ABSTRACT

PUBLIC CONTROL SYSTEMS IN THE USSR:
THE PEOPLE'S CONTROL COMMITTEE

By

Janet S. Adams

The special focus of this study is upon the nationwide citizens' inspectorate in the Soviet Union known as the "People's Control Committee," a network of committees designed to enlist the voluntary efforts of Soviet citizens in determining just how well party and government directives are being carried out in practice. The organization's antecedents, origin, structure, and functions are examined, and where sufficient evidence is available efforts are made to evaluate the success with which the People's Control Committee is fulfilling its many assigned tasks. The broader focus of the study examines the hypothesis that "people's control" in particular and public participation in general perform essential functions in the post-Stalinist, Soviet-type system, that is, in an advanced, industrial society characterized by a syndrome of attributes including highly centralized political and economic structures, single-party rule, and social orientation of the individual toward the collectivity.

Evidence concerning these matters has been culled primarily from Soviet sources, from the speeches of Soviet leaders, from books by inspectors or staff officials of the various control committees, and from articles appearing in the pages devoted to "People's Control" published regularly since March of 1963 almost twice a month in Izvestia and only slightly less frequently in Pravda, and in various periodicals, such as Partiinaya zhizn, Kommunist, and Sovety deputatov trudyashchikhsya. In addition, relevant information has been drawn from the extensive literature, by both Soviet and Western scholars, dealing with the Soviet political and social systems, and more particularly with such special but diverse topics as the administrative machinery of state control, and the post-Stalinist resurgence of citizens' participation in the Soviet Union. Finally, current studies of political scientists concerned with bureaucracy, bureaucratic behavior and administrative controls have been examined for relevant hypotheses which might throw light upon the operations of public control systems in the Soviet Union.

Since antecedents for today's People's Control Committee clearly existed in the first post-revolutionary attempts of the Bolsheviks to transform tsarist state control into a new, people's or "socialist" control, an historical treatment of the evolution of Soviet control organizations was essential to this study. The path of almost constant reorganization of Soviet control institutions throught the years has been briefly traced and analyzed on the basis of two chief formative

factors: ideological concerns and political power considerations.

A major conclusion of this dissertation is that the present, chief significance of the People's Control Committee is its role in the socialization of the Soviet citizen. During the post-Stalinist era, public participation has been intended to help fill the functional void left by destalinization and the substantial reduction of terror with followed Stalin's death. Instead of being guided by coercion, the Soviet citizen has been expected to internalize party-approved norms of behavior and belief, of conduct and commitment, through subject-participant activity, that is, through the party-guided active involvement of the individual in civic duties. However, participation in any form is difficult to keep within bounds. Another conclusion of this study is that the present volume of participation, including millions of citizens taking part in the control activities of the three largest public organizations--the Komsomols, soviets, and trade unions--is creating new forms of public participation on a scale that may be increasingly difficult for the party leadership to channel. Thus, despite the party's zeal, intentions and dominance, the potential of public control systems to effect change in the Soviet social system over time may well find unprecedented opportunities to develop in the years ahead upon the ground being prepared by the many and varied forms of citizen participation in the Soviet Union today.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

FZMK	Fabrichno-zavodski i mestny komitet [profsoyuza] (Factory Committee of the Trade Union)
KNK	Komitet narodnovo kontrolya (Committee of People's Control)
KP	Komsomolski "Prozhektor" (Komsomol "Searchlight")
KPGK	Komitet partiino-gosudarstvennovo kontrolya (Committee of Party-State Control)
MGK	Ministerstvo gosudarstvennovo kontrolya (Ministry of State Control)
NK	See KNK
NK GK	Narodny kommissariat gosudarstvennovo kontrolya (People's Commissariat of State Control, "Goskontrol")
NK RKI	Narodny kommissariat raboche-krestyanskoi inspektsii (People's Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection, "Rabkrin")
PGK	See KPGK
TsKK	Tsentralnaya kontrolnaya kommissiya (Central Control Commission)
TsKK-RKI	Central Control Commission and Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate
VTsSPS	Vsesoyuzny tsentralny sovet sovetskikh profsoyuzov (All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions)

CHAPTER I

THE MEANING OF "PEOPLE'S CONTROL" ACTIVITIES IN THE USSR

> And how much quicker Communism could be built if it were not for the soulless bureaucrats . . . the loss of grain in the fields, overexpenditure by bookkeepers, thievery at warehouses, swindling by managers. . . . " Stalin's stream-of-consciousness, in A. Solzhenitsyn, The First Circle, p. 89.

The subject of this study is the nationwide citizens' inspectorate in the Soviet Union known as the People's Control Committee. The following chapters examine the organization's antecedents, origin, structure, and functions. In addition, where sufficient evidence is available, efforts are made to evaluate the success with which the People's Control Committee is fulfilling its many assigned tasks. Such substantive analysis of this relatively new control organization is essential to an understanding of the present Soviet political system. However, an additional aim of this study is to generalize from the history of Soviet experimentation with public control systems and attempt to discover and explain the most important functions that mass control systems appear to perform in the Soviet-type society, that is, in a society characterized by a syndrome of attributes including highly centralized political

and economic structures, single-party rule, and social orientation of the individual toward the collectivity. In brief, the examination of the People's Control Committee is intended as a case study in the evolution of Soviet socialist techniques of control that involve public participation on a wide scale.

Before proceeding further, the nature of the control which is being investigated here must be clearly defined. In the discussion of the meaning of "control" which follows, two points are emphasized. The first concerns the strict limitations of the Russian term "control" as it applies to the activity of the People's Control Committee; the second, perhaps disconcertingly, points out ambiguities (inherent in both the word and the activity) which tend to give "control" a wider than dictionary meaning in practice.

The precise sense in which the Russians use the term "control" is stated very simply by the Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya.[1] This source describes "control" as "the checking of something, as for example, the execution of laws, plans, and decisions." A fuller dictionary definition of the verb form still clearly preserves the limitations of this meaning. Thus, according to the Tolkovy slovar russkovo yazyka,[2] "to control" means "to verify [check, examine, audit] or observe [superintend, put under surveillance] someone's action [work, operation]." By contrast, English usage is generally broader, often suggesting

relationships of authority and power. For example, while Webster[3] defines "control" as checking, testing or verifying by evidence or experiments, the English definition also includes the "exercise of a restraining or directing influence," and even further asserts that control may mean "to have power over." While action by the People's Control Committees can and does result in follow-up actions involving restraint and disciplinary measures, and while the supervision and checking are bound to impose certain restraints upon those supervised, such follow-up actions and side effects are not, in the Russian sense, strictly a part of the control activity itself.

Yet, while by definition the Russian term is shown to be thus restricted in meaning, its use at times has seemed to imply much more. For example, the Bolsheviks, in the early experimental months of their regime, spoke and legislated in favor of something they called "workers' control over production."[4] Surely, in the spirit of immediate post-revolutionary oratory this phrase was intended, if not to promise the workers a direct hand in management, at least the power to exercise a "restraining and directing role." And, when Lenin addressed the workers and peasants in Izvestia the day after the Bolshevik seizure of power, with the assurance that the new Workers' and Peasants' Government would "create workers' control over the production and distribution of goods and establish public control over the

banks, together with their transformation into one state enterprise," his audience must have understood this as promising something very close to workers' self-management of the economy.[5] The proletariat, having seized political power in name at least, was now being promised a role in directing the economic life of the country as well.

But workers had not been trained as managers. They needed education for this role, as Lenin himself admitted a year later in his speech to the Sixth All-Russian Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, on November 6, 1918, when he declared that "until workers <u>learn to manage</u> . . . socialism is only a wish."[6] Thus, to speak of workers' management, he admitted, was at this point premature. Workers' control, on the other hand, Lenin described as having already been instituted. Here, "workers' control" has lost its self-management overtones and once again reflects its narrow, dictionary meaning, for in this later context, Lenin is referring to a supervisory kind of action, which he hoped might instruct the workers in the business of management, while safeguarding the gains of the revolution.

The shift of terms just illustrated is paralleled by a similar ambiguity in the activity of control. The source of the latter ambiguity is the thin line which <u>may</u> exist between the managerial role (of decision-making) and the supervisory role of the inspector who is empowered to check upon the manager. Given certain circumstances, the second

role may easily preempt the powers of the first.[7] In any case, it is clear that in order to guard against such a shift of authority the inspector must be carefully kept from exceeding his authority. And in the Soviet Union today, not only the Russian definition of the citizen inspector's control duties and the careful organizational safeguards of the Communist Party, but even certain aspects of Russia's political culture tend to discourage such shifts of authority. One aim of the present study will be to document this assertion; another aim will be to explore the implications and possible consequences of ambiguity in the public inspector's role.

"Control" has been defined. The particular type of control activity in the Soviet Union with which this study is concerned now needs further definition, both in terms of its chief functions and its institutional forms. Throughout the Soviet era, such control has meant principally checking upon the economic performance of ministries by a group of supervisory organizations which may be collectively identified as the agencies of control of the Soviet apparatus.[8] Chief among these supervisory groups have been a Ministry of Finances, a State Planning Committee, and a Ministry of State Control.[9] The Ministry of Finances customarily audits the accounts of all enterprises and scrutinizes their staff arrangements, while Gosplan (the State Planning Committee) keeps track of plan fulfillment.[10] It was the state control

agency (Gosudarstvenny kontrol or Goskontrol) which became the institutional basis of the present People's Control Committee, and its first duty traditionally--inherited from the tsar's State Controller's Office--was the official auditing of government accounts.[11]

The advent of Soviet power was to have certain implications for Goskontrol, adding new functions, creating new organizational forms, and increasing its membership. The most significant new element in the Bolsheviks' early experiments with "socialist" forms of control was the effort to involve ordinary Soviet citizens on a large scale in the activities of Goskontrol. This new, independent variable, mass participation, was to have far-reaching implications for control, but perhaps most significant was the new educational role which it added to Goskontrol's traditional one. The citizen-participant himself became an object of socialization in the process of carrying out Goskontrol's tasks of supervision.

Public participation in control activities was proposed at an early date by Lenin. In 1917 he wrote: "Up to the advent of the highest phase of communism, socialists will demand the strictest control on the part of the public and the state over standards of work and expenditure."[12] And he carefully designed the blueprints of a Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate, involving the public, to maintain a watch over the bureaucracy. Under Khrushchev, by the time

the 1961 Party Program appeared, a well-rounded and elaborate, "Leninist" theoretical tapestry had been woven to depict the universal significance of mass participation in the march toward communism, within which the subsidiary tasks of control were clearly delineated. As Kommunist put it quite succintly, "The Party Program states that the chief direction in the development of socialist statehood in the period of the full-scale construction of communism is the comprehensive unfolding and improvement of socialist democracy, the active participation by all citizens in the administration of the state and in the guidance of economic and cultural construction, in improving the work of the state apparatus and in strengthening popular checkup on its activity.[13]

Today, even the most cursory examination of the People's Control Committee reveals that this agency is meant to be far more than simply a citizen's policing system, designed to check on the economic and administrative performance of Soviet bureaucracy. Indeed, citizen participation in control is viewed by some party leaders and Soviet theorists as one key to the creation of a more democratic society in which the erstwhile passive and irresponsible Soviet citizen will transform himself by participation into an active and responsible human being to such a degree that coercion from above will be, for the most part, unnecessary.[14] This body of theory looks ahead to the day when Soviet society may come to be run from below, by its citizens,

rather than from the top, by a party-state structure imposed on the people. Harkening back to Lenin's words about the necessity for workers to "learn to manage," the People's Control Committee is hailed as a school of self-management, training these "New Soviet Men" of the future, today.

The evolution of public participation in control during the Soviet era would seem, from the preceding discussion, to have been continuous from the Leninist to the Khrushchevian model. Such was not the case, however. During the Stalin era, public participation in control was gradually curtailed until a Stalinist model of Goskontrol, closely resembling the earlier tsarist agency, emerged. Interesting questions consequently arise, concerning the very nature and functions of public control in the Soviet social system: Why was the public excluded from state control activities and organizations during the Stalinist period? How did their exclusion affect the nature of state control? Were there economic and political reasons, related to the problems of control, for reviving public participation in the post-Stalinist period? Or did the Soviet leaders have other motives? How were the changes in participation related to the development of the Soviet economy and its organization? The answers to these and related questions will require a more detailed account of the organizational transformation of state control agencies through the Soviet period, which will be the subject of the next two chapters.

One important aspect of the reappearance of public participation is pointed up by this examination of the evolution of control institutions, and that is the timing of Khrushchev's innovations. Why was public participation revived in the post-Stalinist era? For example, was the attempt to substitute "self-discipline from below" for "coercion from above" a recognition by the Soviet leaders that coercion had become dysfunctional at this period of the Soviet Union's economic development? The fact is that coercion as an instrument for effecting a revolutionary transformation of Soviet society has always exhibited certain dysfunctions and that it has become increasingly dysfunctional as this advanced industrial society has grown more complex. Zbigniew Brzezinski speaks of terror as appropriately characterizing that particular stage of a system's development "when the old order is being destroyed and the new erected."[15] This is the stage when the government can be considered in the terms of David Apter's model of a developing society, as "the independent variable."[16] But, as Apter's model predicts, the industrializing society soon transforms the government into an "intervening variable," responsive to inputs and with its independent power "to act . . . drastically curtailed by the complexity of the industrial process itself."[17] Coercion thus becomes to a degree self-defeating, even when viewed in the limited context of this developmental scheme, for implicit in this scheme is

the assumption that modern industries, and highly industrialized societies, require much decentralized decision-making, limits on arbitrary central decisions, and a responsiveness at the center to the evolving demands of further modernization and complexity.[18] When decision-making and management become, of necessity, more and more decentralized, then the business of checking performance clearly requires adjustment to the new conditions. Mass control techniques, because of their diffused character, seem to provide a suitable substitute for coercion under the new conditions.

But "control from below" raises its own problems, for if authority is delegated more and more to lower levels, then the moral commitment of both managers and controllers at those levels grows more important. Two obvious ways of ensuring such commitment are by close party guidance and by allout direct efforts to achieve internalization of party norms. Both approaches characterize the mass control efforts in the Soviet Union today, and will be discussed at length in later pages.

Because of the importance which is attached in this study to the educational role of public participation in control, the nature of this role needs to be examined more fully at this point. The educational mission is concerned with the internalization of party norms, with commitment to communist goals, or, in Soviet parlance with "building the

New Soviet Man." The importance of this task is sometimes underrated by Western observers, who are repelled by the naive, Utopian-socialist flavor of Soviet descriptions of their glowing future. Skeptics share D. MacKenzie Wallace's irony, when he described mid-nineteenth-century Russian revolutionary visions of the same Promised Land: "Their heated imagination showed them in the near future a New Russia, composed of independent federated communes, without any bureaucracy or any central power--a happy land in which everybody virtuously and automatically fulfilled his public and private duties, and in which the policemen and all other embodiments of material constraint were wholly superfluous."[19] But myths and dreams are inevitably simplistic, which is a part of their charm and endurance. And no one at this date can convincingly deny that they are also capable of exerting an influence over men's minds, of moving men to action.

Moreover, myths and dreams may also be symptomatic of seemingly unrelated but vital needs of men and societies. In the present case, the new Soviet man is a clear necessity not only for the communist society of the future, but for the proper functioning of Soviet society today. Such theorists as Mikhail Suslov have, in the present decade, gone far toward spelling out in concrete terms how tomorrow's realities (and even today's) can embody those dreams. Along with increased material goods, increased relief from

terror and fiat, the common Soviet man is increasingly expected to take his rightful place in a "highly-organized and coordinated community of people of labor, distinguished by a lofty communist awareness of their public duty and by high discipline." This is the real meaning, according to Suslov, of "the process of withering away of the state, which is already taking place."[20] And Khrushchev anticipated this definition of the "withering of the state" with one of his own, in a speech to the XXI Party Congress: "The question of the withering of the state, if it is to be understood dialectically, is a question of the development of the socialist state system into communist, social [obshchestvennoe] self-administration."[21]

The chief method whereby today's Soviet man learns self-administration is mass participation. During the Khrushchev era, mass participation was given tremendous impetus. If Stalin feared and mintrusted the common man, Khrushchev, by his policies, appeared to place great trust in even the non-party masses, and initiated a groundswell of voluntary participation in longstanding public organizations, such as the soviets, the trade unions, the Komsomols, and the party itself, as well as in such new areas as citizens' law enforcement agencies (police and courts), organizations of public control, the adult political education movement, and mass, nation-wide discussions of public and party policies, such as the draft Party Program.

Public organizations in the Soviet Union, as, for example, the unions, have always been considered "schools of communism," where the participant receives training by participation. As described by Emily Brown: "All union activities are colored, or are supposed to be colored, by this educational purpose. In fact, rank and file participation in administrative, welfare, and cultural programs inevitably trains thousands, or millions, of people in the spirit of collectivism and mutual aid for the good of society."[22] Even Soviet law embodies within itself what Harold Berman describes as "this dynamic function . . . in molding not merely the conduct of men but also their morality and their very characters." Speaking of the Khrushchev era, Berman adds, "One aspect of this [educative] concept of the law is the greatly increased participation of ordinary Soviet citizens--of society, the public, obshchestvennost, as Soviet terminology has it--in the administration of justice."[23]

It is against the broad backdrop of theory concerned with ultimate communist goals and the massive efforts to mobilize society to pursue them that the socialization role of the citizen inspectorate needs to be viewed. Bringing the masses into control during the Khrushchev era meant adding another important new "school of communism." Moreover, the socialization function may ultimately prove to be the most significant aspect of the public control effort,

partly because of the importance assigned to this normative task by the Soviet leaders themselves and partly because in the long run, of all its assigned tasks, mass control may accomplish this one with the greatest success.

The Meaning of "Subject-Participant"

The subject of popular participation raises one further problem of definition that should be clarified in these introductory pages, for social "participation," as used here, can be defined in two ways. It may mean "active involvement," a sharing in a given activity, or it may indicate a decision-making role in the activity. And only if these two discrete aspects of participation--the "activist" and the "decision-making"--are clearly distinguished from one another, can the suggestive term "subject-participant," as used by Gabriel Almond, G. Bingham Powell, and others, be accurately used to refer to the mass volunteer participation in the Soviet Union that is being studied here.[24] These authors seem to imply "decision-making" in their use of the term, whereas in the Soviet case, "activist" must be understood. Frederick Barghoorn's use of the variants, "participatory-subject pattern" or "enforced participation," emphasizes the important point that participation in the Soviet Union is <u>not</u> intended to provide individuals with decision-making roles, but to train them to fill their subject roles.[25]

Other scholars have pointed out the "subject-activist" nature of much social involvement in the Soviet Union. Discussing the meaning of political modernization in the Soviet Union, Fainsod, for example, says, "it involves using all of the powerful instruments which modern science and technology make available to enforce political unanimity and to mobilize the energies of the nation to carry out the leadership's plan."[26] "Enforced unanimity" and "mobilized energies" thus indicate the character of the citizen's participation, or to use Brzezinski's term, "pseudo-participation," in the Soviet Union.[27] And Grey Hodnett, in his study of primary party organizations in the Soviet Union, has tried to highlight the essential disregard of the participant's personal interests implicit in Soviet mobilization, by defining this negative aspect as "the process of getting members of the primary party organization to behave in ways detrimental to one or more of their basic interests. When this objective is achieved, the 'activeness' of the members is said to have been released."[28]

A distinctive feature of Soviet mobilization and participation is, of course, the guiding role of the party. One of the basic principles influencing the structure and activities of the party and other organizations in the Soviet Union has long been the principle of "democratic centralism." In practice, the centralist elements have consistently negated the "decision-making" implications of

"democracy" in this principle. The party itself serves as the centralizing agent with respect to the public organizations, so that even today it is as true as when Stalin said it, that "not a single important political or organizational question is decided by our soviet and other mass organizations without guiding directions from the party."[29] Numerous examples could be cited. The point is, however, that democratic centralism, meaning ubiquitous party guidance, defines the rules of the game and limits the functions of public participation very rigidly.

Yet, in spite of the limited "activist" meaning of participation which has been insisted upon here as applying in the Soviet Union, it must be pointed out that Soviet theorists themselves do sometimes use the term in the decision-making sense. "Participation" is so used, for example, in the following statement from the Party Program: "Under communism all people will . . . actively participate in the management of public affairs."[30] "Actively participate" is intended here to assure the common man that he will someday share in decisions. In fact, this usage strongly recalls the self-management promise of "workers' control," implicit in some uses of that term. And both are of a piece with the many democratic elements that are enshrined in the 1936 Constitution, preserved for all to see, like those foreign, living bodies fortuitously caught in ancient amber. There is no reason to doubt that ordinary

citizens respond to these hopeful messages from the stony recesses of official pronouncements, that such messages have great psychological appeal, and that they perform useful symbolic functions for the Soviet political system.

However, such messages must also pose certain problems for the leadership by confusing the meaning of public participation as understood by ordinary citizens. In the context of the present study, perhaps the most important aspect of the enduring promise of greater citizen self-management is the constant pressure this promise exerts upon the party to be vigilant in maintaining its guiding role over the activities of the public inspectors.

Some Theories of Bureaucratic Behavior Applied to the Soviet Case

Control systems are, of course, neither new nor restricted to the communist scene. Some means of monitoring performance is required wherever subordinates in a social hierarchy are given commands to fulfill. Although one scholar of Soviet affairs, Barrington Moore, has gone so far as to describe Soviet society itself as "one enormous bureaucracy,"[31] we need not generalize from bureau to society for the purpose of this study. The organization with which we are concerned is a bureaucratic one.[32] Its mission, in large part, is to monitor other bureaus. Therefore, it should be possible to select, from the considerable body of literature by Western scholars related to bureaucratic

behavior, organization, and problems of control, some discrete theories applicable to the Soviet scene and offering useful insights into the behavior of Soviet monitoring agencies. The following section will examine several such theories and attempt to explore their implications for the growth, transformation, and operation of control systems in the Soviet Union.

While control systems are required by any administrative hierarchy, to protect the system against the substandard or deviant performance of lower participants in the fulfillment of centrally-fixed, organizational goals, the particular needs and pressures for control in a given environment are the product of many factors. Of first importance, undoubtedly, is the size of the organization. The larger a bureau is, for example, the greater the amount of performance checking and rechecking it requires. One simple explanation of why this occurs has been offered by Anthony Downs, in his discussion of the "rigidity cycle" experienced by large bureaus.[33] Rigidity sets in as an organization grows because its operations become more and more weighted down with "rules, regulations, and agonizingly slow decisionmaking procedures," all of which hamper the achievement of organizational goals and increase the need to check on their fulfillment. Presumably, the longer a large bureau exists, the more intractable become its problems of control.

In the Soviet Union, the bureaucratic organization of government is not only large, but of long standing. The problems of monitoring its performance are therefore of similar vintage and magnitude. Even allowing for the undoubted transformations which technical progress and education have effected in producing the modern machinery of government in the Soviet Union, the existence of a large and corrupt bureaucracy stretching back at least 200 years prior to the Bolshevik takeover of the government suggests that there existed also a certain, well-established continuity of bureaucratic deviant behavior calling for control, containment and reform. Historians of Russia's past have provided evidence concerning this behavior.[34] Klyuchevsky, for example, describes Peter the Great's efforts to reform the bureaucracy of his day in a passage recently quoted by Merle Fainsod. Peter was chagrined at finding that "bribery and large-scale embezzlement persisted very much as before," and as a last resort, says Fainsod, Peter ordered the "immediate publication of an ukase 'that whoever robbed the state of so much as the value of a piece of rope would hang for it.' According to Klyuchevsky, 'the Procurator-General Yagushinsky, the sovereign's eye in the senate, exclaimed: 'Would your Majesty like to be a ruler without any subjects? We all steal, only some do it on a bigger scale, and in a more conspicuous way, than others." Peter laughed, and did not publish the ukase.'"[35]

Gogol's Inspector General, which was intended as a mirror image of Russian provincial bureaucracy in Gogol's day, attests to the continuity of similar bureaucratic behavior in early 19th-century Russia. And in the 20th century, Fainsod goes so far as to suggest that the widespread incompetence of the tsar's bureaucracy was an important factor in hastening revolution. More specifically, he asserts that, "at a sheer technical level, the inefficiency and venality of the bureaucracy helped to contribute to the disastrous military defeats and the economic breakdown of the home front which prepared the way for revolution."[36] The advent of the Soviet era did not lessen the burden of control, but added new burdens to traditional ones. For the Bolsheviks did not cast aside the old bureaucracy. They inherited it. And one of the first new tasks of the post-revolutionary government was that of safeguarding the revolution against sabotage by the "soulless bureaucrats" inherited from the tsar. Not only corruption, but treason now had to be ferreted out.

The Bolsheviks further multiplied the tasks of control when they established public ownership of the major means of production. The new faceless owner of economic enterprises resembled in many ways the former absentee landlord, and suffered the same kinds of systemic difficulties. The "government"--a distant abstraction to the ordinary worker at best--could not realistically expect the latter to husband

resources in its behalf. Rather, like the absentee landlord, the government could expect to be "robbed blind" by the "tenant" worker, as well as by middle-level officials, the new class of "official stewards." Consequently, the tendency of bureaucrats to steal from the government, so clearly understood by Peter's minister as a natural state of affairs, was further encouraged as government ownership and government administration reached into new economic areas.[37] As the business of government increased, the size of the bureaucracy expanded, and the tasks of monitoring the Soviet apparatus multiplied and grew more difficult.

Organizational growth not only magnifies the tasks of control. It also creates pressures for more control. In fact, control efforts by themselves create pressures for more control. Downs has identified two "inevitable responses" to control efforts, formulating these into "laws." One is the Law of Control Duplication: "Any attempt to control one large organization tends to generate another."[38] The other is the Law of Counter Control. Of this, Downs says: "the greater the effort made by a sovereign or top-level official to control the behavior of subordinate officials, the greater the efforts made by those subordinates to evade or counteract such control."[39] Both of Downs' "laws" will be extensively illustrated from the Soviet scene in later pages, but for the present, some brief illustrations should demonstrate their applicability.

Downs' Law of Control Duplication seems especially helpful in explaining one aspect of the evolution of the government apparatus under Stalin, which eventually produced a vast network of overlapping control agencies. Downs' explanation involves the interesting concept of "leakage of authority."[40] As organizational growth increases, says Downs, leakage of authority is experienced by officials at the top, and a favorite remedy of officials suffering such leakage is simply to create new and separate monitoring devices. Separate monitoring devices tend, however, to be somewhat self-defeating, since they, in their turn, lead to more and more regulations, red-tape and rigidity; thus, in the end they add their own pressures for new and better systems of control. Both leakage of authority and a felt need to "control the controllers" help to explain at least in part the excessive and unprecedented proliferation of monitoring agencies in Stalin's government. The qualification "in part" needs underlining, however, for it would be a vast oversimplification of Stalin's motives to suggest that his excessive elaboration of controls resulted purely from efforts to discipline his bureaucrats. Stalin's concern with "leakage of authority" of course, extended far beyond the corruption and treason of "soulless bureaucrats." It became a principle of administration, a style of rule. Thus, it was for a variety of reasons, including those above, that during the Stalinist era, control systems, backed by the

most frightening control system of them all--the secret police--multiplied and overlapped one another, wrapping all of Soviet society in an hysterical atmosphere of mutual denunciations. A more direct and simple example of control duplication in the Soviet Union is found in the common habit of "calling for another controller" for each new special job of inspection. As Berliner described this practice: "If machine tools are not being economized, for instance, someone advocates setting up an inspection commission. If hoarding is excessive, another suggests sending in an inspector."[41]

Downs' Law of Counter Control deals with the fact that effective evasion of control provokes constant efforts to reestablish it. In large bureaucratic organizations, even the multiplication of monitoring devices cannot prevent the evasion of control by certain subdivisions. Gordon Tullock has called the situation that results, "bureaucratic free enterprise."[42] This phrase describes the existence of pockets of freedom from surveillance where participants escape real pressures to conform to orders from above. "Between the tiger's claws" they find room to pursue objectives which may even oppose or at least hinder the fulfillment of some top-level directives, and they proceed to do just that.

Such activities characterize large-scale bureaucracy everwhere, regardless of national setting.[43] In the Soviet

Union, however, a variant of this phenomenon appeared in economic enterprises and became so commonplace, at least during the Stalinist era, that a description of the typical Soviet factory manager would not be complete without it. (Paradoxically, in fact, the smooth running of the economy came in a large measure to depend on the effective operation of such "deviant" managerial behavior.) Joseph Berliner has described with particular care how the excessive demands and restrictions of the enterprise plan, and the government's emphasis upon achievement of the plan, have forced managers systematically to ignore other organizational injunctions and to pursue plan fulfillment by "extra-legal arrangements."[44] Consequently, the question is rhetorical when he asks, "How does one explain that in a totaliterian regime, sturdily propped with all the murky paraphernalia of a police state, managers go blithely about hoarding materials, engaging in blat,and systematically evading the intent of regulations?"[45] Such activities are simply examples of that bureaucratic free enterprise which flourishes in spite of controls. Inevitably, of course, a tip of this iceberg of activity is exposed, and then, as Tullock and Berliner both emphasize, the revelation of evasion calls forth renewed efforts to control it. One final example, which should be mentioned here because it is one of the chief forms of Soviet control evasion, is the so-called "web of involvement" or krugovaya poruka, whereby controllers

are drawn into a conspiracy with managers and workers to hide defects or illegal practices where their disclosure might endanger an enterprise's chances for plan fulfillment.[46]

Such examples of bureaucratic behavior calling for control and more control could be multiplied almost endlessly, but the point should already be evident that establishing effective control is as difficult as it is essential to large bureaucracies, and that control contributes its own problems to those of effective management by multiplying tasks and duties for controllers and controlled alike. Moreover, from the foregoing discussion, it would be logical to infer that pressures for more and better control might be a permanent feature in an already large and expanding bureaucracy, such as exists in the Soviet Union.

Two additional pressures for control that characterize the Soviet-type society (or to quote Dawns, the "bureau-dominated single-party," society) remain to be discussed here. One is the relatively weaker feedback that Downs ascribes to the communist, as opposed to the democratic, nation, and the second is the absence of non-bureaucratic, political factions in the one-party system. Though all large societies suffer problems with communications and feedback, special factors contribute to weak feedback in the Soviet-type system. Among these are the active discouragement from above of criticism at lower levels, the

consequent fear of subordinates to speak out, and the existence of communications channels designed to pass information chiefly one-way, from the top down.[48] In a society thus characterized by weak feedback and "enormous hierarchies with dozens of levels," as Downs describes both the Soviet Union and Communist China today, the officials at the top must "establish giant monitoring bureaus that develop complex hierarchies of their own (such as the Communist party)."[49] In other words, control mechanisms are intended to substitute for the missing information sources from below.

The second special factor mentioned above, that has magnified the problem of control in the Soviet Union has been the suppression, and eventual outlawing, of critical factions, within and outside of the Communist Party, which might otherwise naturally work to expose errors at all levels of government operation. Opposing factions, which in Western democracies seek to oust current office holders by exposing their inefficiencies and weaknesses have no legal existence in the Soviet system.[50] The resultant "facade of harmony" serves actually to keep errors hidden and to contribute to a pooling of interests that involves incumbent officials and their controllers in conspiracies to avoid detection.[51] If such collusion is a natural outcome, so too is the attempt to substitute multiple control agencies for the missing critical opposition.

Summarizing briefly the special problems of control facing Soviet leaders, it should be said that in addition to inheriting an extensive and corrupt bureaucracy from their predecessors, the first Bolshevik government complicated and enlarged the tasks of this bureaucracy, thereby creating new problems of control and multiplying old ones. They did this first of all by attempting to establish and protect their power in the face of both real and imagined attacks, and secondly by attempting to implement their socialist goals, for example, by extending the nationalization of the nation's economy and thereby vastly increasing the government's administrative responsibilities and by attempting to centralize the direction of this enormous economic empire in Moscow. And they did this, to an important degree, by constructing a single-party monolith, eliminating and thereby depriving themselves of the potential assistance of all those non-bureaucratic elements of control that can be found in pluralistic societies, such as an alert and watchful political opposition, an independent judiciary, and an independent press.[52] The whole intolerable burden of control thus came squarely to rest upon the state administrative machinery itself, depending upon the inventiveness of the party leaders to devise new ways to improve its effectiveness.

It should not be surprising then that some Soviet leaders, including Lenin and Khrushchev, facing this problem

squarely, actively proposed that the public shoulder some of this burden. We might, in fact, expect, on the basis of the theories and discussion presented above, to find more or less constant efforts in the Soviet Union to reorganize control, to multiply controls, and to design control agencies to serve as channels for communication from below. The post-Stalinist efforts to involve Soviet citizens in control seem to bear out these expectations.

Solutions Offered by Mass Participation

Perhaps the immediate motivation for experimenting with public involvement in control in the post-Stalinist period was the necessity of Soviet leaders, experiencing the seismic tremors of destalinization, to find substitutes for Stalin's terror, to find new ways to sharpen the effectiveness of control instruments without terror. However, in addition to substituting for terror, the recruitment of masses of ordinary citizens as inspectors appeared capable of reforming the post-Stalinist state control apparatus in three important ways: by cutting down the size of the state control apparatus and substituting volunteers for paid staff members; by increasing the flow of information from below, and by broadening the state inspectorate's field of vision. Which of these was considered most important is not at all apparent from the public discussion of the time concerned with reform of the state control apparatus.

Clearly, there are areas where public participation might help to alleviate some of the problems directly related to the vast size of the Soviet Union's paid bureaucracy by cutting down the size of that staff. For example, some state-provided services, which in other countries are provided by private agencies, might well be shifted to volunteer workers. And in the post-Stalin era, efforts have in fact been made to take some of the excessive weight of service and administrative duties from both state and party agencies by enlisting the aid of mass volunteers. Volunteer inspectors are but one part of this larger effort.[53]

Public participation might also help to counteract the weak feedback which Downs ascribed to the large, bureau-dominated society, by enlisting public volunteers to solicit complaints and proposals, to ferret out deficiencies and poor performance at the grass roots level, and to publicize these findings. Recent public control efforts have actually demonstrated their capability to perform this low-level "sounding-board" function.

Finally, mass volunteers certainly might improve the state control system by widening the range of vision of its inspectorate, to bring within its view, for example, those forgotten areas where bureaucratic free enterprise has been allowed to flourish to the detriment of state plans and substance. As Berliner so clearly describes this control problem: "Despite the abundant resources at its disposal,

the Ministry of State Control is simply not large enough, nor are its inspectors skilled enough, to cope with a situation in which violations are the normal practice of the community of managers and in which concealment of violation has become a highly developed art. . . . [Therefore,] the Ministry understandingly concentrates on special problems, an approach which is rather self-defeating, for it warns managers about where caution must be exercised."[54] Presumably, public inspectors, being ubiquitous, would be capable of foiling all such efforts at concealment. Khrushchev made use of this argument, when he urged the establishment of the Party-State Control Committee and the incorporation in it of citizen inspectors: "Comrades," he said, addressing the November 1962 Plenum, "we have 10 million party members, 20 million Komsomols, 66 million trade union members. If we were to put into action all these forces, to make use of them for the purposes of control, even a mosquito's flight wouldn't escape notice."[55]

In conclusion, before leaving this discussion of the potential positive contributions of mass participation to control, a final point needs to be made concerning the intended function of public controllers as a substitute for terror. Public inspectors, as some Soviet leaders reason, will not only substitute for coercion, but will improve upon it. Mass participation has in fact been called upon to prevent the very abuses it is supposed to expose. Thus it

is intended to improve upon coercion in achieving control objectives by internalizing desired norms of conduct. As Lenin has expressed this thought: "people will gradually accustom themselves to observe the elementary . . . rules of communal life . . . without coercion," in other words, by harkening to inner voices.[56] And more recently, Paul Kecskemeti, commenting on the 1956 Hungarian uprising and the effects of the Hungarian Communist Party's disciplinary control of workers in their places of work, made the interesting observation that in communist Hungary, "outward pressure did not produce inner loyalty."[57] Public control in the Soviet Union, it is hoped, will make up for the fatal flaw in control by coercion, and will help to create a responsible, inner-directed citizenry.

CHAPTER I--NOTES

[1]Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya (Great Soviet Encyclopedia), 2nd ed., Vol. 22 (September 1953), p. 472.

[2]Tolkovy slovar russkovo yazyka (Explanatory Dictionary of the Russian Language; Moscow, 1936).

[3]Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass., 1965).

[4]See, for example, the announcement of the Petrograd Military-Revolutionary Committee, in Rabochi i Soldat (Worker and Soldier), No. 8 (October 25 [November 7] 1917).

[5]Izvestia TsIK (News of the Central Executive Committee), No. 207 (October 25, 1917). Both this and the preceding statement are reprinted in the collection of Lenin's writing on control compiled by L. F. Nikolskaya and E. F. Polkovnikova, o partiinom, gosudarstvennom i obshchestvennom kontrole (On Party, State, and Public Control; Moscow, 1963), pp. 9-10.

[6]Ibid., p. 260, n. 3; italics added.

[7]For example, the supervisor by ruling out or questioning certain alternative solutions the manager might want to consider may virtually dictate the solution finally chosen. Or supervision may encourage the "safe solution." Inspectors, in fact, may "make management decisions" in much the same way as administrators, implementing policy by choosing among various "means," come to make policy decisions themselves. The situation similarly seems to parallel the thin line easily crossed between line and staff functions, discussed by John A. Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite (New York, 1959); see especially, p. 82.

[8]Barrington Moore, Terror and Progress USSR (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), p. 8.

[9]This nomenclature has altered through the years; see below, Chs. II and III.

[10]Alex Nove, The Soviet Economy (New York, 1966), p. 98; Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass, 1963), p. 388.

[11]It should be added that these principal, specialized agencies of control do not by any means complete the list of Soviet control agencies. There are numerous other economic "cross-checking" agencies, such as the State Bank, which is the repository for the accounts of all economic enterprises, the investment banks, under the Ministry of Finances, and the tribunals of the State Arbitration Committee, where cases involving contract non-fulfillment are settled. At the local level, inspectorates are maintained by some ministries, such as those for trade or agriculture, which, operating partly under the jurisdiction of local soviet government, make on-the-spot checks of economic operations. And in addition, many other organizations, including the Communist Party, the trade unions, the local soviets, the Procuracy, and the secret police, participate in the business of control; Nove, Soviet Economy, p. 117.

[12]V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya (Works), 4th ed., Vol. 25, p. 441; italics added.

[13]"Yuridicheskaya nauka v usloviyakh kommunisticheskovo stroitelstva" (Juridical Science in Conditions of Communist Construction), Kommunist (Communist; November 1963), No. 16, pp. 28-29.

[14]Even crime will disappear, according to the prominent Soviet scholar, G. Strumilin, in Man, Society and the Future (New York, 1964): "With time public opinion will become a force sufficiently strong to exclude crime altogether," p. 108.

[15]Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York, 1967), p. 80.

[16]David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago, 1965), p. 252.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Emily C. Brown, whose study of Soviet trade unions has examined the changing character of the "web of rules under which managers and the managed operate" in industry, presents interesting evidence that this process has indeed affected the role and changing influence of the unions. Labelling the 1930's and 1940's as "the low ebb of union influence and the years of most compulsion in the labor field," Brown adds, "Increasingly such an authoritarian system failed to meet the needs of the developing modern industry. By 1957 the party had decreed enlarged rights for the unions in the plants, along with more scope for

regional and local managements. It called for the workers 'to take an active part in the administration of industry'"; Soviet Trade Unions and Labor Relations (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), pp. 311-12.

[19]Donald MacKenzie Wallace, Russia (New York, 1905), p. 616.

[20]Pravda, October 23, 1961.

[21]Vneocherednoi XXI sezd kommunisticheskoi partii sovetskovo soyuza. Stenograficheskii otchet (Extraordinary XXI Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR. Stenographic Record, Moscow, 1959), Vol. I, p. 102.

[22]Brown, Soviet Trade Unions, p. 317.

[23]Harold J. Berman, Justice in the USSR (New York, 1963), pp. 81-82.

[24]Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics (Boston, 1966), pp. 250, 259, 273-74. Lucian Pye has referred to this kind of "subject participation" as "a new form of mass response to elite manipulation" in those states where "mass participation has not been coupled with an electoral process"; Aspects of Political Development (Boston, 1966), p. 39.

[25]Frederick C. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR (Boston, 1966), p. 15.

[26]Fainsod, in LaPalombara, Bureaucracy, p. 234.

[27]Brzezinski, Ideology and Power, p. 114.

[28]Grey Hodnett, "Mobilization Within the Primary Party Organization in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1945-1961," Columbia University Ph.D. Thesis, 1962, p. 32.

[29]Joseph Stalin, "On the Problems of Leninism," Problems of Leninism, 11th ed. (Moscow, 1940), p. 135. The proper relationship of democratic-centralist elements in the operation of trade unions was described in a more recent Soviet source as meaning both greater initiative (i.e., "Every trade union organization can and should display its own initiative") and uniform rules for all: "However, trade unions united in a community of aims and tasks could not act in one direction if--there were not in effect uniform rules on the chief questions of trade union life"; quoted from P. S. Petrov, ed., Organizatsionno-massovaya rabota

professionalnykh soyuzov (Moscow, 1961), pp. 18-27, in Brown, Soviet Trade Unions, p. 64.

