ABSTRACT

GENERAL ALFRED M. GRUENTHER:
DEDICATED SPOKESMAN FOR NATO

By

Lilyan Mae Alspaugh

The purpose of this study is to describe and analyze the speaking of General Alfred M. Gruenther on behalf of NATO during the period when he served as Supreme Commander. For purposes of specific analysis, a "case study" treatment is made of each of three major speeches, designated as "The Copenhagen Speech," "The London Speech," and "The Rome Speech." The following elements, which enter into every speech situation, are described and analyzed: the speaker, the climate of opinion, the occasion and audience, the verbal message, the speaker's preparation and delivery, and the general consequences of his efforts.

Some of the principal findings are as follows:

1. The primary goal of Gruenther's speaking was to win military support for the collective security of NATO

nations against the threat of Soviet aggression. All of his speeches on NATO covered four major topics: the threat of Soviet aggression, NATO's progress to date, the problems facing NATO, and hopes for the future. However, each speech is developed in terms of the specific demands of the occasion and audience, a high degree of adaptation being noted in each instance.

2. The materials selected to prove the thesis by "logical" methods constitute the major portion of the speech, with less emphasis on the means of establishing personal credibility and on emotional appeals within the verbal message.

3. Gruenther's speeches are replete with evidence (numerical data, examples, and personal testimony) designed to lend abundant support to his thesis and subordinate propositions.

4. The General exercises restraint and moderation in the use of fear appeals and avoids fear-charged

descriptions of warfare. He concentrates on the positive appeals of pride, unity, and the preservation of peace.

5. An outstanding characteristic of the speech organization is the development of ideas in chronological order. In this topical-chronological format, Gruenther uses internal summaries, explanatory transitions, and problem-solution structure.

6. The General's style is marked by plain, informal, and conversational language and the frequent use of simple sentences--free from military jargon. By the use of rhetorical questions, first and second person pronouns, and direct discourse, he sought audience involvement in an attempt to relate himself and his program to his listeners. Gruenther's humorous anecdotes, sprinkled relevantly and frequently throughout his speeches, serve to provide a change of pace and to inject attention-gaining and interest-holding elements into the compositions.

7. Perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of Gruenther's speaking is his great facility in audience adaptation. He adjusts to his audience in choice of materials, in simplicity of language, and in the topical-chronological arrangement of his discourses.

8. Because of his role as Supreme Commander and because of evidences of thorough development of his messages, and because of his masterful audience adaptation, Gruenther must have been perceived as a man of competence, character, and good-will.

9. Gruenther's speech preparation is aided by his training and wide experience, together with a dedication to continuous learning--which provide a veritable storehouse of information ready to be tapped when needed. He outlines his speeches without preparing a manuscript, seldom, if ever, using notes in platform addresses, tape-recorded interviews, or broadcasts. His phenomenal and infallible memory serves him well in his extemporaneous speaking.

10. Gruenther's delivery is marked by a voice that is crisp, clear, and pleasant; by a manner that reflects friendliness; and by a high degree of "directness." When not "wired for sound," he usually walks back and forth on the platform, with a huge NATO map directly behind him--to which he points for clarity and emphasis.

11. Perhaps the greatest indication of Gruenther's effectiveness as a spokesman for NATO lies in the fact that the nations of Western Europe, listening to his competent voice, responded to his urging and provided NATO with life and vitality.

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Lilyan Mae Alspaugh

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Kenneth G. Hance

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INTRODUCTION

General Alfred M. Gruenther as A Subject for Study

General Alfred M. Gruenther, often hailed as one of the most intellectual and best informed soldier-statesmen of this contemporary period, has been chosen for this study as an outstanding spokesman for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while he served from 1953-1956, as Supreme Commander of SHAPE (the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers of Europe), the military arm of the NATO Alliance.

Although this study is confined to his speaking role for NATO as Supreme Commander from 1953-56, it is important to recognize that addressing NATO nations was not new to him. While serving as Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, and subsequently to Eisenhower's successor, General Ridgway, he was given frequent speaking assignments to NATO countries from 1951-53. Furthermore, Gruenther has continued to serve as the dedicated spokesman for NATO even following his retirement as Supreme Commander--and from his military career--in 1956.

He delivered the following well-publicized "Prescription for Effective Americanism" to his audiences in the United States upon his retirement from the Presidency of the American Red Cross in 1964, following seven years of outstanding leadership for this humanitarian organization:

> Cherish self-discipline, education, individual responsibility, and the spirit of voluntary work for the public good.

Nobody can ever say that Al Gruenther has not practiced the virtues he preaches--from obscurity of his childhood in Platte Center, Nebraska--to his graduation from West Point Military Academy--to his selection as the chief planner of the invasion of North Africa and Italy in World War II with his passion for grueling work hours--to the appointment as Supreme Commander of NATO--to the Presidency of the American Red Cross--marked by his continuous dedication and enthusiastic support of NATO in his speeches to American audiences to the present date.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this study is to describe and analyze the speaking of General Alfred M. Gruenther on behalf

of NATO during the period when he served as Supreme Commander. For purposes of specific analysis, a "case study" treatment is made of each of three major speeches, designated as "The Copenhagen Speech," "The London Speech," and "The Rome Speech." The following elements, which enter into every speech situation, are described and analyzed: the speaker; the climate of opinion, with special reference to NATO; the occasion and the audience; the verbal message (the lines of thought, the types of evidence selected to support these lines of thought, the nature of the reasoning employed, the structure or arrangement of the materials, the style (language) employed); the method of preparation; and the delivery exemplified.

In short, the purpose is to provide an account of what transpired when General Gruenther attempted to meet the demands of three speaking situations and to provide an analysis of these procedures--all within the context of an understanding of the nature of the speaker, of the general background (with special reference to NATO), and of the specific occasion and audience.

The description and analysis are conducted in terms of rhetorical topics and principles that are generally accepted within the "classical rhetorical tradition"--those that pertain to the conventional constituents of Invention (the materials of development *per se*), Arrangement (the organization of these materials), Style (the phrasing of these materials), and Delivery (the use of the audible and the visible codes).

Limitations

This study of the speaking of General Gruenther is limited to the period of 1953-1956, while he served as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers of Europe. Also, as previously indicated, special attention is given to three speeches, representing major presentations of the "Case for NATO." While General Gruenther has spoken on hundreds--even thousands--of occasions on a multitude of subjects and is in constant demand as a speaker today (1969), these activities are merely mentioned in connection with the biographical account. (Other studies may, with great profit,

be made concerning Gruenther's contributions as spokesman for a variety of "causes," such as the American Red Cross.)

Intrinsic Merit of the Study

There is intrinsic merit in this study of the speaking of General Gruenther as a learned military leader; a dedicated advocate of military defense for collective security of the NATO nations as a means of combating possible enemy aggression; and a statesman-diplomat in skillfully adapting his appeals to the specific political, economic, and military attitudes of the various audiences he addressed in the NATO nations.

Moreover, intrinsic merit is reinforced by the reputation and prestige accorded General Gruenther by top military officers in United States and Europe. He is regarded as one of the outstanding military leaders of World War II, as well as a distinguished military-diplomat in the negotiations for peace that followed. Gruenther reflects the anomaly of the eminent military planner of war strategy

who is equally successful and enthusiastic in the promotion of the cause of peace--and who competently employs the medium of public address in promoting this cause.

Furthermore, intrinsic merit is evidenced by the insight of General Gruenther in describing, analyzing, and interpreting the political and military issues--and problems--pertinent to the adjustment period following World War II, as revealed in the four major topics included in his NATO speeches. His keen observations as an authoritative source of information on the historical development of international issues constitute a body of materials of great importance not only to his listeners but also to readers of his messages.

Distinctiveness of the Study

This study of the speaking of General Alfred M. Gruenther does not duplicate other research. At the present time there is no published work which covers the speaking of this outstanding military leader, nor has any

biography been published. No edition of the speeches of General Gruenther exists. While there is one Master's thesis covering four speeches by Gruenther analyzed collectively under the five constituents of rhetoric, this thesis does not represent the approach of the present study nor is it based upon some of the evidence made available to this researcher.[1]

This study can make a distinctive contribution to Gruenther literature by the "Case Study" method of research, incorporating an analysis of all of the aspects of rhetorical criticism outlined in the opening section of Chapter VII, "Summary and Conclusions."

Materials and Sources of the Study

Primary sources include a chronological file of General Gruenther's correspondence on NATO, together with a score of interviews with the General during the compilation

[1]Donald Newton Dedmon, "The Rhetorical Analysis of Four Representative Speeches by General Alfred M. Gruenther on The North Atlantic Treaty Organization" (unpublished Master's thesis, State University of Iowa, 1956).

of research materials since 1966. In addition, in 1956, when the writer was associated with the broadcasting industry, a tape-recorded interview with the writer was granted by General Gruenther, the setting for this interview being his office at SHAPE, near Paris, France. Photographs of the interview reveal the conventional NATO map behind the General to which he likes to refer during interviews and staff meetings (as well as in platform addresses).[1]

Further primary source material consists of sixty-three speeches sent by the Public Information Division of SHAPE to the writer[2]--including thirty-eight speeches delivered by General Gruenther as Supreme Allied Commander, dating from July 11, 1953 (the day following his appointment), through November 20, 1956 (his Farewell Speech upon his retirement from SHAPE and the U.S. Army). In addition the writer also received twenty-five speeches delivered by General Gruenther as former Chief of Staff to the two Supreme

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[1]See Appendix B for text of the tape-recorded interview with General Gruenther and photographs--July 25, 1956.

[2]See Appendix C for list of 63 speeches sent to writer by the Public Information Division of SHAPE.

Commanders, covering the period from June 28, 1951, through May 30, 1953.

The available texts of these NATO speeches were prepared from tape recordings, made during the actual delivery before the audience. However, before the speech texts were circulated by the Public Information Division of SHAPE, they were edited by the P.I.D. Staff, in consultation with Gruenther's aides, without revision of his lines of thought.

Notable secondary sources, in addition to the published materials from NATO, include many recent history books, information from newspapers and periodicals, and other materials cited throughout the text and listed in the bibliography.

The writer also has a collection of tape recordings of recent speeches by General Gruenther, made while he was addressing the audience. The original tapes are owned by General Gruenther, who loaned them to the writer for duplication. The recording of copies from the original tapes was executed by the Television and Radio Department of Michigan State University under contract with the writer.

The following tapes are included in the writer's collection of recorded addresses of General Gruenther:

Commencement Address Command and General Staff College Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas	June 10, 1966
Round Table of Palm Beach, Florida (Address by General Gruenther)	March 20, 1967
Harvard University General Thomas D. White Lecture Series "The Future of NATO"	October 6, 1967
Air University Maxwell, Alabama "Some Specific NATO Problems-- Can They Be Resolved?"	November 21, 1967
American Forces Staff College Norfolk, Virginia	January 19, 1968
English-Speaking Union Dinner Royal York Hotel, Toronto, Canada (Speaking as President of the English-Speaking Union of U.S.)	February 1, 1968
Memorial Dinner for Sir Winston Churchill English-Speaking Union Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	February 6, 1968
NATO Symposium Artist-Lecture Series Kent State University, Kent, Ohio (Two lectures on NATO delivered by General Gruenther to the two-day Symposium). Recordings purchased direct from Kent State University.	February 25 and 26, 1969

The writer also has a 50-minute colored video tape recording of General Gruenther's guest appearance on Television Station WTTG, Washington, D.C., when he was interviewed on NATO by two members of the Station's Staff on November 27, 1968. Obviously, this video tape recording was produced simultaneously with the broadcasting of the program.

The above recordings provide excellent confirmation of the attributes of General Gruenther's delivery described in this study--his simple, easily understood choice of language, clearly enunciated, with staccato tones for emphasis. The platform addresses before the various audiences, as well as the TV Broadcast interview, were delivered without reference to notes, indicating that his phenomenal memory is comparable in every way to that of the "days of NATO as Supreme Commander."

Plan of Research

The plan of research is based on the "Case Study" method of analysis. The two major criteria for the selection of the three representative speeches are first--to secure a spread in time sequence, and second--to secure variance in the specific objectives of the speaking situations. The three representative speeches selected were delivered by General Gruenther in Copenhagen, Denmark; London, England; and Rome, Italy.[1]

The Copenhagen Speech, delivered in 1953, was primarily expository since it was General Gruenther's first major address to the military officers and foreign ministers of the NATO nations, just a month and a half following his appointment as Supreme Commander. Therefore, it was essential in this speech to describe NATO's specific operation, explain NATO's organizational framework, and interpret NATO's objectives. (The writer was a member of the audience when General Gruenther delivered this speech in Copenhagen.)

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[1]See Appendix D for texts of Copenhagen, London, and Rome speeches.

The London speech, delivered in 1954, was primarily informative on the current status of NATO, but was also persuasive in the attempt to secure more positive action by Great Britain for larger contributions to NATO military defense.

The Rome speech was primarily persuasive to convince the skeptical Italian audience of the crucial need for increased military defense for collective security--based on a detailed, informative explanation of the decisive events making the fulfillment of the goals of military defense an imperative for self-preservation.

In addition to the rhetorical factors intrinsically attributable to the composition of these three speeches, the research approach also includes the important questions concerned with such areas as the speaker's background, experiences, personality, mental habits, and achievements; the speaker's reputation and objectives; the historical events relevant to the issues covered; the current climate of opinion on those issues; the speaker's and audience's relationship to those issues; the speaker's methods of preparation; and the general consequences of his speaking.

Organization of the Study

This study is organized on a chronological-topical basis. Chapter One, "Gruenther, the Man," chronicles the events in the life of General Alfred M. Gruenther which have especial relevance to his speaking role for NATO. Chapter Two, "The Origin and Development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," describes and interprets the chain of events following the collapse of Nazi Germany and the surrender of Japan, closing World War II--including the origin of the United Nations Organization, which proved inadequate to the Western European nations in coping with the recalcitrant Soviets in their territorial expansion through conquest without war; the Brussels Treaty--the forerunner to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and the launching of NATO for the political, economic, and military security of the Western European nations.

Chapters Three, Four, and Five cover the three Case Studies, which analyze the many factors outlined in the previous section on "The Method and Plan of Research." Specifically, Chapter Three covers "The Copenhagen Speech";

Chapter Four, "The London Speech"; and Chapter Five, "The Rome Speech." Each of these three chapters is structured in three parts: Part I: "The Occasion, Setting and Audience"; Part II, "The Rhetorical Analysis of the Speech by Paragraphs"; and Part III, "The Evaluation of the Speech."

Chapter Six, "The Method of Preparation and Delivery," describes General Gruenther's method of outlining his speeches without a complete manuscript, since his storehouse of information and his phenomenal memory with immediate recall allow extemporaneous delivery of his outlined topics, without benefit of reminder notes.

Chapter Seven, "The Summary and Conclusions," pertaining to this study entitled "General Alfred M. Gruenther, Dedicated Spokesman for NATO," is divided into two sections: Part I, "Summary," provides an overview of Chapters One through Seven; Part II, "Conclusions," sets forth principal interpretations derived from an analysis of the findings summarized in Part I--certain trends or tendencies which become manifest as one reviews these findings.

CHAPTER I.

GRUENTHER--THE MAN

Alfred Maximilian Gruenther was destined for distinguished leadership from childhood. The qualities cultivated in his early years, nurtured and supervised by a devoted but determined father, developed the pattern for his military career and his outstandingly persuasive and effective speaking ability.

In former President Dwight D. Eisenhower's book, Mandate for Change, he describes his long-time close friend, General Alfred M. Gruenther, as "a man with a quick incisive mind, and an outgoing personality . . . one of the ablest all-around officers, civilian or military, I have encountered in fifty years!"

The Early Years of Alfred M. Gruenther

Alfred Gruenther was the first son of parents who were Irish-German descendants. Christian Gruenther, his father, was the son of German parents who had come from the Catholic section of southern Wisconsin. Following the death of Christian's mother, he lived with relatives. During the intervening years, Christian Gruenther worked as a farm-hand and earned his way through a year of college. Subsequently, through hard work he saved enough to start a weekly newspaper in Platte Center, Nebraska--The Platte Center Signal (with a circulation of 300).[1] He married Mary Shea, the school-teacher daughter of Irish farmers of east-central Nebraska. On March 3, 1899, Alfred Maximilian Gruenther was born in Platte Center, Nebraska.

In addition to publishing the Platte Center Signal, Christian Gruenther served as clerk of the District Court, managed two successful campaigns of the U.S. Senator Gilbert Hitchcock, and was State Manager during two of William Jennings Bryan's presidential campaigns.

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[1] Robert Coughlan, "Thinking Machine Who Bosses NATO," Life, XXXIV (June 1, 1953), p. 80.

> . . . politics was neither a vocation, nor an avocation with him. He was an old fashioned patriot who approached his political tasks with strong convictions and a sense of moral obligation. And he took his parental responsibilities with equal seriousness. He was an affectionate father and entered into the front yard ball games with enthusiasm. But he was also a strong disciplinarian who expected exact obedience and refused to allow his children to give anything less than their best, and who punished laziness and bad behavior with righteous wrath.[1]

Alfred was the oldest in a family of six children, and the strict yet affectionate training received in his youth was reflected in the ethos of Alfred M. Gruenther, the General. He always expected much from those under his command, but always treated them with respect and understanding, as documented in his briefing sessions and addresses to his subordinates.[2]

Alfred Gruenther resembled his father physically and mentally, except in height. His father was a tall man, but Gruenther is of medium height, lightly built.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] This characteristic was observed personally by the writer during a television assignment at SHAPE, Paris.

However, his lack of height has been no deterrent in his military or social life, for his dynamic, friendly personality and almost constant smile have won many friends, and influenced thousands! His grey-blue eyes are in bright contrast to his tan Nebraska complexion. He moves quickly and speaks in a rather high-pitched, slightly nasal, but very pleasant voice, with a Nebraska accent.

According to one biographer, Gruenther's father supervised his son's school work, "paid him a bonus for good marks, talked to him about the value of knowledge, drilled him in 'knowing the problem' and taught him checkers, not as a game, but because it was 'good mental exercise.'"[1] Another mental gymnastic in which Gruenther as a boy was frequently engaged was the development of his memory. As several writers have reported, "Gruenther admits that he subscribed to a mail-order memory course at the age of 13."[2]

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[1]Coughlan, "Thinking Machine Who Bosses NATO," p. 80.

[2]Ernest O. Hauser, "The Army's Biggest Brain," Saturday Evening Post, CCXXVI (October 31, 1953), p. 165.

The ability of General Gruenther to concentrate and memorize is one of his outstanding characteristics today. It would seem to be a most useful attribute for a speaker to possess, one that would contribute in a positive way to his ethos. Who among us does not appreciate the speaker who is able to deliver his speech without notes?

An example of his remarkable powers of recall and photographic memory is confirmed by an incident which occurred while he served as Supreme Commander of SHAPE. On this particular occasion he memorized a long speech in French (although he has never had time to learn French). He "delivered the speech--letter perfect--with an atrocious Nebraska accent, hardly understanding a word he was saying."[1]

So the training in concentration and memorization which his father encouraged him to develop as a child has remained through the years.

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[1]Edmond Taylor, "The Atlantic Alliance: After Gruenther, What?," The Reporter, June 2, 1955, p. 19.

Gruenther's Education

In Platte Center young Gruenther attended St. Joseph's School. His father had always hoped his son Alfred would be selected for West Point. He also wanted his son to develop spiritually. Therefore, when Alfred reached the age of 13, he was sent to St. Thomas' Military Academy, a Catholic Preparatory School at St. Paul, Minnesota, which combines both military and religious instruction. At St. Thomas' the military instruction is provided by U. S. Army officers, while the academic instruction is given by priests of the Archdiocese of St. Paul and by a small regular faculty. Gruenther today recalls that he "felt no special enthusiasm" about his first years at St. Thomas'. His first ambition had been to become a priest--subsequently he wanted to become a doctor and arranged his course work for this preparation.

