Toward an Understanding of Faculty Collective Bargaining: A Secondary Analysis of a Survey of Faculty at Michigan State University

By

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A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology

1983

DEDICATION

To my parents, Kirby and Josephine Alexander
Because you believed

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to acknowledge several persons who have been instrumental in bringing this work to completion. First, there are the three members of the Masters Committee; Dr. Harry Perlstadt, who served as major advisor during the preparation of this research, provided editorial guidance, and always maintained his good humor in the face of outrageous ideas. Dr. Philip Marcus, who provided the opportunity to do the initial research, always encouraged asking the next question (especially when the answer was unknown) and more than anything taught the value of finishing. Dr. Christopher Vanderpool reviewed, probed, and thereby taught the value of doing the job thoroughly.

Several friends and associates listened, debated, and helped while this research was being performed and the thesis written. Their contribution is as important as any in sustaining the drive to complete the work. Thanks go to Mary Jo Hardy (more than she will ever know), Mark Pittman, Jim Gross, Michele Armstrong, and Mark Diller.

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INTRODUCTION

American higher education has undergone many changes during the last thirty years. Taken together, they have altered the relationship between faculty members and administrators (Jencks and Riesman, 1968). Not only do these changes reflect the increase in numbers, qualifications, and earnings levels of faculty members, but also structural changes such as the number and size of colleges and universities (Garabino, 1975). Several authors (Ladd and Lipset, 1973, 1975; and Perlstadt, 1975) have located these changes within a general pattern reflecting the continuing development of legal-rationality as the dominant mode of authority in modern society (see also Weber, 1946, 1947).

At one time these changes were taken to be indicative of the occurrence of an academic "revolution" (Jencks and Riesman, 1968). One anticipated result of this revolution was that faculty would be assured of a continuing predominance in academic decision making. In contrast to this prediction of a "golden age" of faculty influence, the existence of faculty collective bargaining agents at a substantial number of colleges and universities serves as a reminder that the question of the extent and mode of faculty influence in academic decision making is far from settled. As this is true for faculty generally, it is also true for the faculty of any particular institution.

On May 24 and 25, 1978, the faculty at Michigan State University participated in an election to determine if they would be represented by a collective bargaining agent. As in an earlier election held at

the university in 1972, approximately 60% of the eligible faculty voting opted to reject representation by either of the two organizations seeking to become bargaining agent. One of these groups, the Michigan State University Faculty Associates, was affiliated with the National Education Association. The other group was the local chapter of the American Association of University Professors.

Both groups sought support by stressing issues related to both faculty economic status and academic autonomy. The relative decline of salaries and benefits compared to the Consumer Price Index is an example of one of the economic status issues; while the growth of unwarranted administrative influence in decisions affecting faculty operations such as teaching and research is an example of an academic autonomy issue raised during the campaign prior to the election.

Anti-unionization activity came from an ad hoc group, Faculty Volunteers Against Collective Bargaining. The Faculty Volunteers campaigned against both groups, arguing that collective bargaining would compromise the University's dedication to academic excellence by promoting mediocrity among the faculty. Further they argued that faculty had already succeeded in achieving high salary and fringe benefit levels without collective bargaining; and that regardless of any of the other benefits of collective bargaining, the presence of a bargaining agent would not ultimately be able to reduce the impact of administrators in academic decision making. In fact, the Faculty Volunteers argued that selection of a bargaining agent would increase the power of administrators.

The outcome of the faculty vote answered the question of whether there would be a collective bargaining agent for the University's

faculty at the time of the election. However, other questions of interest in developing a more complete understanding of faculty support for collective bargaining remain.

The literature on faculty collective bargaining (Carr and Van Eyck, 1973; Ladd and Lipset, 1973, 1975; Garabino, 1975; and Kemerer and Baldridge, 1975) suggests a connection between individual perception, circumstance, and larger social processes that has resulted in the phenomenon of faculty collective bargaining. This literature also identifies demographic patterns among faculty that relate to support for collective bargaining. But the specification of these relationships remain problematic, varying among colleges and universities, and within faculties.

The current research, a secondary analysis of a 1977 survey of faculty and administrators at Michigan State University, provides an opportunity for further study of these relationships. We shall examine the effects of economic and job control issues on faculty support for collective bargaining. Related to this, we shall also examine the extent to which faculty perceptions of faculty and administrator influence in academic decision making affect support for or opposition to collective bargaining.

CHAPTER ONE

LITERATURE

To provide a meaningful perspective through which to interpret the results of the 1977 survey, we present below a review of the relevant literature in the areas of complex organizations, Weber's theories of bureaucracy and collegiality, and faculty collective bargaining. We also include a discussion of organizationally specific circumstances and events in order to provide an historical context for understanding the movement to organize faculty at Michigan State University.

Complex Organizations

As Beyer and Lodahl (1976:108) have noted: "the literature on organizations does not provide consensus on how universities should be viewed as formal organizations." Below we present literature from different perspectives that relates to power and control in colleges and universities.

Parsons (1968) describes the university as an associational organization. It is characterized as an organization typified by decentralized decision making. It manifests a limited bureaucratic hierarchy because deans and other administrators have limited expertise in making decisions concerning disciplines about which they may know little, if anything.

Parsons' associational type is also consistent with views expressed by several other researchers that organizations performing non-routine production require a decentralized decision making

apparatus for greatest efficiency; while those engaged primarily in routine production perform most efficiently with centralized bureaucratic decision making (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Hage and Aiken, 1970; Abrahamson, 1977). As Beyer and Lodahl (1976) note, the search for new knowledge, a major activity in universities, is a non-routine task. An implication of this view is that universities function more efficiently when organized as strong departmental academic decision making units, than when organized around a strong administratively centralized academic decision making unit.

Bachman, Bowers, and Marcus (1968) offer survey evidence documenting the primacy of expert knowledge as a basis for power in college settings. This is especially the case in instances where expert knowledge opposes or is opposed by the coersive power of organizational administrators. This finding supports Parsons and Platt's (1973) observation that expert influence is the primary means of organizational control in universities.

Based on Parsons' functional imperatives (Parsons, 1960) Gross and Grambsch (1968, 1974) examined university goals and power structures. Their survey of administrators and faculty at the same 68 universities in 1964 and 1971 showed great stability in the rank ordering of goals across the seven year interval, and an increasing congruence between goals and goal structures within the universities. However, they also discovered a longitudinal pattern of increasing goal differentiation between universities. Gross and Grambsch interpret this to be evidence of the movement of universities into clusters, each of which emphasizes a different goal pattern. From this they conclude that the clusters will develop into institutional reference groups based on similarity of goals.

In their 1971 survey, Gross and Grambsch also found the power structures of these 68 universities to be very similar to the 1964 patterns, with rank ordering basically stable even though all groups (except department chairpersons) reported their power had actually increased in the interim. Institution type, size, prestige, location, and research productivity made no appreciable difference in power structure. Similar perceptions of actual influence in academic decision making were reported by both administrators and faculty, with respondents agreeing that administrators and regents possessed most power.

Gross and Grambsch draw attention to the impact of the locus of power on university goals, arguing that shifts in the power of outside actors (e.g., alumni, state legislatures, and organized publics) are more likely to result in goal changes than are shifts in the power of internal actors (e.g., deans, chairs, and research directors). This is especially true for public universities and is likely to be a source of conflict between insiders and outsiders, as well as a source of insider solidarity against the power of outsiders.

The studies cited above present the image of the university as a place of scholarship, discussion and basic agreement on certain fundamental points. The image of administrators that grows out of the work of Parsons (1968), Parsons and Platt (1973), and Gross and Grambsch (1968, 1974) is a benign one of staff-like service rather than executive decision making leadership; and of adaption to the demands of departments, students, alumni, and the public. What this perspective does not foster is an active image of university administrators as managers who allocate organizational resources amidst competing claims

for those resources, in addition to charting out programs for future growth and enrichment. This proves to be a major deficiency because it is in response to resource contention that the phenomenon of faculty unionization takes place. In the literature to be reviewed below the dominant themes are that organizations not only react to their environments, they also selectively initiate actions; and that control of the processes of organizational decision making is a major consideration in understanding the behavior of individuals associated with organizations.

Weberian Theories and Perspectives on Bureaucracy and Collegiality

Weber (1946, 1947) develops three particularly useful ideas for understanding why faculty turn to collective bargaining: the monocratic form of bureaucratic administration (1947:329-341), the principle of collegiality (1946:235-238; 1947:392-404) and an assessment of the prospects for the amateur administration of large organizations (1947:412-415). According to Weber the monocratic type of bureaucratic administration (i.e., a bureaucracy headed by one chief executive) operates at the highest degree of efficiency of all organizational types insofar as "imperative coordination" is concerned. Weber contends that the source of this efficiency, technical knowledge, has become "completely indespensible" in the administration of the modern world; and control of this knowledge provides the source of bureaucracy's power (1947:339). This type of administration predominates over all others because of the "need for rapid, clear

decisions, free of the necessity of compromise between different opinions and also free of shifting majorities" (1947:336).

Comparing the structure of government bureaus to the structures of colleges and universities, Blau (1973) concludes that both have similar characteristics. For example, increasing size is accompanied by increasing differentiation at a decreasing rate; the ratio of administrators to line personnel decreases at a decreasing rate as size increases; and vertical and horizontal differentiation are inversely related when organizational size is controlled.

Of particular interest to our research is Blau's findings that a university or college's bureaucratic administrative structure tends to insulate research from the rest of academic life. This creates a dilemma: greater rewards are bestowed for research productivity than for teaching; yet emphasis on research, while attracting both the best students and faculty, decrease faculty loyalty, and generate pressures toward a bureaucratic administrative structure.

An underlying reason for the assignment of greater importance to research over teaching is provided by Ben-David (1972). He observed that, with the exception of the period from the end of World War II until the end of the draft in the Viet Nam War, American higher education has chronically lacked sufficient numbers of students to provide the economic mass necessary to operate its competing institutions. This condition provides a powerful institutional incentive for the development of a research emphasis as a means for broadening and securing an institution's resource base.

Blau, like others, links faculty authority in academic governance to the overall quality of the faculty. He contends the research versus

teaching dilemma can be mitigated by the strong involvement of higher quality faculty. However, because high quality faculty tend toward extra-institutional professional pursuits, they are less likely to become involved in academic governance.

The power of even strong faculties to influence academic affairs is largely constrained by the position of the incumbent president who benefits not only from his own influence, but also from the residual effects of the power of his predecessors. In addition, control of the budget by the board of trustees and central administration severely limits faculty influence (Blau, 1973:187). This is consistent with Weber's observations on the limits of collegiality and amateur administration.

According to Weber the principle of collegiality can deprive any type of authority of its monocratic character (1947:392). Two major types of collegiality pertain to our research. The first involves consultation between the monocrat and certain "formally equal members" of the organization before an administrative act is considered legitimate. In this type of collegial relationship the act of communication provides the basis for legitimacy (1947:393), usually with the monocratic authority being regarded as first among equals ("primus inter pares"). The academic governance structure featuring faculty senates is an example of this type of collegiality. Although ultimate authority usually resides with the college or university president, the president is usually obliged to perform certain consultation protocols with faculty representatives before decisions affecting faculty or academic policy are promulgated. The president may also formally delegate to the faculty senate the authority to act in certain matters.

The second type of collegiality features, in addition to the monocrat, certain "other monocratic authorities which, by tradition or legislation, are in a position to delay or veto acts of the first authority" (1947:393). This approximately describes the relationship between a college or university administration and a faculty union. In the presence of a faculty union, the administration must agree to certain conditions before any teaching or research at the institution begins. In areas subject to collective bargaining this gives the union the status to delay or veto acts of the administration, although the union is not in a position to initiate those acts. Seen in this way, faculty unionization represents an attempt to maintain the principle of collegiality, albeit in a highly formalized form, in academic decision making.

According to Weber this change in form is a result of the nature of bureaucracy. Collegial decision making stands at cross-purposes with bureacracy because it "unavoidably obstructs the promptness of decision, the consistency of policy, the clear responsibility of the individual and the ruthlessness to outsiders in combination with the maintenance of discipline within the group" (1947:402). Additionally, Weber considers attempts at amateur administration to be futile because he regards it as technically inadequate to deal with larger organizations (Weber suggested an upper limit of a few thousand), the need for continuity in organizational policy, or the necessity for technical expertise in the means and methods of administration (1947:415).

Weber argues that built into the structure of collegiality is the reason for its circumvention by an organization's administrative

apparatus. The American model of college and university administration provides the structural means necessary to achieve this circumvention through the office of the president. As Weber observes:

> Only an autonomous university president with a long term of office like the American type would, apart from very exceptional cases, be in a position to create a genuinely independent self-government of a university which went beyond phrase-making and expressions of self-importance.
> (1947:415)

Weber concludes that the only escape from the increasing bureaucratization of administration lies in the creation of new organizations, these being themselves subject to the pressure to bureaucratize. The meaning of this insofar as faculty unionization is concerned is that faculty, fearing too much administrative predominance in academic decision making, must themselves turn to organization (and hence to bureaucratization) in order to remedy problems in the organization of university decision making.

