STATUS CONSISTENCY AND SECONDARY STRATIFICATION CHARACTERISTICS IN AN URBAN METROPOLIS

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ABSTRACT

STATUS CONSISTENCY AND SECONDARY STRATIFICATION CHARACTERISTICS IN AN URBAN METROPOLIS

By

Ronald Burton

One of the purposes of this dissertation has been theoretical, empirical and methodological analysis of "status crystallization," with special emphasis on the Lenski Research Program. Some of the Program's key reasoning has been investigated to ascertain its relevance to the resolution of certain critical problems to be discussed later. Because the Program's original "core" assumptions are not supported by the "auxiliary" assumptions of the available survey-research (Lakatos, 1968) there are certain built-in weaknesses in this whole research approach.

When a person's ranks have low visibility we might call this "secondary stratification".

The following set of assumptions relates to these secondary stratification ranks:

(1) Secondary ranks are emphasized by P only when a highly visible rank is low.

(2) A secondary rank is recognized by only a limited-membership-group.

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(3) When a person steps outside that limited-membership group, the validation of secondary-rank claims is problematic.

The empirical data upon which the current analysis is based, was gathered from five cross-sectional probability-sample surveys of the adult population in Detroit, and is essentially the same data that Lenski used. The status-attributes used were high and low states of income and education; the dependent variables were inclinations toward social change (voting Democratic) and lack of social participation (frequency of contacting "relatives" and "other friends.") We controlled for "structural crystallization" (Smith, 1969) (above and below age forty-five) and ethnicity (Protestant and Catholic.)

Lenski had predicted that persons with inconsistencies involving a high state of achieved status and a low state of ascribed status would vote Democratic more often than Republican. However, when we introduce controls for age and provide alternative formulations based on the salience of ascribed versus achieved status, either the interaction effects disappear or the alternative formulations explain the data almost as well as the main formulations. As was suggested in Chapter III on voting behavior, of the two formulations provided, the "status" (ascribed) alternative operates, for an unexplained reason, to the exclusion of the "class" (achieved) formulation.

Concerning social participation, Lenski predicted that persons whose status is poorly crystallized will exhibit a tend

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exhibit a tendency to withdraw from, or avoid, social intercourse. He argued that negatively sanctioned or unrewarded behavior declines in frequency, and that status-inconsistency is associated with denial of rewards in the realm of interpersonal relations. One finds here neither distinction between the processes of "isolation" and "insulation" (Zelditch and Anderson, 1966) nor use of Blau's contributions (1964) on secondary-stratification characteristics which predict validation problems among "other friends" and not among visiting "relatives," based on the response to lack of education when paired with high income.

We find that the Lenski formulation generally lacks productivity and persistence because representative research in this tradition has been carried on primarily, in a survey-analysis setting, and its replications are self-restricted, not extending to other standardized settings.

In order to suggest that a research program be productive and have momentum, at least the following three conditions should be met:

(1) Applicability to different data-gathering settings.

(2) Openness to further research in elimination of alternative explanations of specific findings.

(3) Response to specific challenges either methodological or theoretical in nature.

Within such a perspective, the value of Lenski's formulation does not seem apparent. It has not been applied

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to a variety of standard settings. Its use has been restricted to similar types of analyses of survey-research without posing alternative formulations or answering the challenges of alternative formulations. In this way, the Lenski theory, unlike the Festinger "cognitive dissonance" theory (1957, 1964), has not been fecund in answering and building on challenges while maintaining the vitality of its "core" theoretical areas.

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CHAPTER I

THEORY

Historical Background

The theoretical roots of the study of multidimensional stratification are found in Weber's "Class, Status and Party," which provides a conceptual model of social stratification consisting of several empirically distinct hierarchies. Two forms of stratification are given primary consideration, class and social status, power being independent of the two. Class is based on position in the market economy, and social status is based on the distinction of social respect (Weber, 1953). Simmel also poses hypotheses concerning the relationship of conflicting multiple affiliation and the effects of status-inconsistency on behavior (Simmel, 1955:54). Marx's proposition of very high correlation between various rank hierarchies suggests a multidimensional view of social rank (Bendix and Lipset, 1953). Cooley, in his discussions of stratification wrote that: ". . . there are in fact an indefinite number of possible collocations" (Cooley, 1909:249). Sorokin thought of stratification as made up of occupational, economic and political hierarchies. He was one of the first theorists to suggest a t

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to suggest a tension related to ill-matched statuses, an "innerly antagonistic . . . multi-bonded stratum made up of mutually contradictory, uncongenial bond-values" (Sorokin, 1947:289; cited in Jackson, 1960).

The change in orientation from a unidimensional view of stratification reached a theoretical turning point in an article by Benoit-Smullyan in 1944. Benoit-Smullyan sees the economic, political and prestige dimensions as separate and distinct status-hierarchies, despite their frequently close correlation. There may develop in a society individuals whose status ranks on these several hierarchies are not parallel, a condition made explicable by the fact that as a man's status changes, affecting not only one dimension at a time, imbalances may occur.

> In a dynamic and mobile society, status equilibrium is always being disturbed since pronounced changes in status occur ordinarily in only one type of status at first, and are only gradually converted into equivalent statuses in other hierarchies (Benoit-Smullyan, 1944:160).

There is a pressure, then, toward "equilibration" of statuses through these "conversion" processes in the political, economic and social realms. In addition, if blockages in this "equilibrating" process occur, consequent tensions and frustrations lead to engagement in a course of action designed to bring about congruency in the individuals' statuses:

> Thus the customary and legal barriers of the 'ancien regime' prevented the prospering bourgeoisie from achieving a position in the political and prestige hierarchies which would be in line with their economic status. The economic

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> progress of the bourgeoisie would not in itself have produced the ensuing tensions, were it not for the fact that there exist strong psychological and social forces working toward status equilibrium which were continually blocked or repressed by institutional barriers (Benoit-Smullyan, 1944:160).

What Benoit-Smullyan suggests, then, is that persons experiencing tensions resulting from status "disequilibrium" may attempt to reduce the tension level by altering their rankings in one or more of the dimensions of status.

"Core" Assumptions in Theories of Status Inconsistency

This beginning by Benoit-Smullyan became the matrix of all subsequent studies of status equilibrium and disequilibrium: how equilibration originates, how tensions develop when the equilibrium is disrupted, and what "auxiliary" processes are applied to re-establish equilibrium. The major differences that develop are concerned with the formulation of tension assumptions and the development of equilibrating mechanisms.

There are three major types of theory regarding the formulation of tension assumptions (Anderson, 1971). Kimberly refers to these as the "psychology of status inconsistency" (1966). The first, referred to as the "cognitive balance-dissonance variant set" stems from Heider's theory of balance (1958) and Festinger's theory of dissonance (1957):

> Balance theory, at its most general level, focuses on the tendency for the affect characterizing the individuals' responses to parts of an entity to be of like sign.

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> Dissonance theory, for another example, focuses on cognitions which imply the obverse of one another and which appear to result from commitment to behavior which results in the frustration of an important motive (cited in Kimberly, 1966:218).

The most cogent of the studies in this tradition is that by Zelditch and Anderson (1966) which used a "balance" model to define the socio-psychological processes concerning the originations of tensions due to status disequilibrium:

> A rank is defined as any value on any criterion. An individual's ranks are balanced if they are all above, all equal to, or all below those of other individuals in the same system. The stratification structure is balanced if the ranks of all individuals within it are balanced (Zelditch and Anderson, 1966:246-248).

Essentially then, this "balance" formulation assumes the following: (a) balanced ranks are stable; (b) imbalanced ranks tend to change until they become balanced; and (c) imbalanced ranks produce a state of tension (Zelditch and Anderson, 1966:249).

The next tradition, which has been called the "cost-gain variant set" (Anderson, 1971) derives from Homans (1961) and Thibaut and Kelley (1959). According to Homans, tensions derive from situations in which persons in an exchange relationship expect the profits of each to be proportional to his investments. Under such a rule of "distributive justice"

> A man in an exchange relation with another will expect that the rewards of each man be proportional to his costs, the greater the rewards, the greater the costs, and that the net rewards, or profits, of each man be proportional to his

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> investments; the greater the investments, the greater the profit (Homans, 1961:75).

In the following passage, Homans adds that when investments are almost equal, the value of the rewards exchanged and the costs involved is expected to be equal (cited in Blau, 1971:57).

Thibaut and Kelley (1959) present a slight variation of this tension formulation:

> This is the concept of comparison level, which they define as the standard against which an individual evaluates the attractiveness of a given relationship. Attractiveness is a function of how close the outcomes, that is, the rewards and costs, of the relationship are to what the individual feels he deserves (Thibaut and Kelley, 1959: cited in Kimberly, 1970:84-85).

The most important spokesman for this "cost-gain outcome variant set" is Kimberly (1962, 1966, 1967, 1970) who developed a social psychology of status-inconsistency, based mainly on the work of Thibaut and Kelley (1959). Kimberly advances the argument that tensions are not a result of status-inconsistency *per se*, but rather of poor reward-cost outcomes often associated with inconsistency (Kimberly, 1967).

Adams (1965), whose work seems to span the first two traditions mentioned, argues that, in tracing the social psychology of "just distribution" of rewards to the work of relative deprivation:

> First, the dissatisfaction associated with relative deprivation results from felt injustice, rather than directly from relative deprivation. Second, what is just is based upon strong expectations. Third, a comparative

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> process is inherent in the development of expectations and the perception of injustice. Fourth, and finally, felt injustice is a response to a discrepancy between what is perceived to be and what is perceived should be (Adams, 1965: cited in Kimberly, 1970:84).

The final of the three theoretical positions related to tension-formation may be referred to as the "expectation-conflict variant set" (Anderson, 1971). The two major figures in this are Sampson (1963, 1969) and Lenski (1954, 1956, 1964, 1966, 1967) with Hughes (1944) Geschwender (1967) and Gibbs and Martin (1964) contributing in this tradition. The primary theoretical emphasis of this dissertation is based on this final tradition.

Both the Sampson and Lenski views begin with tension assumptions derived from Benoit-Smullyan (1944). They also similarly indicate an "expectation incongruity" component as a cause of tension. However, as we shall see, Sampson's expectation set is more "task positional" (1969) while Lenski's is more "social response" oriented (1967).

The "core assumption set" of Sampson (1969) consists of his idea of "positional" expectation incongruity and congruity; his rank variables are elements such as sex, age and class-level in college (Anderson, 1971a). In addition, in group situations tasks are characterized by a division of labor, since complex tasks that groups must accomplish consist in reality of a number of separate sub-tasks that must be coordinated (Brandon, 1965; Bunker, 1966; Sampson and Bunker, 1966; Kardush, 1968; cited in Sampson, 1969). An additional assumption is that these sub-tasks are given high or low s

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high or low status ranks by the participants in terms of how important they are. This position is similar to the Davis and Moore (1966) theory of stratification which emphasizes functional importance and concomitant evaluation.

A major assumption then, is that there is an expectation of "correspondence" between the state of the ranks (sex, age, class-level, et cetera) and the prestige and importance assumed in the sub-tasks involved. If for some reason the skill-level of the sub-task of an individual does not accord with the state of the ranks of the individual involved, "expectation incongruity" results. However, if there is a match between the level of the sub-tasks assigned and the state of the individual's rank, then the individual sees himself and is seen by others as congruent. Expectancy-incongruity between expected and realized tasks leads to tensions for the individual, while expectancy-congruence leads to satisfaction with the task-assignments (Sampson, 1969; cited in Anderson, 1971a).

Turning next to Lenski, one might spell out the "core" ideas in his formulation (Anderson, 1971b). Lenski deals with a group of status-variables including income, occupational prestige, education and a combined measure of racial and ethnic group standing. Interestingly, Lenski's core assumptions were only implicit until he himself delineated them recently:

> Individuals strive to maximize their satisfactions, even, if necessary, at the expense of others. This means that an individual with inconsistent statuses or ranks has a natural

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> tendency to think of himself in terms of that status or rank which is highest, and to expect others to do the same. Meanwhile, others who come in contact with him have a vested interest in doing just the opposite, that is, in treating him in terms of his lowest status or rank (Lenski, 1966:87).

Assuming that the state of the ranks that Lenski deals with can be seen as high or low, the following assumptions seem to follow. When an individual evaluates himself, he pays attention only to the average of the high states of his relevant ranks. A variant of this assumption might be that when an individual evaluates himself, he gives greater weight to that set of status-variables in which he is high, rather than to the set of status-variables in which he is low. The second assumption is that when others evaluate an individual, they evaluate him on the basis of his lower statuses, or give greater weight to his lower rather than to his higher statuses. The third assumption is that the individual expects others to evaluate him on the basis of his higher statuses. Finally, any discrepancy between how an individual and others evaluate the condition of his status-variables leads to tensions in the individual:

> One can see how this works, and the consequences of it, by imagining the interaction of a Negro doctor and a white laborer in a situation where neither the racial nor occupational status-system alone is relevant. The former, motivated by self-interest, will strive to establish the relationship on the basis of occupation (or perhaps education or wealth), while the latter, similarly motivated, will strive to establish the relationship on the basis of race. Since each regards his own point of view as right and proper, and since neither is likely to view the problem in a detached, analytical fashion, one or both are

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> likely to be frustrated, and probably angered by the experience (Lenski, 1966:87).

In a comparison of the Sampson and Lenski formulations, we see that Lenski emphasizes that in evaluation of self, tensions arise because of the difference between self-evaluation and evaluation made by others. Sampson, on the other hand, talks of the incongruity between where one expects to be and where one actually is in a group. Despite such differences, both aspects are variants of a basic "expectation-conflict variant set" deriving from Benoit-Smullyan's (1944) tension model. Anderson summarizes this point as follows:

> Sampson's and Lenski's formulations, of course, both have a tension assumption. Sampson's theory is more limited in scope, in that it pertains to task oriented groups with a division of labor. Lenski appears to be thinking of 'social' expectations regarding reward objects in a wide sense; acceptance, rebuffs, social standing; place in a division of labor and reward mediated by such positions in a status structure for Sampson (Anderson, 1971b: 2).

A variant of this "expectation conflict variant set" is the Gibbs and Martin (1964) theory of "status integration." The basic terms involved are roles, statuses, status-integration and role conflict. Status is seen as a form of social identification (such as married man, or barber) and the roles are the rights, duties, and obligations of the status. The basic assumptions are as follows: (1) The individual has a series of social identifications, (statuses) which have attached rights, duties and obligations (roles). (2) The individual is expected to perform

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the roles in each and every status he occupies. (3) Success in conforming to the roles of the statuses of an individual is dependent upon the nature of the roles of other statuses that a person occupies. Finally, (4), if conforming to the roles of one status interferes with conforming to the roles of another status, an individual is confronted with an incompatibility in statuses (Gibbs and Martin, 1964:23).

This, then, is the tension model that is posed, and the variant is seen as similar to Sampson and Lenski: certain behavior is expected of the roles in each of the individuals' statuses, and if two statuses have conflicting roles it makes these statuses incompatible when occupied simultaneously.

Similar to these formulations is Hughes' (1944) "role conflict" position which stems from Simmel's concern with interaction within small groups instead of whole societies. Simmel was concerned with the instabilities of situations rather than with their monolithic structures (Simmel, 1950). Following in this tradition, Hughes sees the "marginal man" as one at odds with his contemporaries. Caught between worlds:

> . . . he is not amenable to easy categorizations; his self-image and the image others have of him are at best ambiguous. Hughes sees much of this hinging upon 'Dilemmas and Contradictions of Status.' He uses examples like the Negro doctor and the female scientist to point out that role-conflicts ensure, and that these in turn, create peculiar patterns and strategies of interaction. . . . Hughes has

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> restimulated concern for status-discrepancy and directed it more toward the individual than toward the problems of social structure that occupied Weber (Demerath, 1965:131).

Hughes then speaks of "status contradictions" occurring when individuals enter a status without all the personal attributes usually expected of incumbents. This is a:

> . . . clear recognition of the ambiguous and conflicting social position of the status inconsistent; but his concept differs from Benoit-Smullyan in that for him the term 'status' refers to all social positions with definite rights and duties, not just those involving relationships of superiority and subordination (Jackson, 1962:2).

The final author in this variant set is Geschwender (1967) who seems to combine some "expectation" assumptions of Sampson and some "distributive justice" assumptions of Homans (1961). On the one hand he argues that it is inconsistency of expectations (and the dissonance they produce) that makes rank inconsistency stressful; on the other hand he views certain ranks as investments and certain other ranks as rewards. Stress is produced when there are inadequate profits or insufficient rewards for the investments involved (Geschwender, 1967).

Assumptions About Behavior Consequences of Status Inconsistency

Following the discussion of the tension-assumptions of the three major variant sets, we turn to a discussion of the "auxiliary set of assumptions". These are the "auxiliary set" commonly questioned in the area of status-consistency (Anderson, 1971b).

In the "cognitive balance-dissonance variant set", Zelditch and Anderson (1966) discuss a number of modes of equilibration which include types of mobility, redefinition of the system of stratification, and withdrawal. The latter is delineated as follows:

> Isolation involves simply ceasing to compare one's ranks with those of others. Insulation involves shifting to a comparison with others among whom one's own inconsistent ranks are not significant ranks. Role differentiation involves restricting comparison to statuses (as opposed to the more general comparison of actors) which do not involve inconsistent ranks (Zelditch and Anderson, 1966; cited in Kimberly, 1970:93).

Mobility, as a means of equilibration, differs between causally and non-causally related ranks, the dependent rank changing in the direction of the independent rank in the first case and the lower rank being elevated in the second case. In addition, expectations of mobility affect the intensity of reaction to rank-inconsistency. Reactions are less negative if mobility is anticipated. The authors then distinguish between individual, stratum and status, or, collectivity, mobility. The final model of equilibration becomes a redefinition of the system of stratification:

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> Two kinds of redefinition are identified. A left-wing protest involves an attempt to decrease the importance of an old, established rank which is seen as blocking mobility, and an attempt to increase the importance of a new rank with respect to which the equilibrating unit has been rising recently. A right-wing protest involves an attempt to increase the importance of an old, established rank of the equilibrating unit and an attempt to decrease the importance of a new rank which is seen as replacing it (Zelditch and Anderson, 1966; cited in Kimberly, 1970: 94).

Also within the "cognitive balance-dissonance variant set," are Adams's theory of "inequity" (1965), an adaptation of disonance theory (Festinger, 1957), and Brehm and Cohen's discussion of a number of different ways of reducing rank inconsistency (1962). The reduction of rank-inconsistency involves changing the object of comparison, withdrawing from the situation, distorting these factors cognitively, or having the individual increase or decrease inputs and outcomes (Adams, 1965: 283-296).

Proceeding to the "cost-gain outcome variant set", Kimberly (1967) defines two modes of equilibrating skill and position-status. The first, based on position-mobility, suggests that if status-aspiration is high, and the type of inconsistency is a low skill-conflict position:

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> Mobility, which would be downward, will not occur. In lieu of this, it is predicted that an attempt to 'despecialize' the system will be made. This involves 'decreasing differences' in the difficulty of positions. This mode of equilibration 'decreases' the 'average' difficulty of difficult positions (Kimberly, 1967:89).

If status-aspiration is high and the type of inconsistency is a high skill-easy position:

> Mobility, which would be upward will occur. If this is blocked, it is predicted that an attempt to 'specialize' the system will be made. This involves 'increasing differences' in the difficulty of positions. This mode of equilibration 'decreases' the 'average' difficulty of 'easy' positions. Consequently, it will increase the stress to which the high skill-easy position inconsistent is subjected (Kimberly, 1967:89).

The equilibration process is handled by Homans, in this same tradition, in terms of the relationship between distributive justice and satisfaction. If a state of injustice exists and it is to a man's disadvantage, he experiences deprivation, and will "display the emotional behavior we call anger" (Homans, 1961:75). If, on the other hand, "distributive justice" is not realized and is observably to a man's advantage, he will feel guilty (Homans, 1961).

Turning finally to the "expectation-conflict variant set" we look first at the Sampson (1963; 1969) variant of the

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of the modes of equilibration. Following are some of his principles of expectancy congruence:

> Individual tendencies towards expectancy-congruence give rise to social communicated, interpersonal pressures for one's self and others to present pictures of themselves which are congruent with what is expected.
>
> Deviation of a group member from the group's opinion on an issue will produce pressures toward uniformity of opinion, only when this deviation is also a deviation from expectation for that particular group member.
>
> To the extent that P presents multiple faces to these others (because he is subject to multiple expectations), they too will be in an undesirable situation and will seek to change it towards a picture of P which is congruent. Therefore, P will be under pressures from others to present a picture of himself which is consistent (Sampson, 1963:157-159).

