work of the state and party apparatus.
[Italics added.]50

The Draft Party Program had advised reform of the
control agencies merely by including mass participation in
the state control machinery. Bolyasny adds that the party,
too, needs both to check and be checked. Thus, he said,

The Draft Party Program states: "In keeping with
Lenin's instructions, control agencies must function
constantly, combining state control with public
inspection at the center and in the localities." It
seems to me advisable to add to this formulation as

follows: "combining art and state control with
addin

public inspectioni" ( g the word "party").

[Italics added.]5
Although Bolyasny's revision was not made in the Party
Program, it was, of course, eventually embodied in the

Party-State Control Committee.

97

As has already been noted, a certain amount of opposi-
tion to the notion of uniting party and state control
evidently persisted through 1961 among some high party
members. Two aspects of the party's involvement in control
were of special interest to reformers. Obviously, from the
viewpoint of better control, high party officials who joined
"family arrangements" needed to be made a prime target of
control. Moreover, from the same point of view, the control
agency needed the kind of authority enjoyed by the party to
make their own actions more effective. Control needed the
party's Big Stick. A case which shows the speedy effect

with which the party can act is described by Ellen

Mickiewicz.52

In the "compressor" factory of Moscow, the students
at a circle session [of adult political education]
asked their leader why there were so many shortcomings
in the work of the factory. Indeed, the discussion
became so heated that grave accusations were brought
out about factory Officials, accusations that have
Often been commented on by Western observers of
Soviet politics but rarely mentioned baldly by Soviet
sources. In this particular instance the students of
the circle accused their trade union of being utterly
useless, of not knowing what went on in the factory,
of never leaving the union office and never becoming
involved in the productive process at the factory.

And to make matters worse, they contended, the trade
union chairman lived "in harmony" with the director
Of the factory; thus, no appeal could get through
that tightly reinforced protective association.

For the leader of the circle, it is a dangerous
cobweb in which to get entangled. . . . But the
zealous propagandist is charged not to "turn from
the solution of a sharp problem"; he should tell his
students to bring the problem about the improvement
Of conditions of work to the shop trade union organiza-
tion, and he should himself talk over the problem with

98

the party committee of the factory. When, in this
example, nothing came of these forays, the pro-
pagandist went to the city committee of thepparty

and in one week the necessary improvements were made.
[Italics added.]

The power leverage of the party is such as to have
been envied by Archimedes. Certainly the earnest controller
at any level must be acutely aware Of worlds he might move
if such leverage were his. Here, again, it is quite evident
that Khrushchev's new control system was designed to deal
very directly with real problems.

To this list of genuine shortcomings of control which
called for reform in 1962 there must be added at least one
more: the inspector's lack of knowledge concerning where
to look and what to look for. For instance, as enterprise
technology grows more complex, greater technical knowledge
is needed on the part of the inspector. As described in
the preceding chapter, the tendency during the Stalinist
era seemed to be for the areas supervised by state control
inspectors to shrink as the economy expanded, so that state
control became at last a narrow business of audits and

checkups of accounts.53

As Berliner has pointed out,

One important element lacking in the ministry's
[of Goskontrol] ability to control is knowledge.
Unlike the other control agencies which are either
involved in the fate of the firm or have business
dealings with it, the ministry lacks familiarity with
the details of the firm's Operation. With all its
resources, which may be assumed to be ample, the
ministry is obviously unable to maintain a constant
check on all enterprises. It also apparently suffers
from lack of experienced personnel, perhaps in part
because a police career is hardly attractive to
trained engineers.

99

"People's inspectors" could change this. Who, better
than an enterprise's own technicians, would know where to
look for inefficiencies or irregularities? As for "a
constant check," these employees are always "on the job."
Thus, mass participation would seem to be a realistic
response to new economic conditions necessitating wider and
more constant surveillance. Internal surveillance, too,
could Offer other advantages. Unlike sporadic and "campaign-
type" control efforts by agencies from outside an enter-
prise, "on-the-job" inspectors could take effective measures!
to eradicate shortcomings, or even to prevent their reoccur-
rence. Another weakness Of the campaign (the one-shot
inspection, for example), is that it does not, as Berliner
notes, "attempt to change the basic features of the economic

55 Public

system which generate the practices under attack."
inspectors might have the permanence, knowledge and Oppor-
tunity, if not the will or the authority, to make such
systemic changes.

The conclusion must he, therefore, that the proposals
for KPGK did deal realistically with certain existing pro-
blems in the Soviet economy in 1962 which were in need of
more adequate methods of control.

What were some_probab1e unstated
motives of KPGKTs proponents?

Above all, KPGK was a substitute for terror. Granted,

it was but one of the substitutes, for terror had reached

100

into every area of Soviet social activity, playing an
essential role in cementing the structure and contributing
to the dynamism of the Soviet social system. Preoccupation
with the dysfunctions of terror, sometimes causes us to
neglect the fact that terror has functions, as well. And
not simply the Obvious function of maintaining the dictator's
power, the regime, or the system. Terror also mobilizes
economic and social machines, forces compliance with specif-
ied standards of operation, and enforces certain rules of
conduct, of discipline, and of conformance to legal norms.
Thus Soviet administrative reformers seeking adequate sub-
stitutes for these multiple functions of terror faced a
complex task.

The search for substitutes was, however, simplified
in one respect. As Fainsod's study of postwar defectors
shows, the Soviet people after Stalin's death seemed to
expect that not only would an end be made to terror, repres-
sion, and a capricious legal system, but that opportunities
would also be offered them to participate directly in

56 And Stalin's heirs to power

affairs of public concern.
could not be sure of their abilities to govern without
making some concessions at once to all of these desires.

As time went on, however, one may well ask if the degree

and kind of channeled and artificially induced participation

that developed was really just what the public wanted and

needed. Or did not this particular type of mass mobilization

101

merely represent the efforts of the leaders, for reasons
of their own, to find ways to get the economy moving again
on the road to communism mapped out for it by the party?
Western scholars viewing the post—Stalinist decade
have described a number of areas in which mass participation
was being encouraged and have attempted to analyze the
motives of the regime. Swearer, for example, suggests that
the revitalizing of the soviets in the post—Stalinist 1950's
was an effort to find "new ways to rekindle elan" and to
channel the energies of the people "into a more responsive
support of the regime and into state construction."57 By
early 1959, public participation in the soviets was indicated
by the growth of standing commissions: "over 1 million
deputies of 57,000 soviets and 1.5 million activists were
at least nominally recorded as participants in standing

I O 0 58
commiSSions of local sov1ets."

Subsequently, the Party
Program also called for enlarging the role of these com-
mittees, and added certain duties which are of special
interest here: "The standing committees of the soviets
must systematically control the activities of ministries,
departments, and economic councils."59
Emily Brown has traced in detail the growing powers
Of the trade unions from 1957 on, from regional councils
down to factory, plant, and local committees, adding that

"greater union activity resulting from these increases in

union powers was expected to provide an extra check on

102

managements, and also to stimulate the 'creative initiative'
Of workers in solving production problems."60 The resolu-
tion of the Twenty-Second Congress noted that "the rights
and functions of the trade unions in the decision of all
questions touching the living interests of the working
people had significantly widened" and would continue to
grow as Soviet society moved toward communism and new pro-
blems were included in the sphere of union activity.61 In
addition, acting upon the advice of the Party Program in
February 1961, to increase the role Of public organizations
generally and to make greater use of non-salaried volunteer
administrators in their work, unions had by 1963 consider-
ably expanded volunteer staff work at all levels.62
Party agencies, too, were encouraged during this
period to enlist the public in their work. A Ukrainian
Republic secretary, I. P. Kazanets, announced in October
1962, that "today, 10,000 non-salaried instructors, 157
nonstaff departments and 1,940 public councils and commis-
sions for various questions of party guidance are func-
tioning in the party committees of our republic. More than
55,000 communists have been enlisted in active party work
on a volunteer basis through these forms alone. This is
four times as many as the total number of paid personnel
in party agencies."63
The areas of law enforcement and trial procedures

were also opened to public participation during this era.64

103

The voluntary police force, druzhiny, was initiated in

 

1958, to be followed a year later by the introduction of

the Comrades,Courts.65

The decree, "On Participation by

the Working People in Safeguarding Public Order in the
Country," called for use Of the "enormous force of public
influence on violators of order," and the "extensive enlist-
ment of the working people and public organizations in the

"66

matter of safeguarding public order in the country. By

1960, the voluntary people's militia alone numbered 800,000
groups, with 2.5 million members.67
Another area of widespread citizen involvement was
the adult political education program, initiated by a
Central Committee resolution of August 12, 1956. According
to Mickiewicz, who has made a detailed and careful examina-
tion of this program, the growth Of participation of this
program "from 1956 to 1964 . . . was enormous. For the
academic year 1957-58 a total Of 6,200,000 people were
enrolled in the system. Of them, 5,300,000 were members
and candidates of the party; only 900,000 were non-party
students . . . in 1963, in circles and seminars combined,
non-party students constituted 75%. In that same year
Pravda observed that 'every fifth adult resident in our
country' was studying in the political instruction system.

In September 1964, just one month before Khrushchev fell

from power, the system of adult education encompassed some

I'-

n

it

104

36 million people, of whom more than 25 million, or at least
78%, did not belong to the party.68
Zbigniew Brzezinski has suggested that one motive for
the steps which Khrushchev took to "invigorate the ideo-
logical indoctrination Of the population at large" might
have been that such indoctrination was necessary to main-

69 And Robert Tucker

tain the leading role of the party.
maintains that Khrushchev's own personal success was "pro-
bably to be explained in large part by the energetic and
convincing way in which he espoused the cause of the party's

70 Yet, the extent to which

political resurrection.
Khrushchev's populism reached outside the party to enlist
non-party participation in public affairs seemed likely to
threaten the party's hegemony if pursued too far. The
changes made in all these areas of public volunteer work
after Khrushchev's fall, to bring the activities more
closely within the guidance and guardianship Of the party
would indicate that the post-Khrushchevian leadership
differed with Khrushchevian doctrine on the degree of
public participation to be desired.

The general picture sketched above of widespread
efforts in many areas of Soviet life to encourage increased
public participation has been presented for two reasons.
First, a clear understanding of the evolution and origins

of the Party-State Control Committee is only possible if

viewed in the wider context Of these epic processes. The

«an

.Ql-fi

 

105

Party-State Control Committee fits neatly into this general
picture of expanding public participation, even to the
point of exhibiting in its early stages considerable
vagueness about how far ordinary citizens should go in
checking party and state bodies. However, as indicated
above, any such vagueness was thoroughly dispelled under
Brezhnev and Kosygin, when, as will be shown in later
pages, the guardianship of the party grew much more domi-
neering.

Secondly, the answer to the question raised at the
beginning of this section is most meaningfully rephrased
in the context Of the developments described. "What were
some probable unstated motives of KPGK's proponents?"
involves a rewording to define "unstated motives" as
efforts to find overall solutions for the "global" needs
and problems of the continuing transformation of the Soviet
economic and social systems. The assumption here is that
Khrushchev and his followers were attempting to deal on a
very broad front with problems arising out of changes in
the power structure of the country, problems of motivation
and mobilization of its citizens, and problems involving
the future shape of the society. Their solutions for the
reform of control agencies were inevitably dictated by
these larger designs.

To summarize the developments described in this

chapter briefly,where the history Of control reorganization

QA.

"4'

law

A.‘

e.‘

 

‘I

up“

106

during the Stalinist period showed a constant shrinkage of
competency and membership and a "professionalization and
bureaucratization" of state control, in the post-Stalinist
decade this trend was gradually reversed. Where Leninist
prescriptions had in the earlier period been ignored, one-
by—one, they are later revived, until upon the establish-
ment of the Party-State Control Committee, the old TsKK-RKI
seems almost to have been resurrected intact, with its
union of party and state control apparatuses, its expanded
field of operations, its multiplicity of missions, and its
enlistment of the layman and amateur in the business of

inspection.

CHAPTER III--NOTES

1Merle Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The
Russian and Soviet Case," in Joseph LaPalombara, Bureaucracy
and Political Development (Princeton, 1963), p. 256. See
a130, Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled (Cambridge, 1963),
pp. 576-86.

 

 

2A searching treatment of the power nexus out of which-
Khrushchev's Party-State Control Committee finally emerged
is contained in Grey Hodnett's article, "Khrushchev and
Party-State Control," in Alexander Dallin and Alan F.
Westin (eds.), Politics in the Soviet Union: 7 cases (New
York, 1966), pp. 113-64, which traces the history of_the
reorganization of Goskontrol from 1953 to 1962 and tries
to identify the power considerations which motivated these
changes. Since the evidence is not conclusive, Hodnett
posits two alternative assessments of Khrushchev's power
position as the basis for two different interpretations of
Khrushchev's motives in establishing the PGK in the form it
took. Either Khrushchev was not powerful enough to have
his way with PGK and was forced into compromises by elements
(especially Old members of the Goskontrol Ministry and the
"Stalinists") Opposing his reforms, or he was able after
1957 to have his own way without question, in which case
the KPGK closely reflects his intents and was designed, as
he contended, largely for economic reasons.

3See Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the USSR
(London, 1961), on Merkhulost complicity, pp. 441, 443-44,
446-47. V. N. Merkhulov was removed from his post as Min-
ister of State Control on September 17, 1953. Vasily
Gavrilovich Zhavoronkov succeeded him December 17, 1953;
Pravda and Izvestia, December 17, 1953, p. 4; Vedomosti
‘Verkhovnovo soveta SSSR, December 29, 1953. Merle Fainsod
lists the pertinent legal actions and other concurrent
changes in the status and power of the new Committee for
State Security (KGB), which was separated from the MVD in
March 1954, and in December 1958 placed under the leader-
ship Of the former All-Union Komsomol secretary (1943 to
.April 19, 1958; first secretary from 1952), Alexander
Shelepin; How Russia is Ruled, pp. 447-52. From April
'until December 1958, Shelepin was Director of the Central
Committee's Department of Party Organs for the Union
Republics.

 

 

 

107

108

4See, for example, G. Borkov, "Proverka ispolneniya
i zadachi sovershenstvovaniya partiinovo rukovodstva"
(Checking on Fulfillment and the Tasks of Improving Party
Leadership), Kommunist, No. 3 (February 1954), PP- 53-66;
"Leninskie printsipy raboty gosudarstvennovo apparata i
zadachi evo sovershenstvovaniya" (Leninist Principles of
Work of the State Apparatus and the Tasks of Perfecting it),
Kommunist, No. 5 (March 1954), pp. 14-30; Editorials:
"Pokonchit s kantselyarsko-byurokraticheskim stilem ruko-
vodstva," (End Bureaucratic Methods of Leadership), Pravda,
March 3, 1954, and "Improve and Perfect the Work of the
Soviet Apparatus," Izvestia, March 2, 1954.

5XX Sezd Vsesoyuznoi kommunisticheskpi partii (b):
Stenograficheski otchet, 14-25 fevralya 1956_goda (Twentieth
Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (b), Stenographic
Report, February 14-25, 1956; Moscow, 1956), I, pp. 93-94.
Said Khrushchev, "The Ministry of State Control weakly
implements the Leninist instructions about state control,
does not raise the great questions of perfecting the state
administrative apparatus. . . . It is necessary radically
to reorganize the work Of the USSR Ministry of State
Control. . . ."

6Ibid., II, 406-27. The resolution does speak of the
necessity of enlisting the broadest participation of the
masses in the administration Of the state and the strength-
ening of party ties With the masses; ibid., pp. 422-23, 426.

 

 

 

 

 

7"Sovetski apparat upravleniya--vazhnoe orudie
kommunisticheskovo stroitelstva" (The Soviet Administrative
Apparatus is an Important Tool in the Building of Communism),
Kommunist, NO. 17 (November 1956), pp. 3-16.

8"Fevralski plenum TsK KPSS (1957 goda): Post-
anovlenie plenuma TsK KPSS, O dalneishem sovershenstvovanii
organizatsii upravleniya promyshlennostyu i stroitelstvom
(Prinyato 14 fevralya 1957 goda po kokladu tov. Khrushcheva
N. 8.)" (February Plenum CC CPSS [1957]: Decree of the
Plenum, On the Utmost Perfection of the Organization of
Administration of Industry and Construction [Adopted Febru-
ary 14, 1957, According to the Report of Comrade N. S.
KhrushcheVJ), Spravochnik partiinovo rabotnika (Party
Worker's Guide; Moscow, 1957), pp. 112-119; see especially
p. 118.

9Khrushchev's "March Theses" appeared in Pravda and
Izvestia, March 3, 1957. Khrushchev said: "Reorganization
of the management of industry and construction will require
a change in state control, basing it on the enlistment of

 

 

109

the broad masses and concentrating it in the localities,

in the republics, provinces and economic administrative
areas. In conformity with this, the content and methods

of work of the USSR Ministry of State Control and the Union
republic Ministries of State Control should evidently be
radically reorganized. The Ministry of Control now has a
cumbersome apparatus which is based on the departmental
principle and tries to embrace literally all matters, even
the control of the level of technical development of the
various industries and the level of science and technology,
which is of no benefit at all. The controllers try to give
instructions on production problems, thus usurping the
functions of the economic agencies."

10Khrushchev's Report to the Seventh Session of the
USSR Supreme Soviet (published in Pravda and Izvestia,
May 8, 1957, pp. 1-5) virtually repeated these charges
verbatim.

11Partiinaya zhizn, July and August 1957; at the July
Plenum, one delegate, K. D. Petukhov, accused Molotov of
having, in his capacity as Minister of State Control, not
cooperated in fulfilling the decisions of the February
Plenum (1957) concerning the transformation of the adminis-
tration of industry and construction, but instead, of
composing letters opposing these decisions. His statement
appears in Pravda, July 4, 1957, p. 3.

12Pravda, August 24, 1957. In Narodny kontrol v
SSSR (Moscow, 1967), p. 69, it is maintained that Leninist
principles were involved to the extent that the new Commis-
sion of Soviet Control was obligated to conduct its control
activities "in a close relation with soviet, party, trade
union, Komsomol, and other public organizations, with the
involvement of the wide masses of workers, kolkhozniki and
service people" (SP SSSR, 1957, No. 16, p. 163). Repre-
sentatives Of the trade unions and Komsomols now joined
the commissions of Soviet control.

13The law which called for the transformation of the
economic ministries into regional economic councils had been
promulgated on May 10, 1957. It required the transforma—
tion to be completed by July 1, 1957; "Zakon: O dalneishem
sovershenstvovanii organizatsii upravleniya promyshlennostyu
i stroitelstvom," (Law concerning the furthest improvement
of the administration of industry and construction),
Spravochnik partiinovo_rabotnika (Party Worker's Handbook;
Moscow, 1957), pp. 227-33; see also Fainsod, How Russia is
Ruled, pp. 395-96.

 

 

 

 

110

14These measures did not appear in the Report of
Khrushchev to the May 1958 Plenum (on May 6) or in the
resolution adopted (May 7) by the Plenum, which were
printed in Pravda and Izvestia, May 9 and 10, 1958; see Paul
Cocks, "Politics of Party Control: The Historical and
Institutional Role Of Party Control in the CPSU," Ph. D.
Thesis (Harvard University, 1968), pp. 580-97, for an
account of the changing structure and functions of the
Party Control Committee and the local Party Commissions in
the post-Stalinist period.

15Robert Conquest quotes a decree of April 28, 1958
(published in Pravda on May 19, 1958) which already describes
"criminal" def1c1encies in the fulfillment of delivery
quotas, and he further notes that complaints of mestnichestvo

 

were widespread in the Soviet press at this time (Power and
Policy in the USSR, pp. 358-59). Howard Swearer has dealt
with these developments in the area of agriculture: "Agri-
cultural Administration under Khrushchev," in Roy Laird,
Soviet Agricultural and Peasant Affairs (Lawrence, Kansas,
1963), pp. 26-28. Michel Tatu discusses the extraordinary
"drive against swindling, falsification of agricultural
statistics and other machinations" that opened in 1961;
Power in the Kremlin (New York, 1969), pp. 128-32; the series
of special decrees enacted in 1961-1962 to curb economic
abuses is discussed by Kazimierz Grzybowski, "Soviet Crimi-
nal Law," Problems of Communist (March-April 1965), pp. 59-
60.

 

 

 

 

 

16"Kontrolnye tsifry razvitiya Narodnovo khozyaistvo
SSSR na 1959-1965 gody," (Control figures for the Develop-
ment of the National Economy from 1959-65) Materiyaly_
Vneocherednovo XXI sezda KPSS (Materials of the Extraordin—
ary let Congress Of the CPSR: Moscow, 1959), PP. 255-56:
"In order to carry out these tasks [of economic and cultural
work assigned to them by the Seven-Year Plan], Soviet organs
are obligated steadily to strengthen ties with the masses,
resolutely to eliminate elements of red-tape and bureau-
cratism, economize and perfect the state and economic
apparatus" (p. 255); "Together with the party and Komsomol
organizations, the trade union organizations are obliged
to direct special attention to the need for eliminating
such phenomena alien to socialist society as hooliganism,
drunkenness, bribetaking, speculation, and other negative
remnants of the past . . . relying upon a broad aktiv. . . .
(p. 256). Khrushchev's report (delivered January 27, 1969)
did not contain these passages.

17"Za tekhnicheski progress vo vsekh otraslyakh
narodnovo khozyaistva" (For Technical Progress in all
Branches of the Economy), Pravda, July 2, 1959, p. 3. He

 

 

111

also noted that the Presidium of the Central Committee had
"recently adopted a decision on this question." He was
referring to the decision at the June 1959 Plenum to set
up commissions in the primary party organizations of
industry and trade enterprises to supervise the management
of the activities of the enterprises.

18"Novye organizatsionnye formy partiinovo kontrolya,"
(New Organizational Forms of Party Control), Pravda,
July 13, 1959, p. 2; and A. Konushin, "O nekotorykfi itogakh
ochetnovybornykh sobranii" (On several results of the
accounting-and-election meetings), Partiinaya zhizn, No. 3
(February, 1961), pp. 19-20.

19Staff Correspondent V. Rostovshchikov, "Svyazanny
patrul" (The Constrained Patrol), Izvestia, April 26, 1961,
p. 3, describes the poor communication between the central
apparatus of the Soviet Control Commission and local con-
trol groups and lack of authority of the local groups.

20This decree appears in Pravda, July 23, 1961, p. l:
"Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR, O preobrazovanii
Komissii sovetskovo kontrolya Soveta Ministrov SSSR v
soyuzno-respublikanski organ SSSR--Komissiyu gosudarstvennovo
kontrolya Soveta Ministrov SSSR (Goskontrol SSSR)," dated
July 22, 1961, (Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme
Soviet, On the Transformation of the Commission of Soviet
Control of the USSR Council of Ministers into the Union-
Republic Organ of the USSR--the Commission of State Control
of the USSR Council of Ministers).

21The specific proposal of the "Proekt Programmy
Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskovo Soyuza" (Draft Program),
as this appeared in Pravda, July 30, 1961, p. 7, was, as
follows: "Constant state and public control is an impor-
tant means of accomplishing . . . [the improvement of the
state apparatus]. In accordance with Lenin's instructions,
organs of control must function constantly at the center
and at the local level, combining state control with
public inspectorates. The party regards inspectorates of
people's control as an effective weapon for drawing the
broad masses of the people into the management of state
affairs and into control over the strict observance of
legality, as a means of perfecting the governmental appa-
ratus, eradicating bureaucratism, and promptly putting into
effect proposals made by the people."

228. Vorontsov, "O nezavisimosti organov partiinovo
kontrolya," (On the Independence of the Organs of Party
Control), Kommunist, No. 13 (September 1961), pp. 86-87.
Specifically, Vorontsov argued, "The creation of a system

 

 

 

112

of party control with the direct subordination of the
Party Control Commission to the Central Committee of the
CPSU will greatly facilitate the growth of party democracy,
the strengthening of party discipline, the growth of the
activity of communists."

23An example in point is the letter of M. Semenechenko,
in the same issue of Kommunist just mentioned, proposing
changes in the Party Statutes. Semenechenko, a member of
the party bureau of the Irkutsk Sovnarkhoz party organiza-
tion, felt that primary party organizations in sovnarkhozy,
ministries, local soviets and other administrative organiza-
tions should have the same right to control the administra-
tive operations of these agencies as did the primary party
organizations formed in economic enterprises; in other
words, Semenechenko argues for a widening of the administra-
tive control powers of the party control commissions. For
other examples, see Hodnett, in Dallin and Westin, Politics
in the Soviet Union, pp. 131-34.

24N. S. Khrushchev, "Doklad," October 17, 1961,
Materialy XXII sezda KPSS (Moscow, 1961), p. 105.

25Hodnett, in Dallin and Westin, Politics in the
Soviet Union, pp. 135-57.

26"Rezolyutsiya XXII sezda Kommunisticheskoi partii
Sovetskovo Soyuza po otchetu Tsentralnovo komiteta KPSS,"
MaterialyyXXII sezda KPSS, p. 315.

27The Party Program was published in Pravda and
Izvestia, November 2, 1961, pp. 1-9; the Statutes appeared
the following day.

28"0 sozdanii pri gorkomakh and raikomakh partii
vneshtatnykh partiinykh komissii po predvaritelnomu
rassmotreniyu voprosov priema v partiyu i personalnykh
del kommunistov" (On the Creation of Non-Staff Party Com-
missions Attached to City and District Party Committees
for the Preliminary Examination of Questions of Entrance
into the Party and of Personal Matters of Communists),
Spravochnik partiinovo rabotnika, 4th ed. (Moscow, 1963),

p. 470. Note also the earlier decree, of December 12,

1960, which initiated this practice in the city and dis-
trict committees of Moscow, Leningrad, and of Moscow Oblast.
Concerning State Control developments, it is significant
that G. V. Yenyutin, Chairman of the Commission of State
Control, stated in an interview with an Izvestia correspond-
ent, published May 26, 1962, that the Party Program's
recommendation of control with public inspectorates was

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

113

serving his organization "as a compass, as a guide to
action." (p. 3)

29See Hodnett, in Dallin and Westin, Politics in the
Soviet Union, pp. 139-42.

3OFrol P. Kozlov, "KPSS-—Partiya vsevo naroda,"
(CPSU is the Party of All the People), Kommunist, No. 8
(May 1962): p. 14.

31See below, n. 33 for Khruschev's remarks;
"Postanovlenie plenuma TsK KPSS, Prinyatoe 23 noyabrya
1962 goda" (Plenum Resolution adopted November 23, 1962),
Plenum Tsentralnovo komiteta Kommunisticheskoi partii
SovetSkovo Soyuza, 19-23 Noyabryal962 g., StenografICheski
otchet (Plenum of the CC of the CPSU, November 19-23, 1962,
Stenographic record; Moscow, 1963), pp. 448, 451.

32Frederick C. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR
(Boston, 1966) discusses this same point (pp. 153-54) and
cites relevant evidence in the Soviet press: Partiinaya
zhizn (editorial), No. 23 (December 1964), and Pravda,
August 10, 11, and October 2, 1964. Most of the criticism
of Khrushchev following the October 16 announcement of
Khrushchev's "retirement" was veiled but unmistakable.
Pravda's editorial on November 5, 1964 decried "braggadocio
and self-delusion" and spoke of the necessity for "circum-
spection in the solution of problems that affect the
interests of millions."

33N. S. Khrushchev, "Razvitie ekonomiki SSSR i
partiinoe rukovodstvo narodnym khozyaistvom," Plenum TsK
KPSS, 19-23 Noyabrya 1962, pp. 5—99.

34

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Ibid., p. 86.

351bid.

361bid.

37Ibid., pp. 83, 84.

381bid., p. 84.

39V. I. Lenin, Sochinenie, 4th ed. XXX, 276 (Letter
of January 24, 1920); also in V. I. Lenin, O partiinom,

gpsudarstvennom i obshchestvennom kontrole (Moscow, 1963),
p. 147.

40

 

Plenum TsK KPSS, 19—23 noyabrya 1962, pp. 84, 88.

 

114

4lIbid., p. 94.

42Fainsod, in LaPalombara, p. 256.

43See above, n. 15, and Khrushchev's own testimony
at the November 1962 Plenum, "Doklad," pp. 87-88.

44Ibid., p. 87.

4SS. Matuz, A Burkoltsev, "Bumazhnaya metel" (Paper
Snow-storm), Izvestia, November 23, 1961, p. 1. The
earlier article referred to was entitled: "Apparat
sovnarkhoza nada sovershenstvovat" (The Sovnarkhoz Appa-
ratus Needs Perfecting).

46D. Gitelman, P. Sustavov and V. Biryukov, "Grom
bez molnii, O deistvennosti kontrolnykh organov" (Thunder
without Lightning, On the effectiveness of control organs),
Izvestia, February 24, 1962, p. 3.

47Joseph S. Berliner, Factory and Manager in the
USSR (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), Chs. X, XI, and XII; The
term "Berliner practices" is used by Jerry Hough, The
Soviet Prefects: 'The Local Party Organs in Industrial
DeciSion-making (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), p. 211, with
other references to these practices on pp. 118, 213, 216,
257; David Granick, The Red Executive (New York, 1961),
ch. XVI; Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (1953), p. 487.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

48Berliner, Factory and Manager, pp. 324-25.

49Izvestia, July 30, 1961; April 2, 1962; June 14,
1962.

50

I. Bolyasny, "O sisteme partiinovo i gosudarstvennovo
kontrolya, Kommunist, No. 15 (October 1961), p. 89. (On the
System of Party and State Control.)

51

 

Ibid., p. 91.

52Ellen P. Mickiewicz, Soviet Political Schools: The
Communist Party Adult Instruction System (New Haven, 1967i?
p. 110; the details of this case are taken from I. Smirnov,
"Zhivoe slovo progagandy i delo" (The Living Word of
Propaganda and the Deed), Kruzhki tekushchei politiki
(Circles of Current Politics) (Moscow, 1957), PP. 16:17,
32-33.

53See Khrushchev's account of the evolution of
Goskontrol under Stalin, "Doklad," Plenum TsK KPSS, 19-23
noyabrya 1962, pp. 84-85.

 

 

 

 

115

54Berliner, Factory_and Manager, pp. 290-91.

 

551bid., p. 307.

56The Fainsod chapter, "Terror as a System of Power,"
in How Russia is Ruled (1963) examines Stalin's theory and
use of terror, as weli as the implications of terror in
the Stalinist and post-Stalinist eras.

57Howard Swearer, "Popular Participation: Myths and
Realities," Problems of Communism, Vol. IX, No. 5 (September-
October, 1960), p. 43. Of relevance to this point also are
the remarks of Jeremy R. Azrael, "The Party and Society,
in Allen Kassof (ed.), Prospects for Soviet Society (New
York, 1968), p. 65: "The question,itherefore [for Stalin's
heirs], was how to maintain the requisite degree of social
mobilization while abjuring mass terror and sanctioning
important concessions to popular claims and demands."

58Howard R. Swearer, Problems of Communism, Vol. IX,
No. 5 (September-October, 1960), p. 46.

S9

 

 

 

Materialy XXII sezda KPSS, p. 398.

 

60Emily C. Brown, Soviet Trade Unions and Labor
Relations (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), p. 621

61

 

 

Ibid.

 

62Sbornik postanovlenii VTsDPS, April-June 1961
(Collection of DeciSions of CCTU; Moscow, 1962), pp. 7-13;
July-September 1961, pp. 35-43; April-June 1962, pp. 19-
24; July-September 1962, pp. 17-26; Grishin's Report
appeared in Trud, October 29, 1963.

63

 

Pravda, October 29, 1962, p. 9.

64See Harold Berman, Justice in the USSR (Cambridge,
Mass., 1963), ch. II: "Soviet Law Reform After Stalin,
1953-1962"; Leon Lipson, "Hosts and Pests: The Fight
against Parasites," and Albert Boiter, "Comradely Justice:
How Durable Is It?" Problems of Communism, Vol. XIV
(March-April 1965), PP. 72-92.

65Leon Lipson's apt coinage is "non-courts and
impolice," Problems of Communism, XIV (March-April 1965),
p. 73 and passim.

66

 

 

Pravda, March 10, 1959, p. 1.

116

67Herbert Ritvo, The New Soviet Society (New York,
1962), p. 174, n. 240.

68Mickiewicz, Soviet Political Schools, p. 10;
Pravda, August 14, 1963, p. 2; Kommunist, No. 14 (September

1964), p. 3.

69Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Ideology_and Power in
Soviet Politics (New York, 1967), p. 170.

70Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind (New

CHAPTER IV

THE PARTY-STATE CONTROL COMMITTEE

Formal Structure

 

The Party-State Control Committee had a life span of
just three years, until December 1965. During that time,
the reorganization of the agency was guided by the direc-
tives of the "Statute on the Committee of Party-State Con-
trol of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union and the USSR Council of Ministers," dated

December 20, 1962,1

and the "Statute on the Groups and
Posts of Assistance to the Committees of Party-State Con-
trol," on June 30, 1964.2

The resulting "committee" was a sprawling organization
including diverse control elements. For convenience, we
shall make a rough dichotomy of its structure into "The
Committee Network" and "Volunteer Control Groups." Insofar
as this dichotomy suggests a strict line between staff or
paid personnel and nonstaff or volunteer inspectors it is
inaccurate, since volunteer inspectors not only donated
their time and efforts to the "Volunteer Control Groups,"

but also directly participated in the work of control com-

mittees; nevertheless, the basic distinction between the

117

118

network of paid staff inspectors, on the one hand, and the
various groups of volunteer public participants, on the
other, is a sound and useful one. For in the "Committee

Network," along with the unpaid aktivisty, just mentioned,

 

were found the responsible, paid apparatchiki, whose
vocation was achieving control objectives and mobilizing
public participation toward this end. Staff officials
indeed comprised the core of its membership. In contrast,
the "Volunteer Control Groups" included all those unpaid,
but not unsung, people's inspectors of the "Groups and
Posts of Assistance" to Party-State Control Committees,
which have been officially described as the "organizing
centers around which all public control unites."3
Organized as a union-republic agency, the committee
network formed a hierarchy following the familiar pattern
of party and state administrative organization from city
and £3222 (district) up to the all-union level. Coordinat-
ing its activities at the apex was the central organ, the
Committee of Party-State Control of the Central Committee
of the CPSU and of the USSR Council of Ministers, responsible
directly to the two parent bodies. According to the system
of dual subordination, republic, krai_and oblast PGK Com-
mittees were responsible not only to the central PGK Com-
mittee, but to their respective party and government bodies:
the party central committees and the councils of ministers

of the union republics, and the territory and province

119

party committees and soviet executive committees. Local
PGK Committees of cities and raiony were not, however,
subordinated to their local party and government bodies,
but were given some local independence by reporting directly
to the republic, krai and oblast PGK Committees.4
PGK Committees at all levels consisted of both staff
apparatus and nonstaff, "voluntary" departments, as well
as permanent and temporary public commissions. The personnel
of the nonstaff departments of these committees were pri-
marily inspectors, recommended by party, soviet or other
public organizations, or serving in the inspection-and-
control machinery of a variety of government organs.5
The highest organ, the central PGK Committee, was
staffed by leading CPSU Central Committee members, repre-
sentatives of the trade unions, of the Komsomols, and of
the press, and leading workers, collective farmers and
intelligentsia "enjoying general confidence."6 It was
directed by a chairman and several deputy chairmen, whose
appointments required confirmation by the party Central
Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers. Other execu-
tive personnel of the committee required only party confir—
mation. The man who served as the Chairman of the Party-
State Control Committee from its inception, and who was
undoubtedly one of its chief architects, was Aleksandr

Nikolaevich Shelepin, former Komsomol first secretary

(till 1958), head of KGB (until 1961), and for a brief

 

.)

u-

“4‘

120

time simultaneously (1962-1964) full member of the Presidium
of the Central Committee, a Secretary of the Central Com-
mittee, and a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.7
Although the leadership of the Committee was never formally
announced, at least three deputy chairmen were identified
at one time or another in the press: I. V. Shikin, P. V.
Kovanov, and V. I. Zaluzhny, as well as the head of the
Department of Executive Cadres and Organizational Work, V.
Gorin.8
Since the character of these men may well have influ«
enced the early formation of the KPGK, a brief summary of
biographic details concerning the Chairman and his Deputies
is of interest at this point. Shelepin was born in 1918,
and graduated from the Moscow Institute of History, Philos-
ophy and Literature in 1941, acting as Secretary of the
Institute's Komsomol Group from 1936 until 1939. From 1939
to 1940 he served as a Political Officer in the Soviet Army
on the Finnish Front. Returning then to Komsomol work, he
spent the next 18 years in the Komsomol organization,
filling its highest office, Secretary of the All—Union
Komsomol Organization, from 1952 to 1958. In 1958 he
became Chairman of the Committee for State Security, a
post which he held for three years. Having served as a
Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU from 1961
until 1966, he became a member of the Politburo in 1964, a

post which he continued to fill in mid-1970, when he was

121

also serving as Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of
Trade Unions, having succeeded V. V. Grishin in 1967. This
latter position is one which as Jerry Hough has suggested,
is closely in line with Shelepin's past training and inter-
ests, stamping him as a secular, pragmatic breed of ideo-
logist.9
V. I. Zaluzhny, a man close to Shelepin's age (born
1917), who was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Central PGK
Committee in 1963 and currently remains Deputy Chairman of
the People's Control Committee, shares Shelepin's background
in Komsomol work, and offers another example of Hough's prag-
matic, instrumental, secular breed of ideOIOgist. Profes-
sionally trained as an engineer, Zaluzhny's involvement with
the Komsomols began in the war years, when he served first
(1940-41) as a Komsomol organizer for the central All-Union
Komsomol apparatus at the Kirov plant in Leningrad. From
1941-45, he was an instructor for Komsomol work in the Main
Political Administration of the Red Army, and also served
as Battalion Commander and Department Head of the Political
Department of a Guards Division. He is a Reserve Guards
Major. Thus, like his colleague, Deputy-Chariman Shikin,
Zaluzhny is experienced in army political work. However,
Zaluzhny's major professional life has been spent in
Komsomol work, for in 1945 he went to work directly for
the Central Committee of the All-Union Komsomol, working

as a Secretary of the All-Union Komsomol form 1951 till

122

1960, spanning the period when Shelepin was its First
Secretary. He moved on into Communist Party work in 1960,
with an appointment as Second Secretary, with responsi-
bilities for personnel appointment, in Kemerovo Oblast,
an important Siberian industrial region. Zaluzhny has
published materials dealing with both the Party-State and
the People's Control Committees.lo
Iosif Vasilevich Shikin, appointed First Deputy
Chairman of the Committee for Party-State Control in 1963,
holds the rank of Colonel-General in the Red Army. Born
in 1906, he graduated in 1931 from the Krupskaya Academy
of Communist Education, and from 1931 until 1939 he held
various party posts in Gorky. During the war years (1939-
1945) he held executive posts in the Military Political
Administration of the Red Army. From 1945 until 1949 he
headed the Main Political Administration, when his military
and political careers first reached their zenith, only to
suffer an abrupt eclipse. In 1949-50 he was briefly
"shelved" to the post of Commandant of the Lenin Military
Political Academy. In 1950, however, he began a long and
slow return to the centers of political life, apparently
under Khrushchev's aegis. He worked from 1950 until 1961
in the apparat of the Central Committee of the CPSU, from
1954 until 1959, with the important job of heading the
Department of Party Organs for the Union Republics. He

served as USSR Ambassador to Albania in 1961, a period of

123

difficult relations with that tiny country. Serving as
First Deputy Chairman of the PGK Committee, he was passed
over in the selection of Shelepin's successor (by Kovanov)
and has remained First Deputy Chairman of the new Committee
of People's Control.

Pavel Vasilevich Kovanov, who was to be appointed the
Chairman of the People's Control Committee at its incep-
tion, is a year younger than Shikin (born 1907). He first
became a member of the Party's Central Committee in December
1965, having been a Candidate Member since 1961. He graduated
from both the Lenin Pedagogical Institute (1940) and the
Higher Party School of the Central Committee of the CPSU
(1948). As a young man in his early twenties, he served
for a year as a chairman of a collective farm in Moscow
Oblast (1930-31) then held various teaching and economic
posts during the next eleven years, and earned his first
degree. In the Red Army from 1942-44, he saw frontline
service. Returning from the service, he entered the Party's
Higher School and worked for the Central Committee apparat
in Moscow. After graduation from the Higher Party School,
he continued working for the Central Committee in Moscow
until 1956, when he was sent to Georgia as Second Secretary
of the Georgian Republic Central Committee, for six years.
In 1962, he became Deputy Chairman of the Committee of
Party-State Control of the Republic of Georgia. Having

returned to Moscow in 1963, as Deputy Chairman of the

124

central PGK Committee, he succeeded Shelepin as Chairman
of the new People's Control Committee in December 1965.

The members of republic, krai, and oblast PGK Com-
mittees included party officials drawn from their respective
republic kgai_and oblast party committees, representatives
from other local control agencies, from the trade unions,
Komsomols, and the press, and certain outstanding workers,
collective farmers and intelligentsia, all with the approval
of the plenums of the appropriate party committees. Chair-
men and vice-chairmen of PGK Committees at these levels
needed confirmation by the Central Committee of the CPSU
and the USSR Council of Ministers, as did the entire memv
bership of the PGK Committee of the CPSU CC Buro for the
RSFSR and RSFSR Council of Ministers.11

The membership formula at the upper levels was echoed
at each lower level in the hierarchy. By September 14, 1963,
according to Pravda, PGK Committees had been created and
were in operation for all republics, territories, and
regions. In addition there were "1,057 city and E3122.
committees, 348 committees for industrial zones, and 1,634
committees for kolkhoz-sovkhoz production administrations."
In 1965, nonstaff sections and commissions within these
committees totaled 20,198, and were manned by 180,000 non-
staff inspectors.12

Aid to the chairman of a PGK Committee was provided

by his deputy chairmen and nonstaff department members.

125

Nonstaff departments (or sections) were formed for every
major industry of local concern, for cadre and organiza-
tional work, administration, the press, and a number of
others, and were generally manned by specialists with a
pertinent skill. For example, in the Armenian SSR city

of Leninakan, the City Committee of PGK had 10 nonstaff
sections, seven of which were specified in a report on its
organization as: Sections for Industry, Complaints and
Suggestions, Organization, Construction, Transportation

and Communications,Housing, and Public Health Care. Of

the Industry Section's 15 members, 9 were engineers and 6
were economists, with one of the engineers (also a party
member) serving as chief of the section. However, while
nonstaff inspectors were intended to be selected from

among the more highly skilled personnel in a given occupa-
tion, that is, "from a number of highly qualified industrial
workers, agricultural specialists, scientific and cultural
workers," as Pravda on one occasion put it, party member-
ship of candidates, as well as their careful screening by
the party was probably of equal or greater importance.13
The l9-member Complaints Section at Leninakan was headed

"by an old party member," and the Organization Section was
said to contain "Communists experienced in party and goVern-
ment work."14

Figures are not available to indicate the proportion

of staff to nonstaff personnel, of paid to unpaid inspectors,

126

within PGK Committees, but a figure is given by Pravda for
the number of volunteer inspectors in the departments of
the RSFSR 5531 and oblast PGK Committees by September 1963:
"About 5,000 inspectors" had been selected from among
"highly qualified industrial workers, agricultural special-
ists, scientific and cultural workers, and pensioners."15
These volunteer inspectors, it should be emphasized, were
engaged directly in the committee network. Organizationally,
they were separate from the millions drawn into the voluntary
work of the Groups and Posts of Assistance; operationally,
however, they were very much involved with the mass volun-
teers.

Commenting on the involvement of the nonstaff sections
of the formal PGK Committees with their affiliated Groups
and Posts of Assistance, P. Fedosov, the Central PGK Com-
mittee inspector who surveyed the Leninakan operation,
said: "But however helpful and numerous the nonstaff
apparatus may be, its power is insufficient to secure the
[necessary] active volume and constant activity of control.
Therefore, the committee devotes much attention to strength-
ening Groups and Posts of Assistance--the mass link in the
system of party-state control. Members of the committee
and nonstaff inspectors are constantly in communication
with Assistance Groups; they help them in the planning of
work, in organizing inspections and in heightening their

activity."16

127

The Groups and Posts of Assistance to PGK Committees,
were the basic organizational means of involving the greatest
numbers of the public in control work. The Statute of
December 1962 called for the creation of Groups and Posts
of Assistance in enterprises, building projects, farms,
apartment houses, and various institutions, "from represen-
tatives of party, trade union, Komsomol, and other public
organs," chosen in general meetings of these organs. Non-
party as well as party members were to be included, the
chief criterion being the recognized dedication of the
chosen individual to the social goals of inspection.
"Workers, kolkhozniki, specialists, employees, scholars,
literary and artistic people, pensioners, and housewives"

were indicated as likely candidates}.7

By August 3, 1963,
with the PGK experiment only a little more than half a
year old, 516,000 Groups and Posts of Assistance had been
formed (Groups, 193,000 and Posts, 323,000). A total
exceeding 3,000,000 men and women were involved in this
endeavor, all of them volunteers, working in their spare

time and without pay.18

By July 31, 1964, V. Gorin, cen—
tral PGK Committee department head, stated in Pravda that
Assistance Groups had increased to more than 260,000 and
Posts of Assistance to 500,000, with the total army of
"aktivisty" numbering 4,300,000.19
The occasion for Gorin's article was the appearance

of the new statute, approved by the central PGK Committee

128

on June 30, 1964, "On the Groups and Posts of Assistance

20 The June

to the Committees of Party-State Control."
Statute drew upon 18 months of party-state control activity
to outline, in some cases more clearly than this had been
done in the earlier statute, the intended constitution,
duties and manner of operation of the Groups and Posts of
Assistance. For example, the new regulation significantly
limited their activity by instructing that: "Groups and
Posts of Assistance are not created in executive committees
of soviets of workers' deputies, in party, trade union, and
Komsomol organs, in editorial offices of party papers and

21 In other

journals, or in general-education schools."
words, while it might have appeared that Khrushchev's

initial intent was to create a new super-agency that would
exercise its control over the party and other great agencies,
the new statute clearly marked the end of that effort.

The size of Assistance Groups and Posts, the regula-
tions suggest, should be decided by the appropriate party
organization, along with the local PGK Committee, depending
on the amount of work and the size of the enterprises
involved. Groups generally were expected to average from
7 to 50 members; Posts, from 3 to 10. Where the Group was
quite large, it was suggested that a bureau should be
elected to attend to ongoing work. Within one plant, state

farm or collective farm, a plant-wide, state-farm-wide or

collective—farm-wide group might guide the work of all the

129

Groups and Posts of Assistance.22 Members were to serve

two—year terms. While they could not be removed during
this term, except by the agencies which elected them, the
latter might take this action against workers who did "not
justify confidence."23
Groups of Assistance were to be headed by chairmen--
Posts, by leaders-—elected by voice vote in general meetings
of these bodies and approved by the party committee or bureau
of the primary party organization. From one to two deputy
chairmen might also be elected. The chairman of an Assist-
ance Group automatically became assistant secretary for
control in the appropriate party organization; hence, he
was of necessity always a party member. However, in those
enterprises and extablishments possessing no party organiza-
tions, chairmen of Groups might be chosen from among "highly
respected non-party peOple."24 Gorin has stated that the
dual assignments of the Group chairman were intended to
facilitate the "cooperation and contact of the Group's
work with the commissions for implementing the primary
party organization's right to control the activities of
the administration," a point which makes good administra-
tive sense, given the leadership's intentions that Assist-
ance Groups and Posts should operate under the strict
supervision of party organizations, as well as the appro-
priate PGK Committee, submitting all work plans for examina-

tion and approval to the party committees or meetings of

130

primary party organizations. Gorin also spoke of Assistance
Groups and Posts being set up by_the primary party organiza-
tions and corresponding committees at enterprises, construc-
tion projects, and collective farms.25
N. Sidorov, Deputy Chairman of the Moscow PGK Commit-
tee has pointed out that the structure of various Groups of
Assistance has varied in different institutions. "Take,
let's say, the Groups of Assistance of the Central Statis-
tical Administration for the USSR Council of Ministers. In
it there are 26 people: of these, 15 are party members.
The Group is made up of 4 sections. A bureau of 7 people
heads the Group: the chairman, 2 deputies, and 4 section
leaders. Besides these, in the administrations and depart-
ments there are 16 Groups and Posts of Assistance. Several
Groups of Assistance in other ministries, committees, and
departments are structured differently. Thus, the State
Production Committee for the Gas Industry has a committee-
wide Assistance Group of 24 people, headed by a bureau, with
5 posts for the administrations."26

In August 1965, the 2-year membership period for at

least 3 million aktivisty being at an end, the central PGK

 

Committee called for new elections of representatives from
party, trade union, Komsomol and kolkhoz organizations for
Groups and Posts of Assistance, to take place at the next
elective sessions of primary party organizations. It was

hoped that the new elections would "attract new masses of

131

workers" to the business of control, and perhaps more
dedicated and active workers. The occasion was also to be
taken to enlarge the membership of Groups and Posts where
necessary.27 The new elections were thus clearly considered
a useful device for extending the "reach" of the public
participation effort. Certainly, the reshuffling of per-
sonnel after each 2-year term of duty and experience should
serve effectively to multiply the ranks of those matriculat-
ing in this 2-year "school of practical and applied control

techniques."

Operation

A discussion of the PGK Committee's operations can
perhaps most usefully begin with a brief review of their
original mandate and scope of authority. The present sec—
tion will deal not only with these, but with some detailed
descriptions of actual control operations over the three
years of the Committee's existence. As outlined by
Khrushchev's report, the intended task of the PGK agencies
was to conduct "investigations of the actual fulfillment of
party and government directives."28

The broad "charge" may be broken down into three
general categories: economic (improvement of production),
administrative, and civic. Most important were the economic

goals of current plan fulfillment in industry, construction

and agriculture. Four types of production improvement that

132

surveillance might hope to facilitate were: (1) improvement
in the product's quality; (2) lowering of production costs;
(3) raising of labor productivity; and (4) discovery and
use of idle reserves. In the sphere of administration,

the goal was to promote efficiency and to root out its
antitheses--mismanagement, bureaucratism, red.tape, and
waste. Reorganization to eliminate administrative inef-
ficiencies, such as duplication of efforts, and excess
paper work was an added administrative goal. The "civic"
task was twofold. Immediate targets for attack and elimi-
nation were "swindlers, bribetakers, parasites, and bureau—
crats." The long-range purpose was to create a "civic-
minded" social climate which discouraged dishonesty and
irresponsibility toward state and party obligations, or,

in the words of the December 1962 Statute, a social climate
which might promote "the maintenance of party and state

29 Intangible and

discipline and socialist legality."
unrealistic as this hope may sound, examination of the
brief history of control activities suggests that this
long-range purpose may have strongly motivated its leaders
from the start.

To reiterate the missions of the control agencies,

drawing upon the wording of the statute itself: their main

business was to be checking and investigation--checking on

 

the fulfillment of economic plans and "the actual execution

of party and government directives by ministries, state

133

committees and departments, and by other organizations,
enterprises, construction projects, kolkhozy, sovhozy,
and institutions," and investigation to "disclose internal
reserves and un—utilized resources for expanding produc-
tion in industry and agriculture, for improving the quality
of products and lowering their production costs, and for
raising the productivity of labor." Such investigations
were intended to turn up ways to "improve the work of the
state and administrative-managerial apparatus, furthering
a reduction in its costs and perfecting its organization";
they were to "ferret out violations of party and state
discipline, manifestations of localism, a narrowly depart-
mental attitude to business, hoodwinking, report padding,
mismanagement and extravagance, bureaucratism and red tape,
bribetaking, speculation, abuse of office and other
administrative-management abuses."30
A glance at the actual decrees of the central PGK
Committee concerned with major violations disclosed by the
efforts of PGK Committees in 1963 indicates the nature of
the violations that the committees actually looked for and
found, during the first year of their existence. The
largest number of decrees (five) were primarily concerned
with unfulfilled economic directives; four dealt with
criminal negligence in the handling of funds; one focused
on illegal speculative practices, and one on bureaucratic

mismanagement.31 The control committees' intended civic

134

mission of preventing abuses and of creating a social
atmosphere in which crimes are deterred by the citizen's
sense of social responsibility is difficult to observe in
action or measure in accomplishment, though numerous exam-
ples may be found of doubtful victories claimed by inspectors
for preventing violations which did not occur.
Once violations were uncovered, a PGK Committee had
several courses of action open to it. The "teeth" given
PGK agencies by the 1962 Statute included the rights “to
give instruction to executives of ministries, state com-
mittees and departments, and other organizations, enter-
prises, construction projects, kolkhozy, and institutions
concerning the elimination of shortcomings and violations
in the execution of party and government resolutions; to
hear reports and demand explanations, as well as the
necessary documents and materials, from executives who
are poorly carrying out party and government resolutions
and instructions and who tolerate bureaucratism and red
tape; and to impose penalties on those guilty of presenting
incorrect and false information and conclusions."32
Moreover, PGK Committees were empowered: "to call a
halt to orders and actions by enterprises, institutions
and responsible officials that are illegal and are capable
of harming the interests of the state; to establish for
persons guilty of unsatisfactory execution of party and

government decisions time limits for correction; to refer

135

matters, when necessary, to the consideration of Comrades'
Courts; to impose fines on responsible officials causing
material damage to the state or to cooperative and public
organizations; to call guilty parties to account, impose
disciplinary penalties, demote officials or remove them
from their posts; to turn materials on abuses and other
criminal actions over to the agencies of the prosecutor's
office for criminal prosecution of the guilty."33

Thus, the 1962 Statute placed at the committees'
disposal an enforcement arsenal of potential strength. And
of perhaps greater importance than these "punitive rights"
of the control committees was their right (or more properly
speaking, their obligation) to call upon the powerful sup-
port of communications media, particularly the press, to
focus the hard light of publicity upon the malpractices
uncovered by the people's inspectors. Given these powers,
how did the PGK Committees actually proceed to function?
The June 1964 Statute concerning Groups and Posts of Assist-
ance listed the four basic forms and methods of work which
they had developed in practice: "checkups, raids, mass
investigations, and documentary audits."34 Any of these
actions might be initiated by the groups themselves, by
party organizations, or by PGK Committees, as will be seen
in the following examples.

Typical of mass investigations was a report from the

RSFSR, telling of a large-scale checkup on the preparedness

136

of the kolkhozy and sovkhozy for the spring sowing in 1963,

in which over 560,000 people took part.35

A report from
Kazakhstan, later the same year, described a mass investiga-
tion, organized by PGK agencies, of the preservation of
socialist property at enterprises of light industry, food
industry, in trade, in construction industries, in trans-
portation, and on the republic's kolkhozy and sovkhozy.

This account stated that more than 100,000 people took part,
and more than 15,000 installations were inspected--l,l79
state farms, 372 collective farms, 515 construction projects,
829 transportation and communications enterprises, and 296
enterprises of light and food industries.36 Documentary
audits carried out during this investigation revealed
loopholes "through which dishonest people were extracting
the people's wealth," and new procedures were suggested to
eliminate the negligence in invoicing and accounting which
provided these loopholes. In Moldavia, checking on the
course of preparations for the spring sowing in 1965, more
than 6,000 people's inspectors were said to have examined.
machine-tractor parts, agricultural inventories, seed, and
the use being made of organic and mineral fertilizers.37
This action had been initiated by the Republic PGK Committee
in response to the March 1965 Party Central Committee
Plenum.

Less spectacular than mass checks, but presumably

effective, was day-to-day checking, such as that reportedly

137

instigated by the Group of Assistance of the Ministry of
Finances of the USSR. Chief attention of this group cen-
tered on checking the fulfillment by ministry administra-
tions and departments of party and government resolutions
concerned with the financial system, on securing immediate
and full entering of budget income, on mobilizing internal
reserves, on rationalizing the dispersal of state funds,
and on the working out of proposals for improving the
structure of the apparat. When the ministry administrations
and departments were asked to work out, by February 1, 1964,
programs for curtailing expenses and increasing the surplus
and income in the budget, Assistance Groups and Posts checked
their progress, "day-by-day," and facilitated "the desired
results," which, we are given to presume, would not otherwise
have been obtained.38
A quiet investigation of land resources was launched
by the people's inspectors of the kolkhozy and sovkhozy of
Floreshtsky raion in Moldavia. They went up and down by-
ways, measuring unused land along roads and railroads,
along local and state woodlands, and so on. They presented
their findings, that more than 2,000 hectares of unused
land in the raion were available on these sites for cultiva-
tion, to the Republic PGK Committee, which promptly expanded
the investigation to the entire republic, "enlisting the

help of agricultural Specialists, aktivisty of local soviets,

 

and members of the accounting commissions of kolkhozy."

138

This survey revealed an immense amount of unused fertile
land in Moldavia. The party central committee of the
Moldavian Republic then reviewed the results and passed a
regulation, "On Measures for the Increased Use of Land in
the Kolkhozy and Sovkhozy of the Republic." As a result,
we are told, the plowed land area in the republic was
increased by almost 20,000 hectares during 1964, and in
cash value, the productivity accruing to kolkhozy and
sovkhozy amounted to an estimated 4 million rubles.39

Sometimes checks have been initiated by the public
in general. Thus, in 1964, the Department of Complaints
and Suggestions of the City PGK Committee of Leninakan,
having received 418 letters and 1,650 personal appeals
from the public, and carefully sifted these materials,
found that a fourth of them were concerned with housing
problems. They thereupon referred these complaints to the
PGK Department for Housing, with the proposal that the
practice of distributing living space be made the subject
of investigation by the people's inspectors.40

In stark contrast to the mass maneuvers of inspection
armies, perhaps the most devastatingly effective investiga-
tions, in terms of results relative to man-hours-expended,
were those instigated, pursued, and followed up with

relentless publicity by a single newspaper correspondent,

working alone. Thus, an Izvestia correspondent, on Novem-

 

ber 15, 1963, described, with the names of officials and

“v

‘I!
dqu

vy-

(I)
l)!

11’

Is
.m

 

i

I v
(I)

139

departments pointedly included, the treatment and answers

he received in his search to discover why electrical appli—
ances were not being produced with built-in thermostats, a
practice which, he asserted, if carried through, could

save enough electricity on electric appliances in Moscow
apartments alone to "illuminate a city of two million."
Having finally cornered a "Chief Specialist on Heating
Devices for the Electrical Equipment Committee," a man

named L. Petrev, as perhaps most responsible for the missing
thermostats, he transfixed the culprit with the third-degree
glare of national publicity: "Where are your developments?
Where are your proposals for production? What concern are
you showing for people's everyday life? What are you doing
to save the electricity used by household equipment?" The
public, he concluded, had a right to immediate answers from
41

the State Planning Committee on these questions.

The most important aspect of the Izvestia example

 

just cited was not so much the check made, as the publicity
given to the malpractices discovered, for publicity played

a vital role in continuing the impact of the people's inspec-
tions. The party statute advised PGK agencies to make
“active use of the press, films, radio, and television to
give broad publicity to their work"; to see that "the

results of checkups and the measures taken with regard to

42

them are systematically published." Accordingly, by

September 1963, the majority of newspapers were regularly

Mia

NVIJ

:&

 

q .

I I

140

publishing "Sheets of the Party-State Comtrol Committee,"
illustrating the activities of the PGK organs and Groups
and Posts of Assistance.

But Pravda continued to call for still more stringent
measures of "communications-punishment" for unmasked cul-
prits: "Place the miscreants squarely before the public,
demand of them a public explanation, name erring workers
in the leaflets Lightning, publish photographs of the

bureaucrats in newspapers. . . . "43 In 1964, Leninakan's

 

city paper devoted eleven pages to the activities of the
people's inspectors, and in enterprises throughout the city,
Komsomol "Searchlight" detachments and staff issued satiric

pages and photoplacards.44

Elsewhere, wall newspapers were
discussing the work of local Groups and Posts of Assistance,
as for example, Finkor, the all-ministry wall newspaper for
the USSR Ministry of Finances, and other wall newspapers
within the ministry.45

Finally, news media checked news media, to ask: "How
can the activity of people's inspectors be better advertised
in the press? How can newspapers help to make control
public, and, if possible, more effective?" These questions
are raised in an article, "The Newspaper and Party-State

Control," by two inspectors of the central PGK Committee,

in Partiinaya zhizn, a periodical which has made a regular

 

practice of publishing reports by the central PGK Committee

staff inspectors who roam the hustings on special inspection

141

tours. Two republic newspapers were examined at length:
Kazakhstanskaya_pravda and Sovetskaya Moldavia. Both were
given accolades for their "thematic pages showing the
practical work of the organs of PGK," and for articles
giving advice and inspiration to people's inspectors, but
both were also criticized for not showing the practical
work in sufficient detail, for omitting certain important
themes, such as party guidance of control groups, and in
failing to follow up on revealed shortcomings.

In the latter case, Sovetskaya Moldavia was rebuked

 

for having simply reported a "monstrous delinquency in
piggery construction." "And what further?" queried the
inspectors. "What activity followed the article's appear-
ance? The reader isn't told! The editor ought continuously
to follow up in a series the results of his articles in
pages of 'The Voice of the People's Control.'" Generalizing
on the lessons to be learned from this inspection, the
writers addressed themselves to all editors of newspapers:
"It is necessary to raise the level and quality of published
materials about party-state control in order that they
become more effective, that they help to teach the people
sensitively a responsibility toward the allotted task, to
awake creative initiative in the masses toward the transla-
tion into life of party and government decisions."46

Besides following up investigations by publicity,

numerous other methods of punitive or corrective action

142

were employed by the PGK network. In connection with a
"shocking case of bureaucracy," a department head in charge
of road-building machines was fired by his superior after
an Assistance Group had revealed that "about 400 papers
requiring quick action had lain in his office without

47

moving, from one month to half a year." The central PGK

Committee ordered "disciplinary penalties" against the
director of a Kuibyshev bearings plant for over-expenditure

48

of funds and illegal orders. Less stringent remedial

measures were described in Izvestia's "Control Sheet No.

 

24," which noted that a number of errors were rectified in
the course of the checkup of fulfillment of the USSR Council
of Ministers' Resolution: "On Measures to Improve the
Organization of Scientific and Technical Information in the

Country."49

But regarding the remaining shortcomings, the
central PGK Committee found it again necessary to charge
the USSR State Committee for Coordinating Scientific
Research Work, the corresponding republic, departments,
and economic councils, "with the adoption of effective
measures toward elimination of the shortcomings disclosed
by the checkup. A group of scientists and specialists has
been charged with working out proposals for the further
improvement of scientific and technical information, its
utilization and introduction into the national economy."

P. Voronin, chairman of the Moldavian Republic PGK

Committee, suggests that in some cases follow-up checking

“)

.4

“.P‘

4..

l
b u p

a
it. ‘

h‘.
bi.

F

V.

( p

"n.

:I

‘II

‘I

M.

”N
'u

in
w

L...’

I I,

143

itself ensures remedial action, and sometimes the source

of a malpractice needs only to be revealed by investigation
to suggest its own solution. Thus, when it was discovered
on a certain kolkhoz that the corn crop was jeopardized
because kolkhozniki refused to weed the fields, inspectors
then suggested at a meeting with the kolkhoz directors that
labor payments be increased for weeding. The happy result,
said Voronin, was that the land's yield increased "2 to 4
times over the previous year." For the most part, however,
Voronin sadly reflects: "To check and establish, as is
known, is easier than helping to correct errors discovered.
The committees in their daily work teach this--staunchly
strive so that every checking shall result in few errors--

50 Voronin's article presents

and the business is improved."
a rather gentle, quietly constructive attitude toward
inspection that is exceptional among Soviet accounts. It
is perhaps not surprising that he, almost alone among the
commentators quoted in this chapter, raised the question
of the preventive mission of control, calling for a "deep
and many-sided study of what is actually done," and "organ-
izing careful preparation for inspections." But the efficacy
of preventive measures is intangible for the most part, and
their gains may only be guessed at.

More tangible is the educational effort of the control

system, the effort to instruct the peOple's inspectors both

morally and technically. Off to a slow start, educational

144

activities before 1964 were given sparse reference in the
Soviet press. By 1965, however, a real groundswell of
activity had developed, not only in the preparation of
seminars, courses, and "universities," but also in the
publishing of materials for use in these studies. In 1964,
the Moscow PGK Committee sponsored several seminars, attended
by chairmen of Assistance Groups of ministries and depart-
ments, with the aim of sharing with all inspectors the
better forms and methods of inspection discovered by indi-
vidual institutions. In one of these seminars, chairmen
were said to have discussed their mutual experiences in
coordinating their work with groups of the "Komsomol Search-
light" and other public control groups. At the same time
the Sverdlovsk Eaign committee of PGK was reportedly busy
analyzing how Assistance Groups in government institutions
were coordinating their work with administrative organs.
In still another seminar, party secretaries and chairmen
of Assistance Groups of administrations and departments of
the Moscow Sovnarkhoz "meticulously studied the question of
how inspectors establish a businesslike relationship with
public and economic organizations."51
Writing in June 1965, PGK Committee chairman Voronin
discussed the development of seminars in Moldavia: "Experi-
ence has shown the necessity of the study by people's
inspectors of a wider circle of theoretical and practical

questions. The past year the republic committee worked out

145

special thematic courses with the aktiy." Along with basic
Soviet law and general methods of implementing control,
the courses included questions of the economics of enter-
prises, of construction, of kolkhozy, of the organization
of bookkeeping, accounting and auditing, the regulation of
labor, and financial activity. "In a series of cities and
raions there are in operation faculties or sections of
party-state control affiliated to Universities of Marxism-
Leninism. In addition, there are schools of people's
inspectors in many large enterprises and in kolkhozy, where
members of Assistance Groups and Posts and members of staffs
and detachments of the 'Komsomol Searchlight' are studying."52
In October 1964, in Leninakan, where the City PGK
Committee had for some time been offering "systematic
studies and regular seminars" to chairmen of Assistance
Groups and volunteer workers, a two-year "university" of
people's control was launched. Here, it was said, students
were being lectured on Leninist principles of control and
the economics of industrial enterprises. They were also
studying the experience of the work of control agencies
along with practical questions of organizing inSpections.
Special instruction was given the aktinprior to investiga-
tions, "by experienced specialists from the enterprise or
organization to be examined."53

Periodicals joined in this educational effort, in an

attempt to "help the committee [of PGK] to work out its

146

style and methods of effective control" by presenting it
with examples of positive experience and a choice, in depth,

of practices.54

Publishing houses began to turn out
instructional brochures, dealing with specific aspects of
control activities. The Political Literature Publishing
House issued a mass edition in 1964 (725,000 copies) of
the "Rules on Agencies of Party-State Control, Groups and
Posts of Assistance, and the 'Komsomol Searchlight.'" In
the Ukraine, a separate edition of 100,000 copies was

5

published, and in Belorussia, one of 12,000.5 In 1965

the same Moscow publishing house announced the planned
publication of nine booklets in its series, "The Library

56

of the People's Inspector." Some titles in this series

were: Partgoskontrol: Otvety na voprosy_(Party-State

 

Control: Answers to Questions), Organizatory massovovo

 

narodnovo kontrolya (The Organization of Mass, People's

 

Control), Gruppa sodeistviya--reshayushee zveno partgosskon-
trolya (The Assistance Group is a Decisive Link of Party-
State Control), V borbe za reservy promyshlennovo proizvodstva
(In the Struggle For Reserves of Industrial Production),

Glasnost partgoskontrolya (PGK Publicity), and Osnovye vidy

 

proverok i metody ikh organizatsii (Basic Types of Inspec-

 

tion and Methods of their Organization). All were sub-
sequently published in 1965, along with the Spravochnik

narodnovo kontrolera (Handbook of the People's Inspector).

 

147

Enough has been said to illustrate the operations of
the Party-State Control Committee in its brief lifetime.
The period of three years, however, was insufficient to
demonstrate the overall effectiveness of the PGK Committee
in achieving its stated objectives. What was demonstrated,
however, was important enough. During this brief time,
there took place the gradual but thorough restructuring of
state control agencies to incorporate the public in large,
and growing, numbers. Despite the fact that public control
efforts were still new, still in the process of taking
shape, still experimental and tentative, the PGK Committee
laid a sound institutional basis for the future expansion
of public control systems in the Soviet Union. In fact,
the subsequent refashioning of the KPGK into the People's
Control Committee may best be described in terms of "incre-
mental change," and in retrospect it may fairly be said
that with the KPGK, the Khrushchevian effort to establish

mass participation in control was fairly launched.

CHAPTER IV--NOTES

1Spravochnik narodnovo kontrolera (Handbook of the
People's Inspector; 2nd ed., Moscow, 1965). pp. 13-22. See
also, Pravda, January 18, 1963, p. 1. This statute can also
be found in Spravochnik partiinovo‘rabotnika, Vypusk pyaty
(Party Official's Handbook, Issue Five, Moscow, 1964), p.
303; and has been translated in Soviet Statutes and Deci-
sions, Vol. V, No. 2 (Winter 1968-69), pp. 80-88.

2Sprav. narodnovo kontrolera, pp. 23-30; Soviet
Statutes and Decisions, pp. 89495.

3V. Gorin, "Gruppa sodeistviya--organizatuyushchi
tsentr obshchestvennovo kontrolya" (Assistance Groups are
the Organizationing Center of Public Control), Pravda,
July 31, 1964, p. 4.

 

 

 

4Narodgy kogtrol v SSSR (People's Control in the
USSR, Moscow, 1967), p. 82; Sprav. partiinovo rabotnika
(1964)! p0 3050

5

 

 

Ibid., p. 309.

6Ibid., p. 306.