Young Gruenther was more disposed to writing than military training in this early period of his education at St. Thomas'. His father closely scrutinized his son's letters, circled in red ink the mistakes in spelling, punctuation, or grammar, and returned the letters to his

son. This training by his father no doubt contributed to Gruenther's present meticulously correct writing, with most of his personal memoranda carefully hand-written, rather than dictated to a secretary for transcription.[1]

After Graduation from St. Thomas'.--Following the completion of his son's secondary education at St. Thomas', Christian sent him to the Army and Navy Preparatory School in Washington for additional training in preparation for the West Point examinations.

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[1]General Gruenther is so intent upon elimination of errors in his published speeches, that he will not consent to publication unless he, personally, has the opportunity to edit the taped or stenographic address. It is for this reason there is such a paucity of published speeches, despite the innumerable speeches he delivered while Supreme Commander of NATO, 1953-56, as President of the American Red Cross, 1956-64, and currently the hundreds of speeches he has delivered in Europe, Asia, "Down-Under" and in the United States since his retirement from the American Red Cross. (From the Public Information Division of SHAPE this writer has received the mimeographed texts of 38 speeches delivered by General Gruenther as Supreme Commander of NATO from 1953-56, and 25 speeches delivered by him as the Chief of Staff from 1951-53. Although these NATO speeches represent modestly edited messages, without revision of Gruenther's lines of thought, the important fact remains that the speeches are based on voice recordings at the time of delivery to the audience and not on materials released in advance of delivery. In the absence of a 100% stenographic report from the tape recording, there is replicated the nearest possible approximation of what the audience heard.)

Upon completion of the Army and Navy Preparatory School in Washington, Gruenther received the appointment to West Point and graduated fourth in his class November 1, 1918--eleven days before the Armistice![1]

In a speech made in Italy many years later as Supreme Commander of NATO, he referred to this "graduation" in the very wry humor for which he has become so well-known and admired:

> I came to Italy for the first time in 1919 after we had just finished one World War. In fact, I played a major role in ending that War. I was a cadet at the United States Military Academy, scheduled to be graduated in 1921. The State of the War got to be so crucial that the United States decided to graduate our class early, specifically on the first of November, 1918. The Kaiser heard about this significant increase in allied strength, and eleven days later he surrendered![2]

After the Armistice was signed, Gruenther's class of 278 Second Lieutenants was sent back to West Point and remained there until June 1919.

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[1]David F. Schoenbrun, "Ike's Right Arm," This Week (Washington Post Sunday Supplement), Dec. 16, 1951, p. 5.

[2]Xeroxed copy of speech sent to writer by General Alfred M. Gruenther, from A. Craig Baird's Representative American Speeches (1955-56), including special notations by General Gruenther. Speech delivered in Rome, Italy, May 2, 1955, by Alfred M. Gruenther. (Exact duplicate of this speech sent to writer by SHAPE in mimeographed form.)

Although the regular West Point Academy Curriculum included public speaking instruction, Alfred Gruenther and the 278 cadets in his class who were graduated early due to the war emergency did not receive this training before their hurried departure for Europe. When they returned to West Point from their European assignment they were placed in a make-shift course curriculum, and again missed the speech instruction at the Academy. Therefore, the class in which Gruenther graduated from West Point was deprived of speech training due to circumstances beyond their control.[1]

Gruenther's Military Assignments

In 1920, as a Second Lieutenant, Gruenther was assigned to Fort Knox, where he was made an instructor at the post's school and taught military history, courtesy, hygiene, bookkeeping, and Mess Management. Gruenthere's pupils included veterans with twenty years of experience in the army, and Gruenther worked conscientiously and continuously to keep ahead of them.

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[1]Telephone conversation with General Gruenther, August 5, 1969.

It was Fort Knox that provided the setting for his initiation into bridge--a human-interest story publicized in innumerable magazine and newspaper articles relates how it all happened.[1]

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[1]David Schoenbrun, "Ike's Right Arm," This Week (Washington Post Sunday Supplement [Face photograph of General Gruenther on cover]), Dec. 16, 1951; "He's a good tennis player, and like Ike, a demon in bridge," p. 5.

Alan Truscott (Columnist for Bridge Section), "Bridge: Gruenther and Eisenhower--A Victorious Team," The New York Times, Dec. 23, 1965.

Ernest O. Hauser, "The Army's Biggest Brain," p. 34, "Gruenther ranks among the world's best bridge players. . . ."

Coughlan, "The Thinking Machine Who Bosses NATO," p. 78, "He became not only the best bridge player in the Army but one of the best in the world. . . ."

Time Weekly, February 6, 1956. Cover page with photograph of General Gruenther. Foreign News Section entitled "NATO," p. 26. ". . . he soon became the Army's best bridge player and eked out his army pay by refereeing public matches, including the famed Culbertson-Lenz match of 1931."

International Celebrity Register, First Edition, 1959, pp. 314-315. "Although his early post-war I military career was routine and uneventful, he did distinguish himself as one of the Army's best bridge players. . . ."

Fred L. Karpin, "The General Bridged the Lean Years," Washington Post, September 4, 1966 (Karpin writes a weekly bridge column for the Washington Post.) Sub-Heading--"Ike's Former Aide (and Partner) Didn't Fault

One evening Gruenther was invited for the first time to dinner at the home of his superior officer, Major W. R. Gruber. It is reported that the young man looked forward to the evening's discussion among the twelve guests with the hope that he would make a good impression. He was "horrified" when the three bridge tables were produced after dinner, and Major Gruber remarked, "you play bridge, of course . . . ." The Major gazed at Gruenther with incredulity when he admitted he couldn't play the game. Whereupon Major Gruber gave Gruenther a quick briefing on the rules and the rotation system to the three tables. His subsequent embarrassment, and the cool stares of his partners prompted an immediate decision. The very next morning he bought a rule book, avidly devoured its contents, and began playing at the Officers' Club at the post.[1]

Test Tubes, Either." Entire lower third of page. Story covering his refereeing Culbertson-Lenz match while teaching at West Point included on page 14 of this dissertation.

Raymond J. Crowley, "Gruenther's Code: Zip!," Democrat and Chronicle, Rochester, New York, March 24, 1964. Story covering his first introduction to bridge, and his subsequent refereeing of Culbertson-Lenz match.

[1]Coughlan, "Thinking Machine Who Bosses NATO," p. 78.

This was the milestone in Gruenther's life when he resolved he would add bridge to the subjects of a military nature he was researching. This resolution resulted not only in exceptional interest and competence in bridge-playing, but the development of important traits of concentration, memorization, and rapport with his colleagues on the post. His leadership capability was especially significant, since he was regarded as a "loner" until his firm resolution to master the art of bridge-playing. His concentration and memory paid off, for he was soon playing and winning post tournaments.

To Gruenther, bridge-playing was much more than a social pass-time. It was a mental discipline and part of his overall educational pattern. For Gruenther was dedicated to the Army in the literal sense of the word. He learned his profession with far more energy than he expended on becoming a bridge expert. It was said that he didn't merely "play" bridge--he used it as a test of his mental alacrity.

> Bridge, checkers, politics, or military strategy--Gruenther confronts a problem as an intellectual, and the more insoluble it is, the more interesting

> he finds it. His terrifying memory and his uncanny flair for expounding a difficult proposition in stripped-down terms are proverbial--so is his thoroughness.[1]

It is common knowledge that in 1933 he published a 328-page book on Duplicate-Contract Bridge which for many years was the standard text on Tournament Direction. Meantime, he had the pleasure of again playing with Major Gruber of Fort Knox, to whom he owed this acquired ability --and he sent him down by a whacking score!

It was also at Fort Knox that he met and married Grace Elizabeth Crum of Jeffersonville, Indiana, a secretary of the post. His wife and baby son Donald accompanied him later on an assignment to the Philippines, where their second son Richard was born.[2]

In 1927 he returned to West Point as an instructor in chemistry and electricity, the two areas of science in which he had been especially interested as a student at

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[1]Hauser, "The Army's Biggest Brain," p. 34.

[2]Gruenther's two sons, Donald and Richard, are both Colonels now--and both West Pointers like their father. "Donald has seven boys and one girl, and is stationed at the Pentagon, while Richard has three boys and three girls--they've just been ordered to West Point"--reported General Gruenther in a speech delivered in St. Petersburg, Florida, on July 7, 1969.

West Point. During those eight years at West Point he became an excellent teacher. This assignment provided him with a fine opportunity for practicing the art of oral communication.

While he was teaching at West Point, Gruenther was invited to referee the Culbertson-Lenz bridge tournament. For six weeks, every Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday afternoon after his last class at West Point, Mrs. Gruenther would drive him to New York City to direct the tournament and then drive him back for his 7:55 a.m. class the following morning. The back seat of their old Buick was padded with mattresses so Gruenther could stretch out and sleep both ways on the trip between West Point and New York City.

The reason for this arduous life was that Second Lieutenant Gruenther was being paid $100 a night for he was a Pro as a Director of Tournaments. He explained it this way: "For the last dozen years my Army pay had been about $167 a month. For $100 extra I would have taken on Al Capone."[1]

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[1]Fred L. Karpin, "The General Bridged the Lean Years," Washington Post, Sunday, September 4, 1966.

The Culbertson-Lenz Match--the so-called "Bridge Battle of the Century"--was front page news all over the country. A woman reader wrote the War Department, asking how a West Point instructor could drive to New York seven (she said) days a week to referee the match.

The War Department referred the inquiry to the Military Academy Superintendent for immediate investigation.

> The next Monday, the superintendent walked into Gruenther's first class and sat down. The same thing happened the next day and the next, on through Saturday.
>
> Gruenther, of course, was speculating about the superintendent's visits. He had never before been singled out for special attention. Six months later, Gruenther learned that the superintendent had written the following letter to Washington:
>
>> If I could be certain that being a bridge referee would have the same salutary effect on all of the Military Academy's instructors as it had on Lt. Gruenther, I would demand that they all become bridge referees in their spare time. I have never seen a finer chemistry instructor than Lt. Gruenther. . . .[1]

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[1] *Ibid*.

Advancement in Military Rank

The Army was overloaded with second lieutenants when the peace years took over following World War I. "Those were the lean years when few men could win a promotion. One class mate of mine estimated that it would take 85 years to make colonel. I wasn't sure," said Gruenther, "that I could wait that long . . . ."[1]

During the period from his graduation to 1935, Gruenther served on the instructional staffs at Fort Knox and West Point, was given a peacetime assignment in the Philippines, and was advanced from Second Lieutenant to First Lieutenant, and then to Captain. During the ensuing four years from 1935 to 1939, before he was to receive his first field command, he attended the Command and General Staff School and Army War College in Washington, D. C.

Aware that ranking officers were often called upon to speak in public, he enrolled in a public speaking course while stationed in Washington, D. C. The instructor of the course was Granville B. Jacobs, Consultant in Sales Management and Sales Practices for the Riggs National Bank

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[1] *Ibid*.

in Washington. The public speaking classes held once a week in the evening at a Washington hotel were attended regularly by Gruenther while he was in Washington at the Army War College.[1] During this period he also began to collect and index both serious and humorous anecdotes. It is apparent he places special emphasis in his speeches on the importance of appropriate, interesting, and humorous stories, always in context, to enliven his message.

First Field Command Assignment

In 1939 Gruenther was assigned the Command of the Field Artillery Battalion at Fort Sam Houston under the austere and rather gruff Major General (later Lieutenant General) Krueger. When Gruenther was asked about his past military experience, Krueger admonished him and declared Gruenther had spent far too much time at West Point and far too little in the field.

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[1]Information conveyed to writer by General Gruenther, August 5, 1969.

For the entire year the relationship between Krueger and Gruenther was somewhat strained. Gruenther's intuition that the General was becoming more mellow came some time later when Krueger suddenly invited him to become one of his aides. However, he warned Gruenther he was very difficult to get along with--and advised him not to accept the position. After careful consideration, Gruenther reported to the General that he had decided to take his advice! The General was disconcerted, but he agreed that Gruenther had made a sound decision.[1]

No doubt, Gruenther's decision not to accept his superior's offer required some special courage and fortitude.

Gruenther's Staff Appointments

In 1941 Gruenther was sent to Washington, D.C. to serve at General Headquarters under General McNair. Gruenther and Brig. General Mark Clark, who was also

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[1]Coughlan, "Thinking Machine Who Bosses NATO," p. 84.

under McNair's command, became close friends--a very fortunate friendship, indeed, for it was the stepping stone for Gruenther's rapid subsequent advancement.

Mark Clark was also a good friend of Col. Dwight D. Eisenhower who returned from the Philippines to serve as Chief of Staff to Lieutenant General Krueger, Commander of the Third Army at San Antonio, Texas.

On Clark's recommendation and with Krueger's endorsement, Eisenhower made Gruenther his Deputy Chief of Staff (October 1941) which was the beginning of a long and close friendship. Eisenhower voiced this observation while Gruenther served as his deputy: "I was intrigued by the little devil. He always had a joke or a wisecrack, he had all the answers at his finger tips, and he never got tired . . . ."

A few months later Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower was called to Washington, and Lt. Colonel Gruenther succeeded him as Krueger's Chief of Staff. So his very fortunate encounter with Clark and Eisenhower brought him quickly to a dramatic turning point in his career, with a rapid succession of staff appointments,

as well as advancements in rank. Actually, Gruenther received five promotions between July, 1940, and February 1943 to rise to Major General.[1]

In August 1942 Gruenther was transferred to London as Brigadier General, to serve as Deputy Chief of Staff under General Eisenhower. On his way from Texas to London, Gruenther stopped off at Washington to be briefed on Operation TORCH, the invasion of North Africa. But due to complications of circumstances in the Military Headquarters in Washington, he was obliged to leave for London unbriefed.

Upon his arrival in London, General Eisenhower briefly presented to Gruenther the idea of Operation TORCH and appointed him chief planning officer of the African invasion. He was notified to attend a meeting the next morning; and when he reached the conference, thirty British officers of high rank were awaiting him to hear the details of the American plans for Operation TORCH. Gruenther attempted to cover his surprise and acute embarrassment, explaining that he had just arrived and did not

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[1]Fred L. Karpin, "The General Bridged the Lean Years," Washington Post, Sept. 4, 1966.

feel qualified to speak. So the British officers agreed to postpone the meeting a few days. Gruenther quickly appointed a small staff and presented a preliminary plan a few days later. Within six weeks he had the entire operation completely planned despite his lack of experience in planning an invasion. Gruenther said: "It was sink or swim--I managed to swim, and in the process learned the art of planning--and I've spent most of my time at it ever since."

In January 1943, upon General Mark W. Clark's request, Major General Gruenther was named his Chief of Staff for the Fifth Army in North Africa, following the successful completion of Operation TORCH. Later Gruenther became Chief of Staff of the 15th Army Group, still under General Clark.

The 15th Army Group combined the combat forces of the Americans, British, French, Polish, New Zealanders, and Italians under Clark's command. Gruenther was highly commended by Clark for his ability to negotiate with the various nationalities.[1] He also considered Gruenther

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[1]This discerning observation by Clark predicted well the reason for General Gruenther's success in

most courageous and fearless under battle conditions, and Clark admitted Gruenther had a very calming influence over him. Whenever he would become troubled and frustrated, Gruenther would say, "Now Boss, Let's Think about it for awhile."

Clark considered Gruenther a "planner" without peer--for he planned the North African invasion, the Fifth Army landings in Italy, and the arduous campaign in Italy's mountains. Said Clark--"On every efficiency report I ever turned in on Gruenther, I wrote 'Highly Qualified to be Chief of Staff of the Army at appropriate time.'"[1]

Eisenhower, with an admiration matching Clark's, had been heard to remark, "Al Gruenther would make a good President of the United States."[2]

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speaking, as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Europe, to the various nationalities represented among the NATO countries.

[1] Time Magazine, Foreign News Section, Vol. LXVII, No. 6 (February 6, 1956), p. 26.

[2] Ibid.

In July 1945, at the end of the War, after the Germans surrendered, General Clark was named Commander of the U.S. Forces in Austria; and General Gruenther was named Deputy Commanding General of the United States occupied area there.

In 1946 General Gruenther was recalled to Washington where he served in several capacities: Commanding Officer of the National War College until 1947; Director of the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1947-1949; and Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Combat Operations (P & O) from 1949-50. In these two latter assignments, Gruenther maintained close relations with the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, and all the other important defense agencies.

Two new words "Gruentherize" and "Gruenthergram" were added to the Army's lexicon at this time.[1]

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[1]These two words, "Gruentherize" and "Gruenthergram," became very important and meaningful terms at SHAPE in 1953-56, as also conveyed to the writer by the SHAPE Staff during the television assignment with General Gruenther in 1956. To "Gruentherize" a person is to ask him interminable questions in the hope of refining a question or a situation to the n'th degree. A "Gruenthergram" is a small white slip of paper containing either a question or an order.

In December 1950, General Eisenhower was called from the Presidency of Columbia University to become the first Supreme Commander of the NATO forces at the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) at Marly, near Paris. Eisenhower chose Gruenther for his Chief of Staff. No doubt Gruenther's outstanding record of performance as Eisenhower's Deputy Chief of Staff in London in 1942 was an important factor in his being selected for the NATO post. Gruenther had also proved invaluable to Eisenhower while he was President of Columbia University in keeping him informed about defense matters. During this period of the Columbia presidency, Eisenhower returned to the Pentagon on a brief visit and made this observation--

> Everybody was turning to Al, and he would give the place, time, and figures out of his head. It was almost a case of working a good horse to death.[1]

The Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe, was officially dedicated on April 2, 1951, and Eisenhower enthusiastically reported that Gruenther was the service

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[1]Coughlan, "Thinking Machine Who Bosses NATO," p. 84.

specialist on international affairs and that he had a complete comprehension of the job--that he was the obvious and inevitable choice as Chief of Staff.

In 1952 when Eisenhower returned to the United States to run for President, it was well-known that Eisenhower hoped to see his close friend Al Gruenther succeed him.

But it was General Matthew B. Ridgway who was appointed Supreme Commander following Eisenhower's departure, and General Gruenther remained as Chief of Staff for Ridgway.

There are various opinions expressed by writers during this period concerning the rationale that led to the selection of Ridgway as the successor to Eisenhower.

Hauser, the Paris correspondent for the Saturday Evening Post at that time stated it this way:

> The Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington preferred a combat soldier . . . Ridgway, identified with some of the military exploits of World War II and an outstanding success as UN Supreme Commander in Korea, was the man best suited to implement the design with olive drab realities.[1]

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[1]Hauser, "The Army's Biggest Brain," p. 33.

Coughlan of Life Magazine reasoned thus on the choice of Ridgway over Gruenther:

> It seemed to a majority of the NATO countries that the situation called for a man with field command experience to succeed him [Eisenhower]. However, when General Ridgway was chosen it was with the proviso on their part that Gruenther remain as Chief of Staff, and when the top job fell vacant again due to Ridgway's election to Chief of Staff of the Army, Gruenther was the logical successor.[1]

Perhaps the above two viewpoints are not as conflicting as would appear on the surface. Perhaps both versions are reconcilable, in that the NATO countries and the Washington, D. C. Chiefs of Staff preferred Ridgway for the reasons given. However, the explanation that it was agreed in advance that Gruenther was to succeed Ridgway as Supreme Commander when Ridgway became Chief of Staff of the Army appears problematical as well as conjectural at this point of time. The writer wonders whether Washington would document a successor to any post in advance.

Edmond Taylor, columnist and author, indicated that one of the reasons why Ridgway, a great combat soldier,

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[1]Coughlan, "Thinking Machine Who Bosses NATO," p. 88.

seemed out of place at SHAPE was that he surrounded himself with a hand-picked team of U.S. officers. He seldom talked to any non-Americans.[1]

Gruenther, on the other hand, went out of his way to emphasize the international character of SHAPE. He tried to set an example by associating both professionally and socially with the British, French, and other non-American officers on his staff.

