JEREMY TAYLOR:

BACONIAN, SOCINIAN, AND ARMINIAN

INFLUENCES UPON HIS THOUGHT

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ABSTRACT

JEREMY TAYLOR:
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by William E. Blewett

The purpose of this study was to examine the thought of Jeremy Taylor and to determine the relationship which he had with contemporary seventeenth century thought. Baconianism, Socinianism, and Arminianism were chosen because congruity could be established with Taylor as evidenced by his interest and the subject matter of his writings, and because there have been unsubstantiated claims for, or denials of, influence upon Taylor with respect to these movements.

The method used was straightforward. Evidence was sought for the reflection or rejection of these movements of thought by Taylor. This was accomplished by establishing the fact or probability that Taylor had contact with the movements, through persons or published works. Then Taylor's writings and correspondence were examined for evidence of affinity with, or rejection of, the tenets of the movement under consideration.

The results of this study may be summarized as follows:

1. Taylor gives reasonable evidence in his writings of the acceptance of Baconian concepts and attitudes; and he has applied them in the realm of religion. His work in the

field of casuistry appears to supply the deficiency which Bacon had noted in his survey of the state of knowledge. This internal evidence is supported by the recently recognized fact that Bacon's work and thought were enjoying a resurgence of influence during the very years in which Taylor was forming his opinions and expressing himself in his published works. Furthermore, it was pointed out that Taylor's patrons all had connections with known Baconians and that a great number of Taylor's known friends were also connected with Baconian projects and interests.

2. Taylor rejected completely, the Socinian dogmatic position except as it coincided with general Christian teaching. The accusation that he was a Socinian seems to be contemporary name-calling; and his association with Socinian thought in subsequent days appears to be the result of the attempt to see Socinians as the great liberal influence which permeated all Protestant thought of the seventeenth century.

3. The accusation that Taylor was an Arminian has greater credibility than the charge of Socinianism. There is definite affinity with the Arminian position in many points and the admiration which Taylor had for Arminians such as Grotius, Vossius, and Episcopius makes it highly probable that he was influenced by Arminian thought. Even so, Taylor denied the title of Arminian just as he did that of Socinian, Pelagian, "and I cannot tell what monsters of appellations."

In fine, Taylor was an eclectic thinker who held views which were thought to be mutually exclusive. In this, he claimed the guidance of the Apostle Paul who said, "Try all things, and retain that which is good," which Taylor interpreted as meaning, "From every sect and community of Christians take any thing that is good, that advances holy religion and the divine honour."

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And, it should not go unremarked that a true "help meet for man", and two sons--too young to understand, yet loving enough to cooperate--have sacrificed much to allow the pursuance of this study.

W. E. B.

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INTRODUCTION

Jeremy Taylor (1613-1667) was one of the seventeenth century English Churchmen known as the Caroline Divines. He was a protege of Archbishop Laud and was chaplain to Charles I. He served with the Royalist forces in the Civil War and before the House of Stuart was restored to the English throne, he suffered imprisonment three times. Following the Restoration he received the Irish bishopric of Down and Connor. Taylor wrote voluminously and his works have had an enduring popularity for their literary excellence as well as for their content.

Taylor lived and wrote in an age of radical social change. His was the age of Descartes and the scientific revolution, the age of the Thirty Years War on the Continent and of the Civil War in England, the age which marked the end of the English Reformation. A recent writer has said,

> Taylor ... belonged enough to his age to understand its needs and to offer something in satisfaction of them; but he had roots enough in the past, and appeal enough to the future, to lift him out of the ranks of those who achieve only a contemporary fame.[1]

The following pages will present some of the results of a study of the relationship of social, philosophical, religious and political ideas and events to the thought of

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[1]C. J. Stranks, The Life and Writings of Jeremy Taylor (London, 1952), p. 103.

Jeremy Taylor. It is to be admitted that such a study suggests dedication to a life-long program of analysis and comparison, for the collected works of Taylor amount to ten close-packed volumes, to say nothing of the vast array of contemporary literature and the great quantities of ink and paper which have been used to assess that literature in the years since it was published. With this admission, it is hoped that what follows will give some further understanding of Taylor and of his age.

The Problem

A certain amount of skepticism gathers around any attempt to determine the origin and spread of ideas. This is especially so when studying an age when the world of letters was relatively small and when communication arts played a more personal role than in our present day. This difficulty has been recognized by others who have sought to determine the history of ideas. Herbert Grierson, in his classic study, Cross-Currents in Seventeenth Century Literature, expressed something of the difficulty in this way:

> What I wish to consider ... is how the humanist spirit, as I have described it, fared in the Churches.... How far did the spirit of Erasmus, or Montaigne or Bacon or Shakespeare succeed or fail or mellow or modify the Christian temper of these great treatises and these innumerable sermons? It is a difficult question, and one to which my answer, I fear, will be somewhat incomplete.[1]

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[1]Herbert J. C. Grierson, Cross-Currents in Seventeenth Century Literature (Harpers Torchbook Edition, 1958), pp. 174-75.

W. E. H. Lecky, in his History of Rationalism in Europe, described the task of the historian of opinions as "to take a wide survey of the intellectual influences of the period he is describing and to trace that connection of congruity which has a much greater influence upon the sequence of opinions than logical arguments."[1] Even so, Lecky admitted that all we can infer from our studies is "that the process of reasoning is much more difficult than is commonly supposed;...."[2] Not only is the process of reasoning complex and the line of descent obscure, but a modern historian has reminded us that ideas are not compartmentalized or isolated from related areas of thought. "The connections of religion, science, politics, and economics," say C. E. Hill, "are infinite and infinitely subtle. Religion was the idiom in which men of the seventeenth century thought."[3]

As if the foregoing were not enough to indicate a task of no simplicity, the dictum endorsed by Bacon and Taylor that opinion is as varied as is the number of men is fulfilled by those who have written of Taylor. Two or three examples will indicate the variety. Archdeacon Bonney, one of Taylor's biographers, says,

> Alive to every passing occurrence, the soul of Taylor manifests itself on every occasion. From the first day of his seclusion till he removed

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[1]W. F. H. Lecky, History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe (London, 1965), I, p. ix,

[2]Ibid., I, p. xv,

[3]Christopher Hill, Puritanism and Revolution (London, 1958), p. 29.

> into Ireland, he seems to have allowed few subjects connected with the questions of those times to escape him. Most of these he handled with an adroitness that proved his versatility of genius and command of learning.[1]

On the other hand, a recent scholar examining the writings of Taylor has concluded that

> No formative influence was exerted on his thoughts by contemporary literature. Biased as was Taylor's failure to appreciate writers to whom succeeding centuries have given highest praise, one has only to spend an evening scanning the sermons of his fellow preachers to realize by comparison the singular richness and catholicity of his literary quotations and allusions.[2]

Which is to say that Taylor read and quoted from contemporaries but was not influenced by them. Another biographer counters this, saying,

> While ... he has exposed himself to criticism as uncertain or ambiguous, he has earned the good opinion of more generous commentators for an eclecticism, or catholicity, which is not afraid of looking at the truth on all sides and in all its aspects, of gathering up its scattered fragments wherever it may find them, and of fearlessly stating the result of its investigations.[3]

In the face of such opinions as quoted above, it is clear that the task is complex and, indeed, subject to a great extent to the limitations of the investigator's ability to recognize connections of congruity and infinitely subtle connections between religion, philosophy, politics,

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[1]H. K. Bonney, The Life of Jeremy Taylor (London, 1815), p. 234.

[2]Lois E. Barr, The Non-Biblical Learning of Jeremy Taylor with Special Reference to the Sermons, Holy Living and Holy Dying (Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of North Carolina, 1954), p. 265.

[3]George Worley, Jeremy Taylor (London, 1904), p. 226.

and economics. To facilitate this investigation it was determined to select aspects of seventeenth century thought for which congruity could be established with Taylor and his interests as evidenced by the subject matter of his writings; and then to seek for direct and indirect evidence of the reflection of these ideas and opinions by Taylor. The aspects of seventeenth century thought to be considered are Baconianism, Socinianism, and Arminianism.

PART I: TAYLOR AND BACONIANISM

> ...Baconianism, like every other great movement of thought, extended far beyond its direct followers. It diffused itself as a general intellectual influence, and became a part--in some respects the most conspicuous part--of the higher spirit of the age in which all active and forward minds shared. There was no school of thought in the second half of the century which can be said to have been independent of it; and, as the most prominent opponent of the old scholastic system, it was apt to receive the credit of the whole movement against it, and to be taken as the type of the freer intellectual life which had everywhere begun to prevail.[1]

What Tulloch has said is true in general; yet, it is also possible for similar ideas to develop in parallel streams of thought, even though not stemming from the same common source. This is especially possible when the source is the school of experience which gives no man a copyright. Nonetheless, the historian of ideas can analyze the arguments of the outstanding writers in sequence, following the chronological-logical progression of the debate, provided he observes the caution of G. N. Clark that "at the same time it must be remembered that this debate, like others, had an audience, that there were interruptions, asides, pieces of by-play, whispered hints which find no mention in the formal record."[2]

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[1]John Tulloch, Rational Theology in England, II, p. 21.

[2]G. N. Clark, The Seventeenth Century (2nd Edition; Oxford, 1960), pp. 209-210.

In a brief treatment of Taylor with reference to theological thought in the Twentieth Century, W. J. Brown admitted that the Baconian philosophy had obtained some footing in Cambridge when Taylor was a student, "but Taylor's works," he said, "bear no marks of it."[1] Brown is not alone in this opinion, for Bishop Heber, whose life of Taylor as revised by Eden still stands as the basic document, could say, "That he had read Bacon I can well believe; for with what work of contemporary genius was Jeremy Taylor likely to be unacquainted? But...I have not been able to discover a single allusion to those principles which Bacon first laid down, and on which alone the discovery of any new truth is possible." Furthermore, Heber says that Taylor's weapons for his dialectic warfare were taken from the ancient organon in use among the elder divines and schoolmen. "It is no disparagement to Bacon, nor is it inconsistent with the admiration which Taylor may well have felt for him, that he did not apply Bacon's discoveries to an use for which Bacon himself did not intend them," said Heber.[2] In the course of this present study it will be shown that Bishop Heber suffered from the limitations which even his breadth of learning must suffer when the subject becomes so all-inclusive, for the passage just quoted demonstrates a lack

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[1]W. J. Brown, Jeremy Taylor (London, 1925), p. 8.

[2]R. Heber, The Whole Works of the Right Reverend Jeremy Taylor, D.D., with a Life of the Author (Revised and corrected by the Rev. Charles Eden, 10 vols.; London, 1847-52), I, pp. xv-xvi. Hereafter referred to as Works.

of understanding of Bacon and a narrow view of Baconianism.

On the other hand, Baconian influences upon Taylor have been admitted by Archdeacon Bonney who in the first pages of his life of Taylor discusses the state of education at Cambridge when Taylor was a student, remarking of the advantage which Bacon had afforded and concluding: "And to this source may be traced many of the most brilliant ornaments and radical defects that are conspicuous in his [Taylor's] writings."[1] Nonetheless, in spite of this statement, tantalizing to the historian of ideas, Bonney fails to show just what in Taylor he attributes to Baconian influence. Thus the task is to show from direct and indirect evidence the places of affinity in the thought of Bacon and Taylor and to give reasons for feeling that any influence of the one upon the other exists.

First of all we must keep in mind the omnivorous nature of Taylor's reading and his insatiable curiosity or interest in what was going on in the whole realm of thought. The former may be attested by even the most cursory glance at the list of authors cited or alluded to by Taylor or by a noting of the allusions to the events of his day. The second is verified by his correspondence which often discussed matters of intellectual or literary moment. In a letter to Evelyn, after taking up residence in Ireland, Taylor asks,

> But, Sir, I pray say to me something concerning the state of learning; how is any art or science likely to improve? what good bookes

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[1]Bonney, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

> are lately publike? what learned men abroad or
> at home begin anew to fill the mouth of fame,
> in places of the dead Salmasius, Vossius, Mocelin,
> Sirmond, Rigaltius, Des Cartes, Galileo, Peiresk,
> Petavius, and the excellent persons of yesterday?
> I perceive here that there is a new sect rising
> in England, the Perfectionists:....[1]

With such a promise as offered in the foregoing, it would be one of the delights of Taylor scholars to peruse the books which were in his own library or to examine the personal papers for his reactions to the books he read. Unfortunately, the personal papers which remained in the possession of Taylor's descendants were lost and we may assume that his library gathered up to the time of the Civil War was lost during the sequestration of his living at Uppingham. During the War itself, his poverty seems to have precluded the accumulation of books of his own. We have indications that at this time he had access to the libraries of his patrons, Richard Vaughn, Earl of Carbery, and Edward, Earl of Conway. But it is impossible to learn of Taylor's interests from these contacts for we are frustrated by the loss of the Vaughn family papers and library in a fire and the destruction, also, of the Conway residence in Ireland.

Lacking such direct evidence, we postulate a connection between Bacon and Taylor on a congruity evidenced in other ways. Inasmuch as Taylor was certainly aware of contemporary trends in the intellectual world, Tulloch's generalization that Baconianism was of widespread influence in the second half of the seventeenth century lends some credence

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[1] Works, I, lxxxi.

to the assumption that Taylor imbibed some of Bacon's ideas. More recent Bacon scholars have heightened the possibility by showing that the 1640's and the 1650's were a period in which Baconian ideas were popularized. These years are coincident with the formative period in Taylor's life and with the most productive period of his literary life.[1]

Not only were Bacon's works themselves being made available in great quantity, but the evidences of the use of Bacon for inspiration and for reference becomes increasingly obvious in this period. Gibson notes such use of Bacon by Beck, Fuller, Grevill, James Harrington, Samuel Hartlib, Burton, Comenius, Culverwell, Hakewell, Wilkins, and

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[1]A recent work, R. W. Gibson's Francis Bacon, A Bibliography, provides proof of the resurgent interest in Bacon's thought in the period which coincides with the civil disturbances in England. The evidence which he gives shows that in the years 1640-41, more editions of Bacon's works were published than in the preceding fifteen years which followed his death. By the year 1642 the eighteenth English edition of the Essays had been published, the last of which was printed for R. Royston, Taylor's publisher. The popularity of the Essays in other languages had been great also, for there had been ten Italian editions by 1626 and four editions in French by 1622. Seven English editions of Certain Considerations touching ... the Church had been issued by 1642, with one edition re-issued twice. The Advancement of Learning was already available with editions in 1605, 1629, and an issue published at Oxford in 1633, besides a French edition in 1624. Bacon's other works had a degree of popularity also; as Gibson indicates, the De Augmente Scientiarum had been offered in eight Latin editions by 1662, in three French editions by 1640, and had been translated into English in 1640 in which year it had two re-issues. The Novum Organum had appeared in five Latin editions by 1660; while the De Sapienta Veterem had been published in six Latin editions by 1657 and in four English editions by 1658. The Nova Atlantis appeared at Utrecht in 1643 and at London in English in 1659.

Milton.[1]

From this it can be seen that not only were Bacon's works widely available, but that there was general interest in Bacon's ideas by the middle of the seventeenth century. Thus, by moving back some twenty years the time of Baconian resurgence, to a time coincident with Taylor's formative and productive period, credence is given to the hitherto unsupported statements that Taylor undoubtedly was acquainted with Bacon's ideas.

It still remains for us to show the degree of influence through an examination of Taylor's works, but there is another reason for believing that Taylor was not only acquainted with, but disposed to agreement with Baconian ideas. A survey of the persons with whom Taylor had contact, either as admitted influences or as his patrons, shows that many were known for their relationship with known Baconians and others were patrons of those who advocated Baconian projects. It is not unlikely that his association with these persons resulted in at least the acquiring of a knowledge of Baconian thought if not the opportunity to discuss and to accept them. Lancelot Andrewes was one of these persons. Taylor called him "that learned prelate of Winchester;"[2] refers to him as an authority whose testimony he considers "greater than all

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[1]R. W. Gibson, Francis Bacon, A Bibliography of His Works and of Baconiana to the Year 1750 (Oxford, 1950), pp. 240, 247, 250, 253, 263; and pp. 5-14 of a Supplement to the above work.

[2]Works, X, 259.

exceptions;"[1] and calls him "a wise prelate, a great and a good man, whose memory is precious and is had in honour."[2] Andrewes was a friend of Bacon, one of such intimacy as to have been invited to Bacon's house parties,[3] to have been consulted by Bacon about his Advancement of Learning, and to have received the manuscript of the Cogita et Visa, written in 1609. Furthermore, Bacon had dedicated his Advertisement touching a Holy War, written in 1622 and published in 1629, to Andrewes, saying, "This work, because I was ever an enemy to flattering dedications, I have dedicated to your lordship, in respect of our ancient and private acquaintance; and because amongst men of our time I hold you in special reverence. Your Lordship's loving friend, Fr. St. Albans."[4]

A second contact with Baconians is to be found in Taylor's first literary patron, Sir Christopher Hatton, a cousin to Archbishop Laud, Taylor's ecclesiastical patron. Hatton's residence was Kirby Hall, near Uppingham[5] where Taylor's first and only experience of a "normal" parish ministry took place. Hatton was one of the Royalist patrons of Samuel Hartlib, John Durie and Johannes Comenius; three

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[1] Works, V, 236.

[2] Works, VI, 165.

[3] Paul A. Welsby, Lancelot Andrewes, 1555-1626 (London, 1958), p. 50.

[4] Welsby, op. cit., pp. 226-27.

[5] The patron of the living was Juxon, Bishop of London, upon whom Laud had prevailed to obtain the living for his protege.

foreigners who sought to further Bacon's educational ideas, particularly through the establishment of a college of science.[1]

There are some interesting connections between Taylor and Bacon through the family of the second Viscount Conway who became Taylor's patron two years before the Restoration. Conway's physician was William Harvey who had been physician to Bacon; and Harvey's niece was married to Edward Conway's brother, Heneage. Conway's wife was Anne Finch, daughter of Heneage Finch who was a personal friend of Bacon. Anne Conway "was definitely a 'modern'", according to Marjorie Hope Nicholson, who edited her correspondence. Her letters to her father-in-law, Lord Conway, imply that "Copernicus found in her a staunch defender;" while Lord Conway was definitely an 'ancient',[2] and yet he "was an early member of the Royal Society" which was noted for its affinity for Baconianism. Thus, toward the end of his most productive period, we find Taylor in close contact with a coterie alert to the thought of the age and with definite Baconian associations. It is not likely that the books available in this household and the conversations in which a learned chaplain would have been included would have ignored the works and thought of a family friend which were experiencing a

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[1]Hugh Trevor-Roper, "Three Foreigners and the English Revolution," Encounter, Vol. xiv, No. 2, p. 10.

[2]Marjorie Hope Nicholson, Conway Letters, The Correspondence of Anne, Viscountess Conway, Henry More, and Their Friends, 1642-1684 (London, 1930), p. 17.

resurgence of general interest.

Another of Taylor's acquaintances with Baconian associations was William Petty, Surveyor in Ireland, through whose influence Taylor received favorable consideration in obtaining lands in Ireland. Petty, a disciple of S. Hartlib, wrote, "Advice of W. P. to Mr. Samuel Hartlib for the Advancement of Some Particular Parts of Learning", which was published in 1648. This work was written under the influence of Bacon's teaching, stating on page one, "To give an exact Definition...of Learning, or of the Advancement thereof, we shall not undertake (it being already so accurately done by the great Lord VERULAM)...." And again on page twenty-six of the treatise, "What we mean by this History may be known by the Lord VERULAM'S most excellent specimen thereof."[1]

A contact not heretofore noted by Taylor's biographers is with Sir Justinian Isham,[2] a Northamptonshire gentleman who, like Hatton, was a royalist supporter of the educational project promoted by Hartlib, Durie, and Comenius. In his correspondence with Brian Duppa, Bishop of Salisbury, who was also connected with the Conways by marriage, it is revealed that he gave financial assistance to Taylor in 1654[3] and that he was acquainted with Taylor's works before

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[1]Trevor-Roper, "Three Foreigners and the English Revolution," Encounter, Vol. xiv, No. 2, p. 15.

[2]Isham was connected distantly by marriage with the Conway family.

[3]Gyles Isham, ed., The Duppa Isham Correspondence, 1650-1660 (Norhants Record Society, 1955), p. 89.

that.[1] Duppa, in a letter of November 16, 1653, notes that he sends Isham a copy of Taylor's Real Presence which had "come to me warm from the press and hath no longer cool'd in my hands, than during the time wherin I reade it over." This was apparently an advance copy of the 1654 publication as appears from a letter to Sheldon in April of 1653.[2] In a note on page 89 Sir Gyles Isham, editor of the Duppa-Isham correspondence, says, "In the sale of books of the Lamport Library in 1907...a first edition of Taylor's Discourse of the Liberty of Prophesying was sold. It had the inscription: 'For Sir J. I. Bart, a member of the House of Commons at Weston.'"[3] Here again we see how Taylor's friends and patrons brought him into contact with Baconian thought; and we see how the Conway relation embraces Baconianism on every side.

Other small hints of such similar connections between Tyler and Baconianism may be found in Evelyn's diary notation of Taylor's meeting John Wilkins, another known Baconian, at Sayes Court with Robert Boyle as a fellow guest; or in the fact that George Rust, whom Henry More recommended to Taylor for the Deanery of Downe was not unknown to S. Hartlib. Heber quotes from a letter of Dr. John Worthington, Master of Jesus College, Cambridge, to Hartlib in 1661:

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[1]Isham, op. cit., p. 75.