[30]Herbert Ritvo, The New Soviet Society (New York, 1962), p. 111.

[31]Moore, Terror and Progress, p. 2.

[32]Several definitions of bureaucracy are used in the following discussion, depending upon the source quoted, but the referent in each case should be clear from the text. A simple, broad definition has been framed by Joseph LaPalombara (Bureaucracy and Political Development [Princeton, 1963], pp. 6-7), "For some purposes," he suggests, "it is reasonable to think of bureaucracy as encompassing all public servants." While it is true, as has been pointed out quite recently by Jerry F. Hough (The Soviet Prefects [Cambridge, Mass., 1969], p. 3), that "public administration in the Soviet Union . . . does not contain 'every ideal element of a classical bureaucracy,'" yet Weber's legal-rational model of bureaucracy has served as a point of departure or reference point for much subsequent model-building and theorizing. Downs' definition of bureau, for example, so basic to his theory, departs in specific ways from the Weberian model. "The omitted traits are hierarchical organization, impersonality of operations, extensive use of rules, complexity of administrative tasks, secrecy, and employment of specially trained personnel on a career basis." All these Downs calls "secondary characteristics denoting a bureau." The four essential, identifying characteristics of a bureau, Downs lists as follows: "1. It is large." "2. A majority of its members are full-time workers who depend upon their employment in the organization for most of their income." "3. The initial hiring of personnel, their promotion within the bureau and their retention therein are based at least partly upon some type of assessment of the way in which they have performed or can be expected to perform their organizational roles, rather than solely upon either ascribed characteristics . . . or periodic election to office by some constituency outside of the bureau." "4. The major portion of its output is not directly or indirectly evaluated in any markets external to the organization by means of voluntary quid pro quo transactions"; Inside Bureaucracy (Boston, 1967), pp. 24-25.

[33]Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, pp. 158, 272.

[34]Other scholars have commented upon the magnitude and corruptness of the Russian bureaucracy. Alexander Gershenkron, for example, discussing the "bigness" of plants and enterprises established in the 19th century, during the early period of Russian industrialization, comments: "The

state, promoting industrial establishments for good and not so good reasons, showed remarkably little interests in small businesses. Large enterprises were a much more lucrative source of graft; and the corruption of the bureaucracy tended to reinforce a tendency that was already present for weightly economic reasons"; "Problems and Patterns of Russian Economic Development," in Cyril E. Black, The Transformation of Russian Society (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), p. 50; and in another similar passage, he describes the behavior of the commercial manager during this period as follows, "his relations with the government bureaucracy called for special, often very devious, actions"; p. 51.

Alf Edeen discusses the continuity of certain bureaucratic behavior into the twentieth century: "All of the evils and 'beauty patches' inherent in the old chinovnik rule still exist, as is daily demonstrated in the Soviet press: abuse of power, bullying, red tape, paper drill, negligence, incompetence, and corruptibility. That these traditions have lived on so obstinately is not especially remarkable, considering the initial situation facing the Bolsheviks: the extremely low level of education among the population; the lack of qualified personnel; and the necessity of accepting in administrative work 'alien' social groups from the old regime, whose representatives became--consciously or unconsciously--a connecting link in the seemingly broken chain of continuity and who left their mark on the present Soviet civil-service crops"; "The Civil Service: Its Composition and Status," in Black, Transformation of Russian Society, p. 290.

[35]Merle Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case," in Joseph LaPalombara, Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton, 1963), pp. 242-43.

[36]Ibid., pp. 247-48. As LaPalombara notes, Fainsod argues the interesting hypothesis from the Russian example that "a bureaucracy can instill and implement economic modernity without itself absorbing any of the changes it seeks to disseminate;" Ibid., p. 12.

[37]In Alf Edeen's study of the civil service, he presents the following interesting figures concerning growth, which, he says, give an indication of the general trend:

Growth of Bureaucracy

Social Groups	Percentage of Population		
	1897	1926	1956
The entire intelligentsia	0.7	2.7	15.5
Intelligentsia exclusive of education and public health	0.4	1.9	10.3

Edeen further notes: "The expansion of the bureaucracy in connection with industrialization is, however, indirectly apparent in official statistics concerning the development of the intelligentsia during the period between 1926 and 1956. Selected occupational groups, which are of special interest in this connection, are presented in the following table (in thousands).

	1926	1956
Leaders in enterprise (industry, agriculture, building construction, etc.	365	2,240
Technical engineering personnel (incl. foremen)	225	2,570
Agronomists, veterinarians, land-surveyors	45	376
"Plan economists" and bookkeepers	650	2,161
Others	575	2,609

"It might be assumed that the category of 'others' in this table includes functionaries in the state administration proper (probably functionaries in the party apparatus, too), in the police system, and in the officer corps"; Edeen, in Black, Transformation of Russian Society, pp. 276-77.

[38] Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, pp. 148 and 271.

[39] Ibid., p. 147.

[40]Ibid., ch. XIII.

[41]Joseph Berliner, Factory and Manager in the USSR (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), p. 294.

[42]Gordon Tullock, The Politics of Bureaucracy (Washington, D. C., 1965), pp. 167-70.

[43]See especially, Fred Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries (Boston, 1964), on the effects of "over-centralization" in public administration, pp. 280-85; see also, Tullock, Politics of Bureaucracy, pp. 167-70, and Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 164.

[44]Berliner has dealt at length with this phenomenon in Factory and Manager in the USSR.

[45]Ibid., p. 230. Blat is the widely-used Russian term for "payoff" or "graft."

[46]Ibid., pp. 243-45.

[47]Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 164.

[48]It should be noted, however, that the elimination of those motivated by self-interest to act as "watchdogs" in society does not mean that there are no actors to perform this function. The communist state calls upon those motivated by devotion to the collective interest to provide this service. It is not our intention here to attempt to evaluate the comparative effectiveness of self-interest and the altruism of the devoted party member as motivations for preserving civic morality. It is important, however, to note that substitutes are provided in the communist system to perform the critical functions of missing factions. One of these "substitutes" is samokritika, "self-criticism." "All citizens are encouraged to participate in self-criticism and in 'criticism from below.'" Karel Hulicka and Irene M. Hulicka, Soviet Institutions, The Individual and Society (Boston, 1967), p. 253.

A recent attempt to evaluate the positive effect of the "so-called self-criticism (samokritika) letters addressed to the editors of the domestic Soviet press," concludes: "Insofar as the critical letters serve as an integrating device for Soviet society by permitting the release of system-induced tensions and concomitant diminution of personal resentment, by increasing the sense of mass participation and by simulataneously acting as an additional control on the massive Soviet bureaucracy, they become one factor among the myriad to be weighted in assessing the continued

effective functioning of the Soviet system." Alex Inkeles, Social Change in Soviet Russia (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), pp. 291, 324.

[49]Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, p. 164.

[50]While it is true that factions have no legal existence in the Soviet Union, it would be misleading to imply that factions do not exist, both within the party and without. For example, Khrushchev attested to alignments within the highest party circles opposing Stalin's policies, in his "Secret Speech" to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party and in his speech to the Twenty-Second Congress (1961). Attempts in the West to identify political groupings that influence policy making in the Soviet Union have produced growing amounts of evidence that such groups do exist, based upon socioeconomic interests, personality or power conflicts, professions, national and regional interests, and so on. Among such studies, might be mentioned, Barrington Moore, Terror and Progress (Cambridge, Mass., 1954); Frederick C. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR (Boston, 1966), esp. ch. VII; Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the USSR (New York, 1961); Roger Pethyridge, A Key to Soviet Politics (New York, 1962); Sidney Ploss, Conflict and Decision-Making in Soviet Russia (Princeton, 1965), and the article, "Interest Groups," in Allen Kassof, Prospects for Soviet Society (New York, 1968); and Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), to name only a few.

[51]See above, the Berliner example, pp. 24-25.

[52]However, see above, n. 48.

[53]A real question does exist concerning the relative effectiveness of amateurs attempting to substitute for professionals. The lack of training, experience, authority, and sense of responsibility which may easily characterize ordinary citizen-volunteers strongly mitigates against their effectiveness as replacements for staff personnel in many situations.

[54]Berliner, Factory and Manager, p. 323.

[55]Nikita Khrushchev, "Doklad: Razvitie ekonomiki SSSR i partiinoe rukovodstvo narodnym khozyaistvom"(Report: Development of the USSR Economy and Party Leadership of the National Economy), Plenum Tsentralnovo komiteta kommunisticheskoi partii sovetskovo soyuza, 19-23 noyabrya 1962 goda; stenograficheski otchet (Plenum of the Central

Committee of the CPSU, 19-23 November 1962; Stenographic Record; Moscow, 1963), p. 90.

[56]V. I. Lenin, Osnovy marksizma-leninizma. Uchebnoe posobie (Foundations of Marxism-Leninism. School Text; Moscow, 1959), p. 720.

[57]Paul Kecskemeti, The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising (Stanford, Calif., 1961), p. 96.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORY OF "SOCIALIST" CONTROL, 1917-1953

This chapter and the next will survey the important transformations of control institutions in the Soviet Union from the "first" October, 1917 to the October of 1964, when Khrushchev was retired. During this span of nearly fifty years, the control agencies inherited from the last tsar's regime were subjected to repeated efforts aimed at perfecting their operation, redefining old missions and implementing new ones. On the basis of Downs' theory alone, constant restructuring could have been predicted, since efforts to perfect existing control structures must continue as long as there exist waste, inefficiency and the host of bureaucratic ills that inevitably attend "big government" of whatever kind. But if reorganization was predictable, the form of the new structures was not, and it is a basic assumption of this study that the particular institutional forms which evolved were largely shaped by two sets of factors: ideological concerns and practical power considerations; or more specifically, the differing concepts of Soviet leaders and administrators concerning the proper role of control agencies

in Soviet society, and the involvement of the reorganization process itself in political power struggles.

As the following sections will attempt to show, the sharply contrasting points of view held by Lenin and Stalin directly affected the changing organization and activities of Goskontrol. Lenin's broad concepts of a preventive kind of administrative control, which would include the constant and radical redesign of government machinery and would enlist the common worker in the business of governing the communist state, had endless implications for the reorganization of control agencies, particularly in widening the field of their operations, compounding their missions, and multiplying their ranks.[1] On the other hand, Stalin's narrow version of control activities (apparently shared by many officials carried over from the old tsarist control staff), tended to restrict the business of control to the simple auditing of government accounts by official personnel.[2]

Even when guidelines of proposed reorganization seemed to have been clearly laid out and agreed to, however, the reorganization of control agencies often became so entangled in political struggles between government leaders or administrative factions that the emergent institutions were clearly not the simple product of attempts to implement some theories about control, but were indelibly marked and "deformed" by the pressures of political struggle. One illustration of

this point is the curious evolution of the party control commissions, originally conceived of by the Workers' Opposition and the Democratic Centralists as a means of protecting the rank-and-file party members from being overwhelmed by the bureaucratic elements of the party. Despite this concept of their role, the committees, as will be shown below, evolved into instruments of party bureaucratization and early building blocks of Stalin's power position.[3]

This chapter's brief account of the early Soviet experiments with state and people's control will be broken into the following periods: 1917-1923 (Beginnings of People's Control); 1923-1934 (Unified People's Control); and 1934-1953 (People's Control Suspended), the subtitles indicating the serpentine progress of efforts to involve ordinary citizens in control work. While the party and the state control networks were combined during the second period, each had its own earlier history; therefore, in the first period, the origins and evolution of workers' and peasants' inspectorates and of party control commissions will be separately traced, along with the transformation of the state control machinery. The Office of State Control, which had operated under tsarist regimes and the Provisional Government, continued its "business as usual" in the early years of Bolshevik rule, providing continuity in control and serving as the basis for the successive reorganizations, reorientation, and institutional innovation.

Beginnings of People's Control, 1917-1923

In the first year after the Bolshevik leaders assumed power, control reorganization clearly exhibited the effects of their somewhat general notions about how to democratize the autocratic state machinery. This preliminary vagueness, however, was dispelled during the period of War Communism by more concrete and radical experimentation. One Soviet source dates the beginning of the socialist transformation of control and the creation of a "people's" control apparatus with a decree signed by Lenin on January 31, 1918. This decree called for the formation of a Central Control Board, local accounting and control boards and control commissions, to "eradicate bureaucratic red-tape and create more vital and rational forms of control," and to include wide participation by the workers.[4] In March 1918, a Provisional Statute on State Control was issued,[5] and in May the Office of State Control was renamed the People's Commissariat of State Control (Narodny kommissariat gosudarstvennovo kontrolya or NK GK).[6] However, a Draft Statute on State Control, drawn up in August by the commissariat itself and intended to outline its revised duties, revealed that the commissariat's staff at this time had no clear idea of how "socialist control" was to be implemented.[7]

Despite the continuing Civil War and consequent general dislocation, Soviet leaders were imbued with a crusading zeal

ro reform old institutions. The following March (1919), therefore, the Eighth Congress of the RKP(b) took official note of the continuing need for a radical reorganization of the business of control in the Soviet Republic "in order to create real, factual control of a socialist character."[8] These party instructions were to have a more concrete impact than the earlier pronouncements. Stalin, the newly designated People's Commissar of Goskontrol (NK GK), drew up a set of proposals for the reorganization of the Commissariat. The ensuing decree of April 9, 1919, proposed the transformation of the NK GK from a "formal" organ "into an organ of People's Socialist Control, amassing experience of socialist building and continuously perfecting the whole mechanism of the Soviet government."[9] The decree also called for the widest possible participation in the transformed control agency of workers and peasants, both at its center and in the localities, with the unification of all control elements in one body.

A period of fruitful, innovative attempts to institutionalize "socialist control" followed. One example, almost coinciding with the April decree, though not formally announced until May 4, was the creation of a radically new institution, which is of particular relevance to this study, the Central Bureau of Complaints and Declarations.[10] This agency's work was, as a matter of fact, described in an early report of the NK GK, as a kind of "people's control."

The bureau was intended to be "near to and accessible to the broad masses of the population," and was to make use of the widest publicity concerning its activities. Its paramount concern was to be "illegal activities and abuses by officials."[11] Local State Control organs were instructed to form their own local bureaus of complaints, while setting up similar bureaus in all other commissariats, executive committees of soviets, and other local soviet organs. Public response to these new bureaus was so immediate and overwhelming that in barely five months of existence, that is, by October 1, 1919, more than 20,000 complaints and declarations had been received by the Central Bureau and its branches.[12] In fact, the very volume of the complaints quickly outran the ability of the bureaus to process them, so that the effectiveness of the bureaus seemed fated to diminish over time. Nevertheless, this new institution represented an important early effort to give the ordinary citizen some formal means of self-protection against the abuses of bureaucrats.

Two other major results of the April decree were the resolution of the Politburo on January 31, 1920, and the Statute of February, 1920. The Politburo resolution proposed the creation within Goskontrol of an entirely new administrative component made up of committees of workers and peasants, a "workers' and peasants' inspectorate." This idea was revised somewhat by the statute which followed.

The latter, calling for the transformation of the existing Commissariat of State Control itself into a Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (NK RKI or Rabkrin), studiously outlined a number of new methods for drawing ordinary workers and peasants into the commissariat and opened membership in Rabkrin to all workers having voting rights under the Constitution of the RSFSR.[13] The new inspectorate was explicitly advised to unify all control units then in existence, including those workers' control groups dating from an early, November 1917 decree.[14] In addition, new workers' groups were to be invited in as Delegated Members, members of Assistance Groups, and participants in Mass Investigations. Delegated Members were workers and peasants chosen to leave their regular work for extended periods and assigned to work directly in the control apparatus; some of these were expected to become permanent staff members of the commissariat, thus filling its ranks with "fresh faces" from the people. Assistance Cells, however, were created and operated in the workers' and peasants' places of work and consequently did not require their members' lengthy withdrawal from regular work. For this reason, as well as a variety of others, the Assistance Cells proved more popular and successful than the device of "Delegated Membership" in drawing the public into control activities.[15]

The clear ideological intent of this early reorganization was to create, in the form of the new commissariat, a school where workers and peasants could learn to administer the state. As Lenin phrased this concept in a letter of January 24, 1920, the aim was "to pass the whole of the toiling masses, both men and (particularly) women, through participation in workers' and peasants' inspection.[16]

It is only in retrospect, perhaps, that the expanded powers which accrued to Rabkrin's Commissar, Stalin, as a result of this reorganization, stand out in sharp relief. In addition to the old duties, the expanded operations of the new Rabkrin now specifically included the implementation of control over "all the organs of state administration, the economy, and social organizations," supervision of the operations of the Bureau of Complaints, and the examination of the government's entire administrative machinery for suggested reform--a considerable sphere of influence.[17]

While Rabkrin was being "democratized" with the addition of worker and peasant participants, party control was also being critically scrutinized by Soviet leaders, who hoped to reform and democratize its operation. Efforts were underway in 1920 to create a party inspectorate, which, like Rabkrin, would include elements of popular participation. In September 1920, a Central Control Commission (TsKK) of the party was established. Isaac Deutscher,

discussing the early development of the TsKK, found similarities between the two major inspectorates. He likens the role of the TsKK "vis-a-vis the party--to that of the Commissariat of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate vis-a-vis the governmental machine: it audited party morals." The method involved criticism from below. Open meetings, held by the local control commissions, provided forums where the individual citizen--party member or non-party--could openly criticize the conduct of party members. The quixotic aim of these early "purges," says Deutscher, "was to enable the people to crack periodically a whip over their rulers," to draw the party closer to the people, and to "remove corrupted members, without removing the party, from power," thus serving as a kind of "substitute for real elections."[18]

But, while Rabkrin showed a healthy growth of participation by workers and peasants in 1920 and 1921 (i.e., 8,692 Assistance Cells were reported for July 1, 1921, with 65,000 members[19]), all efforts taken in the early 1920's to reorganize and improve the party control apparatus and to increase participation of rank-and-file party members ended only by moving the party control apparatus toward less democracy and greater bureaucratization. Although the intent of establishing both central and local control commissions had been to provide a sounding board for complaints against party "bureaucrats," the commissions soon became

transformed into instruments acting to silence complaints from below and to enforce party unity from above.[20]

This was done, first of all, by undermining the independence and authority of the local control commissions. Local boards, locally elected, had been intended to be independent of the central apparatus so that as representatives of the general membership they would scrutinize central party operations with impunity. But local control boards could not effectively oppose their own party secretaries, who were not locally elected, but were appointed by the central party apparatus, dedicated to its preservation, and powerful enough themselves to stifle any locally-inspired criticism. After the Tenth Congress of the party, in 1921, even the pretense that lower control organs should criticize the higher party apparatus was dispelled when the congress pointedly charged party control commissions to direct their efforts toward "strengthening party unity."[21]

In March 1922, the Eleventh Party Congress moved to bring the local control organs directly under the supervision of the TsKK.[22] The significance of these instructions was that they opened the way to placing the entire party control mechanism under the easy domination of the Secretary General of the party. Even before Stalin assumed the latter post on April 3, 1922, it was clear, by the ease with which Stalin's candidates were "elected" to the TsKK at the Eleventh Congress, that he had already begun to

secure personal leadership of the party control machinery.[23] Also of significance was the fact that his close associate, Valerian Vladimirovich Kuibyshev, had remained chairman of the TsKK since its formation.

By 1922, therefore, the efforts of the previous two years to create a democratic party control agency had failed. As for Rabkrin, where experiments with the involvement of the public had been proceeding with success, the year 1922 brought a decline in the numbers of workers and peasants participating not only in Assistance Cells and in Mass Investigations, but especially as Delegated Members. In part this appeared to result from the introduction of the New Economic Policy and also from a general staff reduction carried out across the board for all state administrative agencies in August 1922, which set the staff limits for Rabkrin at 12,000 (down from 34,000 in mid-1921), plus 2,000 Delegated Members, to be paid by their employers. By December 1922, 73.3% of Rabkrin's central apparatus was still staffed by employees with service dating back to the NK GK or the prerevolutionary control apparatus, that is, to 1919 or earlier. Of this central staff, 87.5% of the members had "employee" backgrounds; only 12.5% claimed to be workers or peasants.[24]

Unified People's Control, 1923-1934

Lenin's writings, during the last active months of his life, reveal his preoccupation with control. Not only was he concerned with the necessity of finding an efficient cutting instrument to prune away ever-present pockets of disease and corruption attacking party and government, but he was acutely mindful of the accumulation of administrative power, noted above, which Stalin was quietly effecting. In two articles, "How We Should Reorganize Rabkrin," and "Better Less, But Better" (the first published in Pravda, January 5, 1923, and the second, March 4, 1923), Lenin offered his solutions for the reorganization of the central party and state control organs. These proposals were to be considered at the forthcoming Twelfth Congress.

In his articles Lenin, while repeating his own sharp criticisms of Rabkrin's operation, defended Rabkrin from some of its attackers, including Trotsky, who branded it a "powerful factor of muddle and wantonness" and wished to disband it.[25] Lenin felt that Rabkrin needed to be revised in such a way as to become a model organization, an instrument for building socialism. His solution was to unite state and party control in one organization--that is, to merge the apparatus of Rabkrin and the TsKK at the top--and to enlarge the TsKK by the addition of a great number of outstanding workers and peasants. The resulting benefits, he anticipated, would be twofold: On the one hand, Rabkrin

would gain in prestige and authority by union with the party; while the introduction of new representatives of the people into the party organ would draw this party body closer to the people. In his opinion, this would achieve a more effective "control from below," which would serve to withstand the growing tendencies in the party toward bureaucratization, and, coincidentally, to weaken the concentration of power in Stalin's party secretariat. An added advantage would be the education of more and more workers and peasants in the tasks of socialist building.

When the Twelfth Congress assembled in April 1923, Lenin was not present to influence personally the implementation of his ideas, for his third, most crippling stroke had occurred in March. The Congress acted, however, according to his suggestions, to unite the state and party control organs and to enlarge the TsKK, from 7 to 50 members. While on the surface this action appeared to accede to Lenin's wishes, it had less apparent but important implications for Stalin's power position. The enlargement of both the TsKK and the Central Committee, Leonard Schapiro notes, was "mainly to the benefit of officials in the party network who owed their careers to the Secretariat which Stalin controlled," and thus "considerably strengthened his supporters."[26] Moreover, the presidium of nine members of the enlarged TsKK was empowered to sit with the newly-enlarged Central Committee, and at least four strong

Stalinist supporters have been identified among these presidium members: Kuibyshev, Yaroslavsky, Stoltz, and Shkiryatov.[27] Three presidium members were admitted to Politburo sessions. And Kuibyshev, who, it has been noted, had headed the TsKK since its creation, as Stalin's trusted lieutenant, now assumed the dual leadership of the new TsKK-RKI.[28]

Acting upon the instructions of the Twelfth Party Congress, the Presidium of the TsKK and the Council of Ministers of the USSR legally ratified the reorganization of the new TsKK-RKI, in two decrees on September 6, 1923, and in the statute of November 12, 1923, "On the NK RKI USSR."[29] These measures also expanded the duties and sphere of authority of Rabkrin. Not only were all state and public organizations to be examined, as in the past, for inefficient or maliciously negligent operation, but new forms of better operation, of better accounting were to be worked out, and a wide-ranging study of better methods was to be made of such matters as labor productivity, the scientific organization of labor and management, and the root causes of bribery and other illegal practices in state enterprises. And for the first time, state controllers were empowered to receive from enterprises examined, full information and all documents, records, and accounts pertinent to their investigations. If administrative heads failed to carry out reforms suggested by the inspectorate, they were to be summoned

before boards of the inspectorate or even before plenary sessions of the TsKK.

The powers of the Central Control Commission were also expanded, for it was now made responsible for guiding the NK RKI (Rabkrin). As already noted, its chairman became the People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate; members of its presidium largely made up the staff of the boards of Rabkrin; and members of the TsKK were given chief responsibilities on the new administrations, sections, and inspectorates of Rabkrin. From these posts of authority, the TsKK was commissioned to "secure the execution of the party line in the activity of soviet organs, to struggle against bureaucratic corruption, and to draw the masses into the work of the state apparat."[30]

When Khrushchev proposed the establishment of a new party-state (and public) control committee at the November Plenum of the party in 1962, he suggested that it should return to the Leninist principles incorporated in this earlier body: the TsKK-RKI, created by the Twelfth Party Congress in 1923. Among the "Leninist principles" he stressed were unity of overall control and the enlistment of wide public participation in this Leninist prototype. Certain real parallels do exist between these two organizations, despite the span of some forty years between their birth dates. It is essential, therefore, that we consider in detail the structure and operation of the antecedent

organization. Particular attention will be focussed on those characteristics of the TsKK-RKI which the later institution appears to have borrowed, and upon the various experiments in drawing the public into control work that were initiated or encouraged during the organizational lifetime of TsKK-RKI.

Perhaps of first interest is the extent of the merger between TsKK and RKI and the care with which the party secured, in addition to its guiding role, the clear independence of the party control mechanism. While for the most part separate executive apparatuses for the TsKK and RKI were maintained at the center,[31] it is clear that the overlapping membership in key executive bodies of leading officials, illustrated by Kuibyshev's dual leadership, accomplished an informal but effective merger in much the same way as the party and state interrelationship have accomplished it in other leading bodies, such as the Politburo. Yet, within the joint framework of the TsKK-RKI, a careful, tri-partite subdivision of the party's TsKK was formed, each of the three party control groups having separate assignments. The mission of the first group was to carry out orders of the party Central Committee; the second was intended to work exclusively with Rabkrin; and the third group comprised the party boards that dealt with infractions of the party Rules.[32] The separation of the last group from the other two was specifically designed to ensure the continued

independence of the work of party boards from other types of control work and controllers. At local levels, too, party control was performed by a separate section of the local party commission, whose members were selected by the party plenum specifically for this work. When the Party-State Control Committee was formed, in 1962, the same separation of party control duties from the main body of control work was scrupulously maintained through the continued existence of a party Control Commission, as a small but discrete organization with sole responsibility for infractions of party rules. Thus, the party has constantly placed itself "off limits" for the people's inspectors.

Formal procedures for such matters as staffing the TsKK-RKI at all levels preserved a further degree of separation. All staff of the party control commissions, central and local, were selected and assigned by the party. Rabkrin assignments, on the other hand, were supposed to be made, at least formally, by the respective executive committee of the soviet at each level, subject to confirmation by higher Rabkrin authorities.[33]

Measures taken at the Thirteenth Congress, in May 1924, and subsequently on the basis of its instructions, served to enlarge the scope of activity of TsKK-RKI, to increase its contact and experimentation with many types of public control bodies, and to enhance the role of the party in control work. In the latter connection, however,

while the threefold increase in the size of the TsKK (from 50 to 151), at the Thirteenth Congress, may have indicated a larger role for this body in control work, its much greater significance was the added support it provided Stalin in his maneuvers to buttress the power position of his party Secretariat.[34] Nevertheless, there is evidence that the influence of the party in the work of the joint TsKK-RKI agencies was growing. In fact, a circular letter of the TsKK, in mid-October 1924, cautions control commissions against going too far in domineering over and stifling the initiative of Rabkrin, and reminds the party commissions that their role should be limited to general guidance only.[35] Such guidance was nevertheless acknowledged to include the definition of the most important objects of control.[36]

The efforts to widen citizen participation in control very soon involved the TsKK-RKI with other existing public organizations, namely, the trade unions, the soviets and the Komsomols. Out of these experiments with various types of control groups came many of the antecedents and prototypes for today's public inspection groups. For example, one of the new types of contact with public control bodies which the Thirteenth Party Congress specifically instructed the TsKK-RKI to pursue was interaction with factory committees.[37] The method worked out by the central control organs and the VTsSPS (the All-Union Central Council of

Trade Unions) enlisted the part-time efforts of control commissions of the factory committees to carry out assignments for Rabkrin.[38] Use of publicity in this connection helped to establish another precedent. Rabkrin members were increasingly urged to publicize their work by reporting directly to meetings of workers, in factories and elsewhere, and by publishing accounts of their control activities. Thus, Moscow's inspectorate published more than 170 articles and notes in the periodical press in 1925.[39] And for two years, beginning on March 15, 1928, Pravda on an average of every sixth day published an "R.K.I. Sheet," called, like the present People's Control Sheet, "Under Control of the Masses." While such efforts to inform the public about control work and its results were small in comparison with the large-scale publicity campaigns lanched in the 1960's, the early pioneering efforts clearly established patterns and precedents that were to be useful later.

The soviets especially during this period developed a variety of new opportunities for public participation in control, based in part upon a general expansion of the powers of soviets at lower levels. The TsKK-RKI, attempting to carry out its mission of perfecting the structure and operation of the state administration and the so-called "liquidation of bureaucratic arrangements,"[40] shifted some state functions to the lower soviets. Legislation through the 1920's, some of it initiated by the TsKK-RKI, also

encouraged the local soviets themselves to become gradually more and more involved in control work and to include more citizens in performing state administrative tasks at this level. An example of such legislation was the 1924 "Statute on Uezd Congresses of Soviets and Uezd Executive Committees, on Volost Congresses of Soviets and Volost Executive Committees, and on Rural Soviets," which gave to the uezd and volost congresses of soviets the right to receive reports on the work of organs and organizations not directly subordinate to their executive committees, but located within the area of the volost or uezd, and gave the uezd ispolkom (soviet executive committee) the right to supervise the legality and expedience of the work of all organs and establishments within the territory of the uezd, with the exception of Red Army units and the Procuracy.[41] This statute urged ispolkomy to meet more widely with representatives of trade unions from factories and workships in their area and to draw the latter into such control work.

The most important organizational form of volunteer aid to the soviets, the sections, or "standing commissions," of soviets, appeared at this time and began to play a special role in control. As early as 1922, standing commissions of guberniya, uezd, minor city and village soviets had been given the statutory right to supervise the correct operation of other sections of the ispolkom.[42] In 1925, the standing commissions of city soviets received the same rights of

control over the work of the various sections of the city ispolkom, reporting their findings to the plenum or presidium of the respective soviet.[43] At first these standing commissions were composed only of members of the soviets, plus an aktiv chosen from a restricted list of representatives of FZMK (fabrichno-zavodski i mestny komitety [profsoyuzov]: the trade union factory committees), and factory managers and directors of the trade unions. However, in 1927 this list was considerably lengthened by statute[44] to include a broader public--not only managers and leading personnel of factories, but also representatives of factory, shop and local committees, members of trade unions, of party and Komsomol organizations, workers of other public, cooperative, economic organizations, and of rural peasant associations, and even selected women delegates.

In addition to standing commissions the RKI developed its own sections attached to some rural and city soviets, and to the ispolkomy of raion and volost soviets.[45] These RKI sections claimed a wide participation of the public in their investigations of state establishments, enterprises, cooperative organizations, sovkhozy and kolkhozy, to expose and help eliminate shortcomings in the work, to check for the prompt and correct fulfilling of party directives, government decrees and the decisions of local state organs, and finally to receive and investigate complaints from the general public. Notices concerning violations (or "signals,"

as they are still called) were referred by the RKI sections to the higher organs of TsKK-RKI for appropriate action or advice. The nature of these control tasks appropriately concerned the public. Local RKI sections investigated such matters as the progress of housing construction, local sanitary conditions, and the operation of stores, dining rooms, hospitals, and nurseries, frequently claiming success in devising ingenious solutions to many problems affecting the living and working conditions of the city's inhabitants.[46] Sections of RKI attached to rural soviets appropriately made checks of the accounting of sown acreages, of the business and accounting apparatus of the rural soviets themselves, and sought to prevent losses in the harvest, pilfering, and similar violations of socialist legality on the rural scene.

A third public organization which was called upon during this period to help with public control was the Komsomols. With its support, TsKK-RKI was able to mobilize youth groups for control activities in factories and other enterprises and for "mass" control activities. These groups were known as the "Light Cavalry," and were the predecessors of the present-day Komsomol units of "Prozhektor" (Searchlight). By 1930, 250,000 young people were said to be involved in the "Light Cavalry."

The chief form of public recruitment which Rabkrin organizers developed and encouraged was at the enterprise

level, where RKI actively urged the formation of "Groups (or Cells) of Assistance to the RKI," to participate in checking on the work of economic enterprises. A recent Soviet source claims that these Groups of Assistance had become practically universal after a decree of the Presidium of the TsKK on August 3, 1931.[47]

Finally, an attempt was made during this period to improve the effective operation of the Bureau of Complaints. Local complaint boards were generally attached to the respective RKI body, while Komsomols and trade unions aided the RKI in setting up Bureaus of Complaints in factories and other enterprises. In 1928, the bureaus began organizing lists of volunteers to follow up complaints, and growing thousands of volunteers joined this effort. Since, as already noted, the Bureau's success in attracting complaints had very soon outstripped its ability to investigate them, the enlistment of volunteers to help in the investigation process was a promising effort to remedy what was perhaps the Bureau's greatest weakness.

This brief description of the TsKK-RKI from its beginning in 1923 into the 1930's indicates that Soviet reformers were successful during this period in stimulating, both by organization and practice, a rising crescendo of public participation along the general lines proposed by Lenin.[48] In fact in certain respects the picture of TsKK-RKI which emerged through these years closely corresponded to the

Leninist model of socialist control: The TsKK-RKI was a unified organization of control, with a wide variety of tasks and with the responsibility of coordinating a multiplicity of agencies. In 1934, this picture was abruptly altered, and the trend reversed.[49]

People's Control Suspended, 1934-1953

Stalin presaged the changes to come in a speech to the Seventeenth Party Congress, in January 1934, in which he expressed his own limited concept of the proper function and scope of control. He said, "A well performing checking of fulfillment is that searchlight (prozhektor) which helps to throw light on the condition of the work of the apparat at any time and brings into God's light the bureaucrats and clerks." And he further observed that what was needed at that moment of the Soviet Union's development was "not supervision, but [simply] checking of the fulfillment of the center's decisions."[50] He might have clarified this statement by further defining control agencies as mere executive agents of central authority. But while the implications of his view of control were not spelled out at the time, they soon began to surface in many ways.

The first evidence of the restrictions Stalin intended to place upon control operations and membership came with a radical reorganization of TsKK-RKI. The joint party-state organ was split into two: a Commission of Party Control

and a Commission of Soviet Control, both with restricted assignments. The statute on the new Commission of Soviet Control described its duties as concerned "only with checking the factual fulfillment of the most important government decisions." No longer was it to concern itself, for example, with perfecting the state apparatus.[51] The tasks of the Party Control Commission were similarly limited to "strengthening control over the fulfillment of decisions of the party and Central Committee, the enforcement of party discipline, and punishment of violations of party ethics."[52]

Ties between the two commissions still existed, but they were ties designed to ensure the leading role of the party in control activities. The work of the Soviet Control Commission was to be accomplished in close contact with the Commission of Party Control. Members of the Soviet Control Commission were to be nominated by the Party Congress, and subsequently confirmed by the Central Executive Committee and Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

Just as Stalin's definition of control resulted in limiting the Soviet Control Commission's operations and area of competency, so too it limited public participation in control. All public participation was not immediately halted, however, for the statute continued to call for sections of the soviets, of trade unions, sections of engineers and technicians, Komsomols, kolkhoz activists and the press to take part in the work of the new commissions

of state control. However, after 1934, with the reorganization of the local organs of the TsKK-RKI, both the Groups of Assistance to the RKI committees and the sections of RKI attached to local soviets were abandoned. Subsequently, new restrictions were applied by the Statute of 1939 on the Commission of State Control, specifying clearly that worker participation in control should be limited to those workers of soviets and economic organizations checking the fulfillment of government directives.[53] And a year later, in the 1940 statute creating the People's Commissariat of State Control, the involvement of the public was pointedly ignored.[54]

As it emerged from the 1930's, the Commission of Soviet Control was greatly reduced in size, complexity of organization and mission, and in the scope of its operation. Basically, its job was now only disciplinary: the simple operational checking of the fulfillment of decisions of the government. In March 1939, the Eighteenth Party Congress, placing new emphasis upon the economic tasks of the state, had called for a moderate enlargement of the economic tasks of control, though not for a widening of its membership. The new People's Commissariat of Goskontrol (NK GK) was instructed to conduct control of the accounting and expenditure of funds and materiel in state, cooperative, and other public organizations, institutions and enterprises.[55] Thus, state control by 1940 had assumed the character of a vast

auditing organ, which inspected books, accounts and similar bookkeeping records, and which reviewed orders, requisitions and estimates.[56] The separate Party Control Commission, drawn even more closely than before into the apparatus of the Party's Central Committee, retained the task of keeping "a check on the fulfillment of the directives of the Central Committee. . . . "[57]

In this restricted capacity, NK GK and its successor after March 1946, the Ministry of State Control (MGK), operated throughout the 1940's and early 1950's.[58] During the years of World War II, its tasks, of course, included checking for sabotage and helping to fulfill the orders of the State Committee on Defense. But in essence these tasks did not widen its competency or membership. By 1948, the instruction of L. Z. Mekhlis, then Minister of State Control, made clear the position which had been officially reached on public involvement in control: "All auditing and checking," he said in his directive, "is to be conducted only by the powers of the controller-personnel of the Ministry of Goskontrol of the Soviet Union and the Union Republics. I forbid . . . for whatever pretense, the involving of workers of other organizations in any kind of auditing and checking."[59]

To summarize briefly, the history of state control from 1917 until 1953 followed two courses of reorganization. The first, a feverish and fruitful era of experiment,

reflected until 1934 Lenin's broad vision of control possibilities in providing safeguards for the little man against bureaucracy, in perfecting state administration, in educating a New Soviet Man, and in building a new communist society. Stalin, on the other hand, made clear by his early actions in building the bureaucratic power of the party and his own secretariat, that control was, in his mind, properly a function by and for the bureaucracy, not the people. During Stalin's regime, control reorganization was a gradual retreat from Lenin's vision, until all the control mechanisms in the Soviet state became simple instruments to enforce the will of the dictator. Once the Ministry of State Control had reached this point, there was little need for further radical reorganization, only the self-perpetuating need to create new control agencies to check the old. The Stalinist state system came to operate within rigid lines. Only in the post-Stalinist era were these shattered. And in the fluid situation that followed, new or forgotten formative influences and ideas once more surfaced.

CHAPTER II--NOTES

[1]Lenin developed his ideas on control most completely in two articles, written a few months before his last fateful stroke. In "Kak nam reorganizovat Rabkrin" (How We Should Reorganize Rabkrin), and "Luchshe menshe, da luchshe" (Better Fewer, But Better), he provided the Twelfth Party Congress with a full outline of his proposals for the transformation of Rabkrin into a unified organization of party-state and people's control. Both articles appeared in Pravda (the first on January 25, 1923, the second on March 4, 1923), and in Lenin's collected works, Sochineniya (4th ed., Moscow, 1941-1962), XXXIII, pp. 440-44, 445-60. They also appear in the volume of selected writings from Lenin on control, collected by L. F. Nikolskaya and E. F. Polkovnikova, O partiinom, gosudarstvennom i obshchestvennom kontrole (On Party, State, and Social Control, Moscow, 1963), pp. 238-58. A "capsule statement" of Lenin's ideas on control and management by the workers, which sees national accounting and control in the hands of the people as the doorway to the "higher phase" of communism and the withering of the state, is found in State and Revolution, written and first published in August 1917 (New York, 1932, pp. 83-85).

[2]Stalin's views on control only became apparent some years after his assumption of the country's leadership, and even then more through the shape of the control apparatus than through his own writing or speeches. However, see his definition of control (n 53 below). With this hindsight, it seems ironic that Lenin's proposals to democratize the operation and widen the bases of participation in the state inspectorate of Rabkrin were entrusted to Stalin, who was appointed to head this new commissariat from March 1919 until April 1923. It seems also somewhat surprising that the commissariat did make some progress at this time toward implementing some of Lenin's ideas.

As for the inclinations of the early commissariat personnel, Philip Scott Spoerry has concluded: "What became officially known, in May 1918, as the People's Commissariat of State Control continued for the most part the same sort of auditing and verification of financial accounts of other governmental organs that it had performed under both Tsarist and Provisional Government regimes. Not only did it continue to perform such functions, but because of the post-audit nature of most of its work, a large share of its activity for a very long period was focussed on the

accounts of pre-revolutionary governmental institutions." And he adds, "The year 1919 . . . does not appear to have been a 'turning-point' in State Control. The vast majority of employees were still of a pre-October type, the vast bulk of work performed was still of a financial-accounting nature. There does seem to have been slightly more emphasis placed on the idea of 'rationalizing' the state apparatus, in decrees and statements, but little in practice was either attempted or accomplished"; Philip Scott Spoerry, "The Central Rabkrin Apparatus: 1917-1925," Ph. D. Dissertation (Harvard, 1968), pp. 209-10.

[3]Merle Fainsod comments on this turn of events, describing it as "a curious paradox," How Russia is Ruled (Cambridge, 1963), p. 183.

[4]"Pyatdesyat let organov kontrolya" (Fifty Years of Control Organs), Partiinaya zhizn (Party Life), No. 3 (February, 1968), p. 22; the decree appears in Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporyazhenii Rabochevo i Krestyanskovo pravitelstva (Collection of Laws and Ordinances of the Workers' and Peasants' Government; Moscow, 1918), No. 18, Item 264 (cited hereafter as Sobranie uzak. 1918); Dekrety Sovetskoi vlasti (Decrees of the Soviet Authority; Moscow, 1957), I (October 25, 1917--March 16, 1918), pp. 267-68.