Weber's conclusions were later supported by Ben-David in his examination of the distinctive structural changes in American higher education. Ben-David (1972) found that, due to its very success, higher education lost its historic balance and headed toward a crisis of purpose and structure in the 1960's. Specifically, two contradictory tendencies affected universities: the spread of higher education to nearly half of 18 - 22 age group, and the increasing emphasis on research for its academic market value. Comparing it to other national systems of higher education, Ben-David emphasized that American higher education is distinguished by competition between institutions for support, faculty, and students; and by the department

form of organization. These interact to emphasize the role and importance of administration and the college or university presidency.

Faculty Unionization

The literature on faculty unionization suggests that faculty collective bargaining is a recent social phenomenon, having made its appearance in the last twenty years. Aussieker and Garabino (1973) report that in 1966 only five institutions of higher education had collective bargaining agreements and that these covered approximately 2,600 faculty. By 1971 the numbers had grown to 228 institutions with agreements covering 65,200 faculty. Ladd and Lipset (1978) estimated that by the end of 1977 a quarter of the entire professoriate was covered by collective bargaining agreements, and that the number of affected campuses was about 500.

In the first major research into the causes of faculty unionization, Carr and Van Eyck (1973) determined that three factors were necessary preconditions. Drawing their data from a portion of the 1969 Carnegie Commission National Survey of Faculty and Student Opinion and from numerous case studies, they concluded that supportive legislation at the state level, substantial faculty dissatisfaction with either compensation or governance, and a positive effort to organize must all be present to explain the appearance of a faculty union. Because they confined their analysis to delimiting historic trends and events that serve as preconditions to unionization, Carr and Van Eyck did not attempt a structural analysis of institutional differences that might indicate the presence of intervening structural variables.

Ladd and Lipset (1973, 1975), working with the same 1969 survey data as Carr and Van Eyck, found four related dimensions that help explain faculty unionization: economic, structural, legal, and historic. Economically, faculty unionization occurs under conditions of fiscal retrenchment. Structurally, unionization appears to be a response to increasing size of educational institutions, and to increased bureaucracy and decreased faculty influence within these institutions. Legally, unionization is related to the enactment of enabling legislation by various states allowing public employees to organize and bargain collectively (unionization having occurred mostly at public institutions). Historically, the 1960's were the beginning of a period in which the social ideal of equality would come into contradiction with the ideal of merit. Faculty unionization was viewed as a response to this contradiction.

Ladd and Lipset find two major variables that correlate highly with degree of support for unionization. The first is "class interest" as determined by a faculty member's scholarly achievement, tenure, salary, age, and place of employment. As one ascends to higher rank, support for collective bargaining declines. The second is "ideology", liberals and left-to-radicals support collective bargaining more than conservatives. The effect of ideology is attenuated by the quality of the institution of employment to such a degree that at high quality colleges and universities less support exists for faculty collective bargaining even though these institutions employ proportionately more liberal-to-radical faculty than do institutions of lower quality.

While they conclude that "unionism is both a response to increased bureaucratization and egalitarianism, and a further stimulus to both",

Ladd and Lipset refrain from further analysis. Warning of the necessity to safeguard academic traditions from the industrial relations model of collective bargaining, they conclude that it is still too early to know the effects of faculty unionization on higher education. In this statement, Ladd and Lipset voice a concern shared by all writers on the subject to that time.

Garabino (1975) draws from the work of Carr and Van Eyck, and from the work of Ladd and Lipset, and extends the analysis of faculty unionization at the structural level. In addition to the Carnegie Commission data which they used, Garabino also makes use of the American Association of University Professors 1969-70 survey on faculty governance. He finds that higher education organizations are becoming structurally more formal as a reaction to pervasive environmental change.

Garabino contends that increasing formality acts to remove academic decision making from the realm of faculty members, and places it increasingly in the realm of administrators. Under these conditions the entire governance structure undergoes the strain of adapting to the new conditions. One important result of this strain is the generation of organizational conflict between administrators and faculty members who expected that organizational informality and high faculty influence should be a prerequisite of the academic professions.

Garabino's general conclusion is that faculty unionizaton represents the "most formal and structured version" of the various models of the academic governance process. His specific conclusions confirm Carr and Van Eyck's and Ladd and Lipset's finding that faculty unionization is largely a public sector phenomenon. He also supports

Ladd and Lipset's finding that the academic quality of an institution is inversely related to the tendency of its faculty to organize. Garabino finds that unionization is most likely to occur within educational conglomerates (i.e., systems of institutions such as the State University of New York), emerging instititutions (i.e., those undergoing a change of purpose such as Central Michigan University), and those where special local circumstances lead to unionization. In all of these institutions, structural changes act to reduce faculty influence in favor of administrative predominance to an extent beyond the scope of existing institutional channels to provide adequate faculty input.

Garabino finds the principal effects of unionization to be the formalization and explication of consultation procedures between faculty and administrators, the introduction of the concept of an effective grievance procedure available to all members of the bargaining unit, the slowing down of the rate of increase in promotion standards, and an overall leveling of salaries between institutions.

Kemerer and Baldridge (1975) draw on data from the Stanford Project on Academic Governance surveys of 1971 and 1974. These surveys provide information that is independent of the 1969 Carnegie Commission survey on which all of the previous authors relied. Kemerer and Baldridge report causal results that confirm the previously cited studies. They find a strong environmental impetus toward unionization in the changing size and structure of higher education. Kemerer and Baldridge distinguish between two different audiences to whom unionization appeals: those who consider themselves "deprived" and those who are interested in the "preservation" of faculty influence in

academic decision making. They argue that while the former group has been the major force behind unionization efforts, increasingly those who believe that traditional participation arrangements are no longer satisfactory to ensure faculty prerogatives will turn to collective bargaining as the means to retain them.

Kemerer and Baldridge find that unionization results in the several key impacts on academic governance. First, unions adapt themselves to local conditions and act to standarize personnel policies, but they run the risk of harming the tradition-based process of peer evaluation by fellow professionals. Second, faculty senates, although overstressed in their importance by their defenders, remain viable in matters of academic policy, but tend to lose influence over economic matters. Third, the level of faculty rights, as well as the level of professionalism may actually rise at those schools with weak traditions in either. Finally, the establishment of collective bargaining for faculty will probably increase the control of administrators and further serve to legitimate their authority.

In sum, Kemerer and Baldridge's findings support the work of Weber cited above. Kemerer and Baldridge argue that the historical trends which produce the unionization response in institutions of higher education, the organizational imperatives for centralization and coordination, will continue even though faculties might continue to unionize as a strategy to preserve their influence in academia.

In a paper examining the faculty unionization election at Michigan State University in 1972, Perlstadt (1975) advanced the concept of the structure of academic governance as a form of oligarchy based on the acceptance of a "conservative, status-quo ideology". He stresses that

such an oligarchy must be envisioned in terms of the maintenance in power in the hands of a few individuals.

Further, Perlstadt argues, this oligarchy is sustained by meritocracy in university decision making. There are two reasons for this: first, the merit-based discussion and decision process discourages consideration of arguments overtly based on politics or pragmatism. This in turn discourages the formation of political coalitions. Second, merit-based policy making discourages participation by nontenured faculty since participation consumes the time and energy which could be devoted to research or teaching. Thus, time spent involved in governance carries the possibility of negative consequences that far outweigh the advantages of participation for the nontentured.

Perlstadt concludes that faculty unionization is an attempt by faculty to protect themselves not only from internal bureaucratic limitations on professional autonomy, but also from external intervention by the political sphere; and is, therefore, a response to the increasing legal-rationalization of power relationships within the university and American society.

Michigan State University

Michigan State University was founded in 1855. Known then as Michigan Agricultural College, it was the first institution of higher education accorded a land grant under the provisions the Morrill Act of 1863. The initial charter to the institution was to engage in teaching and research for the pursuit of scientific agriculture and general education for the people of the State of Michigan.

The College grew slowly to an enrollment of approximately 6,000 students just prior to World War II. During this time the College also evolved from a primarily agricultural orientation to one of applied technology. Reflective of this the name of College was changed to Michigan State College of Agriculture and Applied Science during the 1920's.

After World War II the character and size of the College changed significantly. Enrollments grew steadily so that by the late 1950's they topped 20,000 students. Colleges were created to handle the administrative duties previously assigned to the College Divisions, and program additions were made in the areas of graduate and professional education. In 1954 the name of the institution was changed to Michigan State University.

Enrollments continued to increase during the 1960' and 1970's eventually exceeding 40,000 students. More colleges were added and the program additions to areas of graduate and professional education continued. This growth affected not only the University's size, but also in its level of quality. The academic level of the faculty rose as more holders of doctorates were hired. Eventually possession of the doctorate became a condition for tenure. The extent of improvement in academic quality at the University in the post-World War II period was commented on by Ladd and Lipset (1975) when they cited Michigan State University as an example of a large publicly supported institution that had accomplished the task of upgrading itself to a nationally recognized level of high quality.

Using Weber's concepts, the structure for academic governance at Michigan State University is monocratic but modified by his first type

of collegiality. By this we mean that, although executive authority in all areas of the University is directly traceable to the Office of the President, in the realm of academic decision making the President consults with the faculty or delegates to it the authority to act in certain matters.

The most recent formulation of the governance structure is presented in the University's "Bylaws for Academic Governance, 1975" from which the passages below are taken. Final authority and responsibility for governance resides with the University's popularly elected Board of Trustees under an article in the State of Michigan's 1963 Constitution. The Board delegates its authority to the President and

> through him to the faculty appropriate authority and jurisdiction over matters for which they are accountable to the Board. In other cases, for example, faculty recruitment, promotions, and tenure, the Board does not delegate but instead looks to the faculty for recommendations.
> (1975:5)

Four modes of faculty participation in academic governance are identified. They are:

> Consultation
> A body of faculty. . .who discusses with and inform the administrator with authority and responsibility for decision. Such a committee is not a deliberate body; there is no vote. Rather, the members express their views to inform a decision.
>
> Advisory
> A deliberate body of faculty. . .recommends policies to an administrator who is authorized to make decisions. The administrator is not bound by the recommendation and accepts responsibility for the decision.

> Shared Responsibility
> A deliberative body of faculty. . .makes recommendations to an administrator authorized to make decisions. If the administrator and deliberate body cannot agree and action must be taken, the recommendations of the administrator and the deliberate body will be submitted in writing to the next higher administrative level for resolution.
>
> Delegated Authority
> A deliberate body of faculty. . .is authorized to make decisions on specific matters. Such decisions are subject to administrative review, but will be altered only in exceptional circumstances.
> (1975:9)

Of these four modes of faculty participation in academic governance, delegated authority is the mode in which faculty exert their greatest influence, followed in descending order by shared responsibility, advisory, and consultation. According to the "Bylaws" those areas over which the faculty excercises delegated authority are:

1. Grading policies,
2. Changes in undergraduate courses, curricula, and degree requirements,
3. Changes in graduate and graduate-professional courses.

The areas over which faculty exercise shared responsibility are the following:

1. Procedures to select and review Chairpersons and Directors (shared with Deans),
2. Procedures to select and review Deans (shared with the Provost),
3. To adopt and publish unit bylaws (shared with the appropriate administrator),
4. Policy pertaining to the administration of graduate programs (shared with the Dean of the Graduate School),
5. Formulation of grievance procedures and statement of rights and responsibilities of faculty (shared with the Provost).

While the areas in which faculty have advisory or consultative input

are many, covering the great range of academic decision making, those areas in which faculty influence structurally equals or surpasses administrative influence are limited primarily to setting policies affecting students and creating procedures for selecting and reviewing Chairpersons, Directors, and Deans. Thus at Michigan State, decisions relating to the treatment of faculty are more properly classified as administrative decisions rather than faculty decisions.

Faculty and administrator perceptions of this structure were analyzed by Stonewater (1977). She found evidence of conflicting power perceptions of these two groups. Whereas both faculty and administrators generally agreed on the predominance of administrators across a range of academic decisions, administrators perceived a higher level of faculty influence than faculty members did. Stonewater also reports that faculty generally perceive greater disparity between perceived and preferred influence than do administrators; that faculty in larger colleges of the same university will perceive more influence than do faculty in smaller colleges; and that academic rank was not a significant variable with respect to faculty perceived power. Finally, Stonewater reports that although faculty perceive themselves to have less influence in 1977 than in an earlier study in 1970, that they were less inclined to favor collective bargaining than in the earlier survey.