Sampson then gives a specific illustration (Adams, 1953) of expectation-incongruity as it might affect the productivity of a group.

> Given the inconsistency in expectations for the other's behavior, this reduction (in productivity) may stem from each individual's inability easily to coordinate his behavior with the behavior of others of his group. Such a group may expect much of its effort on achieving a congruence or a consistency of expectations, or working to defend against the apparent inconsistencies which exist, and thus have little energy remaining to devote to the task (Sampson, 1963:161).

We now turn to Lenski (1954; 1956; 1964; 1966; 1967) whose formulation will be explored in considerable detail

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detail . Lenski's "auxiliary set of assumptions" suggest the following. One response to tension for an individual is withdrawal from interaction with, and evaluation by, others. A second is that if an individual has a low state of an ascribed rank as part of his status configuration, he can promote changes designed to alter the social evaluations of the low states of his ascribed rank. Concomitant is the assumption that a person whose status-sets are consistent tends to support the political and economic status quo. If he is satisfied with the status quo he is likely to vote Republican and, if he is social-change oriented, he is likely to vote Democratic (Anderson, 1971b:1).

In the interplay of research and theory, one should be reminded that an "auxiliary set of assumptions" is added to the "core set of assumptions" in order to obtain observable consequences (Lakatos, 1968). Lenski (1966) links his "core assumptions" with his "auxiliary assumptions" by relating the equilibration or lack of equilibration of tensions based on status-inconsistency to his survey-status indicators of political liberalism and social withdrawal (Lenski, 1966).

In this same "expectation-conflict variant set" Gibbs and Martin (1964) pose this hypothesis of tension resoluti

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resolution: western societies exhibit suicide rates that vary inversely with the degree of status-integration in that population (Gibbs and Martin, 1964). This explanation is derived, through a lengthy reasoning process, from a series of postulates:

(a) the suicide rate of a population varies inversely with the stability and durability of social relations in the population, which

(b) varies directly with the extent to which the individuals in that population conform to the patterned and socially sanctioned demands and expectations placed upon them by others, which

(c) varies inversely with the extent to which individuals in that population are confronted with role conflicts, which

(d) varies directly with the extent to which individuals occupy incompatible statuses in that population, which

(e) varies inversely with the degree of status integration in that population (Gibbs and Martin, 1964:27).

The final writer to be discussed in the "expectation-conflict variant set" is Geschwender (1967) who postu

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who postulates that equilibration attempts move from simple to complex modes:

> He defines individual mobility as the easiest. Next in difficulty is striking out against individuals and categories of individuals; that is, prejudice and discrimination. The most complex mode is an attempt to alter society. Withdrawal or social isolation and suicide are also seen as ways of coping with rank inconsistency (Geschwender, 1967: cited in Kimberly, 1970:95).

A complex set of possibilities of relating types of rank inconsistency to these modes of equilibration will now be developed. Persons with two types of inconsistency are referred to as under-rewarded inconsistents. These are:

> high ethnicity and low occupation and income, and high education and low occupation and income. The psychological reaction to these types of inconsistency is anger. Persons with the former type of inconsistency can be upwardly mobile on their lower ranks if their education is sufficient. If it is not, prejudice and discrimination are likely. If this fails, they are likely to join a racist social movement. Persons with the latter type of inconsistency can be mobile on their lower ranks if age permits. If it does not, prejudice and discrimination are likely. If this fails, they are likely to join an extremist social movement (Geschwender, 1967:163-168; cited in Kimberly, 1970:95).

Persons with two additional types of inconsistency are referred to as over-rewarded inconsistents:

> These are low ethnicity and high occupation and income and low education and high occupation and income. The psychological

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> reaction to these forms of inconsistency is guilt. Persons with either of these types of inconsistency are unlikely to be mobile in their lower ranks. Ethnicity and education are difficult to change. Persons with both types of inconsistency may develop prejudice. If this fails, they may advocate moderate liberal reforms within the society (Geschwender, 1967:163-168; cited in Kimberly, 1970:96).

To summarize this section, all of the formulations:

(a) seem to follow Benoit-Smullyan by using a core assumption involving an "inconsistency-tension" assumption and a "tendency to change" assumption.

(b) the formulations differ with respect to how tension is produced and in terms of the "auxiliary set" of assumptions about the behavioral consequences.

Methodologies

We now turn our attention to the specific methodology used to test the "auxiliary set of assumptions." An emphasis will be placed on the Lenski tradition in the "expectation-conflict variant set." This is done primarily because my own data, similar to Lenski's, are survey data, while the other programs are closely tied to experimental paradigms. In addition, "dissonance-balance" and the "cost-gain outcome" formulations of status-c

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status-consistency end up dealing with "distributive justice," a field that poses problems of its own (Berger, et al., 1968). One might clarify the issue by proposing that the term "status consistency" be reserved for the formulations involving "expectation conflict" formulations, e.g., Sampson (1969) and Lenski (1966); and that the term "distributive justice" be used for the "dissonance-balance" and "cost-gain outcome" formulations (cited in Anderson, 1972).

Lenski originally (1954; 1956) examined four types of status indicators (income, occupation, education and ethnicity) as configurative elements. He then computed an index of crystallization (based on the sum of the squared deviations from the mean) across these status-indicators for a sample drawn from the Detroit area. A person whose percentile score on these different ranks stayed fairly close to the mean of all the ranks was considered "highly crystallized," while one who deviated significantly from the means was considered "low crystallized." Lenski then related the score on this index of crystallization to political behavior and attitudes. Preference for the Democratic Party indicated preference for change occasioned by the tensions in a "low crystallized" configuration. In another article based on the same Detroit

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same Detroit-area data, Lenski (1956) further suggested that a "low crystallized" configuration would result in a lack of participation in voluntary and other social activities and associations (Lenski, 1956).

These original studies by Lenski asserted that the degree, rather than the direction, of inconsistency was related to political liberalism and withdrawal. This "non-directed" type of inconsistency-index did not distinguish between different combinations of high and low ranks in an "uncrystallized set" of ranks. Primary interest was in the overall level or lack of crystallization in a particular configuration.

An early corroboration of Lenski's hypothesis concerning status-crystallization and political liberalism is found in a study by Goffman (1956) who used measures of education, income, and occupational prestige as status-indicators. Goffman was interested in the ways in which status-crystallization is related to preferences for change in power-distribution within society. Respondents were asked to

> check their perceptions of the amount of influence in the conduct of national affairs presently held by, and the amount of influence they prefer to be held by, state governments, big business, labor unions, businesses that were not big, and the national government (Goffman, 1957; cited in Geschwender, 1967:502).

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Individuals with low-status crystallization showed a greater preference for change than individuals with a high degree of crystallization. This study supports the notion that a lack of status-crystallization can lead to a desire for change in the distribution of power within a society.

Another study, by Kenkel (1956), produced results which did not support Lenski's hypothesis concerning political liberalism and status-crystallization. In a comment by Lenski (1961), however, it was maintained that Kenkel had used different indices, since a measure of ethnicity was not among the status-attributes employed. Lenski's rejoinder to Kenkel is inadequate, because at that point in its development, the Lenski theory talked about ranks but did not specify that different indices should make a difference.

Jackson, in a crucial study in 1962 suggested that ethnicity be considered an aspect of ascribed status and that equilibration processes were more likely to occur where combinations of ascribed and achieved-status attributes were considered in measuring status-inconsistency. This study moved the "non-directed" study of status-crystallization to the study of more "directed" combinations of status-attributes.

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Emphasis on this more-directed approach continued with a study by Treiman (1966) which showed that the only statistically significant results from Lenski's 1954 study, in terms of the effects of inconsistency in expressing liberal economic attitudes and voting Democratic, were those that included ethnicity. In another study of political extremism published in the same year, Kelly and Chambliss failed to substantiate Lenski's crystallization-formulation, but they too failed to include a measure of ethnicity and dealt only in achieved-status attributes.

In 1967 Lenski moved from his non-directive stance in a study of the voting-patterns of four western nations; he included at least one ascribed status, religious behavior, with his achieved-status variables. The results bore out the contention that sharp discrepancies between achieved and ascribed status-attributes seem to lead to equilibrating processes more readily than status-discrepancy between two achieved-status attributes alone.

Further substantiation of the plausibility of this ascribed-achieved status-inconsistency model is found in later studies by Segal and Knoke (1968), Segal (1969), Segal and Knoke (1969) and Smith (1969). Olsen and Tully (1

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and Tully (1970) summarize this literature as follows: "At least in regard to voting preferences, socio-economic-ethnic inconsistency is apparently much more important than is socio-economic status inconsistency by itself" (Olsen and Tully, 1970:2).

While the literature substantiating the "auxiliary set of assumptions" in regard to the relations of status-inconsistency and political liberalism is fairly extensive, other response-processes seen as equilibrating mechanisms have not received equivalent substantiation. Such areas as: (1) enhanced-mobility striving, (2) withdrawal and social isolation, (3) psychosomatic symptoms of stress, (4) preference for and attempts to change the social order, and (5) prejudice, need to be examined for status-inconsistency effects of these equilibrating processes.

In an attempt to answer these questions, a representative sample of the studies done in the Lenski tradition has been compiled, including a statement about the status-attributes used, the response-processes expected, as well as the results, either positive or negative.

A general review of these studies indicates that "positive" results are obtained. That is, equilibrating

THE LENSKI TRADITION

Independent	Dependent Variables	Results

THE LENSKI TRADITION

Author	Independent Variables	Dependent Variables	Results
Adams, Stuart 1953 ASR, 32 (Oct.)	background charact. congruency	crew performance	positive
Bauman, Karl E. 1968 Soc. Forces, 47, 1	occupation education income	unsatisfactory social interaction community dissatisfaction	negative
Broom, Leonard Lancaster Jones 1970 ASR 35, 6	education occupation income	voting behavior	negative
Demerath, Neil J. III 1965 Social Class in American Protestantism	education income occupation	church-like sect-like religiosity	negative
Dunaham, H. Warren Patricia Phillips Barbara Srinivasan 1966 ASR, 31 (Apr.)	education occupation	schizophrenia psychopathies	positive

Author	Independent Variables	Dependent Variables	Results
Eitzen, David S. 1968 (Diss. U. of Kansas)	education occupation income	political attitudes	negative

Author	Independent Variables	Dependent Variables	Results
Eitzen, David S. 1968 (Diss. U. of Kansas)	education occupation income	political attitudes	negative
Eitzen, David S. 1970 Social Forces 48, 4 (June)	education occupation income	political support for Wallace	positive
Fauman, S. Joseph 1968 Social Forces 47, 1 (Sept.)	education income occupation ethnicity	attitude toward desegregation	positive
Geschwender, James A. 1962 Diss. M.S.U.	ethnicity occupation education income	hostility toward minorities withdrawal generalized indiv. unrest	negative
		participation in social movements	positive
Geschwender, James A. 1968 Social Forces 46, 4 (June)	education income occupation ethnicity	social isolation individual unrest	positive
Geschwender, James A. Benjamin D. Singer Judith Harrington 1969 A.S.A. annual meet.	education income occupation race	participation in riots	positive

Author	Independent Variables	Dependent Variables	Results
Goffman, Irwin 1957 A.S.R. 22, 3 (June)	income occupation age	preference for political change	positive

Author	Independent Variables	Dependent Variables	Results
Goffman, Irwin 1957 A.S.R. 22, 3 (June)	income occupation age	preference for political change	positive
Hale, Harry J., Jr. 1963 Diss. (U. of Tenn.)	age education pay seniority	job satisfaction upward mobility aspiration	positive
Hodge, R. W. Paul M. Siegel 1970 Logic of Social Hier.	education income	Seeman's powerlessness scale	negative
Hornung, Carlton A. 1971 (Eastern Soc. Society)	education income occupation	political certainty	positive
Hough, Richard L. Gene F. Summers 1970 A.S.A. soc. meetings	education income	psychological impairment	negative
Hyman, Martin D. 1967 Soc. Quart. 8, 3 (Summer)	income occupation	job satisfaction	negative
Jackson, Elton F. 1962 A.S.R. 27 (Aug.)	education occupation ethnicity	psycho-physiological impairment	positive

Author	Independent Variables	Dependent Variables	Results

Author	Independent Variables	Dependent Variables	Results
Kelly, K. Dennis W. J. Chambliss 1966 A.S.R., 31, 3 (June)	education income occupation	political liberalism	negative
Kenkel, William F. 1956 A.S.R. 21, 3 (June)	education occupation dwelling value dwelling prestige	politico- economic variables	negative
Knokes, David 1969 Sociol. Focus. 2, 3 (Summer)	economic market indices	political partisanship	negative
Laumann, Edward O. David R. Segal 1971 A.J.S., 77, 1 (July)	education ethno- religious	political attitudes and participation	negative
Lenski, Gerhard 1964 A.S.R., 19 (Aug.)	education income occupation ethnicity	liberal voting	positive
Lenski, Gerhard 1956 A.S.R., 21 (Aug.)	education income occupation ethnicity	social participation withdrawal	positive

Author	Independent Variables	Dependent Variables	Results
Lenski, Gerhard 1964 Public Opinion Quart.	occupation ethnicity	voting preference	positive

Author	Independent Variables	Dependent Variables	Results
Lenski, Gerhard 1964 Public Opinion Quart. 28 (Summer)	occupation ethnicity	voting preference	positive
Lenski, Gerhard 1967 A.S.R., 32, 2 (April)	occupation religion	voting preference	positive
Meile, Richard L. Philip N. Haese 1969 J. of Health & Soc. Beh.	education occupation	symptoms of stress	negative
Olsen, Marvin E. Judy C. Tully 1970 A.S.A. 65th meeting	education income occupation ethnicity	preference for political change	positive
Ploch, Donald R. 1968 Diss. (North Car. C.H.)	income occupation ethnicity	political health and other social variables	positive
Runciman, Walter C. C. R. Bagley 1969 Sociology 3, 3 (September)	education income occupation	hostility toward immigrants	negative
Rush, Gary B. 1965 Diss. (U. of Oregon)	education income occupation	right wing extremism	positive

Author	Independent Variables	Dependent Variables	Results
Segal, David R. 1969	education income occupation	political behavior non partisanship	positive

Author	Independent Variables	Dependent Variables	Results
Segal, David R. 1969 A.S.R., 34, 3 (June)	education income occupation	political behavior non partisanship	positive
Segal, David R. David Knoke 1967 Social Forces 47 (December)	education income occupational mobility ethnicity	Democratic voting	positive
Segal, David R. M. W. Segal D. Knoke Sociometry 33, 3 (September)	education income occupation	social class identification (equilibration)	negative
Smith, Thomas S. 1969 A.S.R., 34, 6 (Dec.)	achieved var. ascribed var. structural crystallization	voting preference	positive
Treiman, D. J. 1966 A.J.S., 71 (May	education (spouse) income	attitude toward Negroes	negative

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processes seem to be present when achieved-status attributes are found discrepant in a configuration with at least one ascribed status. This pattern seems to hold, for several other equilibrating processes in addition to that of political preference.

Ascribed-Achieved Status Distinctions

What explanations have been supportive of this observed need for at least one ascribed-status attribute in a configuration before equilibration-processes manifest themselves? Olsen and Tully (1970) trace the pattern (at least in political behavior) to the process first suggested by Goffman (1957):

> . . . status inconsistency can be expected to result in preferences for political change only when the individual is prevented from reducing his inconsistency through upward mobility. Since achieved statuses are presumably seen by most people as more or less changeable if desired, achieved status inconsistency should be associated with individual social mobility rather than desires for political change. Only inconsistencies involving one or more low ascribed statuses that are essentially unchangeable within the existing socio-political system should produce pressures to alter that system (Olsen and Tully, 1970:3).

In terms of analyzing the general notion of ascribed status in the sociological literature, some useful distinctions have been made by Smith (1969), who suggests that one can examine ascribed-status ranks for fixed or c

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fixed or changeable character since they are determined by others' evaluations of one's personal qualities:

> . . . they are dependent on attributes (qualities) which are either unchanging (sex, pigmentation, etc.) or while variable undergo changes over which ego has no control (e.g., age). They are therefore fixed by virtue of being permanent qualities and/or because they are, from ego's point of view, inelastic (Smith, 1969:909).

The distinction, then, between fixed and changeable status-attributes, has been the basis of discussion of ascribed statuses and their effects on equilibration processes, especially in terms of political participation (Smith, 1969). However, an additional factor, not as frequently cited, is the factor of visibility, or lack of visibility, of a particular status-attribute. Segal (1968) suggests the importance of this factor in his study of the voting preferences of status inconsistents, stating that an individual will vote Democratic when others define his status-attributes as low and when he views these same status attributes as high. He adds the qualification that these low-status attributes must be visible in some fashion. Accordingly, one would expect more equilibration effects among Blacks, whose ascribed state is visible, than among Catholics, whose ascribed state is socially less visible. Smith

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(1969), summarizing the Segal study, suggests that ". . . inconsistencies between low visibility statuses generally lead to intra psychic (covert) experiences of stress which are resolved in a compatible (i.e., relatively non-visible) mode, namely non-partisanship" (Smith, 1969:919).

What we seem to have then is a combination of different states of changeability and visibility as they affect ascribed-status characteristics. Olsen and Tully (1970), among others, have suggested that to relate voting behavior to status-equilibration effects, one needs a non-changeable rank which is visible. However, Segal (1968) and Smith (1969) have suggested that where the non-changeable rank was of low visibility, such as Catholicism, the pressures on the individual seem to shift from the "public" to the "private" realm. The individual who is "cross-pressured" politically, but whose low-ascribed status is not readily publicly identifiable, may still suffer from "intra-punitive" problems which then force him to withdraw from the political scene and not vote at all (Segal, 1968).

If one considers the less-visible ranks as "private", one may wonder about the forms of private ranks that are changeable. There is no formal discussion of this kind of social-ranking in the literature. However, the visible, although changeable status attribute may be related to the status-equilibration effects of status inconsistency.

Status-ranks which are low in visibility and changeable may be considered as a "secondary" form of stratification. According to Blau, "Once major stratification structures have developed, secondary ones in which low status persons rank higher than high status persons may be developed in an effort to promote cohesion within the system" (Blau, 1964:50).

Accordingly, when an individual's "major", highly visible ranks are low, he may emphasize other "secondary," less visible ranks through which he can gain a measure of esteem. For example, the wife of a professional academic may have only a grade-school education. Although her educational accomplishments are seen as low in status-rank, in secondary-status areas such as cooking, housekeeping, voluntary service, she may be highly esteemed by others and may gain a great deal of satisfaction from this recognition. However, the high state of her secondary rank is recognized by a limited membership group, in contrast to the recognition afforded the Ph.D. whose rank is publicl

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publicly acknowledged by such devises as the title of "Doctor" in formal presentations. As distinguished from "public" ranks which are immediately discernable to all others, "private" status-ranks are not immediately obvious and are discernable only to small groups.

In these terms, then, Lenski (1956) very negatively poses the issue of withdrawal as an equilibration process, when he says that the status-inconsistent may withdraw, or retreat into isolation. He does not explain either the process or the intent of withdrawal. The individual may very well withdraw to activities and high states of status-ranks which from his own point of view constitute highly rewarding activities. When the individual who claims eminence in secondary stratification steps outside of the limited-membership group, validation of these secondary-status rankings is problematic. There is then a possibility of tension between the publicly and privately-arrived rank. The wife with little education may be a gourmet cook at home, but she may feel extremely inadequate in the living rooms of her husband's doctoral friends.

The following set of assumptions, then, is relevant to these secondary-stratification ranks:

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(a) Secondary ranks are only emphasized by P when a highly visible rank is low.

(b) Secondary rank is recognized only by a limited membership group; validation outside of that group is problematic.

Lenski's withdrawal-response to tension (1956), as an essentially negative phenomenon and a form of isolation, may be seen as a retreat to a second line of defense where the individual excels in low-visibility ranks. Despite the validation problems of stratification activities restricted to specific groups, we agree with Blau that "the members who cease to compete for superior status win social acceptance in the group in exchange for the contribution they thereby make to group solidarity" (Blau, 1964:50).

Finally, in terms of an analysis of ascribed statuses, these non-visible secondary ranks should be more "local" (Merton, 1957) than "cosmopolitan", based on "particularistic" rather than "universalistic" values (Kimberly, 1970). The distinction here seems to be that universalistic values are less problematic in terms of social interaction because in many systems they are rewarded, while particularistic values are rewarded in fewer, smaller, systems. The sources of status-ran

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status-ranking for locals in specific communities should then be based on particularistic values and on private, less visible stratification levels not transferable to different communities or publics (Zucker and Kimberly, forthcoming; cited in Kimberly, 1970).