7Shelepin has been described by Jerry Hough as a
representative of a special breed of ideological official
in the Soviet Union, differing from the usual stereotype
of the ideologist "with a rigid and closed set of rules
of conduct spelled out by the ideology." The contrasting,
Shelepin-type breed, says Hough, exhibits the following
characteristics: "a pragmatic, instrumental style," "the
open, bargaining attitudes associated with full seculariza-
tion," and the qualities of men who are "increasingly
rational, analytical, and empirical in their political
action"; "Ideology and Ideological Secretaries as a Source
of Change in the Soviet Union," Paper presented at the
Mid-West Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies,
April 11, 1969, Lincoln, Nebraska; Hough quotes the above
traits characterizing two different types of ideological
officials from Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr.,
Comparative Politics (Boston, 1966), who presented the
traits in quite a different context. Hough's interpretation

 

148

til

0‘“?

l ’0 't5

fl)

a.” M H

149

of Shelepin's role and character is fully supported by the
evidence of this study concerning the evolution of the
Party-State Control Committee under his guidance.

A different interpretation of the type of official
apt to be chosen for control work has been advanced by Grey
Hodnett ("Khrushchev and Party-State Control," in Alexander
Dallin and Alan F. Weston, Politics in the Soviet Union:

7 Cases [New York, 1966], p. 151, n. 21), who stresses, for
example, the importance of the probable KGB background of

at least one deputy—chairman in each PGK republic committee.
According to Hodnett, not only would these police backgrounds
mean that such men "might also have qualified as 'Shelepin
men'" (dating from Shelepin's own brief tour of duty in the
KGB), but presumably the kind of training and experience,
the professional norms, outlook, and even connections of
these men would strongly influence their conduct in their
new posts. Certainly in this connection the long service
(1920-1940) of Arvid Pelshe in the "Cheka, OGPU and various
punitive detachments" (quoted from Who's Who in the USSR,

p. 636) is apt to be significant; see below, Ch. V, n. 20.

 

 

8pravda, May 6, 1965, p. 3; July 31, 1964; and
Partiinaya zhizn, No. 13 (July), 1965, p. 77.

9See above, n. 7, and Hough, "Ideology and Ideological
Secretaries as a Source of Change in the Soviet Union," p.
15. Most of the Biographical material in this and following
paragraphs comes from Who's Who in the USSR (2nd ed.: New
York, 1966).

10V. I. Zaluzhny, Kontrol v deistvii (Control in
Action) (Moscow, 1965); V. i} Zaluzhny,’“fiarodny kontrol"
(People's Control), Partiinaya zhizn, No. 13 (July 1966),
pp. 14-19. -

11

 

Sprav. partiinovo rabotnika (1964), pp. 305-06.

12Sprav. narodnovo kontrolera, p. 44.

13%, septa 14' 1963' p. l.

14P. Fedosov, "Komitet partgoskontrolya i evo aktiv"
(The Committee of Party State Control and its Activists),
Partiinaya zhizn, No. 11 (June), 1965, p. 36.

15"Narodny, deistvenny" (Popular, Efficient), Pravda,
September 14, 1963, p. 1.

 

16Fedosov, Partiinaya zhizn, No. 11 (June), 1965,
p. 36.

150

17Sprav.partiinovo rabotnika (1964), p. 306.

 

l8§£§ydg, August 3, 1963, p. 4; September 14, 1963,
p. l.
19
Pravda, July 31, 1964, p. 4.
20

See n. 2 above; the Statute also appeared in
Partiinaya zhizn, No. 14 (July), 1964, pp. 31-34.

21

 

Ibid., p. 32; italics mine.

22Gorin, Pravda, July 31, 1964, p. 4.

23Partiinaya zhizn, No. 14 (July). 1964, p. 33.

 

24Ibid., p. 32.

25Gorin, Pravda, July 31, 1964, p. 4.

26Partiinaya zhizn, No. 8 (April, 1964, pp. 34-37.

 

27"O delegirovanii v sostav grupp i postov sodeistviya
komitetam partiino-gosudarstvennovo gontrolya" (On the
Delegation [of New Members] to the Staff of Groups and
Posts of Assistance to PGK Committees), Partiinaya zhizn,
No. 15 (August), 1965, pp. 25e26.

28N. S. Khrushchev, "Doklad" (Report) Plenum
Tsentralnovo komiteta Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskovo
soyuza, 19-23 noyabrya 1962 goda: Stenograficheskii
otchet (Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU,
19-23 November 1962: Stenographic record, Moscow, 1963,
p. 86).

29Sprav.partiinovo rabotnika (1964), p. 304.

3°Ibid., pp. 307-08.

311bid., pp. 444-45.

321bid., p. 308.

331bid., p. 309.

34Partiinaya zhizn, No. 14 (July), 1964, p. 33.

 

35Pravda, July 27, 1963, p. 2.

36Pravda, February 21, 1964, p. 3.

151

37Partiinaya zhizn, No. 12 (June), 1965, p. 39.

38N. Sidorov, "Kontrolery v sovetskikh uchrezhdeniyakh"
(Inspectors in Soviet Institutions), Partiinaya_zhizn, No.
8 (April), 1964, p. 33.

39R. Voronin, "Deistvennost kontrolya" (The Efficiency
of Control), Partiinaya zhizn, No. 12 (June), 1965, pp. 38-39.

40P. Fedosov, Partiinaya zhizn, No. 11 (June), 1965,
p. 38.

 

 

41Izvestia, Nov. 15, 1963, p. 3.

42Sprav._partiinovo rabotnika, p. 309.

 

43Pravda, September 14, 1963, p. l.

44Partiinaya zhizn, No. 11 (June), 1965, p. 39.

4522.52}! NO. 8 (April) , 1964, p. 36.

46I. Mitrofanov and F. Rasporkin, "Gazeta i partgos-
kontrol" (The Newspaper and Party-State Control), Partiinaya
zhizn, No. 4 (February). 1965, p. 74.

47

 

Partiinaya zhizn, No. 8 (April), 1964, pp. 34-37.

48Sprav.partiinovo rabotnika, pp. 317-18.

49March 3, 1964, p. 4.

50Partiinaya zhizn, No. 12 (June), 1965, pp. 38-42.

 

51
p0 37.
52

Sidorov, Partiinaya zhizn, No. 8 (April), 1964,

 

Partiinaya zhizn, No. 12 (June), 1965, p. 41.

 

53%., N09 11 (JUNE) ' 1965' P. 380

S4;§i§,, No. 4 (February), 1965, p. 75.

55Izvestia, July 28, 1964, p. 4.

 

56Ibid., September 4, 1964, p. 4.

CHAPTER V

THE COMMITTEE OF PEOPLE'S CONTROL

The substance of this chapter will deal largely with
the "incremental changes" which distinguish the present
People's Control Committee from its predecessor, the Party-
State Control Committee. And once again, as in the case of
the early history of change and reorganization experienced
by the first Soviet state control agencies, the more recent
changes can perhaps also be most fruitfully approached by
answering two relevant questions: one concerning the impact
of the differing concepts of Soviet leaders and adminis-
trators about the proper role of control agencies in Soviet
society, and the second concerning the ways in which the
reorganization process itself has become involved in politi-
cxal power struggles.1 While both of these approaches will
In; found helpful in explaining the evolution of the People's
Cknrtrol Committee (KNK), in addition, an essential third
aspect of the committee's development deserves treatment
in detail: those changes in structure and operation that
were based upon the several years of experience of the PGK
(xmmnittees and the consequent hindsight of practice. For

in spite of the fact that the KPGK initially had drawn

152

‘ Y

Q.

153

heavily upon early Leninist models of public control, the
Soviet world in the 1960's had come a long way from the
1920's and early 1930's, and was continuing to evolve. And
in spite of the fact that the soviets, trade unions and
Komsomols had, by 1962, already experimented for several
years with efforts to organize mass participation in con—
trol, the KPGK was, at its start, a largely untried and
therefore somewhat tentative innovation. Its blueprints
were not precise. Nor could its architects foresee all
those areas where more exact specifications were needed.
Time and actual practice soon revealed some of these areas,
pointing up uncertainties, ambiguities and some impractical-
ities in the earlier schemes. Time and actual practice
also suggested where success was most likely, and where
new missions might be sought. Thus, practice and experience
were to suggest many of the changes that had already been
incorporated into the People's Control Committee by 1970.
Since the Party-State Control Committee was closely
identified with Khrushchev's leadership, surviving his
removal only a little more than a year, the transformation
of KPGK into KNK should perhaps be discussed first in terms
of the political struggle in which Khrushchev was the
loser. Shortly after October 1964, when Khrushchev was
removed from the Presidium, a plenary session of the party
Central Committee admitted A. N. Shelepin, then head of

the KPGK, into the Presidium as a full member for the first

154

time.2 This appointment placed Shelepin in a position of
unique power among his peers at that moment, for he was the
only government leader to be serving simultaneously as a
member of the Presidium, the Secretariat, and as a Deputy
Chairman of the Council of Ministers. However, in the
climate of heightened political struggle and somewhat fluid
situation which continued after the displacement of Khrushchev
from the two highest offices in the nation, Shelepin lost
ground himself. Perhaps, as a number of Western observers
have suggested, the combination of Shelepin's relative
youth, past experience and strategic position were too much
of a threat to those of his colleagues who aspired to leader-
ship of the country.3 Moreover, despite Shelepin's apparent
support of the move to oust Khrushchev, he was, by virtue

of his headship of the KPGK, closely identified with
Khrushchev's positions on how public participation in con-
trol should be institutionalized. The clear evidence
(already presented above4) of opposition to Khrushchev's
special design for the PGK Committee indicates that ready
means and motives for downgrading Shelepin existed among
some highly placed government and party leaders.

In late 1965, the CPSU Presidium prepared a draft
resolution, for consideration at the December Plenum,
proposing a reorganization of the PGK Committees to incor-
porate still greater participation by the public, to create

5

"genuine people's control committees." As Brezhnev put it

155

in his December 6th speech to the plenum: "[PGK] is not a
very precise name. It does not fully reflect the fact that
control in our country is that of the people. It would
therefore be more in line with the actual state of affairs
to transform these organs and call them peOple's control

6 He did not add the fact that the new name would

organs."
dissociate the KNK from Khrushchev, who had been denounced
roundly by this time for his many "hare-brained schemes."

On December 9, 1965, the Supreme Soviet approved the "trans-
formation" of KPGK to KNK and appointed Pavel Kovanov as the
new Chairman. At the same time, the Supreme Soviet also
acted to relieve Shelepin "of his duties as Deputy Chairman
of the USSR Council of Ministers," finding it expedient for
him "to concentrate his activity at the party Central Com—

7 It was also announced that the structure of the

mittee."
USSR Council of Ministers was being changed to allow the
Chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee to become
a member of the government.8
This statement signalled a very real change in the
structure of the new KNK, a change which more than justified
changing the name of the new committee. For, insofar as
the formal structure of the new institution was concerned,
the official organizational ties with the party were severed;
the trinity of party-state-and-public (about which Khrushchev

had been so insistentg) became state-and-public. Thus,

although the new People's Control Committee remained, like

156

its predecessor, a union-republic agency, working under the
direct guidance of the Central Committee of the CPSU and
the USSR Council of Ministers, it was no longer formally
attached to the Party Central Committee. Now, officially
it became an organ only of the USSR Council of Ministers,
its members requiring confirmation by the USSR Council of
Ministers, and, its chairmen being appointed by the Supreme

Soviet of the USSR.10

(Members of the PGK Committee, it
will be recalled, required confirmation by both the Central
Committee, the CPSU and the Council of Ministers; executive
personnel of the committee apparatus were confirmed by the
CPSU Central Committee.)

The pattern is repeated at descending levels. Com-
mittees of union and autonomous republics are likewise con-
firmed by the councils of ministers of the union and auton-
omous republics, and their chairmen appointed by the supreme
Soviets of union or autonomous republics. District, city,
area, regional and territorial NK committees are formed by
their respective soviets, and their chairmen appointed by

these soviets.11

In the old PGK committee structure, all

these committees required confirmation by the party commit-
tees at the various levels and were recognized as official
agencies of the party committees. In the case of republic

territorial and regional committees, formal confirmation of

the PGK committee chairmen and deputies was required by the

157

all-union party and state agencies, the CC, CPSU and the
USSR Council of Ministers.12

In assessing the implications of this restructuring
of the control agency under Brezhnev and Kosygin, both
power and ideological factors must be taken into account.
But first, perhaps, one should ask how much real change was
actually involved. For example, the statutory statements
about appointments and confirmations by the soviets cannot
be accepted as representing a real change in the actual

practice of selecting and confirming committee members.

Based upon knowledge of the importance of nomenklatura

 

(the lists of posts for which appointive responsibility is

3 of the

assigned to a given party or government official)1
party committees, it may be assumed that the party 222227
klatura that existed for the PGK Committee network is still
in operation for the new KNK. Confirmation exists for this
assumption in the statement by V. Zaluzhny,writing about
the city of Moscow's district party committees, that the
nonstaff inspectors of the Committees of People's Control
are confirmed "only upon the recommendation of the party

14

organs." And he adds, "Nonstaff inspectors enter into

the nomenklatura of the raikom of the party. The plans of

 

operation of the City and District Committees of People's
Control are worked out at the bureaus of the city and dis-

trict committees of the CPSU."

158

Similar testimony concerning the party's powers to
guide and to select the leading members of NK agencies at
the city level and beneath appears in the March 1969 issue

of Partiinaya zhizn:

 

Primary party organizations recommend to the City
Committee of People's Control in the capacity of non-
staff inspectors, authoritative and eXperienced com-
munists. All chairmen of Groups of NK become deputy
secretaries of the party organizations; heads of non-
staff sections of the Committee are included in the
nomenklatura of the City Party Committee. The partici-
pation of party members in the work of NK organs is
reviewed by the gorkom of the party and the primary
party organizations. . . . The orkom hears the
reports of the primary party organizations of . . .
[various local economic enterprises] on how they are
directing the work of Groups and Posts of NK. . . .
Reports and announcements of leaders of Groups are
regularly reviewed in party meetings, party bureaus,
and in general workers' meetings.1

 

The party role, in other words, is no less real for
being unstated, and removal of the "CPSU" from the "company
letterhead" has not affected the locus of real power in the
corporate leadership.16

One real effect of the restructuring, however, did
mean that the Chairman of the USSR Committee of People's
Control need no longer sit in the Secretariat of the party's
Central Committee. Hough has consequently suggested that
the reorganization of control may have been motivated by a
desire on the part of Shelepin's enemies to Whittle away
some of his excessive concentration of power. In Hough's
words, "reorganization of the Committee [of PGK]--and

especially the removal of its Chairman from the Secretariat--

provided a graceful way to ease Shelepin out of this

re

4‘.

hi

159

strategic post, for, in retaining his seat on the Secretariat,
he automatically had to give up the chairmanship of the

Committee of People's Control."17

Whether the restructuring
was cause or effect, it did have power consequences for the
Committee of People's Control. Obviously, Shelepin, with
his strong personal power base, brought a substantial aura
of power to the chairmanship of the PGK Committee. By the
same token, in Shelepin's hands the committee, as an adjunct
to power, was a potentially lethal political instrument.
When Kovanov stepped into the chairmanship of the new agency,
he did not bring any personal power to the agency. In fact,
he, himself, gained a degree of personal power from the new
position by his consequent elevation to full membership in
the Central Committee of the party.18 Moreover, although
party guidance was still intended to operate in the new
committees just as it had in the old, the official separa-
tion of the party from public control could conceiveably
weaken the prestige and authority of the control agencies.
Certainly, as pointed out earlier, this was one of the
reasons why proponents of party-state control had urged
the direct, organizational incorporation of the party into
the network of control agenCies.19

Another personnel change which should be considered
in relation to the Kovanov appointment, is the dual appoint-
ment of Arvid Pelshe to the chairmanship of the Party

Control Committee and to the Politburo, which took place

160

at the April 1966 Plenum of the Central Committee.20

While
this did not mean an increase in power for the party com-
mittee (Nikolai Shvernik, Pelshe's predecessor had also
been a member of the Presidium), it did mean that Kovanov
and the People's Control Committee were in relatively
inferior power positions to Pelshe and his Party Control
Committee, especially since the latter had, already in
January 1966, as noted by Cocks, "regained its old name of
Party Control Committee, and . . . has increasingly [since
then] assumed many of the general supervisory and disci-
plinary functions of the defunct Party-State Control Com-
mittee in the government and the economy as well as an
expanded role in matters of intra-Party control.“21
If power struggles may have contributed to the reorgan—
ization of control in 1965, there were also still clear dif-
ferences of Opinions among Soviet leaders about the best

ways to organize public participation in control. An

interesting bibliographic article in Voprosy filosofii in

 

April 1967, noted that during 1965 and 1966 there had
appeared "some 80 books, collections and pamphlets, and
more than 90 articles . . . in magazines and scholarly
journals," dealing with the broad question of the political
organization of a society building communism, which for the
most part was interpreted as involving greater participa-

22

tion of the public in managing the state. The titles of

some of the works reveal a preoccupation with the role of

161

the soviets and an inclination to criticize the "loose"
kind of public participation encouraged by Khrushchev's
populism.23 The character of the efforts to involve the
public in social affairs after the 22nd Congress, for
example, were broadly criticized in the following manner:

Most of the works of that [post-22nd Congress] period
spoke primarily of expanding the process of the demo-
cratization of our society. The practical works were
engrossed in setting up and the theorists in describ-
ing the numerous "volunteer associations" of the
working people, forgetting at times the necessity to
search for concrete ways of further democratizing the
state itself. Here the authors in fact forgot that
our soviets are not only state bodies but extremely
broad public organizations and that the main direction
of further democratization of our iystem lay in demo-
cratization of the soviets. . . .2

In the past two years, following the October and
November, 1964, plenary sessions of the CPSU Central
Committee, a turning point could be noted in the
research done in the sphere of the political organiza-
tion of socialist society. Our party's general policy
of scientific leadership of society, of expanding
democracy and heightening discipline and organization
found reflection in scholarly writings.

Among recent works, Varshuk and Razin, the authors of
this article, found other theories more to their liking,
which suggested that greater democratization lay in the
direction of increasing the role and authority of the
standing commissions of the soviets. Yu. E. Volkov, in
his book How Communist Self-Government Is Born, for example,
is quoted as saying that: "If we approach the question

from the standpoint of principle, we must recognize that

all administration in the individual branches of the

162

economy must gradually be concentrated in the hands of the

respecting standing committees of deputies."26

This discussion recalls the controversy over similar
points that was aired during the nationwide discussion of
the Draft Program of the Party Program and Rules. At that

time, very real differences of opinion surfaced concerning

particularly the role of the party in control.27

It is also relevant at this point to record the powers
of the Party Control Committee, as they were outlined in the
1961 Party Rules. Article 40 stated:

The Party Control Committee of the CC of the CPSU:
(A) verifies the observance of Party discipline by
members and candidate members of the CPSU, and takes
action against Communists who violate the program and
the rules of the Party, and Party or state discipline,
and against violators of Party ethics; (B) considers
appeals against decisions of Central Committees of the
Communist Parties of union republics or of territorial
and regional Party committees to expel members from the
Party or impose Party penalties upon them.

The separate role of party control commissions at the
lowest levels was implied in the outline (in Articles 58
and 59) of the powers of control encharged to primary party
organizations:

The Primary Party organization: . . . (E) acts as
the organizer of the working people for the perform-
ance of the current tasks of communist construction;
heads the socialist emulation movement for the ful-
fillment of state plans and undertakings of the working
people; rallies the masses to disclose and make the
best use of untapped resources at enterprises and col—
lective farms, and on a broad scale to apply in pro-
duction the achievements of science, engineering and
the experience of front—rankers; works for the strength—
ening of labor discipline, the steady increase of labor
productivity and improvement of the quality of produc-
tion, and shows concern for the protection and increase

163

of social wealth at enterprises, state farms and col-
lective farms; (F) conducts agitational and propaganda
work among the masses, educates them in the communist
spirit, helps the working people to acquire proficiency
in administering state and social affairs; (G) on the
basis of extensive criticism and self—criticism,
combats cases of bureaucracy, parochialism, and viola-
tions of state discipline, thwarts attempts to deceive
the state, acts against negligence, waste and extrava-
gance at enterprises, collective farms and offices. . . .
Primary Party organizations of industrial enter-
prises and trading establishments, state farms, collec-
tive farms; and design organizations, drafting offices
and research institutes directly related to production
enjoy ghe right to control the work of the administra-
tion.2
The foregoing passages from the Party Rules suggest
briefly the two dissimilar but related types of control
activity with which the party chiefly concerned itself:
action as the instrument of party purge, a potentially
powerful role, and the all-pervasive role of superintendent
of public morality. Through the history of control reorgan-
izations these two functions have been kept organizationally
separate. Even when party and state agencies of control
were joined to create the Party-State Control Committee,
Nikolai Mikhailovich Shvernik, who had served as Chairman
of the Party Control Committee since 1956, became Chairman
of the new Party Commission in 1962, preserving its inde-
pendence from the larger control schemes. With the renaming
of the commission in 1966, and the appointment of Arvid
Pelshe as new Chairman of the Party Control Committee, at

the 23rd Congress of the CP, and the transformation of the

Party-State Control Committee, to effectively "write the

164

party out of" its constitution, the problem of the changed
party role in the new system of NK is brought into sharp
focus.

How has the party role changed? Earlier the question
was asked30 whether the elimination of the party as an
official partner in the control structure meant a lessening
of its role in control activities. Or whether, despite the
apparent contradiction, it meant an increasingly important
role. Evidence exists that the reorganizers of the People's
Control Committee intended that the latter should be the
case.

This point-of-view was well-expressed by Pelshe him-
self, in a speech in November 1964. Recalling that the
Twentieth Party Congress had called upon the Party Central
Committee to "proceed in its work from the principle that
the actual creators of the new life are the masses, led by
the CPSU," he described the increasing role demanded of the
party in more recent times:

In the period of the all-out building of communism,
the role and significance of the CPSU as the leader and
directing force of the Soviet society has increased.
Having become--as the result of the full and final
victory of socialism in our country-—a party of all the
peOple, the CPSU is gradually expanding its guiding
influence in all areas of social life. The increased
role of the party in the life of Soviet society is
conditioned by the growing size and complexity of the
tasks of communist construction, by the upswing of the
creative activity of the masses and the enlistment of
millions of new working people in the administration
of state affairs, by the further development of social-

ist democracy, and by the growing importance of the
theory of scientific communism.3

165

The apparent contradiction between the notion of an
increasingly important role of the party in the activities
of the People's Control Committee and the statutory "writing
out" of the party from the Committee structure cannot be
taken seriously. The explanation can be best shown perhaps
by noting the close parallel which exists between the new
Statute of NK and the Soviet Constitution of 1936. In the
latter, it will be recalled, the Soviet structure and opera-
tion of government is elaborated at length with extensive
reference to the rights and powers of the Soviet government
structure, but with only two brief references to the Com-
munist Party of the Soviet Union. Yet the guidance of the
party as the real power behind the Constitution's Potemkin
facade, cannot be questioned. In the same way, it is quite
clear that the party takes a muted but irresistible hand in
directing the every-day activities of the organs of people's
control.

At the highest level it is also clear that the Com-
mittee of Party Control has also assumed a new role and new
guiding relationship with regard to the NK Committee. The
personal power relations of the two chairmen of these com-
mittees are one indicator of the new relationship between
the two agencies. As already noted, Pelshe, the Politburo
member, far outranks Kovanov, a mere Central Committee Mem-
lxnr. Moreover, there has been increasing evidence in the

Soviet press of high-level control activity on the part of

166

the KNK USSR, which was initiated, guided and encouraged
by the KPK. During the first four years of KNK activity,

for example, a survey of Partiinaya zhizn, reveals that in

 

1966 the magazine began a new department: "In the Commit-
tee of Party Control of the CC CPSU," where announcements
concerning the KPK began to appear for the first time.

Four single-page articles appeared that year.32 In 1967,
six articles appeared, and in 1968, only four. In 1969,
however, the feature appeared in at least a dozen issues.
One of these (No. 3) for the first time attacked a minister
at the highest level (First Deputy Chairman of Gosstroi of
the USSR, A. A. Etmekdzhiyan) and announced his removal from
office for misconduct. The investigation which brought
Etmekdzhiyan's conduct to light, as Christian Duevel has
pointed out, was the first one reported in which the KPK
had "combined efforts with two different organs to carry
out an investigation, and it is the first time that any
USSR ministry has been directly investigated (and not just
some subsidiary organ or local plant under the jurisdiction

33 The other two organs in-

of one or another ministry)."
volved were the Department of Light and Food Industry of
the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR People's Control
Committee. In addition to calling Minister Etmekdzhiyan
to account, the Committee also reprimanded the Party Com-

mittee of the Ministry for not ensuring the honesty of "all

officials of the apparatus regarding work connected with

167

questions of safeguarding public wealth." Duevel, viewing
Soviet events in the analytic context of the perpetual
antagonism of high-level government and party factions,
sees this encouragement of increased party activity in the
ministries as an attempt on Brezhnev's part "to use the
party committees of the ministries as a vehicle for increas-
ing his own influence within the Government apparatus. The
PCC investigation of the Ministry of Meat and Dairy Industry,
with its censure of the party committee of that Ministry,
might now prompt the party committees in other ministries
to conform to (or at least be more amenable to) the 'watch—
dog' role which the General Secretary would like them to
play, on behalf of the Central Committee, within the minis-
tries."34 Whether or not Duevel's theorizing is correct,
it does point up the fact that the Party Control Committee,
under Pelshe, has close ties to the General Secretary of
the CPSU Central Committee, and hence, all the potential
political leverage that such ties imply. Once again, as

in the past, it would not be surprising to find such an
instrument involved in power struggles quite unrelated to
the problems and overall goals of control.

When the Party-State Control Committee was trans-
formed into People's Control, certain of the changes in its
structure and operation were the result of a little maturity
and the accumulation of some experience in the actual

jpractice of involving public inspectors in control. For

168

example, instructions that were initially vague or contra-
dictory demanded clarification. And the passage of time
also changed some of the conditions and problems of control.
Although the growth of PGK was rapid, it had not
attained its present size over night. Its membership,
early in 1963 included almost two million activists, organ-
ized in 142,000 Groups and almost 227,000 Posts.35 These
had increased by September to 193,000 and 323,000 Groups
and Posts, containing three million volunteer inspectors.
In 1964, the Committee network numbered 3,280 Committees
of PGK, with more than 16,000 nonstaff sections and commis-
sions, containing more than 130,000 nonstaff workers.36
By the end of 1965, the participation in Groups and Posts
had exceeded the five-million mark.37
While the staff network did not immediately expand
with the transformation of KPGK into KNK, both staff and
volunteer workers have continued to multiply slowly over
the years. One reason for this is the fact that in such a
large nation as the Soviet Union the organization of local
Control Committees, especially in outlying areas, simply
takes years to accomplish. In Sukhumi, where I visited
“the local office of the People's Control Committee in the
snnmner of 1967, I found both the City and the District
Cknrtrol Committee housed together in the building of the

lrxxal soviet, seemingly well established. However, the

District Control Committee, I was told, had at that time

169

been in existence for only a year. Perhaps as one conse-
quence of its newness, the organization of control agencies
in the rural areas around the town was still somewhat back-
ward. The chairman of a local collective farm talked vaguely
about control groups on his farm, as if their existence had
not yet been firmly established. Even in areas closer to
the Soviet capital, the work of organization still continues.
For example, the First Secretary of the Moscow Oblast Party
Committee reported in mid-1969 that the control workers in
"industrial, transport, construction, agricultural, trade,
public catering enterprises," and others, had increased
since 1968 by 11 thousand, to a total of 150 thousand. Over
a thousand new People's Control Groups and Posts, he said,
had been created (1,288).38

Thus, during the first years of its existence, both
the staff and nonstaff membership of the People's Control
Committee has continued to grow. In 1969, Deputy Chairman
Shikin indicated that staff membership was just under 7,000,
and the combined force of people's inspectors in Groups and
Posts and attached to Committees was near 7 million, an
impressive staff-to—volunteer ratio of one-to-one-thousand.
Moreover, during the first three years of the NK's existence,
Shikin.has claimed that the number of citizens taking part
in discrete examinations must be reckoned in the "tens of

millions."39

170

Classification of the membership of the People's
Control Committees in the Statute of 1968 closely parallels
the description of the KPGK membership, except that in the
present statute, "representatives of the soviets" are
specifically mentioned at each level. Moreover, in addition
to organizing PeOple's Control Committees at all territorial
levels down to the city and district Committees (as had
been done with the PGK Committees), the new system creates
territorial units at a still lower territorial level: Groups
and Posts attached to the "Rural and Settlement Soviets of
Working People's Deputies." Groups and Posts of People's
Control, like Groups and Posts of Assistance to the Party—
State Control Committees, are also formed in "enterprises,
on collective farms, and in institutions, and organizations,"
but are further extended by the Statute of 1968 to "military
units," as well.40 An example of their work in the latter
area was described in an April 1969 issue of Krasnaya
zvezda, by an army lieutenant colonel who was chairman of
a military People's Control Group. Most of his controllers'
attention was directed to the "work supervisor's office of
the billeting-operations unit of Riga Distrist," and to
checking out complaints concerned with military housing,
such as poor construction, faulty or non-existent repairs,
etc.41 Thus, the new Committee of People's Control must be
described as having exceeded both the organizational

"reach" and the size of its predecessor.

171

The Statute on Groups and Posts of Assistance to the
KPGK (1964) had already found it necessary to state clearly
certain organizational settings where Groups and Posts
would got be formed. "Assistance Groups and Posts shall
ngt_be created in the executive committees of Soviets of
Working People's Deputies, party, trade union, and komsomol

agencies, the editorial staff of party newspapers and

2

magazines, and in schools providing general education."
Presumably this statement had established its point effec-
tively enough so that no repetition was necessary in the

new statute.

As in the case of the Party—State Control organs,
the party continues to place its trusted members in charge
of control agencies.43 As Shikin described the party rela-

tionship to People's Control organs in 1969:

Life itself and experience confirm that the power
of the control organs lies in the party leadership.
The organs of people's control function under the
leadership of party organizations; they are constantly
assisted by party committees and party organizations.
The Control Groups at enterprises, kolkhozes and estab-
lishments are as a rule headed by deputy secretaries
or members of party bureaus and party committees; and
on a higher leve1--in the raion, city, oblast, krai
and republic, the [Controll Committees are usually
headed by members of the higher party organs. The
party organs appoint the best trained, most politically
mature communists to leadership posts in the People's
Control organs. It has already become standard in the
activity of many party organizations to receive reports
on the work of control organs in the bureaus and at
plenums of the party committees, and to discuss ques—
tions involving intensification of party leadership
over them.

172

Such practices were already well established in the opera-
tions of Party-State Control agencies, but are not, however,
spelled out in any statute. '
Nor does the new Statute of 1968 make clear in an
unambiguous way to whom the control organs should properly
report. In Article 5, People's Control agencies are
instructed in a general way to "make an accounting perio-
dically before party and soviet agencies about their work."45
What this appears to mean in the case of the committees is
the regular accounting of a committee to its superior party
committee and soviet. But Groups and Posts are not so clearly
instructed. In Article 10, the latter are instructed to
"turn with questions deriving from their activity to party,
soviet, and economic agencies and to People's Control Com-
mittees." And in Article 11, it is stated that, "At their
meetings, collectives of working people may give instruc-
tions to People's Control Groups and Posts. Groups and
Posts shall report on their activity to the collectives
<1f working people that elected them." Finally, in Article
13, "People's Control Groups and Posts at enterprises, on

(xollective farms, and in organizations and institutions

shall.work under the direction of party organizations and

46

time corresponding Committees of People's Control." It

is difficult to say whether these various alternatives spell

cxnrfusion or greater flexibility in the operation of the

Groups.

173

The special circumstances existing in the Armed
Forces and in defense industries, have apparently neces-
sitated more specific instructions concerning control in
these areas. The new statute speaks of "special instruc-
tions confirmed by the Council of the Ministers of the
USSR" dealing with these particular cases, and clearly
placing Armed Forces control under the jurisdiction of the
Central KNK of the USSR.47

Another point on which the Statute on People's Control
was more specific than was the Statute on Party—State Con—
trol concerns setting up Bureaus of Complaints and Sugges-
tions. The earlier statute simply called upon the PGK
Committees to show "an attentive attitude toward letters
and complaints, warnings, and suggestions of the Soviet

48 I I I I I
However, eVidence concerning the various diVi—

People."
sions or sections of PGK Committees does indicate that
Bureaus of Complaints and Suggestions were a regular feature
of many PGK Committees. For example, I. Grushetski,
Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party and Chairman

of the Ukrainian Republic KPGK noted, in the spring of 1963,
that in the PGK Committees of the Ukraine there were 528
Complaint and Suggestion Bureaus in operation, along with
1,656 special divisions.49 Therefore, the new statute

probatdy only articulates existing practice, or ensures its

application more exhaustively, when it states that:

174

People's Control Committees shall create a Bureau
for Complaints and Proposals of working people which
shall consider proposals, declarations and complaints
submitted to the committees and shall achieve the
proper resolution of questions submitted to them. The
Bureau of Complaints and Proposals shall study the
reasons for complaints, shall bring the more important
questions deriving from letters and petitions for the
discussion of committees, and shall exercise control
over the execution of committee decisions adopted with 50
regard to complaints and suggestions of working people.

And an interesting addendum is the next statement:

Directors and officials of enterprises, collective
farms, institutions, and organizations to whom People's
Control Committees send for consideration the complaints
and proposals of working people must give their replies
thereto within the established periods.

