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PASSAGES TO LEVIATHAN:

CHIAPAS AND THE MEXICAN STATE, 1891-1947

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PASSAGES TO LEVIATHAN:

CHIAPAS AND THE MEXICAN STATE, 1891-1947

By

Thomas Louis Benjamin

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ABSTRACT

PASSAGES TO LEVIATHAN:

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By

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This is a study of the formation of a new political order in Chiapas, Mexico from 1891 to 1947. After seventy years of political upheaval and fragmentation, the power of the Mexican State began to be vigorously asserted in Chiapas. This process had its roots in the national reform movement of the 1850s and 1860s, it began to take form in the 1890s, its course was modified and its pace accelerated as a result of the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920, and it was largely completed by the 1940s. What, in fact, took place was the political modernization of Chiapas in Mexico.

A strong, centralized, and interventionist State functioned in Chiapas from the 1560s until 1821, when the province opted for independence from both Spain and Guatemala and joined the newly formed Mexican empire. Integration into Mexico brought political fragmentation, as power devolved on the municipal governments. The national reform movement and the wars of reform and French Intervention in the 1850s and 1860s began the process of national consolidation and political modernization. Nearly two decades of crisis prepared the way for the establishment of the dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz. It was during the rule of Díaz, from 1876 to 1911, that the modern State truly began to take form in Chiapas, and Mexico.

From that point in Mexican history, State formation passed through three distinct phases: the establishment of executive authoritarianism in the 1890s and 1900s, the rise of a socially and economically active State during the revolution of 1910-1920, and the integration of organizations of the masses into the apparatus of the State from 1920 to 1947. These passages were historical stages within which new and more viable political arrangements were worked out in response to political crises and the demands of powerful pressure groups. Each of these passages left an enduring legacy -- executive authoritarianism, social and economic activism, and collaborationism with organized masses -- which are the characteristics of the modern Mexican Leviathan.

This study attempts to place the formation of the modern Mexican State within the context of the Chiapanecan experience. At the same time, it seeks to transcend the limited and particularistic meaning of Chiapanecan history and explore a question of critical importance to all societies: the relationship between the State and the society from which it arises, and which in turn defines its sphere of action.

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.

T.S. Eliot

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A todos, mis más profundos agradecimientos.

Mexico City — Thomas Benjamin

Semana Santa, 1981

CONTENTS

GLOSSARY

Agrarista. A supporter of land reform after 1915.
Amparo. A judicial writ of protection against the act of a public official.
Aparcero. A sharecropper.
Arrendatario. A tenant farmer.
Arrendamiento. A land rent in cash or produce.

Baldiaje. A system of labor service in exchange for permission to live on an *hacienda* and cultivate a small portion of land.
Baldíos. Vacant or national lands; also refers to squatters who live in *baldiaje*.

Caballería. An area of land roughly equal to 111 acres
Cabecera. The political seat of municipal or departmental government.
Cacique. A local and generally unofficial political boss.
Cacicazgo. The domain of a *cacique*.
Caciquismo. The phenomenon of political bossism.
Cafetales. Coffee trees or groves.
Cafetero. A laborer in a coffee plantation.
Cacao. Cocoa.
Camarilla. A political clique.
Campesino. Literally "a person of the country," sometimes translated as peasant.
Caudillo. A charismatic leader, often a military chieftain.
Cristobalense. A resident of San Cristóbal Las Casas.

Desparición de los poderes. "Disappearance of powers," refers to the constitutional prerogative of the Senate of the Nation to remove from power a state government administration.

Ejido. Lands held under comunal tenure; since 1915 communities endowed with communal lands by the State.
Ejidatarios. Residents of an *ejido* who possess land use rights.
Encomienda. A grant by the State of indians for labor service and tribute.
Enganchador. A contractor of migrant workers.

Finca. A Central American term for landed estate.
Finquero. An owner of a *finca*.
Frijol. Black bean.

Guardia blanca. A private military force generally used against *agraristas* to prevent land reform.

Hacienda. A Mexican term for large landed estate.
Hacendado. An owner of an *hacienda*.
Hectárea. An area of land equaling 2.47 acres.

Jefe Político. The principal civil officer of a state department.
Jornalero. A temporary day laborer.

Ladino. The Central American term for anyone who has adopted the dress and mannerisms associated with western European culture, or anyone not an indian.

Maíz. Corn, maize.
Milpa. A maize plot.
Montería. A mahogany lumber camp.
Municipio. A political and geographical unit smaller than and subordinate to a department; the equivalent of a county in the United States.

Partido. A political district within a state subordinate to a department but assigned a *jefe político*.
Patrón. Master, boss, landowner.
Peón acasillado. An agricultural laborer who resides on an *hacienda*.
Peso. The basic unit of Mexican currency. (See Table 16 in Appendix).
Pistolero. A gun slinger.
Porfiriato. The age of Porfirio Díaz (1876-1911).
Pueblo. A small independent village or town.

Rancho. A small or medium-size property.
Ranchero. A farmer, an owner of a *rancho*.
Ranchería. A hamlet or small village which possesses no political status and is located on an *hacienda*.
Repartimiento de comercio. Obligatory purchase and sales by indians from and to Royal officials or their authorized agents.
Repartimiento de indios. Compulsory work levies of indians.

Tienda de Raya. A company store.
Tuxtleco. A resident of Tuxtla Gutiérrez.

Sindicato. A labor union or an umbrella organization encompassing a number of unions.

Vecino. A citizen; house-holder.
Villista. A supporter of Pancho Villa; similar terms include *rabasista* (Emilio Rabasa), *maderista* (Francisco I. Madero), *carrancista* (Venustiano Carranza), *vidalista* (Carlos Vidal), and so on.

LIST OF MAPS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CAM. *Comisión Agraria Mixta.*

CCM. *Confederación Campesina Mexicana.*

CLA. *Comisión Local Agraria.*

CNA. *Comisión Nacional Agraria.*

CNC. *Confederación Nacional Campesina.*

CROM. *Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana.*

CTM. *Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicana.*

LCCA. *Liga Central de Comunidades Agrarias.*

LNC. *Liga Nacional Campesina.*

PCM. *Partido Comunista Mexicana.*

PNR. *Partido Nacional Revolucionario.*

PRI. *Partido Revolucionario Institucional.*

PRM. *Partido de la Revolución Mexicana.*

PSC. *Partido Socialista Chiapaneco.*

SUTICS. *Sindicato Único de Trabajadores de la Industria del Café del Soconusco.*

INTRODUCTION

> For by art is created that great Leviathan called a Commonwealth, or State (in Latin, *Civitas*), which is but an artifical man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defense it was intended.
>
> Thomas Hobbes, 1651

Twentieth-century Mexican history is, above all, the history of the formation of the most stable and broadly based State in Latin America.[1] In Mexican historiography, State-building has generally been viewed as a centrally directed project and has only been studied from a national perspective.[2] What is lost in that perspective is the recognition that State formation in Mexico was a synthesis of regional and national aspirations. Examination of one region over the course of several decades demonstrates that there was local, as well as national, impetus for the process. The Mexican Leviathan is the sum of its geographical parts, and an analysis of the process and its construction in those parts is essential to an understanding of the national whole.

A State exists when political authority within a nation is centralized and has formal structure. Governments and regimes with particular policies and membership may come and go, whereas the State -- organized civil society -- endures. A modern State, in its twentieth-century context, refers to a political structure whose power and authority is centralized and effective throughout the nation and whose reach extends beyond the traditional bounds of national defense and

public order to reorder and regulate social and economic structures. Karl Marx proposed in the *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* that a historian has to distinguish the phrases and fancies of the parties involved in a political struggle from their group interests found in the economic realities of society.[3] State power, said Marx, "is not suspended in mid-air."[4] Political order is never simply a direct result of economic forces, but neither is it independent of such forces. The modern State's centralizing and expansive tendencies reflect both the material interests of various economically powerful groups and the natural appetite for power on the part of State functionaries.

Following more than half a century of political fragmentation in Mexico, a modern State began to take form in the 1880s and 1890s. State centralization and social and economic activism were encouraged by the dynamic sector of the national bourgeoisie -- commercial farmers and industrialists -- for the purpose of rationalizing and mobilizing the total resources of society necessary for the promotion of national prosperity.[5] Porfirian economic modernization, however, led to a deterioration of the material quality of life for most of Mexico's working masses. During the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920, contending factions appealed to workers and *campesinos* for their political and military support and promised reforms in return. As a result, part of the working masses became mobilized into large and powerful organizations demanding political participation, and labor and land reform. This new constituency of the modern Mexican State -- the organized proletariat -- demanded a strong and active State which could reform land tenure and regulate labor-capitalist relations. The construction of the Mexican Leviathan was an undertaking possessing the consent

and active promotion of both elite and mass segments of society, "for whose protection and defense," in the language of Hobbes, "it was intended."

This study is divided into three sections, each representing a passage in the formation of the modern Mexican State in Chiapas. Chapter 1 sets the stage for a detailed review of modern Chiapanecan history by demonstrating how a strong, centralized State was established in Chiapas under Spanish colonial rule in the sixteenth-century and came to be rejected in 1821. Devolution of power on local governmental units after 1821 is shown to be an elite response to excessive State interference in the provincial economy.

PART ONE reviews the first important phase of political centralization and the rise of active government in Chiapas from 1891 to 1910. Entrepreneurial elites in the 1890s rejected political fragmentation and sought order and progress. These new elites, many of them recent immigrants concentrated in the Central Lowlands and the Soconusco district, began to experience the benefits of economic expansion and commercial agriculture. They wanted strong and active government to construct roads, curb local taxation on commerce, suppress local *caudillos*, and reform inefficient labor practices. By the early 1890s. President Porfirio Díaz consolidated his political position in all of Mexico to such an extent that he had no opposition or rivals. In 1891 he provided Chiapas with an energetic and talented young administrator, Emilio Rabasa. This governor owed his power first and foremost to Porfirio Díaz, not to local cliques. Political centralization and economic development made important progress during this period in Chiapas, although not without portentous consequences. The inflammation

of radical regionalism and the swelling of the landless working population in the state, helped define the subsequent course of State formation in the region.

PART TWO reviews the effect of the Mexican Revolution, which originated in northern Mexico, on Chiapas from 1910 to 1920. The disruption of the national regime in 1910-1911 provided an opportunity for one localist group which had harbored political ambition and resentment for twenty years to attempt to bring down the government. The political establishment in the state capital, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, however, was not prepared to give up power as easily as did the Díaz regime in Mexico City. In 1914 groups of backwoods landowners rebelled against the foreign intrusion of a northern revolutionary army and the accompanying social reforms. Five years of revolutionary administration and civil war ended the isolation of rural Chiapas and broke the absolute power of the *hacendado* over villagers and workers. *Campesinos,* taking advantage of the breach in social control, began to take control of their own lives, and to take sides politically with arms and ballots. Revolutionary administration expanded the responsibilities of the state government, and the politics of elites gave way to the politics of the masses.

PART THREE reviews State formation in Chiapas in the age of mass-participation politics from 1920 to 1947. No political faction after 1925 could attain and maintain power in Chiapas without the strong backing of agrarian and labor organizations. This political requirement, in turn, led to the expansion of the power and scope of government in order to satisfy at least some of the demands of the organized masses for basic reforms and to bring these newly organized

constituencies more and more under the control and supervision of the State. During this third passage the independence and importance of the state government declined and the national government, the national political party, and national interest-group organizations became the significant participants of local and national politics. President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) established an institutional alliance between the State and the organized masses. He reorganized the official party as a party of corporations, divided among labor, peasants, military, and popular sectors. Along with the party reorganization, indeed as part of the bargain, came an intensification of reform. The very success of those reforms subsequently led to a partial demobilization of the organized masses. By means of patronage, partition, bureaucratization, and populist rhetoric the State tamed the masses, guaranteeing its own exceptionally strong position in society and preserving private economic power. The modern Mexican State, "the new Leviathan," in the words of Arnaldo Córdova, however, first rose to its unassailable position in society by meeting the demands of its most powerful constituents.[6]

This study attempts to place the formation of the modern Mexican State within the context of the Chiapanecan experience. At the same time, it seeks to transcend the limited and particularistic meaning of Chiapanecan history and to explore a question of critical importance to all societies: the relationship between the State and the society from which it arises, and which in turn defines its sphere of action.





1. *Audiencia* of Guatemala, 1657, from Robert S. Chamberlain, *The Governorship of the Adelantado Francisco de Montejo in Chiapas, 1539-1544* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1948), p. 166.

CHAPTER ONE

THE IMPERIAL STATE, AND BEYOND

> The Iberian countries of the Western Hemisphere entered the modern age as administrative, legal, and political creations of a postfeudal Castilian monarchy committed to the principle of central control.
>
> Claudio Veliz

Chiapas was the first of Spain's Central American provinces to seek independence. A provincial assembly on September 26, 1821, declared that "the province of Chiapas, which has spontaneously declared independence, recognizes no other government than that of the Mexican empire."[1] This was the first step in the formal dissolution of Spanish Central America. Independence ended nearly three centuries of strong and centralized imperial dominion in Chiapas. The Spanish State, in the persons of royal officials and bureaucrats, not landowners or merchants, dominated the society and economy of the province. Independence was more than a break with Spain and Guatemala for elite Chiapanecans, it was a repudiation of centralized government and bureaucratic administration for a system of local self-rule. Aggregation to Mexico contributed, furthermore, to political fragmentation and instability in Chiapas as disputes in Mexico City, Tabasco and Oaxaca, (and territorial conflicts between Mexico and Guatemala) spilled into the state. The Mexican State was not in a position to consolidate its power in Chiapas

(nor was the regional elite willing to tolerate a more powerful State) until the 1890s. To understand how and why the modern Mexican State has evolved in Chiapas let us first review the formation and dissolution of the Spanish imperial State in Chiapas.

GEOGRAPHY

Chiapas has always been a frontier region. The ancient cities of Palenque and Bonampak were located on the northern edge of classic Mayan civilization. By the late fifteenth century Aztec military conquest had advanced no farther south than Zinacantán and Soconusco.[2] Chiapas was conquered early in the sixteenth-century by Spanish expeditions coming from both the north (Mexico) and the south (Guatemala).[3] Spanish settlements in the region, far from the City of Mexico and Santiago, Guatemala, were rustic frontier settlements at best, "no fit place for Jesuits," commented Thomas Gage.[4] The region's frontier location and isolation from the centers of power and culture have dominated the course of its history.

The internal geography of Chiapas has also played a decisive role, as we shall see, in Chiapanecan history. Chiapas, like Mexico, is physically contorted by valleys interspersed among mountains. The Sierra Madre de Chiapas rises from the Isthmus of Tehuantepec and dominates Central America to southern Nicaragua. This range is bisected by an intermontane basin comparable in size only to the valley of Mexico. Through this great Valley of Chiapas (elevation 1500-2500 feet), herein refered to as the Central Lowlands or as *tierra caliente,* flows the Grijalva river, from the Guatemalan border to the Gulf of Mexico. The

valley's tropical climate and fertile soils have made it one of Chiapas' most important agricultural regions. The Central Highlands of Chiapas (elevation 5000-7000 feet), also called *tierra fría,* dominate the northwestern portion of the Sierra Madre. This region, the home of most of Chiapas' indigenous population today, is an extremely rugged and heavily forested area containing several small valleys. To the north and east the Central Highlands fall off and disappear into the lowlands of Tabasco and the Lacandon tropical forest. The portion of the Sierra Madre south of the Valley of Chiapas rises to a maximum 12,000-foot elevation and runs along the Pacific Coast into Guatemala. The Pacific Littoral, bounded by the Sierra Madre to the northwest and the Pacific to the southwest, is a sea-level plain no more than fifteen to twenty-five miles wide.[5]

SETTLING IN

Chiapas, or the two regions the Spanish called Chiapa and Soconusco, was conquered in 1524 and again in 1527. Chiapa (the name Chiapas came into general usage in the eighteenth-century) included roughly both the Central Lowlands and Highlands while Soconusco occupied all of the Pacific Littoral. The first Spanish settlement of forty inhabitants, Chiapa de los Españoles, was located near the Grijalva river but was too hot and unhealthy. The city was moved to a more pleasant valley in the highlands in 1528, today the site of San Cristóbal Las Casas, and named Ciudad Real de los Llanos de Chiapas.[6]

The immediate post-conquest era in Chiapas, roughly from 1528 to 1569, was a period of political confusion and experimentation.

Conquistadores ruled the two provinces with little heed paid to royal government in Castile, New Spain, or Guatemala. *Encomiendas,* grants of indian villages which were required to pay tribute or provide labor, were the only significant sources of income. They were assigned and redistributed, confiscated and returned in these early years to such an extent that many settlers left the province in disgust. Only by the late 1550s and 1560s did *encomienda* tenure stabilize, indeed so much so that even in the eighteenth-century decendants of the first *encomenderos* continued to receive indian tribute. Soconusco became a crown possession at least by 1545, after which year all indian tribute and labor service passed from private hands and into those of royal officials. In the 1520s Chiapa was part of the *gobierno* of New Spain; it was assigned to the Audiencia de los Confines (Guatemala) from 1529 to 1540, and was governed by its own Captain General from 1540 to 1544. Except for a short period of reassignment to Mexico from 1564 to 1569, Chiapa remained subordinate to Guatemala from 1544 to 1790. Despite these paper assignments, the province was actually governed from Ciudad Real de los Llanos de Chiapas (hereafter refered to as Ciudad Real) in the 1550s and 1560s by the municipal government. The first royal governor, *Alcalde Mayor* Juan de Mesa Altamirano, arrived in Chiapas sometime in the 1570s. Orderly government in Soconusco, also directly subordinate to Guatemala, was established in the 1540s.[7]

Early administrative confusion and frontier isolation gave the municipal government (*cabildo* or *ayuntamiento)* in Ciudad Real a larger degree and longer lasting period of independence than was the case in Mexico. The *cabildo* of Ciudad Real ruled Chiapa in the frequent and sometimes long absences between outgoing and incoming *alcaldes mayores.*

Although the royal government succeeded in taming the most radical tendencies of municipal autonomy through visiting commissions, inspectors, and strong *alcaldes mayores*, the *cabildo* remained an important element in provincial government throughout the colonial epoch.[8]

Conflict within Chiapa among royal officials, Spanish settlers, and missionaries during this first period of settling in also added to the political confusion. "Rivalry between competing groups of Spaniards," notes historian Peter Gerhard, "was a source of constant discord; sometimes it was *encomenderos* versus missionaries, then a governor versus local residents, then a Bishop versus Franciscans...."[9] Only after the withdrawal of Chiapa's aggressive Bishop Bartolomé de Las Casas in 1546 and the suppression of indian slavery at about the same time did the Dominican missionaries and the Spanish community in Chiapa reach an accomodation.[10]

THE GROWTH OF ABSOLUTIST STATISM

Epidemics in Chiapa and Soconusco from 1519 to 1570 decimated the indigenous population by at least fifty percent over all and up to eighty to ninety percent in some localities.[11] This demographic disaster weakened the *encomienda* as an economic institution and increased the power of the royal government. The drop in labor service and tribute forced many *encomenderos* to abandon their grants, which then reverted to the crown. In order to meet the labor demands of the Spanish community while the number of indians became ever fewer, the crown was forced to supply contingents of indian workers to petitioners for short periods of time. This draft labor system, known as the *repartimiento de indios*,

concentrated greater power in the hands of the royal government and particularly those who supervised the distribution.[12] The decline of the semifeudal *encomienda* and the rise of the *repartimiento* contributed significantly to the formation of the centralized imperial State in Chiapas.

Absolutist statism characterized government in Spanish America. After a short period of organization and confusion, "the regalist hold over the Indies was consolidated....Regalist central power was successfully reaffirmed, both with respect to the sympathetic interference of humanitarian clerics and the open rebellion of settlers with seigneurial aspirations."[13] The famous discrepancy between the judicial supremacy of the Castilian State and its inability to enforce compliance with all of its dictates in America has led many scholars to conclude that the crown's power was more apparent than real. The wide latitude given the local representatives of the crown, however, in no way diminishes the fact that a strong, centralist imperial State ruled the Indies. Part and parcel of the imperial State system, perhaps its greatest strength, was the delegation of power by the crown to local officials. To Spanish settlers in Chiapas, royal government was first and foremost the *alcalde mayor* in Ciudad Real. Historian Murdo MacLeod argues that during most of the seventeenth-century, the century of Spanish decline in Europe, elite society in America was dominated by the government official.[14] "The kings were not in Spain, but in the Indies," states Julio Alemparte. "The real sovereigns, in a way, were the colonial masters."[15]

Local officials acted on behalf of the central government, their tenure was limited and their duties could be terminated at any time by

the king or his ministers. The suppression of indian slavery in Central America in the 1540s was accomplished in Chiapas despite the opposition of the *cabildo* of Ciudad Real and the very real damage the move caused to the region's sugar industry.[16] Frequent requests by local officials in Soconusco for the importation of indian laborers were rejected by the crown.[17] The *cabildo* of Ciudad Real, having been accused of sedition, was extinguished in 1748. Finally, despite the opposition of residents in Chiapas, the crown abolished the *repartimiento de indios* in 1778.[18] Spanish power clearly and firmly reached into Chiapas.

Elite Chiapanecan society was dominated by the government official, not the landowner or merchant. Since the crown controlled and regulated indian labor, the source of most wealth in Chiapas, its delegated representatives occupied the focal point in the structure of local power. In Soconusco, "where the crown collected the tribute, the governor and other royal officials occupied a position of decided importance."[19] *Alcaldes mayores* and lesser officials generally purchased their offices and sought large profits during their tenure. As a result, the provincial governor not only controlled civil administration, justice, and local defense, but also the local economy. It was the *alcalde mayor* who decided which petitioner would receive labor drafts and the number of days the indians would be allowed to work. He monopolized trade with indian villages through the *repartimiento de comercio*. In 1712 the *alcalde mayor* resold maize to starving Highland villages at inflated prices, which sparked the Great Tzeltal Rebellion of that year.[20]

Spanish power in Europe under the later Hapsburg dynasty in the seventeenth-century suffered a serious decline. The consequences of

Spanish decline in Europe and America, however, were quite different. The royal official remained the dominant figure in colonial society.[21] With the ascension to the throne of the Bourbon house in 1700 the Spanish crown resolved to recentralize the political, economic, and ecclesiastical life of the empire in pursuit of recovery and growth. No longer content with delegating broad powers to creole (American born) civil servants, Charles III instituted a new system of government which would be tightly controlled by the center of power and administered by soldiers and bureaucrats sent from Spain to America.[22]

RECENTRALIZATION AND REACTION

The first move of the recentralization program in Chiapas was the suppression of the *cabildo* of Ciudad Real. In 1767 the province of Chiapa was divided into two *alcaldías mayores,* both subordinate to the governor of Guatemala. The Indendancy system was introduced to Chiapa and Soconusco in 1790, combining both provinces in a single fiscal-administrative unit headed by an intendant-governor residing in Ciudad Real. Although this official was appointed in Spain, he was in effect subordinate to the president-governor of Guatemala. The most important consequence of the Intendancy system was the creation of the post of *subdelegado*, an official directly subordinate to the intendant-governor. *Subdelegados* were posted at Tuxtla, Comitán, Los Llanos, Ixtacomitán, San Andrés Chamula, Simojovel, Palenque, Tila, Ocosingo, and Huistán.[23]

The recentralization of Spanish America and the establishment of the Intendancy of Chiapas did not alter the subordinate status of the province vis-à-vis Guatemala. Judicial appeals were still carried to

Santiago. The Bourbon reforms similarly did not change the economic dominance of Guatemala over Chiapas. In 1630 the *cabildo* of Ciudad Real complained to the king that half of the privately controlled tributaries of the province were held by wealthy merchants of Santiago.[24] In the eighteenth-century the *provincianos* of Ciudad Real complained that Guatemalan merchants monopolized trade in and out of Chiapas. The reestablishment of the *cabildo* of Ciudad Real, sometime between 1774 and 1793, gave voice to the latent regionalism of the province. The local government had several disagreements with the intendant-governor, who was viewed as a representative of Guatemalan commercial interests.[25]

While the Bourbon reforms increased the bureaucratization of the American governments (manifested in Chiapas by the proliferation of *subdelegados*) and substituted Spaniards for American-born officials, the philosophy gaining currency in the Spanish world (outside of official circles) in the late eighteenth-century stressed less government interference and more local effort toward self-improvement. In 1795, Spanish liberal Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos published his *Informe de ley agraria*, a program for the economic regeneration of Spain. Jovellanos condemned trade barriers, governmental favoritism, the protection of special interests, and extolled local autonomy as the first step in national recovery.[26] In Central America liberal ideas were promoted by the royal merchant guild, established in 1793, and the Royal Economic Society, established in 1794. Both organizations, based in Santiago, supported free trade, the diversification of agriculture, the suppression of government intervention in indian communities, and the formation of provincial economic improvement councils.[27]

The Economic Society of Chiapa was established in Ciudad Real in

1819. Awareness of the province's decadence, however, had been widespread for at least thirty years. Chiapa's first intendant-governor wrote in 1790 upon his arrival: "I became aware very soon of the decadence these provinces find themselves in, worn down by poverty, without industry or commerce."[28] The Economic Society of Chiapa, in a lengthy report written in 1819, analyzed the causes of the "decadent state of the province" and offered a plan of regeneration. Two major sources of the decline were reviewed: 1) the suppression of the *repartimiento de indios* in 1778 and, 2) the establishment of the Intendancy in 1790. Without the stimulation of the labor draft, argued the authors of the report, the indian "is reduced to producing only that which is necessary for his own use."[29] The decline of agricultural production and commerce was traced to the suppression. On the other hand, the large number of *subdelegados*, according to the report, increased governmental interference and favoritism in the provincial economy and added to the financial burden of the towns. Undoubtedly the chief obstacle to economic enterprise in colonial Spanish America was the State itself.[30] The oligarchy in Ciudad Real, however, favored less government except in the domain of labor expropriation. This divergence between the financial and political interests of the Spanish State and the material interests of the *provincianos* of Chiapas was further irritated by an economic recession affecting all of Central America during the first two decades of the nineteenth-century. On the eve of independence, a report was sent to the crown declaring that "the discontent that reigns is due to the poor economic conditions of Central America."[31] The natural impulse of the productive forces in Central America was to break, or at least crack, the colonial link.

INDEPENDENCE AND ANNEXATION

The immediate stimulus to the movement for independence in Spanish America was the Napoleonic invasion of Spain in 1807-1808. Provincial Spanish councils of resistence arose to direct the war, in America creoles established loyal governing councils of their own in several cities to rule until King Ferninand VII returned to power. In 1810 the Spanish councils united, formed a central council, and summoned a national parliament (*cortes*). The *cortes* which assembled at the port city of Cádiz to write a constitution, incidentally granted Americans representation. This move encouraged provincialism and separatism which was already high in Central America.[32] The Chiapanecan delegate to the Cádiz *cortes*, for example, introduced a slate of eight propositions outlining homerule. He also sought the abolition of the crown's tobacco monopoly, the establishment of a provincial deputation, and the opening to trade of the Chiapanecan ports of Tonalá and Tapachula.[33] The Cádiz *cortes* promulgated its constitution in 1812, both the constitution and the governing body, however, were suppressed in 1814 when Ferninand returned to the throne.

In January 1821 a new liberal regime assumed power in Spain, restored the Cádiz Constitution, and reconvened the *cortes*. Under this new regime some provinces, such as Chiapas, were granted provincial assemblies to introduce limited home-rule. The new *cortes*, however, enacted measures to restrict the privileges of the church and the military, reforms which were not welcomed in America. In response, royalist commander Agustín de Iturbide, a creole of New Spain, published his *Plan de Iguala* in February 1821. In defense of the existing

last decades of Spanish rule. Lowland landowners had never felt the animosity for Guatemalan merchants as the highland commercial oligarchy had and they had been cheered by the suppression of the *repartimiento de indios* since they had not depended upon the labor drafts. Lowland landowners, however, did fear possible economic domination by Tabasco and were not enthusiastic about union with Mexico.[39]

Iturbide's empire collapsed early in 1823, a victim of rebellion in Mexico City. In light of this, Chiapanecans debated whether to maintain or sever their union with Mexico. By this date the vaunted Mexican connection had become a disappointment. Far from being a cornucopia, Mexico was also poor and had begun to tax Chiapas in order to pay for the Mexican army stationed in the region. The strain and disappointment of union also aggravated regional divisions within Chiapas. The provincial ruling council in 1823 was divided into two factions. The pro-Mexico group, the oligarchy of Ciudad Real (now called San Cristóbal), was opposed by pro-Guatemala and pro-independence factions which were based in the outlying areas of Tuxtla, Chiapa, Comitán, and Tapachula. Landowners outside of San Cristóbal generally opposed whatever the *cristobalenses* favored. In June 1823 the pro-independence faction mustered a majority in the provincial council and dissolved the pact of union with Mexico.[40] The other provinces of Central America, which had joined Mexico in 1822, declared absolute independence in July and formed the United Provinces of Central America.

Immediately the new Mexican government ordered General Viciente Filisola, then in Guatemala, to march to San Cristóbal and dissolve the provincial council, which he did on September 5. In response, municipal councils in Tuxtla, Los Llanos, and Comitán proclaimed the *Plan de Chiapa*

social order, Iturbide made a conservative revolution to immunize Mexico from the Spanish reforms by proclaiming independence. By August 24 Juan O'Donojú, Superior Political Chief of New Spain for Spain, signed the Treaty of Córdova which recognized Mexico as a sovereign and independent nation.[34] Four days later Chiapanecans formed the *sala capitular de Comitán* and seconded the *Plan de Iguala*. The *sala capitular* formally declared independence from Spain and Guatemala on September 26, 1821 and requested annexation by Mexico.[35]

Chiapanecans were more attracted to Mexico than repelled by the liberal Spanish reforms. The Economic Society of Ciudad Real, reflecting the interests of the highland oligarchy, strongly favored annexation by Mexico.[36] The *sala capitular,* also dominated by highland interests, argued that "Guatemala never has proportioned to the Province, sciences, industry, or any other utility and has looked upon it with much indifference.... Chiapas has been under the Guatemalan government for three centuries, and in all this time has not prospered." Mexico, on the other hand, appeared in a different light. "Puebla, Oaxaca, and the other [provinces of the Mexican empire] have similar customs as Chiapa and in no case is there an analogy with Guatemala. The Provinces of the [Mexican] Empire enrich ours by the circulation of commerce which exists one with the other."[37] In fact, during the first two decades of the nineteenth-century trade with Mexico well surpassed that with Guatemala.[38]

Whereas the highland elite wanted to break the close economic domination of Guatemala (and believed Chiapas' great distance from Mexico would preclude similar Mexican domination), lowland landowners and merchants feared any Mexican political connection. Unlike the more commercially developed highlands, the lowlands had prospered in the

last decades of Spanish rule. Lowland landowners had never felt the animosity for Guatemalan merchants as the highland commercial oligarchy had and they had been cheered by the suppression of the *repartimiento de indios* since they had not depended upon the labor drafts. Lowland landowners, however, did fear possible economic domination by Tabasco and were not enthusiastic about union with Mexico.[39]

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Libre of October 26 which declared that Chiapas would not blindly depend upon any metropolis and would remain independent of both Mexico and Guatemala.[41] The Mexican congress then retreated. It ordered the reinstallation of the provincial council as well as the retirement of Mexican troops and called for a referendum in Chiapas to decide the question. "Chiapas should be left in absolute liberty," the Mexican congress declared, "for pronouncing its union with Mexico or Guatemala."[42]

On September 12, 1824 the Chiapanecan provincial council announced the reunion of Chiapas and Mexico based on a vote of 96,829 persons in favor of the Mexican union against 60,400 for union with Guatemala. The distribution of the vote was along regional lines: Soconusco and the Central Lowlands favored Guatemala while the Central Highlands favored Mexico. Later, Mexican union was made more palatable when high duties on commerce between Chiapas and Tabasco were established, One month before the vote, however, the local municipal council in Tapachula announced that Soconusco would annex itself to the recently formed United Provinces of Central America. Mexico and Guatemala, to avoid war, agreed in 1824 that Soconusco would govern itself until a general boundary agreement was reached. Chiapas was formally annexed by Mexico on September 14, 1824 and the state's first governor took office on January 23, 1824.[43]

When Chiapas withdrew from the imperial State in 1821 a number of important political decisions required action but there existed in the province no political decision-making mechanism. Power devolved on the only real political organisms in the province, the *cabildos* or (using the more modern term) *ayuntamientos*. The *ayuntamiento* of San Cristóbal tended to act on behalf of the province as a whole, although

not without generating resentment in other towns. Tapachula represented the extreme of radical localism and opted for independence from Mexico, Guatemala, and Chiapas. For the other municipalities in Chiapas, union with Mexico and the formation of a Chiapanecan government was acceptable because real power remained close to home. Upon leaving the imperial Spanish State, Chiapas joined Mexico but conceded little authority to the new national State.

CHIAPAS IN MEXICO

Fragmentation of sovereignty and political instability were normal conditions in Chiapas after 1824, indeed they were endemic to Mexico as a whole. *Ayuntamientos* in Chiapas repeatedly withdrew allegiance to particular state governments. State governments did the same with regard to national governments. Federal troops garrisoned in Chiapas made and unmade state regimes. *Caudillos* ruled localities as a result of their ability to raise military forces. It was an age when raw power politics resolved political disputes.

Regional conflicts of interest in Chiapas were not the immediate or ostensible causes of political disorder after 1824. Lowland *hacendados*, it is true, were more land and labor hungry than highland *hacendados*, yet accommodation on the truly transcendant issues of land tenure and labor supply and treatment was always easily reached. The most divisive question in Chiapas, as in all of Mexico, pertained to the desirability or undesirability of the great political, economic, and cultural power of the Catholic Church. The clerical establishment dominated social and business life in San Cristóbal, from education to



2. The Mexican Republic, 1825, from Josiah Conder, *Popular Description, Geographical, Historical, and Topographical, of Mexico and Guatemala* (Boston: Wells and Lilly, 1830).

business loans, and health care to agricultural production. Clerics such as Matías de Córdova and Pedro Solorsano were important leaders of the movement for independence and remained politically active long after Chiapas' incorporation into Mexico. The *cristobalense* elite was protective of the Church and all of its privileges. It is estimated that at least one-half of the *haciendas* in Chiapas at independence were clerically owned. They occupied some of the best lands in the Central Lowlands, those along the rivers, and more often than not were under utilized. To a land-hungry lowland agricultural elite, the Church was perceived, more and more, as a roadblock to the formation of a productive and prosperous society. Liberals, those who favored placing restrictions on the Church, were generally found in the Central Lowlands while Conservatives, defenders of clerical power and privileges, were concentrated in San Cristóbal.

Political disorder in Chiapas from the 1820s to the 1850s was the price Chiapanecans paid for local rule (or the absence of a strong State). Personal advancement, in an age when only a hundred supporters constituted a powerful association, accounted for the rise and fall of not a few governments. The national Mexican State was neither strong enough to prevent the unauthorized usurpation of power nor to provide the state of Chiapas with a workable, regulated, and forceful system for changing local governments.

The period 1824-1891 can be divided into three political epochs with respect to Chiapas: 1) 1824-1855, 2) 1855-1864, 3) 1864-1891. The first period was characterized by nearly constant political discord and witnessed the development of opposing factions, Liberals and Conservatives. Liberals developed (or borrowed) an agenda or reforms but were unable to

carry them out. Conservatives dominated San Cristóbal, seat of the state government. Soconusco remained independent until 1842, when it was militarily annexed by Mexico and joined to Chiapas. Between 1855 and 1864 Liberals consolidated their power in the state, successfully defended their regime against clerically-led armies, and instituted the anti-clerical and anti-corporatist reforms of the liberal agenda. Governor Angel Albino Corzo's nine year tenure, very long by the standards of the time, was indicative of the degree of political consolidation initiated during this period. The post-Reform era, 1864-1891, was characterized by the division of the state into a few powerful *cacicazgos* dominated by Reform era military leaders. This parcelization of Chiapas into only three or four domains facilitated the demolition of municipal autonomy and contributed to the establishment of greater political stability inside Chiapas as well as promoting firmer state adherence to the national government.

POLITICAL EVOLUTION

A weak state government tried to preside over numerous municipal regimes between 1824 and 1855. Rebellions aimed at legally (and illegally) constituted state governments occured almost every year. They were instigated by *ayuntamientos*, the federal military garrison in San Cristóbal, by exile groups in Guatemala, and even by neighboring state governments. The clerical establishment of San Cristóbal actively opposed and helped bring down the government of Miguel Joaquín Gutiérrez (1833-1835). In 1848 the *ayuntamiento* of Chiapa withdrew its recognition of the state government, Tuxtla did the same in 1849, Tonalá

in 1850, and Ocozocuatla in 1853. Chiapas was invaded by troops of neighboring states in 1833, 1834, 1841, and 1849.[44] One indication of the strength of centrifugal forces in the state was the establishment of the separate lowland department of Chiapa. The proponent of this action explained, "Chiapa should not continue subordinate to Tuxtla, it should figure among the *pueblos* of first rank in the state."[45]

Soconusco remained independent until 1842. "During this long period," noted a contemporary observer in 1843, "it has experienced all the difficulties of an abandoned country surrendered to rivalries and hatred; without laws, without a plan, without a system and with a purely municipal regime very imperfect, much which still exists and is leading to anarchy."[46] The lack of security for persons and property and the practice of forced loans contributed to Soconusco's economic ruin. Another observer commented in 1850 that since 1811 "industry, agriculture, and commerce have decayed and are decaying each day more and more."[47] President Santa Anna ordered the military to occupy the region in 1842, thereafter it was a department of the state of Chiapas.[48]

The Liberal-Conservative struggles during this first period usually pitted Tuxtla, Chiapa, and Comitán against San Cristóbal, San Bartolomé, and Simojovel. The first Liberal *caudillo*, Joaquín Miguel Gutiérrez, was a *tuxtleco* (in 1848 a Liberal state government changed the name of Tuxtla to Tuxtla Gutiérrez. The same decree changed San Cristóbal to San Cristóbal Las Casas in honor of Chiapas' first bishop). Gutiérrez faced the opposition of the *ayuntamiento* of San Cristóbal, the bishop of Chiapas, and eventually the president of Mexico. The second Liberal *caudillo* was Angel Albino Corzo of Chiapa (Chiapa was later changed to Chiapa de Corzo). Like Gutiérrez, Corzo was forced to transfer the seat

of government from San Cristóbal to Tuxtla and Chiapa at various times because of highland opposition.[49]

Angel Albino Corzo dominated Chiapanecan politics from 1855 to 1864. As *jefe político* of Chiapa and commander of the largest and most cohesive national guard unit in the state, Corzo rose to power. In 1855 he became governor and seconded the *Plan de Ayutla*, the proclaimation which initiated the great reform movement of Juan Alvarez, Benito Juárez, Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, Guillermo Prieto, and Melchor Ocampo. Corzo successfully defended his government against clerically led and financed Conservative forces in 1858-1859 and again in 1863-1864. In conformity with the new Constitution of 1857 and the national reform laws of 1859, Corzo disentailed Church and communal indian property, abolished monasteries, eliminated the civil obligation to pay parish fees, decreed the absolute separation of Church and State, and expelled the Bishop of Chiapas for interference in political affairs. He diminished the capacity of the Church in San Cristóbal to make and unmake state governments. The other lasting consequence of the Reform, and particularly the wars it engendered, was the rise of a few powerful *caudillos*: Julián Grajales of Chiapa, Miguel Utrilla of San Cristóbal, José Pantaleón Domínguez of Comitán, Sebastián Escobar of Tapachula, and Pomposo Castellanos of Tuxtla Gutiérrez.[50]

Governor Corzo was illegally unseated in 1864 by General Porfirio Díaz of Oaxaca, who imposed his comrade-in-arms General José Pantaleón Domínguez. The Liberal *caudillos* who dominated Chiapas after 1864 always firmly supported the central Mexican government and, except in 1875, did not interfere one with the other. General Grajales, Escobar, and Castellanos in 1875 combined to depose Governor Domínguez during the

Tuxtepec rebellion which brought Porfirio Díaz to power in Mexico City. Escobar replaced Domínguez as governor from 1877 to 1878, Utrilla occupied the post from 1879 to 1883, and two of Domínguez' supporters, José María Ramírez and Manuel Caracosa presided over the Chiapas government from 1883 to 1891.[51]

Although Chiapas and its *caudillos* remained loyal to the national regime after 1876, political cohesion within the state was still very weak. In 1878 the customs inspector at Comitán wrote that "there is peace because there is no man who can serve as a popular *caudillo*."[52] He explained that Escobar was boss of Soconusco, Grajales ruled Tuxtla and Chiapa de Corzo, Domínguez controlled Comitán, and Utrilla (who was governor) governed San Cristóbal Las Casas. There was peace because each left the others in peace. This kind of peace, he continued, "was without advantage for both society and the country."[53] During the 1880s the state was reduced to only three prominent *cacicazgos*: Escobar in Soconusco, Grajales in the Central Lowlands, and the governor (whoever he was) in the Central Highlands. Because of its distance from the center of the state, Pichucalco was also independent of state government control. Grajales, for example, would not permit state control over taxation in his region and even federal bureaucrats in Soconusco owed their positions and gave their first loyality to Escobar.[54] Governor Caracosa informed President Díaz in 1891 that "the sentiment of localism is very deep rooted in the sons of each community in this state."[55]

Caracosa took one of the most important steps toward the centralization of state government power in 1890. In that year be began to suppress the *acabalas* (taxes on commerce in transit) collected by the municipalities and which brought in the bulk of municipal revenues. In

order to compensate the municipalities the governor ordered that they receive one-half of the alcohol distillation tax revenues. This solution, however, impoverished municipal treasuries and favored the alcohol-producing highlands much more than the lowlands. It is also likely that the larger towns ignored the ruling altogether. The measure certainly damaged Caracosa's popularity in the state.[56]

The system of regional *caudillos* became too restrictive for landowners and merchants in Chiapas by the 1880s. Telesforo Merodio, for example, complained that Escobar impeded "progress and improvement in order to prevent anyone from surpassing his local influence or arousing ideas of equality and true democracy."[57] Domaciano Gómez of Chiapa de Corzo reported that because of *caudillismo* "it is not possible to freely [farm] in the department."[58] To *hacendado* Lauro Candiani of Tapachula, Escobar appeared an absolute *cacique*, "*dueño* of our lives and haciendas."[59]

The cycle of weak government was nearing completion by the 1890s. Chiapanecans had rejected centralized government in the 1820s. The first steps toward political consolidation were taken during the Reform, when the Liberal faction soundly defeated the Conservatives and diminished the political capacity of the Church. After the wars of reform and intervention political fragmentation diminished when a few Liberal *caudillos* came to exercise power in the state. The formation of *cacicazgos* can be viewed as an intermediate step in political centralization, between municipal autonomy and state government control. By the 1880s and 1890s, however, *hacendados* began to look for a strong central state government to free them from capricious *caudillos*, and to build roads, bridges, seaports, railroads, and telegraph networks.

A NEW ELITE

Political consolidation in Chiapas, particularly in the 1890s and beyond, was accomplished by and on behalf of a new agricultural and commercial elite. The tradition-bound elite of San Cristóbal Las Casas, militarily defeated during the Reform, became indifferent to political participation and economic expansion. Gradually entrepreneurs, *hacendados* in the peripheral departments and recent immigrants to the state, became a powerful economic group and looked to government for assistance and support.

Liberal political domination and the rule of a lowland *hacendado*, Angel Albino Corzo, from 1855 to 1864 was due to more than one *caudillo's* ability to raise and maintain an army. By the time Corzo took power, a shift in the regional distribution of wealth had long been under way in Chiapas. Attracted by greater extensions of land, better soils, and easier trade outlets, *hacendados* and ambitious artisans and laborers had been abandoning the highlands to settle in the Central Lowlands. The settlement of new towns best reflects this most important trend. La Concordia was founded in 1836, San Fernando in 1851, Villa Flores and Villa Corzo sometime during the Reform. Immigrants to the state, like the Spaniard José Antonio Rabasa in 1857, settled in the lowland valleys and established ranches. The return to sugar and cotton cash crops also encouraged agricultural expansion in the central valley.[60] One can see the economic preponderance of the Western and Southern districts by 1855 in Table 1. (See Appendix.) By the time of the Reform this shift was sufficiently advanced to assure the victory of the Liberal faction. It was later accelerated by the highland Caste War of 1869-

1870 and the transfer of the state capital in 1892 from San Cristóbal to Tuxtla Gutiérrez.

The elite in Chiapas by the 1870s and 1880s was a larger, more heterogeneous and entrepreneurial class than ever before. The Reform had led to a great expansion of landowners of both large and small properties. (See Table 2 in Appendix.) There was also an increase of immigration into Chiapas after the Reform. Two-thirds of all foreign residents in the state in 1885 had arrived since 1867. (See Table 3 in Appendix.) The majority of the immigrants were professionals or artisans. One successful story was that of José Antonio Rabasa, a Spaniard, who established a ranch near Ocozocoautla in the 1850s, was a successful *hacendado* by the 1880s, and father of the state's governor in the 1890s. A large infusion of Germans contributed to the transformation of elite society and Chiapas itself. Guillermo Steinpreis, for example, established a brewery in San Cristóbal, Herna Munch a pharmacy valued at $40,000 (unless otherwise indicated, all references to currency are in Mexican pesos), and José Aggeler earned enough money as an *hacienda* manager to set up an electric plant in San Cristóbal.[61] The most successful Germans, immigrants from Guatemala to Soconusco, were coffee planters. By the early 1890s they had transformed that region into the wealthiest department in Chiapas.[62]

Landowners and merchants not only became frustrated with the regional strongmen after the Reform but also with the slow pace of economic development in Chiapas. The word "*modernización*" entered the Chiapanecan vocabulary in the 1870s at about the time when some entrepreneurs began to question the passive role of state government. A positive role for government began to be discussed in Chiapas.[63] One editor asserted in

1888 that "the hour for reforms nears, the capitalists are fixing their sights upon Chiapas."[64] The state government, however, was slow to respond to the new demands expected of it. Governor Utrilla in 1884, for example, asserted that the laws protecting the rights of landowners and property were the principal means for the enrichment of the region.[65] As in the late colonial period, the material interests and perceived needs of an important segment of the regional elite were not in harmony with the customary function of government.

REFLECTIONS

After a short period of settling in the imperial Spanish State consolidated its authority and power in Chiapas in the sixteenth-century. Government permeated colonial society, dominated the indian villages, and directed the local economy. There were royal monopolies, corporate exemptions, and minute public regulation of every economic activity. By the end of the eighteenth-century royal efforts to further centralize and bureaucratize America coincided with an economic recession in Central America. The suppression of the *repartimiento de indios* added to the sentiment in Chiapas that the imperial State, particularly its regional manifestation in Guatemala, was out of touch with the requirements of the province. The Spanish crisis of 1808-1821 and the revolutionary movement of Agustín de Iturbide in Mexico provided the opportunity and motivation for two profound political changes in Chiapas; independence from Spain and Guatemala and emancipation from centralized government. In the quest for regional prosperity elite Chiapanecans rejected the Spanish Leviathan.

Fragmentation of sovereignty and political instability in Chiapas from 1821 to 1891 facilitated the political dominance of the landed elite and the shift of resources and political power from the Central Highlands around San Cristóbal Las Casas to the Central Lowlands near Tuxtla Gutiérrez and Chiapa de Corzo. Unhampered by policies and regulations of a powerful national State, landowner-politicians in Chiapas developed those land and labor practices and laws most conducive to the expansion and aggrandizement of their own class. Political fragmentation prevented the *cristobalense* elite from impeding the growth and development of the Central Lowlands. Gradual and limited recentralization of power in the region did occur in the nineteenth-century, largely as a result of the successful Liberal reform movement in the 1850s and 1860s. The Liberal's rise to power in Chiapas was a function of Liberal success in Mexico City and the shift in wealth and population from *tierra fría* to *tierra caliente*. The Liberal victory contributed to the consolidation of the Mexican State in Chiapas in two ways. First, the Liberal reforms diminished the rival political authority of the Catholic Church. Second, the Liberal victory led to the establishment of greater political stability as Chiapas was parcelized into only three or four *cacicazgos* dominated by Liberal *caudillos* replacing the anarchy of municipal autonomy.

Chiapas was again ready for strong and centralized government by the 1890s. After seventy years of political instability and passive rule, government began to be viewed by the most dynamic element of society -- commercial farmers and merchants -- as a necessary instrument for the modernization and development of the region. Strong central government was seen as a means for destroying local tyrannies and promoting regional prosperity. Chiapas was poised on the threshold of full integration into the Mexican State.

PART ONE:

1891-1910



3. The State of Chiapas, 1911, from *La republica mexicana: Chiapas, 1911*, Latin American Library, Tulane University, Map Collection (LAL #349).

CHAPTER TWO

THE STATE IS MOVING

> The action of the state in the functioning of the general government will be the most powerful force for assuring the stability of institutions, the dignity of the villages, and the majesty of the nation.
>
> Emilio Rabasa, 1912

> *Señor* Rabasa may justly be regarded as the harbinger of progress and commercial activity.
>
> U.S. Consul Albert Brickwood, 1910

Chiapas set off on a new course in the early 1890s. Commercial farming began to assume importance for the first time since the colonial epoch, entrepreneurs immigrated to the state to establish coffee plantations, and the state government initiated a program of political centralization and economic development. Politicians, editors, and citizens spoke of a vague "spirit of enterprise" and of "regeneration and progress" finally revitalizing Chiapas. Governor Emilio Rabasa in 1892 optimistically declared that "the state is moving."[1] Many believed the region had embarked upon the road to modernity.

The gubernatorial administration of Emilio Rabasa (1891-1894) coincided with and gave impetus to many of the changes that were taking place in Chiapas at the time. Rabasa took the first significant and

deliberate steps toward the formation of the centralized and interventionist State in Chiapas. The history of modern Chiapas begins here.

CAPITALIST MODERNIZATION HAD BEGUN

President Porfirio Díaz's program of "order and progress" produced no recognizable benefits for Mexico until the 1880s and 1890s. A new commercial code was passed by congress in 1884 lifting restrictions. A reformed mining law in 1887 and special banking legislation in 1897 helped restructure the national economy. Massive railroad construction projects got underway in the 1880s and during the 1890s the Diaz administration balanced the national budget and refunded the internal and foreign debt. "Capitalist modernization," argues historian John Coatsworth, "had begun."[2]

Mexico's new liberal economic environment and political stability attracted foreign capital and entrepreneurs. North American and British investors built the railroads, electric plants, commercial plantations, and refurbished the mining industry. In Chiapas, following the border accord between Mexico and Guatemala in 1882, German planters from Guatemala began to establish coffee *fincas* in the Soconusco district. At a time of high coffee prices, these planters expanded into Chiapas in search of virgin and inexpensive land. Their success in Guatemala and the high coffee market prices of the late 1880s and early 1890s led to a natural spillover into Mexico. The expansion of coffee cultivation provided the single most important push for economic growth in Chiapas during the *porfiriato*.[3]

Most of the early purchases of land for coffee cultivation were

made for only *centavos* per *hectare* from survey and colonization companies which had obtained from the federal government the right to sell and colonize over four million acres of public lands in Chiapas. A North American concern, Louis Huller and Company, obtained the second concession in 1886. In exchange for making an accurate survey of all national lands in the state, the company was granted the right to sell one-third of the total concession and colonize the remaining two-thirds. Fertile coffee land sold in the late 1880s for sixty or seventy *centavos* per *hectare* rose in value to fifty to one hundred *pesos* in the mid-1890s and well over three hundred *pesos* by 1910.[4]

Coffee cultivation became an incredibly profitable industry in Chiapas. In 1892 it was estimated that coffee produced for seven *centavos* a pound could be sold for over twenty *centavos*. Plantations of only 250 *hectares* could gross from $75,000 to $100,000 U.S. dollars a year. In 1892 there were twenty-six large coffee plantations in Soconusco.[5]

As the best coffee lands in Soconusco were purchased in the early 1890s, coffee production spread to other parts of Chiapas. The departments of Tuxtla, Palenque, Simojovel, and Mezcalapa became major producers and by the end of the decade there was some coffee production in nearly every municipality in the state. Coffee exports brought millions of *pesos* into the state each year, contributing significantly to the increase of agricultural investment and commerce. The new tax revenues which accrued to the region from coffee strengthen the state government and made possible many of the reforms and developmental projects carried out by Emilio Rabasa and his successors.[6]

The 1880s and 1890s also witnessed the expansion of agriculture in the Central Lowlands, and in the departments of Pichucalco and Tonalá. The revival of *cacao* production in Pichucalco by Spanish and Mexican

entrepreneurs, also due to higher prices, rivaled only Soconusco in importing wealth into Chiapas. *Finqueros* and *rancheros* in Pichucalco possessed easy river transport to and a ready market in San Juan Bautista, Tabasco.[7] In the Central Lowlands an ambitious *ranchero* class developed, attracted by fertile lands at good prices and easy river transportation. The entire state reported only 501 *ranchos* in 1877. By 1895, however, due to the denunciations of national and village *ejido* lands, the department of Chiapa counted 527 *ranchos* alone, Tuxtla 240, Tonalá 368, Soconusco 530, and Pichucalco 529.[8] This group of entrepreneurial *rancheros* and *hacendados* sought the destruction of *cacicazgos* and the constitution of an active state government that would, above all, construct a network of roads and railroads. This element in Chiapas was the constituency behind capitalist modernization, and the administration of Emilio Rabasa.[9]

EMILIO RABASA

When Emilio Rabasa became governor of Chiapas in 1891 Porfirio Díaz had fully consolidated his political power in Mexico. His presidential term from 1888 to 1892 demonstrated to ally and rival alike that he could survive consecutive reelections. By the end of his third term in office Díaz had become "*el indispensable, el necesario.*"[10] It was in this political environment of increasing centralization by Porfirio Díaz, and under the tutelage of Rabasa, that Chiapas began to be integrated into the national Mexican State.

Díaz's candidate for governor of Chiapas in 1891 possessed a number of qualities which recommended him to the emerging entrepreneurial elite

in the state and to Díaz himself. In the first place, Rabasa was a native of the Central Lowlands. His parents, José Antonio Rabasa and Manuela Estebanell de Rabasa, moved to Chiapas in the 1850s and purchased a modest ranch near Ocozocuautla in the department of Tuxtla. Don José was a Spanish emigrant who had lived in New Orleans and Mexico City before finally settling on the Chiapanecan frontier. Neither poor nor rich, he was a hardworking man who hade his ranch "*Jesús*" a profitable enterprise. Perhaps more than anything, he was ambitious for his two sons.[11]

José and Manuela's third child, Emilio, was born on May 22, 1855. At the age of twelve Emilio Rabasa Estebanell was enrolled at the Institute of Arts and Sciences in Oaxaca City, the same school where Benito Juárez and Porfirio Díaz had studied as boys. His professional studies were undertaken at the School of Law, also in Oaxaca, and he received his degree in 1878 at the age of twenty-two. By all accounts he was an excellent student and possessed an outstanding intellect.

Following law school Rabasa dabbled in Chiapanecan and Oaxacan politics. In 1881 he was elected to the Chiapas state legislature and one year later appointed professor of law at the State Institute of the Sciences. From 1885 to 1886 Rabasa served as private secretary to Oaxaca's governor, Luis Mier y Terán. He moved to Mexico City in 1886 to take up an appointment as federal judge and to teach law. As a result of his talent, ambition, and influencial friends he was appointed to the supreme court of justice and shortly thereafter, he became Attorney General of the Federal District. During his five year residence in Mexico City Rabasa found time to write five novels, he collaborated with Rafael Reyes Spindola to revive the newspaper *El Universal*, and with his fellow Chiapanecan Victor Manuel Castillo he

founded the prestigeous legal journal *La Revista de Legislación y Jurisprudencia*. As a result of his school-days friendship with Rosendo Pineda (a close advisor to President Díaz), Rabasa became acquainted with many of the most important politicians in Mexico, including Porfirio Díaz himself. He also became identified with the group of progressive politicians and intellectuals known, some years later, as *científicos*. In 1891, at the age of thirty-six, Rabasa became the youngest governor in Mexico.[12]

Aside from his obvious talent and acquaintences, Rabasa received the governor's office in Chiapas for several practical reasons. The current governor, Manuel Caracosa, had lost his bid for a second term as a result of a financial scandal surrounding a proposed Chiapanecan railroad.[13] Further, during Caracosa's term the state debt had grown from $30,000 to over $200,000 without any noticeable improvements.[14] The governor's personal life also contributed to his unsuitability. Although Caracosa was married, he lived with another woman and scandalized "*culta sociedad*" in San Cristóbal.[15]

Having ruled out Caracosa in mid-1891, President Díaz chose Emilio Rabasa. Unlike the other petitioners for the post, Rabasa neither led nor belonged to any *camarilla* (political clique) in the state. He owed his political career entirely to Díaz. Rabasa returned to Chiapas as a national politician, independent of local political groupings, and possessing a broad, modern vision of the purpose of government. Finally, Rabasa's backers in Mexico City, Rosendo Pineda and other *científicos*, saw Rabasa's candidacy as an important step away from outdated localism and personalism and one step toward the spread of scientific, intelligent, and non-militaristic government throughout Mexico.[16]

Emilio became governor of Chiapas at a propitious time by providing a definite direction for the emerging entrepreneurial class in Chiapas. This convergence, furthermore, occured at the beginning of the decade which witnessed Mexico's most rapid economic growth in the nineteenth-century. It seemed to a number of his contemporaries that the age of progress and modernity had finally come to Chiapas. "Regeneration and progress," according to *El Monitor Republicano*, summed up the Rabasa program for Chiapas.[17] The governor, wrote another supporter, "took hold of the reins of the state government at the most opportune time; all of his valor, all of his influence, all of his integrity, and all of his energy was necessary in order to put Chiapas on the road to real progress."[18]

A COMPLETELY NEW PROGRAM OF GOVERNMENT

Emilio Rabasa's program of regeneration and progress had a dual nature: political and developmental. The centralization of power and authority within the state government contributed, in a large way, to the success of the developmental reforms and projects. Rabasa believed that to get Chiapas moving he had to strengthen his own position and office. The governor, however, inherited a relatively weak office and a politically fragmented state. The governor's authority did not extend very far into Escobar's Soconusco, Grajales' Chiapa, or Contreras' Pichucalco. In San Cristóbal Las Casas the clergy and certain important families possessed considerable influence on the conduct of the government. The situation required strong and dramatic action.

In mid-1892 Governor Rabasa transfered the state government from

San Cristóbal to Tuxtla Gutiérrez. In a number of letters to President Díaz, Rabasa explained that the move was due to the high cost of food in the highlands which necessitated higher salaries, the apathy and laziness of *cristobalenses*, the undue influence of the clergy, and the commercial importance of Tuxtla Gutiérrez.[19] The most important reasons, however, were more symbolic than concrete. First in importance was the desire to establish an entirely new governing center and bureaucracy, free of the pernicious influences that plagued all governments in San Cristóbal. When the government did move to Tuxtla a number of *cristobalense* politicians and lawyers refused to follow, a result probably anticipated by Rabasa. Second, the move represented an important geographical reorientation of Chiapas. Whereas San Cristóbal was located on the trade route to Guatemala and most of the important *cristobalense* families maintained close ties with Guatemala, Tuxtla Gutiérrez was the gateway to Mexico City. *Tuxtlecos*, furthermore, were a more diverse group of immigrants, foreigners, and Mexican educated elite. Already the commercial center of the Central Lowlands, Tuxtla soon became the undisputed business, transportation, as well as political center of the state. For Rabasa, the transfer of the government signified nothing less than the rebirth of Chiapas.[20]

The transfer of the government strengthened Rabasa's position within his own government but it did little to rid him of the state's central political problem, the *caudillos*. Given the ability of the *caudillos* Escobar and Grajales to disrupt his administration, Rabasa approached this problem cautiously and slowly. The governor did, however, have Díaz's support and therefore the stronger position. When, for example, General Escobar sent two of his nephews to confer with Rabasa

early in his term over the election of certain favored persons, Díaz informed Rabasa "to comply only with his requests of public interests."[21]

Soon after taking office Rabasa established a state rural police force, the *seguridad pública,* dependent upon the governor, to reduce banditry, quiet political troublemakers, and enfore decrees in remote parts of the state. This force eventually comprised ten officers, over one-hundred soldiers well armed, and a captain originally from Oaxaca.[22] The governor replaced nearly everyone who had served in the Caracosa administration, and most departmental political officers, *jefes políticos.* He staffed many of the most important post in the state government with *oaxaqueños* (natives of Oaxaca), individuals he had previously known and trusted.[23] The system by which *jefes políticos* were "elected" by citizens of the departments was revamped so that the officials became political appointees of the governor and served at his (and Díaz's) will. The post of *visitador de jefaturas* (Inspector General) was established to examine the conduct of the *jefes políticos.* The *visitador* could overrule or dismiss a *jefe político* if he found it necessary.[24]

Rabasa's new political order, not unexpectedly, encountered resistance. The transfer of the government to Tuxtla Gutiérrez produced almost universal disapproval in San Cristóbal. One *cristobalense* complained anonymously to the federal government that the abandonment of San Cristóbal would lead to the economic decline of the highlands, a worsening of conditions for Chiapas' indigenous population, and could possibly lead to another caste war.[25] Former governors Miguel Utrilla and Manuel Caracosa opposed the move and Joaquín Ortega, a highland *hacendado*, saw a personal motive in Rabasa's action. Ortega complained to Díaz that "Governor Rabasa has been completely hostile

to this capital."[26] The transfer remained a constant source of discord within Chiapas until 1911, when a military effort to recover the capital for San Cristóbal failed.

Governor Rabasa's appointments of new *jefes políticos*, customs officials, judges, tax collectors, and even office workers also encountered resistance. Within two months of assuming office, Rabasa persuaded Díaz to replace a number of customs officials and military officers located in Tapachula and Tonalá who were Escobar loyalists. Rabasa's new *jefe político* for Soconusco, Manuel Figuerro of Oaxaca, was appointed without the traditional consultation with the *soconucense caudillo*. After several conflicts between Escobar's municipal president and Rabasa's *jefe político*, Escobar demanded that Díaz remove Figuerro. Rabasa, however, refused to compromise, commenting: "I have confidence in [Figuerro] since he is new to Tapachula and entirely independent of the parties or bands that exist in that city."[27]

General Escobar was assassinated in the street in 1893, most likely by his political rival Juan Félix Zepeda. Rabasa soon thereafter informed Díaz that "I have indicated to the *jefe político* that now with the assassination, he will take this advantage to make sure that Soconusco will never again have *caciques*."[28] *Jefe político* Figuerro made some personnel changes in the local government and confiscated 211 rifles and over twenty boxes of ammunition, Escobar's personal armory.[29] The Escobar *cacicazgo* no longer existed when Rabasa returned to Mexico City in 1894. Thereafter an oligarchy of local merchants, coffee barons, and cattlemen dominated local government in Soconusco, remaining fully cooperative and submissive to the government in Tuxtla Gutiérrez.[30]

Rabasa's encroachment into Julián Grajales territory of Chiapa de

Corzo was less spectacularly (and definitively) successful than his demolition of the Escobar *cacicazgo*; for one thing Grajales lived another ten years. Yet, the mystique Grajales had cultivated over twenty years was shattered under Rabasa. The governor's appointment of individuals outside the Grajales *camarilla* for post in the state government and in Chiapa de Corzo brought cries of harassment from the old *caudillo*. "The enemies that I have in this city," wrote Grajales to Díaz, "are now placed in the principal political posts suitable to molest me when it pleases them best."[31] Later in the year he again complained that "I do not think it is just or reasonable to be molested by those I had to fight before."[32] Although Díaz feigned sympathy for his old comrade in arms, he did not call off Rabasa. When Rabasa resigned in 1894 Grajales told the president, "all of Chiapas, absolutely everyone, wants an independent and impartial Governor, and not one proposed by Rabasa."[33] Grajales was to be disappointed.

Elsewhere in the state, the extension of the authority of the governor and the state government had top priority as well. In San Cristóbal Rabasa avoided difficulties with the local authorities by placing a personal friend and political supporter, Manuel J. Trejo, in the municipal presidency.[34] In 1893 the governor established the *partido* (administrative district) of Motozintla to project state authority in this remote region and end conflicts between the departments of Comitán and Soconusco over demarcation of the boundary line.[35]

As Rabasa prepared to leave state government early in 1894 he recalled for Díaz some of the achievements of his administration. Among those he singled out was the progress of political consolidation. "The departments of Soconusco, Chiapa, and Pichucalco," wrote Rabasa,

"previously removed from the action of the government, are now entirely submissive."[36] Under Rabasa the state government became the only significant focus of political power in Chiapas. Years later, one of Chiapas' most respected revolutionary leaders, Luis Espinosa, recalled that Emilio Rabasa "developed and put into practice a completely new program of government which until then was unknown in Chiapas."[37]

THE INTERVENTIONIST STATE

The developmental program of the Rabasa administration -- fiscal reform, road construction, agrarian reform, and educational development -- although not strictly political in nature, did nevertheless contribute significantly to the formation of the modern State in Chiapas. In each area the state government took on a decidedly new and expanded role in the economic and social life of the region. In the struggle for regional prosperity, Rabasa gave an important impetus to the interventionist State. His porfirian and revolutionary successors continued and eventually completed the edifice begun in 1891.

In the area of fiscal reform Governor Rabasa entered upon his task with an important head start. As mentioned in Chapter One, Governor Caracosa began the task of suppressing the municipal transit taxes on commerce. Rabasa continued (and by one account finished) this campaign against the *alcabalas*, a policy that had profound political and economic implications for the state. By diminishing the revenues of local governments, municipalities became more and more dependent upon state government largess, and as a consequence, less politically independent. The suppression of the *alcabalas* also contributed to the

expansion of trade throughout Chiapas. No longer burdened by tax collectors in each town, landowners and merchants found it profitable to market their produce and manufactures in other parts of the state and even outside of Chiapas.[38]

Following the president's instruction, Rabasa made fiscal reform his first priority. The state's financial situation demanded strong and immediate action; Rabasa had inherited a disaster. Bondholders of the Chiapas railroad scheme were demanding payment, the state debt had ascended to over $200,000 from only $30,000 four years earlier, and the fiscal system of the state government was disorganized and corrupt.[39] Upon taking office, Rabasa appointed a special commission to study the state's tax structure and collection system and recommend reforms. Acting upon the commission's suggestions, Rabasa increased the rural property valuations from five million *pesos* to seventeen million *pesos* (leaving rural properties still undervalued, it was estimated, by half). He also reduced and prorated property and commercial taxes and tightened collection procedures.[40] The governor established the State Treasurer General's Office to coordinate tax collection and expenditures. By law this office was required to publish quarterly financial balances as well as the income of each rent collector. The rent collectors, for the first time, were regularly audited by accountants of the central office.[41] Through new appointments and closer vigilance Rabasa attempted to reduce smuggling into Chiapas from Guatemala and off the Pacific shore. This problem, however, continued to plague his successor for many years.[42]

Rabasa's program of fiscal reform proved successful for the state. State government revenues, according to Rabasa, doubled in two years, from $180,000 in 1891 to $359,000 in 1894. (See Table 4 in Appendix.)

