TURNOVER OF LOCAL UNION OFFICERS

AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS

THESIS   for the degree of   Ph.D

Michigan State University

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
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ABSTRACT

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This study deals with leadership stability on the
local union level. Its conceptual framework starts with
Michels' theory which deals with the power structure within
national political parties. The goal of the study is to
identify some of the organizational structural variables
and explore their relationship to the leadership turnover
on a local union level.

The sample is a random stratified one, consisting
of one hundred United Automobile Workers locals in Michi-
gan during 1959-1967, inclusive. The data sources include
the annual reports of the locals, filed in accordance with
the "Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959", Governmental and U.A.W. publications, and field
interviews.

The dependent variables are local union leader-
ship turnover measured by the number of officers (Presi-
dents, Vice Presidents, Financial and Recording Secre-
taries) who were elected in each local and in all of them.

The independent variables are eighteen structural

characteristics of the local. These are grouped into four concepts: Formalization, Complexity, Attractiveness, and External Elements.

The relationship between the structural variables and turnover are tested with various statistical methods: correlations, multiple correlation, chi-square, and one way analysis of variance. The results indicate that the variables of formalization (age and size of the local), complexity (number of units, payments to local employees, and total resources), and attractiveness (compensation to local officers) correlate negatively with the turnover rates. The growth rates (variables of formalization) correlate positively with turnover. The correlations and their significance levels vary considerably among the different variables and officers.

Generally, the results suggest that Michels' theory is applicable to the local level, and the larger, older, and more segmented the local, the lower its turnover rate.

The external elements (the company, the community, and the time dimensions) are unrelated to the rates of turnover. The multiple correlation calculations show that the total fourteen variables (those continuous variables that can be used in this calculation) account for 7 percent to 34 percent of the variation, depending upon the office involved. Formalization accounts for 4 percent to 17 percent; complexity accounts for 2 percent to 7 percent; and attractiveness for 1 percent to 4 percent.

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This percentage seems to be somewhat lower than expected, and two reasons for this emerge from the structure and nature of the study. 1. Although the study makes it clear that formalistic or structural approach can contribute to the understanding of turnover in the local union, the results suggest that in order to achieve a comprehensive view and a higher degree of statistical and substantive explanation, a combination of both structural and socio-psychological approach is required. 2. The United Auto Workers International Union, a highly organized and structured union, uses various organizational mechanisms to closely control its locals, in order to assure their well defined organizational behavior patterns. Because of the unifying effect of these mechanisms, the variables' potential influence on leadership turnover seems to be reduced.

The study also includes an analysis of the relationships among the different variables themselves, a detailed analysis of the special elections, and the analysis of the inner mobility of officers. These analyses, together with the major findings relevant to turnover suggest the impossibility of treating all four officers included in the study in the same way. The officers differ from one another in their turnover rates which correlate differently with the various structural variables of the study.

These unplanned findings suggest that a refinement of the concept of leadership is required for a better understanding of the turnover phenomenon.

TURNOVER OF LOCAL UNION OFFICERS
AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS

By

Amnon Caspi

A THESIS

Submitted to
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in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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College of Social Science

1970

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM, THE PURPOSE AND THE OUTLINES OF THE STUDY

THE PROBLEM AND PURPOSE

Michels' theory known as the "Iron Law of Oligarchy",[1] originated as an attempt to explain the internal processes within democratic organizations, especially those processes which influence the leadership and distribution of power. The subject of Michels' observations were political parties in Europe, but his theory was extended to include analysis of other types of organizations. These findings have become an important part of organizational theory.

Various aspects of Michels' theory were empirically tested and, with few exceptions, were found correct. These empirical tests were conducted on the national level of political parties and the international level of labor unions. The theory, however, has not been tested on the local levels of either of these organizations.

Michels' theory is a fairly large body of assumptions and hypotheses which can hardly be empirically tested in a single research project. The one aspect we are to examine

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[1]R. Michels, _Political Parties: A Sociological Study of Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy_, (Glencoe, Illinois, 1949).

in this study is the phenomenon of leadership turnover in
the local union. This aspect of turnover is only implied
in Michels' presentation, as he does not use the term or
a direct equivalent of it. However, the concept of "sta-
bility of leadership" can be operationalized as lower
turnover.

The local union is used as the subject of this
study for two reasons. (1) The individual's relation-
ship with an organization is generally at a local level,
rather than an international; and, therefore, it is impor-
tant to study this aspect in order to test whether Michels'
theory can be applied to the local union. (2) Because
the international organization is composed of and influ-
enced by local unions, a better understanding of the local
union will facilitate the understanding of the total or-
ganization.

There is no doubt about the importance of the local
union, even though some of its functions have been removed
to the International. Brooks emphasizes the importance of
our study:

> The sources of vitality within the American Labor
> Movement are to be found in the local unions and
> local organizations. The bulk of our present able
> national leadership - of which we have a great deal -
> sprang out of active locals and the only real danger
> to the Labor Movement is that we shall dry up these
> sources of leadership and inspiration.[1]

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[1] G.W. Brooks, The Source of Vitality of the American
Labor Movement, (Cornell University, 1961), p. 3.

In spite of the declared importance of the local unions, very little has been published about them or their leadership. The available documentation is of a case study nature, a comparison and analysis of relatively few locals, and above all, of descriptive nature. Furthermore, these available studies, with one exception, do not deal directly and solely with the phenomenon of turnover of local leadership. The one exception is of descriptive value only without any attempt to study functional relations.[1]

On the other hand, although sophisticated analysis of the local union is rare, and therefore it is almost impossible to substantiate statements, the union government's literature includes many statements about the differences of rates of turnover between International and local unions. None of these statements is supported by empirical and/or comparative study, although sometimes a case study or a long acquaintance with the Labor Movement is the source of insight upon which the statement is based. One example of these attempted explanations of varying turnover rates is the analysis of Bloom and Northrup, who argue that the reasons for higher rates of turnover in locals are:

1. Local members are willing to change leadership.

2. Local officers are elected for a period of one or two

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[1]L. Appelbaum, "Officers Turnover and Salary Structure in Local Unions," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, XIX, No. 2 (January, 1966), 224-230.

years only.

3. There is no need for a big campaign budget in the local, which makes it easier for new candidates to challenge the officers in power.

4. There are close relations between the local leadership and members.

5. Local officers are moving to higher positions in the International union.

6. Local officers are not highly compensated in materialistic terms.[1]

This type of explanation can be found in a few other cases. Seidman, for example, emphasizes two reasons for higher turnover in locals: (1) the local officers' positions are not of any personal advantage to them; (2) it is impossible for local officers to build machinery which will back them in power.[2] None of these studies however, suggest any theoretical framework for research and explanation.

This study will focus on the phenomenon of leadership turnover at the local union level. The term leadership refers to the group of people who lead the organization. This group exerts more influence than any other within the organization. This influence can be summarized

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[1]G.F. Bloom, and H.R. Northrup, Economic of Labor Relations, 5th ed. (Richard D. Irwin, 1965).

[2]J. Seidman, "Democracy in Labor Unions," Journal of Political Economy, DXI (June, 1953), 221-231.

along five major lines:

1. The leadership defines and modifies the goals of the organization.

2. The leadership determines policies, methods, allocation of resources, rules, and regulations, aimed at achieving the goals of the organization.

3. The leadership is the most influential factor of all organizational-administrative processes, i.e., planning, coordination, communication.

4. The leadership is responsible for solving internal conflicts in the organization.

5. The leadership represents the organization and serves as a link to other organizations, the community, and the whole society.[1]

The importance of turnover is implied by the importance of the leadership: changes of leadership might interfere with the smooth operation of the organization, or facilitate achievement of its goals, depending on the particular situation in a given organization.

Turnover has been studied under different names, in various contexts, and in different organizations. A survey of the literature suggests that the available material about turnover can be classified in four categories:

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[1]P. Selznick, Leadership in Administration (Evanston, Illinois: Row Peterson & Co., 1957), offers a similar presentation.

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1. Turnover of blue-collar workers (hourly-paid employ-ees).[1]

2. Turnover of managers and salaried employees. Here the terms used are generally "mobility" or "succes-sion", and rarely "turnover".[2]

3. Turnover of executives, usually top executives (one definition: 1 percent to 2 percent of the highest paid executives in the organization). Here the term used is "succession".

4. Turnover of leadership in political or "voluntary organ-izations".

The first category is not covered in this study, as the emphasis here is on turnover of leadership. However, some theories, empirical results, or methodological tools of this category will be used if found to be of value. The second and third categories are relevant to this study and serve as the basic source of ideas, theories and hypotheses. The fourth category is our main concern.

We can now define the term "turnover" as it will be used in the study: turnover is the change of leadership in an organization, as expressed by the number of leaders who

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[1]It is interesting to mention Levenson's footnote: "Sociologists refer to succession on lower levels by the negative toned term 'turnover'". In "Bureaucratic Success-ion", in Etzioni Complex Organizations, A Sociological Reader, (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 363.

[2]Ibid., p. 362. This passage provides a short analy-sis of the metamorphosis of the term from "change of reli-gions and political leaders" to "turnover of executive".

served in a given local during a given period of time.
The leadership group in this study includes the President,
Vice President, Recording and Financial Secretaries of the
local union.

In spite of the importance of leadership turnover,
as discussed above, little has been done in this area,
and Carlson's footnote would appear true today: "The
meager systematic literature on succession and its conse-
quences is largely descriptive in nature and tends to over-
emphasize the disruptive aspects. Propositions are seldom
developed or tested."[1]

It is possible, however, to indicate some basic
approaches or partial theories which deal with the ques-
tion of turnover. These approaches vary in degree of
sophistication, levels of discussion, and the particular
aspects with which they deal. One attempt to cope with the
issue of succession was made by Grusky. Grusky starts with
Gouldner's theory,[2] conducts some empirical studies, and
suggests the following theoretical framework: Succession
is a universal phenomenon which is found in every organiza-
tion and is highly important in understanding the organiza-
tion. Succession is a complex problem, and

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[1]R.O. Carlson, "Succession and Performance Among
School Superintendents," _Administrative Science Quarterly_,
1961/62, p. 210.

[2]Gouldner's theory is mainly concerned with organiza-
tional changes as a result of succession; therefore, it is
not useful to our study.

our orientation toward succession is therefore
divided into two interrelated though analytically
separated parts: Succession from the point of
view of the successor's small group system of role-
relationship, and succession from the point of view
of the formal organization as a totality.[1]

Dealing only with the formal aspects of the organi-

zation and emphasizing the relationships between succession

and control systems as a basis for his theoretical frame-

work, Grusky uses the analysis of Weber's theory.[2] Accor-

ding to Weber, the three bases for establishing control,

which he calls leadership typology, are:

1. Identification with the personal qualities of the

    leader: charismatic leadership.

2. Shared or common interests between the organization's

    members and its leader: traditional leadership.

3. The established pattern of authority: bureaucratic

    leadership.

A historical analysis, Grusky argues, will reveal

that American business firms went through the three leader-

ship stages suggested by Weber--charismatic to traditional to

bureaucratic--and this order does affect the rates of suc-

cession. Succession will change as the type of leadership

changes. When organizations are led by charismatic leaders,

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[1]O. Grusky, "Administrative Succession in Formal Or-
ganizations," Social Forces, XXXIX (Dec. 1960), 106, and
"Corporate Size, Bureaucratization and Managerial Succession,"
American Journal of Sociology, LXVII (1961), 261-269.

[2]R. Bendix, Max Weber--An Intellectual Portrait
(Garden City, New York, Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1960), p. 302.

turnover, almost by definition, is impossible, as the probability of the immediate appearance of a second such leader is low. When organizations move to their traditional, and later to bureaucratic stages, succession increases.

Concerned only with the formal aspects of the organization, Grusky considers size to be one of its important characteristics, and therefore studies the relationships between succession and size as measured by sales volume. Based on his findings, he later concludes that ". . . size of firm was directly related to the organizational stability as measured by length of life of firm", and these two variables, size and age, are the major components of bureaucratization. Grusky's basic finding is that "frequency of administrative succession at the top is directly related to size of firm."[1] His explanation of this finding, that succession increases as bureaucratization increases, is that "bureaucratization (should) serve to nullify, or at least cushion the otherwise disruptive consequences of succession."[2]

The softening effect of bureaucratization on succession is possible because personality factors are relatively less important in an organization where written rules and regulations control the behavior of its members. These members are accustomed to accepting authority from above without necessarily relating it to any particular individual.

[1]Grusky, 1960, p. 105.

[2]Ibid., p. 260.

Grusky's findings and theory are in contradiction to Michels' theory, and the reason for this seems to be the fact that they deal with two different types of organizations. Grusky deals with type A while Michels is concerned with type B.[1]

Organizational Facets	Type A	Type B
1. How is leadership achieved	Appointed by higher authority.	Elected by members of the organization.
2. Who offers leadership and, later who accounts for the leader?	Higher strata of the organization.	Lower strata of the organization.
3. What is required of the leader?	Managerial and technical skills.	Political skills.
4. Do followers require periodical assurance?	No	Yes. Established recall system and periodic elections.
5. What motivates obedience of followers?	Hierarchial authority of the organization. Control by reward and punishment; mainly materialistic.	Legitimacy of the elections. Reward and punishment usually non-materialistic.
6. Are leaders' decisions challenged?	Rarely by lower strata. No direct relations between leader and followers. Conflicts solved by third party or higher authority.	By any member of the organization and direct leader-follower relationship.

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[1]A and B are used here to avoid using names which are usually heavily loaded. This typology was influenced by E.E. Raphael's discussion in "The Anderson-Warkov Hypotheses in Local Unions: A Comparative Study," _The American Sociological Review_, XXXII, No. 5 (October, 1967), 768-776.

This typology explains the contradictions to some extent. We can understand, by identifying two types of leadership, each of which seems to be subject to different "laws". This study is concerned with organizations of Type B, so its hypotheses will be derived from Michels' theory. However, Grusky's approach is presented here for two reasons: (1) to support our formal approach to the study of organization and leadership, (2) to illustrate the organizational variables and their treatment.

It seems fit now to phrase the problem of this study: To identify the organizational variables which influence leadership turnover in local unions and to evaluate their contribution to our understanding of the phenomenon of turnover.

OUTLINES OF THE STUDY

The next two chapters include the theoretical and the methodological aspects of the study. Chapters IV, V, and VI include the presentation and analysis of the results. Chapter IV discusses the structural organizational characteristics of the local union. Chapter V deals with the phenomenon of turnover per se and Chapter VI is a discussion of the relationship between the structural variables and turnover. The last chapter includes a summary of the findings with emphasis on their relation to the organizational theory and their possible contribution to it. In addition, some research propositions are suggested.