[5]According to Spoerry, "Rabkrin," p. 217, No. 10, the Provisional Statute was only published in Izvestia Gosudarstvennovo kontrolya (News of State Control), 1918, No. 1-2, pp. 206.

[6]"Narodny komissariat Gosudarstvennovo kontrolya, Prikaz No. 1, May 15, 1918" (People's Commissariat of State Control, Order No. 1), Izvestia VIsIK, May 18, 1919, p. 3.

[7]Izvestia VTsIK, August 18, 1918, and Byulleten 1918 (Bulletin), Supplement to No. 5, August 20, 1918.

[8]Vsesoyuznaya kommunisticheskaya partiya (b) v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh sezdov, konferenstii i plenumov TsK (1898-1924) (The All-Union Communist Party [Bolshevik] in Resolutions and Decisions of the Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee), I (6th ed.: Moscow, 1941), p. 306 (hereafter cited as: VKP(b) v rezolyusiyakh); Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya (Great Soviet Encyclopedia), 2nd ed., Vol. 12 (May 1952), p. 320.

[9]Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporyazhenii Rabochevo i Krestyanskovo pravitelstva, 1919 (Moscow, 1919), No. 12, Item 122; Izvestia VTsIK, April 12, 1919.

[10]Sobranie uzak., 1919, No. 23, art. 271; Izvestia VTsIK, May 4, 1919. The decree establishing the Central Bureau of Complaints and Declarations (published on May 4, 1919) is undated, but Spoerry cites evidence that the Collegium of the Commissariat of State Control "approved Stalin's suggestion to establish, attached to the Otdel of Surprise Inspections, a Bureau of Complaints and Declarations" on April 10, 1919; "Rabkrin," pp. 68, 224.

[11]Spoerry, "Rabkrin," p. 68.

[12]Kratki obzor deyatelnosti Narodnovo komissariata Gosudarstvennovo kontrolya za pervye dva goda (oktyabr 1917 g--oktyabr 1919 g.) (A Short Survey of the Activity of the People's Commissariat of State Control for the First Two Years, October 1917--October 1919; Moscow, 1919), p. 43.

[13]Sobranie uzak., 1920, No. 16, Item 94.

[14]On November 14 (27), 1917, the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) approved the "Polozhenie o rabochem kontrole" (Statute on Workers' Control), which was published November 16 (29), 1917, in Izvestia TsIK, No. 227. Lenin's "Proekt polozheniya o rabochem kontrole" (Draft Statute on Workers' Control), written October 26 or 27 (November 8 or 9) is presented in Lenin, O kontrole, pp. 12-13.

[15]See Spoerry's meticulously documented evaluation, "Rabkrin," pp. 100-09.

[16]Decree of February 7, 1920, Sobranie uzak., 1920, No. 16, Item 94.

[17]"I. V. Stalinu" (To J. V. Stalin), appears in Lenin, O kontrole, pp. 147-48, and in Lenin, Sochineniya (4th ed.), Vol. 30, pp. 276-77.

[18]Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (New York and London, 1949), pp. 233-34. Paul Cocks, whose doctoral dissertation meticulously examines the entire history of the TsKK to the present, states that "the control commission was conceived as an independent organ designed to check the growth of bureaucracy in the Party. It was to function primarily as a court of complaint and appeal to which a dissatisfied and wronged Party member could turn to obtain a fair redress and Party justice. It was also to serve as a forum in which shortcomings and malpractices in the Party could be exposed, impartially aired and corrected";

"Politics of Party Control: The Historical and Institutional Role of Party Control Organs in the CPSU," Ph. D. Thesis (Harvard University, 1968), pp. 11-12.

[19]Spoerry, "Rabkrin," pp. 106, 109.

[20]Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, 1963, pp. 183-84.

[21]VKP(b) v rezolyutsiyakh, I, p. 434, see also, Cocks, "Politics of Party Control," pp. 21-25.

[22]VKP(b) v rezolyutsiyakh, I, p. 523.

[23]Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, 1963, p. 185; Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York, 1960), pp. 256-57.

[24]Spoerry, "Rabkrin," pp. 138, 148; Cocks, "Politics of Party Control," p. 69.

[25]L. Trotsky, Stalin (2nd. ed.; New York, 1946), pp. 346-47; Deutscher, Stalin, p. 236; Narodny kontrol v SSSR (People's Control in the USSR), edited by V. I. Turovtsev, Institute of State and Law, USSR Academy of Sciences (Moscow, 1967), p. 53; V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya (4th ed.) Vol. 33, pp. 440-60, and see n. 1 above.

[26]From 25 members and 15 candidates at the Tenth Congress to 40 members and 17 candidates at the Twelfth Congress. The new membership greatly strengtnened the Stalinist caucus in the Central Committee; see Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (1963), pp. 185-86; Schapiro, Communist Party, p. 274.

[27]Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (1963), pp. 185-86.

[28]A Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya edition published during Stalin's lifetime says that the 1923 merger was made with the guidance of "Leninist-Stalinist principles" (2nd ed.; Moscow, 1952, Vol. 12, p. 320); but according to Khrushchev's pointed editing, the union came "under Lenin's leadership"; N. S. Khrushchev, "Doklad" (Report), Plenum Tsentralnovo komiteta Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskovo soiuza, 19-23 noyabrya 1962 goda: Stenograficheskii otchet (Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 19-23 November 1962: Stenographic record, Moscow, 1963), p. 83. As we have seen, Stalin had no reason to oppose the merger, but only to manipulate it in such a way as to make more secure the hold of his party secretariat over the united structure of party and state control.

[29]Both decrees appeared in Izvestia, September 8, 1923, and are published in Sobranie uzak., 1923, No. 99, Items 983 and 984; the statute may be found in Sobranie uzak., 1923, Nos. 109-10, Item 1,042.

[30]Narodny kontrol v SSSR, pp. 55-56.

[31]A joint organ, serving mainly to direct and coordinate the activities of union republic control commissions (KK-RKI) was set up in 1924 as a general, organizational-instruction section; ibid., p. 56.

[32]Ibid., p. 56.

[33]Ibid., pp. 56-57.

[34]Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (1963), p. 187.

[35]Byulleten TsKK RKP(b) i NK RKI (Bulletin of the Central Control Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) and the People's Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection), (1924), No. 22, pp. 40-41.

[36]Narodny kontrol v SSSR, p. 59.

[37]KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh sezdov, konferenstii i plenumov TsK (The Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the Resolutions and Decisions of the Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the Central Committee), (Moscow, 1954), p. 30.

[38]Trud (Labor), May 22, 1924.

[39]Narodny kontrol v SSSR, pp. 58-59.

[40]Bol. sov. ents. (2nd. ed.), Vol. 12 (May 1952), p. 320.

[41]Narodny kontrol v SSSR, p. 43; Sobranie uzakonenii RSFSR (Collection of Laws of the RSFSR), 1924, No. 82, Items 825, 826, 827; hereafter quoted as, SU RSFSR.

[42]Ibid., Item 827.

[43]Norodny kontrol v SSSR, p. 44.

[44]Ibid.; SU RSFSR, 1927, No. 38, Item 250.

[45]"Postanovlenie VTsIK i SNK RSFSR ot 21 yanvarya 1929 g. o sektsiyakh RKI" (Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's

Commissars of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic on Jan. 21, 1929, concerning the Sections of Rabkrin), SU RSFSR, 1929, No. 13, art. 146; also cited in Narodny kontrol v SSSR, p. 64.

[46]Narodny kontrol v SSSR illustrates this point with two examples: in the first, an RKI section attached to the Sormovsky District Soviet of Nizhegorod Territory is described as helping to build a streetcar line to a local factory in its district; the second told how a section of the Uman city soviet, in the Ukraine, with the help of Komsomols, investigated conditions in the city's public dining rooms; p. 65, n 73.

[47]KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i reshenniyakh, II, p. 442; see also, Narodny Kontrol v SSSR, p. 65.

[48]More details on the development of mass participation in control during this period can be found in Cocks, "Politics of Party Control," pp. 440-59.

[49]The account of Paul Cocks of the changing functions of TsKK-RKI during its lifetime suggests that the transformation effected in 1934 had been long in preparation: "The span of control activity of the C.C.C.-R.K.I. steadily narrowed as many of its functions were usurped by others or were diluted of any meaningful substance. In the Party the C.C.C. gradually lost its functions to Stalin's Secretariat and the Party apparatus. In the state and economy, the work previously performed by the C.C.C.-R.K.I. was increasingly taken over by the Orgburo and Secretariat, the secret police, and the developing commissariat system"; Ibid., p. 176.

[50]J. V. Stalin, Sochineniya, XIII (Moscow, 1952), pp. 372-73; italics added.

[51]Sbornik zakonov SSSR (Collection of Laws of the USSR), 1934, No. 12, Item 75; cited in Norodny kontrol v SSSR, p. 68.

[52]XVII Sezd Vsesoyuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (b): Stenograficheskii otchet (Seventeenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) Stenographic record), (Moscow, 1934), p. 674.

[53]Narodny kontrol v SSSR, p. 68.

[54]Order of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, September 1940: "Ob obrazovanii Narkomata gosudarstvennovo kontrolya" (On the Organization of the

People's Commissariat of State Control), Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR (Official Journal of the USSR Supreme Soviet), 1940, no. 31.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid.

[57] The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow: Reports and Speeches at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) (Moscow, 1939), p. 202; Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (1963), p. 198.

[58] Fainsod (How Russia is Ruled [1953], p. 333) points out that "this reversion to traditional nomenclature involved no redefinition of functions"; Vedomosti Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR, no. 10 (419), March 28, 1946.

[59] Plenum TsK KPSS 19-23 noyabrya 1962: Stenograficheski otchet, p. 85; see also, Mekhlis, "Tridtsat let sotsialisticheskovo Gosudarstvennovo kontrolya" (Thirty Years of Socialist State Control), Pravda, April 9, 1949, p. 6.

CHAPTER III

KHRUSHCHEV'S REORGANIZATION OF CONTROL

The Destalinization of Control, 1953-1964

The preceding chapter has described Stalin's narrow concept of the proper sphere of the duties of the State Control Ministry, and the implications this concept had in restricting the membership and sphere of action of the ministry. Stalin's style of rule and his multiplication of watchdog agencies to check on one another had other, far-reaching implications for control, and especially for the direction in which control agencies evolved after Stalin's death.[1] Stalin himself, which using the secret police as the ultimate weapon of control, was a kind of linchpin that held together the conglomerate structure of bureaucratic watchdog agencies. Removal of the linchpin, therefore, was a kind of instant, inadvertent destalinization, which at once destroyed the basic cohesion of the old order while setting off a struggle for political leadership among men and factions with conflicting ideas about how to rebuild the new one.

With destalinization came a reorientation of Soviet thought and society, a self scrutiny that pierced to the very "foundations of Marxism-Leninism." So great had grown the gap between the original utopian visions of Marx and Lenin and the existing Stalinist reality that the most far-reaching reforms seemed to be called for: reforms of ideology, reforms of the economy, reforms of the government and social institutions, and reforms to revitalize the party itself and its missions. Yet while the need for reform was generally recognized in the immediate post-Stalinist era, the correct course could not be so clearly seen, unanimously approved or single-mindedly followed. Just where the process of destalinization should or could stop would long remain an open question, but one which possessed a special urgency during those first moments, when the ship of state, constructed to obey the command of one helmsman, floundered while many hands sought to grasp the wheel. Against the backdrop of almost a decade of such uncertain, fluid conditions, emerged phoenixlike, a "new TsKK-RKI," the Party-State Control Committee (Komitet partiinovo-gosudarstvennovo kontrolya, KPGK).

In the present context, it is expedient to oversimplify the complex events of 1953-1964, by focussing first of all upon Khrushchev's struggle to achieve and maintain power, and by further acknowledging this period as one during which he achieved varying degrees of ascendancy over his enemies,

perhaps enjoying his greatest power during the last few years.[2] Important, too, were Khrushchev's ideas about reforming state and party control agencies, but these could seldom have been uppermost in his mind, concerned as he was successively with more compelling schemes to reform agriculture, to reorganize the entire Soviet economic, state, and party administrative machinery, to reorient foreign policy, and to revitalize ideology. Nevertheless, it is clear from the final form in which the KPGK emerged that Khrushchev had definite notions about how the Stalinist control agencies should be transformed. And his inability to push through his intended reforms without considerable delay and opposition during most of this period would indicate that the power struggle played a large role in the evolution of the control organs. Thus, as in the previous history of Soviet control organs, the vacillating course of reform during the post-Stalinist decade (as well as the changes made in control since Khrushchev's own removal) continued to illustrate the important formative effects of both practical power considerations and ideological concerns.

There were certain key events in the immediate post-Stalinist period indicating that changes were already taking place within the structure of control institutions and presaging much greater changes. Of first importance was the weakening of KGB power in the months following Stalin's

death. In December 1953, when V. N. Merkhulov was removed from his post as Minister of State Control, tried and condemned as an accomplice of Beria, he was replaced by a longtime party official, Vasily Gavrilovich Zhavoronkov.[3] Thus the tie between the KGB and the Ministry of Control at the highest level was effectively severed. The following year, articles in the Soviet press suggested that there was a need for reinvigorating control of the government's administrative apparatus. Administrative work, they said, was characterized by shortcomings and "bureaucratism," which needed to be eradicated by a steady, systematic control, involving not only the most active party guidance, but the help of the masses. Lenin's ideas on the reform of Rabkrin were recalled.[4] And in 1956, at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party, Khrushchev launched an open attack upon the Ministry of State Control in his address.[5]

At the same time, there was other evidence of opposition to Khrushchev's proposed reform of state control. The fact that in spite of his attack, the final resolution of the Twentieth Congress failed to mention needed reform of the ministry seems an indication of resistance to his charges.[6] The ensuing pattern of events surely reflects the side effects of power struggles for higher political stakes. On November 22, 1956, Molotov (who, in consistent opposition to Khrushchev's policies, had lost his position as Foreign Minister in June) replaced Zhavoronkov as

Minister of State Control, providing an added target for Khrushchev's attacks upon the ministry. Earlier the same month, Kommunist, discussing the past shortcomings of the Ministry of Control, had predicted their imminent correction and the transformation of the ministry in the image of Rabkrin.[7] However, the Central Committee Plenum in December passed without recording any criticism of the ministry.

But within a few months, criticism was again openly voiced. At the February 1957 Plenum, a complete reorganization of the ministry's work was called for.[8] Khrushchev reiterated this request in his "March Theses," noting that control had to be adjusted to the newly reorganized economic order, and urging that it become instrumental in the removal as well as the discovery of the shortcomings. He also scolded the ministry for meddling too much in economic and cultural affairs with which it was incompetent to deal.[9] In his Report to the Supreme Soviet, May 1957, he repeated his charges and demands for reform.[10]

In June 1957, the most crucial confrontation between Khrushchev and the "Anti-Party Group" (in which Molotov figured prominently) ended in defeat for the latter. Molotov was replaced as Minister of State Control by G. V. Enyutin. New demands for control reorganization in line with Lenin's ideas appeared in the press in July and August,[11] but the reforms of the ministry that actually took place on August 23, transforming it into the Soviet

Control Commission, and making the republic commissions independent of the central commission, were hardly in line with Leninist prescription.[12] They did, however, accord with a general reform of all state agencies which was underway at that moment, aimed at weakening state and strengthening party agencies.[13]

The party control mechanism also received the attention of reformers during this period. At the May 1958 Plenum, the TSKK was called upon to take wider interest in checking economic shortcomings, especially at the local levels, and to enlist the aid of rank-and-file members and even non-party volunteers in revealing misconduct on the part of administrators or party officials.[14]

The unusual interest in making both state and party control agencies work more effectively increased during the years from 1958 to 1961, when one of the shocking results of Khrushchev's decentralization of the economic administration and his setting of excessive goals for agricultural production was a sharp and widespread increase in "localism," falsification of reports, and economic crimes.[15] Leninist prescriptions dominate the literature of suggested reform during these years. The revised version of Khrushchev's report, "On the Control Figures of the Development of the National Economy of the USSR, 1959-1965," adopted by the Twenty-First Congress, on February 5, 1959, called upon the soviets and trade unions to

strengthen their ties with the masses in combatting red tape and bureaucracy, and in reducing the cost of government and economic management while improving its operation.[16] At the June 1959 Plenum Khrushchev noted that in this "period of developed construction of a Communist society, public control over fulfillment of the directives of the party and government acquires enormous significance."[17] This plenum approved the setting up of party control commissions within party cells to achieve grass-roots participation in the business of checking enterprise management. Articles in the press urged the enlistment of volunteers by the Commission of Soviet Control and cooperation between the Commission and trade union groups, Komsomols, and "Groups of Assistance" to Soviet Control Commissions.[18]

A more pressing and immediate need for reform was the existing decentralized organization of the Commission of Soviet Control itself, which had apparently allowed the republic agencies of state control to become quite isolated from the central apparatus.[19] Under the existing system, coordination of the work of the republic and local agencies and the supervision necessary to ensure unified forms and methods of work were in effect impossible. To make an immediate correction in this situation, therefore, a "stop-gap" reform was effected, which, as an ad hoc measure, made no attempt to incorporate Leninist reforms. In July 1961,

the Commission of Soviet Control and its counterpart agencies were transformed into union-republic organs.[20] Henceforth, local state control organs in oblasts, krais, and autonomous republics were to be coordinated by their respective Union Republic Control Commissions, which in turn were to be supervised by Moscow. Thus, according to its organizational chart, the revised hierarchy of commissions, to be known as the Commission of State Control, was assured of a new cohesion and unity.

Meanwhile, the debate over the best way to restore Leninist ideas to control was being more frequently aired in official speeches and the press, and opposing viewpoints became clearer. The Draft Program of the Party, which was offered to the public for discussion in mid-1961, called for a new kind of state and public control (omitting mention of the party).[21] The writer of a note in Kommunist, in September 1961, called for reform of the party control commissions to create an independent party purge agency, free of local party influence from the republic level down, maintaining its own single chain of subordination.[22] Public discussion of the draft Program and Party Statutes inevitably produced a number of suggested changes in the control activities of the party,[23] while Khrushchev's control formula called for three basic ingredients: party, state, and public control. This trinity appeared, for example, in Khrushchev's speech to the Twenty-Second

Congress, October 17, 1961, when, speaking of control of party members, he also added that "local party organs must be accountable to those above and communists below."[24] As Hodnett has pointed out, the support expressed in other speeches at this congress for Khrushchev's idea of a joint party-state control agency was not overwhelming.[25] Nevertheless, the final resolution of the Central Committee, as adopted by the Twenty-Second Congress, did call for "party, state, and public control," and mentioned as well the need for accountability of local party organs, above and below.[26] It was somewhat surprising, therefore, that the Party Program, officially approved on October 31, 1961, did not mention control.[27]

Thus, clearly, the great debate was not officially settled in late 1961. Nonetheless, in early 1962, quiet steps were being taken by the State Control agencies to incorporate public participation, and party groups received approval from the Central Committee Resolution of January 11, 1962, to proceed with the formation of non-staff party commissions, (i.e., of public volunteers).[28] Meanwhile the debate over state or party-state and public control continued in the press,[29] with Khrushchev's position appearing to gain ground. In a Kommunist article, in May 1962, Frol Kozlov publicly endorsed Khrushchev's ideas, by urging "broad mass

control from above and below. "The existing systems of party and state control," he said, should be perfected according to Leninist ideas of control, but on an "even broader [social] base."[30]

The final settlement of the debate came at the November Plenum of the Communist Party in 1962. Both Khrushchev's speech and the Resolution of the Plenum called for the creation of a unified party, state, and public control system, and the way ahead appeared open.[31] The moment appeared at hand when Khrushchev's power was sufficiently secure so that he might indeed dictate the rapid fulfillment of his plans. The slowness with which they were subsequently implemented, however, and the fact that he was never fully explicit concerning his objectives, leaves it problematic whether he actually achieved his intended goals in the PGK, or whether in implementation his grand design was somewhat distorted from the start by the continuing opposition of state and party control officials themselves at various levels, or by covert political maneuvers of anti-Khrushchev factions. The quickness and thoroughness with which Khrushchev's own political sun set in October 1964, and the equal dispatch with which the Party-State Control Committee was transformed into the People's Control Committee (dissociated by this sleight-of-hand from Khrushchev's authorship), as well as its subsequent evolution, suggest

that there continued to be active opposition to Khrushchev's many schemes, which included his ideas on control.[32]

Genesis of the Party-State Control Committee (KPGK)

Our rapid survey of the decade of events which produced the Party-State Control Committee must now be slowed to allow for a more detailed examination of the background and process of its creation. In attempting to explain why this organ evolved as it did, several important formative influences must be considered. The power nexus out of which the organization took shape has already been briefly described and must be constantly kept in mind. The shape of the existing building blocks for the new organization and the availability from past experience of "sanctified" patterns or prototypes for new structures are also important. In addition, the following section will attempt to answer three questions: First, what was the stated intent of the organization's designers? Second, what were the objective circumstances that favored or necessitated the creation of the Party-State Control Committee? And third, what were at least some of the unstated intentions and motives of its architects?

What was the stated intent of the designers of the KPGK?

Khrushchev's clearest statements of what the proposed control agency was intended to achieve were made in his

speech to the Central Committee Plenum, November 19, 1962.[33] This was a plenum preoccupied with economic matters, which included the drastic bifurcation of the party's great hierarchy into agricultural and industrial components. Having outlined for his audience the major problems of the national economy as he saw them, and the projected reorganization of the party's guidance of the national economy, he then proceeded to describe how the existing control agencies must be changed to fit the new conditions. The badly-functioning State Control Commission and myriad discrete agencies currently providing only partial and sporadic surveillance of the nation's economic and administrative systems must be replaced by a new control organization with new missions.

To detail the past failures, Khrushchev began by posing the question: "What are the basic shortcomings of our existing control system?" First of all, he said, "we do not have a control center that would exercise unified control along the party and state line both centrally and locally." Because of this,

> the central committees of the communist parties of the union republics and the territory and province party committees are little concerned with inspection of the state of affairs in the localities and do not adequately check up on the fulfillment of party decisions, while in effect we do not have special party control agencies. The Party Control Committee under the Party Central Committee and the party commissions in the localities primarily hear charges against the defenses of party members.[34]

Party control activities, in other words, deserved criticism for concentrating all their attention upon "housekeeping" duties of the party organization itself, and for not watching over the "fulfillment of party directives on economic matters, the fulfillment of the national economic plan."

As for state control,

> . . . its agencies still operate badly. They are poorly linked with life, with the masses of the working people; checkup is carried out chiefly by a staff apparatus without drawing upon the communists at large. The State Control Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers and its agencies rarely submit major economic questions to the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers and often overlook serious abuses, cases of deception, account padding, bribery, the squandering of state material values, etc. . . . At best, the State Control Commission establishes the fact of an abuse or a crime, but it does not take measures to prevent the rise of such phenomena.[35]

As a result, "the major shortcomings in the organization of control have a serious effect on the course of our economic work, on the practical guidance of the development of the economy."[36]

The first step in remedying these shortcomings, Khrushchev suggested, would be a reorganization of the party and state control mechanisms based upon the Leninist idea of "combining party and state control," the idea, which Khrushchev noted, had earlier been achieved by the "merger of the Central Control Commission and the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection." The second step would be to copy and expand another aspect of that "well-arranged" Leninist

system of party and state control, by enrolling "the broad masses of the working people . . . in the organization of control."[37] In the 1960's, as Khrushchev pointed out, "with the increasing complexity of economic life and the vast development of productive forces," the role of mass control was growing and must be further expanded. Only the enlistment of the masses in a unified trinity of party, state, and public control could provide the constancy and all-pervasiveness of control needed in the present decade for the proper functioning of the national economy.[38]

But control--especially mass participation in control--as envisaged by Khrushchev, and by Lenin before him, was to fulfill other functions. It was to educate the public, and thereby create a great moral force for the maintenance of socialist legality. To make this point, Khrushchev quoted Lenin, saying that "the chief purpose of the organization of control is 'to carry <u>all</u> the working masses, both men and <u>especially women</u>, through [the school of] participation in the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection."[39] Thus participation in control would further the inculcation of civic values and the creation of a responsible citizenry. Moreover, in addition to its mass character, the new control would make use of wide publicity in its work. Such publicity also would help to fortify the public conscience, creating a "revolutionary public opinion," informed and enlightened. Recalling the effectiveness of the mass character of

TsKK-RKI and its use of the press, Khrushchev said, "the enemies of socialism, parasites and bureaucrats trembled before this great force of revolutionary public opinion." Thus, following the lead of TsKK-RKI, the new Party-State Control Committee would create "a social atmosphere in which swindlers, theives and bribe-takers will be unable to engage in their criminal machinations."[40]

Finally, in closing his plenary remarks on the subject of control, Khrushchev tied the proposed reorganization to a final, ultimate goal, that of building communist society:

> By carrying out the measures proposed for reorganizing party guidance of the national economy, for perfecting party-state and public control in the country, we will multiply the strength of our party, our people, in the struggle to accomplish the majestic program of building communist society. (Stormy applause.)[41]

What were the objective circumstances that favored the creation of the Party-State Control Committee?

Unquestionably, by 1962 there was genuine need for better control of economic abuses. Khrushchev was clearly not exaggerating when he emphasized this need. The existing economic and administration conditions had resulted from a number of factors. One of these, already mentioned, was Khrushchev's efforts to alleviate the overly centralized administrative pattern inherited from Stalin. As Fainsod has remarked, Stalin's pattern "had more generalized advantages as long as trained and experienced administrators were scarce and the economy was not too complex," but in a

progressively more highly industrialized era, the Stalinist structure "induced congestion at the center and a paralysis of initiative below."[42] Khrushchev's replacement of the economic ministries by regional economic councils in 1957 had been partly a response to this need to decentralize the central apparatus, partly an effort to undercut the strength of the ministries, where opposition to his own power position seemed to be focussed. But decentralization, along with the decline of the secret police, tended to encourage an increase in illegal practices, while at the same time weakening the existing control mechanisms attempting to deal with such matters. One result of these factors by 1961 was a substantial increase in the padding and falsification of reports as well as in various types of "localism"--practices which appeared to alarm Khrushchev when the lower party apparatus became involved.[43]

In his Plenum speech of November 1962, Khrushchev provided evidence of these widespread disorders, referring to his examples as "isolated cases." There is, on the contrary, every indication from numerous Soviet press accounts that they were instead only the isolated peaks of hidden icebergs.[44] One cause of the situation was blamed upon the fact that even when State Controllers exposed flagrant cases of large-scale report padding and falsification, no action to remedy the situation followed. A case in point is described in Izvestia, November 23, 1961.[45]

Inspectors of the State Control Commission had criticized the inflated administration of the Orenburg Economic Council and previously published their charges in Izvestia on May 19, 1959. At that time the council's enterprises and construction organizations allegedly had one administrative official for every five or six workers, while the central apparatus of the council itself contained 460 employees. A reexamination over two years later showed that instead of reducing their staff in the interim, the center had added 75 new employees; administrative personnel in the regional units had similarly increased, by 13%; and the volume of paperwork had considerably expanded. "In the first nine months of 1961 alone, more than 33,000 decrees, instructions, orders, etc., have issued forth from here," said the inspectors, complaining in particular that this shuffling of many papers "prevented the prompt discovery of report padding, falsifications and deception of the state. In eight months, report paddings at eight enterprises amounted to almost 750,000 rubles!"

Ruefully, the inspectors summed up:

> One has the strange impression that the sovnarkhoz [the economic council] is somehow reluctant to punish deceivers of the state. The province statistical administration has repeatedly, with facts in hand, as the saying goes, directed the economic council's attention to cases of abuse and report padding, but nothing has been done about these matters.

A similar complaint about the ineffectiveness of control agencies to eradicate shortcomings is recorded early

in 1962 in another Izvestia article. Thirty-five members of a lumber-stealing ring, which even included the director of an administration of an RSFSR ministry, had been brought to trial for stealing more than 36,000 cubic meters of lumber. "How," ask State Controller Sustavov and Senior Investigator Gitelman, of the Sverdlovsk Province Prosecutor's Office, "could such a large crime go undiscovered so long by the extensive system of control agencies then operating in the lumber industry?"

> According to approximate data that we have managed to collect at the province center, the lumber industry enterprises of the Central Urals were visited in 1961 by more than 4,000 controllers and auditors. They requested 15,000 copies of various documents and questionnaires and drew up about 3,000 acts.
>
> It seems that with this "massive" control there should be exemplary order in the lumber industry and that thefts and violations of state discipline of any kind should be completely excluded. Nevertheless, the criminal case we have mentioned is a fact. Nor are the barbarous destruction of valuable trees, mass spoilage of procured lumber and violations of the elementary rules of conservation in the timberlands of the Central Urals isolated phenomena either. Where, then, is this powerful control apparatus looking? [Italics added.]

Their answer to the problem was that the existing control agencies, while massive in scope, were powerless and disconnected. While the Sustavov and Gitelman article was very likely "planted" in the press by a group backing Khrushchev's scheme for a party-state control organ, it was just as likely not fabricating the real inadequacies of the existing system.

It is also clear from these and other Soviet materials that Soviet inspectors were well aware of another striking defect in their system of control, which has been repeatedly mentioned by Western students of the Soviet economy.[47] As noted earlier, it is a fact of Soviet economic life that managers and administrators have found it necessary under the conditions of Soviet operation to indulge in so-called "Berliner practices," which range all the way from "cutting corners" to downright illegal practices in order to accomplish successfully their economic missions of fulfilling the plan. Controllers, fully aware of this situation are subjected to similar pressures, and are, as Joseph Berliner has pointed out:

> . . . compelled to abdicate their control functions in some measure. Their attitude is revealed in the theme of "looking the other way." . . . Moreover they often engage in these very practices themselves. . . . Awareness of common interest in plan fulfillment often generates within the enterprise a "family relationship: in which Party secretary, chief accountant, and other control officials facilitate or overlook the transgressions of an enterprising and successful director and share in the rewards and prestige that come with plan fulfillment. It is a fact that the control officials perceive their own fates as closely interwoven with the success of the enterprise that explains the endurance of the practices of management.[48]

In this instance the "family relationship" Berliner describes is within one enterprise and involves controllers within that enterprise. But the pattern of mutual involvement is repeated at many levels, and can cut across many jurisdictional lines of enterprise, ministry or party

organization. Moreover, the membership of a high party official in these protective family groups can go far to enhance their immunity to discovery or punishment, even by State Controllers. A "cause celebre" of the year 1962 illustrates this point. In the summer of 1961, Izvestia had first published some facts about this case, concerned with the illicit use of funds to build private dachas. The large circle of quilty officials involved included two members of the Tadzhikistan Central Committee (who also happened to be the republic minister of finance and the vice-chairman of the regional economic council), the first secretaries of the Kurgan-Tyube and Dushambe City Party Committees, and the chairman of the Dushambe Ispolkom, among others. Even after the 1961 "exposure" in Izvestia, the only action taken against them was the exacting of an official acknowledgment by the party buro of the Tadzhikistan Central Committee that the facts published in the Izvestia article were indeed ture. Only after a second Izvestia article, in April 1962, was action finally taken to remove the city officials from their jobs and to oust them from the party.[49] The republic officials were reprimanded, after vacating their dachas. What this denouement points up is that even in disgrace the high party man is hard to touch. Thus, clearly, those reformers in 1962 who hoped somehow to design a more effective control against the

party official were attacking a real and central control problem.

Another important article, which again would appear to have been planted in the press by supporters of Khrushchev's ideas for reforming control, attacks this same problem even more openly and directly. I. Bolyasny, docent at the Zaporozhski Machine-Building Institute, suggested in a Kommunist article, of October 1961, that:

> sometimes the irregularities permitted by officials in the state apparatus and by economic agencies have their source in the actions of local party leaders. This is very obviously confirmed by the cases of hoodwinking and abuses disclosed by the Party Central Committee in Tadzhikistan, Ryazan Province, and elsewhere. In order to ensure efficient and comprehensive supervision locally, it is necessary to check simultaneously on both the work of managerial personnel and the work of the state and party apparatus. [Italics added.][50]

The Draft Party Program had advised reform of the control agencies merely by including mass participation in the state control machinery. Bolyasny adds that the party, too, needs both to check and be checked. Thus, he said,

> The Draft Party Program states: "In keeping with Lenin's instructions, control agencies must function constantly, combining state control with public inspection at the center and in the localities." It seems to me advisable to add to this formulation as follows: "combining party and state control with public inspection," (adding the word "party"). [Italics added.][51]

Although Bolyasny's revision was not made in the Party Program, it was, of course, eventually embodied in the Party-State Control Committee.

As has already been noted, a certain amount of opposition to the notion of uniting party and state control evidently persisted through 1961 among some high party members. Two aspects of the party's involvement in control were of special interest to reformers. Obviously, from the viewpoint of better control, high party officials who joined "family arrangements" needed to be made a prime target of control. Moreover, from the same point of view, the control agency needed the kind of authority enjoyed by the party to make their own actions more effective. Control needed the party's Big Stick. A case which shows the speedy effect with which the party can act is described by Ellen Mickiewicz.[52]

> In the "compressor" factory of Moscow, the students at a circle session [of adult political education] asked their leader why there were so many shortcomings in the work of the factory. Indeed, the discussion became so heated that grave accusations were brought out about factory officials, accusations that have often been commented on by Western observers of Soviet politics but rarely mentioned baldly by Soviet sources. In this particular instance the students of the circle accused their trade union of being utterly useless, of not knowing what went on in the factory, of never leaving the union office and never becoming involved in the productive process at the factory. And to make matters worse, they contended, the trade union chairman lived "in harmony" with the director of the factory; thus, no appeal could get through that tightly reinforced protective association.
>
> For the leader of the circle, it is a dangerous cobweb in which to get entangled. . . . But the zealous propagandist is charged not to "turn from the solution of a sharp problem"; he should tell his students to bring the problem about the improvement of conditions of work to the shop trade union organization, and he should himself talk over the problem with

> the party committee of the factory. When, in this example, nothing came of these forays, the propagandist <u>went to the city committee of the party</u> and in one week the necessary improvements were made. [Italics added.]

The power leverage of the party is such as to have been envied by Archimedes. Certainly the earnest controller at any level must be acutely aware of worlds he might move if such leverage were his. Here, again, it is quite evident that Khrushchev's new control system was designed to deal very directly with real problems.

To this list of genuine shortcomings of control which called for reform in 1962 there must be added at least one more: the inspector's lack of knowledge concerning where to look and what to look for. For instance, as enterprise technology grows more complex, greater technical knowledge is needed on the part of the inspector. As described in the preceding chapter, the tendency during the Stalinist era seemed to be for the areas supervised by state control inspectors to shrink as the economy expanded, so that state control became at last a narrow business of audits and checkups of accounts.[53] As Berliner has pointed out,

> One important element lacking in the ministry's [of Goskontrol] ability to control is knowledge. Unlike the other control agencies which are either involved in the fate of the firm or have business dealings with it, the ministry lacks familiarity with the details of the firm's operation. With all its resources, which may be assumed to be ample, the ministry is obviously unable to maintain a constant check on all enterprises. It also apparently suffers from lack of experienced personnel, perhaps in part because a police career is hardly attractive to trained engineers.[54]

"People's inspectors" could change this. Who, better than an enterprise's own technicians, would know where to look for inefficiencies or irregularities? As for "a constant check," these employees are always "on the job." Thus, mass participation would seem to be a realistic response to new economic conditions necessitating wider and more constant surveillance. Internal surveillance, too, could offer other advantages. Unlike sporadic and "campaign-type" control efforts by agencies from outside an enterprise, "on-the-job" inspectors could take effective measures to eradicate shortcomings, or even to prevent their reoccurrence. Another weakness of the campaign (the one-shot inspection, for example), is that it does not, as Berliner notes, "attempt to change the basic features of the economic system which generate the practices under attack."[55] Public inspectors might have the permanence, knowledge and opportunity, if not the will or the authority, to make such systemic changes.

The conclusion must be, therefore, that the proposals for KPGK did deal realistically with certain existing problems in the Soviet economy in 1962 which were in need of more adequate methods of control.

What were some probable unstated motives of KPGK's proponents?

Above all, KPGK was a substitute for terror. Granted, it was but one of the substitutes, for terror had reached

into every area of Soviet social activity, playing an essential role in cementing the structure and contributing to the dynamism of the Soviet social system. Preoccupation with the dysfunctions of terror, sometimes causes us to neglect the fact that terror has functions, as well. And not simply the obvious function of maintaining the dictator's power, the regime, or the system. Terror also mobilizes economic and social machines, forces compliance with specified standards of operation, and enforces certain rules of conduct, of discipline, and of conformance to legal norms. Thus Soviet administrative reformers seeking adequate substitutes for these multiple functions of terror faced a complex task.

The search for substitutes was, however, simplified in one respect. As Fainsod's study of postwar defectors shows, the Soviet people after Stalin's death seemed to expect that not only would an end be made to terror, repression, and a capricious legal system, but that opportunities would also be offered them to participate directly in affairs of public concern.[56] And Stalin's heirs to power could not be sure of their abilities to govern without making some concessions at once to all of these desires. As time went on, however, one may well ask if the degree and kind of channeled and artificially induced participation that developed was really just what the public wanted and needed. Or did not this particular type of mass mobilization

merely represent the efforts of the leaders, for reasons of their own, to find ways to get the economy moving again on the road to communism mapped out for it by the party?

Western scholars viewing the post-Stalinist decade have described a number of areas in which mass participation was being encouraged and have attempted to analyze the motives of the regime. Swearer, for example, suggests that the revitalizing of the soviets in the post-Stalinist 1950's was an effort to find "new ways to rekindle elan" and to channel the energies of the people "into a more responsive support of the regime and into state construction."[57] By early 1959, public participation in the soviets was indicated by the growth of standing commissions: "over 1 million deputies of 57,000 soviets and 1.5 million activists were at least nominally recorded as participants in standing commissions of local soviets."[58] Subsequently, the Party Program also called for enlarging the role of these committees, and added certain duties which are of special interest here: "The standing committees of the soviets must systematically control the activities of ministries, departments, and economic councils."[59]

Emily Brown has traced in detail the growing powers of the trade unions from 1957 on, from regional councils down to factory, plant, and local committees, adding that "greater union activity resulting from these increases in union powers was expected to provide an extra check on

managements, and also to stimulate the 'creative initiative' of workers in solving production problems."[60] The resolution of the Twenty-Second Congress noted that "the rights and functions of the trade unions in the decision of all questions touching the living interests of the working people had significantly widened" and would continue to grow as Soviet society moved toward communism and new problems were included in the sphere of union activity.[61] In addition, acting upon the advice of the Party Program in February 1961, to increase the role of public organizations generally and to make greater use of non-salaried volunteer administrators in their work, unions had by 1963 considerably expanded volunteer staff work at all levels.[62]

Party agencies, too, were encouraged during this period to enlist the public in their work. A Ukrainian Republic secretary, I. P. Kazanets, announced in October 1962, that "today, 10,000 non-salaried instructors, 157 nonstaff departments and 1,940 public councils and commissions for various questions of party guidance are functioning in the party committees of our republic. More than 55,000 communists have been enlisted in active party work on a volunteer basis through these forms alone. This is four times as many as the total number of paid personnel in party agencies."[63]

The areas of law enforcement and trial procedures were also opened to public participation during this era.[64]

The voluntary police force, druzhiny, was initiated in 1958, to be followed a year later by the introduction of the Comrades, Courts.[65] The decree, "On Participation by the Working People in Safeguarding Public Order in the Country," called for use of the "enormous force of public influence on violators of order," and the "extensive enlistment of the working people and public organizations in the matter of safeguarding public order in the country."[66] By 1960, the voluntary people's militia alone numbered 800,000 groups, with 2.5 million members.[67]

Another area of widespread citizen involvement was the adult political education program, initiated by a Central Committee resolution of August 12, 1956. According to Mickiewicz, who has made a detailed and careful examination of this program, the growth of participation of this program "from 1956 to 1964 . . . was enormous. For the academic year 1957-58 a total of 6,200,000 people were enrolled in the system. Of them, 5,300,000 were members and candidates of the party; only 900,000 were non-party students . . . in 1963, in circles and seminars combined, non-party students constituted 75%. In that same year Pravda observed that 'every fifth adult resident in our country' was studying in the political instruction system. In September 1964, just one month before Khrushchev fell from power, the system of adult education encompassed some

36 million people, of whom more than 25 million, or at least 78%, did not belong to the party.[68]

Zbigniew Brzezinski has suggested that one motive for the steps which Khrushchev took to "invigorate the ideological indoctrination of the population at large" might have been that such indoctrination was necessary to maintain the leading role of the party.[69] And Robert Tucker maintains that Khrushchev's own personal success was "probably to be explained in large part by the energetic and convincing way in which he espoused the cause of the party's political resurrection.[70] Yet, the extent to which Khrushchev's populism reached outside the party to enlist non-party participation in public affairs seemed likely to threaten the party's hegemony if pursued too far. The changes made in all these areas of public volunteer work after Khrushchev's fall, to bring the activities more closely within the guidance and guardianship of the party would indicate that the post-Khrushchevian leadership differed with Khrushchevian doctrine on the degree of public participation to be desired.