The greater attention accorded both the formation of
the bureaus and the handling of complaints indicates a
growing respect on the part of those charged with redesign-
ing the control committees, for the usefulness of this
particular aspect of control committee activity. It remains
to be seen, however, whether today's bureaus will be able
to overcome the defects of their predecessors, established
first in 1919.52

Perhaps the area in which the new statute has made the
greatest contribution to the clarification of the procedures
of the public inspectorates is in distinguishing between the
Committee network and the Groups and Posts in the matter of
missions and powers, and clarifying in general the main
forms of operation. The wide organizational base of volun-

teer control activities--the Groups and Posts of people's

inspectors--clearly operate at the "grass roots." Their

175

field of operations might be termed the production level,
that is, they "exercise control directly at enterprises,
on collective farms, and in institutions and organs." Even
those Groups and Posts that are now also formed at the
lowest territorial level, attached to rural and settlement
soviets, are intended to coordinate their activity with
the work of control Groups "created at enterprises, on
collective farms, and in institutions and organizations
located on the territory of the corresponding soviet."53
In contrast to the Groups and Posts of Assistance,
the NK Committees serve primarily in a directing and
coordinating capacity. Their guiding role is illustrated,
for example, at the lowest NK Committee levels (city,
district, area, region and territory), where, in addition
to being charged with the exercise of "control over the
fulfillment of party and government directives and state
plans and assignments by enterprises, collective farms,
institutions, and organizations located on the territory
of the district, city, area, region or territory," and of
remedial action to eliminate shortcomings, the NK Committees
are enjoined above all to direct the successful control
activities of the Groups and posts located at these enter-
prises, collective farms, institutions and organizations.54
' The coordinating role of the committees is effected partly

through the interlinking structure of the NK Committee

network, with its own army of volunteers, and partly through

176

active efforts to guide and coordinate the efforts of many
other volunteer control agencies in mass or large-scale
investigations. Coordination also means establishing
channels of communication. Thus an important job of the
lower NK Committee is to bring "more important questions
to the consideration of corresponding party, soviet, and
economic agencies, and in necessary instances, to the con-
sideration of central institutions and organizations."55
While this same formula holds at the republic level, republic
ministries and departments are added to the list of respon-
sibilities of those Committees. The KNK of the USSR, (the
Central People's Control Committee) in its unique position

at the apex of the hierarchy, boasts powers that are

similar to those of the lower agencies, but which are stated
in the most sweeping terms: to "direct the activity of all
people's control agencies in the country" and to "exercise
control over the fulfillment of party and government direc-
tives and of state plans and assignments by ministries,
departments, soviet and economic organizations, enterprises,

56 Within this charge a special con-

and collective farms."
cern of the Central Committee of NK is the meticulous and
expedient operation of ministries and departments. Finally,
tine highest NK Committee is charged with what amounts to
-the framing of proposals for policy—making in the area of

contrrflu This committee is expected to sift the results of

cxnrtrol activities at all levels for proposals of "general

177

state significance," and present these to the Central Com-
mittee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers. In
addition, they are to generalize upon all their investiga-
tions and report to the highest party and government bodies
on conditions in individual branches of the nation's economy
and in the various ministries and departments.

The powers of punishment bestowed respectively upon
Groups and Posts and upon Committees are clearly dif-
ferentiated. Groups and Posts, the great army of amateur
inspectors, are not given powers to punish directly. They
can, however, "pronounce social censure on guilty persons,"
demand explanations for their conduct, and oblige them to
appear before the collective to report on measures taken
to eliminate shortcomings. They can also place cases in
the hands of the Comrades' Courts. They are expected to
bring guilty parties to the attention of the local adminis-
trations or to the attention of local party or other social
organizations of the collective and to submit proposals to
control committees where more extensive investigations are
felt to be needed. Regarding specific punishment, penalties,
fines, or deterrent or remedial actions, the Groups and Posts
are given consultative powers only. They may suggest to NK
Committees that certain illegal actions of local officials
be suspended, that certain monetary penalties be imposed,

or that particular individuals need to be called to account.

178

They may not, however, take these actions themselves. Such
powers are reserved to the People's Control Committees.

NK Committees like Groups and Posts of Assistance,
are expected to make a wide use of "social pressure" by
bringing "guilty" officials and their cases before meetings
of collectives of working people and public organizations,
by publishing the results of checks made, and the actions
taken regarding them, and so on. Committees, however, have
the further right to suspend "clearly illegal orders and
actions of officials," and to take direct action against
these officials themselves. For example, in addition to
penalties of censure of various grades (i.e., public exposure,
reprimand, severe reprimand), money fines can be imposed, and
the official may be demoted, removed from an occupied post
(with his subsequent employment in question), or in cases
of criminal acts, turned over to the procuracy.58 A new
practice related to assessing fines and penalties is to
enter this information in the guilty person's work book.
Under the Party-State Control Statute, money fines were

59

handled as a personal matter only. Current practice

indicates that remiss people's inspectors can themselves
.receive this punishment. Pravda, in late December 1969,60
tells of such a case when the Director of the Togliatti
qunicipal Dining Room was reprimanded and cited in his work

:record.for having ignored the criticism of a member of the

locaJ.People's Control Group and for in fact having fired

179

that inspector from her job as a dining room stock clerk.
However, the Togliatti City People's Control Committee
Chairman, himself, was later found to have been remiss in
failing to support the public inspector. As a result the
Kuibyshev Province Party Committee, in whose territory the
incident occurred, severely reprimanded the KNK City Chair-
man (along with the secretary of the City Party Committee)
and recorded all this in the chairman's own work book.61
The next highest NK Committee is intended to serve as a
court of appeal for these actions.

What clearly emerges in the current statutory descrip—
tion of the People's Control Committee is a delineation of
roles and a careful limiting of the boundaries within which
the public inspector may act. He is expected to reveal
shortcomings, waste, mismanagement and inefficiency wherever
it appears on the Soviet economic, social or political
scene, and to suggest remedies. He is not given much
authority to take punitive action; this remains the pre-
rogative of the staff, which means ultimately, directly or
indirectly, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The institutional formula for involving the volunteer
citizen in social duties while simultaneously ensuring that
his participation will not range out of bounds and usurp
"improper" authority (i.e., lose the character of the
subject-participant) closely resembles the basic format of

communist party organization. A core of full-time, committed

180

professionals, applying in organization and practice the
principles of democratic—centralism, mobilize the millions.
The same pattern is repeated over and over in the other
organizations of mass participation. The following chapter
will amply illustrate this point in the case of the public
control systems of the Komsomols, the soviets and the trade
unions.

Before leaving this discussion of the People's Control
Committee, an attempt should be made to assess the changes
that have occurred in its operations since it replaced the
KPGK. Summarizing these changes or trends in the NK Com-
mittees' development, it can be said that at the lower
levels the ongoing activities of the KNK agencies seem to
have largely continued in the directions pointed out for
them by earlier PGK Committees and Groups and Posts of
Assistance. Maturing perhaps along the way, and discarding
many of the first "one-shot" efforts to economize, they
continue to seek new areas where inspectors can "discover
reserves" (eliminate slack and waste) or otherwise con-
tribute to the well-being of the nation. An interview by
USSR KNK Chairman P. V. Kovanov in early 1969 yields some
typical examples of ongoing work by volunteer inspectors
which could easily be duplicated from the records of their
predecessors in the KPGK:

In 1968 over 3 million controllers took part in

harvesting. These were combine tractor operators and
drivers--all leading rural workers. Their economic

181

approach to the work helped save hundreds of millions
of poods of grain. Every load of grain was inspected
by people's controllers before going to the elevator.

Soviet and state organs were alerted that valuable
equipment at certain enterprises and building sites
was not being utilized, was being badly maintained,
and, worst of all, was becoming useless. The CPSU
Central Committee asked us to check this. Some 250,000
inspectors took part in this. The rigorous examination
of 38,000 enterprises and building sites proves the
scale of the work. Many defects were discovered. But
the work of the controllers did not stop here. Thanks
to their active intervention, equipment worth more
than 2.5 billion rubles was put in proper order. Even
during the check superfluous equipment worth almost
one million rubles was sold.62

At the highest levels, the KNK has been drawn much
more tightly under the tutelage of the Party Control Com-
mittee. In practice this has meant that the All-Union
People's Control Committee has occasionally wielded far
greater power against bureaucrats at higher levels than did
the old PGK Committee, although perhaps a more correct
appraisal of this relationship would be to view the advan-
tages of the closer relation as accruing to the Party Control
Committee, which now seems to have at its disposal, in the
KNK apparatus, an instrument of demonstrated effectiveness,
which even if unused further, poses a constant threat to

officials of the government and economic apparatus at the

highest levels.63

Typical of the most recent activity of the USSR
Cknmnittee of People's Control are actions it has taken with
respect to a number of ministries. For example, after a

series of inspections by its agencies of how aviation fuel

182

was being improperly conserved at Moscow airports (the
previous year the "Moscow Transport and Polar Administra-
tions had overexpended more than 3,000 tons of aviation
fuel," and the excesses were continuing), the USSR KNK
demanded that the Ministry of Civil Aviation take decisive
measures (which the committee outlined) to economize on

fuel in the future.64

In the area of agriculture, the USSR
Ministry of Agriculture and the All-Union Farm Machinery
Association were charged by the USSR Committee of People's
Control with paying insufficient attention to the utiliza-
tion of fertilizer by farms. This charge was based upon
investigations by people's controllers in the Latvian
Republic and in some oblasts of the Russian Republic, and
the USSR KNK subsequently ordered these agencies to keep a
watchful eye upon the fulfillment of its orders by the
Association, the Ministry and their local agencies.65
Several ministries have been called upon to aid the
People's Control Committee in fighting water pollution. In
one case, for example, the committee's investigations first
established the fact that the decree of the Russian Repub-
lic's Council of Ministers, "On Measures to StOp Pollution
of the Volga and Don Rivers by Unpurified Sewage," was "not
being seriously implemented in Ivanovo Oblast." Factories
emptying wastes into the Volga had failed to construct the

purification facilities for which they had been assigned

responsibility over a three—year period beginning in 1966.

183

The textile enterprises under the Russian Republic of Light
Industry, in particular, was cited for having achieved only
13% of their assigned construction of purification facili-
ties, and a formal assurance was exacted from the Russian
Republic minister, Kholostov, that these enterprises would
receive the necessary help in planning and in financing

the necessary installations. The USSR Ministry of the
Chemical Industry and the Russian Republic Ministry of the
Pulp-and-Paper Industry were also indicated, and the

Ivanovo Oblast Soviet Ispolkom was reprimanded for laxity
66

 

in control over the enterprises in its territory.
Clean water and its preservation are properly the
overall concern of the USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation
and Water Resources, which is supposed to check on the ful-
fillment by ministries and departments of measures for
preventing the pollution of lakes and rivers. But today,
the USSR People's Control Committee is invoked as a superior
control agency, charged with the organization of systematic
control over the fulfillment by ministries and departments
of the many current resolutions aimed at maintaining the
purity of the nation's water resources.67
Another recent example of KNK action with regard to
a number of ministries at the highest level was concerned
with poor utilization of freight cars, found to be caused

at enterprise level by the lag between growing rates of

basic production and insufficiently developed transportation

184

techniques. Culprits named were the USSR Ministry of Tractor
and Farm Machine Building, the USSR Ministry of Pulp-and-
Paper Industry and the USSR Ministry of the Chemical Indus-
try, along with the Russian Republic Ministry of the Build-
ing Materials, and the corresponding chief administrations
of these ministries, who permitted the adverse conditions
to exist. Actual fines were assessed only at enterprise
level (half a month's wages were revoked for a number of
plant managers), but the ministries were simply charged with
"carrying out additional measures to improve the utiliza-
tion of freight cars . . . and provide necessary assistance
in the development of transportation."68
In September 1969, the USSR People's Control Committee
checked up on why the nation's cement needs were not being
supplied, and in fact why cement production capacity had
fallen in the past three years to half its earlier capacity.
The results of their investigation showed that new construc-
tion of cement producing plants was chiefly at fault, owing
to shortages of various kinds, including the necessary
skilled labor. A formal meeting in mid-1969 of the USSR
KNK with both the USSR Ministry of the Building Materials
Industry and the USSR Ministry of Installation and Specialized
Construction Work may have served the useful purpose of
pressuring the ministries to make special efforts in the

needed direction, and may also have served as a useful

185

channel of information, revealing to policy-makers possible
areas where future allocations might need adjusting.

Even the USSR Central Statistical Administration comes
under the scrutiny of the USSR People's Control Committee.
A checkup of the Central Statistical Administration in the
spring of 1969 revealed that this office was disregarding
letters "telling of violations of the established reporting
procedures" (which often bypass the statistical agencies
themselves, duplicating and elaborating upon their work),
and in its apparatus "such warning signals were not always
carefully considered, at times no prompt and effective
measures were taken on their basis, and control over the
fulfillment of directives on the abolition of the unlawful
reporting was weak." The KNK Committee‘s only action in
this case, however, was to publish its criticisms in Pravda.7o

The above cases are interesting examples of the
People's Control Committee operation at the highest level
and adequately demonstrate the "horizontal reach" of the
USSR Committee of People's Control across ministerial lines.
One final case, which illustrates its "vertical reach,"
should also be included. In this instance, the USSR NK
Committee assumed the role of protector of the rights of
local enterprises against the encroachments of an oblast
soviet. V. Babushkin, head of the USSR KNK's Department of

Planning and Finance Agencies, in a Pravda article accused

local ispolkomy at oblast level and below of seeking

 

186

illegally to siphon off funds (such as the production
development funds set up by enterprises under the new
economic reforms) from enterprises within their jurisdic-
tional territories:

Exceeding their rights, individual local soviets
have adopted decisions obliging the directors of state
enterprises and organizations, including those of
union and republic subordination, without compensation
to allocate cash to urban construction projects, to
give them transportation, provide them with free
materials and assign to them workers, engineers and
technicians, paying for their labor out of production.

Such demands do not fit into the financial plans
of the enterprises, in which every ruble has its
strictly defined purpose. Let us cite one of many
similar examples. In Rostov it was decided to build
a canal for the sport of rowing at a cost of 4,500,000
rubles, although there was no particular need for it.
No funds had been earmarked for this purpose in the
city's budget. The oblagt soviet executive committee
made the enterprises responsible for expenditures on
the canal's construction. It was only after the
intervention of the USSR People's Control Committee
that the erroneous demands were canceled.71

 

In the case cited, the action of the USSR People's Control
Committee against an oblast ispglkom in defense of local
enterprises, was an application of power that would seem
excessive, but which apparently was necessary to bring
.about the desired result.

From its supreme vantage point, and with its abilities
to operate vertically and horizontally, the KNK is seen to
1x3 uniquely situated to undertake the solution of many pro-
lolems that transcend both ministerial and regional boundaries.
'the committee thus seems to have the capability of tackling

true kind of large-scale complex control problems--such as

187

water purification and the conservation of other natural
resources, often involving a variety of social and economic
organizations, as well as much territory--that are becoming
more frequent in today's highly industrialized societies.
By the same token, the NK Committee shows at least the
potential, because of its wide-ranging grasp, to deal with
many modern problems which defy half-measures and the
treatment of symptoms.

Further consideration of KNK's capabilities and
achievements will be resumed in the final chapter of this
study. However, the subject of the People's Control Commit—
tee cannot be treated adequately without a careful examina-
tion of the development of the many other volunteer inspec-
tion groups that exist today in the Soviet Union, organized
by the Komsomols, the soviets, and the trade unions. An
important mission of the People's Control Committee, it
will be recalled, is the coordination of the work of these
groups. Furthermore, the part which the KNK itself plays
in the broad movement of "participatory democracy," as
Soviet theorists speak of the latter, must be properly
viewed as constituting only one fraction of a larger whole
which includes the activities of these other mass organiza-
tions. In the words of I. V. Kapitonov, at the "Ceremony
Commemorating the 99th Anniversary of Lenin's Birth,"

Real democracy exists wherever the people actually

control the affairs of state. . . . The vital and
actively functioning mechanism of Soviet socialist

188

democracy consists of the more than 2 million deputies
and more than 25 million soviet activists, almost 7
million workers in the People's Control agencies, more
than 5 million participants in permanent production
conferences, and the tens of millions of members of
party, trade union, Komsomol, cooperative and other
public organizations. Our people are proud to repeat
Lenin's words: 'We are the state.'72

The next chapter will trace the development of mass
participation in control by the Komsomols, the soviets and
the trade unions, explore the unique contribution of each
to the public control effort, and consider how the People's
Control Committee attempts to coordinate its efforts with

theirs.

CHAPTER V- -NOTES

1See above, Ch. II.
2Plenary Session of the CC, CPSU, November 16, 1964.

3A5 Jerry F. Hough has pointed out ("Reforms in
Government and Administration," in Alexander Dallin and
Thomas B. Larson (eds.), Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1968), p. 27), "The power of the
Chairman of the Committee of Party-State Control resided
in the combination of his ability to acquire information
about the performance of key political and administrative
personnel and his access to the three most important
policy-making committees--the Politburo, the Secretariat,
and the Council of Ministers. He had the potential oppor-
tunity to discredit other officials with his investigations
and a number of forums at which he cou1d subtly use the
information which had been gathered against them. Moreover,
he was one of the few Politburo members who had extensive
information about candidates for vacancies in such posts
as obkom First Secretary and was in a position to challenge
candidates suggested by the General Secretary and to
suggest alternatives. Since the Chairman (Alexander
Shelepin) was a man who had made a particularly wide range
of contacts in his earlier career, he inevitably posed a
potential threat to the General Secretary." Hough may be
assuming too much authority on the part of the Party-State
Control Committee Chairman in the matter of selecting obkom
secretaries and other party officials. Such power to inter-
cede in matters affecting party membership presumably
continued to reside in the separate Party Commission as
its primary function. As Paul Cocks notes: "at the end
(of 1962, the Party Control Commission and local Party com-
Inissions reverted back to their former limited role of
essentially courts of appeal. The C.P.C. [Ts.K.K.] was
renamed Party Commission under the Central Committee. Even
the word 'control' was erased from its title"; "Politics
of Party Control: The Historical and Institutional Role
of Party Control in the CPSU," Ph. D. Thesis (Harvard

University, 1968), p. 591.

4See above, Ch. III.

189

190

5The Decree of the Plenum is dated December 6, 1965:
"O preobrazovanii organov Partiino-gosudarstvennovo kontrolya"
(On the Transformation of the Organs of Party-State Control),
Spravochnik partiinovo rabotnika, Vypusk shestoi (Party
Official's Handbook, Sixth Issue; Moscow, 1966). p. 120.

6Pravda, December 7, 1965.

7Pravda, December 10, 1965. During this period
Shelepin was apparently serving as Party Secretary in the
special area of Asian Affairs, in which capacity he visited

Hanoi in June 1966.

8Ibid.
9See N. S. Khrushchev, "Doklad," October 17, 1961,
Materialy XXII sezd KPSS (Moscow, 1961), p. 105.

10"Statute on People's Control Agencies in the USSR,
confirmed by Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU
and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, December 19,
1968," Soviet Statutes and Decisions, Vol. V, No. 2 (Winter

1968/691: p. 116.

11Ibid., p. 115.

12Spravochnik partiinovo rabotnika, Vypusk pyaty
(Party Official's Handbook, Issue Five, Moscow, 196477 p.

305.

13Kratkipoliticheski slovar (Short Political Diction-
ary; Moscow, 19647, p. 199.

14V. Zaluzhny, "Narodny Kontrol" (People's Control),
Partiinaya zhizn, No. 13 (July 1966), pp. 18-19.

15partiinaya zhizn, No. 5 (March), 1969, pp. 68-69.

16However, see below, p. 159, for a discussion of
the effect of loss of party prestige and power, and the
disregard of one Leninist argument.

17Hough, op. cit., p. 27.

18Pravda, December 10, 1965.

19One of Lenin's arguments for uniting Rabkrin and
the Central Control Committee of the party, it will be
recalled, was to enhance the authority and prestige of
Rabkrin. See above, pp. 52-53. See also, pp. 97-98.

191

20pravda, April 9, 1966.

21Cocks, "Politics of Party Control," p. 592.

22V. V. Varchuk, and V. I. Razin, "Issledovaniya
v oblasti politicheskoi organizatsii sotsialisticheskovo
obshchestva" (Research in the Sphere of the Political
Organization of Socialist Society). Voprosy filosofii
(Questions of Philosophy) No. 4, (1967), pp. 134-43.

23The following titles reveal the interest in the
soviets: "Increasing the Role of Local Soviets and Develop-
ment of the Public Principle in their Work," "The Local
Soviets at the Present State," "The Combination of State
and Public Principles in Governing Society," "The Soviets--
Bodies of Power and Popular Self-Government," "Improvement
of Democratic Principles in Soviet State Administration,"
and "The Soviets--The Working People's Regime."

24Ibid., p. 135.

25Ibid.

26Yu.‘E. Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsya kommunisticheskoe
samoupravlenie (Thus Communist Self-Government Is Born;
Moscow, 1965), p. 129; See also, Stanovlenielkommunist-
icheskovo samoupravleniya (The Formation of Communist
Self-Government; Moscow, 1965), pp. 97, 103, 119-20;
Varchuk and Razin, op. cit., p. 138.

 

27See the full discussion by Grey Hodnett, "Khrushchev
and Party-State Control," in Alexander Dallin and Alan F.
Westin (eds.), Politics in the Soviet Union: Seven Cases
(New York, 19667] pp. 129-42; see also, Herbert Ritvo,§§§
New Soviet Society (New York, 1962), p. 174, n. 240.

28Jan F. Triska, Soviet Communism, Program and Rules
(San Francisco, 1962), p. 177.

zglbidor Pp- 188‘91.

30See above, p. 157.

31See Pravda, Nov. 6, 1964.

32Nos. 18, 19, 21 and 22.

33"Radio Liberty Dispatch," March 3, 1969.

34Ibid.

192

35Pravda, March 22, 1963.

36V. Gorin and Yu. Polenov, "Partiino-gosudarstvenny
kontrol v deistvii" (Party-State Control in Action),
Kommunist, No. 4 (April), 1964, pp. 68-69.

37Pravda, December 13, 1965.

 

38V. Konotop, "Budnichnye zaboty dozornykh" (The
Daily Cares of Patrols), Pravda, July 22, 1969, p. 4.

391. Shikin, "Leninskie printsipy narodnovo kontrolya
v deistvii," (Leninist Principles of People's Control in
Action), Partiinaya zhizn, No. 2 (January), 1969, p. 9.

4oSoviet Statutes and Decisions, Vol. V, No. 2 (Winter
1968/69): pp.(110-l21

41Lieut. Col. V. Sakulin, "Letter to the Editors:
Paper Patches," Krasngya zvezda, April 11, 1969, p. 2,
translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXI,
NO. 15 (1969)! Pp- 27-28.

 

 

 

 

2
Soviet Statutes, p. 91.

43The "Statute of 1964" bluntly states that "The
chairman of a Group simultaneously is the deputy secretary
for control of the party organization"; Soviet Statutes, p.
92.

 

44Partiinaya zhizn, No. 2 (January), 1969, pp. 14-15.

 

45Soviet Statutes, pp. 115-16.

 

46Ibid., pp. 112-13.

471bid., p. 117.

48Soviet Statutes, p. 82.

491. Grushetski, Pravda, May 25, 1963, p. 4.

50Soviet Statutes, p. 119.

 

SlIbid.

52See above, pp. 34, 51-52.

53Soviet Statutes, p. 112.

 

54Ibid., p. 115.

193
551bid.

561bid., p. 116.

57Soviet Statutes, pp. lll-12.
58

 

Ibid., pp. 117-180

59Narodny kontrol v SSSR (People's Control in the
USSR; Moscow, 1967), p. 168.

60"Est i epilog" (There is an Epilogue), Pravda,
December 28, 1969, p. 2.

61"Gde zhe epilog?" (Where is the Epilogue?),
Pravda, October 9, 1969, p. 3; see also, Pravda, December

2§T‘I§69, p. 2.

62P. Kovanov, interview, in Ekonomicheskaya gazeta,
(Economic Journal) January 4, 1969, p. 7.

63See above, pp. 165 ff.
64"Berech goryuchee" (Save Fuel), Izvestia, December
2' 1969' p. 30

65"Vse udobreniya--v delo," (Put All Fertilizers to
Work), Izvestia, April 15, 1969, p. 3.

66"Berech reki i vodoemy" (Protect Rivers and Bodies
of Water), Izvestia, April 15, 1969, p. 3.

67See "Zabota o Baikala" (Concern for Baikal),
Izvestia, February 8, 1969, p. 2.

68"Ne dopuskat prostoya vagonov" (Do Not Permit
Freight Car Demurrage), Pravda, August 23, 1969, p. 2.

691. Velichkin, and Yu. Mikhailov, "Dvoika za stroiku"
(Failing Mark in Construction), Izvestia, September 2, 1969,

p. 3.
7GP. Bogatyrev, and V. Shterev, "Ne nuzhnatskaya

'samodeyatelnost'" (We Don't Need this Kind of "Autonomy"),
Pravda, March 20, 1969, p. 3.

71V. Babushkin, "Kazhdy rubl--po naznacheniyu" (Every
Ruble to its Purpose), Pravda, August 27, 1969, p. 3.

721. V. Kapitonov's speech appeared in Pravda,
April 23, 1969, pp. 2-3.

CHAPTER VI

PUBLIC CONTROL SYSTEMS OF THE SOVIETS,

TRADE UNIONS AND THE KOMSOMOLS

The Committee of People's Control encompasses within
its structure of Committees and Groups wide participation
of the public as inspectors. However, its "mass aspect" is
further enhanced by the coordinating role which it performs
in relation to other public inspectorates. Long before the
creation of the Party-State Control Committee, in fact as
early as the Bolsheviks' first decade in power, such public
organizations as the soviets, trade unions and Komsomols
‘were experimenting with various types of volunteer inspec-
torates. Although participation in these groups waned
during the Stalinist era, they experienced a vigorous renewal
'under Khrushchev, well before the first appearance of the PGK
Committee and its Assistance Groups, when all of the parent
organizations began again to experiment with volunteer
.inspectors. As a consequence, with the creation of the PGK
(Committee, an explicit mission given the new control agency
:nas to coordinate its work with the already existing groups
(of controllers and activists of the public organizations,
xdhile coopting representatives of these organizations into

'the staffs of PGK Committees.l

194

195

The overall coordinating role of the party in this
process should not, of course, be minimized. When the PGK
Committees were forms, they contained, it should be recalled,
not only the specific representatives of the soviets,
Komsomols and trade unions, but also representatives of
both state and party organs, and the last two held positions
of leadership. The post of chairman of the republic, oblast : 1
and Egg} PGK Committees was filled by secretaries of the i
respective party committees, or by deputy chairmen of the 4
respective councils of ministers or soviet executive com- ‘
mittees. At city and district level, the PGK chairmen were
party bureau members and executive committee members. Thus,
insofar as the formal organizational chart and staffing
procedures could ensure coordination of the public control
activities of Komsomols, trade union activists, members of
standing commissions of soviets, and Groups of Assistance
to the PGK Committees, the composition and leadership of
the PGK Committees attempted to do this, setting a pattern
for the later People's Control Committees to follow.
The significance of the coordinating role that the
People's Control Committee is intended to perform with
respect to the activities of the other public organizations
can scarcely be overemphasized.2 It has at least three
broad aspects. Of first importance, perhaps, the reach of
the Committee is thereby obviously extended, both as

.regards numbers of public inspectors involved in control

196

activities, and also in relation to the wide diversification
of missions which can be performed. For example, the mis-
sions of the different public organizations are in some
cases clearly distinct. The trade unions concentrate upon
inspections of the working conditions and service accommoda-
tions of workers and employees, the correct observation of
labor laws and safety regulations, and on the whole tend to
emphasize problems related to employment. Komsomols in
various labor sites, while often working in close coopera—
tion with trade union inspectorates, tend to design their
activities more directly in line with the KNK missions of
fulfilling precisely party and state directives, seeking
unused reserves, applying new techniques, and so on. Else-
where, they seem generally to stand ready to serve as
activists in whatever mission the people's controllers
have underway and are perhaps only distinguished from other
volunteer inspectors by operating in some special fields,
such as education and the armed forces, where there are
large numbers of young people. Volunteer groups attached
to the soviets tend to play civic roles. "Many questions,
tied with housing and cultural construction, with the work
of health establishments, enterprises of trade and public
dining establishments are checked [by people's controllers]
‘together with the soviet gkpiy and are reviewed by soviet
organs."3 Moreover, the soviet apparat is controlled by

its own inspection groups.

197

Secondly, the communication function which the NK
Committee network performs is basically dependent upon
coordination. The coordinating link provides the line of
communication, and the implications of strong or weak com-
munication are extensive.4 To suggest an obvious example,
effective education of control groups depends upon the
spread of innovative ideas and techniques, both connected
with the specific control operation under examination and
with better production methods. The People's Control Com-
mittees are responsible for organizing the gathering and
dissemination of such information. Effective communication
also enhances the responsiveness of the NK Committee,
especially in relation to the information imputs of its
Bureaus of Complaints and Suggestions. Here, the impact
of good communication is clear, for a suggestion is only
as effective as its reach. Moreover, the wide publicity
intended to pervade control operations is itself a form
of effective communication, dependent upon KNK's informa-
tion gathering and coordinating functions.

Finally, while it is true that control duplication is
not of necessity always undesirable, and that multiple
control systems, serving as counter-checks, may in some
cases encourage greater accuracy of checking, it is clear
that multiple uncoordinated control activities could mean
much duplication, waste of motion, and inefficiency, as

well as the neglect of certain areas, unless these numerous

198

control efforts are examined at some coordinating point to
rule out such overlap, to economize efforts and system-
atically to seek out the inadvertently disregarded areas.
An example of one field of mutual public concern where
coordinated control activities might well avoid much lost
motion is that of the trade and dining establishments,
where all the public organizations conduct inspections.
Other examples that suggest the utility of coordination

in the planning and execution of inspections and the follow-
up actions taken will be dealt with in later sections of
this chapter.

To judge how far the "reach" of the first Party-State
Control Committee was extended by its initial assignment to
coordinate the other public control groups, we must examine
first the size of the contingents of volunteer inspectors
attached to the public organizations which existed by late
1962. In the case of the soviets, the great post-Stalinist
expansion in their work and membership began with a January
22, 1957, Central Committee decree, "On Improving the
Activity of the Soviets of Worker's Deputies and the
Strengthening of their Ties with the Masses."5 This decree,
Howard Swearer says,‘"touched off a widespread effort in
succeeding years to revamp the operations of local govern-
mental bodies."6 A Soviet source credits the decree with
inaugurating a "new, contemporary state in the development

of control activity of the soviets."7 One point the

199

directive emphasized was that many ispolkomy, and leaders

 

of economic organizations as well, were not regularly giving
an account of their work to their soviets. This laxity was
said to lead to lack of control and a weakening in the
guidance of the soviets. In the words of the decree: "Not
everywhere are the standing commissions working well. In
many soviets the commissions exist formally, not drawing

into their work an aktiv of workers, kolkhozniki and intel-

 

ligentsia. The party organs and ispolkomy of soviets are

 

obligated to improve drastically the work of standing com—
missions. . . . "8
An example of the kind of results which followed the
appearance of the decree is the "Statute on Permanent Com-
missions of Local Soviets of Working People's Deputies of
the Ukrainian SSR, passed by the Ukrainian SSR on May 31,
1957." According to its directions, standing commissions
were to be formed attached to the soviets of regions, dis-
tricts, cities, settlements or rural localities, and designed,
"according to the needs of the local situation," to deal with
such questions as "the budget, local industry, agriculture,
public education, health, culture, social insurance, trade,
municipal services, public services, road construction,

9 By 1959, the

transport, communications, and others."
number of deputies to local sov; as had increased in the
USSR since 1956 by 350,000, bringing the total to 1.8

million,10 and standing commissions which had been formed

200

by local soviets contained more than a million of their
deputies, along with another one and one-half million
activists.ll

The importance of the standing commissions and a
succinct account of their origin and rapid development
through the period just discussed has been presented by L. G.
Churchward and deserves repetition here:

More than any other fact, the increasing activity
of Standing Committees is an indication of the growing
popular participation in Soviet local government.
Standing Commissions first appeared in 1940, but in
the post-war Soviets they have steadily increased their
role so that by 1955 over 70 per cent of all deputies
in local Soviets were serving on the Standing Commis-
sions. In the Moscow Oblast (1955) in the village
Soviets alone there were 2,986 Standing Commissions,
including 806 Budget Commissions, 750 Agricultural Com-
missions, 779 Cultural Enlightenment Commissions, 360
Road Construction Commissions, 149 Trade Commissions,
and 44 Public Education Commissions. At present [1957]
there are 14 Standing Commissions of the Moscow Oblast
Soviet and about 220 deputies and 250 activists serve on
these Commissions. The Standing Commissions do not
act administratively, they may not issue orders or take
obligatory decisions, but they serve an invaluable
purpose as training schools for Soviet citizens through
investigating questions and preparing reports and recom-
.mendations for the Soviet, its Executive Committee and
Departments.12

What Churchward has described here was only the begin-
ning of a growth in the activities and membership of the
soviets which was still continuing a decade later. In the
local soviets alone, more than two million deputies were

13 Attached to these

elected in the March 1965 elections.
local soviets were more than 300,000 commissions, containing

1,666,000 deputies (80% of the total number of deputies).

201

\

The rest of the membership of the standing commissions was
made up of more than 2,660,000 persons. By late 1967 the
total number of soviets' deputies had reached 2,055,00.14
In the Ukraine alone, by 1967, there were said to be 422,576
deputies in soviets, standing commissions and executive com-
mittees, with more than 8 million persons taking part "in

the independent public organizations attached to the soviets

15

and acting under their direction." For the Soviet Union

as a whole, the latter group contained "more than 23 million
activists."16
During this same period, systems of public control
sponsored by the trade unions followed a similar course of
rapid growth. As Emily Brown has observed, the trade unions
have had a long history of enlisting "volunteers" in active
union work on "public assignments": "Checking on observance
of labor legislation, both through the state function of
inspection and through education, persuasion, and public
influence, is largely carried on by the unions in the plants
and the regional union committees and councils. Much of the
work is done by millions of workers, engineers, and others,
enlisted for 'public work in their free time' on special

I "l7 The

commissions and assignments as 'public inspectors.
mission of protecting the worker's rights and in every way
preserving labor law has been a traditionally important role
of the unions. However, following the pattern of reduced

public involvement extending through the Second World War,

202

trade union control activities had ceased, and their role
and importance had suffered eclipse. Even during the post-
war years, when the factory committees began to reorganize
the control apparatus, the new commissions found it dif-
ficult to regain lost ground, authority and prestige. Only
during the late 1950's did the trade unions assume a leading
role among the mass public organizations in experimenting
with and encouraging the development of new public inspec-
torates.

In 1958, for example, the Rostov Oblast Trade Union
Section for the Protection of Labor had begun sponsoring
inspections, involving non—staff personnel, to conduct
daily checks on the fulfillment of socialist labor laws.18
And the same year, a joint resolution of the VTsSPS (The
All-Union Council of Trade Unions) and the USSR Ministry
of Trade called for the creation of Commissions of Public
Control to monitor the operation of trade and public
dining enterprises, worker's supply sections, and food
depots. Factory committees set up these commissions and

19 By 1965,

staffed them with "more than 50,000 activists."
with more than 600,000 trade enterprises and over 170,000
public dining rooms in the Soviet Union, this area of

public service had become a prime target of trade union
volunteer inspectors. The further projected growth of trade

and dining establishments and better service envisaged by

the 1961 Party Program was expected to require further

203

"systematic control by increasing numbers of workers over
the activity of trade and dining enterprises."20
By 1962, as Brown notes, volunteers were being used
in trade union staff work to the extent that 23 regional
sovProfs and industrial union committees were operating

without paid staff.21

gpgé, a little more than a year

later, recorded these numerical advances: sovprofs and
regional committees now had 8,000 non~staff departments,

over 24,000 public councils and commissions, almost 100,000
nonstaff instructors and 23,000 public technical inspectors.
Down to and including the district level, 850,000 members
were participating voluntarily in active union work; below
this level "95% of all factory, plant, and local committees
and district and city committees worked without paid staffs."22
At the X Plenum of the VTsSPS, held July 26-27, 1962, the
decree, "On Developing to the Fullest the Social Bases in
the Work of the Trade Unions," stressed in particular the
great importance of the citizen inspector. This decree
instructed union factory committees and meetings to utilize
factory workers and office personnel on the widest possible
scale to check on the use of public funds, labor legality,
correct application of salary scales, fulfillment of plans
for housing construction and distribution, the operation

of trade and dining enterprises, and the activities of

health and social insurance agencies.23 Later that year,

the announcement of the new Party-State Control Committee

204

raised new problems of defining the mutual spheres of
activity of new and old inspectorates.

