ABSTRACT

GENERAL ALFRED M. GRUENTHER:
DEDICATED SPOKESMAN FOR.NATO

BY

Lilyan Mae Alspaugh

The purpose of this study is to describe and ana-
lyze the speaking of General Alfred M. Gruenther on behalf
of NATO during the period when he served as Supreme Com-
mander. For purposes of specific analysis, a "case study"
treatment is made of each of three major speeches, desig-
nated as "The Copenhagen Speech," "The London Speech," and
"The Rome Speech." The following elements, which enter
into every speech situation, are described and analyzed:
the speaker, the climate of opinion, the occasion and au-
dience, the verbal message, the speaker's preparation and
delivery, and the general consequences of his efforts.

Some of the principal findings are as follows:

1. The primary goal of Gruenther's speaking was to win

military support for the collective security of NATO
l

Lilyan Mae Alspaugh

nations against the threat of Soviet aggression.

All of his speeches on NATO covered four major topics:
the threat of Soviet aggression, NATO's progress to
date, the problems facing NATO, and hopes for the
future. However, each speech is developed in terms
of the specific demands of the occasion and audience,
a high degree of adaptation being noted in each in-

stance.

The materials selected to prove the thesis by "logical"
methods constitute the major portion of the speech,
with less emphasis on the means of establishing per-
sonal credibility and on emotional appeals within the

verbal message.

Gruenther's speeches are replete with evidence (numer-
ical data, examples, and personal testimony) designed
to lend abundant support to his theSis and subordinate

propositions.

The General exercises restraint and moderation in.
the use of fear appeals and'avoids fear-charged

2

Lilyan Mae Alspaugh

descriptions of warfare. He concentrates on the posi-
tive appeals of pride, unity, and the preservation

of peace.

An outstanding characteristic of the speech organiza-
tion is the development of ideas in chronological
order. In this topical-chronological format, Gruen-
ther uses internal summaries, explanatory transitions,

and problem-solution structure.

The General's style is marked by plain, informal,

and conversational language and the frequent use of
simple sentences--free from military jargon. By the
use of rhetorical questions, first and second person
pronouns, and direct discourse, he sought audience
involvement in an attempt to relate himself and his
program to his listeners. Gruenther's humorous anec-
dotes, sprinkled relevantly and frequently throughout
his speeches, serve to provide a change of pace and
to inject attention-gaining and interest-holding
elements into the compositions.

3

Lilyan Mae Alspaugh

Perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of Gruen-
ther's speaking is his great facility in audience
adaptation. He adjusts to his audience in choice

of materials, in simplicity of language, and in the

topical-chronolOgical arrangement of his discourses.

Because of his role as Supreme Commander and because
of evidences of thorough development of his messages,
and because of his masterful audience adaptation,
Gruenther must have been perceived as a man of compe-

tence, character, and good-will.

Gruenther's speech preparation is aided by his train-
ing and wide experience, together with a dedication
to continuous learning-~which provide a veritable
storehouse of information ready to be tapped when
needed. He outlines his speeches without preparing

a manuscript, seldom, if ever, using notes in plat-
form addresses, tape-recorded interviews, or broad-
casts. His phenomenal and infallible memory serves

him well in his extemporaneous speaking.

10.

ll.

Lilyan Mae Alspaugh

Gruenther's delivery is marked by a voice that is
crisp, clear, and pleasant; by a manner that reflects
friendliness; and by a high degree of "directness."
When not "wired for sound," he usually walks back

and forth on the platform, with a huge NATO map di-
rectly behind him--to which he points for clarity

and emphasis.

Perhaps the greatest indication of Gruenther's effec-
tiveness as a spokesman for NATO lies in the fact
that the nations of Western Europe, listening to his
competent voice, responded to his urging and provided

NATO with life and vitality.

GENERAL ALFRED M. GRUENTHER:

DEDICATED SPOKESMAN FOR NATO

BY

Lilyan Mae Alspaugh

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment othhe requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

College of Communication Arts
Department of Speech

1969

© Copyright by

LILYAN MAE ALSPAUGH

1970

Accepted by the faculty of the Department of Speech,
College of Communication Arts, Michigan State University,
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor

of Philosophy degree.

 

.24;

‘birector of Thesié‘

Guidance Committee: Kenneth G. Hance, Chairman
Russell J. Kleis
Colby Lewis
David C. Ralph

 

 

 

 

.\

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer desires to express sincere appreciation
to the many persons who assisted in the preparation of
this dissertation.

To Dr. Kenneth G. Hance, Professor and Chairman of
the Doctoral Guidance Committee, the writer is especially
indebted and deeply grateful for his learned and dedicated
counsel, discerning insight, and scholarly background in
the area related to this Study.

Special recognition is due Dr. David Ralph,

Dr. Russell J. Kleis, and Dr. Colby Lewis, members of
the Guidance Committee, for their helpful comments in
reviewing the manuscript.

To General Alfred M. Gruenther, the writer conveys
special tribute and gratitude for his invaluable contri-
butions of historical and biographical background, as well
as his unselfish devotion of time and effort in communi-
cating pertinent information essential to the development

of this dissertation.

iv

The writer also acknowledges with deep apprecia-
tion the gracious assistance of Antonio Grande, Chief,
Special Projects Branch of the Public Information Divi-
sion of SHAPE (Paris and Brussels), in providing manu-
scripts of speeches delivered by General Gruenther, sup-
plemented by NATO publications particularly significant
for this study.

Sincere gratitude is extended to Dr. W. Lyle
Willhite, Dean of the School of Business Administration,
Central Michigan University, for his inspiring encourage-
ment and personal endorsement of the writer's leave of
absence which was indispensable to the completion of this
thesis.

And to my husband, Ralph B. Alspaugh, my heartfelt
indebtedness for his patience, endurance, wise counsel,

mfiiloyal encouragement which made this endeavor possible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

AcmOWLE MNT S O C O O O O O O I O O O O O I O O 0

INTRODUCTION 0 O O O O O O O I O O O O 0 O O O O O 0

Chapter

I. GRUENTHER--THE MAN. . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Early Years of Alfred M. Gruenther .
Gruenther's Education. . . . . . . . . .
Gruenther's Military Assignments . . . .
Advancement in Military Rank . . . . . .
First Field Command Assignment . . . . .
Gruenther's Staff Appointments . . . . .
Command vs. Staff Qualifications . . . .
General Alfred M. Gruenther's Appoint-
ment by the North Atlantic Council
as Supreme Commander of the Allied
Powers of Europe. . . . . . . . . . .

Epilogue. . . . . . . . . .

II. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH
ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION . . . . . .

Soviet Territorial Expansion . . . . . .
The Brussels Treaty--The Forerunner to
the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . .
The North Atlantic Treaty. . . . . . . .
The North Atlantic Treaty at Work. . . .
New Defense Policy of NATO--the Forward

Strategy 0 a o o o o o o o o o o o g .

Epilogue. . . . . . . . . .

vi

Page

iv

16
17
18
28

29
33

40
43
46
48

53

55
67

TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.)

Chapter Page
III. THE COPENHAGEN SPEECH (AUGUST 31, 1953) . . 83
PART I
OCCASION, SETTING, AND AUDIENCE
OF THE COPENHAGEN SPEECH . . . . . 83
PART II
RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE
COPENHAGEN SPEECH BY PARAGRAPHS . - - 38
The Progress NATO is Making. . . . . . . 93

The Problems Facing NATO . . . . . . . . 100

Prospects for the Future . . . . . . . . 109

The Threat of the Soviets. . . . . . . . 113
PART III

EVALUATION OF THE COPENHAGEN SPEECH . . 127
IV. THE LONDON SPEECH (JUNE 8, 1954). . . . . . 132

PART I
OCCASION, SETTING, AND AUDIENCE
OF THE LONDON SPEECH . . . . . . 132
PART II

RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE

LONDON SPEECH BY PARAGRAPHS . 133

The Progress NATO is Making. . . . . . . 145
The Problems Facing NATO . . . . . . . . 149
The Threat of the Soviets (and their
”Defects"). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Hope for the Future. . . . . . . . . . . 171

PART III

EVALUATION OF THE LONDON SPEECH . 181

vii

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.)

Chapter

V.

VI.

VII.

THE ROME SPEECH (MAY 2, 1955) . . . . . .
PART I

OCCASION, SETTING, AND AUDIENCE
OF THE ROME SPEECH.

PART II

RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROME
SPEECH BY PARAGRAPHS . . . .

The Threat of the Soviets . . . . . . . .
The Progress NATO is Making
The Problems Facing NATO. . . . . . . . .
Hope for the Future . . . . . . . . . . .

PART III
EVALUATION OF THE HOME SPEECH.
METHOD OF PREPARATION AND DELIVERY. . . . .
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . .

Biography of General Alfred M. Gruenther.
Historical Events Relevant to the Issues
Covered in General Gruenther's
Speeches. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Three Representative Speeches for
Analysis-~Criteria for Selection. . . .
Method of Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . .
Method of Preparation and Delivery. . . .
Postscript. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

viii

Page

188

188

192
201
207

236
263

269
275
284

285

287

291
295
300
302

no
.zu .

o.
"M.
‘u

l- I.

TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont.)

Page

”PENDICES. O O O O O O O 0 O O O O O O O 0 O O 0 O O 309
A. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

(NATO) o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 310

B. TAPE RECORDED INTERVIEW: General Alfred M.
Gruenther and Lilyan M. Alspaugh at the
Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers
of Europe (SHAPE), Marly, France, July 25,
1956. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323

C. SIXTY-THREE SPEECHES SENT TO WRITER BY PUBLIC
INFORMATION DIVISION OF SHAPE . . . . . . . 334

D. TEXTS OF THE COPENHAGEN, LONDON, AND ROME
SPEECHES ANALYZED AS CASE STUDIES IN
CHAPTERS III, IV, AND V, RESPECTIVELY . . . 339
E. TEXTS OF TWO REPRESENTATIVE SPEECHES DE-
LIVERED BY GENERAL ALFRED M. GRUENTHER
AS PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL AMERICAN RED
CROSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365

F. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON GENERAL ALFRED
M. GRUBNTHER. . O O O C O O O O O O O O O O 379
G. CONGRESSIONAL TRIBUTE TO GENERAL GRUENTHER. . 383

BIBLIOGRAPHY. o o o o o o o o a o o o o o o o o o o o 387

ix

INTRODUCTION

General Alfred M. Gruenther as
A Subject for Study

General Alfred M. Gruenther, often hailed as one of
the most intellectual and best informed soldier-statesmen
of this contemporary period, has been chosen for this study
as an outstanding spokesman for the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), while he served from 1953-1956, as
Supreme Commander of SHAPE (the Supreme Headquarters of the
Allied Powers of Europe), the military arm of the NATO
Alliance.

Although this study is confined to his speaking
role for NATO as Supreme Commander from 1953-56, it is im-
Portant to recognize that addressing NATO nations was not
new to him. While serving as Chief of Staff to General
Eisenhower, and subsequently to Eisenhower's successor,
General Ridgway, he was given frequent speaking assignments
t0 NATO countries from 1951-53. Furthermore, Gruenther has
Continued to serve as the dedicated spokesman for NATO even
f011owing. his retirement as Supreme Commander--and from his

military career--in 1956.

He delivered the following well-publicized "Pre-
scription for Effective Americanism" to his audiences‘in the
United States upon his retirement from the Presidency of
the American Red Cross in 1964, following seven years of
outstanding leadership for this humanitarian organization:

Cherish self-discipline, education, individual
responsibility, and the spirit of voluntary work
for the public good.

Nobody can ever say that Al Gruenther has not prac-
ticed the virtues he preaches--from obscurity of his child-
hood in Platte Center, Nebraska--to his graduation from
West Point Military Academy--to his selection as the chief
Planner of the invasion of North Africa and Italy in World
War II with his passion for grueling work hours--to the
aPpointment as Supreme Commander of NATO--to the Presidency
0f the American Red Cross--marked by his continuous dedica-

tion and enthusiastic support of NATO in his speeches to

American audiences to the present date.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to describe and ana-
lyze the speaking of General Alfred M. Gruenther on behalf

xi

of NATO during the period when he served as Supreme Com-
mander. For purposes of specific analysis, a "case study"
treatment is made of each of three major speeches, desig-
nated as "The Copenhagen Speech," "The London Speech," and
"The Rome Speech." The following elements, which enter
into every speech situation, are described and analyzed:
the speaker: the climate of opinion, with special refer-
ence to NATO; the occasion and the audience; the verbal
message (the lines of thought, the types of evidence se-
lected to support these lines of thought, the nature of
the reasoning employed, the structure or arrangement of
the materials, the style (language) employed); the method
0f preparation: and the delivery exemplified.

In short, the purpose is to provide an account of
What transpired when General Gruenther attempted to meet
the demands of three speaking situations and to provide
an analysis of these procedures--all within the context
of an understanding of the nature of the speaker, of the
general background (with special reference to NATO), and
0f the specific occasion and audience.

xii

The description and analysis are conducted in terms
of rhetorical topics and principles that are generally ac-
cepted within the "classical rhetorical tradition"--those
that pertain to the conventional constituents of Invention
(the materials of development per se) , Arrangement (the
organization of these materials), Style (the phrasing of

these materials), and Delivery (the use of the audible and

the visible codes).

Limitations

This study of the speaking of General Gruenther is
limited to the period of 1953-1956, while he served as Su-

Preme Commander of the Allied Powers of Europe. Also, as

Previously indicated, special attention is given to three

sPeeches, representing major presentations of the "Case for

NATO." While General Gruenther has spoken on hundreds--

even thousands--of occasions on a multitude of subjects
And is in constant demand as a speaker today (1969) , these
aCtivities are merely mentioned in connection with the bio-

graphical account. (Other studies may, with great profit,

xiii

I».

5'.

be made concerning Gruenther's contributions as spokesman

for a variety of ”causes," such as the American Red Cross.)

Intrinsic Merit of the Study

There is intrinsic merit in this study of the
speaking of General Gruenther as a learned military leader;
a dedicated advocate of military defense for collective se-
curity of the NATO nations as a means of combating pos-
Sible enemy aggression: and a statesman-diplomat in skill-
fully adapting his appeals to the specific political, econ-
omic, and military attitudes of the various audiences he
addressed in the NATO nations.

Moreover, intrinsic merit is reinforced by the
rePutation and prestige accorded General Gruenther by top
military officers in United States and Europe. He is re-
garded as one of the outstanding military leaders of World
War II, as well as a distinguished military-diplomat in the
negotiations for peace that followed. Gruenther reflects

the anomaly of the eminent military planner of war strategy

xiv

who is equally successful and ehthusiastic in the promotion
of the cause of peace--and who competently employs the
medium of public address in promoting this cause.
Furthermore, intrinsic merit is evidenced by the
insight of General Gruenther in describing, analyzing, and
interpreting the political and military issues--and prob-
lems--pertinent to the adjustment period following World
War II, as revealed in the four major topics included in
his NATO speeches. His keen observations as an authori-
tative source of information on-the historical development
of international issues constitute a body of materials of
great importance not only to his listeners but also to

readers of his messages.

Distinctiveness of the Study

This study of the speaking of General Alfred M.
Gruenther does not duplicate other research. At the pres-
ent time there is no published work which covers the speak-

ing of this outstanding military leader, nor has any

XV

biography been published. No edition of the speeches of
General Gruenther exists. While there is one Master's
amsis covering four speeches by Gruenther analyzed collec-
tflvely under the five constituents of rhetoric, this thesis
does not represent the approach of the present study nor is
it based upon some of the evidence made available to this
researcher.

This study can make a distinctive contribution to
Gruenther literature by the "Case Study" method of research,
incorporating an analysis of all of the aspects of rhetor-
ical criticism outlined in the opening section of Chapter

VII,"Summary and Conclusions."

Materials and Sources of the Study

Primary sources include a chronological file of
General Gruenther's correspondence on NATO, together with

ascore'of interviews with the General'during the compilation

‘

lDonald Newton Dedmon, "The Rhetorical Analysis of
mu" Representative Speeches by General Alfred M. Gruenther
to: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization" (unpublished
aster's thesis, State University of Iowa, 1956) .

xvi

 

 

 

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cm'research materials since 1966. In addition, in 1956,
«men the writer was associated with the broadcasting in-
chmtry, a tape-recorded interview with the writer was
granted by General Gruenther, the setting for this inter-
view being his office at SHAPE, near Paris, France. Photo-
graphs of the interview reveal the conventional NATO map
behind the General to which he likes to refer during inter-
views and staff meetings (as well as in platform addresses).
Further primary source material consists of sixty-
three speeches sent by the Public Information Division of
SHAPE to the writer2--including thirty-eight speeches de-
livered by General Gruenther as Supreme Allied Commander,
dating from July 11, 1953 (the day following his appoint-
ment), through November 20, 1956 (his Farewell Speech upon
his retirement from SHAPE and the U.S. Army). In addition
thevuiter also received twenty-five speeches delivered by

General Gruenther as former Chief of Staff to the two Supreme

‘

l
. See Appendix B for text of the tape-recorded inter-
\newvdth General Gruenther and photographs--July 25, 1956.

2
. See Appendix C for list of 63 speeches sent to
wrlter by the Public Information Division of SHAPE.

xvii

Conunanders, covering the period from June 28, 1951, through
May 30, 1953.

The available texts of these NATO speeches were
Prepared from tape recordings, made during the actual de-
livery before the audience. However, before the speech
teHits were circulated by the Public Information Division
of SHAPE, they were edited by the P.I.D. Staff, in consul-
tation with Gruenther's aides, without revision of his
lines of thought.

Notable secondary sources, in addition to the pub-
lished materials from NATO, include many recent history
b(Doks, information from newspapers and periodicals, and
c>ther materials cited throughout the text and listed in
the bibliography.

The writer also has a collection of tape recordings
0f recent speeches by General Gruenther, made while he was
addressing the audience. The original tapes are owned by
General Gruenther, who loaned them to the writer for dupli-

c=ation. The recording of copies from the original tapes
Was executed by the Television and Radio Department of

Michigan State University under contract with the writer.

xviii

 

The following tapes are included in the writer's collection
of recorded addresses of General Gruenther:

Commencement Address June 10, 1966
Command and General Staff College
Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas

Round Table of Palm Beach, Florida March 20, 1967
(Address by General Gruenther)

Harvard University October 6, 1967
General Thomas D. White Lecture Series
"The Future of NATO"

Air University November 21, 1967
Maxwell , Alabama
"Some Specific NATO Problems--

Can They Be Resolved?"

American Forces Staff College January 19, 1968
Norfolk, Virginia

English-Speaking Union Dinner February 1, 1968
Royal York Hotel, Toronto, Canada

(Speaking as President of the

“English-Speaking Union of U.S.)

Memorial Dinner for February 6, 1968
Sir Winston Churchill

English-Speaking Union

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

NATO Symposium February 25 and 26,
Artist-Lecture Series 1969
Kent State University, Kent, Ohio

(Two lectures on NATO delivered

by General Gruenther to the two-

day Symposium). Recordings pur-

chased direct from Kent State

University.

xix

 

 

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The writer also has a 50-minute colored video tape

recording of General Gruenther's guest appearance on Tele-
Vision Station WTTG, Washington, D.C., when he was inter-

Viewed on NATO by two members of the Station‘s Staff on

November 27, 1968. Obviously, this video tape recording

was produced simultaneously with the broadcasting of the

PrOgram.

The above recordings provide excellent confirmation
of the attributes of General Gruenther's delivery described
111 this study-~his simple, easily understood choice of lan-
guage, clearly enunciated, with staccato tones for emphasis.
The platform addresses before the various audiences, as
well as the TV Broadcast interview, were delivered without
I‘eference to notes, indicating that his phenomenal memory

iii comparable in every way to that of the "days of NATO as

Sllpreme Commander . "

XX

Plan of Research

The plan of research is based on the "Case Study"
method of analysis. The two major criteria for the selec-
tion of the three representative speeches are first--to
Secure a spread in time sequence, and second--to secure
Variance in the specific objectives of the speaking situa-
tions. The three representative speeches selected were
delivered by General Gruenther in Copenhagen, Denmark:

I--0ndon, England; and Rome, Italy.1

The Copenhagen Speech, delivered in 1953, was pri-

marily expository since it was General Gruenther's first

 

miijor address to the military officers and foreign minis-
ters of the NATO nations, just a month and a half following
llis appointment as Supreme Commander. Therefore, it was
eSsential in this speech to describe NATO's specific opera-
llion, explain NATO's organizational framework, and inter-
Pret NATO's objectives. (The writer was a member of the

audience when General Gruenther delivered this speech in

COpenhagen.)

¥

1
See Appendix D for texts of Copenhagen, London,
and Rome speeches .

xxi

The London speech, delivered in 1954, was primarily
informative on the current status of NATO, but was also per-
suasive in the attempt to secure more positive action by
Great Britain for larger contributions to NATO military
defense.

The Rome speech was primarily persuasive to con-
vince the skeptical Italian audience of the crucial need
for’increased military defense for collective security--
based on a detailed, informative explanation of the deci-
8ive events making the fulfillment of the goals of mili-
tarydefense an imperative for self-preservation.

In addition to the rhetorical factors intrinsi-
c=ally attributable to the composition of these three
8Peeches, the research approach also includes the important
Questions concerned with such areas as the speaker's back-
ground, experiences, personality, mental habits, and
aehievements: the speaker's reputation and objectives;
the historical events relevant to the issues covered: the
enrrent climate of opinion on those issues; the speaker's

end.audience's relationship to those issues; the speaker's
methods of preparation: and the general consequences of
his speaking.

xxii

Organization of the Study

This study is organized on a chronological-topical
basis. Chapter One, "Gruenther, the Man," chronicles the
events in the life of General Alfred M. Gruenther which
have especial relevance to his speaking role for NATO.
Chapter Two, "The Origin and Development of the North At-
rlantic Treaty Organization," describes and interprets the
chain of events following the collapse of Nazi Germany and
tflne surrender of Japan, closing World War II--including
tile origin of the United Nations Organization, which
EIroved inadequate to the Western European nations in cop-
iJng with the recalcitrant Soviets in their territorial
eJ‘Epansion through conquest without war; the Brussels
{Dreaty--the forerunner to the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
lization; and the launching of NATO for the political, eco-
nomic, and military security of the Western European na-
tions.

Chapters Three, Four, and Five cover the three Case
Studies, which analyze the many factors outlined in the
previous section on "The Method and Plan of Research." Spe-

cifically, Chapter Three covers "The Copenhagen Speech";

xxiii

 

 
 

Chapter Four, "The London Speech"; and Chapter Five, "The
Rome Speech." Each of these three chapters is structured
in three parts: Part I: "The Occasion, Setting and Audi-
ence"; Part II, "The Rhetorical Analysis of the Speech by
Paragraphs"; and Part III, "The Evaluation of the Speech."

Chapter Six, "The Method of Preparation and De-
livery," describes General Gruenther's method of outlining
his speeches without a complete manuscript, since his
Storehouse of information and his phenomenal memory with
inmwdiate recall allow extemporaneous delivery of his out-
lined topics, without benefit of reminder notes.

Chapter Seven, "The Summary and Conclusions,"
19ertaining to this study entitled "General Alfred M.
(iruenther, Dedicated Spokesman for NATO," is divided into
‘two sections: Part I, "Summary," provides an overview
<3f Chapters One through Seven; Part II, "Conclusions,"
Sets forth principal interpretations derived from an anal-.
Ysis of the findings summarized in Part I--certain trends

or tendencies which become manifest as one reviews these

findings.

xxiv

CHAPTER I.

GRUENTHER--THE MAN

Alfred Maximilian Gruenther was destined for dis-
tinguished leadership from childhood. The qualities cul-
tivated in his early years, nurtured and supervised by a
devoted but determined father, developed the pattern for
his military career and his outstandingly persuasive and
effective speaking ability.

In former President Dwight D. Eisenhower's book,
Mandate for Change, he describes his long-time close
friend, General Alfred M. Gruenther, as "a man with a
quick incisive mind, and an outgoing personality . . .
one of the ablest all-around officers, civilian or mili-

tary, I have encountered in fifty years!"

The Early Years of Alfred M. Gruenther

Alfred Gruenther was the first son of parents who
were Irish-German descendants. Christian Gruenther, his
father, was the son of German parents who had come from
the Catholic section of southern Wisconsin. Following
the death of Christian's mother, he lived with relatives.
During the intervening years, Christian Gruenther worked
as a farm-hand and earned his way through a year of col-
lege. Subsequently, through hard work he saved enough
to start a weekly newspaper in Platte Center, Nebraska--
The Platte Center Signal (with a circulation of 300).1
He married Mary Shea, the school-teacher daughter of Irish
farmers of east-central Nebraska. On March 3, 1899, Alfred
bbximilian Gruenther was born in Platte Center, Nebraska.

In addition to publishing the Platte Center Signal,
Christian Gruenther served as clerk of the District Court,
Immaged two successful campaigns of the U.S. Senator Gil-
mflt Hitchcock, and was State Manager during two of William
Jmudngs Bryan's presidential campaigns.

k

1Robert Coughlan, "Thinking Machine Who Bosses

NATO," Life, XXXIV (June 1, 1953), p. 80.

 

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. . politics was neither a vocation, nor an
avocation with him. He was an old fashioned
patriot who approached his political tasks
with strong convictions and a sense of moral
obligation. And he took his parental responsi-
bilities with equal seriousness. He was an
affectionate father and entered into the front
yard ball games with enthusiasm. But he was
also a strong disciplinarian who expected exact
obedience and refused to allow his children to
give anything less than their best, and who
punished laziness and bad behavior with
righteous wrath.1

Alfred was the oldest in a family of six children,
and the strict yet affectionate training received in his
youth was reflected in the ethos of Alfred M. Gruenther,
the General. He always expected much from those under
his command, but always treated them with respect and
understanding, as documented in his briefing sessions
and addresses to his subordinates.2

Alfred Gruenther resembled his father physically
mmlmentally, except in height. His father was a tall

man but Gruenther is of medium height, lightly built.

lIbid.

2This characteristic was observed personally by
flmewriter during a television assignment at SHAPE, Paris.

However, his lack of height has been no deterrent
in his military or social life, for his dynamic, friendly
personality and almost constant smile have won many
friends, and influenced thousands! His grey-blue eyes
are in bright contrast to his tan Nebraska complexion.

He moves quickly and speaks in a rather high-pitched,
slightly nasal, but very pleasant voice, with a Nebraska
accent.

According to one biographer, Gruenther's father
supervised his son's school work, "paid him a bonus for
good marks, talked to him about the value of knowledge,
drilled him in 'knowing the problem' and taught him
checkers, not as a game, but because it was 'good mental
exercise.”1 Another mental gymnastic in which Gruenther
am a boy was frequently engaged was the development of
Igs memory. As several writers have reported, "Gruenther
whats that he subscribed to a mail-order memory course

at the age of 13."2

*

lCoughlan, "Thinking Machine Who Bosses NATO," p. 80.

2Ernest O. Hauser, "The Army's Biggest Brain,"
Eflaudey Evening Post, CCXXVI (October 31, 1953), p. 165.

The ability of General Gruenther to concentrate
and memorize is one of his outstanding characteristics
today. It would seem to be a most useful attribute for
a speaker to possess, one that would contribute in a posi-
tive way to his ethos. Who among us does not appreciate
the speaker who is able to deliver his speech without
notes?

An example of his remarkable powers of recall and
photographic memory is confirmed by an incident which
occurred while he served as Supreme Commander of SHAPE.

On this particular occasion he memorized a long speech

in French (although he has never had time to learn French).
He "delivered the speech--letter perfect--with an atro-
cious Nebraska accent, hardly understanding a word he was
saying."1

So the training in concentration and memorization
‘fluch his father encouraged him to develop as a child has

Itmained through the years.

k

1Edmond Taylor, "The Atlantic Alliance: After
(fluenther,‘What?," The Reporter, June 2, 1955, p. 19.

Gruenther's Education

In Platte Center young Gruenther attended
St. Joseph's School. His father had always hoped his
son Alfred would be selected for West Point. He also
wanted his son to develop spiritually. Therefore, when
Alfred reached the age of 13, he was sent to St. Thomas'
Military Academy, a Catholic Preparatory School at
St. Paul, Minnesota, which combines both military and
religious instruction. At St. Thomas' the military in-
smruction is provided by U. 8. Army officers, while the
academic instruction is given by priests of the Archdio-
cese«of St. Paul and by a small regular faculty. Gruenther
txflay recalls that he "felt no special enthusiasm" about
lfis first years at St. Thomas'. His first ambition had
twen to become a priest-~subsequently he wanted to become
adoctor and arranged his course work for this preparation.

Young Gruenther was more disposed to writing than
I“ilitary training in this early period of his education at
St..Thomas'. His father closely scrutinized his son's
letters, circled in red ink the mistakes in spelling,

mummuation, or grammar, and returned the letters to his

son. This training by his father no doubt contributed to
Gruenther's present meticulously correct writing, with
most of his personal memoranda carefully hand-written,
rather than dictated to a secretary for transcription.1
After Graduation from St. Thomas'.--Following the
completion of his son's secondary education at St. Thomas',
Christian sent him to the Army and Navy Preparatory
School in Washington for additional training in prepara-

tion for the West Point examinations.

 

General Gruenther is so intent upon elimination
cm errors in his published speeches, that he will not con-
sent to publication unless he, personally, has the oppor-
tunity to edit the taped or stenographic address. It is
for this reason there is such a paucity of published
Speeches, despite the innumerable speeches he delivered
‘flfile Supreme Commander of NATO, 1953-56, as President of
the American Red Cross, 1956-64, and currently the hundreds
Cfi'speeches he has delivered in Europe, Asia, "Down-Under"
and in the United States since his retirement from the
American Red Cross. (From the Public Information Division
CE SHAPE this writer has received the mimeographed texts
Of 38 speeches delivered by General Gruenther as Supreme
Cbmmander of NATO from 1953-56, and 25 speeches delivered
kw him as the Chief of Staff from 1951-53. Although these
DMTO speeches represent modestly edited messages, without
revision of Gruenther's lines of thought, the important
fact remains that the speeches are based on voice record-
ings at the time of delivery to the audience and 22£_on
neterials released in advance of delivery. In the absence
CE a 100% stenographic report from the tape recording,
there is replicated the nearest possible approximation of
what the audience heard.)

 

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Upon completion of the Army and Navy Preparatory
School in Washington, Gruenther received the appointment
to West Point and graduated fourth in his class November
1, 1918--eleven days before the Armistice!1

In a speech made in Italy many years later as
Supreme Commander of NATO, he referred to this "graduation"

in the very wry humor for which he has become so well-known

and admired:

I came to Italy for the first time in 1919 after
we had just finished one WOrld War. In fact, I
played a major role in ending that War. I was a
cadet at the United States Military Academy,
scheduled to be graduated in 1921. The State

of the War got to be so crucial that the United
States decided to graduate our class early,
specifically on the first of November, 1918.

The Kaiser heard about this significant increase

in allied strength, and eleven days later he
surrendered!2

After the Armistice was signed, Gruenther's class
of 278 Second Lieutenants was sent back to West Point and

remained there until June 1919.

V

1David F. Schoenbrun, "Ike's Right Arm," This Week
(Washington Post Sunday Supplement), Dec.'16, 1951, p. 5.

Xeroxed copy of speech sent to writer by General
IUIred M. Gruenther, from A. Craig Baird's Representative
Aierican Speeches (1955-56) , including special notations
kW General Gruenther. Speech delivered in Rome, Italy,
Thy 2, 1955, by Alfred M. Gruenther. (Exact duplicate of
'fius speech sent to writer by SHAPE in mimeographed form.)

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Although the regular West Point Academy Curriculum
included public speaking instruction, Alfred Gruenther and
the 278 cadets in his class who were graduated early due
to the war emergency did not receive this training before
their hurried departure for Europe. When they returned
to West Point from their European assignment they were
placed in a make-shift course curriculum, and again missed
the speech instruction at the Academy. Therefore, the
(flass in which Gruenther graduated from West Point was

deprived of speech training due to circumstances beyond

their control.1

Gruenther's MilitaryfAssignments

In 1920, as a Second Lieutenant, Gruenther was
assigned to Fort Knox, where he was made an instructor
at the post's school and taught military history, cour-
t£sy, hygiene, bookkeeping, and Mess Management. Gruen-
there's pupils included veterans with twenty years of
experience in the army, and Gruenther worked conscien-

tiously and continuously to keep ahead of them.

_¥

Telephone conversation with General Gruenther,
August 5, 1969.

10

It was Fort Knox that provided the setting for his
initiation into bridge--a human-interest story publicized
in innumerable magazine and newspaper articles relates how

it all happened.1

 

lDavid Schoenbrun, "Ike's Right Arm," This Week.
(Washington Post Sunday Supplement [Face photograph of Gen-
eral'Gruenther on cover]), Dec. 16, 1951: "He's a good
tennis player, and like Ike, a demon in bridge,” p. 5.

Alan Truscott (Columnist for Bridge Section),
"Bridge: Gruenther and Eisenhower--A Victorious Team,"
The New York Times, Dec. 23, 1965.

Ernest O. Hauser, "The Army's Biggest Brain,"
p. 34, "Gruenther ranks among the world's best bridge
players. . . ."

Coughlan, "The Thinking Machine Who Bosses NATO,"
p. 78, "He became not only the best bridge player in the
Inmy but one of the best in the world. . . ."

Time Weekly, February 6, 1956. Cover page with
photograph of General Gruenther. Foreign News section
entitled "NATO," p. 26. ". .=. he soon became the Army's
best bridge player and eked out his army pay by refereeing
public matches, including the famed Culbertson-Lenz match
of 1931."

International Celebrity Register, First Edition,
1959, pp. 314-315. "Although his early post-war I military
career was routine and uneventful, he did distinguish him-
self as one of the Army's best bridge players. . . ."

Fred L. Karpin, "The General Bridged the Lean
Years," Washington Post, September 4, 1966 (Karpin writes
a weekly bridge column for the Washington Post.) Sub-
Heading--"Ike's Former Aide (and Partner) Didn't Fault

11

One evening Gruenther was invited for the first
time to dinner at the home of his superior officer, Major
W. R. Gruber. It is reported that the young man looked
forward to the evening's discussion among the twelve
guests with the hope that he would make a good impression.
He was "horrified" when the three bridge tables were pro-
duced after dinner, and Major Gruber remarked, "you play
bridge, of course . . . ." The Major gazed at Gruenther
with incredulity when he admitted he couldn't play the
game. Whereupon Major Gruber gave Gruenther a quick
briefing on the rules and the rotation system to the
three tables. His subsequent embarrassment, and the cool
stares of his partners prompted an immediate decision.
The very next morning he bought a rule book, avidly de-
voured its contents, and began playing at the Officers'

Club at the post.1

 

Test Tubes, Either." Entire lower third of page. Story
covering his refereeing Culbertson-Lenz match while teach-
ing at West Point included on page I! of this dissertation.

Raymond J. Crowley, "Gruenther's Code: Zipl,"
Democrat and Chronicle, Rochester, New York, March 24,
1964. Story covering his first introduction to bridge,
and his subsequent refereeing of Culbertson-Lenz match.

lCoughlan, "Thinking Machine Who Bosses NATO,"
p. 78.

 

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12

This was the milestone in Gruenther's life when
he resolved he would add bridge to the subjects of a mili-
tary nature he was researching. This resolution resulted
not only in exceptional interest and competence in bridge-
playing, but the development of important traits of con-
centration, memorization, and rapport with his colleagues
on the post. His leadership capability was especially
significant, since he was regarded as a "loner" until his
firm resolution to master the art of bridge-playing. His
concentration and memory paid off, for he was soon playing
and winning post tournaments.

To Gruenther, bridge—playing was much more than a
social pass-time. It was a mental discipline and part of
his overall educational pattern. For Gruenther was dedi-
cated to the Army in the literal sense of the word. He
learned his profession with far-more energy than he ex-
pended on becoming a bridge expert. It was said that he
didn't merely "play" bridge--he used it as a test of his
mental alacrity.

Bridge, checkers, politics, or military strategy--

Gruenther confronts a problem as an intellectual,
and the more insoluble it is, the more interesting

13

he finds it. His terrifying memory and his un-
canny flair for expounding a difficult proposi-
tion in stripped-down terms are proverbia1--so
is his thoroughness.
It is common knowledge that in 1933 he published
a 328-page book on Duplicate-Contract Bridge which for
many years was the standard text on Tournament Direction.
Meantime, he had the pleasure of again playing with Major
Gruber of Fort Knox, to whom he owed this acquired ability
--and he sent him down by a whacking score!
It was also at Fort Knox that he met and married
Grace Elizabeth Crum of Jeffersonville, Indiana, a secre-
tory of the post. His wife and baby son Donald accompanied
him later on an assignment to the Philippines, where their
second son Richard was born.2
In 1927 he returned to West Point as an instructor

in chemistry and electricity, the two areas of science in

which he had been especially interested as a student at

 

a

1Hauser, "The Army's Biggest Brain," p. 34.

. 2Gruenther's two sons, Donald and Richard, are
both Colonels now--and both West Pointers like their
father. "Donald has seven boys and one girl, and is sta-
tioned at the Pentagon, while Richard has three boys and
three girls--they've just been ordered to West Point"-—
reported General Gruenther in a speech delivered in St.
Petersburg, Florida, on July 7, 1969.

 

 

,
woe

 

 

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h.

   

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n
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14

west Point. During those eight years at West Point he
became an excellent teacher. This assignment provided
him with a fine opportunity for practicing the art of
oral communication.

While he was teaching at West Point, Gruenther
was invited to referee the Culbertson-Lenz bridge tourna-
ment. For six weeks, every Monday, Tuesday, Thursday,
and Friday afternoon after his last class at West Point,
Mrs. Gruenther would drive him to New York City to direct
the tournament and then drive him back for his 7:55 a.m.
class the following morning. The back seat of their old
lhuck was padded with mattresses so Gruenther could stretch
mn:and sleep both ways on the trip between West Point and
New York City .

The reason for this arduous life was that Second
lieutenant Gruenther was being paid $100 a night for he
was a Pro as a Director of Tournaments. He explained it
this way: "For the last dozen years my Army pay had been
about $167 a month. For $100 extra I would have taken on

Al Capone."1

 

1Fred L. Karpin, "The General Bridged the Lean
Years," Washington Post, Sunday, September 4, 1966.

15

The Culbertson-Lenz Match-~the so-called "Bridge
Battle of the Century"--was front page news all over the
country. A woman reader wrote the War Department, asking
how a West Point instructor could drive to New York seven
(she said) days a week to referee the match.

The War Department referred the inquiry to the
Military Academy Superintendent for immediate investiga-
tion.

The next Monday, the superintendent walked into
Gruenther's first class and sat down. The same
thing happened the next day and the next, on
through Saturday.

Gruenther, of course, was speculating about the
superintendent's visits. He had never before
been singled out for special attention. Six
months later, Gruenther learned that the super-
intendent had written the following letter to
Washington:

If I could be certain that being a

bridge referee would have the same

salutary effect on all of the Military
Academy's instructors as it had on Lt.
Gruenther, I would demand that they all
become bridge referees in their spare

time. I have never seen a finer chem- 1
istry instructor than Lt. Gruenther. . . .

 

lIbid.

16

Advancement in Military Rank

The Army was overloaded with second lieutenants
when the peace years took over following World War I.
"Those were the lean years when few men could win a pro-
motion. One class mate of mine estimated that it would
take 85 years to make colonel. I wasn't sure," said
Gruenther, "that I could wait that long . . . ."1

During the period from his graduation to 1935,
Gruenther served on the instructional staffs at Fort Knox
and‘West Point, was given a peacetime assignment in the
Philippines, and was advanced from Second Lieutenant to
First Lieutenant, and then to Captain. During the ensuing
feur years from 1935 to 1939, before he was to receive his
first field command, he attended the Command and General
Staff School and Army War College in Washington, D. C.

Aware that ranking officers were often called upon 4
to speak in public, he enrolled in a public speaking course
while stationed in Washington, D. C. The instructor of

the course was Granville B. Jacobs, Consultant in Sales

Management and Sales Practices for the Riggs National Bank

 

lIbid.

17

in Washington. The public speaking classes held once a
week in the evening at a Washington hotel were attended
regularly by Gruenther while he was in Washington at the
Army War College.1 During this period he also began to
collect and index both serious and humorous anecdotes.

It is apparent he places special emphasis in his speeches
on the importance of appropriate, interesting, and humor-

ous stories, always in context, to enliven his message.

First Field Command Assignment

In 1939 Gruenther was assigned the Command of the
Field Artillery Battalion at Fort Sam Houston under the
austere and rather gruff Major General (later Lieutenant
Gmneral) Krueger. When Gruenther was asked about his
past military experience, Krueger admonished him and de-
clared Gruenther had spent far too much time at West Point

and far too little in the field.

 

1Information conveyed to writer by General
Gruenther, August 5, 1969.

18

For the entire year the relationship between
Krueger and Gruenther was somewhat strained. Gruenther's
intuition that the General was becoming more mellow came
some time later when Krueger suddenly invited him to be-
come one of his aides. However, he warned Gruenther he
was very difficult to get along with--and advised him not
to accept the position. After careful consideration,
Gruenther reported to the General that he had decided to
take his advice! The General was disconcerted, but he
agreed that Gruenther had made a sound decision.l

No doubt, Gruenther's decision not to accept his

superior's offer required some special courage and forti-

tude.

Gruenther's Staff Appointments

In 1941 Gruenther was sent to Washington, D.C.
to serve at General Headquarters under General McNair.

Gruenther and Brig. General Mark Clark, who was also

 

1Coughlan, "Thinking Machine Who Bosses NATO,"
p. 84.

19

under McNair's command, became close friends--a very for-
tunate friendship, indeed, for it was the stepping stone
for Gruenther's rapid subsequent advancement.

Mark Clark was also a good friend of Col. Dwight D.
Eisenhower who returned from the Philippines to serve as
Chief cf Staff to Lieutenant General Krueger, Commander
of the Third Army at San Antonio, Texas.

On Clark's recommendation and with Krueger's en-
dorsement, Eisenhower made Gruenther his Deputy Chief of
Staff (October 1941) which was the beginning of a long
and close friendship. Eisenhower voiced this observation
while Gruenther served as his deputy: "I was intrigued
by the little devil. He always had a joke or a wise-
crack, he had all the answers at his finger tips, and
he never got tired . . . ."

A few months later Brigadier General Dwight D.
Eisenhower was called to Washington, and Lt. Colonel
Gruenther succeeded him as Krueger's Chief of Staff.

So his very fortunate encounter with Clark and Eisenhower
brought him quickly to a dramatic turning point in his

career, with a rapid succession of staff appointments,

20

as well as advancements in rank. Actually, Gruenther re-
ceived five promotions between July, 1940, and February
1943 to rise to Major General.

In August 1942 Gruenther was transferred to London
as Brigadier General, to serve as Deputy Chief bf Staff
under General Eisenhower. On his way from Texas to Lon-
don, Gruenther stopped off at Washington to be briefed on
Operation TORCH, the invasion of North Africa. But due
to complications of circumstances in the Military Head-
quarters in Washington, he was obliged to leave for Lon-
don unbriefed.

Upon his arrival in London, General Eisenhower
briefly presented to Gruenther the idea of Operation TORCH
and appointed him chief planning officer of the African
invasion. He was notified to attend a meeting the next
morning: and when he reached the conference, thirty Brit-
ish officers of high rank were awaiting him to hear the
details of the American plans for Operation TORCH. Gruen-
ther attempted to cover his surprise and acute embarrass-

ment, explaining that he had just arrived and did not

 

lFred L. Karpin, "The General Bridged the Lean
Years," Washington Post, Sept. 4, 1966.

21

feel qualified to speak. So the British officers agreed
to postpone the meeting a few days. Gruenther quickly
appointed a small staff and presented a preliminary plan
a few days later. Within six weeks he had the entire
operation completely planned despite his lack of exper-
ience in planning an invasion. Gruenther said: "It was
sink or swim--I managed to swim, and in the process
learned the art of p1anning--and I've spent most of my
time at it ever since."

In January 1943, upon General Mark W. Clark's
request, Major General Gruenther was named his Chief Of
Staff for the Fifth Army in North Africa, following the
successful completion of Operation TORCH. Later Gruenther
became Chief of Staff of the 15th Army Group, still under
General Clark.

The 15th Army Group combined the combat forces Of
the Americans, British, French, Polish, New Zealanders,
and Italians under Clark's dommand. Gruenther was highly
commended by Clark for his ability to negotiate with the

various nationalities.1 He also considered Gruenther

fl?

 

lThis discerning observation by Clark predicted
well the reason for General Gruenther's success in

22

most courageous and fearless under battle conditions, and
(Hark admitted Gruenther had a very calming influence
over him. Whenever he would become troubled and frus-
trated, Gruenther would say, "Now Boss, Let's Thigk about
it for awhile."

Clark considered Gruenther a "planner" without
peer--for he planned the North African invasion, the
Fifth Army landings in Italy, and the arduous campaign
in Italy's mountains. Said Clark--"On every efficiency
report I ever turned in on Gruenther, I wrote 'Highly
Qualified to be Chief of Staff of the Army at appropriate
time.”1

Eisenhower, with an admiration matching Clark's,
had been heard to remark, "Al Gruenther would make a good

President of the United States."2

 

speaking, as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in
Europe, to the various nationalities represented among
the NATO countries.

1Time Magazine, Foreign News Section, Vol. LXVII,
No. 6 (February 6, 1956): P. 26.

21bid.

23

In July 1945, at the end of the War, after the
Germans surrendered, General Clark was named Commander of
the U.S. Forces in Austria; and General Gruenther was
named Deputy Commanding General of the United States
occupied area there.

In.A946 General Gruenther was recalled to Washing-
ton where he served in several capacities: Commanding
Officer of the National War College until 1947; Director
of the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1947-1949:
and Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Combat Operations
(P & 0) from 1949-50. In these two latter assignments,
Gruenther maintained close relations with the State De-
partment, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Council, and all the other important defense
agencies.

Two new words "Gruentherize" and "Gruenthergram"

were added to the Army's lexicon at this time.1

 

1These two words, "Gruentherize" and "Gruenther-
gram," became very important and meaningful terms at SHAPE
in 1953-56, as also conveyed to the writer by the SHAPE
Staff during the television assignment with General Gruen-
ther in 1956. To "Gruentherize" a person is to ask him
interminable questions in the hope of refining a question
or a situation to the n'th degree. A "Gruenthergram" is
a small white slip of paper containing either a question
or an order.

24

In December 1950, General Eisenhower was called
from the Presidency of_Columbia University to become
the first Supreme Commander of the NATO forces at the
Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe
(SHAPE) at Marly, near Paris. Eisenhower chose Gruenther
for his Chief of Staff. No doubt Gruenther's outstanding
reCord of performance as Eisenhower's Deputy Chief of
Staff in London in 1942 was an important factor in his
being selected for the NATO post. Gruenther had also
proved invaluable to Eisenhower while he was President
of Columbia University in keeping him informed about de-
fense matters. During this period of the Columbia presi-
dency, Eisenhower returned to the Pentagon on a brief
visit and.made this observation--
Everybody was turning to Al, and he would give
the place, time, and figures out of his head.
It was almost a case of working a good horse
to death.1
The Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe,

was officially dedicated on April 2, 1951, and Eisenhower

enthusiastically reported that Gruenther was the service

 

1Coughlan, "Thinking Machine Who Bosses NATO,"
p. 84.

25

specialist on international affairs and that he had a
complete comprehension of the job-~that he was the ob-
vious and inevitable choice as Chief of Staff.

In 1952 when Eisenhower returned to the United
States to run for President, it was well-known that Eisen-
hower hoped to see his close friend Al Gruenther succeed
him.

But it was General Matthew B. Ridgway who was
appointed Supreme Commander following Eisenhower's de-
parture, and General Gruenther remained as Chief of Staff
for Ridgway.

There are various opinions expressed by writers
during this period concerning the rationale that led to
the selection of Ridgway as the successor to Eisenhower.

Hauser, the Paris correspondent for the Saturday
Evening Post at that time stated it this way:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington pre-
ferred a combat soldier . . . Ridgway, identi-
fied with some of the military exploits of
WOrld war II and an outstanding success as UN
Supreme Commander in Korea, was the man best

suited to implement the design with olive
drab realities.1

 

1Hauser, "The Army's Biggest Brain," p. 33.

26

Coughlan Of Life Magazine reasoned thus on the

choice of Ridgway over Gruenther:
It seemed to a majority of the NATO countries
that the situation called for a man with field
command experience to succeed him [Eisenhower].
However, when General Ridgway was chosen it was
with the proviso on their part that Gruenther
remain as Chief of Staff, and when the top job
fell vacant again due to Ridgway's election to

Chief of Staff of the Army, Gruenther was the
logical successor.1

Perhaps the above two viewpoints are not as con-
flicting as would appear on the surface. Perhaps both
versions are reconcilable, in that the NATO countries and
the Washington, D. C. Chiefs of Staff preferred Ridgway
for the reasons given. However, the explanation that it
was agreed in advance that Gruenther was to succeed Ridg-
way as Supreme Commander when Ridgway became Chief of
Staff cf-the Army appears problematical as well as conjec-
tural at this point of time. The writer wonders whether
Washington would document a successor to any post in
advance.

Edmond Taylor, columnist and author, indicated

that one of the reasons why Ridgway, a great combat soldier,

l
Coughlan, "Thinking Machine Who Bosses NATO," p. 88.

27

seemed out of place at SHAPE was that he surrounded him-
self with a hand-picked team of U.S. officers. He seldom
talked to any non-Americans.

Gruenther, on the other hand, went out of his way
to emphasize the international character of SHAPE. He
tried to set an example by associating both professionally
and socially with the British, French, and other non-
American officers on his staff.