CHAPTER II

THEORIES, CONCEPTS, VARIABLES, AND HYPOTHESES

MICHELS' THEORY

The discussion in the previous chapter and the pre-
sentation of the problem indicate that Michels' theory is
the best theoretical framework for this study. Although
his theory was originally meant to be an explanation of the
internal forces in democratic organizations, especially
political parties, it has become an important part of organ-
izational theory. The major conclusion Michels presents is
that the "real law" of organizational life is oligarchy.

His general argument can be divided into three parts:

1. The stability of leadership. Once in power, Michels
contends, leaders are unlikely to be displaced. Their
advantages are numerous: with the increasing size and
complexity of party and union organizations profession-
alism invariably develops and the leaders acquire an
expertise denied to the mass; the leaders develop
political skills while, conversely, the masses are
almost universally incompetent in politics; the elected
officeholders soon acquire what comes to be regarded as
a moral right to the office and is customarily removed
only for extraordinary reasons. Moreover, by co-opting
the talented and ambitious members the leaders skim off
potentially new and intelligent opposition leaders,
thereby insuring the continuing impotance of the masses.
2. The need for organization. In the struggle with their
powerful employer adversaries, organization—effective
and hence centralized organization—is a necessary con-
dition for success. Its opposite, disorganization,
represents disunity, ineffective power and invariably
the triumph of the employer interests. The imperative

of successful organization--leaders with expertise,
a professional bureaucracy, centralized authority--
combine in Michels' view, to make government by the
masses a technical impossibility.
3. The iron law of Oligarchy. Confluence of the
various factors contributing to the stability of
leadership and the imperatives of nondemocratic or-
ganization produce Michels' celebrated 'iron law of
oligarchy'. The apathy of the masses with their need
for guidance has its counterpart in the natural greed
of leaders for power--"what was initiated by the need
for organization, administration and strategy is com-
pleted by psychological determinism"--for the leader
identifies his personal interests with those of his
organization. Thus the organization no longer exists
merely as a means to the ends which it was created, but
develops in addition its own peculiar ends, notably,
the perpetuation in power of the incumbent leadership.[1]

Although Michels' theory does not explicitly mention

turnover as one of the characteristics of oligarchy, it can

be implied. Lipset et al do so when discussing Michels'

theory as a basis for their empirical study, Union Democ-

racy. They mention two major components of democratic or-

ganizations as opposed to oligarchies: (1) organized legi-

timate opposition, (2) turnover in office.[2] Michels theory

has been empirically tested by various students of the Labor

Movement and the Lipset et al study, Union Democracy, is

probably the most famous one. The results of this study do

not support Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy, but the Inter-

national Typographical Union, the subject of the study, is

atypical, being the only union in the American Labor

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[1]C.P. Magrath, "Democracy in Overall: The Futile
Quest for Union Democracy," Industrial and Labor Relations
Review (July, 1959), p. 507-508.

[2]S.N. Lipset, M. Trow, and J. Coleman, Union
Democracy (Free Press, 1956), p. 3.

Movement with a clear cut two party system.

Other studies examined the turnover of leadership in
international unions. Taft devotes one chapter to the sub-
ject of elections, and his results indicate low officer turn-
over at the International level. The study covers thirty-
four internationals during 1900 to 1948. In this period
2307 officers were elected. In only 18.8 percent of the
presidential elections were incumbents challenged. Incum-
bent officers were challenged in only 23 percent of all the
cases.[1] These results support Michels theory.

Another study was conducted by Brown, who was mainly
concerned with intraunion conflicts, and studied leadership
turnover as one of its variables. The union under study was
the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, over a per-
iod of fifty years. The study concludes: "This signifies
that the smaller the union the greater the proportion of top
leadership not re-elected to office, or, in other words, the
greater is the turnover."[2]

It seems that we do have empirical evidence to sup-
port Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy when related to the
International level. The next step is to establish a con-
ceptual framework by which we will be able to extend our
examination to the local level.

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[1]P. Taft, The Structure and Organisation of Labor
Unions (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1954).

[2]J.S. Brown, "Union Size as a Function of Intraunion
Conflict," Human Relations, IX (1956), 75-89.

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Michels' analysis of the creation of oligarchies has been elaborated on by others, and various factors and processes have been suggested as a basis for empirical research. Two of these elaborations will be presented here.

The first one is Truman's analysis of the "active minority" (his term for leadership). According to Truman, the following items are considered to be factors which actually contributed to the creation of oligarchy:

1. The mere existence of a formal organization, which results in the creation of various functions, the establishment of some kind of a hierarchy, and the demand that decisions be made.

2. The process of growth of the organization, which bears a serious effect on the integration of the various units within the growing organization.

3. The financial structure.

4. The personal characteristics of the leaders.

5. The relative prestige of the organization as related to other organizations.

6. The type of followers.[1]

Truman's suggestions are basically relevant to political organizations, and since he is mainly concerned with political parties, his analysis is directed toward the basic

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[1] D.B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knoff, 1959).

problems of these organizations such as financial struc-
ture. Some of his conditions, however, can be applied to
other organizations, including the local union.

Lipset _et al_ also elaborated on Michels' theory.
According to them, the factors which facilitate oligarchy
in unions are:

1. The development of _a near monopoly of power_ which is
   possible because of:

   a) The development of a _Bureaucratic structure_ which
      actually means the increase of power at the top.

   b) The control over the formal _means of communication
      by the top_.

   c) The monopoly of the _political skills_ by the top,
      while these skills are absent among the rank and
      file.

2. The _leadership's desire_ to stay in power.

3. A _decrease in members' participation_ in union activities.[1]

   An analysis of these two elaborations shows that there
are two types of concepts which seem to explain the creation
of oligarchy:

1. Structural and situational concepts, such as "bureau-
   cratic structure", "relative prestige", "communication".

2. Factors of personality and social psychology, such as
   "the leadership's desire to stay in power", "types of
   followers".

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[1]Lipset _et al_, _Union Democracy_.

In the early stages of development of the organizational theory, structural concepts were used as basic elements to explain organizations (for example, Weber's model of bureaucracy). The major weakness of these early theories was their total neglect of the informal aspects of the organization. Other theories emerged which were more concerned with individuals and groups within the organization (for example, those of M.P. Follet, the "Human Relations School", and others). These theories, with some modifications, still prevail and were supported during the last period by numerous empirical studies, starting with the famous "Hawthorne Studies". Although the formal structure of the organization was considered a factor, its importance seemed to be secondary to that of sociological and psychological factors.

The theories now seem to put less emphasis on the conceptualization and research of the structural and formal aspects as compared with the socio-psychological aspects of organizations. Therefore, our knowledge of structural and formal aspects is substantially less than that of the socio-psychological aspects.

Our approach in this study is formal. However, as this approach is less developed than the socio-psychological, and because of the limitations of the study, we may find ourselves unable to explain some of the results. In such cases, explanations of a socio-psychological nature are suggested.

Based on the above discussion and on additional literature which is included in the bibliography, four formal concepts are suggested as the core of the conceptual framework of this study and the source of its hypotheses. These concepts are Formalization, Complexity, Attractiveness, and External Elements (or Environment).

Each of the above concepts can be operationalized by different variables. The two crucial considerations in selecting the variables for each concept are: (1) to what extent does the variable "represent" the concept?; and (2) is information about the variable obtainable? The final decision about the "representation" of a variable depends on the researcher's judgment. Accessibility of information about a variable depends on two conditions: the existence of the information and its availability (which, in turn, is dependent on factors such as money, time, reputation, and the expertise of the investigator). This study, being no exception, is also subject to these two conditions.

THE CONCEPTS, THE VARIABLES AND THE HYPOTHESES

Formalization

The concept of formalization can be defined in more than one way and on various levels. The following two quotations will serve as the source of our variables:

> The formalization process continues as an organization gets older and larger. . . Patterns of behavior

stabilize; individuals settle into characteristic
roles; standard operating procedures are established.
The most significant characteristic of this develop-
ment is that it represents organizational learning--
the learning of a formal organizational structure,
expressive of the problems which must be solved and
a rationale for solving them. The formal structure
provides the necessary framework within which labor
is divided and specialized, responsibilities are
delegated, routine communications are systematized,
and inducements are allocated.[1]

A shorter, but fairly similar statement can be found in

Tsouderos:

> The process of formalization is defined as a sequen-
> tial, stage by stage development of organizational
> activity over time: a standardization of social
> relationship and finally as an increasing bureaucrati-
> zation of the organization.[2]

These two definitions have one major characteristic

in common: both describe organizational processes during

a given period of time and define them as "formalization".

These processes, like "stabilization of behavior", "alloca-

tion of responsibilities", "establishment of standard opera-

ting procedures", and "routinization of the communication

channels" are hardly variables which can be observed in an

organization, and further operationalization is necessary.

This operationalization can be done in various ways.

One method is to identify a specific variable which can be

observed and represents a specific process. Here, the

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[1]W.H. Starbuck, "Organizational Growth and Develop-
ment" in J.G. March (ed.) <u>Handbook of Organization</u> (Rand
MacNally & Co., 1965), p. 478.

[2]J.E. Tsouderos, "Organizational Change in Terms of
Series of Selected Variables," <u>American Sociological
Review</u>, XX (April 1955), footnote 3, 206.

existence of written operating procedures will be the observed variable for the process of establishment of standard operating procedures.

Another possibility is to identify the basic characteristics of the organisation which can be observed and/or measured and which are related to the process of formalisation.

This study, because of its approach and structure and the nature of its data sources, will use the following characteristics as operationalised variables of the process of formalisation: (1) age; (2) size as measured by annual income and number of members.

Starbuck's quotation mentions age specifically as a factor influencing formalisation. The second quotation (Tsouderos) considers age implicitly, by relating the process of formalisation to the time dimension. The size of the organisation is also explicitly mentioned in the first quotation as a factor influencing the formalisation process. The literature, which considers size an indicator of formalisation, discusses how it should be measured. In business organisations for instance, some of the common measures are sales volume, number of employees, total assets. The two significant measures of the size of the local seem to be membership and annual income.

Relationships between membership size and formalisation were theorised by Coplow whose basic idea is that when

the number of members increases there is a growing need for the institutionalization of interactions, which, in turn, increases with the increase in membership.[1]

It seems that when Tsouderos speaks about "standardization of social relationship" he is partially referring to this concept.

The three variables suggested (age, size of membership and size of income) can be considered as static variables as they reflect the situation of the organization in a given point of time. However, the phenomenon of turnover is dynamic and can be measured only for a period of time. In order to add the dynamic dimension to the static variables of formalization, two variables will be added: growth rates of membership and of income. These variables will indicate changes in the organization during a specific period of time.

Based on the above discussion, and in accordance with Michels' analysis, we suggest this overall hypothesis: As formalization increases, stability of leadership increases. This hypothesis is the equivalent of one that can be tested in our study: As formalization increases, turnover of leadership decreases.

The more specific hypotheses of the concept of formalization are directly inferred from the above discussion

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[1] T. Coplow, "Organizational Size," Administrative Science Quarterly, I, (1957),484-505.

and the specifications of the variables:

Fl[1] - The older the local, the lower its leadership turnover.

F2 - The bigger the local in size or in total income, the lower its leadership turnover.

F3 - The higher the rates of growth in size of membership or total income, the higher its leadership turnover.

Complexity

Hall and Hass in their research define complexity as: "The degree of internal segmentation--the number of separate parts of the organization as reflected by the division of labor, number of hierarchial levels and the spatial dispersion of the organization."[2] As complexity increases, more skills are required to lead the organization. The control of the incumbent leader increases too, as they are familiar with the various organizational components and activities. At the same time, the disadvantages of any opposition to the existing leadership increase.

The selection of variables which represent this concept is especially difficult for type B organizations. Variables which can be used in type A organizations, such as the number of hierarchial levels, are meaningless in the local union. A close look at the locals included in this study suggests the following variables as a possible measure

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[1]Letters and numbers will designate a specific hypothesis and will serve as a reference in following chapters.

[2]R.H. Hall and J.E. Hass, "Organizational Size, Complexity and Formalization," American Sociological Review, XXXII, No. 6 (December, 1967), 906.

of complexity:

1. The number of units in the local. This number (which represents the number of different companies or plants in which local members are employed) is an indication of heterogenity, diversity of viewpoints, and demands.

2. Total resources and facilities which can be used by the local. These include total resources of the local (cash on hand as well as property), and the existence of a local newspaper. It is suggested that the more a local owns (compared to other locals) the more complex it is, since more skills are involved in running it.

3. Total money expenditure for personnel employed by the local. The assumption underlying this measurement is that the more personnel the local employs, the more activities it offers, and therefore it becomes more complex. The total payments to local union personnel is considered an indication of its complexity.[1]

The overall hypothesis is: as complexity increases, leadership turnover decreases. The specific hypotheses are:

C1 - The larger the number of local units, the lower the turnover of its leadership.

C2 - Locals which control more resources (own their own hall and offices and publish their own newspaper) will have

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[1]The third variable, and to some extent the second, raises the question of the relationship between complexity and size. Hall and Hass conclude that these relationships are very weak.

lower rates of turnover of leadership.

C3 - The larger the payment to the locals' employees, the lower the turnover of its leadership.

Attractiveness

As stated previously, only the formal aspects of this concept are to be examined here. Under this condition, the suggested definition of the concept will be: attractiveness is the force which stimulates potential leaders to seek leadership positions and causes leaders in office to stay there. The general assumption is that the more attractive the position the less will its turnover be. Attractive positions will cause many new candidates to compete for it. On the other hand, this attractiveness also means that the incumbent officer will do his best to stay in power. Usually, the incumbent officer has advantages over new candidates, and his chances of staying in power are high, especially if there are many candidates, and assuming that his performance in the past satisfied the demands of the members.

The formal measurement of attractiveness to be considered is the materialistic compensation to the leadership. At least one more important variable of attractiveness is already included among variables suggested earlier. Payne[1] shows that an organization's size and prestige are

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[1] R. Payne, "An Approach to the Study of Relative Prestige of Formal Organization," Social Forces, XXXII, (1954), 244-247.

highly correlated.

It is logical to assume a relationship between prestige and attractiveness, therefore, it can be argued that the larger organizations have more prestige. Following the same reasoning, the leadership turnover of the more prestigous organizations will be lower than smaller or less prestigous groups.

The specific hypothesis suggested is:

A1 - The higher the compensation to the leadership, the lower its turnover.