Time Magazine stated the reasons more frankly: "General Matthew Ridgway was a blunt soldier who demanded more troops than the Europeans were willing to supply, stepped on many toes, and left no happy memories."[2]

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[1]Edmond Taylor, "The Atlantic Alliance: After Gruenther, What?," The Reporter, June 2, 1955, p. 19.

[2]Time Magazine, Foreign News Section--"NATO," February 6, 1956, p. 25.

Command vs. Staff Qualifications

It is apparent that the Chiefs of Staff in Washington distinguish between the qualifications needed for command work and those needed for staff work.[1]

However, with an International Alliance such as NATO (just as in the international holding company in business), the specific demarcation between staff and command seem to disappear. SHAPE is not a fighting unit, but is charged with the formulation of an overall defense plan. The routine command decisions are obviously delegated to the generals and colonels in the field of the various NATO countries.

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[1]Obviously, the military commander (comparable to the manager or president in business parlance of "line organization") is the boss. He must assume the responsibility of decision-making and issuing orders. Consequently, he receives the blame or praise by the public, depending upon the outcome. In large units of military performance, a staff person (or persons) supply the much-needed information about the commander's and the enemy's situations, suggest courses of action, relay the commands of the superior and see they are carried out (and supervise all other essentials to enable the unit to maintain itself as an effective force.) This military concept of Staff can be likened to the Staff positions in business which provide the essential information and analysis to aid the Line Executives who are responsible for the decision-making and execution of the program.

Eisenhower, himself, had no command experience when he was catapulted into the Supreme Command after Pearl Harbor, and he certainly chaulked up an outstanding record of achievement.

General Alfred M. Gruenther's Appointment by the North Atlantic Council as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers of Europe

In 1953 when Ridgway was recalled to Washington for his appointment as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, Gruenther succeeded him as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Europe, and at 52 years of age became the youngest Four-Star General in the Army.

Questions were posed by some observers who voiced doubts about Gruenther's ability to practice the rare art of command at the highest levels.

A British Sunday paper pointed out:

> Gruenther's lack of command experience is regarded by many as a handicap which Gruenther will find it difficult to overcome. As Chief of Staff he has been used to working on projects in great detail, mastering the facts for himself. As Supreme Commander . . . he will have to rise above the facts . . . to make decisions instead of tendering advice, and this calls for qualities

> not always found in the man who has made his mark only as a staff officer.[1]

Edmond Taylor points out that the doubters turned out to be right in one way and wrong in another.

> Gruenther had no difficulty in learning to look at the big picture through a Supreme Commander's spectacles. The speech with which he grew into his new job surprised even his greatest admirers.[2]

Taylor further observed, however, that Gruenther never completely grew out of the periphery of staff responsibilities, but he simple worked with <u>equal efficiency</u> at <u>two</u> levels.[3]

In Army circles it is a well-known axiom that talent for detail is a priceless quality in a staff officer, but it can be disastrous in a commander. Some senior NATO officers were worried that Gruenther would let details distract him from broader thinking, but they learned with amazement of his ability to clear his mind and his desk with "lightning speed." They realized that he never did

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[1]Hauser, "The Army's Biggest Brain," p. 34.

[2]Taylor, "The Atlantic Alliance: After Gruenther, What?," p. 19.

[3]<u>Ibid</u>.

abandon the detail for which he possessed the type of mind which could operate brilliantly in two areas simultaneously with no limit of efficiency in either area.

As Supreme Commander, as well as Chief of Staff in former assignments, Gruenther always had "time" for people. Whatever pressures he happened to be under, he would dismiss them to make a caller feel at ease. Visitors found him calm, and ready to give his undivided attention to the interview. The writer personally experienced this attribute of General Gruenther at SHAPE and in later interviews in Washington. This characteristic was further confirmed to the writer by Staff members at SHAPE who also pointed out that newsmen consider Gruenther a perfect news source and most cooperative in press interviews. After all, he is the son of a newspaper publisher and understands the press point of view.

The above profile of GRUENTHER--THE MAN is the background prerequisite to the exploration of the particular focus in this paper--his speaking to NATO Members to promote the defense alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

However, to complete our profile of General Gruenther, it is essential to include here an Epilogue which details his career following his retirement from SHAPE; and covers his continuing dedication to mankind through the acceptance of the Presidency of the American Red Cross from 1957 to 1964, and his world-wide speaking commitments since 1964 to spread the crusade for international understanding, peace, and freedom for all people.

Epilogue

When General Gruenther retired from the Army as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Europe on January 1, 1957, he sought neither money nor a life of ease. It is well-known that General Gruenther could have named his own price in private industry, for he had demonstrated his outstanding leadership ability as the Army's leading intellect, a man blessed with organizational talent bordering on genius.

Instead, he accepted the invitation of the American Red Cross to serve as their National President at a salary which other men with his military honors and achievements would probably classify as "coolie wages."[1]

His office as President was in the Washington Headquarters of the American Red Cross. His indefatigable energy and indomitable dedication to digging for the

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[1]Richard Carter, "The Controversial Red Cross," Holiday Magazine, February 1960.

facts, whatever his assignment, scored for him a record for Red Cross service which was labeled by the nation-wide community leaders and Headquarters Staff of Red Cross as "the greatest since Clara Barton."

General Gruenther delivered inspiring, challenging, and persuasive speeches throughout the country in behalf of the Red Cross. He spoke to gain support for the organization's fund-raising projects--projects earmarked to provide aid for disaster areas and community improvement. He also spoke to promote enlistment for volunteer service. He criss-crossed this continent and others, many times, preaching the values of enlisting in the world cause of the Red Cross. From January 1, 1957 to March 31, 1964, during the seven and one-fourth years General Gruenther served as President of the American Red Cross, he made 802 speeches and travelled 741,250 miles.[1]

Just as he appealed for the cooperation of the European countries in NATO and the need for military commitments for the defense of their populace, so also he

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[1]Statistics secured from official records of American Red Cross by General Gruenther who conveyed the information to this writer.

subsequently appealed to people to provide volunteer service and funds for the aid of mankind.

(In Appendix D will be found two representative speeches General Gruenther delivered in behalf of the American Red Cross.)

Upon his retirement on March 31, 1964, at 65 years of age as President of the American Red Cross, General Gruenther in an interview with the Associated Press offered a "Prescription for Effective Americanism"--"Cherish self-discipline, education, individual responsibility, and the spirit of voluntary work for the public good."

(No one can ever say that General Gruenther has not practiced the virtues he preaches in his public speaking! It is well-known that few speakers can really live up to what they urge others to do.)

Innumerable newspapers throughout the country carried the release on General Gruenther's retirement from the American Red Cross, and each article featured

his "Prescription for Effective Americanism" stated above.[1]

The Winchester Evening Star of Winchester, Virginia, published an article headed "A Great American" which so aptly describes the retiring President of the American Red Cross and GRUENTHER--THE MAN, profiled in this paper, that it is included in its entirety below:

> From a country newspaper shop in Platte Center, Neb., by way of West Point and a succession of Army staff duties, to Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Europe ---
>
> From international military fame to a place of broad civilian responsibility and service as president of American National Red Cross ---
>
> This was the career of General Alfred Maximilian Gruenther, who at the age of 65 retires March 31 from the Red Cross.
>
> Those who know Al Gruenther have observed at close range the qualities which made him what he is: brains, decisiveness, concentration on

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[1]Several representative copies of releases in the writer's file recording General Gruenther's retirement message in the following communities:

News Register (Wheeling, W. Virginia), 3/24/64
The Herald (Wheeling, W. Virginia), 3/24/64
Journal Herald (Dayton, Ohio), 3/26/64
Globe (Joplin, Mo.), 3/26/64
Miami Herald (Miami, Fla.), 3/24/64
Enterprise (High Point, N.C.), 3/24/64
The Times Union (Rochester, N.Y.), 3/28/64

the task in hand, cheerfulness, confidence, consideration for others, and, above all, devotion to duty.

Dwight Eisenhower, whose chief of staff he was before he succeeded Ike at Supreme European Headquarters, considered General Gruenther competent to be President of the United States, a position he might have attained had he entered politics.

General Gruenther's military rank never gave him delusions of grandeur. More than most men in high places, he knew how to "walk with kings nor lose the common touch." He was as much at ease with a committee of volunteer workers in the smallest Red Cross chapter as with presidents and prime ministers of NATO countries.

When he retired from the Army he took a course plotted a century ago by Robert E. Lee when General Lee assumed the Presidency of Washington College, now Washington & Lee University. Like Lee, Gruenther sought not money-making but a path of unselfish service. For General Gruenther this was the humanitarian work of the Red Cross.

His words on retirement from Red Cross could appropriately describe his own principles:

"Cherish self-discipline, education, individual responsibility, and the spirit of voluntary work for the public good."

A grateful country salutes General Gruenther![1]

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[1] Winchester Evening Star, Winchester, Virginia (March 26, 1964).

General Gruenther received Red Cross decorations from many countries of the world, including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Ethiopia, Finland, Greece, Japan, Philippines, USSR (Badge of Honor).

He has also received military and diplomatic decorations from over 15 countries of the world, and innumerable awards and recognitions by the United States, including military, religious, and humanitarian service citations.

General Gruenther has been awarded no fewer than 37 honorary degrees from American universities, including Columbia University, Dartmouth College, Harvard University, Loyola University (Chicago), Loyola University (Los Angeles), University of Maryland, New York University, Yale University, etc.[1]

He is also a member of the Board of Directors of the following corporations: Pan American World Airways, New York Life Insurance Company, Rexall Drug and Chemical Company, and Federated Department Stores.

As a public relations emissary in the area of international relations and understanding General Gruenther

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[1]A detailed listing of his many activities, Honorary Degrees, Decorations, and Awards will be found in Appendix F.

has travelled over a half million miles throughout the world in these last five years since his retirement from the American Red Cross, to continue his service to mankind.[1]

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[1]Statistics conveyed to this writer by General Gruenther, August 5, 1969: "Since retirement from the American Red Cross on March 31, 1964, through the year of 1968 travelled 469,000 miles; since January 1969 to August 5 travelled 55,000 miles--a total of over a half million miles in the last five years."

CHAPTER II.

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

To understand the elements included in General Gruenther's speaking as Commander of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe, it is necessary to review briefly the origin and development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. No attempt is made to provide a definitive history; rather, attention is given to those matters which illuminate both the problems faced by Gruenther and his listeners and also the proposals made by Gruenther in his attempt to provide solutions to these problems.

On June 26, 1945, the representatives of fifty nations signed the United Nations Charter in San Francisco, and people of the world hoped that peace had at last dawned after one of the most ruthless wars in history.

Peace, however, was not assured, for the Western countries were confronted with a new threat: the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union. The defeat of Germany and Japan, two great military and industrial powers, resulted in an extensive "vacuum" to the east and the west of the Soviet Union. Under these favorable circumstances the Kremlin used the combined strength of their Red Army and World Communism to conduct their imperialistic policy.

The Western democracies demobilized almost all their armed forces following the War in keeping with their wartime pledges and popular demand. The United States and the United Kingdom withdrew the bulk of their armed forces from Europe, with the exception of occupation forces and units committed in other parts of the world.

Whereas the armed strength of the Allied Forces in Europe at the time of the surrender of Germany was about five million men, one year later following demobilization, their armed strength amounted to no more than 880,000 men. The following table shows the exact strengths after demobilization:

STRENGTH OF ALLIED FORCES IN 1945 vs. 1946*

	1945	1946
United States	3,100,000 men	391,000 men
United Kingdom	1,321,000 men	488,000 men
Canada	299,000 men	0 men

*NATO--Facts about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Nato Information Service, Paris, France, January, 1962, p. 4.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, continued their armed forces on a wartime basis. In 1945 their strength exceeded four million men. The Kremlin also kept their war industries going at full blast!

History books on this period record the innumerable attempts of political conciliation with the USSR by the Western Powers, who made every effort to make the United Nations an effective instrument of peace. The series of obstructions from 1945 to 1947 promulgated by the Soviet Union delayed the culmination of peace treaties. While the Peace Conference opened in Paris on July 29, 1946, the peace treaties with Italy, Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Roumania were not signed until February 10, 1947.

Between 1945 and December, 1960, the Soviet Union vetoed decisions taken by the Security Council of the United Nations on nearly one hundred different occasions.[1]

Soviet Territorial Expansion

Soviet territorial expansion, of course, had already begun during the war by the annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, together with certain parts of Finland, Poland, Roumania, North-eastern Germany, and Eastern Czechoslovakia--a total of about 180,000 square miles of territory occupied by more than 23 million inhabitants.[2]

This type of territorial expansion continued after the defeat of Germany and was supplemented by a policy of control over the countries of Eastern Europe. The Soviet strategy of Communist infiltration into "popular front" governments compelled Albania, Bulgaria, Roumania, Eastern Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia to fall within

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[1] NATO--Facts about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, p. 5.

[2] Ibid., p. 5.

the Soviet domination (an area of about 390,000 square miles and a population of over 90 million non-Russian inhabitants.)[1] And this campaign was effectively accomplished as a "conquest without war."

> The Communist parties in Western Europe, on orders from Moscow, strengthened Soviet policy by propaganda and by a course of action which opposed any Western viewpoint which was out of line with Soviet aims.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> As the gulf widened between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union, the Communist parties in the West allied themselves with the Opposition, and obeyed instructions from abroad. This trend was further reinforced by the setting up, in September, 1947, of the Cominform, the Communist answer to the Marshall Plan. The members of the Cominform were the leaders of the Communist parties in the USSR, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, France, Italy, and later, the Netherlands.
>
> At the end of 1947, directions for agitation and orders to strike supported a concerted and virulent campaign of opposition throughout the whole of Western Europe. The struggle continued with persistent attempts to infiltrate into all branches of activity in the Western countries, notably into the trade unions, in France and Italy in particular.[2]

The free countries of Europe recognized the importance of finding a means of guaranteeing their freedom and

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 8.

security in the face of Soviet expansion. And they turned toward the United States--the one country who was strong enough to pose a threat to the USSR. As history has revealed, the reaction of the United States was prompt and decisive. Four hundred million dollars for aid to Greece and Turkey were dispatched through the "Truman Doctrine"--and the organization of American civilian and military missions to these countries was authorized by Congress. The well-known Marshall Plan, authored by the Secretary of State of the U.S., General George C. Marshall, initiated the idea of a program for European recovery.

Interestingly enough, this offer of economic assistance in 1947 which contributed so effectively to the recovery of the Western countries was also open to the Soviet Union and the countries behind the Iron Curtain. However, Stalin refused all American aid for the USSR and despite initial interest on the part of both Czechoslovakia and Poland, forced all satellite governments to do likewise. When the Prague coup d'état in February, 1948, brought Czechoslovakia into the Soviet orbit, the Western allies in Western Europe unanimously recognized that common defensive action was needed.

The Brussels Treaty--The Forerunner to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

On March 17, 1948, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom signed the Brussels Treaty. On that date in Brussels they pledged to build up a common defense system and to strengthen their economic and cultural ties.

But the Brussels Treaty was scarcely signed when the Russians began their blockade of West Berlin (June, 1948) which was scheduled to last for 323 days. However, the Western Powers countered the blockade by the organization of the historic "Air Lift" (which lasted 11 months)--spearheaded and implemented primarily by the United States. The dramatic memorial built by the West Berliners in tribute to the aid of the U.S. Air-Lift which daily delivered their supplies and raw materials is a constant reminder to West Berlin of America's friendship.

The blockade hastened the setting up of Western defense, and in September, 1948, a military body was established with the Brussels Treaty known as The Western Union Defense Organization. Field Marshall Montgomery was

appointed Chairman of the Commanders-in-Chief; and his Headquarters were set up at Fontainebleau, France.

The Brussels Treaty of the free countries in Europe created the initial interest of the United States in the problems of security in the North Atlantic area. The idea of a single mutual defense system, including and superseding the Brussels Treaty, was promoted in the Canadian House of Commons, with the hope of course that the United States should be able constitutionally to join the Atlantic Alliance.

Following the acceptance by the U.S. Senate of a resolution drafted by Senator Vandenberg, preliminary talks opened in Washington in July, 1948, between the State Department and the Ambassadors of Canada and the Powers of the Western European Union. The Consultative Council of the five Treaty Powers of the Brussels Treaty announced complete agreement on the principle of a defensive pact for the North Atlantic area. In March, 1949, the Brussels Treaty Signatory Powers, Canada, and the United States officially invited Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal to accept the Treaty.

On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and the United States. Subsequently three other countries joined the twelve original signatories. Greece and Turkey were invited to join the Alliance in September, 1951 (signing the Treaty in February, 1952), and the Federal Republic of Germany officially became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on May 9, 1955.

The North Atlantic Treaty

First and foremost, the North Atlantic Treaty sets up a traditional defensive alliance whereby "an armed attack against one . . . shall be considered an attack against . . . all" (Article 5). Article 2 seeks to promote "economic collaboration."[1] But for various reasons the Alliance has always been subject to stresses and

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[1]See Appendix A for text of the North Atlantic Treaty.

strains in this economic area, despite their successive and persistent efforts.[1] For example, the continuing problem related to the Common Market and the thwarting of Great Britain's participation by France is indicative of one of the major struggles in the area of economic collaboration in NATO.

The most decisive break of precedent by the United States in entering the North Atlantic Alliance consisted in the deviation from its long enduring American philosophy of isolationism expounded by the founding fathers.

> The vast majority of Americans presumably recognize that in the face of the Soviet challenge, the isolationism of an earlier age has become either a luxury that can no longer be afforded, or an embarrassing legacy that must be concealed whenever possible.[2]

It must be conceded that isolationism was a very useful philosophy in the development of nineteenth century America. For the themes of "isolation," "America's remoteness from Europe," and all the "dangers of military

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[1]Richard Mayne, "Europe's Scrambled Algebra," NATO's Fifteen Nations, Feb.-March, 1965, p. 20.

[2]Lawrence S. Kaplan, "NATO and the Language of Isolationism," The South Atlantic Quarterly, Vol. LVII (Spring, 1958), p. 204.

alliance" were included in the proclamations on foreign policy in Washington's Farewell Address, Jefferson's First Inaugural Address, and the Monroe Doctrine!

Perhaps this philosophy of isolationism explains the early misgivings and apprehension concerning NATO reflected by public opinion in the United States.[1]

Will L. Clayton, president of the Atlantic Union Committee, defended the North Atlantic Treaty against the barbs of anti-isolationism with this statement:

> The world has gone through such a revolutionary change in the last few years that I cannot help feeling that if George Washington and our forefathers lived in the present, they would do exactly what we are doing.[2]

The real fear of the Treaty's supporters in the Administration and in the Senate was the implication of the <u>military</u> alliance which was interpreted by many as adding up to another war. The Administration pointed

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[1]Reticence in accepting NATO was reflected by a U.S. International Education Association who appointed this writer to attend the NATO Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 1953 as a "quiet observer" and not as an official delegate of the organization. (The NATO invitation urged delegate representation.)

[2]Kaplan, "NATO and the Language of Isolationism," p. 211.

out that this new alliance could not be likened to the "military alliance" of the previous hundred years, but was merely for defense--that it did not contemplate conquest or aggression.[1]

But another major criticism of the Treaty by U.S. Senate leaders concerned the potential usurpation of Congressional responsibility for declaring war, since by Article 5 of the Treaty, the war-making power was at the discretion of either one or more of the eleven allies. Article 5 would force the United States into war, since an attack on one was to be considered an attack on all. It was further pointed out that the highly regarded Rio de Janeiro Pact of 1947 at least noted in its Article 20 that "no state shall be required to use armed forces without its consent."

The many criticisms of the North Atlantic Treaty required considerable skill in arbitrating--

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[1]As will be noted in Chapters III, IV, and V, General Gruenther's speeches consistently included the theme that SHAPE--the military arm of NATO--was completely dedicated to building an army shield for <u>defense</u>, <u>not aggression</u>.