The general picture sketched above of widespread efforts in many areas of Soviet life to encourage increased public participation has been presented for two reasons. First, a clear understanding of the evolution and origins of the Party-State Control Committee is only possible if viewed in the wider context of these epic processes. The

Party-State Control Committee fits neatly into this general picture of expanding public participation, even to the point of exhibiting in its early stages considerable vagueness about how far ordinary citizens should go in checking party and state bodies. However, as indicated above, any such vagueness was thoroughly dispelled under Brezhnev and Kosygin, when, as will be shown in later pages, the guardianship of the party grew much more domineering.

Secondly, the answer to the question raised at the beginning of this section is most meaningfully rephrased in the context of the developments described. "What were some probable unstated motives of KPGK's proponents?" involves a rewording to define "unstated motives" as efforts to find overall solutions for the "global" needs and problems of the continuing transformation of the Soviet economic and social systems. The assumption here is that Khrushchev and his followers were attempting to deal on a very broad front with problems arising out of changes in the power structure of the country, problems of motivation and mobilization of its citizens, and problems involving the future shape of the society. Their solutions for the reform of control agencies were inevitably dictated by these larger designs.

To summarize the developments described in this chapter briefly,where the history of control reorganization

during the Stalinist period showed a constant shrinkage of competency and membership and a "professionalization and bureaucratization" of state control, in the post-Stalinist decade this trend was gradually reversed. Where Leninist prescriptions had in the earlier period been ignored, one-by-one, they are later revived, until upon the establishment of the Party-State Control Committee, the old TsKK-RKI seems almost to have been resurrected intact, with its union of party and state control apparatuses, its expanded field of operations, its multiplicity of missions, and its enlistment of the layman and amateur in the business of inspection.

CHAPTER III--NOTES

[1]Merle Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case," in Joseph LaPalombara, Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton, 1963), p. 256. See also, Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled (Cambridge, 1963), pp. 576-86.

[2]A searching treatment of the power nexus out of which Khrushchev's Party-State Control Committee finally emerged is contained in Grey Hodnett's article, "Khrushchev and Party-State Control," in Alexander Dallin and Alan F. Westin (eds.), Politics in the Soviet Union: 7 cases (New York, 1966), pp. 113-64, which traces the history of the reorganization of Goskontrol from 1953 to 1962 and tries to identify the power considerations which motivated these changes. Since the evidence is not conclusive, Hodnett posits two alternative assessments of Khrushchev's power position as the basis for two different interpretations of Khrushchev's motives in establishing the PGK in the form it took. Either Khrushchev was not powerful enough to have his way with PGK and was forced into compromises by elements (especially old members of the Goskontrol Ministry and the "Stalinists") opposing his reforms, or he was able after 1957 to have his own way without question, in which case the KPGK closely reflects his intents and was designed, as he contended, largely for economic reasons.

[3]See Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the USSR (London, 1961), on Merkhulov's complicity, pp. 441, 443-44, 446-47. V. N. Merkhulov was removed from his post as Minister of State Control on September 17, 1953. Vasily Gavrilovich Zhavoronkov succeeded him December 17, 1953; Pravda and Izvestia, December 17, 1953, p. 4; Vedomosti Verkhovnovo soveta SSSR, December 29, 1953. Merle Fainsod lists the pertinent legal actions and other concurrent changes in the status and power of the new Committee for State Security (KGB), which was separated from the MVD in March 1954, and in December 1958 placed under the leadership of the former All-Union Komsomol secretary (1943 to April 19, 1958; first secretary from 1952), Alexander Shelepin; How Russia is Ruled, pp. 447-52. From April until December 1958, Shelepin was Director of the Central Committee's Department of Party Organs for the Union Republics.

[4]See, for example, G. Borkov, "Proverka ispolneniya i zadachi sovershenstvovaniya partiinovo rukovodstva" (Checking on Fulfillment and the Tasks of Improving Party Leadership), Kommunist, No. 3 (February 1954), pp. 53-66; "Leninskie printsipy raboty gosudarstvennovo apparata i zadachi evo sovershenstvovaniya" (Leninist Principles of Work of the State Apparatus and the Tasks of Perfecting it), Kommunist, No. 5 (March 1954), pp. 14-30; Editorials: "Pokonchit s kantselyarsko-byurokraticheskim stilem rukovodstva," (End Bureaucratic Methods of Leadership), Pravda, March 3, 1954, and "Improve and Perfect the Work of the Soviet Apparatus," Izvestia, March 2, 1954.

[5]XX Sezd Vsesoyuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (b): Stenograficheski otchet, 14-25 fevralya 1956 goda (Twentieth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (b), Stenographic Report, February 14-25, 1956; Moscow, 1956), I, pp. 93-94. Said Khrushchev, "The Ministry of State Control weakly implements the Leninist instructions about state control, does not raise the great questions of perfecting the state administrative apparatus. . . . It is necessary radically to reorganize the work of the USSR Ministry of State Control. . . ."

[6]Ibid., II, 406-27. The resolution does speak of the necessity of enlisting the broadest participation of the masses in the administration of the state and the strengthening of party ties with the masses; ibid., pp. 422-23, 426.

[7]"Sovetski apparat upravleniya--vazhnoe orudie kommunisticheskovo stroitelstva" (The Soviet Administrative Apparatus is an Important Tool in the Building of Communism), Kommunist, No. 17 (November 1956), pp. 3-16.

[8]"Fevralski plenum TsK KPSS (1957 goda): Postanovlenie plenuma TsK KPSS, O dalneishem sovershenstvovanii organizatsii upravleniya promyshlennostyu i stroitelstvom (Prinyato 14 fevralya 1957 goda po kokladu tov. Khrushcheva N. S.)" (February Plenum CC CPSS [1957]: Decree of the Plenum, On the Utmost Perfection of the Organization of Administration of Industry and Construction [Adopted February 14, 1957, According to the Report of Comrade N. S. Khrushchev]), Spravochnik partiinovo rabotnika (Party Worker's Guide; Moscow, 1957), pp. 112-119; see especially p. 118.

[9]Khrushchev's "March Theses" appeared in Pravda and Izvestia, March 3, 1957. Khrushchev said: "Reorganization of the management of industry and construction will require a change in state control, basing it on the enlistment of

the broad masses and concentrating it in the localities, in the republics, provinces and economic administrative areas. In conformity with this, the content and methods of work of the USSR Ministry of State Control and the Union republic Ministries of State Control should evidently be radically reorganized. The Ministry of Control now has a cumbersome apparatus which is based on the departmental principle and tries to embrace literally all matters, even the control of the level of technical development of the various industries and the level of science and technology, which is of no benefit at all. The controllers try to give instructions on production problems, thus usurping the functions of the economic agencies."

[10]Khrushchev's Report to the Seventh Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet (published in Pravda and Izvestia, May 8, 1957, pp. 1-5) virtually repeated these charges verbatim.

[11]Partiinaya zhizn, July and August 1957; at the July Plenum, one delegate, K. D. Petukhov, accused Molotov of having, in his capacity as Minister of State Control, not cooperated in fulfilling the decisions of the February Plenum (1957) concerning the transformation of the administration of industry and construction, but instead, of composing letters opposing these decisions. His statement appears in Pravda, July 4, 1957, p. 3.

[12]Pravda, August 24, 1957. In Narodny kontrol v SSSR (Moscow, 1967), p. 69, it is maintained that Leninist principles were involved to the extent that the new Commission of Soviet Control was obligated to conduct its control activities "in a close relation with soviet, party, trade union, Komsomol, and other public organizations, with the involvement of the wide masses of workers, kolkhozniki and service people" (SP SSSR, 1957, No. 16, p. 163). Representatives of the trade unions and Komsomols now joined the commissions of Soviet control.

[13]The law which called for the transformation of the economic ministries into regional economic councils had been promulgated on May 10, 1957. It required the transformation to be completed by July 1, 1957; "Zakon: O dalneishem sovershenstvovanii organizatsii upravleniya promyshlennostyu i stroitelstvom," (Law concerning the furthest improvement of the administration of industry and construction), Spravochnik partiinovo rabotnika (Party Worker's Handbook; Moscow, 1957), pp. 227-33; see also Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled, pp. 395-96.

[14]These measures did not appear in the Report of Khrushchev to the May 1958 Plenum (on May 6) or in the resolution adopted (May 7) by the Plenum, which were printed in Pravda and Izvestia, May 9 and 10, 1958; see Paul Cocks, "Politics of Party Control: The Historical and Institutional Role of Party Control in the CPSU," Ph. D. Thesis (Harvard University, 1968), pp. 580-97, for an account of the changing structure and functions of the Party Control Committee and the local Party Commissions in the post-Stalinist period.

[15]Robert Conquest quotes a decree of April 28, 1958 (published in Pravda on May 19, 1958) which already describes "criminal" deficiencies in the fulfillment of delivery quotas, and he further notes that complaints of mestnichestvo were widespread in the Soviet press at this time (Power and Policy in the USSR, pp. 358-59). Howard Swearer has dealt with these developments in the area of agriculture: "Agricultural Administration under Khrushchev," in Roy Laird, Soviet Agricultural and Peasant Affairs (Lawrence, Kansas, 1963), pp. 26-28. Michel Tatu discusses the extraordinary "drive against swindling, falsification of agricultural statistics and other machinations" that opened in 1961; Power in the Kremlin (New York, 1969), pp. 128-32; the series of special decrees enacted in 1961-1962 to curb economic abuses is discussed by Kazimierz Grzybowski, "Soviet Criminal Law," Problems of Communist (March-April 1965), pp. 59-60.

[16]"Kontrolnye tsifry razvitiya Narodnovo khozyaistvo SSSR na 1959-1965 gody," (Control figures for the Development of the National Economy from 1959-65) Materiyaly Vneocherednovo XXI sezda KPSS (Materials of the Extraordinary 21st Congress of the CPSR: Moscow, 1959), pp. 255-56: "In order to carry out these tasks [of economic and cultural work assigned to them by the Seven-Year Plan], Soviet organs are obligated steadily to strengthen ties with the masses, resolutely to eliminate elements of red-tape and bureaucratism, economize and perfect the state and economic apparatus" (p. 255); "Together with the party and Komsomol organizations, the trade union organizations are obliged to direct special attention to the need for eliminating such phenomena alien to socialist society as hooliganism, drunkenness, bribetaking, speculation, and other negative remnants of the past . . . relying upon a broad aktiv. . . ." (p. 256). Khrushchev's report (delivered January 27, 1969) did not contain these passages.

[17]"Za tekhnicheski progress vo vsekh otraslyakh narodnovo khozyaistva" (For Technical Progress in all Branches of the Economy), Pravda, July 2, 1959, p. 3. He

also noted that the Presidium of the Central Committee had "recently adopted a decision on this question." He was referring to the decision at the June 1959 Plenum to set up commissions in the primary party organizations of industry and trade enterprises to supervise the management of the activities of the enterprises.

[18]"Novye organizatsionnye formy partiinovo kontrolya," (New Organizational Forms of Party Control), Pravda, July 13, 1959, p. 2; and A. Konushin, "O nekotorykh itogakh ochetnovybornykh sobranii" (On several results of the accounting-and-election meetings), Partiinaya zhizn, No. 3 (February, 1961), pp. 19-20.

[19]Staff Correspondent V. Rostovshchikov, "Svyazanny patrul" (The Constrained Patrol), Izvestia, April 26, 1961, p. 3, describes the poor communication between the central apparatus of the Soviet Control Commission and local control groups and lack of authority of the local groups.

[20]This decree appears in Pravda, July 23, 1961, p. 1: "Ukaz Prezidiuma Verkhovnovo Soveta SSSR, O preobrazovanii Komissii sovetskovo kontrolya Soveta Ministrov SSSR v soyuzno-respublikanski organ SSSR--Komissiyu gosudarstvennovo kontrolya Soveta Ministrov SSSR (Goskontrol SSSR)," dated July 22, 1961, (Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, On the Transformation of the Commission of Soviet Control of the USSR Council of Ministers into the Union-Republic Organ of the USSR--the Commission of State Control of the USSR Council of Ministers).

[21]The specific proposal of the "Proekt Programmy Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskovo Soyuza" (Draft Program), as this appeared in Pravda, July 30, 1961, p. 7, was, as follows: "Constant state and public control is an important means of accomplishing . . . [the improvement of the state apparatus]. In accordance with Lenin's instructions, organs of control must function constantly at the center and at the local level, combining state control with public inspectorates. The party regards inspectorates of people's control as an effective weapon for drawing the broad masses of the people into the management of state affairs and into control over the strict observance of legality, as a means of perfecting the governmental apparatus, eradicating bureaucratism, and promptly putting into effect proposals made by the people."

[22]S. Vorontsov, "O nezavisimosti organov partiinovo kontrolya," (On the Independence of the Organs of Party Control), Kommunist, No. 13 (September 1961), pp. 86-87. Specifically, Vorontsov argued, "The creation of a system

of party control with the direct subordination of the Party Control Commission to the Central Committee of the CPSU will greatly facilitate the growth of party democracy, the strengthening of party discipline, the growth of the activity of communists."

[23]An example in point is the letter of M. Semenechenko, in the same issue of Kommunist just mentioned, proposing changes in the Party Statutes. Semenechenko, a member of the party bureau of the Irkutsk Sovnarkhoz party organization, felt that primary party organizations in sovnarkhozy, ministries, local soviets and other administrative organizations should have the same right to control the administrative operations of these agencies as did the primary party organizations formed in economic enterprises; in other words, Semenechenko argues for a widening of the administrative control powers of the party control commissions. For other examples, see Hodnett, in Dallin and Westin, Politics in the Soviet Union, pp. 131-34.

[24]N. S. Khrushchev, "Doklad," October 17, 1961, Materialy XXII sezda KPSS (Moscow, 1961), p. 105.

[25]Hodnett, in Dallin and Westin, Politics in the Soviet Union, pp. 135-57.

[26]"Rezolyutsiya XXII sezda Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskovo Soyuza po otchetu Tsentralnovo komiteta KPSS," Materialy XXII sezda KPSS, p. 315.

[27]The Party Program was published in Pravda and Izvestia, November 2, 1961, pp. 1-9; the Statutes appeared the following day.

[28]"O sozdanii pri gorkomakh and raikomakh partii vneshtatnykh partiinykh komissii po predvaritelnomu rassmotreniyu voprosov priema v partiyu i personalnykh del kommunistov" (On the Creation of Non-Staff Party Commissions Attached to City and District Party Committees for the Preliminary Examination of Questions of Entrance into the Party and of Personal Matters of Communists), Spravochnik partiinovo rabotnika, 4th ed. (Moscow, 1963), p. 470. Note also the earlier decree, of December 12, 1960, which initiated this practice in the city and district committees of Moscow, Leningrad, and of Moscow Oblast. Concerning State Control developments, it is significant that G. V. Yenyutin, Chairman of the Commission of State Control, stated in an interview with an Izvestia correspondent, published May 26, 1962, that the Party Program's recommendation of control with public inspectorates was

serving his organization "as a compass, as a guide to action." (p. 3)

[29]See Hodnett, in Dallin and Westin, Politics in the Soviet Union, pp. 139-42.

[30]Frol P. Kozlov, "KPSS--Partiya vsevo naroda," (CPSU is the Party of All the People), Kommunist, No. 8 (May 1962), p. 14.

[31]See below, n. 33 for Khruschev's remarks; "Postanovlenie plenuma TsK KPSS, Prinyatoe 23 noyabrya 1962 goda" (Plenum Resolution adopted November 23, 1962), Plenum Tsentralnovo komiteta Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskovo Soyuza, 19-23 Noyabrya 1962 g., Stenograficheski otchet (Plenum of the CC of the CPSU, November 19-23, 1962, Stenographic record; Moscow, 1963), pp. 448, 451.

[32]Frederick C. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR (Boston, 1966) discusses this same point (pp. 153-54) and cites relevant evidence in the Soviet press: Partiinaya zhizn (editorial), No. 23 (December 1964), and Pravda, August 10, 11, and October 2, 1964. Most of the criticism of Khrushchev following the October 16 announcement of Khrushchev's "retirement" was veiled but unmistakable. Pravda's editorial on November 5, 1964 decried "braggadocio and self-delusion" and spoke of the necessity for "circumspection in the solution of problems that affect the interests of millions."

[33]N. S. Khrushchev, "Razvitie ekonomiki SSSR i partiinoe rukovodstvo narodnym khozyaistvom," Plenum TsK KPSS, 19-23 Noyabrya 1962, pp. 5-99.

[34]Ibid., p. 86.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Ibid., pp. 83, 84.

[38]Ibid., p. 84.

[39]V. I. Lenin, Sochinenie, 4th ed. XXX, 276 (Letter of January 24, 1920); also in V. I. Lenin, O partiinom, gosudarstvennom i obshchestvennom kontrole (Moscow, 1963), p. 147.

[40]Plenum TsK KPSS, 19-23 noyabrya 1962, pp. 84, 88.

[41]Ibid., p. 94.

[42]Fainsod, in LaPalombara, p. 256.

[43]See above, n. 15, and Khrushchev's own testimony at the November 1962 Plenum, "Doklad," pp. 87-88.

[44]Ibid., p. 87.

[45]S. Matuz, A Burkoltsev, "Bumazhnaya metel" (Paper Snow-storm), Izvestia, November 23, 1961, p. 1. The earlier article referred to was entitled: "Apparat sovnarkhoza nada sovershenstvovat" (The Sovnarkhoz Apparatus Needs Perfecting).

[46]D. Gitelman, P. Sustavov and V. Biryukov, "Grom bez molnii, O deistvennosti kontrolnykh organov" (Thunder without Lightning, On the effectiveness of control organs), Izvestia, February 24, 1962, p. 3.

[47]Joseph S. Berliner, Factory and Manager in the USSR (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), chs. X, XI, and XII; The term "Berliner practices" is used by Jerry Hough, The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-making (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), p. 211, with other references to these practices on pp. 118, 213, 216, 257; David Granick, The Red Executive (New York, 1961), ch. XVI; Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (1953), p. 487.

[48]Berliner, Factory and Manager, pp. 324-25.

[49]Izvestia, July 30, 1961; April 2, 1962; June 14, 1962.

[50]I. Bolyasny, "O sisteme partiinovo i gosudarstvennovo kontrolya, Kommunist, No. 15 (October 1961), p. 89. (On the System of Party and State Control.)

[51]Ibid., p. 91.

[52]Ellen P. Mickiewicz, Soviet Political Schools: The Communist Party Adult Instruction System (New Haven, 1967), p. 110; the details of this case are taken from I. Smirnov, "Zhivoe slovo progagandy i delo" (The Living Word of Propaganda and the Deed), Kruzhki tekushchei politiki (Circles of Current Politics) (Moscow, 1957), pp. 16-17, 32-33.

[53]See Khrushchev's account of the evolution of Goskontrol under Stalin, "Doklad," Plenum TsK KPSS, 19-23 noyabrya 1962, pp. 84-85.

[54]Berliner, Factory and Manager, pp. 290-91.

[55]Ibid., p. 307.

[56]The Fainsod chapter, "Terror as a System of Power," in How Russia is Ruled (1963) examines Stalin's theory and use of terror, as well as the implications of terror in the Stalinist and post-Stalinist eras.

[57]Howard Swearer, "Popular Participation: Myths and Realities," Problems of Communism, Vol. IX, No. 5 (September-October, 1960), p. 43. Of relevance to this point also are the remarks of Jeremy R. Azrael, "The Party and Society, in Allen Kassof (ed.), Prospects for Soviet Society (New York, 1968), p. 65: "The question, therefore [for Stalin's heirs], was how to maintain the requisite degree of social mobilization while abjuring mass terror and sanctioning important concessions to popular claims and demands."

[58]Howard R. Swearer, Problems of Communism, Vol. IX, No. 5 (September-October, 1960), p. 46.

[59]Materialy XXII sezda KPSS, p. 398.

[60]Emily C. Brown, Soviet Trade Unions and Labor Relations (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), p. 62.

[61]Ibid.

[62]Sbornik postanovlenii VTsDPS, April-June 1961 (Collection of Decisions of CCTU; Moscow, 1962), pp. 7-13; July-September 1961, pp. 35-43; April-June 1962, pp. 19-24; July-September 1962, pp. 17-26; Grishin's Report appeared in Trud, October 29, 1963.

[63]Pravda, October 29, 1962, p. 9.

[64]See Harold Berman, Justice in the USSR (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), ch. II: "Soviet Law Reform After Stalin, 1953-1962"; Leon Lipson, "Hosts and Pests: The Fight against Parasites," and Albert Boiter, "Comradely Justice: How Durable Is It?" Problems of Communism, Vol. XIV (March-April 1965), pp. 72-92.

[65]Leon Lipson's apt coinage is "non-courts and impolice," Problems of Communism, XIV (March-April 1965), p. 73 and passim.

[66]Pravda, March 10, 1959, p. 1.

[67]Herbert Ritvo, The New Soviet Society (New York, 1962), p. 174, n. 240.

[68]Mickiewicz, Soviet Political Schools, p. 10; Pravda, August 14, 1963, p. 2; Kommunist, No. 14 (September 1964), p. 3.

[69]Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York, 1967), p. 170.

[70]Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind (New York, 1963), pp. 162-63.

CHAPTER IV

THE PARTY-STATE CONTROL COMMITTEE

Formal Structure

The Party-State Control Committee had a life span of just three years, until December 1965. During that time, the reorganization of the agency was guided by the directives of the "Statute on the Committee of Party-State Control of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the USSR Council of Ministers," dated December 20, 1962,[1] and the "Statute on the Groups and Posts of Assistance to the Committees of Party-State Control," on June 30, 1964.[2]

The resulting "committee" was a sprawling organization including diverse control elements. For convenience, we shall make a rough dichotomy of its structure into "The Committee Network" and "Volunteer Control Groups." Insofar as this dichotomy suggests a strict line between staff or paid personnel and nonstaff or volunteer inspectors it is inaccurate, since volunteer inspectors not only donated their time and efforts to the "Volunteer Control Groups," but also directly participated in the work of control committees; nevertheless, the basic distinction between the

network of paid staff inspectors, on the one hand, and the various groups of volunteer public participants, on the other, is a sound and useful one. For in the "Committee Network," along with the unpaid aktivisty, just mentioned, were found the responsible, paid apparatchiki, whose vocation was achieving control objectives and mobilizing public participation toward this end. Staff officials indeed comprised the core of its membership. In contrast, the "Volunteer Control Groups" included all those unpaid, but not unsung, people's inspectors of the "Groups and Posts of Assistance" to Party-State Control Committees, which have been officially described as the "organizing centers around which all public control unites."[3]

Organized as a union-republic agency, the committee network formed a hierarchy following the familiar pattern of party and state administrative organization from city and raion (district) up to the all-union level. Coordinating its activities at the apex was the central organ, the Committee of Party-State Control of the Central Committee of the CPSU and of the USSR Council of Ministers, responsible directly to the two parent bodies. According to the system of dual subordination, republic, krai and oblast PGK Committees were responsible not only to the central PGK Committee, but to their respective party and government bodies: the party central committees and the councils of ministers of the union republics, and the territory and province

party committees and soviet executive committees. Local PGK Committees of cities and raiony were not, however, subordinated to their local party and government bodies, but were given some local independence by reporting directly to the republic, krai and oblast PGK Committees.[4]

PGK Committees at all levels consisted of both staff apparatus and nonstaff, "voluntary" departments, as well as permanent and temporary public commissions. The personnel of the nonstaff departments of these committees were primarily inspectors, recommended by party, soviet or other public organizations, or serving in the inspection-and-control machinery of a variety of government organs.[5]

The highest organ, the central PGK Committee, was staffed by leading CPSU Central Committee members, representatives of the trade unions, of the Komsomols, and of the press, and leading workers, collective farmers and intelligentsia "enjoying general confidence."[6] It was directed by a chairman and several deputy chairmen, whose appointments required confirmation by the party Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers. Other executive personnel of the committee required only party confirmation. The man who served as the Chairman of the Party-State Control Committee from its inception, and who was undoubtedly one of its chief architects, was Aleksandr Nikolaevich Shelepin, former Komsomol first secretary (till 1958), head of KGB (until 1961), and for a brief

time simultaneously (1962-1964) full member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, a Secretary of the Central Committee, and a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers.[7] Although the leadership of the Committee was never formally announced, at least three deputy chairmen were identified at one time or another in the press: I. V. Shikin, P. V. Kovanov, and V. I. Zalùzhny, as well as the head of the Department of Executive Cadres and Organizational Work, V. Gorin.[8]

Since the character of these men may well have influenced the early formation of the KPGK, a brief summary of biographic details concerning the Chairman and his Deputies is of interest at this point. Shelepin was born in 1918, and graduated from the Moscow Institute of History, Philosophy and Literature in 1941, acting as Secretary of the Institute's Komsomol Group from 1936 until 1939. From 1939 to 1940 he served as a Political Officer in the Soviet Army on the Finnish Front. Returning then to Komsomol work, he spent the next 18 years in the Komsomol organization, filling its highest office, Secretary of the All-Union Komsomol Organization, from 1952 to 1958. In 1958 he became Chairman of the Committee for State Security, a post which he held for three years. Having served as a Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU from 1961 until 1966, he became a member of the Politburo in 1964, a post which he continued to fill in mid-1970, when he was

also serving as Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, having succeeded V. V. Grishin in 1967. This latter position is one which as Jerry Hough has suggested, is closely in line with Shelepin's past training and interests, stamping him as a secular, pragmatic breed of ideologist.[9]

V. I. Zaluzhny, a man close to Shelepin's age (born 1917), who was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Central PGK Committee in 1963 and currently remains Deputy Chairman of the People's Control Committee, shares Shelepin's background in Komsomol work, and offers another example of Hough's pragmatic, instrumental, secular breed of ideologist. Professionally trained as an engineer, Zaluzhny's involvement with the Komsomols began in the war years, when he served first (1940-41) as a Komsomol organizer for the central All-Union Komsomol apparatus at the Kirov plant in Leningrad. From 1941-45, he was an instructor for Komsomol work in the Main Political Administration of the Red Army, and also served as Battalion Commander and Department Head of the Political Department of a Guards Division. He is a Reserve Guards Major. Thus, like his colleague, Deputy-Chariman Shikin, Zaluzhny is experienced in army political work. However, Zaluzhny's major professional life has been spent in Komsomol work, for in 1945 he went to work directly for the Central Committee of the All-Union Komsomol, working as a Secretary of the All-Union Komsomol form 1951 till

1960, spanning the period when Shelepin was its First Secretary. He moved on into Communist Party work in 1960, with an appointment as Second Secretary, with responsibilities for personnel appointment, in Kemerovo Oblast, an important Siberian industrial region. Zaluzhny has published materials dealing with both the Party-State and the People's Control Committees.[10]

Iosif Vasilevich Shikin, appointed First Deputy Chairman of the Committee for Party-State Control in 1963, holds the rank of Colonel-General in the Red Army. Born in 1906, he graduated in 1931 from the Krupskaya Academy of Communist Education, and from 1931 until 1939 he held various party posts in Gorky. During the war years (1939-1945) he held executive posts in the Military Political Administration of the Red Army. From 1945 until 1949 he headed the Main Political Administration, when his military and political careers first reached their zenith, only to suffer an abrupt eclipse. In 1949-50 he was briefly "shelved" to the post of Commandant of the Lenin Military Political Academy. In 1950, however, he began a long and slow return to the centers of political life, apparently under Khrushchev's aegis. He worked from 1950 until 1961 in the apparat of the Central Committee of the CPSU, from 1954 until 1959, with the important job of heading the Department of Party Organs for the Union Republics. He served as USSR Ambassador to Albania in 1961, a period of

difficult relations with that tiny country. Serving as First Deputy Chairman of the PGK Committee, he was passed over in the selection of Shelepin's successor (by Kovanov) and has remained First Deputy Chairman of the new Committee of People's Control.

Pavel Vasilevich Kovanov, who was to be appointed the Chairman of the People's Control Committee at its inception, is a year younger than Shikin (born 1907). He first became a member of the Party's Central Committee in December 1965, having been a Candidate Member since 1961. He graduated from both the Lenin Pedagogical Institute (1940) and the Higher Party School of the Central Committee of the CPSU (1948). As a young man in his early twenties, he served for a year as a chairman of a collective farm in Moscow Oblast (1930-31) then held various teaching and economic posts during the next eleven years, and earned his first degree. In the Red Army from 1942-44, he saw frontline service. Returning from the service, he entered the Party's Higher School and worked for the Central Committee apparat in Moscow. After graduation from the Higher Party School, he continued working for the Central Committee in Moscow until 1956, when he was sent to Georgia as Second Secretary of the Georgian Republic Central Committee, for six years. In 1962, he became Deputy Chairman of the Committee of Party-State Control of the Republic of Georgia. Having returned to Moscow in 1963, as Deputy Chairman of the

central PGK Committee, he succeeded Shelepin as Chairman of the new People's Control Committee in December 1965.

The members of republic, krai, and oblast PGK Committees included party officials drawn from their respective republic krai and oblast party committees, representatives from other local control agencies, from the trade unions, Komsomols, and the press, and certain outstanding workers, collective farmers and intelligentsia, all with the approval of the plenums of the appropriate party committees. Chairmen and vice-chairmen of PGK Committees at these levels needed confirmation by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers, as did the entire membership of the PGK Committee of the CPSU CC Buro for the RSFSR and RSFSR Council of Ministers.[11]

The membership formula at the upper levels was echoed at each lower level in the hierarchy. By September 14, 1963, according to Pravda, PGK Committees had been created and were in operation for all republics, territories, and regions. In addition there were "1,057 city and raion committees, 348 committees for industrial zones, and 1,634 committees for kolkhoz-sovkhoz production administrations." In 1965, nonstaff sections and commissions within these committees totaled 20,198, and were manned by 180,000 nonstaff inspectors.[12]

Aid to the chairman of a PGK Committee was provided by his deputy chairmen and nonstaff department members.

Nonstaff departments (or sections) were formed for every major industry of local concern, for cadre and organizational work, administration, the press, and a number of others, and were generally manned by specialists with a pertinent skill. For example, in the Armenian SSR city of Leninakan, the City Committee of PGK had 10 nonstaff sections, seven of which were specified in a report on its organization as: Sections for Industry, Complaints and Suggestions, Organization, Construction, Transportation and Communications,Housing, and Public Health Care. Of the Industry Section's 15 members, 9 were engineers and 6 were economists, with one of the engineers (also a party member) serving as chief of the section. However, while nonstaff inspectors were intended to be selected from among the more highly skilled personnel in a given occupation, that is, "from a number of highly qualified industrial workers, agricultural specialists, scientific and cultural workers," as Pravda on one occasion put it, party membership of candidates, as well as their careful screening by the party was probably of equal or greater importance.[13] The 19-member Complaints Section at Leninakan was headed "by an old party member," and the Organization Section was said to contain "Communists experienced in party and government work."[14]

Figures are not available to indicate the proportion of staff to nonstaff personnel, of paid to unpaid inspectors,

within PGK Committees, but a figure is given by Pravda for the number of volunteer inspectors in the departments of the RSFSR krai and oblast PGK Committees by September 1963: "About 5,000 inspectors" had been selected from among "highly qualified industrial workers, agricultural specialists, scientific and cultural workers, and pensioners."[15] These volunteer inspectors, it should be emphasized, were engaged directly in the committee network. Organizationally, they were separate from the millions drawn into the voluntary work of the Groups and Posts of Assistance; operationally, however, they were very much involved with the mass volunteers.

Commenting on the involvement of the nonstaff sections of the formal PGK Committees with their affiliated Groups and Posts of Assistance, P. Fedosov, the Central PGK Committee inspector who surveyed the Leninakan operation, said: "But however helpful and numerous the nonstaff apparatus may be, its power is insufficient to secure the [necessary] active volume and constant activity of control. Therefore, the committee devotes much attention to strengthening Groups and Posts of Assistance--the mass link in the system of party-state control. Members of the committee and nonstaff inspectors are constantly in communication with Assistance Groups; they help them in the planning of work, in organizing inspections and in heightening their activity."[16]

The Groups and Posts of Assistance to PGK Committees, were the basic organizational means of involving the greatest numbers of the public in control work. The Statute of December 1962 called for the creation of Groups and Posts of Assistance in enterprises, building projects, farms, apartment houses, and various institutions, "from representatives of party, trade union, Komsomol, and other public organs," chosen in general meetings of these organs. Non-party as well as party members were to be included, the chief criterion being the recognized dedication of the chosen individual to the social goals of inspection. "Workers, kolkhozniki, specialists, employees, scholars, literary and artistic people, pensioners, and housewives" were indicated as likely candidates.[17] By August 3, 1963, with the PGK experiment only a little more than half a year old, 516,000 Groups and Posts of Assistance had been formed (Groups, 193,000 and Posts, 323,000). A total exceeding 3,000,000 men and women were involved in this endeavor, all of them volunteers, working in their spare time and without pay.[18] By July 31, 1964, V. Gorin, central PGK Committee department head, stated in Pravda that Assistance Groups had increased to more than 260,000 and Posts of Assistance to 500,000, with the total army of "aktivisty" numbering 4,300,000.[19]

The occasion for Gorin's article was the appearance of the new statute, approved by the central PGK Committee

on June 30, 1964, "On the Groups and Posts of Assistance to the Committees of Party-State Control."[20] The June Statute drew upon 18 months of party-state control activity to outline, in some cases more clearly than this had been done in the earlier statute, the intended constitution, duties and manner of operation of the Groups and Posts of Assistance. For example, the new regulation significantly limited their activity by instructing that: "Groups and Posts of Assistance are not created in executive committees of soviets of workers' deputies, in party, trade union, and Komsomol organs, in editorial offices of party papers and journals, or in general-education schools."[21] In other words, while it might have appeared that Khrushchev's initial intent was to create a new super-agency that would exercise its control over the party and other great agencies, the new statute clearly marked the end of that effort.

The size of Assistance Groups and Posts, the regulations suggest, should be decided by the appropriate party organization, along with the local PGK Committee, depending on the amount of work and the size of the enterprises involved. Groups generally were expected to average from 7 to 50 members; Posts, from 3 to 10. Where the Group was quite large, it was suggested that a bureau should be elected to attend to ongoing work. Within one plant, state farm or collective farm, a plant-wide, state-farm-wide or collective-farm-wide group might guide the work of all the

Groups and Posts of Assistance.[22] Members were to serve two-year terms. While they could not be removed during this term, except by the agencies which elected them, the latter might take this action against workers who did "not justify confidence."[23]

Groups of Assistance were to be headed by chairmen--Posts, by leaders--elected by voice vote in general meetings of these bodies and approved by the party committee or bureau of the primary party organization. From one to two deputy chairmen might also be elected. The chairman of an Assistance Group automatically became assistant secretary for control in the appropriate party organization; hence, he was of necessity always a party member. However, in those enterprises and extablishments possessing no party organizations, chairmen of Groups might be chosen from among "highly respected non-party people."[24] Gorin has stated that the dual assignments of the Group chairman were intended to facilitate the "cooperation and contact of the Group's work with the commissions for implementing the primary party organization's right to control the activities of the administration," a point which makes good administrative sense, given the leadership's intentions that Assistance Groups and Posts should operate under the strict supervision of party organizations, as well as the appropriate PGK Committee, submitting all work plans for examination and approval to the party committees or meetings of

primary party organizations. Gorin also spoke of Assistance Groups and Posts being set up by the primary party organizations and corresponding committees at enterprises, construction projects, and collective farms.[25]

N. Sidorov, Deputy Chairman of the Moscow PGK Committee has pointed out that the structure of various Groups of Assistance has varied in different institutions. "Take, let's say, the Groups of Assistance of the Central Statistical Administration for the USSR Council of Ministers. In it there are 26 people: of these, 15 are party members. The Group is made up of 4 sections. A bureau of 7 people heads the Group: the chairman, 2 deputies, and 4 section leaders. Besides these, in the administrations and departments there are 16 Groups and Posts of Assistance. Several Groups of Assistance in other ministries, committees, and departments are structured differently. Thus, the State Production Committee for the Gas Industry has a committee-wide Assistance Group of 24 people, headed by a bureau, with 5 posts for the administrations."[26]

In August 1965, the 2-year membership period for at least 3 million aktivisty being at an end, the central PGK Committee called for new elections of representatives from party, trade union, Komsomol and kolkhoz organizations for Groups and Posts of Assistance, to take place at the next elective sessions of primary party organizations. It was hoped that the new elections would "attract new masses of

workers" to the business of control, and perhaps more dedicated and active workers. The occasion was also to be taken to enlarge the membership of Groups and Posts where necessary.[27] The new elections were thus clearly considered a useful device for extending the "reach" of the public participation effort. Certainly, the reshuffling of personnel after each 2-year term of duty and experience should serve effectively to multiply the ranks of those matriculating in this 2-year "school of practical and applied control techniques."

Operation

A discussion of the PGK Committee's operations can perhaps most usefully begin with a brief review of their original mandate and scope of authority. The present section will deal not only with these, but with some detailed descriptions of actual control operations over the three years of the Committee's existence. As outlined by Khrushchev's report, the intended task of the PGK agencies was to conduct "investigations of the actual fulfillment of party and government directives."[28]

The broad "charge" may be broken down into three general categories: economic (improvement of production), administrative, and civic. Most important were the economic goals of current plan fulfillment in industry, construction and agriculture. Four types of production improvement that

surveillance might hope to facilitate were: (1) improvement in the product's quality; (2) lowering of production costs; (3) raising of labor productivity; and (4) discovery and use of idle reserves. In the sphere of administration, the goal was to promote efficiency and to root out its antitheses--mismanagement, bureaucratism, red tape, and waste. Reorganization to eliminate administrative inefficiencies, such as duplication of efforts, and excess paper work was an added administrative goal. The "civic" task was twofold. Immediate targets for attack and elimination were "swindlers, bribetakers, parasites, and bureaucrats." The long-range purpose was to create a "civic-minded" social climate which discouraged dishonesty and irresponsibility toward state and party obligations, or, in the words of the December 1962 Statute, a social climate which might promote "the maintenance of party and state discipline and socialist legality."[29] Intangible and unrealistic as this hope may sound, examination of the brief history of control activities suggests that this long-range purpose may have strongly motivated its leaders from the start.

To reiterate the missions of the control agencies, drawing upon the wording of the statute itself: their main business was to be <u>checking and investigation</u>--checking on the fulfillment of economic plans and "the actual execution of party and government directives by ministries, state

committees and departments, and by other organizations, enterprises, construction projects, kolkhozy, sovhozy, and institutions," and investigation to "disclose internal reserves and un-utilized resources for expanding production in industry and agriculture, for improving the quality of products and lowering their production costs, and for raising the productivity of labor." Such investigations were intended to turn up ways to "improve the work of the state and administrative-managerial apparatus, furthering a reduction in its costs and perfecting its organization"; they were to "ferret out violations of party and state discipline, manifestations of localism, a narrowly departmental attitude to business, hoodwinking, report padding, mismanagement and extravagance, bureaucratism and red tape, bribetaking, speculation, abuse of office and other administrative-management abuses."[30]

A glance at the actual decrees of the central PGK Committee concerned with major violations disclosed by the efforts of PGK Committees in 1963 indicates the nature of the violations that the committees actually looked for and found, during the first year of their existence. The largest number of decrees (five) were primarily concerned with unfulfilled economic directives; four dealt with criminal negligence in the handling of funds; one focused on illegal speculative practices, and one on bureaucratic mismanagement.[31] The control committees' intended civic

mission of preventing abuses and of creating a social atmosphere in which crimes are deterred by the citizen's sense of social responsibility is difficult to observe in action or measure in accomplishment, though numerous examples may be found of doubtful victories claimed by inspectors for preventing violations which did not occur.

Once violations were uncovered, a PGK Committee had several courses of action open to it. The "teeth" given PGK agencies by the 1962 Statute included the rights "to give instruction to executives of ministries, state committees and departments, and other organizations, enterprises, construction projects, kolkhozy, and institutions concerning the elimination of shortcomings and violations in the execution of party and government resolutions; to hear reports and demand explanations, as well as the necessary documents and materials, from executives who are poorly carrying out party and government resolutions and instructions and who tolerate bureaucratism and red tape; and to impose penalties on those guilty of presenting incorrect and false information and conclusions."[32]

Moreover, PGK Committees were empowered: "to call a halt to orders and actions by enterprises, institutions and responsible officials that are illegal and are capable of harming the interests of the state; to establish for persons guilty of unsatisfactory execution of party and government decisions time limits for correction; to refer

matters, when necessary, to the consideration of Comrades' Courts; to impose fines on responsible officials causing material damage to the state or to cooperative and public organizations; to call guilty parties to account, impose disciplinary penalties, demote officials or remove them from their posts; to turn materials on abuses and other criminal actions over to the agencies of the prosecutor's office for criminal prosecution of the guilty."[33]

Thus, the 1962 Statute placed at the committees' disposal an enforcement arsenal of potential strength. And of perhaps greater importance than these "punitive rights" of the control committees was their right (or more properly speaking, their obligation) to call upon the powerful support of communications media, particularly the press, to focus the hard light of publicity upon the malpractices uncovered by the people's inspectors. Given these powers, how did the PGK Committees actually proceed to function? The June 1964 Statute concerning Groups and Posts of Assistance listed the four basic forms and methods of work which they had developed in practice: "checkups, raids, mass investigations, and documentary audits."[34] Any of these actions might be initiated by the groups themselves, by party organizations, or by PGK Committees, as will be seen in the following examples.