Time Magazine stated the reasons more frankly:
"General Matthew Ridgway was a blunt soldier who demanded
more troops than the Europeans were willing to supply,

stepped on many toes, and left no happy memories."2

 

1Edmond Taylor, "The Atlantic Alliance: After
Gruenther, What?," The Reporter, June 2, 1955, p. 19.

 

2Time Magazine, Foreign News Section--"NATO,"
February 6, 1956, p. 25.

28
Command vs. Staff Qualifications

It is apparent that the Chiefs of Staff in Wash-
ington distinguish between the qualifications needed for
command work and those needed for gtgff work.1

However, with an International Alliance such as
NATO (just as in the international holding company in
business), the specific demarcation between staffand
command seem to disappear. SHAPE is not a fighting unit,
but is charged with the formulation of an overall defense
plan. The routine command decisions are obviously dele-

gated to the generals and colonels in the field of the

various NATO countries.

 

1Obviously, the military commander (comparable to
the manager or president in business parlance of "line or-
ganization") is the boss. He must assume the responsibil-
ity of decision-making and issuing orders. Consequently,
he receives the blame or praise by the public, depending
upon the outcome. In large units of military performance,
a staff person (or persons) supply the much-needed informa-
tion about the commander's and the enemy's situations, sug-
gest courses of action, relay the commands of the superior
and see they are carried out.(and supervise all other essen-
tials to enable the unit to maintain itself as an effective
force.) This military concept of Staff can be likened to
the Staff positions in business which provide the essential
information and analysis to aid the Line Executives'Who are

reaponsible for the decision-making and execution of the
program.

 

no.‘

 
 
 
 
 
 

 

a\\
I‘

29

Eisenhower, himself, had no command experience when
he was catapulted into the Supreme Command after Pearl Har-

bor, and he certainly chaulked up an outstanding record of

achievement.

General Alfred M. Gruenther's Appointment
by_the North Atlantic Council as Supreme

Commander of the Allied Powers of Eurgpe

In 1953 when Ridgway was recalled to Washington
for his appointment as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army,
Gruenther succeeded him as Supreme Commander of the Allied
Powers in Europe, and at 52 years of age became the young-

est Four-Star General in the Army.

Questions were posed by some observers who voiced
doubts about Gruenther's ability to practice the rare art

of command at the highest levels.

A British Sunday paper pointed out:

Gruenther's lack of command experience is re-
garded by many as a handicap which Gruenther
will find it difficult to overcome. As Chief

of Staff he has been used to working on projects
in great detail, mastering the facts for himself.
As Supreme Commander . . . he will have to rise
above the facts . . . to make decisions instead

of tendering advice, and this calls for qualities

30
not always found in the man who has made his
mark only as a staff officer.1
Edmond Taylor points out that the doubters turned
out to be right in one way and wrong in another.
Gruenther had no difficulty in learning to look
at the big picture through a Supreme Commander's
spectacles. The speech with which he grew into
his new job surprised even his greatest admirers.2
Taylor further observed, however, that Gruenther never
completely grew out of the periphery of staff responsibil-
ities, but he simple worked with equal efficiency at 339'
levels.3
In Army circles it is a well-known axiom that
talent for detail is a priceless quality in a staff offi-
cer, but it can be disastrous in a commander. Some senior
NATO officers were worried that Gruenther would let details
distract him from broader thinking, but they learned with

amazement of his ability to clear his mind and his desk

with "lightning speed." They realized that he never did

 

1 .
Hauser, "The Army's Biggest Brain," p. 34.
2Taylor, "The Atlantic Alliance: After Gruenther,
What? I“ P. 19.

3Ibid.

31
abandon the detail for which he possessed the type of mind
which could operate brilliantly in two areas simultaneously
with no limit of efficiency in either area.

As Supreme Commander, as well as Chief of Staff in
former assignments, Gruenther always had "time" for people.
Whatever pressures he happened to be under, he would dis-
miss them to make a caller feel at ease. Visitors found
him calm, and ready to give his undivided attention to the
interview. The writer personally experienced this attri-
bute of General Gruenther at SHAPE and in later interviews
in Washington. This characteristic was further confirmed
to the writer by Staff members at SHAPE who also pointed
out that newsmen consider Gruenther a perfect news source
and most cooperative in press interviews. After all, he
is the son of a newspaper publisher and understands the

press point of view.

 

The above profile of GRUENTHER--THE MAN is the
background prerequisite to the exploration of the partic-
ular focus in this paper--his speaking to NATO Members to
promote the defense alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization.

on
u

a...

 

.
o...

“—

 

32

However, to complete our profile of General Gruen-
ther, it is essential to include here an Epilogue which
details his career following his retirement from SHAPE;
and covers his continuing dedication to mankind through
the acceptance of the Presidency of the American Red Cross
from 1957 to 1964, and his world-wide speaking commitments
since 1964 to spread the crusade for international under-

standing, peace, and freedom for all people.

 

I~

 

 

 

 

Epilogue

When General Gruenther retired from the Army as
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Europe on Janu-
ary 1, 1957, he sought neither money nor a life of ease.
It is well-known that General Gruenther could have named
his own price in private industry, for he had demonstrated
his outstanding leadership ability as the Army's leading
intellect, a man blessed with organizational talent bor-
dering on genius.

Instead, he accepted the invitation of the Ameri-
can Red Cross to serve as their National President at a
salary which other men with his military honors and
achievements would probably classify as "coolie wages."l

His office as President was in the Washington
Headquarters of the American Red Cross. His indefatig-

able energy and indomitable dedication to digging for the

 

1Richard Carter, "The Controversial Red Cross,"
Holiday Magazine, February 1960.

33

 

sue .

 

 

 

.
C
I“ .
s. .
a
n
A
I ..
I.

 

‘I..h

 

 

 

 

   

 

34

facts, whatever his assignment, scored for him a record
for Red Cross service which was labeled by the nation-
wide community leaders and Headquarters Staff of Red Cross
as "the greatest since Clara Barton."

General Gruenther delivered inspiring, challenging,
and persuasive speeches throughout the country in behalf
of the Red Cross. He spoke to gain support for the organ-
ization's fund-raising projects--projects earmarked to
provide aid for disaster areas and community improvement.
He also spoke to promote enlistment for volunteer service.
He criss-crossed this continent and others, many times,
preaching the values of enlisting in the world cause of
the Red Cross. From January 1, 1957 to March 31, 1964,
during the seven and one-fourth years General Gruenther
served as President of the American Red Cross, he made
802 speeches and travelled 741,250 miles.1

Just as he appealed for the coopEration of the
European countries in NATO and the need for military com-

mitments for the defense of their populace, so also he

 

1

Statistics secured from official records of
American Red Cross by General Gruenther who conveyed
the information to this writer.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

\
h
l

35

subsequently appealed to people to provide volunteer
service and funds for the aid of mankind.

(In Appendix D will be found two representative
speeches General Gruenther delivered in behalf of the

American Red Cross.)

Upon his retirement on March 31, 1964, at 65 years
of age as President of the American Red Cross, General
Gruenther in an interview with the Associated Press offered
a "Prescription for Effective Americanism"--"Cherish self-
discipline, education, individual responsibility, and the
spirit of voluntary work for the public good."

(No one can ever say that General Gruenther has
not practiced the virtues he preaches in his public speak-
ing! It is well-known that few speakers can really live
up to what they urge others to do.)

Innumerable newspapers throughout the country
carried the release on General Gruenther's retirement

from the American Red Cross, and each article featured

36

his "Prescription for Effective Americanism" stated
above.

The Winchester Evening Star of Winchester, Vir-
ginia, published an article headed "A Great American"
which so aptly describes the retiring President of the
American Red Cross and GRUENTHERr-THE MAN, profiled in
this paper, that it is included in its entirety below:

From a country newspaper shop in Platte Center,
Neb., by way of West Point and a succession of
Army staff duties, to Supreme Commander of the
Allied Powers in Europe ---

From international military fame to a place of
broad civilian rebponsibility and service as
president of American National Red Cross ---
This was the career of General Alfred Maximilian
Gruenther, who at the age of 65 retires March 31
from the Red Cross.

Those who know A1 Gruenther have observed at

close range the qualities which made him what
he is: brains, decisiveness, concentration on

 

1 . .

Several representative copies of releases in the
writer's file recording General Gruenther's retirement
message in the following communities:

News Register (Wheeling, W. Virginia), 3/24/64
The Herald (Wheeling, W. Virginia), 3/24/64
Journal Herald (Dayton, Ohio), 3/26/64

Globe (Joplin, Mo.), 3/26/64

Miami Herald (Miami, Fla.), 3/24/64

Enterprise (High Point, N.C.), 3/24/64

The Times Union (Rochester, N.Y.), 3/28/64

37

the task in hand, cheerfulness, confidence,
consideration for others, and, above all,
devotion to duty.

Dwight Eisenhower, whose chief of staff he was
before he succeeded Ike at Supreme European
Headquarters, considered General Gruenther
competent to be President of the United States,
a position he might have attained had he en-
tered politics.

General Gruenther's military rank never gave
him delusions of grandeur. More than most
men in high places, he knew how to "walk with
kings nor lose the common touch." He was as
much at ease with a committee of volunteer
workers in the smallest Red Cross chapter as
with presidents and prime ministers of NATO
countries.

When he retired from the Army he took a course
plotted a century ago by Robert E. Lee when
General Lee assumed the Presidency of Washing-
ton College, now Washington & Lee University.
Like Lee, Gruenther sought not money-making
but a path of unselfish service. For General
Gruenther this was the humanitarian work of
the Red Cross.

His words on retirement from Red Cross could
appropriately describe his own principles:

"Cherish self-discipline, education, individual
responsibility, and the spirit of voluntary work

for the public good."

1
A grateful country salutes General Gruenther!

 

1
‘ (Winchester Evening Star, Winchester, Virginia
(March 26, 1964).

38

General Gruenther received Red Cross decorations
from many countries of the world, including Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, Chile, Ethiopia, Finland, Greece,

Japan, Philippines, USSR (Badge of Honor).

He has also received military and diplomatic decor-
ations from over 15 countries of the world, and innumerable
awards and recognitions by the United States, including
military, religious, and humanitarian service citations.

General Gruenther has been awarded no fewer than
37 honorary degrees from American universities, including
Columbia University, Dartmouth College, Harvard University,
Loyola University (Chicago), Loyola University (Los Angeles),
University of Maryland, New York University, Yale Univer-
sity, etc.

He is also a member of the Board of Directors of
the following corporations: Pan American World Airways,
New York Life Insurance Company, Rexall Drug and Chemical
Company, and Federated Department Stores.

As a public relations emissary in the area of in-

ternational relations and understanding General Gruenther

 

1A detailed listing of his many activities, Honor-
ary Degrees, Decorations, and Awards will be found in Ap-
pendix F.

39

has travelled over a half million miles throughout the
world in these last five years since his retirement from
the American Red Cross, to continue his service to man-

1
kind.

 

lStatistics conveyed to this writer by General
Gruenther, August 5, 1969: "Since retirement from the
American Red Cross on March 31, 1964, through the year
of 1968 travelled 469,000 miles; since January 1969 to
August 5 travelled 55,000 miles--a total of over a half
million miles in the last five years."

CHAPTER II.

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC

TREATY ORGANIZATION

To understand the elements included in General
Gruenther's speaking as Commander of the Supreme Head-
quarters of the Allied Powers in Europe, it is necessary
to review briefly the origin and development of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. No attempt is made to pro-
vide a definitive history; rather, attention is given to
those matters which illuminate both the problems faced by
Gruenther and his listeners and also the proposals made
by Gruenther in his attempt to provide solutions to these
problems.

On June 26, 1945, the representatives of fifty
nations signed the United Nations Charter in San Fran-
cisco, and people of the world hoped that peace had at
last dawned after one of the most ruthless wars in his-
tory .

40

41

Peace, however, was not assured, for the Western
countries were confronted with a new threat: the expan-
sionist policy of the Soviet Union. The defeat of Germany
and Japan, two great military and industrial powers, re-
sulted in an extensive "vacuum" to the east and the west
of the Soviet Union. Under these favorable circumstances
the Kremlin used the combined strength of their Red Army
and World Communism to conduct their imperialistic policy.

The Western democracies demobilized almost all
their armed forces following the War in keeping with their
wartime pledges and popular demand. The United States and
the United Kingdom withdrew the bulk of their armed forces
from Europe, with the exception of occupation forces and
units committed in other parts of the world.

Whereas the armed strength of the Allied Forces
in Europe at the time of the surrender of Germany was
about five million men, one year later following demobili-
zation, their armed strength amounted to no more than
880,000 men. The following table shows the exact strengths

.after demobilization:

42

STRENGTH OF ALLIED FORCES IN 1945 VS. 1946*

12.42 1.22.6.
United States 3,100,000 men 391,000 men
United Kingdom 1,321,000 men 488,000 men
Canada - 299,000 men 0 men

 

*NATO--Fa¢ts about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
Nato Information Service, Paris, France, January, 1962,
p. 4. '

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, continued
their armed forces on a wartime basis. In 1945 their
strength exceeded four million men. The Kremlin also
kept their war industries going at full blast!

History books on this period record the innumer-
able attempts of political conciliation with the USSR by
the Western Powers, who made every effort to make the
United Nations an effective instrument of peace. The
series of obstructions from 1945 to 1947 promulgated by
the Soviet Union delayed the culmination of peace treaties.
While the Peace Conference opened in Paris on July 29,
1946, the peace treaties with Italy, Finland, Bulgaria,

lhmgary, and Roumania were not signed until February 10,

1947.

o .
-..1
I

 

 

 

 

 

D.-
\

 

 

 

 

43

Between 1945 and December, 1960, the Soviet Union
vetoed decisions taken by the Security Council of the

United Nations on nearly one hundred different occasions.

Soviet Territorial Expansion

Soviet territorial expansion, of course, had al-
ready begun during the war by the annexation of Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania, together with certain parts of Fin-
land, Poland, Roumania, North-eastern Germany, and Eastern
Czechoslovakia--a total of about 180,000 square miles of
territory occupied by more than 23 million inhabitants.2

This type of territorial expansion continued after
the defeat of Germany and was supplemented by a policy of
control over the countries of Eastern Europe. The Soviet
strategy of Communist infiltration into "popular front"
governments compelled Albania, Bulgaria, Roumania, Eastern

Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia to fall within

 

1NATOF-Facts about the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-
ization, p. 5.

21bido I p. 5.

44

the Soviet domination (an area of about 390,000 square
miles and a population of over 90 million non-Russian in-
habitants.)1 And this campaign was effectively accom-
plished as a "conquest without war."

The Communist parties in Western Europe, on
orders from Moscow, strengthened Soviet policy
by propaganda and by a course of action which
opposed any Western viewpoint which was out

of line with Soviet aims.

As the gulf widened between the Western Powers
and the Soviet Union, the Communist parties in
the West allied themselves with the Opposition,
and obeyed instructions from abroad. This
trend was further reinforced by the setting
up, in September, 1947, of the Cominform, the
Communist answer to the Marshall Plan. The
members of the Cominform were the leaders of
the Communist parties in the USSR, Poland,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Hungary,
Yugoslayia, France, Italy, and later, the
Netherlands.

At the end of 1947, directions for agitation

and orders to strike supported a concerted and
virulent campaign of opposition throughout the
whole of Western Europe. The struggle continued
with persistent attempts to infiltrate into all
branches of activity in the Western countries,
notably into the trade unions, in France and
Italy in particular.2

The free countries of Europe recognized the import-

ance of finding a means of guaranteeing their freedom and

 

1Ibid. 2Ibid., p. 8.

45

security in the face of Soviet expansion. And they turned
toward the United States--the one country who was strong
enough to pose a threat to the USSR. As history has re-
vealed, the reaction of the United States was prompt and
decisive. Four hundred million dollars for aid to Greece
and Turkey were dispatched through the "Truman Doctrine"--
and the organization of American civilian and military
missions to these countries was authorized by Congress.
The well-known Marshall Plan, authored by the Secretary

of State of the U.S., General George C. Marshall, initiated
the idea of a program for European recovery.

Interestingly enough, this offer of economic assis-
tance in 1947 which contributed so effectively to the re-
covery of the western countries was also open to the Soviet
Union and the countries behind the Iron Curtain. However,
Stalin refused all American aid for the USSR and despite
initial interest on the part of both Czechoslovakia and
Poland, forced all satellite governments to do likewise.
When the Prague coup d'état in February, 1948, brought
Czechoslovakia into the Soviet orbit, the Western allies
in western EurOpe unanimously recognized that common de-

fensive action was needed.

46

The Brussels Treatyé-The Forerunner to
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

On March 17, 1948, Belgium, France, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom signed the Brussels
Treaty. On that date in Brussels they pledged to build up
a common defense system and to strengthen their economic
and cultural ties.

But the Brussels Treaty was scarcely signed when
the Russians began their blockade of west Berlin (June,
1948) which was scheduled to last for 323 days. However,
the Western Powers countered the blockade by the organiza-
tion of the historic "Air Lift" (which lasted 11 months)--
spearheaded and implemented primarily by the United States.
The dramatic memorial built by the West Berliners in tri-
bute to the aid of the U.S. Air-Lift which daily delivered
their supplies and raw materials is a constant reminder to
West Berlin of America's friendship.

The blockade hastened the setting up of Western
defense, and in September, 1948, a military body was estab-
lished with the Brussels Treaty known as The western Union

Defense Organization. Field Marshall Montgomery was

47

appointed Chairman of the Commanders-in-Chief: and his
Headquarters were set up at Fontainebleau, France.

The Brussels Treaty of the free countries in
Europe created the initial interest of the-United States
in the problems of security in the North Atlantic area.
The idea of a single mutual defense system, including
and superseding the Brussels Treaty, was promoted in the
Canadian House of Commons, with the hope of course that
the United States should be able constitutionally to join
the Atlantic Alliance.

Following the acceptance by the U.S. Senate of a
resolution drafted by Senator Vandenberg, preliminary
talks opened in Washington in July, 1948, between the
State Department and the Ambassadors of Canada and the
Powers of the Western European Union. The Consultative
Council of the five Treaty Powers of the Brussels Treaty
announced complete agreement on the principle of a defen-
sive pact for the North Atlantic area. In March, 1949,
the Brussels Treaty Signatory Powers, Canada, and the
United States officially invited Denmark, Iceland, Italy,

Norway, and Portugal to accept the Treaty.

48

On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was
signed in Washington by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and the
United States. Subsequently three other countries joined
the twelve original signatories. Greece and Turkey were
invited to join the Alliance in September, 1951 (signing
the Treaty in February, 1952), and the Federal Republic
of Germany officially became a member of the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization on May 9, 1955.

The North Atlantic Treaty

First and foremost, the North Atlantic Treaty sets
up a traditional defensive alliance whereby "an armed at-
tack against one . . . shall be considered an attack
against . . . all" (Article 5). Article 2 seeks to pro-
mote "economic collaboration."1 But for various reasons

the Alliance has always been subject to stresses and

 

1
See Appendix A for text of the North Atlantic
Treaty .

49

strains in this economic area, despite their successive
and persistent efforts.l For example, the continuing
problem related to the Common Market and the thwarting
of Great Britain's participation by France is indicative
of one of the major struggles in the area of economic
collaboration in NATO.

The most decisive break of precedent by the United
States in entering the North Atlantic Alliance consisted
in the deviation from its long enduring American philosophy

of isolationism expounded by the founding fathers.

 

The vast majority of Americans presumably
recognize that in the face of the Soviet chal-
lenge, the isolationism of an earlier age has
become either a luxury that can no longer be
afforded, or an embarrassing legacy that must
be concealed whenever possible.2

It must be conceded that isolationism was a very
useful philosophy in the development of nineteenth cen-
tury America. For the themes of "isolation," "America's

remoteness from Europe," and all the "dangers of military

 

lRichard Mayne, "Europe's Scrambled Algebra,"
NATO's Fifteen Nations, Feb.-March, 1965, p. 20.

2Lawrence S. Kaplan, "NATO and the Language of
Isolationism," The South Atlanticguarterly, Vol. LVII
(Spring, 1958), p. 204.

50

alliance" were included in the proclamations on foreign
policy in Washington's Farewell Address, Jefferson's First
Inaugural Address, and the Monroe Doctrine!

Perhaps this philosophy of isolationism explains

the early misgivings and apprehension concerning NATO re-
. 1
flected by public opinion in the United States.

Will L. Clayton, president of the Atlantic Union
Committee, defended the North Atlantic Treaty against the
barbs of anti-isolationism with this statement:

The world has gone through such a revolutionary
change in the last few years that I cannot help
feeling that if George Washington and our fore-
fathers lived in the present, they would do
exactly what we are doing.

The real fear of the Treaty's supporters in the
Administration and in the Senate was the implication of

the militagy alliance which was interpreted by many as

adding up to another war. The Administration pointed

 

lReticence in accepting NATO was reflected by a
U.S. International Education Association who appointed
this writer to attend the NATO Conference in Copenhagen,
Denmark, in 1953 as a "quiet observer" and not as an
official delegate of the organization. (The NATO invi-
tation urged delegate representation.)

2Kaplan, "NATO and the Language of Isolationism,"
p. 211.

51

out that this new alliance could not be likened to the
"military alliance" of the previous hundred years, but
was merely for defense--that it did not contemplate
conquest or aggression.

But another major criticism of the Treaty by U.S.
Senate leaders concerned the potential usurpation of Con-
gressional responsibility for declaring war, since by
Article 5 of the Treaty, the war-making power was at the
discretion of either one or more of the eleven allies.
Article 5 would force the United States into war, since
an attack on one was to be considered an attack on all.
It was further pointed out that the highly regarded Rio
de Janeiro Pact of 1947 at least noted in its Article 20
that "no state shall be required to use armed forces
without its consent."

The many criticismsof the North Atlantic Treaty

required considerable skill in arbitrating--

 

1As will be noted in Chapters III, IV, and V,
General Gruenther's speeches consistently included the
theme that SHAPE--the military arm of NATO--was completely
dedicated to building an army shield for defense, Egg
aggression.

52

The concept of an alliance was truly a Pandora's

box containing the plagues of war, sabotage of

the Constitution, raid on the United States

Treasury, etc. For all the caution displayed

by the managers of the pact, some of those

plagues were bound to escape even if the box

officially remained closed.1

It will be noted that the language of Article 5
was not a major asset to the Pact's cause--"even under
the most charitable interpretation"2 and its defenders
were well aware of this liability. Thus, they pointed
out that the emphasis in the text of the Treaty was as
much on the promotion of stability, the safeguarding of
their common heritage, and the encouragement of economic
collaboration as on the guarantees against external
aggression.
The North Atlantic Treaty was ultimately accepted

on terms laid down by the Government on July 21, 1949.

. . . The Senate Committee on Foreign Rela-

tions . . . convinced isolationists that the

pact conformed with the spirit of the Monroe

Doctrine and had nothing in common with the

old European military alliances. In brief,
the Government succeeded in invoking the

 

1Kaplan, "NATO and the Language of Isolationism,“
p. 212. '

2Ibid., p. 213.

53

shibboleths of isolationism to win acceptance
of a policy that marked a departure from the

isolationist traditions . . . . But what-
ever the language employed in 1949, Europeans

at last knew that the vast weight America
could wield in international politics had
swung behind them.1
The organization of common defenses was a many-
faceted task, with political, economic, and financial
aspects as well as purely military ones. The total struc-
ture of the organization included (1) The North Atlantic

Council and its Committees, (2) the International Secre-

tariat, and (3) the Military Structure.2

The North Atlantic Treaty at WOrk

The North Atlantic Council met for the first time
in Washington on September 17 and 19, 1949, and began to
build a civilian and military framework. The Council of
Foreign Ministers of member countries was scheduled to

meet annually in ordinary session. (A special session

 

1Ibid., p. 215.

SeeAppendixA for four.charts Covering the Civil
and Military Organization of NATO.

54

could be convened at any time that a member were to invoke

Article 4 or 5 of the Treaty). The Council created a De-

fense Committee composed of the Defense Ministers of mem-
ber countries, responsible for drawing up coordinated

defense plans for the North Atlantic area.

A number of permanent military bodies were set up
including a Military Committee, consisting of Chiefs-of-
Staff of member countries responsible‘fOr advising the

Council. in military -' matters.

The Foreign Ministers directed that the questions
of adequate forces and their financing should be tackled

as a single problem rather than separately. They noted

that the combined resources of the member countries were
sufficient to achieve the progressive and rapid develop-

ment of adequate defenses without impairing social and

economic progress. They urged governments to concentrate

on Setting up balanced collective forces for the overall

defense . 1

\

I Aspects of NATO--The First Twenty Years, NATO
nformation Service, Brussels 39, p. 7 (A brochure con-

taining extracts from the book NATO--Facts and Figures
° be published in 1969.).

9
a. "‘

1:, A
h.. v

I
. ..
x.‘ .,

b
1“.

 

I“

55

Soon after these first meetings, there occurred
an event which had a far-reaching effect on the evolution
of NATO-~the Communist attack upon South Korea. All mem-
ber countries of the United Nations were requested by the
Security Council to go to the assistance of the South

Korean Republic.

New Defense Policy of NATO--
The Forward Strategy_

When the Council met again in New York on Septem-
ber 15 to 18, 1950, its discussions concentrated on the
problem of how to defend the NATO area against an aggres-
sion similar to that in Korea. It was unanimously agreed
that a Forward Strategy must be adopted for Europe, i.e.,
any aggression must be resisted as far to the East as pos-
Sible in order to ensure the defense of all the European
member countries. Such a strategy, however, demanded
forces far exceeding those available to NATO at that time
(approximately fourteen divisions on the European contin-

ent as against some 210 Soviet divisions). It was urgent

.
Jinan
r .-

op...-

 

 

On’ 1!

~..

0. .-
'9‘”

a
g

n’ ‘
es

 

56

that military strength would have to be built up and de-
fense plans revised!

The Council further recognized that a Forward
Strategy implied the defense of Europe on German soil,
and decided to study the problem of the political and
military participation of the Federal Republic. The
twelve divisions that the Federal Republic of Germany
could contribute were also a very important positive fac-
tor for their inclusion in NATO. (Germany's participa-
tion raised many difficulties of principle for some mem-
ber countries--especia11y France--and it was not until
four years later, in May 1955, that the Federal Republic
of Germany officially became a member of NATO.)

At Brussels on December 18, 1950, the Council
node some important decisions on military matters; it
aPproved (l) the Defense Committee's recommendations for
the creation of an integrated European defense force, (2)
the establishment of a Supreme Headquarters in Europe,
and (3) the reorganization of the NATO military structure.
It decided that the Supreme Headquarters should be placed

uhder an American officer, and requested President Truman

57

to designate General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme
Allied Commander (SACEUR). The President agreed, and on
December 19, 1950, the Council officially announced the
appointment.1

On April 2, 1951, General Eisenhower issued Gen-
eral Order No. 1, activating Allied Command Europe and
the Supreme Headquarters--Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE),
Paris, France.

Based on the principle_that the burden of defend-
ing the West should be shared equitably among the member
countries, it recognized that the defense build-up must
rest on a foundation of social and economic stability
which demanded expanded production by concerted action.
Through the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, a procedure
was adopted whereby the United States purchased from one
Or another European member equipment to be given to it
Or to another member (thus helping to relieve "balance
0f payment difficulties" on their war debts to the United

States).

M

1Ibid.,'p. 9.

.‘I:

5-. .

v
‘p- e

r...

 

1..

I

It.
1“

.a

u

 

 

58

On February 18, 1952, Greece and Turkey were ac-
cepted in the NATO Alliance, bringing the total to 14
member countries.

As reported in Chapter I, General Eisenhower
asked to be released as Supreme Commander in 1952 in
order to return to the United States and enter the Presi-
dential campaign; and on April 28, 1952, the Permanent
Council appointed General Matthew B. Ridgway to the post
of Supreme Allied Commander in replacement of General
Eisenhower. A year later when General Ridgway was re-
called to Washington to become Chief of Staff of the U.S.
Army, General Alfred M. Gruenther succeeded him as the
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in EurOpe on July
10, 1953.

General Gruenther did not assume his new post as
a stranger, for he had been closely associated with the
defense organization since its formation as Chief of Staff
for both General Eisenhower and General Ridgway, his prede-
cessors. He came to his post as a master-planner of large-
Sca1e defense moves. But equally important, he also came

to this post as a "master-speaker" to enlist the interest

59

and support of the NATO countries in the need for a de-

fense alliance and to persuade the reluctant governments
to complete their military commitments in readiness for

any eventuality of attack.

Gruenther moved into SHAPE at a far more diffi-
cult period of time than Eisenhower for enlisting cooper-
ation on military contributions. When Eisenhower was em-
barking upon broad and extensive plans for the defense
alliance, the psychological situation was far more con-
ducive to cooperation, with the Korean conflict at its
peak. There were also reports that atomic explosions
were being tested in the USSR. The Western nations were
fearful of their future and were willing to cooperate on
mutual defense.

However, when Gruenther assumed command of SHAPE,
the member countries had been lulled into apathy by the
temporary change from "frown" to "smile" of the Kremlin.
The Korean armistice had been accomplished, the tension
had eased, and western Europe was weary of military mobil-

ization and expenditures. Americans, too, were growing

60

tired of foreign-aid grants which NATO needed to prevent

the collapse of its military structure.1

 

1The variance between the two periods (Eisenhower's
command and Gruenther's) is described by General Gruenther
in a speech delivered in New York, at the Alfred E. Smith
Memorial Foundation dinner, on October 8, 1953:

I think that it requires no great vision to
be able to predict that NATO's next three years
will be more difficult than its first three year
period.

It is well to recognize that NATO was created
in an atmosphere of fear. The threat was towering
and immediate. The hour was late. The whips of
fear drove us into each other's arms. Ancient
rivalries were forgotten. Political differences
were reconciled. Confronted by the facts and by
the question of survival, we found that survival
was paramount and all else secondary. That ele-
ment of fear is beginning to disappear. One reason
is the very success we have to date in building up
a certain degree of strength in NATO. We have
grown stronger, and many hope--rather wishfully,

I fear--that Soviet intentions are changing. I
think it would be a tragic mistake for us to lower
our guard now.

As for the military potential of the Soviet
bloc, there is no evidence to indicate that it is
lessening. On the contrary, all of the intelli-
gence reports available to us indicate that it is
increasing.

From Vital Speeches of the Dgy, October 15,
1953, p. 76.

A similar version of the above message is also in-
Cluded in General Gruenther's speech delivered in Copen-
hogan, Denmark, on August 31, 1953. The text for the
Copenhagen Speech" was sent to the writer by the Public

61

Another contributing factor for the lack of in-
terest in a military alliance resided in the United Na-
tions Conferences--the Summit Conference and the Geneva
Conference--which provided the atmosphere of Soviet
friendliness--a continuation of Russia's ruse! The con-
ference proceedings recorded discussion on disarmament
and the de-emphasis of nuclear weapon production, thus
lessening the fear of any further war and adding to the
apathy of military mobilization for defense.

"In their reply to a Soviet note of March 31,
1954, the United States, United Kingdom and France re-
jected the USSR's bid to join NATO!"1 (Just another
ruse of Russia's "friendship.")

With the Soviets leaning toward peaceful moves,
and the desires of the Western werld to cut down_on taxes
for military expenditures, General Gruenther faced many-

Problems in building collective military defense for NATO.

‘—

Information Division of SHAPE and is analyzed in Chapter
III as a Case Study.

1
Aspects of NATO--Chronology_(1945-1969),.NATO
Information Service, Brussels, p. 12.

62

At the suggestion of the British Government,
the London Conference held from September 28-
October 3, 1954, brought together the Foreign
Ministers of the five Brussels Treaty powers,
and they included Germany, Italy, the United
States and Canada. The conference formulated
a series of decisions to form a part of a gen-
eral settlement which concerned, directly or
indirectly, all the NATO powers.l

This was a strategic move for the British Govern-
ment to invite the Federal Republic of Germany to the Lon-
don Conference, and thus pave the way for more receptivity
for her inclusion in the NATO Alliance. Subsequently, in
a Paris meeting of the NATO members, the approval to bring
the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO was secured. All
the governments represented at the London Conference also
agreed that the North Atlantic Treaty should be regarded
as being of indefinite duration. The provision of the
agreements in this important meeting in Paris may be sum?

marized as follows:

France, the United Kingdom and the United States
terminated the occupation regime in the Federal

Republic of Germany and recognized it as a sover-
eign State . . . .

The Federal Republic of Germany and Italy acceded
to the Brussels Treaty and the Western Union

 

l A '
Aspects of NATO, The First Twenty Years, p. 17.

63

became the Western European Union (WEU). There
was to be extremely close cooperation between

the WEU and NATO.

The Federal Republic of Germany was invited to
join NATO, contributing a national army to be
integrated into the forces of the Alliance . . . .
The United States and United Kingdom . . . under-
took to maintain for as long as necessary their
forces on the European continent. (President
Eisenhower publicly confirmed this undertaking

on March 5, 1955.) A unified military formation
was to be established by assigning to the Supreme
Allied Commander Europe all member countries'

forces . . . stationed within the area of his
command.1

The accession Of the Federal Republic of Germany
to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization became effec-
tive on May 9, 1955. Two days later the USSR denounced
its treaties with France and the United Kingdom; and on
May 14, 1955, in retaliation to the Paris Agreements with
the acceptance of the Federal Republic of Germany in NATO,
the USSR concluded the Warsaw Pact with its European satel-
lites.

This Pact, signed in Warsaw, was the first time
a formal multilateral military alliance tied together the

Soviet Union and the Communist States of Eastern Europe.

 

1
Ibid., p. 18.

64

The structure of the Warsaw Pact and its terminology were
closely modeled on NATO. The most important difference
between NATO and the WTO (Warsaw Treaty Organization) is
that "whereas any member of NATO can withdraw from the
alliance, no such thing can even be contemplated by any
member of WTO, as was seen by the painful experience of
Hungary in 1956."1

On May 15, 1956, the Austrian State Treaty was
signed which ended the Four-Power occupation regime in
that country. The success in securing Russia's approval
of withdrawal from Austria provided a strategic time to
follow up with the USSR on an agreement that Germany's
reunification should take place under terms permitting
her to remain in the Western Alliance. But the Soviet
Union rejected this view at the Second Geneva Conference

in October, 1955. However, the NATO Council declared

that the negative outcome of the conference with the USSR

 

1Major E. Hinterhoff, "The Czechoslovak Crisis
and the Warsaw Pact," NATO's Fifteen Nations, Oct-Nov.
1968, p. 28. (In recognition of his writings on the
Warsaw Pact, the author was awarded the NATO Research
Fellowship in 1962.)

65

"in no way halted the efforts of the North Atlantic Powers
to secure the reunification of Germany in freedom."1

In the years during his assignment as Supreme Com-
mander of the Allied Powers in Europe, as well as during
the period since his military retirement in 1956, General
Gruenther has continued to convey the theory of Russia's
fanatical dedication to world domination by the spread of
Communism throughout the world despite the spasmodic in-
terludes alternating as "friend" and "foe." Gruenther had
to persuade the NATO members of Russia's continuous at-
tempts to divide and weaken Western EurOpe, and to encour-
age them to support the NATO military alliance with in-
creasing commitments for successful defense.

With so many problems in the military as well as
the political-diplomatic realms, it became apparent that
face-to-face oral communication could be an important
tool in resolving these complex difficulties. Although
NATO was a Western Alliance and General Gruenther was
speaking to the Western Allies, his speaking was also

of vital interest to the rest of the world. Russia, for

 

lIbid., p. 19.

66

instance, was eager to study the content of the Gruenther
messages of defense against aggression.

Through personal visits and talks with govern-
mental officials, foreign ministers, diplomats, and mili-
tary heads of the NATO countries, Gruenther sought to se-
cure their support. He lacked any definite authority;
he had no power to dictate to the member nations and
force them to build up military defenses; he had no right
to issue commands in this political and diplomatic realm
to secure cooperation. His strength was derived from a
wealth of information, the conviction that his proposal
was valid, and the personal attributes needed to bring
about agreement, cooperation, and goodwill.

It is General Gruenther's role as an oral advo-
Cate in appealing to the NATO countries for cooperation
and support of the military alliance which will be ana-

lyzed in the succeeding chapters of this study.

Epilogue

Since NATO is considered even more important at
the present time with the continuing and more serious dis-
agreements of the USSR with the Western World, it is logi-
cal that a brief review of the events following General
Gruenther's retirement from SHAPE is in order.

In August, 1956, the writer interviewed both Gen-
eral Gruenther and General Lauris Norstad, Gruenther's
successor, in their respective offices at SHAPE, located
in Marly, France (suburb of Paris). A transcription of
the tape recordings of interviews with both Generals is
included in Appendix B along with photographs of this
occasion. It is interesting to note that General Gruen-
ther's replies to the questions posed by the interviewer
in 1956 are just as appropriate in their application to
the current problems with the USSR as thbse prevailing
in the earlier period. True to General Gruenther's pre-
diction, the USSR continues unwaveringly in its fanatic

67

68

dedication to world domination by its spread of Communism
throughout the world, necessitating a strong Western de-
fense to deter attack.

General Lauris Norstad assumed command of SHAPE
as its Supreme Commander on November 20, 1956.

In May, 1957, in Bonn, NATO's defense policy was
the principal subject of the Ministerial Conference due
to the Soviet propaganda machine. The Soviet leaders had
launched a campaign inducing public opinion in the various
member countries of NATO to Oppose the modernization of
Western defense forces.

The Council agreed that one object of this cam-
paign was to ensure for Soviet forces a monopoly
of nuclear weapons on the European continent,

and that in the face of this threat the Atlantic
Alliance must be in a position to meet any attack
which might be launched against it.1

At this meeting a question was posed which even
now is of crucial importance, namely, the correct balance
between nuclear and conventional arms, and the ABM (anti-

ballistic missiles program)--current1y under considera-‘

tion in the United States!

 

1 .
Agpects of-NATO--The First Twenty Years, NATO
Information Service, Brussels, p. 22.

69

Beginning with this 1957 Ministerial meeting, and
continuing to the present, the reunification of Germany,
to which NATO has been dedicated since the Federal Repub-
lic joined the Alliance, has been a continuous source of
contention. At the same time, there has been a constant
attempt at reassurance of European security through the

reaffirmation of the defensive character of NATO strategy.

The Tenth Anniversary of SHAPE

For the tenth anniversary of SHAPE and Allied
Command Europe on April 2, 1961, General H. J. Kruls (the
Hague, Holland) Editor-in-Chief of the bi-monthly magazine,
NATO'S.Fifteen Nations, invited Generals Eisenhower, Ridg-
way, Gruenther, and Norstad (the four Supreme Commanders
of SHAPE frOmrl951-1961) to express their viewpoints on
NATO .

The following are extracts from General Gruen-

ther's reply:

70

March 11, 1961
Dear General Kruls--

. . . It was my honor to serve as the SHAPE Chief
of Staff from December 18, 1950--the day that the
NATO Ministerial Conference at Brussels directed
General Eisenhower to organize Allied Command
Europe--until General Ridgway relinquished Com-
mand on July 13, 1953.

SHAPE came into existence on April 2, 1951. Most
of us feel that the world is now an uneasy place;
I am sure, however, that you recall very well
that the people of the NATO countries were
greatly worried during the early months of 1951.

General Eisenhower arrived in Paris on January 8,
1951. On the following day he started his visit
to the NATO capitals in Europe. Brussels was the
first stop, and then he came to The Hague, where

I first met you. The spirit at each Governmental
Conference was good, but the stark reality stood
out clearly: NATO had at that time only extremely
meagre forces in being in Europe. The situation
in Korea was very grave, and there was every in-
dication that it would grow worse.

The only thing we were really sure about was that
our SHAPE "Vigilance" coat of arms was a good one.
I played a minor role in developing that insignia.
I offered three bottles of cognac as a prize for
the winning design! I was delighted to award the
prize two weeks later.

We were wearing cloth SHAPE patches by the time
SHAPE opened officially. I am glad to see that
you show the insignia in each issue of VIGILANCE.

I am aware of the fact that NATO is having prob-
lems--some of them severe ones. However, I would

71

like to make the point that I have traveled a
great deal since I became President of the
American Red Cross on January 1, 1957--over
450,000 miles. About two thirds of this
travel has been in the United States. I am
convinced‘ that the peOple of this country
have great faith in NATO. The knowledge of
the organization is greater than it has ever
been previously. I am certain that the Amer-
ican Government and the American people will
continue to support it steadfastly.

Most of your readers have an intimate know-
ledge of NATO. It is only natural that the
frustrations and apparent failures of NATO
depress them at times. Nevertheless, I have
no fear in stating categorically that NATO
has made much greater progress than those

who were with SHAPE at its birth ever thought
possible. Of course, we must do better, and
I am sure we will.

The six years I spent at SHAPE were the hap-
piest of my 38-year military career. I shall
never cease to be grateful to the SHAPE per-
sonnel for their dedicated service. Also, I
shall always be thankful for the help that the
NATO-Governments gave us.

As for THE FIFTEEN NATIONS, I read every issue.
I think that you and your associates are doing
a magnificent job. May the magazine continue
to thrive.

Sincerely,

Alfred M. Gruenther (signed)1

 

fir

1"Vigilance" Supplement to NATO's Fifteen Nations
(February-March, 1961), p. 7.

72

Since General Gruenther is dedicated to hand-
written letters and notes for personal messages, the
reply to General Kruls' request was no exception. Above
the printed version of General Gruenther's message there
is included on the magazine page (in red ink) an exact
copy of an extract from General Gruenther's handwritten
message--to indicate the personal involvement of the

General in conveying his thoughts on NATO.

The Berlin Question

Towards the end of 1958, it was the question of
Berlin which dominated the scene. August 13, 1961,
brought the ”Wall of Shame" which sealed off the Eastern
Sector of Berlin. Notwithstanding the protest of the
three Allied Powers, the building of the Berlin Wall
proceeded. The Wall, of course, was to prevent the East
Germans from escaping to the West, prompted by the threat
of the Soviet Government to increase the strength of the

Red Army on the western frontiers by calling up reserves.

73

(During the first six months of 1958, over 103,000 had
1
fled to the West.)

In January, 1963, General Lauris Norstad retired
as Supreme Commander and was succeeded by General Lyman
L. Lemnitzer, an able Commander-Statesman, whom the
writer had the privilege of interviewing at SHAPE IN
August, 1963.

The years 1964-65 brought very few newrdevelop-
ments in the solution of outstanding problems, as de-
scribed by the NATO Information Services:

The year 1965 was a year which saw no major
crises.in Europe but in which the Soviet
Union continued to oppose a settlement of
the cardinal issues between East and West:
and to devote an increasing share of its
economic and technical resources to mili-
tary purposes.2

This strengthened the determination of NATO coun-
tries to maintain the unity of the Alliance and to tighten
their defense system through broader allied participation
in nuclear force planning.

March, 1966, brought President de Gaulle's ulti-

matum to cease France's participation in NATO integrated

 

1Aspects of NATO--The First_Twenty Years, NATO
Information Service, Brussels, p. 35.

21bid., p. 43.

74

military commands. The French Government notified the
other 14 NATO nations of the withdrawal of French forces
from NATO, with the simultaneous withdrawal from French
territory of allied military forces and the Headquarters
of SHAPE.

Although France remains a member of the NATO
Alliance, it does not participate in the military struc-
ture.

In July, 1966, the NATO Defense Ministers met in
Paris and adopted a NATO force plan for the period up to
and including 1970, and worked out plans for the years
following 1970.

March 30, 1967, marked the final flag-lowering
ceremony at SHAPE in France; and on the Blst the offi-
cial opening ceremony of SHAPE in Costeau, near Mons,
Belgium, marked the beginning of a new era of SHAPE
history.1

In 1968, the efforts of NATO "to negotiate with

the Soviets about mutual and balanced force-reduction in

 

l .
See Appendix B for photographs of SHAPE in its
new location at Costeau, Belgium.

75

Europe" were thwarted when on August 20 the armed forces
of the Soviet Union and four other Warsaw Pact countries
(Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Hungary) invaded
Czechoslovakia.

The Ministers in their communique issued from
the NATO Brussels Headquarters reaffirmed the
inviolability of the principle that all nations
are independent and that consequently any inter-
vention by one state in the affairs of another
is unlawful. In the case of Czechoslovakia
they noted that this principle had been delib-
erately violated by the Soviet leaders and four
of their allies.

The NATO Ministers underlined the dangers of
the Soviet contention that a right exists for
intervention in the affairs of other states
deemed to be within a so-called 'Socialist
Commonwealth' as this runs counter to the
basic principles of the United Nations Charter.

One of the main reasons for the recent Czechoslo-
vakian crisis was the fear by the Soviets that Czechoslo-
viakia, as a result of its process of liberalization, might
find itself on the way toward a withdrawal from the Pact.

Although the Pact was meant originally as a
manifestation of Soviet reactions to Germany's

admission to NATO, it gave the Soviet Union
very considerable political, and in the long

 

1
Ibid., p. 53.

76
run also strategic advantages, which the
Russians would be reluctant to lose.1

The immediate and very important implication of
the Warsaw Pact was the legalization of the presence of.
Soviet trOOps in Hungary, Poland, Roumania, and Eastern
Germany. The presence of Soviet troops in the countries
of Eastern Europe played a very important role in keep-
ing within their power the Communist puppet regimes which
were subservient to Moscow. It was for these reasons
that the Soviet was trying by hook or by crook to intro-
duce its trOOps into Czechoslovakia, in order to bolster
up the pro-Soviet elements in the party and administra-
tion.

Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia, and especially
the Soviet deployment of troops along the frontier of the
Federal German Republic, created justified fears of a sud-
den Soviet "coup" which could take NATO by surprise.
Therefore, the stationing of Soviet troops along the

frontier of the Federal German Republic, which extends

lMajor E. Hinterhoff, "The Czechoslovak Crisis and
the Warsaw Pact," NATOLngifteen Napiong, October-November
1968, p. 28.

77

the existing confrontation of 20 Soviet Divisions in
Eastern Germany against NATO's troops in Northern Germany,
could mean that the "Russians could make a few deep and
l
powerful thrusts into Western Germany."
And what does all this mean for Western security?
The authoritative answer was provided by the
Foreign Ministers of NATO on November, 1968, when they
declared:
The North Atlantic Alliance will continue to
stand as the indispensable guarantor of secur—
ity and the essential foundation for the pur-
suit of European reconciliation. By its Con-
stitution the Alliance is of indefinite dura-
tion. Recent events have further demonstrated
that its continued existence is more than ever
necessary.2
General Gruenther participated in a Two-Day Sym-
posium on NATO at Kent State University in Ohio, cOvering
the "Origins and Development of NATO," on February 25,
1969 and "The Present and Future of NATO" on the follow-

ing day. He confirmed the increasing need for NATO and

pointed out--

 

1Ibid., p. 31.

2Harlan Cleveland, "NATO After the Invasion,"
"Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 2 (January 1969), p. 251.

 

78

The reasons for the eXistence of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization may be even
more valid today than they were 20 years
ago when the Alliance was organized.1
The other two participants at the Kent State Uni-
versity Two-Day Symposium were Mr. Georges Bidault, Former
French Provisional President, and Dr. Walter LaFeber, Pro-
fessor of American History and Chairman of the Department
of History at Cornell University.
Georges Bidault said,
There is a bad balance of power now in Europe
with the scales tipping toward the Warsaw Pact
Countries and I suppose Mr. Nixon hopes to
achieve a better balance. But NATO's future
is very uncertain until de Gaulle passes from
the scene.2
On this score, Bidault considered that de Gaulle would

never give up power voluntarily, and predicted that the

French President could be beaten at the polls.3

 

lCorrespondence from General Gruenther, Feb. 26,
1969. (Tape recordings of his two speeches at this Sym-
posium in writer's file.)

2David Hess, "Fate of NATO Up to De Gaulle,
Experts Admit," Akron-Beacon Journal, Feb. 26, 1969.

3Ibid. (the recent election in France proved
Bidault correct in his prediction).

79

Gruenther, on the other hand, holds there are
other factors beyond de Gaulle's opposition which have
contributed over the years to NATO's decline. He points
out that the apparition of an American-Soviet détente has
undermined west EurOpe's willingness to develop the A1-
1iance. But to balance off this apathy, Gruenther con-
tends that the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia
has revived some fears of many Western European leaders.
However, Gruenther admitted at this Symposium, "Most of
the vows to strengthen NATO have been solely in the form
of statements. Not one of the allies, including the
United States, has said it's willing to put up the money
to bolster the Alliance."1

In tribute to the leadership provided by the
United States, Bidault conveyed the point of view that
"without the physical and moral presence of the United
States in Europe, I'm quite certain the Russians, even
10 or 20 years ago, would have been on the shores of the

2
Atlantic Ocean."

 

1Ibid. 2Ibid.

80

Looking into the future, LaFeber said "NATO's
prospects for revitalization hinge largely on how badly
President Nixon wants an East-West détente. Although
surdi a détente is not now in the cards, if it were
achieved, NATO would probably be reduced to a Chapter

in history. " 1'

 

The 20th Anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty
organization on April 4, 1969, brought the announcement
0f the retirement of General Lyman Lemnitzer, NATO's
fifth Supreme Commander, who is succeeded by General

Andrew J . Goodpaster.

In an appeal to the NATO nations for more and
bettor-trained manpower and improved weapons, General
Lemhitzer said:

The Communist threat to the western alliance

is formidable and active . . . NATO in its 20

years has given the members of the alliance

the peace, freedom, and security they sought.

'Whether they will continue to live in that

peace and freedom lies solely in their will
\ .

lIbid.

81

and determination to maintain the military
forces of the alliance at the levels needed
for collective security of all NATO.1
Lemnitzer pointed to the occupation of Czechoslo-
vakia last August, the continually rising defense budgets
on the part of the Warsaw Pact powers, and the Soviet
expansion in the Mediterranean, which seemed aimed at
flanking NATO Europe.
Lemnitzer argued that the answer must be in main-

taining a credible nuclear deterrent and improving the

alliance's conventional forces.