Attempts to Unionize Faculty at Michigan State University

One of the organizational results of the growth in size and quality of Michigan State University was the creation of the University

College in 1954. This entity replaced the former Basic Division that was formed after World War II. The University College was assigned the academic responsibility for general education for the great mass of the undergraduate student body. Perlstadt (1975:10) describes it as a "lower tier college within a research oriented university" whose faculty were characterized by "high teaching loads, low research expectations, and relatively low salaries".

Perlstadt (1975) reports that as a result of several negative faculty tenure decisions within the University College, the College's faculty sought relief through collective bargaining. In 1970, the College's Michigan Higher Education Association chapter, affiliated with the National Education Association (NEA), petitioned the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) to establish the faculty of the College as a bargaining unit and to identify the chapter as the College faculty's collective bargaining agent.

MERC held a hearing on the Michigan Higher Education Associations's application. Its examiner ruled that the University College faculty could not bargain for itself because the proper bargaining unit was one composed of all university faculty. This meant that any attempted unionization of the faculty would have to take place on a university-wide scale.

In early 1971, within a few months of the MERC ruling, the M.S.U. Faculty Associates (FA) was organized and affiliated with the NEA. FA started a campaign to generate support for its petition for a representation election. It distributed faculty signature cards and began collecting them. FA's objective was to collect valid signatures from at least 30% of the University's faculty and thereby force the election.

Shortly after FA launched its campaign, the local chapter of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) also decided to actively seek to become faculty bargaining agent and began a signature collection campaign of its own. The objective of AAUP was to collect signatures from 10% of the University's and thereby be included in any faculty representation as an intervening representative.

In April, 1971, the Faculty Steering Committee of the Academic Council, the principal deliberative body in the University's structure of academic governance, established an Ad Hoc Committee on Collective Bargaining. The charge to the Committee was to hold hearings on collective bargaining; and, as a result of these hearings, to prepare and issue a report on the merits of faculty collective bargaining. During the nine months the Committee spent holding hearings and preparing its report, FA refrained from further efforts to collect faculty signatures. AAUP followed the lead of FA, but only after it succeeded in assuring itself of at least an intervenor's role by collecting the necessary number of signature cards.

The report of the Ad Hoc Committee was issued in January, 1972 and though officially neutral, the overall effect was two-fold. According to Perlstadt, the report combined a demonstration of the complexity of collective bargaining with a latent message that was to "confuse the innocent on both sides, sow seeds of doubt in the minds of others, and set the faculty up for what was to follow from the Committee of Concerned Faculty" (1975:20).

An election was authorized for October, 1972 by MERC after a formal description of the bargaining unit was agreed to by the University and FA, and after FA was certified to have gathered the

signatures of at least 30% of the individuals in the proposed bargaining unit. AAUP was certified as an intervenor. The ballot for the election would contain three choices: FA, AAUP, and "No Agent".

In the campaign that followed, as Perlstadt has observed (1975:27) "the main thrust of (FA). . .was to combine two issues: salary inequities and faculty power." The main thrust of the AAUP was "academic freedom, educational goals and economic welfare," in addition to stressing its history as an organization of academic professionals.

A group of faculty opposed to collective bargaining formed The Committee of Concerned Faculty. This group was composed largely of tenured faculty from the Colleges of Agriculture and Natural Science. Its membership also represented a significant portion of those faculty involved in the formal process of University academic governance. Concerned Faculty attacked FA for representing only the interests of a small minority of University faculty and implied that FA's affiliation with NEA and its subsidiary, the Michigan Education Association (MEA)

fatally flawed FA's ability to both effectively represent faculty interests and at the time preserve academic traditions (Perlstadt, 1975:28-35).

The results of the October, 1972 representation election were an overwhelming defeat for FA and AAUP. 83% of the eligible faculty cast ballots. Of these 63% voted for "No Agent", 22% voted for FA, and 15% voted for AAUP.

The defeat of faculty bargaining in 1972 did not end the desire to ultimately establish a faculty union. In fact, FA continued to be active and continued to be the leading organizational proponent of

faculty collective bargaining on campus. For FA, the question was not so much whether to try again, but when.

In January, 1976 FA started a second signature card drive in hopes of forcing a second representation election (MSU Faculty Associates, 1976a). A significant difference in the tactics employed in the first and second campaigns occurred in June when FA attempted to form a local coalition with the AAUP. By October it was apparent to FA that AAUP was not interested in pursuing the idea of a local coalition and, as a result, FA continued its signature card campaign (MSU Faculty Associates, 1976b). In early 1977 the AAUP started another signature campaign to assure itself of intervenor status in any upcoming election.

One reason for the local AAUP's rejection of the local coalition was that similar discussions were occurring on the national level between the NEA and the national AAUP. Under terms proposed by the NEA, the two organizations would join in a "National Alliance in Higher Education" in which the AAUP would handle academic standards and practices, and the NEA would handle organizing efforts and contract negotiations. The most important provision of the proposed alliance was that NEA would also have primary responsibility for money collection and would provide funds to the AAUP in amounts sufficient to cover its services to members (MSU Faculty Associates, 1977a). Since AAUP's agreement to such a proposal would have effectively ended its independence, the NEA-AAUP coalition never materialized.

In March, 1977 FA and the University administration attended a MERC hearing (with AAUP present as intervenor) to define the bargaining unit. Major differences between the administration and FA centered on

whether or not to include faculty from the University's Colleges of Human and Osteopathic Medicine, and what criteria to apply to part-time faculty. The Administration wanted the medical school faculty included, FA did not. Under the Administration's proposal, part-time faculty were to be included if they had been employed at least three terms during the previous academic year. FA proposed that part-time faculty be included if they had been employed at least two terms during the previous academic year. The suggestion of the MERC Hearing Officer was that an election could be scheduled even though consensus between the Administration and FA was not possible. If such an election occurred the ballots of those in questionable categories would be separated at the time of voting and held out of the counting. Under this proposal, a formal bargaining unit determination hearing would be held after the election, but only if the number of withheld ballots were enough to change the election's result. (MSU Faculty Associates, 1977b).

By August 1977 FA had a sufficient number of valid signatures to be certified by MERC regardless of the outcome of the continuing discussions over bargaining unit composition. The negotiations over composition of the bargaining were the last until the Hearing Officer's proposal was finally adopted by FA and the Administration on January 11, 1978. An election would be scheduled for May, 1978 (MSU Faculty Associates, 1978). The AAUP was again certified as an intervenor. The ballot for the election would again contain three choices: FA, AAUP, and "No Agent".

In the 1977-1978 campaign, like the earlier one, the FA focused in the main on the same two issues: salary inequities and faculty power.

However, the AAUP changed tactics and campaigned directly against the FA's association with the NEA. In a sense AAUP made the NEA, not the FA, its opponent. As the AAUP saw it, the issue was one of local control versus national control. It protrayed the NEA as a remote organization, highly centralized at the state level. AAUP offered itself as an organization attuned to local control. AAUP also offered itself as expert in the affairs of higher education, as opposed to the primary-secondary, and junior college orientation of the NEA (AAUP, 1978).

As in the 1972 campaign, an opposition group formed, this called Faculty Volunteers Against Collective Bargaining. The arguments advanced by the Faculty Volunteers were essentially the same as six years earlier: they argued that collective bargaining would compromise the University's dedication to academic excellence by promoting mediocrity among the faculty. Further they argued that faculty had already succeeded in achieving high salary and fringe benefit levels without collective bargaining; and that regardless of any of the other benefits of collective bargaining, the presence of a bargaining agent would not ultimately be able to reduce the impact of administrators in academic decision making. In fact, the Faculty Volunteers argued that selection of a bargaining agent would increase the power of administrators.

As six years earlier, the results of the 1978 representation election were an overwhelming defeat for both FA and AAUP. The proportion of faculty voting dropped to 72%, down 11% from 1972. The "No Agent" choice received 59% of all ballots counted, nearly the same as the 63% it received in the previous election. FA increased its

share to 26% from 22%, and AAUP again received 15% of the votes counted (MSU News-Bulletin, 1978).

The reactions from FA and AAUP left no doubt as to their intention to continue the effort to unionize the faculty. A spokesman for FA announced that the group would begin circulating signature cards for a third election "right away. We're going to be looking over the results, our approach and the tactics we used and hope that next time we're more persuasive." The AAUP's spokesman expressed disappointment over the decline in faculty turnout. He indicated that the contested ballots withheld from the counting (pending the outcome of the election) would have improved the AAUP's showing. He said that AAUP would consider calling the next election rather than entering as an intervenor (MSU News-Bulletin, 1978).

Research Questions

We have reviewed the relevant literature in the areas of complex organizations, Weber's theories of bureaucracy and collegiality, and faculty collective bargaining. We have also reviewed the history of Michigan State University and the several attempts to organize its faculty through 1978.

The literature cited above suggests several questions for empirical investigation. In this research we shall confine ourselves to research questions in two areas, questions that relate to patterns of perception that differentiate between suppport for and opposition to faculty collective bargaining, and questions related to the sociological meaning of faculty collective bargaining. Specifically,

we will use responses to a 1977 survey to answer the following research questions:

1. Are the demographic characteristics associated with support for collective bargaining the same for the faculty members surveyed in 1977 as those reported in earlier literature?

2. Do supporters of collective bargaining generally perceive the power structure of academic governance described above significantly differently than non-supporters?

3. Do supporters of collective bargaining generally perceive the impacts of collective bargaining differently than non-supporters?

4. How does the existence of the phenomenon of faculty collective bargaining relate to the development of the university as a type of formal organization and to the theory of bureaucracy?

CHAPTER TWO

METHODS

The current research is a secondary analysis of Stonewater (1977). A reanalysis of her data was decided upon because her data gathering coincided with a campaign by the MSU Faculty Associates to collect the necessary number of signature cards to force the holding of a representation election. Below, we present a summary of Stonewater's data collection methods in order to provide readers with sufficient information to judge the quality of the data. A complete description of the procedures can be found in Stonewater (1977:45-67).

Population and Sample

A stratified sample of faculty and administrators was selected from the population at Michigan State University. The faculty sample, drawn from five colleges within the University, was selected on the basis of their position along two major structural parameters previously found to affect perceptions of influence in decision making: size as determined by the number of students and faculty, and differentiation as measured by the number of units within the college (Baldridge, 1971; Blau, 1973).

Of seventeen colleges within the University, seven were eliminated because they lacked either an undergraduate or graduate program. The five colleges finally selected were chosen from the remaining twelve so as to cover the broadest possible range on each of the two structural variables.

An additional factor that influenced selection was type (Stonewater, 1977). The colleges were chosen so as to include one with a strong research orientation, and one with a strong professional program. The University's Office of Institutional Research supplied data on the structural variables.

Only full-time faculty at or above the rank of Instructor received questionnaires (N=637). The resulting list included those with tenure track and non-tenure track employment. Faculty members with administrative job titles were classified as administrators (e.g., a department chairperson was classified as an administrator in Stonewater's research).

The administrator sample was drawn from a list that included those faculty members with administrative job titles, but not including employees designated as Administrative-Professionals. The list of 427 possible individuals was reduced by eliminating those administrators whose primary responsibilities were either non-academic of off-campus (Stonewater, 1977:48). The size of the final list was 288. Both the faculty and administrator sampling frames were supplied by the University's Office of the Provost.

Survey Instrument

The survey instrument included items used in a 1970 survey of the University involving approximately 2,500 students, 500 faculty, and 500 administrators (Marcus, 1971). The replicated questions covered perceptions of the University, departmental priorities, faculty salary determinants, and certain general issues. In some items it was

necessary to edit wording to render the questions applicable to current situations, but content of those items was unaffected (Stonewater, 1977:49). The principal item relating to faculty and administrator perceptions of power and influence had to be restructured to reveal the respondent's attitude concerning which single group "should have" and "does have" most influence over a range of issues (Stonewater, 197:50).

New items were developed to assess respondents' attitudes regarding the establishment of a faculty collective bargaining unit, satisfaction, general faculty influence in decision making, and parts of a general question relating to then-current University issues.

Separate questionnaires were developed for faculty and administrators. All questions were not asked of both groups, since certain items were considered as appropriate for only one of the two groups (Stonewater, 1977:52).

The survey instruments were pre-tested on a group of 36 faculty and administrators not included in the final samples. In addition, representatives of the University's Academic Council, the local chapter of the American Association of University Professors, and M.S.U. Faculty Associates were consulted. On the basis of results of the pre-test and consultations, several changes were made in the survey instruments. Examples of the final versions of the questionnaires and the cover letters for both the first and second used in the first and second mailings can be found in Stonewater (1977).

Data Collection

After consultations with the Deans of the five colleges, questionnaires were mailed to all respondents. A second mailing, three

weeks after the first, requested respondents to complete and return the questionnaires immediately. Only questionnaires that were received before six weeks after the first mailing, and three weeks after the second, were included in the analysis.