> The concept of an alliance was truly a Pandora's box containing the plagues of war, sabotage of the Constitution, raid on the United States Treasury, etc. For all the caution displayed by the managers of the pact, some of those plagues were bound to escape even if the box officially remained closed.[1]

It will be noted that the language of Article 5 was not a major asset to the Pact's cause--"even under the most charitable interpretation"[2] and its defenders were well aware of this liability. Thus, they pointed out that the emphasis in the text of the Treaty was as much on the promotion of stability, the safeguarding of their common heritage, and the encouragement of economic collaboration as on the guarantees against external aggression.

The North Atlantic Treaty was ultimately accepted on terms laid down by the Government on July 21, 1949.

> . . . The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations . . . convinced isolationists that the pact conformed with the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine and had nothing in common with the old European military alliances. In brief, the Government succeeded in invoking the

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[1]Kaplan, "NATO and the Language of Isolationism," p. 212.

[2]*Ibid.*, p. 213.

> shibboleths of isolationism to win acceptance of a policy that marked a departure from the isolationist traditions . . . . But whatever the language employed in 1949, Europeans at last knew that the vast weight America could wield in international politics had swung behind them.[1]

The organization of common defenses was a many-faceted task, with political, economic, and financial aspects as well as purely military ones. The total structure of the organization included (1) The North Atlantic Council and its Committees, (2) the International Secretariat, and (3) the Military Structure.[2]

The North Atlantic Treaty at Work

The North Atlantic Council met for the first time in Washington on September 17 and 19, 1949, and began to build a civilian and military framework. The Council of Foreign Ministers of member countries was scheduled to meet annually in ordinary session. (A special session

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 215.

[2] See Appendix A for four charts covering the Civil and Military Organization of NATO.

could be convened at any time that a member were to invoke Article 4 or 5 of the Treaty). The Council created a Defense Committee composed of the Defense Ministers of member countries, responsible for drawing up coordinated defense plans for the North Atlantic area.

A number of permanent military bodies were set up including a Military Committee, consisting of Chiefs-of-Staff of member countries responsible for advising the Council in military matters.

The Foreign Ministers directed that the questions of adequate forces and their financing should be tackled as a single problem rather than separately. They noted that the combined resources of the member countries were sufficient to achieve the progressive and rapid development of adequate defenses without impairing social and economic progress. They urged governments to concentrate on setting up balanced collective forces for the overall defense.[1]

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[1] Aspects of NATO--The First Twenty Years, NATO Information Service, Brussels 39, p. 7 (A brochure containing extracts from the book NATO--Facts and Figures to be published in 1969.).

Soon after these first meetings, there occurred an event which had a far-reaching effect on the evolution of NATO--the Communist attack upon South Korea. All member countries of the United Nations were requested by the Security Council to go to the assistance of the South Korean Republic.

New Defense Policy of NATO--The Forward Strategy

When the Council met again in New York on September 15 to 18, 1950, its discussions concentrated on the problem of how to defend the NATO area against an aggression similar to that in Korea. It was unanimously agreed that a Forward Strategy must be adopted for Europe, i.e., any aggression must be resisted as far to the East as possible in order to ensure the defense of all the European member countries. Such a strategy, however, demanded forces far exceeding those available to NATO at that time (approximately fourteen divisions on the European continent as against some 210 Soviet divisions). It was urgent

that military strength would have to be built up and defense plans revised!

The Council further recognized that a Forward Strategy implied the defense of Europe on German soil, and decided to study the problem of the political and military participation of the Federal Republic. The twelve divisions that the Federal Republic of Germany could contribute were also a very important positive factor for their inclusion in NATO. (Germany's participation raised many difficulties of principle for some member countries--especially France--and it was not until four years later, in May 1955, that the Federal Republic of Germany officially became a member of NATO.)

At Brussels on December 18, 1950, the Council made some important decisions on military matters; it approved (1) the Defense Committee's recommendations for the creation of an integrated European defense force, (2) the establishment of a Supreme Headquarters in Europe, and (3) the reorganization of the NATO military structure. It decided that the Supreme Headquarters should be placed under an American officer, and requested President Truman

to designate General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR). The President agreed, and on December 19, 1950, the Council officially announced the appointment.[1]

On April 2, 1951, General Eisenhower issued General Order No. 1, activating Allied Command Europe and the Supreme Headquarters--Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Paris, France.

Based on the principle that the burden of defending the West should be shared equitably among the member countries, it recognized that the defense build-up must rest on a foundation of social and economic stability which demanded expanded production by concerted action. Through the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, a procedure was adopted whereby the United States purchased from one or another European member equipment to be given to it or to another member (thus helping to relieve "balance of payment difficulties" on their war debts to the United States).

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

On February 18, 1952, Greece and Turkey were accepted in the NATO Alliance, bringing the total to 14 member countries.

As reported in Chapter I, General Eisenhower asked to be released as Supreme Commander in 1952 in order to return to the United States and enter the Presidential campaign; and on April 28, 1952, the Permanent Council appointed General Matthew B. Ridgway to the post of Supreme Allied Commander in replacement of General Eisenhower. A year later when General Ridgway was recalled to Washington to become Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General Alfred M. Gruenther succeeded him as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Europe on July 10, 1953.

General Gruenther did not assume his new post as a stranger, for he had been closely associated with the defense organization since its formation as Chief of Staff for both General Eisenhower and General Ridgway, his predecessors. He came to his post as a master-planner of large-scale defense moves. But equally important, he also came to this post as a "master-speaker" to enlist the interest

and support of the NATO countries in the need for a defense alliance and to persuade the reluctant governments to complete their military commitments in readiness for any eventuality of attack.

Gruenther moved into SHAPE at a far more difficult period of time than Eisenhower for enlisting cooperation on military contributions. When Eisenhower was embarking upon broad and extensive plans for the defense alliance, the psychological situation was far more conducive to cooperation, with the Korean conflict at its peak. There were also reports that atomic explosions were being tested in the USSR. The Western nations were fearful of their future and were willing to cooperate on mutual defense.

However, when Gruenther assumed command of SHAPE, the member countries had been lulled into apathy by the temporary change from "frown" to "smile" of the Kremlin. The Korean armistice had been accomplished, the tension had eased, and Western Europe was weary of military mobilization and expenditures. Americans, too, were growing

tired of foreign-aid grants which NATO needed to prevent the collapse of its military structure.[1]

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[1]The variance between the two periods (Eisenhower's command and Gruenther's) is described by General Gruenther in a speech delivered in New York, at the Alfred E. Smith Memorial Foundation dinner, on October 8, 1953:

> I think that it requires no great vision to be able to predict that NATO's next three years will be more difficult than its first three year period.
>
> It is well to recognize that NATO was created in an atmosphere of fear. The threat was towering and immediate. The hour was late. The whips of fear drove us into each other's arms. Ancient rivalries were forgotten. Political differences were reconciled. Confronted by the facts and by the question of survival, we found that survival was paramount and all else secondary. That element of fear is beginning to disappear. One reason is the very success we have to date in building up a certain degree of strength in NATO. We have grown stronger, and many hope--rather wishfully, I fear--that Soviet intentions are changing. I think it would be a tragic mistake for us to lower our guard now.
>
> As for the military potential of the Soviet bloc, there is no evidence to indicate that it is lessening. On the contrary, all of the intelligence reports available to us indicate that it is increasing.
>
> From Vital Speeches of the Day, October 15, 1953, p. 76.

A similar version of the above message is also included in General Gruenther's speech delivered in Copenhagen, Denmark, on August 31, 1953. The text for the "Copenhagen Speech" was sent to the writer by the Public

Another contributing factor for the lack of interest in a military alliance resided in the United Nations Conferences--the Summit Conference and the Geneva Conference--which provided the atmosphere of Soviet friendliness--a continuation of Russia's ruse! The conference proceedings recorded discussion on disarmament and the de-emphasis of nuclear weapon production, thus lessening the fear of any further war and adding to the apathy of military mobilization for defense.

"In their reply to a Soviet note of March 31, 1954, the United States, United Kingdom and France rejected the USSR's bid to join NATO!"[1] (Just another ruse of Russia's "friendship.")

With the Soviets leaning toward peaceful moves, and the desires of the Western World to cut down on taxes for military expenditures, General Gruenther faced many problems in building collective military defense for NATO.

Information Division of SHAPE and is analyzed in Chapter III as a Case Study.

[1] Aspects of NATO--Chronology (1945-1969), NATO Information Service, Brussels, p. 12.

> At the suggestion of the British Government, the London Conference held from September 28-October 3, 1954, brought together the Foreign Ministers of the five Brussels Treaty powers, and they included Germany, Italy, the United States and Canada. The conference formulated a series of decisions to form a part of a general settlement which concerned, directly or indirectly, all the NATO powers.[1]

This was a strategic move for the British Government to invite the Federal Republic of Germany to the London Conference, and thus pave the way for more receptivity for her inclusion in the NATO Alliance. Subsequently, in a Paris meeting of the NATO members, the approval to bring the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO was secured. All the governments represented at the London Conference also agreed that the North Atlantic Treaty should be regarded as being of <u>indefinite</u> duration. The provision of the agreements in this important meeting in Paris may be summarized as follows:

> France, the United Kingdom and the United States terminated the occupation regime in the Federal Republic of Germany and recognized it as a sovereign State . . . .
>
> The Federal Republic of Germany and Italy acceded to the Brussels Treaty and the Western Union

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[1] <u>Aspects of NATO, The First Twenty Years</u>, p. 17.

> became the Western European Union (WEU). There was to be extremely close cooperation between the WEU and NATO.
>
> The Federal Republic of Germany was invited to join NATO, contributing a national army to be integrated into the forces of the Alliance . . . .
>
> The United States and United Kingdom . . . undertook to maintain for as long as necessary their forces on the European continent. (President Eisenhower publicly confirmed this undertaking on March 5, 1955.) A unified military formation was to be established by assigning to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe all member countries' forces . . . stationed within the area of his command.[1]

The accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization became effective on May 9, 1955. Two days later the USSR denounced its treaties with France and the United Kingdom; and on May 14, 1955, in retaliation to the Paris Agreements with the acceptance of the Federal Republic of Germany in NATO, the USSR concluded the Warsaw Pact with its European satellites.

This Pact, signed in Warsaw, was the first time a formal multilateral military alliance tied together the Soviet Union and the Communist States of Eastern Europe.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

The structure of the Warsaw Pact and its terminology were closely modeled on NATO. The most important difference between NATO and the WTO (Warsaw Treaty Organization) is that "whereas any member of NATO can withdraw from the alliance, no such thing can even be contemplated by any member of WTO, as was seen by the painful experience of Hungary in 1956."[1]

On May 15, 1956, the Austrian State Treaty was signed which ended the Four-Power occupation regime in that country. The success in securing Russia's approval of withdrawal from Austria provided a strategic time to follow up with the USSR on an agreement that Germany's reunification should take place under terms permitting her to remain in the Western Alliance. But the Soviet Union rejected this view at the Second Geneva Conference in October, 1955. However, the NATO Council declared that the negative outcome of the conference with the USSR

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[1]Major E. Hinterhoff, "The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Warsaw Pact," NATO's Fifteen Nations, Oct-Nov. 1968, p. 28. (In recognition of his writings on the Warsaw Pact, the author was awarded the NATO Research Fellowship in 1962.)

"in no way halted the efforts of the North Atlantic Powers to secure the reunification of Germany in freedom."[1]

In the years during his assignment as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Europe, as well as during the period since his military retirement in 1956, General Gruenther has continued to convey the theory of Russia's fanatical dedication to world domination by the spread of Communism throughout the world despite the spasmodic interludes alternating as "friend" and "foe." Gruenther had to persuade the NATO members of Russia's continuous attempts to divide and weaken Western Europe, and to encourage them to support the NATO military alliance with increasing commitments for successful defense.

With so many problems in the military as well as the political-diplomatic realms, it became apparent that face-to-face oral communication could be an important tool in resolving these complex difficulties. Although NATO was a Western Alliance and General Gruenther was speaking to the Western Allies, his speaking was also of vital interest to the rest of the world. Russia, for

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[1] Ibid., p. 19.

instance, was eager to study the content of the Gruenther messages of defense against aggression.

Through personal visits and talks with governmental officials, foreign ministers, diplomats, and military heads of the NATO countries, Gruenther sought to secure their support. He lacked any definite authority; he had no power to dictate to the member nations and force them to build up military defenses; he had no right to issue commands in this political and diplomatic realm to secure cooperation. His strength was derived from a wealth of information, the conviction that his proposal was valid, and the personal attributes needed to bring about agreement, cooperation, and goodwill.

It is General Gruenther's role as an oral advocate in appealing to the NATO countries for cooperation and support of the military alliance which will be analyzed in the succeeding chapters of this study.

Epilogue

Since NATO is considered even more important at the present time with the continuing and more serious disagreements of the USSR with the Western World, it is logical that a brief review of the events following General Gruenther's retirement from SHAPE is in order.

In August, 1956, the writer interviewed both General Gruenther and General Lauris Norstad, Gruenther's successor, in their respective offices at SHAPE, located in Marly, France (suburb of Paris). A transcription of the tape recordings of interviews with both Generals is included in Appendix B along with photographs of this occasion. It is interesting to note that General Gruenther's replies to the questions posed by the interviewer in 1956 are just as appropriate in their application to the current problems with the USSR as those prevailing in the earlier period. True to General Gruenther's prediction, the USSR continues unwaveringly in its fanatic

dedication to world domination by its spread of Communism throughout the world, necessitating a strong Western defense to deter attack.

General Lauris Norstad assumed command of SHAPE as its Supreme Commander on November 20, 1956.

In May, 1957, in Bonn, NATO's defense policy was the principal subject of the Ministerial Conference due to the Soviet propaganda machine. The Soviet leaders had launched a campaign inducing public opinion in the various member countries of NATO to oppose the modernization of Western defense forces.

> The Council agreed that one object of this campaign was to ensure for Soviet forces a monopoly of nuclear weapons on the European continent, and that in the face of this threat the Atlantic Alliance must be in a position to meet any attack which might be launched against it.[1]

At this meeting a question was posed which even now is of crucial importance, namely, the correct balance between nuclear and conventional arms, and the ABM (anti-ballistic missiles program)--currently under consideration in the United States!

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[1] Aspects of NATO--The First Twenty Years, NATO Information Service, Brussels, p. 22.

Beginning with this 1957 Ministerial meeting, and continuing to the present, the reunification of Germany, to which NATO has been dedicated since the Federal Republic joined the Alliance, has been a continuous source of contention. At the same time, there has been a constant attempt at reassurance of European security through the reaffirmation of the defensive character of NATO strategy.

The Tenth Anniversary of SHAPE

For the tenth anniversary of SHAPE and Allied Command Europe on April 2, 1961, General H. J. Kruls (the Hague, Holland) Editor-in-Chief of the bi-monthly magazine, NATO'S Fifteen Nations, invited Generals Eisenhower, Ridgway, Gruenther, and Norstad (the four Supreme Commanders of SHAPE from 1951-1961) to express their viewpoints on NATO.

The following are extracts from General Gruenther's reply:

March 11, 1961

Dear General Kruls--

. . . It was my honor to serve as the SHAPE Chief of Staff from December 18, 1950--the day that the NATO Ministerial Conference at Brussels directed General Eisenhower to organize Allied Command Europe--until General Ridgway relinquished Command on July 13, 1953.

SHAPE came into existence on April 2, 1951. Most of us feel that the world is now an uneasy place; I am sure, however, that you recall very well that the people of the NATO countries were greatly worried during the early months of 1951.

General Eisenhower arrived in Paris on January 8, 1951. On the following day he started his visit to the NATO capitals in Europe. Brussels was the first stop, and then he came to The Hague, where I first met you. The spirit at each Governmental Conference was good, but the stark reality stood out clearly: NATO had at that time only extremely meagre forces in being in Europe. The situation in Korea was very grave, and there was every indication that it would grow worse.

The only thing we were really sure about was that our SHAPE "Vigilance" coat of arms was a good one. I played a minor role in developing that insignia. I offered three bottles of cognac as a prize for the winning design! I was delighted to award the prize two weeks later.

We were wearing cloth SHAPE patches by the time SHAPE opened officially. I am glad to see that you show the insignia in each issue of VIGILANCE.

I am aware of the fact that NATO is having problems--some of them severe ones. However, I would

like to make the point that I have traveled a great deal since I became President of the American Red Cross on January 1, 1957--over 450,000 miles. About two thirds of this travel has been in the United States. I am convinced that the people of this country have great faith in NATO. The knowledge of the organization is greater than it has ever been previously. I am certain that the American Government and the American people will continue to support it steadfastly.

Most of your readers have an intimate knowledge of NATO. It is only natural that the frustrations and apparent failures of NATO depress them at times. Nevertheless, I have no fear in stating categorically that NATO has made much greater progress than those who were with SHAPE at its birth ever thought possible. Of course, we must do better, and I am sure we will.

The six years I spent at SHAPE were the happiest of my 38-year military career. I shall never cease to be grateful to the SHAPE personnel for their dedicated service. Also, I shall always be thankful for the help that the NATO Governments gave us.

As for THE FIFTEEN NATIONS, I read every issue. I think that you and your associates are doing a magnificent job. May the magazine continue to thrive.

Sincerely,

Alfred M. Gruenther (signed)[1]

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[1]"Vigilance" Supplement to NATO'S Fifteen Nations (February-March, 1961), p. 7.

Since General Gruenther is dedicated to handwritten letters and notes for personal messages, the reply to General Kruls' request was no exception. Above the printed version of General Gruenther's message there is included on the magazine page (in red ink) an exact copy of an extract from General Gruenther's handwritten message--to indicate the personal involvement of the General in conveying his thoughts on NATO.

The Berlin Question

Towards the end of 1958, it was the question of Berlin which dominated the scene. August 13, 1961, brought the "Wall of Shame" which sealed off the Eastern Sector of Berlin. Notwithstanding the protest of the three Allied Powers, the building of the Berlin Wall proceeded. The Wall, of course, was to prevent the East Germans from escaping to the West, prompted by the threat of the Soviet Government to increase the strength of the Red Army on the Western frontiers by calling up reserves.

(During the first six months of 1958, over 103,000 had fled to the West.)[1]

In January, 1963, General Lauris Norstad retired as Supreme Commander and was succeeded by General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, an able Commander-Statesman, whom the writer had the privilege of interviewing at SHAPE IN August, 1963.

The years 1964-65 brought very few new developments in the solution of outstanding problems, as described by the NATO Information Services:

> The year 1965 was a year which saw no major crises in Europe but in which the Soviet Union continued to oppose a settlement of the cardinal issues between East and West; and to devote an increasing share of its economic and technical resources to military purposes.[2]

This strengthened the determination of NATO countries to maintain the unity of the Alliance and to tighten their defense system through broader allied participation in nuclear force planning.

March, 1966, brought President de Gaulle's ultimatum to cease France's participation in NATO integrated

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[1] Aspects of NATO--The First Twenty Years, NATO Information Service, Brussels, p. 35.

[2] Ibid., p. 43.

military commands. The French Government notified the other 14 NATO nations of the withdrawal of French forces from NATO, with the simultaneous withdrawal from French territory of allied military forces and the Headquarters of SHAPE.

Although France remains a member of the NATO Alliance, it does not participate in the military structure.

In July, 1966, the NATO Defense Ministers met in Paris and adopted a NATO force plan for the period up to and including 1970, and worked out plans for the years following 1970.

March 30, 1967, marked the final flag-lowering ceremony at SHAPE in France; and on the 31st the official opening ceremony of SHAPE in Costeau, near Mons, Belgium, marked the beginning of a new era of SHAPE history.[1]

In 1968, the efforts of NATO "to negotiate with the Soviets about mutual and balanced force reduction in

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[1]See Appendix B for photographs of SHAPE in its new location at Costeau, Belgium.

Europe" were thwarted when on August 20 the armed forces of the Soviet Union and four other Warsaw Pact countries (Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Hungary) invaded Czechoslovakia.