External Elements

There is very little doubt that the environment in which an organization operates is of great importance as a factor influencing processes within the organization. However, the direct relationship and influence are still unknown. An interesting illustration of an attempt to analyse this factor is Munro's article.[1] In this article, Munro studies some external forces of the local union, and examines their influence on the processes within the local. As the concept of external elements is very broad, only part of its factors will be studied in this research. It is assumed that the external influences occur on various levels. The lowest level is the immediate environment with which the

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[1]J.L. Munro, "External Factors of Control in the U.S.A. Labor Union Locals," *Journal of Industrial Relations* (Australia), X (1968), 135-145.

organisation under study heavily interacts. The second
level is the larger community of which the organisation is
a part. The third and broadest is society as a whole.

The first level is interorganizational relations.
The variable suggested for study of this level is the
company with which the local has a labor agreement. The
relations between the local and the company have direct
bearing on the standing of the leadership and determine
the members evaluation of their leadership. This evalua-
tion is supposedly an important factor influencing turn-
over. However, our knowledge at this time does not permit
us to predict any specific relationship.[1] The hypothesis
we suggest therefore is:

E1 - Different locals connected with different companies
    will have different turnover rates.

The second level suggested for study here is the com-
munity. In this case the suggested variable is the size of
the community in terms of its population, adjusted by two
additional factors: (1) the percentage of blue collar wor-
kers in the particular community; (2) the membership size of
the local. The size of the community seems to be an impor-
tant factor, as it influences the prestige of the local union
leadership. In a small community, where local union leaders

[1]The only detailed treatment available is found in
F.H. Harbison and R. Dubin, _Patterns of Union Management
Relations, United Automobile Workers (CIO) General Motors,
Studebaker,_ (Chicago: Science Research Association, 1947).

are an important part of the community leadership, the prestige and the attractiveness of the union leadership increases, and, based on the discussion of attractiveness, its turnover decreases.

Based on the above presentation we hypothesize that:

E2 - In small communities the turnover of local union

leadership will be lower.

The third level is the society as a whole. It is very difficult to study the influence of this factor as it has many components and lacks an operational definition. We suggest testing the influence of two general factors which seem closely related to the influence of the "whole society".

One factor, in its most operationalized expression, is the influence of the element of time on the turnover of officers. Actually, we will ask whether changes in standard of living, economic activities and value systems cause differences in rates of leadership turnover in different time periods. Namely, whether in time t_1 we will find different rates of turnover than in time t_2.

The second factor is mainly an attempt to relate leadership turnover, with the element of time, and the negotiation of the labor contract. The question is whether we will find different rates of leadership turnover in years of negotiations as compared to years in which no negotiations took place. We assume that the negotiations reflect economic and other related issues beyond those of

wages and other materialistic compensations.[1]

Based on the above discussion, we suggest the following two hypotheses:

E3(a) - There will be differences in rates of leadership turnover in the different years covered by this study.

E3(b) - More leadership turnover will be found in years of labor contract negotiations and immediately after.

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[1] It was suggested to me in one of the interviews which were conducted as a preparation for the study, that the most decisive factor influencing turnover is the economic factor, namely, the economic issues the local has to cope with and the success of its leadership to satisfy the members in this respect. To the contrary, we could not find any support of this argument in the literature. Sayles and Strauss in their Local Union--Its Place in the Industrial Plant (New York: Harper, 1953, revised 1967), argue that "Although we have listed a number of situations where economic issues play an important part in union elections, it should be emphasized that these are more or less exceptions". (p. 97) The examination immediately above relates the turnover to the total labor contract, including the economic and the noneconomic issues.

CHAPTER III

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Research and theory are now re-emphasizing the formal aspects of organizational behavior as opposed to the past tendency of emphasizing the socio-psychological aspects and studying individual and group behavior. We have come to realize that better understanding of organizations rests on consideration of units of analysis such as the structure of the organization, the interrelations of the positions, communication networks. This method does not neglect individuals and groups, but regards them as "given" in a formal study, or as "products" of the organizational characteristics in other types of studies.

Accepting this trend as valid and meaningful, the approach of this study will be of a formal type. This approach does not deny the fact that turnover is a behavioral phenomenon, but suggests that in this study its formal aspects will be emphasized. Hage's article, "Axiomatic Theory of Organization", explains the advantages of studying the formal characteristics of organizations:

1. These characteristics can both differentiate between organizations with similar objectives and indicate similarities between organizations with different objectives.

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2. They are not time specific or cultural bound.

3. Because of the above two, they are useful in studying organizational evolutions.[1]

These points, especially the first and second, are relevant to this study which deals with the differentiations between organizations with similar objects over a period of time.

The decision to emphasize the formal aspects dictates the type of data and the methods of collecting it, but does not exclude the use of techniques generally used in the socio-psychological type of study.

Another consideration of the study is related to the type of the dependent variables. The major variable is the phenomenon of turnover; therefore the study's time span is important. We have selected a nine year period (1959-1967 inclusive) as this is the longest period with adequate available data.

1959 was the first year in which the local unions had to file their annual reports under the "Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act", and 1967 was the last year for which information was available for this study. This period covers five elections and although this time span is long enough to lead to meaningful conclusions, it is not long enough to identify patterns of change.

A stratified (by size of membership and type of

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[1]J. Hage, "Axiomatic Theory of Organization," Administration Science Quarterly, X, No. 3 (December, 1965), 289-320.

local) random sample of 100 United Auto Workers (UAW)
locals was drawn from the population of 275 U.A.W. locals
in Michigan.[1]

SOURCES OF THE DATA

Many information sources have been used in data
collection relating to this study. Most of the data is
of a secondary nature. An important characteristic of
much of the data is that it was obtained from sources open
to the public. These include annual reports and U.A.W.
material filed by locals according to the above mentioned
Act.[2] This characteristic makes the replication of the
study relatively simple; an important advantage in a field
where practically nothing has been previously researched.

Other sources are more unique to the study, especi-
ally those which are related to the U.A.W. (excluding the
publications for the public). Many researchers have stu-
died the U.A.W. because of its unique characteristics as
well as the ready aid and enthusiastic help of its leader-
ship. In this case, as in many others, the cooperation was
much more than any researcher could expect.

Annual Reports of the Local Unions

Every local must file this report with the U.S.
Department of Labor as specified in the Labor Management

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[1] For detailed description and reasons for selecting
the U.A.W. see Appendix A.

[2] Sec. 205 of the Disclosure Act states that all re-
ports and documents filed shall be public information.

Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959. These reports fur-
nish the information about turnover and most of the inde-
pendent variables.

Governmental Sources

Some items of information were collected from other
Governmental sources:

a) Census information which is used in the analysis
of community influence.

b) Other publications of the U.S. Department of
Labor.

U.A.W. Convention Proceedings

This source was used for three major purposes:

a) To establish the population's distribution by
size and type as a basis for the sampling process.

b) To furnish information about the turnover and
election of regional directors.

c) To achieve some degree of insight into the rela-
tionship between the locals and the International. Of spe-
cial interest and importance are the conventions of 1951 and
1953 (previous to the period of the study) when changes in
the term of service of the local officers were discussed.

U.A.W. Printed Material

These include the International Constitutions of the
last nine regular and special conventions, local by-laws,
labor agreements, educational publications (such as

"Election guide", "The President's Job") and other descriptive material of the U.A.W.[1]

U.A.W. Compilation for this Study

Some information was compiled especially for this study by the U.A.W. staff. This includes information about the age, type, and size of the 100 locals at the beginning of 1968 and information about the turnover of regional directors and staff members of U.A.W. International Headquarters.

Interviews with U.A.W. Officials

Interviews were conducted for four different purposes and therefore used different techniques.

1. Preliminary interviews which were aimed to familiarize the researcher with the problem, to explore available information, and to foster a free exchange of ideas and methods to be applied. These interviews were carried out mainly in U.A.W. Headquarters and included the staff of the several departments. The interviews took the form of general discussions, without any particular structure. They ranged from a half-day conference with the people in the Research Department to a quick phone call for clarification of a particular point.

2. Later we decided to interview a small sub-sample of local presidents to find some more "from the field" explanations of

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[1] For more details see Bibliography section, U.A.W. Documents.

the statistical findings. In order to construct the ques-
tionnaire we conducted additional interviews in the field
and in Headquarters. These were mainly aimed at determin-
ing what information would be feasible for the local offi-
cers to supply.

3. Four interviews were carried out as a pre-test of the
interviews to be conducted with the sub-sample.

4. The presidents of eight locals were interviewed, repre-
senting the locals of the four highest and four lowest turn-
over.[1] The average time of the interview was an hour and a
half using an open-ended questionnaire.

QUALITY OF THE DATA

The annual reports of the lcoal unions furnished
most of the data used in this study. Because the original
purpose of these reports is unrelated to the purpose of
the study, the reports have a high degree of objectivity.
Such objective information is necessary for this study's
formal approach. Three reasons make the accuracy of the
data highly reliable:

1. The law specifies high fines for violating its provi-
   sions (up to $10,000 fine and/or one year in prison).

2. The U.A.W. is well-known for its integrity.

3. There is no particular reason for the local to manipu-
   late its reports.

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[1]For more details about the sub-sample see Appendix
A. And Appendix C.

As the reports are required by law and as the U.A.W. has a well-organized "red-tape" system, only 1.7 percent (16 out of 900) of the reports were missing, and only about 3 percent caused any problems. The sequence of the reports helped clarify most of these problems.

The quality of the other printed materials, the Governmental and various U.A.W. sources, seems to be satisfactory. Basically none are directly related to the subject of the study, nor do they have any particular reason for any bias.

It is difficult to evaluate the interviews; however, with the exception of one aspect (the attitude toward the International), the respondents were quite candid and answered all questions frankly and to the best of their knowledge. It is important to mention however, that their knowledge with respect to some issues is questionable as it required a very good memory for details.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology of this study is selected to achieve four goals:

1. To describe the phenomenon of turnover, and to compare it to other available descriptions. To describe some of the structural characteristics of the local union. This goal will be achieved by using instruments such as regular tables, and frequency distribution.

2. To establish functional relationships between the

variables by using X^2 and correlations.

3. To test certain hypotheses about the functional relationships. This will be achieved by using significance levels for the above measures.

4. To describe the contribution of the various independent variables to the explanation of the dependent variable. Through computers it is possible to apply sophisticated testing methods, as specified above.

A question arises regarding the type of statistical methods to be used--parametric or non-parametric. As the nature of the data is still unknown, and as no clear cut guidelines are available, both parametric and non-parametric statistics[1] will be employed. This, in turn, calls for special caution in the interpretation of the statistics to be presented.

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[1]For a discussion of this point see Siegel, Non-parametric Statistics, (1965), Chapter 3, pp. 18-35.

CHAPTER IV

THE STRUCTURAL VARIABLES OF THE LOCALS

SIZE OF LOCALS AND RATES OF GROWTH

As the membership size of the local, measured by number of votes in the conventions, was one of the two criteria for sampling, the size distribution of the sample is an accurate reflection of the size distribution of the U.A.W. locals in Michigan with one exception: the eleven largest locals are included in the sample.[1] Table IV-1 illustrates distribution of the 100 locals according to the two measures of size used in this study--total annual income and membership.

The smallest local (when an average of the 9 years has been used), has about 25 members while the largest has more than 30,000.[2] As for the size of locals in terms of income, the smallest income is about $1,000 per year, while the largest is over two million dollars average annual

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[1] See Appendix A for the detailed sampling procedure and the comparison of the population and the sample.

[2] The mean size of membership was about 2700 and the standard deviation 5145. All the above figures were calculated by dividing the local per capita taxes each local paid to the International by the per capita for each member, which is $36.00 yearly.

TABLE IV-1.--Distribution of sample locals by income and membership (annual average).

Income Group in 1000 Dollars	Number of Locals	Membership Group	Number of Locals
1 - 100	72	25 - 600	50
101 - 200	4	601 - 2500	26
201 - 300	5	2501 - 5500	8
301 - 500	6	5501 - 8500	4
501 - 1000	10	8501 - 10000	6
1001 and up	3	10,001 and up	6
Total	100	Total	100

income ($2,059,000.00).[1]

The simple correlation between the size of member-ship and the income is R=.99.[2] This high correlation is a result of the fact that the major source of local union income is its members' dues. Because the two measures are highly correlated, the calculations later on in the study

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[1] The mean income of the locals is $168,000.00 and the standard deviation $321,057.00.

[2] If not otherwise specified, the correlation figures hereafter are Kendall Rank Order Correlations Coefficient (Tau). For technical presentation, see S. Siegel, Non-parametric Statistics for the Behavioral Science (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), pp. 213-223. Four measures of correla-tions were used:
1. Simple correlation and partial correlation.
2. Multiple correlation, as part of the various least squares calculation. This calculation includes par-tial correlations and significance levels for all correlations coefficients.
3. Spearman Rank Order Correlation (Rho) including one tail significance level.
4. Kendall Rank Order Correlation Coefficient (Tau) one tail significance level, partial correlations without significance levels.
The basic measures of correlations (R, Rho, Tau) are usually close and in the same direction. However, in cases where they differ a detailed discussion will be presented.

will use only the size of membership.[1]

Which size measure should be employed when studying organizations is an important question as sometimes different measures will yield different results. Some suggestions for size measures of organizations are number of employees, volume of sales, value of assets, membership, income. The above correlation suggests that when studying sub-units of the same organization with the same financial structure, the two measures of size--income and membership-- are close that either is sufficient.

The relationship between the size of the organization and its rate of growth is a question with which many students of organizational theory are concerned. Simon summarizes the relations between size and growth for business organizations by saying: "It is generally agreed that there is little or no relations between size of firm and expected percentage of growth."[2]

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[1]After discussing the concepts in the theoretical chapter, we suggested variables to be studied and analyzed as representation of these concepts. The data reveals, however, that sometimes the correlations between variables within the concept are so high that, with the exception of the multiple correlation calculation, it is possible to analyze the relationship of turnover by using only one variable. As a rule we use only one variable in an analysis when the simple correlation between any two variables of the same concept is $R < .70$. Following this rule we eliminate one size variable: income.
No differences in any results were found when the size of income was used and size of membership was eliminated.

[2]H. Simon, "Comment--Firm Size and Rate of Growth," Journal of Political Economy, LXXII (Feb. 1964), 81-83.

The findings of our research are in the same direction. The correlation between the size of membership and the rate of membership growth was found to be Tau=.09, P=.09.[1]

The analysis of the overall relationship between size and rate of growth is heavily supported by the comparison between single-unit and amalgamated locals.[2] The amalgamated locals are significantly[3] larger than the single-unit locals, however, the one way analysis of variance has shown that the type of the local has no bearing on its rate of growth (P=.718). A tentative explanation can be found in the close relationship in size between the business firm and its local. The size and the growth rates of the local are related to those of the firm with which the local has an agreement. This kind of explanation assumes a maximum unionization of employees.