For the first time in Chiapanecan history, property taxes brought in more revenue than the highly regressive head tax. "This was the charge that you entrusted to me in 1891," Rabasa informed Díaz," and I believe I have now complied with it, without coersion or violence, although with the discontent of two or three friends who previously had paid nothing."[43]

The new fiscal order provided the resources for the state government to begin a program of public works, from roads to schools. Rabasa's most favored project was the construction of a network of roads, telegraph and telephone lines. In 1891, when Rabasa began his duties, Chiapas possessed nothing that could even remotely be called a road.[44] Earlier efforts to establish a network of roads by contracting the work to private companies had come to nothing. What commerce there was in Chiapas was carried by canoe or on the backs of indian carriers along centuries-old trails and paths.[45] Governor Francisco León (1895-1899), the military officer in charge of road construction under Rabasa, expressed his opinion concerning the delay in constructing roads in Chiapas. "In these regions [San Cristóbal, Simojovel, Chilón, and Palenque] the capitalists raise objections to the reparation of roads because they find it less costly to be served by *cargadores* [indian carriers] who are paid a trifle and work like mules...."[46] According to León, the highland elite possessed no pressing need for roads.

Governor Rabasa initiated construction of the first highway in Chiapas, running from the border of Oaxaca to Arriaga, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapa de Corzo, San Cristóbal, Comitán, and the border with Guatemala. Earlier governments had planned for the state's first road to link San Cristóbal and San Juan Bautista, Tabasco which was the route best

suited for the Central Highlands. Rabasa dispensed with roadbuilding concessions and subsidies and, with the approval of President Díaz, instructed the 10th army batallion to do the work; materials and salaries were financed by state revenues. By the end of Rabasa's term the Oaxaca to San Cristóbal segment had been completed.[47] To Rabasa the highway's significance was "to open [Chiapas] to becoming Mexican."[48] The Rabasa administration also expanded the telegraph network (begun in 1886), constructed the first telephone lines in the state, and channelized the Grijalva river above Tuxtla to permit river travel and commerce to the Gulf of Mexico. Improved seaport facilities were constructed at Tonalá and San Benito (off Tapachula), thereby permitting large vessels to pick up Chiapanecan commodities for export, particularly the growing quantities of coffee.[49]

The roadbuilding program initiated during the Rabasa administration brought incalculable benefits to Chiapas. The state highway, like the government's move to Tuxtla Gutiérrez, put Chiapas in closer contact with Mexico. This road opened the agriculturally rich Central Lowlands to the port at Tonalá and markets in the Central Highlands and the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, thereby giving an important impulse to commercial, export-oriented agriculture in that region. Since the road favored Rabasa's lowland constituency more than the highlands, it became part of a discriminatory pattern of development which was to have important consequences later, particularly in 1911. Its effect, however, is apparent even today.

In the liberal tradition of Juárez and Lerdo de Tejada, Emilio Rabasa strongly believed that the division of communal village lands and the creation of a new class of peasant farmers would promote

productive capitalist agriculture and the integration of the indian into Mexican society. To advance these goals Rabasa enacted and vigorously enforced a measure (prior to the 1894 federal *Ley de Ocupación y Enajenación de Terrenos Baldíos*)[50] to divide all *ejido* land in Chiapas into private parcels. *Jefes políticos* were instructed to set up municipal commissions to oversee the division and the sale of plots to individuals. These commissions were required by law to apportion five-*hectare* plots at no cost to those heads of families who could not afford the payment schedule. Well-to-do indians and *ladino campesinos* in most communities were able to purchase enough land to form respectable *ranchos* and accentuate the class differences already existent in small villages. Only the most destitute received the minimum free allotments (from 10% to 50% of a village's population, generally). Many more, however, received no land at all due to corruption and residency requirements. Proceeds of the land sales were to be used for local public works and schools and twenty percent was to be forwarded to the state treasury.[51]

Emilio Rabasa's agrarian reform, called "*el reparto*" and "*el fraccionamiento*," was both a success and a social disaster. The number of small property owners did increase significantly. Many payments were less than twenty *pesos* a year, an affordable sum even for some *campesinos*.[52] The number of *ranchos* in Chiapas more than doubled between 1890 and 1910.[53] Enterprising sharecroppers, renters, small merchants, and ranch foremen benefited most from this opportunity to become a landowner.[54] In 1903 the average size of agricultural properties in Chiapas was only 380 *hectares*, whereas the average size of all landholdings in Mexico was 5600 *hectares*. One in forty

Chiapanecans owned land by 1910. The United States Consul in 1911 noted that "Chiapas is unique among the states of Mexico for the number of small holdings and peasant farmers."[55]

The effect of the *reparto* upon Chiapas' villages was devastating; the Rabasa legislation constituted the final assault upon a large number of village *ejidos* in the state. Between 1893 and 1909 at least sixty-seven village *ejidos* were affected. (See Table 5 in Appendix.) As the number of *ranchos* and *haciendas* increased, communities that had been independent for hundreds of years either disappeared or became *hacienda rancherías*. According to one report "the *ejido* of Pueblo Nuevo Chiapilla was divided into lots in the year 1895 and from that date *Señor* Adrián Culebro, owner of the *finca "Santa Rosalía"* and *Señor* José A. Velasco, owner of the *finca "El Castaño,"* incorporated this land into their *fincas*."[56] Another complaint reached President Díaz early in 1895 from Chiapa de Corzo, accompanied by nine pages of signatures and thumb prints. "We are trying to save the only source which provides us life," wrote the petitioners. "It is true that we are granted lots for free but this places us in a worse condition of poverty."[57] There were numerous requests to Díaz and to the state government to stop the *reparto*, all to no avail.[58] In 1895 Governor Fausto Moguel admitted that "we have had some difficulties originating from the greed of some *finqueros* who, to the detriment of the poorer classes, attempt to acquire large portions of land."[59]

The *reparto* had two faces. As it added to the size of the *ranchero* class it also forced even more villagers into more exploitative and less secure work such as migrant labor, indebted servitude, sharecropping, and *baldiaje*. Many villagers never received plots or were unable to

maintain possession of them, either through fraud or sale. At the time Rabasa believed that the distribution of parcels to villagers was the best way to prevent large landowners from denouncing and buying up all *ejido* land and leaving villagers completely landless.[60] Twenty-five years later Rabasa admitted that he had erred in permitting parcel holders to sell their plots. Too many ended up without land, which was not the governor's intent.[61] Rabasa's attempt (and partial success) to create a class of industrious and responsible smallholders also led to the formation of the modern Chiapanecan working class.

Governor Rabasa's educational program was both ambitious and realistic. After 1891 the state government took primary responsibility for education in Chiapas. The poverty of most municipal governments forced the state government to give direct support to rural primary education. "When I arrived in the state," Rabasa informed Díaz, "the government sustained one school in the *pueblo* of Huistán, and no more; today it supports more than 100 primaries of first, second, and third class, two preparatory schools, one college of superior studies for girls, and the Industrial-Military School. All of this is under the supervision of the General Office of Public Instruction which previously did not exist in the state."[62] The state's budget for education climbed from $7,000, allocated by Governor Caracosa in 1891, to $40,000 under Rabasa.[63]

In keeping with his inclination for centralization, Rabasa established the General Office of Public Instruction to supervise the establishment of new schools, the certification of new teachers, and the creation of a uniform statewide curriculum. The Director General was authorized to appoint inspectors to visit schools and municipalities to enforce the

public instruction law and to encourage municipal and private educational efforts. The governor added a new head tax to be used exclusively for municipal primary schools and a law which required landowners to maintain a primary school if more than ten school-aged children resided on their property. Despite this flurry of legislation, rural primary education remained entirely inadequate due to the poverty of both state and municipal governments.[64] "And still *Señor* Rabasa complains, and with reason," wrote *El Universal*, "that it is not possible to comply with the law of obligatory education."[65] The governor did, however, take the first steps to make education a public responsibility in modern Chiapas. He created two state-supported preparatory schools, a night school of agricultural and technical education for indians in San Cristóbal, and two public libraries.[66]

Rabasa, unlike many of his contemporaries, did not view education as the primary means of integrating the indian population into Mexican society. "Before teaching him to read," he insisted, "it is necessary to liberate the indian from his misery and from the grasp of the superior class." He believed a hundred schools would not have as positive effect as one railroad in improving the work and living conditions of the indian population.[67]

Rabasa's new fiscal order and program of internal improvements found greater approval and support in the Central Lowlands. David Castellanos and Segundo Alfonso, *hacendados* from Comitán, believed the higher property valuations were impoverishing their department.[68] The increased property valuations of the large but generally idle *haciendas* around San Cristóbal (combined with the transfer of the government to Tuxtla Gutiérrez) made Rabasa very unpopular in tierra

fría.[69] Although the Rabasa developmental program tended to alienate the highland elite, it was also creating a larger and more important constituency in other parts of the state. This fact perhaps best explains its continuation after Rabasa returned to Mexico City.[70]

RABASA'S LEGACY

In his writing and government service Emilio Rabasa demonstrated that he was a sincere liberal reformer, not unlike the North American progressives at the turn of the century. He advocated better sanitation in the cities, an effective and honest police force, prison reform, and honesty in government. In his novels he criticized the mistreatment of indians, incompetence and corruption in government, personalism, nepotism, and sycophancy. He despised the thousands of minor despots in Mexico. Despite his structural reforms of the state government in Chiapas, Rabasa believed that good government rested not so much with one form or another but with the quality of public servants. At the level of state government the key official, he had no doubt, was the *jefe político* and he took particular care to appoint individuals that he personally trusted to that office.[71] Rabasa was convinced that state governments had an important role to play in the creation of modern Mexico. That role, he later wrote, was one which emphasized the power of the state government to promote development while at the same time curbing the tendencies of localism and parochialism.[72]

Like other *científicos,* Rabasa accepted Porfirio Díaz as the only alternative to anarchy but wanted to move gradually to a less

personalistic system of rule and one with more democratic procedures.[73] As a political creation of Díaz, he never failed to demonstrate his loyality and submission to the supreme *caudillo*. Although Rabasa's program of reform and development in Chiapas was his own which he pursued with his characteristic energy and intelligence, Rabasa never proceeded with any program, reform, or important appointment without first consulting the president.[74] Rabasa was in many ways the model governor for modern Mexico; intelligent, active, and loyal.

Rabasa had been more than just a good governor for just over two years; he also set a tone, established precedents, created a program of political reform and economic development supported by the active entrepreneurial class and continued by his successors. Like Rabasa, the four porfirian governors of Chiapas who served from 1894 to 1911 came from the middle strata of society. Fausto Moguel, originally a *tuxtleco* but living in Oaxaca when Rabasa recruited him in 1891 for state treasurer, was appointed to finish Rabasa's term. Moguel informed Díaz that he would continue the Rabasa program which "has now begun to transform the state and which will be the base of its future prosperity."[75] Lieutenant Colonel Francisco León, a native of Oaxaca, was elected governor for the period 1895-1899 upon Rabasa's recommendation. León had directed the road building program under Rabasa and Moguel and was strongly committed to extending the reforms begun under Rabasa.[76] León's successor, Rafael Pimentel, another native of Oaxaca, was the only one of Rabasa's successors that the former governor did not select. Governor León was forced to resign due to a political scandal and Pimentel, already in Chiapas as Díaz's political agent, assumed the office. Ramón Rabasa, however, Emilio's brother and an important

politician in Chiapas in his own right, was selected state treasurer, which gave his brother some influence during Pimentel's term from 1899 to 1905.[77] In 1905 Governor Pimentel attempted to transfer the state government back to San Cristóbal Las Casas. The Rabasa brothers blocked this move and Pimentel resigned. Ramon assumed the office and remained in power until 1911.[78] Emilio Rabasa was not a regional *caudillo* like Bernardo Reyes in Nuevo León or Teodoro Dehesa in Veracruz. He maintained an important influence in Chiapanecan affairs but he did not dictate to his successors. Rabasa intervened in matters of importance. His successors counted on him to be their informal representative and Chiapas' agent in Mexico City. The period 1894-1911 in Chiapanecan history clearly had Rabasa's stamp on it.

Rabasa left the governor's office in February 1894 after serving a few months more than two years of his four year term. As he told the president, he wished to return to Mexico City to take care of the education of his daughters and because of his wife's poor health.[79] Rabasa was elected senator from Sinaloa and he also continued to practice, teach, and write about law. His criticism of the Constitution of 1857, in two books published in 1906 and 1912, were profoundly influencial at the 1917 constitutional convention at Querétaro.[80] The predominant influence of Rabasa, according to Mexican historian Daniel Cosío Villegas, "resulted in the enlarging of the powers of the executive branch."[81] As a governor and a political thinker, Emilio Rabasa bridged the gap between what Mexico was and what it soon became. On the 100th anniversary of his birth, the editors of *El Universal* commented that "Rabasa represents the culmination of liberal thought in Mexico and he began something more, the neoliberalism of the twentieth-

century."[82] His record in Chiapas supports this view.

REFLECTIONS

The administration of Emilio Rabasa represents a major watershed in Chiapanecan history. Building upon the ideological concensus which emerged from the Reform, the political stability which Porfirio Díaz established in the nation, and the energy and expectations of a growing entrepreneurial class in Chiapas, Rabasa began the sustained process of economic development and political consolidation which was to characterize Chiapas, and Mexico, over the course of the next fifty years. To Rabasa, government was a useful tool which could help transform an isolated and backward region into one more prosperous and modern. He realized, however, that before a state government could become an effective tool of modernization it first had to centralize and consolidate its authority. Rabasa began this process by undermining the power of local political bosses, strengthening the fiscal base of state government, and establishing a new center of government. At the same time, this governor expanded the functions of state government. It began to intervene in a major way in the regional society and economy through road construction, reform of village land tenure, and support for education. At this early stage in national State formation in Mexico, regional (state) governments assumed a role which was just as important as that preformed by the national government in furthering that process.

The efforts of the Chiapas state government in the early 1890s in promoting both political and economic modernization, in light of later

developments, may seem meager and certainly was insufficient to the task at hand. A beginning, however, was effected. More than in any other period, the genesis of modern Chiapas can be found here.

CHAPTER THREE

REFORM AND DISCORD

> For some time the Government of this state has imposed upon itself the necessity of putting an end to the servitude of indebted workers. Humanity and political economy, civilization and the temper of our institutions demand it.
>
> Francisco León, 1896

> The *cristobalenses* will not be content until they have the government there. The motive of their constant conspiracy is to recover it.
>
> Francisco León, 1896

Emilio Rabasa returned to Mexico City in 1894 yet the course he set for Chiapas during his two year administration endured and his personal influence in Chiapanecan affairs remained considerable. Fausto Moguel, selected by Rabasa to serve out his term, was little more than a caretaker governor. Moguel kept Rabasa's appointees, continued work on the Rabasa program, and provided for the election of Francisco León. "One of the most progressive governors of the Republic,"[1] León tested the limits of porfirian toleration of liberal reform and found it most inflexible. During the León administration the regional elites of

Pichucalco and Comitán became dissatisfied with the Rabasa program, and malcontents in San Cristóbal Las Casas became ever more determined to return the capital to their city and rid the state of Emilio Rabasa's influence. Despite the best of intentions, León left Chiapas politically polarized. He failed to achieve his labor reform and the pacification of San Cristóbal, yet this administration demonstrated the propensity, if not the capacity, for instituting significant social reform. With national regimes in power which encouraged social and economic reforms, later state governments would succeed where León had not.

THE MOGUEL INTERREGUM

Governor Fausto Moguel served out the remaining nineteen months of Emilio Rabasa's term and prepared Francisco León's accession to the governor's office. Two events of importance, events which were to have lingering effects for years to come, took place during the interregum of 1894-1895.

A war scare during the winter of 1894 threatened to make Chiapas the battlefield in a conflict between Mexico and Guatemala. In 1892 Guatemalan President Justo Rufino Barrios signed the final border accord with Mexico regarding the boundary between Guatemala and Chiapas. Two years later, however, Barrios moved a large number of troops and canon to the border and threatened war, primarily for domestic political effect. President Porfirio Díaz ordered the transfer of the 12th Batallion, then stationed in Juchitán, Oaxaca to Tapachula and sent General Bonifacio Topete to Chiapas to report on the state's readiness for war.[2] The tension subsided by April 1895, although not

as the result of Mexico's show of force. Due to the absense of a good road between Juchitán and Tapachula, the 12th Batallion reached the border only after a long delay. For reasons of national security, Díaz came to view the construction of a coastal railroad as a necessity.[3] Although construction did not begin for another six years, the Panamerican Railroad was conceived during the crisis.

With Emilio Rabasa's resignation in 1894, several discreet campaigns commenced for the purpose of influencing Díaz's selection of the next governor of Chiapas. The common thread of all the petitions was opposition to any Rabasa appointee and support for a native son, that is, a *cristobalense, comiteco, or chiapaneco.*[4] In no other city, however, was electioneering more intense or well organized as in San Cristóbal. Here there was a concensus among the leading citizens of adamant opposition to any continuation of *rabascismo.* During the Moguel interregnum a *cristobalense camarilla* was formed, united not by a *caudillo* as was normally the case but by a political cause. This clique, led by lawyers and landowners like Jesús Martínez Rojas, José H. Ruiz, Jesús Flores, Gregorio Culebro, Clemente Robles, and Manuel Pineda, worked almost unceasingly over the next seventeen years to return the state government to San Cristóbal.[5]

By April 1895 the *cristobalense camarilla* (characterized at the time as an "iron circle")[6] had fired the ambition and captured the sympathy of General Topete, who had assumed command of the federal army batallion still located in San Cristóbal. Topete became their candidate for governor in the July elections.[7] Díaz, however, supported León and ordered Governor Moguel to elect him. León took office on December 1. The "Iron Circle" was discouraged but not defeated. Rafael Pimentel, Díaz's

political agent in Chiapas, reported that "the supporters and directors of Topete" continued to meet after the election and plot.[8] Manuel Lacroix, a member of León's government, informed President Díaz in December 1895 that "this state seems content with the new government, with the exception of certain persons of San Cristóbal." General Topete, Lacroix continued, was slandering León, calling him a drunk and worse, in order to discredit him.[9] Pimentel advised Díaz to transfer Topete to another state "because at the least he would create difficulties for León in the function of his government."[10] General Topete was transfered in January 1896 but the problem remained in San Cristóbal, as serious and dangerous as before.

THE LEON PROGRAM

Governor Francisco León, perhaps even more than Emilio Rabasa, was an active governor. He strongly continued the road building program, the division of *ejidos*, the establishment of schools, and the centralization and consolidation of state government power and authority. León enlarged the role of the state government in the area of public health and attempted to enact a program of labor and indian reform. He was surely one of the most progressive governors of his time, yet he was forced to resign from office, politically disgraced.

Chiapas' need for easier communication, according to León, was "a question of life or death."[11] During his tenure the state government expended over $200,000 on road construction, which the governor accounted for personally to avoid fraud.[12] In 1896, for example, it was reported that over 100 men were at work daily on the state highway.[13] In 1898

the state government extended the telephone network along the highway's route.[14] The administration finished construction of the state highway, yet, as León informed Díaz, "only the departments of Tonalá, Tuxtla, Chiapa, Las Casas, and Comitán receive the benefits of this road, leaving without easy communication the rich departments of Palenque, Chilón, and Simojovel."[15] Despite this problem, however, the *tuxtleco* periodical *El Porvenir de Chiapas* was optimistic: "One of the driving wheels of progress is now being built."[16]

Governor León, as Rabasa before him, invested a large percentage of the state budget in education and, again like Rabasa, was not encouraged by what he saw. The governor informed Díaz in 1896:

> Even though I have invested considerable sums in this branch, the practical result has come to almost nothing, in preparatory and professional instruction and in primary instruction.17

The principal cause of the underdeveloped state of education in Chiapas, as León saw it, was the absolute lack of suitable professors. To correct that deficiency, León established the State Normal School.

In the area of fiscal policy the León administration increased the rate of taxation on commercial capital,[18] excepted legally constituted investment partnerships from rural property taxes in order to encourage joint capital ventures,[19] and attempted (unsuccessfully) to reduce Chiapas' contribution to the federal treasury. During most of the nineteenth-century the states were required to forward to Mexico City between twenty-five to thirty percent of all taxes collected within their jurisdiction. Certain taxes --those levied upon the sale of national lands, on mail and telegraph services, custom duties, and stamp taxes on official documents -- were exclusively federal in nature.

The national government also limited states to the collection of only a few taxes, on property, alcohol, and individuals. In two studies commissioned by Governor León, the state treasurer calculated that from 1824 Chiapas had contributed over $13,000,000 to the federal treasury but had received only about $100,000 from Mexico City in the form of subsidies, emergency aid, and material improvements. The implication was clear: Chiapas deserved more help from the national government or less of a tax burden.[20]

President Díaz did have a plan for public improvements in Chiapas, although his reasons had little to do with fairness. In 1896 Díaz informed León that

> for some time now Guatemala has cajoled the residents of Soconusco and has established ports of deposit on the frontier, in which they charge such low taxes on coffee and the other products of Soconusco that it amounts to a free service.
>
> They are, furthermore, bringing a railroad to the frontier and will ask permission to extend it into Mexican territory. Added to this we have no railroad, nor docks on the coast of Soconusco and the government of the state imposes taxes that appear to be high to the residents of Soconusco. I propose for your consideration that the government of Guatemala is skillfully and slyly breeding a spirit of separation in the heart of Soconusco.21

Díaz promised that the national government would construct a railroad from Tehuantepec to Tapachula, build a steel pier on the coast, encourage a bank to open a branch in the region, and he suggested that Chiapas "treat Soconusco with a gentle hand and relax a little their taxation, because the landowners there in their conversations with Guatemalans will assure them that Soconusco is remaining firm to the state."[22] Due to the mediation of Emilio Rabasa, a contract was signed for the construction of a railroad (although the Chicago firm later

backed out) and the Bank of London proposed to establish a branch bank in Tapachula.[23] Certainly a bank was needed. The German moneylenders in Tapachula charged two to four percent a month, "signifying the ruin of commerce and agriculture."[24] Like the railroad, however, the establishment of a bank was delayed until 1900.

The León administration took the first significant state actions in the areas of public health and the confinement of criminals. In 1897 the state created the office of Inspector General of Public Health. The Inspector General, and his assistants stationed in the various towns, were authorized to inspect food industries, medicine sales, burial practices, outbreaks of contagious diseases (with the authority to impose quarantines), and all other matters affecting public health.[25] By the end of León's term, the state's first publically supported hospital was nearing completion.[26] The state government was forced to begin building a penitentiary, according to León, due to "the scarcity of [financial] resources of the *ayuntamientos* of the *cabeceras* of the departments which has prevented the operation of jails due to weak security."[27]

THIS VICIOUS AND SPINELESS CUSTOM

For over two decades, indebted servitude had given Chiapas a bad reputation in Mexico City. During the 1870s and 1880s, Chiapas came under attack by liberal and radical editors and reporters as the slave state of Mexico. *El Socialista* led the attack with numerous articles.[28] Chiapanecans, in response, defended indebted servitude as a humane, efficient, and legal contractual arrangement.[29] Flavio Antonio

Paniagua, for example, editor of *La Brújula*, reacted strongly in 1873 to an article published in the Mexico City periodical *Almavia* which alleged that slavery flourished in Chiapas. Paniagua replied that "neither direct nor indirect, open or disguised slavery exists [in Chiapas]."[30] Fernando Zepeda, editor of the *Boletín de Noticias*, wrote in 1886 in the Mexico City newspaper *El Partido Liberal* that there was no perpetual service in Chiapas. Writing in response to an article published by *El Socialista*, Zepeda indicated that "by speaking in favor of the servants, exaggerating their poor conditions, [the critics] are instilling in them imaginary rights such as the abolition of their debts, exciting in them the passion and disposition for rebellion, which would be without doubt unfortunate for society and, particularly, for the agricultural industry of the country."[31] Prior to the 1890s, landowners and intellectuals in Chiapas were most vocal in support of indebted servitude.[32] Service appeared basic to the wellbeing of Chiapanecan agriculture; "it constitutes," one *hacendado* noted, "the principal element of life of our *fincas*."[33]

Beginning in the 1890s, however, with the breakup of village communal lands and the increased availability of labor, many Chiapanecans began to believe that their economic interests were no longer bound to servitude, but rather, demanded its demise. Liberal economic doctrine of the age was cited to give support for the idea of free labor. In 1895, the conservative metropolitan review *El Economista Mexicana*, for example, recommended " the radical modification of the system of service in those states where there is the greatest scarcity of laborers; the increase of salaries, the decrease of the hours of work, in a word, the treatment of the *peón* as a man and not as a beast."[34]

The first public call for labor reform in Chiapas came in 1893. That year the newly formed *Sociedad Agrícola Mexicana de Chiapas*, located in Tuxtla Gutiérrez and composed of the leading agriculturalists of the Central Lowlands, set forth their program. They recommended the promoting of scientific agricultural techniques, the establishment of banks, the construction of railroads, and the correction of labor abuses.[35] Later that year, Governor Emilio Rabasa criticized the system of service. He asserted in his annual *informe* that this "problem," as he called it, paralyzed substantial amounts of capital which could be more efficiently employed, and therefore, was prejudicial to both workers and capitalists.[36]

Governor León issued a call for an agricultural congress to resolve the issue of indebted servitude as soon as he took office. The congress would meet in March 1896, with each municipality assigned one delegate.[37] There is no question that León wished to rid Chiapas of "this vicious and spineless custom," as he called it.[38] One month before the opening of the congress, however, a portentous warning appeared in Mexico City. *El Mundo*, one of the semi-official metropolian newspapers, in a direct reference to the pending assembly in Chiapas, censured those who would "attempt to change the economic face of the country."[39]

The congress which assembled in Tuxtla Gutiérrez in late March 1896 was certainly not a radical body; the nearly one hundred delegates represented the wealthiest members of landed society.[40] The geographical makeup of the congress was also weighted in favor of those departments where indebted servitude was most important. Apparently those areas where servitude had declined did not sent delegates.

The dominant concern of the sessions was not the humanitarian

sentiment of improving the lives of rural workers but that of increasing agricultural productivity, freeing the thousands of *pesos* tied up in debts, and finding a solution to the geographical maldistribution of the work force within the state. Clemente Robles, representative of San Cristóbal and three other municipalities, summed up the feelings of most participants when he stated that "the present system of service is bad economics for the state."[41] Most delegates agreed that the system was antiquated, prejudicial to the worker and the *hacendado*. Economic self-interest, they stressed, required the modification of indebted servitude.[42]

The congress divided into two committees to study and propose solutions to the labor problems facing the state. The agenda of the congress included six points of which the First Committee was responsible for points one through three and the Second Committee, points four through six. The agenda read as follows:

> First. The contract of domestic service as it is honored in the state - does it merit the charge of slavery as has been alleged occasionally in the national press?
>
> Second. The mentioned contract - does it conflict with some of the established principles of the Federal Constitution?
>
> Third. Does it conform to the accepted principles of political economy or can it be qualified as anti-economical?
>
> Fourth. Has the occasion arrived to abolish the service known in the state as debt peonage?
>
> Fifth. If affirmative - what are the most efficient means for the amortization of the debt and the substitution of this service, conciliating both the interests of the farmer and the servant?
>
> Sixth. If negative - what means should be adopted for improving the actual system of service?43

Throughout the month-long congress, Governor León kept the president informed on the proceedings and, as a good porfirian governor, constantly requested his advice and counsel. Díaz, for his part, did not hesitate to offer suggestions. Immediately preceding the opening of the congress, Díaz, refering to the meeting's objective, wrote that "considering the great danger [of this effort], without losing any time I take this opportunity to inform you that for no reason should you permit it. You must believe that if [servitude] exists here it is because I cannot yet remove it; we are still not at the level of education where it is possible to bring such a benefit to the villages."[44] León responded that he would proceed with caution "without overly disturbing customs and with due respect for the consequences."[45] It is quite likely that from this point on, the question of significant reform became moot.

The course of the congress and of subsequent legislative action was one of progressive dilution of proposed reforms. Although there are no records of what took place behind the facade of the congress and the official record itself is edited and incomplete, the work of the Second Committee as reported is instructive. This committee, headed by Manuel Cano and José Lara, was responsible for proposing modifications of the labor system and clearly was the more important of the two. During the second week of the congress, Cano presented a fairly sweeping reform proposal which included the obligatory amortization of debts through wage deducations, a minimum wage of thirty *centavos* a day, the prohibition of all cash or credit advances, the final liquidation of all workers' debts within ten years, and careful supervision of the amortization process by the state government.[46] On April 19, the

Second Committee, by a vote of thirty-two in favor and eighteen against, approved and presented its formal recommendation to the full congress. This proposal included Cano's amortization plan and the proposed prohibition of advances but only to newly contracted servants. This proposal made no mention of a minimum wage or the eventual liquidation of debts. Finally, at the end of the congress, the full assembly formally recommended to the governor that contracts for new servants prohibit the accumulation of any debt. Established debts, they noted, were to remain unmodified and valid.[47] Indebted servitude, in short, was to die a natural death along with the servants themselves.

Although León had correctly sensed that there was a concensus within the Chiapanecan landholding class regarding the economic problems presented by indebted servitude, he had miscalculated their willingness to do anything about it. The First Committee, for example, concluded that indebted servitude in Chiapas, although anti-economical, was not a form of slavery nor was it unconstitutional.[48] One minority delegate on the Second Committee argued that "there is no doubt that servitude is hostile to progress; but one cannot suppress it all at once, because this will bring worse wrongs."[49] Those who opposed any constructive reform, furthermore, had the full support of President Díaz.

On April 30 Governor León wrote Díaz: "I have the honorable satisfaction to inform you: that the Agrarian Congress has closed its sessions giving a solution to the Agenda that was previously formulated, but not without first adopting in the most part the dispatched plan which you appropriately indicated to me." León continued, "it is true that this leaves things as they were for now, but in the not remote future this vicious and spineless custom which no one loves will be

reformed, without producing a disturbance nor in a radical manner."[50]

Díaz, in response, indicated he wanted no more.

> The matter is over, and since it was not decided but in part, it shows that it cannot be resolved and therefore you should not return to touch it; in so much as it is so important to landowners, it would damage your personal prestige and in this respect and if you agree, I invite you to leave it alone and I repeat, do not touch it further, even if a new opportunity indicates that you should do so.[51]

Although the Second Committee voted in the affirmative that the time had arrived to end indebted servitude, the committee nevertheless proceeded to include the sixth point on the agenda in its discussions, i.e., "what means should be adopted for improving the actual system of service?" The result of its efforts was a legislative proposal redefining the rights and obligations of both workers and employers. This proposal required the witnessing by at least two persons of the signing of all labor contracts, written rather than oral contracts, and contracts which expressed the amount of money promised and the exact nature and amount of work required. Employers were responsible for the treatment of sick and injured workers and the acquisition of medicine for them. This legislative proposal was never acted upon by León.[52]

In 1897 Governor León decreed that all indebted servants had to be registered and their debts recorded by the *jefes políticos*. After November 12, 1897, the state government and its courts would not recognize any contract for servants contracted after that date which recorded a debt exceeding two months' salary (or approximately fifteen to twenty *pesos*).[53] The state's survey found 31,512 indebted servants in Chiapas collectively indebt by $3,017,012, clearly a problem did exist. (See Table 6 in Appendix.) Later in the year, León observed

that the law had been accepted by the "sensible part of the state" and would be "an important factor in the wellbeing of Chiapas, because it will expel innumerable abuses and a very bad system which has been one of the causes of the current backwardness of our agriculture."[54] This was putting the best face on what León clearly realized was a failure. He was absolutely correct when he told Díaz "this leaves things as they were."

The Agrarian Congress of Chiapas was not so much a liberal assembly as a modernizing one. Governor León, Manuel Cano, José Lara, and others wanted to use the power of the State to remove what they perceived as an obstacle to the full realization of agricultural productivity. But what was viewed as an economic issue in Chiapas was seen in Mexico City as a social issue, a dangerous experiment with unseen and potentially radical consequences. As a result the experiment was vetoed; the evolution away from indebted servitude was discouraged.

Francisco León, not one to be discouraged, proposed in the summer of 1896 to reform "the custom of employing indians as cargo carriers in place of beasts of burden." The governor informed the president that he wanted a "law prohibiting under the penalty of severe fines, the burdening of indians of a weight of more than one *arroba* [about thirty-five pounds]." [55] When this custom was forgotten, León believed, good roads would flourish. Díaz, however, commented that "it could be counterproductive."[56] León dropped the idea -- for two years. In 1898 the governor informed the president that there were more than 500 *tamanes* (indian cargo carriers) in Chiapas. They were paid a *peso* for each *flete* (load) and therefore many carried three or four in order to earn more. *Tamanes* were held financially responsible for any loss or

damage to the merchandise. This form of transport, according to León, monopolized commerce and impeded other forms of competition. "Regarding the merchants who traffic with these unfortunates," noted León

> they do not agree nor can they agree to the opening of highways or even less to the construction of railroads which would lead to the disappearance of this exploitation which leaves upon the bodies of many indians the same lesions that beasts of burden show on their backs. This explains why I have been offered thirty thousand *pesos* not to open a highway to San Cristóbal.

This time, however, perhaps anticipating Díaz's reaction, León advocated no reform. "It will be necessary to prohibit this traffic; but first we have to establish roads and railroads which will permit the passage of another kind of transport and then these improvements will render meaningless such prohibition."[57]

There is no question that Francisco León was a sincere reformer. He sought to use the power of the State to modify and eventually end abuses and systematic exploitation of laborers and indians. His reformism was grounded in liberal economic thought and a deep felt humanitarianism. At the national level, however, the porfirian system would tolerate no modification of labor practices by state government. León was not really ahead of his time. There existed a constituency in Chiapas that also desired modification of inefficient labor practices. Landowners in the Central Lowlands and in Soconusco believed that with the end of service they could attract sufficient workers from other more populous areas of the state with higher wages. It is more accurate to say that Porfirio Díaz and his closest associates were too firmly tied to ideas and practices of the past.

THE VAMPIRE CITY

Francisco León pursued a political policy of centralization of authority in Chiapas and subordination to the national government. León, however, faced a far more volatile and dangerous political adversary in the "Iron Circle" in San Cristóbal than Emilio Rabasa faced with Sabastián Escobar or Julián Grajales. The organization of *cristobalenses* rested not upon the prestige or authority of one person but on a sacred cause. Rabasa, in fact, was the true target of *cristobalense* wrath. His centralizing program, development and fiscal policies, and above all, the transfer of the government to Tuxtla Gutiérrez had provoked certain *cristobalenses*, long accustomed to social and political rule, into organizing a government-in-exile. Francisco León, a supporter of the Rabasa program but no puppet of the ex-governor, was their immediate target. His replacement by someone sympathetic to their cause was their goal.

León began his administration in a spirit of conciliation and unification. His Secretary of Government, Manuel Lacroix of Palenque, informed Díaz in January 1896 that "the governor has followed up to now a policy of unification, nominating for political posts men of all circles."[58] His most surprising nomination was that of Timoteo Flores Ruiz, one of the "Iron Circle," as Secretary of *Hacienda*. Flores Ruiz served for fifteen days in Tuxtla Gutiérrez and then resigned and returned to San Cristóbal, because of a disagreement with the governor.[59]

León replaced a number of Rabasa appointees, in the state government and the *jefaturas*, with his own men, usually *oaxaqueños*.[60] The most important *jefatura*, that of Soconusco, was filled in 1896 by a Díaz

appointee, a man unknown to León.[61] General Ignacio Bravo replaced General Topete in January as federal zone commander and, after too long a delay, moved the federal barracks from San Cristóbal to Tuxtla Gutiérrez, leaving detachments of thirty-five men each in San Cristóbal, Tapachula, Comitán, and Tonalá.[62]

As early as March 1896 León had lost all patience with San Cristóbal. His attitude from this point on toward the city and its residents certainly contributed in no small way to his later difficulties. A robbery of files from a state government office in San Cristóbal provoked this comment from León to Díaz: "...you will see to what unlikely degree the perversion in that city has reached, obstinately rebellious to all order and progress....It has even reached such a degraded extreme that even the *cristobalense* high magistracy is carelessly involved in illegal intrigues." San Cristóbal, concluded León, "was the most restless and hypocritical city in the republic."[63] Díaz suggested, in response, that the governor "employ the least number possible of *sancristobalense* lawyers."[64]

At the same time that the Agrarian Congress was in session, León created three new *partidos* in Chamula, Cintalapa, and Frailesca. The *partido* of Chamula included the municipalities of Chamula, Zinacantán, San Andrés, Santiago, Magdalena, Santa Marta, San Pedro Chenalho, and San Miguel Mitontic.[65] Governor León justified this expansion of state supervision and protection as a legitimate response to the harsh exploitation of the indians of these municipalities by the residents of San Cristóbal. "The *cristobalenses*," wrote León, "are not content with squeezing the juice out of them, maintaining them in servitude for a *peso* a month, sucking their blood like voracious vampires in all

kinds of little contracts; they make them so brutalized.... I believe the opportunity has arrived to begin to give the Chamula a close protector who guarantees their rights and promotes their improvement."[66]

The establishment of the Department of Mariscal (formerly the *partido* of Motozintla) and the *partidos* of Chamula, Cintalapa, and Frailesca was a way to place distant and difficult-to-reach regions under closer supervision of the state government. The *jefes políticos* formerly responsible for these regions (with the exception of San Cristóbal) rarely if ever visited the areas and exercised little control. The expansion of the number of *jefaturas* was similar in intent and effect to the creation of *subdelegados* in 1790.[67]

Not unexpectedly, the formation of the *partido* of Chamula, combined with the unhappiness in San Cristóbal over the Agrarian Congress and lingering discontent over the location of the government, produced the first political crisis of the León administration. In July, *cristobalenses* cried that the Chamula were preparing another caste war. "Critical situation this capital," telegraphed former Miguel Utrilla, "rumors of barbarous indian insurrection."[68] As far as León was concerned, "the *cristobalenses* have created the pretext of a Chamula uprising in order to alarm the state and to have a plausible motive to buy arms."[69] In a long letter explaining the situation to Díaz, León commented that:

> The *cristobalenses* of today are the same as during the time of Ortega and Father Chanona [Conservative general during the War of Reform, 1859-1860]: backward, troublemakers, hypocrites, and traitors. For this, *señor* Rabasa transferred the government here and they are still calling him 'the dead man' and since then have conspired to drag the capital back there.
>
> Since the abominable abuses of long ago are still being committed upon the indian race in the neighboring *pueblos*, it made the creation of the

> *jefatura* in Chamula indispensable, and irritated those who exploit them; and in spite, they invented the story of the uprising, calculating to draw out of it all kinds of advantages; if they frightened the Government to withdraw the *jefatura* they would remain masters of the flock.[70]

León, in a calculated move, declared a state of seige, "appearing to believe them," he said, and to prevent the formation of a citizen's militia.[71] The governor refused to blink and the crisis blew over, for the time being.

The election for governor in the summer of 1899 rekindled regional and political discontent in Chiapas. In April of that year seventeen of the leading *hacendados*, merchants, and professionals in the department of Pichucalco asked President Díaz not to re-elect Francisco León. This powerful group of *pichucaleños*, originally part of the Rabasa constituency, became disaffected for two reasons. They believed the state government had abandoned them by not promoting public improvements there as elsewhere. They were also disconcerted with León's campaign to reform indebted servitude, an institution that was strongly rooted and all-pervasive in that department.[72]

> Here we have not one school well provided for the education of our children, this obliges us to send them to other states, or Europe, or the United States.... Even our attachment to work, our arduous dedication to agriculture has been considered a reviled bud, qualifying us as slavers, because of the system of domestic service that exists, as if its existence was not an institution of long persistence, outside of our social situation, and as if we were to be blamed for these historical antecedents.... In conclusion: the state government has not helped us; when it is not hostile to us, it scornfully abandons us, demanding higher taxes.[73]

Elite *comitecos*, also part of Rabasa's original constituency, became disenchanted with the state's new progress during the León administration. In 1897 León intervened to prevent the landowners of the city of Comitán

from expropriating all of the city *ejido*, which had been in their possession prior to the *reparto* anyway. They were simply transferring title to themselves without apportioning parcels to poor families or those who wished to buy plots. This abuse León set about to correct, making no friends in Comitán in the process.[74] Other *comitecos* complained that "the *jefes políticos* and municipal presidents are frequently individuals that, even by their own account, abuse, extort, and are in open conflict with the best members of society."[75]

REELECTION AND RESIGNATION

It was in San Cristóbal, of course, where the most intensive efforts were underway to stop León's reelection. Viciente Espinosa, *jefe político* of Las Casas, informed a friend in Mexico City in 1898 that "if it is said that in the coming year I will proceed to replace the old fool [referring to León], I recommend that you tell no one any of this."[76] The *cristobalense camarilla* tried to persuade Víctor Manuel Castillo to seek the post, a strange choice given his close friendship with Emilio Rabasa, but he refused.[77] Francisco León, however, still possessed Díaz's confidence and in the spring the governor ordered all *jefes políticos* to establish reelection clubs. As a result no other candidate came forward.[78]

On May 25, 1899, less than two months before the July election, one of the sentries at the government palace in Tuxtla Gutiérrez attempted to assassinate Governor León. The soldier fired once at the governor as he was proceeding to his office, missed his target, and tried to escape but was captured.[79] León reported to Díaz two days

later that "two versions have come to my attention. The first presupposes responsibility to [Emilio] Rabasa, who would govern through Lacroix. The other, that the prisoner received $500 from conspirators in San Cristóbal."[80] Two days after that León was more certain. "From anomous reports," telegraphed the governor to Díaz, "I know that a ring of conspirators exists in San Cristóbal with sympathizers in this [city]; among those that are implicated is the Administrator of Stamp Taxes, Garmendía. In San Cristóbal, implicated as the leaders, are Jesús Martínez Rojas, José H. Ruiz, Jesús Flores, Joaquín Peña; I am advised that they are preparing an uprising of indians in Chamula and another here for the first of June."[81] In Mexico City, a press report indicated that "the clergy [of San Cristóbal] is the principal instigator, for not being pleased with the reelection."[82] In July, meanwhile, Francisco León was reelected governor for the term 1899-1903.

On June 12, Antonio Martínez, the soldier held for the assassination attempt, informed his captors that Major Romualdo Sánchez of the State Security Batallion gave him money to kill León.[83] Sánchez was then imprisoned and on July 9 confessed that he received the commission to kill León from *cristobalenses* Viciente Espinosa, Clemente Robles, and Ciro Farrera.[84] These three were imprisoned on July 14, two days after the election.[85] Others implicated in the plot, José and Modesto Cano, Jesús Martínez Rojas, and J. Antonio Rivera G., escaped to Guatemala.[86]

Governor León believed that the conspirators decided to do away with him when it became clear his reelection was a certainty. In this intrigue, believed León, Judge Leonardo Pineda, Ciro Farrera's uncle, would be appointed interim governor and would then return the government to San Cristóbal so that the conspirators would again have free access

to the state treasury.[87] León's reconstruction of the crime and the motive is plausible. The documentary record, however, yields no definitive judgement and after so many years it is impossible to say definitively if Farrera and the others really tried to kill León or, on the other hand, León used the assassination attempt to rid him of political enemies.

Regardless of the answer, León's decision to prosecute Farrera proved politically disastrous. Ciro Farrera was perhaps the most powerful man in Chiapas. Viciente Farrera, Ciro's father, had established the state's largest import-export house, *Casa Farrera*, in San Cristóbal in 1839. Since that time *Casa Farrera* had placed establishments in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Tonalá, Mexico City, and New York City. The Farreras owned numerous *haciendas* and some coffee *fincas* throughout Chiapas and were related to the wealthiest families in the state. Farrera also had close political and familial ties to Víctor Manuel Castillo, a national deputy from Chiapas and close friend to Emilio Rabasa.[88] Francisco León, a colonel from Oaxaca, had tackled too powerful a prey.

In preparation for a smooth and predictable trial, León asked for the resignation of Federal District Judge Abraham López, who he believed was involved in the conspiracy. Perhaps under normal circumstances León would have succeeded and been able to call up First Supplement Judge Manuel Trinidad Corzo, who was close to the León administration. In the summer of 1899, however, in a case that was attracting national attention, López refused to be intimidated.[89] León then sought the intervention of the Supreme Court and the president. After reviewing the preliminary proceedings of the Farrera case, the Supreme Court confirmed López's authority.[90] Díaz, for his part, replied that "it is

not possible to change judges if the elected judge [*propietario*] does not resign."[91] Prior to the trial, León reported that "V.M. Castillo [defense counsel] in union with the district judge have made Major Sánchez retract his confession and in an *amparo* judgement put Farrera in liberty."[92]

In August, Porfirio Díaz strongly advised Governor León to take a temporary leave of absense during the course of the trial and to appoint Rafael Pimentel interim governor. León agreed, although he had reservations about Pimentel, who according to the governor, "was very friendly toward the defendants, especially Ciro, in whose house he stays each time he arrives and furthermore is not disinterested in work that has been carried out against me."[93] By September Porfirio Díaz believed that León's prestige was irrevocably damaged and that he was a political libility to the regime. Díaz wanted to ease out León, promising that only a temporary absense was necessary.[94] Díaz also asked Castillo not to make derogative statements aimed at his "good friend" León and suggested he should return to Mexico City.[95]

Governor León delayed his departure. He wished to remain in Chiapas and in power until December 1, the first and inaugural day of his second term. "If it is your judgement," León informed Díaz, "that I resign, your indication will be enough, but I would wish, in that case, that my leave not be the result of efforts by the conspirators or even appear to be the case."[96] Díaz was adamant that León leave as soon as possible, which he did on October 2, for "reasons of poor health."[97] By then León realized he would not be returning and appropriated $10,000 from the state treasury for "travel expenses." On November 30 León resigned as constitutional governor, giving up his second term, and the

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state legislature selected Pimentel as his replacement.[98]

Less than a week after León took his "temporary" leave on October 2, Judge López resigned his seat, citing poor health as his reason.[99] Judge Raquel Ramírez then heard the Farrera case in January 1900. Ramírez ruled that the "declaration of [Major Romualdo] Sánchez in which he accused *Señor* Ciro Farrera to be one of the authors of the attack, was extracted by means of threats and torture." Throwing out the only evidence against Farrera and the other defendants, Judge Ramírez ruled that there was no crime to prosecute and that the accused should be placed in absolute liberty.[100]

REFLECTIONS

The government of Francisco León continued the political and developmental modernization program begun by Emilio Rabasa in 1891 and proposed that state government enter the virgin territory of social reform. León's bold venture into State-directed social engineering, however, failed to get off the ground for two reasons: divided elite opinion in Chiapas and unmitigated opposition by the national government. The modernizing constituency in Chiapas in the 1890s was not of sufficient strength to overcome both. Years later, during the Mexican Revolution, national governments made social reform a national policy thereby tipping the balance in Chiapas and throughout the nation against that element of society that still opposed the active State. As the 1920s progressed, the assumptions that had seemed so novel and dangerous in León's program in the 1890s became politically orthodox. Before this could occur, however, a new political constituency had to

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appear and develop, that of workers and *campesinos*.

"The shameful separation of *Señor* León from the government of Chiapas, his complete nullification,"[101] as Ciro Farrera termed it, led to a period of readjustment in Chiapanecan politics. The activist and centralizing governments of Rabasa and León had exacerbated regional discontent in certain parts of the state, a natural response to State formation. Subsequent governments in Chiapas during the last decade of the *porfiriato*, having learned a lesson from León's downfall, pursued more conciliatory policies without compromising the political achievement of the 1890s. This pause in political activism was further reinforced by the economic expansion of the 1900s, which produced a diminished sense of urgency regarding State-directed modernization. Complacency characterized government in Chiapas during the final years of the *porfiriato*.

CHAPTER FOUR

COMPLACENCY, PROGRESS, AND POVERTY

> The governor promised to take into consideration the improvement of roads, the reduction of the high taxes which burden the *fincas*, and other defects mentioned at that time, but so far nothing has really been done; on the contrary things have gone from bad to worse.
>
> *Soconucense* petition, 1902

The first decade of the twentieth-century brought to Chiapas an impressive surge of agricultural development and modernization, foreign investment, economic specialization. The Rabasa program initiated in 1891 laid the foundation for later economic expansion but after 1900 pressure for active government declined. The concensus for urgent and fundamental transformation of Chiapas among the entrepreneurial elite in the 1890s had turned into self-satisfaction. Much of the progress of the early 1900s occurred as a result of private initiative which reinforced the new unobtrusive role of government. The state governments of the 1900s pursued more modest programs because they understood that the active governments of the 1890s had created political difficulties for themselves. There was complacency in state government in promoting public improvements, in social reforms and concern for justice, and in political consolidation. The state regimes of this decade were much more accommodating to regional sensibilities, particularly regarding the

political participation of the "superior class" in the various departments. As a result, there was an apparent reduction of regional antagonism toward the state government, with the exception of San Cristóbal. Its residents still nourished the ambition of returning the seat of government to their city.

The two governors of the state during this period, Rafael Pimentel and Ramón Rabasa, were neither as talented nor as energetic as their two predecessors. Both pushed for public improvements in neglected regions of the state but without much success. Both possessed weak personalities and were easily dominated by a few powerful men. Most importantly, unlike their two predecessors, Pimentel and Ramón Rabasa possessed no broad vision of a new Chiapas. The first decade of the twentieth-century represents a plateau in the process of State formation. Given the limits of the porfirian regime and the complacency of the regional elite, further progress in political modernization was unlikely as matters stood.

PASSIVE MODERNIZATION

Rafael Pimentel was born in Oaxaca in 1855. His brother, Emilio, attended law school with Emilio Rabasa and the two became close friends but Rafael never developed the same respect and affection for Rabasa. Due to the patronage of Porfirio Díaz, Rafael Pimentel held political posts in Oaxaca, Chihuahua, and Guerrero during the 1890s and when he became governor of Chiapas he was something of a political trouble-

shooter for the president.[1]

Pimentel accepted the governor's office in Chiapas, but he had little interest in the state and even less affection for it. In 1895 he had informed Díaz that "in all frankness, I feel no great sympathy [for Chiapas], because I see that its sons are more Guatemalan than Mexican."[2] His opinion had not changed by 1899. Early in his administration he purchased an *hacienda* in the Central Highlands and spent most of his weekends there to enjoy the cooler climate.[3] He developed a reputation for staying away from the government palace and spent as much time in Mexico City as he did in Chiapas.[4]

A number of important modernizing projects and developments got underway during the Pimentel administration, although the governor could take little credit for them. The most significant was the initiation of the Panamerican Railroad from Tehuantepec to Tapachula. Largely as a result of Emilio Rabasa's efforts, the Pan-American Railroad Company was incorporated in New Jersey in 1901 and obtained a joint federal-state subsidy totaling $10,000 US gold for each mile completed. Payments were forthcoming only at the termination of each fifty mile segment.[5] Construction began in 1901 and was finished in 1908.

Early in 1902 the Bank of Chiapas was formed in Tuxtla Gutiérrez with $500,000 capital from Mexico City investors. State Treasurer General Ramón Rabasa was appointed manager and Ciro Farrera served on the board of directors.[6] In 1908 the Bank of Chiapas merged with the Bank of Puebla and a branch office was opened in Tapachula.[7] In both the railroad and the bank projects the Pimentel-Díaz correspondence suggests that the governor had only a small role.

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The Pimentel administration made studies on the cost, feasibility, and necessity of a highway from San Cristóbal to Salto del Agua (Palenque) and of an iron bridge across the Grijalva river between Tuxtla Gutiérrez and Chiapa de Corzo but no work was begun on either project.[8] Indeed, the roads constructed by Rabasa and León, according to one observer, "are almost lost, on account of not being care for, despite the immense costs to the state in men and money."[9] From Soconusco came the complaint that "the governor promised [in July 1900] to take into consideration the improvement of roads, the reduction of the high taxes which burden the *fincas*, and other defects mentioned at that time, but so far nothing has really been done; on the contrary things have gone from bad to worse."[10]

The one area of government responsibility that Pimentel did take an interest in was education. In 1902 he proposed to erect a network of regional schools for indians, whom he considered "the only significant obstacle to the development of commerce, agriculture, and industry."[11] The first and only school, the *Escuela Regional Fray Bartolomé de Las Casas*, opened its doors in Chamula in 1905.[12] In 1904 Pimentel persuaded Sóstenes Ruiz, a well known Chiapanecan educator living and working in Guatemala, to return to Chiapas and open a private college for all grades which would be partly subsidized by the state. Esponda's *Liceo de Chiapas y Escuela de Comercio*, located in San Cristóbal, educated a large portion of the children of the Chiapanecan elite from all departments prior to their professional training.[13] Pimentel also founded the State Experimental Farm for the introduction and propagation of modern methods and new crops as well as the private *sociedad mercantil* which installed electric lights in Tuxtla Gutiérrez.[14]

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Governor Pimentel gave his permission for the employment of highland indians in the coffee plantations of Soconusco, a development which further tarnished the reputation of Chiapas. After enjoying very high prices from 1891 to 1897, coffee planters found themselves in a slump from 1898 to 1900. In March 1898 several of the largest Soconusco planters hired attorney Agustín Farrera to lobby before the federal and state governments for tax relief.[15] Farrera in his study of the coffee situation reported to Díaz and Pimentel that planters were selling their coffee for less than half the price that they had received before 1898, yet "the cost of production is the same since the wages and transport find themselves at the earlier price.[16] Prior to 1900 coffee planters received the bulk of their harvest workers from neighboring Guatemalan villages, although never in sufficient numbers.[17] Instead of tax relief, Pimentel gave the planters permission to recruit highland indians. As a result, coffee production climbed to unprecedented volumes in the 1900s.

At the beginning only a few German planters used labor recruiters called *enganchadores* (hookers) or *habilitadores* (providers) to contract indians and bring them to the coffee fincas, although later the practice became widespread. The *enganchadores* would advance a small sum of money to establish a debt or large quantities of liquor for intoxication in order to obtain signed contracts.[18] The *enganche* system clearly had an unsavory character about it. An editorial in the *cristobalense* periodical *El Tiempo* in 1907 called *enganche* "the commerce in human flesh."[19] Yet most indians signed on voluntarily and returned to the harvests year after year since wages were nearly twice as high in Soconusco as they were at home.[20] It has been suggested that ten to

fifteen thousand highland indians, Chamula for the most part, were physically forced to migrate to the coffee *fincas* each year.[21] This was not the case. Population increase and the dimunition of communal lands in the highlands created the economic necessity of yearly migration to the hargests. It was a situation of survival, not slavery.

TRANSFER OF THE STATE CAPITAL?

In politics as well as in modernization, Rafael Pimentel was a passive governor. He seemed to bend before the powers that be. *El Universal* reported that Ciro Farrera was the power behind the throne, which was likely since Pimentel had been close to Farrera before the assassination scandal.[22] Furthermore, Ciro's brothers Rómulo and Agustín were given public posts during the Pimentel administration.[23] It is not clear how close Pimentel was to the *cristobalense camarilla*; the administration did have a definite *procristobalense* slant. The one inhibiting element was Treasurer General Ramón Rabasa, whose appointment was owed to Porfirio Díaz and Emilio Rabasa.[24]

Like his predecessors, Pimentel appointed a number of *oaxaqueños* to public posts. He appointed a *oaxaqueño* Chief of Staff (the third most important post in state government), in order to offset the influence of his *chiapaneco* Secretary of Government.[25] Unlike his predecessors, however, Governor Pimentel made little effort to appoint upright and honest *jefes políticos* or to moderate their behavior. According to Manuel Cruz, an *hacendado* and lawyer from Pichucalco, the *jefes políticos* of Pimentel "are commonly persons foreign to the departments, protected by the governor and at times, it is said, by

some Minister. With very few exceptions, these local officials are hungry bandits, men without conscience, who devastate the *pueblos*."[26] Under Pimentel, complaints were aimed at the low moral character of the *jefes políticos* and not, as in the 1890s, at their execution of unpopular state policies.[27] From the careful selection of *jefes políticos* by Rabasa and León, state government had retreated to business as usual when government stood for thievery.

In July 1903 Governor Pimentel was unaminously reelected to a second term,[28] although apparently against the counsel of Emilio Rabasa and Víctor Manuel Castillo.[29] Having done very little during his first term, Pimentel had stirred up little opposition within Chiapas and had maintained the confidence of the president. Having secured his political position, Pimentel embarked upon the boldest move of his career -- the return of the state government to San Cristóbal Las Casas.

Pimentel had various reasons for wanting to change the location of the capital. Perhaps the most important was his dislike of the people and climate of Tuxtla Gutiérrez and his sincere belief that stately San Cristóbal was more suitable.[30] His friendship with Ciro Farrera and Clemente Robles, men who strongly favored San Cristóbal, also probably contributed to his decision.

With Porfirio Díaz's approval, Pimentel authorized the temporary transfer of the executive and legislative branches of the state government to San Cristóbal on September 20, 1905 in order to attend, ostensibly, to the construction of a road from San Cristóbal to Salto del Agua.[31] The real reason, Pimentel informed Díaz, was "to explore public opinion and study the obstacles to a definitive transfer."[32]

Another, and more binding, reason for the temporary nature of the transfer and Pimentel's timing of the move in the fall of 1905 was constitutional. Emilio Rabasa, during his tenure as governor, had amended the state constitution so that any definitive change in the location of the government required ratification during two legislative periods by the local congress. When Pimentel began the transfer, the 1903-1905 legislature was ending and the 1905-1907 legislature would begin its session in December. The governor could obtain the approval of two congresses in only a matter of months.[33]

Pimentel did foresee some problems connected with the transfer, although not from *tuxtlecos* who were not, he reported, "men of action."[34] He expected some opposition from Víctor Manuel Castillo and particularly Emilio Rabasa, who would attempt to "sustain the blunder that he made," as Pimentel saw it.[35] A problem, however, which weighed more on the governor's mind was "the preponderant and decisive influence which the clergy exercises [in San Cristóbal], particularly now that it is headed by Bishop Orozco y Jiménez, who is a high flying eagle who uses money to subjugate consciences, and to give you an idea of the fantasy state of this society, it is enough to say that there is not one lawyer who does not first consult the bishop even on the most insignificant matter." The power and influence of the bishop, furthermore, dominated not only Las Casas, but Comitán, La Libertad, Simojovel, and Ocosingo. Unless the bishop's influence was neutralized, wrote Pimentel to Díaz, "the action of the government will be of little importance."[36]

But before Pimentel had a chance to tackle the bishop, Emilio Rabasa intervened. In a report to the president, Rabasa outlined a

powerful reason why the government should remain in Tuxtla Gutiérrez. "The decree authorizes the provisional transfer," wrote Rabasa, "and should remain in a provisional state."[37] Rabasa reported that the state of Chiapas was in debt by $90,000. Nearly $30,000 of this sum was held by the Bank of Chiapas, managed by Ramón Rabasa, and by the Tuxtla commercial house of *Cueto y Cía.* These institutions, wrote Rabasa, "will close their doors to the government now that they have lost confidence in it by its transfer and neglience; there it will not obtain a *centavo* because in San Cristóbal there is no one to give it, because there is hardly anyone who has any."[38] In short, Rabasa concluded, if the government was moved to San Cristóbal the banks would call in their loans and the state would be bankrupt.[39] Rabasa played his strongest card and it paid off.

If Governor Pimentel had the will to fight Rabasa, by the end of October he had lost the strength to do so when he came down with malaria.[40] In order to recover, Pimentel turned over the government temporarily to Miguel A. Castillo, one of the wealthiest *hacendados* of San Cristóbal. Pimentel returned to office in December, at Díaz's urging, long enough to return the government to Tuxtla Gutiérrez and turn over power to Ramón Rabasa.[41] He returned to Mexico City a sick man but soon recovered and, perhaps in recompense, Díaz made him senator from Colima.[42] Emilio Rabasa had won and nearly everyone of importance in San Cristóbal was outraged.[43]

A GOOD AND HONORABLE MAN

Ramón Rabasa, former Treasurer General, municipal president of

Tuxtla Gutiérrez, and manager of the Bank of Chiapas, became interim governor of Chiapas on December 25, 1905. In June 1906, to the unanimous dismay of San Cristóbal, he was elected constitutional governor for the period 1906-1910.[44] During the interim period, Porfirio Díaz had asked Bishop Orozco y Jiménez what he thought of Rabasa. "A good and honorable man," replied the prelate.[45]

Like Emilio, Ramón Rabasa was a builder. He initiated work on the long delayed San Cristóbal - Salto del Agua road, repaired the state highway, expended over $90,000 in state funds to build the Grijalva bridge, and modernized Tuxtla Gutiérrez with new streets, a water system, and public buildings appropriate to a state capital.[46] Like Pimentel, Ramón Rabasa was attentative to the Central Highlands, "above all San Cristóbal, which merits special attention since it is a city of true importance."[47] He asked President Díaz for federal assistance (not forthcoming) to construct a road from the center of the state to Pichucalco and one from Comitán to Palenque.[48]

The governor's pet project and obsession was an interior railroad line, from the Panamerican railroad station at Arriaga to Tuxtla, Comitán, and on through to Tabasco and Yucatán. In 1906 Rabasa's successor at the Bank of Chiapas, Rómulo Farrera, at the governor's urging proposed the idea to Díaz.[49] In 1908 Rabasa commissioned two studies on the best routes and projected expenses of the interior line and presented them to the president in person.[50] Emilio Rabasa also discussed the project with Díaz,[51] yet despite constant pressure the interior Chiapas railroad never became a priority with Díaz and was never constructed.[52] No other single improvement would have had quite the positive effect upon Chiapanecan development, truly making Chiapas the granary of Mexico, as the much desired interior railroad.

In 1907, in response to growing criticism of *enganche*, Governor Rabasa expedited a Servants' Law which was essentially the same 1896 rights and obligations recommendation of the Agrarian Congress. This law sought to end the underhanded contracting methods employed by the *enganchadores*, but it was never enforced.[53]

Rabasa was also active in the area of education. The number of state-support primary schools had actually decreased under the Pimentel administration, from 124 in 1898 to only 64 in 1904. Under Rabasa the number climbed again to 183 by 1907.[54]

The second great expansion of foreign capital Chiapas occurred in the period 1900-1910, but particularly after 1905. The first expansion, that of German capital for the most part, occurred in the late 1880s and early 1890s and was concentrated in Soconusco. The second expansion involved United States capital primarily, employed in Soconusco and Palenque departments in the cultivation of coffee and rubber.(See Table 7 in Appendix.) The Zacualpa Plantation Company, organized in 1899 in San Francisco, California, went into operation in the early 1900s and placed 17,800 acres in cultivation of rubber in Soconusco, forming the largest rubber plantation in the world. By 1910 there were twenty rubber plantations in operation in Chiapas, most of them were owned by United States investors.[55] The German-American Coffee Company, incorporated in 1903, was the second most important North American capital investment in Chiapas. German-American owned the famous *Triunfo* plantation in Palenque, which possessed over 43,000 acres and employed 3000 indians.[56] Even in German-capital-dominated Soconusco, United States interests owned six import-export houses.[57] During the decade 1900-1910, US capital surpassed the value of German capital in all of

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Chiapas. By 1909 US capital totaled $1,227,120 (*pesos*) in Soconusco and $1,614,285 (*pesos*) in Palenque with a total for the entire state of $2,953,300. German capital totaled $1,807,817 (*pesos*), although it should be remembered that by 1910 a considerable quantity of German capital was invested in Mexican-owned properties and some Germans had become Mexican nationals.[58]

Chiapas from 1907 to 1911, like most of Mexico, suffered an economic downturn. From 1907 to 1909 the industrialized countries sustained a business recession which contracted external demand and led to lower prices for raw materials on the international market.[59] Reports from *jefes políticos* in Chiapas described the effects of the "*crisis monetaria*": a decline in commerce, lack of credit, decline in production, and even a lack of confidence in the future.[60] Francisco Ruiz, a landowner from Chiapa de Corzo, complained in 1910 that the new Tuxtla Gutiérrez branch of the Bank of Mexico was limiting credit terms to only six months and had raised the rate to three percent a month, which was ruining the farmers.[61] To compound problems, an epidemic from Guatemala had invaded the border departments in 1908 and 1909.[62]

At the end of the decade, perhaps in response to the economic crisis, two self-help and political pressure organizations of landowners were formed in the state. The *Cámara Agrícola de Chiapas* (Chiapas Chamber of Agriculture) was established in Tuxtla Gutiérrez in 1909 and pushed for easier credit, agricultural education, colonization, and the amortization of the debts of workers. It published a bulletin which reported on modern agricultural techniques and advocated the expansion of new crops in the lowland valleys. The organization was dominated by *hacendados* Tuxtla, Ocozocoautla, Cintalapa, Jiquipilas, Chiapa, and

Comitán and its leadership was close to the Rabasa administration. The *Cámara* claimed only eleven members from Las Casas (including the bishop), a list which did not include any of the *cristobalense* radicals like Jesús Martínez Rojas, Manuel Pineda, or Clemente Robles.[63]

In 1908 German coffee planters created the *Unión Cafetera de Soconusco* (Coffee Planter's Union of Soconusco) in order to establish a uniform labor policy. The planters agreed to limit workers' debts to sixty *pesos*, not to give advances to laborers indebted to other planters, and to keep records explaining when and how the debts of their workers were incurred.[64]

CIENTIFICO ADMINISTRATION

In the political realm the administration of Ramón Rabasa differed from those of his predecessors in the *tuxtlecos* rather than *oaxaqueños* dominated the upper reaches of state government and wealthy *hacendados* filled the *jefaturas*. In many ways the Rabasa administration was representative of the last years of the *porfiriato* when the elite of the elite, the so-called *científicos* (scientists), dominated the national government and made fortunes.