 

To commemorate the 20th Anniversary of NATO, the
editors of NATO'S Fiftggn Nggjgng published a special
Anniversary issue. General of the Army, Dwight D. Eisen-
hower, the first Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, and
former President of the United States, wrote a praise-
worthy contribution for this Anniversary edition-~eval-
uating NATO as "rich with promise of greatness and re-

ward"--

 

1"Chief Asks Stronger NATO," Detroit Free Press,

March 25, 1969, p. 11A.

82

. . . . NATO has been the shield of security
behind which fifteen nations have been able

to build a present prosperity and an evident
strength that presage a more abundant and
secure future. . . . the NATO countries pro-
duce more than half of the world's real wealth,
control more than half of the world's military
power, and supply more than half of the world's
technicians and administrators.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is rich
with promise of greatness and reward for its
members and all the free world. The obstacles
before it are no more formidable than those
already surmounted. The essential ingredient
for continuing success is perseverance in our
loyal support of a partnership that has already
paid rich dividends to fifteen nations. It is
an example to free nations everywhere which
seek the security and prosperity that is pos-
sible for them in like partnerships. . . .1

The nation and the world mourned the passing of
this great leader of mankind on March 28, l969--just a
few days before the 20th Anniversary of the signing of
the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D. C. on April

4, 1949, by the twelve original signatories.

 

1NATO'S-FifteenNations,'Vol. XIV, No. 1 (February-

.March, 1969), p. 35.

CHAPTER III

THE COPENHAGEN SPEECH (AUGUST 31, 1953)

PART I
THE OCCASION, SETTING, AND AUDIENCE OF

THE COPENHAGEN SPEECH

Following his appointment as Supreme Commander of
the Allied Powers of Europe, General Gruenther delivered
in Copenhagen, Denmark, his first major address to the
military officers and foreign ministers of the NATO nations
at the "Atlantic Community Convention"--as titled in the
Script of the speech which the writer received from the
Public Information Division of SHAPE. However, this "Con-
vention" was sponsored by a local group in Copenhagen who
held one of the first meetings on the significance of the
Atlentic Community, calling themselves the "Hedge Hog"
°r9enization. But as a substitute for "Hedge Hog". they
°h°8e for this five-day conference in August 1953 the more
f°rmal title of "Atlantic Community Convention" which, of

83

84

course, was synonymous with "NATO." In addition to the
representatives from the NATO nations, delegates from var-
ious civic and educational groups of the free nations were
invited to attend, which resulted in a very cosmopolitan
audience in Copenhagen to hear General Gruenther's address
on "The Role of NATO in the Defense of the West."

The speech was delivered in the evening in a spa-
Cious, attractively decorated assembly room of a large
government building in the. heart of Copenhagen, and was
followed by a reception, providing the opportunity for the
andience to meet General Gruenther, the NATO officers, and
the various government heads who were present. Since the
Copenhagen speech is the only one of the three speech case
Studies in this paper which the writer had the privilege
of hearing (as a representative of a national educational
as"~""<><:iation of the United States) the details on the set-
ting for the speech are from personal observation.

More than 350 persons were in the audience--most
0f Whom were seated with their own delegations from their
own respective countries. Flags of the NATO nations

d"Igorated the low platform from which General Gruenther

85

delivered his speech. A huge colored map of NATO formed
the background to which Gruenther referred periodically
in pointing out specific geographical locations.

The basic purpose of this introductory speech was
primarily expository--to explain the "Role of NATO in the
Defense of the West"--as well as to reply to some objec-
tions which had been raised against NATO. The purpose,
goals, and organization of SHAPE were covered in detail
in the Copenhagen speech to inform the audience of the
complete background relationship with NATO. In the two
SUbsequent speeches analyzed as case studies--the 1954
L°ndon Speech, and the 1955 Rome Speech--the administra-
tiVe organization of SHAPE as related to NATO was excluded
as NATO operations became better known among the member
n"“tIi-cons.

In addition to this purely expository material

pert‘—a.ining to NATO, the following four major topics are

\

1A map of NATO is the favorite backdrop invariably
Ch°3en by General Gruenther for public addresses and broad-
casts. For interviews and conferences in his office at
SHAPE he also preferred the location immediately in front
Of the large NATO map covering one wall--as photographed
during the recorded interview with the writer in July 1956.

(See Appendix B. )

86

included in all of General Gruenther's speeches to NATO
nations: the threat of the Soviet Union (which explains
why NATO was formed); the progress NATO is making; the
problems NATO is facing; and the hope for the future.

These four topics are not always developed in the
same sequential order in his various speeches, including
the three Case Studies. Furthermore, the speeches ob-
Viously vary with the progression of time, involving re-
ViSions in the statistical information on NATO military
caPabilities with the introduction of new weapons of war-
faJE'e--along with the progressive increase of Soviet mili-
tary power.

It is significant also to note that the speeches
vary in the choice of materials and their develOpment for
adaptations to the immediate occasion and audience whom
Gruel‘lther is addressing.1 He added or subtracted from
the basic structure of the speech to meet the needs of

. the immediate audience situation, but always kept in mind

\

1Please note the fact of audience adaptation--a
phe“Omenon or practice which subsequent analyses will
81“"""‘--was an outstanding characteristic of Gruenther's
mmklnanship.

87

the overall Western--as well as World audience-~in the

news releases.

PART II

HHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COPENHAGEN SPEECH

BY PARAGRAPHS1

[Paragraphs 1 and 2]

(1) General Eisenhower arrived in Paris approximately
two and one half years ago to organize Supreme Head-
quarters Allied Powers Europe, commonly known as
SHAPE. That Headquarters is now a going concern,
and is charged with the defense of Europe, extending
from the Northern tip of Norway to the Eastern borders
of Turkey, an arc of some 7,000 kilometers.

(2) SHAPE is one of three major military commands
which function under the North Atlantic Council, the
overall civilian political authority, which sits in
continuous session in Paris. The Council is served
by an international staff under the leadership of
Lord Ismay, the Secretary General. The governing
military body is the Military Committee, consisting
of one representative from each of the fourteen mem-
ber nations. The present Chairman of the Military
Committee is Admiral Qvistgaard of Denmark. To pro-
vide for more rapid and effective action the Military
Committee set up the Standing Group, consisting of
a representative of the United Kingdom, France, and
the United States. The Standing Group sits perma-
nently in Washington, and functions as a type of
executive committee for the Military Committee.

\
1The text of General Gruenther's Copenhagen Speech

:er’t to the writer by the Public Information Division of
HUUPE did not include any reference to the introduction of

88

89

In the opening two paragraphs Gruenther was at-
tempting to convey information on the organization of
SHAPE and its operating relationship with NATO administra-
tion, as the undergirding and foundation for his later
discussion on the importance of military defense for
collective security.

In the first paragraph he explains the length of
time SHAPE has been organized and the expanse of territory
for which SHAPE was responsible in the defense of Europe:

SHAPE (the military arm of NATO), had been organized

by General Eisenhower upon his arrival in Paris approx-
imately two and one half years ago (since early 1951).

 

 

General Gruenther. Also excluded was the General's ack-
nOWIedgement to the introduction, as well as his Opening
remarks stating the purpose and scope of his message to
the Copenhagen audience.

However, General Gruenther has informed the writer
that he was introduced by the President of the local Danish
Society. The writer clearly recalls the General's gracious
ac3kl'lowledgement to the introduction, which was followed by
a clear explanation of the thesis of his address. In sum-
max—y, the introduction of the speaker, the speaker's ack-
n(3""-'l.edgement, and his opening remarks on the purpose and
Scope of his message (the Introduction of the speech) were
deleted in the transcription of the tape recording of the
Speech for the SHAPE files. The text from SHAPE opened
“fifth the Body of the speech as indicated by the two itali-
(:1sz paragraphs recorded here. Since the Copenhagen speech
(.1093 not appear in any published source, the text from SHAPE
18 the only available record.

90

SHAPE was charged with the defense of Europe from the
Northern tip of Norway to the Eastern borders of
Turkey--an arc of some 7,000 kilometers.

In the second paragraph Gruenther describes the
three administrative levels of control of SHAPE-NATO in
. 1
descending order of rank:

(a) The North Atlantic Council, the overall civilian-
political authority, which sits in continuous ses-
sion in Paris. The Council is served by an inter-
national staff under the leadership of Lord Ismay,
the Secretary General.

(b) The Military Committee, the governing military
body, with one representative from each of the
NATO nations.

 

(c) The Standing Group (or executive committee) for
the Military Committee consisting of a representa-
tive from the United Kingdom, France, and the
United States, respectively,--stationed in Wash-
ington--to provide more rapid and effective action.

 

Gruenther's explanation of the background and admin-
iAstrative operation of SHAPE is clearly and succinctly or-
ganized and described in a manner which represents the type
of methodology that presumably should aid the audience in
understanding the relationships between the three levels
of control of SHAPE and thereby build Gruenther's reputa-

tion in military administration.
\

l . . . . .
See the four Charts covering the C1v1l and Mili-
taryOrganization of NATO--Appendix A.

 

91

Gruenther's language style is didactic and matter-
<3f-fact in describing the organization and operation of
SHAPE. His word choice is simple and direct, contribut-
:ing to the clarity of his crisp, to-the-point statements.

The General is particularly careful to clarify
the significance of the "Standing. Group" by explaining
tfliat it sits permanently in Washington and functions as
El type of "executive committee" for the Military Commit-
tee. He further sees fit to explain the reason for its
<>rganization by the Military Committee--to provide for
rtlore rapid and effective action when time is at premium.
Tule term "Standing Group" is obviously identified by
cgruenther as terminology needing further explanation for
1"15.8 audience, which is another illustration of adaptation
and of the type of workmanship which is designed to add

't<> his stature with the audience.

[Paragraph 3]

(3) All countries represented here this evening
have had defense problems throughout the centuries.
In the case of Denmark, for example, more than
1,000 years ago your Danish ancestors set up

 

92

stone walls as ramparts for the southern land

defenses against the predatory Saxons. 0n the

site of beautiful Copenhagen, Bishop Absalon,

its farsighted founder, built a stronghold

900 years ago against the pirating Wends.

Happily, the enemies of those days are today

friends. It is not necessary for me to point

to other symbols of the enduring will of Den-

mark during the past 1,000 years to defend

its freedom. Our objective in NATO today is

the same, but the scope of the problem is much

more vast, and the methods differ.

To involve the audience Gruenther states that all

countries present have had defense problems throughout
the centuries--which provided the universality of the cur-
rent defense problems faced by NATO. To adapt the problem
to the host country of Denmark, two examples of defense
are cited from the many "symbols of enduring will" of Den-
mark's history to defend its freedom: first, the southern
land defenses set up against the predatory Saxons 1000
years ago, and second, the stronghold on the site of Cop-
enhagen against the pirating Wends in 900. It is signif-
icant to note that General Gruenther has again adhered to
his usual chronological pattern of citing the example of

the predatory Saxons 1000 years ago, then the example of

the pirating Wends of 900 years ago.

93

The samples are introduced as an analogy to the

objective of NATO, with of course the exceptions that the

scope of the problem and the methods of NATO were vastly

different. Here, again, Gruenther is following an approach

which is a design of workmanship to produce goodwill and

establish himself with the audience by the recognition of

Denmark's success in defending their country against in-

vaders in the past.

(4)

(5)

The Progress NATO is Making
[Paragraphs 4-5-6-7-8 and 9]

Our basic defense philosophy involves the use
of the minimum number of active forces, and to
place maximum dependence upon Reserve forces. We
visualize that with this minimum of active forces
we will create a shield to give us a cushion of
time sufficiently long to enable our Reserve
forces to mobilize. In case of attack we would
depend upon the Tactical Air Forces and the Land
Forces to fight the combined air-land battle,
while our Strategic Air Forces would strike deep
into enemy territory against industrial targets.

To provide for more effective control of the
defense battle the SHAPE area has been broken into
regional commands, set up as follows: the Northern
Command under General Mansergh at Oslo, the Central
Command under Marshal Juin at Fontainebleau, the
Southern Command covering Italy, Turkey and Greece
under Admiral Fechteler at Naples, and the

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

94

Mediterranean Command under Admiral Mountbatten
with headquarters at Malta.

When General Eisenhower arrived early in
1951 the state of the defenses in Europe was
pitifully low. Since then there has been a tre-
mendous improvement. The forces have approxi-
mately doubled, and the gain in effectiveness
has been greater still. That applies particu-
larly to our air forces, which initially were
especially weak. One of NATO's outstanding
achievements is the increase in number of air-
fields. We shall have by the end of this year
about 125 usable fields.

The defense budgets of the member countries
have increased. Not considering the United
States, the other countries have more than
doubled the amounts spent for defense. If the
U.S. increase is taken into account the ratio
is much more favorable.

Nearly all countries have increased their
periods of national service , the most recent
case being that of Denmark which has now pro-
vided for 18 months' service, a very gratifying
development.

During this two and one half year period we
have had the opportunity to prepare detailed
defense plans for the employment of our forces.
Every commander now knows exactly what he would
do in the event of an emergency. That does not
guarantee that we would be able to withstand an
attack successfully, but at least each element
of the command knows what action to take. The
success of our efforts would depend upon the
amount of force that the aggressor would bring
against us, and also on the skill with which he
would employ that force.

95

In the preceding six paragraphs General Gruenther
confines his remarks to expository factual information
concerning the Eggggess NATO was makingr-a major topic
in this address as well as all others to NATO countries.

In the development of the progress of NATO at the time
of the Copenhagen speech, Gruenther presents six areas
of progress in military defense.

He first outlines the basic philosophy involving
the use of the minimum number of active forces by placing
maximum dependence upon Reserve forces, thereby providing
an.effective shield of active forces until the Reserve
Iforces could be mobilized. The strategy of defense in
Case of attack would be the use of Tactical Air Force and
‘the Land Forces, while the Strategic Air Forces would be
(iirected against industrial targets.

The second contribution to NATO's progress for more
effective control of the defense battle was the organiza-
tfiion of regional commands--the Northern Command at Oslo, the
central Comand at Fontainebleau, the Southern. Command cov-
ering Italy, Turkey, and Greece at Naples, and the Mediter-

3ranean Command with headquarters at Malta. This

96

organization of four regional commands reflects the pro-
gress in logical development of space relationships.

The third improvement in the progress of NATO was
the doubling of forces--especially the air forces, which
were initially very weak when General Eisenhower arrived
early in 1951. The increase in airfields was notable,
with approximately 125 usable air fields estimated by
the end of 1953.

The fourth area of progress concerned the increase
in defense budgets, which had more than doubled in all mem-
ber countries, with the U.S. ratio of increase much higher.

The fifth improvement noted by Gruenther was the
Jincrease in the periods of national service--with special
Commendation to Denmark who had recently increased their
Program to 18 months' service.

And the sixth evidence of progress during the two
and one half year period was the preparation of detailed
defense plans for the employment of NATO forces, with each

‘kbmmand knowing exactly the procedure to follow in the

event of an emergency.

97

Gruenther's description of the progress NATO was
making is a factual reporting responsibility based on his
personal testimony as authoritative evidence. This use of
his comprehensive knowledge of every area of military de-
fense represents an attempt to support his thesis concern-
ing NATO and, also, the type of approach designed to pro-
<1uce in the audience a sense of respect for the speaker's

intelligence and military leadership.

[Paragraphs lO-ll-lZ-l3]

(10) Just what could our NATO forces accomplish
now? One official, of a cynical turn of mind,
when asked three years ago "What do the Soviets
need to march to the Channel?" answered, ”Only
shoes!" I can assure you that at this time the
NATO forces of Allied Command Europe are of such
strength that the Soviets do not have sufficient
power in occupied Europe to be reasonably cer-
tain of success if they should attack with the
forces now there. In other words, I believe
they would have to bring in additional forces
from the USSR before they could launch a suc-
cessful attack against the West. If that esti-
mate is a correct one, it represents a most sig-
nificant achievement, because it means that we
should be able to obtain a reasonable amount of
warning of an impeding attack.

(11) _ We should then be able to mobilize our reh
serves, and otherwise take appropriate readiness
measures, to enable us to meet the threat.

98

(12) This is real progress, much greater than
we thought would be possible when we started
out two and a half years ago.

(13) Before leaving the question of progress,
I desire to make clear that we still do not
have adequate strength to defeat an all-out

attack. But we would in no sense be a push-
over.

The rhetorical question concerning what the NATO
;forces could currently accomplish is a method to involve
the audience with a question which any member of the
group might have asked-~a very logical question follow-
ing Gruenther's resume of the progress NATO had made in
its various areas of military defense.

By the introduction of another question in direct
discourse posed to a cynical official three years prior--
"What do the-Soviets need to march to the Channel?"--he
answered--”only shoes!" But Gruenther's reply for the
current period is positive and optimistic--supported by
personal testimony--conveying his belief that the Soviets
would be obliged to bring in additional forces from the
USSR before they could launch a successful attack against
the West, since they did not have sufficient power in

occupied Europe.

99

On the condition that this supposition was correct,
Gruenther proceeds to outline the effects of their achieve-
ment: that NATO would have a reasonable warning of an at-
tack, and in turn, this would enable them to mobilize their
reserves to meet the threat of the USSR.

To the internal summary sentence, This is real
.PPOQTCBS, much greater than we thought would be possible
when.we started out 2 1/2 years ago, Gruenther includes
.a reservation to correct any impression the audience might
have received of over-optimism. Although it was good
Strategy to convey the idea that progress had been achieved
florrpsychological reasons, it was equally essential to
clarify the need for additional defense support from the
metuber nations. Therefore, he closes this section of his
sPeach on the progress NATO has made, with the admonition
that NATO did not have adequate strength to defeat an all-
out; attack-- But we will in no sense be a push-over.

By logical reasoning, with supporting evidence,
Gruenther builds his presentation on the progress which

NATO has made in the specific areas of military defense

during the two and one half years since the organization

100

of the Alliance. However, it was imperative to curtail
over-optimism by pointing to the inadequacy of current
defense capabilities to meet an all-out attack. For the
next two years were to be far more difficult in enlisting
SUpport of the NATO nations to increase their defense

capabilities.

The Problems Facing NATO
[Paragraphs 14-15-16-17-18-19-20]

(14) What are some of the major problems which
we still face?

We consider that air power is the dominant
factor in modern warfare. Our most critical
deficiency today is the strength of our air
forces, and I say that in spite of the excel-
lent progress already made. The Soviets have
an air force of some 20,000 operational planes,
a large proportion of which are jets. To meet
that air threat our air forces must be increased
and their effectiveness must be such as to be
ready to fight on an instant‘d notice. It is
not sufficient to depend upon Reserve air forces
for the reason that air attacks can develop with
such devastating swiftness that we would not be
able to mobilize air reserves in time. We at
SHAPE have given first priority to the develop-
ment of our air forces. That does not mean that'
we think we could win a war solely by the use of
air power. We consider that an adequate defense
posture can be obtained only by the air-land-
naval team. It is essential, however, that in-
creased emphasis be placed on the development of
larger and more effective air forces.

101

(15) Earlier I told you that under our concept
our shield would hold long enough to enable our
reserve forces to mobilize and move to the area
where they are needed. Unfortunately those re-
serves are still critically inadequate. That
deficiency represents our second major problem.
The Soviets have a very large active land force
in being, consisting of 175 Soviet divisions,
and approximately 70 satellite divisions. The
Soviet divisions are less effective, but their
effectiveness is increasing constantly. We
have no thought of trying to match that force
division for division, because to maintain ac-
tive forces of that magnitude would place unac-
ceptable strain on our economy. That is the
reason why we place such great dependence on
reserve divisions. But those divisions must
be good, because if they are employed against
Soviet forces their effectiveness has to be of
higher caliber. The creation of adequate re-
serve forces presents a difficult problem for
the NATO governments. It means that a large
proportion of our manpower will have to spend
considerable time each year in reserve training.
That is inconvenient for the individuals con-
cerned, and of course it tends to create economic
strains.

(16) Our third major difficulty lies in the Logis-
tics field. We must have adequate supplies for
our forces if an emergency should develop and we
must have a logistic system which enables us to
move those supplies quickly to the places where
they will be needed. Our progress is still far
below what it should be and we are constantly
urging member governments to take appropriate
measures.

(17) Now for a short discussion of the role of
naval forces in the defense of Europe. The Soviets
have an extensive submarine capability which can
be exercised by the more than 300 submarines in

102

the Soviet Navy. Also they have a significant
mining capability. Both of these could be used
to interfere with our vital sea lines of com-
munication from North America. Admiral McCor-
mick, SACLANT commander, with headquarters at
Norfolk, Virginia, is charged with the protec-
tion of the sea lines of communications across
the Atlantic. In addition, Admiral McCormick's
forces will assist in the defense of our vital
North flank of Denmark and Norway, by the ex-
tensive use of naval power, both surface craft
and naval aviation. In the Mediterranean Ad-
miral Fechteler has assigned to him the U.S.
Sixth Fleet with its powerful carrier-based
aviation which will be able to give effective
air support in the Mediterranean area. Admiral
Mountbatten is charged with the protection of
the lines of communication in the Mediterranean,
and with other important naval assignments.
Naval power by means of its great flexibility
will be able to make a substantial contribution
to the defense of Europe.

(18) In outlining these major problems to you,
you have noted that the philosophy behind our
concept is certainly a defensive one. I stress
that point because Soviet propaganda efforts,
particularly in the last month, have emphasized
the aggressive nature of NATO. I can assure you
that there has never been as much as a single
paragraph written at SHAPE which evnisages that
we would be the aggressor. All of our plans
are based on the assumption that war, if it
comes, will be started by the enemy, and that
we will have to adjust our strategy accordingly.
I need not tell you that in this day of modern
weapons, that is a tremendous disadvantage for
us. Moreover, the Soviets know well that our
troop dispositions and our strength are such
that we do not have a capability to assume the
role of an aggressor. Our alliance is clearly

103

defensive. It is that common bond--that objec-
tive for the preservation of peace-—which has
been responsible for the progress we have al-
ready made.

(19) Much thought is being given by the planners
at SHAPE and at the Standing Group for the em-
ployment of new weapons. The peoples of the
NATO nations, and especially the Finance Min-
isters, are constantly asking the question,
"To what extent will new weapons lessen the
requirements? To what extent may we expect
to have our taxes reduced as a result of the
advent of these new weapons?" We do not have
a satisfactory answer to that question. It is
a difficult problem, involving the projection
of strategic thinking about four years in ad-
vance. Many of the new weapons are still in
the testing stage, with the result that not
enough is yet known of their capabilities.
Even if these new weapons should reduce the
requirements for conventional forces, that
would not necessarily mean lower cost, because
most of the new weapons are very expensive. I
don't want to go so far at this time as to say
that the outlook for the reduction of expenses
is a discouraging one. At the same time I do
not want to hold out the hope that there will
be a substantial reduction, until the subject
has been more thoroughly studied.

(20) In this connection you will I am sure be
interested to know that the United States Com-
mand in Germany organized on May let a Special
Weapons School at Oberammergau in Germany to
teach Allied Officers the application of the
new weapons in tactical situations. In our
maneuvers this fall atomic warfare considera-
tions will be realistically played.

104

'The transition to the second major topic is intro-
duced with the rhetorical question, What are some of the
major problems which we still face? Just as in General
Gruenther's analysis of the progress NATO was making, six
areas of military defense were explained, so also in the
second major proposition on NATO's major problems, six
specific problem areas are analyzed.

Because air power was considered the dominant
factor in modern warfare, the first major problem in NATO
military defense was identified by Gruenther as the criti-
cal deficiency in NATO air forces, compared to the 20,000
operational planes of the Soviets, most of which were
jets. That SHAPE had given first priority to the develop-
ment of the air forces was also attributable to the recog-
nition that Reserve air forces could not be mobilized
quickly enough to meet air attack.

The second major problem of NATO was the critical
inadequacy of reserve forces. Here again, by contrast and
comparison, Gruenther reports the superior power of the
Soviets with 175 divisions, and approximately 70 satellite

divisions. That NATO placed such great dependence on

105

reserve divisions was caused by the excessive cost of
maintaining active forces. But the creation of adequate
reserve forces also presented a difficult problem because
of the length of time required in reserve training.

The third major difficulty was attributed to the
Logistics field--not only in the need for adequate sup-
plies but also in the movement of supplies to places
where they are needed. Because NATO was far below stan-
dard, the member governments were being urged to take the
appropriate measures.

The fourth major difficulty concerned the exten-
sive submarine capability of the Soviet Navy with over
300 submarines, along with significant mining capability.
That both of these capabilities were a threat to the vital
sea lines of communication resulted in Gruenther's explan-
ation of the four supplementary commands of NATO respon-
sible for the protection of the sea lines adjacent to the
respective territories of the member nations--thereby mak-.l
ing a substantial contribution to the defense of Europe.

A fifth problem with which NATO was faced was the

Soviet propaganda efforts emphasizing the aggressive nature

106

of NATO. By personal address, Gruenther reminds the aud-
ience that in outlining the major problems, the philos-
Ophy behind the concept was a defensive one, supported by
the evidence that there has never been as much as a single
paragraph written at SHAPE which envisages that we would
be the aggressor. Since their plans were all based on
the assumption that war would be started by the enemy,
Gruenther emphasizes the disadvantage with the statement
I need not tell you that in this day of modern weapons,
that this is a tremendous disadvantage for us. Further
evidence that the allegation by the Soviets was unethical
and false is implicitly inferred by Gruenther's statement
that the Soviets were well aware of NATO's lack of capa-
bilities to assume the role of aggressor.

A sixth problem centered in two questions based
on the employment of new weapons. To simulate dialogue
with the audience, Gruenther poses the two questions in
direct discourse as questions which were being asked by
the people of NATO nations and especially the Finance
Ministers: To what extent will new weapons lessen the
requirements? To what extent may we expect to have our

taxes reduced as a result of the advent of these new weapons?

107

The answer to these two questions was vitally sig-
nificant to the whole program of enlisting additional de-
fense support from member nations. Gruenther had no doubt
anticipated that these crucial questions were in the minds
of his audience, and must have realized the answer must be
a double-barreled reply which would not deter increased
effort of the NATO nations in building land, air, and
naval support, but at the same time he could not definitely
promise reduction in taxes, with the projection of new
weapons. His methodology in replying to the two questions
represents the type of workmanship designed to convey his
honest opinion based on logical reasoning, a procedure
which should have helped to establish his credibility with
the audience. First, he admits that there was no satis-
factory answer at the present time since the difficult
problem involved strategic thinking four years in advance.
Secondly, many of the new weapons were still in the test-
ing stage, without adequate knowlege of their capabilities.
Third, that even if the new weapons could substitute for
some of the conventional forces, this would not necessar-

ily mean lower cost because the new weapons would be very

expensive.

108

Therefore, to summarize his comments for the audi-
ence on the basis of the uncertainty of the information
available, he chose the position of honest conviction:
that the outlook for the reduction of expenses was not a
discouraging one, but he could not convey the hope that
there would be a substantial reduction until the subject
had been thoroughly studied. To add optimisim to his per-
sonal testimony, he includes in personal address the in-
formation on Special weapons School at Oberammergau, Ger-
many, organized by the U.S. Command to teach Allied offi-
cers the application of new weapons in tactical situations
for realistic maneuvers on atomic warfare.

The stylistic pattern followed in the analysis of
NATO's major problems is typical of General Gruenther's
characteristic simplicity in sentence structure and word
choice. Although he was involved with military problems,
he absolves himself completely from military jargon by
describing the problems in simple, understandable language

for the lay members of the audience.

109

Prospects for the Future
[Paragraphs 21-22-23-24]

(21) What are the prospects for the future?
When General Eisenhower made his estimate
shortly after he arrived in Europe he came
to the conclusion that the first two to three
years would probably be the most difficult.
No similar alliance in history had ever suc-
ceeded for any length of time during peace.
The project was a very new one, involving
a cumbersome procedure to obtain unanimous
action by the members. In spite of those
disadvantages, however, the alliance has
thus far succeeded beyond all expectations.
The doctrine of collective security has been
adopted wholeheartedly by all NATO members.

(22) That very success, however, is causing us
trouble for the future. I think that it re-
quires no great vision to be able to predict
that the next two and a half years will prob-
ably be more difficult than the first two and
a half year period.

(23) It is well to recognize that NATO was cre-
ated in an atmosphere of fear. The threat was
towering and immediate, the hour was late. The
whips of fear drove us into each other's arms.
Ancient rivalries were forgotten. Political
differences were reconciled. Confronted by
the facts and by the question of survival, we
found that survival was paramount and all else
secondary.

(24) That element of fear is beginning to dis-
appear. We have grown stronger, and we are be-
coming more susceptible to the blandishments of
the Soviet peace offensive. I can assure you,
however, that there is no evidence that the

110

armed strength of the Soviet bloc is growing
weaker. On the contrary, all intelligence re-
ports indicate that it is increasing. It is
true that the Soviet dictatorship appears to

be having difficulties in the captive countries.
What this will mean to the nations of the West
is not yet clear. Certainly the speech which
Malenkov made to the Supreme Soviet on August 8
was hard and unyielding. There was no hint in
it, or at any time since, that the Soviets plan
to make any concessions to the West.

General Gruenther moves to his third topic with
the rhetorical question as the transition--What are our
prospects for the future? General Eisenhower predicted
that the first two to three years would probably be the
most difficult. General Gruenther observes that no sim-
ilar alliance in history had ever succeeded for any
length of time during peace-~also that the procedure
was very cumbersome to obtain unanimous action by the
members.

However, despite these apparent disadvantages,
Gruenther expresses enthusiastic personal testimony that
the alliance has thus far succeeded beyond all expecta-
tions, and that it had been adopted wholeheartedly by
all NATO members. But he warned that this success, para-

doxically, would probably contribute to problems for the

future.

111

Gruenther predicts that the next two and a half
years will be more difficult than the first two and a
half year period referred to by General Eisenhower, and
by personal testimony sets out to prove this contention

with the following arguments:

. . . NATO was created in an atmosphere of fear
The threat was towering and immediate, the hour
was late‘
The whips of fear drove us into each other's arms.‘
Ancient rivalries were forgotten
Political differences were reconciled
Confronted by the facts and by the question of
survival--
We found that survival was paramount and all
else secondary.

In the above parallel construction, and the series
of simple sentences, there are two very dramatic metaphors*
e-in the second and third lines above, which are expressed
in language in the "grand manner" which is in great con-
trast to General Gruenther's usual pattern of simplicity
of description.

In contrast to the first few years, Gruenther pre-
sents a far different description of the more recent period
where the fear is beginning to disappear with the growing

strength of NATO-~resulting in the member nations becoming

more susceptible to the blandishments of the Soviet peace

112

offensive. But General Gruenther then reverts to the
authority of intelligence reports, indicating that the
Soviet armed strength had been increasing rather than
growing weaker (an anomaly, indeed, for a nation alleg-
. edly embarking on a peace offensive!)

Other indications that appeared contrary to the
so-called peace propaganda were evidenced in the diffi-
culties which the Soviet dictatorship were encountering
with their captive countries-~as well as the unyielding
speech by Malenkov twenty-one days before reflecting no
plan of the Soviets to make concessions to the West.

In other words, General Gruenther points up the
dangers of the Soviet peace propaganda offensive launched
for the prime purpose of dissipating the fear of NATO
nations of an aggressive attack, and thereby curtail NATO
interest in increasing their armed defense, while the So-
viets steadily continued to build up their military
strength! Thus, the Soviets, while embarking upon a prop-
aganda program for a peace offensive, were at the same
time building their military strength, presumably for

a military offensive.

113

The personal testimony of General Gruenther based
on supporting evidence from intelligence reports confirmed
that the Soviet military strength was increasing rather
than decreasing with their launching of the peace propa-
ganda program. Therefore, the apathy and reticence of
some NATO members were, in his judgment, attributable to
the Soviet peace propaganda program devised to allay NATO

fears of an aggressive attack.

The Threat of the Soviets
[Paragraphs 25 and 26]

(25) I shall not dwell on possible Soviet inten-
tions other than to point out that at the 19th
Soviet Congress in Moscow last October Malenkov
made it clear that the major and continuing
Soviet effort would be directed toward the dis-
memberment of the NATO alliance and the progres-
sive isolation of its member states. This of
course is the ancient but still valid strategy
of divide and conquer. Even without the cynical
public announcement of this intention, I cannot
believe that any of the NATO partners would be
gullible enough to be taken in by this oldest
of confidence games.

(26) The plan of world communism has been chron-
icled and proclaimed. Both the strategy and
the tactics of the communist drive have been
published and republished in every corner of

114

the earth. We know the techniques and we know
the successes those techniques have won. We
will continue to ignore them at our peril,
Surely we have learned the hard way that So—
viet peace offers followed at once by Soviet
threats is a key technique in the communist
cold war--a technique designed to keep the
West off balance and at the same time to fos-
ter despair, disillusionment and loss of con-
fidence in our leaders.

The above two paragraphs reflect the fourth major
topic to be conveyed by General Gruenther in the threat
of the Soviets, with the significant report of Malenkov
at the 19th Soviet Congress in Moscow in 1952. Although
the Soviet intention of dividing and conquering the mem-
bers of the NATO alliance was of course not publicly
announced, General Gruenther infers a warning in express-
ing the hope that no NATO nations would be gullible enough
to be taken in by the oldest of confidence games. This
association of the opponent with unethical tactics, a
methodology designed to discredit the integrity of the
opponent, should have produced in the minds of the audience
a significant awareness of the dangers imminent in this

peace offensive and contributed to the credibility of

the speaker.

115

This line of thought is continued in the next para-
graph in the description of the plan of world communism with
its strategy and tactics to launch peace offers followed im-
mediately by threats--the technique of the Communist Cold
War--an exact simile to the methodology adopted by the USSR
in its peace offensive with the ultimate goal of dismember-
ing and conquering the NATO alliance. Gruenther's logical
analysis of the effects of this type of cold war involving
the Soviet strategy of keeping the West off-balance, and at
the same time to foster despair, disillusionment, and the
loss of confidence in NATO leaders should have clearly con-
veyed the reasons for the danger and peril in ignoring these
well-known techniques.

In paragraph #26 the series of sentences beginning
with the plural first person pronoun followed the methodology
designed to produce audience involvement in the sharing of
the knowledge of Communism which should have developed rap-
port with the audience and helped to establish Gruenther's
credibility for his knowledgeability on the sinister ways

of Communist techniques:

We know the techniques and we know the successes
those techniques have won.

We will continue to ignore them at our peril . . . .

We have learned the hard way that Soviet peace offers

116
[Paragraph 27]

(27) A friend of mine used to say "The pocket-
book is the sensitive nerve of the human body"
and I suppose that is a wise observation. Cer-
tainly it is true that the economic difficulties
of the NATO nations are increasing. It is also
true that important social and economic projects
are being deferred as a result of expenditure
for defense. I realize our armed forces will
be effective and unblunted only to the extent
that the nations supporting them remain strong
in spirit, active in intellectual endeavor and
sound economically. The task for NATO is to
strive for that balance between military econ-
omic and social requirements that will make us
secure both from external attack by an aggressor
and from internal disintegration resulting from
poverty and discouragement.

General Gruenther's admission that the economic
difficulties of the NATO nations were increasing, and
that important social and economic projects were deferred
because of defense expenditures is an important and stra-
tegic observation for him to voice at this particular

point of time.1

 

1This observation might well have been in response
to the criticisms lodged by NATO members as well as by
some officials in the United States on the over-emphasis
of expenditures for military defense without adequate con-
sideration for the economic and monetary problems of the
NATO alliance. It was significant and important for NATO
leadership to also recognize the importance of economic,
social and political issues.

117

It was significant that Gruenther should empha-
size the relevancy of the NATO nations remaining strong
in spirit, active in intellectual endeavor, and sound
economically. His statement on the goal of NATO in se-
curing balance between military, economic, and social
requirements in order to protect the NATO nations against
external attack as well as against internal disintegra-
tion from poverty and discouragement is the type of rea-
soning which should have dispelled all doubts on his in-
tuitive recognition of the importance of balance for the
success and effectiveness of the armed forces.

The use of parallel construction remain strong
in spirit, active in intellectual endeavor, and sound
economically is not only strong in composition, but ex-

cellent in word choice.

[Paragraph 28]
(Concluding paragraph of Body of Speech)

(28) This determination must be made on a long
term basis. It would be the most dangerous type
of wishful thinking to assume that the struggle
will be of short duration. A defense program is

118

not something that can be turned off every time
Soviet leaders speak of the possibility of co-
existence and turned on a month later, when a
Laos is invaded or an Iran maneuvered to the
edge of the land of no return. We cannot
afford it psychologically and we cannot afford
it financially. That way, indeed, lies ulti—
mate bankruptcy for the West. Having agreed
upon our minimum requirements we must push
steadily and uniformly between optimism and
despair, without sudden outpourings of billions
and equally sudden and violent retrenchments.

The transition sentence refers back to the conclud-
ing sentence of the previous paragraph (#27) as a determin-
ation which must be followed on a long term basis.

That a defense program must be consistent in its
Support, without being turned on and off with the change
of the smile of co-existence to the frown of invasion by
the Soviets, is sound logical reasoning by General Gruen-
ther-~an approach to the psychological and financial prob-
lems following a design which should have earned the re-

spect of the audience and contributed to the speaker's

credibility.

 

119

[Paragraph 1]
(Opening Paragraph of Conclusion of Speech)

(1) I feel that we are facing a period ahead
where service to the cause of freedom must be
given unselfishly by the North Atlantic peoples.
From my experience I am confident that the people
will make the necessary sacrifice if they under-
stand why they are being made, and if they be-
lieve that NATO can be an effective agency to
preserve the peace. For that reason I am par-
ticularly gratified that you men and women have
taken the time and trouble, at considerable ex-
pense, to meet in connection with the Atlantic
Community Conference now taking place at Copen-
hagen. Your contribution in crusading for this
cause can indeed be a tremendous one. I am es-
pecially pleased to see you stressing the civil-
ian aspects of NATO. I congratulate you on the
efforts you are making to strengthen NATO and
I want you to know that if we at SHAPE can be
of any assistance to you, we stand ready to
help. We would be particularly honored to have
any of your groups visit SHAPE. You will find
there 420 officers from twelve nations who have
made an outstanding success in the field of in-
ternational cooperation.

The emphasis on the importance of unselfish seré
vice to the cause of freedom and the expression of faith
in NATO members to make the necessary saCrifices if they'
understand the reasons and if they believe NATO can be an
effective agency to preserve the peace, are most signifi-~

cant comments with dramatic impact designed no doubt to

120

secure rapport with the audience by expressing faith in
their willingness to make any sacrifice to preserve the
peace.

The tribute to the young men and women in the
audience for their interest in attending the Atlantic
Community Conference, their contributions in crusading
for the cause, stressing the civilian aspects of NATO--
in direct and personal address for audience involvement--
represent the type of approach which is designed to
establish their goodwill through appealing to their pride
of achievement.

Within this paragraph the singular first person
pronoun appears six times, the plural first person pro-
noun, four times--and the second person pronoun, "you"--
eight times--which emphasizes the informal, conversational,
friendly tone through personal address--a stylistic pattern
which usually serves to implement the type of workmanship
described in the previous paragraph in terms of earning

rapport with the audience and establishing the credibility

of the speaker.

121
[Paragraph 2]

(2) Many years ago Clemenceau said "War is too
important to be entrusted to the generals."
While he was half joking when he made that
statement, the events since then have certainly
proved him to be correct. Modern war embraces
not only the military factor but also vast
political, economic and psychological consider-
ations.

With the reference to Clemenceau's quotation,
Gruenther is again emphasizing the fact that modern war-
fare includes the political, economic, and psychological

, , , , 1
considerations as well as the military factors.

These comments also reflect his humility and wis-
dom as a military leader in giving full recognition to

the other areas which contribute to the effective and

successful achievement and preservation of peace.

[Paragraph 3]

(3) Although it may seem strange to have men in
uniform advocating the cause of peace you will
find that the officers at SHAPE, as well as
throughout Allied Command Europe, consider that
to be our prime objective. Most of us have seen

1See footnote, p. 116.

122

too much of war to believe that any benefits
can come from another world struggle. I would
not go so far as to say that "Peace is too im-
portant to be entrusted to the civilians." But
I do say that we in the military are making a
real contribution to peace by denying to a
would-be aggressor an easy, cheap and profit-
able conquest. We firmly believe that if NATO
had been in existence in l939 World War II
never would have taken place.

By admitting that it may appear incongruous for
military men to advocate the cause of peace, Gruenther
considerably strengthens his tribute to SHAPE officers
in pointing up the cause of peace as their prime objec-
tive.

As a partial corollary to Clemenceau's well-known
quotation, Gruenther admits he would not go as far as to
say that Peace is too important to be entrusted to the
civilians, but feels that the military are making a real
contribution to peace by denying a would-be aggressor an
easy, cheap and profitable conquest. The irony and sar-
casm of this reference to the Soviets as would-be aggres-
sors was a meaningful description representing a type of
workmanship designed to appeal to the NATO audience, and

pay tribute to the military personnel of NATO for their

contributions in behalf of peace.

123

With a hypothetical supposition, Gruenther rea-

sons that World War II would never have taken place if

NATO had been in existence in l939--which by inference

implies that NATO can prevent World War III.

(4)

sents the basic reason for the organization of NATO--that

military strength is a pre-requisite for any negotiations

[Paragraph 4]

It is a sad commentary on the state of the
world today that peace cannot be established
without power. Nevertheless, that is a fact,
We have tried negotiation from weakness, and
in the process, we have seen almost half of
the world swallowed up in the darkness of
Soviet imperialism. We must have military
strength not only to resist aggression but
also to give our statementczfirm basis from
which to negotiate a modus vivendi with the
Soviet Union.

Gruenther is here stating an axiom which repre-

with a potential enemy as well as for successful resis-

tance of aggression.

Gruenther's unswerving dedication to building NATO's mil-

itary defense capabilities to meet these two fundamental

goals.

It is this reasoning which explains

up in the darkness of Soviet imperialism." is a dramatic
metaphor of fear-charged words which portrays a realistic

picture of the ominous aggressive characteristic of Soviet

124

The second sentence including the statement

we have seen almost half of the world swallowed

imperialism--as confirmed by history.

(5)

(6)

(7)

[Paragraphs 5-6 and 7]
(Closing Paragraphs of Conclusion)

The task of leadership in the period is in-
deed a heavy one. It is time to reconcile our
national policies where they show signs of di-
verging. It is time to heal the wounds to na-
tional pride that have come from bitter and
ill-considered words. It is time for forgive-
ness, for understanding, for patience, and
above all for rededication to that fundamental
unity of purpose and policy without which we
should surely perish.

Our modest strength is beginning to reap
dividends. It would be a tragedy if we should
weary and falter in the last hard stretch to
the goal we have agreed upon.

Never was there greater need among the NATO

nations for unity, for wisdom, and for persever-

ance. Never was there a greater need to see
clearly that our lives are bound inextricably
together. Never was there a greater need to
demonstrate that we who have inherited freedom,

125
have not forgotten the value of that heritage
nor lost the will to defend it.

In these concluding paragraphs there is the sem-
blance of eloquence of language which is elevated from
Gruenther's usual pattern of simplicity in sentence struc-
ture and word choice. This decisive contrast stresses
the significance of the idealistic philosophy he is at-
tempting to convey to his audience.

Through parallel construction, the repetition of
the opening phrase It is time . . . in each of three sen-
tences of the first paragraph above, brings added emphasis
to the ethical philosophy structured in effective rhythmic
cadence--It is time to reconcile . . . . It is time to
heal the wounds . . . . It is time for forgiveness

The ethical implications in the two metaphors no
doubt carried special significance to the patriotic and
Spiritual philosophy which General Gruenther attempts to
convey in these closing words in Copenhagen--

It is time to heal the wounds to national pride
that have come from bitter and ill-considered
words. (Par. #5)
It would be a tragedy if we should weary and falter

in the last hard stretch to the goal we have
agreed upon. (Par. #6)

126

The concluding paragraph, in parallel construc-
tion, again uses repetition of the initial phrase in each
of the three sentences to gain emphasis: Never was there
greater need . . . . Never was there a greater need . . . .
Never was there a greater need . . . .

The seven paragraphs of the Conclusion of the
Copenhagen speech offer a real challenge to the audience
in the many tasks of leadership related to unselfish
service in the cause of freedom.

A sincere and enthusiastic endorsement of an
ethical philosophy is encompassed in Gruenther's plea
for unity in purpose and policy, wisdom, perseverance,
forgiveness, patience, and understanding--expressed in
eloquent as well as simple language. This is the type
of inspirational challenge to an audience which is de-
signed to lift their sights while building the credibil-

ity of the speaker.

PART III

EVALUATION OF THE COPENHAGEN SPEECH

Since the Copenhagen speech was General Gruenther's
first major message to the official representatives of the
NATO nations as well as to delegates from the Atlantic
Community and civic groups, his principal objective was
to explain the background and purpose of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and to answer any objections which had
been raised regarding NATO. He clearly described the rea-
sons for this alliance of ten free European nations, with
Canada and the United States making the even dozen in 1953
--to build collective military security as a defense
against the threat of enemy aggression.

Gruenther's description of the military arm of
NATO--the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers of
Europe (SHAPE)--and its relationship to the civil organi-
zation of NATO was carefully interpreted as essential
background information to clarify to the audience the

127

128

overall operation of this new alliance dedicated to the
preservation of peace and the prevention of a third
World War. Gruenther thereby fulfilled his responsibil-
ity to inform his audience on the purpose, goals, and
organization of NATO by adhering to acceptable method-
ology in the arrangement of his lines of thought, the
development of his ideas and factual material supported
by examples, illustrations, personal testimony, and pat-
terns of logic.

In connection with his handling of objections re-
garding NATO, Gruenther presented clear and logical argu-
ments for the significance of SHAPE as a crucial part of
NATO. His methodology of stating a generalization, sup-
porting it by various types of evidence, such as numerical
data, facts, and figures, often with personal testimony
based on logical reasoning, represents his distinguishing
characteristics in the development of his materials which
contribute so very much to the clarity of his message.

Another positive characteristic reflected in this
address in Copenhagen is his choice of simple and under-

standable language, free from military jargon. This

129

clarity of expression is particularly essential when
addressing a cosmopolitan group such as the audience he
faced in Copenhagen, representing military officers, for-
eign ministers, and a large contingency of lay groups
from civic and educational organizations present on this
occasion.

Last, and probably most significant, is the over-
all adaptation to this particular audience. This adapta-
tion is fulfilled not only by the choice of material he
conveys and the simplicity of the language in which his
ideas are expressed, but in the topical and chronological
arrangement of presentation. Although there are four
major topics which General Gruenther included in all of
his messages to NATO nations, as enumerated in Part I of
this chapter the degree of development of each topic as
well as the order in which they are covered is revealed
as one of the significant clues to his outstanding adap-
tation to his audience. For example, in this speech in
Copenhagen, Gruenther's principal objective was to pro-
vide the audience with the background purpose, goals, and

organization of NATO. These lines of thought were

130

introduced in the early part of the speech, followed by
the progress NATO was making in attempting to fulfill
its fundamental purpose of building defense for collec-
tive security. To have opened this address with the mil-
itary strength of the Soviets and their potential threat
of aggression (as in the Rome speech) would have been
confusing and frustrating to the Copenhagen audience at
this early period of NATO's operation when people needed
basic information on this Alliance which was created to
thwart enemy aggression by its very strength of military
defense for collective security.

General Gruenther is the type of speaker who has
never been known to deliver a "canned" speech! He has an
orderly, military mind which naturally visualizes and con-
veys information by topical grouping of ideas, but the
number of subordinate topics under the respectiVe divi-
sions varies with the background knowledge of the audience.
For this reason, the Copenhagen speech, in its adaptation
to the audience, includes internal summaries, explicit
transitions, and specific identification of subordinate

topics. Likewise, the language style is didactic and

131

matter-of-fact, with crisp, to-the-point statements, well
adapted to this cosmopolitan audience in Copenhagen where
ease of translation to other languages was of paramount
importance.

Perhaps because the writer was a member of the
audience in Copenhagen that evening in 1953 and heard
this speech delivered by General Gruenther (without bene-
fit of reminder notes) the privilege of personal opinion
can be expressed so positively in behalf of the speaker.
Having also heard innumerable commendatory remarks from
the audience during the reception which followed the
address, the writer cabled home that evening, "I have

just heard the orator of the century!"

CHAPTER IV

THE LONDON SPEECH (JUNE 8, 1954)

PART I
THE OCCASION, SETTING, AND AUDIENCE OF

THE LONDON SPEECH

On June 8, 1954, General Gruenther, as the honored
guest and principal speaker, addressed the English-Speaking
Union of the Commonwealth at a dinner meeting in the spa-
cious and attractive Ballroom of the Hotel Dorchester, the
leading hotel (at that time) in London, England.1

Although the speech script sent to the writer by
the Public Information Division of SHAPE carried no title
for the address, Vital Speeches of the Day published the
speech with the heading: "What Disarmament Means to NATO--

Substitute Human Beings for Atomic Weapons."2

 

1Information conveyed to writer by General Gruenther
regarding description of audience and location of meeting-
place.

2Vital Speeches of the Day, September 1, 1954, pp.
676-679.

132

133

General Gruenther was addressing royalty and
titled persons of England, the members of the English-
Speaking Union of the Commonwealth, many government offi-
cials and military officers of Great Britain and other
NATO nations--comprising an audience of well over 350
persons..

The English-Speaking Union was founded in England
in 1918, following World War I, by Sir Evelyn Wrench, to
explore the concepts of Democracy--and celebrated their
50th Anniversary in 1968. From England the organization
spread to many English-speaking nations in the world, in-
cluding Canada, Scotland, Australia, New Zealand, India,
Pakistan, and the United States.

