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PASSAGES TO LEVIATHAN:
CHIAPAS AND THE MEXICAN STATE, 1891-1947

presented by

Thomas Louis Benjamin

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Ph - D - degree in _H.is_tm:;L_.

 

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PASSAGES TO LEVIATHAN:

CHIAPAS AND THE MEXICAN STATE, 1891-1947

By

Thomas LOuis Benjamin

A DISSERTATION
Submitted to
Michigan State University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Department of History

1981

 

 

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ABSTRACT

PASSAGES TO LEVIATHAN:
CHIAPAS AND THE MEXICAN STATE, 1891-1947
By

Thomas Louis Benjamin

This is a study of the formation of a new political order in Chiapas,
Mexico from 1891 to 1947. After seventy years of political upheaval and
fragmentation, the power of the Mexican State began to be vigorously
asserted in Chiapas. This process had its roots in the national reform
movement of the 18508 and 18605, it began to take form in the 18905, its
course was modified and its pace accelerated as a result of the Mexican
Revolution of 1910—1920, and it was largely completed by the 1940s. What,
in fact, took place was the political modernization of Chiapas in Mexico.

A strong, centralized, and interventionist State functioned in Chiapas
from the 15603 until 1821, when the province opted for independence from
both Spain and Guatemala and joined the newly formed Mexican empire.
Integration into Mexico brought political fragmentation, as power devolved
on the municipal governments. The national reform movement and the wars
of reform and French Intervention in the 18505 and 18603 began the process
0f national consolidation and political modernization. Nearly tw0
decades of crisis prepared the way for the establishment of the dictator—
ship of Porfirio Diaz. It was during the rule of Dfaz, from 1876 to 1911,

that the modern State truly began to take form in Chiapas, and Mexico.

 

 

 

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Thomas Louis Benjamin

From that point in Mexican history, State formation passed
through three distinct phases: the establishment of executive
authoritarianism in the 18903 and 19003, the rise of a socially and
economically active State during the revolution of 1910—1920, and the

integration of organizations of the masses into the apparatus of the

State from 1920 to 1947. These passages were historical stages within

which new and more viable political arrangements were worked out in
response to political crises and the demands of powerful pressure groups.
Each of these passages left an enduring legacy —— executive
authoritarianism, social and economic activism, and collaborationism

with organized masses —— which are the characteristics of the modern
Mexican Leviathan.

This study attempts to place the formation of the modern Mexican
State within the context of the Chiapanecan experience. At the same
time, it seeks to transcend the limited and particularistic meaning of
Chiapanecan history and explore a question of critical importance to

all societies: the relationship between the State and the society from

which it arises, and which in turn defines its Sphere of action.

 

 

 

Copyright by
THOMAS LOUIS BENJAMIN

1981

 

 

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of our exploring

Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.

T.S. Eliot

 

 

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Dissertations are in many respects collective endeavors and I wish

to acknowledge my collaborators. Archival research for this study was

undertaken in Mexico, Guatemala, and the United States during the years
1978—1981. Financial support during this time was generously provided

through fellowships by the College of Arts and Letters at Michigan State

University and by the Henry L. and Grace Doherty Charitable Foundation

at Princeton University.

I would like to thank the staffs of the archives listed in the
bibliography of this study and those of the following libraries for their
assistance and patience: in Mexico City the Biblioteca and Hemeroteca
Nacional, the Biblioteca del Instituto de Investigaciones Historicas at
the Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de México, the Biblioteca of El Colegio
de Mexico, and the Biblioteca 'Gilberto Loya' of the Secretaria de
Programaci6n y Presupuesto; in Chiapas, the Biblioteca and Hemeroteca
del Estado, the Biblioteca 'Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas,‘ and the
Biblioteca of the Universidad Autonoma de Chiapas; in Guatemala City,
the Biblioteca and Hemeroteca Nacional; and in the United States the
Michigan State University Library, the Latin American Library at Tulane
University, the Library of Congress, and the New York City Public Library.

My research was particularly aided by M. Favio Galvez, Natalie
Fuentes, Gary Gossen, Christina Johns, Prudencio Moscoso Pastrana, Thomas

Naihaus, Peter Reich, Gloria Sarmiento, Daniela Spenser, Angles Suarez,

Lawrence Taylor, and John Taylor.

 

 

I first undertook the study of Latin American history in 1975
under the direction of Professors David C. Bailey and Leslie B. Rout, Jr.

Their enthusiasm for Latin America and the writing of history was then

and remains highly contagious. Their unfailing encouragement and

assistance, along with that of Professors Donald M. Lammers, Warren I.
Cohen, Paul A. Varg, Stanley Chojnacki, William Beezley, and John Hart,
significantly contributed to whatever value this study may have. Errors
of fact and judgement are entirely of my own doing.

Finally, the support and respect of my family thrOugh the lengthy
and occasionally disastrous course of research and writing has made

this effort not only possible but worthwhile.

A todos, mis més profundos agradecimientos.

Mexico City Thomas Benjamin

Semana Santa, 1981

 

 

 

 

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CONTENTS

Acknowledgments
Glossary

List of Maps

List of Abbreviations

Introduction

The Imperial State, and Beyond

PART ONE: 1891-1910

The State is Moving
Reform and Discord
Complacency, Progress, and Poverty

PART TWO: 1910—1920

A Profound Political Division
Civil War

PART THREE: 1920—1947

In Defense of Class Interests

Struggle for Hegemony
Unification, Demobilization, Consolidation

Conclusion

Appendix

List of References
Bibliographical Essay
Bibliography

vi
viii
ix

35
59
84

108
137

170
200
235

264

274
293
364
378

 

 

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GLOSSARY

Agrarista. A supporter of land reform after 1915.

Amparo. A judicial writ of protection against the act of a public official.
Aparcero. A sharecropper.

Arrendatario. A tenant farmer.

Arrendamiento. A land rent in cash or produce.

Baldiaje. A system of labor service in exchange for permission to live
on an hacienda and cultivate a small portion of land.

Baldl’os. Vacant or national lands; also refers to squatters who live in
baldiaje.

Caballerfa. An area of land roughly equal to 111 acres

Cabecera. The political seat of municipal or departmental government.
CaCigue. A local and generally unofficial political boss.

Cacicazgo. The domain of a cacigue.

Caciquismo. The phenomenon of political bossism.

Cafetales. Coffee trees or groves.

Cafetero. A laborer in a coffee plantation.

Camarilla. A political clique.

camPesino. Literally "a person of the country," sometimes translated as
peasant.

Caudillo. A charismatic leader, often a military Chieftain.

Cristobalense. A resident of San Cristbbal Las Casas.

Desparici’on de los poderes. "Disappearance of powers," refers to the
CODStitutional prerogative of the Senate of the Nation to remove from
Power a state government administration.

Ejido. Lands held under comunal tenure; since 1915 communities endOWEd
with communal lands by the State.
I ' - Residents of an ejido who possess land use rights. '
Encomienda. A grant by the State of indians for labor service and tribute.
Enganchador. A contractor of migrant workers.

Finca. A Central American term for landed estate.
Flnquero. An OWner of a finca.
. Black bean.

Guardia blanca_ A private military force generally used against agrarlstas
to Prevent land reform.

:zclenda. A Mexican term for large landed estate.
Hezifdado- An Owner of an hacienda.
area. An area of land equaling 2.47 acres.

 

 

 

Jefe Poli’tico. The principal civil officer of a state department.
Jornalero. A temporary day laborer.

Ladino. The Central American term for anyone who has adopted the dress
and mannerisms associated with western European culture, or anyone
not an indian.

Mai'z. Corn, maize.

Milpa. A maize plot.

Monteri’a. A mahogany lumber camp.

Municipio. A political and geographical unit smaller than and subordinate
to a department; the equivalent of a county in the United States.

Partido. A political district within a state subordinate to a department
but assigned a jefe poli'tico.

Patr6n. Master, boss, landowner.

Peon acasillado. An agricultural laborer who resides on an hacienda.

Peso. The basic unit of Mexican currency. (See Table 16 in Appendix).

Pistolero. A gun slinger. ‘

Porfiriato. The age of Porfirio Dfaz (1876—1911).

Pueblo. A small independent village or town.

Rancho. A small or medium—size property.

Ranchero. A farmer, an owner of a rancho.

Rancheri’a, A hamlet or small village which possesses no political status
and is located on an hacienda.

Repartimiento de comercio. Obligatory purchase and sales by indians from
and to Royal officials or their authorized agents.

Repartimiento de indios. Compulsory work levies of indians.

Tienda de Raga. A company store.
Tuxtleco. A resident of Tuxtla Gutic’arrez.

Sindicato. A labor union or an umbrella organization encompaSSing a
number of unions.

Vecino. A citizen; house—holder.

Vlllista. A supporter of Pancho Villa; similar terms include rabasista
(Emilio Rabasa), maderista (Francisco I. Madero), carranCiSta
(Venustiano Carranza), Vidalista (Carlos Vidal), and SO on.

 

 

viii

LIST OF MAPS

Audiencia of Guatemala, 1657
The Mexican Republic, 1825

The State of Chiapas, 1911

22

34

 

 

 

 

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CAM.

CCM.

CNA.
CNC.
CROM.
CTM.
LCCA.
LNC.
PCM.
PNR.
PRI.
PRM.
PSC.

SUTICS.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Comision Agraria Mixta.

Confederaci6n Campesina Mexicana.
Comisién Local Agraria.

Comisién Nacional Agraria.
Confederaci6n Nacional Campesina.
Confederacion Regional Obrera Mexicana.
Confederacién de Trabajadores Mexicana.
Liga Central de Comunidades Agrarias.
Liga Nacional Campesina.

Partido Comunista Mexicans.

Partido Nacional Revolucionario.
Partido Revolucionario Institucional.
Partido de la Revoluci6n Mexicana.
Partido Socialista Chiapaneco.

Sindicato Uhico de Trabajadores de la Industria del Cafe’
del Soconusco.

 

 

 

 

 

INTRODUCT ION

For by art is created that great Leviathan
called a Commonwealth, or State (in Latin,
Civitas), which is but an artifical man,
though of greater stature and strength than
the natural, for whose protection and
defense it was intended.

Thomas Hobbes , 1651

Twentieth—century Mexican history is, above all, the history of the
humation of the most stable and broadly based State in Latin America.1
thexican historiography, State—building has generally been viewed as a
cauxally directed project and has only been studied from a national
perspective.2 What is lost in that perspective is the recognition that
Mate formation in Mexico was a synthesis of regional and national
aqfirations. Examination of one region over the c0urse of several
«mades demonstrates that there was local, as well as national, impetus
forthe process. The Mexican Leviathan is the sum of its geographical
paruL and an analysis of the process and its construction in those parts
isesmnmial to an understanding of the national whole.

A State exists when political authority within a nation is
cmuxalized and has formal structure. Governments and regimes with
Parthnflar policies and membership may come and go, whereas the State ——
orgmfized civil society -— endures. A modern State, in its twentieth—
CEHUKY context, refers to a political structure whose power and
auflumity is centralized and effective throughout the nation and whose

readlextends beyond the traditional bounds of national defense and

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public order to reorder and regulate social and economic structures.

Karl Marx proposed in the Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte that a
historian has to distinguish the phrases and fancies of the parties
involved in a political struggle from their group interests found in the
economic realities of society.3 State power, said Marx, "is not
suspended in mid—air."4 Political order is never simply a direct

result of economic forces, but neither is it independent of Such forces.
The modern State's centralizing and expansive tendencies reflect both
the material interests of various economically powerful groups and the
natural appetite for power on the part of State functionaries.

Following more than half a century of political fragmentation in
Mexico, a modern State began to take form in the 18805 and 18905. .State
centralization and social and economic activism were encouraged by the
dynamic sector of the national bourgeoisie —- commercial farmers and
industrialists -- for the purpose of rationalizing and mobilizing the
total resources of society necessary for the promotion of national
prosperity.5 Porfirian economic modernization, however, led to a
deterioration of the material quality of life for most of Mexico's
working masses. During the Mexican Revolution of 1910—1920, contending
factions appealed to workers and campesinos for their political and
military support and promised reforms in return. As a result, part of
the working masses became mobilized into large and powerful organizations
demanding political participation, and labor and land reform. This
new constituency of the modern Mexican State —— the organized
pr01etariat -— demanded a strong and active State which could reform
land tenure and regulate labor—capitalist relations. The construction

of the Mexican Leviathan was an undertaking possessing the consent

 

 

 

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and active promotion of both elite and mass segments of society, "for
whose protection and defense," in the language of Hobbes, ”it was
intended."

This study is divided into three sections, each representing a
passage in the formation of the modern Mexican State in Chiapas. Chapter
1 sets the stage for a detailed review of modern Chiapanecan history by
demonstrating how a strong, centralized State was established in
Chiapas under Spanish colonial rule in the sixteenth—century and came
to be rejected in 1821. Devolution of power on local governmental units
after 1821 is shown to be an elite response to excessive State inter—
ference in the provincial economy.

PART ONE reviews the first important phase of political central—
ization and the rise of active government in Chiapas from l89l to 1910.
Entrepreneurial elites in the 18908 rejected political fragmentation
and sought order and progress. These new elites, many of them recent
immigrants concentrated in the Central Lowlands and the Soconusco
district, began to experience the benefits of economic expansion and
commercial agriculture. They wanted strong and active government to
construct roads, curb local taxation on commerce, suppress local
caudillos, and reform inefficient labor practices. By the early 18905.
President Porfirio Diaz consolidated his political position in all of
Mexico to such an extent that he had no opposition or rivals. In 1891
he provided Chiapas with an energetic and talented young administrator,
Emilio Rabasa. This governor owed his power first and foremost to
Porfirio Diaz, not to local cliques. Political centralization and
economic development made important progress during this period in

Chiapas, although not without portentous consequences. The inflammation

 

 

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of radical regionalism and the swelling of the landless working
population in the state, helped define the subsequent course of State
formation in the region.

PART TWO reviews the effect of the Mexican Revolution, which
originated in northern Mexico, on Chiapas from 1910 to 1920. The
disruption of the national regime in 1910—1911 provided an opportunity
for one localist group which had harbored political ambition and
resentment for twenty years to attempt to bring down the government.
The political establishment in the state capital, Tuxtla GutiErrez,
however, was not prepared to give up power as easily as did the Diaz
regime in Mexico City. In 1914 groups of backwoods landowners rebelled
against the foreign intrusion of a northern revolutionary army and the
accompanying social reforms. Five years of revolutionary administration
and civil war ended the isolation of rural Chiapas and broke the
absolute power of the hacendado over villagers and workers. Campesinos,
taking advantage of the breach in social control, began to take control
of their own lives, and to take sides politically with arms and
ballots. Revolutionary administration expanded the responsibilities-
of the state government, and the politics of elites gave way to the
politics of the masses.

PART THREE reviews State formation in Chiapas in the age of mass-
participation politics from 1920 to 1947. No political faction after
1925 could attain and maintain power in Chiapas without the strong
backing of agrarian and labor organizations. This political
requirement, in turn, led to the expansion of the power and scope of
government in-order to satisfy at least some of the demands of the

organized masses for basic reforms and to bring these newly organized

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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constituencies more and more under the control and supervision of the
State. During this third passage the independence and importance of the
state government declined and the national government, the national
political party, and national interest-group organizations became the
significant participants of local and national politics. President
Lazaro Cardenas (1934—1940) established an institutional alliance between
the State and the organized masses. He reorganized the official party as
a party of corporations, divided among labor, peasants, military, and
popular sectors. Along with the party reorganization, indeed as part of
the bargain, came an intensification of reform. The very success of
those reforms subsequently led to a partial demobilization of the organized
masses. By means of patronage, partition, bureaucratization, and populist
rhetoric the State tamed the masses, guaranteeing its own exceptionally
strong position in society and preserving private economic power. The
modern Mexican State, "the new Leviathan," in the words of Arnaldo C6rdova,
however, first rose to its unassailable position in society by meeting the
demands of its most powerful constituents.6

This study attempts to place the formation of the modern Mexican
State within the context of the Chiapanecan experience. At the same time,
it seeks to transcend the limited and particularistic meaning of Chiapanecan
history and to explore a question of critical importance to all societies:
the relationship between the State and the society from which it arises,

and which in turn defines its sphere of action.

 

 

 

 

 

 

              

     

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CHAPTER ONE
THE IMPERIAL STATE, AND BEYOND

The Iberian countries of the Western
Hemisphere entered the modern age as
administrative, legal, and political
creations of a postfeudal Castilian
monarchy committed to the principle
of central control.

Claudio Veliz

Chiapas was the first of Spain's Central American provinces to
sed<independence. A provincial assembly on September 26, 1821, declared
that'khe province of Chiapas, which has spontaneously declared
independence, recognizes no other government than that of the Mexican
wwireJJ' This was the first step in the formal dissolution of Spanish
Camral America. Independence ended nearly three centuries of strong
mm centralized imperial dominion in Chiapas. The Spanish State, in
Hm perSOns of royal officials and bureaucrats, not landowners or
nmrchants, dominated the society and economy of the province. Independence
wasuwre than a break with Spain and Guatemala for elite Chiapanecans,
it was a repudiation of centralized government and bureaucratic
admhflstration for a system of local self—rule. Aggregation to Mexico
cmuributed, furthermore, to political fragmentation and instability in
ChiaPaS as disputes in Mexico City, Tabasco and Oaxaca, (and territorial
umflicts between Mexico and Guatemala) spilled into the state. The

Madcan State was not in a position to consolidate its power in Chiapas

 

 

 

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(nor was the regional elite willing to tolerate a more powerful State)

until the 18905. To understand how and why the modern Mexican State has
evolved in Chiapas let us first review the formation and dissolution of

the Spanish imperial State in Chiapas.

GEOGRAPHY

Chiapas has always been a frontier region. The ancient cities of
Palenque and Bonampak were located on the northern edge of classic Mayan
civilization. By the late fifteenth century Aztec military conquest had
advanced no farther south than Zinacantan and Soconusco.2 Chiapas was
conquered early in the sixteenth—century by Spanish expeditions coming
from both the north (Mexico) and the south (Guatemala).3 Spanish
settlements in the region, far from the City of Mexico and Santiago,
Guatemala, were rustic frontier settlements at best, "no fit place for
Jesuits," commented Thomas Gage}+ The region‘s frontier location and
isolation from the centers of power and culture have dominated the course
of its history.

The internal geography of Chiapas has also played a decisive role,
as We shall see, in Chiapanecan history. Chiapas, like Mexico, is
physically contorted by valleys interspersed among mountains. The
Sierra Madre de Chiapas rises from the Isthmus of Tehuantepec and
dominates Central America to southern Nicaragua. This range is bisected
by an intermontane basin comparable in size only to the valley of Mexico.
Through this great Valley of Chiapas (elevation 1500—2500 feet), herein
refered to as the Central Lowlands or as tierra caliente, flows the

Grijalva river, from the Guatemalan border to the Gulf of Mexico. The

 

 

 

valley's tropical climate and fertile soils have made it one of Chiapas'
most important agricultural regions. The Central Highlands of Chiapas
(elevation 5000—7000 feet), also called tierra fri’a, dominate the north-
western portion of the Sierra Madre. This region, the home of most of
Chiapas' indigenous population today, is an extremely rugged and heavily
forested area containing several small valleys. To the north and east
the Central Highlands fall off and disappear into the lowlands of

Tabasco and the Lacandon tropical forest. The portion of the Sierra
Madre south of the Valley of Chiapas rises to a maximum 12,000—foot
elevation and runs along the Pacific Coast into Guatemala. The Pacific
Littoral, bounded by the Sierra Madre to the northwest and the Pacific
to the southwest, is a sea—level plain no more than fifteen to twenty—

five miles wide. 5
SETTLING IN

Chiapas, or the W0 regions the Spanish called Chiapa and Soconusco,
was conquered in 1524 and again in 1527. Chiapa (the name Chiapas came
into general usage in the eighteenth—century) included roughly both the
Central Lowlands and Highlands while Soconusco occupied all of the
Pacific Littoral. The first Spanish settlement of forty inhabitants,
Chiapa de los Espafioles, was located near the Grijalva river but was too
hot and unhealthy. The city was moved to a more pleasant valley in the
highlands in 1528, today the site of San Cristobal Las Cases, and named
Ciudad Real de los Llanos de Chiapas.6

The immediate post-conquest era in Chiapas, roughly from 1528 to

1569, was a period of political confusion and experimentation.

 

 

 

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Conquistadores ruled the two provinces with little heed paid to royal
government in Castile, New Spain, or Guatemala. Encomiendas, grants of
indian villages which were required to pay tribute or provide labor,
were the only significant sources of income. They . Were assigned and
redistributed, confiscated and returned in these early years to such an
extent that many settlers left the province in disgust. Only by the
late 15503 and 15603 did encomienda tenure stabilize, indeed so much so
that even in the eighteenth—century decendants of the first encomenderos
continued to receive indian tribute. Soconusco became a crown
possession at least by 1545, after which year all indian tribute and
labor service passed from private hands and into those of royal officials.
In the 15205 Chiapa was part of the gobierno of New Spain; it was
assigned to the Audiencia de los Confines (Guatemala) from 1529 to 1540,
and was governed by its own Captain General from 1540 to 1544. Except
for a short period of reassignment to Mexico from 1564 to 1569, Chiapa
remained subordinate to Guatemala from 1544 to 1790. Despite these
paper assignments, the province was actually governed from Ciudad Real
de los Llanos de Chiapas (hereafter refered to as Ciudad Real) in the
15503 and 15608 by the municipal government. The first royal governor,
Alcalde Mayor Juan de Mesa Altamirano, arrived in Chiapas sometime in
the 15708. Orderly government in Soconusco, also directly subordinate to
Guatemala, was established in the 15403.7

Early administrative confusion and frontier isolation gave the
municipal government (cabildo or aguntamiento) in Ciudad Real a larger
degree and longer lasting period of independence than was the case in
Mexico. The cabildo of Ciudad Real ruled Chiapa in the frequent and

sometimes long absences between outgoing and incoming alcaldes mayoreS.

 

 

 

 

 

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Although the royal government succeeded in taming the most radical
tendencies of municipal autonomy through visiting commissions, inspectors,
and strong alcaldes mayores, the cabildo remained an important element in
provincial government throughout the colonial epoch.8

Conflict within Chiapa among royal officials, Spanish settlers,
and missionaries during this first period of settling in also added to
the political confusion. "Rivalry between competing groups of Spaniards,"
notes historian Peter Gerhard, "was a source of constant discord;
sometimes it was encomenderos versus missionaries, then a governor versus

”9

local residents, then a Bishop versus Franciscans. Only after
the withdrawal of Chiapa's aggressive Bishop Bartolome’ de Las Casas in
1546 and the suppression of indian slavery at about the same time did

the Dominican missionaries and the Spanish community in Chiapa reach an

accomodation. 10

THE GROWTH OF ABSOLUTIST STATISM

Epidemics in Chiapa and Soconusco from 1519 to 1570 decimated the
indigen0us population by at least fifty percent over all and up to
eighty to ninety percent in some localities.ll This demographic disaster
Weakened the encomienda as an economic institution and increased the
power of the royal government. The drop in labor service and tribute
forced many encomenderos to abandon their grants, which then reverted to
the crown. In order to meet the labor demands of the Spanish community
while the number of indians became ever fewer, the crown was forced to
SuPPly contingents of indian workers to petitioners for short periods

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concentrated greater power in the hands of the royal government and
particularly those who supervised the distribution.12 The decline of
the semifeudal encomienda and the rise of the repartimiento contributed
significantly to the formation of the centralized imperial State in
Chiapas.

Absolutist statism characterized government in Spanish America.
After a short period of organization and confusion, "the regalist hold
over the Indies was consolidated. . . .Regalist central power was
successfully reaffirmed, both with respect to the sympathetic inter—
ference of humanitarian clerics and the open rebellion of settlers with
seigneurial aspirations."13 The famous discrepancy between the
judicial supremacy of the Castilian State and its inability to enforce
compliance with all of its dictates in America has led many scholars to
conclude that the crown's power was more apparent than real. The wide
latitude given the local representatives of the crown, however, in no
way diminishes the fact that a strong, centralist imperial State ruled
the Indies. Part and parcel of the imperial State system, perhaps its
greatest strength, was the delegation of power by the crown to local
officials. To Spanish settlers in Chiapas, royal government was first
and foremost the alcalde mayor in Ciudad Real. Historian Murdo MacLeod
argues that during most of the seventeenth—century, the century of
Spanish decline in Europe, elite society in America was dominated by the

government official.” "The kings were not in Spain, but in the Indies,"

 

states Julio Alemparte. "The real sovereigns: in a way, were the
colonial masters."15

Local officials acted on behalf of the central government, their

tenure was limited and their duties could be terminated at any time by

 

 

 

13

the king or his ministers. The suppression of indian slavery in
Central America in the 15403 was accomplished in Chiapas deSpite the
opposition of the cabildo of Ciudad Real and the very real damage the
move caused to the region's sugar industry.16 Frequent requests by
local officials in Soconusco for the importation of indian laborers
were rejected by the crown.17 The cabildo of Ciudad Real, having been
accused of sedition, was extinguished in 1748. Finally, despite the
opposition of residents in Chiapas, the crown abolished the
repartimiento de indios in 1778.18 Spanish power clearly and firmly
reached into Chiapas.

Elite Chiapanecan society was dominated by the government official,
not the landowner or merchant. Since the crown controlled and regulated
indian labor, the source of most wealth in Chiapas, its delegated
representatives occupied the focal point in the structure of local power.
In Soconusco, "where the crown collected the tribute, the governor and
other royal officials occupied a position of decided importance."19
Alcaldes mayores and lesser officials generally purchased their offices
and sought large profits during their tenure. As a result, the
provincial governor not only controlled civil administration, justice,
and local defense, but also the local economy. It was the alcalde
mayor who decided which petitioner would receive labor drafts and the
number of days the indians would be allowed to work. He monopolized
trade with indian villages through the repartimiento de comercio. In
1712 the alcalde mayor resold maize to starving Highland villages at
inflated prices, which sparked the Great Tzeltal Rebellion of that year.20

Spanish power in Europe under the later Hapsburg dynasty in the

seventeenth—century suffered a serious decline. The consequences of

 

 

 

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Spanish decline in Europe and America, however, were quite different.
The royal official remained the dominant figure in colonial society.21
With the ascension to the throne of the Bourbon house in 1700 the
Spanish crown resolved to recentralize the political, economic, and
ecclesiastical life of the empire in pursuit of recovery and growth. No
longer content with delegating broad powers to creole (American born)
civil servants, Charles III instituted a new system of government which
would be tightly controlled by the center of power and administered by

soldiers and bureaucrats sent from Spain to America.22
RECENTRALIZATION AND REACTION

The first move of the recentralization program in Chiapas was the
suppression of the cabildo of Ciudad Real. In 1767 the province of
Chiapa was divided into two alcaldi’as mayores, both subordinate to the
governor of Guatemala. The Indendancy system was introduced to Chiapa
and Soconusco in 1790, combining both provinces in a single fiscal—
administrative unit headed by an intendant—governor residing in Ciudad
Real. I Although this official was appointed in Spain, he was in effect
subordinate to the president—governor of Guatemala. The most important
consequence of the Intendancy system was the creation of the post of
subdelegado, an official directly subordinate to the intendant—governor.
Subdelegados were posted at Tuxtla, Comitan, Los Llanos, Ixtacomitan,
San Andre's Chamula, Simojovel, Palenque, Tila, Ocosingo, and Huistafn.23

The recentralization of Spanish America and the establishment of the

 

Intendancy of Chiapas did not alter the subordinate status of the

province vis—‘a-vis Guatemala. Judicial appeals were still carried to

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Santiago. The Bourbon reforms similarly did not change the economic
dominance of Guatemala over Chiapas. In 1630 the cabildo of Ciudad
Real complained to the king that half of the privately controlled
tributaries of the province were held by wealthy merchants of Santiago.
In the eighteenth-century the provincianos of Ciudad Real complained
that Guatemalan merchants monopolized trade in and out of Chiapas.
The reestablishment of the cabildo of Ciudad Real, sometime between 1774
and 1793, gave voice to the latent regionalism of the province. The
local government had several disagreements with the intendant—governor,
who was viewed as a representative of Guatemalan commercial interests.25
While the Bourbon reforms increased the bureaucratization of the
American governments (manifested in Chiapas by the proliferation of
subdelegados) and substituted Spaniards for American—born officials,
the philosophy gaining currency in the Spanish world (outside of official
circles) in the late eighteenth—century stressed less government inter—
ference and more local effort toward self—improvement. In 1795, Spanish
liberal Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos published his Informs de leg
agraria, a program for the economic regeneration of Spain. Jovellanos
condemned trade barriers, governmental favoritism, the protection of
Special interests, and extolled local autonomy as the first step in
national recovery.26 In Central America liberal ideas were promoted by
the royal merchant guild, established in 1793, and the Royal Economic
Society, established in 1794. Both organizations, based in Santiago,
SuPported free trade, the diversification of agriculture, the Suppression
0f government intervention in indian communities, and the formation of
Provincial economic improvement councils.2

The Ecouomic Society of Chiapa was established in Ciudad Real in

 

 

 

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1819. Awareness of the province's decadence, however, had been wide—-
spread for at least thirty years. Chiapa's first intendant—governor
wrote in 1790 upon his arrival: "I became aware very soon of the
decadence these provinces find themselves in, worn dowu by poverty,
without industry or commerce."28 The Economic Society of Chiapa, in

a lengthy report written in 1819, analyzed the causes of the "decadent
state of the province" and offered a plan of regeneration. TWO major
sources of the decline were reviewed: 1) the suppression of the
repartimiento de indios in 1778 and, 2) the establishment of the
Intendancy in 1790. Without the stimulation of the labor draft, argued
the authors of the report, the indian ”is reduced to producing only that
which is necessary for his own use."29 The decline of agricultural
production and commerce was traced to the Suppression. On the other hand,
the large number of subdelegados, according to the report, increased
governmental interference and favoritism in the provincial economy and
added to the financial burden of the towns. Undoubtedly the chief
obstacle to economic enterprise in colonial Spanish America was the
State itself.30 The oligarchy in Ciudad Real, however, favored less
government except in the domain of labor expropriation. This

divergence between the financial and political interests of the Spanish
State and the material interests of the provincianos of Chiapas was
further irritated by an economic recession affecting all of Central
America during the first two decades of the nineteenth-century. On the
eve of independence, a report was sent to the crown declaring that
"the discontent that reigns is due to the poor economic conditions of
Central America."31 The natural impulse of the productive forces in

Central America was to break, or at least crack, the colonial link.

 

 

17

INDEPENDENCE AND ANNEXATION

The immediate stimulus to the movement for independence in Spanish
America was the Napoleonic invasion of Spain in 1807-1808. Provincial
Spanish c0uncils of resistence arose to direct the war, in America
creoles established loyal governing councils of their own in several
cities to rule until King Ferninand VII returned to power. In 1810 the
Spanish councils united, formed a central council, and summoned a
national parliament (cortes). The cortes which assembled at the port
city of Cadiz to write a constitution, incidentally granted Americans
representation. This move encouraged provincialism and separatism which

was already high in Central America.32 The Chiapanecan delegate to the

 

Cédiz cortes, for example, introduced a slate of eight propositions
outlining homerule. He also sought the abolition of the crown's tobacco
monopoly, the establishment of a provincial deputation, and the opening
to trade of the Chiapanecan ports of Tonala and Tapachula.33 The Gadiz
cortes promulgated its constitution in 1812, both the constitution and
the governing body, however, were suppressed in 1814 when Ferninand
returned to the throne.

In January 1821 a new liberal regime assumed power in Spain,
restored the Cadiz Constitution, and reconvened the cortes. Under this
new regime some provinces, such as Chiapas, were granted provincial
assemblies to introduce limited home—rule. The new cortes, however,
enacted measures to restrict the privileges of the church and the
military, reforms which were not welcomed in America. In responSe,
royalist commander Agustin de Iturbide, a creole of New Spain,

published his Plan de Iguala in February 1821. In defense of the existing

 

 

 

 

 

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last decades of Spanish rule. Lowland landowners had never felt the
animosity for Guatemalan merchants as the highland commerCial oligarchy
had and they had been cheered by the suppression of the repartimiento de
indios since they had not depended upon the labor drafts. Lowland
landowners, however, did fear possible economic domination by Tabasco
and were not enthusiastic about union with Mexico.39

Iturbide's empire collapsed early in 1823, a victim of rebellion in
Mexico City. In light of this, Chiapanecans debated whether to maintain
or sever their union with Mexico. By this date the vaunted Mexican
connection had become a disappointment. Far from being a cornucopia,
Mexico was also poor and had begun to tax Chiapas in order to pay for
the Mexican army stationed in the region. The strain and disappointment
of union also aggravated regional divisions within Chiapas. The
provincial ruling council in 1823 was divided into two factions. The
pro-Mexico group, the oligarchy of Ciudad Real (now called San Cristobal),
was opposed by pro—Guatemala and pro—independence factions which were
based in the outlying areas of Tuxtla, Chiapa, Comitan, and Tapachula.
Landowners outside of San Crist6bal generally opposed whatever the
cristobalenses favored. In June 1823 the pro-independence faction
mustered a majority in the provincial council and dissolved the pact of
union with Mexico.40 The other provinces of Central America, which had
joined Mexico in 1822, declared absolute independence in July and formed
the United Provinces of Central America.

Immediately the new Mexican government ordered General Viciente
Filisola, then in Guatemala, to march to San Cristbbal and dissolve the
provincial council, which he did on September 5. In response, municipal

councils in Tuxtla, Los Llanos, and Comitan proclaimed the Plan de Chiapa

 

 

 

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social order, Iturbide made a conservative revolution to immunize

Mexico from the Spanish reforms by proclaiming independence. By

August 24 Juan O'Donojd, Superior Political Chief of New Spain for

Spain, signed the Treaty of Cdrdova which recognized Mexico as a

sovereign and independent nation.34 Four days later Chiapanecans

formed the sala capitular de Comita’n and seconded the Plan de Iguala.

The sala capitular formally declared independence from Spain and

Guatemala on September 26, 1821 and requested annexation by Mexico.35
Chiapanecans were more attracted to Mexico than repelled by the

liberal Spanish reforms. The Economic Society of Ciudad Real, reflecting

the interests of the highland oligarchy, strongly favored annexation

by Mexico.36 The sala capitular, also dominated by highland interests,

argued that "Guatemala never has proportioned to the Province, sciences,

industry, or any other utility and has looked upon it with much

indifference.... Chiapas has been under the Guatemalan government for
three centuries, and in all this time has not prospered." Mexico, on
the other hand, appeared in a different light. "Puebla, Oaxaca, and the

other [provinces of the Mexican empire] have similar customs as Chiapa
and in no case is there an analogy with Guatemala. The Provinces of the
[Mexican] Empire enrich ours by the circulation of commerce which exists

37 In fact, during the first two decades of the

one with the other."
nineteenth-century trade with Mexico well surpassed that with Guatemala.38

Whereas the highland elite wanted to break the close economic
domination of Guatemala (and believed Chiapas' great distance from Mexico
would preclude similar Mexican domination), lowland landowners and

merchants feared any Mexican political connection. Unlike the more

commercially developed highlands, the lowlands had prospered in the

 

 

 

 

 

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last decades of Spanish rule. Lowland landowners had never felt the
animosity for Guatemalan merchants as the highland commercial oligarchy
had and they had been cheered by the suppression of the repartimiento de
indios since they had not depended upon the labor drafts. Lowland
landowners, however, did fear possible economic domination by Tabasco
and were not enthusiastic about union with Mexico.39

Iturbide's empire collapsed early in 1823, a victim of rebellion in
Mexico City. In light of this, Chiapanecans debated whether to maintain
or sever their union with Mexico. By this date the vaunted Mexican
connection had become a disappointment. Far from being a cornucopia,
Mexico was also poor and had begun to tax Chiapas in order to pay for
the Mexican army stationed in the region. The strain and disappointment
of union also aggravated regional divisions within Chiapas. The
provincial ruling council in 1823 was divided into two factions. The
pro—Mexico group, the oligarchy of Ciudad Real (now called San Cristobal),
was opposed by pro-Guatemala and pro—independence factions which were
based in the outlying areas of Tuxtla, Chiapa, Comitan, and Tapachula.
Landowners outside of San Crist6ba1 generally opposed whatever the
cristobalenses favored. In June 1823 the pro—independence faction
mustered a majority in the provincial council and dissolved the pact of
union with Mexico.["0 The other provinces of Central America, which had
joined Mexico in 1822, declared absolute independence in July and formed
the United Provinces of Central America.

Immediately the new Mexican government ordered General Viciente
Filisola, then in Guatemala, to march to San Crist'obal and dissolve the
Provincial council, which he did on September 5. In response, municipal

councils in Tuxtla, Los Llanos, and Comitan proclaimed the Plan de Chiapa

 

 

 

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Libra of October 26 which declared that Chiapas would not blindly
depend upon any metropolis and would remain independent of both Mexico
and Guatemala.41 The Mexican congress then retreated. It ordered the
reinstallation of the provincial council as well as the retirement of
Mexican troops and called for a referendum in Chiapas to decide the
question. "Chiapas should be left in absolute liberty," the Mexican
congress declared, "for pronouncing its union with Mexico or Guatemala."
On September 12, 1824 the Chiapanecan provincial council announced
the reunion of Chiapas and Mexico based on a vote of 96,829 persons in
favor of the Mexican union against 60,400 for union with Guatemala. The
distribution of the vote was along regional lines: Soconusco and the
Central Lowlands favored Guatemala while the Central Highlands favored
Mexico. Later, Mexican union was made more palatable when high duties
on commerce between Chiapas and Tabasco were established, One month
before the vote, however, the local municipal council in Tapachula
announced that Soconusco would annex itself to the recently formed
United Provinces of Central America. Mexico and Guatemala, to avoid war,
agreed in 1824 that Soconusco would govern itself until a general
boundary agreement was reached. Chiapas was formally annexed by Mexico
on September 14, 1824 and the state's first governor took office on
January 23, 1824.43
When Chiapas withdrew from the imperial State in 1821 a number of
important political decisions required action but there existed in the
province no political decision—making mechanism. Power devolved on
the only real political organisms in the province, the cabildos or
(using the more modern term) ayuntamientos. The ayuntamiento of San

Crist6bal tended to act on behalf of the province as a whole, although

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not without generating resentment in other towns. Tapachula represented
the extreme of radical localism and opted for independence from Mexico,
Guatemala, and Chiapas. For the other municipalities in Chiapas, union
with Mexico and the formation of a Chiapanecan government was acceptable
because real power remained close to home. Upon leaving the imperial
Spanish State, Chiapas joined Mexico but conceded little authority to the

new national State.

CHIAPAS IN MEXICO

Fragmentation of sovereignty and political instability were normal
conditions in Chiapas after 1824, indeed they were endemic to Mexico as
a whole. Ayuntamientos in Chiapas repeatedly withdrew allegiance to
particular state governments. State governments did the same with
regard to national governments. Federal troops garrisoned in Chiapas
made and unmade state regimes. Caudillos ruled localities as a result
of their ability to raise military forces. It was an age when raw power
politics resolved political disputes.

Regional conflicts of interest in Chiapas were not the immediate
or ostensible causes of political disorder after 1824. Lowland
hacendados, it is true, were more land and labor hungry than highland
hacendados, yet accommodation on the truly transcendant issues of land
tenure and labor supply and treatment was always easily reached. The
most divisive question in Chiapas, as in all of Mexico, pertained to the
desirability or undesirability of the great political, economic, and
cultural power of the Catholic Church. The clerical establishment

dominated social and business life in San Crist’obal, from education to

 

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Geoql‘aphical, Historical, and Topographical,
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business loans, and health care to agricultural production. Clerics
such as Matias de C5rdova and Pedro Solorsano were important leaders of
the movement for independence and remained politically active long

after Chiapas' incorporation into Mexico. The cristobalense elite was
protective of the Church and all of its privileges. It is estimated
that at least one—half of the haciendas in Chiapas at independence were
clerically owned. They occupied some of the best lands in the Central
Lowlands, those along the rivers, and more often than not were under
utilized. To a land—hungry lowland agricultural elite, the Church was
perceived, more and more, as a roadblock to the formation of a productive
and prosperous society.‘ Liberals, those who favored placing restrictions
on the Church, were generally found in the Central Lowlands while
Conservatives, defenders of clerical power and privileges, were concentrated
in San Cristbbal.

Political disorder in Chiapas from the 18203 to the 18503 was the
price Chiapanecans paid for local rule (or the absence of a strong State).
Personal advancement, in an age when only a hundred supporters constituted
a powerful association, accounted for the rise and fall of not a few
governments. The national Mexican State was neither strong enough to
prevent the unauthorized usurpation of power nor to provide the state of
Chiapas with a workable, regulated, and forceful system for changing local
governments .

The period 1824—1891 can be divided into three political epochs
with respect to Chiapas: 1) 1824-1855, 2) 1855—1864, 3) 1864—1891. The
first period was characterized by nearly constant political discord and
witnessed the development of opposing factions, Liberals and Conservatives,

Liberals developed (or borrowed) an agenda or reforms but were unable to

 

 

 

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carry them out. Conservatives dominated San Crist6bal, seat of the state
government. Soconusco remained independent until 1842, when it was
militarily annexed by Mexico and joined to Chiapas. Between 1855 and
1864 Liberals consolidated their power in the state, successfully
defended their regime against clerically—led armies, and instituted

the anti—clerical and anti—corporatist reforms of the liberal agenda.
Governor Angel Albino Corzo's nine year tenure, very long by the
standards of the time, was indicative of the degree of political
consolidation initiated during this period. The post—Reform era, 1864—
1891, was characterized by the division of the state into a few

powarful cacicazgos dominated by Reform era military leaders. This
parcelization of Chiapas into only three or four domains facilitated

the demolition of municipal autonomy and contributed to the establishment
of greater political stability inside Chiapas as well as promoting firmer

state adherence to the national government.

POLITICAL EVOLUTION

A weak state government tried to preside over numerous municipal
regimes between 1824 and 1855. Rebellions aimed at legally (and illegally)
constituted state governments occured almost every year. They were
instigated by ayuntamientos, the federal military garrison in San
Cristobal, by exile groups in Guatemala, and even by neighboring state
governments. The clerical establishment of San Cristobal actively
Opposed and helped bring down the government of Miguel Joaquin Gutierrez
(1833-1835). In 1848 the ayuntamiento of Chiapa withdrew its

recognition of the state government, Tuxtla did the same in 1849, Tonala’

 

 

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in 1850, and Ocozocuatla in 1853. Chiapas was invaded by troops of
neighboring states in 1833, 1834, 1841, and 1849.44 One indication of
the strength of centrifugal forces in the state was the establishment of
the separate lowland department of Chiapa. The proponent of this action
explained, "Chiapa should not continue subordinate to Tuxtla, it should
figure among the pueblos of first rank in the state."45
Soconusco remained independent until 1842. "During this long period,"
noted a contemporary observer in 1843, "it has experienced all the
difficulties of an abandoned country surrendered to rivalries and hatred;
without laws, without a plan, without a system and with a purely
municipal regime very imperfect, much which still exists and is leading

to anarchy . "46

The lack of security for persons and property and the
practice of forced loans contributed to Soconusco's economic ruin.
Another observer cemented in 1850 that since 1811 "industry, agriculture,
and commerce have decayed and are decaying each day more and more."47
President Santa Anna ordered the military to occupy the region in 1842,
thereafter it was a department of the state of Chiapas.48

The Liberal—Conservative struggles during this first period usually
pitted Tuxtla, Chiapa, and Comitan against San Cristobal, San Bartolome’,
and Simojovel. The first Liberal caudillo, Joaquin Miguel Gutierrez,
was a tuxtleco (in 1848 a Liberal state government changed the name of
Tuxtla to Tuxtla Gutierrez. The same decree changed San Crist6bal to
San Cristhbal Las Casas in honor of Chiapas' first bishop). Gutierrez
faced the opposition of the ayuntamiento of San Cristbbal, the bishop of
Chiapas, and eventually the president of Mexico. The second Liberal

caudillo was Angel Albino Corzo of Chiapa (Chiapa was later changed to

Chiapa de Corzo). Like Gutierrez, Corzo was forced to transfer the seat

 

 

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of government from San Cristobal to Tuxtla and Chiapa at various times
because of highland opposition.49
Angel Albino Corzo dominated Chiapanecan politics from 1855 to 1864.
As jefe poll’tico of Chiapa and commander of the largest and most
cohesive national guard unit in the state, Corzo rose to power. In
1855 he became governor and seconded the Plan de Ayutla, the proclaimation
which initiated the great reform movement of Juan Alvarez, Benito Juérez,
Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, Guillermo Prieto, and Melchor Ocampo. Corzo
Successfully defended his government against clerically led and
financed Conservative forces in 1858—1859 and again in 1863—1864. In
conformity with the new Constitution of 1857 and the national reform
laws of 1859, Corzo disentailed Church and communal indian property,
abolished monasteries, eliminated the civil obligation to pay parish
fees, decreed the absolute separation of Church and State, and expelled
the Bishop of Chiapas for interference in political affairs. He
diminished the capacity of the Church in San Cristobal to make and unmake
state governments. The other lasting consequence of the Reform, and
particularly the wars it engendered, was the rise of a few powerful
caudillos: Julian Grajales of Chiapa, Miguel Utrilla of San Crist6bal,
Jose’ Pantale6n Dominguez of Comitan, Sebastian Escobar of Tapachula, and
Pomposo Castellanos of Tuxtla Gutiferrez.50
Governor Corzo was illegally unseated in 1864 by General Porfirio
Diaz of Oaxaca, who imposed his comrade-in—arms General Jose’ Panta1e6n
Dominguez. The Liberal caudillos who dominated Chiapas after 1864
always firmly supported the central Mexican government and, except in
1875, did not interfere one with the other. General Grajales, Escobar,

and Castellanos in 1875 combined to depose Governor Dominguez during the

 

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Tuxtepec rebellion which brought Porfirio Diaz to power in Mexico City.
Escobar replaced Dominguez as governor from 1877 to 1878, Utrilla
occupied the post from 1879 to 1883, and two of Dominguez' supporters,
.1056 Maria Ramirez and Manuel Caracosa presided over the Chiapas
government from 1883 to 1891.51

Although Chiapas and its caudillos remained loyal to the national
regime after 1876, political cohesion within the state was still very
weak. In 1878 the customs inspector at Comitan wrote that "there is
peace because there is no man who can serve as a popular caudillo."52
He explained that Escobar was boss of Soconusco, Grajales ruled Tuxtla
and Chiapa de Corzo, Dominguez controlled Comitfin, and Utrilla (who was
governor) governed San Crist6bal Las Casas. There was peace because
each left the others in peace. This kind of peace, he continued, "was
without advantage for both society and the country."53 During the 18805
the state was reduced to only three prominent cacicazgos: Escobar in
Soconusco, Grajales in the Central Lowlands, and the governor (whoever
he was) in the Central Highlands. Because of its distance from the
center of the state, Pichucalco was also independent of state government
control. Grajales, for example, would not permit state control over
taxation in his region and even federal bureaucrats in Soconusco owed
their positions and gave their first loyality to Escobar.“ Governor
Caracosa informed President Dfaz in 1891 that "the sentiment of localism
is very deep rooted in the sons of each community in this state."55

Caracosa took one of the most important steps toward the central—
ization of state government power in 1890. In that year be began to
Suppress the acabalas (taxes on commerce in transit) collected by the

municipalities and which brought in the bulk of municipal revenues. In

 

 

 

 

 

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order to compensate the municipalities the governor ordered that they
receive one—half of the alcohol distillation tax revenues. This solution,
however, impoverished municipal treasuries and favored the alcohol-
producing highlands much more than the lowlands. It is also likely that
the larger towns ignored the ruling altogether. The measure certainly
damaged Caracosa's popularity in the state.56

The system of regional caudillos became too restrictive for land—
owners and merchants in Chiapas by the 18805. Telesforo Merodio, for
example, complained that Escobar impeded "progress and improvement in
order to prevent anyone from surpassing his local influence or arousing

ideas of equality and true democracy."57 Domaciano G6mez of Chiapa de

 

Corzo reported that because of caudillismo ”it is not possible to freely

[farm] in the department.“58 To hacendado Lauro Candiani of Tapachula,

Escobar appeared an absolute cacique, "duefio of our lives and haciendas."59
The cycle of weak government was nearing completion by the 18908.

Chiapanecans had rejected centralized government in the 18208. The

first steps toward political consolidation were taken during the Reform,

when the Liberal faction soundly defeated the Conservatives and

diminished the political capacity of the Church. After the wars of

 

reform and intervention political fragmentation diminished when a few
Liberal caudillos came to exercise power in the state. The formation of

cacicazgos can be viewed as an intermediate step in political central—

 

ization, between municipal autonomy and state government control. By
the 18803 and 18905, however, hacendados began to look for a strong
central state government to free them from capricious caudillos, and to

build roads, bridges, seaports, railroads, and telegraph networkS.

 

 

 

 

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29

A NEW ELITE

Political consolidation in Chiapas, particularly in the 18903 and
beyond, was accomplished by and on behalf of a new agricultural and
commercial elite. The tradition-bound elite of San Cristbbal Las Casas,
militarily defeated during the Reform, became indifferent to political
participation and economic expansion. Gradually entrepreneurs, hacendados
in the peripheral departments and recent immigrants to the state,
became a powerful economic group and looked to government for assistance
and support.

Liberal political domination and the rule of a lowland hacendado,
Angel Albino Corzo, from 1855 to 1864 was due to more than one caudillo’s
ability to raise and maintain an army. By the time Corzo took power, a
shift in the regional distribution of wealth had long been under way in
Chiapas. Attracted by greater extensions of land, better soils, and
easier trade outlets, hacendados and ambitious artisans and laborers had
been abandoning the highlands to settle in the Central Lowlands. The
settlement of new towns best reflects this most important trend. La
Concordia was founded in 1836, San Fernando in 1851, Villa Flores and
Villa Corzo sometime during the Reform. Immigrants to the state, like
the Spaniard José Antonio Rabasa in 1857, settled in the lowland valleys
and established ranches. The return to sugar and cotton cash crops
also encouraged agricultural expansion in the central valley.60 One can
see the economic preponderance of the Western and Southern districts
by 1855 in Table 1. (See Appendix.) By the time of the Reform this
shift was sufficiently advanced to assure the victory of the Liberal

faction. It was later accelerated by the highland Caste War of 1869-

 

 

 

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1870 and the transfer of the state capital in 1892 from San Cristbbal
to Tuxtla Gutierrez.

The elite in Chiapas by the 18703 and 18803 was a larger, more
heterogeneous and entrepreneurial class than ever before. The Reform
had led to a great expansion of landowners of both large and small
properties. (See Table 2 in Appendix.) There was also an increase of
immigration into Chiapas after the Reform. Ive—thirds of all foreign
residents in the state in 1885 had arrived since 1867. (See Table 3 in
Appendix.) The majority of the immigrants were professionals or
artisans. One successful story was that of Jose Antonio Rabasa, a
Spaniard, who established a ranch near Ocozocoautla in the 1850s, was
a successful hacendado by the 18803, and father of the state's governor
in the 18905. A large infusion of Germans contributed to the
transformation of elite society and Chiapas itself. Guillermo Steinpreis,
for example, established a brewery in San Cristbbal, Herna Munch a
pharmacy valued at $40,000 (unless otherwise indicated, all references
to currency are in Mexican pesos), and Jose Aggeler earned enough money
as an hacienda manager to set up an electric plant in San Cristfibal.61
The most successful Germans, immigrants from Guatemala to Soconusco, were
coffee planters. By the early 18903 they had transformed that region
into the wealthiest department in Chiapas.62

Landowners and merchants not only became frustrated with the regional
strongmen after the Reform but also with the slow pace of economic
development in Chiapas. The word "modernizac1'6n" entered the Chiapanecan
vocabulary in the 18703 at about the time when some entrepreneurs began
to question the passive role of state government. A positive role for

. 63 .
government began to be discussed in Chiapas. One editor asserted in

 

 

 

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1888 that "the hour for reforms nears, the capitalists are fixing their
sights upon Chiapas."64 The state government, however, was slow to
respond to the new demands expected of it. Governor Utrilla in 1884,
for example, asserted that the laws protecting the rights of landowners
and property were the principal. means for the enrichment of the region.65
As in the late colonial period, the material interests and perceived
needs of an important segment of the regional elite were not in harmony

with the customary function of government.
REFLECTIONS

After a short period of settling in the imperial Spanish State
consolidated its authority and power in Chiapas in the sixteenth-century.
Government permeated colonial society, dominated the indian villages,
and directed the local economy. There were royal monopolies, corporate
exemptions, and minute public regulation of every economic activity.

By the end of the eighteenth-century royal efforts to further centralize
and bureaucratize America coincided with an economic recession in

Central America. The suppression of the repartimiento de indios added
to the sentiment in Chiapas that the imperial State, particularly its
regional manifestation in Guatemala, was out of touch with the require-
ments of the province. The Spanish crisis of 1808—1821 and the
revolutionary movement of Agustin de Iturbide in Mexico provided the
0Pportmnity and motivation for two profound political changes in Chiapas;
independence from Spain and Guatemala and emancipation from centralized
government. In the quest for regional prosperity elite Chiapanecans

rejected the Spanish Leviathan.

 

 

 

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Fragmentation of sovereignty and political instability in Chiapas
from 1821 to 1891 facilitated the political dominance of the landed elite
and the shift of resources and political power from the Central Highlands
around San Crist’obal Las Casas to the Central Lowlands near Tuxtla
Gutiérrez and Chiapa de Corzo. Unhampered by policies and regulations
of a powerful national State, landowner—politicians in Chiapas developed
those land and labor practices and laws most conducive to the expansion
and aggrandizement of their own class. Political fragmentation prevented
the cristobalense elite from impeding the growth and development of the
Central Lowlands. Gradual and limited recentralization of power in the
region did occur in the nineteenth—century, largely as a result of the
successful Liberal reform movement in the 18503 and 18603. The Liberal's
rise to power in Chiapas was a function of Liberal success in Mexico City
and the shift in wealth and population from tie-Ira fria to tierra
caliente. The Liberal victory contributed to the consolidation of the
Mexican State in Chiapas in two ways. First, the Liberal reforms
diminished the rival political authority of the Catholic Church. Second,
the Liberal victory led to the establishment of greater political stability
as Chiapas was parcelized into only three or four cacicazgos dominated
by Liberal caudillos replacing the anarchy of municipal autonomy.

Chiapas was again ready for strong and centralized government by the
18903. After seventy years of political instability and passive rule,
government began to be viewed by the most dynamic element of society -—
commercial farmers and merchants -— as a necessary instrument for the
modernization and development of the region. Strong central government
was seen as a means for destroying local tyrannies and promoting regional
prosperity. Chiapas was poised on the threshold of full integration

into the Mexican State.

 

 

PART ONE :

1891—1910

 

 

 

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3. The State of Chiapas, 1911, from La republica mexicana: Chiapas, 1911,
Latin American Library, Tulane University, Map Collection (LAL #349).

 

 

 

 

 

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CHAPTER TWO
THE STATE IS MOVING

The action of the state in the functioning
of the general government will be the most
powerful force for assuring the stability of
institutions, the dignity of the villages,
and the majesty of the nation.

Emilio Rabasa, 1912

Sefior Rabasa may justly be regarded as the
harbinger of progress and commercial activity.

U.S. Consul Albert Brickwood, 1910

Chiapas set off on a new course in the early 18903. Commercial
farming began to assume importance for the first time since the colonial
epodh entrepreneurs immigrated to the state to establish coffee
Plantations, and the state government initiated a program of political
Cmnralization and economic develOpment. Politicians, editors, and
Citizens sPOke of a vague "spirit of enterprise" and of "regeneration
mm PrOgress” finally revitalizing Chiapas. Governor Emilio Rabasa in
1892OptimiStically declared that ”the state is moving.”1 Many believed
Um region had embarked upon the road to modernity.

The gubernatorial administration of Emilio Rabasa (1891-1894)
cohmided with and gave impetus to many of the changes that were taking

NaCejn Chiapas at the time. Rabasa took the first significant and

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deliberate steps toward the formation of the centralized and inter—

ventionist State in Chiapas. The history of modern Chiapas begins here.

CAPITALIST MODERNIZATION HAD BEGUN

President Porfirio Diaz's program of "order and progress" produced
no recognizable benefits for Mexico until the 18803 and 18903. A new
commercial code was passed by congress in 1884 lifting restrictions.

A reformed mining law in 1887 and special banking legislation in 1897
helped restructure the national economy. Massive railroad construction
projects got underway in the 18803 and during the 18903 the Diaz
administration balanced the national budget and refunded the internal
and foreign debt. "Capitalist modernization," argues historian John
Coatsworth, "had begun."2

Mexico's new liberal economic environment and political stability
attracted foreign capital and entrepreneurs. North American and British
investors built the railroads, electric plants, commercial plantations,
and refurbished the mining industry. In Chiapas, following the border
accord between Mexico and Guatemala in 1882, German planters from
Guatemala began to establish coffee fincas in the Soconusco district.
At a time of high coffee prices, these planters expanded into Chiapas
in search of virgin and inexpensive land. Their success in Guatemala
and the high coffee market prices of the late 18803 and early 18903 led
to a natural spillover into Mexico. The expansion of coffee cultivation
provided the single most important push for economic growth in Chiapas
during the porfiriato.3

Most of the early purchases of land for coffee cultivation were

 

 

 

 

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made for only centavos per hectare from survey and colonization companies
which had obtained from the federal government the right to sell and
colonize over four million acres of public lands in Chiapas. A North
American concern, Louis Huller and Company, obtained the second concession
in 1886. In exchange for making an accurate survey of all national lands
in the state, the company was granted the right to sell one—third of the
total concession and colonize the remaining two—thirds. Fertile coffee
land sold in the late 18803 for sixty or seventy centavos per hectare

rose in value to fifty to one hundred pesos in the mid—18903 and well

over three hundred pesos by 1910.4

Coffee cultivation became an incredibly profitable industry in
Chiapas. In 1892 it was estimated that coffee produced for seven centavos
a pound could be sold for over twenty centavos. Plantations of only
250 hectares could gross from $75,000 to $100,000 U.S. dollars a year.

In 1892 there were twenty—six large coffee plantations in Soconusco.

As the best coffee lands in Soconusco were purchased in the early
18903, coffee production spread to other parts of Chiapas. The departments
of Tuxtla, Palenque, Simojovel, and Mezcalapa became major producers
and by the end of the decade there was some coffee production in nearly
every municipality in the state. Coffee exports brought millions of pesos
into the state each year, contributing significantly to the increase
of agricultural investment and commerce. The new tax revenues which
accrued to the region from coffee strengthen the state government and
made possible many of the reforms and developmental projects carried Out
by Emilio Rabasa and his successors.6

The 18803 and 18903 also witnessed the expansion of agriculture in
the Central Lowlands, and in the departments of Pichucalco and Tonala.

The revival of cacao production in Pichucalco by Spanish and Mexican

 

 

 

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entrepreneurs, also due to higher prices, rivaled only Soconusco in
importing wealth into Chiapas. Finqueros and rancheros in Pichucalco
possessed easy river transport to and a ready market in San Juan Bautista,
Tabasco.7 In the Central Lowlands an ambitious ranchero class developed,
attracted by fertile lands at good prices and easy river transportation.
The entire state reported only 501 ranchos in 1877. By 1895, however,

due to the denunciations of national and village ejido lands, the
department of Chiapa counted 527 ranchos alone, Tuxtla 240, Tonala 368,
Soconusco 530, and Pichucalco 529.8 This group of entrepreneurial
rancheros and hacendados sought the destruction of cacicazgos and the
constitution of an active state government that would, above all, construct

a network of roads and railroads. This element in Chiapas was the

 

constituency behind capitalist modernization, and the administration of

Emilio Rabasa.9

EMILIO RABASA

When Emilio Rabasa became governor of Chiapas in 1891 Porfirio Diaz
had fully consolidated his political power in Mexico. His presidential
term from 1888 to 1892 demonstrated to ally and rival alike that he
could survive consecutive reelections. By the end of his third term in
office Diaz had become "el indispensable, el necesario."lo It was in
this political environment of increasing centralization by Porfirio Diaz,
and under the tutelage of Rabasa, that Chiapas began to be integrated
into the national Mexican State.

Diaz's candidate for governor of Chiapas in 1891 possessed a number

0f qualities which recommended him to the emerging entrepreneurial elite

 

 

 

 

 

 

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in the state and to Dfaz himself. In the first place, Rabasa was a native
of the Central Lowlands. His parents, Jose Antonio Rabasa and Manuela
Estebanell de Rabasa, moved to Chiapas in the 18503 and purchased a modest
ranch near Ocozocuautla in the department of Tuxtla. Don .1036 was a
Spanish emigrant who had lived in New Orleans and Mexico City before
finally settling on the Chiapanecan frontier. Neither poor nor rich, he
was a hardworking man who hade his ranch "Jesds" a profitable enterprise.
Perhaps more than anything, he was ambitious for his two sons.1
Jose and Manuela's third child, Emilio, was born on May 22, 1855.
At the age of twelve Emilio Rabasa Estebanell was enrolled at the
Institute of Arts and Sciences in Oaxaca City, the same school where
Benito Juérez and Porfirio Dfaz had studied as boys. His professional
studies were undertaken at the School of Law, also in Oaxaca, and he
received his degree in 1878 at the age of twenty—two. By all accounts he
was an excellent student and possessed an outstanding intellect.
Following law school Rabasa dabbled in Chiapanecan and Oaxacan
politics. In 1881 he was elected to the Chiapas state legislature and
one year later appointed professor of law at the State Institute of the
Sciences. From 1885 to 1886 Rabasa served as private secretary to
Oaxaca's governor, Luis Mier y Tera’n. He moved to Mexico City in 1886
to take up an appointment as federal judge and to teach law. As a
result of his talent, ambition, and influencial friends he was appointed
to the Supreme court of justice and shortly thereafter, he became
Attorney General of the Federal District. During his five year
residence in Mexico City Rabasa found time to write five novels, he
cellaborated with Rafael Reyes Spindola to revive the newspaper El

Universal, and with his fellow Chiapanecan Victor Manuel Castillo he

 

 

 

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founded the prestigeous legal journal La Revista de Legislaci6n y
Jurisprudencia. As a result of his school—days friendship with Rosendo
Pineda (a close advisor to President Diaz), Rabasa became acquainted
with many of the most important politicians in Mexico, including Porfirio
Diaz himself. He also became identified with the group of progressive
politicians and intellectuals known, some years later, as cienti’ficos.
In 1891, at the age of thirty—six, Rabasa became the youngest governor
in Mexico. 12

Aside from his obvious talent and acquaintances, Rabasa received the
governor's office in Chiapas for several practical reasons. The current
governor, Manuel Caracosa, had lost his bid for a second term as a
result of a financial scandal surrounding a proposed Chiapanecan railroad.13

Further, during Caracosa's term the state debt had grown from $30,000 to

over $200,000 without any noticeable improvements.14 The governor's

 

personal life also contributed to his unsuitability. Although Caracosa
was married, he lived with another woman and scandalized "culta sociedad"
in San Cristbbal.15
Having ruled out Caracosa in mid-1891, President Dfaz chose Emilio
Rabasa. Unlike the other petitioners for the post, Rabasa neither led
nor belonged to any camarilla (political clique) in the state. He owed
his political career entirely to Diaz. Rabasa returned to Chiapas as
a national politician, independent of local political groupings, and
possessing a broad, modern vision of the purpose of government. Finally,

Rabasa's backers in Mexico City, Rosendo Pineda and other cienti’ficos,

saw Rabasa's candidacy as an important step away from outdated localism

 

and personalism and one step toward the spread of scientific, intelligent,

. 16
and non—militaristic government throughout Mex1co.

 

 

41

Emilio became governor of Chiapas at a propitious time by providing
a definite direction for the emerging entrepreneurial class in Chiapas.
This convergence, furthermore, occured at the beginning of the decade
which witnessed Mexico's most rapid economic growth in the nineteenth—
century. It seemed to a number of his contemporaries that the age of
progress and modernity had finally come to Chiapas. "Regeneration and

progress, "

according to El Monitor Republicano, summed up the Rabasa
program for Chiapas.17 The governor, wrote another supporter, "took
[hold of the reins of the state government at the most opportune time;
all of his valor, all of his influence, all of his integrity, and all
of his energy was necessary in order to put Chiapas on the road to real

progress. "18

A COMPLETELY NEW PROGRAM OF GOVERNMENT

Emilio Rabasa's program of regeneration and progress had a dual
nature: political and developmental. The centralization of power and
authority within the state government contributed, in a large way, to
the success of the developmental reforms and projects. Rabasa believed
that to get Chiapas moving he had to strengthen his own Position and
office. The governor, however, inherited a relatively weak office and
a politically fragmented state. The governor's authority did not
extend very far into Escobar's Soconusco, Grajales' Chiapa, or
Contreras' Pichucalco. In San Cristfnbal Las Casas the clergy and
certain important families possessed considerable influence on the conduct
0f the government. The situation required strong and dramatic action.

In mid—1892 Governor Rabasa transfered the state government from

 

 

 

 

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San Cristbbal to Tuxtla Gutierrez. In a number of letters to President
Diaz, Rabasa explained that the m0ve was due to the high cost of food
in the highlands which necessitated higher salaries, the apathy and
laziness of cristobalenses, the undue influence of the clergy, and the
commercial importance of Tuxtla Gutiérrez.19 The most important reasons,
however, were more symbolic than concrete. First in importance was the
desire to establish an entirely new governing center and bureaucracy,
free of the pernicious influences that plagued all governments in San
Cristbbal. When the government did move to Tuxtla a number of
cristobalense politicians and lawyers refused to follow, a result
probably anticipated by Rabasa. Second, the move represented an
important geographical reorientation of Chiapas. Whereas San Crist6bal
was located on the trade route to Guatemala and most of the important
cristobalense families maintained close ties with Guatemala, Tuxtla
Gutierrez was the gateway to Mexico City. Tuxtlecos, furthermore, were
a more diverse grOup of immigrants, foreigners, and Mexican educated
elite. Already the commercial center of the Central Lowlands, Tuxtla
soon became the undisputed business, transportation, as well as political
center of the state. For Rabasa, the transfer of the government signified
nothing less than the rebirth of Chiapas.20

The transfer of the government strengthened Rabasa's position
within his own government but it did little to rid him of the state's
central political problem, the caudillos. Given the ability of the
caudillos Escobar and Grajales to disrupt his administration, Rabasa
approached this problem cautiously and slowly. The governor did, however,
have Diaz's support and therefore the stronger position. When, for

example, General Escobar sent two of his nephews to confer with Rabasa

 

 

43

early in his term over the election of certain favored persons, Dfaz
informed Rabasa "to comply only with his requests of public interests."21
Soon after taking office Rabasa established a state rural police
force, the seguridad publica, dependent upon the governor, to reduce
banditry, quiet political troublemakers, and enfore decrees in remote
parts of the state. This force eventually comprised ten officers, over
one-hundred soldiers well armed, and a captain originally from Oaxaca.22
The governor replaced nearly everyone who had served in the Caracosa
administration, and most departmental political officers, jefes polfticos.
He staffed many of the most important post in the state government with
oaxaquefios (natives of Oaxaca), individuals he had previously known and
trusted.23 The system by which jefes politicos were "elected" by
citizens of the departments was revamped so that the officials became
political appointees of the governor and served at his (and Diaz‘s)
will. The post of Visitador de jefaturas (Inspector General) was
established to examine the conduct of the jefes politicos. The Visitador
could overrule or dismiss a jefe poli'tico if he found it necessary.24
Rabasa's new political order, not unexpectedly, encountered
resistance. The transfer of the government to Tuxtla Gutierrez produced
almost universal disapproval in San Cristobal. One cristobalense
complained anonymously to the federal government that the abandonment
of San Cristfibal would lead to the economic decline of the highlands,
a worsening of conditions for Chiapas' indigenous population, and
could possibly lead to another caste war.25 Former governors Miguel
Utrilla and Manuel Caracosa opposed the move and Joaquin Ortega, a
highland hacendado, saw a personal motive in Rabasa's action. Ortega

complained to Diaz that "Governor Rabasa has been completely hostile

 

 

 

 

Fj—i‘
44

to this capital."26 The transfer remained a constant source of discord
within Chiapas until 1911, when a military effort to recover the
capital for San Crist6bal failed.

Governor Rabasa's appointments of new jefes poli'ticos, customs
officials, judges, tax collectors, and even office workers also
encountered resistance. Within two months of assuming office, Rabasa
persuaded Diaz to replace a number of customs officials and military
officers located in Tapachula and Tonala who were Escobar loyalists.
Rabasa's new jefe poll’tico for Soconusco, Manuel Figuerro of Oaxaca,
was appointed without the traditional consultation with the soconucense
caudillo. After several conflicts between Escobar's municipal president
and Rabasa's jefe poli’tico, Escobar demanded that Diaz remove Figuerro.

Rabasa, however, refused to compromise, commenting: "I have confidence

 

in [Figuerro] since he is new to Tapachula and entirely independent of
the parties or bands that exist in that city."27
General Escobar was assassinated in the street in 1893, most likely
by his political rival Juan Felix Zepeda. Rabasa soon thereafter
informed Di’az that ”I have indicated to the jefe poll’tico that now
with the assassination, he will take this advantage to make sure that
Soconusco will never again have caciques."28 Jefe poli’tico Figuerro
made some personnel changes in the local government and confiscated 211
rifles and over twenty boxes of ammunition, Escobar's personal armory.29
The Escobar cacicazgo no longer existed when Rabasa returned to MexicO
City in 1894. Thereafter an oligarchy of local merchants, coffee barons,
and cattlemen dominated local government in Soconusco, remaining fully
30

cooperative and submissive to the government in Tuxtla Gutierrez.

Rabasa's encroachment into Julian Grajales territory of Chiapa de

 

 

 

 

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Corzo was less spectacularly (and definitively) successful than his
demolition of the Escobar cacicazgo; for one thing Grajales lived
another ten years. Yet, the mystique Grajales had cultivated over
twenty years was shattered under Rabasa. The governor's appointment of
individuals outside the Grajales camarilla for post in the state
government and in Chiapa de Corzo brought cries of harassment from the

' wrote Graj ales

old caudillo. "The enemies that I have in this city,’
to Diaz, ”are now placed in the principal political posts suitable to
molest me when it pleases them best."31 Later in the year he again
complained that "I do not think it is just or reasonable to be molested

32 Although Diaz feigned sympathy for

by those I had to fight before."
his old comrade in arms, he did not call off Rabasa. When Rabasa
resigned in 1894 Grajales told the president, "all of Chiapas, absolutely
everyone, wants an independent and impartial Governor, and not one
proposed by Rabasa.”33 Grajales was to be disappointed.

Elsewhere in the state, the extension of the authority of the
governor and the state government had top priority as well. In San
Cristhbal Rabasa avoided difficulties with the local authorities by
placing a personal friend and political supporter, Manuel J. Trejo,
in the municipal presidency.34 In 1893 the governor established the
partido (administrative district) of Motozintla to project state
authority in this remote region and end conflicts between the
departments of Comitan and Soconusco over demarcation of the boundary
line.35

As Rabasa prepared to leave state government early in 1894 he
recalled for Diaz some of the achievements of his administration. Among
those he singled out was the progress of political consolidation. "The

departments of Soconusco, Chiapa, and Pichucalco," wrote Rabasa,

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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46

"previously removed from the action of the government, are now entirely
submissive."36 Under Rabasa the state government became the only
significant focus of political power in Chiapas. Years later, one of
Chiapas' most reSpected revolutionary leaders, Luis Espinosa, recalled
that Emilio Rabasa "developed and put into practice a completely new

program of government which until then was unknown in Chiapas."37
THE INTERVENTIONIST STATE

The developmental program of the Rabasa administration —- fiscal
reform, road construction, agrarian reform, and educational development -—
although not strictly political in nature, did nevertheless contribute
significantly to the formation of the modern State in Chiapas. In
each area the state government took on a decidedly new and expanded role
in the economic and social life of the region. In the struggle for
regional prosperity, Rabasa gave an important impetus to the
interventionist State. His porfirian and revolutionary successors
continued and eventually completed the edifice begun in 1891.

In the area of fiscal reform Governor Rabasa entered upon his task
with an important head start. As mentioned in Chapter One, Governor
Caracosa began the task of suppressing the municipal transit taxes on
commerce. Rabasa continued (and by one account finished) this campaign
against the alcabalas, a policy that had profound political and
economic implications for the state. By diminishing the revenues of
local governments, municipalities became more and more dependent upon
state government largess, and as a consequence, less politically

independent. The suppression of the alcabalas also contributed to the

 

 

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expansion of trade throughout Chiapas. No longer burdened by tax
collectors in each town, landowners and merchants found it profitable
to market their produce and manufactures in other parts of the state
and even outside of Chiapas.38

Following the president's instruction, Rabasa made fiscal reform
his first priority. The state's financial situation demanded strong
and immediate action; Rabasa had inherited a disaster. Bondholders of
the Chiapas railroad scheme were demanding payment, the state debt had
ascended to over $200,000 from only $30,000 four years earlier, and the
fiscal system of the state government was disorganized and corrupt.39
Upon taking office, Rabasa appointed a special commission to study the
state's tax structure and collection system and recommend reforms.
Acting upon the commission's suggestions, Rabasa increased the rural
property valuations from five million pesos to seventeen million pesos
(leaving rural properties still undervalued, it was estimated, by half).
He also reduced and prorated property and commercial taxes and tightened

40 The governor established the State Treasurer

collection procedures.

General's Office to coordinate tax collection and expenditures. By

law this office was required to publish quarterly financial balances as

Well as the income of each rent collector. The rent collectors, for the

first time, were regularly audited by accountants of the central office.41

Through new appointments and closer vigilance Rabasa attempted to

reduce smuggling into Chiapas from Guatemala and off the Pacific shore.

This problem, however, continued to plague his successor for many years.42
Rabasa's program of fiscal reform proved successful for the state.

State government revenues, according to Rabasa, doubled in two years,

from $180,000 in 1891 to $359,000 in 1894. (See Table 4 in Appendix.)

 

 

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For the first time in Chiapanecan history, property taxes brought in
more revenue than the highly regressive head tax. "This was the
charge that you entrusted to me in 1891," Rabasa informed Diaz," and I
believe I have now complied with it, without coersion or violence,
although with the discontent of two or three friends who previously had
paid nothing."43
The new fiscal order provided the resources for the state government
to begin a program of public works, from roads to schools. Rabasa's
most favored project was the construction of a network of roads,
telegraph and telephone lines. In 1891, when Rabasa began his duties,
Chiapas possessed nothing that could even remotely be called a road.44
Earlier efforts to establish a network of roads by contracting the work
to private companies had come to nothing. What commerce there was in
Chiapas was carried by canoe or on the backs of indian carriers along
centuries—old trails and paths.45 Governor Francisco Le6n (1895—1899),
the military officer in charge of road construction under Rabasa,
expressed his opinion concerning the delay in constructing roads in
Chiapas. "In these regions [San Cristobal, Simojovel, Childn, and
Palenque] the capitalists raise objections to the reparation of roads
because they find it less costly to be served by cargadores [indian

carriers] who are paid a trifle and work like mules...."46

According
to Le6n, the highland elite possessed no pressing need for roads.
Governor Rabasa initiated construction of the first highway in
Chiapas, running from the border of Oaxaca to Arriaga, Tuxtla Gutierrez,
Chiapa de Corzo, San Crist6bal, Comitan, and the border with Guatemala.

Earlier governments had planned for the state's first road to link

San Cristobal and San Juan Bautista, Tabasco which was the route best

 

 

 

 

 

 

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suited for the Central Highlands. Rabasa dispensed with roadbuilding
concessions and subsidies and, with the approval of President Di’az,
instructed the 10th army batallion to do the work; materials and salaries
were financed by state revenues. By the end of Rabasa's term the
Oaxaca to San Crist6ba1 segment had been completedf+7 To Rabasa the
highway's significance was "to open [Chiapas] to becoming Mexican."48
The Rabasa administration also expanded the telegraph network (begun in
1886), constructed the first telephone lines in the state, and
channelized the Grijalva river above Tuxtla to permit river travel and
commerce to the Gulf of Mexico. Improved seaport facilities were
constructed at Tonala and San Benito (off Tapachula), thereby permitting
large vessels to pick up Chiapanecan commodities for export,
particularly the growing quantities of coffee.49

The roadbuilding program initiated during the Rabasa administration
brought incalculable benefits to Chiapas. The state highway, like the
government's move to Tuxtla Gutierrez, put Chiapas in closer contact
with Mexico. This road Opened the agriculturally rich Central Lowlands
to the port at Tonala and markets in the Central Highlands and the
Isthmus of Tehuantepec, thereby giving an important impulse to
commercial, export-oriented agriculture in that region. Since the road
favored Rabasa’s lowland constituency more than the highlands, it
became part of a discriminatory pattern of development which was to
have important consequences later, particularly in 1911. Its effect,
however, is apparent even today.

In the liberal tradition of Juarez and Lerdo de Tejada, Emilio
Rabasa strongly believed that the division of communal village lands

and the creation of a new class of peasant farmers would promote

 

 

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productive capitalist agriculture and the integration of the indian
into Mexican society. To advance these goals Rabasa enacted and
vigorously enforced a measure (prior to the 1894 federal Ley de
Ocupacién y Enajenaci6n de Terrenos Baldl’os)50 to divide all ejido
land in Chiapas into private parcels. Jefes politicos were instructed
to set up municipal commissions to oversee the division and the sale
of plots to individuals. These commissions were required by law to
apportion five—hectare plots at no cost to those heads of families who
could not afford the payment schedule. Well—to—do indians and ladino
campesinos in most communities were able to purchase enough land to
form respectable ranchos and accentuate the class differences already
existent in small villages. Only the most destitute received the
minimum free allotments (from 107. to 507. of a village‘s population,
generally). Many more, however, received no land at all due to
corruption and residency requirements. Proceeds of the land sales were
to be used for local public works and schools and twenty percent was
to be forwarded to the state treasury.51

Emilio Rabasa's agrarian reform, called "e1 reparto'l and "e1
fraccionamiento," was both a success and a social disaster. The
number of small property owners did increase significantly. Many
payments were less than twenty pesos a year, an affordable sum even for
some campesinos.52 The number of ranchos in Chiapas more than doubled
between 1890 and 1910.53 Enterprising sharecroppers, renters, small
merchants, and ranch foreman benefited most from this opportunity to
become a landowner.54 In 1903 the average size of agricultural
Properties in Chiapas was only 380 hectares, whereas the average size

of all landholdings in Mexico was 5600 hectares. One in forty

 

 

 

 

 

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Chiapanecans owned land by 1910. The United States Consul in 1911
noted that "Chiapas is unique among the states of Mexico for the number
of small holdings and peasant farmers."55
The effect of the reparto upon Chiapas' villages was devastating;
the Rabasa legislation constituted the final assault upon a large number
of village ejidos in the state. Between 1893 and 1909 at least sixty—
seven village ejidos were affected. (See Table 5 in Appendix.) As the
number of ranchos and haciendas increased, communities that had been
independent for hundreds of years either disappeared or became hacienda
rancherl’as. According to one report "the ejido of Pueblo Nuevo Chiapilla
was divided into lots in the year 1895 and from that date Seh‘or
Adrian Culebro, owner of the finca "Santa Rosalia" and Sen‘br Jose A.
Velasco, owner of the fines "El Castafio," incorporated this land into

56

their fincas." Another complaint reached President Diaz early in

1895 from Chiapa de Corzo, accompanied by nine pages of signatures and

thumb prints. "We are trying to save the only source which provides us

life," wrote the petitioners. "It is true that we are granted lots for
. . . 57

free but this places us in a worse condition of poverty." There were

numerous requests to Diaz and to the state government to stop the

reparto, all to no avail.58 In 1895 Governor Fausto Moguel admitted

that "we have had some difficulties originating from the greed of some

finqueros who, to the detriment of the poorer classes, attempt to

. , "59

acquire large portions of land.
The reparto had two faces. As it added to the size of the ranchero

Class it also forced even more villagers into more exploitative and less

secure work such as migrant labor, indebted servitude, sharecropping,

and baldiaje. Many villagers never received plots or were unable to

 

 

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maintain possession of them, either through fraud or sale. At the
time Rabasa believed that the distribution of parcels to villagers was
the best way to prevent large landowuers from denouncing and buying up
all ejido land and leaving villagers completely landless.60 Twenty-
five years later Rabasa admitted that he had erred in permitting
parcel holders to sell their plots. Too many ended up without land,
which was not the governor's intent.61 Rabasa's attempt (and partial
success) to create a class of industrious and responsible smallholders
also led to the formation of the modern Chiapanecan Working class.
Governor Rabasa's educational program was both ambitious and
realistic. After 1891 the state government took primary reSponsibility
for education in Chiapas. The poverty of most municipal governments
forced the state government to give direct support to rural primary

" Rabasa informed Dfaz, "the

education. "When I arrived in the state,
government sustained one school in the pueblo of Huistan, and no more;
today it supports more than 100 primaries of first, second, and third
class, two preparatory schools, one college of superior studies for
girls, and the Industrial—Military School. All of this is under the
supervision of the General Office of Public Instruction which previously
did not exist in the state."62 The state's budget for education climbed
frmn$7,000, allocated by Governor Caracosa in 1891, to $40,000 under
Rabasa.63
In keeping with his inclination for centralization, Rabasa established
Hm General Office of Public Instruction to supervise the establishment
0f new schools, the certification of new teachers, and the creation of

axmiform statewide curriculum. The Director General was authorized

U>appoint inspectors to visit schools and municipalities to enforce the

 

 

 

 

 

53

public instruction law and to encourage municipal and private
educational efforts. The governor added a new head tax to be used
exclusively for municipal primary schools and a law which required
landowners to maintain a primary school if more than ten school—aged
children resided on their property. Despite this flurry of legislation,
rural primary education remained entirely inadequate due to the
poverty of both state and municipal governments.64 "And still Sefibr
Rabasa complains, and with reason," wrote El Universal, "that it is
not possible to comply with the law of obligatory education."65 The
governor did, however, take the first steps to make education a
public responsibility in modern Chiapas. He created two state—supported
preparatory schools, a night school of agricultural and technical
education for indians in San Cristobal, and two public libraries.66
Rabasa, unlike many of his contemporaries, did not View education
as the primary means of integrating the indian population into Mexican
society. ”Before teaching him to read," he insisted, ”it is necessary
to liberate the indian from his misery and from the grasp of the
superior class." He believed a hundred schools would not have as
positive effect as one railroad in improving the work and living
conditions of the indian population.67

Rabasa's new fiscal order and program of internal improvements

 

found greater approval and support in the Central Lowlands. David

 

Castellanos and Segundo Alfonso, hacendados from Comitan, believed the
higher property valuations were impoverishing their department.68
The increased property valuations of the large but generally idle

Inciendas around San Cristobal (combined with the transfer of the

gwernment to Tuxtla Gutierrez) made Rabasa very unpopular in tierra

 

 

 

 

 

54

fria.69 Although the Rabasa developmental program tended to alienate
the highland elite, it was also creating a larger and more important
constituency in other parts of the state. This fact perhaps best

. . . . . . 7O
explains ltS continuation after Rabasa returned to MeXico City.