The first instructions to the unions were not very
explicit on this score. The XIII Congress of Trade Unions
of the USSR, for example, directed the trade unions "actively
to assist the work of the organs of Party-State Control."24
In practice the immediate result of these instructions was
the enlistment by 1965 of a "hundred thousand trade union
activists in the Groups and Posts of Assistance to PGK Com-
mittees and as members of the PGK Committee staffs."25 In
addition, the ranks of the public inspectors in union
agencies were said to include 10 million workers, represent-
ing a substantial contribution of the trade unions to the
public control effort.26

The Komsomols in 1962 also contributed toward widening
the scope of early Party-State Control Committee activities,
at the same time offering well established patterns for
organizing volunteer activities. Their "Light Cavalry
Brigades," dating from the 1920's, had continued to exist
through the years, and in the early 1950's retained their
right to act as inspectors, although according to evidence
cited by Allen Kassof from 1951, the right was at that time
little used: "One formal channel of Komsomol activity is
based on an arrangement that permits local organizations

to bring before the relevant party unit or ministerial organ

questions of inefficiency and waste; however, Komsomol

205

officers are reported to resort to this practice only
"27

rarely. . . . However, Kassof's evidence from a later
date shows the existence of a "more frequently employed
device . . . the 'light cavalry raids,‘ unannounced inspec-
tion tours by Komsomol teams designed to combat cheating

and waste."28

Writing about their activity in the early

1960's, Kassof says, "Komsomol raids are now a quite wide-
spread practice in the Soviet economy and seem to be highly
valued as a deterrent to corruption as well as to ordinary

29

inefficiency." The example with which he illustrates

this point is taken from an article in Komsomolskaya pravda,

 

May 12, 1961, which describes current activities in rural
areas:

Komsomol members on the Kirov Collective Farm,
Korenovskaia District, working jointly with Communists,
have organized posts and motor patrol groups for the
protection of the harvest. Petty thieves have not
been brought into court. The Young Communists have
photographed them and posted their photos with the
caption: 'Here they are, the pilferers of collective
farm wealth!‘ They have become the subject for dis-
cussion at meetings and in wall newspapers. Many 0
those who have found themselves in the 'pillory,‘ as
the collective farmers themselves aptly call it,
begged with tears in their eyes that the photos be
taken down and promised to work honestly.

But the Komsomol patrols have apprehended not only
petty thieves. They have also caught some inveterate
crooks. . . . The Komsomol patrols helped the Kirov
Collective Farm not only to raise but also to defend
a rich harvest. . . .

The application of the new law on intensifying the
struggle against swindlers, loafers, and antisocial
and parasitic elements must be combined with an increase
in vigilance and with a strengthening of the protection

206

of public wealth. The Komsomol committees of state

and collective farms can and must play a great role
here. The Komsomol committees of collective and state
farms and enterprises must make wide use of such tested
forms of Komsomol and youth participation in the pro-
tection of public wealth as Komsomol posts, Komsomol
patrol groups for the protection of the fields, and
Komsomol 'light cavalry' raids.

The above case is of interest particularly because it
illustrates methods of checking and applying disciplinary
actions which were to be closely copied not only by the

Komsomolski Prozhektor (Komsomol Searchlight), the control

 

system of volunteers set up two years later, but also by
the new PGK Committees. In this respect, the Komsomol
light cavalry raids of the late 1950's and early 1960's
served as models for later actions by people's inspectors.
Although this particular period of revived Komsomol checking
activity does not coincide with Shelepin's leadership of
the Komsomols, since he left them in 1958, nevertheless his
subsequent headship of the PGK suggests that the continuity
of practices was not entirely coincidental. On the other
hand, it would reflect only basic good sense for Shelepin
and his colleagues to make conscious use of this earlier
Komsomol experience, as well as the early innovations of
the soviets and trade unions with volunteer inspectorates,
in fashioning the later institutions and practices.

The diversity of practices, missions and structures
'of the public control systems that had developed by the late

1960's in the USSR deserves further emphasis here if only to

207 1

point up the substantial size of the problem of coordination

which the People's Control Committee inherited in this

regard. Therefore, before discussing the latter subject

directly, a brief examination needs to be made of these

varied activities and institutional forms. Illustrating

the wide-ranging interests with which the soviets have

become occupied, standing commissions are formed according ]

both to "branch" and "functional" principles. Examples of

LJL_.__L

the branch type are the standing commissions of the USSR
Supreme Soviet for industry, transport and communications,
and those attached to local soviets for health or for
communal and housing affairs. Functionally oriented com-
missions are the planning and budget commission of the USSR
Supreme Soviet, or the standing commissions for socialist
legality of the local soviets. Existing at all levels, the
commissions are intended not only to conduct overall
surveillance of the government apparat as a whole (at the
level of the Supreme Soviet), but to examine in detail the

30 At its

daily operation of administration at all levels.
August 1966 session, the USSR Supreme Soviet organized the
following standing commissions for each House: Mandate
Commissions, Planning-Budget Commissions, and Commissions
for Industry, Transport and Communications, for Construc-
tion and the Industry of Building Materials, for Education,

Science and Culture, for Trade and Services, for Legal

Proposals, for Foreign Affairs.31 N. V. Podgorny, Chairman

208

of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, in his report "On
the Organization of Standing Commissions of the Soviet of
the Union and Soviet of Nationalities," summarized the
advantages of the new commissions. They would more care-
fully examine the plans for the nation's economic develop-
ment, for the state budget, deeply analyze the plan indicators
in certain branches of the economy and culture, and more
thoroughly analyze the work of the USSR ministries and
departments, ferreting out causes of shortcomings. Below
the all-union level, standing commissions are expected to
conduct extensive control over the work of the government

32 Thus, at the level

apparatus at their respective levels.
of local soviets, "standing commissions check on the execu-
tion of the directives of the soviet and of its ispolkom,
of directives of the superior organs, the fulfillment of
laws and decrees of the government," and they verify the
work done on behalf of the soviet's constituents. They
also systematically check the work of the sections and
administrations of the ispolkom, and of enterprises and
establishments (on questions related to the competency of

33 Some standing commissions (depending

the commissions).
upon the particular decree under which they operate locally)
conduct inspections of the fulfillment of the orders of

their own soviets and i§polkomy by all organs, establish-

 

ments and enterprises, and even citizens located in the

territory of the given soviet.34

209

An illustration of trade union control activity in
quite a different area of interest concerns the inspection
of trade and public dining enterprises. This is only one
area where the trade unions employ volunteer inspectors,
for they are also enlisted to help state and sovprof tech-
nical inspectors in checking safety and health provisions
at work sites, or as members of plant Commissions on Protec-
tion of Labor to check safety engineering, sanitation and
the general observance of labor legislation.35 However, the
work of trade union inspectorates in public dining estab-
lishments offers us a clear picture of what inspection by
these groups entails. By the Decree of July 31, 1964, the
Presidium of the VTsSPS confirmed a new "Statute on the
Commission and Groups of Public Control of Factory, Plant,
and Local Trade Union Committees over the Work of Trade

35 which defined the pro-

and Public Dining Enterprises,"
cedures for organizing these control groups and the opera-
tional techniques they were intended to employ. As the title
of the statute indicates, the organizational structure has
two forms: the Commission and the Group. The Commission

is the directing and coordinating instrument responsible

for the over-all improvement of workers' trade and dining
facilities; the Group is the instrument chiefly of public
involvement and of practical day-to-day checking. Thus,

Commissions are smaller (though the statute makes little

distinction, commissions being specified as not less than

210

5 members, Groups as not less than 7), and less numerous.
"A Commission of Public Control is formed by the Factory,
Plant or Local Trade Union Committee [FZMK] of an enter-
prise, institution, or educational institution" for the
purpose of ensuring day-to-day control over the work of
trade and public dining enterprises.37 This Commission,
made up of "the most active workers and employees of the
enterprise or institution" as judged by the FZMK, operates
for a term of one year under the leadership of a member of
the factory committee. Its mission is to dedicate itself
to "the improvement of services of trade enterprises for
the workers, employees, and members of their families on
the basis of day-to-day public control over the work of
stores, luncheonettes, restaurants, house kitchens, coffee
shops, snack bars, depots, and fruit and vegetable kombinaty,
(not only uncovering shortcomings in the activity of trade
and public dining enterprises but also helping to eliminate
'them."38 The Commission works according to a plan framed
for it by the FZMK, and accounts directly to the FZMK.

For the purpose of on-going operations in trade and
(lining establishments, the Commission holds elections for
(iroups of Public Control. Each trade and public dining
(Enterprise, depot, etc., is assigned a Control Group, which
cxarries out the following day-to-day tasks: 1. Takes part
ill the drawing up of plans for trade turnover and other

enaonomic indicators of a trade and dining unit. 2. Makes

211

daily checks of the observance of workrules. 3. Verifies
details of food preparation, storage and handling, including
adherence to menus, adequate satisfaction of public demands,
etc. 4. Checks goods for quality. 5. Suggests new,
improved methods of serving the public. 6. Watches for
discrepancies in prices charged, weights sold, etc. 7.
Watches for discourtesies and apathy in service to the
public. On this point the statute says: "The Group sees

to it that there is a complaint and suggestion book in trade
enterprises which is permanently located in a visible,

39 8. Checks special security measures

accessible place."
for storing valuable materials. 9. Helps to secure better,
mechanized equipment. 10. Helps with preparation of the
weekly, or ten—day menu plan. 11. Helps directly with
repair and maintenance of trade and dining enterprises.

12. Checks the maintenance of sanitary and personal hygiene

rules by service personnel. l3. Checks at depots or fruit

and vegetable kombinaty on correct fulfillment of orders

 

and methods of distribution, and in addition, studies the
(correctness of the orders placed by stores, i.e., "the
status of calculations of the demand for goods, the timely
(nonveyance of this demand to the industrial enterprises,
cyther suppliers, or superior trade organizations."40 14.
liinally, the Group rewards excellence of service which they

(liscover, by presenting brigades, sections, departments and

irudividual workers with suitable awards, including not only

212

awards of "Shock Workers" and of "Enterprises of Communist
Labor," but also such special awards as, "Brigade of Dis-
tinguished Service of Buyers," or badges: "Excellent Worker
of Soviet Trade," "Excellent Worker of a Consumers' Coopera-
tive," and, as the statute notes, "other encouragements."41
These tasks of the trade union Group of Public Con—
trol adequately summarize the day-to-day checking which
these units are supposed to perform. The Commission, while
directing the Groups in this work and being ultimately
responsible for the quality of their performance, has much
more far-ranging duties. It is responsible, for example,
for the overall equitable placing of trade and dining
facilities to best serve all the workers. Working with the
FZMK and the management of the enterprise, it attempts to
secure the establishment of these facilities, not only
convenient to the workers' place of work, but to their
living quarters as well, and to equip these facilities,
providing them with fuel, transport, and inventory "of the
lnost modern kind." The Commission attempts to insert a
section concerning the improvement of such facilities in
'the union's collective agreement with management, and helps
.in.drawing up the trade turnover plan and other economic
:indices of a worker's supply section. It handles all the
(Irganizational work of control--the preparation of meetings
(If workers and employees held by the FZMK or the shop com-

rnittee to which directors of an enterprise or of the trade

213

or dining establishment must make an accounting, the election
of Groups of Public Control, their instruction in methods

of control and party and government decrees, as well as
technical matters and regulations related to the trade and
dining facilities, and the general supervision of the Groups'
activities. It draws up proposals based on all these prac-
tical findings aimed at the improvement of trade and dining
facilities. It brings questions concerning the work of trade
enterprises and the subsidiary farms, maintained by some
enterprises,42 to the attention of the FZMK, of general
meetings or of conferences of workers and employees.

Turning from the trade union inspectorates, we find
that many similar "task forces" are formed by Komsomols at
enterprise work sites. The Komsomols, however, have, in
their volunteer control network of "Prozhektoristy" a more
'versatile inspection instrument, systematically organized
to respond to control needs in any situation where young
4Communists are found. The structure of the Komsomolski

IProzhektor in fact resembles the organization of the People's

 

(kontrol Committee. Like the latter, it is made up of two
Ixarts: a staff hierarchy and a broad base of grass roots
:inspectorates. The staff organization, comparable to the
ITK Committee network, comprises the "headquarters" of the

Kxnnsomol Prozhektor. Staff units of this apparatus are

 

(Ireated in Komsomol committees at all territorial levels.

qurus, the Central Headquarters of the Komsomol Prozhektor

214

was created in the Central Committee of the Komsomol and
headed by the first secretary of the All—Union Komsomol

organization.43

And, according to the "Statute on the
Komsomol Searchlight," of March 20, 1963, corresponding
units, headed by the respective secretary of the Komsomol
committee, were to be created "in industrial and rural
production committees, the district committees, city,
regional and territorial committees of the Komsomol, and
the Central Committee of the union—republic Komsomols."44
The broader enlistment of both Komsomols, and the "most
authoritative and energetic non-Komsomols" as well, was

to take place at the enterprise level, where detachments

and groups or posts of Komsomol Prozhektor were to be organ-

 

ized. "Detachments of 'Komsomol Prozhektor' shall be

 

created at enterprises, construction sites, on state and
collective farms, institutions, scientific research insti-
tutes, design offices, and designing organizations. Groups

or posts of 'Komsomol Prozhektor' shall be formed in shops,
45

 

divisions, and sectors." The practical work of these
detachments and groups is now carried on under the close
supervision of the People's Control Groups.

According to the 1963 Statute, the entire "sub-

organization" of the Komsomol Prozhektor is under the guidance

 

of local Komsomol agencies, carrying out missions assigned
by the respective party organizations, the agencies of the

KNK and the Komsomol committees. Komsomol meetings,

215

plenums and activist groups are empowered--and are expected--
to hear regular reports on the Prozhektor activities. And
Komsomol committees are given the authority to coopt and

confirm the Prozhektor staffs. They are expected to choose

 

these members from among "the directors of detachments of
'KP,' Komsomol activists, the foremost people in production,
representatives of the intelligentisia, and the youth press,
radio and television." Detachments and groups are formed
by the "enlistment" of reliable young workers.46
In sum, the contribution of Prozhektor in extending
the reach of the People's Control Committee seems to be
chiefly in providing a young army of volunteers, available
to join forces with the People's Control effort in whatever
way seems most expedient in a given situation. This point

is supported by the following characterization of "KP"

work: "Komsomolski Prozhektor is an important form of

 

mass participation of the Soviet youth in the performance
of tasks presented them by the organs of People's Control,
in assisting party organizations to eliminate shortcomings
in the work of enterprises and establishments. However,
"KP" does not enter into the system of organs of People's

Control.47

While the sizable public control systems already
existing in 1962 and the variety and multiplicity of their
tasks conveniently presented the KPGK with a domain of

<operations underway, they also challenged the KPGK with a

216

formidable task of coordination. In the following sections
some methods of achieving coordination that have since been
worked out will be examined. The need for careful coordina-
tion in practice of the various groups of public control

is so apparent to the observer of the Soviet systems of
public control that it is somewhat surprising that more
careful efforts were not made in advance of the appearance
of the Party-State Control Committee to specify forms and
relationships more precisely. Clearly it was anticipated
by the designers of the KPGK that effective coordination of
investigations could help to avoid duplication of efforts
and wasted time and could contribute to the mutual improve-
ment of the various control efforts, and further that
experience could be profitably shared. However, how this
would be done was left to the ingenuity of practitioners
and administrators of control operations. Practice, over
time,did produce a number of cooperative relationships
between public inspectorates of the public organizations
and the People's Control agencies.

One general form of c00peration is the joint consi-
deration of plans of inspection. Another is the joint
inspection itself or the subsequent joint discussion of
Inethods of handling problems which are raised during the
«course of investigations. An important effort at coordina-
‘tion is the enlistment of trade union, soviet, or Komsomol

"controller-citizens" in the work of seminars conducted by

217

the organs of People's Control. Perhaps of greatest
importance are follow-up coordinated efforts which bring
local, low-level problems to the attention of higher
agencies of authority whose involvement and actions can
have decisive effect in particular local cases. By such
"vertical" involvement of higher PeOple's Control Commit-
tees or higher party or state agencies the "reach" of the
KNK in extended in another important dimension.

The following examples begin with some of the concrete
methods of cooperation worked out by the People's Control
Committees with trade union volunteers. At one chemical-
pharmaceutical factory, PGK Groups and Posts of Assistance
created for control over the "introduction of rational pro-
posals and the protection of labor" were said to be working
closely with the respective commissions of the factory com-
Inittee. Important results of their investigations were
presented at a joint session of the buro, the People's
Control Group and the presidium of the production confer-
ence.48 Clearly, when trade union organizations already
exist in an enterprise for purposes which the new control
«groups tend to duplicate, it has been to their mutual
aadvantage to work together. At one factory manufacturing
anitomobile parts an examination undertaken by the local
<3roup of Assistance touched upon the questions of raising
ZLabor productivity and the quality of production. Here it

xyas found expedient for the Group to consult closely with

218

the leadership of the factory production conference. When
the Groups of Assistance turned to the inspection of tech—
nical security, this investigation was organized together

with the trade union Commission for the Protection of

Labor.49

An account of cooperative work in a Kirghiz textile
plant rather fully describes several other forms control
coordination takes in practice. Here, the factory produc-
tion conference has attached to it, four commissions: for
the use of raw materials, for financial audits of the
enterprise, for the quality of production and for the pro-
ductivity of labor. The Groups of Assistance of PGK early
established ties with each of these commisSions, as well
as with the presidium of the production conference. Joint
checks were performed with the appropriate groups, and the
results of these checks were subsequently discussed by the
jpresidium of the production meeting. How such cooperation
can prove of mutual advantage was shown by a case which
.involved large losses of raw materials during the production
process. Ordinarily these losses were reported monthly,
Ifilt their causes were by that time quite impossible to trace.
People's controllers, instituting a day-by-day accounting
(If the raw materials with the help of the volunteer inspec-
tors of the trade union, pinpointed the daily losses, which

(XNlld then be much more effectively dealt with.50

219

In the case of the volunteer inspectorates of the
soviets, these often work side by side with Assistant Groups
of the NK Committees at local levels, where they are con-
cerned with many questions related to the ordinary citizen's
living conditions, with housing, with cultural building,
with the work of medical institutions, with enterprises of
trade and public dining establishments, and so on. For
example, in Tbilisi, an Assistance Group of the housing
administration of a local suburb, having made a survey of
the needs and wishes of the local inhabitants, was able to
satisfy some of their requests by soliciting the coopera-
tion of local soviet volunteer groups, as well as higher
PGK authorities. Proposals were drawn up on the basis of
the Assistance Group questionnaire for the lengthening of
the local bus route, the installation of additional telephone
service, repair of streets and sidewalks in the settlement,
the opening of several new shops for the sale of essential
goods, and so on. These were brought to the joint considera-
tion of the City PGK Committee, members of the standing
commissions of the local soviets, workers of corresponding
sections and administrations of the ispolkom, and other mem-
bers of the soviet EEEEXJ and subsequently, the proposals
of this group were presented to the Tbilisi City Soviet,
libere action was taken to satisfy the needs of the suburban

. 51
community .

220

Another example, this one from a city raion in
Sverdlovsk, similarly illustrates both the varied control
tasks that standing commissions perform at lower levels
and how their work is coordinated with the efforts of the
people's inspectors. Here, the question of how to involve
wide citizen participation in PGK activities was considered
at the meeting of the ispolkom of the district soviet.
Standing commissions and PGK Groups of Assistance were
subsequently called upon to work together at the Sverdlovsk
Machine-Building Plant

to check on the fulfillment of party and government

directives on improving the quality of production;

at the Sverdlovsk Staff of Conductors--[to check] the

condition of production and financial discipline and

the service of passengers; at the Krupski Sewing

Factory [to inspect] the handling of customers'

orders; and at the Bread and Macaroni Kombinat [to

determine] how well socialist property was Being 52

conserved and how economically flour was being used.
The combined forces of standing commissions, nonstaff
sections (especially those concerned with trade and dining
establishments) and PGK nonstaff sections conducted inspec-
tions of trade establishments in the raion, checking on
their mechanization and use of refrigerator equipment, on
the style of work in restaurants, observance of trade rules
and regulations concerning the preservation of socialist
property, the economizing of fuel and electricity, and so
(on. Finally, the Housing Commission of the ispolkom, in

(nonjunction with the Bureau of Complaints and Suggestions

(of the Committee of PGK, checked on the attention being

221

given to the regulations by which living quarters were
locally assigned.53

As these examples once again confirm, the field of
operations of local soviet standing commissions is as varied
as are the many needs of local communities, and it includes
as well the whole apparatus of local state government.
Standing commissions at all levels, in fact, play a sizeable
role in control, and as the chief representatives of the
public in checking upon the entire state apparatus, their
role is a distinctive one. In other areas, their control ’3
duties often overlap with those of other public inspector-
ates. Trade and public dining enterprises are obvious
examples. Thus, the need for coordination with other con-
trol groups in such areas perhaps provides an added reason
for the reorganization of People's Control, which seems
intended to tie the structure of this organization more
directly to the soviet organs themselves.54

Existing separately, but with its own chain of command
and channels of communication, the Komsomol control system
has made its own independent efforts to systematize and
coordinate earlier sporadic and disorganized methods of
achieving control objectives. One source, commenting on
the early formation of KP organs in Leningrad in the fall
of 1962, noted that "Komsomolski Prozhektor united the

already existing raiding brigades, Komsomol Control Posts,

the Staffs for New Technology, the Councils of Young

222

Specialists, and the Young People's Construction Bureau."55

The examples which follow illustrate forms of coordination
which have subsequently been developed between the Komsomol

Prozhektor and the People's Control Committee at the "grass

 

roots" level.

The first case concerns the Administration of the
Kirov and Admiralty Ship—building Factories whose investiga-
tion showed an excessive waste of metal scraps resulting
from the production of factories in its territory. Direc-
tives were issued, and managers of enterprises gave promises
to stop the waste of valuable scraps, but the situation
regarding metal losses remained as before. In view of the
ineffectiveness of this single, sweeping investigation of
the use of waste metal products, the oblast headquarters

of Komsomol Prozhektor decided to commission factory staffs

 

of "KP." To them, on the spot, shortcomings could be more
easily seen and the causes pinpointed and eradicated.

Accordingly, Prozhektoristy_of the Kirov and Admiralty

 

Shipbuilding Factories organized a mass investigation of
the utilization of the wastes of production and established
a regular check of the enterprises in their territory.

The Komsomol Prozhektor of the Kirov factory showed
special zeal in this matter. Together with the People's
Controllers of the enterprise, members of “KP" went
around the iactory territory, visited the shops, the
sectors, established what kind of stores of unused metal
could be directed to production, why certain leaders of
shops did not trouble themselves about the collection
of metal, about the economic use of wastes from the

 

 

223

blast-furnace and from other metallurgical production.
On the initiative of the staff, all the shop Komsomol
organizations began a constant watch over the disposal
of the by-products of production. . . . They not only
observed but also took active part in the collection

of metal scrap, redirecting it to metallurgical produc-
tion. In the course of one week one open-hearth shop
received an extra 800 tons of metal extracted from

the waste.

The materials of the raid of the Komsomol Prozhektor
were considered at the meeting of the City PGK Committee.
To this meeting were invited the managers of many enter-
prises that were failing to utilize wastes of production
and secondary raw materials, workers of the Leningrad
City Office of Glavvtorsyre (the Chief Administration of
Secondary Raw Materials) and of the Leningrad Regional
Economic Council. The talk was sharp, principled. The
meeting strongly indicted those who failed to make the
best use of the wastes of production, throwing on the
scrapheap needed industrial raw materials. For the
unnecessary disposal of a great quantity of waste paper
and for failing to fulfill agreed upon obligations
with a unit of Glavvtorcyre, the City Committee of
Party-State Control imposed a money fine in the amount
of half his month's salary upon N. M. Ashurov, the
deputy director of the printing firm, 'The Printing
House.’ The deputy director of the factory 'Electrician,‘
S. M. Nikitin, received equally severe punishment. In
its decision, the Committee of Party-State Control
obligated the leaders of the enterprises of the Leningrad
Oblast Administration of the Russian Chief Administration
of Secondary Metals to strengthen control over the
accounting, storing and rational use of metal scraps,
waste paper and other byproducts of production, to
prevent their unnecessary loss. In order to implement
this decision, the combined forces of the Raion Committee
of PGK and the Groups of Assistance and the Komsomolski
Prozhektor of the enterprises were to be called upon.

This raid taught the Komsomol Prozhektoristy how to
organize a mass inspection, and clearly showed that
unused reserves are everywhere, that it is necessary
only to uncover them and direct them to the service
of the economy.

The singular economies of this raid made it possible
to consider a still further valuable undertaking of the
Komsomol Prozhektor. This took place at the time of
the all-union mass inspection of the inventory and
utilization of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, the
conditions of their accounting and storage which had

 

 

 

 

 

224

been launched by the PGK Committee of the Central Com-
mittee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers.

Prozhektoristy of the drop—forge shop of the factory
"Bolshevik" . . . carried out a raid, examining the
expenditure of metal. Great disorders were discovered:
scrap of metal waste, rusting machine tools under the
open sky, pieces of stores scattered about--all this
did not escape from the attentive eyes of the young
inspectors.

But what could be done to prevent new nuts, washers,
deficient bearings, lathe shavings, chisels, drills
from falling into the mountains of shavings intended
for smelting? . . . How could each kilogram of metal
be turned to account?

It was decided to bring this up for discussion at a
Komsomol meeting. Members of the raiding group described
to these young people what kind of losses the factory
was suffering from uneconomic expenditure of metal,
and pointed out specifically several culprits.

"It is necessary to return to the struggle for
economic expenditure of metals at each work site,"
decided the young people of the drop-forge shop. "Have
each Komsomol become a Prozhektorist first of all at
his work bench, at his own place of work."

Soon after the meeting, a special Creative Group
was formed, attached to the factory staff of the Komsomol
Prozhektor. Its staff was made up of young technologists,
economists, rationalizers, and innovators of production.
This group began helping the Prozhektoristy to carry out
an analysis of the expenditure of metal in the shop,
announcing results of raids and defining their tasks.

The initiative of the Komsomols of the drop-forge
shop was supported by the factory Group of Assistance
to Party-State Control. Experienced engineers, technolo-
gists, workers were brought to the assistance of the
young people. They considered what could be done by
each worker and by the whole collective to economize
the expenditure of metals and to increase their utiliza-
tion. It was decided to retain scraps suitable for the
preparation of small items and not send these off for
smelting, and to pay strict attention to the quality
of the preparation for work of instrument, presses and
hammer. It was pointed out also that much metal could
be economized by means of lowering the discard in the
making of small parts, by the more rational dispersal
of materials, and by the introduction of progressive
technology.

The example of the Komsomols of the drOp-forge shop
quickly found support in other shops of the enterprise.
In many of them "Creative Groups" were formed to help

 

 

 

225

the Komsomol Prozhektor and actively joined the search
for unused metal reserves. Members of the factory
staff of "KP," together with the shop PGK Group of
Assistance, considered the plan of work, talked over
the methods of carrying out raids in the enterprise,
about the issuance of "Molniya" ["Lightning," the
Komsomol local news sheet used to publicize control
activities], and wall newspapers, advertizing the
course of the mass inspection of the accounting,
preservation and use of ferrous and nonferrous metals.
In the "Economizing Compaign" were included all the
detachments and posts of "KP," many young workers and
engineering-technical personnel.

The very first months after this mass compaign
began brought glad tidings. The Brigades of Communist
Labor of Nikolai Sokolov, Sergei Klimov, Antoliya
Kopronov and Ivan Berezin saved more than 800 tons
of metal.56

 

This lengthy example of the joint activities of the

Komsomol Prozhektor and the organs of PGK illustrates the

 

way in which the mutual contacts make the work of each
group more effective. First of all, the combined forces

of Assistance Groups and Prozhektoristy made possible a

 

broader, "grass roots" inspection than had been possible
before. These inspectors were able to make observations
of work in progress at the lowest level--where they them-
selves were often concerned and where some of the malprac-
tices were occurring. Without this kind of inspection at
the lowest levels, it is not surprising that earlier
administrative investigations had been unable to uncover
these root causes. Moreover, the inclusion of a small
"army" of "KP" and PGK inspectors in the business of
longterm, day-by-day surveillance of waste undoubtedly
created new opportunities for the more effective elimina-

tion of unnecessarily wasteful practices.

226

The union of Komsomol and Party-State Control activi-
ties had repercussions at higher levels as well. Taking
advantage of the authority of the Leningrad City PGK Com—
mittee, the controllers were able to indict negligent
managers at a fairly august assemblage of interested govern-
ment and economic officials. Obviously, the Komsomols by
themselves could not exert this kind of influence, but with
the power to threaten ultimate fines as a result of their
inspections, they might expect greater cooperation from
factory managers in the future.

Finally, the ready cooperation of technicians, engi—
neers, and skilled members of Assistance Groups in such a

venture as the Prozhektor "Creative Group" could greatly

 

facilitate the innovation of new methods and techniques

of improving production. Subsequently, those techniques
found useful could be easily communicated to other Komsomol
groups concerned with control problems, and applied else-
where.

Cooperation of people's controllers and production
conferences makes possible more effective types of control,
extending the implications of control itself. For example,
'when production conferences and engineering personnel
‘Mork out recommendations on the mechanization and automa—
tion of production processes, or on the better organization
of labor and production, or on ways to improve the quality

(of production and to lower costs, such recommendations can

227

have impact only if they are acted upon. As Lukyanov and
Rodionov have concluded: "It is very important that the
control over the fulfillment of these recommendations be
reflected in the plans of the PGK Groups of Assistance for
carrying out inspections, raids, and checks."57 However,
while stressing the very great importance of ties between

58

PGK and the factory production committee, these authors

insist that direct contacts between PGK Groups and trade
union public inspectorates are equally important, though
perhaps for different reasons. In the latter case, special
importance attaches to the educational impact of control
upon the participant, who thereby "passes through a school
of instruction in the management of production."59
Time and experience have not diminished the need for
cooperation. The realization of this point is expressed
in the proposals of the Plenary session of the Central
Council of Trade Unions which opened in Moscow on January
27, 1970. The somewhat random and unsystematic joining of
forces in mutual activities is no longer considered
sufficient by itself, although, as V. I. Prokhurov, a
Secretary of the Central Council of Trade Unions asserted,
'hIoint checkups with People's Control Agencies should become

"60

2a more widespread practice. Urged now is the union of

(nontrol groups at the factory level into "joint commissions.‘

According to the plenum resolutions:

228

The plenary session of the Central Council of Trade
Unions emphasizes the necessity of further strengthen-
ing the trade unions' ties with the People's Control
agencies in the struggle for a regime of economy. To
this end, they should set up joint commissions for
supervision over the preservation ofimaterial goods,
draw up plans for the joint verification of the ful-
fillment by economic organiZations of the decisions of
directive agencies on cutting administrative and over-
head expenses and production costs, and appoint trade
union representatives to participate in checkups, 61
inspections and the work of PeOple's Control Groups.

 

 

And it is important to note that the January 1970 Trade

Union Plenum continued to stress the goals of heightening

the efficiency of production and of enlisting all the working
people in this struggle. Perhaps characteristically, A. N.
Shelepin, Chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions,
noted on that occasion:

It is especially important constantly to work on
increasing all employees' sense of responsibility and
discipline for the work assigned to them, for the
fulfillment of state plans and the prompt commis-
sioning of production facilities and the swiftest
possible assimilation of rated capacities.

Finally, the plenum resolutions reiterated the old charges:

to develop in every way the public principle in the
activity of the trade unions [themselves], to strive
systematically to reduce expenditures on the main—
‘tenance of the paid staff of trade union agencies and
the organizations and institutions subordinate to them,
and more widely to enlist the trade union aktiv in the
activity of these organizations and institutions.62

Greater public participation in control and management
remain on the lips of Soviet leaders as a prime method of
"increasing all employees' sense of responsibility and

discipline. "63

229

The examples that have been presented here for the
most part illustrate the positive values which effective
coordination by the People's Control agencies of widespread
control efforts "from below" can and does achieve. What
this summarizes, however, is not a balanced inventory of
actual practice and results, but an ideal picture of “1
accomplishment, an encouraging yardstick of achievement,
which is apparently intended by the Soviet authors of the
materials cited to draw the public inspectors forward in
faithful emulation. Only such an isolated example as the ,:
urging of the Trade Union plenum for institutional reforms
to achieve closer ties between People's Controllers and
trade union volunteer inspectors does suggest that coordina-
tion may not on the whole be proceeding as smoothly as
desired. Considering the magnitude of the task of coordina-
tion--which grows as the ranks of inspectors themselves and
their missions increase in number--the absence of negative
aspects in the evidence presented here would clearly be
misleading if accepted as an appraisal of how well the KNK
is realizing its potential as chief control coordinator.
In the next chapter, where a general, overall evaluation
will be attempted of how well the People's Control Committees
are carrying out their chief missions, evidence concerning
the clashes, dysfunctions and chaos of much control practice

and focussing upon the difficulties of the public inspector's

230

assignments, will hopefully present a more balanced appraisal

of actual achievement.

. 5‘5“.”

CHAPTER VI--NOTES

1V. Evdokimov, Organizatory massovo narodnovo kontrolya
(Organizers of Mass People's Control, Moscor, 19657, p. 37.

28ee Ibid., p. 42.

3Ibid., p. 44.
4See above, Ch. I, p. 28 ff.