This reasoning however does not apply to amalgamated locals which are encouraged to organize as many plants as possible. The factor which seems to prevent the growth of

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[1]The correlation between the rate of growth of membership and the rate of growth of income is R=.80 and following our rule we decided to use only one measure of rate of growth.

[2]Amalgamated locals are those composed of more than one unit, when each unit works for a different company or plant.

[3]Hereafter, when the term significance is used without any number, it means P<.05. This is not the level of acceptance of hypotheses of this study. As the meaning of the significance level is not only statistical, discussion in each case will consider the significance level along with other concepts.

amalgamated locals beyond a certain size, in terms of units, is their limited resources. As one president put it: "We should organize more, but we do not have the time."[1]

AGE OF THE LOCALS AND OTHER VARIABLES

The 100 sample locals range in age from ten to thirty-four. The average age is 24.9 years and the standard deviation is 6.4. The correlates of the age of the local are summarized in Table IV-2. This table indicates a positive relationship between age and size of the local. This seems to be the major relationship, based on the fact that, when the size variable is constant, the correlation with payments to employees and officers as well as with total resources drops substantially. No relationship was found between the age of the local and the rate of growth or with the community index.

It was found that the amalgamated locals with an average age of 27.1 years, are significantly older ($P < .03$) than the single-unit locals (24 years). Older locals tend significantly ($P < .005$) to have their own union hall and offices. The average age of locals with facilities is 28.2 years compared with 22.8 years for those without facilities. The older locals also tend significantly ($P < .005$) to publish their own newspapers. The average age of locals with a newspaper is 27.1 years as compared to 23.3 years of those without a newspaper.

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[1] Interview with an amalgamated local president.

TABLE IV-2.--The correlates of age with other variables of the study.

Variables[a]	Correlation	Level of Significance	Membership[b] constant
Membership	.33	$P<.005$	
Membership Growth Rates	(-) .004	$P = .48$	
Payment to Employees	.31	$P<.005$	.07
Payments to Officers	.36	$P<.005$	.18
Community Index	(-) .05	$P = .25$	(-) .12
Total Resources	.38	$P < .005$	.20

[a]For explanation of the variables and their measures, see Appendix B.

[b]As the sampling distribution of Kendall Partial Rank Correlation is still unknown, no tests of significance are now possible.

THE TYPE OF LOCAL

The type of local was the second criterion for the selection of the sample. Table IV-3 gives the distribution of amalgamated locals in the sample and in Michigan.

Some information about the amalgamated locals has already been presented. They are larger in membership, older, and they do not differ from single-unit locals in rate of growth (P = .718).

Some additional information about the amalgamated locals is included in Table IV-4. Amalgamated locals tend

TABLE IV-3.-- Amalgamated and single-unit locals in the
sample in Michigan.[a]

Type of Local	In the Sample Number of locals	In Michigan Number of locals	%
Amalgamated locals	28	66	24
Single Unit locals	72	209	76
Total	100	275	100

[a]For a detailed table see Appendix A.

to have their own facilities in more cases than single-unit
locals (P<.001). The amalgamated locals tend to have more
newspapers (P .05) and their payments to employees and
officers are higher (P<.05) than those of the single-unit
locals. In terms of resources, the amalgamated locals
average about $423,000.00 while the single-units average
only $55,700.00 (P<.005).

No relationship has been found between the type of
the local, company with which it is associated (P<.95),
and the community index (P=.11).

THE COMMUNITY FACTOR

The community index[1] gives information about the
relationship of the size of the local, the size of the com-
munity, and the proportion of blue-collar workers in this

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[1]See Appendix B for detailed discussion of the con-
struction of this index.

TABLE IV-4.--Relationship between the type of the local and facilities, newspaper and payments to employees and officers.

FACILITIES	Single Unit locals	Amalga-mated locals	All Samples	Statistical Tests
Locals with Facilities	16	18	34	x^2 = 16.98
Locals without Facilities	52	8	60	Df = 2
Locals with Facilities Acquired during study	4	2	6	P < .001
Total Number of locals	72	28	100	

NEWSPAPER

	Single Unit locals	Amalga-mated locals	All Samples	Statistical Tests
Locals Publishing Newspaper	26	17	43	x^2 = 4.979 Df = 1
Locals Without Newspapers	46	11	57	P < .05
Total Number of locals	72	28	100	

PAYMENTS

Payments in $1000 per year:

	Single Unit locals	Amalga-mated locals	All Samples	Statistical Tests
to employees	$14.8	$63.9	$28.6	All P < .05
to all officers	$ 5.8	$17.1	$ 8.9	(Parametric
to President	$ 2.3	$ 6.7	$ 3.5	One Way
to Vice President	$ 0.7	$ 3.3	$ 1.4	Analysis
to Recording Secretary	$ 0.7	$ 2.1	$ 1.1	of
to Financial Secretary	$ 2.1	$ 5.0	$ 2.9	Variance)

community. Some of the correlations of the community
index are presented in Table IV-5, and some were discus-
sed earlier.

TABLE IV-5.--Correlations between community index and
other variables.

Variables	Tau Correlation	Level of Significance
Membership	.19	P<.005
Age	-.05	P =.25
Membership Growth	-.06	P =.20
Payment to Employees	.17	P<.005
Payment to Officers	.13	P =.02
Resources	.16	P<.005

THE COMPANY

The distribution of the 100 locals among the various
companies is as follows: Twenty-nine are locals of the "Big
Three"[1] (sixteen of General Motors, ten of Chrysler, and
three of Ford). The other seventy-one are locals of other
companies and amalgamated locals. Table IV-6 contains some
comparison of the "Others" and the "Big Three" grouped
together and separately.

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[1]A separation and an analysis was done of the "others"
compared to the Big Three locals. The Big Three is considered
a special group, as can be seen from publications such as
"New from U.A.W." and "Solidarity House."

TABLE IV-6.--"Big Three" locals as compared to others.[a]

Locals Measures	Others (71)[b]	Big Three (29)	P[c]	G.M. (16)	Chrysler (10)	Ford (3)	P[d]
Income (in $1000.)	$100.	$334.1	.001	$418.8	$258.7	$133.3	.005
Payments to Employees (in $1000.)	$ 17.5	$ 55.6	.01	$ 65.1	$ 40.7	$ 54.3	.065
Payments to Officers (in $1000.)	$ 5.0	$ 18.5	.005	$ 17.4	$ 19.6	$ 20.6	.005
Total Resources (in $1000.)	$147.5	$186.4	.70	$217.5	$164.5	$ 93.3	.98
Age	21.4	26.7	.07	26.8	26.6	27	.35
Community Index	23.3	21.8	.91	25.2	18.1	16.4	.98
Rate of Growth of Membership	100.4	131.2	.09	135.8	146.6	55	.11

[a]Using parametric One Way Analysis of Variance

[b]Number of Locals in the sample.

[c]"Others" and Big Three compared as a group.

[d]"Others" and each of the Big Three are compared.

A comparison of "Others" to the "Big Three" shows that the Big Three locals have more income (an average of $334,100.00 as compared to $100,000.00 or P<.005). Their payments to employees and officers are higher (P<.01). They are older, (P=.07) but do not differ significantly in terms

of their total resources (P=.70) and their community index (P=.91).

When we compare each of the Big Three separately, we find that General Motors (GM) locals lead with the highest income and largest resources, largest payments to employees, and lowest payments to officers. The total resources, the age, and the community index are different but not significantly so, and, as already mentioned, the rate of growth is not significantly different (P=.11).

Big Three locals tend to have more facilities than "Other" (72.4 percent compared to 18.3 percent, X^2 test yielded a value of 29,964, and P<.001). Newspapers are also more common in the Big Three locals: 79.3 percent of them have a newspaper as compared with 28.2 percent of the others (X^2=21,9; P<.001). There is no association between the type of the local (amalgamated or single-unit) and the company (P<.90).

It seems from these findings that no one general conclusion can be drawn about the relations between the company and other structural variables of the study.

Payments of the Locals to Employees and Officers

As presented in Table IV-4, payments, both to employees and to officers, differ significantly between single unit locals to amalgamated. All the calculations regarding these payments are subject to two limitations. The first is a statistical limitation which is caused by

the nature of the distribution of these variables, as pre-
sented in Table IV-7. The second limitation is a result
of the formal nature of the study. The actual payments are
not a direct reflection of the amount of work, as it is
well known that in small locals, and sometimes even in large
ones, part of the administrative and organizational work is
on a voluntary basis.

TABLE IV-7.--Distribution of locals according to their
yearly payments to officers and employees.

Payment to:	$0-$500.	$501-$1,000.	$1001. and up	Total number of locals
All four	34	4	62	100
President	38	12	50	100
Vice President	66	17	17	100
Recording Secretary	69	14	17	100
Financial Secretary	41	23	36	100
Other Employees[a]	0	44	56	100

[a]Includes all payments to employees and officers
other than the four under study.

Another indication of the diversity of payments is
the comparison between the average yearly payments of all
locals and the highest payment made by a single local.

For all four officers: Average, $8,000; highest, $56,000.
For President: Average, $3,500; highest, $20,000.
For Vice President: Average, $1,400; highest, $15,000.
For Recording Secretary:Average, $1,100; highest, $14,000.
For Financial Secretary:Average, $2,900; highest, $14,000.
For other employees: Average,$28,600; highest, $54,600.

CHAPTER V

PATTERNS OF ELECTIONS, TURNOVER AND INNER MOBILITY OF LOCAL OFFICERS

The phenomenon of turnover and the mobility of leadership will be analyzed in this chapter. In an attempt to describe, compare, and analyze this phenomenon, it will be independently of the other variables.

It is difficult to conclude or prove any causal relationship from the data, and it is equally as difficult to explain some of the results. However, based on general knowledge, insight of various people in the field, and material collected in interviews, we can offer some tentative and speculative explanations.

COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION OF TURNOVER

The study deals with the top leadership of one hundred U.A.W. locals during the period 1959 - 1967.[1]

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[1]For purposes of this study, top leadership is considered President, Vice-President, Recording and Financial Secretaries. The deviation from this pattern of top leadership was found to be of no significance. Although the constitution allows for more than one Vice President, only three of the test cases had a Second Vice-President. One of these had elected a Third Vice-President for a short time. Two other locals had elected a Second Vice-President in the past, and in two cases, the leadership had once included three Vice Presidents. In only one case had the Vice Presidential position been permanently vacant. The office of Treasurer was omitted as it existed only in three locals. The remaining ninety-seven locals followed the option given to them in Section 9, Article 37 of the International U.A.W. Constitution: "At the discretion of the local union the offices of Financial Secretary and Treasurer may be Combined".

According to the U.A.W. constitution, regular elections should be held every two years.[1] In some cases we find *special elections*--elections held on other than a regular election year. The special elections were held to fulfill a constitutional provision stating that vacancies be promptly filled, with the exception of the Presidency, which is automatically filled by the Vice President. When vacancies occur within 60 days before the regular elections, the executive board appoints temporary officers.[2]

How much turnover?

The U.A.W. constitution requires locals to elect officers every two years. When this provision was adopted, 80 percent of all U.A.W. locals decided to have elections in 1959 and 20 percent in 1960.[3] Of the 100 locals in the sample, seventy-two are of the first group and had *five* elections during the period under study. The remaining twenty-eight held *four* elections. However, because the reports provide sufficient data, we can treat

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After analyzing the position of Treasurer in the three locals mentioned above, the office which most closely resembled that of Financial Secretary was considered the one under study.

[1]U.A.W. Constitution 1968, Article 37, Section 14, p. 74. All references to U.A.W. Constitution are to the 1968 Constitution unless otherwise specified. No major changes which might influence the analysis in this study have occurred since 1959.

[2]The Executive Board consists of the above four officers and any other executive officer of the local. Usually these include three trustees, Sergeant at arms, and the Guide.

[3]Personal communication with U.A.W. officials.

all 100 locals as having held five elections.

Table V-1 describes the distribution of locals by the number of officers. The means and accumulated numbers indicate differences in turnover among the four officers. Two groups can be identified—the President and the Vice President in one, and the Secretaries in the other.

TABLE V-1.—Distribution of the hundred locals by the number of officers.

No. of Officers Office	Total	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Mean No. of offi- 0 cers
President	314	8	25	33	19	10	4	1	- 3.14
Accumulation		8	33	66	85	95	99	100	
Vice President[a]	330	9	18	29	25	12	4	2	1 3.30
Accumulation		9	27	56	81	93	97	99	100
Recording Secretary	243	24	36	21	13	4	2		2.43
Accumulation		24	60	81	94	98	100		
Financial Secretary	216	36	29	23	8	3	1		2.16
Accumulation		36	65	88	96	99	100		

Total No. of Officers	4	6	7- 8	9- 10	11- 12	13- 14	15- 16	20- 23	
Total No. Of Locals	1103	2	4	16	23	20	25	8	2	11.03

[a]This row of figures includes thirteen Vice Presidents elected after the previous Vice President moved automatically to the position of President. See Table V-8 for details.

Table V-2 presents the officers and the individuals who served. The total number of officers in a local is the number of people elected during the nine year period. If an individual served as President, than as Recording Secretary and then again as President, he was counted three times for the turnover calculations but only once for the individuals' figures. If he succeeded himself as President, he was counted only once in both the turnover and individual calculations.[1]

The figures reveal that the presidency more than any other, is the office to which more individuals are re-elected. The lowest rates of reelection are for the Vice Presidency. Looking at the whole group, we find more than 10 percent of all officers (125 out of 1103) served in more than one office or in the same office more than once.

We have compared the various rates of turnover among officers but we have yet to answer the question, "How much turnover?". The problem lies with the standard of compar-ison. Lacking another sample for comparison, we can com-pare our turnover rates to a theoretical model. This model consists of the calculations of the highest and the lowest possible numbers of officers and the demarkation line between "low" and "high" turnover. Having one hundred

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[1]Although Table V-2 furnishes some information which can be useful, the closeness of these two turnover indexes, as the correlations suggest, show that the individual num-ber cannot be used for further meaningful calculations.

TABLE V-2.-- Rates of Turnover.

Office	Total No. of Officers	Mean	Total No. of Individuals.a	Mean	Total of Officers minus Total of Individuals	% of Total Officers	Demarkation Line.b	Definition of Turnover	Correlation of Total Officers and Total Individuals.c
President	314	3.14	293	2.93	21	6.68	300	high	.89
Vice President	330	3.30	321	3.21	9	2.72	300	high	.94
Recording Secretary	243	2.43	236	2.36	7	2.88	300	low	.98
Financial Secretary	216	2.16	206	2.06	10	4.62	300	low	.94
Total	1103	11.03	978	9.78	125	11.33	1200	low	.79

[a] An individual can serve more than once and, if his terms are consecutive, will be counted for each term in the same office. The figures in this column represent the total number of individuals who served as officers in the period of the study.