Of 627 questionnaires sent to faculty, 347 were returned in usable form, for a response rate of 55%. In no college was the number of returned questionnaires under 31 and in no college was the response rate less than 52%. Of the 288 questionnaires sent to Administrators, 197 were returned in usable condition, a response rate of 68%. The totals for the entire survey were 544 usable returns out of 915 questionnaires sent out, an overall response rate of 59% (Stonewater, 1977:59). Table 1.Ø shows the questionnaire response rates for faculty by college, total faculty, total administrators, and overall total.

Comparison of Respondents to Population

Responses were checked to determine the representativeness of the samples. The faculty response was evaluated on the parameters of age, rank, and gender. Administrator response was evaluated on the parameters of gender and administrative position (Stonewater, 1977:6Ø).

While an examination of Tables 2.Ø to 6.Ø indicates that the samples are reasonably close approximations of the five colleges and the University, some caution is indicated when interpreting the survey results. The sample of faculty contains slightly more women proportionately than are found in the University generally. In any instances in which gender is a significant variable, this relative over-representation should be kept in mind. Additionally, the sample

of faculty somewhat over-represents younger, lower rank faculty. The sample of administrators is a very close approximation of the population by gender. By position the sample differs slightly from the population of administrators, but not significantly so (Stonewater, 1977:61).

Table 1.0

Usable Questionnaire Response

Group	1st Mailing Out	1st Mailing Returned		2nd Mailing Returned		Total Returned	
	n	n	%	n	%	n	%
Arts and Letters	245	91	37	36	15	127	52
Communication	55	22	40	9	16	31	56
Engineering	81	37	46	12	14	49	60
Human Ecology	61	27	44	10	17	37	61
Social Science	185	70	38	33	18	103	56
Total Faculty	627	247	39	100	16	347	55
Total Administrators	288	155	54	42	14	197	68
TOTAL	915	402	44	142	15	544	59

Stonewater, 1977:59

Table 2.0[a]

Comparison of Faculty Respondents, Populations of Colleges Used, and University Population - Age

Age	Respondents		Five College Population		University Population	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Under 30	11	4	21	3	42	2
30 - 39	113	37	189	30	624	30
40 - 49	87	28	193	31	660	32
50 - 54	30	10	63	10	232	11
55 - 59	36	12	75	12	242	12
60 and over	31	10	79	13	248	12
No response	1					
TOTAL	309[b]	101	620[c]	99	2048	99

[a]Stonewater, 1977:66. Data obtained from Office of the Provost. April, 1977.

[b]Tenure track faculty only.

[c]Difference between this total and the total in the faculty mailing is accounted for by the exclusion of non-tenure track faculty and the inclusion of some administrators.

Table 3.0[a]

Comparison of Faculty Responses, Population of Colleges Used, and University Population - Rank

Rank	Respondents		Five College Population		University Population	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Professor	143	46	289	47	1014	50
Associate Professor	78	25	169	27	570	28
Assistant Professor	82	27	149	24	432	51
Instructor	6	2	13	2	32	2
TOTAL	309	100	620	100	2048	101

[a]Stonewater, 1977:65.

Table 4.0[a]

Comparison of Faculty Respondents, Population of Colleges Used, and University Population - Gender

Gender	Respondents		Five Colleges Population		University Population	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
Male	249	81	510	82	1919	87
Female	59	19	110	18	297	13
No Response	1					
TOTAL	309	100	620	100	2216[b]	100

[a]Stonewater, 1977:66.

[b]The n is different because data was gathered at a different time.

Table 5.0[a]

Comparison of Administrator Respondents to Population - Gender

Gender	Respondents		Population	
	n	%	n	%
Male	171	87	252	88
Female	26	13	36	12
TOTAL	197	100% (n=197)	288	100% (n=288)

[a]Stonewater, 1977:64.

Table 6.0[a]

Comparison of Administrator Respondents to Population - Position

Position	Respondents		Population	
	n	%	n	%
Dean	13	7	21	7
Associate Dean	9	5	15	5
Assistant Dean	17	8	33	12
Director	46	23	68	24
Associate Director	12	6	14	5
Assistant Director	14	7	22	8
Chairperson	57	29	85	29
Associate Chairperson	15	8	16	6
Other	14	7	14	5
TOTAL	197	100	288	100

[a]Stonewater, 1977:64.

CHAPTER THREE

DETAILED FINDINGS

In this report, "supporters of collective bargaining" are defined as those faculty responding that they favored establishment of a collective bargaining unit for M.S.U. faculty to either "some" or a "great" extent. "Non-supporters of collective bargaining" are defined as those faculty responding that they favored such a unit only "slightly" or "not at all". This division is employed because it yields the closest approximation to the actual vote of the faculty in the May, 1978 representation election.

In 1977, supporters constituted 44% of faculty surveyed. This represented a decline of 13% from 1970, when 57% of faculty surveyed indicated support for a faculty collective bargaining unit (Marcus, 1971). As shown in Table 7.0, all of the loss of support occurred among those favoring establishment of a bargaining unit to "a great extent". The proportion of faculty responding that they favored collective bargaining to this extent fell from nearly one-third of faculty in 1970 to slightly less than one-fifth of faculty seven years later.

Table 7.0

Faculty Attitudes Toward Collective Bargaining,
1970 and 1977
Extent of Support (as percent of n)

Year	Great	Some	Slight	Not at All	Total	
1970	33%	24%	14%	29%	100%	(n=113)
1977	19%	25%	20%	36%	100%	(n=340)

The relationship between demographic characteristics of the faculty and extent of support for collective bargaining are presented in Table 8.0. Those characteristics showing statistically significant associations with support for collective bargaining are further reported in Table 8.1.

Table 8.Ø

Faculty Demographic Characteristics Crosstabulated with Extent of Support for Collective Bargaining

Characteristic	Chi-Square	df
a. College of respondent	19.Ø1	12
b. Quality of own department	12.74	15
c. Respondent's primary responsibility	3.4Ø	6
d. Academic rank of respondent	19.38*	9
e. Years at M.S.U.	7.82**	3
f. Years at current position or rank	14.31	12
g. Is respondent tenured	6.Ø7*	1
h. Highest advanced degree	11.95**	3
i. Respondent's age	4.11*	1
j. Respondent's gender	.48	3

* - alpha less than .Ø5
** - alpha less than .Ø1

Table 8.1

Response Patterns for Supporters and Non-Supporters of Collective Bargaining (as percent of n) on Significant Demographic Characteristics (from Table 8.0)

Characteristics	Supporters	Non-Supporters	
a. Academic rank of respondent			
Professor	34%	66%	(n=143)
Associate Professor	49%	51%	(n= 80)
Assistant Professor	54%	46%	(n= 90)
Instructor	50%	50%	(n= 26)
b. Years at M.S.U.			
Less than 10 years	49%	51%	(n=175)
10 years or longer	39%	61%	(n=165)
c. Is respondent tenured			
Tenured	40%	60%	(n=242)
Not tenured	54%	46%	(n= 95)
d. Highest advanced degree			
Masters	60%	40%	(n= 74)
Doctorate	39%	61%	(n=253)
e. Respondent's age			
Under 40	49%	51%	(n=146)
40 and older	40%	60%	(n=187)

As Tables 8.0 and 8.1 show, faculty holding higher rank are less likely to support collective bargaining than are lower ranking faculty. In fact the only rank in which a majority favor collective bargaining is that of Assistant Professor. Assistant Professors favor collective bargaining by a 54% to 46% margin. In all other ranks, non-supporters either equal or exceed supports. While there is a small decline in support for collective bargaining between the ranks of Assistant and Associate Professor, there is a much larger drop in support between the ranks of Associate and Full Professors.

Tables 8.Ø and 8.1 also demonstrate that supporters tend to be younger and to have been on the faculty for less time than non-supporters. Supporters are also more likely to be found among those whose highest degree is a masters. Fully 6Ø% of faculty holding the masters support collective bargaining, compared to only 39% of faculty holding doctorates.

Tenure also makes a difference in extent of faculty support for collective bargaining. Although the majority of supporters and non-supporters are tenured there are proportionately more non-tenured faculty who support collective bargaining than who oppose it.

The pattern of demographic characteristics reported above for supporters of faculty collective bargaining at Michigan State University is consistent with the national pattern reported by Ladd and Lipset (1973, 1975). The evidence of this survey provides further substantiation for their concept of "class interest" as a factor in determining support for collective bargaining. Faculty in a privileged status position by virtue of the combined effects of rank, degree, tenure, length of employment, and age are less likely to support collective bargaining than are those in less privileged classes.

While there is no statistically significant difference among the faculty when grouped by college, a significant difference is found when the colleges are grouped according to college mean, as shown in Table 8.2. This grouping is based of Ladd and Lipset's (1978) report that the two colleges in the "Liberal Studies" group are the two disciplines most likely to favor collective bargaining, and that one of the colleges (Engineering) in the "Applied Studies" group is among the academic disciplines least likely to support collective bargaining.

Table 8.2.

College Group Crosstabulated with Support for Collective Bargaining
(as percent of college n)

Group	Extent of Support					
Liberal Studies	Great	Some	Slight	Not at All	Total	Mean
Social Science	22%	25%	25%	28%	100%(n=102)	2.41
Arts and Letters	25%	23%	18%	34%	100%(n=119)	2.40
Applied Studies						
Communication	16%	29%	16%	39%	100%(n=31)	2.23
Human Ecology	10%	33%	13%	44%	100%(n=39)	2.05
Engineering	8%	18%	22%	52%	100%(n=49)	1.84

Chi Square = 11.35 with 3 df. alpha less than .01

The finding of a significant difference between colleges supports the argument that academic discipline exerts a general ideological influence on support for collective bargaining. This is consistent with Ladd and Lipset's (1975) finding that the colleges in the more supportive group are also the most politically liberal of the disciplines, and that colleges in the technical and applied disciplines are supportive.

Paradoxically colleges in the more supportive group, the two most liberal colleges ideologically, are also the college with the highest proportion of full professors, as shown in Tables 8.3.

Table 8.3

Rank (as percent of college n) Crosstabulated with College

College	Prof.	Assoc. Prof.	Asst. Prof.	Inst.	Total
Liberal Studies					
Social Science	52%	20%	24%	4%	100% (n=103)
Arts and Letters	43%	25%	29%	3%	100% (n=125)
Applied Studies					
Communication	29%	23%	29%	19%	100% (n= 31)
Human Ecology	28%	13%	29%	28%	100% (n= 39)
Engineering	35%	31%	31%	3%	100% (n= 48)

Chi-square = 45.09 with 12 df, alpha less than .01

This indicates that in order for any ideologically based difference to survive the generally negative impact of rank, higher ranking faculty in these two colleges should be significantly more likely to support collective bargaining than higher ranking faculty of the three colleges in the less supportive group. However, as shown in Table 8.4, this is not the case.

Table 8.4

College Group Crosstabulated with Support for Collective Bargaining, Controlling for Rank

Rank

Associate, Assistant Professors, and Instructors

Group	Supporters	Non-Supporters	Total
Liberal Studies	59%	41%	100% (n=117)
Applied Studies	41%	59%	100% (n= 80)

Chi-square = 5.98 with 1 df, alpha less than .05

Professors

Group	Supporters	Non-Supporters	Total
Liberal Studies	35%	65%	100% (n=106)
Applied Studies	25%	75%	100% (n= 36)

Chi-square = 1.20 with 1 df, insignificant

The effect of academic orientation support for collective bargaining is attenuated by academic rank. Table 8.4 reveals no significant difference in level of support for collective bargaining among full professors. However, academic discipline remains a significant variable among lower ranked faculty. This indicates that higher academic rank exerts a leveling influence on ideological differences among the disciplines.

In terms of support for collective bargaining, there are significantly more supporters among the lower ranks in the colleges of Social Science and Arts and Letters than in the other three colleges. Apparently, the impact of this larger proportion of lower ranking supporters in Social Science and Arts and Letters more than counters the effect of the high proportion of full professors in these two colleges. This supports the pattern Ladd and Lipset (1973; 1975) find between ideology and rank. Rank acts to attenuate the ideological differences among the faculty.

The effect of rank may also be conceived of in terms of an evolving loyalty to the organization (Blau and Scott, 1962: 64-74). As faculty stay at one college or university they establish social relationships. These relationships form the basis for the establishment of a local reference group, one standing in conjunction with a state or national professional reference group. Assuming that the college or university does not structurally limit a faculty member's professional opportunity, over time the faculty member should develop both a professional reference group and a loyalty to the local reference group situated at the college or university (Blau and Scott, 1962: 71). Because lower ranking faculty have not established local loyalties to the same extent as higher ranking faculty, they may be expected to more readily support collective bargaining (with its implicit criticism of local conditions) than should higher ranking faculty. As a result of growing attachments to the local academic community, faculty members at a given institution tend to become more alike by augmenting their professional loyalties with a set of local ones. Thus, over time faculty become part of a local academic community as well as part of a more dispersed professional community.