The English-Speaking Union was launched in the
United States in 1920, and the 75 cities where branches of

the ES-U have been established are now planning the

 

1The audience of the Copenhagen Speech, on the
other hand, included civic and educational representatives
who were invited from many free countries, local residents
of Copenhagen who were not members of the Danish Society
sponsoring the Atlantic Community Convention--as well as
military and government officials of Denmark and other NATO
nations. But in the third case study on the speech deliv-
ered in Rome, the audience included a number of representa-
tives from countries which were ngt_members of the NATO
Alliance and were present to audit Gruenther's message.

134

national celebration of the 50th Anniversary in the United
States in l970--the year which the United Nations Assembly
has designated as "International Education Year." The
growing importance of English as a universal language in
today's world points the way to the increasing use of
English as a vehicle for further world education. General
Gruenther served as National Chairman of the ES-U of the
United States from 1966-68 and led the U.S. delegation to
the 1968 ES-U World Branches Conference in Edinburgh,
Scotland, chairing the meeting on international relations.1
Other speakers at this ES-U dinner meeting in Lon-
don were the Duke of Edinburgh (now Prince Philip), Sir
Winston Churchill, Prime Minister; Clement Atlee, Leader
of the Opposition in Parliament, and former Prime Minister;
and Clement Davies, Leader of the Liberal Party. The Duke
of Edinburgh, President of the English-Speaking Union,
served as presiding chairman of the meeting and introduced
General Gruenther. Two choice extracts from his introduc-

tion of the General were:

 

1"ES-U Salutes General Gruenther," The English-

Speaking Union of the United States, XV, No. 9 (November,
1968), p. l.

135

. . . This dinner is being given in honour of
General Gruenther whose main job at SHAPE is
to get people and nations to cooperate now.

I think we in this Union can also take pride

in the fact that he speaks English--or perhaps,

so as not to wound any feelings, I had better

put it that he speaks a language which we can

all understand. I think it would only be fair

to add that he has, of course, the invaluable

support and assistance of an English speaking

Field Marshalll

The speaking situation in London, with the histor-

ical ties between Great Britain and the United States,
provided an opportunity for General Gruenther's subtle
humor, frequent jesting with one or the other of the two
countries as the whipping post, and sparks of friendly
irony delivered with "tongue-in-cheek" finesse which are
characteristic of the type of repartee exchanged between
long-time friends. Perhaps some of the jesting by General
Gruenther in his address balanced off some of the barbs
included in Prince Philip's introduction of the speaker!

The ties between Great Britain and the United States had

been intertwined through the years with the early migration

 

1Basil Blackwell, ed., Speeches at the Dinner in
Honour of General Alfred M. Gruenther under the Auspices
of the English-Speaking Union of the Commonwealth, June 8,
1954, Oxford University, 1954. (This brochure also in-
cluded the speeches delivered by Sir Winston Churchill,
Clement Atlee, and Clement Davies.)

136

of settlers from England to America, resulting in periodic
tensions to be sure, but the differences were endured and
surmounted as their relationship strengthened in their
common cause of two World Wars.

The basic purpose of the speech was to convey news
of NATO's progress, to provide documentation on the grow-
ing military strength of the Soviets (as well as their
"defects"), and to appeal for more positive action from
Great Britain for increased contributions to NATO's mili-
tary defense.

On the other hand, the Copenhagen speech of 1953
was primarily expository on the purpose and scope of NATO,
for General Gruenther was addressing that assembly just a
few months after being appointed as Supreme Commander of
the Allied Powers in Europe, when NATO was emerging from
little or no defense capabilities. There, General Gruen-
ther recognized his responsibility to provide a clear ex-
planation of NATO's specific operation, organizational
framework, and objectives as essential background infor-
mation on which to launch the reasons for the need of

military defense support from NATO nations--facts which

137

were well-known to Gruenther's audience in London, since
the British had played an important part in the forming
of NATO.

Moreover, the speech in Rome in 1955--the third
case study to be analyzed--was a persuasive presentation
on the urgent need for military defense support as an im-
perative to collective security. The Italian audience
was apathetic and apprehensive regarding additional con-
tributions to armed defense, for Soviet "peace offensive"
propaganda had diminished the fear of an aggressive at-
tack (despite Russia's constant build—up of military
strength).

Therefore, in these three different speaking sit-
uations, General Gruenther was attempting to adapt to
three different audience profiles, varying the degree of
information and/or persuasion to fulfill the purpose and

objectives of the specific addresses.

(l)

(2)

PART II

RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LONDON SPEECH

5

BY PARAGRAPHS

[3 Paragraphs]
(Introduction)

Your Royal Highness, Sir Winston Churchill,
Your Excellencies, my lords, ladies and gentle-
men:

I am deeply grateful for the generous intro-
duction which Your Royal Highness gave me. I
should like to say to you that during the trip
which the Queen and you took, we at SHAPE watched
your progress carefully, and with a great deal of
interest. We felt that your journey was an event
of great significance for the entire Free World.
I hope you will be kind enough to convey to her
Majesty our sincere admiration and gratitude
for her devotion to the concepts of liberty and
freedom for which we are all working.

I regret very much that Mrs. Gruenther could
not be here this evening, but it happens that we
have two sons and seven grandchildren. Some of
you will be old enough eventually to have grand-
children. And you will then learn that compli-
cations develop in the lives of grandchildren,
especially when one of the sons happens to be in
Korea, and his wife is left with four children
between the ages of eight months and five-and-a-
half years. That was the situation which developed

138

139
in our family and Mrs. Gruenther had to go back
to the United States last night.

(3) But it's about the future of those grand-
children that I would like to talk to you to-
night--not about the toys that they play with,
but about the kind of world to which they must
look forward. That is why the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization was formed in 194.9.1

In the opening greeting to his audience, General

Gruenther rigidly adheres to the formal protocol in ad-

dressing Royalty, government officials, and titled per-

sonages of England. His expression of gratitude to the

Duke of Edinburgh for the "generous" introduction is

appropriately coupled with his commendation of the good-

will journey fromwwhich Queen Elizabeth and the Duke of

Edinburgh had recently returned. Through expressing the

interest of SHAPE in their journey and in "Her Majesty's"

devotion to the concepts of liberty and freedom, he was

implicitly associating the purpose of NATO with their

tour, which held such great significance to the free world.

 

1The three paragraphs beginning with the acknowledg-
ment by General Gruenther of the introduction by the Duke
of Edinburgh were included in Vital Speeches of the Day but
deleted from the SHAPE script, which carried only the open-
ing formal salutation to the audience. However, the balance
of the speech was identical in both sources. Paragraphs 1-3
also included in SPEECHES . . . . by Blackwell.

140

His apology for Mrs. Gruenther's absence provides
the opportunity to convey that they have two sons and
seven grandchildren, and to explain his wife's sudden
departure for the United States to meet an emergency
which had developed with the four young children of their
son stationed in Korea. The introduction of the humorous
note Some of you will be old enough eventually to have
grandchildren, was a compliment which both the old and
the young of the audience would no doubt appreciate.

To Gruenther it was the future of the grandchil-
dren that provided the link to the topic of his speech
on NATO. For the kind of world to which the grandchil-
dren must look forward explains the reason the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization was formed in 1949.

In the first paragraph of the introduction, Gruen-
ther freely uses personal address and first person pro-
nouns to convey a conversational tone of collective pride
for the concepts of freedom and liberty espoused by Her
Majesty the Queen on her recent journey with the Duke to
free nations. In the four sentences in the first para-

graph there are three singular first person pronouns,

141

three plural first person pronouns, three second person

pronouns, and two possessive second person pronouns to

emphasize the personal involvement of mutual objectives.

The three paragraphs of the introduction, with

the personal references and fine adaptation to the audi-

ence, provides a very smooth transition to the opening

paragraph of the Body of the speech covering the involve-

ment of England in the founding of NATO.

(1)

(2)

[Paragraphs 1 and 2]
(Body of Speech)

You will be interested to know that the
first person I ever heard discuss NATO was a
British subject. It was Ambassador Sir Gladwyn
Jebb, and the month was March 2948. At the
time I heard him first outline the concept, I
thought it was a very elusive and illusory pro-
ject. But he was a crusader, a dedicated man.
He continued on it, and with the help of the
British Government and the governments of the
other free countries, a pact was finally signed
in 1949 on the 4th of April.

You are aware, of course, that General Eisen-
hower came to Paris and set up our headquarters--
SHAPE--as part of this organization on the 2nd
of April 1951, to organize a defense of Europe
from the northern tip of Norway to the eastern
borders of Turkey--a perimeter of some four
thousand miles.

142

To adapt immediately to his audience in the body
of the speech, General Gruenther pays tribute to the Brit-
ish spokesman, Ambassador Sir Gladwyn Jebb, who was the
first person he had ever heard discuss NATO, back in 1948.
By admitting his personal doubts about the concept in
1948, Gruenther was awarding full recognition to this
dedicated British ambassador for his early involvement
in NATO, and to the help of the British Government and
the governments of the other free nations in expediting
the NATO pact signed on April 4, 1949.

By this methodology he was paying tribute to Great
Britain, without including the important part played by
the United States in the organization of NATO. By this
methodology he is also reflecting personal humility--
frankly admitting that he was not as astute as they were
in recognizing the potentials of NATO. This workmanship
was especially important at this time in view of the fact
that the first Supreme Commander of SHAPE, General Eisen-
hower, was an American who came to Paris to set up the
military headquarters and to organize a defense of Europe
from the northern tip of Norway to the eastern borders of

Turkey--a perimeter of some four thousand miles.

143

[Paragraphs 3 and 4]

(3) When he arrived in Europe, the morale of
the Free World was at a very low ebb. It was
only a matter of weeks until we were going to
be ejected from the Korean peninsula. In
Europe itself the new and better world we had
hoped for was confronted with the stark reali-
zation that Soviet imperialism was again on
the march.

(4) Our assets were very, very meager. But
what was even more discouraging was the fact
that the security resources we possessed could
not be co-ordinated to respond to a single
strategic plan of defense. Now, three years
and two months later, I can tell you that we
have made very significant progress in develop-
ing a position of strength.

Before proceeding to his first major topic on the
"Progress of NATO" Gruenther points to the discouraging
morale in the Free World at the time Eisenhower arrived
in Europe--including the rise of Soviet imperialism on
the continent, the crucial problem in Korea, and the com-
plete inadequacy of security resources for any type of
strategic plan of defense.

By contrasting the past with the present-~three
years and two months 1ater--he introduces his topic of

‘NATO's progress in military strength by describing it

as significant.

144

The use of two metaphors provides picturesque
emphasis to the pitifully low state of affairs when Eisen-
hower arrived in Europe:

The morale of the Free World was at a very low ebb. . .
Soviet imperialism was again on the march.

Repetition of the adjective "very" also provides

emphasis to the sparsity of NATO assets at that time:
Our assets were gggy, 223y_meager.

Personal address is used to point up and emphasize

the significant progress in NATO strength since 1951:
Now, three years and two months later, i can
tell ygg that ye have made very significant
progress in developing a position of strength.

The use of the collective "we" in the above obser-
vation of progress hints at pride motivation and may well
have aroused feelings of pride in the minds of the audi-
ence for the accomplishments of NATO during this brief

period-~with the evidence provided in the subsequent two

paragraphs.

 

Note: Underlining in the excerpts from General Gruenther's
speech indicate emphasis of the writer to illustrate
rhetorical principles.

145

The Prgqress NATO is Making
[Paragraphs 5 and 6] '

(S) The forces which General Eisenhower had in
1951 have been increased numerically some three
to four times--and from the standpoint of effec—
tiveness the increase has been greater still.

To give you an idea of what we have now, there
are available for the defense of Europe, between
90 and 100 divisions in varying degrees of readi-
ness. Some of these divisions will be ready on
D-Day, others on D plus 15, and still others on
D plus 30.

(6) With respect to air power, the increase has
been even greater. To quote one statistic:
When General Eisenhower arrived we had 15 air-
fields. Not one of them could take jets, but
that wasn't important, because we had no jets
to put on them. Now we have 120 airfields, and
every one of them can take jets. By the end of
this year the number of airfields will be further
increased.

In launching the supporting evidence for the pro-
gress of NATO, Gruenther reports the numerical increase
of three to four times the forces of 1951, but to provide
more specific information he translates the increase into
current "division" strength-~between 90 and 200-divisions
in varying degrees df'readiness.

By comparison and contrast Gruenther emphasizes

the great increase in the number of airfields--When

146

General Eisenhower arrived we had 15 airfields . . . .

Now we have 120 airfields.

In this reference, Gruenther introduces a shade

of humor by pointing out that although none of the orig-

inal 15 airfields could take jets, it really wasn't im-

portant because SHAPE had no jets to put on them!

(7)

(8)

(9)

[Paragraphs 7-8 and 9]

With respect to practical results, I would
like to invite your attention to the following
facts:

Three years ago the Soviets could march to
the Channel on very short notice with only the
forces that they had in Occupied Europe. Now,
however, because of the shield we have developed,
they would have to reinforce their forces in
Occupied Europe from the Soviet Union. If that
estimate is correct, it gives us a certain in-
surance against a so-called accidental or mis-
calculated war. It means that if World War III
should erupt it would be only because the Soviets
in the Kremlin had made the first and fateful de-
cision to start it, with all of the responsibil-
ities which that decision entails.

I would be less than frank if I did not tell
you that we still have great deficiencies. It
would be almost miraculous if in the short period
of three years we had been able to build up from
the low level at which we were in 1951 to a

147

strength which would stop an all-out Soviet
attack now. We are just not that good yet,
and that is one reason why we have recommended
to our political superiors, the North Atlantic
Council, that we have additional forces. It
is the reason why we recommended that there

be a German contribution to our protective
shield. '

In reverse order to the progress of NATO in the
three years since 1951, Gruenther reports the status of
the Soviets in 1951, when they could have marched to the
Channel with only the forces they had in Occupied Europe.
But as a result of NATO's progress, the Soviets in 1954
would have to supplement their European forces with
forces from the Soviet Union.

This supporting evidence on the personal testi-
mony of Gruenther was significant to the explanation that
under these circumstances NATO would not be caught unaware
by a Soviet attack since the Soviets would need to trans-
port troops from the USSR, thus giving NATO the insurance
of time for preparation.

To vindicate the need for the German contribution
and their membership in the Alliance, Gruenther admits
that NATO deficiencies in military strength could not re-

pell an all-out Soviet attack, despite the great growth

148

of NATO military forces in the period of three years.
That the NATO protective shield had to be supplemented
provided the reasons for the recommendation to the North
Atlantic Council of the need for additional forces and

a German contribution of armed forces.

The plural first person pronoun is used to invoke
the personal involvement of the British audience with the
need for additional forces for a protective shield. Al-
though the German contribution was included only as a
passing remark, Gruenther obviously intentionally left
it without further interpretation, knowing that the Brit-
ish were not enthusiastically receptive to the inclusion
of Germany in NATO, having been the recipient of many
devastating German attacks and atrocities during WOrld
War II.

Since this particular audience--the English-
Speaking Union--was supposedly not an official gathering
of NATO representatives, it was presumably not necessary
to become involved with details of German affiliation

with NATO.

149

The Problems Facing NATO
[Paragraphs 10-17, inclusive]
(Use of atomic weapons if war occurred
3 yrs. in future?)

(10) We are engaged at SHAPE at this very moment
in working on a philosophy of war--if unfortu-
nately it should take place--projected some
three years into the future. We have not com-
pleted that study yet, but I can tell you some
of the highlights of it.

(11) If a full-scale war should take place three
years from now, we visualize a conflict in which
we would use atomic weapons. We are working on
a concept of having as small a force in being
as possible while depending heavily on reserve
forces. Our protective shield, therefore, must
be able to hold long enough for these reserves
to mobilize. We feel that it will not hold long
enough unless we have atomic power to support
it. So in our thinking we visualize the use of
atomic bombs in the support of our ground troops.
We also visualize the use of atomic bombs against
targets of war making potential deep in enemy
territory.

(12) I recognize that such a plan creates a major
political problem, and I want you to realize that
we at SHAPE do not think we are the political
masters. We understand clearly that the strategy
which will be adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization will be a strategy which has been

accepted by the fourteen member governments of
NATO.

(13) I am only telling you what our thinking is
now, and the type of plan that we shall forward
to our political superiors. Whether they approve
it or not-is a matter for them to decide.

150

(14) I recognize full well, as does everybody in
this audience, that people are deeply worried
over the possibility of an atomic war. I can
assure you that worry extends to our headquar-
ters just as much as it does into your homes.
We are trying to build a force of such strength
that it will deter aggression. We do not want
war to take place--any kind of war!

(15) But if it does take place, there is no ques-
tion in our minds that every weapon must and
will be used. You all know that the Soviet
Union, especially during the last few weeks,
has been conducting a very vigorous campaign
asking that atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons
be banned. We at our headquarters do not think
that that is the answer to the problem. We
feel that if you ban those types of weapons,
you require our forces to adopt a wall-of-flesh
type of strategy. We have just within the last
two months seen a very clear illustration of
the results of that kind of strategy, where at
Dien-Bien-Phu forty thousand of the Viet-Minh
forces finally overwhelmed, after a most fierce
struggle, some ten thousand gallant members of
the French Union forces.

(16) If, however, a decision is made that atomic
weapons are not to be used, we at our headquarters
will point out to our political supperiors that
our defensive posture can only be maintained
successfully at the expense of increased manpower.
When one considers the low value placed on human
life by the Soviets, we, in our humble opinion
believe it would be a major mistake for the West
to adopt a type of strategy which substitutes
human beings fer atomic weapons.

(17) We believe that an atomic disarmament should
be part of a safe and secure across-the-board
total disarmament plan. In other words, we feel

151

that war itself should be made impossible, be-
cause we see no profit from war-~and we think
that we know a little about that subject!
The eight paragraphs above are all concerned with
the problems of atomic weapons which would emanate in a
war projected three years into the future-~a hypothetical
supposition and a philosophical study in which SHAPE was
immediately concerned.
The projection of the adoption of atomic weapons
(paragraph #11) was related to a concept of having only
a small armed force available, with dependence upon a
large reserve force. The protective shield force must
hold until reserve forces mobilize, supplemented of
course by atomic power. The atomic bombs were also visu-
alized against targets of war in enemy territory.
The succeeding three paragraphs (12, 13, and 14)
adopt personal address, with personal testimony, for em-
phasis in a conversational tone on collective involvement

with the plan of strategy for the use of atomic bombs:

g recognize that such a plan creates a major
political problem, and ; want you to realize

. . . . I am only telling you what our think-
ing is now . . . . ; recognize full well as

does everybody in this audience that people
are deeply worried . . . . A can assure you . . .

152

The keynote sentence of overall SHAPE policy is
epitomized in the statement:

We are trying to build a force of such strength
that it will deter aggression. We do not want
war to take place-~any kind of war!

The collective "we" includes of course all nations
of NATO, and thereby the personal involvement of the Eng-
lish audience.

SHAPE and the Soviet policy on atomic warfare
were in juxtaposition. The Soviets were conducting a
vigorous campaign to ban atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons.
SHAPE, on the other hand, felt that by banning those types
of weapons, the land forces become walls of flesh. As an
example of such a tragedy, Gruenther cites a recent battle
of 40,000 Communist troops in Dien-Bien Phu, following a
fierce struggle as a wall of flesh, finally overwhelming
10,000 French Union forces.

Gruenther contrasts the philosophy of the Soviets
with its low value on human life with that of the west,
where the importance and dignity of the individual are
held in high regard. Gruenther maintains it would be a

major mistake for the West to substitute human beings for

153

atomic weapons; but if atomic weapons are not to be used,
then SHAPE manpower must be vastly increased.

His logical conclusion on atomic power based on
NATO-SHAPE testimony is that atomic disarmament must be
part of a complete and total across the board disarmament
--that war itself should be made impossible because we
see no profit from war and we think we know a little
about that subject.

Contrast in warfare strategy of the Soviets come
pared to the strategy of free nations was explicitly and
logically developed throughout these eight paragraphs,
leading to the deductive conclusion that atomic disarma-
ment could be condoned by the west only if it is made
part of a 22221 disarmament plan, thereby making war it-
self impossible, to which all free nations would whole-
heartedly concur.

If only atomic and nuclear weapons are banned as
proclaimed in the Soviet campaign, the defensive position
of SHAPE could be successfully maintained only by greatly
increased manpower which-SHAPE would consider a major mis-
take, since the west would never agree to using human be-

ings as a substitute for atomic weapons.

154

The statement, . . . we feel that war itself
should be made impossible, because we see no profit from
war--and we think that we know a little about that sub-
ject!"--is a significant observation of a military leader
whose principal responsibility was to build military
strength for NATO as collective security against acts
of aggression. But equally important was the need for
military strength to negotiate effectively at the peace
table, since negotiation from weakness had never been
successful. NATO was dedicated to the preservation of
peace--not war. This objective for the maintenance of
peace is, of course, the type of philosophy which could
well establish the credibility of this military leader
with his audience.

Concerning the subsequent phrase--and we think
that we know a little about that subject!--Gruenther was
no doubt referring to the kinship of the United States
and Great Britain in their participation as allies in
the two world wars--a methodology that is designed to
capture the interest of the audience in a shared exper-

ience.

155

Although the problems concerned war strategy,
the language was simple, clear, and understandable,
without military jargon. The use of the metaphor expres-
sion of the race track across-the-board in referring to
a total disarmament plan would probably have imparted a
most effective description to a country like England,

where betting on horse races was a common and acceptable

practice.
[Paragraphs 18-21, inc.]
(If War Should Take Place in 1954)
(18) Now, let us suppose that this war should un-

fortunately take place this year--1954. I have
already mentioned that we have grave disadvan—
tages. What would be the result of the war now?
My firm belief is that the Soviet Union, if a
war took place this year, would be defeated!

(19) I think that statement requires some explan-
ation. At the present time we have many serious
deficiencies. Some of our troops are poorly
trained. Some of our supplies are altogether
too inadequate. But we have one asset now which
is of tremendous value, and that is that we have
a long-range air capability to which the Soviets
now have no answer. I refer to a plane, the
B-47, which can fly so fast and so high that
there is no defense against it in the year 1954.
One of those planes four months ago left the

156

United States, and landed in England four hours
and thirtyéfour minutes later. That is an aver-
age speed of 650 miles an hour. Now I will con-
fide to you that our people wouldn't have an-
nounced this record unless they knew they had

a good friendly tail-wind to send it over here.
But even so, that's travelling. That plane can
fly very fast, and drop atomic weapons, and
drop them accurately! I hope and pray that it
will never be necessary to employ this power

in an active role.

(20) In the cold war, we have assets of incalcu-
lable value. We have a spiritual strength which
the Soviet Union cannot equal under any circum-
stances. Our economic potential is still on
the rise, and much greater than anything which
an enemy can match. Above all, we now have an
integrated allied chain of command, throughout
the entire fourteen NATO nations, which will be
able to direct our resources to the best advan-
tags.

(21) Because of all of these reasons I say to

you that if the Soviets should launch an attack

in 1954 they would suffer a severe defeat! I

don't want to say that we would win, because I

am sure that in a third world war there would

be no winner. But the Soviets would definitely

be defeated in every sense of the word!

A second hypothetical supposition was to presume

that a war would take place within the year of 1954.
After posing the rhetorical question, What would be the
result of the war now?, Gruenther replies with a periodic

sentence which holds the audience in suspense on the answer

until the completion of the sentence.

157

Gruenther proceeds to explain why the Soviets
would be defeated (despite some poorly trained NATO troops
and inadequate supplies), by providing evidence on one
tremendous asset--the B-47 which has the long-rangevcapa-
bility of flying so fast and high the Soviets had no de-
fense against it in 1954.

Although Gruenther does not explicitly attribute
the credit for the invention of the B-47 to the United
States, he implies its American ownership in two state-

ments:

One of these planes four months ago left the
United States and landed in England four hours
and 34 minutes later .

Now I will confide to you that our people
wouldn't have announced this record unless
they knew they had a good friendly tail-wind
to send it over here.

Once again, Gruenther's humble attitude shines
through by not claiming the honor for the United States
in the invention of the B-47, a super plane which pro-
vided the greatest threat to the Soviets at this time.

In the second quoted statement above there is a

spark of humor regarding the aid of the tail-wind-—included

most appropriately just before the serious turn to the hope

158

that it would never be necessary to employ this fast
plane's capability in dropping atomic weapons on enemy
targets!

Gruenther's knowledge of the devastating effects
0f atomic weapons presumably prompted his statement cf
hope that it would never be necessary to drop them on
enemy targets. This type of humane consideration for
an enemy is a methodology which conceivably could have
captured the appreciation and respect of the audience for
the credibility of a military leader who possesses compas-
sion for his fellow-men.

In addition to the B-47 and atomic weapons, Gruen-
ther also enumerates NATO assets of incalculable value in
the cold war--spiritual strength and economic potential
not equaled in any way by the Soviets, and most important,
an integrated allied chain of command throughout the en-
tire fourteen NATO nations.

With an internal summary of the above reasons
Gruenther concludes that if the Soviets should attack in
1954 they would be defeated. By personal testimony, how-

ever, he admits that he would not want to say that NATO

159

would win--because I am sure that in a third world war
there would be no winner. But he strengthens the con-
clusion of his internal summary with the allegation that
the Soviets would definitely be defeated in every sense
of the word.

By logical development of materials, Gruenther
has enumerated the type of evidence which gives credence
to his conclusion that the Soviets would definitely be
defeated in every sense of the word (despite his .'
admission that in a third world war there would be no
winner--attributable obviously to nuclear weapons). This
is the type of methodology in the development of sound
supporting evidence which presumably should assist in

establishing the credibility of the-speaker.

The Threat of the Soviets (and their "Defects")
[Paragraphs 22-23]

(22) My point in making these assertions so posi-
tively is that we spend a considerable amount of
our time trembling over the assets of the Soviet
Union. There is a considerable tendency on our
part to think that every Soviet soldier is eight
feet high. But I can assure you there are some

'1-60

five-foot Soviet soldiers, and even some
five-foot Soviet Generals, and we know some of
their defects. Instead of emphasizing only

what they have on the credit side of the ledger
let's all realize that they have many items on
the debit side too. I am sorry to say that they
have had considerable success in the past two
months because of our timidity. By living
dangerously, and with no public opinion of their
own to which their leaders must respond, they
have caused us great trepidation. Let's stop
being frightened. Let us become more and more
aware of the fact that as the Soviet political
and military leaders balance our assets and
deficiencies, they must arrive at the clear
conclusion that they could not win a war against
a united Free World. What I want is to see our
people more confident of our present capabilities
and less fearful of what, on the surface, appears
to be overwhelming Soviet power. This business
of undermining confidence is a favorite communist
trick.

(23) Having said that, I want to make it clear,
that as we project our thinking ahead some five
to ten years, I am not sure that our present
margin will exist then. In other words, I can-
not be confident that time is on our side, even
though we have the advantage now. After all,
on the first of May in the May Day parade, the
Soviets exhibited some airplanes with very
devastating characteristics. We know that their
atomic stockpile is increasing, that they are
working hard on their air defense, that they are
stockpiling and creating additional war supplies,
and that their industrial potential is increas-
ing. What kind of an overall power balance that
will give five, six, seven, eight and ten years
from now, I do not know. I am sure that we have
it in our capacity to continue that balance in
our favor, but whether or not we will, is some-
thing for the future to decide. If the present

161

tendency to relax should continue, I'm afraid
the ultimate results would be extremely disad-
vantageous and tragic to the concepts we hold
so dear: Freedom and the dignity of the human
individual.

In this speech, General Gruenther abbreviates his
third topic on the threat of the Soviets which was usually
covered more fully in his addresses to other NATO nations.
As a contrast to his usual procedure he discounts the
Soviet profile through pointing up their defects on the
debit side of their ledger rather than emphasizing their
assets on the credit side. In personal address and paral-
lel construction he prescribes the plan--

Let's stop being frightened.

Let us become more and more aware of the fact
that as the Soviet political and military leaders
balance our assets and deficiencies, they must
arrive at the clear conclusion that they could
not win a war against a united Free World.

At this point of time he is attempting to convince
the audience to be more confident of NATO's present capa-
bilities, and less fearful of what appears to be overwhelm-
ing Soviet power. Gruenther was more frank and explicit

with his English audience than with other NATO nations in

discounting the Soviet power and their technique of

162

undermining confidence. Perhaps this was attributable to
his awareness of Britain's wholehearted belief in NATO's
need for military defense, while some other NATO nations,
prone to be apathetic and less aware of Russia's trickery
in their peace propaganda, needed to be convinced of the
vital necessity for increasing support of military de-
fense for collective security. Gruenther's description
of the fantasy of believing every Soviet soldier is eight
feet high is a dramatic metaphor to portray the over-
emphasis of the power of the Soviets by the members of
NATO.

In projecting the time forward five to ten years,
however, Gruenther by personal testimony admits doubt con-
cerning whether the NATO margin of advantage over the
Soviets would continue to exist. He supports his doubt
or uncertainty with evidence of the new planes exhibited
by the Soviets on MAY day, the increase in their atomic
stockpile, growth in air defense and war supplies, and
increase in their industrial potential. Although he ad-
mits confidence in NATO's capacity to continue the balance
in favor of the free nations, he is skeptical of the oute

come if the present tendency to relax would continue.

163

In other words, Gruenther is attempting to make
clear the inevitable result of the current tendency of
NATO members to relax in their efforts of increasing their
military defense support. If this apathy would continue,
the ultimate outcome would be tragic in terms of protect-
ing the freedom and dignity of "our" people. The fact
that the Soviets were continuing to increase their mili-
tary strength made it imperative that NATO should also
continue its efforts in the same ratio. Gruenther is
logical in his reasoning that five, six, seven, eight,
or ten years in the future might spell a different out-
come of an aggressive attack by the Soviets unless con-

stant preparedness were to be the watchword of NATO.

[Paragraphs 24-25-26]

(24) At this point I hope you will permit me to
touch on the question of Anglo-American rela-
tions. I came from a small town in Nebraska.
The Duke of Edinburgh was very kind to adver-
tise my many qualifications in his flattering
introduction, but he left out one of great pride
to me. I am an admiral in the Nebraska Navy.
And the Duke didn't say a word about that. I'll
have you know, before some of those titters
erupt into loud laughter, that the Nebraska

164

Navy has never suffered even one vessel damaged
or defeated. I'd like to ask the Duke if any
navy that he's ever been associated with can
claim a similar record.

(25) To let you know something about my ancestry
--my grandfather was a German born in Bavaria.
My grandmother, named Shea was born in Ireland.
She left there at a time when there was some
little dispute about potatoes. She settled in
a small Nebraska village and eventually I was
born there. There were 374 people in that vil-
lage before I was born, and I made number 375.
We spent much of our time expecting the redcoats
to come into that village any day. I don't want
you to think that we had any special hate-the-
British days, because we didn't. Every day was
"down with the British." I was seventeen years
old before I knew the words "damn British" were
two words.

(26) By the year 1942, I had known two Britishers.
Both were monocles and I didn't care if I saw
either of them again.

Again from the serious note of a possible Soviet
aggression in the uncertain future, Gruenther moves to a
humorous vein, but explicitly announces his topic as
Anglo-American relations. However, the Anglo-American
relations are not on an international scale, but are de-
veloped with humorous witticisms on the basis of Gruenther-
British relations!

His first quip was to chide the Duke of Edinburgh

for not including in his introduction any reference to his

165

rank of Admiral in the Nebraska Navy-~a navy which had
never suffered even one vessel damaged or defeated! A
fantasy-~as it obviously was--but he continues the imag-
inary concept by posing the humorous question to the Duke
whether any navy he had ever been associated with could
claim a similar record.

His second quip concerned his ancestry-~his grand-
father was born in Bavaria and his grandmother named Shea,
was born in Ireland, but she left when there was some
little dispute about potatoes (a controversy which was
very conservatively and diplomatically described by Gruene
ther in a humorous jest). That he was a small-town boy
was conveyed by explaining that his grandmother settled
in a small Nebraska village (Platte Center), where he was
eventually born as the 375th member of the town!

Five witticisms followed:

We spent much of our time expecting the redcoats

to come into that village any day.

I don't want you to think that we had any special
hate-the-British days, because we didn't.

Every day was "down with the British.”

I was seventeen years old before I knew the words

"damn British" were two words.

By the year 1942, I had known two Britishers.

Both were monocles and I didn't care if I
saw either of them again.

166

Obviously, unless he was convinced of the friend-
ship and understanding which prevailed in Anglo-American
relationships, he probably would not have risked this
type of personal jesting as humorous anecdotes.

Perhaps some critics would conclude that Gruenther
went out of his way to convey his ancestry as German and
Irish. Since both Germany and Ireland had not enjoyed
the most ”congenial" relationships with England in the
past, critics of rhetoric might question the reason for
introducing this particular material even in jest at this

particular time, before this particular audience.

[Paragraphs 27-28]

(27) On a Wednesday late in July 1942, General
Eisenhower asked for me to come to London. I
arrived on the following Sunday evening, August
2nd, 1941. At the airport I received instruc-
tions to report immediately to General Eisen-
hower in this very hotel--on the fifth floor.
He wanted to talk to me about an operation
which was about to be put in the planning stage.
I had come from Texas, where I had been Chief
of Staff in a command where General Eisenhower
had served. The General's first question was,
"Do you know where Algiers is?" I couldn't
tell the General I didn’t know but actually

167

I hadn't the slightest idea. I had been study-
ing Texas geography, and anybody who's been to
Texas knows that is a big assignment. As a
matter of fact, we in Texas thought we were
going to be attached by the Germans; so we had
all the Texans mobilized. Algiers was the last
thing I thought of, but I didn't admit it to
General Eisenhower. Just as he started to tell
me about this Operation TORCH a telephone call
came, and it was the Prime Minister who said

"I want you out at Chequers right away." So

I learned no more about Algiers or the opera-
tion that night.

(28) The following morning I was summoned before
a British group of about 25 planners and they
said, "General Gruenther, we would like your
plan for Operation TORCH." Well, I assumed
that TORCH had something to do with Algiers,
but I didn't know; so I finessed that problem.
The British looked down their noses at me, and
I left that meeting sure that "damn British"
still should have been one word.

The anecdote on "Operation TORCH" of l942--General
Eisenhower's assignment to General Gruenther as Chief
Planning Officer of the African Invasion of World War II

--is covered in detail in Chapter I, page 31.

 

A prelude to the difficulty in securing informa-
tion about Operation TORCH, not included in this speech,
began with Gruenther's journey from Texas to Washington,
where he had hoped to be briefed on Operation TORCH. But
due to complications in the Military Headquarters in Wash-
ington he was obliged to leave for London with no informa-
tion on his assignment!

168

His report that he had been Chief of Staff in a
command in Texas where General Eisenhower had served was
modestly stated, since he came to London as a Brigadier
General to serve as Deputy Chief of Staff under General
Eisenhower. Another indication of his humble attitude
and of his willingness to become a laughingstock for the
audience is his confession that he did not have the
slightest idea where Algiers was located when questioned
by Eisenhower. Likewise,--his reference to studying
Texas geography and mobilizing all the Texans for an
attack by the Germans is similar to the jest in paragraph
#25 when Gruenther expected the redcoats to come to his
hometown any day when he was a boy! Gruenther's willing-
ness to be the laughingstock for the audience is the kind
of methodology which is usually very effective in gaining
rapport with the audience and increasing a speaker's
credibility.

Again, he provided in his speech the circumstances
for him to be laughed at when the twenty-five British!-
planners asked about his plan for Operation TORCH--and

his confession to the audience that he really didn't know

169

whether TORCH had something to do with Algiers! Since
the British planners looked down their noses at this non-
committal reply, he again implicitly refers to his jest
about the redcoats in the little village of Nebraska
(paragraph #25) for as he left the London meeting he was
sure that "damn British" 351;; should have been one wOrd.

Since the British planners were obviously inter-
ested in "Operation TORCH” and an American was placed in
charge of the planning, it was diplomatic for Gruenther
to place himself as the laughingstock--and then to react
in a perfectly normal way in resenting the British planners
by whom he was victimized--by referring to them as the

"damn British."

[Paragraphs 29-31, inclusive]

(29) That was in August 1942. Since then I have
had a tremendous amount of experience with the
British, and I want to tell you now that I have
the greatest admiration for you all. I have
numerous friends among the British officers and
civilians. I think you people are tops, and I
want to tell you that without reservation. Be~
fore you get too conceited, however, I don't
want you to think you're the only pebble on the
beach.

170

(30) At our headquarters at SHAPE we have a great
deal of trouble with our parishioners, our
clients--our allies, as they're sometimes called.
Our number one trouble is with the Americans, the
number two trouble is with the British.

(31) We find that a few Americans are very modest
--very, very few. We had in one of our NATO
hospitals a few weeks ago one of the doctors
who called another doctor friend to look at a
case. The latter said, "I don't have time."
Finally he was persuaded to come, but first he
asked, "What is this case I'm supposed to look
at?" The answer was, "It's the most remarkable
case we've ever seen in this hospital. It's an
American with an inferiority complex." We run
into very few of those at our headquarters, and
I don't suppose you have seen many either.

With personal address, personal testimony, and
parallel construction for emphasis, Gruenther again re-
verts to the serious note in expressing very sincere ad-

miration for the British

. . I have had a tremendous amount of ex-
perience with the British
want to tell ygy_now that I have . . . .
have numerous friends among the British . . . .
think you people are tops . . .
want to tell you that without reservation.

INIH NIH

Immediately following the above complimentary
remarks, he includes a witticism--Before you get too con-
ceited, however, I don't want you to think you're the

only pebble on the beach.--which could only be directed

171

to an audience who understood the "tongue-in-cheek" barbs
bountifully sprinkled throughout the speech.

To balance off the jesting on the British, Gruen-
ther places the Americans as their number one trouble at
SHAPE, with the British taking second place! And he
probably attempts to even the score with another strike
against the Americans--by the humorous anecdote in a NATO
hospital where they discovered the rare diagnosis of an

American with an inferiority complex!

Hope for the Future
[Paragraphs 32-33]

(32) At our headquarters we have an allied staff
consisting of 171 Americans, 82 British, 63
French, 29 Italians, 13 Canadians, 10 Belgians,
9 Dutch, 7 Greeks and 7 Turks, 5 Norwegians,

3 Danes, and one from little Luxembourg--a total
of 12 nations and 400 officers. We have had so
much experience with these people of varying
backgrounds and traditions that we think we

know a little bit about this question of inter-
national cooperation. Please don't think that
we believe it is easy. Sitting outside my office
is an American sergeant who gets more money than
a French colonel of thirty years' service. He
thinks he deserves it, but the French colonel
may have other ideas about that. But in spite
of many inequalities such as this one, and after

172

35 years of service, I have come to the conclu-
sion that our headquarters at SHAPE is the hap-
piest headquarters I have ever been associated
with. And the reason for that is that these
people believe in the cause. They are thoroughly
dedicated to the objective of international coop-
eration. We at that headquarters think we can
solve any Anglo-American-Commonwealth problem
that exists. There's only one that we haven't
been able to solve, and that is to find a window
that will allow enough cool air in to cool a
Britisher to what he thinks it should be in
January and still keep it warm enough for the
American who sits next to him. But we hope to
solve that within the next few months.

(33) I don't want to tell you that the Americans
are perfect. In fact, we receive so many irri-
tating messages from Washington that we subscribe
wholeheartedly to that wisecrack: "Washington is
the only place in the world where sound travels
faster than light." But, admitting all of that,
may I say that the Americans have made tremendous
progress during the past 15 years in developing
a capacity for world leadership. I hope that
you can put up with them--and--parenthetically,

I also hope they can put up with you.

The numerical description of the SHAPE Staff com-
Prised of 400 representatives from the 12 countries of
NATO provides the support for Gruenther's observation
that these representatives with varying backgrounds and
traditions gave SHAPE some first-hand experience in inter-
national cooperation. Perhaps Gruenther was attempting

to convey to his audience that SHAPE in Paris was serving

173

as a pilot test laboratory for achieving the know-how of
international cooperation on a larger scale among the

peoples of NATO nations.

In admitting that some inequalities exist,
Gruenther cites the American sergeant at SHAPE who gets
more money than a French Colonel of 30 years' service!

In passing, it is interesting to note that a similar com-
parison is also included in the speech Gruenther delivered
in Rome in 1955 (the third case study to be analyzed), but
in Italy he compared the higher salary of the American
sergeant with an Italian Colonel of many years' service.
In this London speech, however, Gruenther chose to cite

a French Colonel rather than an English Colonel of many
Years' service for comparison with the American sergeant--
Perhaps dictated by the similarity of salary range for
French and Italian Colonels.

In spite of the many inequalities such as the
example given, Gruenther concludes that SHAPE is the hap-
Piest headquarters he had been associated with in his 35
Years of service. By personal testimony he attributes
this harmonious setting at SHAPE to the Staff's dedica-

tion to the cause for which they are working and to the

174

objective of international cooperation. Again, Gruenther's
modesty comes through, for it was members of the Staff who
conveyed to the writer a similar glowing account of the
harmony that pervaded the headquarters office at SHAPE in
Paris, but attributed the cause to the Supreme Commander!

Following the serious remarks on the dedication
of his Staff, Gruenther again reverts to humor on the
ventilation problems at SHAPE in January--to find a window
that will allow enough air in to cool a Britisher and
still keep it warm enough for the American who sits next
to him!

In the concluding paragraph of the body of the
Speech, Gruenther conveys in personal address, I.don't
want to tell you that the Americans are perfect. But
admitting some of their shortcomings (such as his adopted
wisecrack on sound travelling faster than light in Wash-
ington, from which they receive so many irritating mes-
sages), Gruenther frankly states that the Americans have
made tremendous progress during the past 15 years in de-
veloping a capacity for world leadership. He closes the

Body of the speech with another quip which purports to

175

brush off some possible sensitive relationships in the
guise of humor:
I hope you can put up with them-~and--paren-
thetically, I also hope they can put up with
you.

The above statement might be interpreted by some
critics as bordering on a barb with serious overtones.
At any rate, it would seem that here is something which
is a bit on the precarious side!1 In any event, this
methodology or approach in the hands of a less competent
craftsman could have been disastrous. But a superior
speaker such as General Gruenther whose tact and diplomacy

are legend, could most likely adopt this line of jesting

Without the danger of being misunderstood by his audience.

[Paragraphs 1-6]
(Conclusion)

(1) Be that as it may, we cannot at this time
afford to be disunited. I am absolutely certain

1In all fairness, the writer feels it is vitally
important to report that General Gruenther was not in-
formed that his speech was being tape-recorded at the
time of delivery in London. Furthermore, he had no oppor-
tunity to edit the copy, since it was published without
his knowledge.

(2)

(3)

(4)

176

that in the era that we are approaching now,
we are going to have to solve this problem of
security together and in common, or we are not
going to solve it at all. Any time a mishap
occurs to one of our partners in freedom, we
should recall again the eternal refrain of
John Donne:

". . . . never to send to know for whom
the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.

Though we forget all else, we must not forget
that.

It has been a tremendous pleasure and honor
for me to be here this evening, and to see all
these amateur speakers at the head table. It-
has interested me very much. The Duke says the
most important one comes first, and to see Sir
Winston following me has caused me to feel very,
very happy. But, Sir Winston, I should like to
tell you that we who followed your leadership
in the war have the greatest admiration for you.
I remember a speech you made in June 1940 where
you said:

"Let us therefore bring ourselves to
our duties and bear ourselves in such
a way that if the British Empire and
the Commonwealth last for a thousand
years they will say, 'This was their
finest hour.'"

We who heard that poured our hearts out for you
with great affection sir, and we still do.

I am very much honored and wish to express
my gratitude to you, to Mr. Atlee and to Mr.
Davies for having taken time out of your busy
day to be here tonight.

I am confident that if we will continue to
realize that in dealing with our allies we must

177

have patience, wisdom and understanding, we can
solve any of the problems in the cold war and
face them with calm poise and steady purpose.
For free men there is no other way to insure

survival.
(5) Thank you very, very much.
(6) I now have the honor to propose a toast to

the President of the English-Speaking Union,

the Duke of Edinburgh, who will visit SHAPE

two weeks from today. From then on he'll not

only be an admiral, but also a NATO General

with all the knowledge of SHAPE strategy.

The opening sentence of the Conclusion represents

a summing up of differences in points of view and philos-
ophy with the statement, Be that as it may, we cannot at
this time afford to be disunited. In his support of unity,
Gruenther acclaims, in personal testimony, the need for
the NATO Alliance to solve the problems of security to-
gether, and in common, or we are not going to solve it
at all. He implicitly reminds his audience of the pro-
visions of the NATO Treaty (an attack on one nation is
an attack on all) with the statement--anytime a mishap
occurs to one of our partners in freedom we should recall

again the eternal refrain of John Donne, " . . . never

send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee."

178

which Gruenther followed with the eloquent but simple
statement--Though we forget all else, we must not forget
that.

Again the transition from the serious to the
humorous is noted in his reference to all these amateur
speakers at the head table. In humorously quoting the
Duke, who said that the most important speeches come
first, Gruenther facetiously contends it made him very,
very happy to see Sir Winston follow him in the speaking
line-up! Whereupon Gruenther quickly reassures Sir-Win-
ston Churchill in personal address:

But, Sir Winston, £_should like to tell ygy
that we who followed your leadership in the
war have the greatest admiration for you. I

remember a speech you made in June 1940 where
you said:

"Let us therefore bring ourselves to
our duties and bear ourselves in such
a way that if the British Empire and
the Commonwealth last fer a thousand
years they will say, 'This was their
finest hour.'"

Gruenther's sincere expression of admiration for
Sir Winston Churchill is an example of the kind of work-
manship designed to motivate the pride of the audienee in

the excellence of their war leader, as well as to pay

179

deserved tribute to this great statesman of Great Britain
by quoting his famous statement which has gained world
recognition--especially in departments of Public Address
in leading universities of the free world.

The climactic statement expressing the need for
patience, wisdom, and understanding appears to be a very
effective closing admonition of conviction for solving
the problem of the cold war with calm poise and steady~
purpose. The terminal sentence of the conclusion, For
free men there is no other way to insure survival, was
the nearest approach to the fear appeal of survival in
the entire address, inasmuch as the appeal to logical
reasoning with supporting evidence predominated through-
out his message, with the implication that the British
have known war.

Since the Duke of Edinburgh had introduced him,
it was most appropriate that the actual close of the
speaking situation be a toast in the Duke's honor for
his visit to SHAPE two weeks from today when he would
become a NATO General with all the knowledge of SHAPE

strategy. The exactness of timing from the date of the

180

current speech was a means of emphasizing the importance
of the event at which the Duke was to be honored by the

appointment as a NATO General!

PART III

EVALUATION OF THE LONDON SPEECH

The speech delivered by General Gruenther to the
English-Speaking Union in London in 1954 seems clearly
intended to convey news on the progress NATO was making,
provide documentation on the growing strength of the
Soviets as well as their defects, and to secure positive
action by Great Britain for increased contributions to
NATO military defense. Because Great Britain was well
aware of the purpose, goals, and operation of SHAPE in
its relationship with NATO, there was no reason for Gruen-
ther to include here the extensive background information
which was very necessary in the Copenhagen speech.

The English-Speaking Union is an organization
composed of highly intellectual members of social and
economic stature. Therefore, General Gruenther adapted
his remarks with dexterity of judgment by eliminating
detailed explanation, whenever feasible, for this audience

181

182

representing royalty, government officials, military
officers, and others of social rank of England.

In the development of the four major topics
covered in all of General Gruenther's addresses to NATO
nations,1 it is interesting to note that this is the only
speech in which he pointed up some of the defects in the
Russian military strength in his abbreviated coverage of
"the threat of the Soviets." Here is another illustration
of his keen awareness in audience adaptation, for he re-
alized that discounting the Soviet power and emphasizing
NATO capabilitites as of 1954 would not deter Great Brit-
ain's interest in the importance of NATO. Obviously, this
approach was not appropriate for those NATO members who
were apathetic and apprehensive regarding the need for
building defense in the face of Soviet peace overtures!
However, Gruenther was very discerning in pointing up in
his London address the projection to five, six, seven, or
ten years in the future to alert his audience to the re-

alization that the continuous strengthening of Soviet

 

1The Progress NATO was Making; The Threat of the
Soviets: The Problems Facing NATO; and Hope for the Future.

183

military power might spell a grievous outcome to NATO
from an aggressive attack unless constant Vigilance in
military defense continued to be a dedicated commitment
of the Alliance.

Likewise, General Gruenther was equally astute
in his use of jesting, quips, and witticisms to his
English audience where translation to another language
for a foreign audience was not necessary. Translated
jesting often "does not come through" as intended by the
speaker-~as illustrated in United Nations' translations
of this type of humor. That Gruenther has exemplified
the epitome of audience adaptation in his choice of ma-
terials of development is the type of workmanship which
should earn commendations from the rhetoricians.

As a military leader speaking to government offi-
cials of England it was most appropriate that the major
part of the development of his speech was based on logical
argument, supported by factual and numerical data, examples,
illustrations, and personal testimony. Emotional appeals
were kept to a minimum, especially fear appeals, for

England was well aware of the ravages of war. Gruenther

184

concentrated on clear, rational arguments, unencumbered
by fear-charged description, in his remarks to this
audience.

The organization of this address is meticulously
based on the chronological and topical format--with unity
and brevity the watchwords. His frequent use of explana-
tory transitions (especially in the approach to each of
his four topics) with problem-solution organization and
cause and effect reasoning, added clarity to his message.
The delineation between the introduction, body, and con-
clusion of his speech was clearly indicated.