[2]Tanner MSS., Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS. lii, 216.

[3]I am indebted to Professor Trevor-Roper for directing me to the Duppa-Isham Correspondence.

> Mr. Rust (whom Mr. Brereton knows, and you know him by his M.S.) is going over to Ireland, to be dean of Downe, being invited thither by Dr. Taylor, the bishop; and Mr. Marsh (sometime my pupil, and fellow of Caius Coll.) is there already, and made dean of Armagh. They are both excellent persons, and prefferred to these places by the care of the above-named bishop.[1]

Granted such connections could be dismissed as being inevitable amongst the literary society in which Taylor moved; it is still significant that, of the small number of people with whom we know Taylor to have had contact, so many were known Baconians.

These connections with Baconians or supporters of Baconians do not allow us, taken alone, to claim Baconian influence upon Taylor, but they give us encouragement for further investigation of Taylor's works and this is what we shall now proceed to do.

Before beginning this comparison of Bacon and Taylor, let us state two things: First, Bacon must be seen not as the renovator of science in any narrow definition of the word "science", but as concerned with the whole realm of knowledge which it is man's privilege to claim as a lawful field for the exercise of his rational faculties. This means that Bacon, himself, had much to say beyond the confines of "science" and that his method and ideas had their influence in all areas of intellectual endeavor. Secondly, Taylor, being an eclectic thinker, gathers the thoughts of others, digests them; and while revealing an affinity with

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[1] Works, I, cix.

the thoughts of others, he does not merely reiterate the words of those to whom he is indebted for the raw materials of his own productions. The same is true of Bacon. Lecky said that Bacon's ideas were not original with him, that he was able to devour and convert the thoughts of others and to systematize them and present them in a clear and simple manner to others.

On the Relations of Science and Religion

> Philosophy has always been wider than natural philosophy and more than the philosophy of science. All great philosophers have tried to provide an account not only of the natural order, but of man's place in nature. A theory of human knowledge and its limits must also carry implications about human purposes and human ends; and a theory of the natural order must suggest some answer to the problem of creation, and therefore carry some implications about the existence and the nature of God. It was in the seventeenth century that the modern conflict, or apparent conflict, between science and religion had its beginning.[1]

Among the things for which Francis Bacon has been most known is his separation of science and religion. Basil Willey described this dichotomy by saying that Bacon "is concerned to insist that Truth is twofold. There is truth of religion and truth of science; and these different kinds of truth must be kept separate. This position is the inevitable result of any attempt to combine nominalism in philosophy with acceptance of religious dogma, and in this respect Bacon belongs with Duns Scotus and Occam."[2] Taylor seems

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[1]Lecky, Rationalism in Europe, I, pp. 441-42.

[2]Basil Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background (Anchor Edition; New York, 1955), p. 35.

to speak to this point in the Ductor Dubitantium. Citing S. Austin, Taylor says, "...'if it be Truth, wheresoever it be found, the Christian knows it is his Lord's goods;' and therefore I have proved and adorned some truths with the wise sayings of philosophers and poets...."[1] Taylor admits a difference but will not allow an absolute separation. He reminds his readers that

> Whatsoever is true in one science, is true also in another, and when we have wisely speculated concerning the dimensions of bodies, their circumscriptions, the acts of sense, the certainty of their healthful perception, the commensuration of a place and a body, we must not esteem these to be unconcerning propositions, if ever we come to use them in divinity: and therefore we must not worship that which our senses tell us to be a thing below worship; nor believe that infinite which we see measured; nor esteem that greater than the heavens which I see and feel goes into my mouth. If philosophy gives it a skin, divinity does not flea it off: and truth cannot be contrary to truth; and God would not in nature teach us anything to misguide us in the regions of grace.[2]

Thus Taylor seems to extend the scholastic idea adopted by Bacon, that God is revealed in nature as well as divinity, that the study of nature serves to the glory of God. Yet, in The Great Exemplar, Taylor, discussing the answer which the Lord had given to Nicodemus, said, "This doctrine was not to be estimated by any proportions to natural principles or experiments of sense, but to the secrets of a new metaphysic and abstracted, separate speculation."[3]

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[1]Works, IX, xv. Taylor cites De doct. Christi, lib. ii, cap. 18.

[2]Works, IX, 54.

[3]Works, II, 308.

In several other places Taylor indicated the distinction he made between the things of the spirit and the things of nature, between the things of theology and of other disciplines. In Holy Living he had described the acts and offices of faith and the first point was, "To believe every thing God hath revealed to us and when once we are convinced that God hath spoken it, to make no further enquirey, but humbly to submit; ever remembering that there are some things which our understandings cannot fathom, nor search out their depth."[1] Later, in the Ductor Dubitantium, he said, "This heap of probable inducements is not of power as a mathematical and physical demonstration, which is in discourse as the sun is in the heaven, but it makes a milky and white path, visible enough to walk securely."[2] Again, in his second sermon on the "Whole Duty of the Clergy", Taylor compared the experiments of philosophy and those of religion saying the former "are rude at first, and the observations weak, and the principles unproved ... but in Christian religion they that were first were best, because God and not man was the teacher;..."[3] Finally, in the Via Intelligentia, Taylor indicated that not only was the source different, but the faculty of man which apprehends spiritual learning is different from that which learns the things of science--"It is not the wit of the man, but the spirit of the man;

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[1]Works, III, 145.

[2]Works, IX, 154.

[3]Works, VIII, 538.

not so much his head as his heart, that learns the divine philosophy."[1]

This sounds more and more similar to Bacon's famous dictum that the more absurd the article of belief the greater glory to God, which has been interpreted by some as the expression of Bacon's "true" atheism, by others as the indication that religion is not rational. This brings us, then, to an examination of the concept of reason and its role as held by Bacon and Taylor.

On Reason

> But in the discourses of conscience, whatsoever is right reason, though taken from any faculty or science, is also of use and efficacy, because whatever can guide the actions or discourses, or be the business or the conduct of any man, does belong to conscience and its measures; and what is true in any science is true in conscience.[2]

In Holy Living, Taylor presents us with an empirical foundation for the definition of reason during a discussion of "The Contingencies and Treating Our Dead". He points out that men live the life of sense a long time before they use their reason, that they must furnish their heads with experiment and notices of many things before they can come to use their reason. And then all their knowledge is but remembrance, "and he is the wisest man that remembers most, and joins these remembrances together to the best purposes

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[1]Works, VIII, 375.

[2]Works, IX, xv.

[3]Works, III, 454.

of discourse." Furthermore, this same reason is used in all disciplines though it may operate according to principles peculiar to the particular discipline.

> Now in all this, here is no difference in my reason, save that as it does not prove a geometrical proposition by moral philosophy, so neither does it prove a revelation by a natural argument, but into one and the other it enters by principles proper to the inquisition; and faith and reason are not opposed at all. Faith and natural reason are several things, and arithmetical and moral reasons are as differing, but it is reason that carries me to objects of faith, and faith is my reason so disposed, so used, so instructed.[1]

Reason, for Francis Bacon, is a faculty of the mind which he proposed should methodically arrive at axioms[2] from observed or known facts, or the deduction of axioms from accepted principles.[3] The method does not involve any supernatural endowment. The method is suitable and fit to be used upon any facts and for any science,[4] with limitations placed upon it when used with regard to divinity--a two-fold allowance or two-fold limitation of it.[5] It is Bacon's contention that there is a deficiency in this area of knowledge due to the failure to establish the proper

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[1]Works, Ductor Dubitantium, IX, 61.

[2]Bacon used the Latin axiomata here which would be more correctly translated as "proposition;" cf. W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, II, 600.

[3]I.e., intermediate propositions duly and orderly formed from particulars. Bacon called for systematic generalizations until the most general was reached. Vide, New Organon and Related Writings (Liberal Arts Press, New York, 1960), Aphorisms-Book I, XIX.

[4]New Organon, Aphorisms-Book I, CXXVII.

[5]The Advancement of Learning (Everyman Edition; London,

limitations of the use of reason in religion when dealing with the data of revelation.[1] Yet Bacon also suggested that the true logic ought to enter the several provinces of science armed with a higher authority than belongs to the principles of those sciences themselves, and ought to call those putative (reported) principles to account until they are fully established. Now, Bacon is stating this in opposition to the practice of logicians to borrow the principles of each science from the science itself (which practice Taylor accepted). In essence, Bacon established a degree of agnosticism or skepticism in regard to all branches of knowledge, but judiciously excepted religion. We might ask if this was his strategy since he was presenting an apology for science and attempting to restore science from the effects imputed to it by classical interpretations of the Fall. On the other hand, Taylor, writing more than a generation later, did not need to make such reservations, but by postulating a definition of reason as infused by the Holy Spirit and designating it Right Reason, was able to include or utilize reason more fully in the science of religion. In this, Taylor has definite affinity with the thought of contemporaries such as Chillingworth, Hales, and Boyle.

In order to clear the way for the implementation of his new method of investigating, understanding, and domi-

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1915), pp. 210, 211.

[1]Ibid., p. 212.

nating nature, Bacon needed to free the mind of man from the fetters of all theological-philosophical preconceptions. To do this, Bacon distinguished three "kingdoms" to which man belonged: that of God, of politics, and of nature. To acquire understanding of matters relegated to the first two "kingdoms" required supernatural assistance. But knowledge of the "kingdom" of nature could be obtained through the exercise of human faculties alone, by the use of human reason. Thus, to enable man to investigate nature, through the apprehension of brute facts, Bacon had restricted the competence of human reason to the realm of nature. Then he could apply his own method for the utilization of this human faculty for ratiocination.

> There are and can be only two ways of searching into and discovering truth. The one flies from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms, and from these principles, the truth of which it takes for settled and immovable, proceeds to judgment and to discovery of middle axioms. And this way is now in fashion. The other derives axioms from the senses and particulars, rising by a gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last of all. This is the true way, but is yet untried.[1]

Having articulated his method and having restricted the area of competence for human reason alone, Bacon, in line with his assertion that there are two kinds of truth, could say that while we must try to understand revelation, we should expect to find that for the most part revelation would be disagreeable to our understanding. Yet, he could

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[1]*New Organon*, Aphorisms-Book I, XIX.

not dispose of revelation by simply relegating it to the realm of the irrational. So he called for a further delineation of the limits of reason in matters of the spirit.

Taylor rejects Bacon's opinion that revelation may be against reason by equating reason with the eternal law of God.

> ...to profess an article against our reason is immediately against our conscience; for reason and conscience dwell under the same roof, and eat the same portions of meat, and drink the same chalice. The authority of scripture is superinduced, but right reason is the eternal word of God; "the kingdom of God" that is "within us"; and the best portions of scripture, even the law of Jesus Christ, which in moral things is the eternal law of nature, is written in our hearts, is reason, and that wisdom to which we cannot choose but assent; and therefore in whatsoever he goes against his reason he must needs go against his conscience, because he goes against that by which he supposes God did intend to govern him, reason not having been placed in us as a snare and a temptation, but as a light and a star to lead us by day and night.[1]

Contemporaries of Taylor also had been challenged by the need to include religion in the realm of the rational. Robert Boyle, writing in the Christian Virtuoso, analyzed the apparent contradictions between reason and revelation and indicated that they were due to the limitations of the human intellect. That is, Boyle's solution to the problem was to make clear why revelation cannot be included in the province of human intellect alone:--namely, that it is not acquired by sense experience alone. Therefore, he set out three definitions of "reason", the third of which is the

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[1]Works, IX, 69.

faculty of the mind managing a system of ideas and propositions furnished with the noble instrument of revelation. For Boyle,

> Reason in itself is the same in speculations of all kinds. Acting organically through an instrument, reason is more limited in respect to some objects than to others. It needs special sets of notions to deal with different objects. Right reason is reason fully informed or at least as fully informed as is necessary to pass a sound judgment on the thing in question. Right reason, then, has a broader extent than philosophy, which is reason informed only by natural light. Reason informed by natural light is not competent to refute reason enlightened by revelation.[1]

In essence, Boyle insisted that "while human reason can and must examine the credentials of revelation, it is simply incompetent to judge the revelations themselves."[2] This conclusion parallels that of Bacon, as we shall see later.

William Chillingworth also was concerned to define reason and in the "preface to the author of Charity Maintained with an Answer to his direction to N. N.", Chillingworth defined right reason as that which is "grounded on Divine revelation, and common notions written by God in the hearts of all men, and deducing, according to the never-failing rules of logic, consequent deductions from them;..."[3]

It is quite possible that Bacon leaned toward this concept of a higher reasoning for in the Advancement of

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[1]Richard S. Westfall, Science and Religion in Seventeenth-Century England (New Haven, 1958), p. 172.

[2]Ibid., p. 174.

[3]William Chillingworth, The Religion of Protestants a Safe Way to Salvation (Oxford, 1638), Vol. I, p. 14.

Learning he said, "So as we ought not to attempt to draw down or submit the mysteries of God to our reason; but contrariwise to raise and advance our reason to the divine truth."[1] This was Taylor's approach to the matter, also. In the sermon, Via Intelligentia, Taylor asserted that the Spirit in the soul of man gives life to the word of God, and then went on to say, "The Spirit of God makes us 'wise unto salvation'; it does not spend its holy influence in disguises and convulsions of the understanding: God's Spirit does not destroy reason, but heightens it;..."[2]

John Hales of Eton uttered similar thoughts while discussing the Holy Spirit as "that in us which is opposed against the flesh, and which denominates us spiritual men...."[3] He said that he contended for the Spirit in this sense "and this is nothing but reason illuminated by revelation out of the written word."

Bacon called for a delineation of the limits of reason in matters spiritual in the following manner:

> ...I note this deficiency, that there hath not been to my understanding, sufficiently inquired and handled the true limits and use of reason in spiritual things, as a kind of divine dialectic: which for that it is not done, it seemeth to me a thing usual, by pretext of true conceiving that which is revealed, to search and mine into that which is not revealed; and by pretext of enucleating inferences and con-

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[1] Advancement of Learning, p. 89.

[2] Works, VIII, 376.

[3] John Tulloch, Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in the Seventeenth Century (2 Vols; Edinburgh, 1872), p. 241.

> tradictories, to examine that which is positive: the one sort falling into the error of Nicodemus, demanding to have things made more sensible than it pleaseth God to reveal them,...the other into the error of the disciples, which were scandalized at a show of contradiction....[1]

Proceeding further, in order to guide men in the study of divinity--that is, to point out the areas in which adequate knowledge was not available--Bacon noted that divinity could be divided into two principal parts, that concerned with matter revealed and that concerned with the nature of that revelation. The latter he divided into three branches, the limits of the information, and the acquiring or obtaining of the information. The limits involved such questions as to what extent particular persons continued to be inspired, to what extent the Church is inspired, and what limits are placed upon reason.[2] Bacon had already indicated that the latitude for the use of human reason in spiritual things was very great and general, and of two sorts:[3] First, in the "conception and apprehension of the mysteries of God to us revealed;" and secondly, "in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction thereupon." In the former we may only illustrate or attempt to understand whereas in the latter we may use argument. Says Bacon,

> In the former, we see God vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity, in the expressing of his mysteries in sort as may be sensible unto us; and doth graft his revelations and holy

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[1] Advancement of Learning, p. 212.

[2] Ibid., p. 213.

[3] Ibid., pp. 210-11.

> doctrine upon the notions of our reason, and applieth his inspirations to open our understanding, as the form of the key to the ward of the lock: for the latter, there is allowed us a use of reason and argument, secondary and respective, although not original and absolute. For after the articles and principles of religion are placed and exempted from examination of reason, it is then permitted unto us to make derivations and inferences from and according to the analogy of them, for our better direction.[1]

In Taylor we have again a congruity of thought--understood as attempting to carry out Bacon's suggestions just as he did by providing a book to guide men in the resolution of cases of conscience.[2] In his second sermon on "The Whole Duty of the Clergy", Taylor said,

> Although you are to teach our people nothing but what is the word of God; yet by the word I understand all that God spake expressly, and all that by certain consequences can be deduced from it ... right reason is so far from being an exile from the enquiries of religion, that it is the great assurance of many propositions of faith; and we have seen the faith of men strangely alter; every rational truth supposing its principles, being eternal and unchangeable. All that is to be done here is to see that you argue well, that your deduction be evident, that your reason be right: for scripture is to our understandings as the grace of God to our wills; and we may as well choose the things of God without our wills, and delight in them without love, as understand the scripture or make use of them without reason.
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> But how shall our reason be guided?.... To this I answer, in making deductions, the first great measure to direct our reason and our enquiries is the analogy of faith: that is, let the fundamentals of the faith be your cynosura, your great light to walk by; and whatever you derive from thence, let it be

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[1] Ibid., p. 211.

[2] Vide p. 42, infra.

agreeable to the principles from whence it come.[1]

Taylor goes on to remind his hearers of the rule of St. Paul that those who prophesy should do so according to the proportion of faith, which he interprets to mean:

> ...Let him teach nothing but what is revealed, or agreeable to the autopista, the "prime credibilities" of Christianity; that is, by the plain words of scripture let him expound the less plain, and the superstructure by the measures of the foundation, and doctrines be answerable to faith, and speculations relating to practice, and nothing taught as simply necessary to be believed, but what is evidently and plainly set down in the holy scriptures;... But then take this rule with you; do not pass from plainness to obscurity, nor from simple principles draw down crafty conclusions, nor from easiness pass into difficulty...: your principles are easy, your way plain, and the words of faith are open, and what naturally flows from thence will be as open....[2]

In the Ductor Dubitantium, Taylor stated:

> The reason of man is a right judge always when she is truly informed; but in many things she knows nothing but the face of the article:... Everything that is above our understanding is not therefore to be suspected or disbelieved, neither is any thing to be admitted that is against scripture, though it be agreeable to right reason, until all information is brought in by which the sentence is to be made.[3]

Taylor has wrestled with the same problem of the relation of faith and reason which Bacon attempted to resolve and for which Bacon called for the efforts of others. Bacon resolved the problem by saying that there are two truths, that faith may well be repugnant to reason. And

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[1] Works, VIII, 528-30.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Works, IX, 64-65.

yet, there are indications that Bacon leaned toward the idea that reason is lifted to a higher level in matters of faith. This latter idea was in line with the thought of Taylor and his contemporaries, Hales, Chillingworth, and Boyle. Taylor attempts to spell out the use of reason in religion, suggesting that the great guide in the use of reason be the fundamentals of the faith. Nonetheless, in the face of contradictions between faith and reason, Taylor also attempts to slip between the horns of the dilemma, saying that we must suspend our judgment in the event of apparent conflict.

Utilitarian Emphasis in Bacon and Taylor

"...If there was (in the seventeenth century) any outstanding intellectual revolution in process of enactment, it was a general transference of interest from metaphysics to physics, from the contemplation of Being to the observation of Becoming."[1]

As we have indicated previously, the influence of Baconian ideas was not always of a direct nature, but rather served to stimulate thought and interpretations in other disciplines. This is so with Bacon's concern for Becoming rather than with Being. Put another way, Bacon's concern for the utility or purposefulness of knowledge was not confined to the physical sciences. In the theological realm we can see this as a shift away from the question of "Who am I"? which finds its answer in the dogma of the Church, whether catholic or reformed. The answer directed one to

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[1]Basil Willey, Seventeenth Century Background, p. 15.

consider the ultimate state, to the end: "I am a sinner, either of the Elect or Damned," according to the Calvinist dogma; or "a sinner consigned to purgatory or to hell (in a state of grace or a state of sin)" according to the Roman Catholic sacramentarian approach. The shift was to the consideration of, "What am I becoming, and by what means?" The answers to these questions were the subject matter of Moral Theology and hence the increased emphasis on the provision of cases of conscience. Let us see the way in which this is manifested or expressed by Taylor, Bacon and others.

Taylor's experience, study and meditation led him to see the need for making good the deficiency of practical theological teaching which Bacon had so rightly pointed out. Thus Taylor publicly proclaimed the principles behind his endeavors as early as 1650, saying, "...I have chosen to serve the purposes of religion, by doing assistance to that part of theology which is wholly practical, that which makes us wiser, therefore because it makes us better."[1] And with few exceptions, he remained steadfast in this resolve.

A recent writer concerned with the place of meditation in Caroline thought said that it "is profoundly characteristic of Caroline piety,...that 'doing' and 'being' are insisted upon as resembling heat and fire, essentially inseparable:...."[2] His example of this is from Taylor's

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[1] Works, II, 2.

[2] H. R. McAdoo, The Structure of Caroline Moral Theology (London, 1949), p. 165.

Great Exemplar:

> From hence if a pious soul passes to affections of greater sublimity, and intimate and more immoderate, abstracted and immaterial love, it is well; only remember what the love of God requires of us, is an operative, material and communicative love; "If ye love me keep my commandments;" so that still a good life is the effect of the sublimest meditation.[1]

This is true with Bacon also, for the aim of all knowledge is the production of works for the promotion of human happiness and the relief of man's estate. In the Advancement of Learning, Bacon says,

> ...But men must know that in this theatre of man's life it is reserved only for God and angels to be lookers on: Neither could the life question ever have been received in the church...but upon this defense, that the monastical life is not simply contemplative, but performeth the duty either of incessant prayers and supplications, which hath been truly esteemed as an office in the church, or else of writing or taking instructions for writing concerning the law of God, as Moses did when he abode so long in the mount.[2]

This utilitarian emphasis comes out in Taylor in many places and throughout his literary career. It is found particularly in his devotional work, The Great Exemplar, but also in Holy Living, in Golden Grove, in the sermons and in the Liberty of Prophesying. Speaking of hope in Holy Living he said, "Let your hope be of things possible, safe, and useful."[3] In the Golden Grove he gave this admonition: "Suppose every day to be a day of business:

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[1]Works, II, 138.