RABASA'S LEGACY

In his writing and government service Emilio Rabasa demonstrated
that he was a sincere liberal reformer, not unlike the North American
progressives at the turn of the century. He advocated better
sanitation in the cities, an effective and honest police force, prison
reform, and honesty in government. In his novels he criticized the
mistreatment of indians, incompetence and corruption in government,
personalism, nepotism, and sycophancy. He despised the thousands of
minor despots in Mexico. Despite his structural reforms of the state
government in Chiapas, Rabasa believed that good government rested not
so much with one form or another but with the quality of public
servants. At the level of state government the key official, he had
no doubt, was the jefe polftico and he took particular care to appoint
individuals that he personally trusted to that office.71 Rabasa was
convinced that state governments had an important role to play in the
creation of modern Mexico. That role, he later wrote, was one which
emphasized the power of the state government to promote development
while at the same time curbing the tendencies of localism and
parochialism.72

Like other cientfricos, Rabasa accepted Porfirio Diaz as the only

alternative to anarchy but wanted to move gradually to a less

 

 

 

 

55

personalistic system of rule and one with more democratic procedures.73
As a political creation of Dfaz, he never failed to demonstrate his
loyality and submission to the supreme caudillo. Although Rabasa's
program of reform and development in Chiapas was his own which he
pursued with his characteristic energy and intelligence, Rabasa never
proceeded with any program, reform, or important appointment without
first consulting the president.74L Rabasa was in many ways the model
governor for modern Mexico; intelligent, active, and loyal.

Rabasa had been more than just a good governor for just over two
years; he also set a tone, established precedents, created a program
of political reform and economic development supported by the active
entrepreneurial class and continued by his successors. Like Rabasa, the
four porfirian governors of Chiapas who served frOm 1894 to 1911 came
from the middle strata of society. Fausto Moguel, originally a tuxtleco
but living in Oaxaca when Rabasa recruited him in 1891 for state
treasurer, was appointed to finish Rabasa's term. Moguel informed Diaz
that he would continue the Rabasa program which "has now begun to
transform the state and which will be the base of its future prosperity."75
Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Le6n, a native of Oaxaca, was elected
governor for the period 1895-1899 upon Rabasa‘s recommendation. Leon
had directed the road building program under Rabasa and Moguel and was
strongly committed to extending the reforms begun under Rabasa.76 Lefin‘s
successor, Rafael Pimentel, another native of Oaxaca, was the only
one of Rabasa's successors that the former governor did not select.
Governor Le6n was forced to resign due to a political scandal and
Pimentel, already in Ehiapas as Diaz's political agent, assumed the

office. Ramon Rabasa, however, Emilio's brother and an important

 

 

 

 

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56

politician in Chiapas in his own right, was selected state treaSurer,
which gave his brother some influence during Pimentel's term from 1899
to 1905.77 In 1905 Governor Pimentel attempted to transfer the state
government back to San Cristobal Las Casas. The Rabasa brothers blocked
this move and Pimentel resigned. Ramon assumed the office and remained
in power until 1911.78 Emilio Rabasa was not a regional caudillo

like Bernardo Reyes in Nuevo Le6n or Teodoro Dehesa in Veracruz. He
maintained an important influence in Chiapanecan affairs but he did not
dictate to his Successors. Rabasa intervened in matters of importance.
His successors counted on him to be their informal representative and
Chiapas' agent in Mexico City. The period 1894—1911 in Chiapanecan

history clearly had Rabasa's stamp on. it.

Rabasa left the governor's office in February 1894 after serving a
few months more than two years of his four year term. As he told the
president, he wished to return to Mexico City to take care of the
education of his daughters and because of his wife's poor health.79
Rabasa was elected senator from Sinaloa and he also continued to
practice, teach, and write about law. His criticism of the Constitution
of 1857, in two books published in 1906 and 1912, were profoundly

- . . . . 8
influenCial at the 1917 constitutional convention at Querétaro. 0 The

 

predominant influence of Rabasa, according to Mexican historian Daniel

Cosio Villegas, "resulted in the enlarging of the powers of the

executive branch."81 As a governor and a political thinker, Emilio

 

mmasa bridged the gap between what Mexico was and what it soon became.
filthe 100th anniversary of his birth, the editors of El Universal
cmmmnted that "Rabasa represents the culmination of liberal thought in

Madco and he began something more, the neoliberalism of the twentieth.

 

 

 

 

 

 

57

century."82 His record in Chiapas supports this view.
REFLECTIONS

The administration of Emilio Rabasa represents a major watershed
in Chiapanecan history. Building upon the ideological concensus
which emerged from the Reform, the political stability which Porfirio
Diaz established in the nation, and the energy and expectations of
a growing entrepreneurial class in Chiapas, Rabasa began the sustained
process of economic development and political consolidation which was
to characterize Chiapas, and Mexico, over the course of the next fifty
years. To Rabasa, government was a useful tool which could help
transform an isolated and backward region into one more prosperous and
modern. He realized, however, that before a state government could
become an effective tool of modernization it first had to centralize
and consolidate its authority. Rabasa began this process by under—
mining the power of local political bosses, strengthening the fiscal
base of state government, and establishing a new center of government.
At the same time, this governor expanded the functions of state
government. It began to intervene in a major way in the regional
society and economy thrOugh road construction, reform of village land
tenure, and support for education. At this early stage in national
State formation in Mexico, regional (state) governments assumed a role
whhfllwas just as important as that preformed by the national government
hlfurthering that process.

The efforts of the Chiapas state government in the early 18903 in

Promoting both political and economic modernization, in light of later

 

 

58

developments, may seem meager and certainly was insufficient to the
task at hand. A beginning, however, was effected. More than in any

other period, the genesis of modern Chiapas can be found here.

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER THREE

REFORM AND DISCORD

For some time the Government of this
state has imposed upon itself the
necessity of putting an end to the
servitude of indebted workers. Humanity
and political economy, civilization and

the temper of our institutions demand
it.

Francisco Leon, 1896

 

The cristobalenses will not be content
until they have the government there.
The motive of their constant conspiracy
is to recover it.

 

Francisco Leon, 1896

Emilio Rabasa returned to Mexico City in 1894 yet the course he set
for Chiapas during his two year administration endured and his personal
influence in Chiapanecan affairs remained considerable. Fausto Moguel,

selected by Rabasa to serve out his term, was little more than a

 

caretaker overnor. Mo uel ke t Rabasa's appointees, continued work on
8 g P

fim Rabasa program, and provided for the election of Francisco Lean.

. l .
"One of the most progressive governors of the Republic," Leon tested

the limits of porfirian toleration of liberal reform and found it most

hfilexible. During the Leon administration the regional elites of

59

 

 

 

 

 

 

60

Pichucalco and Comitan became dissatisfied with the Rabasa program,

and malcontents in San Cristobal Las Casas became ever more determined

to return the capital to their city and rid the state of Emilio Rabasa's
influence. Despite the best of intentions, Lebn left Chiapas politically
polarized. He failed to achieve his labor reform and the pacification

of San Crist6ba1, yet this administration demonstrated the propensity,

if not the capacity, for instituting significant social reform. With
national regimes in power which encouraged social and economic reforms,

later state governments would succeed where Leon had not.
THE MOGUEL INTERREGUM

Governor Fausto Moguel served out the remaining nineteen months of
Emilio Rabasa's term and prepared Francisco Leon‘s accession to the
governor's office. Two events of importance, events which were to have
lingering effects for years to come, took place during the interregum
of 1894—1895.

A war scare during the winter of 1894 threatened to make Chiapas
the battlefield in a conflict between Mexico and Guatemala. In 1892
Guatemalan President Justo Rufino Barrios signed the final border
accord with Mexico regarding the boundary between Guatemala and ChiapaS.
Two years later, however, Barrios moved a large number of troops and
canon to the border and threatened war, primarily for domestic

political effect. President Porfirio Diaz ordered the transfer of the
lZfllBatallion, then stationed in Juchitan, Oaxaca to Tapachula and
sent General Bonifacio Topete to Chiapas to report on the state's

readiness for war.2 The tension subsided by April 1895, although not

 

 

 

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as the result of Mexico's show of force. Due to the absense of a good
road between Juchitan and Tapachula, the 12th Batallion reached the

border only after a long delay. For reasons of national security, Diaz
came to view the construction of a coastal railroad as a necessity.3
Although construction did not begin for another six years, the Panamerican
Railroad was conceived during the crisis.

With Emilio Rabasa‘s resignation in 1894, several discreet campaigns
commenced for the purpose of influencing Diaz's selection of the next
governor of Chiapas. The common thread of all the petitions was
opposition to any Rabasa appointee and support for a native son, that
is, a cristobalense, comiteco, or chiapaneco.4 In no other city, however,

was electioneering more intense or well organized as in San Cristfibal.

 

Here there was a concensus among the leading citizens of adamant
opposition to any continuation of rabascismo. During the Moguel

interregnum a cristobalense camarilla was formed, united not by a caudillo

 

as was normally the case but by a political cause. This clique, led by
lawyers and landowners like Jesds Martinez Rojas, Jose H. Ruiz, Jesfis
Flores, Gregorio Culebro, Clemente Robles, and Manuel Pineda, worked
almost unceasingly over the next seventeen years to return the state
government to San Cristébal.5

By April 1895 the cristobalense camarilla (characterized at the time

 

as an "iron circle")6 had fired the ambition and captured the sympathy

0f General Topete, who had assumed command of the federal army batallion
still located in San Cristbbal. Topete became their candidate for

governor in the July elections.7 Diaz, however, Supported Lebn and ordered
Governor Moguel to elect him. Le6n took office on December 1. The "Iron

Circle" was discouraged but not defeated. Rafael Pimentel, Diaz's

 

 

 

 

 

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political agent in Chiapas, reported that "the supporters and directors
of Topete" continued to meet after the election and plot.8 Manuel
Lacroix, a member of Leon's government, informed President Diaz in
December 1895 that "this state seems content with the new government,
with the exception of certain persons of San Cristobal." General Topete,
Lacroix continued, was slandering Le6n, calling him a drunk and worse,

in order to discredit him.9 Pimentel advised Diaz to transfer Topete

to another state "because at the least he would create difficulties for
Le6n in the function of his government."10 General Topete was transfered
in January 1896 but the problem remained in San Cristdbal, as serious

and dangerous as before.
THE LEON PROGRAM

Governor Francisco Leén, perhaps even more than Emilio Rabasa, was
an active governor. He strongly continued the road building program,
the division of ejidos, the establishment of schools, and the
centralization and consolidation of state government power and authority.
Le6n enlarged the role of the state government in the area of public
health and attempted to enact a program of labor and indian reform.
He was surely one of the most progressive governors of his time, yet
he was forced to resign from office, politically disgraced.

Chiapas' need for easier communication, according to Leon, was
'h question of life or death."11 During his tenure the state government
expended over $200,000 on road construction, which the governor accounted
for personally to avoid fraud.12 In 1896, for example, it was reported

Hut over 100 men were at work daily on the state highway.13 In 1898

 

 

 

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the state government extended the telephone network along the highway's
route.14 The administration finished construction of the state highway,
yet, as Le6n informed Diaz, "only the departments of Tonalé: Tuxtla,
Chiapa, Las Casas, and Comitah receive the benefits of this road,

leaving without easy communication the rich departments of Palenque,
Chil6n, and Simojovel."15 Despite this problem, however, the tuxtleco
periodical El Porvenir de Chiapas was optimistic: "One of the driving
wheels of progress is now being built."16

Governor Le6n, as Rabasa before him, invested a large percentage of
the state budget in education and, again like Rabasa, was not
encouraged by what he saw. The governor informed Diaz in 1896:

Even though I have invested considerable sums in

this branch, the practical result has come to almost

nothing, in preparatory and professional instruction

and in primary instruction.l7
The principal cause of the underdeveloped state of education in Chiapas,
as Le6n saw it, was the absolute lack of suitable professors. To correct
that deficiency, Leon established the State Normal School.

In the area of fiscal policy the Leon administration increased the
rate of taxation on commercial capital,18 excepted legally constituted
investment partnerships from rural property taxes in order to encourage
joint capital ventures,19 and attempted (unsuccessfully) to reduce
Chiapas' contribution to the federal treasury. During most of the
nineteenth-century the states were required to forward to Mexico City
between twenty-five to thirty percent of all taxes collected within
their jurisdiction. Certain taxes ——those levied upon the sale of

national lands, on mail and telegraph services, custom duties, and

stamp taxes on official documents —— were exclusively federal in nature,

 

 

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The national government also limited states to the collection of only a
few taxes, on property, alcohol, and individuals. In two studies
commissioned by Governor Le6n, the state treasurer calculated that from
1824 Chiapas had contributed over $13,000,000 to the federal treasury
but had received only about $100,000 from Mexico City in the form of
subsidies, emergency aid, and material improvements. The implication
was clear: Chiapas deserved more help from the national government or
less of a tax burden.20
President Dfaz did have a plan for public improvements in Chiapas,

although his reasons had little to do with fairness. In 1896 Diaz

informed Leon that

for some time now Guatemala has cajoled the residents
of Soconusco and has established ports of deposit on
the frontier, in which they charge such low taxes on
coffee and the other products of Soconusco that it
amounts to a free service.

They are, furthermore, bringing a railroad to the
frontier and will ask permission to extend it into
Mexican territory. Added to this we have no railroad,
nor docks on the coast of Soconusco and the government
of the state imposes taxes that appear to be high to
the residents of Soconusco. I propose for your
consideration that the government of Guatemala is
skillfully and slyly breeding a spirit of separation
in the heart of Soconusco.21

Diaz promised that the national government would construct a rail—
road from Tehuantepec to Tapachula, build a steel pier on the coast,
encourage a bank to open a branch in the region, and he suggested that
Chiapas ”treat Soconusco with a gentle hand and relax a little their
taxation, because the landowners there in their conversations with
themalans will assure them that Soconusco is remaining firm to the

22

Stated' Due to the mediation of Emilio Rabasa, a contract was signed

for the construction of a railroad (althOugh the Chicago firm later

 

 

 

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backed out) and the Bank of London proposed to establish a branch bank

in Tapachula.23 Certainly a bank was needed. The German moneylenders

in Tapachula charged two to four percent a month, "signifying the ruin
of commerce and agriculture."24 Like the railroad, however, the
establishment of a bank was delayed until 1900.

The Le6n administration took the first significant state actions

in the areas of public health and the confinement of criminals. In 1897
the state created the office of Inspector General of Public Health.
The Inspector General, and his assistants stationed in the various
towns, were authorized to inspect food industries, medicine sales,
burial practices, outbreaks of contagious diseases (with the authority
to impose quarantines), and all other matters affecting public health.25
By the end of Leon's term, the state's first publically supported
hospital was nearing completion.26 The state government was forced to
begin building a penitentiary, according to Leon, due to "the scarcity
of [financial] resources of the ayuntamientos of the cabeceras of the
departments which has prevented the operation of jails due to weak

security.”27

THIS VICIOUS AND SPINELESS CUSTOM

For over two decades, indebted servitude had given Chiapas a bad
reputation in Mexico City. During the 18708 and 18805, Chiapas came
under attack by liberal and radical editors and reporters as the slave
state of Mexico. El Socialista led the attack with numerous articles.28

Chiapanecans, in reSponse, defended indebted servitude as a humane,

. . 29 . .
efficient, and legal contractual arrangement. FlaVio Antonio

 

 

 

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Paniagua, for example, editor of La Brfijula, reacted Strongly in 1873
to an article published in the Mexico City periodical Almavia which
alleged that slavery flourished in Chiapas. Paniagua replied that
"neither direct nor indirect, open or disguised slavery exists [in
Chiapas]."30 Fernando Zepeda, editor of the Boletfh de Noticias, wrote
in 1886 in the Mexico City newspaper ET Partido Liberal that there was
no perpetual service in Chiapas. Writing in response to an article
published by El Socialists, Zepeda indicated that ”by speaking in

favor of the servants, exaggerating their poor conditions, [the critics]
are instilling in them imaginary rights Such as the abolition of their
debts, exciting in them the passion and disposition for rebellion,

which would be without doubt unfortunate for society and, particularly,
for the agricultural industry of the country.”31 Prior to the 18903,
landowners and intellectuals in Chiapas were most vocal in support of
indebted servitude.32 Service appeared basic to the wellbeing of

Chiapanecan agriculture; "it constitutes,’ one hacendado noted, "the

principal element of life of our fincas."33
Beginning in the 18905, however, with the breakup of village

communal lands and the increased availability of labor, many Chiapanecans

began to believe that their economic interests were no longer bound to

servitude, but rather, demanded its demise. Liberal economic doctrine

of the age was cited to give support for the idea of free labor. In

1895, the conservative metropolitan review El Economista Mexicana, for

example, recommended " the radical modification of the system of service

hxthose states where there is the greatest scarcity of laborers; the

hmrease of salaries, the decrease of the hours of work, in a word, the

34
treatment of the peon as a man and not as a beast."

 

 

 

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The first public call for labor reform in Chiapas came in 1893.
That year the newly formed Sociedad Agrfbola maxicana de Chiapas,
located in Tuxtla Gutiérrez and composed of the leading agriculturalists
of the Central Lowlands, set forth their program. They recommended the
promoting of scientific agricultural techniques, the establishment of
banks, the construction of railroads, and the correction of labor
abuses.35 Later that year, Governor Emilio Rabasa criticized the system
of service. He asserted in his annual informs that this ”problem,"
as he called it, paralyzed substantial amounts of capital which could
be more efficiently employed, and therefore, was prejudicial to both
workers and capitalists.36

Governor Le6n issued a call for an agricultural congress to resolve
the issue of indebted servitude as soon as he took office. The congress
would meet in March 1896, with each municipality assigned one delegate.37
There is no question that Le6n wished to rid Chiapas of "this vicious
and spineless custom," as he called it.38 One month before the opening
of the congress, however, a portentous warning appeared in Mexico City.
El Mundo, one of the semi—official metropolian newspapers, in a direct
reference to the pending assembly in Chiapas, censured those who
Would "attempt to change the economic face of the country.”39

The congress which assembled in Tuxtla Gutiérrez in late March
1896 was certainly not a radical body; the nearly one hundred delegates
represented the wealthiest members of landed society.40 The geographical
makeup of the congress was also weighted in favor of those departments
Where indebted servitude was most important. Apparently those areas

where servitude had declined did not sent delegates.

The dominant concern of the sessions was not the humanitarian

 

 

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sentiment of improving the lives of rural workers but that of
increasing agricultural productivity, freeing the thousands of pesos
tied up in debts, and finding a solution to the geographical mal—
distribution of the work force within the state. Clemente Robles,
representative of San Cristbbal and three other municipalities,
summed up the feelings of most participants when he stated that "the

. . . 41
present system of serVice is bad economics for the State." Most
delegates agreed that the system was antiquated, prejudicial to the
worker and the hacendado. Economic self—interest, they stressed,

. . . . . . 42
required the modification of indebted serVitude.

The congress divided into two committees to Study and propose
solutions to the labor problems facing the State. The agenda of the
congress included six points of which the First Committee was
responsible for points one through three and the Second Committee,
points four through six. The agenda read as follows:

First. The contract of domestic service as it is
honored in the state — does it merit the charge of
slavery as has been alleged occasionally in the
national press?

Second. The mentioned contract — does it conflict
with some of the established principles of the
Federal Constitution?

Third. Does it conform to the accepted principles
of political economy or can it be qualified as anti-

economical?

Fourth. Has the occasion arrived to abolish the
service known in the state as debt peonage?

Fifth. If affirmative — what are the most efficient
means for the amortization of the debt and the
substitution of this service, conciliating both the
interests of the farmer and the servant?

Sixth. If negative — what means should be adopted
for improving the actual system of service?43

 

 

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Throughout the month—long congress, Governor Le6n kept the
president informed on the proceedings and, as a good porfirian governor,
constantly requested his advice and counsel. Diaz, for his part, did
not hesitate to offer suggestions. Immediately preceding the opening
of the congress, Diaz, refering to the meeting's objective, wrote
that "considering the great danger [of this effort], without losing
any time I take this opportunity to inform you that for no reason
should you permit it. You must believe that if [servitude] exists here
it is because I cannot yet remove it; we are still not at the level
of education where it is possible to bring such a benefit to the
villages."44 Lebn responded that he would proceed with caution
"without overly disturbing customs and with due respect for the
consequences."45 It is quite likely that from this point on, the
question of significant reform became moot.

The course of the congress and of subsequent legislative action
was one of progressive dilution of proposed reforms. Although there
are no records of what took place behind the facade of the congress and
the official record itself is edited and incomplete, the work of the
Second Committee as reported is instructive. This committee, headed
by Manuel Cano and Jose Lara, was responsible for proposing modifications
of the labor system and clearly was the more important of the two.

During the second week of the congress, Cano presented a fairly sweeping
reform proposal which included the obligatory amortization of debts
through wage deducations, a minimum wage of thirty centavos a day, the
prohibition of all cash or credit advances, the final liquidation of

all workers' debts within ten years, and careful Supervision of the

46 .
amortization process by the state government. On April 19, the

 

 

 

 

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Second Committee, by a vote of thirty—two in favor and eighteen against,
approved and presented its formal recommendation to the full congress.
This proposal included Cano's amortization plan and the proposed
prohibition of advances but only to newly contracted servants. This
proposal made no mention of a minimum wage or the eventual liquidation
of debts. Finally, at the end of the congress, the full assembly
formally recommended to the governor that contracts for pew servants
prohibit the accumulation of any debt. Established debts, they noted,
were to remain unmodified and valid.47 Indebted servitude, in short,
was to die a natural death along with the servants themselves.

Although Lebn had correctly sensed that there was a concensus within
the Chiapanecan landholding class regarding the economic problems
presented by indebted servitude, he had miscalculated their willingness
to do anything about it. The First Committee, for example, concluded
that indebted servitude in Chiapas, although anti-economical, was not
a form of slavery nor was it unconstitutionalf+8 One minority delegate
on the Second Committee argued that "there is no doubt that servitude
is hostile to progress; but one cannot suppress it all at once, because

49 Those who opposed any constructive

ads will bring worse wrongs."
reform, furthermore, had the full Support of President Diaz.

On April 30 Governor Le6n wrote Diaz: "I have the honorable
satisfaction to inform you: that the Agrarian Congress has closed its
sessions giving a solution to the Agenda that was previously formulated,
but not without first adopting in the most part the dispatched plan
which you appropriately indicated to me." Leon continued, "it is true

flmt this leaves things as they were for now, but in the not remote

flmure this vicious and spineless custom which no one loves will be

 

 

 

 

 

71

50
reformed, without producing a disturbance nor in a radical manner."

Diaz, in response, indicated he wanted no more.

The matter is over, and since it was not decided

but in part, it shows that it cannot be resolved

and therefore you Should not return to touch it;

in so much as it is so important to landowners, it

would damage your personal prestige and in this

respect and if you agree, I invite you to leave it

alone and I repeat, do not touch it further, even
if a new opportunity indicates that you should do
50.51

Although the Second Committee voted in the affirmative that the
time had arrived to end indebted servitude, the committee nevertheless
proceeded to include the sixth point on the agenda in its discussions,
i.e.,'%mat means should be adopted for improving the actual system
of service?" The result of its efforts was a legislative proposal
redefining the rights and obligations of both workers and employers.
This proposal required the witnessing by at least two persons of the
signing of all labor contracts, written rather than oral contracts, and
contracts which expressed the amount of money promised and the exact
nature and amOunt of work required. Employers were responsible for the
treatment of sick and injured workers and the acquisition of medicine
for them. This legislative proposal was never acted upon by Le6n.52
In 1897 Governor Le6n decreed that all indebted servants had to

be registered and their debts recorded by the jefes polfticos. After
November 12, 1897, the state government and its courts would not
recognize any contract for servants contracted after that date which
recorded a debt exceeding two months' salary (or approximately fifteen
to twenty pesos).53 The state's survey found 31,512 indebted servants

hiChiapas collectively indebt by $3,017,012, clearly a problem did

exist. (See Table 6 in Appendix.) Later in the year, Le6n obserVed

 

 

72

that the law had been accepted by the ”sensible part of the State" and
would be "an important factor in the wellbeing of Chiapas, because it
will expel innumerable abuses and a very bad system which has been one

"54 This

of the causes of the current backwardness of our agriculture.
was putting the best face on what Le6n clearly realized was a failure.

He was absolutely correct when he told Diaz "this leaves things as they
were."

The Agrarian Congress of Chiapas was not so much a liberal assembly
as a modernizing one. Governor Le6n, Manuel Cano, José Lara, and others
wanted to use the power of the State to remove what they perceived as
an obstacle to the full realizatiOn of agricultural productivity. But
what was viewed as an economic issue in Chiapas was seen in Mexico City
as a social issue, a dangerOus experiment with unseen and potentially
radical consequences. As a result the experiment was vetoed; the
evolution away from indebted servitude was discouraged.

Francisco Le6n, not one to be discouraged, proposed in the summer of
1896 to reform "the custom of employing indians as cargo carriers in
place of beasts of burden." The governor informed the president that
he wanted a "law prohibiting under the penalty of severe fines, the
burdening of indians of a weight of more than one arroba [about thirty—

55

five pounds]." When this custom was forgotten, Le6n believed, good

roads would flourish. Diaz, however, commented that "it could be

56 Lean dropped the idea —— for two years. In 1898

COunterproductive."
the governor informed the president that there were more than 500
tamanes (indian cargo carriers) in Chiapas. They were paid a peso for

each flete (load) and therefore many carried three or four in order to

earn more. Tamanes were held financially responsible for any loss or

 

 

73

damage to the merchandise. This form of transport, according to Le6n,
monopolized commerce and impeded other forms of competition. "Regarding
the merchants who traffic with these unfortunates," noted Le6n

they do not agree nor can they agree to the opening
of highways or even less to the construction of
railroads which would lead to the disappearance of
this exploitation which leaves upon the bodies of
many indians the same lesions that beasts of burden
show on their backs. This explains why I have been
offered thirty thousand pesos not to open a highway
to San Cristbbal.

This time, however, perhaps anticipating Diaz's reaction, Le6n advocated
no reform. "It will be necessary to prohibit this traffic; but first

we have to establish roads and railroads which will permit the passage
of another kind of transport and then these improvements will render

meaningless such prohibition."57

 

There is no question that Francisco Le6n was a sincere reformer.
He sought to use the power of the State to modify and eventually end
abuses and systematic exploitation of laborers and indians. His
reformism was grounded in liberal economic thought and a deep felt
humanitarianism. At the national level, however, the porfirian system
would tolerate no modification of labor practices by state government.
Le6n was not really ahead of his time. There existed a constituency
hiChiapas that also desired modification of inefficient labor practices.
Landowners in the Central Lowlands and in SoconusCo believed that with
the end of service they could attract sufficient workers from other
more populous areas of the state with higher wages. It is more accurate
to say that Porfirio Diaz and his closest associates were too firmly

tied to ideas and practices of the past.

 

 

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THE VAMPIRE CITY

Francisco Lean pursued a political policy of centralization of
authority in Chiapas and subordination to the national government. Le6n,
however, faced a far more volatile and dangerOus political adversary
in the "Iron Circle" in San Cristfibal than Emilio Rabasa faced with
Sabastian Escobar or Julian Grajales. The organization of cristobalenses
rested not upon the prestige or authority of one person but on a
sacred cause. Rabasa, in fact, was the true target of cristobalense
wrath. His centralizing program, development and fiscal policies, and
above all, the transfer of the government to Tuxtla Gutierrez had
provoked certain cristobalenses, long accustomed to social and political
rule, into organizing a government—in—exile. Francisco Le6n, a supporter
of the Rabasa program but no puppet of the ex—governor, was their
immediate target. His replacement by someone sympathetic to their cause
was their goal.

Le6n began his administration in a spirit of conciliation and
unification. His Secretary of Government, Manuel Lacroix of Palenque,
informed Dfaz in January 1896 that "the governor has followed up to now
a policy of unification, nominating for political posts men of all

circles."58

His most surprising nomination was that of Timoteo Flores
Ruiz, one of the "Iron Circle," as Secretary of Hacienda. Flores Ruiz
served for fifteen days in Tuxtla Gutierrez and then resigned and
returned to San Cristobal, because of a disagreement with the governor.59
Le6n replaced a number of Rabasa appointees, in the state government

. ~ 60
and the Jefaturas, with his own men, usually oaxaguenos. The most

important jefatura, that of Soconusco, was filled in 1896 by a Dfaz

 

 

 

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appointee, a man unknown to Leon.61 General Ignacio Bravo replaced
General Topete in January as federal zone commander and, after too long
a delay, moved the federal barracks from San Cristbbal to Tuxtla
Gutierrez, leaving detachments of thirty-five men each in San Cristfibal,
Tapachula, Comitfin, and Tonala.62

As early as March 1896 Lebn had lost all patience with San
Crist6bal. His attitude from this point on toward the city and its
residents certainly contributed in no small way to his later difficulties.
A robbery of files from a state government office in San Cristbbal
provoked this comment from Le6n to Diaz: ”...you will see to what
unlikely degree the perversion in that city has reached, obstinately
rebellious to all order and progress....It has even reached such a
degraded extreme that even the cristobalense high magistracy is carelessly
involved in illegal intrigues." San Cristbbal, concluded Le6n, "was
the most restless and hypocritical city in the republic."63 Dfaz
suggested, in response, that the governor "employ the least number
possible of sancristobalense lawyers."64

At the same time that the Agrarian Congress was in Session, Le6n
created three new partidos in Chamula, Cintalapa, and Frailesca. The
partido of Chamula included the municipalities of Chamula, Zinacantan,
San Andres, Santiago, Magdalena, Santa Marta, San Pedro Chenalho, and
San Miguel Mitontic.65 Governor Le6n justified this expansion of
state supervision and protection as a legitimate response to the harsh
exploitation of the indians of these municipalities by the residents of

' wrote Le6n, "are not content

San Cristdbal. "The cristobalenses,‘
Wifllsqueezing the juice out of them, maintaining them in servitude for

a Peso a month, sucking their blood like voracious vampires in all

 

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kinds of little contracts; they make them so brutalized.... I believe
the opportunity has arrived to begin to give the Chamula a close
protector who guarantees their rights and promotes their improvement."66
The establishment of the Department of Mariscal (formerly the partido
of Motozintla) and the partidos of Chamula, Cintalapa, and Frailesca
was a way to place distant and difficult—to—reach regions under closer
supervision of the state government. The jefes politicos formerly
responsible for these regions ( with the exception of San Cristobal)
rarely if ever visited the areas and exercised little control. The
expansion of the number of jefaturas was similar in intent and effect
to the creation of subdelegados in 1790.67
Not unexpectedly, the formation of the partido of Chamula, combined
with the unhappiness in San Cristobal over the Agrarian Congress and
lingering discontent over the location of the government, produced the
first political crisis of the Le6n administration. In July, cristobalenses
cried that the Chamula were preparing another caste war. "Critical
situation this capital," telegraphed former Miguel Utrilla, "rumors of

68

- ; o o /
barbarous indian insurrection." As far as Leon was concerned, "the

cristobalenses have created the pretext of a Chamula uprising in order

to alarm the state and to have a plausible motive to buy arms."69 In

a long letter explaining the situation to Diaz, Leon commented that:

The cristobalenses of today are the same as during

the time of Ortega and Father Chanona [Conservative
general during the War of Reform, 1859-1860]: backward,
troublemakers, hypocrites, and traitors. For this,

sefibr Rabasa transferred the government here and they are
still calling him 'the dead man' and since then have
conspired to drag the capital back there.

Since the abominable abuses of long ago are still
being committed upon the indian race in the
neighboring pueblos, it made the creation of the

 

 

 

 

 

 

77

jefatura in Chamula indispensable, and irritated
those who exploit them; and in spite, they invented
the story of the uprising, calculating to draw out
of it all kinds of advantages; if they frightened the
Government to withdraw the jefatura they would remain
masters of the flock.70
Le6n, in a calculated move, declared a state of seige, "appearing
to believe them," he said, and to prevent the formation of a citizen's
. . . 71 . . .
militia. The governor refused to blink and the cr1s1s blew over,
for the time being.
The election for governor in the summer of 1899 rekindled regional
and political discontent in Chiapas. In April of that year seventeen
of the leading hacendados, merchants, and professionals in the department
of Pichucalco asked President Diaz not to re—elect Francisco Lean. This
powerful group of pichucalefibs, originally part of the Rabasa constituency,
became disaffected for two reasons. They believed the state government
had abandoned them by not promoting public improvements there as
elsewhere. They were also disconcerted with Leon's campaign to reform
indebted servitude, an institution that was strongly rooted and all-
. . 72
pervas1ve in that department.
Here we have not one school well provided for the
education of our children, this obliges us to send
them to other states, or Europe, or the United
States.... Even our attachment to work, our arduous
dedication to agriculture has been considered a
reviled bud, qualifying us as slavers, because of
the system of domestic service that exists, as if
its existence was not an institution of long persistence,
outside of our social situation, and as if we were to
be blamed for these historical antecedents.... In
conclusion: the state government has not helped us;
when it is not hostile to us, it scornfully abandons
us, demanding higher taxes.73
Elite comitecos, also part of Rabasa's original constituency, became

disanchanted with the state's new progress during the Le6n administration.

In 1897 Lefin intervened to prevent the landowners of the city of Comitan

 

 

 

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from expropriating all of the city ejido, which had been in their
possession prior to the reparto anyway. They were simply transferring
title to themselves without apportioning parcels to poor families or
those who wished to buy plots. This abuse Lebn set about to correct,
making no friends in Comitan in the process.74 Other comitecos
complained that "the jefes politicos and municipal presidents are
frequently individuals that, even by their own account, abuse, extort,

and are in open conflict with the best members of society."75

REELECTION AND RESIGNATION

It was in San Crist6bal, of course, where the most intensive

efforts were underway to stop Leon's reelection. Viciente Espinosa,

 

jefe polftioo of Las Casas, informed a friend in Mexico City in 1898
that "if it is said that in the coming year I will proceed to replace
the old fool [referring to Le6n], I recommend that you tell no one

76

any of this." The cristobalense camarilla tried to persuade Victor
Manuel Castillo to seek the post, a strange choice given his close
friendship with Emilio Rabasa, but he refused.77 Francisco Le6n,
however, still possessed Diaz's confidence and in the spring the
governor ordered all jefes politicos to establish reelection clubs.
As a result no other candidate came forward.7

On May 25, 1899, less than two months before the July election,

one of the sentries at the government palace in Tuxtla Gutiérrez

 

attempted to assassinate Governor Le6n. The soldier fired once at the

governor as he was proceeding to his office, missed his target, and

 

tried to escape but was captured.79 Le6n reported to Diaz two days

 

 

 

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later that "two versions have come to my attention. The first pre-
supposes responsibility to [Emilio] Rabasa, who would govern through
Lacroix. The other, that the prisoner received $500 from conspirators

8O .
Two days after that Le6n was more certain.

in San Cristbbal.”
"From anomous reports," telegraphed the governor to Diaz, "I know that
a ring of conspirators exists in San Cristbbal with sympathizers in
this [city]; among those that are implicated is the Administrator of
Stamp Taxes, Garmendia. In San Cristobal, implicated as the leaders,
are Jesfis Martinez Rojas, Jose H. Ruiz, Jesus Flores, Joaquin Pefia; I
am advised that they are preparing an uprising of indians in Chamula
and another here for the first of June."81 In Mexico City, a press
report indicated that "the clergy [of San Cristbbal] is the principal
instigator, for not being pleased with the reelection.”82 In July,
meanwhile, Francisco Leon was reelected governor for the term 1899—1903.
On June 12, Antonio Martinez, the soldier held for the assassination
attempt, informed his captors that Major Romualdo Sénchez of the State
Security Batallion gave him money to kill Leon.83 Séhchez was then
imprisoned and on July 9 confessed that he received the commission to
kill Le6n from cristobalenses Viciente Espinosa, Clemente Robles, and
Ciro Farrera.84 These three were imprisoned on July 14, two days after
the election.85 Others implicated in the plot, José and Modesto Cano,
Jesfis Martinez Rojas, and J. Antonio Rivera G., escaped to Guatemala.86
Governor Leon believed that the conspirators decided to do away
With him when it became clear his reelection was a certainty. In this
intrigue, believed Le6n, Judge Leonardo Pineda, Ciro Farrera's uncle,

wmfld be appointed interim governor and would then return the government

to San Crist6bal so that the conspirators would again have free access

 

 

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80

to the state treasury.87 Ledn's reconstruction of the crime and the
motive is plausible. The documentary record, however, yields no
definitive judgement and after so many years it is impossible to say
definitively if Farrera and the others really tried to kill Leon or, on
the other hand, Le6n used the assassination attempt to rid him of
political enemies.

Regardless of the answer, Le6n's decision to prosecute Farrera
proved politically disastrous. Ciro Farrera was perhaps the most
powerful man in Chiapas. Viciente Farrera, Ciro‘s father, had established
the state's largest import-export house, Casa Farrera, in San Cristbbal
in 1839. Since that time Casa Farrera had placed establishments in
Tuxtla Gutierrez, Tonala, Mexico City, and New York City. The Farreras
owned numerous haciendas and some coffee fincas throughout Chiapas and
were related to the wealthiest families in the state. Farrera also had
close political and familial ties to Victor Manuel Castillo, a national
deputy from Chiapas and close friend to Emilio Rabasa.88 Francisco Le6n,
a colonel from Oaxaca, had tackled too powerful a prey.

In preparation for a smooth and predictable trial, Le6n asked for
the resignation of Federal District Judge Abraham Lopez, who he
believed was involved in the conspiracy. Perhaps under normal circumstances
Le6n would have succeeded and been able to call up First Supplement
Judge Manuel Trinidad Corzo, who was close to the Le6n administration.

In the summer of 1899, however, in a case that was attracting national
attention, L6pez refused to be intimidated.89 Le6n then sought the

intervention of the Supreme Court and the president. After reviewing

 

the preliminary proceedings of the Farrera case, the Supreme Court

confirmed Lépez's authority.90 Diaz, for his part, replied that ”it is

 

 

 

 

81

not possible to change judges if the elected judge [propietario] does

91 Prior to the trial, Le6n reported that "V.M. Castillo

not resign."
[defense counsel] in union with the district judge have made Major
Sénchez retract his confession and in an amparo judgement put Farrera
in liberty."92
In August, Porfirio Diaz strongly advised Governor Le6n to take a
temporary leave of absense during the course of the trial and to
appoint Rafael Pimentel interim governor. Leon agreed, although he
had reservations about Pimentel, who according to the governor, "was
very friendly toward the defendants, especially Ciro, in whose house he
stays each time he arrives and furthermore is not disinterested in
work that has been carried out against me."93 By September Porfirio
Diaz believed that Le6n's prestige was irrevocably damaged and that he
was a political libility to the regime. Dfaz wanted to ease out Lean,
promising that only a temporary absense was necessary.94 Diaz also
asked Castillo not to make derogative statements aimed at his "good
friend" Le6n and suggested he should return to Mexico City.95
Governor Le5n delayed his departure. He wished to remain in Chiapas
and in power until December 1, the first and inaugural day of his
second term. "If it is your judgement," Le6n informed Diaz, "that I
resign, your indication will be enough, but I would wish, in that case,
that my leave not be the result of efforts by the conspirators or even

appear to be the case."96 Diaz was adamant that Le6n leave as soon as

possible, which he did on October 2, for "reasons of poor health."97
By then Lebn realized he would not be returning and appropriated $10,000

from the state treasury for ”travel expenses." On November 30 Le6n

resigned as constitutional governor, giving up his second term, and the

 

 

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state legislature selected Pimentel as his replacement.98

Less than a week after Le6n took his "temporary" leave on October
2, Judge L6pez resigned his seat, citing poor health as his reason.99
Judge Raquel Ramirez then heard the Farrera case in January 1900.
Ramirez ruled that the "declaration of [Major Romualdo] sanchez in which
he accused Sefibr Ciro Farrera to be one of the authors of the attack,
was extracted by means of threats and torture." Throwing out the
only evidence against Farrera and the other defendants, Judge Ramirez
ruled that there was no crime to prosecute and that the accused should

be placed in absolute liberty.lOO

REFLECTIONS

The government of Francisco Le6n continued the political and
developmental modernization program begun by Emilio Rabasa in 1891 and
proposed that state government enter the virgin territory of social
reform. Leon's bold venture into State—directed social engineering,
however, failed to get off the ground for two reasons: divided elite
opinion in Chiapas and unmitigated opposition by the national government.
The modernizing constituency in Chiapas in the 18905 was not of
sufficient strength to overcome both. Years later, during the Mexican
Revolution, national governments made social reform a national policy
thereby tipping the balance in Chiapas and throughout the nation
against that element of society that still opposed the active State.
AS the 1920s progressed, the assumptions that had seemed so novel and
dangerous in Le6n's program in the 18908 became politically orthodox.

Before this could occur, however, a new political constituency had to

 

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83

appear and develop, that of workers and campesinos.

"The shameful separation of Senor Le6n from the government of Chiapas,
his complete nullification,"101 as Ciro Farrera termed it, led to a
period of readjustment in Chiapanecan politics. The activist and
centralizing governments of Rabasa and Le6n had exacerbated regional
discontent in certain parts of the state, a natural response to State
formation. Subsequent governments in Chiapas during the last decade
of the porfiriato, having learned a lesson from Leon's downfall,
pursued more conciliatory policies without compromising the political
achievement of the 18905. This pause in political activism was
further reinforced by the economic expansion of the 19005, which
produced a diminished sense of urgency regarding State—directed
modernization. Complacency characterized government in Chiapas during

the final years of the porfiriato.

 

 

 

CHAPTER FOUR

COMPLACENCY, PROGRESS, AND POVERTY

The governor promised to take into consideration
the improvement of roads, the reduction of the
high taxes which burden the fincas, and other
defects mentioned at that time, but so far nothing
has really been done; on the contrary things have
gone from bad to worse.

Soconucense petition, 1902

The first decade of the twentieth—century brought to Chiapas an
impressive surge of agricultural development and modernization, foreign
investment, economic specialization. The Rabasa program initiated in
1891 laid the foundation for later economic expansion but after 1900
pressure for active government declined. The concensus for urgent and
fundamental transformation of Chiapas among the entrepreneurial elite in
the 18905 had turned into self—satisfaction. Much of the progress of the
early 19003 occurred as a result of private initiative which reinforced
the new unobtrusive role of government. The state governments of the
19005 pursued more modest programs because they understood that the
active governments of the 18903 had created political difficulties for
themselves. There was complacency in state government in promoting
public improvements, in social reforms and concern for justice, and in
political consolidation. The state regimes of this decade Were much more

accommodating to regional sensibilities, particularly regarding the

84

 

 

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political participation of the "superior class" in the various departments.
As a result, there was an apparent reduction of regiOnal antagonism
toward the state government, with the exception of San Cristabal. Its
residents still nourished the ambition of returning the seat of government
to their city.

The two governors of the state during this period, Rafael Pimentel
and Ram6n Rabasa, were neither as talented nor as energetic as their
two predecessors. Both pushed for public improvements in neglected
regions of the state but without much Success. Both possessed weak
perSOnalities and were easily dominated by a few powerful men. Most
importantly, unlike their two predecessors, Pimentel and Ram6n Rabasa
possessed no broad vision of a new Chiapas. The first decade of the
twentieth—century represents a plateau in the process of State formation.
Given the limits of the porfirian regime and the complacency of the
regional elite, further progress in political modernization was unlikely

as matters stood.

PASSIVE MODERNIZATION

Rafael Pimentel was born in Oaxaca in 1855. His brother, Emilio,
attended law school with Emilio Rabasa and the two became close friends
but Rafael never developed the same respect and affection for Rabasa.
Due to the patronage of Porfirio Diaz, Rafael Pimentel held political
posts in Oaxaca, Chihuahua, and Guerrero during the 18905 and when he

became governor of Chiapas he was something of a political trouble—

 

 

 

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shooter for the president.1

Pimentel accepted the governor's office in Chiapas, but he had
little interest in the state and even less affection for it. In 1895
he had informed Diaz that "in all frankness, I feel no great sympathy
[for Chiapas], because I see that its sons are more Guatemalan than
Mexican."2 His opinion had not changed by 1899. Early in his
administration he purchased an hacienda in the Central Highlands and
spent most of his weekends there to enjoy the cooler climate.3 He
developed a reputation for staying away from the government palace and
spent as much time in Mexico City as he did in Chiapas.4

A number of important modernizing projects and developments got
underway during the Pimentel administration, although the governor
c0u1d take little credit for them. The most significant was the
initiation of the Panamerican Railroad from Tehuantepec to Tapachula.
Largely as a result of Emilio Rabasa's efforts, the Pan—American
Railroad Company was incorporated in New Jersey in 1901 and obtained a
joint federal-state subsidy totaling $10,000 US gold for each mile
completed. Payments were forthcoming only at the termination of each
fifty mile segment.5 Construction began in 1901 and was finished in
1908.

Early in 1902 the Bank of Chiapas was formed in Tuxtla Gutierrez
with $500,000 capital from Mexico City investors. State Treasurer
General Ram6n Rabasa was appointed manager and Ciro Farrera served on
the board of directors.6 In 1908 the Bank of Chiapas merged with the
Bank of Puebla and a branch office was opened in Tapachula.7 In both
the railroad and the bank projects the Pimentel—Diaz correspondence

Suggests that the governor had only a small role.

 

 

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The Pimentel administration made studies on the cost, feasibility,
and necessity of a highway from San Crist6bal to Salto del Agua
(Palenque) and of an iron bridge across the Grijalva river between
Tuxtla Gutiérrez and Chiapa de Corzo but no work was begun on either
project.8 Indeed, the roads constructed by Rabasa and Le6n, according
to one observer, "are almost lost, on account of not being care for,
despite the immense costs to the state in men and money."9 From
Soconusco came the complaint that "the governor promised [in July 1900]
to take into consideration the improvement of roads, the reduction of
the high taxes which burden the fincas, and other defects mentioned at
that time, but so far nothing has really been done; on the contrary
things have gone from bad to worse."10

The one area of government responsibility that Pimentel did take
an interest in was education. In 1902 he proposed to erect a network
of regional schools for indians, whom he considered "the only significant
obstacle to the development of commerce, agriculture, and industry."11
The first and only school, the Escuela Regional Fray Bartolomé de Las
Casas, opened its doors in Chamula in 1905.12 In 1904 Pimentel
persuaded SBstenes Ruiz, a well known Chiapanecan educator living and
working in Guatemala, to return to Chiapas and open a private college
for all grades which would be partly subsidized by the state. Esponda's
Liceo de Chiapas y Escuela de Comercio, located in San Cristfibal,
educated a large portion of the children of the Chiapanecan elite from
all departments prior to their professional training.13 Pimentel also
founded the State Experimental Farm for the introduction and propagation
0f modern methods and new crops as well as the private sociedad mercantil

. ., l
which installed electric lights in Tuxtla Gutierrez. 4

 

 

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88

Governor Pimentel gave his permission for the employment of
highland indians in the coffee plantations of Soconusco, a development
which further tarnished the reputation of Chiapas. After enjoying
very high prices from 1891 to 1897, coffee planters found themselves in
a slump from 1898 to 1900. In March 1898 several of the largest
Soconusco planters hired attorney Agustin Farrera to lobby before the
federal and state governments for tax relief.15 Farrera in his study
of the coffee situation reported to Diaz and Pimentel that planters
were selling their coffee for less than half the price that they had
received before 1898, yet "the cost of production is the same since
the wages and transport find themselves at the earlier price.l6 Prior
to 1900 coffee planters received the bulk of their harvest workers from
neighboring Guatemalan villages, although never in sufficient numbers.17
Instead of tax relief, Pimentel gave the planters permission to recruit
highland indians. As a result, coffee production climbed to unprecedented
volumes in the 1900s.

At the beginning only a few German planters used labor recruiters
called enganchadores (hookers) or habilitadores (providers) to contract
indians and bring them to the coffee fincas, although later the practice
became widespread. The enganchadores would advance a small sum of
mOney to establish a debt or large quantities of liquor for intoxication
in order to obtain signed contracts.18 The enganche system clearly
had an unsavory character about it. An editorial in the cristobalense
periodical El Tiempo in 1907 called enganche "the commerce in human
flesh."19 Yet most indians signed on voluntarily and returned to the
harvests year after year since wages were nearly twice as high in.

Soconusco as they were at home.20 It has been suggested that ten to

 

 

 

 

89

fifteen thousand highland indians, Chamula for the most part, were
physically forced to migrate to the coffee fincas each year.21 This
was not the case. Population increase and the dimunition of communal
lands in the highlands created the economic necessity of yearly

migration to the hargests. It was a situation of Survival, not slavery.
TRANSFER OF THE STATE CAPITAL?

In politics as well as in modernization, Rafael Pimentel was a
passive governor. He seemed to bend before the powers that be. El
Universal reported that Ciro Farrera was the power behind the throne,
which was likely since Pimentel had been close to Farrera before the
assassination scandal.22 Furthermore, Ciro's brothers Rdmulo and
Agustin were given public posts during the Pimentel administration.23
It is not clear how close Pimentel was to the cristobalense camarilla;
the administration did have a definite procristobalense slant. The
one inhibiting element was Treasurer General Ram6n Rabasa, whose
appointment was owed to Porfirio Diaz and Emilio Rabasa.24

Like his predecessors, Pimentel appointed a number of oaxaquefibs
to public posts. He appointed a oaxaquefio Chief of Staff (the third
most important post in state government), in order to offset the
influence of his chiapaneco Secretary of Government.25 Unlike his
predecessors, however, Governor Pimentel made little effort to appoint
upright and honest jefes politicos or to moderate their behavior.
According to Manuel Cruz, an hacendado and lawyer from Pichucalco, the

jefes politicos of Pimentel "are commonly persons foreign to the

departments, protected by the governor and at times, it is said, by

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some Minister. With very few exceptions, these local officials are
hungry bandits, men without conscience, who devastate the pueblos."26
Under Pimentel, complaints were aimed at the low moral character of
the jefes politicos and not, as in the 18905, at their execution of
unpopular State policies.27 From the careful selection of jefes
politicos by Rabasa and Le6n, state government had retreated to
business as usual when government stood for thievery.

In July 1903 Governor Pimentel was unaminously reelected to a
second term,28 although apparently against the counsel of Emilio Rabasa
and Victor Manuel Castillo.29 Having done very little during his
first term, Pimentel had stirred up little opposition within Chiapas
and had maintained the confidence of the president. Having secured
his political position, Pimentel embarked upon the boldest move of
his career —- the return of the state government to San Cristbbal Las
Casas.

Pimentel had various reasons for wanting to change the location
of the capital. Perhaps the most important was his dislike of the people
and climate of Tuxtla Gutierrez and his sincere belief that stately
San Crist6bal was more suitable.30 His friendship with Ciro Farrera
and Clemente Robles, men who strongly favored San Cristbbal, also
probably contributed to his decision.

With Porfirio Diaz's approval, Pimentel authorized the temporary
transfer of the executive and legislative branches of the State
government to San Cristébal on September 20, 1905 in order to attend,
ostensibly, to the construction of a road from San Cristbbal to Salto

31 The real reason, Pimentel informed Diaz, was "to explore

32

del Agua.

public opinion and study the obstacles to a definitive transfer."

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Another, and more binding, reason for the temporary nature of the
transfer and Pimentel's timing of the move in the fall of 1905 was
constitutional. Emilio Rabasa, during his tenure as governor, had
amended the state constitution so that any definitive change in the
location of the government required ratification during two legislative
periods by the local congress. When Pimentel began the transfer, the
1903—1905 legislature was ending and the 1905—1907 legislature would
begin its session in December. The governor could obtain the approval
of two congresses in only a matter of months.33

Pimentel did foresee some problems connected with the transfer,
although not from tuxtlecos who were not, he reported, "men of action.”34
He expected some opposition from Victor Manuel Castillo and particularly
Emilio Rabasa, who would attempt to ”sustain the blunder that he

' as Pimentel saw it.35 A problem, however, which weighed more

made,’
on the governor's mind was "the preponderant and decisive influence
which the clergy exercises [in San Crist6ba1], particularly now that it
is headed by Bishop Orozco y Jimenez, who is a high flying eagle who
uses money to subjugate consciences, and to give you an idea of the
fantasy state of this society, it is enough to say that there is not
one lawyer who does not first consult the bishop even on the most

insignificant matter." The power and influence of the bishop, further—

more, dominated not only Las Casas, but Comitan, La Libertad, Simojovel,

 

 

and Ocosingo. Unless the bishop's influence was neutralized, wrote
Pimentel to Diaz, "the action of the government will be of little
importance."36

But before Pimentel had a chance to tackle the bishop, Emilio

Rabasa intervened. In a report to the president, Rabasa outlined a

 

powerf

 

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92

powerful reason why the government should remain in Tuxtla Gutierrez.

l H

"The decree authorizes the provisional transfer,’ wrote Rabasa, and
should remain in a provisional state."37 Rabasa reported that the

state of Chiapas was in debt by $90,000. Nearly $30,000 of this sum was
held by the Bank of Chiapas, managed by Ram6n Rabasa, and by the

Tuxtla commercial house of Cueto y Cih. These institutions, wrote
Rabasa, ”will close their doors to the government now that they have

lost confidence in it by its transfer and neglience; there it will not
obtain a centavo because in San Crist6bal there is no one to give it,
because there is hardly anyone who has any."38 In short, Rabasa
concluded, if the government was moved to San Cristébal the banks

would call in their loans and the state w0uld be bankrupt.39 Rabasa
played his strongest card and it paid off.

If Governor Pimentel had the will to fight Rabasa, by the end of
October he had lost the strength to do so when he came down with malaria.40
In order to recover, Pimentel turned over the government temporarily
to Miguel A. Castillo, one of the wealthiest hacendados of San Crist6bal.
Pimentel returned to office in December, at Diaz's urging, long enough
to return the government to Tuxtla Gutierrez and turn over power to
Ram6n Rabasa.41 He returned to Mexico City a sick man but soon recovered
and, perhaps in recompense, Diaz made him senator from Colima.42 Emilio
Rabasa had won and nearly everyone of importance in San Cristfibal was

outraged.43

A GOOD AND HONORABLE MAN

Ram6n Rabasa, former Treasurer General, municipal president of

 

Int

 

 

 

 

 

 

93

Tuxtla Gutierrez, and manager of the Bank of Chiapas, became interim
governor of Chiapas on December 25, 1905. In June 1906, to the
unanimous dismay of San Crist6ba1, he was elected constitutional
governor for the period 1906—1910.44 During the interim period,
Porfirio Diaz had asked Bishop Orozco y Jimenez what he thought of

I

Rabasa. "A good and honorable man,‘ replied the prelate.45

Like Emilio, Ram6n Rabasa was a builder. He initiated work on the
long delayed San Crist6bal - Salto del Agua road, repaired the state
highway, expended over $90,000 in state funds to build the Grijalva
bridge, and modernized Tuxtla Gutierrez with new streets, a water
system, and public buildings appropriate to a state capital.46 Like
Pimentel, Ram6n Rabasa was attentative to the Central Highlands, "above
all San Crist6bal, which merits special attention since it is a city
of true importance."47 He asked President Diaz for federal assistance
(not forthcoming) to construct a road from the center of the state to
Pichucalco and one from Comitén to Palenque.48

The governor's pet project and obsession was an interior railroad
line, from the Panamerican railroad station at Arriaga to Tuxtla,
Comitan, and on through to Tabasco and Yucatan. In 1906 Rabasa's
successor at the Bank of Chiapas, R6mulo Farrera, at the governor's
urging proposed the idea to Diaz.49 In 1908 Rabasa commissioned two
studies on the best routes and projected expenses of the interior line
and presented them to the president in person.50 Emilio Rabasa also
discussed the project with Diaz,51 yet despite constant pressure the
interior Chiapas railroad never became a priority with Diaz and was
never constructed.52 No other single improvement would have had

quite the positive effect upon Chiapanecan development, truly making

Chiapas the granary of Mexico, as the much desired interior railroad.

‘A.
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94

In 1907, in response to growing criticism of enganche, Governor
Rabasa expedited a Servants' Law which was essentially the same 1896
rights and obligations recommendation of the Agrarian Congress. This
law sought to end the underhanded contracting methods employed by
the enganchadores, but it was never enforced.53

Rabasa was also active in the area of education. The number of
state-support primary schools had actually decreased under the Pimentel
administration, from 124 in 1898 to only 64 in 1904. Under Rabasa the
number climbed again to 183 by 1907.54

The second great expansion of foreign capital Chiapas occurred in
the period 1900—1910, but particularly after 1905. The first expansion,
that of German capital for the most part, occurred in the late 1880s
and early 18905 and was concentrated in Soconusco. The second expansion
involved United States capital primarily, employed in Soconusco and
Palenque departments in the cultivation of coffee and rubber.(See Table
7 in Appendix.) The Zacualpa Plantation Company, organized in 1899 in
San Francisco, California, went into operation in the early 19003 and
placed 17,800 acres in cultivation of rubber in Soconusco, forming the
largest rubber plantation in the world. By 1910 there were twenty
rubber plantations in operation in Chiapas, most of them were owned by
United States investors.55 The German—American Coffee Company,
incorporated in 1903, was the second most important North American
capital investment in Chiapas. German—American owned the famous Triunfo
plantation in Palenque, which possessed over 43,000 acres and employed
3000 indians.56 Even in German—capital—dominated Soconusco, United

57 .
States interests owned six import—export houses. During the decade

1900-1910, US capital surpassed the value of German capital in all of

'1"
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95

Chiapas. By 1909 US capital totaled $1,227,120 (pesos) in Soconusco
and $1,614,285 (pesos) in Palenque with a total for the entire state of
$2,953,300. German capital totaled $1,807,817 (pesos), although it
should be remembered that by 1910 a considerable quantity of German
capital was invested in Mexican—owned properties and some Germans had
become Mexican nationals.5

Chiapas from 1907 to 1911, like most of Mexico, suffered an economic
downturn. From 1907 to 1909 the industrialized countries sustained a
business recession which contracted external demand and led to lower
prices for raw materials on the international market.59 Reports from
jefes politicos in Chiapas described the effects of the "crisis monetaria":
a decline in commerce, lack of credit, decline in production, and even
a lack of confidence in the future.60 Francisco Ruiz, a landowner from
Chiapa de Corzo, complained in 1910 that the new Tuxtla Gutierrez branch
of the Bank of Mexico was limiting credit terms to only six months and
had raised the rate to three percent a month, which was ruining the
farmers.61 To compound problems, an epidemic from Guatemala had invaded
the border departments in 1908 and 1909.62

At the end of the decade, perhaps in re8ponse to the economic
crisis, Uwo self—help and political pressure organizations of landowners
were formed in the state. The Camera Agricola de Chiapas (Chiapas
Chamber of Agriculture) was established in Tuxtla Gutiérrez in 1909 and
pushed for easier credit, agricultural education, colonization, and
the amortization of the debts of workers. It published a bulletin which
reported on modern agricultural techniques and advocated the expansion
Ci new crops in the lowland valleys. The organization was dominated by

Incendados Tuxtla, Ocozocoautla, Cintalapa, Jiquipilas, Chiapa, and

 

 

 

 

 

 

96

Comitan and its leadership was close to the Rabasa administration.
The Cémara claimed only eleven members from Las Casas (including the
bishop), a list which did not include any of the cristobalense radicals
like Jesfis Martinez Rojas, Manuel Pineda, or Clemente Robles.63

In 1908 German coffee planters created the Unidn Cafetera de
Soconusco (Coffee Planter's Union of Soconusco) in order to establish
a uniform labor policy. The planters agreed to limit workers' debts
to Sixty pesos, not to give advances to laborers indebted to other

planters, and to keep records explaining when and how the debts of

. . 64
their workers were incurred.

CIENTIFICO ADMINISTRATION

In the political realm the administration of Ram6n Rabasa differed
from those of his predecessors in the tuxtlecos rather than oaxaquefibs
dominated the upper reaches of state government and wealthy hacendados
filled the jefaturas. In many ways the Rabasa administration was
representative of the last years of the porfiriato when the elite of
the elite, the so—called cientificos (scientists), dominated the
national government and made fortunes.

Appointees to top administrative post were largely taken from the
landholding groups of the department of Tuxtla. Virgilio Grajales, for
example, became Secretary of Government, Te6filio H. Orantes was State
Attorney General, and Abraham L6pez and later Ausencio Cruz were
Treasurers General.65

With the exception of Las Casas, most jefes politicos were wealthy

hacendados from the departments they officially served. For Las Casas,

 

 

 

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Rabasa chose tuxtleco José Joaquih Pefia "because he is honest and
energetic and will know how to handle those rogues that have caused so
many problems in San Cristbbal, principally the group called 'la mano
negra' [the black hand] whose chief is Jesds Martinez Rojas."66 Martinez
Rojas, on the other hand, considered Pefia "the most hated person in

this district and my worst enemy."67 As a result of this appointment,
Martinez Rojas left San Crist6bal and lived on his finca in La Libertad.
Other appointments were less controversal. The jefes politicos for
Comitén, Chiapas, Tuxtla, Pichucalco, Soconusco, and Tonala each owned
haciendas valued at over $10,000.69 The important municipal presidencies
were held by close friends of the administration. Radl E. Rinc6n, for
example, president of the Camara Agricola de Chiapas, presided over the
ayuntamiento of Tuxtla Gutierrez.7O Other important posts were filled

by members of the Rabasa family. The governor's nephew, for example,
Ieopoldo Rabasa, was jefe polihico of Tuxtla, Chief of Police for

Tuxtla, and Chief of the State Public Security Forces.

As active civil government in Chiapas seemed on the wane, a shadow
clerical government in San Cristbbal took on an extraordinary and active
role under Bishop Francisco Orozco y Jimenez. The bishop arrived in
Chiapas in 1902 and apparently saw himself as following in the footsteps
of Chiapas' first bishop, Bartolome de Las Casas. The comparison was
not unwarrented, for Orozco y Jimenez did come to enjoy, as a result of
his efforts in Chiapas, the reputation as one of Mexico's most progressive

prelates and, like Las Casas, he worked for a Catholic utopia led by

active priests like himself.72

There is some indication that Orozco y Jiménez involved himself to

some extent in local and state politics. It is likely that he favored

 

 

 

rIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII_'_'_'_'_'_"_'_'_'_'_'_'_"_'_'_'_'_'_'_"_'_'_'_'_'_'_"_'_'_'_'_'_"_'_'_'_'_'_'—'_1'II

98

the return of the state government to San Crist6bal, since he was a
close friend of Jesfis Martinez Rojas and he supported San Crist6bal's
municipal president, Jose Manuel Velasco, for governor in 1910. In
the fall of 1909 the bishop informed Porfirio Diaz that Ram6n Rabasa

is entirely inept as governor. The consequences
have been exceedingly sad in all of the state in
general and in particular in each locality, as it
is understood he has given possession of the control
and dispatch of all manner of business, above all
in the area of justice, to a certain camarilla of
perverse and poorly intentioned men. Everywhere,
but beginning in this Capital [San Crist6bal], there
is a general discontent, which is heightened even
more by the terrible monetary crisis and the lack 73
of business, and aggravated by the increase of taxes.

Outside of San Cristbbal, whatever discontent did exist in Chiapas
remained hard to detect until 1910, when Ramon Rabasa sought reelection
and Francisco I. Madero, an hacendado from the state of Coahuila,
began his anti—reelectionist campaign for president of Mexico. Until

then, Chiapas appeared to be peaceful and progressing.

 

MODERNIZATION AND PROGRESS

By 1910 Chiapas had undergone nearly twenty years of unprecedented
material development and modernization. The state government had begun
to take an active role in the economic and social development of the
region and had consolidated its own political power vis-a—vis other
power centers in the state. One indication of this shift was the
increase of state revenue from $200,000 in 1890 to $900,000 in 1906.
(See Table 4 in Appendix.) In relation to later progress in socioeconomic
intervention and political centralization and consolidation of the State,

the efforts taken between 1891 and 1910 appear slight. Still, they

 

 

 

 

99

constitute a beginning and contributed to the material development of
Chiapas.
By any standard Chiapas was more modern in 1910 than in 1890. In
just twenty years Chiapas had created an impressive transportation and
communications infrastructure where previously there had been none. A
good state highway traversed the state from the Panamerican railroad
at Arriaga through the Jiquilipas and Cintalapa valleys to Tuxtla
Gutierrez, across the Grijalva river to Chiapa de Corzo, and on to
San Cristobal and Comitan. The Panamerican railroad reached Arriaga in
1905 and Tapachula by 1908, extending the line to over 250 miles. All
the major towns and many haciendas were linked by a telephone and
telegraph network by 1910.
The effect these improvements had upon the economy of Chiapas cannot
be overestimated. The railroad permitted shipment of Soconusco coffee
to Gulf of Mexico ports, thereby reducing shipping costs by more than
half, leading to greater production, profits, and commerce in Chiapas
in general. Production of coffee in Soconusco increased from ten to
over twenty million pounds from 1907—1908 to 1909-1910 while the total
value of the crop more than tripled, reaching nearly two and a half
million dollars by 1910.74 The railroad and the state highway opened
up large parts of the interior of the state to wider markets by facilitating
the movement of bulky commodities such as corn, cattle, cotton, and Sugar
to Mexico City. Low shipping costs encouraged the rise of commercial
agriculture in the interior valleys so much that by 1910 the value of
agricultural production in Chiapas was five times that of 1890.75
The valleys of Cintalapa and Jiquilipas in the department of Tuxtla

Were particularly favored by the changes between 1890 and 1910. In

 

 

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1890 there were no roads through these valleys, no utilization of
machinery, and only minimal trade, even with Tuxtla Gutierrez, due to
prohibitive freight costs. The value of all agricultural implements was
only $7,475 dollars and the total value of agricultural production was
$45,000 dollars. Between 1890 and 1910, according to one observer,

76 The

the valleys underwent "a rapid advance toward modern farming."
digging stick began to be replaced by the steel plow, 306 of them by
1910. To the seven animal powered sugar mills of 1890 were added over
the course of twenty years thirty—five additional animal and thirteen
steam powered mills. The total value of agricultural implements reached
$132,475 dollars by 1910 and the value of agricultural production in
the valleys climbed to $201,094 dollars. Early in 1910 over one hundred
railroad cars of corn were shipped to Mexico City from Chiapas to be
sold for three or four times the local price.77

Commenting on the development of his area, hacendado Raquel D. Cal
y Mayor wrote in 1907 that "the vigor which has initiated the spirit of
enterprise in the valley of Cintalapa is truly worthy of high praise."
Cal y Mayor attributed this "violent development" to three causes. The
first in importance was the "influence of Yankee energy" which built
the Panamerican railroad. Scarcity of laborers leading to the

utilization of machinery was mentioned second. The third cause was the

cooperation of the state government in its construction of roads and in

 

. . . 78 . . .
promoting sensible tax polic1es. It 15 not difficult to understand why
landowners and merchants in the Central Lowlands supported the active

State and the Rabasa program.

The indicators of growth and development between 1890 and 1910 are

 

not lacking. The value of urban and rural property in Chiapas in 1885

 

 

 

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101

was $502,501 and $3,307,374 respectively. By 1906 these reported values
had increased to $3,640,276 and $30,742,743. (See Table 8 in Appendix.)
The number of haciendas and ranchos had increased from about 1,000 in

9 The United States consul in

1880 to 4,500 in 1896 and 6,800 by 1909.7
Chiapas noted in 1911 that "Chiapas is unique among the states of Mexico
for the number of small holdings and peasant farmers."80 Cattle, coffee,
maiz, frijol, wheat, and sugar production in the state increased over
these two decades in bulk and value.81
Although certain departments benefited more than others by the
prosperity of the 18908 and 19008, namely Soconusco, Palenque, Pichucalco,
Tuxtla, Comitén, Chiapa, and Chilén, an increase in economic specialization
(made possible by new roads) benefited entrepreneurs in most regions.
The increase of wheat production in the Central Highlands made it
possible in 1895 for Chiapas to stop importing wheat and start exporting
it.82 Sugar which was grown and refined in the valleys of Jiquilipas,
Cintalapa, and Tuxtla was utilized by the over 200 distilleries of
alcohol in the highlands. Cotton grown in the departments of Chiapa
and La Libertad was purchased by the textile factory La Providencia in
Tuxtla Gutierrez. Lowland cotton was also sold to highland indians who
wove blankets which were sold throughout the state. Cattle stocks in
Comitan, Chi16n, Tonala, Tuxtla, and Pichucalco increased as Chiapanecans

continued to send herds to Guatemala and opened new markets in Yucatan

and central Mexico.83
MODERNIZATION AND POVERTY

Modernization and development in Chiapas between 1890 and 1910,

 

 

102

it must be remembered, benefited only the elte of the state, not most
Chiapanecans. It is difficult to chart the changes which rural workers
and their families faced after 1890. Material standards and working
conditions, certainly bad before, did not improve and probably worsened.

Despite the substantial material and productive improvements during
the two decades between 1890 and 1910, daily wages remained static.
The United States consul reported in 1910 that Soconusco "planters
justify the low pay scale by the plea that the more money a Chamula is
paid the more bad liquor he will drink."84 Another justification was
that ”no one can get 100 cents worth of work out of them for each
dollar spent."85 In fact, low wages was one of the so—called advantages
for investing in Chiapas. Statements such as "the inhabitants are
willing to work for low wages," were published to attract investors.
Wages, even as reported in the state censuses, remained at the
subsistence level of thirty—seven centavos a day for twenty years, and
even declined in Mescalapa and Pichucalco.87

Descriptions of labor conditions in the plantation zones of Palenque,
Soconusco, and Chil6n confirm that modernization and poverty advanced
together hand in hand. Karena Shields, who lived on an hacienda in
Palenque in the early 18903, reported that Mexican, German, and North
American planters alike took merciless advantage of the workers. "As
long as a man owed money to his patr6n," noted Shields, "his freedom
was only a meaningless technicality."88 Dr. C.L.G. Anderson, a stockholder
in a rubber plantation company, was told on a visit to Palenque in
1905 that "eighty percent of the money paid out to labor came back

through the Company Store."89

In Soconusco, the United States consul reported in 1911 that coffee

 

I

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103

planters secured their laborers under the peonage system:

Their agents or labor contractors, called

’habilitadores', go to the tableland and offer

indians loans of money, principally during the

progress of a feast; this money is seldom paid,

and cases exist where the debt and peonage

conditions have been passed on from father to

son. While this system is not legal under

Mexican laws, it having been copied from

Guatemala, the indians consider it binding,

much more so since the authorities have connived

to imprison peons for debt.90

Without doubt the worst working conditions in Chiapas were found on

the monterias (mahogany lumber camps). Hidden in the jungle where the
borders of Chiapas, Tabasco, and Guatemala meet were approximately
twenty large monterias. Unlike the largely voluntary labor in the
Soconusco coffee plantations, enganchadores for the monterfhs kidnapped
highland indians to form labor gangs and drove them into the jungle.
Once there workers were chained at night and guarded during the day.
One former monteria foreman recalled in 1943 that "in those times there
were no men who wanted to work in the monterias. For that reason Don
Porfirio opened the jails and ordered the prisoners to work in the

91

nonterias." The Diaz government also deported rebellious Yaqui and

Maya indians from Sonora and Yucatan to the camps.92
The system of indebted servitude, temporary migrant labor, and

slave labor did not exhaust the forms of labor expropriation in porfirian

Chiapas. In 1910, according to various accounts, there were 75,000 to

150,000 rural workers in Chiapas out of a total population of over

400,000. One—third to one-half were indebted servants.93 Those rural

workers not tied to an hacienda by debt worked as free jornaleros (wage

laborers), baldibs (sharecroppers), or arrendatarios (renters). Baldios

cultivated hacienda land, uSually two hectareas, and in return gave

 

 

 

104

the patr6n between forty and one hundred and twenty days a year of
their labor.94 Arrendatarios turned over a portion of their harvest to
the hacendado, or paid a cash rent, in return for using his land. These
forms of labor were popular outside the plantation zones. They provided
the hacendado with cheap labor and produce without the responsibility
for crop failure or the expenditure of capital in workers' debts.95

The indigenous communities of the Central Highlands presented yet
a different situation. In the department of Las Casas over 40,000
indians lived and made their living yet the 1909 census reported only
3,000 jornaleros.96 Many of course, sometimes entire villages, were
tied to haciendas. In addition, perhaps 10,000 indians left the
highlands each year for three or four months to work the coffee harvests.
Most indians, however, even those forced by economic necessity into
migrant wage labor, still lived on communal ejidal land. The Rabasa
reparto had pressed least heavily upon highland villages. (See Table
6 in Appendix.) Between 1892 and 1909, nearly 57,000 hectareas of ejido
land in the department of Las Casas had been parceled, leaving over
50,000 hectareas in communal possession.97 This certainly did not
mean that the indigenous communities in the highlands, already pressed
by population increases, were not reduced even further into difficult,
squalid, and impoverished lives; they were. They still, however, had
land and a refuge.98

The reparto continued in Chiapas, although with less intensity after
1900, until 1909, when it was discontinued by the national legislature.99
Manuel Pineda, in his 1910 study on the reparto program, argued that

100

it "constituted a true expropriation." The citizens of Huistén

agreed; they told President Diaz in 1909, "Sefibres Flores and Morales,

 

 

 

 

105

who try at all cost to extend their properties, are taking over our
possessions on which we have small houses and fields where we produce

what is necessary for our subsistence."101 The people of Chapultenango
asked Diaz to "permit us to leave as a whole the land which by the old

law we occupy because we consider we will be injured once it is divided."102
With the reparto, neighboring haciendas denounced the portions put on

the market and, as Emilio Rabasa said, ”the indians sell their lots

as soon as they have them.”103 From 1892 until 1909 land was increasingly
removed from Village control, particularly in Soc0nusco the center of

the organized labor movement in the 19205 and 1930s.

The modernization of Mexico, wrote Frank Tannenbaum in 1929, "was

coincident with lowering standards of life for the masses of the people."104
Although increasing alienation of village land and coercive labor forms
did not lead to revolution in Chiapas, when revolution did come to the
state from the outside between 1910 and 1920, these important changes in
the material conditions of life of most Chiapanecans did have a profound
impact. They constituted, collectively, one of the necessary conditions
for the politicization of the working masses. Without the protective
cushion of village land campesinos were forced into an exploitive labor
market, and later, from political indifference to participation. They
looked to the State for protection and assistance. A strong porfirian
State, established in Mexico at a time when the industrial revolution
began to permeate Latin America, advanced the modernization (the diffusion
of capitalist relations of production) of Chiapas. Modernization, in

turn, created the necessary conditions for the politicization of the
working masses who, in time, would demand an even stronger State that

could defend their interests.

 

 

 

106

REFLECTIONS

The period in Chiapanecan history from 1891 to 1910 is remarkable
for the acceleration of change which took place. In terms of local
politics, national integration, economic development and modernization,
and capital formation the watershed of change is located in the 1890s.
At that time the power of the national State began to be consolidated,
foreign capital began to penetrate the autarkic Mexican economy, and
roadblocks to the expansion of capital began to be removed. In Chiapas,
as in Mexico, the conditions favorable to a more efficient, entrepreneurial,
capitalist agriculture began to take hold and a segment of elite
society began to take advantage of those conditions. It was this element
of society which provided the most important impetus for political
modernization in Chiapas. "If not all entrepreneurs," explains Antonio
Gramsci, "at least an elite amongst them must have the capacity to be
an organizer of society in general, including all its complex organism
of services, right up to the State organism, because of the need to
create the conditions more favorable to the expansion of their own class."105

This period, important as it was, constituted no more than a
beginning. Much remained that was inimical to capitalist expansion in
Chiapas and political modernization; yet, in 1910 the regional
entrepreneurial elite, the generative force of State formation in ChiapaS,
appeared satisfied with the material and political accomplishments which
had come about since 1891. Thereafter, political modernization would
originate from the efforts to attract the support of the working masses,

and, later, from their demands.

 

 

 

 

PART TWO:

1910—1920

 

 

 

 

 

CHAPTER FIVE

A PROFOUND POLITICAL DIVISION

The transfer of the Capital from San
Crist6bal to Tuxtla has created a
profound political division between
tierra fria and tierra caliente.

Romulo Farrera, 1911

Conflict in Chiapas from 1910 to 1920 was sparked by the Mexican
Revolution. The revolution originated in northern Mexico and in 1911
forced the resignation of President Porfirio Diaz. In the confusing
interregnum between the resignation of Diaz and the accession of
revolutionary leader Francisco I. Madero to the presidency, radicals
in San Cristobal Las Casas tried to take power in Chiapas as a prelude
to returning the state government to their city. Even though they
wrapped themselves in the revolutionary banner of Madero, the cristobalenses
failed to triumph either electorally or by force of arms. Thereafter,
until 1914, an uneasy peace was maintained between the government in
Tuxtla Gutiérrez and the radical party in San Cristbbal. The absense of
porfirian authoritarianism, however, led to the liberation of violence,
banditry, and a certain amount of labor unrest.

The insurgent movement in San Crist6bal had a reactionary rather
than a revolutionary character. Its leaders looked back to the time

before 1892 when San Cristhbal was the social, economic, and political

108

 

 

 

 

 

 

109

center of Chiapas. They condemned the "rabasista governments" of 1891
to 1911 for the unequal regional development of the state and for
oppressing and impoverishing highland indian villages through the
reparto program. They condemned the caciguismo of the government
establishment in Tuxtla Gutierrez and its practice of political fraud,
yet they behaved no differently.