Typical of mass investigations was a report from the RSFSR, telling of a large-scale checkup on the preparedness

of the kolkhozy and sovkhozy for the spring sowing in 1963, in which over 560,000 people took part.[35] A report from Kazakhstan, later the same year, described a mass investigation, organized by PGK agencies, of the preservation of socialist property at enterprises of light industry, food industry, in trade, in construction industries, in transportation, and on the republic's kolkhozy and sovkhozy. This account stated that more than 100,000 people took part, and more than 15,000 installations were inspected--1,179 state farms, 372 collective farms, 515 construction projects, 829 transportation and communications enterprises, and 296 enterprises of light and food industries.[36] Documentary audits carried out during this investigation revealed loopholes "through which dishonest people were extracting the people's wealth," and new procedures were suggested to eliminate the negligence in invoicing and accounting which provided these loopholes. In Moldavia, checking on the course of preparations for the spring sowing in 1965, more than 6,000 people's inspectors were said to have examined machine-tractor parts, agricultural inventories, seed, and the use being made of organic and mineral fertilizers.[37] This action had been initiated by the Republic PGK Committee in response to the March 1965 Party Central Committee Plenum.

Less spectacular than mass checks, but presumably effective, was day-to-day checking, such as that reportedly

instigated by the Group of Assistance of the Ministry of Finances of the USSR. Chief attention of this group centered on checking the fulfillment by ministry administrations and departments of party and government resolutions concerned with the financial system, on securing immediate and full entering of budget income, on mobilizing internal reserves, on rationalizing the dispersal of state funds, and on the working out of proposals for improving the structure of the apparat. When the ministry administrations and departments were asked to work out, by February 1, 1964, programs for curtailing expenses and increasing the surplus and income in the budget, Assistance Groups and Posts checked their progress, "day-by-day," and facilitated "the desired results," which, we are given to presume, would not otherwise have been obtained.[38]

A quiet investigation of land resources was launched by the people's inspectors of the kolkhozy and sovkhozy of Floreshtsky raion in Moldavia. They went up and down byways, measuring unused land along roads and railroads, along local and state woodlands, and so on. They presented their findings, that more than 2,000 hectares of unused land in the raion were available on these sites for cultivation, to the Republic PGK Committee, which promptly expanded the investigation to the entire republic, "enlisting the help of agricultural specialists, aktivisty of local soviets, and members of the accounting commissions of kolkhozy."

This survey revealed an immense amount of unused fertile land in Moldavia. The party central committee of the Moldavian Republic then reviewed the results and passed a regulation, "On Measures for the Increased Use of Land in the Kolkhozy and Sovkhozy of the Republic." As a result, we are told, the plowed land area in the republic was increased by almost 20,000 hectares during 1964, and in cash value, the productivity accruing to kolkhozy and sovkhozy amounted to an estimated 4 million rubles.[39]

Sometimes checks have been initiated by the public in general. Thus, in 1964, the Department of Complaints and Suggestions of the City PGK Committee of Leninakan, having received 418 letters and 1,650 personal appeals from the public, and carefully sifted these materials, found that a fourth of them were concerned with housing problems. They thereupon referred these complaints to the PGK Department for Housing, with the proposal that the practice of distributing living space be made the subject of investigation by the people's inspectors.[40]

In stark contrast to the mass maneuvers of inspection armies, perhaps the most devastatingly effective investigations, in terms of results relative to man-hours-expended, were those instigated, pursued, and followed up with relentless publicity by a single newspaper correspondent, working alone. Thus, an Izvestia correspondent, on November 15, 1963, described, with the names of officials and

departments pointedly included, the treatment and answers he received in his search to discover why electrical appliances were not being produced with built-in thermostats, a practice which, he asserted, if carried through, could save enough electricity on electric appliances in Moscow apartments alone to "illuminate a city of two million." Having finally cornered a "Chief Specialist on Heating Devices for the Electrical Equipment Committee," a man named L. Petrev, as perhaps most responsible for the missing thermostats, he transfixed the culprit with the third-degree glare of national publicity: "Where are your developments? Where are your proposals for production? What concern are you showing for people's everyday life? What are you doing to save the electricity used by household equipment?" The public, he concluded, had a right to immediate answers from the State Planning Committee on these questions.[41]

The most important aspect of the Izvestia example just cited was not so much the check made, as the publicity given to the malpractices discovered, for publicity played a vital role in continuing the impact of the people's inspections. The party statute advised PGK agencies to make "active use of the press, films, radio, and television to give broad publicity to their work"; to see that "the results of checkups and the measures taken with regard to them are systematically published."[42] Accordingly, by September 1963, the majority of newspapers were regularly

publishing "Sheets of the Party-State Comtrol Committee," illustrating the activities of the PGK organs and Groups and Posts of Assistance.

But Pravda continued to call for still more stringent measures of "communications-punishment" for unmasked culprits: "Place the miscreants squarely before the public, demand of them a public explanation, name erring workers in the leaflets Lightning, publish photographs of the bureaucrats in newspapers. . . . "[43] In 1964, Leninakan's city paper devoted eleven pages to the activities of the people's inspectors, and in enterprises throughout the city, Komsomol "Searchlight" detachments and staff issued satiric pages and photoplacards.[44] Elsewhere, wall newspapers were discussing the work of local Groups and Posts of Assistance, as for example, Finkor, the all-ministry wall newspaper for the USSR Ministry of Finances, and other wall newspapers within the ministry.[45]

Finally, news media checked news media, to ask: "How can the activity of people's inspectors be better advertised in the press? How can newspapers help to make control public, and, if possible, more effective?" These questions are raised in an article, "The Newspaper and Party-State Control," by two inspectors of the central PGK Committee, in Partiinaya zhizn, a periodical which has made a regular practice of publishing reports by the central PGK Committee staff inspectors who roam the hustings on special inspection

tours. Two republic newspapers were examined at length: Kazakhstanskaya pravda and Sovetskaya Moldavia. Both were given accolades for their "thematic pages showing the practical work of the organs of PGK," and for articles giving advice and inspiration to people's inspectors, but both were also criticized for not showing the practical work in sufficient detail, for omitting certain important themes, such as party guidance of control groups, and in failing to follow up on revealed shortcomings.

In the latter case, Sovetskaya Moldavia was rebuked for having simply reported a "monstrous delinquency in piggery construction." "And what further?" queried the inspectors. "What activity followed the article's appearance? The reader isn't told! The editor ought continuously to follow up in a series the results of his articles in pages of 'The Voice of the People's Control.'" Generalizing on the lessons to be learned from this inspection, the writers addressed themselves to all editors of newspapers: "It is necessary to raise the level and quality of published materials about party-state control in order that they become more effective, that they help to teach the people sensitively a responsibility toward the allotted task, to awake creative initiative in the masses toward the translation into life of party and government decisions."[46]

Besides following up investigations by publicity, numerous other methods of punitive or corrective action

were employed by the PGK network. In connection with a "shocking case of bureaucracy," a department head in charge of road-building machines was fired by his superior after an Assistance Group had revealed that "about 400 papers requiring quick action had lain in his office without moving, from one month to half a year."[47] The central PGK Committee ordered "disciplinary penalties" against the director of a Kuibyshev bearings plant for over-expenditure of funds and illegal orders.[48] Less stringent remedial measures were described in Izvestia's "Control Sheet No. 24," which noted that a number of errors were rectified in the course of the checkup of fulfillment of the USSR Council of Ministers' Resolution: "On Measures to Improve the Organization of Scientific and Technical Information in the Country."[49] But regarding the remaining shortcomings, the central PGK Committee found it again necessary to charge the USSR State Committee for Coordinating Scientific Research Work, the corresponding republic, departments, and economic councils, "with the adoption of effective measures toward elimination of the shortcomings disclosed by the checkup. A group of scientists and specialists has been charged with working out proposals for the further improvement of scientific and technical information, its utilization and introduction into the national economy."

P. Voronin, chairman of the Moldavian Republic PGK Committee, suggests that in some cases follow-up checking

itself ensures remedial action, and sometimes the source of a malpractice needs only to be revealed by investigation to suggest its own solution. Thus, when it was discovered on a certain kolkhoz that the corn crop was jeopardized because kolkhozniki refused to weed the fields, inspectors then suggested at a meeting with the kolkhoz directors that labor payments be increased for weeding. The happy result, said Voronin, was that the land's yield increased "2 to 4 times over the previous year." For the most part, however, Voronin sadly reflects: "To check and establish, as is known, is easier than helping to correct errors discovered. The committees in their daily work teach this--staunchly strive so that every checking shall result in few errors--and the business is improved."[50] Voronin's article presents a rather gentle, quietly constructive attitude toward inspection that is exceptional among Soviet accounts. It is perhaps not surprising that he, almost alone among the commentators quoted in this chapter, raised the question of the preventive mission of control, calling for a "deep and many-sided study of what is actually done," and "organizing careful preparation for inspections." But the efficacy of preventive measures is intangible for the most part, and their gains may only be guessed at.

More tangible is the educational effort of the control system, the effort to instruct the people's inspectors both morally and technically. Off to a slow start, educational

activities before 1964 were given sparse reference in the Soviet press. By 1965, however, a real groundswell of activity had developed, not only in the preparation of seminars, courses, and "universities," but also in the publishing of materials for use in these studies. In 1964, the Moscow PGK Committee sponsored several seminars, attended by chairmen of Assistance Groups of ministries and departments, with the aim of sharing with all inspectors the better forms and methods of inspection discovered by individual institutions. In one of these seminars, chairmen were said to have discussed their mutual experiences in coordinating their work with groups of the "Komsomol Searchlight" and other public control groups. At the same time the Sverdlovsk raion committee of PGK was reportedly busy analyzing how Assistance Groups in government institutions were coordinating their work with administrative organs. In still another seminar, party secretaries and chairmen of Assistance Groups of administrations and departments of the Moscow Sovnarkhoz "meticulously studied the question of how inspectors establish a businesslike relationship with public and economic organizations."[51]

Writing in June 1965, PGK Committee chairman Voronin discussed the development of seminars in Moldavia: "Experience has shown the necessity of the study by people's inspectors of a wider circle of theoretical and practical questions. The past year the republic committee worked out

special thematic courses with the aktiv." Along with basic Soviet law and general methods of implementing control, the courses included questions of the economics of enterprises, of construction, of kolkhozy, of the organization of bookkeeping, accounting and auditing, the regulation of labor, and financial activity. "In a series of cities and raions there are in operation faculties or sections of party-state control affiliated to Universities of Marxism-Leninism. In addition, there are schools of people's inspectors in many large enterprises and in kolkhozy, where members of Assistance Groups and Posts and members of staffs and detachments of the 'Komsomol Searchlight' are studying."[52]

In October 1964, in Leninakan, where the City PGK Committee had for some time been offering "systematic studies and regular seminars" to chairmen of Assistance Groups and volunteer workers, a two-year "university" of people's control was launched. Here, it was said, students were being lectured on Leninist principles of control and the economics of industrial enterprises. They were also studying the experience of the work of control agencies along with practical questions of organizing inspections. Special instruction was given the aktiv prior to investigations, "by experienced specialists from the enterprise or organization to be examined."[53]

Periodicals joined in this educational effort, in an attempt to "help the committee [of PGK] to work out its

style and methods of effective control" by presenting it with examples of positive experience and a choice, in depth, of practices.[54] Publishing houses began to turn out instructional brochures, dealing with specific aspects of control activities. The Political Literature Publishing House issued a mass edition in 1964 (725,000 copies) of the "Rules on Agencies of Party-State Control, Groups and Posts of Assistance, and the 'Komsomol Searchlight.'" In the Ukraine, a separate edition of 100,000 copies was published, and in Belorussia, one of 12,000.[55] In 1965 the same Moscow publishing house announced the planned publication of nine booklets in its series, "The Library of the People's Inspector."[56] Some titles in this series were: Partgoskontrol: Otvety na voprosy (Party-State Control: Answers to Questions), Organizatory massovovo narodnovo kontrolya (The Organization of Mass, People's Control), Gruppa sodeistviya--reshayushee zveno partgosskontrolya (The Assistance Group is a Decisive Link of Party-State Control), V borbe za reservy promyshlennovo proizvodstva (In the Struggle For Reserves of Industrial Production), Glasnost partgoskontrolya (PGK Publicity), and Osnovye vidy proverok i metody ikh organizatsii (Basic Types of Inspection and Methods of their Organization). All were subsequently published in 1965, along with the Spravochnik narodnovo kontrolera (Handbook of the People's Inspector).

Enough has been said to illustrate the operations of the Party-State Control Committee in its brief lifetime. The period of three years, however, was insufficient to demonstrate the overall effectiveness of the PGK Committee in achieving its stated objectives. What was demonstrated, however, was important enough. During this brief time, there took place the gradual but thorough restructuring of state control agencies to incorporate the public in large, and growing, numbers. Despite the fact that public control efforts were still new, still in the process of taking shape, still experimental and tentative, the PGK Committee laid a sound institutional basis for the future expansion of public control systems in the Soviet Union. In fact, the subsequent refashioning of the KPGK into the People's Control Committee may best be described in terms of "incremental change," and in retrospect it may fairly be said that with the KPGK, the Khrushchevian effort to establish mass participation in control was fairly launched.

CHAPTER IV--NOTES

[1]Spravochnik narodnovo kontrolera (Handbook of the People's Inspector; 2nd ed., Moscow, 1965), pp. 13-22. See also, Pravda, January 18, 1963, p. 1. This statute can also be found in Spravochnik partiinovo rabotnika, Vypusk pyaty (Party Official's Handbook, Issue Five, Moscow, 1964), p. 303; and has been translated in Soviet Statutes and Decisions, Vol. V, No. 2 (Winter 1968-69), pp. 80-88.

[2]Sprav. narodnovo kontrolera, pp. 23-30; Soviet Statutes and Decisions, pp. 89-95.

[3]V. Gorin, "Gruppa sodeistviya--organizatuyushchi tsentr obshchestvennovo kontrolya" (Assistance Groups are the Organizationing Center of Public Control), Pravda, July 31, 1964, p. 4.

[4]Narodny kontrol v SSSR (People's Control in the USSR, Moscow, 1967), p. 82; Sprav. partiinovo rabotnika (1964), p. 305.

[5]Ibid., p. 309.

[6]Ibid., p. 306.

[7]Shelepin has been described by Jerry Hough as a representative of a special breed of ideological official in the Soviet Union, differing from the usual stereotype of the ideologist "with a rigid and closed set of rules of conduct spelled out by the ideology." The contrasting, Shelepin-type breed, says Hough, exhibits the following characteristics: "a pragmatic, instrumental style," "the open, bargaining attitudes associated with full secularization," and the qualities of men who are "increasingly rational, analytical, and empirical in their political action"; "Ideology and Ideological Secretaries as a Source of Change in the Soviet Union," Paper presented at the Mid-West Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, April 11, 1969, Lincoln, Nebraska; Hough quotes the above traits characterizing two different types of ideological officials from Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics (Boston, 1966), who presented the traits in quite a different context. Hough's interpretation

of Shelepin's role and character is fully supported by the evidence of this study concerning the evolution of the Party-State Control Committee under his guidance.

A different interpretation of the type of official apt to be chosen for control work has been advanced by Grey Hodnett ("Khrushchev and Party-State Control," in Alexander Dallin and Alan F. Weston, Politics in the Soviet Union: 7 Cases [New York, 1966], p. 151, n. 21), who stresses, for example, the importance of the probable KGB background of at least one deputy-chairman in each PGK republic committee. According to Hodnett, not only would these police backgrounds mean that such men "might also have qualified as 'Shelepin men'" (dating from Shelepin's own brief tour of duty in the KGB), but presumably the kind of training and experience, the professional norms, outlook, and even connections of these men would strongly influence their conduct in their new posts. Certainly in this connection the long service (1920-1940) of Arvid Pelshe in the "Cheka, OGPU and various punitive detachments" (quoted from Who's Who in the USSR, p. 636) is apt to be significant; see below, Ch. V, n. 20.

[8]Pravda, May 6, 1965, p. 3; July 31, 1964; and Partiinaya zhizn, No. 13 (July), 1965, p. 77.

[9]See above, n. 7, and Hough, "Ideology and Ideological Secretaries as a Source of Change in the Soviet Union," p. 15. Most of the Biographical material in this and following paragraphs comes from Who's Who in the USSR (2nd ed.: New York, 1966).

[10]V. I. Zaluzhny, Kontrol v deistvii (Control in Action) (Moscow, 1965); V. I. Zaluzhny, "Narodny kontrol" (People's Control), Partiinaya zhizn, No. 13 (July 1966), pp. 14-19.

[11]Sprav. partiinovo rabotnika (1964), pp. 305-06.

[12]Sprav. narodnovo kontrolera, p. 44.

[13]Pravda, Sept. 14, 1963, p. 1.

[14]P. Fedosov, "Komitet partgoskontrolya i evo aktiv" (The Committee of Party State Control and its Activists), Partiinaya zhizn, No. 11 (June), 1965, p. 36.

[15]"Narodny, deistvenny" (Popular, Efficient), Pravda, September 14, 1963, p. 1.

[16]Fedosov, Partiinaya zhizn, No. 11 (June), 1965, p. 36.

[17]Sprav. partiinovo rabotnika (1964), p. 306.

[18]Pravda, August 3, 1963, p. 4; September 14, 1963, p. 1.

[19]Pravda, July 31, 1964, p. 4.

[20]See n. 2 above; the Statute also appeared in Partiinaya zhizn, No. 14 (July), 1964, pp. 31-34.

[21]Ibid., p. 32; italics mine.

[22]Gorin, Pravda, July 31, 1964, p. 4.

[23]Partiinaya zhizn, No. 14 (July), 1964, p. 33.

[24]Ibid., p. 32.

[25]Gorin, Pravda, July 31, 1964, p. 4.

[26]Partiinaya zhizn, No. 8 (April, 1964, pp. 34-37.

[27]"O delegirovanii v sostav grupp i postov sodeistviya komitetam partiino-gosudarstvennovo gontrolya" (On the Delegation [of New Members] to the Staff of Groups and Posts of Assistance to PGK Committees), Partiinaya zhizn, No. 15 (August), 1965, pp. 25-26.

[28]N. S. Khrushchev, "Doklad" (Report) Plenum Tsentralnovo komiteta Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskovo soyuza, 19-23 noyabrya 1962 goda: Stenograficheskii otchet (Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 19-23 November 1962: Stenographic record, Moscow, 1963, p. 86).

[29]Sprav. partiinovo rabotnika (1964), p. 304.

[30]Ibid., pp. 307-08.

[31]Ibid., pp. 444-45.

[32]Ibid., p. 308.

[33]Ibid., p. 309.

[34]Partiinaya zhizn, No. 14 (July), 1964, p. 33.

[35]Pravda, July 27, 1963, p. 2.

[36]Pravda, February 21, 1964, p. 3.

[37]Partiinaya zhizn, No. 12 (June), 1965, p. 39.

[38]N. Sidorov, "Kontrolery v sovetskikh uchrezhdeniyakh" (Inspectors in Soviet Institutions), Partiinaya zhizn, No. 8 (April), 1964, p. 33.

[39]R. Voronin, "Deistvennost kontrolya" (The Efficiency of Control), Partiinaya zhizn, No. 12 (June), 1965, pp. 38-39.

[40]P. Fedosov, Partiinaya zhizn, No. 11 (June), 1965, p. 38.

[41]Izvestia, Nov. 15, 1963, p. 3.

[42]Sprav. partiinovo rabotnika, p. 309.

[43]Pravda, September 14, 1963, p. 1.

[44]Partiinaya zhizn, No. 11 (June), 1965, p. 39.

[45]Ibid., No. 8 (April), 1964, p. 36.

[46]I. Mitrofanov and F. Rasporkin, "Gazeta i partgos-kontrol" (The Newspaper and Party-State Control), Partiinaya zhizn, No. 4 (February), 1965, p. 74.

[47]Partiinaya zhizn, No. 8 (April), 1964, pp. 34-37.

[48]Sprav. partiinovo rabotnika, pp. 317-18.

[49]March 3, 1964, p. 4.

[50]Partiinaya zhizn, No. 12 (June), 1965, pp. 38-42.

[51]Sidorov, Partiinaya zhizn, No. 8 (April), 1964, p. 37.

[52]Partiinaya zhizn, No. 12 (June), 1965, p. 41.

[53]Ibid., No. 11 (June), 1965, p. 38.

[54]Ibid., No. 4 (February), 1965, p. 75.

[55]Izvestia, July 28, 1964, p. 4.

[56]Ibid., September 4, 1964, p. 4.

CHAPTER V

THE COMMITTEE OF PEOPLE'S CONTROL

The substance of this chapter will deal largely with the "incremental changes" which distinguish the present People's Control Committee from its predecessor, the Party-State Control Committee. And once again, as in the case of the early history of change and reorganization experienced by the first Soviet state control agencies, the more recent changes can perhaps also be most fruitfully approached by answering two relevant questions: one concerning the impact of the differing concepts of Soviet leaders and administrators about the proper role of control agencies in Soviet society, and the second concerning the ways in which the reorganization process itself has become involved in political power struggles.[1] While both of these approaches will be found helpful in explaining the evolution of the People's Control Committee (KNK), in addition, an essential third aspect of the committee's development deserves treatment in detail: those changes in structure and operation that were based upon the several years of experience of the PGK Committees and the consequent hindsight of practice. For in spite of the fact that the KPGK initially had drawn

heavily upon early Leninist models of public control, the Soviet world in the 1960's had come a long way from the 1920's and early 1930's, and was continuing to evolve. And in spite of the fact that the soviets, trade unions and Komsomols had, by 1962, already experimented for several years with efforts to organize mass participation in control, the KPGK was, at its start, a largely untried and therefore somewhat tentative innovation. Its blueprints were not precise. Nor could its architects foresee all those areas where more exact specifications were needed. Time and actual practice soon revealed some of these areas, pointing up uncertainties, ambiguities and some impracticalities in the earlier schemes. Time and actual practice also suggested where success was most likely, and where new missions might be sought. Thus, practice and experience were to suggest many of the changes that had already been incorporated into the People's Control Committee by 1970.

Since the Party-State Control Committee was closely identified with Khrushchev's leadership, surviving his removal only a little more than a year, the transformation of KPGK into KNK should perhaps be discussed first in terms of the political struggle in which Khrushchev was the loser. Shortly after October 1964, when Khrushchev was removed from the Presidium, a plenary session of the party Central Committee admitted A. N. Shelepin, then head of the KPGK, into the Presidium as a full member for the first

time.[2] This appointment placed Shelepin in a position of unique power among his peers at that moment, for he was the only government leader to be serving simultaneously as a member of the Presidium, the Secretariat, and as a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. However, in the climate of heightened political struggle and somewhat fluid situation which continued after the displacement of Khrushchev from the two highest offices in the nation, Shelepin lost ground himself. Perhaps, as a number of Western observers have suggested, the combination of Shelepin's relative youth, past experience and strategic position were too much of a threat to those of his colleagues who aspired to leadership of the country.[3] Moreover, despite Shelepin's apparent support of the move to oust Khrushchev, he was, by virtue of his headship of the KPGK, closely identified with Khrushchev's positions on how public participation in control should be institutionalized. The clear evidence (already presented above[4]) of opposition to Khrushchev's special design for the PGK Committee indicates that ready means and motives for downgrading Shelepin existed among some highly placed government and party leaders.

In late 1965, the CPSU Presidium prepared a draft resolution, for consideration at the December Plenum, proposing a reorganization of the PGK Committees to incorporate still greater participation by the public, to create "genuine people's control committees."[5] As Brezhnev put it

in his December 6th speech to the plenum: "[PGK] is not a very precise name. It does not fully reflect the fact that control in our country is that of the people. It would therefore be more in line with the actual state of affairs to transform these organs and call them people's control organs."[6] He did not add the fact that the new name would dissociate the KNK from Khrushchev, who had been denounced roundly by this time for his many "hare-brained schemes." On December 9, 1965, the Supreme Soviet approved the "transformation" of KPGK to KNK and appointed Pavel Kovanov as the new Chairman. At the same time, the Supreme Soviet also acted to relieve Shelepin "of his duties as Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers," finding it expedient for him "to concentrate his activity at the party Central Committee."[7] It was also announced that the structure of the USSR Council of Ministers was being changed to allow the Chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee to become a member of the government.[8]

This statement signalled a very real change in the structure of the new KNK, a change which more than justified changing the name of the new committee. For, insofar as the formal structure of the new institution was concerned, the official organizational ties with the party were severed; the trinity of party-state-and-public (about which Khrushchev had been so insistent[9]) became state-and-public. Thus, although the new People's Control Committee remained, like

its predecessor, a union-republic agency, working under the direct guidance of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers, it was no longer formally attached to the Party Central Committee. Now, officially it became an organ only of the USSR Council of Ministers, its members requiring confirmation by the USSR Council of Ministers, and, its chairmen being appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.[10] (Members of the PGK Committee, it will be recalled, required confirmation by both the Central Committee, the CPSU and the Council of Ministers; executive personnel of the committee apparatus were confirmed by the CPSU Central Committee.)

The pattern is repeated at descending levels. Committees of union and autonomous republics are likewise confirmed by the councils of ministers of the union and autonomous republics, and their chairmen appointed by the supreme Soviets of union or autonomous republics. District, city, area, regional and territorial NK committees are formed by their respective soviets, and their chairmen appointed by these soviets.[11] In the old PGK committee structure, all these committees required confirmation by the party committees at the various levels and were recognized as official agencies of the party committees. In the case of republic territorial and regional committees, formal confirmation of the PGK committee chairmen and deputies was required by the

all-union party and state agencies, the CC, CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers.[12]

In assessing the implications of this restructuring of the control agency under Brezhnev and Kosygin, both power and ideological factors must be taken into account. But first, perhaps, one should ask how much real change was actually involved. For example, the statutory statements about appointments and confirmations by the soviets cannot be accepted as representing a real change in the actual practice of selecting and confirming committee members. Based upon knowledge of the importance of nomenklatura (the lists of posts for which appointive responsibility is assigned to a given party or government official)[13] of the party committees, it may be assumed that the party nomenklatura that existed for the PGK Committee network is still in operation for the new KNK. Confirmation exists for this assumption in the statement by V. Zaluzhny,writing about the city of Moscow's district party committees, that the nonstaff inspectors of the Committees of People's Control are confirmed "only upon the recommendation of the party organs."[14] And he adds, "Nonstaff inspectors enter into the nomenklatura of the raikom of the party. The plans of operation of the City and District Committees of People's Control are worked out at the bureaus of the city and district committees of the CPSU."

Similar testimony concerning the party's powers to guide and to select the leading members of NK agencies at the city level and beneath appears in the March 1969 issue of Partiinaya zhizn:

> Primary party organizations recommend to the City Committee of People's Control in the capacity of non-staff inspectors, authoritative and experienced communists. All chairmen of Groups of NK become deputy secretaries of the party organizations; heads of non-staff sections of the Committee are included in the nomenklatura of the City Party Committee. The participation of party members in the work of NK organs is reviewed by the gorkom of the party and the primary party organizations. . . . The gorkom hears the reports of the primary party organizations of . . . [various local economic enterprises] on how they are directing the work of Groups and Posts of NK. . . . Reports and announcements of leaders of Groups are regularly reviewed in party meetings, party bureaus, and in general workers' meetings.[15]

The party role, in other words, is no less real for being unstated, and removal of the "CPSU" from the "company letterhead" has not affected the locus of real power in the corporate leadership.[16]

One real effect of the restructuring, however, did mean that the Chairman of the USSR Committee of People's Control need no longer sit in the Secretariat of the party's Central Committee. Hough has consequently suggested that the reorganization of control may have been motivated by a desire on the part of Shelepin's enemies to whittle away some of his excessive concentration of power. In Hough's words, "reorganization of the Committee [of PGK]--and especially the removal of its Chairman from the Secretariat--provided a graceful way to ease Shelepin out of this

strategic post, for, in retaining his seat on the Secretariat, he automatically had to give up the chairmanship of the Committee of People's Control."[17] Whether the restructuring was cause or effect, it did have power consequences for the Committee of People's Control. Obviously, Shelepin, with his strong personal power base, brought a substantial aura of power to the chairmanship of the PGK Committee. By the same token, in Shelepin's hands the committee, as an adjunct to power, was a potentially lethal political instrument. When Kovanov stepped into the chairmanship of the new agency, he did not bring any personal power to the agency. In fact, he, himself, gained a degree of personal power from the new position by his consequent elevation to full membership in the Central Committee of the party.[18] Moreover, although party guidance was still intended to operate in the new committees just as it had in the old, the official separation of the party from public control could conceiveably weaken the prestige and authority of the control agencies. Certainly, as pointed out earlier, this was one of the reasons why proponents of party-state control had urged the direct, organizational incorporation of the party into the network of control agencies.[19]

Another personnel change which should be considered in relation to the Kovanov appointment, is the dual appointment of Arvid Pelshe to the chairmanship of the Party Control Committee and to the Politburo, which took place

at the April 1966 Plenum of the Central Committee.[20] While this did not mean an increase in power for the party committee (Nikolai Shvernik, Pelshe's predecessor had also been a member of the Presidium), it did mean that Kovanov and the People's Control Committee were in relatively inferior power positions to Pelshe and his Party Control Committee, especially since the latter had, already in January 1966, as noted by Cocks, "regained its old name of Party Control Committee, and . . . has increasingly [since then] assumed many of the general supervisory and disciplinary functions of the defunct Party-State Control Committee in the government and the economy as well as an expanded role in matters of intra-Party control."[21]

If power struggles may have contributed to the reorganization of control in 1965, there were also still clear differences of opinions among Soviet leaders about the best ways to organize public participation in control. An interesting bibliographic article in Voprosy filosofii in April 1967, noted that during 1965 and 1966 there had appeared "some 80 books, collections and pamphlets, and more than 90 articles . . . in magazines and scholarly journals," dealing with the broad question of the political organization of a society building communism, which for the most part was interpreted as involving greater participation of the public in managing the state.[22] The titles of some of the works reveal a preoccupation with the role of

the soviets and an inclination to criticize the "loose" kind of public participation encouraged by Khrushchev's populism.[23] The character of the efforts to involve the public in social affairs after the 22nd Congress, for example, were broadly criticized in the following manner:

> Most of the works of that [post-22nd Congress] period spoke primarily of expanding the process of the democratization of our society. The practical works were engrossed in setting up and the theorists in describing the numerous "volunteer associations" of the working people, forgetting at times the necessity to search for concrete ways of further democratizing the state itself. Here the authors in fact forgot that our soviets are not only state bodies but extremely broad public organizations and that the main direction of further democratization of our system lay in democratization of the soviets. . . .[24]
>
> In the past two years, following the October and November, 1964, plenary sessions of the CPSU Central Committee, a turning point could be noted in the research done in the sphere of the political organization of socialist society. Our party's general policy of scientific leadership of society, of expanding democracy and heightening discipline and organization found reflection in scholarly writings.[25]

Among recent works, Varshuk and Razin, the authors of this article, found other theories more to their liking, which suggested that greater democratization lay in the direction of increasing the role and authority of the standing commissions of the soviets. Yu. E. Volkov, in his book <u>How Communist Self-Government Is Born</u>, for example, is quoted as saying that: "If we approach the question from the standpoint of principle, we must recognize that all administration in the individual branches of the

economy must gradually be concentrated in the hands of the respecting standing committees of deputies."[26]

This discussion recalls the controversy over similar points that was aired during the nationwide discussion of the Draft Program of the Party Program and Rules. At that time, very real differences of opinion surfaced concerning particularly the role of the party in control.[27]

It is also relevant at this point to record the powers of the Party Control Committee, as they were outlined in the 1961 Party Rules. Article 40 stated:

> The Party Control Committee of the CC of the CPSU: (A) verifies the observance of Party discipline by members and candidate members of the CPSU, and takes action against Communists who violate the program and the rules of the Party, and Party or state discipline, and against violators of Party ethics; (B) considers appeals against decisions of Central Committees of the Communist Parties of union republics or of territorial and regional Party committees to expel members from the Party or impose Party penalties upon them.[28]

The separate role of party control commissions at the lowest levels was implied in the outline (in Articles 58 and 59) of the powers of control encharged to primary party organizations:

> The Primary Party organization: . . . (E) acts as the organizer of the working people for the performance of the current tasks of communist construction; heads the socialist emulation movement for the fulfillment of state plans and undertakings of the working people; rallies the masses to disclose and make the best use of untapped resources at enterprises and collective farms, and on a broad scale to apply in production the achievements of science, engineering and the experience of front-rankers; works for the strengthening of labor discipline, the steady increase of labor productivity and improvement of the quality of production, and shows concern for the protection and increase

> of social wealth at enterprises, state farms and collective farms; (F) conducts agitational and propaganda work among the masses, educates them in the communist spirit, helps the working people to acquire proficiency in administering state and social affairs; (G) on the basis of extensive criticism and self-criticism, combats cases of bureaucracy, parochialism, and violations of state discipline, thwarts attempts to deceive the state, acts against negligence, waste and extravagance at enterprises, collective farms and offices. . . .
>
> Primary Party organizations of industrial enterprises and trading establishments, state farms, collective farms; and design organizations, drafting offices and research institutes directly related to production enjoy the right to control the work of the administration.[29]

The foregoing passages from the Party Rules suggest briefly the two dissimilar but related types of control activity with which the party chiefly concerned itself: action as the instrument of party purge, a potentially powerful role, and the all-pervasive role of superintendent of public morality. Through the history of control reorganizations these two functions have been kept organizationally separate. Even when party and state agencies of control were joined to create the Party-State Control Committee, Nikolai Mikhailovich Shvernik, who had served as Chairman of the Party Control Committee since 1956, became Chairman of the new Party Commission in 1962, preserving its independence from the larger control schemes. With the renaming of the commission in 1966, and the appointment of Arvid Pelshe as new Chairman of the Party Control Committee, at the 23rd Congress of the CP, and the transformation of the Party-State Control Committee, to effectively "write the

party out of" its constitution, the problem of the changed party role in the new system of NK is brought into sharp focus.

How has the party role changed? Earlier the question was asked[30] whether the elimination of the party as an official partner in the control structure meant a lessening of its role in control activities. Or whether, despite the apparent contradiction, it meant an increasingly important role. Evidence exists that the reorganizers of the People's Control Committee intended that the latter should be the case.

This point-of-view was well-expressed by Pelshe himself, in a speech in November 1964. Recalling that the Twentieth Party Congress had called upon the Party Central Committee to "proceed in its work from the principle that the actual creators of the new life are the masses, led by the CPSU," he described the increasing role demanded of the party in more recent times:

> In the period of the all-out building of communism, the role and significance of the CPSU as the leader and directing force of the Soviet society has increased. Having become--as the result of the full and final victory of socialism in our country--a party of all the people, the CPSU is gradually expanding its guiding influence in all areas of social life. The increased role of the party in the life of Soviet society is conditioned by the growing size and complexity of the tasks of communist construction, by the upswing of the creative activity of the masses and the enlistment of millions of new working people in the administration of state affairs, by the further development of socialist democracy, and by the growing importance of the theory of scientific communism.[31]

The apparent contradiction between the notion of an increasingly important role of the party in the activities of the People's Control Committee and the statutory "writing out" of the party from the Committee structure cannot be taken seriously. The explanation can be best shown perhaps by noting the close parallel which exists between the new Statute of NK and the Soviet Constitution of 1936. In the latter, it will be recalled, the Soviet structure and operation of government is elaborated at length with extensive reference to the rights and powers of the Soviet government structure, but with only two brief references to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Yet the guidance of the party as the real power behind the Constitution's Potemkin facade, cannot be questioned. In the same way, it is quite clear that the party takes a muted but irresistible hand in directing the every-day activities of the organs of people's control.

At the highest level it is also clear that the Committee of Party Control has also assumed a new role and new guiding relationship with regard to the NK Committee. The personal power relations of the two chairmen of these committees are one indicator of the new relationship between the two agencies. As already noted, Pelshe, the Politburo member, far outranks Kovanov, a mere Central Committee Member. Moreover, there has been increasing evidence in the Soviet press of high-level control activity on the part of

the KNK USSR, which was initiated, guided and encouraged by the KPK. During the first four years of KNK activity, for example, a survey of Partiinaya zhizn, reveals that in 1966 the magazine began a new department: "In the Committee of Party Control of the CC CPSU," where announcements concerning the KPK began to appear for the first time. Four single-page articles appeared that year.[32] In 1967, six articles appeared, and in 1968, only four. In 1969, however, the feature appeared in at least a dozen issues. One of these (No. 3) for the first time attacked a minister at the highest level (First Deputy Chairman of Gosstroi of the USSR, A. A. Etmekdzhiyan) and announced his removal from office for misconduct. The investigation which brought Etmekdzhiyan's conduct to light, as Christian Duevel has pointed out, was the first one reported in which the KPK had "combined efforts with two different organs to carry out an investigation, and it is the first time that any USSR ministry has been directly investigated (and not just some subsidiary organ or local plant under the jurisdiction of one or another ministry)."[33] The other two organs involved were the Department of Light and Food Industry of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR People's Control Committee. In addition to calling Minister Etmekdzhiyan to account, the Committee also reprimanded the Party Committee of the Ministry for not ensuring the honesty of "all officials of the apparatus regarding work connected with

questions of safeguarding public wealth." Duevel, viewing Soviet events in the analytic context of the perpetual antagonism of high-level government and party factions, sees this encouragement of increased party activity in the ministries as an attempt on Brezhnev's part "to use the party committees of the ministries as a vehicle for increasing his own influence within the Government apparatus. The PCC investigation of the Ministry of Meat and Dairy Industry, with its censure of the party committee of that Ministry, might now prompt the party committees in other ministries to conform to (or at least be more amenable to) the 'watchdog' role which the General Secretary would like them to play, on behalf of the Central Committee, within the ministries."[34] Whether or not Duevel's theorizing is correct, it does point up the fact that the Party Control Committee, under Pelshe, has close ties to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and hence, all the potential political leverage that such ties imply. Once again, as in the past, it would not be surprising to find such an instrument involved in power struggles quite unrelated to the problems and overall goals of control.

When the Party-State Control Committee was transformed into People's Control, certain of the changes in its structure and operation were the result of a little maturity and the accumulation of some experience in the actual practice of involving public inspectors in control. For

example, instructions that were initially vague or contradictory demanded clarification. And the passage of time also changed some of the conditions and problems of control.

Although the growth of PGK was rapid, it had not attained its present size over night. Its membership, early in 1963 included almost two million activists, organized in 142,000 Groups and almost 227,000 Posts.[35] These had increased by September to 193,000 and 323,000 Groups and Posts, containing three million volunteer inspectors. In 1964, the Committee network numbered 3,280 Committees of PGK, with more than 16,000 nonstaff sections and commissions, containing more than 130,000 nonstaff workers.[36] By the end of 1965, the participation in Groups and Posts had exceeded the five-million mark.[37]

While the staff network did not immediately expand with the transformation of KPGK into KNK, both staff and volunteer workers have continued to multiply slowly over the years. One reason for this is the fact that in such a large nation as the Soviet Union the organization of local Control Committees, especially in outlying areas, simply takes years to accomplish. In Sukhumi, where I visited the local office of the People's Control Committee in the summer of 1967, I found both the City and the District Control Committee housed together in the building of the local soviet, seemingly well established. However, the District Control Committee, I was told, had at that time

been in existence for only a year. Perhaps as one consequence of its newness, the organization of control agencies in the rural areas around the town was still somewhat backward. The chairman of a local collective farm talked vaguely about control groups on his farm, as if their existence had not yet been firmly established. Even in areas closer to the Soviet capital, the work of organization still continues. For example, the First Secretary of the Moscow Oblast Party Committee reported in mid-1969 that the control workers in "industrial, transport, construction, agricultural, trade, public catering enterprises," and others, had increased since 1968 by 11 thousand, to a total of 150 thousand. Over a thousand new People's Control Groups and Posts, he said, had been created (1,288).[38]

Thus, during the first years of its existence, both the staff and nonstaff membership of the People's Control Committee has continued to grow. In 1969, Deputy Chairman Shikin indicated that staff membership was just under 7,000, and the combined force of people's inspectors in Groups and Posts and attached to Committees was near 7 million, an impressive staff-to-volunteer ratio of one-to-one-thousand. Moreover, during the first three years of the NK's existence, Shikin has claimed that the number of citizens taking part in discrete examinations must be reckoned in the "tens of millions."[39]

Classification of the membership of the People's Control Committees in the Statute of 1968 closely parallels the description of the KPGK membership, except that in the present statute, "representatives of the soviets" are specifically mentioned at each level. Moreover, in addition to organizing People's Control Committees at all territorial levels down to the city and district Committees (as had been done with the PGK Committees), the new system creates territorial units at a still lower territorial level: Groups and Posts attached to the "Rural and Settlement Soviets of Working People's Deputies." Groups and Posts of People's Control, like Groups and Posts of Assistance to the Party-State Control Committees, are also formed in "enterprises, on collective farms, and in institutions, and organizations," but are further extended by the Statute of 1968 to "military units," as well.[40] An example of their work in the latter area was described in an April 1969 issue of Krasnaya zvezda, by an army lieutenant colonel who was chairman of a military People's Control Group. Most of his controllers' attention was directed to the "work supervisor's office of the billeting-operations unit of Riga Distrist," and to checking out complaints concerned with military housing, such as poor construction, faulty or non-existent repairs, etc.[41] Thus, the new Committee of People's Control must be described as having exceeded both the organizational "reach" and the size of its predecessor.