[2]Advancement of Learning, p. 157.

[3]Works, III, 152.

for your whole life is a race, and a battle; a merchandise, and a journey."[1] By this time Taylor had experienced both battles and journeys but it would be interesting to know about his contact with business and merchandising.

Taylor's attitude toward unprofitable meditations comes out in the preface to the Great Exemplar, his meditative life of Christ. He speaks of those who study unprofitable notions saying that they are not so wise, but rather,

> He is truly wise, that knows best to promote the best end, that which he is bound to desire, and is happy if he obtains, and miserable if he misses; and that is the end of a happy eternity, which is obtained by the only means of living according to the purposes of God, and the prime intentions of nature:....[1]

Later in the work, Taylor again points up the practical aspects of meditation:

> But in all other things meditation is the instrument and conveyance; it produces constancy of purpose, despising of things below, inflamed desires of virtue, love of God, self-denial, humility of understanding, and universal correction of our life and manners.[2]

The concern for practical results and for the process of achieving them comes out even in a discussion of the duties of the tongue. God has given us a religion fitted to our condition and institutions;

> Therefore, when we are commanded to love God, by this love Christ understands obedience; when we are commanded to honour God, it is by singing and reciting His praises, and doing things which cause reputation and honour: and

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[1] Works, II, 35.

[2] Works, II, 143.

> even here, when we are commanded to speak that which is good, it is instanced in such things which are really profitable, practically useful.[1]

The same concern is evidenced in the preface to the Liberty of Prophesying where Taylor says,

> ...If men would a little turn the tables, and be as zealous for a good life and all the stricktest precepts of Christianity (which is a religion the most holy, most reasonable, and the most consumate that ever was taught to man), as they are for such propositions in which neither the life nor the ornament of christianity is concerned, we should find that as a consequent of this piety men would be as careful as they could to find out all truths, and the sense of all revelations, which may concern their duty; and where men were miserable and could not, yet others that lived good lives too would also be so charitable as not to add afflictions to this misery: and both of them are parts of good life.[2]

Later in the same work, Taylor claims that it is interest as well as the grounds of emolument which causes sects and heresies and in the following discussion he calls for the emphasis to be placed on the good life as against right belief, saying,

> I have instanced in the Roman religion [he] cited the faults of indulgences, masses for the dead, etc. , but I wish it may be considered also how far men's doctrines in other sects serve men's temporal ends; so far that it would not be unreasonable or unnecessary to attempt to cure some of their distemperatures or mispersuasions by the salutary precepts of sanctity and holy life. Sure enough, if it did not more concern their reputation and their lasting interest to be counted true believers rather than good livers, they would rather endeavor to live well than to be accounted of a right opinion in things

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[1] Sermons, Works, IV, 311.

[2] Works, V, 360.

beside the creed.[1]

In an interesting study of Taylor's rhetoric based upon his sermons, an analysis of the frequency of figures of thought as compared with the use of tropes and figures of diction substantiates our contentions that Taylor shared in this shift from concern with Being to the concern for Becoming, reflected often in utilitarianism directed to the here and now. The author points out in her conclusion that the figures of thought make up 48 per cent of the total of one hundred and eight ornaments per page. These devices being designed to set forth the idea clearly give evidence of Taylor's primary concern for presenting the truth to the mind in a manner in which it can be apprehended most fully. This was in line with the emphasis on idea rather than on ornament which affected the disintegration of the rhetorical period into short, logical sentences which took place during this century. In conclusion, Sister Antoine says, "Despite the utilitarian bias betrayed by the purposefullness of his ornament, Taylor remains an ornate preacher."[2]

Sister Antoine's findings are in line with the tendency noted by Thomas Wood in his study of English casuistical divinity in the period under consideration. Speaking of the seventeenth century casuistical writers--Anglican, separatist high churchman and Puritan--he says,

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[1] Works, V, 360.

[2] Sister M. Salome Antoine, The Rhetoric of Jeremy Taylor's Prose: Ornament of the Sunday Sermons (Washington, 1946), p. 224.

> Contrary to common practice, they write for the most part not in Latin, but in English; and even their Latin works were rapidly translated. For, as William Ames said, they believed that this was a subject "worthy to be followed with all care by all men" (De Conscientia, eius Jure et Casibus. Eng. trans., Address to the Reader); and they cherished the hope that their works would be welcomed not by the clergy alone, but also by all conscientious laymen who were able to read them.[1]

In the preface to the Ductor Dubitantium, Taylor echoed these sentiments, stating his purpose in these words:

> For I intend here to offer to the world a general instrument of moral theology, by the rules and measures of which the guides of souls may determine the particulars that shall be brought before them; and those who love to enquire may also find their duty so described, that unless their duties be complicated with laws, and civil customs, and secular interests, men that are wise may guide themselves in all their proportions of conscience;....[2]

Toward the end of his life, after he had been made Bishop, Taylor preached a sermon at Christ Church, Dublin, and succinctly stated his view of the practicableness of the Christian religion: "For once and for all; let us remember this, that christianity is the most profitable, the most useful, and the most bountiful institution in the whole world; and the best definition I can give of it is this, it is "the wisdom of God brought down among us to do good to men;"....[3]

Thus Bacon's concern for the utility and purposefulness

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[1]Thomas Wood, English Casuistical Divinity during the Seventeenth Century (London, 1952), p. xi.

[2]Works, IX, xix-xx.

[3]Works, VIII, 253.

of knowledge bore fruit in the thought and writings of Taylor. By his choice of subjects themselves, as well as by the emphasis and particular interpretation given, Taylor stressed the need for religious wisdom to issue in the living of a good life.

Taylor and the Baconian Method

> If you ask "What is truth?" you must not do as Pilate did, ask the question and go away from Him that only can give you an answer:...[1]

> What is truth said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer.[2]

It has been said that the main intellectual problem of the seventeenth century was the separation of the "true" from the "false".[3] Men were seeking a formula or method whereby they could find truth. This was so in the realm of religion where among Christians, men found a multiplication of divisions and sects with varied opinions of the truth, not only within Protestantism but within the Catholic fold. In the political realm the question was directed to the true nature of government; in the scientific, the question was concerned with what is true and what is false knowledge. Behind this lies the basic epistemological problem of how do we obtain knowledge and how do we test it? The first subject in the 1625 edition of Bacon's Essays was "Of Truth." In it Bacon said, "Truth, which onely doth judge

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[1]Jeremy Taylor, Via Intelligentia, Works, VIII, 368.

[2]Bacon, "Of Truth," Essays, p. 5.

[3]Willey, op. cit., p. 55.

it selfe, teacheth that the Inquirie of Truth, which is the Lovemaking, or Wooing of it; the knowledge of Truth, which is the Presence of it; and the Beleefe of Truth, which is the Enjoying of it; is the Soveraigne Good of humane Nature."[1] This is not something to be obtained in the hereafter, but

> It is Heaven upon Earth, to have a Mans Minde Move in Charitie, Rest in Providence, and Turne upon the Poles of Truth.[2]

Again, in the Advancement of Learning Bacon, speaking of the remedies which learning administers to the diseases of the mind, concludes by saying,

> Certain it is that Veritas and Bonitas differ but as the seal and the print: for Truth prints Goodness; and they be the clouds of error which descend in the storms of passions and perturbations.[3]

Bacon's desire for truth leads him to the conclusion that in the realm of science we must return to the material, to the facts; to the basic observations freed from the clouds of error which men have cast upon them.

Taylor calls for a return to the raw materials of knowledge also. Discussing the saying of Erasmus that he was confused by the reading of the commentaries on the Scriptures, Taylor says,

> For indeed the truths of God are best dressed in the plain culture and simplicity of the Spirit; but the truths that men commonly teach are like the reflections of a multiplying

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[1] Essays (World Classics Edition; Facsimile of 1625 Edition), p. 6.

[2] Advancement of Learning, p. 56.

[3] Ibid.

> glass: for one piece of good money you shall have forty that are fantastical; and it is forty to one if your finger hit upon the right. Men have wearied themselves in the dark, having been amused with false fires: and instead of going home have wandered all night "in untrodden, unsafe ways;" but have not found out what their soul desires. But therefore since we are so miserable, and are in error, and have wandered very far, we must do as wandering travelors used to do, go back just to that place from whence they wandered, and begin upon a new account. Let us go to truth itself, to Christ, and He will tell us an easy way of ending all our quarrels: for we shall find christianity to be the easiest and the hardest thing in the world: it is like a secret in arithmetic, infinitely hard till it be found out by a right operation, and then it is so plain, we wonder we did not understand it earlier.[1]

Here we see both Taylor's desire to get back to the basic matter of the Faith (as Bacon wanted for science) and we also are made aware of Taylor's use of his observations of nature and simple scientific (here arithmetic) experiences to illustrate the things of the spirit. But, the parallel is much greater, for Taylor goes on to say that Christ's way of ascertaining truth is "by doing the will of God." Once again we are brought to see the constant association with action. The shift from the contemplation of Being to the process of Becoming, of becoming Good.[2]

The affinity of the thoughts of these men on this matter of truth is brought out by comparing other statements from their writings. Taylor, in the same paragraph

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[1] Via Intelligentia, Works, VIII, 364.

[2] This has a marked affinity with modern pragmatism, which holds that all knowledge is "practical." cf. W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, II, p. 949.

in which he refers to Pilate's treatment of Truth, says, "Every man is a liar, and his understanding is weak, and his propositions uncertain, and his opinions trifling, and his contrivances imperfect, and neither truth nor peace come from man."[1] Bacon, in his essay, "Of Truth," discusses the difficulties and labors of seeking truth that bring men to favor lies, and points out that it is the natural love of the lie itself that gives falsehood the advantage.[2] In the Liberty of Prophesying, Taylor claimed that it was the "subtlety of the devil, so to temper truth and falsehood in the same person, that truth may lose much of its reputation by its mixture with error, and error may become more plausible by reason of its conjunction with truth."[3] Bacon, in his earlier essay, had made the same point in these words: "And that Mixture of Falsehood, is like Alloy in Coyne of Gold and Silver; which may make the Metall worke the better, but it embaseth it."[4] He continued, "For these winding, and crooked courses, are the Goings of the Serpent; which goeth basely upon the belly, and not upon the Feet."

Only the reading of Taylor with Bacon fresh in mind can reveal the affinity which the divine had with the renovator.

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[1] Works, VIII, 367.

[2] Essays, p. 7.

[3] Works, V, 502.

[4] "of Truth," Essays, p. 7.

If truth is to be obtained here and now in this world, if the emphasis is to be placed upon becoming Good, what is the method proposed, and is it of universal applicability? Bacon answers this query in the Novum Organon, saying,

> It may also be asked (in the way of doubt rather than objection) whether I speak of natural philosophy only, or whether I mean that the other sciences, logic, ethics, and politics, would be carried on by this method. Now I certainly mean what I have said to be understood of them all; and as the common logic, which governs by the syllogism, extends not only to natural but to all sciences, so does mine also, which proceeds by induction, embrace everything. For I form a history and a table of discovery for anger, fear, shame, and the like; for matters political; and again for the mental operations of memory, composition, and division, judgment, and the rest; not less than for heat and cold, or light, or vegetation, or the like. But nevertheless, since my method of interpretation, after the history has been prepared and duly arranged, regards not the working and discourses of the mind only (as the common logic does) but the nature of things also, I supply the mind such rules and guidance that it may in every case apply itself aptely to the nature of things. And therefore I deliver many and diverse precepts in the doctrine of interpretation, which in some measure modify the method of invention according to the quality and condition of the subject of the inquirey.[1]

From this statement by Bacon, himself, it is plain that he foresaw a renovation of all learning and it was his intention to provide a methodology which, with modification, could be utilized in any and all branches of learning. Particularly did Bacon mention the study of ethics. It was here that Taylor could utilize most closely Bacon's method as we shall demonstrate.

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[1] New Organon, Aphorisms-Book I, CXXVII.

In his brief work, Of Church Controversies, Bacon wrote,

> In doctrine of manners there is but a generality and repetition. The word, the bread of life, they toss up and down, they break it not: they draw not their directions down ad casus conscientiae; that a man may be warranted in his particular actions whether they be lawful or not; neither indeed are many of them able to do it, what through want of grounded knowledge, what through want of study and time. It is a compendious and easy thing to call for the observation of the sabbath day, or to speak against unlawful gain; but what actions and works may be done upon the sabbath, and what not; and what courses of gain are lawful, and in what cases: to set this down, and to clear the whole matter with good distinctions and decisions, is a matter of great knowledge and labour, and asketh much meditation and conversing in the Scriptures, and other helps which God hath provided and preserved for instructions.[1]

Again, in the Advancement of Learning, Bacon had written,

> I commend much the deducing of the law of God to cases of conscience; for that I take indeed to be a breaking, and not exhibiting whole of the bread of life. But that which quickeneth both these doctrines of faith and manners, is the elevation and consent of the heart; whereunto appertain books of exhortation, holy meditation, Christian resolution, and the like.[2]

It is most obvious to one merely reading over the titles of Taylor's works to realize the emphasis placed by him on "books of exhortations, holy meditation, Christian resolution, and the like." His great work, in his own opinion, was the ponderous Ductor Dubitantium or Cases of Conscience for which he prepared the way with the Unum Necessarium or Doctrine of Repentance. His Life of Christ

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[1]Francis Bacon, Works of (London, 1819), Vol., II, 520.

[2]Advancement of Learning, p. 220.

was a meditative work filled with exhortation to godly living, and his famous Holy Living and Holy Dying had this same purpose in mind. Here then is a meeting of the minds of Bacon and Taylor. But a greater affinity or congruity is evident when the reasons for which Taylor wrote and the place he gave to moral casuistry in his thought are considered.

In the preface to the Ductor Dubitantium,[1] Taylor calls attention to the lack of books of casuistical divinity, meaning works by others than Roman Catholics, and says, "But since there were not found many able to do this but such which had other cures to attend..."--there was lack of ability and lack of time. More important there was a deficiency of grounded knowledge for Taylor adds, "It is not to be denied but the careless and needless neglect of receiving private confessions hath been too great a cause of our not providing materials apt for so pious and useful administration." This is why Gosse calls the Ductor Dubitantium "The result of twenty years of cases noted in a succession of pocket-books,..."[2]

Of the high place which Taylor gives to casuistical divinity, able testimony is presented further along in the preface to the Ductor Dubitantium. There Taylor says that he considers nothing

> More requisite than that we should all

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[1]Works, IX, v.

[2]Edmund Gosse, Jeremy Taylor (London, 1904), p. 164.

> be instructed, and thoroughly prepared to every good work; that we should have a conscience void of offence both towards God and towards man; that we should be able to separate the vile from the precious, and know what to choose and what to avoid; that we may have our senses exercised to discern between good and evil, that we may not call good evil, or evil good. For since obedience is the love of God, and to do well is the life of religion, and the end of faith is the death of sin and the life of righteousness; nothing is more necessary than that we be rightly informed in all moral notices: because in these things an error leads on to evil actions, to the choice of sin and the express displeasure of God; otherwise than it happens in speculation and ineffective notices and school-questions.[1]

Having established, or at least having asserted, the importance of casuistical divinity, Taylor quickly reviewed the lack of adequate books written by Protestants and pointed up the unsuitableness of Roman works in order to "make it evident that it was necessary that cases of conscience should be written over anew, and established upon better principles, and proceed in more sober and satisfying methods:..."[2]

Taylor found that when he began to prepare his cases of conscience it was necessary to establish these better principles and this called forth his Unum Necessarium, for he said,

> But by that time I had made some progression in the first preparatory discourse to the work, I found that a great part of that learning was supported by principles very weak and very false; and that it was in vain to dispute concerning a single case whether it were lawful or no, when

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[1] Works, IX, v.

[2] Ibid.

> by the general discoursings of men it might be permitted to live in states of sin without danger or reproof, as to the final event of souls. I thought it therefore necessary by way of address and preparation to the publication of the particulars, that it should appear necessary for a man to live a holy life;...[1]

Bacon had already voiced similar thoughts in the Proem to The Great Instauration. It was his desire to restore "that commerce between the mind of man and that nature of things" to its "perfect and original condition, or if that may not be, yet reduced to a better condition than that in which it now is." He realized that the errors which prevailed would continue forever since the entire fabric of human reason employed in the inquisition of nature was faulty, because the primary notions of things which the mind has are false, confused and over hastily abstracted.[2] "There was but one course left ... to try the whole thing anew upon a better plan and to commence a total reconstruction of sciences, arts and all human knowledge , raised upon the proper foundations."[3]

Although he disclaimed any special knowledge of theology, Bacon did claim that his observations were applicable in the field of religion just as truly as they applied in the field of science. Since the advance of religion had been impeded by bigotry and authority, an attitude of dispassionate search must prevail in order for man to gain

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[1] Works, VII, 9.

[2] The New Organon and Related Writings (Library of Liberal Arts), p. 3.

[3] Ibid., p. 4.

spiritual ennoblement. Whether in science or religion, the thinker who views the problem with detachment arrives at a more valid conclusion than one who is engrossed in the problem.[1]

Bacon claimed that he established the lawful marriage of the empirical with the rational faculties.[2] The uniting of these faculties is reflected in the dedication to the Unum Necessarium where Taylor sets out his manner of approach to the task.

> I hope I have received many of the mercies of a repenting sinner, and I have felt the turnings and varieties of spiritual intercourse; and I have observed the advantages in ministering to others, and am most confident that the greatest benefits of our office may with best effect be communicated to souls in personal and particular ministrations. In the following book I have given advices, and have asserted many truths in order to this: I have endeavored to break in pieces almost all those propositions upon the confidence of which men have been negligent of severe and strict living; I have cancelled some false grounds upon which many answers in moral theology used to be made to enquiries in cases of conscience; I have according to my weak ability described all the necessities and great inducements of a holy life; and have endeavored to do it so plainly that it may be useful to every man, and so inoffensively that it may hurt no man.[3]

One might notice the significant words here: "I have felt,"

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[1] "Certain considerations touching the better pacification and edification of the Church of England," Works (Edited by J. Spedding, R. Ellis, and D. D. Heath; London, 1857), X, 103. Cited in W. K. Jordan, The Development of Religious Toleration in England, 4 Vols. (London, 1932-40), I, 459.

[2] "The Great Instauration," New Organon, p. 14.

[3] Works, VII, 17.

"I have often observed," "described," "plainly," and "useful." The comparative reading of the two men will show that the use of these words is indicative of a similarity of intellectual process.

In a treatment of Thomas Fuller's Holy and Profane States, Walter Houghton asks, "What were the 'sleeping images', derived not merely from his reading, but also from his very existence in the world of the middle of the seventeenth century, which led him to conceive and formulate this 'general drift and main scope'?"[1] A reading of Taylor followed by a reading of Bacon gives us an indication of the extent to which Baconianism, absorbed from his reading and from the world about him, had permeated the thought of Taylor.

This opinion that Bacon's method was applicable to other fields of study is held by other students of the seventeenth century. C. D. Broad postulates the application of Bacon's method to the investigation of psychology and politics.[2] Basil Willey sees the application of it within the spiritual sphere. Speaking of the rational tradition of the Cambridge Platonists, Willey notes that their interpretation of the gospel purpose of salvation was conceived as a this-worldly goal which Willey expressed

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[1]Walter E. Houghton, Jr., The Formation of Thomas Fuller's Holy and Profane States (Cambridge, Mass., 1938), p. 37.

[2]C. D. Broad, The Philosophy of Francis Bacon (Cambridge, 1926), p. 59.

as "to be 'saved" is to be 'good.'" He then says,

> This teaching may be said to represent the application within the spiritual sphere of Bacon's scientific method. The purpose of science is to know the real world and master it, but for centuries men have wasted their powers in vain speculations. The purpose of religion is to produce men of godlike temper and lives ('real effects'), but for centuries they have been wrangling over creeds and forms, and never so hotly as since the so-called Reformation.[1]

Willey concludes by saying that the Cambridge Platonists "reject no article of the Faith, but they shift the emphasis of exhortation, affirming values where orthodoxy affirmed facts." Taylor shares this view of the application as evidenced by the use he makes of the words of Fisher of Rochester. In the preface of the Ductor Dubitantium, Taylor quotes Fisher:

> "But when men did strive to become learned, they did not care so much to become good; they then were taught to dispute rather than to live." To this purpose I understand that excellent saying of Solomon, "Of making many books there is no end, and much study is a weariness of the flesh. Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter. Fear God and keep His commandments; for this is the whole duty of man." Meaning, that books which serve to any other purpose are a laborious vanity, consumptive of our time and health to no purpose; nothing else being to any purpose but such things as teach us to fear God, and how to keep His commandments. All books, all learning which ministers to this end, partakes of the goodness of the end; but that which promotes it is not to be regarded:....[2]

Taylor's purpose in writing this book was to divert the attention of Christian people from theological controversy

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[1]Willey, p. 143.