Methodological Challenges to the "Lenski Tradition" Research

Turning next to challenges of the Lenski tradition, we see that most of the inferred questions of the Lenski position actually relate to the relevance of the "auxiliary set of assumptions" to the "core set of assumptions" (Anderson, 1971). The "core assumptions" have not drawn the extensive criticisms directed to the "auxiliary assumptions," however three specific exceptions to them will be treated at the end of this discussion. The major challenges to the "auxiliary assumptions" will be treated in order of their appearance.

Anderson and Zelditch (1964) suggest: ". . . (a) rank inconsistency does not invariably produce a political response and (b) that if a political response occurs it can be rightist or leftist or take the form of political apathy depending on certain not very well understood conditions" (Anderson and Zelditch, 1964:120).

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This position is borne out by the findings of Rush (1965), suggesting that in any given study, tables might contain both left and right-wing responses. In addition, there is some question of the rank an individual will emphasize or pay attention to in terms of the effects of inconsistent self-image. Anderson and Zelditch suggest that even if we assume that the alternative ranks are mutually exclusive, this effect occurs only at one particular time, and that subsequently the individual having emphasized one rank, may switch to another. The suggestion then is that this might result in ambivilence, based on some process of "rebuff". A rich Italian who at one point in time emphasizes his high income to his fellow immigrants and is proud of his accomplishments, at another point in time may denigrate his ethnicity. He wonders why he is not accepted as an equal among rich non-Italians, when he applies for membership in an exclusive country club.

Anderson and Zelditch (1964) as a result conclude that it is difficult to make any determinant predictions from Lenski's formulation, or to determine which of the equilibration-processes a status-inconsistent will choose.

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Runciman (1967; 1970), from a "qualitative" point of view, argues that discrepancy between the status man enjoys in one field and another will never, "by itself", explain the tensions an individual faces, or the equilibration-processes which he might bring to bear on the problem. Runciman claims that it will not be surprising to find differences of some sort or other between those who are and those who are not "in equilibrium" (Runciman and Bagley, 1970). But there is no warrant for citing such a finding in support of a "theory of status-congruence" unless specific premises from which it could have been predicted are shown. Two risks are particularly apparent:

> The first is that it may turn out that the correlation is to be explained not by the discrepancy of status as such, but by a particular feature of the situation which may happen to coincide with a discrepancy of status. The second is that even where discrepancies of status are precisely matched with differences of attitude, the difference may be such as can be statistically accounted for by the cumulative independent influence of the two or more 'status factors' involved (Runciman and Bagley, 1970:177).

Although Runciman claims that there is no general rule of relative deprivation emerging from lack of status-congruence, he does feel that the study of "comparative reference groups" will take the researcher one step closer to an explanation of the relationship between t

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between tensions produced and the equilibrating mechanisms used to manage them. ". . . there will be the same lapse into circularity if 'choice of comparative reference group' is cited post hoc as a vindication of the claim that the reference group which defines the scope of a person's resentment was at the same time the cause of it" (Runciman and Bagley, 1970:181).

The authors feel its usefulness must lie instead in helping the investigator to formulate more precisely one or more particular generalizations which explain otherwise unexpected or puzzling differences in attitude.

> The first step must, of course, be to establish a consistent association between feelings of 'relative deprivation' and variations in attitudes or circumstances which are logically independent of this feeling. Once given this the investigator will want to show that under specified historical conditions a specified reference group comparison will impinge upon a specified group and therefore, given the psychological generalizations applicable in the particular cultural context, give rise to feelings of relative deprivation (Runciman and Bagley, 1970:181-182).

The useful question, for Runciman, is not how many of the person's multiplicity of status-ranks are discrepant, but ". . . which out of the multiplicity of the available comparisons he makes between himself and others, and what are the consequences of this for his other soc

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other social attitudes" (Runciman and Bagley, 1970: 183).

Blalock's (1965; 1966; 1967) challenge of the Lenski procedure amounts to two major assertions. On the one hand, the additive model of stratification, in which one deals with the main effects of separate-status variables, may explain almost as much as the status-inconsistency model which poses the addition of complex-interaction terms into the development of a model of social interaction (Blalock, 1967). A second, more subtle, issue raised has to do with the "identification problem." Blalock suggests:

> If one takes status inconsistency as a perfect mathematical function of a difference between two statuses, and if he also wishes to estimate the separate main effects of these statuses, the three 'independent' variables will be confounded together. This can be seen empirically by noting that one cannot vary inconsistency while holding constant the other status and inconsistency. Without *a priori* assumptions, the structural parameters cannot be estimated by least squares or any other purely empirical procedure (Blalock, 1967:69-70).

In other words, one cannot take a regression model involving both an interaction-term related to an inconsistency-effect and the main effect of several status variables, and suggest the possibility of theoretical interpretation. A hopeful note is posed in the suggestion that

> It is true, however, that the existence of statistical interaction or nonadditivity, may be taken as a clue that a status inconsistency effect may be present, though rather definite a priori assumptions must be made if one is to make stronger statements about the magnitude, or even directions, of the various component effects (Blalock, 1967:70).

A more recent challenge to the Lenski formulation (Laumann and Segal, 1971) suggests that more important than the inconsistency-effects due to combinations of ascribed-achieved status configurations, is the persistence of subcultural factors as explanations of the social interaction and political behavior of ethno-religious members in urban communities. In a study of Detroit, the authors state that

> While there are substantial differences among ethno-religious groups on a number of political and social attitudes and characteristic modes of social participation, net of group differences in educational composition, we have also suggested that the theory of status crystallization affords little if any explanatory power in accounting for the pattern of differences among groups (Laumann and Segal, 1971:55).

In others words, there is no overall pattern of statistical interaction between education and ethno-religious group-membership with regard to either social participation or political attitudes. However, specifi

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> . . . there are significant interaction effects involving particular ethno-religious groups that indicate subcultural differences in political orientations and sociability patterns (Laumann and Segal, 1971:55).

Interaction-effects in this sample are seen specifically in Jews, who, because of their moderately low ascribed-ethnic status and generally high-achieved status are especially prone to the known effects of status-inconsistency. However, very similar interaction effects are found among German Presbyterians, which suggests that

> . . . the stability of high achieved status in these groups across generations, and the relative homogeneity of these groups, may be more parsimonious explanations of their similarities than is the theory of status-inconsistency, which in fact would lead us to expect differences in the very areas in which similarities have been observed (Laumann and Segal, 1971:55).

Since Jews in this study show interaction effects, and non-whites in an earlier study also show interaction effects (Segal, 1968), the authors conclude that similar behavior on the part of the two highly-visible ethnic groups may be the basis of previously reported inconsistencies between high states of achieved-status and low visibility ascribed ethnic groups.

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> It is possible for apparent effects of inconsistencies between low-ascribed and high-achieved statuses to emerge on the basis of social dynamics other than those assumed by the theory of status inconsistency. Specifically, it is the persistence of traits characteristic of ethnic subcultures that leads to these results (Laumann and Segal, 1971:55).

Turning next to challenges that have been directed toward the "core assumptions" themselves, there is developing evidence that people will judge the status-inconsistent individual in terms of the average of his several statuses rather than in terms of the Lenski assumption of judgment in terms of his lower status (Himmelfarb and Senn, 1969; Berger and Fisek, 1970; and Segal, Segal and Knoke, 1970).

Himmelfarb and Senn (1969) suggest that the effects of stimulus-inconsistency were examined in two experiments testing the applicability of a simple averaging-model to impressions of social class. The results of both studies supported an "averaging" formulation of impression formulation.

> Implicitly, it was assumed that people hold expectations that a person's ranking on each of the dimensions of income, education and occupation tends to be the same or at least, correlated. [Former research has emphasized the] mechanisms people use to avoid presenting themselves in an incongruous manner. The present studies, in a somewhat simplified fashion, are relevant to the way judges respond to information

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> indicative of status incongruity (Himmelfarb and Senn, 1969:50).

The results suggest that stimulus-inconsistency is resolved by a simple-averaging process only when the different dimensions are of equal importance. Otherwise, they suggest that a weighted-averaging formulation would provide a better model of status judgments (Himmelfarb and Senn, 1969).

Berger and Fisek (1970) address themselves to the theoretical issue of how expectations are formed in multi-characteristic task situations. The authors formulate two alternative mechanisms, a "balancing" mechanism and a "combining" mechanism, which may be operative in such situations. The balancing mechanism comes originally from some of the earlier ideas found in cognitive-consistency theories. "Actor p will tend to cognitively balance his situation so as to form performance expectations for self and others that correspond with a distribution of states of characteristics that is consistent or univalent for each individual" (Berger and Fisek, 1970:291).

The second mode of cognitive definition of the situation is one called a "combining" mechanism;

> The ideas involved here are loosely associated with those from information and decision-making theories. According to

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> this mechanism, the actor essentially operates as an information available process system, taking into account all information available to him as regards the relevant status characteristics and the task in the situation (Berger and Fisek, 1970:292).

The results of the experiment and the Paul Tress (1971) replication which resulted similarly, confirm the predictions made from the "combining" argument, thus yielding evidence against the "core assumptions" in the Lenski formulation that suggest some kind of "balancing" mechanism (Lenski, 1966).

Segal, Segal and Knoke (1969) pose two hypotheses in terms of Lenski's "core assumptions." One is that the best predictor of a status-inconsistent individual's evaluation of his social class will be the average of his several objective statuses. As status-indicators Segal, Segal and Knoke use such achieved criteria as education, family income and occupation of the head of household. As the dependent variable they use the individual's subjective social-class identification. The first hypothesis is not supported for status-inconsistent individuals, in that maximizing processes are used in evaluating social class position (Segal, Segal and Knoke, 1969).

These three research studies indicate that:

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(a) people may not judge an individual on the basis of his lowest status-rank (Himmelfarb and Senn, 1969)

(b) the individual evaluates his own status-configuration based on some "combination" of his status ranks (Berger and Fisek, 1970)

(c) that some kind of "averaging" process of status ranks for ego may be involved (Segal, Segal and Knoke, 1970).

However, in order for Lenski's "core" assumptions to be considered false, it would have to be shown that both the individual and others, at the same time, were using similar "averaging processes" to evaluate the inconsistent individual. Otherwise the "core" assumptions will be maintained since others will attribute to the individual lower status than he attributes to himself (Laumann and Segal, 1971) and thus his deference-expectations will be frustrated (Lenski, 1966).

Conclusion

In this chapter we have reviewed the "status-consistency" tradition and suggested that there are three major theoretical positions stemming from Benoit-Smullyan's (1944) study of social status and problems of equilibration. The first of these, the

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expectancy-conflict position, includes primarily the works of Lenski (1954; 1956; 1964; 1967) and Sampson (1963; 1969). The second tradition, which we referred to as the "cost-gain outcome" formula is found primarily in the works of Kimberly (1962; 1966; 1970). Finally, there are the dissonance-balance formulations of Zelditch and Anderson (1966) on the one hand and J. Stacy Adams (1965) on the other. The primary consideration of the chapter was with the Lenski tradition in the expectancy-conflict position. Emphasis was on the fact that the data available for the dissertation were similar to Lenski's survey data, and while other formulations derived from research done in experimental situations. Secondly, two of the other formulations were concerned with "distributive justice" rather than "status consistency" and therefore an apt topic for separate consideration.

Within the expectancy-conflict tradition, Lenski's "core" assumptions deal with the lack of consistency between "high and low" states of achieved and ascribed variables. The implicit assumptions suggest that when an individual evaluates himself, he gives greater weight to his higher states on these status-variables, and that others give greater weight to his low states. However, the individual expects others to evaluate him on the basis of his highe

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his higher ranks. When there is a discrepancy between the two evaluations, tensions in the individual result. Effort to manage these tensions gives rise to an "auxiliary" set of assumptions observable as response-processes. Most critical reviews of this literature have been attempts to test the "auxiliary" set of assumptions rather than the "core" (Anderson, 1971; Lakatos, 1968).

Review of a representative sample of studies in the Lenski tradition suggests that if at least one of the ranks is a low state of an ascribed status-variable, then there will be either an attempt to change the evaluations of others via such means as political extremism, or withdrawal from these evaluations into personal isolation. A closer look at the nature of ascription shows it to indicate different states of both changeability and visibility. Prior discussions have emphasized that reactions to inconsistency are greater where ranks are non-changeable. This is especially true when the non-changeable rank is the low state of a status-variable.

In terms of different states of visibility as they affect status consistency, ranks which are changeable and lack visibility may be seen as aspects of "secondary stratification." The following set of assumptions relates to these secondary stratification ranks.

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(a) Secondary ranks are emphasized by P only when a highly visible rank is low.

(b) A secondary rank is recognized by only a limited membership group and whenever the individual steps outside that group, the validation is a problem.

Lenski's withdrawal-response to tension, which is implied to be an essentially negative phenomenon and a form of isolation, may instead be interpreted as a retreat to second-line defense, the individual then excelling in low visibility ranks even at the expense of status-validation problems outside specific groups.

In addition, we saw that there were some serious methodological challenges, primarily to the "auxiliary" assumptions but to the "core" assumptions as well. However, the general conclusion reached was that a configuration including at least one low state of an ascribed status-rank seems to lead to the equilibrating process originally elucidated by Benoit-Smullyan (1944), and in this case specified by Lenski, as a variant of the "expectation-conflict variant set." Although Lenski's "core" assumptions seem to have been challenged theoretically by the studies discussed, the research done in this area has not basically altered the plausibility of these assumptic

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assumptions, nor shown that the "auxiliary" assumptions do not support the "core" assumptions (Anderson, 1971b).

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CHAPTER II

DATA

The Data to be Used

In terms of the previous studies of status-consistency, we will now discuss the data dealt with in the present study. The empirical data upon which this analysis is based were gathered from five cross-sectional probability-sample surveys of the adult population in the Detroit metropolitan area, in 1953-1958, exclusive of the year 1954. These surveys were conducted by the Detroit Area Study, a research group of the University of Michigan (Freedman, 1953).

The Detroit Area Studies

Study	Year	Title of Study
816	1953	"Ideal family size in Detroit"
837	1955	"Orientation of moral issues in a metropolis: the meaning of work"
843	1956	"Party leadership and political behavior: intra-class correlation of attitudes in Detroit"
849	1957	"Religion in the metropolitan community"
855	1958	"The vitality of supernatural experience"

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The sampling procedure employed was a three-stage, cluster-area sample. The area embraced in the Detroit Area Study surveys are the census-tracted area in Wayne, Macomb and Oakland Counties of Michigan. The samples used were designed to yield a cross-section of all adults living in private households in the Detroit metropolitan area. In the sampling technique employed (tracts, blocks, and dwelling units), the probability of selection of every dwelling unit is known. Probabilities proportional to the size of the selection-unit governed its chances of being used at each stage. Each dwelling-unit contained within the tracted area possesses an equal chance of entering the sample (Kish, 1951).

In order to maximize sample-size and minimize errors in sampling-variations, the current study, then, is based on a sample of cases drawn from five different annual surveys. Such combining of data from several annual studies is possible since the Detroit Area Study samples have been designed to facilitate such procedure, and the data necessary for this particular study were gathered in comparable form in all five surveys used. Although the probability that the same people could have appeared more than once is greater than zero, we will not discuss the issue of "automatic correlation" (Galtung, 1967).

Data used for analysis were collected by an established research-organization. Both advantages and disadvantages resulted from the fact that the primary research-objectives in collection differed from the central goals of this study. We can deal with what pertains to major educational and income levels of an urban community because of the study's sampling of a major metropolis. However, data relevant to the condition of secondary analysis were not available for our study, groups of people interested in theoretical study being very small in a random sample. If a sample were designed expressly for the present research problem, Blacks and Jews would be included. In addition, efforts to test Lenski's "auxiliary assumptions" (that tensions lead to attempts to change the political system, and withdrawal from social participation) were restricted to political preference on the one hand and frequency of contact with relatives and other friends, on the other hand (Axelrod, 1956). Additional attitudinal as well as subjective measures might have provided more direct indications of the dependent variables.

Following are the indicators used, the first column referring to the column-number of the summary-deck for data common to all DSA surveys.

1	Relative ranking on annual income of family head (above or below the median)
17	Political preference (Democratic)
30	Age (forty-four and younger, or forty-five and older)
40	Education of ego (above or below the median)
67	Frequency of contact with relatives (a few times a month or more often)
68	Frequency of contact with other friends (a few times a month or more often)
80	Religious preference (Protestant or Catholic)

The N of the sample consists of 1,340 Protestants and 1,077 Catholics. Concerning frequency of contact with relatives and other friends, the sample is restricted to two of the studies, 843 and 855, and the N for Protestants in these columns is 603 and for Catholics is 485.

Methodological Challenges

As already shown in Chapter I, there are several methodological and substantive problems that have to be dealt with when we try to test the Lenski formulation with sample-survey data.

It has been suggested that in the absence of explicit criteria of consistency, most studies of status-discrepancy employ procedures that implicitly adopt a frequency-definition of norms. Typically, status-consistent and status-discrepant subgroups are identified in one of two ways:

> . . . either the component status variables are cross-tabulated, with the cells of the cross-tabulation on or near the main diagonal defined as consistent and the cells in the extreme of the table defined as discrepant; or, alternatively, each component variable is partitioned into percentile-classes, each class scored with its mean percentile, and a measure of the dispersion of scores over status variables--a status discrepancy score --computed for each individual. Whatever the procedure, the sample is normally divided into groups varying in degree of status discrepancy, and comparisons on the criterion variable are made between these groups (Treiman, 1966:652).

Blalock (1965; 1966; 1967) agrees that in order to determine the effects of rank-inconsistency on a dependent variable, the effects of the rank-hierarchies on the dependent variable must be taken into account. However, he demonstrates that it is not possible, in the light of current statistical theory, to empirically distinguish rank-hierarchy from inconsistency-effects (cited in Hyman, 1967:386).

Blalock (1966) suggests then that although education and income are probably causally linked, or

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> . . . we can imagine varying education while holding income constant (or vice versa). This is true because we can presumably manipulate other causes, say of income. These could be manipulated so as to counteract the changes in education, in much the same way that a physicist might hold temperature constant (while increasing pressure) by introducing a compensatory cooling agent. But if status-inconsistency is defined as the difference between education and income, it is manifestly impossible to vary one factor while holding the other two constant (Blalock, 1966:56).

However, this model implies that a liberal vote or lack of social participation is caused by inconsistency, *per se*. But Lenski posits that inconsistency produces "strains," which in turn lead to liberalism and social withdrawal. If there are other factors affecting strain besides status-inconsistency, it may be possible to permit identification. Unfortunately, however, there is a practical complication that re-introduces the identification problem through the back door:

> Lenski and other students of status-inconsistency have not been able to measure the strain factor directly, and have had to use status-inconsistency as an 'indicator' of strain . . . and we are back where we started (Blalock, 1966:56).

An obvious implication, then, is that attempts must be made to obtain independent measures of strain, and then to:

> . . . relate these separately to inconsistency on the one hand, and to the dependent variable on the other. But careful conceptualization

> will be necessary, since the theory calls for a special type of strain, due primarily to status inconsistency rather than 'generalized' strains (Blalock, 1966:56).

Thus Blalock has spelled out the problem of separating the effects of status-inconsistency from those of individual-status variables. An "identification" problem is presented by the existence of too many unknowns, when inconsistency is defined as ". . . a perfect mathematical function of the difference between two (or more) statuses" (Blalock, 1967:305).

If one is trying to explain the variation in some dependent variable by a combination of status-variables plus inconsistency,

> . . . it will not be possible to estimate the coefficients without making a priori assumptions that place restrictions on the model. The necessity of making some restrictive assumptions in order to identify the various component forces one to face up to the problem of clarifying the theory to the point where this is possible (Blalock, 1967:305).

This then is the problem, and it can be seen as quite formidable because there are incredibly many possible parametric values that might have produced the same empirical results. In some instances, then:

> . . . one particular set of values might seem more plausible than others, on either theoretical grounds or because the interpretation is much simpler. But if one wishes to select that most plausible set of values, he should

> do so with the full realization that implicit assumptions must be made which rule out the remaining alternatives (Blalock, 1967:306).

To choose between alternatives, one then would have to use criteria such as the theoretically simplest or most plausible. However one is able to accomplish this, the caveat remains: "One should always evaluate the evidence in favor of any particular theory against all plausible rival hypotheses" (Blalock, 1967:308).

Lenski's (1954) original assumptions amounted to the presumption that inconsistency has the same impact on the dependent variable, regardless of the direction of the inconsistency. In other words, the contributions of the inconsistent cells are both positive and equal. However, it is equally possible to get results when:

(a) There is an inconsistency-effect in one direction only.

(b) The effect is positive in one direction but negative in the other.

(c) One or the other of the main effects of the status-variable is zero.

(d) The main effects of the status-variables are in opposite directions and the magnitudes of the inconsistency are quite large (albeit in opposite directions).