The stylistic pattern followed in this address
was also admirably adapted to his intellectual audience.
Although his message adhered to simplicity and clarity in
choice of words and composition, there was appropriately
included more "heightened" language in tone and meaning,
sometimes moving to the level of eloquence. The frequent
use of first person pronouns with direct discourse brought
personal involvement with the audience in the discussion
of common problems, as well as in the progress of NATO.
Rhetorical questions were also used frequently to simu-

late dialogue for audience involvement.

185

Perhaps the most distinguishing stylistic factor
in this London speech is reflected in the interpolation
of generous quantities of humor and jesting in a relevant
way, providing frequent change of pace from serious to
humorous tone-~a methodology recognized by rhetoricians
for maintaining audience interest. One or two of the
jests, however, bordered on barbs, in the opinion of
this critic. For example, in his anecdote referring to
the damn British (as one word), perhaps some explanation
of the use of "damn Yankee" as one word in some quarters
of the United States might have softened any resentment
which might have been incurred with some members of the
audience. As previously mentioned, this methodology of
jesting in the hands of a less competent craftsman could
have been disastrous. But with General Gruenther's well-
deserved credibility and his generally known qualities
of kindness and sense of fairness to others, his intent
in his jesting should have been clearly understood by
the audience.

The principal purpose of Gruenther's jesting,
appearing in paragraphs 24 through 33 in Part II can be

interpreted, perhaps, as follows:

186

To promote NATO without flaunting the leadership
of the United States perhaps it was necessary to place
himself in situations where he could be the laughingstock
to project his humility as well as to convince the English
that the United States was not "running the show." The
leadership of the United States, with Great Britain play-
ing "second fiddle," would be neither consistent nor dip-
lomatic, for the British Empire had dominated the world
for centuries before the United States appeared on the
horizon. And to counterbalance any impression that the
United States was "eating crow” to ameliorate the English,
it was important perhaps also to direct some jibes
against the English.

General Gruenther's methodology was no doubt
studied carefully and developed as a psychological strategy
to achieve the objective of cooperation in the guise of
jesting--a method used to attain an objective under circum-
stances where it would not be expedient to be explicit.

It should be observed, also, that Gruenther's
methodology included another means of attempting to reduce

the concern that the United States might "run the show."

187

Here, as in the Rome speech, he stressed the fact that
Great Britain had early endorsed NATO before the United
States was given the leadership of the military defense
of the Alliance, and that he was merely attempting to
do what had been requested by the National Council of

NATO .

CHAPTER V

THE ROME SPEECH (MAY 2, 195 5)

PART I
THE OCCASION, SETTING, AND AUDIENCE OF

THE ROME SPEECH

On the evening of May 2, 1955, General Gruenther
delivered his speech in Rome to an audience of over 500
persons at the Centro Italiano di Studi Per La Riconcilia-
zione Internazionale (Italian Center for the Study of In-
ternational Reconciliation)--a large building located in
the center of Rome. The organization sponsoring the Ital-
ian Center was founded for the express purpose of dedicated
study of international affairs, and some of the most not-
able Italian leaders held membership in the organization.

The platform of the large auditorium in the Italian
Center was decorated with the flags of NATO nations, and a
large NATO map formed the background to which General
Gruenther referred periodically during his address.

188

189

(Both the NATO map and flags were always on display when-
ever the General spoke to NATO nations.) He was intro-
duced by an official of the Italian Center for the Study
of International Reconciliation.

Gruenther was facing a critical group, for within
the Italian audience there prevailed a certain fear and
suspicion of the great power of the United States, and a
certain resentment of what is sometimes called "American
impatience with European methods."l Military officers,
ambassadors, and plenipotentiary ministers of the fifteen
NATO nations were present,2 and they represented a great
divergence in their interests and opinions. In addition,
numerous representatives from many other countries of
Europe, Asia, and Africa (not members of NATO) attended
the meeting, along with many Italian diplomats, military

and civilian leaders, and other important political,

 

1The Royal Institute of International Affairs
(Report Of Study Group), Atlantic Alliance, NATO's Role
in the Free World (London and New York: Royal Institute
of International Affairs), p. 42. (From Library of the
National War College, Washington 25, D.C.) Series first
published in 1952.

2Although the Federal Republic of Germany was not
at this time an official member of NATO until its formal
accession on May 9, 1955 (bringing the total to 15 nations)
it sent some representatives to this Rome meeting.

190

economic, cultural, and journalistic representatives in
Rome.1 Therefore, many elements contributed to the skep-
tical attitude reflected in the Rome audience, and General
Gruenther was aware that these representatives wanted the
details on the defense picture.

The status of the Communist Party in Italy was of
grave concern to the other NATO nations. Not only was the
party active in Italy, but it was growing and exerting
power in critical areas. The Communist Party in Italy
had substantial control of the key positions in the Labor
Movement, and thereby had the capacity to interfere seri-
ously with any measures to eliminate confidence in a non-
communist future for Italy.2

Furthermore, there were questions among some
Italian leaders concerning the advisability of having
joined the NATO Alliance in 1949 when they had not been
invited to join the Brussels Pact in 1948 by the original

signatories--Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,

 

l
A. Craig Baird, ed. Representative American Speeches,
1955-56 (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1956), P. 25.

2George F. Kennan, Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1967), P. 331.

191

and United Kingdom.1 It was well-known that the Brussels
Pact was supposedly the forerunner of the NATO Alliance.
But it was not until 1954 that Italy and the Federal Re-
public of Germany were invited to join the Brussels Pact.2
Some of the Italian representatives in the audience,
as well as some representatives from other NATO nations (in-
cluding France, Belgium, and the Netherlands), did not look
with enthusiasm upon Germany's affiliation as a fellow-
member in the Military Alliance of NATO, to help redress the
numerical imbalance between the forces of NATO and those of
the Soviet Union and its Satellites. They were fearful of
the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany and the
possibility of the return of the old Nazism of World War II.
The above profile of the occasion, setting, and
audience in Rome will provide the explanation for GenerAI
Gruenther's unusually long introduction to his speech in
conveying the origin and development of NATO, and the rea-
sons for the establishment of SHAPE, the military defense

arm of NATO.

 

lNATO: Factgyabout the North Atlantic Treaty Organ-

ization (Paris: NATO Information Service, 1962): pp. 10-11.
21bid., pp. 237-38.

PART II
RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROME SPEECH
BY PARAGRAPHS

[Paragraph 1]
(Introduction)

(1) Eccellenze, Signore e Signori:

It is a great honor for me to be here this

evening. I wish I could speak to you in

Italian--in perfect Italian--with, of course,

a slight Nebraska accent. But that would be

a bit difficult for me. I beg of you to ex-

cuse me if I now proceed in English--also

with a Nebraska accent.

In the opening lines of his address to the Italian

Center for the Study of International Reconciliation on
the evening of May 2, 1955, at the Banci di Roma, Italy,
General Gruenther expresses his recognition of the import-
ance of the occasion and the significance of communicating
with this distinguished group of men. As indicated in
the preceding section on "The Occasion, Setting, and
Audience," the audience included not only diplomatic and

military officials from Italy, but also similar

192

193

representatives from other NATO countries, as well as
numerous representatives from many other countries of
Europe, Asia, and Africa.

Moreover, he indicates his wish to speak with the
Italians in‘their'native language, a wish that he saw as
impossible because of his own limitations. This sugges-
tion of humility and awareness of what the circumstance
seemed to call for should have been helpful in building
rapport with the assembly and identifying him as a
straightforward, humble man, an impression the General
no doubt wished to make.

The reference to the Nebraska accent--even in
speaking English--adds a light, humorous touch that would
allow the speaker to move ahead with some assurance that

the audience was not skeptical at the start of the speech.

[Paragraph 2]

(2) I feel that it is a sad commentary on the
state of the world that you should find it ap-
propriate to have a military man talk to this
distinugished group in the year 1955. Unfor-
tunately, however, the question of security is
our main preoccupation in this uneasy world.

194

This introductory material exemplifies the approach
designed to arouse the interest of the audience and at the
same time establish a high level of credibility through
modest statement and inferred apology that a military man
should talk to this distinguished group in 1955. He re-
alized that the Italian people were war weary, for they
had been overrun by the enemy. They were also fed up on
men in military uniforms, and were no doubt averse to a
military man from the United States--a large country
which was apparently taking over the leadership of NATO.
General Gruenther was eager to secure rapport with the
Italian audience and to capture their interest and under-
standing in recognizing that security is the main preoc-
cupation in this uneasy world.

Gruenther”s overall language is simple and direct,
with a limited use of descriptive adjectives. His emphasis
in language pattern is on first and second person pronouns
to convey the feeling of togetherness in animated conver-
sation. The serious tone of his remarks in this second
paragraph are in sharp contrast to the humorous opening

paragraph.

195

[Paragraph 3]

(3) I came to Italy for the first time in 1919
after we had just finished one world war. In
fact, I played a major role in ending that war.
I was a cadet at the United States Military
Academy, scheduled to be graduated in 1921.

The state of the war got to be so crucial that
the United States Government decided to gradu-
ate our class early, specifically on the let
of November 1918. The Kaiser heard about this
significant increase in allied strength and 11
days later he surrendered. However, the United
States Government now had 278 new Second Lieu-
tenants on its hands, and there was little use
for them. The decision was made to send us to
Europe on a tour of observation and study. We
visited Italy in the summer of 1919 absolutely
convinced then that our profession would never
be needed again in the new and better world
which was just getting under way.

This paragraph opens with an excellent transition
sentence from the serious note of the military reference
to a humorous, hypothetical story which could well have
attracted the interest and attention of the audience, and
no doubt helped to establish General Gruenther's credibil-
ity. By referring to his experience as a Plebe West Point
Cadet who was graduated three years early to help win the
inar, causing the Kaiser to surrender 11 days later, he was

Jplacing himself as the victim of humor which usually

h>uilds credibility for a speaker with his audience. In

196

addition he was attempting to represent himself as a per-

sonable, warm-hearted individual.

Young Gruenther's military tour for observation

and study in Italy following his early graduation could

well have produced rapport with the audience. That the

United States Government chose Italy for the continuing

education of their 278 Second Lieutenants should have

prompted a feeling of national pride in his listeners.

Furthermore, it should be observed that instead of bluntly

stating that he had first-hand knowledge of their country,

by suggestion he outlined his previous contact in Italy.

(4)

[Paragraph 4]

The next time I came to Italy was in Septem-
ber 1943, when there was a very great need for
the military. We landed at Salerno as a part
of General Clark's allied force, and in the 18
months that followed I learned about war. My
course of instruction lasted from the 9th of
September 1943 until July 1945. By that time
we had moved up the Italian peninsula to Verona.
If I did not know of the futility of war earlier,
I certainly had it impressed upon me indelibly
during my experiences in Italy. I want to say,
at the same time, that we learned to respect the
Italian people. The assistance we received from

197

the Italian Resistance movement made a very

significant contribution to the success of

the allied Italian campaign. I want to thank

the people from Italy now for the magnificent

assistance you gave us.

In the chronological report of activities in the
Italian Campaign General Gruenther merely mentions that
he was part of General Clark's allied force. It is pos-
sible-of course that some of the seasoned military leaders
in the audience may have been aware of his major responsi-
bilities during the Italian Campaign which, no doubt,
would have been a contribution to his credibility. In
January 1943, nine months before he landed in Salerno,
he had been appointed as General Mark Clark's Chief of
Staff on the personal request of General Clark. However,
not to "pull rank" was typical of General Gruenther's
modesty in the military realm as well as in the role of
speech-making.
Gruenther spent almost two years in Italy, moving

up to Verona by the end of the period--an experience
which convinced him of the futility of war. This was a

significant testimonial from a well-known military leader,

trained in war strategy, yet implicitly admitting the

198

importance of the preservation of peace--a thesis to which
he was constantly referring. In addition, there appears

to be an important reminder to the Italian people that
enemy invaders had been driven out by the "foreign mili-
tary." Perhaps he was attempting to allay their fears

that the foreign military were neither aggressors, enemies,
or oppressorsl

The special tribute he paid to the Italian people
for their outstanding contribution to the Italian Resis-
tance Movement was probably intended to appeal to their

a
national pride. But these commendations could also have
produced an audience attitude favorable toward a General
who recognized and appreciated their achievements in the
Italian Campaign.

In this fourth paragraph of the Introduction, ten
forms of the first person pronoun were used to contribute
to the conversational and informal tone of the message.
The personal pronoun "I" was used six times: "we" twice:
and "my" twice in relating himself to the audience in his

assignments in Italy--and at the same time, perhaps, add-

ing to his credibility.

199

Among the total of eight sentences comprising
this paragraph, five were simple sentences, two were com-
plex, and only one sentence was compound. The overall
reflection of simplicity in his sentence composition
applies equally to his word choice, confined for the
most part to one- and two-syllable words in this para—

graph.

[Paragraph 5]

(5) Then came VE-Day on May 8, 1945. From
Verona, I moved on to Vienna where I joined
our allies, the Soviets; I saw much of them
for the next several months. In Vienna we
concerned ourselves with problems of occupa-
tion. I was confident that we had reached a
good understanding and that international ten-
sion was a thing of the past. But in September
1946 those tensions began to reappear, and we
experienced a chill in the Soviet climate.

At this point, General Gruenther not only is con-
tinuing the narrative of his experiences and activities,
but is leading to the discussion of the problem and indi-
cating here the sudden turn of events from peaceful solu-
tions, good understanding, and amicable relationships, to

tensions. Again we have an opportunity to perceive

200

Gruenther as a man who can work cooperatively but is also
sensitive to changes in behavior which might prompt more
direct action.

When VE-Day arrived he worked equally hard to pre-
serve the peace. At least implicitly, here is a man who
wishes to sit around the conference table of peace as
amiably and efficiently as he could plot a military cam-
paign when necessary.

Causal factors for the tensions which developed
between the Soviets and the western allies resulted in
a chill in the Soviet climate, a metaphor created by Gen-
eral Gruenther to describe the sudden change in Soviet
relationships with the Western European nations.

In using the first person pronoun five times in
this brief paragraph, General Gruenther apparently again
sought to associate and establish himself with the Italian
audience through a conversational and informal communica-

tion.

201

The Threat of the Soviets
[Paragraph 6]

(6) Nevertheless, the Western allies continued
to demobilize; but the Soviets did not. Soon
a series of frictions developed, culminating
in such incidents as the Czechoslovakian Coup
and the Berlin Blockade. As a result, a number
of the former allies found that they had to
build a collective security organization in
order to preserve the peace. It was called '
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and
that treaty was signed on April 4, 1949.

Here again, as in his earlier discussion of his
visits to Italy, we see the General making good use of
the chronological order of events--a practice which he
used frequently.

Because of the great military strength of the
Soviets, who had not demobilized following the War, Gen-
eral Gruenther developed one of his major topics in point-
ing up the potential threat of Soviet power which had al-
ready culminated in the Berlin Blockade and the invasion
of Czecho-Slovakia.

Furthermore, since the western allies were continu-

ing to demobilize, in contrast to the pattern followed by

the Soviets in constantly increasing their military

202

strength, the need for building a collective security for
defense against acts of aggression became evident.

Therefore, the causal factors of weakness of the
Allied military defense, and the increasing strength of
the Soviet Bloc resulted in the collective security plan
outlined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in
April, 1949.

The clear, simply-stated development of the rea-
sons for the organization of NATO in order to provide the
audience with a comprehensive background of factual, chron-
ological information represents outstanding competence in
the handling of materials--an example of workmanship
which should have added to General Gruenther's credibility.

In addition, this analysis of the reasons for the
organization of NATO contains potentially significant
appeals in the sense that the listeners were being made
aware that NATO was created in response to a major need,
and not as a result of the desire of the Generals to

create just another military organization.

203
[Paragraph 7]

(7) But NATO didn't make much progress until
the Free World was once again shocked by the
advent of war-~this time the invasion of South
Korea in June Z950. That act of aggression
made it crystal clear that rapid progress was
needed in perfecting our defense organization.
The subsequent invasion of South Korea by the
Soviet Bloc constituted further evidence of the need for
. . l
collective security in a western defense organization.
General Gruenther limited his reporting to factual
evidence, without using explicit fear-charged descriptions
of invasion incidents, for he preferred to build his argu-
ments logically for collective security in the North At-
lantic Treaty Organization. His use of crisp, decisive
language to explain the reasons for stepping-up the mili-
tary power of NATO could have served the dual purpose of
clarifying his analysis and at the same time jarring what

may have been an audience apathetic to the urgent needs

of NATO.

 

fir

1Since neither the United States nor any one of the
major free nations of Western Europe could singly match the
strength of the Soviet Bloc, General Gruenther and others
believed that a defense organization was needed--that it was
essential that the Western Allies band together for their
protection against acts of aggression and for the preserva-
tion of peace.

204

[Paragraph 8]

General Eisenhower arrived in Europe in
January 1951 to organize the defense of Europe
from the Northern tip of Norway to the eastern
borders of Turkey--a distance of 7,000 kilome-
ters. He came as the servant of the North At-
lantic Treaty organization--12 nations then,
now 14. I was General Eisenhower's Chief of
Staff. He arrived in Paris on the 7th of Janu-
ary 1951. After a three day survey in Paris
he started his trips; first to Brussels, then
The Hague, then to Denmark, Norway, England,
Portugal, and Italy. We arrived in Rome on
the 18th day of January 1951.

General Gruenther's description of Eisenhower's
arrival in Paris in January 1951 to organize the defense
of Europe and not a military machine, per se, was re-
flected in his reference to Eisenhower as a servant of
NATO, rather than the military title of "Supreme Com-
mander." By calling attention to his appointment as
Eisenhower's Chief of Staff he was suggesting his famili-
arity with NATO from the very beginning, and by associa-
tion, setting himself forth as a man who also was defense-
minded rather than offense-centered.

In addition, the selection of Italy as one of the

seven nations visited by General Eisenhower soon after he

became Supreme Commander of NATO was no doubt included by

205

General Gruenther in his address to emphasize the import-

ance of Italy's participation in NATO--in the hope of cap-

turing the good-will of the audience through the appeal

to their national pride.

In this paragraph Gruenther uses a series of simple

sentences--didactic and crisp--to convey chronological in-

formation which was vitally important for audience under-

standing of Eisenhower's objectives and activities upon

his arrival in Europe as Supreme Commander.

(9)

[Paragraph 9]
(Concluding Paragraph of the Introduction)

I would like to tell you what the situation
was then. First of all, the morale of the Free
World was at a very low ebb. We had practically
no strength. When General Eisenhower returned
to Paris from this trip on the 24th of January,
1951, he had a meeting of his commanders. I can
remember the conference very well, because there
was present one very sour-looking officer, a
general, who seemed to be rather unhappy about
the state of the world. General Eisenhower
asked the question: "What do you think the
Soviets would need to move to the English Chan-
nel?" This despondent general said, "General,
they need only one thing--boots!" This was his
cynical way of saying that we had no defense
worthy of the name.

206

The opening statement of this concluding para-
graph of the Introduction of the speech emphasizes per-
sonal address for rapport with the audience to reveal
the great weakness of NATO military defense in 1951.
Gruenther chose direct discourse to interpret the de-
plorable lack of military support among the NATO nations.

When General Eisenhower questioned his staff con-
cerning the needs of the Soviets to move to the English
Channel, a despondent General cynically replied, "General,
they need only one thing--boots!"l This statement which
very poignantly emphasizes the overwhelming strength of
the Soviets in contrast to the lamentable lack of NATO

defense carries a definite fear inference.

 

1A similar reference appears in both the Copen-
hagen and London speeches: Copenhagen speech: I 10:

One official, of_a cynical turn of mind when
asked three years ago, "What do the Soviets
need to march to the Channel?" answered,
"Only shoes!"

London speech: I 8: (most abbreviated coverage):

Three years ago the Soviets could march to the
Channel on very short notice with only the
forces that they had in occupied Europe.

207

The use of direct discourse as a stylistic prac-

tice is frequently advocated as a means of beginning and

ending an Introduction of a speech. Gruenther's use of

direct discourse is in harmony with the best advice and

counsel. Furthermore, this practice perhaps resulted in

far more effective conviction and impact on the audience

at this point in the speech than a detailed statistical

report on the comparative military strength of the Soviets

over NATO.

(1)

The Prggress NATO Is Making
[Opening Paragraph of the Body
of the Speech]

It is new four years and a few months since
that conference took place. I can tell you
that since that time our forces throughout our
area have increased from three to four times
numerically from what they were then, and when
one considers the question of effectiveness,
the increase is greater still. I can assure
you that nobody can march to the Channel now
by just putting his boots on. It would require
more men and more air support to move the men
in those boots. Most important of all, the Free
World has become convinced that the only answer
to this problem is Collective Security. If we
had had a NATO organization in 1939, even with
the defects that ours has now--and I can assure

208

you it still has many--I'm convinced there would

have been no World War II. If we could have

served notice at that time an attack on one na-

tion would be considered as an attack on all,

Hitler would have been dissuaded from attacking.

The sentence separating the Introduction from the
Body of the speech serves as a transition by indicating
the lapse of time of over four years since the NATO Gen-
eral's cynical remark concerning the military strength of
the Soviets. Gruenther then moves directly to the devel-
opment of his second topic--in spite of some shortcomings,
NATO is making prggress. In the development of this point,
factual and numerical data--the increased size of NATO
forces--and personal opinion form the basis of the speaker's
proof. He relates his evidence to the previously mentioned
boots interpretation and shows how the growth of NATO power
leads to a revised analysis: nobody can now march to the
Channel by just putting his boots on.
Gruenther generalizes that more fighting men and

planes plus cooperative action on the part of NATO nations
would and could produce the defensive potential necessary

to discourage an offensive move on the part of the Russians.

He views these elements as "cause" for producing the desired

209

"effect": and in an if-then sequence reasons that i£_these
causes--men, planes, cooperative action--had been opera-
tive, thgg_World War II would not have resulted.

It appears that Gruenther sought to bring the
force of his conviction and expertise to bear on this
point since he does not hesitate to make use of the first
person singular, particularly in stating opinions: his
choice of verbs used with these pronouns also suggests
strong commitment on his part to the ideas being expressed,

for instance: I can tell you, I can assure you, I'm con-

vinced.
[Paragraph 2]
(Body of Speech)
(2) In any case that is what the Free Nations

have decided on; that is the goal toward which
they are building." They are now absolutely
dedicated to the idea that no nation--be it
large or small-—is sufficient unto itself in
this jet-atomic age. That is our doctrine,
and therein lies our greatest progress and our
greatest strength.

The transition sentence, referring to the collec-

tive security clause in the Treaty (that an attack on one

210

nation would be considered as an attack on all) conveys
the commitment of NATO members to the importance of col-
lective security in this jet-atomic age. This Gruenther-
coined phrase, jet-atomic age, which reveals the explosive
combination of the devastating atomic bomb with the light-
ning speed of jet air power, presumably was intended to
portray to the audience the menacing reality of unprece-
dented military power available to a possible enemy.
Moreover, this military potential clearly provided the
reasons for collective security since no NATO nation,
whatever its size, was sufficient by itself to endure

an enemy attack of jet-atomic proportions.

The thesis that the NATO nations were a cohesive
unit is further strengthened in this paragraph by the
selection of the words absolutely dedicated, which sug-
gests strong commitment and oneness of purpose. At the
same time, the reiteration of the conviction that no na-
tion . . . is sufficient unto itself emphasizes once
again that there is little choice but to be involved in

the collective action.

211

In the concluding sentence of the paragraph, the
repetition of greatest-—. . . and therein lies our great-
est progress and our greatest strength--produces impres-
sive rhythm in the sentence structure to emphasize their
doctrine of collective security. In addition, the use
of the plural possessive personal pronoun our three times
in the brief concluding sentence of only 14 words, is the
type of workmanship which is designed to enhance the rap-
port of togetherness with the audience in confirming the
need for unity in military defense and in suggesting an
awareness on the part of the speaker that this nation

could make a meaningful contribution.

[Paragraph 3]

(3) We now have a going concern. We have an
over-all headquarters at SHAPE in Paris, and
four subordinate headquarters. We have a
northern command at Oslo that has for its
mission the defense of Norway and Denmark;

a headquarters at Fontainebleau for the de-
fense of the critical central area; a head-
quarters at Naples for the defense of Italy,
Greece and Turkey; and a headquarters at
Malta for the protection of the vital Medi-
terranean sea-lines of communication.

212

Additional support for Gruenther's second topic
that NATO is making prggress is introduced by the descrip-
tion of the geographical spread of the four NATO commands
to cover the defense areas within and adjacent to all the
NATO nations, including the overall headquarters at SHAPE
in Paris-~thus providing, no doubt, a sense of security
to the NATO representatives in the audience. The thought
units are concise and the information concrete.

The progress in being a going concern and the
_ assurance of NATO's dedication to collective security
with the four military command headquarters are important
expressions of optimism suggesting connotations of activ-
ity--expressions useful at this point in the speech before
proceeding to the vivid detailed description of the mili-
tary strength of the Soviets in the subsequent paragraph.
The stylistic pattern adopted in these optimistic obser-
vations by Gruenther represents the type of workmanship
intended to establish himself with the audience. In addi-
tion, in the first three sentences he relates himself to
his material and to his audience through the plural first

person pronoun, which was repeated three times in sentences

213

of parallel construction-~each beginning with the phrases:
We now have . . . .--We have an . . . .--We have . . . .
Furthermore, the use of the phrase going concern
to describe NATO command is a picturesque expression
readily understood by most laymen not familiar with the
operation of a military command headquarters and provides
a portrayal of NATO as an organization which was attempt-
ing to fulfill its purpose and responsibilities in build-

ing collective security defense for NATO.

[Paragraph 4]
(Body)

(4) Those headquarters study the problems of
not what a possible enemy may decide to do,
but what he could do. We refer to that capac-
ity in military jargon as "capabilities." We
do not try to assess enemy intentions; that
would be very dangerous. This is what we find:
That the Soviet Bloc now constitutes some 800
million people--the most powerful empire in
the history of the world. From the standpoint
of air power, it has some 20,000 operational
aircraft. From the standpoint of naval power
it has a relatively weak surface navy, but a
strong submarine fleet. To give you just an
idea of Soviet naval power, I can cite that
the Soviet Navy now has approximately 350
submarines of all classes, big and little,

214

good and bad. To get an idea of what 350 sub-
marines mean, please bear in mind that when
World War II began, the Germans had approxi-
mately 75 submarines. That does not mean that
the Soviets are five times as good as the
Germans were then, because the Soviets do not
have "know-how"; but it is an indication of
where they are placing their emphasis.

With the definition of a possible enemy's capabil-
ities, Gruenther assesses the military power of the So-
viets, not in terms of their intentions but what they
could do with the support of their land, air, and sea
forces. The run-down on their numerical military strength
is "good" factual evidence for his listeners to consider,
although he is quick to recognize and state that numbers
alone were not the whole picture.

To explain the significance of the 350 Soviet sub-
marines, Gruenther compares them with the 7S submarines
which the Germans had at the opening of World War II, but
he concedes that the great variance between the two does
not necessarily indicate that the Soviets were five times
stronger than the Germans were then, because the Soviets

do not have know—how. In this way he is able to counter

the refutation that may have arisen in the minds of some,

215

namely that numerical strength--both men and machines--
did not tell the full story concerning military capabi-
ity.

It is possible that the Italian members of his
audience might have been repelled by any reference to
Germany's part in World War II, reminding them of the
devastating German invasion and recalling the gruesome
memories of their great losses.

On the other hand, despite this possibility of
antagonizing the Italian audience by referring to Germany,
Gruenther perhaps has chosen Germany as an example for
comparison with Soviet submarine power for two reasons.
First, the Italians were well aware of the terrifying
destruction which could be wrought by only 75 submarines,
having been the victim of the German submarine attacks
during the Second World War. Second, it is probable
that Gruenther used Germany for comparison with Soviet
submarine power to pave the way with the Italian audience
for the information he was about to convey on Germany's
accession to NATO--not only for their much-needed military

contributions, but also for their military know-how.

216

Gruenther's competency in reporting the authentic
detailed computation on Soviet overall military strength
could conceivably have added further to his image
as a straight-forward, alert, and knowledgeable leader.
Furthermore, his clear and direct interpretation of mili-
tary capabilities which could be readily understood by
the audience, is free from military jargon and technical
language. Also, the use of the phrase know-how further
illustrates Gruenther's choice of expressions which people
understand and which tend to promote a conversational, in-
formal tone--a condition generally viewed as conducive to
good conversation.

Gruenther confines his analysis of the Soviet
military strength to the report-level with no interpretive
or evaluative description. It is possible, however, that
this enormous military power implicitly produced some

emotional concern in the audience.

217

[Paragraph 5]

(S) In addition to the Soviet forces, there are
between 75 and 80 Satellite divisions, not
nearly as good as the Soviet ones; but the
Soviets know that and they are doing their
best to improve them. The Satellites have
between two and three thousand aircraft, again
not nearly as good as the Soviets, but they are
improving. The Satellite navies are relatively
small and ineffective.

Continuing his analysis of the Soviet capability
by enumeration and evaluation of the Satellite potential,
Gruenther evaluates their contributions as inferior-to
the Soviet's, but improving. His report appears to be
"complete" and thorough.

The combined strength of the Soviets and the Satel-
lites, referred to as the Soviet Bloc, would obviously
constitute a threat far more formidable than an attack
by the Soviets alone. Again the speaker refrains from
fear-charged description, and confines his discussion to
the report level. However, it seems reasonable to assume

that the military statistics produced emotional concern

in the audience.

218

[Paragraph 6]

(6) Those are the forces of the Soviet Bloc.
They are the forces which we at SHAPE use as
the basis for our planning. We notice that the
Soviet armed forces are constantly increasing
in effectiveness. We do not say that these
forces are ever going to be used. To speculate
in that field is not our job. Our task is to
plan to make an act of aggression by those
forces so expensive that it will never take
place. In other words, our prime objective
is to prevent a third world war.

The transition sentence serves as a summarization
of the strength of the Soviet forces--the basis on which
SHAPE was planning its military defense.

Because the Soviet armed forces were constantly
increasing in effectiveness, it was, therefore, essential
for SHAPE to build a defense system which would be such
a threat to a potential enemy that an act of aggression
would not take place. By this reasoning, Gruenther de-
veloped the prime objective of SHAPE--to prevent a third
world war--an appeal to security and self-preservation.
The speaker again sets forth his role as defender rather

than aggressor and points up his "down to earth" approach

for coping with the serious problem. He acknowledges the

219

severity of the problem but sounds a confident note that
the goal can be achieved.

The several simple sentences clearly and suc-
cinctly describe the prime objective-~to prevent a third
world war--the concept included in the periodic climactic
sentence closing the paragraph.

The use of seven plural first person pronouns
in this brief paragraph indicates Gruenther's attempt to
promote "togetherness" 'with his Italian audience, as
well as with the representatives from other NATO nations,
in the emphasis on their common objectives for the preser-

vation of peace.

[Paragraph 7]

(7) Yesterday was May Day in Moscow. May Day
has traditionally been a celebration for the
workers. However, in Moscow for the last sev-
eral years, it has turned into an Armed Forces
demonstration. Last year the Soviets showed
some airplanes; it was expected they would show
some new planes yesterday. But it rained very,
very heavily and so no new planes appeared. I
think it is well, however, for us to bear in
mind that if we had had one of these Italian
sunshiny days yesterday, you would have had big

 

flllll‘l‘lllllll

 

220

headlines today concerning new types of air-
planes the Soviets had perfected within the
last year. I mention that not to create any
fear in your hearts, but merely to bring to
your attention some of the grim realities
that we're facing.

This narrative on May Day in Moscow was used as
an illustration to convey the probable strength of the
Soviets in air power, although their planes were not dis-
played during the celebration due to the heavy downpour
of rain. But he warned that had the weather allowed,
headlines would have carried the tidings on the new types
of airplanes the Soviets had launched.

The appeal to fear was more explicit here than
in any previous section of the speech, for the word "fear”
appears for the first time. Regardless of his expliCit
remark of not wishing to create any fear in your hearts
he implicitly inferred fear by reference to the grim re-
alities that we're facing. This last phrase in the
periodic sentence leads to the climax of the paragraph.

May Day in Moscow, the euphonious phrase in the

opening sentence of the paragraph,could well have captured

the attention of the audience and maintained interest

221

throughout this vivid narrative on the Soviet day of
celebration for their military strength. Likewise, the
phrase Italian sunshiny days should have given pleasure
to the listeners, as any such compliment might do. Con-
creteness and recency are evidenced in his statement that
the Soviets had perfected within the last year the new
types of airplanes which they had planned to exhibit on

May Day in Moscow had the weather allowed.

[Paragraph 8]

(8) We at SHAPE have been given the problem of
planning for the defense of Europe. Our mission
is two-fold; to defend our European territory--
all of it; and secondly, in the event of an all-
out act of aggression, to defeat the enemy. No-
tice that I do not say to "win," because I'm
convinced that if there should be a third world
war there would be no winner. However, it is
essential that we be able to defeat the enemy.

The problem of planning at SHAPE to implement a
two-fold mission of defense of all NATO territory and
defeat of the enemy was expressed in the first person
plural pronoun several times to indicate the shared de-

cisioning at SHAPE.

222

However, in contrast, Gruenther reverts to per-
sonal testimony in the singular first person pronoun--
and with personal authority admits that he does not say
NATO will win since if there were a third world war,
there would be no winner. But he emphasizes it would
be essential for NATO to be able to defeat the enemy,
which of course underlines the basic premise of effective

defense for NATO through collective security.l

 

1Similar concept included in Paragraph 21 in Body
of London speech--that if there were a third world war,
there would be no winner. However, in the London speech
his statement on the defeat of the Soviets is more defin-
ite than in the Rome speech:

London speech: But the Soviets would definitely be
defeated in every sense of the word.

Rome speech: However it is essential that we be
able to defeat the enemy.

This variance in degree of certainty in the defeat of the
enemy could perhaps be explained by the greater threat
from the Soviets prevailing during the Rome speech in 1955
than in 1954, when Gruenther spoke in London-~or in the
slackening of the rate of increase in NATO military
strength in 1955 compared to 1954.

On the other hand, perhaps the variance of cer-
tainty concerning the defeat of the enemy could be ex-
plained by Gruenther's presumption that Great Britain
would continue to contribute to NATO's defense support,
while he was confronted with a persuasion problem in Rome
to enlist continuous support from the Italians.

223

The supporting materials set forth in this para-

graph can be classified as explanation and personal

opinion. Having presented more factual material in pre-

ceding paragraphs, the speaker is now free to interpret

what they mean and what must be done to counter them.

(9)

[Paragraph 9]

The next question is how well could we do
now? Are we good enough to defend this 7,000
kilometer perimeter against an all—out attack
now? Considering where we were four years ago,
it would be nothing short of a miracle if we-
had developed that much strength in such a
short period of time. Our forces were at a
pitifully low level in 1951. In the year be-
fore General Eisenhower came over here--1950--
the budget of the European nations for defense
was approximately five billion dollars. Last
year--1954--the budget in those same countries
had gone up to 13.5 billion dollars. However,
it takes time to implement defense measures,
and so we're not yet strong enough to be cer-
tain of resisting successfully an all-out at-
tack. Therefore, with respect to the first
mission I have described-~to defend our European
territory-~we cannot give that assurance yet.
It was for that reason that when General Eisen~
hower was Supreme Commander, he recommended a
German contribution.

The two rhetorical questions simulating rapport

dialogue with the audience are introduced at the opening

224

of the paragraph, no doubt, to capture the interest of
the audience and to provide the answers to the status of
NATO's military defense in the development of the para-
graph. Then by means of a chronological arrangement,
the speaker attempts to show how the answer to these
questions has unfolded, by comparing and contrasting
NATO military defense inadequacy in 1950 with its growth
by 1954.

Evidence on the "pitifully" low level of NATO
military strength in 1951 is a repetition of the similar
facts conveyed in the concluding paragraph of the intro-
duction of the speech to emphasize the lack of defense
when General Eisenhower arrived in Europe.

Although the defense budget of European nations
had increased over 2-1/2 times from 1950 to 1954, Gruen-
ther provides the answer to the rhetorical question that
NATO was not yet strong enough to resist an all-out.at-
tack. This inadequacy of military strength serves as
the springboard for the introduction of the German con-
tribution. To support the accession of the Federal Re-

public of Germany into NATO he relates the recommendation

225

of General Eisenhower (when he was Supreme Commander) as
a source authority. This is the first use of outside
authority that Gruenther has included in providing evi-
dence for his remarks.

In the nine uses of the first person pronoun,
eight were plural (six were the collective "we," and
two were the possessive "our") with only one singular
first person pronoun. These first person pronouns con-
tributed to the conversational tone--a methodology de-
signed to convey rapport and togetherness with the audi-
ence and to help in the establishment of himself as a

cooperative and competent military leader.

[Paragraph 10]

(10) A week from today in Paris, Signor Martino
will be present at the meeting of the Foreign
Ministers in Paris when Germany is admitted to
NATO. As your Secretary General has stated,
Germany will become the 15th member of NATO.
We will then get, in due course,a German mili-
tary contribution. That contribution will con-
sist of some 1,300 tactical aircraft, 12 Army
divisions; and some naval craft, for use gen-
erally in the Baltic area. When the German
forces are effective, which will be in three
to four years from now, we will be able to

226

defend Europe even against an all-out act of
aggression. That is the military reason why
we have constantly advocated this German con-
tribution.

To convince the skeptical Italians of the need
for the German contribution, it was important to asso-
ciate Italian leaders in their official, cooperative re-
lationship with NATO in the admittance of Germany to the
Alliance. That Signor Martino would be attending the
meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Paris when Germany
would be officially installed as a new member of NATO
should have helped to promote acceptance of the audi-
ence to the accession.

The statistical enumeration of the German military
contribution provided the evidence for Gruenther's con-
clusion that in three or four years Europe could be de-
fended against an all-out act of aggression with Germany's
accession to NATO--thereby appealing to the Italian audi-
ence through the motive of self-preservation. At the
same time, the suggestion that Europe was vulnerable,

and would be for several years, could have been a vivid

reminder that continuing support was a "must."

227

This statistical report of Germany's military
contribution was expressed in clear, understandable lan-
guage which followed General Gruenther's usual pattern

of eliminating military jargon and technical terminology.

[Paragraph 11]

(11) The admission of Germany to NATO, however,
has more than military significance. It is the
beginning of a new Europe. We all have high
hopes for the Europe which is going to evolve
from this arrangement. I think the Italians
should feel particularly proud of the role that
Italy has played to bring it about. Certainly,
Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi was one of the
small group that sponsored the idea initially.
It was he who spoke to General Eisenhower--he
and Count Sforza--in January 1951, when General
Eisenhower came here to Home. Both of these
distinguished Italians had long shared the con-
cept of a united Europe. I'm sorry they cannot
be present at the Palais de Chaillot a week
from today.

To tie the concept of a new Europe with Germany's
admission to NATO and with the role that Italy had al-
ready played in the plan was a signal strategy to appeal
to the national pride of the Italians, and perhaps, at

the same time, to help promote greater receptivity by

228

the audience concerning Germany's accession to member-
ship in NATO.

The specific naming of two Italian leaders, Prime
Minister Alcide De Gasperi and Count Sforza, as initial
sponsors of the plan for a united Europe, and their per-
sonal endorsement of the concept to General Eisenhower
in 1951, should have added even more to the sense of na-
tional pride of the audience than the more general com-
ments. General Gruenther's method of paying tribute to
others who have promoted the concept of unity for free
nations is the kind of approach which should enhance his
image and develop audience appreciation for the recogni-
tion accorded their national leaders.1

In summary, paragraphs 10 and 11 covered an over-
all method of problem-solution in presenting the follow-
ing arguments in the hope of converting the Italian aud-

ience to Germany's accession to NATO:

 

In the London speech, General Gruenther also
pays tribute to Ambassador Sir Gladwyn Jebb, a noted
statesman, who had promoted the concept of a North At-
lantic Alliance in March 1948. (See paragraph one of
the Body of the London speech.)

229

l. Germany's military contribution to NATO

2. The testimony of Eisenhower endorsing the acces-
sion of Germany

3. The endorsement of three Italian leaders: Signor
Martino, their Foreign Minister; and Prime Min-
ister Alcide De Gasperi and Count Sforza who were
Italy's initial sponsors of a United Europe--a
concept which would be implemented by the addi-
tion of Germany for the political unity of Europe.

[Paragraph 12]

(12) I have said that we cannot be sure of accomp-
lishing our first mission-~that is, the defense
of Europe—-now, but that when we get the German
contribution we shall be. Because I have said
it will take three or four years before that
German contribution is effective, you may have
in mind the question: "Doesn't that mean that
we are in mortal peril during those three to
four years?" Although there is no exact answer
to that question, I'd like to make an observa-
tion on it. At this time--the second of May
1955--our side has a tremendous advantage over
the Soviet Bloc in the field of long-range air-
power. A little over a year ago an American
plane, the B-47, of which there are many in the
American Air Force, flew from Maine over to
England in 4 hours and 34 minutes. That is an
average speed of about 1,100 kilometers an hour.

The first two sentences are internal summaries

covering the German military contribution and the probable

230

delay in its ultimate effectiveness for three or four
years--information previously discussed by General Gruen-
ther. The important rhetorical question in the form of
direct discourse concerning the degree of danger to be
confronted during the interim is a rhetorical procedure
designed to capture the attention and interest of the
audience with its fear-charged.expression of mortal peril.
However, Gruenther's personal testimony on the
great advantage which NATO possessed over the Soviets in
long-range airpower with the American plane, the B-47,
conceivably could have contributed a feeling of confi-

dence and optimism to the audience.1 The good news

 

1In the London speech (I 19) Gruenther did not

explicitly identify the B-47 as an invention of the Amer-
icans but implied its origination by stating that four
months previous to the London speech in June, 1954, a
B-47 left the United States and landed in England four
hours and 34 minutes later.

In contrast, howeVer, in this speech in Rome he
explicitly identifies the B-47 as an American plane flying
a little over a year ago from Maine to England.

Presumably, the B-47 in 1954 was still under ex-
periments for testing its adoption by NATO, while in 1955
in Rome, Gruenther identified it as an American plane and
added there are many in the American Air Force. Perhaps,
however, Gruenther merely decided in the London speech to
withhold an explicit statement of U.S. credit for the plane
for reasons related to diplomatic relations with England.
In England he attributed to the B-47 a speed of 650 miles

231

conveyed by Gruenther on the B-47 American plane should
also have contributed to his image as a reliable and
trustworthy source of information. His account of this
source of strength was brief and to the point. In journ-
alistic fashion he identified what it was, where it came
from, and what it could do.

The use of four plural first person pronouns and
three singular first person pronouns contributed to the
conversational tone as well as an involvement with the
audience in sharing both the serious problem of danger
until the German contribution would be effective, as well

as the good news on the B-47 plane.

[Paragraph 13]

(13) At this stage of technological development,
there is no answer to that plane. The Soviets
do not have an answer to that plane, and we do
not have an answer to that either. We have a

 

an hour, which he thoughtfully transposed to 1,100 kilo-
meters an hour, to adapt the measurement of distance to
terminology familiar to the Italians.

232

significant number of those planes. For that
reason, if a war should break out today, and
if my most pessimistic assumption should prove
correct--that the aggressor should overrun
Europe--he would still be defeated because he
does not have an answer to these long-range
airplanes.. Even if it had been a sunshiny
day in Moscow yesterday, the answer would not
have been shown. There might have been new
planes displayed, and I'm sure there would
have been. But it will take some time before
the Soviets can get them to Detroit, Pittsburg,
and Chicago, which they must be able to do be-
fore they can defeat us. I do not want to say
that the time is not coming when they can do
that, but what I do want to say is that the
time has not yet arrived when they can surpass
us in long-range air power. Moreover, if we
are vigilant that day will never arrive. In
other words I do not feel that the situation
is hopeless. We must maintain our courage.

I don't want to appear complacent about this
matter, but at the same time I don't want to
be hysterical either.

Since there is no answer to the new B-47 either
by the Soviets or NATO, Gruenther proposes the hypothet-
ical supposition which should have instilled optimism
and a renewal of confidence in the future for the audi-
ence:

. . . if a war should break out . . . and the
aggressor should overrun Europe he would still

be defeated because he does not have an answer
to these long-range airplanes.

233

In his opinion testimony as an authority in war-
fare he will not commit himself on whether the Soviet
planes can attack the U.S., but he admits the time has
not yet arrived when the Soviets can surpass the B-47.
His reasoning brings him to the conclusion that the situ-
ation is not hopeless, yet he does not wish to leave the
impression with the audience of over-optimism by appear-
ing complacent. Implicitly, the inference of fear is
conveyed to the audience, perhaps, by his statement,

I don't want to be hysterical, either. Therefore, by
his development of opinions through logical reasoning

he has attempted to maintain courage and optimism on the
one hand, yet has inferred the danger of over-confidence,
on the other.

To convey his opinions in conversational format
he has used eight first person pronouns (five singular,
and three plural) which accounts for the large proportion
of personal testimony included in this paragraph.

Parallel construction in sentence structure is

evidenced by the following series of sentences:

234

I do not want to say .
I do want to say .
I do not feel . .
I don't want to appear complacent .
I don't want to be hysterical . . . .
Both word choice and sentence composition conforms
to Gruenther's regular pattern of simplicity, directness,

and clarity.

[Paragraph 14]

(14) I know that in a group of this kind it is
unnecessary to say that security consists of
more--much more--than just the military strength.

It consists of economic and psychological ele-
ments as well. The economic element speaks for
itself. However, I'd like to devote a few mo~
ments to the psychological aspects.

Up to this point in the speech Gruenther has been
concentrating on the military strength of NATO, but obvi-
ously recognizes the importance of economic.and psycho-
logical elements.

This paragraph merely serves as the bridge to the
subsequent discussion of psychological problems. In this
particular phrasing, we find one of the few direct pro-

cedural sentences wherein the General inserts a specific

statement concerning the next topic to be discussed.

235
[Paragraph 15]

(15) We have made tremendous progress in this
alliance of ours--much greater success than we
ever thought possible four years ago. We are
much farther along than the estimates which
we made in April 1951. That does not mean,
however, that the path for the future is going
to be a smooth one. My belief is that the next
four years are going to be harder than the last
four years, and largely because of the diffi-
culty in solving the psychological problems.

With an internal summary in the first two sen-
tences on the coverage of his second topic--the progress
of NATO--he comments on the tremendous progress since
April 1941. He then proceeds to lead into his third
topic--thepproblems of NATO with the personal testimony
that the next four years would be harder than the last
four years because of the psychological problems.

In the first two sentences he uses the plural
first person pronoun four times to emphasize by inference
that the progress and success which NATO has recorded
during the past four years has been attained through
joint efforts and cooperation--to convey togetherness
with the audience, perhaps appeal to their natioanl

pride, and probably build credibility for the leader-

ship of NATO.

236

The Problems Facing NATO
[Paragraph 16]

(16) We will have the problem of creating a pub-

lic opinion stout-hearted enough to continue

through this Cold War no matter how long it

lasts, and it may last a long, long time. Our

people are peace-loving, and it is very diffi-

cult for them to keep up their enthusiasm for

defense burdens that are so heavy-~and may grow

even heavier. There is also a very strong peace

offensive being waged now by the Communists. In

this campaign the Communists are attempting by

neutralist propaganda to divide and split our

alliance. The Soviets are very clever in this

propaganda business

In pinpointing some of the major psychological

problems facing NATO, Gruenther relies upon general pro-
cess materials: explanation, description, and definition.
He begins by describing the NATO members as peace-loving
(thereby appealing to their pride), but at the same time
is explaining, but not condoning, their lack of enthusi-
asm for building defense. This psychological problem of
cause and effect relation must, therefore, be solved,
according to Gruenther, by a strong public opinion to
encourage the endurance for defense burdens if NATO is
to fulfill its goal of collective security.

Another psychological problem facing NATO was the

Peace offensive being waged by the Cbmmunists in

237

"attempting by neutralist propaganda to divide and split
our alliance."1 In this observation General Gruenther
is following one of the fundamental principles for effec-
tive persuasion by linking the opponent's cause to un-
ethical tactics. By admitting the cleverness of the
Soviets in this type of propaganda Gruenther is inferring
that those who are weary of war and military defense
burdens are vulnerable to promises of peace. It is this
danger he was implicitly attempting to forestall in alert-
ing his audience on the peace offensive being waged by
the Communists, for this was no time for NATO nations to
forsake military defense responsibilities.

In the opening sentence, the metaphor . . . stout-
hearted enough to continue through this Cold War no matter
how long it lasts . . . provides dramatic and significant

impact to the problem of creating favorable public opinion.

 

1Also in the Copenhagen speech (T 25), General Gruen-
ther refers touthe=major and continuing Soviet effort . . .
directed toward the dismemberment of the NATO Alliance . . .
the ancient but still valid strategy of divide and conquer.
And in 1 26 he continues . . . surely we have learned the
hard way that Soviet peace offers followed at once by Soviet
threats is a key technique in the communist cold war.

238

Here the General is implicitly pointing up the need for
patience and courageous endurance to continue the build-
ing of military defense in the face of the Soviet peace
offensive and their neutralist propaganda to divide and
split the Alliance.

The use of the plural first person pronouns ("we"
and "our?) in the attempt to create this favorable public
opinion encompassed the involvement of the audience and
the need for "togetherness" in this venture of building
defense without interruption. Gruenther's understanding
of the purpose of the peace offensive of the Communists
and his analysis of their neutralist propaganda should
have alerted the audience to the implicit dangers in-
volved, and presumably should have enhanced his image by
his competency in recognizing the ulterior motives of the

Soviet disguise.

[Paragraphs 17-20, inc.]