> The Ministers in their communique issued from the NATO Brussels Headquarters reaffirmed the inviolability of the principle that all nations are independent and that consequently any intervention by one state in the affairs of another is unlawful. In the case of Czechoslovakia they noted that this principle had been deliberately violated by the Soviet leaders and four of their allies.
>
> The NATO Ministers underlined the dangers of the Soviet contention that a right exists for intervention in the affairs of other states deemed to be within a so-called 'Socialist Commonwealth' as this runs counter to the basic principles of the United Nations Charter.[1]

One of the main reasons for the recent Czechoslovakian crisis was the fear by the Soviets that Czechoslovakia, as a result of its process of liberalization, might find itself on the way toward a withdrawal from the Pact.

> Although the Pact was meant originally as a manifestation of Soviet reactions to Germany's admission to NATO, it gave the Soviet Union very considerable political, and in the long

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 53.

> run also strategic advantages, which the Russians would be reluctant to lose.[1]

The immediate and very important implication of the Warsaw Pact was the legalization of the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary, Poland, Roumania, and Eastern Germany. The presence of Soviet troops in the countries of Eastern Europe played a very important role in keeping within their power the Communist puppet regimes which were subservient to Moscow. It was for these reasons that the Soviet was trying by hook or by crook to introduce its troops into Czechoslovakia, in order to bolster up the pro-Soviet elements in the party and administration.

Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia, and especially the Soviet deployment of troops along the frontier of the Federal German Republic, created justified fears of a sudden Soviet "coup" which could take NATO by surprise. Therefore, the stationing of Soviet troops along the frontier of the Federal German Republic, which extends

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[1]Major E. Hinterhoff, "The Czechoslovak Crisis and the Warsaw Pact," NATO's Fifteen Nations, October-November 1968, p. 28.

the existing confrontation of 20 Soviet Divisions in Eastern Germany against NATO's troops in Northern Germany, could mean that the "Russians could make a few deep and powerful thrusts into Western Germany."[1]

And what does all this mean for Western security?

The authoritative answer was provided by the Foreign Ministers of NATO on November, 1968, when they declared:

> The North Atlantic Alliance will continue to stand as the indispensable guarantor of security and the essential foundation for the pursuit of European reconciliation. By its Constitution the Alliance is of indefinite duration. Recent events have further demonstrated that its continued existence is more than ever necessary.[2]

General Gruenther participated in a Two-Day Symposium on NATO at Kent State University in Ohio, covering the "Origins and Development of NATO," on February 25, 1969 and "The Present and Future of NATO" on the following day. He confirmed the increasing need for NATO and pointed out--

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[1] Ibid., p. 31.

[2] Harlan Cleveland, "NATO After the Invasion," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 2 (January 1969), p. 251.

> The reasons for the existence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization may be even more valid today than they were 20 years ago when the Alliance was organized.[1]

The other two participants at the Kent State University Two-Day Symposium were Mr. Georges Bidault, Former French Provisional President, and Dr. Walter LaFeber, Professor of American History and Chairman of the Department of History at Cornell University.

Georges Bidault said,

> There is a bad balance of power now in Europe with the scales tipping toward the Warsaw Pact Countries and I suppose Mr. Nixon hopes to achieve a better balance. But NATO's future is very uncertain until de Gaulle passes from the scene.[2]

On this score, Bidault considered that de Gaulle would never give up power voluntarily, and predicted that the French President could be beaten at the polls.[3]

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[1]Correspondence from General Gruenther, Feb. 26, 1969. (Tape recordings of his two speeches at this Symposium in writer's file.)

[2]David Hess, "Fate of NATO Up to De Gaulle, Experts Admit," Akron-Beacon Journal, Feb. 26, 1969.

[3]Ibid. (the recent election in France proved Bidault correct in his prediction).

Gruenther, on the other hand, holds there are other factors beyond de Gaulle's opposition which have contributed over the years to NATO's decline. He points out that the apparition of an American-Soviet détente has undermined West Europe's willingness to develop the Alliance. But to balance off this apathy, Gruenther contends that the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia has revived some fears of many Western European leaders. However, Gruenther admitted at this Symposium, "Most of the vows to strengthen NATO have been solely in the form of statements. Not one of the allies, including the United States, has said it's willing to put up the money to bolster the Alliance."[1]

In tribute to the leadership provided by the United States, Bidault conveyed the point of view that "without the physical and moral presence of the United States in Europe, I'm quite certain the Russians, even 10 or 20 years ago, would have been on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean."[2]

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*

Looking into the future, LaFeber said "NATO's prospects for revitalization hinge largely on how badly President Nixon wants an East-West détente. Although such a détente is not now in the cards, if it were achieved, NATO would probably be reduced to a Chapter in history."[1]

The 20th Anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on April 4, 1969, brought the announcement of the retirement of General Lyman Lemnitzer, NATO's fifth Supreme Commander, who is succeeded by General Andrew J. Goodpaster.

In an appeal to the NATO nations for more and better-trained manpower and improved weapons, General Lemnitzer said:

> The Communist threat to the Western alliance is formidable and active . . . NATO in its 20 years has given the members of the alliance the peace, freedom, and security they sought. Whether they will continue to live in that peace and freedom lies solely in their will

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[1] Ibid.

> and determination to maintain the military forces of the alliance at the levels needed for collective security of all NATO.[1]

Lemnitzer pointed to the occupation of Czechoslovakia last August, the continually rising defense budgets on the part of the Warsaw Pact powers, and the Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean, which seemed aimed at flanking NATO Europe.

Lemnitzer argued that the answer must be in maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent and improving the alliance's conventional forces.

To commemorate the 20th Anniversary of NATO, the editors of NATO'S Fifteen Nations published a special Anniversary issue. General of the Army, Dwight D. Eisenhower, the first Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, and former President of the United States, wrote a praiseworthy contribution for this Anniversary edition--evaluating NATO as "rich with promise of greatness and reward"--

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[1]"Chief Asks Stronger NATO," Detroit Free Press, March 25, 1969, p. 11A.

> . . . . NATO has been the shield of security behind which fifteen nations have been able to build a present prosperity and an evident strength that presage a more abundant and secure future. . . . the NATO countries produce more than half of the world's real wealth, control more than half of the world's military power, and supply more than half of the world's technicians and administrators.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is rich with promise of greatness and reward for its members and all the free world. The obstacles before it are no more formidable than those already surmounted. The essential ingredient for continuing success is perseverance in our loyal support of a partnership that has already paid rich dividends to fifteen nations. It is an example to free nations everywhere which seek the security and prosperity that is possible for them in like partnerships. . . .[1]

The nation and the world mourned the passing of this great leader of mankind on March 28, 1969--just a few days before the 20th Anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington, D. C. on April 4, 1949, by the twelve original signatories.

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[1] NATO'S Fifteen Nations, Vol. XIV, No. 1 (February-March, 1969), p. 35.

CHAPTER III

THE COPENHAGEN SPEECH (AUGUST 31, 1953)

PART I

THE OCCASION, SETTING, AND AUDIENCE OF THE COPENHAGEN SPEECH

Following his appointment as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers of Europe, General Gruenther delivered in Copenhagen, Denmark, his first major address to the military officers and foreign ministers of the NATO nations at the "Atlantic Community Convention"--as titled in the script of the speech which the writer received from the Public Information Division of SHAPE. However, this "Convention" was sponsored by a local group in Copenhagen who held one of the first meetings on the significance of the Atlantic Community, calling themselves the "Hedge Hog" organization. But as a substitute for "Hedge Hog", they chose for this five-day conference in August 1953 the more formal title of "Atlantic Community Convention" which, of

course, was synonymous with "NATO." In addition to the representatives from the NATO nations, delegates from various civic and educational groups of the free nations were invited to attend, which resulted in a very cosmopolitan audience in Copenhagen to hear General Gruenther's address on "The Role of NATO in the Defense of the West."

The speech was delivered in the evening in a spacious, attractively decorated assembly room of a large government building in the heart of Copenhagen, and was followed by a reception, providing the opportunity for the audience to meet General Gruenther, the NATO officers, and the various government heads who were present. Since the Copenhagen speech is the only one of the three speech case studies in this paper which the writer had the privilege of hearing (as a representative of a national educational association of the United States) the details on the setting for the speech are from personal observation.

More than 350 persons were in the audience--most of whom were seated with their own delegations from their own respective countries. Flags of the NATO nations decorated the low platform from which General Gruenther

delivered his speech. A huge colored map of NATO formed the background to which Gruenther referred periodically in pointing out specific geographical locations.[1]

The basic purpose of this introductory speech was primarily expository--to explain the "Role of NATO in the Defense of the West"--as well as to reply to some objections which had been raised against NATO. The purpose, goals, and organization of SHAPE were covered in detail in the Copenhagen speech to inform the audience of the complete background relationship with NATO. In the two subsequent speeches analyzed as case studies--the 1954 London Speech, and the 1955 Rome Speech--the administrative organization of SHAPE as related to NATO was excluded as NATO operations became better known among the member nations.

In addition to this purely expository material pertaining to NATO, the following four major topics are

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[1]A map of NATO is the favorite backdrop invariably chosen by General Gruenther for public addresses and broadcasts. For interviews and conferences in his office at SHAPE he also preferred the location immediately in front of the large NATO map covering one wall--as photographed during the recorded interview with the writer in July 1956. (See Appendix B.)

included in all of General Gruenther's speeches to NATO nations: the threat of the Soviet Union (which explains why NATO was formed); the progress NATO is making; the problems NATO is facing; and the hope for the future.

These four topics are not always developed in the same sequential order in his various speeches, including the three Case Studies. Furthermore, the speeches obviously vary with the progression of time, involving revisions in the statistical information on NATO military capabilities with the introduction of new weapons of warfare--along with the progressive increase of Soviet military power.

It is significant also to note that the speeches vary in the choice of materials and their development for adaptations to the immediate occasion and audience whom Gruenther is addressing.[1] He added or subtracted from the basic structure of the speech to meet the needs of the immediate audience situation, but always kept in mind

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[1]Please note the fact of audience adaptation--a phenomenon or practice which subsequent analyses will show--was an outstanding characteristic of Gruenther's workmanship.

the overall Western--as well as World audience--in the news releases.

PART II

RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COPENHAGEN SPEECH

BY PARAGRAPHS[1]

[Paragraphs 1 and 2]

(1) *General Eisenhower arrived in Paris approximately two and one half years ago to organize Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, commonly known as SHAPE. That Headquarters is now a going concern, and is charged with the defense of Europe, extending from the Northern tip of Norway to the Eastern borders of Turkey, an arc of some 7,000 kilometers.*

(2) *SHAPE is one of three major military commands which function under the North Atlantic Council, the overall civilian political authority, which sits in continuous session in Paris. The Council is served by an international staff under the leadership of Lord Ismay, the Secretary General. The governing military body is the Military Committee, consisting of one representative from each of the fourteen member nations. The present Chairman of the Military Committee is Admiral Qvistgaard of Denmark. To provide for more rapid and effective action the Military Committee set up the Standing Group, consisting of a representative of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. The Standing Group sits permanently in Washington, and functions as a type of executive committee for the Military Committee.*

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[1]The text of General Gruenther's Copenhagen Speech sent to the writer by the Public Information Division of SHAPE did not include any reference to the introduction of

In the opening two paragraphs Gruenther was attempting to convey information on the organization of SHAPE and its operating relationship with NATO administration, as the undergirding and foundation for his later discussion on the importance of military defense for collective security.

In the first paragraph he explains the length of time SHAPE has been organized and the expanse of territory for which SHAPE was responsible in the defense of Europe:

> SHAPE (the military arm of NATO), had been organized by General Eisenhower upon his arrival in Paris approximately two and one half years ago (since early 1951).

General Gruenther. Also excluded was the General's acknowledgement to the introduction, as well as his opening remarks stating the purpose and scope of his message to the Copenhagen audience.

However, General Gruenther has informed the writer that he was introduced by the President of the local Danish Society. The writer clearly recalls the General's gracious acknowledgement to the introduction, which was followed by a clear explanation of the thesis of his address. In summary, the introduction of the speaker, the speaker's acknowledgement, and his opening remarks on the purpose and scope of his message (the Introduction of the speech) were deleted in the transcription of the tape recording of the speech for the SHAPE files. The text from SHAPE opened with the Body of the speech as indicated by the two italicized paragraphs recorded here. Since the Copenhagen speech does not appear in any published source, the text from SHAPE is the only available record.

SHAPE was charged with the defense of Europe from the Northern tip of Norway to the Eastern borders of Turkey--an arc of some 7,000 kilometers.

In the second paragraph Gruenther describes the three administrative levels of control of SHAPE-NATO in descending order of rank:[1]

(a) The North Atlantic Council, the overall civilian-political authority, which sits in continuous session in Paris. The Council is served by an international staff under the leadership of Lord Ismay, the Secretary General.

(b) The Military Committee, the governing military body, with one representative from each of the NATO nations.

(c) The Standing Group (or executive committee) for the Military Committee consisting of a representative from the United Kingdom, France, and the United States, respectively,--stationed in Washington--to provide more rapid and effective action.

Gruenther's explanation of the background and administrative operation of SHAPE is clearly and succinctly organized and described in a manner which represents the type of methodology that presumably should aid the audience in understanding the relationships between the three levels of control of SHAPE and thereby build Gruenther's reputation in military administration.

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[1]See the four Charts covering the Civil and Military Organization of NATO--Appendix A.

Gruenther's language style is didactic and matter-of-fact in describing the organization and operation of SHAPE. His word choice is simple and direct, contributing to the clarity of his crisp, to-the-point statements.

The General is particularly careful to clarify the significance of the "*Standing Group*" by explaining that it sits permanently in Washington and functions as a type of "*executive committee*" for the Military Committee. He further sees fit to explain the reason for its organization by the Military Committee--to provide for more rapid and effective action when time is at premium. The term "Standing Group" is obviously identified by Gruenther as terminology needing further explanation for his audience, which is another illustration of adaptation and of the type of workmanship which is designed to add to his stature with the audience.

[Paragraph 3]

(3) *All countries represented here this evening have had defense problems throughout the centuries. In the case of Denmark, for example, more than 1,000 years ago your Danish ancestors set up*

> *stone walls as ramparts for the southern land defenses against the predatory Saxons. On the site of beautiful Copenhagen, Bishop Absalon, its farsighted founder, built a stronghold 900 years ago against the pirating Wends. Happily, the enemies of those days are today friends. It is not necessary for me to point to other symbols of the enduring will of Denmark during the past 1,000 years to defend its freedom. Our objective in NATO today is the same, but the scope of the problem is much more vast, and the methods differ.*

To involve the audience Gruenther states that all countries present have had defense problems throughout the centuries--which provided the universality of the current defense problems faced by NATO. To adapt the problem to the host country of Denmark, two examples of defense are cited from the many "symbols of enduring will" of Denmark's history to defend its freedom: first, the southern land defenses set up against the predatory Saxons 1000 years ago, and second, the stronghold on the site of Copenhagen against the pirating Wends in 900. It is significant to note that General Gruenther has again adhered to his usual chronological pattern of citing the example of the predatory Saxons 1000 years ago, then the example of the pirating Wends of 900 years ago.

The samples are introduced as an analogy to the objective of NATO, with of course the exceptions that the scope of the problem and the methods of NATO were vastly different. Here, again, Gruenther is following an approach which is a design of workmanship to produce goodwill and establish himself with the audience by the recognition of Denmark's success in defending their country against invaders in the past.

The Progress NATO is Making
[Paragraphs 4-5-6-7-8 and 9]

(4) *Our basic defense philosophy involves the use of the minimum number of active forces, and to place maximum dependence upon Reserve forces. We visualize that with this minimum of active forces we will create a shield to give us a cushion of time sufficiently long to enable our Reserve forces to mobilize. In case of attack we would depend upon the Tactical Air Forces and the Land Forces to fight the combined air-land battle, while our Strategic Air Forces would strike deep into enemy territory against industrial targets.*

(5) *To provide for more effective control of the defense battle the SHAPE area has been broken into regional commands, set up as follows: the Northern Command under General Mansergh at Oslo, the Central Command under Marshal Juin at Fontainebleau, the Southern Command covering Italy, Turkey and Greece under Admiral Fechteler at Naples, and the*

Mediterranean Command under Admiral Mountbatten with headquarters at Malta.

(6) *When General Eisenhower arrived early in 1951 the state of the defenses in Europe was pitifully low. Since then there has been a tremendous improvement. The forces have approximately doubled, and the gain in effectiveness has been greater still. That applies particularly to our air forces, which initially were especially weak. One of NATO's outstanding achievements is the increase in number of airfields. We shall have by the end of this year about 125 usable fields.*

(7) *The defense budgets of the member countries have increased. Not considering the United States, the other countries have more than doubled the amounts spent for defense. If the U.S. increase is taken into account the ratio is much more favorable.*

(8) *Nearly all countries have increased their periods of national service , the most recent case being that of Denmark which has now provided for 18 months' service, a very gratifying development.*

(9) *During this two and one half year period we have had the opportunity to prepare detailed defense plans for the employment of our forces. Every commander now knows exactly what he would do in the event of an emergency. That does not guarantee that we would be able to withstand an attack successfully, but at least each element of the command knows what action to take. The success of our efforts would depend upon the amount of force that the aggressor would bring against us, and also on the skill with which he would employ that force.*

In the preceding six paragraphs General Gruenther confines his remarks to expository factual information concerning the progress NATO was making--a major topic in this address as well as all others to NATO countries. In the development of the progress of NATO at the time of the Copenhagen speech, Gruenther presents six areas of progress in military defense.

He first outlines the basic philosophy involving the use of the minimum number of active forces by placing maximum dependence upon Reserve forces, thereby providing an effective shield of active forces until the Reserve forces could be mobilized. The strategy of defense in case of attack would be the use of Tactical Air Force and the Land Forces, while the Strategic Air Forces would be directed against industrial targets.

The second contribution to NATO's progress for more effective control of the defense battle was the organization of regional commands--the Northern Command at Oslo, the Central Command at Fontainebleau, the Southern Command covering Italy, Turkey, and Greece at Naples, and the Mediterranean Command with headquarters at Malta. This

organization of four regional commands reflects the progress in logical development of space relationships.

The third improvement in the progress of NATO was the doubling of forces--especially the air forces, which were initially very weak when General Eisenhower arrived early in 1951. The increase in airfields was notable, with approximately 125 usable air fields estimated by the end of 1953.

The fourth area of progress concerned the increase in defense budgets, which had more than doubled in all member countries, with the U.S. ratio of increase much higher.

The fifth improvement noted by Gruenther was the increase in the periods of national service--with special commendation to Denmark who had recently increased their program to 18 months' service.

And the sixth evidence of progress during the two and one half year period was the preparation of detailed defense plans for the employment of NATO forces, with each command knowing exactly the procedure to follow in the event of an emergency.

Gruenther's description of the progress NATO was making is a factual reporting responsibility based on his personal testimony as authoritative evidence. This use of his comprehensive knowledge of every area of military defense represents an attempt to support his thesis concerning NATO and, also, the type of approach designed to produce in the audience a sense of respect for the speaker's intelligence and military leadership.

[Paragraphs 10-11-12-13]

(10) *Just what could our NATO forces accomplish now? One official, of a cynical turn of mind, when asked three years ago "What do the Soviets need to march to the Channel?" answered, "Only shoes!" I can assure you that at this time the NATO forces of Allied Command Europe are of such strength that the Soviets do not have sufficient power in occupied Europe to be reasonably certain of success if they should attack with the forces now there. In other words, I believe they would have to bring in additional forces from the USSR before they could launch a successful attack against the West. If that estimate is a correct one, it represents a most significant achievement, because it means that we should be able to obtain a reasonable amount of warning of an impeding attack.*

(11) *We should then be able to mobilize our reserves, and otherwise take appropriate readiness measures, to enable us to meet the threat.*

(12) *This is real progress, much greater than we thought would be possible when we started out two and a half years ago.*

(13) *Before leaving the question of progress, I desire to make clear that we still do not have adequate strength to defeat an all-out attack. But we would in no sense be a push-over.*

The rhetorical question concerning what the NATO forces could currently accomplish is a method to involve the audience with a question which any member of the group might have asked--a very logical question following Gruenther's resume of the progress NATO had made in its various areas of military defense.