[2]Works, IX, xiii.

to that branch of religion which is wholly practical; that which makes us wiser therefore because it makes us better.[1]

In the dedication to the Liberty of Prophesying, Taylor said, "But if we consider that sects are made and opinions are called heresies, upon interest and the grounds of emolument, we shall see that a good life would cure much of this mischief."[2] In his devotional work Taylor also reveals the importance he gives to this life both by the title, Holy Living, and by saying that of all the signs of faith (of which he lists several), "St. James's sign is the best, 'Shew me thy faith by thy works.'" Again, in his Life of Christ, Taylor says his purpose is "withdrawing the thoughts of men from controverted and less important doctrines to the great and necessary rallying points of Christianity, and those duties and charities on which all men are agreed, but which all men forget so easily."[3] In this preface he lays down "the exact conformity of Christianity with right reason and natural instinct--its fitness for the present wants, as well as the future prospects of man," says Heber.[4] Thus Taylor aligns himself with the Baconian principle of turning men's thought from vain speculations to consideration of concrete results in the here and now. It would be well to remind ourselves that

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[1]Brown, p. 138.

[2]Works, V, 361.

[3]Works, II, 2.

[4]Works, I, cxxviii.

Bacon did not produce Baconians who took over his whole system, but rather, as Herbert Butterfield says, he "stimulated people in a piecemeal way."[1]

Stuart Hampshire says, "Perhaps Bacon's most profound observation was that the scientist must recognize the superior power of negative instances."[2] This was propounded by Bacon in Aphorism 46, Book I, of the New Organon: "...It is the peculiar and perpetual error of human intellect to be more moved and excited by affirmatives than by negatives; whereas it ought properly to hold itself indifferently disposed towards both alike. Indeed in the establishment of any true axiom, the negative instance is the more forcible of the two." Taylor picked up this point of view and applied it in the realm of reasoning about matters of the spirit. In The Worthy Communicant, he said, "Whatsoever is against right reason, that no faith can oblige us to believe. For although reason is not the positive and affirmative measures of our faith, and God can do more than we can understand, and our faith ought to be larger than our reason, and take something into her heart that reason can never take into her eye; yet in all our creed there can be nothing against reason. If true reason justly contradicts any article, it is not 'of the household of faith.'"[3]

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[1]Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science (New York, 1960), p. 103.

[2]Stuart Hampshire, The Age of Reason (New York, 1956), p. 22.

[3]Works, VIII, 106.

Taylor expresses this point more succinctly in the Ductor Dubitantium, saying, "Although right reason is not the positive and affirmative measure of any article, yet it is the negative measure of every one; so that, whatsoever is contradictory to right reason, is at no hand to be admitted as a mystery of faith, and this is certain upon an infinite account."[1]

We can see an affinity if we compare not only certain specific points but the attitude with which the work is undertaken. Both men point to the miserable state of the subject of their studies; both men establish principles upon which to evaluate the raw materials of their respective subjects; both men, emphasizing the need for observation, illustrate the application of their principles to the attainment of the desired knowledge. Furthermore, both men are concerned to make their efforts available to all men that all men may enter into the study; and finally, both are concerned that the results shall be of value to mankind.

Taylor's Use of the Empirical Method

Though Bacon was not the first to employ the empirical approach to science, he was the great apologist and advocate of the empirical method whereby the trend[2] of the British school of philosophers was determined. It had

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[1] Works, IX, 66.

[2] This trend has persisted, in striking contrast to Continental intellectual history, for more than three centuries.

been objected that science led men to atheism through its concentration on second causes. Bacon believed that, though it is true science does study second causes, God works in Nature only through second causes. Therefore, Bacon pointed out that though natural philosophy can teach us nothing directly of God, the study of it leads us inevitably to Him in the end.[1] Bacon argues "that...God has revealed Himself to man by means of two scriptures; first, of course through the written word, but also secondly, through his handiwork."[2] We find these thoughts echoed in Taylor in a section of one of his sermons for the summer half of the year:

> For if God is glorified in the sun and moon, in the fabric of the honeycombs, in the discipline of the bees, in the economy of pismires, in the little houses of birds, in the curiosity of an eye, God being pleased to delight in those little images and reflexes of Himself from those pretty mirrors, which, like a crevice in a wall, through a narrow perspective transmit the species of a vast excellency: much rather shall God be pleased to behold Himself in the glasses of our obedience, in the emissions of our will and understanding; these being rational and apt instruments to express Him, far better than the natural, as being nearer communication of Himself.
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> But I shall no longer discourse of the philosophy of this expression:....[3]

In the preface to his Life of Christ, Taylor discusses those who study unprofitable notions and yet are not really wise. He quotes Aristotle to the effect that they are foolish who exert all their efforts upon the study of the

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[1]Willey, p. 37.

[2]Willey, p. 42.

[3]"The Invalidity of a Late Death-Bed Repentance," Works, IV, 382.

wonders of nature, the subtleties of metaphysics and mathematics. Taylor asserts that the truly wise man is the one who promotes the best end--a happy eternity, which is obtained only by living according to God's purposes and "the prime intentions of nature." There is no opposition between natural and prime reason and Christianity for they are all one now. Furthermore, though he shifts the emphasis, Taylor does not reject the empirical method, for he concludes this passage by saying, "But then I shall only observe, that this part of wisdom, and the excellency of its secret and deep reason, is not to be discerned but by experience; the propositions of this philosophy being (as in many others) empirical, and best found out by observations of real and material events."[1]

Taylor's awareness of what was being done in the realm of science and his acceptance of the Baconian apology is revealed also in his discussion of confirmation:

> I will not be so curious as to enter into a discourse of the philosophy of this; but I shall say that they who are curious in the secrets of nature, and observe external signatures in stones, plants, fruits, and shells, of which naturalists make many observations and observe strange effects, and the more internal signatures in minerals and living bodies of which chemists discourse strange secrets, may easily, if they please, consider that it is infinitely credible that in higher essences, even in spirits, there may be signatures proportionable, wrought more immediately and to greater purposes by a divine hand. I only point at this, and so pass it over, as

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[1] Works, II, 35.

(it may be) not fit for every man's consideration.[1] Bacon also uses this image of the "signature" in his Aphorisms: "There is a great difference between the Idols of the human mind and the Ideas of the divine. That is to say, between certain empty dogmas, and the true signatures and marks set upon the works of creation as they are found in nature."[2]

The attitudes implicit in the empirical method can be extended into areas of thought other than science as we have pointed out when considering other Baconian ideas. For example, to the empiricist things must be considered as they are, not as one thinks they should be or as they would conform to preconceived or logical patterns. This is reflected by Taylor in the Liberty of Prophesying when he sets forth some of the bases of his argument as a refutation of the charge of encouraging variety of sects and contradicting opinions. On the contrary, Taylor says his discourse "supposes them already in being: and therefore since there are and ever were and ever will be variety of opinions because there is variety of human understandings and uncertainty in things, no man would be too forward in determining all questions, nor so forward in prescribing to others, nor invade that liberty which God hath left us entire, by propounding many things obscurely, and be exempting our souls and understandings from all power

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[1] Works, V, 659.

[2] New Organon, Aphorisms-Book I, XXII.

externally compulsory."[1]

Bacon had described his application of his method in words which have a great deal of similarity:

> I,...dwelling purely and constantly among the facts of nature, withdraw my intellect from them no further than may suffice to let the images and rays of natural objects meet in a point...; whence it follows that the strength and excellence of the wit has but little to do in the matter. And the same humility which I use in inventing I employ likewise in teaching. For I do not endeavor either by triumphs of confutation, or pleadings of antiquity, or assumption of authority, or even by the veil of obscurity, to invest these inventions of mine with any majesty; which might easily be done by one who sought to give luster to his own name rather than light to other men's minds.[2]

Another indication of the way in which the Baconian empirical attitude permeated the mind of Taylor is seen in one of the Divine's most noted literary phrases, "But so have I seen," with which he introduces illustrations of points in his discourses. One example of this will suffice: "But so have I seen a crowd of disordered people rush violently and in heaps, till their utmost border was restrained by a wall, or had spent the fury of the first fluctuation and watery progress, and by and by it returned to the contrary with the same earnestness; and only because it was violent and ungoverned."[3] This was not the voice of a mere theorist, but the words of one who spoke from

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[1] Works, V, 347.

[2] The Great Instauration, in the New Organon and Related Writings, pp. 13-14.

[3] Works, III, 449.

experience, from the facts of life. And this was one of the reasons his writings found such prominence in the homes of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries.

The Use of History

The facts of the present were not the only ones which could teach the discerning mind. History was considered by Bacon to be one of the great teachers of knowledge. In a discussion of the affections of man's nature Bacon said,

> But the poets and writers of histories are the best doctors of this knowledge; where we may find painted forth with great life, how affections are kindled and incited; and how pacified and restrained; and how again constrained from act and further degree; and how they disclose themselves; and how they work; how they vary; how they gather and fortify; and how they are inwrapped one within the other; and how they do fight and encounter one with another; and other the like particularities: amongst the which this last is of special use in moral and civil matters:....[1]

In a section of the preface to the Great Exemplar, Taylor contrasts the benefits from the Greek and Roman poets and historians and philosophers with the evils from the latter schoolmen. In conclusion he says, "And from hence I hope that they may the rather be invited to love and consider the rare documents of Christianity, which certainly is the great treasure house of those excellent, moral and perfective discourses, which with much pains and great pleasure, we find respersed and thinly scattered in all the Greek and Roman poets, historians, and philos-

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[1] Advancement of Learning, p. 172.

ophers."[1]

Taylor reflects Bacon's attitudes toward history in other ways also. One of the most striking is in the idea of modern times being the true ancient days of the world.[2] Bacon expresses this both in The Advancement of Learning and in the Novum Organon. In the former it is briefly stated as follows:

> Antiquity deserveth reverence, that men should make a stand thereupon and discover what is the best way; but when the discovery is well taken, then to make a progression. And to speak truly, Antiquitas saeculi juventus mundi. These times are the ancient and not those which we account ancient ordine retrogrado, by a computation backward from ourselves.[2]

In the latter, the Novum Organon, Bacon spells this out in more detail saying that as we look for greater knowledge of human things in those whom we consider to be of riper judgment, because of experience, so we ought of our own age in which we live, inasmuch as it is the more advanced age of the world and "stored and stocked with infinite experiments and observations."[3] In connection with this, Bacon discusses specifically the question of authority, saying that it is foolish to grant so much to authors and yet so little to time who is the author of all authority.

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[1]It has been called to my attention that this viewpoint appeared, vividly, in John of Salisbury (circa 1115-1180). Since Taylor nowhere refers to John of Salisbury, however, this fact does not effect the relationship of Taylor to Bacon.

[2]Advancement of Learning, p. 31.

[3]New Organon (Lib. Liberal Arts Edition), p. 81.

"it is no wonder, therefore, if those enchantments of antiquity and authority and consent have so bound up men's powers," says Bacon.[1]

In Taylor we find the same conjunction of a discussion of the subject of authority and this new interpretation of the world's time. Rule Ten of the Ductor Dubitantium is entitled, "In following the authority of men, no rule can be antecedently given for the choice of the persons, but the choice is wholly to be conducted by prudence, and according to the subject matter." Section one which follows is: "Ancient writers are more venerable, modern writers are more knowing. They might be better witnesses, but these are better judges.... They lived in the infancy of christianity, and we in the older ages; they practiced more and knew less, we know more and practice less; passion is for younger years, and for beginning of things, wisdom is by experience, and age and progression."[2]

Bacon had a high appreciation of the use of history for examples. In The Advancement of Learning, he stated it this way:

> ...The form of writing which of all others is fittest for this variable argument of negotiations and occasions is that which Machiavel chose wisely and aptly for government; namely discourse upon histories or examples. For knowledge drawn freshly, and in our view, out of particulars, knoweth the way best to particulars again; and so hath much greater life for practice when the example attendeth upon the discourse. For this is no point of order

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[1] Ibid., p. 81.

[2] Works, IX, 205.

> as it seemeth at first, but of substance: for when the examples is the ground, being set down in a history at large, it is set with all circumstances, which may sometimes control the discourse thereupon made, and sometimes supply it as a very pattern for action; whereas the examples alleged for the discourse' sake are cited succinctly, and without particularity, and carry a servile aspect towards the discourse which they are brought in to make good.[1]

One of the theses of this study is that Taylor provides us with an example of one who followed out the Baconian principles within his own discipline. Whether he obtained these principles directly from Bacon or through others we are not able to determine, but there is no question but that Taylor reflected much of what Bacon advocated. An example of this is with regard to the use of history and experience in substantiation of his own opinions. Speaking against persecution of sects and differing religious opinions by the state or by the established church, Taylor says, "And the experience which christendom hath had in this last age is argument enough that toleration of differing opinions is so far from disturbing public peace or destroying the interest of princes and commonwealths, that it does advantage to the public, it secures peace, because there is not so much as the pretense of religion left to such persons to contend for it, being already indulged to them."[2] Taylor then gives examples to prove his point. He points to France and says that since the cessation of the policy of perse-

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[1] Advancement of Learning, p. 186.

[2] Works, V, 351.

cution of Protestants that nation has prospered. He also directs the readers to a consideration of how the Netherlands had flourished under the religiously tolerant administration of Mary of Parma, whereas during the rule of the Duke of Alva, who pursued a policy of persecution, the Netherlands had experienced war and economic decline. This use of recent history is in addition to that general tendency of the Caroline Divines to appeal to the history of the Church during the first four centuries for precedents to establish their position as well as for illustrative purposes.

Taylor is keenly aware of the importance of historical interpretation and of the understanding which can be gained from seeing things in historical perspective. He charges the Latin lawyers with being none of the best historians, with subjecting the truth of history to the aims of papal power.[1] Again he defends his interpretation of the Ninth Article of the Church of England by an appeal to the motive of comprehension which prevailed in the councils of the English divines. He does not claim that his interpretation was necessarily theirs, nor that it was contrary, "but this I am sure, that they framed the words with much caution and prudence, and so as might abstain from grieving the contrary minds of differing men."[2]

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[1] Works, X, 433.

[2] "A Further Explication of the Doctrine of Original Sin," Works, VII, 331.

Taylor's use of history is another point of affinity with the thought and method of Bacon.

Anti-Scholasticism in Bacon and Taylor

In a paragraph discussing the diffusion of Baconianism, Tulloch said that, "As the most prominent opponent of the old scholastic system, it was apt to receive the credit of the whole movement against it, and to be taken as the type of freer intellectual life which had everywhere begun to prevail."[1] Scholasticism seemed to discourage inquiry along experimental lines and therefore was held to be an obstacle to truth. Descartes, Hobbes, Brown, Milton, Glanville and Boyle, to mention only a few contemporaries, shared Taylor's echoing of this critical attitude toward scholasticism. Bacon had said that the scholastics propagated a kind of degenerate learning for they

> Having sharp and strong wits, and abundance of leisure, and small variety of reading, but their wits being shut up in the cells of a few authors (chiefly Aristotle as their dictator) as their persons were shut up in the cells of monasteries and colleges, and knowing little history, either of nature or time, did out of no great quantity of matter and infinite agitation of wit spin out unto those laborious webs of learning which are extant in their books. For the wit and mind of man, if it work upon matter, which is the contemplation of the creatures of God, worketh according to the stuff, and is limited thereby; but if it work upon itself, as the spider worketh his web, then it is endless, and brings forth indeed cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of thread and work, but of no substance or

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[1] Works, II, 21.

profit.[1]

Taylor expresses the same idea in a different manner in the Ductor Dubitantium where he states, "...I was always confident, that though the questions of the school were nice and subtle, difficult and very often good for nothing; yet that in moral theology I should have found so perfect an accord, so easy determination of questions, that it would have been harder to find out questions than answers."[2] Taylor goes on to say that he was not deceived in his conjecture for God has made the way to heaven plain and simple but besides that some men would not be governed, "...Moral theology was made a trade for the house and an art of the schools: and as nothing is more easy than natural logic, and yet nothing harder than sophistical, so it is in moral theology; what God had made plain, men have intricated, and the easy commandment is wrapped up in uneasy learning;...."[3]

Taylor makes the same point in a discussion of "The Doctrine of Transubstantiation against Reason" in the Real Presence, pointing out that as the doctrine of the Trinity is set down in scripture and in the Creed and was taught by the fathers of the first three centuries of the Christian era, he finds no difficulty with it, but rather that the difficulty arises from the too curious handling

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[1]Advancement of Learning, p. 26.

[2]Works, IX, xi.

[3]Works, IX, xii.

of that which we cannot understand. He said,

> The schoolmen have so pried into this secret, and have so confounded themselves and this article, that they have made it to be unintelligible, inexplicable, indefensible, in all their minutes and particularities; and it it too sadly apparent in the arguments of the Anti-trinitarians, whose sophisms against the article itself, although they are most easily answered, yet as they bring them against the minutiae and impertinences of the school, they are not so easily to be avoided.[1]

Inasmuch as this was so much the attitude of seventeenth century theologians and preachers in England, it may seem unnecessary to make this point. On the other hand, Taylor has often been called medieval, scholastic; and while he shared with all his fellows the training and background which cannot be eliminated, he did share in the casting off of the burden of the unintelligible, inexplicable and indefensible which were "good for nothing", just as Bacon saw that their interest in abstract speculations was "of no substance or profit".

Affinity of the Religious Opinions of Taylor and Bacon

In the evaluations of Jeremy Taylor's religious opinions there is generally the recognition of a real approach to the position of the pre-Laudian moderates, to those who represented that moderate party after Archbishop Laud's rise to power and also to that particular group of churchmen given the name of Latitudinarians. At the same time one always meets with a qualification deprecating his

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[1] Works, VI, 118.

originality and perhaps pointing out his superb command of the English tongue and the ability to express with clarity and power the principles of those more creative (or perhaps more apparently creative because of slight chronological priority of publication and birth) men of the period. Typical is this statement by W. K. Jordan in his treatment of the history of toleration:

> Taylor raised the moderate ideal, which greater minds in an earlier generation had formulated, to a larger and more realistic sphere of discussion and observation. He dwelt amongst men rather than upon the mountain-top of speculation; his honest and enquiring mind sought constantly for a solution to the religious quarrel which had broken the culture and polity of the western world--a solution which would at once restore the vitality of Christian life and maintain the integrity of the state. He advanced a definition of Anglicanism which, while rooted in the theory of the great Elizabethan founders of the Church, adapted that noble conception to an age which was pregnant with more pressing problems and torn by wider gulfs of difference.[1]

But perhaps this ideal and other religious attitudes came from a source different from that assumed by writers such as Jordan.

Walter Houghton, whose almost parallel study of Fuller has been referred to earlier, provides a clue to our investigation when he points out that in Bacon's Advertisement Touching the Controversies of the Church of England and in Certain Considerations Touching...the Church, Fuller found his own "pre-Laudian position: the condemnation of controversies over subtle points of theology; the plea for a

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[1]Works, IV, 409.

plain style of preaching, drawing its substance from casuistry; the distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals (in which the latter included church polity and ceremonies); the preservation of episcopacy; and the respect for foreign Protestant churches."[1] All of these are found in Taylor and in addition there are two other rather important points of congruity: the matter of "lay religion", and an Erastian position regarding the relations with the Crown.

The first topic to be considered is toleration, which embraces two of the points mentioned by Houghton--the condemnation of controversies over subtle points of theology and the distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals.[2] Though written in 1598, Bacon's Advertisement Touching Controversies of the Church of England was not published until 1640. In it he censured radical Puritans, indicated his indifference to small details of church government, and disavowed any intent to enter the controversy which he called a "disease requiring rather rest than any other cure." He asserted that the controversies were not concerned with the fundamentals of faith but rather with indifferent matters of little moment.[3] In Holy Living Taylor echoes these sentiments, saying, "...And no man will

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[1]Houghton, p. 158.

[2]The latter point is receiving considerable attention in current Ecumenical discussions. See Hans Kung, Council, Reform and Reunion.

[3]Jordan, II, 461.

have reason to be angry with me for refusing to mingle in his unnecessary or vicious quarrels; especially while I study to do him good by conducting him in the narrow way to heaven without intricating him in the labyrinths and wild turnings of questions and uncertain talkings."[1] This same thought was expressed in setting forth the purpose of the Great Exemplar, "of withdrawing the thoughts of men from controverted and less important doctrines to the great and necessary rallying points of christianity, and those duties and charities on which all men are agreed, but which all men forget so easily."[2]

With regard to the distinction between points fundamental and matters of opinion, Bacon spoke his mind in the essay, "Of Unity in Religion". He says the extremes are to be avoided and that this can be done "if the League of Christians, penned by our Savior himselfe, were by the two crosse Clauses thereof, soundly and plainly expounded; He that is not with us, is against us: and againe; He that is not against us, is with us: That is, if the Points Fundamental and of Substance in Religion, were truly discerned and distinguished, from Points not meerely of Faith, but of Opinion, Order, or good Intention. This is a Thing, may seeme to many, a Matter triviall, and done already: But if it were done lesse partially, it would be embraced

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[1] Works, III, 3.

[2] Works, I, cxxv.

more generally."[1] Bacon spelled this out more explicitly in the Advancement of Learning: "We see of the fundamental points our Savior penneth the league thus, 'He that is not with us is against us;' but of points not fundamental, thus, 'He that is not against us, is with us.' So we see the coat of our Saviour was entire without seam, and so is the doctrine of the Scriptures in itself; but the garment of the Church was of divers colours, and yet not divided:...."[2] Bacon noted that many controversies centered upon matters that were the result of obscure inference, which were derivative speculations and not positive revelations. He said, "If men would revive the blessed style of that great doctor of the Gentiles, they would conduct their discussions in terms of ego, non dominus; and again secundum consilium meum, in opinions and counsels, and not in positions and oppositions."[3]

In the Liberty of Prophesying, Taylor stated the latitude of his toleration, saying in part,

> The intendment of my discourse is, that permissions should be in questions speculative, indeterminable, curious, and unnecessary; and that men would not make more necessities than God made, which indeed are not many. The fault I find, and seek to remedy, is that men are so dogmatical and resolute in their opinions, and impatient of others' disagreeings, in those things wherein is no sufficient means of union and determination; but that men should let opinions and problems keep their own forms and

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[1] Essays, p. 14.