(e) The composite table shows no interaction in spite of the fact that there are inconsistency effects (cited in Blalock, 1967: 306).

Jackson's (1962) assumptions are that neither status-variable has a main effect, and there is an inconsistency-effect only when ascribed status is high and achieved is low. Although the alternatives are somewhat more restricted than those of Lenski's assumptions, the alternatives to Jackson's (1962) directional assumptions are:

(a) Inconsistency effects appear only when the achieved status is "higher" than the ascribed. This would require that the two main effects be opposed, however.

(b) Among other alternatives, a situation where inconsistency effects are equal but in opposite directions (cited in Blalock, 1967:305).

The major alternative assumptions made in this study will be to presume that inconsistency might have opposite effects, depending on direction (Hyman, 1966; Mitchell, 1964). However, Blalock suggests:

> One might raise the objection that the single variable 'inconsistency' could hardly be expected to have opposite effects. It would

> perhaps be better to reconceptualize 'inconsistency' in terms of two (or more) distinct variables, e.g., (1) the degree to which (income) exceeds education, (2) the degree to which education exceeds (income) (Blalock, 1966:60).

A second alternative assumption made in this study is to suppose that inconsistency-effects in a given direction are taken as proportional to the main effects of whichever status variable has the lower value. Blalock suggests, in support of this assumption,

> . . . one might argue that it is the lower of the two statuses that produces strains in the individual and that his behavior due to the strain component ought therefore to be essentially similar in nature to that produced by the 'main' effect of this particular status variable (Blalock, 1967:314).

In this case assume that we are dealing with the portion of a table in which income is lower than education. We would then take the inconsistent effect to be proportional to the main effect of the income variable. Similarly, if education is lower than income, then inconsistency is assumed to produce effects proportional to the education-effects (cited in Blalock, 1967:314). These have been referred to by Hyman (1967) as assumptions based on "status effects."

Notwithstanding all this, Blalock suggests that

> . . . there is a sense in which the existence of interaction can be helpful in appraising

> the utility of the inconsistency formulation when predicting to specific dependent variables. . . . Provided one assumes that the individual status variables produce effects that are additive, then the amount of interaction represents a kind of minimum 'net' inconsistency effect. Thus, whenever one finds interaction, he might suspect an inconsistency effect, though it may be difficult to pin this down to specific cells. Empirical support for or against status inconsistency models would therefore seem to hinge on the interaction term (Blalock, 1967:308).

The existence of interaction might then be taken as weak evidence in favor of an inconsistency-effect, provided that alternative explanations for interaction can be eliminated (cited in Blalock, 1967:305).

Finally, there are a number of alternative explanations for interaction, including:

> . . . the possibility of sampling error, differential measurement errors, approaches to upper (or lower) limits due to measurement artifacts, non-linearity combined with multicollinearity, and other specific non-additive models (e.g., multiplicative effects). They also include the possibility that the inconsistency effects are spurious (e.g., due to age or ethnic differences that have not been controlled) (Blalock, 1967:308).

We will attempt to look at some of these problems and suggest how our data based on the Lenski formulation respond to these challenges. Among Blalock's challenges there is the problem of "alternative explanations for interaction." As a form of "specification error," there may be errors due to missing variables, in which case the interaction component would disappear if these disturbing influences could be controlled (Blalock, 1967a:72). Blalock uses, as an example, ethnic groups with different economic and cultural (religious) backgrounds being considered in the same category of low ethnicity. One of the major purposes of this study is to control for ethnicity by separating the sample into Catholics and white Protestants, and investigating the degree of interaction between income and education in these different groups.

Another example of spurious interaction would be that ". . . whenever income is considerably lower than expected on the basis of education or occupation, it is quite likely that age needs to be controlled" (Blalock, 1967a:72).

The assumption is that the investment in education needs several years for a commensurate income, until a degree of proportionality is reached (Homans, 1961). In order to control for this factor, we have differentiated between those above and below forty-five years of age. Although age, as an aspect of "structural crystallization" (Smith, 1969), does seem to have a definite effect on interaction, the relationship should not be primarily an aspect of the frustrations of youth, as suggested by Blalock. Age has been controlled in several studies in the Lenski tradition, but very few, other than Smith (1969), have treated it theoretically as a method of expanding the problems of inconsistency and placing them in a wider social context.

Smith's "Structural Crystallization" as a Methodological Contribution

Smith (1969) has made an important contribution to this problem by distinguishing between "status inconsistency" and "structural crystallization." Crystallization seems to be a contextual property of the social structure which has something to do with what are considered ascribed or achieved statuses. The contribution of Smith's position derives from his idea that what is considered an ascribed or an achieved status is a function of the broader social context. As an indicator of crystallization, Smith uses age, explaining:

> Because of its personal and social correlates, aging tends to superimpose an effect upon the variability of achievement, a phenomenon reflected in the fact that change in achieved status usually slows down and often stops in later middle age. In effect, aging tends to fix achieved rankings, making their elasticities more equal to the elasticities of ascribed statuses (Smith, 1969:909).

We can look at statuses in terms of how subject to change they are on the part of the individual, such as their elasticity and inelasticity. At the same time one can look at how ambiguous to the individual are the relationships between the status-attributes in his status-set and how well he can control the visibility of these status-relationships to others.

Smith suggests that

> As crystallization progresses, ego's efforts contribute decreasingly to any changes in his status. The second development, invariable relationships among statuses, suggests that crystallization is likely to reduce the ambiguities about status generally (Smith, 1969:910).

This reasoning then has implications for refining predictions of the effects of status on selected dependent variables. Implied are the decreased relevance of achievement and increased relevance of ascription with increasing crystallization. The reasoning seems to be that individuals will distribute their energies into activities which produce rewards:

> . . . those arenas of activities in which investments in achievement pay off in status returns, will be more 'salient' to an individual's assessment of his reward-position than those in which his rankings are fixed. Thus, we may infer that the salience of achieved rankings exceeds that of ascribed rankings as long as crystallization is low. With advances in crystallization, conversely, the individual's capacity to change status

> rankings decreases, and in consequence, the salience of all his rankings to the determination of his reward position should become more nearly equal (Smith, 1969:911).

Smith then suggests the following hypotheses:

(1) Inconsistencies among achieved rankings will be stressful in proportion to the salience of achievement. Thus, we shall expect inconsistent achieved rankings to produce support for liberal parties when crystallization is low but not when it is high.

(2) Inconsistencies between paired ascribed and achieved rankings will be stressful in proportion to the degree of overall crystallization. In other words, as crystallization increases, so should the stressfulness and overall partisan liberalism produced by this pattern (cited in Smith, 1969:914).

In the main, Smith's hypotheses are borne out. However, one major discrepancy is that inconsistencies between religious status and achieved status produce an effect only when the overall ensemble of statuses is relatively uncrystallized. The prediction had been that interaction effects would occur only between achieved-ascribed groups when crystallization was advanced. The speculation explaining this result is:

> . . . we are observing an inconsistency between statuses that are not particularly visible in a social sense. Although social (i.e., others') evaluations of status dimensions do proceed with greater independence under low degrees of crystallization, intrapsychic awareness of inconsistencies among them, nevertheless, occurs and is stressful (Smith, 1969:919).

These phenomena of "social awareness of visibility" and "intra-psychic" stress related to inconsistency need to be clarified and the discussion of "secondary stratification characteristics" (Blau, 1964) which was introduced in the theory chapter may provide some insights in this area. Further discussion will resume in the analysis chapters where an attempt will be made to clarify this divergence from the Smith hypothesis, while at the same time presenting rival and alternative hypotheses.

Additional Blalock Methodological Challenges

Another type of "specification error" posed by Blalock (1967a) is a multiplicative formulation, a

> . . . natural extension of the notion that in order for Y to be present, both XI and X2 must also be present. Then it would require a combination of low ethnic status <u>and</u> high education in order for this felt need (to change the political system) to be translated into liberal voting behavior (Blalock, 1967a: 73).

The suggestion is that it is not strain due to inconsistency that causes liberal voting behavior or lack of social participation, but rather a strain due to ethnicity which needs an additional factor, education, to make people aware of the need for political change. Blalock's multiplicative model, in the specific example cited above, would say nothing about the second order-interactive effects of income and education. As a result, both high income and high education, as well as low income and high education, would be considered equal in terms of their interactive effects when combined with low ethnicity. However, as we will show in the following analysis chapters, alternative theoretical positions might predict that different combinations of high and low states of income and education might have interaction effects when paired with Protestant or Catholic background.

A final kind of spurious interaction measured by Blalock is the suggestion that persons with like number of years of education might not be equal, since

> . . . persons listed as having 'high' education but realtively low occupations or income may very well have graduated from low status community colleges, trade schools, or two year business schools. In effect, they will have been misclassified as to educational status through the use of a rough indicator such as

> number of years of schooling (Blalock, 1967a: 72).

According to Hauser, however, the existence of grade-specific differentials in academic performance by ethnic background or socio-economic origin is not a sufficient demonstration of an academic argument. Years of schooling as an indicator of educational quality, in terms of available evidence

> . . . suggests that educational attainment is a rather good indicator of educational quality. We already know that educational attainment accounts for most of the influence of social background on adult achievements; refinements of intervening variable cannot add to the importance of education in that respect (Hauser, 1970:112).

Although Hauser makes these statements on the basis of his experiences, it is admittedly difficult to evaluate his argument. The strongest support for the use of education as a status-indicator based on years of schooling, is the fact that this is the kind of data which I happen to have.

An "Ideal Test" of the Lenski Formulation

This section contains a discussion of what the data for an ideal test of the Lenski formulation should look like (Anderson, 1972). Lenski's theory in fact predicts the following:

(1) If a person P (primarily) evaluates himself on the basis of his high rank states; and,

(2) If P's significant others evaluate him (primarily) on the basis of his low rank states; and,

(3) If P expects the significant others to evaluate him on the basis of his high rank states; and,

(4) If P perceives the discrepancy between the expected and received evaluations from the significant others; and,

(5) If P perceives that voting Democratic contributes to social change that would affect his low ranks; then,

(6) P is more likely to vote Democratic than a person whose ranks are consistent (Anderson, 1972:1).

An ideal survey would have to contain information

> . . . relevant to each one of the 'if-statements' above. For the conclusion (6) does not follow unless each of the five 'if-statements' is satisfied. In available surveys the practice seems to be to assume the validity of the five 'if-statements.' A survey that settles the five 'if-statements' by <u>assumption</u> is however a very weak test of the

> theory, compared with one that could check them out empirically (Anderson, 1972:2).

In terms of empirical tests of these assumptions, only the first if-statement has been empirically tested. Segal, Segal and Knoke (1970) hypothesized: ". . . the best predictor of a status-inconsistent individual's evaluation of his social class will be his highest objective status" (Segal, Segal and Knoke, 1970:350).

However, results of their study of a national sample of American adults suggests that status-inconsistent people average their several statuses in defining their social positions, rather than maximizing their claims by disregarding low statuses (cited in Segal, Segal and Knoke, 1970:347).

In addition, the authors implicitly question assumptions 2-4 in speculating about alternative assumptions derived from "symbolic interaction" theory (Mead, 1934).

> Other people's evaluation of one's status will be incorporated into the self through the objective 'we' (Mead, 1934). On the basis of this principle we would expect a person to come to view himself as others view him. Similarly, in terms of Cooley's (1902) 'looking-glass self', we would expect an individual to bring his own definition of his social status into agreement with the evaluations of others. He will not maximize the evaluation of his status unless others do so. In any case, there will not be a gross

> discrepancy between an individual's evaluation of his social position and the evaluation of others with whom he comes in contact (Segal, Segal and Knoke, 1970:348).

In terms of the fifth assumption that voting Democratic contributes to social change that would affect low ranking, it is by no means clear that:

> . . . all electors voting Democratic support programs of social change. No doubt different people vote Democratic for different reasons, even within a single city, and it is their conceptualization of their intention that defines their action, and whether that action can be taken as a case of political liberalism (Dorein and Stockman, 1969:50).

Anderson, finally, has suggested:

> . . . it would be very hard to get the information in question in a survey like the Detroit Area Study. But that means that Lenski's theory may be, in an important sense, untestable through survey research (Anderson, 1972:2).

Conclusion and Review

In summary, then, we have looked at some of the methodological difficulties related to alternative models to the additive function of component-status variables. The "mean value theorem in sociology" (Treiman, 1970), suggests some of the forms that the additive model of stratification may take:

> At the aggregate level, at least, the behavior associated with any given status configuration will be a weighted average of the behaviors associated with each of the

> component statuses in the configuration. Individuals may strike a balance between the behaviors appropriate to each status; or may choose to act in terms of one status on some occasions and in terms of the other on other occasions, depending upon which status is more salient at the time; or may permanently resolve any conflict by always acting in a manner appropriate to whatever status is most salient in general. All of these alternatives imply an additive effect of status variables on behavior at the aggregate level (Treiman, 1970:225).

In contrast to the different forms that the additive model may take, there are several alternative models of status inconsistency, one of which suggests that status inconsistency, *per se*, has a disorganizing effect on individuals. There are also more directed approaches relating achieved and ascribed status variables in any number of combinations. It is important to remember, however,

> . . . that the two alternatives are not contradictory, but that the social pathology theory requires that in addition to additive effects of the status variables on the behavior of interest there be interaction effects as well (Treiman, 1970:226).

If one feels, theoretically, that the interaction effects should explain a large degree of the variance, then "inconsistency effects" will have to be predicted and explained.

CHAPTER III

VOTING DEMOCRATIC AND STATUS INCONSISTENCY

Introduction

Studies using voting behavior as a dependent variable for inconsistency-effects have been rather extensive since the 1950's. In his earliest study of status-crystallization, Lenski suggested that a lack of status-consistency is as important in explaining political attitudes as the more conventional linear models relating social class and voting behavior. His findings indicate that a lack of status-consistency pushed one in the direction of voting Democratic to an extent which could not have been predicted from the linear, additive model (Lenski, 1954). In a later (1967) study, he suggests that voting Democratic and liberal attitudes in economic areas are indicative of a political reaction against the social order. In other words, as one indicator of inconsistency-effects, voting Democratic is a reaction against the system, an attempt to alter the political _status quo_ through the support of "liberal" movements. Lenski himself summarizes the dynamics involved in this relationship in the following paragraph:

> For some years voting behavior has been regarded as a highly relevant variable in studies of the effects of status-inconsistency. It has been hypothesized that status inconsistency is a source of stress for individuals, especially when the inconsistencies are substantial, since the individual prefers to think of himself in terms of his higher status or statuses while others have a tendency to treat him in terms of the lower. (This is what one would expect if he assumes men are strongly motivated by self interest.) The resulting conflict between expectations and experiences is bound to be disturbing, and it has been hypothesized that one common pattern of response is to react against the social order, by supporting a political party advocating change. If this reasoning is correct, one would then expect persons occupying inconsistent statuses to be more likely than persons occupying more consistent statuses to support liberal and socialist parties (Lenski, 1967:298-299).

A base-line model of voting behavior, then, would assume that there is a push toward the Democratic party if one is of low educational, financial or occupational status; and there is also a push in this direction for members of ethnic and religious minorities. At the same time there is a push in the Republican direction for persons with high social status in general, and for members of certain "core" Protestant churches (Segal, 1969:352).

Social and Economic Formulations of Voting Behavior

What might be the link between these political and social variables? In other words, what assumptions underly these relationships? One might suggest that there are two basic assumptions underlying the relationship of social status, political behavior and attitudes. One can use a model of rational self-interest: "Each citizen in our model votes for the party he believes will provide him with a higher utility income than any other party during the coming election period" (Downs, 1957:38).

This economic interpretation as the major determinant of political behavior has been criticized, however. It has been argued that the economic model itself does not explain American political behavior and research seeking to relate economic self-interest to political invovement has been contradictory (Lindenfeld, 1964; Segan and Knoke, 1967).

Social processes rather than economic pressures, on the other hand, are often cited as an intervening mechanism:

> The higher the identification of the individual with the group, the higher the probability that he will think and behave in ways which distinguish members of his group from non-members (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960:307).

The simple determinism of the economic-market principle in class action is seen as complicated by the existence of status groups (Knoke, 1969).

Lenski suggests that religious and racial minorities tend to be status-groups in the sense in which Weber employed the term.

> . . . they are groups which are differentiated in terms of social honor, and where honor and respect are denied to a particular group, its members tend to react critically toward the social system as a whole, its key institutions, and their leaders. Thus it appears that American radicalism derives at least as much from the 'status group struggle' as it does from the more familiar class struggle. In other words, the denial of equal honor and respect to all socio-religious groups may be as powerful a factor in stimulating discontent as the denial of economic advantages and political authority (Lenski, 1961:173).

One might, then, consider two sets of assumptions based on the question of whether class or status variables seem most important in their effect on the dependent variable. The class model might consider such variables as income and education as important. Here a straight Homans (1954) "investment-reward exchange relationship" may be seen to hold:

> This assertion is consistent with views of social behavior as an exchange process, which suggests that people will attempt to achieve a condition of status congruence at the level of their highest status (Homans, 1962:15).

Investments will have to be related to rewards in some relevant way. The individual's evaluation of his own social position will not be in accord with the social position given him by others with whom he comes in contact. The observable response-processes, as they might affect political behavior and attitudes, are processes attempting to raise one's lower ranks. This model then would be concerned with the rigidity or changeability of these lower ranks. The more fixed and less changeable, the greater the likelihood of direct political action to change the system. Age may play a part here, the lower ranks of youth being considered more changeable and individual mobility seen as possible. The individual is less likely to suffer from inconsistency effects. As summarized by Anderson and Zelditch:

> If Ego finds his rank inconsistent in comparison with alter, he will get upset to the extent that he perceives that upward mobility in his lower ranks is blocked. If the situation is perceived to be transient then Ego is not likely to get upset (Anderson and Zelditch, 1964:118).

In regard to which factors will influence Ego's reactions, the authors continue:

> If a person experiences deprivation associated with his present status then the stronger his expectation is that he himself will be able to move to a higher status with less deprivation, the less likely he is to combine

> with others to remove the causes of deprivation in his present status (Anderson and Zelditch, 1964:118-119).

Since status-differences are the basis of our second model, ascribed rather than achieved differences become more important. In the evaluation of esteem and honor, the factor of visibility and lack of ambiguity about status-relationships become crucial variables. In considering the effects of status-consistency on self image, one of the major factors may be the visibility of ascribed statuses on the blocking of social acceptance as they might be involved in some "rebuff process" (Zelditch and Anderson, 1966). The lack of social acceptance of a nouveau riche ethnic by his new peers obviously depends upon his "tainted" visibility, especially when his educational attainments are obviously below his income. Homans refers to a lack of "social certitude" as the

> . . . simultaneous holding of high and low ranks creating doubt in others as to the reality and legitimacy of the individual's higher ranks. A certain minimum amount of social visibility is necessary before rank-inconsistency can have the painful consequences described by Homans (Hyman, 1967: 395).

Ascribed statuses are significantly based on two factors. These are: first, the degree of visibility of the individual's statuses to significant others, and second, the degree of ambiguity of the relationship between statuses in an individual's configuration to that individual. In terms of observable response-processes, the individual may on one hand be reacting to blocked social mobility related to achieved variables, and on the other hand to blocked social acceptance related to the visibility of his lower ranks, especially if they are seen as ascribed. As blockages in social acceptance are considered an aggregate, rather than an individual phenomenon, (both to ego and to alter), collective action may be seen as one kind of appropriate response, and voting Democratic can be seen, in this case, as an aspect of collective reproach of the social system through its political structure. However, one might question, at this point, why the reaction to society should lead in a liberal rather than a conservative direction. The reasoning, derived from Smith (1969) suggests that

> To the degree that statuses attributed to ego are fixed, we may speak of the person as being in a condition analogous to a dependency relationship vis-a-vis the larger society (Smith, 1969:910).

Smith sees minority groups, because of the nature of their ascribed statuses, as being "dependent groups" and suggests that such groups generally vote Democratic. This derives from:

> . . . the apparent appeal of the Democratic Party to dependent groups generally, and from the apparent ideological distinction between Democrats and Republicans--i.e., with the Republican Party generally reputed to attract individuals favoring a kind of 'laissez-faire' individualism, and the Democratic Party, those favoring the idea of a 'Welfare state' (Smith, 1969:913).

Structural Crystallization and Voting Behavior

What seems to be at stake here, then, are the partisan responses to two kinds of "blocking." On the one hand, is the class-oriented mobility-blocking related to the degree of changeability of achieved variables? On the other hand, is the blocking of social acceptance of a status-oriented model where the visibility of the ascribed status characteristics would determine the responses to inconsistency-effects? In both cases it might be suggested that structural crystallization (as measured by age) affects the degree of changeableness and visibility in these two models and would add in both cases to the saliency of response related to voting-preference (Smith, 1969). In other words, with increasing age, both the individual's ability to change his statuses through effort decreases, and the individual's

status-relations become less ambiguous to himself and more visible to others.