By the introduction of another question in direct discourse posed to a cynical official three years prior--*"What do the Soviets need to march to the Channel?"*--he answered--*"only shoes!"* But Gruenther's reply for the current period is positive and optimistic--supported by personal testimony--conveying his belief that the Soviets would be obliged to bring in additional forces from the USSR before they could launch a successful attack against the West, since they did not have sufficient power in occupied Europe.

On the condition that this supposition was correct, Gruenther proceeds to outline the effects of their achievement: that NATO would have a reasonable warning of an attack, and in turn, this would enable them to mobilize their reserves to meet the threat of the USSR.

To the internal summary sentence, *This is real progress, much greater than we thought would be possible when we started out 2 1/2 years ago,* Gruenther includes a reservation to correct any impression the audience might have received of over-optimism. Although it was good strategy to convey the idea that progress had been achieved for psychological reasons, it was equally essential to clarify the need for additional defense support from the member nations. Therefore, he closes this section of his speech on the progress NATO has made, with the admonition that NATO did not have adequate strength to defeat an all-out attack-- *But we will in no sense be a push-over.*

By logical reasoning, with supporting evidence, Gruenther builds his presentation on the progress which NATO has made in the specific areas of military defense during the two and one half years since the organization

of the Alliance. However, it was imperative to curtail over-optimism by pointing to the inadequacy of current defense capabilities to meet an all-out attack. For the next two years were to be far more difficult in enlisting support of the NATO nations to increase their defense capabilities.

The Problems Facing NATO
[Paragraphs 14-15-16-17-18-19-20]

(14) *What are some of the major problems which we still face?*

We consider that air power is the dominant factor in modern warfare. Our most critical deficiency today is the strength of our air forces, and I say that in spite of the excellent progress already made. The Soviets have an air force of some 20,000 operational planes, a large proportion of which are jets. To meet that air threat our air forces must be increased and their effectiveness must be such as to be ready to fight on an instant's notice. It is not sufficient to depend upon Reserve air forces for the reason that air attacks can develop with such devastating swiftness that we would not be able to mobilize air reserves in time. We at SHAPE have given first priority to the development of our air forces. That does not mean that we think we could win a war solely by the use of air power. We consider that an adequate defense posture can be obtained only by the air-land-naval team. It is essential, however, that increased emphasis be placed on the development of larger and more effective air forces.

(15) *Earlier I told you that under our concept our shield would hold long enough to enable our reserve forces to mobilize and move to the area where they are needed. Unfortunately those reserves are still critically inadequate. That deficiency represents our second major problem. The Soviets have a very large active land force in being, consisting of 175 Soviet divisions, and approximately 70 satellite divisions. The Soviet divisions are less effective, but their effectiveness is increasing constantly. We have no thought of trying to match that force division for division, because to maintain active forces of that magnitude would place unacceptable strain on our economy. That is the reason why we place such great dependence on reserve divisions. But those divisions must be good, because if they are employed against Soviet forces their effectiveness has to be of higher caliber. The creation of adequate reserve forces presents a difficult problem for the NATO governments. It means that a large proportion of our manpower will have to spend considerable time each year in reserve training. That is inconvenient for the individuals concerned, and of course it tends to create economic strains.*

(16) *Our third major difficulty lies in the Logistics field. We must have adequate supplies for our forces if an emergency should develop and we must have a logistic system which enables us to move those supplies quickly to the places where they will be needed. Our progress is still far below what it should be and we are constantly urging member governments to take appropriate measures.*

(17) *Now for a short discussion of the role of naval forces in the defense of Europe. The Soviets have an extensive submarine capability which can be exercised by the more than 300 submarines in*

the Soviet Navy. Also they have a significant mining capability. Both of these could be used to interfere with our vital sea lines of communication from North America. Admiral McCormick, SACLANT commander, with headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia, is charged with the protection of the sea lines of communications across the Atlantic. In addition, Admiral McCormick's forces will assist in the defense of our vital North flank of Denmark and Norway, by the extensive use of naval power, both surface craft and naval aviation. In the Mediterranean Admiral Fechteler has assigned to him the U.S. Sixth Fleet with its powerful carrier-based aviation which will be able to give effective air support in the Mediterranean area. Admiral Mountbatten is charged with the protection of the lines of communication in the Mediterranean, and with other important naval assignments. Naval power by means of its great flexibility will be able to make a substantial contribution to the defense of Europe.

(18) *In outlining these major problems to you, you have noted that the philosophy behind our concept is certainly a defensive one. I stress that point because Soviet propaganda efforts, particularly in the last month, have emphasized the aggressive nature of NATO. I can assure you that there has never been as much as a single paragraph written at SHAPE which evnisages that we would be the aggressor. All of our plans are based on the assumption that war, if it comes, will be started by the enemy, and that we will have to adjust our strategy accordingly. I need not tell you that in this day of modern weapons, that is a tremendous disadvantage for us. Moreover, the Soviets know well that our troop dispositions and our strength are such that we do not have a capability to assume the role of an aggressor. Our alliance is clearly*

defensive. It is that common bond--that objective for the preservation of peace--which has been responsible for the progress we have already made.

(19) *Much thought is being given by the planners at SHAPE and at the Standing Group for the employment of new weapons. The peoples of the NATO nations, and especially the Finance Ministers, are constantly asking the question, "To what extent will new weapons lessen the requirements? To what extent may we expect to have our taxes reduced as a result of the advent of these new weapons?" We do not have a satisfactory answer to that question. It is a difficult problem, involving the projection of strategic thinking about four years in advance. Many of the new weapons are still in the testing stage, with the result that not enough is yet known of their capabilities. Even if these new weapons should reduce the requirements for conventional forces, that would not necessarily mean lower cost, because most of the new weapons are very expensive. I don't want to go so far at this time as to say that the outlook for the reduction of expenses is a discouraging one. At the same time I do not want to hold out the hope that there will be a substantial reduction, until the subject has been more thoroughly studied.*

(20) *In this connection you will I am sure be interested to know that the United States Command in Germany organized on May 1st a Special Weapons School at Oberammergau in Germany to teach Allied Officers the application of the new weapons in tactical situations. In our maneuvers this fall atomic warfare considerations will be realistically played.*

The transition to the second major topic is introduced with the rhetorical question, *What are some of the major problems which we still face?* Just as in General Gruenther's analysis of the progress NATO was making, six areas of military defense were explained, so also in the second major proposition on NATO's major problems, six specific problem areas are analyzed.

Because air power was considered the dominant factor in modern warfare, the first major problem in NATO military defense was identified by Gruenther as the critical deficiency in NATO air forces, compared to the 20,000 operational planes of the Soviets, most of which were jets. That SHAPE had given first priority to the development of the air forces was also attributable to the recognition that Reserve air forces could not be mobilized quickly enough to meet air attack.

The second major problem of NATO was the critical inadequacy of reserve forces. Here again, by contrast and comparison, Gruenther reports the superior power of the Soviets with 175 divisions, and approximately 70 satellite divisions. That NATO placed such great dependence on

reserve divisions was caused by the excessive cost of maintaining active forces. But the creation of adequate reserve forces also presented a difficult problem because of the length of time required in reserve training.

The third major difficulty was attributed to the Logistics field--not only in the need for adequate supplies but also in the movement of supplies to places where they are needed. Because NATO was far below standard, the member governments were being urged to take the appropriate measures.

The fourth major difficulty concerned the extensive submarine capability of the Soviet Navy with over 300 submarines, along with significant mining capability. That both of these capabilities were a threat to the vital sea lines of communication resulted in Gruenther's explanation of the four supplementary commands of NATO responsible for the protection of the sea lines adjacent to the respective territories of the member nations--thereby making a substantial contribution to the defense of Europe.

A fifth problem with which NATO was faced was the Soviet propaganda efforts emphasizing the aggressive nature

of NATO. By personal address, Gruenther reminds the audience that in outlining the major problems, the philosophy behind the concept was a defensive one, supported by the evidence that *there has never been as much as a single paragraph written at SHAPE which envisages that we would be the aggressor.* Since their plans were all based on the assumption that war would be started by the enemy, Gruenther emphasizes the disadvantage with the statement *I need not tell you that in this day of modern weapons, that this is a tremendous disadvantage for us.* Further evidence that the allegation by the Soviets was unethical and false is implicitly inferred by Gruenther's statement that the Soviets were well aware of NATO's lack of capabilities to assume the role of aggressor.

A sixth problem centered in two questions based on the employment of new weapons. To simulate dialogue with the audience, Gruenther poses the two questions in direct discourse as questions which were being asked by the people of NATO nations and especially the Finance Ministers: *To what extent will new weapons lessen the requirements? To what extent may we expect to have our taxes reduced as a result of the advent of these new weapons?*

The answer to these two questions was vitally significant to the whole program of enlisting additional defense support from member nations. Gruenther had no doubt anticipated that these crucial questions were in the minds of his audience, and must have realized the answer must be a double-barreled reply which would not deter increased effort of the NATO nations in building land, air, and naval support, but at the same time he could not definitely promise reduction in taxes, with the projection of new weapons. His methodology in replying to the two questions represents the type of workmanship designed to convey his honest opinion based on logical reasoning, a procedure which should have helped to establish his credibility with the audience. First, he admits that there was no satisfactory answer at the present time since the difficult problem involved strategic thinking four years in advance. Secondly, many of the new weapons were still in the testing stage, without adequate knowlege of their capabilities. Third, that even if the new weapons could substitute for some of the conventional forces, this would not necessarily mean lower cost because the new weapons would be very expensive.

Therefore, to summarize his comments for the audience on the basis of the uncertainty of the information available, he chose the position of honest conviction: that the outlook for the reduction of expenses was not a discouraging one, but he could not convey the hope that there would be a substantial reduction until the subject had been thoroughly studied. To add optimisim to his personal testimony, he includes in personal address the information on Special Weapons School at Oberammergau, Germany, organized by the U.S. Command to teach Allied officers the application of new weapons in tactical situations for realistic maneuvers on atomic warfare.

The stylistic pattern followed in the analysis of NATO's major problems is typical of General Gruenther's characteristic simplicity in sentence structure and word choice. Although he was involved with military problems, he absolves himself completely from military jargon by describing the problems in simple, understandable language for the lay members of the audience.

Prospects for the Future
[Paragraphs 21-22-23-24]

(21) *What are the prospects for the future? When General Eisenhower made his estimate shortly after he arrived in Europe he came to the conclusion that the first two to three years would probably be the most difficult. No similar alliance in history had ever succeeded for any length of time during peace. The project was a very new one, involving a cumbersome procedure to obtain unanimous action by the members. In spite of those disadvantages, however, the alliance has thus far succeeded beyond all expectations. The doctrine of collective security has been adopted wholeheartedly by all NATO members.*

(22) *That very success, however, is causing us trouble for the future. I think that it requires no great vision to be able to predict that the next two and a half years will probably be more difficult than the first two and a half year period.*

(23) *It is well to recognize that NATO was created in an atmosphere of fear. The threat was towering and immediate, the hour was late. The whips of fear drove us into each other's arms. Ancient rivalries were forgotten. Political differences were reconciled. Confronted by the facts and by the question of survival, we found that survival was paramount and all else secondary.*

(24) *That element of fear is beginning to disappear. We have grown stronger, and we are becoming more susceptible to the blandishments of the Soviet peace offensive. I can assure you, however, that there is no evidence that the*

> *armed strength of the Soviet bloc is growing weaker. On the contrary, all intelligence reports indicate that it is increasing. It is true that the Soviet dictatorship appears to be having difficulties in the captive countries. What this will mean to the nations of the West is not yet clear. Certainly the speech which Malenkov made to the Supreme Soviet on August 8 was hard and unyielding. There was no hint in it, or at any time since, that the Soviets plan to make any concessions to the West.*

General Gruenther moves to his third topic with the rhetorical question as the transition--*What are our prospects for the future?* General Eisenhower predicted that the first two to three years would probably be the most difficult. General Gruenther observes that no similar alliance in history had ever succeeded for any length of time during peace--also that the procedure was very cumbersome to obtain unanimous action by the members.

However, despite these apparent disadvantages, Gruenther expresses enthusiastic personal testimony that *the alliance has thus far succeeded beyond all expectations,* and that *it had been adopted wholeheartedly by all NATO members.* But he warned that this success, paradoxically, would probably contribute to problems for the future.

Gruenther predicts that the next two and a half years will be more difficult than the first two and a half year period referred to by General Eisenhower, and by personal testimony sets out to prove this contention with the following arguments:

> *. . . NATO was created in an atmosphere of fear*
> *The threat was towering and immediate, the hour was late**
> *The whips of fear drove us into each other's arms.**
> *Ancient rivalries were forgotten*
> *Political differences were reconciled*
> *Confronted by the facts and by the question of survival--*
> *We found that survival was paramount and all else secondary.*

In the above parallel construction, and the series of simple sentences, there are two very dramatic metaphors* --in the second and third lines above, which are expressed in language in the "grand manner" which is in great contrast to General Gruenther's usual pattern of simplicity of description.

In contrast to the first few years, Gruenther presents a far different description of the more recent period where the fear is beginning to disappear with the growing strength of NATO--resulting in the member nations becoming more susceptible to the *blandishments* of the Soviet peace

offensive. But General Gruenther then reverts to the authority of intelligence reports, indicating that the Soviet armed strength had been increasing rather than growing weaker (an anomaly, indeed, for a nation allegedly embarking on a peace offensive!)

Other indications that appeared contrary to the so-called peace propaganda were evidenced in the difficulties which the Soviet dictatorship were encountering with their captive countries--as well as the unyielding speech by Malenkov twenty-one days before reflecting no plan of the Soviets to make concessions to the West.

In other words, General Gruenther points up the dangers of the Soviet peace propaganda offensive launched for the prime purpose of dissipating the fear of NATO nations of an aggressive attack, and thereby curtail NATO interest in increasing their armed defense, while the Soviets steadily continued to build up their military strength! Thus, the Soviets, while embarking upon a propaganda program for a <u>peace offensive</u>, were at the same time building their military strength, presumably for a <u>military offensive</u>.

The personal testimony of General Gruenther based on supporting evidence from intelligence reports confirmed that the Soviet military strength was increasing rather than decreasing with their launching of the peace propaganda program. Therefore, the apathy and reticence of some NATO members were, in his judgment, attributable to the Soviet peace propaganda program devised to allay NATO fears of an aggressive attack.

The Threat of the Soviets
[Paragraphs 25 and 26]

(25) *I shall not dwell on possible Soviet intentions other than to point out that at the 19th Soviet Congress in Moscow last October Malenkov made it clear that the major and continuing Soviet effort would be directed toward the dismemberment of the NATO alliance and the progressive isolation of its member states. This of course is the ancient but still valid strategy of divide and conquer. Even without the cynical public announcement of this intention, I cannot believe that any of the NATO partners would be gullible enough to be taken in by this oldest of confidence games.*

(26) *The plan of world communism has been chronicled and proclaimed. Both the strategy and the tactics of the communist drive have been published and republished in every corner of*

> *the earth. We know the techniques and we know the successes those techniques have won. We will continue to ignore them at our peril, Surely we have learned the hard way that Soviet peace offers followed at once by Soviet threats is a key technique in the communist cold war--a technique designed to keep the West off balance and at the same time to foster despair, disillusionment and loss of confidence in our leaders.*

The above two paragraphs reflect the fourth major topic to be conveyed by General Gruenther in <u>the threat of the Soviets</u>, with the significant report of Malenkov at the 19th Soviet Congress in Moscow in 1952. Although the Soviet intention of *dividing and conquering* the members of the NATO alliance was of course not publicly announced, General Gruenther infers a warning in expressing the hope that no NATO nations would be *gullible enough to be taken in by the oldest of confidence games.* This association of the opponent with unethical tactics, a methodology designed to discredit the integrity of the opponent, should have produced in the minds of the audience a significant awareness of the dangers imminent in this peace offensive and contributed to the credibility of the speaker.

This line of thought is continued in the next paragraph in the description of the plan of world communism with its strategy and tactics to launch peace offers followed immediately by threats--the technique of the Communist Cold War--an exact simile to the methodology adopted by the USSR in its peace offensive with the ultimate goal of dismembering and conquering the NATO alliance. Gruenther's logical analysis of the effects of this type of cold war involving the Soviet strategy of keeping the West off-balance, and at the same time to *foster despair, disillusionment, and the loss of confidence in NATO leaders* should have clearly conveyed the reasons for the danger and peril in ignoring these well-known techniques.

In paragraph #26 the series of sentences beginning with the plural first person pronoun followed the methodology designed to produce audience involvement in the sharing of the knowledge of Communism which should have developed rapport with the audience and helped to establish Gruenther's credibility for his knowledgeability on the sinister ways of Communist techniques:

> *We know the techniques and we know the successes those techniques have won.*
> *We will continue to ignore them at our peril . . . .*
> *We have learned the hard way that Soviet peace offers . . .*

[Paragraph 27]

(27) *A friend of mine used to say "The pocketbook is the sensitive nerve of the human body" and I suppose that is a wise observation. Certainly it is true that the economic difficulties of the NATO nations are increasing. It is also true that important social and economic projects are being deferred as a result of expenditure for defense. I realize our armed forces will be effective and unblunted only to the extent that the nations supporting them remain strong in spirit, active in intellectual endeavor and sound economically. The task for NATO is to strive for that balance between military economic and social requirements that will make us secure both from external attack by an aggressor and from internal disintegration resulting from poverty and discouragement.*

General Gruenther's admission that the economic difficulties of the NATO nations were increasing, and that important social and economic projects were deferred because of defense expenditures is an important and strategic observation for him to voice at this particular point of time.[1]

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[1]This observation might well have been in response to the criticisms lodged by NATO members as well as by some officials in the United States on the over-emphasis of expenditures for military defense without adequate consideration for the economic and monetary problems of the NATO alliance. It was significant and important for NATO leadership to also recognize the importance of economic, social and political issues.

It was significant that Gruenther should emphasize the relevancy of the NATO nations remaining *strong in spirit, active in intellectual endeavor, and sound economically*. His statement on the goal of NATO in securing balance between military, economic, and social requirements in order to protect the NATO nations against external attack as well as against internal disintegration from poverty and discouragement is the type of reasoning which should have dispelled all doubts on his intuitive recognition of the importance of balance for the success and effectiveness of the armed forces.

The use of parallel construction *remain strong in spirit, active in intellectual endeavor, and sound economically* is not only strong in composition, but excellent in word choice.

[Paragraph 28]
(Concluding paragraph of Body of Speech)

(28) *This determination must be made on a long term basis. It would be the most dangerous type of wishful thinking to assume that the struggle will be of short duration. A defense program is*

> *not something that can be turned off every time Soviet leaders speak of the possibility of co-existence and turned on a month later, when a Laos is invaded or an Iran maneuvered to the edge of the land of no return. We cannot afford it psychologically and we cannot afford it financially. That way, indeed, lies ultimate bankruptcy for the West. Having agreed upon our minimum requirements we must push steadily and uniformly between optimism and despair, without sudden outpourings of billions and equally sudden and violent retrenchments.*

The transition sentence refers back to the concluding sentence of the previous paragraph (#27) as a determination which must be followed on a long term basis.

That a defense program must be consistent in its support, without being turned on and off with the change of the smile of co-existence to the frown of invasion by the Soviets, is sound logical reasoning by General Gruenther--an approach to the psychological and financial problems following a design which should have earned the respect of the audience and contributed to the speaker's credibility.