5Spravochnikpartiinovo rabotnika (Party Official's
Handbook; Moscow, 1957), pp. 448—57;’it'has been pointed
out by Christian Duevel ("Radio Liberty Dispatch," December
13, 1957) that the plenum which passed this decree on the
soviets took place at a moment when Khrushchev's prestige,
owing to the Hungarian intervention in November 1956, was
"at its lowest point since the death of Stalin." Duevel
advances the theory that "Khrushchev's opponents, who were
mainly entrenched in the Government, used the opportunity
to press for a greater role and more competence for the
soviet (i.e. Government) organs." He further suggests
that the subsequent "reshuffle of the Presidium at the June
[1957] plenum signified a severe setback for the Government
representation in the supreme policy-making organ of the
CPSU. Henceforth and throughout Khrushchev's tenure of
office the party apparat held the absolute majority in the
Presidium of the Central Committee. The earlier intentions
to give more 'rights' to the soviets remained thus largely
on paper. Khrushchev's overthrow in October 1964 was bound
to reopen this sore problem. In point of fact, in late
November 1964 Izvestia came out with the complaint that the
role of the SOViet organs had been 'belittled' under
Khrushchev. . . . The directive Pravda editorial of Dec-
ember 6, 1964 'The State of the Whole People' finally spelt
out the new line which was fairly positive for the Govern-
ment organs. However, this favorable constellation did not
last very long. It seems that by the end of 1965 (when
Shelepin was ousted from the Party-State Control Committee)
Brezhnev had completely regained the initiative and was
once again implementing the old Khrushchev line in relations
between the party and state organs." What Duevel has traced
is the continuing tug—of-war between "pro-soviet" and "pro-
party" groups, who disagree on the locus of the authority

 

231

232

in the Soviet state. The evidence is that the "role of

the soviets as the leading one" is often argued, but that
its proponents have been in a position only intermittently
(as in January 1957, again when the 1961 Party Program was
written, and perhaps also in 1965, when the People's Con-
trol Committee structure was reformed) to attempt to imple-
ment its precepts.

6Howard R. Swearer, "Popular Participation: Myths
and Realities," Problems of Communism, Vol. IX, No. 5
(September-October 1960), p. 43.

 

7Narodny kontrol v SSSR (People's Control in the
USSR; Moscow, 1967). p. 49.

 

8Spravochnik_partiinovo rabotnika, 1957, p. 454.

9Soviet Statutes and Decisions, Vol. V, No. 2
(Winter 1968/69), p. 73.

loSwearer, Problems of Communism, p. 43; Izvestia,
February 17, 1959.

11"Vybory v Sovetu" (Elections to the Soviet), Sovet
Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya, No. 2 (February), 1959, p. 4.

12L. G. Churchward, "Continuity and Change in Soviet
Local Government, 1947—1957," Soviet Studies, IX (1958), P.
271; Yu. V. Todorskii, Postoyanpye komissiimestnytp
Sovetov deputatov trudyashchikngya (The Standing Commis—
sions of Worker's Deputies; Moscow, 1955), p. 4; interview
of Churchward with A. A. Vayuzlin, August 28, 1957; A.
Medvedev and F. Khlystov, Kulturno—prosvetitelnaya rabota
selskikh Sovetov (Cultural-educational work of Rural
Soviets: Moscow, 1953); A. Va. Luzhin, Postoyannye komissii
mestnykh Sovetov deputatov trudyashchikhsya (Standing
Commissions of Local Soviets of Worker's Deputies; Moscow,
1953); A. K. Aleksandrev, Postoyannaya zhilishchnokommunalnaya
komissia gorodskovo Soveta deputatov trudyashchikhsya,
(Standing Communal—Housing Commissions of City Soviets of
Workers' Deputies; Moscow, 1955).

13NK v SSSR, p. 93; See also, Sostav deputatov mestnykh
Sovetov dgputatov trudyashchikhsya, izbrannykh v marte 1965 g.
(Composition of Deputies of Local Soviets of Working People's
Deputies Elected in March 1965; Moscow, 1965), p. 44.

14M. P. Georgadze, "XXIII sezd KPSS o povyshenii roli
Sovetov deputatov trudyashchiksya" (The XXIII Congress of
the CPSU on Heightening the Role of Soviets of Working

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

233

People's Deputies), XXIII sezd KPSS i voprosy gosudarstvennovo
stroitelstva (XXIII Congress of the CPSU and Questions of
State Construction; Moscow, 1968), pp. 16-17.

15P. B. Bersheda, "Uchastie obshchestvennosti v
deyatelnosti sovetov (po materialam Ukranskoi SSR)" (Public
Participation in the Activity of the Soviets, According to
Materials on the Ukrainian SSR), Ibid., p. 190.

16

 

NK v SSSR, p. 93.

 

17See Emily C. Brown, Soviet Trade Unions and Labor
Relations (Cambirdge, Mass., 1966), pp. 86 and 112.

18E. Panova, Kontrol profsoyuzov za soblyudeniem
trudovovo zakonodatelstva (Control of the Trade Unions over
the Achievement of Labor Legality; Moscow, 1967, p. 7.
Panova also notes that the technical inspector is ubiquitous
in industry and [mechanized] agriculture, "the basic link
accomplishing state surveillance over the protection of
labor in the system of the trade union." p. 4.

19V. Syrov and G. Orkin, Spravochnik obshchestvennovo
kontrolera (Handbook of the Public Inspector, Moscow,ii965i,
p. 6.

20

 

 

Ibid.

21Trud, July 28, 1962.

22See Brown, p. 112; Trud, October 29, 1963; see Brown,
pp. 112-114, for further discussion and evidence in the press
of this development.

23

 

Ibid., p. 19.

24Materialy XIII sezda professionalnykh soyuzov SSSR
(Materials of the XIII Congress of USSR Trade Unions;
Moscow, 1964), p. 100; see also p. 124.

25A. N. Lukyanov and V. A. Rodionov, Partiino-
'gosudarstvennykontrol v promyshlennosti (Party-State
ControI in Industry; Moscow, 1965), p. i75.

26Ibid.

27Allen Kassof, The Soviet Youth Program (Cambridge,
l!ass., 1965): p. 113; the evidence cited is from N. Sizov,
"Zadalneishii podem raboty komsomolskikh organizatsii
lyredpriyatii" (On the Further Development of the WOrk of

234

Komsomol Organizations in Enterorises), in Komsomolskaya
rabota na predpriyatii (Komsomol Work in ththnterprise;
Moscow, 1951), pp. 809.

28

 

Kassof, Soviet Youth, p. 113.

 

29Ibid., p. 114

30NK v SSSR, p. 131.

 

31Izvestia, August 4, 1966; In the December, 1966
issue of Soviet State and Law, two legal scholars, S. G.
Novikov and M. A. Shafir were already arguing for increasing
further the powers of the Mandate Commissions to include
checking the performance of deputies on behalf of their
constituencies.

32On the reforming, controlling and organizing func-
tions of standing commissions see K. F. Sheremet and G. V.
Barabashev, Sovetskoe stroitelstvo (Soviet Building), p.
230; NK v SSSR, p. 141.

33

 

NK v SSSR, p. 142.

 

34Particular examples are the decrees on the work of
the standing commissions of local soviets in effect in the
Uzbek, Kazakh and Georgian republics; NK v SSSR, pp. 142-43.

35Brown, Soviet Trade Unions, pp. 86, 112, 119, 124,
194, 195, 221.

36This statute has been translated in Soviet Statutes,
pp. 64-72, from V. N. Alipov, M. I. Kogan, I. N. Sadikov,
conmu, Pravila raboty torgoyykh predpriyatii iyprodazhi
tovarov: shornik normativnykh materialov (Rules for the
‘Work.of Trade Enterprises and the Sale of Goods: A Collec-
'tion of Normative Materials, 3rd rev. ed., Moscow, 1965),
13. 456. This statute followed a period of growth of these
entemprises stimulated by two joint decrees of the Central
Ckxmnittee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers.
1TH; first, ratified February 20, 1959, was "On the Further
Grtnuth and Improvement of Public Dining Establishments,"
arui the second, passed on August 8, 1960, was "On Measures
fcu: the Further Improvement of Trade."

37Syrov and Orkin, Spravochnik, p. 9; In the case of
larpne factories with union shop committees, the shop com-
mittee can form a separate Control Commission.

38£pid., p. 11; and Soviet Statutes, pp. 65-66.

235

39Soviet Statutes, p. 69.

 

40Soviet Statutes, p. 70.

 

41Ibid.

42The Commission is also responsible for attempting
to increase the productivity of these farms and to organize
public control over the proper use of their produce. A
Commission is also intended by the statute to be attached
to the worker's committee of sovkhoz (state farms) to
check on the proper distribution an allocation of agri-
cultural produce and municipal services, according to law,
for the public dining of workers and employees. See
Soviet Statutes, p. 67.

43"Polozhenie o 'Komsomolsom prozhektore'" (Statute
on the Komsomol Prozhektor), confirmed by the Central Com-
mittee of the Komsomols, March 20, 1963. The statute was I“
first published in Komsomolskaya pravda, March 23, 1963.
It can also be found in Spravochnik narodnovo kontrolera
(Handbook of the People's Inspector; 2nd ed., Moscow,(I965),
pp. 36-42; and has been translated in Soviet Statutes and
Decisions, Vol. V, No. 2 (Winter 1968—69), pp. 96-99.

44

”I I."

 

 

 

 

Spravochnik NK, p. 38.

 

45Ibid., p. 38.

46Ibid., pp. 38-39.

47Narodny kontrol v SSSR (People's Control in the USSR;
.Modcow, I967), p. 173.

48

 

Ibid., p. 176.

49Sovetskie profsoyuzy_(Soviet Trade Unions), No. 16
(1963), p. 4.

50
177—78.

 

Lukyanov and Rodionov, PGK v promyshlennosti, pp.

51V. Evdokimov, Organizatory massovovo narodnovo
loontrolya (Organizers of Mass People's Control; Moscow,
7.965), p. 45.

52

 

Ibid., p. 45.

53Ibid., p. 46.

236

54While theoretically the involvement of the public
in all these groups is considered to further what Soviet
writers speak of as the "democratization" of Soviet society
(meaning apparently the voluntary assumption by ordinary
unpaid citizens of more and more of the country's management
tasks), the incorporation of volunteers into the soviets
has received the greatest recent emphasis. This has been
especially true since the establishment of the People's
Control Committee. In fact, one recent Soviet source has
flatly stated that "the basic role in creating people's
control belongs to the soviets" (NK v SSSR, p. 37), a claim
presumably based on Lenin's assertion that establishment of
such control would signify that "Russia had one foot in
the door of socialism" (V. I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie
sochinenii, XXXI, p. 445). And many Soviet writers today
see Soviet "democratization" or "Communist self-government"
as centered in the further develOpment of the standing
commissions of the soviets where the participation in con-
trol of the public elements is centered: "Without [enhancing
the role and broadening the powers of the soviets' standing
committees] . . . it is impossible to enhance the role of
the soviets in all spheres of the country's life. This is
an important problem, a link in the single process of
strengthening the Soviet socialist state and gradually
transforming its administrative bodies into communist self-
government"; V. V. Varchuk and V. I. Razin, "Issledovianiya
v oblasti politicheskoi organizatsii sotsialisticheskovo
obshchestva," (Research in the Sphere of the Political
Organization of Socialist Society), Voprosy filosofii
(Questions of Philosophy), No. 4 (April), 1967, pp.ii34—43;
CDSP, Vol. XIX, No. 23, p. 10.

55B. Surovtsev and A. Shevtsov, Komsomolski yprozhektor
(The Komsomol Searchlight; Leningrad, 1966), p. 4.

56

 

 

 

Ibid. I pp. 12-160

57Ibid., p. 178.

58Such ties "in full measure answer the demands of
the Program of the CPSU, instructing that the production
conferences must be transformed 'into the most active
organs, facilitating the improved work of the enterprises
and the control over production.'" Programma Kommunisticheskoi
jpartii Sovetskovo Spyuza, p. 299; Lukyanov and Rodionov, £95
\7 promyshlennosti, p. 179.

59ibid., p. 180.

60Trud, January 28, 1970, p. 2.

i J5”

61Ibid.

62Ibid.

63See above, n.

61.

237

_.;am'av

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Public participation in monitoring Soviet economic
and administrative operations has been described at some
length. The recent history of Soviet public control systems
and many of their current forms have been outlined, and goals
set for them have been enumerated. In conclusion, some
assessment must be attempted here of how well the public
inspector is achieving these assigned goals, and in par-
ticular, how well he is performing his missions of economic
and administrative control. To be still more specific, con-
cerning the economic assignments, we will examine what kinds
of economies have been claimed and achieved and whether
these seem to be "one-shot affairs," "paper victories," or
of genuine and lasting importance. Concerning administra-
tive control, we will try to determine how well the public
inspector has fulfilled his assignment of improving the
mechinery of government and of replacing staff members with
volunteers in various areas of Soviet administration.

Next, we will explore briefly some changes that the
introduction of volunteer workers into control agencies has
ibrought about in more traditional state control methods and

the special circumstances surrounding the public inspector

238

' . 1m"

239

himself that appear to affect the quality of his work.
Questions will be asked concerning what particular pressures
the volunteer inspector faces in carrying out his duties,
and how his position differs from that of a controller in
the Ministry of State Control. In sum, the major portion

of this chapter will deal directly with the performance

of the public inspectorates in achieving their assigned
missions of control.

Finally, a broader assessment of the role of the
public inspector in Soviet society will be assayed, focusing
upon the socialization mission which participation in control
is expected to perform. Viewed from this perspective, pub-
lic control systems are seen as fulfilling an essential role
in the current Soviet economic and social systems, in fact,
an expanding role whose importance is likely to increase
as economic and social conditions in the Soviet Union conv
tinue to evolve. In this context, the public control
systems must themselves be viewed as agents of change, by
their activities contributing to the changing fabric of
Soviet society.

Before attempting an evaluation of how well the
public inspector is accomplishing his control tasks in
‘various areas of the Soviet economy, the difficulties of
Inaking a sound appraisal must be set forth. Even so limited
an objective as judging how well the People's Control Com-

Inittee has carried out its most concrete and simple tasks

240

encounters a host of problems. The source of greatest dif-
ficulty perhaps lies in the nature of the evidence with
which we must deal. Most of the materials upon which this
study has been based are Soviet accounts--books and articles
from newspapers and periodicals--which share certain short-
comings. In the main they are designed or redesigned,
selected and edited to serve the purposes of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union. Thus, they may be more instruc-
tive concerning particular campaigns and motives of the
party at a given moment than in reflecting the conditions
of Soviet society itself. Through such lenses, images may
be skewed. Materials reporting upon the activities of
People's Control agencies, for example, inevitably display
a "rigged ratio" of praise and blame, leaving the observer
to guess at the real proportions of success and failure that
prompted the writers' comments. Personal observations of
the Soviet scene by Western observers can be used (and have
been used here) to correct distortions in the source mate-
rials, but isolated observations are no substitute for
systematic and extensive field studies and are clearly open
to criticism on the basis of their own unintended but
inevitable selectivity.

The very nature of the problem being investigated
presents difficulties. For if, as will be argued here, the
ultimate objective of the People's Control Committee, beyond

the immediate goals of its inspections, is the larger concern

__.I- 3"

241

of transforming ordinary citizens into creative and respon-
sible managers, the attempt to assess the success of this
effort clearly faces formidable obstacles. As Frederick
Barghoorn has remarked, "to a degree impossible to determine
without field studies . . . enforced participation is self-
defeating."l Just how self-defeating, however, we are left
with scant basis to judge. Nevertheless, from the Soviet
sources, the informed insights of Western scholars, and

our own highly selective first-hand observations, we shall
later draw some tentative conclusions.

Meanwhile, the quality of thought of Soviet scholars
and the supporting evidence presented in Soviet sources
should not be condemned out of hand. Many Soviet writers
earnestly address themselves to the problems of seeking
better methods of control and of achieving the greater
democratization of Soviet society. As for the factual
accounts with which they deal, these might be usefully com-
pared to Soviet statistical material, which, while perhaps
leaving much to be desired in the way of accuracy, honesty
and exhaustiveness, nonetheless forms a sufficiently sound
basis for on-going Soviet economic and social planning.
Just as present-day Soviet statistics may be incomplete
or simply withheld, but rarely lie, so the accounts used
here are not designed simply to mislead the Western scholar,
but are intended for internal use, to provide necessary

data. And Soviet scholars themselves reveal serious concern

' '. some"

242

with improving the quality and relevance of their materials.
A particularly apt illustration of this concern appeared

in a bibliographical article in Voprosy filosofii, dealing

 

with works on the political organization of socialist
,society. The following passage not only expresses the
authors' concern about the quality of scholarship and data,
but emphasizes as well the difficulty of attempting to judge
Soviet realities on the basis of frequently questionable
reports.

A survey of the literature shows that a general
shortcoming in many of the works is that they consider
a number of problems in isolation from the real process
of the development of the socialist state. The authors
largely restrict themselves merely to the study of
various documents, and their conclusions, therefore,
are at times of an abstract nature. It is no secret,
however, that the various records and reports do not
always reflect the real processes correctly. It is
also known that in the recent past certain irresponsible
executives deliberately exaggerated the figures in their
reports, with the intent of demonstrating the rapidity
of the process of "democratization," and that some
credulous scholars embe£lished reality on the basis of
these inflated figures.

What Kind of Savings Have Public
Inspectors Achieved?

 

A prime economic task of people's inspectors is to
achieve savings of all kinds, and the Soviet press constantly
reports their success, often in terms of cash value. Our
evaluation of results must therefore begin with an examina-
tion of some of these reports, in order to determine just
what kind of material and monetary contributions the people's

inspectors claim to have made to the USSR national economy.

243

In an article published early in 1969, Deputy-
Chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee, Iosif
Shikin, briefly summarized past achievements of the control
agencies in a manner that typifies many claims made generally
for control groups at all levels:

With the active participation of the people's
controllers, up to 10 billion kilowatt-hours of electric
power were economized in the country in 1968. This is
equivalent to the yearly output of such a giant as the
Volga Hydroelectric Power Station named "22nd CPSU
Congress." The people's controllers in industry and
construction work helped to attain savings of a large
quantity of material and monetary resources. Many tens
of millions of poods of grain saved from losses during
the harvest are credited to the rural people's control-
lers. In connection with the drafting of the State
Plan for the Development of the USSR National Economy
and the 1969 Budget, the organs of people's control
have searched out additional possibilities and reserves
which can be used to increase the output of industrial
products and especially of consumer goods.3

This statement exhibits two traits that characterize
many control success stories. One is the vagueness of the
quantity of material and monetary resources," "many tens of

Inillions of poods of grain," and "additional possibilities

 

and reserves." The other trait is the arbitrary selection
of a very precise amount, such as Shikin's "ten billion
kilowatt-hours of electric power." Why not, "up to eleven-
;point—five billion kilowatt hours" or some other figure?
(One suspects that in this case it was the example of the
‘Volga power station-—which afforded a striking image-~that
suggested the precise amount of the savings, and not vice

versa.

244

One gains a strong sense of formalism from such
success stories. Both the vagueness and the seemingly-
contrived precision of many claims suggest that they have
been manufactured simply for the record, for report pur-
poses. An example already noted is the claim of an Izvestia
correspondent that by installing thermostates on electric
appliances, "enough electricity might be saved on electrical
appliances in Moscow apartments alone to illuminate a city
of two million."4 The fine precision of this figure is
marred by the writer's failure to include a time period
for the illumination. Would the city be illuminated for
five seconds? Five minutes? The figure was apparently
mythical, but if not examined too closely had a nice sense
of concreteness about it--just the combination of qualities,
in other words, that points to formalism.

But if a sense of formalism pervades most success
stories of inspection results, there are also many convinc-
ing accounts, enough to indicate that people's inspectors
are effectively exposing waste in many areas. A case in
podJit, to the credit of the Latvian Republic People's
Control Committee describes a correction of major propor-
tions in the port operations at Riga.5 Executives of the
port administration, dissatisfied with Riga's rating as a
'thirdrclass port, which was based on the annual volume of
cargo it handled (400,000 tons, mostly fish), had managed

txa increase the port's volume of cargo by utilizing "loose"

245

bookkeeping methods and by engaging its ships in the hauling
of dredging materials and dirt fill. They had expanded
Riga's volume of cargo, in fact, to 711,000 tons (253,000

of which were sand dredged from Riga's harbor), and thereby
increased their own salaries and bonuses. Fishing boats
experienced delays in unloading, and mechanization of the
regular harbor facilities apparently languished, until the
KNK stepped in and put an end to the illegal and wasteful
practices.

The correction of this kind of situation is of obvious
benefit to the Soviet economy, though exact quantification
of overall results is beyond the powers of the Soviet author-
ities themselves. In fact, the kind of clearly formalistic
reporting of the successes claimed by People's Control
agencies may very well be justified by the obvious impos-
sibility of measuring the multiplied impact of many such
(genuine accomplishments. Meaningful measurements cannot
presently be made. Perhaps in the long run, economic
:results will become evident in rising productivity, improved
<quality of output, and similar indicators. Even then,
handover, since such gross indices are influenced by a multi-
ttuie of other factors, the discrete impact of the public
iJispector must probably go largely undetermined. Meanwhile,
People's Control Committee officials are safe with their

alleged victories, since it is unlikely that anyone could

check out all the claims.

 

246

Certainly the People's Control agencies have produced
useful innovations in some areas, and may be expected to
produce more. One innovation is the discovery of new forms
and methods of control. Some of these have been admittedly
ad hoc or "one shot" cases which cannot produce results
indefinitely. Nevertheless, insofar as public initiative
can be stimulated to search for shortcomings, presumably
it will prove more flexible and inventive and less formal-
istic in its approach to inspection problems than traditional
methods have. The first year of Party-State Control Com-
mittee activity produced an abundance of novel, "one—shot"
methods. The Moldavian example of utilizing uncultivated
strips of land along roadways will be recalled as a case
in point.6 In the Kazakh Republic's Karaganda Oblast, an
Assistance Group on one of the sovkhozes discovered a
number of private cattle in the public herd. When this
improper circumstance came to the attention 0f the Kazakh
Party-State Control Committee, the committee ordered
similar counts of the public herds in all the agricultural
oblasts of the republic. "In a number of oblasts, tens of
“thousands of cattle, sheep, and hogs, livestock which
Imelongs to private individuals, have been discovered in
among the common herds. . . . In just the Zaisanski
Agricultural Production Administration alone, over 17,000

livestock were found to be unlisted.”

247

Kazakh Republic PGK Chairman Kozlov mentions another
"new form" of control which may offer more lasting results.
This is the formation of "so—called Thematic PGK Assistance
Commissions. They will include many scholars, economists,
engineering and technical workers. These commissions will

study definite problems and will propagandize and introduce

{£5.ny

advanced experience."8 Concrete examples of the work of
the thematic commissions included proposals for rationaliz-
ing and improving production methods in the mines of the
Karaganda Coal Basin. On the basis of the technical
expertise and practical experience of various members of
the Assistance Commissions, the PGK Committee of the
Karaganda Oblast Industrial Party Committee and the Oblast
Executive Committee hoped to increase coal production
throughout the oblast by 12-13% in 1963. A joint conference
of Karaganda engineering and technical workers and combine
operators was called in June, to discuss the suggestions of
the thematic commissions. On the face of it, this new kind
of "Stakhanovite" effort to increase productivity by
disseminating knowledge of new techniques might well be
expected to produce positive results over time.

What these examples seem to point up is the potential
xyhich People's Control agencies may possess for the adapta-
'tion of control methods to changing times and changing condi-
1zions. In the myriad places in the Soviet systems of

Ixroduction and administration where checking of performance

248

s constantly required, new bottlenecks, new evasions and

ew shortcomings require new and different kinds of controls.
1d forms become ritualistic, inadequate, or inapplicable.
lew drives, the fresh, widespread application of public

real can devise new methods of control to fit the changing
conditions, and even branch out to discover new, more rational

methods of organizing production processes themselves.

But drawbacks are present as well. For what has been

described as the new drive of the public sounds very much

like the old "campaign-technique" in a new guise. Lacking

in this inspection picture is the steady, constant, and

effective surveillance needed to accompany the application

of the public's initiative. Unfortunately, therefore, the

lasting application of public initiative in devising new

control measures would seem to depend ultimately on the level

of enthusiasm with which participation in control

can be
maintained.

And this presents us with a dilemma: how well

the public is educated in management skills and a sense of
civic responsibility depends upon active public participa-

tion; while active participation is most reliably generated

by an internalized sense of responsibility. Enforced

participation is expected to produce a New Soviet Man, who
is a self-motiving individual, perpetually initiating

"campaigns from below." The nub of this problem is whether

the commitment of participants can be acquired through "volun—

teer" control activities whose voluntarism is questionable.

"_ g: .._; (“‘3'

 

249

A further drawback to instilling commitment is the
nature of certain control methods that encourage formalistic
behavior on the part of the participants. The methods of
carrying out inspections, reporting on their results, and
accounting for discovered shortcomings often result in
what appears to be automatic responses and volumes of paper
work. Repeatedly, for example, the discovery of shortcomings
ends in the issuance of a resolution, followed by a public

statement such as:

The CPSU Central Committee has instructed the Committee

of the Tadzhikistan Communist Party to submit a report

to the CPSU Central Committee in January 1970, on the

course of fulfillment of this resolution.9

Widespread eliciting of reports and explanations tends

to have less of an impact in eradicating shortcomings than
in producing paper. And the inspector easily falls into
routines that fulfill outward requirements and produce
reports. One is reminded of the ritualistic signing of
cxxmnents in the ubiquitous book of customer's comments
which is inevitably presented to the rest camp visitor,
(lining car customer, river cruise sojourner, and others.
Wfluare comments and suggestions are thus solicited, the
tendency, most often is {123 to criticize, but to repeat
acceptable slogans, to say and do what is expected by the
person who is being judged. To the extent that public

inspectors behave in similarly unproductive and stereotyped

patterns, the greater initiative and self-motivation that

250

are desired goals of public participation will prove

elusive.

Have People's inspectors curtailed the government's

adnfikfistrative machinery and causédiit to operate
more economically?

.Along with the effort to economize the economic
resources of the nation, another prime objective of the
People's Control Committee, often repeated in the Soviet
press, is the improved Operation and simplification of
the Soviet Union's economic and governmental apparatus.

Numerous discrete instances of administrative economies

are constantly reported. Not only are the people's con-

trollers and other volunteers expected to reduce the number
of regular staff members required in public, economic and
governmental administration, but they are also intended

to take a hand in restructuring the state apparatus, to

eliminate overstaffing in inflated administrations. The

following example of action by public inspectors to reduce
overstaffing in an agricultural region comes from the

Chairman of the Kazakh Republic PGK Committee:

It is known that the sovkhozes in our republic play
the main role in our agricultural production. What has
happened is that, over recent years, there has been a
considerable increase in the administrative and mana-
gerial apparatus. On certain sovkhozes of the Tselinny
Krai there is one administrator or assistant for every
four or five workers. On sovkhozes of Kokchetavskaya
Oblast there has been a 40% increase over the past

three years in the number of auxiliary and administra-
tive personnel.

 

251

[And he continued:] Party-State Control workers of
time Tselinny Krai have studied thoroughly the various
lxxcal situations and have introduced specific pro-
;xosals for Simplifying and curtailing the administrative-
managerial apparatus of sovkhozes for the considera-
tion of the krai party committee. According to their
:figures, about 10,000 persons in the krai can be released

frrnn the sphere of management and shifted into the sphere
of production. 10

.An.example of alleged achievement in reducing admin-

istrative personnel was offered more recently by I. Shikin:

On instructions of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party and the USSR Council of Ministers, the
People's Control organs carried out a number of inspec-

tions aimed at improving the operation of the state and
economic administrative machine. Typical in this con-
nection is the experience of the People's Control Group
at the Rostov Agricultural Machine-Building Plant. At
its initiative, a reorganization of the structure of
plant and shop management was carried out, and over

400 administrative and management personnel were
released.

And he further notes that:

In connection with drafting the plans for the
nationsl economy and the 1969 budget, the People's
Control Committees joined with financial organs in

submitting proposals to reduce expenditures for main-
tenance of the administrative apparatus.11

Staff cuts are easily measured and should provide
evidence of the successful operation of the People's Control
Committee over time if real gains are scored in this area of
activity. In fact, if the current results are really as
sizable as reported, it should be possible at this time to
make some overall assessment of their impact. The two
Soviet writers, Varchuk and Razin, whose concern with Soviet
scholarship was mentioned earlier, have suggested that one

important indicator of the impact of greater public

 

252

participation in administrative activities would be the

demonstrated reduction of the size of the state apparatus.

In their words:

Drawing in the public and improving the structure

(If the state apparatus is a single process. If the
figures we have attesting to the enlistment of the
public are large, but we find neither the slightest
reduction of the state apparatus nor the least improve-
ment in its work, we must conclude that the enlistment
(If the public is being conducted for the sake of the
(enlistment itself, for the sake of a good showing;

i.e., we find it yields no effect and at times merely
distrpgts the energies of party and state officials.

To illustrate their point, the authors refer to

"certain officials" in the executive committees of the

soviets who have "turned over some of their work to

volunteer bodies without changing the pay or staff of the
regular apparatus." Such officials, they say, are often,

in fact, "hostile toward concrete proposals to reduce

staffs and eliminate such links in the apparatus as have
become unnecessary."l3

Establishing facts about the size of the state admin-
istrative apparatus or the staff of the public organizations
is difficult since Soviet sources do not break down their

statistics to show the staff personnel of these adminis-

txative agencies separately. The heading Administrative

Organs does appear in Soviet statistical handbooks; however,
it isaicompound heading which lumps State and Economic

Administrative Organs and Administrative Organs of Cogerative

and mnflic Organizations. Since figures on state administrative

_' It"

 

253

agencies and the administrative organs of social organiza—

tions cannot be isolated, any conclusions about the growth

or contraction of the state apparat alone cannot be made.
For the purposes of this study, however, the problem is

not too serious perhaps, for the People's Control agencies
are presumably committed to the reduction of the adminis-

trative machinery generally of all government, economic

and public organizations. Any reduction in the combined

personnel of all these administrative organs would there-

fore be significant .

The figures do not, however, show a reduction. What

 

the statistics do indicate in general terms is a‘ stability
of numbers of staff personnel, at least through the early

1960's. In the 25-year period ending in 1965, the distribu--~
tion of all inhabitants of the Soviet Union employed in the

national economy shows that the percentage of those employed
in the apparat of Organs of State Administration, of the
Administration of Cooperative and Social Organizations, and

of Credit and Insurance Organizations in successive years

1940 = 3%; 1950 = 3%; 1958 = 2% 1960 = 2%;

1964 = 2%; and 1965 = 2%.14

A further breakdown of the figures fails to reveal

was as follows:

any decrease in the numbers of administrative personnel,
when compared with the increasing labor force in all areas.
During the span of years which might be expected to be most

revealing for this study--the period of the 1960's when

254

public control was instituted--the entire work force of

blue-and-white-collar workers (excluding kolkhozniki) has

Taking 1960 as 100, the following

1961 == 106; 1962 = 110; 1963 = 114;
15 If

shown a steady increase.

increases are recorded:

 

1964 = 118; 1965 = 124; 1966 = 128; and 1967 = 133.

we compare with this the numbers of workers and employees

”all!!!"

in the following gross category, Apparat of the Organs of

State and Economic Administration and Organs of Administra-

tion of Cooperative and Social Organizations, for the same

span of years, we find a similar growth rate. Taking 1960

1966 = 124; and 1967 = 132.16

as 100, 1964 = 109; 1965 — 117;
The Administrative Organs have been further refined

by Murray Feshbach for the years through 1964, into State

and Economic Administrative Organs and Administrative Organs

of Cooperative and Social Organizations. According to his

figures, taking 1960 as 100, State and Economic Administra-

tive Organs show the following growth rate: 1961 = 104;

Much the same pattern

 

1962 = 106; 1963 = 105; 1964 = 109.

is shown by Administrative Organs of Cooperative and Social

Organizations: 1961 = 105; 1962 = 107; 1963 = 106; and

1964 = 109.
The pattern of growth in the numbers of the apparat

of Soviet administrative and public organizations during
the period of the 1960's for which figures are presently
available closely parallels the growth rate of the Soviet

Union's entire work force during the same period. For the

255

first 4-year period, from 1960 to 1964, the personnel in
the administrative apparat increased at an overall annual
rate of 2%. After 1964, the increases were sharper:
1964-1965 = 8%; 1965-1966 = 7%; 1966-1967 = 8%.18 The
entire work force of the Soviet Union grew at roughly the
same rate. On the basis of these gross indicators, there-
fore, while the administrative apparat cannot be considered
to have unduly expanded, neither can it be adduced that the
administrative staffs in the Soviet Union during the first
seven years of the 1960's experienced a remarkable decrease
of paid personnel.

The continuing appeals in the Soviet press for new
efforts to cut the staffs and expenses of the administra—
tion suggest that the battle has in fact hardly begun. The
October 1969 Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and
the USSR Council of Ministers, "On Measures for Improving
the Staffs and Reducing the Cost of Management," makes
the following plea:

The CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of
Ministers have made it incumbent on USSR ministries
and departments and Union-Republic Councils of Ministers
to draw up and carry out measures for improving the
structure of the managerial apparatus and eliminating
excesses in the staffs of enterprises, organizations
and offices so as to reduce 1970 expenditures on the
upkeep of the managerial apparatus by 1,700,000,000

rubles.

An impressive figure and a stout resolution! Thus the

planned reductions of personnel go on, but only the future

statistics in Narodnoe khozyaistvo can attest to the final,

 

 

256 !

large-scale effectiveness of all efforts--including those
of the People's Control Committee--in achieving the planned
reductions of personnel.

Some Consequences of Public Participation

in Control Work.

The introduction of volunteers into inspection work

‘ ".de

has given rise to criticism on many counts. Public organiza— ]
tions generally, with their broad membership of ordinary
citizens, have been critically characterized by one Soviet

source as "poorly organized, unstable, operating on the

20

basis of enthusiasm alone." The role of the public inspec-

tor has itself been questioned.21 And the wisdom of end-
lessly multiplying volunteer committees has also been
debated. A chairman of the executive committee of a dis-
trict soviet, for example, wrote to Izvestia in the following

manner :

If anyone should ask me what nonstaff departments,
committees and subcommittees, groups and subgroups,,
posts, and so on, we have in our executive committee,

I probably could not give a precise answer. There are
so many that I cannot list them all. Don't hurry to
reproach me: "Well then, are you against the public,
chairman?" No, I am for the public, but for one that
will really take an active part in the work of the
soviet. I am also against the imposition on us of
stereotyped recommendations: Set up such-and-such a
nonstaff department, organize such-and—such a committee
of public volunteers. How does this turn out in
practice? As is known, every district soviet has its
standing committees. But we have been advised to set
up as many more nonstaff departments as there are com-
mittees. Moreover, these nonstaff departments duplicate
the soviet's standing committees in every way (even in
their names).

257

Frequent complaints are registered about how the
activities of the volunteer inspector in economic enter-
prises result in the overlap of inspection efforts, the

waste of management and employee time in inspections and

23

meetings, the dislocation of work. Moreover, the inspector

himself sometimes wonders where he is expected to find g
enough free time to carry out his control duties, as the 1
following passage shows. The writer is a Moscow taxi driver,

active party worker, member of the Party Bureau of Taxi

Garage No. 3, and chairman of the People's Control Group:

How can one best adjust one's personal free time to
the demands of public work? . . . [Each month, in
addition to the time that I spend on my regular job]

. . . there remain 10-12 days that are in fact free.
When we start to make up our monthly plans for volunteer
work, this number of days is insufficient.