Two elite groups faced each other in 1911. One wanted to maintain
its power and the other wanted to usurp it. Those holding power, however,
still held (albeit less aggressively) to the modernizing program
initiated in 1891 and represented the most dynamic and entrepreneurial
segment of Chiapanecan society. The cristobalense radicals, on the
other hand, could not see beyond the highlands and the glory their local
society once possessed. They wanted to repeal the changes of the past

twenty years.1
THE FALL 0F PORFIRIO DIAZ

President Porfirio Diaz gave an interview to a North American
journalist in March 1908 and suggested that Mexico was perhaps ready
for democracy and that he would step down in 1910.2 To this day
historians are unsure whether Diaz was sincere or made the statement
to flush out opponents to the regime and eliminate them. Whatever
the motive, Francisco I. Madero, scion of a wealthy landed family in
the state of Coahuila, was encouraged. He published a book which
endorsed the reelection of Diaz one more time in 1910 but called for
a free and open election of the vice—president, Diaz's presumed

3 . . . .
successor. Madero argued that the porfirian dictatorship was a

 

 

 

110

justified and necessary stage in Mexico's history. It had broken the
endless cycle of revolution and prepared the way for "the realization
of the grandiose democratic ideal."4 To establish democratic government
in Mexico Madero proposed the necessity of free voting with no re-
elections, later turned into the revolutionary slogan, "sufragio
efectivo, no reelecci6n."5

Madero's La sucesi6n presidencial en 1910, published in December
1908, received an enthusiastic response and established its author as
a popular figure in liberal circles. Madero was persuaded to become
a candidate for president in the July 1910 election and he toured
Mexico speaking on democratic government and setting up anti-reelectionist
clubs. Diaz did not molest Madero until the summer of 1910, when he
ordered his arrest. Although he was in jail not quite a month (while
Diaz was reelected to another term), the arrest transformed the anti—
reelectionist party into a revolutionary movement. Under the Plan of
San Luis Potosi (issued by Madero in Texas), a program of political
reform essentially, Madero revolted in November 1910.

After a disappointing beginning, the revolution picked up military
momentum in 1911 in the north under the leadership of Pascual Orozco
and Francisco "Pancho" Villa. On May 10, 1911, the revolutionists
captured Ciudad Juarez, a point of entry to the United States and a
conduit for money and arms. Their Success now seemed certain; the
myth of invulnerability surrounding the porfirian regime was shattered.
The Diaz government, although still in control of most of the country,
was demoralized and arranged for a conditional surrender and a transfer
0f power. Diaz and a few of his closest supporters resigned on May 25,

leaving the government in the hands of the former ambassador to the

 

 

111

United States, Francisco Le6n De la Barra. The interim president
prepared for the election of Madero in July and his accession to the
presidency in November 1911. However, the revolution, for the most
rpart, had eliminated only the upper crust of the dictatorship; the
Senate and Chamber of Deputies, most governors and state legislatures,

. . 6
and the federal army and bureaucracy surv1ved intact.

CHIAPAS AND THE REVOLUTION

The Madero campaign and the revolution in its early stages had
little impact in Chiapas. With only slight exaggeration, Raquel D. Cal
y Mayor, a lowland hacendado, journalist, and politician, wrote in
May 1910 that "Chiapas is indifferent to the ridiculous anti—reelectionist
movements."7 Madero did not campaign in Chiapas and no anti—reelectionist
clubs were formed in the state in 1910.8

The first signs of a changing political climate in Chiapas came
with the establishment of two publications, one in Mexico City and the
other in San Crist6bal. Jose Antonio Rivera G., a comiteco and active
anti—reelectionist since the early 18905 and ally of the cristobalense
radicals, began publication of the review Chiapas 9 Mexico in May 1910
in Mexico City. Although Rivera G. informed Diaz that his review was
not hostile to the national administration, it did publish the harshest
criticism of the Rabasa brothers which, until then, had been seen in
print.10 He charged that the rabasista progress had not benefited the
entire state but had relegated the highlands to an inferior position and
its indian population to perpetual slavery and poverty. Interestingly,

Pr0~indigenism became part of the radical cristobalense program, a

 

 

112

cynical ploy given their previous lack of concern for the welfare of
indigenous communities. In order to rectify twenty years of rabasista
rule, Rivera G. argued, the state government should be returned to San
Crist6ba1. 11

Juan Félix Zepeda, a sixty year—old former judge in San Cristdbal
and fervent Catholic, began publication of the periodical Mas Alla.
Revista Catélica Dominical Informativa in October 1910 in San Cristfibal.
Zepeda supported the return of the government to San CristSbal, the
direct election of ayuntamientos, the elimination of the post of jefe
politico, and the suppression of enganche.12 In November he wrote that
"Madero, as a democratic fighter, is a hero; but as a seditious fugitive
he is a criminal; if the one deserves a statue, the other is worthy of

3 In December Mas Alla uncovered an alleged scandal

a scaffold."1
concerning Luis Rubalcova, the governor's private secretary, Julio
Quiros, an engineer on the state payroll, and Leopoldo Rabasa, the
governor's nephew and jefe politico of Tuxtla. Zepeda charged that
these three secretly held the contract with the state government to
transport mail between Tuxtla Gutierrez and Jalisco station on the
Panamerican railroad.l4 For this Zepeda was arrested and Mas Alla was
closed down.15

Early in 1911 an anti—reelectionist club, probably the first in the
state, was formed in Tapachula. The Club "Juan Alvarez" was composed
of radical anarchist-unionists. This organization sympathized with
neither the government in Tuxtla Gutierrez nor the radicals in San
Cristobal. Other political clubs representing various factions of the

elite appeared in Tapachula in the succeeding months in order to

compete for power in the municipal elections.

 

 

 

 

113

Criticism of the Rabasa regime from San Cristdbal began to blossom
in March and April 1911. As the national crisis deeped, cristobalenses
became more and more bold in their denunciations of the Rabasas, calling
for "a political change as in some other states."17 In April La Vbz del
Pueblo called for the end of caciquismo. Under the Rabasas, commented
the editor, "San Cristbbal has declined."18 The first anti—reelectionist
club in San Crist’obal was established on April 3, 1911, led by the
radical mano negra faction. Manuel Pineda was selected president, Jesds
Martinez Rojas became secretary-treasurer, and Timeoteo Flores and Juan
Felix Zepeda served on the executive committee.19 On April 20 this
organization called for the resignation of Ram5n Rabasa, the establishment
of free and independent municipalities, the abolition of the head tax,
strict laws to protect the indigenous communities, and equitable and
proportional departmental taxation within the state.20
Only in May, the last month of the Diaz regime, did armed revolutionary
groups appear in Chiapas. On May 8 around a hundred men on horseback,
proceeding from Tabasco, captured Pichucalco, recruited the sixty men
in the local jail, and liberated $30,000 from the only bank in town.
They returned to Tabasco the following day.21 Small groups of apolitical
bandits began to appear also in May, robbing trains, haciendas, and
even businesses in towns.22 Although they were also branded as bandits,
Lindoro and Isadoro Castellanos, hacendados from Ocosingo, rebelled in
the name of Madero two days before Diaz resigned. Leading nearly 300
Supporters, the Castellanos brothers expressed dissatisfaction with the
State government and charged that the people of Chilfin were oppressed by
the jefe politico.23 Don Lindoro, the self-proclaimed jefe maderista

0f Chiapas, abandoned OCOSingo on May 25 with $1000 belonging to the

 

 

 

 

114

jefe polf'tico.24 Three days later the same band briefly occupied
Comitan, terrorizing local officials.25 Nicolas Macias Ruiz also
rebelled on May 23 in Villa Flores, in the department of Chiapa.26

These groups posed little threat to the state government.
THE LIBERTY OF DESIGNATING A NEW GOVERNOR

Rambn Rabasa resigned in favor of Manuel de Trejo on May 27, 1911,
(two days after Diaz's resignation) and expressed his desire to give
Chiapas "the liberty of designating a new governor."27 On May 31 the
Secretary General of Government resigned along with the jefes politicos
of Las Casas, Chilén, La Libertad, Comitén, Simojovel, and Tuxtla.28
The state legislature, however, remained intact, as did the municipal
governments.29 Manuel de Trejo had been in and out of the state
government numerous times over the previous twenty years and, although
he was originally from San Cristobal, he was an unconditional supporter
of Emilio and Ramon Rabasa.30 The transfer of power from Rabasa to
Manuel de Trejo, as Timeoteo Flores Ruiz pointed out to the interim
president, signified no real change. "The entrance of de Trejo," he
informed De la Barra, "is the death of the revolution and the

. . . . . 31
continuation of feroc1ous ca01qulsmo."

 

Chiapas experienced a political spring following Rabasa's resignation,

notwithstanding Flores Ruiz's overstatement. Maderista clubs were
organized in Chiapa de Corzo, Tonalé, Tapachula, Motozintla, and Tuxtla
Gutierrez for the purpose of either maintaining power or winning it
anew. The club "Chiapas" of Tuxtla Gutierrez was formed by Ciro

I .
Farrera, Ponciano Burguete, and Cesar Cano, raba51sta hacendados, and

 

 

 

115

promoted the candidacy of De Trejo for constitutional governor. For

local deputies the club backed Teofilio Orantes, a former civil judge

in Tuxtla, and Raul Rinc6n, former president of the Camara Agrfbola.32

The club ”Chiapas" fairly represented that segment of Chiapanecan

society that had enjoyed political power since 1891. Two hacendados

from Pichucalco, Carlos A. Vidal and César Cordova, proposed the
separation of their department from Chiapas and its annexation to Tabasco.

charged Vidal, "have always been treated like

33

"We pichucalquefibs,’
Chiapanecan bastards." In Tapachula the maderista‘club "Soconusco"
was composed of wealthy cattlemen who opposed the anarchist "Juan
Alvarez" Club and the political domination of the coffee interests.34
Early in June the anti—reelectionist club in San Cristobal sent a
five—man commission to Mexico City to see Interim President De la Barra.
The commission included Juan Felix Zepeda, Jesus Martinez Rojas, and
Jose Antonio Rivera G. They sought to persuade De la Barra to name
Eusebio Salazar y Madrid (a cristobalense living in Mexico City) in
place of Manuel de Trejo. They could not see the president but they
did receive a sympathetic hearing from De la Barra's Secretary of
Government, Emilio V§zquez Gomez, who was interested in placing
revolutionaries in government.35
The naming of new governors was an important but difficult problem
for the De la Barra administration. The Treaty of Ciudad Juarez (the
capitulation document between Madero and Diaz) permitted Madero to
recommend to the state legislatures his choices for interim governors.
The old legislatures remained, however, and in more than a few states
36

the constitutional prerogative to name governors was exclusively theirs.

Although Madero selected Venustiano Carranza interim governor of

 

 

—7—-——'fi—fi'

 

 

116

Coahuila, for example, the state legislature appointed a porfirista
instead.37 With regard to Chiapas, Madero called together the
Chiapanecan colony of Mexico City for the purpose of advising him on
the most acceptable candidate. Members of the colony met on June 19

and by 67 votes designated Flavio Guillén, a close personal friend of
Madero. Salazar y Madrid was second in the count with twenty—eight
votes. With this indication, Madero recommended Guillén as his choice
for interim governor to the Chiapas legislature, which was scheduled

to meet on June 21.38

Flavio Guillén, although Madero's favorite, was unacceptable to
many in Chiapas. The Club Democrético Chiapaneco Independiente of Chiapa
de Corzo, among several others, telegraphed Madero saying that they
could not accept Guillén because he belonged to the cientffico element.
They suggested, instead, Salazar y Madrid.39 Guillén himself protested
that many Chiapanecans "have made a crime of my friendship with Estrada
Cabrera, Ram6n Corral, and Emilio Rabasa."40
vazquez G6me2 intervened on June 20, one day before the state

legislature met, by telegraphing Governor Manuel de Trejo and asking
him to resign in favor of Salazar y Madrid.41 The Secretary of
Government indicated that he was dissatified with the governor's progress
in placing revolutionaries in government. With this indication Manuel

de Trejo resigned. The following day the state legislature, refusing to
be intimidated or pressured by Madero and vazquez Gémez, selected
Reinaldo Gordillo Le6n, an engineer from Comitan, interim governor of
Chiapas.42 Gordillo Leon had served as municipal president of Comitan
and one of his principal qualifications was his strong animosity for

fellow comiteco and intellectual leader of the radical cristobalenses

7%

 

 

————————i'

117

Jose Antonio Rivera G.43 The state legislature was most interested in
keeping the radical cristobalense party out of power.

In an attempt to force federal intervention and the assistance of
Emilio vazquez Gomez, the cristobalense anti—reelectionists raised the
flag of rebellion on July 3, 1911, and refused to recognize the legality
of Gordillo Leon's appointment.44 "The state legislature refused to
accept the designation made by the Secretary of Government," proclaimed
the cristobalenses, "for this and other reasons given: the nomination
is not recognized and Manuel Pineda is named interim governor."45 Over
one hundred prominent citizens of San Cristfibal signed the document of
rebellion.46 In response the state legislature appropriated $60,000
for the support of a volunteer batallion called the Hijos de Tuxtla
(Sons of Tuxtla).47 Twenty years of resentment, now incited by a small
but bold group of men, found its ultimate expression. The time seemed

right.
THE JULY PRON U NCI AMI EN TO

By July, each side had a clear perception of the other. El Imparcial,
basing its report on a telegram from Tuxtla Gutiérrez, said the purpose
of the rebellion was for sustaining ”the clerical predominance in the
state."47 Protuxtleco historian Luis Espinosa viewed the dispute as
one between the "liberal element" in Tuxtla and the "clerical element"
in San Crist6bal.48 The cristobalenses saw themselves as true

revolutionaries fighting against an entrenched oligarchy in Tuxtla

 

 

Gutierrez. By July 1911 the issue of the location of the capital no

longer appeared so prominently in cristobalense propaganda. They had

 

 

0—11

(h

4.

'v

 

 

118

found a broader issue: "a real vote and no boss rule," which attracted
allies throughout the state.49 Nevertheless, outside the two cities
the contention was viewed as a feud between Tuxtla Gutierrez and San
Cristobal.50 This general impression, rough and approximate, was not
far from the mark.

The July pronunciamiento (declaration of rebellion) was designed to
force the government in Tuxtla Gutierrez to accept vazquez G6mez's
nominee for interim governor. The local congressional elections were
coming up in mid-July and the composition of the new state legislature
depended heavily upon the political inclination of the interim governor.
The cristobalense party feared that an unfriendly governor would subvert
the election through the appointment of partisan jefes politicos. The
election of an unfriendly legislature, in turn, would insure the
election of a full term (1911—1914) governor hostile to cristobalense
interests.

The July pronunciamiento did succeed in prompting vazquez G6mez to
again strongly recommend a compromise candidate to the state legislature,
this time Dr. Policarpo Rueda.51 This pressure from above was reinforced
from below by a cristobalense threat to march thousands of angry
indians into Tuxtla Gutiérrez.52 Policarpo Rueda, president of the
Club Democratico Independiente of Tonalé, was one of the earliest
maderistas in Chiapas and sympathetic, although not subservient, to the
radical party in San Cristobal.53 Interim Governor Gordillo Leon
resigned on July 5 and the legislature appointed Dr. Rueda in his place.

Rueda tried to conciliate both sides by allowing each to control a
political sphere of influence. He immediately replaced the jefes

Politicos named by Gordillo Leon and appointed cristobalense radical

 

 

119

Juan Felix Zepeda Secretary of Government, to placate the opposition.54
On July 13 Rueda traveled to San Cristbbal and appointed jefes politicos
who were acceptable to the radical party for the departments of Las
Casas, Comitan, Chilon, Palenque, and Pichucalco. Manuel Pineda, for
example, took the jefatura of Las Casas. Rueda also tried, without
success, to disarm both sides. In response to Rueda's "subversion” and
to gain some time, the local legislature moved the elections back from

July ll-l3, to August 13-15, and again to August 27—29.55

 

In early August Secretary of Government Emilio Vézquez G6mez was
replaced within the national cabinet by Alberto Garcia Granados. The

new Secretary, in turn, appointed José Antonio Rivera G. Secretary of

 

Government for the Federal District. Interim Governor Rueda then asked
the state legislature for an indefinite leave of absense to visit Mexico
and seek reassurance and support for his administration from the

new Secretary, Garcia Granados.56 The state legislature then turned to
another compromise candidate, Manuel Rovelo Argfiello. To obtain the
position Rovelo Argfiello first asked for the support of Rivera G. and
pledged his complete neutrality. Rivera G. then threw his support to
Rovelo Arguello and Garcia Granados recommended him to the Chiapas
legislature.57 The state legislature made Rovelo Argfiello Chiapas'
fourth interim governor in as many months.

Rovelo Argfiello assumed office shortly before the August elections
for the state legislature and on his first day replaced the jefes
politicos appointed by Dr. Rueda in Chiapa de Corzo, Pichucalco, Tonala,
Simojovel, and Mariscal.58 Only one of the appointments made in
consultation with the cristobalense radicals, Pichucalco, was overturned.

As it turned out, however, the departmental electors did not always

 

 

 

120

vote in line with the wishes of their jefes politicos. Comitan, for
example, despite the presence of a cristobalense jefe politico elected
a pro—government legislator. The cristobalense party, winning only in
Las Casas, Simojovel, La Libertad, and Chil6n, failed to obtain a
majority in the new legislature.59

Two opposing explanations were forthcoming regarding the outcome
of the election. Interim Governor Rovelo Argfiello explained to De la
Barra that "if San Cristbbal did not have a complete triumph in the
elections, surely it was because it tried to determine candidates
absolutely unknown by the departmental electors."6O Timoteo Flores
Ruiz, on the other hand, charged that "the legislature gave a glope
de estado; the current congress, like the one before, continues to
serve a camarilla."6l

The four procristobalense state deputies arrived in Tuxtla
Gutierrez on September 13, on the eve of the convocation of the new
legislature. The following day they were advised that San Cristobal,
under the leadership of wealthy hacendados Juan Espinosa Torres and
Manuel Pineda, had again withdrawn recognition of the state government,

. 62
initiating rebellion. The four returned to San Crist6bal.

HOSTILITIES COMMENCE

The September 14 pronunciamiento had as its primary goal federal
intervention, again, but the cristobalenses were now willing to install
a friendly government by force of arms if necessary. On September 14,
Juan Espinosa Torres, "Comandante Militar y Jefe de las Fuerzas

Libertadores del Estado," sent an ultimatum to Tuxtla Gutierrez giving

 

 

 

 

 

lZl

twenty-four hours to the state legislature to dissolve itself and
demanding that the governor place the armed forces of the state at
his disposal. "It being impossible, contemptible, and shameful to
tolerate any longer the actual state of affairs," wrote the rebels in
San Cristobal, "which pushes us to the edge of ruin and indefinite
oppression, we subscribers have resolved to sustain by arms the

principles of the triumphant Revolution."63 The first armed clash came

 

the following day.

Garcia Granados, Secretary of Government, upon learning of the
renewed rebellion, was quoted as saying that the problem in Chiapas was
that "persons of the old regime are seeking to dominate the government,
and this brings out discord on the part of the people of the new regime."64
Francisco I. Madero was less understanding. He telegraphed Espinosa
Torres on September 17: "You have no motive which justifies such an
assault and I am formally notifying you that if you continue to advance
and attack Tuxtla, I will decidedly support the Government of Sr. De la
Barra in order to punish you and others who are deserving in an exemplary

manner and when I receive power I will also demand that you and your

followers be held strictly accountable."65 There clearly existed a

 

conflict in policy between the national government of De la Barra and
the leader of the national revolution, Madero, regarding the situation

in Chiapas. This lack of coordination had encouraged the cristobalense

 

party all summer to maintain their belligerent position and had,
inadvertently, led to violence.

Upon hearing of the new cristobalense pronunciamiento, Dr. Rueda
left Mexico City and arrived in Chiapas on September 19 to resume his

post of interim governor. To avoid this disagreeable prospect, the

 

 

 

122

state legislature requested, and obtained, the resignation of Rovello
Argfiello, repealed the appointment of Dr. Rueda, and named federal
deputy Querido Moheno interim governor of Chiapas. The legislature
refused to allow Dr. Rueda to return to Tuxtla Gutierrez and Moheno
would not come to Chiapas citing as his reason the illegal intervention
of the Secretary of Government, Garcia Granados. Rovelo Argfiello
remained in charge.6

The military conflict lasted not quite a month. The state
government had at its disposal about one thousand well armed men while
the cristobalenses counted on about one thousand indian soldiers, poorly
armed and disciplined, and an additional eight hundred ladinos.67 The
two forces clashed at points leading to Tuxtla Gutierrez from the
Central Highlands: Chiapas de Corzo, Acala, and Chicoasén. At all three
points the cristobalenses were stOpped at the Grijalva river.68 The
rebels remained on the offensive until the first week in October. By
that time they had taken Ixtapa, Chioasén, La Concordia, San Bartolome
de los Llanos, Copainala, Simojovel, Chiapilla, San Gabriel, and
Solistahuacan. Comitan, under the leadership of municipal president
Belisario Dominguez, remained loyal to the state government. Chiapa de
Corzo at first attempted to maintain a tenuous neutrality but was
occupied by cristobalense forces and on September 24 withdrew
recognition of the state government. The ayuntamiento of Chiapa de Corzo
bet on the probability that the cristobalense candidate would win the
gubernatorial elections in November.69

Tuxtlecos charged at the time that the clergy in San Crist6ba1 and

the bishop were responsible for the conflict and recruited the Chamula

villagers to take part.70 Indians did take part in most of the military

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

123

actions under the command of a Chamula cacique, Jacinta Pérez, called
El Pajarito.71 The party in San Crist6bal apparently offered land
distribution and the abolition of the head tax in order to recruit an
indian army.72 Their participation did add to the bloody image of
a caste war which horrified the tuxtlecos. But did Bishop Francisco
Orozco y Jiménez directly or indirectly involve himself in the
movement in order to establish a clerically-dominated government in
San Cristbbal?

There is no question that the leaders of the insurrection were
fervent Catholics, particularly Manuel Pineda, and it is known that
Jesus Martinez Rojas was a personal friend of the bishop. We also
know that the rebels carried the banner of the Virgin of Guadalupe as
the symbol of their cause. On the other hand, after the conflict,

a number of Chiapanecan priests published their opinion that the
radical leaders of the movement used the bishop's name in support of
their cause without his permission.73 Luis Espinosa, the most thorough
chronicler of the 1911 crisis, offers no hard evidence of the bishop's
involvement other than letters which show that the bishop was informed
and concerned.74

On September 17, Orozco y Jiménez wrote Interim President De la
Barra requesting federal intervention: "Although I have never attempted
nor do I now attempt to involve myself in politics, I believe it is my
duty as Bish0p, in the wellbeing of my diocesanos to manifest to you
that this society is increasingly profoundly alarmed that at any time
hostilities between this city and Tuxtla Gutiérrez will break out.
Perhaps intervention by you, which for my part I seek and would give

thanks for, can stop the flowing of blood between brother tOWns whose

 

 

 

 

 

 

€th

tode

Did

1a

 

 

124

misfortune grieves me and upon which I cannot look with indifference."75
One week later the bishop made another plea: "The situation now is
extremely anarchic and distressing. My ecclesiastical authority is by
today ineffectual, I have exhausted all means to help. Only you can
remedy it and I urge that it be with quick and effective intervention."76
Did the bishop encourage or discourage the ambitions of the rebels?

We don't know.

During the first three weeks of the conflict Interim President De
la Barra declined to intervene on one Side or another.77 He explained
this inactivity this way: ”If the federal forces operate, this will
displease some. If they do not operate, this will displease others."78
Instead he looked for peaceful solutions. On the night of September 21,
De la Barra and Rovelo Argfiello held a telegraphic conference. The
interim president twice suggested the desirability of asking the Senate
to declare the desaparicién de los poderes (federal intervention and
removal) of the state government and the appointment of a military officer
as interim governor. The interim governor strongly replied that his
government was in perfect accord with the Constitution. De la Barra
decided not to press the issue.79 In communications with Espinosa Torres,
De la Barra stressed the point that there were legal and peaceful means
to protest election violations.80 On October 4, De la Barra ordered
General Eduardo Paz to go to Chiapas and seek out a peaceful solution
to the conflict. At the same time he ordered the Secretary of War to
give arms and ammunition to the Hijos de Tuxtla, the volunteer force of
the state government.81

To the state government and the people of Tuxtla Gutiérrez, it

appeared that Chiapas had degenerated into a bloody caste war about which

 

the

ass

Cu:

Va.

r‘rr
o—, -

I”

 

 

125

the federal government did nothing. After repeated requests for
assistance to the executive branch, Rovelo Argfiello turned to the
national Senate.82 In re3ponse the Senate created a commission on
Chiapas to investigate the crisis and propose a solution. The commission
was led by none other than Emilio Rabasa and Victor Manuel Castillo.83
Speaking before the commission on behalf of the federal government,
Secretary of Government Garcia Granados asked that the Senate declare
the desaparicién de los poderes and appoint a military interim governor
until the November elections.84 The commission, however, concluded

that the established government in Tuxtla Gutiérrez was legitimate.

On October 6, the full Senate voted to inform the interim president that
it was the will of the Senate, and its constitutional perogative under
article 116, that he order "federal forces to immediately begin active
and energetic operations against the rebels that have risen in arms
against the government of the state of Chiapas."85 De la Barra complied
and ordered General Paz to cooperate with the state government forces

to bring about a military end to the rebellion.

The combined federal—state counteroffensive began on October 8 at
Chiapa de Corzo. The townspeople tried unsuccessfully to repel the
attact and after a four hour battle more than one hundred pe0ple were
killed and many more were wounded.86 During the next four days federal
and state troops retook most of the important towns under cristobalense
control. During one foray the Hijos de Tuxtla captured ten Chamula
soldiers and cut off their ears to make them examples of what would
happen when indios would fight ladinos.

The odds were too great. On October 12 the cristobalense rebels

O O O 88
agreed to enter into negotiations w1th General Paz. A peace agreement

 

 

V3

 

 

126

was signed the following day by commissioners representing both sides.
The rebels agreed to recognize the state government of Rovelo Arghello
in exchange for a general amnesty. The agreement also included the
disarming of both sides, the establishment of federal detachments
where necessary to insure fair elections, and the appointment by the
governor of a military officer as jefe politico of Comitan. It was

reported that Rovelo Arguello was not happy with the agreement.

THE GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION

With the fighting over, Chiapanecans again turned their attention
to politics, electoral politics. The two candidates for constitutional
governor in the November elections were Reinaldo Gordillo Leon (former
interim governor) and Jose Antonio Rivera G. General Paz considered
both unacceptable and proposed Dr. Policarpo Rueda but there were no
takers.90 The election was close, fairly free, and representative of
the political and regional division of the state. According to a
variety of sources, including the Secretary of Government, Rivera G.

won the election with the votes of 320 electors against Gordillo Leon's

91

292. The departmental vote was as follows:
DEPARTMENT RIVERA G. GORDILLO LEON
Las Casas 110 O
Chilén 55 1
Chiapa 47 O
Pichucalco 30 O
Palenque 23 6
Tonala 21 10
Simojovel 16 24
La Libertad 3 26
Motozintla O 31
Soconusco 7 37
Tuxtla 0 71
8 82

Comitan

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

127

The state legislature, after waiting a month, finally declared that
the voting in Palenque and Chil6n had been fraudulent. Their votes were
nullified and by a tally of 290 to 242 Gordillo Le6n was elected
governor.92 Gordillo Le6n later admitted what everyone already knew,
that the state legislature would never have confirmed Rivera G. He noted
that Madero, who assumed the presidency in mid-NOvember, did not want
to give the victory to Gordillo Le6n but was advised to sacrifice Rivera
G. for the sake of stability.93 Madero, however, did request that
the new governor "bring into your administration some of the elements

"94 At the beginning of 1912, perhaps to avoid

of the Opposing party.
yet another pronunciamiento in San Cristbbal,95 Madero named Gordillo
Le6n ambassador to Guatemala and finally obtained the Chiapanecan post
for Flavio Guillén.96 A fragile truce ensued in Chiapas.

The end of the conflict and the election of Gordillo Lebn also
led to the return to normalcy in Soconusco. "The great danger here,"
wrote the North American consul in August 1911, "is that a spread of
agitation or revolutionary movement might reach the agricultural working
classes and endanger the gathering of the coffee crop.... It is feared
that should the masses awaken to the actual conditions of things danger
might result to the coffee crop and even to the security of the
plantations and planters.”97 There was some evidence of discontent.
In Tuxtla Chico workers protested the head tax and there were scattered
reports of labor trouble and the destruction of property.98 The manager
of the plantation El Rosario reported in August 1911 "our laborers
are still running away during the night in small bunches."99 In July

1911 the anarchist "Juan Alvarez" club had taken over the ayuntamiento

of Tapachula in the elections as well placing one of their members in

 

th

De

9:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

128

the jefatura politica.loo When Governor Gordillo Le6n took office in
December 1911 he ordered Dr. Victor Constantino Herrera, the jefe
politico to resign.101 In February 1912, the Nbrth American consul
reported that the new jefe politico, Abelardo Domihguez, "has continued
to make good his promises to assist the planters in every possible way
and owners and managers report greater attempts to afford them
assistance in managing their field hands than they have experienced for

some time."102

CONCILIATION AND CONCORD, AND RESIDUAL VIOLENCE

The dominant theme of the new Guillén administration was "conciliation

"103 The governor, as befitting a true

and concord between brothers.
naderista, encouraged a free political environment and competition
between parties governed by political discourse. In Tuxtla Gutiérrez
the Partido Liberal Chiapaneco, formed by Ciro Farrera in 1911, promoted
lowland commercial and agricultural interests.104 In San Cristbbal,
Jeshs Martinez Rojas formed the Partido POpular Chiapaneco to advance
highland interests, including the return of the government to San
Crist‘bbal.105
Governor Guillén's conciliatory policy was followed in the mid—1912
elections for senators and national deputies, and state legislators.
The same legislature which had imposed Gordillo Leon, chose two men loyal
to the old regime, Leopold Gout and Jose Castellot, for the senate.
Belisario Dominguez was elected an alternate senator, presumably a

reward for his steadfast support for the government during the rebellion.

There was a split in the election of national deputies. R5mulo Farrera

 

 

 

129

and Manuel Rovelo Argdhllo were elected as candidates of the tuxtleco
Partido Liberal, Adolfo E. Grajales represented Soconusco, anvaeSus
Martinez Rojas and César Castellanos were elected as candidates of the
cristobalense Partido Popular. The newly elected state legislature,
noted Martinez Rojas, was "for the most part independent."106 No
better testimony of Guillén's political skill can be found than in the
transformation in the opinion of the cristobalense La Voz del Pueblo.
In February 1912 Guillén's appointment was viewed as a ”cientffico
triumph." By September the governor was refered to as "a man of good
faith, of noble and honorable ideals."107
Governor Guillén, in cooperation with the new legislature, also
decreed some moderate reforms. Although the division of ejidos had
ended in 1909, the 1892 Lag de Ejidos (decreeing the parcelization of
communal village lands) was repealed in November 1912. In December a
new labor law was promulgated. This law required employers not to
carry workers‘ debts for more than a year, established a maximum ten—
hour work day, prohibited debt inheritance, and required employers to
provide a primitive form of insurance for disabled workers.108 Guillen
also established the Office of Servant Contractors to oversee the
contracting of highland indians and to prevent abuses. It quickly
became, unfortunately, a corrupt and abusive agency itself.109 Finally,
in response to the participation of indians in the 1911 insurrection,
the state gavernment abolished the regressive head tax.110
Notwithstanding Guillén's program of conciliation and reform,
banditry reappeared throughout the state and Chiapas was plagued by a

deeprooted wave of violence. Hacendados reported difficulties in

keeping workers on their properties and bandits roamed the state, burning

 

 

 

130

haciendas, tearing up towns, and stealing cattle.111 In Tonala, for

example, landowners and merchants felt compelled to form their own rural
defense corps for use against bandits and rebellious workers.112
Numerous petty political squabbles, often violent, erupted in the
municipalities over the control of local government.113 Early in 1912
one political party in Palenque attempted to prevent a rival party from
assuming office by armed force.114 The end of the tight political
control exercized during the Diaz dictatorship led to the venting of
frustration and the abuse of the free political climate. Banditry,

and violence on the part of workers, was also partly economic in nature.
While wages remained stable during the period after Madero began his
revolution, prices for basic commodities soared. Between 1910 and 1912,
for example, the price of five liters of corn in Tuxtla Gutierrez
increased from eight to thirty centavos and in Tapachula from twelve to

twenty centavos.115 The Mexican State in Chiapas was in crisis.

THE CONSTITUTIONALIST REVOLUTION

In February 1913 Governor Guillén took a leave of absence to travel
to Mexico City. He wanted to lend his support to the Madero administration
in its struggle against Falix Diaz, the dictator's nephew, who had
Staged a revolt in the capital city. The state legislature then recalled
Reinaldo Gordillo Le6n from Guatemala to occupy the governor's office.116
General Victoriano Huerta, the federal general in command of the defense
0f the Madero government, treacherously joined forces with Diaz and

overthrew the Madero government. President Madero and Vice—President

Pino Suarez were murdered on the night of February 21. The following day

 

 

~12;

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to

I‘d!

 

 

131

Governor Gordillo Leon professed his loyality to the new administration
of President General Victoriano Huerta.117 The governor also asked
Senator Emilio Rabasa to work against the naming of a military governor
for Chiapas, a change desired by certain cristobalenses.118 The
governor of Coahuila, Venustiano Carranza, took exception to Huerta's
coup d’état on the same day, February 22, refusing to recognize its
legality. The Constitutionalist revolution had begun.

Most Chiapanecans were not really distressed at the fall of the
Madero government. The state government, including the legislature,
quickly and willingly accommodated itself to the new political order.
In March, for example, Gordillo Lebn asked all jefes politicos to help
those political clubs supporting Felix Diaz and Francisco Le6n De la
Barra, candidates for president and vice—president.119 The cristobalense
rebels of 1911 considered Madero a traitor to their cause and to the
principles of 1910.120 Jesus Martinez Rojas supported the Huerta
regime (until October 1913) believing that the new president intended
to comply with the promises of the revolution. In Tuxtla Gutiérrez
little had changed, as witnessed by the return of Ramon Rabasa to the
municipal government.122

President Huerta replaced Gordillo Le6n with General A.Z. Palafox
in July 1913, a move which was made in conformity with the general
militarization of the nation and which, incidentally, pleased many
cristobalenses. During his one year in Chiapas Palafox met his quota
for soldiers in the federal army and kept Chiapas out of the hands of
anti—Huerta rebels. The military administration made an attempt to

reform the office 0f labor contracting in San Cristbbal, set maximum

prices for primary commodities sold in towns, increased the number of

 

 

 

 

 

 

132

school inspectors, and increased the budget for road construction to

a record $150,000.123

The Constitutionalist movement, that is, the anti-Huerta
rebellion led by Venustiano Carranza, gathered military strength and
political unity in the spring of 1913. Initially limited to the
northern tier of states, the movement soon gained allies in Morelos,
Campeche, and Tabasco.124 By the summer there were a number of
Constitutionalist chiefs in Tabasco, Carlos Greene, Pedro Colorado,
Juan Hernandez, and Luis Felipe Domihguez, who conducted military
operations in both Tabasco and northern Chiapas.125 Late in 1913
the Vidal brothers of Pichucalco, Carlos and Luis, offered their

services to Greene and harrassed Chiapanecan authorities in their home

department.126

General Luis Felipe Dominguez, an hacendado from Tenosique, Tabasco,
entered Chiapas in March 1913 in command of the Usumacinta Brigade.
Over the next two years he marched from monterfa to monteria liberating
the mahogany workers.127 Thirty years later one worker recalled: ”I
escaped from that hell because the Revolution liberated me. General
Luis Felipe Dominguez came in 1913 and we all left with him."128 One
administrator of a monteria reported in 1914 that the lumber camps
"Santa Margarita" and ”Santa Clara" were reduced to ashes. 29 In each
camp Dominguez decreed the absolute liberty of work, the abolition of
all workers' debts, and the execution of administrators and overseers.
The Usumacinta Brigade, however, put the monterfas out of business for
only two to three years but in doing so became a legend in indigenous
Chiapas.130

The other Dominguez who entered legend in 1913 was Chiapanecan

 

 

 

133

Senator Dr. Belisario Dominguez. He was elevated to the Senate in early
1913 upon the death of Leapold Gout. Dominguez, a comiteco and medical
doctor trained in Paris, was a staunch maderista who had been sickened
by Huerta's climb to power over the bodies of Madero and Pino Suarez.
In September 1913 the senator published a speech he was not allowed to
read in the congressional record which was a virulent inditement of the
Huerta regime. Dominguez called upon his collegues to do their duty
and depose the president, "a bloody and ferocious soldier who
assassinates without hesitation anyone who is an obstacle to his wishes."
He continued, arguing that "the country hOpes that you will honor her
before the world, saving her from the shame of having as chief executive
a TRAITOR and an ASSASSIN."131

Two weeks later Dominguez was picked up by four policemen who drove
him to a cemetery, shot him, and buried the body. When the senator
failed to appear in the Senate chamber that day, October 8, the Chiapas
delegation led by Jesus Martinez Rojas inquired at the Secretary of
Government as to his disappearance and declared that the Chamber of
Deputies would remain in permanent session until the matter was fully
cleared up. The following day rumors of Dominguez's assassination
circulated in the capital city and Huerta dissolved both chambers of the
legislature on October 10 to prevent the congress from withdrawing its
recognition of the government. The Huerta regime no longer had even a

shadow of legitimacy.132

Violence became epidemic and contagious in Chiapas in 1913 and 1914.
In the confused political climate it was often impossible to distinguish
between bandits and revolutionaries. In June 1913 the jefe politico

of Soconusco captured a large quantity of Constitutionalist revolutionary

 

 

 

 

134

propaganda being smuggled into the state.134 By September 1913

Governor Palafox was asking the federal government for arms to use
against the rebels in Pichucalco, Palenque, and Mariscal.l35 In
February 1914 an uprising occured in Tapachula but it was Suppressed in
one day. In the process jefe politico (and coffee planter) Fernando
Braun detained the leaders of the anarchist "Juan Alvarez" club,
shot them, and burned the bodies.136 Ricardo Caracosa led a small band
of revolutionaries near Comitan in 1914, supported by Guatemalan
president Estrada Cabrera.137 Similar small insurrectionary groups also
appeared: in Cintalapa led by Luis Espinosa, in Villa Flores led by
Santana C6rdova, in Ocosingo led by Aar6n Castellanos. These bands,
not individually, not collectively, threatened the Palafox government
in 1914.138

Defeated militarily by the Constitutionalists, the Huerta regime
collapsed in the summer of 1914. The President General resigned on
July 15 and First Chief of the Constitutionalist movement, Venustiano
Carranza, entered Mexico City on August 20. Governor Palafox resigned
on August 13 and the state legislature named Jose Cano, a tuxtleco and
Rabasa intimate, interim governor. Faced with incipient rebellion
within his own movement in the north, Carranza set about to secure his
control over the south. In late August he appointed three military
governors, revolutionary proconsuls, for the south: Salvador Alvarado
for Yucatan, Francisco J. Mujica for Tabasco, and Jesfis Agustin Castro

for Chiapas. Castro arrived in Tuxtla Gutierrez on September 14, 1914.139

 

 

135

REFLECTIONS

The Mexican State entered a period of profound crisis in 1910. The
State was so intimately bound up with the personality of Porfirio Diaz
that his disappearance led to a period of political fragmentation.
Centralizing tendencies could no longer focus upon any one center and
centrifugal forces, held in check for some thirty years, flourished in
crisis.

Chiapas, although far from being in a revolutionary situation in
1910 but being closely integrated into the national State, c0uld not
avoid the repercussions of the national crisis. The Madero revolutiOn
provided an opportunity for one localist grOup which had harbored
political ambition and resentment for twenty years to attempt to bring
down the government. The political establishment in Tuxtla Gutiérrez,
however, was not about to give up power as easily as the Diaz regime in
Mexico City. It is no coincidence that the three most prosperous
departments in the state, Tuxtla, Comitan, and Soconusco, cast their
votes in the November 1911 gubernatorial election for the government
candidate. The entrepreneurial segment of Chiapanecan society was not
Prepared to relinquish control of Chiapas' political and economic
development without a fight. Radical localism in San Cristbbal was
defeated and the concensus Emilio Rabasa created in the early 1890s held
firm.

In Chiapas, as in Mexico as a whole, the Mexican Revolution weakened
the national State. Within this decade—long crisis, however, conditions
aPPeared which favored the formation of an even stronger and more active

State. Revolutionary factions seeking mass support promised soc1al and

 

136

economic reforms which only a strong, interventionist State c0u1d
satisfy. Reform—oriented government along with years of civil war led
to the politicization of the working masses in Chiapas, as in Mexico.
Their pressure on revolutionary and post—revolutionary governments for

political participation and social—economic reforms also contributed

to the reconstruction of a State which was more formidable than Don

Porfirio's.

 

 

CHAPTER SIX

CIVIL WAR

 

Chiapanecan cowards, while the north
is struggling, you are enjoying peace,
but I will teach you to feel the
effects of the Revolution.

Jesus Agustin Castro, 1914

Chiapas was invaded by an outside military force for the fourth time

 

in its history in the fall of 1914.1 The revolution which proceeded from
northern Mexico was imposed on the state. As a result a civil war

ensued in Chiapas between those who supported the Constitutionalist
movement and those who did not. Unlike the cristobalense radicals of 1911
who sought to restore past greatness, the anti—Constitutionalist rebels

of 1914-1920 simply wanted to maintain the status quo ante. The two

 

movements were similar, however, in their antipathy for political

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

centralization. Both were essentially localist, opposed to the expansion

of the central State.

In 1920, with the fall of the Carranza government, the Chiapanecan

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

rebels skillfully manuevered the peaceful takeover of the state government.
The conservative insurgents acquired the political direction of a region
which had just emerged from years of social revolution; the past was

irretrievable. Five years of revolutionary administration and civil war

 

 

137

 

 

 

 

 

138

had broken the isolation of rural Chiapas and the absolute power of the
hacendado over villages and workers. The politicization of the country-
side had begun by creating opportunities for powerless individuals and
groups to act in their own interest. Perhaps the best evidence of this
politicization was not the victory of the conservative insurgents in

1920 but their inability to remain in power.

REVOLUTION IMPOSED

General Jesus Agustin Castro and the Divisién Veintiuno, comprising
1200 officers and men from the state of Durango, reached Tuxtla Gutierrez
on September 14, 1914. As military governor, Castro assumed all
executive, legislative, and judicial power. All important positions in
state government and all departmental political officers were staffed
by military officers. The important municipal governments were overturned
in favor of loyal Constitutionalists, and military detachments were
stationed in each departmental cabecera. In less than two weeks
Constitutionalist rule was imposed on Chiapas.2

The harbinger of revolution, General Castro, was only twenty-seven
years old when he undertook the task of transforming Chiapas. A native
of Durango, he had joined the maderista movement in 1910 and by 1914 had
ascended to the rank of General in the Second Division of the Center under
the command of Jesfis Carranza. Like other young men in the Constitutionalist
movement, Castro was a sincere reformer, sensitive to human misery, and
desirous of rapid and radical change effected by a strong State. He
outlined his proconsular task to the literate population upon his arrival

in Chiapas:

 

 

 

139

If yesterday the despotic government degenerated men

and converted them into slaves, the Revolution will

raise them up and make them dignified citizens; if

the tyranny sustained ignorance, the Revolution will

destroy it and bring enlightenment; if the privileged

robbed the poor, the Revolution will return to them

their rights; if there was one justice for the rich

and another for the poor, the Revolution will impose

equality before the law; if the ambitious misused

their power through fraud and crime, the Revolution

will see to it that officials will be choosen by the

popular vote. All the conquests of the Revolution

speak eloquently and proclaim a great future for the

country.3

Castro's first official act was to declare October 7, the anniversary
of Belisario Dominguez's assassination, a day of mourning. Thereafter
official reform decrees were pronounced in rapid succession. In mid—
October, in conformity with the laws of the Reform (1855-1859), priests
were prohibited from wearing ecclesiastical dress in public and from
saying mass more than once a week, convents were closed, and anyone with
4
a cross on the roof of his house was fined ten pesos. The Leg de
Obreros (Workers' Law) abolishing indebted servitude came on October 31,
the confiscation of all Church property on December 5, and the nullification
of mortgages of less than three thousand pesos on December 8. On January
16, 1915, the post of jefe politico was abolished, in conformity with
Carranza‘s conviction that no political intermediaries must exist between
the municipalities and the state government. An experimental agricultural
school was established in March and in April the Local Agrarian COmmission
(CLA) was organized to supervise the return of land to villages. A law
5

permitting divorce and remarriage was decreed on May 22. These laws and
decrees, all in harmony with the principles of the Constitutionalist

movement, sought to liberate workers, small property owners, indians,

women, and municipal governments from the control of economic, spiritual,

 

 

 

 

140

political, and domestic bosses.

The Leg de Obreros was by far the most significant and far reaching
decree of the early Constitutionalist period in Chiapas. In one action
Castro abolished in law (and proceeded to do the same in practice) the
system of indebted servitude. The debts of all workers were forgiven.
This law prohibited company stores and child labor, established the
maximum number of days per week and hours per day of labor required by
workers, and obligated employers to provide decent housing, medicines,
and schools for workers and their families. A minimum wage schedule was
formulated requiring the highest wages (one peso per day) in labor-scarce
departments and the lowest permissible wages (sixty centavos) in
departments where there existed labor Surpluses. Military commanders of
the departments (and later state government work inspectors) were
responsible for enforcing compliance and giving fines or prison terms to
those who failed to live up to the standards of the law.6 Governor
Francisco Le6n first prOposed that the State begin to take responsibility
for the wellbeing of workers in the 18905. Under Castro this expansion
of responsibility finally took place.

In the fall of 1914 General Castro was reported to have told a crowd
of tuxtlecos that he would teach them to feel the effects of the
revolution. Teach them he did. Executions of "enemies of the people"
commenced immediately with state rurales making up many of the victims.
The most notable victim, Arturo Paramiro, Chief of the secret police under
Governor Palafox, was executed in October. Jacinto Perez, the Chamula
cacique of the 1911 rebellion, was also shot in October after military
authorities in San Crist6bal were advised that he constituted a potential

danger.7

 

 

 

141

Constitutionalist military expeditions into the countryside took the
form of punitive raids against haciendas, churches, and occasionally,
towns. The soldiers burned haciendas, stole cattle and crops, and
ordered workers to return to their villages and homes. They broke into
churches and destroyed altars and took anything of value.8 "It appears

these Constitutionalists,"

wrote the NOrth American conSular agent in
Oc6s, Guatemala, "are determined to commit all the possible damage before
they are defeated. They have committed no end of depredations in the
state of Chiapas."9 A North American landowner in Pichucalco complained
that the Constitutionalists drove all her servants away. The officer in
command asked the workers, "don't you want to mount your patron's horse,
and put on his spurs, and be a sefi’or?"lo
In a trip to the Central Highlands in early 1915, General Castro
visited several indian villages and explained the principles of the
revolution (through an interpreter) to the thousands who had gathered
to hear him. His government, Castro explained, was their friend and the
enemy of the ladino exploiters. Villagers were told they could retake
the land that had been stolen from them and in Oxchuc Castro supervised
the division of an abandoned hacienda.11 The Constitutionalist message
was getting across. ”As the revolution developed in intensity,”
declared a North American resident of Tonala, "the peons and laborers
working on the claimants' haciendas became more and more restless. Many
became insolent and refused to work, some joined various bands of

. . 12
revolutionary forces, and still others became bandlts and thieves."

H

S‘:

 

 

 

142

COUNTERREVOLUTION

The Constitutionalist victory over the government of Victoriano
Huerta in the summer of 1914 was accompanied by serious friction between
the First Chief, Venustiano Carranza, and one of his most powerful and
popular general, Pancho Villa. In part, the ripening split in the
Constitutionalist movement was a struggle for personal power. Carranza
governed dictatorially during the preconstitutional period (1913—1916)
and tolerated little dissent or independence on the part of his military
commanders. Villa, chief of the Division of the North, chafed under
Carranza's tight control while the First Chief considered Villa too
insubordinate. Each came to distrust and loathe the other.13

The split also reflected a deeper factional dispute and a divergence
of world—views. Both carrancistas and villistas viewed themselves as
thg true revolutionaries and both factions appealed to the lower classes.
Villa and his party, however, possessed no national perspective and were
primarily concerned with the welfare of the villista army. The
carrancistas organized and communicated their social reform program more
successfully. They possessed a national perspective of Mexico's
problems and were also able to attract the support of the middle class,
who felt they had more to gain (or less to lose) from Carranza than
Villa.14

Mexico verged on civil war once again in the fall of 1914. In
September Carranza called for a national convention to determine a date
for national elections, discuss topics of national importance, and, it
was widely desired, resolve the factional dispute within the movement and

Prevent a civil war. Supporters of both Carranza and Villa wanted a

 

 

 

 

143

peaceful resolution but expected the convention to champion their leader.
The canvention which met in Aguascalientes on October 10, hOWever, at
first assumed a neutral position and made itself a sovereign government,
much to Carranza's disgust. In early November Villa recognized the
authority of the convention government and placed himself and the Division
of the North under its command. Carranza refused to do likewise since
Villa by now controlled the convention. The convention government then
declared Carranza an insurgent. The loyal Constitutionalist generals,
the most important being Alvaro Obreg6n, remained with Carranza and by
the end of November the Constitutionalists were forced to abandon Mexico
City to Villa's army and flee to Veracruz. At the end of 1914 the
fortunes of Carranza and the Constitutionalist movement had never been
lower.15

It was during this desperate period that the first counterrevolutionary
uprising occured in Chiapas. In light of the apparent imminent collapse
of the Constitutionalist movement and in reSponse to General Castro's
heavy—handed treatment of the state, approximately forty men rebelled on
December 2, 1914 in the department of Chiapa. They signed the Acta de
Canqufg which proclaimed the sovereignty of Chiapas, pledged the
signatories to drive the "carrancista filibusters" from the state, and
made former state rurale and hacendado Tiburcio Fernandez Ruiz chief of
the rebellion. They insisted they had risen in arms "in view of the
vandalistic acts which have victimized the Chiapanecan family by the
odious armed group that has invaded Chiapanecan soil, sent by the
carrancista government without any other objective than to destroy our
political institutions, end Our sovereignty, and make themselves masters

of our lives and haciendas, sowing everywhere unhappiness and misery and

 

 

 

 

144

attacking the most sacred possession of man, the home."16

The military government in Tuxtla Gutiérrez attributed the rebellion
simply to hacendado opposition to the Leg de Obreros.l7 Salvador Alvarado,
Chief of the Army of the Southeast (stationed in Yucatan), however,
blamed the uprising on the abuse of power by Castro or his subordinates.18

A North American resident of the state noted that the insurgents "are

"19 The villista

men of good reputation who call themselves villistas.
label was adopted because they understood that Villa was also fighting
Carranza. In time, however, the rebels acquired the name mapaches
(racoons) because often they were so hungry they ate uncooked corn right
in the fields like their namesakes.20

The mapache movement did not simply represent the reaction of the
Chiapanecan landed class to reformist government.21 Hacendados did
form the leadership of the mapaches but hacendados also gave their
support to the Constitutionalist government; most simply stayed out of
the struggle or left Chiapas altogether. The mapaches rebelled to
defend their patria chica from abusive outsiders. The mapaches were
backwoods, frontier landowners, ranchers, hacienda foremen, cowboys,
ex—soldiers and rurales. Their home territory was the southern foothills
of the Sierra Madre around Villa Flores, Villa Corzo, and La Concordia.
The state government had not built any roads or railroads into this
region, thereby making commercial agriculture very difficult. Only one
Of the mapaches, for example, Fernandez Ruiz, owned property valued at
over ten thousand pesos, although there were nearly 900 hacendados in
Chiapas who did.22 The mapaches were counterrevolutionaries, they were
net, however, representative of all hacendados in Chiapas and cannot be

viewed as guardians of the landed class.

 

 

 

 

 

 

145

At first the insurgency was comprised of a loose coalition of groups
which gave only nominal Submission to Fernandez Ruiz. Salvador Méndez
operated in the Custepedes Valley, Virgilio Culebro and Tirso Castafi6n
in Tonalé; Eliezar Ruiz and the entire Ruiz clan in the department of
Chiapa, and Federico and Enrique Macias in La Frailesca. Two ex—federal
army officers, Rosendo Marquez and Teofilio Castillo Corzo, resided in
Guatemala and aided the effort by recruiting men and rounding up arms and
ammunition. Occasionally the rebels coordinated their military
operations. The first of these was an attack on Villa Flores on December
14, 1914. They held the town for only one day and left upon the approach
of a Constitutionalist column. Generally, however, the mapaches ambushed
government columns, raided trains on the Panamerican railroad, harassed
supporters of the government, and carried on guerrilla warfare.23

In December 1914 Angel Maria Perez and Jose Domingo Pérez and other
cattlemen of Soconusco rebelled against the Constitutionalists in Tapachula.
This group fielded an army of nearly 2000 men, took possession of the
Tapachula and Huixtla, and professed loyality to the convention government
in Aguascalientes. In January, a large Constitutionalist force from the
Isthmus counter—attacked, dispersed the rebels into the mountains, and
killed the two leaders. A second attempt was made in March, when Francis¢o
Pino led eighty men to capture Union Juarez. They were quickly routed
and driven into Guatemala.24 Soconusco thereafter remained peaceful,

productive, and solidly in the Constitutionalist camp.
LA MISERIA

The Chiapanecan civil war took on a momentum of its own in 1915.

 

 

 

 

146

Mapache raids brought government counterattacks, executions, and arrests.
Both sides plundered and killed in the name of military necessity while
numerous bandits took advantage of the war to help themselves.25 As life
in the countryside became more and more dangerous, families moved to town
and agricultural production sharply declined. Food became scarce and
expensive, and hunger took its toll.26

The indigenous population suffered as much at the hands of the
Constitutionalists as from the mapaches. Mateo Mendez Tzotzek of Chamula
recounted that the carrancistas "were awful to indians and ladinos alike.
They made women stay and be raped while they sent the men to look for
food for their horses. They stole food, livestock, everything from the
Chamulas."27 Xun Vaskis, of Zinacantan, remembered that the mapaches
"stole coils of woven palm. They stole pants. They stole shirts, money,

everything."28

For most Chiapanecans, indian and ladino, the civil war
was a powerful force beyond their control and comprehension. They did
understand its effects: hunger, rape, murder, theft, abduction, and fear.
As late as the 19608, residents of San Cristbbal Las Casas referred to
the revolutionary years as 1a miseria.29

On June 3, 1915, the state legislature of Oaxaca withdrew its
recognition of the Carranza government and General Castro was ordered to
contain this defection. Castro withdrew from Chiapas with two brigades
of the Division veintiuno, leaving General Blas Corral as military
governor. Corral, with only one brigade, had sufficient forces to control
the towns but not to pacify the entire state.30 In central Mexico,
on the other hand, the Constitutionalists had revived in the spring of
1915 and by the summer, Pancho Villa was, according to General Obregbn,

. . . 3
"defeated as a general and is a nullity as a polit1c1an." 1 By October

 

 

 

 

147

the convention government in Aguascalientes came to an ignominious end
at about the same time the United States government extended de facto
recognition to Carranza.32

In 1916 the mapaches were forced to abandon their disorganized
and uncoordinated character and establish greater cohesion. Early in
the year former Chiapanecan governor Flavio GuilIén, Pancho Villa's
agent in Guatemala, attempted to gain control of the insurgent movement
in Chiapas. With the assistance of Guatemalan President Manuel Estrada
Cabrera, who provided arms and ammunition, Guillén named comiteco Virgilio
Culebro chief of the Villistas in Chiapas.33 This drove Tirso Castafidn,
leader of a rival band in Comitan, into establishing a closer alliance
with Fernandez Ruiz. In April the two leaders met in Villa Flores and
formed a government. Castahon was designated Provisional Governor of
Chiapas while Fernandez Ruiz assumed the more important post of General
in Chief of the Chiapanecan Liberation Movement. Together they forced
Culebro into Guatemalan exile, retained Estrada Cabrera's patronage (without
Guillén as middleman), and claimed the allegiance of most rebel factions
in the state.34

To seal the bargain, Fernandez Ruiz and Castafién, joined by the
Macias brothers and Castillo Corzo, combined forces to attack the
Constitutionalist garrison in Comitan. The assault, the largest military
action taken by either side thus far in the war, began at three in the
morning of April 15, 1916 by approximately one thousand men. The
government troops, vastly outnumbered, held out for four hours and then
abandoned the city. Following their victory, drunken rebel soldiers
sacked most of the commercial houses in Comitan and broke into private

homes 100king for money, liquor, food, horses, and women. A disapproving

 

 

 

 

148

Fernandez Ruiz protected a few of the private homes in the center of
town but left the rest to the mercy of Castahdn's troops. The following
day government reinforcements from San Cristbbal forced the mapaches to
evacuate Comitfin, to the relief of the townspeople.35

In July 1916 the rebellion received a further boost when Alberto
Pineda, son of 1911 cristobalense rebel leader Manuel Pineda, took to arms.
Early in 1915 the government had arrested four cristobalense hacendados,
Pineda among them, as rebel sympathizers. They were detained in Tuxtla
Gutiérrez and released when family and friends paid a $20,000 fine. Again
in early 1916 Pineda and twenty other highland gentlemen were rounded up
and jailed. Although soon released, Pineda had endured humiliation
enough and went to see the mapache chief.36 Fernandez Ruiz gave Pineda
the rank of colonel and along with some other highland landowners he
formed the Las Casas Brigade. They operated in the departments of Las
Casas, Chilbn, Palenque, and Simojovel.37

The pinedistas, when compared to the lowland mapaches, were wealthier
and more socially prominent. They were also better mannered. Pineda
apparently understood that guerrilla warfare required the cooperation of
villagers for food and information. Both groups, however, can be
classified as serrano movements, using the terminology of Alan Knight.
They were similar to the Pascual Orozco revolt in Western Chihuahua in
1912, villismo of 1913—1915, and the Figueroa brothers‘ revolt in Guerrero
in 1910—1911. These movements, Knight notes, "derived from remote,
mountainous regions and they represented the popular backlash of autonomous

. . . . . 38
communities reacting against the incur51ons of central government.

 

 

 

149

SIDE SHOWS

In 1916 General Blas Corral received orders from Carranza to end the
rebellion in Chiapas and the abuses of the military government.39 Corral
correctly understood that the Chiapanecan rebellion could be sustained
practically forever so long as the government of Guatemala actively
supported the insurgents and gave them sanctuary. The Estrada Cabrera
administration treated the Mexican government as a natural enemy.l'0 In
1916 alone, Guatemala supplied certain factions of the mapaches with over
250 rifles and 140,000 shells. In retaliation, Corral supported
Guatemalan revolutionaries operating near Huehuetenango with arms and
money, although with little success.41 Despite secret negotiations between
the Mexican and Guatemalan governments in 1916 and 1917, no agreement was
reached and each side continued to interfere in the internal affairs of
the other.42

In 1918 General Salvador Alvarado, then operating in Chiapas, captured
the archive of Fernandez Ruiz and Hector Macias. Much to his surprise he
learned that the mapache leader refused to take munitions from the
Guatemalan government. Instead nearly all ammunition used by most mepache
groups had been purchased or stolen from the government's troops.43

Felix Diaz, Don Porfirio's ne'er—do-well nephew, initiated a new
rebellion in the state of Veracruz to overthrow Carranza in February 1916,
The felicista movement, however, was no match for the armies of the
government and it was forced from Veracruz into Oaxaca and finally into
Chiapas by November. Of the 3000 men Diaz had raised in Veracruz, less
than 100 managed to flee into Chiapas, most unarmed and on foot.44

General Diaz believed Chiapas would be fertile ground for his movement

 

 

150

but before he could join forces with the Chiapanecan rebels he suffered

a devastating attack at Pueblo Nuevo. This engagement reduced the
felicistas to a pitifully small band of refugees. Diaz did confer with
both Fernandez Ruiz and Pineda, inviting them to enlist in his revolution.
Fernandez Ruiz cordially received and materially aided Diaz and his
entourage but rejected any alliance. The mapacbe chief asserted that he
was fighting only in defense of his native state. Protected by mapaches,
Diaz continued on to Guatemala and returned to New York.45

Diaz's second-in-command, Juan Andreu Almazan, years later gave a
candid assessment of the mapaches. Although their leaders were landowners
of high quality, he commented, "unfortunately, perhaps due to the
incredible amorality of the principal chiefs, the revolutionary movement
had degenerated into the most criminal conduct in the history of all the
civil war of Mexico.... The mapaches did not attack the enemy who carried
carbines, no sir, like sickly male goats from hell they attacked women,
without deference to age, social position, or health.”46
Yet another rebellious element injected itself into Chiapas in 1916.

In April, Emilio Zapata, caudillo of the agrarian revolutionaries in

the state of Morelos, appointed Rafael Cal y Mayor Chief of Military
Operations in Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, and Yucatan. Cal y Mayor was
from one of the most distinquished landholding families in the department
Of Tuxtla and had been a law student in Mexico City before he joined
zaPata. The Chiapanecan zapatista staked out the Chiapas—Veracruz border
in the department of Mezcalapa as his territory and for the next three
Years terrorized everyone in the vicinity. Due to the size of his group,
Cal y Mayor was not much more than an irritant to the government in Tuxtla

Gutiérrez. To the inhabitants of northwest Chiapas, however, he was

 

 

 

151

. 47
considered the most unscrupulous and brutal murderer of the revolution.

REVOLUTIONARY ADMINISTRATION

Civil government in Chiapas remained in the hands of non—Chiapanecan
military men from September 1914 to September 1916. Throughout this
period and until 1920, vigorous civil administration backed by military
force worked to regulate "the relationship between the capitalist and

the workers, toward the end of obtaining equilibrium."48

 

The agents of executive will in the countryside throughout the war
were Constitutionalist military officers with various titles. When the
jefaturas politicas were abolished in 1915 General Castro created the
post of Executive Delegate to perform the same duties. This post was
abolished in June 1915 but revived in 1917. Work inspectors charged with
the enforcement of the Leg de Obreros were located in each department and
were powerful agents in the extension of revolutionary administration.49

Hacendados attempted to continue their labor practices as though nothing

 

had changed. Some maintained two debt registers, one for the revolutionary

 

authorities showing the cancelation of all debts and another, true list

50

 

for use when the Constitutionalists would be driven from the state.
The Executive Delegate in Palenque, for example, fined several hacendados
a total of $1,250 for infractions of the Leg de Obreros. He also found
that hacendados had close ties with local government officials and indian
cacigues in procuring laborers and maintaining obedience. In order to
enforce the law executive delegates were forced to depose several municipal
presidents and secretaries.51 The military government also set about to

end the practice of baldiaje and arrendamiento. Executive delegates were

 

 

 

 

 

152

instructed to publicize the prohibition of these practices and the fines
of between $500 to $1000 for bacendados who continued demanding labor or
cowmodities in rent.52

The military government also distributed circulars and sent translators
throughout Chiapas advising villagers on how to denounce lands they wanted
returned to them.53 A number of villages did proceed through administrative
channels to request the return of communal lands alienated during the
porfiriato, although many more apparently simply took over land they
considered rightfully theirs.54 Chiapanecan campesinos perhaps realized
how ineffective a government land reform program would be or, more likely,
did not understand the agrarian bureaucratic process. Despite the
military government's emphasis on agrarian reform in Chiapas, between
1915 and 1920 only six grants of land to villages were approved, providing
17,300 hectareas.55

In 1918 a state labor relations board was established for the purpose
of fairly resoling conflicts between workers and employers. Local boards
were set up in each department.56 One month after its creation a strike
of coffee workers began in some plantations in Soconusco. The strikers,
led by Michoacan socialist Ismael Mendoza, demanded the reduction of the
cuerda (coffee workers were paid by task rather than by hour), medical
attention, the elimination of company stores, and payment in cash. The
government in Tuxtla Gutierrez refused to support the strike and it was
broken by the planters.57

Nowhere else did the Constitutionalists rule with such a light hand
as they did in Soconusco. As a result the department was quiet and
peaceful throughout the revolution. This anomalous condition was the

product of a number of different forces all working to maintain the

 

 

153

production of coffee. In contrast to Alvarado's control of the henequen
industry in Yucatan, the Constitutionalist authorities in Chiapas did not
attempt to regulate the production or marketing of coffee. The Carranza
government, noted the United States consul in Guatemala City, "in that
part of Chiapas, is friendly in the extreme." As a result, he continued,
"business is active and there is a great deal of seeming prosperity."58
Discontent on the part of workers was dispelled by higher wages, land
reform, government support of the planters, and private police forces.
Competition for workers, noted one observer, "is going to eat up a large

59 Most of the government—approved land reform

petitions, furthermore, were from Soconusco during the revolution.60

share of the profits."

Planters, with private guards, and municipal governments cooperated to
prevent labor violence, vandalism, and land seizures.61 Coffee was too
valuable to both the planters and the government to let a revolution
disrupt production.

In most of Chiapas, however, revolutionary administration combined
with the dislocation and disruption of war led to a social revolutionary
climate between 1914 and 1920. Under the cover of war, and sometimes
with military protection, campesinos began to take control of their lives.
They stopped paying rent, seized land and livestock, and ran away from
their former employers,62 A group of labor contracters for the coffee
plantations complained in 1918 that workers would take their advances,
Sign contracts, and then work for someone else or not show up at all.63
Villagers began to complain to the authorities of conditions which they
passively accepted only a short time before.64

The military governments maintained and even gave greater emphasis to

the earlier priorities of road construction and education. In 1915 an

 

 

154

unprecedented fifty percent of the state budget was devoted to roads
and schools.65 To pay for these improvements and to finance the war
the Corral administration increased taxes by forty percent on rural
properties valued over $1000, on commerce, and coffee production.66
In 1916 Carranza reduced the financial independence of state
governments. The First Chief diminished the scope of the state governments
in the kinds of taxation they could impose and he reduced the proportion
of federal taxes earmarked for state governments from fifty to twenty
percent.67 While federal per-capita expenditure increased from thirty—
four pesos in 1910 to fifty—three pesos in 1921, Chiapas state per-capita
expenditure declined from eight to only five pesos in the same time span.68

The magnitude of this form of centralization on Chiapas is illustrated

. . 69
1“ the follow1ng table: (Also See Table 9 in Appendix.)

BUDGET YEAR TOTAL BUDGET EDUCATION ROADS
1915 $1,376,106 $588,575 $192,654
1916 1,860,259 856,776 227,694
1916 (revised) 544,317 193,405 169,500
1917 670,027 128,405 67,293
1919 672,111 130,038 92,585

Carranza made state governments even more dependent upon the federal
government than they had been previously for the financing of capital
intensive development projects. The federal government increased its
political control over state governments through the provision and
denial of grants and subsidies. Furthermore, given the limited size of
the national budget and the responsibility to direct funds where they
would bring the greatest benefit to the nation (or to the elite in Mexico
City), the federal government would favor some regions over others. In

the post—revolutionary period, most of the federal government's investment

 

 

 

155

benefited only a few states. Unfortunately for Chiapas, the state was
never very important to politicians in Mexico City and the revolution did

. 7
not alter this status. 0

HOME RULE

As it became embarrassingly clear that the military government could
not crush the rebellion in Chiapas by force, Mexico City ordered the
implementation of a new strategy. In September 1916 First Chief Carranza
appointed Colonel Pablo Villanueva, a Chiapanecan, interim governor while
General Blas Corral was shifted to Chief of Military Operations of the
region. Villanueva planned to end the war through conciliation and
negotiation. To facilitate his peace offensive the new governor brought
a number of rebel sympathizers into his government, including Humberto
Consuelo Ruiz, brother of the mapache leaders Francisco and Fausto Ruiz.
Consuelo Ruiz was appointed Secretary General of Government, the second
most important civil post in state government. Villanueva's other
controversal appointment was that of Rafael Macal as Treasurer General,
an old friend of the Rabasas'.71

Although civil government was returned to Chiapanecan hands in late
1916, landowners and merchants had served the earlier military administration.
Luis Espinosa, César C6rdova, the Vidal brothers, Victorico Grajales,

Moises E. Villers, Eduardo Castellanos, and Jose Farrera, to name only

a few, joined the Divisign veintiuno when it arrived in Chiapas in 1914.72
Hacendado Raquel D. Cal y Mayor served in several capacities in the
governments of Castro and Corral.73 Still, the appointment of Villanueva

"transformed the public spirit" in Tuxtla Gutiérrez and Tapachula and

 

 

 

156

cemented elite support for the Constitutionalist regime.74 In late 1916
the Villanueva government sent eight delegates, all hacendados, to the
constitutional convention in Quere’taro.75 Hacendados Diego Coeto Lara,
Prudencio Pastrana, and Ezequiel Burguete sat on the state supreme court.76
The Constitutionalist regime in Chiapas, particularly after 1916, had the
support and active participation of many of the most respected names in
Chiapanecan society.77 No simple class war ensued in 1914. Rather, the
revolution turned into a conflict within the elite, between one segment
that cooperated with and integrated into the Constitutionalist movement
and another segment that rejected any intrusion or change. The revolution
turned into a civil war between those who compromised with the presence

of the national State but also possessed the ability to use it for purposes
of their own and those who would not.

Villanueva's first moves were to take steps to end the abuses
committed by the military in Chiapas and to open negotiations with the
mapaches.78 Fernandez Ruiz, however, held a secure military position
in the field and demanded nothing less than the immediate evacuation
of all carrancista troops and the election of a civil government composed
entirely of Chiapanecans. Villanueva c0uld not accept these conditions
but before the end of the armistice Tirso Castahén attacked San Crist5bal,
ending any further discussion. The governor then ordered General Corral
to resume active military operations. Consuelo Ruiz resigned from the

government and the policy of accommodation was in ruins.7
WAR AND MORE WAR

1917 was the most successful and active year of the mapaches during

 

 

157

the revolution. The total number of rebels under Fernandez Ruiz and
his subordinate commanders reached, perhaps, two thousand, rivaling and
surpassing the number of government troops in Chiapas.80 All travel
between the major towns was organized in conveys with military escorts.
One such convoy between Tonala and Tuxtla Gutiérrez early in 1917 contained
eighty—three ox carts and a guard of thirty mounted soldiers.81 Train
service between Tehuantepec and Tapachula occupied only the daylight hours
and even then trains with heavy guard were derailed and held up.82

By June Fernandez Ruiz felt strong enough to strike a final blow.
He ordered diversions along the Panamerican railroad as well as in the
highlands and early in the morning of June 5, sent a force of 500 men
under the joint command of Colonels Fausto Ruiz and Wulfrano Aguilar into
Tuxtla Gutiérrez. The attack had been well planned, for the capital of
the state was defended by less than sixty soldiers while General Corral
and over one thousand men were in the Frailesca valley looking for mapaches.
The inSurgents quickly took control of the city, although not the military
garrison, began to loot businesses and homes, and burned the government
palace. (Colonel Aguilar was dismissed by Fernandez Ruiz for the destruction
of the palace.) The mapaches were more interested with plunder than
defense, however, for Constitutionalist reinforcements from nearby towns
soon retook the capital. Fernandez Ruiz ordered a second assault upon
Tuxtla Gutiérrez on July 29, this time under the command of Tirso Castafidn.
They again quickly took the town and held it for twenty—two hours but
failed to block the road from Ozocoautla and the reinforcements it carried.
The mapaches possessed neither the leadership nor the discipline to fight
a defensive war or hold on to any city for very long; they were raiders.83

1917 also saw a division in mapache ranks between Alberto Pineda

158

and Tirso Castafidn. Pineda had become disgusted by Castafidn's
"vandalistic behavior," as he termed it, particularly Castafidn's treat-
ment of comitecos.84 Pineda believed that Castafi6n damaged the common
cause and Castafi6n was jealous of Pineda's prestige and authority in
the Central Highlands. This feud led to frequent armed classes between
the two rebel bands. In March 1918, Fernandez Ruiz sided with Pineda and
expelled Castahdn, who fled to Guatemala.85

Frustrated in the lowlands, Fernandez Ruiz ordered an offensive in
the highlands in January 1918. He sent four of his own regiments to
serve under Pineda and elevated the cristobalense to brigadier general.86
With about one thousand soldiers, Pineda left his base in Ocosingo and
over the next two months took Simojovel, Palenque, Salto del Agua, Sivaca,
Copainala, and Pichucalco. This successful campaign was abruptly halted
by Salvador Alvarado in March.87

The failure to successfully prosecute the war in Chiapas by 1918 led
President Carranza to call in one of his most respected generals, Salvador
Alvarado. Alvarado arrived in Chiapas from Yucatan in late March with
over four thousand soldiers. In Tuxtla Gutierrez, Alvarado formed a
citizens' committee to negotiate a political settlement with the mapaches.
Negotiations did begin and took place on an isolated hacienda in the
department of Chiapa, but during one of the sessions a column of government
troops under the command of Carlos Vidal closed in on the negotiators,
killing some on both sides, although the principal rebel leaders escaped.
This was the same kind of treacherous tactic which led to Emiliano Zapata's
88

assassination in April 1919, also at the hands of the Constitutionalists.

Alvarado then turned to total war.

On March 20, following the example of the Spanish army in Cuba and

 

 

 

 

159

the United States army in the Philippines, General Alvarado ordered a
program of pOpulation reconcentration. The departments of Tonala, Tuxtla,
Chiapa, and La Libertad were declared rebel zones. All inhabitants in
those areas were required to resettle in government controlled towns or
they would be considered and treated as rebels after May 31, 1918.89
The reconcentration program, more than any single action of the
revolution, destroyed the economy of Chiapas and brought starvation to the
state. The North American consul at Saline Cruz among others charged that
the main reSult of the program was "to fill the pockets of the government
generals and their lieutenants, who are thus enabled to buy up the
livestock and other belongings of the reconcentrated population at nominal
figures, and to embitter the people against the government."90 More
people than ever abandoned the state or joined the rebellion in 1918,
particularly small property owners, rather than be shot at in the country
or go hungry in the towns.91 Governor Villanueva was not willing to
pursue victory at any price and worked at cross purposes with Alvarado.92
When villagers, ranchers, and hacendados requested permission not to
reconcentrate, the governor assented.93
Faced with an aggressive campaign of nearly five thousand Constitutional—
ists, Fernandez Ruiz avoided battle with Alvarado. Alvarado's two
lieutenants, Generals Blas Corral and Carlos Vidal, divided the state
between them, the former going after Pineda and the latter after Fernandez
Ruiz. In April Corral attacked Pineda's base, Ocosingo, with 1500 regulars.
Pineda, with only 300 men, held out for fourteen days. On the fourteenth
day Alvarado personally led an additional 500 regulars and 500 indigenous

troops, forcing Pineda to escape during the night.94 Corral continued

to harrass pinedistas, forcing them to break up into small groups and move

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

160

into Tabasco and Guatemala. He recaptured Simojovel and Pichucalco,
although in October Pineda resurfaced and briefly occupied San Crist6bal.95
Alvarado returned to Mexico City in the fall of 1918 to report to
Carranza. He told the president, with considerable exaggeration, that
the rebellion had been crushed and in an interview with the newspapers
stated that three—fourths of Chiapas had been pacified.96 Alvarado
returned to the state near the end of the year to mOp up, although by
that time much of his expeditionary force had been transferred to other
parts of Mexico. Fernandez Ruiz demonstrated the deficiency of Alvarado's
pacification when he ambushed the famous general near La Concordia.
Alvarado barely escaped to Tuxtla Gutierrez and from there he returned
to Mexico City. He covered his defeat with declarations of victory and
did not return to Chiapas.97 The stalemate continued. The government
could not pacify the countryside and the rebels could not hold the cities.
Although Alvarado left Chiapas in defeat, he had in fact come close
to breaking the back of the rebellion. Due to the hardships imposed by
this aggressive campaign the mapaches had been reduced to less than 600
men by late 1918 and were running out of arms and ammunition. Furthermore,
at the end of 1918 and throughout 1919 the entire state was hit by the
Spanish influenza epidemic and a bout of malaria. Both devastated the
mapache ranks. In October one of the Macias brothers showed up at the
Mexican legation in Guatemala asking the ambassador to arrange suitable
peace terms between the warring parties. Fernandez Ruiz, it seems, was
ready to compromise. The legation communicated this desire to General
Alvarado, but he refused to discuss any terms but those of unconditional
surrender. The legation then reported to Mexico City that due to the

demoralization of the mapaches and their lack of arms and men, 1500 men

 

 

161

commanded by a respected general other than Alvarado could end the
rebellion. The Carranza government did not heed this advice.98

The year 1919, from a military point of view, was relatively quiet.
The only significant military action took place near the end of the year.
In November and December, Fernandez Ruiz routed two different
Constitutionalist columns near Villa Flores, the rebel capital.99 The

most heated conflict during 1919, however, took place on the political

battlefield within Constitutionalist ranks.

POLITICAL BATTLES

In 1918 President Carranza let it be known that Chiapas would
return to civilian rule and that gubernatorial elections would be held
in May 1920. Chiapas then turned its attention to political rather than
military campaigns. Two rival political camps immediately formed in
Tuxtla Gutiérrez, one supporting Pablo Villanueva and the other
Carlos Vidal. State government employees, personal friends, and important
tuxtlecos formed the pro—Villanueva Partido Liberal Chiapaneco while
Vidal's supporters, many of them fellow officers, formed the Club Liberal
Joaqufh Miguel Gutierrez. The opposing political parties were not
completely unfamiliar to Chiapas. Behind Villanueva was Ram6n Rabasa,
Raquel D. Cal y Mayor, Raul E. Rinc6n, and Lisandro L6pez, rabasistas all.l00
Vidal had the support of the Anti—reelectionist club in San Cristbbal
and its leader, Jesfis Martinez Rojas, was Vidal's campaign manager.101

Vidal, more than anything else, was the all round Opposition candidate

 

and his program reflected his diverse constituencies. The Vidal platform

was an interesting combination of Constitutionalism (support for

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

162

Carranza's reforms), the 1911 program (economic development of the
Central Highlands), and the mapache program (a free and autonomous
Chiapas).102
Both candidates campaigned as outsiders: Villanueva resigned his
commission and ran as a civilian against a government of army officers;
Vidal ran as the military officer unstained by sordid political compromises.
In the towns and villages factions competing for local offices endorsed
either Villanueva or Vidal, their decisions based less on political
issues than judgements as to who was most likely to win. Preparations
for the first round, the municipal elections of November 1919, OCCupied
all of 1919. Most government employees backed Villanueva while army
officers did their best on behalf of Vidalista candidates, or more
commonly, against villanuevistas. The real issues of local political
contests had little or nothing to do with broader national or even state—
wide issues, but pitted the "Outs" against the "ins;" one clan against
another, one part of town against another.104 Yet, beginning in 1918
politics began to take on a new character in some areas in response to
the politizication of the countryside during the revolution. The
political polarization of indios versus ladinos, the landless versus the
landed, and workers versus capitalists appeared. The politics of class
Was beginning in Chiapas.105
The evolution of politics in Motozintla, cabecera of the department
0f Mariscal, in 1919 and 1920, from traditional family rivalry to class
polarization, was pivotal in the transformation of Chiapanecan politics
in the 19208. Motozintla is located in a small, high valley in the
Sierra Madre, just north of the coffee producing region of Soconusco.

For decades the indian villages in Mariscal had provided a large

103

 

 

 

 

 

 

163

percentage of the labor force on the coffee plantations. Thanks to the
difficult terrain and their long distance from Tapachula the villages had
remained free, although they had been adversely affected by the reparto
program before the revolution. This rather unique environment provided
the birthplace for the first socialist organization in Chiapas.