At this point it is appropriate to see whether Smith's (1969) hypotheses generally hold for our data, in order that we may determine whether to include it in the more formal presentation of the two earlier models.

One might predict that due to the salience of achieved statuses for the young, one would expect inconsistencies in statuses such as income and education to cause a problem with a status-uncrystallized population. The reasoning, according to Smith, is that:

> . . . the degree to which the total effect (partisanship) is expressed varies with the salience of the given status dimension. The questions involved become easier to deal with when we consider achieved and ascribed dimensions separately. Since we anticipate that achievement is salient while subject to variation, we expect achieved statuses to be more salient than ascribed statuses when crystallization is low. (Below age 45) As long as ego can change achieved rankings but is unsuccessful at resolving inconsistencies among them, he will experience frustration at his inability. Thus, we expect inconsistent achieved rankings to produce support for liberal parties when crystallization is low but not when it is high (Smith, 1969: 912).

From this one could predict that when comparing income and education-inconsistency effects on voting Democratic, for a Protestant sample under age forty-five, this status-uncrystallized group would exhibit inconsistency-effects.

Referring to Table I, the inconsistency-effect will be computed by taking a "difference of differences" in the cell proportions, namely by subtracting the sum of the proportions in the consistent cells (high-high, low-low) from the comparable sum in the inconsistent cells (high-low, low-high). The resulting measure may be either positive or negative, with a positive difference indicating a surplus in the proportion of respondents favoring the Democratic party in the inconsistent cells over the consistent cells (Smith, 1969).

The data in Table I shows a strong inconsistency effect for young Protestants (+33) and in the predicted direction.

In considering advancing status-crystallization and its effect on achievement-oriented inconsistencies, one would expect a lessening of inconsistency effects with increasing age. The reasoning here follows from the statement that:

> When achieved rankings have become set in a crystallized ensemble and are not subject to further variation, he will not experience frustration even if some inconsistencies still survive. As achieved rankings become inelastic, they lose part of their salience, and continued striving thereafter becomes unrewarding and is abandoned. The removal of

TABLE 1

EFFECTS ON VOTING DEMOCRATIC OF DIFFERENT COMBINATIONS OF INCOME-EDUCATION INCONSISTENCY FOR PROTESTANTS AND CATHOLICS

(Controlling for Age)

		Affluent	Over Achiever	Under Achiever	Poor	Difference of Differences
	Income	High	High	Low	Low	
	Education	High	Low	High	Low	
Age;	Under 45					
Protestant		49% (251)	84% (192)	54% (215)	56% (245)	+33
Catholic		70% (255)	85% (150)	84% (200)	97% (32)	+ 2
Age:	45 and Older					
Protestant		26% (145)	36% (99)	43% (99)	74% (194)	-21
Catholic		53% (64)	85% (125)	68% (54)	82% (158)	+19

(Relevant dichotomies for the status attributes)

	Income	Education
Low	Below Median	Below Median
High	Above Median	Above Median

> the effort consequently eliminates the frustration. Only under low crystallization, therefore, would we expect inconsistencies in achievement to produce a disposition to favor social change.(Smith, 1969:914).

From the above one would expect that Protestants, over age forty-five and compared once again for income and education, would exhibit little if any inconsistency effects. Although there are some inconsistency effects, they are in a negative direction (-21) and thus gives some slight support for the hypothesis. (See Table 1.)

Considering next paired achieved-ascribed differences among the structurally uncrystallized, the suggestion is that prior to crystallization of one's ascribed status, its salience is at a low level and not likely to appear visible or aid in reducing the ambiguity of status relations to the individual. Income and education comparisons for Catholics under age forty-five, it would be expected, would not lead to "inconsistency effects." The data suggest little if any inconsistency effects (+2). In an uncrystallized status-structure composed of achieved and ascribed rankings, little if any inconsistency-effects result.

Finally, considering the paired achieved-ascribed differences among the structurally crystallized, the suggestion would be that:

> . . . with the fixing of achievement and the disappearance of the saliency differential, the entire status-set acquires a more visible, global evaluation, and the various contingencies or interdependencies among ascription and achievement are acknowledged (Smith, 1969: 914).

Comparing income and education of Catholics above age forty-five, one would expect, then, inconsistency effects with increasing crystallization. The data support this prediction (+19).

Methodological Challenges

In general, the data so far seem to support Smith's (1969) hypotheses. However, the notion of status-consistency problems has been undergoing a rather radical evolution from its original conceptions, methodologically as well as theoretically. One of the conclusions reached is that:

> . . . only on *a priori* grounds can one unequivocally allocate variation to either the effects of statuses taken independently or to their particular combination. Some headway can be made in untangling the 'independent' effects of status variables from the effects of their particular configurations at the cost of more rigorous specification of the problem. We have seen that the only meaning that 'status inconsistency effects' can have which is distinct from the meaning of 'status effects' is that the relation between status and attitudes of behavior depends upon (varies with) the conjunction of particular levels on the several dimensions of social status (Laumann, 1970:519).

This would indicate that there is a need for more rigorous theoretical specification of the kinds of interaction between status-variables and behavior that would count as status-inconsistency effects. Accordingly, we have to make predictions, based on different sets of assumptions. In other words we have to be able to predict, from the models developed earlier, which of the two inconsistent combinations in our data has the greater effect on the dependent variable.

In looking at Table 1 earlier, we used a "difference of differences" between the sums of the inconsistent and consistent cells. A positive response was seen to indicate inconsistency-effects and a negative result (or no result at all) was seen to indicate a lack of inconsistency-effects. A methodological dilemma is uncovered here because although it is true that if a positive result is obtained one probably has some kind of inconsistency-effect, it is not necessarily true that if one fails to get a positive number one does not have an inconsistency-effect.

This may be illustrated by looking at one of the inconsistent cells. Among those who are "high income and low education" whose indicator is voting Democratic, one of the responses may be, "I make pretty good money, but they still won't accept me. Obviously the system needs changing." This seems to be a radicalizing response and may be related to an identification with low-prestige ethnic groups. However, another response might be that "the system is pretty good and considering where I started from, I've done very well, in terms of my income." This might be considered a system-supporting response. If a high income-low education cell is seen as inconsistent but the two responses are considered equally probable since some of the people in that cell will go in one direction while the rest will go in the other direction, then the results may cancel each other. This is a crucial problem in using the "difference of differences" test for inconsistency-effects. If it works out that one obtains a positive response, results may be in the predicted direction. If one does not get a positive response (or any response at all), one may still be getting hidden inconsistency-effects. This problem has to do with Blalock's "identification" problem: to be able to solve questions, one must have enough information. In this situation one has more unknowns than relationships (Blalock, 1965; 1966; 1967). The only way to get around this identification-problem, in the absence of information in data, is to make some reasonably plausible assumptions.

Alternative "Ascription" Assumption (Model 1)

The first assumption is that for many purposes education can be treated as an ascribed-status. This assumption seems most plausible after a certain age when advancing one's education becomes less realistic.

Continuing with the development of assumptions, if one is to be concerned with which way the inconsistent individual will respond, radicalizing or system-maintaining, one must make assumptions regarding which of these ranks he will pay most attention to in terms of its effect on self-image. This is based on the idea that when inconsistency effects are observed, they emerge because the individual experiences a "self" problem of some kind (Mead, 1934; Kolb, 1944; Meltzer, 1964). The individual feels dissatisfied with self-evaluation in terms of others' reaction to him. If one is low in some rank and it has nothing to do with how he feels, his self-image, then it should not affect him. If this kind of assumption is not included, then everyone can be considered rank-inconsistent to some degree. This leads to the question of which of these ranks affects self-image, and which is an accident or can be rationalized as an unfortunate circumstance. An assumption is needed concerning which of the two ranks, income or education, will be considered more salient to the individual. One assumption might be that the most salient rank is always the high state of an ascribed status. If one has available a high state of an ascribed status, then he may pay a lot of attention to it because he considers it most salient to his self-image. The least salient rank is a low state of an ascribed status. Achieved characteristics will fall somewhere in between in terms of salience.

Where the individual is low in income but high in education, he is likely to suggest that although it is unfortunate that he has so little income, he ended up fairly well as far as his education is concerned. This circumstance is likely to lead to a lowering of the Democratic vote. On the other hand, a person who has high income and low education, because he does not have a high ascribed-status, should be upset at the lack of social acceptance of his high achieved-status. This response would most likely lead to greater Democratic voting.

If these last two assumptions are correct, then there is less likelihood that the two responses will cancel each other out. If the salient status has a low rank, then the individual is more likely to respond with a radicalizing approach and less likely to support the system. If the salient status has a high rank he is more likely to support the system maintaining response and is less likely to be radicalized. With these assumptions, then, one may be able to overcome the indeterminance related to the "identification" problem. One should be able to predict which of these ranks the individual centers his self image around, and in what direction the results are likely to move.

Alternative "Achievement" Assumption (Model 2)

Laumann (1970) has commented on the relative significance of income and education on inconsistency-effects, and following Homans, supports an alternative assumption (Model 2).

> These two distinct types of status inconsistency need hardly have the same consequences for behavior. The person who gains little income relative to his educational standing is likely to be depressed, frustrated, or otherwise disenchanted by the low rate of return upon his education investment, while the person who gains much income despite an inferior level of educational attainment is unlikely to experience similar feelings of psychological malaise. Thus, once a distinction between the two types of status inconsistency is introduced, one finds ample grounds for postulating a positive correlation between status inconsistency and

> (the dependent variable) when income is low relative to education and a negative correlation between status inconsistency and (the dependent variable) when income is high relative to education (Laumann, 1970:517).

This alternative set of assumptions reasons that in an achievement-oriented society, the most salient rank is always the high state of an achieved-status. At the same time the least salient rank is always the low state of an achieved status. The two ascribed statuses should fall somewhere between the high and low states of the achieved statuses. The results that follow this alternative set of assumptions are opposite those that follow from the first set of assumptions. While the first model suggests that high ascribed-status would have the greatest salience for the individual's self-image, the second model predicts that high achieved-status would have the greatest salience for the individual in an inconsistent situation.

One might predict, then, from our previous discussions, that Model 1 which emphasizes ascribed statuses would be most appropriate of Catholics, and Model 2 which emphasizes achieved statuses would be most appropriate to Protestants. One can infer from this that the inconsistent cell of high income-low education would be most salient for Catholics and that the inconsistent cell of high education-low income would be most salient for Protestants, in terms of inconsistency-effects.

Analysis of Data

The interpretation of the data in the Table stems from our earlier discussion where it was proposed that:

> . . . the determination as to whether rank inconsistency, per se, as distinct from the two hierarchies from which it is generated, has an effect upon a dependent variable, requires information as to the direction of any association existing between each of these hierarchies and the dependent variable. Once this information is at hand a judgment can be made as to whether the data depart from what would be predicted merely on the basis of knowledge about the association of each of these hierarchies with the dependent variable (Hyman, 1967:386).

For example, suppose that the rank-hierarchies of education and income are each positively associated with a dependent variable d. If education-income inconsistency has no effect on d, then the value of d for education-income inconsistents should be somewhere between the value of d for those high on both education and income and those low on both education and income. Only if the data deviate from this null hypothesis can it be said that education-income rank-inconsistency has an effect upon d (Hyman, 1967).

From the data in Table 1, we see that for Protestants under age forty-five, the cell that contains those who have high education relative to income exhibits a score of 54 percent, or 1 percent above the mean for the two consistent cells. Accordingly, this score, because it falls within the two consistent cells and close to the mean of these two consistent cells, does not substantially contribute to the inconsistency-effects. We see that for Protestants under age forty-five, the cell in which income is low relative to education (54 percent), which should be the major contributor to "inconsistency effects" for model 2, does not substantiate the hypothesis.

One might suggest, however, that for those under forty-five years of age, low income relative to education may be seen as temporary and not an indicator of blocked social mobility. How then can we explain the finding that the cell which contains individuals having high income relative to education has a score of 84 percent, or 32 percent above the mean for the two consistent cells? One might question this unexpected finding as a status effect of low education, rather than a status-inconsistency effect. However, the cell of low education relative to income is 28 percent above the consistently low score, which should be the highest percentage if there is only a 7 percent spread from the high consistent cell to the low consistent cell, suggesting that for young Protestants, voting Democratic is not highly correlated with social status.

Contrary to the hypotheses, it is obviously a combination of high income and low education that is determining the inconsistency-effects for this Table. If one suggests that high education relative to income might indicate blocked social mobility (at least in more crystallized structures--Smith, 1969), what might a high income relative to education indicate for young Protestants? The possibility of some aspect of visibility and blocked social acceptance is worth investigating. Contrary to our assumptions, low education relative to income may be more visible among the young than had been predicted. In other words, such an individual seems to have less control over the visibility of his low educational status and may not be acceptable to other high income-high education people with whom he may want to involve himself. What may be happening to this young Protestant may be part of some "rebuff process" (Zelditch and Anderson, 1966) related to the increasing autonomy of education as it relates to other facets of social life in America (Hauser, 1970).

However, with Anderson and Zelditch: "We suspect that conformity or, for that matter, resentment due to rebuff or anticipated rebuff would be hard to diagnose with conventional survey interviews (Anderson and Zelditch, 1964: 124).

For Protestants forty-five years and over, Model 2 would predict that if there are inconsistency-effects, they would be monitored in the high education-low income cell. However, one would expect that with advancing "structural crystallization", income-education disparities would become less of a problem as the salience of achieved ranks decreases. What we discover is that both inconsistent cells are below the mean of the consistent cells which indicates that individuals in the inconsistent cells vote in a Republican direction (High income-low education: -14 percent; high education-low income: -7 percent). The greatest deviation from the mean, however, is in the "high income-low education" cell, countering the prediction of Model 2. In addition, percentages in both inconsistent cells fall between the percentages of the consistent cells, suggesting that no "inconsistency effects" are operative. In other words, although achieved ranks do lose some salience with advancing age, remaining response-mechanisms seem to

shift from the left to the right of the political spectrum. This would be similar to what Wiley (1970) predicts: "People with inconsistent class (achieved) attributes are especially prone to support right wing groups" (Wiley, 1970:529).

In addition, Lipset reviewed four major polls on McCarthyism and concluded that among manual workers, especially the Republican ones, support for McCarthy increased with income. He suggested that:

> Perhaps the higher income people with lower occupational or educational strata were precisely those who were most drawn to an ideology that attacked as pro-Communist both liberal lower-class based politics, and moderate, conservative 'old upper class' elitist groups (Wiley, 1970:530).

One might also include in this high income-low education group small businessmen, retirees and even some salaried middle-class who identify with the "old middle class."

One must conclude from the results at hand that, for Protestants of all ages, "class" (achieved) oriented explanations in terms of Model 2 could not be verified, and that the alternative "status" (ascribed) oriented Model seemed to explain the data more effectively. However, the precise dynamics of the process seem indeterminant from the data available.

In regard to status-uncrystallized Catholics, one would expect that even though we are comparing achievement-oriented statuses, the factor of Catholicism would allow this to be perceived as an ascribed-achieved inconsistency. We would expect then, that inconsistencies between ascribed and achieved rankings will be stressful in proportion to the degree of overall crystallization. If inconsistency-effects are to be found, one would expect that the "high income-low education" cell would predominate, according to Model 1. However, the two inconsistent cells for Catholics under age forty-five differ by 1 percent, and no overall inconsistency-effects are evident. Once again we have to ask for an explanation of the differences between young Protestants, who evince distinct inconsistency-effects in the "high income-low education" cell, and young Catholics who evince no inconsistency-effects while no difference in the two inconsistent cells was discovered. This indeterminancy, once again, cannot be enlightened by the present survey data.

Finally, with increasing structural crystallization, Catholics are expected to show greater inconsistency-effects. When we examine Catholics above age forty-five, and compare the two inconsistent cells, it is the high income-low education cell that is 18 percent above the mean of the two consistent cells; the high education-low income cell is only 1 percent above the mean of the consistent cells. This conforms with our prediction in Model 1. In addition, the high income-low education cell (at 85 percent) was 3 percent larger than the consistently low cell (at 82 percent), although the latter should have been the largest of the four cells if no inconsistency-effects were present. This indicates then, according to the criteria set down, that inconsistency-effects are present in the high income-low education cell. However, another methodological dilemma is inherent in the data. When education but not income, or income but not education, is associated with a dependent variable d, then another technique is recommended to determine the difference between status-effects and status-inconsistency effects. Hyman (1967) suggests that we:

> . . . consider 'income high-education low' inconsistency where education but not wealth is associated with d. If this kind of inconsistency has no effect on d, then we would predict that 'wealth high-education low' inconsistents will show the same d percentage as will consistents with about the same educational rank. Thus we can compare the d percentage of the 'education-wealth consistently low' group with that of these inconsistents, and only if there is a

> substantial difference will we judge that a rank-inconsistency effect is present (Hyman, 1967:387).

However, we find only a 3 percent difference between the consistently low cell (at 82 percent) and the inconsistent high income-low education cell (at 85 percent), findings that cast grave doubts on the presence of inconsistency effects.

Review and Conclusion

Interestingly, Smith has predicted that for ascribed-achieved differences among the structurally crystallized, it would be the high education-low income cell that would register the inconsistency-effect. This is implied in his statement that

> . . . a young Negro is not as likely to resign himself to the contingency of race and income as long as increases are possible or appear possible. For with advancing age, as his income becomes set, and unchanging in response to his investment in achievement, the contingency is likely to take on greater salience as a source of stress (Smith, 1969: 914).

From this, one might expect the high education-low income cell to be the larger in this case, as the contingencies among statuses would be most apparent from a Homans' (1962) investment-rewards perspective.

What seems to occur, as we have seen, is some kind of reaction to low education on the part of older

Catholics, somewhat closer to the prediction of Model 1. The implication is that there is increasing visibility of ascribed statuses with advancing age as well as decreasing ambiguity about status-relationships; further, that the results of this visibility are especially stressful for older Catholics with little education. However, inconsistency-effects were not convincingly demonstrated for this group, which makes the results doubtful.

Although aging seems to have different effects on Protestants and Catholics in terms of the relationship between status-inconsistency and voting behavior, when we examine the separate inconsistent cells, the literature based on available survey-data results and our own predictions do not adequately explain the differences. Of the two models provided, the ascribed-status model operates, for some unexplained reason, to the exclusion of the achieved-class model. In addition, when inconsistent effects were demonstrated, the only cell that provided the inconsistent effect was the high income-low education cell and this only among an unpredicted group, young Protestants, contrary to expectations based on Homans' investment-reward exchange theory (Homans, 1962).

Obviously other theoretical and methodological perspectives will have to be developed to demonstrate inconsistency effects on some dependent variable. Judging from the results of our research to this point, and most others in the same tradition, it is probable that survey-data may not be a sufficiently powerful instrument to handle the extremely hairy and complex dilemmas involved in the study of status-inconsistency effects.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL PARTICIPATION AND STATUS INCONSISTENCY

Introduction

In the former chapter, when we considered status-inconsistency and voting behavior, a base-line model of the relation of different status-factors and voting behavior was indicated. The expectation was that with increasing wealth there is a tendency to vote Republican, and with decreasing wealth a greater likelihood to vote Democratic. Within an additive model one would posit differences in terms of particular status-inconsistent configurations. Status-inconsistency, especially the kind that pairs high-achieved and low-ascribed status, according to Lenski (1966; 1967), would lead to more liberal voting behavior than would be predicted from the additive model. The theoretical assumptions were that the individual attempts to raise his lower ranks and if the attempts are unsuccessful, the individual may, in one kind of response, try to change the system itself.

Continuing to look at the research done in the "Lenski tradition" and trying to follow some of the moves in this research program, we turn to contact-frequencies of social participation as another kind of "observable response process" (Zelditch and Anderson, 1966). In order to build a base-line model of social participation and its relations to social status, the direction of the relationships would have to be predicted. In other words, higher status should give a push in the direction of social participation as a measure of social integration (Axelrod, 1956). At the same time, lower social status should give an opposite push, serving to prevent social participation. That is, the low-status individual with fewer financial resources, for instance, might restrict his involvement to one group, such as relatives (Dotson, 1951). It has been suggested that:

> . . . the highly discrepant are not only likely to be politically left. In 1956, Lenski published evidence that they are also less frequently committed to secular voluntary organizations. Even among those who are members, there is an inordinately low rate of interpersonal relations and a strong tendency to token affiliation (Demerath, 1965:132).