[Paragraph 1]
(Opening Paragraph of Conclusion of Speech)

(1) *I feel that we are facing a period ahead where service to the cause of freedom must be given unselfishly by the North Atlantic peoples. From my experience I am confident that the people will make the necessary sacrifice if they understand why they are being made, and if they believe that NATO can be an effective agency to preserve the peace. For that reason I am particularly gratified that you men and women have taken the time and trouble, at considerable expense, to meet in connection with the Atlantic Community Conference now taking place at Copenhagen. Your contribution in crusading for this cause can indeed be a tremendous one. I am especially pleased to see you stressing the civilian aspects of NATO. I congratulate you on the efforts you are making to strengthen NATO and I want you to know that if we at SHAPE can be of any assistance to you, we stand ready to help. We would be particularly honored to have any of your groups visit SHAPE. You will find there 420 officers from twelve nations who have made an outstanding success in the field of international cooperation.*

The emphasis on the importance of unselfish service to the cause of freedom and the expression of faith in NATO members to make the necessary sacrifices if they understand the reasons and *if they believe NATO can be an effective agency to preserve the peace,* are most significant comments with dramatic impact designed no doubt to

secure rapport with the audience by expressing faith in their willingness to make any sacrifice to preserve the peace.

The tribute to the young men and women in the audience for their interest in attending the Atlantic Community Conference, their contributions in crusading for the cause, stressing the civilian aspects of NATO--in direct and personal address for audience involvement--represent the type of approach which is designed to establish their goodwill through appealing to their pride of achievement.

Within this paragraph the singular first person pronoun appears six times, the plural first person pronoun, four times--and the second person pronoun, "you"--eight times--which emphasizes the informal, conversational, friendly tone through personal address--a stylistic pattern which usually serves to implement the type of workmanship described in the previous paragraph in terms of earning rapport with the audience and establishing the credibility of the speaker.

[Paragraph 2]

(2) *Many years ago Clemenceau said "War is too important to be entrusted to the generals." While he was half joking when he made that statement, the events since then have certainly proved him to be correct. Modern war embraces not only the military factor but also vast political, economic and psychological considerations.*

With the reference to Clemenceau's quotation, Gruenther is again emphasizing the fact that modern warfare includes the political, economic, and psychological considerations as well as the military factors.[1]

These comments also reflect his humility and wisdom as a military leader in giving full recognition to the other areas which contribute to the effective and successful achievement and preservation of peace.

[Paragraph 3]

(3) *Although it may seem strange to have men in uniform advocating the cause of peace you will find that the officers at SHAPE, as well as throughout Allied Command Europe, consider that to be our prime objective. Most of us have seen*

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[1]See footnote, p. 116.

> *too much of war to believe that any benefits can come from another world struggle. I would not go so far as to say that "Peace is too important to be entrusted to the civilians." But I do say that we in the military are making a real contribution to peace by denying to a would-be aggressor an easy, cheap and profitable conquest. We firmly believe that if NATO had been in existence in 1939 World War II never would have taken place.*

By admitting that it may appear incongruous for military men to advocate the cause of peace, Gruenther considerably strengthens his tribute to SHAPE officers in pointing up the cause of peace as their prime objective.

As a partial corollary to Clemenceau's well-known quotation, Gruenther admits he would not go as far as to say that *Peace is too important to be entrusted to the civilians*, but feels that the military are making a real contribution to peace *by denying a would-be aggressor an easy, cheap and profitable conquest.* The irony and sarcasm of this reference to the Soviets as *would-be aggressors* was a meaningful description representing a type of workmanship designed to appeal to the NATO audience, and pay tribute to the military personnel of NATO for their contributions in behalf of peace.

With a hypothetical supposition, Gruenther reasons that World War II would never have taken place if NATO had been in existence in 1939--which by inference implies that NATO can prevent World War III.

[Paragraph 4]

(4) *It is a sad commentary on the state of the world today that peace cannot be established without power. Nevertheless, that is a fact. We have tried negotiation from weakness, and in the process, we have seen almost half of the world swallowed up in the darkness of Soviet imperialism. We must have military strength not only to resist aggression but also to give our statement a firm basis from which to negotiate a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union.*

Gruenther is here stating an axiom which represents the basic reason for the organization of NATO--that military strength is a pre-requisite for any negotiations with a potential enemy as well as for successful resistance of aggression. It is this reasoning which explains Gruenther's unswerving dedication to building NATO's military defense capabilities to meet these two fundamental goals.

The second sentence including the statement *". . . we have seen almost half of the world swallowed up in the darkness of Soviet imperialism."* is a dramatic metaphor of fear-charged words which portrays a realistic picture of the ominous aggressive characteristic of Soviet imperialism--as confirmed by history.

[Paragraphs 5-6 and 7]
(Closing Paragraphs of Conclusion)

(5) *The task of leadership in the period is indeed a heavy one. It is time to reconcile our national policies where they show signs of diverging. It is time to heal the wounds to national pride that have come from bitter and ill-considered words. It is time for forgiveness, for understanding, for patience, and above all for rededication to that fundamental unity of purpose and policy without which we should surely perish.*

(6) *Our modest strength is beginning to reap dividends. It would be a tragedy if we should weary and falter in the last hard stretch to the goal we have agreed upon.*

(7) *Never was there greater need among the NATO nations for unity, for wisdom, and for perseverance. Never was there a greater need to see clearly that our lives are bound inextricably together. Never was there a greater need to demonstrate that we who have inherited freedom,*

have not forgotten the value of that heritage
nor lost the will to defend it.

In these concluding paragraphs there is the semblance of eloquence of language which is elevated from Gruenther's usual pattern of simplicity in sentence structure and word choice. This decisive contrast stresses the significance of the idealistic philosophy he is attempting to convey to his audience.

Through parallel construction, the repetition of the opening phrase *It is time . . .* in each of three sentences of the first paragraph above, brings added emphasis to the ethical philosophy structured in effective rhythmic cadence--*It is time to reconcile . . . . It is time to heal the wounds . . . . It is time for forgiveness . . . .*

The ethical implications in the two metaphors no doubt carried special significance to the patriotic and spiritual philosophy which General Gruenther attempts to convey in these closing words in Copenhagen--

It is time to heal the wounds to national pride
that have come from bitter and ill-considered
words. (Par. #5)

It would be a tragedy if we should weary and falter
in the last hard stretch to the goal we have
agreed upon. (Par. #6)

The concluding paragraph, in parallel construction, again uses repetition of the initial phrase in each of the three sentences to gain emphasis: *Never was there greater need . . . . Never was there a greater need . . . . Never was there a greater need . . . .*

The seven paragraphs of the Conclusion of the Copenhagen speech offer a real challenge to the audience in the many tasks of leadership related to unselfish service in the cause of freedom.

A sincere and enthusiastic endorsement of an ethical philosophy is encompassed in Gruenther's plea for unity in purpose and policy, wisdom, perseverance, forgiveness, patience, and understanding--expressed in eloquent as well as simple language. This is the type of inspirational challenge to an audience which is designed to lift their sights while building the credibility of the speaker.

PART III

EVALUATION OF THE COPENHAGEN SPEECH

Since the Copenhagen speech was General Gruenther's first major message to the official representatives of the NATO nations as well as to delegates from the Atlantic Community and civic groups, his principal objective was to explain the background and purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to answer any objections which had been raised regarding NATO. He clearly described the reasons for this alliance of ten free European nations, with Canada and the United States making the even dozen in 1953 --to build collective military security as a defense against the threat of enemy aggression.

Gruenther's description of the military arm of NATO--the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers of Europe (SHAPE)--and its relationship to the civil organization of NATO was carefully interpreted as essential background information to clarify to the audience the

overall operation of this new alliance dedicated to the preservation of peace and the prevention of a third World War. Gruenther thereby fulfilled his responsibility to inform his audience on the purpose, goals, and organization of NATO by adhering to acceptable methodology in the arrangement of his lines of thought, the development of his ideas and factual material supported by examples, illustrations, personal testimony, and patterns of logic.

In connection with his handling of objections regarding NATO, Gruenther presented clear and logical arguments for the significance of SHAPE as a crucial part of NATO. His methodology of stating a generalization, supporting it by various types of evidence, such as numerical data, facts, and figures, often with personal testimony based on logical reasoning, represents his distinguishing characteristics in the development of his materials which contribute so very much to the clarity of his message.

Another positive characteristic reflected in this address in Copenhagen is his choice of simple and understandable language, free from military jargon. This

clarity of expression is particularly essential when addressing a cosmopolitan group such as the audience he faced in Copenhagen, representing military officers, foreign ministers, and a large contingency of lay groups from civic and educational organizations present on this occasion.

Last, and probably most significant, is the overall adaptation to this particular audience. This adaptation is fulfilled not only by the choice of material he conveys and the simplicity of the language in which his ideas are expressed, but in the topical and chronological arrangement of presentation. Although there are four major topics which General Gruenther included in all of his messages to NATO nations, as enumerated in Part I of this chapter the degree of development of each topic as well as the order in which they are covered is revealed as one of the significant clues to his outstanding adaptation to his audience. For example, in this speech in Copenhagen, Gruenther's principal objective was to provide the audience with the background purpose, goals, and organization of NATO. These lines of thought were

introduced in the early part of the speech, followed by the progress NATO was making in attempting to fulfill its fundamental purpose of building defense for collective security. To have opened this address with the military strength of the Soviets and their potential threat of aggression (as in the Rome speech) would have been confusing and frustrating to the Copenhagen audience at this early period of NATO's operation when people needed basic information on this Alliance which was created to thwart enemy aggression by its very strength of military defense for collective security.

General Gruenther is the type of speaker who has never been known to deliver a "canned" speech! He has an orderly, military mind which naturally visualizes and conveys information by topical grouping of ideas, but the number of subordinate topics under the respective divisions varies with the background knowledge of the audience. For this reason, the Copenhagen speech, in its adaptation to the audience, includes internal summaries, explicit transitions, and specific identification of subordinate topics. Likewise, the language style is didactic and

matter-of-fact, with crisp, to-the-point statements, well adapted to this cosmopolitan audience in Copenhagen where ease of translation to other languages was of paramount importance.

Perhaps because the writer was a member of the audience in Copenhagen that evening in 1953 and heard this speech delivered by General Gruenther (without benefit of reminder notes) the privilege of personal opinion can be expressed so positively in behalf of the speaker. Having also heard innumerable commendatory remarks from the audience during the reception which followed the address, the writer cabled home that evening, "I have just heard the orator of the century!"

CHAPTER IV

THE LONDON SPEECH (JUNE 8, 1954)

PART I

THE OCCASION, SETTING, AND AUDIENCE OF THE LONDON SPEECH

On June 8, 1954, General Gruenther, as the honored guest and principal speaker, addressed the English-Speaking Union of the Commonwealth at a dinner meeting in the spacious and attractive Ballroom of the Hotel Dorchester, the leading hotel (at that time) in London, England.[1]

Although the speech script sent to the writer by the Public Information Division of SHAPE carried no title for the address, Vital Speeches of the Day published the speech with the heading: "What Disarmament Means to NATO--Substitute Human Beings for Atomic Weapons."[2]

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[1]Information conveyed to writer by General Gruenther regarding description of audience and location of meeting-place.

[2]Vital Speeches of the Day, September 1, 1954, pp. 676-679.

General Gruenther was addressing royalty and titled persons of England, the members of the English-Speaking Union of the Commonwealth, many government officials and military officers of Great Britain and other NATO nations--comprising an audience of well over 350 persons.[1]

The English-Speaking Union was founded in England in 1918, following World War I, by Sir Evelyn Wrench, to explore the concepts of Democracy--and celebrated their 50th Anniversary in 1968. From England the organization spread to many English-speaking nations in the world, including Canada, Scotland, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, and the United States.

The English-Speaking Union was launched in the United States in 1920, and the 75 cities where branches of the ES-U have been established are now planning the

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[1]The audience of the Copenhagen Speech, on the other hand, included civic and educational representatives who were invited from many free countries, local residents of Copenhagen who were not members of the Danish Society sponsoring the Atlantic Community Convention--as well as military and government officials of Denmark and other NATO nations. But in the third case study on the speech delivered in Rome, the audience included a number of representatives from countries which were <u>not</u> members of the NATO Alliance and were present to <u>audit</u> Gruenther's message.

national celebration of the 50th Anniversary in the United States in 1970--the year which the United Nations Assembly has designated as "International Education Year." The growing importance of English as a universal language in today's world points the way to the increasing use of English as a vehicle for further world education. General Gruenther served as National Chairman of the ES-U of the United States from 1966-68 and led the U.S. delegation to the 1968 ES-U World Branches Conference in Edinburgh, Scotland, chairing the meeting on international relations.[1]

Other speakers at this ES-U dinner meeting in London were the Duke of Edinburgh (now Prince Philip), Sir Winston Churchill, Prime Minister; Clement Atlee, Leader of the Opposition in Parliament, and former Prime Minister; and Clement Davies, Leader of the Liberal Party. The Duke of Edinburgh, President of the English-Speaking Union, served as presiding chairman of the meeting and introduced General Gruenther. Two choice extracts from his introduction of the General were:

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[1]"ES-U Salutes General Gruenther," The English-Speaking Union of the United States, XV, No. 9 (November, 1968), p. 1.

> . . . This dinner is being given in honour of General Gruenther whose main job at SHAPE is to get people and nations to cooperate now.
> . . . . . .
> I think we in this Union can also take pride in the fact that he speaks English--or perhaps, so as not to wound any feelings, I had better put it that he speaks a language which we can all understand. I think it would only be fair to add that he has, of course, the invaluable support and assistance of an English speaking Field Marshal![1]

The speaking situation in London, with the historical ties between Great Britain and the United States, provided an opportunity for General Gruenther's subtle humor, frequent jesting with one or the other of the two countries as the whipping post, and sparks of friendly irony delivered with "tongue-in-cheek" finesse which are characteristic of the type of repartee exchanged between long-time friends. Perhaps some of the jesting by General Gruenther in his address balanced off some of the barbs included in Prince Philip's introduction of the speaker! The ties between Great Britain and the United States had been intertwined through the years with the early migration

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[1]Basil Blackwell, ed., Speeches at the Dinner in Honour of General Alfred M. Gruenther under the Auspices of the English-Speaking Union of the Commonwealth, June 8, 1954, Oxford University, 1954. (This brochure also included the speeches delivered by Sir Winston Churchill, Clement Atlee, and Clement Davies.)

of settlers from England to America, resulting in periodic tensions to be sure, but the differences were endured and surmounted as their relationship strengthened in their common cause of two World Wars.

The basic purpose of the speech was to convey news of NATO's progress, to provide documentation on the growing military strength of the Soviets (as well as their "defects"), and to appeal for more positive action from Great Britain for increased contributions to NATO's military defense.

On the other hand, the Copenhagen speech of 1953 was primarily expository on the purpose and scope of NATO, for General Gruenther was addressing that assembly just a few months after being appointed as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Europe, when NATO was emerging from little or no defense capabilities. There, General Gruenther recognized his responsibility to provide a clear explanation of NATO's specific operation, organizational framework, and objectives as essential background information on which to launch the reasons for the need of military defense support from NATO nations--facts which

were well-known to Gruenther's audience in London, since the British had played an important part in the forming of NATO.

Moreover, the speech in Rome in 1955--the third case study to be analyzed--was a persuasive presentation on the urgent need for military defense support as an imperative to collective security. The Italian audience was apathetic and apprehensive regarding additional contributions to armed defense, for Soviet "peace offensive" propaganda had diminished the fear of an aggressive attack (despite Russia's constant build-up of military strength).

Therefore, in these three different speaking situations, General Gruenther was attempting to adapt to three different audience profiles, varying the degree of information and/or persuasion to fulfill the purpose and objectives of the specific addresses.

PART II

RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LONDON SPEECH

BY PARAGRAPHS

[3 Paragraphs]
(Introduction)

Your Royal Highness, Sir Winston Churchill, Your Excellencies, my lords, ladies and gentlemen:

(1) *I am deeply grateful for the generous introduction which Your Royal Highness gave me. I should like to say to you that during the trip which the Queen and you took, we at SHAPE watched your progress carefully, and with a great deal of interest. We felt that your journey was an event of great significance for the entire Free World. I hope you will be kind enough to convey to her Majesty our sincere admiration and gratitude for her devotion to the concepts of liberty and freedom for which we are all working.*

(2) *I regret very much that Mrs. Gruenther could not be here this evening, but it happens that we have two sons and seven grandchildren. Some of you will be old enough eventually to have grandchildren. And you will then learn that complications develop in the lives of grandchildren, especially when one of the sons happens to be in Korea, and his wife is left with four children between the ages of eight months and five-and-a-half years. That was the situation which developed*

in our family and Mrs. Gruenther had to go back to the United States last night.

(3) *But it's about the future of those grandchildren that I would like to talk to you tonight--not about the toys that they play with, but about the kind of world to which they must look forward. That is why the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed in 1949.*[1]

In the opening greeting to his audience, General Gruenther rigidly adheres to the formal protocol in addressing Royalty, government officials, and titled personages of England. His expression of gratitude to the Duke of Edinburgh for the "generous" introduction is appropriately coupled with his commendation of the goodwill journey from which Queen Elizabeth and the Duke of Edinburgh had recently returned. Through expressing the interest of SHAPE in their journey and in "Her Majesty's" devotion to the concepts of liberty and freedom, he was implicitly associating the purpose of NATO with their tour, which held such great significance to the free world.

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[1]The three paragraphs beginning with the acknowledgment by General Gruenther of the introduction by the Duke of Edinburgh were included in Vital Speeches of the Day but deleted from the SHAPE script, which carried only the opening formal salutation to the audience. However, the balance of the speech was identical in both sources. Paragraphs 1-3 also included in SPEECHES . . . . by Blackwell.

His apology for Mrs. Gruenther's absence provides the opportunity to convey that they have two sons and seven grandchildren, and to explain his wife's sudden departure for the United States to meet an emergency which had developed with the four young children of their son stationed in Korea. The introduction of the humorous note *Some of you will be old enough eventually to have grandchildren,* was a compliment which both the old and the young of the audience would no doubt appreciate.

To Gruenther it was the future of the grandchildren that provided the link to the topic of his speech on NATO. For the kind of world to which the grandchildren must look forward explains the reason the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed in 1949.

In the first paragraph of the introduction, Gruenther freely uses personal address and first person pronouns to convey a conversational tone of collective pride for the concepts of freedom and liberty espoused by *Her Majesty* the Queen on her recent journey with the Duke to free nations. In the four sentences in the first paragraph there are three singular first person pronouns,

three plural first person pronouns, three second person pronouns, and two possessive second person pronouns to emphasize the personal involvement of mutual objectives.

The three paragraphs of the introduction, with the personal references and fine adaptation to the audience, provides a very smooth transition to the opening paragraph of the Body of the speech covering the involvement of England in the founding of NATO.

[Paragraphs 1 and 2]
(Body of Speech)

(1) *You will be interested to know that the first person I ever heard discuss NATO was a British subject. It was Ambassador Sir Gladwyn Jebb, and the month was March 1948. At the time I heard him first outline the concept, I thought it was a very elusive and illusory project. But he was a crusader, a dedicated man. He continued on it, and with the help of the British Government and the governments of the other free countries, a pact was finally signed in 1949 on the 4th of April.*

(2) *You are aware, of course, that General Eisenhower came to Paris and set up our headquarters--SHAPE--as part of this organization on the 2nd of April 1951, to organize a defense of Europe from the northern tip of Norway to the eastern borders of Turkey--a perimeter of some four thousand miles.*

To adapt immediately to his audience in the body of the speech, General Gruenther pays tribute to the British spokesman, Ambassador Sir Gladwyn Jebb, who was the first person he had ever heard discuss NATO, back in 1948. By admitting his personal doubts about the concept in 1948, Gruenther was awarding full recognition to this dedicated British ambassador for his early involvement in NATO, and to the help of the British Government and the governments of the other free nations in expediting the NATO pact signed on April 4, 1949.