[2] Advancement of Learning, p. 213.

[3] Ibid., p. 212.

> not be obtruded as axioms, nor questions in the vast collection of the system of divinity be adopted into the family of faith. And I think I have reason to desire this.[1]

Taylor accepts this Baconian position of distinguishing fundamentals and non-fundamentals and establishes his base upon the fundamentals of the Christian religion as expressed in the Apostles' Creed. He does not stop there, however, but suggests a further distinction--that of persons:

> ...This also should be another consideration distinguishing the persons; for if the persons be Christians in their lives and Christians in their professions, if they acknowledge the eternal Son of God for their Master and their Lord, and live in all relations as becomes such persons whom God loves and who love God, who are partakers of Christ and Christ hath a title to them, who dwell in Christ and Christ in them, because their understandings have not been brought up like mine, have not had the same masters, have not met with the same books nor the same company, or have not the same interest, or are not so wise, or else are wiser; that is, for some reason or other which I neither do understand nor ought to blame, have not the same opinions that I have, and do not determine their school-questions to the sense of my sect or interest?[2]

Jordan suggests that Taylor's attitude reflects the decade of party strife and the erosion of the grounding systems of absolute truth.[3] This may well be part of the existential cause, but, as in Fuller's case, I believe there was the influence of Francis Bacon in good

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[1]Works, V, 346-47. It is interesting to see the use of the words "axiom" and "collection".

[2]Works, V, 346.

[3]Works, IV, 382-83.

measure.[1]

Taylor's position was different from that of Chillingworth to whom he has generally been considered to be indebted for his ideas on toleration.[2] Chillingworth's definition of fundamentals was not summarized in the Creed, but rather he felt that it was not necessary for men to know certainly what is and what is not fundamental. "They that believe all things plainly delivered in scripture," he said, "believe all things fundamental, and are at sufficient unity in matters of faith, though they cannot precisely and exactly distinguish between what is fundamental and what is profitable; nay, though by error they mistake some vain or perhaps some hurtful opinions, for necessary and fundamental truths."[3]

Gosse was not wrong when he noted a novel approach to the matter of toleration when compared with those who preceded Taylor by a year or two in their meditations on a possible religious peace, but he failed to see the real source of what was "novel" in Taylor. Pointing out that the others had conceived a plan of mutual concession, of agreement upon common essentials, Gosse says that Taylor first conceived of toleration based upon "a broad base of

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[1]Note: Robert Boyle had imbibed this Baconian distinction by 1647 also. Writing to John Durie he laments "that men should rather be quarreling for a few trifling opinions, wherein they dissent, than to embrace one another for those many fundamental truths, wherein they agree." (Westfall, p. 115).

[2]Coleridge, Tulloch, and Jordan among others.

[3]Religion of Protestants, p. 474.

practical piety, of loyal confidence in that church which, as he says in one of his luminous phrases, 'is not a chimera or a shadow, but a company of men believing in Jesus Christ,' and therefore able to trust the bona fides of others who approach the same truth from a different standpoint."[1] Taylor speaks for himself in a passage of the Liberty of Prophesying where he discusses "of the duty of particular churches in allowing communion."

> Since therefore the judicial acts of the church are then most prudent and religious when they nearest imitate the example and piety of God; to make the way to heaven straighter than God made it, or to deny to communicate with those with whom God will vouchsafe to be united, and to refuse our charity to those who have the same faith, because they have not all our opinions and believe not every thing necessary which we overvalue, is impious and schismatical; it infers tyranny on one part, and persuades and tempts to uncharitableness and animosities on both; it dissolves societies, and is an enemy of peace; it busies men in impertinent wranglings; and by names of men and titles of factions it consigns the interested parties to act their differences to the height, and makes them neglect those advantages which piety and a good life bring to the reputation of christian religion and societies.[2]

The plea for a plain style of preaching which draws its substance from casuistry, and the matter of "lay religion" may be considered together as representing two facets of what might be called practical religion. Regarding the first point, we can definitely accept the findings of Sister Antoine in the study referred to earlier,[3] as

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[1]Gosse, p. 46.

[2]Works, V, 601.

[3]Page 35 supra.

well as the judgment of others, that Taylor's preaching was, while ornate, definitely casuistically oriented and, by comparison with early and mid-seventeenth century preachers, his style was plain. It appears that Taylor heeded Bacon's maxim: "The duty and office of rhetoric is to apply reason to imagination for the better moving of the will."[1] This point may be concluded by Jordan's evaluation of Taylor in which he said that Taylor argued his case from the careful foundations which the Latitudinarians had laid, but added "a more pragmatic consideration of details and a thoughtful skepticism born of war and disillusionment."

> The thought of this brilliant divine was soundly based, and the comprehensive grasp which he displayed in bringing into consideration the ultimate complexities of the problem of toleration immediately established him as the intellectual leader of the moderate Anglican group. Others of that party were personally more tolerant; others pleaded for a larger liberty; but none possessed the same clarity of expression, or the luminous capacity for expression.[2]

This is plain preaching on the basis of problems of practical divinity.

For the second aspect of the matter of practical religion it must be recalled that Bacon provided principles whereby all men can enter into the program of gathering scientific knowledge. Thus science is not restricted to philosophers or professionals. By the same token we find Taylor does not advocate a priest or clergy-dominated

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[1] Advancement of Learning, p. 146.

[2] Jordan, IV, 379-80.

Christianity, but strives to have the faith be that of every layman also. This has been noted by others such as Jordan who says, "Taylor's thought is instinct with a brooding scepticism and with a largeness of view which very nearly associates him with lay Christianity."[1] Again Jordan says, "Taylor made a considerable contribution to the development of the theory of religious toleration and decisively influenced the growth of a mature body of Anglican thought which accurately reflected the tolerant and liberal sentiments of the mass of lay opinion within the Church of England."[2] Paul Elmen, in his unpublished Life of Taylor, discusses the shift from considering casuistry as the province of the priest to advocating that it is within the ability of good men to determine the thesis found in the Ductor Dubitantium, "It is of course possible," he says, "that this extension of powers to the laity, by no means a typical program of the Laudian school, was an historical accident, since the Church of England had no institutional status during the years when the book was written. But both before and after the Puritan control of religion in England, Taylor had sought to reduce the metaphysical problem to a practical simplicity and to suggest principles which common people could translate into acts."[3]

Erastianism was another point which was shared by Bacon

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[1]Ibid., p. 380.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Paul Elmen, The Life of Jeremy Taylor (Unpublished MS), p. 260.

and Taylor. This was a common position in that day, admittedly, but taken in context with the other points of congruity, it adds substance to the contention that there is a real affinity of thought between these two men. Three of the particular points of the religious position which we have set out to illustrate can be grouped under this topic: Erastianism itself, the preservation of episcopacy and the respect for foreign protestant churches. The latter was necessary since any Erastian policy involves a measure of acceptance of the cujus regio eius religio theory. In England itself it implied a maintenance of episcopacy as a bolster of the crown. As James had put it: "No Bishop, No King." The extension of this policy beyond the borders meant the recognition of the right for other crowned heads, especially to those of non-Roman countries and therefore to the foreign protestant churches. A comparison of Bacon and Taylor on this subject will show the degree of parallelism. Bacon's Erastianism is well known and to the minds of some, he was driven to this position by his quest for toleration and peace.[1] Taylor expresses his opinion in the Ductor Dubitantium:

> The supremacy and conduct of religion is necessary to the supreme power, because without it he cannot in many cases govern his people. For besides that religion is the greatest band of laws, and conscience is the greatest endearment of obedience, and a security for princes in closets, and retirements, and his best guard

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[1]Jordan, II, 465.

> against reasons; it is also that by which the common people can be carried to any great or good or civil design.[1]

Bacon said:

> But we may not take up the Third sword, which is Mahomets Sword, or like unto it; That is, to propagate Religion by Warrs, or by Sanguinary Persecutions, to force Consciences; except it be in cases of Overt Scandall, Blasphemy, or Intermixture of Practice, against the State; Much lesse to Nourish Seditions; to Authorize Conspiracies and Rebellions; to put the Sword into the Peoples Hands; and the like; Tending to the Subversion of all Government, which is the Ordinance of God. For this is, but to dash the first Table, against the Second; and so to consider Men as Christians, as we forget that they are Men.[2]

Or again, more succinctly, in Certain Observations upon a Libel, Bacon said that the government's Roman Catholic policy had been grounded upon two principles, the one, "That consciences are not to be forced, but to be won and reduced by the force of truth, by the aid of time, and the use of all good means of instruction or persuasion. The other, that causes of conscience when they exceed their bounds and grow to be matter of faction, leese [lose] their nature; and that sovereign princes ought distinctly to punish the practice or contempt, though coloured with the pretence of conscience and religion."[3] Taylor, with an economy of words not too common in his writings, said, "The persuasions of religion are not to be compelled: but the disturbances by

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[1] Works, X, 207.

[2] "Of Unity in Religion," Essays, p. 14.

[3] Bacon, Works, VIII, 177-78. Cited by Jordan, II, 466-67. This was written in 1592.

religion are to be restrained by the laws. And if any change upon just reason is to be made, let it be made by authority of the supreme."[1] Earlier, in the Liberty of Prophesying, Taylor had stated: "...Religion is a thing superinduced to temporal government and the church is in no sense to disserve the necessity and just interests of that to which it is superadded for its advantage and conservation."[2] And again, "Let the prince and the secular power have a care the commonwealth be safe: for whether such or such a sect of Christians be to be permitted is a question rather political than religious;...."[3]

When this attitude was extended to relations with others beyond the kingdom, this meant the recognition of foreign protestants, including their ministries. Taylor did question this to some extent, saying that the Anglicans had leaned so far backwards to accept non-episcopal ministries that they endangered their own three-fold ministry.

A congruity of time and association has been established by presenting the hitherto unnoticed facts regarding Taylor's great number of contacts with persons who had close connections with Baconians or who supported Baconian projects; and by noting that Taylor's period of greatest creativity coincided with the years in which Bacon's work enjoyed renewed popularity.

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[1] Works, X, 211.

[2] Works, V, 591.

[3] Works, V, 599.

Taylor's affinity with Bacon has been established by comparing his thought with that of Bacon. Certain of Bacon's main principles of attitude and method were found to have been accepted by Taylor and adapted to the realm of religion. Taylor agreed to the distinction of science from religion but sought to resolve the matter, seeking a further rapproachment. This was most evident in the matter of the relationship between reason and faith. Both men wrestled with the problem of apparent contradiction. Taylor, having examined the use of reason in religion (for which Bacon issued a "call"), slips through the horns of the dilemma by suggesting that judgment be suspended, whereas Bacon had suggested that religion was beyond reason. Bacon's utilitarian emphasis was embraced by Taylor and applied in the realm of religion through his concern for practical theology. Taylor emphasized the good life as against right belief. He sought answers to "What am I becoming?" and "By what means?"

Bacon suggested that this method of his had applicability in all sciences and Taylor applied it to religion. Taylor emulated Bacon in re-defining principles and by a return to the raw materials of faith just as Bacon sought a return to the raw materials of the physical sciences. This is especially evident in Taylor's works on casuistry. Taylor's empirical approach to religion is most apparent and his use of history is in keeping with Bacon's teaching.

Perhaps the most striking area of affinity in thought

between the two men is in their religious opinions. Bacon's whole program reappears in Taylor. This program included the condemnation of controversies over subtle points of theology, a plea for a plain style of preaching which drew upon casuistry for its substance, the distinction of fundamentals from non-fundamentals, the preservation of episcopacy, and respect for foreign Protestants.

It is thus clear that if we hesitate to call Taylor a Baconian, we may reasonably class him as "Baconian".

PART II: TAYLOR AND SOCINIANISM

Making his opinions public in an age of religious conflict, Taylor exposed his thought to criticism and himself to accusations of being unorthodox and heretical. One of the persistent accusations of his contemporaries and of later critics was that he was a Socinian.

After reading Taylor's doctrine of Original Sin in the Unum Necessarium, Brian Duppa (1588-1662), Bishop of Winchester, wrote, "And whom hath [he] adhered to! the choice he hath is not great, for either it must be to the old Pelagians, or to the new brood that hath sprung out of their ashes, whether Socinian or Anabaptists, or any other of newer denominations."[1] That was the opinion of one of his friends and brethren of the Church of England. Those who considered him an enemy were no less adamant in their criticism. As the Archbishop of Armagh reported it, Taylor was or was about to be accused to the King by "the rotten sort of his new flock, impotentia," as a Socinian, an Arminian, and the writer knows not what else.[2] Taylor himself reported that the Presbyterians were calling him an Arminian, a Socinian, and a Papist or half a Papist in order to under-

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[1]Tanner MSS, Bodleian Library, Oxford; MS lii,93; Duppa's letter of October 25.

[2]Carte MSS, Bodleian Library, Oxford; MS ccxxl, 150; Dated Dublin, January 19, 1660/61.

mine him with "the better sort of people."[1] A contemporary minister of Belfast, Patrick Adair, summed up the Presbyterian attitude toward Taylor by claiming, "He had sucked in the dregs of much of Popery, Socinianism, and Arminianism, and was a heart enemy not only to Nonconformists but also to the Orthodox."[2]

In the nineteenth century, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, in spite of naming him in the company of Bacon, Shakespeare, and Milton as one of the four great geniuses of the English language, called Taylor "half a Socinian in heart."[3]

To what extent, if any, are these charges justified? Was Taylor a Socinian? Did he imbibe some of the attitudes from the descendants of Castellio and Socinus? This section of the paper will deal with this problem, again an allegation which has not been analyzed nor systematically considered. First, let us seek to define Socinianism; then, ascertain the points wherein he differs. Then, let us see what evidence there is for his exposure to Socinian influences.

Definition of Socinianism

Socinianism had its origins in the thought of two sixteenth century Italians, an uncle and his nephew. The word

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[1]Taylor to Ormonde, 19 December 1660, Carte MSS, fol. ss. Cited by Stranks, p. 231.

[2]Patrick Adair, A True Narrative of the Rise and Progress of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland (Belfast, 1866), pp. 244-45. Cited by Stranks, p. 279, n. 1.

[3]S. T. Coleridge, Table Talk and Omiana (London, 1888), 4 June 1830. Cited by Stranks, p. 286, n. 1.

comes from Socinus, the Latinized name of Lelio Francesco Maria Sozine (1525-1562) and Fausto Paolo Sozzini[1] (1539-1604). The main or popular tenet of Socinianism was anti-trinitarianism, though there was much more to it. The earliest comprehensive statement of Socinian principles was The Racovian Catechism, based on drafts of F. P. Socinus and published in Polish at Racow in 1605. A German version appeared in 1608 and a Latin version the following year. The catechism professed to be only a body of opinions, not a formal confessional creed. Among the subjects dealt with in its eight sections were the Scriptures as the only source of truth; the way of salvation, which was interpreted as by knowledge and a holy life; the Person of Christ, that he was merely a man raised to divine power by his marvelous life and resurrection; and a definition of the Church as the body of Christians who uphold and profess the saving doctrines.[2]

In a recent study of Socinianism, H. John McLachlan (Socianism in Seventeenth Century England) points out that the word itself was applied to various kinds of unorthodox religious opinion. As is often the case, fine discriminations were not made; therefore, Socinian was the name given to "all who departed radically from the orthodox Christian scheme of redemption or found difficulty with the metaphysi-

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[1]Sic. spelling of Sozzini.

[2]The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church (Oxford, 1958), pp. 1135-36.

cal notions enshrined in Catholic doctrinal formulae, or even allowed to reason its legitimate place in religion."[1] Pointing out that the movement toward Socinianism amongst the Italians and their allies was on the whole rather extra-trinitarian rather than anti-trinitarian, and that they impugned generally accepted dogmas by underestimate or by scrupulous avoidance of their terms rather than by frontal attack, McLachlan says, "We may regard it either as a criticism of the accepted doctrinal scheme of Christianity, or as an assertion of the principle of freedom of religious inquirey and the place of reason and tolerance in matters of faith."[2] However, it is McLachlan's opinion that recognition of two leading characteristics are a scrupulous and vigorous biblicism and the acknowledgment of the rights of reason in religion. One foot thus rested in the camp of the reformers by grounding authority in religion in the Bible while the other foot was in a camp which claimed that human reason was a necessary adjunct to revelation and also a source of religious insight. The Bible was written under the direct influence of the Holy Spirit, and any doctrine, in order to have weight or substance, must be scripturally attested and depend upon revelation given in Scripture. But revelation was not self-evidencing, for, as the Racovian Catechism put it, reason "is indeed, of great service, since

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[1]H. John McLachlan, Socinianism in Seventeenth-Century England (Oxford, 1951), p. 3.

[2]Ibid., p. 7.

without it we could neither perceive with certainty the authority of the sacred writings, understand their contents, discriminate one thing from another, nor apply them to any practical purpose. When therefore, I stated that the Holy Scriptures were sufficient for our salvation, so far from excluding right reason, I certainly assumed its presence."[1] Thus, biblical revelation could not contain anything irrational. "Right reason and divine truth must, of certainty, agree."[2]

The results of this influence and attitude among Englishmen of the seventeenth century is evidenced by a report on the doctrines advocated by John Bidle, the "Father of English Unitarianism," written by Sir Peter Pett, a friend of John Evelyn, a founder of the Royal Society, an Arminian, and a Fellow of All Souls during the Commonwealth. McLachlan says that

> The doctrines he [Pett] enumerates are distinctly Socinian: saving faith consists in universal obedience to the commands of God and Christ; Christ did not rise again by his own power, but only the power of the Father; justifying faith was not "the pure gift of God" but might be acquired by men's natural abilities; faith could not believe "anything contrary to, or above reason"; there was no such thing as original sin; "Christ was not Lord or King before his Resurrection, or Priest before his Ascension", nor had he dominion over the angels before his death, nor did he by dying make satisfaction for man. Arminianism is carried to its logical conclusion in the assertion that

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[1]Racovian Catechism, ed. by Thomas Rees (1818), p. 15. Cited by McLachlan, p. 11.

[2]McMachlan, p. 11.

> God has no certain knowledge of future contingencies, and Protestantism to the radical position that "there is not any Authority of Fathers or General Councils in determining Matters of Faith."[1]

McLachlan points out that Socinianism maintained "devotion to the principles of freedom, reason, and tolerance in religion" even though it underwent many changes in seventeenth century England. He would have Socinianism considered as the bearer of the liberal spirit of the Renaissance, as a wider movement rather than just another form of Christian doctrine.

> It is part of the larger movement towards free inquiry, part of the break-away from medieval scholasticism in the direction of modern empiricism. To judge from the reactions against it on the orthodox side, the radical nature of the Socinian criticism was clearly recognized by many contemporaries, and its disintegrating influence upon old modes of Christian thought was more widely felt than has been generally admitted. The dominant form of anti-trinitarianism in England in the seventeenth century, Socinianism was of greater importance than a mere doctrinal variant of Christianity. Like Arminianism, it reinforced, by attempting to carry out consistently to its conclusion, the great principle of the Reformation which affirmed the supremacy of private judgment. Like Arminianism too, it was a liberating force, freeing men from the dominance of the prevalent Calvinistic theology.[2]

In summary, this is what McLachlan has to say:

> The word describes at once a sect or a body of doctrine and a movement or ethos. From the view-point of the historian of dogma, Socinianism consists primarily in certain beliefs about the nature of God and the person and work of Christ. From the wider angle of the historian of religion and culture, it denotes a movement of the human mind and will whose main characteristic is

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[1] Ibid., p. 185.

[2] Ibid., p. 337.

> attachment to principles rather than doctrine. With varying degrees of emphasis, writers affected by Socinian thought represent an anti-dogmatic, rationalizing, tolerant tendency within the English religious scene. They contend for freedom of thought and worship; defend the rights of reason to interpret what is and what is not revelation; strive for peace and unity within the Christian Church, and plead for a distinction between fundamentals and non-fundamentals in religion and for charity and tolerance towards all sincere seekers after truth.[1]

The accusation that Taylor was a Socinian must be assessed, then, keeping both the dogmatic and the religio-cultural interpretations of Socinianism in mind. Nonetheless, this must be determined with as much precision as possible and guarding against McLachlan's seeming attempt to enfold in the arms of Socinianism every stirring of men's minds and souls from the Reformation.

Agreement and Disagreement with Socinian Doctrine

To what extent may we say that the opinions expressed by Taylor's contemporaries and the writers of succeeding ages have substance? A comparison of Taylor's position expressed in his writings with the major tenets of Socinians will provide the answer.