In 1919 two political clubs Were formed in Motozintla around two
alliances of political clans to participate in the upcoming elections.
The Club Liberal Mariscalense, run by the Avendaho, Garcia, and Ruiz
families, was organized to maintain control of the ayuntamiento and
support Villanueva. Since this was the party in power it was also the
party of the enganchadores, the ever present labor contractors. The Club
Liberal Belisario Dominguez, dominated by the Velazquez, Perez, and Zunfim
families, was the opposition party. It supported Vidal because the
Club Liberal Mariscalense supported Villanueva.106

Villanueva won the first bout with Vidal when he put his Supporters

in most of the municipal presidencies in the 1919 elections.107 Not

surprisingly, the Club Liberal Mariscalense won in Motozintla.108 After
the election the Club Liberal Belisario Domihguez underwent a radical
transformation. Under the influence of Raymundo Enriquez, a federal
agrarian engineer in Soconusco, and Ricardo Alfonso Paniagua, originally
from Motozintla and in 1919 a representative of the Socialist Party of
Michoacan, the party broadened its base to include indian workers and
women. In the last days of December 1919 the judge in Motozintla reported
that "for several nights Mendoza [leader of the Club Liberal Belisario
Domihguez] and others have held secret meetings, with the indigenous

class armed with clubs, machetes, and firearms; it is rumored that the

leaders will effect an uprising tomorrow."109 Several meetings Were held

 

Co-

Jun
Pie
and
Rho

new:

 

. Winga—iw

 

164

during the first two weeks of January 1920 leading to the formation of
the Partido Socialista Chiapaneco (the Chiapanecan Socialist Party or PSC)
on January 13.110

The PSC, reported Municipal President Avendafio, was a "true workers'
mob" of over 200 members which he characterized as "very advanced bolshevik

socialism."lll The PSC, according to Paniagua, ”was founded with the

. . . . . l
prinCipal object to procure the improvement of our proletarian classes." 12
The party's general program called for the socialization of land and
all instruments of production, social equality, and the institution of

. . . 113 . . . .
communism in Mex1co. The muniCipal government in MotOZintla used
every means at its disposal to destroy the PSC; the party was denied
permission to organize, meetings were disrupted by the police, and

. . 114 .

party members were arrested for agitation. Paniagua was busy

organizing PSC branches elsewhere in the department of Mariscal when the

Constitutionalist regime in Mexico City and in Chiapas was overthrowu.115
VICTORY BY PERSEVERANCE

Venustiano Carranza's term of office was to expire in December 1920
and under the Constitution of 1917 he was ineligible for reelection. On
June 1, 1919, General Alvaro Obregbn announced his candidacy for the
presidency of Mexico. No other man in the country had as much prestige
and popularity as Obreg6n, who was widely believed to be Carranza's
choice to succeed him. Early in 1920, however, the pro—administration
newspaper El Dem6crata formally launched the candidacy of Ignacio Bonillas,
the Mexican ambassador to the United States and a man generally unknown

in Mexico. It was a strange choice on Carranza's part, and it led to

his do‘

In

he

165

his downfall.116

In April 1920 a revolutionary movement formed in the state of Sonora
(Obreg6n's own) under the leadership of Governor Adolfo De la Huerta.
The conflict originated as a federal—state dispute over the placement of
army units in the state but the rebellion quickly evolved into a drive
aimed at preventing Carranza from imposing an unpopular successor.
Obreg6n, fearful of government imprisonment (he was ordered to appear
before a Mexico City court), joined the movement and by late April Carranza
was faced with a serious revolt. Most of the army followed Obreg6n and
joined the Agua Prieta movement, as it was called from the name of the
Sonoran town where the rebellion was proclaimed. As in late 1914,
Carranza was forced to abandon Mexico City for Veracruz. Before his train
reached the port city it was attacked and the president was obliged to
escape into the Puebla countryside on horseback. On the night of May 20
his pursuers found camp of the presidential party and the First Chief
of the Constitutionalist revolution was killed.117
The repercussion of these events in Chiapas, as in most states, was
overwhelming. In March Interim Governor General Alejo Gonzalez (Villanueva
had resigned in 1919 in order to run for governor) met with Fernandez
Ruiz and the two agreed to suspend hostilities until mid—April. In the
subsequent peace negotiations, the mapache caudillo dropped his demand for
the immediate evacuation of federal trOOps from the state if the
government would incorporate the mapaches into the federal military.
Fernandez Ruiz also sought the temporary suspension of taxation of rural
property for the purpose of reconstruction, the agreement by the federal
government to build a railroad into the interior of Chiapas, the

division of national lands for the benefit of the "proletarian class",

 

 

 

 

166

and the election of a Chiapanecan government.118

By April the question of negotiation became irrelevant as the
Constitutionalist government of Alejo Gonzalez began to collapse. Early
in the month Albino Lacunza, the commander of the government garrison
in Villa Flores, joined the mapaches in seconding the Agua Prieta
movement. Fernandez Ruiz declared himself First Chief of the movement
in Chiapas. On May 1, the 150 man garrison at Chiapa de Corzo pledged
its loyality to Obregbn and Fernandez Ruiz. Five days later gubernatorial
candidate Carlos Vidal went over to the Agua Prieta movement and most of
the army in Chiapas followed his lead.119 General Gonzalez abandoned
Tuxtla Gutiérrez on May 18 with nearly 1000 men and tried, unsuccessfully,
to join Carranza in Veracruz.120 Fernandez Ruiz OCCupied the state
capital four days later. Perseverance had won the war; the mapaches
owned Chiapas.121

By declaring his adherence to the Agua Prieta movement in its early
stages Fernandez Ruiz won the good will of the new authorities in Mexico
City. Early in June, Interim President Adolfo De la Huerta chose
Francisco Ruiz, one of Fernandez Ruiz's lieutenants, interim governor of
Chiapas. Fernandez Ruiz was designated Chief of Military Operations in
the state of Chiapas and his rank of General of Division was confirmed
by the president. The mapache army was incorporated into the federal
army. In July Carlos Vidal, Francisco Ruiz, Hector Macias, and Alberto
Pineda endorsed Tiburcio Fernandez Ruiz for constitutional governor of
the state. Running unopposed, Fernandez Ruiz won the November election
and took office on December 1, 1920.122

Another group won political power late in 1920. The collapse of

Constitutionalist rule had local as well as state—wide consequences. In

 

 

 

 

167

some localities Vidalista parties joined the Agua Prieta movement and,
with military support, overturned local governments. Such was the case
in Motozintla. Ricardo Alfonso Paniagua placed Partido Socialista
Chiapaneco members on the Mariscal electoral college and elected in

O O O O 123
November a soc1alist muniCipal government. The stage was set for the

political battles of the 1920s.
REFLECTIONS

The mapache victory was unique in the Mexican Revolution. Only in
Chiapas did a genuinely counterrevolutionary movement come to power. But
the victory did not move the calendar back to 1910; the Chiapas the
nmpaches fought to save was irrevocably lost. As a result of five years
of reformist administration and civil war the vast majority of the
population, previously excluded from political participation, had been
politicized. If the masses could be mobilized by a political party to
struggle for their class interests they would constitute a powerful
political force. The politics of elites were giving way to the politics
of the masses.

The Mexican State nearly disintegrated during the ten year Mexican
Revolution. No government was able to reestablish the degree of control
exercized by Porfirio Diaz during the period 1910-1920. Because of this
the powerless, the disaffected, and the marginal elements of the
pOpulation had an opportunity to act on behalf of their own interests.
They took land, refused to pay rent, organized strikes, overturned local

governments, and began to take control of their lives.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

168

Out of this period of dissolution, and in response to the
politicization of the population, the national State emerged potentially
stronger. Its role in the life of the nation expanded. The State
assumed the responsibility to regulate, as General Blas Corral said,
"the relationship between the capitalist and the workers." This,
combined with the porfirian program of economic development, suggested
a blueprint of balanced modernization for Mexico. A potentially more
centralized State also emerged from the revolution. The Constitution of
1917 made the State the principal promotor of public wellbeing and
made the office of chief executive the principal, and unhindered, agent
of the State. This is Lorenzo Meyer's meaning when he ways that ”the
Revolution is not a negation of the political past but rather an

impressive step forward in the modernization of the Mexican authoritarian

State."124

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PART THREE:

1920-1947

 

 

 

 

j

 

The pr
begins

The revolution be
in Chiapas. Awarenes
of Chiapanecan campes
caciques, and jefes pt
relaxed. Mobilizatim
directed from above a
formed agrarian defen
leaders, and radical
Chiapas as a result 0
organize them "in def
the necessary conditi
to attain it began 01

Mapache administu
with the welfare of '
anti—Constitutionali

COnstitutionalists ,

committees soon was

 

 

 

CHAPTER SEVEN

IN DEFENSE OF CLASS INTERESTS

The proletarian phase of the Revolution
begins properly in 1920.

Lazaro Cardenas, 1931

The revolution began the politicization of the rural working class
in Chiapas. Awareness of and concern with political issues on the part
of Chiapanecan campesinos arose only after the absolute power of hacendados,
caciques, and jefes politicos over the relations of production had been
relaxed. Mobilization of the rural working class in Chiapas was not
directed from above as in Michoacan and Yucatan where the state governments
formed agrarian defense leagues by 1916.1 Labor organizers, agrarian
leaders, and radical political activists gained access to campesinos in
Chiapas as a result of ten years of political disorder and began to
organize them "in defense of class interests."2 The revolution created
the necessary conditions for radical social reorganization; the struggle
to attain it began only in 1920.

Mapache administration from 1920 to 1924 concerned itself primarily
With the welfare of the landed class in general and the friends of the
anti—Constitutionalist rebellion in particular. An alliance of former
Constitutionalists, socialists, labor unions, and village agrarian

committees soon was formed in opposition to the mapache government.

170

 

This alliance channeled
mpache government and
govermnent had time to
the state it was overt]
casualty in the repres
and 1927 a revolution
segment of the once 1)
political parties, 1a
creating a new and p0
this constituency cam

active national State

THE AFTERMATH 0F CIVI

Evidence of the d:
every district and mu
foreman from Mapastep
and plantations have
Governor Tiburcio Fer
that all telegraph at
destroyed and neglect
0f the houses in Coo:
been destroyed.5 Th1
Chiapas, was in seril
materially and econo

The social and e
changes over the pas

from 438,843 in 191C

 

 

 

171

This alliance channeled popular discontent in the state to defeat the
napache government and establish a reform government in 1925. Before this
government had time to consolidate and institutionalize its power within
the state it was overthrown and purged by the federal government, the
casualty in the repression of a national rebellion. Still, between 1920
and 1927 a revolution as profound as that in 1910—1920 took place. A
segment of the once powerless Chiapanecan working class began to organize
political parties, labor unions, and self—governing agrarian communities,
creating a new and powerful political constituency in the state. From
this constituency came the new demands for an even stronger and more

active national State.
THE AFTERMATH OF CIVIL WAR

Evidence of the destructive nature of the civil war existed in nearly
every district and municipality in Chiapas. Angel Primo, an hacienda
foreman from Mapastepec, wrote in 1920 that "all the neighboring ranches
and plantations have almost disappeared owing to the past revolution."3
Governor Tiburcio Fernandez Ruiz informed President Alvaro 0breg6n in 1921
that all telegraph and telephone lines as well as roads were "totally
destroyed and neglected during the period of struggle."4 Fully one half
Of the houses in Ocosingo, for example, a town of 3000 inhabitants, had
been destroyed.5 The Panamerican railroad, a major economic artery for
Chiapas, was in serious disrepair.6 It would require decades to recover
materially and economically from the civil war.

The social and economic structure of the state had sustained important
Changes over the past ten years. The population of Chiapas had dropped

from 438,843 in 1910 to 421,744 in 1921.7 (See Table 10 in Appendix.)

5... —

 

Although not important
percentage of the capi
as mmerous abandoned
American colony disapp
stayed and prospered.8
while the percentage
increased from thirty
1921. (The number of
The depressed rural e
landowners during the
petition for and obta
to establish -- or no
record supports the v
lives between 1910 any
Despite impressiv
Chiapas was still ove
0f the state‘s popula
most living in commun
forty thousand Chiapa

1 Land was

language,1
hacendados possessed
this was a smaller cc
seventy thousand fan:
and slightly more thy
Host Chiapanecans st

labor, the variOus f

1
indebted servitude .

 

 

 

172

Although not important in overall numbers, Chiapas had lost a significant
percentage of the capital—holding and managerial class through emigration,
as numerous abandoned prOperties and businesses demOnstrated. The North
American colony disappeared almost entirely. Germans, on the other hand,
stayed and prospered.8 Fewer campesinos lived on haciendas or ranchos,
while the percentage of the population living in independent villages
increased from thirty—six percent to forty—nine percent between 1910 and
1921. (The number of independent villages increased from 316 to 606.)9
The depressed rural economy and diminished social control exercized by
landowners during the revolution encouraged hacienda residents to
petition for and obtain political status for their communities or simply
to establish —- or move to —— independent villages. The statistical
record supports the view that campesinos began to regain control of their
lives between 1910 and 1920.

Despite impressive changes, nevertheless, much remained the same.
Chiapas was still overwhelmingly rural and indian. Eighty—four percent
of the state's population was classified in the census of 1921 as rural,
most living in communities of less than fifty inhabitants.lo Over
forty thousand Chiapanecans in 1921 did not Speak Spanish but an indian
glanguage.ll Land was still concentrated in too few hands: seventy-two

hacendados possessed twenty percent of all privately owned land, although
12

this was a smaller concentration than in most states. 0f the approximately

seventy thousand families in Chiapas, only thirteen thousand owned land,

and slightly more than one thousand owned properties valued at over $5000.13

Most Chiapanecans still subsisted by working for others through wage
labor, the various forms of renting and sharecropping, and —— still ——

indebted servitude.l

i

The revolution eff:
and the relationship b
commities continued
Soconusco and the want
although banned in 191
indians, as did the e
growth, soil erosion,
indians to rent lands

to clear and cultivat

 

this way landowners 0
or to market. This s
enough money to buy

coffee harvests, and
and economic conditic
linguistic, and geogr

politically.

”APACHE RECONSTRUCTII

The administrati
1924) emphasized inc
reconstruction rathe
of rural workers. ]
Alvaro Obregbn, sim:
unlike Fernandez Ru:
constituency compos

The reconstruct

 

 

 

173

The revolution effected only minimal change in the Central Highlands
and the relationship between indians and ladinos. The indigenous
communities continued to supply labor to the coffee plantations in
Soconusco and the monterias in Palenque and Chil6n. Indebted servitude,
although banned in 1914, remained an important element in the lives of
indians, as did the enganchadores and tiendas de raya.15 Population
growth, soil erosion, and the depressed economy forced more and more
indians to rent lands in the Central Lowlands. Hacendados permitted indians
to clear and cultivate fields in exchange for a rent of corn or beans. In
this way landowners opened new pasture and obtained produce for themselves
or to market. This system permitted ambitious zinacantecos to earn
enough money to buy some land in the highlands, to avoid work in the
coffee harvests, and even to become employers or other indians.1 Social
and economic conditions changed less for indians due to their cultural,
linguistic, and geographical isolation and their failure to organize

politically.
MAPACHE RECONSTRUCTION

The administration of Tiburcio Fernandez Ruiz (December 1920 to December
1924) emphasized increased productivity, economic recovery, and material
reconstruction rather than the redistribution of land or the organization
of rural workers. It matched fairly closely the priorities of President
Alvaro Obregbn, similarly elected to a four year term in 1920. Obregén,
unlike Fernandez Ruiz, recognized the political value of a sympathetic
constituency composed of organized labor and agrarians.l

The reconstruction program envisioned by Governor Fernandez Ruiz

 

 

 

involved close f edera

coumications, and
1921 that he wished t
He asked the presiden
and research stations
technical preparatory
$250,000 for road can
one agricultural scho
Industrial—Military S;
subsidy for road cons
throughout his term 0
major requests. At t
free hand in governin
Mapache reconstru
reform, and ending en
forgave fines levied
war and just forgot a
in the war zones (Tu)
and 1921. Individual
and even dispensatior
In 1921 the state
lav which affected 01
PrOperties. In accou
dESignate 8000 hectfal
the State Commission

the excess property ‘

Villages, frustrated

 

 

 

 

174

involved close federal—state cooperation in the advancement of agriculture,
communications, and education. The governor informed Obregon in early

1921 that he wished to "introduce modern systems” to Chiapanecan agriculture.
He asked the president to help him establish several agricultural schools
and research stations, to rebuild the Industrial—Military School ( a
technical preparatory destroyed during the civil war), and grant Chiapas
$250,000 for road construction.18 In 1921 Obregbn provided funding for

one agricultural school, in 1922 he contributed $20,000 to rebuild the
Industrial—Military School, and in 1923 he authorized a $15,000 monthly
subsidy for road construction.19 Despite stringent national budgets
throughout his term of office, Obregbn managed to meet in part the goveror's
major requests. At the same time, Obregon did not give Fernandez Ruiz a
free hand in governing Chiapas.

Mapache reconstruction also involved cutting taxes, discouraging land
reform, and ending enforcement of the Leg de Obreros. The administration
forgave fines levied on landowners who did not pay taxes during the civil
war and just forgot about the unpaid taxes. Assessments on rural properties
in the war zones (Tuxtla, Chiapa, and La Libertad) were canceled for 1920
and 1921. Individuals were also given liberal postponements of payment
and even dispensations.20

In 1921 the state government of Chiapas promulugated a state agrarian
law which affected only properties over 8000 hectéreas, or about seventy
properties. In accordance with this law landowners were required to
designate 8000 hectéreas that they intended to keep. Then, working with
the State Commission of Fractional Division, they were required to sell
the excess property to willing buyers in twenty annual payments.21 A few

villages, frustrated by the interminable delay of the federal program,

 

 

purchased land under

program which was cen
villages, state legis
to establish small to
but, unfortmately, i
of 8000 hectfareas, wh
Under the federal
(Ciudad, villa, puebl
for the restitution 0
Petitions were first
investigated by agrar
need for land. Petit
passed on for inspect
at the same time the
petitions were approv
making definitive the
In Chiapas the fe
enthusiasm. The Chia
sympathy for the idea
employed only two agr
Constitutionalist per
Agrarian Department,
Previsional grants be
governor claimed four
Adalberto Tejeda of l
campesinos.26 Judie:
judges) also contribm

program in Chiapas. 2

 

 

175

purchased land under the terms of this law. Unlike the federal agrarian
program which was centered upon the restitution or granting of land to
villages, state legislation favored individuals with Sufficient capital
to establish small to medium size ranches. It was an imaginative program
but, unfortunately, it was hampered in Chiapas by the high ceiling limit
of 8000 hectéreas, which was one of the highest in the nation.22

Under the federal agrarian program villages with political status
(Ciudad, villa, pueblo, agencia municipal, congregacién) could petition
for the restitution of lands illegally alienated or for outright grants.
Petitions were first presented to State Agrarian Commissions (CLA) and
investigated by agrarian engineers as to the validity of the claim and the
need for land. Petitions approved by the CLA and the governor were then
passed on for inspection to the National Agrarian Commission (CNA) while
at the same time the land was provisionally granted to the village. When
petitions were approved by the CNA the president would sign the title,
making definitive the grant or restitution.23

In Chiapas the federal agrarian program was administered with little
enthusiasm. The Chiapas CLA was staffed by landowners who held little
sympathy for the idea of expropriating land from hacendados.24 The CLA
employed only two agrarian engineers, a reduction from six during the
Constitutionalist period. According to the Memorias of the National
Agrarian Department, the Fernandez Ruiz administration approved only nine
provisional grants benefiting just over one thousand families. (The
governor claimed fourteen grants.)25 In the same time span Governor
Adalberto Tejeda of Veracruz pushed forward 154 grants benefiting 24,000
campesinos.26 Judicial interference (restraining orders from district
judges) also contributed to the sluggish nature of the federal agrarian

27

Pr0gram in Chiapas. (See Table 11 in Appendix.)

 

 

The Fernandez Rui

of the reform decrees
employed neither wor
practices or whether
children of their wo
declined relative to
for enforcement of t
The political co
entirely mapache.29
Pineda, the governme
Highlands and the G
of the state highway
work on the still un
concessions, furtherm
and most of these we
Carlos Vidal and
this administration;
villagers petitionin:
had suffered under t‘J
during the civil war

it took office .

PARTIDO SOCIALISTA C

The Partido Soci
the first party in C
the welfare of the I:

more powerful and we

 

 

176

The Fernandez Ruiz government ended public vigilance and enforcement
of the reform decrees on labor relations and education. The administration
employed neither work nor education inspectors to check on illegal labor
practices or whether landowners provided schools and teachers for the
children of their workers. The budgets for education and agrarian reform
declined relative to the 1914—1920 period while no funds were budgeted
for enforcement of the Leg de Obreros.28
The political composition of the state administration was almost
entirely mapache.29 To the added displeaSure of Carlos Vidal and Alberto
Pineda, the government was oblivious to the economic needs of the Central
Highlands and the Gulf Plain. Fernandez Ruiz emphasized the reconstruction
of the state highway (now called the National Highway) but abandoned
work on the still unfinished San Cristbbal — Salto del Agua road. Tax
concessions, furthermore, were generally granted only to lowland hacendados,
and most of these were in the mapache departments of Chiapa and La Libertad.30
Carlos Vidal and the former Constitutionalists were not happy with
this administration; neither were Alberto Pineda and his Supporters,
villagers petitioning for land, nor people in the towns and villages who
had suffered under the lawless and sometimes brutal treatment of mapaches
during the civil war. The government was unpopular in Chiapas almost before

it took office.

PARTIDO SOCIALISTA CHIAPANECO

The Partido Socialista Chiapaneco (PSC). formed in January 1920, was
the first party in Chiapas to exclusively champion the rights and promote
the welfare of the rural working class. Its enemies, however, were far

more powerful and were determined to destroy it.

 

In the fall of 193
to Carlos Vidal that 1
General Staff DivisiOI
agreed. He directed
Paniagua to create a
Paniagua that "at all
organizations of the
introduce in that reg
and for all the caci;
entity."31

In many ways thi
of a well known poli
cakital, if the PSC
survive. Vidal, a g
3150 Provided the PE
Vidal, 0n the other
State to further his
the PSC wok the Of

During 1920 the

Soconusco Only to t

Motozintla.33 Begi

Influence into the

(

often with a gnarc
tr‘
Assisting the PSC .

W
ho was Well known

92
l a Special com

177

In the fall of 1920 PSC president Ricardo Alfonso Paniagua proposed
to Carlos Vidal that they join forces. Vidal, soon to be Chief of the
General Staff Division in the war Ministry under Obreg6n, enthusiastically
agreed. He directed the Vidalista party in Tuxtla Gutiérrez to work with
Paniagua to create a "Great Socialist Party." Vidal also informed
Paniagua that ”at all costs we need the unionization of all workers'
organizations of the state in order that, as a socialist base, we can
introduce in that region the dictatorship of the proletariate and end once

and for all the cacigues and kings who attempt to dominate that unfortunate

entity."31

In many ways this was an ideal alliance. Paniagua needed the support
of a well known politician, particularly one with contacts in the national
capital, if the PSC was to have more than a local influence or even
survive. Vidal, a general in the army and well placed in the War Ministry,
also provided the PSC protection by federal military units in Chiapas.
Vidal, on the other hand, needed a broad base of support in his native
state to further his political ambition. Having secured a strong patron,
the PSC took the offensive.32

During 1920 the PSC remained in the mountains of Mariscal, affecting
Soconusco only to the extent of hampering the work of enganchadores in
Motozintla.33 Beginning in 1921, however, the party began to extend its
influence into the coffee zone. PSC agents visited coffee plantations
(Often with a guard of fifty mounted and armed men), organized unions, and
tried (unsuccessfully) to negotiate collective contracts with the planters.34
Assisting the PSC in this region was agrarian engineer Raymundo Enriquez,
who was well known in the villages as a sympathetic agrarian.35 In April

1921 a special commissioner, appointed by Fernandez Ruiz to look into

 

 

 

planters' complaints,
disorder, and the aba
a difficult situation
Agitation by the
the Sindicato de obre
Union of Soconusco) ,
affiliated with the I
de Ohreros Hexicanos
local planters, "is 1
and to the hacendac‘o
complaints was the i
informing enganchado
the card was not to
made ca'mPesinos beli
B)’ the fall of 1
ready to confront tt
the “ginning of the
bFIIIenbers of the S;-

began 0“ September :

only two days. The

and jailed twenty mi

federal Emmy

h

zone C:

ar
Vest, however t
’

178

planters' complaints, reported that the PSC had caused "demoralization,
disorder, and the abandonment of work, leaving the coffee enterprises in
a difficult situation."36
Agitation by the PSC led to the formation in the spring of 1922 of
the Sindicato de Obreros y Campesinos de Soconusco (Worker's and Peasants'
Union of Soconusco), headed by Pompeyo cardenas of Tuxtla Chico and
affiliated with the national labor sindicate the Confederaci6n Regional
de Obreros Mexicanos (CROM). The Sindicato, according to a manifesto by
local planters, "is pursuing an effort sufficiently pernicious to society
and to the hacendados of this region."37 In particular, one of their
complaints was the issuance of cards by the PSC to members of the Sindicato
informing enganchadores, foremen, and local officials that the holder of
the card was not to be molested. These cards, according to the manifesto,
made campesinos believe that "they should respect no authority."38
By the fall of 1922 the first workers' organization in Chiapas was
ready to confront the coffee planters. With only one or two weeks before
the beginning of the harvest the PSC called a strike in the coffee zone
by members of the Sindicato de Obreros y Campesinos.39 The strike, which
began on September 22, 1922 and involved five thousand workers, lasted
only two days. The government killed one of the leaders of the strike
and jailed twenty more while planters provided a large payment to the
federal army zone commander to restore order.40 Fearful of losing the
harvest, however, the planters agreed to an eight-hour work way, schools
on the plantations, and the liquidation of workers‘ debts at the end of
each year but not to the demand for higher wages. This first confrontation,
although not entirely successful, had fomented "true alarm among the
41

fingueros of the coffee zones." The PSC was mobilizing workers to act

in behalf of their political interests as well their economic interests.

 

 

 

mi 1922 ELECTIONS

Politics in Chiapas
had been prior to the
administration, and co
politicos to 110 weak
political power was en
power and authority ex
political environment
commanders, labor unio
that petitioned for 1
different and often ri
multiplied the difficr
political control. Tl
ahighly politicized (
the state government V
control it had exerci
The administratio
establish political c
by following traditio
clearly allied with I
villages to municipa
depending on their d
for agrarian reform,
municipales which we

Another method of po

aErarian committees.

the agrarian execut

 

179

THE 1922 ELECTIONS

Politics in Chiapas in the 19203 was vastly different from what it
had been prior to the revolution. The channels of communication,
administration, and control had disintegrated from twelve powerful jefes
politicos to 110 weak municipal presidents. The diffusion of local
political power was enhanced by the survival of caciques whose extralegal
power and authority exceeded that of many municipal presidents. This
political environment was further complicated by federal military
commanders, labor unions, and village agrarian committees (the bodies
that petitioned for land). The potential for conflict between these
different and often rival power centers was substantial and only
multiplied the difficulties of a state government in establishing
political control. The one significant exception to this portrait of
a highly politicized countryside was the indigenous municipality. Here
the state government was able to reestablish the degree of tight political
control it had exercized before 1910.42

The administration of Fernandez Ruiz certainly did its best to
establish political control in Chiapas before the 1922 elections, generally
by following traditional policies. In the countryside the regime was
clearly allied with hacendados and cacigues.43 The government elevated
villages to municipal status or diminished them to agencias municipales
depending on their degree of support for the regime. Communities pushing
for agrarian reform, for example, were frequently converted into agencias
municipales which were governed by officials appointed by the governor.44
Another method of political control was the cooptation of the village
agrarian committees. In the village of Copoya (Cintalapa), for example,

the agrarian executive committee was appointed (illegally) by the CLA.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Besides supporting t

landless campesinos
for the parcels.“5
identified with the
been formed by the T
coffee planters];6
The political op
of former Constituti
General Carlos Vidal
Constitutionalist wi
Chiapaneco de la Con
the Revolutionary Co
socialism" as its pr:
presented a slate of
legislature, and for
and Soconusco, altho
candidates which inc
throughout the state
political action gro
and Mariscal the vid
is obreros y Campesi
by Colonel Luis Vid
The mapache adm'
despite overwhelmin

employed various fo

for example, the pr

Simply named its 0

 

 

 

- .t‘ as: $4.4...“ 7,

180

Besides supporting the state government the agrarian committee relegated
landless campesinos to poor quality national lands and even charged rent
for the parcels.45 In Soconusco the state government was closely
identified with the political club "Orden, Union, y Trabajo," which had
been formed by the Tapachula Camara de Agricultura, an organization of
coffee planters.46

The political opposition to the Fernandez Ruiz administration consisted
of former Constitutionalists and socialists. Both wings recognized
General Carlos Vidal as the party boss. Manuel de J. Lebn directed the
Constitutionalist wing in Tuxtla Gutiérrez as president of the Comite
Chiapaneco de la Confederacion Revolucionaria (Chiapanecan Committee of
the Revolutionary Confederation, CCCR). The CCCR prOposed "revolutionary
socialism" as its program, nominated Carlos Vidal for senator, and
presented a slate of candidates for the national legislature, state
legislature, and for the municipal governments.47 The PSC in Mariscal
and Soconusco, although part of the CCCR, had its own regional slate of
candidates which included Raymundo Enriquez for national deputy. Vidalistas
throughout the state used village agrarian committees as ready—made
political action groups and shadow municipal governments. In Soconusco
and Mariscal the Vidalistas had a well organized base in the Sindicato
de Obreros y Campesinos and were protected by a federal regiment commanded
by Colonel Luis Vidal, brother of Carlos Vidal.48

The mapache administration was determined to win the fall elections
despite overwhelming unpopularity in the towns and countryside. They
employed various forms of official imposition. In Huehuetfin (Soconusco),
for example, the pro—administration ayuntamiento held no elections but

4
simply named its own replacement. 9 Opposition leaders throughout the

 

 

 

 

state were arrested t
administration hacier
some localities to it
won elections in abor
Governor Fernandez R1
"did not hesitate to
of his own political

It was a blantant poi

THE PEOPLE ROSE UP I}

Immediately follv
pro-Vidalista electi<
violence broke out i‘
North American consu
the governor of the
demonstration march
power. The city pol
building, killing th
district judge Subse
eighty campesinos.
Socialista Cbiapane
ambition rather than

In January 1923 ‘

by Colonel Luis Vid

thousand workers, In

Cannesinos. It thr

 

 

 

181

state were arrested before the election, voting booths were set up on pro—
administration haciendas, and ballots were given to voters selectively in

. . . 50 . .
some localities to insure favorable outcomes. Nevertheless, Vidalistas
won elections in about forty—two of fifty—seven towns in the state.
Governor Fernandez Ruiz, however, with control of the state legislature,
"did not hesitate to declare such elections null and void and name members
51

of his own political party to substitute for those who were imposed."

It was a blantant political imposition and it was resisted.
THE PEOPLE ROSE UP IN ARMS

Immediately following the state legislature's nullification of the
pro—vidalista elections and the installation of the new ayuntamientos,
violence broke out in the departments of Mariscal and Soconusco. The
North American consul reported that ”the people rose up in arms against
the governor of the state."52 Imposition in Motozintla sparked a
demonstration march to the municipal palace and demands for a change of
power. The city police fired into the crowd and the mob then attacked the
building, killing the new municipal president and some policemen.53 The
district judge subsequently ordered the army to arrest and imprison over
eighty oampesinos. All just happened to be members of the Partido
Socialista Chiapaneco. The judge considered this a case of personal
ambition rather than political insurrection.54

In January 1923 an "ejército reorganizador" was formed in Soconusco
by Colonel Luis Vidal. This peoples‘ army included as many as a
thousand workers, most of them members of the Sindicato de Obreros y

Campesinos. It threatened ayuntamientos in Huehuetan, Tapachula, Huixtla,

 

 

 

 

 

Tuxtla Chico, Escuinl

Finally the natit
Secretary of Governm
Serrano, and a confi
Callas failed to tea
called the governor
governor to enact th

remove all federal a

 

As a result, Fernand
administration's inn
blame for the impos‘
who was dismissed.
did not have much cc
two new municipal e]
had been deposed aft
legislature to pass
liability but the dc
he decreed the amne:
The results of
returned with a pro
split in the politi
Chiapas deputation
candidates were ele
The Fernéndez R
disapproval, follow
Inhovember 1923, i

PSC and editor of t

 

 

182

Tuxtla Chico, Escuintla, and Metapa.55

Finally the national government intervened. President Obregon sent
Secretary of Government Plutarco Elias Calles, Secretary of War Francisco
Serrano, and a confidential agent to investigate the problem in Chiapas.56
Calles failed to reach an understanding with Fernandez Ruiz and Obreg6n
called the governor to Mexico City, told him to appoint a provisional
governor to enact the necessary conciliatory measures, and threatened to
remove all federal army units from the state if he did not cooperate.57
As a result, Fernandez Ruiz appointed Manuel E. Cruz, a member of the
administration's inner circle, provisional governor. Cruz placed the
blame for the impositions on Secretary General of Government Amadeo Ruiz
who was dismissed. The provisional governor suggested that Fernandez Ruiz
did not have much control over his own administration. He also ordered
two new municipal elections and ordered that duly elected officials that
had been deposed after the election be reinstated. Cruz asked the state
legislature to pass an amnesty law clearing the vidalistas of criminal
liability but the deputies refused. When Fernandez Ruiz returned to office
he decreed the amnesty measure desired by Obregc’m.58

The results of the 1922 elections were mixed. The state legislature
returned with a pro-administration majority and there was a fairly even
Split in the political composition of the municipal governments. In the
Chiapas deputation to the national legislature, however, only two mapache
candidates were elected.58

The Fernandez Ruiz administration, despite the rebellion and Obregbn's
disapproval, followed the same procedures in the 1923 municipal elections.
In November 1923, for example, Miguel Pino y Farrera, an officer of the

PSC and editor of the Arriaga newspaper Hombre Libre, was arrested for

 

 

for sedition, having
standing numerous abt
political control of
the state legislator
ayuntamientos if cit
nullification of the
legally impose polit
Again Chiapanecans t

national insurrectic
CHIAPAS AND THE DE 1

The dominant the
was accommodation a:
government hope to .
revolutionary Mexie
country were aliena

perhaps was unavoid

revolutionary estab

army and numerous g
States government c
the disapproval of
perceived radical I

conservatives.64 '
President Adolfo dc
apresidencial hop:

1“ December 19

JOined Adolfo de 1

 

 

183

for sedition, having promoted several socialist candidates. 0 NOtwith—
standing numerous abuses and illegalities, the administration again lost
political control of the most important towns in the state. And again,

the state legislature voted to give the governor power to name "provisional"
ayuntamientos if citizens' groups in the municipalities asked for the
nullification of the elections. This technique permitted the governor to
legally impose politically acceptable ayuntamientos throughout Chiapas.
Again Chiapanecans took up arms to resist imposition, this time during a

national insurrection.
CHIAPAS AND THE DE LA HUERTA REBELLION

The dominant theme of the administration of President Alvaro Obregon
was accommodation and conciliation. Only by such a policy could his
government hope to survive in the dangerous political climate of post—
revolutionary Mexico.62 Nevertheless, several powerful elements in the
country were alienated during his tenure of office, a situation which
perhaps was unavoidable. In his campaign to reform and tame the new
revolutionary establishment, Obregon discharged nearly one half of the
army and numerous generals.63 His diplomatic agreements with the United
States government on claims, petroleum, and agrarian expropriations won
the disapproval of ultranationalists, and his designation of the then
perceived radical Plutarco Elias Calles as his successor frightened
conservatives.64 The succession question also antagonized former Interim
President Adolfo de la Huerta, the Finance Secretary under Obregon and
a presidencial hopeful.

In December 1923 thirty-six generals and fully one half of the army

joined Adolfo de la Huerta in rebellion against Obregon and his

 

 

 

"impositional tendeI
rapidly 896°“de by
including Chiapas' I
remained loyal to 0‘
without and within.
Inside ChiapaS <'
of Fernandez Ruiz w‘.
beginning of the Y6
municipal president
is one of the state
republic, that is r'
was careful to affi
loyal to the govern
soon joined by the
and independent gro
The most serious de
his 2500 man 67th In
a Successful seige,
and captured San Cr
his government to l
Bravo Izquierdo, 0p
insurrectious in Ch
(3Ht1~0bregon) and
General Bravo r
the local P01itica]

an .
‘1 Permitted no St

1'

 

 

184

"impositional tendencies."65 Originating in Veracruz, the movement was
rapidly seconded by political and military leaders in several states,
including Chiapas' neighbors Oaxaca and Tabasco.66 .Fernandez Ruiz
remained loyal to Obregbn but his government faced serious threats from
without and within.

Inside Chiapas a popular rebellion broke out against the government
of Fernandez Ruiz which was of a greater magnitude than the one at the
beginning of the year. On December 28, Colonel Victorico Grajales,
municipal president of Chiapa de Corzo, initiated the uprising. "Chiapas
is one of the states," he proclaimed, "perhaps the only one in the
republic, that is ruled by an anti—revolutionary government."67 Grajales
was careful to affirm that his movement, while locally seditious, was
loyal to the government of Obreg6n. The rebellion in Chiapa de Corzo was
soon joined by the Partido Socialista Chiapaneco in Mariscal and Soconusco,
and independent groups in Comitan, Jiquipilas, Cintalapa, and Pichucalco.68
The most serious defection originated in Tabasco. Alberto Pineda and
his 2500 man 67th mounted regiment joined rebel General Carlos Greene in
a successful seige of Villahermosa. Early in 1924 Pineda invaded Chiapas
and captured San Cristbbal Las Casas. Fernandez Ruiz, in response, moved
his government to Tapachula, the headquarters of federal General Donato
Bravo Izquierdo, one batallion, and three regiments. Of all the
insurrections in Chiapas, only Pineda's was genuinely delahuertista
(anti—Obregon) and considered a serious threat by General Bravo.69

General Bravo negotiated a temporary truce with Colonel Grajales in
the local political struggle for the duration of the national rebellion
and permitted no state government military action against the anti-mapache

rebels. This decision was motivated by Bravo's assessment that the real

 

 

enemy was Pineda and
political allies of l
Bravo reactivated C0
volunteer regiment t
which raised a worke
understanding the P0
become a redoubt for
rebellion.

Having postponed
rebellion, General I
in April 1924. Pine
Aguilar, held severe
Throughout April am
several bloody enco
Guatemala in July,
ChiaPanecan history

The delahuertis
Electoral struggle
Vidalistas. They p
would use them agai

and preoared to as

 

185

enemy was Pineda and by Bravo's reluctance to declare war against the
political allies of his military superior, General Carlos Vidal.7O General
Bravo reactivated Colonel Grajales' commission and transfered him and his
volunteer regiment to fight in Tabasco. The general also armed the PSC,
which raised a workers' batallion to fight Pineda.71 Bravo Izquierdo,
understanding the political situation in Chiapas, prevented the state from
become a redoubt for the delahuertistas and thereby prolonging the
rebellion.

Having postponed the political struggle in Chiapas until after the
rebellion, General Bravo undertook the Chiapanecan campaign against Pineda
in April 1924. Pineda, in league with Generals César A. Lara and Céndido
Aguilar, held several strong defensive positions in the Central Highlands.
Throughout April and May, state and federal forces pushed Pineda back in
several bloody encounters. Although Pineda was finally forced into
Guatemala in July, he had fought one of the most aggressive campaigns in
Chiapanecan history.72

The delahuertista rebellion had been the first phase of the 1924
electoral struggle for governor, and as such, it had strengthened the
Vidalistas. They had been armed by the army to fight Pineda but they
would use them against the mapache government. They were mobilized
and prepared to as aggressive a political campaign as the Fernandez Ruiz

administration.73

THE TRIUMPH OF LABORISM
"The man that will augur the triumph of laborism in Chiapas,"74 Carlos

Vidal and President Obregfin met in mid-1924. Vidal came away from

that meeting with the mistaken belief that he had the president's tacit

 

support for his bid
manager, PSC chief R
political struggle S
75
would back them.
Governor Fernand
win the July elECtiO
of absense to campai
and to promote his 0
Félix Garcia, provis
troops in the munici
to a confidential ag
removed all municipa
"Systematic oppositi
the legislature on t
register their candi
representatives to 1:
commission (CLA) fre
Worked to elect the
according to one grc
The vidalistas v
Chiapaneco had becon

rederation of 01313034

the state.80 While

Pathfindez Ruiz coulr
Employees and officc
friendship of the m

Viddlistas and 1

186

support for his bid to become governor of Chiapas. Vidal and his campaign
manager, PSC chief Ricardo Alfonso Paniagua, then launched an all—out
political struggle secure in the knowledge that the federal government
would back them.75
Governor Fernandez Ruiz, as before, spared no effort to control and
win the July elections. In June, the governor took a three month leave
of absense to campaign for his handpicked successor, Luis Ramirez Corzo,
and to promote his own candidacy for senator.76 He appointed his nephew,
Felix Garcia, provisional governor and placed nearly one thousand state
troops in the municipalities to insure orderly elections.77 According
to a confidential agent of the Secretary of Government, the governor
removed all municipal presidents not in sympathy with the mapache regime.
"Systematic opposition was practiced toward Vidal and the candidates for
the legislature on his ticket.... The municipal governments refused to
register their candidacies, stamp their ballots or allow their
representatives to be part of the electoral colleges."78 The state agrarian
commission (CLA) frequently installed village agrarian committees which
worked to elect the administration slate of candidates rather than,
according to one group, ”attending to our petitions for land."79
The Vidalistas were better organized in 1924. The Partido Socialista
Chiapaneco had become the parent political organization encompassing a
federation of oppositionist parties, nearly sixty in all, located throughout
the state.80 While Vidal had formidable grass—roots support in Chiapas,
Fernandez Ruiz could count on only the official element —— government
employees and office seekers. Vidal had one other critical asset, the

friendship of the next president of Mexico, Plutarco Elias Calles.81

Vidalistas and mapaches exercized little restraint in collecting votes

 

1111924. In one 91"
captain, captured T
The more "normal" e.
of rival polling bo:
electoral victory bi
summer of 1924 disca
sixty-two, district:
Colonel Julio Cutie}
arrested the entire

At the end of O<
day Colonel Gutierre
(led by its presidir
possession of the 16
ordered the federal
but not to expell th
before the start of
MT governors-elect
Obregtlm notice of th
their loyality.86 0

the Chiapanecan prob

 

187

in 1924. In one extreme case a group of vidalistas, led by a federal army
captain, captured Tuxtla Chico and determined the outcome of the election.8
The more "normal" electoral procedure, however, involved the installation
of rival polling booths, the collection of votes, and the declaration of
electoral victory by each side.83 The retiring mapache legislature in the
Summer of 1924 discarded the returns of fifty—eight, out of a total of
sixty—two, districts which favored Vidal for governor. In response,
Colonel Julio Gutierrez, garrison commander of Tuxtla Gutierrez, angrily
arrested the entire state legislature on October 23.84

At the end of October 1924 Chiapas had two state legislatures. On the
day Colonel Gutierrez arrested the mapache body, the vidalista legislature
(led by its presiding officer Ricardo Alfonso Paniagua) invaded and took
possession of the legislative chamber of the government palace. Obregbn
ordered the federal garrison to provide security for the governor's offices
but not to expell the extra—legal legislature.85 On November 30, one day
before the start of the new legislative session and the new administration,
both governors—elect, Luis Ramirez Corzo and Carlos Vidal, gave President
Obreg6n notice of their impending accession to office and both professed

86 Obreg6n decided to let his successor, Calles, resolve

87

their loyality.
the Chiapanecan problem.
On December 1, President Calles turned the problem over to the senate.
Calles recommended that state autonomy be revoked owing to the state of
anarchy existing in the state and the Senate complied on December 5. The
following day Calles sent three names to the senate, César C6rdova,
Eduardo Roman, and Virgilio Figueroa, asking that body to choose one as
the interim governor who would preside over new elections. After learning

that Calles favored Cérdova, a director of the CNA and an ally of Vidal,

 

the senate named him
Cbrdova arrived
municipal elections
Although C6rdova pro
as interim governor
official action in C
and to name new muni
Fernandez Ruiz, were
candidate, dropped <
although marked by ‘
The Chiapas deputat
that of Fernandez R
legislature in the

to Vidal on May 209

VI DALI Sr‘u‘O

When Carlos Vii
Paniagua became hi
Commission and pre

personal relations

vrdalismo. As 300

formed the Confede
all workers in the
titular head, beer

The radical w:

8
oconusco, headed

188

the senate named him interim governor of Chiapas.88

C6rdova arrived in Chiapas in early January 1925 and scheduled the
municipal elections for April and the gubernatorial election in May.
Although C6rdova protested his complete neutrality, his very selection
as interim governor indicated Calles' support for Vidal. His first
official action in Chiapas was to suspend the power of all ayuntamientos
and to name new municipal councils which, claimed the supporters of
Fernandez Ruiz, were entirely Vidalista.89 Ramirez Corzo, the mapache
candidate, dropped out of the race for governor.90 The elections,
although marked by violence, overwhelmingly favored Vidal and his party.
The Chiapas deputation to the national legislature, however, remained
that of Fernandez Ruiz's slate, which had been accepted by the national
legislature in the fall. C6rdova planned to turn over the government

to Vidal on May 20, 1925.91

VI DALI SMO

When Carlos Vidal became governor of Chiapas, socialist party leader
Paniagua became his right hand man as director of the State Agrarian
Commission and president of the state legislature.92 As before, the close
personal relationship between Vidal and Paniagua formed the true axis of
vidalismo. As soon as the new administration assumed power, the PSC
formed the Confederacién Socialista de Trabajadores de Chiapas to unionize
all workers in the state. The Confederation, of which Governor Vidal was
titular head, became a member of the national labor confederation CROM.93

The radical wing of Vidalismo now was the Partido Socialista de

Soconusco, headed by Ernesto C. Herrera. Calles' Attorney General, Octavio

 

 

m, on a trip to Chi
place in the state wt
Capitalist BourBEOiS
composed almost enti‘.
now perfectly organi
wanted to Soconusciz
Once in office V
previous government,
period (1914-1916),
were not subject to
socialist guise, Vi<
Constitutionalist 0‘
between workers and
administration song
0i land to villages
Schools and roads.
Poor and disposseg
the social and eco
0f the existing 5}.
The Vidal admi
The firSt decree 1'
in San Cristbbals
for regulating the
coffEe Plantation;
officials and be
from these Office

to enforce the la

189

Paz, on a trip to Chiapas in April 1925 described Soconusco as "the only
place in the state where the division is perfectly demarcated between the
Capitalist Bourgeois Reaction and the revolutionary element which is
composed almost entirely by workers and campesinos of the region, who are
now perfectly organized."94 Vidal and Paniagua, it is safe to say,
wanted to Soconuscize Chiapas.

Once in office Vidal cleared out all employees remaining from the
previous government, reaffirmed all decrees of the preconstitutional
period (1914—1916), and reassured small landowners that their properties
were not subject to expropriation.95 Despite the administration's radical
socialist guise, vidalismo was essentially reformist and moderate. The
Constitutionalist objective of using the State to create an equilibrium
between workers and capitalists was the essence of Vidalismo. The
administration sought to regulate labor relations, accelerate the return
of land to villages, increase the tax share of hacendados, and build
schools and roads. Vidal placed the state government on the side of the

poor and dispossessed without threatening a wholesale transformation of

 

the social and economic order. Vidalismo constituted a certain humanization
of the existing system made possible by a powerful, expansive State.

The Vidal administration decreed three labor laws between 1925 and 1927.
The first decree in 1926 established Investigative Offices of Contracts
in San Crisffibal, Comitén, and Motozintla. These offices were reSponsible
for regulating the contract agreements and employment of indians in the
coffee plantations. All contracts had to be signed before government
Officials and be in conformity with the Leg de Obreros of 1914. Inspectors
from these offices were required to visit indian villages and plantations

to enforce the labor reform law.96 Also in 1926 the Vidal administration

 

 

 

 

revived the Central 1
disappeared in 1920.
was charged With for‘
three representative
of employers, and a
responsible for reso
regarding contracts,
management disputes
If the dispute was r
judged to have a leg
authorize permissior
the task of forming
and establish appro
and agricultural ta
The Labor Law 0
with the collective
be made with labor
from replacing strf
Of profit Sharing,
enacted during the
the minimum Wage f
the fiI‘St time, a
of coffee harveste
In the area of
a hmernme“gsémct
after FirSt Chief

de
Cree) the Leg de

190

revived the Central Board of Conciliation and Arbitration, which had
disappeared in 1920. The Central Board, located in the state capital,
was charged with forming municipal labor relations boards composed of
three representatives of workers' organizations, three representatives
of employers, and a government representative. These boards were
responsible for resolving all conflicts between workers and employers
regarding contracts, wages, work conditions, and unionization. All labor-
management disputes first were heard before one of the municipal boards.
If the dispute was not resolved at the local level and the workers were
judged to have a legitimate complaint, the Central Board could then
authorize permission for a strike. The Central Board was also assigned
the task of forming several regional minimum wage commissions to study
and establish apprOpriate minimum wage scales for the different regions
and agricultural tasks.

The Labor Law of 1927 attempted to replace the individual contract
with the collective work contract. The 1927 law required that all contracts
be made with labor unions whenever possible and prohibited employers
from replacing striking workers. The law also introduced the principle
of profit sharing, although regulations governing this feature were never
enacted during the brief Vidal administration. Finally, the law increased
the minimum wage for unskilled labor to $1.20 a day and established, for
the first time, a minimum wage for piece work of $1.20 for each 220 pounds
of coffee harvested.98

In the area of land reform the Vidal administration seriously began
a government-sanctioned redistribution program in Chiapas, fully ten years
after First Chief Venustiano Carranza decreed national agrarian reform

decree, the Leg de seis de enero de 1915. The state agrarian law of 1927

 

 

 

permitted townS to 9
annual payments at t
declarations.99 T0
volumes of the agrai
As a result the mural
increased from an a‘
petitions in 1925 a:
years of the Vidal

approved, distribut
Table 11 in Appendi
any other state prc
only land but money
lending agency to p
businessmen, and it
Plan to President (
but the president,

Project.102

When Carlos Vi
bankat and owed
and reverse the ve

administration, Vi

“a“. The North

es
tote Particular]

a .
heavy Increase
’

both urban and rur

h
ad to pay fifty 1

to
ffee Planter frc

191

permitted towns to expropriate adjoining lands and pay for them in ten
annual payments at the value set forth in the (notoriously devalued) tax
declarations.99 To encourage village petitions the government distributed
volumes of the agrarian handbook, Catecismo agrario, to each municipality.lOO
As a result the number of agrarian petitions under the Vidal administration
increased from an average of ten per year in 1920-1924 to sixty-eight

01 During the two and a half

petitions in 1925 and thirty—four in 1926.1
years of the Vidal government, thirty—nine petitions were provisionally
approved, distributing 81,344 hectéreas to 6634 heads of families. (See
Table 11 in Appendix.) Vidal's agrarian record compared favorably with
any other state program in Mexico. Realizing that campesinos needed not
only land but money to work the land, Vidal sought to establish a state
lending agency to provide low interest loans to poor farmers, small
businessmen, and incipient industrialists. The governor prOposed this

plan to President Calles and asked for a $2,000,000 three-year loan,

but the president, pleading budgetary difficulties, did not back the

. 102
prOJect.

When Carlos Vidal became governor of Chiapas the state government was
bankrupt and owed back wages to its own employees. To remedy this deficit
and reverse the very mild and inequitable tax policies of the mapache
administration, Vidal raised prOperty valuations and taxes across the
board. The North American consul in Salina Cruz reported that "on real
estate particularly, in the states of Chiapas and Oaxaca, there has been
a heavy increase, not only in the rate but in the assessed valuations on

. "103 .
both urban and rural properties. One bu31nessman reported that he
104

had to pay fifty percent more than during the preceeding year. A

coffee planter from Soconusco complained that on a crop of 800 tons which

 

 

 

 

grossed $580,800 do?
fully two-thirds wa:
administration of 1
such tax increases.
Governor Vidal
revolutionary progr
Vidal increased the
from sixty to ninet
increased federal 5
Professor Ricardo E
Department of Educ;
effort to increase
supported 182 scho
(See Table 12 in A
more Spending for
exPenditure for Ch
fact again demonst
of the national gt
policy of requirir
Employ teachers.
of schools Sustai:
The Vidal adm
to prosDerity and
(under Fernandez
a new department
highway engineers

the federal gOVer

192

grossed $580,800 dollars, he had to pay $94,901 dollars in taxes, of which
fully two—thirds was state taxes.105 Not since the Emilio Rabasa
administration of 1891-1894 had the landed class in Chiapas experienced
such tax increases.

Governor Vidal considered school and road construction one of the most
revolutionary programs the government of the state could pursue. Although
Vidal increased the number of state supported primary schools in Chiapas
from sixty to ninety, the most significant trend during the 19203 was
increased federal support for education in the states. In July 1924,
Professor Ricardo sanchez, inspector of rural schools for the federal
Department of Education, arrived in Chiapas to begin an intensive federal
effort to increase rural education.106 By 1927 the federal government
supported 182 schools in Chiapas, of which, 159 were rural primaries.

(See Table 12 in Appendix.) Although the federal government allocated
more spending for education in Chiapas than the state government, federal
expenditure for Chiapas was less than in sixteen other states.107 This
fact again demonstrates the relative unimportance of Chiapas in the eyes
of the national government. The state government did pursue a vigorous
policy of requiring hacendados to build schools on their properties and
employ teachers. Over the course of the Vidal administration the number
of schools sustained by landowners jumped from around 200 to over 400.108

The Vidal administration considered road construction to be the key
to prosperity and increased spending from five percent of the budget
(under Fernandez Ruiz) to nearly twenty-five percent. Vidal established
a new department of roads, the Direcci6n General de Caminos, which employed

highway engineers to survey and plan new routes. As in education, however,

the federal government was taking on greater responsibility for road

 

 

 

 

construction througl

projects to the arm:
TO IMPROVE CONDITIOi

The Vidal progr

In the day—to—da)’ i
Squarely sided with
partnership was for
appointed socialist
municipal secretari
established social:
In one municipal a;
an employee of the
member of the soci
0f the hacienda, "
is to improve cond
in Soconusco, anot
Strike of 200 work
Lotario SChanune, 2
workers for joinir
the governor order
The State gow
Villagers invaded
bad elements were
did not need nor

that an agrarian

 

193

construction through greater subsidies to the state and by assigning

projects to the army.109

TO IMPROVE CONDITIONS FOR WORKERS

The Vidal program of reform and development was certainly not radical.
In the day—to-day implementation of the program, however, the government
squarely sided with agricultural workers and landless villagers. A
partnership was formed with the powerless in the state. Governor Vidal
appointed socialist party members as rent collectors, work inspectors,
municipal secretaries, and municipal agents. These officials in turn
established socialist party branches, labor unions, and agrarian committees.
In one municipal agency, for example, Vidal replaced as municipal agent
an employee of the largest hacienda in the district, with Ricardo Ruiz, a
member of the socialist party. Ruiz, according to the legal representative
of the hacienda, "has told us that his special mission for the government

110

is to im rove conditions for workers." On the finca San Juan Chicharras
P

in Soconusco, another municipal agent organized a union and started a
strike of 200 workers to increase daily wages to one peso a day.111 When
Lotario Schamme, administrator of the finca Germania, dismissed over 200
workers for joining the Conféderaci6n Socialista de Trabajadores de Chiapas,
the governor ordered an immediate reinstatement and mandatory arbitration.112
The state government often turned the other way when landless
villagers invaded and seized private property. Hacendados complained that
bad elements were exploiting the workers and forcing them to take land they

did not need nor know how to use. One landowner complained, for example,

that an agrarian engineer employed by the state, aided by the municipal

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

president and fourt

survey a division.
authorities in t
the sympathy of th
One of the gr
governments in Ch
that of the caciqu
government and its
reform. After 192
became agraristas,
executive committe
to sell parcels of
twenty—nine reside
Cancfic (Chilfm) co
them to carry load
into indebted serv
indians. All the
served to worsen c
agraristas, ruled
brothers alternatt
as municipal agen'
the ejido treasurj
suited them. Whe‘
eXpelled the pair
many more unscrup

Such conditi

felt compelled t

 

194

president and fourteen armed men, forced himself onto his land to

survey a division. "Unfortunately," continued this hacendado, "many

authorities in towns, like this municipal president, believe they can win

the sympathy of the governor with such savage orders."113
One of the greatest difficulties facing the post-revolutionary

governments in Chiapas, and all governments in Mexico to this day, was

that of the caciques. Local bosses could help or hinder the state

government and its reform program, particularly in the matter of land

reform. After 1925 all caciques, some cynically and some sincerely,

became agraristas, advocates of land reform. The president of the agrarian

executive committee of the ejido El Caucho, for example, used his position

to sell parcels of land to residents of other villages while leaving

twenty-nine residents of his own community landless.114 The indians of

Cancfic (Chilbn) complained in 1926 that their municipal agent forced

them to carry loads for less than they earned before 1910, forced them

into indebted servitude, and made most of his money by selling liquor to

indians. All the reforms of the revolution, they wrote, ”have only

served to worsen our situation.”115 Marcos and Agustin Bravo, posing as

agraristas, ruled the ejido El Naranjo in Soconusco as hacendados. The

brothers alternated as president of the ejido administrative committee and

as municipal agent. They did not work the land but paid themselves from

the ejido treasury, and expelled or brought in new ejidatarios as it

suited them. When CLA president Paniagua heard of this situation he

expelled the pair from the state.116 Unfortunately, however, there were

many more unscrupulous cacigues who were not disciplined.

Such conditions were so confusing and wideSpread that Governor Vidal

felt compelled to issue the following circular to all municipal presidents:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Vidal demanded tha

support the land I
Survived and abus
labor inspectors.
necessary ftmctio
world. The moder
the cacique who,

replaced by anyom

HELL HAS BROKEN L

Mexican state
alliances between
were uSually obre
An analyst for th
governor who wish
pretend to be in
Administration.
and to replace hi
of those who ru1<
Vidal learned it

In 1926 form

sacred tenets of

and succeed Call

 

 

195

Some municipal authorities with sufficient frequency

not only obstruct the [agrarian] labor of Executive

and Administrative Village Committees but even harrass

these Committees, even to the point of committing l7

abuses against them, notoriously violating the law.
Vidal demanded that the abuses be stopped and that government officials
support the land reform effort without reservation but caciquismo
survived and abuses continued. There were too many bosses and too few
labor inspectors. The caciques, it must be remembered too, performed a
necessary function as mediator between the locality and the outside
world. The modern Mexican State has never really come to terms with
the cacique who, although considered a political pariah, has not been

replaced by anyone more acceptable.118

HELL HAS BROKEN LOOSE IN CHIAPAS

Mexican state-federal relations during the 19205 were a mosaic of
alliances between governors and national political leaders. Governors
were usually obregonistas or callistas of varing loyality and sincerity.
An analyst for the United States War Department wrote in 1926 that "a
governor who wishes to retain his Governorship must be in accord, or
pretend to be in accord, with the leaders who control the Federal
Administration. If he is not, means are generally found to put him out
and to replace him, eventually, by a person who will support the plans
of those who rule."119 Fernandez Ruiz learned this lesson in 1925;
Vidal learned it in 1927.

In 1926 former president Alvaro 0breg6n violated one of the most

sacred tenets of the 1910 revolution when he decided to seek reelection

and succeed Calles in the presidency in 1928. At the end of the year

 

 

 

  
 
 
  
  
    
 

the abregonista b1
to amend the const
reelection. ’ihvo
and Francisco R.
for their candida
by the Anti-Reele
Revolutionary Par
same month.120 A
succession led to

The national
political divisio
of General Serran
According to one
serranismo."121
to approve the am
permitting presid
position.122 Sen
to power as the n
senator petitions
autonomy and appt
time being. Fer]
preparation for 1

In the fall 1
state government
campaign. He ap‘

however, the Se

compete with Obr

 

F——————

196

the obregonista bloc in the national legislature led a successful effort
to amend the constitution to permit one nonconsecutive presidential
reelection. Two presidential hopefuls, however, Generals Arnulfo R. G6mez
and Francisco R. Serrano, continued to find support and encouragement

for their candidacies. In June 1927, G6mez was nominated for president
by the Anti—Reelectionist Party and Serrano was nominated by the National
Revolutionary Party. Obreg6n also officially announced his candidacy the
same month.120 As in 1910, 1920, and 1923, the problem of presidential
succession led to a national crisis.

The national electoral campaign led to the reemergence of an old
political division in Chiapas. Governor Vidal, an old friend and colleague
of General Serrano, became the general's national campaign manager.
According to one close observer, Vidal was "the principal axis of
serranismo."121 Under Vidal's instructions the Chiapas legislature refused
to approve the amendment reforming articles 82 and 83 of the constitution
permitting presidential reelection. Only Veracruz took a similar, defiant
position.122 Senator Tiburcio Fernandez Ruiz viewed Obreg6n's return
to power as the means of a mapache return to power in Chiapas. The
senator petitioned the full Senate in August of 1927 to remove the state's
autonomy and appoint a provisional governor, but this move failed for the
time being. Fernandez Ruiz also formed obregonista parties in Chiapas in
preparation for the electoral struggle in 1928.123

In the fall of 1927 Governor Vidal took a leave of absense from the
State government in order to devote his full time to the presidential
campaign. He appointed his brother, Luis, provisional governor. By now,

however, the serranistas correctly realized they could not peacefully

j compete with 0breg6n and Calles and made plans for a rebellion in

 

 

 

conjtmction with t

[against us]," arg
but it is possible
revolt, planned f0
countermeasures ta
repeat of the De
party were captur
execution of the
road, near a town
shot.125
At mid-day on
federal garrison
Calles to take co
Alvarez ordered I:
the state and mun
Vidal, socialist
Sabines, and othe
Luis Vidal turned
all shot.127
On October 4,
Jaime Carrillo, z
post of provisior
Every municipali1
Civil. Federal '

and executed Vid

officials in Arr

for Tapachula b

 

 

 

 

197

conjunction with the supporters of General Gomez. "With these elements

" argued Vidal, "it is impossible to triumph democratically,

but it is possible to carry out a bloody ridicule of the vote."124 The

[against us],

revolt, planned for October 2, 1927 was cut short by rapid and forceful
countermeasures taken by Calles and Obregon, who wanted to prevent a
repeat of the De la Huerta disaster. The leading members of the serranista
party were captured in Cuernavaca the following day. Calles ordered the
execution of the fourteen prisoners and so on the Cuernavaca — Mexico City
road, near a town called Huitzilac, Serrano, Vidal, and the others were
shot.125

At mid—day on October 3 General Manuel Alvarez, commander of the
federal garrison in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, received orders from President
Calles to take control of the state government of Chiapas.126 General
Alvarez ordered the federal troops to occupy all public buildings, disarm
the state and municipal police, and capture Provisional Governor Luis
Vidal, socialist leader Ricardo Alfonso Paniagua, police chief Julio
Sabines, and other high officials of the state government. As soon as
Luis Vidal turned over the state treasury to General Alvarez, they were
all shot.127

On October 4, the Chief of Military Operations in Chiapas, General
Jaime Carrillo, arrived in Tuxtla Gutiérrez from Tapachula and assumed the
post of provisional governor. Carrillo replaced the ayuntamientos of
every municipality in the state with appointed Juntas de Administracién
Civil. Federal troops also jailed hundreds of local and state officials,
and executed Vidalistas throughout the state. The municipal and state
officials in Arriaga and Mapastepec were arrested and placed on a train

for Tapachula but were shot before the train arrived. The municipal

 

 

 

 

president of San Cr
holding that import
similar executions,
general bloodlettir
the situation fair
in Chiapas. They
ones are simply pl
Vidalismo died
early November th
Propaganda contro
an exaggeration.
the Partido Socia
Chiapas to save t

unions , however ,

mapache political

REFLECTIONS

Political cor
important task fr
however, after a
regional caudill
by Porfirio Diaz
had entered an a
and control of ‘
Presidents Obre

in political pa

 

T____’___

198

president of San Cristobal, Juan Manuel Gutiérrez, was executed simply for
holding that important post under the Vidal administration. Reports of
similar executions, particularly of socialist party members, indicate a
general bloodletting.128 A North American resident of Chiapas summed up

the situation fairly well: "I suppose you know that hell has broken loose

in Chiapas. They have jailed or shot all the authorities and the new

129

 

ones are simply playing thunder with us."
Vidalismo died in Chiapas in October 1927. Excelsior reported in

early November that Senator Fernandez Ruiz and his Committee of Pro—Obregon

Propaganda controlled all political parties in the state.130 This was

an exaggeration. True, the leadership of the Vidal administration and

the Partido Socialista Chiapaneco had either been killed or had left

Chiapas to save themselves; the local socialist parties and the labor

unions, however, survived. Here was a base on which to rebuild an anti—

mapache political movement.

REFLECTIONS

Political consolidation was the most immediate and perhaps the most
important task facing Mexico in 1920. A return to authoritarian centralism,
however, after a decade of political atomization and in the face of
regional caudillos was by no means inevitable. The mechanisms utilized
by Porfirio Diaz for political control were no longer applicable. Mexico
had entered an age of mass participation politics during the revolution
and control of workers and campesinos was now a political necessity.
Presidents Obreg6n and Calles used land reform and unionization to assist

[ in political pacification and to build support for their governments.

 

 

their backing of a
political base whi
De la Huerta and i

The government
hand, engaged in
napache governmen
hacendados and ca
workers and campe
opponents of the
proletarian organ
good politics in
socialism.

No political
Chiapas without t
This political re
and the scope of
demands of organi
powerful constitx
of the State. P(

for hegemony on

unconditional su

 

 

 

 

199

Their backing of agrarian and labor organizations created a formidable
political base which remained loyal to the government in 1923-1924 against
De la Huerta and in 1927—1928 against Gomez and Serrano.

The government of Tiburcio Fernandez Ruiz in Chiapas, on the other
hand, engaged in politics as if the revolution had not taken place. The
mapache government allied itself with the traditional elements of power,
hacendados and caciques, and actively worked against the organization of
workers and campesinos. These organizations were naturally drawn to the
opponents of the mapache regime who understood the political value of
proletarian organization. Politics in defense of class interests was
good politics in the 19205. This was what Carlos Vidal understood as
socialism.

No political party after 1925 could attain and maintain power in
Chiapas without the strong backing of agrarian and labor organizations.
This political requirement, in turn, led to the expansion of the power
and the scope of government in order to l) satisfy at least some of the
demands of organized workers and campesinos, and 2) bring these new
powerful constituencies more and more under the control and supervision
of the State. Political struggle in Chiapas after 1927 was a struggle
for hegemony on the part of the state government to obtain the

unconditional Submission of the labor movement.

 

 

 

 

The assassin
1928 produced a r
Calles, seeking I
included the pow:
caudillo, establ:
(an).1 Calla
conciliation, al
influence.“2 Cal
he left the pres
Part of the pric
disassociation l
Emilio Fortes G:
no alliance wit'

political actio

 

 

CHAPTER EIGHT

STRUGGLE FOR HEGEMONY

Labor organization does not exist in the
state. Those few groups that function with
this title are created by the authorities
merely for the purpose of political order,
there existing in them neither class
consciousness nor the struggle for economic
and social betterment.

El Comité de Obreros y Campesinos Radicales
Revolucionarios Cardenistas de Soconusco,
1934

The assassination of president—elect Alvaro Obregon in the summer of
1928 produced a national political crisis. President Plutarco Elias
Calles, seeking to avoid a ruinous conflict between his partisans (which
included the powerful labor organization CROM) and those of the slain
caudillo, established a government party, the Partido Nacional Revolucionario
(PNR).1 Calles proposed that the PNR would rule Mexico by concenSus and
conciliation, although he intended to exercise a preponderant degree of
influence.2 Calles did remain the most powerful national politician after
he left the presidency in 1928; his authority, however, was not unlimited.
Part of the price of peace between obregonistas and callistas was the
disassociation of the government and CROM. Between 1928 and 1934 presidents
Emilio Portes Gil, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, and Abelardo L. Rodriguez fashioned
no alliance with worker or agrarian organizations. They discouraged

political action by labor grOups and demanded their unconditional SmeiSSion

200

 

 

to the State. Th1
This policy ca
by the mm in 1933
owed much to the 5
leader Viciente L
hope of justice. .
and from the labo
vacillation of Ge
should be an inst
still dedicated 1:
"1a poli’tica de
Chiapas, like
circrnnstances, £0
and balanced all'
1927.6 After its
labor organizatic
Following the pol
labor organizatir
lost the support
independent labo
administration,

another pledged

for hegemony fai

THE MACABRE SBA]

At the end

 

201

to the State. This was the policy of hegemony.3

This policy came to an end when General Lazaro Gardenas was selected
by the PNR in 1933 as its candidate for the presidency. His nomination
owed much to the support of proletarian organizations. According to labor
leader Viciente Lombardo Toledano "the working class saw in Cardenas a
hope of justice.... Cardenas was a candidate from the left wing of the PNR
and from the labor movement, [the candidacy] which we directed against the

vacillation of General Calles."4

cardenas believed organized labor
should be an instrument of the State, integrated within its apparatus yet
still dedicated to the class struggle. This was the policy of collaboration,
"la politica de masas."5

Chiapas, like the nation as a whole, although under different
circumstances, followed a similar course. Vidalismo had been a strong
and balanced alliance between the government and organized labor in 1925—
1927.6 After its destruction, Chiapanecan governments until 1936 used
labor organizations in their political struggles with rival factions.
Following the policy of hegemony, state governments created an official
labor organization which exercized little political influence and steadily
lost the support of workers and campesinos in Chiapas. In 1935-1936 the
independent labor movement in Chiapas, with the assistance of the Gardenas
administration, spearheaded a move to remove one governor and install
another pledged to a policy of alliance and collaboration. The struggle

for hegemony failed.

THE MACABRE SHADOW OF VIDAL AND PANIAGUA

 

At the end of 1927 the Gran Partido Obregonista de Chiapas, led by

 

 

 

Senator, former GO
believed it Owned
for two reasons.
1111923, as Secret
Fernandez Ruiz an:
In 1925 Calles he]
Fernandez Ruiz am
1928. The only h<
Alvaro Obregon in
of Raymundo Enriqw
The pro-napache L
threat: "The maca‘
horizon of the Ch
0f pain and miser
One week afte
October 3, 1927,
Airtimez Rojas in
San Cristobal Las
and he appointed
Secretary Genera]
0f “‘0 political
elite COnfllCt he
was also a part1:
in the municipal

I
Martinez Rojas

Ruiz as mufiicipa
Chiapas .10

202

Senator, former Governor, and former mapache chief Tiburcio Fernandez Ruiz,

believed it owned Chiapas.7 A mapache return to powar, however, was unlikely

for two reasons. First, Plutarco Elias Calles was president of Mexico.

In 1923, as Secretary of Government, Calles had conferred with Governor

Fernandez Ruiz and came away with a distinct disliking for the governor.

In 1925 Calles helped Carlos Vidal become governor over the Opposition of

Fernandez Ruiz and it was unlikely that Calles would help the mapaches in

1928. The only hope in the mapache party was the return to power of

Alvaro Obreg6n in December 1, 1928. The second problem was the candidacy

of Raymundo Enriquez for governor of Chiapas, announced in January 1928.

The pro—mapache La Voz de Chiapas considered the Enriquez candidacy a true

threat: ”The macabre shadow of Vidal and Paniagua still blooms on the

horizon of the Chiapanecan landscape, accouncing to the people a new era

of pain and misery.”8
One week after the federal purge of the government of Chiapas on

October 3, 1927, Provisional Governor Jaime Carrillo appointed Federico

Martinez Rojas interim governor. Martihez Rojas, municipal president of

San Cristobal Las Casas, was the son of the 1911 rebel Jesfis Martinez Rojas

and he appointed Manuel Rabasa, the son of former governor Ramon Rabasa,

Secretary General of Government.9 This political team, made up of the sons

of two political enemies, demonstrates how the politics of regional and

elite conflict had diminished in the face of class conflict. Martinez Rojas

was also a partisan of Fernandez Ruiz. Those vidalistas that had remained

in the municipal presidencies after the October purge were deposed by

Martinez'Rojas. His most daring appointment was that of mapache Sostenes

Ruiz as municipal president of Tapachula, center of the labor movement in
10

 

Chiapas.

 

 

 

From the mom

parties and labor
City complaining
metionary elemei
anti-worker and at
elements.12 Call:
allegations and i1
appointed former i
Couti'fio placed en;
the gubernatorial
Three candida
Enriquez, and Raf.
was the candidate
the support of ti
the former govern
The best the garc
opponent, Enrique
Chiapa de Corzo,
of the National A
national legislat
instrumental in t
1922 he helped es1
the first labor 'i
ally of Vidal and
credentials. He
moment, former z

president of the

 

203

From the moment of the appointment of Martinez Rojas, the socialist
parties and labor unions of Chiapas sent a stream of protests to Mexico
City complaining how "our state has fallen into the hands of the
reactionary element."11 The interim governor was accused of pursuing
anti—worker and anti-agrarian policies and of conniving with clerical
elements.12 Calles sent confidential agents to Chiapas who confirmed the
allegations and in March 1928 the Senate removed Martinez Rojas and
appointed former Constitutionalist Amador Coutifio interim governor.
Coutifio placed enriquistas in the municipal presidencies and prepared for
the gubernatorial election.l3

Three candidates entered the campaign in 1928: Luis C.Garcia, Raymundo
Enriquez, and Rafael Cal y Mayor. The relatively unknown Colonel Garcia
was the candidate of the Fernandez Ruiz faction. The garciistas claimed
the support of fifty—seven parties in the state and the moral support of
the former governor of Tabasco and anti—vidalista Tomas Garrido Canabal.
The best the garciistas could say about their candidate was that his
opponent, Enriquez, was a Vidalista.l4 Raymundo Enrifiuez, originally from
Chiapa de Corzo, was thirty—five years old in 1928. He was a graduate
of the National Agricultural College and had served two terms in the
national legislature, in 1920—1922 and 1926—1928. In 1920 Enriquez was
instrumental in the creation of the Partido Socialista Chiapaneco and in
1922 he helped establish the Sindicato de Obreros y Campesinos de Soconusco,
the first labor union in Chiapas. He had been a close friend and political
ally of Vidal and Paniagua and possessed impeccable agrarian and labor
credentials. He was Vidal's logical successor.15 Almost at the last

moment, former zapatista Rafael Cal y Mayor joined the race. Cal y Mayor,

president of the Partido Nacional Agrarista, believed he was the acceptable

 

 

 

 

socialist candida

the Serrano revol

for his candidacy
Enriquez, the fir
recognize him.17
Ruiz, Alberto Dom
formed the Union
socialist, labor,
The campaign
19205. Enriquez
payment of gover
The garcim'sta par
campaign against
in the assassinat
all three candida
installed separat
declared its cand
Enriquez, which 1)
police jailed the
de Chiapas. Whe

position was , fo

CONTINUITY AND C

Chiapas did

 

 

 

204

socialist candidate since Enriquez was linked, although not directly, to
the Serrano revolt. Cal y Mayor, however, had little organized support
in Chiapas.16
Enriquez returned to Chiapas at the end of 1927 to determine Support
for his candidacy. In December the Partido Agrarista Chiapaneco endorsed
Enriquez, the first organization of the former Vidalista coalition to
recognize him.17 In February 1928, Enriquez with the assistance of César
Ruiz, Alberto Dominguez, and Ernesto Herrera (new president of the PSC)
formed the Union de Partidos Revolutionarios, which included twenty-two
socialist, labor, and agrarian organizations in Chiapas.18
The campaign and election in 1928 was fairly typical for Mexico in the
19203. Enriquez was supported by Interim Governor Coutifio, who suspended
payment of government salaries in order to fund the electoral effort.19
The garciista party attacked socialist party offices and ran a slanderous
campaign against Enriquez, complete with forged documents implicating him
in the assassination of president-elect Obreg6n in July 1928.20 In September
all three candidates claimed victory. On November 1, all three parties
installed separate state legislatures in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, each of which
declared its candidate governor—elect. Calles, however, recognized only
Enriquez, which prompted Cal y Mayor to withdraw. On November 24 the state
police jailed the entire garciista legislature and the staff of La Vbz
de Chiapas. When Enriquez became governor on December 1, his political

. . 21
p081t10n was, for the moment, secure.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

Chiapas did not recover economically from the material destruction of

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

the revolution an

by the world depr
hectfireas under c
landowners invest
the Central Lowla
in commercial agr'
Furthermore, the
in intent nor exe
to one hacendado.
Agrarian refo
0f the nearly 300
and 1930, only si
10,000 campesinos
Only sixteen large
hectfireas, had bee
modification of la
(1920-1924), when
several thousand.:
The most stril
disparity. Mobil:
Chiapaneco and thr
in the department:
for land and work
beginning had bee
in this region, r

desire of the goV

and working condi

 

205

the revolution and the decline of trade and commodity prices brought on
by the world depression until late in the 1930s. The total number of
hectéreas under cultivation in Chiapas dropped throughout the 19205 as
landowners invested in cattle and horses. Yield per hectarea of maize in
the Central Lowlands also fell in the 19205 and 19308, reflecting a decline
in commercial agriculture and an increase in sharecropping and renting.22
Furthermore, the first years of agrarian reform, although neither radical
in intent nor execution, had killed "all spirit of enterprise," according
to one hacendado.23

Agrarian reform, over ten years old, could not be termed a success.
Of the nearly 300 petitions for land that had been submitted between 1915
and 1930, only sixty—seven ejidos had been created, benefiting about
10,000 campesinos, this in a rural population of nearly half a million.
Only sixteen large haciendas, out of a total of eighty with more than 5000
hectareas, had been affected and then only partially. The only important
modification of land tenure occured during the Fernandez Ruiz administration
(1920—1924), when the number of small private properties had increased by
several thousand.24

The most striking aspect of change in the 19205 was its regional
disparity. Mobilization of the popular class by the Partido Socialista
Chiapaneco and the Vidal administration (1925-1927) had been most successful
in the departments of Soconusco, Mariscal, and Tonala. Although the struggle
for land and workers' rights was by no means completed here, a good
beginning had been effected. Most of the ejidos in Chiapas were situated

in this region, reflecting both the degree of worker organization and the

 

desire of the government to defuse potential conflict. Wages were higher

and working conditions were better here than in the rest of the state.

 

 

 

l
i
w
\

 

 

Unions and social

treatment, abusiv
Quite differe
and in the depar
no mobilization i
in 1925 that "ind
are held liable f
While so working
fed."26 Historia
"the people here
in the southern
labor an indian
There were no la
Land reform h
in the department
languished. The
1925. Few villag
to military servi
through the CLA a
effort to obtain
in Mariscal, thos
worthy leadershi
19209. The porf
more extensive i
which also accou

The revoluti

the capital-p035

 

 

206

Unions and socialist parties served as efficient watchdogs against mis—
treatment, abusive hours and wages, and indebted servitude.25

Quite different conditions were to be found in the Central Highlands
and in the departments of Chilon, Palenque, and Simojovel, There had been
no mobilization in these indigenous parts of the state. Frans Blom observed
in 1925 that "indians living at large on the distant lands of the haciendas
are held liable for a certain amount of labor each year, in lieu of rent.
While so working they are paid, largely in credit at the local store and

2
6 Historian Frank Tannenbaum noticed in San Cristbbal in 1927 that

fed."
"the people here live largely by supplying labor to the coffee plantations
in the southern part of the state.... After many months and years of

labor an indian may succeed in working off his debt, but not always."27
There were no labor unions in the indigenous highlands.

Land reform had also bypassed the indigenous highlands. Zinacantan,
in the department of Las Casas, is a good example of why land reform
languished. The first petition for land from Zinacantan was filed in
1925. Few villagers signed it for they believed it would obligate them
to military service. No organized effort was made to force the petition
through the CLA and the petition was forgotten. There was no further
effort to obtain land by zinacantecos until 1933.28 Unlike the indians
in Mariscal, those in the rest of the state lacked the dynamic and trust—
worthy leadership provided by Ricardo Alfonso Paniagua and the PSC in the
19208. The porfirian reparto program, it is necessary to recall, had been
more extensive in Mariscal and Soconusco than in the Central Highlands
which also accounts for the Successful mobilization of workers there.