Appointees to top administrative post were largely taken from the landholding groups of the department of Tuxtla. Virgilio Grajales, for example, became Secretary of Government, Teófilio H. Orantes was State Attorney General, and Abraham López and later Ausencio Cruz were Treasurers General.[65]

With the exception of Las Casas, most *jefes políticos* were wealthy *hacendados* from the departments they officially served. For Las Casas,

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Rabasa chose *tuxtleco* José Joaquín Peña "because he is honest and energetic and will know how to handle those rogues that have caused so many problems in San Cristóbal, principally the group called '*la mano negra*' [the black hand] whose chief is Jesús Martínez Rojas."[66] Martínez Rojas, on the other hand, considered Peña "the most hated person in this district and my worst enemy."[67] As a result of this appointment, Martínez Rojas left San Cristóbal and lived on his *finca* in La Libertad.[68] Other appointments were less controversal. The *jefes políticos* for Comitán, Chiapas, Tuxtla, Pichucalco, Soconusco, and Tonalá each owned *haciendas* valued at over $10,000.[69] The important municipal presidencies were held by close friends of the administration. Raúl E. Rincón, for example, president of the *Cámara Agrícola de Chiapas*, presided over the *ayuntamiento* of Tuxtla Gutiérrez.[70] Other important posts were filled by members of the Rabasa family. The governor's nephew, for example, Leopoldo Rabasa, was *jefe político* of Tuxtla, Chief of Police for Tuxtla, and Chief of the State Public Security Forces.[71]

As active civil government in Chiapas seemed on the wane, a shadow clerical government in San Cristóbal took on an extraordinary and active role under Bishop Francisco Orozco y Jiménez. The bishop arrived in Chiapas in 1902 and apparently saw himself as following in the footsteps of Chiapas' first bishop, Bartolomé de Las Casas. The comparison was not unwarrented, for Orozco y Jiménez did come to enjoy, as a result of his efforts in Chiapas, the reputation as one of Mexico's most progressive prelates and, like Las Casas, he worked for a Catholic utopia led by active priests like himself.[72]

There is some indication that Orozco y Jiménez involved himself to some extent in local and state politics. It is likely that he favored

the return of the state government to San Cristóbal, since he was a close friend of Jesús Martínez Rojas and he supported San Cristóbal's municipal president, José Manuel Velasco, for governor in 1910. In the fall of 1909 the bishop informed Porfirio Díaz that Ramón Rabasa

> is entirely inept as governor. The consequences have been exceedingly sad in all of the state in general and in particular in each locality, as it is understood he has given possession of the control and dispatch of all manner of business, above all in the area of justice, to a certain *camarilla* of perverse and poorly intentioned men. Everywhere, but beginning in this Capital [San Cristóbal], there is a general discontent, which is heightened even more by the terrible monetary crisis and the lack of business, and aggravated by the increase of taxes.[73]

Outside of San Cristóbal, whatever discontent did exist in Chiapas remained hard to detect until 1910, when Ramón Rabasa sought reelection and Francisco I. Madero, an *hacendado* from the state of Coahuila, began his anti-reelectionist campaign for president of Mexico. Until then, Chiapas appeared to be peaceful and progressing.

MODERNIZATION AND PROGRESS

By 1910 Chiapas had undergone nearly twenty years of unprecedented material development and modernization. The state government had begun to take an active role in the economic and social development of the region and had consolidated its own political power *vis-à-vis* other power centers in the state. One indication of this shift was the increase of state revenue from $200,000 in 1890 to $900,000 in 1906. (See Table 4 in Appendix.) In relation to later progress in socioeconomic intervention and political centralization and consolidation of the State, the efforts taken between 1891 and 1910 appear slight. Still, they

constitute a beginning and contributed to the material development of Chiapas.

By any standard Chiapas was more modern in 1910 than in 1890. In just twenty years Chiapas had created an impressive transportation and communications infrastructure where previously there had been none. A good state highway traversed the state from the Panamerican railroad at Arriaga through the Jiquilipas and Cintalapa valleys to Tuxtla Gutiérrez, across the Grijalva river to Chiapa de Corzo, and on to San Cristóbal and Comitán. The Panamerican railroad reached Arriaga in 1905 and Tapachula by 1908, extending the line to over 250 miles. All the major towns and many *haciendas* were linked by a telephone and telegraph network by 1910.

The effect these improvements had upon the economy of Chiapas cannot be overestimated. The railroad permitted shipment of Soconusco coffee to Gulf of Mexico ports, thereby reducing shipping costs by more than half, leading to greater production, profits, and commerce in Chiapas in general. Production of coffee in Soconusco increased from ten to over twenty million pounds from 1907-1908 to 1909-1910 while the total value of the crop more than tripled, reaching nearly two and a half million dollars by 1910.[74] The railroad and the state highway opened up large parts of the interior of the state to wider markets by facilitating the movement of bulky commodities such as corn, cattle, cotton, and sugar to Mexico City. Low shipping costs encouraged the rise of commercial agriculture in the interior valleys so much that by 1910 the value of agricultural production in Chiapas was five times that of 1890.[75]

The valleys of Cintalapa and Jiquilipas in the department of Tuxtla were particularly favored by the changes between 1890 and 1910. In

1890 there were no roads through these valleys, no utilization of machinery, and only minimal trade, even with Tuxtla Gutiérrez, due to prohibitive freight costs. The value of all agricultural implements was only $7,475 dollars and the total value of agricultural production was $45,000 dollars. Between 1890 and 1910, according to one observer, the valleys underwent "a rapid advance toward modern farming."[76] The digging stick began to be replaced by the steel plow, 306 of them by 1910. To the seven animal powered sugar mills of 1890 were added over the course of twenty years thirty-five additional animal and thirteen steam powered mills. The total value of agricultural implements reached $132,475 dollars by 1910 and the value of agricultural production in the valleys climbed to $201,094 dollars. Early in 1910 over one hundred railroad cars of corn were shipped to Mexico City from Chiapas to be sold for three or four times the local price.[77]

Commenting on the development of his area, *hacendado* Raquel D. Cal y Mayor wrote in 1907 that "the vigor which has initiated the spirit of enterprise in the valley of Cintalapa is truly worthy of high praise." Cal y Mayor attributed this "violent development" to three causes. The first in importance was the "influence of Yankee energy" which built the Panamerican railroad. Scarcity of laborers leading to the utilization of machinery was mentioned second. The third cause was the cooperation of the state government in its construction of roads and in promoting sensible tax policies.[78] It is not difficult to understand why landowners and merchants in the Central Lowlands supported the active State and the Rabasa program.

The indicators of growth and development between 1890 and 1910 are not lacking. The value of urban and rural property in Chiapas in 1885

was $502,501 and $3,307,374 respectively. By 1906 these reported values had increased to $3,640,276 and $30,742,743. (See Table 8 in Appendix.) The number of *haciendas* and *ranchos* had increased from about 1,000 in 1880 to 4,500 in 1896 and 6,800 by 1909.[79] The United States consul in Chiapas noted in 1911 that "Chiapas is unique among the states of Mexico for the number of small holdings and peasant farmers."[80] Cattle, coffee, maiz, frijol, wheat, and sugar production in the state increased over these two decades in bulk and value.[81]

Although certain departments benefited more than others by the prosperity of the 1890s and 1900s, namely Soconusco, Palenque, Pichucalco, Tuxtla, Comitán, Chiapa, and Chilón, an increase in economic specialization (made possible by new roads) benefited entrepreneurs in most regions. The increase of wheat production in the Central Highlands made it possible in 1895 for Chiapas to stop importing wheat and start exporting it.[82] Sugar which was grown and refined in the valleys of Jiquilipas, Cintalapa, and Tuxtla was utilized by the over 200 distilleries of alcohol in the highlands. Cotton grown in the departments of Chiapa and La Libertad was purchased by the textile factory *La Providencia* in Tuxtla Gutiérrez. Lowland cotton was also sold to highland indians who wove blankets which were sold throughout the state. Cattle stocks in Comitán, Chilón, Tonalá, Tuxtla, and Pichucalco increased as Chiapanecans continued to send herds to Guatemala and opened new markets in Yucatán and central Mexico.[83]

MODERNIZATION AND POVERTY

Modernization and development in Chiapas between 1890 and 1910,

it must be remembered, benefited only the elte of the state, not most Chiapanecans. It is difficult to chart the changes which rural workers and their families faced after 1890. Material standards and working conditions, certainly bad before, did not improve and probably worsened.

Despite the substantial material and productive improvements during the two decades between 1890 and 1910, daily wages remained static. The United States consul reported in 1910 that Soconusco "planters justify the low pay scale by the plea that the more money a Chamula is paid the more bad liquor he will drink."[84] Another justification was that "no one can get 100 cents worth of work out of them for each dollar spent."[85] In fact, low wages was one of the so-called advantages for investing in Chiapas. Statements such as "the inhabitants are willing to work for low wages," were published to attract investors.[86] Wages, even as reported in the state censuses, remained at the subsistence level of thirty-seven *centavos* a day for twenty years, and even declined in Mescalapa and Pichucalco.[87]

Descriptions of labor conditions in the plantation zones of Palenque, Soconusco, and Chilón confirm that modernization and poverty advanced together hand in hand. Karena Shields, who lived on an *hacienda* in Palenque in the early 1890s, reported that Mexican, German, and North American planters alike took merciless advantage of the workers. "As long as a man owed money to his *patrón*," noted Shields, "his freedom was only a meaningless technicality."[88] Dr. C.L.G. Anderson, a stockholder in a rubber plantation company, was told on a visit to Palenque in 1905 that "eighty percent of the money paid out to labor came back through the Company Store."[89]

In Soconusco, the United States consul reported in 1911 that coffee

planters secured their laborers under the peonage system:

> Their agents or labor contractors, called *'habilitadores'*, go to the tableland and offer indians loans of money, principally during the progress of a feast; this money is seldom paid, and cases exist where the debt and peonage conditions have been passed on from father to son. While this system is not legal under Mexican laws, it having been copied from Guatemala, the indians consider it binding, much more so since the authorities have connived to imprison peons for debt.90

Without doubt the worst working conditions in Chiapas were found on the *monterías* (mahogany lumber camps). Hidden in the jungle where the borders of Chiapas, Tabasco, and Guatemala meet were approximately twenty large *monterías*. Unlike the largely voluntary labor in the Soconusco coffee plantations, *enganchadores* for the *monterías* kidnapped highland indians to form labor gangs and drove them into the jungle. Once there workers were chained at night and guarded during the day. One former *montería* foreman recalled in 1943 that "in those times there were no men who wanted to work in the *monterías*. For that reason Don Porfirio opened the jails and ordered the prisoners to work in the *monterías*."[91] The Díaz government also deported rebellious Yaqui and Maya indians from Sonora and Yucatán to the camps.[92]

The system of indebted servitude, temporary migrant labor, and slave labor did not exhaust the forms of labor expropriation in porfirian Chiapas. In 1910, according to various accounts, there were 75,000 to 150,000 rural workers in Chiapas out of a total population of over 400,000. One-third to one-half were indebted servants.[93] Those rural workers not tied to an hacienda by debt worked as free *jornaleros* (wage laborers), *baldíos* (sharecroppers), or *arrendatarios* (renters). *Baldíos* cultivated *hacienda* land, usually two *hectareas*, and in return gave

the *patrón* between forty and one hundred and twenty days a year of their labor.[94] *Arrendatarios* turned over a portion of their harvest to the *hacendado*, or paid a cash rent, in return for using his land. These forms of labor were popular outside the plantation zones. They provided the *hacendado* with cheap labor and produce without the responsibility for crop failure or the expenditure of capital in workers' debts.[95]

The indigenous communities of the Central Highlands presented yet a different situation. In the department of Las Casas over 40,000 indians lived and made their living yet the 1909 census reported only 3,000 *jornaleros*.[96] Many of course, sometimes entire villages, were tied to *haciendas*. In addition, perhaps 10,000 indians left the highlands each year for three or four months to work the coffee harvests. Most indians, however, even those forced by economic necessity into migrant wage labor, still lived on communal *ejidal* land. The Rabasa *reparto* had pressed least heavily upon highland villages. (See Table 6 in Appendix.) Between 1892 and 1909, nearly 57,000 *hectareas* of *ejido* land in the department of Las Casas had been parceled, leaving over 50,000 *hectareas* in communal possession.[97] This certainly did not mean that the indigenous communities in the highlands, already pressed by population increases, were not reduced even further into difficult, squalid, and impoverished lives; they were. They still, however, had land and a refuge.[98]

The *reparto* continued in Chiapas, although with less intensity after 1900, until 1909, when it was discontinued by the national legislature.[99] Manuel Pineda, in his 1910 study on the *reparto* program, argued that it "constituted a true expropriation."[100] The citizens of Huistán agreed; they told President Díaz in 1909, "*Señores* Flores and Morales,

who try at all cost to extend their properties, are taking over our possessions on which we have small houses and fields where we produce what is necessary for our subsistence."[101] The people of Chapultenango asked Díaz to "permit us to leave as a whole the land which by the old law we occupy because we consider we will be injured once it is divided."[102] With the *reparto*, neighboring *haciendas* denounced the portions put on the market and, as Emilio Rabasa said, "the indians sell their lots as soon as they have them."[103] From 1892 until 1909 land was increasingly removed from village control, particularly in Soconusco the center of the organized labor movement in the 1920s and 1930s.

The modernization of Mexico, wrote Frank Tannenbaum in 1929, "was coincident with lowering standards of life for the masses of the people."[104] Although increasing alienation of village land and coercive labor forms did not lead to revolution in Chiapas, when revolution did come to the state from the outside between 1910 and 1920, these important changes in the material conditions of life of most Chiapanecans did have a profound impact. They constituted, collectively, one of the necessary conditions for the politicization of the working masses. Without the protective cushion of village land *campesinos* were forced into an exploitive labor market, and later, from political indifference to participation. They looked to the State for protection and assistance. A strong porfirian State, established in Mexico at a time when the industrial revolution began to permeate Latin America, advanced the modernization (the diffusion of capitalist relations of production) of Chiapas. Modernization, in turn, created the necessary conditions for the politicization of the working masses who, in time, would demand an even stronger State that could defend their interests.

REFLECTIONS

The period in Chiapanecan history from 1891 to 1910 is remarkable for the acceleration of change which took place. In terms of local politics, national integration, economic development and modernization, and capital formation the watershed of change is located in the 1890s. At that time the power of the national State began to be consolidated, foreign capital began to penetrate the autarkic Mexican economy, and roadblocks to the expansion of capital began to be removed. In Chiapas, as in Mexico, the conditions favorable to a more efficient, entrepreneurial, capitalist agriculture began to take hold and a segment of elite society began to take advantage of those conditions. It was this element of society which provided the most important impetus for political modernization in Chiapas. "If not all entrepreneurs," explains Antonio Gramsci, "at least an elite amongst them must have the capacity to be an organizer of society in general, including all its complex organism of services, right up to the State organism, because of the need to create the conditions more favorable to the expansion of their own class."[105]

This period, important as it was, constituted no more than a beginning. Much remained that was inimical to capitalist expansion in Chiapas and political modernization; yet, in 1910 the regional entrepreneurial elite, the generative force of State formation in Chiapas, appeared satisfied with the material and political accomplishments which had come about since 1891. Thereafter, political modernization would originate from the efforts to attract the support of the working masses, and, later, from their demands.

PART TWO:

1910-1920

CHAPTER FIVE

A PROFOUND POLITICAL DIVISION

> The transfer of the Capital from San Cristóbal to Tuxtla has created a profound political division between *tierra fría* and *tierra caliente*.
>
> Rómulo Farrera, 1911

Conflict in Chiapas from 1910 to 1920 was sparked by the Mexican Revolution. The revolution originated in northern Mexico and in 1911 forced the resignation of President Porfirio Díaz. In the confusing interregnum between the resignation of Díaz and the accession of revolutionary leader Francisco I. Madero to the presidency, radicals in San Cristóbal Las Casas tried to take power in Chiapas as a prelude to returning the state government to their city. Even though they wrapped themselves in the revolutionary banner of Madero, the *cristobalenses* failed to triumph either electorally or by force of arms. Thereafter, until 1914, an uneasy peace was maintained between the government in Tuxtla Gutiérrez and the radical party in San Cristóbal. The absense of porfirian authoritarianism, however, led to the liberation of violence, banditry, and a certain amount of labor unrest.

The insurgent movement in San Cristóbal had a reactionary rather than a revolutionary character. Its leaders looked back to the time before 1892 when San Cristóbal was the social, economic, and political

center of Chiapas. They condemned the "*rabasista* governments" of 1891 to 1911 for the unequal regional development of the state and for oppressing and impoverishing highland indian villages through the *reparto* program. They condemned the *caciquismo* of the government establishment in Tuxtla Gutiérrez and its practice of political fraud, yet they behaved no differently.

Two elite groups faced each other in 1911. One wanted to maintain its power and the other wanted to usurp it. Those holding power, however, still held (albeit less aggressively) to the modernizing program initiated in 1891 and represented the most dynamic and entrepreneurial segment of Chiapanecan society. The *cristobalense* radicals, on the other hand, could not see beyond the highlands and the glory their local society once possessed. They wanted to repeal the changes of the past twenty years.[1]

THE FALL OF PORFIRIO DÍAZ

President Porfirio Díaz gave an interview to a North American journalist in March 1908 and suggested that Mexico was perhaps ready for democracy and that he would step down in 1910.[2] To this day historians are unsure whether Díaz was sincere or made the statement to flush out opponents to the regime and eliminate them. Whatever the motive, Francisco I. Madero, scion of a wealthy landed family in the state of Coahuila, was encouraged. He published a book which endorsed the reelection of Díaz one more time in 1910 but called for a free and open election of the vice-president, Díaz's presumed successor.[3] Madero argued that the porfirian dictatorship was a

justified and necessary stage in Mexico's history. It had broken the endless cycle of revolution and prepared the way for "the realization of the grandiose democratic ideal."[4] To establish democratic government in Mexico Madero proposed the necessity of free voting with no re-elections, later turned into the revolutionary slogan, "*sufragio efectivo, no reelección.*"[5]

Madero's *La sucesión presidencial en 1910*, published in December 1908, received an enthusiastic response and established its author as a popular figure in liberal circles. Madero was persuaded to become a candidate for president in the July 1910 election and he toured Mexico speaking on democratic government and setting up anti-reelectionist clubs. Díaz did not molest Madero until the summer of 1910, when he ordered his arrest. Although he was in jail not quite a month (while Díaz was reelected to another term), the arrest transformed the anti-reelectionist party into a revolutionary movement. Under the Plan of San Luis Potosí (issued by Madero in Texas), a program of political reform essentially, Madero revolted in November 1910.

After a disappointing beginning, the revolution picked up military momentum in 1911 in the north under the leadership of Pascual Orozco and Francisco "Pancho" Villa. On May 10, 1911, the revolutionists captured Ciudad Juárez, a point of entry to the United States and a conduit for money and arms. Their success now seemed certain; the myth of invulnerability surrounding the porfirian regime was shattered. The Díaz government, although still in control of most of the country, was demoralized and arranged for a conditional surrender and a transfer of power. Díaz and a few of his closest supporters resigned on May 25, leaving the government in the hands of the former ambassador to the

United States, Francisco León De la Barra. The interim president prepared for the election of Madero in July and his accession to the presidency in November 1911. However, the revolution, for the most part, had eliminated only the upper crust of the dictatorship; the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, most governors and state legislatures, and the federal army and bureaucracy survived intact.[6]

CHIAPAS AND THE REVOLUTION

The Madero campaign and the revolution in its early stages had little impact in Chiapas. With only slight exaggeration, Raquel D. Cal y Mayor, a lowland *hacendado*, journalist, and politician, wrote in May 1910 that "Chiapas is indifferent to the ridiculous anti-reelectionist movements."[7] Madero did not campaign in Chiapas and no anti-reelectionist clubs were formed in the state in 1910.[8]

The first signs of a changing political climate in Chiapas came with the establishment of two publications, one in Mexico City and the other in San Cristóbal. José Antonio Rivera G., a *comiteco* and active anti-reelectionist since the early 1890s and ally of the *cristobalense* radicals, began publication of the review *Chiapas y México* in May 1910 in Mexico City. Although Rivera G. informed Díaz that his review was not hostile to the national administration, it did publish the harshest criticism of the Rabasa brothers which, until then, had been seen in print.[10] He charged that the *rabasista* progress had not benefited the entire state but had relegated the highlands to an inferior position and its indian population to perpetual slavery and poverty. Interestingly, pro-indigenism became part of the radical *cristobalense* program, a

cynical ploy given their previous lack of concern for the welfare of indigenous communities. In order to rectify twenty years of *rabasista* rule, Rivera G. argued, the state government should be returned to San Cristóbal.[11]

Juan Félix Zepeda, a sixty year-old former judge in San Cristóbal and fervent Catholic, began publication of the periodical *Más Allá. Revista Católica Dominical Informativa* in October 1910 in San Cristóbal. Zepeda supported the return of the government to San Cristóbal, the direct election of *ayuntamientos*, the elimination of the post of *jefe político*, and the suppression of *enganche*.[12] In November he wrote that "Madero, as a democratic fighter, is a hero; but as a seditious fugitive he is a criminal; if the one deserves a statue, the other is worthy of a scaffold."[13] In December *Más Allá* uncovered an alleged scandal concerning Luis Rubalcova, the governor's private secretary, Julio Quiros, an engineer on the state payroll, and Leopoldo Rabasa, the governor's nephew and *jefe político* of Tuxtla. Zepeda charged that these three secretly held the contract with the state government to transport mail between Tuxtla Gutiérrez and Jalisco station on the Panamerican railroad.[14] For this Zepeda was arrested and *Más Allá* was closed down.[15]

Early in 1911 an anti-reelectionist club, probably the first in the state, was formed in Tapachula. The Club "Juan Alvarez" was composed of radical anarchist-unionists. This organization sympathized with neither the government in Tuxtla Gutiérrez nor the radicals in San Cristóbal. Other political clubs representing various factions of the elite appeared in Tapachula in the succeeding months in order to compete for power in the municipal elections.[16]

Criticism of the Rabasa regime from San Cristóbal began to blossom in March and April 1911. As the national crisis deeped, *cristobalenses* became more and more bold in their denunciations of the Rabasas, calling for "a political change as in some other states."[17] In April *La Voz del Pueblo* called for the end of *caciquismo*. Under the Rabasas, commented the editor, "San Cristóbal has declined."[18] The first anti-reelectionist club in San Cristóbal was established on April 3, 1911, led by the radical *mano negra* faction. Manuel Pineda was selected president, Jesús Martínez Rojas became secretary-treasurer, and Timeoteo Flores and Juan Félix Zepeda served on the executive committee.[19] On April 20 this organization called for the resignation of Ramón Rabasa, the establishment of free and independent municipalities, the abolition of the head tax, strict laws to protect the indigenous communities, and equitable and proportional departmental taxation within the state.[20]

Only in May, the last month of the Díaz regime, did armed revolutionary groups appear in Chiapas. On May 8 around a hundred men on horseback, proceeding from Tabasco, captured Pichucalco, recruited the sixty men in the local jail, and liberated $30,000 from the only bank in town. They returned to Tabasco the following day.[21] Small groups of apolitical bandits began to appear also in May, robbing trains, *haciendas,* and even businesses in towns.[22] Although they were also branded as bandits, Lindoro and Isadoro Castellanos, *hacendados* from Ocosingo, rebelled in the name of Madero two days before Díaz resigned. Leading nearly 300 supporters, the Castellanos brothers expressed dissatisfaction with the state government and charged that the people of Chilón were oppressed by the *jefe político.*[23] Don Lindoro, the self-proclaimed *jefe maderista* of Chiapas, abandoned Ocosingo on May 25 with $1000 belonging to the

jefe político.[24] Three days later the same band briefly occupied Comitán, terrorizing local officials.[25] Nicolas Macías Ruiz also rebelled on May 23 in Villa Flores, in the department of Chiapa.[26] These groups posed little threat to the state government.

THE LIBERTY OF DESIGNATING A NEW GOVERNOR

Ramón Rabasa resigned in favor of Manuel de Trejo on May 27, 1911, (two days after Díaz's resignation) and expressed his desire to give Chiapas "the liberty of designating a new governor."[27] On May 31 the Secretary General of Government resigned along with the *jefes políticos* of Las Casas, Chilón, La Libertad, Comitán, Simojovel, and Tuxtla.[28] The state legislature, however, remained intact, as did the municipal governments.[29] Manuel de Trejo had been in and out of the state government numerous times over the previous twenty years and, although he was originally from San Cristóbal, he was an unconditional supporter of Emilio and Ramón Rabasa.[30] The transfer of power from Rabasa to Manuel de Trejo, as Timeoteo Flores Ruiz pointed out to the interim president, signified no real change. "The entrance of de Trejo," he informed De la Barra, "is the death of the revolution and the continuation of ferocious *caciquismo*."[31]

Chiapas experienced a political spring following Rabasa's resignation, notwithstanding Flores Ruiz's overstatement. *Maderista* clubs were organized in Chiapa de Corzo, Tonalá, Tapachula, Motozintla, and Tuxtla Gutiérrez for the purpose of either maintaining power or winning it anew. The club "Chiapas" of Tuxtla Gutiérrez was formed by Ciro Farrera, Ponciano Burguete, and César Cano, *rabasista* hacendados, and

promoted the candidacy of De Trejo for constitutional governor. For local deputies the club backed Teofilio Orantes, a former civil judge in Tuxtla, and Rául Rincón, former president of the *Cámara Agrícola.*[32] The club "Chiapas" fairly represented that segment of Chiapanecan society that had enjoyed political power since 1891. Two *hacendados* from Pichucalco, Carlos A. Vidal and César Córdova, proposed the separation of their department from Chiapas and its annexation to Tabasco. "We *pichucalqueños*," charged Vidal, "have always been treated like Chiapanecan bastards."[33] In Tapachula the *maderista* club "Soconusco" was composed of wealthy cattlemen who opposed the anarchist "Juan Alvarez" Club and the political domination of the coffee interests.[34]

Early in June the anti-reelectionist club in San Cristóbal sent a five-man commission to Mexico City to see Interim President De la Barra. The commission included Juan Félix Zepeda, Jesús Martínez Rojas, and José Antonio Rivera G. They sought to persuade De la Barra to name Eusebio Salazar y Madrid (a *cristobalense* living in Mexico City) in place of Manuel de Trejo. They could not see the president but they did receive a sympathetic hearing from De la Barra's Secretary of Government, Emilio Vázquez Gómez, who was interested in placing revolutionaries in government.[35]

The naming of new governors was an important but difficult problem for the De la Barra administration. The Treaty of Ciudad Juárez (the capitulation document between Madero and Díaz) permitted Madero to recommend to the state legislatures his choices for interim governors. The old legislatures remained, however, and in more than a few states the constitutional prerogative to name governors was exclusively theirs.[36] Although Madero selected Venustiano Carranza interim governor of

Coahuila, for example, the state legislature appointed a *porfirista* instead.[37] With regard to Chiapas, Madero called together the Chiapanecan colony of Mexico City for the purpose of advising him on the most acceptable candidate. Members of the colony met on June 19 and by 67 votes designated Flavio Guillén, a close personal friend of Madero. Salazar y Madrid was second in the count with twenty-eight votes. With this indication, Madero recommended Guillén as his choice for interim governor to the Chiapas legislature, which was scheduled to meet on June 21.[38]

Flavio Guillén, although Madero's favorite, was unacceptable to many in Chiapas. The *Club Democrático Chiapaneco Independiente* of Chiapa de Corzo, among several others, telegraphed Madero saying that they could not accept Guillén because he belonged to the *científico* element. They suggested, instead, Salazar y Madrid.[39] Guillén himself protested that many Chiapanecans "have made a crime of my friendship with Estrada Cabrera, Ramón Corral, and Emilio Rabasa."[40]

Vázquez Gómez intervened on June 20, one day before the state legislature met, by telegraphing Governor Manuel de Trejo and asking him to resign in favor of Salazar y Madrid.[41] The Secretary of Government indicated that he was dissatified with the governor's progress in placing revolutionaries in government. With this indication Manuel de Trejo resigned. The following day the state legislature, refusing to be intimidated or pressured by Madero and Vázquez Gómez, selected Reinaldo Gordillo León, an engineer from Comitán, interim governor of Chiapas.[42] Gordillo León had served as municipal president of Comitán and one of his principal qualifications was his strong animosity for fellow *comiteco* and intellectual leader of the radical *cristobalenses*

José Antonio Rivera G.[43] The state legislature was most interested in keeping the radical *cristobalense* party out of power.

In an attempt to force federal intervention and the assistance of Emilio Vázquez Gómez, the *cristobalense* anti-reelectionists raised the flag of rebellion on July 3, 1911, and refused to recognize the legality of Gordillo León's appointment.[44] "The state legislature refused to accept the designation made by the Secretary of Government," proclaimed the *cristobalenses*, "for this and other reasons given: the nomination is not recognized and Manuel Pineda is named interim governor."[45] Over one hundred prominent citizens of San Cristóbal signed the document of rebellion.[46] In response the state legislature appropriated $60,000 for the support of a volunteer batallion called the *Hijos de Tuxtla* (Sons of Tuxtla).[47] Twenty years of resentment, now incited by a small but bold group of men, found its ultimate expression. The time seemed right.

THE JULY *PRONUNCIAMIENTO*

By July, each side had a clear perception of the other. *El Imparcial*, basing its report on a telegram from Tuxtla Gutiérrez, said the purpose of the rebellion was for sustaining "the clerical predominance in the state."[47] *Protuxtleco* historian Luis Espinosa viewed the dispute as one between the "liberal element" in Tuxtla and the "clerical element" in San Cristóbal.[48] The *cristobalenses* saw themselves as true revolutionaries fighting against an entrenched oligarchy in Tuxtla Gutiérrez. By July 1911 the issue of the location of the capital no longer appeared so prominently in *cristobalense* propaganda. They had

found a broader issue: "a real vote and no boss rule," which attracted allies throughout the state.[49] Nevertheless, outside the two cities the contention was viewed as a feud between Tuxtla Gutiérrez and San Cristóbal.[50] This general impression, rough and approximate, was not far from the mark.

The July *pronunciamiento* (declaration of rebellion) was designed to force the government in Tuxtla Gutiérrez to accept Vázquez Gómez's nominee for interim governor. The local congressional elections were coming up in mid-July and the composition of the new state legislature depended heavily upon the political inclination of the interim governor. The *cristobalense* party feared that an unfriendly governor would subvert the election through the appointment of partisan *jefes políticos*. The election of an unfriendly legislature, in turn, would insure the election of a full term (1911-1914) governor hostile to *cristobalense* interests.

The July *pronunciamiento* did succeed in prompting Vázquez Gómez to again strongly recommend a compromise candidate to the state legislature, this time Dr. Policarpo Rueda.[51] This pressure from above was reinforced from below by a *cristobalense* threat to march thousands of angry indians into Tuxtla Gutiérrez.[52] Policarpo Rueda, president of the *Club Democrático Independiente* of Tonalá, was one of the earliest *maderistas* in Chiapas and sympathetic, although not subservient, to the radical party in San Cristóbal.[53] Interim Governor Gordillo León resigned on July 5 and the legislature appointed Dr. Rueda in his place.

Rueda tried to conciliate both sides by allowing each to control a political sphere of influence. He immediately replaced the *jefes políticos* named by Gordillo León and appointed *cristobalense* radical

Juan Félix Zepeda Secretary of Government, to placate the opposition.[54] On July 13 Rueda traveled to San Cristóbal and appointed *jefes políticos* who were acceptable to the radical party for the departments of Las Casas, Comitán, Chilón, Palenque, and Pichucalco. Manuel Pineda, for example, took the *jefatura* of Las Casas. Rueda also tried, without success, to disarm both sides. In response to Rueda's "subversion" and to gain some time, the local legislature moved the elections back from July 11-13, to August 13-15, and again to August 27-29.[55]

In early August Secretary of Government Emilio Vázquez Gómez was replaced within the national cabinet by Alberto García Granados. The new Secretary, in turn, appointed José Antonio Rivera G. Secretary of Government for the Federal District. Interim Governor Rueda then asked the state legislature for an indefinite leave of absense to visit Mexico and seek reassurance and support for his administration from the new Secretary, García Granados.[56] The state legislature then turned to another compromise candidate, Manuel Rovelo Argüello. To obtain the position Rovelo Argüello first asked for the support of Rivera G. and pledged his complete neutrality. Rivera G. then threw his support to Rovelo Argüello and García Granados recommended him to the Chiapas legislature.[57] The state legislature made Rovelo Argüello Chiapas' fourth interim governor in as many months.

Rovelo Argüello assumed office shortly before the August elections for the state legislature and on his first day replaced the *jefes políticos* appointed by Dr. Rueda in Chiapa de Corzo, Pichucalco, Tonalá, Simojovel, and Mariscal.[58] Only one of the appointments made in consultation with the *cristobalense* radicals, Pichucalco, was overturned. As it turned out, however, the departmental electors did not always

vote in line with the wishes of their *jefes políticos*. Comitán, for example, despite the presence of a *cristobalense jefe político* elected a pro-government legislator. The *cristobalense* party, winning only in Las Casas, Simojovel, La Libertad, and Chilón, failed to obtain a majority in the new legislature.[59]

Two opposing explanations were forthcoming regarding the outcome of the election. Interim Governor Rovelo Argüello explained to De la Barra that "if San Cristóbal did not have a complete triumph in the elections, surely it was because it tried to determine candidates absolutely unknown by the departmental electors."[60] Timoteo Flores Ruiz, on the other hand, charged that "the legislature gave a *glope de estado*; the current congress, like the one before, continues to serve a *camarilla*."[61]

The four *procristobalense* state deputies arrived in Tuxtla Gutiérrez on September 13, on the eve of the convocation of the new legislature. The following day they were advised that San Cristóbal, under the leadership of wealthy *hacendados* Juan Espinosa Torres and Manuel Pineda, had again withdrawn recognition of the state government, initiating rebellion. The four returned to San Cristóbal.[62]

HOSTILITIES COMMENCE

The September 14 *pronunciamiento* had as its primary goal federal intervention, again, but the *cristobalenses* were now willing to install a friendly government by force of arms if necessary. On September 14, Juan Espinosa Torres, "*Comandante Militar y Jefe de las Fuerzas Libertadores del Estado*," sent an ultimatum to Tuxtla Gutiérrez giving

twenty-four hours to the state legislature to dissolve itself and demanding that the governor place the armed forces of the state at his disposal. "It being impossible, contemptible, and shameful to tolerate any longer the actual state of affairs," wrote the rebels in San Cristóbal, "which pushes us to the edge of ruin and indefinite oppression, we subscribers have resolved to sustain by arms the principles of the triumphant Revolution."[63] The first armed clash came the following day.

García Granados, Secretary of Government, upon learning of the renewed rebellion, was quoted as saying that the problem in Chiapas was that "persons of the old regime are seeking to dominate the government, and this brings out discord on the part of the people of the new regime."[64] Francisco I. Madero was less understanding. He telegraphed Espinosa Torres on September 17: "You have no motive which justifies such an assault and I am formally notifying you that if you continue to advance and attack Tuxtla, I will decidedly support the Government of Sr. De la Barra in order to punish you and others who are deserving in an exemplary manner and when I receive power I will also demand that you and your followers be held strictly accountable."[65] There clearly existed a conflict in policy between the national government of De la Barra and the leader of the national revolution, Madero, regarding the situation in Chiapas. This lack of coordination had encouraged the *cristobalense* party all summer to maintain their belligerent position and had, inadvertently, led to violence.

Upon hearing of the new *cristobalense pronunciamiento*, Dr. Rueda left Mexico City and arrived in Chiapas on September 19 to resume his post of interim governor. To avoid this disagreeable prospect, the

state legislature requested, and obtained, the resignation of Rovello Argüello, repealed the appointment of Dr. Rueda, and named federal deputy Querido Moheno interim governor of Chiapas. The legislature refused to allow Dr. Rueda to return to Tuxtla Gutiérrez and Moheno would not come to Chiapas citing as his reason the illegal intervention of the Secretary of Government, García Granados. Rovelo Argüello remained in charge.[66]

The military conflict lasted not quite a month. The state government had at its disposal about one thousand well armed men while the *cristobalenses* counted on about one thousand indian soldiers, poorly armed and disciplined, and an additional eight hundred ladinos.[67] The two forces clashed at points leading to Tuxtla Gutiérrez from the Central Highlands: Chiapas de Corzo, Acala, and Chicoasén. At all three points the *cristobalenses* were stopped at the Grijalva river.[68] The rebels remained on the offensive until the first week in October. By that time they had taken Ixtapa, Chioasén, La Concordia, San Bartolomé de los Llanos, Copainala, Simojovel, Chiapilla, San Gabriel, and Solistahuacan. Comitán, under the leadership of municipal president Belisario Domínguez, remained loyal to the state government. Chiapa de Corzo at first attempted to maintain a tenuous neutrality but was occupied by *cristobalense* forces and on September 24 withdrew recognition of the state government. The *ayuntamiento* of Chiapa de Corzo bet on the probability that the *cristobalense* candidate would win the gubernatorial elections in November.[69]

Tuxtlecos charged at the time that the clergy in San Cristóbal and the bishop were responsible for the conflict and recruited the Chamula villagers to take part.[70] Indians did take part in most of the military

actions under the command of a Chamula *cacique*, Jacinto Pérez, called *El Pajarito*.[71] The party in San Cristóbal apparently offered land distribution and the abolition of the head tax in order to recruit an indian army.[72] Their participation did add to the bloody image of a caste war which horrified the *tuxtlecos*. But did Bishop Francisco Orozco y Jiménez directly or indirectly involve himself in the movement in order to establish a clerically-dominated government in San Cristóbal?

There is no question that the leaders of the insurrection were fervent Catholics, particularly Manuel Pineda, and it is known that Jesús Martínez Rojas was a personal friend of the bishop. We also know that the rebels carried the banner of the Virgin of Guadalupe as the symbol of their cause. On the other hand, after the conflict, a number of Chiapanecan priests published their opinion that the radical leaders of the movement used the bishop's name in support of their cause without his permission.[73] Luis Espinosa, the most thorough chronicler of the 1911 crisis, offers no hard evidence of the bishop's involvement other than letters which show that the bishop was informed and concerned.[74]

On September 17, Orozco y Jiménez wrote Interim President De la Barra requesting federal intervention: "Although I have never attempted nor do I now attempt to involve myself in politics, I believe it is my duty as Bishop, in the wellbeing of my *diocesanos* to manifest to you that this society is increasingly profoundly alarmed that at any time hostilities between this city and Tuxtla Gutiérrez will break out. Perhaps intervention by you, which for my part I seek and would give thanks for, can stop the flowing of blood between brother towns whose

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misfortune grieves me and upon which I cannot look with indifference."[75] One week later the bishop made another plea: "The situation now is extremely anarchic and distressing. My ecclesiastical authority is by today ineffectual, I have exhausted all means to help. Only you can remedy it and I urge that it be with quick and effective intervention."[76] Did the bishop encourage or discourage the ambitions of the rebels? We don't know.

During the first three weeks of the conflict Interim President De la Barra declined to intervene on one side or another.[77] He explained this inactivity this way: "If the federal forces operate, this will displease some. If they do not operate, this will displease others."[78] Instead he looked for peaceful solutions. On the night of September 21, De la Barra and Rovelo Argüello held a telegraphic conference. The interim president twice suggested the desirability of asking the Senate to declare the *desaparición de los poderes* (federal intervention and removal) of the state government and the appointment of a military officer as interim governor. The interim governor strongly replied that his government was in perfect accord with the Constitution. De la Barra decided not to press the issue.[79] In communications with Espinosa Torres, De la Barra stressed the point that there were legal and peaceful means to protest election violations.[80] On October 4, De la Barra ordered General Eduardo Paz to go to Chiapas and seek out a peaceful solution to the conflict. At the same time he ordered the Secretary of War to give arms and ammunition to the *Hijos de Tuxtla*, the volunteer force of the state government.[81]

To the state government and the people of Tuxtla Gutiérrez, it appeared that Chiapas had degenerated into a bloody caste war about which

the federal government did nothing. After repeated requests for assistance to the executive branch, Rovelo Argüello turned to the national Senate.[82] In response the Senate created a commission on Chiapas to investigate the crisis and propose a solution. The commission was led by none other than Emilio Rabasa and Víctor Manuel Castillo.[83] Speaking before the commission on behalf of the federal government, Secretary of Government García Granados asked that the Senate declare the *desaparición de los poderes* and appoint a military interim governor until the November elections.[84] The commission, however, concluded that the established government in Tuxtla Gutiérrez was legitimate. On October 6, the full Senate voted to inform the interim president that it was the will of the Senate, and its constitutional perogative under article 116, that he order "federal forces to immediately begin active and energetic operations against the rebels that have risen in arms against the government of the state of Chiapas."[85] De la Barra complied and ordered General Paz to cooperate with the state government forces to bring about a military end to the rebellion.

The combined federal-state counteroffensive began on October 8 at Chiapa de Corzo. The townspeople tried unsuccessfully to repel the attact and after a four hour battle more than one hundred people were killed and many more were wounded.[86] During the next four days federal and state troops retook most of the important towns under *cristobalense* control. During one foray the *Hijos de Tuxtla* captured ten Chamula soldiers and cut off their ears to make them examples of what would happen when *indios* would fight *ladinos*.[87]

The odds were too great. On October 12 the *cristobalense* rebels agreed to enter into negotiations with General Paz.[88] A peace agreement

was signed the following day by commissioners representing both sides. The rebels agreed to recognize the state government of Rovelo Argüello in exchange for a general amnesty. The agreement also included the disarming of both sides, the establishment of federal detachments where necessary to insure fair elections, and the appointment by the governor of a military officer as *jefe político* of Comitán. It was reported that Rovelo Argüello was not happy with the agreement.[89]

THE GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION

With the fighting over, Chiapanecans again turned their attention to politics, electoral politics. The two candidates for constitutional governor in the November elections were Reinaldo Gordillo León (former interim governor) and José Antonio Rivera G. General Paz considered both unacceptable and proposed Dr. Policarpo Rueda but there were no takers.[90] The election was close, fairly free, and representative of the political and regional division of the state. According to a variety of sources, including the Secretary of Government, Rivera G. won the election with the votes of 320 electors against Gordillo León's 292.[91] The departmental vote was as follows:

DEPARTMENT	RIVERA G.	GORDILLO LEÓN
Las Casas	110	0
Chilón	55	1
Chiapa	47	0
Pichucalco	30	0
Palenque	23	6
Tonalá	21	10
Simojovel	16	24
La Libertad	3	26
Motozintla	0	31
Soconusco	7	37
Tuxtla	0	71
Comitán	8	82

The state legislature, after waiting a month, finally declared that the voting in Palenque and Chilón had been fraudulent. Their votes were nullified and by a tally of 290 to 242 Gordillo León was elected governor.[92] Gordillo León later admitted what everyone already knew, that the state legislature would never have confirmed Rivera G. He noted that Madero, who assumed the presidency in mid-November, did not want to give the victory to Gordillo León but was advised to sacrifice Rivera G. for the sake of stability.[93] Madero, however, did request that the new governor "bring into your administration some of the elements of the opposing party."[94] At the beginning of 1912, perhaps to avoid yet another *pronunciamiento* in San Cristóbal,[95] Madero named Gordillo León ambassador to Guatemala and finally obtained the Chiapanecan post for Flavio Guillén.[96] A fragile truce ensued in Chiapas.

The end of the conflict and the election of Gordillo León also led to the return to normalcy in Soconusco. "The great danger here," wrote the North American consul in August 1911, "is that a spread of agitation or revolutionary movement might reach the agricultural working classes and endanger the gathering of the coffee crop.... It is feared that should the masses awaken to the actual conditions of things danger might result to the coffee crop and even to the security of the plantations and planters."[97] There was some evidence of discontent. In Tuxtla Chico workers protested the head tax and there were scattered reports of labor trouble and the destruction of property.[98] The manager of the plantation *El Rosario* reported in August 1911 "our laborers are still running away during the night in small bunches."[99] In July 1911 the anarchist "Juan Alvarez" club had taken over the *ayuntamiento* of Tapachula in the elections as well placing one of their members in

the *jefatura política*.[100] When Governor Gordillo León took office in December 1911 he ordered Dr. Víctor Constantino Herrera, the *jefe político* to resign.[101] In February 1912, the North American consul reported that the new *jefe político*, Abelardo Domínguez, "has continued to make good his promises to assist the planters in every possible way and owners and managers report greater attempts to afford them assistance in managing their field hands than they have experienced for some time."[102]

CONCILIATION AND CONCORD, AND RESIDUAL VIOLENCE

The dominant theme of the new Guillén administration was "conciliation and concord between brothers."[103] The governor, as befitting a true *maderista*, encouraged a free political environment and competition between parties governed by political discourse. In Tuxtla Gutiérrez the *Partido Liberal Chiapaneco*, formed by Ciro Farrera in 1911, promoted lowland commercial and agricultural interests.[104] In San Cristóbal, Jesús Martínez Rojas formed the *Partido Popular Chiapaneco* to advance highland interests, including the return of the government to San Cristóbal.[105]

Governor Guillén's conciliatory policy was followed in the mid-1912 elections for senators and national deputies, and state legislators. The same legislature which had imposed Gordillo León, chose two men loyal to the old regime, Leopold Gout and José Castellot, for the senate. Belisario Domínguez was elected an alternate senator, presumably a reward for his steadfast support for the government during the rebellion. There was a split in the election of national deputies. Rómulo Farrera

and Manuel Rovelo Argüello were elected as candidates of the *tuxtleco Partido Liberal*, Adolfo E. Grajales represented Soconusco, and Jesús Martínez Rojas and César Castellanos were elected as candidates of the *cristobalense Partido Popular*. The newly elected state legislature, noted Martínez Rojas, was "for the most part independent."[106] No better testimony of Guillén's political skill can be found than in the transformation in the opinion of the *cristobalense La Voz del Pueblo*. In February 1912 Guillén's appointment was viewed as a "*científico* triumph." By September the governor was refered to as "a man of good faith, of noble and honorable ideals."[107]

Governor Guillén, in cooperation with the new legislature, also decreed some moderate reforms. Although the division of *ejidos* had ended in 1909, the 1892 *Ley de Ejidos* (decreeing the parcelization of communal village lands) was repealed in November 1912. In December a new labor law was promulgated. This law required employers not to carry workers' debts for more than a year, established a maximum ten-hour work day, prohibited debt inheritance, and required employers to provide a primitive form of insurance for disabled workers.[108] Guillén also established the Office of Servant Contractors to oversee the contracting of highland indians and to prevent abuses. It quickly became, unfortunately, a corrupt and abusive agency itself.[109] Finally, in response to the participation of indians in the 1911 insurrection, the state government abolished the regressive head tax.[110]

Notwithstanding Guillén's program of conciliation and reform, banditry reappeared throughout the state and Chiapas was plagued by a deeprooted wave of violence. *Hacendados* reported difficulties in keeping workers on their properties and bandits roamed the state, burning

haciendas, tearing up towns, and stealing cattle.[111] In Tonalá, for example, landowners and merchants felt compelled to form their own rural defense corps for use against bandits and rebellious workers.[112] Numerous petty political squabbles, often violent, erupted in the municipalities over the control of local government.[113] Early in 1912 one political party in Palenque attempted to prevent a rival party from assuming office by armed force.[114] The end of the tight political control exercized during the Díaz dictatorship led to the venting of frustration and the abuse of the free political climate. Banditry, and violence on the part of workers, was also partly economic in nature. While wages remained stable during the period after Madero began his revolution, prices for basic commodities soared. Between 1910 and 1912, for example, the price of five liters of corn in Tuxtla Gutiérrez increased from eight to thirty *centavos* and in Tapachula from twelve to twenty *centavos*.[115] The Mexican State in Chiapas was in crisis.

THE CONSTITUTIONALIST REVOLUTION

In February 1913 Governor Guillén took a leave of absence to travel to Mexico City. He wanted to lend his support to the Madero administration in its struggle against Félix Díaz, the dictator's nephew, who had staged a revolt in the capital city. The state legislature then recalled Reinaldo Gordillo León from Guatemala to occupy the governor's office.[116] General Victoriano Huerta, the federal general in command of the defense of the Madero government, treacherously joined forces with Díaz and overthrew the Madero government. President Madero and Vice-President Pino Suárez were murdered on the night of February 21. The following day

Governor Gordillo León professed his loyality to the new administration of President General Victoriano Huerta.[117] The governor also asked Senator Emilio Rabasa to work against the naming of a military governor for Chiapas, a change desired by certain *cristobalenses*.[118] The governor of Coahuila, Venustiano Carranza, took exception to Huerta's coup d'état on the same day, February 22, refusing to recognize its legality. The Constitutionalist revolution had begun.

Most Chiapanecans were not really distressed at the fall of the Madero government. The state government, including the legislature, quickly and willingly accommodated itself to the new political order. In March, for example, Gordillo León asked all *jefes políticos* to help those political clubs supporting Félix Díaz and Francisco León De la Barra, candidates for president and vice-president.[119] The *cristobalense* rebels of 1911 considered Madero a traitor to their cause and to the principles of 1910.[120] Jesús Martínez Rojas supported the Huerta regime (until October 1913) believing that the new president intended to comply with the promises of the revolution.[121] In Tuxtla Gutiérrez little had changed, as witnessed by the return of Ramón Rabasa to the municipal government.[122]

President Huerta replaced Gordillo León with General A.Z. Palafox in July 1913, a move which was made in conformity with the general militarization of the nation and which, incidentally, pleased many *cristobalenses*. During his one year in Chiapas Palafox met his quota for soldiers in the federal army and kept Chiapas out of the hands of anti-Huerta rebels. The military administration made an attempt to reform the office of labor contracting in San Cristóbal, set maximum prices for primary commodities sold in towns, increased the number of

school inspectors, and increased the budget for road construction to a record $150,000.[123]

The Constitutionalist movement, that is, the anti-Huerta rebellion led by Venustiano Carranza, gathered military strength and political unity in the spring of 1913. Initially limited to the northern tier of states, the movement soon gained allies in Morelos, Campeche, and Tabasco.[124] By the summer there were a number of Constitutionalist chiefs in Tabasco, Carlos Greene, Pedro Colorado, Juan Hernández, and Luis Felipe Domínguez, who conducted military operations in both Tabasco and northern Chiapas.[125] Late in 1913 the Vidal brothers of Pichucalco, Carlos and Luis, offered their services to Greene and harrassed Chiapanecan authorities in their home department.[126]

General Luis Felipe Domínguez, an *hacendado* from Tenosique, Tabasco, entered Chiapas in March 1913 in command of the Usumacinta Brigade. Over the next two years he marched from *montería* to *montería* liberating the mahogany workers.[127] Thirty years later one worker recalled: "I escaped from that hell because the Revolution liberated me. General Luis Felipe Domínguez came in 1913 and we all left with him."[128] One administrator of a *montería* reported in 1914 that the lumber camps "Santa Margarita" and "Santa Clara" were reduced to ashes.[129] In each camp Domínguez decreed the absolute liberty of work, the abolition of all workers' debts, and the execution of administrators and overseers. The Usumacinta Brigade, however, put the *monterías* out of business for only two to three years but in doing so became a legend in indigenous Chiapas.[130]

The other Domínguez who entered legend in 1913 was Chiapanecan

Senator Dr. Belisario Domínguez. He was elevated to the Senate in early 1913 upon the death of Leopold Gout. Domínguez, a *comiteco* and medical doctor trained in Paris, was a staunch *maderista* who had been sickened by Huerta's climb to power over the bodies of Madero and Pino Suárez. In September 1913 the senator published a speech he was not allowed to read in the congressional record which was a virulent inditement of the Huerta regime. Domínguez called upon his collegues to do their duty and depose the president, "a bloody and ferocious soldier who assassinates without hesitation anyone who is an obstacle to his wishes." He continued, arguing that "the country hopes that you will honor her before the world, saving her from the shame of having as chief executive a TRAITOR and an ASSASSIN."[131]

Two weeks later Domínguez was picked up by four policemen who drove him to a cemetery, shot him, and buried the body. When the senator failed to appear in the Senate chamber that day, October 8, the Chiapas delegation led by Jesús Martínez Rojas inquired at the Secretary of Government as to his disappearance and declared that the Chamber of Deputies would remain in permanent session until the matter was fully cleared up. The following day rumors of Domínguez's assassination circulated in the capital city and Huerta dissolved both chambers of the legislature on October 10 to prevent the congress from withdrawing its recognition of the government. The Huerta regime no longer had even a shadow of legitimacy.[132]

Violence became epidemic and contagious in Chiapas in 1913 and 1914. In the confused political climate it was often impossible to distinguish between bandits and revolutionaries. In June 1913 the *jefe político* of Soconusco captured a large quantity of Constitutionalist revolutionary

propaganda being smuggled into the state.[134] By September 1913 Governor Palafox was asking the federal government for arms to use against the rebels in Pichucalco, Palenque, and Mariscal.[135] In February 1914 an uprising occured in Tapachula but it was suppressed in one day. In the process *jefe político* (and coffee planter) Fernando Braun detained the leaders of the anarchist "Juan Alvarez" club, shot them, and burned the bodies.[136] Ricardo Caracosa led a small band of revolutionaries near Comitán in 1914, supported by Guatemalan president Estrada Cabrera.[137] Similar small insurrectionary groups also appeared: in Cintalapa led by Luis Espinosa, in Villa Flores led by Santana Córdova, in Ocosingo led by Aarón Castellanos. These bands, not individually, not collectively, threatened the Palafox government in 1914.[138]

Defeated militarily by the Constitutionalists, the Huerta regime collapsed in the summer of 1914. The President General resigned on July 15 and First Chief of the Constitutionalist movement, Venustiano Carranza, entered Mexico City on August 20. Governor Palafox resigned on August 13 and the state legislature named José Cano, a *tuxtleco* and Rabasa intimate, interim governor. Faced with incipient rebellion within his own movement in the north, Carranza set about to secure his control over the south. In late August he appointed three military governors, revolutionary proconsuls, for the south: Salvador Alvarado for Yucatán, Francisco J. Múgica for Tabasco, and Jesús Agustín Castro for Chiapas. Castro arrived in Tuxtla Gutiérrez on September 14, 1914.[139]

REFLECTIONS

The Mexican State entered a period of profound crisis in 1910. The State was so intimately bound up with the personality of Porfirio Díaz that his disappearance led to a period of political fragmentation. Centralizing tendencies could no longer focus upon any one center and centrifugal forces, held in check for some thirty years, flourished in crisis.

Chiapas, although far from being in a revolutionary situation in 1910 but being closely integrated into the national State, could not avoid the repercussions of the national crisis. The Madero revolution provided an opportunity for one localist group which had harbored political ambition and resentment for twenty years to attempt to bring down the government. The political establishment in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, however, was not about to give up power as easily as the Díaz regime in Mexico City. It is no coincidence that the three most prosperous departments in the state, Tuxtla, Comitán, and Soconusco, cast their votes in the November 1911 gubernatorial election for the government candidate. The entrepreneurial segment of Chiapanecan society was not prepared to relinquish control of Chiapas' political and economic development without a fight. Radical localism in San Cristóbal was defeated and the concensus Emilio Rabasa created in the early 1890s held firm.

In Chiapas, as in Mexico as a whole, the Mexican Revolution weakened the national State. Within this decade-long crisis, however, conditions appeared which favored the formation of an even stronger and more active State. Revolutionary factions seeking mass support promised social and

economic reforms which only a strong, interventionist State could satisfy. Reform-oriented government along with years of civil war led to the politicization of the working masses in Chiapas, as in Mexico. Their pressure on revolutionary and post-revolutionary governments for political participation and social-economic reforms also contributed to the reconstruction of a State which was more formidable than Don Porfirio's.

CHAPTER SIX

CIVIL WAR

> Chiapanecan cowards, while the north
> is struggling, you are enjoying peace,
> but I will teach you to feel the
> effects of the Revolution.
>
> Jesús Agustín Castro, 1914

Chiapas was invaded by an outside military force for the fourth time in its history in the fall of 1914.[1] The revolution which proceeded from northern Mexico was imposed on the state. As a result a civil war ensued in Chiapas between those who supported the Constitutionalist movement and those who did not. Unlike the *cristobalense* radicals of 1911 who sought to restore past greatness, the anti-Constitutionalist rebels of 1914-1920 simply wanted to maintain the *status quo ante*. The two movements were similar, however, in their antipathy for political centralization. Both were essentially localist, opposed to the expansion of the central State.

In 1920, with the fall of the Carranza government, the Chiapanecan rebels skillfully manuevered the peaceful takeover of the state government. The conservative insurgents acquired the political direction of a region which had just emerged from years of social revolution; the past was irretrievable. Five years of revolutionary administration and civil war

had broken the isolation of rural Chiapas and the absolute power of the *hacendado* over villages and workers. The politicization of the countryside had begun by creating opportunities for powerless individuals and groups to act in their own interest. Perhaps the best evidence of this politicization was not the victory of the conservative insurgents in 1920 but their inability to remain in power.

REVOLUTION IMPOSED

General Jesús Agustín Castro and the *División Veintiuno*, comprising 1200 officers and men from the state of Durango, reached Tuxtla Gutiérrez on September 14, 1914. As military governor, Castro assumed all executive, legislative, and judicial power. All important positions in state government and all departmental political officers were staffed by military officers. The important municipal governments were overturned in favor of loyal Constitutionalists, and military detachments were stationed in each departmental *cabecera*. In less than two weeks Constitutionalist rule was imposed on Chiapas.[2]

The harbinger of revolution, General Castro, was only twenty-seven years old when he undertook the task of transforming Chiapas. A native of Durango, he had joined the *maderista* movement in 1910 and by 1914 had ascended to the rank of General in the Second Division of the Center under the command of Jesús Carranza. Like other young men in the Constitutionalist movement, Castro was a sincere reformer, sensitive to human misery, and desirous of rapid and radical change effected by a strong State. He outlined his proconsular task to the literate population upon his arrival in Chiapas:

> If yesterday the despotic government degenerated men and converted them into slaves, the Revolution will raise them up and make them dignified citizens; if the tyranny sustained ignorance, the Revolution will destroy it and bring enlightenment; if the privileged robbed the poor, the Revolution will return to them their rights; if there was one justice for the rich and another for the poor, the Revolution will impose equality before the law; if the ambitious misused their power through fraud and crime, the Revolution will see to it that officials will be choosen by the popular vote. All the conquests of the Revolution speak eloquently and proclaim a great future for the country.3

Castro's first official act was to declare October 7, the anniversary of Belisario Domínguez's assassination, a day of mourning. Thereafter official reform decrees were pronounced in rapid succession. In mid-October, in conformity with the laws of the Reform (1855-1859), priests were prohibited from wearing ecclesiastical dress in public and from saying mass more than once a week, convents were closed, and anyone with a cross on the roof of his house was fined ten *pesos*.[4] The *Ley de Obreros* (Workers' Law) abolishing indebted servitude came on October 31, the confiscation of all Church property on December 5, and the nullification of mortgages of less than three thousand *pesos* on December 8. On January 16, 1915, the post of *jefe político* was abolished, in conformity with Carranza's conviction that no political intermediaries must exist between the municipalities and the state government. An experimental agricultural school was established in March and in April the Local Agrarian Commission (CLA) was organized to supervise the return of land to villages. A law permitting divorce and remarriage was decreed on May 22.[5] These laws and decrees, all in harmony with the principles of the Constitutionalist movement, sought to liberate workers, small property owners, indians, women, and municipal governments from the control of economic, spiritual,

political, and domestic bosses.

The *Ley de Obreros* was by far the most significant and far reaching decree of the early Constitutionalist period in Chiapas. In one action Castro abolished in law (and proceeded to do the same in practice) the system of indebted servitude. The debts of all workers were forgiven. This law prohibited company stores and child labor, established the maximum number of days per week and hours per day of labor required by workers, and obligated employers to provide decent housing, medicines, and schools for workers and their families. A minimum wage schedule was formulated requiring the highest wages (one *peso* per day) in labor-scarce departments and the lowest permissible wages (sixty *centavos*) in departments where there existed labor surpluses. Military commanders of the departments (and later state government work inspectors) were responsible for enforcing compliance and giving fines or prison terms to those who failed to live up to the standards of the law.[6] Governor Francisco León first proposed that the State begin to take responsibility for the wellbeing of workers in the 1890s. Under Castro this expansion of responsibility finally took place.

In the fall of 1914 General Castro was reported to have told a crowd of *tuxtlecos* that he would teach them to feel the effects of the revolution. Teach them he did. Executions of "enemies of the people" commenced immediately with state *rurales* making up many of the victims. The most notable victim, Arturo Paramiro, Chief of the secret police under Governor Palafox, was executed in October. Jacinto Pérez, the Chamula *cacique* of the 1911 rebellion, was also shot in October after military authorities in San Cristóbal were advised that he constituted a potential danger.[7]

Constitutionalist military expeditions into the countryside took the form of punitive raids against *haciendas*, churches, and occasionally, towns. The soldiers burned *haciendas*, stole cattle and crops, and ordered workers to return to their villages and homes. They broke into churches and destroyed altars and took anything of value.[8] "It appears these Constitutionalists," wrote the North American consular agent in Ocós, Guatemala, "are determined to commit all the possible damage before they are defeated. They have committed no end of depredations in the state of Chiapas."[9] A North American landowner in Pichucalco complained that the Constitutionalists drove all her servants away. The officer in command asked the workers, "don't you want to mount your patron's horse, and put on his spurs, and be a *señor*?"[10]

In a trip to the Central Highlands in early 1915, General Castro visited several indian villages and explained the principles of the revolution (through an interpreter) to the thousands who had gathered to hear him. His government, Castro explained, was their friend and the enemy of the *ladino* exploiters. Villagers were told they could retake the land that had been stolen from them and in Oxchuc Castro supervised the division of an abandoned *hacienda*.[11] The Constitutionalist message was getting across. "As the revolution developed in intensity," declared a North American resident of Tonalá, "the peons and laborers working on the claimants' *haciendas* became more and more restless. Many became insolent and refused to work, some joined various bands of revolutionary forces, and still others became bandits and thieves."[12]

COUNTERREVOLUTION

The Constitutionalist victory over the government of Victoriano Huerta in the summer of 1914 was accompanied by serious friction between the First Chief, Venustiano Carranza, and one of his most powerful and popular general, Pancho Villa. In part, the ripening split in the Constitutionalist movement was a struggle for personal power. Carranza governed dictatorially during the preconstitutional period (1913-1916) and tolerated little dissent or independence on the part of his military commanders. Villa, chief of the Division of the North, chafed under Carranza's tight control while the First Chief considered Villa too insubordinate. Each came to distrust and loathe the other.[13]

The split also reflected a deeper factional dispute and a divergence of world-views. Both *carrancistas* and *villistas* viewed themselves as the true revolutionaries and both factions appealed to the lower classes. Villa and his party, however, possessed no national perspective and were primarily concerned with the welfare of the *villista* army. The *carrancistas* organized and communicated their social reform program more successfully. They possessed a national perspective of Mexico's problems and were also able to attract the support of the middle class, who felt they had more to gain (or less to lose) from Carranza than Villa.[14]

Mexico verged on civil war once again in the fall of 1914. In September Carranza called for a national convention to determine a date for national elections, discuss topics of national importance, and, it was widely desired, resolve the factional dispute within the movement and prevent a civil war. Supporters of both Carranza and Villa wanted a

peaceful resolution but expected the convention to champion their leader. The convention which met in Aguascalientes on October 10, however, at first assumed a neutral position and made itself a sovereign government, much to Carranza's disgust. In early November Villa recognized the authority of the convention government and placed himself and the Division of the North under its command. Carranza refused to do likewise since Villa by now controlled the convention. The convention government then declared Carranza an insurgent. The loyal Constitutionalist generals, the most important being Alvaro Obregón, remained with Carranza and by the end of November the Constitutionalists were forced to abandon Mexico City to Villa's army and flee to Veracruz. At the end of 1914 the fortunes of Carranza and the Constitutionalist movement had never been lower.[15]

It was during this desperate period that the first counterrevolutionary uprising occured in Chiapas. In light of the apparent imminent collapse of the Constitutionalist movement and in response to General Castro's heavy-handed treatment of the state, approximately forty men rebelled on December 2, 1914 in the department of Chiapa. They signed the *Acta de Canquí*, which proclaimed the sovereignty of Chiapas, pledged the signatories to drive the "*carrancista* filibusters" from the state, and made former state *rurale* and *hacendado* Tiburcio Fernández Ruiz chief of the rebellion. They insisted they had risen in arms "in view of the vandalistic acts which have victimized the Chiapanecan family by the odious armed group that has invaded Chiapanecan soil, sent by the *carrancista* government without any other objective than to destroy our political institutions, end our sovereignty, and make themselves masters of our lives and *haciendas*, sowing everywhere unhappiness and misery and

attacking the most sacred possession of man, the home."[16]

The military government in Tuxtla Gutiérrez attributed the rebellion simply to *hacendado* opposition to the *Ley de Obreros*.[17] Salvador Alvarado, Chief of the Army of the Southeast (stationed in Yucatán), however, blamed the uprising on the abuse of power by Castro or his subordinates.[18] A North American resident of the state noted that the insurgents "are men of good reputation who call themselves *villistas*."[19] The *villista* label was adopted because they understood that Villa was also fighting Carranza. In time, however, the rebels acquired the name *mapaches* (racoons) because often they were so hungry they ate uncooked corn right in the fields like their namesakes.[20]

The *mapache* movement did not simply represent the reaction of the Chiapanecan landed class to reformist government.[21] *Hacendados* did form the leadership of the *mapaches* but *hacendados* also gave their support to the Constitutionalist government; most simply stayed out of the struggle or left Chiapas altogether. The *mapaches* rebelled to defend their *patria chica* from abusive outsiders. The *mapaches* were backwoods, frontier landowners, ranchers, *hacienda* foremen, cowboys, ex-soldiers and *rurales*. Their home territory was the southern foothills of the Sierra Madre around Villa Flores, Villa Corzo, and La Concordia. The state government had not built any roads or railroads into this region, thereby making commercial agriculture very difficult. Only one of the *mapaches*, for example, Fernández Ruiz, owned property valued at over ten thousand *pesos*, although there were nearly 900 *hacendados* in Chiapas who did.[22] The *mapaches* were counterrevolutionaries, they were not, however, representative of all *hacendados* in Chiapas and cannot be viewed as guardians of the landed class.