Taylor was far from being an anti-trinitarian or even an extra-trinitarian. Not only did he consider the acceptance of the Apostles' Creed to be a minimal basis for a statement of the Christian faith, but he expressed himself most plainly on the matter, particularly with regard to

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[1]Ibid., p. 335.

the Person and Work of Jesus Christ, whom Socinians regarded merely as a man. In the very beginning of his meditative life of Christ, Taylor seems to speak to this issue. He prefaced his own affirmation, saying,

> However the person of Jesus Christ was depressed with a load of humble accidents, and shadowed with the darkness of poverty and sad contingencies, so that the Jews, and the contemporary ages of the gentiles, and the apostles themselves, could not at first discern the brightest essence of divinity; yet... the sanctity and holiness of the life of Jesus... found confessors and admirers even in the midst of those despites which were done Him upon the contrariant designs of malice and contradictory ambition.... For however it might concern any man's mistaken ends, to mislike the purpose of His preaching and spiritual kingdom, and those doctrines which were destructive of their complacencies and carnal securities; yet they could not deny but that He was a man of God, of exemplar sanctity, of an angelical chastity, of a life sweet, affable, and complying with human conversation, and as obedient to government as the most humble children of the kingdom, and yet He was lord of all the world.[1]

Taylor's view of the Person and Work of Christ is put rather succinctly in the words which followed:

> And certainly very much of this was with a design that He might shine to all the generations and ages of the world and become a guiding star and pillar of fire to us in our journey. For we who believe that Jesus was perfect God and perfect man, do also believe that one minute of His intolerable passion, and every action of His, might have been satisfactory, and enough for the expiation and reconcilement of ten thousand worlds; and God might, upon a less effusion of blood, and shorter life of merit, if He had pleased, have accepted human nature to pardon and favour: but that the holy Jesus hath added so many excellent instances of holiness, and so many degrees of passion, and so many kinds

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[1]*Works*, II, 38.

> of virtues, is, that He might become an example to us, and reconcile our wills to Him, as well as our persons, to His heavenly Father.[1]

Thus Christ is truly God. There is no implication of unitarian understanding of the Person of Jesus either by means of direct statement or by understatement; nor is there a Socinian view of the work of Christ. While there is in Taylor a great stress on the practical results of life in Christ which we have shown to be consonant with a mind attuned to Baconian emphasis, there is no substitution of a purely moral or exemplary understanding of the atonement for the catholic and traditional, vicarious or propitiatory interpretation of the doctrine. This is brought out in his prayers also, where Taylor addresses God the Son, saying, "O eternal, holy and most glorious Jesu, who hast united two natures of distance infinite, descending to the lowlinesses of human nature that Thou mightest exalt human nature to a participation of the divinity;..." And again in the same prayer, "Holy Jesu, since Thy image is imprinted on our nature by creation, let me also express Thy image by all the parts of a holy life, conforming my understanding and will and affections to Thy holy precepts;...."[2] Taylor speaks of "the descent of God to the susception of human nature" and says in comment upon that fact, "What can be given more excellent for the redemption of man than the

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*, II, 48.

blood of the Son of God?"[1]

Taylor's opinion of the Socinian position on this doctrine of the Person and Work of Christ is expressed indirectly in two passages of his Dissuasive. In the one, deploring the Roman pretensions that the doctrine of the Incarnation relies entirely on unwritten tradition, he says,

> For the Socinians, knowing that tradition was on both sides claimed in this article, please themselves in the concession of their adversaries, that this is not to be proved by scripture.... Now they being secured by their very enemies that they need not fear scripture in this question, and knowing of themselves that tradition cannot alone do it; they are at peace, and dwell in confidence in this their capital error;....[2]

Later in the Dissuasive, Taylor criticises the Roman doctrine of transubstantiation, stating that it "is too near the doctrine of the Socinians, who suppose the humanity to be absolutely deified, and divine honours to be due to Christ, as a man whom God hath exalted above every name."[3]

More directly, Taylor had this to say in his Liberty of Prophesying: "The Socinians profess a portentous number of strange opinions; they deny the holy Trinity, and the satisfaction of our blessed Savior:...."[4] Thus it is clear that Taylor was not Socinian in this major tenet of orthodox Christianity.

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[1] Ibid., II, 52.

[2] Works, VI, 416.

[3] Works, VI, 488.

[4] Works, V, 356.

The epistomological position of the Socinians was that the Scriptures are the only source of religious truth and that they are written under the direct influence of the Holy Spirit.

Taylor upheld the fullness of the Scriptures and decried the superaddition of articles and propositions not contained in the Scriptures, instancing the case of the Church of Rome. To this point, Taylor, in the preface to the first part of the Dissuasive from Popery, quotes Tertullian contra Hermogenes, "I adore the fulness of scriptures; and if it be not written, let Hermogenes fear the woe that is destined to them that detract from or add to it."[1] In the second part of the Dissuasive, Taylor devotes a whole section to discussion of "the sufficiency of the holy scriptures to salvation, which is the foundation and ground of the protestant religion."[2] Here Taylor states, "That the scripture is a full and sufficient rule to Christians in faith and manners, a full and perfect declaration of the will of God, is therefore certain, because we have no other."[3] The grounds upon which all Christians accept this is, according to Taylor, that

> The apostles at first owned these writings; the churches received them; they transmitted them to their posterity; they grounded their

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[1]Cont. Hermogen c. xxii, p. 241 D. Cited by Taylor, Works, VI, 173.

[2]Works, VI, 380.

[3]Works, VI, 380.

> faith upon them; they proved their propositions by them; they confuted heretics; and they made them measures of right and wrong; all that collected body of doctrines of which all Christians consentingly made public confessions, and on which all their hopes of salvation did rely, were all contained in them, and they agreed in no point of faith which is not plainly set down in scripture.[1]

This same persuasion is again stated in the "Third Letter Written to a Gentleman Tempted to the Communion of the Romish Church", in which Taylor says, "I therefore answer, that whatsoever the apostles did deliver as necessary to salvation, all that was written in the scriptures: and that to them who believe the scriptures to be the word of God, there needs no other magazine of divine truths but the scripture."[2] Twenty years earlier, Taylor had asserted the same position in his famous Liberty of Prophesying: "The peace of the Church and the unity of her doctrine is best conserved when it is judged by the proportion it hath to that rule of unity which the apostles gave, that is the creed, for articles of mere belief, and the precepts of Jesus Christ, and the practical rules of piety, which are most plain and easy, and without controversy, set down in the gospels and writings of the apostles."[3]

While Taylor is thus concerned to accord to Scripture a proper authority, he nonetheless, in a manner similar to that of Socinus and his followers, seeks to accord to

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[1] Works, VI, 380-81.

[2] Works, VI, 685.

[3] Works, V, 533.

reason a proper place in the determination of doctrine. To this end, Taylor denies the competency of the fathers, the councils, and the popes to determine the obscure and controverted parts of scripture. "Since tradition is of an uncertain reputation, and sometimes evidently false; councils are contradictory to each other, and therefore certainly are equally deceived many of them, and therefore all may; and then the popes of Rome are very likely to mislead us... and in this world we believe in part, and prophesy in part, and this imperfection shall never be done away till we be translated to a more glorious state:..."[1] The result of all this is, that truth is either obtained by chance or predestination, "or else we must be safe in a mutual toleration and private liberty of persuasion, unless some other anchor can be thought upon where we may fasten our floating vessels and ride safely."[2]

Taylor's desire for the truth almost leads to an extreme individualism as he seeks to present the case for toleration in the Liberty of Prophesying and again when he claims this same toleration for himself, writing in the Preface to the Unum Necessarium:

> It concerns all persons to see that they do their best to find out truth; and if they do, it is certain that let the error be never so damnable, they shall escape the error or the misery of being damned for it.[3]

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[1] Liberty of Prophesying, Works, V, 483.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Works, V, 604.

> Though the Church of England is my mother, and I hope I shall ever live and at least die in her communion, and if God shall call me to it, and enable me, I will not refuse to die for her, yet I conceive there is something most highly considerable in that saying--"Call no man master upon earth;" that is, no man's explication of her articles shall prejudice my affirmative, if it agrees with scripture and right reason, and the doctrine of the primitive church for the first three hundred years;....[1]

Realizing, however, that great freedom of judgment is not good for all men, that it presents great difficulties for society and social institutions, Taylor seeks a practical rule of thumb, an "anchor" where we may fasten and ride safely. He suggests that men in general should choose a guide which they shall follow... namely, the Church. He says that the governors of the church must judge the truth of doctrine for themselves. And, these others must know that the governors do this for them in order to "keep them in peace and obedience," but this is not for the "determination of their private persuasions."

> For the economy of the church requires that her authority be received by all her children. Now this authority is divine in its original, for it derives immediately from Christ, but it is human in its ministrations. We are to be led like men, not like beasts. A rule is prescribed for the guides themselves to follow, as we are to follow the guides.... For although every man is bound to follow his guide unless he believes his guide to mislead him; yet when he sees reason against his guide, it is best to follow reason; for though in this he may fall into error, yet he will escape the sin; he may do violence to truth, but never to his own conscience; and an honest error is better than an hypocritical profession of truth, or a

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[1] Works, VII, 19.

> violent luxation of the understanding; since he retains his honesty and simplicity, he cannot err in a matter of faith or absolute necessity; God's goodness hath secured all honest and careful persons from that; for other things, he must follow the best guides he can, and he cannot be obliged to follow better than God hath given him.[1]

The choice of the guide is to be made, however, by the exercise of reason, using certain standards available to everyone. This is plainly pointed out in his sermon "On Christian Prudence". Having stated that we must not judge our doctrines by our guides but rather the guides by the doctrines, Taylor says, "And if we doubt concerning the doctrine, we may judge that by the lives and designs of the teachers ("by their fruits you shall know them"), and by the plain words of scriptures, by the apostles' creed, and by the commandments, and by the certain known and established forms of government." He claims these are the "great indices." They are "so plain, apt, and easy, that he that is deceived is so because he will be so; he is betrayed unto it by his own lust, and a voluntary chosen folly."[2]

But, the reason is also in need of guidance. Taylor seems to fluctuate here, seems to be unable to make up his mind about the competency of reason. He affirms that reason "is a box of quicksilver that abides nowhere; it dwells in no settled mansion; it is like a dove's neck, or a changeable taffeta; it looks to me otherwise than to you who do

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[1] Works, V, 493-494.

[2] Works, IV, 605.

not stand in the same light that I do; and if we enquire after the law of nature by the rules of our reason, we shall be as uncertain as the discourse of people, or the dreams of disturbed fancies."[1] Earlier in the same work Taylor had made the same point while discussing the use of ad hominem arguments:

> That which will demonstrate a truth to one person, possibly will never move another, because our reason does not consist in a mathematical point; and the heart of reason, that vital and most sensible part, in which only it can be conquered fairly, is an amoulatory essence, and not fixed; it wanders up and down, like a floating island, or like that which we call the life blood and it is not often very easy to hit that white by which only our reason is brought to perfect assent: and this needs no other proof but our daily experience, and common notice of things.[2]

It is plain that Taylor did not consider individual reason to constitute the only guide in matters of faith. Instead, he submits to revelation and established authority as a public matter while reserving the right to private judgment in matters of opinion.[3]

Taylor actually reproves the Socinians for their excesses in the use of reason:

> Thus are they to be blamed, who make intricacies and circles in mysterious articles, because they cannot wade through them; it is not to be understood why God should send His holy Son from His bosom to redeem us, to pay our

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[1] Ductor Dubitantium, Works, IX, 293.

[2] Works, IX, 95.

[3] Notice, too, that Bacon and his followers emphasized the collective or social employment of reason (as by the Royal Society) in the search for firmly grounded beliefs.

> price; nor to be told why God should exact a price of Himself for His own creature; nor to be made intelligible to us, why He loved us so well, as to send His Son to save us, should at the same time so hate us. But the Socinians who conclude that this was not thus, are to be reproved for their excesses in the enquiries of reason, not where she is a competent judge, but where she is not competently instructed;...[1]

The end of the matter is that while the Socinians claimed that reason, which they called right reason, and by which they meant natural, human reason, was the sole judge in matters of doctrine, Taylor, while appearing at first glance to agree with them, by his definition of right reason parts company with Socinus and his disciples:

> He that follows his guide so far as his reason goes along with him or, which is all one, he that follows his own reason (not guided by natural arguments but by divine revelation and all other good means) hath great advantages over him that gives himself wholly to follow any human guide whatsoever, because he follows all their reasons and his own too.[2]

For Taylor, right reason is reason infused or illuminated by the Holy Spirit.

With such an attitude toward reason, it follows that there might well be some degree of agreement with the Socinian position regarding the place of knowledge in the scheme of salvation. For the Socinian, knowledge and a holy life are the way of salvation; and saving faith consists in universal obedience to the commands of God and Christ. Taylor considered the relationship of knowledge or

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[1] Works, IX, 64.

[2] Liberty of Prophesying, Works, V, 495.

understanding to religious passion in a discussion of considerations upon the accidents after the Resurrection. Speaking of the women who went to the garden, he said that their love and the passion of their religion caused them to make haste to the garden and endeared them more to our Lord than more sober and less active spirits.

> This is more safe, but that is religious; this moves to God by way of understanding; that by the will; this is supported by discourse, that by passion; this is the sobriety of the apostles, the other was the zeal of the holy women; and because a strong fancy and an earnest passion, fixed upon holy objects, are the most active and forward instruments of devotion, as devotion is of love; therefore, we find God hath made great expressions of His acceptance of such dispositions. And women, and less knowing persons, and tender dispositions, and pleasant natures, will make up a greater number in heaven than the severe, and wary, and enquiring people, who sometimes love because they believe, and believe because they can demonstrate, but never believe because they love. When a great understanding and a great affection meet together it makes a saint great like an apostle; but they do not well, who make abatement of their religious passions, by the severity of their understanding. It is no matter by which we are brought to Christ, so we love Him and obey Him;...[1]

With this last emphasis on obedience the Socinians would be in agreement. It was Taylor's insistence on the practical effects or results, stemming from his Baconianism, which would make him appear to some to be a Socinian. In the Unum Necessarium, Taylor joined this idea of holy life and obedience, saying that he desired to judge the perfection of a church "by such indications as are the most proper

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[1]Great Exemplar, Works, II, 723.

tokens of a 'life'. I mean propositions of holiness, the necessities of a holy life; for certainly that church is most to be followed who brings us nearest to God; and they make our approaches nearest who teach us to be most holy, and whose doctrines command the most excellent and severest lives."[1]

For Taylor, faith is a matter of both will and understanding, but more of the will;[2] and though this would not cause a Socinian to disagree with him, when Taylor further asserts that faith is a gift of God, Socinus' followers must part company with him. "Faith is an infused grace" and "if God pleases to behold His own glory in our weakness or understanding it is but the same things He does in the instances of His other graces."[3] Pointing out that God uses a variety of means to kindle charity in men, "So also He may produce faith by arguments of a differing quality, and by issues of His providence He may engage us in such conditions in which, as our understanding is not great enough to choose the best, so neither is it furnished with powers to reject any proposition: and to believe well is an effect of a singular predestination, and is a gift in order to a grace, as that grace is in order to salvation."[4]

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[1] Works, VII, 14.

[2] Great Exemplar, Works, II, 296.

[3] Ibid., II, 295.

[4] Ibid., II, 295-96.

Taylor asserts that whether we come to faith by education (by being raised a Christian) or by demonstrative proof, by neither of them did we truly make a choice.

This point is contrary to Socinian belief. They contended that justifying faith is not the pure gift of God but that it is acquired by men's natural abilities. Taylor goes only so far as to maintain that man cooperates with God. He asserts that Jesus is "the author and finisher of our faith: He is the principle, and He is the promoter; He begins our faith in revelations, and perfects it in commandments; He leads us by the assent of our understandings and finishes the work of His grace by a holy life: which St. Paul there expresses by its several constituent parts; as 'laying aside every weight and the sin that so easily besets us, and running with patience the race that is set before us,... resisting unto blood, striving against sin,' for in these things Jesus is therefore made our example, because He is 'the author and finisher of our faith;' without these faith is imperfect."[1]

Taylor was aware that he differed with the Socinians on this point, and states this in a discussion of the imputation of righteousness. He groups the Socinians and the Roman Catholics on the one side, denying that Christ's righteousness is imputed to us in order to preserve the necessity for holy living; while the Lutherans and

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[1]Ibid., II, 299-300.

Calvinists emphasize this imputation because they feel it is necessary to insure our salvation in the face of our imperfection. Between these the truth is plain enough to be read, thus:

> Christ's righteousness is not imputed to us for justification directly and immediately; neither can we be justified by our own righteousness: but our faith and sincere endeavors are, through Christ, accepted instead of legal righteousness: that is, we are justified through Christ, by imputation not of Christ's nor our own righteousness, but of our faith and endeavors of righteousness, as if they were perfect: and we are justified by a non-imputation, viz., of our past sins, and present unavoidable imperfections: so that we are handled as if we were just persons and no sinners.[1]

But the attitude on this point of the imputation of righteousness stems from another doctrine upon which Taylor did not accept "orthodox" interpretation and which therefore caused most of the charges against him.[2] That was the doctrine of Original Sin.

The Socinians denied that there was such a thing as Original Sin. It was their contention that Adam would have died even had he not sinned, and that his death carried with it no effect upon the condition of posterity. They further denied that there was original righteousness in the Garden of Eden and also contended that there is no moral pollution which is inherent to man at the present time. Their denial of the orthodox position regarding the

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[1]"Answer to a Letter by R. R.Bishop of Rochester," Works, VII, 551-52.

[2]And which perhaps kept him from an English bishopric at the Restoration.

results of Adam's sin was based on a rational argument that if Adam had had any original rectitude of disposition it would have excluded any choice between good and evil.[1]

Taylor's view on this matter is admirably stated in his Deus Justificatus, a simple, straightforward account of his interpretation set forth for one of his friends, Lady Christian, the countess dowager of Devon. His position may be summarized as follows: Original Sin is certain and confessed by all. The Fall resulted in three things: (1) it deprived Adam of his supernatural endowments; (2) it sentenced Adam to death since he lost the tree of life which was the instrument of immortality, and thereby man became subject to sickness; and became ignorant, foolish and unreasonable; and (3) Adam was left to his nature, which implied that all men were to be born as children, with the ability to do before they could understand, and under laws which they were bound to keep but which they were not able to keep. In summary, man was returned to his prime creation, lacking Grace. But, and this is important, our will was abused, not destroyed; our understanding was cozened, but still capable of the best instructions.

Thus, "From the first Adam nothing descended to us but an infirm body, and a naked soul, evil example and a

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[1]Note: This reaction to the implications of the orthodox interpretation of doctrines of this Fall was common in the seventeenth century. The Cambridge Platonists suggested that some "natural light" remained to man in opposition to the customary deprecation of human nature and human reason. cf. B. Willey, p. 142.

body of death, ignorance and passion, hard labor and a cursed field, a captive soul and an imprisoned body; that is, a soul naturally apt to comply with the appetites of the body and its desires, whether reasonable or excessive: and though these things were not direct sins to us in their natural abode and first principle, yet that are proper inherent miseries and principles of sin to us in their emanation."[1] In Taylor's own words, "The sum of all this; by the disobedience of one man...'many were constituted' or put into the order of sinners, they were made such by God's appointment, that is, not that God could be the author of a sin to any, but that He appointed the evil which is the consequent of sin to be upon their heads who descended from the sinner:..."[2]

It is quite evident from the foregoing that Taylor was no Socinian as regards the doctrine of Original Sin, but rather that his qualification of the orthodox Calvinistic view, his denial of the transmission of guilt, and especially his rejection of the damnation of infants who died unbaptised, made him suspect in the eyes of the orthodox Calvinists. He was quite aware that he was not running with the pack, and in the seventh chapter of the Unum Necessarium, "A Further Explication of the Doctrine of Original Sin," which he added after being attacked for his views stated

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[1]Deus Justificatus, Works, VII, 517.

[2]Ibid., VII, 530.

in the early edition, he said,

> ... But amongst all this infinite uncertainty, the church of England speaks moderate words, apt to be construed to the purposes of all peaceable men that desire her communion.
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> Thus every one talks of original sin, and agrees that there is such a thing, but what is it they agree not; and therefore in such infinite variety, he were of a strange imperious spirit that would confine others to his particular fancy. For my own part, now that I have shown what the doctrine of the purest ages was, what uncertainty there is of late in the question, what great consent there is in some of the main parts of what I affirm, and that in the contrary particulars men cannot agree, I shall not be ashamed to profess what company I now keep in my opinion of the article; no worse men than Zwinglius, Stapulensis, the great Erasmus, and the incomparable Hugo Grotius, who also says there are multi in Gallia qui eandem sentintiam magnia sane argumentis tuentur, 'many in France which with great argument defend the same sentence;" that is, who explicate the article entirely as I do; and as S. Chrysostom and Theodore did of old, in compliance with those holy fathers that went before them:...[1]

Even with such a distinguished company Taylor is still led to end his Deus Justificatus with a translation of the words of Lucretius,

> Fear not to own what's said because 'tis new,
> Weigh well and wisely if the thing be true.
> Truth and not conquest is the best reward;
> 'Gainst falsehood only stand upon thy guard.'"[2]

That Taylor advocated an agreement upon certain fundamentals of belief, actually advocating the acceptance of the Apostles' Creed as the basis for such a determination, we have already pointed out in the discussion of Taylor's

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[1] Works, VII, 330.

[2] Lib. ii, line 1039. Quoted by Taylor, Works, VII, 537.

and Bacon's religious position. This was a tenet of Socinians and had been called for by Acontius; thus Taylor had an affinity with them on this point. His position regarding the Calvinist doctrine of predestination and their interpretation of Original Sin certainly would ally him with the Socinians in the tendency to break down the sway of Calvinistic theology, but it is the contention of this dissertation that Taylor owed more to the influence of the Arminians than to the Socinians. This contention is postulated on the fact that the main thrust of Arminianism was directed toward the Calvinist position on predestination and on Original Sin; and by the fact of Taylor's obvious admiration for men such as Grotius and Vossius, known Arminians.