The Statute on Groups and Posts of Assistance to the KPGK (1964) had already found it necessary to state clearly certain organizational settings where Groups and Posts would not be formed. "Assistance Groups and Posts shall not be created in the executive committees of Soviets of Working People's Deputies, party, trade union, and komsomol agencies, the editorial staff of party newspapers and magazines, and in schools providing general education."[42] Presumably this statement had established its point effectively enough so that no repetition was necessary in the new statute.

As in the case of the Party-State Control organs, the party continues to place its trusted members in charge of control agencies.[43] As Shikin described the party relationship to People's Control organs in 1969:

> Life itself and experience confirm that the power of the control organs lies in the party leadership. The organs of people's control function under the leadership of party organizations; they are constantly assisted by party committees and party organizations. The Control Groups at enterprises, kolkhozes and establishments are as a rule headed by deputy secretaries or members of party bureaus and party committees; and on a higher level--in the raion, city, oblast, krai and republic, the [Control] Committees are usually headed by members of the higher party organs. The party organs appoint the best trained, most politically mature communists to leadership posts in the People's Control organs. It has already become standard in the activity of many party organizations to receive reports on the work of control organs in the bureaus and at plenums of the party committees, and to discuss questions involving intensification of party leadership over them.[44]

Such practices were already well established in the operations of Party-State Control agencies, but are not, however, spelled out in any statute.

Nor does the new Statute of 1968 make clear in an unambiguous way to whom the control organs should properly report. In Article 5, People's Control agencies are instructed in a general way to "make an accounting periodically before party and soviet agencies about their work."[45] What this appears to mean in the case of the committees is the regular accounting of a committee to its superior party committee and soviet. But Groups and Posts are not so clearly instructed. In Article 10, the latter are instructed to "turn with questions deriving from their activity to party, soviet, and economic agencies and to People's Control Committees." And in Article 11, it is stated that, "At their meetings, collectives of working people may give instructions to People's Control Groups and Posts. Groups and Posts shall report on their activity to the collectives of working people that elected them." Finally, in Article 13, "People's Control Groups and Posts at enterprises, on collective farms, and in organizations and institutions shall work under the direction of party organizations and the corresponding Committees of People's Control."[46] It is difficult to say whether these various alternatives spell confusion or greater flexibility in the operation of the Groups.

The special circumstances existing in the Armed Forces and in defense industries, have apparently necessitated more specific instructions concerning control in these areas. The new statute speaks of "special instructions confirmed by the Council of the Ministers of the USSR" dealing with these particular cases, and clearly placing Armed Forces control under the jurisdiction of the Central KNK of the USSR.[47]

Another point on which the Statute on People's Control was more specific than was the Statute on Party-State Control concerns setting up Bureaus of Complaints and Suggestions. The earlier statute simply called upon the PGK Committees to show "an attentive attitude toward letters and complaints, warnings, and suggestions of the Soviet People."[48] However, evidence concerning the various divisions or sections of PGK Committees does indicate that Bureaus of Complaints and Suggestions were a regular feature of many PGK Committees. For example, I. Grushetski, Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party and Chairman of the Ukrainian Republic KPGK noted, in the spring of 1963, that in the PGK Committees of the Ukraine there were 528 Complaint and Suggestion Bureaus in operation, along with 1,656 special divisions.[49] Therefore, the new statute probably only articulates existing practice, or ensures its application more exhaustively, when it states that:

> People's Control Committees shall create a Bureau for Complaints and Proposals of working people which shall consider proposals, declarations and complaints submitted to the committees and shall achieve the proper resolution of questions submitted to them. The Bureau of Complaints and Proposals shall study the reasons for complaints, shall bring the more important questions deriving from letters and petitions for the discussion of committees, and shall exercise control over the execution of committee decisions adopted with regard to complaints and suggestions of working people.[50]

And an interesting addendum is the next statement:

> Directors and officials of enterprises, collective farms, institutions, and organizations to whom People's Control Committees send for consideration the complaints and proposals of working people must give their replies thereto within the established periods.[51]

The greater attention accorded both the formation of the bureaus and the handling of complaints indicates a growing respect on the part of those charged with redesigning the control committees, for the usefulness of this particular aspect of control committee activity. It remains to be seen, however, whether today's bureaus will be able to overcome the defects of their predecessors, established first in 1919.[52]

Perhaps the area in which the new statute has made the greatest contribution to the clarification of the procedures of the public inspectorates is in distinguishing between the Committee network and the Groups and Posts in the matter of missions and powers, and clarifying in general the main forms of operation. The wide organizational base of volunteer control activities--the Groups and Posts of people's inspectors--clearly operate at the "grass roots." Their

field of operations might be termed the production level, that is, they "exercise control directly at enterprises, on collective farms, and in institutions and organs." Even those Groups and Posts that are now also formed at the lowest territorial level, attached to rural and settlement soviets, are intended to coordinate their activity with the work of control Groups "created at enterprises, on collective farms, and in institutions and organizations located on the territory of the corresponding soviet."[53]

In contrast to the Groups and Posts of Assistance, the NK Committees serve primarily in a directing and coordinating capacity. Their guiding role is illustrated, for example, at the lowest NK Committee levels (city, district, area, region and territory), where, in addition to being charged with the exercise of "control over the fulfillment of party and government directives and state plans and assignments by enterprises, collective farms, institutions, and organizations located on the territory of the district, city, area, region or territory," and of remedial action to eliminate shortcomings, the NK Committees are enjoined above all to direct the successful control activities of the Groups and posts located at these enterprises, collective farms, institutions and organizations.[54] The coordinating role of the committees is effected partly through the interlinking structure of the NK Committee network, with its own army of volunteers, and partly through

active efforts to guide and coordinate the efforts of many other volunteer control agencies in mass or large-scale investigations. Coordination also means establishing channels of communication. Thus an important job of the lower NK Committee is to bring "more important questions to the consideration of corresponding party, soviet, and economic agencies, and in necessary instances, to the consideration of central institutions and organizations."[55] While this same formula holds at the republic level, republic ministries and departments are added to the list of responsibilities of those Committees. The KNK of the USSR, (the Central People's Control Committee) in its unique position at the apex of the hierarchy, boasts powers that are similar to those of the lower agencies, but which are stated in the most sweeping terms: to "direct the activity of all people's control agencies in the country" and to "exercise control over the fulfillment of party and government directives and of state plans and assignments by ministries, departments, soviet and economic organizations, enterprises, and collective farms."[56] Within this charge a special concern of the Central Committee of NK is the meticulous and expedient operation of ministries and departments. Finally, the highest NK Committee is charged with what amounts to the framing of proposals for policy-making in the area of control. This committee is expected to sift the results of control activities at all levels for proposals of "general

state significance," and present these to the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers. In addition, they are to generalize upon all their investigations and report to the highest party and government bodies on conditions in individual branches of the nation's economy and in the various ministries and departments.

The powers of punishment bestowed respectively upon Groups and Posts and upon Committees are clearly differentiated. Groups and Posts, the great army of amateur inspectors, are not given powers to punish directly. They can, however, "pronounce social censure on guilty persons," demand explanations for their conduct, and oblige them to appear before the collective to report on measures taken to eliminate shortcomings. They can also place cases in the hands of the Comrades' Courts. They are expected to bring guilty parties to the attention of the local administrations or to the attention of local party or other social organizations of the collective and to submit proposals to control committees where more extensive investigations are felt to be needed. Regarding specific punishment, penalties, fines, or deterrent or remedial actions, the Groups and Posts are given consultative powers only. They may suggest to NK Committees that certain illegal actions of local officials be suspended, that certain monetary penalties be imposed, or that particular individuals need to be called to account.

They may not, however, take these actions themselves. Such powers are reserved to the People's Control Committees.

NK Committees like Groups and Posts of Assistance, are expected to make a wide use of "social pressure" by bringing "guilty" officials and their cases before meetings of collectives of working people and public organizations, by publishing the results of checks made, and the actions taken regarding them, and so on. Committees, however, have the further right to suspend "clearly illegal orders and actions of officials," and to take direct action against these officials themselves. For example, in addition to penalties of censure of various grades (i.e., public exposure, reprimand, severe reprimand), money fines can be imposed, and the official may be demoted, removed from an occupied post (with his subsequent employment in question), or in cases of criminal acts, turned over to the procuracy.[58] A new practice related to assessing fines and penalties is to enter this information in the guilty person's work book. Under the Party-State Control Statute, money fines were handled as a personal matter only.[59] Current practice indicates that remiss people's inspectors can themselves receive this punishment. Pravda, in late December 1969,[60] tells of such a case when the Director of the Togliatti Municipal Dining Room was reprimanded and cited in his work record for having ignored the criticism of a member of the local People's Control Group and for in fact having fired

that inspector from her job as a dining room stock clerk. However, the Togliatti City People's Control Committee Chairman, himself, was later found to have been remiss in failing to support the public inspector. As a result the Kuibyshev Province Party Committee, in whose territory the incident occurred, severely reprimanded the KNK City Chairman (along with the secretary of the City Party Committee) and recorded all this in the chairman's own work book.[61] The next highest NK Committee is intended to serve as a court of appeal for these actions.

What clearly emerges in the current statutory description of the People's Control Committee is a delineation of roles and a careful limiting of the boundaries within which the public inspector may act. He is expected to reveal shortcomings, waste, mismanagement and inefficiency wherever it appears on the Soviet economic, social or political scene, and to suggest remedies. He is not given much authority to take punitive action; this remains the prerogative of the staff, which means ultimately, directly or indirectly, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The institutional formula for involving the volunteer citizen in social duties while simultaneously ensuring that his participation will not range out of bounds and usurp "improper" authority (i.e., lose the character of the subject-participant) closely resembles the basic format of communist party organization. A core of full-time, committed

professionals, applying in organization and practice the principles of democratic-centralism, mobilize the millions. The same pattern is repeated over and over in the other organizations of mass participation. The following chapter will amply illustrate this point in the case of the public control systems of the Komsomols, the soviets and the trade unions.

Before leaving this discussion of the People's Control Committee, an attempt should be made to assess the changes that have occurred in its operations since it replaced the KPGK. Summarizing these changes or trends in the NK Committees' development, it can be said that at the lower levels the ongoing activities of the KNK agencies seem to have largely continued in the directions pointed out for them by earlier PGK Committees and Groups and Posts of Assistance. Maturing perhaps along the way, and discarding many of the first "one-shot" efforts to economize, they continue to seek new areas where inspectors can "discover reserves" (eliminate slack and waste) or otherwise contribute to the well-being of the nation. An interview by USSR KNK Chairman P. V. Kovanov in early 1969 yields some typical examples of ongoing work by volunteer inspectors which could easily be duplicated from the records of their predecessors in the KPGK:

> In 1968 over 3 million controllers took part in harvesting. These were combine tractor operators and drivers--all leading rural workers. Their economic

> approach to the work helped save hundreds of millions of poods of grain. Every load of grain was inspected by people's controllers before going to the elevator.
>
> Soviet and state organs were alerted that valuable equipment at certain enterprises and building sites was not being utilized, was being badly maintained, and, worst of all, was becoming useless. The CPSU Central Committee asked us to check this. Some 250,000 inspectors took part in this. The rigorous examination of 38,000 enterprises and building sites proves the scale of the work. Many defects were discovered. But the work of the controllers did not stop here. Thanks to their active intervention, equipment worth more than 2.5 billion rubles was put in proper order. Even during the check superfluous equipment worth almost one million rubles was sold.[62]

At the highest levels, the KNK has been drawn much more tightly under the tutelage of the Party Control Committee. In practice this has meant that the All-Union People's Control Committee has occasionally wielded far greater power against bureaucrats at higher levels than did the old PGK Committee, although perhaps a more correct appraisal of this relationship would be to view the advantages of the closer relation as accruing to the Party Control Committee, which now seems to have at its disposal, in the KNK apparatus, an instrument of demonstrated effectiveness, which even if unused further, poses a constant threat to officials of the government and economic apparatus at the highest levels.[63]

Typical of the most recent activity of the USSR Committee of People's Control are actions it has taken with respect to a number of ministries. For example, after a series of inspections by its agencies of how aviation fuel

was being improperly conserved at Moscow airports (the previous year the "Moscow Transport and Polar Administrations had overexpended more than 3,000 tons of aviation fuel," and the excesses were continuing), the USSR KNK demanded that the Ministry of Civil Aviation take decisive measures (which the committee outlined) to economize on fuel in the future.[64] In the area of agriculture, the USSR Ministry of Agriculture and the All-Union Farm Machinery Association were charged by the USSR Committee of People's Control with paying insufficient attention to the utilization of fertilizer by farms. This charge was based upon investigations by people's controllers in the Latvian Republic and in some oblasts of the Russian Republic, and the USSR KNK subsequently ordered these agencies to keep a watchful eye upon the fulfillment of its orders by the Association, the Ministry and their local agencies.[65]

Several ministries have been called upon to aid the People's Control Committee in fighting water pollution. In one case, for example, the committee's investigations first established the fact that the decree of the Russian Republic's Council of Ministers, "On Measures to Stop Pollution of the Volga and Don Rivers by Unpurified Sewage," was "not being seriously implemented in Ivanovo Oblast." Factories emptying wastes into the Volga had failed to construct the purification facilities for which they had been assigned responsibility over a three-year period beginning in 1966.

The textile enterprises under the Russian Republic of Light Industry, in particular, was cited for having achieved only 13% of their assigned construction of purification facilities, and a formal assurance was exacted from the Russian Republic minister, Kholostov, that these enterprises would receive the necessary help in planning and in financing the necessary installations. The USSR Ministry of the Chemical Industry and the Russian Republic Ministry of the Pulp-and-Paper Industry were also indicated, and the Ivanovo Oblast Soviet Ispolkom was reprimanded for laxity in control over the enterprises in its territory.[66]

Clean water and its preservation are properly the overall concern of the USSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, which is supposed to check on the fulfillment by ministries and departments of measures for preventing the pollution of lakes and rivers. But today, the USSR People's Control Committee is invoked as a superior control agency, charged with the organization of systematic control over the fulfillment by ministries and departments of the many current resolutions aimed at maintaining the purity of the nation's water resources.[67]

Another recent example of KNK action with regard to a number of ministries at the highest level was concerned with poor utilization of freight cars, found to be caused at enterprise level by the lag between growing rates of basic production and insufficiently developed transportation

techniques. Culprits named were the USSR Ministry of Tractor and Farm Machine Building, the USSR Ministry of Pulp-and-Paper Industry and the USSR Ministry of the Chemical Industry, along with the Russian Republic Ministry of the Building Materials, and the corresponding chief administrations of these ministries, who permitted the adverse conditions to exist. Actual fines were assessed only at enterprise level (half a month's wages were revoked for a number of plant managers), but the ministries were simply charged with "carrying out additional measures to improve the utilization of freight cars . . . and provide necessary assistance in the development of transportation."[68]

In September 1969, the USSR People's Control Committee checked up on why the nation's cement needs were not being supplied, and in fact why cement production capacity had fallen in the past three years to half its earlier capacity. The results of their investigation showed that new construction of cement producing plants was chiefly at fault, owing to shortages of various kinds, including the necessary skilled labor. A formal meeting in mid-1969 of the USSR KNK with both the USSR Ministry of the Building Materials Industry and the USSR Ministry of Installation and Specialized Construction Work may have served the useful purpose of pressuring the ministries to make special efforts in the needed direction, and may also have served as a useful

channel of information, revealing to policy-makers possible areas where future allocations might need adjusting.

Even the USSR Central Statistical Administration comes under the scrutiny of the USSR People's Control Committee. A checkup of the Central Statistical Administration in the spring of 1969 revealed that this office was disregarding letters "telling of violations of the established reporting procedures" (which often bypass the statistical agencies themselves, duplicating and elaborating upon their work), and in its apparatus "such warning signals were not always carefully considered, at times no prompt and effective measures were taken on their basis, and control over the fulfillment of directives on the abolition of the unlawful reporting was weak." The KNK Committee's only action in this case, however, was to publish its criticisms in Pravda.[70]

The above cases are interesting examples of the People's Control Committee operation at the highest level and adequately demonstrate the "horizontal reach" of the USSR Committee of People's Control across ministerial lines. One final case, which illustrates its "vertical reach," should also be included. In this instance, the USSR NK Committee assumed the role of protector of the rights of local enterprises against the encroachments of an oblast soviet. V. Babushkin, head of the USSR KNK's Department of Planning and Finance Agencies, in a Pravda article accused local ispolkomy at oblast level and below of seeking

illegally to siphon off funds (such as the production development funds set up by enterprises under the new economic reforms) from enterprises within their jurisdictional territories:

> Exceeding their rights, individual local soviets have adopted decisions obliging the directors of state enterprises and organizations, including those of union and republic subordination, without compensation to allocate cash to urban construction projects, to give them transportation, provide them with free materials and assign to them workers, engineers and technicians, paying for their labor out of production.
>
> Such demands do not fit into the financial plans of the enterprises, in which every ruble has its strictly defined purpose. Let us cite one of many similar examples. In Rostov it was decided to build a canal for the sport of rowing at a cost of 4,500,000 rubles, although there was no particular need for it. No funds had been earmarked for this purpose in the city's budget. The oblast soviet executive committee made the enterprises responsible for expenditures on the canal's construction. It was only after the intervention of the USSR People's Control Committee that the erroneous demands were canceled.[71]

In the case cited, the action of the USSR People's Control Committee against an oblast ispolkom in defense of local enterprises, was an application of power that would seem excessive, but which apparently was necessary to bring about the desired result.

From its supreme vantage point, and with its abilities to operate vertically and horizontally, the KNK is seen to be uniquely situated to undertake the solution of many problems that transcend both ministerial and regional boundaries. The committee thus seems to have the capability of tackling the kind of large-scale complex control problems--such as

water purification and the conservation of other natural resources, often involving a variety of social and economic organizations, as well as much territory--that are becoming more frequent in today's highly industrialized societies. By the same token, the NK Committee shows at least the potential, because of its wide-ranging grasp, to deal with many modern problems which defy half-measures and the treatment of symptoms.

Further consideration of KNK's capabilities and achievements will be resumed in the final chapter of this study. However, the subject of the People's Control Committee cannot be treated adequately without a careful examination of the development of the many other volunteer inspection groups that exist today in the Soviet Union, organized by the Komsomols, the soviets, and the trade unions. An important mission of the People's Control Committee, it will be recalled, is the coordination of the work of these groups. Furthermore, the part which the KNK itself plays in the broad movement of "participatory democracy," as Soviet theorists speak of the latter, must be properly viewed as constituting only one fraction of a larger whole which includes the activities of these other mass organizations. In the words of I. V. Kapitonov, at the "Ceremony Commemorating the 99th Anniversary of Lenin's Birth,"

> Real democracy exists wherever the people actually control the affairs of state. . . . The vital and actively functioning mechanism of Soviet socialist

> democracy consists of the more than 2 million deputies and more than 25 million soviet activists, almost 7 million workers in the People's Control agencies, more than 5 million participants in permanent production conferences, and the tens of millions of members of party, trade union, Komsomol, cooperative and other public organizations. Our people are proud to repeat Lenin's words: 'We are the state.'[72]

The next chapter will trace the development of mass participation in control by the Komsomols, the soviets and the trade unions, explore the unique contribution of each to the public control effort, and consider how the People's Control Committee attempts to coordinate its efforts with theirs.

CHAPTER V--NOTES

[1]See above, Ch. II.

[2]Plenary Session of the CC, CPSU, November 16, 1964.

[3]As Jerry F. Hough has pointed out ("Reforms in Government and Administration," in Alexander Dallin and Thomas B. Larson (eds.), Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1968), p. 27), "The power of the Chairman of the Committee of Party-State Control resided in the combination of his ability to acquire information about the performance of key political and administrative personnel and his access to the three most important policy-making committees--the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the Council of Ministers. He had the potential opportunity to discredit other officials with his investigations and a number of forums at which he could subtly use the information which had been gathered against them. Moreover, he was one of the few Politburo members who had extensive information about candidates for vacancies in such posts as obkom First Secretary and was in a position to challenge candidates suggested by the General Secretary and to suggest alternatives. Since the Chairman (Alexander Shelepin) was a man who had made a particularly wide range of contacts in his earlier career, he inevitably posed a potential threat to the General Secretary." Hough may be assuming too much authority on the part of the Party-State Control Committee Chairman in the matter of selecting obkom secretaries and other party officials. Such power to intercede in matters affecting party membership presumably continued to reside in the separate Party Commission as its primary function. As Paul Cocks notes: "at the end of 1962, the Party Control Commission and local Party commissions reverted back to their former limited role of essentially courts of appeal. The C.P.C. [Ts.K.K.] was renamed Party Commission under the Central Committee. Even the word 'control' was erased from its title"; "Politics of Party Control: The Historical and Institutional Role of Party Control in the CPSU," Ph. D. Thesis (Harvard University, 1968), p. 591.

[4]See above, Ch. III.

[5]The Decree of the Plenum is dated December 6, 1965: "O preobrazovanii organov Partiino-gosudarstvennovo kontrolya" (On the Transformation of the Organs of Party-State Control), Spravochnik partiinovo rabotnika, Vypusk shestoi (Party Official's Handbook, Sixth Issue; Moscow, 1966), p. 120.

[6]Pravda, December 7, 1965.

[7]Pravda, December 10, 1965. During this period Shelepin was apparently serving as Party Secretary in the special area of Asian Affairs, in which capacity he visited Hanoi in June 1966.

[8]Ibid.

[9]See N. S. Khrushchev, "Doklad," October 17, 1961, Materialy XXII sezd KPSS (Moscow, 1961), p. 105.

[10]"Statute on People's Control Agencies in the USSR, confirmed by Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR, December 19, 1968," Soviet Statutes and Decisions, Vol. V, No. 2 (Winter 1968/69), p. 116.

[11]Ibid., p. 115.

[12]Spravochnik partiinovo rabotnika, Vypusk pyaty (Party Official's Handbook, Issue Five, Moscow, 1964), p. 305.

[13]Kratki politicheski slovar (Short Political Dictionary; Moscow, 1964), p. 199.

[14]V. Zaluzhny, "Narodny Kontrol" (People's Control), Partiinaya zhizn, No. 13 (July 1966), pp. 18-19.

[15]Partiinaya zhizn, No. 5 (March), 1969, pp. 68-69.

[16]However, see below, p. 159, for a discussion of the effect of loss of party prestige and power, and the disregard of one Leninist argument.

[17]Hough, op. cit., p. 27.

[18]Pravda, December 10, 1965.

[19]One of Lenin's arguments for uniting Rabkrin and the Central Control Committee of the party, it will be recalled, was to enhance the authority and prestige of Rabkrin. See above, pp. 52-53. See also, pp. 97-98.

[20]Pravda, April 9, 1966.

[21]Cocks, "Politics of Party Control," p. 592.

[22]V. V. Varchuk, and V. I. Razin, "Issledovaniya v oblasti politicheskoi organizatsii sotsialisticheskovo obshchestva" (Research in the Sphere of the Political Organization of Socialist Society), Voprosy filosofii (Questions of Philosophy) No. 4, (1967), pp. 134-43.

[23]The following titles reveal the interest in the soviets: "Increasing the Role of Local Soviets and Development of the Public Principle in their Work," "The Local Soviets at the Present State," "The Combination of State and Public Principles in Governing Society," "The Soviets--Bodies of Power and Popular Self-Government," "Improvement of Democratic Principles in Soviet State Administration," and "The Soviets--The Working People's Regime."

[24]Ibid., p. 135.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Yu. E. Volkov, Tak rozhdaetsya kommunisticheskoe samoupravlenie (Thus Communist Self-Government Is Born; Moscow, 1965), p. 129; See also, Stanovlenie kommunisticheskovo samoupravleniya (The Formation of Communist Self-Government; Moscow, 1965), pp. 97, 103, 119-20; Varchuk and Razin, op. cit., p. 138.

[27]See the full discussion by Grey Hodnett, "Khrushchev and Party-State Control," in Alexander Dallin and Alan F. Westin (eds.), Politics in the Soviet Union: Seven Cases (New York, 1966), pp. 129-42; see also, Herbert Ritvo, The New Soviet Society (New York, 1962), p. 174, n. 240.

[28]Jan F. Triska, Soviet Communism, Program and Rules (San Francisco, 1962), p. 177.

[29]Ibid., pp. 188-91.

[30]See above, p. 157.

[31]See Pravda, Nov. 6, 1964.

[32]Nos. 18, 19, 21 and 22.

[33]"Radio Liberty Dispatch," March 3, 1969.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Pravda, March 22, 1963.

[36]V. Gorin and Yu. Polenov, "Partiino-gosudarstvenny kontrol v deistvii" (Party-State Control in Action), Kommunist, No. 4 (April), 1964, pp. 68-69.

[37]Pravda, December 13, 1965.

[38]V. Konotop, "Budnichnye zaboty dozornykh" (The Daily Cares of Patrols), Pravda, July 22, 1969, p. 4.

[39]I. Shikin, "Leninskie printsipy narodnovo kontrolya v deistvii," (Leninist Principles of People's Control in Action), Partiinaya zhizn, No. 2 (January), 1969, p. 9.

[40]Soviet Statutes and Decisions, Vol. V, No. 2 (Winter 1968/69), pp. 110-12.

[41]Lieut. Col. V. Sakulin, "Letter to the Editors: Paper Patches," Krasnaya zvezda, April 11, 1969, p. 2, translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXI, No. 15 (1969), pp. 27-28.

[42]Soviet Statutes, p. 91.

[43]The "Statute of 1964" bluntly states that "The chairman of a Group simultaneously is the deputy secretary for control of the party organization"; Soviet Statutes, p. 92.

[44]Partiinaya zhizn, No. 2 (January), 1969, pp. 14-15.

[45]Soviet Statutes, pp. 115-16.

[46]Ibid., pp. 112-13.

[47]Ibid., p. 117.

[48]Soviet Statutes, p. 82.

[49]I. Grushetski, Pravda, May 25, 1963, p. 4.

[50]Soviet Statutes, p. 119.

[51]Ibid.

[52]See above, pp. 34, 51-52.

[53]Soviet Statutes, p. 112.

[54]Ibid., p. 115.

[55]Ibid.

[56]Ibid., p. 116.

[57]Soviet Statutes, pp. 111-12.

[58]Ibid., pp. 117-18.

[59]Narodny kontrol v SSSR (People's Control in the USSR; Moscow, 1967), p. 168.

[60]"Est i epilog" (There is an Epilogue), Pravda, December 28, 1969, p. 2.

[61]"Gde zhe epilog?" (Where is the Epilogue?), Pravda, October 9, 1969, p. 3; see also, Pravda, December 28, 1969, p. 2.

[62]P. Kovanov, interview, in Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, (Economic Journal) January 4, 1969, p. 7.

[63]See above, pp. 165 ff.

[64]"Berech goryuchee" (Save Fuel), Izvestia, December 2, 1969, p. 3.

[65]"Vse udobreniya--v delo," (Put All Fertilizers to Work), Izvestia, April 15, 1969, p. 3.

[66]"Berech reki i vodoemy" (Protect Rivers and Bodies of Water), Izvestia, April 15, 1969, p. 3.

[67]See "Zabota o Baikala" (Concern for Baikal), Izvestia, February 8, 1969, p. 2.

[68]"Ne dopuskat prostoya vagonov" (Do Not Permit Freight Car Demurrage), Pravda, August 23, 1969, p. 2.

[69]I. Velichkin, and Yu. Mikhailov, "Dvoika za stroiku" (Failing Mark in Construction), Izvestia, September 2, 1969, p. 3.

[70]P. Bogatyrev, and V. Shterev, "Ne nuzhnatskaya 'samodeyatelnost'" (We Don't Need this Kind of "Autonomy"), Pravda, March 20, 1969, p. 3.

[71]V. Babushkin, "Kazhdy rubl--po naznacheniyu" (Every Ruble to its Purpose), Pravda, August 27, 1969, p. 3.

[72]I. V. Kapitonov's speech appeared in Pravda, April 23, 1969, pp. 2-3.

CHAPTER VI

PUBLIC CONTROL SYSTEMS OF THE SOVIETS, TRADE UNIONS AND THE KOMSOMOLS

The Committee of People's Control encompasses within its structure of Committees and Groups wide participation of the public as inspectors. However, its "mass aspect" is further enhanced by the coordinating role which it performs in relation to other public inspectorates. Long before the creation of the Party-State Control Committee, in fact as early as the Bolsheviks' first decade in power, such public organizations as the soviets, trade unions and Komsomols were experimenting with various types of volunteer inspectorates. Although participation in these groups waned during the Stalinist era, they experienced a vigorous renewal under Khrushchev, well before the first appearance of the PGK Committee and its Assistance Groups, when all of the parent organizations began again to experiment with volunteer inspectors. As a consequence, with the creation of the PGK Committee, an explicit mission given the new control agency was to coordinate its work with the already existing groups of controllers and activists of the public organizations, while coopting representatives of these organizations into the staffs of PGK Committees.[1]

The overall coordinating role of the party in this process should not, of course, be minimized. When the PGK Committees were forms, they contained, it should be recalled, not only the specific representatives of the soviets, Komsomols and trade unions, but also representatives of both state and party organs, and the last two held positions of leadership. The post of chairman of the republic, oblast and krai PGK Committees was filled by secretaries of the respective party committees, or by deputy chairmen of the respective councils of ministers or soviet executive committees. At city and district level, the PGK chairmen were party bureau members and executive committee members. Thus, insofar as the formal organizational chart and staffing procedures could ensure coordination of the public control activities of Komsomols, trade union activists, members of standing commissions of soviets, and Groups of Assistance to the PGK Committees, the composition and leadership of the PGK Committees attempted to do this, setting a pattern for the later People's Control Committees to follow.

The significance of the coordinating role that the People's Control Committee is intended to perform with respect to the activities of the other public organizations can scarcely be overemphasized.[2] It has at least three broad aspects. Of first importance, perhaps, the reach of the Committee is thereby obviously extended, both as regards numbers of public inspectors involved in control

activities, and also in relation to the wide diversification of missions which can be performed. For example, the missions of the different public organizations are in some cases clearly distinct. The trade unions concentrate upon inspections of the working conditions and service accommodations of workers and employees, the correct observation of labor laws and safety regulations, and on the whole tend to emphasize problems related to employment. Komsomols in various labor sites, while often working in close cooperation with trade union inspectorates, tend to design their activities more directly in line with the KNK missions of fulfilling precisely party and state directives, seeking unused reserves, applying new techniques, and so on. Elsewhere, they seem generally to stand ready to serve as activists in whatever mission the people's controllers have underway and are perhaps only distinguished from other volunteer inspectors by operating in some special fields, such as education and the armed forces, where there are large numbers of young people. Volunteer groups attached to the soviets tend to play civic roles. "Many questions, tied with housing and cultural construction, with the work of health establishments, enterprises of trade and public dining establishments are checked [by people's controllers] together with the soviet aktiv and are reviewed by soviet organs."[3] Moreover, the soviet apparat is controlled by its own inspection groups.

Secondly, the communication function which the NK Committee network performs is basically dependent upon coordination. The coordinating link provides the line of communication, and the implications of strong or weak communication are extensive.[4] To suggest an obvious example, effective education of control groups depends upon the spread of innovative ideas and techniques, both connected with the specific control operation under examination and with better production methods. The People's Control Committees are responsible for organizing the gathering and dissemination of such information. Effective communication also enhances the responsiveness of the NK Committee, especially in relation to the information imputs of its Bureaus of Complaints and Suggestions. Here, the impact of good communication is clear, for a suggestion is only as effective as its reach. Moreover, the wide publicity intended to pervade control operations is itself a form of effective communication, dependent upon KNK's information gathering and coordinating functions.

Finally, while it is true that control duplication is not of necessity always undesirable, and that multiple control systems, serving as counter-checks, may in some cases encourage greater accuracy of checking, it is clear that multiple uncoordinated control activities could mean much duplication, waste of motion, and inefficiency, as well as the neglect of certain areas, unless these numerous

control efforts are examined at some coordinating point to rule out such overlap, to economize efforts and systematically to seek out the inadvertently disregarded areas. An example of one field of mutual public concern where coordinated control activities might well avoid much lost motion is that of the trade and dining establishments, where all the public organizations conduct inspections. Other examples that suggest the utility of coordination in the planning and execution of inspections and the follow-up actions taken will be dealt with in later sections of this chapter.

To judge how far the "reach" of the first Party-State Control Committee was extended by its initial assignment to coordinate the other public control groups, we must examine first the size of the contingents of volunteer inspectors attached to the public organizations which existed by late 1962. In the case of the soviets, the great post-Stalinist expansion in their work and membership began with a January 22, 1957, Central Committee decree, "On Improving the Activity of the Soviets of Worker's Deputies and the Strengthening of their Ties with the Masses."[5] This decree, Howard Swearer says, "touched off a widespread effort in succeeding years to revamp the operations of local governmental bodies."[6] A Soviet source credits the decree with inaugurating a "new, contemporary state in the development of control activity of the soviets."[7] One point the

directive emphasized was that many ispolkomy, and leaders of economic organizations as well, were not regularly giving an account of their work to their soviets. This laxity was said to lead to lack of control and a weakening in the guidance of the soviets. In the words of the decree: "Not everywhere are the standing commissions working well. In many soviets the commissions exist formally, not drawing into their work an aktiv of workers, kolkhozniki and intelligentsia. The party organs and ispolkomy of soviets are obligated to improve drastically the work of standing commissions. . . . "[8]

An example of the kind of results which followed the appearance of the decree is the "Statute on Permanent Commissions of Local Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Ukrainian SSR, passed by the Ukrainian SSR on May 31, 1957." According to its directions, standing commissions were to be formed attached to the soviets of regions, districts, cities, settlements or rural localities, and designed, "according to the needs of the local situation," to deal with such questions as "the budget, local industry, agriculture, public education, health, culture, social insurance, trade, municipal services, public services, road construction, transport, communications, and others."[9] By 1959, the number of deputies to local soviets had increased in the USSR since 1956 by 350,000, bringing the total to 1.8 million,[10] and standing commissions which had been formed

by local soviets contained more than a million of their deputies, along with another one and one-half million activists.[11]

The importance of the standing commissions and a succinct account of their origin and rapid development through the period just discussed has been presented by L. G. Churchward and deserves repetition here:

> More than any other fact, the increasing activity of Standing Committees is an indication of the growing popular participation in Soviet local government. Standing Commissions first appeared in 1940, but in the post-war Soviets they have steadily increased their role so that by 1955 over 70 per cent of all deputies in local Soviets were serving on the Standing Commissions. In the Moscow Oblast (1955) in the village Soviets alone there were 2,986 Standing Commissions, including 806 Budget Commissions, 750 Agricultural Commissions, 779 Cultural Enlightenment Commissions, 360 Road Construction Commissions, 149 Trade Commissions, and 44 Public Education Commissions. At present [1957] there are 14 Standing Commissions of the Moscow Oblast Soviet and about 220 deputies and 250 activists serve on these Commissions. The Standing Commissions do not act administratively, they may not issue orders or take obligatory decisions, but they serve an invaluable purpose as training schools for Soviet citizens through investigating questions and preparing reports and recommendations for the Soviet, its Executive Committee and Departments.[12]

What Churchward has described here was only the beginning of a growth in the activities and membership of the soviets which was still continuing a decade later. In the local soviets alone, more than two million deputies were elected in the March 1965 elections.[13] Attached to these local soviets were more than 300,000 commissions, containing 1,666,000 deputies (80% of the total number of deputies).

The rest of the membership of the standing commissions was made up of more than 2,660,000 persons. By late 1967 the total number of soviets' deputies had reached 2,055,00.[14] In the Ukraine alone, by 1967, there were said to be 422,576 deputies in soviets, standing commissions and executive committees, with more than 8 million persons taking part "in the independent public organizations attached to the soviets and acting under their direction."[15] For the Soviet Union as a whole, the latter group contained "more than 23 million activists."[16]

During this same period, systems of public control sponsored by the trade unions followed a similar course of rapid growth. As Emily Brown has observed, the trade unions have had a long history of enlisting "volunteers" in active union work on "public assignments": "Checking on observance of labor legislation, both through the state function of inspection and through education, persuasion, and public influence, is largely carried on by the unions in the plants and the regional union committees and councils. Much of the work is done by millions of workers, engineers, and others, enlisted for 'public work in their free time' on special commissions and assignments as 'public inspectors.'"[17] The mission of protecting the worker's rights and in every way preserving labor law has been a traditionally important role of the unions. However, following the pattern of reduced public involvement extending through the Second World War,

trade union control activities had ceased, and their role and importance had suffered eclipse. Even during the post-war years, when the factory committees began to reorganize the control apparatus, the new commissions found it difficult to regain lost ground, authority and prestige. Only during the late 1950's did the trade unions assume a leading role among the mass public organizations in experimenting with and encouraging the development of new public inspectorates.

In 1958, for example, the Rostov Oblast Trade Union Section for the Protection of Labor had begun sponsoring inspections, involving non-staff personnel, to conduct daily checks on the fulfillment of socialist labor laws.[18] And the same year, a joint resolution of the VTsSPS (The All-Union Council of Trade Unions) and the USSR Ministry of Trade called for the creation of Commissions of Public Control to monitor the operation of trade and public dining enterprises, worker's supply sections, and food depots. Factory committees set up these commissions and staffed them with "more than 50,000 activists."[19] By 1965, with more than 600,000 trade enterprises and over 170,000 public dining rooms in the Soviet Union, this area of public service had become a prime target of trade union volunteer inspectors. The further projected growth of trade and dining establishments and better service envisaged by the 1961 Party Program was expected to require further

"systematic control by increasing numbers of workers over the activity of trade and dining enterprises."[20]

By 1962, as Brown notes, volunteers were being used in trade union staff work to the extent that 23 regional sovprofs and industrial union committees were operating without paid staff.[21] Trud, a little more than a year later, recorded these numerical advances: sovprofs and regional committees now had 8,000 non-staff departments, over 24,000 public councils and commissions, almost 100,000 nonstaff instructors and 23,000 public technical inspectors. Down to and including the district level, 850,000 members were participating voluntarily in active union work; below this level "95% of all factory, plant, and local committees and district and city committees worked without paid staffs."[22] At the X Plenum of the VTsSPS, held July 26-27, 1962, the decree, "On Developing to the Fullest the Social Bases in the Work of the Trade Unions," stressed in particular the great importance of the citizen inspector. This decree instructed union factory committees and meetings to utilize factory workers and office personnel on the widest possible scale to check on the use of public funds, labor legality, correct application of salary scales, fulfillment of plans for housing construction and distribution, the operation of trade and dining enterprises, and the activities of health and social insurance agencies.[23] Later that year, the announcement of the new Party-State Control Committee

raised new problems of defining the mutual spheres of activity of new and old inspectorates.

The first instructions to the unions were not very explicit on this score. The XIII Congress of Trade Unions of the USSR, for example, directed the trade unions "actively to assist the work of the organs of Party-State Control."[24] In practice the immediate result of these instructions was the enlistment by 1965 of a "hundred thousand trade union activists in the Groups and Posts of Assistance to PGK Committees and as members of the PGK Committee staffs."[25] In addition, the ranks of the public inspectors in union agencies were said to include 10 million workers, representing a substantial contribution of the trade unions to the public control effort.[26]

The Komsomols in 1962 also contributed toward widening the scope of early Party-State Control Committee activities, at the same time offering well established patterns for organizing volunteer activities. Their "Light Cavalry Brigades," dating from the 1920's, had continued to exist through the years, and in the early 1950's retained their right to act as inspectors, although according to evidence cited by Allen Kassof from 1951, the right was at that time little used: "One formal channel of Komsomol activity is based on an arrangement that permits local organizations to bring before the relevant party unit or ministerial organ questions of inefficiency and waste; however, Komsomol

officers are reported to resort to this practice only rarely. . . . "[27] However, Kassof's evidence from a later date shows the existence of a "more frequently employed device . . . the 'light cavalry raids,' unannounced inspection tours by Komsomol teams designed to combat cheating and waste."[28] Writing about their activity in the early 1960's, Kassof says, "Komsomol raids are now a quite widespread practice in the Soviet economy and seem to be highly valued as a deterrent to corruption as well as to ordinary inefficiency."[29] The example with which he illustrates this point is taken from an article in Komsomolskaya pravda, May 12, 1961, which describes current activities in rural areas:

> Komsomol members on the Kirov Collective Farm, Korenovskaia District, working jointly with Communists, have organized posts and motor patrol groups for the protection of the harvest. Petty thieves have not been brought into court. The Young Communists have photographed them and posted their photos with the caption: 'Here they are, the pilferers of collective farm wealth!' They have become the subject for discussion at meetings and in wall newspapers. Many of those who have found themselves in the 'pillory,' as the collective farmers themselves aptly call it, begged with tears in their eyes that the photos be taken down and promised to work honestly.
>
> But the Komsomol patrols have apprehended not only petty thieves. They have also caught some inveterate crooks. . . . The Komsomol patrols helped the Kirov Collective Farm not only to raise but also to defend a rich harvest. . . .
>
> The application of the new law on intensifying the struggle against swindlers, loafers, and antisocial and parasitic elements must be combined with an increase in vigilance and with a strengthening of the protection

> of public wealth. The Komsomol committees of state and collective farms can and must play a great role here. The Komsomol committees of collective and state farms and enterprises must make wide use of such tested forms of Komsomol and youth participation in the protection of public wealth as Komsomol posts, Komsomol patrol groups for the protection of the fields, and Komsomol 'light cavalry' raids.