Turning from characteristic differences between supporters and non-supporters to the perceived impacts of collective bargaining, faculty consider the most likely impacts to be economic, as Table 9.Ø shows. Under collective bargaining, faculty feel the university's salary structure will tend toward equalization of salary levels between units and reduction of the merit component of salary increases. These trends are perceived as occurring against a backdrop of generally improved economic status for the faculty. Greater faculty involvement in decision making ranks fourth; and greater job security, fifth. This pattern indicates faculty generally consider the impacts of collective bargaining to be related more to economic issues than to governance.

ABSTRACT

Toward an Understanding of Faculty Collective Bargaining:
A Secondary Analysis of a Survey of Faculty at
Michigan State University

By

Bruce K. Alexander

A secondary analysis of a 1977 survey of 347 faculty and 197 administrators is conducted to examine the extent that faculty demographic characteristics, perceptions of academic governance, and perceptions of the impact of collective bargaining differ between supporters and non-supporters of faculty collective bargaining. These differences are related to the theory of Weber on the nature of bureaucracy and collegiality. The demographic patterns associated with support for collective bargaining nationally are confirmed locally. Perceptions of the academic governance structure are determined to be inversely related to support for faculty collective bargaining. Perceptions of the impacts of collective bargaining are determined to be directly related to support for faculty collective bargaining.

Table 9.Ø

Faculty Perceptions of Impact of Collective Bargaining
(ranked by mean and consensus)
Crosstabulated with Support for Collective Bargaining

Mean Rank	Mean	Item	Chi-Square	Consensus Rank
1	3.14	Equalizing faculty salaries across units	44.Ø6**	1
2	3.Ø1	Reducing the merit basis of faculty salary increases	83.79**	2
3	2.69	Improving the overall economic	179.74**	3
4	2.47	Giving faculty greater involvement in decision making	212.27**	5
5	2.42	Providing greater job security	113.78**	6
6	2.16	Acquiring additional funds from the legislature	1Ø2.Ø5**	4

** - alpha less than .Ø1, df = 9

As Table 9.Ø also shows, there are significant differences between supporters and non-supporters on all items relating to impact of collective bargaining. These differences are presented in greater detail in Table 9.1.

Table 9.1

Perceived Impact of Collective Bargaining
(as percent of group n)
for Supporters and Non-Supporters of Collective Bargaining

	Perceived Impact					
Item	Great	Some	Slight	None	Total	Group Mean
Equalizing faculty salaries across units:						
Supporters	38%	55%	7%	0%	100% (n=147)	3.31
Non-Supporters	26%	52%	19%	3%	100% (n=182)	3.02
Reducing the merit basis of faculty salary increases:						
Supporters	12%	44%	36%	8%	100% (n=145)	2.60
Non-Supporters	53%	32%	10%	5%	100% (n=184)	3.33
Improving the overall economic status of the faculty:						
Supporters	34%	60%	6%	0%	100% (n=149)	3.27
Non-Supporters	3%	42%	31%	24%	100% (n=184)	2.24
Giving faculty greater involvement in decision making:						
Supporters	38%	48%	10%	4%	100% (n=149)	3.22
Non-Supporters	2%	20%	43%	35%	100% (n=185)	1.89
Providing greater job security:						
Supporters	27%	49%	18%	6%	100% (n=148)	2.97
Non-Supporters	8%	22%	30%	40%	100% (n=185)	1.98
Acquiring additional funds from the legislature:						
Supporters	21%	40%	24%	15%	100% (n=147)	2.67
Non-Supporters	4%	15%	35%	46%	100% (n=185)	1.77

Supporters of collective bargaining are, not surprisingly, more likely than non-supporters to see the impact of collective bargaining in positive terms. Particularly important is the difference between supporters and non-supporters on the issue of greater faculty involvement in decision making. The overwhelming majority of

supporters see collective bargaining having some or great impact on giving faculty greater involvement. This majority (86%) among supporters is nearly four times the proportion of non-supporters responding that collective bargaining would give faculty at least some increased involvement in decision making (22%). This indicates that collective bargaining supporters see unionization as a means to exert influence on university decision making, in addition to its impact on strictly economic matters. This means that, for supporters, collective bargaining is a tool to increase their voice in university affairs, in contrast to the general faculty position that collective bargaining would have little impact on academic governance.

By about the same percentage, 93%, supporters believe collective bargaining will impact favorably on equalizing salaries across units and improving the faculty's overall economic status to some or a great extent. By contrast, 78% of non-supporters feel collective bargaining will, to some or a great extent, equalize salaries; but only 45% feel it will materially improve the overall economic condition of the faculty.

Supporters are more likely than non-supporters to respond that one of the impacts of collective bargaining will be increased legislative funding. 61% of supporters see a union having at least some impact in this area, contrasted with only 19% of non-supporters. Apparently supporters believe that a union could lobby the legislature effectively for increased appropriations for the university. This would not only result from the lobbying ability of the bargaining unit itself, but also from the lobbying abilities of the national and state level organizations with which the local bargaining unit might be affiliated.

Supporters of collective bargaining are overwhelmingly of the opinion that one of the impacts of establishment of a bargaining unit would be increased job security. Three-fourths of supporters see collective bargaining as having at least some impact in this area, contrasted with thirty percent of non-supporters.

Supporters are less likely than non-supporters to see collective bargaining greatly reducing the merit basis of faculty salary increases. Only 12% of supporters see this impact, whereas 53% of non-supporters see the merit basis being greater reduced. There are several possible explanations for this, involving either supporter approval of the concept of merit or supporter disbelief in the concept's real applicability to salary determinations, but these require data beyond the range of this survey before any further analysis can proceed.

In a related survey question faculty were asked to rate how much priority should be given to several areas of involvement when determining faculty salaries. As Table 10.0 shows only one area of disagreement exists between supporters of collective bargaining and non-supporters. Teaching and research ranked as the highest two items, followed by publications. Because these three activities are inherently personal or individual, they appear to lend themselves to logically support the merit basis of faculty salary increases. However, because the survey question asks how much priority <u>should</u> be given to these areas, rather than asking how much priority is actually given, responses to this question offer no help in determining why supporters of collective bargaining are less likely than non-supporters to agree that collective bargaining will greatly reduce the merit component of salary increases.

Table 10.0

Faculty Priorities for Salary Determination Crosstabulated with Support for Collective Bargaining

Mean Rank	Mean	Item	Chi-Square	Consensus Rank
1	3.83	Teaching effectiveness	4.29	1
2	3.54	Research activities	9.12	2
3	3.35	Publications	8.60	4
4	2.76	Service activities in the university	12.60	3
5	2.75	Personal values and ethnical standards	11.29	9
6	2.74	Academic advisement of students	6.79	6
7	2.71	Service activities in the community	18.34*	7
8	2.55	Job counseling and career guidance of students	11.11	5
9	2.30	Popularity with students	15.37	8

* - alpha less than .05
df = 9 for all items

As Table 10.0 shows, the only area of significant disagreement between supporters and non-supporters of collective bargaining is that of service activities in the community. More supporters than non-supporters report this area should receive some or great priority by a difference of sixteen percentage point. This difference is enough so that for supporters community service ranks fourth, behind publications and ahead of university service, in salary priority. This difference between groups is further illustrated in Table 10.1 below.

Table 10.1

Faculty Priority for Salary Determination (as percent of group n) for Supporters and Non-Supporters of Collective Bargaining for Significant Items in Table 10.0

Item	Priority					Group Mean
	Great	Some	Slight	None	Total	
Service activities in the community:						
Supporters	19%	54%	22%	5%	100% (n=149)	2.87
Non-Supporters	10%	47%	35%	8%	100% (n=190)	2.59

The difference between supporters and non-supporters in the area of community service indicates that supporters are somewhat more oriented toward extra-university involvements than non-supporters, responding that such involvements should be rewarded in determining salaries. This is not to say that supporters actually are more involved in the off-campus world than non-supporters, just that supporters are significantly more willing to reward such involvements than non-supporters.

It was argued above that class interest is a dominant factor in whether or not faculty support collective bargaining; and that the pattern of class interest locally is generally consistent with the pattern reported by other researchers drawing from national-level data.

Controlling for rank, a major component of academic status, on all statistically significant associations between support for collective bargaining and both perceived impact of collective bargaining and faculty salary priority, we find no difference in the zero-order associations of variables. Thus, if academic status is operationally

defined as rank, it does not exert the controlling influence on either collective bargaining's perceived impacts or salary priorities that it exerts on whether or not collective bargaining itself is supported. But, as will be shown below, rank does exercise a controlling influence on other variables.

As mentioned above, one of the major differences between collective bargaining supporters and non-supporters centers on the amount of influence faculty exercise in decision making. Supporters see unionization having at least some impact toward increasing faculty influence; whereas non-supporters do not. This implies that supporters may see the faculty, generally, and themselves, in particular, as being less influential than non-supporters see themselves. The questions to which we now turn address this implication. Specifically, we will examine whether or not supporters perceive a difference power structure than non-supporters, whether or not supporters prefer a level of influence for faculty that is significantly higher than that preferred by non-supporters, and whether faculty supporters of collective bargaining see themselves as less influential than non-supporters see themselves.

Table 11.0

Faculty Perception of Actual Influence Crosstabulated with Support for Collective Bargaining

Mean Rank	Mean	Item & Participation Mode	Chi-Square	Consensus Rank
1	1.70	Disciplining a student for cheating on an exam (DA)	4.81	7
2	1.48	Creating new educational programs (DA)	6.25	12
3	1.45	Hiring new faculty members (A)	2.78	10.5
4	1.44	Appointing a department chairperson (SR)	3.27	10.5
5	1.40	Determining tenure for faculty members (A)	4.78	9
6	1.37	Determining if a temporary faculty member should be rehired (A)	2.93	8
7	1.17	Appointing an academic dean (SR)	1.72	6
8	1.09	Determining university undergraduate admissions policy (C)	7.09	5
9	1.06	Determining faculty salaries (A)	5.86	4
10	1.02	Appointing a provost (A)	5.92	3
11	1.01	Determining internal university budget allocations (A)	1.44	2
12	1.00	Determining university fees and tuition (A)	1.81	1

degrees of freedom equal three for all items
participating mode - DA: delegated authority
SR: shared responsibility
A: advisory participation
C: consultation rights

Faculty responses to an item asking about actual influence, presented in Table 11.0, reveal no significant differences between

perceptions of supporters and non-supporters. Faculty were asked to specify which group, faculty or administrators, actually has most influence over each of the academic decisions specified. The higher the item mean, the more faculty are considered to actually have most influence.

Faculty respond that administrators have more influence than faculty, this being defined as an item mean of less than 1.5Ø, on every item but one concerning disciplining cheating students. Faculty see themselves as least influential in money matters (salaries, internal budget allocations, and student fees and tuition). They see themselves as most influential in areas related to educational programs, these being the areas over which the faculty exercises authority delegated to it by the Board of Trustees. In matters of selection of unit administrators, as level rises from chairperson to provost, faculty see themselves becoming progressively less influential.

The pattern of perceived influence described above is consistent with the formal legal structure of participation set forth for faculty in the University's "Bylaws for Academic Governance". To recapitulate, both collective bargaining supporters and non-supporters see the same configuration of faculty influence when faculty are contrasted with administrators.

In another item concerning faculty perception of influence, presented in Table 12.Ø, faculty were asked to rate how much influence university faculty have over a similar, but shorter and less specific, list of academic decisions. Another difference between this item and the preceeding question, the current item does not specify a contrast group, as the preceeding item does. The pattern of faculty responses

to this less structured, more general item are consistent with responses to the preceeding item. However, when the more general item is crosstabulated with support for collective bargaining, several statistically significant associations are found.

Table 12.Ø

Faculty Perception of University Faculty Influence Crosstabulated with Support for Collective Bargaining

Mean Rank	Mean	Item & Participation Mode	Chi-Square	Consensus Rank
1	3.66	Curriculum (DA)	5.9Ø$_2$	1
2	3.32	Hiring of new faculty (A)	8.Ø4	2
3	3.3Ø	Criteria for graduate student admissions (SR)	8.72	7
4	3.21	Selection of a department chairperson (SR)	17.46*	3
5	2.96	Development of faculty personnel policies (A)	5.76*$_1$	5
6	2.39	Selection of an academic dean (SR)	7.3Ø*$_1$	6
7	2.36	Faculty lead determinations (A)	8.17	8
8	1.97	Department budget allocations (C)	4.9Ø	4

* - alpha less than .Ø5
** - alpha less than .Ø1
degrees of freedom equal nine
participation mode - see Table 9.Ø
1. degrees of freedom for these items equal one
2. degrees of freedom for this item equals six

As shown in Table 12.Ø, concerns relating to educational matters again rank as those in which faculty perceive themselves to be most

influential, and money matters again as those in which faculty feel least influential. Again, hiring new faculty follows as next highest area after educational matters as it did in Table 11.0. Another recurring pattern is that for selection of unit administrators, faculty again report that their influence declines as the level of the unit rises. The significant associations between perception of faculty influence and suppport for collective bargaining are presented in Table 12.1.