(17) When I left Italy in the summer of 1945, I
went to Vienna, and there for the next four
months I saw a great deal of the Soviets. There
I met one of the ablest officers I have ever

239

known in any service. He was a Russian, aged

42, a four~star general. He was the number two
man under Marshal Koniev who, as you saw in the
pictures in your papers today, stood in the
front row at the Moscow parade yesterday. I

was the number two man under General Clark at

the time, and so I saw General Koniev's deputy
very often. We saw each other three or four
times a week. Over a period of time he out-
lined his philosophy to me, and it can be sum-
marized as something like this: "You come from
a democracy. You’re proud of the freedoms which
you have. However, you will live to find that'
those freedoms are divisive. You ask your people
to pass on issues which are so complicated that
they cannot possibly decide whether the black
answer is right or the white answer. And you
send them to the polls to vote on those subjects.
You're going to find that as time goes on in this
jet age (he did not know about the atomic part
then) you're going to find that they cannot
reach sound decisions. We, in the Soviet Union,
however, have solved that problem by appointing
wise men at the head who tell our people what

to do. We don't £25 them. We don't have these
foolish voting contests to decide these issues.
You-might just as well ask your people to vote
on whether the Einstein theory is correct or

not. What do they know about it?”

(18) His second thesis was this: ”You have re-
ligion. What a wonderful invention for the Cap-
italists! Of course you want to tell the people
to get their reward in Heaven, so you can exploit
them on this earth. You don't want to give them
their just reward here. You have even gone so
far as to devise a Commandment, 'Thou shalt not
steal,’ so that they don’t get that reward here."

(19) His third thesis was this: "In order to
make any government work, the people have to
support it energetically, and that requires a

240

very extensive educational campaign. It is
necessary to start educating citizens at a
very early age."

(20) It is significant that that very officer
has been made the head of what is called in
the Soviet Union the "Main Political Director-
ate of the Ministry of Defense.” He has about
2,000 assistants, many of them university grad-
uates, to help him. His job is to educate the
young men of the Soviet Armed Forces; and be—
cause there is a turnover of about two million
of them a year he has a sizable audience. Also,
knowing him as I do, knowing how dedicated he
is to his cause, I'm sure he's doing a very
effective job.

Within the four preceding paragraphs the Soviet
philosophy on democracy, religion, and early indoctrina-
tion of the young is summarized by General Gruenther in
the style of direct discourse from observations conveyed
to him by a Soviet four-star general with whom he was
personally associated in Vienna in 1945.

Gruenther's description of the Russian general as
one of the ablest officers he had ever known in any mili-
tary service Was very likely conveyed to the audience to
establish the Russian's credibility as an authoritative
source for the interpretation of the Soviet philosophy.

That the Russian general was number two man under Marshall

Koniev (one of the top military leaders of Russia) and

241

that the rank of number two man was also shared by Gruen-
ther under General Mark Clark, was no doubt included to
clarify the close and frequent association between the
Russian general and Gruenther during the occupation of
Austria, thus providing the opportunity for their dis-
cussion which ensued over a period of four months. It
would seem that because of their comparable rank and
role, the two would and should have had a basis and op-
portunity for extended communication which would enable
one to gain an understanding of the other's point of
view.

In summarizing the Russian general's philosophy
on democracy, Gruenther used direct discourse and paral-
lel construction--and to attract the attention and inter-
est of the audience adopted personal address in the open-
ing six sentences describing democracy:

You come from a democracy.

Zoane proud of the freedoms which you have.

However, you will live to find that those free-
doms are divisive.

You ask your people to pass on issues which are
so complicated that they cannot possibly

decide . . . .

And you send them to the polls to vote on those
subjects.

242
You're going to find that as time goes on .

that they cannot reach sound decisions.

To contribute to the clarity and simplicity of
the above description, four of the six sentences are of
simple structure, with the great majority of the words
confined to one and two syllables.

Also in parallel construction, the Soviet ideol-
ogy is contrasted to democracy, but shifted from the
second person to the first person pronoun in personal
address, a practice that is thought useful in obtaining
the attention and holding the interest of the audience:

We, in the Soviet union, however, have solved
that problem by appointing wise men at the
head who tell our people what to do.

We don't ask them.

We don't have these foolish voting contests to
decide these issues.

In describing the futility of asking people to
vote on complicated issues in foolish voting contests,
the Russian general gives an illustration of an extreme
hypothetical analogy--of asking people to vote on whether
or not the Einstein theory is correct--which he consid-

ered of comparable futility to seeking answers from the

populace on complicated government issues. It would

243

seem likely that the audience would be repelled by the
communist denouncement of the democratic system, which
is dedicated to upholding the freedom of the people's
choice in resolving issues, since historically, and dur-
ing the dictatorship of Mussolini, the Italians had ex-
perienced struggle against power from the top.

The sarcastic rhetorical question, "what do they
know about it?" posed by the Russian general, brought
the paragraph (#17) to a climactic close.

In his second thesis of denouncing religion as a
"wonderful invention of the Capitalists" the Russian gen-
eral continued his discourse with vitriolic criticism,
replete with irony and sarcasm in each of his succeding
observations. This derision of religion would hardly
meet with much approval in the Vatican City of Italy,
and this Soviet philosophy which ran counter to traditional
and historical values held by the audience almost certainly
should have stirred a stronger commitment to NATO, which
stood in confrontation with the Russians.

The third thesis summarized by Gruenther in direct

discourse of the Russian general covered the extensive

244

Soviet educational campaign for the early indoctrination
of youth to develop their dedication to the Communist
ideology. General Gruenther again builds the credibil-
ity of the Russian general as an authoritative source of
information by describing his important position in Russia
as head of the Main Political Directorate of the Ministers
of Defense for the education of all the young men of the
Soviet Armed Forces, with a turnover of about 2 million

a year. The Russian general had about 2,000 assistants,
many of them University graduates, to help him. The addi-
tional statistical information was included by Gruenther
to support his reasons for reporting the viewPoints of

this high ranking Russian general.

 

In this summarization of Communist philosophy by
General Gruenther, conveyed to him by a Russian general,
the use of personal discourse for the presentation of the
three theses was no doubt adopted by Gruenther for sev-

eral reasons--

245

First, the emotion-charged concepts, denouncing
both democracy and religion, in the direct discourse of
the Russian general should have resulted in violent neg-
ative reactions by the audience. The use of the specific
Russian officer rather than general opinion would, accord-
ing to rhetorical theory, be more forceful than the al-
ternative.

Second, it would seem a fair presumption that
Gruenther introduced this discourse into his speech to
convey the Soviet ideology through the interpretation of
a highly respected four-star Russian general to avoid the
possibility of accusations of prejudice by a subjective
interpretation. Also, rhetorical theory confirms that
personal discourse is generally regarded as one of the
most effective methods of enlisting and maintaining in-
terest of the audience in detailed interpretation or de-

. scription. The use of this approach was a nice change
of pace from the earlier explanation and opinion evidence.

Finally, and perhaps most significant, the indict-

ments against freedom of choice of the individual and

freedom of religion voiced by the Russian general attacked

246

very sensitive areas of life upheld by most Italians.
Thus, it is quite probable that this denunciation could
very well have encouraged active support of military de-
fense for NATO as a thrust against the Soviet ideology.

The stylistic pattern of simplicity in sentence
structure as well as in word choice is followed in all
four paragraphs, with a predominance of simple sentences,
and one- and two-syllable words. As indicated, personal
address, parallel construction, direct discourse, compar-
ison and contrast, first person pronouns (plural and
singular), a metaphor, and rhetorical questions were in-
corporated in the speaker's workmanship. Language manage-
ment of this type is generally accepted as being conducive
to effective communication since it aids clarity, is in-
terest and attention arresting, and facilitates subsequent
recall of the information.

There may have been some positive benefits for
Gruenther, as a speaker and leader, derived from the use
of the extended illustration. For instance, he should
have emerged as one who can at least communicate with

the Russians on an unemotional basis, an attribute of

247

value for a leader whose responsibility it was to confront

the Russians, one way or another.

[Paragraphs 21 and 22]

(21) To show you how effective their system is
on these young men, I'd like to give you some
examples. Mrs. Gruenther and I have two sons,
and both of them have served in Korea. One of
them was seriously wounded there. That young
man, as the head of an Infantry Company, ad-
vanced almost to the Yalu River. Whenever he
advanced, he had air support and artillery sup-
port and all the assistance that a powerful na-
tion could afford in order to be saving human
lives. He was fighting against men, Communists,
who had no air support; and when I say no air
support, I mean not even one plane was ever put
in front of a Communist advance. What did that
mean? It meant that they suffered losses five,
six, seven times the losses that my son's com-
pany had. But those Communist soldiers had a
dedication, or a sense of fanaticism, if that
is a better explanation, because of their in-
doctrination, and they kept coming on and on
in spite of their terrible losses.

(22) A year ago today we were in the last stages
of a struggle in Indo-China where we had at
Dien Bien Phu some 12,000 members of the gallant
French Union surrounded by 30 to 40 thousand
Communist forces. The Communists again had no
air support, and again they took terrible losses,
but on and on they came.

248

These two paragraphs stand as amplification of
the preceding one. Gruenther apparently has a need to
offer additional proof to help establish the point that
Russian indoctrination led to a great zeal in the minds
and hearts of their fighting men. To prove the effective-
ness of the Soviet system of indoctrination of their
young men, Gruenther describes examples of their fanatic
dedication on the battlefields in Korea and Indo-China.

In the first example, he explains that his two
sons had served in Korea, and one was seriously wounded
as the head of an infantry company. Gruenther narrates
the dramatic personal experience of his son as he ad-
vanced to the Yalu River with air and artillery support
and other military assistance to save the lives of his
men. The Communists, however, gave no air support to
their infantrymen, thereby increasing their losses many
times the losses of his son's company. But-the Communist
infantrymen, against all odds, continued to fight on and
on with the dedication of fanaticism, in spite of their
terrible losses-~reflecting the results of their intensive

indoctrination to the Communist cause.

249

A second parallel example in Indo-China illus-
trated similar results of fanatic dedication by the
Communist forces. Here, too, the Communist troops
fought on and on, again resulting in terrible losses.

In both examples, the effect to cause relation
prevailed--the Communists fought with fanatic dedica-
tion because of their indoctrination. In both ex-
amples, the repetition of the phrase, "and they kept
coming on and on in spite of their terrible losses"
emphasized with dramatic emotion-charged language the
powerful significance of the Communist indoctrination.
(That the Communist troops were sent into battle with-
out any air support inferred implicitly the communist
philosophy of the low value placed on human life.)

In reporting the total lack of air support for
the Communist infantrymen, Gruenther posed the rhetorical
question, What did that mean?, which he answered in terms
of the great losses they suffered. But this question

provided an explanation for the basic purpose of the

250

examples--effective indoctrination in a cause, resulting
in fanatic dedication--a subject he pursued in subsequent
discussion.

That Gruenther's two sons had fought in a war
against communism in Korea, with one son having been
seriously wounded in action, should have struck a sympa-
thetic note in the minds of those Italians who had suf-
fered from past wars. Moreover, the factual reference
to both of his sons,serving in the armed forces strongly
points to the loyalty and service of the General and his

family.

[Paragraph 23]

(23) We must find an answer to that fanaticism,
but our answer would never--must never--be the
same as theirs. However, the problem we face
was outlined by this former Soviet friend cf
mine. We must match their fanaticism by a dedi-
cation to our way of life. There is no reason
why we should not achieve it. We have religion
--a wonderful spiritual strength--a sense of
freedom, and above all, the dignity of the in-
dividual. We have everything that men should
be willing to fight for in a hot war or cold
war. Our job, as I see it, is to inspire these
400 million people in NATO to be able to con-
tinue the struggle, to make the sacrifices

251

which are going to be necessary for an enduring
peace. We must understand our responsibilities
as well as our privileges.

Having indicated something of the problem faced
by NATO in the realm of psychological considerations,
Gruenther proceeds to an outline of the solution. The
subordinate materials are laid out in topical fashion.
The emphasis is on "what" we should do rather than the
specifics of "how" it can be accomplished.

In a transition sentence to tie the examples of
Communist fanaticism to the type of fanaticism needed
by the free nations of NATO, an admonition is conveyed
by Gruenther that our fanaticism would never--must never--
be the same as theirs.

By deductive reasoning, Gruenther concludes that
the fanaticism of the Communists must be matched by a
dedication to our way of life. In reflecting optimism
in achieving a dedicated fanaticism, he supports our way
of life with four major assets: religion, a wonderful
spiritual strength, a sense of freedom, and the dignity
of the individual. These assets stand as direct refuta-

tion to the arguments set forth as criticisms by the

252

Russian general when he made an attack on the assets of
the free nations of NATO.

By causal relation, these privileges brought their
accompanying responsibilities--in being willing to make
any sacrifice in a cold or hot war, as well as to inspire
the 400 million people of NATO to continue the struggle

necessary for an enduring peace.

 

The development of his thesis concerning privi-
leges and responsibilities of free nations represents
workmanship likely to impress the audience since the
ideas were uttered by a spokesman who was obviously
"practicing his preaching" by the very post he occupied

as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers of Europe.1

 

lGruenther is a man of many talents--especially in
the field of management--as documented by the demand for
his counsel since military retirement as a member of the
Board of Directors of four International Corporations and
as former President of the American Red Cross. But he
devoted over 45 years of his life in service to the United
States--38 years in the U.S. Army, and over seven years to
the National American Red Cross. He fulfilled his respon-
sibilities with an outstanding record, in return for the
privileges of being an American.

253

His emphasis on religion was most appropriate for this
audience in the Vatican City.

In the search for the answer to Communist fanat-
icism, the repetition of the word never brought forceful
emphasis: our answer would never--must never--be the
same as theirs. Here again is emphasis given to the
seriousness of the threat and to the great concern mani-
fested by the NATO Chief.

The series construction in the first six sentences,
in which there is repetition of words and "tone" gives
particular emphasis to the need for collective involve-
ment and to the grave situation.

We must find an answer . . .
However, the problem we fac .
We must match their fanaticism . . . .
There is no reason why yg-should not achieve it
We have religion . . .
We have everything . . . .
Here, as elsewhere in the address, Gruenther uses

the first person plural with a strong single syllable verb

to "punch-home" the import of his message.

 

l . . . . .

This emphasis on religion was espeCially appro-
priate for a military leader who in his youth had contem-
plated the priesthood for his life's service, and for hav-
ing received in 1956 the [Laetare Medal--the National Award
for his many service contributions as a distinguished Cath-
olic layman.

254

We have everything that men should be willing to
fight for in a hot war or a cold war, is an observation
that hits at pride motivation and may well have aroused
feelings of pride in the accomplishments of NATO, a
shared venture in which the Italians were participating.
Here again was an opportunity for the speaker to pick up
support for his ideas and appreciation for himself. His
fervent enunciation of his confidence in the cause of
NATO should have made a favorable impression on his

listeners.

[Paragraphs 24 and 25]

(24) I do not have the answer to the problem.
I feel that I'm much in the same position of
an American comedian, who a few years ago said
.he had the solution to the submarine problem.
When asked for this answer, he replied; "Well,
it's a very simple thing. All you do is bring
the ocean to a boil; that will force the sub-
marines to the top; and when they get there
you knock them off!" "Well," someone asked,
"how do you get the ocean to a boil?" "Oh,"
he answered, "now just a second. All I was
doing here was outlining the general principle.
It's up to you to work out the details."

255

(25) I, as he did, am submitting the general
principle to you, in the belief that this very
distinguished group can work out the details.

It is, of course, not a military problem. How-
ever, unless we solve this problem of public
participation, we are not going to succeed in
this struggle.

From the transition sentence, indicating he did
not have an answer to this problem of public participa-
tion, he moves quickly from a serious tone to a humorous
application of the dilemma.

The humorous anecdote with questions and answers
in direct discourse by Will Rogers, the American comedian,
was included as an analogy of the same situation in which
Gruenther was placed. The comedian outlined the general
principle of the submarine problem but told his ques-
tioner it was up to him to work out the details.

Likewise, Gruenther was submitting his problem
to the audience to work out the details of securing
public participation completely dedicated to NATO's
purpose and goals, to insure success in the struggle

for enduring peace. The humility in admitting can-

didly that he did not have an answer to the problem,

256

along with appealing to the pride of the listeners in
submitting the problem to this very distinguished group
to work out the details, appears to have been a "good"
strategy. For it was important for his audience to re-
alize the extent of the problems and the sacrifices re-
quired to achieve the goal of enduring peace. Recogniz-
ing the audience as capable of solving the problem of
securing public participation in the goal of NATO was

a strategic move to encourage them to ponder the problem
as a means of enlisting their own support.

The conversational and informal tone in personal
address, together with the humorous anecdote of Will
Rogers in direct discourse is a well-placed break from
the serious tone of the earlier discussion. Its interpo-
lation in a relevant way follows the dictates of many
rhetorical theorists who advise the use of change of
pace materials and humor in this way.

By giving emphasis to the fact that it is not a
military problem, but rather a problem of public partici-
pation, Gruenther again gives focus to the notion that

the NATO approach is not one of military offensive. It

257

can also be observed that the alliteration in the phrase
problem of public participation represents a fine example
of interesting and dynamic word choice, one that would

be lauded by most public speaking pedagogy.

[Paragraph 26]

(26) I'd like now to move on to another point.
NATO has been accused of being aggressive.
That is simply not true. At my headquarters
we make the plans for the defense of this part
of the world. I can promise you that there
has never been as much as one sentence written
that envisages that we will start a war. In
fact, we go on the assumption that we will
have to absorb the first blow. That is a ma-
jor disadvantage, but I'm sure that it is the
right approach. However, we must counter these
Soviet charges. For when we convince our people
that this is a defensive organization-ethat NATO
is an instrument for peace-~I'm sure that we can
get them to make the necessary sacrifices and
to have the necessary wisdom and perseverance
to support an alliance of this character.

At this point in the speech, Gruenther seems to
feel the need to state again, to reinforce his earlier
statements: NATO is defensive, and not offensive: people
must be"sold" on NATO and made willing to endure sacri-

fices in order to produce the desired security.

258

The opening sentence is a definite, explicit
technique of announcing topical change to aid the audience
in making the necessary mental shift. This is one of the
few times that Gruenther introduces procedural guidelines
so directly; generally a "hint" of the shift is offered,
or a transition is provided by a transitional summary.

Gruenther proceeds with a type of rebuttal, try-
ing to refute the false accusations waged against NATO
by Soviet charges that NATO is aggressive. Personal
testimony is the primary form of support offered. Gruen-
ther adopts personal proof for his refutation by indi-
cating that it is at his headquarters that the plans are
made for defense. And he emphasizes that there has never
been as much as one sentence written that envisages that
we will start a war.

Not only does he explain the alleged fallacy of
the accusations made by the Soviets, but also in logical
sequence proposes the methodology of countering the Soviet
charges by attempting to convince the people of NATO that
the alliance is a defensive organization. Thus through

problem-solution methodology Gruenther seeks to refute

259

the allegation of aggressiveness, counters the Soviet
charge by proving NATO is a defensive organization, and
finally, points up the need for urging the people of NATO
to make the necessary sacrifices for the support of the
alliance.

By his strong defense of "our" side, Gruenther's
countering of the Soviets' allegations concerning the
aggressiveness of NATO should have resulted in winning
support for NATO. '

Gruenther's logical proof that NATO is a defen-
sive organization and is an instrument of peace empha-
sizes the ethical strength of the alliance, and, in turn
should certainly establish the credibility of NATO's
leader! The metaphor that NATO is an instrument of peace
provides a most potent antidote to the Soviet allegation
of aggressiveness!

The choice of such words as I can promise you and
I'm sure have a "ring of truth" to them, and coming at
this point in the address may well have served as a "cap-
stone" for the speaker's attempt to project himself as

one who is to be believed and "obeyed."

260

[Paragraph 27]

(27) No military alliance of this kind has ever

succeeded before in peace-time. There were

times in the past four years when people said

ours would not work. One public figure charac-

terized it as "an administrative monstrosity."

My answer to that is that we have made it work.

In this, NATO could be likened to the bumble-

bee. You could prove by logic and aerodynamics

that the bumblebee cannot fly--his body is too

heavy and his wings are too small. But the

bumblebee is too determined to be deterrred by

logic and aerodynamics, so he goes ahead and

flies anyway.

Having developed his major line of arguments, the
General moves into the "wrap-up" of his remarks. Having
identified the problem with all its serious ramifications,
and indicated some guidelines and/or directions for its
solution, he is able to speak in a positive way about
the success or achievement of the project he represents.
The opening sentence based on factual information

is a source of pride which no doubt appealed to the audi-
ence because of NATO's singular achievement in succeeding
in peace-time, but also because of audience involvement
in the venture.

In quoting a public figure's opinion of NATO as

an administrative monstrosity Gruenther, by personal

261

testimony, proclaims unequivocally that we hgyg made it
work,--again appealing to the pride of the audience in
their personal involvement.

The anecdote which Gruenther relates on the
bumblebee being able to fly by virtue of his sheer de-
termination, in spite of scientific principles to the
contrary, is an admirable analogy to the determination
of NATO to endure1 (without being deterred by false alle-
gations and name-calling).

The determination of a leader to turn the tide
against precedent and by dynamic faith and confidence in
the great purpose of NATO dedicate himself to its success
should have appealed to the audience and contributed to

the credibility of their military leader.

[Paragraph 28]

(28) We in NATO have not been deterred by our
difficulties either. We have been able to make
this organization succeed. One of the greatest
tributes that has been paid to our effectiveness

 

lThis bumblebee story is one of General Gruenther's
favorites and is included in many of his speeches.

262

is the fact that the Soviet Union has made the
dissolution of NATO the number one objective of
Soviet Foreign Policy. A year ago they even
offered to join it, although there may have
been a reason why they made the offer on April
Fool's Day.

This paragraph represents a continuation of the
preceding one, in which the tone is positive, the empha-

sis is on we have succeeded together, and the mood is

 

somewhat light.

A direct tie-in with the bumblebee analogy is made
in the opening transition sentence. NATO, as the bumble-
bee, is not deterred by difficulties, either. Once again
the audience is "patted on the back" by the use of the
plural first person pronouns. Here, as throughout the
speech, the speaker seems to be working to build rapport
with the audience.

Evidence of NATO's success is indicated by the
fact that the Soviet Union had made the dissolution of
NATO its number one objective. By personal testimony,
General Gruenther considers this objective to be one of
NATO's greatest tributes.

In noting that the Soviets offered to join NATO

a year ago (1954), Gruenther is very likely correct in

263

reporting there may have been a reason why they made the
offer on April Fool's Day. For this was probably tongue-
in-cheek humor of the Soviets, based on their desire to

make NATO look foolish under any and all circumstances!

Hope for the Future
[Paragraph 1]
(Conclusion)

The fourth major proposition--Hope for the Future
--is covered in the conclusion of General Gruenther's
speech by the summarization of goals and objectives in
three paragraphs.

(1) I'm not cynical about any efforts for last-
ing peace. On the contrary, I'm optimistic.
I say that our statesmen can find an answer if
they receive continuing popular support. We
must continue to develop our position of strength,
and above all, to improve our unity. I have seen
this organization grow from the time it was a
gleam in the planner's eye, and to me it is my
whole life. I have seen it succeed in spite of
numerous frustrations. I'm convinced, in spite
of the difficulties still to be overcome, it
will thrive.

In personal address to the audience, Gruenther

emphasizes his optimism by refuting cynicism. His opinion

264

testimony of optimism is supported by five factors ex-

pressed in parallel construction:

I say that our statesmen can find an answer . . .
We must continue to develop our position of
strength . . .

I have seen this organization grow from the

time it was a gleam in the planner's eye,

and to me it is my whole life.

I have seen it succeed in spite of numerous
frustrations.
I am convinced, in spite of the difficulties . . . .

Since Gruenther was associated with NATO from its
very beginning as Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower,
his evaluative statement on the significance of NATO in
the statement, it is my whole life, conveyed the highest
tribute he could pay to NATO and its member nations, and
most likely enhanced his credibility considerably as a
leader completely dedicated to the organization he was
serving.

The last two of the factors enumerated--support-
ing Gruenther's optimism--are expressed in similar sen-
tence structure and word choice: they provide a rhythmic
tone which probably was most effective in delivery.

There is a noticeable stylistic change in the

composition of the conclusion. While Gruenther's sentence

265

structure is seldom loose or involved in this address,

he becomes in_this paragraph even more terse. There is

an almost journalistic brevity in each sentence, many of

which are periodic and strong: additional forcefulness

is provided by such wordings as: I'm not cynical, I'm

optimistic, I say, I have seen, I'm convinced.

(2)

[Paragraph 2]

When General Eisenhower called our staff
together four years ago, he told them this:
"The outstanding characteristic of an allied
staff officer is an ability to have a ready
smile." That was his way of stating that
friends could work well together; that friends
could solve their problems if they had mutual
confidence in each other. We have that char-
acteristic in our headquarters, and all of
them including Admiral Fechteler's headquarters
in Naples, are all very happy headquarters.

Of course, it is not always easy. Sitting out-
side of my office is an American Sergeant who
gets more money than an Italian Colonel of 30
years service. That is the type of irritation
we run into, but the Italian Colonel feels that
he is dedicated to his cause, and he overlooks
that type of irritation. With that sort of
spirit—-with that sort of dedication--it is

not possible to contemplate failure.

Continuing with the ending of the speech, Gruen-

ther uses description to characterize the philosophy of

266

harmony and friendliness that permeated the various mili-
tary headquarters of NATO. This is artfully blended with
the well-known quotation from General Eisenhower, "The
outstanding characteristic of an allied staff officer is
an ability to have a ready smile." Specifically, Eisen-
hower's quotation serves as the undergirding for the
whole philosophy of SHAPE with its emphasis on mutual
confidence and harmonious relationships. In this connec-
tion, Gruenther especially notes Admiral Fechteler's
headquarters in Naples, which should have added to his
rapport with the Italian audience.

By admitting It is not always easy-~Gruenther
cites as an example the disparity in wages between an
American Sergeant and an Italian Colonel and the latter's
overlooking the irritation because of his dedication to
his causel--thereby serving as another important tribute
to Italy's military leaders, and an approach almost cer-

tain to gain goodwill with the Italian audience.

fl j—fi

 

1See 1 32 of London Speech and reference to French
colonel in similar situation-~also writer's subsequent
analysis on the comparison of the London and Rome speeches
with regard to the selection of a French colonel for illus-
tration in the London address and an Italian colonel in Rome.

267

Even the closing sentence of the paragraph, with
its rhythmic parallel construction-rdramatically associ-
ated with the dedicated Italian colonel-~serves as an
additional tribute to Italy: With that sort of spirit--
with that sort of dedication-~it is not possible to con-

template failure.

[Paragraph 3]

(3) I want to express my gratitude to the Ital-
ian people and the Italian Government for the
loyal support they have always given us. With
such unity, such understanding, such persever-
ance--no power, however menacing, will be able
to prevail against this alliance.

Mille grazie a tutti per la vostra gentile

attenzione!

In these closing remarks, Gruenther very diplo-
matically expresses his gratitude to the Italian people
and government for their loyal support, and he leads
directly to the concluding tribute to Italy in a periodic
sentence in parallel construction, eulogizing the loyal
support Italy had always given--With such unity, such

understanding, such perseverance--no power, however menac-

ing, will be able to prevail against this alliance.

268

That he thanks the audience for their kind atten-
tion--in Italian--is a thoughtful and friendly gesture of
togetherness for the climax of his message, an appropriate
tie-in with his introductory remarks on the subject of
accent. It should have rated well with his Italian au-

dience--regardless of the Nebraska accent!

PART III

EVALUATION OF THE ROME SPEECH

The audience which General Gruenther addressed
in Rome, Italy, on May 5, 1955, was probably the most
critical group he had faced since becoming Supreme Com-
mander--this accounts for his unusually long introduction
of nine paragraphs to attempt to secure their goodwill.
Aware that the Italians were skeptical and apprehensive
about NATO, he carefully reviewed the events leading to
the organization of NATO, commended the Italians for their
contributions in WOrld War II, conveyed the danger of the
potential threat of the Soviet aggression, and included
some humorous anecdotes in a relevant way to gain rapport
with the audience before proceeding to the body of his
speech to "sell” the importance of NATO for collective
security. Although he far exceeded his usual two- to
three-paragraph average length for introductions to his
speeches, he wisely recognized the importance of inter-
preting the aged for NATO before appealing for larger

269

270

contributions for military defense. General Gruenther's
perception of the significance of careful adaptation of
his message to the audience is apparent not only in the
introduction but throughout the entire address.

The materials which General Gruenther selected
to prove his rationale by logical methods constituted the
major portion of his speech, with far less emphasis on
the establishment of his personal credibility and emo-
tional appeals within the speech composition. He had
many opportunities in this speech to run the gamut of
emotional appeals on the explosive subjects of war, nu-
clear weapons, and communism. But he wisely chose to
follow restraint and moderation as a military commander
who had personally experienced the horrors of World War
II. Gruenther realized that fear-charged descriptions
would have only defeated his basic purpose in promoting
support for military defense contributions in later sec-
tions of his speech, where he covered the alleged "smile"
of the Soviets in the peace propaganda program.

Concerning emotional appeals it should be noted,

however, that General Gruenther lost no opportunity to

271

appeal to the pride of his Italian audience in the impor-
tant part they played in identifying the need for collec-
tive security and unity before the establishment of NATO--
evidenced by their declaration of interest in a United
Europe. This tribute to the Italian pride for the sup-
port of European unity was excellent psychological strategy
on the part of General Gruenther since it served as the
bridge in attempting to sell to the skeptical Italians

the importance of the military contributions of Germany

as a member of the Alliance. This was of great importance
because their memories of Germany were still vividly re-
called as an atrocious enemy who had over-run their country
in WOrld War II. Thus, it could be inferred that Germany
was contributing to this new United Europe envisioned by
the Italians.

In his excellent chronological and topical format,
Gruenther used internal summaries, transitions, problem-
solution structure, and cause and effect reasoning in the
body of his speech to contribute to the clarity of his
message for the audience. As noted in the first para-

graph of this evaluation, the threat of Soviet aggression

272

was included in the introduction of this speech rather
than in later sections of the body of the address, as

in the Copenhagen and London speeches. To include the
Soviet threat in the introduction of the Rome speech was
a logical arrangement since this topic was essential
evidence in his review of the detailed events leading

to the establishment of NATO.

The brief conclusion, consisting of three para-
graphs, centered on the topic of "hope for the future"--
in harmony with General Gruenther's usual pattern of
organization. This "hope for the future" was dramatic-
ally and inspirationally conveyed to appeal to their con-
tinued support of NATO's collective security as well as
to unity and preservation of peace for the future-~along
with the usual amenities to the audience.

Concerning General Gruenther's language usage,
if the writer were to draft but one brief phrase which
would characterize all of General Gruenther's oral com-
munications it would be--"Dynamic,clear, and simple in
word choice and composition.” Although short sentences

predominated in this speech (as well as in all of his

273

addresses), he uses a sufficient number of longer sen-
tences to provide variety. Consistently, Gruenther
adopted a majority of one- and two-syllable words for
his NATO speeches for rapid translation to the various
foreign languages.

Throughout his speech Gruenther very effectively
used first person pronouns and direct discourse for in-
volvement with the audience, and, also, rhetorical ques-
tions to simulate dialogue. Perhaps the long personal
discourse of the Russian general conveying Soviet views
on democracy and religion represented a means of inter-
preting Soviet philosophy and ideology which served as
one of the most persuasive methods Gruenther could have
chosen to include in a speech to these people of the
Vatican City. The Russian general's denouncement of re-
ligion could very well have proved to be one of the most
potent arguments of persuasion for enlisting the continued
support of Italy in contributing to NATO's military defense.

This speech delivered by General Gruenther in Rome,
although substantially longer than most of his NATO speeches,

is probably one of the most impressive in terms of

274

persuasive qualities. This is true because of the method-
ology followed in the development and arrangement of ma-
terials for complete adaptation to the audience and for
carrying the thesis of the urgent need for collective

security to the very conclusion of the address.

CHAPTER.VI

METHOD OF PREPARATION AND DELIVERY~

General Gruenther's background training and ex-
perience as a military officer provided a veritable store-
house of information for the preparation of his speeches
for NATO. Likewise, he did not assume his new post as
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers of Europe as a
stranger, as noted in Chapter II of this paper. He had
been closely associated with the defense organization of
NATO since its formation, as Chief of Staff for both
General Eisenhower and General Ridgway, his predecessors.
"He came to his post as a master-planner of large-scale
defense moves. But equally important, he also came to
this post as a 'master speaker' to enlist the interest
and cooperation of the NATO countries in support of mili-
tary defense."1 Gruenther is a great salesman, possessing

the arts of commending, convincing, and captivating his

1See page 58, Chapter II.

275

276

audience with clear, simple language, in a cooperative
and conversational tone. He was not only a very compe-
tent military commander, but an outstanding diplomat as
well.

In addition to his staff responsibilities of
information research for the two Supreme Commanders who
preceded him, General Gruenther also travelled with these
two Commanders over Europe--and then continued his visits
to NATO countries when he assumed the post of Supreme
Commander. During his journeys he searched for informa-
tion on the political, economic, and military concerns
of the NATO countries, and thus paved the way for his
inimitable adeptness in audience adaptation in fulfilling
his role as the spokesman for SHAPE, the military arm of
NATO.

As this writer travelled throughout Europe in
1953, shortly after General Gruenther was appointed Su-
preme Commander, it was evident from interviews with mili-
tary officers, government officials, and educational
leaders, that he was considered one of the most.popular

American representatives in Europe. That he was well-liked

277

was readily apparent, for the American Embassies in the
NATO countries confirmed the fact that no printed signs
appeared in Western European commpnities disparaging the
the Supreme Commander--such as "Gruenther Go Home!" Such
"exit" suggestions, however, were prevalent in many areas
for other military leaders during the recovery period
following World War II.

General Gruenther's significant speaking capabil-
ities were partially attributable to his intuitive judg-
ment in adapting his remarks to each specific audience.
However, he supported his selection of materials by care-
fully collecting information on the nature of the audience
he was scheduled to address--covering such areas as their
country's background participation in World War II, their
familiarity with the purpose and operation of NATO, their
specific goals for the future, their prejudices, and the
factual and statistical profile of their economic, polit-
ical, and military status. If the critic would wish to
identify the pulse of General Gruenther's effectiveness
as a speaker, he would no doubt point to the General's

exhaustive search for information on the specific locale

278

of his speaking commitment, the particular occasion, and
the audience he was to face.

Gruenther's thorough background experience, his
personal authority, and knowledge provided most of the
supporting evidence for the development of the four major
topics1 included in his NATO speeches-~supplemented by
wide reading of current magazines and European newspapers
every day, and the constant research of his aides in se-
curing current statistical data on the military capabil-
ities of the Soviets with comparative evaluations on the
military strength of NATO. Therefore, in his speeches
on NATO it is evident that he was speaking on a subject
on which he was well informed and to which he was deeply
dedicated as the Supreme Commander in promoting the mili-
tary defense of NATO for the collective security of the
respective members.

General Gruenther's phenomenal memory, with his
ability for immediate recall of facts and statistics,
is a great asset to his speech preparation. It is well-

known that Gruenther prepares his addresses in outline

 

1
Covered in Chapters III, IV, and V--Analyses of
three speeches.

279

form, without a complete manuscript, since his storehouse
of information and his infallible memory hold him in good
stead in the extemporaneous delivery of his outlined
tOpics.

The General says that his regular practice of
outlining his speeches helps him to develop a clear con-
tinuity in his lines of thought for the organization of
his message. The importance of effective organization
drilled into his training at west Point is seen in his
complete devotion to meticulous organization of his
speeches. His abbreviated topical outline could well
serve as his guide to extemporaneous speaking; but seldom,
if ever, does he take any notes to the platform. The
writer has never observed General Gruenther referring to
his notes, in a platform address, tape-recorded interview,
or broadcast. Whenever he serves as a participant in a
discussion group where questions cannot always be antici-
pated, his outstanding memory of factual and statistical
data with immediate recall is amazing to his fellow par-
ticipants and to members of the audience. This rare

ability of immediate recall without notes was clearly

280

evidenced in his recent participation in an unrehearsed
round-table discussion for TV broadcasts over the NBC and
CBS networks to eulogize the late President Eisenhower
during the week-end preceding the funeral.

General Gruenther states that he prepared but one
complete manuscript of a NATO speech, which was delivered
in 1954. All the other NATO speeches delivered by General
Gruenther from 1953 through 1956 while he served as Su-
preme Commander were confined to brief outlines for ex-
temporaneous delivery. It should be pointed out, however,
that the speech which was prepared in complete manuscript
form was also reduced to a brief outline and delivered
as Were the other NATO speeches--without benefit of re-
minder notes.

The available texts of his NATO speeches were pre-
pared from tape recordings made during the actual delivery
before the audience. However, before the speech texts
were circulated by the Public Information Division of
SHAPE, they were edited by the P.I.D. Staff, in consulta-
tion with Gruenther's aides, without revision of lines

of thought.

281

General Gruenther is well aware of the physical
setting and its importance in capturing the attention and
interest of his audience. As previously noted in this
paper, he prefers to speak with a NATO map at his back
to which he may refer during the course of his speech.

He dislikes a podium and remains behind it only when he
must use-a public address system, for his extemporaneous
delivery needs no podium for reference notes! He prefers
to be as close to his audience as possible, and he is
often very close to the edge of the platform--a procedure
he followed whenever he addressed groups in the auditorium
at SHAPE in Paris. The writer had the opportunity to ob-
serve the General when he addressed a large group of Euro-
pean university students at SHAPE--without a podium, with-
out notes, but with a great deal of enthusiasm to capture
the rapport and interest of this group of young people
who had travelled hundreds of miles to meet together at
SHAPE—-to hear this Supreme Commander, who stood close

to his audience and not only used rhetorical questions
but actually invited their response in the language of.

their choice (many of whom could not speak English).

282

He did not talk down to them--it seemed that he was ac-
tually reasoning y££h_them--and they received his admoni-
tions on the preservation of peace with thundering applause
and the vocal acclaim which is so typical of European
youth!

The General's voice is crisp but very pleasant--
with careful enunciation, yet "artfully" preserving the
Nebraska accent. Gruenther uses very few gestures--just
enough for emphasis at salient points in his delivery.
When he is not wired to a public address system, he
usually walks back and forth on the platform, making for
informality and a conversational atmosphere with the
entire audience. He always appears at ease when speak-
ing, giving the impression that he truly appreciates and
enjoys the privilege of "talking giggf the audience, made
realistic by his frequent use of rhetorical questions.

He is blessed with a contour of facial expression which
gives the appearance of a friendly, permanent smile--con—
tributing to his natural and relaxed manner, which is
nicely balanced by his rather rapid speaking, which evi-

dences quick thinking and immediate, on-the-spot

283

adaptation to the occasion and audience. It is the opin-
ion of this writer that General Gruenther has no peer in

audience adaptation.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study of the speaking of General Alfred M.
Gruenther is developed in terms of a philosophy of rhetor-
ical criticism which embraces the several elements that
enter into every speaking situation. Therefore, the pur-
pose is to consider such factors as: the speaker's back-
ground, experience, personality, mental habits, and achieve-
ments; the historical events relevant to the issues covered;
the current climate of opinion on those issues: the
speaker's and audience's relationship to those issues: the
nature and purpose of the immediate speaking situation and
the nature of the audience: the speaker's choice of topics
and the development of his ideas: the speaker's adaptation
to the audience: the method of arrangement he employed:

his choice of words and their composition: his methods of

284

285

preparation; his oral and visible practices; and general

consequences of his speaking.

Biography of General Alfred M. Gruenther

Alfred M. Gruenther was born in Platte Center,
Nebraska, in 1899 and received his education in religious
and military sChools. When he was but thirteen years old,
he subscribed to a mail-order memory course. With the
encouragement of his father, Gruenther's continued dili-
gence in the development of his memory proved to be one
of his greatest assets contributing to his success as a
military commander and in his speaking role to NATO na-
tions.

He was appointed to West Point Military Academy
and was graduated fourth in his class in November, 1918,
later becoming an instructor at the Academy for eight
years. Following a series of Army Staff assignments he
was sent to London as Deputy Chief of Staff under General
Eisenhower's command, and subsequently became Chief of
Staff for General Mark Clark's Fifth Army in North Africa

and Italy.

286

Gruenther's war record was remarkable, and after
the War he became General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff
when SHAPE was organized in Paris in January 1951. In
August of 1951 he was promoted to full General, when he
was but fifty-two years old--the Army's youngest! When
General Eisenhower answered the call from the United
States to stand as a candidate for President, General
Gruenther continued as Chief of Staff under General Ridg-
way, Eisenhower's successor._ When General Ridgway returned
to the United States as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army,
General Gruenther became Supreme Commander of the Allied
Powers of Europe in 1953.

He was not a stranger in his speaking role to
NATO nations, for he had addressed many of these countries
while he served as Chief of Staff for both Eisenhower and
Ridgway. When he was Supreme Commander, his visits to the
NATO nations required very careful and discerning judgment
in adapting his message to specific audiences, since the
Soviets had launched a peace propaganda campaign which

was proving effective in lulling some areas into apathy

287

and skepticism concerning the need for military defense.
It was during this period that General Gruenther, as the
leader of the military arm of NATO, scored his greatest
success in his official speaking role--by enthusiastic-
ally and competently conveying the urgent need for mili-
tary contributions to the collective security of the
Alliance as a threat to Soviet aggression. Although
General Gruenther retired as Supreme Commander of NATO
and the U.S. Army in November 1956, it is generally
agreed that he has been--and still is--the outstanding

spokesman for NATO.

Historical Events Relevant to the Issues
Covered in General Gruenther's Speeches
As indicated in Chapter II on the "Origin and De-
velopment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,"
NATO was indissolubly involved with the historical de-
velopments of the post World-War II period, with the de-
mobilization of the armed forces of the Western Allies

concurrent with the continued strengthening of the armed

288

forces of the Soviets on a wartime basis. History books
on this period record the innumerable attempts of polit-
ical conciliation with the USSR by the Western Powers,
who made every effort to make the United Nations an
effective instrument of peace.

As the Soviet Territorial Expansion penetrated
Eastern Europe with effective "conquest without war,"
the Communist parties in western Europe allied themselves
with the Soviet Union and strengthened the Soviet policy
by propaganda. When Czechoslovakia was brought into the
Soviet orbit, the Western allies in Western Europe unani-
mously recognized that common defensive action was needed.
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom signed the Brussels Treaty and pledged to
build up a common defense system and to strengthen their
economic and cultural ties. It was the Brussels Treaty
of the free countries in Europe which created the initial
interest of the United States in the problems of security
in the North Atlantic area. On April 4, 1949, the North
Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington by the foreign

ministers of the five members of the Brussels Treaty,

289

with seven additional western countries--Denmark, Iceland,
Italy, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and United States,
making a total of twelve nations. Subsequently three other
countries joined the twelve original signatories--Greece,
Turkey, and the Federal Republic of Germany, making a
total of 15 countries in NATO.

In 1950 the National Council of NATO decided that
the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers of EurOpe
(SHAPE) should be placed under an American officer, and
requested President Truman to designate General Dwight D.
Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander, who was officially
appointed and assumed commandership of SHAPE on April 2,
1951. The choice of an American officer was based on.
the contributions of the United States since 1947 when
the free countries of Europe recognized the importance
of finding a means of guaranteeing their freedom and
security in the face of Soviet expansion. And they turned
toward the United States, the one country which was strong
enough to posgga threat to the USSR. As history has re-
vealed, the reabtion of the United States was prompt and

decisive, emanating in the well-known Marshall Plan for

290

economic assistance which contributed so effectively to
the recovery of the Western countries.

As reported in Chapter I, General Eisenhower asked
to be released as Supreme Commander in 1952 in order to
return to the United States and enter the Presidential
Campaign; and on April 28, 1952, the Permanent Council
of NATO appointed General Matthew B. Ridgway to the post
of Supreme Allied Commander in replacement of General
Eisenhower. A year later when General Ridgway was re-
called to Washington to become Chief of Staff of the
U.S. Army, General Alfred M. Gruenther was appointed
by the NATO Council as Supreme Allied Commander on July
10, 1953.

In his speaking role for SHAPE, General Gruenther
had the responsibility of addressing many of the NATO
countries and their visiting journalists who convened
in the Paris SHAPE office for news on NATO. He was ini-
tiated into this speaking role when he served as Chief of
Staff for General Eisenhower and subsequently for General

Ridway.

291

Three Representative Speeches for Analysis
--Criteria for Selection

The choice of the three representative speeches
selected for rhetorical analysis was determined on the
basis of securing a spread in time sequence, and a vari-
ance in the primary objectives of the speaking situations
--covering the period during which General Gruenther
served as Supreme Commander from 1953-1956.

The first speech, analyzed in Chapter III, was
delivered in Copenhagen, Denmark, on August 31, 1953.
It was primarily expository since it was General Gruen-
ther's first major address to the military officers and
foreign ministers of the NATO nations just a month and
a half following his appointment as Supreme Commander,
when NATO was emerging from little or no defense capa-
bilities. There in Copenhagen, Gruenther recognized
the need to explain clearly NATO's specific operation,
its organizational framework, and NATO's objectives as
essential background information on which to launch the
reasons for the need of military support for NATO nations.

Since the writer had the privilege of attending this

292

meeting in Copenhagen, the occasion, setting and audience
are based on personal observations in Part I of Chapter
III.

The second speech, analyzed in Chapter IV, was the
address delivered on June 8, 1954, to the English-Speaking
Union of the Commonwealth in London, England, at a dinner
meeting in the Hotel Dorchester. Gruenther was the
honored guest and invited speaker for this important
group comprising English Royalty (the Duke of Edinburgh,
now Prince Philip), government and political officials
of England (Sir Winston Churchill, Clement Atlee, and
Clement Davies), military officers, and others of social
status in London. The purpose of the speech was to con-
vey news on NATO's progress, provide documentation on
the growing strength of the Soviets (as well as their
"defects"), and to.secure more positive action by Great
Britain for increased contributions to NATO military de-
fense. Because Great Britain was well aware of the pur-
pose, goals, and operation of SHAPE in its relationship
with NATO, it was unnecessary for Gruenther to include
here the extensive background information which was essen-

tial in the Copenhagen speech.

293

The third speech, analyzed in Chapter V, was de-
livered in Rome, Italy, on May a, 1955 to a very critical
and skeptical audience, a circumstance which accounts for
the exceedingly long introduction of nine paragraphs to
attempt to secure the goodwill of the audience. Gruenther
recognized the importance of interpreting to the Italians
the crucial aged for NATO in this lengthy introduction
before appealing for larger contributions for military
defense in the body of the speech. Although this address
is much longer than most of Gruenther's NATO speeches,
and might be considered almost too long, it is probably
the most impressive in terms of persuasive qualities.

Two of the three speeches chosen for analysis in.
this study were published in public address journals.

The London speech, delivered on June 8, 1954, appeared
in Vital Speeches of the Day.1 This version, which
was used for analysis in Chapter IV, includes a

three-paragraph Introduction by General Gruenther

 

1Vital Speeches of the Dgy, Vo1. xx, No. 22 (Sept.
1, 1954), PP. 676-679.

294

that is not recorded in the script from the Public Infor-
mation Division of SHAPE. The published text was an exact
duplicate of the Body and Conclusion of the script re-
ceived from SHAPE. The London speech also appeared in

a brochure entitled, SPEECHES at the Dinner in Honour of
General Alfred M. Gruenther under the Auspices of the
English-Speaking Union of the Commonwealth,,June 8, 1954,
published in England.1 This publication included the
very complimentary introduction of General Gruenther by
the Duke of Edinburgh (now Prince Philip) in which he
commended the achievements and competency of General
Gruenther. This publication also included the three-
paragraph Introduction of the speech which was carried

in Vital Speeches of the Day? but not included in the
script from SHAPE. (Following the text of General Gruen-
ther's speech, three additional speeches on this same

occasion were included in SPEECHES . . .: addresses by

Sir Winston Churchill, Prime Minister: Clement Atlee,

 

1Basil Blackwell, ed., SPEECHES at the Dinner in
Honour of General Alfred M. Gruenther under the Auspices
of the English-Speakinggnion of the Commonwealth, June+8,
1954. “Oxford University, 1954.

2Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XX, No. 22
(September 1, 1954), pp. 676-679.

 

295

Leader of the Opposition in Parliament, and former Prime
Minister; and Clement Davies, Leader of the Liberal
Party.) The Body and Conclusions of the Gruenther ad-
dress appearing in SPEECHES . . . were also identical to
the text issued by SHAPE.

The Rome Speech, delivered on May 2, 1955,
appeared in Representative American Speeches1 which was
identical to the script from SHAPE.

Although the Copenhagen Speech, delivered on
August 31, 1953, did not appear in a published speech
journal, the notes taken down by the writer at the time
of delivery confirmed the lines of thought in the script
from SHAPE, despite the inadequacy of the writer's notes

as a verbatim record.

Method of Analysis

The primary goal of General Gruenther's speaking
role was to win military support for collective security

of NATO nations as a threat against Soviet aggression.

 

1A. Craig Baird, ed., Representative American
Speeches, 1955-56 (New York: H. W. Wilson & Co., 1956),
vel. XXVIII, No. 3, pp. 25-37.

 

296

All of Gruenther's speeches on NATO covered four
major topics--the threat of Soviet aggression, the prog-
ress which NATO had made, the problems which NATO was
encountering, and hopes for the future. But, as is
well-known in military circles, General Gruenther has
never delivered a "canned speech." The degree of develop-
ment of each of the four topics, as well as the chronolog-
ical order in which they were covered, is revealed as one
of the significant clues to Gruenther's meticulous care
in adapting his message to his audience. The number and
type of subordinate topics included under each of the
four major divisions were dependent upon the background
knowledge of the audience and their familiarity with the
various aspects of NATO operation.