Judge for yourselves: Consider me and my colleagues--
chairmen of shop committees, secretaries and members of
party bureaus; you will find that each of us is obliged
to attend in the course of one month: two sessions of
the party bureau, one meeting for all party members in
the garage, two sessions of the People's Control Group
and one general meeting each of the shop party organiza-
tion's communists, the column trade union and the
brigade. ~

To this we must still add the quarterly meetings of
the People's Control Groups and of the party organization
aktiv, conferences, etc. Add participation in ad hoc
commissions and People's Control inspections--sometimes
lasting several days--and there goes your week! All our
month's free days turn out to be taken up by volunteer
work. 24

Of more long-range importance are some effects which
time introduction of volunteer inspectorates may be having

ugxyn staff responsibilities for control. Sometimes,

258

apparently the introduction of volunteers has encouraged

a tendency of responsible officials in the apparat, at least
at lower levels, to delegate their control responsibilities
to the volunteer organizations. "Reports of early efforts
at control by the lowest level of nonstaff soviet inspec-
torates indicate that the soviet officials in the executive

committees sometimes tended to shrug off their traditional

control duties."25

Such a tendency could have important repercussions
for citizens' participation. Insofar as this practice
grows, and citizens are quick to assume responsibilities
thus delegated by default from staff agencies, the area of
citizen responsibility for decision making is expanded. In
fact, this tendency is an interesting counter force to the
;pressures toward what Grey Hodnett has described as the
"atrophy of participation." In many cases where a staff
worker is presented with a group assignment for which his
sniperiors hold him responsible, there is, as Hodnett points

(Nit, a strong tendency toward one-man leadership to get the

26

jcfl) done as simply as possible. The group comes to play

In: role at all. If public control groups are able to
reverse this tendency, the subject-participant role of
tine Soviet citizen may easily become more active and inde-
pendent.

Probably the most common response of the staff offi-

cjjgl'who enjoys the assistance and services of volunteer

it‘k'

259

inspectors is not to delegate responsibilities, but to find

that his own duties have actually increased in order to

include the supervision of these amateur inspectors in the

performance of their assigned tasks. In some cases the

responsible staff member may consequently find his duties

multiplied past endurance. Such a case is described by

the chairman of the executive committee of the Khasavyurt

District Soviet, B. Batyrov: In a district of 75,000

inhabitants and 30 rural soviets, Chairman Batyrov's district

executive committee's staff consists of only four other

members: his deputy-chairman, two instructors and a secre-

tary.
Thus it happens [he says] that our deputy-chairman,

for instance, is at the same time the chairman of no
less than 11 committees. The latter are set up accord-
ing to decisions of the superior agencies; each such
decision carries a clause demanding that the deputy-
chairman of the district soviet executive committee be
confirmed without fail as the chairman of one committee

You can judge for yourself how much sense

or another.
But there is no one

there is to this "versatility."
else to appoint. . . .27

This, too, is an interesting development resulting

from the multiplication of volunteer groups, for it is
obvious that as the groups multiply, the supervisory powers

of responsible officials are stretched so thin as to be

nominal. Strict supervision, however, would appear to be

a basic requirement of subject-participatory activity.

Participation in control duties has important conse-

quences for the volunteer inspector himself, for he is

:ubject to many local pressures which undoubtedly affect

 

260

the quality of his work. In this regard, perhaps the
greatest weakness of the public inspector is his vulner—

ability before those he may be expected to control. The

 

response of managers to Komsomol inspection groups is

described by Komsomol officials in Allen Kassof's study:

It happens, unfortunately, that the observations
. cause displeasure in some careless . 1

of the raiders . .

business executives. . . . The first reaction of such
an executive to the remarks of the Komsomol members

is, "It's not your affair, kids."

And Kassof adds, "The life of the Komsomol organizer is not

29 The Togliatti incident, which was

always an easy one."
30 told of the difficulties of the

described here earlier,
public inspector who persisted in recording the errors of

her colleagues and superiors and, failing to receive the
backing of the People's Control staff, lost her regular

job. This wrong was subsequently rectified, and the whole
affair was exposed in the press, but the proportion of those

inspectors who silently suffer recriminations from their

revelations must be large. And those inspectors who

collaborate with the perpetrators of the shortcomings they

discover must, also be numerous.
Evidence concerning the latter category is frequently

published. For example, there is the recent case involving
"Laboratory for Neutralization and Problems of Energetics,"

the
which spent ten years and millions of rubles ostensibly

LANE,
designing purification devices to eliminate air pollution

from gas engines. Three years of investigations by various

261

inspection agencies, including the USSR People's Control

Committee, into the net results of LANE's decade of activity,

produced many glowing accounts of ongoing projects. In the

words of Izvestia:

It was only on June 12, 1969, in an order issued by
the USSR Ministry of Tractor and Farm Machine Building,

that a spade was called a spade for the first time.
(Here is a verbatim quotation: "During the entire
existence of the laboratory virtually no work was com-

pleted and turned over to industry.")31

One reason why earlier inspections had failed to
reveal the true state of affairs was that "people who were
supposed to be disinterested judges were materially dependent

on the director of the very organization that they should

have been supervising."32 The director had bought them off.

How much easier it must be to buy off or scare away the
lowly plant inspector, self-appointed to the task of con-

trol, and dependent on his superiors for his job!

Even the factory worker whose regular job may be
quality control or the inspection of operating equipment,

and so on, is under considerable pressures to provide

cursory inspection only. Joseph Berliner, in his Factory

and Manager in the USSR, has treated in great detail the
subject of control in the factory during the Stalinist

period. His examples clearly reveal the many pressures

exerted on plant inspectors by foremen, engineers and shop

chiefs to okay shoddy goods needed to fulfill the plant's

production quota. Production officials, says Berliner,

 

262

"are as likely to report on their recalcitrant colleague

[a conscientious plant inspector] to the director as the

other way around."34 Certainly, today's volunteer inspector

 

at his own place of work courts even greater displeasure

from colleagues and superiors than those former professionally—

assigned inspectors Berliner is writing about. And because !

today's public inspector is more apt to be interested, due

to his own regular job, in the meeting of production quotas,
he would be more hesitant than a disinterested inspector

to declare spoilage and delay deliveries.

Any plant inspector, volunteer or not, is more
closely involved with his colleagues in the enterprise

he is checking than are outside controllers, such as those

of the old Ministry of State Control.35 On the other hand,

the plant inspector, being intimately acquainted with his

enterprise, knows better than any outsider where to look

for mismanagement and waste. Moreover, the public inspector

who may also be a skilled or professional worker has the

necessary technical knowledge to discover old weaknesses

and to devise new and better ways of doing things. Finally,

the public inspector is close to ubiquitous.

All these attributes were among those that Khrushchev

counted on to make public inspection so effective that no

misdeed could escape detection. What he wanted to stamp

out were such irregular practices of managers as stockpiling

hard-to-get items, the employment of tolkachi to secure

263

others, and so on. Evidence of KNK accomplishments indicates

that people's inspectors have had considerable success in

exposing tolkachi and in turning up "hidden reserves" not

included in regular inventories. Describing the results of

one check, Chairman Kovanov said,

On October 1968, the national economy had 2-7
million rubles of above-norm supplies. During the
check, Plyushkins [an allusion to Gogol's miser] were
encountered who had stocked up raw mategéals and [other]

materials for two to three years ahead.

Many accounts are much more detailed, and resemble

the following report of reserves left unlisted in the
inventories of the administration of the Underground Mine

Construction Trust of the USSR Ministry for the Construction

of Heavy Industry Enterprises:

[Among the unlisted reserves were] 2,423 linear
meters of metal pipe, 73 tons of rolled and formed
metal, 1,643 linear meters of steel cable, 972 linear
meters of communications cable, 500 squagp meters of

place glass, and other materials. . . .

If, under the present operating conditions of Soviet
industry, the stockpiling of certain materials is necessary
for the regular fulfillment of production quotas, it is not
clear whether the public inspector is helping or hindering
the Soviet economy by exposing these "unused reserves," or
bringing to light other "extra-legal" practices which the

Soviet manager often finds essential for the successful

operation of his enterprise. In the past, as Jerry Hough

has pointed out, the Soviet leadership itself has generally

maintained a "fairly understanding attitude" toward "Berliner

2 1‘ “cm

264

practices" so long as plan indicators were being fulfilled.38

Berliner has also suggested that the old Ministry of Control

did not strive to eliminate such practices, but only to

keep them within acceptable bounds.39 Thus, if the inspec-

torates of public control should prove more determined in
exposing irregular management practices than the traditional
instruments of control, this could indeed influence the

operating techniques of Soviet economic management in a
manner which Soviet managers themselves might find restric-

tive. In this connection it is unclear how the "meddling"

people's inspector may influence a manager's inclination to
innovate at the risk of incurring the initial lag or drop

in production that accompanies the introduction of a new

technique. Currently public control operations are not

designed to make allowances for such lags; thus they would

seem to threaten with penalties the manager whom the Liberman

reforms would encourage to take risks.

The foregoing sections have dealt with the subjects

of how well the public control systems in the USSR have
been achieving their control objectives, what dimensions
they have added to the older ministries of control, and with

certain other consequences of the introduction of public

participation into control work. The treatment has stressed

the inadequacies of the volunteer systems and the diffi-

culties they have faced in achieving the specific control

objectives they have been assigned. But the significance

265

of public participation in control is not at all confined

to the successful accomplishment of control tasks. This is

a point which must be stated most emphatically. There

remains a much broader significance of public participation

in control which must be included in the final appraisal of

this institution. There remains, in fact, the mission of

control agencies which is not immediately concerned with

control objectives at all, but which is concerned with the

socialization of the Soviet citizen.

The leaders of the People's Control Committee continue

to emphasize that "education is a primary aim of People's

Control."40 The Statute on People's Control Agencies'

describes the work of the public inspector as "an honorable

social duty." In its performance the citizen is expected

to internalize standards of collective responsibility. In

Shikin's words:

Of enormous political significance is the participa-
tion of millions of workers in the management of govern-
mental affairs through the system of control. V. I.
Lenin had expressed the wish that the entire mass of
workers would be given the experience of participating
in the Worker and Peasant Inspectorate. It can be said
that today, this wish of Lenin's is being successfully
carried out. More and more hundreds of thousands of
Soviet peOple, who become members of the Groups and
Posts of People's Control, which are elected anew every
year, the millions of participants in the inspections
and raids--a11 of these are acquiring the skills of
state and public activity, and their feelings of owner-
ship of the country is strengthened, and this is one of 41
the primary functions of the system of people's control.

Ultimately, of course, the New Soviet Man is expected

to constitute an improved control instrument,42 but the first

266

and foremost product which participation is intended to
fashion is the New Soviet Man himself. In the last analysis

the continuing and growing significance of public participa-
tion in control must be acknowledged to exist just here, in
this widespread activation of the Soviet citizen, with its
intended consequences of political socialization.

A great deal has been said in earlier chapters con-

cerning the post-Stalinist revival of citizen's participa-

tion in many areas of Soviet life. The volunteer efforts

that produced the Comrades' Courts and dru‘zhinny, and the

 

growing numbers of citizen groups attached to the soviets,

trade unions, and Komsomol organizations have been enumerated.

What has been recorded is a kind of participatory explosion,

with everexpanding repercussions, capable of creating new

We are now faced with the problem of attempting

impacts.
What is their

some evaluation of these repercussions.
probable impact on Soviet society today, and what will it

be tomorrow? If, indeed, volunteers act as agents of
change, what kinds of change and response do they tend to

stimulate?
One answer to these questions must be sought in
terms of the evolution of Soviet society, and the role

which public control systems are playing in the transforma-
To clarify

tion of the Soviet economic and social systems.

this point a reference to the Stalinist period must be made,

for the changes instituted by Stalin in creating a great

n. F"

267

new industrial order and educating the technological person-
nel to man it continue to transform Soviet society. It is
perhaps an oversimplification, and yet a meaningful one, to
argue that the Stalinist totalitarian administrative model,
by its success in achieving miracles of industrial develop-
ment, created its own obsolescence, that the very success
by which a higher stage of industrialization was reached
made archaic the earlier "Stalinist" methods of operation.
New methods were needed. The rigid, centralist mold had

to be broken, and had to be supplanted by more flexible,
decentralized decision-making in economic areas. Terror
and capricious central leadership increasingly revealed
their dysfunctions in the developed economy. Stalin's
successors have sought new solutions of organization and
operation, in administrative and economic decentralization,
in economic reforms, in substitutes for terror, while
’continuing the process of technical education.

What needs to be emphasized here is that certain
processes have their own momentum. While industrialization
is one such process, the education of a nation's technical
manpower is another. The educated man or technician in
whatever field, for example, is less tolerant of irrational
behavior in his area of competency than the uneducated one.
Education implies the internalization of certain "profes-
sional" standards of conduct (again, within the respective

field of training), even of (the familiar phrase) "intolerance

268

to shortcomings." On the one hand, the educated man is

less willing to accept uninformed guidance or interference

in his own field of competence, whether this guidance origi-
nates in the party, the government or elsewhere. On the
other hand, where professional norms reinforce the normative
teaching of the party, the educated man is more likely than
the uneducated one to meet the moral standards of the New
Soviet Man. Thus, education simultaneously fosters independ-
ence, initiative and--conformity.

Meanwhile, the increasingly complex industrial society
that has come to exist in the Soviet Union today multiplies
the demands for more education, for the more intelligent and
responsible performance of millions of citizens. Their
initiative and intelligence must somehow be brought to bear
more effectively in the collective interest. Initiative
and responsible behavior at lower levels daily grow more
essential for the better operation of the economic system
and the administrative one. If People's Control Committees
cannot rise to this challenge, then other methods of stimulat-
ing innovation and responsibility will have to be sought to
supplement and further the gentle prodding of production-
related propaganda and to instill achievement values and
related norms of conduct. Ultimately the little men down
the line must be trusted—-and worthy of trust.

Today, the convergence of many pressures—valong with

'the many needs--to create a responsible, trustworthy citizen

269

suggests that not only will progress be made toward this
end, but that other transformations will be entailed as
well. For these pressures and needs are changing the fabric
of Soviet society. In the past, pre-revolutionary Russia
seemingly lacked the tradition of public organs that had
existed in Western democracies or even Eastern ones, such
as Czechoslovakia. But today, public control systems, in
conjunction with the other mass organizations, are estab—
lishing and multiplying patterns of participation in Soviet
society which will have undoubted, if unpredictable,
future impact. The very creation of machinery for public
participation and the present broad dimensions of this
public activity are providing a basis for future develop-
ments that may well stimulate greater individual initiative
and create new and different forms of participation in the
years ahead. Today the long-missing tradition and habits
(of citizen participation are being established in the
Soviet Union.

However, a cautionary point needs to be made concerning
'this participation. This point concerns the impact of
<3itizen participation on the role of the Communist Party
(If the Soviet Union. We have spoken here about the par—
‘ticipstory "explosion" while suggesting that a greater
decentralization of decision—making is required in the
Scnriet Union today. The implications of the "explosion"

imagery are entirely fitting. The movement in the direction

. 4': "macaw

270

of more lower-level decision—making is fraught with centri-
fugal political tendencies. And it is clear that if the
ordinary citizen, the technician, the expert, is to be given
the responsibility of running his small corner of the state
shOp, his willingness to make the right decision for the
state's interest becomes, from the point of view of the
political leaders, of ever greater concern. Moreover, the
centrifugal tendencies have extremely important implications
for the political structure of the Soviet Union.

Earlier, some essential characteristics of this
political organization were noted, such as, the highly-
centralized political and economic structure, single-party
inhle, and the social orientation of the individual to the
collectivity. Given these characteristics, the party's
response to centrifugal tendencies of the participatory
explosion may be clearly anticipated. For if the existing
political structure of the Soviet Union is to be main—
'tained, the integrating power of the party--in fact, the
:hmportance of the party as a necessary cohesive forces-is
rmore urgently needed as participation eXpands. The present
fcunm of the Soviet political system requires that growth in
ciixizen's participation be balanced by a stronger guiding
party; hence such continued growth can be expected to elicit
iruxreased efforts by the party to enhance its centralizing,

integrating and dominant roles.

’pw

271

In the past decade, it has been the fashion among
some Western observers of the Soviet scene to suggest that
the CPSU had lost not only its viability but its rationale
for existence, since the economic managers, technicians

and skilled personnel required to operate today's vast

"(3”

and complex economic empires had this business well in
hand, and since in fact the needs of the economy would
dictate political decisions. The party, like Stalin, has
been viewed as breeding its own obsolescence. Despite
certain elements of truth in this view, the fact remains
that political considerations are still paramount in the
Soviet Union. The need for centralization and cohesiveness
is above all a political need of the Soviet State in its
present form. While citizen participation may offer a
flexibility needed by the economic and social systems in
the Soviet Union today, it is not about to displace the
party at this moment in certain of the latter's vital roles,
such as goal setting and in guiding political socializa-
tion processes. In fact, the party's role in these areas
can be expected to grow in importance through its attempts
to maintain its own ascendancy.

Thus, if the party has its way, subject-participation,
lneaning the party—guided active civic involvement of millions,
Inas an assured future in the Soviet Union. Whether the
responsible citizen will in the long run continue to accept

£111 the goals set by the party and submit in every way to

272

his subject role cannot be answered here. Presumably,

the party's prerogatives will always remain in question,

for as has been repeatedly pointed out here, participation,
subject or not, is difficult to keep perpetually in bondage.
Therefore, deSpite the party's zeal, intentions and dominance,
the genuine potential of public control systems to effect
change in the Soviet social system over time may well find
unprecedented opportunities to develop in the years ahead
upon the ground being prepared by the many and varied forms

of citizen participation in the Soviet Union today.

.4 Fur——

CHAPTER VI I --NOTES

1Frederick C. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR (Boston
and Toronto, 1966), p. 15.

2V. V. Varchuk and V. I. Razin, "Issledovaniya v
oblasti politicheskoi organizatsii sotsialisticheskovo
obshchestva" (Research in the Sphere of the Political
Organization of Socialist Society), Voprosy filosofii
(Questions fo Philosoth), No. 4 (Apfil), 1967, p. id2.

31. Shikin, "Leninskie printsipy narodnovo kontrolya
v deistvii" (Leninist Principles of People's Control in
Action), Partiinaya zhizn (Party Life), No. 2 (January),

1969, p. 10.
4Izvestia, November 15, 1963, p. 3.

5V. Sochenov and I. Kovalenko, Ekonomicheskaya
azeta (Economic Journal), No. 47, November 18, 1968, pp.

38- 90

6See above, Ch. IV.

7G. Kozlov, Chairman of the Kazakh PGK Committee, in
Pravda, June 26, 1963, p. 4.

8Ibid.; the thematic commissions seem to resemble
the "creative groups" organized by Komsomols in Leningrad
:factories, which are described in Ch. VI.

9Partiinaya zhizn, No. 1 (January), 1969, p. 8,
(mincerning the work of the Tadzhikistan Communist Party in
ifillfilling the decisions of the XXIII Congress.

10Pravda, June 26, 1963, p. 4.

11

12Varchuk and Razin, Voprosy filosofii, No. 4 (1967),
p. .143.

13Ibid., p. 14.

273

Shikin, Partiinaya zhizn, No. (JanuarY), 1969, p. 12.

1 MW“, ‘ \

274

14Narodnoe khozygistvo SSSR v 1965 (The National
Economy of the USSR in 1965) (Moscow, 1966), P. 555.

15Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1967 (The National
Economy of the USSR in 1967) (Moscow, 1968), p. 647.

16
p. 649.

17Murray Feshbach, "Manpower in the USSR: A Survey
of Recent Trends and Prospects," New Directions in the Soviet
Economy, Joint Committee Print, 89th Congress, 2nd Session,
Part III: The Human Resources (Washington, D. C., 1966),
pp. 703-88. Feshbach's absolute figures (p. 773) are
(in thousands): State and Economic Administrative Organs,
1960 = 1,120; 1961 = 1,166; 1962 = 1,184; 1963 = 1,177;
1964 = 1,219; Administrative Organs of Cooperative and
Social Organizations: 1960 = 124; 1961 = 130; 1962 = 132;
1963 = 131; 1964 = 135.

Extrapolated from Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1967,

18Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1967, p. 649; See above,
n. 16.

19pravda, October 24, 1969, p. 1.

20Varchuk and Razin, Voprogy filosofii, No. 4 (1967),
p. 143.

21See, for example, E. V. Shorina, "Obshchestvennye
inspektsii, nuzhny 1i oni?" (Are Public Inspectors Neces-
sary?), Sovety deputatov trudyashchikhsya (Soviets of
Workers' DeputieS), No. 3 (1963), pp. 64-66.

22Izvestia, January 4, 1969, p. 3.

23See, for example, Partiinaya zhizn, No. 15 (August),
1965, pp. 11-12.

24Letter of V. Ovchinnikov, Pravda, May 11, 1969, p. 2.

25Varchuk and Razin, Voprosy filisofii, No. 4 (1967),
13.141; see also, Shorina, Sovety_deputatov trudyashchikhsya,

NO. 3 (1963)! p- 65.

26Grey Hodnett, "Mobilization Within the Primary
Party Organization in the Communist Party of the Soviet
[h1i0n: 1945—1961" (Columbia University Ph. D. Thesis,
11962), p. 327; Hodnett's example is concerned with the
primary party secretary whose buro has been given an
assignment; however, the situation clearly may apply

275

wherever a group task ultimately rests upon the respon-
sibility of the responsibility of the leader of the group.

27Izvestia, January 4, 1969, p. 3.

8The quote, which appears in Kassof, is from A.
Kachanov, "Zorok komsomolski glaz" (Vigilant is the Komsomol
Eye), Molodoi kommunist (The Young Communist), November 20,
1960, p. 40.

29Allen Kassof, The Soviet Youth Program (Cambridge,
Mass., 1965), p. 1150

30

 

 

See above, Ch. V, n. 60.
318. Morozov, "Cherez vykhlopnuyu trubu" (Through
the Exhaust Pipe), Izvestia, August 15, 1969, p. 4.

32Ibid.

 

33Joseph Berliner, Factory and Manager in the USSR
(Cambridge, Mass., 1957), pp. 231-317.

34

 

Ibid., p. 239.

35For a particularly detailed treatment of the web
of involvement which vitiates the control efforts of the
Inany agencies and persons assigned control functions by
the state but who deal directly one way or another with the
enterprise concerned, see Berliner, Factory and Manager in
the USSR, pp. 323-24.

36Kovanov interview, in Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, No. 4.
(January 1969), p. 7.

37

 

Pravda, July 17, 1969, p. 3.

38Jerry F. Hough, The Soviet Prefects: The Local
IParty Organs in Industrial Decision-Making (Cambridge,
Ffidss., 1969), p. 211.

39Berliner, Factory and Manager in the USSR, p. 328.

40

p. 10.
41

Shikin, Partiinaya zhizn, No. 2 (January), 1969,

 

Ibid.

42There is evidence that the self-selected, normatively-
nuativated individual does produce a superior compliance agent:
see Herbert Kaufman, The Forest Ranger (Baltimore, 1960) .

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

 

I. Books and Pamphlets

Bodrova, A., ed. Partiiny Kontrol (Party Control). Kiev:
Gospolitizdat, 1960.

 

Bolshaya sovetskgya entsiklopediya (Great Soviet Encyclopedia),
2ndied. Vol. 12 (May 1952) and Vol. 22 (September 1953).
Moscow, 1949-1958.

 

Byulleten TsKK RKP(b) i NK RKI (Bulletin of the Central Con-
trol Committee of the Russian Communist Party
[Bolshevik] and the PeOple's Commissariat of Worker
and Peasant Inspection), No. 22 (1924).

 

Dorokhova, G. A. Raboche-krestyanskaya inspeksiya, 1920-1923.
(The Worker-Peasant Inspection, 1920-1923). Moscow:
Gosyurizdat, 1959.

 

Dozornye narodnovo kontrolya (Patrols of the people's
inspector). Krasnodar: Krasnodarskoe knizhnoe
izdat., 1964.

XX sezd Vsesoyuznoi kommunisticheskoiypartii(b): Steno-
graficheski otchet, 14— 25 fevralya 1956 goda (Twentieth
Congress of the Ail-Union Communist Party (v), Steno-
graphic Report, February 14-25, 1956). 2 Vols.

Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1956.

 

XXIII sezd KPSS i voprosy gosudarstvennovo stroitelstva,
29 marta-8 aprelya 1966 goda: Stenograficheski
otchet (XXIII Congress of the CPSU and Questions of
State Construction, March 29-April 8, 1966: Steno-
graphic Record). 2 Vols. Moscow: Politizdat, 1968.

Evdokimov, Vasili Egorovich. Organizatory massovo narodnovo
kontrolya (Organizers of Mass, People's Control).
Moscow: Politizdat, 1965.

 

(aruppy sodeistviia pargpskontrolyu (Groups of Assistance to
Party State Control). Moscow. Gospolitizdat, 1963.

276

277

Istoriya profdvizheniya v SSSR (History of the Trade Union
Movement in the USSR). Moscow: Profizdat, 1961.

Istoriya sovetskoi konstitutsii; sbornik dokumentov 1917-
1957. (History of the Soviet Constitution; a Coilec-
tion of Documents, 1917-1957). Moscow: Izd-vo
akademii nauk SSSR, 1957.

Kaziev, M. Ya. Obshchestvenny kontrol za meditsinskim
obslpzhivaniem trudyashchikhsya (Public ControI'Of
the Medical Service of the Workers). Moscow:
Profizdat, 1962.

Kolchina, O. P. Obshchestvennye nachala v partiinoi rabote
(Public Bases in Party Work). Moscow: Znanie, I962.

Kozlov, V. I. v meste s massami, pod kontrolem mass (To-
gether with the Masses, Under Control of the Masses).
Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1962.

KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh sezdov, konferentsii i
plenumov TsK (CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of
Seséions, Conferences and Plenums of the Central
Committee). Vol. II. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1954.

 

Kratki obzor deyatelnosti Narodnovo komissariata Gosudarstf
vennovo kontrolya za pervye dva goda (oktyabr 1917 ge-
dkpyabr 1919 g) (A Short Survey of the Activity 6f
the PeOple's Commissariat of State Control for the
First Two Years, October 1917-October 1919). Moscow:
Narodny komissariat Gosudarstvennovo kontrolya, 1919.

 

Kratki politicheski slovar (Short Political Dictionary).
Moscow; 1964.

The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow: Reports and
Speeches at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Mafdh 10—21,
1939. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House,

193 .

jLenin, V. I. O partiinom,Agosudarstvennom u obshchest-
vennom kontrole (On Party, State and Public Control),
comp. by L. F. Nikolskaya and E. F. Polkovnikova.
Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1963.

 

. Osnovy marksizma-leninizma. Uchebnoe posobie
"’ (Foundations of Marxism-Leninism. School Text).
Moscow, 1959.

 

278

Lenin, V. I. Sochineniya (Works), 4th ed., 35 vols.
Moscow: Gospolititdat, 1941-1951.

 

. State and Revolution. Little Lenin Library,
Vol. 14. N. Y.: International Publishers, 1932.

 

 

Leninskaya sistema_partiinojgosudarstvennovo kontrolya i
evo rol v stroitelstve sotsialzma (The Leninist
System of Party-State Control add Its Role in
Building Socialism). Moscow: "Mysl," 1965.

Lepeshkin, Aleksei I. Mestnye organy vlasti sovetskovo
ggsudarstva, 1921-1936 gg. (Local Organs of RuId
of the Soviet State, 1921-1936). Moscow:
Gosyurizdat, 1959.

 

Lukyanov, Aleksei N. and Rodionov, Vladimir A. Partiino-
gosudarstvenny kontrol v promyshlennosti (Party-
State Control in Industry). Moscow: 1TMysl," 1965.

Lukyanov, Anatoli I. Vsenarodnaya sotsialisticheskaya
demokratiya iypovyshenie roli obshchestvennykh
organizatsi v SSSR (All-People's Socialist Democracy
and the Heightening of the Role of Public Organiza-
tions in the USSR). Moscow: "Mysl," 1966.

 

Materialy XXII sezda KPSS (Materials of the XXII Congress
of the CPSU). Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1961.

Materialy Vneocherednovo XXI sezda KPSS (Materials of the
Extraordinary let Congress of the CPSU). Moscow:
Gospolitizdat, 1959.

Mitrofanov, Ivan I. Osnovnye vidy proverok i metody ikh
organizatsii (Basic Forms of Inspections and
Methods of Organizing Them). Moscow: Politizdat,

1965.

 

Moskalev, M. A. Kontrol_po—Leninski (Control According to
Lenin). Moscow: Znanie, 1963.

Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1965 (The National Economy of
the USSR in 1965). Moscow: "Statistika," 1966.

Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1967 (The National Economy of
the USSR in 1967). Moscow: "Statistika," 1968.

jNarodny kontrol v SSSR (People's Control in the USSR).
'—" V. I. Turovtsev, resp. ed. Moscow: Izd. "Nauka,"

1967.

Jan"

279

Novikov, S. G. Postoyannye komissii Verkhovnovo sovieta
SSSR (Standing Commissions of the USSR Supreme
Sov1et). Moscow: Gosyurizdat, 1962.

Otchet o deyatelnosti NK RKI za 1920 god (Report on the
Actitity of NK RKI during 1920). Moscow: Narodny
komissariat RKI, 1920.

Panova, Efaliya A. Kontrol profsoyuzov za soblyudeniem
trudovovo zakonodatelstva (Control of the Trade
Unions over the Achievement of Labor Legality).
Moscow: Profizdat, 1967.

Partgoskontrol: otvetyyna voprosy (Party-State Control.
Answers to Questions). Moscow: Politizdat, 1965.

Petrov, P. S. Organizatsionno-massovaya rabotayprofessi-
onalnykh soyuzov (Organizational-Mass Work of the
Trade Unions). Moscow: Profizdat, 1961.

 

Pod kontrolem mass (sbornik) (Under the Control of the
Masses [Collection]), Minsk: Izd. "Belarus," 1964.

Polozheniya ob organakhypartgoskontrolya, gruppakh i
postakh sodeistviya, "komsomolskom prozhektore"
(Statutes on the Organs of Party-State Control, on
the Groups and Posts of Assistance, and on the
"Komsomol Searchlight"). Moscow: Politizdat, 1964.

Polozhenie o postgyannykh komissiyakh mestnykh Sovetov
dgputatov trudyashchikhsya (Statute on the Standing

Commissions of the Local Soviets of Worker's Deputies).

Moscow: Gospolitizat, 1956.

Programma kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskovo Soyuza (Pro-
gram of the CPSU). Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1962.

Raginsky, M. Yu., ed. Formy uchastiya obshchestvennosti
v borbe s prestuppostu (Forms of Participation of
the Public in the Struggle with Crime). Moscow:
Gosyurizdat, 1963.

quiionov, Vladimir A. V borbe za rezervy promyshlennovo
proizvodstva (In the Struggle to Utilize Reserves of
Industrial Production). Moscow: Politizdat, 1965.

 

:ROZjJMrIn Ma and Razdunov, F. S. Komissii pri ispolkomakh
raionnykh iygorodskikh Sovetov deputatov trudyash- '
dhikhs a (Commissions Attached to the Executive
Committees of Raion and City Soviets of Worker's
Deputies). Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1964.

/ by]

280

Sbornik zakonov SSSR i ukazov Prezidiuma Verkhovnovo sovets
SSSR (Collection of Laws of the USSR and Decrees of
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR).
Moscow: Izdanie Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR, 1934.

XVII Sezd Vsesoyuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii(b): Steno-
graficheski otchet (XVII Congress of the All-Union
Communist Party [Bolshevik]: Stenographic Record,
January 26-February 10, 1934). Moscow: Gospolitizdat,
1934. '

Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporyazhenii Rabochevo i Krest-
yanskovo pravitelstva, 1917-1918 (Collection of
Laws and Ordinances of the Workers' and Peasants'
Government). Moscow, 1918.

 

Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporyazhenii Rabochevo-Krestyanskovo
pravitelstva, 1919 (Collection of Laws and Orders of
the Workers' and Peasants' Government). Moscos, 1919.

 

Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporyazhenii RSFSR (Collection of
Laws and(Orders of the RSFSR). Moscow, 1924.

Soviet Statutes and Decisions, International Arts and
Science Press Journaiiof Translations. Vol. V, No. 2
(Winter 1968-69).

Spravochnik narodnovo kontrolera (Handbook of the People's
Inspector), 2nd ed. Moscow: Politizdat, 1965.

Spravochnik partiinovo rabotnika (Party Official's Hand-
hook)} Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1957.

Spravochnik partiinovo rabotnika, Vypusk chetverty(Party
Official's Handbook, Fourth Issue). Moscow:
Gospolitizdat, 1963.

Spravochnik partiinovo rabotnika, Vypuskypyaty (Party
Official's Handbook, Issue Five). Moscow:
Gospolitizdat, 1964.

Spravochnik partiinovo rabotnika, Vypusk shestoi (Party
Official's Handbook: Sixth Issue). Moscow:
Gospolitizdat, 1966.

fatalin, Joseph. Problems of Leninism, 11th ed. Moscow:
Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1940.

. Sochineniya (Works), 13 vols. Moscow:
"‘ Gospolitizdat, 1916-52.

 

 

281

Strumilin, Stanislav G. Man, Society and the Future. New
York: Crosscurrents Press, Inc., 1964.

Syrov, Venedict G. and Orkin, Grigori A. Spravochnik
obshchestvennovo kontrolera (Handbook of the Public
Inspector). Moscow: Profizdat, 1965.

Surovtsev, B. and Shevtsov, A. Komsololski prozhektor
(Komsomol Searchlight). Leningrad: Lenizdat,(I966.

Todorski, Yu. V. Postoyannye komissii mestnykh Sovetov
depptatov trudyashchikhsya (The Standing CommissiOns
of Local Soviets of Worker's Deputies). Moscow:
Gosyurizdat, 1955.

-" arm-r

Tolkovy slovar russkovo yagyka (Explanatory Dictionary
of the Russian Language), 4 vols. Moscow: Gosizdat
inostrannykh i natsionalnykh slovarei, 1935-1940.

Tregunov, A. Glasnostypartgoskontrolya (Publicizing Party-
State Control). Moscow: Polititdat, 1965.

Triska, Jan F. (ed.). Soviet Communism, Program apg
Rules. San FranciSco: Chandler Publishing Co.,

I962?

Trofimov, Konstantin S. Gruppa sodeistviya--reshayushchee
zveno partgoskontrolya (The Group of Assistanceiis
a Vital Link of Party-State Control). Moscow:
Politizdat, 1965.

Trotsky, L. Stalin (2nd ed.) New York: Harper and Bros.,
1946.

‘Vneocherednoi XXI sezd kommunisticheskoi partii sovetskovo
soyuza, Stenpgraficheskii otchet (Extraordinary XXI
Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR. Steno-
graphic Record). 2 vols. Moscow: Gospolitizdat,

1959.