The implicit theoretical perspective, while similar to role-theory used by Hughes (1944), suggests that the status-inconsistents

> . . . are unable to define their position and are uncomfortable under the prevailing status-system. They seek to change the system and, in the meantime, they withdraw from voluntary organizations where status judgments are most blatant (Demerath, 1965: 132).

Jackson's "Isolation" Assumptions

Jackson (1962) has improved on the withdrawal hypothesis by finding that among inconsistents whose ethnic status is high but whose economic status is low, political liberalism is supplanted by a high rate of psychosomatic symptoms of stress (Jackson, 1962). He goes on to use a distinction based on the differences between "ascribed" and "achieved" statuses as first defined by Linton (1950):

> Ascribed statuses are those which are assigned to individuals without reference to their innate differences or abilities. They can be predicted and trained for, from the moment of birth. The achieved statuses are, as a minimum, those requiring special qualities, although they are not limited to these. They are not assigned to individuals from birth, but are left often to be filled through competition and individual effort (Jackson, 1961: 43).

Using this distinction between ascribed and achieved statuses, Jackson suggests that

> . . . a deficiency in the former (ascribed statuses) is likely to be blamed against the society, whereas a deficiency in the latter (achieved statuses) is more likely to be

> blamed upon oneself. Thus, low ascribed status should conduce to political radicalism, while low achieved status should result in intrapunitive symptoms such as psychosomatic stress (and less social participation) (Jackson, 1962; cited in Demerath, 1965:133).

Jackson suggests that the rationale for this assumption relates to the differences in choice of response to status-inconsistency. In terms of how inconsistents, who respond politically, differ from those who respond by withdrawing into social isolation, three factors are evident:

(1) higher achieved status

(2) lower ascribed status

(3) different positions of their achieved and ascribed ranks relative to one another.

Thus, the first response to status-inconsistency is related to achievement status in two ways:

> A high achievement-inconsistent, because of his greater ability to see his problems, in a social context and to make an active coping response to them, is likely to respond to his stress with attitudes and actions favoring changes in the social system. Conversely, the inconsistent of low achieved-status is likely to make a more passive, less coping response, and this response is likely to be directed at himself because he is less able to see the social sources of his status dilemma (Jackson, 1960:71).

According to Jackson, the second possible explanatory factor is ascribed status. However, he tends to discount this factor by suggesting that

> It seems unlikely that the choice of an internal, passive, psychosomatic response to status-inconsistency is due principally to high (ascribed) status, while low (ascribed) status produces the more actively coping, socially directed, political response (Jackson, 1960:71).

The third explanatory factor may influence the response to status-inconsistency by affecting the way in which the inconsistent individual defines his problems. A person whose achievements ranks are inferior to his ascribed ranks is likely to define his difficulties in terms of personal failure:

> The success-values of American society tend to evaluate any low achiever as a failure, and the high racial-ethnic rank of this type of inconsistent increases the likelihood of feelings of personal deficiency and self blame. Unlike the low-status consistent, he cannot justify his lack of success in terms of his ascribed handicaps. He is therefore likely to experience feelings of guilt, increasing the likelihood of a response turned against the self. . . . This factor, then, is an additional force preventing low-achievement inconsistents from focusing upon the social system as the source of their difficulties (Jackson, 1960:72).

On the other hand, the inconsistent whose achievement ranks exceed his ascribed ranks is evaluated as a success:

> . . . since he has won his way (or maintained his position) despite the handicap of his low ascribed-status. If he experiences stress due to conflicting expectations he is unlikely to blame himself because according to American success values his behavior has been completely laudatory. He is therefore more likely to see his problems as stemming from the actions of others, and hence the social system, thus predisposing him to respond by favoring social change (Jackson, 1960:72).

The suggestion in this third explanation, then, is that finding the problem in oneself is more likely to lead to withdrawal and isolation than finding the problem in society.

Speculating on how this might be applied to levels of social participation, Jackson suggests that inconsistency-patterns vary in the extent to which the individual feels that his status-attributes can be made consistent through upward mobility. Such equilibration should be possible if the pattern is one of low standing on achievement-dimensions and high standing on ascriptive-dimensions:

> According to Benoit-Smullyan's equilibration hypothesis, persons with this 'remediable' kind of status-inconsistency would be expected to try to equalize their status-ranks through upward mobility. Or such striving might at least take place in fantasy. In either case, such a response could be expected to reduce the likelihood of any other response, especially such a comparatively unrewarding response as (withdrawal into isolation) (Jackson, 1960:16-17).

Jackson suggests then, that mobility effects would probably not continue far into middle age, ". . . since only the young men have any real possibility of upward mobility to motivate their actual or fantasied strivings" (Jackson, 1960:17).

On the basis of these assumptions, one can predict that among persons with inconsistent status-patterns remediable through upward mobility:

> . . . the younger person will report (higher levels of social participation) than the older person because the younger persons are likely to be occupied with upward mobility strivings and thus are less likely to make another response (lower levels of social participation) (Jackson, 1960:17).

The alternative assumption would be that among persons of inconsistent status-patterns not remediable by upward social mobility (such as high achieved-low ascribed status):

> . . . we would expect, on these grounds at least, little difference between age groups in the level of (social participation) reported, since not even the younger people in these patterns can hope to equalize their status-ranks through upward mobility (Jackson, 1960:17).

The arguments above outlined may be summarized in the following assumption:

I. Where upward mobility is possible, an individual whose status-ranks are inconsistent will respond to the strains produced by attempting to equilibrate his status-ranks through upward mobility in preference to other forms of response.

The following hypothesis derives from the above stated assumption:

1. In a situation where upward mobility would have an equilibrating effect on patterns of status-inconsistency (high ascribed-low achieved), younger individuals will show a higher level of social participation, and older persons will show a reduced level of social participation.

Alternative "Insulating" Assumptions

As in our earlier discussion of voting behavior, additional assumptions concerning which of the two ranks, income or education, is going to be considered salient to the individual, are needed for prediction of responses to status-inconsistency. A combination of high income and low education might present a greater problem for Catholics than for Protestants, based on earlier discussions in which we suggested a formulation where the most salient rank was always the high state of an ascribed rank. Where the salient rank is a low state, then the individual is more likely to respond by an "insulated" response (Zelditch and Anderson, 1966), or to interact to a greater degree with others like himself, such as relatives. If the salient status has a high rank, he is likely to be satisfied with his overall configuration, and factors other than status-inconsistency may be more important in affecting his social participation. This formulation, in which the most salient rank is always the high state of an ascribed rank, seems more appropriate to a Catholic than to a Protestant population.

The following assumptions should be stated at this point:

IIa The most salient rank is always the high state of an ascribed rank.

IIb The least salient rank is always the low state of an ascribed rank.

IIc Achieved characteristics will fall somewhere in between the high and low states of ascribed ranks in terms of salience.

The following hypotheses then would follow:

2a If the salient ascribed-status has a low rank, the individual is likely to blame the system and retreat into insulation with others like himself; i.e., higher contact-frequencies with relatives and low social participation with extra familial groups including friends.

2b Catholics with high income-low education configurations would be expected to have higher participation in "expressive" groups such as his relatives, and to withdraw from "instrumental" informal groups such as friends (Dotson, 1951).

2c Greater participation in kinship groups should occur more frequently among young Catholics than older Catholics where lack of education relative to income is related to the amounts of education received by different age-cohorts.

For Protestants, the following assumptions are in order:

IIIa The most salient rank is always the high state of an achieved rank.

IIIb The least salient rank is always the low state of an achieved rank.

IIIc Ascribed ranks will fall somewhere between the high and low states of achieved ranks in terms of salience.

The following hypotheses then follow:

3a Education can be viewed as an ascribed status, especially when the individual is older and the possibilities of continuing his education become remote.

3b If the salient achieved status has a low rank, the individual is likely to retreat into isolation and have lower rates of interaction with both relatives and friends.

3c In Protestant populations, where social mobility is seen as possible, the individual will strive for upward mobility as an equilibration process while he is young.

3d When Protestants advance in age, and mobility is no longer seen as possible, low income-high education discrepants will lower all forms of social participation, including contacting relatives and other friends on a sustained basis.

To reiterate, one might expect two entirely different patterns of social participation depending on these three sets of assumptions derived from Jackson. The issue involved is whether it is the achieved or the ascribed status rank, of the inconsistent pair, that is seen as deficient by the individual. When the ascribed-status rank is low, then the individual will be more likely to blame society and at the same time retreat into "insulation" with similar group members, such as might occur in a Catholic community (Lenski, 1961; Zelditch and Anderson, 1966). Here one would more likely find participation in social-supportive activities, such as contacting relatives, and less participation in "status-competitive" activities such as contacting "other friends" (Axelrod, 1956; Lenski, 1956).

On the other hand, where it is achieved-status that is low, one might expect the individual rather than society to be considered responsible, and a process of social isolation in which the individual withdraws from both social-supportive and status-competitive interaction might be predicted. In this case, it would be expected that the Protestant sample would fail to interact with relatives as well as other friends.

Festinger has spelled out these alternatives in his discussion of "cognitive dissonance" (Festinger, 1957). Under conditions of dissonance (or status-inconsistency) several solutions are possible:

> First the individual may change one or more of the dissonant elements. In the context of stratification, this can be translated into vertical mobility so that the low-status

> ranking is raised to a level commensurate with the high. It might also refer to a wholesale change in the status-system itself, presumably the intent of those political radicals who support programs of social change (Festinger, 1957; cited in Demerath, 1965: 135-136).

A second remedy lies at the opposite extreme. Instead of actively changing one or all of the dissonant elements involved,

> . . . one may passively withdraw from the dissonant situation so that none of the elements are salient. Here is a niche for Lenski's findings that those with high status-discrepancy have a low rate of commitment to secular voluntary organizations in which status judgments are allegedly most pronounced (Demerath, 1965:136).

Demerath suggests that the two approaches suggested by Festinger share a common quality; both are:

> . . . unstable positions in that they sever the individual's ties with conventional society. This is less true of those pursuing mobility, but certainly those advocating radical change and those who effect a complete withdrawal risk converting status-discrepancy into alienation (Demerath, 1965:136).

Demerath then introduces Festinger's third resolution of dissonance which he suggests avoids these pitfalls when it applies to status-inconsistency because it simply:

> . . . involves adding new elements to the situation which reinforces one or more of the disputing factors. Thus a person who is ranked both high and low in secular status, may seek other status-criteria for evaluation. He may find an alternative orientation which

> contributes to a more consistent self-image (Demerath, 1965:136).

What is suggested, then, is that, although conventional status is pretty much tied to economic institutions in our society, it is possible to supplement conventional status with judgments drawn from other institutions since different types of social institutions represent different orientations and different criteria for status judgments. Thus, it is possible for the status-inconsistent to

> . . . put inordinate emphasis on his role in the family . . . [which] carry values that are in some measure distinct from those which frame conventional status. In each case, it is possible to reinforce a self-image of high status by adding new criteria to the range of conventional standards (Demerath, 1965:137).

Festinger's third response to dissonance, then, can be seen as an adjustment more stable than total withdrawal or radical protest. Demerath questions why none of the previously-cited research in the Lenski tradition have explored this third alternative:

> In fact, some of the research may be criticized for failing to see its possibilities. Thus Lenski's statement that the highly discrepant are less involved in voluntary organizations (and social participation) requires specification. It may be that they are less involved in those voluntary organizations which subscribe to the secular values that determine the conventional status system. On the other hand, the highly discrepant

> may be more involved in organizations (and social participation) which harbor non-economic values or values unrelated to status judgments. We might expect, for example, that they will be inordinately involved in the family . . . while at the same time they will be less involved in . . . fraternal organization (and contact with other friends) (Demerath, 1965:137).

However, this alternative assumes validation of one's newly emphasized status-ranks by others, and this assumption may be problematic.

<u>"Secondary Stratification" Assumptions</u>

Another argument that relates to this problem is based on the suggestion that equilibrating mechanisms may be related to secondary-stratification processes:

> Once major stratification structures have developed, secondary ones on which low-status persons rank higher than high-status persons may be developed in an effort to promote cohesion within the system (Blau, 1964:50).

In other words, social participation may be seen as a response-process based on lack of acceptance along the major stratification-dimensions, and increased involvement in groups, such as relatives, where status-claims can be validated, or at least not questioned (Blau, 1964). One might suggest that individuals whose income exceeds their education may have difficulty validating their claims for approval and social acceptance in the groups they come into contact with unless high-income level is accompanied by appropriately high levels of education. In other words, there are expectancy-relations based on parity between income and education, especially among people below age forty-five, where educational achievements have risen sharply with each successive age-cohort (Hauser, 1970).

What is suggested is that where an insufficient level of education fails to justify a high level of income, the individual cannot have his high income "universally" accepted by others. He is restricted in claims for esteem to groups where validation is based on more "particularistic" criteria (Blau, 1964). An example of this would be in contacts with relatives, where income can be acknowledged and educational level is not as likely to be stressed. Social interaction outside such particularistic groups can, however, be seen as problematic.

Interaction with relatives, then, should be extensive for high income-low education individuals, under age forty-five, and less extensive for those over forty-five, whose income-education connections are more ambiguous. This pattern of interaction should not hold for such status-competitive groups as "other friends" whose high income-low education claims to validation of esteem based on income may be questioned if not accompanied by equally high levels of education (Axelrod, 1956). As Dotson points out, most urbanites have an active social life among their kin groups, neighbors, and co-workers. Contacts outside these groups, such as with "other friends", are likely to lead to invidious status-comparisons, and withdrawal is most likely to be the result (Dotson, 1951).

The assumptions might be spelled out as follows:

IVa Secondary ranks are only emphasized by P when a highly visible rank is low.

IVb A secondary rank is only recognized by a limited membership-group and when one steps outside these groups, the validation is problematic.

IVc Education is considered a highly visible rank when one is young due to the high percentage of younger people now getting advanced education.

IVd The relation between education and other status-variables becomes more ambiguous for older groups since education was less available at an earlier time period.

IVe Education is considered changeable for younger individuals and less subject to individual efforts at an older age.

IVf Contact with relatives tends to provide "intrinsic" satisfactions and is "particularistic" in nature, because the individual's status-attributes are not given much attention in these groups.

IVg Contact with other friends tends to provide "extrinsic" satisfactions and is "universalistic" in nature, since parity is expected in relationships between these states of status-attributes.

The following hypotheses would follow:

4a Interaction with particularistic groups, such as relatives, should be extensive for high income-low education individuals, especially prior to age forty-five.

4b Interaction with particularistic groups, such as relatives, should be minimal for high income-low education individuals, especially after age forty-five.

4c Interaction with universalistic groups such as other friends should be minimal for high income-low education individuals at all age groups.

In other words, only certain audience-groups can act to serve these validation functions, such as the association with relatives which provides intrinsic satisfactions. On the other hand, contact with other friends would not provide validation of status-claims since it provides extrinsic satisfactions:

> This distinction between intrinsically and extrinsically rewarding social associations, which is of fundamental importance, can be considered a special class of Parsons' more general distinction between particularism and universalism (Parsons and Shils, 1951). Extrinsic benefits constitute standards for comparing associations and deciding between them, whereas no such independent criteria of comparison exist for intrinsically rewarding associations (Blau, 1964:58).

One may speculate, according to this second argument based on secondary status-characteristics, that there may be additional responses available for the "high income-low education" individual. When he is younger and his lack of education is less ambiguous to himself and more visible to others, then he will probably not over-emphasize his high income or try to capitalize on it because this will make clearer the disparity between his income and education. Support will be sought among relatives where lack of education is not likely to be questioned. He may at the same time attempt to interact in other voluntary groups by de-emphasizing his high status and by "conceding" (Box and Ford, 1969) his low status and attempting to average his status-attributes (Himmelfarb and Senn, 1969).

Among older high income-low education individuals, where parity between income and education is not as often expected, one would predict reduced levels of interaction with relatives and other friends, as over-competitiveness might obviate the need for social acceptance and social participation (Litwak, 1960). In other words for over-achievers, over age forty-five, isolating effects may be encountered. Although there may be fewer public pressures on older over-achievers since his low education is less expected, it may still be visible and there may be intra-psychic, or private, problems related to lack of education, at a time in life when educational mobility is seen as no longer possible (Segal, 1969). This might mean a withdrawal from interaction with relatives and other friends. Although the over-achiever may have made it in the occupational world the "hard way" (with little education) the extra effort needed may have restricted his horizons and left little time, energy or motivation for any type of social participation (Litwak, 1960).

Methodological Challenges

Prior to reviewing the data, we have attempted to work with the "Blalock methodological challenge" (Blalock, 1965; 1966; 1967) by using tests of "inconsistency-effects" derived from Hyman (1967):

> . . . the determination as to whether rank inconsistency, per se as distinct from the two hierarchies from which it is generated, has an effect upon a dependent variable, requires information as to the direction of any association existing between each of those hierarchies and the dependent variable. Once this information is at hand a judgment can be made as to whether the data depart from what would be predicted merely on the basis of knowledge about the association of each of these hierarchies with the dependent variable (Hyman, 1967:386).

For example, suppose that the rank hierarchies of education and income are each positively associated with a dependent variable d. If education-income inconsistency has no effect on d, then the value of d for education-income inconsistents should be somewhere between the value of d for those high in both education and income and those low in both education and income. Only if the data deviate from this null hypothesis can it be said that education-income rank inconsistency has an effect on d (Hyman, 1967:386).

However, as we have seen, another methodological problem occurs where education but not income, or income but not education, is associated with a dependent variable d. In these instances, Hyman suggests another technique to determine the difference between status-effects and status-inconsistency effects:

> Let us consider income high-education low inconsistency where education but not wealth is associated with d. If this kind of inconsistency has no effect on d, then we would predict that the wealth high-education low inconsistents will show the same d percentage as will consistents with about the same educational rank. Thus we can compare the d percentage of the education-wealth consistently low group with that of these inconsistents, and only if there is a substantial difference will we judge that a rank inconsistency effect is present (Hyman, 1967:387).

Analysis of Data

We now turn to the data found in Table 2. Titles will be used for each of the four cells of a table:

(1) High income-high education--"affluent"

(2) High income-low education--"over-achiever"

(3) Low income-high education--"under-achiever"

(4) Low income-low education--"poor"

For Catholics under age forty-five, we had predicted, according to the Jackson argument, that an insulating process of informal group-participation might lead to greater participation with relatives for the over-achiever cell. The data indicate that there are clear inconsistency-effects: the over-achiever cell (at

TABLE 2

EFFECTS ON CONTACTING CATHOLIC RELATIVES OF DIFFERENT INCONSISTENCY-COMBINATIONS

		Affluent	Over Achiever	Under Achiever	Poor	Difference of Differences
	Income	High	High	Low	Low	
	Education	High	Low	High	Low	
Age:	Under 45					
Catholic		53% (120)	73% (77)	54% (81)	55% (11)	21%
Age:	45 and Older					
Catholic		50% (46)	35% (55)	44% (25)	49% (77)	-20

(The relevant dichotomies for the status attributes)

	Income	Education
Low	Below Median	Below Median
High	Above Median	Above Median

73 percent) is 20 percent above the "affluent" cell (at 53 percent) which should be the highest cell in an additive model of the relationship of social status to informal group-relations (contacting relatives.) The inconsistency-effects seem convincing because the other three cells are all within two percentage-points of each other (at 53 to 55 percent), suggesting little relationship between status and contact with relatives. Young Catholics, who have an over-achiever inconsistency-configuration seem to respond by contacting their relatives more frequently than an additive model might have predicted.

However, our alternative model based on secondary stratification-characteristics seems to fit the data for younger Catholics as well as the Jackson argument (Model 1). The Blau argument (Model 2) predicts that in contact with relatives, over-achieving Catholics under age forty-five might find validation for their status claims, or at least their status claims would not be questioned, even if their educational level did not match income. Relatives were seen to act in a supportive way based on their particularistic nature and intrinsic satisfactions. The data support this model; the only inconsistency-effects noted are in the over-achieving cell, (at

73 percent) which, as we mentioned earlier, is 20 percent higher than the consistently high cell, (53 percent) and this should be the largest cell if an additive model were operating.

Turning next to Catholics over age forty-five, our predictions, based on Model 1, had been that with advancing age, a deficiency in education would become less of a problem since different age-cohorts have differing expectations about educational attainment (Blau and Duncan, 1967). The data, however, suggest an exact reversal of the pattern from younger to older Catholics. Here the over-achieving cell (at 35 percent) is 14 percent below the poor status cell, (at 49 percent) which should be the lowest cell in an additive model of the relation of social status and contact with relatives. The results seem to show, not a reduction in status inconsistency effects as had been predicted, but a reversal toward the isolation-pattern of decreasing contact with relatives. One might claim that with advancing age, high income individuals shift their informal group-associational patterns from relatives to "other friends" (Axelrod, 1956). However, this does not seem to be a significant trend among Catholics; as we compare affluent individuals in the above and below age forty-five cells, we find a decrease of only 3 percent (from 53 percent to 50 percent), which suggests very little drop-off in participation with relatives for affluent Catholics with advancing age. This is contrasted with the 38 percent drop in the over-achieving cells from younger to older Catholics.