The revolution in Chiapas had not aimed at destroying capitalism or

the capital—possessing class. The bOurgeoisie participated in both sides

 

 

 

 

 

during the civil

Fernandez Ruiz an
those who wanted
The political mob
a necessity and f
utilization. Cap
The employmen
a result of the a
with the exceptio
non-expropriable
Manuel Rovelo Ar
and invested in
places, "busines
1921, Tuxtla Guti
chambers of come
In the late 19205
the minutes of ti
state treasurer,
policies, labor—n
concern. The mix
commerce and the
Hacendados a‘
League of Coffee
departments of L
organization of

asociaciones, an

(and agrarian c0

 

207

during the civil war and had served in the administrations of both
Fernandez Ruiz and Vidal. Political conflict in the 19203 was between
those who wanted modernization without reform and those who wanted both.
The political mobilization of the working class made reformist government
a necessity and forced modifications in capital investment and
utilization. Capital, however, was still king.

The employment of capital underwent an important transformation as
a result of the agrarian program and the revolution. Commercial agriculture,
with the exception of Soconusco, declined as landowners invested in
non—expropriable property — livestock and business. Former Governor
Manuel Rovelo Argfiello, for example, sold his properties in the early 1920s
and invested in real estate in Mexico City. In San Cristébal, of all
places, ”businessmen began comprising the upper class."29 In 1920 and
1921, Tuxtla Gutierrez and San Cristobal businessmen and landowners formed
chambers of commerce to push for laws and reforms favorable to capital.30
In the late 19208 and 19308 the Tuxtla Chamber of Commerce, according to
the minutes of that organization, constantly consulted with the governor,
state treasurer, and other high administration officials regarding tax
policies, labor—management problems, public works, and similar topics of
concern. The minutes reveal close cooperation between the chamber of
commerce and the state government.31

Hacendados as well as businessmen began to organize. In 1933 the
League of Coffee Producers was established representing planters in the
departments of Las Casas, Simojovel, Palenque, and Comitan.32 The
organization of cattlemen also began in the 19305. These uniones,
asociaciones, and cooperativas were formed to defend against cattle theives

(and agrarian communities), improve veterinary medicine, and lobby for

 

 

 

an improVed state

Soconusco con
and export of cof
one principal COf
families.35 Inl
Tapachula to cont
the world depress
Association of So
to help the indus
armies called gua
agrarian communit
secure against ag
until 1936, which
exercized by the
production, furtt
Permit disruptior
production, and 6
percent of all re

state income.39
REGIME 0F INSTITI

The assassin;
Created a serious
that the Calliste
the intellectual

to Calles remain

208

an improved state cattle law.33

Soconusco continued to be dominated by the cultivation, processing,
and export of coffee by Germans.34 In the early 19303 there were ninety-
one principal coffee plantations; seventy-five belonged to only sixteen
families.35 In 1929 planters organized the Partido Democrético Pro—
fapachula to control the ayuntamiento.36 As coffee prices declined during
the world depression Governor Enriquez, in response to the Coffee Grower’s
Association of Soconusco demands, reduced state taxes on coffee production
to help the industry.37 Planters also joined together to form private
armies called guardias blancas to protect their properties and menance
agrarian communities and socialist party meetings.38 Coffee trees remained
secure against agrarian expropriation in both state and federal legislation
until 1936, which helps explain the high degree of economic control
exercized by the planters of Soconusco in the 1920s and 19308. Coffee
production, furthermore, was simply too important and profitable to
permit disruptions by agraristas. State taxes on coffee plantations,
production, and export brought to the state treasury sixty to eighty
percent of all revenue on agriculture and thirty to fifty percent of all

state income.39

REGIME OF INSTITUTIONS

The assassination of president—elect Alvaro Obregon in July 1928
created a serious crisis in Mexico. The partisans of Obregbn had suspicions
that the callista labor movement (CROM and its leader Luis Morones), was
the intellectual author of the crime. They were also adamantly opposed

to Calles remaining in the presidency beyond the end of his term. In

 

 

 

deference to the3
obregonistas he W
leave the age 0f
president worked
chose Emilio Port
was elected to fi
who "represented
assumed office or
The "regime (
in late 1928 and
the organizing c<
party convention
party and select
a coalition of e:
the Phh as "a pa
frankly a goverru
35 it has been d
an independent p
1119M have an org
Aarbn Séenz,
Campaign, appear
President. Call
authority and ch
distinguished po
March 2, 1929.
General Gonzalo

Ortiz Rub 10 Was

209

deference to these powerful sentiments, President Calles reassured
obregonistas he would not remain in power and proposed instead that Mexico
leave the age of caudillos and establish a "regime of institutions." The
president worked with moderate obregonistas in the legislature and
chose Emilio Portes Gil, a state governor, interim president until someone
was elected to finish Obregon's term of office. Portes Gil, a politician
who "represented the frontier between obregonistas and callistas,"
assumed office on December 1, 1928.!+0

The "regime of institutions" proposed by Calles began to take shape
in late 1928 and early 1929. Before leaving the presidency, Calles formed
the organizing committee of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR). A
party convention was planned in March 1929 in Querétaro to organize the
party and select a presidential candidate.41 The party was designed as
a coalition of existing national and regional parties. Portes Gil described
the PNR as "a party of the State. The Partido Nacional Revolucionario is
frankly a government party. We are not going to deceive public opinion,
as it has been deceived in the past, by presuming that the [PNR] will be
an independent party. The revolution makes it necessary that the govern—
ment have an organ of promotion and defense."4

Aaron Séenz, governor of Nuevo Lebn and director of Obregon's reelection
campaign, appeared to be the popular choice as the PNR'S candidate for
president. Calles, however, saw Séenz as a potential threat to his
authority and chose Pascual Ortiz Rubio, a little known and even less
distinguished politician. The PNR convention nominated Ortiz Rubio on
March 2, 1929. The following day, diehard obregonistas rebelled, led by
General Gonzalo Escobar. The government put down the rebellion in May;

Ortiz Rubio was elected president in July and took office in December.43

 

 

 

 

The regime of in

The struggle
in Chiapas. Pro
credentials, had
Chiapas. The Ur:
with partisans o
the Union de Par
the PNR. At the
instructed to vo
behind Ortiz Rub
restraints, at t
in Mexico City,
In February 1929
Calles. After h.
dispensing favor:
seeking political
2000 man "social
a trusted enriqu.‘

Enriquez mad:
Coutifio ayuntamie
resignation of C1
which prompted at
September the Un.
of Propaganda Set
de Soconusco (PS
faction then str'

a hotel in Tuxtli

 

 

 

210

The regime of institutions was born, midwifed by a caudillo.

The struggle between obregonistas and callistas had its counterpart
in Chiapas. Provisional Governor Coutifio, an obregonista with agrarian
credentials, had no intention of giving Enriquez a free hand in governing
Chiapas. The Union de Partidos and the state legislature were staffed
with partisans of the former provisional governor. On November 10, 1928,
the Uni6n de Partidos endorsed Aaron Sienz and in December it adhered to
the PNR. At the PNR convention in Querétaro the Chiapas delegation was
instructed to vote for Séenz even though it was clear that Calles was
behind Ortiz Rubio.44 The Enriquez administration was burdened by outside
restraints, at the beginning, yet even before the consolidation of callismo
in Mexico City, Enriquez manuevered to take political control in Chiapas.

In February 1929 the governor traveled to Mexico City to consult with

 

Calles. After his return the governor visited Mariscal and Soconusco,
dispensing favors and conferring with the leaders of the labor movement,
seeking political support. In March the state government established a
2000 man "social defense force" which was placed under the authority of
a trusted enriquista.45

Enriquez made his first overt move in May when he deposed the pro—
Coutifio ayuntamiento of Tuxtla Gutiérrez. In August he forced the
resignation of César Ruiz, Secretary General of the Uni6n de Partidos,
which prompted criticism by coutinistas in the national press. By
September the Union de Partidos was solidly enriquista with the exception
of Propaganda Secretary Ernesto Herrera, president of the Partido Socialista
de Soconusco (PSS) and municipal president of Tapachula.46 The Coutiho
faction then struck back. On September 18 six state legislators met in

a hotel in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, accused the governor of misappropriation of

 

 

 

 

state funds, wit

for the Senate t
arrested the dis
and called up 5'
the PNR backed t
post as municipa
The most powerf
been exiled by B
By the end 0
power within the
the first phase

enemies still th

A GOVERNMENT TEA

Others besid
Tomés Garrido Ca
Rafael Cal y May
Soconusco. Thee
(socialist) labc
domination. The
confidence in tt
labor movement,
in1925. Enriqt
of political re:

Tomas Garrir
obregonista, har

because of its 2

 

 

 

 

211

state funds, withdrew their support for the administration, and called
for the Senate to intervene and depose Enriquez. The governor promptly
arrested the dissident deputies, expelled them from the state legislature,
and called up six loyal alternates. The national executive committee of
the PNR backed the governor. In early October Ernesto Herrera left his
post as municipal president, socialist party president, and left Chiapas.
The most powerful politician outside the state government in Chiapas had
been exiled by Enriquez.47
By the end of 1929 Governor Raymundo Enriquez had consolidated his
power within the important political institutions in Chiapas. This marked

the first phase of his struggle for hegemony in the state. Powerful

enemies still threatened from without.

A GOVERNMENT THAT CENTRALIZES ALL POWER

Others besides Amador Coutiho sought political influence in Chiapas:
Tomas Garrido Canabal, caudillo of the state of Tabasco, former zapatista
Rafael Cal y Mayor, and the growing communist—led labor movement in
Soconusco. These threats forced Enriouez to seek not an alliance with the
(socialist) labor movement, like that between Vidal and Paniagua, but
domination. The defection of Ernesto Herrera had shaken Enriquez's
confidence in the political fidelity of the soconucense socialists. The
labor movement, furthermore, was much larger and more hetrogeneous than
in 1925. Enriquez was forced to create, in self—defense, a new mechanism
Of political regulation of labor.

Tomas Garrido Canabal, governor of Tabasco (1922—1926) and a loyal
obregonista, had been strongly opposed to the government of Carlos Vidal

because of its lenient anti—clerical stand and its attachment to CROM.

 

 

 

 

 

In 1926 Garrido

source of confli
organization all
envisioned this
his own Confeder
hand, wanted it
Garrido made
at Huitzilac.
of Pichucalco an
banana workers w
garridista Liga
Garrido also had
mapache Gran Par
president.50 Ga
and he would con'
stop him.
Governor Enr
an obregonista, ‘
in 1929 the Port
a national agrar
Agrarias (League
through this act
Liga Nacional Ca
in sixteen state
Mayor's LCA neve
did, however, wc

in Chiapas. The

 

 

212

In 1926 Garrido had even demanded Vidal's resignation. An additional
source of conflict was the desire by both governors to unify in one labor
organization all rural workers in Chiapas, Tabasco, and Yucatan. Vidal
envisioned this unification taking place under the direction of CROM and
his own Confederacion Socialista de Trabajadores. Garrido, on the other
hand, wanted it carried out by his Liga Central de Resistsncia.48

Garrido made his move into Chiapas one month after Vidal's exeCution
at Huitzilac, Two Ligas de ResistenCia were established in the departments
of Pichucalco and Palenque.49 At the same time several small unions of
banana workers were established in Chiapas under the control of the
garridista Liga de Productores de Rotén (League of Banana Producers).
Garrido also had a close relationship with Fernandez Ruiz and in 1928 the
mapache Gran Partido Obregonista named the tabasqueho honorary vice—
president.50 Garrido became governor of Tabasco a second time in 1930
and he would continue to extend his power in Chiapas if Enrihuez did not
stop him.

Governor Enriquez also faced competition from Rafael Cal y Mayor, also
an obregonista, who was ambitious to become governor of Chiapas. Beginning
in 1929 the Portes Gil administration in Mexico City showered favor on
a national agrarian organization led by Cal y Mayor, the Liga de Comunidades
Agrarias (League of Agrarian Communities, LCA). The national government,
through this action, attempted to check the growth of the more radical
Liga Nacional Campesina (National Peasant League, LNC), which had affiliates
in sixteen states and a membership totaling more than 300,000.51 Cal y
Mayor's LCA never came close to surpassing the influence of the LNC; it
did, however, work to undermine Enriquez's control of campesino organizations

in Chiapas. The LCA established leagues in Cintalapa in 1929 and in

 

 

 

 

Huixtla and Pij ij

organizations to
ordered its lea
vacate a certain
was working to e
the working clas
In 1930 the
threat to Enriqu
1928 a Yugloslav
Veracruz and loc
organized the Bl
Tapachula. Alth
of the Mexican C
organization, no
Syndical Opposit:
COmmittees which
enriquista. The
Opposition to gr
during the 19305
Partisans of
elections of 193
0f the Union de
and elected its
the state execu1
La Vanguardia, '
Chiapaneco in M

"A government tl

 

 

—7—r- .. -.,_ FT_WWW

213

Huixtla and Pijijiapam in 1930.52 Cal y Mayor also encouraged these

organizations to follow his instructions exclusively. In 1930 the LCA
ordered its league in Cintalapa to disregard a state government order to
vacate a certain piece of property.53 Cal y Mayor, like Garrido Canabal,
was working to erode the authority of the government of Chiapas within
the working class movement.

In 1930 the communist labor movement in Chiapas offered a greater
threat to Enriquez than Coutifio, Cal y Mayor, and Garrido Canabal. In
1928 a Yugloslav, J. Groham Bukovich, assisted by propagandists from
Veracruz and local labor leaders unhappy with the post—Vidal regimes,
organized the Blogue Obrero y Campesino (Peasant and Worker Bloc) in
Tapachula. Although avowedly communist, the Blogue remained independent
of the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) from 1928 until 1931. By 1930 the
organization, now called the Oposicion Sindical Revolutionaria (Revolutionary
Syndical Opposition), included nearly eighty labor unions and agrarian
committees which called themselves communist or socialist, but not
enriguista. The communists of Soconusco furnished the most consistent
Opposition to growing State control over worker and campesino organizations
during the 19303 and 19403.54

Partisans of Cal y Mayor and Amador Coutifio participated in the state
elections of 1930. The PNR state committee (which was also the directorate
of the union de Partidos), however, firmly controlled the electoral process
and elected its entire slate. "Before the invincible political force of

" wrote the pro—administration

the state executive committee of the P.N.R.,
La vanguardia, "there is no resistance." The pro-Coutifio El Baluarte

Chiapaneco in Mexico City agreed but phrased it somewhat differently:

"A government that centralizes all power solely in the person of the

 

 

 

 

governor, deserve

In response t
commists within
unification of t
difficult negoti
state executive
great campesino
Campesino g Obre
CCOC) in March 1
of the Uni6n de
Soconusco, led
the majority of

recognized by t
at the conventi
the soconucense
resisted by Mén
The CCOC did, h
from the indepe
politicians. '
labor leaders,

One year b
Enriquez had f
Chiapas. The
Support of the

petitions and

The official

 

214

. . 5
g0vernor, deserves no other name than that of dictatorship."5

In response to the threat of the obregonistas from without and the
communists Within, the Enriquez administration initiated efforts for the
unification of the labor movement in mid—1930. Following lengthy and
difficult negotiations between the government and labor organization, the
state executive committee of the PNR assembled in Ocozocoautla "the first
great campesino and worker convention" and created the Confederaci6n
Campesino y Obrera de Chiapas (Peasant and Worker Confederation of Chiapas,
CCOC) in March 1931. The CCOC replaced the agrarian and worker committee
of the Uni6n de Partidos. The Sindicato de Obreros y Campesinos de
Soconusco, led by Gonzalo Mendez, brought 200 representatives and formed
the majority of the assembly. The communist Bloque de Obreros was not
recognized by the government and was not invited. The only disagreement
at the convention was over the inclusion of migrant indian laborers into
the soconucense syndicate, a modification desired by the government but
resisted by Méndez, who feared a "dilution of the revolutionary fervor.”
The CCOC did, however, begin the unionization of highland indians, separate
from the independent socialist unions and directed and led by ladino state
politicians. The first executive committee of the CCOC was made up of
labor leaders, not politicians, and most were soconucenses.56

One year before the state PNR selection of the next governor, Raymundo
Enriquez had formed a pact with a large part of the labor movement in
Chiapas. The terms of the agreement were clear: in exchange for labor
support of the state PNR the government of Chiapas would favor those agrarian
petitions and labor arbitrations of member organizations of the CCOC.

The official labor union had become a reality in Chiapas.

 

m ENRI’QUEZ PROGI

Near the end l
Revolucion, havin
the agrarian refo
he remarked that
short period with
for lands can do
the subject."57
governors to Mexi
the agrarian comr
or p01itical pre:
Enriquez was one

In June 1931
national legisla
that "it WOuld b
Indeed, Chiapas
do“ the Pace of
the Enr{(11192 adn
over 200,000 hec
in Appendix.) 1
Gardenas of Mic}
to 131 Villages

To advance ‘
established the
This agency Pro

or him relate

 

215

THE ENRI’QUEZ PROGRAM

Near the end of 1929 former President Calles, the Jefe Maximo de la
Revoluci6n, having just returned from Europe, indicated that he believed
the agrarian reform program was doing more harm than good. In June 1930
he remarked that "each one of the state governments should fix a relatively
short period within which the communities still having a right to petition
for lands can do so; and once this period has passed, not another word on
the subject.”57 The Ortiz Rubio administration then invited state
governors to Mexico City and asked them to enact "stop laws" terminating
the agrarian commissions in their states. Some governors,due to conviction
or political pressures within their states, could not cooperate. Raymundo
Enriquez was one of those and both reasons were valid.58

In June 1931 the Chiapas PNR announced, in response to a call from the
national legislature for the termination of land reform in twenty days,
that "it would be prejudicial for Chiapas to terminate the agrarian effort."59
Indeed, Chiapas was one of the few states to increase rather than slow
down the pace of agrarian reform in 1929—1932.60 In the period 1928—1932
the Enriquez administration provisionally awarded 126 ejidal grants totally
over 200,000 hectéreas and benefiting nearly 14,000 families. (See Table 11
in Appendix.) This record compares favorably to that of Governor Lazaro
Gardenas of Michoacan, who in the same time span granted 141,663 hectareas
to 181 villages.61

To advance the institutionalization of reform, the Enriquez administration
established the Department of Labor, Proletarian Defense, and Social Welfare.

This agency provided free legal c0unsel to workers and villagers in land

or labor related procedures or disputes, supervised labor contracting and

 

 

enforcement, and a
The eight labor in
periodic visits t
labor conditions,
. . 6

"age prov1smn5,
negotiation of cc
Were numerous rep
compliance with 1
and fines on has
Although Enr
Chiapas continue
treating primary
Increased aSSist
federal bureauct
"The (my three
administration J.
roadsj'65 No p:
The first four ‘
spedfic highwa
he found Upon t
budget to roads
Paving the Stat
The federal 80\

"R H
Dads 9 noted

216

enforcement, and supervised the operation of the labor relations boards.
The eight labor inspectors employed by the department were required to make
periodic visits to every hacienda within their jurisdiction to check on
labor conditions, negotiate collective contracts, and enforce the minimum
wage provisions.62 By the end of 1931 the department had supervised the
negotiation of collective contracts which covered 14,000 workers. There
were numerous reports, furthermore, of improved labor conditions,
compliance with the minimum wage law, indemnification of injured workers,
and fines on hacendados, all the result of government intervention.63
Although Enrifiuez gave emphasis to rural education, the state of
Chiapas continued to fall behind the pace of the federal government in
creating primary schools in the state. (See Table 12 in Appendix.)
Increased assistance from Mexico City, however, also brought meddling
federal bureaucrats who sometimes created conflicts with the state authorities.64
"The only three great problems of the present government," wrote the pro-
administration La vanguardia in 1929, "without doubt are roads, roads, and
roads."65 No project interested Enriduez more than road construction.
The first four points of his initial administrative program referred to
specific highway construction projects. DeSpite the empty treasury that
he found upon taking office, the governor devoted twenty percent of the
budget to roads, the single largest item of state expenditure. He began
paving the state highway and initiated construction of three major roads.
The federal government began providing $300,000 yearly for these works.

"Roads," noted Enriquez, "will be the best legacy I can leave my children."66

 

 

VICTORICO GRAJALI

The successir
revealed the dim:
the creation of
December differe
candidates. Fat:
deputy Antonio L
conservatives, h
ists César Lara
GraJ'ales. Graje
from Chiapa de (
In 1923 he revol
Supported the c;
Politician who r
the choice of R;
April 1932 Graj,
Partido NaciOna

Grajales Wa
won the electio
candidates triu
City as fEderal
of ChiaPas char
1932- Faustop
brother) Saster
the post in Ta}

Ru' I .
12 S Imposit:

 

VICTORICO GRAJALES

The succession struggle which took place in late 1931 and early 1932
revealed the diminished political influence of organized labor following
the creation of the Confederacién Campesino y Obrera de Chiapas. In
December different constituencies began to mention possible gubernatorial
candidates. Factions within the "official” labor movement proposed state
deputy Antonio Le6n and CCOC founder Martin Cruz. The Enriquez administration
conservatives, headed by former mapache Fausto Ruiz, and former Constitutional-
ists César Lara and Benigno Cal y Mayor, proposed state deputy Victorico
Grajales. Grajales was a former Constitutionalist colonel and an hacendado
from Chiapa de Corzo who had never been connected with the labor movement.
In 1923 he revolted against the Fernandez Ruiz administration and strongly
supported the candidacy of Carlos Vidal in 1924 and 1925. Grajales was a
politician who was well known and respected throughout Chiapas and he was
the choice of Raymundo Enriquez, another native of Chiapa de Corzo. In
April 1932 Grajales became the official nominee for governor of the Chiapas
Partido Nacional Revolutionario.67

Grajales was the only candidate for governor in 1932 and he unamiously
won the election in July. There was minimal violence and all state PNR
candidates triumphed. Antonio Le6n and Martin Cruz were sent to Mexico
City as federal deputies, and Out of Grajales' way. The political complexion
0f Chiapas changed immediately after Grajales aSSumed office in December
1932. Fausto Ruiz became the president of the state legislature and his
brother, Sbstenes Ruiz, was elected municipal president of Tapachula. As
the post in Tapachula had previously been assigned to socialist party members,

Ruiz's imposition was particularly insulting to organized labor and

 

 

 

indicative of it:
the third worker
attended by only
of the CCOC. Th‘
politicians rath
Chiapas, which h
now reduced to a

The Graj ales
Central Lowlands
and Ruiz, almost
presidents, judg
By 1935 six of t
the governor's c
GraJ'ales' close
Ra.Vmundo Enrique

Before even
break occured b<
LEJPEZ Cutiérrez
death all those
Previous admini
LEE>11, charged 1
elements and Wa
0f MeXiCO, Whic
purify his admi
the Preceding g
beginning of hi

but10st the fj

 

218

indicative of its political decline. The final blow, however, came during
the third worker and campesino congress in March 1933. At this meeting,
attended by only ninety-two delegates, Fausto Ruiz was elected president
of the CCOC. The other seats on the executive committee were filled by
politicians rather than labor leaders. The official labor organization of
Chiapas, which had little influence over the selection of the governor, was
now reduced to a submissive organ of state government.68

The Grajales administration was a government of cattlemen from the
Central Lowlands. Two cattle families from the department of Chiapa, Lefin
and Ruiz, almost monopolized official positions as local deputies, municipal
presidents, judges, tax collectors, and administrative department heads.69
By 1935 six of the nine deputies in the state legislature were natives of
the governor's own department, Chiapa. Perhaps most surprising was
Grajales' close rapport with Tabasco's governor Tomas Garrido Canabal.70
Raymundo Enriquez rapidly had second thoughts about his selection.

Before even six months had passed in the Grajales administration, a
break occured between the governor and the former governor. Captain Gustavo
prez Gutierrez reported that Grajales in mid—1933 "began to persecute to
death all those who still felt sympathy for those who had power in the
previous administration."71 Enriquez, along with national deputy Antonio
Le6n, charged in the national press that Grajales was smothering proletarian
elements and was opposed to the candidacy of Lazaro cardenas for president
of Mexico, which was true. Grajales replied that it had been necessary to
purify his administration of those elements which had been introduced by

2
the preceding government.7 Grajales was forced on the defensive from the

beginning of his term. He won the struggle for domination within Chiapas

but lost the fight in Mexico City.

 

 

 

 

THE GRAJALES PRC

Reform took
The Enriquez era
the governor sup
agrarian reform.
1934-1936. (See
the division of
1936. Grajales
conform to the 1
sliding scale fc
land to 5000 hec
the financial re
been paid for b:
in order to gran
cane, coffee, a:

Grajales rer
for Chiapas [th;
production."7/+
$300,000 in 193
first alleweathr
an interior rai
costly network
trucks which ha
In 1925, for ex
produce was car

300 trucks. Tr

219

THE GRAJALES PROGRAM

Reform took a back seat to modernization in the Grajales administration.
The Enriquez era had been tranquil and his government successful because
the governor supported the federal authorities and accelerated the pace of
agrarian reform. Grajales, however, deemphasized the agrarian program in
1934—1936. (See Table 11 in Appendix.) In 1935 he promised to complete
the division of lands in the state and terminate the program entirely by
1936. Grajales also reformed the 1921 state agrarian code in order to
conform to the 1933 federal agrarian law. This 1935 state law fixed a
sliding scale for maximum land ownership, from 150 hectareas of well watered
land to 5000 hectéreas of mountain property. The state government assumed
the financial responsibility for the land surveys (which previously had
been paid for by the villages themselves) and established an agrarian debt
in order to grant land to petitioners without charge. Plantations of sugar
cane, coffee, and cacao were granted the maximum extension of 5000 hectareas.73
Grajales remarked in his first Informs that "nothing is more important
for Chiapas [than roads]; they will resolve the problem of agricultural
production."74 During his tenure state road expenditures increased from
$300,000 in 1933 to over $500,000 by 1936. In 1935 the state completed the
first all—weather road, from Arriaga to Chiapa de Corzo. That old panacea,
an interior railroad line, was realistically set aside for the less
costly network of roads and highways traversed by automobiles, buses, and
trucks which had begun to open the region to wider markets at less cost.
In 1925, for example, there were only seven trucks in Chiapas and most
Produce was carried in animal—driven carts, but by 1938 there were over

300 trucks. Transport costs of a ton per kilometer were $1.50 to $3.50 by

 

 

cart but only to
was motorized it
The Partido
1933, urged all
code, which regu
1935 with the Ag
prohibited lando
properties uncul
landowners and "
to cut all the w
without charge.
the harvest, eit
quality of land
seeds, machinery
that the age old
the State, would
The Grajales
Chiapas since 19
across the board
government suspe
to encourage ren
repealed. In 19
Council and fift
"diverse economi
cattlemen to org
association, the

was formed in ma

220

cart but only twelve to twenty centavos by truck on a paved road.75 Commerce
was motorized in Chiapas in the 19303.

The Partido Nacional Revolucionario's first six—year plan, written in
1933, urged all states to implement article 191 of the 1931 federal labor
code, which regulated sharecropping and land rental. Grajales complied in
1935 with the Agricultural Partnership Law. This piece of legislation
prohibited landowners (at the risk of expropriation) from leaving their
properties uncultivated, and regulated the nature of contracts between

landowners and "

partners" (sharecroppers and renters). Partners were allowed
to cut all the wood they needed and to use water for domestic purposes
without charge. Rent was regulated at between five and thirty percent of

the harvest, either in produce or cash, depending upon the amount and

quality of land cultivated and whether the landlord provided animals, tools,
seeds, machinery, and so on.76 The Agricultural Partnership Law signified
that the age old practice of baldiaje, although reformed and regulated by

the State, w0uld continue in Chiapas.

The Grajales administration was the most pro-hacendado government in
Chiapas since 1920—1924. Early in 1933 the governor cut rural property taxes
across the board. In order to promote industrial development, the
government Suspended taxes for ten years for new industries and existing one
to encourage renovation. All State taxes on the lumber industry were
repealed. In 1934 the administration established the Central Economic
Council and fifteen local councils in order to give official support for
"diverse economic activities." The central council, for example, encouraged
cattlemen to organize self—help and self—defense organizations. The first
association, the Cattlemen's Cooperative of La Frailesca and Custepeques,

was formed in mapache country in 1934 with eighty—nine members. In 1935

 

 

 

 

 

other cooperative
Conitan. They be
and by force.77
The first sys
population of Ch:
remarked that the
progress in the s
The new Departmer
in 1934 establisl
labor unions, am
in the Central l-l:?
Spanish language
a "pants campaigr
in place of their
contracts in plae
at all), had the
indian labor unie
and obtained the
workers were worl
1936.78 Grajales
by unionizing the
the socialists or
Anti-clericai
Grajales adminis
closed churches"
Church-State con

Carlos Vidal refl

221

other cooperatives were established in Tonalé, Villa Flores, Ocosingo, and
Comitén. They became effective in warding off agrarista activities, legally
and by force.77

The first systematic effort to integrate and protect the indigenous
population of Chiapas was initiated by this administration. In 1934 Grajales
remarked that the indians were the greatest obstacle to modernization and
progress in the state. The governor intended to turn indians into Mexicans.
The new Department of Social Action, Culture, and Indigenous Protection
in 1934 established fourteen cooperatives, seventy-one local (official)
labor unions, and arbitrated 162 conflicts between workers and employers
in the Central Highlands. An Indian Credit Bank and ten centers of
Spanish language teaching were also established. The department also began
a "pants campaign” to persuade (unsuccessfully) indians to wear long pants
in place of their traditional dress. The substitution of collective
contracts in place of individual contracts (or more commonly no contract
at all), had the greatest impact. Officials of the department formed
indian labor unions, negotiated collective contracts with coffee planters,
and obtained the minimum wage for migrant laborers. Over 8000 coffee
workers were working under this system by the end of 1934, over 20,000 by
1936.78 Grajales' indigenous policy was paternalistic and useful politically
by unionizing the indigenous population of the Central Highlands before
the socialists or communists made any attempt.

Anti—clericalism in Chiapas reached such an intensity during the
Grajales administration that this period became known as the "time of
closed churches" and the "burning of the saints." During the height of
Church—State conflict in Mexico from 1926 to 1929, Chiapas was quiet.

Carlos Vidal refused to initiate an anti—clerical campaign and Raymundo

 

 

 

fl

Enriquez limited
This restriction,

In August 195
be closed, an on
He sent a detach:
to close the chm
saints. In Tuxti
objects. In Feb:
including the bi:
governor also be,
program of study
conception of th
neaSure prohibit
San Cristobal La
became Venustian
and so on.82 Gr
intended effect
fanaticism has I

The formatic
is perhaps best
federal bureaucr
and employees ir
span the number
1178 and the nut
1334.81; Despit:
restraints, govt

the municipal 1

222

Enriduez limited the number of priests allowed in the state to eleven.
This restriction, however, was not rigidly enforced.79
In August 1933, Governor Grajales ordered that all churches in Chiapas

be closed, an order that was enforced and continued until the end of 1936.
He sent a detachment of troops to San Bartolomé de los Llanos, for example,
to close the church and destroy all parish records as well as images of
saints. In Tuxtla Gutiérrez the government ordered bonfires of religious
objects. In February 1935 Grajales expelled all priests from the state,
including the bishop.80 In comformity with the PNR'S six—year plan the
governor also began to institute socialist, or "rational," education, a
program of study intended to fight "fanaticism" and give children a better
conception of their social obligations.81 The most ethereal anti—clerical
measure prohibited the inclusion of the names of saints in place names.

San Cristbbal Las Casas became Ciudad Las Casas, San Bartolomé de los Llanos
‘became Venustiano Carranza, San Lorenzo Zinacantan became simply Zinacantan,
and so on.82 Grajales' anti—clerical campaign, however, did not have its
intended effect as one municipal president suggested in 1936: "Today,
fanaticism has resurged with even more force."83

The formation of the Mexican Leviathan in Chiapas in the early 19305

is perhaps best demonstrated in the movement of municipal, state, and
federal bureaucrats. From 1930 to 1935 the number of municipal officials
and employees in Chiapas declined from 1708 to 1328. Over the same time
Span the number of state officials and employees increased from 929 to
1178 and the number of federal bureaucrats more than doubled, from 636 to
1334.84 Despite policy differences between administrations and budgetary
restraints, government became ever more responsible and larger except at

the municipal level, where declining size reflected a reduced role.

 

 

 

 

fl

Mexican politic:

philosophy were
CARDBNISMO

General L’aza
the spring of 1‘.
(1932-1934), mo:
Andreu Almazan z
Vicente Lombard<
with our help, '
accept Gardenas
ranch in Baja C;
that the Jefe M
General Gardens
replied that Cé
an opportunity.

Cardenismo,
labor and agrar
of land reform.
Enrique Flores
Confederacion C
early 1934 to p
the COM had aff
0f the stronges
in Tabasco, Yuc

The other e

223

Mexican political leaders in the 19205 and 19305 regardless of faction or

philosophy were statists all.
CARDEN I SMO

General Lazaro Cardenas became a candidate for president of Mexico in
the spring of 1933. He had the backing of President Abelardo Rodriguez
(1932—1934), most of the army, and two important regional caudillos, Juan
Andreu Almazén and Saturnino Cedillo.85 Also, according to labor leader
Vicente Lombardo Toledano, " the left wing of the PNR nominated Cérdenas
with our help, that of the labor movement, and General Calles...had to
accept Cardenas."86 In May 1933 several governors visited Calles at his
ranch in Baja California to discuss the succession issue. Upon learning
that the Jefe Maximo supported Gardenas, one of the visitors noted that
General Cérdenas was uncultured, excitable, and had extreme ideas. Calles
replied that Cérdenas "is a young and honest revolutionary...he deserves
an opportunity...with a good rein, he can establish a good government."87

Cardenismo, as Lombardo noted, was formed by an alliance between the
labor and agrarian movements. The agraristas opposed Calles' deceleration
of land reform. Agrarian moderates like Emilio Portes Gil, Granciano Sanchez,
Enrique Flores Magén, Marte Gomez, and Graciano Séhchez, formed the
Confederacién Campesina Mexicana (Mexican Peasant Confederation, CCM) in
early 1934 to push the nomination of Gardenas by the PNR. By July 1934
the COM had affiliations in twenty—four states and was rapidly becoming one
Of the strongest campesino organizations in Mexico. It found little support
in Tabasco, Yucatan, and Chiapas.88

The other element of cardenismo was organized labor, the traditional

 

 

 

enemy of the agl
and envisioned 1
election of Can
reform policy, '
This law, desigi
the right of in
were required t
(or could not 0
appeal to gover
Unions not regi
strike. In sho
the power to m

In reaction
of Worker and P
detailed critic
ruins after fi\
and formed a ne
absolute indep(
the State. pm
campesinos de 1
Personal relat-
imPortant Sourt

In the sum]
Year Plan desi
moderate Cérde
in QUerétaro i

agrar ian Wing

 

224

enemy of the agrarians. Both had come on hard times between 1928 and 1934
and envisioned their return to political influence with the candidacy and
election of Cérdenas. Just as the agrarians opposed the callista non-land
reform policy, the labor movement opposed the Federal Labor Law of 1931.
This law, designed to federalize state labor statutes, denied labor unions
the right of independent struggle with capitalists. Labor organizations
were required to register with the government. Those who did not register
(or cOuld not obtain registration) did not officially exist and could not
appeal to government protection or intervention in labor—management disputes.
Unions not registered with the government, furthermore, had no right to
strike. In short, according to Lombardo, the 1931 law gave the government
the power to impose tranquility at the expense of workers.89

In reaction to the Federal Labor Law, Lombardo organized the Alliance
of Worker and Peasant Groups, a temporary congress which formulated a
detailed criticism of the legislation. In 1933, with CROM nearly in
ruins after five years of official neglect, Lombardo converted to Marxism
and formed a new "pure CROM" (without Luis Morones) dedicated to the
absolute independence of union organization with respect to the power of
the State. Pure CROM, renamed the Confederacién General de Obreros g
Campesinos de México (CGOCM), was officially "apolitical." The close
personal relationship, however, between Lombardo and Cardenas was an
important source of support for the cardenas candidacy.90

In the summer of 1933 the PNR began work on a party platform, a six-
year plan designed to follow callista principles which would guide and
moderate Cérdenas once he was in power. At the PNR national convention
in Querétaro in December, Gardenas was officially nominated and the

agrarian wing of the party modified the six—year plan. The convention

 

 

 

approved recommeI
(peones acasillat
of an Agrarian D<
continue land re
structure of the
lost their auton
executive commit
the Phk state cc
and municipality
expense of local
The modifies
of concern to or
party candidate
Lombardo on Car
declared that "
much more than
The electio
to the presiden
State. Under C
C0rporate form

fOtmed the strx
THE HARD LINE
The Grajal

appearance of

agrarian or gen

 

225

approved recommendations by Graciano Sinchez permitting hacienda residents
(peones acasillados) to petition for ejidos and sactioning the creation
of an Agrarian Department to replace the Comision Nacional Agraria and
continue land reform. The convention also modified the organizational
structure of the PNR. Regional parties, the base of the PNR since 1929,
lost their autonomy and became direct dependencies of the party's national
executive committee. In Chiapas the Union de Partidos was replaced by
the PNR state committee which placed local committees in every district
and municipality. The PNR was becoming a genuine national party at the
expense of local and regional political organizations.

The modifications of the six—year plan did not affect the articles
of concern to organized labor. Still, labor had an ally in the official
party candidate. In the 1934 presidential campaign the influence of
Lombardo on Cérdenas was clear. On one occasion, candidate Gardenas
declared that "the union is the best Weapon of the workers and is worth
much more than the protection of the laws and the authorities."92

The election of Lazaro Gardenas in the summer of 1934 and his elevation
to the presidency in December led to important modifications in the Mexican
State. Under Cérdenas the new Mexican Leviathan began to take on the
corporate form which we are familar with today. Cardenismo also trans—

formed the struggle for hegemony in Chiapas.

THE HARD LINE

The Grajales administration got underway at the same time as the

appearance of cardenismo in 1933. As Grajales began to subdue labor and

agrarian organizations in Chiapas, Cardenas emerged on the national political

 

 

stage giving em
to Grajales’ bot
of cardenismo 3‘
years. Grajale’
stability and 1‘3
dura" -- the hat

As the lead
became more con:
came to have li
reform, and on
labor organizat
Union) of Tapac
observed that w
organizations h
Chiapas (Chambe
national Confed
cardenista.

At the end
a member of the
GraJ'ales, accor
stability of hi
the path of the
the report, was
unions. In Tap
preSident, S631
The State gover
(

Drlvate armies

i
n the municip;

 

 

226

stage giving encouragement to agrarian and labor sectors. The opposition
to Grajales, both inside and out of Chiapas, rallied around the banner
of cardenismo and a fierce struggle between the two was sustained for four
years. Grajales considered independent labor organizations a threat to
stability and his political control and applied the policy of "1a linea
dura" —— the hard line.93

As the leadership of the Confederacién Campesina y Obrera de Chiapas
became more conservative and staffed by hacendados, as genuine labor leaders
came to have little influence on state government policy, on agrarian
reform, and on labor—management disputes, defectiOns occured from the official
labor organization. The Sindicato de Cargadores g Estibadores (Longshoremen's
Union) of Tapachula left the CCOC in April 1934, for example, "having
observed that we are vilely exploited."94 Independent labor and agrarian
organizations had two places to go: the communist Camara del Trabajo de
Chiapas (Chamber of Labor organized in 1934 and a member of the PCM) or the
national Confederaci6n Campesina Mexicana (CCM), which was strongly
cardenista.

At the end of 1934 the Liga Central de Comunidades Agrarias of Chiapas,
a member of the CCM, sent a detailed report to President Gardenas. Governor
Grajales, according to the League, "saw in the unions a threat to the
stability of his government and from the beginning has placed obstacles in
the path of their development."95 One tactic, continued the authors of
the report, was the formation of sindicatos blancos, or fraudulent official
unions. In Tapachula the Sindicato de Lecheros was formed by the municipal
president, sostenes Ruiz, and Fernando Braun, a leading coffee planter.
The state government also permitted the formation of guardias blancas
(private armies) which menaced unions and agrarian communities. Cattlemen

in the municipality of Villa Flores, for example, formed twenty—one

 

 

guardias blancas
many to count it
The laws anc
originally desig
The Grajales go‘
belonging to th
The labor relat
money from the
high officials
landowners appe
served as 1ab01
deductions mat
indebted Servi‘
that exist [in
Soconusco, "ar
been formed wi
°PP0rtuni5ts.
Confederacign
are c0mposed c
Public Officiz
Membership in
sufficient re;
Wrote the Lig,
let up 0n tho
official Orga
Defender, "0r

[0f SBfEtV] q

227

guardias blancas; there were eight in Cintalapa, five in Chiapa, and too
. I 96

many to count in Tonala and Soconusco.

The laws and institutions of the state government which were
originally designed to protect workers came to benefit capitalists instead.
The Grajales government refused to register numerous unions, usually those
belonging to the Camara de Trabajo and the Confederaci6n Campesina Mexicana.
The labor relations boards favored hacendados, labor inspectors made more
money from the bribes of employers than from their salaries, and several
high officials in the state government were also legal advisers to

. . . 97 . . . .

landowners appealing land reform dec1srons. Munic1pa1 officials also
served as labor contractors for coffee plantations, various fees and
deductions made a mockery of the minimum wage, and company stores and
a . a 98 II V - u
indebted serv1tude were once again common. The few workers organizatiOns

that exist [in Chiapas],' complained the Social Revolutionary Bloc of
Soconusco, ”are only political groups that have no worker control and have
been formed with the only object of serving as instruments of political
opportunists. These pseudo—proletarian groups, such as the so—called
Confederacién Campesina y Obrera de Chiapas and the district federations,
are composed only of the members of their board of directors, who are
public officials, capitalists, or unconditional servants of either."99
Membership in an organization not associated with the CCOC, however, was
Sufficient reason for imprisonment or assassination. The authorities,

wrote the Liga Central Socialista de Resistencia in Tapachula, "will not

let up on those workers and peasants who do not belong to the CCOC, the
official organization of the state."100 According to the state Public
Defender, "organizations belonging to the COM in Chiapas enjoy no guarantees

[of safety] since they are enemies of the government of the state."101

 

 

The entire forty
cémara de Traba.‘
Slayings of agrz
gangland flavor
Tapachula.103
The Ca’rdena
arms to agraria
defense guards.
concern over tl
officials.105
noted that his
peasants. The

p01itical enem
nations or r

An odd ass
Ernesto Herre]
and oust Graj;
GraJ'ales in m,
early 19203;
was establish
of 1933 Cirde
Campaign in (
hampering the
Pérez Trevi’fi,

took over thl

 

228

The entire forty—one member Masons Union of Tapachula, affiliated with the
Camara de Trabajo, was jailed and fined simply for holding a meeting.102
Slayings of agrarian and labor leaders were common and occasionally had a
gangland flavor, as in the machine—gunning of a cardenista party office in
Tapachula.103 The denunciations fill several archives.

The Cétdenas administration did not intervene in Chiapas except to send
arms to agrarian communities and ejidos that wanted to establish social
defense guards.104 The national administration in 1935 did express its
concern over the "systematic repression" of workers in Chiapas by local
officials.105 Grajales, however, in a letter to the president in response,
noted that his government had raised the standard of living for workers and
peasants. The complaints, wrote the governor, "are simply intrigues of

political enemies."106

INTRIGUES OF POLITICAL ENEMIES

An odd assortment of mutual enemies, Raymundo Enriquez, Amador Coutifio,
Ernesto Herrera, and Rafael Cal y Mayor, came together in 1934 to oppose
and oust Grajales under the banner of cardenismo. The crusade against
Grajales in many ways resembled that against Governor Fernandez Ruiz in the
early 19205: it was populist and it succeeded. The tone of the crusade
was established quite early by former Governor Enriquez. In the summer
of 1933 Cardenas designated Enriquez director of the cardenista presidential
campaign in Chiapas, and Enriquez immediately charged that Grajales was
hampering the operation.107 Grajales supported the candidacy of Manuel
Perez Trevifio until he dropped out of the race in July. The governor then

took over the cardenista campaign in Chiapas since he was the state PNR

 

 

 

chief.108
Grajales' ad
The governor cor
confederation, 1
in the region wl
managed to impo:
and another in T
reappeared, cal
headed by Ernes
In mid-1935 Mar
shot in his ce]
0f Grajales ent
”011 only jail 1
The Cérdem
Mmh the newl‘
an obviOus att
Virt“all slaver
chief Graciano
in the Central
"Chamula Worke
Peso tax which
as Well as Va]
the area_..ll3
indian labor I
gubernatorial
that State of

as middlfimen

 

chief.108

Grajales' adversaries faced a powerful political machine in Chiapas.
The governor controlled the state PNR from top to bottom, the state labor
confederation, the state legislature, and most municipal governments. Even
in the region where unionization was the most developed, the state regime
managed to impose a coffee planter as municipal president of Cacahoatan
and another in Motozintla.109 In 1934 the Partido Socialista de Soconusco
reappeared, calling itself cardenista, with close links with the CCM, and
headed by Ernesto Constantino Herrera, Alberto Dominguez, and Genaro Marin.
In mid—1935 Marin was arrested by the local authorities in Tapachula and
shot in his cell, leaving him paralyzed.110 The PSS and other opponents
of Grajales entered the state and local elections in 1934 and 1935 but
won only jail terms.111

The Gardenas administration finally intervened in Chiapas in 1936. In
March the newly established federal Department of Indigenous Affairs, in
an obvious attack upon the state government, declared that "conditions of
virtual slavery exist in Chiapas."112 The report, authored by former CCM
chief Graciano Sénchez, charged that the practice of enganche continued
in the Central Highlands and, despite a minimum wage of $1.30 a day,
"Chamula workers labor for thirty centavos a day, and have to pay a twenty
peso tax which the state labor inspectors demand for authorizing the hiring,
as well as various excises charged by municipalities for passage through
the area."113 The department then sent a commission to Chiapas to study
indian labor conditions.114 In April 1936, in the middle of the
gubernatorial campaign, the commission issued its report, which alleged

that state officials tolerated inhuman working conditions. In their role

as middlemen between the indian unions and coffee planters, labor

 

 

 

inspectors PTij
politically ins1
the report was (
Cérdenas £01
result of the It
number of plant
the end of 1936
Indigenas (Synd
migrant indian
government, was
salaries. It d
who in turn dis
ladino relatior
salaried work,
planters -- a ]
the increase 1:
0f the federal:
largely C0mple1
responsibility
The Depart:
1936 Was essen
t0 remoVe Graj

State and fede

THOSE WHO GO A

The initia

 

230

inspectors profited from bribes, graft, and theft of wages.115 Although
politically inspired for the purpose of discrediting the Grajales regime,
the report was essentially accurate.116

Cardenas forced Grajales to dismiss a number of state officials as a
result of the report. The Department of Indigenous Affairs also forced a
number of planters to cancel around $24,000 in illegal advances.117 At
the end of 1936 the department also formed the Sindicato de Trabajadores
Indibenas (Syndicate of Indian Workers, STI) to represent over 25,000
migrant indian workers. The Sindicato, at first supervised by the federal
government, was responsible for contracts, transportation, and payment of
salaries. It distributed obligatory "work tickets" to indian authorities
who in turn distributed them in their villages.118 One student of indian—
ladino relations in Chiapas contends that "the State restored forced
salaried work, controlled it, and guaranteed it."119 The benefit to the
planters —- a large and dependable work force -— was considerable despite
the increase in labor costs. The formation of the STI marked the beginning
of the federalization of the Chiapanecan "indian problem," a process
largely completed by 1950. As with rural education, indians became the
responsibility of the national government.

The Department of Indigenous Affairs' intervention in Chiapas in March
1936 was essentially a political act, the first part of a larger campaign

to remove Grajales from power. It turned into a power struggle between the

state and federal governments.
THOSE WHO GO AGAINST THE PNR

The initial phase of the gubernatorial campaign in Chiapas coincided

 

 

 

 

 

with a national
implicitly criti
strikes. carder
Calles or resigr
ship of the PNR.
Mexico and, rem]
in December 193.
political views
and on April 10
Luis liorones.12
The defeat
the crisis Cove
national press
a revolt agains
Two guberna
and the anti-g:
Gutierrez, In
Agricultural Cc
school in 1916:
of the COHH'sié;
Cardenas admin:
Cérdenas West
Bank Of Ej idal
Department . 122
Secretary Gene-
state 1e8181at

ally of COVern

231

with a national political crisis. In mid—1935 former President Calles
implicitly criticized President Cardenas for tolerating an increase in
strikes. Cardenas, many believed, would be forced to heed the advice of
Calles or resign. Instead, Cardenas reorganized the cabinet and the leader—
ship of the PNR, dismissing callistas. General Calles then retired from
Mexico and, temporarily, public life. He returned from the United States
in December 1935 and published a defense of his administration and his
political views. For this provocation, Calles was expelled from the PNR
and on April 10, 1936 was expelled from Mexico along with Luis Leon and
Luis Morones.120
The defeat of callismo Opened Chiapas to federal intervention. During
the crisis Governor Grajales was labeled many times as a callista in the
national press and his opponents even planted rumors that he was planning
a revolt against Cardenas.121
Two gubernatorial candidates appeared at the end of 1935. Cardenas
and the anti—grajalista coalition found a suitable candidate in Efrain
Gutierrez. In 1914 Gutierrez had interrupted his studies at the National
Agricultural College to join Emiliano Zapata in Morelos. He returned to
school in 1916, finished his engineering degree, and became an official
of the Comisién Nacional Agraria. From 1928 to 1932 he served in the
Cardenas administration in Michoacan. During the first two years of the
Cardenas presidency Gutierrez served as the first director of the National
Bank of Ejidal Credit and later as Secretary General of the Agrarian
Department.122 The official candidate for governor was Dr. Samuel Le6n,
Secretary General of Government in 1933-1934 and vice-president of the
state legislature in 1935. Dr. Le6n, naturally, was a close friend and

ally of Governor Grajales.123

 

 

 

The state Pl
for April 1936.
party designate
grajalistas fro
Although the PN
Chiapas, Grajal
the state gover
Gutierrez camp
PNR, however, V
governments we:
than upon the
delegates won
convention thr
cried "officia

The genera
race, Governm
to another ca]
labor Organiz.
0f the PNR_
wrote Excélsi
almost everyd
a municipal P
Partido Nacic

the national
federal dEpu‘

grdjalista S

ma
01.!

232

The state PNR plebiscite, to choose party candidates, was scheduled
for April 1936. Early in March the national executive committee of the
party designated a new state chairman for Chiapas who proceeded to purge
grajalistas from state, district, and municipal party committees.124
Although the PNR had carried out an efficient and quiet coup d'état in
Chiapas, Grajales did not submit. In preparation for the April plebiscite,
the state government used harrassment and assassination against the

125

Gutierrez camp and attempted to purchase the necessary votes.‘ The

PNR, however, was unbeatable. Ejidos, agrarian communities, and municipal

 

governments were more dependent upon the national party and federal largess

than upon the state government. On April 5 Efrain Gutierrez and his

delegates won ninety—seven of the 110 municipalities. The state PNR

convention three weeks later officially nominated Gutiérrez. Grajalistas

- n . . . . . "126

cried off1c1al 1mp031t10n.
The general election was July 6. Although Dr. Leon dropped out of the

race, Governor Grajales still refused to back down and threw his support

to another candidate, Aguiles Cruz. The governor also pulled the state's

 

labor organization, the Confederacion Campesina y Obrera de Chiapas, out
of the PNR. "Since the PNR recognized the triumph of Ing. Gutierrez,"
wrote Excélsior, "assassinations and political persecutions are committed
almost everyday."127 During the general campaign, the state PNR informed
a municipal party official in Huixtla that "those who go against the
Partido Nacional Revoluoionario, go against President Cardenas."128 In May
the national PNR committee expelled from the party the Chiapanecan

federal deputies who still opposed Gutiérrez.129 On election day loyal
grajalista state and municipal officials:

made use of all means within their reach to commit
outrages against the persons of workers who went to

 

 

 

 

the b

the m

of th

assau

Efrain Guti
assassination s
governor-elect'
escaped unharme
and President (
acting on 3 rec

2

Grajales.l3 ]
governor and ti

government pal.

December 1, l9

REFLECTIONS

The liexica‘
working class
Ency in the po
POIitical Part
reforms benefi
these demands
collaboration
80V9rnment of
threats fI‘Om V
aCCOunt the m

the complete :

 

 

233

the booths to vote for the PNR ticket.... In most of
the municipalities the police, led by official elements
of the state, resorted to the most arbitrary procedures,
assaulting polling booths and injuring some voters.l30
Efrain Gutierrez won the election, but still Grajales fought on. An

assassination squad of twenty to twenty-five pistoleros assaulted the

governor-elect's house one night following the election but Gutierrez

escaped unharmed. Grajales swore he would never turn over power to Gutierrez

and President Cardenas took the threat seriously.131 On September 22,
acting on a request from the president, the Senate intervened and deposed
Grajales.132 Former Governor Amador Coutifio was appointed provisional
governor and the army closed all state government offices and occupied the

13 0’ '
government palace. 3 Efrain Gutierrez became governor of Chiapas on

December 1, 1936.

REFLECTIONS

The Mexican Revolution opened the door to the mobilization of the rural
working class in Chiapas, creating a new and potentially powerful constitu-
ency in the political arena. This constituency began to demand in the 19205
political participation and a strong and active State to enact and enforce
reforms beneficial to their class. In Chiapas, between 1925 and 1927,
these demands were met as the state government followed a policy of
collaboration with organized labor. From 1927 to 1936, however, the
government of Chiapas followed a policy of hegemony in response to political
threats from within and without of the state. This policy took into
account the political necessity of labor support but increasingly demanded

:he complete subordination of organization labor to government.

 

 

 

 

 

 

The P011CY

and "opposition
the first offic
primary functio
regime. The di
Cimara de Traba
independently '
the federal go
1111936. Duri
"opposition" w
with the carde
and communist

yielded their :
Cérdenas. Aft<

the State and

influence, cla

 

 

V .. _. suit—fir. u: - I

234

The policy of hegemony divided organized labor in Chiapas into "official"
1d "opposition" elements. The Confederacion campesino y Obrera de Chiapas,
he first official labor organization which was formed in 1931, had as its
rimary function the maintenance of labor's political support for the state
egime. The dissident wing of the labor movement, led by the communist
Emara de Trabajo and the national Confederacion Campesina Mexicana, struggled
.ndependently in defense of class interests. They obtained the support of
:he federal government in 1934 and returned to political influence in Chiapas
.n 1936. During the administration of Victorico Grajales (1932—1936), the
'opposition” wing of the Chiapanecan labor movement was forced to unite
with the cardenista regime in self-defense and self—preservation. Socialist
1nd communist labor leaders adopted the policy of the united front and
fielded their independence to the reformist Leviathan headed by Lazaro
Iérdenas. After 1936, organized labor in Chiapas became integrated within
:he State and (as the reform program advanced) steadily lost political

Lnfluence, class unity, and its sense of class interest.

 

 

 

 

 

The Cons
centralism o:
expanded the
from the pro

not and co

 

 

CHAPTER NINE

UNIFICATION, DEMOBILIZATION, CONSOLIDATION

Sefior President: We feel proud to have our
ejido and our primary school, and to receive
the economic help of the Bank of Ejidal
Credit.... We the organized campesinos of
this colony are disposed to join the new
National Party of Workers and Campesinos and
we will be with you at all times.

Crispin Gomez, 1938

We the undersigned were workers of the finca
'Numancia' of this district, members of the
Sindicato fihico de la Industria Cafetera del
Soconusco; the enterprise, today in the hands
of ejidatarios and the worst enemies of the
Unionized element, arbitrarily suspended us
from work.... Ours is not the first case; many
union sections have been dissolved and the
ejidatarios possess the coffee region to the
detriment of union members.

Alberto Guzman, 1945

The Constitution of 1917, far from repudiating the authoritarian
centralism of the Mexican State as it developed under Porfirio Diaz,
expanded the responsibilities and extended the reach of government. Aside
from the provision for a strong chief executive, the Constitution did
not and could not outline precisely how the State could consolidate its
power and establish its legitimacy in the eyes of the Mexican people.

One thing was certain in the immediate post—revolutionary era: with the

235

 

 

 

 

 

    

politicizati
and rural, th

The first

regime and or
Plutarco Elia
intended to b
workers and p
drift of the
friend of uni<
Cfirdenas l
legitimacy to
masses. card
union and a c
the party of
peasant, mili
party reorgan
of reform. I
(So long dela
The accelera
grateful to
and less con

became embro

that working

 

236

politicization and mobilization of part of the working class, both urban
and rural, the methods of Porfirio Diaz were obsolete.

The first governments that followed the revolution developed ties
with organized workers and peasants, trading mild reforms and limited
political participation for political support. This policy came to an end
with the assassination of Alvaro Obregon. Part of the price of peace
between obregonistas and callistas was severance of all ties between the
regime and organized labor. The revolutionary family, headed by patriarch
Plutarco Elias Calles and embodied in the National Revolutionary Party,
intended to become the sole arbitrator of Mexican politics. Organized
workers and peasants, however, disturbed by the increasing conservative
drift of the national government, helped bring to power a well—known
friend of unionization and agrarian reform, Lazaro Cérdenas.

Gardenas confronted the task of consolidating the power and giving
legitimacy to the authority of the State by aligning to it the organized
masses, Cardenas created an institutional alliance, "conceived as a
union and a commitment,"1 between the State and the masses. He reorganized
the party of the State as a party of corporations, divided among labor,

easant, military, and pOpular (middle class) sectors. Along with the
arty reorganization, indeed as part of the bargain, came an intensification
f reform. The very success of the reforms of the Mexican Revolution
(so long delayed) led to a partial demobilization of the working class.
e acceleration of agrarian reform created many communities which were
rateful to the State for land, dependent upon it for credit and tools,
nd less concerned with solidarity and struggle. Ejidos and unions
ecame embroiled in conflicts with one another. Ejidatarios often found

hat working with the Bank of Ejidal Credit was as oppressive as it had

 

 

 

 

been working f

undertook to "
and 1946. Hi
of the offici

ments lost a

From the
the General C
by Vicente Lo
CRO " and had
and Lombardo
workers‘ orgal
conflicts and
of defense am
second CGOCM i
organizations
Trabajadores .
remained at t
CTM, accordin
doubt, the or
the interveni
in support of
regime."2

In July 1

Organ zat ions

 

237

been working for an hacendado. Cardenas' successor, Manuel Avila Camacho,
undertook to "consolidate the conquests of the revolution" between 1940
and 1946. With the electoral reform of 1945 and the last reorganization
of the official party in 1946, the labor sector as well as state govern-

ments lost a significant degree of political influence and local autonomy.

UNIFICATION IN MEXICO

From the start of the Cardenas administration the government patronized
the General Confederation of Workers and Peasants of Mexico (CGOCM) led
by Vicente LOmbardo Toledano. The CGOCM had evolved from Lombardo's "pure
CRO " and had supported Gardenas for president in 1934. Both Cérdenas
and Lombardo sought an increase in unionization and the integration of
workers' organizations into a unified front that would end inter—syndical
conflicts and give workers a more effective political voice and a mechanism
of defense and struggle. This united front was established during the
second CGOCM congress in February 1936. Over three thousand workers‘
organizations with 600,000 members combined to form the Confederacién de
Trabajadores de México (Confederation of Mexican Workers, CTM). Lombardo
remained at the head of the labor movement and a dedicated Marxist. The
CTM, according to one scholar of the Mexican labor movement, "was, without
doubt, the organization that Cdrdenas considered indispensable...and was
the intervening instrument by which the working masses would be mobilized
in support of the decisions of the State and in defense of the established
regime."2

In July 1935 Cardenas called for the unification of all campesino

organizations as well. Lombardo wanted to unify both rural and urban

 

workers within
He ordered the
every state of
of Agrarian C
been organize
Party shall c
Cérdenas pref

separate and

Nacional Cam

in 1938.4

The unifi
constituted 0
State. Begi
forward labor
PNR nominees,
In December 1‘
the PNR. At
the revolutio
(RM) to repl
interest grou
was dominated
in the PRM wz
labor union,

The most
manner of se

by sectors, .

The PRM tran

 

 

238

workers within the CTM but Cardenas was adamant that they remain separate.
He ordered the Partido Nacional Revolucionario to "call conventions in
every state of the union to meet'for the purpose of having but one League
of Agrarian Communities.... Once the Leagues of Agrarian Communities have
been organized in the states, the National Executive Committee of the
Party shall call a Great Convention to organize the Peasant Confederation."3
‘Cardenas prefered a single industrial workers' union, the CTM, and a
separate and less independent campesino organization, the Confederacién
Nacional Campesina (National Peasant Confederation, CNC), which was formed
in 1938.4

The unification of workers and peasants in separate umbrella organizations
constituted only the first phase in Cardenas‘ drive to establish a corporate
State. Beginning in 1936, the CTM, with the president‘s support, put
forward labor candidates for elective offices. These candidates became
PNR nominees, thus strengthing the alliance between the PNR and the CTM.
In December 1937 Gardenas proposed to formalize sector participation in
the PNR. At the party's national constitutional assembly in March 1938,
the revolutionary family created the Partido de la Revolucién Mexicana
(PRM) to replace the PNR. The PRM was divided into three sectors or
interest groups: workers, peasants, and soldiers. The workers' sector
was dominated by the CTM and the peasant sector by the CNC. Membership
in the PRM was automatically bestowed by membership in an affiliated
labor union, cooperative, ejido, or by inclusion in the armed forces.5

The most notable difference between the PNR and the PRM was the
manner of selecting candidates for public offices. Names were advanced
by sectors, and through high level negotiation official candidates emerged.

The PRM tranSformed labor and peasant representatives into politicians.

 

 

 

 

Sector leader:
the interests
federation of
struggle, but
State within 1
reinstallatior

collaboration,

UNIFICATION I]

Efrain Gu
support of or
administratior
had joined thr
After the ele
state Confede.
gutierristas

In July 1‘
convoked the
established t
Peasant Confe
labor federat
Confederacién

The Confe
and over 271

Aususr 1937 t

members a jOiI

 

 

239

Sector leaders came to identify more with the interests of the State than

the interests of class. In this way, notes historian Paul Nathan, "a

federation of interest groups within a party cannot ‘facilitate' the class

6 The PRM, however, did help legitimize the

struggle, but mollify it."
State within the ranks of the organized masses. The PRM represented the

reinstallation and institutionalization of the policy of alliance and

collaboration, with the State holding the strongest position.7

 

UNIFICATION IN CHIAPAS

Efrain Gutiérrez entered office in late 1936 with nearly unanimous
support of organized labor. The labor groups which the Grajales
administration had refused to register, including the communist unions,
had joined the CTM and had been solidly behind Gutierrez in the campaign.
After the election, Provisional Governor Amador Coutifio reorganized the
state Confederaci6n Campesina y Obrera de Chiapas (CCOC) by placing
gutierristas in charge.8

In July 1937, after less than seven months in office, Gutiérrez
convoked the First Workers' Congress of Chiapas. This assembly
established the Confederacian Obrera y Campesina del Estado (Worker and
Peasant Confederation of the State) in place of the CCOC. The new state
Labor federation was composed of two subordinate affiliates: the
Zonfederacién Obrera and the Confederaci5n Campesina.9

The Confederacién Obrera was made up of 145 local labor unions in 1937,
1nd over 271 in 1939 with a rank and file of around 33,000.10 In
lugust 1937 the Sindicato de Trabajadores Indigenas, claiming 18,000

. l ./
bembers, joined the confederation. 1 The Confederacron Obrera, subSidized

 

 

 

by the state

to obtain leg
obtain indivi
Confederacian

the accelerat

 

the Graj ales

relations be

into the CTM.
Lombardo at
hacienda res
majority of
Campesina bec
communities .1
unions voiced
The other
Campesina re;
the agrarian
In 1938, in r
unification,
Comunidades 1

and Syndicate

the CNC.16 7

Primary chant

 

 

240

by the state government, assisted nearly 5,000 sharecroppers and renters
to obtain legally registered contracts and helped unorganized rural workers
obtain individual parcels of land through the Law of Idle Lands.12 The
Confederaci6n Obrera's main task was to unionize workers. One result of
the acceleration of unionization was a fOurfold increase in strikes from
the Grajales period, twelve in 1938 and twenty—eight in 1939. The labor
relations board considered 496 disputes in 1938 and 405 in 1939.13
At the end of 1938 Vicente Lombardo Toledano, Secretary General of
the CTM, flew to Chiapas to formally integrate the Confederacién Obrera
into the CTM. The most important task of confederation, proclaimed
Lombardo at the second state workers' congress, was the organization of
hacienda residents (peones acasillados). These campesinos comprised the
majority of rural workers in Chiapas but were excluded from the Confederacion
Campesina because they were not residents of legally constituted agrarian
communities.14 The CTM became the primary channel through which local
unions voiced their complaints and requests to the government.15
The other wing of the new state labor confederation, the Confederacién
Campesina represented all ejidal governments (comisariados ejidales) and
the agrarian executive committees of communities petitioning for land.
In 1938, in conformity with President Cérdenas' campaign for campesino
unification, the Confederacién Campesina officially became the Liga de
Comunidades Agrarias y Sindicatos del Estado (League of Agrarian Communities
and Syndicates of the State), and joined the national peasant confederation,
the CNC.16 The CNC, like the CTM, replaced the state government as the
primary channel of communication between campesino organizations and the
State.17
Businessmen and industrialists were also unified in the late 19303.

Cardenas wanted class conflict to take place peacefully and legally among

 

 

   
    
    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  

powerful corp
necessary as
of Commerce a
The new legis
public respon
collaboration
$500 were obl
They were 315
registered e
labor relati
the national
and collabor

As in 0t
1938. The 16
was composed
one represent
Comunidades 1
Regional Conn
appointed an:
Candidates f1

Mario J.
ordered all 1
any potentiai
COnfederatior
the PRM Regi:

organization

during the s

State PRM, C

 

 

 

241

powerful corporations and he considered the organization of capitalists
necessary as well as workers and peasants. In 1936 the Law of Chambers
of Commerce and Industry was enacted, replacing an obsolete 1908 law.
The new legislation maintained that businesses were institutions with
public responsibilities and defined chambers of commerce as organs of
collaboration of the State. Businesses and industries valued at more than
$500 were obligated to join the National Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
They were also required to register with the government since only
registered enterprises could participate in arbitrations conducted by the
labor relations board.18 The Tuxtla Gutiérrez Chamber of Commerce joined
the national chamber in 1938. It continued its policy of close consultation
and collaboration with the state government.19

As in other states, the Chiapas PNR was converted into the PRM in mid—
1938. The leadership of the party, the Regional Committee for Chiapas,
was composed the president of the party, local deputy Isidro Rabasa, and
one representative of the Confederacién Obrera, one from the Liga de
Comunidades Agrarias, and later, one from the popular sector.20 The
Regional Committee of the PRM, in close consultation with the governor,
appointed and discharged municipal and district party committee members.
Candidates for public posts were named by party conventions.21

Mario J. Culebro, Secretary General of the Confederacién Obrera,
ordered all labor unions in the state in 1939 to abstain from supporting
any potential candidates for local, state, or national office. The
confederation, state Culebro, would present its slate of candidates to
the PRM Regional COmmittee behind closed doors. The affilitated
Organizations and members would then support as a bloc the labor slate
during the state PRM convention.22 The high degree of integration among

state PRM, CTM, and CNC affiliations was demonstrated in 1939 when the

 

 

 

 

 

Regional Connn

supported Gen
PRM nominatio
gub ernator ial

support Dr. R

 

picked Gamboa
National Exe
campaign. G
Politics
the national
government.
localities a
which were 0
addition, as
fmctions whi
government he
government be
and promoting
became less e
matter for be
and sector re
politicians.
the state gov

1940 and the

insignificant

242

Regional Committee reported that 1361 separate organizations in Chiapas
supported General Manuel Avila Camacho, a presidential hopeful, for the
PRM nomination.23 In early 1940 the Regional Committee of the PRM persuaded
gubernatorial candidate General César Lara to drop out of the race and
support Dr. Rafael Gamboa, the official candidate and nominee. Gutiérrez
picked Gamboa through careful consultation with the party sectors and the
National Executive Committee in order to avoid a repetition of the 1936
campaign. Gamboa was unanimously and peacefully elected in 1940.24
Political unification of worker and peasant organizations within

the national ruling party diminished the political importance of state
government. It was replaced, as the key mediating institution between
localities and the national government, by national interest groups
which were organized at the local, regional, and national levels. In
addition, as the federal government moved more and more into acquiring
functions which were once exclusively state functions, the state
government became an anachronism; a regional branch of the national
overnment better adapted to enforce national policies than defending

nd promoting regional priorities. Politics, not unexpectedly, also
ecame less exciting. Political competition and discontent became a
atter for bargaining between state officials, national bureaucrats,

nd sector representatives, all usually indistinguishable bureaucrat—
oliticians. At the beginning of the process of State formation in Chiapas
he state government had occupied a prominent and important role; after
940 and the rise of the Leviathan, the state government became

nsignificant as a political institution and a modernizing agent.

 

 

 

THE RISE AND

The state
into Mexicans
Prior to 189C
change the ir
through the l
responsibilit
terms of stat
Chiapas. Thj
indigenismo (

Indigeni:
Revolution, 1
and Prevente<
Writers, and
a Positive h
for example,
At the level
goals by the
Without tOta
“Mush educ
the larger S
Was the idea
MeXiCan SOCi
inferiority.

In 1937

Education an

 

THE RISE AND FALL OF INDIGENISM

The state government of Chiapas assumed the task of converting indians
into Mexicans in the 1890s and sustained its labors until the 19508.

Prior to 1890 few public officials considered it desirable or possible to
change the indigenous population. After 1950 the federal government,
through the Instituto Nacional Indigenista (INI), assumed primary
responsibility for the "indian problem." The period 1936—1940 was, in
terms of state government policy, the golden age of indigenous reform in
Chiapas. This period coincided with the rise of the ideology of
indigenismo during the Gardenas administration.

Indigenismo became a tenet of the national ideology during the Mexican
Revolution, replacing the racist notion that ethnicity was uncivilized
and prevented Mexico from becoming a great nation. In the 19205 artists,
writers, and intellectuals viewed indian society, past and present, as
a positive heritage of the nation. The national agrarian reform program,
for example, revived the communal tenure of land, the indigenous ejido.

t the level of government policy indigenismo encompassed two intertwined

oals by the 19305: the incorporation of the indian into national society
without total cultural obliteration, and the betterment of indian life
through education, political and economic organization, and the reform of
:he larger surrounding society. The revolutionary aspect of indigenismo
was the idea that indian poverty was largely the result of inequalities in
iexican society and not simply a consequence of ethnic or racial
.nferiority.25
In 1937 Governor Gutierrez established the Department of Rural

Iducation and Indigenous Incorporation, later renamed the Department of

 

 

 

 

 

Indigenous P1
had assisted
in late 1936
indigenous d4
literacy, sev
established :
to contract ;
also had son
film theater
selling liqu

Urbina w
agrarian com
land. Both
the entire m
communal lan
drive for is
aBrarian ref
indigenous n
described th
laws and leg
technical S,
Chiapas has

One resr
f” agrarian
authority tr
new Caciques

with and eve

 

244

Indigenous Protection.26 The department's first director, Erasto Urbina,
had assisted in the formation of the Sindicato de Trabajadores Indigenas
in late 1936 and was a gutierrista state deputy. Under Urbina the state
indigenous department initiated a massive effort to increase Spanish
literacy, sending 250 teachers to indian Villages. The department also
established collection agencies in San Cristobal, Comitan, and Motozintla

. . . 27 .
to contract and transport indian workers to the coffee fincas. Urbina

 

also had some success in convincing planters to provide radios and install
film theaters, construct better housing for migrant laborers, and stop
selling liquor to indians.28

Urbina was the prime mover‘ in the formation of new and energetic
agrarian committees in Zinacantan and Chamula and the petitioning for
land. Both petitions were approved in 1940: Chamula gained title to nearly
the entire municipality (parceled into several ejidos), while Zinacanfan's
communal lands were doubled.29 With Urbina's retirement in 1940 the
‘drive for land subsided. Only eight municipalities remained untouched by
agrarian reform in all of Chiapas by 1950; all eight were highland
indigenous municipalities.30 As late as 1954 an agrarian engineer
described the indians of Tenejapa as "completely ignorant of our agrarian
laws and legal procedures for obtaining full possession and of the

"31 Agrarian reform in the highlands of

technical survey of their lands.
Chiapas has remained incomplete.32(See Table 13 in Appendix.)

One result of the formation of committees in indian villages to push
for agrarian reform and Urbina's policy of turning over local political
authority to indians was the rise of the modern indian cacique. These

new caciques, skilled middlemen who spoke Spanish and knew how to work

with and even manipulate officials, came to tightly control municipal and

 

 

ejidal goverl
became PFOSP‘
Mariano Zéral
and Chamula 1
support at U
power in Chie
made a very 1
of Tenejapa I
motive was U
which he taxe

Indigenm
indigenismo :
ladino explo:
the organize!

the Sindic
functioned as
coffee plants
and free medj
the worst abt
Sindicato was
to bribes frc
September 19:
‘1’"1'00 de mi
which derail;
of self‘defer
cent“ of rot
Planters‘

car

SOCOHusco , 40

 

245

ejidal governments, and the Sindicato de Trabajadores Indigenas. They

. 33
became prosperous bu51nessmen, money lenders, property owners, and employers.
Mariano Zérate and Salvador 030, for example, were caciques of Zinacantan

and Chamula respectively from the 19308 to the 19603.34

With political
support at the state and federal levels, indian caciques became a pernicious
power in Chiapas. The caciques of the ejido of La Libertad, for example,
made a very unfair and unequal division of lands in 1939.35 The cacique
of Tenejapa in 1944 used the police to break up a market in Yochib. His
motive was to maintain his monopoly over the Sunday market in Tenejapa,
which he taxed.36

Indigenous unification and organization was to be the cornerstone of
indigenismo in Chiapas. The only way the indian population might escape
ladino exploitation and capricious, patronizing government was through
the organization of a powerful, indian—led labor union. That organization was

the Sindicato de Trabajadores Indigenas. From 1936 to 1939 the STI

functioned as Urbina had planned. It negotiated collective contracts with
coffee planters, obtained the minimum wage, free meals, transportation,
nd free medical treatment.37 The STI had briefly succeeded in mitigating
he worst abuses of migrant labor in Chiapas.38 By 1939, however, the
indicato was in the hands of a few Chamula caciques who were susceptible
o bribes from planters and hacendados. The leadership of the STI in
eptember 1939, for example, refused to support a strike by the Sindicato
nico de Trabajadores de la Industria de Café del Soconusco (SUTICS),
hich derailed the strike movement.39 The STI ceased being an instrument
f self—defense and reform and became, as reputation would have it, a

enter of robbery and a compliant contracting agency for the coffee

lanters‘ cartel, the Asociacién Agricola Local de Cafeticultores del

40

OCODUSCO .

 

 

 

 

AGRARlAN REFO]

Governor
Mexico, final
and the coffe
reported to I
a team of th:
land content:

The gove
longer be ex
for such an
permission f
purpose of p
within fiftj
not permittw
and modifier

coffee land
members, se
to Campesl'n
buy off agr
a pmpagam
the coffee
however, h;
buSiness.
Also b
InduStria

CoffeE zor

 

AGRARIAN REFORM

Governor Efrain Gutierrez, after twenty years of agrarian reform in
‘ Mexico, finally brought that program to the indigenOus Central Highlands
and the coffee plantations of Soconusco. In September 1937 Gutierrez
reported to the state legislature that within a few days he was sending
a team of thirty agrarian engineers to Soconusco to study the problem of
land concentration and begin to act upon petitions for land.41

The governor gave notice to the planters that their lands would no
longer be exempt from expropriation. Long before, however, they had planned
for Such an eventuality. In the 19208 German nationals obtained
permission from their government to become Mexican citizens only for the
purpose of preventing the expropriation of their properties, which were
within fifty kilometers of the international border and thus, by law,
not permitted to foreign nationals.42 After Cérdenas took power in 1934
and modified the federal agrarian code to permit the expropriation of
coffee lands, the planters began to divide their properties among family
members, sell parcels to friends and neighbors, and even give some land
to campesinos to defuse agrarian sentiment. Planters also tried to
buy off agrarian committees and kill agrarian leaders, and they launched
a Propaganda campaign to convince the government that expropriation of
the coffee industry would mean the economic ruin of Chiapas.44 Gutiérrez,
however, had no intention of driving the established planters out of
business.

Also beginning in 1937, the Sindicato Uhico de Trabajadores de la

Industria de Café de Soconusco (SUTICS), the principal labor union in the

coffee zone, began to organize agrarian committees in the coffee

 

plantations a
converting me
The prel:
which time t]
to three new
ejidos in th
Agustin de 1
wave granted
peones acas:
seven proper
Agrariax
machinery, -
a few power
tried to be
(dry and sh
in to force
Plants were
dependency:
the State 1
t0 PUrchas,
EOVEmment
SOCORUSCQ‘
In the
SUPEI‘ViseC‘
and Marisc
c“£96? zor

affeCted’

247

plantations and petitioned for land.45 This began the process of
converting many unionized rural workers into landholding ejidatarios.
The preliminary surveys were completed by the end of March 1939, at
which time the governor traveled to Tapachula to give provisional grants
to three new ejidos.46 In April Gutierrez established seven collective
ejidos in the coffee zone: Cacahoatan, Uni6n Juarez, E1 Matazano,
Agustin de Iturbide, El Aguila, Agua Caliente, and Talguian. This first
wave granted 8119 hectareas of first class coffee land to benefit 1636

47

peones acasillados. Over 3000 hectareas were expropriated from the
seven properties belonging to Fernando Braun.48

Agrarian reform in Soconusco in 1939 left the coffee processing
machinery, not to mention the marketing houses, still in the hands of
a few powerful German planters, and during the 1939—1940 harvest they
tried to bankrupt the new ejidos. The planters refused to process
(dry and shell) and purchase ejido coffee for export. Gutiérrez stepped
in to force the planters to process the crop and a few processing
‘ plants were seized by ejidatarios. The Bank of Ejidal Credit (a federal
dependency) gave emergency credit to eight ejidal credit societies and
the state government contracted with the firm of A.C. Muller of Houston
to purchase ejido coffee.49 These difficulties prompted the federal
government to step in and initiate the second phase of land reform in
Soconusco.

In the spring of 1940 President Cardenas traveled to Soconusco and
Supervised divisions affecting nearly every large plantation in Soconusco
and Mariscal. Gardenas added another 20,000 bectéreas to the ejidal
coffee zone and expropriated several processing plants.50 Those properties

affected however were declared "small property" and their owners were
, 9

 

 

 

 

 

 

granted cert:
additional a1
a "small prop
remark: "Wit
Presiden
agrarian act
the third an
included the
processing c
certificates
fifty percer
Part of
early l9405
Juarez and l
iIldependent
union of mi
the formati
Which in tu
national Ag
Smaller one
By 1946

in Place.
Slightly mc
into thin,
ejidatariof
Processgd ,

0f thESe c:

248

granted certificates of inaffectability, exempting those properties from
additional agrarian litigation.51 Hacendado Ad Giesman's conversion into
a "small property owner" prompted some peones acasillados in 1941 to
remark: "With six fincas in operation, it is a curious small property."52

President Manuel Avila Camacho in 1941 ordered the termination of
agrarian activity in Soconusco during his administration, thus initiating
the third and final phase of land reform in the coffee zone. This phase
included the upgrading of provisional grants to definitive grants, the
processing of petitions still under consideration, and the provising of
certificates of inaffectability which up to 1941 had benefited only
fifty percent of the planters and landowners of Soconusco.53

Part of the resolution of remaining agrarian problems during the
early 19403 involved the breakup of the two large communal ejidos, Uni6n
Juarez and Cacahoatan. Both had been formed by c0mbining numerous
independent agrarian communities and rival agrarian committees. The
union of nine communities in the Cacahoatan ejido, for example, let to
the formation of nine political factions that c0uld not agree on anything,
which in turn led to violence and agricultural inactivity. The
national Agrarian Department was forced to divide these two ejidos into
smaller ones which were still worked communally.54

By 1946 the agrarian contour of contemporary Soconusco was largely
in place. About one half of all coffee properties had been converted into
slightly more than one hundred ejidos. Most of the ejidos were organized
into thirty—one credit societies, essentially business corporations with
ejidatarios as shareholders and workers. They assigned tasks to the workers,
processed and marketed the coffee, and paid the ejidatarios. Over half

Of these credit societies, sixteen out of thirty-one, accepted credit

 

 

 

from the Ban
number of da
processing,
hacendado, t
The agra
the formatio
structure to
federal Agra
a dependency
Chiapas intc
was responsi
'efes channe
trucks, and
obtain ampl;
made them as
and between
bureaucrats
Department,
affairs,
Land Wi
living of 9
credit in C
Agricultura
Bank of Eji
designEd to
in Tuxtla G

established

249

from the Bank of Ejidal Credit. The bank determined salaries, the

number of days per week ejidatarios could work, and oversaw the harvests,
processing, and marketing of the coffee. The bank became a bureaucratic
hacendado, the ejidatario, a peon of the bank.55

The agrarian reform program of the 19305 and 19408 included not only
the formation of ejidos but also the creation of a complex bureaucratic
structure to assist, supervise, and control ejidatarios. In 1937 the
federal Agrarian Department established the Division of Ejidal Promotion,
a dependency of the state Agrarian Mixed Commissions. This office divided
Chiapas into eight ejidal zones, each supervised by a jefe de la zona who
was responsible for channeling governmental assistance to ejidos. These
jefes channeled tools, livestock, schools and school teachers, roads and
trucks, and improved seed to ejidos. They assisted ejidal governments to
obtain amplifications of their original grants, a duty which occasionally
made them assassination targets.56 Jefes also arbitrated conflicts within
and between ejidos.57 The jefes were trained agronomists and career
bureaucrats who carried out the directives of the federal Agrarian
Department, further diminishing the role of the State government in ejidal
affairs.