Table 12.1

Faculty Perception of University Faculty Influence (as percent of group n) for Supporters and Non-Supporters of Collective Bargaining for Significant Items in Table 12.0

Item	Extent of Faculty Influence					Group Mean
	Great	Some	Slight	None	Total	
Selection of a department chairperson:						
Supporters	33%	46%	18%	3%	100% (n=147)	3.09
Non-Supporters	43%	43%	12%	2%	100% (n=190)	3.27
Development of faculty personnel policies:						
Supporters	22%	44%	28%	6%	100% (n=145)	2.82
Non-Supporters	31%	46%	20%	3%	100% (n=190)	3.05
Selection of an academic dean:						
Supporters	10%	25%	49%	16%	100% (n=146)	2.29
Non-Supporters	9%	40%	40%	11%	100% (n=190)	2.47

As Table 12.1 shows, supporters of collective bargaining see the faculty as somewhat less influential in the areas of selection of unit administrators and development of personnel policies that do non-supporters.

A relevant question, at this point, is whether rank affects faculty perceptions of influence for those items significantly associated with support for collective bargaining. Rank exercises no impact on the faculty's perceived influence in selection of an academic dean. However, rank does have impact on the faculty's perceived influence in selection of a chairperson and in the development of personnel policies.

In the area of selection of a department chairpersons, the difference between supporters and non-supporters is accounted for by the difference between ranks. Both supporters and non-supporters of collective bargaining who are full professors are more likely to see the faculty as having a higher level of influence in selection of a department chairperson than are either lower-ranking supporters or non-supporters.

In the area of faculty personnel policies, controlling for the effect of rank reveals that there are no significant differences on this item between supporters and non-supporters of collective bargaining below the rank of professor. Among professors, however, supporters of collective bargaining are more likely to perceive faculty as having little influence in this area than are non-supporters. Twenty-eight percent of full-professor supporters of collective bargaining see the faculty as having little influence in developing faculty personnel policies, contrasted with the 14% of full-professor non-supporters. Despite this significant association, full-professor supporters still view the faculty as being more influential than lower ranking non-supporters do. This indicates that status does impact on perception of faculty influence independently of its impact on support for collective bargainning.

Overall, support for collective bargaining does not appear to affect perception of the university's actual influence structure. When comparing themselves with administrators, faculty perceive the same influence structure regardless of whether or not they support collective bargaining. Even without administrators as a comparison group, no differences are found between supporters and non-supporters on five of eight items, and on one of the significant items the association is an artifact of rank. Thus for five of eight items in Table 12.0 there are no significant associations. Of the three significant associations, none is ranked higher than fourth by the faculty.

While perception of the university's actual structure of influence may not relate to support for collective bargaining, reaction to the structure, in terms of preferred influence does show significant differences between supporters and non-supporters. Responses to an item asking about ideal influence, presented in Table 13.0 below, show statistically significant associations with support for collective bargaining on seven of the twelve items.

Table 13.0.

Faculty Preferred Influence Crosstabulated with Support for Collective Bargaining

Mean Rank	Mean	Item & Participation Mode:	Chi-Square	Consensus Rank
1	1.96	Creating new educational programs (DA)	5.30	1
2	1.92	Appointing a department chairperson	2.95	3
3	1.90	Hiring new faculty members (A)	4.38*[1]	4
4	1.88	Disciplining a student for cheating on an exam (DA)	.78	5
5	1.86	Determining tenure for faculty members (A)	2.25	6
6.5	1.82	Appointing an academic dean (SR)	2.31	7
6.5	1.82	Determining if a temporary faculty member should be rehired (A)	7.91*	8
8.5	1.60	Appointing a provost (A)	10.54**	10.5
8.5	1.60	Determining university undergraduate admissions policy (C)	7.81*	10.5
10	1.53	Determining faculty salaries (A)	26.52**	12
11	1.31	Determining internal university budget allocations (A)	27.08**	9
12	1.05	Determining university fees and tuition (A)	7.37**[1]	2

* - alpha less than .05
** - alpha less than .01
degrees of freedom equal three for all items
participation mode - see Table 9.0
1. degrees of freedom for these equals one.

For the items in this question, faculty were again asked to choose between whether faculty or administrators should have most influence from an identical list of academic decisions to that presented in Table 11.Ø.

In contrast to their perception of actual influence, faculty prefer to have most influence in all areas of academic decision making except determining fees and tuition and making internal budget allocations. Faculty respond that they should have most influence in selection of unit administrators, although the degree to which they support this still declines as the level of the unit rises. While the faculty's chief preference for most influence is still the area of educational programs, influence in selection of a chairperson ranks next highest, followed by faculty personnel matters.

It is interesting to note that the rank order of items is nearly the same, when faculty perceptions of actual and preferred influence are compared, even though faculty opinion shifts drastically. The Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient between lists in Table 11.Ø and Table 13.Ø is .94, indicating that the arrangement of items' importance is relatively fixed, regardless of which group exercises most influence.

Table 13.1

Faculty Preferred Influence (as percent of group n) for Supporters and Non-Supporters of Collective Bargaining for Significant Items in Table 13.0

Item:	Who Should Have Most Influence				Group Mean
	Administrators	Faculty	Total		
Hiring new faculty members:					
Supporters	6%	94%	100%	(n=139)	1.94
Non-Supporters	13%	87%	100%	(n=181)	1.87
Determining if a temporary faculty member should be rehired:					
Supporters	12%	88%	100%	(n=135)	1.88
Non-Supporters	23%	77%	100%	(n=177)	1.77
Appointing a provost:					
Supporters	34%	66%	100%	(n=137)	1.66
Non-Supporters	45%	55%	100%	(n=176)	1.55
Determining university undergraduate admissions policy:					
Supporters	37%	63%	100%	(n=136)	1.63
Non-Supporters	42%	58%	100%	(n=176)	1.58
Determining faculty salaries:					
Supporters	31%	69%	100%	(n=135)	1.69
Non-Supporters	59%	41%	100%	(n=180)	1.41
Determining internal university budget allocations:					
Supporters	55%	45%	100%	(n=133)	1.45
Non-Supporters	80%	20%	100%	(n=178)	1.20
Determining university fees and tuition:					
Supporters	90%	10%	100%	(n=130)	1.10
Non-Supporters	98%	2%	100%	(n=180)	1.02

The significant differences in preferred influence between supporters and non-supporters are presented in greater detail in Table 13.1 above. On all seven items, a greater proportion of supporters than non-supporters respond that faculty should have the most influence. With the exception of the area "hiring new faculty members", the significant items comprise the lower half of the list of academic decisions. Thus, although faculty as a whole respond that the faculty should exercise most influence in most areas of academic decision making, supporters of collective bargaining believe this more strongly than do non-supporters.

From the preceeding discussion, we find that faculty generally see themselves as less influential in academic decisions making than they desire to be when contrasted with administrators. Reaction to this common situation provides a basis for supporting collective bargaining as a viable means to attain increased faculty influence, or at least check any increase in administrator influence, in academic decision making. This is consistent, not only with the finding that supporters of collective bargaining prefer a higher degree of faculty influence than do non-supporters, but also with the finding that supporters see on of collective bargaining's chief impacts to be an increase in faculty influence in decision making. Parenthetically, it is worth noting that status does not exert a significant influence on perception of actual or preferred influence.

So far we have asked respondents about faculty influence in general. Next we ask about each respondent's influence relative to departmental colleagues. Table 14.Ø shows supporters of collective bargaining seeing themselves as less influential relative to department

Table 14.Ø

Faculty Perceived Influence in Own Department Crosstabulated with Support for Collective Bargaining

Mean Rank	Mean	Item & Participation Mode:	Chi-Square	Consensus Rank
1	2.13	Curriculum (DA)	11.32	7
2	1.69	Selection of a department chairperson	12.48*	1
3	1.92	Criteria for graduate student selection (SR)	7.34	8
4	1.89	Hiring new faculty (A)	8.49	5
5	1.83	Faculty load determination (A)	8.71	3
6	1.83	Development of faculty personnel policies (A)	1Ø.31	6
7	1.8Ø	Selection of an academic dean (SR)	15.55*	2
8	1.75	Department budget allocations	13.11*	4

* - alpha less than .Ø5
degrees of freedom equal six
participation mode - see Table 9.Ø

colleagues in several areas than non-supporters see themselves. These differences are further illustrated in Table 14.1.

For all items in this question, at least 55% of both supporters and non-supporters of collective bargaining respond that they have about the same influence in departmental matters as their departmental colleagues. Supporters see themselves as significantly less influential than their colleagues in matters affecting selection of unit administrators and department budget allocations.

When controlling for rank no significant differences between lower ranking supporters and non-supporters are found; but full-professor supporters of collective bargaining see themselves as less influential in departmental matters than do full-professor non-supporters. The vast majority of full-professors (between 79 and 96 percent, depending on item) perceive of themselves as at least as influential as their departmental colleagues. However, those who perceive themselves as less influential are more likely to support collective bargaining. Among less than full-professors, a substantial majority (between 61 and 79 percent, depending on item) perceive themselves at least as influential as their departmental colleagues, but those perceiving themselves as less influential are no more likely to be supporters than be non-supporters.

This implies that, if full professors support collective bargaining, they do so because it represents a new avenue through which to gain influence in academic decision making. Faculty of lower rank, although perceiving themselves as less influential than full professors perceive trhemselves, are no more likely to support collective bargaining than to oppose it. Apparently, lower-ranking non-supporters

Table 14.1

Faculty Perceived Influence in Own Department
(as percent of group n)
for Supporters and Non-Supporters of
Collective Bargaining for Significant Items in Table 14.0

Item:	Own Influence Relative to Other				Group Mean
	More	Same	Less	Total	
Selection of a department chairperson:					
Supporters	5%	75%	20%	100% (n=146)	1.85
Non-Supporters	14%	75%	11%	100% (n=190)	2.03
Selection of an academic dean:					
Supporters	1%	65%	34%	100% (n=146)	1.67
Non-Supporters	6%	75%	19%	100% (n=189)	1.87
Department budget allocations:					
Supporters	5%	55%	40%	100% (n=146)	1.65
Non-Supporters	5%	70%	25%	100% (n=189)	1.80

see themselves eventually acquiring greater influence through traditional ways, whereas supporters of collective bargaining do not. Or, putting it another way, supporters see collective bargaining as a viable means to gain influence at all ranks; non-supporters do not, even though at lower ranks they possess less influence than at full professor.

A similar pattern is found when the relationship between perceived individual influence and support for collective bargaining is controlled for relative individual satisfaction among faculty. As Tables 15.0 and 15.1 show, supporters of collective bargaining are significantly less likely to be satisfied with their jobs than are non-supporters. More supporters than non-supporters report being unsatisifed, 36% to 18%. Though faculty generally see other faculty members as less satisfied than they see themselves, supporters are significantly more likely than non-supporters to see other faculty as unsatisifed, 49% to 30%, even though the drop perception of satisfaction from self to others is smaller for supporters than for non-supporters.

Table 15.0

Faculty Satisfaction and Perception of Others' Satisfaction Crosstabulated with Support for Collective Bargaining

Mean	Item	Chi-Square	df
2.94	Own satisfaction	36.82**	9
2.66	Others' satisfaction	11.45**	1

** - alpha less than .01

Table 15.1

Faculty Satisfaction and Perception of Others' Satisfaction (as percent of group n) for Supporters and Non-Supporters of Collective Bargaining for Table 15.Ø

Item	Relative Job Satisfaction						Group Mean
	Satisfied		Unsatisfied		Total	N	
Own	Very	Slightly	Slightly	Very			
Supporters	13%	51%	30%	6%	100%	143	2.71
Non-Supporters	34%	48%	14%	4%	100%	188	3.12
Others	Satisfied		Unsatisfied				
Supporters	51%		49%		100%	141	2.50
Non-Supporters	70%		30%		100%	181	2.78

Controlling for satisfaction in the relationship between perception of own influence and support for collective bargaining reveals that, among satisfied faculty, supporters see themselves as less influential in departmental affairs than non-supporters; but among unsatisfied no differences exist between supporters and non-supporters in own influence in departmental matters. This reaffirms the finding mentioned above that, even though most supporters are satisfied with their jobs, they support collective bargaining because they desire increased influence.

In terms of areas of departmental emphasis, no association was found between support for collective bargaining and the areas listed in Table 16.Ø, except for the area of the amount of departmental emphasis that should be given to instruction of undergraduate majors.