Our first model, then, does not account for this change of behavior with age. However, our second model more nearly fits the data. With increasing age, the ability of over-achievers to stake a claim to esteem based on income is less affected by the educational levels associated with it. In other words, there are few expectations among individuals over forty-five that high income must be correlated with educational attainment. However, the results seem to show that the over-achieving individual not only reduces his contacts with relatives but that he actually avoids contact with them, and status-inconsistency effects seem evident. As we have seen, contact with relatives is not status-related for Catholics of any age. However, with increasing age there is a sharp reversal of contact with relatives, from high to low for over-achieving Catholics. As this is not true for consistently high-status Catholics, one might speculate that older over-achieving Catholics are reacting to some kind of intra-punitive (Segal, 1968) tensions related to lack of education, which leads them to withdraw from social participation.

Turning next to the Protestant sample, Jackson's argument is that reaction to inconsistency-effects should generally lead to social isolation. We see that in Table 3, for individuals below age forty-five, Model 1 had predicted that the greatest inconsistency-effects would be among the under-achievers, the deficiency in achievement being seen as the individual's fault rather than the system's. The under-achievers cell, at 45 percent, turns out to be the lowest cell in terms of contacting relatives, in accordance with the predictions made. However, the cell is only 1 percent below the poor cell (at 46 percent), casting doubt that inconsistency-effects are operating, and suggesting that more likely these results are related to some aspect of status-effects associated with low overall status. In addition, the data seem to depart even further from the hypothesis; the only place we actually find inconsistency-effects is in the over-achieving cell (at 77 percent) which is 13 percent above the affluent cell (at 64 percent). This finding suggests that for some

TABLE 3

EFFECTS ON CONTACTING RELATIVES OF DIFFERENT COMBINATIONS OF INCOME-EDUCATION INCONSISTENCY FOR PROTESTANTS

(Controlling for Age)

		Affluent	Over Achiever	Under Achiever	Poor	Difference of Differences
	Income	High	High	Low	Low	
	Education	High	Low	High	Low	
Age:	Under 45					
Protestant		64% (121)	77% (43)	45% (64)	46% (104)	+12
Age:	45 and Older					
Protestant		50% (80)	48% (44)	48% (54)	65% (43)	-12

reason it is the insulating processes that are operating, contrary to Model 1.

Model 2 however, as with young Catholic over-achievers, suggests that young Protestant over-achievers turn to their relatives for intrinsic support when income exceeds education. Here is the first significant divergence; the Blau argument (Model 2) seems to fit the data more adequately. Under the first model, under-achieving younger Protestants should show little, if any, interaction effects, due to the potential for social mobility (Smith, 1969). The second model predicts that young Protestant "over-achievers" should show "interaction effects" in terms of contacting relatives. The data confirm the second model and cast grave doubts on the first model.

Considering, next, the sample-group of Protestants over age forty-five, in terms of percentage contacting relatives, Model 1 had predicted even stronger isolation effects for older under-achievers than younger ones. In terms of these isolating effects, we see that the cell in question, (at 48 percent) is in fact 17 percent lower than the poor cell, supporting Model 1. However, we are confounded again since the two inconsistent cells are both equal (at 48 percent), giving no support to that part of our model that specifies the particular cell likely to cause inconsistency-effects.

In addition, we find that the data in the Table shows an inverse relationship between social status and frequency of contact with relatives. In other words, although for Protestants under age forty-five there is a direct relation between social status and frequency of contact with relatives, for those over age forty-five this pattern is reversed. This makes the interpretation of this particular Table difficult when one cannot proceed from an adequate base-line model (or more exactly, a base-line model that reverses itself with age). This holds equally true for Model 2, where no inconsistency effects had been predicted.

We turn to consideration of the percentage of contacts with "other friends". We had predicted, from Model 1, that for Catholics one would expect that due to the insulating processes described, there would be greater contact with relatives but less contact with other friends, especially among over-achievers. (See Table 4). The prediction, based on Model 1, is upheld for Catholics in both age groups.

When we consider Protestant behavior in terms of percentage of contact with other friends, our prediction,

TABLE 4

EFFECTS ON CONTACTING OTHER FRIENDS OF DIFFERENT COMBINATIONS OF INCOME-EDUCATION INCONSISTENCY FOR PROTESTANTS AND CATHOLICS

(Controlling for Age)

		Affluent	Over Achiever	Under Achiever	Poor	Difference of Differences
	Income	High	High	Low	Low	
	Education	High	Low	High	Low	
Age:	Under 45					
Protestant		80% (128)	80% (45)	65% (89)	46% (115)	+19
Catholic		73% (124)	66% (77)	64% (82)	55% (11)	+ 2
Age:	45 and Older					
Protestant		73% (84)	62% (47)	66% (64)	70% (93)	-15
Catholic		72% (46)	50% (58)	54% (26)	44% (80)	-12

based on Model 1, had been that one would expect less contact with all informal groups, including contacting relatives and friends. For Protestant under-achievers, under age forty-five, there are no inconsistency-effects, as expected. For Protestant under-achievers <u>over</u> age forty-five, (at 66 percent), this cell is 4 percent lower than the poor cell (at 70 percent), showing some status-inconsistency effects operating as expected. This result suggests that an isolating effect may be working, as predicted. However, the over-achieving cell (at 62 percent) turns out to have even stronger inconsistency-effects than the predicted under-achieving cell, being 8 percent below the consistently poor group (at 70 percent) indicating insulating effects. This finding does not accord with Model 1.

In terms of contact with "other friends" Model 2 had predicted that as interaction was based on universalistic norms and extrinsic satisfactions, and was subject to competitive status-comparisons, the over-achieving younger individuals, whether Catholic or Protestant, would not be led to interaction with friends to receive esteem for their high-status levels. Since no inconsistency-effects were found in these groups, Model 2 receives some support. In terms of older Protestants and Catholics, Model 2 had predicted that over-achievers might avoid contacting friends and all other social groups based on the intra-psychic effects related to over-achievement and lack of education (Segal, 1968). As indicated, we do get interaction-effects for older Protestant over-achievers but no interaction-effects for older Catholic over-achievers, providing only partial support for this aspect of the predictions derived from Model 2.

Review of Data

In review, when we attempt to examine data related to consistency-effects and social participation in informal groups, including relatives and friends, we are at a loss to explain some of the confounding results from Model 1 as derived from Jackson (1960). Considerably more supportive evidence, however, is found based on Blau's (1964) Model 2. Returning to the assumptions found in this model, there was the suggestion that high income, supported by appropriate amounts of education, are viewed as being universally accepted. In other words, the individual has little difficulty in validating his claims to esteem and societal approval. All the groups he comes into contact with accept and validate his status claims. On the other hand, an individual whose income exceeds his education cannot receive universal acclaim for accomplishment because there is a commonly accepted contingency relation between income and education (Duncan and Blau, 1967). The individual will make claims against his high income, but only specific particularistic groups based on intrinsic satisfactions will support these claims and provide social support. There will be a lack of acceptance from universalistic groups where extrinsic satisfactions are provided in a status-competitive setting (Blau, 1964).

Visiting friends has been shown to provide for the individual extrinsic satisfaction in that normal exchange relations occur and expectations of status-parity are evident (Axelrod, 1956). On the other hand, visiting relatives is seen to provide intrinsic satisfactions, and particularistic criteria are used in providing acceptance and support, especially among the young where education is expected and more highly visible (Segal, 1968).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the alternative argument based on Festinger's (1957) dissonance-reduction assumptions and Blau's notions of secondary-stratification characteristics seem to fit the data at least as well, and generally somewhat better, than do hypotheses derived from Jackson's assumptions in the Lenski tradition.

As with Lenski's assumptions related to voting behavior, the study of the relation of certain status-attributes and social participation produces indeterminances that are difficult to handle through secondary analysis of survey data. However, this has been the approach used in most of the research done in the Lenski tradition, and it is extremely tenuous since it is based on unprovable assumptions about what these contact-frequencies really indicate. As suggested earlier, it is probable that the analysis of survey data, as represented by research in the Lenski tradition, may not be powerful enough to work through the dilemmas involved in status-consistency effects.

Because survey data aim to estimate population parameters, it tends to de-emphasize clustering which would make the items dependent on each other. Therefore, the emphasis on statistical independence does not permit any observation of the individual's social context. For a secondary stratification system to develop, the individual uses certain "social networks" (Mitchell, 1969) that exist in his private environment. A major difficulty in obtaining positive results with these data is that the independence of the observations militates against obtaining the kind of data needed to find interaction effects. The community data used for the study of voting behavior are of a more global, non private nature. Primarily neighborhood and precinct status characteristics are needed. Although detailed information about each person's "social network" is needed to study secondary status characteristics, these are ruled out by the statistical procedures in survey research.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION

Introduction

The purpose of this dissertation has been to analyze the Lenski Research Program in order to see how certain theoretical, empirical and methodological problems might be resolved. We have pointed to a number of weaknesses in this whole research program. There are issues here that are important theoretically, but representative studies in the Lenski tradition have not really addressed themselves to these issues. And, given the nature of the data involved (secondary analysis of survey-data), it is hard to see how they could have satisfactorily addressed themselves to some of these theoretically relevant issues.

Trying not to be unfair to Lenski, we must add that there has been a good deal of research in the areas of voting Democratic, mental illness, and social participation. There does seem to be a fair amount of evidence that:

> Theoretically it becomes possible to conceive of a nonvertical dimension to individual or family status; that is, a consistency dimension. In this dimension units may be compared with

> respect to the degree of consistency of their positions in the several vertical hierarchies. In other words, certain units may be consistently high or consistently low, while others may combine high standing with respect to certain status variables with low standing with respect to others (Lenski, 1954:405).

With the distinctions added to this formulation, based on incongruities in ascribed and achieved statuses (Jackson, 1962) much research has indicated that:

> . . . individuals with inconsistencies among their occupational, educational and income-statuses showed little or no tendency to favor the Democratic party, while persons with inconsistencies between one or more of these socio-economic measures and either race, religion, or nationality did in most cases tend to vote Democratic more often than Republican. At least in regard to voting preferences, socio-economic-ethnic inconsistency is apparently much more important than is socio-economic status inconsistency by itself (Olsen and Tully, 1970: 2).

However, when we introduce controls for age or provide alternative formulations based on the salience of ascribed versus achieved statuses, either the interaction effects disappear or the alternative formulations explain the data as well as the main formulations. As was suggested in the chapter on voting behavior, of the two models provided, the "status" (ascribed) model operates, for some unexplained reason, to the exclusion of the "class" (achieved) model. An even greater problem was that where inconsistency effects were demonstrated, the only cell which provided the "effect" was the high income-low education combination and this only among an unexpected group, young Protestants, where mobility-opportunity is usually perceived. These results are contrary to the Lenski formulation.

Turning next to social participation, and arguing that negatively-sanctioned or unrewarded behavior declines in frequency, and that status-inconsistency is associated with the denial of rewards in the realm of interpersonal relations, Lenski predicted that ". . . persons whose status is poorly crystallized will exhibit a tendency to withdraw from, or avoid, social intercourse" (Lenski, 1956: 459; cited in Hodge and Siegel, 1970:513).

Distinguishing between processes of isolation and insulation (Zelditch and Anderson, 1966) and using contributions from Blau (1964) on secondary-stratification characteristics (validation problems in group-contact based on lack of education when paired with high income), we found that the Lenski formulations were not so fruitful in explaining frequencies of social participation with relatives and other friends as the alternative formulations posited were.

What is required, however, is not simply a call for further replications of the Lenski formulation. As Galtung

(1967) suggested, there is the problem in replication of whether to sample as homogeneously or as heterogeneously as possible within the confines of the formulation. The idea would be to

> . . . sample until the limit of tenability of one's propositions is found. The best strategy for this purpose is not to start close to the original sample . . . but rather to start far out and see whether the findings still hold. If they do, one may stop the process if one is satisfied with the extension of the replication. But if one had started very close to the base, replication of findings would be more trivial (Galtung, 1967:440).

One might have extended the formulation, for instance, into the study of organizations using discrepancy between attributes such as power, influence, authority, responsibility, et cetera, as measures of interaction effects. However, the Lenski formulation has not been productive since it has been investigated in only one type of setting and its replications have been restricted to that setting. There have really been very few successful or even persistent attempts to extend it to other kinds of settings.

When Are Research Programs Productive?

In order to suggest that a research program has momentum, at least the following three requirements seem necessary:

(1) extendability to different settings

(2) ability to rule out alternative explanations

(3) ability to meet specific challenges.

(Cited in TRP memo, 1972)

There are several additional ways in which the research formulations can be elaborated (informal discussions with B. Anderson, 1972). One is the articulation of new scope-conditions not present in the original formulation. Scope rules are used to delimit the range of applicability of a particular theoretical formulation. Observations within that range are relevant and observations outside of it are irrelevant to the empirical testing of the theory. A second means of elaboration would be to make the original formulation more precise, in terms of the conceptual clarity of the assertations made in the theory, so that new consequences could be deduced from the theory. A third method would be the invention of new testing-grounds for the theory, an infrequent occurrence in the Lenski tradition. Very few new innovations have been added to the survey techniques upon which most of the data-gathering is based.

A fourth elaboration would be the ability of the formulation to explain contradictory data. There are several ways of handling contradictory data. (a) The results can be seen as derived from mistakes found in the research procedure--use of a certain procedure produces a certain result which is actually an artifact of the research procedure. (b) The results are only seemingly contradictory and if more carefully examined they actually support the theory although there is error in the reasoning that makes them look contradictory. (c) The results were obtained in a manner which violates or does not meet the scope-conditions of the formulation. In other words, negative data can be shown to be only seemingly contradictory or they can be shown to be artifacts of the research, or, finally, they can be shown to be dealing with things which are essentially outside the scope-conditions.

The only area where there has been some elaboration of the Lenski tradition has been in voting behavior. In other areas, such as social participation, prejudice, job-satisfaction, et cetera, there has not been sufficient elaboration. It is only in the field of voting behavior that the Lenski theory has become more precise, the scope conditions have been stated, and, to some extent, the negative data have been accounted for by using different kinds of reasoning. Smith's (1969) study of structural crystallization can be seen as a conceptual clarification of the original theory in that crystallization and consistency were discussed and Smith suggested that they be treated separately to avoid conceptual confusion. A further kind of elaboration in which the Lenski tradition has made some progress is in the invention of new research procedures. Jackson and Burke (1965) while not inventing a new research-technique have, nèvertheless used a different analysis-technique on the data by insisting on the "linear versus interactive" statistical model in the study of voting behavior.

A final kind of elaboration deals with the systematic endeavor to contrast Lenski's theoretical formulations at the core of the research program with alternative explanatory formulations. This is one of the areas where the Lenski tradition including the field of voting behavior has been most deficient. In other traditions, such as Festinger's theory (1964) there have been systematic attempts to contrast predictions from alternative explanatory formulations. In the Lenski program there are a number of elaborations (based on voting behavior) but there are no persistent attempts to contrast his core-formulation with alternative ways they could handle the same data and set up experiments systematically addressed to that problem.

For illustrative purposes, it might be worthwhile to contrast the Lenski program with a research program that has been very productive: the Festinger Cognitive Dissonance Program (Festinger, 1964).

In work on cognitive dissonance done by Festinger and others (Festinger, 1957; 1964; Brehm and Cohen, 1962; Chapanis and Chapanis, 1964; Gerard, 1967), one can enumerate various settings which are very different from one another in which much persistent work has been done to check out the theory. These areas include the following:

(1) Re-evaluation of chosen and unchosen alternatives. (Post-decision dissonance reduction.) The most common type of research is one in which:

> . . . the individual evaluates two objects, 'freely' chooses one of them, and then re-evaluates the two objects. Dissonance-theory predicts that the evaluation of the chosen object should increase and the unchosen decrease (Shaw and Costanzo, 1970:215).

(2) Forced Compliance. Compliance with the wishes of the experimenter can be induced either by promise or reward, threat or punishment, or other justification for the behavior. The theory predicts:

> . . . that the greater the justification for an overt act that is inconsistent with private opinion, the less will be the subsequent attitude-change. The results of the research in this area are extremely difficult to evaluate because of the difficulty of inducing

> compliance without at the same time inducing opinion-change, the elimination of subjects, and other problems of design (Shaw and Costanzo, 1970:216).

(3) Selective Exposure. The general prediction of dissonance theory is that

> . . . the existence of dissonance will lead the individual to seek consonant information and to avoid dissonant information (Shaw and Costanzo, 1970:216).

(4) Social Support. Dissonance may be aroused through

> . . . lack of social support; this dissonance can be reduced by changing one's own view, by seeking to change the views of those who do not support one, or by finding others who do support one's own position (Shaw and Costanzo, 1970:216).

If one looks at some of the work on cognitive dissonance in these various settings, one sees attempts to contrast the predictions from dissonance theory with predictions from other formulations. At the same time, there have been attempts to rule out alternative interpretations of the data.

Research findings have led to modifications of dissonance theory. For instance, Brehm and Cohen (1962) emphasized the role of commitment and volition in the arousal of dissonance. They maintained that:

> . . . whether one cognition is the obverse of another, or follows from another, depends upon the degree of the person's commitment. For

> example, when a person makes a decision but is free to change his mind, he is not committed and should experience no dissonance. On the other hand, once a person has engaged in an irreversible behavior (for example, destroying a valuable painting) or makes a decision that he must 'live with,' he should experience dissonance and dissonance-reducing behavior should occur (Shaw and Costanzo, 1970).

Later, Festinger (1964) accepted the commitment-variable and tried to specify its role more clearly. Linder, Cooper and Jones (1967) experimentally demonstrated the importance of volition in the arousal of dissonance by insufficient reward for compliance with a request to act counter to one's own attitudes.

In his 1957 versions of the theory, Festinger was concerned primarily with what happens following a decision.

> . . . prior to a decision, the individual is faced with a conflict situation during which he impartially and objectively seeks and evaluates information relevant to the decision. When he has accumulated enough evidence to be confident about the correctness of a given decision, the decision is made. After the decision is made, the individual experiences dissonance and attempts to reduce it in order to achieve consonance (Shaw and Costanzo, 1970:213-214).

By 1964 enough evidence had accumulated to lead Festinger to change his thinking in at least three respects. First, he came to the conclusion that

> . . . predecision activity probably has some effect on post-decision behavior, although the nature of this effect could not be specified at the time. Gerard (1967) has now reported data

> verifying this conclusion (Shaw and Costanzo, 1970:214).

Second, he accepted the notion of commitment proposed by Brehm and Cohen (1962). However, he suggested that:

> . . . a person is committed to a decision if the decision unequivocally affects subsequent behavior. He rejected the notion that the decision must be irrevocable in order for the person to feel committed to it (Shaw and Costanzo, 1970:214).

Third, he changed his view of the course of dissonance following a decision. His modified view was that:

> . . . there is a period immediately following the decision in which the decision maker experiences regret. This is the period after the decision and before dissonance-reduction becomes effective. In his monograph (Festinger, 1964) he cited ten experiments that provided evidence generally supporting these modifications (Shaw and Costanzo, 1970:214).

When one says, then, that the Festinger theory has momentum, it is in description of exactly this ability to invent new situations and to rule out systematically alternatives. In the same sense, one may say that the Lenski formulation is sterile, its research always using the same situation (analysis of survey-samples using status-attributes including voting behavior and social participation) and always duplicating activity in that situation (looks for interaction effects without posing alternative formulations). In this way, the Lenski formulation, unlike the Festinger cognitive-dissonance formulation does not seem to have fruitfully built on previous research, since it has not been applied to various settings. In addition, the Festinger formulation, while severely challenged, has been seen as fecund, as illustrated above, leading to attempts to work with these challenges while maintaining the "core" theoretical areas.

Reasons Why the Lenski Formulation Has Not Been Fruitful

One might speculate as to the reasons why the research growing out of the Lenski formulation seems stereotypical, although extensively replicated. One is that the Lenski tradition has relied extensively on secondary analysis of survey-data. The work on cognitive dissonance was more fruitful because it sought out several very different situations which the theory interpreted as dissonant. The studies were explicitly designed to test the theory in a variety of different standard settings. This is not to suggest that survey-research itself is necessarily at fault. Galtung's commentary suggests:

> Clearly, what is missing in sociological research more often than not are behavior data. Replications of findings from verbal data on behavioral data would immensely increase the belief in our proposition. This does not, as many seem to believe, imply a switch from survey methods to observational methods, since much valid information about behavior can be obtained

> simply by asking people what they do or did instead of always asking them what they mean or meant. Such questions may telescope series of behavior into meaningful statements that can be checked and validated, and hypotheses can be tested independently using behavioral and attitudinal variables (Galtung, 1967:450).