The methodology adopted for the analysis of the
three representative speeches described above was based
on,a sequential, paragraph-by-paragraph examination and
interpretation of the rhetorical principles and practices
represented.

The materials selected by General Gruenther to

prove his thesis by logical methods constituted the major

297

portion of his speech, with far less emphasis on the estab-
lishment of his personal credibility and emotional appeals
within the speech composition.

Gruenther's speeches were replete with evidence,
including numerical data, examples, analogies, comparisons,
and personal testimony. He seldom referred to other au-
thoritative sources for evidence, but supported his ma-
terials by his personal authority since the sources of
military information were not disclosed for military
reasons. Moreover, his position as Supreme Commander
would also support his opinions as an authority in the
areas he discussed. Obviously, all references to mili-
tary capabilities of the Soviets as well as NATO would
vary from speech to speech, as they were constantly chang-
ing, both geographically as well as numerically.

Gruenther preferred to reason inductively, sum-
marizing or generalizing from the examples, analogies,
facts, and numerical data. Sign reasoning was seldom
used by General Gruenther.

One of the outstanding characteristics of Gruen-

ther's speech organization was his development of ideas

298

in chronological order. In his excellent chronological-
topical format he used internal summaries, explanatory
transitions, problem-solution structure, and cause and
effect reasoning to contribute to the clarity of his
message for the audience.

The Introductionsof his speeches were usually
brief, not more than two or three paragraphs (the speech
in Rome was a rare exception with its nine paragraphs):
the Conclusions were also usually brief, centered on the
topic "hope for the future," with a closing statement
dramatically and inspirationally conveyed to appeal to
continued support of NATO's collective security, as well
as to unity and the preservation of peace for the future.

The General followed restraint and moderation in
the psychological appeals of fear, and avoided the fear-
charged descriptions of warfare. He concentrated on the
positive appeals of pride, unity, and the preservation
of peace.

His plain, informal, and conversational language
and frequent use of simple sentences-—free from military

jargon--made it possible for his messages to be easily

299

understood by the audience and thus promote "instantaneous
intelligibility." By his frequent use of rhetorical ques-
tions, first and second person pronouns, and personal dis-
course to simulate dialogue, he sought attention and au-
dience involvement in his attempt to relate himself and
his program to his audience. Gruenther's humorous anec-
dotes, sprinkled relevantly and frequently throughout

his speeches to change the pace from serious to humorous
tones, provided the welcome relaxation for the audience--
helping to maintain their attention and interest. Well-
phrased parallel and series construction, together with
repetitions, helped him to emphasize matters of importance
--especially in the Conclusions of his Speeches, where his
appeals for the support of NATO added vividness and clarity
to his message.

Perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of
Gruenther's speaking is his inimitable facility in audi-
ence adaptation. He adjusts his communication to his au-
dience in his choice of materials, the simplicity of the
language in which his ideas are expressed, and in the

topical and chronological arrangement of his address.

300

Gruenther's credibility was enhanced throughout
his speaking role as Supreme Commander by the explicit
evidence of the thorough development of the substance of
the materials he presented. He certainly must have been
perceived as a man of competence, character, and good-
will. His intelligence, his dedication to exhaustive
research on the local situation, and the evidence of his
preparedness by extemporaneous delivery without consult-
ing notes are certainly to be construed as evidence of
competency in the speaking situation.

Gruenther gave the impression of confidence, as
well as modesty, but it was evident from his immediate
recall of information to be presented (without the aid
of reminders) that he had mastered the facts to be con-

veyed.

Method of Preparation and Delivery

General Gruenther's preparation of his speeches
was aided by his background training and wide experience,

his travels, and his long-time dedication to continuous

301

learning—~which provided a veritable storehouse of infor-
mation, ready to be tapped and instantly available when
he needed it. He was a voracious reader with a phenom-
enal memory which were great assets to his speech prepar-
ation.

Gruenther outlines his speeches without preparing
a manuscript--seldom, if ever, using notes in a platform
address, tape recorded interviews, or broadcasts. His
infallible memory serves him well in his extemporaneous
delivery.

He dislikes a podium and remains behind it only
when he must use a public address system, for he likes
to be as close to his audience as possible.

Gruenther's voice is crisp but very pleasant,
with careful enunciation, yet artfully preserving his
Nebraska accent. The rate of his speaking, with adequate
variety in pitch and force, adds to the "ease of listen-
ing" for his audience. His facial contour constantly
[gives the appearance of a friendly and warm smile. He
truly enjoys the privilege of "talking yigh" his audience,
which is made realistic by his frequent use of rhetorical

questions and direct discourse to simulate dialogue.

302

Gruenther uses very few gestures, and when "not
wired for sound" usually walks back and forth on the
platform, with a huge NATO map directly behind him--to
which he points when the speech reference warrants.

From the statements which have been published
recently, along with the many comments which have come
personally to this writer following the recent NBC and
CBS network discussion programs in which Gruenther par-
ticipated, it could be generally agreed that his delivery

consistently is in keeping with good rhetorical practice.

Postscript

 

In the evaluation of General Gruenther's speaking
on NATO since 1951, perhaps the greatest vindication of
his effectiveness is that the nations of Western Europe,
listening to the competent voice of General Gruenther,
responded to his urging and provided NATO with life
and vitality. Perhaps, too, it is not erroneous
to say that, in part at least, Gruenther's leader-

ship was responsible for the fact that NATO has

303

endured, despite all the predictions to the contrary
both in the United States and EurOpe. The current year:
1969, has brought the celebration of NATO's twentieth
anniversary. Perhaps many will agree that SHAPE moved
to Brussels, Belgium, with the blessings of Fate two
years ago--departing from the French soil where, to De-
Gaulle, NATO was an unwelcome visitor. But NATO is now
on friendly soil--and flourishing!

Another star in the speaking crown of General
Gruenther as a former Supreme Commander and dedicated
spokesman for NATO is that he is in greater demand than
ever before to speak on NATO and its contributions to
the preservations of peace--as evidenced by the inter-
national news releases--and his presence and participa-
tion at educational symposiums on NATO on our American
university campuses.

General Alfred M. Gruenther has earned a repu-
tation as a man of integrity, who is friendly, likeable,
sincere, warm-~and despite his seventy years is just as

active physically and intellectually as ever! That he

304

has had two hip-joint operations for arthritis, and
uses a cane to rise from his chair, has not inhibited
his traveling to various areas of the world to ful-
fill speaking commitments. As recently as the week-
end of July 12, 1969, he met the other 14 members of
President Nixon's commission in New York for the study
of the feasibility of an all-volunteer armed force.
And during the month of June he traveled over 29,000
miles, attending meetings and giving speeches in the

United States and Europe!

Perhaps comments from those who knew him or
worked with him during his service to NATO will sub-

stantiate some of the observations made in this study--

305

From NATO SecretaryrGeneral Lord Ismay, who
served as personal Chief of Staff to Sir Winston
Churchill during World War II:

General Gruenther is the greatest soldier-
statesman I have ever known.1

From General Dwight D. Eisenhower--(Gruenther
proved invaluable to Eisenhower while he was Presi-
dent of Columbia University by keeping him informed
about defense matters. During this period of the
Columbia Presidency, before he was appointed Supreme
Allied Commander of NATO, Eisenhower returned to the
Pentagon on a brief visit, and made this observation
in 1949):

Everybody was turning to Al, and he would
give the place, time and figures out of his
head. It was almost a case of working a

good horse to death.2

From President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956:

 

1Time Magazine, Vol. LXVII, No. 6 (February 6,
1956), p. 25. Cover page carried close-up photograph
with 1egend--"NATO'S GENERAL GRUENTHER."

2Robert Coughlan, "Thinking Machine Who Bosses
NATO," Life, xxx1v (June 1, 1953), p. 84.

306

A1 Gruenther would make a good President of
the United States.1

From President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1964:

He [Gruenther] was--and is--one of the ablest,
all-around officers, civilian and military, I
have encountered in 50 years.2

From General Mark Clark (while Gruenther served
as his Chief of Staff during World War II):

On every efficiency report I ever turned in
on Gruenther, I wrote, "Highly Qualified to.
be Chief of Staff of the Army at appropriate
time."3

From Ernest O. Hauser, Paris correspondent for
the Saturdgy Evenipg Post, 1953:

Bridge, checkers, politics, or military
strategy--Gruenther confronts a problem as

an intellectual and the more insoluble it

is the more interesting he finds it. His
terrifying memory and his uncanny flair for
expounding a difficult proposition in stripped-
down terms are proverbial--so is his thorough-
ness.4

 

1Time Magazine, Vol. LXVII, No. 6 (February 6,
1956), p. 26.

2Democrat and Chronicle (Rochester, New York),
March 20, 1964.

3Time Maggzine, Vol. LXVII, No. 6 (February 6,
1956), p. 26.

4Ernest O. Hauser, "The~Army's Biggest Brain,"
Saturday EveningPost,CCXXVI (October 31, 1953), p. 34.

307

From Edmond Taylor, well-known journalist--When

 

questions were posed by some observers who voiced doubts
about Gruenther's ability to practice the rare art of
command at the highest level, Edmond Taylor points out
that the doubters turned out to be right in one way and
wrong in another:

Gruenther had no difficulty in learning to look
at the big picture through a Supreme Commander's
spectacles. The speed with which he grew into
his new job surprised even his greatest admirers
. . . he never completely grew out of the periph-
ery of staff responsibilities . . . he simply
worked with equal efficiency at two levels.1

Finally, a current newspaper report on General
Gruenther's speech to the Medical Society in St. Peters-
burg, Florida, July 7, 1969:

"Without an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) System,
America cannot defend itself against the inter-
continental nuclear weapons in the Soviet arsenal."
That grim warning was sounded last night in St.
Petersburg by one of the most prominent men the

United States has produced, retired Army General
Alfred M. Gruenther . . . . General Gruenther

 

lEdmond Taylor, "The Atlantic Alliance: After,
Gruenther, What?," The Reporter, June 2, 1955, p. 19.

308
is still a top adviser to the White House and
the Pentagon at 70 . . . .1
Furthermore, General Gruenther has earned a repu-

tation as a speaker of great competence. In the light
of this study, it appears that this reputation is fully
warranted because he speaks out of tremendous knowledge
and exemplifies the best of rhetorical principles--
careful preparation, analysis, and development of
materials with attention to the specific situation
in adaptation; meticulous organization; thoughtful
composition: and articulate, direct delivery, with

a high level of rapport with his audience:

 

1St. Petersburg Independent (St. Petersburg,
Florida), July 8, 1969, Profile, lB.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Washington D.C.. 4 April, 1949

ThePar-tiestothis'l‘rcstyrcaffirmtheirfaithinthcpurpom sndprinciplcsofthe
Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peeplcs and all
governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of
their people‘. founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule
of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation
of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

ARTICLE!

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any
international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such s
manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to
refraininthcirintcrnationalrclstionsfromtbctbreatoruscofforceinanymanner
Inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

“noun

The Parties will contribute toward the further develOpment of peaceful and friendly
international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a
better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by
promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in
their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between
any or all of them.

ARTICLE III

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately .
and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain
and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the terri-
torial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

312

313

ARTICLE V

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North
America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree
that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual
or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of
armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be
reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security
Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace
and security.

ARTICLE vr ‘

For the purpose of Article v an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed
to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North
America, on the Algerian Departments of France 2, on the occupation forces of any
Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic
area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any
of the Parties.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the
rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the
United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the mainten-
ance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VIII

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between
it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of
this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict
with this Treaty.

(1) The definition of the territories to which Article v applies has been revised by Article II of
the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey (see p. 242).

(2) On 16th January, 1963, the North Atlantic Council has heard a declaration by the
French Representative who recalled that by the vote on self-determination on 1st July, 1962,
the Algerian people had pronounced itself in favour of the independence of Algeria in
co-operation with France. In consequence, the President of the French Republic had on 3rd
July, 1962, formally recognized the independence of Algeria. The result was that the
“Algerian departments of France" no longer existed as such, and that at the same time the
fact that they were mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty had no longer any bearing.
Following this statement the Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian cuts
of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as
from 3rd July, 1962.

314

ARTICLE IX

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to
consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so
organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such
subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a
defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles
111 and v.

ARTICLE X

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a
position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the
North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party
to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the
United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will
inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of secession.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance
with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be
deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America,
which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into
force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the
majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been
deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the
deposit of their ratifications.

ARTICLE XII

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter,
the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of review-
ing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the
North Atlantic area, including the develOpment of universal as well as regional arrange-
ments under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international
peace and security.

ARTICLE XIII

AftertheTreaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may ceasetobe a Party
one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the
United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of
the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

315

ARTICLE XIV

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be
deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly
certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the governments of the
other signatories.

FOUR CHARTS COVERING CIVIL AND MILITARY

ORGANIZATION OF NATO

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The flags of the original 12 nations being raised
for the first time during opening day ceremonies of the
Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe, Rocquencourt
(Marly), France, 23 March 1951.

 

Main entrance to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe (SHAPE), Brussels (Costeau), Belgium, 6 Sept. 1968.

GENERAL ALFRED M. GRUENTHER

 

APPENDIX B
TAPE RECORDED INTERVIEW: General Alfred M.
Gruenther and Lilyan M. Alspaugh at the
Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers
of Europe (SHAPE), Marly, France,

July 25, 1956.

TAPE RECORDED INTERVIEW: General Alfred M. Gruenther and
Lilyan M. Alspaugh at the Supreme Headquarters of the
Allied Powers of Europe (SHAPE), Marly, France, July 25, 1956.

ALSPAUGH: General Gruenther, it is a real privilege to be here
in your office at the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers of Europe.
I want you to know that from the first time I heard you speak-ewhen you
addressed the NATO Conference in 1953 at Copenhagen, Denmark--I have fol-x
lowed your career with great interest. I agree with the press opinions
that you possess an inimitable and rare combination of qualities of both
a statesman and.military authority. Certainly in the NATO Alliance. the
diplomatic relationships among the fifteen NATO countries are an essen—
tial and vital counterpart to the military unity and strength.

Has this new soft-line policy of the Russian leaders with the
emphasis on peace changed the need for NATO? That is, has the military
mission blunted the resolve of NATO, weakened by Moscow's change from
frowns to smiles?

GRUENTHER: I would any first of all, in answering your first
question that the need for NATO is now greater than it has ever been
before. I'd also like to comment on an element in your question where
you say that the Soviet emphasis is for peace. Actually, NATO has as
its fundamental objective the maintenance of peace. That is the reason
why the fifteen member nations have banded together--to secure peace by
collective security and to make it so expensive for an aggressor that
the conflict will never come.

You say in effect, has the Soviet soft line blunted the resolve
of the West? I don't think it has blunted that resolve yet; and I don't
think it will if our people understand the real objective of NATO as a.
defensive organization to thwart enemy aggression.

I do not think that it is correct to say that the Soviets intend
to go to war now or at any time in the future. But they do have a mili-~
tary capability; that military capability continues to increase: and our
job is, in the free world, to be able to match by unity that strength
which they have, and to prevent active aggression from ever taking place.
With what you refer to as "the soft line,” beginning to function more
effectively, there is a danger that our people will tend to relax; because
the democracies love peace--and it is to their credit that they do. They
are always willing to go more than halfway to see and give the other fellow
the benefit of the doubt. It is in that field where we may have a danger
and where we may engage in wishful thinking.

324

325

ALSPAUGH: I wonder, then, if we can feel that war is less likely
at the present time than it was several years ago-—in view of what you've
said?

GRUENTHER: That brings up a question, of course--whether war was
likely several years ago. I don't think I can answer that in the terms'
in which you’ve asked it--at least categorically so. I think this--I
think there has been a change in Soviet policy as a result of this unity
which the West has been able to develop. I think that the rulers of the
Kremlin instead of being outwardly as aggressive as they were a few years
ago, are now treading more softly. I feel that whether you say war is
less likely now than it was a few years ago is problematical. I~do not
think there is going to be a Third World War, but it is up to the West
to see that that objective is achieved and I believe it can be.‘

ALSPAUGH: Very promising. General Gruenther, do you think that
the concept of land armies is an outmoded one? That is, in this jet.
atomic age, must we change our strategy of World War II concepts?

GRUENTHER: Oh, we've changed our strategy of world War II-con-
cepts vary considerably already. The introduction of this vast destruc-
tive power of the atomic weapon has already, in the few brief years since
this element of power has come into our army, caused radical changes..

You've asked, is the concept.of land armdes outmoded? No, it is
not outmoded. Land armies will be needed. But perhaps they will not be
needed in the numbers that they were, let's say, twelve years ago whenr
General Eisenhower landed in Europe. We feel that because of this new'
destructive power, you will not need as large land forces as.you needed
before. In other words, we are streamlining our tactics.

We have what we call now a new weapons concept. It does not elim-
inate land armies, but it gives them a new type of mission; and it brings-
our strategy, we think, up to date. We can't be complacent about that.

I think we have.to be reviewing it constantly: because there will be
changes as we move ahead--say about 1966--and in looking back on our 1956
strategy, we will probably find that by 1966 our '56 concepts were a bit
out of date. Just as the '44 concepts are out of date now.

ALSPAUGH: General Gruenther, does the fact that an air general
has been selected to take.your place upon your retirement signify any
change in NATO's strategy?

GRUENTHER: Oh, not at all. General Norstad has been associated
with this project almost since it started. Even back in the Pentagon in
his staff position there, he had an intimate connection with it. General
Norstad was selected without regard to the color of his uniform. He was
selected because of his outstanding grasp of matters in this field. From
time to time one hears that means a return to peripheral strategy. It
means nothing of the kind. I'm sure there is no tendency on the part of

326

the responsible official opinion of the United States that has any
thought of returning to a peripheral strategy concept, or going to.it.
I should say we are not returning to it, because we never had it.

ALSPAUGH: That is very interesting, for this question covering
a change to peripheral strategy has been raised frequently among dis-
cussion groups in the United States.

GRUENTHER: You can answer that question very firmly and I can
assure you that General Norstad is very much dedicated to this concept.
He's helped with all of the policies we made here. He's been right in
on them from the start. The change-over will be very smooth, I assure
you.. He will do a much better job than I did, but I can assure you there
is no question of a change of the strategic concept; certainly not to
any peripheral strategy.

ALSPAUGH: Perhaps it's your modesty, General Gruenther, that has
contributed so much to your success. Now, turning to Germany. Is the
German contribution of military forces an essential ingredient to the
success of the NATO air and ground shield force, would you say?

GRUENTHER: Oh, yes. As you know, the Germans are going to con-
tribute some 1,300 tactical aircraft, some twelve German divisions and a
certain number of naval craft for use largely in the Baltic. Those
forces are extremely important and we have continuously advocated them.
The German government intends to make the contribution: and their parlia-
ment, just before it adjourned the other day, passed the first part of
the conscription bill. Though they still have not designated the length
of the conscription. .That will be taken up when the parliament returns
from its recess this fall. The Germans have now moved forward towards
creating this contribution, and it is very important. Definitely.

ALSPAUGH: That's fine. Would you say that it's likely that the
mere existence of NATO has contributed to changes in Soviet policy? That
is, would you say it was logical to assume that if the Western World un-
dertook reductions in armaments now, it might easily persuade the Rus-
sian leaders to alter their policies once more?

GRUENTHER: With respect to your first question, I think that
there is a great deal of evidence that the establiéhment of NATO and the.
resulting unity and strength which came about from that alliance, has had
a very important effect on the shifting of Soviet policy. Perhaps one.
can get a better line on that by considering the statements of Soviet
officials. Take Khrushchev. Time after time he has made it unmistakably
clear that one of the prime objectives of Soviet foreign policy is to
secure the dismemberment of NATO. Just a few weeks ago, about three weeks
ago now, at one of the receptions in the Kremlin, the toast to which he
drank was to the death of NATO. So, as we contemplate our own weaknesses,
it is well for us to realize, from time to time, that the organization is
held in great respect by the Soviets.

327

They misrepresent the purpose of the organization and constantly
they refer to it as the "aggressive" NATO organization. But you realize
well the one thing the organization is not--it is not aggressive: We do
not have the capability; we do not have the strength even if we had the
intention. I reiterate once again that our objective is to secure peace,
and very definitely to prevent an act of aggression from taking place.

As to the second part of your question, "Would it be logical to as-
sume that by our carrying on further reductions in armaments, would that
have the effect of persuading the Russians to alter their policy once
again?" I would doubt that very much. The Soviets have shown they re-
spect strength. They respect one of the attributes of strength and that
is unity, which we have already been able to develop. The very fact that
they are trying to divide us, and secure a break-up of NATO, indicates
that they want us to do just what your question says-~not for the purpose
of changing their policy further, but for the purpose of giving them an
advantage. I would say it would not be logical to assume that any uni-
lateral reduction in armaments would bring about a change in Soviet policy.

ALSPAUGH: I see. Do you feel that the Allies are carrying their
share of the military burden of NATO, General Gruenther?

GRUENTHER: That's a very difficult question you ask. The way in
which you ask the question reflects an implication of whether the United
States is carrying its share of the burden. You might very well broaden
the question to say, "Are all Allies carrying their share of the burden
including the United States?” There is a tendency on the part of many
Americans to feel we are carrying a burden far in excess of what we
should. There is no answer to that question as to whether or not an ally
is carrying its proper share of the burden, because there really is no
yardstick.

But let me just discuss a question which bears on that. Greece
has an income of approximately $200 per person per year. The United
States, by the same method of calculation, now has an income of about
$2,000 per person per year. Now, that brings up the question, should
the Greek contribution be one-tenth that of the United States? I think
that it is obvious that that isn't a fair way of evaluating what the
~ Greek contribution should be, because the individual that is living on
a $200 a year income has very little in the way of surplus there. He has
the bare necessities of life and maybe not always that. So to say because
of that line of reasoning, that Greece should undertake one—tenth the
burden that the United States does, I think, is incorrect.

But that isn't answering your question. You've asked, are the
Allies carrying out their share of the burden? I think they have all
made a very substantial contribution--much greater than when we started.
When General Eisenhower came here, he found that the budgets--the mili-
tary budgets--for the members of NATO for the year prior to the time he
came, were about six and one-half billion dollars for that year. In '53

328

it increased to about twelve and a half--(12.7 billion). It has now
tapered off and it is now down to a little over 12 billion.

So whether they are making the contribution that you say they
should is one of those questions we will never be able to determine and,
moreso--whether or not the United States is paying its share of the
burden. But the NATO nations are making sacrifices, and they submit
each year to a cross examination in a process called the "annual review"
where the other members sit around and say, "Why didn't you do this: why
didn't you do that?" Some of those.question session are very tough ones.
They expose all of their weaknesses in this process--this annual review
process-~which is for the purpose of trying to get countries to state
the approximate share that they should give, and I think that is working
out fairly well. I would be inclined to say that the countries, by and
large, are making a fair share contribution.

ALSPAUGH: That is very gratifying information, indeed.

GRUENTHER: Before leaving this question on contributions by NATO
nations, I would like to add one comment which occurs to me. There is a
tendency sometimes for Americans to propose calculations on the basis of
numerical figures--just like the Greek example I just mentioned.

But there is one other factor that we forget and it.is this: In
most of these countries, the salary they pay their men in uniform is only
a pittance. Take the case of France. In France, a soldier, a sailor, or
an airman conscripted will get the equivalent of about eight cents a day.
That's all he gets. Now, the boy doesn't live on eight cents a day: he
is supplemented by funds from home. That never gets into a budgetary
figure at all. In Turkey, the conscripts receiVe a starting salary of
13¢ a month and that goes up to 21¢ a month. Now, a regular soldier-~a
man who is going to make a career of it gets more than that in Turkey
and also more than that in France. But when you go to strictly numerical
figures, you do not get the whole story; because this element of service
pay of men and so forth is figured in the United States on a vastly dif-
ferent scale than it is for these European countries.

ALSPAUGH: Now I can see that I really shouldn't have posed that
question.. It really isn't fair to pose it the way I did.

GRUENTHER: Well, no, I think it is all right to raise the issue;
but it doesn't lend itself to a yes or no answer.

ALSPAUGH: General Gruenther, you've seen the development of NATO
at first hand from the very beginning and how would you evaluate the pos-.
itive accomplishments of NATO militarily as well as politically?

GRUENTHER: Well to start out, I think you have to go back to when
General Eisenhower arrived here in January 1951. The state of the free
world was at a very low ebb. We had, for the most part, disarmed at the

329

end of World War II, whereas the Soviets had retained a.very large part
of their armed forces. Then, a series of incidents took place--the
Czechoslovakian Coup; the Berlin Airlift; and finally the Korea Attack
which convinced the free world that Soviet imperialism was again on the
march.

When-General Eisenhower came to Europe, we had precious few re-
sources. Worse than that, the resources we did have couldn't be used
effectively; because we had no common concept for their use. There was
no strategic concept.

Those defects have all been changed--we now have forces from
four to five times as strong as they were then. And above all, we now
have a common concept so that we can use the forces that we do have, and
the people of NATO subscribe to--and really believe in the idea of col-.
lective security. That is another way of stating that they believe in
this idea of unity. That has been a tremendous accomplishment.

Now mind you, there are still many shortcomings. And we democ-
racies tend to examine those shortcomings a great deal, and I think it
is well that we do. But there is an.inclination to exaggerate our defi-
ciencies or pay too much attention to them without recognizing many of
the accomplishments that have taken place. And those accomplishments,
one that I would give absolute priority to, was the number one that has
been ours, and that is this development of unity: because that was the
big thing where we were at a big disadvantage when General Eisenhower
first came here. The Soviet gets his unity by the gun-in-the-back
method and we've got to get ours by the somewhat more cumbersome pro-
cesses of democracy. And we've done a very good job in that field.

ALSPAUGH: Is there understanding and unity among the fifteen
NATO countries?

GRUENTHER: Oh, a great measure of it. Tremendous. Now, I don't
want to say that they don't have disagreements, because you know very
well that they do. But the progress in this development of unity has
been remarkable. The progress in the development of military strength
has been very significant.

ALSPAUGH: And even has gone so far as to meet your expectations,
General Gruenther?

GRUENTHER: Well, to say that it meets your expectations . . . a
military man is never satisfied and so I don't want to say that. But I
would like to say this, though--when we planned five years ago, at the
time when General Eisenhower was just getting the organization started,
we planned then where we would be five years hence, which means where we
would be now. We are further ahead now than we thought at that time we
would be. In other words, our progress has been greater than we esti-
mated. That doesn't mean we are satisfied with that progress, and we are

330

finding the very fact that we've got deficiencies means we feel we should
be correcting those. We are trying to correct them all the time. The
progress has been really and truly inspiring, and far ahead of what we
ever thought possible.

ALSPAUGH: But even to identify deficiencies is progress.
GRUENTHER: Yes, I think that's right.

ALSPAUGH: How would you evaluate the importance of the-United
States in NATO?

GRUENTHER: In my opinion, the importance of the United States
in NATO is overwhelmingly great. Whether we like it or not,.we have got
to realize that the mantle of world leadership has fallen upon our.
shoulders. The pattern which is going to develop is going to be molded
very much according to the inspirational leadership which we are able
to furnish. I think the United States has done a good job in that re-
spect. I think that the progress we have made in the international field
in the last fifteen years is great indeed. You hear from time to time
certain anti-American statementS'and'that causes people to wonder whether
the United States is appreciated. I think the answer to that question is
that it is very much appreciated in spite of some of this anti-American
sentiment, some of which develops because a country with a living stand-
ard as high as ours is bound to be.the subject of some envy.

The anti-American sentiment is not what bothers me so much as it
is the attitude of skepto-Americanism. And I use that term to indicate
a fear that our friends have that we may not be able to discharge this
burden of leadership satisfactorily. That while we have in the field of
production an industrial potential (there is no country in the world that
can come anywhere near us in that field) it doesn't mean automatically
that we have the wisdom to make an alliance of this sort thrive. An
alliance such as this one is a difficult one to maintain, especially
considering the competition that we are facing from the Soviets who are
doing everything possible to lull us into a state of relaxation.

That is where American influence can be very decisive. I feel
that a job we have ahead of us is to be able to convince our European
allies, and to continue to convince them, that our objectives and theirs
are the same. In other words, that there is a mutual field of interest.
This is what the Soviets are trying to convince our European allies does
not exist. They are trying to paint the picture by showing that this
contest is a bi-polar one with Russia at one end of the pole and the
United States at the other. Their line to the European countries is,
"Why should you get mixed up in this type of contest?--just stand on the
sidelines-~you have nothing to gain and everything to lose."

That is where our U.S. leadership has got to be very wise and
understanding in dealing with allies so that they are made to feel a part

331

of the team; that we make it clear to our people that we are engaged in
this project not as a community chest operation, but as a part of the
vital security interests of the United States--and that we are interested
in defending Europe as part of that security objective. All of that, be-,
cause of our power position depends very, very heavily on the support
that we get from the United States in this project.

You asked me earlier about advice to young people, and while I
would be presumptuous to feel that my words in that respect are profound,
I do have this feeling though that the future of our civilization is go-
ing to depend upon these young people in the United States who are going
to be the leaders of the 21st century, which after all is just 44 years
away. The new and better world that we are going to have then is going
to be largely formed in accordance with the ability that these young
people are going to be able to put into it.

I have specifically this in mind--we're a very big country in
the United States with this tremendous technological advance, and there
is a tendency for us as we come up through our educational processes to
feel that we are the big noise and fail to understand some of the prob-
lems of the rest of the world. It is natural that young people are in-
terested in engineering jobs and so forth, and I have no objection to
that. I'm glad that they're getting into it; but I do hope that these
young folks, as they come along, will be able to understand more and more
of what makes the world tick-~what the responsibilities of the United
States are--and how that wisdom is to be acquired and exercised; because‘
the burden is a heavy one--it's a vital onev-and if our civilization in
the form in which we cherish it is going to survive, we are going to
have to do more than match the dedication on the part of the communists.

we should all bear in mind that they have a very vigorous group
of missionaries preaching their sinister philosophy. I'm talking about
the communist party which has, according to Khrushchev, 7,200,000 mem-
bers. Those people are dedicated. I'm not worried that the United States
is going to go communist, because of the 167 million people we have-
There are very few that really believe in the communist philosophy. But
to say that we have 167 million people who do not believe in it, does not
mean that we have 167 million crusaders. Nor does it mean that we have
7,200,000 crusaders. While we're not a crusading nation, I do feel that
we have got to be dedicated in a positive way to the ideals which we cher-
ish so very, very warmly.

I feel that foremost among those are the concepts of liberty and
freedom which spring from our religious civilization, and that is matched--
and the issue is very clearly drawn--against any atheistic civilization.
But just to say that we like to be religious, and that we love freedom
doesn't mean that we get it, and it doesn't mean that our way of life is
necessarily going to prevail. The other fellow has supreme confidence in
his, and he wants no part of ours. In addition to being a dedicated
philosophy on his part, he has made it an aggressive one. He has

332

announced his intentions on having that spread, and he has communist
parties throughout the world to foster that.

It is going to require a tremendous amount of vigilance on our
part. I am talking now not about military vigilance--I'm talking about
spiritual vigilance--this wisdom, this knowbhow in how to make a very
complicated machine work, namely, an alliance. But I'm sure we can do
it. I'm sure our people have the natural talent if they'll only under-
stand what the issues are and spend some time in studying the matter.
There is no question in my mind that we will develop the necessary
leadership, that we'll prevent a Third World War from taking place, and
that we will more than hold our own in the Cold War which unfortunately
seems destined to continue for some time in the future.

ALSPAUGH: I certainly wish that we could convey that message,
General Gruenther, to every young student in our country. You have
certainly spearheaded the significance of democracy in coupling the im-
portance of education and our spiritual way of life. Certainly with the
promotion of our educational system in the area of democracy, accompanied
by our deep and abiding spiritual faith, I'm sure that the optimism that
you have outlined this afternoon will come to pass.

I want to thank you very much for having given me this great
privilege to interview you this afternoon. I have hoped and prayed since
1953 this would come to pass and it has. It has been a real joy to talk
with you.

When you re-enter civilian life back in the United States, may I
wish you and Mrs. Gruenther every happiness and continued success.

GRUENTHER: Well, thank you very much. It's been a great plea-
sure to have you here, and I trust that you'll find your trip in Europe
an interesting one. And that you'll go back beating the drum for this
very, very essential and noble cause. Thank you kindly for coming.

ALSPAUGH: Thank you.

333

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APPENDIX C
SIXTY-THREE SPEECHES SENT TO WRITER BY

PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION OF SHAPE

 

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28

15

15

21

24

25

21

31

21

21

28

15

20

24

18

Jun
Nov
Nov
Jan
Jan
Jan

Jan

Mar
Apr
Apr
Apr
Apr
May
May
May
May

May

Jun

1951

1951

1951

1952

1952

1952

1952

1952

1952

1952

1952

1952

1952

1952

1952

1952

1952

1952

1952

List of 25 Speeches Delivered by General Gruenther as
Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower and General

Ridgway (1951-1953)

Address to American Club of Paris

Address to International Chamber of Commerce, Paris
Briefing of British Press Editors, at SHAPE
Addresses in Briefing of British MPs

Remarks to members of Press

Addresses in Briefing to Netherlands Government Officials
American Chamber of Commerce, Paris

Address to Members of French Press

Address in Briefing of Italian Government Officials
lst Anniversary of NATO

Address to the Associated Press, New York

Address to the Corps of Cadets, West Point

Address to US Chamber of Commerce

Briefing of American Press

Briefing of British Press

NATO Defense College

Briefing US Businessmen and women

European Conference of International Council for
Christian Leadership, The Hague

Société de la Géographie Economique

335

6 Jan
8 Jan
19 Jan
l8 May
26 May

30 May

1953

1953

1953

1953

1953

1953

336

Address NATO Defense College

Briefing for British MPs

Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale
Visiting Journalists to SHAPE

Briefing of New SHAPE Officers

Memorial Day Services at American Cemetery, Anzio

11

20

30

31

11

27

ll

10

22

15

29

30

Jul
Jul
Jul
Aug
Sep
Sep
Sep
Oct
Jan

Feb

Apr
Jun
Jun

Feb

Mar

Mar

Apr

1953

1953

1953

1953

1953

1953

1953

1953

1954

1954

1954

1954

1954

1954

1955

1955

1955

1955

1955

1955

337

List of 38 Speeches Delivered by General Gruenther

as Supreme Allied Commander (1953-56)

Handover ceremony at SHAPE

Remarks in the Critique on Exercise

Interview--US News and World Report

Atlantic Community Convention, Copenhagen

Press Representatives at Hq Mediterranean

Interview US News and world Report

BBC--NATO AS I SEE IT

Alfred E. Smith Memorial Foundation Dinner, New York
Remarks at SHAPE Correspondents' Luncheon
Correspondence with Wesleyan University, Conn.
Bulletin Forum at Philadelphia

County Hall, London

Publication--News Week

English Speaking Uhion.of the Commonwealth, London
North Dakota Legislative Assembly

Delegates to 2nd NATO Troop Information Conference
SHAPE CORRESPONDENTS' LUNCHEON
Remarks to German Correspondents

European-Atlantic Group

Fourth Anniversary of SHAPE

ll

27

228

17

23

22

29

16

21

13

20

May

May

May

Sep
<Dct
Nov
:Feb
:Feb
JFeb
llar
.Mar
.Mar
Apr
May
MAY
Jun
Nov

NOV

1955

1955

1955

1955

1955

1955.

1956

1956

1956

1956

1956

1956

1956

1956

1956

1956

1956

1956

338

Italian Center of Study of International Reconciliation
City Livery Club, London

University of Maryland Overseas Program, Heidelberg
Annual Convention American Bankers Assoc.

Convention of American WOmen's Activities in Europe
Dallas Council on World Affairs

Los Angeles world Affairs Council

Annual Congressional Dinner, Veterans of Foreign Wars
English Speaking Union

SHAPE Staff Officers

Statement before The House Foreign Affairs Committee
Correspondents--German

International Broadcasting Service Group

Bonn Economic Policy Club

Banquet by "The Scotsman"

Senate Appropriations Committee

Farewell Conference

Farewell Speech at SHAPE

APPENDIX D

TEXTS OF THE COPENHAGEN, LONDON, AND ROME

SPEECHES ANALYZED AS CASE STUDIES IN

CHAPTERS III, IV, AND V, RESPECTIVELY

THE COPENHAGEN SPEECH”

*Copied from transcript received from Public Information
Division, SHAPE.

Address delivered 31 August 1953, in Copenhagen, Denmark,
to members of the Atlantic Community Convention.

THE ROLE OF NATO IN THE DEFENSE OF THE WEST

 

GENERAL ALFRED M. GRUENTHER

SUPREME COMMANDER ALLIED POWERS EUROPE

General Eisenhower arrived in Paris approximately two and one
half years ago to organize Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe,
commonly known as SHAPE. That.Headquarters is now a going concern, and
is charged with the defense of Europe, extending from the Northern tip
of Norway to the Eastern borders of Turkey, an arc of some 7,000 kil-
ometers.

SHAPE is one of three major military commands which function
under the North Atlantic Council, the overall civilian political au-
thority, which sits in continuous session in Paris. The Council is
served by an international staff under the leadership of Lord Ismay,
the Secretary General. The governing military body is the Military
Committee, consisting of one representative from each of the fourteen
member nations. The present Chairman of the Military Committee is
Admiral Qvistgaard of Denmark. To provide for more rapid and effective
action the Military Committee set up the Standing Group, consisting of
a representative of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States.
The Standing Group sits permanently in washington, and functions as a
type of executive committee for the Military Committee.

All countries represented here this evening have had defense
problems throughout.the centuries. In the case of Denmark, for example,
more than 1,000 years ago your Danish ancestors set up stone walls as
ramparts for the Southern land defenses against the predatory Saxons.
On the site of beautiful Copenhagen, Bishop Absalon, its farsighted
founder, built a stronghold 900 years ago againstlthe pirating Wends.
Happily, the enemies of those days are today friends. It is not neces-
sary for me to point to other symbols of the enduring will of Denmark
during the past 1,000 years to defend its freedom. Our objective in
NATO today is the same, but the scope of the problem is much more vast,
and the methods differ.

341

342

Our basic defense philosophy involves the use of the minimum
number of active forces, and to place maximum dependence upon Reserve
forces. We visualize that with this minimum of active forces we will
create a shield to give us a cushion of time sufficiently long to enable
our Reserve forces to mobilize. In case of attack we would depend upon
the Tactical Air Forces and the Land Forces to fight the combined air-
land battle, while our Strategic Air Forces would strike deep into enemy
territory against industrial targets.

To provide for more effective control of the defense battle the
SHAPE area has been broken into regional commands, set up as follows:
the Northern Command under General Mansergh at Oslo, the Central Com-
mand under Marshal Juin at Fontainebleau, the Southern Command covering
Italy, Turkey and Greece under Admiral Fechteler at Naples, and the
Mediterranean Command under Admiral Mountbatten with headquarters at
Malta.

When General Eisenhower arrived early in 1951 the state of the
defenses in Europe was pitifully low. Since then there has been a tre-
mendous improvement. The forces have approximately doubled, and the
gain in effectiveness has been greater still. That applies particularly
to our air forces, which initially were especially weak. One of NATO's
outstanding achievements is the increase in number of airfields. We
shall have by the end of this year about 125 usable fields.

The defense budgets of the member countries have increased. Not
considering the United States, the other countries have more than doubled
the amounts spent for defense. If the U.S. increase is taken into ac-
count the ratio is much more favorable.

Nearly all countries have increased their periods of national
service, the most recent case being that of Denmark which has now pro-
vided for 18 months' service, a very gratifying development.

During this two and one half year period we have had the oppor-
tunity to prepare detailed defense plans for the employment of our
forces. Every commander now knows exactly what he would do in the event
of an emergency. That does not guarantee that we would be able to with-
stand an attack successfully, but at least each element of the command
knows what action to take. The success of our efforts would depend upon
the amount of force that the aggressor would bring against us, and also
on the skill with which he would employ that force.

Just what could our NATO forces accomplish now? One official, of
a cynical turn of mind, when asked three years ago "What do the Soviets
need to march to the Channel?" answered "Only shoes!" I can assure you
that at this time the NATO forces of Allied Command Europe are of such
strength that the Soviets do not have sufficient power in occupied Europe
to be reasonably certain of success if they should attack with the forces
now there. In other words, I believe they would have to bring in addi-
tional forces from the USSR.before they could launch a successful attack

343

against the West. If that estimate is a correct one, it represents a
most significant achievement, because it means that we should be able
to obtain a reasonable amount of warning of an impeding [sic] attack.

We should then be able to mobilize our reserves, and otherwise
take appropriate readiness measures, to enable us to meet the threat.

This is real progress, much greater than we thought would be
possible when we started out two and a half years ago.

Before leaving the question of progress, I desire to make clear
that we still do not have adequate strength to defeat an all-out attack.
But we would in no sense be a pushover.

What are some of the major problems which we still face?

We consider that air power is the dominant factor in modern war-
fare. Our most critical deficiency today is the strength of our air
forces, and I say that in spite of the excellent progress already made.
The Soviets have an air force of some 20,000 operational planes, a large
proportion of which are jets. To meet that air threat our air forces
must be increased and their effectiveness must be such as to be ready to
fight on an instant's notice. It is not sufficient to depend upon Re-
serve air forces for the reason that air attacks can develop with such
devastating swiftness that we would not be able to mobilize air reserves
in time. We at SHAPE have given first priority to the development of
our air forces. That does not mean that we think we could win a war
solely by the use of air power. We consider that an adequate defense
posture can be obtained only by the air-land-naval team. It is essential,
however, that increased emphasis be placed on the development of larger
and more effective air forces.

Earlier I told you that under our concept our shield would hold
long enough to enable our reserve forces to mobilize and move to the area
where they are needed. Unfortunately those reserves are still critically
inadequate. That deficiency represents our second major problem. The
Soviets have a very large active land force in being, consisting of 175
Soviet divisions, and approximately 70 satellite divisions. The Soviet
divisions are less effective, but their effectiveness is increasing con—
stantly. We have no thought of trying to match that force division for
division, because to maintain active forces of that magnitude would place
unacceptable strain on our economy. That is the reason why we place such
great dependence of reserve divisions. But those divisions must be good,
because if they are employed against Soviet forces their effectiveness
has to be of higher caliber. The creation of adequate reserve forces
presents a difficult problem for the NATO governments. It means that a
large proportion of our manpower will have to spend considerable time
each year in reserve training. That is inconvenient for the individuals
concerned, and of course it tends to create economic strains.

344

Our third major difficulty lies in the Logistics field. we must
have adequate supplies for our forces if an emergency should develop and
we must have a logistic system which enables us to move those supplies
quickly to the places where they will be needed. Our progress in both of
these respects is still far below what it should be and we are constantly
urging member governments to take appropriate measures.

Now for a short discussion of the role of naval forces in the
defense of Europe. The Soviets have an extensive submarine capability
which can be exercised by the more than 300 submarines in the Soviet
Navy. Also they have a significant mining capability. Both of these
could be used to interfere with our vital sea lines of communication
from North America. Admiral McCormick, SACLANT commander, with head-
quarters at Norfolk, Virginia, is charged with the protection of the
sea lines of communications across the Atlantic. In addition Admiral
McCormick's forces will assist in the defense of our vital North flank
of Denmark and Norway, by.the extensive use of naval power, both surface
craft and naval aviation. In the Mediterranean Admiral Fechteler has
assigned to him the U.S. Sixth Fleet with its powerful carrier-based
aviation which will be able to give effective air support in the Mediter—
ranean area. Admiral Mountbatten is charged with the protection of the
lines of communication in the Mediterranean, and with other important
naval assignments. Naval power by means of its great flexibility will
be able to make a substantial contribution to the defense of Europe.

In outlining these major problems to you, you have noted that
the philosOphy behind our concept is certainly a defensive one. I stress
that point because Soviet propaganda efforts, particularly in the last
month, have emphasized the aggressive nature of NATO. I can assure you
that there has never been as much as a single paragraph written at SHAPE
which envisages that we would be the aggressor. All of our plans are.
based on the assumption that war, if it comes, will be started by the
enemy, and that we will have to adjust our strategy accordingly. I need
not tell you that in this day of modern weapons that is‘a tremendous dis-
advantage for us. Moreover, the Soviets know well that our troop dispo-
sitions and our strength are such that we do not have a capability to
assume the role of an aggressor. Our alliance is clearly defensive. It
is that common bond--that objective for the preservation of peace--which
has been responsible for the progress that we have already made.

Much thought is being given by the planners at SHARE and at the
Standing Group for the employment of new weapons. The peoples of the

NATO nations, and especially the Finance Ministers, are constantly asking
the question "To what extent will new weapons lessen the requirements?

To what extent may we expect to have our taxes reduced as a result of

the advent of these new weapons?". We do not yet have a satisfactory
answer to that question. It is a difficult problem, involving the pro-
jection of strategic thinking about four years in advance. Many of the
new weapons are still in the testing stage, with the result that not
enough is yet known of their capabilities. Even if these new weapons

345

should reduce the requirements for conventional forces, that would not
necessarily mean lower cost, because most of the new weapons are very
expensive. I don't want to go so far at this time as to say that the
outlook for the reduction of expenses is a discouraging one. At the
same time I do not want to hold out the hope that there will be a sub-
stantial reduction, until the subject has been more thoroughly studied.

In this connection you will I am sure be interested to know that
the United States Command in Germany organized on May lst a Special Wea-
pons School at Oberammergau in Germany to teach Allied officers the
application of the new weapons in tactical situations. In our maneuvers
this fall atomic warfare considerations will be realistically played.

What are our prospects for the future? When General Eisenhower
made his estimate shortly after he arrived in Europe he came to the
conclusion that the first two to three-years would probably be the most
difficult. No similar alliance in history had ever succeeded for any
length of time during peace. The project was a very new one, involving
a cumbersome procedure to obtain unanimous action by the members. In
spite of those disadvantages, however, the alliance has thus far suc-
ceeded beyond all expectations. The doctrine of collective security has
been adopted wholeheartedly by all NATO members.

That very success, however, is causing us trouble for the future.
I think that it requires no great vision to be able to predict that the
next two and a half years will probably be more difficult than the first
two and a half year period.

It is well to recognize that NATO was created in an atmosphere of
fear. The threat was towering and immediate, the hour was late. The
whips of.fear drove us into each other's arms. Ancient rivalries were
forgotten. Political differences were reconciled. Confronted by the
facts and by the question of survival, we found that survival was para-
mount and all else secondary.

That element of fear is beginning to disappear. We have grown
stronger, and we are becoming more susceptible to the blandishments of
the Soviet peace offensive.. I can assure you, however, that there is
no evidence that the armed strength of the Soviet bloc is growing weaker.
On the contrary, all intelligence reports indicate that it is increas-
ing. It is true that the Soviet dictatorship appears to be having dif-
ficulties in the captive countries. What this will mean to the nations
of the West is not yet clear. Certainly the speech which Malenkov made
to the Supreme Soviet on August 8 was hard and unyielding. There was
no hint in it, or at any time since, that the Soviets plan to make any
consessions to the West. ‘

I shall not dwell on possible Soviet intentions other than to
point out that at the 19th Soviet Congress in Moscow last October Malenkov

made it clear that the major and continuing Soviet effort would be.

346

directed toward the dismemberment of the NATO alliance and the progres-
sive isolation of its member states. This of course is the ancient but
still valid strategy of divide and conquer. Even without the cynical
public announcement of this intention, I can not believe that any of

the NATO partners would be gullible enough to be taken in by this oldest
of confidence games.

The plan of world communism has been chronicled and proclaimed.
Both the strategy and the tactics of the communist drive have been pub-
lished and republished in every corner of the earth. We know the tech-
niques and we know the successes those techniques have won. We will
continue to ignore them at our peril. Surely we have learned the hard
way that Soviet peace offers followed at once by Soviet threats is a
key technique in the communist cold war--a technique designed to keep
the west off balance and at the same time to foster despair, disillusion-
ment and loss of confidence in our leaders.

A friend of mine used to say "The pocketbook is the most sensi-
tive nerve of the human body" and I suppose that is a wise observation.
Certainly it is true that the economic difficulties of the NATO nations
are increasing. It is also true that important social and economic pro-
jects are being deferred as the result of expenditure for defenée. I
realize our armed forces will be effective and unblunted only to the
extent that the nations supporting them remain strong in spirit, active
in intellectual endeavor and sound economically. The task for NATO is
to strive for that balance between military economic and social require-
ments that will make us secure both from external attack by an aggressor
and from internal disintegration resulting from poverty and discourage-.
ment.

This determination must be made on a long-term basis. It would
be the most dangerous type of wishful thinking to assume that the struggle
will be of short duration. A defense program is not something that can
be turned off every time Soviet leaders speak of the possibility of co-
existence and turned onia month later, when a Laos is invaded or an Iran
maneuvered to the edge of the land of no return. We can not afford.it
psychologically and we can not afford it financially. That way, indeed,
lies ultimate bankruptcy for the west. Having agreed upon our minimum
requirements we must push steadily and uniformly between optimism and
despair, without sudden outpourings of billions and equally sudden and
violent retrenchments.

I feel that we are facing a period ahead where service to the
cause of freedom must be given unselfishly by the North Atlantic peoples.
From my experience I am confident that the people will make the neces-
sary sacrifices if they understand why they are being made, and if they
believe that NATO can be an effective agency to preserve the peace. For
that reason I am particularly gratified that you men and women have taken
the time and trouble, at considerable expense, to meet in connection with
the Atlantic Community Conference now taking place at Copenhagen. Your

347

contribution in crusading for this cause can indeed be a tremendous one.
I am especially pleased to see you stressing the civilian aspects of
NATO. I congratulate you on the efforts you are making to strengthen
‘NATO and I want you to know'that if we at SHAPE can be of any assistance
to you, we stand ready to help. We would be particularly honored to
heme any of your groups visit SHAPE. You will find there 420 officers
from twelve nations who have made an outstanding success in the field
of international cooperation.