Table 16.Ø

Faculty Perception of Departmental Emphasis (Goals)
Crosstabulated with Support for Collective Bargaining

Mean Rank	Mean	Item:	Chi-Square	Consensus Rank
1	3.78	Instruction of undergraduate majors	6.58*[1]	1
2	3.64	Instruction of graduate students	9.82	2
3	3.31	Applied research	9.82	4
4	3.82	Basic research	8.99	5
5	3.22	Advisement of graduate majors	14.5Ø	3
6	3.18	Advisement of undergraduate majors	13.13	6
7	3.Ø2	Instruction of undergraduate non-majors	7.86	7
8	2.66	Implementation of a strong affirmative action program	14.71	9
9	2.65	Continuing/life-long education	11.25	8

* - alpha less than .Ø5
degrees of freedom equal nine
1. degrees of freedom for this item equals one.
Categories were collapsed to obtain a valid chi-square.

Table 16.1

Faculty Perception of Departmental Emphasis (Goals)
(as percent of group n)
for Supporters and Non-Supporters of
Collective Bargaining for Significant Items in Table 16.1

Item:	Amount of Emphasis					Group Mean
	Great	Some	Slight	None	Total	
Instruction of undergraduate majors						
Supporters	73%	26%	1%	0%	100% (n=147)	3.72
Non-Supporters	84%	14%	2%	0%	100% (n=191)	3.82

As seen in Table 16.Ø, faculty respond that departmental emphasis and faculty salary priorities (from Table 1Ø.Ø) should reflect the same order of major faculty activities. Faculty place teaching and research as the top priorities for both departments and individual faculty. These are followed by academic advisement of students, and other educational activities. It is interesting that faculty rate implementation of a strong affirmative action program eighth, and that there is not a significant difference between supporters and non-supporters since supporters are generally considered to be more politically liberal than non-supporters. This could mean that supporters do not believe that affirmative action is within the sphere of control of the departments to implement. Alternately, it could simply mean that supporters of collective bargaining do not support the idea of affirmative action because it might endanger the chances for promotion and/or tenure of faculty already at Michigan State. As shown in Table 16.1, more non-supporters than supporters of collective bargaining rate instruction of undergraduate majors as being of great importance as a departmental goal. It should be noted that, if the categories of emphasis to some extent are combined, the appearance of a relationship disappears with 99% of supporters and 98% of non-supporters feeling that this goal should be emphasized. Thus, as with faculty salary priorities, the goals which both supporters and non-supporters feel should be emphasized are the same. This indicates that supporters prefer an image of the university that is very similar to that preferred by non-supporters, except that supporters see collective bargaining as a viable means to achieve realization of this image, whereas non-supporters do not.

Table 17.0

Faculty Perceptions of Current Issues
Crosstabulated with Support for Collective Bargaining

Mean Rank	Mean	Item:	Chi-Square	Consensus Rank
1	3.39	In making student admissionsn decisions, academic aptitude should be given the greatest weight	10.16	1
2	3.14	Procedures for reappointment of faculty are generally fair to the faculty members involved	35.60**	3
3	2.72	Two-year community colleges would probably better serve the needs of most disadvantaged students	25.18**	11.5
4	2.66	The current grievance procedures for faculty are adequate	68.77**	9
5	2.35	This university should admit disadvantaged students who appear to have potential, even if they do not meet normal entrance standards	23.66**	6
6	2.32	University rules are often ignored by the faculty	6.45*$_1$	8
7	2.32	Life-long education is important enough to compete with other university programs for resources	6.73	7
8	2.24	Eliminating academic programs or departments is a legitimate means of budget reallocation	18.90*	13
9	2.17	There should be greater university coordination of programs, even if it means the loss of unit autonomy	8.38	10
10	2.12	The percentage of graduate students at MSU should be increased considerably above its present 20% level	17.16*	11.5

Table 17.0 Continued

11	2.04	The university is dealing with its current budgetary problems in the most reasonable way possible	30.43**	4
12	2.00	The soon-to-be-appointed President's Planning Council will be a good means of assessing university priorities	5.75	5
13	1.49	Giving college credit for remedial courses is justified	7.69	2

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* - alpha less than .05
** - alpha less than .01
degrees of freedom = 9
1. Degrees of freedom for this item equals one.
Categories were collapsed to obtain a valid chi-square statistic.

Finally, while both supporters and non-supporters of collective bargaining may share a similar image of what the University should be, they disagree substantially over whether the University is, in its current structure and practice, adequate to its educational task. This is not surprising, of course, since the existence of a union movement on campus serves as prima facia evidence that at least some of the faculty are dissatisfied.

In response to a question asking faculty to rate the extent to which they agreed with a list of statements about the University, as Table 17.Ø shows, the item with which faculty most readily agreed was a reaffirmation of the need for academic aptitude in the students admitted to the university. They also agreed that credit should be not given for remedial course work. Third by consensus, faculty generally believe that procedures for faculty reappointment are generally fair. Interestingly, in the fourth and fifth ranked items (by consensus), faculty in 1976-77 give cool reception to statements that the University is handling its budgetary problems well, and that the Planning Council is a good means of assessing university priorities. The remaining items, ranked according to faculty consensus, show agreement with the following statements:

6. The university should admit disadvantaged students with potential, even if they don't meet normal entrance standards;

7. Life-long education is important enough to compete with other programs for resources;

8. Faculty often ignore university rules;

9. Current grievance procedures are adequate;

1Ø. There should be greater coordination of university programs, even if unit autonomy is lost;

11.5 Two-year community colleges better serve disadvantaged students;

11.5 M.S.U. should increase its percentage of graduate students;

13. Eliminating programs or departments is a legitimate means of budget realloocation.

Support for collective bargaining is significantly related with faculty perceptions of current university issues on eight of the thirteen statements. As shown in Table 17.1, non-supporters agree to the statements more often than supporters of collective bargaining do on seven of the eight significant relationships. The issue of admitting disadvantaged students who appear to have potential even if they don't meet normal standards for admission is the only issue with which supporters agree to a greater extent than do non-supporters, 47% of supporters agreeeing to at least some extent compared to 37% of non-supporters. This is interesting considering there is no difference between supporters and non-supporters regarding departmental affirmative action programs (see Table 16.0). The mean for all faculty on the question of departmental affirmative action is 2.66; the mean for supporters on the question of admitting disadvantaged students is 2.51, and the mean for non-supporters is 2.19. This indicates the source of the difference between supporters and non-supporters for the latter item is the greater decline in agreement with affirmative action-related statements on the part of non-supporters.

Table 17.1

Faculty Perceptions of Current Issues (as percent of group n)
for Supporters and Non-Supporters of Collective Bargaining
for Significant Items in Table 17.0

Item	Extent of Agreement					Group Mean
	Great	Some	Slight	None	Total	
Reappointment/fair:						
Supporters	23%	56%	13%	8%	100% (n=145)	2.94
Non-Supporters	47%	40%	8%	5%	100% (n=188)	3.29
Two year college/better/disadvantaged students:						
Supporters	27%	30%	26%	17%	100% (n=143)	2.67
Non-Supporters	31%	34%	19%	16%	100% (n=183)	2.80
Grievance procedures/fair:						
Supporters	13%	29%	28%	14%	100% (n=141)	2.25
Non-Supporters	29%	48%	16%	7%	100% (n=180)	2.99
Admit disadvantaged student with potential:						
Supporters	18%	29%	39%	14%	100% (n=148)	2.51
Non-Supporters	8%	29%	37%	26%	100% (n=186)	2.19
Faculty ignore university rules:						
Supporters	10%	28%	34%	28%	100% (n=143)	2.20
Non-Supporters	13%	39%	26%	22%	100% (n=179)	2.43
Eliminating programs or department/budget reallocation:						
Supporters	10%	22%	28%	40%	100% (n=148)	2.02
Non-Supporters	19%	30%	25%	26%	100% (n=188)	2.42
Increase percentage of graduate students:						
Supporters	10%	24%	24%	42%	100% (n=148)	2.02
Non-Supporters	17%	22%	27%	34%	100% (n=187)	2.22
University dealing well with current budgetary problems:						
Supporters	1%	19%	37%	41%	100% (n=143)	1.80
Non-Supporters	4%	39%	34%	23%	100% (n=178)	2.24

On only two items do more than half of supporters agree with statements to some or a great extent. These two items concern whether procedures for reappointment of faculty are fair and whether community colleges better serve the needs of disadvantaged students. The percentages of supporters agreeing to at least some extent with these statements are seventy-three and fifty-seven, respectively.

Faculty grievance procedures are strongly related to collective bargaining concerns with 77% of non-supporters agreeing to at least some extent that the current grievance procedures are fair to the faculty, compared to 42% of supporters. More than half, 52%, of non-supporters agree to at least some extent that faculty often ignore university rules, compared to 38% of supporters.

The five significant relationships mentioned so far rank second through sixth when the items are ranked by faculty mean. While nearly half of non-supporters agree to at least some extent that eliminating academic programs is a legitimate way of reallocating the university budget, only about a third of supporters agree to this extent. Additionally, non-supporters are more likely than supporters to agree that the university's percentage of graduate students should be increased, 39% to 34%. Finally, whereas 43% of non-supporters agree to at least some extent that the university is dealing with its current budgetary problems in the most reasonable way possible, only 20% of supporters agree to such an extent.

The pattern of responses to the items in Table 17.0 demonstrates that, in addition to the responses reported in Table 15.0, supporters of collective bargaining are less likely that non-supporters to be satisfied with a variety of current university policies and practices.

This pattern indicates that supporters are less likely than non-supporters to look upon the university, its administration, policies and practices with favor; and that they see collective bargaining as the means to redress their discontent.

CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Demographic Characteristics

The first of the four research questions to be addressed by the current research, a secondary analysis of a 1977 survey of 347 faculty members and 197 administrators at Michigan State University, was to ascertain whether local support for collective bargaining followed the national pattern observed by other researchers (Ladd and Lipset, 1973, 1975, 1978; Garabino, 1975; Kemerer and Baldridge, 1975). The current research confirms the general pattern. Demographic characteristics do not, of course, in themselves determine whether faculty members support or oppose collective bargaining, but they are useful in locating some of the differences among faculty regarding their common situation of employment at the university.

Local supporters of collective bargaining tend to be younger, lower rank faculty, and to have been employed at the institution for a shorter period of time than non-supporters. Supporters are also less likely than non-supporters to be tenured or to hold doctoral degrees. No relationship to support for collective bargaining is found for other demographic characteristics such as gender, primary responsibility (teaching or research), or individual assessment of the quality of one's own department.

The effects of ideological differences between disciplines that generally predispose faculty in certain disciplines to support collective bargaining more than faculty in others are cancelled out by

the improving status position of faculty as they move up in rank. These findings support Ladd and Lipset's (1973, 1975) observation that "class interest" is a major factor in determining support for or opposition to collective bargaining.

Perceptions of Academic Governance

The second research question to be answered was whether supporters and non-supporters of collective bargaining perceive the structure of academic governance similarly.

Not all faculty members who are younger, of lower rank, or without tenure uniformly support collective bargaining. Many of these faculty members do not favor collective bargaining, even though they have not yet received the major institutional rewards of job security, status and influence. Non-supporters see these rewards coming to them as they advance through the existing structures of academic rank, responsibilities and governance. Supporters do not.

Differences between supporters and non-supporters are also found in their images of what a university is and should be. The normative patterns held by both groups are virtually the same in the area of goals toward which both departments and individual faculty members should strive. Both stress the primary importance of teaching, followed closely by research and publishing. The only area of difference between supporters and non-supporters concerns the prominence that faculty service outside the university should be accorded in the determination of faculty salaries. As mentioned above, this indicates that supporters of collective bargaining are somewhat

more oriented toward rewarding involvement in the world off-campus than are non-supporters.

The existence of this apparent consensus of values does not prove to be of great utility in understanding sentiment favoring collective bargaining. It is easy to argue that both teaching and research ought to be of great importance to both individuals and departments. It is something altogether different to move from the abstract to the concrete and examine the actual relative importance of each in faculty and administrative decision making. This, unfortunately, was an area beyond the scope of the survey instrument upon which the current research is based. It will be up to future researchers to examine this question and its implications for support for collective bargaining.

Although supporters and non-supporters generally agree on the importance of certain abstract goals at the level of individuals and departments, they do not share similar views regarding the adequacy of current university policies and practices. Supporters of collective bargaining are more likely to be critical of the University and its administration than are non-supporters. This is reflected in responses to questions concerning university issues. Supporters responded less favorably than non-supporters to most of these questions, but particularly so to items related to faculty personnel matters. Supporters are less satisfied with their jobs than are non-supporters, and are more apt than non-supporters to report that other faculty members are also dissatisfied.

The main source for the critical image that supporters of collective bargaining hold of the University centers on the power of administrators and the inability of faculty to significantly influence

or control decision making in the University. The issue of faculty influence has the strongest association with support for collective bargaining of any item in the current survey. The importance of academic decision making has been suggested by Blau (1973:159), who observes that this is the prime area for conflict within colleges and universities because "administrative and professional considerations are often at variance. . .when administrative demands infringe upon the specialized responsibilities of experts." Thus, as the hired experts in the areas of teaching and research, faculty are likely to come into conflict with those charged with responsibility for administration over the issue of which agenda to use in the allocation of resources and in the evaluation of performance, the agenda of the "experts" or that of the administrators.