Land without the resources to work it could not raise the standard of
living of ejidatarios, thus the necessity of government credit. Most
credit in Chiapas prior to 1939 was dispensed by the National Bank of
Agricultural Credit to private producers of coffee and cacao.58 The
Bank of Ejidal Credit, established by President Gardenas in 1935 and
designed to provide credit to ejidal credit societies, opened an office
in Tuxtla Gutiérrez in 1936. The following year a central office was

established in Tapachula and branch officers were set up in San Cristhbal,

 

 

Tonala, and
in 1936 to 3
number of ej
1936 to 160
Presiden
in the mid-l
coalition.
unionized re
productive e
hands. The
the governor
Whether it w
agrarian mov

land became

SEQUESTRATIO

Mexico d
W0 Mexican
0f the Axis
Preperties i
Board of Adm
SeventY‘Six
minim peso
until 1946,

Administ

turned OVer

 

250

Tonala, and Huixtla. Loans to credit societies increased from $100,000

59

in 1936 to $3,000,000 in 1940, and to over $31,000,000 by 1948. The

number of ejidal credit societies in Chiapas increased from thirty-six in
1936 to 160 by 1950.60

President Lazaro Cérdenas and Governor Efrain Gutierrez came to power
in the mid—19308 at the head of a politically powerful labor—agrarian
coalition. In Chiapas this coalition was based in Soconusco, the most
unionized region in the state and the home of the state's principal
productive enterprises, coffee plantations, which still were in private
hands. The coalition pledged its political support to Gutierrez and
the governor, in turn, was committed to extending land reform to Soconusco.
Whether it was planned or not, the agrarian program served to pacify the
agrarian movement and weaken organized labor. Communities that received

land became loyal guardians of the State that granted it.
SEQUESTRATION

Mexico declared war on Germany, Italy, and Japan on June 2, 1942 after
two Mexican oil tankers were torpedoed by German U—Boats in May. Nationals
of the Axis nations were reconcentrated to interior cities and their
properties impounded and administered by the federal government.61 The
Board of Administration and Supervision of Foreign Property impounded
seventy—six German coffee plantations in Chiapas valued at more than twelve
million pesos, most were located in Soconusco.62 The sequestration lasted
until 1946.

Administration of the impounded German plantations in Chiapas was

turned over to the Fideicomiso Cafeteros de Tapachula (Coffee Fiduciary)

 

which was rur
increase in <
impounded plz
properties Wt
roads, house:
tolerated no
of peones ac.
Guatemalan w
less than th

The last
sequestratio
de la Indust
ization of a
each Plantat
Since the p]
family, the)
1D 1946 over

MeXiCo were

DEMOB ILIZAT

The exp
confederati
S‘lccess of
of the Orga
and indepen

 

251

which was run by officials of the Bank of Foreign Commerce. DeSpite the
increase in coffee prices during the Second World War, production in the
impounded plantations dropped by half during the sequestration. When the
properties were finally returned to their owners in 1946, machinery,
roads, houses, and the coffee groves were in bad condition.63 The Fiduciary
tolerated no strikes and even lowered salaries but did allow the organization
of peones acasillados into labor unions.64 The Fiduciary also hired
Guatemalan workers in preference to Mexican workers since they accepted
less than the minimum wage.65

The last phase of agrarian reform in Soconusco occured during the
sequestration of 1942—1946. Although the Sindicato finico de Trabajadores
de la Industria de Café de Soconusco repeatedly demanded the total national—
ization of all impounded properties, the agrarian reform department left
each plantation with a minimum of 300 hectareas, as required by law.
Since the planters had previously divided their properties within the
family, they still managed to retain a good portion of their properties.

In 1946 over 10,000 hectéreas of the richest and most productive land in

Mexico were returned to their original owners.6
DEMOBILIZATION

The extensive unification of peasants and workers into powerful
Confederations integrated into the Party of the State, and the partial
success of agrarian reform in Chiapas, led to the political demobilization
0f the organized masses. It was a demobilization of class solidarity
and independent struggle, rather than a disbanding of formal organizations,

although that took place also. Once—aggressive labor unions and agrarian

 

 

 

 

 

252

leagues turned away from the broader struggle for class advancement to
focus on internal rivalries, disputes with the State bureaucracy, and
self-preservation and aggrandizement. The always fragile yet potentially
pOWerful mobilization of workers and peasants in Chiapas peaked and then
subsided between 1936 and 1947. The movement, as Arnaldo C6rdova describes
it, was devoured by the State.67

The formation of ejidos created communities which were, and remain,
closely tied to the State. They received their land from the State and
were dependent upon it for credit, material assistance, and further
amplification of their original grants. Ejidatarios became loyal,

conservative, and self—interested citizens. "We the organized campesinos

I ll

of this colony,’ wrote the leadership of one new ejido in 1938, are

disposed to join the new National Party of Workers and Soldiers [the PRM]
and we will be with you at all times."68 In 1940 ejidatarios in Chiapas
numbered over 40,000, comprising around twelve percent of the male
population but possessing over twenty percent of all cultivated land. By
1970 ejidatarios numbered nearly 150,000 and comprised twenty percent of
the male population but possessed over fifty percent of all land in
cultivation.69 (See Table 14 in Appendix.) Most ejidatarios were and
remain poor, but within the Chiapanecan campesinado they are the privileged
poor.

Ejidatarios had something to defend, and their solidarity with members
of neighboring ejidos, with organized workers, and with unorganized
sharecroppers, renters, and day laborers, disappeared. The ejidatarios
of Independencia (Mariscal) in 1936, for example, encroached upon 100
hectéreas of the best land of the ejido of San Isidro Siltepec. In 1943,

assisted by an agrarian engineer who was probably bribed, the same

 

 

 

253

ejidatarios helped themselves to an additional 120 hectareas, provoking
a violent feud.70 Forty—two baldios of Tierra Colorado in the municipality
of Zinacantan opposed the formation of an ejido comprising lands they
had cultivated for thirty years. When the Chamula ejidos were formed in
1940 the ejidatarios ordered the baldibs to move off the land. In 1956
the baldios of Tierra Colorado petitioned the government for their own
ejido. The Chamula ejido then gave them membership rather than risk losing
some of their land to a new ejido.71
Internal ejidal conflicts were, and remain, serious and commonplace.
Governance of ejidos almost always fell into the hands of a few powerful
cacigues whose authority derived from the support of government officials
and from their own skillful employment of favors and punishments. Bartolome
Vasquez Chahal was the cacique of Venustiano Carranza from 1939 until his
death in 1947. He rented ejidal land to cattlemen, which not only made
him a wealthy man but won him the backing of the ladino ayuntamiento.72
Parcels were usually unfairly distributed to ejidatarios, according to
faction, and were occasionally sold to outsiders.73 Conflicts within
ejidos often arose between factions linked to the Bank of Ejidal Credit
and those opposed to the bank. One group in 1942, for example, did not
like working ”to promote a group of favorites of the Bank of Ejidal
Credit."74
The bank of ejidal credit, in fact, became the most heated issue of
conflict within ejidos in the 19405. Referring to the situation in Chiapas,
the Secretary General of the League of Agrarian Communities commented
that "the property owner has not changed, now he is called ‘ the bank‘

and the exploitation could not be more iniquitous."75 The ejidal bank's

control of those ejidos that accepted government credit was substantial.

 

 

 

254

he bank placed its employees in charge of ejidal credit societies, paid
low price for ejidal coffee but sold it to exporters for a much better
me, and in 1942 used $800,000 belonging to the collective ejidos of

ni6n Juarez and Cacahoatan to purchase 300 hectéreas and the processing

achinery of Enrique Braun. The price was quite high, leading some to

 

onclude that the bank and Braun were in collusion. The bank, furthermore,
pt control of the land and the machinery instead of turning it over to

e credit society. In response, some mutinous ejidatarios created the

ion Central de Crédito Ejidal Colectivo to get out from under the control
f the bank. The bank, however, "killed this new organization."76

To avoid the capricious domination of caciques and bankers, factions

ppeared in the collective ejidos of Soconusco demanding parcelization,
nat is, the working of the former coffee plantations not as a whole but
1 small, individual plots.77 "In view of the scandalous misuse of money
mat can be observed in the ejidos," wrote one ejidal faction, ”we demand
mat the ejidal parcels be emancipated and that in these ejidos new
misariados Ejidales be organized."78 The president of the dissident
'ga de Accién Politica y Social of Chiapas informed President Avila Camacho
at "the ejidatarios are longing, truly longing to obtain: parcelization;
tle to authentic property that will protect a portion of land which is
reir property; and individual credit. These are the true desires of
H79

iidatarios. The bank, and public authorities linked to the bank,

asponded that those who wanted parcelization were either Guatemalans (who
. . 80 . .
id no right to land anyway) or communists. In fact, communists dld
rpport the parcelization effort, an interesting ideological shift from
. . . 81 . .
reir earlier collectivation demands. Parcelizatlon of the collective

'idos, however, from an economic and fiscal point of view was out of the

 

 

255

question. It would lower productivity and thus lower tax revenue for
the federal and state governments.

Agrarian reform combined with the aggrandizement of the ejidal bank
led to antagonism between ejidos and labor unions. In 1945, when the
finca Numancia of Cacahoatan was converted into an ejido, the local SUTICS
section (whose members were not included in the ejidal census) found
itself in a difficult situation. The leaders of the ejido, wrote the
local SUTICS section chief Alberto Guzman, "not only took away our jobs
before dissolving the Section but until now have not recognized their
obligation to indemnify us." Guzman continued, arguing that "the ejidal
bank, Sehor President, manages these sefibres ejidatarios.... Ours is not
the first case; many union sections have been dissolved, and the
ejidatarios possess the coffee region to the detriment of union members."

According to a SUTICS memorandum, "once the Credit Societies were
constituted, the agency of the Bank in Tapachula began to apply a policy
of separation between ejidatarios and unionized workers." 3 The ejidal
bank jailed union leaders who voiced opposition to its activities and it
even organized an armed defense force, allegedly to help ejidatarios
defend themselves against hacendados but in fact "to control all the workers
of Cacahoatan."84 In 1945 the Agrarian Department granted land not to
the SUTICS section members who lived and worked on the land but to a
neighboring agrarian colony linked to the bank.85 "We demand," wrote
SUTICS in 1943, "that the employees of the Bank of Ejidal Credit be

"86

replaced by others who do not extort [money from] ejidatarios. SUTICS

 

supported the demands for parcelization.

By 1945 the ejidal bank not only controlled the operations and

finances of fifteen credit societies (representing between fifty to

 

 

 

 

 

256

seventy ejidos) but also owned several coffee plantations and processing
plants. The bank, an agent of the State, had become in less than six
years one of the most powerful institutions in Soconusco. "At the moment
the bank acquired these properties," wrote SUTICS, "it demanded the
cancellation of collective work contracts affecting 147 workers." The
bank informed these workers that "it could recognize no union rights, in
View ofthe fact that it [the bank] is not an enterprise but an official

apparatus; one finds in this same situation the workers of the fincas

'Santa Rose' in Tuxtla Chico; 'El Palmar' and 'California' in Tapachula...".87

Such practices by the Bank of Ejidal Credit were not limited to Chiapas.
The institution came under criticism for its financial irregularities and
exploitation of ejidatanios and workers throughout the country.

The demobilization of organized labor came not only at the hands of
the ejidal bank but also as a result of hiring practices of private
farmers that began in the early 19403. In 1941 the migration authorities
in Motozintla called attention to the "ruinous competition" of Guatemalan
workers who came to Mexico to escape a deteriorating economy at home and
to look for land and higher wages to the north.89 Fingueros and the
Fideicomiso Cafetero prefered non-unionized Guatemalan braceros who would
work for less than the minimum wage.90 By 1950 the migration of Guatemalan
workers into Chiapas had become a flood of 30,000 a year.

The flow of Guatemalan braceros into the coffee zone had two important
consequences. First, since the government permitted, or perhaps could not
stop, Guatemalans from crossing the border, labor unions lost what leverage

they once had over the planters with the strike. Rather than renegotiate

 

collective contracts with unionized Mexican workers, planters hired

Guatemalans. As a result, "the standard of salaries has remained stagnant

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

z"- —'.——1'—‘

257

for over four years [1939—1943]; the same salary that a worker earned
when a kilo of maize cost 6c, is the same he earns nows, when this same
kilo of maize is valued at 18¢."92 The second consequence was the
decline in the number of highland indians who came to work in Soconusco,
from around 30,000 in 1940 to less than 10,000 by 1950.93

Demobilization took place on many fronts and for different reasons
but the result was the same: the shifting of responsibility for the
welfare or workers and peasants from independent class-based organizations
to the State. This trend was doubly discouraging when, after 1940,
government support for organized labor declined. In Chiapas, for example,
the number of authorized strikes declined from twenty-eight in 1939 to

one in 1940 and three in 1941.94

ECONOMIC RECOVERY

The recovery of commercial agriculture from the civil war and the
world depression coincided with the demobilization of the organized working
class in Chiapas in the 19403. The deceleration of the pace of agrarian
reform, the increase in the number of certificates of inaffectability,
the decline in unionization, decline in government support for organized
labor, and the increase of commodity prices encouraged landowners to
reinvest in agriculture. Further, the expansion and paving of the regional
network of roads and highways, and the construction of a Gulf Plain
railroad from Veracruz, through Pichucalco and Palenque, and on to Yucatan
in 1940 decreased tranSportation costs.95 The combined effect of these
diverse developments can be seen in the production figures for coffee,
maize, and frijol from 1925 to 1950 in the following table: (All figures

in Metric Tons.)96

 

 

 

258
YEAR COFFEE MAIZE FRIJOL
1925 17,700 69,479 9,627
1930 11,740 37,336 3,033
1935 12,768 53,858 3,410
1940 18,525 57,890 5,582
1945 18,339 100,128 6,275
1950 30,001 210,039 21,142

The greatest production increases for all three commodities came in
the period 1945 to 1950. There were similar increases (in maize in the
Central Lowlands) in hectareas placed under cultivation and yield per
hectarea.

Over the course of half a century, from the 18903 to the 19403, the
Mexican State intervened in the regional Chiapanecan economy, modernizing
both its material infrastructure (primarily roads and railroads) and the
social relations of production (land tenure and labor utilization). State
intervention, in the final analysis, strengthened and modernized the
capitalist economy, at very little cost to the dominant class, and
alleviated the evils produced by unrestrained private economic power.

By the 19403 the contemporary structure of the Chiapanecan economy was
set and a period of unequaled growth ensued which has continued to this
day. The economic organization of Chiapas in the 19803 is much closer

to that of the 19403 than the 19403 economy is to that of the 18903.

 

THE POLITICS OF CONSOLIDATION

The accelerated agrarian reform program, pro—labor policies and the
toleration of strikes, the expropriation of the foreign—owned oil companies,
and the radical rhetoric of the Cardenas administration produced a serious

division in Mexican society. President Cardenas realized the potential

 

 

 

 

259

danger to political stability that continuation of his program signified

and in 1938 he began to moderate the reform agenda.98 It was widely

assumed, even by the Marxist labor leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano, that

the continuation of cardenismo w0u1d lead to irreparable internal division

and possibly civil war, which in turn would provoke intervention by the

United States. The times seemed to call for a period of consolidation.99
Gardenas and the revolutionary family of the PRM chose General Avila

Camacho as the next president, someone who represented the middle ground

in Mexican politics. The large segment of Mexican society that opposed

any perpetuation of cardenismo supported the independent candidacy of

General Juan Andreu Almazan. It is believed that Almazan, in fact, had

more popular Support in Mexico City than Avila Camacho. Nevertheless,

PRM candidate Avila Camacho was declared winner in the general election in

July 1940, although not without considerable violence and electoral fraud.

The general impression in the country was that the official candidate

and next president of Mexico had not really triumphed. These circumstances

further induced Avila Camacho to follow a course of conciliation, moderation,

and, as he stated in his inaugural address, "consolidation of the conquests

of the revolution."100
In Chiapas the official gubernatorial candidate, Dr. Rafael Gamboa,

was as much a choice of the officials of the national executive committee

of the PRM as he was of the state committee. He was a close friend of

Veracruz Governor Miguel Aleman, who was an important avilacamachista and

became the Secretary of Government in the new administration. Dr. Gamboa

had served as Secretary General of Government in the Gutierrez administration

and had moved on to the Senate, where he made valuable contacts with the

right people. His administration in Chiapas (1940-1944) represented no

 

 

 

260

sharp break with that of his predecessor in terms of personnel. It was
also reported, however, that he was well regarded by coffee planters and
businessmen.101 Juan M. Esponda, Secretary General of Government from
1940 to 1942, succeeded Gamboa in 1944. Although unpopular in Chiapas,
particularly with the agrarian sector, Esponda was Gutiérrez's and Gamboa's
man and he was elected.102

The administration of Avila Camacho gave special emphasis to private
agricultural production, industrial expansion, and foreign investment. His
government also expanded public investment through the Banco de México
and the Nacional Financiera (National Investment Bank). These new policies
were pursued during the favorable economic climate engendered by national
mobilization during the Second World War. It was at this time that seriously
embarked on the road to industrial development.103

The administration also undertook, at the end of the war, political
reforms which strengthened the power of the federal government at the
expense of local government and the labor sector of the PRM. In December
1945 the Avila Camacho government revised the 1918 Leg Electoral. The
new statute removed from municipal and state authorities the power of
establishing (and redrawing) electoral districts, forming census lists for
voting purposes, overseeing the electoral process and computing vote tallies,
and declaring a winner. The system of local control of elections had led
to innumerable cases of fraud and violence, most recently in the presidential
election of 1940. The president wanted to avoid a repetition of that
embarrassing episode and centralized the electoral process at all levels
of government in the Comisién Federal de Vigilancia Electoral (Federal
Commission of Electoral Supervision).104

The Partido de la Revolucién Mexicana was also reformed during the

 

 

Avila Camacho administration. In 1940 the military sector was dropped

from the party structure, in 1942 a popular sector was added, representing
government employees, small businessmen, and in general, the middle class.
In 1943 the party's campesino sector welcomed ”small property owners" as
members. In the national party convention of January 1946 the PRM was
dissolved and the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (Institutional
Revolutionary Party, PRI) was born. The convention also nominated Miguel
Aleman Valdes for the presidency of the republic (1946—1952). In the PRI,
sector independence and influence was diminished and the power of the
party's president was strengthened. In the internal selection of candidates,
individual voting booths replaced bloc votes by sector. The transformation
of the PRM into the PRI reduced the power of the party's single most
powerful organization, the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico. The
Ley Electoral and the formation of the PRI also increased the power of the
national regime and the office of the president.105

In the municipal elections of 1946, Chiapas Governor Juan M. Esponda
(who had become notorious for selling local offices to the highest bidder)
imposed Oaxaquého Guizar Ocequera as municipal president of Tapachula.106

On the day Guizar assumed office, December 31, the opposition faction

The police panicked and fired into the crowd,

killing six and wounding forty—three unarmed citizens.107

staged a protest rally.

The provisions of the 1945 Leg Electoral, although derelict in
preventing the scandal, were immediately applied to Chiapas. The Federal
Electoral Commission and the Permanent Commission of the Congress of the
Nation began an investigation of the incident which concluded that the
governor and several state deputies had illegally intervened in the

Governor Esponda took an unlimited leave of

municipal elections.

 

 

263

proletarian organizations faced two alternatives as a result of the
specific historical circumstances of Mexico in the 19303: cooperation with
a powerful capitalist State or repression by it and the destruction of
many of the gains of the Mexican Revolution.

The State, ”the new Leviathan," in the words of Arnaldo C6rdova,
however, became the ultimate arbiter in Mexican society with popular
(albeit organized) consent.1 Argrarian organizations demanded a strong
State that could divide haciendas, the labor movement looked to the State
to regulate capital and capitalists, nationalists demanded a powerful
‘State to secure the economic sovereignty of the nation, and late in the
day, even capitalists looked to a strong State as an important source of
investment capital. In the post-revolutionary era the State rose to its

central position in Mexican society with the support of organizations,

and it should come as no surprise that since the 19403 the organized element

in Mexico has occupied a privileged position.

 

 

 

 

262

absense rather than face federal intervention. The state legislature,
guided by the new Aleman administration in Mexico City, appointed General
César Lara provisional governor.109 Lara's appointment ended the
cardenista-gutierrista era in Chiapas. Lara was an old delahuertista (he
fought with Alberto Pineda in 1923-1924) and had been a grajalista in the
19303. He brought the mapache—grajalista faction back to power. Francisco

Grajales, a mapache captain during the civil war, was elected for the

 

period 1948—1952, Efrain Aranda Osorio for 1952—1958, and Dr. Samuel Leén,
the unsuccessful grajalista candidate for governor in 1936, for the period

1958—1964.110
REFLECTIONS

The Chiapanecan labor movement was born in 1920 and domesticated by
1947. It helped dismantle and erect state regimes, pressured government
to institute reforms, and worked to improve conditions for workers and
peasants. In a manner resembling the achievement of the entrepreneurial
elite in Chiapas in the 18903, the labor movement became an important
part of the constituency promoting a strong and interventionist State.
Although responsive to the material interests of organized entrepreneurs,
workers, and peasants, the State did not become captive to any one element
of its constituency. From the 19203 to the 19403 the national State in
Chiapas converted caudillos into bureaucrats, strong regional parties into
one party of the State, and powerful and independent labor and peasant
organizations into compliant sectors. By means of patronage, partition,
bureaucratization, and populist rhetoric the State defused labor's potential

capacity for establishing political hegemony in Mexican society. Large

 

 

263

proletarian organizations faced two alternatives as a result of the
specific historical circumstances of Mexico in the 1930s: cooperation with

powerful capitalist State or repression by it and the destruction of
any of the gains of the Mexican Revolution.

The State, ”the new Leviathan," in the words of Arnaldo Cbrdova,

owever, became the ultimate arbiter in Mexican society with popular
(albeit organized) consent.lll Argrarian organizations demanded a strong
State that could divide haciendas, the labor movement looked to the State
to regulate capital and capitalists, nationalists demanded a powerful
State to secure the economic sovereignty of the nation, and late in the
day, even capitalists looked to a strong State as an important source of
investment capital. In the post—revolutionary era the State rose to its
central position in Mexican society with the support of organizations,

and it should come as no surprise that since the 19403 the organized element

in Mexico has occupied a privileged position.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONCLUSION

The intervention of the State must be
increasingly great, increasingly frequent,
and increasingly of a basic nature.

Lazaro Cérdenas, 1934

Few times in history has a State obtained
such a definitive degree of legitimacy
and dominion over the economic, political,
and ideological life of a country.

Carlos Pereyra, 1974

The formation of the Mexican State was the single most important
development in the history of modern Chiapas. No significant aspect of
Chiapanecan life, from techniques of agricultural production to social
relations within cOmmunities, remained untouched. Most Chiapanecans were
ignorant of and indifferent to the national State prior to the 18903; this
was no longer possible after the 19403. Throughout Chiapas, even in
remote villages, the presence of the State became visible and important.

For better or worse, it happened. It is the essence of what happened in
Chiapas from the 18903 to the 19403.

This regional study has addressed the topic of the historical
formation of the State in light of three analytical guidelines. These
guidelines: 1) the preeminence of social determinants of State formation;
2) State formation as a long evolutionary process (the State as a work—

in—progress) and; 3) State formation as a synthesis of regional and

 

 

265

national aspirations, are reviewed in this concluding discussion. The
point of this recapitulation is not to formulate a model of universal
applicability; such a task lies outside the province of the historian.
Instead, my aim is to briefly sketch the theoretical principles which
guided and directed the collection of information, its organization and

. . . . . l
interpretation, and the final comp031tion.

SOCIAL DETERMINANTS

Karl Marx first theorized that the State, the legal and political
superstructure of society, "arises upon” the economic or material intra-
structure. This idea is based on the assumption that "the mode of
production of material life conditions the social, political, and
intellectual life process in general."2 Any separation between the
political, economic, social, and cultural parts of the societal whole,
in short, is artifical and arbitrary. Marx, however, went on to claim
that "the bourgeois State is nothing but a mutual insurance pact of the
bourgeois class both against its members taken individually and against
the exploited class."3

Gradual but important changes in the regional economy and the
composition and outlook of the elite contributed to the definitive
initiation of State formation in Chiapas in the 18903. An expansive
regional economy assisted the rise of an entrepreneurial elite while

the expansion of this elite strengthened the economy. This small but

 

dynamic segment of the regional bourgeoisie looked to a strong, centralized

and active State to accomplish certain tasks it deemed necessary for

its material wellbeing: the elimination of local bosses who interfered

 

266

 

in the productive and commercial process and the construction of a
communications—transportation infrastructure. "This type of entrepreneur,"
writes David Walker, "cannot be considered an authentic champion of
liberalism or of the laissez-faire State. He is the antithesis of the
entrepreneur who asks for the non-intervention of the State in the economy,
since such intervention is precisely the key of his success."

A subsequent profound modification of Chiapanecan society and
economy was caused by the Mexican Revolution and the ensuing regional
civil war. Political disruption and the accompanying breach in social
control led to the politicization of part of the working class and, later,
the formation of proletarian organizations. Politically powerful labor
and peasant organizations looked to a centralized and active State
capable of instituting basic reforms in land tenure and labor utilization.
The State became ever more powerful and came to participate extensively
in the society and economy of Chiapas in response to the active
encouragement of specific elements of both the bourgeoisie and the
proletariat.

The Mexican State became not the captive of the bourgeois class in
its struggle against an exploited class but a mechanism responsive to
organized elites from both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.5 It
was formed to advance and defend not the interests of broad classes but

the interests of elements within both classes as well as its own wellbeing.6

PROCESS AS PASSAGES

The State is not created by decree or spontaneously generated but
derived from a formative process. The rise of the State is, above all,

the product of specific historical circumstances which are at the same

EIZZ:________________________________________i

 

 

267

time contemporaneous and inherited. The process of State formation
involves the transmission of acquired attributes although not without
reverses, deviations, and breaks in continuity. The reverses, however,
constitute the challenges which provoke men to erect new and more viable
political structures or else succumb to anarchy.

State formation in Chiapas can be viewed in terms of relatively
self-contained passages which are, as the word itself implies, inter-
connected. The initial passage involved the conscious replacement of the
centralized Spanish State by a politically fragmented political order.
State formation began almost immediately following emancipation as "the
material foundation for the newly created nation began to take shape only
with the rise of opportunities for incorporation of the local economies
into the world capitalist system and with the consequent development of
differentiated and interdependent interests generated by such opportunities."7

The first definitive stage of State formation in Chiapas came in
1891 to 1910. This passage saw the integration of the regional economy
into the world economy through the production and export of coffee, rubber,
mahogany, and cacao. Elite entrepreneurs in commercial agriculture,
the primary beneficiaries of this integration, strengthened the regional
unit of government. Greater centralization and intervention by the
regional government, a trend epitomized by the transfer of the seat of
government in 1892 and the reparto program of modification of village land
tenure, created the defining characteristics of State formation in the
subsequent passages. The products of State formation in one stage become
the agents of change and of State formation at a later stage.

From 1910 to 1920 the Mexican Revolution, proceeding to Chiapas from

outside the state, disrupted State formation in Chiapas. Conflict in

 

 

268

1911 derived from the inflammation of local sentiment in San Cristobal
Las Casas by the centralization of state government during the preceeding
twenty years. The regional civil war from 1914 to 1920 was a similar
localist reaction to the intervention within the state by the national
government. Both localist movements ultimately failed yet the crises they
provoked led to the politicization of the working class in Chiapas. The
geographical contours of politicization (and subsequent mobilization)

was largely determined by the reparto program which had been more effective
in Mariscal and Soconusco than in any other part of the state. The
revolutionary decade represented a period of discontinuity in the formative
process within which was born a new political constituency to advance even
further State centralization and intervention. It was a passage of
transition from the politics of elites to the politics of the masses.

In the succeeding passage, from 1920 to 1947, politicized workers were
organized into a powerful political bloc demanding substantial socio-
economic reforms from a powerful State. This workers' and peasants'
bloc did not become the dominant and exclusive political actor in Chiapas
or Mexico and political and economic reforms were employed by the State
as instruments of power. The organized proletariat became an authentic
but subordinate element of the State. State formation did not end in
Chiapas in 1947 but we can see by that date the basic outline of a
political structure and a pattern of political behavior that has continued

to this day.

CENTER AND PERIPHERY

One of the attributes of the modern national State is effective

 

269

authority throughout the national territory, from the national capital

to the smallest village. Extension of central government to the periphery
is more than simply an operation directed and controlled by the center.8
State formation in Mexico was a synthesis of regional and national
aspirations and material requirements. Regional governmental units
operated as voices of particular interests at the periphery and as active
agents of centralization and intervention. As the process of State
formation continued and matured, however, regional governmentswere reduced
to instruments of central control and administration.

Emancipation from the Spanish imperial State in 1821 was immediately
followed by the institution of a system of limited municipal government
and local—regional autonomy. An ineffective national system of domination
conformed to the material interests of landowners in the 18205 but had
become, by the 18905, a distinct liability. As the history of Chiapas
demonstrates, the first stage of State formation involved the weakening
of local systems of authority and political power by the regional, or
state government. From 1891 to 1910, State formation in Chiapas became
the responsibility primarily of the state government. "The action of the

" wrote Emilio Rabasa

state in the functioning of the general government,
in 1912, "will be the most powerful force for assuring the stability of
institutions, the dignity of the villages, and the majesty of the nation."9
The state government of Chiapas, not the national government, took the
initiative to suppress local power centers and promote economic modernization
in response to specific Chiapanecan requirements and demands.

With the Mexican Revolution and the Constitution of 1917, however,

the national government began to usurp many traditional functions of state

government and strengthened the federal treasury at the expense of state

 

 

 

 

 

270

treasuries. Expansion of the central State apparatus and appropriation

of greater resources derived from the revolutionary role expected of the
State as the principal guarantor and regulator of capitalist relations.
Specialized functions —- land reform, labor—management regulation, education,
indigenous protection, agricultural credit, etc. —— required specific
institutions which in time developed their own bureaucratic momentum
and bureaucratic networks and little by little appropriated spheres of
operation of state government. In time, state governments became less
the agent and platform for the expression of peripherial interests than
simply the agent of central government, and sometimes troublesome agents
at that. Plutarco Elias Calles made this point in 1931: ”If the government
should have one plan of action and the states another, a disorderly and
chaotic situation would be created.... The state governments should be
humble, modest, and honorable."10 State governments, important agents of
State formation once, became anachronistic institutions whose main task

is to prevent political disturbances.ll

The centralization of pOWer, resources, and economic decision—making

in the central government in Mexico City was a double—edged sword. Only

a strong State could have constructed costly public works, expropriate
private property, and regulate labor—management relations; all of which

were necessary before Chiapas could develop an efficient capitalist economy.
Yet, beginning in the 1940s, the economic priorities of the national

State began to diverge from the economic needs of Chiapas and other
predominantly rural and agricultural regions in Mexico. During the
presidency of Manuel Avila Camacho the federal government directed its
resources and fiscal policies toward the industrialization of Mexico.

Direct State investment, and domestic and foreign investment, was channeled

 

 

271

into textiles, food—processing, cement, electricity, automobiles, and
other import substitution industries. Mexico's industrial development
since 1940, however, has benefited only a few regions at the expense of
the rest.12

The push for industrialization from the 19403 to the 19708 has
primarily benefited those regions which were already relatively developed
economically and industrially: the Federal District, and the states of
México, Nuevo Le6n, Coahuila, Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, Baja California Norte,
Sonora, and Jalisco.l3 James Wilkie, in his quantitative study of
Mexican federal expenditures since 1910, shows that federal investments
were ”largely directed to entities which do not lie within regions of
high poverty."14 The neglected regions were predominantly rural and
agricultural: Tabasco, Campeche, Quintana Roo, Oaxaca, Guerrero, and
Chiapas among others. State neglect of the agricultural sector (particularly
ejidos and small properties), furthermore, contributed to Mexico's unequal
regional development. According to one report "in 1940 the difference in
the per capita gross national product between the wealthiest areas and
the ten poorest states was close to 4,500 pesos (monetary value constant
in 1960 pesos). In 1960 the difference was 6,500 pesos."15

Since the 19403 Chiapas has produced more and more agricultural
commodities (industry has remained insignificant), but accessibility to
material advantages has not greatly expanded. The total value of
agricultural production increased from 200 million pesos in 1950 to over
three billion pesos in 1975.16 Despite this impressive increase, ninety
percent of the state's population in 1975 earned less than 1000 pesos a

month, or slightly more than eighty dollars.l7 From 1950 to 1970 the

number of ejidos in Chiapas nearly doubled, coming to comprise fully one—

 

272

half of all land in cultivation. Ejidos, however, over the last three
decades, have received only ten percent of all agricultural credit.18

The political function of the ejido, pacification of the countryside, has
been relatively successful but as an economic enterprise the ejido has
failed. The system of credit, internal political organization, and the
small size of parcels seem to discourage productivity in ejidos.19
Private property, which has consistently been more productive, however,

is held by a smaller percentage of the male population today than in 1910.
(See Table 15 in Appendix.)

The creation of a strong and active State was beneficial and necessary
during the first stages of economic development in Chiapas. The central-
ization of economic decision-making and financial reSOurces in the federal
government (and the concomitant debilitation of state government-directed
allocation of resources) came to have an injurious affect on Chiapas.

In 1968 a reporter for the New York Times noted that in Chiapas "state
governments come and go and not much seems to change."20 This can be
explained by the fact that the important decisions affecting Chiapas are

no longer made in Tuxtla Gutiérrez but in Mexico City. Today the government
in Tuxtla Gutierrez has a clearer perception of Chiapas’ investment needs,
as well as a vested interest in meeting these needs, than the government

in Mexico City. A new balance needs to be found, a north-south dialogue

within Mexico should begin.21
FINAL REFLECTIONS

I have tried to show that between 1891 and 1947 a strong, centralized,

and interventionist national State arose in Chiapas in response to the

 

273

material needs of powerful organized groups. My argument has not been
that Mexican State formation in Chiapas was typical of what developed in
other regions but rather in one small part of this complex and varied
nation the struggle for modernity took this particular form because of
these particular reasons. Lacunae exist in abundance in our understanding
of the history of Chiapas and Mexican State formation and it is my hope
that this study might suggest the need and perhaps Specific topics for
more systematic investigation. My research examines only lightly several
topics of importance which deserve studies in depth but, like Gordon
Wright whom I quote, "a nagging curiosity about general trends...led me

to persist in trying to see the problem in the large."22

 

APPENDIX

 

275

TABLE 1

Population and Production Units in Chiapas, 1855

 

 

District Total Description of Production Unit
Population

Central 35,782 Forty—five Cattle and Horse Ranches

District and Sixteen Wheat Haciendas

Northern 17,791 Fifteen Ranches and Haciendas

District

Western 15, 873 156 Cattle and Horse Ranches

District

Northeast 21, 739 Twenty-six Cattle and Horse Ranches

District

Northwest 9,685 Eighty—three Cacao Fincas and "Some

District Cattle Ranches"

Southern 16,266 184 Haciendas and Ranches of Cattle,

District Horse, and Sheep

 

Comment: The Central District covers the Central Highlands; the Northern
District refers to the Simojovel area; the Western District includes Tuxtla,
Chiapa, Tonala, Mapastepeque, and Cintalapa; the Northeast District includes
Chilon, Ocosingo, and Palenque; the Northwest District includes Pichucalco
and Copainala; and the Southern District includes Comitan, San Bartolomé,
Pinola, and Soconusco.

Source: Manuel Orozco y Berra, Apéndice a1 diccionario universal de
historia y de geografia I—III (Mexico, 1855), III, pp. 31—32, 76, 449.

 

 

276

TABLE 2

Number and Description of Landholdings in Chiapas, 1778—1909

 

 

Year Number and Description Source
1778 Thirty—two Haciendas Molina
1837 853 Fincas Rusticas Informe 1889
1855 515 Haciendas and Ranchos Orozco y Berra
1862 Forty—two Haciendas and 123 Ranchos Pérez Hernandez
1877 448 Haciendas and 501 Ranchos Emiliano Busto
1889 3159 Fincas Rusticas Informs 1889
1896 1048 Haciendas and 3497 Ranchos Datos estadfsticos
1897 5858 Fincas Rfisticas Corzo
1909 1120 Haciendas, 5742 Ranchos, and Anuario

3742 No Clasificados estadistico

 

Comment: The sources do not explain the differences between an
hacienda, rancho, and finca rfistica. The terms hacienda and rancho do
have general meanings and they are defined in the Glossary. The term
finca rustica is taken to mean all rural properties regardless of size.
Very small properties, those less than ten to fifteen hectareas were
called, in official terminology, no clasificados.

Source: Virginia Molina, San Bartolomé de los Llanos (México: INAH,
1976), p. 69; Manuel Orozco y Berra, Apéndice al diccionario universal de
historia y de geografia 3 vols. (México, 1855), III, pp. 31-32; José
Maria Pérez Hernandez, Estadistica de la repfiblica mejicana (Guadalajara:
Imprenta del Gobierno, 1862), p. 52; Emiliano Busto, Estadistica de la
repfiblica mexicana, estado que guarden la agricultura, industria, mineria,
y comercio (Mexico, 1880), p. xviii; Manuel T. Corzo, Ligeros apuntes
geograficos y estadfsticos del estado de Chiapas (Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Imprenta
del Gobierno de Chiapas, 1897), p. 11; Datos estadfsticos del estado de
Chiapas recopilados en el afio de 1896 (Tuxtla Gutierrez: Imprenta del
Gobierno, 1898), p. 31; Anuario estadistico del estado de Chiapas. Afib de
1909 (Tuxtla Gutierrez: Tipografia del Gobierno, 1911), p. 52.

 

277

 

 

TABLE 3
Profession Number
Tailors 3
Carpenters 4
Artesans 5
Shoe Makers 8
Weavers ll
Doctors/Druggists ll
Farmers l6
Merchants 23
Other Professions 34
Resident Since 1867 107
Total 140

 

 

Source: Menpria sobre diversos ramos de la administracion publica del
estado de Chiapas por el gobernador constitucional Jose Maria Ramirez
(Chiapas: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1885).

 

278

TABLE 4

Public Rents in Chiapas, 1862—1910

 

 

Year Amount
1862 $45,633
1877 120,102
1881 135,215
1882 134,995
1883 151,249
1884 136,015
1885 154,510
1886 125,218
1887 143,332
1888 135,126
1889 183,279
1890 204,332
1891 229,608
1892 274,749
1893 441,520
1894 359,184
1895 421,428
1896 373,928
1897 504,434
1898 509,445
1899 473,295
1900 521,235
1901 492,002
1902 395,713
1903 659,421
1904 607,036
1905 835,604
1906 906,365
1907 714,884
1910 740,556

 

Source: for 1862 see, José Maria Pérez Hernandez, Estadistica de la
repfiblica mejicana (Guadalajara: Tip. del Gobierno, 1862), p. 193; for
1877 see, Emiliano Busto, Estadfstica de la repfiblica mexicana, estado
que guarden la agricultura, industria, mineria, y comercio (Mexico, 1880),
I, P. xix; and for 1881 to 1910 see, Anuario estadistico de la repfiblica
mexicana (Mexico: Sria. de Fomento, volumes for the years 1894-1912.)

 

 

279

TABLE 5

Ejido Reparto, 1893—1909

 

 

Year Pueblo Department
1893 Tuxtla Gutierrez Tuxtla
1893 Ixtacomitan Pichucalco
1893 Pinola Comitan
1893 San Carlos Comitan
1893 San Bartolomé de los Llanos La Libertad
1893 Yaja16n Chilbn
1893 Simojovel de Allende Simojovel
1893 Jiquipilas Tuxtla
1893 San Fernando Tuxtla
1893 Suchiapa Tuxtla
1894 Cintalapa Tuxtla
1894 Ocozocoautla Tuxtla
1894 Teopatan Mezcalapa
1894 Teopisca Las Casas
1894 Chiapa de Corzo Chiapa
1894 Chapultenango Pichucalco
1894 Pueblo Nuevo Chiapilla Chiapa
1895 Pichucalco Pichucalco
1895 Mezcalapa Mezcalapa
1895 Tapilula Mezcalapa
1895 Ixhuatan Mezcalapa
1895 Coapilla Mezcalapa
1895 Ostuacan Pichucalco
1895 Sunoapa Pichucalco
1895 Magdalena Las Casas
1895 Nicapa Pichucalco
1895 Citala Chilbn
1895 Solosuchiapa Pichucalco
1895 San Bartolomé Mezcalapa
1895 Ixtapangajoya Pichucalco
1895 Cacahoatan SOCODPSCO
1896 Tonala Tonala
1896 Chiapilla Chiapa
1896 San Pedro Huitiluapan Chilon
1897 Villa de Acala Chiapa
1897 Ocosingo Chilon
1897 Las Margaritas Comitan
1897 Frontera Diaz Soconusco
1897 Tuxtla Chico Soconusco
1897 Metapa Soconusco
1898 Union Juarez Soconusco
1898 Villa Flores Chiapa

M/II—

 

 

 

280

TABLE 5 (con'd.)

 

 

 

Year Pueblo Department
1898 Huixtla Soconusco
1898 Huehuetan Soconusco
1898 Socoltenango Comitan
1898 La Independencia Comitan
1898 Guaquitepec Simojovel
1899 Tapachula Soconusco
1899 Novos Simojovel
1900 Cancuc Chi16n

1900 Asuncion Huixtuipan Simojovel
1900 Mazatén Soconusco
1902 San Crist6ba1 Las Casas Las Casas
1902 Pijijiapam Tonala

1902 Mapastepec Tonala

1903 Tecpatan Mezcalapa
1903 Ixhuatan Mezcalapa
1904 Tololapa La Libertad
1904 Quechula Mezcalapa
1905 San Felipe Tizapa Soconusco
1905 Escuintla Soconusco
1905 San Diego 1a Reforma La Libertad
1905 Acacoyagua SOCOHUSCO
1907 San Cayetano Tonala

1909 Berriozabal Tuxtla

n.d. Jitotol Simojovel
n.d. Santa Margarita Palenque
Comment: The division of a village ejido often continued for several

1rs.

Source:
:itled "Oficina General de Ejidos:
7 la Oficina Gral. de Ejidos," found in the Archivo
:ci6n de Fomento, 1908, Volume III, Expediente 12.
:d to verify the accuracy of th
{LVI, Resoluciones Presidenciales,
:hivo General de la Nacibn; various expe
: Archivo "seis de enero de 1915” de la Se
l a letter from Emilio Rabasa to Porfi
: Coleccibn General

. I
r10 Diaz,

Most of the work, however, was accomplished during the first year
division, which is the year given in this table.

The basic document from which this table is compiled is
Copia del inventario general formado
Histérico de Chiapas,
Additional information
e OGE document was culled from: volumes
Ramo Comisihn Nacional Agraria,
dientes concerning Chiapas in
cretaria de Reforma Agraria;
May 21, 1894, found in

Porfirio Diaz, R011 104, Legajo XIX.

 

 

281

TABLE 6

Register of Indebted Servants, 1897

 

 

Department or Number of Value of
Partido Servants Debts

Mezcalapa 747 $72,570
Simojovel 2626 222,293
La Libertad 1142 105,701
Tonala 832 76,033
Pichucalco 3242 506,675
Chiapa 1463 125,895
Chi16n 3530 188,468
Las Casas 2238 117,733
Palenque 1131 n.d.
Comitan 4783 333,077
Soconusco 3997 467,840
Tuxtla 2339 214,904
Motozintla 714 50,971
Chamula 234 11,029
Frailesca 865 80,250
Cintalapa 1630 195,958
Total 31,512 $3,017,012

 

Comment: The Soconusco figures are incomplete due to the inexplicable
sense of two account books. Motozintla, Chamula, Frailesca, and
italapa are partidos.

Source: Periédico Oficial del Estado (Tuxtla Gutierrez), July 30, 1898.

 

 

282

TABLE 7

United States Joint Capital Investments in Chiapas, 1900—1910

 

 

 

 

Joint Stock Company Purpose of Investment
Zaccalpa Plantation Company Rubber
Tapachula Rubber Company Rubber
American Mutual Plantation Co. Rubber

St. Paul Tropical Development Co. Land Sales
Roblito Rubber Plantation Co. Rubber
Chiapas Land and Stock Co. Land Sales
Wisconsin Rubber Co. Rubber
Orizaba Rubber Plantation Co. Rubber
Graves and Graves Co. Rubber
Mexican Plantation Association Rubber
Mexican Plantation Company Rubber
Chiapas Rubber Culture Company Rubber
Palenque Development Company Rubber
Pan—American Land and Colonization C0. Land Sales
Tabasco and Chiapas Land Co. Land Sales
Mexican Hardwood Company Timber
German—American Coffee Company Coffee
Pan-American Railroad Company Railroad
Santa Clara Plantation Company Coffee
Montecristo Rubber Plantation Co. Rubber
Grijalva Land Company Coffee
Mescalapa Land Company Coffee
United States Banking Company Rubber
Chicago Rubber Plantation Company Rubber
Federal Fruit Company Rubber
Esperanza Timber Company Timber

San Marcos Rubber Plantation Co. Rubber
Comment: This table does not include investments by individual United

tes citizens resident in Chiapas such as O.H. Harrison, Charles Lesher,

. Quimby, and others.

"Rubber in Chiapas (Mexico),” June 25, 1910;
" October 10, 1910 in the
Miscellaneous Reports.

Source: Albert Brickwood, '
"Plantations in Palenque, Chiapas, Mex1co,
ional Archives, Record Group 84, Tapachula:

 

283

 

TABLE 8

Property Values in Chiapas, 1837—1906

 

 

Year Urban Property Rural Property
1837 n.d. $1,261,000
1875 n.d. 1,730,866
1877 n.d. 3,622,840
1885 $502,501 3,307,374
1896 3,002,113 18,182,372
1897 3,163,465 21,839,645
1902 3,875,588 23,272,129
1904 3,460,546 23,695,500
1905 3,640,276 30,454,266
1906 3,640,276 30,742,743

 

Comment: These are reported values for purposes of taxation, and are
devalued, according to some reports, as much as one—hundred to one—hundred
and fifty percent. (See: Chiapas, su estado actual, 1895, p. 13) This
chart, then, not only measures reported increases of landed wealth but
the increasing power of the state government to obtain more realistic
valuations.

Source: For 1837 see M6ises T. De la Pena, Chiapas econémico 4 vols.
(Tuxtla Gutierrez: Departamento de Prensa y Turismo, 1951) II, p. 325;
for 1875 see Paniagua, Catecismo, p. 92; for 1877 see Busto, Estadistica
de la repfiblica mexicana, I, p. xviii; for 1885 see Memoria sobre diversos
ramos, 1885; and for the years 1896-1906 see Anuario estadistico de la
repfiblica mexicana, 1897, 1898, 1903, 1906, 1908, 1912.

284

TABLE 9

Comparison of State-Federal Budgets, 1900—1960

 

 

Total Chiapas Total Federal
Year Chiapas Per—Capita Federal Per-Capita

Budget Expenditure Budget Expenditure
1900 $3,865 10.7 $400,960 29.4
1910 3,776 8.6 521,910 34.4
1921 2,191 5.5 757,710 52.8
1929 6,227 11.7 1,048,300 63.3
1940 10,937 16.1 1,324,850 67.4
1950 14,129 15.6 2,746,060 106.8
1960 37,908 31.3 4,828,710 138.2

 

Comment: All budget figures in millions of pesos.

1 figures refer to proposed expenditures.

In Chiapas budgets,

Source: For Chiapas proposed budgets see Peri6dico Oficial del Estado,
For Federal budgets see James W. Wilkie, The Mexican Revolution:
deral Expenditure and Social Change since 1910 (Los Angles: University

00—1960.

California Press, 1970).

285

TABLE 10

Population of Chiapas, 1877—1960

 

 

Year Population
1877 208,215
1893 304,882
1900 360,799
1910 438,843
1921 421,744
1930 521,318
1940 679,885
1950 907,026
1960 1,210,870

 

Source: Estadisticas sociales del Porfiriato, 1877—1910 (Mexico:
Direccibn General de Estadistica, 1956), p. 7; Anuario de 1930, (Mexico:
Talleres Gréficos de la Secretaria de Agricultura y Fomento, 1932), p. 34;
Secretaria de la Presidencia, Monografia del estado de Chiapas (Mexico:
Talleres Graficos de la Nacion, 1975), p. 18.

 

286

TABLE 11

Agrarian Reform in Chiapas, 1917-1948

 

 

Administration Petitions Settlements Provisional Grants
Villanueva: 41 10 17,295
1917—1919 hectéreas
Fernandez Ruiz: 47 19 20,754
1920—1924
Vidal: 102 43 87,061
1925—1927
Enriquez: n.d. 126 192,517
1928—1932
Grajales: n.d. 104 105,602
1932—1936
Gutiérrez: n.d. 424 449,150
1936—1940
Gamboa: n.d. 27 62,225
1940—1944
Esponda/Lara: n.d. 74 98,627
1944—1948

 

Source: Anuario de 1930; Gutiérrez, Informs 1939; Gutiérrez, Trayectoria
un Gobierno, pp. 40—41; and De la Pefia, Chiapas Econémico II, pp. 375—
6.

 

 

287

TABLE 11 (cont'd.).

 

 

Administration Ejidos Definitive Grants Beneficiaries
Villanueva: 4 4,470 1464
1917—1919 hectareas

Fernandez Ruiz: 14 20,274 1122
1920—1924

Vidal: 39 81,344 6634
1925—1927

Enriquez: 113 171,889 14,000
1928-1932

Grajales: 61 66,087 6131
1932—1936

Gutierrez: 261 349,180 29,398
1936-1940

Gamboa/Lara/ 115 538,374 n.d.
Esponda:

1940—1948

 

Comment: Beneficiaries refers to heads of households only.

Source: Gutiérrez, Informe 1939; Gutierrez, Trayectoria de un Gobierno,
pp. 40-41; De la Peha, Chiapas econémico II, pp. 376—377.

 

 

288

TABLE 12

Schools in Chiapas, 1927-1936

 

 

Year State/Municipal Federal/Rural Primary Federal/Total
1927 125 159 182
1928 99 151 172
1929 122 318 338
1930 183 321 344
1931 106 261 285
1932 71 311 334
1933 50 290 339
1934 117 351 380
1935 224 459 442
1936 227 461 493

 

Source: Sria. de la Economia Nacional, Anuario estadistico, 1938 (Mexico:
DAPP, 1939), p. 93.

 

289

TABLE 13

Ejido Distribution by Region in Chiapas, 1950

 

 

Zone Number of Ejidos Hectéreas in Ejidos
I: Pichucalco 13 5,162
II: Tecpatan 5 5,170
111: Chicoasen 53 37,542
IV: Simojovel 53 43,017
V: Palenque 15 5,491
VI: Las Casas 57 37,488
VII: Ocosingo 16 7,619
VIII: Comitén 93 30,079
IX: Cintalapa 42 29,836
X: Tuxtla—Chiapa 66 37,057
XI: Villa Corzo 29 27,740
XII: La Concordia 34 27,246
XIII: Motozintla 85 52,754
XIV: Tonala 33 16,310
XV: Escuintla 40 28,782
XVI: Tapachula 107 39,085

 

Source: Tercer censo agricola, ganadero, y ejidal. 1950. Chiapas
(Mexico: Direccién General de Estadfstica, 1957), p. 583.

 

290

TABLE 14

Ejidos and Ejidatarios in Chiapas, 1920—1979

 

 

Year Ejidos Ejidatariosa Percentage of Male Populationb
1920 4 1,464 Less than 1
1930 67 9,676 3.5
1935 217 29,191 n.d.
1940 395 42,566 12.5
1950 739 71,362 15.5
1960 932 92,000 15.0
1970 1216 148,210 20.0
1979 1341 n.d. n.d.

 

a"He must be a Mexican male, over sixteen years of age, if single, or
of any age if married; or female, single or widowed, if she is the head of
a family." From: Chapter III, Article 443, Agrarian Code of the United
Mexican States, 1924, quoted in Simpson, Ejido, pp. 768—769.

b

In 1940 only 52,000 women in Chiapas over the age of 15 were single
out of a total population of 338,615 women.

There were 19,000 widows.

The 1940 Census of Population listed 164 women private property owners.
Although the statistics do not provide the number of women ejidatarios,
it is probable that they were as few as women landlords. Thus, ejidatarios
as percentage of male population is a more meaningful indication of the
economic strength of ejidatarios,

Source: De la Pefia, Chiapas econémico II, pp. 375—376; Anuario de 1938,
p. 196; Anuario de 1940, p. 499; Tercer censo agricola, ganadero, y ejidal.
1950, p. 5; Helbig, Chiapas: geografia, pp. 315—316.

 

 

291

TABLE 15

Rural Private Property Owners in Chiapas, 1910—1970

 

 

 

Year Number Percentage of Male Population
1910 10,604 6%

1923 13,026 6

1927 20,930 8

1940 24,429 7

1950 28,739 6

1970 30,926 4

 

Source: De la Pefia, Chiapas econbmico II, p. 325; Anuario de 1923—1924,
p. 107; Anuario de 1930, p. 340; 60 Censo de poblacién 1940. Chiapas, p. 29;
V Censo agrfcola—ganadero y ejidal 1970. Chiapas, p. 77.

292

TABLE 16

Rates of Exchange for Pesos to U.S. Dollars, 1877-1945

 

 

Year Pesos for Dollars
1877 1.04
1894 1.98
1900 2.06
1910 2.01
1925 2.03
1933 3.50
1939 5.19
1945 4.85

 

Source: Jan Bazant, A Concise History of Mexico from Hidalgo to Cardenas,
1805-1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 192.

 

 

L IS T OF REFERENCES

ACh
AFIM
AFLB
AGC
AGN/OC
AGN/ALR
AGN/LC
AGN/MAC
AGN/MAV
AGN/CNA
AGOM
AHCH
AHRM
ASRE
ASRA

AVC
CGPD

LAM
NA/RG 59
NA/RG 76
NA/RG 84
NA/RG 165
NA/RG 266
PC

SCh
SFIM

Epigraph: Thomas Hobbes, ' .
Of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and C1v11

293

ARCHIVAL ABBREVIATIONS

Archivo de Chiapas

Archivo Francisco I. Madero

Archivo Francisco Lebn De la Barra

Archivo General de Centroamerica

Archivo General de la Nacibn/Fondo Obregbn—Calles
AGN/Fondo Abelardo L. Rodriguez

AGN/Fondo Lazaro Cardenas

AGN/Fondo Manuel Avila Camacho

AGN/Fondo Miguel Aleman Valdés

AGN/Ramo de Comisibn Nacional Agraria

Archivo General Octavio Magafia

Archivo Histbrico de Chiapas

Archivo Histhrico de Matias Romero

Archivo de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores

Archivo 'seis de enero de 1915” de la Secretaria de Reforma
Agraria

Archivo Venustiano Carranza

Colecci6n General Porfirio Diaz

Latin American Manuscripts, Lilly Library

National Archives of the United States/Record Group 59:
General Records of the Department of State

NA/Record Group 76: Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions
and Arbitrations

NA/Record Group 84: Records of the Foreign Service Posts of
the Department of State

NA/Record Group 165: Records of the War Department General
and Special Staffs

NA/Record Group 266: Records of the Office of Strategic
Services

Paniagua Collection

Serie Chiapas

Serie Francisco I. Madero

NOTES

Introduction

Leviathan, or the Matter, Forms, and Power
(1651), Volume 23 of The

Great Books (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952), p. 47.

lArnaldo C6rdova, "Regreso a la revoluci6n mexicana,‘
(julio 1980), p. 5.

' Nexos 30

- H H '
To avoid conquIOn, the word state, when it refers

294

   
 

to the constituent unit of the Mexican federal republic, is not capitalized.
The term which refers to the broader and abstract organization of the civil
society of a nation, "State," is capitalized.

2See: Richard N. Sinkin, The Mexican Reform, 1855-1876: A Study in
Liberal Nation—Building (Austin: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1979);
Laurens B. Perry, Juarez and Diaz: Machine Politics in Mexico (DeKalb:
Northern Illinois University Press, 1978); Arnaldo C6rdova, La formacién
del poder politico en Maxico (Mexico: Serie Popular Era, 1972) and La
politica de masas del cardenismo (Mexico: Serie Popular Era, 1974); Rafael
Loyola Diaz, La crisis obregén—calles y el estado mexicano (Mexico: Siglo
XXI, 1980); Octavio Ianni, El estado capitalista en la época de Cardenas
(Mexico: Serie Popular Era, 1977); Ariel José Contreras, Mexico 1940:
industrializacién y crisis politica (México: Siglo XXI, 1977).

3Z.A. Jordan, Karl Marx: Economy, Class, and Social Revolution (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971), p. 57.

4Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected works Vol. I (New York:
International Publishers, 1968), p. 171.

 

5 . . .
Sinkin, The Mex1can Reform, 1855—1876, p. 7.

6 ’ . I :I 1 I/
Arnaldo Cordova, La Ideologia de la revoluc10n mex1cana: la formac10n
del nuevo regimen (Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1973), pp. 236—237.

Chapter One

Epigraph: Claudio Veliz, The Centralist Tradition of Latin America
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 16.

l . . . ,/ ..
Quoted in: Rodric A1 Camp, "La cuestion chiapaneca: reviSIOn de una
polemica territorial," Historia Mexicana XXIV (abril—junio 1975), p. 584.

2
- Carlos Navarrete, "Historia de los chiapanecas, ICACH (julio—
diciembre 1965), pp. 160—161; Bernal Diaz del Castillo, The True History
:f8the Conquest of Mexico (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1966), pp.
5 -359.

3
Peter Gerhard, The Southeast Frontier of New Spain (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 150.

4 . .
Quoted in: J. Eric S. Thompson, ed., Thomas Gaye's Travels in the New
Vorld (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958), p. 138.

 

 

295

 

5Charles C. Cumberland, Mexico: The Struggle for Modernity (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 6-7. Chiapas is fortunate to have
two fine geographical studies, both by Karl M. Helbig, La cuenca superior

del rib Grijalva. Uh estudio regional de Chiapas, sudeste de México
(Tuxtla Gutiérrez: ICACH, 1964) and El Soconusco y su zona cafetelera en

Chiapas (Tuxtla Gutierrez: ICACH, 1964).

6The early colonial history of Chiapas is related in: Robert S.
Chamberlain, The Governorship of the Adelantado Francisco de Montejo in
Chiapas, 1539—1544 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of washington,
1948); Fray Francisco Ximénez, Historia de la provincia de San Vicente de
Chiapa y Guatemala 3 vols. (Guatemala: Biblioteca "Goatemala," 1929-1931);
Fray Antonio de Remesal, Historia general de las indias occidentales, y
particular de la gobernacién de Chiapa y Guatemala (Guatemala: Biblioteca

"Goatemala," 1932).

7Gerhard, The Southeast Frontier. See the Chapters on Chiapa and

Soconusco.
8 .
Ibld., pp. 8—14.

9Ibid., p. 21.

10Robert Wasserstrom, "White Fathers and Red Souls: Indian-Ladino
Relations in Highland Chiapas, 1528—1973," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
Department of AnthrOpology, Harvard University, 1977, pp. 48—50, 76-77.

1
lGerhard, The Southeast Frontier, pp. 169, 158—160.

12 . . . . .
William L. Sherman, Forced-Native Labor in Sixteenth Century Central
America (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979), p. 179.

13 .
Veliz, The Centralist Tradition, p. 68.

14 , . . . .
Murdo J. MacLeod, Spanish Central America: A Soc10econom1c History,
1520-1720 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 313.

15 .
Alempart, El cabildo en Chile colonial (1966) quoted in Veliz, The

Centralist Tradition, p. 25.

16
Sherman, Forced Native Labor, pp. 249—250.

17
MacLeod, Spanish Central America, pp. 145—147.

18
"Real provisi6n por la cual quedan prohibidos los servicios personales,

repartimientos y mandamientos, de un pueblo en otro, ano 1778," Archivo
General de Centroamerica, AI.22.20, expediente 26.854, legajo 2900, hereafter

cited as AGC and identifying information.

 

 

 

 

There was no cabildb in
See Gerhard, The Southeast Frontier, p. 20.

19M‘acLeod, Spanish Central America, p. 73.

Soconusco.

20Carlos Castafidn, Ciudad Real, to Real Junta Superior, Santiago,
April 19, 1819, AGC, AI.6.6, exp. 127, leg. 8; Archivo General del Estado
Boletin 2: Documentos histéricos de Chiapas (Tuxtla Gutiérrez, 1953), pp.
29; Ximénez, Chiapa y Guatemala III, pp. 257-259.

21Veliz, The Centralist Tradition, p. 72.

22Ibid., pp. 75-79. Also see: David Brading, "Government and Elite in
Colonial Mexico," The Hispanic American Historical Review 53 (August 1973),

pp. 389-414.
23Gerhard, The Southeast Frontier, pp. 153-154.

24Ibid., p. 152.

25Ayuntamiento de Ciudad Real to Fiscal, Santiago, September 3, 1793,
AGC, AI.2, exp. 594, leg. 52; "Actuaci6n judicial. Contiene 1a relaci6n de
los autos sobre las ocurrencias hebidas entre e1 ayuntamiento de Ciudad
Real de Chiapas y el Teniente Letrado Licds. Jose Mariano Valero (quien
también era Intendente Gobernador) de que resulto 1a suspensién y arresto
de este, ano 1810," AGC, AI.l5, exp. 2176, leg. 331.

26Mario Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment in Central America, 1808—1826
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 4—7.

27Ibid., pp. 18—25.

28 . . . . . ,
Henri Favre, Cambio y continuidad entre los mayas de Mex1co,.contribucion
al estudio de la situacién colonialista en America Latina (Mexico: Siglo

XXI, 1973), p. 50.

29"Informe de la sociedad economica de Chiapa dado de orden del Exmo.
Sor. Presidente, gobernador, y capitan general del reyno en el expediente
sobre ventajas, o deterioro que ha producido a aquella provincia e1
sistema de intendencia, Ciudad Real, 11 de diciembre de 1819," AGC, AI.6.6,

exp. 127, leg. 8.

30 John Coatsworth, "Obstacles to Economic Growth in Nineteenth~

See:
Century Mexico," The American Historical Review 83 (February, 1978), p. 94.

31Quoted in Miles WOrtman, "Government Revenue and Economic Trends in
Central America, 1787—1819," The Hispanic American Historical Review 55

(May, 1975), pp. 267—268.

 

 

 

—_ "ww— —-—-

 

32John Lynch, The Spanish-American Revolutions, 1808-1826 (New York: W.
Norton, 1973), pp. 34-35; Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, pp. 31-35.

33Rodriguez, The Cadiz Experiment, pp. 71-72.
34 . . .
Lynch, The Spanish—American Revolutions, pp. 318—321.

35Ai Camp, "La cuesti6n chiapaneca," pp. 582—584. Also see for fuller
treatment of the topic: Prudencio Moscoso Pastrana, Mexico y Chiapas:
Independencia y federacién de la provincia chiapaneca (Tuxtla Gutierrez:
Bosquejo Hist6rico, 1974); Valentin Rincbn Coutino, Chiapas entre Guatemala
y Mexico (Mexico: Sociedad Mexicana de Geografia y Estadistica, 1964);
Rafael Heliodoro Valle, La anexién de Centro America a Mexico 6 vols.

(México, 1924-1949).
36 . . .
Favre, Cambio y CODtanldad, pp. 52—53.

37Sala Capitular de Chiapa to Don Pedro Solorzano, October 29, 1821,
in Archivo Histbrico del Estado, Boletin de documentos histbricos. No. 12

(Tuxtla Gutiérrez, 1974), pp. 43-48.
38 n - n
Wortman, Government Revenue and Economic Trends, pp. 267—268.

Also see: Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr.,

39Favre, Cambio y continuidad, p. 53.
" The

"Economic and Social Origins of the Guatemalan Political Parties,
Hispanic American Historical Review 45 (November, 1965), pp. 544-566.

40La Junta General celebrada en Ciudad Real de Chiapa, Abril 8 de 1823,
AGC, B6.2.1., exp. 2387, leg. 84, fol. 1; "Plan de libertad de la Prov.
de Chiapa," Boletih de documentos. No. 12, pp. 107—110. Also see: Rodriguez,

The Cadiz Experiment, pp. 174-179.

41Matias Ruiz, Alcalde de ComitEn, to Secretario de Relaciones de la
Provincias Unidas del Centro de America, October 27, 1823, AGC, B5.8,
exp. 2037, leg. 72, fol. 166; Vicente Filisola, "Descripci6n de la
provincia de Chiapa," November 28, 1823, Latin American Manuscripts. Also
see: "Plan de libertad de la Prov. de Chiapa," Boletin de documentos. No 12.

2 , ./ . :
A1 Camp, "La cuestion ch1apaneca,‘ p. 602.

43Coutino, Chiapas entre Guatemala y Mexico, pp. 16—17; Cesar Sephlveda,
"Historia y problemas de los limites de Mexico. La frontera sur," Historia
Mexicana VIII (octubre-diciembre 1958), p. 146; Chester Lloyd Jones,
Guatemala: Past and Present (Minneapolis: University of Minnisota Press,
L940), pp. 35-39; Manuel Larrainzar, Noticia histérica de Soconusco y su

incorporacién a la repfiblica mexicana (Mexico, 1843), pp. 56-57.

 

 

 

298

44Manuel Trens, Historia de Chiapas (Mexico, 1942), pp. 349, 356, 375-
377, 381-400, 342, 456, 499, 507, 509, 526.

45

Gral. Angel Albino Corzo, Segundo resena de sucesos ocurridos en

Chiapas desde 1847 a 1867 (Tuxtla Gutierrez: Gobierno del Estado, 1964,
1868), pp. 23—24.

 

Larrainzar, Noticia histérica de Soconusco, p. 79.

Mario Garcia 5., Soconusco en la historia (Mexico, 1963), p. 171.

Larrainzar, Noticia histérica de Soconusco, pp. 82-83.

49Trens, Historia de Chiapas, pp. 375—377, 381-385; Corzo, Segunda
resena de sucesos, pp. 59-60, 99.

OCorzo, Segunda resena de sucesos, pp. 32-33, 45-46; Alberto Cal y
Mayor Redondo, "Evolucibn politica y constitucional del estado de Chiapas,"
Tesis profesional, UNAM, 1954, pp. 93—95; Manuel Trens, El imperio en
Chiapas, 1863-1864 (Tuxtla Gutierrez, 1956), pp. 7—10.

Corzo, Segunda resena de sucesos, p. 8; Carlos Caceres L6pez, Historia
general del estado de Chiapas 2 vols. (Mexico, 1963) 11, Chapter XII.

Anonymous, "Analisis situacibn general estado de Chiapas, 1878,"
Archivo Histbrico de Matias Romero, expediente 28784, hereafter cited as
AHMR and identifying information.

53Ibid.; Also see: "Sebastien Escobar y el departamento de Soconusco,

Estado de Chiapas, apuntes para la historia por Carlos Gris, 1885." in

Archivo de Chiapas, Tomo VIII, documento 4—47, hereafter identified as
ACh and identifying information.

Ricardo Jordan, Tapachula, to Porfirio Diaz, January 11, 1885, Coleccién
General Porfirio Diaz, Roll 12, Legajo X, Document 1558; Coronel Telesforo
Merodio, San Cristbbal, to Porfirio Diaz, July 11, 1888, Colecci6n General
Porfirio Diaz, Roll 42, Legajo XIII, Document 7025, hereafter identified as
CGPD and identifying information; Céceres prez, Historia general 11, p.

234; J. Mario Garcia Soto, Geografia general de Chiapas (Mexico, 1969),
pp. 250—255.

5Manuel Caracosa to Porfirio Diaz, January 31, 1891, CGPD,65, XVI,1499.

56Caracosa to Diaz, September 24, 1890, CGPD,63,XV, 11897; Caracosa to
Diaz, October 1, 1890, CGPD,63,XV,11898.

57Merodia to Diaz, July 11, 1888, CGPD,42,XIII,7025. Also see:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

299

E. Simon to Porfirio Diaz, December 20, 1890, CGPD,64,XV,14399.

58Domaciano G6mez to Diaz, December 25, 1890, CGPD,64,XV,14248. Also
see: D. Bejares to Diaz, November 22, 1890, CGPD,64,XV,14526.

59Candiani to Diaz, January 12, 1891, CGPD,65,XVI,266.

6OMuriel Verbitsky and John C. Hotchkiss, "Appendix 1: Historical
Problems," Report on the "Man-in-Nature" Project, UnpUblished Manuscript,
University of Chicago, 3 vols., 1959, II, p. 5; Robert Wasserstrom,
"Population Growth and Economic Development in Chiapas, 1524—1975,"
Human Ecology 6 (1978), p. 134; Garcia Soto, Geografia general de Chiapas,
pp. 151, 155, 173; Virginia Molina, San Bartolome de los Llanos: Una
urbanizacién frenada (Mexico: SEP/INAH, 1976), p. 88.

61Mary Lowenthal, "The Elite of San Cristobal," Unpublished manuscript,
Harvard Chiapas Project, 1963, pp. 21—24.

2Daniela Spenser, "The Formation of a Coffee Economy in Soconusco,
1870-1914," Unpublished manuscript, 1981. Also see: Helen H. Sargent,
San Antonio Nexapa (New York: Vantage Press, 1952), p. 77.

63El Democrata, October 20, 1880; Government of Chiapas, Decree 3,
November 1, 1881, Serie Chiapas, Roll 77, Volume XXIV, hereafter cited as
SCh and identifying information; Expediente de la Secretaria de Hacienda
respecto de las medidas propuestas y acordadas para impulsar e1 desarrollo
de los elementos de rigueza agricola del Departamento de Soconusco en el
Estado de Chiapas, 1870—1871 (México: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1871);
Federico Larrainzar, Los intereses materiales en Chiapas (San Cristbbal,
1881), pp. 1—2, 8—10, 17—18.

64El Caudillo, April 29, 1888.

5Memoria sobre diversos ramos (1883), p. 75.
Chapter Two

Epigraph: Emilio Rabasa, La constitucién y la dictadura, estudio sobre
la organizacibn politica de Mexico (Mexico: Revista de Revistas, 1912), p.
306; Albert Brickwood, "AgricultUre in the Valleys of Cintalapa and
Jiquipilas, State of Chiapas, Mexico," October 4, 1910, National Archives,
Record Group 84, Tapachula: Miscellaneous Reports, hereafter cited as
NA, Record Group number, and identifying information.

lRabasa to Diaz, August 12, 1892, CGPD,84,XVII,12859.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2
Coatsworth, "Obstacles to Economic Growth," p. 99; Wilfred Hardy
Callcott, Liberalism in Mexico, 1857-1929 (Stanford: Stanford University

Press, 1931), p. 131.

3Albert Brickwood, "Coffee in Soconusco, Chiapas," September 26, 1910,
NA, RG 84, Vol. 159 C8.6, Tapachula: Miscellanous Reports.

4Brickwood, "Lands in Chiapas, (Mexico)," August 10, 1910, NA, RG 84,
Tapachula: Miscellaneous Reports; "Colonizacibn en Chiapas," 1913, Archivo
de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Legajo 11-2-141, hereafter
cited as ASRE and identifying information.

5Carlos Gris, "Queris ser rico,” El universal, December 30, 1891;
"Informe sobre el cultivo del cafe," La Agricultura, November 15, 1892;
Chiapas, su estado actual, su riqueza, sus ventas para los negocios (Mexico:
Imprenta de la Escuela Correccional, 1895), p. 8; Coffee: Extensive
Information and Statistics (Washington, D.C.: International Bureau of the
American Republics, 1902), p. 17; Karl Kaerger, Landwirtschaft und
Kolonisation im Spanischen Amerika 2 vols. (Leipsig: Verlag von Duncker
und Humbolt, 1901), II, pp. 192—193, 521—525.

6W.W. Byam, A Sketch of the State of Chiapas, Mexico (Los Angles: Geo.
Rice and Sons, 1897), pp. 37, 45-46, 74; J. Figueroa Domenech, Guia general
descriptive de la republica mexicana, Tbmo II: Estados y territorios
federales (Mexico: Ramon Araluce, 1899), p. 91; The Mexican Year Book, l912
(Mexico: Department of Finance, 1912), p. 128.

7Byam, A Sketch of the State of Chiapas, p. 42; Manuel T. Corzo, Ligeros
apuntes geograficos y estadisticos del Estado de Chiapas (Tuxtla Gutierrez:
Imprenta del Gobierno, 1897), p. 27; Anuario estadistico de la repfiblica
mexicana. 1894 (México: Secretaria de Fomento, 1894), p. 611.

8Emiliano Busto, Estadistica de la republica mexicana. Estado que guarden
la agricultura, industria, minerfa, y comercio (Mexico, 1880) I, p. xviii;
Datos estadisticos del estado de Chiapas recopilados en el afio de 1896
(Tuxtla Gutierrez: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1898).

9El Partido Liberal, December 18, 1890; El Universal, September 3, 1891;
La Juventud Estudiosa, September 1, 1893; E1 Veto de Chiapas, June 1, 1895;
Lazaro Pavia, Los estados y sus gobernates (Mexico, 1890), pp. 115-116;
Jose C. Valades, El Porfirismo, historia de un regimen. El crecimiento

(Mexico: Editorial Patria, 1948) I, pp. 288-289.

10Daniel Cosio Villegas, Historia moderna de Mexico. E1 Porfiriato. La
Vida politica interior (Mexico: Editorial Hermes, 1970), VIII, pp. xxi—
xxiii, and vol. IX, pp. x—xiv, 313, 375.

11Marcia Ann Hakala, "Emilio Rabasa, Modern Mexican Novelist," Dies.
Indiana University 1970, pp. 1—2.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

301

12Ibid., pp. 2-28. Also see: Vicente Llevano, Lic. Emilio Rabasa

(Tuxtla Gutierrez: Gobierno Constitucional del Estado, 1946), pp. 8—12;
El Universal, July 14, 1891.

13El Partido Liberal, March 29, 1890.
l4"Conflictos pecunicarios en Chiapas," El Universal, January 14, 1892.
15

E. Pino, Tonalé, to Porfirio Diaz, November 2, 1890, CGPD,64,XV,13828.

l6Diaz to Caracosa, May 9, 1891, CGPD,68,XVI,4666; Valadés, El Porfirismo
I, pp. 34—38; J. Mario Garcia Soto, GeOgrafia general de Chiapas (Mexico,
1969), p. 225.

17El Monitor Republicano, January 8, 1892.

18El VOto de Chiapas, June 1, 1895.

Rabasa to Diaz, March 28, 1892, CGPD,78,XVIII,4551; Rabasa to Diaz,
April 9, 1892, CGPD,82,XVIII,9647.

Rabasa to Diaz, June 15, 1892, CGPD,83,XVII,11203; Rabasa to Diaz,
August 12, 1892, CGPD,84,XVII,12859; Rabasa to Diaz, August 23, 1892, CGPD,
85,XVII, 14543. Also see: Decree 8, August 11, 1892, Governor Emilio
Rabasa, SCh, 78, XXVIII; Traslacién de los poderes pfiblicos del estado,

de la capital de San Cristébal Las Casas a la Ciudad de Tuxtla Gutierrez,
1892 (1902), ACh, IX.

General S. Escobar, Malacatan, to Diaz, August 12, 1892; Diaz to
Rabasa, August 12, 1892 [note written on Escobar's telegram by Diaz];
Rabasa to Diaz, August 15, 1892, CGPD,323,LI,6100 and 6122.

22

Alfredo Saavedra, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to Diaz, August 18, 1894, CGPD,
106,XIX,11178. There were no federal rurales in Chiapas.

2
3M.M. Mijangos, San Cristfibal, to Diaz, June 24, 1892, CGPD,85,XVII,
14345.

"Decreto por el que se nombra a jefes politicos de departamentos
Para mejorar 1a administracién, 29 de diciembre de 1893," ACh,IX, Ramo
de Gobernaci6n; Antonio A. Moguel, Reseha de las atribuciones y deberes
de los jefes politicos de Chiapas fermada de acuerdo con la legislacién

Vigente y por disposici6n del ejecutivo del estado (Tuxtla Gutiérrez:
ImPrenta del Gobierno, 1897).

Anomino, San Cristbbal, to Secretario de Fomento, Mexico, July 8,
1892, CGPD,84,XVII,12856.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

26Joaquin Ortega, San Cristbbal, to Diaz, July 18, 1892, CGPD,85,XVII,14386;
Fortunato Mazarigos, San Cristbbal, to Diaz, June 20, 1892, CGPD,85,XVII,
14343; Jose Ma. Mijangos, San Cristbbal, to Diaz, July 1, 1892, CGPD,85,
XVII, 14344; C. Morales, San Crist6ba1, to Diaz, June 20, 1892, CGOD,85,

XVII,14342.

7Rabasa to Diaz, February 12, 1892, CGPD,77,XVII,2792; Rabasa to Diaz,

2
March 25, 1892, CGPD,78,XVIII,4549; Manuel Figuero, Tapachula, to Diaz,
April 11, 1893, CGPD,92,XVII; Rabasa to Diaz, May 17, 1893, CGPD,92,XVIII,

6224.

28Rabasa to Diaz, October 14, 1893, CGPD,98,XVIII,15335.

29Teofilo Palacios, Tapachula, to Diaz, November 26, 1893, CGPD,100,
XVIII,18770; Rabasa to Diaz, February 18, 1894, CGPD,101,XIX,2678.

Several politicians, businessmen, and

30See: Spenser, "Coffee Economy.
landowners from Tuxtla Gutiérrez and San Cristbbal owned or held interests

in coffee plantations in Soconusco. See: Thomas Benjamin, "Register of
Chiapanecan Elites, 1890-1940," Unpublished manuscript, 1980.

lJulian Grajales, Chiapa de Corzo, to Diaz, January 4, 1892, CGPD,89,
XVIII,502.

32Grajales to Diaz, November 1, 1892, CGPD,86,XVII,17185.

33Diaz to Grajales, November 25, 1892, CGPD,86,XVII,17186; Grajales to
Diaz, August 2, 1894, CGPD,106,XIX,11381.

34E1 Partido Liberal, January 10, 1892.

5 . .
Governor FranCisco Le6n, Tuxtla Gutierrez, to Diaz, December 20, 1898,

CGPD,156,XXIII,17495.

36Rabasa to Diaz, January 13, 1894, CGPD,100,XIX,300. I uncovered no

information regarding actions Rabasa took to bring Pichucalco under the
control of the state government.

37Luis ESpinosa, ed., Chiapas (México, 1925), no pagination. For a

Similar opinion see: José Casahonda Castillo, 50 afios de revolucién en
Chiapas (Tuxtla Gutierrez:lnstituto de Ciencias y Artes de Chiapas, 1974),

p. 15.