At first the insurgency was comprised of a loose coalition of groups which gave only nominal submission to Fernández Ruiz. Salvador Méndez operated in the Custepedes Valley, Virgilio Culebro and Tirso Castañón in Tonalá, Eliezar Ruiz and the entire Ruiz clan in the department of Chiapa, and Federico and Enrique Macías in La Frailesca. Two ex-federal army officers, Rosendo Márquez and Teofilio Castillo Corzo, resided in Guatemala and aided the effort by recruiting men and rounding up arms and ammunition. Occasionally the rebels coordinated their military operations. The first of these was an attack on Villa Flores on December 14, 1914. They held the town for only one day and left upon the approach of a Constitutionalist column. Generally, however, the *mapaches* ambushed government columns, raided trains on the Panamerican railroad, harassed supporters of the government, and carried on guerrilla warfare.[23]

In December 1914 Angel María Pérez and José Domingo Pérez and other cattlemen of Soconusco rebelled against the Constitutionalists in Tapachula. This group fielded an army of nearly 2000 men, took possession of the Tapachula and Huixtla, and professed loyality to the convention government in Aguascalientes. In January, a large Constitutionalist force from the Isthmus counter-attacked, dispersed the rebels into the mountains, and killed the two leaders. A second attempt was made in March, when Francisco Pino led eighty men to capture Union Juárez. They were quickly routed and driven into Guatemala.[24] Soconusco thereafter remained peaceful, productive, and solidly in the Constitutionalist camp.

LA MISERIA

The Chiapanecan civil war took on a momentum of its own in 1915.

Mapache raids brought government counterattacks, executions, and arrests. Both sides plundered and killed in the name of military necessity while numerous bandits took advantage of the war to help themselves.[25] As life in the countryside became more and more dangerous, families moved to town and agricultural production sharply declined. Food became scarce and expensive, and hunger took its toll.[26]

The indigenous population suffered as much at the hands of the Constitutionalists as from the *mapaches*. Mateo Méndez Tzotzek of Chamula recounted that the *carrancistas* "were awful to indians and *ladinos* alike. They made women stay and be raped while they sent the men to look for food for their horses. They stole food, livestock, everything from the Chamulas."[27] Xun Vaskis, of Zinacantán, remembered that the *mapaches* "stole coils of woven palm. They stole pants. They stole shirts, money, everything."[28] For most Chiapanecans, indian and *ladino*, the civil war was a powerful force beyond their control and comprehension. They did understand its effects: hunger, rape, murder, theft, abduction, and fear. As late as the 1960s, residents of San Cristóbal Las Casas referred to the revolutionary years as *la miseria*.[29]

On June 3, 1915, the state legislature of Oaxaca withdrew its recognition of the Carranza government and General Castro was ordered to contain this defection. Castro withdrew from Chiapas with two brigades of the *División Veintiuno*, leaving General Blas Corral as military governor. Corral, with only one brigade, had sufficient forces to control the towns but not to pacify the entire state.[30] In central Mexico, on the other hand, the Constitutionalists had revived in the spring of 1915 and by the summer, Pancho Villa was, according to General Obregón, "defeated as a general and is a nullity as a politician."[31] By October

the convention government in Aguascalientes came to an ignominious end at about the same time the United States government extended de facto recognition to Carranza.[32]

In 1916 the *mapaches* were forced to abandon their disorganized and uncoordinated character and establish greater cohesion. Early in the year former Chiapanecan governor Flavio Guillén, Pancho Villa's agent in Guatemala, attempted to gain control of the insurgent movement in Chiapas. With the assistance of Guatemalan President Manuel Estrada Cabrera, who provided arms and ammunition, Guillén named *comiteco* Virgilio Culebro chief of the *villistas* in Chiapas.[33] This drove Tirso Castañón, leader of a rival band in Comitán, into establishing a closer alliance with Fernández Ruiz. In April the two leaders met in Villa Flores and formed a government. Castañón was designated Provisional Governor of Chiapas while Fernández Ruiz assumed the more important post of General in Chief of the Chiapanecan Liberation Movement. Together they forced Culebro into Guatemalan exile, retained Estrada Cabrera's patronage (without Guillén as middleman), and claimed the allegiance of most rebel factions in the state.[34]

To seal the bargain, Fernández Ruiz and Castañón, joined by the Macias brothers and Castillo Corzo, combined forces to attack the Constitutionalist garrison in Comitán. The assault, the largest military action taken by either side thus far in the war, began at three in the morning of April 15, 1916 by approximately one thousand men. The government troops, vastly outnumbered, held out for four hours and then abandoned the city. Following their victory, drunken rebel soldiers sacked most of the commercial houses in Comitán and broke into private homes looking for money, liquor, food, horses, and women. A disapproving

Fernández Ruiz protected a few of the private homes in the center of town but left the rest to the mercy of Castañón's troops. The following day government reinforcements from San Cristóbal forced the *mapaches* to evacuate Comitán, to the relief of the townspeople.[35]

In July 1916 the rebellion received a further boost when Alberto Pineda, son of 1911 *cristobalense* rebel leader Manuel Pineda, took to arms. Early in 1915 the government had arrested four *cristobalense hacendados*, Pineda among them, as rebel sympathizers. They were detained in Tuxtla Gutiérrez and released when family and friends paid a $20,000 fine. Again in early 1916 Pineda and twenty other highland gentlemen were rounded up and jailed. Although soon released, Pineda had endured humiliation enough and went to see the *mapache* chief.[36] Fernández Ruiz gave Pineda the rank of colonel and along with some other highland landowners he formed the Las Casas Brigade. They operated in the departments of Las Casas, Chilón, Palenque, and Simojovel.[37]

The *pinedistas*, when compared to the lowland *mapaches*, were wealthier and more socially prominent. They were also better mannered. Pineda apparently understood that guerrilla warfare required the cooperation of villagers for food and information. Both groups, however, can be classified as *serrano* movements, using the terminology of Alan Knight. They were similar to the Pascual Orozco revolt in Western Chihuahua in 1912, *villismo* of 1913-1915, and the Figueroa brothers' revolt in Guerrero in 1910-1911. These movements, Knight notes, "derived from remote, mountainous regions and they represented the popular backlash of autonomous communities reacting against the incursions of central government.[38]

SIDE SHOWS

In 1916 General Blas Corral received orders from Carranza to end the rebellion in Chiapas and the abuses of the military government.[39] Corral correctly understood that the Chiapanecan rebellion could be sustained practically forever so long as the government of Guatemala actively supported the insurgents and gave them sanctuary. The Estrada Cabrera administration treated the Mexican government as a natural enemy.[40] In 1916 alone, Guatemala supplied certain factions of the *mapaches* with over 250 rifles and 140,000 shells. In retaliation, Corral supported Guatemalan revolutionaries operating near Huehuetenango with arms and money, although with little success.[41] Despite secret negotiations between the Mexican and Guatemalan governments in 1916 and 1917, no agreement was reached and each side continued to interfere in the internal affairs of the other.[42]

In 1918 General Salvador Alvarado, then operating in Chiapas, captured the archive of Fernández Ruiz and Hector Macias. Much to his surprise he learned that the *mapache* leader refused to take munitions from the Guatemalan government. Instead nearly all ammunition used by most *mapache* groups had been purchased or stolen from the government's troops.[43]

Félix Díaz, Don Porfirio's ne'er-do-well nephew, initiated a new rebellion in the state of Veracruz to overthrow Carranza in February 1916. The *felicista* movement, however, was no match for the armies of the government and it was forced from Veracruz into Oaxaca and finally into Chiapas by November. Of the 3000 men Díaz had raised in Veracruz, less than 100 managed to flee into Chiapas, most unarmed and on foot.[44] General Díaz believed Chiapas would be fertile ground for his movement

but before he could join forces with the Chiapanecan rebels he suffered a devastating attack at Pueblo Nuevo. This engagement reduced the *felicistas* to a pitifully small band of refugees. Díaz did confer with both Fernández Ruiz and Pineda, inviting them to enlist in his revolution. Fernández Ruiz cordially received and materially aided Díaz and his entourage but rejected any alliance. The *mapache* chief asserted that he was fighting only in defense of his native state. Protected by *mapaches*, Díaz continued on to Guatemala and returned to New York.[45]

Díaz's second-in-command, Juan Andreu Almazán, years later gave a candid assessment of the *mapaches*. Although their leaders were landowners of high quality, he commented, "unfortunately, perhaps due to the incredible amorality of the principal chiefs, the revolutionary movement had degenerated into the most criminal conduct in the history of all the civil war of Mexico.... The *mapaches* did not attack the enemy who carried carbines, no sir, like sickly male goats from hell they attacked women, without deference to age, social position, or health."[46]

Yet another rebellious element injected itself into Chiapas in 1916. In April, Emilio Zapata, *caudillo* of the agrarian revolutionaries in the state of Morelos, appointed Rafael Cal y Mayor Chief of Military Operations in Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, and Yucatán. Cal y Mayor was from one of the most distinquished landholding families in the department of Tuxtla and had been a law student in Mexico City before he joined Zapata. The Chiapanecan *zapatista* staked out the Chiapas-Veracruz border in the department of Mezcalapa as his territory and for the next three years terrorized everyone in the vicinity. Due to the size of his group, Cal y Mayor was not much more than an irritant to the government in Tuxtla Gutiérrez. To the inhabitants of northwest Chiapas, however, he was

considered the most unscrupulous and brutal murderer of the revolution.[47]

REVOLUTIONARY ADMINISTRATION

Civil government in Chiapas remained in the hands of non-Chiapanecan military men from September 1914 to September 1916. Throughout this period and until 1920, vigorous civil administration backed by military force worked to regulate "the relationship between the capitalist and the workers, toward the end of obtaining equilibrium."[48]

The agents of executive will in the countryside throughout the war were Constitutionalist military officers with various titles. When the *jefaturas políticas* were abolished in 1915 General Castro created the post of Executive Delegate to perform the same duties. This post was abolished in June 1915 but revived in 1917. Work inspectors charged with the enforcement of the *Ley de Obreros* were located in each department and were powerful agents in the extension of revolutionary administration.[49] *Hacendados* attempted to continue their labor practices as though nothing had changed. Some maintained two debt registers, one for the revolutionary authorities showing the cancelation of all debts and another, true list for use when the Constitutionalists would be driven from the state.[50] The Executive Delegate in Palenque, for example, fined several *hacendados* a total of $1,250 for infractions of the *Ley de Obreros*. He also found that *hacendados* had close ties with local government officials and indian *caciques* in procuring laborers and maintaining obedience. In order to enforce the law executive delegates were forced to depose several municipal presidents and secretaries.[51] The military government also set about to end the practice of *baldiaje* and *arrendamiento*. Executive delegates were

instructed to publicize the prohibition of these practices and the fines of between $500 to $1000 for *hacendados* who continued demanding labor or commodities in rent.[52]

The military government also distributed circulars and sent translators throughout Chiapas advising villagers on how to denounce lands they wanted returned to them.[53] A number of villages did proceed through administrative channels to request the return of communal lands alienated during the *porfiriato*, although many more apparently simply took over land they considered rightfully theirs.[54] Chiapanecan *campesinos* perhaps realized how ineffective a government land reform program would be or, more likely, did not understand the agrarian bureaucratic process. Despite the military government's emphasis on agrarian reform in Chiapas, between 1915 and 1920 only six grants of land to villages were approved, providing 17,300 *hectáreas*.[55]

In 1918 a state labor relations board was established for the purpose of fairly resoling conflicts between workers and employers. Local boards were set up in each department.[56] One month after its creation a strike of coffee workers began in some plantations in Soconusco. The strikers, led by Michoacán socialist Ismael Mendoza, demanded the reduction of the *cuerda* (coffee workers were paid by task rather than by hour), medical attention, the elimination of company stores, and payment in cash. The government in Tuxtla Gutiérrez refused to support the strike and it was broken by the planters.[57]

Nowhere else did the Constitutionalists rule with such a light hand as they did in Soconusco. As a result the department was quiet and peaceful throughout the revolution. This anomalous condition was the product of a number of different forces all working to maintain the

production of coffee. In contrast to Alvarado's control of the henequen industry in Yucatán, the Constitutionalist authorities in Chiapas did not attempt to regulate the production or marketing of coffee. The Carranza government, noted the United States consul in Guatemala City, "in that part of Chiapas, is friendly in the extreme." As a result, he continued, "business is active and there is a great deal of seeming prosperity."[58] Discontent on the part of workers was dispelled by higher wages, land reform, government support of the planters, and private police forces. Competition for workers, noted one observer, "is going to eat up a large share of the profits."[59] Most of the government-approved land reform petitions, furthermore, were from Soconusco during the revolution.[60] Planters, with private guards, and municipal governments cooperated to prevent labor violence, vandalism, and land seizures.[61] Coffee was too valuable to both the planters and the government to let a revolution disrupt production.

In most of Chiapas, however, revolutionary administration combined with the dislocation and disruption of war led to a social revolutionary climate between 1914 and 1920. Under the cover of war, and sometimes with military protection, *campesinos* began to take control of their lives. They stopped paying rent, seized land and livestock, and ran away from their former employers.[62] A group of labor contracters for the coffee plantations complained in 1918 that workers would take their advances, sign contracts, and then work for someone else or not show up at all.[63] Villagers began to complain to the authorities of conditions which they passively accepted only a short time before.[64]

The military governments maintained and even gave greater emphasis to the earlier priorities of road construction and education. In 1915 an

unprecedented fifty percent of the state budget was devoted to roads and schools.[65] To pay for these improvements and to finance the war the Corral administration increased taxes by forty percent on rural properties valued over $1000, on commerce, and coffee production.[66]

In 1916 Carranza reduced the financial independence of state governments. The First Chief diminished the scope of the state governments in the kinds of taxation they could impose and he reduced the proportion of federal taxes earmarked for state governments from fifty to twenty percent.[67] While federal per-capita expenditure increased from thirty-four *pesos* in 1910 to fifty-three *pesos* in 1921, Chiapas state per-capita expenditure declined from eight to only five *pesos* in the same time span.[68] The magnitude of this form of centralization on Chiapas is illustrated in the following table:[69] (Also See Table 9 in Appendix.)

BUDGET YEAR	TOTAL BUDGET	EDUCATION	ROADS
1915	$1,376,106	$588,575	$192,654
1916	1,860,259	856,776	227,694
1916 (revised)	544,317	193,405	169,500
1917	670,027	128,405	67,293
1919	672,111	130,038	92,585

Carranza made state governments even more dependent upon the federal government than they had been previously for the financing of capital intensive development projects. The federal government increased its political control over state governments through the provision and denial of grants and subsidies. Furthermore, given the limited size of the national budget and the responsibility to direct funds where they would bring the greatest benefit to the nation (or to the elite in Mexico City), the federal government would favor some regions over others. In the post-revolutionary period, most of the federal government's investment

benefited only a few states. Unfortunately for Chiapas, the state was never very important to politicians in Mexico City and the revolution did not alter this status.[70]

HOME RULE

As it became embarrassingly clear that the military government could not crush the rebellion in Chiapas by force, Mexico City ordered the implementation of a new strategy. In September 1916 First Chief Carranza appointed Colonel Pablo Villanueva, a Chiapanecan, interim governor while General Blas Corral was shifted to Chief of Military Operations of the region. Villanueva planned to end the war through conciliation and negotiation. To facilitate his peace offensive the new governor brought a number of rebel sympathizers into his government, including Humberto Consuelo Ruiz, brother of the *mapache* leaders Francisco and Fausto Ruiz. Consuelo Ruiz was appointed Secretary General of Government, the second most important civil post in state government. Villanueva's other controversal appointment was that of Rafael Macal as Treasurer General, an old friend of the Rabasas'.[71]

Although civil government was returned to Chiapanecan hands in late 1916, landowners and merchants had served the earlier military administration. Luis Espinosa, César Córdova, the Vidal brothers, Victorico Grajales, Moisés E. Villers, Eduardo Castellanos, and José Farrera, to name only a few, joined the *División Veintiuno* when it arrived in Chiapas in 1914.[72] *Hacendado* Raquel D. Cal y Mayor served in several capacities in the governments of Castro and Corral.[73] Still, the appointment of Villanueva "transformed the public spirit" in Tuxtla Gutiérrez and Tapachula and

cemented elite support for the Constitutionalist regime.[74] In late 1916 the Villanueva government sent eight delegates, all *hacendados*, to the constitutional convention in Querétaro.[75] *Hacendados* Diego Coeto Lara, Prudencio Pastrana, and Ezequiel Burguete sat on the state supreme court.[76] The Constitutionalist regime in Chiapas, particularly after 1916, had the support and active participation of many of the most respected names in Chiapanecan society.[77] No simple class war ensued in 1914. Rather, the revolution turned into a conflict within the elite, between one segment that cooperated with and integrated into the Constitutionalist movement and another segment that rejected any intrusion or change. The revolution turned into a civil war between those who compromised with the presence of the national State but also possessed the ability to use it for purposes of their own and those who would not.

Villanueva's first moves were to take steps to end the abuses committed by the military in Chiapas and to open negotiations with the *mapaches*.[78] Fernández Ruiz, however, held a secure military position in the field and demanded nothing less than the immediate evacuation of all *carrancista* troops and the election of a civil government composed entirely of Chiapanecans. Villanueva could not accept these conditions but before the end of the armistice Tirso Castañón attacked San Cristóbal, ending any further discussion. The governor then ordered General Corral to resume active military operations. Consuelo Ruiz resigned from the government and the policy of accommodation was in ruins.[79]

WAR AND MORE WAR

1917 was the most successful and active year of the *mapaches* during

the revolution. The total number of rebels under Fernández Ruiz and his subordinate commanders reached, perhaps, two thousand, rivaling and surpassing the number of government troops in Chiapas.[80] All travel between the major towns was organized in conveys with military escorts. One such convoy between Tonalá and Tuxtla Gutiérrez early in 1917 contained eighty-three ox carts and a guard of thirty mounted soldiers.[81] Train service between Tehuantepec and Tapachula occupied only the daylight hours and even then trains with heavy guard were derailed and held up.[82]

By June Fernández Ruiz felt strong enough to strike a final blow. He ordered diversions along the Panamerican railroad as well as in the highlands and early in the morning of June 5, sent a force of 500 men under the joint command of Colonels Fausto Ruiz and Wulfrano Aguilar into Tuxtla Gutiérrez. The attack had been well planned, for the capital of the state was defended by less than sixty soldiers while General Corral and over one thousand men were in the Frailesca valley looking for *mapaches*. The insurgents quickly took control of the city, although not the military garrison, began to loot businesses and homes, and burned the government palace. (Colonel Aguilar was dismissed by Fernández Ruiz for the destruction of the palace.) The *mapaches* were more interested with plunder than defense, however, for Constitutionalist reinforcements from nearby towns soon retook the capital. Fernández Ruiz ordered a second assault upon Tuxtla Gutiérrez on July 29, this time under the command of Tirso Castañón. They again quickly took the town and held it for twenty-two hours but failed to block the road from Ozocoautla and the reinforcements it carried. The *mapaches* possessed neither the leadership nor the discipline to fight a defensive war or hold on to any city for very long; they were raiders.[83]

1917 also saw a division in *mapache* ranks between Alberto Pineda

and Tirso Castañón. Pineda had become disgusted by Castañón's "vandalistic behavior," as he termed it, particularly Castañón's treatment of *comitecos*.[84] Pineda believed that Castañón damaged the common cause and Castañón was jealous of Pineda's prestige and authority in the Central Highlands. This feud led to frequent armed classes between the two rebel bands. In March 1918, Fernández Ruiz sided with Pineda and expelled Castañón, who fled to Guatemala.[85]

Frustrated in the lowlands, Fernández Ruiz ordered an offensive in the highlands in January 1918. He sent four of his own regiments to serve under Pineda and elevated the *cristobalense* to brigadier general.[86] With about one thousand soldiers, Pineda left his base in Ocosingo and over the next two months took Simojovel, Palenque, Salto del Agua, Sivaca, Copainala, and Pichucalco. This successful campaign was abruptly halted by Salvador Alvarado in March.[87]

The failure to successfully prosecute the war in Chiapas by 1918 led President Carranza to call in one of his most respected generals, Salvador Alvarado. Alvarado arrived in Chiapas from Yucatán in late March with over four thousand soldiers. In Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Alvarado formed a citizens' committee to negotiate a political settlement with the *mapaches*. Negotiations did begin and took place on an isolated *hacienda* in the department of Chiapa, but during one of the sessions a column of government troops under the command of Carlos Vidal closed in on the negotiators, killing some on both sides, although the principal rebel leaders escaped. This was the same kind of treacherous tactic which led to Emiliano Zapata's assassination in April 1919, also at the hands of the Constitutionalists.[88] Alvarado then turned to total war.

On March 20, following the example of the Spanish army in Cuba and

the United States army in the Philippines, General Alvarado ordered a program of population reconcentration. The departments of Tonalá, Tuxtla, Chiapa, and La Libertad were declared rebel zones. All inhabitants in those areas were required to resettle in government controlled towns or they would be considered and treated as rebels after May 31, 1918.[89]

The reconcentration program, more than any single action of the revolution, destroyed the economy of Chiapas and brought starvation to the state. The North American consul at Salina Cruz among others charged that the main result of the program was "to fill the pockets of the government generals and their lieutenants, who are thus enabled to buy up the livestock and other belongings of the reconcentrated population at nominal figures, and to embitter the people against the government."[90] More people than ever abandoned the state or joined the rebellion in 1918, particularly small property owners, rather than be shot at in the country or go hungry in the towns.[91] Governor Villanueva was not willing to pursue victory at any price and worked at cross purposes with Alvarado.[92] When villagers, ranchers, and *hacendados* requested permission not to reconcentrate, the governor assented.[93]

Faced with an aggressive campaign of nearly five thousand Constitutionalists, Fernández Ruiz avoided battle with Alvarado. Alvarado's two lieutenants, Generals Blas Corral and Carlos Vidal, divided the state between them, the former going after Pineda and the latter after Fernández Ruiz. In April Corral attacked Pineda's base, Ocosingo, with 1500 regulars. Pineda, with only 300 men, held out for fourteen days. On the fourteenth day Alvarado personally led an additional 500 regulars and 500 indigenous troops, forcing Pineda to escape during the night.[94] Corral continued to harrass *pinedistas*, forcing them to break up into small groups and move

into Tabasco and Guatemala. He recaptured Simojovel and Pichucalco, although in October Pineda resurfaced and briefly occupied San Cristóbal.[95]

Alvarado returned to Mexico City in the fall of 1918 to report to Carranza. He told the president, with considerable exaggeration, that the rebellion had been crushed and in an interview with the newspapers stated that three-fourths of Chiapas had been pacified.[96] Alvarado returned to the state near the end of the year to mop up, although by that time much of his expeditionary force had been transferred to other parts of Mexico. Fernández Ruiz demonstrated the deficiency of Alvarado's pacification when he ambushed the famous general near La Concordia. Alvarado barely escaped to Tuxtla Gutiérrez and from there he returned to Mexico City. He covered his defeat with declarations of victory and did not return to Chiapas.[97] The stalemate continued. The government could not pacify the countryside and the rebels could not hold the cities.

Although Alvarado left Chiapas in defeat, he had in fact come close to breaking the back of the rebellion. Due to the hardships imposed by this aggressive campaign the *mapaches* had been reduced to less than 600 men by late 1918 and were running out of arms and ammunition. Furthermore, at the end of 1918 and throughout 1919 the entire state was hit by the Spanish influenza epidemic and a bout of malaria. Both devastated the *mapache* ranks. In October one of the Macias brothers showed up at the Mexican legation in Guatemala asking the ambassador to arrange suitable peace terms between the warring parties. Fernández Ruiz, it seems, was ready to compromise. The legation communicated this desire to General Alvarado, but he refused to discuss any terms but those of unconditional surrender. The legation then reported to Mexico City that due to the demoralization of the *mapaches* and their lack of arms and men, 1500 men

commanded by a respected general other than Alvarado could end the rebellion. The Carranza government did not heed this advice.[98]

The year 1919, from a military point of view, was relatively quiet. The only significant military action took place near the end of the year. In November and December, Fernández Ruiz routed two different Constitutionalist columns near Villa Flores, the rebel capital.[99] The most heated conflict during 1919, however, took place on the political battlefield within Constitutionalist ranks.

POLITICAL BATTLES

In 1918 President Carranza let it be known that Chiapas would return to civilian rule and that gubernatorial elections would be held in May 1920. Chiapas then turned its attention to political rather than military campaigns. Two rival political camps immediately formed in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, one supporting Pablo Villanueva and the other Carlos Vidal. State government employees, personal friends, and important *tuxtlecos* formed the pro-Villanueva *Partido Liberal Chiapaneco* while Vidal's supporters, many of them fellow officers, formed the *Club Liberal Joaquín Miguel Gutiérrez*. The opposing political parties were not completely unfamiliar to Chiapas. Behind Villanueva was Ramón Rabasa, Raquel D. Cal y Mayor, Rául E. Rincón, and Lisandro López, *rabasistas* all.[100] Vidal had the support of the Anti-reelectionist club in San Cristóbal and its leader, Jesús Martínez Rojas, was Vidal's campaign manager.[101]

Vidal, more than anything else, was the all round opposition candidate and his program reflected his diverse constituencies. The Vidal platform was an interesting combination of Constitutionalism (support for

Carranza's reforms), the 1911 program (economic development of the Central Highlands), and the *mapache* program (a free and autonomous Chiapas).[102]

Both candidates campaigned as outsiders: Villanueva resigned his commission and ran as a civilian against a government of army officers; Vidal ran as the military officer unstained by sordid political compromises.[103] In the towns and villages factions competing for local offices endorsed either Villanueva or Vidal, their decisions based less on political issues than judgements as to who was most likely to win. Preparations for the first round, the municipal elections of November 1919, occupied all of 1919. Most government employees backed Villanueva while army officers did their best on behalf of *vidalista* candidates, or more commonly, against *villanuevistas*. The real issues of local political contests had little or nothing to do with broader national or even state-wide issues, but pitted the "outs" against the "ins;" one clan against another, one part of town against another.[104] Yet, beginning in 1918 politics began to take on a new character in some areas in response to the politizication of the countryside during the revolution. The political polarization of *indios* versus *ladinos*, the landless versus the landed, and workers versus capitalists appeared. The politics of class was beginning in Chiapas.[105]

The evolution of politics in Motozintla, *cabecera* of the department of Mariscal, in 1919 and 1920, from traditional family rivalry to class polarization, was pivotal in the transformation of Chiapanecan politics in the 1920s. Motozintla is located in a small, high valley in the Sierra Madre, just north of the coffee producing region of Soconusco. For decades the indian villages in Mariscal had provided a large

percentage of the labor force on the coffee plantations. Thanks to the difficult terrain and their long distance from Tapachula the villages had remained free, although they had been adversely affected by the *reparto* program before the revolution. This rather unique environment provided the birthplace for the first socialist organization in Chiapas.

In 1919 two political clubs were formed in Motozintla around two alliances of political clans to participate in the upcoming elections. The *Club Liberal Mariscalense*, run by the Avendaño, García, and Ruiz families, was organized to maintain control of the *ayuntamiento* and support Villanueva. Since this was the party in power it was also the party of the *enganchadores*, the ever present labor contractors. The *Club Liberal Belisario Domínguez*, dominated by the Velázquez, Pérez, and Zunún families, was the opposition party. It supported Vidal because the *Club Liberal Mariscalense* supported Villanueva.[106]

Villanueva won the first bout with Vidal when he put his supporters in most of the municipal presidencies in the 1919 elections.[107] Not surprisingly, the *Club Liberal Mariscalense* won in Motozintla.[108] After the election the *Club Liberal Belisario Domínguez* underwent a radical transformation. Under the influence of Raymundo Enríquez, a federal agrarian engineer in Soconusco, and Ricardo Alfonso Paniagua, originally from Motozintla and in 1919 a representative of the Socialist Party of Michoacán, the party broadened its base to include indian workers and women. In the last days of December 1919 the judge in Motozintla reported that "for several nights Mendoza [leader of the *Club Liberal Belisario Domínguez*] and others have held secret meetings, with the indigenous class armed with clubs, *machetes*, and firearms; it is rumored that the leaders will effect an uprising tomorrow."[109] Several meetings were held

during the first two weeks of January 1920 leading to the formation of the *Partido Socialista Chiapaneco* (the Chiapanecan Socialist Party or PSC) on January 13.[110]

The PSC, reported Municipal President Avendaño, was a "true workers' mob" of over 200 members which he characterized as "very advanced bolshevik socialism."[111] The PSC, according to Paniagua, "was founded with the principal object to procure the improvement of our proletarian classes."[112] The party's general program called for the socialization of land and all instruments of production, social equality, and the institution of communism in Mexico.[113] The municipal government in Motozintla used every means at its disposal to destroy the PSC; the party was denied permission to organize, meetings were disrupted by the police, and party members were arrested for agitation.[114] Paniagua was busy organizing PSC branches elsewhere in the department of Mariscal when the Constitutionalist regime in Mexico City and in Chiapas was overthrown.[115]

VICTORY BY PERSEVERANCE

Venustiano Carranza's term of office was to expire in December 1920 and under the Constitution of 1917 he was ineligible for reelection. On June 1, 1919, General Alvaro Obregón announced his candidacy for the presidency of Mexico. No other man in the country had as much prestige and popularity as Obregón, who was widely believed to be Carranza's choice to succeed him. Early in 1920, however, the pro-administration newspaper *El Demócrata* formally launched the candidacy of Ignacio Bonillas, the Mexican ambassador to the United States and a man generally unknown in Mexico. It was a strange choice on Carranza's part, and it led to

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In April 1920 a revolutionary movement formed in the state of Sonora (Obregón's own) under the leadership of Governor Adolfo De la Huerta. The conflict originated as a federal-state dispute over the placement of army units in the state but the rebellion quickly evolved into a drive aimed at preventing Carranza from imposing an unpopular successor. Obregón, fearful of government imprisonment (he was ordered to appear before a Mexico City court), joined the movement and by late April Carranza was faced with a serious revolt. Most of the army followed Obregón and joined the Agua Prieta movement, as it was called from the name of the Sonoran town where the rebellion was proclaimed. As in late 1914, Carranza was forced to abandon Mexico City for Veracruz. Before his train reached the port city it was attacked and the president was obliged to escape into the Puebla countryside on horseback. On the night of May 20 his pursuers found camp of the presidential party and the First Chief of the Constitutionalist revolution was killed.[117]

The repercussion of these events in Chiapas, as in most states, was overwhelming. In March Interim Governor General Alejo González (Villanueva had resigned in 1919 in order to run for governor) met with Fernández Ruiz and the two agreed to suspend hostilities until mid-April. In the subsequent peace negotiations, the *mapache caudillo* dropped his demand for the immediate evacuation of federal troops from the state if the government would incorporate the *mapaches* into the federal military. Fernández Ruiz also sought the temporary suspension of taxation of rural property for the purpose of reconstruction, the agreement by the federal government to build a railroad into the interior of Chiapas, the division of national lands for the benefit of the "proletarian class",

and the election of a Chiapanecan government.[118]

By April the question of negotiation became irrelevant as the Constitutionalist government of Alejo González began to collapse. Early in the month Albino Lacunza, the commander of the government garrison in Villa Flores, joined the *mapaches* in seconding the Agua Prieta movement. Fernández Ruiz declared himself First Chief of the movement in Chiapas. On May 1, the 150 man garrison at Chiapa de Corzo pledged its loyality to Obregón and Fernández Ruiz. Five days later gubernatorial candidate Carlos Vidal went over to the Agua Prieta movement and most of the army in Chiapas followed his lead.[119] General González abandoned Tuxtla Gutiérrez on May 18 with nearly 1000 men and tried, unsuccessfully, to join Carranza in Veracruz.[120] Fernández Ruiz occupied the state capital four days later. Perseverance had won the war; the *mapaches* owned Chiapas.[121]

By declaring his adherence to the Agua Prieta movement in its early stages Fernández Ruiz won the good will of the new authorities in Mexico City. Early in June, Interim President Adolfo De la Huerta chose Francisco Ruiz, one of Fernández Ruiz's lieutenants, interim governor of Chiapas. Fernández Ruiz was designated Chief of Military Operations in the state of Chiapas and his rank of General of Division was confirmed by the president. The *mapache* army was incorporated into the federal army. In July Carlos Vidal, Francisco Ruiz, Héctor Macias, and Alberto Pineda endorsed Tiburcio Fernández Ruiz for constitutional governor of the state. Running unopposed, Fernández Ruiz won the November election and took office on December 1, 1920.[122]

Another group won political power late in 1920. The collapse of Constitutionalist rule had local as well as state-wide consequences. In

some localities *vidalista* parties joined the Agua Prieta movement and, with military support, overturned local governments. Such was the case in Motozintla. Ricardo Alfonso Paniagua placed *Partido Socialista Chiapaneco* members on the Mariscal electoral college and elected in November a socialist municipal government.[123] The stage was set for the political battles of the 1920s.

REFLECTIONS

The *mapache* victory was unique in the Mexican Revolution. Only in Chiapas did a genuinely counterrevolutionary movement come to power. But the victory did not move the calendar back to 1910; the Chiapas the *mapaches* fought to save was irrevocably lost. As a result of five years of reformist administration and civil war the vast majority of the population, previously excluded from political participation, had been politicized. If the masses could be mobilized by a political party to struggle for their class interests they would constitute a powerful political force. The politics of elites were giving way to the politics of the masses.

The Mexican State nearly disintegrated during the ten year Mexican Revolution. No government was able to reestablish the degree of control exercized by Porfirio Díaz during the period 1910-1920. Because of this the powerless, the disaffected, and the marginal elements of the population had an opportunity to act on behalf of their own interests. They took land, refused to pay rent, organized strikes, overturned local governments, and began to take control of their lives.

Out of this period of dissolution, and in response to the politicization of the population, the national State emerged potentially stronger. Its role in the life of the nation expanded. The State assumed the responsibility to regulate, as General Blas Corral said, "the relationship between the capitalist and the workers." This, combined with the porfirian program of economic development, suggested a blueprint of balanced modernization for Mexico. A potentially more centralized State also emerged from the revolution. The Constitution of 1917 made the State the principal promotor of public wellbeing and made the office of chief executive the principal, and unhindered, agent of the State. This is Lorenzo Meyer's meaning when he ways that "the Revolution is not a negation of the political past but rather an impressive step forward in the modernization of the Mexican authoritarian State."[124]

PART THREE:

1920-1947

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CHAPTER SEVEN

IN DEFENSE OF CLASS INTERESTS

> The proletarian phase of the Revolution
> begins properly in 1920.
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> Lázaro Cárdenas, 1931

The revolution began the politicization of the rural working class in Chiapas. Awareness of and concern with political issues on the part of Chiapanecan *campesinos* arose only after the absolute power of *hacendados, caciques,* and *jefes políticos* over the relations of production had been relaxed. Mobilization of the rural working class in Chiapas was not directed from above as in Michoacán and Yucatán where the state governments formed agrarian defense leagues by 1916.[1] Labor organizers, agrarian leaders, and radical political activists gained access to *campesinos* in Chiapas as a result of ten years of political disorder and began to organize them "in defense of class interests."[2] The revolution created the necessary conditions for radical social reorganization; the struggle to attain it began only in 1920.

Mapache administration from 1920 to 1924 concerned itself primarily with the welfare of the landed class in general and the friends of the anti-Constitutionalist rebellion in particular. An alliance of former Constitutionalists, socialists, labor unions, and village agrarian committees soon was formed in opposition to the *mapache* government.

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This alliance channeled popular discontent in the state to defeat the *mapache* government and establish a reform government in 1925. Before this government had time to consolidate and institutionalize its power within the state it was overthrown and purged by the federal government, the casualty in the repression of a national rebellion. Still, between 1920 and 1927 a revolution as profound as that in 1910-1920 took place. A segment of the once powerless Chiapanecan working class began to organize political parties, labor unions, and self-governing agrarian communities, creating a new and powerful political constituency in the state. From this constituency came the new demands for an even stronger and more active national State.

THE AFTERMATH OF CIVIL WAR

Evidence of the destructive nature of the civil war existed in nearly every district and municipality in Chiapas. Angel Primo, an *hacienda* foreman from Mapastepec, wrote in 1920 that "all the neighboring ranches and plantations have almost disappeared owing to the past revolution."[3] Governor Tiburcio Fernández Ruiz informed President Alvaro Obregón in 1921 that all telegraph and telephone lines as well as roads were "totally destroyed and neglected during the period of struggle."[4] Fully one half of the houses in Ocosingo, for example, a town of 3000 inhabitants, had been destroyed.[5] The Panamerican railroad, a major economic artery for Chiapas, was in serious disrepair.[6] It would require decades to recover materially and economically from the civil war.

The social and economic structure of the state had sustained important changes over the past ten years. The population of Chiapas had dropped from 438,843 in 1910 to 421,744 in 1921.[7] (See Table 10 in Appendix.)

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Although not important in overall numbers, Chiapas had lost a significant percentage of the capital-holding and managerial class through emigration, as numerous abandoned properties and businesses demonstrated. The North American colony disappeared almost entirely. Germans, on the other hand, stayed and prospered.[8] Fewer *campesinos* lived on *haciendas* or *ranchos*, while the percentage of the population living in independent villages increased from thirty-six percent to forty-nine percent between 1910 and 1921. (The number of independent villages increased from 316 to 606.)[9] The depressed rural economy and diminished social control exercized by landowners during the revolution encouraged *hacienda* residents to petition for and obtain political status for their communities or simply to establish -- or move to -- independent villages. The statistical record supports the view that *campesinos* began to regain control of their lives between 1910 and 1920.

Despite impressive changes, nevertheless, much remained the same. Chiapas was still overwhelmingly rural and indian. Eighty-four percent of the state's population was classified in the census of 1921 as rural, most living in communities of less than fifty inhabitants.[10] Over forty thousand Chiapanecans in 1921 did not speak Spanish but an indian language.[11] Land was still concentrated in too few hands: seventy-two *hacendados* possessed twenty percent of all privately owned land, although this was a smaller concentration than in most states.[12] Of the approximately seventy thousand families in Chiapas, only thirteen thousand owned land, and slightly more than one thousand owned properties valued at over $5000.[13] Most Chiapanecans still subsisted by working for others through wage labor, the various forms of renting and sharecropping, and -- still -- indebted servitude.[14]

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The revolution effected only minimal change in the Central Highlands and the relationship between indians and *ladinos*. The indigenous communities continued to supply labor to the coffee plantations in Soconusco and the *monterías* in Palenque and Chilón. Indebted servitude, although banned in 1914, remained an important element in the lives of indians, as did the *enganchadores* and *tiendas de raya*.[15] Population growth, soil erosion, and the depressed economy forced more and more indians to rent lands in the Central Lowlands. *Hacendados* permitted indians to clear and cultivate fields in exchange for a rent of corn or beans. In this way landowners opened new pasture and obtained produce for themselves or to market. This system permitted ambitious *zinacantecos* to earn enough money to buy some land in the highlands, to avoid work in the coffee harvests, and even to become employers or other indians.[16] Social and economic conditions changed less for indians due to their cultural, linguistic, and geographical isolation and their failure to organize politically.

MAPACHE RECONSTRUCTION

The administration of Tiburcio Fernández Ruiz (December 1920 to December 1924) emphasized increased productivity, economic recovery, and material reconstruction rather than the redistribution of land or the organization of rural workers. It matched fairly closely the priorities of President Alvaro Obregón, similarly elected to a four year term in 1920. Obregón, unlike Fernández Ruiz, recognized the political value of a sympathetic constituency composed of organized labor and agrarians.[17]

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involved close federal-state cooperation in the advancement of agriculture, communications, and education. The governor informed Obregón in early 1921 that he wished to "introduce modern systems" to Chiapanecan agriculture. He asked the president to help him establish several agricultural schools and research stations, to rebuild the Industrial-Military School (a technical preparatory destroyed during the civil war), and grant Chiapas $250,000 for road construction.[18] In 1921 Obregón provided funding for one agricultural school, in 1922 he contributed $20,000 to rebuild the Industrial-Military School, and in 1923 he authorized a $15,000 monthly subsidy for road construction.[19] Despite stringent national budgets throughout his term of office, Obregón managed to meet in part the goveror's major requests. At the same time, Obregón did not give Fernández Ruiz a free hand in governing Chiapas.

Mapache reconstruction also involved cutting taxes, discouraging land reform, and ending enforcement of the *Ley de Obreros*. The administration forgave fines levied on landowners who did not pay taxes during the civil war and just forgot about the unpaid taxes. Assessments on rural properties in the war zones (Tuxtla, Chiapa, and La Libertad) were canceled for 1920 and 1921. Individuals were also given liberal postponements of payment and even dispensations.[20]

In 1921 the state government of Chiapas promulugated a state agrarian law which affected only properties over 8000 *hectáreas*, or about seventy properties. In accordance with this law landowners were required to designate 8000 *hectáreas* that they intended to keep. Then, working with the State Commission of Fractional Division, they were required to sell the excess property to willing buyers in twenty annual payments.[21] A few villages, frustrated by the interminable delay of the federal program,

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purchased land under the terms of this law. Unlike the federal agrarian program which was centered upon the restitution or granting of land to villages, state legislation favored individuals with sufficient capital to establish small to medium size ranches. It was an imaginative program but, unfortunately, it was hampered in Chiapas by the high ceiling limit of 8000 *hectáreas*, which was one of the highest in the nation.[22]

Under the federal agrarian program villages with political status (*ciudad, villa, pueblo, agencia municipal, congregación*) could petition for the restitution of lands illegally alienated or for outright grants. Petitions were first presented to State Agrarian Commissions (CLA) and investigated by agrarian engineers as to the validity of the claim and the need for land. Petitions approved by the CLA and the governor were then passed on for inspection to the National Agrarian Commission (CNA) while at the same time the land was provisionally granted to the village. When petitions were approved by the CNA the president would sign the title, making definitive the grant or restitution.[23]

In Chiapas the federal agrarian program was administered with little enthusiasm. The Chiapas CLA was staffed by landowners who held little sympathy for the idea of expropriating land from *hacendados*.[24] The CLA employed only two agrarian engineers, a reduction from six during the Constitutionalist period. According to the *Memorias* of the National Agrarian Department, the Fernández Ruiz administration approved only nine provisional grants benefiting just over one thousand families. (The governor claimed fourteen grants.)[25] In the same time span Governor Adalberto Tejeda of Veracruz pushed forward 154 grants benefiting 24,000 *campesinos*.[26] Judicial interference (restraining orders from district judges) also contributed to the sluggish nature of the federal agrarian program in Chiapas.[27] (See Table 11 in Appendix.)

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The Fernández Ruiz government ended public vigilance and enforcement of the reform decrees on labor relations and education. The administration employed neither work nor education inspectors to check on illegal labor practices or whether landowners provided schools and teachers for the children of their workers. The budgets for education and agrarian reform declined relative to the 1914-1920 period while no funds were budgeted for enforcement of the *Ley de Obreros*.[28]

The political composition of the state administration was almost entirely *mapache*.[29] To the added displeasure of Carlos Vidal and Alberto Pineda, the government was oblivious to the economic needs of the Central Highlands and the Gulf Plain. Fernández Ruiz emphasized the reconstruction of the state highway (now called the National Highway) but abandoned work on the still unfinished San Cristóbal - Salto del Agua road. Tax concessions, furthermore, were generally granted only to lowland *hacendados*, and most of these were in the *mapache* departments of Chiapa and La Libertad.[30]

Carlos Vidal and the former Constitutionalists were not happy with this administration; neither were Alberto Pineda and his supporters, villagers petitioning for land, nor people in the towns and villages who had suffered under the lawless and sometimes brutal treatment of *mapaches* during the civil war. The government was unpopular in Chiapas almost before it took office.

PARTIDO SOCIALISTA CHIAPANECO

The *Partido Socialista Chiapaneco* (PSC), formed in January 1920, was the first party in Chiapas to exclusively champion the rights and promote the welfare of the rural working class. Its enemies, however, were far more powerful and were determined to destroy it.

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In the fall of 1920 PSC president Ricardo Alfonso Paniagua proposed to Carlos Vidal that they join forces. Vidal, soon to be Chief of the General Staff Division in the War Ministry under Obregón, enthusiastically agreed. He directed the *vidalista* party in Tuxtla Gutiérrez to work with Paniagua to create a "Great Socialist Party." Vidal also informed Paniagua that "at all costs we need the unionization of all workers' organizations of the state in order that, as a socialist base, we can introduce in that region the dictatorship of the proletariate and end once and for all the *caciques* and kings who attempt to dominate that unfortunate entity."[31]

In many ways this was an ideal alliance. Paniagua needed the support of a well known politician, particularly one with contacts in the national capital, if the PSC was to have more than a local influence or even survive. Vidal, a general in the army and well placed in the War Ministry, also provided the PSC protection by federal military units in Chiapas. Vidal, on the other hand, needed a broad base of support in his native state to further his political ambition. Having secured a strong patron, the PSC took the offensive.[32]

During 1920 the PSC remained in the mountains of Mariscal, affecting Soconusco only to the extent of hampering the work of *enganchadores* in Motozintla.[33] Beginning in 1921, however, the party began to extend its influence into the coffee zone. PSC agents visited coffee plantations (often with a guard of fifty mounted and armed men), organized unions, and tried (unsuccessfully) to negotiate collective contracts with the planters.[34] Assisting the PSC in this region was agrarian engineer Raymundo Enríquez, who was well known in the villages as a sympathetic agrarian.[35] In April 1921 a special commissioner, appointed by Fernández Ruiz to look into

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planters' complaints, reported that the PSC had caused "demoralization, disorder, and the abandonment of work, leaving the coffee enterprises in a difficult situation."[36]

Agitation by the PSC led to the formation in the spring of 1922 of the *Sindicato de Obreros y Campesinos de Soconusco* (Worker's and Peasants' Union of Soconusco), headed by Pompeyo Cárdenas of Tuxtla Chico and affiliated with the national labor sindicate the *Confederación Regional de Obreros Mexicanos* (CROM). The *Sindicato*, according to a manifesto by local planters, "is pursuing an effort sufficiently pernicious to society and to the *hacendados* of this region."[37] In particular, one of their complaints was the issuance of cards by the PSC to members of the *Sindicato* informing *enganchadores,* foremen, and local officials that the holder of the card was not to be molested. These cards, according to the manifesto, made *campesinos* believe that "they should respect no authority."[38]

By the fall of 1922 the first workers' organization in Chiapas was ready to confront the coffee planters. With only one or two weeks before the beginning of the harvest the PSC called a strike in the coffee zone by members of the *Sindicato de Obreros y Campesinos.*[39] The strike, which began on September 22, 1922 and involved five thousand workers, lasted only two days. The government killed one of the leaders of the strike and jailed twenty more while planters provided a large payment to the federal army zone commander to restore order.[40] Fearful of losing the harvest, however, the planters agreed to an eight-hour work way, schools on the plantations, and the liquidation of workers' debts at the end of each year but not to the demand for higher wages. This first confrontation, although not entirely successful, had fomented "true alarm among the *finqueros* of the coffee zones."[41] The PSC was mobilizing workers to act in behalf of their political interests as well their economic interests.

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THE 1922 ELECTIONS

Politics in Chiapas in the 1920s was vastly different from what it had been prior to the revolution. The channels of communication, administration, and control had disintegrated from twelve powerful *jefes políticos* to 110 weak municipal presidents. The diffusion of local political power was enhanced by the survival of *caciques* whose extralegal power and authority exceeded that of many municipal presidents. This political environment was further complicated by federal military commanders, labor unions, and village agrarian committees (the bodies that petitioned for land). The potential for conflict between these different and often rival power centers was substantial and only multiplied the difficulties of a state government in establishing political control. The one significant exception to this portrait of a highly politicized countryside was the indigenous municipality. Here the state government was able to reestablish the degree of tight political control it had exercized before 1910.[42]

The administration of Fernández Ruiz certainly did its best to establish political control in Chiapas before the 1922 elections, generally by following traditional policies. In the countryside the regime was clearly allied with *hacendados* and *caciques*.[43] The government elevated villages to municipal status or diminished them to *agencias municipales* depending on their degree of support for the regime. Communities pushing for agrarian reform, for example, were frequently converted into *agencias municipales* which were governed by officials appointed by the governor.[44] Another method of political control was the cooptation of the village agrarian committees. In the village of Copoya (Cintalapa), for example, the agrarian executive committee was appointed (illegally) by the CLA.

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Besides supporting the state government the agrarian committee relegated landless *campesinos* to poor quality national lands and even charged rent for the parcels.[45] In Soconusco the state government was closely identified with the political club "*Orden, Unión, y Trabajo*," which had been formed by the Tapachula *Cámara de Agricultura*, an organization of coffee planters.[46]

The political opposition to the Fernández Ruiz administration consisted of former Constitutionalists and socialists. Both wings recognized General Carlos Vidal as the party boss. Manuel de J. León directed the Constitutionalist wing in Tuxtla Gutiérrez as president of the *Comité Chiapaneco de la Confederación Revolucionaria* (Chiapanecan Committee of the Revolutionary Confederation, CCCR). The CCCR proposed "revolutionary socialism" as its program, nominated Carlos Vidal for senator, and presented a slate of candidates for the national legislature, state legislature, and for the municipal governments.[47] The PSC in Mariscal and Soconusco, although part of the CCCR, had its own regional slate of candidates which included Raymundo Enríquez for national deputy. *Vidalistas* throughout the state used village agrarian committees as ready-made political action groups and shadow municipal governments. In Soconusco and Mariscal the *vidalistas* had a well organized base in the *Sindicato de Obreros y Campesinos* and were protected by a federal regiment commanded by Colonel Luis Vidal, brother of Carlos Vidal.[48]

The *mapache* administration was determined to win the fall elections despite overwhelming unpopularity in the towns and countryside. They employed various forms of official imposition. In Huehuetán (Soconusco), for example, the pro-administration *ayuntamiento* held no elections but simply named its own replacement.[49] Opposition leaders throughout the

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state were arrested before the election, voting booths were set up on pro-administration *haciendas*, and ballots were given to voters selectively in some localities to insure favorable outcomes.[50] Nevertheless, *vidalistas* won elections in about forty-two of fifty-seven towns in the state. Governor Fernández Ruiz, however, with control of the state legislature, "did not hesitate to declare such elections null and void and name members of his own political party to substitute for those who were imposed."[51] It was a blantant political imposition and it was resisted.

THE PEOPLE ROSE UP IN ARMS

Immediately following the state legislature's nullification of the *pro-vidalista* elections and the installation of the new *ayuntamientos*, violence broke out in the departments of Mariscal and Soconusco. The North American consul reported that "the people rose up in arms against the governor of the state."[52] Imposition in Motozintla sparked a demonstration march to the municipal palace and demands for a change of power. The city police fired into the crowd and the mob then attacked the building, killing the new municipal president and some policemen.[53] The district judge subsequently ordered the army to arrest and imprison over eighty *campesinos*. All just happened to be members of the *Partido Socialista Chiapaneco*. The judge considered this a case of personal ambition rather than political insurrection.[54]

In January 1923 an "*ejército reorganizador*" was formed in Soconusco by Colonel Luis Vidal. This peoples' army included as many as a thousand workers, most of them members of the *Sindicato de Obreros y Campesinos*. It threatened *ayuntamientos* in Huehuetán, Tapachula, Huixtla,

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Finally the national government intervened. President Obregón sent Secretary of Government Plutarco Elías Calles, Secretary of War Francisco Serrano, and a confidential agent to investigate the problem in Chiapas.[56] Calles failed to reach an understanding with Fernández Ruiz and Obregón called the governor to Mexico City, told him to appoint a provisional governor to enact the necessary conciliatory measures, and threatened to remove all federal army units from the state if he did not cooperate.[57] As a result, Fernández Ruiz appointed Manuel E. Cruz, a member of the administration's inner circle, provisional governor. Cruz placed the blame for the impositions on Secretary General of Government Amadeo Ruiz who was dismissed. The provisional governor suggested that Fernández Ruiz did not have much control over his own administration. He also ordered two new municipal elections and ordered that duly elected officials that had been deposed after the election be reinstated. Cruz asked the state legislature to pass an amnesty law clearing the *vidalistas* of criminal liability but the deputies refused. When Fernández Ruiz returned to office he decreed the amnesty measure desired by Obregón.[58]

The results of the 1922 elections were mixed. The state legislature returned with a pro-administration majority and there was a fairly even split in the political composition of the municipal governments. In the Chiapas deputation to the national legislature, however, only two *mapache* candidates were elected.[58]

The Fernández Ruiz administration, despite the rebellion and Obregón's disapproval, followed the same procedures in the 1923 municipal elections. In November 1923, for example, Miguel Pino y Farrera, an officer of the PSC and editor of the Arriaga newspaper *Hombre Libre*, was arrested for

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for sedition, having promoted several socialist candidates.[60] Notwithstanding numerous abuses and illegalities, the administration again lost political control of the most important towns in the state. And again, the state legislature voted to give the governor power to name "provisional" *ayuntamientos* if citizens' groups in the municipalities asked for the nullification of the elections. This technique permitted the governor to legally impose politically acceptable *ayuntamientos* throughout Chiapas.[61] Again Chiapanecans took up arms to resist imposition, this time during a national insurrection.

CHIAPAS AND THE DE LA HUERTA REBELLION

The dominant theme of the administration of President Alvaro Obregón was accommodation and conciliation. Only by such a policy could his government hope to survive in the dangerous political climate of post-revolutionary Mexico.[62] Nevertheless, several powerful elements in the country were alienated during his tenure of office, a situation which perhaps was unavoidable. In his campaign to reform and tame the new revolutionary establishment, Obregón discharged nearly one half of the army and numerous generals.[63] His diplomatic agreements with the United States government on claims, petroleum, and agrarian expropriations won the disapproval of ultranationalists, and his designation of the then perceived radical Plutarco Elías Calles as his successor frightened conservatives.[64] The succession question also antagonized former Interim President Adolfo de la Huerta, the Finance Secretary under Obregón and a presidencial hopeful.

In December 1923 thirty-six generals and fully one half of the army joined Adolfo de la Huerta in rebellion against Obregón and his

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"impositional tendencies."[65] Originating in Veracruz, the movement was rapidly seconded by political and military leaders in several states, including Chiapas' neighbors Oaxaca and Tabasco.[66] Fernández Ruiz remained loyal to Obregón but his government faced serious threats from without and within.

Inside Chiapas a popular rebellion broke out against the government of Fernández Ruiz which was of a greater magnitude than the one at the beginning of the year. On December 28, Colonel Victorico Grajales, municipal president of Chiapa de Corzo, initiated the uprising. "Chiapas is one of the states," he proclaimed, "perhaps the only one in the republic, that is ruled by an anti-revolutionary government."[67] Grajales was careful to affirm that his movement, while locally seditious, was loyal to the government of Obregón. The rebellion in Chiapa de Corzo was soon joined by the *Partido Socialista Chiapaneco* in Mariscal and Soconusco, and independent groups in Comitán, Jiquipilas, Cintalapa, and Pichucalco.[68] The most serious defection originated in Tabasco. Alberto Pineda and his 2500 man 67th mounted regiment joined rebel General Carlos Greene in a successful seige of Villahermosa. Early in 1924 Pineda invaded Chiapas and captured San Cristóbal Las Casas. Fernández Ruiz, in response, moved his government to Tapachula, the headquarters of federal General Donato Bravo Izquierdo, one batallion, and three regiments. Of all the insurrections in Chiapas, only Pineda's was genuinely *delahuertista* (anti-Obregon) and considered a serious threat by General Bravo.[69]

General Bravo negotiated a temporary truce with Colonel Grajales in the local political struggle for the duration of the national rebellion and permitted no state government military action against the *anti-mapache* rebels. This decision was motivated by Bravo's assessment that the real

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enemy was Pineda and by Bravo's reluctance to declare war against the political allies of his military superior, General Carlos Vidal.[70] General Bravo reactivated Colonel Grajales' commission and transfered him and his volunteer regiment to fight in Tabasco. The general also armed the PSC, which raised a workers' batallion to fight Pineda.[71] Bravo Izquierdo, understanding the political situation in Chiapas, prevented the state from become a redoubt for the *delahuertistas* and thereby prolonging the rebellion.

Having postponed the political struggle in Chiapas until after the rebellion, General Bravo undertook the Chiapanecan campaign against Pineda in April 1924. Pineda, in league with Generals César A. Lara and Cándido Aguilar, held several strong defensive positions in the Central Highlands. Throughout April and May, state and federal forces pushed Pineda back in several bloody encounters. Although Pineda was finally forced into Guatemala in July, he had fought one of the most aggressive campaigns in Chiapanecan history.[72]

The *delahuertista* rebellion had been the first phase of the 1924 electoral struggle for governor, and as such, it had strengthened the *vidalistas*. They had been armed by the army to fight Pineda but they would use them against the *mapache* government. They were mobilized and prepared to as aggressive a political campaign as the Fernandez Ruiz administration.[73]

THE TRIUMPH OF LABORISM

"The man that will augur the triumph of laborism in Chiapas,"[74] Carlos Vidal and President Obregón met in mid-1924. Vidal came away from that meeting with the mistaken belief that he had the president's tacit

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support for his bid to become governor of Chiapas. Vidal and his campaign manager, PSC chief Ricardo Alfonso Paniagua, then launched an all-out political struggle secure in the knowledge that the federal government would back them.[75]

Governor Fernández Ruiz, as before, spared no effort to control and win the July elections. In June, the governor took a three month leave of absense to campaign for his handpicked successor, Luis Ramírez Corzo, and to promote his own candidacy for senator.[76] He appointed his nephew, Félix García, provisional governor and placed nearly one thousand state troops in the municipalities to insure orderly elections.[77] According to a confidential agent of the Secretary of Government, the governor removed all municipal presidents not in sympathy with the *mapache* regime. "Systematic opposition was practiced toward Vidal and the candidates for the legislature on his ticket.... The municipal governments refused to register their candidacies, stamp their ballots or allow their representatives to be part of the electoral colleges."[78] The state agrarian commission (CLA) frequently installed village agrarian committees which worked to elect the administration slate of candidates rather than, according to one group, "attending to our petitions for land."[79]

The *vidalistas* were better organized in 1924. The *Partido Socialista Chiapaneco* had become the parent political organization encompassing a federation of oppositionist parties, nearly sixty in all, located throughout the state.[80] While Vidal had formidable grass-roots support in Chiapas, Fernández Ruiz could count on only the official element -- government employees and office seekers. Vidal had one other critical asset, the friendship of the next president of Mexico, Plutarco Elías Calles.[81]

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in 1924. In one extreme case a group of *vidalistas*, led by a federal army captain, captured Tuxtla Chico and determined the outcome of the election.[82] The more "normal" electoral procedure, however, involved the installation of rival polling booths, the collection of votes, and the declaration of electoral victory by each side.[83] The retiring *mapache* legislature in the summer of 1924 discarded the returns of fifty-eight, out of a total of sixty-two, districts which favored Vidal for governor. In response, Colonel Julio Gutiérrez, garrison commander of Tuxtla Gutiérrez, angrily arrested the entire state legislature on October 23.[84]

At the end of October 1924 Chiapas had two state legislatures. On the day Colonel Gutiérrez arrested the *mapache* body, the *vidalista* legislature (led by its presiding officer Ricardo Alfonso Paniagua) invaded and took possession of the legislative chamber of the government palace. Obregón ordered the federal garrison to provide security for the governor's offices but not to expell the extra-legal legislature.[85] On November 30, one day before the start of the new legislative session and the new administration, both governors-elect, Luís Ramírez Corzo and Carlos Vidal, gave President Obregón notice of their impending accession to office and both professed their loyality.[86] Obregón decided to let his successor, Calles, resolve the Chiapanecan problem.[87]

On December 1, President Calles turned the problem over to the senate. Calles recommended that state autonomy be revoked owing to the state of anarchy existing in the state and the Senate complied on December 5. The following day Calles sent three names to the senate, César Córdova, Eduardo Román, and Virgilio Figueroa, asking that body to choose one as the interim governor who would preside over new elections. After learning that Calles favored Córdova, a director of the CNA and an ally of Vidal,

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Córdova arrived in Chiapas in early January 1925 and scheduled the municipal elections for April and the gubernatorial election in May. Although Córdova protested his complete neutrality, his very selection as interim governor indicated Calles' support for Vidal. His first official action in Chiapas was to suspend the power of all *ayuntamientos* and to name new municipal councils which, claimed the supporters of Fernández Ruiz, were entirely *vidalista*.[89] Ramírez Corzo, the *mapache* candidate, dropped out of the race for governor.[90] The elections, although marked by violence, overwhelmingly favored Vidal and his party. The Chiapas deputation to the national legislature, however, remained that of Fernández Ruiz's slate, which had been accepted by the national legislature in the fall. Córdova planned to turn over the government to Vidal on May 20, 1925.[91]

VIDALISMO

When Carlos Vidal became governor of Chiapas, socialist party leader Paniagua became his right hand man as director of the State Agrarian Commission and president of the state legislature.[92] As before, the close personal relationship between Vidal and Paniagua formed the true axis of *vidalismo*. As soon as the new administration assumed power, the PSC formed the *Confederación Socialista de Trabajadores de Chiapas* to unionize all workers in the state. The Confederation, of which Governor Vidal was titular head, became a member of the national labor confederation CROM.[93]

The radical wing of *vidalismo* now was the *Partido Socialista de Soconusco*, headed by Ernesto C. Herrera. Calles' Attorney General, Octavio

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Paz, on a trip to Chiapas in April 1925 described Soconusco as "the only place in the state where the division is perfectly demarcated between the Capitalist Bourgeois Reaction and the revolutionary element which is composed almost entirely by workers and *campesinos* of the region, who are now perfectly organized."[94] Vidal and Paniagua, it is safe to say, wanted to Soconuscize Chiapas.

Once in office Vidal cleared out all employees remaining from the previous government, reaffirmed all decrees of the preconstitutional period (1914-1916), and reassured small landowners that their properties were not subject to expropriation.[95] Despite the administration's radical socialist guise, *vidalismo* was essentially reformist and moderate. The Constitutionalist objective of using the State to create an equilibrium between workers and capitalists was the essence of *vidalismo*. The administration sought to regulate labor relations, accelerate the return of land to villages, increase the tax share of *hacendados*, and build schools and roads. Vidal placed the state government on the side of the poor and dispossessed without threatening a wholesale transformation of the social and economic order. *Vidalismo* constituted a certain humanization of the existing system made possible by a powerful, expansive State.

The Vidal administration decreed three labor laws between 1925 and 1927. The first decree in 1926 established Investigative Offices of Contracts in San Cristóbal, Comitán, and Motozintla. These offices were responsible for regulating the contract agreements and employment of indians in the coffee plantations. All contracts had to be signed before government officials and be in conformity with the *Ley de Obreros* of 1914. Inspectors from these offices were required to visit indian villages and plantations to enforce the labor reform law.[96] Also in 1926 the Vidal administration

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revived the Central Board of Conciliation and Arbitration, which had disappeared in 1920. The Central Board, located in the state capital, was charged with forming municipal labor relations boards composed of three representatives of workers' organizations, three representatives of employers, and a government representative. These boards were responsible for resolving all conflicts between workers and employers regarding contracts, wages, work conditions, and unionization. All labor-management disputes first were heard before one of the municipal boards. If the dispute was not resolved at the local level and the workers were judged to have a legitimate complaint, the Central Board could then authorize permission for a strike. The Central Board was also assigned the task of forming several regional minimum wage commissions to study and establish appropriate minimum wage scales for the different regions and agricultural tasks.[97]

The Labor Law of 1927 attempted to replace the individual contract with the collective work contract. The 1927 law required that all contracts be made with labor unions whenever possible and prohibited employers from replacing striking workers. The law also introduced the principle of profit sharing, although regulations governing this feature were never enacted during the brief Vidal administration. Finally, the law increased the minimum wage for unskilled labor to $1.20 a day and established, for the first time, a minimum wage for piece work of $1.20 for each 220 pounds of coffee harvested.[98]

In the area of land reform the Vidal administration seriously began a government-sanctioned redistribution program in Chiapas, fully ten years after First Chief Venustiano Carranza decreed national agrarian reform decree, the *Ley de seis de enero de 1915*. The state agrarian law of 1927

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permitted towns to expropriate adjoining lands and pay for them in ten annual payments at the value set forth in the (notoriously devalued) tax declarations.[99] To encourage village petitions the government distributed volumes of the agrarian handbook, *Catecismo agrario*, to each municipality.[100] As a result the number of agrarian petitions under the Vidal administration increased from an average of ten per year in 1920-1924 to sixty-eight petitions in 1925 and thirty-four in 1926.[101] During the two and a half years of the Vidal government, thirty-nine petitions were provisionally approved, distributing 81,344 *hectáreas* to 6634 heads of families. (See Table 11 in Appendix.) Vidal's agrarian record compared favorably with any other state program in Mexico. Realizing that *campesinos* needed not only land but money to work the land, Vidal sought to establish a state lending agency to provide low interest loans to poor farmers, small businessmen, and incipient industrialists. The governor proposed this plan to President Calles and asked for a $2,000,000 three-year loan, but the president, pleading budgetary difficulties, did not back the project.[102]

When Carlos Vidal became governor of Chiapas the state government was bankrupt and owed back wages to its own employees. To remedy this deficit and reverse the very mild and inequitable tax policies of the *mapache* administration, Vidal raised property valuations and taxes across the board. The North American consul in Salina Cruz reported that "on real estate particularly, in the states of Chiapas and Oaxaca, there has been a heavy increase, not only in the rate but in the assessed valuations on both urban and rural properties."[103] One businessman reported that he had to pay fifty percent more than during the preceeding year.[104] A coffee planter from Soconusco complained that on a crop of 800 tons which

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grossed $580,800 dollars, he had to pay $94,901 dollars in taxes, of which fully two-thirds was state taxes.[105] Not since the Emilio Rabasa administration of 1891-1894 had the landed class in Chiapas experienced such tax increases.