Having considered the main tenets of Socinianism and compared them with Taylor's opinions on those points, let us now see what evidence exists for supposing that Taylor had contact with Socinians and Socinian thought.

Two of the basic Socinian writers and their works had become well known in intellectual circles by the 1640's. Sebastian Castellio's Contra Libellum Calvini, written in 1562, had been printed again in 1612 in Holland by those interested in toleration. Contact between Holland and England at this time is a well attested fact, especially marked by the presence of English observers at the Synod of Dort, John Hales of Eton being the most famous. The other Socinian writer was Giacomo Aconzio (circa 1520-65),

better known by his Latinized name, Acontius, whose Satanae Stratagematum Libro Octo which appeared in 1565 was dedicated to Elizabeth I of England. This had been republished in Latin at Oxford in 1631 and appeared in English translation in 1648.[1] Another important Socinian work was The Racovian Catechism which, though known, was not in plentiful supply.[2] It is a fair assumption that Jeremy Taylor would have come to know these works, inasmuch as he was one of the intellectual elite of his age. We know, for instance, that his good friend John Warner, Bishop of Rochester (1581-1666) possessed the rare 1609 edition of The Racovian Catechism.[3]

That editions of Socinian books and other Socinian writings were available in England is clear from the inclusion by Laud in the proposed Canons of 1640 of a prohibition of the importation of such items and a proviso that violators should be excommunicated and proceeded against in Star Chamber.[4] The Canons further provided that preachers who presumed to "vent such Doctrine in any Sermon" should suffer excommunication for the first offense and deprivation for the second. It was further provided that no student at either university should be allowed to have or read Socinian works unless specially excepted. Graduates

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[1]McLachlan, Socinianism, pp. 8, 56.

[2]Ibid., p. 134. Vide p. 79 supra.

[3]McLachlan, p. 134.

[4]Ibid., pp. 41-42.

in divinity, those who had episcopal or archidiaconal jurisdiction and doctors of law in holy orders were excepted from these provisions.[1]

But Taylor's contact with Socinian influences did not need to come only from acknowledged Socinian works. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) who was one of Taylor's inspirations, was an opponent of Socinianism but gradually became familiar with Socinian writings and, in the opinion of some scholars, made some modifications in his thought as a result of this contact. In some places, at least, it would be difficult to distinguish between Arminian and Socinian principles as influencing Grotius.[2]

It is the opinion of many scholars (Tulloch, McLachlan, and Coleridge among them) that Taylor was influenced considerably by the Latitudinarians, Hales, Chillingworth, and Falkland. It is also the opinion of some that the Latitudinarians were influenced by Socinian works. An example of such opinion is this bit of reasoning by McLachlan:

> As already suggested, a leading tenet of Latitudinarianism is the reduction of essentials in religion to a minimum, so that all sects may be united on a common doctrinal programme. This principle Hales and Chillingworth undoubtedly owed to Acontius.... Acontius is a direct precursor of Hales and Chillingworth. His work, known in England since...1565...was...republished (in Latin) at Oxford in 1631. The date is important. It was just after this that Falkland settled at Great Tew; Hales composed his

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[1] Ibid.

[2] McLachlan, p. 22; Stranks, p. 202.

> Tract Concerning Schism in 1636, and The Religion of Protestants saw the light of day two years later. The Latitudinarians read Acontius in Latin and were instrumental in spreading his ideas some time before John Goodwin translated the first four books of the Stratagemata (1648).[1]

If these opinions are correct, then it is possible that Taylor made contact with Socinian ideas through these persons.

But what does Taylor say for himself? We have already quoted his reference to Socinian excesses in the use of reason,[2] and we have noted his passing remark about Socinian "capital error".[3] In his Discourse of Confirmation, Taylor says,

> For the rite is so wholly for the mystery, and the outward for the inward, and yet by the outward God so usually and regularly gives the inward, that as no man is to rely upon the external ministry as if the opus operantum would do the whole duty, so no man is to neglect the external because the internal is the more principal. The mistake in this particular hath caused great contempt of the sacraments and rituals of the Church, and is the ground of the Socinian errors in these questions.[4]

These statements indicate a familiarity with Socinian thought, but at most would imply some selective acceptance of their principles, but certainly not any which could not have been derived from other schools of thought.

We have two other references to Socinian works by

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[1]McLachlan, pp. 57-58.

[2]Pages 93-94 supra.

[3]Page 87 supra.

[4]Works, V, 634-35.

Taylor. One is in a letter to John Evelyn in which Taylor discusses the new sect called the "Perfectionists" and suggests that their major tenet, that it is possible to render to God perfect and entire obedience, is derived from Castellio.[1] In another letter, this one to Lord Conway, Taylor mentions his efforts to obtain, for Lord Conway, Castellio contra Beza.[2]

In summary, then, what can we say about Taylor's alleged Socinianism? One of the modern claimants for Socinian influence upon Taylor admits, after making great claims, that if we judge from the published writings of the Oxford moderates (and Taylor is included in this classification), we will find them "too cautious to commit themselves thus far, ...unmoved by Socinian teachings on the Trinity and the Atonement. But the rational, tolerant, and irenical notes typical of Socinian writers undoubtedly wakened in them a sympathetic response."[3]

That there were affinities we may agree, but there were obvious dissimilarities and overt disclaimers of being a Socinian. Taylor does not accept Socinian dogma contrary to orthodox belief, as in the doctrines of the Person and Work of Christ, Original Sin, the Atonement, and justifying Faith. He does have an affinity with Socinian tendencies

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[1]"Letter to John Evelyn, Esquire," dated Lisnagarvy, April 9, 1659. Cited by Heber, Works, lxxxi.

[2]Murray MSS, Taylor to Conway, 24 April 1658.

[3]McLachlan, pp. 88-89.

with regard to the matter of toleration, reliance on Scripture as the only source of truth, and the use of reason. Yet, it should be noted that in most of these areas there is a qualification which distinguishes Taylor from the company of Socinus' followers. Reason is not mere human reason; for Taylor, it is reason informed by the Holy Spirit. Toleration, for Taylor, is actually a limited one which excludes Socinians by being based on a minimal acceptance of the Apostles' Creed. And, while Taylor's emphasis on holy living--on becoming Good--makes him appear to be at one with the Socinians, this is more likely the result of Baconian influence rather than Socinian.

Therefore, if we accept the very broad definition of Socinianism which McLachlan advanced,[1] we might say Taylor was a "Socinian"; but it is most clear that, removing the name-calling of religious controversy and considering the whole works of Taylor, he was not a Socinian.

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[1]Page 83 supra.

PART III: TAYLOR'S ARMINIANISM

Taylor was accused of being "an Arminian, a Socinian, and a Papist or a half Papist." This triad shared a certain animosity toward those of strict Calvinist belief and we can write off these accusations to a certain degree as name-calling. Furthermore, there are affinities between Socinianism and Arminianism which make confusion of those terms understandable, both in the seventeenth century and in the twentieth.[1] Both these movements advocated the free interpretation of the Bible, perhaps due to a common Erasmian influence. Also, both advocated the principle of toleration of divergent opinion and belief in religion. Nonetheless, it is possible to distinguish between these movements and to consider the degree of influence which Arminianism had upon Taylor.

Definition of Arminianism

The doctrines of Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609), professor at Leyden University, were developed and attained a certain degree of form in the Remonstrance of 1610. In

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[1]"Arminianism and Socinianism had close affinities that were born of a similar tendency of mind. The difference between them was more one of emphasis than radical departure. ... The opponents of one system found themselves at loggerheads also with the other and did not often discriminate between them. 'One egge is no liker another, neither doth milk more resemble milk, than the Remonstrants do the Socinians', wrote Nicholas Chewney in 1656." McLachlan, p. 50.

this, the party of Arminius' followers set out five points in which they departed from orthodox Calvinism. The first claimed that those who believe in Christ are saved and those who do not are damned, and that neither is the result of divine predestination. The second asserted that Christ died on the cross for the redemption of all men, not just for the elect. Saving faith is received by man not from his own free will but from the grace of God by rebirth and renewal. The fourth point was that all good works are solely due to the grace of God. The last point was that although man can remain in a state of grace and will be sustained and protected by the Holy Spirit, it is possible for him, through his own negligence, to lose that state.[1]

In a recent symposium sponsored by the Remonstrant Brotherhood, scholars from both sides of the Atlantic discussed the nature and influence of Arminianism. We can draw upon these scholars for an answer to the question, "What do the Arminians hold?"[2] Geoffrey Nuttall, discussing the influence of Arminianism in England pointed out that it was vast and then said,

> If at all adequately dealt with, it would include, besides the gradual, and eventually almost insensible, adoption of the doctrine of

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[1]Arminius Symposium held at Amsterdam, Leiden, and Utrecht in Holland, August 4-7, 1960, as a part of a national celebration of the four hundredth anniversary of the birth of Jacobus Arminius.

[2]The classical rejoinder is, "The best bishoprics and deaneries in all England." There is a shorter one: "The best livings in England."

> general redemption, the consideration of the increasingly large place allowed to reason in religion as over against superstition; also it would show the growth in mutual tolerance among Christians and the toleration of multiformity in religion by the State, which came to accompany this. All these phenomena undoubtedly had other theological, and also other more secular contributory causes, besides what may, broadly speaking, be called Arminianism; but Arminianism played no small part.[1]

James Luther Adams, discussing Arminianism and the Structure of Society acknowledges that even when carefully defined, Arminianism has assumed many shades of meaning. He bids us consider the variety of ingredients to be found in the antecedents of Arminianism and in its early development: he refers to Dutch Lutheranism, to the experience of the sectarians and the struggles for toleration of the Anabaptists and the Mennonites. "It presupposed also the spirit of Erasmus, 'the philosophy of Christ,' an ethical teaching that claimed to be available to reasonable men everywhere, a teaching to be appropriated through free inquiry and through cultivation of the mind. In the famous school of the Devotio Moderna in Utrecht, Arminius acquired his classical learning, and from it he gained also his conception of a divinely derived 'good conscience' and Christian liberty. Erasmus previously had also attended the school of the Brethren of the Common Life. Moreover, already within the first generation, Arminianism had become the name of a High-Church anti-Puritan movement in the Church of England." Adams concludes his discussion

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[1]Gerald O. McCulloh, ed., Man's Faith and Freedom, The

of a definition of Arminianism by saying,

> In general, it has promoted "a free and catholic spirit" that has cherished practical morality as a sign of the Christian way. This spirit is not to be grasped merely by listing doctrines that are the opposite of those set forth in The Articles of the Synod of Dort. We can say that it was initially informed by some such gestalt of ideas as the following: the Christian must place his confidence in the sovereignty and mercy of God; all that is worthy in human life depends upon his grace; salvation through Christ is available to all men; faith precedes election; yet the regenerate man derives from Christ the grace to respond to the offer of salvation; and from Christ he derives also Christian liberty.[1]

We may, from these attempts to define Arminianism, draw the following conclusions: Arminianism was a reaction to the deterministic logic of orthodox Calvinism. It centered in the rejection of both the Supralapsarian and Sublapsarian forms of predestination; it asserted that Divine Sovereignty was compatible with real free-will in man; that Christ had died for all; that is, that grace was universal (though not asserting the universalism found in Origen). Arminius also advocated toleration in matters of religion and to this end, called for the distinction of fundamentals and nonessentials in religion. From this it followed that the territorial idea of religious adherence was to be replaced by a comprehension of religious positions which was to be guaranteed by the secular government. This Erastianism was naturally advocated by the Arminians. Since

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Theological Influence of Jacobus Arminius (New York, 1962), p. 49.

[1]McCulloh, pp. 90-91.

this toleration was based on the belief that conscience was the judge in matters of religion and morals, men were to be persuaded not forced to accept a given religious position.

Before examining the writings of Taylor to ascertain the affinities between his thought and Arminian thought, let us consider the contacts which we know Taylor to have had with Arminians (and Arminian works).

In the forefront one must consider Lancelot Andrewes, the man who was rated highly by both Bacon and Taylor. Andrewes' most recent biographer has stated that though he cannot be classified formally as an Arminian, "We may fairly conclude he was truly one in spirit; and a spiritual succession from Andrewes through the Caroline divines and the non-jurors... is a most legitimate descent."[1] It is known that Andrewes was a friend of and corresponded with Hugo Grotius, one of the outstanding Arminians of the early seventeenth century.[2] Thus, we may conclude that Andrewes would have been a source of Arminian ideas for Taylor.[3]

Hugo Grotius who studied under Arminius or

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[1]Maurice F. Reidy, Bishop Lancelot Andrewes (Loyola University Press, 1955), p. 77.

[2]Rosalie L. Colie, Light and Enlightenment (Cambridge, 1957), p. 14.

[3]Note: Taylor refers to Andrewes in Einiatos, using his sermon illustrations; iv, 487; he refers to Andrewes' Tortua in his Apology for the Liturgy (v, 236); refers to Andrewes Resp. ad apol. Bellarmine in his Real Presence, vi, 165; appears to have seen a tract by Andrewes on the fourth book of Hooker's Polity, ix, 697; and refers to

Leyden[1] was a definite source of Arminian thought for Taylor. It is Eden Page's opinion that Taylor's admiration for Grotius had more to do in forming his views on Original Sin than any dislike for Augustine which Heber had suggested.[2] Taylor associates himself with "the incomparable Hugo Grotius" and with Erasmus, among others, in defending his view of Original Sin in the seventh chapter of Unum Necessarium.[3] In this same passage, he says that he supposes "their great names are guard sufficient against prejudices and trifling noises, and an amulet against the names of Arminian, Socinian and Pelagian, and I cannot tell what monsters of appellatives."[4]

Taylor may be linked to another Arminian, Gerhard Johannes Voss, often referred to by the Latinized form of the name, Vossius.[5] Vossius had spent some time in England during the reign of James I and had been made a canon of Canterbury. His contribution was the providing of a

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him, x, 259, and misapplies in the same fashion an illustration from Homer, x, 463.

[1]McCulloh, p. 70.

[2]Works, I, xlvi.

[3]Works, VII, 330.

[4]Jordan, in The Development of Religious Toleration in England, II, 348, says, "The powerful influence and the nobility of Grotius' views served to keep intact the Arminian tradition during the period of exile of the Remonstrants."

[5]One of four whom Rosalie Colie claims were mainly responsible for the modification of Arminius' position regarding the authority of the magistrate.

careful selection of biblical passages providing justification of the theory of divine right of kings, which enhanced his position in the eyes of the king, in spite of Archbishop Abbot's influence for the Counter-Remonstrants. Vossius is referred to as "that learned and good man" in the seventh chapter of the Unum Necessarium.[1]

Simon Bischop (1583-1643), better known as Episcopius, who systematized the typical tenets of Arminianism[2] was another Arminian who was read and approved by Taylor. In a letter, Taylor remarked of Episcopius, "His 'whole works are excellent and contain the whole body of orthodox religion.'"[3] Episcopius "emphasized the practical nature of Christianity, affirmed that the Church is based upon a minimum of speculative beliefs, remonstrated against current Calvinist dogmas of predestination and original sin, stressed the responsibility of man, not God, for sin, and taught a reduced view of the divinity of Christ and a subordinationist doctrine of the Trinity."[4]

These four--Andrewes, Grotius, Vossius, and Episcopius--would provide sufficient substance to suggest that Taylor came by his Arminian affinities through his reading and

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[1] Works, VII, 323.

[2] Oxford Dictionary of the English Church, p. 458.

[3] A letter to Graham, in Dopping's Commonplace Book, Trinity College Library, Dublin. Cited by Stranks, p. 161, n. 1.

[4] Oxford Dictionary of the English Church, p. 458.

study. In addition, there was probably the influence of others who had imbibed Arminian theology, among them the Oxford Latitudinarians, especially John Hales. Nonetheless, it is good to reiterate the warning given by Rosalie Colie,

> One must avoid the conclusion that Arminianism in England was the direct result of the visits of Arminians to that country, or even the direct result of Arminian books. Generally speaking, the Calvinist system did not offer a universally happy solution to separation from the Church of Rome, and "Arminian" ideas sprang up spontaneously all over the reformed north as a reaction to Genevan strictures of doctrine. But in England the name of Arminianism caught hold, and Puritans miserable at the increased power of the Church of England under King Charles attacked as "Arminians" their prelatical opponents.[1]

Taylor most certainly came face to face with Arminian thought. The question for us is whether he was Arminian in thought, or whether he was called such by the affinity of his own thought, or whether he does, perhaps with modifications, exemplify Arminianism in the Church of England of the seventeenth century.

Arminian Doctrine in Taylor

The major tenet of Arminianism was that of rejecting both the Supralapsarian and the Sublapsarian views of predestination. While allowing predestination, they claimed that it was posited upon God's foreknowledge of the individual's faith and obedience. In other words, man, through

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[1]Light and Enlightenment, p. 14.

the exercise of his free-will, not God, by a divine fiat, determined a man to election or damnation. The Arminians attacked the Calvinist doctrine of predestination on the grounds that it "was representing God as the author of sin; nor that alone; but also that God really sins, nay, that God alone sins."[1]

Taylor's agreement with the Arminian position is clearly enunciated in Deus Justificatus where he says,

> There are one sort of Calvin's scholars, whom we for distinction's sake call Supralapsarians, who are so fierce in their sentences of predestination and reprobation, that they say God looked upon mankind only as His creation and His slaves, over whom He having absolute power, was very gracious that He was pleased to take some few, and save them absolutely; and to the other greater part He did no wrong, though He was pleased to damn them eternally, only because he pleased;.... But this bloody and horrible opinion is held but by a few;.... It makes God be all that for which any other thing or person is or can be hated.[2]

Taylor refers to the Sublapsarians as "the more wary and temperate of the Calvinists [who] bring down the order of reprobation lower; affirming that God looked upon all mankind in Adam as fallen into His displeasure, hated by God, truly guilty of his sin, liable to eternal damnation, and they being all equally condemned, He was pleased to separate some, the smaller number far, and irresistibly bring them to heaven; but the far greater number He passed over, leaving them to be damned for the sin of Adam: and

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[1]Arminius, Works, III, 657. Cited by Jordan, II, 325.

[2]Works, VII, 500-01.

so they think they salve God's justice; and this was the design and device of the synod of Dort."[1] After showing that in order to develop this position the Calvinists teach a particular interpretation of Original Sin (with which Taylor disagrees and which will be considered later), Taylor concludes, "But this way of stating the article of reprobation is as horrid in the effect as the other."[2] Thus Taylor rejects both the Supralapsarian and the Sublapsarian statements of the Calvinist doctrine of predestination.

Taylor maintained that our election depends upon our faith and obedience. In a discourse entitled "Of Certainty of Salvation" which is found in the Great Exemplar, Taylor expounds this opinion. He says that if we would consider "that in scripture it was not revealed to any man concerning his final condition, but to the dying penitent thief, and to the twelve apostles, that twelve thrones were designed for them, and a promise made of their enthronization; and yet that no man's final estate is so clearly declared miserable and lost as that of Judas, one of the twelve to whom a throne was promised; the result will be, that the election of holy persons is a condition allied to duty, absolute and infallible in the general, and supposing all the dispositions and requisites concurring; but fallible in the particular if we fall off from

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[1] Works, VII, 501-02.

[2] Works, VII, 503.

the mercies of the covenant, and prevaricate the conditions. But the thing which is most observable is, that if in persons so eminent and privileged, and to whom a revelation of their election was made as a particular grace, their condition had one weak leg, upon which because it did rely for one half of the interest, it could be no stronger than its supporters: the condition of lower persons, to whom no revelation is made, no privileges are indulged, no greatness of spiritual eminency is appendent, as they have no greater certainty in the thing, as they have less in person; and are therefore to work out their salvation with great fears and tremblings of spirit."[1]

It follows from this that grace is not irresistible and therefore saints may fall. Taylor reminds us that,

> We find in scripture many precepts given to holy persons being in the state of grace, to secure their standing, and perpetuate their present condition. For "he that endureth unto the end," he only "shall be saved," said our blessed Savior: and "he that standeth, let him take heed lest he fall:" and, "thou standest by faith; be not high-minded, but fear:" and "work out your salvation with fear and trembling:" "hold fast that thou hast, and let no man take the crown from thee;"[2]

Taylor summarizes, saying that if this is true when addressed to the whole gentile world by St. Paul, "much more is it true in single persons, whose election in particular is shut up in the abyss, and permitted to the condition of

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[1]Works, II, 547.

[2]Works, II, 552.

our faith and obedience, and the revelations of doomsday."[1]

Now, grace being resistible was, nevertheless, universal. Taylor agreed with the Arminians in this and expressed it in "Considerations of the Epiphany of the Blessed Jesus by a Star, and the Adoration of Jesus by the Eastern Magi" in Great Exemplar:

> God, who is the universal Father of all men, at the nativity of the Messiah gave notice of it to all the world, as they were represented by the grand division of Jews and gentiles;... For the gospel is of universal dissemination, not confined within the limits of a national prerogative, but catholic and diffused: as God's love was, so was the dispensation of it, "without respect of persons;" for all, being included under the curse of sin, were to Him equal and indifferent, undistinguishable objects of mercy; and Jesus, descended of the Jews, was also "the expectation of the gentiles; and therefore communicated to all; the grace of God being like the air we breathe; and "it hath appeared to all men," saith St. Paul:...[2]

In the conclusion of that section, Taylor says, "And thus, in one view and two instances, God hath drawn all the world to Himself by His Son Jesus,...that in Him all nations and all conditions, and all families, and all persons, might be blessed;..."[3]

Another tenet of the Arminian party, one which was shared by Bacon and by the Socinians, was that which called for distinguishing between fundamentals and non-essentials. The Arminian, Episcopius, maintained the right of individuals

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[1]Works, II, 553.