38Valadés, El Porfirismo I, p. 124; Chiapas, su estado actual, p. 13.

39"Conf1iCtOS pecuniarios en Chiapas," El Universal, January 14, 1892;
Rabasa to Diaz, January 20, 1892, CGPD,76,XVII,1155.

 

 

 

 

 

 

0Circular 1, Secci6n de Hacienda, March 26, 1892, and, Dictamen del
Comisibn, May 26, 1892, SCh,78,XXVIII; Rambn Rabasa, El estado de Chiapas:
geografia y estadistica (Mexico, 1895), p. 115; El Universal, September
26, 1893; Rabasa to Diaz, August 4, 1892, CGPD,84,XVII,12862.

41Discurso del Lic. Emilio Rabasa (Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Imprenta del
Gobierno, 1892, 1893); Llevano, Lic Emilio Rabasa, pp. 20—21; Cal y Mayor
Redondo, "Evolucibn politica y constitucional," pp. 104—105; Rabasa to

Diaz, July 18, 1893, CGPD,94,XVIII,9141.
42Rabasa to Diaz, March 25, 1892, CGPD,78,XVIII,4549.

43Rabasa to Diaz, January 13, 1894, CGPD,100,XIX,300; R. Rabasa, El
estado de Chiapas, p. 115.

44Rabasa to Diaz, August 23, 1892, CGPD,85,XVII,14543.

Fernando Castafi6n Gamboa, "Panorama hist6rico de las comunicaciones
en Chiapas," Ateneo Chiapas 1 (1951), p. 90.

46Francisco Lebn to Diaz, June 15, 1896, CGPD,129,XXI,9371.

47Rabasa to Diaz, March 22, 1893, CGPD,92,XXI,5499; Discurso del Lic.

Emilio Rabasa, 1892, 1893; Angel M. Corzo, Historia de Chiapas (México:
Editorial "Protos," 1944), pp. 137—140; Casahonda Castillo, 50 afios de

revolucién, p. 14.

48Rabasa to Diaz, April 24, 1892, CGPD,80,XVII,6243.

49Discurso del Lic. Emilio Rabasa, 1892, 1893. Also see: Rabasa to

Diaz, April 24, 1892, CGPD,80,XVII,6243; Rabasa to Diaz, January 15, 1894,
CGPD,XX,100,300; Rabasa to Diaz, September 5, 1893, CGPD,96,XVIII,12498.

50 . . , . .
See: Miguel Mejia Fernandez, Politica agraria en MeXico en el Siglo

XIX'(México: Siglo XXI, 1979), p. 253.

51Ley y reglamento para la divisi6n y reparto de egidos en el estado
de Chiapas (Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1893), pp. 1—18.

52Srio. Gral. Oficina Ejidos to Srio. Gral. Gobierno (Chiapas), December,

23, 1908, Archivo Historico de Chiapas, Secci6n de Fomento, 1908, Volume
III, expediente 12, hereafter cited as AHCH and identifying information.

53Datos estadisticos del Estado de Chiapas (1896), p. 1; Anuario
estadistico del Estado de Chiapas, afio de 1909 (Tuxtla Gutierrez: Tipografia

del Gobierno, 1911), p. 54.

 

 

 

 

 

 

54"Oficina General de Ejidos: Copia del inventario general formado por
la Oficina Gral. de Ejidos," AHCH, Fomento, 1908, Vol. III, exp. 12.

" Daily Cbnsular and Trade Reports,

55Albert Brickwood, "Tapachula,
Also see: Jean

October 25, 1911 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1911), p. 434.
Meyer, Problemas campesinos y revueltas agrarias, 1821-1910 (México:
SepSetentas, 1973), p. 229.

56Pueblo Nuevo Chiapilla, AGN,CNA,Libro 12, Caja 2.

7Vecinos de Chiapa de Corzo to Diaz, January 6, 1895, CGPD,112,XX,936.
"Copia del inventario general formado por la Oficina Gral. de Ejidos,"
AHCH,Fomento,1908,111,12.

59Mogue1 to Diaz, January 11, 1895, CGPD,112,XX,936.
6ORabasa, Mexico City, to Diaz, May 21, 1894, CGPD,104,XIX,7417.

Emilio Rabasa, La evolucién histérica de Mexico (Mexico: Editorial

Porrua, 1956, 1920), p. 237.

2Rabasa to Diaz, January 15, 1894, CGPD,100,XX,300; Rabasa to Diaz,
December 17, 1892, CGPD,88,XVII,19858.

63El Universal, January 17, 1894.

Ley del Director General de Instruccibn Pfiblica, December 28, 1892,

Decree 8, SCh,84,Second Series.

65El Universal, January 17, 1894.

66Elliot S. Glass, Mexico en las obras de Emilio Rabasa (Mexico:
Editorial Diana, 1975), p. 41; Discurso del Lic. Emilio Rabasa, 1893.

67Rabasa, La evolucién histérica, pp. 222, 224

68Castellanos, Comitén, to Diaz, December 8, 1892, CGPD,90,XVIII,1802;
Alfonso, Comitan, to Diaz, July 28, 1894, CGPD,106,XIX,10114.

 

69V. Pineda, San Cristbbal, to Diaz, August 8, 1894, CGPD,106,XVIII,11163;

B. Topete, San Cristébal, to Diaz, January 15, 1895, CGPD,112,XX,354; Cal
Y Mayor R., "Evoluci6n politica y constitucional," p. 105.

70131 Universal, January 27, 1893, June 9, 1895; El VOto de Chiapas,

 

 

 

 

305

June 1, 1895; Ricardo de Marcia y Campos, Administrador de Aduana,
Tapachula, to Diaz, November 15, 1894, CGPD,110,XIX,17617.

71Hakala, "Emilio Rabasa," pp. 137-150.

72Rabasa, La constitucién y la dictadura, pp. 305, 316.

73Eugene M. Braderman, "A Study of Political Parties and Politics in
Mexico since 1890," Diss. University of Illinois, 1938, pp. 15—17;
Leopoldo Zea, Positivism in Mexico (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1974), pp. 235-245; Walter N. Breymann, "The Cientificos: Critics of the
Diaz Regime, 1892—1903," Proceedings of the Arkansas Academy of Science

V11 (1954), pp. 91—97.

7 . ,, . .
4The Rabasa—Diaz corre5pondence in the Colecc10n General Porfirio Diaz
confirms this point many times over.

75F. Moguel, Tuxtla Gutierrez, to Diaz, February 28, 1894, CGPD,102,
XIX,3521.

76Manuel Lacroix, Tuxtla Gutierrez, to Diaz, December 3, 1895, CGPD,123,
XX, 18724.

77Le’on to Diaz, September 6, 1899, CGPD,347,LVIII,3717.

78Emilio Rabasa, "Memorandum," to Diaz, October 1905, CGPD,223,XXX,13655.

79Rabasa to Diaz, January 13, 1894, CGPD,100,XX,300.

80Alfonso M. de Lascurian, "Influencia de Don Emilio Rabasa, en la
Constitucién de 1917,” Tesis, UNAM, 1956, pp. 24-25, 37; Hilario Medina,
"Emilio Rabasa y la Constituci6n de 1917," Historia Mexicana 10 (junio-
julio 1960), pp. 134—148; Cosio Villegas, La constitucién de 1857 y sus
criticos (Mexico: Editorial Hermes, 1957), pp. 61~62, 167-193. In 1906
Rabasa published El articulo l4 constitucional and in 1912 La constitucién

y la dictadura.

81Cosio Villegas, Change in Latin America: The Mexican and Cuban
Revolutions (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), p. 27. Cosio
also suggested that "the form of the new regime was actually suggested by
a reactionary who wished to give posthumous justification to the dictatorial
government of Porfirio Diaz." (p. 27). Rabasa's ideas helped model the
constitutional form of the revolutionary government because he anticipated
the necessity of a centralized, interventionist State. He viewed the
porfirian political system not as the best government Mexico could ever
attain but as a necessary, but temporary, passage in the evolution of the
modern Mexican State; a State based on law and institutions, not capricious
decrees and personalities. Cosio also argued that Rabasa "certainly

 

 

 

 

 

306

lacked any revolutionary ideas or inclinations." (p.27.) In his novel

La bola, however, Rabasa considered revolution "the daughter of the

progress of the world, the inevitable law of humanity.... To them [revolutions]
we owe the rapid transformation of society and institutions." See: Hakala,
"Emilio Rabasa," pp. 152—153. Perhaps Cosio's disappointment with the

Mexican Revolution in the 19403 can be explained not by changes in the
revolution but its faithfulness to porfirian statism.

82
El universal, May 25, 1856.

Chapter Three

Epigraph: Francisco Le6n to Porfirio Diaz, May 25, 1896, CGPD,129,XXI,
9447; Lebn to Diaz, August 1, 1896, CGPD,132,XXI,13977.

1El Universal, May 26, 1899.

2Topete, Tuxtla Gutierrez, to Diaz, December 18, 1894, CGPD,111,XIX,
19654; Topete, San Cristbbal, to Diaz, January 15, 1895, CGPD,112,XX,354.
Also see: Daniel Cosio Villegas, Historia moderna de Mexico. El Porfiriato.
La Vida politica exterior (Mexico: Editorial Hermes, 1960) V, p. 254.

3Lebn to Diaz, April 2, 1895, CGPD,116,XX,6577; Luis Espinosa, ed.,
Chiapas (Mexico, 1925), no pagination.

4Juan Angel Pefia, San Bartolomé, to Diaz, July 27, 1894, CGPD,106,XIX,
10113; Manuel Marina, Chiapa de Corzo, to Diaz, July 30, 1894, CGPD,106,XIX,
11244; R. Rovelo, Comitén, to Diaz, April 14, 1895, CGPD,117,XX,8625;
Nicolas Dominguez, Comitén, to Diaz, August 10, 1894, CGPD,106,XIX,11206;
M. Mijanjos, San Cristbbal, to Diaz, May 30,1895, CGPD,118,XX,11305;
Mariano Trujillo, Tuxtla Gutierrez, to Diaz, August 4, 1894, CGPD,106,XIX,
11204; Julian Grajales, Chiapa de Corzo, to Diaz, August 2, 1894, CGPD,
106,XIX,11381; Miguel Utrilla, San Cristbbal, to Diaz, August 24, 1894,
CGPD,107,XIX,14764; Manuel Castellanos, Comitén,to Diaz, July 28, 1894,

CGPD,108,XIX,14249.

5The precise composition of this group would change over the years.
V. Pineda, San Cristbbal, to Diaz, August 8, 1894, CGPD,106,XIX,5393;
Pimentel, San Cristbbal, to Diaz, November 30, 1895, CGPD,103,XX,5393.

6During the decade 1900-1910 this groups was called "La mano negra."
Rafael Pimentel, San Cristbbal, to Diaz, November 30, 1895, CGPD,122,XX,

18031.

7 , . .
Abenamar Evoli, San Cristobal, to Diaz, April 2, 1895, CGPD,115,XX,

 

 

 

 

 

307

5948; Lebn to Diaz, December 14, 1895, CGPD,336,LIV,7048.
8Pimentel to Diaz, November 30, 1895, CGPD,122,XX,18031.
9Lacroix to Diaz, December 12, 1895, CGPD,123,XX,18685.

10Pimentel to Diaz, N0vember 30, 1895, CGPD,122,XX,18031; Pimentel to
Diaz, December 31, 1895, CGPD,336,LIV,7434.

llLe‘6n to Diaz, April 29, 1897, CGPD,140,XXII,5995.

leemoria presentada por el ejecutivo del Estado de Chiapas...
(Tuxtla Gutierrez: Imprenta del Gobierno,. 1899.)

13From El Porvenir de Chiapas, quoted in El Partido Liberal, May 27, 1896.
l4Le‘bn to Diaz, August 26, 1898, CGPD,154,XXVII,12909.

15"Memorandum que presenta al C. Presidente de la Repfiblica, e1
Gobernador de Chiapas," February 17, 1899, CGPD,158,XXIV,2339.

16Quoted in El Partido Liberal, May 27, 1896.

l7Le’on to Diaz, June 10, 1896, CGPD,129,XXI,9401.

18Lacroix to Diaz, n.d. (approximately January 1896), CGPD,124,XXI,426.

19Secretaria de Hacienda del Estado de Chiapas, Decreto Num. 8,
December 28, 1895, CGPD,129,XXI,9439.

20"Nota de lo recaudado por el Gobierno Federal en el Estado de Chiapas
en los afios que se indican," and "Lo que ha hecho e1 Gobierno Federal en
beneficio del Estado de Chiapas," January 1899, CGPD,158,XXIV,3128 and 3130.

21Diaz to Lebn, March 5, 1896, CGPD,300,XLI,402.

22Ibid.

23El universal, January 16, 1896; El Partido Liberal, September 30, 1896.

24"Memorandum que presenta al C. Presidente de la Republica...." 1899.

2 , . I
5"Reglamento de la InSpeccion General de Salubridad Publica," May 31,
1897, SCh,XXVIII,78, Second Series.

 

 

 

 

 

26

El Universal, October 1, 1899.
27Lebn to Diaz, August 9, 1898, CGPD,152,XXII,10721.

28Gast6n Garcia Canth, El Socialismo en Mexico. Siglo XIX (México:
Ediciones Era, 1969), pp. 239—240, 381-403.

29The author canvassed all the available issues of Chiapanecan newspapers
for the period 1860 to 1911, in all over fifty periodicals.. These news—
papers are in the Hemeroteca "Fernando Castafién Gamboa," Tuxtla Gutierrez,
in the 108-roll microfilm collection Serie Chiapas, and in the Chiapas
Collection at the Latin American Library of Tulane University.

3OLa Brfijula, October 20, 1878.

31El Partido Liberal, January 8, 1886.

32El Dembcrata, September 10, 1880; El Sentimiento Nacional, December 28,
1883; El Trabajo, January 10, 1886; El MOnitor Republicano, May 26, 1885.

33Documentos relativos a1 Congreso Agricola de Chiapas (Tuxtla Gutierrez:
Imprenta del Gobierno del Estado, 1896), p. 69.

34Quoted in Diego G. prez Rosado, Historia y pensamiento econémico de
Mexico 6 vols., (Mexico: UNAM, 1969) III, p. 326.

35La Agriculture, January 15, 1893.

36Discurso del Lic. Emilio Rabasa. 1893. Nearly a year earlier Rabasa
had expressed his reservations regarding the efficiency of indebted servitude

to Diaz privately, See: Rabasa to Diaz, December 12, 1892, CGPD,88,XVII,

19860.

37Circular Num. 6, December 7, 1895, SCh,XVIII,75.

38Le6n to Diaz, April 30, 1896, CGPD,128,XXI,7354.

39Valadés, El porfirismo I, p. 274.

40The delegates are listed in Documentos Congreso Agricola, pp. viii-xi,
For compilations of Chiapanecan elites see: Directorio general de la
repfiblica mexicana, 1893-1894 (Mexico, 1893); Directorio general de la
repfiblica mexicana, 1900—1901 (México, 1900); Anuario estadistico del

estado de Chiapas, afio de 1909.

4 I
lDocumentos Congreso Agricola, pp. 58, 104—105.

 

 

 

309

42 . , -
Ibid., pp. 23, 33, 71. Also see: Moises T. De la Pena, Chiapas

econbmico 4 vols. (Tuxtla Gutierrez: Departamento de Prensa y Turismo,
1951) II, pp. 357-358.

3"Cuestionario aprobado por el Congreso Agricola para su estudio,"
April 9, 1896, CGPD,127,XXI,5536.

44

45

Diaz to Le6n, March 1896, CGPD,127,XXI,7304.
Le6n to Diaz, April 7, 1896, CGPD,127,XXI,5541.

6Documentos Congreso Agricola, pp. 32-33.

47Ibid., pp. 84—87.

48Ibid., pp. 63—72.

49Ibid., p. 91.

5OLe‘bn to Diaz, April 30, 1896, CGPD,128,XXI,7354.

SlDiaz to Le6n, May 1896, CGPD,128,XXI,7356.

52Documentos Congreso Agricola, pp. 131-144.
53Decree Number 8, May 24, 1897, SCh,XXVIII,78.

4Informe del Gobernador de Chiapas C. Coronel Francisco Lean (Tuxtla
Gutiérrez: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1897).

55Lebn to Diaz, June 15, 1896, CGPD,129,XXI,9371.
56Diaz to Lebn, June 30, 1896, CGPD,129,XXI,9373.
57Le"on to Diaz, December 20, 1898, CGPD,156,XXIII,17495.

8Lacroix to Diaz, n.d. (approximately January 1896), CGPD,124,XXI,426.

59Lacroix to Diaz, March 31, 1896, CGPD,125,XXI,1863.

60 November 22, 1898, CGPD,156,XXIII,17542.

Le6n to Diaz,

61Julian Hornedo, Jefe Politico, Soconusco, to Diaz, March 24, 1896,

CGPD,127,XXI,5434.

 

310

62 . I
Gral. Bravo, San Cristobal, to Diaz, January 23, 1896, CGPD,337,LV,
458; Bravo to Diaz, January 26, 1896, CGPD,124,XXI,1457.

63Le6n to Diaz, March 26, 1896, CGPD,127,XXI,5584.

64Diaz to Lebn, April 6, 1896, CGPD,127,XXI,5585.

65
Decree Number 5, April 25, 1896, AHCH, Hemeroteca, Foleto "San
Cristbbal."

66Le6n to Diaz, April 10, 1896, CGPD,127,XXI,5530.

67Le6n to Diaz, August 26, 1896, CGPD,154,XVIII,12906.

68Utrilla to Diaz, July 29, 1896, CGPD,338,LV,4187.

69Le6n to Diaz, July 29, 1896, CGPD,338,LV,4140.

70Lebn to Diaz, July 30, 1896, CGPD,132,XXI,13977.

7lLe6n to Diaz, July 30, 1896, CGPD,338,LV,4206.

72Le6n to Diaz, May 17, 1897, CGPD,341,LVI,2026.

73Jose Franco, Santos Cristiani, M. Vidal, et. al., Pichucalco, to
Diaz, April 2, 1899, CGPD,159,XXIV,4563; Vecinos de Pichucalco to Diaz,
June 13, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,2267.

74Lebn to Diaz, July 7, 1897, CGPD,142,XXII,9423.

75J. Antonio Rivera G., David Culebro, Jesfis Dominguez, et. al., Comitén,
to Diaz, May 30, 1899, CGPD,161,XXIV,7944.

76Vicente Espinosa, San Cristbbal, to Sefiorita Emelimia Avendano,
México, December 3, 1898, CGPD,162,XXIV,10063. This letter was intercepted

by Le6n.
77Lebn to Diaz, August 19, 1899, CGPD,163,XXIV,11560.

78Jose Delegado, Pichucalco, to Diaz, May 1, 1899, CGPD,160,XXIV,5841;

El Universal, April 14, 1899.

79El universal, May 26, 1899.

80Le6n to Diaz, May 27, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,1994.

 

311

81 ,
Leon to Diaz, May 29, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,2008. Diaz advised Lébn

he should give "no credit to rumors." See: Diaz to Le6n, May 30, 1899,
CGPD,346,LVIII, 2009.

82El Universal, May 30, 1899.

8 , ,
3Leon to Diaz, June 12, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,2247.

84 I ,
Leon to Diaz, July 9, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,2617; Clemente Robles, San
Crist6ba1, to Diaz, July 10, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,2544.

85El Universal, July 14, 1899.

8 , . . I .
6Valades, E1 porfirismo II, p. 300; Orantes, SlnteSlS, p. 112; Gustavo

prez Gutiérrez, Chiapas y sus epopeyas libertarias 3 vols. (Tuxtla
Gutiérrez, 1957) II, p. 284.

87Lebn to Diaz, July 15, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,2683; Lebn to Diaz, August
18, 1899, CGPD,163,XXIV,11709; El Peri6dico Oficial del Estado, August 5,
1899.

88Lowenthal, ”The Elite of San Cristbbal," pp. 11—12; Directorio general
de la repfiblica mexicana (1893 and 1900), pp. 7—10 and 289—295. Also see:
Romulo Farrera, Mexico, to Diaz, August 10, 1899, CGPD,163,XXIV,11518.

89Esposa de Farrera to Diaz, July 21, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,2814.

90prez to Diaz, August 22, 1899, CGPD,164,XXIV,13502.

91Le6n to Diaz, August 17, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,3381; Diaz to Le6n,
August 18, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,3381.

92Le6n to Diaz, August 25, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,3531. An amparo is a
Writ of protection against the action of some public functionary.

93Le’on to Diaz, August 24, 1899, CGPD,164,XXIV,13502.

94Diaz to Lébn, September 5, 1899, CGPD,347,LVIII,3716; Diaz to Lebn,
September 7, 1899, CGPD,347,LVIII,3718.

95Diaz to Castillo, September 6, 1899, CGPD,347,LVIII,3720.

96Le6n to Diaz, September 30, 1899, CGPD,347,LVIII,4215.
97Diaz to Le6n, October 2, 1899, CGPD,347,LVIII,4221; Lebn to Diaz,

October 2, 1899, CGPD,347,LVIII,4321.

 

312

98
Pimentel to Diaz, October 16, 1899, CGPD, 347 ,LVIII, 4621, Pimentel

to Diaz, November 30,1899,CGPD,347,LVIII,5482.

99
Lopez to Diaz, October 11, 1899, CGPD,165,XXIV,15048.

100 .
"Juc10 contra presuntos culpables de homicidio frustrado en la
persona del Coronel Francisco Leon, 1900, " AHCH ,Hermeroteca, Expediente
1673.

lOlFarrera to Diaz, March 15, 1900, CGPD,170,XXV,2858.

Chapter Four

Epigraph: "Memorandum," Tapachula, 1902, CGPD,190,XXVII,5679.

lDiccionario Porrua 2 vols. (Mexico: Editorial Porrua, 1964) II,
pp. 1632—1633.

2Pimentel to Diaz, November 30, 1895, CGPD,122,XX,18031.
3Pimentel to Diaz, September 12, 1904, CGPD,212,XXIX,11991.

4El Universal, January 3, 1901. A spot check through the CGPD confirms
that Pimentel was frequently absent.

5Fred Wilber Powell, The Railroads of Mexico (Boston: The Stratford Co.
1921), p. 154; Moody's Manual of Railroads and Corporation Securities. 1909
(New York: Moody Manual Company, 1909), p. 755. Also see: Pimentel to
Diaz, April 11, 1909, CGPD,180,XXVI,3436.

6Revista de Chiapas, August 31, 1902.

7Gerente, Banco Oriental de México, Puebla, to Diaz, June 21, 1909,

CGPD,260,XXXIV,10296.

8Pimentel to Diaz, October 13, 1904, CGPD,213,XXIX,12874; Pimentel to
Diaz, September 28, 1905, CGPD,223,XXX,13299.

9 to Diaz, June 30, 1905, CGPD,202,XVIII,20.

Manuel Cruz, Pichucalco,

10"Memorandum," Tapachula, 1902, CGPD,190,XXVII,5679.

 

w-.. .v

313

11 .
Inferme del Ciudadano gobernador del estado (1905).

12Ibid.

13 . z ,
Pimentel to Diaz, December 19, 1903, CGPD,205,XVIII,16346; Sostenes
Esponda, San Crist6ba1, to Diaz, March 7, 1904, CGPD,355,LXII,760.

14 .
Inferme del Ciudadano gobernador del estado (1905).

15O.H. Harrison, Tapachula, to Diaz, March 16, 1899, CGPD,170,XXV,2870.

l6A. Farrera, "Memorandum sobre el café en Chiapas," March 16, 1899,
CGPD,165,XXIV,15132. Also see: Lic. Agustin Farrera, Breves apuntes
sobre el estado de Chiapas (Mexico: Liberia Madrilena, 1900).

17Ricardo Pozas, "E1 trabajo en las plantaciones de cafe y el cambio
sociocultural del indio," Revista Mexicana de Estudios AntrOpologicos
XIII (1952), p. 34.

18Albert Brickwood, "Coffee in Soconusco, Chiapas, Mexico," September
26, 1910, NA,RG 84,Tapachula: Miscellanous Reports.

19El Tiempo, June 15, 1907.

20Trinidad Sanchez Santos, El problema de los indigenas de Chiapas,
I H
manuscript located in the Biblioteca "Fray Bartolome Las Casas, San
Cristbbal, 1902.

21See: Calcott, Liberalism in Mexico, p. 152.

22El Universal, January 15, 1901.

23R. Farrera, Tuxtla Gutierrez, to Diaz,’February 19, 1900, CGPD,170,
XXV92898; A. Farrera, Chiapa de Corzo, to Diaz, August 18, 1901, CGPD,
184,XXVI,8386.

24Ram6n Rabasa to Diaz, April 2, 1900, CGPD,170,XXV,3594.

25Pimentel to Diaz, January 15, 1901, CGPD,184,XXVI,2238.

26Manuel Cruz, Pichucalco, to Diaz, June 30, 1903, CGPD,202,XXVIII,9929.

July 17, 1903, CGPD,355,LXII,2436;
October 19, 1903, CGPD,355,LXII,
ptember 1900, CGPD,176,XXV,12052.

27 ’ ' ' 1 Diaz

Carlos Mason, SimOJove , to I ,
Jesfis Solis, Tuxtla Gutierrez, to D183,
3140; Varios vecinos, Pichucalco to Diaz, Se

 

 

314

28Pimente1 to Diaz, July 15, 1903, CGPD,355,LXII,3412.
29Pimentel to Diaz, July 14, 1904, CGPD,210,XXIX,8254.
30Pimentel to Diaz, March 14, 1900, CGPD,170,XXV,3532.

lDecreto Num. 2, Seccion de Gobernacibn (Chiapas), September 20, 1905,
CGPD,223,XXX,13533; Pimentel to Diaz, October 3, 1905, CGPD,357,LXV,2127.

32Pimentel to Diaz, October 11, 1905, CGPD,233,XXX,13362.

33Pimentel to Diaz, September 28, 1905, CGPD,233,XXX,13299.

34Ibid.

35Ibid.

36Pimentel to Diaz, October 11, 1905, CGPD,233,XXX,13362.

37Emilio Rabasa, "Memorandum," October 1905, CGPD,223,XXX,13655.

38Ibid.

391bid.

4OPimentel to Diaz, October 29, 1905, CGPD,244,XXX,15210.

41Pimentel to Diaz, December 22, 1905, CGPD,358,LXIV,2803; R. Rabasa
to Diaz, December 27, 1905, CGPD,244,XXX,15849.

2
Diccionario Porrfia II, p. 1633.

3Miguel Utrilla, Adrian and Gregorio Culebro, J. Espinosa Torres, and
others, San Crist6bal, to Diaz, December 21, 1905, CGPD,385,LXIV,2781;
José Lazos, Mariano Cruz, Carlos Bonifaz, and twenty—three others, San
Cristobal, to Diaz, December 21, 1905, CGPD,358,LVIX,2787.

44R. Rabasa to Diaz, June 5, 1906, CGPD,229,XXXI,7298; J. Martinez Rojas
San Cristbbal, to Diaz, April 30, 1906, CGPD,228,XXXI,4341; Dr. Arturo
Aguilar Ruiz, San Cristobal, to Diaz, April 27, 1906, CGPD,228,XXXI,5277.

3

4 ,
5Obispo de Chiapas, San Cristobal, to Diaz, October 24, 1909, CGPD,262,
XXXIV,5277.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

315

46R.Rabasa to Diaz, April 6, 1906, CGPD,235,XXXI,17893; R.Rabasa to
Diaz, July 16, 1908, CGPD,250,XXXIII,8611.

47R.Rabasa to Diaz, May 30, 1908, CGPD,250,XXXIII,8218.

48R.Rabasa to Diaz, September 9, 1908, CGPD,252,XXXIII,12014.

49R.Farrera to Diaz, May 13, 1906, CGPD,228,XXXI,4890.

50R.Rabasa to Diaz, June 3, 1908, CGPD,250,XXXIII,8283; R.Gordillo Leén,

"Informe respeta de la comisibn para explorar los lugares por donde puede
establecer una via herrada entre Comitan y Tuxtla Gutiérrez," May 10, 1908,
CGPD,250,XXXIII,8284; R.Rabasa to Diaz, June 10, 1909, CGPD,250,XXXIII,8322.

51Emilio Rabasa to Diaz, July 26, 1908, CGPD,250,XXXIII,8602.

2 , . .
Romulo Farrera, "Se hace necesarlo un ferrocarril que penetre hasta
el interior de Chiapas," El Tiempo, October 26, 1910.

53Informe rendido por el C. Gobernador del Estado. 1908.

Anuario estadistico de la repfiblica mexicana. 1898 (Mexico: Secretaria
de Fomento, 1898), pp. 422—424; Anuario estadistico. 1904, p. 238.

55Albert Brickwood, "Rubber in Chiapas (Mexico)," June 25, 1910, NA,

RG 84, Tapachula: Miscellaneous Reports; J.L. Hermessen, India Rubber
World (February 1910), no pagination.

S . . . .
6Brickwood, "Plantations 1n Palenque, Chiapas, Mex1co," October 10,

1910, NA, RG 84, Tapachula: Miscellaneous Reports; The Mexican Year Book,
1912 (Mexico: Department of Finance, 1912), p. 128.

7Brickwood, "Annual Industrial and Trade Report for 1909," September 1,
1910, NA, RG 84, Tapachula: Miscellaneous Reports.

8 , .
Anuario estadlstico del estado de Chiapas, ano de 1909, pp. 95-102.

I O O . l O O u
Fernando Rosenwelg, "El comerc1o exterior," 1n C0310 Villegas, Historia

moderna de Mexico, Vol. VII, Tomo II, pp. 642—643, 664-666, 673, 682-683;
Roger D. Hanson, The Politics of Mexican Development (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 20.

6 ,
OPeriodico Oficial del Estado, September 5, 1908, August 14, 1909,
September 3, 1910, February 18, 1911.

61
F. Ruiz, Chiapa de Corzo, to Diaz, November 1, 1910, CGPD,276,XXXV,

16716.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

62

R. Rabasa to Diaz, August 17, 1910, CGPD,274,XXXV,14331.

63Boletih de la Cémara Agricola de Chiapas, June 15, 1909, July 8, 1909,

May 15, 1911, May 31, 1911; Brickwood, "Annual Industrial and Trade Report
for 1909."

64Brickwood, "Soconusco Coffee-Growers Meeting," October 1, 1910, NA,

RG 84, Tapachula: Miscellaneous Reports.

5Anuario estadfstico del estado de Chiapas, afio de 1909, p. 275.

66R. Rabasa to Diaz, April 27, 1906, CGPD,350,LXIV,826.

67Martinez Rojas, San Crist6bal, to Diaz, April 30, 1906, CGPD,228,XXXI,
4341.

68Martinez Rojas, San Crist6ba1, to Governor Rabasa, April 29, 1906,
CGPD,228,XXXI,4343.

69Anuario estadistico del estado de Chiapas, afio de 1909, pp. 273—311.

7OIbid.

lBrickwood, "Political Situation in the State of Chiapas," March 19,
1911, NA, RG 84, Tapachula: Miscellaneous Reports.

2Francis J. Weber, ed., Francisco Orozco y Jimenez: An Apologia Pro—
Vita Sua (Mexico, 1968); Vicente Camberos Vizcaino, Francisco El Grande.
Mons. Francisco Orozco y Jimenez, Biografia 2 vols. (Mexico: Editorial
Jus, 1966), p. 142. Also see: Martinez Rojas, San Crist6bal, to Governor
Rabasa, April 29, 1906, CGPD,228,XXXI,4343.

3 / a /
Obispo de Chiapas, Francisco Orozco y Jimenez, San Cristobal, to Diaz,
October 24, 1909, CGPD,264,XXXIV,16730.

4Brickwood, "Coffee Crop Conditions in Foreign Countries," February 1,
1912, NA, RG 84, Tapachula: Miscellaneous Reports.

75 , . . . .
Brlckwood, "Agriculture in the Valleys of Cintalapa and J1qu1p1las,

 

 

State of Chiapas, Mexico," October 4, 1910, NA, RG 84, Tapachula: Miscellaneous

Reports.

76Ibid.

77
Ibid. Also see: Brickwood, "Agricultural Possibilities in the State

 

0f Chiapas, Mexico," June 10, 1910, NA, RG 84, Tapachula: Miscellaneous Reports.

 

 

 

 

 

317

78La Vbz del Pueblo, May 5, 1907.

79Busto, Estadistica de la republica mexicana I, p. xviii; Datos
estadisticos 1896; Anuario estadistico Chiapas 1909, p. 52.

80Brickwood, "Tapachula, Daily Consular and Trade Reports, October 25,
1911 No. 250 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1911), p. 434.

81See: Anuario estadistico de la repfiblica mexicana, volumes 1894-1907.

82Valadés, El porfirismo I, p. 289.

83R. Rabasa, El estado de Chiapas, p. 118; Chiapas, su estado actual,

pp. 7, 20-21.
4Brickwood, "Coffee in Soconusco, Chiapas, Mexico."

85"Claim on Behalf of Chival Planters' Association," National Archives,
Record Group 76, Docket 806, Box 35, hereafter cited as NA, RG 76, and
identifying information.

86Geografe J. Tamborrel, The Tabasco and Chiapas Land Co. of San Juan
Bautista, Mexico (Mexico, 1901), p. 17.

87 . . .
Datos estadisticos 1896, p. 10; Anuario estadfstlco Chiapas 1909, p. 52.

88Karena Shields, The Changing Wind (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1959),
p. 40.

9Reports of Dr. C. L. G. Anderson, et. al. (San Francisco: Chiapas
Rubber Plantation Company, 1905), pp. 10—12.

90Brickwood, "Memorandum," August 1911, NA, RG 84, Tapachula Dispatches.

lFrans Blom and Gertrude Duby, La selva lacandona 2 vols. (México:
Editorial Cultura, 1955) I, p. 263; B. Traven, March to the Mbnteria (New
York: Hill and Wang, 1971); Thomas Benjamin, "El trabajo en las monterias
de Tabasco, Chiapas, y Guatemala," Unpublished manuscript, 1981.

2 , .
De la Pefia, Chiapas economica II, pp. 675—677.

3Estadi’sticas sociales del Porfiriato, 1877-1910 (Mexico: Direcci6n
General de Estadistica, 1956), p. 40; Seminario de Historia Moderna de
Mexico, Estadisticas economicas del Porfiriato: Fuerza de trabajo y
actividad econémica por sectores (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 1964), p.
39; Anuario estadistico Chiapas 1909, p. 52.

 

 

 

 

 

 

———?,____ ,_
ff -r .r_ ._

318

94De la Pefia, Chiapas econ6mico II, 358.

95Robert Wasserstrom, "La evoluci6n de la economia regional en Chiapas:
1528-1975," America Indigena XXXVI, (julio—septiembre 1976), p. 489.

96Carlos Z. Flores, Departamento de Las Casas del estado de Chiapas

(San Cristobal Las Casas, 1909), p. 41; Anuario estadistico Chiapas 1909,
p. 52.

97Flores, Departamento de Las Casas, pp. 38-39.

98Sénchez Santos, El problema de los indigenas (1902), no pagination.

 

99Mejia Fernandez, Politica agraria en Mexico, p. 255.

100Manuel Pineda, Estudio sobre ejidos (San Crist6bal: Tipografia Flores,
1910), p. 11.

101Vecinos de Huistan to Diaz, February 12, 1909: CGPD9256’XXXIV’2304'

 

102E1 pueblo de Chapultenango, Pichucalco, to Diaz, July 1909, CGPD,262,

XXXIV,12506.

Lopez Rosado, Historia g pensamiento economico I, p. 210.

l . .
O4Frank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution (New York: The

Macmillan Company, 1929), p. 154.

105 . . .
Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York:

International Publishers, 1971), pp. 5—6.

Chapter Five

Epigraph: R. Farrera, Mexico, to Interim President Francisco Le6n De
la Barra, May 29, 1911, Archivo General Octavio Magafia, Caja 8, Expediente
F-2, Document 46, hereafter cited as AGOM and identifying information.

Part of this chapter has been published as "Revoluci6n interrumpida —
Chiapas y el interinato presidencial - 1911," Historia Mexicana XXX (julio—
septiembre 1980), pp. 79-98.

 

 

 

"Una revoluci6n, politica 0 social, nunca as local, ni mira a

restablecer e1 pasado." See Arnaldo C6rdova, La ideOJOgIa de la revoluci6n
mexicana, p. 154.

 

 

 

2
James Creelman, ”President Diaz, Hero of the Americas," Person's
Magazine XXX (March 1908), pp. 231-277.

3 . . .,
EmlllO Rabasa, La evoluCion historica de México (Paris—Mexico: Libreria
de la Vda. de Ch. Bouret, 1921), pp. 206—207.

4 . ., . .
Franc1sco I. Madero, La suceSion preSidenCial en 1910. El partido
nacional democrético (San Pedro, Coahuila, 1908), p. 3.

5 .
C6rdova, La ideologia de la revolucién mexicana, p. 103.

6
Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: Genesis under Madero
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952), pp. 119—151.

7Revista Chiapaneca, May 1, 1910.

8 . . .
Cumberland, MeXican Revolution, see chapter 81X.
9 . , .

Chiapas g MeXlCO, May 15, 1910.

lOJ. Antonio Rivera G., Mexico, to Diaz, January 5, 1910, CGPD,267,
xxxv,73.

llChiapas g Mexico, May 15, 1910, September 12, 1910.

12Mas Alla. Revista Catolica Lominical Informativa, October 9, l9lO.

13Daniel A. Zepeda, Tapachula, to Diaz, December 20, 1910, CGPD,277,
XXXV,l8129.

14Chiapas g México, October 15, 1910, February 15, 1911; La Vbz del
Pueblo, January 22, 1911.

15Ram6n Rabasa, Tuxtla Gutierrez, to Diaz, December 6, 1910, CGPD,277,
XXXV,18289.

Nulidad de su representaci6n oficial en el congreso
chula, March 1912), pp. 6—7;
der politico en Chiapas,"

16 . /
Don LUlS R. GarCia.
del estado y su Valor politico g social (Tapa
Antonio Garcia de Le6n, "Lucha de clases y po
Historia g Sociedad 22 (1979), pp. 66, 68.

17Manuel Pineda y otros, San Cristobal, to Diaz,/March 26, 1911, CGPD,
370,LXX,7050. Also see: Alfredo Aguilar, San Cristobal, to Diaz, March
16, 1911, CGPD,281,XXXVI,4825; Jesfis Martinez Rojas, San Cristobal, to.
Diaz, March 14, 1911, CGPD,281,XXXVI,5220; Cristobalenses to Diaz, April
14, 1911, CGPD, 370,LXX,8630.

320

18La VOz del Pueblo, April 20, 1911.

19"Bases organicas del 'Centro directivo de la libertad del sufragio
en Chiapas, San Crist6ba1 Las Casas, 3 de abril de 1911," AGOM,22,1,33.

20La Libertad del Sufragio, April 20, 1911.

21El Heraldo de Chiapas, May 14, 1911.

22Consul General, Mexico City, to Secretary of State, May 15, 1911,
National Archives, Record Group 165, Document 5761-269, hereafter cited
as NA, RG 165, and identifying information.

23Consul Brickwood to Secretary of State, May 25, 1911, NA, RG 165,
5761—268.

24El Heraldo de Chiapas, May 28, 1911.

25Ibid., June 1, 1911.

26Ibid., June 29, 1911.

27Ibid., June 1, 1911.

28Ibid.

29La Libertad del Sufragio, June 22, 1911.

30Luis Espinosa and others, Tuxtla Gutierrez, to De la Barra, June 4,
1911, SCh,XXX,79.

31T. Flores Ruiz, San Cristobal, to De la Barra, n.d., AGOM,22,1,44.

2
3 El Heraldo de Chiapas, June 8, ll, 15, 18, 1911.

33
1912.

El Heraldo de Chiapas, June 22, 1911; La VOz del Pueblo, February 25,

34E1 Club "Soconusco," Tapachula, to De la Barra, August 22, 1911,
AGOM,18,5,287.

3 . . . .
5Gregorio Ponce de Le6n, El interinato preSidenCial de 1911 (Mexico:
Secretaria de Fomento, 1912), p. 241. Also see El Heraldo de Chiapas,
June 4, 1911.

 

321

Stanley R. Ross, Francisco I. Madero: Apostle of Mexican Democracy
(New York: Ams Press, 1970), pp. 178—179.

Cumberland, Gensis under Madero, p. 155.

38El Heraldo de Chiapas, June 22, 1911.

39Paul Marina Flores, Chiapa de Corzo, to Madero, June 24, 1911,

Archivo Francisco I. Madero, Ms. 21, 2201-2310, Expediente 1/426, hereafter
cited as AFIM and identifying information.

Flavio Guillén, "La cuesti6n de Chiapas," El Heraldo de Chiapas, July
2, 1911.

41El Heraldo de Chiapas, July 2, 1911.

42Ibid., June 29, July 2, 1911.

Jesus Martinez Rojas, Los ultimos acontecimientos politicos de
Chiapas (San Crist6bal, 1912), pp. 17—18.

Manuel Franco, San Crist6ba1, to Madero, October 12, 1911, in Isidro
Fabela and Josefina E. de Fabela, comps., Documentos hist6ricos de la
revolucion mexicana - Revolucion g regimen maderista (Mexico: Editorial
Jus y Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica, 1960~1973) II, Document 350, pp. 152-157.

45"En la ciudad de San Cristbbal Las Casas," July 3, 1911, AHCH, Sucesos
de 1911-1912, Manuscritos y Impresos, Carpeta 1625.

Céceres Lopez, Chiapas, sintesis geOgréfica e historia, pp. 136-137.

Luis Espinosa, Rastros de sangre. Historia de la revolucion en
Chiapas (Tuxtla Gutierrez: La Colecci6n Ceiba, 1980, edicibn facsimilar

de la primera edicifin de 1912), p. 25.
47
El Imparcial, July 6, 1911.

ESpinosa, Rastros de sangre, p. 7.

4 z , . . .
9Martinez Rojas, Los ultimos aconteCimientos, p. 18. "The cristobalense
cause is worthy and lofty; it is the pursuit of the great work of Don

Francisco I. Madero! Death to caciquismo!" Al pueblo acalteco, Acala,
September 26, 1911, AHCH,Carpeta 1625.

0
El Progreso (Tapachula), July 14, 1911.

322

R. Gordillo Le6n, Tuxtla Gutierrez, to De la Barra, July 5, 1911,
AGOM,16,2,363.

Rovelo Argfiello, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to Senators P. Gonzalez Mena,

Luis G. Curiel, and R.R. Guzman, September 27, 1911, AHCH, Seccifin de
Guerra, Tomo VII, Exp. 26.

53"El Policarpo Rueda ha sido designado de acuerdo con los diversos
partidos politicos de ese Estado y el Ministerio de Gobernaci6n para
Gobernador Interino." See Madero to Manuel Pineda, July 4, 1911, Serie

Francisco I. Madero, Roll 20, hereafter identified as SFIM and identifying
information. Also see El Heraldo de Chiapas, June 22, 1911.

Espinosa, Rastros de sangre, p. 29.

55

El Heraldo de Chiapas, July 10, 1911; Martinez Rojas, Los ultimos
acontecimientos, pp. 20-21.

Interview with Dr. Policarpo Rueda in the newspaper Cuba (Havana,

Cuba), December 4, 1912, in Documentos historicos de la revolucion
mexicana IV, Doc. 956, pp. 229—233.

Martinez Rojas, Los ultimos acontecimientos, pp. 21-22. This account
contains copies of the telegraph exchange between Rivera G. and Rovelo

Argfiello. See pp. 126-127.
Rovelo Arguello to Senators, September 26, 1911.
59 . .
La Libertad del Sufragio, August 31, 1911.

Rovelo Argfiello to De la Barra, September 17, 1911, Archivo Francisco

Leon De la Barra, X—l, Carpeta 2—25, Document 141, hereafter cited as
AFLB and identifying information.

61T. Flores Ruiz to De la Barra, September 30, 1911, AGOM,9,F-5,210.

Rovelo Arguello to Senators, September 26, 1911.

63J. Espinosa Torres to Secretary General of Government, Tuxtla
Gutierrez, September 14, 1911, AHCH, Legislatura, 1911—1912.

The Mexican Herald, September 26, 1911.
Madero to Espinosa Torres, September 17, 1911, AHCH, Guerra, VII,28.

"Discurso que pronuncio e1 Sr. Lic. Querido Moheno en la Camara de

323

Diputados," reprinted in full in Prudencio Moscoso Pastrana, Jacinta Perez

"Pajarito," ultimo lider Chamula (Tuxtla Gutierrez: Editorial del Gobierno

del Estado de Chiapas, 1972), pp. 111—112; Rovelo Arguello to De la Barra,
September 19, 1911, AFLB,X—l, 2 de 25, 147; Rovelo Argfiello to De la

Barra, September 21, 1911, AFLB,X—l,2 de 25, 148. Also see: Espinosa,
Rastros de sangre, pp. 80-81, 98.

Rovelo Arguello to Senators, September 26, 1911.

68

Brickwood to Henry Lane Wilson, September 25, 1911, NA, RG 84, V01.
148/C8.2; T. Castillo Corzo, Puente Porfirio Diaz, to De la Barra, AFLB,
X—1,2 de 25,134; A1 Pueblo Acalteco, Acala, September 26, 1911, AHCH, ’
Carpeta 1625; La Patria, October 3, 1911; Imparcial, September 21, 25, 1911.

Peace Commission to Rovelo Arghello, October 15, 1911, AHCH,
Legislatura, 1911-1912; Espinosa, Rastros de sangre, pp. 110-114.

70

"Hay datos fundados para creer complicado a1 Obispo," Rovelo Argfiello
to Senators, September 27, 1911.

71

See: Moscoso Pastrana, Jacinto Pérez "Pajarito."

El Imparcial, September 25, 1911.

Boletin eclesiastico del Obispado de Chiapas, December 12, 1911.
Espinosa, Rastros de sangre, pp. 52—55.

Obispo to De la Barra, September 16, 1911, AFLB,X-l,2 de 25,139.
Obispo to De la Barra, September 24, 1911, AFLB,X-1,2 de 25,151.

77De la Barra to Rovelo Arguello, September 15, 1911, AFLB,X-l,2 de 25,
133.

El Imparcial, September 25, 1911.
Orantes, Sihtesis, p. 162; El Imparcial, October 20, 1911.

80De la Barra to Espinosa Torres, September 17, 1911, AFLB,Xel, 2 de 25,
140.

Rovelo Arguello to De la Barra, October 5, 1911, AGOM,21,4,326; The
Mexican Herald, October 2, 4, 1911.

Rovelo Arguello to Senators, September 27, 1911.

324

83"Sesibn del Senado de la Repfiblica del 6 del Octubre sobre la
situacifin del Estado de Chiapas," in Emilio Rabasa, Antologia de Emilio
Rabasa. Biografia y seleccién de Andres Serra Rojas 2 vols. (Mexico:
Ediciones Oasis, 1969), pp. 339-341. The volumes of the Diario de los
Debates for 1911 are missing in the Hemeroteca Nacional.

84El Imparcial, October 20, 1911.

85El Imparcial, October 20, 1911; Moiéés Camacho to Rovelo Arguello,
October 7, 1911, AHCH,Cuerra,VII,28. Also see: "Sesi6n del Senado de la
Reprlica del 6 de Octubre," Antologia I, pp.339-141.

86

Brickwood to Henry Lane Wilson, October 10, 1911, NA, RG 84, Vol. 148,
Dispatch 131; The Mexican Herald, October 13, 1911.

7E1 Imparcial, October 11, 13, 1911. For details of the military
conflict see AHCH, Impresos y Manuscritos, 1911, Carpeta 1623.

General Paz to De la Barra, October 12, 1911, AGOM,8,P—5,471.

"Memorandum of Peace Discussions," October 13, 1911, AHCH, Guerra,
VII; The Mexican Herald, October 22, 29, 1911.

0General Paz to De la Barra, October 12, 1911, AGOM,9,P—5,407; E.
Paz, "Al pueblo chiapaneco," October 1911, AGOM,22,3,192.

91La Patria, November 23, 1911, La VOz del Pueblo, December 3, 1911.

92La Patria, December 15, 1911.

93

"Retrazos de historia chiapaneca,” Liberacion, February 3, 1935.

Madero to Gordillo Le6n, December 23, 1911, Documentos historicos de
la revolucién mexicana 11, Doc. 502, p. 448.

95Vice-Consul Leon Porash, Tapachula, to Henry Lane Wilson, March 5,
1912, NA, RG 84, Consular and Diplomatic Letters Sent; Porash to

Secretary of State, February 12, 1912, NA, RG 84, Dispatches to the State
Department.

Orantes, Sintesis, p. 189; Rivera G., "Los embrollos politicos del
Sr, Madero," La Tribune, February 4, 1912.

"Memorandum Sent August, 1911," NA, RG 84, Tapachula Dispatches, Vol.
148.C8.2/105.

325

98 .
Brickwood to Henry Lane Wilson, September 12, 1911, NA, RG 84,
Tapachula Dispatches; Porash to Henry Lane Wilson, March 16, 1912, NA,
RG 84, Consular and Diplomatic Letters Sent.

99 .
L.A. Osten to Brickwood, August 19, 1911, NA, RG 84, Tapachula

Dispatches.

100Club "Soconusco," Tapachula, to De la Barra, August 22, 1911, AGOM,
18,5,287.

101Vice Consul Charles Lesher to Henry Lane Wilson, December 23, 1911,
NA, RG 84, Tapachula Dispatches.

102 .
"Llevabamos Slete meses poco mas o menos de padecer zobras por los

perjuicios a causa de lo anormal situacion. Desde la llegada del Sefior
Jefe Politico Abelardo Dominguez se ha venido notando e1 restablecimiento
de la tranquilidad.” See Vecinos de Tapachula to Governor of Chiapas,
February 12, 1912, AHCH, Gobernacibn, 1912, VII, 94. Also see Porash to
Henry Lane Wilson, February 14, 1912, NA, RG 84, Consular and Diplomatic
Letters Sent.

103Flavio Guillén, "Manifiesto que el Gobierno del Estado dirije a los
pueblos de Chiapas,” April 20, 1912, AHCH, Carpeta 1623.

104
1911.

La Libertad del Sufragio, May 23, 1912. Ciro Farrera died in November

l05Ibid.; La Voz del Pueblo, January 28, 1911.

l06M’anifiesto del Lic. Jesus Martinez Rojas al Pueblo Chiapaneco (Mexico,
1913), pp. 9—13; La Voz del Pueblo, June 9, 1912.

107La Voz del Pueblo, February 11, 1912, September 1, 1912.

lO8Peri6dico Oficial del Estado, November 30, December 14, 1912.

109"Acuerdo del Sr. Gobernador," March 31, 1914, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1914.

llOManifiesto del Lic. Jesfis Martinez Rojas, p. 13.

lllPorash to Governor Guillén, March 14, 1912, NA, RG 84, Tehuantepec
Post Records, Vol. 150/C8.7; Porash to Secretary of State, February 17,
1912, NA, RG 84, Tapachula Post Records, Vol. 158/C8.4.

Tuxtla Gutierrez, to Jefe

112Secretary General of (State) Government, II 20
, .

Politico, Tonala, September 17, 1913, AHCH, Gobernacifin, 1913,

 

 

326

Municipal President Arriaga to Senores Municipes, December 25, 1912,
AHCH, Gobernacién, 1912, VIII, 95; Angel Maria Perez, Tapachula, to
Secretary of Government, Mexico, November 8, 1913, Archivo General de la
Nacibn, Ramo de Gobernaci6n, Relaciones con los Estados.

114Jefe Politico Palenque to Governor, January 8, 1912, AHCH, Gobernaci6n,
1912, VIII, 100.

5Periodico Oficial del Estado, March 19, 1910, August 24, 1912.

1 . . . .
1 6F1av1o Guillén, Dos estudios - FranCisco I. Madero g fray Matias de

Cordova (Mexico: Departamento del Distrito Federal, 1974), introduction.

117Decree of February 22, 1913, Governor Gordillo Le6n, SCh,XXX,79.

118Gordillo Le6n to Emilio Rabasa, February 22, 1913, AHCH, Gobernacifin,
1913, VII, 106.

119"Acuerdo del Gobernador del Estado," March 15, 1913, AHCH,
Gobernacién, 1913, III, 23.

120La Tribuna, February 4, 1913. Also see Manifiesto del Lic. Jesus
Martinez Rojas, p. 8.

121La Tribuna, February 4, 1913.

122Asuntos Ayuntamientos, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1914, 510. Also see
Espinosa, Chiapas.

Periodico Oficial del Estado, September 18, November 13, 1913,
April 30, 1914.

12 . . , .
4Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: The Constitutionalist

Years (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974), pp. 23—57.

125 . . .r .
Alfonso Tarecena, Historia de la revoluCion en Tabasco (Villahermosa:

Ediciones del Gobierno de Tabasco, 1974), pp. 239-256; Manuel Gonzalez
Calzada, Historia de la revolucion mexicana en Tabasco (Mexico: Biblioteca

del Instituto de Estudios Historicos de la Revolucion Mexicana, 1972),

12
6Jefe Politico, Pichucalco, to Secretary General of Government, August

5, 1914, AHCH, Gobernacibn, 1914, VII, 30; Governor Palafox to General
Huerta, November 14, 1913, AHCH, Gobernacibn, 1913, X, 143.

1 ,
27Governor Palafox to Secretary General of (Federal) Government, Mexico,

June 20, 1913, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1913, XI, 146.

 

 

 

 

327

128Blom and Duby, La selva lacandona I, pp. 281—282.

129Fernando Mijanes, ”San Roman," to Lindoro Castellanos, Ocosingo,

April 7, 1914, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1914, VII, 30.

130Blom and Duby, La selva lacandona I, pp. 281—282.

131"Dr. Belisario Dominguez (Chiapas), Speech to Senate," September 23,
1913, National Archives, Record Group 59, 812.00/9320, hereafter cited
as NA, RG 59, and identifying information.

132Michael C. Meyer, Huerta: A Political Portrait (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1972), pp. 135-136.

133Jefe Politico, Soconusco, to Gordillo Le6n, June 17, 1913, AHCH,
Gobernacifin, 1913, XI, 146.

134 .
Jefe Politico, Soconusco, to Secretary General of Government, Tuxtla

Gutierrez, June 19, 1913, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1913, XI, 146.

1
35Governor Palafox to Minister of Government, September 27, 1913, AHCH,
Gobernacifin, 1913, II, 20.

136Mauro Calderon, "Tapachula (dos sucesos en el afio de 1920)," ICACH

1 (junio 1959), pp. 50-51.

137Palafox to Minister of Government, February 26, 1914, AHCH, Gobernaci6n,
1914, VII, 30.

138See: Expediente 30 entitled "Revoluci6n en el Estado," in AHCH,

Gobernacién, 1914, VII.

1 - ./
39Casahonda Castillo, 50 anos de revolUCion, p. 39.

Chapter Six

Epigraph: Luis Pola, "Por e1 honor de Chiapas," El Sur de Mexico,
April 12, 1945.

1The first recorded invasion of Chiapas was by Aztec armies in the

14908. The second, the Spanish Conquest, came in 1524 and the third, in
1822—1823, was led by Mexican General Vicente Filosola.

 

 

 

 

 

 

328

2J.M. Marquez, El Veintiuno. Hombres de la revolucién y sus hechos

(Oaxaca, 1916), pp. 65*73; Alicia Hernandez Chavez, "La defensa de los

finqueros en Chiapas, 1914-1920," Historia Mexicana XXVIII (enero—marzo
1979), p. 355.

Periodico Oficial del Estado, September 23, 1914. Also see Miguel

Angel Peral, Diccionario biOgrafico mexicano (Mexico: Editorial Pac, 1944),
p. 166.

4Acuerdo del Gobernador del Estado, October 12, 1914, AHCH, Gobernacifin,
1914, II, 7.

Periodico Oficial del Estado, September 23, October 15, October 31,
December 5, December 8, 1914, January 16, April 10, May 22, May 28, 1915;
Asuntos Ayuntamientos, October 15, 1914, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1914, 351.

6Periodico Oficial del Estado, October 31, 1914.

Santiago Serrano, Chiapas revolucionario (hombres y hechos) (Tuxtla
Gutierrez, 1923), p. 9; Moscoso Pastrana, Jacinto Perez "Pajarito," pp.98—99;
Periodico Oficial del Estado, September 23, 1914.

8Claim on Behalf of Walter A. Quinby, NA, RG 76, Doc. 146, 3024.

9J.A. Ross, Consular Agent, Ocos (Guatemala), to William Owen, Consul

General, Guatemala City, January 2, 1915, NA, RG 84, 0c6s, Guatemala, 1914-
1915.

Testimony of Mrs. Cora Lee Sturgis, in Investigation of Mexican
Affairs. Preliminary Report and Hearings of the Committee on Foreign

Relations, United States Senate 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1920) I,
pp. 921—922.

lMarquez, El veintiuno, pp. 156—159.
12 .

Memorandum of Claim, NA, RG 76, Doc. 185, 1649.
3Cumberland, The Constitutionalist Years, pp. 151—164.

Douglas Richmond, "Carranza: The Authoritarian Populist as Nationalist
President," and Friedrich Katz, "Villa: Reform Governor of Chihuahua," in
George Wolfskill and Douglas Richmond, eds., Essays on the Mexican Revolution:

Revisionist Views of the Leaders (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979),
pp. 53-55, 36-39.

15
Cumberland, The Constitutionalist Years, pp. 165-185.

 

 

 

 

 

 

329

16Quoted in full in Casahonda Castillo, 50 anos de revolucién, p. 49.

l7Boletin de Informacién, December 18, 1914.

8Informe del Gral. Salvador Alvarado, May 20, 1916, Documentos
histéricos de la revoluci6n mexicana, Vol. 4, Tomo 1, Doc. 657, pp. 143—145.

19Ross to Owen, January 10, 1915, NA, RG 84, Ocos; Ross to Mrs. A.C.

Gordon, Seattle, Washington, January 5, 1915, NA, RG 84, Ocos.

2 . . . ,
O"Estos no son cristianos, estos son mapachada." Garc1a de Leon,
"Lucha de clases," p. 60.

21Hern’andez Chavez, "La defensa de los finqueros," and Garcia de Le6n,
"Lucha de clases," take the perSpective that the Chiapanecan civil war from
1914 to 1920 represented a class struggle. Notes Garcia de Le6n, "L03

0 I C I I
grupos dominantes locales Vieron en peligro su hegemonla, realizaron un
tenaz resistencia armada."

Octavio Gordillo y Ortiz, Diccionario biogréfico de Chiapas (Mexico:

B. Costa-Amic, 1977), p. 85; Serrano, Chiapas revolucionario, p. 11;
Anuario estadiStico Chiapas 1909.

Hernandez Chavez, "La defensa de los finqueros," pp. 357-358.
Mario Garcia, Soconusco en la historia, pp. 263-265.

"Memorandum - Revoluci6n en Chiapas, 1916," Archivo de la Secretaria

de Relaciones Exteriores, Expediente 17-9—101, hereafter cited as ASRE and
identifying information.

26V. Carranza to General Castro, February 2, 1915, Archivo Venustiano

Carranza, Carpeta l, hereafter cited as AVC and identifying information.

 

2 . .
7Gary Gossen, Chamulas in the World of the Sun: Time and Space in a

Maya Oral Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 271,
274.

Robert M. Laughlin, Of Cabbages and Kings: Tales from Zinacantan
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1977), p. 129.

2 n
9Lowenthal, "The Elite of San Cristbbal, p. 38.
3O C '

Marquez, El veintiuno, p. 85.

Cumberland, The Constitutionalist Years, p. 203.

 

 

330

32Ibid., p. 209.

33"Memorandum - Revoluci6n en Chiapas, 1916."

34Ibid.

35"El 15 de abril de 1916," El paladih (Comitén). April 15, 1955-

6Prudencio Moscoso Pastrana, El pinedismo en Chiapas (México, 1960),
pp. 55-59.

37Ibid., pp. 59—62.

38Alan Knight, "Peasant and Caudillo in Revolutionary Mexico, 1910—1917,"

in D.A. Brading, ed., Caudillo and Peasant in the Mexican Revolution
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 27.

39"Plan de Compafia contra los rebeldes de Chiapas, 1916," ASRE, 17—6—10/11.

0Consul General, Guatemala City, to Department of State, September
21, 1920, NA, RG 84, Correspondence. Also see: Douglas W. Richmond,
"The First Chief and Revolutionary Mexico: The Presidency of Venustiano
Carranza, 1915-1920,” Diss. University of Washington, 1976, p.327.

l"Memorandum — Revolucibn en Chiapas, 1916."

2Richmond, ”The Presidency of Venustiano Carranza,” p. 327.
43Alvarado to Carranza, April 24, 1918, AVC, Telegramas, 2.

4Luis Liceaga, Felix Diaz (Mexico: Editorial Jus, 1958), p. 394.

5"Memorias del General Juan Andreu Almazan,"

28, 1958.

El Universal, May 25,

46Ibid., May 31, 1958.

47"Copia del Informe Rendido por el C. General de Brigada Rafael Cal y
Mayor a1 General en Jefe de la Revolucibn Emiliano Zapata, Afio de 1917,"
Rare Manuscript Collection, Latin American Library, Tulane University.

Informe que rinde a1 Sefior Ministro de Gobernacibn, e1 Gobernador
Provisional del estado, General Blas Corral, 27 de enero de 1916, AHCH,
Gobernacibn, 1915, IV, 23.

 

 

 

 

 

331

49Ibid.; Visitador de Jefaturas, Comitan, to Secretary General of

Government, Tuxtla Gutierrez, December 15, 1914, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1915,
IV, 13.

Visitador de Jefaturas, Palenque and Chilbn, to Secretary General

of Government, Tuxtla Gutierrez, December 30, 1914, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1914,
IV, 13.

Delegaci6n Departmental, Palenque, to Secretary General of Government,
Tuxtla Gutierrez, April 24, 1915, AHCH, Gobernacibn, 1915, IV, 11.

2Informe que rinde a1 Senor Ministro de Gobernacibn, 27 de enero de 1916.

3Peri6dico Oficial del Estado, June 19, 1915; Aviso General, Delegacibn
de la Comisibn Nacional Agraria, January 27, 1916, SCh, XXX, 79.

Informe que rinde a1 Senor-Ministro de Gobernacibn, 27 de enero de 1916.

55Resoluciones Presidenciales, AGN, CNA, Libro 2, pp. 81-82, Libro 6,
pp. 192-194, Libro 9, 13-14, Libro 10, 111—112; Richmond, "The Presidency
of Venustiano Carranza," p. 72.

56Ley de 19 de agosto de 1918, Villanueva, AHCH, Fomento, 1918, IV, 47;

Acuerdo del Gobernador, 31 de agosto de 1918, AHCH, Fomento, 1918, IV, 50.

57De la Pena, Chiapas economico II, p. 377; Garcia de LeOn, "Lucha de
clases," p. 69.

58”Political Conditions in Chiapas, Mexico," March 18, 1919, NA, RG 84,
CorreSpondence, Guatemala City.

59Vice—Consul, Guatemala City, to Department of State, October 18, 1919,

NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Guatemala City.

6OResoluciones Presidenciales, AGN, CNA, Libro 2, pp. 81—82, Libro 6,
Pp. 192—194, Libro 9, pp. 13—14.

61”Political Conditions in Chiapas, MexiCO," March 18: 1919'

62 . .
Rafael Pasca31o, Tuxtla Gut1érrez, to Secretary General of Government,

February 6, 1918, AHCH, Fomento, 1918, II, 14.

Juan Dard6n y demas to Secretary General of Government, October 9,
1918, AHCH, Fomento, IV, 50.

 

 

64Secretary General of Government, Tuxtla Gutierrez, to Municipal
President, San Martin, Chil6n, September 17, 1918, AHCH, Fomento, 1918,
II, 19; Juan Santos, Mazatan, to Secretary General of Government, Tuxtla
Gutiérrez, May 28, 1918, AHCH, Gobernacién, 1918, XV, 158; Vecinos de
Nicapa del Pichucalco to Governor of Chiapas, July 23, 1918, AHCH,
Gobernacibn, 1918, XV, 158; Vecinos de Oxchuc to Governor of Chiapas,
July 15, 1918, AHCH, Fomento, 1918, II, 19; Vecinos de Zinacantan to
Governor of Chiapas, October 7, 1918, AHCH, Gobernacibn, 1918, XV, 158.

65See: Thomas Benjamin and Christina Johns, "Political Regionalism and
Revolutionary Ideology in Mexico: A Comparison of Chiapas and Federal
Budgets, 1910—1960,” Unpublished manuscript, 1979.

66Circular, November 7, 1917, AHCH, Gobernacibn, 1917, V, 117; Periédico
Oficial del Estado,December 22, 29, 1917.

67Richmond, "The Presidency of Venustiano Carranza," pp. 233—234.

68Benjamin and Johns, "A Comparison of Chiapas and Federal Budgets."

69Ibid.

70James W. Wilkie, The Mexican Revolucion: Federal Expenditure and
Social Change since 1910 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970),
pp. 246—256; Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, Democracy in Mexico (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 26.

71Villanueva to Carranza, October 5, 1916, AVC, Telegramas, 2; Serrano,
Chiapas revolucionario, pp. 153-155.

72Lopez Gutiérrez, Chiapas III, p. 261.

73Provincia (mayo—junio 1949), p. 10.

74Tuxtlecos to Carranza, September 20, 1916, AVC, Telegramas, 2;
Tapachulefios to Carranza, September 2, 1916, AVC, Telegramas, 2.

75The Chiapanecan delegation was: Propietarios, Enrique Suarez, Enrique
D. Cruz, Cristobal L1. Castillo, J. Amilcar Vidal, and Daniel Zepeda;
Suplentes, Francisco Rincén, Lisandro prez, Amadeo Ruiz, and Daniel
RObles. See Diario de los Debates del Congreso Constitugente 1916—1917
(Mexico: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Histbricos de la Revolucian
Mexicans, 1960) II, p. 90.

76Villanueva to Carranza, October 28, 1916, AVC, Telegramas, 2.

77

Villanueva to Carranza, February 10, 1917, AVC, Telegramas, 2.

 

333

78Villanueva to Carranza, September 23, 1916, AVC, Telegramas, 2.

79

Villanueva to Carranza, November 7, 1916, AVC, Telegramas, 2; Serrano,
Chiapas revolucionario, p. 65.

80Statement of Angel Primo, NA, RG 76, 22, 561.

Statement of William J. McGavock, Investigation of Mexican Affairs
I, p. 868.

82Consul, Salina Cruz, to Secretary of State, February 26, 1917, NA,
RG 59, Microcopy 274, 812.00/20571.

Chiapas Nuevo, June 7, 1917; Serrano, Chiapas revolucionario, pp.
110—111.

84Moscoso Pastrana, El pinedismo, p. 113.

85Ibid., pp. 91-101; Serrano, Chiapas revolucionario, p. 113.
6Serrano, Chiapas revolucionario, p. 119.
87 . .

El Tribuno, April 15, 1918.

Serrano, Chiapas revolucionario, p. 120; prez Gutierrez, Chiapas
III, p. 202; El Patria Chica, March 1, 1918.

89Address by General Salvador Alvarado to the People of Chiapas, March
20, 1918, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1918, I, 14. Also see Chiapas Nuevo, March
31, 1918.

90

"Military Activities," Consul, Salina Cruz, to Department of State,
July 25, 1918, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Salina Cruz, V01. 61.

91"Informe constitucional del C. Presidente Municipal de Mapastepec,
Chiapas, ano de 1918," AHCH, Gobernacibn, 1918, II, 14; El Obrera
(Comitan), September 10, 1919.

92Villanueva to Alvarado, May 7, 1918, AHCH, Fomento, 1918, II, 14.

Secretary General of Government, Tuxtla Gutierrez, to Jefe del
Destacamento, Acala, September 15, 1918, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1918, V, 42;
Decree of June 4, 1918, AHCH, Gobernacibn, 1918, V, 42.

94
Alvarado to Carranza, April 28, 1918, AVC, Telegramas, 2; Alvarado
to Carranza, May 6, 1918, AVC, Telegramas, 2.

 

 

334

95"Rebel Activities in Chiapas, July 22 — September 30, 1918,"
November 7, 1918, NA, RG 165, 10640—1484 (19); "Rebel Activities in
Chiapas, October and November 1918," March 19, 1919, NA, RG 165, 10640—
1484 (32).

96Ibid. Also see: Alvarado to Carranza, October 8, 1918, AVC, Telegramas,
2; Alvarado to Carranza, November 12, 1918, AVC, Telegramas, 2.

97Serrano, Chiapas revolucionario, p. 133.

98Legac16n de Mexico en Guatemala to Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores,
October 31, 1918, ASRE, 17—78—28, 23; George Braun, Tuxtla Gutierrez, to
U.S. Consul, Salina Cruz, December 17, 1918, NA, RG 84, Correspondence,
Salina Cruz, Vol. 61.

99Serrano, Chiapas revolucionario, p. 145.

100Ibid., p. 161.

101”Alerta, Chiapanecos!" Tuxtla Gutierrez, June 1919, AHCH, Carpeta 1625.

102151 Criterio, April 27, August 10, 1919.

103El Iris de Chiapas, February 26, 1920.

104Club Radical Chiapaneco, Chiapa de Corzo, to Governor of Chiapas,
December 27, 1919, AHCH, Gobernacibn, 1919, VI, 18; Club Liberal Soconucense,
October 1919, AHCH, Gobernacibn, 1919, III, 23; Club Liberal de Arriaga,
July 26, 1919, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1919, III, 26.

105Juan Santos, Mazatan, to Secretary General of Government, Tuxtla
Gutierrez, May 29, 1918, AHCH, GobernaciOn, 1918, XV, 158; Vecinos de
Niapa del Pichucalco to Governor of Chiapas, July 23, 1918, AHCH,
Gobernacibn, 1918, XV, 158.

106Vecinos de Motozintla to President of the Republic, July 24,1919,
AHCH, Gobernacion, 1919, XII, E1 Club Belisario Dominguez to President,
August 1, 1919, AHCH, Gobernacion, 1919, III, 21.

1
07El Criterio, December 28, 1919.

108
The municipal president of Motozintla arrested some of the leaders of

the Club Belisario Dominguez and ordered the dissolution of the club.
Municipal President to Ismael Mendoza, December 13, 1919, AHCH, Gobernacibn,
1919, VI, 20.

 

 

 

335

10 . .
9Juez Mlxto, Mot021ntla, to Governor of Chiapas, December 31, 1919,
AHCH, Gobernacién, 1919, VI, 20.

110"Acta de constituci6n del Partido Socialista Chiapaneco, Motozintla,
13 de enero de 1920," in Expediente relativo a1 Partido Socialista
Chiapaneco fundado en Motozintla, Departamento de Mariscal, Chiapas, 1920,
AHCH, Gobernacion, 1920, VI, 10.

lllLibano Avendafio, Motozintla, to Governor of Chiapas, January 21, 1920,
AHCH, GobernaciOn, 1920, VI, 10.

112R.A. Paniagua to Governor of Chiapas, March 27, 1920, AHCH, Gobernaci6n,
1920, VI, 10.

113"Bases generales del Partido Socialista Chiapaneco, enero 15, 1920,"
AHCH, Gobernacion, 1920, VI, 10.

114See Expediente relative a1 PSC.

115Juez Mixto Trinidad Marin, Motozintla, to Governor of Chiapas, April
22, 1920, AHCH, Gobernacion, 1920, VI, 10.

116Cumberland, The Constitutionalist Years, pp. 401—405.

117Jan Bazant, A Concise History of Mexico from Hidalgo to Cardenas, 1805—
1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 153—155.

118"Bases para la pacificacibn del Estado," quoted in full in Serrano,
Chiapas revolucionario, p. 189.

119"De Facto Government in District," U.S. Consul, Salina Cruz, to
Department of State, May 22, 1920, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Salina Cruz,
Vol. 78.

2OExcélsior, May 26, 1920.

121Ibid.

122El Universal, July 7, 24, 1920; "Public Order in Chiapas State,"
U.S. Consul, Salina Cruz, to Department of State, September 10, 1920, NA,
RG 84, Correspondence, Salina Cruz, Vol. 78.

12
3Presidente Colegio Electoral R. A. Paniagua to Governor of Chiapas,
December 16, 1920, AHCH, Gobernacifin, 1921, XVIII, 458.

124

Lorenzo Meyer, "Historical Roots of the Authoritarian State inMexico,"

 

 

 

336

in José Luis Reyna and Richard S. Weinert, eds., Authoritarianism in
Mexico (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977),
p. 19.

Chapter Seven

Epigraph: Gardenas quoted in Osorio Marban, El partido de la revolucién
mexicana I, p. 247.

lManuel Diego Hernandez, "Aproximacién a1 estudio del movimiento obrero-
campesino en Michoacén, 1910-1920," Boletih del Centro de Estudios de la
Revolucién Mexicana "Lazaro Cardenas" 3 (abril 1980), p. 26; Gilbert Joseph,
”Revolution from Without: The Mexican Revolution in Yucatan, 1915—1924,"
Diss. Yale University, 1978, p. 156.

2R.A. Paniagua, Motozintla, to presidente municipal San Pedro, Mariscal,
December 9, 1920, AHCH, Fomento, 1921, V. 133.

3Claim of the St. Paul Tropical Development Company, NA, RG 76, Doc. 561.

4Ferandez Ruiz to Obregon, March 15, 1921, Archivo General de la
Nacibn, Fondo Obregbn—Calles, Expediente 816—C—14, hereafter cited as AGN,
0C, and identifying information.

5"Descripci6n de los pueblos y caminos recorridos," AHCH, Fomento, 1926,
417.

6G.W. Knoblauch, "The Railroad Situation in Mexico," n.d., NA, RG 76,
File 145, Box 3, Monograph l9.

7Departamento de la Estadistica Nacional, Anuario de 1930 (Mexico:
Talleres Graficos de la Secretaria de Agricultura y Fomento, 1932), p. 32.

8This is confirmed in file after file in the Records of the Boundary
and Claims Commissions, Record Group 76 of the U.S. National Archives.

9 . . .
Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution, p. 467.

lOIbid., pp. 454—455.

llAnuario de I930, p. 34.

12
T"““ “L“ The Mexican Agrarian Revolution, pp. 341, 347.

3

 

 

 

337

13Ibid., p. 504; Departamento de la Estadistica Nacional, Anuario

estadistico, 1923-1924 2 vols. (Mexico: Talleres Graficos de la Naci6n,
1926), p. 107.

14Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution, pp. 113-114; Tribes and

Temples: A Record of the Expedition to Middle America Conducted by the
Tulane University of Louisiana in 1925 2 vols. (New Orleans: Tulane
University, 1927) II, p. 331.

15$. Castillejos to Governor of Chiapas, August 17, 1925, AHCH,

Gobernacihn, 1925, VIII; Carlos Basuri, Tojolabales, Tzeltales, y Mayas.
Breves apuntes sobre antropologia, etnografia, y linguistica(México:
Talleres Graficos de la Nacién, 1931), pp. 102—103, 134—135; Anomino,
"Mexico Desconocido: Las monterias de Chiapas," Universidad de Mexico I,
(1931), p. 325; El Universal, January 7, 11, 1926.

16Wasserstrom, ”White Fathers and Red Souls," pp. 208—213; Frank Cancian,
Change and Uncertainty in a Peasant Economy: The Maya Corn Farmers of
Zinacantan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 16.

17David C. Bailey, "Obregbn: Mexico's Accommodating President," in
Wolfskill and Richmond, Essays on the Mexican Revolution, p. 86.

l8Fernandez Ruiz to Obregon, March 15, 1921, AGN, 0c, 816—C-l4.

19Fern’andez Ruiz to Obregén, May 12, 1921, AGN, 0C, 816—C—14; Obregbn

to Secretary of Finance, November 31, 1922, AGN, 0C, 816-Ch—ll; Obregbn to
Fernandez Ruiz, January 12, 1923, AGN, 0C, 816-C-l4.

20Informe de Fernandez Ruiz, 1921 and 1922; Peri6dico Oficial del
Estado, June 29, 1921. Volume VIII in the Ramo de Gobernacién (AHCH)
contains over 100 individually granted tax dispensations.

21"Agrarian Law of the State (Chiapas, October 28, 1921)," NA, RG 76,

File 146, Binder 15, Box 10. Also see: Periédico Oficial del Estado,
November 2, 1921; Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution, p. 483.

22 .
Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution, pp. 429-450.

2 .
3Eyler N. Simpson, The Ejido: Mexico's way Out (Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 1937), p. 57.

4President of the Agrarian Party to ComisiEn Nacional Agraria, November
30, 1922, Archivo "seis de enero de 1915" de la Secretaria de Reforma
Agraria, Cintalapa, Expediente 23:589(723.8), hereafter cited as ASRA and
identifying information; Proletariat of the Municipality [unnamed] to
Calles, January 1, 1925, AGN, OC, 818-Ch-l6; Vidal to Calles, May 28, 1925,
AGN, oc, 24l—A—Ch-l7.

 

 

 

 

 

338

25For state budgets 1921—1925 see: Periédical Oficial del Estado; De
la Pefia, Chiapas econémico II, p. 375.

26Heather Fowler Salamini, Agrarian Radicalism in Veracruz, 1920—1938
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1978), p. 38.

27Expediente for Cintalapa, November 30, 1922, ASRA, 23:589(723.8);
expediente for Huixtla, May 3, 1923, ASRA, 23:590(723.8).

28Benjamin and Johns, "A Comparison of Chiapas and Federal Budgets."

29Lopez Gutierrez, Chiapas III, p. 269.

30Pineda to Obregbn, March 10, 1922, AGN, OC, 816—C—l4. See tax

concessions in Volume VIII, Ramo de Gobernaci6n, 1923, AHCH, and De la
Pena, Chiapas econ6mico II, p. 435.

31Vidal, México, to Paniagua, Motozintla, November 10, 1920, AHCH,
Fomento, 1921, V, 133.

32Secretary General of Government, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to General Manuel
Mendoza, Jefe de las Operaciones Militares Chiapas, September 4, 1922,
AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1922, XIX, 619.

33See: Expediente relative a1 Partido Socialista Chiapaneco fundado en

Motozintla, Departamento de Mariscal, Chiapas, 1920, AHCH, Gobernaci6n,
1920, VI, 10.

34Paniagua, Motozintla, to Guillermo Kahl, January 9, 1921, AHCH, Fomento,
1921, V, 133; S. Aleleberg, Finca La Grandeza, (Soconusco) to Amadeo Solis,
Motozintla, August 16, 1922, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1922, XIX, 619.

35Acuerdo del Gobierno del Estado, September 3, 1921, August 17, 1921,
AHCH, Fomento, 1921, V, 151 and 159.

36Isabel Nucamendi, El comisionado eSpecial del gobierno, to Fernandez
Ruiz, April 13, 1921, AHCH, Fomento, 1921, V, 123.

37
391.

"Manifiesto," Tapachula, June 7, 1922, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1922, XV,

38
Ibid.; Tarjeta, AHCH, Gobernacion, 1922, XIX, 619.

3QSecretaria de Relaciones Exteriores to Governor of Chiapas, September
19: 1922, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1922, XIX, 618.

 

 

 

339

aoGovernor of Chiapas to Departamento de Relaciones Interiores de
Gobernacibn Federal, September 27, 1922, AHCH, Gobernacifin, 1922, XIX, 618.

41La Frontera del Sur (Tapachula), September 22, 1922.

42Tribes and Temples II, pp. 327, 356; Henning Silverts, ”On Politics

and Leadership in Highland Chiapas," in Evon Z. Vogt and Alberto Ruz L.
eds., Desarrollo cultural de los Mayas (Mexico: UNAM, 1964), pp. 366—367.

A3Amalia Chavarria to Obreg6n, June 20, 1923, AGN, 0C, 811—Ch—l4;
Vecinos de Libertad Calera to Obregbn, May 29, 1922, ASRA, Libertad Calera,
23:597; Presidente municipal [location unknown] to Governor of Chiapas,
January 8, 1923, AHCH, Gobernacibn, 1923, 45.

44Secretary General of Government (Chiapas) to Under—Secretary General,
February 23, 1923, AHCH, Gobernacibn, 1923, 45; Varios ciudadanos de San
Pedro Remate to Governor of Chiapas, December 5, 1923, AHCH, Gobernacién,
1923, 45.