Governor Vidal considered school and road construction one of the most revolutionary programs the government of the state could pursue. Although Vidal increased the number of state supported primary schools in Chiapas from sixty to ninety, the most significant trend during the 1920s was increased federal support for education in the states. In July 1924, Professor Ricardo Sánchez, inspector of rural schools for the federal Department of Education, arrived in Chiapas to begin an intensive federal effort to increase rural education.[106] By 1927 the federal government supported 182 schools in Chiapas, of which, 159 were rural primaries. (See Table 12 in Appendix.) Although the federal government allocated more spending for education in Chiapas than the state government, federal expenditure for Chiapas was less than in sixteen other states.[107] This fact again demonstrates the relative unimportance of Chiapas in the eyes of the national government. The state government did pursue a vigorous policy of requiring *hacendados* to build schools on their properties and employ teachers. Over the course of the Vidal administration the number of schools sustained by landowners jumped from around 200 to over 400.[108]

The Vidal administration considered road construction to be the key to prosperity and increased spending from five percent of the budget (under Fernández Ruiz) to nearly twenty-five percent. Vidal established a new department of roads, the *Dirección General de Caminos*, which employed highway engineers to survey and plan new routes. As in education, however, the federal government was taking on greater responsibility for road

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TO IMPROVE CONDITIONS FOR WORKERS

The Vidal program of reform and development was certainly not radical. In the day-to-day implementation of the program, however, the government squarely sided with agricultural workers and landless villagers. A partnership was formed with the powerless in the state. Governor Vidal appointed socialist party members as rent collectors, work inspectors, municipal secretaries, and municipal agents. These officials in turn established socialist party branches, labor unions, and agrarian committees. In one municipal agency, for example, Vidal replaced as municipal agent an employee of the largest *hacienda* in the district, with Ricardo Ruiz, a member of the socialist party. Ruiz, according to the legal representative of the *hacienda*, "has told us that his special mission for the government is to improve conditions for workers."[110] On the *finca* San Juan Chicharras in Soconusco, another municipal agent organized a union and started a strike of 200 workers to increase daily wages to one *peso* a day.[111] When Lotario Schamme, administrator of the *finca* Germania, dismissed over 200 workers for joining the *Confederación Socialista de Trabajadores de Chiapas,* the governor ordered an immediate reinstatement and mandatory arbitration.[112]

The state government often turned the other way when landless villagers invaded and seized private property. *Hacendados* complained that bad elements were exploiting the workers and forcing them to take land they did not need nor know how to use. One landowner complained, for example, that an agrarian engineer employed by the state, aided by the municipal

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president and fourteen armed men, forced himself onto his land to survey a division. "Unfortunately," continued this *hacendado*, "many authorities in towns, like this municipal president, believe they can win the sympathy of the governor with such savage orders."[113]

One of the greatest difficulties facing the post-revolutionary governments in Chiapas, and all governments in Mexico to this day, was that of the *caciques*. Local bosses could help or hinder the state government and its reform program, particularly in the matter of land reform. After 1925 all *caciques*, some cynically and some sincerely, became *agraristas*, advocates of land reform. The president of the agrarian executive committee of the *ejido* El Caucho, for example, used his position to sell parcels of land to residents of other villages while leaving twenty-nine residents of his own community landless.[114] The indians of Cancúc (Chilón) complained in 1926 that their municipal agent forced them to carry loads for less than they earned before 1910, forced them into indebted servitude, and made most of his money by selling liquor to indians. All the reforms of the revolution, they wrote, "have only served to worsen our situation."[115] Marcos and Agustín Bravo, posing as *agraristas*, ruled the *ejido* El Naranjo in Soconusco as *hacendados*. The brothers alternated as president of the *ejido* administrative committee and as municipal agent. They did not work the land but paid themselves from the *ejido* treasury, and expelled or brought in new *ejidatarios* as it suited them. When CLA president Paniagua heard of this situation he expelled the pair from the state.[116] Unfortunately, however, there were many more unscrupulous *caciques* who were not disciplined.

Such conditions were so confusing and widespread that Governor Vidal felt compelled to issue the following circular to all municipal presidents:

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> Some municipal authorities with sufficient frequency not only obstruct the [agrarian] labor of Executive and Administrative Village Committees but even harrass these Committees, even to the point of committing abuses against them, notoriously violating the law.[117]

Vidal demanded that the abuses be stopped and that government officials support the land reform effort without reservation but *caciquismo* survived and abuses continued. There were too many bosses and too few labor inspectors. The *caciques*, it must be remembered too, performed a necessary function as mediator between the locality and the outside world. The modern Mexican State has never really come to terms with the *cacique* who, although considered a political pariah, has not been replaced by anyone more acceptable.[118]

HELL HAS BROKEN LOOSE IN CHIAPAS

Mexican state-federal relations during the 1920s were a mosaic of alliances between governors and national political leaders. Governors were usually *obregonistas* or *callistas* of varing loyality and sincerity. An analyst for the United States War Department wrote in 1926 that "a governor who wishes to retain his Governorship must be in accord, or pretend to be in accord, with the leaders who control the Federal Administration. If he is not, means are generally found to put him out and to replace him, eventually, by a person who will support the plans of those who rule."[119] Fernández Ruiz learned this lesson in 1925; Vidal learned it in 1927.

In 1926 former president Alvaro Obregón violated one of the most sacred tenets of the 1910 revolution when he decided to seek reelection and succeed Calles in the presidency in 1928. At the end of the year

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the *obregonista* bloc in the national legislature led a successful effort to amend the constitution to permit one nonconsecutive presidential reelection. Two presidential hopefuls, however, Generals Arnulfo R. Gómez and Francisco R. Serrano, continued to find support and encouragement for their candidacies. In June 1927, Gómez was nominated for president by the Anti-Reelectionist Party and Serrano was nominated by the National Revolutionary Party. Obregón also officially announced his candidacy the same month.[120] As in 1910, 1920, and 1923, the problem of presidential succession led to a national crisis.

The national electoral campaign led to the reemergence of an old political division in Chiapas. Governor Vidal, an old friend and colleague of General Serrano, became the general's national campaign manager. According to one close observer, Vidal was "the principal axis of *serranismo*."[121] Under Vidal's instructions the Chiapas legislature refused to approve the amendment reforming articles 82 and 83 of the constitution permitting presidential reelection. Only Veracruz took a similar, defiant position.[122] Senator Tiburcio Fernández Ruiz viewed Obregón's return to power as the means of a *mapache* return to power in Chiapas. The senator petitioned the full Senate in August of 1927 to remove the state's autonomy and appoint a provisional governor, but this move failed for the time being. Fernández Ruiz also formed *obregonista* parties in Chiapas in preparation for the electoral struggle in 1928.[123]

In the fall of 1927 Governor Vidal took a leave of absense from the state government in order to devote his full time to the presidential campaign. He appointed his brother, Luis, provisional governor. By now, however, the *serranistas* correctly realized they could not peacefully compete with Obregón and Calles and made plans for a rebellion in

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conjunction with the supporters of General Gómez. "With these elements [against us]," argued Vidal, "it is impossible to triumph democratically, but it is possible to carry out a bloody ridicule of the vote."[124] The revolt, planned for October 2, 1927 was cut short by rapid and forceful countermeasures taken by Calles and Obregón, who wanted to prevent a repeat of the De la Huerta disaster. The leading members of the *serranista* party were captured in Cuernavaca the following day. Calles ordered the execution of the fourteen prisoners and so on the Cuernavaca - Mexico City road, near a town called Huitzilac, Serrano, Vidal, and the others were shot.[125]

At mid-day on October 3 General Manuel Alvarez, commander of the federal garrison in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, received orders from President Calles to take control of the state government of Chiapas.[126] General Alvarez ordered the federal troops to occupy all public buildings, disarm the state and municipal police, and capture Provisional Governor Luis Vidal, socialist leader Ricardo Alfonso Paniagua, police chief Julio Sabines, and other high officials of the state government. As soon as Luis Vidal turned over the state treasury to General Alvarez, they were all shot.[127]

On October 4, the Chief of Military Operations in Chiapas, General Jaime Carrillo, arrived in Tuxtla Gutiérrez from Tapachula and assumed the post of provisional governor. Carrillo replaced the *ayuntamientos* of every municipality in the state with appointed *Juntas de Administración Civil*. Federal troops also jailed hundreds of local and state officials, and executed *vidalistas* throughout the state. The municipal and state officials in Arriaga and Mapastepec were arrested and placed on a train for Tapachula but were shot before the train arrived. The municipal

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president of San Cristóbal, Juan Manuel Gutiérrez, was executed simply for holding that important post under the Vidal administration. Reports of similar executions, particularly of socialist party members, indicate a general bloodletting.[128] A North American resident of Chiapas summed up the situation fairly well: "I suppose you know that hell has broken loose in Chiapas. They have jailed or shot all the authorities and the new ones are simply playing thunder with us."[129]

Vidalismo died in Chiapas in October 1927. *Excélsior* reported in early November that Senator Fernández Ruiz and his Committee of Pro-Obregón Propaganda controlled all political parties in the state.[130] This was an exaggeration. True, the leadership of the Vidal administration and the *Partido Socialista Chiapaneco* had either been killed or had left Chiapas to save themselves; the local socialist parties and the labor unions, however, survived. Here was a base on which to rebuild an anti-*mapache* political movement.

REFLECTIONS

Political consolidation was the most immediate and perhaps the most important task facing Mexico in 1920. A return to authoritarian centralism, however, after a decade of political atomization and in the face of regional *caudillos* was by no means inevitable. The mechanisms utilized by Porfirio Díaz for political control were no longer applicable. Mexico had entered an age of mass participation politics during the revolution and control of workers and *campesinos* was now a political necessity. Presidents Obregón and Calles used land reform and unionization to assist in political pacification and to build support for their governments.

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Their backing of agrarian and labor organizations created a formidable political base which remained loyal to the government in 1923-1924 against De la Huerta and in 1927-1928 against Gómez and Serrano.

The government of Tiburcio Fernández Ruiz in Chiapas, on the other hand, engaged in politics as if the revolution had not taken place. The *mapache* government allied itself with the traditional elements of power, *hacendados* and *caciques*, and actively worked against the organization of workers and *campesinos*. These organizations were naturally drawn to the opponents of the *mapache* regime who understood the political value of proletarian organization. Politics in defense of class interests was good politics in the 1920s. This was what Carlos Vidal understood as socialism.

No political party after 1925 could attain and maintain power in Chiapas without the strong backing of agrarian and labor organizations. This political requirement, in turn, led to the expansion of the power and the scope of government in order to 1) satisfy at least some of the demands of organized workers and *campesinos*, and 2) bring these new powerful constituencies more and more under the control and supervision of the State. Political struggle in Chiapas after 1927 was a struggle for hegemony on the part of the state government to obtain the unconditional submission of the labor movement.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

STRUGGLE FOR HEGEMONY

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>
> *El Comité de Obreros y Campesinos Radicales Revolucionarios Cardenistas de Soconusco,* 1934

The assassination of president-elect Alvaro Obregón in the summer of 1928 produced a national political crisis. President Plutarco Elías Calles, seeking to avoid a ruinous conflict between his partisans (which included the powerful labor organization CROM) and those of the slain *caudillo*, established a government party, the *Partido Nacional Revolucionario* (PNR).[1] Calles proposed that the PNR would rule Mexico by concensus and conciliation, although he intended to exercise a preponderant degree of influence.[2] Calles did remain the most powerful national politician after he left the presidency in 1928; his authority, however, was not unlimited. Part of the price of peace between *obregonistas* and *callistas* was the disassociation of the government and CROM. Between 1928 and 1934 presidents Emilio Portes Gil, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, and Abelardo L. Rodríguez fashioned no alliance with worker or agrarian organizations. They discouraged political action by labor groups and demanded their unconditional submission

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This policy came to an end when General Lázaro Cárdenas was selected by the PNR in 1933 as its candidate for the presidency. His nomination owed much to the support of proletarian organizations. According to labor leader Viciente Lombardo Toledano "the working class saw in Cárdenas a hope of justice.... Cárdenas was a candidate from the left wing of the PNR and from the labor movement, [the candidacy] which we directed against the vacillation of General Calles."[4] Cárdenas believed organized labor should be an instrument of the State, integrated within its apparatus yet still dedicated to the class struggle. This was the policy of collaboration, "*la política de masas*."[5]

Chiapas, like the nation as a whole, although under different circumstances, followed a similar course. *Vidalismo* had been a strong and balanced alliance between the government and organized labor in 1925-1927.[6] After its destruction, Chiapanecan governments until 1936 used labor organizations in their political struggles with rival factions. Following the policy of hegemony, state governments created an official labor organization which exercized little political influence and steadily lost the support of workers and *campesinos* in Chiapas. In 1935-1936 the independent labor movement in Chiapas, with the assistance of the Cárdenas administration, spearheaded a move to remove one governor and install another pledged to a policy of alliance and collaboration. The struggle for hegemony failed.

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Senator, former Governor, and former *mapache* chief Tiburcio Fernández Ruiz, believed it owned Chiapas.[7] A *mapache* return to power, however, was unlikely for two reasons. First, Plutarco Elías Calles was president of Mexico. In 1923, as Secretary of Government, Calles had conferred with Governor Fernández Ruiz and came away with a distinct disliking for the governor. In 1925 Calles helped Carlos Vidal become governor over the opposition of Fernández Ruiz and it was unlikely that Calles would help the *mapaches* in 1928. The only hope in the *mapache* party was the return to power of Alvaro Obregón in December 1, 1928. The second problem was the candidacy of Raymundo Enríquez for governor of Chiapas, announced in January 1928. The pro-*mapache La Voz de Chiapas* considered the Enríquez candidacy a true threat: "The macabre shadow of Vidal and Paniagua still blooms on the horizon of the Chiapanecan landscape, accouncing to the people a new era of pain and misery."[8]

One week after the federal purge of the government of Chiapas on October 3, 1927, Provisional Governor Jaime Carrillo appointed Federico Martínez Rojas interim governor. Martínez Rojas, municipal president of San Cristóbal Las Casas, was the son of the 1911 rebel Jesús Martínez Rojas and he appointed Manuel Rabasa, the son of former governor Ramón Rabasa, Secretary General of Government.[9] This political team, made up of the sons of two political enemies, demonstrates how the politics of regional and elite conflict had diminished in the face of class conflict. Martínez Rojas was also a partisan of Fernández Ruiz. Those *vidalistas* that had remained in the municipal presidencies after the October purge were deposed by Martínez Rojas. His most daring appointment was that of *mapache* Sóstenes Ruiz as municipal president of Tapachula, center of the labor movement in Chiapas.[10]

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From the moment of the appointment of Martínez Rojas, the socialist parties and labor unions of Chiapas sent a stream of protests to Mexico City complaining how "our state has fallen into the hands of the reactionary element."[11] The interim governor was accused of pursuing anti-worker and anti-agrarian policies and of conniving with clerical elements.[12] Calles sent confidential agents to Chiapas who confirmed the allegations and in March 1928 the Senate removed Martínez Rojas and appointed former Constitutionalist Amador Coutiño interim governor. Coutiño placed *enriquistas* in the municipal presidencies and prepared for the gubernatorial election.[13]

Three candidates entered the campaign in 1928: Luis C.García, Raymundo Enríquez, and Rafael Cal y Mayor. The relatively unknown Colonel García was the candidate of the Fernández Ruiz faction. The *garcíistas* claimed the support of fifty-seven parties in the state and the moral support of the former governor of Tabasco and anti-*vidalista* Tomás Garrido Canabal. The best the *garcíistas* could say about their candidate was that his opponent, Enríquez, was a *vidalista*.[14] Raymundo Enríquez, originally from Chiapa de Corzo, was thirty-five years old in 1928. He was a graduate of the National Agricultural College and had served two terms in the national legislature, in 1920-1922 and 1926-1928. In 1920 Enríquez was instrumental in the creation of the *Partido Socialista Chiapaneco* and in 1922 he helped establish the *Sindicato de Obreros y Campesinos de Soconusco*, the first labor union in Chiapas. He had been a close friend and political ally of Vidal and Paniagua and possessed impeccable agrarian and labor credentials. He was Vidal's logical successor.[15] Almost at the last moment, former *zapatista* Rafael Cal y Mayor joined the race. Cal y Mayor, president of the *Partido Nacional Agrarista*, believed he was the acceptable

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socialist candidate since Enríquez was linked, although not directly, to the Serrano revolt. Cal y Mayor, however, had little organized support in Chiapas.[16]

Enríquez returned to Chiapas at the end of 1927 to determine support for his candidacy. In December the *Partido Agrarista Chiapaneco* endorsed Enríquez, the first organization of the former *vidalista* coalition to recognize him.[17] In February 1928, Enríquez with the assistance of César Ruiz, Alberto Domínguez, and Ernesto Herrera (new president of the PSC) formed the *Unión de Partidos Revolutionarios*, which included twenty-two socialist, labor, and agrarian organizations in Chiapas.[18]

The campaign and election in 1928 was fairly typical for Mexico in the 1920s. Enríquez was supported by Interim Governor Coutiño, who suspended payment of government salaries in order to fund the electoral effort.[19] The *garcíista* party attacked socialist party offices and ran a slanderous campaign against Enríquez, complete with forged documents implicating him in the assassination of president-elect Obregón in July 1928.[20] In September all three candidates claimed victory. On November 1, all three parties installed separate state legislatures in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, each of which declared its candidate governor-elect. Calles, however, recognized only Enríquez, which prompted Cal y Mayor to withdraw. On November 24 the state police jailed the entire *garcíista* legislature and the staff of *La Voz de Chiapas*. When Enríquez became governor on December 1, his political position was, for the moment, secure.[21]

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the revolution and the decline of trade and commodity prices brought on by the world depression until late in the 1930s. The total number of *hectáreas* under cultivation in Chiapas dropped throughout the 1920s as landowners invested in cattle and horses. Yield per *hectárea* of maize in the Central Lowlands also fell in the 1920s and 1930s, reflecting a decline in commercial agriculture and an increase in sharecropping and renting.[22] Furthermore, the first years of agrarian reform, although neither radical in intent nor execution, had killed "all spirit of enterprise," according to one *hacendado*.[23]

Agrarian reform, over ten years old, could not be termed a success. Of the nearly 300 petitions for land that had been submitted between 1915 and 1930, only sixty-seven *ejidos* had been created, benefiting about 10,000 *campesinos*, this in a rural population of nearly half a million. Only sixteen large *haciendas*, out of a total of eighty with more than 5000 *hectáreas*, had been affected and then only partially. The only important modification of land tenure occured during the Fernández Ruiz administration (1920-1924), when the number of small private properties had increased by several thousand.[24]

The most striking aspect of change in the 1920s was its regional disparity. Mobilization of the popular class by the *Partido Socialista Chiapaneco* and the Vidal administration (1925-1927) had been most successful in the departments of Soconusco, Mariscal, and Tonalá. Although the struggle for land and workers' rights was by no means completed here, a good beginning had been effected. Most of the *ejidos* in Chiapas were situated in this region, reflecting both the degree of worker organization and the desire of the government to defuse potential conflict. Wages were higher and working conditions were better here than in the rest of the state.

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Quite different conditions were to be found in the Central Highlands and in the departments of Chilón, Palenque, and Simojovel. There had been no mobilization in these indigenous parts of the state. Frans Blom observed in 1925 that "indians living at large on the distant lands of the *haciendas* are held liable for a certain amount of labor each year, in lieu of rent. While so working they are paid, largely in credit at the local store and fed."[26] Historian Frank Tannenbaum noticed in San Cristóbal in 1927 that "the people here live largely by supplying labor to the coffee plantations in the southern part of the state.... After many months and years of labor an indian may succeed in working off his debt, but not always."[27] There were no labor unions in the indigenous highlands.

Land reform had also bypassed the indigenous highlands. Zinacantán, in the department of Las Casas, is a good example of why land reform languished. The first petition for land from Zinacantán was filed in 1925. Few villagers signed it for they believed it would obligate them to military service. No organized effort was made to force the petition through the CLA and the petition was forgotten. There was no further effort to obtain land by *zinacantecos* until 1933.[28] Unlike the indians in Mariscal, those in the rest of the state lacked the dynamic and trustworthy leadership provided by Ricardo Alfonso Paniagua and the PSC in the 1920s. The porfirian *reparto* program, it is necessary to recall, had been more extensive in Mariscal and Soconusco than in the Central Highlands which also accounts for the successful mobilization of workers there.

The revolution in Chiapas had not aimed at destroying capitalism or the capital-possessing class. The bourgeoisie participated in both sides

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during the civil war and had served in the administrations of both Fernández Ruiz and Vidal. Political conflict in the 1920s was between those who wanted modernization without reform and those who wanted both. The political mobilization of the working class made reformist government a necessity and forced modifications in capital investment and utilization. Capital, however, was still king.

The employment of capital underwent an important transformation as a result of the agrarian program and the revolution. Commercial agriculture, with the exception of Soconusco, declined as landowners invested in non-expropriable property - livestock and business. Former Governor Manuel Rovelo Argüello, for example, sold his properties in the early 1920s and invested in real estate in Mexico City. In San Cristóbal, of all places, "businessmen began comprising the upper class."[29] In 1920 and 1921, Tuxtla Gutiérrez and San Cristóbal businessmen and landowners formed chambers of commerce to push for laws and reforms favorable to capital.[30] In the late 1920s and 1930s the Tuxtla Chamber of Commerce, according to the minutes of that organization, constantly consulted with the governor, state treasurer, and other high administration officials regarding tax policies, labor-management problems, public works, and similar topics of concern. The minutes reveal close cooperation between the chamber of commerce and the state government.[31]

Hacendados as well as businessmen began to organize. In 1933 the League of Coffee Producers was established representing planters in the departments of Las Casas, Simojovel, Palenque, and Comitán.[32] The organization of cattlemen also began in the 1930s. These *uniones, asociaciones,* and *cooperativas* were formed to defend against cattle theives (and agrarian communities), improve veterinary medicine, and lobby for

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Soconusco continued to be dominated by the cultivation, processing, and export of coffee by Germans.[34] In the early 1930s there were ninety-one principal coffee plantations; seventy-five belonged to only sixteen families.[35] In 1929 planters organized the *Partido Democrático Pro-Tapachula* to control the *ayuntamiento*.[36] As coffee prices declined during the world depression Governor Enríquez, in response to the Coffee Grower's Association of Soconusco demands, reduced state taxes on coffee production to help the industry.[37] Planters also joined together to form private armies called *guardias blancas* to protect their properties and menance agrarian communities and socialist party meetings.[38] Coffee trees remained secure against agrarian expropriation in both state and federal legislation until 1936, which helps explain the high degree of economic control exercized by the planters of Soconusco in the 1920s and 1930s. Coffee production, furthermore, was simply too important and profitable to permit disruptions by *agraristas*. State taxes on coffee plantations, production, and export brought to the state treasury sixty to eighty percent of all revenue on agriculture and thirty to fifty percent of all state income.[39]

REGIME OF INSTITUTIONS

The assassination of president-elect Alvaro Obregón in July 1928 created a serious crisis in Mexico. The partisans of Obregón had suspicions that the *callista* labor movement (CROM and its leader Luis Morones), was the intellectual author of the crime. They were also adamantly opposed to Calles remaining in the presidency beyond the end of his term. In

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deference to these powerful sentiments, President Calles reassured *obregonistas* he would not remain in power and proposed instead that Mexico leave the age of *caudillos* and establish a "regime of institutions." The president worked with moderate *obregonistas* in the legislature and chose Emilio Portes Gil, a state governor, interim president until someone was elected to finish Obregón's term of office. Portes Gil, a politician who "represented the frontier between *obregonistas* and *callistas*," assumed office on December 1, 1928.[40]

The "regime of institutions" proposed by Calles began to take shape in late 1928 and early 1929. Before leaving the presidency, Calles formed the organizing committee of the *Partido Nacional Revolucionario* (PNR). A party convention was planned in March 1929 in Querétaro to organize the party and select a presidential candidate.[41] The party was designed as a coalition of existing national and regional parties. Portes Gil described the PNR as "a party of the State. The *Partido Nacional Revolucionario* is frankly a government party. We are not going to deceive public opinion, as it has been deceived in the past, by presuming that the [PNR] will be an independent party. The revolution makes it necessary that the government have an organ of promotion and defense."[42]

Aarón Sáenz, governor of Nuevo León and director of Obregón's reelection campaign, appeared to be the popular choice as the PNR's candidate for president. Calles, however, saw Sáenz as a potential threat to his authority and chose Pascual Ortiz Rubio, a little known and even less distinguished politician. The PNR convention nominated Ortiz Rubio on March 2, 1929. The following day, diehard *obregonistas* rebelled, led by General Gonzalo Escobar. The government put down the rebellion in May; Ortiz Rubio was elected president in July and took office in December.[43]

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The struggle between *obregonistas* and *callistas* had its counterpart in Chiapas. Provisional Governor Coutiño, an *obregonista* with agrarian credentials, had no intention of giving Enríquez a free hand in governing Chiapas. The *Unión de Partidos* and the state legislature were staffed with partisans of the former provisional governor. On November 10, 1928, the *Unión de Partidos* endorsed Aáron Sáenz and in December it adhered to the PNR. At the PNR convention in Querétaro the Chiapas delegation was instructed to vote for Sáenz even though it was clear that Calles was behind Ortiz Rubio.[44] The Enríquez administration was burdened by outside restraints, at the beginning, yet even before the consolidation of *callismo* in Mexico City, Enríquez manuevered to take political control in Chiapas. In February 1929 the governor traveled to Mexico City to consult with Calles. After his return the governor visited Mariscal and Soconusco, dispensing favors and conferring with the leaders of the labor movement, seeking political support. In March the state government established a 2000 man "social defense force" which was placed under the authority of a trusted *enriquista*.[45]

Enríquez made his first overt move in May when he deposed the pro-Coutiño *ayuntamiento* of Tuxtla Gutiérrez. In August he forced the resignation of César Ruiz, Secretary General of the *Unión de Partidos*, which prompted criticism by *coutinistas* in the national press. By September the *Unión de Partidos* was solidly *enriquista* with the exception of Propaganda Secretary Ernesto Herrera, president of the *Partido Socialista de Soconusco* (PSS) and municipal president of Tapachula.[46] The Coutiño faction then struck back. On September 18 six state legislators met in a hotel in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, accused the governor of misappropriation of

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state funds, withdrew their support for the administration, and called for the Senate to intervene and depose Enríquez. The governor promptly arrested the dissident deputies, expelled them from the state legislature, and called up six loyal alternates. The national executive committee of the PNR backed the governor. In early October Ernesto Herrera left his post as municipal president, socialist party president, and left Chiapas. The most powerful politician outside the state government in Chiapas had been exiled by Enríquez.[47]

By the end of 1929 Governor Raymundo Enríquez had consolidated his power within the important political institutions in Chiapas. This marked the first phase of his struggle for hegemony in the state. Powerful enemies still threatened from without.

A GOVERNMENT THAT CENTRALIZES ALL POWER

Others besides Amador Coutiño sought political influence in Chiapas: Tomás Garrido Canabal, *caudillo* of the state of Tabasco, former *zapatista* Rafael Cal y Mayor, and the growing communist-led labor movement in Soconusco. These threats forced Enríquez to seek not an alliance with the (socialist) labor movement, like that between Vidal and Paniagua, but domination. The defection of Ernesto Herrera had shaken Enríquez's confidence in the political fidelity of the *soconucense* socialists. The labor movement, furthermore, was much larger and more hetrogeneous than in 1925. Enríquez was forced to create, in self-defense, a new mechanism of political regulation of labor.

Tomás Garrido Canabal, governor of Tabasco (1922-1926) and a loyal *obregonista*, had been strongly opposed to the government of Carlos Vidal because of its lenient anti-clerical stand and its attachment to CROM.

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In 1926 Garrido had even demanded Vidal's resignation. An additional source of conflict was the desire by both governors to unify in one labor organization all rural workers in Chiapas, Tabasco, and Yucatán. Vidal envisioned this unification taking place under the direction of CROM and his own *Confederación Socialista de Trabajadores*. Garrido, on the other hand, wanted it carried out by his *Liga Central de Resistencia*.[48]

Garrido made his move into Chiapas one month after Vidal's execution at Huitzilac. Two *Ligas de Resistencia* were established in the departments of Pichucalco and Palenque.[49] At the same time several small unions of banana workers were established in Chiapas under the control of the *garridista Liga de Productores de Rotán* (League of Banana Producers). Garrido also had a close relationship with Fernández Ruiz and in 1928 the *mapache Gran Partido Obregonista* named the *tabasqueño* honorary vice-president.[50] Garrido became governor of Tabasco a second time in 1930 and he would continue to extend his power in Chiapas if Enríquez did not stop him.

Governor Enríquez also faced competition from Rafael Cal y Mayor, also an *obregonista*, who was ambitious to become governor of Chiapas. Beginning in 1929 the Portes Gil administration in Mexico City showered favor on a national agrarian organization led by Cal y Mayor, the *Liga de Comunidades Agrarias* (League of Agrarian Communities, LCA). The national government, through this action, attempted to check the growth of the more radical *Liga Nacional Campesina* (National Peasant League, LNC), which had affiliates in sixteen states and a membership totaling more than 300,000.[51] Cal y Mayor's LCA never came close to surpassing the influence of the LNC; it did, however, work to undermine Enríquez's control of *campesino* organizations in Chiapas. The LCA established leagues in Cintalapa in 1929 and in

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Huixtla and Pijijiapam in 1930.[52] Cal y Mayor also encouraged these organizations to follow his instructions exclusively. In 1930 the LCA ordered its league in Cintalapa to disregard a state government order to vacate a certain piece of property.[53] Cal y Mayor, like Garrido Canabal, was working to erode the authority of the government of Chiapas within the working class movement.

In 1930 the communist labor movement in Chiapas offered a greater threat to Enríquez than Coutiño, Cal y Mayor, and Garrido Canabal. In 1928 a Yugloslav, J. Groham Bukovich, assisted by propagandists from Veracruz and local labor leaders unhappy with the post-Vidal regimes, organized the *Bloque Obrero y Campesino* (Peasant and Worker Bloc) in Tapachula. Although avowedly communist, the *Bloque* remained independent of the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) from 1928 until 1931. By 1930 the organization, now called the *Oposición Sindical Revolutionaria* (Revolutionary Syndical Opposition), included nearly eighty labor unions and agrarian committees which called themselves communist or socialist, but not *enriquista*. The communists of Soconusco furnished the most consistent opposition to growing State control over worker and *campesino* organizations during the 1930s and 1940s.[54]

Partisans of Cal y Mayor and Amador Coutiño participated in the state elections of 1930. The PNR state committee (which was also the directorate of the *Unión de Partidos*), however, firmly controlled the electoral process and elected its entire slate. "Before the invincible political force of the state executive committee of the P.N.R.," wrote the pro-administration *La Vanguardia*, "there is no resistance." The pro-Coutiño *El Baluarte Chiapaneco* in Mexico City agreed but phrased it somewhat differently: "A government that centralizes all power solely in the person of the

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In response to the threat of the *obregonistas* from without and the communists within, the Enríquez administration initiated efforts for the unification of the labor movement in mid-1930. Following lengthy and difficult negotiations between the government and labor organization, the state executive committee of the PNR assembled in Ocozocoautla "the first great *campesino* and worker convention" and created the *Confederación Campesino y Obrera de Chiapas* (Peasant and Worker Confederation of Chiapas, CCOC) in March 1931. The CCOC replaced the agrarian and worker committee of the *Unión de Partidos*. The *Sindicato de Obreros y Campesinos de Soconusco*, led by Gonzalo Méndez, brought 200 representatives and formed the majority of the assembly. The communist *Bloque de Obreros* was not recognized by the government and was not invited. The only disagreement at the convention was over the inclusion of migrant indian laborers into the *soconucense* syndicate, a modification desired by the government but resisted by Méndez, who feared a "dilution of the revolutionary fervor." The CCOC did, however, begin the unionization of highland indians, separate from the independent socialist unions and directed and led by *ladino* state politicians. The first executive committee of the CCOC was made up of labor leaders, not politicians, and most were *soconucenses*.[56]

One year before the state PNR selection of the next governor, Raymundo Enríquez had formed a pact with a large part of the labor movement in Chiapas. The terms of the agreement were clear: in exchange for labor support of the state PNR the government of Chiapas would favor those agrarian petitions and labor arbitrations of member organizations of the CCOC. The official labor union had become a reality in Chiapas.

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THE ENRÍQUEZ PROGRAM

Near the end of 1929 former President Calles, the *Jefe Máximo de la Revolución*, having just returned from Europe, indicated that he believed the agrarian reform program was doing more harm than good. In June 1930 he remarked that "each one of the state governments should fix a relatively short period within which the communities still having a right to petition for lands can do so; and once this period has passed, not another word on the subject."[57] The Ortiz Rubio administration then invited state governors to Mexico City and asked them to enact "stop laws" terminating the agrarian commissions in their states. Some governors, due to conviction or political pressures within their states, could not cooperate. Raymundo Enríquez was one of those and both reasons were valid.[58]

In June 1931 the Chiapas PNR announced, in response to a call from the national legislature for the termination of land reform in twenty days, that "it would be prejudicial for Chiapas to terminate the agrarian effort."[59] Indeed, Chiapas was one of the few states to increase rather than slow down the pace of agrarian reform in 1929-1932.[60] In the period 1928-1932 the Enríquez administration provisionally awarded 126 ejidal grants totally over 200,000 *hectáreas* and benefiting nearly 14,000 families. (See Table 11 in Appendix.) This record compares favorably to that of Governor Lázaro Cárdenas of Michoacán, who in the same time span granted 141,663 *hectareas* to 181 villages.[61]

To advance the institutionalization of reform, the Enríquez administration established the Department of Labor, Proletarian Defense, and Social Welfare. This agency provided free legal counsel to workers and villagers in land or labor related procedures or disputes, supervised labor contracting and

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enforcement, and supervised the operation of the labor relations boards. The eight labor inspectors employed by the department were required to make periodic visits to every *hacienda* within their jurisdiction to check on labor conditions, negotiate collective contracts, and enforce the minimum wage provisions.[62] By the end of 1931 the department had supervised the negotiation of collective contracts which covered 14,000 workers. There were numerous reports, furthermore, of improved labor conditions, compliance with the minimum wage law, indemnification of injured workers, and fines on *hacendados*, all the result of government intervention.[63]

Although Enríquez gave emphasis to rural education, the state of Chiapas continued to fall behind the pace of the federal government in creating primary schools in the state. (See Table 12 in Appendix.) Increased assistance from Mexico City, however, also brought meddling federal bureaucrats who sometimes created conflicts with the state authorities.[64] "The only three great problems of the present government," wrote the pro-administration *La Vanguardia* in 1929, "without doubt are roads, roads, and roads."[65] No project interested Enríquez more than road construction. The first four points of his initial administrative program referred to specific highway construction projects. Despite the empty treasury that he found upon taking office, the governor devoted twenty percent of the budget to roads, the single largest item of state expenditure. He began paving the state highway and initiated construction of three major roads. The federal government began providing $300,000 yearly for these works. "Roads," noted Enríquez, "will be the best legacy I can leave my children."[66]

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The succession struggle which took place in late 1931 and early 1932 revealed the diminished political influence of organized labor following the creation of the *Confederación Campesino y Obrera de Chiapas*. In December different constituencies began to mention possible gubernatorial candidates. Factions within the "official" labor movement proposed state deputy Antonio León and CCOC founder Martín Cruz. The Enríquez administration conservatives, headed by former *mapache* Fausto Ruiz, and former Constitutionalists César Lara and Benigno Cal y Mayor, proposed state deputy Victorico Grajales. Grajales was a former Constitutionalist colonel and an *hacendado* from Chiapa de Corzo who had never been connected with the labor movement. In 1923 he revolted against the Fernández Ruiz administration and strongly supported the candidacy of Carlos Vidal in 1924 and 1925. Grajales was a politician who was well known and respected throughout Chiapas and he was the choice of Raymundo Enríquez, another native of Chiapa de Corzo. In April 1932 Grajales became the official nominee for governor of the Chiapas *Partido Nacional Revolutionario*.[67]

Grajales was the only candidate for governor in 1932 and he unamiously won the election in July. There was minimal violence and all state PNR candidates triumphed. Antonio León and Martín Cruz were sent to Mexico City as federal deputies, and out of Grajales' way. The political complexion of Chiapas changed immediately after Grajales assumed office in December 1932. Fausto Ruiz became the president of the state legislature and his brother, Sóstenes Ruiz, was elected municipal president of Tapachula. As the post in Tapachula had previously been assigned to socialist party members, Ruiz's imposition was particularly insulting to organized labor and

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indicative of its political decline. The final blow, however, came during the third worker and *campesino* congress in March 1933. At this meeting, attended by only ninety-two delegates, Fausto Ruiz was elected president of the CCOC. The other seats on the executive committee were filled by politicians rather than labor leaders. The official labor organization of Chiapas, which had little influence over the selection of the governor, was now reduced to a submissive organ of state government.[68]

The Grajales administration was a government of cattlemen from the Central Lowlands. Two cattle families from the department of Chiapa, León and Ruiz, almost monopolized official positions as local deputies, municipal presidents, judges, tax collectors, and administrative department heads.[69] By 1935 six of the nine deputies in the state legislature were natives of the governor's own department, Chiapa. Perhaps most surprising was Grajales' close rapport with Tabasco's governor Tomás Garrido Canabal.[70] Raymundo Enríquez rapidly had second thoughts about his selection.

Before even six months had passed in the Grajales administration, a break occured between the governor and the former governor. Captain Gustavo López Gutiérrez reported that Grajales in mid-1933 "began to persecute to death all those who still felt sympathy for those who had power in the previous administration."[71] Enríquez, along with national deputy Antonio León, charged in the national press that Grajales was smothering proletarian elements and was opposed to the candidacy of Lázaro Cárdenas for president of Mexico, which was true. Grajales replied that it had been necessary to purify his administration of those elements which had been introduced by the preceding government.[72] Grajales was forced on the defensive from the beginning of his term. He won the struggle for domination within Chiapas but lost the fight in Mexico City.

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THE GRAJALES PROGRAM

Reform took a back seat to modernization in the Grajales administration. The Enríquez era had been tranquil and his government successful because the governor supported the federal authorities and accelerated the pace of agrarian reform. Grajales, however, deemphasized the agrarian program in 1934-1936. (See Table 11 in Appendix.) In 1935 he promised to complete the division of lands in the state and terminate the program entirely by 1936. Grajales also reformed the 1921 state agrarian code in order to conform to the 1933 federal agrarian law. This 1935 state law fixed a sliding scale for maximum land ownership, from 150 *hectáreas* of well watered land to 5000 *hectáreas* of mountain property. The state government assumed the financial responsibility for the land surveys (which previously had been paid for by the villages themselves) and established an agrarian debt in order to grant land to petitioners without charge. Plantations of sugar cane, coffee, and *cacao* were granted the maximum extension of 5000 *hectáreas*.[73]

Grajales remarked in his first *Informe* that "nothing is more important for Chiapas [than roads]; they will resolve the problem of agricultural production."[74] During his tenure state road expenditures increased from $300,000 in 1933 to over $500,000 by 1936. In 1935 the state completed the first all-weather road, from Arriaga to Chiapa de Corzo. That old panacea, an interior railroad line, was realistically set aside for the less costly network of roads and highways traversed by automobiles, buses, and trucks which had begun to open the region to wider markets at less cost. In 1925, for example, there were only seven trucks in Chiapas and most produce was carried in animal-driven carts, but by 1938 there were over 300 trucks. Transport costs of a ton per kilometer were $1.50 to $3.50 by

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cart but only twelve to twenty *centavos* by truck on a paved road.[75] Commerce was motorized in Chiapas in the 1930s.

The *Partido Nacional Revolucionario's* first six-year plan, written in 1933, urged all states to implement article 191 of the 1931 federal labor code, which regulated sharecropping and land rental. Grajales complied in 1935 with the Agricultural Partnership Law. This piece of legislation prohibited landowners (at the risk of expropriation) from leaving their properties uncultivated, and regulated the nature of contracts between landowners and "partners" (sharecroppers and renters). Partners were allowed to cut all the wood they needed and to use water for domestic purposes without charge. Rent was regulated at between five and thirty percent of the harvest, either in produce or cash, depending upon the amount and quality of land cultivated and whether the landlord provided animals, tools, seeds, machinery, and so on.[76] The Agricultural Partnership Law signified that the age old practice of *baldiaje*, although reformed and regulated by the State, would continue in Chiapas.

The Grajales administration was the most pro-*hacendado* government in Chiapas since 1920-1924. Early in 1933 the governor cut rural property taxes across the board. In order to promote industrial development, the government suspended taxes for ten years for new industries and existing one to encourage renovation. All state taxes on the lumber industry were repealed. In 1934 the administration established the Central Economic Council and fifteen local councils in order to give official support for "diverse economic activities." The central council, for example, encouraged cattlemen to organize self-help and self-defense organizations. The first association, the Cattlemen's Cooperative of La Frailesca and Custepeques, was formed in *mapache* country in 1934 with eighty-nine members. In 1935

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other cooperatives were established in Tonalá, Villa Flores, Ocosingo, and Comitán. They became effective in warding off *agrarista* activities, legally and by force.[77]

The first systematic effort to integrate and protect the indigenous population of Chiapas was initiated by this administration. In 1934 Grajales remarked that the indians were the greatest obstacle to modernization and progress in the state. The governor intended to turn indians into Mexicans. The new Department of Social Action, Culture, and Indigenous Protection in 1934 established fourteen cooperatives, seventy-one local (official) labor unions, and arbitrated 162 conflicts between workers and employers in the Central Highlands. An Indian Credit Bank and ten centers of Spanish language teaching were also established. The department also began a "pants campaign" to persuade (unsuccessfully) indians to wear long pants in place of their traditional dress. The substitution of collective contracts in place of individual contracts (or more commonly no contract at all), had the greatest impact. Officials of the department formed indian labor unions, negotiated collective contracts with coffee planters, and obtained the minimum wage for migrant laborers. Over 8000 coffee workers were working under this system by the end of 1934, over 20,000 by 1936.[78] Grajales' indigenous policy was paternalistic and useful politically by unionizing the indigenous population of the Central Highlands before the socialists or communists made any attempt.

Anti-clericalism in Chiapas reached such an intensity during the Grajales administration that this period became known as the "time of closed churches" and the "burning of the saints." During the height of Church-State conflict in Mexico from 1926 to 1929, Chiapas was quiet. Carlos Vidal refused to initiate an anti-clerical campaign and Raymundo

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Enríquez limited the number of priests allowed in the state to eleven. This restriction, however, was not rigidly enforced.[79]

In August 1933, Governor Grajales ordered that all churches in Chiapas be closed, an order that was enforced and continued until the end of 1936. He sent a detachment of troops to San Bartolomé de los Llanos, for example, to close the church and destroy all parish records as well as images of saints. In Tuxtla Gutiérrez the government ordered bonfires of religious objects. In February 1935 Grajales expelled all priests from the state, including the bishop.[80] In comformity with the PNR's six-year plan the governor also began to institute socialist, or "rational," education, a program of study intended to fight "fanaticism" and give children a better conception of their social obligations.[81] The most ethereal anti-clerical measure prohibited the inclusion of the names of saints in place names. San Cristóbal Las Casas became Ciudad Las Casas, San Bartolomé de los Llanos became Venustiano Carranza, San Lorenzo Zinacantán became simply Zinacantán, and so on.[82] Grajales' anti-clerical campaign, however, did not have its intended effect as one municipal president suggested in 1936: "Today, fanaticism has resurged with even more force."[83]

The formation of the Mexican Leviathan in Chiapas in the early 1930s is perhaps best demonstrated in the movement of municipal, state, and federal bureaucrats. From 1930 to 1935 the number of municipal officials and employees in Chiapas declined from 1708 to 1328. Over the same time span the number of state officials and employees increased from 929 to 1178 and the number of federal bureaucrats more than doubled, from 636 to 1334.[84] Despite policy differences between administrations and budgetary restraints, government became ever more responsible and larger except at the municipal level, where declining size reflected a reduced role.

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CARDENISMO

General Lázaro Cárdenas became a candidate for president of Mexico in the spring of 1933. He had the backing of President Abelardo Rodríguez (1932-1934), most of the army, and two important regional *caudillos*, Juan Andreu Almazán and Saturnino Cedillo.[85] Also, according to labor leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano, " the left wing of the PNR nominated Cárdenas with our help, that of the labor movement, and General Calles...had to accept Cárdenas."[86] In May 1933 several governors visited Calles at his ranch in Baja California to discuss the succession issue. Upon learning that the *Jefe Máximo* supported Cárdenas, one of the visitors noted that General Cárdenas was uncultured, excitable, and had extreme ideas. Calles replied that Cárdenas "is a young and honest revolutionary...he deserves an opportunity...with a good rein, he can establish a good government."[87]

Cardenismo, as Lombardo noted, was formed by an alliance between the labor and agrarian movements. The *agraristas* opposed Calles' deceleration of land reform. Agrarian moderates like Emilio Portes Gil, Granciano Sánchez, Enrique Flores Magón, Marte Gómez, and Graciano Sánchez, formed the *Confederación Campesina Mexicana* (Mexican Peasant Confederation, CCM) in early 1934 to push the nomination of Cárdenas by the PNR. By July 1934 the CCM had affiliations in twenty-four states and was rapidly becoming one of the strongest *campesino* organizations in Mexico. It found little support in Tabasco, Yucatán, and Chiapas.[88]

The other element of *cardenismo* was organized labor, the traditional

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enemy of the agrarians. Both had come on hard times between 1928 and 1934 and envisioned their return to political influence with the candidacy and election of Cárdenas. Just as the agrarians opposed the *callista* non-land reform policy, the labor movement opposed the Federal Labor Law of 1931. This law, designed to federalize state labor statutes, denied labor unions the right of independent struggle with capitalists. Labor organizations were required to register with the government. Those who did not register (or could not obtain registration) did not officially exist and could not appeal to government protection or intervention in labor-management disputes. Unions not registered with the government, furthermore, had no right to strike. In short, according to Lombardo, the 1931 law gave the government the power to impose tranquility at the expense of workers.[89]

In reaction to the Federal Labor Law, Lombardo organized the Alliance of Worker and Peasant Groups, a temporary congress which formulated a detailed criticism of the legislation. In 1933, with CROM nearly in ruins after five years of official neglect, Lombardo converted to Marxism and formed a new "pure CROM" (without Luis Morones) dedicated to the absolute independence of union organization with respect to the power of the State. Pure CROM, renamed the *Confederación General de Obreros y Campesinos de México* (CGOCM), was officially "apolitical." The close personal relationship, however, between Lombardo and Cárdenas was an important source of support for the Cárdenas candidacy.[90]

In the summer of 1933 the PNR began work on a party platform, a six-year plan designed to follow *callista* principles which would guide and moderate Cárdenas once he was in power. At the PNR national convention in Querétaro in December, Cárdenas was officially nominated and the agrarian wing of the party modified the six-year plan. The convention

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approved recommendations by Graciano Sánchez permitting *hacienda* residents (*peones acasillados*) to petition for *ejidos* and sactioning the creation of an Agrarian Department to replace the *Comisión Nacional Agraria* and continue land reform. The convention also modified the organizational structure of the PNR. Regional parties, the base of the PNR since 1929, lost their autonomy and became direct dependencies of the party's national executive committee. In Chiapas the *Unión de Partidos* was replaced by the PNR state committee which placed local committees in every district and municipality. The PNR was becoming a genuine national party at the expense of local and regional political organizations.[91]

The modifications of the six-year plan did not affect the articles of concern to organized labor. Still, labor had an ally in the official party candidate. In the 1934 presidential campaign the influence of Lombardo on Cárdenas was clear. On one occasion, candidate Cárdenas declared that "the union is the best weapon of the workers and is worth much more than the protection of the laws and the authorities."[92]

The election of Lázaro Cárdenas in the summer of 1934 and his elevation to the presidency in December led to important modifications in the Mexican State. Under Cárdenas the new Mexican Leviathan began to take on the corporate form which we are familar with today. *Cardenismo* also transformed the struggle for hegemony in Chiapas.

THE HARD LINE

The Grajales administration got underway at the same time as the appearance of *cardenismo* in 1933. As Grajales began to subdue labor and agrarian organizations in Chiapas, Cárdenas emerged on the national political

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stage giving encouragement to agrarian and labor sectors. The opposition to Grajales, both inside and out of Chiapas, rallied around the banner of *cardenismo* and a fierce struggle between the two was sustained for four years. Grajales considered independent labor organizations a threat to stability and his political control and applied the policy of "*la línea dura*" -- the hard line.[93]

As the leadership of the *Confederación Campesina y Obrera de Chiapas* became more conservative and staffed by *hacendados*, as genuine labor leaders came to have little influence on state government policy, on agrarian reform, and on labor-management disputes, defections occured from the official labor organization. The *Sindicato de Cargadores y Estibadores* (Longshoremen's Union) of Tapachula left the CCOC in April 1934, for example, "having observed that we are vilely exploited."[94] Independent labor and agrarian organizations had two places to go: the communist *Cámara del Trabajo de Chiapas* (Chamber of Labor organized in 1934 and a member of the PCM) or the national *Confederación Campesina Mexicana* (CCM), which was strongly *cardenista*.

At the end of 1934 the *Liga Central de Comunidades Agrarias* of Chiapas, a member of the CCM, sent a detailed report to President Cárdenas. Governor Grajales, according to the League, "saw in the unions a threat to the stability of his government and from the beginning has placed obstacles in the path of their development."[95] One tactic, continued the authors of the report, was the formation of *sindicatos blancos*, or fraudulent official unions. In Tapachula the *Sindicato de Lecheros* was formed by the municipal president, Sóstenes Ruiz, and Fernando Braun, a leading coffee planter. The state government also permitted the formation of *guardias blancas* (private armies) which menaced unions and agrarian communities. Cattlemen in the municipality of Villa Flores, for example, formed twenty-one

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The laws and institutions of the state government which were originally designed to protect workers came to benefit capitalists instead. The Grajales government refused to register numerous unions, usually those belonging to the *Cámara de Trabajo* and the *Confederación Campesina Mexicana*. The labor relations boards favored *hacendados*, labor inspectors made more money from the bribes of employers than from their salaries, and several high officials in the state government were also legal advisers to landowners appealing land reform decisions.[97] Municipal officials also served as labor contractors for coffee plantations, various fees and deductions made a mockery of the minimum wage, and company stores and indebted servitude were once again common.[98] "The few workers' organizations that exist [in Chiapas]," complained the Social Revolutionary Bloc of Soconusco, "are only political groups that have no worker control and have been formed with the only object of serving as instruments of political opportunists. These pseudo-proletarian groups, such as the so-called *Confederación Campesina y Obrera de Chiapas* and the district federations, are composed only of the members of their board of directors, who are public officials, capitalists, or unconditional servants of either."[99] Membership in an organization not associated with the CCOC, however, was sufficient reason for imprisonment or assassination. The authorities, wrote the *Liga Central Socialista de Resistencia* in Tapachula, "will not let up on those workers and peasants who do not belong to the CCOC, the official organization of the state."[100] According to the state Public Defender, "organizations belonging to the CCM in Chiapas enjoy no guarantees [of safety] since they are enemies of the government of the state."[101]

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The entire forty-one member Masons' Union of Tapachula, affiliated with the *Cámara de Trabajo*, was jailed and fined simply for holding a meeting.[102] Slayings of agrarian and labor leaders were common and occasionally had a gangland flavor, as in the machine-gunning of a *cardenista* party office in Tapachula.[103] The denunciations fill several archives.

The Cárdenas administration did not intervene in Chiapas except to send arms to agrarian communities and *ejidos* that wanted to establish social defense guards.[104] The national administration in 1935 did express its concern over the "systematic repression" of workers in Chiapas by local officials.[105] Grajales, however, in a letter to the president in response, noted that his government had raised the standard of living for workers and peasants. The complaints, wrote the governor, "are simply intrigues of political enemies."[106]

INTRIGUES OF POLITICAL ENEMIES

An odd assortment of mutual enemies, Raymundo Enríquez, Amador Coutiño, Ernesto Herrera, and Rafael Cal y Mayor, came together in 1934 to oppose and oust Grajales under the banner of *cardenismo*. The crusade against Grajales in many ways resembled that against Governor Fernández Ruiz in the early 1920s: it was populist and it succeeded. The tone of the crusade was established quite early by former Governor Enríquez. In the summer of 1933 Cárdenas designated Enríquez director of the *cardenista* presidential campaign in Chiapas, and Enríquez immediately charged that Grajales was hampering the operation.[107] Grajales supported the candidacy of Manuel Pérez Treviño until he dropped out of the race in July. The governor then took over the *cardenista* campaign in Chiapas since he was the state PNR

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Grajales' adversaries faced a powerful political machine in Chiapas. The governor controlled the state PNR from top to bottom, the state labor confederation, the state legislature, and most municipal governments. Even in the region where unionization was the most developed, the state regime managed to impose a coffee planter as municipal president of Cacahoatán and another in Motozintla.[109] In 1934 the *Partido Socialista de Soconusco* reappeared, calling itself *cardenista*, with close links with the CCM, and headed by Ernesto Constantino Herrera, Alberto Domínguez, and Genaro Marín. In mid-1935 Marín was arrested by the local authorities in Tapachula and shot in his cell, leaving him paralyzed.[110] The PSS and other opponents of Grajales entered the state and local elections in 1934 and 1935 but won only jail terms.[111]

The Cárdenas administration finally intervened in Chiapas in 1936. In March the newly established federal Department of Indigenous Affairs, in an obvious attack upon the state government, declared that "conditions of virtual slavery exist in Chiapas."[112] The report, authored by former CCM chief Graciano Sánchez, charged that the practice of *enganche* continued in the Central Highlands and, despite a minimum wage of $1.30 a day, "Chamula workers labor for thirty *centavos* a day, and have to pay a twenty *peso* tax which the state labor inspectors demand for authorizing the hiring, as well as various excises charged by municipalities for passage through the area."[113] The department then sent a commission to Chiapas to study indian labor conditions.[114] In April 1936, in the middle of the gubernatorial campaign, the commission issued its report, which alleged that state officials tolerated inhuman working conditions. In their role as middlemen between the indian unions and coffee planters, labor

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inspectors profited from bribes, graft, and theft of wages.[115] Although politically inspired for the purpose of discrediting the Grajales regime, the report was essentially accurate.[116]

Cárdenas forced Grajales to dismiss a number of state officials as a result of the report. The Department of Indigenous Affairs also forced a number of planters to cancel around $24,000 in illegal advances.[117] At the end of 1936 the department also formed the *Sindicato de Trabajadores Indígenas* (Syndicate of Indian Workers, STI) to represent over 25,000 migrant indian workers. The *Sindicato*, at first supervised by the federal government, was responsible for contracts, transportation, and payment of salaries. It distributed obligatory "work tickets" to indian authorities who in turn distributed them in their villages.[118] One student of indian-*ladino* relations in Chiapas contends that "the State restored forced salaried work, controlled it, and guaranteed it."[119] The benefit to the planters -- a large and dependable work force -- was considerable despite the increase in labor costs. The formation of the STI marked the beginning of the federalization of the Chiapanecan "indian problem," a process largely completed by 1950. As with rural education, indians became the responsibility of the national government.

The Department of Indigenous Affairs' intervention in Chiapas in March 1936 was essentially a political act, the first part of a larger campaign to remove Grajales from power. It turned into a power struggle between the state and federal governments.

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with a national political crisis. In mid-1935 former President Calles implicitly criticized President Cárdenas for tolerating an increase in strikes. Cárdenas, many believed, would be forced to heed the advice of Calles or resign. Instead, Cárdenas reorganized the cabinet and the leadership of the PNR, dismissing *callistas*. General Calles then retired from Mexico and, temporarily, public life. He returned from the United States in December 1935 and published a defense of his administration and his political views. For this provocation, Calles was expelled from the PNR and on April 10, 1936 was expelled from Mexico along with Luis León and Luis Morones.[120]

The defeat of *callismo* opened Chiapas to federal intervention. During the crisis Governor Grajales was labeled many times as a *callista* in the national press and his opponents even planted rumors that he was planning a revolt against Cárdenas.[121]

Two gubernatorial candidates appeared at the end of 1935. Cárdenas and the anti-*grajalista* coalition found a suitable candidate in Efraín Gutiérrez. In 1914 Gutiérrez had interrupted his studies at the National Agricultural College to join Emiliano Zapata in Morelos. He returned to school in 1916, finished his engineering degree, and became an official of the *Comisión Nacional Agraria*. From 1928 to 1932 he served in the Cárdenas administration in Michoacán. During the first two years of the Cárdenas presidency Gutiérrez served as the first director of the National Bank of Ejidal Credit and later as Secretary General of the Agrarian Department.[122] The official candidate for governor was Dr. Samuel León, Secretary General of Government in 1933-1934 and vice-president of the state legislature in 1935. Dr. León, naturally, was a close friend and ally of Governor Grajales.[123]

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The state PNR plebiscite, to choose party candidates, was scheduled for April 1936. Early in March the national executive committee of the party designated a new state chairman for Chiapas who proceeded to purge *grajalistas* from state, district, and municipal party committees.[124] Although the PNR had carried out an efficient and quiet *coup d'état* in Chiapas, Grajales did not submit. In preparation for the April plebiscite, the state government used harrassment and assassination against the Gutiérrez camp and attempted to purchase the necessary votes.[125] The PNR, however, was unbeatable. *Ejidos*, agrarian communities, and municipal governments were more dependent upon the national party and federal largess than upon the state government. On April 5 Efraín Gutiérrez and his delegates won ninety-seven of the 110 municipalities. The state PNR convention three weeks later officially nominated Gutiérrez. *Grajalistas* cried "official imposition."[126]

The general election was July 6. Although Dr. León dropped out of the race, Governor Grajales still refused to back down and threw his support to another candidate, Aguiles Crúz. The governor also pulled the state's labor organization, the *Confederación Campesina y Obrera de Chiapas*, out of the PNR. "Since the PNR recognized the triumph of Ing. Gutiérrez," wrote *Excélsior*, "assassinations and political persecutions are committed almost everyday."[127] During the general campaign, the state PNR informed a municipal party official in Huixtla that "those who go against the *Partido Nacional Revolucionario*, go against President Cárdenas."[128] In May the national PNR committee expelled from the party the Chiapanecan federal deputies who still opposed Gutiérrez.[129] On election day loyal *grajalista* state and municipal officials:

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> the booths to vote for the PNR ticket.... In most of the municipalities the police, led by official elements of the state, resorted to the most arbitrary procedures, assaulting polling booths and injuring some voters.130

Efraín Gutiérrez won the election, but still Grajales fought on. An assassination squad of twenty to twenty-five *pistoleros* assaulted the governor-elect's house one night following the election but Gutiérrez escaped unharmed. Grajales swore he would never turn over power to Gutiérrez and President Cárdenas took the threat seriously.[131] On September 22, acting on a request from the president, the Senate intervened and deposed Grajales.[132] Former Governor Amador Coutiño was appointed provisional governor and the army closed all state government offices and occupied the government palace.[133] Efraín Gutiérrez became governor of Chiapas on December 1, 1936.

REFLECTIONS

The Mexican Revolution opened the door to the mobilization of the rural working class in Chiapas, creating a new and potentially powerful constituency in the political arena. This constituency began to demand in the 1920s political participation and a strong and active State to enact and enforce reforms beneficial to their class. In Chiapas, between 1925 and 1927, these demands were met as the state government followed a policy of collaboration with organized labor. From 1927 to 1936, however, the government of Chiapas followed a policy of hegemony in response to political threats from within and without of the state. This policy took into account the political necessity of labor support but increasingly demanded the complete subordination of organization labor to government.

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The policy of hegemony divided organized labor in Chiapas into "official" nd "opposition" elements. The *Confederación Campesino y Obrera de Chiapas*, he first official labor organization which was formed in 1931, had as its rimary function the maintenance of labor's political support for the state egime. The dissident wing of the labor movement, led by the communist *ámara de Trabajo* and the national *Confederación Campesina Mexicana*, struggled ndependently in defense of class interests. They obtained the support of he federal government in 1934 and returned to political influence in Chiapas n 1936. During the administration of Victorico Grajales (1932-1936), the "opposition" wing of the Chiapanecan labor movement was forced to unite with the *cardenista* regime in self-defense and self-preservation. Socialist and communist labor leaders adopted the policy of the united front and yielded their independence to the reformist Leviathan headed by Lázaro Cárdenas. After 1936, organized labor in Chiapas became integrated within he State and (as the reform program advanced) steadily lost political nfluence, class unity, and its sense of class interest.

CHAPTER NINE

UNIFICATION, DEMOBILIZATION, CONSOLIDATION

Señor President: We feel proud to have our *ejido* and our primary school, and to receive the economic help of the Bank of Ejidal Credit.... We the organized *campesinos* of this colony are disposed to join the new National Party of Workers and *Campesinos* and we will be with you at all times.

Crispín Gómez, 1938

We the undersigned were workers of the *finca* 'Numancia' of this district, members of the *Sindicato Único de la Industria Cafetera del Soconusco*; the enterprise, today in the hands of *ejidatarios* and the worst enemies of the Unionized element, arbitrarily suspended us from work.... Ours is not the first case; many union sections have been dissolved and the *ejidatarios* possess the coffee region to the detriment of union members.

Alberto Guzmán, 1945

The Constitution of 1917, far from repudiating the authoritarian centralism of the Mexican State as it developed under Porfirio Díaz, expanded the responsibilities and extended the reach of government. Aside from the provision for a strong chief executive, the Constitution did not and could not outline precisely how the State could consolidate its power and establish its legitimacy in the eyes of the Mexican people. One thing was certain in the immediate post-revolutionary era: with the

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politicization and mobilization of part of the working class, both urban and rural, the methods of Porfirio Díaz were obsolete.

The first governments that followed the revolution developed ties with organized workers and peasants, trading mild reforms and limited political participation for political support. This policy came to an end with the assassination of Alvaro Obregón. Part of the price of peace between *obregonistas* and *callistas* was severance of all ties between the regime and organized labor. The revolutionary family, headed by patriarch Plutarco Elías Calles and embodied in the National Revolutionary Party, intended to become the sole arbitrator of Mexican politics. Organized workers and peasants, however, disturbed by the increasing conservative drift of the national government, helped bring to power a well-known friend of unionization and agrarian reform, Lázaro Cárdenas.

Cárdenas confronted the task of consolidating the power and giving legitimacy to the authority of the State by aligning to it the organized masses. Cárdenas created an institutional alliance, "conceived as a union and a commitment,"[1] between the State and the masses. He reorganized the party of the State as a party of corporations, divided among labor, peasant, military, and popular (middle class) sectors. Along with the party reorganization, indeed as part of the bargain, came an intensification of reform. The very success of the reforms of the Mexican Revolution (so long delayed) led to a partial demobilization of the working class. The acceleration of agrarian reform created many communities which were grateful to the State for land, dependent upon it for credit and tools, and less concerned with solidarity and struggle. *Ejidos* and unions became embroiled in conflicts with one another. *Ejidatarios* often found that working with the Bank of Ejidal Credit was as oppressive as it had

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been working for an *hacendado*. Cárdenas' successor, Manuel Avila Camacho, undertook to "consolidate the conquests of the revolution" between 1940 and 1946. With the electoral reform of 1945 and the last reorganization of the official party in 1946, the labor sector as well as state governments lost a significant degree of political influence and local autonomy.

UNIFICATION IN MEXICO

From the start of the Cárdenas administration the government patronized the General Confederation of Workers and Peasants of Mexico (CGOCM) led by Vicente Lombardo Toledano. The CGOCM had evolved from Lombardo's "pure CROM" and had supported Cárdenas for president in 1934. Both Cárdenas and Lombardo sought an increase in unionization and the integration of workers' organizations into a unified front that would end inter-syndical conflicts and give workers a more effective political voice and a mechanism of defense and struggle. This united front was established during the second CGOCM congress in February 1936. Over three thousand workers' organizations with 600,000 members combined to form the *Confederación de Trabajadores de México* (Confederation of Mexican Workers, CTM). Lombardo remained at the head of the labor movement and a dedicated Marxist. The CTM, according to one scholar of the Mexican labor movement, "was, without doubt, the organization that Cárdenas considered indispensable...and was the intervening instrument by which the working masses would be mobilized in support of the decisions of the State and in defense of the established regime."[2]

In July 1935 Cárdenas called for the unification of all *campesino* organizations as well. Lombardo wanted to unify both rural and urban

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workers within the CTM but Cárdenas was adamant that they remain separate. He ordered the *Partido Nacional Revolucionario* to "call conventions in every state of the union to meet for the purpose of having but one League of Agrarian Communities.... Once the Leagues of Agrarian Communities have been organized in the states, the National Executive Committee of the Party shall call a Great Convention to organize the Peasant Confederation."[3] Cárdenas prefered a single industrial workers' union, the CTM, and a separate and less independent *campesino* organization, the *Confederación Nacional Campesina* (National Peasant Confederation, CNC), which was formed in 1938.[4]

The unification of workers and peasants in separate umbrella organizations constituted only the first phase in Cárdenas' drive to establish a corporate State. Beginning in 1936, the CTM, with the president's support, put forward labor candidates for elective offices. These candidates became PNR nominees, thus strengthing the alliance between the PNR and the CTM. In December 1937 Cárdenas proposed to formalize sector participation in the PNR. At the party's national constitutional assembly in March 1938, the revolutionary family created the *Partido de la Revolución Mexicana* (PRM) to replace the PNR. The PRM was divided into three sectors or interest groups: workers, peasants, and soldiers. The workers' sector was dominated by the CTM and the peasant sector by the CNC. Membership in the PRM was automatically bestowed by membership in an affiliated labor union, cooperative, *ejido*, or by inclusion in the armed forces.[5]

The most notable difference between the PNR and the PRM was the manner of selecting candidates for public offices. Names were advanced by sectors, and through high level negotiation official candidates emerged. The PRM transformed labor and peasant representatives into politicians.