[2]Works, II, 91.

[3]Works, II, 96.

to form their own religious opinions and was willing to tolerate what he regarded as error in the thoughts of others.[1] "His tolerance appears to have been rooted in the conditions that the doctrines necessary for salvation were clearly revealed in the Bible, that they were few and simple, and that they were generally entertained by Christians of all communions. He repeatedly stressed the conviction that any doctrine which is in controversy is probably obscure and not of fundamental importance, and that it could therefore be relegated to the arena of free discussion."[2] In a letter to Grotius following the Synod of Dort, Episcopius stated his belief that the Remonstrants, with their insistence upon a distinction of fundamentals and unessentials and their willingness to tolerate others of differing opinions, provided the key to Christian peace. He said that true Christianity could never be attained "until an accurate discrimination be made between necessary and unnecessary truths. To contend earnestly for an unnecessary truth, as though it were an important point of doctrine, is a line of conduct I shall never adopt.... I believe...that to draw a line of distinction between essential and unessential truths, and promote unity and peace among Christians, should be the end and object of all our labours and writings, and that to which every thing else

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[1]Jordan, II, 338.

[2]F. Calder, Memoirs of Simon Episcopius (1838), p. 499. Cited in Jordan, II, 339-40.

ought to be subservient."[1]

Taylor shares his thoughts on this matter with us in the Epistle Dedicatory to the Liberty of Prophesying, saying that he "thought it might not misbecome my duty and endeavors to plead for peace and charity, and forgiveness and permissions mutual."[2] To achieve this, he points out that some doctrines are clearly unnecessary and others are, on the contrary, absolutely necessary; therefore, he says, "Why may not the first separation be made upon this difference, and articles necessary be only urged as necessary, and the rest left to men indifferently as they were by the scripture indeterminately?"[3] And when this is considered, he suggests that we not think all who differ from us to be fools but to remember that we may be mistaken ourselves. Taylor asserts that the necessary doctrines are few and clearly revealed, while those which are disputable are not clearly revealed:

> And such is the nature of all questions disputable, which are therefore not required of us to be believed in any one particular sense, because the nature of the thing is such as not to be necessary to be known at all simply and absolutely; and such is the ambiguity and cloud of its face and representment, as not to be necessary so much as to be accident, and therefore not to be the particular sense of any one person.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 501. Cited in Jordan, II, 339-40.

[2] Works, V, 343.

[3] Works, V, 345.

[4] Works, V, 349.

Many could agree with the above sentiments in the seventeenth century... the difficulty was in agreeing upon what was a practical statement of that which was necessary. It was Taylor's opinion, and this was his practical approach to the problem, that, "We have no other help in the midst of these distractions and disunions, but all of us to be united in that common term, which as it does constitute the church in its being such, so is it the medium of the communion of saints, and that is the creed of the apostles; and in all other things an honest endeavor to find out what truths we can, and a charitable and mutual permission to others that disagree from us and our opinions."[1] He was confident that this would prove a satisfactory basis and confessed he knew of no other, going so far as to suggest that this was the only reasonable position, against which a man could throw himself upon chance, absolute predestination, or his own confidence, "in every one of which it is two to one at least but he may miscarry."[2]

The second distinction is to be that of persons;... that is, whether they "be Christian in their lives and Christians in their profession, if they acknowledge the eternal Son of God for their Master and their Lord, and live in all relations as becomes persons making such professions...."[3]

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[1] Works, V, 357.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Works V, 346.

Thus it is that Taylor says, "If I tell him [an honest man] that he must live a good life and believe the creed, and not trouble himself with... disputes, or interest himself in sects and factions, I speak reason; because no law of God ties him to believe more than what is of essential necessity, and whatsoever he shall come to know to be revealed by God: Now if he believes his creed, he believes all that is necessary to all..."[1] The creed is "the rule of unity which the apostles gave."[2] Thus Taylor's definition of a heretic is also in accord with the apostles' teaching: "such as deny Christ to become in the flesh, such as deny any articles of the creed;..."[3] To do such "breaks part of the covenant made between God and man by the mediation of Jesus Christ" and Taylor grants that it is a grievous crime, "a calling God's veracity into question, and a destruction also of good life; because upon the articles of creed obedience is built, and it lives or dies as the effect does by its proper cause, for faith is the moral cause of obedience."[4] Even so, we are cautioned against giving the name of heresy to matters of opinion, to things concerned with "human ends," rather than with "divine rules."

In fine, Taylor's position is summed up in the following passage from the body of the Liberty of Prophesying:

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[1]Works, V, 355.

[2]Ibid., 353.

[3]Ibid., 359.

[4]Ibid., 560.

> The peace of the church and the unity of her doctrine is best conserved when it is judged by the proportion it hath to that rule of unity which the apostles gave, that is the creed, for articles of mere belief, and the precepts of Jesus Christ, and the practical rules of piety, which are most plain and easy, and without controversy, set down in the gospels and writings of the apostles. But to multiply articles, and adopt them into the family of faith, and to require assent to such articles which (as St. Paul's phrase is) are of "doubtful disputation" equal to that assent we give to matters of faith, is to build a tower on top of a bulrush: and the further the effect of such proceedings does extend, the worse they are: the very making such a law is unreasonable, the inflicting spiritual censures upon them that cannot do so much violence to their understanding as to obey it, is unjust and ineffectual; but to punish the person with death or with corporal infliction, indeed it is effectual, but it is therefore tyrannical.[1]

In Taylor's opinion, the punishment of heretics should not be greater than the apostles' suggestions, which are to reject them and not to wish them God-speed.[2] Episcopius, representing the Arminians, limited the disciplinary power of the church to disowning the doctrine and excluding the man from the Church when the individual professed a doctrine clearly contrary to the fundamentals of the faith.[3]

But how were men to propagate the true faith? By what means should they convert? Arminius advocated commending the faith to others by persuasion and not by compulsion; and when there are differences upon some articles, "then the right hand of fellowship should be extended by both

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[1] Works, V, 533.

[2] Ibid., 359.

[3] Jordan, Religious Toleration in England, II, 343.

parties," and each of the parties should "acknowledge the other for partakers of the same faith and fellow-heirs of the same salvation."[1] Furthermore, it is the obligation of the magistrates to maintain the conditions making such discussion possible. Thus Grotius in his Rights of War and Peace denounced the tendency of church systems to utilize the sword in order to secure or maintain dominance.[2] We have already noted that Taylor decried the use of coercion and violence on the part of the Church. But he did not mean to imply a benign acceptance of error; on the contrary, he called for its zealous suppression, saying,

> But let it be done by such means as are proper instruments of their suppression, by preaching and disputation (so that neither of them breed disturbance), by charity and sweetness, by holiness of life, assiduity of exhortation, by the word of God and prayer.
>
> For these ways are most natural, most prudent, most peaceable and effectual. Only let not men be hasty in calling every disliked opinion by the name of heresy; and when they have resolved that they will call it so, let them use the erring person like a brother, not beat him like a dog, or convince him with a gibbet, or vex him out of his understanding and persuasions.[3]

This same theme is developed in a sermon on "The Faith and Patience of the Saints" which was part of the summer half of Eniatos. In it, Taylor reiterated the position called for in his earlier Liberty of Prophesying and compared the

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[1]Arminius, Writings, I, 188-89. Cited by McCulloh, p. 95.

[2]Rights of War and Peace, p. 255. Cited by Jordan, II, 347.

[3]Works, V, 354.

tendency of his day with the Gospel prophecies and commandments:

> ...But He never promised to His servants that they should pursue kings and destroy armies, that they should reign over the nations, and promote the cause of Jesus Christ by breaking His commandments.... But now-a-days we find a generation of men who have changed the covenant of sufferings into victories and triumphs, riches and prosperous chances, and reckon their Christianity by their good fortunes; as if Christ had promised to His servants no heaven hereafter, no Spirit in the meantime to refresh their sorrows; as if He had enjoined them no passive graces; but as if to be a Christian and to be a Turk were the same thing. Mahomet entered and possessed by the sword: Christ came by the cross, entered by humility; and His saints "possess their souls by patience'"[1]

Taylor points out that forced unity of persuasion never was nor ever will be real and substantial; and "though it were very convenient if it could be had, yet it is therefore not necessary because it is impossible."[2] Besides, whatever advantages to the public would follow from such forced unity, might "be supplied by a charitable compliance and mutual permission of opinion, and the offices of a brotherly affection prescribed us by the laws of Christianity."[3] The ecclesiastical and the secular authority must both leave to God the judgment of those who err. But, allowing for the distinction of fundamentals and nonessentials and advocating only suasion, not the use of force, to change men's opinions, the toleration which Taylor advocated did have some

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[1]Works, IV, 442.

[2]Liberty of Prophesying, Works, V, 602.

[3]Ibid.

limitations:

> ...Whatsoever is against the foundation of faith, or contrary to good life and the laws of obedience, or destructive to human society and the public and just interests of bodies politic, is out of the limits of my question, and does not pretend to compliance or toleration: so that I allow no indifferency, nor any countenance to those religions (if there be any such) that teach ill life; nor do I think that anything will now excuse from belief of a fundamental article, except stupidity or sottishness and natural inability.[1]

Taylor's idea of toleration leads us to see his complete Erastianism. Kings are supreme in religion or they are but half-kings, since the affairs of religion represent a goodly portion of the interests of mankind. Since it is unlawful for a subject to rebel or take up arms against the civil power under any circumstances, the civil power is supreme in ecclesiastical causes as well as secular ones.[2] The Erastian position as developed by Episcopius, Grotius, and other Arminians expanded beyond the narrow considerations of Erastus and called upon the state to order religious life and worship that protection might be afforded to all Christian communions. Although this did not carry the day in seventeenth century Holland, English Erastianism, establishing the civil government as the seat of authority, framed and enforced an ecclesiastical order which imposed a tolerant and comprehensive system, employing coercion against those individuals and sects who refused to abandon

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[1] Works, V, 346.

[2] Ductor Dubitantium, Works, X, 314.

the ancient ideal of religious uniformity.[1]

Taylor's acceptance of this comprehensive view of the church is ably set forth in a prayer from Holy Dying:

> Lord, let me never have my portion amongst those that divide the union, and disturb the peace, and break the charitie of the church and christian communion. And though I am fallen into evil times, in which christendom is divided by the names of an evil division; yet I am in charity with all Christians, with all that love the Lord Jesus, and long for His coming, and I would give my life to save the soul of any of my brethren; and I humbly beg of Thee, that the public calamity of the several societies of the church may not be imputed to my soul, to any evil purposes.[2]

Taylor's position on toleration and the distinguishing of fundamentals and nonessentials points to the placing of authority in matters of dogma and morals in the individual conscience, ultimately. Thus, while the clear and simple fundamentals, in which the Arminians had every confidence and which Taylor summarized in the Creed, assured a modicum of an agreement among Christians, it was still the responsibility of every man before God to exercise his conscience in making the decisions which determined his actions and his belief. Furthermore, though he recognized that many men were not competent to do more than accept guides in these matters, he yet required them to judge the guides; that is, to evaluate the man's life and the fruits of his belief. Conscience thus appears to be based upon common

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[1]Jordan, II, 455; McCulloh, p. 99.

[2]Works, III, 401.

sense possessed by every man, and the theologian's task is to educate those who are capable of being educated to make decisions through the exercise of their consciences. If properly instructed and inspired, men will not err; or if they should err, will not thereby reap damnation except it be through willful error.

What then shall be said of Taylor and Arminianism? It is clear that Taylor had every opportunity to imbibe Arminian ideas, from the Dutch Arminians or their English disciples, especially through his contact with Grotius, whom he so openly admired--or even from the air, as it were. His rejection of both the Supralapsarian and the Sublapsarian views of election and the assertion of free will; his positing of universal grace and his toleration based upon the distinction of matters fundamental from those unessential; and his full-blown Erastianism certainly indicate an affinity with Arminianism. But, here again, it is necessary to remember that his views on toleration and on the relationship between the ecclesiastical authority and the Crown stem from Baconianism. Thus, while he may have affinities with the teachings of Arminius and his followers, he cannot be called an Arminian, but rather may be said to have been "Arminian".

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this study was to examine the thought of Jeremy Taylor and to determine the relationship which he had with three trends of contemporary seventeenth century thought: Baconianism, Socinianism, and Arminianism. The result of this study may be summarized as follows:

1. Taylor gives reasonable evidence in his writings of the acceptance of Baconian concepts and attitudes; and he has applied them in the realm of religion. His work in the field of casuistry appears to supply the deficiency which Bacon had noted in his survey of the state of knowledge. This internal evidence is supported by the recently recognized fact that Bacon's work and thought were enjoying a resurgence of influence during the very years in which Taylor was forming his opinions and expressing himself in his published works. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that Taylor's patrons all had connections with known Baconians and a great number of Taylor's known friends were also connected with Baconian projects and interests.

2. Taylor rejected, completely, the Socinian dogmatic position except as it coincided with general Christian teaching. The accusation that he was a Socinian seems to be contemporary name-calling; and his association with Socinian thought in subsequent days appears to be the

result of the attempt to see Socinianism as the great liberal influence which permeated all Protestant thought of the seventeenth century.

3. The accusation that Taylor was an Arminian has greater credibility than the charge of Socinianism. There is definite affinity with the Arminian position in many points, and the admiration which Taylor had for Arminians such as Grotius, Vossius, and Episcopius makes it highly probable that he was influenced by Arminian thought. Even so, Taylor denied the title of Arminian just as he did that of Socinian, Pelagian, "and I cannot tell what monsters of appellations."[1]

The truth is that Taylor was an eclectic thinker. As J. T. Worely put it, "His natural breadth of mind, widened by his insatiable appetite for reading, often led him away from the traditions of his own school and to hold views on various doctrinal points sometimes thought to exclude each other, or, at all events, scarcely possible to be held simultaneously."[2]

But, let Taylor speak for himself. In a sermon entitled "Of Christian Prudence", published as a part of the summer half of Eniatos, he said:

> Let us make one separation more, and then we may consider and act according to the premises. If we espy a design or an evil mark upon one doctrine, let us divide it from the other that are not so spotted. For indeed the public com-

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[1] Works, VII, 330.

[2] Worely, Jeremy Taylor, p. 106.

> munions of men are at this day so ordered that they are as fond of their errors as of their truths, and sometimes most zealous for that which they have least reason to be so. And if we can by any arts of prudence separate from an evil proposition and communicate in all the good, then we may love colleges of religious persons, though we do not worship images; and we may obey our prelates, though we do no injury to princes; and we may be zealous against a crime, though we be not imperious over men's persons; and we may be diligent in the conduct of souls, though we be not rapacious of estates: and we may be moderate exactors of obedience to human laws, though we do not dispense with the breach of the divine; and the clergy may represent their calling necessary, though their persons be full of modesty and humility; and we may preserve our rights, and not lose our charity. For this is the meaning of the apostle, "Try all things, and retain that which is good:" from every sect and community of Christians take any thing that is good, that advances holy religion and the divine honour. For one hath a better government, a second a better confession, a third hath excellent spiritual arts for the conduct of souls, a fourth hath fewer errors;....[1]

Thus Taylor preached; thus he thought. His motto could well have been those lines from Lucretius with which he had ended his Deus Justificatus and which he had translated:

> Fear not to own what's said because 'tis new,
> Weigh well and wisely if the thing be true.[2]

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[1] Works, IV, 606.

[2] Lucretius, Lib. II, line 1039. Taylor, Works, VII, 537.

APPENDIX

Taylor's Works with Original Dates of Publication

1. A Sermon Preached upon the Anniversary of Gunpowder Treason. Oxford, 1638.

2. Of the Sacred Order and Offices of Episcopacy. Oxford, 1642.

3. The Psalter of David. Oxford, 1644. (Sometimes attributed to C. Hatton)

4. A Discourse concerning Prayer Extemporary. Anon. London, 1646.

5. A Discourse of the Liberty of Prophesying. London, 1647.

6. An Apology for Authorized and Set Forms of Liturgie. London, 1649. (This is an expanded version of item 4 above.)

7. The Great Exemplar of Sanctity and Holy Life according to the Christian Institution. Described in the History of the Life and Death of the Ever Blessed Jesus Christ, The Savior of the World. London, 1649.

8. A Funeral Sermon Preached at the Obsequies of the Right Honorable and Most Virtuous Lady, The Lady Frances, Countess of Carbery. London, 1650.

9. The Rule and Exercises of Holy Living. London, 1650.

10. The Rule and Exercises of Holy Dying. London, 1651.

11. Clerus Domini, or, A Discourse of the Divine Institution, Necessity, Sacredness, and Separation of the Office Ministerial. London, 1651.

12. Twenty-Seven Sermons Preached at Golden Grove; Being for the Summer Half-Year. London, 1651.

13. A Short Catechism for the Institution of Young Persons in the Christian Religion: to Which Is Added an Explication of the Apostles Creed. London, 1652.

14. A Discourse of Baptism. London, 1652.

15. Two Discourses, One, Of Baptism; Two, Of Prayer. London, 1653.

16. Twenty-Five Sermons Preached at Golden Grove; Being for the Winter Half-Year. London, 1653. These sermons, together with those for the summer half-year, item 12 above, were published under the title, Ἐνιαυτός, A Course of Sermons for All the Sundays of the Year. 1653.

17. The Real Presence and Spiritual of Christ in the Blessed Sacrament proved against the Doctrine of Transubtantiation. London, 1654.

18. The Golden Grove; or a Manual of Daily Prayers and Litanies. Also Festival Hymns, according to the manner of the ancient Church, composed for the use of the devout, especially of younger persons. London, 1655. Incorporates item 13 above.

19. Unum Necessarium, or The Doctrine and Practice of Repentance. London, 1655.

20. A Further Explication of the Doctrine of Original Sin. London, 1656. This was a pamphlet of some 54 pages usually bound up between pages 448 and 449 of Unum Necessarium, after the first edition.

21. Deus Justificatus, or a Vindication of the Glory of the Divine Attributes in the question of Original Sin, against the presbyterian way of understanding it. London, 1656.

22. Correspondence between John Warner, Bishop of Rochester, and Doctor Taylor, concerning the chapter of Original Sin in the Unum Necessarium. London, 1656.

23. Συμβολον Ἠθικο-Πολεμικὸν or a Collection of Polemical and Moral Discourses. London, 1657. This is a reissue of items 2, 5, 6, 17, 18, and 21. The new material being the dedication and that added to the Liberty of Prophesying, the refutation of the anabaptists and the concluding paragraph.

24. A Discourse of the Nature and Offices of Friendship. London, 1657.

25. Two Letters to Persons Changed in Their Religion. London, 1657.

26. A Collection of Offices, or Forms of Prayer in cases ordinary and extraordinary, taken out of the scriptures and the ancient liturgies of several churches, especially the Greek. Together with a large preface

in vindication of the liturgy of the Church of England. Anon. London, 1657.

27. Ductor Dubitantium, or The Rule of Conscience in all her general measures; serving as a great instrument for the determination of Cases of Conscience. London, 1660.

28. The Worthy Communicant. London, 1660.

29. A Sermon Preached at the Consecration of Two Archbishops and Ten Bishops. London, 1661.

30. A Sermon Preached at the Opening of the Parliament in Ireland. London, 1661.

31. Rules and Advices to the Clergy of the Diocese of Down and Connor. Dublin, 1661.

32. Via Intelligentiae. (A sermon preached to the University of Dublin) London, 1662.

33. A Sermon Preached in Christ Church, Dublin: at the Funeral of the Most Reverend Father in God, John, late Lord Archbishop of Armagh, and Primate of All Ireland: with a Succinct Narrative of his whole Life. London, 1663.

34. Ἑβδομὰς Ἐμβολίμαιος (a seven sermon supplement to Ἐνιαυτός). London, 1663.

35. The Righteousness Evangelical Described. The Christian's Conquest over the Body of Sin. Fides Formata, or Faith working by Love. In three sermons preached at Christ Church, Dublin. Dublin, 1663.

36. Χρίσις τελειωτική, A Discourse of Confirmation. London, 1664.

37. A Dissuasive from Popery. London, 1664.

38. The Second Part of the Dissuasive from Popery. London, 1667.

39. Δεκὰς Ἐμβολίμαιος, A Supplement to the Ἐνιαυτός. London, 1667. A reissue of items 1, 8, 29, 30, 32, 33, 35, and two sermons on "The Whole Duty of the Clergy in Life, Belief, and Doctrine."

40. Three Letters to One Tempted to the Communion of the Church of Rome. London, 1673.

41. A Sermon Preached at the Funeral of That Worthy Knight, Sir George Dalston. London, 1674.

42. Christ's Yoke an Easy Yoke, And yet, The Gate to Heaven a Strait Gate. London, 1675. (two sermons)

43. On the Reverence Due to the Altar. (Edited by the Rev. John Barrow from the original MS.) Oxford, 1848.

44. A Form of Consecration or Dedication of Churches and Chapels according to the Use of the Church of Ireland. This was printed at Dublin in 1666, but it has only recently been identified as the work of Jeremy Taylor by F. R. Bolton.

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