45President, Partido Agrarista Chiapaneco, to President Comisibn Nacional
Agraria, November 30, 1922, ASRA, Cintalapa, 23:589(723.8); Vecinos de
Libertad to Obreg6n, May 22, 1922, ASRA, Libertad Calera, 23:597; Expediente
Libertad Calera, AGN, CNA, Libro 14.

46M. Marroquin, Tapachula, to Governor of Chiapas, July 31, 1922, AHCH,
Gobernacion, 1922, XV.

7Varios ciudadanos conscientes, "Farisaismo. Vidal y su candidatura
para Senador por Chiapas," Tuxtla Gutiérrez, May 8, 1922, AHCH, Carpeta 1631;
Partido Socialist Chiapaneco to Governor of Chiapas, July 15, 1922, AHCH,
Gobernacién, 1922, XIX, 619. Also see Octavio Gordillo y Ortiz, Diccionario
biografico de Chiapas (Mexico, 1977), pp. 184, 266; Casahonda Castillo,
50 afios de revolucion en Chiapas, pp. 71, 140.

4 .
8Secretary General of Government, Tuxtla Gutierrez, to General Manuel
Mendoza, Tapachula, September 4, 1922, AHCH, Gobernacifin, 1922, XIX, 619.

49A. Rebora to Interim Governor Cruz, May 29, 1923, AGN, 0C, 428-Ch-8.

Rebora was sent to Chiapas to investigate political conditions for
President Alvaro Obregbn.

0Secretary General of Government to State Attorney General, June 20,
1922, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1922, XIX, 68; Catarino Ramos, Paulino Zacarias,
Mauro prez, and others to Governor of Chiapas, March 18, 1923, AHCH,
GobernaciOn, 1923, Asuntos Municipales; Rebora to Cruz, May 29, 1923,
AGN, 0C, 428—Ch—8.

 

 

 

 

 

 

51U S Vice—Consul, Salina Cruz, to Secretary of State, March 12 1923
1924, Vol. 169; Excelsior, March 24, 1923.

NA, RG 84, Salina Cruz,

52Ibid.

53Municipal President Motozintla to Governor of Chiapas, January 8,

1923, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1923, 45.

4Paniagua to Obreg6n, February 25, 1923, Santiago Ramos to Senator
Luis ESpinosa, February 25, 1923, Obreg6n to Fernandez Ruiz, February 26
1923, AGN, OC 428—Ch—8; Vecinos de Motozintla to Governor of Chiapas,
March 5 1923 Varios chiapanecos to Secretary General of Government,

February 26, 1923, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1923, 45.

55Ejército Reorganizador, Soconusco, to Calles, February 28, 1923,
Secretaria de Guerra to Obreg6n, February 14, 1923, Fernandez Ruiz to
Obreg6n, March 28, 1923, AGN, 0C, 428—Ch—8; U.S. Vice—Consul, Salina Cruz,
to Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, March 12, 30, 1923 NA, RG 84,

Correspondence, Salina Cruz, Vol. 169.

56Rafael Coutino to Calles, February 19, 1923, AGN, 0C, 428 Ch 8

57Interim Governor M. Cruz to Obreg6n, June 14, 1923, AGN, QC, 428— Ch- 8.
"Alvaro Obreg6n, the Mexican Revolution and

Also see Randall G. Hansis,
1920—1924, " Diss. University of New Mexico,

the Politics of Consolidation,
1971, p. 60.

58Cruz to Obreg6n June 14, 1923, AGN, 0C, 428—Ch—8; Fernandez Ru1z to
Obreg6n, July 31, 1923, Obreg6n to Fernandez Ruiz, September 11, 1923, AGN
0C 243 Ch D l' U.S. Vice—Consul, Salina Cruz, to Secretary of State,
March 12, 1923, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Salina Cruz, Vol. 169.

5
9Lopez Gutiérrez, Chiapas III, p. 270.

6OLuis Espinosa to Obreg6n, November 29, 1923, Fernandez Ruiz to

Obreg6n, December 3, 1923, AGN, 0C, 408—Ch—8.

6 /
lExcelsior, November 27, 1923.

95.

62 . .
Obreg6n: Mexico's Accommodat1ng PreSIdent," p.

Bailey, "
Ernest Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage (New York: The Century Co.,
1928), p. 320.

64,
'Present Executive and Ministry," March 10, 1925, NA, RG 165
l657-G—547.

 

 

65John W.F. Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico: A Chronicle of the Revolution,
1919—1936 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), pp. 219—220.

66"Stability of Government: Rebel Activity," December 19, 1923, NA,
RG 165, 2657-6—535.
67 .z .
Lopez Cutlerrez, Chiapas III, p. 273-275.
8Donato Bravo Izquierdo, Lealtad militar. Campana en el estado de
Chiapas e istmo de Tehuantepec (Mexico, 1948), pp. 31, 46, 81; Excelsior,
March 3, 1924.
69U.S. Vice—Consul, Salina Cruz, to Secretary of State, January 26, 1924,
NA, RG 59, 812.00/27048; Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, pp. 243—244.
7OObreg6n to Governor of Chiapas, February 28, 1924, AGN, 0C, 101-R2—
Ch-4.
Lopez Gutiérrez, Chiapas III, pp. 282—283, 277—278; Excelsior, March
3, 1924.
2Bravo Izquierdo, Lealtad militar, pp. 111, 123-141; César C6rdova to

7
General Calles, January 31, 1925, AGN, 0C, 121—C—Ch-1.

7 . . . '
3Munic1pal PreSIdent, Chicomuselo, to Governor of Chiapas, September 3,
1925, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1925, I; State Attorney General to Secretary General
of Government, July 17, 1924, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1923-1924; President
Municipal, San Crist6bal, to Obreg6n, September 13, 1924, AGN, OC, 428-Ch-9.
74”Al Pueblo Chiapaneco,” Partido Politico Estudiantil, 1924, AHCH,

Carpeta 1631.
75 ,. .
Lopez Gut1errez, Chiapas III, pp. 299—300.

Comité Directivo Electoral, June 18, 1924, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1925, I.
77 , /
General Av1la Camacho to Obregon, September 9, 1924, AGN, 0C, 428—Ch-9.

8

Archivo de Gobernaci6n Federal, Relaciones Interiores, expediente
E-2—75—5, quoted in Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage, pp. 407—408. Also
see Vecinos de San Pedro Remate to Obreg6n, June 28, 1924, AHCH, Gobernaci6n,

1924, Asuntos Ayuntamientos.
9 . . . . . ,
Partido Soc1allsta Ch1apaneco to Calles, December 9, 1924, Lu1s Leon,

7
Comisi6n Nacional Agraria, to Calles, December 12, 1924, Proletariat of
the Municipality to Calles, January 25, 1925, AGN, 0C, 24l-A—Ch-17.

 

 

 

 

342

8O"Comité directive de la campafia pro—Vidal, 1924," AGN, OC, 428—T—23;
State Attorney General to Governor of Chiapas, April 14, 1925, AHCH,

Gobernaci6n, 1924, I.
8lLa Vbz de Chiapas, February 9, 1928; Diputado Alfredo Marin to

Calles, December 3, 1924, AGN, 0C, 428-Ch—8; General J.M. Dorantes to
Obreg6n, September 11, 1924, Delfilio Martinez Rojas, Municipal President

Las Casas, to Obreg6n, September 13, 1924, AGN, OC, 428—Ch—9.
82Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage, p. 407. Also see Vecinos de San
Bartolo Solistahuacan to Diputado Ramirez Corzo, printed in Diario de los

Debates, September 4, 1924.

83"Comisi6n revisora de credenciales — Sexta Secci6n," Diario de los
Debates, September 4, 1924; Vecinos de Mapastepec to Governor of Chiapas,
December 24, 1924, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1925, IX; Fernandez Ruiz, Alfredo
Marin, Gustavo Pineda and others to Obreg6n, September 9, 1924, AGN, 0C,

428—Ch—9.

84Hansis, ”The Politics of Consolidation,” pp. 60—61.

85Secretary General of Government to Fernandez Ruiz, October 22, 1924,
Obreg6n to Fernandez Ruiz, November 10, 1924, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1924, XIV.

Fernandez Ruiz to Obreg6n, November 30, 1924; Vidal to Obreg6n,

November 30, 1924, AGN, OC, 428—Ch—8.

8 Obreg6n to Fernandez Ruiz, November 6, 1924; Obreg6n to Vidal, November
29, 1924, AGN, 0C, 408—Ch—lO.

8 Excélsior, December 3, 5, 6, 25, 1924; Peri6dico Oficial del Estado,
January 7, 1925.

89C6rdova to Calles, January 7, 1925, Pascual C6rdova to Calles,
January 7, 1925, AGN, OC, 428—Ch-8.

9 Francisco P. Ramirez to Calles, March 3, 1925, AGN, OC, 408-Ch-10.

l . . .
Gruening, Mexico and its Heritage, p. 409; Han51s, ”The Politics of
Consolidation," p. 61; Lopez Gutierrez, Chiapas III, p. 301; Diario de los

Debates, August 15, 27, September 4, 24, 1924.
92 .
Vidal to Calles, May 28, 1925, AGN, OC, 241—A—Ch—17.

93
Informe de Carlos Vidal, 1925; Secretary General of CROM to Calles,
March 31, 1927, AGN, 0C, 802—C—29; Garcia Soto, Geografia general de Chiapas,

P. 261.

 

 

 

 

343

94Reconstruccién (Tuxtla Gutiérrez), April 5, 1925.
95 ./ .
Lopez Gutierrez, Chiapas III, pp. 303—304.

96
1926).

97Ley que establece 1a junta central de conciliaci6n y arbitraje, las
juntas municipales de conciliaci6n y las comisiones especiales del
salario minimo, 15 de enero de 1926," Peri6dico Oficial del Estado,

Ley reglamentaria del trabajo (Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Imprenta del Gobierno,

January 27, 1926.

98"New Labor Law in Chiapas," March 9, 1927, NA, RG 84, Correspondence,

Salina Cruz.

99"New Law for Expropriation of Lands for Public Use, State of Chiapas,"
January 19, 1927, NA, RG 76, File 146, Box 10, Binder 15; Foster to
Secretary of State, January 27, 1927, NA, RG 59, 812.52/1437.

100Circular, AHCH, Fomento, 1927, II.

lOlAnuari'o de 1930, p. 375.
10 . .
Vidal to Calles, September 21, 1925, Calles to Vidal, October 6, 1925,
AGN, oc, 816-C—l4.
103" . . . . . . . n
Political Conditions, Salina Cruz District, July 10, 1926, NA, RG 84,

Correspondence, Salina Cruz.

1
04"Conditions Affecting Credits," December 4, 1927, NA, RG 84,

Correspondence, Salina Cruz.

1
0 Foster to Secretary of State, April 12, 1927, NA, RG 59, 812.512/3368.

106 .
Vice—Consul, Salina Cruz, to Secretary of State, July 24, 1924,
NA, RG 59, 812.42/87.

0 . . ,, . / .
Notic1a estadistica sobre la educaCion pfiblica en MeXlCO correspondiente

al afio de 1927 (Mexico: SEP, 1929), pp. 62, 162, 137.

108 .
"M1 labor primordial consist6 en conferenciar apliamente con cuanto
finquero encontraba a mi paso; haciéndole palpar claramente el ideal que

PErSigue nuestro actual gobernante; consistente en desanalfabetizar a los
Son muy contados los

pobres hijos de nuestra queridisima Patria Chica.
Senores Finqueros que se opusieron a los disposiciones de esta inspeccion

escolar actualmente a mi cargo." Inspector Mdfioz to Secretary General of

 

 

 

344

Government, December 31, 1926, AHCH, Instruccion Pfiblica, 1926, X;
Anuario de 1930, p. 191.

109Informe de Carlos Vidal, 1926; Periédico Oficial del Estado, December

16, 1925, January 6, 1926; De la Pefia, Chiapas econ6mico II, p. 435;
John Bedwell to U.S. Consul Salina Cruz, June 23, 1926, NA, RG 84,
Correspondence, Salina Cruz.

110R. Ruiz to Governor of State, August 18, 1925; S. Castillejos to

Govenor of State, August 17, 1925, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1925.

111Municipal President, Tapachula, to Vidal, August 12, 1925; Sefiores

Hind y Cia. to Secretary General of Government, August 13, 1925, AHCH,
Gobernaci6n, 1925, VIII.

112 . . I
Municipal Secretary, Tuzantan, to Secretary General of Government,

December 8, 1926; M. Orduna, Confederacion Socialista, to Vidal, December
15, 1926, AHCH, Fomento, 1926.

113J. Valasez to Vidal, January 26, 1927, AHCH, Fomento, 1927, II.

Also see numerous other examples in Ramo Fomento, 1925—1927.

114

Municipal Delegate, E1 Eden, to Vidal, December 1, 1925, AHCH, Fomento,
1927.

5Varios ciudadanos de Cancuc to Secretary General of Government, May 1,
1926, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1926, XII.

116J. Martinez to Deputy Paniagua, April 17, 1926, AHCH, Gobernaci6n,
1926, XIV. Also see D. Xetet y otros to Vidal, June 28, 1927, AHCH,
Fomento, 1927, II.

ll7Circular, Numero 5, June 1, 1926, AHCH, Fomento, 1926.

l . ,
l8U'no Mas Uho, April 13, 1981.

119"Local Political Conditions," March 30, 1926, NA, RG 165.

120
Dulles, Yesterday in mexico, see chapter 38.

1 . .
21Francisco J. Santamaria, La tragedia de Cuernavaca en 1927 y mi

escapatoria Célebre (Mexico, 1939), pp. 23, 27.

122 I .
Lopez Gutierrez, Chiapas III, p. 314.

123Ibid., p. 417.

 

345

124Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, p. 338.

125mm. , pp. 342—351.

126"Declaraciones de Manuel Zepeda Lara (1935)," and "Declaraciones

del Senor Alberto Solis Gamboa y Profesor Epigmenio de Leon (1935)," in
Datos para la historia del Vidalismo en Chiapas, AHCH, Carpeta 941.

12?Salvador Martinez Mancera, "C6mo fue la muerte del General Luis P.
Vidal, Gobernador de Chiapas," El Universal Grafico, October 25, 1937.

128El Universal, October 9, 10, 11, 1927; U.S. Consul, Salina Cruz, to
Charge d'Affairs, American Embassy Mexico City, October 15, 1927,
"Political Conditions," October 9, 1927, NA, RG 84, Correspondence,
Salina Cruz; U.S. Consul, Frontera, to Secretary of State, October 8, 1927,
NA, RG 59, 812.00/29920.

129U.S. Consul, Salina Cruz, to Charge d'Affairs, October 19, 1927,
NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Salina Cruz 1927.

l30Excélsior, November 5, 1927.

Chapter Eight

Epigraph: "Memorandum: resumen de los cargos que organizaciones
campesinos, elementos obreros y politicos hacen a1 Gobernador del Estado,
Coronel Victorico Grajales," El comité de obreros y campesinos, Soconusco,
December 13, 1934, Archivo General de la Nacidn, Fondo Lazaro Cérdenas,
Expediente 542.1/20, hereafter cited as AGN, LC, and identifying information.

1The Confederaci6n Regional de Obreros Mexicanos (CROM) enjoyed a
powerful position, economically and politically, during the administration
of President Plutarco Elias Calles. CROM, and its political arm, the
Partido Laborista Mexicano, opposed the reelection of General Alvaro
Obreg6n, fearing that he would favor the Partido Nacional Agrarista (PNA)
at CROM's expense. Obregonistas, following Obreg6n‘s assassination,
demanded that Calles break his ties with CROM, his most important source
of mass political support.

2Rafael Loyola Diaz, La crisis obreg6n—calles y el estado mexicana
(Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1980), pp. 17—l8.

3Arnaldo C6rdova, La clase Obrera en la historia de Mexico: En una
época de crisis, 1928—1934 (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1980), pp. 19—38.

 

 

 

346

4James Wilkie y Edna Monzon de Wilkie, México visto en el Siglo XX.
Entrevistas de historia oral (Mexico: Instituto Mexicano de Investigaciones
Economicas, 1969), pp. 309—310.

5C6rdova, La politica de masas, p. 47.

6Chiapas was no exception in this regard. Felipe Carrillo Puerto
achieved a similar governing alliance in Yucatan in 1921—1923, as did
Adalberto Tejeda in Veracruz in 1923—1924 and 1929-1932, and Lazaro
Cérdenas in Michoacén in 1929—1932.

7La voz de Chiapas, December 29, 1927.

81bid., January 12, 1928.

9Ibid., March 1, 1928.

10Information provided by Daniela Spenser, 1981.

11Partido Agrarista, Arriaga, to Calles, December 30, 1927, AGN, OC,
408—Ch-l6.
12”Political Conditions," April 15, 1928, NA, RG 84, Correspondence,
Salina Cruz.

13"Dictamen que motiv6 1a destitucién del Lic. Federico Martinez Rojas,"
México, March 21, 1928, AHCH, Carpeta 1616; La V02 de Chiapas, April 19,
26, May 10, 1928.

14La VOz de Chiapas, November 24, December 29, 1927, January 5, 19,
1928.

15 /
Chiapas: Revista Mensual (Tuxtla Gutierrez), October 12, 1928;
"Quién es Raymundo Enriquez?" La vanguardia, August 28, 1932.

l6"Partido Progresista Chiapaneco Pro—Enriquez al Pueblo Chiapaneco,"
July 26, 1928, AHCH, Carpeta 1623.

l7Partido Agrarista to Calles, December 30, 1927, AGN, OC, 408—Ch-l6.

18Enriquez to Club Laborista de Margarita, May 27, 1928, AGN, 0C,
408—Ch—l6.

l
9Inspector de Correos, Arriaga, to Calles, July 22, 1928, AGN, 0C,
217—Ch—18.

 

 

347

0Presidente Liga Revolucionario Estado de Chiapas to Calles, September
1, 1928, AGN, OC, 408—Ch-l6; La Vbz de Chiapas, September 16, 1928.

lExcelsior, November 7, 8, 27, December 2, 1928.

22Wasserstrom, "White Fathers and Red Souls," Figure 15.

23Anuario de 1930, p. 288; Dolores de Triado to Cardenas, November 1,
1937, ASRA, Cintalapa, 23:589.

4Anuario de 1930, pp. 340, 383; Anuario de 1938, p. 196-197.

Favre, Cambio y continuidad, pp. 76—77; Wasserstrom, "La evolucibn
de la economia regional," p. 496; Reconstruccion, April 5, 1925.

26Tribes and Temples II, p. 331.

7Frank Tannenbaum, Peace by Revolution: An Interpretation of Mexico
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), pp. 29-30.

28Matthew Edel, "Zinacantan's Ejido: The Effects of Mexican Land Reform

on an Indian Community in Chiapas," Unpublished manuscript, 1962, p. 12.
Also see Julian Pitt—Rivers and Norman A. McQuown, "Historical Change and
Continuity in Settlement, Society, Language, and Ethnic Relations Among
the Tzeltal—Tzotzil Indians of Highlands Chiapas," in Chicago Mimeographs,
Unpublished Manuscripts, Vol. 12, pp. 2—3.

2 o o o I
9For maize and frijol production figures see Jorge A. Vivo Escoto,

Estudio geografia, pp. 51, 64; Lowenthal, "Elite of San Cristobal."

3O"Cémara Nacional de Tuxtla Gutiérrez de Comercio," AHCH, Carpeta 475;
Boletih de la Camara Nacional de Comercio Agricultura, y Industria de
San Cristobal Las Casas, March 31, 1928.

31"Cémara Nacional de Tuxtla Gutiérrez," AHCH, Carpeta 475.

32José Ruiz, San Crist6ba1, to Rodriguez, September 5, 1933,

Archivo General de la Naci6n, Fondo Abelardo L. Rodriguez, Expediente
08/183, hereafter cited as AGN, ALR, and identifying information.

33Moises T. De la Pena, "La potencialidad ganadera de Chiapas," Ateno
Chiapas (1951), pp. 51—52.

4

Municipal President, Tapachula, to Secretary General of Government,
April 16, 1929, AHCH, Gobernaci6n, 1929, II. This document lists all
major coffee and cattle hacendados in Soconusco.

 

 

 

35Leo Waibel, La Sierra Madre de Chiapas (México: Sociedad Mexicana de
Geografia y Estadistica, 1933), pp. 122—127.

36La vanguardia, November 16, 1930.

37Peri6dico Oficial del Estado, February 26, November 19, December 30,
1930, December 30, 1931.

38"Memorandum," December 13, 1934, AGN, LC, 542.1/20.

39Manuel E. Guzman, Chiapas: Estudio y resolucion de algunos problemas
economicas y sociales del estado (Mexico: 1930), p. 17.

40Loyola Diaz, La crisis obregén—calles, pp. 106—107, 112—113.

4Irma, p. 135.

42Osorio Marban, El partido de la revolucién, pp. 56—57, 213.
43 I . . ,
Loyola Diaz, La crisis obregon—calles, pp. 127-145.

44Excelsior, December 19, 1928, March 2, 1929.

45La Vanguardia, February 24, March 1, 1929; El universal, March 1, 1929.

46La Vanguardia, May 12, August 22, September 14, 1929.

47"Al pueblo Chiapaneco," Lic Amador Coutifio, Mexico D.F., December

1929, in ASRA, Huixtla, 25:590 (723.8); La vanguardia, September 22,
October 6, 1929.

48Carlos Martinez Assad, El laboratorio de la revolucién. E1 Tabasco
garridista (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1979), pp. 164—165, 170—171; La Voz de
Chiapas, February 9, June 7, 1928.

49Rafael L6pez to Governor Martinez Rojas, November 10, 1927, AHCH,
Fomento, 1927. Also see in the same volume, "Estatutos de la Liga de
Resistencia del distrito de Pichucalco."

50 . . .
Martinez Assad, El laboratorio de la revoluc16n, p. 129; La Voz de
Chiapas, January 5, 1928.

51 ., . .
Lorenzo Meyer, Historia de la revoluCion mexicana: El conflicto
social y los gobiernos del maximato Vol. 13 (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico,
1978), P. 245.

349

52Cal y Mayor to Portes Gil, December 31, 1929, ASRA, Cintalapa, 23:589;
Liga Central to Cérdenas, July 18, 1936, ASRA, Huixtla, 25:590;

Procuraduria de Pueblos to Comisién Nacional Agraria, ASRA, Pijijiapam,
23:8237.

S3Ing. Sub—Auxiliar to Agente General de la Secretaria de Agricultura

y Fomento, January 31, 1931, ASRA, Cintalapa, 23:589; Excelsior, December
31, 1930.

54Garcia de Le6n, "Lucha de clases," pp. 75—77.

5La Vanguardia, October 12, November 9, 1930; El Baluarte Chiapaneco
(Mexico, D.F.), September 20, 1930.

56”The Agrarian Movement," February 1931, NA, RG 165; Sub—Delegado
Martin de la Pefia to Comisibn Nacional Agraria, February 24, 1931, ASRA,
Ocozocoautla, 23:606; La vanguardia, March 8, 15, July 5, August 31, 1931.

57Simpson, The Ejido, pp. 113-114, 117—118.

58Robert E. Scott, "Some Aspects of Mexican Federalism, 1917—1948,"
Diss. University of Wisconsin, 1949, p. 185.

59La Vanguardia, June 28, 1931.

6O"La reforma agraria y los gobiernos de los Estados," Excelsior,
November 30, 1930.

l / I o I I
Romana Falcon, "E1 surgimiento del agrarismo cardenista — Una

revision de las tesis populistas," Historia Mexicana XXVII (enero—marzo
1978), p. 346.

Informe de Raymundo Enriquez, 1932; Inspector General to Inspector
L6pez, January 31, 1931, AHCH, Personal y Cuenta, 1931.

Informe de Raymundo Enriquez, 1931 and 1932; Excelsior, December 6,
1930; Peri6dico Oficial del Estado, May 27, 1931; L6pez, Hernandez, and
others to Governor of Chiapas, May 20, 1929, AHCH, Fomento, 1929.

64 .
Declaraciones del Gobernador del Estado de Chiapas, Ing. Raymundo
. Enriquez (Tuxtla Gutierrez: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1930).

65La vanguardia, March 31, 1929.

 

Guzman, Chiapas: Estudio y resolucién, p. 85; La Vanguardia, March
31, 1929; UPRECH, November 9, 1928, December 15, 1928.

 

350

67La Vanguardia, December 27, 1931, January 3, May 8, 1932. Fausto
Ruiz broke with the Fernandez Ruiz camp in the early 19205 for personal
reasons.

68Renovaci6n, January 7, 21, February 18, March 4, 1932; Excelsior,
April 4, 5, 1932.

69Liga Central de Comunidades Agrarias del Estado de Chiapas to
Cérdenas, December 11, 1934, AGN, LC, 542.1, 20.

70Gustavo prez Gutiérrez, Capitan de Caballeria, Tuxtla Gutierrez,
to Cardenas, January 1, 1935, AGN, LC, 542.1, 20; Renovacién, December 2,
1933.

71Gutierrez to Gardenas, January 1, 1935.

72E1 Nacional, August 6, 13, 1933; Renovacién, August 9, 14, 1933.

73Periodico Oficial del Estado, January 30, 1935; Liberacién, February
10, 1935; La verdad, November 9, 1935.

74Informe de Victorico Grajales, 1933.

75Anuario de 1930, p. 428; Anuario de 1939, pp. 522-523; Anuario de
1940, p. 626; De la Pefia, Chiapas econ6mico II, p. 459.

76Liberacién, January 27, 1935; Periédico Oficial del Estado, April 2,
1936; De la Pena, Chiapas econémico II, p. 366.

77Renovaci6n, January 21, 1933; Periédico Oficial del Estado, February
12, 1936.

78Informe de Victorico Grajales, 1934; Periodico Oficial del Estado,
April 18, June 6, 1934; De la Pefia, Chiapas econémico I, pp. 299, 319.

79La vanguardia, August 25, 1929; Gossen, Chamulas in the World of the
Sun, pp. 269—270.

80"The Present Church Situation,” February 12, 1935, NA, RG 165;
Michael Salovesh, "Politics in a Maya Community," Diss. Northern Illinois
University, 1972, pp. 123-124; Gustavo Montiel, Tuxtla Gutierrez de mis
recuerdos (Mexico: Costa—Amie, 1972), see photographs.

81La escuela socialista de Chiapas (Tuxtla Gutierrez: Imprenta del
Gobierno del Estado, 1935), pp. 33, 37, 59-60; Peri6dico Oficial del
Estado, May 27, June 10, 1936.

 

 

 

351

82Peri6dico Oficial del Estado, February 28, 1934.

83Lopez Gutierrez, Chiapas III, pp. 449—450.

84Lucio Mendieta y Nunez, La administracién pfiblica en Mexico (México,
1942), pp. 290—291.

85Alicia Hernandez Chavez, Historia de la revolucién mexicana: La
mecanica cardenista Vol. 16 (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 1979), pp. 37—38.

86Wilkie y Wilkie, Mexico visto en el Siglo XX, p. 309.

87Luis Gonzalez y Gonzalez, Historia de la revoluci6n mexicana: Los
artifices del cardenismo Vol. 14 (Mexico: E1 Colegio de Mexico, 1979),
p. 235.

88Lyle C. Brown, "cardenas: Creating a Campesino Power Base for
Presidential Policy," in Wolfskill and Richmond, Essays on the Mexican
Revolution, p. 105; Meyer, El conflicto social, pp. 249-250.

89C6rdova, En una época de crisis, pp. 97—110.

90Ibid., pp. 154—155, 227.

91Lyle C. Brown, "General Lazaro Cardenas and Mexican Presidential
Politics, 1933—1940: A Study in the Acquisition and Manipulation of
Political Power," Diss. University of Texas, 1964. Also see expedientes
La Concordia, May 12, 1935, ASRA, La Concordia, 23:8195.

2 , I
9 Cordova, La politica de masas, p. 54.

93Garcia de Le6n, ”Lucha de clases,” p. 81.

94Sindicato de Cargadores y Estibadores, Tapachula, to Presidente del
Comité de Salud Pfiblica, October 27, 1934, AGN, ALR, 525.3, 449.

95Liga Central de Comunidades Agrarias del Estado de Chiapas to
Gardenas, December 11, 1934, AGN, LC, 542-1, 20’

96Ibid.

97Ibid.

98"Memorandum," December 13, 1934, AGN, LC, 542.1, 20.

 

 

 

 

352

99Bloque Social Revolucionario Pro—Chiapas to Cardenas, December 11,
1934, AGN, LC, 542.1, 20.

lOOIssac Morga, Liga Central, to Cardenas, July 6, 1935, AGN, LC, 542.1,
299; Liberacién, June 23, 1935.

101Trinidad Garcia to Secretary of Government, Mexico City, April 5,
1934, AGN, LC, 542.1, 299; CCM to Gardenas, April 6, 1934, AGN, ALR,
516.1, 84; Elisa Vazquez de G6mez, Tuxtla Gutierrez, to Cérdenas, July
10, 1934, AGN, LC, 525.3, 515-1.

lOZUnién de Albaniles to Gobernaci6n Federal, September 29, 1933, AGN,
ALR, 516.1, 40—2.

103Enrique Flores Mag6n to Rodriguez, April 3, 1934, AGN, ALR, 524, 532;
Genaro Marin to Jefe de la Guarnicién, Tapachula, May 1, 1934, AGN, ALR,
517.1, 43. Also see camera de Trabajo, Tapachula, to Cérdenas, January
4, 1934, AGN, ALR, 552.14, 438; Vecinos de Colonia "Sal vador Urbina,"
to Gobernacibn Federal, February 24, 1934, AGN, ALR, 552.14, 438.

104Jefe Departamento Agrario to Cérdenas, September 4, 1935, AGN, LC,
551.3, 166.

105Luis Rodriguez, Private Secretary of the President, to Grajales,
March 19, 1935, AGN, LC, 533, 7.

106Grajales to Gardenas, August 8, 1935, AGN, LC, 542.1, 20.

1 /
O7Raymundo Enriquez to Rodriguez, July 26, 1933, AGN, ALR, 516.1, 40.

l /
O8Renovacion, August 14, 1933.

109Liga Central to Cérdenas, December 11, 1934, also see telegrams
directed to Governor Grajales in AGN, ALR, 516.1, 40.

llOGenero Marin to Jefe de la Guarnicién, Tapachula, May 1, 1934,
AGN, LC, 517.1, 43; Marin, Cércel Publica Tapachula, to Gardenas,
September 2, 1935, April 30, 1936, AGN, LC, 542.1, 299.

lllDelegado CCM, Tapachula, to Cardenas, June 22, 1935, AGN, LC, 542.1,
1126; Gamara de Trabajo, Tapachula, to Cérdenas, June 23, 1935, AGN,
LC, 542.1, 1126; Felipe Galindo, Escuintla, to Cérdenas, October 6, 1936,
AGN, LC, 544.5, 332; Francisco Lara, Palenque, to Cérdenas, January 1,
1935, AGN, LC, 544.5, 371; "Chiapas y Sus enemigos," Liberacién,
January 6, 1935; Excelsior, March 5, 1934; La Prensa, September 23, 1935.

112EXCElsior, March 3, 1934.

353

113"Labor Conditions in Chiapas," March 3, 1936, NA, RG 165.

114"Commission to Study Labor Problem of Indians in Chiapas," March 19,
1936, NA, RG 165.

115Excelsior, April 5, 1936; El universal, April 5, 1936.

116Grupo de partidarios suyos, Las Casas, to Cardenas, July 24, 1936,
AGN, LC, 135.23, 42.

117Mexican Labor News (published by the Workers' University of Mexico
in english translation, Director, Vicente Lombardo Toledano), September
20, 1936.

118"Social Advancement in Chiapas," December 4, 1936, NA, RG 165.

119Favre, Cambio y continuidad, p. 75.

120Hernandez Chavez, La mecanica cardenista, pp. 54-60.

121”Local Political Conditions," March 8, 1935, NA, RG 165; Ambassador
Daniels to Secretary of State, September 24, 1935, NA, RG 59, 812.00/
30284; Excelsior, April 10, 1936; La Prensa, September 23, 1935.

12 , . , , . .
2Diccionario biografico de MeXlCO (Monterrey: Editorial Revesa, 1968),
pp. 330—331; Chiapas Nuevo, December 15, 1938.

123El Universal, April 1, 1936.

124Grajales to Cardenas, March 9, 1936, AGN, LC, 542.1, 20.

125"Bombing of PNR Offices in Chiapas," March 14, 1936, NA, RG 165;
Excelsior, April 4, 5, 1936.

126Excelsior, April 7, 12, 14, 28, 1936.

127Ibid., May 5, 1936.

2 , . . , . .
8Comite Executive Nacional, PNR, to PreSidente Comite Mun1c1pa1, June
24, 1936, ASRA, Huixtla, 25:590.

29Excélsior, May 12, 15, 1936.

130"Local Political Conditions,” July 7, 1936, NA, RG 165.

 

354

131"Local Political Conditions," July 21, August 4, 1936, NA, RG 165;
Ambassador Daniels to Secretary of State, July 7, September 23, 1936,
NA, RG 59, 812.00/30386 and 30409.

132Excelsior, September 23, 1936.

133Ibid., September 24, 1936.

Chapter Nine

Epigraph: G6mez, El Presidente del Comisariado Ejidal to Cérdenas,
February 10, 1938, AGN, LC, 135.23, 42; Guzman, Ex—Secretario local de
la Seccion Num. 14 de Numancia, Cacahoatan, to Avila Camacho, November
22, 1945, Archivo General de la Nacibn, Fondo Manuel Avila Camacho, 432,
262, hereafter cited as AGN, MAC, and identifying information.

lCdrdova, La formacion del poder politico, p. 43.

2Arturo Anguiano, El estado y la politica Obrera del cardenismo
(Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1975), pp. 58, 51—65; Joe C. Ashby, Organized
Labor and the Mexican Revolution under Lazaro Cardenas (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1963), p. 81.

3Gilberto Bésquez, The National RevolutiOnary Party of Mexico and the
Six-Year Plan (Mexico: PNR, 1937), p. 312.

4Moises Gonzalez Navarro, La confederacién nacional campesina. Un
grupo de presién en la reforma agraria mexicana (Mexico: Costa-Amic,
1968), pp. 138, 154—155. The ejido was the basic constituent unit of
the CNC. Graciano Sanchez, former Secretary General of the CCM, was
elected Secretary General of the CNC.

5Brown, "General Lazaro Cardenas and Mexican Presidential Politics,"
pp. 273—290.

6Nathan, quoted in C6rdova, La politica de masas, p. 166.

7 , ,
Octavio Ianni, El estado capitalista en la epoca de Cardenas (Mexico:
Ediciones Era, 1977), pp. 44—55.

8 - ,
Coutino to Cardenas, October 1, 1936, AGN, LC, 542.1, 20.

9
El Universal, July 7, 1937.

355

10chiapas Nuevo, December 30, 1937; Informe de Efrain Gutierrez, 1939.

llChiapas Nuevo, August 26, 1937.

12Periédico Oficial del Estado, February 9, 1938; Chiapas Nuevo,
November 3, 1939.

l3Departamento del Trabajo, Directorio de agrupaciones obreras y
patronales de la repfiblica (Mexico: DAPP, 1939), pp. 63—78; Chiapas Nuevo,
December 17, 1937; Gutierrez, Gobierno revolucionario, p. 49; Anuario de
1939, pp. 322—324.

l4Mexican Labor News, January 5, 1939; Chiapas Nuevo, April 6, 1939.

15Mexican Labor News, September 21, 1939; Chiapas Nuevo, September 21,
1939; Mario Culebro to Gutierrez, May 22, 1940, ASRA, Cacahoatan, 23:8213.

l6Informe de Efrain Gutierrez, 1938.

17Mexican Labor News, August ll, 18, 1938; Secretary General CNC to
Chief of the Agrarian Department, January 4, 1939, ASRA, Carranza,
23:8142; Secretary, Liga de Comunidades Agrarias, Tapachula, to Chief of
the Agrarian Department, February 28, 1940, ASRA, Union Juarez, 23:8051.

l8C6rdova, La politica de masas, pp. 197—201.

19Estatutos de la H. Camara Nacional de Comercio e Industria de Tuxtla
Gutierrez, Chiapas (Tuxtla Gutierrez, 1938).

20Chiapas Nuevo, October 20, September 29, 1938.

21Ibid., July 7, October 27, November 17, 1938.

2
2Ibid., June 22, 1939.

23Ibid., December 28, 1939.

2
4Ibid., February 20, April 27, 1940; El universal, September 5, 1940,

25
George A. Collier, Fields of the Tzotzil: The Ecological Bases of
Tradition in Highland Chiapas (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975),
PP. 195—198.

26 ., ,
Periodico Oficial del Estado, January 6, 1937; Informe de Efrain
Gutierrez, 1938.

356

27Chiapas Nuevo, August 26, 1937; Periodico Oficial del Estado,
July 28, 1937.

28Roger Reed, "Chamula and the Coffee Plantations of Chiapas," AB
Harvard College, 1973, pp. 84-87.

29Edel, "Zincantan's Ejido," p. 29; Aviso de Posesi6n, September 1,
1940, ASRA, Zinacantan, 23:8118(723.8); Dictamen y Expediente Num. 975,
March 23, 1940, ASRA, Chamula, 23:23232(723.8).

30De la Pena, Chiapas econémico II, p. 377.

31Jose Luis Campero Calderon to Chief, Agrarian Department, July 8,
1954, ASRA, Tenejapa, 21:10535.

32Kirsten Albrechtsen Svendsen, ”El trabajo asalariado en las
comunidades indigenas," Tesis, UNAM, 1967, pp. 102-114; Ing. Leandro
Molinar Merar, "Las zonas indigenas, uno de los mayores retos en materia
agraria," El Dia, June 16, 1978.

33Ulrich Kohler, Cambio cultural dirigido en los altos de Chiapas: Un
estudio sobre la antropologia social aplicada (México: INI — SEP, 1975),
p. 62; Robert Redfield and Alfonso Villa Rojas, Notes on the Ethnology
of Tzeltal Communities of Chiapas (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution
of Washington, no. 28, 1939), p. 110.

34Salvador G6mez 050 to Gardenas, March 22, 1940, and Acta conciliatoria,
November 14, 1974, ASRA, Chamula, 23:23232; Wasserstrom, "White Fathers
and Red Souls," pp. 223—224.

35Ampliacién Ejidos Poblado La Libertad, February 29, 1939, ASRA,
La Libertad, 24:8128.

36Indigenismo en Accién, May 20, 1944.

H

37 . I -
"Labor de la Agencia de Colocaciones de Comitan, Chiapas Nuevo,

January 12, 1939.
38Gutierrez to Cérdenas, August 24, 1938, AGN, LC, 533.31, 9.

39Comité Ejecutivo, Sindicato de Trabajadores Indigenas, San Cristbbal,
t0 Cérdenas, September 16, 1939, AGN, LC, 533.31, 9.

40Reed, "Chamula and the Coffee Plantations," pp. 84—85, 103—105.

41
Chiapas Nuevo, September 23, 1937.

 

 

357

42"Political Conditions," April 6, 1927, NA, RG 84, Correspondence,
Salina Cruz, 1927.

43Military Attache to Secretary of State, November 3, 1939, NA, RG 59,
812.61333/7; "Informe del asemblea de los ciudadanos de Amatenango,"
May 7, 1936, ASRA, Amatenango, 23:8585(723.l); J. Pineda to Comisién
Agraria Mixta, October 20, 1940, ASRA, Benito Juarez, 23:17539.

44Francisco Isasi, Huixtla, to cardenas, August 13, 1938, ASRA, Huixtla,

25:590; Chiapas Nuevo, January 12, 1938; El Universal, November 15, 1938.

45"Memorandum que presenta e1 delegado del SUTICS del Estado de Chiapas,

a1 Sr. Presidente de la Repfiblica," June 19, 1945, AGN, MAC, 432, 417.

46Chiapas Nuevo, March 16, 1939.

47Acta de Posesibn, April 5, 1939, ASRA, Cacahoatan, 25:8213(723.8);

"Informe del conjunto de Cacahoatan y Uni6n Juarez, Chiapas," August 15,
1938, ASRA, Uni6n Juarez, 23:8051(723.1); Gastbn de Vilac, Chiapas bajo
el signo de la hoz (Mexico, 1940), p. 74.

48De Vilac, Chiapas bajo el signo de la hoz, p. 74.

Liga de Comunidades Agrarias to Chief, Agrarian Department, February
28, 1940, ASRA, Unibn Juarez, 23:8051(723.8); Chiapas Nuevo, August 24,
October 5, November 9, 23, 1939; El Universal, December 18, 1939.

50Excélsior, April 3, 4, 1940; William Cameron Townsend, Lazaro

Cardenas: Mexican Democrat (Ann Arbor: George Wahr, 1952), pp. 342-343.

51"Acta de Demarcaciones de las zonas de protecci6n de las propiedades

del Sr. Enrique Braun," June 7, 1942, ASRA, Unibn Juarez, 23:8051(723.8);
Nathaniel and Sylvia Weyl, The Reconguest of Mexico: The Years of
Lazaro Cardenas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 182.

Liga Femenil Revolucionario, Finca E1 Retiro, to Avila Camacho,
February 20, 1941, AGN, MAC, 404.1, 380.

53Salvador Teuffer S., Resolucién y antecedentes del problema agraria

en la zona del Soconusco, Chiapas (Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Liga de Comunidades
Agrarias y Sindicatos Campesinos de Chiapas, 1942), pp. 27-28.

54"Memorandum del Comisariado Ejidal," April 21, 1940, and Garcia Bros,

Delegate of the Agrarian Department to Chief of Agrarian Department,
January 30, 1941, ASRA, Cacahoatan, 23:8213.

 

 

 

 

 

358

55"Memorandum on Coffee Situation in Chiapas, Mexico," May 22, 1946,
NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Tapachula 1946.

56Chiapas Nuevo, July 27, 1937, August 11, 1938, July 27, 1939,
August 10, 1939.

57Comité Agrario, La Concordia, to Aleman, May 20, 1947, ASRA, La
Concordia, 23:8195; "Manifiesto," November 21, 1937, ASRA, Huixtla,
25:590.

58De la Pena, Chiapas econémico IV, p. 1237.

59Chiapas Nuevo, May 20, 1939; De la Pena, Chiapas economico IV, p. 1241.

60De la Pena, Chiapas econémico IV, p. 1240; Anuario de 1940, p. 532.

61Blanca Torres Ramirez, Historia de la revolucién mexicana: Mexico
en la segunda guerra mundial (Mexico: E1 Colegio de Mexico, 1979), pp
81—95, 106.

2La junta de administracién y vigilancia de la propiedad extranjera,
(Mexico, 1943), pp. 57, 64-65.

63"Memorandum on Coffee Situation in Chiapas, Mexico," May 22, 1946.

64Reed, "Chamula and the Coffee Plantations," pp. 86—87; Helbig, El
Soconusco y su zona cafetalera, pp. 100-101.

Manuel deez, Confederacibn de Obreros, Tapachula, to Avila Camacho,
September 7, 1944, AGN, MAC, 546.2, 10.

66"Restitucidn de tierras ejidales del poblado de Cacahoatan," December
27, 1943, AGN, MAC, 404.1, 368.

67C6rdova, Politica de las masas, p. 180.

68G6mez to Cardenas, February 10, 1938.

9Anuario de 1942, pp. 746—749; Censo Agricola—Ganadero y Ejidal 1970,
p. 37.

70Comisariado Ejidal de Siltepec to Avila Camacho, April 3, 1943,
ASRA, San Isidro Siltepec, 23:642.

7
1Los baldios que vivimos en Tierra Colorado, Municipio Zinacantan,
to Avila Camacho, March 23, 1944; Presidente Comisariado Ejidal to Chief,

 

 

 

359

Agrarian Department, April 12, 1947; Presidente Comisariado Ejidal to
Chief, Agrarian Department, August 2, 1956, ASRA, Chamula, 23:23232.

72Salovesch, "Politics in a Maya Community," pp. 128—130, 133—135.

3Secretario General del Departamento Agrario to Secretario Particular
del Presidente, March 17, 1941, AGN, MAC, 404.1, 380.

74Vecinos de Cacahoatan to Avila Camacho, July 15, 1942, AGN, MAC,
703.4, 238.

75Secretaria General, LCA, to Avila Camacho, April 8, 1942, AGN, MAC,
703.4, 232.

76"Carta abierta al C. Presidente de la Republica por el Comite de

Defensa de los Intereses de los Trabajadores Cafeteros del Soconusco,"
July 5, 1942, AGN, MAC, 703.4, 238.

7Comisariado Ejidal, Colonia Triunfo de Madero, Cintalapa, to Avila
Camacho, February 3, 1943, AGN, MAC, 404.11, 369.

78SUTICS, Finca Monte Perla, to Avila Camacho, February 1943, AGN,

MAC, 432, 417.

79Ramon Mandujano Alfonso, Tapachula, to Avila Camacho, September 9,

1946, AGN, MAC, 404.1, 368; Presidente Comisariado Ejidal to Aleman,
November 10, 1948, Archivo General de la Nacibn, Fondo Miguel Aleman
Valdés, 546.6, 418. Also see Sociedad Local de Crédito Ejidal, Cuatimoc,
Cacahoatan, to Avila Camacho, May 3, 1944, AGN, MAC, 404.1, 368.

80”Carta Abierta por el Comisariado Ejidal, Cacahoatan, y la Sociedad

Local de Crédito Ejidal Uni6n Juarez; August 27, 1942, AGN, MAC, 703.4,
238; Los vecinos de las fincas La Rioja, La Argentina, etc., "Labor
anti—mexicana en la region de Soconusco, Chiapas," October 21, 1948,
AGN, MAV, 546.6, 418.

81Juan Caracosa Perez, Tapachula, to Aleman, April 17, 1948, AGN,
MAV, 544.61, 12.

82Guzman to Avila Camacho, November 22, 1945.

83"Memorandum que presenta e1 delegado del SUTICS," June 19, 1945.

4Salvador Duran, Secretario General SUTICS, Tapachula, to Avila
Camacho, June 24, 1942, AGN, MAC, 703.4, 232; Duran to Avila Camacho,
July 17, 1942, AGN, MAC, 703.4, 238.

 

 

 

360

85Secretario General, SUTICS, to Avila Camacho, October 19, 1945,
AGN, MAC, 404.1, 380.

86SUTICS, "Memorandum," February 1943, AGN, MAC, 432, 417.

87"Memorandum que presenta e1 delegado del SUTICS," June 19, 1945.

88El Nacional, July 15, August 11, 1945.

89Delegacibn Migracibn, Motozintla, to Avila Camacho, November 21, 1941,
AGN, MAC, 546.2, 10.

90Manuel G6mez, Confederacian de Obreros, Tapachula, to Avila Camacho,
September 7, 1944, AGN, MAC, 546.2, 10.

91

”Salem por el norte y entran por el sur," El Universal, March 10,
1950.

92"Informe del Federacibn Regional de Trabajadores del Soconusao, CTM,"
February 13, 1943, AGN, MAC, 432, 520.

93Reed, ”Chamula and the Coffee Plantations," pp. 103—105.

Anuario de 1939, p. 278; Anuario de 1942, p. 628.

95"Monthly Economic Review," March 8, 1940, NA, RG 84, Correspondence,
Tapachula.

96Vivo Escoto, Estudio de geografia, pp. 42, 51, 64.

7Wasserstrom, "White Fathers and Red Souls," Figure 15.

98Albert L. Michaela, "The Crisis of Cardenismo," Journal of Latin
American Studies 2 (May 1980), p. 61; "Economic Effects of the Mexican
Agrarian Program," August 10, 1938, NA, RG 59, 812.52, 3102.

Luis Medina, Historia de la revolucibn mexicana: Del cardenismo a1
avilacamachismo Vol. 18 (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico, 1978), p. 46.

lOOIbid., see chapters 3, 4, and 5.

101
Provincia (mayo—junio 1949), p. 26; U.S. Consul, Coatzacoalcos,
to Secretary of State, November 30, 1941, National Archives, Record

Group 266, 14986, hereafter cited as NA, RG 266, and identifying
information.

 

 

 

361

102"Gubernatorial Election of the State of Chiapas, Mexico," July 14,
1944, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Tapachula 1944.

103Torres Ramierz, México en la segunda guerra mundial, Part IV, "Una
economia de paz en tiempos de guerra."

104Luis Medina, Historia de la revolucién mexicana: Civilismo y
modernizacién del autoritarismo Vol. 20 (Mexico: El Colegio de Mexico,

1979), pp. 62-66.

105Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, "E1 Partido del Estado. II. Fundacian,
Lucha Electoral y Crisis del Sistema," Nexos 17 (mayo 1979), pp. 4-6;

Medina, Civilismo y modernizacién, pp. 73—79.

106La Nacién, December 21, 1946; Secretario General, Partido Civico
Tapachulteco, to Aleman, December 18, 1946, AGN, MAV, 544.5, 5.

107El Sur de Mexico, January 2, 1947.

108Diario de los Debates, January 3, 1947; Gustavo Sénchez Cano, Tuxtla

Gutierrez, to Aleman, January 1, 1947, AGN, MAV, 544.5, 5.
109 . . , . . ./
Medina, C1Vilismo y modernizaCion, p. 104.

llOCasahonda Castillo, 50 anos de revolucién, pp. 118—136, 148.

111 , . .
Cordova, La ideologia de la revoluc16n meXicana, p. 236.

Conclusion

Epigraph: Inaugural Address, quoted in, Ambassador J. Daniels to
Secretary of State, December 1, 1934, NA, RG 59, 812.00/22; Carlos
Pereyra, ”Mexico: 10s limites del reformismo," Cuadernos Politicos

(Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1974), p. 56.

"The Historical Formation of the State in Latin

1
See: Oscar Oszlak,
America: Some Theoretical and Methodological Guidelines for Its Study,"

Latin American Reserach Review XVI (1981), pp. 3-32; Americo Saldivar V.,
"E1 estado mexicano? Continuidad o cambio en las formas de dominaci6n?"
Historia y Sociedad 10 (1976), pp. 17—27; Arnaldo C6rdova, "Mexico:
Revoluci6n burguesa y politics de masas," in Adolfo Guilly y otros,

Interpretaciones de la revolucién mexicana (Mexico: Editorial Nueva
Imagen, 1979), pp. 55—89; J.P. Nettl, ”The State as a Conceptual Variable,"

Wbrld Politics 20 (July 1968), pp. 559-592.

 

 

 

362

2Marx quoted in Ralph Miliband, Marxism and Politics (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1977), p. 7. My emphasis, Marx said "conditions" not

"determines."

3Marx quoted in John McMurtry, The Structure of Marx's World View
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 105.

4David Walker, "Las ubérrimas ubres del Estado," Nexos 15 (marzo 1979),
p. 17. Walker also argues that there was a similar cooperative
relationship between the Porfirian regime and certain working class
organizations, see David Walker, "Porfirian Labor Politics: Working Class
Organizations in Mexico City and Porfirio Diaz, 1876-1902," The Americas

XXXVII (January 1981), pp. 257—289.

5For two differing global interpretations see: Albert L. Michaels and
Marvin Bernstein, "The Modernization of the Old Order: Organization and
Periodization of Twentieth—Century Mexican History," in James W. Wilkie,
Michael C. Meyer, and Edna Monzon de Wilkie, eds. Contemporary Mexico:
Papers of the IV International Congress of Mexican History (Los Angles:
UCLA Latin American Center, 1976), pp. 687—710. Michaels and Bernstein
see the modern Mexican State as solely the creation of the Mexican
bourgeoisie. Jean Meyer in La revoluci6n mejicana (Barcelona: Dopesa,
1973), on the other hand, argues that the modern State in Mexico was the
work of the bureaucratic class, the bourgeoisie d'affairs, for the purpose
of the radical transformation of "old Mexico" into ”modern Mexico."
Meyer notes in "Periodizacion e Ideologia," Contemporary Mexico, p. 721,
"Necesita decenios para el penoso aprendizaje del poder y sigue e1 proyecto
profirista de construcci6n del Estado y de la naci6n." For an excellent
essay contrasting these two global interpretations see John Womack, Jr.,
"Los doctores de la historia y el mito de la Revoluci6n," Nexos 15 (marzo

1979), pp. 3—6.

6Octavio Ianni argues that in Mexico the bourgeoisie was insufficiently
organized and hegemonic as a social class to act as the dominant element
of the State. Thus the State apparatus became a determining productive
force between organized capitalists and organized workers producing social

capitalism. Ianni, El estado capitalista en la época de Cardenas, p. 16.

7Oszlak, "The Historical Formation of the State in Latin America," p. 28.

8Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (New York: Basic
Books, 1969), pp. 52—53.

9Rabasa, La constitucién y la dictadura, p. 306.

lOCalles quoted by Ambassador R. Clark to Secretary of State, November
3. 1931, NA, RG 59, 812.00/29658.

ll . . .
”Mexican Federalism: Fact or Fiction?" Annals of

Lloyd J. Mecham,

 

363

the American Academy of Political and Social Science CCVIII (March 1940),
pp. 23—38; William Tucker, The Mexican Government Today (Minneapolis:
Minnesota University Press, 1957), pp. 73-81; Howard F. Cline, Mexico:
Revolution to Evolucion, 1940—1960 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1962), pp. 53, 139—140.

12Sanford A. Mosk, Industrial Revolucion in Mexico (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1950), see chapters two and three; Ariel Jose
Contreras, Mexico 1940: industrializaci6n y crisis politica (Mexico: Siglo
XXI, 1977), see chapter seven.

l3Enrique Padilla Arag6n, Mexico: desarrollo con pobreza (Mexico: Siglo
XXI, 1969), PP. 91—95.

l4Wilkie, Federal Expenditure and Social Change, p. 247.

15Paul Lamartine Yates, El desarrollo regional de Mexico, quoted in

Gonzalez Casanova, Democracy in Mexico, pp. 107-108.

l6Tercer censo censo agriCola, ganadero y ejidal. 1950. Chiapas
(Mexico: Direcci6n General de Estadistica, 1957), p. 458; Monografia del
estado de Chiapas (Mexico: Talleres Graficos de la Nacidn, 1975), pp.
137—138.

l7"Chiapas, e1 estado rico con habitantes pobres,‘ Proceso (September 22,

1980), pp. 18—19.

18 , l . . . . .
Luis M. Fernandez Ortiz, ”Economia campe51na y agriculture capitalista,
notas sobre Chiapas," Economia campesina y capitalismo dependiente
(Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1978), pp. 33—35.

19Gustavo Gordillo, "La alternative ejidal," Uno Mas Uno, September 21,
1980.

20Henry Ginger, "A Mexican State Feels Neglected," New York Times,
February 11, 1968.

21
1981

Rodolfo F. Pefia, "Chiapas quiere decir olvido," Uno Mas Uho, April 4,

2 . .
ZWright, Rural Revolution in France (Stanford: Stanford UniverSity
Press, 1964), pp. v—vi.

 

 

 

 

B IBLIOGRAPHICAL ES SAY

 

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

This essay is written to help the reader judge the scope of research
undertaken in this study, to suggest the possibilities for research within
the repositories discussed here, and above all to stimulate further efforts

in Chiapanecan history.

ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTATION

William Blake once wrote that "nothing can be more contemptible than
to suppose public records to be true." He perhaps had in mind the official
presentation of some event past or present as found in a government report
or edited collection of documents. Historical research in Mexico is still
largely dependent upon the public archives since the private papers of
many historical figures are in the possession of their families and, for
various reasons, are not open to researchers. Naturally, this state of
affairs limits the choice of research topics as well as the degree of
certainty of some conclusions.

It is erroneous, however, to suppose that nothing of value can be
fOund in the public archives of Mexico. The public archive, the primarily
source of information for this study, houses a treasure of valuable and
Often-times unexamined documentation. It offers the historian not one
official point of View but hundreds if not thousands of perspectives, both

official and unofficial. The public archives consulted for this study

364

 

 

365

contain principally correspondence: requests, complaints, suggestions,
and reports from friend and foe of particular regimes from officials,
private organizations, villagers, workers, unions, merchants, and
landowners. Each item has a point of view, many of them twist and distort
elementary facts, and some offer complete fabrications. The danger this
presents for the historian is not that he will be taken in by the official
interpretation but that he will get lost and wander aimlessly amid
various perspectives. The best of sources are often notoriously unreliable
and must be carefully approached, examined, compared, and correlated.

The sources of documentary material for this study of Chiapanecan
history will be discussed in four parts: 1) the period 1524—1891, 2) the

period 1891-1910, 3) the period 1910-1920, and 4) the period 1920-1947.

1524—1891

The most valuable source of colonial documentation in the Americas
on Chiapas is the Archivo General de Centroamerica (AGC), in Guatemala
City. The Ramo Provincia de Chiapas (1551—1821) contains seventy—four
legajos, which are catalogued and indexed. Additional legajos on the
independence of Chiapas and its annexation to Mexico (1821-1824) are also
to be found. The Archivo Eclesiastico de San Cristbbal Las Casas,
located in the cathedral in San Cristbbal, contains abundant material
regarding the administrative, spiritual, and economic functions of the
Catholic Church in the region during the colonial epoch and the nineteenth
century.

Sources for the study of nineteenth century Chiapas are scattered

in several Mexico City archives. Among the most important are Serie

 

366

Chiapas and Serie Guatemala in the Fondo de Microfilm of the Instituto
Nacional de Antropologia e Historia. Serie Chiapas contains 108 rolls of
microfilm. The majority of documents were filmed from the Archivo
Eclesiatico de San Cristbbal but decrees of the state government and runs
of nineteenth-century newspapers were also filmed. Serie Guatemala
contains 127 rolls of microfilm regarding military operations in Chiapas,
Tabasco, and Yucatan. There documents were filmed in the Archivo
Histbrico de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores and the Archivo de la
Secretaria de la Defensa Nacional. The Archivo de Chiapas (ACh),
belonging to the Departamento de Investigaciones Histbricas, INAH, and
located in the Anexo del Castillo de Chapultepec, possesses the most
balanced and most complete sources of nineteenth—century documentation
on Chiapas. The bulk of the documents are official, that is, circulars,
decrees, reports, censuses, manifestos, and bulletins. A fairly complete
listing of the ACh can be found in Julio Herrera, Archivo de Chiapas.
Documentos inéditos (Departamento de Investigaciones Histbricas, INAH, 1974).
The Archivo Histbrico de Matias Romero (AHRM) located at and owned by the
Banco de Mexico, contains the official and private correspondence of
Secretary of Finance and Ambassador to the United States Matias Romero.
Romero took an interest in Soconusco and its potential for coffee cultivation
and the AHMR is an excellent 50urce of information on this district in the
18705 and 18805. The Banco de Mexico has published a guide to the AHRM
by Guadalupe Monroy entitled Archivo histérico de Matias Romero, catalogo

descriptivo and in two volumes.
1891-1910

The Colecci6n General Porfirio Diaz (CGPD), located at the Universidad

 

 

 

 

de las Américas in Cholula, Puebla (on microfilm) and also at the
Universidad Iberoamericana, in Mexico City (the original documents), is
the most important source of historical data for Porfirian Chiapas. The
correspondence found in the CGPD is numerous, comprehensive, and wide—
ranging. Hundreds of letters from governors, jefe politicos, government
officials, the personal agents and spies of the president, and citizens
describe, often in detail, political events, social and economic problems
and developments, and federal—state relations. In addition, the CGPD
has one distinct advantage over most of the other collections of
presidential papers: it cotains many copies of Diaz's answering correspond—
ence. The CGPD is organized chronologically and is not catalogued or
indexed. It is necessary, therefore, to scan each document in each roll
of the microfilm collection to find information regarding Chiapas. Since
the CGPD contains nearly a million documents this is a tedious task.
Because of fires in the Chiapas state archive in 1863 and 1917
there is very little documentation in the Archivo Hist6rico de Chiapas
(AHCH) in Tuxtla Gutierrez. The material which has survived, pamphlets
and folletos for the most part, is located in the pamphlet collection in

the Hemeroteca del Estado which is a part of the AHCH.

1910—1920

The most abundant and useful documentary material on the revolutionary
decade in Chiapas can be found in the AHCH, the official state archive
of Chiapas. Material for the years 1910—1920 in the AHCH is bound in
large volumes and divided by subject matter, i.e. Ramo de Gobernaci6n,

Ramo de Fomento, Ramo de Guerra, etc. The year 1917, for example, might

 

 

 

368

have fifteen or twenty volumes of Gobernaci6n, I drew heavily on the
Ramos GobernaciCn and Fomento, which contain not only decrees, acuerdos,
and circulars, but correspondence between the state government and

jefes politicos, municipal presidents, military garrison commanders, work
and education inspectors, and citizens. Unfortunately this archive is
poorly organized and preserved and is neither indexed nor catalogued.

The United States National Archives, in Washington, D.C., is an

 

important repository of documentation on the revolution in Chiapas. Reports
by U.S. consuls in Tapachula, Salina Cruz, Oc6s, and Guatemala City

on conditions in Chiapas are to be found in Record Group 84 (consular
records) and Record Group 165 (military defense division). Information

by North American citizens living in Chiapas during this period and who
witnessed the revolution at close range is found in Record Group 76
(Special Mexican Claims Commission) and in the two volume report of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations entitled Investigation of Mexican
Affairs.

The Archivo de la Revolucibn Mexicana, 1910—1920, in the Archivo
Hist6rico de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores in Mexico City (ASRE)
contains very useful information (generally in lengthy reports) on the
military history of the civil war in the state and the role of the
Guatemalan government in assisting rebel groups in the state. The ASRE
is catalogued and indexed. The other documentary repositories consulted
for the revolutionary decade yielded valuable information for limited
Periods or specific topics although not in abundant quantities. These
archives are: Archivo Francisco I. Madero in the Biblioteca Nacional; the
Serie Francisco I. Madero in the Fondo de Microfilm, INAH; the Archivo

Francisco Lebn De la Barra and the Archivo VEnustiano Carranza (Telegramas)

 

369

at the Centro de Estudios de Historia de México; the Archivo General
Octavio Magafia in the Archivo Historico of the Universidad Nacional
Autonoma de Mexico; and the documentary collection published by Editorial

. - l . . l .
Jus entitled Documentos historicos de la revolu01on meXicana.

1920-1946

Documentary material on post—revolutionary Chiapas is concentrated
in three repositories: the state archive of Chiapas, the national archive
of Mexico, and the archive of the agrarian reform department. Material
in the AHCH runs only from 1920 to 1928, with scattered documentation
running to 1931. The AHCH documentation for this period is useful for
examining electoral conflicts at both the municipal and state levels.

The Unidad de Presidentes of the Archivo General de la Nacién
provided the most abundant source of political data (particularly
information on unions) for the 19203, 1930s, and 19408. The following
Fondos were consulted: Obreg6n-Calles, Abelardo L. Rodriguez, Lazaro
Cardenas, Manuel Avila Camacho, and Miguel Aleman Valdes. Scholars familiar
with Mexican history will notice the regrettable absense of documentation
from the administrations of Emilio Portes Gil and Pascual Ortiz Rubio.
Their papers have not yet been organized and catalogued and are not open
to the public. My attention was directed to the following topics as
listed in the card catalogues to the above Fondos: gobierno, conflictos
electorales, conflictos obreros, conflictos agrarios, and indigenas.

The Archivo "seis de enero de 1915" of the Secretaria de Reforma
Agraria (ASRA) is perhaps the best SOurce of social history for twentieth—
century. I examined the Secci6n de Dotaciones which is divided into

eXpedientes, one for each agrarian community. Because it is not uncommon

 

 

 

 

370

to find over ten volumes of documents in one expediente and since there
are nearly two thousand agrarian communities in Chiapas, I could only
sample the agrarian records for Chiapas. I chose to examine in detail
fifty communities, divided among the Central Highlands, the Central
Depression, and the Pacific Littoral. The communities I examined were
generally of some size and importance and located where the struggles
were important in terms of both land reform and state politics. The ASRA
includes letters from villagers and hacendados presenting their briefs

as well as from the agrarian engineers who reported on local conditions,
wages, the level and nature of trade, road conditions, ejidal politics,
and even religious and cultural practices and beliefs. The ASRA was most

useful in reconstructing the political role of ejidos in the 19303.

PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES

Newspapers published in Chiapas and Mexico City often filled gaps
left by the absense of documentary data. This was particularly true for
the period 1928—1932. Very few runs of Chiapanecan periodicals dating
from the period 1890—1910, unfortunately, have survived. The best
collections of newspapers can be found in the Hemeroteca del Estado in
Tuxtla Gutierrez, in Serie Chiapas at INAH, in the Paniagua Collection
at the Latin American Library at Tulane University, and, to a lesser
extent, in the Hemeroteca Nacional in Mexico City.

Informes and Memorias, state—of—the—state reports published annually
by the governor, also proved useful, revealing not only data on material
Progress by each state administration but providing interesting political

self—portraits of the governors. Informes published prior to 1910 were

 

L—‘

 

 

371

consulted in the private library of Professor Prudencio MOSCOSO Pastrana
in San Cristdbal Las Casas. Those published after 1910 were found in the
AHCH.

Statistical compilations were indispensable sources for demographic,
economic, and social trends. They can be divided into two groups:
private and official publications. The first group, published during
the nineteenth—century generally, included: Orozco y Berra (1855), Perez
Hernandez (1862), Emiliano Busto (1877), Rabasa (1895), Corzo (1897),
Byam (1897), Domenech (1899), and Flores (1909). The second group includes
the two state anuarios (1897) and (1911), the three statistical volumes
on the Porfiriato published by El Colegio de Mexico, and the national
anuarios which run from the 1890s to the present day.

Finally, Chiapas is fortunate to have a number of good first—hand
accounts written by visitors. For the colonial epoch we have Bernal Diaz's
account of the conquest of Chiapa and Thomas Gage's report on life in
Chiapas in the 16005. For the post—independence era we have Haefkens'
(1827), Gender (1830), and Muhlenpfordt (1843), and Stephens (1847). Two
interesting accounts by North American women who grew up in Chiapas
during the Porfiriato are by Sargent (Soconusco in the 18905) and Shields
(Palenque in the 19005). For the period after 1910 we have Blom (Tribes
and Temples, 1925), Basauri (1931), Tannenbaum (1929, 1933), Redfield and
Villa Rojas (1939), Amram (1937), Greene (1939), Waibel (1933), Blom and
Duby (1955), and Pozas (1949). B. Traven's five "jungle novels” set in
the period around 1910 and Rosario Castellanos' Balum Canan (Comitan in

the 19305) evoke strong and clear images of rural life in Chiapas.

 

372

INTERPRETATIVE STUDIES

Good secondary works on the history of Chiapas are few, although
starting in the 19708 professional historians, and anthropologists taking
a historical perspective, began to investigate the state.

There are only five broad or general studies which merit discussion.
Trens (1942) is a detailed and lengthy chronicle of Chiapas from the
conquest to the War of the Reform. The book focuses almost exclusively
on politics and administration and is well documented. prez Gutierrez
(1932) in three volumes takes up where Trens ends and constitutes the most
detailed political study of the Porfirian and revolutionary eras. De la
Pefia (1950) in four volumes presents a virtual encyclopedia of data divided
topically, from labor conditions to road construction, coffee cultivation
to cattle raising. Two anthropologists, Wasserstrom (1977) and Favre (1971),
discuss the history of the highland indigenous population from the
conquest to the present day. The quality of these last two works is
uneven, ranging from the superficial to the astute.

It is in the field of colonial history where the best interpretative
Studies based on unpublished sources are located. All, however, treat
Chiapas within the larger context of Central America or southern Mexico.
Sherman (1979) treats the theme of indian labor in the sixteenth-century,
MacLeod (1973) examines social and economic trends in the sixteenth and
seventeenth—centuries, and Gerhard (1979) provides an EXCEllent historical
geography of Chiapas covering the whole of the colonial ePOCh-

Three studies stand out with regard to the PeriOd Of independence.
Rodriguez (1978) examines Central America in the period 1808 to 19261 its

- e
reaction to the intellectual currents of SpanlSh thought 0f the lat

373

eighteenth-century and the fall of the Spanish monarchy in 1808 and its
participation in the Cortes at Cadiz. Moscoso (1974) and Ai Camp (1975)
argue that Chiapas joined the Mexican Empire then republic freely, uncoerced
by Mexico.

The nineteenth—century (1824—1910), aside from Trens and L6pez Gutierrez,
is a desert for historical studies. Only two merit attention. Wasserstrom
(1978) argues that ladino expropriation of indigenous lands nearly
produced a race war in 1848. Spenser (1981) shows how foreign capital
came to dominante the Soconusco district during the Porfiriato.

The twentieth—century offers the largest quantity of historical studies
although most are polemical works. The best study on the rebellion in 1911
is by Luis Espinosa (1912) and is biased in favor of the state government.
Martinez Rojas (1913) and Eduardo Paz (1912) present favorable treatments
of the Cristobalense movement. Moscoso (1972) presents an interesting
treatment of the Chamula cacique who mobilized indian soldiers on
behalf of the Cristobalense cause. Benjamin (1980) emphasizes the
contradictory roles of the De la Barra government and revolutionary leader
Madero in helping ignite the conflict.

For the period of the civil war of 1914—1920 there are several
good studies. Serrano (1923) offers a pro—mapache interpretation, Moscoso
(1960) is pro—Pineda, and Casahonda Castillo (1970) is pro—Constitutionalist.
Hernandez Chavez (1979), the best study of the period, concentrates on
the mapaches and argues that the movement constituted a defense of class
interests. Benjamin (1981) places the civil war in the broader context
of the Mexican Revolution. Garcia de Leon (1979) presents an orthodox
Marxist interpretation of Chiapanecan history from 1910 to about 1940-

' ’ ' ' es and
He gives an innovative diSCUS51on based on interViews Wlth mapach

 

 

 

374

a Chiapanecan communist. The dominant theme, however, class struggle
for political power, is overdrawn.

Studies of contemporary Chiapas, although not historical, give a
useful if limited portrait of what Chiapas has become. Helbig‘s (1964
and 1964) economic—geographic studies (of Soconusco and the Central
Depression) are unsurpassed. In the 19505 the Anthropology Department
at Harvard University, under the direction of Evon Vogt, began a
systematic program of investigation in the indigenous villages in the
Central Highlands of Chiapas. As a result of this Harvard Chiapas Project
a large body of literature has been published although only a small part
holds any value for the general reader (including historians) who have
not been introduced to the sectarian disputes in professional anthropology.
Some of the studies I found useful are Cancian (1972), Collier (1975),
Edel (1962), Gossen (1974), Laughlin (1977), Lowenthal (1963), Vogt (1969),

and Wilson‘s (1966) novel.

THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF MEXICO: STATE FORMATION

The historiography of State formation in Mexico is still in its infancy.
Most works on the topic are weighted on the side of theory rather than
empiricism and are influenced by the classic Marxist writings. The few
studies which do attempt a detailed empirical reconstruction of State
formation focus on the middle of the nineteenth—century. Too many students
of the Mexican Revolution, however, assume that the nation completely
remade itself after 1910 and that the modern State took its present form
in 1917, having little relation to its Porfirian predecessor.

Among the numerous theoretical studies, one stands out: Arnaldo

 

 

 

 

375

C6rdova's pioneering La formacién del poder polftico en Mexico (1972).

The dominant theme in modern Mexican history, according to CSrdova, is
continuity. The revolutionary State as defined in the Constitution of 1917
was simply a reorganized Porfirian State. Mexican authoritarianism survived
the transition from personal to institutional rule intact. The revolution
interrupted State activism in economic development; it did not initiate

the active State. Finally, according to C6rdova, the revolution in the
last analysis was not a movement of the masses but one which manipulated
the masses in order to achieve a capitalist development of the country.
Many of Cérdova's ideas were not new when he published his book in 1972,
but their combination within a coherent framework established a fundamental
revisionist paradigm of the 19703.

Another book of argument rather than research, one almost as important
as C6rdova's but outside the ideological spectrum of Marxism, is Jean
Meyer‘s La revolucién mejicana, 1910-1940 (1973). From Meyer's
perspective the ruling class in Mexico is not composed of simply capitalists
but the bourgeoisie d'affairs: politicians, bosses, and bureaucrats.

Their concern is less the preservation of class dominance but the welfare
and prestige of the State and the destruction of old Mexico. Like

Cérdova, Meyer emphasizes continuity. "The Porfiriato and the revolution,"
he argues, "were two moments of the same enterprise," the formation of

the modern State. For Cordova the conflicts within Mexican society

during the process of State formation were between classes; for Meyer,
between the State and society as a whole.

The monographs based upon archival investigation naturally treat more

limited topics and periods of time, but likewise, they give greater

 

emphasis to the continuity of Mexican political development than any

 

 

 

376

tendency to start anew. Richard N. Sinkin's The Mexican Reform, 1855-1876
(1979) is a brief for the continuity of political centralization from

the Bourbon monarchs to this day. Sinkin, however, makes a convincing
case for locating the foundation of the modern Mexican State — regular,
orderly, secular, and powerful government — within the twenty—five year
period after 1855. It was an imperfect beginning as Sinkin admits, but
compared to the previous half-century of political instability and near
national disintegration, the achievement was substantial. Laurens Ballard
Perry, in Juarez and Diaz (1978), demonstrates in almost minute detail
the continuity between the so-called liberal regimes of the Reform era
and the so—called conservative Diaz government. Benito Juarez, Sebastian
Lerdo de Tejada, and Porfirio Diaz were centralists who practiced machine
politics. Even today, notes Perry, Mexico is governed by a monolithic
political machine, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, "Juarez's
great—grandchild."

Once we enter the realm of revolutionary historiography any coherent
picture of State formation becomes murky. Perhaps the greatest problem
is that until recently most students of the revolution have worked
solely within the revolutionary paradigm, that is, accepting the notion
that the revolution is the major watershed in Mexican history and in the
formation of the modern State. As a result the questions these students
have tended to investigate have been those traditionally associated with
revolutions: what were its origins, how did it evolve, how revolutionary
or conservative was it, and what were its local and regional variants?
John Womack (1978, p. 104), in fact, has suggested that the revolution has
become a fetish for historians and that in the larger sense "we have

resisted comprehending what the Revolution meant."

 

 

 

 

377

With only a few exceptions, the most impressive investigations of
State formation during the Mexican Revolution have been regional studies.
Studies by John Womack (1968), Paul Friedrich (1970), Jean Meyer (1973),
Arturo Warman (1976), Hector Aguilar Camin (1977), and Heather Fowler
Salamini (1978) in one way or another demonstrate how the central State
constantly attempted and succeeded in controlling, channeling, and
restructuring popular movements and unorganized masses. In a few of
these works there is the strong implication that, as Gilbert Joseph argues
(1979, p. 47), "the epic revolution would ultimately have the effect of

' of consolidating the increasingly centralized,

creating a 'modern leviathan,
increasingly capitalistic modern State which had already been emerging
during the Diaz period."

Finally, one of the more important political studies of the Mexican
Revolution published in the 19703 is Peter Smith's Labyrinths of Power
(1979). Smith studied over 6000 members of national political elites who
held public positions between 1900 and 1970. One of Smith's most important
discoveries was that from the beginning of the century, political elites
came mainly from the middle class. The revolution, he concludes, did not
lead to any major change in the class basis of political leadership.

Also, the elites who assumed positions in the 19405 bore a striking
resemblence to the late Diaz group: urban, highly educated, and trained
as technicians. The PRI, notes Smith, has not really institutionalized
the revolution; "what it had done is to find a new formula for re-
institutionalizing the essence of the Porfiriato." Continuity in Mexican

history, perhaps more than any other theme, characterized the 19703

 

revisiOnist paradigm of State formation.

 

Ti

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

 

 

 

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Archives

Archivo de Chiapas, Departamento de Investigaciones Hist6ricas,
Instituto Nacional de Antropologia e Historia, Mexico City.

Archivo Francisco I. Madero, Biblioteca Nacional, Mexico City.

Archivo Francisco Leon De la Barra, Centro de Estudios de Historia de
Mexico, Mexico City.

Archivo General de Centroamerica, Ramo de Provincia de Chiapas, Guatemala
City.

Archivo General de la Nacion, Mexico City:
Ramo de Comisién Nacional Agraria
Unidad de Presidentes:

— Fondo Obreg6n-Calles

~ Fondo Abelardo L. Rodriguez

- Fondo Lazaro Cardenas

— Fondo Manuel Avila Camacho
Fondo Miguel Aleman Valdés

Archivo General Octavio Magafia, Archivo Historico de la Universidad
Autbnoma de Mexico, Mexico City.

Archivo Histérico de Chiapas, Gobierno del Estado, Tuxtla Gutierrez,
Chiapas.

Archivo Histbrico de Matias Romero, Banco de Mexico, Mexico City.
Archivo Hist6rico de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City.

Archivo "seis de enero de 1915" de la Secretaria de Reforma Agraria,
Mexico City.

Archivo Venustiano Carranza (Telegramas), Centro de Estudios de Historia
de Mexico, Mexico City.

Coleccibn General Porfirio Diaz, Universidad de las Américas, Cholula,
Puebla.

378

 

 

 

JIIII

 

 

 

379

Fondo de Microfilm, Serie Chiapas and Serie Francisco I. Madero, Instituto
Nacional de AntrOpologia e Historia, Mexico City.

Latin American Manuscripts, Lilly Library, Indiana University.

National Archives of the United States, Washington, D.C."
Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State.
Record Group 76: Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and
ArbitratiOns.
Record Group 84: Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the
Department of State.
Record Group 165: Records of the War Department General and Special
Staffs and the Military Intelligence Division.
Record GrOup 226: Records of the Office of Strategic Services.

Paniagua (Chiapas) Collection, Latin American Library, Tulane University.

Printed Documents

Chiapas. Anuario estadistico del estado de Chiapas, afio de 1909. Tuxtla
Gutiérrez: Tipografia del Gobierno, 1911.

Chiapas. Coleccién de leyes agrarias y demas disposiciones que se han
emitido con relaciones a1 ramo de tierras. San Cristbbal Las Casas:
Imprenta del Gobierno, 1878.

Chiapas. Confederacién de campesinos y obreros del Estado de Chiapas,
Estatutos. Tuxtla Gutierrez: Gobierno del Estado, 1935.

Chiapas. Datos estadisticos del estado de Chiapas. 1896. Tuxtla Gutiérrez:
Imprenta del Gobierno, 1897.

Chiapas. Declaraciones del gobernador del estado de Chiapas, Ing. Raynundo
E. Enriquez. Tuxtla Gutierrez: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1930.

Chiapas. Discurso del Lic. Emilio Rabasa, gobernador del estado de Chiapas,
ante la XVIII Legislatura del mismo, al abrir esta su primer periodo
de sesiones ordinarias. Tuxtla Gutierrez: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1892
and 1893.

Chiapas. Documentos relativos a1 congreso agricola de Chiapas. Tuxtla
Gutiérrez: Gobierno del Estado, 1898.

Chiapas. Informe del gobernador de Chiapas, C, Coronel Francisco Leon ante
la XX Legislatura del estado al abrir esta su primer periodo de sesiones
ordinarias. Tuxtla Gutierrez: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1897.

Chiapas. Informe rendido por el C. gobernador del estado ante la XXI H.
Legislatura del mismo, el dia 16 de septiembre de 1900. Tuxtla Gutierrez:
Imprenta del Gobierno, 1900.

 

 

 

 

 

 

380

Chiapas. Informe del ciudadano gobernador del estado a la XXIII Legislatura
del mismo, 16 de septiembre de 1903. Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Imprenta del
Gobierno, 1903.

Chiapas. InfOrme del ciudadano gobernador del estado a la XXIII Legislatura
del mismo, 16 de septiembre de 1904. Tuxtla Gutiérrez: lmprente del
Gobierno, 1904.

Chiapas. Informe que el gobernador constitucional C. Ramén Rabasa rinde a
la XXIV Legislatura del estado, el 16 de septiembre de 1906. Tuxtla
Gutierrez: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1906.

Chiapas. Infbrme rendido por el gobernador constitucional C. Ramon Rabasa
a la XXV Legislatura del estado, el 16 de septiembre de 1907. Tuxtla
Gutierrez: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1907.

Chiapas. Informe rendido por el C. gobernador del estado Ramon Rabasa ante
la XXV Legislatura del mismo, e1 16 de septiembre de 1908. Tuxtla
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