[b] See explanation in the text.

[c] All P < .005.

locals with five elections for each of the four officers, the calculations for the highest possible number will be 500 for each position, a total of 2000. The lowest possible number will be 100 for each position, a total of 400. The demarkation line will be calculated by the following formula:

$$\text{Lowest Number} + \frac{\text{Highest Number} - \text{Lowest Number}}{2} = \text{Demarkation line.}$$

Thus, for the single office, the demarkation line in this case will be:

$$100 + \frac{500 - 100}{2} = 300.$$

The total number of presidents for the period of the study was 314, so we define the turnover of presidents as high.

The demarkation line for the four positions is:

$$400 + \frac{2000 - 400}{2} = 1200.$$

The total number of officers in the sample was 1103; therefore, according to this study, officer turnover in local unions is low.

Applebaum's findings - comparison

Applebaum statistically surveyed turnover at the local level in Milwaukee, Wisconsin for the years 1960-62, inclusive,[1] As in this study, he used data from reports

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[1] L. Appelbaum, "Officers Turnover and Salary Structure in Local Unions," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, XIX, No. 2 (January, 1966), 224-230.

filed by ninety-seven local unions under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 1959, as the source of his calculations. Table V-3 is a comparison of Appelbaum's findings and the findings of this study.

TABLE V-3.--Comparison of turnover rates--Appelbaum's and the current study.

| Position | Appelbaum's Study | | Current Study | |
	No Change	1-2 Changes	Means of Officers	Means of Individuals
President	59.8%	40.2%	3.140	2.930
Vice President	39.5%	60.5%	3.300	3.210
Recording Secretary	66.7%	36.3%	2.430	2.360
Financial Secretary	73.5%	26.5%	2.160	2.060
All Four Officers	59.1%	40.9%	11.030	9.780

The two studies use different indexes of turnover; however, we can compare them by defining stability as "high" when the percentage of change or the mean of officers is low and vice-cersa. Two basic findings emerge from this comparison: (1) the turnover rates in descending order are Vice-Presidents, Presidents, Recording Secretaries, Financial Secretaries; (2) there is a clear cut division of the four offices into two groups. These findings show

the existence of similar pattern beyond the U.A.W. locals.

Local and International Turnover

No change whatsoever occurred in the offices of the International President, Secretary-Treasurer, or two of the Vice Presidents during the nine year period under study. The remaining two Vice Presidential positions were eliminated, one in 1959 and the other in 1962. In 1962 three Executive Board members were elected, and all of them remained in office during the whole period of the study. A fourth member was added to the Board in 1966.

The analysis of the second level of international organization, the regional directors, reveals a different picture. Although there are eighteen geographical regions under the present structure of the U.A.W., two were established after 1959, making it possible to analyze only sixteen. Of these, the directors of ten regions who were elected or re-elected in 1959 were repeatedly re-elected in the 1962, 1964, 1966 and 1968 conventions. Five of the regions had two directors during this period (1959-68) and one region had three.

Using our theoretical model to decide high and low turnover, we find a demarkation line of 60 for the total number of leaders in the International level.[1] As the

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[1]The calculation, based on 5 elections of one International president, one secretary-treasurer, two vice-presidents and sixteen regional directors, is:

$$20 + \frac{100 - 20}{2} = 60.$$

actual number of leaders for this period was twenty-seven, the conclusion, based on the above-mentioned data and the model, is clear: turnover at the International level is lower than at the local level.

Why the Differences in Turnover?

Neither Michels nor any student of his theory had tried to differentiate leadership. So, we cannot rely on our original theoretical framework for an explanation of the differences in our findings. We can only offer a post hoc explanation. This explanation will be based on a classification of local leadership which accounts for the differences in turnover of the four offices.[1]

The first criterion for this classification is the type of the office: some can be defined as political while others are technical. We can assume that the turnover of political offices will be higher than that of the technical. The scarcity of technical skills among union members is a fact which reduces competition.

The second criterion is the amount of personal contact with local members. We assume that the more contact the leader has with his followers, the better are his chances of staying in power: a personal acquaintance

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[1]This classification resembles the one suggested by A. A. Cook, "Dual Government in Union - A Tool for Analysis," Industrial & Labor Relations Review, XV (April, 1962).

helps the incumbent officer retain the members' support.[1]

Table V-4 illustrates the four offices arranged
according to these two criteria, and shows the average
value of turnover for each position and for individuals
in these positions. The justification for placing each
position in a particular cell is based on two sources:
first, a content analysis of Article 39 of the U.A.W. Con-
stitution, which describes the functions of the President
and Vice President in terms of leading the members and the
functions of the Financial Secretary and the Recording
Secretary as dealing with technical matters; the second
source is general knowledge obtained through reading local
union material and interviewing local union leaders. Table
V-4 shows that the political offices are all higher in
their turnover than the technical offices. It also illus-
trates that those offices with few contacts are generally
higher in turnover than those with many contacts. The
Recording Secretary is lower than the President.

SPECIAL ELECTIONS

Fifty-eight locals held special elections during
the period of the study. A detailed analysis of these
fifty-eight locals reveals the picture presented in Table
V-5. This table shows that in almost 70 percent of the

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[1]An implied theoretical and empirical support to
this assumption can be found in Bavelas, "Communication
Patterns and Task Oriented Groups," in Cartright and Zander,
Group Dynamics, 1953. Individuals controlling communica-
tions are elected leaders.

TABLE V-4.—Means of officers by the type of the office
and the amount of personal contact with rank and
file members.

Amount of Personal Contact	Political Offices	Technical Offices
Many Contacts	President 3.14 (2.93)[a]	Financial Secretary 2.16 (2.06)
Few Contacts	Vice President 3.30 (3.21)	Recording Secretary 2.43 (2.36)

[a]Means of individuals

TABLE V-5.—Distribution of special elections by their
frequency.[a]

Number of Special Elections	Number of Locals Which Held Special Elections	Total Number of Officers Elected in Special Elections
One	31	31
Two	12	24
Three	10	30
Four to Six	5	23
Total	58	108

[a]Automatic movement of Vice President to the
Presidency is not included here.

locals only one or two special elections took place. This table however, does not relate the frequency of elections to the type of office. This is illustrated in Table V-6.

The figures in the last column of Table V-6 should be modified as they do not include the automatic movement of the vice president to the presidency. This movement has two effects: First, it changes the total number of presidents who were replaced at other than regular elections. Second, it changes the total number of vice presidents. As we have eighteen cases of automatic movement of vice president to the presidency, the numbers should read as follows:

1. Total number of presidents replaced at other than regular elections - 30.

2. Thirteen[1] vice presidents out of the forty-eight were elected because of the automatic movement of the previous vice president to the presidency (see Table V-8); therefore, instead of forty-eight we have only thirty-five vice presidents elected in special elections.

Even after these corrections, the vice presidency remains the most frequently turned over office, followed quite closely by the presidency. The recording secretary and the financial secretary are about the same insofar as the number of officers elected in special elections is concerned and remain lower than the presidency and the vice presidency.

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[1]The total number is fourteen. See Table V-8.

TABLE V-6--Frequency of special elections by the office.

Office	1 Election		2 Elections		3 Elections		Total	
	Number of Cases	Number of Officers	Number of Cases	Number of Officers	Number of Cases	Number of Officers	Number of Cases	Number of Officers
President[a]	9	9	0	0	1	3	10	12 (30)[b]
Vice President	25	25	10	20	1	3	36	48 (35)[c]
Recording Secretary	15	15	4	8	1	2	20	25
Financial Secretary	17	17	3	6	0	0	20	25
Total Number of Officers	66	66	17	34	3	8	85[d]	108

[a] These are cases when a new President was elected and the Vice President did not move up.

[b] The number after correction is 30, see text for explanation.

[c] The number after correction is 35, see text for explanation.

[d] This number of the total of cases, not to be confused with the number of locals (58) where they occurred.

PATTERNS OF RE-ELECTIONS

The material presented thus far has not revealed what happened to those elected in special elections. We can hypothesize that the majority of them will be re-elected when regular elections are held. The rationale is based on two points: (1) if one agrees to run in special elections, he is ready to serve, and will be ready to run again in the coming regular elections; (2) the incumbent officer has an advantage over new candidates.

Table V-7 presents the data related to this question. About 35 percent of all officers are not re-elected (36 out of 108). The highest figure is for Presidents--50 percent of those elected in special elections, when for some reason the vice president did not move to the office automatically, were not re-elected (6 out of 12). The second highest is the vice presidency: 36 percent were not re-elected. Twenty-seven percent (7 out of 26) of the recording secretaries and 26 percent (6 out of 23) financial secretaries were not re-elected.

The previous hypothesis concerning the incumbents' advantages is hardly supported by these results. We can only speculate that some candidates receive much greater support for special elections than for regular elections. It is clear, however, that this point needs further investigation; and the given data is not sufficient to draw conclusions.

TABLE V-7.--What happened to those officers who were elected in special elections, by office.

Officer	Total	Re-elected in the following elections	Not re-elected	Unknown[a]
All Four	108	68	36	4
President	12[b]	6	6	0
Vice President	47	28	17	2
Recording Secretary	26	19	7	0
Financial Secretary	23	15	6	2

[a]The special elections that took place in 1967 are included in this study; however, in these cases, the results were unknown at the time of data collection.

[b]These 12 cases represent situations when the Vice President did not move automatically to the presidency.

As mentioned earlier, when the president is unable to function, the vice president moves automatically into the vacancy. Table V-8 shows what happens in these cases. It is interesting to note that while 50 percent of the presidents elected in special elections were not re-elected (Table V-7), 55.6 percent (Table V-8) of the Vice Presidents were not re-elected.[1] Although this is not statistically significant, it indicates a trend. The office

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[1]We do not know however how many were not re-elected because they had decided not to run again.

TABLE V-8.--The results of the vice presidents' automatic
movement to the presidency.

	Total automatic movements.	New Vice President Elected	New Vice President Not Elected
Vice Presidents who moved up and were re-elected in the following elections.	7	6	1
Vice Presidents who moved up and were not re-elected.	10	7	3
Unknown[a]	1	1	0
Total	18[b]	14	4

[a]See footnote in Table V-7.

[b]This total of 18 relates to 17 locals: i.e. in one local it happened the automatic movement occurred twice and neither was re-elected President.

of the Vice President has two functions: (1) to assist the President in the performance of his duties; (2) to take over when the President is incapable of performing his duties. We found in our interviews that the assistance to the President is usually limited to replacing him when he is temporarily absent.

The question therefore arises: to what extent do voters, in choosing one vice president over another, take into consideration the fact that his potential duty is to replace the president. We do not have enough information to explore this question in depth, but the data suggests

that quite a few vice presidents, after moving to the presidency automatically, do not gain the confidence of the local members and are not re-elected.[1]

PATTERNS OF INNER MOBILITY

The term inner mobility will be used here to describe a situation when an individual has been elected to different offices, one after the other, or to the same office but not consecutively. Some indication about this phenomenon can be found in Table V-2, in the column of the differences between the total number of officers and the number of individuals occupying these offices. In this chapter we will discuss the differences between the total number of officers and the total number of individuals.

In sixty-four locals out of 100 some inner mobility occurred: in twenty-nine of these locals, one individual was involved, usually holding two different offices during the nine year period; in twenty-three cases, two individuals were involved; in eleven cases, three individuals experienced this mobility; and in one local, there were four individuals.

The patterns of movement are presented in Table V-9. Among the four officers studied here, the vice presidential office is the major source of new presidents:[2] more

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[1] Again we assume that they ran for office.

[2] The numbers in the Table do not include automatic movement of the vice president.

TABLE V-9.--Inner mobility patterns.[a]

Current Office	President	Vice Pres.	Recording Secretary	Financial Secretary	Total
Previous Office					
President(P.)	-	1 (5)	0 (6)	2 (3)	3 (14)
Vice President (V.P.)	23 (27)	-	1 (2)	2 (2)	26 (31)
Recording Secretary (R.S.)	6 (13)	5 (5)	-	4 (4)	15 (22)
Financial Secretary (F.S.)	4 (4)	4 (4)	1 (1)	-	9 (9)
Total	33 (44)	10 (14)	2 (9)	8 (9)	53 (76)

[a]The numbers in parentheses are the cases of total inner mobility, when the three and four steps of mobility are included. There are 11 cases of three steps of mobility, four of them are R.S.-P.-R.S., one of each of the following: R.S.-P.-V.P., V.P.-P.-R.S.-, V.P.-P.-V.P., V.P.-automatic P.-P.-V.P.-R.S., P.-R.S.-P., and one case of four steps, -V.P.-automatic P.-V.P.-P.

than 60 percent of new presidents came from this source. The contributions from the offices of recording and financial secretaries was much lower (30 percent and less than 1 percent respectively).

Very often the term mobility means "upward mobility". It is important for us to understand the significance of the term as it relates to the local union. The eight presidents who were interviewed answered questions about the

relative importance of the various positions.[1] Table
V-10 contains the analysis of their answers. The re-
sults suggest that the vice president and the financial
secretary are equally important mainly because the an-
swers of Local G's president deviate from the basic pat-
tern. It seems that the ranking order of: President,
Vice President, Financial Secretary, Recording Secretary,
reflect their relative importance fairly well.

TABLE V-10.--Analysis of presidents' answers about the
relative importance of the four offices.[a]

	Local	Presi-dent	Vice Presi-dent	Recor-ding Sec.	Finan-cial Sec.
High	A	4	3	2	1
High	B	4	3	1	2
Turn-	C	4	1	2	3
Over	D	4	3	1	2
Total		16	10	6	8
Low	E	4	3	1	2
Low	F	4	1	3	2
Turn-	G	3	1	2	4
Over	H	4	3	1	2
Total		15	8	7	10
Total Rating		31	18	13	18

[a]Presidents were asked to grade each office in terms
of its importance. A descending scale: 4, 3, 2, 1 was used
with 4 representing the most important office.

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[1]See Appendix C for a detailed description of the
questionnaire.

On the basis of this order of importance, the fig-
ures in Table V-9 were rearranged in Table V-11 so that
the upper left side represents upward mobility while the
lower right side represents the downward mobility. The
results indicate that most (forty-six) mobility cases with-
in the local are upward, as compared with only seven cases
of downward mobility. When we add the three and four steps
of mobility the upward cases are fifty-seven, and the down-
ward are nineteen. These results enable us to examine the
framework suggested as an explanation of the higher turnover
rates of president and vice president as compared to the
recording and financial secretary. Assuming the existence
of these two groups, we can hypothesize greater mobility
within each group then from one group to another.