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Sector leaders came to identify more with the interests of the State than the interests of class. In this way, notes historian Paul Nathan, "a federation of interest groups within a party cannot 'facilitate' the class struggle, but mollify it."[6] The PRM, however, did help legitimize the State within the ranks of the organized masses. The PRM represented the reinstallation and institutionalization of the policy of alliance and collaboration, with the State holding the strongest position.[7]

UNIFICATION IN CHIAPAS

Efraín Gutiérrez entered office in late 1936 with nearly unanimous support of organized labor. The labor groups which the Grajales administration had refused to register, including the communist unions, had joined the CTM and had been solidly behind Gutiérrez in the campaign. After the election, Provisional Governor Amador Coutiño reorganized the state *Confederación Campesina y Obrera de Chiapas* (CCOC) by placing *gutierristas* in charge.[8]

In July 1937, after less than seven months in office, Gutiérrez convoked the First Workers' Congress of Chiapas. This assembly established the *Confederación Obrera y Campesina del Estado* (Worker and Peasant Confederation of the State) in place of the CCOC. The new state labor federation was composed of two subordinate affiliates: the *Confederación Obrera* and the *Confederación Campesina*.[9]

The *Confederación Obrera* was made up of 145 local labor unions in 1937, and over 271 in 1939 with a rank and file of around 33,000.[10] In August 1937 the *Sindicato de Trabajadores Indígenas*, claiming 18,000 members, joined the confederation.[11] The *Confederación Obrera*, subsidized

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by the state government, assisted nearly 5,000 sharecroppers and renters to obtain legally registered contracts and helped unorganized rural workers obtain individual parcels of land through the Law of Idle Lands.[12] The *Confederación Obrera's* main task was to unionize workers. One result of the acceleration of unionization was a fourfold increase in strikes from the Grajales period, twelve in 1938 and twenty-eight in 1939. The labor relations board considered 496 disputes in 1938 and 405 in 1939.[13]

At the end of 1938 Vicente Lombardo Toledano, Secretary General of the CTM, flew to Chiapas to formally integrate the *Confederación Obrera* into the CTM. The most important task of confederation, proclaimed Lombardo at the second state workers' congress, was the organization of hacienda residents (*peones acasillados*). These *campesinos* comprised the majority of rural workers in Chiapas but were excluded from the *Confederación Campesina* because they were not residents of legally constituted agrarian communities.[14] The CTM became the primary channel through which local unions voiced their complaints and requests to the government.[15]

The other wing of the new state labor confederation, the *Confederación Campesina* represented all *ejidal* governments (*comisariados ejidales*) and the agrarian executive committees of communities petitioning for land. In 1938, in conformity with President Cárdenas' campaign for *campesino* unification, the *Confederación Campesina* officially became the *Liga de Comunidades Agrarias y Sindicatos del Estado* (League of Agrarian Communities and Syndicates of the State), and joined the national peasant confederation, the CNC.[16] The CNC, like the CTM, replaced the state government as the primary channel of communication between *campesino* organizations and the State.[17]

Businessmen and industrialists were also unified in the late 1930s. Cárdenas wanted class conflict to take place peacefully and legally among

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powerful corporations and he considered the organization of capitalists necessary as well as workers and peasants. In 1936 the Law of Chambers of Commerce and Industry was enacted, replacing an obsolete 1908 law. The new legislation maintained that businesses were institutions with public responsibilities and defined chambers of commerce as organs of collaboration of the State. Businesses and industries valued at more than $500 were obligated to join the National Chamber of Commerce and Industry. They were also required to register with the government since only registered enterprises could participate in arbitrations conducted by the labor relations board.[18] The Tuxtla Gutiérrez Chamber of Commerce joined the national chamber in 1938. It continued its policy of close consultation and collaboration with the state government.[19]

As in other states, the Chiapas PNR was converted into the PRM in mid-1938. The leadership of the party, the Regional Committee for Chiapas, was composed the president of the party, local deputy Isidro Rabasa, and one representative of the *Confederación Obrera*, one from the *Liga de Comunidades Agrarias*, and later, one from the popular sector.[20] The Regional Committee of the PRM, in close consultation with the governor, appointed and discharged municipal and district party committee members. Candidates for public posts were named by party conventions.[21]

Mario J. Culebro, Secretary General of the *Confederación Obrera*, ordered all labor unions in the state in 1939 to abstain from supporting any potential candidates for local, state, or national office. The confederation, state Culebro, would present its slate of candidates to the PRM Regional Committee behind closed doors. The affilitated organizations and members would then support as a bloc the labor slate during the state PRM convention.[22] The high degree of integration among state PRM, CTM, and CNC affiliations was demonstrated in 1939 when the

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Regional Committee reported that 1361 separate organizations in Chiapas supported General Manuel Avila Camacho, a presidential hopeful, for the PRM nomination.[23] In early 1940 the Regional Committee of the PRM persuaded gubernatorial candidate General César Lara to drop out of the race and support Dr. Rafael Gamboa, the official candidate and nominee. Gutiérrez picked Gamboa through careful consultation with the party sectors and the National Executive Committee in order to avoid a repetition of the 1936 campaign. Gamboa was unanimously and peacefully elected in 1940.[24]

Political unification of worker and peasant organizations within the national ruling party diminished the political importance of state government. It was replaced, as the key mediating institution between localities and the national government, by national interest groups which were organized at the local, regional, and national levels. In addition, as the federal government moved more and more into acquiring functions which were once exclusively state functions, the state government became an anachronism; a regional branch of the national government better adapted to enforce national policies than defending and promoting regional priorities. Politics, not unexpectedly, also became less exciting. Political competition and discontent became a matter for bargaining between state officials, national bureaucrats, and sector representatives, all usually indistinguishable bureaucrat-politicians. At the beginning of the process of State formation in Chiapas the state government had occupied a prominent and important role; after 1940 and the rise of the Leviathan, the state government became insignificant as a political institution and a modernizing agent.

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THE RISE AND FALL OF INDIGENISM

The state government of Chiapas assumed the task of converting indians into Mexicans in the 1890s and sustained its labors until the 1950s. Prior to 1890 few public officials considered it desirable or possible to change the indigenous population. After 1950 the federal government, through the *Instituto Nacional Indigenista* (INI), assumed primary responsibility for the "indian problem." The period 1936-1940 was, in terms of state government policy, the golden age of indigenous reform in Chiapas. This period coincided with the rise of the ideology of *indigenismo* during the Cárdenas administration.

Indigenismo became a tenet of the national ideology during the Mexican Revolution, replacing the racist notion that ethnicity was uncivilized and prevented Mexico from becoming a great nation. In the 1920s artists, writers, and intellectuals viewed indian society, past and present, as a positive heritage of the nation. The national agrarian reform program, for example, revived the communal tenure of land, the indigenous *ejido*. At the level of government policy *indigenismo* encompassed two intertwined goals by the 1930s: the incorporation of the indian into national society without total cultural obliteration, and the betterment of indian life through education, political and economic organization, and the reform of the larger surrounding society. The revolutionary aspect of *indigenismo* was the idea that indian poverty was largely the result of inequalities in Mexican society and not simply a consequence of ethnic or racial inferiority.[25]

In 1937 Governor Gutiérrez established the Department of Rural Education and Indigenous Incorporation, later renamed the Department of

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Indigenous Protection.[26] The department's first director, Erasto Urbina, had assisted in the formation of the *Sindicato de Trabajadores Indígenas* in late 1936 and was a *gutierrista* state deputy. Under Urbina the state indigenous department initiated a massive effort to increase Spanish literacy, sending 250 teachers to indian villages. The department also established collection agencies in San Cristóbal, Comitán, and Motozintla to contract and transport indian workers to the coffee *fincas*.[27] Urbina also had some success in convincing planters to provide radios and install film theaters, construct better housing for migrant laborers, and stop selling liquor to indians.[28]

Urbina was the prime mover in the formation of new and energetic agrarian committees in Zinacantán and Chamula and the petitioning for land. Both petitions were approved in 1940: Chamula gained title to nearly the entire municipality (parceled into several *ejidos*), while Zinacantán's communal lands were doubled.[29] With Urbina's retirement in 1940 the drive for land subsided. Only eight municipalities remained untouched by agrarian reform in all of Chiapas by 1950; all eight were highland indigenous municipalities.[30] As late as 1954 an agrarian engineer described the indians of Tenejapa as "completely ignorant of our agrarian laws and legal procedures for obtaining full possession and of the technical survey of their lands."[31] Agrarian reform in the highlands of Chiapas has remained incomplete.[32](See Table 13 in Appendix.)

One result of the formation of committees in indian villages to push for agrarian reform and Urbina's policy of turning over local political authority to indians was the rise of the modern indian *cacique*. These new *caciques*, skilled middlemen who spoke Spanish and knew how to work with and even manipulate officials, came to tightly control municipal and

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ejidal governments, and the *Sindicato de Trabajadores Indígenas*. They became prosperous businessmen, money lenders, property owners, and employers.[33] Mariano Zárate and Salvador Oso, for example, were *caciques* of Zinacantán and Chamula respectively from the 1930s to the 1960s.[34] With political support at the state and federal levels, indian *caciques* became a pernicious power in Chiapas. The *caciques* of the *ejido* of La Libertad, for example, made a very unfair and unequal division of lands in 1939.[35] The *cacique* of Tenejapa in 1944 used the police to break up a market in Yochib. His motive was to maintain his monopoly over the Sunday market in Tenejapa, which he taxed.[36]

Indigenous unification and organization was to be the cornerstone of *indigenismo* in Chiapas. The only way the indian population might escape *ladino* exploitation and capricious, patronizing government was through the organization of a powerful, indian-led labor union. That organization was the *Sindicato de Trabajadores Indígenas*. From 1936 to 1939 the STI functioned as Urbina had planned. It negotiated collective contracts with coffee planters, obtained the minimum wage, free meals, transportation, and free medical treatment.[37] The STI had briefly succeeded in mitigating the worst abuses of migrant labor in Chiapas.[38] By 1939, however, the *Sindicato* was in the hands of a few Chamula *caciques* who were susceptible to bribes from planters and *hacendados*. The leadership of the STI in September 1939, for example, refused to support a strike by the *Sindicato Único de Trabajadores de la Industria de Café del Soconusco* (SUTICS), which derailed the strike movement.[39] The STI ceased being an instrument of self-defense and reform and became, as reputation would have it, a center of robbery and a compliant contracting agency for the coffee planters' cartel, the *Asociación Agrícola Local de Cafeticultores del Soconusco*.[40]

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AGRARIAN REFORM

Governor Efraín Gutiérrez, after twenty years of agrarian reform in Mexico, finally brought that program to the indigenous Central Highlands and the coffee plantations of Soconusco. In September 1937 Gutiérrez reported to the state legislature that within a few days he was sending a team of thirty agrarian engineers to Soconusco to study the problem of land concentration and begin to act upon petitions for land.[41]

The governor gave notice to the planters that their lands would no longer be exempt from expropriation. Long before, however, they had planned for such an eventuality. In the 1920s German nationals obtained permission from their government to become Mexican citizens only for the purpose of preventing the expropriation of their properties, which were within fifty kilometers of the international border and thus, by law, not permitted to foreign nationals.[42] After Cárdenas took power in 1934 and modified the federal agrarian code to permit the expropriation of coffee lands, the planters began to divide their properties among family members, sell parcels to friends and neighbors, and even give some land to *campesinos* to defuse agrarian sentiment.[43] Planters also tried to buy off agrarian committees and kill agrarian leaders, and they launched a propaganda campaign to convince the government that expropriation of the coffee industry would mean the economic ruin of Chiapas.[44] Gutiérrez, however, had no intention of driving the established planters out of business.

Also beginning in 1937, the *Sindicato Único de Trabajadores de la Industria de Café de Soconusco* (SUTICS), the principal labor union in the coffee zone, began to organize agrarian committees in the coffee

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The preliminary surveys were completed by the end of March 1939, at which time the governor traveled to Tapachula to give provisional grants to three new *ejidos*.[46] In April Gutiérrez established seven collective *ejidos* in the coffee zone: Cacahoatán, Unión Juárez, El Matazano, Agustín de Iturbide, El Aguila, Agua Caliente, and Talguián. This first wave granted 8119 *hectáreas* of first class coffee land to benefit 1636 *peones acasillados*.[47] Over 3000 *hectáreas* were expropriated from the seven properties belonging to Fernando Braun.[48]

Agrarian reform in Soconusco in 1939 left the coffee processing machinery, not to mention the marketing houses, still in the hands of a few powerful German planters, and during the 1939-1940 harvest they tried to bankrupt the new *ejidos*. The planters refused to process (dry and shell) and purchase *ejido* coffee for export. Gutiérrez stepped in to force the planters to process the crop and a few processing plants were seized by *ejidatarios*. The Bank of Ejidal Credit (a federal dependency) gave emergency credit to eight ejidal credit societies and the state government contracted with the firm of A.C. Muller of Houston to purchase *ejido* coffee.[49] These difficulties prompted the federal government to step in and initiate the second phase of land reform in Soconusco.

In the spring of 1940 President Cárdenas traveled to Soconusco and supervised divisions affecting nearly every large plantation in Soconusco and Mariscal. Cárdenas added another 20,000 *hectáreas* to the ejidal coffee zone and expropriated several processing plants.[50] Those properties affected, however, were declared "small property" and their owners were

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granted certificates of inaffectability, exempting those properties from additional agrarian litigation.[51] *Hacendado* Ad Giesman's conversion into a "small property owner" prompted some *peones acasillados* in 1941 to remark: "With six *fincas* in operation, it is a curious small property."[52]

President Manuel Avila Camacho in 1941 ordered the termination of agrarian activity in Soconusco during his administration, thus initiating the third and final phase of land reform in the coffee zone. This phase included the upgrading of provisional grants to definitive grants, the processing of petitions still under consideration, and the provising of certificates of inaffectability which up to 1941 had benefited only fifty percent of the planters and landowners of Soconusco.[53]

Part of the resolution of remaining agrarian problems during the early 1940s involved the breakup of the two large communal *ejidos*, Unión Juárez and Cacahoatán. Both had been formed by combining numerous independent agrarian communities and rival agrarian committees. The union of nine communities in the Cacahoatán *ejido*, for example, let to the formation of nine political factions that could not agree on anything, which in turn led to violence and agricultural inactivity. The national Agrarian Department was forced to divide these two *ejidos* into smaller ones which were still worked communally.[54]

By 1946 the agrarian contour of contemporary Soconusco was largely in place. About one half of all coffee properties had been converted into slightly more than one hundred *ejidos*. Most of the *ejidos* were organized into thirty-one credit societies, essentially business corporations with *ejidatarios* as shareholders and workers. They assigned tasks to the workers, processed and marketed the coffee, and paid the *ejidatarios*. Over half of these credit societies, sixteen out of thirty-one, accepted credit

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from the Bank of Ejidal Credit. The bank determined salaries, the number of days per week *ejidatarios* could work, and oversaw the harvests, processing, and marketing of the coffee. The bank became a bureaucratic *hacendado*, the *ejidatario*, a peon of the bank.[55]

The agrarian reform program of the 1930s and 1940s included not only the formation of *ejidos* but also the creation of a complex bureaucratic structure to assist, supervise, and control *ejidatarios*. In 1937 the federal Agrarian Department established the Division of Ejidal Promotion, a dependency of the state Agrarian Mixed Commissions. This office divided Chiapas into eight ejidal zones, each supervised by a *jefe de la zona* who was responsible for channeling governmental assistance to *ejidos*. These *jefes* channeled tools, livestock, schools and school teachers, roads and trucks, and improved seed to *ejidos*. They assisted ejidal governments to obtain amplifications of their original grants, a duty which occasionally made them assassination targets.[56] *Jefes* also arbitrated conflicts within and between *ejidos*.[57] The *jefes* were trained agronomists and career bureaucrats who carried out the directives of the federal Agrarian Department, further diminishing the role of the state government in ejidal affairs.

Land without the resources to work it could not raise the standard of living of *ejidatarios*, thus the necessity of government credit. Most credit in Chiapas prior to 1939 was dispensed by the National Bank of Agricultural Credit to private producers of coffee and *cacao*.[58] The Bank of Ejidal Credit, established by President Cárdenas in 1935 and designed to provide credit to ejidal credit societies, opened an office in Tuxtla Gutiérrez in 1936. The following year a central office was established in Tapachula and branch officers were set up in San Cristóbal,

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Tonalá, and Huixtla. Loans to credit societies increased from $100,000 in 1936 to $3,000,000 in 1940, and to over $31,000,000 by 1948.[59] The number of ejidal credit societies in Chiapas increased from thirty-six in 1936 to 160 by 1950.[60]

President Lázaro Cárdenas and Governor Efraín Gutiérrez came to power in the mid-1930s at the head of a politically powerful labor-agrarian coalition. In Chiapas this coalition was based in Soconusco, the most unionized region in the state and the home of the state's principal productive enterprises, coffee plantations, which still were in private hands. The coalition pledged its political support to Gutiérrez and the governor, in turn, was committed to extending land reform to Soconusco. Whether it was planned or not, the agrarian program served to pacify the agrarian movement and weaken organized labor. Communities that received land became loyal guardians of the State that granted it.

SEQUESTRATION

Mexico declared war on Germany, Italy, and Japan on June 2, 1942 after two Mexican oil tankers were torpedoed by German U-Boats in May. Nationals of the Axis nations were reconcentrated to interior cities and their properties impounded and administered by the federal government.[61] The Board of Administration and Supervision of Foreign Property impounded seventy-six German coffee plantations in Chiapas valued at more than twelve million *pesos*, most were located in Soconusco.[62] The sequestration lasted until 1946.

Administration of the impounded German plantations in Chiapas was turned over to the *Fideicomiso Cafeteros de Tapachula* (Coffee Fiduciary)

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which was run by officials of the Bank of Foreign Commerce. Despite the increase in coffee prices during the Second World War, production in the impounded plantations dropped by half during the sequestration. When the properties were finally returned to their owners in 1946, machinery, roads, houses, and the coffee groves were in bad condition.[63] The Fiduciary tolerated no strikes and even lowered salaries but did allow the organization of *peones acasillados* into labor unions.[64] The Fiduciary also hired Guatemalan workers in preference to Mexican workers since they accepted less than the minimum wage.[65]

The last phase of agrarian reform in Soconusco occured during the sequestration of 1942-1946. Although the *Sindicato Único de Trabajadores de la Industria de Café de Soconusco* repeatedly demanded the total nationalization of all impounded properties, the agrarian reform department left each plantation with a minimum of 300 *hectáreas*, as required by law. Since the planters had previously divided their properties within the family, they still managed to retain a good portion of their properties. In 1946 over 10,000 *hectáreas* of the richest and most productive land in Mexico were returned to their original owners.[66]

DEMOBILIZATION

The extensive unification of peasants and workers into powerful confederations integrated into the Party of the State, and the partial success of agrarian reform in Chiapas, led to the political demobilization of the organized masses. It was a demobilization of class solidarity and independent struggle, rather than a disbanding of formal organizations, although that took place also. Once-aggressive labor unions and agrarian

leagues turned away from the broader struggle for class advancement to focus on internal rivalries, disputes with the State bureaucracy, and self-preservation and aggrandizement. The always fragile yet potentially powerful mobilization of workers and peasants in Chiapas peaked and then subsided between 1936 and 1947. The movement, as Arnaldo Córdova describes it, was devoured by the State.[67]

The formation of *ejidos* created communities which were, and remain, closely tied to the State. They received their land from the State and were dependent upon it for credit, material assistance, and further amplification of their original grants. *Ejidatarios* became loyal, conservative, and self-interested citizens. "We the organized *campesinos* of this colony," wrote the leadership of one new *ejido* in 1938, "are disposed to join the new National Party of Workers and Soldiers [the PRM] and we will be with you at all times."[68] In 1940 *ejidatarios* in Chiapas numbered over 40,000, comprising around twelve percent of the male population but possessing over twenty percent of all cultivated land. By 1970 *ejidatarios* numbered nearly 150,000 and comprised twenty percent of the male population but possessed over fifty percent of all land in cultivation.[69] (See Table 14 in Appendix.) Most *ejidatarios* were and remain poor, but within the Chiapanecan *campesinado* they are the privileged poor.

Ejidatarios had something to defend, and their solidarity with members of neighboring *ejidos*, with organized workers, and with unorganized sharecroppers, renters, and day laborers, disappeared. The *ejidatarios* of Independencia (Mariscal) in 1936, for example, encroached upon 100 *hectáreas* of the best land of the *ejido* of San Isidro Siltepec. In 1943, assisted by an agrarian engineer who was probably bribed, the same

ejidatarios helped themselves to an additional 120 *hectáreas,* provoking a violent feud.[70] Forty-two *baldíos* of Tierra Colorado in the municipality of Zinacantán opposed the formation of an *ejido* comprising lands they had cultivated for thirty years. When the Chamula *ejidos* were formed in 1940 the *ejidatarios* ordered the *baldíos* to move off the land. In 1956 the *baldíos* of Tierra Colorado petitioned the government for their own *ejido.* The Chamula *ejido* then gave them membership rather than risk losing some of their land to a new *ejido.*[71]

Internal ejidal conflicts were, and remain, serious and commonplace. Governance of *ejidos* almost always fell into the hands of a few powerful *caciques* whose authority derived from the support of government officials and from their own skillful employment of favors and punishments. Bartolomé Vásquez Chahal was the *cacique* of Venustiano Carranza from 1939 until his death in 1947. He rented ejidal land to cattlemen, which not only made him a wealthy man but won him the backing of the *ladino ayuntamiento.*[72] Parcels were usually unfairly distributed to *ejidatarios*, according to faction, and were occasionally sold to outsiders.[73] Conflicts within *ejidos* often arose between factions linked to the Bank of Ejidal Credit and those opposed to the bank. One group in 1942, for example, did not like working "to promote a group of favorites of the Bank of Ejidal Credit."[74]

The bank of ejidal credit, in fact, became the most heated issue of conflict within *ejidos* in the 1940s. Referring to the situation in Chiapas, the Secretary General of the League of Agrarian Communities commented that "the property owner has not changed, now he is called ' the bank' and the exploitation could not be more iniquitous."[75] The ejidal bank's control of those *ejidos* that accepted government credit was substantial.

he bank placed its employees in charge of ejidal credit societies, paid low price for ejidal coffee but sold it to exporters for a much better ne, and in 1942 used $800,000 belonging to the collective *ejidos* of nión Juárez and Cacahoatán to purchase 300 *hectáreas* and the processing achinery of Enrique Braun. The price was quite high, leading some to onclude that the bank and Braun were in collusion. The bank, furthermore, ept control of the land and the machinery instead of turning it over to he credit society. In response, some mutinous *ejidatarios* created the *nión Central de Crédito Ejidal Colectivo* to get out from under the control f the bank. The bank, however, "killed this new organization."[76]

To avoid the capricious domination of *caciques* and bankers, factions ppeared in the collective *ejidos* of Soconusco demanding parcelization, hat is, the working of the former coffee plantations not as a whole but n small, individual plots.[77] "In view of the scandalous misuse of money hat can be observed in the *ejidos*," wrote one ejidal faction, "we demand hat the ejidal parcels be emancipated and that in these *ejidos* new *omisariados Ejidales* be organized."[78] The president of the dissident *iga de Acción Política y Social* of Chiapas informed President Avila Camacho hat "the *ejidatarios* are longing, truly longing to obtain: parcelization; itle to authentic property that will protect a portion of land which is heir property; and individual credit. These are the true desires of *jidatarios*."[79] The bank, and public authorities linked to the bank, esponded that those who wanted parcelization were either Guatemalans (who ad no right to land anyway) or communists.[80] In fact, communists did pport the parcelization effort, an interesting ideological shift from heir earlier collectivation demands.[81] Parcelization of the collective *jidos*, however, from an economic and fiscal point of view was out of the

question. It would lower productivity and thus lower tax revenue for the federal and state governments.

Agrarian reform combined with the aggrandizement of the ejidal bank led to antagonism between *ejidos* and labor unions. In 1945, when the *finca* Numancia of Cacahoatán was converted into an *ejido*, the local SUTICS section (whose members were not included in the ejidal census) found itself in a difficult situation. The leaders of the *ejido*, wrote the local SUTICS section chief Alberto Guzmán, "not only took away our jobs before dissolving the Section but until now have not recognized their obligation to indemnify us." Guzmán continued, arguing that "the ejidal bank, *Señor* President, manages these *señores ejidatarios*.... Ours is not the first case; many union sections have been dissolved, and the *ejidatarios* possess the coffee region to the detriment of union members."[82]

According to a SUTICS memorandum, "once the Credit Societies were constituted, the agency of the Bank in Tapachula began to apply a policy of separation between *ejidatarios* and unionized workers."[83] The ejidal bank jailed union leaders who voiced opposition to its activities and it even organized an armed defense force, allegedly to help *ejidatarios* defend themselves against *hacendados* but in fact "to control all the workers of Cacahoatán."[84] In 1945 the Agrarian Department granted land not to the SUTICS section members who lived and worked on the land but to a neighboring agrarian colony linked to the bank.[85] "We demand," wrote SUTICS in 1943, "that the employees of the Bank of Ejidal Credit be replaced by others who do not extort [money from] *ejidatarios*."[86] SUTICS supported the demands for parcelization.

By 1945 the ejidal bank not only controlled the operations and finances of fifteen credit societies (representing between fifty to

seventy *ejidos*) but also owned several coffee plantations and processing plants. The bank, an agent of the State, had become in less than six years one of the most powerful institutions in Soconusco. "At the moment the bank acquired these properties," wrote SUTICS, "it demanded the cancellation of collective work contracts affecting 147 workers." The bank informed these workers that "it could recognize no union rights, in view of the fact that it [the bank] is not an enterprise but an official apparatus; one finds in this same situation the workers of the *fincas* 'Santa Rose' in Tuxtla Chico; 'El Palmar' and 'California' in Tapachula...".[87] Such practices by the Bank of Ejidal Credit were not limited to Chiapas. The institution came under criticism for its financial irregularities and exploitation of *ejidatarios* and workers throughout the country.[88]

The demobilization of organized labor came not only at the hands of the ejidal bank but also as a result of hiring practices of private farmers that began in the early 1940s. In 1941 the migration authorities in Motozintla called attention to the "ruinous competition" of Guatemalan workers who came to Mexico to escape a deteriorating economy at home and to look for land and higher wages to the north.[89] *Finqueros* and the *Fideicomiso Cafetero* prefered non-unionized Guatemalan *braceros* who would work for less than the minimum wage.[90] By 1950 the migration of Guatemalan workers into Chiapas had become a flood of 30,000 a year.[91]

The flow of Guatemalan *braceros* into the coffee zone had two important consequences. First, since the government permitted, or perhaps could not stop, Guatemalans from crossing the border, labor unions lost what leverage they once had over the planters with the strike. Rather than renegotiate collective contracts with unionized Mexican workers, planters hired Guatemalans. As a result, "the standard of salaries has remained stagnant

for over four years [1939-1943]; the same salary that a worker earned when a kilo of maize cost 6¢, is the same he earns nows, when this same kilo of maize is valued at 18¢."[92] The second consequence was the decline in the number of highland indians who came to work in Soconusco, from around 30,000 in 1940 to less than 10,000 by 1950.[93]

Demobilization took place on many fronts and for different reasons but the result was the same: the shifting of responsibility for the welfare or workers and peasants from independent class-based organizations to the State. This trend was doubly discouraging when, after 1940, government support for organized labor declined. In Chiapas, for example, the number of authorized strikes declined from twenty-eight in 1939 to one in 1940 and three in 1941.[94]

ECONOMIC RECOVERY

The recovery of commercial agriculture from the civil war and the world depression coincided with the demobilization of the organized working class in Chiapas in the 1940s. The deceleration of the pace of agrarian reform, the increase in the number of certificates of inaffectability, the decline in unionization, decline in government support for organized labor, and the increase of commodity prices encouraged landowners to reinvest in agriculture. Further, the expansion and paving of the regional network of roads and highways, and the construction of a Gulf Plain railroad from Veracruz, through Pichucalco and Palenque, and on to Yucatán in 1940 decreased transportation costs.[95] The combined effect of these diverse developments can be seen in the production figures for coffee, maize, and frijol from 1925 to 1950 in the following table: (All figures in Metric Tons.)[96]

YEAR	COFFEE	MAIZE	FRIJOL
1925	17,700	69,479	9,627
1930	11,740	37,336	3,033
1935	12,768	53,858	3,410
1940	18,525	57,890	5,582
1945	18,339	100,128	6,275
1950	30,001	210,039	21,142

The greatest production increases for all three commodities came in the period 1945 to 1950. There were similar increases (in maize in the Central Lowlands) in *hectáreas* placed under cultivation and yield per *hectárea*.[97]

Over the course of half a century, from the 1890s to the 1940s, the Mexican State intervened in the regional Chiapanecan economy, modernizing both its material infrastructure (primarily roads and railroads) and the social relations of production (land tenure and labor utilization). State intervention, in the final analysis, strengthened and modernized the capitalist economy, at very little cost to the dominant class, and alleviated the evils produced by unrestrained private economic power. By the 1940s the contemporary structure of the Chiapanecan economy was set and a period of unequaled growth ensued which has continued to this day. The economic organization of Chiapas in the 1980s is much closer to that of the 1940s than the 1940s economy is to that of the 1890s.

THE POLITICS OF CONSOLIDATION

The accelerated agrarian reform program, pro-labor policies and the toleration of strikes, the expropriation of the foreign-owned oil companies, and the radical rhetoric of the Cárdenas administration produced a serious division in Mexican society. President Cárdenas realized the potential

danger to political stability that continuation of his program signified and in 1938 he began to moderate the reform agenda.[98] It was widely assumed, even by the Marxist labor leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano, that the continuation of *cardenismo* would lead to irreparable internal division and possibly civil war, which in turn would provoke intervention by the United States. The times seemed to call for a period of consolidation.[99]

Cárdenas and the revolutionary family of the PRM chose General Avila Camacho as the next president, someone who represented the middle ground in Mexican politics. The large segment of Mexican society that opposed any perpetuation of *cardenismo* supported the independent candidacy of General Juan Andreu Almazán. It is believed that Almazán, in fact, had more popular support in Mexico City than Avila Camacho. Nevertheless, PRM candidate Avila Camacho was declared winner in the general election in July 1940, although not without considerable violence and electoral fraud. The general impression in the country was that the official candidate and next president of Mexico had not really triumphed. These circumstances further induced Avila Camacho to follow a course of conciliation, moderation, and, as he stated in his inaugural address, "consolidation of the conquests of the revolution."[100]

In Chiapas the official gubernatorial candidate, Dr. Rafael Gamboa, was as much a choice of the officials of the national executive committee of the PRM as he was of the state committee. He was a close friend of Veracruz Governor Miguel Alemán, who was an important *avilacamachista* and became the Secretary of Government in the new administration. Dr. Gamboa had served as Secretary General of Government in the Gutiérrez administration and had moved on to the Senate, where he made valuable contacts with the right people. His administration in Chiapas (1940-1944) represented no

sharp break with that of his predecessor in terms of personnel. It was also reported, however, that he was well regarded by coffee planters and businessmen.[101] Juan M. Esponda, Secretary General of Government from 1940 to 1942, succeeded Gamboa in 1944. Although unpopular in Chiapas, particularly with the agrarian sector, Esponda was Gutiérrez's and Gamboa's man and he was elected.[102]

The administration of Avila Camacho gave special emphasis to private agricultural production, industrial expansion, and foreign investment. His government also expanded public investment through the *Banco de México* and the *Nacional Financiera* (National Investment Bank). These new policies were pursued during the favorable economic climate engendered by national mobilization during the Second World War. It was at this time that seriously embarked on the road to industrial development.[103]

The administration also undertook, at the end of the war, political reforms which strengthened the power of the federal government at the expense of local government and the labor sector of the PRM. In December 1945 the Avila Camacho government revised the 1918 *Ley Electoral*. The new statute removed from municipal and state authorities the power of establishing (and redrawing) electoral districts, forming census lists for voting purposes, overseeing the electoral process and computing vote tallies, and declaring a winner. The system of local control of elections had led to innumerable cases of fraud and violence, most recently in the presidential election of 1940. The president wanted to avoid a repetition of that embarrassing episode and centralized the electoral process at all levels of government in the *Comisión Federal de Vigilancia Electoral* (Federal Commission of Electoral Supervision).[104]

The *Partido de la Revolución Mexicana* was also reformed during the

Avila Camacho administration. In 1940 the military sector was dropped from the party structure, in 1942 a popular sector was added, representing government employees, small businessmen, and in general, the middle class. In 1943 the party's *campesino* sector welcomed "small property owners" as members. In the national party convention of January 1946 the PRM was dissolved and the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI) was born. The convention also nominated Miguel Alemán Valdés for the presidency of the republic (1946-1952). In the PRI, sector independence and influence was diminished and the power of the party's president was strengthened. In the internal selection of candidates, individual voting booths replaced bloc votes by sector. The transformation of the PRM into the PRI reduced the power of the party's single most powerful organization, the *Confederación de Trabajadores de México*. The *Ley Electoral* and the formation of the PRI also increased the power of the national regime and the office of the president.[105]

In the municipal elections of 1946, Chiapas Governor Juan M. Esponda (who had become notorious for selling local offices to the highest bidder) imposed Oaxaqueño Guízar Ocequera as municipal president of Tapachula.[106] On the day Guízar assumed office, December 31, the opposition faction staged a protest rally. The police panicked and fired into the crowd, killing six and wounding forty-three unarmed citizens.[107]

The provisions of the 1945 *Ley Electoral*, although derelict in preventing the scandal, were immediately applied to Chiapas. The Federal Electoral Commission and the Permanent Commission of the Congress of the Nation began an investigation of the incident which concluded that the governor and several state deputies had illegally intervened in the municipal elections.[108] Governor Esponda took an unlimited leave of

proletarian organizations faced two alternatives as a result of the specific historical circumstances of Mexico in the 1930s: cooperation with a powerful capitalist State or repression by it and the destruction of many of the gains of the Mexican Revolution.

The State, "the new Leviathan," in the words of Arnaldo Córdova, however, became the ultimate arbiter in Mexican society with popular (albeit organized) consent.[111] Argrarian organizations demanded a strong State that could divide *haciendas*, the labor movement looked to the State to regulate capital and capitalists, nationalists demanded a powerful State to secure the economic sovereignty of the nation, and late in the day, even capitalists looked to a strong State as an important source of investment capital. In the post-revolutionary era the State rose to its central position in Mexican society with the support of organizations, and it should come as no surprise that since the 1940s the organized element in Mexico has occupied a privileged position.

absense rather than face federal intervention. The state legislature, guided by the new Alemán administration in Mexico City, appointed General César Lara provisional governor.[109] Lara's appointment ended the *cardenista-gutierrista* era in Chiapas. Lara was an old *delahuertista* (he fought with Alberto Pineda in 1923-1924) and had been a *grajalista* in the 1930s. He brought the *mapache-grajalista* faction back to power. Francisco Grajales, a *mapache* captain during the civil war, was elected for the period 1948-1952, Efraín Aranda Osorio for 1952-1958, and Dr. Samuel León, the unsuccessful *grajalista* candidate for governor in 1936, for the period 1958-1964.[110]

REFLECTIONS

The Chiapanecan labor movement was born in 1920 and domesticated by 1947. It helped dismantle and erect state regimes, pressured government to institute reforms, and worked to improve conditions for workers and peasants. In a manner resembling the achievement of the entrepreneurial elite in Chiapas in the 1890s, the labor movement became an important part of the constituency promoting a strong and interventionist State. Although responsive to the material interests of organized entrepreneurs, workers, and peasants, the State did not become captive to any one element of its constituency. From the 1920s to the 1940s the national State in Chiapas converted *caudillos* into bureaucrats, strong regional parties into one party of the State, and powerful and independent labor and peasant organizations into compliant sectors. By means of patronage, partition, bureaucratization, and populist rhetoric the State defused labor's potential capacity for establishing political hegemony in Mexican society. Large

proletarian organizations faced two alternatives as a result of the specific historical circumstances of Mexico in the 1930s: cooperation with a powerful capitalist State or repression by it and the destruction of many of the gains of the Mexican Revolution.

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CONCLUSION

The intervention of the State must be increasingly great, increasingly frequent, and increasingly of a basic nature.

Lázaro Cárdenas, 1934

Few times in history has a State obtained such a definitive degree of legitimacy and dominion over the economic, political, and ideological life of a country.

Carlos Pereyra, 1974

The formation of the Mexican State was the single most important development in the history of modern Chiapas. No significant aspect of Chiapanecan life, from techniques of agricultural production to social relations within communities, remained untouched. Most Chiapanecans were ignorant of and indifferent to the national State prior to the 1890s; this was no longer possible after the 1940s. Throughout Chiapas, even in remote villages, the presence of the State became visible and important. For better or worse, it happened. It is the essence of what happened in Chiapas from the 1890s to the 1940s.

This regional study has addressed the topic of the historical formation of the State in light of three analytical guidelines. These guidelines: 1) the preeminence of social determinants of State formation; 2) State formation as a long evolutionary process (the State as a work-in-progress) and; 3) State formation as a synthesis of regional and

national aspirations, are reviewed in this concluding discussion. The point of this recapitulation is not to formulate a model of universal applicability; such a task lies outside the province of the historian. Instead, my aim is to briefly sketch the theoretical principles which guided and directed the collection of information, its organization and interpretation, and the final composition.[1]

SOCIAL DETERMINANTS

Karl Marx first theorized that the State, the legal and political superstructure of society, "arises upon" the economic or material infra-structure. This idea is based on the assumption that "the mode of production of material life *conditions* the social, political, and intellectual life process in general."[2] Any separation between the political, economic, social, and cultural parts of the societal whole, in short, is artifical and arbitrary. Marx, however, went on to claim that "the bourgeois State is nothing but a mutual insurance pact of the bourgeois class both against its members taken individually and against the exploited class."[3]

Gradual but important changes in the regional economy and the composition and outlook of the elite contributed to the definitive initiation of State formation in Chiapas in the 1890s. An expansive regional economy assisted the rise of an entrepreneurial elite while the expansion of this elite strengthened the economy. This small but dynamic segment of the regional bourgeoisie looked to a strong, centralized, and active State to accomplish certain tasks it deemed necessary for its material wellbeing: the elimination of local bosses who interfered

in the productive and commercial process and the construction of a communications-transportation infrastructure. "This type of entrepreneur," writes David Walker, "cannot be considered an authentic champion of liberalism or of the *laissez-faire* State. He is the antithesis of the entrepreneur who asks for the non-intervention of the State in the economy, since such intervention is precisely the key of his success."[4]

A subsequent profound modification of Chiapanecan society and economy was caused by the Mexican Revolution and the ensuing regional civil war. Political disruption and the accompanying breach in social control led to the politicization of part of the working class and, later, the formation of proletarian organizations. Politically powerful labor and peasant organizations looked to a centralized and active State capable of instituting basic reforms in land tenure and labor utilization. The State became ever more powerful and came to participate extensively in the society and economy of Chiapas in response to the active encouragement of specific elements of both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

The Mexican State became not the captive of the bourgeois class in its struggle against an exploited class but a mechanism responsive to organized elites from both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.[5] It was formed to advance and defend not the interests of broad classes but the interests of elements within both classes as well as its own wellbeing.[6]

PROCESS AS PASSAGES

The State is not created by decree or spontaneously generated but derived from a formative process. The rise of the State is, above all, the product of specific historical circumstances which are at the same

time contemporaneous and inherited. The process of State formation involves the transmission of acquired attributes although not without reverses, deviations, and breaks in continuity. The reverses, however, constitute the challenges which provoke men to erect new and more viable political structures or else succumb to anarchy.

State formation in Chiapas can be viewed in terms of relatively self-contained passages which are, as the word itself implies, interconnected. The initial passage involved the conscious replacement of the centralized Spanish State by a politically fragmented political order. State formation began almost immediately following emancipation as "the material foundation for the newly created nation began to take shape only with the rise of opportunities for incorporation of the local economies into the world capitalist system and with the consequent development of differentiated and interdependent interests generated by such opportunities."[7]

The first definitive stage of State formation in Chiapas came in 1891 to 1910. This passage saw the integration of the regional economy into the world economy through the production and export of coffee, rubber, mahogany, and *cacao*. Elite entrepreneurs in commercial agriculture, the primary beneficiaries of this integration, strengthened the regional unit of government. Greater centralization and intervention by the regional government, a trend epitomized by the transfer of the seat of government in 1892 and the *reparto* program of modification of village land tenure, created the defining characteristics of State formation in the subsequent passages. The products of State formation in one stage become the agents of change and of State formation at a later stage.

From 1910 to 1920 the Mexican Revolution, proceeding to Chiapas from outside the state, disrupted State formation in Chiapas. Conflict in

1911 derived from the inflammation of local sentiment in San Cristóbal Las Casas by the centralization of state government during the preceeding twenty years. The regional civil war from 1914 to 1920 was a similar localist reaction to the intervention within the state by the national government. Both localist movements ultimately failed yet the crises they provoked led to the politicization of the working class in Chiapas. The geographical contours of politicization (and subsequent mobilization) was largely determined by the *reparto* program which had been more effective in Mariscal and Soconusco than in any other part of the state. The revolutionary decade represented a period of discontinuity in the formative process within which was born a new political constituency to advance even further State centralization and intervention. It was a passage of transition from the politics of elites to the politics of the masses.

In the succeeding passage, from 1920 to 1947, politicized workers were organized into a powerful political bloc demanding substantial socio-economic reforms from a powerful State. This workers' and peasants' bloc did not become the dominant and exclusive political actor in Chiapas or Mexico and political and economic reforms were employed by the State as instruments of power. The organized proletariat became an authentic but subordinate element of the State. State formation did not end in Chiapas in 1947 but we can see by that date the basic outline of a political structure and a pattern of political behavior that has continued to this day.

CENTER AND PERIPHERY

One of the attributes of the modern national State is effective

authority throughout the national territory, from the national capital to the smallest village. Extension of central government to the periphery is more than simply an operation directed and controlled by the center.[8] State formation in Mexico was a synthesis of regional and national aspirations and material requirements. Regional governmental units operated as voices of particular interests at the periphery and as active agents of centralization and intervention. As the process of State formation continued and matured, however, regional governments were reduced to instruments of central control and administration.

Emancipation from the Spanish imperial State in 1821 was immediately followed by the institution of a system of limited municipal government and local-regional autonomy. An ineffective national system of domination conformed to the material interests of landowners in the 1820s but had become, by the 1890s, a distinct liability. As the history of Chiapas demonstrates, the first stage of State formation involved the weakening of local systems of authority and political power by the regional, or state government. From 1891 to 1910, State formation in Chiapas became the responsibility primarily of the state government. "The action of the state in the functioning of the general government," wrote Emilio Rabasa in 1912, "will be the *most powerful force* for assuring the stability of institutions, the dignity of the villages, and the majesty of the nation."[9] The state government of Chiapas, not the national government, took the initiative to suppress local power centers and promote economic modernization in response to specific Chiapanecan requirements and demands.

With the Mexican Revolution and the Constitution of 1917, however, the national government began to usurp many traditional functions of state government and strengthened the federal treasury at the expense of state

treasuries. Expansion of the central State apparatus and appropriation of greater resources derived from the revolutionary role expected of the State as the principal guarantor and regulator of capitalist relations. Specialized functions -- land reform, labor-management regulation, education, indigenous protection, agricultural credit, etc. -- required specific institutions which in time developed their own bureaucratic momentum and bureaucratic networks and little by little appropriated spheres of operation of state government. In time, state governments became less the agent and platform for the expression of peripherial interests than simply the agent of central government, and sometimes troublesome agents at that. Plutarco Elías Calles made this point in 1931: "If the government should have one plan of action and the states another, a disorderly and chaotic situation would be created.... The state governments should be humble, modest, and honorable."[10] State governments, important agents of State formation once, became anachronistic institutions whose main task is to prevent political disturbances.[11]

The centralization of power, resources, and economic decision-making in the central government in Mexico City was a double-edged sword. Only a strong State could have constructed costly public works, expropriate private property, and regulate labor-management relations; all of which were necessary before Chiapas could develop an efficient capitalist economy. Yet, beginning in the 1940s, the economic priorities of the national State began to diverge from the economic needs of Chiapas and other predominantly rural and agricultural regions in Mexico. During the presidency of Manuel Avila Camacho the federal government directed its resources and fiscal policies toward the industrialization of Mexico. Direct State investment, and domestic and foreign investment, was channeled

into textiles, food-processing, cement, electricity, automobiles, and other import substitution industries. Mexico's industrial development since 1940, however, has benefited only a few regions at the expense of the rest.[12]

The push for industrialization from the 1940s to the 1970s has primarily benefited those regions which were already relatively developed economically and industrially: the Federal District, and the states of México, Nuevo León, Coahuila, Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, Baja California Norte, Sonora, and Jalisco.[13] James Wilkie, in his quantitative study of Mexican federal expenditures since 1910, shows that federal investments were "largely directed to entities which do not lie within regions of high poverty."[14] The neglected regions were predominantly rural and agricultural: Tabasco, Campeche, Quintana Roo, Oaxaca, Guerrero, and Chiapas among others. State neglect of the agricultural sector (particularly *ejidos* and small properties), furthermore, contributed to Mexico's unequal regional development. According to one report "in 1940 the difference in the per capita gross national product between the wealthiest areas and the ten poorest states was close to 4,500 *pesos* (monetary value constant in 1960 *pesos*). In 1960 the difference was 6,500 *pesos*."[15]

Since the 1940s Chiapas has produced more and more agricultural commodities (industry has remained insignificant), but accessibility to material advantages has not greatly expanded. The total value of agricultural production increased from 200 million *pesos* in 1950 to over three billion *pesos* in 1975.[16] Despite this impressive increase, ninety percent of the state's population in 1975 earned less than 1000 *pesos* a month, or slightly more than eighty dollars.[17] From 1950 to 1970 the number of *ejidos* in Chiapas nearly doubled, coming to comprise fully one-

half of all land in cultivation. *Ejidos*, however, over the last three decades, have received only ten percent of all agricultural credit.[18] The political function of the *ejido*, pacification of the countryside, has been relatively successful but as an economic enterprise the *ejido* has failed. The system of credit, internal political organization, and the small size of parcels seem to discourage productivity in *ejidos*.[19] Private property, which has consistently been more productive, however, is held by a smaller percentage of the male population today than in 1910. (See Table 15 in Appendix.)

The creation of a strong and active State was beneficial and necessary during the first stages of economic development in Chiapas. The centralization of economic decision-making and financial resources in the federal government (and the concomitant debilitation of state government-directed allocation of resources) came to have an injurious affect on Chiapas. In 1968 a reporter for the *New York Times* noted that in Chiapas "state governments come and go and not much seems to change."[20] This can be explained by the fact that the important decisions affecting Chiapas are no longer made in Tuxtla Gutiérrez but in Mexico City. Today the government in Tuxtla Gutiérrez has a clearer perception of Chiapas' investment needs, as well as a vested interest in meeting these needs, than the government in Mexico City. A new balance needs to be found, a north-south dialogue within Mexico should begin.[21]

FINAL REFLECTIONS

I have tried to show that between 1891 and 1947 a strong, centralized, and interventionist national State arose in Chiapas in response to the

material needs of powerful organized groups. My argument has not been that Mexican State formation in Chiapas was typical of what developed in other regions but rather in one small part of this complex and varied nation the struggle for modernity took this particular form because of these particular reasons. Lacunae exist in abundance in our understanding of the history of Chiapas and Mexican State formation and it is my hope that this study might suggest the need and perhaps specific topics for more systematic investigation. My research examines only lightly several topics of importance which deserve studies in depth but, like Gordon Wright whom I quote, "a nagging curiosity about general trends...led me to persist in trying to see the problem in the large."[22]

APPENDIX

TABLE 1

Population and Production Units in Chiapas, 1855

District	Total Population	Description of Production Unit
Central District	35,782	Forty-five Cattle and Horse Ranches and Sixteen Wheat *Haciendas*
Northern District	17,791	Fifteen Ranches and *Haciendas*
Western District	15, 873	156 Cattle and Horse Ranches
Northeast District	21, 739	Twenty-six Cattle and Horse Ranches
Northwest District	9,685	Eighty-three *Cacao Fincas* and "Some Cattle Ranches"
Southern District	16,266	184 *Haciendas* and Ranches of Cattle, Horse, and Sheep

Comment: The Central District covers the Central Highlands; the Northern District refers to the Simojovel area; the Western District includes Tuxtla, Chiapa, Tonalá, Mapastepeque, and Cintalapa; the Northeast District includes Chilón, Ocosingo, and Palenque; the Northwest District includes Pichucalco and Copainala; and the Southern District includes Comitán, San Bartolomé, Pinola, and Soconusco.

Source: Manuel Orozco y Berra, *Apéndice al diccionario universal de historia y de geografía* I-III (Mexico, 1855), III, pp. 31-32, 76, 449.

TABLE 2

Number and Description of Landholdings in Chiapas, 1778-1909

Year	Number and Description	Source
1778	Thirty-two *Haciendas*	Molina
1837	853 *Fincas Rústicas*	*Informe* 1889
1855	515 *Haciendas* and *Ranchos*	Orozco y Berra
1862	Forty-two *Haciendas* and 123 *Ranchos*	Pérez Hernández
1877	448 *Haciendas* and 501 *Ranchos*	Emiliano Busto
1889	3159 *Fincas Rústicas*	*Informe* 1889
1896	1048 *Haciendas* and 3497 *Ranchos*	*Datos estadísticos*
1897	5858 *Fincas Rústicas*	Corzo
1909	1120 *Haciendas*, 5742 *Ranchos*, and 3742 *No Clasificados*	*Anuario estadístico*

Comment: The sources do not explain the differences between an *hacienda, rancho,* and *finca rústica.* The terms *hacienda* and *rancho* do have general meanings and they are defined in the Glossary. The term *finca rústica* is taken to mean all rural properties regardless of size. Very small properties, those less than ten to fifteen *hectáreas* were called, in official terminology, *no clasificados.*

Source: Virginia Molina, *San Bartolomé de los Llanos* (México: INAH, 1976), p. 69; Manuel Orozco y Berra, *Apéndice al diccionario universal de historia y de geografía* 3 vols. (México, 1855), III, pp. 31-32; José María Pérez Hernández, *Estadística de la república mejicana* (Guadalajara: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1862), p. 52; Emiliano Busto, *Estadística de la república mexicana, estado que guarden la agricultura, industria, minería, y comercio* (México, 1880), p. xviii; Manuel T. Corzo, *Ligeros apuntes geograficos y estadísticos del estado de Chiapas* (Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Imprenta del Gobierno de Chiapas, 1897), p. 11; *Datos estadísticos del estado de Chiapas recopilados en el año de 1896* (Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1898), p. 31; *Anuario estadístico del estado de Chiapas. Año de 1909* (Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Tipografía del Gobierno, 1911), p. 52.

TABLE 3

Profession	Number
Tailors	3
Carpenters	4
Artesans	5
Shoe Makers	8
Weavers	11
Doctors/Druggists	11
Farmers	16
Merchants	23
Other Professions	34
Resident Since 1867	107
Total	140

Source: *Memoria sobre diversos ramos de la administracion publica del estado de Chiapas por el gobernador constitucional Jose Maria Ramirez* (Chiapas: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1885).

TABLE 4

Public Rents in Chiapas, 1862-1910

Year	Amount
1862	$45,633
1877	120,102
1881	135,215
1882	134,995
1883	151,249
1884	136,015
1885	154,510
1886	125,218
1887	143,332
1888	135,126
1889	183,279
1890	204,332
1891	229,608
1892	274,749
1893	441,520
1894	359,184
1895	421,428
1896	373,928
1897	504,434
1898	509,445
1899	473,295
1900	521,235
1901	492,002
1902	395,713
1903	659,421
1904	607,036
1905	835,604
1906	906,365
1907	714,884
1910	740,556

Source: for 1862 see, José María Pérez Hernández, *Estadística de la república mejicana* (Guadalajara: Tip. del Gobierno, 1862), p. 193; for 1877 see, Emiliano Busto, *Estadística de la república mexicana, estado que guarden la agricultura, industria, minería, y comercio* (México, 1880), I, P. xix; and for 1881 to 1910 see, *Anuario estadístico de la república mexicana* (México: Sria. de Fomento, volumes for the years 1894-1912.)

TABLE 5

Ejido Reparto, 1893-1909

Year	*Pueblo*	Department
1893	Tuxtla Gutiérrez	Tuxtla
1893	Ixtacomitán	Pichucalco
1893	Pinola	Comitán
1893	San Carlos	Comitán
1893	San Bartolomé de los Llanos	La Libertad
1893	Yajalón	Chilón
1893	Simojovel de Allende	Simojovel
1893	Jiquipilas	Tuxtla
1893	San Fernando	Tuxtla
1893	Suchiapa	Tuxtla
1894	Cintalapa	Tuxtla
1894	Ocozocoautla	Tuxtla
1894	Teopatán	Mezcalapa
1894	Teopisca	Las Casas
1894	Chiapa de Corzo	Chiapa
1894	Chapultenango	Pichucalco
1894	Pueblo Nuevo Chiapilla	Chiapa
1895	Pichucalco	Pichucalco
1895	Mezcalapa	Mezcalapa
1895	Tapilula	Mezcalapa
1895	Ixhuatán	Mezcalapa
1895	Coapilla	Mezcalapa
1895	Ostuacán	Pichucalco
1895	Sunoapa	Pichucalco
1895	Magdalena	Las Casas
1895	Nicapa	Pichucalco
1895	Citala	Chilón
1895	Solosuchiapa	Pichucalco
1895	San Bartolomé	Mezcalapa
1895	Ixtapangajoya	Pichucalco
1895	Cacahoatán	Soconusco
1896	Tonalá	Tonalá
1896	Chiapilla	Chiapa
1896	San Pedro Huitiluapán	Chilón
1897	Villa de Acala	Chiapa
1897	Ocosingo	Chilón
1897	Las Margaritas	Comitán
1897	Frontera Díaz	Soconusco
1897	Tuxtla Chico	Soconusco
1897	Metapa	Soconusco
1898	Union Juárez	Soconusco
1898	Villa Flores	Chiapa

TABLE 5 (con'd.)

Year	*Pueblo*	Department
1898	Huixtla	Soconusco
1898	Huehuetán	Soconusco
1898	Socoltenango	Comitán
1898	La Independencia	Comitán
1898	Guaquitepec	Simojovel
1899	Tapachula	Soconusco
1899	Novos	Simojovel
1900	Cancúc	Chilón
1900	Asunción Huixtuipán	Simojovel
1900	Mazatán	Soconusco
1902	San Cristóbal Las Casas	Las Casas
1902	Pijijiapám	Tonalá
1902	Mapastepec	Tonalá
1903	Tecpatán	Mezcalapa
1903	Ixhuatán	Mezcalapa
1904	Tololapa	La Libertad
1904	Quechula	Mezcalapa
1905	San Felipe Tizapa	Soconusco
1905	Escuintla	Soconusco
1905	San Diego la Reforma	La Libertad
1905	Acacoyagua	Soconusco
1907	San Cayetano	Tonalá
1909	Berriozabal	Tuxtla
n.d.	Jitotol	Simojovel
n.d.	Santa Margarita	Palenque

Comment: The division of a village *ejido* often continued for several ırs. Most of the work, however, was accomplished during the first year division, which is the year given in this table.

Source: The basic document from which this table is compiled is :itled "*Oficina General de Ejidos: Copia del inventario general formado la Oficina Gral. de Ejidos*," found in the Archivo Histórico de Chiapas, :ción de Fomento, 1908, Volume III, Expediente 12. Additional information :d to verify the accuracy of the OGE document was culled from: volumes :LVI, Resoluciones Presidenciales, Ramo Comisión Nacional Agraria, :hivo General de la Nación; various expedientes concerning Chiapas in : Archivo "seis de enero de 1915" de la Secretaría de Reforma Agraria; l a letter from Emilio Rabasa to Porfirio Díaz, May 21, 1894, found in : Colección General Porfirio Díaz, Roll 104, Legajo XIX.

TABLE 6

Register of Indebted Servants, 1897

Department or *Partido*	Number of Servants	Value of Debts
Mezcalapa	747	$72,570
Símojovel	2626	222,293
La Libertad	1142	105,701
Tonalá	832	76,033
Pichucalco	3242	506,675
Chiapa	1463	125,895
Chilón	3530	188,468
Las Casas	2238	117,733
Palenque	1131	n.d.
Comitán	4783	333,077
Soconusco	3997	467,840
Tuxtla	2339	214,904
Motozintla	714	50,971
Chamula	234	11,029
Frailesca	865	80,250
Cintalapa	1630	195,958
Total	31,512	$3,017,012

Comment: The Soconusco figures are incomplete due to the inexplicable ɜense of two account books. Motozintla, Chamula, Frailesca, and ıntalapa are *partidos*.

Source: *Periódico Oficial del Estado* (Tuxtla Gutiérrez), July 30, 1898.

TABLE 7

United States Joint Capital Investments in Chiapas, 1900-1910

Joint Stock Company	Purpose of Investment
Zaccalpa Plantation Company	Rubber
Tapachula Rubber Company	Rubber
American Mutual Plantation Co.	Rubber
St. Paul Tropical Development Co.	Land Sales
Roblito Rubber Plantation Co.	Rubber
Chiapas Land and Stock Co.	Land Sales
Wisconsin Rubber Co.	Rubber
Orizaba Rubber Plantation Co.	Rubber
Graves and Graves Co.	Rubber
Mexican Plantation Association	Rubber
Mexican Plantation Company	Rubber
Chiapas Rubber Culture Company	Rubber
Palenque Development Company	Rubber
Pan-American Land and Colonization Co.	Land Sales
Tabasco and Chiapas Land Co.	Land Sales
Mexican Hardwood Company	Timber
German-American Coffee Company	Coffee
Pan-American Railroad Company	Railroad
Santa Clara Plantation Company	Coffee
Montecristo Rubber Plantation Co.	Rubber
Grijalva Land Company	Coffee
Mescalapa Land Company	Coffee
United States Banking Company	Rubber
Chicago Rubber Plantation Company	Rubber
Federal Fruit Company	Rubber
Esperanza Timber Company	Timber
San Marcos Rubber Plantation Co.	Rubber

Comment: This table does not include investments by individual United
tes citizens resident in Chiapas such as O.H. Harrison, Charles Lesher,
. Quimby, and others.

Source: Albert Brickwood, "Rubber in Chiapas (Mexico)," June 25, 1910;
"Plantations in Palenque, Chiapas, Mexico," October 10, 1910 in the
ional Archives, Record Group 84, Tapachula: Miscellaneous Reports.

TABLE 8

Property Values in Chiapas, 1837-1906

Year	Urban Property	Rural Property
1837	n.d.	$1,261,000
1875	n.d.	1,730,866
1877	n.d.	3,622,840
1885	$502,501	3,307,374
1896	3,002,113	18,182,372
1897	3,163,465	21,839,645
1902	3,875,588	23,272,129
1904	3,460,546	23,695,500
1905	3,640,276	30,454,266
1906	3,640,276	30,742,743

Comment: These are reported values for purposes of taxation, and are devalued, according to some reports, as much as one-hundred to one-hundred and fifty percent. (See: *Chiapas, su estado actual,* 1895, p. 13) This chart, then, not only measures reported increases of landed wealth but the increasing power of the state government to obtain more realistic valuations.

Source: For 1837 see Móises T. De la Peña, *Chiapas económico* 4 vols. (Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Departamento de Prensa y Turismo, 1951) II, p. 325; for 1875 see Paniagua, *Catecismo*, p. 92; for 1877 see Busto, *Estadística de la república mexicana*, I, p. xviii; for 1885 see *Memoria sobre diversos ramos*, 1885; and for the years 1896-1906 see *Anuario estadístico de la república mexicana*, 1897, 1898, 1903, 1906, 1908, 1912.

TABLE 9

Comparison of State-Federal Budgets, 1900-1960

Year	Total Chiapas Budget	Chiapas Per-Capita Expenditure	Total Federal Budget	Federal Per-Capita Expenditure
1900	$3,865	10.7	$400,960	29.4
1910	3,776	8.6	521,910	34.4
1921	2,191	5.5	757,710	52.8
1929	6,227	11.7	1,048,300	63.3
1940	10,937	16.1	1,324,850	67.4
1950	14,129	15.6	2,746,060	106.8
1960	37,908	31.3	4,828,710	138.2

Comment: All budget figures in millions of *pesos*. In Chiapas budgets,
1 figures refer to proposed expenditures.

Source: For Chiapas proposed budgets see *Periódico Oficial del Estado,*
00-1960. For Federal budgets see James W. Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolution:*
deral Expenditure and Social Change since 1910 (Los Angles: University
California Press, 1970).

TABLE 10

Population of Chiapas, 1877-1960

Year	Population
1877	208,215
1893	304,882
1900	360,799
1910	438,843
1921	421,744
1930	521,318
1940	679,885
1950	907,026
1960	1,210,870

Source: *Estadísticas sociales del Porfiriato, 1877-1910* (México: Dirección General de Estadística, 1956), p. 7; *Anuario de 1930,* (México: Talleres Gráficos de la Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento, 1932), p. 34; Secretaría de la Presidencia, *Monografía del estado de Chiapas* (México: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1975), p. 18.

TABLE 11

Agrarian Reform in Chiapas, 1917-1948

Administration	Petitions	Settlements	Provisional Grants
Villanueva: 1917-1919	41	10	17,295 *hectáreas*
Fernández Ruiz: 1920-1924	47	19	20,754
Vidal: 1925-1927	102	43	87,061
Enríquez: 1928-1932	n.d.	126	192,517
Grajales: 1932-1936	n.d.	104	105,602
Gutiérrez: 1936-1940	n.d.	424	449,150
Gamboa: 1940-1944	n.d.	27	62,225
Esponda/Lara: 1944-1948	n.d.	74	98,627

Source: *Anuario de 1930;* Gutiérrez, *Informe 1939;* Gutiérrez, *Trayectoria un Gobierno,* pp. 40-41; and De la Peña, *Chiapas Económico* II, pp. 375-6.

TABLE 11 (cont'd.).

Administration	*Ejidos*	Definitive Grants	Beneficiaries
Villanueva: 1917-1919	4	4,470 *hectareas*	1464
Fernández Ruiz: 1920-1924	14	20,274	1122
Vidal: 1925-1927	39	81,344	6634
Enríquez: 1928-1932	113	171,889	14,000
Grajales: 1932-1936	61	66,087	6131
Gutiérrez: 1936-1940	261	349,180	29,398
Gamboa/Lara/ Esponda: 1940-1948	115	538,374	n.d.

Comment: Beneficiaries refers to heads of households only.

Source: Gutiérrez, *Informe 1939*; Gutiérrez, *Trayectoria de un Gobierno*, pp. 40-41; De la Peña, *Chiapas económico* II, pp. 376-377.

TABLE 12

Schools in Chiapas, 1927-1936

Year	State/Municipal	Federal/Rural Primary	Federal/Total
1927	125	159	182
1928	99	151	172
1929	122	318	338
1930	183	321	344
1931	106	261	285
1932	71	311	334
1933	50	290	339
1934	117	351	380
1935	224	459	442
1936	227	461	493

Source: Sría. de la Economía Nacional, *Anuario estadístico, 1938* (México: DAPP, 1939), p. 93.

TABLE 13

Ejido Distribution by Region in Chiapas, 1950

Zone	Number of *Ejidos*	*Hectáreas* in *Ejidos*
I: Pichucalco	13	5,162
II: Tecpatán	5	5,170
III: Chicoasen	53	37,542
IV: Simojovel	53	43,017
V: Palenque	15	5,491
VI: Las Casas	57	37,488
VII: Ocosingo	16	7,619
VIII: Comitán	93	30,079
IX: Cintalapa	42	29,836
X: Tuxtla-Chiapa	66	37,057
XI: Villa Corzo	29	27,740
XII: La Concordia	34	27,246
XIII: Motozintla	85	52,754
XIV: Tonalá	33	16,310
XV: Escuintla	40	28,782
XVI: Tapachula	107	39,085

Source: *Tercer censo agrícola, ganadero, y ejidal. 1950. Chiapas* (México: Dirección General de Estadística, 1957), p. 583.

TABLE 14

Ejidos and *Ejidatarios* in Chiapas, 1920-1979

Year	*Ejidos*	*Ejidatarios*[a]	Percentage of Male Population[b]
1920	4	1,464	Less than 1
1930	67	9,676	3.5
1935	217	29,191	n.d.
1940	395	42,566	12.5
1950	739	71,362	15.5
1960	932	92,000	15.0
1970	1216	148,210	20.0
1979	1341	n.d.	n.d.

[a]"He must be a Mexican male, over sixteen years of age, if single, or of any age if married; or female, single or widowed, if she is the head of a family." From: Chapter III, Article 44a, Agrarian Code of the United Mexican States, 1924, quoted in Simpson, *Ejido*, pp. 768-769.

[b]In 1940 only 52,000 women in Chiapas over the age of 15 were single out of a total population of 338,615 women. There were 19,000 widows. The 1940 Census of Population listed 164 women private property owners. Although the statistics do not provide the number of women *ejidatarios*, it is probable that they were as few as women landlords. Thus, *ejidatarios* as percentage of male population is a more meaningful indication of the economic strength of *ejidatarios*.

Source: De la Peña, *Chiapas económico* II, pp. 375-376; *Anuario de 1938*, p. 196; *Anuario de 1940*, p. 499; *Tercer censo agrícola, ganadero, y ejidal. 1950*, p. 5; Helbig, *Chiapas: geografía*, pp. 315-316.

TABLE 15

Rural Private Property Owners in Chiapas, 1910-1970

Year	Number	Percentage of Male Population
1910	10,604	6%
1923	13,026	6
1927	20,930	8
1940	24,429	7
1950	28,739	6
1970	30,926	4

Source: De la Peña, *Chiapas económico* II, p. 325; *Anuario de 1923-1924*, p. 107; *Anuario de 1930*, p. 340; *6º Censo de población 1940. Chiapas*, p. 29; *V Censo agrícola-ganadero y ejidal 1970. Chiapas*, p. 77.

TABLE 16

Rates of Exchange for *Pesos* to U.S. Dollars, 1877-1945

Year	*Pesos* for Dollars
1877	1.04
1894	1.98
1900	2.06
1910	2.01
1925	2.03
1933	3.50
1939	5.19
1945	4.85

Source: Jan Bazant, *A Concise History of Mexico from Hidalgo to Cardenas, 1805-1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 192.

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ARCHIVAL ABBREVIATIONS

ACh	Archivo de Chiapas
AFIM	Archivo Francisco I. Madero
AFLB	Archivo Francisco León De la Barra
AGC	Archivo General de Centroamerica
AGN/OC	Archivo General de la Nación/Fondo Obregón-Calles
AGN/ALR	AGN/Fondo Abelardo L. Rodríguez
AGN/LC	AGN/Fondo Lázaro Cárdenas
AGN/MAC	AGN/Fondo Manuel Avila Camacho
AGN/MAV	AGN/Fondo Miguel Alemán Valdés
AGN/CNA	AGN/Ramo de Comisión Nacional Agraria
AGOM	Archivo General Octavio Magaña
AHCH	Archivo Histórico de Chiapas
AHRM	Archivo Histórico de Matías Romero
ASRE	Archivo de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores
ASRA	Archivo 'seis de enero de 1915" de la Secretaría de Reforma Agraria
AVC	Archivo Venustiano Carranza
CGPD	Colección General Porfirio Díaz
LAM	Latin American Manuscripts, Lilly Library
NA/RG 59	National Archives of the United States/Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State
NA/RG 76	NA/Record Group 76: Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions and Arbitrations
NA/RG 84	NA/Record Group 84: Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State
NA/RG 165	NA/Record Group 165: Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs
NA/RG 266	NA/Record Group 266: Records of the Office of Strategic Services
PC	Paniagua Collection
SCh	Serie Chiapas
SFIM	Serie Francisco I. Madero

NOTES

Introduction

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to the constituent unit of the Mexican federal republic, is not capitalized. The term which refers to the broader and abstract organization of the civil society of a nation, "State," is capitalized.