The above case is of interest particularly because it illustrates methods of checking and applying disciplinary actions which were to be closely copied not only by the Komsomolski Prozhektor (Komsomol Searchlight), the control system of volunteers set up two years later, but also by the new PGK Committees. In this respect, the Komsomol light cavalry raids of the late 1950's and early 1960's served as models for later actions by people's inspectors. Although this particular period of revived Komsomol checking activity does not coincide with Shelepin's leadership of the Komsomols, since he left them in 1958, nevertheless his subsequent headship of the PGK suggests that the continuity of practices was not entirely coincidental. On the other hand, it would reflect only basic good sense for Shelepin and his colleagues to make conscious use of this earlier Komsomol experience, as well as the early innovations of the soviets and trade unions with volunteer inspectorates, in fashioning the later institutions and practices.

The diversity of practices, missions and structures of the public control systems that had developed by the late 1960's in the USSR deserves further emphasis here if only to

point up the substantial size of the problem of coordination which the People's Control Committee inherited in this regard. Therefore, before discussing the latter subject directly, a brief examination needs to be made of these varied activities and institutional forms. Illustrating the wide-ranging interests with which the soviets have become occupied, standing commissions are formed according both to "branch" and "functional" principles. Examples of the branch type are the standing commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet for industry, transport and communications, and those attached to local soviets for health or for communal and housing affairs. Functionally oriented commissions are the planning and budget commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet, or the standing commissions for socialist legality of the local soviets. Existing at all levels, the commissions are intended not only to conduct overall surveillance of the government apparat as a whole (at the level of the Supreme Soviet), but to examine in detail the daily operation of administration at all levels.[30] At its August 1966 session, the USSR Supreme Soviet organized the following standing commissions for each House: Mandate Commissions, Planning-Budget Commissions, and Commissions for Industry, Transport and Communications, for Construction and the Industry of Building Materials, for Education, Science and Culture, for Trade and Services, for Legal Proposals, for Foreign Affairs.[31] N. V. Podgorny, Chairman

of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, in his report "On the Organization of Standing Commissions of the Soviet of the Union and Soviet of Nationalities," summarized the advantages of the new commissions. They would more carefully examine the plans for the nation's economic development, for the state budget, deeply analyze the plan indicators in certain branches of the economy and culture, and more thoroughly analyze the work of the USSR ministries and departments, ferreting out causes of shortcomings. Below the all-union level, standing commissions are expected to conduct extensive control over the work of the government apparatus at their respective levels.[32] Thus, at the level of local soviets, "standing commissions check on the execution of the directives of the soviet and of its ispolkom, of directives of the superior organs, the fulfillment of laws and decrees of the government," and they verify the work done on behalf of the soviet's constituents. They also systematically check the work of the sections and administrations of the ispolkom, and of enterprises and establishments (on questions related to the competency of the commissions).[33] Some standing commissions (depending upon the particular decree under which they operate locally) conduct inspections of the fulfillment of the orders of their own soviets and ispolkomy by all organs, establishments and enterprises, and even citizens located in the territory of the given soviet.[34]

An illustration of trade union control activity in quite a different area of interest concerns the inspection of trade and public dining enterprises. This is only one area where the trade unions employ volunteer inspectors, for they are also enlisted to help state and sovprof technical inspectors in checking safety and health provisions at work sites, or as members of plant Commissions on Protection of Labor to check safety engineering, sanitation and the general observance of labor legislation.[35] However, the work of trade union inspectorates in public dining establishments offers us a clear picture of what inspection by these groups entails. By the Decree of July 31, 1964, the Presidium of the VTsSPS confirmed a new "Statute on the Commission and Groups of Public Control of Factory, Plant, and Local Trade Union Committees over the Work of Trade and Public Dining Enterprises,"[36] which defined the procedures for organizing these control groups and the operational techniques they were intended to employ. As the title of the statute indicates, the organizational structure has two forms: the Commission and the Group. The Commission is the directing and coordinating instrument responsible for the over-all improvement of workers' trade and dining facilities; the Group is the instrument chiefly of public involvement and of practical day-to-day checking. Thus, Commissions are smaller (though the statute makes little distinction, commissions being specified as not less than

5 members, Groups as not less than 7), and less numerous. "A Commission of Public Control is formed by the Factory, Plant or Local Trade Union Committee [FZMK] of an enterprise, institution, or educational institution" for the purpose of ensuring day-to-day control over the work of trade and public dining enterprises.[37] This Commission, made up of "the most active workers and employees of the enterprise or institution" as judged by the FZMK, operates for a term of one year under the leadership of a member of the factory committee. Its mission is to dedicate itself to "the improvement of services of trade enterprises for the workers, employees, and members of their families on the basis of day-to-day public control over the work of stores, luncheonettes, restaurants, house kitchens, coffee shops, snack bars, depots, and fruit and vegetable kombinaty, not only uncovering shortcomings in the activity of trade and public dining enterprises but also helping to eliminate them."[38] The Commission works according to a plan framed for it by the FZMK, and accounts directly to the FZMK.

For the purpose of on-going operations in trade and dining establishments, the Commission holds elections for Groups of Public Control. Each trade and public dining enterprise, depot, etc., is assigned a Control Group, which carries out the following day-to-day tasks: 1. Takes part in the drawing up of plans for trade turnover and other economic indicators of a trade and dining unit. 2. Makes

daily checks of the observance of workrules. 3. Verifies details of food preparation, storage and handling, including adherence to menus, adequate satisfaction of public demands, etc. 4. Checks goods for quality. 5. Suggests new, improved methods of serving the public. 6. Watches for discrepancies in prices charged, weights sold, etc. 7. Watches for discourtesies and apathy in service to the public. On this point the statute says: "The Group sees to it that there is a complaint and suggestion book in trade enterprises which is permanently located in a visible, accessible place."[39] 8. Checks special security measures for storing valuable materials. 9. Helps to secure better, mechanized equipment. 10. Helps with preparation of the weekly, or ten-day menu plan. 11. Helps directly with repair and maintenance of trade and dining enterprises. 12. Checks the maintenance of sanitary and personal hygiene rules by service personnel. 13. Checks at depots or fruit and vegetable kombinaty on correct fulfillment of orders and methods of distribution, and in addition, studies the correctness of the orders placed by stores, i.e., "the status of calculations of the demand for goods, the timely conveyance of this demand to the industrial enterprises, other suppliers, or superior trade organizations."[40] 14. Finally, the Group rewards excellence of service which they discover, by presenting brigades, sections, departments and individual workers with suitable awards, including not only

awards of "Shock Workers" and of "Enterprises of Communist Labor," but also such special awards as, "Brigade of Distinguished Service of Buyers," or badges: "Excellent Worker of Soviet Trade," "Excellent Worker of a Consumers' Cooperative," and, as the statute notes, "other encouragements."[41]

These tasks of the trade union Group of Public Control adequately summarize the day-to-day checking which these units are supposed to perform. The Commission, while directing the Groups in this work and being ultimately responsible for the quality of their performance, has much more far-ranging duties. It is responsible, for example, for the overall equitable placing of trade and dining facilities to best serve all the workers. Working with the FZMK and the management of the enterprise, it attempts to secure the establishment of these facilities, not only convenient to the workers' place of work, but to their living quarters as well, and to equip these facilities, providing them with fuel, transport, and inventory "of the most modern kind." The Commission attempts to insert a section concerning the improvement of such facilities in the union's collective agreement with management, and helps in drawing up the trade turnover plan and other economic indices of a worker's supply section. It handles all the organizational work of control--the preparation of meetings of workers and employees held by the FZMK or the shop committee to which directors of an enterprise or of the trade

or dining establishment must make an accounting, the election of Groups of Public Control, their instruction in methods of control and party and government decrees, as well as technical matters and regulations related to the trade and dining facilities, and the general supervision of the Groups' activities. It draws up proposals based on all these practical findings aimed at the improvement of trade and dining facilities. It brings questions concerning the work of trade enterprises and the subsidiary farms, maintained by some enterprises,[42] to the attention of the FZMK, of general meetings or of conferences of workers and employees.

Turning from the trade union inspectorates, we find that many similar "task forces" are formed by Komsomols at enterprise work sites. The Komsomols, however, have, in their volunteer control network of "Prozhektoristy" a more versatile inspection instrument, systematically organized to respond to control needs in any situation where young Communists are found. The structure of the Komsomolski Prozhektor in fact resembles the organization of the People's Control Committee. Like the latter, it is made up of two parts: a staff hierarchy and a broad base of grass roots inspectorates. The staff organization, comparable to the NK Committee network, comprises the "headquarters" of the Komsomol Prozhektor. Staff units of this apparatus are created in Komsomol committees at all territorial levels. Thus, the Central Headquarters of the Komsomol Prozhektor

was created in the Central Committee of the Komsomol and headed by the first secretary of the All-Union Komsomol organization.[43] And, according to the "Statute on the Komsomol Searchlight," of March 20, 1963, corresponding units, headed by the respective secretary of the Komsomol committee, were to be created "in industrial and rural production committees, the district committees, city, regional and territorial committees of the Komsomol, and the Central Committee of the union-republic Komsomols."[44] The broader enlistment of both Komsomols, and the "most authoritative and energetic non-Komsomols" as well, was to take place at the enterprise level, where detachments and groups or posts of Komsomol Prozhektor were to be organized. "Detachments of 'Komsomol Prozhektor' shall be created at enterprises, construction sites, on state and collective farms, institutions, scientific research institutes, design offices, and designing organizations. Groups or posts of 'Komsomol Prozhektor' shall be formed in shops, divisions, and sectors."[45] The practical work of these detachments and groups is now carried on under the close supervision of the People's Control Groups.

According to the 1963 Statute, the entire "sub-organization" of the Komsomol Prozhektor is under the guidance of local Komsomol agencies, carrying out missions assigned by the respective party organizations, the agencies of the KNK and the Komsomol committees. Komsomol meetings,

plenums and activist groups are empowered--and are expected--to hear regular reports on the Prozhektor activities. And Komsomol committees are given the authority to coopt and confirm the Prozhektor staffs. They are expected to choose these members from among "the directors of detachments of 'KP,' Komsomol activists, the foremost people in production, representatives of the intelligentisia, and the youth press, radio and television." Detachments and groups are formed by the "enlistment" of reliable young workers.[46]

In sum, the contribution of Prozhektor in extending the reach of the People's Control Committee seems to be chiefly in providing a young army of volunteers, available to join forces with the People's Control effort in whatever way seems most expedient in a given situation. This point is supported by the following characterization of "KP" work: "Komsomolski Prozhektor is an important form of mass participation of the Soviet youth in the performance of tasks presented them by the organs of People's Control, in assisting party organizations to eliminate shortcomings in the work of enterprises and establishments. However, "KP" does not enter into the system of organs of People's Control.[47]

While the sizable public control systems already existing in 1962 and the variety and multiplicity of their tasks conveniently presented the KPGK with a domain of operations underway, they also challenged the KPGK with a

formidable task of coordination. In the following sections some methods of achieving coordination that have since been worked out will be examined. The need for careful coordination in practice of the various groups of public control is so apparent to the observer of the Soviet systems of public control that it is somewhat surprising that more careful efforts were not made in advance of the appearance of the Party-State Control Committee to specify forms and relationships more precisely. Clearly it was anticipated by the designers of the KPGK that effective coordination of investigations could help to avoid duplication of efforts and wasted time and could contribute to the mutual improvement of the various control efforts, and further that experience could be profitably shared. However, how this would be done was left to the ingenuity of practitioners and administrators of control operations. Practice, over time, did produce a number of cooperative relationships between public inspectorates of the public organizations and the People's Control agencies.

One general form of cooperation is the joint consideration of plans of inspection. Another is the joint inspection itself or the subsequent joint discussion of methods of handling problems which are raised during the course of investigations. An important effort at coordination is the enlistment of trade union, soviet, or Komsomol "controller-citizens" in the work of seminars conducted by

the organs of People's Control. Perhaps of greatest importance are follow-up coordinated efforts which bring local, low-level problems to the attention of higher agencies of authority whose involvement and actions can have decisive effect in particular local cases. By such "vertical" involvement of higher People's Control Committees or higher party or state agencies the "reach" of the KNK in extended in another important dimension.

The following examples begin with some of the concrete methods of cooperation worked out by the People's Control Committees with trade union volunteers. At one chemical-pharmaceutical factory, PGK Groups and Posts of Assistance created for control over the "introduction of rational proposals and the protection of labor" were said to be working closely with the respective commissions of the factory committee. Important results of their investigations were presented at a joint session of the buro, the People's Control Group and the presidium of the production conference.[48] Clearly, when trade union organizations already exist in an enterprise for purposes which the new control groups tend to duplicate, it has been to their mutual advantage to work together. At one factory manufacturing automobile parts an examination undertaken by the local Group of Assistance touched upon the questions of raising labor productivity and the quality of production. Here it was found expedient for the Group to consult closely with

the leadership of the factory production conference. When the Groups of Assistance turned to the inspection of technical security, this investigation was organized together with the trade union Commission for the Protection of Labor.[49]

An account of cooperative work in a Kirghiz textile plant rather fully describes several other forms control coordination takes in practice. Here, the factory production conference has attached to it, four commissions: for the use of raw materials, for financial audits of the enterprise, for the quality of production and for the productivity of labor. The Groups of Assistance of PGK early established ties with each of these commissions, as well as with the presidium of the production conference. Joint checks were performed with the appropriate groups, and the results of these checks were subsequently discussed by the presidium of the production meeting. How such cooperation can prove of mutual advantage was shown by a case which involved large losses of raw materials during the production process. Ordinarily these losses were reported monthly, but their causes were by that time quite impossible to trace. People's controllers, instituting a day-by-day accounting of the raw materials with the help of the volunteer inspectors of the trade union, pinpointed the daily losses, which could then be much more effectively dealt with.[50]

In the case of the volunteer inspectorates of the soviets, these often work side by side with Assistant Groups of the NK Committees at local levels, where they are concerned with many questions related to the ordinary citizen's living conditions, with housing, with cultural building, with the work of medical institutions, with enterprises of trade and public dining establishments, and so on. For example, in Tbilisi, an Assistance Group of the housing administration of a local suburb, having made a survey of the needs and wishes of the local inhabitants, was able to satisfy some of their requests by soliciting the cooperation of local soviet volunteer groups, as well as higher PGK authorities. Proposals were drawn up on the basis of the Assistance Group questionnaire for the lengthening of the local bus route, the installation of additional telephone service, repair of streets and sidewalks in the settlement, the opening of several new shops for the sale of essential goods, and so on. These were brought to the joint consideration of the City PGK Committee, members of the standing commissions of the local soviets, workers of corresponding sections and administrations of the *ispolkom*, and other members of the soviet *aktiv*, and subsequently, the proposals of this group were presented to the Tbilisi City Soviet, where action was taken to satisfy the needs of the suburban community.[51]

Another example, this one from a city raion in Sverdlovsk, similarly illustrates both the varied control tasks that standing commissions perform at lower levels and how their work is coordinated with the efforts of the people's inspectors. Here, the question of how to involve wide citizen participation in PGK activities was considered at the meeting of the ispolkom of the district soviet. Standing commissions and PGK Groups of Assistance were subsequently called upon to work together at the Sverdlovsk Machine-Building Plant

> to check on the fulfillment of party and government directives on improving the quality of production; at the Sverdlovsk Staff of Conductors--[to check] the condition of production and financial discipline and the service of passengers; at the Krupski Sewing Factory [to inspect] the handling of customers' orders; and at the Bread and Macaroni Kombinat [to determine] how well socialist property was being conserved and how economically flour was being used.[52]

The combined forces of standing commissions, nonstaff sections (especially those concerned with trade and dining establishments) and PGK nonstaff sections conducted inspections of trade establishments in the raion, checking on their mechanization and use of refrigerator equipment, on the style of work in restaurants, observance of trade rules and regulations concerning the preservation of socialist property, the economizing of fuel and electricity, and so on. Finally, the Housing Commission of the ispolkom, in conjunction with the Bureau of Complaints and Suggestions of the Committee of PGK, checked on the attention being

given to the regulations by which living quarters were locally assigned.[53]

As these examples once again confirm, the field of operations of local soviet standing commissions is as varied as are the many needs of local communities, and it includes as well the whole apparatus of local state government. Standing commissions at all levels, in fact, play a sizeable role in control, and as the chief representatives of the public in checking upon the entire state apparatus, their role is a distinctive one. In other areas, their control duties often overlap with those of other public inspectorates. Trade and public dining enterprises are obvious examples. Thus, the need for coordination with other control groups in such areas perhaps provides an added reason for the reorganization of People's Control, which seems intended to tie the structure of this organization more directly to the soviet organs themselves.[54]

Existing separately, but with its own chain of command and channels of communication, the Komsomol control system has made its own independent efforts to systematize and coordinate earlier sporadic and disorganized methods of achieving control objectives. One source, commenting on the early formation of KP organs in Leningrad in the fall of 1962, noted that "Komsomolski Prozhektor united the already existing raiding brigades, Komsomol Control Posts, the Staffs for New Technology, the Councils of Young

Specialists, and the Young People's Construction Bureau."[55] The examples which follow illustrate forms of coordination which have subsequently been developed between the Komsomol Prozhektor and the People's Control Committee at the "grass roots" level.

The first case concerns the Administration of the Kirov and Admiralty Ship-building Factories whose investigation showed an excessive waste of metal scraps resulting from the production of factories in its territory. Directives were issued, and managers of enterprises gave promises to stop the waste of valuable scraps, but the situation regarding metal losses remained as before. In view of the ineffectiveness of this single, sweeping investigation of the use of waste metal products, the oblast headquarters of Komsomol Prozhektor decided to commission factory staffs of "KP." To them, on the spot, shortcomings could be more easily seen and the causes pinpointed and eradicated. Accordingly, Prozhektoristy of the Kirov and Admiralty Shipbuilding Factories organized a mass investigation of the utilization of the wastes of production and established a regular check of the enterprises in their territory.

> The Komsomol Prozhektor of the Kirov factory showed special zeal in this matter. Together with the People's Controllers of the enterprise, members of "KP" went around the factory territory, visited the shops, the sectors, established what kind of stores of unused metal could be directed to production, why certain leaders of shops did not trouble themselves about the collection of metal, about the economic use of wastes from the

blast-furnace and from other metallurgical production. On the initiative of the staff, all the shop Komsomol organizations began a constant watch over the disposal of the by-products of production. . . . They not only observed but also took active part in the collection of metal scrap, redirecting it to metallurgical production. In the course of one week one open-hearth shop received an extra 800 tons of metal extracted from the waste.

The materials of the raid of the Komsomol Prozhektor were considered at the meeting of the City PGK Committee. To this meeting were invited the managers of many enterprises that were failing to utilize wastes of production and secondary raw materials, workers of the Leningrad City Office of Glavvtorsyre (the Chief Administration of Secondary Raw Materials) and of the Leningrad Regional Economic Council. The talk was sharp, principled. The meeting strongly indicted those who failed to make the best use of the wastes of production, throwing on the scrapheap needed industrial raw materials. For the unnecessary disposal of a great quantity of waste paper and for failing to fulfill agreed upon obligations with a unit of Glavvtorcyre, the City Committee of Party-State Control imposed a money fine in the amount of half his month's salary upon N. M. Ashurov, the deputy director of the printing firm, 'The Printing House.' The deputy director of the factory 'Electrician,' S. M. Nikitin, received equally severe punishment. In its decision, the Committee of Party-State Control obligated the leaders of the enterprises of the Leningrad Oblast Administration of the Russian Chief Administration of Secondary Metals to strengthen control over the accounting, storing and rational use of metal scraps, waste paper and other byproducts of production, to prevent their unnecessary loss. In order to implement this decision, the combined forces of the Raion Committee of PGK and the Groups of Assistance and the Komsomolski Prozhektor of the enterprises were to be called upon.

This raid taught the Komsomol Prozhektoristy how to organize a mass inspection, and clearly showed that unused reserves are everywhere, that it is necessary only to uncover them and direct them to the service of the economy.

The singular economies of this raid made it possible to consider a still further valuable undertaking of the Komsomol Prozhektor. This took place at the time of the all-union mass inspection of the inventory and utilization of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, the conditions of their accounting and storage which had

been launched by the PGK Committee of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers.

Prozhektoristy of the drop-forge shop of the factory "Bolshevik" . . . carried out a raid, examining the expenditure of metal. Great disorders were discovered: scrap of metal waste, rusting machine tools under the open sky, pieces of stores scattered about--all this did not escape from the attentive eyes of the young inspectors.

But what could be done to prevent new nuts, washers, deficient bearings, lathe shavings, chisels, drills from falling into the mountains of shavings intended for smelting? . . . How could each kilogram of metal be turned to account?

It was decided to bring this up for discussion at a Komsomol meeting. Members of the raiding group described to these young people what kind of losses the factory was suffering from uneconomic expenditure of metal, and pointed out specifically several culprits.

"It is necessary to return to the struggle for economic expenditure of metals at each work site," decided the young people of the drop-forge shop. "Have each Komsomol become a Prozhektorist first of all at his work bench, at his own place of work."

Soon after the meeting, a special Creative Group was formed, attached to the factory staff of the Komsomol Prozhektor. Its staff was made up of young technologists, economists, rationalizers, and innovators of production. This group began helping the Prozhektoristy to carry out an analysis of the expenditure of metal in the shop, announcing results of raids and defining their tasks.

The initiative of the Komsomols of the drop-forge shop was supported by the factory Group of Assistance to Party-State Control. Experienced engineers, technologists, workers were brought to the assistance of the young people. They considered what could be done by each worker and by the whole collective to economize the expenditure of metals and to increase their utilization. It was decided to retain scraps suitable for the preparation of small items and not send these off for smelting, and to pay strict attention to the quality of the preparation for work of instrument, presses and hammer. It was pointed out also that much metal could be economized by means of lowering the discard in the making of small parts, by the more rational dispersal of materials, and by the introduction of progressive technology.

The example of the Komsomols of the drop-forge shop quickly found support in other shops of the enterprise. In many of them "Creative Groups" were formed to help

> the Komsomol Prozhektor and actively joined the search for unused metal reserves. Members of the factory staff of "KP," together with the shop PGK Group of Assistance, considered the plan of work, talked over the methods of carrying out raids in the enterprise, about the issuance of "Molniya" ["Lightning," the Komsomol local news sheet used to publicize control activities], and wall newspapers, advertizing the course of the mass inspection of the accounting, preservation and use of ferrous and nonferrous metals. In the "Economizing Compaign" were included all the detachments and posts of "KP," many young workers and engineering-technical personnel.
>
> The very first months after this mass compaign began brought glad tidings. The Brigades of Communist Labor of Nikolai Sokolov, Sergei Klimov, Antoliya Kopronov and Ivan Berezin saved more than 800 tons of metal.[56]

This lengthy example of the joint activities of the Komsomol Prozhektor and the organs of PGK illustrates the way in which the mutual contacts make the work of each group more effective. First of all, the combined forces of Assistance Groups and Prozhektoristy made possible a broader, "grass roots" inspection than had been possible before. These inspectors were able to make observations of work in progress at the lowest level--where they themselves were often concerned and where some of the malpractices were occurring. Without this kind of inspection at the lowest levels, it is not surprising that earlier administrative investigations had been unable to uncover these root causes. Moreover, the inclusion of a small "army" of "KP" and PGK inspectors in the business of longterm, day-by-day surveillance of waste undoubtedly created new opportunities for the more effective elimination of unnecessarily wasteful practices.

The union of Komsomol and Party-State Control activities had repercussions at higher levels as well. Taking advantage of the authority of the Leningrad City PGK Committee, the controllers were able to indict negligent managers at a fairly august assemblage of interested government and economic officials. Obviously, the Komsomols by themselves could not exert this kind of influence, but with the power to threaten ultimate fines as a result of their inspections, they might expect greater cooperation from factory managers in the future.

Finally, the ready cooperation of technicians, engineers, and skilled members of Assistance Groups in such a venture as the Prozhektor "Creative Group" could greatly facilitate the innovation of new methods and techniques of improving production. Subsequently, those techniques found useful could be easily communicated to other Komsomol groups concerned with control problems, and applied elsewhere.

Cooperation of people's controllers and production conferences makes possible more effective types of control, extending the implications of control itself. For example, when production conferences and engineering personnel work out recommendations on the mechanization and automation of production processes, or on the better organization of labor and production, or on ways to improve the quality of production and to lower costs, such recommendations can

have impact only if they are acted upon. As Lukyanov and Rodionov have concluded: "It is very important that the control over the fulfillment of these recommendations be reflected in the plans of the PGK Groups of Assistance for carrying out inspections, raids, and checks."[57] However, while stressing the very great importance of ties between PGK and the factory production committee,[58] these authors insist that direct contacts between PGK Groups and trade union public inspectorates are equally important, though perhaps for different reasons. In the latter case, special importance attaches to the educational impact of control upon the participant, who thereby "passes through a school of instruction in the management of production."[59]

Time and experience have not diminished the need for cooperation. The realization of this point is expressed in the proposals of the Plenary session of the Central Council of Trade Unions which opened in Moscow on January 27, 1970. The somewhat random and unsystematic joining of forces in mutual activities is no longer considered sufficient by itself, although, as V. I. Prokhurov, a Secretary of the Central Council of Trade Unions asserted, "Joint checkups with People's Control Agencies should become a more widespread practice."[60] Urged now is the union of control groups at the factory level into "joint commissions." According to the plenum resolutions:

> The plenary session of the Central Council of Trade Unions emphasizes the necessity of further strengthening the trade unions' ties with the People's Control agencies in the struggle for a regime of economy. To this end, they should set up joint commissions for supervision over the preservation of material goods, draw up plans for the joint verification of the fulfillment by economic organizations of the decisions of directive agencies on cutting administrative and overhead expenses and production costs, and appoint trade union representatives to participate in checkups, inspections and the work of People's Control Groups.[61]

And it is important to note that the January 1970 Trade Union Plenum continued to stress the goals of heightening the efficiency of production and of enlisting all the working people in this struggle. Perhaps characteristically, A. N. Shelepin, Chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions, noted on that occasion:

> It is especially important constantly to work on increasing all employees' sense of responsibility and discipline for the work assigned to them, for the fulfillment of state plans and the prompt commissioning of production facilities and the swiftest possible assimilation of rated capacities.

Finally, the plenum resolutions reiterated the old charges:

> to develop in every way the public principle in the activity of the trade unions [themselves], to strive systematically to reduce expenditures on the maintenance of the paid staff of trade union agencies and the organizations and institutions subordinate to them, and more widely to enlist the trade union aktiv in the activity of these organizations and institutions.[62]

Greater public participation in control and management remain on the lips of Soviet leaders as a prime method of "increasing all employees' sense of responsibility and discipline."[63]

The examples that have been presented here for the most part illustrate the positive values which effective coordination by the People's Control agencies of widespread control efforts "from below" can and does achieve. What this summarizes, however, is not a balanced inventory of actual practice and results, but an ideal picture of accomplishment, an encouraging yardstick of achievement, which is apparently intended by the Soviet authors of the materials cited to draw the public inspectors forward in faithful emulation. Only such an isolated example as the urging of the Trade Union plenum for institutional reforms to achieve closer ties between People's Controllers and trade union volunteer inspectors does suggest that coordination may not on the whole be proceeding as smoothly as desired. Considering the magnitude of the task of coordination--which grows as the ranks of inspectors themselves and their missions increase in number--the absence of negative aspects in the evidence presented here would clearly be misleading if accepted as an appraisal of how well the KNK is realizing its potential as chief control coordinator. In the next chapter, where a general, overall evaluation will be attempted of how well the People's Control Committees are carrying out their chief missions, evidence concerning the clashes, dysfunctions and chaos of much control practice and focussing upon the difficulties of the public inspector's

assignments, will hopefully present a more balanced appraisal of actual achievement.

CHAPTER VI--NOTES

[1]V. Evdokimov, Organizatory massovo narodnovo kontrolya (Organizers of Mass People's Control, Moscor, 1965), p. 37.

[2]See Ibid., p. 42.

[3]Ibid., p. 44.

[4]See above, Ch. I, p. 28 ff.

[5]Spravochnik partiinovo rabotnika (Party Official's Handbook; Moscow, 1957), pp. 448-57; it has been pointed out by Christian Duevel ("Radio Liberty Dispatch," December 13, 1957) that the plenum which passed this decree on the soviets took place at a moment when Khrushchev's prestige, owing to the Hungarian intervention in November 1956, was "at its lowest point since the death of Stalin." Duevel advances the theory that "Khrushchev's opponents, who were mainly entrenched in the Government, used the opportunity to press for a greater role and more competence for the soviet (i.e. Government) organs." He further suggests that the subsequent "reshuffle of the Presidium at the June [1957] plenum signified a severe setback for the Government representation in the supreme policy-making organ of the CPSU. Henceforth and throughout Khrushchev's tenure of office the party apparat held the absolute majority in the Presidium of the Central Committee. The earlier intentions to give more 'rights' to the soviets remained thus largely on paper. Khrushchev's overthrow in October 1964 was bound to reopen this sore problem. In point of fact, in late November 1964 Izvestia came out with the complaint that the role of the soviet organs had been 'belittled' under Khrushchev. . . . The directive Pravda editorial of December 6, 1964 'The State of the Whole People' finally spelt out the new line which was fairly positive for the Government organs. However, this favorable constellation did not last very long. It seems that by the end of 1965 (when Shelepin was ousted from the Party-State Control Committee) Brezhnev had completely regained the initiative and was once again implementing the old Khrushchev line in relations between the party and state organs." What Duevel has traced is the continuing tug-of-war between "pro-soviet" and "pro-party" groups, who disagree on the locus of the authority

in the Soviet state. The evidence is that the "role of the soviets as the leading one" is often argued, but that its proponents have been in a position only intermittently (as in January 1957, again when the 1961 Party Program was written, and perhaps also in 1965, when the People's Control Committee structure was reformed) to attempt to implement its precepts.

[6]Howard R. Swearer, "Popular Participation: Myths and Realities," Problems of Communism, Vol. IX, No. 5 (September-October 1960), p. 43.

[7]Narodny kontrol v SSSR (People's Control in the USSR; Moscow, 1967), p. 49.

[8]Spravochnik partiinovo rabotnika, 1957, p. 454.

[9]Soviet Statutes and Decisions, Vol. V, No. 2 (Winter 1968/69), p. 73.

[10]Swearer, Problems of Communism, p. 43; Izvestia, February 17, 1959.

[11]"Vybory v Sovetu" (Elections to the Soviet), Sovety Deputatov Trudyashchikhsya, No. 2 (February), 1959, p. 4.

[12]L. G. Churchward, "Continuity and Change in Soviet Local Government, 1947-1957," Soviet Studies, IX (1958), p. 271; Yu. V. Todorskii, Postoyannye komissii mestnykh Sovetov deputatov trudyashchiknsya (The Standing Commissions of Worker's Deputies; Moscow, 1955), p. 4; interview of Churchward with A. A. Vayuzlin, August 28, 1957; A. Medvedev and F. Khlystov, Kulturno-prosvetitelnaya rabota selskikh Sovetov (Cultural-educational work of Rural Soviets: Moscow, 1953); A. Va. Luzhin, Postoyannye komissii mestnykh Sovetov deputatov trudyashchikhsya (Standing Commissions of Local Soviets of Worker's Deputies; Moscow, 1953); A. K. Aleksandrev, Postoyannaya zhilishchnokommunalnaya komissia gorodskovo Soveta deputatov trudyashchikhsya, (Standing Communal-Housing Commissions of City Soviets of Workers' Deputies; Moscow, 1955).

[13]NK v SSSR, p. 93; See also, Sostav deputatov mestnykh Sovetov deputatov trudyashchikhsya, izbrannykh v marte 1965 g. (Composition of Deputies of Local Soviets of Working People's Deputies Elected in March 1965; Moscow, 1965), p. 44.

[14]M. P. Georgadze, "XXIII sezd KPSS o povyshenii roli Sovetov deputatov trudyashchiksya" (The XXIII Congress of the CPSU on Heightening the Role of Soviets of Working

People's Deputies), XXIII sezd KPSS i voprosy gosudarstvennovo stroitelstva (XXIII Congress of the CPSU and Questions of State Construction; Moscow, 1968), pp. 16-17.

[15]P. B. Bersheda, "Uchastie obshchestvennosti v deyatelnosti sovetov (po materialam Ukranskoi SSR)" (Public Participation in the Activity of the Soviets, According to Materials on the Ukrainian SSR), Ibid., p. 190.

[16]NK v SSSR, p. 93.

[17]See Emily C. Brown, Soviet Trade Unions and Labor Relations (Cambirdge, Mass., 1966), pp. 86 and 112.

[18]E. Panova, Kontrol profsoyuzov za soblyudeniem trudovovo zakonodatelstva (Control of the Trade Unions over the Achievement of Labor Legality; Moscow, 1967, p. 7. Panova also notes that the technical inspector is ubiquitous in industry and [mechanized] agriculture, "the basic link accomplishing state surveillance over the protection of labor in the system of the trade union." p. 4.

[19]V. Syrov and G. Orkin, Spravochnik obshchestvennovo kontrolera (Handbook of the Public Inspector, Moscow, 1965), p. 6.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Trud, July 28, 1962.

[22]See Brown, p. 112; Trud, October 29, 1963; see Brown, pp. 112-114, for further discussion and evidence in the press of this development.

[23]Ibid., p. 19.

[24]Materialy XIII sezda professionalnykh soyuzov SSSR (Materials of the XIII Congress of USSR Trade Unions; Moscow, 1964), p. 100; see also p. 124.

[25]A. N. Lukyanov and V. A. Rodionov, Partiino-gosudarstvenny kontrol v promyshlennosti (Party-State Control in Industry; Moscow, 1965), p. 175.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Allen Kassof, The Soviet Youth Program (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), p. 113; the evidence cited is from N. Sizov, "Zadalneishii podem raboty komsomolskikh organizatsii predpriyatii" (On the Further Development of the Work of

Komsomol Organizations in Enterorises), in Komsomolskaya rabota na predpriyatii (Komsomol Work in the Enterprise; Moscow, 1951), pp. 809.

[28]Kassof, Soviet Youth, p. 113.

[29]Ibid., p. 114

[30]NK v SSSR, p. 131.

[31]Izvestia, August 4, 1966; In the December, 1966 issue of Soviet State and Law, two legal scholars, S. G. Novikov and M. A. Shafir were already arguing for increasing further the powers of the Mandate Commissions to include checking the performance of deputies on behalf of their constituencies.

[32]On the reforming, controlling and organizing functions of standing commissions see K. F. Sheremet and G. V. Barabashev, Sovetskoe stroitelstvo (Soviet Building), p. 230; NK v SSSR, p. 141.

[33]NK v SSSR, p. 142.

[34]Particular examples are the decrees on the work of the standing commissions of local soviets in effect in the Uzbek, Kazakh and Georgian republics; NK v SSSR, pp. 142-43.

[35]Brown, Soviet Trade Unions, pp. 86, 112, 119, 124, 194, 195, 221.

[36]This statute has been translated in Soviet Statutes, pp. 64-72, from V. N. Alipov, M. I. Kogan, I. N. Sadikov, comp., Pravila raboty torgovykh predpriyatii i prodazhi tovarov: shornik normativnykh materialov (Rules for the Work of Trade Enterprises and the Sale of Goods: A Collection of Normative Materials, 3rd rev. ed., Moscow, 1965), p. 456. This statute followed a period of growth of these enterprises stimulated by two joint decrees of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers. The first, ratified February 20, 1959, was "On the Further Growth and Improvement of Public Dining Establishments," and the second, passed on August 8, 1960, was "On Measures for the Further Improvement of Trade."

[37]Syrov and Orkin, Spravochnik, p. 9; In the case of large factories with union shop committees, the shop committee can form a separate Control Commission.

[38]Ibid., p. 11; and Soviet Statutes, pp. 65-66.

[39]Soviet Statutes, p. 69.

[40]Soviet Statutes, p. 70.

[41]Ibid.

[42]The Commission is also responsible for attempting to increase the productivity of these farms and to organize public control over the proper use of their produce. A Commission is also intended by the statute to be attached to the worker's committee of sovkhozy (state farms) to check on the proper distribution and allocation of agricultural produce and municipal services, according to law, for the public dining of workers and employees. See Soviet Statutes, p. 67.

[43]"Polozhenie o 'Komsomolsom prozhektore'" (Statute on the Komsomol Prozhektor), confirmed by the Central Committee of the Komsomols, March 20, 1963. The statute was first published in Komsomolskaya pravda, March 23, 1963. It can also be found in Spravochnik narodnovo kontrolera (Handbook of the People's Inspector; 2nd ed., Moscow, 1965), pp. 36-42; and has been translated in Soviet Statutes and Decisions, Vol. V, No. 2 (Winter 1968-69), pp. 96-99.

[44]Spravochnik NK, p. 38.

[45]Ibid., p. 38.

[46]Ibid., pp. 38-39.

[47]Narodny kontrol v SSSR (People's Control in the USSR; Modcow, 1967), p. 173.

[48]Ibid., p. 176.

[49]Sovetskie profsoyuzy (Soviet Trade Unions), No. 16 (1963), p. 4.

[50]Lukyanov and Rodionov, PGK v promyshlennosti, pp. 177-78.

[51]V. Evdokimov, Organizatory massovovo narodnovo kontrolya (Organizers of Mass People's Control; Moscow, 1965), p. 45.

[52]Ibid., p. 45.

[53]Ibid., p. 46.

[54]While theoretically the involvement of the public in all these groups is considered to further what Soviet writers speak of as the "democratization" of Soviet society (meaning apparently the voluntary assumption by ordinary unpaid citizens of more and more of the country's management tasks), the incorporation of volunteers into the soviets has received the greatest recent emphasis. This has been especially true since the establishment of the People's Control Committee. In fact, one recent Soviet source has flatly stated that "the basic role in creating people's control belongs to the soviets" (NK v SSSR, p. 37), a claim presumably based on Lenin's assertion that establishment of such control would signify that "Russia had one foot in the door of socialism" (V. I. Lenin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, XXXI, p. 445). And many Soviet writers today see Soviet "democratization" or "Communist self-government" as centered in the further development of the standing commissions of the soviets where the participation in control of the public elements is centered: "Without [enhancing the role and broadening the powers of the soviets' standing committees] . . . it is impossible to enhance the role of the soviets in all spheres of the country's life. This is an important problem, a link in the single process of strengthening the Soviet socialist state and gradually transforming its administrative bodies into communist self-government"; V. V. Varchuk and V. I. Razin, "Issledovianiya v oblasti politicheskoi organizatsii sotsialisticheskovo obshchestva," (Research in the Sphere of the Political Organization of Socialist Society), Voprosy filosofii (Questions of Philosophy), No. 4 (April), 1967, pp. 134-43; CDSP, Vol. XIX, No. 23, p. 10.

[55]B. Surovtsev and A. Shevtsov, Komsomolski prozhektor (The Komsomol Searchlight; Leningrad, 1966), p. 4.

[56]Ibid., pp. 12-16.

[57]Ibid., p. 178.

[58]Such ties "in full measure answer the demands of the Program of the CPSU, instructing that the production conferences must be transformed 'into the most active organs, facilitating the improved work of the enterprises and the control over production.'" Programma Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskovo Soyuza, p. 299; Lukyanov and Rodionov, PGK v promyshlennosti, p. 179.

[59]Ibid., p. 180.

[60]Trud, January 28, 1970, p. 2.

[61] *Ibid*.

[62] *Ibid*.

[63] See above, n. 61.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Public participation in monitoring Soviet economic and administrative operations has been described at some length. The recent history of Soviet public control systems and many of their current forms have been outlined, and goals set for them have been enumerated. In conclusion, some assessment must be attempted here of how well the public inspector is achieving these assigned goals, and in particular, how well he is performing his missions of economic and administrative control. To be still more specific, concerning the economic assignments, we will examine what kinds of economies have been claimed and achieved and whether these seem to be "one-shot affairs," "paper victories," or of genuine and lasting importance. Concerning administrative control, we will try to determine how well the public inspector has fulfilled his assignment of improving the mechinery of government and of replacing staff members with volunteers in various areas of Soviet administration.

Next, we will explore briefly some changes that the introduction of volunteer workers into control agencies has brought about in more traditional state control methods and the special circumstances surrounding the public inspector

himself that appear to affect the quality of his work. Questions will be asked concerning what particular pressures the volunteer inspector faces in carrying out his duties, and how his position differs from that of a controller in the Ministry of State Control. In sum, the major portion of this chapter will deal directly with the performance of the public inspectorates in achieving their assigned missions of control.

Finally, a broader assessment of the role of the public inspector in Soviet society will be assayed, focusing upon the socialization mission which participation in control is expected to perform. Viewed from this perspective, public control systems are seen as fulfilling an essential role in the current Soviet economic and social systems, in fact, an expanding role whose importance is likely to increase as economic and social conditions in the Soviet Union continue to evolve. In this context, the public control systems must themselves be viewed as agents of change, by their activities contributing to the changing fabric of Soviet society.