TABLE V-11.--Rearrangement of mobility patterns to examine
upward and downward mobility.[a]

Previous Office	Current Office Presi-dent	Vice Pres.	Recording Secretary	Financial Secretary
Recording Secretary	6 (13)	5 (5)	4 (4)	-
Financial Secretary	4 (4)	4 (4)	-	1 (1)
Vice President	23 (27)	-	2 (2)	1 (2)
President	-	1 (5)	2 (3)	0 (6)

[a]Numbers in parentheses represent total cases of
inner mobility, as in Table V-9.

Table V-12 tests this hypothesis which cannot be proven statistically. The reason for this can be that the technical skills required for the offices of Financial Secretary and Recording Secretary are not interchangeable, while, on the other hand, the possession of the same technical skills and the experience acquired by serving in these two positions can be of value when moving to the political-type positions of President and Vice President.

TABLE V-12.--Mobility between groups of offices.[a]

Previous Office	Current Office		
	Pres. and Vice Pres.	Recording Sec. and Financial Sec.	Total
President and Vice President	24 (32)	5 (13)	29 (45)
Recording Secretary and Financial Secretary	19 (26)	5 (5)	24 (31)
Total	43 (58)	10 (18)	53 (76)

$X^2 = .1106$; $P < .80$; $(X^2) = 1.6534$; $(P) < .20$.

[a]Numbers in parentheses include three and four steps mobility.

SUMMARY

The findings presented in this chapter should be used for two purposes. The first is to determine their relation to our theoretical framework. The second purpose is to analyze special elections and mobility in order to determine

their impact on turnover.

Turnover was defined as leadership changes, regardless of whether these occurred through regular elections, special elections or automatic movement. Although special elections took place in fifty-eight out of one hundred locals, their impact on turnover in terms of their contribution to the number of changes is relatively small (less than 10 percent of the total changes occurred as a result of special elections). Eighteen changes were as results of automatic movement, and these plus the special election changes total 11.4 percent of the officers who came into power by other than regular elections. Furthermore, as the data shows, about 65 percent of those elected in special elections were re-elected in the regular elections; therefore, the actual contribution of special elections and automatic movement to the total turnover is even smaller (only thirty-six cases).

The amount of mobility is not directly related to the amount of turnover because, according to the definition used in this study, the same rate of turnover can have different rates of mobility. However, we must consider mobility in our analysis, otherwise the relationships with which we are concerned will include an additional dimension which we do not intend to study.

Our analysis shows 125 cases of mobility. This number is not high enough to justify the modification of

our analysis of turnover because of it.

We can conclude that although the mechanisms and organizational processes of special elections and mobility are important, their impact on the rate of turnover in this study does not require modification of our treatment of turnover and its structural variables.

CHAPTER VI

STRUCTURAL VARIABLES AND TURNOVER

This chapter includes the testing of our hypotheses
and concepts drawn in Chapter II. Each of the variables
will be related to the turnover of the different offices,
and then the relationship of each concept to the phenom-
enon of turnover will be discussed.

FORMALIZATION

Table VI-1 contains the correlations between the
formalization variables and the turnover of different
officers.[1] Only the measures of membership size and rate
of growth, as found and explained in Chapter IV, are pre-
sented.

Hypotheses F1, the older the local the lower the
turnover, is supported by the findings.[2] The negative

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[1]The correlation to be used, unless otherwise
specified, is Kendall Rank Order Correlation (Tau).

[2]The question of how high the correlation and sig-
nificance should be, in order to support a hypotheses is
a difficult one. In the textbooks, any correlation lower
than .50 is termed a "weak correlation". However, any
correlation, when its one-tail significance is better than
the standard .05 level, is considered as an indication of
relationship. Empirical studies of our type usually yield
correlations of about -.30 to .30, and even those are rare.
We suggest therefore to accept a correlation as supporting

TABLE VI-1.--Correlations of turnover and formalization variables.[a]

Variables: Officers	Size of Membership	Age	Rate of Growth of Membership TAU	R[b]
All four	-.15 (.01)	-.28 (.005)	.08 (.11)	.22
President	-.11 (.05)	-.24 (.005)	.04 (.29)	.03
Vice President	-.03 (.32)	-.22 (.005)	.11 (.06)	.20
Recording Secretary	-.10 (.08)	-.08 (.13)	.10 (.06)	.18
Financial Secretary	-.14 (.02)	-.10 (.07)	-.01 (.46)	.12

[a]The numbers in parentheses are the One Tail Significance Level.

[b]Simple Correlations

correlation indicates that the older the local, the less turnover it will experience. This is true when we consider the total number of officers, the President and the Vice President. Both correlation and significance drop substantially for the Recording and Financial Secretaries.

These findings support our previous suggestion of the division of the local leadership into two groups. We will see in the forthcoming discussion that various

a hypothesis when it is higher than .10 and its one-tail significance is .05 or better. This guideline is subjected to the same reasoning stated on page 40, footnote 3.

variables influence the various offices differently.[1]

As none of the theoretical frameworks used in this study differentiate among different types of leaders, explanations of such differences will be post hoc.

Age is considered a major factor in the creation of organizational and behavioral patterns. As the organization grows older, many of its facets are institutionalized and, thus, the leaders can avoid unnecessary conflicts and can engage in activities which will help them to be re-elected. Following this reasoning, we can expect age to influence turnover. However, the technical leaders whose patterns of activities are established at the organization's creation, are less influenced by age, as compared to the political leaders.

We classified the Financial Secretary and the Recording Secretary as technical officers in our discussion in Chapter V, and the lower influence in their case is therefore understandable.

Hypothesis F2: the bigger the local, the lower the turnover, is statistically supported and we conclude that with the exception of the Vice Presidency, the larger locals have lower turnover. The office of the

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[1]Correlation, as a rule, does not imply causal relationship. However, under certain conditions, when it is possible to assume only one direction of relationships, as in the case of age and turnover, we will use the term influence. In other cases, when the relation cannot be interpreted as being one-way, we will use the term relate.

Financial Secretary seems to be more clearly related to the variable of size then the other three offices: the job is directly related to the "amount of money" involved which, being almost equivalent to the income of the local, is directly related to the size of the membership as discussed in Chapter IV. As the local grows, the functions of the Financial Secretary become more and more complex and require higher technical skills. These skills are rare among local members, and the one and natural way to acquire them is by experience. Therefore, the longer a Financial Secretary stays in office the better will be his performance. The voting member, well aware of this fact, tends to re-elect him. It was also established (in Chapter V) that the stability of the Financial Secretary is the highest among the four offices.

Hypothesis F3 suggests direct relationship between growth rate and turnover. Membership growth infers the influx of new members causing instability and new problems, and, in these cases we assume a higher leadership turnover. Acceptance or rejection of this hypothesis depends on the statistics used.[1] The non-parametric correlation suggests a low relation for the Vice President and the Recording Secretary and no relation for the others. With the exception of the President, the parametric statistics support the hypothesis.

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[1]When only Tau correlation is presented, it implies that the other statistical methods yield about the same results.

The local presidents interviewed in this study all argued strongly that the growth rate is related to the turnover rate. We therefore accept the results of the parametric statistics and the hypothesis that with the exception of the President, higher officer turnover is related to higher rates of growth. Based on the socio-psychological approach we can speculate that presidential turnover is not related to the growth rate while turnover rates of the other offices is related to it. The influx of new people introduces new ideas and attitudes into the local, but for these new people, the president represents the union and the benefits for which they joined. So, although they attempt to bring about changes, they still want the president to remain in power.

As we have shown, age, size, and growth with some exceptions seem to be significant factors when related to turnover. However, the analysis thus far has yielded only the direct relationship between each separate variable and turnover. In other words, it has shown how good each variable is as a predictor of turnover.

It is important to know how the concept of formalization is related to turnover,[1] and how much of its

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[1]The importance of this analysis can be illustrated by studying Grusky's theory ("Corporate Size") and its criticism by G. Gordon and S. Becker, "Organizational Size and Organizational Succession--A Re-Examination," American Journal of Sociology, LXX (1964), 212-223. Grusky tested his hypotheses concerning the relationship between size and succession by using X^2 on tables containing information about organizational size and succession. A table

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variability can be accounted for by all the variables
together.[1]

In this study, a variety of Least Squares[2] pro-
grams was used to find these relationships. The purpose
of these calculations was to assess the contribution of
all the variables and their relative importance accor-
ding to the statistics of Multiple Correlation. Our
study contains fourteen variables which can be used in
the Least Square programs.[3] Table VI-2 contains the in-
formation about the relationship between turnover and these
variables.

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was constructed for the positions of Board Chairman, Pres-
ident, Treasurer, Comptroller and Secretary. The signi-
ficance levels of his findings corresponding to these
positions are: $P<.30$; $P<.25$; $P<.15$; $P<.35$; $P<.05$.
His second sample does not suggest much better results, and
all of them are far below any standard level of acceptance.
He argues, however, that it was the multiple comparison and
the replication which provided a basis of confidence in the
existence of a relationship between size and succession
(1961, p. 263, footnote 9), but does not explain how it was
practically done. Gordon and Becker, in a replication of
Grusky's study using Multiple Correlation Analysis, prove
that the size factor (both sales and employees) explains
less than 1 percent of the phenomenon of succession.

[1]A close estimate of the contribution of each vari-
able to the variability of turnover can be obtained by the
R^2 or Tau^2. Only correlations about .32 yield an R^2 which
accounts for more than 10 percent of the variability. None
of our findings is that high.

[2]See statistical and computer reference section.

[3]These fourteen variables are: Membership, Income,
Age, Membership Growth Rate, Income Growth Rate, Number of
Units in the Local, Total Payments to Employees and Offi-
cers not under study, Total Payments to the Four Officers
under study, Payments to each Officer, Community Index, and

TABLE VI-2.--Overall statistics--turnover and the fourteen structural variables.

Statistics Officers	Multiple Correlation Coefficient[a] R	Coefficient of Determination R^2	Level of Signifi-cance P
All Four	.58	.34	.001
President	.41	.17	.253
Vice President	.57	.33	.001
Recording Secretary	.42	.18	.231
Financial Secretary	.43	.18	.193

[a]The Multiple Correlation Coefficient does not indicate the direction of the relationship, as it is computated $R = \sqrt{R^2}$.

Column 2 in the Table--R^2 or the Coefficient of Determination[1]--reveals that these fourteen independent variables account for 17 percent to 34 percent of the

Total Resources of the Local. For a detailed description of the variables see Appendix B. When considering the total effect of the independent variables of this study, we should remember that there are four other variables which are not included in the Least Squares calculations: Type of the Local, Facilities, Newspaper, Company.

[1]R^2--the coefficient of determination can be defined as "the proportion of the sum of the square deviation from the mean of the dependent variable accounted for by the independent variable". Michigan State University--Calculations of Least Squares. Description No. 7, p. 5-6.

variability of turnover, depending on the office. We will see however, that a substantial portion of the variability can be explained by fewer variables, because then relative contributions differ greatly.

Using the same statistical method, but considering only five variables of formalization,[1] we find the results presented in Table VI-3. This table reveals that 9 percent to 17 percent of the variation of turnover for

TABLE VI-3.--Multiple correlation of formalization variables and turnover.[a]

Statistics Officers	Multiple Correlation Coefficient R	Coefficient of Determination R^2	Significance Level P
All Four	.42	.17	.005
President	.31	.10	.08
Vice President	.35	.12	.03
Recording Secretary	.30	.09	.11
Financial Secretary	.20	.04	.56

[a]The formalization variables in the equation include size (membership and income); age; rates of growth (membership and income).

[1]Income size and rate of growth are included in this calculation although omitted elsewhere because a variable, unless its correlation with other variables is 1.00, still contributes something to the explanation, and therefore should be included in calculations.

President, Vice President and Recording Secretary can be explained by variables of formalization, when grouped together. The percentage drops to 4 percent in the case of the Financial Secretary.

The theoretical framework of this study implied that the concept of formalization would account for a substantial portion of turnover. We expected a higher contribution than we found. The question is whether we can identify a factor which might decrease the potential contribution of the concept. It seems that such a factor, which was found relevant in the case of the U.A.W. and was labeled "instant bureaucracy" could also be relevant to other organizations with the same patterns of relations between headquarters and the sub-units.

This pattern of relations is directed toward facilitating the adjustment of new locals to their organizational environment, and enabling their leaders to perform their functions efficiently. The International's mechanisms for implementation of this instant bureaucracy are:

1. The International Constitution which includes detailed specifications for newly established local as to structure, leadership, financial structure, and relations with other organizations.

2. The requirement that the local write its own bylaws, or adopt the relevant chapter from the Constitution,

and follow the "master bylaws" pattern.[1]

4. A close follow-up of all the local's activities by a
    representative of the International.

These mechanisms,and the intensity of their appli-
cation influence the development of phenomenon such as
stabilization of behavioral patterns, establishment of
standard operating procedures, division of labor, rou-
tinization of communication and allocation of responsi-
bilities and resources. The impact of these mechanisms
minimizes the influence of variables such as size and
age on the development of the same phenomena. This is
a manifestation of the formalization concept, as al-
ready discussed in the theoretical chapter.

In other words, we can argue that in organiza-
tions where the relations between headquarters and sub-
units are not subject to the mechanisms of "instant bur-
eaucracy," size, age and other variables of formaliza-
tion will account for a high proportion of turnover.

Most facets of instant bureaucracy are related to
the technical aspects of leading the local union. This
accounts for the even smaller contribution of formaliza-
tion to the explanation of the turnover of the technical
officers--the Recording Secretary and the Financial Secre-
tary.

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[1]The bylaws of the eight locals which were inter-
viewed were closely scrutinized, and a "master example" is
recognizable in them.

We can now conclude our discussion of the variables and concept of formalization. With few exceptions, all three hypotheses, F1, F2, and F3, are supported by the data. Examination of the variables' contribution to our understanding of turnover rate differences reveals that, although each variable by itself can account for only a small portion of the variation, all the five variables together account for 4 percent to 17 percent of the variation.

COMPLEXITY

Hypothesis C1 states that as the number of units in the local increases, turnover decreases. This is supported by Column 1 of Table VI-4[1], except for the Recording Secretary, as well as by the results presented in Table VI-5.[2] Based on these results, we can accept hypothesis C1.

The hypothesis is derived from Michels' theory which suggests that when organizational complexity

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[1]The variables of complexity will be analyzed by correlation and multiple correlation. Some variables which cannot be analyzed by these statistics, because they are not in a continuous order, will be analyzed by One Way Analysis of Variance.