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Chapter One

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Chapter Two

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[29]Teofilo Palacios, Tapachula, to Díaz, November 26, 1893, CGPD,100, XVIII,18770; Rabasa to Díaz, February 18, 1894, CGPD,101,XIX,2678.

[30]See: Spenser, "Coffee Economy. Several politicians, businessmen, and landowners from Tuxtla Gutiérrez and San Cristóbal owned or held interests in coffee plantations in Soconusco. See: Thomas Benjamin, "Register of Chiapanecan Elites, 1890-1940," Unpublished manuscript, 1980.

[31]Julian Grajales, Chiapa de Corzo, to Díaz, January 4, 1892, CGPD,89, XVIII,502.

[32]Grajales to Díaz, November 1, 1892, CGPD,86,XVII,17185.

[33]Díaz to Grajales, November 25, 1892, CGPD,86,XVII,17186; Grajales to Díaz, August 2, 1894, CGPD,106,XIX,11381.

[34]*El Partido Liberal*, January 10, 1892.

[35]Governor Francisco León, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to Díaz, December 20, 1898, CGPD,156,XXIII,17495.

[36]Rabasa to Díaz, January 13, 1894, CGPD,100,XIX,300. I uncovered no information regarding actions Rabasa took to bring Pichucalco under the control of the state government.

[37]Luis Espinosa, ed., *Chiapas* (México, 1925), no pagination. For a similar opinion see: José Casahonda Castillo, *50 años de revolución en Chiapas* (Tuxtla Gutiérrez:Instituto de Ciencias y Artes de Chiapas, 1974), p. 15.

[38]Valadés, *El Porfirismo* I, p. 124; *Chiapas, su estado actual*, p. 13.

[39]"Conflictos pecuniarios en Chiapas," *El Universal*, January 14, 1892; Rabasa to Díaz, January 20, 1892, CGPD,76,XVII,1155.

[40]Circular 1, Sección de Hacienda, March 26, 1892, and, Dictamen del Comisión, May 26, 1892, SCh,78,XXVIII; Ramón Rabasa, *El estado de Chiapas: geografía y estadística* (México, 1895), p. 115; *El Universal*, September 26, 1893; Rabasa to Díaz, August 4, 1892, CGPD,84,XVII,12862.

[41]*Discurso del Lic. Emilio Rabasa* (Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1892, 1893); Llevano, *Lic Emilio Rabasa*, pp. 20-21; Cal y Mayor Redondo, "Evolución política y constitucional," pp. 104-105; Rabasa to Díaz, July 18, 1893, CGPD,94,XVIII,9141.

[42]Rabasa to Díaz, March 25, 1892, CGPD,78,XVIII,4549.

[43]Rabasa to Díaz, January 13, 1894, CGPD,100,XIX,300; R. Rabasa, *El estado de Chiapas*, p. 115.

[44]Rabasa to Díaz, August 23, 1892, CGPD,85,XVII,14543.

[45]Fernando Castañón Gamboa, "Panorama histórico de las comunicaciones en Chiapas," *Ateneo Chiapas* 1 (1951), p. 90.

[46]Francisco León to Díaz, June 15, 1896, CGPD,129,XXI,9371.

[47]Rabasa to Díaz, March 22, 1893, CGPD,92,XXI,5499; *Discurso del Lic. Emilio Rabasa,* 1892, 1893; Angel M. Corzo, *Historia de Chiapas* (México: Editorial "Protos," 1944), pp. 137-140; Casahonda Castillo, *50 años de revolución*, p. 14.

[48]Rabasa to Díaz, April 24, 1892, CGPD,80,XVII,6243.

[49]*Discurso del Lic. Emilio Rabasa,* 1892, 1893. Also see: Rabasa to Díaz, April 24, 1892, CGPD,80,XVII,6243; Rabasa to Díaz, January 15, 1894, CGPD,XX,100,300; Rabasa to Díaz, September 5, 1893, CGPD,96,XVIII,12498.

[50]See: Miguel Mejía Fernández, *Política agraria en México en el siglo XIX* (México: Siglo XXI, 1979), p. 253.

[51]*Ley y reglamento para la división y reparto de egidos en el estado de Chiapas* (Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1893), pp. 1-18.

[52]Srio. Gral. Oficina Ejidos to Srio. Gral. Gobierno (Chiapas), December, 23, 1908, Archivo Historico de Chiapas, Sección de Fomento, 1908, Volume III, expediente 12, hereafter cited as AHCH and identifying information.

[53]*Datos estadísticos del Estado de Chiapas* (1896), p. 1; *Anuario estadístico del Estado de Chiapas, año de 1909* (Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Tipografia del Gobierno, 1911), p. 54.

[54]"Oficina General de Ejidos: Copia del inventario general formado por la Oficina Gral. de Ejidos," AHCH, Fomento, 1908, Vol. III, exp. 12.

[55]Albert Brickwood, "Tapachula," *Daily Consular and Trade Reports, October 25, 1911* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1911), p. 434. Also see: Jean Meyer, *Problemas campesinos y revueltas agrarias, 1821-1910* (México: SepSetentas, 1973), p. 229.

[56]Pueblo Nuevo Chiapilla, AGN,CNA,Libro 12, Caja 2.

[57]Vecinos de Chiapa de Corzo to Díaz, January 6, 1895, CGPD,112,XX,936.

[58]"Copia del inventario general formado por la Oficina Gral. de Ejidos," AHCH,Fomento,1908,III,12.

[59]Moguel to Díaz, January 11, 1895, CGPD,112,XX,936.

[60]Rabasa, Mexico City, to Díaz, May 21, 1894, CGPD,104,XIX,7417.

[61]Emilio Rabasa, *La evolución histórica de México* (México: Editorial Porrua, 1956, 1920), p. 237.

[62]Rabasa to Díaz, January 15, 1894, CGPD,100,XX,300; Rabasa to Díaz, December 17, 1892, CGPD,88,XVII,19858.

[63]*El Universal*, January 17, 1894.

[64]Ley del Director General de Instrucción Pública, December 28, 1892, Decree 8, SCh,84,Second Series.

[65]*El Universal*, January 17, 1894.

[66]Elliot S. Glass, *México en las obras de Emilio Rabasa* (México: Editorial Diana, 1975), p. 41; *Discurso del Lic. Emilio Rabasa,* 1893.

[67]Rabasa, *La evolución histórica*, pp. 222, 224.

[68]Castallanos, Comitán, to Díaz, December 8, 1892, CGPD,90,XVIII,1802; Alfonso, Comitán, to Díaz, July 28, 1894, CGPD,106,XIX,10114.

[69]V. Pineda, San Cristóbal, to Díaz, August 8, 1894, CGPD,106,XVIII,11163; B. Topete, San Cristóbal, to Díaz, January 15, 1895, CGPD,112,XX,354; Cal y Mayor R., "Evolución política y constitucional," p. 105.

[70]*El Universal,* January 27, 1893, June 9, 1895; *El Voto de Chiapas,*

June 1, 1895; Ricardo de Marcia y Campos, Administrador de Aduana, Tapachula, to Díaz, November 15, 1894, CGPD,110,XIX,17617.

[71]Hakala, "Emilio Rabasa," pp. 137-150.

[72]Rabasa, *La constitución y la dictadura*, pp. 305, 316.

[73]Eugene M. Braderman, "A Study of Political Parties and Politics in Mexico since 1890," Diss. University of Illinois, 1938, pp. 15-17; Leopoldo Zea, *Positivism in Mexico* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974), pp. 235-245; Walter N. Breymann, "The Científicos: Critics of the Diaz Regime, 1892-1903," *Proceedings of the Arkansas Academy of Science* VII (1954), pp. 91-97.

[74]The Rabasa-Díaz correspondence in the Colección General Porfirio Díaz confirms this point many times over.

[75]F. Moguel, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to Díaz, February 28, 1894, CGPD,102, XIX,3521.

[76]Manuel Lacroix, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to Díaz, December 3, 1895, CGPD,123, XX, 18724.

[77]León to Díaz, September 6, 1899, CGPD,347,LVIII,3717.

[78]Emilio Rabasa, "Memorandum," to Díaz, October 1905, CGPD,223,XXX,13655.

[79]Rabasa to Díaz, January 13, 1894, CGPD,100,XX,300.

[80]Alfonso M. de Lascurian, "Influencia de Don Emilio Rabasa, en la Constitución de 1917," Tesis, UNAM, 1956, pp. 24-25, 37; Hilario Medina, "Emilio Rabasa y la Constitución de 1917," *Historia Mexicana* 10 (junio-julio 1960), pp. 134-148; Cosío Villegas, *La constitución de 1857 y sus criticos* (México: Editorial Hermes, 1957), pp. 61-62, 167-193. In 1906 Rabasa published *El articulo 14 constitucional* and in 1912 *La constitución y la dictadura*.

[81]Cosío Villegas, *Change in Latin America: The Mexican and Cuban Revolutions* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961), p. 27. Cosío also suggested that "the form of the new regime was actually suggested by a reactionary who wished to give posthumous justification to the dictatorial government of Porfirio Díaz." (p. 27). Rabasa's ideas helped model the constitutional form of the revolutionary government because he anticipated the necessity of a centralized, interventionist State. He viewed the porfirian political system not as the best government Mexico could ever attain but as a necessary, but temporary, passage in the evolution of the modern Mexican State; a State based on law and institutions, not capricious decrees and personalities. Cosío also argued that Rabasa "certainly

lacked any revolutionary ideas or inclinations." (p.27.) In his novel *La bola*, however, Rabasa considered revolution "the daughter of the progress of the world, the inevitable law of humanity.... To them [revolutions] we owe the rapid transformation of society and institutions." See: Hakala, "Emilio Rabasa," pp. 152-153. Perhaps Cosío's disappointment with the Mexican Revolution in the 1940s can be explained not by changes in the revolution but its faithfulness to porfirian statism.

82 *El Universal*, May 25, 1856.

Chapter Three

Epigraph: Francisco León to Porfirio Díaz, May 25, 1896, CGPD,129,XXI, 9447; León to Díaz, August 1, 1896, CGPD,132,XXI,13977.

1 *El Universal*, May 26, 1899.

2 Topete, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to Díaz, December 18, 1894, CGPD,111,XIX, 19654; Topete, San Cristóbal, to Díaz, January 15, 1895, CGPD,112,XX,354. Also see: Daniel Cosío Villegas, *Historia moderna de México. El Porfiriato. La vida política exterior* (México: Editorial Hermes, 1960) V, p. 254.

3 León to Díaz, April 2, 1895, CGPD,116,XX,6577; Luis Espinosa, ed., *Chiapas* (México, 1925), no pagination.

4 Juan Angel Peña, San Bartolomé, to Díaz, July 27, 1894, CGPD,106,XIX, 10113; Manuel Marina, Chiapa de Corzo, to Díaz, July 30, 1894, CGPD,106,XIX, 11244; R. Rovelo, Comitán, to Díaz, April 14, 1895, CGPD,117,XX,8625; Nicolas Domínguez, Comitán, to Díaz, August 10, 1894, CGPD,106,XIX,11206; M. Mijanjos, San Cristóbal, to Díaz, May 30,1895, CGPD,118,XX,11305; Mariano Trujillo, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to Díaz, August 4, 1894, CGPD,106,XIX, 11204; Julian Grajales, Chiapa de Corzo, to Díaz, August 2, 1894, CGPD, 106,XIX,11381; Miguel Utrilla, San Cristóbal, to Díaz, August 24, 1894, CGPD,107,XIX,14764; Manuel Castellanos, Comitán,to Díaz, July 28, 1894, CGPD,108,XIX,14249.

5 The precise composition of this group would change over the years. V. Pineda, San Cristóbal, to Díaz, August 8, 1894, CGPD,106,XIX,5393; Pimentel, San Cristóbal, to Díaz, November 30, 1895, CGPD,103,XX,5393.

6 During the decade 1900-1910 this groups was called "La mano negra." Rafael Pimentel, San Cristóbal, to Díaz, November 30, 1895, CGPD,122,XX, 18031.

7 Abenamar Evoli, San Cristóbal, to Díaz, April 2, 1895, CGPD,115,XX,

5948; León to Díaz, December 14, 1895, CGPD,336,LIV,7048.

[8]Pimentel to Díaz, November 30, 1895, CGPD,122,XX,18031.

[9]Lacroix to Díaz, December 12, 1895, CGPD,123,XX,18685.

[10]Pimentel to Díaz, November 30, 1895, CGPD,122,XX,18031; Pimentel to Díaz, December 31, 1895, CGPD,336,LIV,7434.

[11]León to Díaz, April 29, 1897, CGPD,140,XXII,5995.

[12]*Memoria presentada por el ejecutivo del Estado de Chiapas...* (Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1899.)

[13]From *El Porvenir de Chiapas*, quoted in *El Partido Liberal*, May 27, 1896.

[14]León to Díaz, August 26, 1898, CGPD,154,XXVII,12909.

[15]"Memorandum que presenta al C. Presidente de la República, el Gobernador de Chiapas," February 17, 1899, CGPD,158,XXIV,2339.

[16]Quoted in *El Partido Liberal*, May 27, 1896.

[17]León to Díaz, June 10, 1896, CGPD,129,XXI,9401.

[18]Lacroix to Díaz, n.d. (approximately January 1896), CGPD,124,XXI,426.

[19]Secretaría de Hacienda del Estado de Chiapas, Decreto Num. 8, December 28, 1895, CGPD,129,XXI,9439.

[20]"Nota de lo recaudado por el Gobierno Federal en el Estado de Chiapas en los años que se indican," and "Lo que ha hecho el Gobierno Federal en beneficio del Estado de Chiapas," January 1899, CGPD,158,XXIV,3128 and 3130.

[21]Díaz to León, March 5, 1896, CGPD,300,XLI,402.

[22]*Ibid.*

[23]*El Universal,* January 16, 1896; *El Partido Liberal*, September 30, 1896.

[24]"Memorandum que presenta al C. Presidente de la Republica...." 1899.

[25]"Reglamento de la Inspección General de Salubridad Pública," May 31, 1897, SCh,XXVIII,78, Second Series.

[26]*El Universal*, October 1, 1899.

[27]León to Díaz, August 9, 1898, CGPD,152,XXII,10721.

[28]Gastón García Cantú, *El Socialismo en México. Siglo XIX* (México: Ediciones Era, 1969), pp. 239-240, 381-403.

[29]The author canvassed all the available issues of Chiapanecan newspapers for the period 1860 to 1911, in all over fifty periodicals. These newspapers are in the Hemeroteca "Fernando Castañón Gamboa," Tuxtla Gutiérrez, in the 108-roll microfilm collection Serie Chiapas, and in the Chiapas Collection at the Latin American Library of Tulane University.

[30]*La Brújula*, October 20, 1878.

[31]*El Partido Liberal*, January 8, 1886.

[32]*El Demócrata*, September 10, 1880; *El Sentimiento Nacional*, December 28, 1883; *El Trabajo*, January 10, 1886; *El Monitor Republicano*, May 26, 1885.

[33]*Documentos relativos al Congreso Agrícola de Chiapas* (Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Imprenta del Gobierno del Estado, 1896), p. 69.

[34]Quoted in Diego G. López Rosado, *Historia y pensamiento económico de México* 6 vols., (México: UNAM, 1969) III, p. 326.

[35]*La Agricultura*, January 15, 1893.

[36]*Discurso del Lic. Emilio Rabasa*. 1893. Nearly a year earlier Rabasa had expressed his reservations regarding the efficiency of indebted servitude to Díaz privately, See: Rabasa to Díaz, December 12, 1892, CGPD,88,XVII, 19860.

[37]Circular Num. 6, December 7, 1895, SCh,XVIII,75.

[38]León to Díaz, April 30, 1896, CGPD,128,XXI,7354.

[39]Valadés, *El porfirismo* I, p. 274.

[40]The delegates are listed in *Documentos Congreso Agrícola*, pp. viii-xi. For compilations of Chiapanecan elites see: *Directorio general de la república mexicana, 1893-1894* (México, 1893); *Directorio general de la república mexicana, 1900-1901* (México, 1900); *Anuario estadístico del estado de Chiapas, año de 1909*.

[41]*Documentos Congreso Agrícola*, pp. 58, 104-105.

[42]*Ibid.*, pp. 23, 33, 71. Also see: Moisés T. De la Peña, *Chiapas económico* 4 vols. (Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Departamento de Prensa y Turismo, 1951) II, pp. 357-358.

[43]"Cuestionario aprobado por el Congreso Agrícola para su estudio," April 9, 1896, CGPD,127,XXI,5536.

[44]Díaz to León, March 1896, CGPD,127,XXI,7304.

[45]León to Díaz, April 7, 1896, CGPD,127,XXI,5541.

[46]*Documentos Congreso Agrícola*, pp. 32-33.

[47]*Ibid.*, pp. 84-87.

[48]*Ibid.*, pp. 63-72.

[49]*Ibid.*, p. 91.

[50]León to Díaz, April 30, 1896, CGPD,128,XXI,7354.

[51]Díaz to León, May 1896, CGPD,128,XXI,7356.

[52]*Documentos Congreso Agrícola*, pp. 131-144.

[53]Decree Number 8, May 24, 1897, SCh,XXVIII,78.

[54]*Informe del Gobernador de Chiapas C. Coronel Francisco León* (Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1897).

[55]León to Díaz, June 15, 1896, CGPD,129,XXI,9371.

[56]Díaz to León, June 30, 1896, CGPD,129,XXI,9373.

[57]León to Díaz, December 20, 1898, CGPD,156,XXIII,17495.

[58]Lacroix to Díaz, n.d. (approximately January 1896), CGPD,124,XXI,426.

[59]Lacroix to Díaz, March 31, 1896, CGPD,125,XXI,1863.

[60]León to Díaz, November 22, 1898, CGPD,156,XXIII,17542.

[61]Julian Hornedo, Jefe Político, Soconusco, to Díaz, March 24, 1896, CGPD,127,XXI,5434.

[62]Gral. Bravo, San Cristóbal, to Díaz, January 23, 1896, CGPD,337,LV, 458; Bravo to Díaz, January 26, 1896, CGPD,124,XXI,1457.

[63]León to Díaz, March 26, 1896, CGPD,127,XXI,5584.

[64]Díaz to León, April 6, 1896, CGPD,127,XXI,5585.

[65]Decree Number 5, April 25, 1896, AHCH, Hemeroteca, Foleto "San Cristóbal."

[66]León to Díaz, April 10, 1896, CGPD,127,XXI,5530.

[67]León to Díaz, August 26, 1896, CGPD,154,XVIII,12906.

[68]Utrilla to Díaz, July 29, 1896, CGPD,338,LV,4187.

[69]León to Díaz, July 29, 1896, CGPD,338,LV,4140.

[70]León to Díaz, July 30, 1896, CGPD,132,XXI,13977.

[71]León to Díaz, July 30, 1896, CGPD,338,LV,4206.

[72]León to Díaz, May 17, 1897, CGPD,341,LVI,2026.

[73]José Franco, Santos Cristiani, M. Vidal, et. al., Pichucalco, to Díaz, April 2, 1899, CGPD,159,XXIV,4563; Vecinos de Pichucalco to Díaz, June 13, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,2267.

[74]León to Díaz, July 7, 1897, CGPD,142,XXII,9423.

[75]J. Antonio Rivera G., David Culebro, Jesús Domínguez, et. al., Comitán, to Díaz, May 30, 1899, CGPD,161,XXIV,7944.

[76]Vicente Espinosa, San Cristóbal, to Señorita Emelimia Avendano, México, December 3, 1898, CGPD,162,XXIV,10063. This letter was intercepted by León.

[77]León to Díaz, August 19, 1899, CGPD,163,XXIV,11560.

[78]Jose Delegado, Pichucalco, to Díaz, May 1, 1899, CGPD,160,XXIV,5841; *El Universal*, April 14, 1899.

[79]*El Universal*, May 26, 1899.

[80]León to Díaz, May 27, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,1994.

[81]León to Díaz, May 29, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,2008. Díaz advised León he should give "no credit to rumors." See: Díaz to León, May 30, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII, 2009.

[82]*El Universal*, May 30, 1899.

[83]León to Díaz, June 12, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,2247.

[84]León to Díaz, July 9, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,2617; Clemente Robles, San Cristóbal, to Díaz, July 10, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,2544.

[85]*El Universal*, July 14, 1899.

[86]Valadés, *El porfirismo* II, p. 300; Orantes, *Síntesis*, p. 112; Gustavo López Gutiérrez, *Chiapas y sus epopeyas libertarias* 3 vols. (Tuxtla Gutiérrez, 1957) II, p. 284.

[87]León to Díaz, July 15, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,2683; León to Díaz, August 18, 1899, CGPD,163,XXIV,11709; *El Periódico Oficial del Estado*, August 5, 1899.

[88]Lowenthal, "The Elite of San Cristóbal," pp. 11-12; *Directorio general de la república mexicana* (1893 and 1900), pp. 7-10 and 289-295. Also see: Romulo Farrera, México, to Díaz, August 10, 1899, CGPD,163,XXIV,11518.

[89]Esposa de Farrera to Díaz, July 21, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,2814.

[90]López to Díaz, August 22, 1899, CGPD,164,XXIV,13502.

[91]León to Díaz, August 17, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,3381; Díaz to León, August 18, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,3381.

[92]León to Díaz, August 25, 1899, CGPD,346,LVIII,3531. An amparo is a writ of protection against the action of some public functionary.

[93]León to Díaz, August 24, 1899, CGPD,164,XXIV,13502.

[94]Díaz to León, September 5, 1899, CGPD,347,LVIII,3716; Díaz to León, September 7, 1899, CGPD,347,LVIII,3718.

[95]Díaz to Castillo, September 6, 1899, CGPD,347,LVIII,3720.

[96]León to Díaz, September 30, 1899, CGPD,347,LVIII,4215.

[97]Díaz to León, October 2, 1899, CGPD,347,LVIII,4221; León to Díaz, October 2, 1899, CGPD,347,LVIII,4321.

[98]Pimentel to Díaz, October 16, 1899, CGPD,347,LVIII,4621; Pimentel to Díaz, November 30, 1899, CGPD,347,LVIII,5482.

[99]López to Díaz, October 11, 1899, CGPD,165,XXIV,15048.

[100]"Jucio contra presuntos culpables de homicidio frustrado en la persona del Coronel Francisco León, 1900," AHCH,Hermeroteca, Expediente 1673.

[101]Farrera to Díaz, March 15, 1900, CGPD,170,XXV,2858.

Chapter Four

Epigraph: "Memorandum," Tapachula, 1902, CGPD,190,XXVII,5679.

[1]*Diccionario Porrua* 2 vols. (México: Editorial Porrua, 1964) II, pp. 1632-1633.

[2]Pimentel to Díaz, November 30, 1895, CGPD,122,XX,18031.

[3]Pimentel to Díaz, September 12, 1904, CGPD,212,XXIX,11991.

[4]*El Universal*, January 3, 1901. A spot check through the CGPD confirms that Pimentel was frequently absent.

[5]Fred Wilber Powell, *The Railroads of Mexico* (Boston: The Stratford Co. 1921), p. 154; *Moody's Manual of Railroads and Corporation Securities. 1909* (New York: Moody Manual Company, 1909), p. 755. Also see: Pimentel to Díaz, April 11, 1909, CGPD,180,XXVI,3436.

[6]*Revista de Chiapas*, August 31, 1902.

[7]Gerente, Banco Oriental de México, Puebla, to Díaz, June 21, 1909, CGPD,260,XXXIV,10296.

[8]Pimentel to Díaz, October 13, 1904, CGPD,213,XXIX,12874; Pimentel to Díaz, September 28, 1905, CGPD,223,XXX,13299.

[9]Manuel Cruz, Pichucalco, to Díaz, June 30, 1905, CGPD,202,XVIII,20.

[10]"Memorandum," Tapachula, 1902, CGPD,190,XXVII,5679.

[11]*Informe del ciudadano gobernador del estado* (1905).

[12]*Ibid.*

[13]Pimentel to Díaz, December 19, 1903, CGPD,205,XVIII,16346; Sóstenes Esponda, San Cristóbal, to Diaz, March 7, 1904, CGPD,355,LXII,760.

[14]*Informe del ciudadano gobernador del estado* (1905).

[15]O.H. Harrison, Tapachula, to Díaz, March 16, 1899, CGPD,170,XXV,2870.

[16]A. Farrera, "Memorándum sobre el café en Chiapas," March 16, 1899, CGPD,165,XXIV,15132. Also see: Lic. Agustín Farrera, *Breves apuntes sobre el estado de Chiapas* (México: Libería Madrilena, 1900).

[17]Ricardo Pozas, "El trabajo en las plantaciones de café y el cambio sociocultural del indio," *Revista Mexicana de Estudios Antropológicos* XIII (1952), p. 34.

[18]Albert Brickwood, "Coffee in Soconusco, Chiapas, Mexico," September 26, 1910, NA,RG 84,Tapachula: Miscellenous Reports.

[19]*El Tiempo*, June 15, 1907.

[20]Trinidad Sánchez Santos, *El problema de los indígenas de Chiapas*, manuscript located in the Biblioteca "Fray Bartolomé Las Casas," San Cristóbal, 1902.

[21]See: Calcott, *Liberalism in Mexico*, p. 152.

[22]*El Universal*, January 15, 1901.

[23]R. Farrera, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to Díaz, February 19, 1900, CGPD,170, XXV,2898; A. Farrera, Chiapa de Corzo, to Díaz, August 18, 1901, CGPD, 184,XXVI,8386.

[24]Ramón Rabasa to Díaz, April 2, 1900, CGPD,170,XXV,3594.

[25]Pimentel to Díaz, January 15, 1901, CGPD,184,XXVI,2238.

[26]Manuel Cruz, Pichucalco, to Díaz, June 30, 1903, CGPD,202,XXVIII,9929.

[27]Carlos Masón, Simojovel, to Díaz, July 17, 1903, CGPD,355,LXII,2436; Jesús Solis, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to Díaz, October 19, 1903, CGPD,355,LXII, 3140; Varios vecinos, Pichucalco to Díaz, September 1900, CGPD,176,XXV,12052.

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Chapter Five

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[45]"En la ciudad de San Cristóbal Las Casas," July 3, 1911, AHCH, Sucesos de 1911-1912, Manuscritos y Impresos, Carpeta 1625.

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[52]Rovelo Argüello, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to Senators P. González Mena, Luis G. Curiel, and R.R. Guzmán, September 27, 1911, AHCH, Sección de Guerra, Tomo VII, Exp. 26.

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[70]"Hay datos fundados para creer complicado al Obispo," Rovelo Argüello to Senators, September 27, 1911.

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[80]De la Barra to Espinosa Torres, September 17, 1911, AFLB,X-1, 2 de 25, 140.

[81]Rovelo Argüello to De la Barra, October 5, 1911, AGOM,21,4,326; *The Mexican Herald*, October 2, 4, 1911.

[82]Rovelo Argüello to Senators, September 27, 1911.

[83]"Sesión del Senado de la República del 6 del Octubre sobre la situación del Estado de Chiapas," in Emilio Rabasa, *Antología de Emilio Rabasa. Biografía y selección de Andrés Serra Rojas* 2 vols. (México: Ediciones Oasis, 1969), pp. 339-341. The volumes of the *Diario de los Debates* for 1911 are missing in the Hemeroteca Nacional.

[84]*El Imparcial*, October 20, 1911.

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[93]"Retrazos de historia chiapaneca," *Liberación*, February 3, 1935.

[94]Madero to Gordillo León, December 23, 1911, *Documentos históricos de la revolución mexicana* II, Doc. 502, p. 448.

[95]Vice-Consul Leon Porash, Tapachula, to Henry Lane Wilson, March 5, 1912, NA, RG 84, Consular and Diplomatic Letters Sent; Porash to Secretary of State, February 12, 1912, NA, RG 84, Dispatches to the State Department.

[96]Orantes, *Síntesis*, p. 189; Rivera G., "Los embrollos políticos del Sr. Madero," *La Tribuna*, February 4, 1912.

[97]"Memorandum Sent August, 1911," NA, RG 84, Tapachula Dispatches, Vol. 148.C8.2/105.

[98]Brickwood to Henry Lane Wilson, September 12, 1911, NA, RG 84, Tapachula Dispatches; Porash to Henry Lane Wilson, March 16, 1912, NA, RG 84, Consular and Diplomatic Letters Sent.

[99]L.A. Osten to Brickwood, August 19, 1911, NA, RG 84, Tapachula Dispatches.

[100]Club "Soconusco," Tapachula, to De la Barra, August 22, 1911, AGOM, 18,5,287.

[101]Vice Consul Charles Lesher to Henry Lane Wilson, December 23, 1911, NA, RG 84, Tapachula Dispatches.

[102]"Llevabamos siete meses poco más o menos de padecer zobras por los perjuicios a causa de lo anormal situación. Desde la llegada del Señor Jefe Político Abelardo Domínguez se ha venido notando el restablecimiento de la tranquilidad." See Vecinos de Tapachula to Governor of Chiapas, February 12, 1912, AHCH, Gobernación, 1912, VII, 94. Also see Porash to Henry Lane Wilson, February 14, 1912, NA, RG 84, Consular and Diplomatic Letters Sent.

[103]Flavio Guillén, "Manifiesto que el Gobierno del Estado dirije a los pueblos de Chiapas," April 20, 1912, AHCH, Carpeta 1623.

[104]*La Libertad del Sufragio*, May 23, 1912. Ciro Farrera died in November 1911.

[105]*Ibid.*; *La Voz del Pueblo*, January 28, 1911.

[106]*Manifiesto del Lic. Jesús Martínez Rojas al Pueblo Chiapaneco* (México, 1913), pp. 9-13; *La Voz del Pueblo*, June 9, 1912.

[107]*La Voz del Pueblo*, February 11, 1912, September 1, 1912.

[108]*Periódico Oficial del Estado*, November 30, December 14, 1912.

[109]"Acuerdo del Sr. Gobernador," March 31, 1914, AHCH, Gobernación, 1914.

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[112]Secretary General of (State) Government, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to Jefe Político, Tonalá, September 17, 1913, AHCH, Gobernación, 1913, II, 20.

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[114]Jefe Político Palenque to Governor, January 8, 1912, AHCH, Gobernación, 1912, VIII, 100.

[115]*Periódico Oficial del Estado*, March 19, 1910, August 24, 1912.

[116]Flavio Guillén, *Dos estudios - Francisco I. Madero y fray Matías de Córdova* (México: Departamento del Distrito Federal, 1974), introduction.

[117]Decree of February 22, 1913, Governor Gordillo León, SCh,XXX,79.

[118]Gordillo León to Emilio Rabasa, February 22, 1913, AHCH, Gobernación, 1913, VII, 106.

[119]"Acuerdo del Gobernador del Estado," March 15, 1913, AHCH, Gobernación, 1913, III, 23.

[120]*La Tribuna*, February 4, 1913. Also see *Manifiesto del Lic. Jesús Martínez Rojas*, p. 8.

[121]*La Tribuna*, February 4, 1913.

[122]Asuntos Ayuntamientos, AHCH, Gobernación, 1914, 510. Also see Espinosa, *Chiapas*.

[123]*Periódico Oficial del Estado*, September 18, November 13, 1913, April 30, 1914.

[124]Charles C. Cumberland, *Mexican Revolution: The Constitutionalist Years* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974), pp. 23-57.

[125]Alfonso Tarecena, *Historia de la revolución en Tabasco* (Villahermosa: Ediciones del Gobierno de Tabasco, 1974), pp. 239-256; Manuel González Calzada, *Historia de la revolución mexicana en Tabasco* (México: Biblioteca del Instituto de Estudios Historicos de la Revolucion Mexicana, 1972), pp. 150-151.

[126]Jefe Político, Pichucalco, to Secretary General of Government, August 5, 1914, AHCH, Gobernación, 1914, VII, 30; Governor Palafox to General Huerta, November 14, 1913, AHCH, Gobernación, 1913, X, 143.

[127]Governor Palafox to Secretary General of (Federal) Government, México, June 20, 1913, AHCH, Gobernación, 1913, XI, 146.

[128]Blom and Duby, *La selva lacandona* I, pp. 281-282.

[129]Fernando Mijanes, "San Román," to Lindoro Castellanos, Ocosingo, April 7, 1914, AHCH, Gobernación, 1914, VII, 30.

[130]Blom and Duby, *La selva lacandona* I, pp. 281-282.

[131]"Dr. Belisario Domínguez (Chiapas), Speech to Senate," September 23, 1913, National Archives, Record Group 59, 812.00/9320, hereafter cited as NA, RG 59, and identifying information.

[132]Michael C. Meyer, *Huerta: A Political Portrait* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972), pp. 135-136.

[133]Jefe Político, Soconusco, to Gordillo León, June 17, 1913, AHCH, Gobernación, 1913, XI, 146.

[134]Jefe Político, Soconusco, to Secretary General of Government, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, June 19, 1913, AHCH, Gobernación, 1913, XI, 146.

[135]Governor Palafox to Minister of Government, September 27, 1913, AHCH, Gobernación, 1913, II, 20.

[136]Máuro Calderon, "Tapachula (dos sucesos en el año de 1920)," *ICACH* 1 (junio 1959), pp. 50-51.

[137]Palafox to Minister of Government, February 26, 1914, AHCH, Gobernación, 1914, VII, 30.

[138]See: Expediente 30 entitled "Revolución en el Estado," in AHCH, Gobernación, 1914, VII.

[139]Casahonda Castillo, *50 años de revolución*, p. 39.

Chapter Six

Epigraph: Luis Pola, "Por el honor de Chiapas," *El Sur de México*, April 12, 1945.

[1]The first recorded invasion of Chiapas was by Aztec armies in the 1490s. The second, the Spanish Conquest, came in 1524 and the third, in 1822-1823, was led by Mexican General Vicente Filosola.

[2]J.M. Márquez, *El Veintiuno. Hombres de la revolución y sus hechos* (Oaxaca, 1916), pp. 65-73; Alicia Hernández Chávez, "La defensa de los finqueros en Chiapas, 1914-1920," *Historia Mexicana* XXVIII (enero-marzo 1979), p. 355.

[3]*Periódico Oficial del Estado*, September 23, 1914. Also see Miguel Angel Peral, *Diccionario biográfico mexicano* (México: Editorial Pac, 1944), p. 166.

[4]Acuerdo del Gobernador del Estado, October 12, 1914, AHCH, Gobernación, 1914, II, 7.

[5]*Periódico Oficial del Estado*, September 23, October 15, October 31, December 5, December 8, 1914, January 16, April 10, May 22, May 28, 1915; Asuntos Ayuntamientos, October 15, 1914, AHCH, Gobernación, 1914, 351.

[6]*Periódico Oficial del Estado*, October 31, 1914.

[7]Santiago Serrano, *Chiapas revolucionario (hombres y hechos)* (Tuxtla Gutiérrez, 1923), p. 9; Moscoso Pastrana, *Jacinto Perez "Pajarito,"* pp.98-99; *Periódico Oficial del Estado*, September 23, 1914.

[8]Claim on Behalf of Walter A. Quinby, NA, RG 76, Doc. 146, 3024.

[9]J.A. Ross, Consular Agent, Ocós (Guatemala), to William Owen, Consul General, Guatemala City, January 2, 1915, NA, RG 84, Ocós, Guatemala, 1914-1915.

[10]Testimony of Mrs. Cora Lee Sturgis, in *Investigation of Mexican Affairs. Preliminary Report and Hearings of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate* 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1920) I, pp. 921-922.

[11]Márquez, *El veintiuno*, pp. 156-159.

[12]Memorandum of Claim, NA, RG 76, Doc. 185, 1649.

[13]Cumberland, *The Constitutionalist Years*, pp. 151-164.

[14]Douglas Richmond, "Carranza: The Authoritarian Populist as Nationalist President," and Friedrich Katz, "Villa: Reform Governor of Chihuahua," in George Wolfskill and Douglas Richmond, eds., *Essays on the Mexican Revolution: Revisionist Views of the Leaders* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), pp. 53-55, 36-39.

[15]Cumberland, *The Constitutionalist Years*, pp. 165-185.

[16]Quoted in full in Casahonda Castillo, *50 años de revolución*, p. 49.

[17]*Boletín de Información*, December 18, 1914.

[18]Informe del Gral. Salvador Alvarado, May 20, 1916, *Documentos históricos de la revolución mexicana*, Vol. 4, Tomo I, Doc. 657, pp. 143-145.

[19]Ross to Owen, January 10, 1915, NA, RG 84, Ocos; Ross to Mrs. A.C. Gordon, Seattle, Washington, January 5, 1915, NA, RG 84, Ocos.

[20]"Estos no son cristianos, estos son mapachada." García de León, "Lucha de clases," p. 60.

[21]Hernández Chávez, "La defensa de los finqueros," and García de León, "Lucha de clases," take the perspective that the Chiapanecan civil war from 1914 to 1920 represented a class struggle. Notes García de León, "Los grupos dominantes locales vieron en peligro su hegemonía, realizaron un tenaz resistencia armada."

[22]Octavio Gordillo y Ortiz, *Diccionario biográfico de Chiapas* (México: B. Costa-Amic, 1977), p. 85; Serrano, *Chiapas revolucionario*, p. 11; *Anuario estadístico Chiapas 1909*.

[23]Hernández Chávez, "La defensa de los finqueros," pp. 357-358.

[24]Mario García, *Soconusco en la historia*, pp. 263-265.

[25]"Memorándum - Revolución en Chiapas, 1916," Archivo de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Expediente 17-9-101, hereafter cited as ASRE and identifying information.

[26]V. Carranza to General Castro, February 2, 1915, Archivo Venustiano Carranza, Carpeta 1, hereafter cited as AVC and identifying information.

[27]Gary Gossen, *Chamulas in the World of the Sun: Time and Space in a Maya Oral Tradition* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 271, 274.

[28]Robert M. Laughlin, *Of Cabbages and Kings: Tales from Zinacantan* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1977), p. 129.

[29]Lowenthal, "The Elite of San Cristóbal," p. 38.

[30]Márquez, *El veintiuno*, p. 85.

[31]Cumberland, *The Constitutionalist Years*, p. 203.

[32]*Ibid.*, p. 209.

[33]"Memorándum - Revolución en Chiapas, 1916."

[34]*Ibid.*

[35]"El 15 de abril de 1916," *El Paladín* (Comitán), April 15, 1955.

[36]Prudencio Moscoso Pastrana, *El pinedismo en Chiapas* (México, 1960), pp. 55-59.

[37]*Ibid.*, pp. 59-62.

[38]Alan Knight, "Peasant and Caudillo in Revolutionary Mexico, 1910-1917," in D.A. Brading, ed., *Caudillo and Peasant in the Mexican Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 27.

[39]"Plan de Compaña contra los rebeldes de Chiapas, 1916," ASRE, 17-6-10/11.

[40]Consul General, Guatemala City, to Department of State, September 21, 1920, NA, RG 84, Correspondence. Also see: Douglas W. Richmond, "The First Chief and Revolutionary Mexico: The Presidency of Venustiano Carranza, 1915-1920," Diss. University of Washington, 1976, p.327.

[41]"Memorándum - Revolución en Chiapas, 1916."

[42]Richmond, "The Presidency of Venustiano Carranza," p. 327.

[43]Alvarado to Carranza, April 24, 1918, AVC, Telegramas, 2.

[44]Luis Liceaga, *Félix Díaz* (México: Editorial Jus, 1958), p. 394.

[45]"Memorias del General Juan Andreu Almazán," *El Universal*, May 25, 28, 1958.

[46]*Ibid.*, May 31, 1958.

[47]"Copia del Informe Rendido por el C. General de Brigada Rafael Cal y Mayor al General en Jefe de la Revolución Emiliano Zapata, Año de 1917," Rare Manuscript Collection, Latin American Library, Tulane University.

[48]Informe que rinde al Señor Ministro de Gobernación, el Gobernador Provisional del estado, General Blas Corral, 27 de enero de 1916, AHCH, Gobernación, 1915, IV, 23.

[49]*Ibid.*; Visitador de Jefaturas, Comitán, to Secretary General of Government, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, December 15, 1914, AHCH, Gobernación, 1915, IV, 13.

[50]Visitador de Jefaturas, Palenque and Chilón, to Secretary General of Government, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, December 30, 1914, AHCH, Gobernación, 1914, IV, 13.

[51]Delegación Departmental, Palenque, to Secretary General of Government, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, April 24, 1915, AHCH, Gobernación, 1915, IV, 11.

[52]Informe que rinde al Señor Ministro de Gobernación, 27 de enero de 1916.

[53]*Periódico Oficial del Estado*, June 19, 1915; Aviso General, Delegación de la Comisión Nacional Agraria, January 27, 1916, SCh, XXX, 79.

[54]Informe que rinde al Señor Ministro de Gobernación, 27 de enero de 1916.

[55]Resoluciones Presidenciales, AGN, CNA, Libro 2, pp. 81-82, Libro 6, pp. 192-194, Libro 9, 13-14, Libro 10, 111-112; Richmond, "The Presidency of Venustiano Carranza," p. 72.

[56]Ley de 19 de agosto de 1918, Villanueva, AHCH, Fomento, 1918, IV, 47; Acuerdo del Gobernador, 31 de agosto de 1918, AHCH, Fomento, 1918, IV, 50.

[57]De la Peña, *Chiapas económico* II, p. 377; García de León, "Lucha de clases," p. 69.

[58]"Political Conditions in Chiapas, Mexico," March 18, 1919, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Guatemala City.

[59]Vice-Consul, Guatemala City, to Department of State, October 18, 1919, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Guatemala City.

[60]Resoluciones Presidenciales, AGN, CNA, Libro 2, pp. 81-82, Libro 6, pp. 192-194, Libro 9, pp. 13-14.

[61]"Political Conditions in Chiapas, Mexico," March 18, 1919.

[62]Rafael Pascasio, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to Secretary General of Government, February 6, 1918, AHCH, Fomento, 1918, II, 14.

[63]Juan Dardón y demas to Secretary General of Government, October 9, 1918, AHCH, Fomento, IV, 50.

[64]Secretary General of Government, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to Municipal President, San Martín, Chilón, September 17, 1918, AHCH, Fomento, 1918, II, 19; Juan Santos, Mazatán, to Secretary General of Government, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, May 28, 1918, AHCH, Gobernación, 1918, XV, 158; Vecinos de Nicapa del Pichucalco to Governor of Chiapas, July 23, 1918, AHCH, Gobernación, 1918, XV, 158; Vecinos de Oxchuc to Governor of Chiapas, July 15, 1918, AHCH, Fomento, 1918, II, 19; Vecinos de Zinacantán to Governor of Chiapas, October 7, 1918, AHCH, Gobernación, 1918, XV, 158.

[65]See: Thomas Benjamin and Christina Johns, "Political Regionalism and Revolutionary Ideology in Mexico: A Comparison of Chiapas and Federal Budgets, 1910-1960," Unpublished manuscript, 1979.

[66]Circular, November 7, 1917, AHCH, Gobernación, 1917, V, 117; *Periódico Oficial del Estado*,December 22, 29, 1917.

[67]Richmond, "The Presidency of Venustiano Carranza," pp. 233-234.

[68]Benjamin and Johns, "A Comparison of Chiapas and Federal Budgets."

[69]*Ibid.*

[70]James W. Wilkie, *The Mexican Revolucion: Federal Expenditure and Social Change since 1910* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), pp. 246-256; Pablo González Casanova, *Democracy in Mexico* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 26.

[71]Villanueva to Carranza, October 5, 1916, AVC, Telegramas, 2; Serrano, *Chiapas revolucionario*, pp. 153-155.

[72]Lopez Gutiérrez, *Chiapas* III, p. 261.

[73]*Provincia* (mayo-junio 1949), p. 10.

[74]Tuxtlecos to Carranza, September 20, 1916, AVC, Telegramas, 2; Tapachuleños to Carranza, September 2, 1916, AVC, Telegramas, 2.

[75]The Chiapanecan delegation was: Propietarios, Enrique Suárez, Enrique D. Cruz, Cristóbal Ll. Castillo, J. Amilcar Vidal, and Daniel Zepeda; Suplentes, Francisco Rincón, Lisandro López, Amadeo Ruiz, and Daniel Robles. See *Diario de los Debates del Congreso Constituyente 1916-1917* (Mexico: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana, 1960) II, p. 90.

[76]Villanueva to Carranza, October 28, 1916, AVC, Telegramas, 2.

[77]Villanueva to Carranza, February 10, 1917, AVC, Telegramas, 2.

[78]Villanueva to Carranza, September 23, 1916, AVC, Telegramas, 2.

[79]Villanueva to Carranza, November 7, 1916, AVC, Telegramas, 2; Serrano, *Chiapas revolucionario*, p. 65.

[80]Statement of Angel Primo, NA, RG 76, 22, 561.

[81]Statement of William J. McGavock, *Investigation of Mexican Affairs* I, p. 868.

[82]Consul, Salina Cruz, to Secretary of State, February 26, 1917, NA, RG 59, Microcopy 274, 812.00/20571.

[83]*Chiapas Nuevo*, June 7, 1917; Serrano, *Chiapas revolucionario*, pp. 110-111.

[84]Moscoso Pastrana, *El pinedismo*, p. 113.

[85]*Ibid.*, pp. 91-101; Serrano, *Chiapas revolucionario*, p. 113.

[86]Serrano, *Chiapas revolucionario*, p. 119.

[87]*El Tribuno*, April 15, 1918.

[88]Serrano, *Chiapas revolucionario*, p. 120; López Gutiérrez, *Chiapas* III, p. 202; *El Patria Chica*, March 1, 1918.

[89]Address by General Salvador Alvarado to the People of Chiapas, March 20, 1918, AHCH, Gobernación, 1918, I, 14. Also see *Chiapas Nuevo*, March 31, 1918.

[90]"Military Activities," Consul, Salina Cruz, to Department of State, July 25, 1918, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Salina Cruz, Vol. 61.

[91]"Informe constitucional del C. Presidente Municipal de Mapastepec, Chiapas, ano de 1918," AHCH, Gobernación, 1918, II, 14; *El Obrero* (Comitán), September 10, 1919.

[92]Villanueva to Alvarado, May 7, 1918, AHCH, Fomento, 1918, II, 14.

[93]Secretary General of Government, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to Jefe del Destacamento, Acala, September 15, 1918, AHCH, Gobernación, 1918, V, 42; Decree of June 4, 1918, AHCH, Gobernación, 1918, V, 42.

[94]Alvarado to Carranza, April 28, 1918, AVC, Telegramas, 2; Alvarado to Carranza, May 6, 1918, AVC, Telegramas, 2.

[95]"Rebel Activities in Chiapas, July 22 - September 30, 1918," November 7, 1918, NA, RG 165, 10640-1484 (19); "Rebel Activities in Chiapas, October and November 1918," March 19, 1919, NA, RG 165, 10640-1484 (32).

[96]*Ibid.* Also see: Alvarado to Carranza, October 8, 1918, AVC, Telegramas, 2; Alvarado to Carranza, November 12, 1918, AVC, Telegramas, 2.

[97]Serrano, *Chiapas revolucionario*, p. 133.

[98]Legación de México en Guatemala to Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, October 31, 1918, ASRE, 17-78-28, 23; George Braun, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to U.S. Consul, Salina Cruz, December 17, 1918, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Salina Cruz, Vol. 61.

[99]Serrano, *Chiapas revolucionario*, p. 145.

[100]*Ibid.*, p. 161.

[101]"Alerta, Chiapanecos!" Tuxtla Gutiérrez, June 1919, AHCH, Carpeta 1625.

[102]*El Criterio*, April 27, August 10, 1919.

[103]*El Iris de Chiapas*, February 26, 1920.

[104]Club Radical Chiapaneco, Chiapa de Corzo, to Governor of Chiapas, December 27, 1919, AHCH, Gobernación, 1919, VI, 18; Club Liberal Soconucense, October 1919, AHCH, Gobernación, 1919, III, 23; Club Liberal de Arriaga, July 26, 1919, AHCH, Gobernación, 1919, III, 26.

[105]Juan Santos, Mazatán, to Secretary General of Government, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, May 29, 1918, AHCH, Gobernación, 1918, XV, 158; Vecinos de Niapa del Pichucalco to Governor of Chiapas, July 23, 1918, AHCH, Gobernación, 1918, XV, 158.

[106]Vecinos de Motozintla to President of the Republic, July 24, 1919, AHCH, Gobernación, 1919, XII; El Club Belisario Domínguez to President, August 1, 1919, AHCH, Gobernación, 1919, III, 21.

[107]*El Criterio*, December 28, 1919.

[108]The municipal president of Motozintla arrested some of the leaders of the Club Belisario Domínguez and ordered the dissolution of the club. Municipal President to Ismael Mendoza, December 13, 1919, AHCH, Gobernación, 1919, VI, 20.

[109]Juez Mixto, Motozintla, to Governor of Chiapas, December 31, 1919, AHCH, Gobernación, 1919, VI, 20.

[110]"Acta de constitución del Partido Socialista Chiapaneco, Motozintla, 13 de enero de 1920," in Expediente relativo al Partido Socialista Chiapaneco fundado en Motozintla, Departamento de Mariscal, Chiapas, 1920, AHCH, Gobernación, 1920, VI, 10.

[111]Libano Avendaño, Motozintla, to Governor of Chiapas, January 21, 1920, AHCH, Gobernación, 1920, VI, 10.

[112]R.A. Paniagua to Governor of Chiapas, March 27, 1920, AHCH, Gobernación, 1920, VI, 10.

[113]"Bases generales del Partido Socialista Chiapaneco, enero 15, 1920," AHCH, Gobernación, 1920, VI, 10.

[114]See Expediente relativo al PSC.

[115]Juez Mixto Trinidad Marín, Motozintla, to Governor of Chiapas, April 22, 1920, AHCH, Gobernación, 1920, VI, 10.

[116]Cumberland, *The Constitutionalist Years*, pp. 401-405.

[117]Jan Bazant, *A Concise History of Mexico from Hidalgo to Cárdenas, 1805-1940* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 153-155.

[118]"Bases para la pacificación del Estado," quoted in full in Serrano, *Chiapas revolucionario*, p. 189.

[119]"De Facto Government in District," U.S. Consul, Salina Cruz, to Department of State, May 22, 1920, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Salina Cruz, Vol. 78.

[120]*Excélsior*, May 26, 1920.

[121]*Ibid.*

[122]*El Universal*, July 7, 24, 1920; "Public Order in Chiapas State," U.S. Consul, Salina Cruz, to Department of State, September 10, 1920, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Salina Cruz, Vol. 78.

[123]Presidente Colegio Electoral R. A. Paniagua to Governor of Chiapas, December 16, 1920, AHCH, Gobernación, 1921, XVIII, 458.

[124]Lorenzo Meyer, "Historical Roots of the Authoritarian State inMexico,"

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Chapter Seven

Epigraph: Cárdenas quoted in Osorio Marbán, *El partido de la revolución mexicana* I, p. 247.

[1]Manuel Diego Hernández, "Aproximación al estudio del movimiento obrero-campesino en Michoacán, 1910-1920," *Boletín del Centro de Estudios de la Revolución Mexicana "Lázaro Cárdenas"* 3 (abril 1980), p. 26; Gilbert Joseph, "Revolution from Without: The Mexican Revolution in Yucatan, 1915-1924," Diss. Yale University, 1978, p. 156.

[2]R.A. Paniagua, Motozintla, to presidente municipal San Pedro, Mariscal, December 9, 1920, AHCH, Fomento, 1921, V. 133.

[3]Claim of the St. Paul Tropical Development Company, NA, RG 76, Doc. 561.

[4]Ferández Ruiz to Obregón, March 15, 1921, Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Obregón-Calles, Expediente 816-C-14, hereafter cited as AGN, OC, and identifying information.

[5]"Descripción de los pueblos y caminos recorridos," AHCH, Fomento, 1926, 417.

[6]G.W. Knoblauch, "The Railroad Situation in Mexico," n.d., NA, RG 76, File 145, Box 3, Monograph 19.

[7]Departamento de la Estadística Nacional, *Anuario de 1930* (México: Talleres Gráficos de la Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento, 1932), p. 32.

[8]This is confirmed in file after file in the Records of the Boundary and Claims Commissions, Record Group 76 of the U.S. National Archives.

[9]Tannenbaum, *The Mexican Agrarian Revolution*, p. 467.

[10]*Ibid.*, pp. 454-455.

[11]*Anuario de 1930*, p. 34.

[12]Tannenbaum, *The Mexican Agrarian Revolution*, pp. 341, 347.

[13]*Ibid.*, p. 504; Departamento de la Estadística Nacional, *Anuario estadístico, 1923-1924* 2 vols. (México: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1926), p. 107.

[14]Tannenbaum, *The Mexican Agrarian Revolution*, pp. 113-114; *Tribes and Temples: A Record of the Expedition to Middle America Conducted by the Tulane University of Louisiana in 1925* 2 vols. (New Orleans: Tulane University, 1927) II, p. 331.

[15]S. Castillejos to Governor of Chiapas, August 17, 1925, AHCH, Gobernación, 1925, VIII; Carlos Basuri, *Tojolabales, Tzeltales, y Mayas. Breves apuntes sobre antropología, etnografía, y linguística*(México: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1931), pp. 102-103, 134-135; Anomino, "Mexico Desconocido: Las monterías de Chiapas," *Universidad de México* I, (1931), p. 325; *El Universal*, January 7, 11, 1926.

[16]Wasserstrom, "White Fathers and Red Souls," pp. 208-213; Frank Cancian, *Change and Uncertainty in a Peasant Economy: The Maya Corn Farmers of Zinacantan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 16.

[17]David C. Bailey, "Obregón: Mexico's Accommodating President," in Wolfskill and Richmond, *Essays on the Mexican Revolution*, p. 86.

[18]Fernández Ruiz to Obregón, March 15, 1921, AGN, OC, 816-C-14.

[19]Fernández Ruiz to Obregón, May 12, 1921, AGN, OC, 816-C-14; Obregón to Secretary of Finance, November 31, 1922, AGN, OC, 816-Ch-11; Obregón to Fernández Ruiz, January 12, 1923, AGN, OC, 816-C-14.

[20]*Informe de Fernández Ruiz*, 1921 and 1922; *Periódico Oficial del Estado*, June 29, 1921. Volume VIII in the Ramo de Gobernación (AHCH) contains over 100 individually granted tax dispensations.

[21]"Agrarian Law of the State (Chiapas, October 28, 1921)," NA, RG 76, File 146, Binder 15, Box 10. Also see: *Periódico Oficial del Estado*, November 2, 1921; Tannenbaum, *The Mexican Agrarian Revolution*, p. 483.

[22]Tannenbaum, *The Mexican Agrarian Revolution*, pp. 429-450.

[23]Eyler N. Simpson, *The Ejido: Mexico's Way Out* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1937), p. 57.

[24]President of the Agrarian Party to Comisión Nacional Agraria, November 30, 1922, Archivo "seis de enero de 1915" de la Secretaría de Reforma Agraria, Cintalapa, Expediente 23:589(723.8), hereafter cited as ASRA and identifying information; Proletariat of the Municipality [unnamed] to Calles, January 1, 1925, AGN, OC, 818-Ch-16; Vidal to Calles, May 28, 1925, AGN, OC, 241-A-Ch-17.

[25]For state budgets 1921-1925 see: *Periódical Oficial del Estado*; De la Peña, *Chiapas económico* II, p. 375.

[26]Heather Fowler Salamini, *Agrarian Radicalism in Veracruz, 1920-1938* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1978), p. 38.

[27]Expediente for Cintalapa, November 30, 1922, ASRA, 23:589(723.8); expediente for Huixtla, May 3, 1923, ASRA, 23:590(723.8).

[28]Benjamin and Johns, "A Comparison of Chiapas and Federal Budgets."

[29]Lopez Gutiérrez, *Chiapas* III, p. 269.

[30]Pineda to Obregón, March 10, 1922, AGN, OC, 816-C-14. See tax concessions in Volume VIII, Ramo de Gobernación, 1923, AHCH, and De la Peña, *Chiapas económico* II, p. 435.

[31]Vidal, México, to Paniagua, Motozintla, November 10, 1920, AHCH, Fomento, 1921, V, 133.

[32]Secretary General of Government, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to General Manuel Mendoza, Jefe de las Operaciones Militares Chiapas, September 4, 1922, AHCH, Gobernación, 1922, XIX, 619.

[33]See: Expediente relativo al Partido Socialista Chiapaneco fundado en Motozintla, Departamento de Mariscal, Chiapas, 1920, AHCH, Gobernación, 1920, VI, 10.

[34]Paniagua, Motozintla, to Guillermo Kahl, January 9, 1921, AHCH, Fomento, 1921, V, 133; S. Aleleberg, Finca La Grandeza, (Soconusco) to Amadeo Solís, Motozintla, August 16, 1922, AHCH, Gobernación, 1922, XIX, 619.

[35]Acuerdo del Gobierno del Estado, September 3, 1921, August 17, 1921, AHCH, Fomento, 1921, V, 151 and 159.

[36]Isabel Nucamendi, El comisionado especial del gobierno, to Fernández Ruiz, April 13, 1921, AHCH, Fomento, 1921, V, 123.

[37]"Manifiesto," Tapachula, June 7, 1922, AHCH, Gobernación, 1922, XV, 391.

[38]*Ibid.*; Tarjeta, AHCH, Gobernación, 1922, XIX, 619.

[39]Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores to Governor of Chiapas, September 19, 1922, AHCH, Gobernación, 1922, XIX, 618.

[40]Governor of Chiapas to Departamento de Relaciones Interiores de Gobernación Federal, September 27, 1922, AHCH, Gobernación, 1922, XIX, 618.

[41]*La Frontera del Sur* (Tapachula), September 22, 1922.

[42]*Tribes and Temples* II, pp. 327, 356; Henning Silverts, "On Politics and Leadership in Highland Chiapas," in Evon Z. Vogt and Alberto Ruz L. eds., *Desarrollo cultural de los Mayas* (México: UNAM, 1964), pp. 366-367.

[43]Amalia Chavarría to Obregón, June 20, 1923, AGN, OC, 811-Ch-14; Vecinos de Libertad Calera to Obregón, May 29, 1922, ASRA, Libertad Calera, 23:597; Presidente municipal [location unknown] to Governor of Chiapas, January 8, 1923, AHCH, Gobernación, 1923, 45.

[44]Secretary General of Government (Chiapas) to Under-Secretary General, February 23, 1923, AHCH, Gobernación, 1923, 45; Varios ciudadanos de San Pedro Remate to Governor of Chiapas, December 5, 1923, AHCH, Gobernación, 1923, 45.

[45]President, Partido Agrarista Chiapaneco, to President Comisión Nacional Agraria, November 30, 1922, ASRA, Cintalapa, 23:589(723.8); Vecinos de Libertad to Obregón, May 22, 1922, ASRA, Libertad Calera, 23:597; Expediente Libertad Calera, AGN, CNA, Libro 14.

[46]M. Marroquín, Tapachula, to Governor of Chiapas, July 31, 1922, AHCH, Gobernación, 1922, XV.

[47]Varios ciudadanos conscientes, "Farisaismo. Vidal y su candidatura para Senador por Chiapas," Tuxtla Gutiérrez, May 8, 1922, AHCH, Carpeta 1631; Partido Socialist Chiapaneco to Governor of Chiapas, July 15, 1922, AHCH, Gobernación, 1922, XIX, 619. Also see Octavio Gordillo y Ortiz, *Diccionario biográfico de Chiapas* (México, 1977), pp. 184, 266; Casahonda Castillo, *50 años de revolución en Chiapas*, pp. 71, 140.

[48]Secretary General of Government, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to General Manuel Mendoza, Tapachula, September 4, 1922, AHCH, Gobernación, 1922, XIX, 619.

[49]A. Rebora to Interim Governor Cruz, May 29, 1923, AGN, OC, 428-Ch-8. Rebora was sent to Chiapas to investigate political conditions for President Alvaro Obregón.

[50]Secretary General of Government to State Attorney General, June 20, 1922, AHCH, Gobernación, 1922, XIX, 68; Catarino Ramos, Paulino Zacarías, Mauro López, and others to Governor of Chiapas, March 18, 1923, AHCH, Gobernación, 1923, Asuntos Municipales; Rebora to Cruz, May 29, 1923, AGN, OC, 428-Ch-8.

[51]U.S. Vice-Consul, Salina Cruz, to Secretary of State, March 12, 1923, NA, RG 84, Salina Cruz, 1924, Vol. 169; *Excélsior*, March 24, 1923.

[52]*Ibid.*

[53]Municipal President Motozintla to Governor of Chiapas, January 8, 1923, AHCH, Gobernación, 1923, 45.

[54]Paniagua to Obregón, February 25, 1923, Santiago Ramos to Senator Luis Espinosa, February 25, 1923, Obregón to Fernández Ruiz, February 26, 1923, AGN, OC, 428-Ch-8; Vecinos de Motozintla to Governor of Chiapas, March 5, 1923, Varios chiapanecos to Secretary General of Government, February 26, 1923, AHCH, Gobernación, 1923, 45.

[55]Ejército Reorganizador, Soconusco, to Calles, February 28, 1923, Secretaría de Guerra to Obregón, February 14, 1923, Fernández Ruiz to Obregón, March 28, 1923, AGN, OC, 428-Ch-8; U.S. Vice-Consul, Salina Cruz, to Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, March 12, 30, 1923, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Salina Cruz, Vol. 169.

[56]Rafael Coutino to Calles, February 19, 1923, AGN, OC, 428-Ch-8.

[57]Interim Governor M. Cruz to Obregón, June 14, 1923, AGN, OC, 428-Ch-8. Also see Randall G. Hansis, "Alvaro Obregón, the Mexican Revolution and the Politics of Consolidation, 1920-1924," Diss. University of New Mexico, 1971, p. 60.

[58]Cruz to Obregón, June 14, 1923, AGN, OC, 428-Ch-8; Fernández Ruiz to Obregón, July 31, 1923, Obregón to Fernández Ruiz, September 11, 1923, AGN, OC, 243-Ch-D-1; U.S. Vice-Consul, Salina Cruz, to Secretary of State, March 12, 1923, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Salina Cruz, Vol. 169.

[59]Lopez Gutiérrez, *Chiapas* III, p. 270.

[60]Luis Espinosa to Obregón, November 29, 1923, Fernández Ruiz to Obregón, December 3, 1923, AGN, OC, 408-Ch-8.

[61]*Excélsior*, November 27, 1923.

[62]Bailey, "Obregón: Mexico's Accommodating President," p. 95.

[63]Ernest Gruening, *Mexico and its Heritage* (New York: The Century Co., 1928), p. 320.

[64]"Present Executive and Ministry," March 10, 1925, NA, RG 165, 1657-G-547.

[65]John W.F. Dulles, *Yesterday in Mexico: A Chronicle of the Revolution, 1919-1936* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), pp. 219-220.

[66]"Stability of Government: Rebel Activity," December 19, 1923, NA, RG 165, 2657-G-535.

[67]Lopez Gutiérrez, *Chiapas* III, p. 273-275.

[68]Donato Bravo Izquierdo, *Lealtad militar. Campaña en el estado de Chiapas e istmo de Tehuantepec* (Mexico, 1948), pp. 31, 46, 81; *Excélsior*, March 3, 1924.

[69]U.S. Vice-Consul, Salina Cruz, to Secretary of State, January 26, 1924, NA, RG 59, 812.00/27048; Dulles, *Yesterday in Mexico*, pp. 243-244.

[70]Obregón to Governor of Chiapas, February 28, 1924, AGN, OC, 101-R2-Ch-4.

[71]Lopez Gutiérrez, *Chiapas* III, pp. 282-283, 277-278; *Excélsior*, March 3, 1924.

[72]Bravo Izquierdo, *Lealtad militar*, pp. 111, 123-141; César Córdova to General Calles, January 31, 1925, AGN, OC, 121-C-Ch-1.

[73]Municipal President, Chicomuselo, to Governor of Chiapas, September 3, 1925, AHCH, Gobernación, 1925, I; State Attorney General to Secretary General of Government, July 17, 1924, AHCH, Gobernación, 1923-1924; President Municipal, San Cristóbal, to Obregón, September 13, 1924, AGN, OC, 428-Ch-9.

[74]"Al Pueblo Chiapaneco," Partido Político Estudiantil, 1924, AHCH, Carpeta 1631.

[75]Lopez Gutiérrez, *Chiapas* III, pp. 299-300.

[76]Comité Directivo Electoral, June 18, 1924, AHCH, Gobernación, 1925, I.

[77]General Avila Camacho to Obregón, September 9, 1924, AGN, OC, 428-Ch-9.

[78]Archivo de Gobernación Federal, Relaciones Interiores, expediente E-2-75-5, quoted in Gruening, *Mexico and its Heritage*, pp. 407-408. Also see Vecinos de San Pedro Remate to Obregón, June 28, 1924, AHCH, Gobernación, 1924, Asuntos Ayuntamientos.

[79]Partido Socialista Chiapaneco to Calles, December 9, 1924, Luis León, Comisión Nacional Agraria, to Calles, December 12, 1924, Proletariat of the Municipality to Calles, January 25, 1925, AGN, OC, 241-A-Ch-17.

[80]"Comité directivo de la campaña pro-Vidal, 1924," AGN, OC, 428-T-23; State Attorney General to Governor of Chiapas, April 14, 1925, AHCH, Gobernación, 1924, I.

[81]*La Voz de Chiapas*, February 9, 1928; Diputado Alfredo Marín to Calles, December 3, 1924, AGN, OC, 428-Ch-8; General J.M. Dorantes to Obregón, September 11, 1924, Delfilio Martínez Rojas, Municipal President Las Casas, to Obregón, September 13, 1924, AGN, OC, 428-Ch-9.