The current research shows that although perception of the University's actual influence structure is unrelated to support for collective bargaining, the faculty's reaction to this structure is related. Supporters of collective bargaining see themselves as being less influential than other faculty. Supporters also prefer a higher degree of faculty influence in academic decision making than do non-supporters. This should not be interpreter to imply that non-supporters do not perceive a disparity between actual and preferred influence. Stonewater (1977) reports that faculty generally perceive this disparity. Rather, it means that the disparity perceived by supporters is greater than that generally found among all faculty.

Faculty ideology holds that administrators predominate in academic decision making more than they should (Stonewater, 1977). Supporters of collective bargaining believe that a faculty union would

significantly increase faculty influence and control. Non-supporters do not generally perceive this to be the case. Given the demographic pattern described above, this is not surprising. Generally, supporters of collective bargaining are those outside positions of organizational power. For these faculty members, a collective action strategy could obtain institutional benefits sooner and with greater certainty than would generally be the case if pursued individually.

Faculty status differences also act to attenuate faculty perception of and receptivity to the issue of influence in faculty ideology. Structurally, these differences reduce receptivity because proportionately more higher ranking faculty are in positions of organizational influence than are lower ranking faculty. For full professors influence in departmental, college, and university matters is not something to acquire, it is something already possessed. This is not to say that all full professors are overwhelmingly influential in all areas. Obviously they are not. It is to say that as a group full professors shape academic decision making at the university to a greater extent than other ranks.

Another aspect of faculty ideology is that faculty are generally liberal. Liberals are more supportive of the idea of collective bargaining than are conservatives, and faculty are no exception (Ladd and Lipset, 1973, 1975, 1978). However, although faculty hold views favoring collective bargaining generally, they also "apparently hold individualistic, meritocratic beliefs about the way affairs ought to be arranged at their own institutions" (Garabino, 1957:54).

The combined effect of the idea of local merit and the influence of rank-based status difference on the generally liberal ideology of

faculty partially explains the discrepancy between the survey results and the actual vote in the 1978 representation election. Of faculty responding to the 1977 survey, 64% indicated at least slight support for the establishment of a collective bargaining unit, and 44% indicated some or great support. The actual 1978 vote was 1,Ø97 for "neither" (59%), 476 (26%) for Faculty Associates, and 289 (15%) for the local chapter of AAUP. Together FA and AAUP won 41% of the vote, only a slight change from the 44% in our 1977 sample findings who supported collective bargaining to some or a great extent.

Perceptions of the Impact of Collective Bargaining

The third research question was whether supporters and non-supporters of collective bargaining perceive similar impacts as a result of faculty collective bargaining.

One of the chief perceived impacts of collective bargaining at Michigan State University would be an increase in faculty influence in academic decision making. For supporters (who regard themselves as less infuential than other faculty) collective bargaining creates the possibility of a new mode of faculty participation, one that would increase their voice in decision making. Kemerer and Baldridge (1975) argued that this new mode of influence would most likely exist along side (rather than replace) other modes of faculty participation. Because it is a mode that supporters, the current outsiders, would be likely to control, supporters see collective bargaining as openning a new channel for influencing the university's distribution of rewards.

The two impacts that faculty as a whole see as most likely are equalization of faculty salaries across University units and reducing

the merit basis of faculty salary increases. Our finding that supporters of collective bargaining disagree with the statement that unionization would result in reduction of the merit basis of faculty salary increases is a surprise. There is nothing in the literature to suggest such a relationship. If anything, the literature's general thrust leads to a contrary expectation: that merit increases, an individualistic phenomenon, would not be supported by those advocating a collective action strategy. We observed above that neither of the possible explanations for this finding can be supported to the exclusion of the other on the basis of the current data. Possibly, supporters approve of the merit basis for salary differences and find it reconcilable with demands for equal salary levels across units. Alternatively, it is also possible that supporters do not believe that a merit-based determination of salary increases is actually possible, and therefore, they reject the idea that an already ineffectual basis for salary differences can be made less effective. More extensive data must be obtained before further analysis of this issue can proceed.

The next two impacts of collective bargaining considered most likely by all faculty were that it would improve the overall economic status of the faculty and increase faculty involvement in decision making. Supporters see both of these impacts as decidedly more likely than do non-supporters. Our research indicates that although faculty influence and economic consideration may be logically separable factors, they do not appear so to faculty. A cross-tabulation of faculty responses to these two items produces a Yule's Q coefficient of .84. On the basis of these findings it appears that supporters see collective bargaining as the medium leading to the solution of varied and even contradictory problems.

Supporters of collective bargaining also agree that unionization would provide greater job security and would help the University acquire additional funds for the legislature. Non-supporters disagree with both of these positions. Therefore, is comes as no surprise that supporters tend to see collective bargaining as resulting in more benefits and fewer drawbacks than do non-supporters. Non-supporters see collective bargaining as being only marginally effective in economc areas and ineffective in areas related to faculty influence.

The University as Bureaucratic Organization

The final research question to be answered concerned faculty unionization as a response to the development of the university as a type of bureaucratic formal organization.

Faculty collective bargaining does not, of course, take place in a vacuum. It has specific historical, legal, economic, and social antecedents that are embedded in the university's structural response to the growth of mass post-secondary education in the post-World War II era. This structural response has created a very different university from the one that existed forty years ago. The institution is larger, more complex and diverse. Problems of management of university resources have grown, and problems of coordinating university programs have appeared where none existed.

The act of coordination is not purely benign. To be sure, management does involve elements of a neutral and disinterested administration; but it also necessarily entails the act of making choices between competing demands for scarce organizational resources.

Very simply, what is given to one unit of a university reduces what is available to the rest. At Michigan State University these decisions are made as the result of the delegation of authority by Board of Trustees to the President, and through him to unit administrators. The influence of faculty members exists primarily as advisory to administrator's decision making.

University administration may once have been possible, as Ben-David (1972) observes, on a largely part-time, rotating basis. This is no longer the case. The growth in size and complexity, and the need to account for funds and mandated performances to outside agencies such as government or foundations, requires skills and efficiency represented by the bureaucratic form of organization. Administration becomes not an adjunct responsibility of the faculty, but a full-time profession complete with its own technical knowledge of how a university can and should be organized to work.

It should be remembered that this change in the nature of the administrative apparatus did not occur over any intense opposition from faculty. Faculty allowed it to grow because it relieved them of the responsibility for administration and allowed them more time for teaching and research. In the process, amateur decision making gave way to technically superior bureaucratic decision making as Weber (1947) predicted.

The business of administration is mostly routine. This explains, in part, the generally low level of faculty interest in governance. The routine tasks take time away from the more rewarded activities of teaching and research. However, as planning and change become important elements in the administration of an organization,

administration ceases to be mere routine and becomes the means for organizational definition. It is at this point that faculty influence becomes a political question.

One reason that faculty did not rebel at the rise of the bureaucratic administrative apparatus is because the principle of collegiality was not threatened by the creation of a bureaucracy. The most influential faculty, the members of the faculty oligarchy (Perlstadt, 1975), were able to adapt the bureaucratic structure to the needs that the oligarchy had for speed and precision in university administration. Thus we find that a bureaucratic staff can provide an oligarchy the same advantages it provides Weber's monocrat.

Our research indicates that faculty support for collective bargaining occurs as a political response to the planning and implementing aspects of the organization of academic decision making. Faculty outside the oligarchy perceive collective bargaining as a viable means to affect the university's planning and implementing of change. As such, collective bargaining is an attempt by certain faculty to rationalize the structure of collegiality. Collective bargaining attempts to amend the power of oligarchy and appeals to those outside the existing collegial dispensation (Perlstadt, 1975).

The growth in size and scope of the American higher education has resulted in increased formality and rationality in the organizational structures of colleges and universities. As Ladd and Lipset (1973, 1975, 1978) have argued, faculty collective bargaining efforts reflect the current contradiction manifested between the ideal of egalitarianism (equality of result) and the ideal of merit. The futures of collective bargaining and higher education depend on the resolution of this conflict.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

The current research was conducted in order to answer a number of questions that relate to the understanding of faculty support for collective bargaining at a major midwestern university. In the process we have identified support for collective bargaining as a social phenomenon that occurs in response to the historic development of the university as a type of formal organization. We found that the concept of collegiality provides explanatory power in understanding faculty collective bargaining as a response to the growth of bureaucratic forms of administration in higher education.

We found the same general pattern of demographic characteristics relating to support for collective bargaining identified by other researchers: Supporters of collective bargaining tend to desire more influence for faculty than do non-supporters. Supporters are less saitisfied with their jobs and more critical of the University and its administration than are non-supporters. Finally, we found that support for collective bargaining can be viewed as a political response by faculty outside the existing collegial structure of influence acquisition to the planning and implementation aspect of academic decision making.

Suggestions for Further Research

In the areas of faculty rewards for off-campus activities, supporters of collective bargaining appeared to show somewhat more of

an orientation to the off-campus world than non-supporters. It remains to be demonstrated whether supports actually are more involved in community affairs and public service, or whether they are merely more willing to reward such involvements. Additionally, the question of whether supporters of collective bargaining at Michigan State University manifest a predominately cosmopolitan or local orientation should be examined. Unfortunately, this question is beyond the scope of our research because of the limitations of the Stonewater (1977) survey instrument. The terms originate in Merton's "Patterns of Influence" chapter in Lazarfeld and Stanton (1949), and refer to the degree of involvement of persons in either their local systems of interaction or in larger, more distant systems. Those oriented toward the local, concrete system are referred to as "locals", whereas those "in contact with, attached to, or influenced by events and communications from outside the local, concrete system of social relations" are the "cosmopolitan" (Stinchcombe, 1974:54).

This distinction has proved to be so useful that it has been applied to actors in a wide variety of social systems, ranging from street gangs (Whyte, 1955), to social service agencies (Blau and Scott, 1962), and labor unions (Wilensky, 1956). It has been previously applied to academicians by Lazarfeld and Thielens (1958), and Caplow and McGee (1958). Ladd and Lipset (1975:283-284) apply the terms explicitly to faculty unionization and argue that, as a rule, cosmopolitans oppose collective bargaining, whereas locals are split on the issue. The clear implication of this is that faculty unionization efforts can only succeed to the degree that two conditions apply: first, that locals outnumber cosmopolitans; and second, that supporters outnumber non-supporters among the locals.

It has been suggested by Blau and Scott (1962:71) and Stinchcombe (1974:53-57) that cosmopolitans might support collective bargaining if an organization offered limited opportunity for internal professional advancement at a time when the professional job market was not advantageous for movement. Because this is precisely the situation faced by many faculty today, the study of faculty orientation, its possible impact on status differences, and its possible relationship to support for collective bargaining is an area in need of further empirical investigation.

From the 1977 survey it is impossible to determine why supporters believed that collective bargaining will produce less negative influence on the merit basis of faculty salary increases than do non-supporters. Two possible explanations were offered above, but both await further investigation before a determination can be made as to which, if either, is correct.

All faculty report a consensus of values relating to departmental goals and faculty salary priorities. Future research warrants an examination of faculty reaction to the perception of actual department goals and salary priorities, and the impact of this perception on support for collective bargaining.

It is worth noting that those faculty under 40 years old in the 1977 survey were under 30 years old in 1968. It would be very interesting to see if this cohort remains proportionately more supportive of collective bargaining as they advance through the academic ranks than their generational predecessors.

Future research based on this survey would benefit from the inclusion of additional items that would facilitate a more extensive

treatment of faculty political, economic, and social backgrounds. Probably the single most limiting factor in the design of the 1977 survey instrument was its failure to address these areas explicitly.

Another limitation of the 1977 survey centers on the concept of faculty productivity. It was simply impossible to determine if productivity, a significant variable according to Ladd and Lipset (1973), had any effect on support for collective bargaining. Here, too, we suggest the incorporation of additional items in any future research.

A future survey might also do well to expand the number of colleges sampled. Although the demographic profiles of the five colleges sampled in 1977 reflected very favorably on the colleges and the University, overall faculty responses may be skewed because of the extremely large sizes of the College of Arts and Letters and the College of Social Science. This skewing would be reduced through the addition of another large college known to be ideologically different from the two mentioned above. A likely candidate for inclusion in any future research would be the College of Natural Science, which would not only redress the skewing impact, but would support additional research because of the large body of literature developed concerning the differences between the sciences and the humanities.

In conclusion, since attempts to organize the faculty at Michigan State University may recur in the future, it is recommended that the faculty be resurveyed on a periodic basis. Not only will this develop a data base of faculty perceptions, it will also provide a unique opportunity to further our understanding of the impact of change in higher education.

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