Many years ago Clemenceau said "War is too important to be en-
trusted to the generals." While he was half joking when he made that
statement, the events since then have certainly proved him to be cor-
rect. Modern war embraces not only the military factor but also vast
apolitical, economic and psychological considerations.

Although it may seem strange to have men in uniform advocating

the cause of peace you will find that the officers at SHAPE, as well as
throughout Allied Command Europe, consider that to be our prime objec-
tive. Most of us have seen too much of war to believe that any bene-
fits can come from another world struggle. I would not go so far as to
say that "Peace is too important to be entrusted to the civilians."
But I do say that we in the military are making a real contribution to
peace by denying to a would-be aggressor an easy, cheap and profitable
conquest. We firmly believe that if NATO had been in existence in 1939
World War II never would have taken place.

It is a sad commentary on the state of the world today that peace
cannot be established without power. Nevertheless, that is a fact. We
have tried negotiation from weakness, and in the process, we have seen
almost half of the world swallowed up in the darkness of Soviet imperial-
ism. We must have military strength not only to resist aggression but
also to give our statesmen a firm basis from which to negotiate a modus
vivendi with the Soviet Union.

The task of leadership in the period is indeed a heavy one. It
is time to reconcile our national policies where they show signs of
diverging. It is time to heal the wounds to national pride that have
come from bitter and ill-considered words. It is time for forgiveness,
for understanding, for patience, and above all for rededication to that
fundamental unity of purpose and policy without which we shall surely
perish.

Our modest strength is beginning to reap dividends. It would be
a tragedy if we should weary and falter in the last hard stretch to the
goal we have agreed upon.

Never was there greater need among the NATO nations for unity,
for wisdom and for perseverance. Never was there a greater need to see
clearly that our lives are bound inextricably together. Never was there
a greater need to demonstrate that we who have inherited freedom, have
not forgotten the value of that heritage nor lost the will to defend it.

THE LONDON SPEECH *

*See Blackwell, Basil, ed. Speeches at the Dinner in
Honour of General Alfred M. Gruenther under the Auspices
of the English-Speaking Union of the Commonwealth,

June 8, 1954. Oxford University Press, 1954.

 

 

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THE ROME SPEECH*

*Before the Italian Center of Study for International
Reconciliation. Rome, Italy, May 2, 1955. Source:
Baird, A. Craig, ed., Representative American Speeches,
1955-56.

New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1956, pp.
26-37 0

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APPENDIX E

TEXTS OF TWO REPRESENTATIVE SPEECHES DELIVERED BY

GENERAL ALFRED M. GRUENTHER AS PRESIDENT OF

THE NATIONAL AMERICAN RED CROSS

RED CROSS CONVENTION DINNER, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA,
MAY 19, 1958

The colorful convention dinner was presided over by Convention
Chairman Sydney G. Walton. The invocation was given by the Rt. Rev.
Monsignor William J. Flanagan, Archdiocese of San Francisco. Musical
highlights of the evening included Scottish airs by the kilted Sixth
Army Pipe Band under the direction of Sgt. Alvin L. Pierce and selec-
tions by the University of California Glee Club directed by Robert P.
Commanday. Ray Hackett's Orchestra furnished background dinner music.
The feature of the dinner was an address by American Red Cross Presi-
dent Gruenther. In introducing General Gruenther, Mr. Walton referred
to him as "our own intercontinental missile . . . only Sputnik is
circling the earth faster."

ADDRESS BY GEN. ALFRED M. GRUENTHER: Youth's Challenge
Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Guests, and Fellow Red Crossers:

This morning, in the-very dramatic opening of the Convention--.
presented so effectively by the chapters in the Bay Area--we saw "Sally
Jones" explain rather pathetically that she was confused about what Red
Cross means with respect to service. Sally, a symbolic figure represent-
ing the average American adult, did recall clearly, however, that she
once belonged to the Junior Red Cross. But she didn't seem to understand
the basic humanitarian concept of the organization. I think it is well
for us to ponder this evening whether or not we are partially responsible
for Sally's confusion. With that objective in mind I should like to
discuss some aspects of our Junior Red Cross problem.

I am sure most of you know that the organization came into being
in September 1917, five months after the United States entered World War I.
It was initiated by President Wilson to give the young people of that time
a chance to do something in the war effort.

Since then, Junior Red Cross has been building its important pro-
grams of community, national, and international service. Between 1946
and 1957 its membership increased from 19 million to slightly over 22
million. Twenty-two million of anything would seem to be a large number
in which one could take considerable satisfaction. However, in my 16-1/2
months' service with the Red Cross, I have been increasingly distressed
by certain trends that lie hidden within the apparent Junior Red Cross
success. Our current 22 million Junior Red Cross'members, we find, are

366

367

60 percent of the total school population. The 19 million members in
1946 constituted 74 percent of the total school enrollment.

Moreover, the number of schools enrolled in Junior Red Cross
has dropped sharply in this period. In 1946, 124,000 schools were en-
rolled; in 1957 only 67,000. The chapters having a Junior Red Cross
program fell from 78 percent in 1946 to 52 percent in 1957.

I think it is advisable to consider just what these statistics
mean to us from the standpoint of the American position in the world,
and also to compare our situation in the field of youth activities with
that of the U.S.S.R.

At national headquarters, as some of you know, we are conducting

a study of youth"s place in Red Cross. The study has been in progress
for several months, with the assistance of Dr. Chris Sower of Michigan
State University. We have sent out to many of you questionnaires that
are now being analyzed. I hope that within the next several months we
will be able to make specific suggestions for modernizing our youth
programs. However, I am already convinced that the youth of today,
properly selected, properly trained, and properly supervised, can make

a significant contribution to every one of the Red Cross services.

For example there is the field of safety. Last year 40,000
persons died in automobile accidents and 1,400,000 were injured. Red
Cross has remedial activities in the form of first aid programs and
driver training, in both of which juniors could be of real service.

Another great cause of accidental death is water accidents.
Last-year 6,000 people died in these. Most water tragedies occur at
beaches and other such recreation spots, but no small numbers happen
in places you would hardly suspect. Some 350 of last year”s 6,000 drown-
ings occurred in farm ponds. And these ponds are increasing at the rate
of 80,000 a year. Just recently, the Soil Conservation Service of the
Agriculture Department asked Red Cross for increased help in preventing
farm pond drownings. Here, as in the water safety field generally, the
role of Junior Red Crossers could be a very important one. Many of you
have seen the pamphlet Teaching Johnny To Swim, which is one of our first
materials directed toward solving the problemmof accidents at the "old
swimming hole" and in home pools.

Juniors Red Cross members, I believe, could also make an impor-
tant contribution in combating juvenile delinquency. I have been
shocked to learn that since 1950 major crimes have been increasing at
a rate four times faster than the increase in population. In the year
just past, 1957, there were 3,000,000 major crimes committed, and almost
half of those were committed by young people who have not yet reached
their eighteenth birthday.

Crime and its prevention now cost us twenty billion dollars a
year. Next to our national defense budget, there is no other item that

368

we pay as much for. So, simply from the standpoint of economic interests--
disregarding for the moment the moral values-cit is obvious that we must
do something to develop corrective measures. My own feeling is that we

do not have enough participation in such programs as the Junior Red Cross.
As a result, Junior Red Cross members are not having the advantage of par-
ticipation in a community and world-wide service activity that was created
especially for them.

Good citizenship is a priceless asset and one which must be
fostered at this critical period in world history. At least part of
the reason for special alertness in this respect can be inferred from
a look on the other side of the hill to see what other people are doing.
I move for that purpose to the U.S.S.R.

At the end of the war, I was in Vienna from July to November-
l945. In my capacity as deputy to General Clark, I saw my Russian oppo-
site number several times each week. All of us then thought that we were
at the beginning of a new and better world. We believed that there
should never be again such a thing as danger of war. We spent much time
in working out the details of such things as clubs for Allied personnel
to develop better understanding.

My Soviet counterpart in these negotiations was a four-star
general, age 42, a colonel-general in the Soviet Army. He was an able
officer and dedicated to the Communist ideology. He was at his desk every
day at 10 o'clock in the morning, and he was still there at 2 o'clock the
next morning. Since we were closely associated in our work, we discussed
the world frequently. I can remember very well that in some of our talks
he spoke of the divisiveness of liberty and how the very institutions we
had set up in this country to safeguard our freedom were going to be our
undoing. He said, "You are going to live to see the day that you wish
you had a very strong government such as ours. We put good men at the
top and then we tell the people what to do. You, on the other hand, en-
trust those major decisions to a ballot-box type of operation. Thus,
under your system the people make important decisions, but they do not
understand what it is all about." He went on, "Of courSe, you are very
clever in the way that you fool the people. You constantly hold out hope
for reward in the next world. In that way you are able to exploit the
working man. In fact, you have been clever enough to devise a command-
ment, 'Thou shalt not steal,‘ so that the working man does not get what
is coming to him in this world. But the day is going to come when you
are going to find that this will not work. You will need, first of all,
a much stronger form of_government. Secondly, you must start the indoce
trination of young people at a very early age. They will then carry you
over most of your obstacles."

The more I have studied the Soviet system of yOuth training the
more I am inclined to agree with my former military associate that the
Russians have perfected an effective organization in the youth field.
These boys here on this stage--the Boy Scouts and Cub Scouts--wou1d, in

369

the Soviet Union, belong to an organization called the Young Pioneers.
Then, when they reached the age of.l4, most of them would join a group
known as the Komsomol. The Komsomol, which would carry them through
from 14 until 26, has the following objectives:

To encourage participation of the youth in the state and in
economic construction.

To establish cultural centers.

To strengthen student discipline, to promote the ideological-
political training of yOuth through political education,
propaganda work, and political agitation.

Actively to promote atheism.

To encourage and organize sports program for youths.

Young peeple who prove themselves most outstanding during their
service in the Komsomol are then selected for membership in the Communist
Party.

Competition for selection by the party is very keen. 0f the
200,000,000 people in the Soviet Union, only slightly more than 7,000,000
are allowed to join. The party gets the cream of the crop.

However, whether or not they are considered potential party
material, all young people--both the Young Pioneers and the Komsomol--
actively work in the field of political indoctrination. The Soviets
thus develop a well-disciplined, dedicated group.

But even so, they have their troubles, too. One Komsomol member
named Mikhail served as a godfather in a church baptism. This-led the
newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda to reproach him in these words:

Yes, Mikhail, you did not act as a Komsomol member: a
Komsomol member must keep to the principlesvwhich originate
in a lofty ideal consciousness and a stable, socialist world
view, with which the Communist Party arms Soviet youth. Our
world view is a Marxist and materialist world view. It is
the most advanced and the only scientific one.

The same paper on July 8, 1956, took occasion to criticize a
young lady Komsomol member for marrying in the church. She was required
to explain why she did, and she submitted this explanation:

My grandmother, who brought me up, insisted on it, and
besides, a wedding comes only once in one's life, and
I was so anxious that everything should be beautiful.

What action was taken in her case is not known. The mere fact
that the paper recorded her explanation, however, may be assumed to have
been a tacit rebuke.

370

I have pointed to these two cases as an indication of the care-
ful supervision of youth-~especially in the field of promoting atheismv-
being taken by a country that is playing a very important part in our
uneasy world. Moreover, it will be playing an increasingly important
part for the rest of the lives of everybody here.

In the dedication that the Soviets encourage among youth they
are creating a very formidable strength. This is an important factor
in the cold war now in progress. It is also a valuable element whenever
the Kremlin decides to give high priority to a program such as industrial
production or emphasis on scientific training.

We in the Free World must secure our dedication by voluntary
methods. Whether we like it or not, the mantle of world leadership has
fallen on our shoulders. The fate of our civilization will depend, in
large measure, on our ability to discharge this heavy burden. That is
why I am so eager to see the concept of service developed at an early
age through the medium of the Junior Red Cross.

In addition to the element of service, our leadership role re-
quires that we as a nation, broaden our understanding of world affairs.
We have made good progress in this field in the last 20 years, but in
many respects our outlook toward other peoples--their cultures and tra-
ditions--is still somewhat parochial.

An example of a problem in understanding that confronts us today
is provided by India, where, last fall, I had the pleasure of attending
the International Red Cross Conference. India is a country of 380,000,000
people whose standard of living is indescribably low. Average life ex-
pectancy is 32 years and the national income is $58 per person per year
as against ours of $2,050.

Of course, one may say that India is unique. But if you draw an
arc from Japan through Burma, Thailand, India, and Pakistan to Afghan—
istan, you include the homelands of a billion and a half of the world's
2,700,000,000 people. And of that billion and a half, more than 50 per-
cent go to bed hungry every night.

If a significant number of people in that part of the world
should come under Communist domination, we as a nation would be in real
trouble from a standpoint of security and also from a standpoint of the
ideals that we and our partners in freedom consider so sacred.

Our task is to be able to communicate with those people, to make
them understand that our beliefs and theirs are the same when it comes
to the preservation of peace and to service to mankind.

Among the many things-Americans will need for greater communica-
tion with other peoples is more training in languages. Some experience
of the Foreign Service Institute--on whose advisory group I serve--will

371

be pertinent in this connection. The Institute is conducted by the De-
partment of State to educate young men and young women who are entering
the diplomatic service. They go to college, apply to come into the
Foreign Service, and if they are accepted, they study at the Institute
for 4 months before being sent out on their first assignment at some
foreign station.

Obviously, languages are an important part of the qualifications
for the Foreign Service. But, alas, of the 8,000 young men and women
applying in recent years and otherwise very well qualified, only 300 of
them had any ability in any foreign language whatsoever. Many candidates
must be accepted without language qualification; then follows a long,
painful, and expensive process of teaching them a language.

By way of comparison, in the Soviet Union there are 10,000,000
people studying English and 4,000,000 studying German. In our country
8,000 are studying Russian. The Soviets can develop such mass education
programs because they are a disciplined people and because their youth
organizations have developed a stern dedication to the state. The Soviet
educational system.has the primary duty of training the nation's youth
for the purpose of furthering the state's interests; the Soviet student,
in short, prepares himself to serve the state in whatever capacity he is
assigned. He is told what to do, and he does it. It is an evil system
but an effective one.

I am not advocating that we have anything like the Soviet educa-
tional program. I have merely outlined their situation with respect to
youth training so that we can realize better the type of problem that
confronts us.

During my 6 years in Europe, I traveled from the northern end of
Norway to the eastern borders of Turkey many times. As I visited these
countries, I was always tremendously interested to find out why ancient
civilizations in some of these areas had disappeared. I found that his-
torians generally are of the opinion that they disappeared because the
‘people became more engrossed with the material aspects of their lives
than with the spiritual side. Or, stated in another way, they lost their
community spirit.

One by one these civilizations faded. Now all you can find of
many of them are ruins, 50 feet or more beneath the surface of the earth.

A Far Eastern philosopher 6 months ago took a trip to the Soviet
Union and asked many persons there, "What is the object of your sOciety?"
The invariable reply was, "Our object is to serve the state so that we
will build up a system that will surpass that of the United States."

The philosopher later came to the United States and spent 3 months
here. He put his question to many Americans'and, of course, got various
answers. The replies added up, however, to the impression that we in the

372

United States consider that the number one objective of our society is
to improve our standard of living.

Naturally, I have no objection to the improvement of our standard
of living. But I am sure you will agree with me that it is not an end
in itself. Throughout history there has never been a great civilization
that has been able to use a great amount of leisure successfully. In
other words, most, as they have gotten the higher standard of living
and the leisure that went with it, began to decline, and they are now
subjects of history books-~and Ancient History at that.

I don't think that this will ever happen to us--I am sure it won't.
But I do say that if crime continues to increase at four times the rate
of the population increase; if half of our major crimes are committed by
young people 18 years and younger; if we fail to teach to young people
the nobility and grandeur of voluntary service-~we could be well on the
way to serious trouble.

I think we can solve this problem. I would hope, as one element
of the solution, that all chapters will take immediate steps to improve
the effectiveness of the Junior Red Cross programs. In that way we will
not only be performing a great service for the Red Cross, but an even
greater one for the United States and for the entire Free World.

It has been my pleasure to visit a large number of chapters since
the first of January 1957. I want you to know that I am most favorably
impressed with the seriousness with which the chapters and the volunteers
undertake their work.

Slightly over a year ago I spoke to a group of volunteers in this
city. Afterwards I was told by a good friend of mine--a volunteer--that
I tended to glorify the volunteers too much, and that this attitude might
create frictions between the professional staff and the volunteers.

I want you all to know that I still prefer my weakness; I have a
profound admiration for volunteers. I intend to continue in that frame
of mind, because I think the job you are doing is a tremendous one.

I am prouder than ever that I belong to the Red Cross. The pres-
tige of the organization is very high, and it increases daily. With the
fine leadership I see being shown in the overwhelming majority of our
chapters, I am absolutely certain that we are going to be able to make
the contribution that our spiritual heritage demands of us.

Only by wrestling with our problems forthrightly, imaginatively,
and in humble determination to find wise solutions, will we be able to
maintain our concepts of freedom and human dignity in a highly competi-
tive and troubled world.

373

It has been a very great pleasure for me to be able to meet with
you this evening. Our convention started off well. I am confident that
your active participation during the next 2 days will make it the best
ever.

Good luck to all of you. God bless you.

AFLmCIO MURRAY—“GREEN AWARD TO GENERAL GRUENTHER
NEW YORK, APRIL 4, 1963

No one can receive an award of this kind without being deeply
grateful and, at the same time, considerably embarrassed. No one person
in the Red Cross can be good enough to justify all of the praise which
I have received this evening. The effectiveness of the American Red
Cross has come about because of the devoted service of our two million
volunteers and the relatively small career staff. They are the ones
who should receive the Murrawareen Award. On their behalf I am happy
to accept this honor.

With the consent of your organization, the $5,000 check which I
have just received, will be placed in a special African-ASian Red Cross
Fund. It will be used to bring members of the newer Red Cross Societies
on study visits to this country. Transportation expenses will be de-
frayed from this fund. While the representatives are in the United
States they will be guests of the American Red Cross, nationally and in
the chapters visited.

There are now 88 Red Cross Societies in the world. At the end
of World War II there were only 56 societies. This gives an indication
of the numbers of new societies and of the magnitude of the problem faced
by the emerging countries as they attempt to develop community services.
These study visits can be very important to this development.

The AFL-CIO Community Services has had considerable experience
in this field-~First Aid, Home Nursing, Disaster Services-wand we shall
call on you to help us. There is another area where you can be of great
assistance, and this is in the development of Blood Programs.

I have inspected blood programs in almost 25 countries. Once you
leave Europe and the North American continent, most blood programs are
grossly inadequate.

As you know, the American Red Cross operates the largest blood
bank in the world. Last year we collected approximately 2-1/2 million
pints of blood, constituting about 45% of all of the blood used in this
country. From this experience, the Red Cross has developed a consider-
able know-how.

But we still have much to learn. We have had study visitors from

many Red Cross Societies to study our blood program in action in the
hope that this process would assist them to organize adequate blood

374

375

programs in their own countries. I regret to say that, in general, we
have not been as successful as we would like to be. The visitors have
often been over-impressed with the gadgets in a blood center. Many of
them conclude that if they could only have this equipment their own
blood programs would be successful.

You in the AFL-CIO Community Services know very well that equip-
ment is not what makes a blood program function. What is needed is the
motivation to convince an individual to put out his arm and allow some-
one to put a needle in it to withdraw blood for a person he will prob-
ably never know nor see. You have supported the Red Cross Blood Program
magnificently, and you have had great success in motivating your members
to donate blood. The method that succeeds in Washington, D.C., or in
Los Angeles may be worthless in Djakarta, Indonesia. But I am sure that
by working together we can solve this problem and thus eliminate much
suffering in the world, because blood is such an important factor in
clinical medicine.

The 88 Red Cross Societies constitute the League of Red Cross
Societies which has its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. There is
a meeting of the Executive Committee of the League every September, and
a meeting of the entire Board of Governors every other September. At
such meetings we are not concerned with ideological subjects. Still,
the impact of the two major conflicting philosophies in the world today
cannot be avoided entirely.

It has caused me considerable distress to find that in many cases.

our motives are misunderstood. On several occasions I have had people
say to me--people who are in no sense unfriendly to us--something like
this: "Yes, we know you are against Communism because it is a material-
istic doctrine. But aren't you in the United States materialistic?
Isn't making money one of your prime motives? And don't you exploit the
underdog in order to make these profits?"

Naturally, we disagree with this type of charge. But there is a
big difference between disagreeing and convincing other people. Of
course, there is regrettably a certain amount of exploitation in our
country, but certainly large-scale exploitation is well in our past.
The answer to any remnant which may still exist is definitely not Com-
‘munism. The answer is to correct the defects in our system so that its
effectiveness will continue to increase. Our philosophy is based on the
freedom of the individual, but this carries with it a high degree of
individual responsibility. Frequently, the responsibility is neglected.
After all, in a population of 188 million people it is difficult to
convince that number of individuals that each one must carry his share
of the load. This is where I feel that voluntary organizations such as
the AFL-CIO Community Services, the American Red Cross, and many many
others too can play an important role. The concept of serving volun-
tarily in order to improve the lot of distressed individuals is a noble
one. Furthermore, it is the very heart of individual responsibility.

 

376

Whether we like it or not, we have an even heavier national re-
sponsibility on our shoulders. We have an obligation to furnish leader-
ship for the Free World. This is a tremendous burden. It involves not
only a financial responsibility, but also one which may be more diffi-
cult to meet: that of understanding the cultures of other peoples,
their problems and their aspirations.

In carrying out this task our wealth is often a handicap. We
are the richest nation in the world, and that fact of life frequently
creates a certain amount of envy and resentment. To deal with that
aspect requires great understanding and sympathy.

Two and a half years ago a member of the American Red Cross Board
of Governors and I were in the U.S.S.R. We were courteously received,
and we enjoyed the visit very much. As for me, I came away with an
impression of discipline. I was tremendously interested in the youth
programs in the U.S.S.R. We have approximately 22 million young people
in our Junior Red Cross activities, so I was eager to see how the Soviets
handle their youth programs. I would say that, generally speaking, they
handle them very well. Not only does one get an impression of stern
discipline, but one is also struck by the very conscious effort to in-
still a tremendous love-of country into the hearts of all young people.
And I would also say that I believe they are successful in this en-
deavor.

Along with this indoctrination, they also promote a strong anti-
pathy toward capitalism. They never speak of our system as the Free
Enterprise or the Incentive system. It is always "Imperialist Capital-
ism," and always stated as though it is something sinister and evil,
born of greed and avarice.

While I have indicated some of the strengths of the other side,
I do not want to end this talk without making it crystal clear that they
have their problems and some are very serious ones. On balance, there
is no question but that democracy is on the march, and that Communism is
retreating.

While we were in Moscow, we stayed at the National Hotel which
faces Red Square. From my room I could look out and see the mausoleum
in which lay the bodies of Lenin and Stalin. When we went through the
mausoleum, we watched a long line of approximately 10,000 Soviet citi-
zens follow us. We could not tell what they were thinking, but certainly
there was an attitude of respect.and reverence.

The day after we visited the mauseleum was Sunday and we were
scheduled to catch a plane leaving Moscow at 7:30 that morning. We were
told to have our bags ready by 5:30, since the trip to the airport is a
fairly long one. My baggage was ready by 5:15 and I stood on the small
balcony outside my room taking a last look at Red Square. I was very
much surprised to see that already approximately a thousand people were

 

T1

in

377

lined up to go through the mausoleum. And it does not open until 11
o'clock on Sundays. While I was standing there three buses came up and
discharged their passengers. As they oriented themselves and saw the
crowd, they actually ran to get into the line. Why? I don't know.
They were not going any place for approximately five and one half hours.

Just imagine what those people and the other 220 million people
of the U.S.S.R. thought some months later when they were told that
Stalin was a traitor and a criminal. His body was removed from the
mausoleum and buried in a small grave behind it. Just a month ago when
the 10th Anniversary of Stalin's death took place, there was.not a single
mention of it in any Soviet newspaper.

Today as I left Washington I passed the Lincoln Memorial. Nearly
all of us have seen it. Just think of the shock it would be to all of
us if our President should suddenly announce that Lincoln had been a
criminal, a traitor,.and that all Lincoln memorials were to be destroyed.

Then for a moment let us consider Berlin. There is a 28-mile
wall which divides the two cities. But it is only a part of a longer
wall--one 750 miles long--between the East and the West. The purpose
of that wall, the concrete and barbed wire sections, is not to prevent
an attack. Its purpose is to keep the people within an earthly para-
dise--the one under which our grandchildren will be living according to
Mr. Khrushchev. But Mr. Khrushchev faces a problem as he tries to ex-
plain why it is necessary to keep people within those boundaries.

Just as these illustrations represent serious problems for him,
they are advantages for us, if we can continue to increase our dedica-
tion to the ideals in which we believe.

I want to make it clear that I am not trying to stir up hatred
against any other nation or philosophy of government. I am not so much
interested in what we are against as I am in what we are for.

Earlier this evening my beloved wife, Grace, was introduced. You
are also aware that Lt. General Garrison H. Davidson, who is directly
to our front, is married to my sister. What you don't know, however, is
that these two individuals--Grace and Gar--belong to a very active organs
ization. When Grace and I were married 41 years ago, I took her to our
home in Nebraska. After she was there a few days, she said: "If you
don't mind my saying so, your family is a very cocky one." I expressed
great shock, and begged her to keep her views to herself. But she re-
fused to comply, and within a week or so, she had organized the Anti-
Gruenther Society. I regret to tell you that the society has flourished
during the last 41 years. She is now the President, and Gar Davidson
is the Vice President.

I told you at the beginning of my talk that I was embarrassed to
receive the Murray-Green Award this evening. That is still true. How-
ever, I must confess to you that I did get a certain measure of

= .- an 1555"

‘ r7. -w_-

 

378

satisfaction from the highly flattering things which were said about me,
because I could see the consternation that it was creating in the minds
of the President and Vice President of the Anti-Gruenther Society.

I regret that the President of the Pro-Gruenther Society, my
brother Homer, is not here tonight. Homer is a member of the White House
staff, a holdover from the previous administration. I think he is afraid
to leave Washington for fear they might put someone else in his place.
His office is in the East wing of the White House. After listening to
that wonderful message from President Kennedy this evening, I concluded
that Homer must have been able to get over to the West side of the White
House earlier today. I would not go so far as to say that the message
is forgery, but neither am I going to take a chance on verifying its
authenticity.

This has been a wonderful evening for us--that is, for the Red
Cross and for the two members of the Pro-Gruenther Society who are
present. Best wishes to all of you, and good luck to the AFL—CIO
Community Services.

APPENDIX F

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON GENERAL

ALFRED M. GRUENTHER

 

Fl,

1;;

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

ALFRED M. GRUEMEER
General, U.S. Army (Retired)

BACKGROUND:

Born, Platte Center, Nebraska, March 3, 1899: Mother a school-
teacher; Father, the publisher of the Platte Center Signal.

CAREER:

Graduated from U.S. Military Academy, west Point, New York:
November 1, 1918 (originally Class of 1921). After the armistice
was signed, his class was sent back to West Point and remained there
until June 1919. From 1919 to 1941, routine peace-time assignments.
He was Instructor and Assistant Professor.in Chemistry and Elec-
triCity for 8 years at West Point. He served as a lieutenant for
16-1/2 years.

In October 1941, he became Deputy Chief of Staff, Third'Army,
San Antonio, Texas. Lt. Col. Gruenther was made Chief of Staff,
Third Army, when Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower was trans-
ferred to Washington on December 12, 1941.

In August 1942, he was transferred to London, as a Brigadier
General, to serve as Deputy Chief of Staff under General Eisenhower.
In January 1943, he was named Chief of Staff of General Mark W.
Clark's Fifth Army in North Africa (Major General). Later he became
Chief of Staff of the 15th Army Group, still under General Clark.

In July 1945, General Clark was named Commander of the U.S. Forces
in Austria, and General Gruenther was named Deputy Commanding Gen-
eral.

1946-1947, Deputy Commandant, National War College.

1947-1949, Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

1949-1950, Deputy Chief of Staff for.P1ans, Department of
Army (Lieutenant General).

1951-1953, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters of Allied
Powers in Europe (SHAPE, Paris) (General).

1953-1956, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Succeeded
General Matthew B. Ridgway). Retired December 31,
1956.

1957-1964, President, American Red Cross. Retired March 31,
1964.

380

381
ALFRED M. GRUENTHER

He is married to the former Grace Elizabeth Crum. They have
two sons, both of whom were West Pointers, and now Colonels in the
Army. The older son, Donald (8 children) was in Vietnam from 1967
to 1969, and is now stationed at the Pentagon: the younger son,
Richard (6 children) was in Vietnam from July 1968 to July 1969,
and is now at West Point as Head of the Department of Military
Instruction.

ACTIVITIES:

The Business Council

General Advisory Committee, Arms Control and Disarmament

General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance

President's Committee on Traffic Safety

Board of Directors, Pan American World Airways

Board of Directors, New York Life Insurance Company (Executive Com-
mittee)

Board of Directors, Rexall Drug and Chemical Company (Executive
Committee)

Board of Directors, Federated Department Stores (Executive Committee)

Electoral College, Hall of Fame

Executive Committee, Atlantic Council

Visiting Committee, Johns Hopkins School of Medicine

Editorial Advisory Board, Foreign Affairs Magazine

Honorary President, World Bridge Federation

Chairman, English Speaking Union, November 1966-68.

HONORARY DEGREES: (37)

Babson Institute: Bates College: Belmont Abbey College: Brandeis
University; The-Citadel: Cleveland-Marshall Law School}.Columbia
University: Creighton University; Dartmouth College:.Harvard Uni-
versity: College of the Holy Cross: Jefferson Medical College:
LaSalle College: Loyola University (Chicago); Loyola University
(Los Angeles): University of Maryland (Heidelberg); University of
Nebraska; New York University: Oberlin College; Rockhurst College;
Rutgers University; St. John's University; Saint Lawrence Univer-
sity; College of Saint Thomas: Saint Vincent College: Seattle
University: Simpson College; Springfield College: St. Anselm's
College; Syracuse University; Temple University; Trinity College}.
Union College; Villanova University; Williams College: Yale Uni-
versity; Iowa Wesleyan College.

382
ALFRED M. GRUENTHER

DECORATIONS:

United States, Distinguished Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clus-
ters; Legion of Merit: Belgium, Grand Cordon Order of Leopold;
Brazil, Commander, Order of Military Merit; England, Companion of
the Bath; France, Grand Cross, Legion of Honor, Medaille Militaire:
Germany, Grand Cross of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany;
Greece, Grand Cross, Royal Order of Saviour: Italy, Knight of the
Order of the Grand Cross of Merit of the Republic of Italy, Ordine
Militaire D'Italia; Luxembourg, Grand Cross, Order of the Couronne
de Chene; Morocco, Grand Officer, Quissam Alaouite; Order of Malta,
Grand Cross of Merit with Star and Ribbon: The Netherlands, Grand
Cross, Order of Orange-Nassau;.the Philippines, Golden Heart Pres-
idential Award: Poland, Virtuti Militari; Portugal, Grand Cross of
Aviz.

RED CROSS DECORATIONS:

Argentina, Argentine Red Cross Medal; Australia, Australian Red
Cross Medal of Honour; Brazil, Cross of Distinction, Brazilian Red
Cross Society; Chile, Grand Cross of Honor, Chilean Red Cross;
Ethiopia, Red Cross Grand Gold Medal; Finland, Cross of Merit, Fin-
nish Red Cross; Greece, Gold Cross with Laurel, Greek Red Cross
Society: Japan, Red Cross Order of Merit; Philippines, Sampaguita
Medal: USSR, Badge of Honor, Alliance of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies.

AWARDS:

Veterans of Foreign Wars Gold Medal Award, 1956; Laetare Medal,
1956; James Forrestal Memorial Award, 1957; Gold Medal, National
Institute of Social Sciences, 1957; Gold Medal, Pennsylvania So-
ciety, 1957; Lafayette Gold Medal Award, 1958: Distinguished Service
Medal, Theodore Roosevelt Association,,l958; Father of the Year,
1959: Cardinal Gibbons Award, 1959; National Veterans Award, 1959;
Boy Scout Silver Buffalo Award, 1960; Research Institute of America
Living History Award, 1960: Bellarmine Medal, 1962: Murray-Green
Award, 1963; Salvation Army Award for 1964: Distinguished Nebraskan
Award for 1966: Magna Charta Award, 1968; Order of Lafayette Free-
dom Award, 1969. '

(Prepared September, 1968: Revised September, 1969)

 

APPENDIX G

CONGRESSIONAL TRIBUTE TO GENERAL GRUENTHER

January 27, 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE 1207

GENERAL GRUENTHER, A DISTIN-
GUISHED NEBRASKAN

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, on

edncsday evening of this week, the
Nebraska Society of Washington pre-
sented its annual Distinguished Ne-
braskan Award to Gen. Alfred M.
Gruenther, U.S. Army. retired. the il-
lustrious former Supreme Allied Com-
mander in Europe and later president of
the American National Red Cross.

The presentation was made by our col-
league. Senator CURTIS. who is retiring
after 3 years as a member of the Nebras-
ka Society's board of governors. I ask
unanimous consent to have the text of
these remarks printed in the RECORD at
the conclusion of my statement.

It is unfortunate that we do not have
a copy of General Gruenther's extem-
poraneous response. It was witty, mod-
est. and charming. as is the man who
made it.

All Nebraskans share a great pride in
General Gruenther and in his titanic
contributions to the cause of peace. This
dedicated soldier-humanitarian height-
ened that pride when he told us he al-
ways has and always will regard himself
as a Nebraskan.

We were pleased, too. Mr. President to
have a number of congratulatory mes-
sages sent to the president of our so-
ciety, Mr. Kimon T. Karabatsos. I ask
unanimous consent to have two of them.
one from former President Eisenhower
and one from Governor Morrison of Ne-
braska, printed in the RECORD following
Senator Cunris' splendid salute to Gen-
eral Gruenther.

There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:

Tumors 'ro GEN. Atraro M. Gavenrnrn ON
ms OCCASION or rm: AWARD DINNER or
Till-Z NEIJIHSKA STATE SOCIETY or Warrimu-
row 1;? SENATOR Cam. T. CURTIS. JANU-
ARY 20. 1906
We are here to pay respectful tribute to

a. man who has earned the right to be called

an outstanding American. As native sons of

Nebraska. we are here to honor a great

Nebraskan.

You have no doubt noticed. as I have. that
men of high ability are seldom. if ever. one-
track men. Though they carve distinguished
careers in one field. they show extraordinary
talents in many others. Sometimes they
achieve top rank in one career after another.
And, sometimes. as with our honored guest
this evening. they manage several diversified

careers—almost at one timkwith no appar-

ent strain.

It would be easy. at this point. to tell you
that our guest was born in Platte Center.
Nebr.. in 1899. and then rattle off. in rapid
succession the events and remarkable
achievements which have marked his life.

But somehow I feel that would not give you
a true picture'of the man. We will come
closer to getting a three-dimensional view
if. instead. we take a brief look at one or
two incidents in each of the five careers
which he has made for himself, simultan-
eously. or in rapid succession.

Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther. the man we
honor tonight. was born in Platte Center
in 1899. I've been told that he carries in
his pocket a silver dollar. minted in that
year. Though why anyone with his phenome-
nal memory should need a reminder. I
wouldn‘t know.

This fantastic memory. plus the keen in-
tellect and facility for intense concentration
which accompany it. are the combination
which has helped General Gruenther in ev-
erything he has undertaken. The effect of

‘this powerful combination was first demon-

strated when he was graduated from West
Point. fourth in his class. at the age of 18.

In times of peace and prosperity, it is not
easy for even the finest junior officer to find
rapid advancement. But Lieutenant Gruen-
ther. who had married Grace Elizabeth Crum.
of Jeffersonville, 1nd,. had an idea for supple-
menting his less than generous military in-
come. He acquired a manual on how to play
bridge. Soon he was recognized as one of
the Nation's finest amateur players. And
soon he was arranging and refereeing bridge
matches, an activity which helped to provide
for his wife and two sons. General Gruen-
ther has retained his early skill. at bridge, a
talent which might have led some men to a
professional career. General Gruenther, on
the other hand, seems quite content to be the
favorite partnerof his longtime friend. gen-
eral. and later President Dwight D. Eisen-
hower.

General Gruenther's second career began
with the rumblings of World War II. In
October 1941, Lieutenant Colonel Gruenther
was named deputy chief of staff of the 3d
Army. Brig. Gen. Dwight Eisenhower was
chief of staff. Within months, Colonel
Gruenther succeeded his friend as chief of
staff of the 3d Army and within a year was
again a deputy chief of staff. this time to
General Eisenhower at Allied Command
Headquarters. Europe.

In these assignments, and his final war-
time post as chief of staff for Gen. Mark
Clark's 5th Army. General Gruenther built
an enviable reputation. Through his con-
summate skill in organization. his ability to
forsee situations and his meticulous atten-
tion to detail in seeing that orders were
carried out, he was both recognized and re-
warded as the perfect staff omcer. While he
was, as yet. little known outside the military.
inside he was already becoming known as the
possessor of one of the greatest minds in the
Army. By war's end, in 1945. he Was the
youngest of all the major generals.

Stage three concerns a new career—Gen-
eral Gruenther the planner. After 2 years
as Deputy Commandant of the National War
College, the general was appointed director
Of the joint staff which serVed as the Work-
ing force of the Joint Chiefs of Stall in the
preparation of strategic and logistic plans
for the Armed Forces.

During this period and in the 2 years
between 1949 and 1951 when he served as

384

 

 

385

January 97, 1.966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE 1208

Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans at Army
Headquarters. most of the plans actually put
in practice by the Army passed through his
hands for approval.

When General Gruenther was appointed.
Chief of Stail‘ of the Supreme Headquarters
of the Allied Powers in Europe. it appeared.
as it had several times in the past. that he
was destined to remain the smart. capable,
and highly efficient No. 2 man on whom
every commanding officer could depend with-
out question. But that limited horizon. ton.
was soon to be broadened. In July 1958. he
succeeded Gen. Matthew Ridgway as Supreme
Allied Commander in Europe and com-
mander in chief of the U.S. European Com-
ma nd. So began career No. 4.

Upon the shoulders of a supreme com-
mander of allied forces rest many burdens.
not the least of which is the task of main-
tainlng good relations with dignitaries Of
many stripes. On one such occasion. Gen-
eral Gruenther put his fantastic memory to
good use.

During a visit they had made to Allied
headquarters, the general had met. quite
casually. 180 members Of the British Parlia-
ment. As things developed. it became nec-
essary for General Gruenther to visit the
House of Commons. In typical fashion. he
included in his preparations an hour‘s study
of the names and photographs of all 180 of
the members he had met. When he arrived
at Westminster, he recognized them all. ad—
dressed each one by name as he shook hands,
and even made a few personal inquiries about
their families.

Not too long after this incident in Com-
mons, it Was announced that President
Eisenhower would pay a bliour visit to
Allied headquarters in the near future for
a conference. The subjects to be discussed
were listed. Although _it had no place on the
list. General Gruenther immediately directed
his staff to compile a chart showing the
location of every unit. squad. and individual
servieeinan in the whole command.

The President arrived. the conference
began. After about 50 minutes the listed
subjects had been discussed. There mas a
brief pause. The President broke the
silence by asking the distribution of the
forces—the staff officer. the planner. the
supreme commander was ready. It was this
kind of kecnness and foresight that led Lord
lsinay to call him “the greatest soldier-
statesman I have met."

After 83 years of tremendous achievement
you might think that General Gruenther
would feel as Gen. George Marshall once
put it. “I want to go and sit in a chair on my
front porch. In about 6 or 8 weeks I'll
begin to rock a little." But not General
Gruenther—he was still looking for action
and he found it.

There is an old adage among athletic
coaches: "It’s a lot easier to make a fine
runner out of a boxer than it is to make a
runner into a fine boxer." I submit that it
is easier to make a great humanitarian out
of a soldier than it is to make a fine soldier
out of a humanitarian. especially when you
are referring to our friend from Nebraska.

On January 1. 1958. the day after he
retired from the Army. General Gruenther—
with all the enthusiasm. fire and concentra-
tion he had demonstrated in the military-—

became the president of the American Na-
tional Red Cross. and career No. 5 was born.

From the end of World War II to 1057 the
trend in vouiitary contributions to the Red
Cross and other organizations had been
slowly, but steadily downward. With a
larger population to serve in the face of
rising costs. the Red Cross needed to reverse
that trend. As always. it didn't take the
general long to catch on. He soon became
convinced that one of his principal missions
in his new post was to tell the Red Cross
story to people—lots of people. And he did
just that.

In a little over 7 years—in addition to all
his other administrative duties—General
Gruenther crossed this country scores of
times. visited Africa once. the Far East three
times, South America three times, and Eu-
rope seven times. spreading the word wher-
ever he went. Ali together he traveled about
700.000 miles and made more than 800 major
addresses.

I'm sure by now you have guessed the
result. Beginning in 1058. contributions to
the Red Cross began to increasthand I'm
happy to say they have continued to improve
every year since. To tell you the truth, I
don't think they would have dared to do
anything else.

General Gruenther has been decorated by
many nations including his own. He has
been similarly honored by Red Cross soeieties
of at least 9 nations and he has received
honorary degrees from no feWer than 25
Colleges and universities.

We know nothing of what new career and
what new honors may await him in the
future. but I can say with certainty that no
recognition he ever receives will carry with
it more true admiration. greater respect. or
warmer affection than that he receives from
all of us tonight.

Gmrsntmc, PA.,
December 29, 1965.
Mr. KIMON T. KARADATSOS,
Velsieol Chemical Corp,
Washington, D.C.

Dma Ma. KARABA‘I‘SOS: I have been informed
by Senators Hausru and CURTIS that the Ne-
braska State Society of Washington is honor-
ing my friend. Gen. Alfred Gruenther. with
its annual Distinguished Nebraskan Award.
Although it is impossible for me to attend
the ceremony at which your society is pre-
senting the award. I do want to join you.
by means of this letter. in paying tribute to
Alfred Gruenther.

In war and peace he has served his country
in important posts, brilliantly. selflessly. and
effectively. Joining the Army during World
War I. he early established a record for ef-
ficiency that caused him to be classed among
the most promising officers in the service.
He fully lived up to the promise and in his
final post. as commander in chief of military
forces of NATO. he established an interna-
tional reputation for fairness, integrity. and
a profound understanding that commanded
the admiration of both European and Ameri-
can governments.

On such a subject I could write volumes;
possibly I should content myself with saying
that in every position in which he has served
he has established standards that no other
has exceeded.

 

386

January 27; 1966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORDé—SENATE 1209

He is my intimate friend and I hope that
at the dinner you will extend to him my warm
personal greetings and my felicitatlons that
he is to receive the award you are now giving
liilii. _

Sincerely.
Dwrcn'r D. Ersmnoma.

P.S.—He is also a fair kind of bridge player
and is the world's champion at revoking.

 

STATE or NEDRASKA,
Exururlvrz OPTICE.
Lincoln, Nehru. January 26. 1966'.

Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther. distinguished
Nebraskan: Your native State of Nebraska.
always humbly proud of the meaningful in-
ilucnccs for good which have been exerted
by its in my illustrious sons and daughters.
is honored with you in your designation as
It distinguished Nebraskan by the Nebraska
State SOt'lt‘ty of \NiilJlllHlIUll. D.C.

I am confident that your selection. grati-
fying though it. may be to you. is a source
of snnilar satisfaction. not only to all of
your fellow Nebraskans. but also to all of
those men and women of our Armed Forces
who served with you in meeting the great
responsibilities you encountered in your
steady ascent up the stairway of service to
your countrynu-n.

It must also be a source of high pleasure
to those citizens of the nine foreign coun-
tries whose various decorations you wear as
an attestation of their appreciation for your
efforts in their behalf—and that of the en-
tire free world—as Nebraska's "Pershing of
Peace." For that. my friend. was your true
role as the Chief of Stall of SHAPE, under
that great general, Dwight D. Eisenhower.
811d as Supreme Allied Commander in
Europe.

A distinguished Nebraskan you are. sir.
.And Nebraska is distinguished by the
strength for military and American Red
Cross humanitarian service which you drew
from your Nebraska family and your native
roots. Your fellow Nebrarkans, everywhere.
Join in the accolades attendant upon your
selection and in every best wish that all of
the blessings of this good life. and of the
freedom you helped to insure. may be yours

“Shout the years to come.
Sincerely yours.
FRANK B. Monmson.
Governor 0/ Nebraska.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Baird, A. Craig, ed. Representative American §peeches,
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Ball, Mary Margaret. NATO and Its European Union Move-
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Herter, Christian Archibald. Toward an Atlantic Community.
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Kaplan, Lawrence 8., ed. NATO and Its Poligy of Contain-
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‘10 |

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Kissinger, Henry Alfred. The Troubled Partnership: A
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Osgood, Robert Endicott. NATO: The Entangling Alliance.
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Salvadori, Massimo. NATO, A Twentieth-Century Community
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Pamphlets

 

Aspects of NATO: Chronolpgy (1945-1969). Brussels 39,
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of the Egglish-Speaking Union of the Commonwealth,
June 8, 1954. Oxford University Press, 1954.

 

 

 

 

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Carter, Richard. "The Controversial Red Cross." Holiday
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Gruenther, Alfred M. "What Atomic Disarmament Means to
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1954). pp. 676-679.

 

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Guillaume, Gilbert. "The Legal Structure of the Atlantic
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(Autumn, 1969), pp. 618-629.

 

 

Mayne, Richard. "Europe's Scrambled Algebra." NATO's
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Crowley, Raymond J. "Gruenther's Code: Zip!" Democrat
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"Chief Asks Stronger NATO," Detroit Free Press, March 25,
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392

Enterprise (High Point, N.C.), March 24, 1964.

 

Globe (Joplin, Mo.), March 26, 1964.

Gruenther, Alfred M. "Communist World is In Trouble,"
The Citizen (Ottawa, Canada),February 26, 1965.

 

"Gruenther Arrives," The Manila Times, February 17, 1965.

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Hess, David. "Fate of NATO Up to De Gaulle, Experts Ad-
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Journal Herald (Dayton, Ohio), March 26, 1964.

Karpin, Fred L. "The General Bridged the Lean Years,"
Washington Post, September 4, 1966.

Miami Herald (Miami, Florida), March 24, 1964.

 

News Register (Wheeling, W. Virginia), March 24, 1964.

St. Petersburg Independent (St. Petersburg, Florida),
July 8, 1969, Profile, 1B.

 

Schoenbrun, David F. "Ike's Right Arm," This Week (Wash-
ington Post Sunday Supplement), December 16, 1951.

 

The Times Union (Rochester, N.Y.), March 28, 1964.

 

Truscott, Alan. "Bridge: Gruenther and Eisenhower--A
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393

Other Materials

TV Broadcast: SO-minute colored videotape recording of
General Gruenther's guest appearance on Television
Station WTTG, Washington, D.C., November 27, 1968.
Interviewed by Station Staff. Subject: "NATO."
(Writer's File)

Audio Tape Recordings: Speeches delivered by General
Gruenther, 1966-69, inclusive. (Writer's File)

Commencement Address June 10, 1966
Command and General Staff College
Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas

Round Table of Palm Beach, Florida March 20, 1967
(Address by General Gruenther)

Harvard University October 6, 1967
General Thomas D. White Lecture

Series
"The Future of NATO"

Air University November 21,
Maxwell, Alabama 1967
"Some Specific NATO Problems-~Can

They Be Resolved?"

American Forces Staff College January 19, 1968
Norfolk, Virginia

English-Speaking Union Dinner February 1, 1968
Royal York Hotel, Toronto, Canada

(Speaking as President of the

English-Speaking Union of U.S.)

Memorial Dinner for Sir Winston February 6, 1968
Churchill

English-Speaking Union

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

394

NATO Symposium February 25 and
Artist-Lecture Series 26, 1969

Kent State University, Kent, Ohio
(Two lectures on NATO delivered
by General Gruenther to the two-
day Symposium.) Recordings pur-
chased direct from Kent State
University.

NATO's Fifteen Nations, 1956-1969, inclusive. Six issues
per year (Gratis subscription to writer from NATO).

Correspondence

General Alfred M. Gruenther, 1953-69, inclusive:

Periodic letters covering information on NATO
Developments.

Antonio Grande, Public Information Division, SHAPE,

1953-69, inclusive: Letters and published mate-
rials on NATO and SHAPE.

Interviews

General Alfred M. Gruenther: Twice-yearly interviews--

Washington, D.C., 1965-69, during development of
Dissertation.

General Alfred M. Gruenther: Tape recorded interview:

July 25, 1956, SHAPE, Marly, France. (Retirement
as Supreme Commander.)

General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Commander, Allied

Powers of Europe (Successor to General Gruenther),

July 25, 1956, SHAPE, Marly, France. Tape record-
ing.

General Lyman Lemnitzer, Supreme Commander, Allied

Powers of Europe (Successor to General Norstad),
July 20, 1963, SHAPE, Marly, France.

395

Speech Scripts from Publichnformation Division, SHAPE,
Marly, France.

63 Speeches in Manuscript Form (See complete list,
Appendix C)

25 Speeches delivered by General Alfred M.

Gruenther (as Chief of Staff to General Eisen-

hower and General Ridgway) in the period 1951-
1953.

38 Speeches delivered by General Alfred M.

Gruenther (as Supreme Allied Commander) in the
period 1953-1956.

Unpublished Master's Thesis

Dedmon, Donald. "Rhetorical Analysis of Four Representa-

tive Speeches of General Alfred M. Gruenther on
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." State
University of Iowa, January, 1956.