[2]The "number of units" includes the dichotomy between single-unit and amalgamated-locals, but contains more information about the number of units. However, the correlation calculations might be biased by the distribution of locals by units: 72 are single-unit locals; 16 locals have 2 units; 2 locals have 3, 2 have 5, 2 have 9, and 6 locals have from 10 to 99 units.

increases the stability of its leaders increases too. A
specific explanation of this complexity variable seems to
emerge from the nature of the political struggle in the
amalgamated local as compared to the single-unit local.
The politics in the amalgamated local takes place at two
different levels--the unit level, where each unit has its
own leadership and the local level where the leadership
of the entire local is elected.

When we examined the intensity of the political
struggle in the amalgamated local, we found the unit level
struggle much stronger and more meaningful to the members
than the struggle at the amalgamated local level.[1] One
indication of this phenomenon can be found in election
results. Our interviews and analysis of election results
show that the total votes cast for officers of the units
is higher than the total votes cast for officers of the
local union. The number of votes can serve as an index
of apathy, and we can conclude that members are more apa-
thetic toward election of officers in the amalgamated lo-
cal than toward the election of officers in their immed-
iate unit. According to Michels, apathy is related to
turnover and we should expect to find lower turnover where
there is higher apathy: and this is our finding--lower
turnover in the amalgamated local.

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[1] Interviews and analysis of election data in about
5 amalgamated locals were used in this examination.

TABLE VI-4.--Correlations of turnover and complexity variables.[a]

Variables Officers	No. of units in the Local	Total Resources	Total Payments to Employees
All Four	-.21 (.005)	-.17 (.005)	-.12 (.04)
President	-.28 (.005)	-.14 (.02)	-.15 (.01)
Vice President	-.16 (.01)	-.08 (.13)	-.02 (.40)
Recording Secretary	-.02 (.37)	-.06 (.18)	-.04 (.26)
Financial Secretary	-.15 (.01)	-.13 (.03)	-.08 (.12)

[a]For an explanation of this variable see footnote 2 page 83. The numbers in parentheses are the significance level of the Tau correlations coefficient.

Other factors contributing to the stability of the amalgamated local leadership are the advantages of the incumbent officer, which are much greater in the case of the amalgamated. Because of the geographical dispersion of the units, the incumbent officer is fully exposed to the members, while this exposure is very costly, and sometimes impossible for a new candidate.[1]

Hypothesis C2 deals with the resources of the local.

[1]This discussion excludes the Recording Secretary, as the type of local does not influence him.

TABLE VI-5.--Average number of officers and type of local.

Type of Local Officers	Single Unit Local	Amalgamated Local	Level of Signi- ficance P[a]
All Four	11.5	9.8	.01
President	3.3	2.6	.01
Vice President	3.4	2.9	.10
Recording Secretary	2.4	2.4	.85
Financial Secretary	2.3	1.9	.10

[a]These are results of parametric one way analysis of variance.

The three variables are: total resources, facilities, a newspaper. Table VI-4, Table VI-6 and Table VI-7 present the findings. The total resources variable is negatively correlated with turnover, which means that more resources are related with less turnover, when dealing with all four officers, the president, and the vice-president. Facilities (Table VI-6) have no relationship whatsoever to turnover. With the exception of the vice president, newspapers seem to be related to turnover (Table VI-7) and their publication is related to smaller turnover.

The findings related to hypothesis C2 are in accordance with the analysis and explanation suggested by Lipset (et al) and discussed in our theoretical framework: the

TABLE VI-6.—Average number of officers and the existence
of facilities.[a]

Officers	With Facilities	Without Facilities	Level of Significance P
All Four	10.7	11.3	.46
President	2.9	3.3	.54
Vice President	3.4	3.3	.53
Recording Secretary	3.4	2.5	.93
Financial Secretary	2.0	2.3	.41

[a]A third group of 6 locals acquired facilities during the period of the study, and were not included in this analysis.

TABLE VI-7.—Average number of officers and the existence
of a newspaper.

Officers	With Newspaper	Without Newspaper	Level of Significance P
All Four	10.4	11.5	.07
President	2.9	3.3	.16
Vice President	3.4	3.2	.47
Recording Secretary	3.1	2.6	.04
Financial Secretary	1.9	2.4	.04

control of resources and communication networks makes it easier for the incumbent officer to stay in power and more difficult for a new candidate to enter and win the race.

The exception of the facilities variable is a result of its definition in this study. The definition ignored the differences of value of the facilities—and amount of control the local has over them. We assume that a definition and analysis which will include these aspects will reveal a relationship between facilities and turn-over.

The hypothesis dealing with the relationship between resources and turnover includes three variables, and as we do not have statistical methods to weigh them, its acceptance is based on our earlier discussion.

Hypothesis C3 states that higher payments to the employees of the local are related to lower local leadership turnover. The test results of this hypotheses are presented in Table VI-4 column 3 and except for the president and total officers do not support the hypothesis. The explanation may lie in the distribution of the variables as shown in Table IV-7.

The analysis of the complexity variables, when grouped together, by multiple correlation, is presented in Table VI-8. As this table suggests, the contribution of the complexity concept to the statistical explanation

TABLE VI-8.--Multiple correlation of complexity variables and turnover.[a]

Statistics Officers	Multiple Correlation Coefficient R	Coefficient of Determination R^2	Significance Level P
All Four	.26	.07	.07
President	.25	.06	.10
Vice President	.22	.05	.20
Recording Secretary	.15	.02	.52
Financial Secretary	.12	.02	.68

[a]The complexity variables in the equation include: number of units; total payments to employees; total resources of the local. The other two variables, facilities and newspaper, are not included because they are not in a continuous order and could not be analyzed in multiple correlation.

of turnover is lower than that of formalization.[1]

As in the case of formalization, we expected a higher contribution of the concept than was actually found. The reason for the lower contribution seems to be the exclusion of two basic measures of complexity from our analysis. The first one is the demographic complexity. A careful comparison of the eight interviewed locals shows very

[1]The addition of the contribution of the facilities and newspaper, which are not included in the calculations because of statistical reasons, does not seem to change the results substantially.

few items which differentiate between locals with high turnover from those with low turnover. However, one clear factor does emerge in all four locals with high turnover: the heterogeneity of its members.

In two locals, it is the age distribution of the members,[1] another local has a majority of female workers, and the fourth has a tremendous influx of high school students into the local during the summer months.

The second measure, the number of issues faced by the local, is highly related to the measure of demographic complexity. The existence of many issues implies the high degree of segmentation. The existence of a higher number of issues in an organization will increase the probability of the existence of many different groups within it.

We now can conclude our discussion of the variables and concept of complexity. Two of the hypotheses, C1 and C2 were accepted, and C3 was rejected. We found that the contribution of the concept to the statistical explanation of turnover is substantially lower than that of formalization, due to the exclusion of two important measures, and, again the offices of the Recording Secretary and the Financial Secretary are much less influenced by this concept.

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[1]The importance of members' ages was recognized early in the study, and Professor Daniel Kruger strongly suggested its inclusion. However, it was impossible to collect data relating to this subject. On the same subject see the Washington Post, July 6, 1969, "Apathy Splits Labor's Ranks".

ATTRACTIVENESS

Hypothesis Al states that higher payments to offi-
cers are related to lower turnover. The findings presen-
ted in Table VI-9 support the hypothesis. However, there
is some information which should be introduced and weigh-
ed before evaluating the variables and concept of attrac-
tiveness.

First, the statistical analysis is subject to the
limitation of the distribution of these variables (see
Table IV-8.)

Second, our interviews with locals' presidents
reveal two basic opinions. All agreed that the material
compensations of leadership, whether for a full time job
or for "lost-time", is in no way proportionate to the
amount of time and effort invested. Table IV-8 clearly
indicates the level of compensation to local leaders, and
supports the above opinion.

The interviewers also emphasized that the real
attractiveness of leadership offices rests in its non-
materialistic compensation.

Our study is directed toward "explaining" organi-
zational turnover through the use of variables which is
a limiting factor. This limitation is more clearly empha-
sized in the case of attractiveness. The partiality of
materialistic compensation as a measure of attractiveness
has already been discussed. Statistically, as indicated

in Column Tau^{2^1} of Table VI-9 its contribution to the explanation of turnover is very low.

Although the hypothesis A1 was supported statistically, the previous discussion shows that the concept of attractiveness needs the modification and elaboration which measures of non-materialistic compensation add.

TABLE VI-9.--Turnover and payments to officers.

| Officers | Payments to Officers | | |
	Tau Correlation	Level of Significance P	Tau^2
All Four	-.19	.005	.04
President	-.21	.005	.04
Vice President	-.11	.05	.01
Recording Secretary	-.12	.04	.01
Financial Secretary	-.18	.005	.03

EXTERNAL ELEMENTS

The influence of environment or external elements, will be examined on three different levels. The first is

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[1]Multiple correlation cannot be used in this case, as we assume no relation between the payment to a particular officer and the turnover of others. This assumption is supported by the pattern of mobility discussed in Chapter V. We will therefore use Tau^2 which is the coefficient of determination and which will show the contribution of a specific officer's payment to the turnover rate of the same officer.

the immediate environment, the company with which the local has a labor agreement. Hypothesis E1 states that the company is related to turnover and the findings are presented by using two grouping systems in Table VI-10. The first grouping and analysis consists of the Big Three, when compared with all others.[1] The second is all locals other than the Big Three when compared separately to each of the Big Three, and the Big Three compared among themselves. As Table VI-10 indicates, no significant relations whatsoever exist between the company and turnover and, therefore, we reject the hypothesis.

Hypothesis E2 states the relations between the second level of the environment (the community) and turnover: the smaller the community factor, the lower will be the turnover. In our study, this factor is measured by the community index, which is the community population adjusted by the number of blue collar workers and the size of the local. Table VI-11 presents the correlates of the community index and the turnover of officers. The findings do not support our hypothesis; therefore, we reject hypothesis E2.

Hypothesis E3(a) states the relations between rates of turnover and different years (the time dimension). The results are presented in Table VI-12 and VI-13. The

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[1]For the rationale of this grouping, see footnote 1 p. 45.

TABLE VI-10.--Average number of officers by the company.[a]

Company Officers	Others	All Big Three	P	General Motors	Chrysler	Ford	P
All Four	11.2	11.0	.72	12.2	9.9	10.3	.32
President	3.2	3.1	.86	3.3	3.2	1.7	.24
Vice President	3.2	3.6	.15	4.0	3.1	3.3	.19
Recording Secretary	2.4	2.4	.93	2.6	2.1	2.7	.80
Financial Secretary	2.2	2.1	.61	2.3	1.5	2.7	.24

[a]One Way Analysis of Variance (parametric).

TABLE VI-11.--Correlations of turnover and community index.

Officers	Tau Correlation	Level of Significance P
All Four	(-).03	.31
President	.02	.36
Vice President	(-).04	.29
Secording Secretary	(-).07	.15
Financial Secretary	(-).06	.18

TABLE VI-12.--Numbers of new elected officers by the year:
I (Regular Elections Only).

Officers	Total	1961	1963	1965	1967
All Four	454	105	117	114	118
President	146	33	44	35	34
Vice President	147	31	36	45	35
Recording Secretary	89	20	20	17	32
Financial Secretary	72	21	17	17	17

$X^{(2)} = 10.541$
Df. = 9
$P < .50$

TABLE VI-13.--Number of new elected officers by the year:
II (Regular Elections Only).

Officers	Total	1960	1962	1964	1966
All Four	113	27	32	24	30
President	36	10	7	10	9
Vice President	33	5	10	8	10
Recording Secretary	23	5	10	3	5
Financial Secretary	21	7	5	3	6

$X^2 = 7.865$
Df. = 9
$P < .70$

assumption is that changes in the environment are reflected in the flow of time. For example, changes in unemployment rates are related to time and place. Based on this assumption, we calculated the tables so that they represent not only all the officers who were replaced in each regular election, but also, each officer separately.[1]

The results of both tables indicate that no relationship exists, and we therefore reject hypothesis E3(a).

Hypothesis E3(b) states the relationship between negotiation years and rates of turnover. Table VI-14 examines these relations by comparing the number of turnover cases to the number of non-turnover cases in either the contract expiration year or one year later.[2] This hypothesis, too, is rejected.

Although the statistical findings reject the hypotheses, we do not feel that the original assumption concerning the relationship between external elements--environment--and turnover should be disregarded. The fact which seems to account for these findings is the sample itself: U.A.W. locals in Michigan. We have already discussed some of the characteristics of the relationships

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[1]In this case we had to treat locals with four or five elections separately, and therefore we constructed two tables. Special elections were also calculated separately (they are not shown here) and their P's are $< .70$, $< .50$.

[2]In this case no distinction was made between regular and special elections. The information in Table VI-14 is based on twenty-nine cases (see Appendix A).

TABLE VI-14.--Distribution of changes of officers as
occurred in the same year of the new labor con-
tract or a year later.

Officers	Total	Turnover	No Turnover
All Four	216	79	137
President	54	25	29
Vice President	54	21	33
Recording Secretary	54	16	38
Financial Secretary	54	17	37

$$X^2 = 4.05$$
$$Df = 3$$
$$P < .50$$

between U.A.W. locals and Headquarters when we discussed
the concept of formalization. These relations enhance the
organizational uniformity of the locals, and reduce the
potential impact of the environment.

An organization's interrelation with its environ-
ment is limited mainly by the scarcity of resources. The
decision of the organization to interact with other organ-
izations is partly free choice and partly a result of
functional necessity (union-management). The U.A.W. con-
stitution dictates some of the organizations with which the
local should interact and therefore reduces its potential

free choice interrelations.[1] These dictated relations are with other U.A.W. or Labor organizations, and therefore the potential influence of the community on the local is reduced.

As all locals in the sample are in the same line of industry, even if some differences exist among them, they are nullified by the unifying impact of U.A.W. affiliation.[2]

The location of all locals in Michigan subjects them to similar social, economical and demographic characteristics. Because Solidarity House, the U.A.W. Headquarters, is located in Detroit, Michigan, the Headquarter sub-unit relationship is also intensified.

We conclude therefore, that in spite of the statistical results rejecting the hypothesized relations between turnover and the environment, the usefulness of the concept seems valid and worthy of further study.

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[1]U.A.W. International Constitution Article 36, Sections 1 and 2: "It shall be mandatory. . . for all local unions. . . to affiliate with. . ."

[2]See, for instance, differences in turnover of Presidents in Table VI-10. Note however, that none of the results in the Table is significant.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The basic assumption of this study is the relationship between structural variables and the phenomenon of leadership turnover. The first consideration in constructing the theoretical framework for examination of this assumption is its relevance to the phenomenon of turnover and to the type of organization in which it is found.