[82]Gruening, *Mexico and its Heritage*, p. 407. Also see Vecinos de San Bartolo Solistahuacán to Diputado Ramírez Corzo, printed in *Diario de los Debates*, September 4, 1924.

[83]"Comisión revisora de credenciales - Sexta Sección," *Diario de los Debates*, September 4, 1924; Vecinos de Mapastepec to Governor of Chiapas, December 24, 1924, AHCH, Gobernación, 1925, IX; Fernández Ruiz, Alfredo Marín, Gustavo Pineda and others to Obregón, September 9, 1924, AGN, OC, 428-Ch-9.

[84]Hansis, "The Politics of Consolidation," pp. 60-61.

[85]Secretary General of Government to Fernández Ruiz, October 22, 1924, Obregón to Fernández Ruiz, November 10, 1924, AHCH, Gobernación, 1924, XIV.

[86]Fernández Ruiz to Obregón, November 30, 1924; Vidal to Obregón, November 30, 1924, AGN, OC, 428-Ch-8.

[87]Obregón to Fernández Ruiz, November 6, 1924; Obregón to Vidal, November 29, 1924, AGN, OC, 408-Ch-10.

[88]*Excélsior*, December 3, 5, 6, 25, 1924; *Periódico Oficial del Estado*, January 7, 1925.

[89]Córdova to Calles, January 7, 1925, Pascual Córdova to Calles, January 7, 1925, AGN, OC, 428-Ch-8.

[90]Francisco P. Ramírez to Calles, March 3, 1925, AGN, OC, 408-Ch-10.

[91]Gruening, *Mexico and its Heritage*, p. 409; Hansis, "The Politics of Consolidation," p. 61; Lopez Gutiérrez, *Chiapas* III, p. 301; *Diario de los Debates*, August 15, 27, September 4, 24, 1924.

[92]Vidal to Calles, May 28, 1925, AGN, OC, 241-A-Ch-17.

[93]*Informe de Carlos Vidal*, 1925; Secretary General of CROM to Calles, March 31, 1927, AGN, OC, 802-C-29; García Soto, *Geografía general de Chiapas*, p. 261.

[94]*Reconstrucción* (Tuxtla Gutiérrez), April 5, 1925.

[95]Lopez Gutiérrez, *Chiapas* III, pp. 303-304.

[96]*Ley reglamentaria del trabajo* (Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1926).

[97]Ley que establece la junta central de conciliación y arbitraje, las juntas municipales de conciliación y las comisiones especiales del salario minimo, 15 de enero de 1926," *Periódico Oficial del Estado*, January 27, 1926.

[98]"New Labor Law in Chiapas," March 9, 1927, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Salina Cruz.

[99]"New Law for Expropriation of Lands for Public Use, State of Chiapas," January 19, 1927, NA, RG 76, File 146, Box 10, Binder 15; Foster to Secretary of State, January 27, 1927, NA, RG 59, 812.52/1437.

[100]Circular, AHCH, Fomento, 1927, II.

[101]*Anuario de 1930*, p. 375.

[102]Vidal to Calles, September 21, 1925, Calles to Vidal, October 6, 1925, AGN, OC, 816-C-14.

[103]"Political Conditions, Salina Cruz District," July 10, 1926, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Salina Cruz.

[104]"Conditions Affecting Credits," December 4, 1927, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Salina Cruz.

[105]Foster to Secretary of State, April 12, 1927, NA, RG 59, 812.512/3368.

[106]Vice-Consul, Salina Cruz, to Secretary of State, July 24, 1924, NA, RG 59, 812.42/87.

[107]*Noticia estadística sobre la educación pública en México correspondiente al año de 1927* (Mexico: SEP, 1929), pp. 62, 162, 137.

[108]"Mi labor primordial consistó en conferenciar apliamente con cuanto finquero encontraba a mi paso; haciéndole palpar claramente el ideal que persigue nuestro actual gobernante; consistente en desanalfabetizar a los pobres hijos de nuestra queridísima Patria Chica. Son muy contados los Señores Finqueros que se opusieron a los disposiciones de esta inspeccion escolar actualmente a mi cargo." Inspector Múñoz to Secretary General of

Government, December 31, 1926, AHCH, Instrucción Pública, 1926, X; *Anuario de 1930*, p. 191.

[109]*Informe de Carlos Vidal*, 1926; *Periódico Oficial del Estado*, December 16, 1925, January 6, 1926; De la Peña, *Chiapas económico* II, p. 435; John Bedwell to U.S. Consul Salina Cruz, June 23, 1926, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Salina Cruz.

[110]R. Ruiz to Governor of State, August 18, 1925; S. Castillejos to Govenor of State, August 17, 1925, AHCH, Gobernación, 1925.

[111]Municipal President, Tapachula, to Vidal, August 12, 1925; Señores Hind y Cia. to Secretary General of Government, August 13, 1925, AHCH, Gobernación, 1925, VIII.

[112]Municipal Secretary, Tuzantán, to Secretary General of Government, December 8, 1926; M. Orduna, Confederación Socialista, to Vidal, December 15, 1926, AHCH, Fomento, 1926.

[113]J. Valásez to Vidal, January 26, 1927, AHCH, Fomento, 1927, II. Also see numerous other examples in Ramo Fomento, 1925-1927.

[114]Municipal Delegate, El Eden, to Vidal, December 1, 1925, AHCH, Fomento, 1927.

[115]Varios ciudadanos de Cancuc to Secretary General of Government, May 1, 1926, AHCH, Gobernación, 1926, XII.

[116]J. Martínez to Deputy Paniagua, April 17, 1926, AHCH, Gobernación, 1926, XIV. Also see D. Xetet y otros to Vidal, June 28, 1927, AHCH, Fomento, 1927, II.

[117]Circular, Número 5, June 1, 1926, AHCH, Fomento, 1926.

[118]*Uno Más Uno*, April 13, 1981.

[119]"Local Political Conditions," March 30, 1926, NA, RG 165.

[120]Dulles, *Yesterday in Mexico,* see chapter 38.

[121]Francisco J. Santamaría, *La tragedia de Cuernavaca en 1927 y mi escapatoria célebre* (México, 1939), pp. 23, 27.

[122]Lopez Gutiérrez, *Chiapas* III, p. 314.

[123]*Ibid.*, p. 417.

[124]Dulles, *Yesterday in Mexico*, p. 338.

[125]*Ibid.*, pp. 342-351.

[126]"Declaraciones de Manuel Zepeda Lara (1935)," and "Declaraciones del Señor Alberto Solís Gamboa y Profesor Epigmenio de León (1935)," in Datos para la historia del vidalismo en Chiapas, AHCH, Carpeta 941.

[127]Salvador Martínez Mancera, "Cómo fue la muerte del General Luis P. Vidal, Gobernador de Chiapas," *El Universal Gráfico*, October 25, 1937.

[128]*El Universal*, October 9, 10, 11, 1927; U.S. Consul, Salina Cruz, to Charge d'Affairs, American Embassy Mexico City, October 15, 1927, "Political Conditions," October 9, 1927, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Salina Cruz; U.S. Consul, Frontera, to Secretary of State, October 8, 1927, NA, RG 59, 812.00/29920.

[129]U.S. Consul, Salina Cruz, to Charge d'Affairs, October 19, 1927, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Salina Cruz 1927.

[130]*Excélsior*, November 5, 1927.

Chapter Eight

Epigraph: "Memorándum: resumen de los cargos que organizaciones campesinos, elementos obreros y políticos hacen al Gobernador del Estado, Coronel Victorico Grajales," El comité de obreros y campesinos, Soconusco, December 13, 1934, Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Lázaro Cárdenas, Expediente 542.1/20, hereafter cited as AGN, LC, and identifying information.

[1]The Confederación Regional de Obreros Mexicanos (CROM) enjoyed a powerful position, economically and politically, during the administration of President Plutarco Elías Calles. CROM, and its political arm, the Partido Laborista Mexicano, opposed the reelection of General Alvaro Obregón, fearing that he would favor the Partido Nacional Agrarista (PNA) at CROM's expense. Obregonistas, following Obregón's assassination, demanded that Calles break his ties with CROM, his most important source of mass political support.

[2]Rafael Loyola Díaz, *La crisis obregón-calles y el estado mexicano* (México: Siglo XXI, 1980), pp. 17-18.

[3]Arnaldo Córdova, *La clase obrera en la historia de México: En una época de crisis, 1928-1934* (México: Siglo XXI, 1980), pp. 19-38.

[4]James Wilkie y Edna Monzón de Wilkie, *México visto en el siglo XX. Entrevistas de historia oral* (México: Instituto Mexicano de Investigaciones Económicas, 1969), pp. 309-310.

[5]Córdova, *La política de masas*, p. 47.

[6]Chiapas was no exception in this regard. Felipe Carrillo Puerto achieved a similar governing alliance in Yucatán in 1921-1923, as did Adalberto Tejeda in Veracruz in 1923-1924 and 1929-1932, and Lázaro Cárdenas in Michoacán in 1929-1932.

[7]*La Voz de Chiapas*, December 29, 1927.

[8]*Ibid.*, January 12, 1928.

[9]*Ibid.*, March 1, 1928.

[10]Information provided by Daniela Spenser, 1981.

[11]Partido Agrarista, Arriaga, to Calles, December 30, 1927, AGN, OC, 408-Ch-16.

[12]"Political Conditions," April 15, 1928, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Salina Cruz.

[13]"Dictamen que motivó la destitución del Lic. Federico Martínez Rojas," México, March 21, 1928, AHCH, Carpeta 1616; *La Voz de Chiapas*, April 19, 26, May 10, 1928.

[14]*La Voz de Chiapas*, November 24, December 29, 1927, January 5, 19, 1928.

[15]*Chiapas: Revista Mensual* (Tuxtla Gutiérrez), October 12, 1928; "Quién es Raymundo Enríquez?" *La Vanguardia*, August 28, 1932.

[16]"Partido Progresista Chiapaneco Pro-Enríquez al Pueblo Chiapaneco," July 26, 1928, AHCH, Carpeta 1623.

[17]Partido Agrarista to Calles, December 30, 1927, AGN, OC, 408-Ch-16.

[18]Enríquez to Club Laborista de Margarita, May 27, 1928, AGN, OC, 408-Ch-16.

[19]Inspector de Correos, Arriaga, to Calles, July 22, 1928, AGN, OC, 217-Ch-18.

[20]Presidente Liga Revolucionario Estado de Chiapas to Calles, September 1, 1928, AGN, OC, 408-Ch-16; *La Voz de Chiapas,* September 16, 1928.

[21]*Excélsior*, November 7, 8, 27, December 2, 1928.

[22]Wasserstrom, "White Fathers and Red Souls," Figure 15.

[23]*Anuario de 1930*, p. 288; Dolores de Triado to Cárdenas, November 1, 1937, ASRA, Cintalapa, 23:589.

[24]*Anuario de 1930*, pp. 340, 383; *Anuario de 1938*, p. 196-197.

[25]Favre, *Cambio y continuidad*, pp. 76-77; Wasserstrom, "La evolución de la economía regional," p. 496; *Reconstrucción*, April 5, 1925.

[26]*Tribes and Temples* II, p. 331.

[27]Frank Tannenbaum, *Peace by Revolution: An Interpretation of Mexico* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), pp. 29-30.

[28]Matthew Edel, "Zinacantan's Ejido: The Effects of Mexican Land Reform on an Indian Community in Chiapas," Unpublished manuscript, 1962, p. 12. Also see Julian Pitt-Rivers and Norman A. McQuown, "Historical Change and Continuity in Settlement, Society, Language, and Ethnic Relations Among the Tzeltal-Tzotzil Indians of Highlands Chiapas," in Chicago Mimeographs, Unpublished Manuscripts, Vol. 12, pp. 2-3.

[29]For maize and frijol production figures see Jorge A. Vivó Escoto, *Estudio geografía*, pp. 51, 64; Lowenthal, "Elite of San Cristóbal."

[30]"Cámara Nacional de Tuxtla Gutiérrez de Comercio," AHCH, Carpeta 475; *Boletín de la Cámara Nacional de Comercio Agricultura, y Industria de San Cristóbal Las Casas*, March 31, 1928.

[31]"Cámara Nacional de Tuxtla Gutiérrez," AHCH, Carpeta 475.

[32]José Ruiz, San Cristóbal, to Rodríguez, September 5, 1933, Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Abelardo L. Rodríguez, Expediente 08/183, hereafter cited as AGN, ALR, and identifying information.

[33]Moisés T. De la Peña, "La potencialidad ganadera de Chiapas," *Ateno Chiapas* (1951), pp. 51-52.

[34]Municipal President, Tapachula, to Secretary General of Government, April 16, 1929, AHCH, Gobernación, 1929, II. This document lists all major coffee and cattle hacendados in Soconusco.

[35]Leo Waibel, *La Sierra Madre de Chiapas* (México: Sociedad Mexicana de Geografía y Estadística, 1933), pp. 122-127.

[36]*La Vanguardia*, November 16, 1930.

[37]*Periódico Oficial del Estado*, February 26, November 19, December 30, 1930, December 30, 1931.

[38]"Memorándum," December 13, 1934, AGN, LC, 542.1/20.

[39]Manuel E. Guzmán, *Chiapas: Estudio y resolución de algunos problemas económicas y sociales del estado* (México: 1930), p. 17.

[40]Loyola Díaz, *La crisis obregón-calles*, pp. 106-107, 112-113.

[41]*Ibid.*, p. 135.

[42]Osorio Marbán, *El partido de la revolución*, pp. 56-57, 213.

[43]Loyola Díaz, *La crisis obregón-calles*, pp. 127-145.

[44]*Excélsior*, December 19, 1928, March 2, 1929.

[45]*La Vanguardia*, February 24, March 1, 1929; *El Universal*, March 1, 1929.

[46]*La Vanguardia*, May 12, August 22, September 14, 1929.

[47]"Al pueblo chiapaneco," Lic Amador Coutiño, México D.F., December 1929, in ASRA, Huixtla, 25:590 (723.8); *La Vanguardia*, September 22, October 6, 1929.

[48]Carlos Martínez Assad, *El laboratorio de la revolución. El Tabasco garridista* (México: Siglo XXI, 1979), pp. 164-165, 170-171; *La Voz de Chiapas*, February 9, June 7, 1928.

[49]Rafael López to Governor Martínez Rojas, November 10, 1927, AHCH, Fomento, 1927. Also see in the same volume, "Estatutos de la Liga de Resistencia del distrito de Pichucalco."

[50]Martínez Assad, *El laboratorio de la revolución*, p. 129; *La Voz de Chiapas*, January 5, 1928.

[51]Lorenzo Meyer, *Historia de la revolución mexicana: El conflicto social y los gobiernos del maximato* Vol. 13 (México: El Colegio de Mexico, 1978), p. 245.

[52]Cal y Mayor to Portes Gil, December 31, 1929, ASRA, Cintalapa, 23:589; Liga Central to Cárdenas, July 18, 1936, ASRA, Huixtla, 25:590; Procuraduría de Pueblos to Comisión Nacional Agraria, ASRA, Pijijiapam, 23:8237.

[53]Ing. Sub-Auxiliar to Agente General de la Secretaría de Agricultura y Fomento, January 31, 1931, ASRA, Cintalapa, 23:589; *Excélsior*, December 31, 1930.

[54]Garcia de León, "Lucha de clases," pp. 75-77.

[55]*La Vanguardia*, October 12, November 9, 1930; *El Baluarte Chiapaneco* (México, D.F.), September 20, 1930.

[56]"The Agrarian Movement," February 1931, NA, RG 165; Sub-Delegado Martín de la Peña to Comisión Nacional Agraria, February 24, 1931, ASRA, Ocozocoautla, 23:606; *La Vanguardia*, March 8, 15, July 5, August 31, 1931.

[57]Simpson, *The Ejido*, pp. 113-114, 117-118.

[58]Robert E. Scott, "Some Aspects of Mexican Federalism, 1917-1948," Diss. University of Wisconsin, 1949, p. 185.

[59]*La Vanguardia*, June 28, 1931.

[60]"La reforma agraria y los gobiernos de los Estados," *Excélsior*, November 30, 1930.

[61]Romana Falcón, "El surgimiento del agrarismo cardenista - Una revisión de las tesis populistas," *Historia Mexicana* XXVII (enero-marzo 1978), p. 346.

[62]*Informe de Raymundo Enríquez*, 1932; Inspector General to Inspector López, January 31, 1931, AHCH, Personal y Cuenta, 1931.

[63]*Informe de Raymundo Enríquez*, 1931 and 1932; *Excélsior*, December 6, 1930; *Periódico Oficial del Estado*, May 27, 1931; López, Hernández, and others to Governor of Chiapas, May 20, 1929, AHCH, Fomento, 1929.

[64]*Declaraciones del Gobernador del Estado de Chiapas, Ing. Raymundo E. Enríquez* (Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Imprenta del Gobierno, 1930).

[65]*La Vanguardia*, March 31, 1929.

[66]Guzmán, *Chiapas: Estudio y resolución*, p. 85; *La Vanguardia*, March 31, 1929; *UPRECH*, November 9, 1928, December 15, 1928.

[67]*La Vanguardia*, December 27, 1931, January 3, May 8, 1932. Fausto Ruíz broke with the Fernández Ruiz camp in the early 1920s for personal reasons.

[68]*Renovación*, January 7, 21, February 18, March 4, 1932; *Excélsior*, April 4, 5, 1932.

[69]Liga Central de Comunidades Agrarias del Estado de Chiapas to Cárdenas, December 11, 1934, AGN, LC, 542.1, 20.

[70]Gustavo López Gutiérrez, Capitán de Caballería, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to Cárdenas, January 1, 1935, AGN, LC, 542.1, 20; *Renovación*, December 2, 1933.

[71]Gutiérrez to Cárdenas, January 1, 1935.

[72]*El Nacional*, August 6, 13, 1933; *Renovación*, August 9, 14, 1933.

[73]*Periódico Oficial del Estado*, January 30, 1935; *Liberación*, February 10, 1935; *La Verdad*, November 9, 1935.

[74]*Informe de Victorico Grajales*, 1933.

[75]*Anuario de 1930*, p. 428; *Anuario de 1939*, pp. 522-523; *Anuario de 1940*, p. 626; De la Peña, *Chiapas económico* II, p. 459.

[76]*Liberación*, January 27, 1935; *Periódico Oficial del Estado*, April 2, 1936; De la Peña, *Chiapas económico* II, p. 366.

[77]*Renovación*, January 21, 1933; *Periódico Oficial del Estado*, February 12, 1936.

[78]*Informe de Victorico Grajales*, 1934; *Periódico Oficial del Estado*, April 18, June 6, 1934; De la Peña, *Chiapas económico* I, pp. 299, 319.

[79]*La Vanguardia*, August 25, 1929; Gossen, *Chamulas in the World of the Sun*, pp. 269-270.

[80]"The Present Church Situation," February 12, 1935, NA, RG 165; Michael Salovesh, "Politics in a Maya Community," Diss. Northern Illinois University, 1972, pp. 123-124; Gustavo Montiel, *Tuxtla Gutiérrez de mis recuerdos* (México: Costa-Amic, 1972), see photographs.

[81]*La escuela socialista de Chiapas* (Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Imprenta del Gobierno del Estado, 1935), pp. 33, 37, 59-60; *Periódico Oficial del Estado*, May 27, June 10, 1936.

[82]*Periódico Oficial del Estado,* February 28, 1934.

[83]López Gutiérrez, *Chiapas* III, pp. 449-450.

[84]Lucio Mendieta y Núñez, *La administración pública en México* (México, 1942), pp. 290-291.

[85]Alicia Hernández Chávez, *Historia de la revolución mexicana: La mecánica cardenista* Vol. 16 (México: El Colegio de México, 1979), pp. 37-38.

[86]Wilkie y Wilkie, *México visto en el siglo XX*, p. 309.

[87]Luis González y González, *Historia de la revolución mexicana: Los artifices del cardenismo* Vol. 14 (México: El Colegio de México, 1979), p. 235.

[88]Lyle C. Brown, "Cárdenas: Creating a Campesino Power Base for Presidential Policy," in Wolfskill and Richmond, *Essays on the Mexican Revolution*, p. 105; Meyer, *El conflicto social*, pp. 249-250.

[89]Córdova, *En una época de crisis*, pp. 97-110.

[90]*Ibid.*, pp. 154-155, 227.

[91]Lyle C. Brown, "General Lazaro Cárdenas and Mexican Presidential Politics, 1933-1940: A Study in the Acquisition and Manipulation of Political Power," Diss. University of Texas, 1964. Also see expedientes La Concordia, May 12, 1935, ASRA, La Concordia, 23:8195.

[92]Córdova, *La política de masas*, p. 54.

[93]Garcia de León, "Lucha de clases," p. 81.

[94]Sindicato de Cargadores y Estibadores, Tapachula, to Presidente del Comité de Salud Pública, October 27, 1934, AGN, ALR, 525.3, 449.

[95]Liga Central de Comunidades Agrarias del Estado de Chiapas to Cárdenas, December 11, 1934, AGN, LC, 542.1, 20.

[96]*Ibid.*

[97]*Ibid.*

[98]"Memorándum," December 13, 1934, AGN, LC, 542.1, 20.

[99]Bloque Social Revolucionario Pro-Chiapas to Cárdenas, December 11, 1934, AGN, LC, 542.1, 20.

[100]Issac Morga, Liga Central, to Cárdenas, July 6, 1935, AGN, LC, 542.1, 299; *Liberación*, June 23, 1935.

[101]Trinidad García to Secretary of Government, Mexico City, April 5, 1934, AGN, LC, 542.1, 299; CCM to Cárdenas, April 6, 1934, AGN, ALR, 516.1, 84; Elisa Vázquez de Gómez, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to Cárdenas, July 10, 1934, AGN, LC, 525.3, 515-1.

[102]Unión de Albaniles to Gobernación Federal, September 29, 1933, AGN, ALR, 516.1, 40-2.

[103]Enrique Flores Magón to Rodríguez, April 3, 1934, AGN, ALR, 524, 532; Genaro Marín to Jefe de la Guarnición, Tapachula, May 1, 1934, AGN, ALR, 517.1, 43. Also see Cámara de Trabajo, Tapachula, to Cárdenas, January 4, 1934, AGN, ALR, 552.14, 438; Vecinos de Colonia "Sal vador Urbina," to Gobernación Federal, February 24, 1934, AGN, ALR, 552.14, 438.

[104]Jefe Departamento Agrario to Cárdenas, September 4, 1935, AGN, LC, 551.3, 166.

[105]Luis Rodríguez, Private Secretary of the President, to Grajales, March 19, 1935, AGN, LC, 533, 7.

[106]Grajales to Cárdenas, August 8, 1935, AGN, LC, 542.1, 20.

[107]Raymundo Enríquez to Rodríguez, July 26, 1933, AGN, ALR, 516.1, 40.

[108]*Renovación*, August 14, 1933.

[109]Liga Central to Cárdenas, December 11, 1934, also see telegrams directed to Governor Grajales in AGN, ALR, 516.1, 40.

[110]Genero Marín to Jefe de la Guarnición, Tapachula, May 1, 1934, AGN, LC, 517.1, 43; Marín, Cárcel Pública Tapachula, to Cárdenas, September 2, 1935, April 30, 1936, AGN, LC, 542.1, 299.

[111]Delegado CCM, Tapachula, to Cárdenas, June 22, 1935, AGN, LC, 542.1, 1126; Cámara de Trabajo, Tapachula, to Cárdenas, June 23, 1935, AGN, LC, 542.1, 1126; Felipe Galindo, Escuintla, to Cárdenas, October 6, 1936, AGN, LC, 544.5, 332; Francisco Lara, Palenque, to Cárdenas, January 1, 1935, AGN, LC, 544.5, 371; "Chiapas y sus enemigos," *Liberación*, January 6, 1935; *Excélsior*, March 5, 1934; *La Prensa*, September 23, 1935.

[112]*Excélsior*, March 3, 1934.

[113]"Labor Conditions in Chiapas," March 3, 1936, NA, RG 165.

[114]"Commission to Study Labor Problem of Indians in Chiapas," March 19, 1936, NA, RG 165.

[115]*Excélsior*, April 5, 1936; *El Universal*, April 5, 1936.

[116]Grupo de partidarios suyos, Las Casas, to Cárdenas, July 24, 1936, AGN, LC, 135.23, 42.

[117]*Mexican Labor News* (published by the Workers' University of Mexico in english translation, Director, Vicente Lombardo Toledano), September 20, 1936.

[118]"Social Advancement in Chiapas," December 4, 1936, NA, RG 165.

[119]Favre, *Cambio y continuidad*, p. 75.

[120]Hernández Chávez, *La mecánica cardenista*, pp. 54-60.

[121]"Local Political Conditions," March 8, 1935, NA, RG 165; Ambassador Daniels to Secretary of State, September 24, 1935, NA, RG 59, 812.00/30284; *Excélsior*, April 10, 1936; *La Prensa*, September 23, 1935.

[122]*Diccionario biográfico de México* (Monterrey: Editorial Revesa, 1968), pp. 330-331; *Chiapas Nuevo*, December 15, 1938.

[123]*El Universal*, April 1, 1936.

[124]Grajales to Cárdenas, March 9, 1936, AGN, LC, 542.1, 20.

[125]"Bombing of PNR Offices in Chiapas," March 14, 1936, NA, RG 165; *Excélsior*, April 4, 5, 1936.

[126]*Excélsior*, April 7, 12, 14, 28, 1936.

[127]*Ibid.*, May 5, 1936.

[128]Comité Executivo Nacional, PNR, to Presidente Comité Municipal, June 24, 1936, ASRA, Huixtla, 25:590.

[129]*Excélsior*, May 12, 15, 1936.

[130]"Local Political Conditions," July 7, 1936, NA, RG 165.

[131]"Local Political Conditions," July 21, August 4, 1936, NA, RG 165; Ambassador Daniels to Secretary of State, July 7, September 23, 1936, NA, RG 59, 812.00/30386 and 30409.

[132]*Excélsior*, September 23, 1936.

[133]*Ibid.*, September 24, 1936.

Chapter Nine

Epigraph: Gómez, El Presidente del Comisariado Ejidal to Cárdenas, February 10, 1938, AGN, LC, 135.23, 42; Guzmán, Ex-Secretario local de la Seccion Num. 14 de Numancia, Cacahoatán, to Avila Camacho, November 22, 1945, Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Manuel Avila Camacho, 432, 262, hereafter cited as AGN, MAC, and identifying information.

[1]Córdova, *La formación del poder político*, p. 43.

[2]Arturo Anguiano, *El estado y la política obrera del cardenismo* (México: Ediciones Era, 1975), pp. 58, 51-65; Joe C. Ashby, *Organized Labor and the Mexican Revolution under Lazaro Cardenas* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963), p. 81.

[3]Gilberto Bósquez, *The National Revolutionary Party of Mexico and the Six-Year Plan* (Mexico: PNR, 1937), p. 312.

[4]Moisés González Navarro, *La confederación nacional campesina. Un grupo de presión en la reforma agraria mexicana* (México: Costa-Amic, 1968), pp. 138, 154-155. The ejido was the basic constituent unit of the CNC. Graciano Sánchez, former Secretary General of the CCM, was elected Secretary General of the CNC.

[5]Brown, "General Lazaro Cardenas and Mexican Presidential Politics," pp. 273-290.

[6]Nathan, quoted in Córdova, *La política de masas*, p. 166.

[7]Octavio Ianni, *El estado capitalista en la época de Cárdenas* (Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1977), pp. 44-55.

[8]Coutiño to Cárdenas, October 1, 1936, AGN, LC, 542.1, 20.

[9]*El Universal*, July 7, 1937.

[10]*Chiapas Nuevo*, December 30, 1937; *Informe de Efrain Gutierrez,* 1939.

[11]*Chiapas Nuevo*, August 26, 1937.

[12]*Periódico Oficial del Estado*, February 9, 1938; *Chiapas Nuevo*, November 3, 1939.

[13]Departamento del Trabajo, *Directorio de agrupaciones obreras y patronales de la república* (Mexico: DAPP, 1939), pp. 63-78; *Chiapas Nuevo*, December 17, 1937; Gutiérrez, *Gobierno revolucionario*, p. 49; *Anuario de 1939*, pp. 322-324.

[14]*Mexican Labor News*, January 5, 1939; *Chiapas Nuevo*, April 6, 1939.

[15]*Mexican Labor News*, September 21, 1939; *Chiapas Nuevo*, September 21, 1939; Mario Culebro to Gutierrez, May 22, 1940, ASRA, Cacahoatan, 23:8213.

[16]*Informe de Efraín Gutiérrez*, 1938.

[17]*Mexican Labor News*, August 11, 18, 1938; Secretary General CNC to Chief of the Agrarian Department, January 4, 1939, ASRA, Carranza, 23:8142; Secretary, Liga de Comunidades Agrarias, Tapachula, to Chief of the Agrarian Department, February 28, 1940, ASRA, Union Juárez, 23:8051.

[18]Córdova, *La política de masas*, pp. 197-201.

[19]*Estatutos de la H. Cámara Nacional de Comercio e Industria de Tuxtla Gutiérrez, Chiapas* (Tuxtla Gutierrez, 1938).

[20]*Chiapas Nuevo*, October 20, September 29, 1938.

[21]*Ibid.*, July 7, October 27, November 17, 1938.

[22]*Ibid.*, June 22, 1939.

[23]*Ibid.*, December 28, 1939.

[24]*Ibid.*, February 20, April 27, 1940; *El Universal*, September 5, 1940.

[25]George A. Collier, *Fields of the Tzotzil: The Ecological Bases of Tradition in Highland Chiapas* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975), pp. 195-198.

[26]*Periódico Oficial del Estado*, January 6, 1937; *Informe de Efraín Gutiérrez*, 1938.

[27]*Chiapas Nuevo*, August 26, 1937; *Periódico Oficial del Estado*, July 28, 1937.

[28]Roger Reed, "Chamula and the Coffee Plantations of Chiapas," AB Harvard College, 1973, pp. 84-87.

[29]Edel, "Zincantán's Ejido," p. 29; Aviso de Posesión, September 1, 1940, ASRA, Zinacantán, 23:8118(723.8); Dictamen y Expediente Num. 975, March 23, 1940, ASRA, Chamula, 23:23232(723.8).

[30]De la Peña, *Chiapas económico* II, p. 377.

[31]José Luis Campero Calderon to Chief, Agrarian Department, July 8, 1954, ASRA, Tenejapa, 21:10535.

[32]Kirsten Albrechtsen Svendsen, "El trabajo asalariado en las comunidades indígenas," Tesis, UNAM, 1967, pp. 102-114; Ing. Leandro Molinar Merar, "Las zonas indígenas, uno de los mayores retos en materia agraria," *El Día*, June 16, 1978.

[33]Ulrich Kohler, *Cambio cultural dirigido en los altos de Chiapas: Un estudio sobre la antropología social aplicada* (México: INI - SEP, 1975), p. 62; Robert Redfield and Alfonso Villa Rojas, *Notes on the Ethnology of Tzeltal Communities of Chiapas* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, no. 28, 1939), p. 110.

[34]Salvador Gómez Oso to Cárdenas, March 22, 1940, and Acta conciliatoria, November 14, 1974, ASRA, Chamula, 23:23232; Wasserstrom, "White Fathers and Red Souls," pp. 223-224.

[35]Ampliación Ejidos Poblado La Libertad, February 29, 1939, ASRA, La Libertad, 24:8128.

[36]*Indigenismo en Acción*, May 20, 1944.

[37]"Labor de la Agencia de Colocaciones de Comitán," *Chiapas Nuevo*, January 12, 1939.

[38]Gutiérrez to Cárdenas, August 24, 1938, AGN, LC, 533.31, 9.

[39]Comité Ejecutivo, Sindicato de Trabajadores Indígenas, San Cristóbal, to Cárdenas, September 16, 1939, AGN, LC, 533.31, 9.

[40]Reed, "Chamula and the Coffee Plantations," pp. 84-85, 103-105.

[41]*Chiapas Nuevo*, September 23, 1937.

[42]"Political Conditions," April 6, 1927, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Salina Cruz, 1927.

[43]Military Attache to Secretary of State, November 3, 1939, NA, RG 59, 812.61333/7; "Informe del asemblea de los ciudadanos de Amatenango," May 7, 1936, ASRA, Amatenango, 23:8585(723.1); J. Pineda to Comisión Agraria Mixta, October 20, 1940, ASRA, Benito Juárez, 23:17539.

[44]Francisco Isasi, Huixtla, to Cárdenas, August 13, 1938, ASRA, Huixtla, 25:590; *Chiapas Nuevo*, January 12, 1938; *El Universal*, November 15, 1938.

[45]"Memorándum que presenta el delegado del SUTICS del Estado de Chiapas, al Sr. Presidente de la República," June 19, 1945, AGN, MAC, 432, 417.

[46]*Chiapas Nuevo*, March 16, 1939.

[47]Acta de Posesión, April 5, 1939, ASRA, Cacahoatán, 25:8213(723.8); "Informe del conjunto de Cacahoatán y Unión Juárez, Chiapas," August 15, 1938, ASRA, Unión Juárez, 23:8051(723.1); Gastón de Vilac, *Chiapas bajo el signo de la hoz* (Mexico, 1940), p. 74.

[48]De Vilac, *Chiapas bajo el signo de la hoz*, p. 74.

[49]Liga de Comunidades Agrarias to Chief, Agrarian Department, February 28, 1940, ASRA, Unión Juárez, 23:8051(723.8); *Chiapas Nuevo*, August 24, October 5, November 9, 23, 1939; *El Universal*, December 18, 1939.

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[51]"Acta de Demarcaciones de las zonas de protección de las propiedades del Sr. Enrique Braun," June 7, 1942, ASRA, Unión Juárez, 23:8051(723.8); Nathaniel and Sylvia Weyl, *The Reconquest of Mexico: The Years of Lazaro Cardenas* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 182.

[52]Liga Femenil Revolucionario, Finca El Retiro, to Avila Camacho, February 20, 1941, AGN, MAC, 404.1, 380.

[53]Salvador Teuffer S., *Resolución y antecedentes del problema agrario en la zona del Soconusco, Chiapas* (Tuxtla Gutiérrez: Liga de Comunidades Agrarias y Sindicatos Campesinos de Chiapas, 1942), pp. 27-28.

[54]"Memorándum del Comisariado Ejidal," April 21, 1940, and García Bros, Delegate of the Agrarian Department to Chief of Agrarian Department, January 30, 1941, ASRA, Cacahoatán, 23:8213.

[55]"Memorandum on Coffee Situation in Chiapas, Mexico," May 22, 1946, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Tapachula 1946.

[56]*Chiapas Nuevo*, July 27, 1937, August 11, 1938, July 27, 1939, August 10, 1939.

[57]Comité Agrario, La Concordia, to Alemán, May 20, 1947, ASRA, La Concordia, 23:8195; "Manifiesto," November 21, 1937, ASRA, Huixtla, 25:590.

[58]De la Peña, *Chiapas económico* IV, p. 1237.

[59]*Chiapas Nuevo,* May 20, 1939; De la Pena, *Chiapas economico* IV, p. 1241.

[60]De la Peña, *Chiapas económico* IV, p. 1240; *Anuario de 1940*, p. 532.

[61]Blanca Torres Ramírez, *Historia de la revolución mexicana: México en la segunda guerra mundial* (México: El Colegio de México, 1979), pp. 81-95, 106.

[62]*La junta de administración y vigilancia de la propiedad extranjera*, (México, 1943), pp. 57, 64-65.

[63]"Memorandum on Coffee Situation in Chiapas, Mexico," May 22, 1946.

[64]Reed, "Chamula and the Coffee Plantations," pp. 86-87; Helbig, *El Soconusco y su zona cafetalera*, pp. 100-101.

[65]Manuel Gómez, Confederación de Obreros, Tapachula, to Avila Camacho, September 7, 1944, AGN, MAC, 546.2, 10.

[66]"Restitución de tierras ejidales del poblado de Cacahoatán," December 27, 1943, AGN, MAC, 404.1, 368.

[67]Córdova, *Política de las masas*, p. 180.

[68]Gómez to Cárdenas, February 10, 1938.

[69]*Anuario de 1942*, pp. 746-749; *Censo Agrícola-Ganadero y Ejidal 1970*, p. 37.

[70]Comisariado Ejidal de Siltepec to Avila Camacho, April 3, 1943, ASRA, San Isidro Siltepec, 23:642.

[71]Los baldios que vivimos en Tierra Colorado, Municipio Zinacantán, to Avila Camacho, March 23, 1944; Presidente Comisariado Ejidal to Chief,

Agrarian Department, April 12, 1947; Presidente Comisariado Ejidal to Chief, Agrarian Department, August 2, 1956, ASRA, Chamula, 23:23232.

[72]Salovesch, "Politics in a Maya Community," pp. 128-130, 133-135.

[73]Secretario General del Departamento Agrario to Secretario Particular del Presidente, March 17, 1941, AGN, MAC, 404.1, 380.

[74]Vecinos de Cacahoatán to Avila Camacho, July 15, 1942, AGN, MAC, 703.4, 238.

[75]Secretaria General, LCA, to Avila Camacho, April 8, 1942, AGN, MAC, 703.4, 232.

[76]"Carta abierta al C. Presidente de la República por el Comité de Defensa de los Intereses de los Trabajadores Cafeteros del Soconusco," July 5, 1942, AGN, MAC, 703.4, 238.

[77]Comisariado Ejidal, Colonia Triunfo de Madero, Cintalapa, to Avila Camacho, February 3, 1943, AGN, MAC, 404.11, 369.

[78]SUTICS, Finca Monte Perla, to Avila Camacho, February 1943, AGN, MAC, 432, 417.

[79]Ramón Mandujano Alfonso, Tapachula, to Avila Camacho, September 9, 1946, AGN, MAC, 404.1, 368; Presidente Comisariado Ejidal to Alemán, November 10, 1948, Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Miguel Alemán Valdés, 546.6, 418. Also see Sociedad Local de Crédito Ejidal, Cuatimoc, Cacahoatán, to Avila Camacho, May 3, 1944, AGN, MAC, 404.1, 368.

[80]"Carta Abierta por el Comisariado Ejidal, Cacahoatán, y la Sociedad Local de Crédito Ejidal Unión Juárez," August 27, 1942, AGN, MAC, 703.4, 238; Los vecinos de las fincas La Rioja, La Argentina, etc., "Labor anti-mexicana en la region de Soconusco, Chiapas," October 21, 1948, AGN, MAV, 546.6, 418.

[81]Juan Caracosa Pérez, Tapachula, to Alemán, April 17, 1948, AGN, MAV, 544.61, 12.

[82]Guzmán to Avila Camacho, November 22, 1945.

[83]"Memorándum que presenta el delegado del SUTICS," June 19, 1945.

[84]Salvador Durán, Secretario General SUTICS, Tapachula, to Avila Camacho, June 24, 1942, AGN, MAC, 703.4, 232; Durán to Avila Camacho, July 17, 1942, AGN, MAC, 703.4, 238.

[85]Secretario General, SUTICS, to Avila Camacho, October 19, 1945, AGN, MAC, 404.1, 380.

[86]SUTICS, "Memorándum," February 1943, AGN, MAC, 432, 417.

[87]"Memorándum que presenta el delegado del SUTICS," June 19, 1945.

[88]*El Nacional*, July 15, August 11, 1945.

[89]Delegación Migración, Motozintla, to Avila Camacho, November 21, 1941, AGN, MAC, 546.2, 10.

[90]Manuel Gómez, Confederación de Obreros, Tapachula, to Avila Camacho, September 7, 1944, AGN, MAC, 546.2, 10.

[91]"Salen por el norte y entran por el sur," *El Universal*, March 10, 1950.

[92]"Informe del Federación Regional de Trabajadores del Soconusco, CTM," February 13, 1943, AGN, MAC, 432, 520.

[93]Reed, "Chamula and the Coffee Plantations," pp. 103-105.

[94]*Anuario de 1939*, p. 278; *Anuario de 1942,* p. 628.

[95]"Monthly Economic Review," March 8, 1940, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Tapachula.

[96]Vivo Escoto, *Estudio de geografía*, pp. 42, 51, 64.

[97]Wasserstrom, "White Fathers and Red Souls," Figure 15.

[98]Albert L. Michaels, "The Crisis of Cardenismo," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 2 (May 1980), p. 61; "Economic Effects of the Mexican Agrarian Program," August 10, 1938, NA, RG 59, 812.52, 3102.

[99]Luis Medina, *Historia de la revolución mexicana: Del cardenismo al avilacamachismo* Vol. 18 (México: El Colegio de México, 1978), p. 46.

[100]*Ibid.*, see chapters 3, 4, and 5.

[101]*Provincia* (mayo-junio 1949), p. 26; U.S. Consul, Coatzacoalcos, to Secretary of State, November 30, 1941, National Archives, Record Group 266, 14986, hereafter cited as NA, RG 266, and identifying information.

[102]"Gubernatorial Election of the State of Chiapas, Mexico," July 14, 1944, NA, RG 84, Correspondence, Tapachula 1944.

[103]Torres Ramírez, *México en la segunda guerra mundial*, Part IV, "Una economía de paz en tiempos de guerra."

[104]Luis Medina, *Historia de la revolución mexicana: Civilismo y modernización del autoritarismo* Vol. 20 (México: El Colegio de México, 1979), pp. 62-66.

[105]Pablo González Casanova, "El Partido del Estado. II. Fundación, Lucha Electoral y Crisis del Sistema," *Nexos* 17 (mayo 1979), pp. 4-6; Medina, *Civilismo y modernización*, pp. 73-79.

[106]*La Nación*, December 21, 1946; Secretario General, Partido Civico Tapachulteco, to Alemán, December 18, 1946, AGN, MAV, 544.5, 5.

[107]*El Sur de México*, January 2, 1947.

[108]*Diario de los Debates*, January 3, 1947; Gustavo Sánchez Cano, Tuxtla Gutiérrez, to Alemán, January 1, 1947, AGN, MAV, 544.5, 5.

[109]Medina, *Civilismo y modernización*, p. 104.

[110]Casahonda Castillo, *50 años de revolución*, pp. 118-136, 148.

[111]Córdova, *La ideología de la revolución mexicana*, p. 236.

Conclusion

Epigraph: Inaugural Address, quoted in, Ambassador J. Daniels to Secretary of State, December 1, 1934, NA, RG 59, 812.00/22; Carlos Pereyra, "México: los límites del reformismo," *Cuadernos Políticos* (Mexico: Ediciones Era, 1974), p. 56.

[1]See: Oscar Oszlak, "The Historical Formation of the State in Latin America: Some Theoretical and Methodological Guidelines for Its Study," *Latin American Reserach Review* XVI (1981), pp. 3-32; Americo Saldivar V., "El estado mexicano? Continuidad o cambio en las formas de dominación?" *Historia y Sociedad* 10 (1976), pp. 17-27; Arnaldo Córdova, "México: Revolución burguesa y política de masas," in Adolfo Guilly y otros, *Interpretaciones de la revolución mexicana* (México: Editorial Nueva Imagen, 1979), pp. 55-89; J.P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics* 20 (July 1968), pp. 559-592.

[2]Marx quoted in Ralph Miliband, *Marxism and Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 7. My emphasis, Marx said "conditions" not "determines."

[3]Marx quoted in John McMurtry, *The Structure of Marx's World View* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 105.

[4]David Walker, "Las ubérrimas ubres del Estado," *Nexos* 15 (marzo 1979), p. 17. Walker also argues that there was a similar cooperative relationship between the Porfirian regime and certain working class organizations, see David Walker, "Porfirian Labor Politics: Working Class Organizations in Mexico City and Porfirio Díaz, 1876-1902," *The Americas* XXXVII (January 1981), pp. 257-289.

[5]For two differing global interpretations see: Albert L. Michaels and Marvin Bernstein, "The Modernization of the Old Order: Organization and Periodization of Twentieth-Century Mexican History," in James W. Wilkie, Michael C. Meyer, and Edna Monzon de Wilkie, eds. *Contemporary Mexico: Papers of the IV International Congress of Mexican History* (Los Angles: UCLA Latin American Center, 1976), pp. 687-710. Michaels and Bernstein see the modern Mexican State as solely the creation of the Mexican bourgeoisie. Jean Meyer in *La revolución mejicana* (Barcelona: Dopesa, 1973), on the other hand, argues that the modern State in Mexico was the work of the bureaucratic class, the bourgeoisie d'affairs, for the purpose of the radical transformation of "old Mexico" into "modern Mexico." Meyer notes in "Periodizacion e Ideologia," *Contemporary Mexico*, p. 721, "Necesita decenios para el penoso aprendizaje del poder y sigue el proyecto profirista de construcción del Estado y de la nación." For an excellent essay contrasting these two global interpretations see John Womack, Jr., "Los doctores de la historia y el mito de la Revolución," *Nexos* 15 (marzo 1979), pp. 3-6.

[6]Octavio Ianni argues that in Mexico the bourgeoisie was insufficiently organized and hegemonic as a social class to act as the dominant element of the State. Thus the State apparatus became a determining productive force between organized capitalists and organized workers producing social capitalism. Ianni, *El estado capitalista en la época de Cárdenas*, p. 16.

[7]Oszlak, "The Historical Formation of the State in Latin America," p. 28.

[8]Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1969), pp. 52-53.

[9]Rabasa, *La constitución y la dictadura*, p. 306.

[10]Calles quoted by Ambassador R. Clark to Secretary of State, November 3, 1931, *NA, RG 59*, 812.00/29658.

[11]Lloyd J. Mecham, "Mexican Federalism: Fact or Fiction?" *Annals of*

the American Academy of Political and Social Science CCVIII (March 1940), pp. 23-38; William Tucker, *The Mexican Government Today* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1957), pp. 73-81; Howard F. Cline, *Mexico: Revolution to Evolucion, 1940-1960* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 53, 139-140.

[12]Sanford A. Mosk, *Industrial Revolucion in Mexico* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950), see chapters two and three; Ariel José Contreras, *México 1940: industrialización y crisis política* (México: Siglo XXI, 1977), see chapter seven.

[13]Enrique Padilla Aragón, *México: desarrollo con pobreza* (México: Siglo XXI, 1969), pp. 91-95.

[14]Wilkie, *Federal Expenditure and Social Change*, p. 247.

[15]Paul Lamartine Yates, *El desarrollo regional de México*, quoted in González Casanova, *Democracy in Mexico*, pp. 107-108.

[16]*Tercer censo censo agrícola, ganadero y ejidal. 1950. Chiapas* (México: Dirección General de Estadística, 1957), p. 458; *Monografía del estado de Chiapas* (México: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1975), pp. 137-138.

[17]"Chiapas, el estado rico con habitantes pobres," *Proceso* (September 22, 1980), pp. 18-19.

[18]Luis M. Fernández Ortiz, "Economía campesina y agricultura capitalista, notas sobre Chiapas," *Economía campesina y capitalismo dependiente* (México: Universidad Nacional Autonoma de México, 1978), pp. 33-35.

[19]Gustavo Gordillo, "La alternativa ejidal," *Uno Más Uno*, September 21, 1980.

[20]Henry Ginger, "A Mexican State Feels Neglected," *New York Times*, February 11, 1968.

[21]Rodolfo F. Peña, "Chiapas quiere decir olvido," *Uno Más Uno*, April 4, 1981.

[22]Wright, *Rural Revolution in France* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp. v-vi.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

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This essay is written to help the reader judge the scope of research undertaken in this study, to suggest the possibilities for research within the repositories discussed here, and above all to stimulate further efforts in Chiapanecan history.

ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTATION

William Blake once wrote that "nothing can be more contemptible than to suppose public records to be true." He perhaps had in mind the official presentation of some event past or present as found in a government report or edited collection of documents. Historical research in Mexico is still largely dependent upon the public archives since the private papers of many historical figures are in the possession of their families and, for various reasons, are not open to researchers. Naturally, this state of affairs limits the choice of research topics as well as the degree of certainty of some conclusions.

It is erroneous, however, to suppose that nothing of value can be found in the public archives of Mexico. The public archive, the primarily source of information for this study, houses a treasure of valuable and often-times unexamined documentation. It offers the historian not one official point of view but hundreds if not thousands of perspectives, both official and unofficial. The public archives consulted for this study

contain principally correspondence: requests, complaints, suggestions, and reports from friend and foe of particular regimes from officials, private organizations, villagers, workers, unions, merchants, and landowners. Each item has a point of view, many of them twist and distort elementary facts, and some offer complete fabrications. The danger this presents for the historian is not that he will be taken in by the official interpretation but that he will get lost and wander aimlessly amid various perspectives. The best of sources are often notoriously unreliable and must be carefully approached, examined, compared, and correlated.

The sources of documentary material for this study of Chiapanecan history will be discussed in four parts: 1) the period 1524-1891, 2) the period 1891-1910, 3) the period 1910-1920, and 4) the period 1920-1947.

1524-1891

The most valuable source of colonial documentation in the Americas on Chiapas is the Archivo General de Centroamerica (AGC), in Guatemala City. The Ramo Provincia de Chiapas (1551-1821) contains seventy-four legajos, which are catalogued and indexed. Additional legajos on the independence of Chiapas and its annexation to Mexico (1821-1824) are also to be found. The Archivo Eclesiástico de San Cristóbal Las Casas, located in the cathedral in San Cristóbal, contains abundant material regarding the administrative, spiritual, and economic functions of the Catholic Church in the region during the colonial epoch and the nineteenth century.

Sources for the study of nineteenth century Chiapas are scattered in several Mexico City archives. Among the most important are Serie

Chiapas and Serie Guatemala in the Fondo de Microfilm of the Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia. Serie Chiapas contains 108 rolls of microfilm. The majority of documents were filmed from the Archivo Eclesiático de San Cristóbal but decrees of the state government and runs of nineteenth-century newspapers were also filmed. Serie Guatemala contains 127 rolls of microfilm regarding military operations in Chiapas, Tabasco, and Yucatán. There documents were filmed in the Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores and the Archivo de la Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional. The Archivo de Chiapas (ACh), belonging to the Departamento de Investigaciones Históricas, INAH, and located in the Anexo del Castillo de Chapultepec, possesses the most balanced and most complete sources of nineteenth-century documentation on Chiapas. The bulk of the documents are official, that is, circulars, decrees, reports, censuses, manifestos, and bulletins. A fairly complete listing of the ACh can be found in Julio Herrera, *Archivo de Chiapas. Documentos inéditos* (Departamento de Investigaciones Históricas, INAH, 1974). The Archivo Histórico de Matías Romero (AHRM) located at and owned by the Banco de México, contains the official and private correspondence of Secretary of Finance and Ambassador to the United States Matías Romero. Romero took an interest in Soconusco and its potential for coffee cultivation and the AHMR is an excellent source of information on this district in the 1870s and 1880s. The Banco de México has published a guide to the AHRM by Guadalupe Monroy entitled *Archivo histórico de Matías Romero, catálogo descriptivo* and in two volumes.

1891-1910

The Colección General Porfirio Díaz (CGPD), located at the Universidad

de las Américas in Cholula, Puebla (on microfilm) and also at the Universidad Iberoamericana, in Mexico City (the original documents), is the most important source of historical data for Porfirian Chiapas. The correspondence found in the CGPD is numerous, comprehensive, and wide-ranging. Hundreds of letters from governors, jefe políticos, government officials, the personal agents and spies of the president, and citizens describe, often in detail, political events, social and economic problems and developments, and federal-state relations. In addition, the CGPD has one distinct advantage over most of the other collections of presidential papers: it cotains many copies of Díaz's answering correspondence. The CGPD is organized chronologically and is not catalogued or indexed. It is necessary, therefore, to scan each document in each roll of the microfilm collection to find information regarding Chiapas. Since the CGPD contains nearly a million documents this is a tedious task.

Because of fires in the Chiapas state archive in 1863 and 1917 there is very little documentation in the Archivo Histórico de Chiapas (AHCH) in Tuxtla Gutiérrez. The material which has survived, pamphlets and folletos for the most part, is located in the pamphlet collection in the Hemeroteca del Estado which is a part of the AHCH.

1910-1920

The most abundant and useful documentary material on the revolutionary decade in Chiapas can be found in the AHCH, the official state archive of Chiapas. Material for the years 1910-1920 in the AHCH is bound in large volumes and divided by subject matter, i.e. Ramo de Gobernación, Ramo de Fomento, Ramo de Guerra, etc. The year 1917, for example, might

have fifteen or twenty volumes of Gobernación. I drew heavily on the Ramos Gobernación and Fomento, which contain not only decrees, acuerdos, and circulars, but correspondence between the state government and jefes políticos, municipal presidents, military garrison commanders, work and education inspectors, and citizens. Unfortunately this archive is poorly organized and preserved and is neither indexed nor catalogued.

The United States National Archives, in Washington, D.C., is an important repository of documentation on the revolution in Chiapas. Reports by U.S. consuls in Tapachula, Salina Cruz, Ocós, and Guatemala City on conditions in Chiapas are to be found in Record Group 84 (consular records) and Record Group 165 (military defense division). Information by North American citizens living in Chiapas during this period and who witnessed the revolution at close range is found in Record Group 76 (Special Mexican Claims Commission) and in the two volume report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations entitled *Investigation of Mexican Affairs*.

The Archivo de la Revolución Mexicana, 1910-1920, in the Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores in Mexico City (ASRE) contains very useful information (generally in lengthy reports) on the military history of the civil war in the state and the role of the Guatemalan government in assisting rebel groups in the state. The ASRE is catalogued and indexed. The other documentary repositories consulted for the revolutionary decade yielded valuable information for limited periods or specific topics although not in abundant quantities. These archives are: Archivo Francisco I. Madero in the Biblioteca Nacional; the Serie Francisco I. Madero in the Fondo de Microfilm, INAH; the Archivo Francisco León De la Barra and the Archivo VEnustiano Carranza (Telegramas)

at the Centro de Estudios de Historia de México; the Archivo General Octavio Magaña in the Archivo Historico of the Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico; and the documentary collection published by Editorial Jus entitled *Documentos históricos de la revolución mexicana.*

1920-1946

Documentary material on post-revolutionary Chiapas is concentrated in three repositories: the state archive of Chiapas, the national archive of Mexico, and the archive of the agrarian reform department. Material in the AHCH runs only from 1920 to 1928, with scattered documentation running to 1931. The AHCH documentation for this period is useful for examining electoral conflicts at both the municipal and state levels.

The Unidad de Presidentes of the Archivo General de la Nación provided the most abundant source of political data (particularly information on unions) for the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. The following Fondos were consulted: Obregón-Calles, Abelardo L. Rodríguez, Lázaro Cárdenas, Manuel Avila Camacho, and Miguel Alemán Valdés. Scholars familiar with Mexican history will notice the regrettable absense of documentation from the administrations of Emilio Portes Gil and Pascual Ortiz Rubio. Their papers have not yet been organized and catalogued and are not open to the public. My attention was directed to the following topics as listed in the card catalogues to the above Fondos: gobierno, conflictos electorales, conflictos obreros, conflictos agrarios, and indígenas.

The Archivo "seis de enero de 1915" of the Secretaría de Reforma Agraria (ASRA) is perhaps the best source of social history for twentieth-century. I examined the Sección de Dotaciones which is divided into expedientes, one for each agrarian community. Because it is not uncommon

to find over ten volumes of documents in one expediente and since there are nearly two thousand agrarian communities in Chiapas, I could only sample the agrarian records for Chiapas. I chose to examine in detail fifty communities, divided among the Central Highlands, the Central Depression, and the Pacific Littoral. The communities I examined were generally of some size and importance and located where the struggles were important in terms of both land reform and state politics. The ASRA includes letters from villagers and hacendados presenting their briefs as well as from the agrarian engineers who reported on local conditions, wages, the level and nature of trade, road conditions, ejidal politics, and even religious and cultural practices and beliefs. The ASRA was most useful in reconstructing the political role of ejidos in the 1930s.

PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES

Newspapers published in Chiapas and Mexico City often filled gaps left by the absense of documentary data. This was particularly true for the period 1928-1932. Very few runs of Chiapanecan periodicals dating from the period 1890-1910, unfortunately, have survived. The best collections of newspapers can be found in the Hemeroteca del Estado in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, in Serie Chiapas at INAH, in the Paniagua Collection at the Latin American Library at Tulane University, and, to a lesser extent, in the Hemeroteca Nacional in Mexico City.

Informes and Memorias, state-of-the-state reports published annually by the governor, also proved useful, revealing not only data on material progress by each state administration but providing interesting political self-portraits of the governors. Informes published prior to 1910 were

consulted in the private library of Professor Prudencio Moscoso Pastrana in San Cristóbal Las Casas. Those published after 1910 were found in the AHCH.

Statistical compilations were indispensable sources for demographic, economic, and social trends. They can be divided into two groups: private and official publications. The first group, published during the nineteenth-century generally, included: Orozco y Berra (1855), Pérez Hernández (1862), Emiliano Busto (1877), Rabasa (1895), Corzo (1897), Byam (1897), Domenech (1899), and Flores (1909). The second group includes the two state anuarios (1897) and (1911), the three statistical volumes on the Porfiriato published by El Colegio de México, and the national anuarios which run from the 1890s to the present day.

Finally, Chiapas is fortunate to have a number of good first-hand accounts written by visitors. For the colonial epoch we have Bernal Díaz's account of the conquest of Chiapa and Thomas Gage's report on life in Chiapas in the 1600s. For the post-independence era we have Haefkens' (1827), Conder (1830), and Muhlenpfordt (1843), and Stephens (1847). Two interesting accounts by North American women who grew up in Chiapas during the Porfiriato are by Sargent (Soconusco in the 1890s) and Shields (Palenque in the 1900s). For the period after 1910 we have Blom (*Tribes and Temples*, 1925), Basauri (1931), Tannenbaum (1929, 1933), Redfield and Villa Rojas (1939), Amram (1937), Greene (1939), Waibel (1933), Blom and Duby (1955), and Pozas (1949). B. Traven's five "jungle novels" set in the period around 1910 and Rosario Castellanos' *Balum Canan* (Comitán in the 1930s) evoke strong and clear images of rural life in Chiapas.

INTERPRETATIVE STUDIES

Good secondary works on the history of Chiapas are few, although starting in the 1970s professional historians, and anthropologists taking a historical perspective, began to investigate the state.

There are only five broad or general studies which merit discussion. Trens (1942) is a detailed and lengthy chronicle of Chiapas from the conquest to the War of the Reform. The book focuses almost exclusively on politics and administration and is well documented. López Gutiérrez (1932) in three volumes takes up where Trens ends and constitutes the most detailed political study of the Porfirian and revolutionary eras. De la Peña (1950) in four volumes presents a virtual encyclopedia of data divided topically, from labor conditions to road construction, coffee cultivation to cattle raising. Two anthropologists, Wasserstrom (1977) and Favre (1971), discuss the history of the highland indigenous population from the conquest to the present day. The quality of these last two works is uneven, ranging from the superficial to the astute.

It is in the field of colonial history where the best interpretative studies based on unpublished sources are located. All, however, treat Chiapas within the larger context of Central America or southern Mexico. Sherman (1979) treats the theme of indian labor in the sixteenth-century, MacLeod (1973) examines social and economic trends in the sixteenth and seventeenth-centuries, and Gerhard (1979) provides an excellent historical geography of Chiapas covering the whole of the colonial epoch.

Three studies stand out with regard to the period of independence. Rodríguez (1978) examines Central America in the period 1808 to 1926: its reaction to the intellectual currents of Spanish thought of the late

eighteenth-century and the fall of the Spanish monarchy in 1808 and its participation in the Cortes at Cadiz. Moscoso (1974) and Ai Camp (1975) argue that Chiapas joined the Mexican Empire then republic freely, uncoerced by Mexico.

The nineteenth-century (1824-1910), aside from Trens and López Gutiérrez, is a desert for historical studies. Only two merit attention. Wasserstrom (1978) argues that ladino expropriation of indigenous lands nearly produced a race war in 1848. Spenser (1981) shows how foreign capital came to dominante the Soconusco district during the Porfiriato.

The twentieth-century offers the largest quantity of historical studies although most are polemical works. The best study on the rebellion in 1911 is by Luis Espinosa (1912) and is biased in favor of the state government. Martínez Rojas (1913) and Eduardo Paz (1912) present favorable treatments of the Cristobalense movement. Moscoso (1972) presents an interesting treatment of the Chamula cacique who mobilized indian soldiers on behalf of the Cristobalense cause. Benjamin (1980) emphasizes the contradictory roles of the De la Barra government and revolutionary leader Madero in helping ignite the conflict.

For the period of the civil war of 1914-1920 there are several good studies. Serrano (1923) offers a pro-mapache interpretation, Moscoso (1960) is pro-Pineda, and Casahonda Castillo (1970) is pro-Constitutionalist. Hernández Chávez (1979), the best study of the period, concentrates on the mapaches and argues that the movement constituted a defense of class interests. Benjamin (1981) places the civil war in the broader context of the Mexican Revolution. García de León (1979) presents an orthodox Marxist interpretation of Chiapanecan history from 1910 to about 1940. He gives an innovative discussion based on interviews with mapaches and

a Chiapanecan communist. The dominant theme, however, class struggle for political power, is overdrawn.

Studies of contemporary Chiapas, although not historical, give a useful if limited portrait of what Chiapas has become. Helbig's (1964 and 1964) economic-geographic studies (of Soconusco and the Central Depression) are unsurpassed. In the 1950s the Anthropology Department at Harvard University, under the direction of Evon Vogt, began a systematic program of investigation in the indigenous villages in the Central Highlands of Chiapas. As a result of this Harvard Chiapas Project a large body of literature has been published although only a small part holds any value for the general reader (including historians) who have not been introduced to the sectarian disputes in professional anthropology. Some of the studies I found useful are Cancian (1972), Collier (1975), Edel (1962), Gossen (1974), Laughlin (1977), Lowenthal (1963), Vogt (1969), and Wilson's (1966) novel.

THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF MEXICO: STATE FORMATION

The historiography of State formation in Mexico is still in its infancy. Most works on the topic are weighted on the side of theory rather than empiricism and are influenced by the classic Marxist writings. The few studies which do attempt a detailed empirical reconstruction of State formation focus on the middle of the nineteenth-century. Too many students of the Mexican Revolution, however, assume that the nation completely remade itself after 1910 and that the modern State took its present form in 1917, having little relation to its Porfirian predecessor.

Among the numerous theoretical studies, one stands out: Arnaldo

Córdova's pioneering *La formación del poder político en México* (1972). The dominant theme in modern Mexican history, according to Córdova, is continuity. The revolutionary State as defined in the Constitution of 1917 was simply a reorganized Porfirian State. Mexican authoritarianism survived the transition from personal to institutional rule intact. The revolution interrupted State activism in economic development; it did not initiate the active State. Finally, according to Córdova, the revolution in the last analysis was not a movement of the masses but one which manipulated the masses in order to achieve a capitalist development of the country. Many of Córdova's ideas were not new when he published his book in 1972, but their combination within a coherent framework established a fundamental revisionist paradigm of the 1970s.

Another book of argument rather than research, one almost as important as Córdova's but outside the ideological spectrum of Marxism, is Jean Meyer's *La revolución mejicana, 1910-1940* (1973). From Meyer's perspective the ruling class in Mexico is not composed of simply capitalists but the bourgeoisie d'affairs: politicians, bosses, and bureaucrats. Their concern is less the preservation of class dominance but the welfare and prestige of the State and the destruction of old Mexico. Like Córdova, Meyer emphasizes continuity. "The Porfiriato and the revolution," he argues, "were two moments of the same enterprise," the formation of the modern State. For Córdova the conflicts within Mexican society during the process of State formation were between classes; for Meyer, between the State and society as a whole.

The monographs based upon archival investigation naturally treat more limited topics and periods of time, but likewise, they give greater emphasis to the continuity of Mexican political development than any

tendency to start anew. Richard N. Sinkin's *The Mexican Reform, 1855-1876* (1979) is a brief for the continuity of political centralization from the Bourbon monarchs to this day. Sinkin, however, makes a convincing case for locating the foundation of the modern Mexican State - regular, orderly, secular, and powerful government - within the twenty-five year period after 1855. It was an imperfect beginning as Sinkin admits, but compared to the previous half-century of political instability and near national disintegration, the achievement was substantial. Laurens Ballard Perry, in *Juárez and Díaz* (1978), demonstrates in almost minute detail the continuity between the so-called liberal regimes of the Reform era and the so-called conservative Diaz government. Benito Juárez, Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, and Porfirio Díaz were centralists who practiced machine politics. Even today, notes Perry, Mexico is governed by a monolithic political machine, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional, "Juárez's great-grandchild."

Once we enter the realm of revolutionary historiography any coherent picture of State formation becomes murky. Perhaps the greatest problem is that until recently most students of the revolution have worked solely within the revolutionary paradigm, that is, accepting the notion that the revolution is the major watershed in Mexican history and in the formation of the modern State. As a result the questions these students have tended to investigate have been those traditionally associated with revolutions: what were its origins, how did it evolve, how revolutionary or conservative was it, and what were its local and regional variants? John Womack (1978, p. 104), in fact, has suggested that the revolution has become a fetish for historians and that in the larger sense "we have resisted comprehending what the Revolution meant."

With only a few exceptions, the most impressive investigations of State formation during the Mexican Revolution have been regional studies. Studies by John Womack (1968), Paul Friedrich (1970), Jean Meyer (1973), Arturo Warman (1976), Hector Aguilar Camín (1977), and Heather Fowler Salamini (1978) in one way or another demonstrate how the central State constantly attempted and succeeded in controlling, channeling, and restructuring popular movements and unorganized masses. In a few of these works there is the strong implication that, as Gilbert Joseph argues (1979, p. 47), "the epic revolution would ultimately have the effect of creating a 'modern leviathan,' of consolidating the increasingly centralized, increasingly capitalistic modern State which had already been emerging during the Diaz period."

Finally, one of the more important political studies of the Mexican Revolution published in the 1970s is Peter Smith's *Labyrinths of Power* (1979). Smith studied over 6000 members of national political elites who held public positions between 1900 and 1970. One of Smith's most important discoveries was that from the beginning of the century, political elites came mainly from the middle class. The revolution, he concludes, did not lead to any major change in the class basis of political leadership. Also, the elites who assumed positions in the 1940s bore a striking resemblence to the late Díaz group: urban, highly educated, and trained as technicians. The PRI, notes Smith, has not really institutionalized the revolution; "what it had done is to find a new formula for re-institutionalizing the essence of the Porfiriato." Continuity in Mexican history, perhaps more than any other theme, characterized the 1970s revisionist paradigm of State formation.

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