Before attempting an evaluation of how well the public inspector is accomplishing his control tasks in various areas of the Soviet economy, the difficulties of making a sound appraisal must be set forth. Even so limited an objective as judging how well the People's Control Committee has carried out its most concrete and simple tasks

encounters a host of problems. The source of greatest difficulty perhaps lies in the nature of the evidence with which we must deal. Most of the materials upon which this study has been based are Soviet accounts--books and articles from newspapers and periodicals--which share certain shortcomings. In the main they are designed or redesigned, selected and edited to serve the purposes of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Thus, they may be more instructive concerning particular campaigns and motives of the party at a given moment than in reflecting the conditions of Soviet society itself. Through such lenses, images may be skewed. Materials reporting upon the activities of People's Control agencies, for example, inevitably display a "rigged ratio" of praise and blame, leaving the observer to guess at the real proportions of success and failure that prompted the writers' comments. Personal observations of the Soviet scene by Western observers can be used (and have been used here) to correct distortions in the source materials, but isolated observations are no substitute for systematic and extensive field studies and are clearly open to criticism on the basis of their own unintended but inevitable selectivity.

The very nature of the problem being investigated presents difficulties. For if, as will be argued here, the ultimate objective of the People's Control Committee, beyond the immediate goals of its inspections, is the larger concern

of transforming ordinary citizens into creative and responsible managers, the attempt to assess the success of this effort clearly faces formidable obstacles. As Frederick Barghoorn has remarked, "to a degree impossible to determine without field studies . . . enforced participation is self-defeating."[1] Just how self-defeating, however, we are left with scant basis to judge. Nevertheless, from the Soviet sources, the informed insights of Western scholars, and our own highly selective first-hand observations, we shall later draw some tentative conclusions.

Meanwhile, the quality of thought of Soviet scholars and the supporting evidence presented in Soviet sources should not be condemned out of hand. Many Soviet writers earnestly address themselves to the problems of seeking better methods of control and of achieving the greater democratization of Soviet society. As for the factual accounts with which they deal, these might be usefully compared to Soviet statistical material, which, while perhaps leaving much to be desired in the way of accuracy, honesty and exhaustiveness, nonetheless forms a sufficiently sound basis for on-going Soviet economic and social planning. Just as present-day Soviet statistics may be incomplete or simply withheld, but rarely lie, so the accounts used here are not designed simply to mislead the Western scholar, but are intended for internal use, to provide necessary data. And Soviet scholars themselves reveal serious concern

with improving the quality and relevance of their materials. A particularly apt illustration of this concern appeared in a bibliographical article in Voprosy filosofii, dealing with works on the political organization of socialist society. The following passage not only expresses the authors' concern about the quality of scholarship and data, but emphasizes as well the difficulty of attempting to judge Soviet realities on the basis of frequently questionable reports.

> A survey of the literature shows that a general shortcoming in many of the works is that they consider a number of problems in isolation from the real process of the development of the socialist state. The authors largely restrict themselves merely to the study of various documents, and their conclusions, therefore, are at times of an abstract nature. It is no secret, however, that the various records and reports do not always reflect the real processes correctly. It is also known that in the recent past certain irresponsible executives deliberately exaggerated the figures in their reports, with the intent of demonstrating the rapidity of the process of "democratization," and that some credulous scholars embellished reality on the basis of these inflated figures.[2]

What Kind of Savings Have Public Inspectors Achieved?

A prime economic task of people's inspectors is to achieve savings of all kinds, and the Soviet press constantly reports their success, often in terms of cash value. Our evaluation of results must therefore begin with an examination of some of these reports, in order to determine just what kind of material and monetary contributions the people's inspectors claim to have made to the USSR national economy.

In an article published early in 1969, Deputy-Chairman of the USSR People's Control Committee, Iosif Shikin, briefly summarized past achievements of the control agencies in a manner that typifies many claims made generally for control groups at all levels:

> With the active participation of the people's controllers, up to 10 billion kilowatt-hours of electric power were economized in the country in 1968. This is equivalent to the yearly output of such a giant as the Volga Hydroelectric Power Station named "22nd CPSU Congress." The people's controllers in industry and construction work helped to attain savings of a large quantity of material and monetary resources. Many tens of millions of poods of grain saved from losses during the harvest are credited to the rural people's controllers. In connection with the drafting of the State Plan for the Development of the USSR National Economy and the 1969 Budget, the organs of people's control have searched out additional possibilities and reserves which can be used to increase the output of industrial products and especially of consumer goods.[3]

This statement exhibits two traits that characterize many control success stories. One is the vagueness of the <u>quantity</u> of material and monetary resources," "<u>many</u> tens of millions of poods of grain," and "<u>additional</u> possibilities and reserves." The other trait is the arbitrary selection of a very precise amount, such as Shikin's "ten billion kilowatt-hours of electric power." Why not, "up to eleven-point-five billion kilowatt hours" or some other figure? One suspects that in this case it was the example of the Volga power station--which afforded a striking image--that suggested the precise amount of the savings, and not vice versa.

One gains a strong sense of formalism from such success stories. Both the vagueness and the seemingly-contrived precision of many claims suggest that they have been manufactured simply for the record, for report purposes. An example already noted is the claim of an Izvestia correspondent that by installing thermostates on electric appliances, "enough electricity might be saved on electrical appliances in Moscow apartments alone to illuminate a city of two million."[4] The fine precision of this figure is marred by the writer's failure to include a time period for the illumination. Would the city be illuminated for five seconds? Five minutes? The figure was apparently mythical, but if not examined too closely had a nice sense of concreteness about it--just the combination of qualities, in other words, that points to formalism.

But if a sense of formalism pervades most success stories of inspection results, there are also many convincing accounts, enough to indicate that people's inspectors are effectively exposing waste in many areas. A case in point, to the credit of the Latvian Republic People's Control Committee describes a correction of major proportions in the port operations at Riga.[5] Executives of the port administration, dissatisfied with Riga's rating as a third-class port, which was based on the annual volume of cargo it handled (400,000 tons, mostly fish), had managed to increase the port's volume of cargo by utilizing "loose"

bookkeeping methods and by engaging its ships in the hauling of dredging materials and dirt fill. They had expanded Riga's volume of cargo, in fact, to 711,000 tons (253,000 of which were sand dredged from Riga's harbor), and thereby increased their own salaries and bonuses. Fishing boats experienced delays in unloading, and mechanization of the regular harbor facilities apparently languished, until the KNK stepped in and put an end to the illegal and wasteful practices.

The correction of this kind of situation is of obvious benefit to the Soviet economy, though exact quantification of overall results is beyond the powers of the Soviet authorities themselves. In fact, the kind of clearly formalistic reporting of the successes claimed by People's Control agencies may very well be justified by the obvious impossibility of measuring the multiplied impact of many such genuine accomplishments. Meaningful measurements cannot presently be made. Perhaps in the long run, economic results will become evident in rising productivity, improved quality of output, and similar indicators. Even then, however, since such gross indices are influenced by a multitude of other factors, the discrete impact of the public inspector must probably go largely undetermined. Meanwhile, People's Control Committee officials are safe with their alleged victories, since it is unlikely that anyone could check out all the claims.

Certainly the People's Control agencies have produced useful innovations in some areas, and may be expected to produce more. One innovation is the discovery of new forms and methods of control. Some of these have been admittedly ad hoc or "one shot" cases which cannot produce results indefinitely. Nevertheless, insofar as public initiative can be stimulated to search for shortcomings, presumably it will prove more flexible and inventive and less formalistic in its approach to inspection problems than traditional methods have. The first year of Party-State Control Committee activity produced an abundance of novel, "one-shot" methods. The Moldavian example of utilizing uncultivated strips of land along roadways will be recalled as a case in point.[6] In the Kazakh Republic's Karaganda Oblast, an Assistance Group on one of the sovkhozes discovered a number of private cattle in the public herd. When this improper circumstance came to the attention of the Kazakh Party-State Control Committee, the committee ordered similar counts of the public herds in all the agricultural oblasts of the republic. "In a number of oblasts, tens of thousands of cattle, sheep, and hogs, livestock which belongs to private individuals, have been discovered in among the common herds. . . . In just the Zaisanski Agricultural Production Administration alone, over 17,000 livestock were found to be unlisted."[7]

Kazakh Republic PGK Chairman Kozlov mentions another "new form" of control which may offer more lasting results. This is the formation of "so-called Thematic PGK Assistance Commissions. They will include many scholars, economists, engineering and technical workers. These commissions will study definite problems and will propagandize and introduce advanced experience."[8] Concrete examples of the work of the thematic commissions included proposals for rationalizing and improving production methods in the mines of the Karaganda Coal Basin. On the basis of the technical expertise and practical experience of various members of the Assistance Commissions, the PGK Committee of the Karaganda Oblast Industrial Party Committee and the Oblast Executive Committee hoped to increase coal production throughout the oblast by 12-13% in 1963. A joint conference of Karaganda engineering and technical workers and combine operators was called in June, to discuss the suggestions of the thematic commissions. On the face of it, this new kind of "Stakhanovite" effort to increase productivity by disseminating knowledge of new techniques might well be expected to produce positive results over time.

What these examples seem to point up is the potential which People's Control agencies may possess for the adaptation of control methods to changing times and changing conditions. In the myriad places in the Soviet systems of production and administration where checking of performance

s constantly required, new bottlenecks, new evasions and ew shortcomings require new and different kinds of controls. ld forms become ritualistic, inadequate, or inapplicable. ew drives, the fresh, widespread application of public zeal can devise new methods of control to fit the changing conditions, and even branch out to discover new, more rational methods of organizing production processes themselves.

But drawbacks are present as well. For what has been described as the new drive of the public sounds very much like the old "campaign-technique" in a new guise. Lacking in this inspection picture is the steady, constant, and effective surveillance needed to accompany the application of the public's initiative. Unfortunately, therefore, the lasting application of public initiative in devising new control measures would seem to depend ultimately on the level of enthusiasm with which participation in control can be maintained. And this presents us with a dilemma: how well the public is educated in management skills and a sense of civic responsibility depends upon active public participation; while active participation is most reliably generated by an internalized sense of responsibility. Enforced participation is expected to produce a New Soviet Man, who is a self-motiving individual, perpetually initiating "campaigns from below." The nub of this problem is whether the commitment of participants can be acquired through "volunteer" control activities whose voluntarism is questionable.

A further drawback to instilling commitment is the nature of certain control methods that encourage formalistic behavior on the part of the participants. The methods of carrying out inspections, reporting on their results, and accounting for discovered shortcomings often result in what appears to be automatic responses and volumes of paper work. Repeatedly, for example, the discovery of shortcomings ends in the issuance of a resolution, followed by a public statement such as:

> The CPSU Central Committee has instructed the Committee of the Tadzhikistan Communist Party to submit a report to the CPSU Central Committee in January 1970, on the course of fulfillment of this resolution.[9]

Widespread eliciting of reports and explanations tends to have less of an impact in eradicating shortcomings than in producing paper. And the inspector easily falls into routines that fulfill outward requirements and produce reports. One is reminded of the ritualistic signing of comments in the ubiquitous book of customer's comments which is inevitably presented to the rest camp visitor, dining car customer, river cruise sojourner, and others. Where comments and suggestions are thus solicited, the tendency most often is <u>not</u> to criticize, but to repeat acceptable slogans, to say and do what is expected by the person who is being judged. To the extent that public inspectors behave in similarly unproductive and stereotyped patterns, the greater initiative and self-motivation that

are desired goals of public participation will prove elusive.

Have People's inspectors curtailed the government's administrative machinery and caused it to operate more economically?

Along with the effort to economize the economic resources of the nation, another prime objective of the People's Control Committee, often repeated in the Soviet press, is the improved operation and simplification of the Soviet Union's economic and governmental apparatus. Numerous discrete instances of administrative economies are constantly reported. Not only are the people's controllers and other volunteers expected to reduce the number of regular staff members required in public, economic and governmental administration, but they are also intended to take a hand in restructuring the state apparatus, to eliminate overstaffing in inflated administrations. The following example of action by public inspectors to reduce overstaffing in an agricultural region comes from the Chairman of the Kazakh Republic PGK Committee:

> It is known that the sovkhozes in our republic play the main role in our agricultural production. What has happened is that, over recent years, there has been a considerable increase in the administrative and managerial apparatus. On certain sovkhozes of the Tselinny Krai there is one administrator or assistant for every four or five workers. On sovkhozes of Kokchetavskaya Oblast there has been a 40% increase over the past three years in the number of auxiliary and administrative personnel.

> [And he continued:] Party-State Control workers of the Tselinny Krai have studied thoroughly the various local situations and have introduced specific proposals for simplifying and curtailing the administrative-managerial apparatus of sovkhozes for the consideration of the krai party committee. According to their figures, about 10,000 persons in the krai can be released from the sphere of management and shifted into the sphere of production.[10]

An example of alleged achievement in reducing administrative personnel was offered more recently by I. Shikin:

> On instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the USSR Council of Ministers, the People's Control organs carried out a number of inspections aimed at improving the operation of the state and economic administrative machine. Typical in this connection is the experience of the People's Control Group at the Rostov Agricultural Machine-Building Plant. At its initiative, a reorganization of the structure of plant and shop management was carried out, and over 400 administrative and management personnel were released.

And he further notes that:

> In connection with drafting the plans for the nationsl economy and the 1969 budget, the People's Control Committees joined with financial organs in submitting proposals to reduce expenditures for maintenance of the administrative apparatus.[11]

Staff cuts are easily measured and should provide evidence of the successful operation of the People's Control Committee over time if real gains are scored in this area of activity. In fact, if the current results are really as sizable as reported, it should be possible at this time to make some overall assessment of their impact. The two Soviet writers, Varchuk and Razin, whose concern with Soviet scholarship was mentioned earlier, have suggested that one important indicator of the impact of greater public

participation in administrative activities would be the demonstrated reduction of the size of the state apparatus. In their words:

> Drawing in the public and improving the structure of the state apparatus is a single process. If the figures we have attesting to the enlistment of the public are large, but we find neither the slightest reduction of the state apparatus nor the least improvement in its work, we must conclude that the enlistment of the public is being conducted for the sake of the enlistment itself, for the sake of a good showing; i.e., we find it yields no effect and at times merely distracts the energies of party and state officials. . . .[12]

To illustrate their point, the authors refer to "certain officials" in the executive committees of the soviets who have "turned over some of their work to . . . volunteer bodies without changing the pay or staff of the regular apparatus." Such officials, they say, are often, in fact, "hostile toward concrete proposals to reduce staffs and eliminate such links in the apparatus as have become unnecessary."[13]

Establishing facts about the size of the state administrative apparatus or the staff of the public organizations is difficult since Soviet sources do not break down their statistics to show the staff personnel of these administrative agencies separately. The heading Administrative Organs does appear in Soviet statistical handbooks; however, it is a compound heading which lumps State and Economic Administrative Organs and Administrative Organs of Cooperative and Public Organizations. Since figures on state administrative

agencies and the administrative organs of social organizations cannot be isolated, any conclusions about the growth or contraction of the state apparat alone cannot be made. For the purposes of this study, however, the problem is not too serious perhaps, for the People's Control agencies are presumably committed to the reduction of the administrative machinery generally of all government, economic and public organizations. Any reduction in the combined personnel of all these administrative organs would therefore be significant.

The figures do not, however, show a reduction. What the statistics do indicate in general terms is a stability of numbers of staff personnel, at least through the early 1960's. In the 25-year period ending in 1965, the distribution of all inhabitants of the Soviet Union employed in the national economy shows that the percentage of those employed in the apparat of Organs of State Administration, of the Administration of Cooperative and Social Organizations, and of Credit and Insurance Organizations in successive years was as follows: 1940 = 3%; 1950 = 3%; 1958 = 2% 1960 = 2%; 1964 = 2%; and 1965 = 2%.[14]

A further breakdown of the figures fails to reveal any decrease in the numbers of administrative personnel, when compared with the increasing labor force in all areas. During the span of years which might be expected to be most revealing for this study--the period of the 1960's when

public control was instituted--the entire work force of blue-and-white-collar workers (excluding kolkhozniki) has shown a steady increase. Taking 1960 as 100, the following increases are recorded: 1961 = 106; 1962 = 110; 1963 = 114; 1964 = 118; 1965 = 124; 1966 = 128; and 1967 = 133.[15] If we compare with this the numbers of workers and employees in the following gross category, Apparat of the Organs of State and Economic Administration and Organs of Administration of Cooperative and Social Organizations, for the same span of years, we find a similar growth rate. Taking 1960 as 100, 1964 = 109; 1965 = 117; 1966 = 124; and 1967 = 132.[16]

The Administrative Organs have been further refined by Murray Feshbach for the years through 1964, into State and Economic Administrative Organs and Administrative Organs of Cooperative and Social Organizations.[17] According to his figures, taking 1960 as 100, State and Economic Administrative Organs show the following growth rate: 1961 = 104; 1962 = 106; 1963 = 105; 1964 = 109. Much the same pattern is shown by Administrative Organs of Cooperative and Social Organizations: 1961 = 105; 1962 = 107; 1963 = 106; and 1964 = 109.

The pattern of growth in the numbers of the apparat of Soviet administrative and public organizations during the period of the 1960's for which figures are presently available closely parallels the growth rate of the Soviet Union's entire work force during the same period. For the

first 4-year period, from 1960 to 1964, the personnel in the administrative apparat increased at an overall annual rate of 2%. After 1964, the increases were sharper: 1964-1965 = 8%; 1965-1966 = 7%; 1966-1967 = 8%.[18] The entire work force of the Soviet Union grew at roughly the same rate. On the basis of these gross indicators, therefore, while the administrative apparat cannot be considered to have unduly expanded, neither can it be adduced that the administrative staffs in the Soviet Union during the first seven years of the 1960's experienced a remarkable decrease of paid personnel.

The continuing appeals in the Soviet press for new efforts to cut the staffs and expenses of the administration suggest that the battle has in fact hardly begun. The October 1969 Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, "On Measures for Improving the Staffs and Reducing the Cost of Management," makes the following plea:

> The CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers have made it incumbent on USSR ministries and departments and Union-Republic Councils of Ministers to draw up and carry out measures for improving the structure of the managerial apparatus and eliminating excesses in the staffs of enterprises, organizations and offices so as to reduce 1970 expenditures on the upkeep of the managerial apparatus by 1,700,000,000 rubles.[19]

An impressive figure and a stout resolution! Thus the planned reductions of personnel go on, but only the future statistics in Narodnoe khozyaistvo can attest to the final,

large-scale effectiveness of all efforts--including those of the People's Control Committee--in achieving the planned reductions of personnel.

Some Consequences of Public Participation in Control Work.

The introduction of volunteers into inspection work has given rise to criticism on many counts. Public organizations generally, with their broad membership of ordinary citizens, have been critically characterized by one Soviet source as "poorly organized, unstable, operating on the basis of enthusiasm alone."[20] The role of the public inspector has itself been questioned.[21] And the wisdom of endlessly multiplying volunteer committees has also been debated. A chairman of the executive committee of a district soviet, for example, wrote to Izvestia in the following manner:

> If anyone should ask me what nonstaff departments, committees and subcommittees, groups and subgroups, posts, and so on, we have in our executive committee, I probably could not give a precise answer. There are so many that I cannot list them all. Don't hurry to reproach me: "Well then, are you against the public, chairman?" No, I am for the public, but for one that will really take an active part in the work of the soviet. I am also against the imposition on us of stereotyped recommendations: Set up such-and-such a nonstaff department, organize such-and-such a committee of public volunteers. How does this turn out in practice? As is known, every district soviet has its standing committees. But we have been advised to set up as many more nonstaff departments as there are committees. Moreover, these nonstaff departments duplicate the soviet's standing committees in every way (even in their names).[22]

Frequent complaints are registered about how the activities of the volunteer inspector in economic enterprises result in the overlap of inspection efforts, the waste of management and employee time in inspections and meetings, the dislocation of work.[23] Moreover, the inspector himself sometimes wonders where he is expected to find enough free time to carry out his control duties, as the following passage shows. The writer is a Moscow taxi driver, active party worker, member of the Party Bureau of Taxi Garage No. 3, and chairman of the People's Control Group:

> How can one best adjust one's personal free time to the demands of public work? . . . [Each month, in addition to the time that I spend on my regular job] . . . there remain 10-12 days that are in fact free. When we start to make up our monthly plans for volunteer work, this number of days is insufficient.
>
> Judge for yourselves: Consider me and my colleagues--chairmen of shop committees, secretaries and members of party bureaus; you will find that each of us is obliged to attend in the course of one month: two sessions of the party bureau, one meeting for all party members in the garage, two sessions of the People's Control Group and one general meeting each of the shop party organization's communists, the column trade union and the brigade.
>
> To this we must still add the quarterly meetings of the People's Control Groups and of the party organization aktiv, conferences, etc. Add participation in ad hoc commissions and People's Control inspections--sometimes lasting several days--and there goes your week! All our month's free days turn out to be taken up by volunteer work.[24]

Of more long-range importance are some effects which the introduction of volunteer inspectorates may be having upon staff responsibilities for control. Sometimes,

apparently the introduction of volunteers has encouraged a tendency of responsible officials in the apparat, at least at lower levels, to delegate their control responsibilities to the volunteer organizations. "Reports of early efforts at control by the lowest level of nonstaff soviet inspectorates indicate that the soviet officials in the executive committees sometimes tended to shrug off their traditional control duties."[25]

Such a tendency could have important repercussions for citizens' participation. Insofar as this practice grows, and citizens are quick to assume responsibilities thus delegated by default from staff agencies, the area of citizen responsibility for decision making is expanded. In fact, this tendency is an interesting counter force to the pressures toward what Grey Hodnett has described as the "atrophy of participation." In many cases where a staff worker is presented with a group assignment for which his superiors hold him responsible, there is, as Hodnett points out, a strong tendency toward one-man leadership to get the job done as simply as possible.[26] The group comes to play no role at all. If public control groups are able to reverse this tendency, the subject-participant role of the Soviet citizen may easily become more active and independent.

Probably the most common response of the staff official who enjoys the assistance and services of volunteer

inspectors is not to delegate responsibilities, but to find that his own duties have actually increased in order to include the supervision of these amateur inspectors in the performance of their assigned tasks. In some cases the responsible staff member may consequently find his duties multiplied past endurance. Such a case is described by the chairman of the executive committee of the Khasavyurt District Soviet, B. Batyrov: In a district of 75,000 inhabitants and 30 rural soviets, Chairman Batyrov's district executive committee's staff consists of only four other members: his deputy-chairman, two instructors and a secretary.

> Thus it happens [he says] that our deputy-chairman, for instance, is at the same time the chairman of no less than 11 committees. The latter are set up according to decisions of the superior agencies; each such decision carries a clause demanding that the deputy-chairman of the district soviet executive committee be confirmed without fail as the chairman of one committee or another. You can judge for yourself how much sense there is to this "versatility." But there is no one else to appoint. . . .[27]

This, too, is an interesting development resulting from the multiplication of volunteer groups, for it is obvious that as the groups multiply, the supervisory powers of responsible officials are stretched so thin as to be nominal. Strict supervision, however, would appear to be a basic requirement of subject-participatory activity.

Participation in control duties has important consequences for the volunteer inspector himself, for he is subject to many local pressures which undoubtedly affect

the quality of his work. In this regard, perhaps the greatest weakness of the public inspector is his vulnerability before those he may be expected to control. The response of managers to Komsomol inspection groups is described by Komsomol officials in Allen Kassof's study:

> It happens, unfortunately, that the observations of the raiders . . . cause displeasure in some careless business executives. . . . The first reaction of such an executive to the remarks of the Komsomol members is, "It's not your affair, kids."[28]

And Kassof adds, "The life of the Komsomol organizer is not always an easy one."[29] The Togliatti incident, which was described here earlier,[30] told of the difficulties of the public inspector who persisted in recording the errors of her colleagues and superiors and, failing to receive the backing of the People's Control staff, lost her regular job. This wrong was subsequently rectified, and the whole affair was exposed in the press, but the proportion of those inspectors who silently suffer recriminations from their revelations must be large. And those inspectors who collaborate with the perpetrators of the shortcomings they discover must also be numerous.

Evidence concerning the latter category is frequently published. For example, there is the recent case involving the "Laboratory for Neutralization and Problems of Energetics," LANE, which spent ten years and millions of rubles ostensibly designing purification devices to eliminate air pollution from gas engines. Three years of investigations by various

inspection agencies, including the USSR People's Control Committee, into the net results of LANE's decade of activity, produced many glowing accounts of ongoing projects. In the words of Izvestia:

> It was only on June 12, 1969, in an order issued by the USSR Ministry of Tractor and Farm Machine Building, that a spade was called a spade for the first time. (Here is a verbatim quotation: "During the entire existence of the laboratory virtually no work was completed and turned over to industry.")[31]

One reason why earlier inspections had failed to reveal the true state of affairs was that "people who were supposed to be disinterested judges were materially dependent on the director of the very organization that they should have been supervising."[32] The director had bought them off. How much easier it must be to buy off or scare away the lowly plant inspector, self-appointed to the task of control, and dependent on his superiors for his job!

Even the factory worker whose regular job may be quality control or the inspection of operating equipment, and so on, is under considerable pressures to provide cursory inspection only. Joseph Berliner, in his Factory and Manager in the USSR, has treated in great detail the subject of control in the factory during the Stalinist period.[33] His examples clearly reveal the many pressures exerted on plant inspectors by foremen, engineers and shop chiefs to okay shoddy goods needed to fulfill the plant's production quota. Production officials, says Berliner,

"are as likely to report on their recalcitrant colleague [a conscientious plant inspector] to the director as the other way around."[34] Certainly, today's volunteer inspector at his own place of work courts even greater displeasure from colleagues and superiors than those former professionally-assigned inspectors Berliner is writing about. And because today's public inspector is more apt to be interested, due to his own regular job, in the meeting of production quotas, he would be more hesitant than a disinterested inspector to declare spoilage and delay deliveries.

Any plant inspector, volunteer or not, is more closely involved with his colleagues in the enterprise he is checking than are outside controllers, such as those of the old Ministry of State Control.[35] On the other hand, the plant inspector, being intimately acquainted with his enterprise, knows better than any outsider where to look for mismanagement and waste. Moreover, the public inspector who may also be a skilled or professional worker has the necessary technical knowledge to discover old weaknesses and to devise new and better ways of doing things. Finally, the public inspector is close to ubiquitous.

All these attributes were among those that Khrushchev counted on to make public inspection so effective that no misdeed could escape detection. What he wanted to stamp out were such irregular practices of managers as stockpiling hard-to-get items, the employment of tolkachi to secure

others, and so on. Evidence of KNK accomplishments indicates that people's inspectors have had considerable success in exposing tolkachi and in turning up "hidden reserves" not included in regular inventories. Describing the results of one check, Chairman Kovanov said,

> On October 1968, the national economy had 2-7 million rubles of above-norm supplies. During the check, Plyushkins [an allusion to Gogol's miser] were encountered who had stocked up raw materials and [other] materials for two to three years ahead.[36]

Many accounts are much more detailed, and resemble the following report of reserves left unlisted in the inventories of the administration of the Underground Mine Construction Trust of the USSR Ministry for the Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises:

> [Among the unlisted reserves were] 2,423 linear meters of metal pipe, 73 tons of rolled and formed metal, 1,643 linear meters of steel cable, 972 linear meters of communications cable, 500 square meters of place glass, and other materials. . . .[37]

If, under the present operating conditions of Soviet industry, the stockpiling of certain materials is necessary for the regular fulfillment of production quotas, it is not clear whether the public inspector is helping or hindering the Soviet economy by exposing these "unused reserves," or bringing to light other "extra-legal" practices which the Soviet manager often finds essential for the successful operation of his enterprise. In the past, as Jerry Hough has pointed out, the Soviet leadership itself has generally maintained a "fairly understanding attitude" toward "Berliner

practices" so long as plan indicators were being fulfilled.[38] Berliner has also suggested that the old Ministry of Control did not strive to eliminate such practices, but only to keep them within acceptable bounds.[39] Thus, if the inspectorates of public control should prove more determined in exposing irregular management practices than the traditional instruments of control, this could indeed influence the operating techniques of Soviet economic management in a manner which Soviet managers themselves might find restrictive. In this connection it is unclear how the "meddling" people's inspector may influence a manager's inclination to innovate at the risk of incurring the initial lag or drop in production that accompanies the introduction of a new technique. Currently public control operations are not designed to make allowances for such lags; thus they would seem to threaten with penalties the manager whom the Liberman reforms would encourage to take risks.

The foregoing sections have dealt with the subjects of how well the public control systems in the USSR have been achieving their control objectives, what dimensions they have added to the older ministries of control, and with certain other consequences of the introduction of public participation into control work. The treatment has stressed the inadequacies of the volunteer systems and the difficulties they have faced in achieving the specific control objectives they have been assigned. But the significance

of public participation in control is not at all confined to the successful accomplishment of control tasks. This is a point which must be stated most emphatically. There remains a much broader significance of public participation in control which must be included in the final appraisal of this institution. There remains, in fact, the mission of control agencies which is not immediately concerned with control objectives at all, but which is concerned with the socialization of the Soviet citizen.

The leaders of the People's Control Committee continue to emphasize that "education is a primary aim of People's Control."[40] The Statute on People's Control Agencies describes the work of the public inspector as "an honorable social duty." In its performance the citizen is expected to internalize standards of collective responsibility. In Shikin's words:

> Of enormous political significance is the participation of millions of workers in the management of governmental affairs through the system of control. V. I. Lenin had expressed the wish that the entire mass of workers would be given the experience of participating in the Worker and Peasant Inspectorate. It can be said that today, this wish of Lenin's is being successfully carried out. More and more hundreds of thousands of Soviet people, who become members of the Groups and Posts of People's Control, which are elected anew every year, the millions of participants in the inspections and raids--all of these are acquiring the skills of state and public activity, and their feelings of ownership of the country is strengthened, and this is one of the primary functions of the system of people's control.[41]

Ultimately, of course, the New Soviet Man is expected to constitute an improved control instrument,[42] but the first

and foremost product which participation is intended to fashion is the New Soviet Man himself. In the last analysis the continuing and growing significance of public participation in control must be acknowledged to exist just here, in this widespread activation of the Soviet citizen, with its intended consequences of political socialization.

A great deal has been said in earlier chapters concerning the post-Stalinist revival of citizen's participation in many areas of Soviet life. The volunteer efforts that produced the Comrades' Courts and druzhinny, and the growing numbers of citizen groups attached to the soviets, trade unions, and Komsomol organizations have been enumerated. What has been recorded is a kind of participatory explosion, with everexpanding repercussions, capable of creating new impacts. We are now faced with the problem of attempting some evaluation of these repercussions. What is their probable impact on Soviet society today, and what will it be tomorrow? If, indeed, volunteers act as agents of change, what kinds of change and response do they tend to stimulate?

One answer to these questions must be sought in terms of the evolution of Soviet society, and the role which public control systems are playing in the transformation of the Soviet economic and social systems. To clarify this point a reference to the Stalinist period must be made, for the changes instituted by Stalin in creating a great

new industrial order and educating the technological personnel to man it continue to transform Soviet society. It is perhaps an oversimplification, and yet a meaningful one, to argue that the Stalinist totalitarian administrative model, by its success in achieving miracles of industrial development, created its own obsolescence, that the very success by which a higher stage of industrialization was reached made archaic the earlier "Stalinist" methods of operation. New methods were needed. The rigid, centralist mold had to be broken, and had to be supplanted by more flexible, decentralized decision-making in economic areas. Terror and capricious central leadership increasingly revealed their dysfunctions in the developed economy. Stalin's successors have sought new solutions of organization and operation, in administrative and economic decentralization, in economic reforms, in substitutes for terror, while continuing the process of technical education.

What needs to be emphasized here is that certain processes have their own momentum. While industrialization is one such process, the education of a nation's technical manpower is another. The educated man or technician in whatever field, for example, is less tolerant of irrational behavior in his area of competency than the uneducated one. Education implies the internalization of certain "professional" standards of conduct (again, within the respective field of training), even of (the familiar phrase) "intolerance

to shortcomings." On the one hand, the educated man is less willing to accept uninformed guidance or interference in his own field of competence, whether this guidance originates in the party, the government or elsewhere. On the other hand, where professional norms reinforce the normative teaching of the party, the educated man is more likely than the uneducated one to meet the moral standards of the New Soviet Man. Thus, education simultaneously fosters independence, initiative and--conformity.

Meanwhile, the increasingly complex industrial society that has come to exist in the Soviet Union today multiplies the demands for more education, for the more intelligent and responsible performance of millions of citizens. Their initiative and intelligence must somehow be brought to bear more effectively in the collective interest. Initiative and responsible behavior at lower levels daily grow more essential for the better operation of the economic system and the administrative one. If People's Control Committees cannot rise to this challenge, then other methods of stimulating innovation and responsibility will have to be sought to supplement and further the gentle prodding of production-related propaganda and to instill achievement values and related norms of conduct. Ultimately the little men down the line must be trusted--and worthy of trust.

Today, the convergence of many pressures--along with the many needs--to create a responsible, trustworthy citizen

suggests that not only will progress be made toward this end, but that other transformations will be entailed as well. For these pressures and needs are changing the fabric of Soviet society. In the past, pre-revolutionary Russia seemingly lacked the tradition of public organs that had existed in Western democracies or even Eastern ones, such as Czechoslovakia. But today, public control systems, in conjunction with the other mass organizations, are establishing and multiplying patterns of participation in Soviet society which will have undoubted, if unpredictable, future impact. The very creation of machinery for public participation and the present broad dimensions of this public activity are providing a basis for future developments that may well stimulate greater individual initiative and create new and different forms of participation in the years ahead. Today the long-missing tradition and habits of citizen participation are being established in the Soviet Union.

However, a cautionary point needs to be made concerning this participation. This point concerns the impact of citizen participation on the role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We have spoken here about the participatory "explosion" while suggesting that a greater decentralization of decision-making is required in the Soviet Union today. The implications of the "explosion" imagery are entirely fitting. The movement in the direction

of more lower-level decision-making is fraught with centrifugal political tendencies. And it is clear that if the ordinary citizen, the technician, the expert, is to be given the responsibility of running his small corner of the state shop, his willingness to make the right decision for the state's interest becomes, from the point of view of the political leaders, of ever greater concern. Moreover, the centrifugal tendencies have extremely important implications for the political structure of the Soviet Union.

Earlier, some essential characteristics of this political organization were noted, such as, the highly-centralized political and economic structure, single-party rule, and the social orientation of the individual to the collectivity. Given these characteristics, the party's response to centrifugal tendencies of the participatory explosion may be clearly anticipated. For if the existing political structure of the Soviet Union is to be maintained, the integrating power of the party--in fact, the importance of the party as a necessary cohesive force--is more urgently needed as participation expands. The present form of the Soviet political system requires that growth in citizen's participation be balanced by a stronger guiding party; hence such continued growth can be expected to elicit increased efforts by the party to enhance its centralizing, integrating and dominant roles.

In the past decade, it has been the fashion among some Western observers of the Soviet scene to suggest that the CPSU had lost not only its viability but its rationale for existence, since the economic managers, technicians and skilled personnel required to operate today's vast and complex economic empires had this business well in hand, and since in fact the needs of the economy would dictate political decisions. The party, like Stalin, has been viewed as breeding its own obsolescence. Despite certain elements of truth in this view, the fact remains that political considerations are still paramount in the Soviet Union. The need for centralization and cohesiveness is above all a political need of the Soviet state in its present form. While citizen participation may offer a flexibility needed by the economic and social systems in the Soviet Union today, it is not about to displace the party at this moment in certain of the latter's vital roles, such as goal setting and in guiding political socialization processes. In fact, the party's role in these areas can be expected to grow in importance through its attempts to maintain its own ascendancy.

Thus, if the party has its way, subject-participation, meaning the party-guided active civic involvement of millions, has an assured future in the Soviet Union. Whether the responsible citizen will in the long run continue to accept all the goals set by the party and submit in every way to

his subject role cannot be answered here. Presumably, the party's prerogatives will always remain in question, for as has been repeatedly pointed out here, participation, subject or not, is difficult to keep perpetually in bondage. Therefore, despite the party's zeal, intentions and dominance, the genuine potential of public control systems to effect change in the Soviet social system over time may well find unprecedented opportunities to develop in the years ahead upon the ground being prepared by the many and varied forms of citizen participation in the Soviet Union today.

CHAPTER VII--NOTES

[1]Frederick C. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR (Boston and Toronto, 1966), p. 15.

[2]V. V. Varchuk and V. I. Razin, "Issledovaniya v oblasti politicheskoi organizatsii sotsialisticheskovo obshchestva" (Research in the Sphere of the Political Organization of Socialist Society), Voprosy filosofii (Questions fo Philosophy), No. 4 (April), 1967, p. 142.

[3]I. Shikin, "Leninskie printsipy narodnovo kontrolya v deistvii" (Leninist Principles of People's Control in Action), Partiinaya zhizn (Party Life), No. 2 (January), 1969, p. 10.

[4]Izvestia, November 15, 1963, p. 3.

[5]V. Sochenov and I. Kovalenko, Ekonomicheskaya gazeta (Economic Journal), No. 47, November 18, 1968, pp. 38-39.

[6]See above, Ch. IV.

[7]G. Kozlov, Chairman of the Kazakh PGK Committee, in Pravda, June 26, 1963, p. 4.

[8]Ibid.; the thematic commissions seem to resemble the "creative groups" organized by Komsomols in Leningrad factories, which are described in Ch. VI.

[9]Partiinaya zhizn, No. 1 (January), 1969, p. 8, concerning the work of the Tadzhikistan Communist Party in fulfilling the decisions of the XXIII Congress.

[10]Pravda, June 26, 1963, p. 4.

[11]Shikin, Partiinaya zhizn, No. (January), 1969, p. 12.

[12]Varchuk and Razin, Voprosy filosofii, No. 4 (1967), p. 143.

[13]Ibid., p. 14.

[14]Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1965 (The National Economy of the USSR in 1965) (Moscow, 1966), p. 555.

[15]Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1967 (The National Economy of the USSR in 1967) (Moscow, 1968), p. 647.

[16]Extrapolated from Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1967, p. 649.

[17]Murray Feshbach, "Manpower in the USSR: A Survey of Recent Trends and Prospects," New Directions in the Soviet Economy, Joint Committee Print, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, Part III: The Human Resources (Washington, D. C., 1966), pp. 703-88. Feshbach's absolute figures (p. 773) are (in thousands): State and Economic Administrative Organs, 1960 = 1,120; 1961 = 1,166; 1962 = 1,184; 1963 = 1,177; 1964 = 1,219; Administrative Organs of Cooperative and Social Organizations: 1960 = 124; 1961 = 130; 1962 = 132; 1963 = 131; 1964 = 135.

[18]Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1967, p. 649; See above, n. 16.

[19]Pravda, October 24, 1969, p. 1.

[20]Varchuk and Razin, Voprosy filosofii, No. 4 (1967), p. 143.

[21]See, for example, E. V. Shorina, "Obshchestvennye inspektsii, nuzhny li oni?" (Are Public Inspectors Necessary?), Sovety deputatov trudyashchikhsya (Soviets of Workers' Deputies), No. 3 (1963), pp. 64-66.

[22]Izvestia, January 4, 1969, p. 3.

[23]See, for example, Partiinaya zhizn, No. 15 (August), 1965, pp. 11-12.

[24]Letter of V. Ovchinnikov, Pravda, May 11, 1969, p. 2.

[25]Varchuk and Razin, Voprosy filisofii, No. 4 (1967), p.141; see also, Shorina, Sovety deputatov trudyashchikhsya, No. 3 (1963), p. 65.

[26]Grey Hodnett, "Mobilization Within the Primary Party Organization in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: 1945-1961" (Columbia University Ph. D. Thesis, 1962), p. 327; Hodnett's example is concerned with the primary party secretary whose buro has been given an assignment; however, the situation clearly may apply

wherever a group task ultimately rests upon the responsibility of the responsibility of the leader of the group.

[27] Izvestia, January 4, 1969, p. 3.

[28] The quote, which appears in Kassof, is from A. Kachanov, "Zorok komsomolski glaz" (Vigilant is the Komsomol Eye), Molodoi kommunist (The Young Communist), November 20, 1960, p. 40.

[29] Allen Kassof, The Soviet Youth Program (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), p. 115.

[30] See above, Ch. V, n. 60.

[31] S. Morozov, "Cherez vykhlopnuyu trubu" (Through the Exhaust Pipe), Izvestia, August 15, 1969, p. 4.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Joseph Berliner, Factory and Manager in the USSR (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), pp. 231-317.

[34] Ibid., p. 239.

[35] For a particularly detailed treatment of the web of involvement which vitiates the control efforts of the many agencies and persons assigned control functions by the state but who deal directly one way or another with the enterprise concerned, see Berliner, Factory and Manager in the USSR, pp. 323-24.

[36] Kovanov interview, in Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, No. 4. (January 1969), p. 7.

[37] Pravda, July 17, 1969, p. 3.

[38] Jerry F. Hough, The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), p. 211.

[39] Berliner, Factory and Manager in the USSR, p. 328.

[40] Shikin, Partiinaya zhizn, No. 2 (January), 1969, p. 10.

[41] Ibid.

[42] There is evidence that the self-selected, normatively-motivated individual does produce a superior compliance agent: See Herbert Kaufman, The Forest Ranger (Baltimore, 1960).

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