We assume that application of Michels' theory, although it deals with the leadership of national political parties, will provide a theoretical framework for the study of local unions. We also assume that "stability of leadership", can be expressed in terms of turnover rates.

We have supported Michels' theory in relation to the International level, and our findings relating to the local level indicate the same direction. We have found however, that the contribution of various concepts to the explanation of turnover is lower than expected: in some cases based on our statistical results, we rejected the hypotheses although the theoretical argumentation seemed valid. We also found that the different independent variables

influenced the four leaders in different ways.

Our approach was a formalistic one and therefore dictated other stages of the study. However, we opened the door from the beginning to the socio-psychological explanation.

We suggest a combined approach to this study. If we want to study the organization in depth and to understand its functioning in real life, we not only have to study each of these aspects thoroughly but also have to study the interrelations of the formal and informal aspects as well.

We realized and noted that some of our "explanations" to some of the findings in the study seemed speculative (especially in the context of a formalistic study).

We propose to interpret these findings by modifying Michels' theory with the addition of the type of relations between the headquarters and the sub unit of the organization under study, and a differentiation of leadership.

The type of relations between the headquarter and the sub units was first introduced during the discussion of the formalization concept. We suggested that the headquarter applies different mechanisms in order to facilitate the effective functioning of new locals. From the viewpoint of the headquarter, these mechanisms serve two purposes, socialization and control, both of which are aimed at shaping not only the organizational structure

of the local but also the behavior of its members. The low impact of formalization and complexity, and the nullified impact of the external elements proves the effectiveness of these mechanisms and their application insofar as the U.A.W. is concerned. These mechanisms, which facilitate local bureaucratization through the rapid creation of patterns of behavior and solutions to problems also reduce turnover and some of its components.

The second modification is the differentiation of leadership. Our first suggestion to differentiate between leaders according to the Type A-Type B organizations is insufficient, and additional differentiation of leadership is required. The proposed differentiation is based on the finding of different turnover rates for different leaders, a finding which was consistent not only throughout our study but also throughout Appelbaum's study as well. Our tentative criterion for leadership differentiation is the type of decision required by the office. We termed those made by the president and the vice president as political, and those made by the financial and recording secretaries as technical.

In summary, the two major contributions of our study to the organizational theory are:

1. Questioning the concept of leadership as a homogeneous group, and introducing the necessity in differentiation between various types of leaders.

2. Establishing the importance of the relation-
ship between headquarters and sub-units when behavioral
phenomena in the sub-unit are being studied.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Two major limitations of this study emerged while
analysing the data: the selection of variables and the
selection of sample locals. The limitation of the selec-
ted variables is twofold:

1. It was found that some rather important formal
variables had not been considered, for example: age of
members, skills distribution of members, statistical re-
sults of elections, and runoff elections analysis. We
recognise the impossibility of including all of them in
this study; however, post hoc, some of those structural
variables which were excluded seem more important than
some of those we have included.

2. It became clear that exclusive use of formal
variables and formal expressions of phenomena obscures
the problem and biases the relationship among its vari-
ables.

To overcome these limitations, we suggest that fur-
there investigation be directed toward:

1. Replication of this study aimed at testing the
theoretical structure as suggested. This replication
should include locals of different internationals and

different geographical locations.

2. Based on the above, or independently, other formal variables and concepts should be included. Data dealing with unemployment rates, rejection of contracts by rank and file members, and other similar elements must be examined as to its influence on turnover.

3. The most important and, in terms of achievement, the most difficult modification is to integrate the socio-psychological concepts and variables with the conceptual framework, so that the research produces a more realistic picture of the organization. It is true, however, that this integration can be accomplished only when both approaches are better equipped in terms of theories and analytical tools.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

POPULATION AND THE SAMPLE

The process of sampling for this study includes two facets: the time and the locals.

SAMPLING OF TIME

Because of the type of problem, the longer the period covered by the study the better the results. As the study's basic source of information is reports of the locals in accordance with the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, the period of the study was set to be 1959 - 1967. 1968 was not included as reports were not yet available for the public when the data was collected. Consistent data on turnover prior to 1959 was not available.

SAMPLING OF LOCALS

After it was decided to include only locals of Michigan because of the limited resources of the study, the next step was to decide what locals to select: (1) from various International unions; (2) from one International.

There are two basic advantages of selecting locals

association with one International:

1. By this method one seemingly important variable, the relationship between the locals and the International, can be controlled (at least to some extent).

2. In some cases, another important variable, the type of industry, can also be controlled.

On the basis of these two points, we decided to select locals of one International.

The United Auto Workers was selected for the following reasons:

1. The International constitution includes the local by-laws, thus introducing an element of uniformity or control of more variables. These bylaws specify such items as the officers, their functions, and election procedures.

2. In the process of collecting data, we learned that the U.A.W. International has attempted to improve the paper work of its locals, and has improved the accounting system.

After deciding the period of time and the International to be studied, the stratified random sample was drawn. Using issues published in 1960, 1964, and 1968 of the "Register of Reporting Labor Organizations," an official publication of the U.S. Department of Labor, it was possible to identify locals which reported during the

period of 1959-1967.[1]

Based on U.A.W. convention information, these 275 locals were divided according to size of membership into six groups. The basis for the division was the total number of votes of each local.[2] The same source also afforded information regarding the type of each local (single or amalgamated). The size of the sample was set at 100. All locals in groups five and six were included in the sample. Of the others, a randomly stratified sample by size and type of local, has been drawn. Table A-1 is a summary of the information relevant to the sampling.

THE SUB-SAMPLES

Two sub-samples which were drawn from the main sample were used in the study.

The Eight Locals Sample

Of the original 100 locals, eight were selected for interviews the intent being to study closely the extreme cases of turnover. With total turnover figures as the criterion, the four highest and the four lowest were selected. Table A-2 represents some of the characteristics of the sub-sample.

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[1]There were roughly 300 U.A.W. locals in Michigan, and about 1264 throughout the U.S.A. in 1965 (source: Directory of National and International Local Union, 1965). It was found later, in 1969, that three of the 100 locals in the sample ceased to exist.

[2]See U.A.W. constitution, 1959, page 17, article 8 Section 7. This provision has not been changed since then.

TABLE A-1.—Population and Sample

		POPULATION (U.A.W. locals in Michigan)					SAMPLE			
No. of No.Votes	Mem-ber. Size	Total No.of Locals	Percen-tage of Locals	Single Unit Locals	Amalg. Locals	Percen-tage of Am-alg.locals	Total No.of Locals	Percen-tage of Locals Group	Single Unit Locals	Amalg. Locals
1. 1	-149	79	28.7	65	14	17.7	25	31.6	21	4
2. 2-5	150-549	83	30.2	69	14	16.8	27	32.5	22	5
3. 6-10	550-1049	39	14.1	27	12	30.7	13	33.3	9	4
4. 11-50	1050-5049	57	20.7	41	16	28	18	31.6	13	5
5. 51-100	5050-10049	11	4	5	6	54.5	11	100	5	6
6. 101+	10050+	6	2.2	2	4	66.6	6	100	2	4
Total		275	100	209	66	24	100	36.4	72	28

TABLE A-2.--Comparison of the 8 interviewed locals.

Group	Variable Average No. of Officers	Average Age	Average Size Member-ship	Number of Amalgamated Locals
High Turnover (4)	18.75	26.2	230	0
Low Turnover (4)	5	29.2	1350	2
Total	11.8	27.7	790	2

Sub-Sample for the Analysis of Negotiations

A study of the relationship between turnover and the time of negotiations was conducted on a sample of twenty-nine locals. These locals were selected only because of the availability of their labor agreements during the nine years under study. The distribution of this sub-sample was found to be very close to the distribution of the main sample in one important respect--while 29 percent of the locals in the main sample are Big Three locals, 27.4 percent of the sub-sample are Big Three locals.

APPENDIX B

DATA COLLECTION: SOURCES AND VARIABLES

This appendix is a technical description of the variables and how and where the information on each of them was obtained.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND VARIABLES

The following code letters will be used in this description:

R - information obtained from "Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959." According to the law, each local union (with some exceptions which do not affect this study) must file an annual report. The information in the report includes financial data, notification of bylaws, and changes of officers.

CP- Information obtained from the U.A.W. - Conventions Proceedings.

I - Information obtained from interviews with U.A.W. officials.

U.A.W. - Information obtained through special compilation for this study, in the U.A.W. Headquarters by different departments.

Type of Local

A dichotomic variable - single unit local or amalgamated local, a local which includes more than one unit. Source of information: CP, U.A.W.

Facilities

The existence of the union hall and/or offices. The information was obtained from R and was organized in three categories:

1. The local owns a building.

2. The local does not own a building.

3. A building was either built or bought during the period of study.

Note that the value of the facilities is not considered here. This aspect is included in the variable total resources of the local.

Newspaper

The existence of a local newspaper. This information was obtained from the Labor Archives, Wayne State University.

Company

The company with which the local has a labor agreement.

1. Chrysler. 2. Ford. 3. GM. 4. Others and amalgamated locals.

If a majority of locals in an amalgamated local are

in the same company, this local was counted as one of this company.

The four categories above were combined together for some calculation:

1. Big Three companies.

2. Others.

Sources of information - CP and U.A.W.

Membership[1]

Membership figures were based on the per capita payments of the local to the Internationa. (using an average of the nine years under study: AV). Source - R.

Income

The total income of the local (AV.). Source of information - R.

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[1]The exact meaning of membership size is still questionable, even after the passing of the Reporting and Disclosure Act. A review of the available sources and their reliability, where international unions are concerned, can be found in Marcus (1962). However, this review does not include the annual reports as a source. Estey, in his article sounds very pessimistic: "BLMR (the agency which was responsible for these reports prior to its merger in 1963 with the office of Welfare and Pension Plans) data on unions structure is inaccurate, incomplete and internally inconsistent." Later, however, in 1966, Ferguson and Stober suggested that the LMRDA data is the best available, better than using direct union figures and better than convention information. The data is available faster and suffers from less bias than other sources. They suggest some techniques to overcome most of the common deficiencies of the data.

Age

The age of the local beginning with the date in which it was first chartered by the U.A.W. International. Information was supplied by the U.A.W. except in three cases where the direct inquiry in the locals yielded the information.

Membership Rate of Growth

$$\text{Rate of Growth} = \frac{\text{Membership of Union X in 1967/}}{\text{Membership of Union X in 1959}} \Big/ \frac{\text{All unions' membership in 1967/}}{\text{All unions' membership in 1959.}}$$

The formula was suggested to me by Professor Marcus. For detailed explanation see Marcus (1962), p. 62. Source of data for calculations is R.

Income Rate of Growth

The same as above but with income figures instead of membership.

Unit

The number of units in each amalgamated local. Single unit locals were given the value of one for various calculations. Source of information CP, U.A.W.

Payments to employees and officers other than the 4 Under Study

The total amount of money, salaries and other payments made by the local during the year to all employees and officers such as chairman of committees and recreational

directors. The figure used for calculations was the average for the nine year period. Source of information - R. The major weakness of the total payment as an indicator of complexity is the fact that in many locals, especially small ones, much of the work is on a voluntary basis.

Payments to Officers

Total amount of money, salaries and other payments that the local paid to the four officers under study. In cases of more than one Vice President only the amount paid to the first one was included (AV). Source of information - R.

Payments to the President, Vice President, Recording Secretary, Financial Secretary

As above, for each of the officers separately, (AV). Source - R.

Community Index

The index is a one figure description of the relationship between the size of the local, the total population of its city or town, and the percentage of blue collar employees in the city or town.

$$\text{The Index Number} = \frac{M}{(\frac{P}{R}) \times B} \times 100$$

M - The size of the local in terms of membership (as presented above).

P - Population of the city or town, based on the 1960 census.

R - "Non-Worker-Worker ratio" is the ratio of the persons not in the labor force to those in the labor force in the same location as above, plus one.

B - Percentage of blue collar workers in this location.

In few cases (six) where the population was smaller than 1000, R and B were not available. In these cases an average was calculated between the highest and lowest possible index.

The highest index number indicates the largest size local as related to the size of the population and the blue collar population in this community. Source of information: Census information for 1960, and R.

Total Resources of the Local

This figure represents the total assets of the local--cash, securities, fixed assets, (AV). Source- R.

Turnover of Officers

Five measures of turnover are used herein: (1) the total number of officers; (2) the presidents; (3) the vice-presidents; (4) the recording secretaries; (5) the financial secretaries. The measurement is the actual number of officers during the period of the study.

APPENDIX C

INTERVIEW GUIDELINES

1. Number, name, type of local. With which company do you have an agreement?

2. When was local established? Do you have bylaws?

3. How many members do you have now? How many did you have in 1960?

4. For how long have you been serving as officer? Do you intend to run again? To the same position? Why?

5. Why did you run in the first place? Were you the only candidate? Do you have a caucus in the local? Who opposed you? Why? Who supported you? Why?

6. How do you like this office? What are the rewards (advantages) of elected officers? (Later ask especially about materialistic compensation, seniority rights, prestige)

7. What are the "costs" (disadvantages) of being an officer?

8. Why do other people try to be elected? Do you usually have enough candidates for the various offices you have to fill?

9. What happened to previous officers, during, for instance, the last ten years? (try to count all of them). Where are they now? Are they active members of the local? Do they have influence on what goes on in the local?

10. People say, though I do not agree with it, that the local officer is no more than a senior clerk executing the constitution of the U.A.W. What do you think? Can you describe your responsibilities, tasks and duties?

11. Can you do the same for the other officers in the local?

12. Can you arrange the four officers--President, Vice President, Recording Secretary and Financial Secretary according to their importance in the local? According to the prestige of the office?

13. Do you use outside consultant (not U.A.W. people) for your activities?

14. Do you think that the functions of the office are influenced by the person who holds it? (count the four offices)

15. What, in your opinion, are the factors which influence turnover of officers in the local?

16. It seems that turnover at the International level is different than in the Local. Can you explain it?

17. Do you think that there are many differences in turnover between the four offices in the local? Where do you think you will find more change? (count the four offices). How can you explain that?

18. In your opinion, what are the chances of local officers to get a job in the International? What job do you have in mind? What can the officer do in order to get it?

19. Do you think that the regional director and/or the international representative influence changes of leadership in the local? How can they do it?

20. In your opinion, do the following factors influence turnover of officers--generally? In your local?

    a. Age of the local
    b. Type of the local- single unit or amalgamated.
    c. Size of membership
    d. Size of income.
    e. A slower or faster rate of growth.
    f. The company with which the local has a labor agreement.
    g. The type and size of the community.
    h. The percentage of male and female members.

21. Are you a member and/or officer in other organizations?