\7 _pomoshch aktivistu-obshchestvenniku: Sbornikgpolozheni ob
obshchestvenpykh organizatsiy_kh (Aid to the Public-
Activist: A Collection of Statutes on Public Organ-
izations). Moscow: Moskovski rabochi, 1967.

lysespyuznaya kommunisticheskaya_partiya(b) v resolyutsiyakh
i resheniyakh sezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK
(1898- -l924) (The All- -Union Communist Party in
Resolutions and Decisions of the Congresses, Confer-
ences and Plenums of the Central Committee [1898-
l924]), 6th ed. Vol. I. Moscow: Gospolitizdat,

1941.

 

282

Zaluzhny, V. I. Kontrol v deistvii (Control in Action).
Moscow: Znanie, 1965.

Zasedaniya Verkhovnovo soveta SSSR (III sessiya) Steno-
graficheski otchet (Meetings of the Supreme Soviet
[Third Session] Stenographis Record). Moscow:
Izdanie Verkhovnovo Sovieta SSSR, 1947.

Zhiromskaya, I. P. Leninskie printsipy partgoskontrolya
(Leninist Principles of Party-State Control).
Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1963.

_'f_" a?"

II. Articles

Agapova, A. "Partiiny kontrol na predpriyatiyakh" (Party
Control in Enterprises), Kommunist (Communist), No. 4
(1969), pp. 65-74.

Akhundov, V. "Za deistvenny kontrol ispolneniya" (For
Efficient Control Over Fulfillment), Partiinaya
zhizn (Party Life), No. 15 (August, 1966), pp. 11-17.

Akulintsev, V. "Ob organizatsii partiinovo kontrolya
deyatelnosti administratsii v novykh usloviyakh"
(On the Organization of Party Control Activity of
the Administration in New Conditions), P. zh., No.
24 (December, 1967), pp- 15-22.

Aleshkin, D., and Fedostsev, G. "Byt pod kontrol mass"
(Life Under the Control of the Masses), P. zh., No.

.Anisimov, E. "Razvivaem kontrol snizu" (We are Developing
Control from Below), Sovety deputatov i trudygsh-
chikhs a (Soviets of Workers' Deputies), No. li—
(1959).

Babushkin, V. "Kazhdy rubl--—po naznacheniyu" (Every Ruble
to its Purpose), Pravda (August 27, 1969), p. 3.

Ekashtovoi, K. "Zorki glaz narodnykh kontrolerov" (The
Sharp Eye of the PeOple's Inspectors), Kolkhozno-
sovhkoznoe proizvodstvo Moldavii (Collective ahd
State Farm Production of Moldatia), No. 5 (1964),

pp. 8-90

Batrukhin, M. "Pod obshchestvennym kontrolem" (Under
Public Control), Kolkhozno-sovkhoznoeyproizvodstvo
R.S.F.S.R. (Collective and State Farm Production

of the R.S.F.S.R.), No. 2 (1964), pp. 23-24.

 

283

"Berech goryuchee" (Save Fuel), Izvestia (December 2, 1969),
p. 3.

"Berech reki i vodoemy" (Protect Rivers and Bodies of
Water), Izvestia (April 15, 1969), p. 3.

Bersheda, P. B. "Uchastie obshchestvennosti v deyatelnosti
Sovetov (po materialam Ukrainskoi SSR" (Public Par—
ticipation in the Activity of the Soviets [According
to Materials of the Ukrainian Republic]), in XXIII
sezd KPSS i voprosy gosudarstvennovo stroitelstva
(XXIII Congress of the CPSU and Questions of State
Construction; Moscow: "Mysl," 1968), pp. 189-197.

 

Bogatyrev, P. and Shterev, V. "Ne nuzhnatskaya 'samodeyatel-
nost'" (We Don't Need This Kind of "Autonomy"), Pravda
(March 20, 1969), p. 3.

Bolyasny, I. "O sisteme partiinovo i gosudarstvennovo
kontrolya" (On a System of Party and State Control),
Kommunist, No. 15 (October 1961), p. 89.

 

Borkov, G. "Proverka ispolneniya i zadachi sovershenst-
vovaniya partiinovo rukovodstva" (Checking on Ful-
fillment and the Tasks of Improving Party Leadership),
Kommunist, No. 3 (February 1954), pp. 53-66.

 

Burkov, B. "Soviet Trade Unions," New Times, No. 12 (1959),
pp. 5-7.

 

"Chto chitat o partiinovosudarstvennom kontrole. (Rekomen-
datsionno-annotirovanny ukazatel. V pomoshch
propagandisty)" (What to Read on Party-State Control.
Recommended-Annotated Guide for the Propagandist),
Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie (Political Self-
Education), No. 11 (1963), pp. 138-39.

 

Dolgopolov, Yu. A. "Narodnye kontrolery za raboti" (People's
Inspectors at Work), Uchet i finansy v kolkhozakh i
sovkhozakh (Accounting and Finances on Collective and
State Farms), No. 6 (1963), pp. 33-35.

 

Donskod, V} and Ukronnikov, S. "Razvitie leninskikh idei
o partiino-gosudarstvennom kontrole" (The Development
of Leninist Ideas on Party-State Control), Kommunist,
No. 18 (1962): pp. 30-39.

Eg]jj;, N. P. "Partiino—gosudarstvenni kontrol v deistvii"‘
(Party-State Control in Action), Uchet i finansy v
kolkhozakh i sovkhozakh, No. 6 (1963), pp. 35-36.

 

 

284

Enyutik, T. B. "O formakh raboty organov partgoskontrolya
po razvitiyu bolshoi khimii," (On Forms of Work of
the Organs of Party-State Control In the Deve10pment
of the Chemical IndustrY), Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i

ravo (Soviet State and Law) (November, 1964), pp.
8-55.

"Est i epilog" (There is an Epilogue), Pravda (December 28,
1969)] p. 2.

Fedosov, N. "Komitet partgoskontrol i evo aktiv" (The
Committee of Party-State Control and its Activists),
P. zh., No. 11 (June, 1965), pp. 36-39.

"Gde zhe epilog?" (Where is the Epilogue?), Pravda (October
9, 1969), p. 3.

Georgadze, M. P. "XXIII sezd KPSS o povyshenii roli
Sovetov deputatov trudyashchikhsya" (The XXIII
Congress of the CPSU on Heightening the Role of
Soviets of Working People's Deputies), in XXIII
sezd KPSS i voprosy gosudarstvennovo stroiteigpva
(XXIII Congress of the CPSU and Questions of State
Construction; Moscow: "Mysl," 1968), pp. 8-28.

Gitelman, D., Sustanov, P., and Biryukov, V. "Grom bez
molnii, O deistvennosti kontrolnykh organov"
(Thunder without Lightning, On the Effectiveness of
Control Organs), Izvestia (February 24, 1962), p. 3.

Gorirn V3 "Gruppa sodeistviya——organizatuyushchi tsentr
obshchestvennovo kontrolya" (Assistance Groups are
the Organizing Center of Public Control), Pravda
(July 31, 1964): p. 4.

(hirin, V. and Polenov, Yu. "Partiinno-gosudarstvenny kon-
trol v deistvii" (Party-State Control in Action),
Kommunist, No. 4 (1964), pp. 68-69.

 

(Erushetski, I. "Voprosy organizatsionnoi raboty v kon—
trolnykh organakh" (Questions of Organizational
Work in Control Organs), P. zh., No. 19 (October
1963), PP. 15-20.

(hrrov, P. "Leninskie printsipy kontrolya" (Leninist Prin-
ciples of Control), Selskaya zhizn (Rural Life)
(January 11, 1963).

285

Ivanov, V. P. and Moruchkov, S. A. "Razvitie leninskikh
printsipov edinovo partiino—gosudarstvennovo
kontrolya" (DevelOpment of Leninist Principles of
Unified Party-State Control), Voprosy Istorii
(Problems of History), No. 10 (1963), pp. 21-36.

"Kakuyu rol igrayut postoyannye komissii v osushchestvlenii
kontrolya za vypolneniem reshenii Sovetov i ispol-
nitelynkh komitetov? Konsultatsiya?" (What is the
Role of the Standing Commission in Implementing
Control Over the Fulfillment of Decisions of Soviets 1
and Executive Committees? Consultation), Gorod
khozyaistvo Moskvy (City Economy of Moscow), No. 11
(1959), p. 28.

Kalinin, V. "Organy partgoskontrolya i sudy" (Organs of
Party-State Control and the Courts), Sotsialisti-
cheskaya zakonnost (Socialist Legalityi, No. 10—
71964)? pp. 18-21.

 

Kallion, I. Kh. and Shneider, Kh. Kh. "Obshchestvenny
kontrol i evo effectivnost" (Public Control and Its
Effectiveness), Sov. gos. i pravo, No. 3 (March,
1967): pp. 65-72.

Khrushchev, Nikita S. "Doklad: Razvitie ekonomiki SSSR
i partiinoe rukovodstvo narodnym khozyaistvom
(Report: Development of the USSR Economy and Party
Leadership of the National EconomY), Plenum Tsen-
tralnovo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoiypartii Sovetskovo
Soyuza, 19-23 noyabrya 1962 gpda; stenograficheski
otchet (Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU,
19-23 Nov. 1962; Stenographic Record). Moscow:
gospolitizdat, 1963.

WKommunisty vskrivayut rezervy proizvodstva" (Communists
Open Up Reserves of Production), P. zh., No. 10
(1964), p. 32. “‘—"

Ivonotop, V. "Budnichnye zaboty dozornykh" (The Daily Cares
of Patrols), Pravda (July 22, 1969), p. 4.

loonovalenko, A. "Partiiny kontrol v sovkhozakh" (Party
Control in State Farms), P. zh., No. 13 (1960),
pp. 43—45.

"loontrol snizu" (Control from Below), P. zh., No. 9 (1963),
p. 78.

qunushin, A. "O nekotorykh itogakh ochetnovybornykh
sobranii" (On Several Results of the Accounting-and-
Election Meetings), P. zh., No. 3 (February, 1961),
pp. 19-20.

286

Korneev, V. "Iz opyta sodeistviya kontrolyu" (From the
Experience of Assistance to Control), Kolkhozno-
sovkhoznoe proizvodstvo R.F.S.F.R., No. 8 (1963),
pp. 11-12.

Kovalev, G. and Kuznetsov, V. "Kontrol massovy deistvenny"
(Mass, Efficient Control), Partiinaya zhizn (Tashkent),
No. 5 (1964), pp. 70-72.

 

Kovanov, P. Interview, Ekonomicheskaya gazeta (Economic
Journal) (January 4, 1969), p. 7.

. "Narodny kontrol v deistvii" (PeOple's Control
in Action), Kommunist, No. 7 (1967), p. 46.

 

 

Kozlov, Frol P. "KPSS--Partiya vsevo naroda" (CPSU is the
Party of All the People), Kommunist, No. 8 (May 1962),
p. 14.

 

Kozlov, G. "Narodny, deistvenny, konkretny!" (Popular,
Effective, Concretel), Pravda, June 26, 1963, p. 4.

Lenin, V. I. "Kak nam reorganizovat Rabkrin" (How We Should
Reorganize Rabkrin), Pravda (January 25, 1923).

. "Luchshe menshe, da luchshe" (Better Fewer,
But Better), Pravda (March 4, 1923).

 

"Leninskie printsipy raboty gosudarstvennovo apparata i
zadachi evo sovershenstvovaniya" (Leninist Principles
of Work of the State Apparatus and the Tasks of
Perfecting it), Kommunist, No. 5 (March 1954), pp.
14-30.

 

Makhnenko, A. Kh. "Razvitie i sovershenstvovanie kontrolnoi
deyatelnosti postoyannykh komissii Verkhovnykh Sovetov"
(Development and Improvement of the Control Activity
of Standing Commissions of the Supreme Soviets),

Sov. 905. i ppavo, No. 7 (July, 1965), pp. 22-28.

Malenkin, A. "Gruppa--osnova narodnovo kontrolya" (The
Group is the Basis of People's Control), P. zh.,
No. 17 (1968), p. 40.

. "O nekotorykh voprosakh deyatelnosti organov
partiino-gosudarstvennovo kontrolya Ukrainoi" (On
Several Questions Concerning the Activity of Organs
of Party-State Control of the Ukraine), Sov. gos. i
pravo (March, 1964), pp. 36-44.

 

287

Malkov, V. V. "O putyakh rasshireniya polnomochi obsh-
chestvennovo kontrolya v usloviyakh obshchenarodnovo
gosudarstva" (On Ways of Expanding the Authority of
Public Control in the Conditions of the All-People's
State), Sov. 905. i pravo (February, 1963), pp. 55-56.

 

Matuz, S. and Burkoltsev, A. "Bumazhnaya metel" (Paper
Snow Storm), Izvestia (November 23, 1961), p. 1.

Mekhlis, Lev Zakharovich. "Tridsat let sotsialisticheskovo
gosudarstvennovo kontrolya" (Thirty Years of Socialist
State Control), Pravda (April 9, 1949), p. 6.

Melkisis, E. A. "Zalog effektivnosti kontrolya" (Guarantee
of the Effectiveness of Control), Uchet i finansy v
kolkhozakh i sovkhozakh, No. 10, 1965), pp. 55-56.

 

 

Mezentsev, S. "V. I. Lenin o kontrole" (V. I. Lenin on
Control), P zh., No. 18 (September, 1963), pp. 73-76.
, and Tregubov, A. "Knigi i broshyuri 0 par-
tiino-gosudarstvennom kontrole (obzor)" (Books and
Brochures on Party-State Control [Survey]),
Politicheskoe samoobrazovanie, No. 4 (1965), pp.
127-133.

 

 

Mitrofanov, I. and Rasporkin, F. "Gazeta i partgoskontrol"
(The Newspaper and Party—State Control), P. zh.,
No. 4 (February, 1965), pp. 73-75.

Morozov, T. and Melnikov, V. "Kontrol dolzhen byt post-
oyanny" (Control Must Be Steady), P. zh., No. 23
(December, 1968), p. 66.

Nabatov, A. "Chutko prislushivatsya k golosu mass" (Listen
Attentively to the Voice of the Masses), Partiinayg
zhizn Kazakhstana (Party Life of Kazakhstah), No. 4
(1964): pp. 55-58.

 

 

"Narodny, deistvenny" (Popular, Efficient), Pravda (Septem-
ber 14, 1963), P. 1.

"Narodny komissariat Gosudarstvennovo kontrolya. Prikaz
No. 1, May 15, 1918" (People's Commissariat of
State Control, Order No. 1), Izvestia VTsIK (News
of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee,
May 19, 1918, p. 5.

 

"Narodny kontrol" (PeOple's Control), Editorial, Pravda
(December 13, 1965).

288

"Narodny kontrol na zhatve" (People's Control at Harvest
Time), Pravda (July 6, 1965).

"Narodny kontrol v deistvii" (People's Control in Action),
Partiinaya zhizn, Tashkent, No. 4 (1963), pp. 42-47;
No. 11 (1963), pp. 80-83; No. 4 (1965), pP. 62-67.

 

"Ne dopuskat prostoya vagonov" (Do Not Permit Freight Car
Demurrage), Pravda (August 23, 1969), p. 2.

Nikolaev, S. "Dozornye partii" (Party Patrols), Selsko-
khozyaistvennoe proizvodstvo Povolzhya (AgricuItural
Production Along the Volga), No. 7 (1963), p. 22.

"Novye formy partiinovo kontrolya v deistvii" (New Forms
of Party Control in Action), P. zh., No. 17 (1959),
pp. 32-42.

"Novye organizatsionnye formy partiinovo kontrolya" (New
Organizational Forms of Party Control), Pravda
(July 13, 1959), p. 2.

"Ob obrazovanii Narkomata gosudarstvennovo kontrolya" (On
the Formation of the People's Commissariat of State
Control), Vedomosti Verkhovnovo soveta SSSR (Official
Journal of the USSR Supreme Soviet), No. 31 (1940).

"O delegirovanii v sostav grupp i postov sodeistviya komi-
tetam partiinc-gosudarstvennovo kontrolya" (On the
Delegation [of New Members] to the Staff of Groups
and Posts of Assistance to PGK Committees), P. zh.,
No. 15 (August 1965), pp. 25-26.

"0 gruppakh sodeistviya organam partiino-gosudarstvennovo
kontrolya" (On the Groups of Assistance to Organs
of Party-State Control), P. zh., No. 3 (1963), p.
57.

Parkhomenko, V. and Ushakov, D. "Bespokoiny chelovek"
(The Concerned Man), Partiinaya zhizn Kazakhstana

No. 6 (1965), pp. 58-60.

 

"Partiinaya khronika: Aktiv obsuzhdaet rabotu organov
narodnovo kontrolya (Party News: The Active Members
Consider the Work of the Organs of People's Control),
P. zh., No. 17 (September 1966), p. 79.

"Partiinaya khronika: Luchshe kontrolirovat vypolnenie
peshenii" (Party News: Improve Control over the
Fulfillment of Resolutions), P. zh., No. 2 (1965),

p. 79.

.3‘;.’i3’

289

"Partiiny kontrol na proizvodstve" (Party Control Over
Production), P. zh., No. 6 (1964), p. 40.

Pelevin, A. "Zabota ob ekonomii i berezhlivosti" (Care
About Economies and Thrift), Ekonomicheskaya gazeta
(Economic Newspaper) (December 28, 1963).

 

"Pokonchit s kantselyarsko«byurokaticheskim stilem
rukovodstva" (End Bureaucratic Methods of Leader-
ship), Pravda (March 3, 1954).

"Polozhenie o gruppakh i postakh sodeistviya komitetam
partiino-gosudarstvennovo kontrolya" (Statute on
the Groups and Posts of Assistance to Committees
of Party-State Control), P. zh., No. 14 (1964),
p. 31.

"Polozhenie o komissiyakh pri pervichnykh partiinykh
organizatsiyakh proizvodstvennykh i torgovykh
predpriyatii po osushchestvleniyu part-organiza—
tsiyami prava kontrolya deyatelnosti administratsii,
(Tekct)" (Statute on the Commissions Attached to
Primary Party Organizations of Production and Trade
Enterprises For Implementation by the Party Organ-
izations of the Right of Control over the Activity
of the Administration), P. zh., No. 13 (1959), PP.
24—27.

"Polozhenie o 'komsomolskom prozhektore'" (Statute on the
Komsomol Searchlight), Komsomolskaya_pravda
(Komsomol Truth) (March 23, 1963).

 

Promyslov, V. "Uspekh~—v slozhenii sil" (Success is in the
Building of Strength), Izvestia (June 17, 1966).

"Pyatdesyat let organov kontrolya" (Fifty Years of Control
Organs), P. zh., No. 3 (February, 1968), pp. 22-24.

Rostovshchikov, V. "Svyazanny patrul" (The Constrained
Patrol), lzvestia (April 26, 1961), p. 3.

Sakulin, V., Lieut. Col. "Letter to the Editors: Paper
Patches," Krasnaya zvezda (Red Star) (April 11,
1969), p. 2; in Current Digest of the Soviet Press,
Vol. XXI, No. 15 (1969). pp. 27-28.

 

 

Salamakha, A. "Narodny kontrol deistvuet!" (People's
Control Works!) Kolkhozno-sovhoznoe proizvodstvo
Moldavii (Collective and State Farm Production of
MoldaVia), No. l (1964), pp. 36-38.

 

 

290

Salishchev, N. T. and Shorina, E. V. "Kontrolnaya deyatel~
nost: praktichesky opyt i nauchnye rekomendatsii"
(Control Activity: Practical Experience and
Scientific Recommendations) Sov. 905. i pravo,

No. 11 (November 1965), pp. 19-25.

 

Shchumina, T. D. "Na strazhe narodnovo dobra" (Guarding
the People's Property); Uchet i finansy v kolkhozakh
i sovhkozakh, No. 10 (1965): Pp. 56-57.

 

Shikin, I. "Leninskie printsipii narodnovo kontrolya v
deistvii" (Leninist Principles of People's Control
in Action), P. zh., No. 2 (1969), PP. 8-15.

Shkaradek, V. "Pravo kontrolya kolkhoznoi partiinoi
organizatsii" (Right of Control of the Collective
Farm Party Organization), Kommunist (Vilnyus), f‘
No. 10 (1959), PP. 71-73. 5

 

Shorina, E. V. "Obshchestvennye inspektsii, nuzhny 1i

oni?" (Are Public Inspectors Necessary?) Sovet
deputatov trudyashchikhsya, No. 3 (1963), pp. 31-66.

. "Partiino-gosudarstvenny kontrol--vazhnoe
sredstva kommunisticheskovo stroitelstva" (Party-
State Control is an Important Method of Communist
Construction), Sov. gos. igpravo (May, 1963). PP.
14-25.

 

 

Sidorov, N. "Kontrolery v sovetskikh uchrezhdeniyakh"
(Inspectors in Soviet Institutions), P. zh., No.
8 (April, 1964): PP. 34-37.

Eaaloveva, N. "Dozornye" (Patrols), Partiinaya zhizn,
Tashkent, No. 7 (1964), pp. 78-80.

 

'wmjvershenstvovat formy i metody partiinovo kontrolya

(Peredovaya)" (Perfect the Forms and Methods of
Party Control [Lead Articlej), Pravda (August 3,
1959).

'wyyvetski apparat upravleniyav-vazhnoe orudie kommunistich—
eskovo stroitelstva" (The Soviet Administrative
Apparatus is an Important Tool in the Building of
Communism), Kommunist, No. 17 (November, 1956),
pp. 3-16.

 

Stxxrovoitov, N. "Poryadok provedeniya predstoyashchikh
vyborov v sovetu" (Arrangements for the Conduct
of Forthcoming Elections to the Soviet), Sovety
deputatov trudyashchikhsya, No. 2 (February, 1959),

p. 4.

291

Sunko, N. F. "Berech narodnoe dobro" (Protect the People's
Property), Uchet i finansy v kolkhozakh i sovkho-
zakh, No. 2 (1965), pp. 53-54.

 

Surganov, F. "Novye formy partiinovo kontrolya v deistvii“
(New Forms of Party Control in Action), Pravda
(September 23, 1959).

Tolstov, V. "Kontrol snizu" (Control from Below), P. zh.,
No. 1 (January, 1963), pp. 39-44.

Tulebaev, K. "V komitet postupilo pismo" (A Letter Was
Brought Before the Committee), Partiinaya zhizn
Kazakhstana, No. 6 (1963), pp. 52-55,

 

 

Tyrovtsev, V. "Stil kontrolya——delovitost" (The Inspector's
Manner is Business-like), Izvestia (February 8, 1965).

Udot, N. G. "Obshchestvenny kontrol ukreplyaet ekonomiku
kolkhoza" (Public Control Strengthens the Economy
of the Collective Farm), Uchet i finansy v kolkho-
zakh i sovkhozakh, No. 6 (T9657, pp. 36-37.

 

 

Varchuk, V. V. and Razin, V. I. "Issledovaniya v oblasti
politicheskoi organizatsii sotsialisticheskovo
obshchestva" (Research in the Sphere of the Political
Organization of Socialist Society), Voprosy filosofii
(Questions of Philosophy), No. 4 (1967), pp. 131343.

 

Velichkin, I. and Mikhailov, Yu. "Dvoika za stroiku"
(Failing the Mark in Construction), Izvestia
(September 2, 1969), p. 3.

Vilyanov, B. "V tesnom kontakte" (In Close Contact),
Selsko-khozyaistvennoe proizvodstvo Povolzhya (Agri-
cultural Production Along the Volga), No. 9 (1965),
pp. 15-16.

Virunurm, L. "V tesnom kontakte" (In Close Contact),
P. zh., No. 22 (November 1963), pp. 46-48.
. "Nachalo bolshoi raboty" (The Beginning of
Great Work), Kommunist Estonii (Communist of
Esthonia), No. 9 (1963), PP. 54-59.

 

 

"V mestnykh partiinvkh organizatsiyakh: Nepravilnoe
otnoshenie k rukovoditelyu gruppy narodnovo kontrolya
(In Local Party Organizations: Incorrect Relation-
ship to the Leader of the Group of People's Control),
P. zh., No. 20 (October 1966), p. 63.

 

292

"V mestnykh partiinykh organizatsiyakh: uluchshat
rukovodstvo organami narodnovo kontrolya" (In the
Local Party Organizations: Improve the Leadership
by the Organs of PeOple' 8 Control), P. 4b., No. 24
(December 1966), p. 58.

"V mestnykh partiinykh organizatsiyakh: Narodnym konu
troleram--povsednevnuyu pomoshch" (In Local Party
Organizations: Daily Help to the People' 3 Inspec-
tors), P. 4b., No. 3 (February 1967), p. 60.

"V mestnykh partiinykh organizatsiyakh: Vypolnenie
obyazatelstv--pod partiiny kontrol" (In Local Party
Organizations: Fulfillment of Obligations is Under
Party Control), P. 4b., No. 7 (April, 1967), p. 61.

"V mestnykh partiinykh organizatsiyakh: Vypolnenie
obyazatelstv--pod povsednevny kontrol" (In Local
Party Organizations: The Fulfillment of Obliga-
tions is Under Daily Control), P. 4b., No. 6
(MarCh,1967)p p0 54.

"V mestnykh partiinykh organizatsiyakh: Narodnye kontrol-
ery deistvuyut" (In Local Party Organizations:
People's Controllers Act), P. zh., No. 11 (June,
1967), p. 65.

Voronin, P. "Deistvennost kontrolya" (The Efficiency of
Control), P. 4h., No. 12 (June, 1965), pp. 38-42.

. "Gruppy sodeistviya--nadezhnaya opora" (The
Assistance Group is a Trustworthy Foundation),
Selskaya zhizn (July 3, 1963).

 

 

‘Vorontsov, S. "O nezavisimosti organov partiinovo kon-
trolya" (On the Independence of the Organs of Party
Control), Kommunist, No. 13 (September 1961), PP.
86-87.

 

”Vsenarodny kontrol" (All—People's Control), Agitator,
No. 4 (1963), PP. 10-13.

”Vse udobreniya--v delo" (Put All Fertilizers to Work),
Izvestia (April 15, 1969), p. 3.

"Zabota o Baikala" (Concern for Baikal), Izvestia (February
8, 1969), p. 2. '—-—---

"Za dedstvennost partiinovo kontrolya v sovkhozakh" (Toward
Effectiveness of Party Control on State Farms),
Partiinaya zhizn, Tashkent, No. 7 (1960): pp. 3-8.

 

293

Zakharov, M. "Organam kontrolya-—postoyannoe partiinoe
rukovodstvo" (Steady Party Leadership to Organs of
Control), Po leninskomu pgti (On the Leninist Path),
No. 5 (1964): pp. 27-29.

Zaluzhny, V. "Narodny kontrol" (People's Control), P. zh.,
No. 13 (July,l966), pp. 14-19.

Secondary‘Sources

III. Books

Almond, Gabriel A. and Powell, G. Bingham Jr. Comparative
Politics. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., Inc., 1966.

Apter, David E. The Politics of Modernization. Chicago
and London: The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1965.

Armstrong, John A. The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite. New
York: Frederick A. Praeger,‘l959.

Barghoorn, Frederick C. Politics in the U.S.S.R. Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., Inc., 1966.

Berliner, Joseph S. Factory and Manager in the U.S.S.R.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1957.

Berman, Harold J. Justice in the U.S.S.R. New York:
Random House, 1963.

Brown, Emily C. Soviet Trade Unions and Labor Relations.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., Ideology and Power in Soviet
Politics. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967.

Churchward, L. G. Contemporary Soviet Government. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, 1968.

Cocks, Paul Maupin. "Politics of Party Control: The
Historical and Institutional Role of Party Control
in the CPSU," Ph. D. Thesis. Harvard University,

1968.

Conquest, Robert. Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R. New
York and London: Macmillan, 1961.

. Russia After Khrushchev. New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, 1965.

 

.44

294

Dallin, Alexander and Weston, Alan F. (eds.). 'Politics
in the Soviet Union: 7 Cases. New York: Harcourt,
Brace & World, 1966.

 

Deutscher, Isaac. Stalin: A Political Biography. New
York and London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1949.

Downs, Anthony. Inside Bureaucracy. Boston: Little, Brown
& Co., 1967.

Etzioni, A. The Active Society. New York: Free Press,
1968.

. A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations.
New York: Free Press, 1961.

 

Fainsod, Merle. How Russia is Ruled, 2nd ed. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963.

Granick, David. The Red Executive. Garden City, New York:
Doubleday & Co., 1961.

Hodnett, Grey. "Mobilization Within the Primary Party
Organization in the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union: 1945-1961," Ph. D. Thesis. Columbia Univer-

sity, 1962.

Hough, Jerry F. The Soviet Prefects: The Logal Party
Organs in Industrial Decision-making. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969.

Inkeles, Alex. Social Change in Soviet Russia. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968.

Kassof, Allen (ed.). Prospects for Soviet Society. New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968.

. The Soviet Youth Program. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1965.

 

Katz, D., and Kahn, R. L. The Social Psychology of Organ-
izations. New York: Wiley, 1966.

Kaufman, Herbert. The Forest Ranger. Baltimore: 1960.
Kecskemeti, Paul. The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces

in the Hungarian Uprising. Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1961.

295

Kolkowicz, Roman. The Soviet Military and the communist
Party. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University
Press, 1967.

LaPalombara, Joseph (ed.). Bureaucracy and Political
Development. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University

Press, 1963.

 

Mickiewicz, Ellen Propper. Soviet Political Schools: The
Communist Party Adult Instruction System. New Haven
and London: Yale UniVersity Press, 1967.

Moore, Barrington. Terror and Progress USSR. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951.

Nove, Alex. The Soviet Economy. New York: Praeger, 1966.

Pethybridge, Roger. A Key to Soviet Politics: The Crisis
of the Anti-Party Group. New York: Praeger, 1962.

Ploss, Sidney. Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet
Russia. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University
Press, 1965.

Pye, Lucian W. Aspects of Political Development. Boston:
Little, Brown & Co., Inc., 1966.

Riggs, Fred. Administration in Developing Countries.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964.

Ritvo, Herbert. The New Soviet Sociepy. New York: The
New Leader, 1962.

Schapiro, Leonard. The Communist Parpy of the Soviet
Union. New York: Random House, Inc., 1960.

. The U.S.S.R. and the Future. New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.

 

Spoerry, Philip Scott. "The Central Rabkrin Apparatus:
1917-1925," Ph. D. Thesis. Harvard University, 1968.

'Tannenbaum, Arnold S. Control in Organizations. New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968.

'ratu, Michel. Power in the Kremlin. New York: Viking
Press, 1969.

'Fucker, Robert C. The Soviet Political Mind. New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, l963.

296
Tullock, Gordon. The Politics of Bureaucracy. Washington,
D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965.
Wallace, D. M. Russia. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1912.

Who's Who in the USSR 1965-66, 2nd ed. New York: The
Scarecrow Press, 1966.

 

IV. Secondary Sources, Articles

Adams, Jan S. "'People's Control' in the Soviet Union,"
The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XX, No. 4
(December, 1967), pP. 919-29.

. "Soviet Inspectors General: An Expanding
Role?" Soviet Studies, Vol. XX, No. 1 (July, 1968),
pp. 106-11.

 

 

Azrael, Jeremy R. "The Party and Society," Prospects for
Soviet Society, ed. Allen Kassof (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 59-75.

 

Boiter, Albert. "Comradely Justice: How Durable Is It?"
Problems of Communism, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (March-
April, 1935), pp- 82—92.

Churchward, L. G. "Continuity and Change in Soviet Local
Government, 1947-1957," Soviet Studies, Vol. IX
(1958): PP. 256—85.

"Soviet Local Government Today," Soviet
Studies, Vol. XVII, No. 4 (April, 1966), pp. 331-52.

 

Duevel, Christian. "The Dismantling of Party and State
Control as an Independent Pillar of Soviet Power,"
Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR,
Vol. XIII, NO. 3, 1966.

Edeen, Alf. "The Civil Service: Its Composition and
Status," Transformation of Russian Society, ed.
Cyril E. Black (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1960), pp. 274-91.

ZFainsod, Merle. "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The
Russian and Soviet Case," Bureaucragy and Political
Development, ed. Joseph LaPalombara (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 233-67.

 

Feldmesser, Robert. "Equality and Inequality Under Khrush—
chev," Problems of Communism, Vol. IX (March-April,
1960), pp. 31-39.

297

Feshbach, Murray. "Manpower in the USSR: A Survey of
Recent Trends and Prospects," New Directions in the
Soviet Economy, Joint Committee Print, 89th Congress,
2nd Session, Part III: The Human Resources (Washing-
ton, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966),
pp. 703-88.

 

 

 

Gershenkron, Alexander. "Problems and Patterns of Russian
Economic Deve10pment," The Transformation of
Russian Society, ed. Cyril E. Black (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard Universtiy Press, 1960), pp. 42-71.

 

 

Grossman, Gregory. "Soviet Economic Planning: Industrial
Prices in the USSR," American Economic Review,
Vol. 49 (May, 1959), pp. 50-64.

 

 

 

Grzybowski, Kasimierz. "Soviet Criminal Law," Problems of
Communism, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (March-April, 1965),
pp. 53-61.

Hodnett, Grey. "Khrushchev and Party-State Control,"
Politics in the Soviet Union: 7 Cases, ed.
Alexander Dallin and Alan F. Weston (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966), PP. 113-64.

 

Hollander, Paul. "Leisure: The Unity of Pleasure and
Purpose," in Prospects for Soviet Society, ed.
Allen Kassof (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968).

 

Hough, Jerry F. "Reforms in Government and Administration,"
Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev, ed. Alexander
Dallin and Thomas B. Larson (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice—Hall, 1968), pp. 23-40.

 

. "Ideology and Ideological Secretaries as
a Source of Change in the Soviet Union," Paper
prepared for delivery at the Mid-West Association
for the Advancement of Slavic Studies., April 11,
1969, Lincoln, Nebraska.

 

jLipson, Leon. "Hosts and Pests: The Fight Against Para-
sites," Problems of Communism, Vol. XIV, No. 2
(March—April, 1965), pp. 72-82.

 

1Ritvo, Herbert. "Party Controls Reorganized," Survey,
No. 49 (October, 1963), pp. 78-89.

Shvearer, Howard. "Agricultural Administration Under
Khrushchev," Soviet Agricultural and Peasant
Affairs, ed. Roy D. Laird (Lawrence, Kansas: Uni-
versity of Kansas Press, 1963).

 

 

298

Swearer, Howard. "Decentralization in Soviet Administrative
Practice," Slavic Review, Vol. XXI, No. 3 (September,

 

. "Popular Participation: Myths and Realities,"
Problems of Communism, Vol. IX, No. 5 (September-
October, I960), pp. 42'51.

 

 

Wesson, Robert G. "Volunteers and Soviets," Soviet Studies,
Vol. XV (January, 1964), pp. 231-49.