Another speculation about the relative fruitlessness of the Lenski tradition may stem from the fact that there has been very little work done on refining the theory and on spelling out the different variants of it, as was done to the Festinger formulation. Smith's study of structural crystallization (1969) and Jackson's (1962) study of mental illness are the only two studies which actually spell out major variant-formulations of the Lenski tradition, but to date these leads do not seem to have been followed up.

Applications of Lenski's Theory

One might suggest application of Lenski's theory using organizational variables. Evan and Simmons (1969) discuss the effects of three organizational sources of inequitable payment:

(1) Status inconsistency between a subject's rate of pay and his officially recognized level of competence.

(2) Status inconsistency between a subject's rate of pay and level of authority.

> (3) An inconsistency between a subject's pay and his prior pay expectations.
>
> The first and last of these had strong effects, particularly on the quality of the subject's work. In both cases the underpaid subject behaved in accordance with equity-theory, and produced lower quality work. However, the data based on the overpaid subject did not consistently support the theory of equity (Evan and Simmons, 1969:236; cited in Simmons, 1968).

Interestingly, the authors claim that theoretically their study is in the traditions of both Lenski and J. Stacey Adams (1965).

> In effect, some elements of the theory of status inconsistency and some elements of the theory of equity can be seen in the findings of these experimental studies. The theory of status inconsistency is used as a source of independent variables and the theory of equity is used as a source of intervening variables, to predict variations in the dependent variable of the quality and quantity of performance (Evan and Simmons, 1969:225).

Obviously, these authors have a very unclear idea of what Lenski was saying in the first place. They think that by having some kind of inconsistency-effect present, one is theoretically in the Lenski tradition. It cannot be forgotten that Lenski has a very specific theory about the effects of status-crystallization (Lenski, 1966). Central to the theory is the process of self-evaluation. Tensions arise because of the difference in evaluation of oneself and one's evaluation by others. Evan and Simmons, on the other hand, say they are using the exchange (cost-gain) formulation of J. Stacey Adams. Anderson and Shelly (1971) very neatly sum up the problem with the Adams' formulation (1965) and indirectly the Evan and Simmons study (1969).

> In applying a general theory of equity, J. S. Adams argues that an over-rewarded subject develops dissonance in the form of guilt, which he reduces by turning out more work on an hourly basis (hence getting less per unit work) or less in a piece rate situation (hence earning less per hour). Our previous experiment indicates that Adams' results may be due to social pressures from the experimenter, rather than any guilt results from inequity (Anderson and Shelly, 1971:241).

What one can not do is take evidence from experiments and studies based on the Adams (1965) tradition and say that it is also relevant to the Lenski tradition. This does not follow even though both Adams and Lenski's formulations deal with inconsistency. The two traditions postulate very different underlying mechanisms. As we mentioned previously, the Lenski "self" theory postulates congruence between "self" evaluation and "other" evaluation. It is entirely different from the Adams' theory which is based on "investment and return" (Adams, 1965).

One might speculate that it would be possible to invent a theory which would pull the Lenski and the Adams theory together. One might suggest, for instance, that the notions of self that Lenski uses and the notions of investment that Adams uses are in some meaningful way related. Suppose Adams were to state in a revised theory, that the investments most meaningful for people are those in highly self-related activities (i.e., important in self evaluation.) It could be suggested that the only investments which will provide a reasonable return on one's investment are those that involve a high level of self-commitment (cited in discussion with B. Anderson, 1972). These would be reasonable assumptions and relate to other formulations. However, Adams's theory specifically has no such "core" assumptions and it is difficult to say, at this time, whether such a theory could be developed. In response, then, to the illusions that Evan and Simmons (1969) have of being in the Lenski <u>and</u> Adams tradition, while there is such a possibility, there is at present no theoretical formulation available pulling these theories together. Until there is one, it is very difficult to speculate in which sense the experiments of Evan and Simmons are at all relevant to the Lenski formulation.

One would not want to say that studies such as the Evan and Simmons experiment are irrelevant, because it is possible that eventually whatever is left of the consistency-theories will coagulate in some overriding formulation covering this kind of research. Prior to this, however, they do not reply to the charge that the Lenski tradition is not extendable to different settings and is thus sterile.

Alternative Extensions of the Lenski Formulation

However, other extensions of the Lenski formulation seem more promising. Hodge (1962) concerns himself with the structure of groups rather than individual inconsistency. He uses deviations from the regression of income on education over occupational groups as a measure of occupational-status consistency. One of his findings is that managerial and craft occupations consistently have income in excess of educational expectations. Hodge claims that his original theoretical insights derive from Sorokin's (1947) attention to the discrepancies between different hierarchical aspects of contemporary society. In addition:

> Since the appearance of Sumner's Folkways (1906) most of us have been convinced that individuals act in accordance with social norms and that such action is accompanied with appropriate motivational and attitudinal syndromes. However, insofar as such norms exist prior to the recruitment of specific role incumbents, one is put on guard to avoid explanations of social structure couched in terms of the properties and propensities of individual actors. As Durkheim observed, 'The determining cause of a social fact should be

> sought among the social facts preceding it and not among the states of the individual consciousness' (1950.) To understand social stratification is to understand the organization of social aggregates into meaningful units of social structure from which individual esteem, influence, and economic advantage are ultimately derived (Hodge, 1962:337).

In another study, Hodge and Treiman (1968) have shown that indices based upon the occupational levels of friends, neighbors, and relatives make independent contributions to class identification no less important than those of personal education, occupation, and income. Thus class-identification rests not only upon one's own location in the status-structure, but upon the socio-economic level of acquaintances. The authors claim that:

> The major defect of the 'interest theory of classes' (Centers, 1949) is not, however, its exaggeration of the role of economic position in the formation of class consciousness. The primary fault lies in its systematic neglect of the great range of between-class contacts which are open to many citizens. Our data demonstrate that patterns of acquaintance and kinship between various status groups, as well as their residential heterogeneity, are no less important than the socio-economic position of individuals in the formation of class identities (Hodge and Treiman, 1968:547).

Finally, one of the more interesting variants of the Lenski tradition is a recent article by Landecker (1970) inquiring into the integrative or divisive consequences of status-inconsistency. Landecker refers to Simmel's discussions of status-reversals as a cross-cutting classification where status-superiority in one respect coincides with status-inferiority in another respect (Simmel, 1955). Simmel considered the pattern of status-reversals as socially advantageous in several ways. Primarily, however, it seems to add a dimension of equality to that of inequality, it

> balances one kind of inequality against another. Perhaps as a result, it lacks the 'oppressiveness' and 'injustice' of nonreciprocal, strictly one-sided status differences. Of particular relevance is Simmel's view that status reversals contribute to the unity of a collectivity as a whole, because they impede the development of cleavages between its upper and lower strata. It is apparent, on the other hand, that he would have expected such cleavages in the event that rank systems are highly correlated (Landecker, 1970:344).

Contrasted with this view, according to Landecker, is that of Homans on distributive justice (Homans, 1961), which is seen as a requirement of elementary social behavior: ". . . man's rewards in exchange with others should be proportional to his investments" (Homans, 1961:235).

Although different groups and societies vary in what they feel constitutes investment, reward, and cost, to Homans, distributive justice and status-congruence go hand in hand (Homans, 1961:264). Yet it seems equally probable that:

> . . . there are also groups whose standards of distributive justice call for status incongruence; groups which believe that those persons who are disadvantaged in some respects should have special advantages in others, or that those who are partly privileged should be kept from becoming totally underprivileged. Furthermore, there is evidence of a compensatory upgrading in self-rating along certain lines by persons with low status along other lines; (Hyman, 1942) in such cases, a distributive justice of status incongruence seems to prevail rather than one of congruence (Landecker, 1970:344).

The studies in the Lenski tradition lend support to the conclusion, contrary to Simmel's view, that status-reversals are socially divisive, and that combinations of mutually-equivalent statuses are integrative. However, if Lenski's assumptions are correct, there might be support for an additional assumption that status-inconsistency, at this level, although devisive, might be highly "innovative" for the group (cited in Hofstadter, 1955).

Landecker's crucial distinction is based on the size of the group upon which status-inconsistency operates:

> The adverse impact of status-incongruence on the small group seems to reflect the fact that such a group is highly sensitive to personal experiences and reactions to its members. The available evidence suggests that status incongruence as an object of personal experience, tends to evoke emotional strain. This reaction, in turn, is likely to introduce tension into person-to-person interactions, on whose harmonious quality the cohesion of the small group depends (Landecker, 1970:353).

On the other hand, what matters about a low degree of crystallization in large groups is that

> . . . it supports social interactions which cut across different status levels and thereby reduce the divisive effects of stratification on the cultural system as well as the interaction system. For this reason, weak crystallization can be considered integrative for large collectivities (Landecker, 1970:353).

Landecker, then, has put the study of status-inconsistency into a wider social context by introducing the concept of population-size in group interaction.

Future Research Directions

In terms of future research directions, one should investigate further a basic assumption of the Lenski tradition: the assumption that the status inconsistent's low state of his status-attributes is known to his audience. The implicit assumption is made explicit in Zelditch and Anderson (1966): ". . . members of S (the social system) agree on the weights to be given the criteria by which they evaluate themselves and others" (Zelditch and Anderson, 1966:249).

However, the visibility of ranks may be problematic in terms of the ease or difficulty of concealing lower ranks. Earlier it was mentioned that low visibility-ranks were not given validation in all groups within which an individual interacted, and these may be seen as an aspect of secondary-stratification characteristics (Blau, 1964). Rather than the emphasis on a secondary rank, one might raise the problem of the concealment of low-status rank. On the one hand, visible but low status ranks are more difficult to conceal and as such should contribute to the strains related to status inconsistency. On the other hand, less visible low-status ranks would be easier to conceal and so the stress related to status-inconsistency would be less of a problem (Siegel, 1969).

Yet not all potentially "discredited" statuses are easily observed (Goffman, 1963). Certain low statuses may be concealed, and participants in the higher statuses need not fear that interaction with that individual will lead to status-loss for them. A light-skinned Black might be an example of such a concealed-status which is "discreditable" but not "discredited." The distinction is that the individual feels

> . . . his differentness is known about already or is evident on the spot (he is discredited;) and the individual who assumes that it is neither known by those present nor immediately perceivable by them. (he is discreditable) (Goffman, 1963; cited in Box and Ford, 1969: 200).

The modern world can be characterized by this feature of "audience segregation":

> The high degree of structural differentiation and the relative frequency of social and

> geographical mobility in modern society provides support for the segmentation of roles which characterize life in a Gesellschaft. The separate area of any individual's social life may easily be compartmentalized and, in these circumstances, he may even fabricate 'biographies' (Berger, 1963) to suit the various situations in which he finds himself (Box and Ford, 1969:194).

Another characteristic of life which increases the probability of concealment is "cultural inarticulation". Individuals come into various degrees of contact with many discrete cultures and their primary and secondary socialization-experiences are therefore highly fragmented:

> Thus it becomes necessary for the inhabitant of such a society in constructing his own world-view, to interpret the world of his experience rather than passively receive it. Modern man's environment demands that he construct a social world for himself, for unlike his ancestors, he is not provided at birth with a ready-made reality (Berger and Luckman, 1967; cited in Box and Ford, 1969:194).

Concealment of poorly valued statuses is therefore doubly facilitated by the conditions of modern life. Audience-segregation minimizes the chances of third parties "betraying" the individual who is trying to "pass" for what he "is not." At the same time, because of cultural inarticulation, the typical individual is sufficiently skillful in the use of "techniques of presentation" based on his ability to manipulate others in what Goffman has called a "dramaturgical" stance (Goffman, 1959), to conceal his lower ranks.

To add to the Lenski formulations, status-inconsistency theory would have to make allowance for the fact and ease of status-concealment in the same way that it has to consider the degree of validation of secondary-stratification characteristics.

Box and Ford (1969) suggest that the only researcher to pay attention to this fact of status-concealment is Hyman (1967). He argued that:

> . . . status-inconsistents who have lived in the same neighborhood for more than twenty years should have more interpersonal problems than those who have been resident in the same area for a shorter period. But his evidence on 'passing' or biographical 'alternations' was only inferential. Furthermore, his dependent variable, social isolation was not directly treated. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that status concealment, as a mode of avoiding the possible consequences of status inconsistency, has yet to be investigated adequately (Box and Ford, 1969:194).

Finally, vis-a-vis the scope-conditions, the range of phenomena that the Lenski theory talks about and the implicit scope-limitations, or the area outside this range where the theory would seem to be irrelevant, several scope-conditions of Lenski's theories will be mentioned as pertinent.

The first scope-condition would have to do with the frequency of a particular constellation in that part of the population that is relevant to the actor. This scope condition suggests that status-discrepancy becomes more important if inconsistent. If one is dealing with a society which is in such flux that there are many other inconsistents, it is not going to matter as much to the actor. What seems to matter is whether his position is unique and he sees himself as somehow different from others. This also has to do with the behavior of "others." If "O" gets used to the fact that there are lots of people like "P" around, then "other" will probably shift his evaluation of the situation. If there are many inconsistents around they would make fewer attempts at equilibration especially considering that these kinds of similarities may not change the inconsistents' self image.

If the actor is a member of a "cognitive minority" (Berger, 1969), a group of people whose view of the world differs significantly from the one generally taken for granted in society, his view of the world is probably an uncomfortable one:

> . . . simply because society refuses to accept the minorities' definitions of reality as 'knowledgeable.' The predictable conclusion of the unequal struggle is the progressive disintegration of the plausibility of the

> challenged 'knowledge' in the consciousness of the one holding it (Berger, 1969:8-9).

The individual in an inconsistent status-configuration would react differently to the strains imposed. It would depend on whether he is one-of-a-kind and thus suffers the consequences of the cognitive minority or is a member of insulating groups who share common status-configurations and the "knowledge" systems that go with them. Predictions of strain due to status-disequilibrium without knowledge of the massiveness of the cognitive or "plausibility structures" by which an individual creates reality, would not be very realistic (Berger and Luckman, 1966).

Within this same area, what seems to be important is the extent of the area within which status-comparisons are made, such as "local" or "global"

> To simply take objective rankings as if they apply universally is to violate the data, and the theorist may be led to create a class of consistents and inconsistents when they might not exist. Further there is no necessary reason why local systems should fit fully with global status systems. . . . It is curious that Malewski (1967) suggests that we need to look closely at the local environment before accepting various rank propositions, and yet completely ignores his own counsel when he reports Lenski's findings on participation in voluntary organizations (1956). If the voluntary associations are part of a local status system which is to some extent compensating

> for the effects of the global system, then participation in them may well be the opposite to a source of strain (Doreian and Stockman, 1969:53).

Scope Rule Two suggests that the problems of inconsistency have to be seen from the actor's point of view. In looking at local status systems, is is important to consider how individuals regard that system. This suggests that it is the actors' status-set that is important. Whetever ranks he perceives as important for his self-image are at issue, and the status that others perceive to be at issue are important as well. If this kind of expectancy-conflict arises when "O" evaluates "P" and when "P" evaluates himself, then obviously what is involved are the statuses or possible ranks that "P" and "O" themselves take into account. The experimenter imposes what he thinks are the relevant status-dimensions for "P" and "O" based on status-ranks that are available in the literature. What one needs to determine, if one is going to be able to test the Lenski conception, is not the ranks that the experimenter thinks "P" and "O" take into account when they evaluate one another, but rather the status dimensions that "P" and "O" actually themselves take into account.

For instance, the "North Hatt" (1953) occupational-prestige scale is an artifact in that it is a result of a particular research methodology. If one determined a measure for "P" on this scale, one doubts that "P" would use that same scale when evaluating himself. A carpenter is not worried about the fact that his occupation has a low rank compared to a Supreme Court judge. The occupational position he compares himself with is probably that of a tool and die maker. The "North Hatt" scale, although it is based on a random sample of a national population, is not necessarily used by the individual when making status-comparisons because a specific individual has none of these particular status rankings in mind when he compares himself with others. It is irrelevant that a majority of people rank a Supreme Court judge highest because it is by a global occupational-ranking scale that would not be used by anybody when evaluating his own occupation. It is the ranks that are considered relevant in the social millieu of "P" that really matter to "P". Dorien and Stockman, when looking at the evaluations of "local" and "global" status systems suggest that:

> While each type may be characterized by different ranks, their perspectives of the ranking-system differ also. Different dimensions are important to them and each emphasizes a different status system (Doreian and Stockman, 1969: 53).

From the same perspective, when Lenski uses an income scale as a status-dimension, he takes the ordinary metric scale of income and categorizes it into a number of ranges which are seen as arbitrarily chosen. Income is then defined operationally. However:

> . . . since social action is contingent upon the way actors see their environment, not necessarily the way it is, any law-like regularities that might connect the nature of the actors environment and his actions will be a function of his imposed equivalence classes, not of the underlying metric (Doreian and Stockman, 1969: 56).

What seems to be unclear is whether the concept of status or rank-dimensions is supposed to refer to part of the actor's cognitive maps or to theoretical conceptions of the sociologists. It has been argued that if the former is the case, then the ways in which dimensions have been described (by survey research) are very inadequate representations of these cognitive maps. If the concepts of rank-dimensions used in survey research are seen from the researcher's perspective alone, then:

> . . . they are the products of a mistake. The mistake is one of attempting to build such concepts without close attention to the social reality of 'first order concepts' (from the point of view of the actor) from which they are supposed to be abstractions. . . . The main problem this raises is that it probably is impossible to build a theory of motivation with respect to these rank dimensions which does not include concepts of the first order (Doreian and Stockman, 1969:58).

What is implied is that without taking into account the points of view of the actor, Lenski's theory breaks down. This seems to be true for "international systems" as well as individuals:

> Galtung (1966) has suggested that the relationship between status-inconsistency and conflict behavior may be found in the international system as well. Nations which rank high on such 'achieved' statuses as economic and military capacity, yet are denied a correspondingly high rank on 'ascribed' ones such as recognition and prestige, appear to resent their lot (cited in Wallace, 1971:23).

It might be difficult to know how to deal with a <u>nation</u> which lacked "status consistency" and one might have to go further with rules of scope to include them as variants of the Lenski theory.

Finally, Scope Rule Three would suggest that Lenski's theory seems to have an individual rather than a collective orientation--it is the individual's self image which is affected by the strains of status disequilibrium. It is the disparities and inconsistencies in inter-personal relationships which affect and have meaning for the individual.

This may be explained by the emphasis placed on individual achievement in our society. The "ethos" of our society is such that it is individual achievement that counts. If one were concerned with the achievements of the collectivity, people might simply worry less about their own achievements. In a society that emphasized collective achievement rather than individual achievement, these processes that Lenski talks about might not operate, or would play less of a role in their effects on inconsistency. Broom and Jones suggest this:

> For example, Lipsett (1963:249) has suggested that the Australian value system seems to be less achievement-oriented, more particularistic, more specific, and more equilitarian than that of the United States. To the extent that such differences exist between industrial societies, the effects of status-inconsistency may also be expected to differ (Broom and Jones, 1970:1000).

This raises the question of whether a scope-rule would work in a Kibbutz where a collective, rather than an individual, orientation operates.

To summarize, one suspects that Lenski's findings might or might not be validated, depending upon whether one operated within these scope conditions. To the extent that a society or some particular group within a society places less weight on individual achievement, and emphasizes collective achievement; and to the extent that there are many inconsistents with status-configurations comparable to "P" in a particular group; and to the extent that the stratification variables that the investigator believes are important to "P" are not really important to "P", and other status variables are more important to "P", one would expect that Lenski's theory would not operate. To the extent that the researchers have in fact used status-variables that "P" actually uses for himself, and to the extent that they are dealing with a society that emphasizes individual achievement and to the extent that this particular kind of inconsistency is reasonably rare, then one would expect the Lenski processes to be highlighted.

As Anderson summarizes:

> In order to clarify the relationships between various consistency theories and their purported data bases, the following two conditions would have to be met:
>
> 1. The theories need to be expressed in a common analytic language. Only then can the logical relations of equivalence, implication, independence and contradiction that might exist between assertions be clarified.
>
> 2. The observation conditions and methods used in (allegedly) supporting studies need to be coordinated to the analytic concepts in a systematic way. Only to the extent that these two conditions are met will we be able to state more precisely which studies support or challenge which assertions in the theories. In order to carry out such an analysis, an intensive program of logical analysis of the theories and data-gathering procedures would have to be launched (Anderson, TRP Project, 1972:1).

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