By this methodology he was paying tribute to Great Britain, without including the important part played by the United States in the organization of NATO. By this methodology he is also reflecting personal humility--frankly admitting that he was not as astute as they were in recognizing the potentials of NATO. This workmanship was especially important at this time in view of the fact that the first Supreme Commander of SHAPE, General Eisenhower, was an American who came to Paris to set up the military headquarters and to *organize a defense of Europe from the northern tip of Norway to the eastern borders of Turkey--a perimeter of some four thousand miles.*

[Paragraphs 3 and 4]

(3) *When he arrived in Europe, the morale of the Free World was at a very low ebb. It was only a matter of weeks until we were going to be ejected from the Korean peninsula. In Europe itself the new and better world we had hoped for was confronted with the stark realization that Soviet imperialism was again on the march.*

(4) *Our assets were very, very meager. But what was even more discouraging was the fact that the security resources we possessed could not be co-ordinated to respond to a single strategic plan of defense. Now, three years and two months later, I can tell you that we have made very significant progress in developing a position of strength.*

Before proceeding to his first major topic on the "Progress of NATO" Gruenther points to the discouraging morale in the Free World at the time Eisenhower arrived in Europe--including the rise of Soviet imperialism on the continent, the crucial problem in Korea, and the complete inadequacy of security resources for any type of strategic plan of defense.

By contrasting the past with the present--three years and two months later--he introduces his topic of NATO's progress in military strength by describing it as *significant*.

The use of two metaphors provides picturesque emphasis to the pitifully low state of affairs when Eisenhower arrived in Europe:

> *The morale of the Free World was at a very low ebb. . . . Soviet imperialism was again on the march.*

Repetition of the adjective "very" also provides emphasis to the sparsity of NATO assets at that time:

> *Our assets were very, very meager.*

Personal address is used to point up and emphasize the significant progress in NATO strength since 1951:

> *Now, three years and two months later, I can tell you that we have made very significant progress in developing a position of strength.*

The use of the collective "we" in the above observation of progress hints at pride motivation and may well have aroused feelings of pride in the minds of the audience for the accomplishments of NATO during this brief period--with the evidence provided in the subsequent two paragraphs.

Note: Underlining in the excerpts from General Gruenther's speech indicate emphasis of the writer to illustrate rhetorical principles.

The Progress NATO is Making
[Paragraphs 5 and 6]

(5) *The forces which General Eisenhower had in 1951 have been increased numerically some three to four times--and from the standpoint of effectiveness the increase has been greater still. To give you an idea of what we have now, there are available for the defense of Europe, between 90 and 100 divisions in varying degrees of readiness. Some of these divisions will be ready on D-Day, others on D plus 15, and still others on D plus 30.*

(6) *With respect to air power, the increase has been even greater. To quote one statistic: When General Eisenhower arrived we had 15 airfields. Not one of them could take jets, but that wasn't important, because we had no jets to put on them. Now we have 120 airfields, and every one of them can take jets. By the end of this year the number of airfields will be further increased.*

In launching the supporting evidence for the progress of NATO, Gruenther reports the numerical increase of three to four times the forces of 1951, but to provide more specific information he translates the increase into current "division" strength--*between 90 and 100 divisions in varying degrees of readiness.*

By comparison and contrast Gruenther emphasizes the great increase in the number of airfields--*When*

General Eisenhower arrived we had 15 airfields . . . . Now we have 120 airfields.

In this reference, Gruenther introduces a shade of humor by pointing out that although none of the original 15 airfields could take jets, it really wasn't important because SHAPE had no jets to put on them!

[Paragraphs 7-8 and 9]

(7) *With respect to practical results, I would like to invite your attention to the following facts:*

(8) *Three years ago the Soviets could march to the Channel on very short notice with only the forces that they had in Occupied Europe. Now, however, because of the shield we have developed, they would have to reinforce their forces in Occupied Europe from the Soviet Union. If that estimate is correct, it gives us a certain insurance against a so-called accidental or miscalculated war. It means that if World War III should erupt it would be only because the Soviets in the Kremlin had made the first and fateful decision to start it, with all of the responsibilities which that decision entails.*

(9) *I would be less than frank if I did not tell you that we still have great deficiencies. It would be almost miraculous if in the short period of three years we had been able to build up from the low level at which we were in 1951 to a*

> *strength which would stop an all-out Soviet attack now. We are just not that good yet, and that is one reason why we have recommended to our political superiors, the North Atlantic Council, that we have additional forces. It is the reason why we recommended that there be a German contribution to our protective shield.*

In reverse order to the progress of NATO in the three years since 1951, Gruenther reports the status of the Soviets in 1951, when they could have marched to the Channel with only the forces they had in Occupied Europe. But as a result of NATO's progress, the Soviets in 1954 would have to supplement their European forces with forces from the Soviet Union.

This supporting evidence on the personal testimony of Gruenther was significant to the explanation that under these circumstances NATO would not be caught unaware by a Soviet attack since the Soviets would need to transport troops from the USSR, thus giving NATO the insurance of time for preparation.

To vindicate the need for the German contribution and their membership in the Alliance, Gruenther admits that NATO deficiencies in military strength could not repell an all-out Soviet attack, despite the great growth

of NATO military forces in the period of three years. That the NATO protective shield had to be supplemented provided the reasons for the recommendation to the North Atlantic Council of the need for additional forces and a German contribution of armed forces.

The plural first person pronoun is used to invoke the personal involvement of the British audience with the need for additional forces for a protective shield. Although the German contribution was included only as a passing remark, Gruenther obviously intentionally left it without further interpretation, knowing that the British were not enthusiastically receptive to the inclusion of Germany in NATO, having been the recipient of many devastating German attacks and atrocities during World War II.

Since this particular audience--the English-Speaking Union--was supposedly not an official gathering of NATO representatives, it was presumably not necessary to become involved with details of German affiliation with NATO.

The Problems Facing NATO
[Paragraphs 10-17, inclusive]
(Use of atomic weapons if war occurred 3 yrs. in future?)

(10) *We are engaged at SHAPE at this very moment in working on a philosophy of war--if unfortunately it should take place--projected some three years into the future. We have not completed that study yet, but I can tell you some of the highlights of it.*

(11) *If a full-scale war should take place three years from now, we visualize a conflict in which we would use atomic weapons. We are working on a concept of having as small a force in being as possible while depending heavily on reserve forces. Our protective shield, therefore, must be able to hold long enough for these reserves to mobilize. We feel that it will not hold long enough unless we have atomic power to support it. So in our thinking we visualize the use of atomic bombs in the support of our ground troops. We also visualize the use of atomic bombs against targets of war making potential deep in enemy territory.*

(12) *I recognize that such a plan creates a major political problem, and I want you to realize that we at SHAPE do not think we are the political masters. We understand clearly that the strategy which will be adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be a strategy which has been accepted by the fourteen member governments of NATO.*

(13) *I am only telling you what our thinking is now, and the type of plan that we shall forward to our political superiors. Whether they approve it or not is a matter for them to decide.*

(14) *I recognize full well, as does everybody in this audience, that people are deeply worried over the possibility of an atomic war. I can assure you that worry extends to our headquarters just as much as it does into your homes. We are trying to build a force of such strength that it will deter aggression. We do not want war to take place--any kind of war!*

(15) *But if it does take place, there is no question in our minds that every weapon must and will be used. You all know that the Soviet Union, especially during the last few weeks, has been conducting a very vigorous campaign asking that atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons be banned. We at our headquarters do not think that that is the answer to the problem. We feel that if you ban those types of weapons, you require our forces to adopt a wall-of-flesh type of strategy. We have just within the last two months seen a very clear illustration of the results of that kind of strategy, where at Dien-Bien-Phu forty thousand of the Viet-Minh forces finally overwhelmed, after a most fierce struggle, some ten thousand gallant members of the French Union forces.*

(16) *If, however, a decision is made that atomic weapons are not to be used, we at our headquarters will point out to our political supperiors that our defensive posture can only be maintained successfully at the expense of increased manpower. When one considers the low value placed on human life by the Soviets, we, in our humble opinion believe it would be a major mistake for the West to adopt a type of strategy which substitutes human beings for atomic weapons.*

(17) *We believe that an atomic disarmament should be part of a safe and secure across-the-board total disarmament plan. In other words, we feel*

> *that war itself should be made impossible, because we see no profit from war--and we think that we know a little about that subject!*

The eight paragraphs above are all concerned with the problems of atomic weapons which would emanate in a war projected three years into the future--a hypothetical supposition and a philosophical study in which SHAPE was immediately concerned.

The projection of the adoption of atomic weapons (paragraph #11) was related to a concept of having only a small armed force available, with dependence upon a large reserve force. The protective shield force must hold until reserve forces mobilize, supplemented of course by atomic power. The atomic bombs were also visualized against targets of war in enemy territory.

The succeeding three paragraphs (12, 13, and 14) adopt personal address, with personal testimony, for emphasis in a conversational tone on collective involvement with the plan of strategy for the use of atomic bombs:

> *I recognize that such a plan creates a major political problem, and I want you to realize . . . . I am only telling you what our thinking is now . . . . I recognize full well as does everybody in this audience that people are deeply worried . . . . I can assure you . . .*

The keynote sentence of overall SHAPE policy is epitomized in the statement:

> *We are trying to build a force of such strength that it will deter aggression. We do not want war to take place--any kind of war!*

The collective "we" includes of course all nations of NATO, and thereby the personal involvement of the English audience.

SHAPE and the Soviet policy on atomic warfare were in juxtaposition. The Soviets were conducting a vigorous campaign to ban atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons. SHAPE, on the other hand, felt that by banning those types of weapons, the land forces become *walls of flesh.* As an example of such a tragedy, Gruenther cites a recent battle of 40,000 Communist troops in Dien-Bien Phu, following a fierce struggle as a wall of flesh, finally overwhelming 10,000 French Union forces.

Gruenther contrasts the philosophy of the Soviets with its low value on human life with that of the West, where the importance and dignity of the individual are held in high regard. Gruenther maintains it would be a major mistake for the West to substitute human beings for

atomic weapons; but if atomic weapons are not to be used, then SHAPE manpower must be vastly increased.

His logical conclusion on atomic power based on NATO-SHAPE testimony is that atomic disarmament must be part of a complete and total *across the board* disarmament --that war itself should be made impossible because *we see no profit from war and we think we know a little about that subject.*

Contrast in warfare strategy of the Soviets compared to the strategy of free nations was explicitly and logically developed throughout these eight paragraphs, leading to the deductive conclusion that atomic disarmament could be condoned by the West only if it is made part of a <u>total</u> disarmament plan, thereby making war itself impossible, to which all free nations would wholeheartedly concur.

If only atomic and nuclear weapons are banned as proclaimed in the Soviet campaign, the defensive position of SHAPE could be successfully maintained only by greatly increased manpower which SHAPE would consider a major mistake, since the West would never agree to using human beings as a substitute for atomic weapons.

The statement, . . . *we feel that war itself should be made impossible, because we see no profit from war--and we think that we know a little about that subject!*"--is a significant observation of a military leader whose principal responsibility was to build military strength for NATO as collective security against acts of aggression. But equally important was the need for military strength to negotiate effectively at the peace table, since negotiation from weakness had never been successful. NATO was dedicated to the preservation of peace--not war. This objective for the maintenance of peace is, of course, the type of philosophy which could well establish the credibility of this military leader with his audience.

Concerning the subsequent phrase--*and we think that we know a little about that subject!*--Gruenther was no doubt referring to the kinship of the United States and Great Britain in their participation as allies in the two world wars--a methodology that is designed to capture the interest of the audience in a shared experience.

Although the problems concerned war strategy, the language was simple, clear, and understandable, without military jargon. The use of the metaphor expression of the race track *across-the-board* in referring to a *total disarmament plan* would probably have imparted a most effective description to a country like England, where betting on horse races was a common and acceptable practice.

[Paragraphs 18-21, inc.]
(If War Should Take Place in 1954)

(18) *Now, let us suppose that this war should unfortunately take place this year--1954. I have already mentioned that we have grave disadvantages. What would be the result of the war now? My firm belief is that the Soviet Union, if a war took place this year, would be defeated!*

(19) *I think that statement requires some explanation. At the present time we have many serious deficiencies. Some of our troops are poorly trained. Some of our supplies are altogether too inadequate. But we have one asset now which is of tremendous value, and that is that we have a long-range air capability to which the Soviets now have no answer. I refer to a plane, the B-47, which can fly so fast and so high that there is no defense against it in the year 1954. One of those planes four months ago left the*

United States, and landed in England four hours and thirty-four minutes later. That is an average speed of 650 miles an hour. Now I will confide to you that our people wouldn't have announced this record unless they knew they had a good friendly tail-wind to send it over here. But even so, that's travelling. That plane can fly very fast, and drop atomic weapons, and drop them accurately! I hope and pray that it will never be necessary to employ this power in an active role.

(20) *In the cold war, we have assets of incalculable value. We have a spiritual strength which the Soviet Union cannot equal under any circumstances. Our economic potential is still on the rise, and much greater than anything which an enemy can match. Above all, we now have an integrated allied chain of command, throughout the entire fourteen NATO nations, which will be able to direct our resources to the best advantage.*

(21) *Because of all of these reasons I say to you that if the Soviets should launch an attack in 1954 they would suffer a severe defeat! I don't want to say that we would win, because I am sure that in a third world war there would be no winner. But the Soviets would definitely be defeated in every sense of the word!*

A second hypothetical supposition was to presume that a war would take place within the year of 1954. After posing the rhetorical question, *What would be the result of the war now?*, Gruenther replies with a periodic sentence which holds the audience in suspense on the answer until the completion of the sentence.

Gruenther proceeds to explain why the Soviets would be defeated (despite some poorly trained NATO troops and inadequate supplies), by providing evidence on one tremendous asset--the B-47 which has the long-range capability of flying so fast and high the Soviets had no defense against it in 1954.

Although Gruenther does not explicitly attribute the credit for the invention of the B-47 to the United States, he implies its American ownership in two statements:

> *One of these planes four months ago left the United States and landed in England four hours and 34 minutes later . . . .*
>
> *Now I will confide to you that our people wouldn't have announced this record unless they knew they had a good friendly tail-wind to send it over here.*

Once again, Gruenther's humble attitude shines through by not claiming the honor for the United States in the invention of the B-47, a super plane which provided the greatest threat to the Soviets at this time.

In the second quoted statement above there is a spark of humor regarding the aid of the tail-wind--included most appropriately just before the serious turn to the hope

that it would never be necessary to employ this fast plane's capability in dropping atomic weapons on enemy targets!

Gruenther's knowledge of the devastating effects of atomic weapons presumably prompted his statement of hope that it would never be necessary to drop them on enemy targets. This type of humane consideration for an enemy is a methodology which conceivably could have captured the appreciation and respect of the audience for the credibility of a military leader who possesses compassion for his fellow-men.

In addition to the B-47 and atomic weapons, Gruenther also enumerates NATO assets of *incalculable value* in the cold war--spiritual strength and economic potential not equaled in any way by the Soviets, and most important, an integrated allied chain of command throughout the entire fourteen NATO nations.

With an internal summary of the above reasons Gruenther concludes that if the Soviets should attack in 1954 they would be defeated. By personal testimony, however, he admits that he would not want to say that NATO

would win--*because I am sure that in a third world war there would be no winner.* But he strengthens the conclusion of his internal summary with the allegation that the Soviets would definitely be defeated *in every sense of the word.*

By logical development of materials, Gruenther has enumerated the type of evidence which gives credence to his conclusion that the Soviets would definitely be <u>defeated</u> *in every sense of the word* (despite his admission that *in a third world war there would be no winner*--attributable obviously to nuclear weapons). This is the type of methodology in the development of sound supporting evidence which presumably should assist in establishing the credibility of the speaker.

<u>The Threat of the Soviets (and their "Defects")</u>
[Paragraphs 22-23]

(22) *My point in making these assertions so positively is that we spend a considerable amount of our time trembling over the assets of the Soviet Union. There is a considerable tendency on our part to think that every Soviet soldier is eight feet high. But I can assure you there are some*

five-foot Soviet soldiers, and even some five-foot Soviet Generals, and we know some of their defects. Instead of emphasizing only what they have on the credit side of the ledger let's all realize that they have many items on the debit side too. I am sorry to say that they have had considerable success in the past two months because of our timidity. By living dangerously, and with no public opinion of their own to which their leaders must respond, they have caused us great trepidation. Let's stop being frightened. Let us become more and more aware of the fact that as the Soviet political and military leaders balance our assets and deficiencies, they must arrive at the clear conclusion that they could not win a war against a united Free World. What I want is to see our people more confident of our present capabilities and less fearful of what, on the surface, appears to be overwhelming Soviet power. This business of undermining confidence is a favorite communist trick.

(23) *Having said that, I want to make it clear, that as we project our thinking ahead some five to ten years, I am not sure that our present margin will exist then. In other words, I cannot be confident that time is on our side, even though we have the advantage now. After all, on the first of May in the May Day parade, the Soviets exhibited some airplanes with very devastating characteristics. We know that their atomic stockpile is increasing, that they are working hard on their air defense, that they are stockpiling and creating additional war supplies, and that their industrial potential is increasing. What kind of an overall power balance that will give five, six, seven, eight and ten years from now, I do not know. I am sure that we have it in our capacity to continue that balance in our favor, but whether or not we will, is something for the future to decide. If the present*

tendency to relax should continue, I'm afraid the ultimate results would be extremely disadvantageous and tragic to the concepts we hold so dear: Freedom and the dignity of the human individual.

In this speech, General Gruenther abbreviates his third topic on the threat of the Soviets which was usually covered more fully in his addresses to other NATO nations. As a contrast to his usual procedure he discounts the Soviet profile through pointing up their defects on the debit side of their ledger rather than emphasizing their assets on the credit side. In personal address and parallel construction he prescribes the plan--

Let's stop being frightened.

Let us become more and more aware of the fact that as the Soviet political and military leaders balance our assets and deficiencies, they must arrive at the clear conclusion that they could not win a war against a united Free World.

At this point of time he is attempting to convince the audience to be more confident of NATO's present capabilities, and less fearful of what appears to be overwhelming Soviet power. Gruenther was more frank and explicit with his English audience than with other NATO nations in discounting the Soviet power and their technique of

undermining confidence. Perhaps this was attributable to his awareness of Britain's wholehearted belief in NATO's need for military defense, while some other NATO nations, prone to be apathetic and less aware of Russia's trickery in their *peace propaganda,* needed to be convinced of the vital necessity for increasing support of military defense for collective security. Gruenther's description of the fantasy of believing *every Soviet soldier is eight feet high* is a dramatic metaphor to portray the overemphasis of the power of the Soviets by the members of NATO.

In projecting the time forward five to ten years, however, Gruenther by personal testimony admits doubt concerning whether the NATO margin of advantage over the Soviets would continue to exist. He supports his doubt or uncertainty with evidence of the new planes exhibited by the Soviets on MAY day, the increase in their atomic stockpile, growth in air defense and war supplies, and increase in their industrial potential. Although he admits confidence in NATO's capacity to continue the balance in favor of the free nations, he is skeptical of the outcome if the present tendency to relax would continue.

In other words, Gruenther is attempting to make clear the inevitable result of the current tendency of NATO members to relax in their efforts of increasing their military defense support. If this apathy would continue, the ultimate outcome would be tragic in terms of protecting the freedom and dignity of "our" people. The fact that the Soviets were continuing to increase their military strength made it imperative that NATO should also continue its efforts in the same ratio. Gruenther is logical in his reasoning that five, six, seven, eight, or ten years in the future might spell a different outcome of an aggressive attack by the Soviets unless constant preparedness were to be the watchword of NATO.

[Paragraphs 24-25-26]

(24) *At this point I hope you will permit me to touch on the question of Anglo-American relations. I came from a small town in Nebraska. The Duke of Edinburgh was very kind to advertise my many qualifications in his flattering introduction, but he left out one of great pride to me. I am an admiral in the Nebraska Navy. And the Duke didn't say a word about that. I'll have you know, before some of those titters erupt into loud laughter, that the Nebraska*

Navy has never suffered even one vessel damaged or defeated. I'd like to ask the Duke if any navy that he's ever been associated with can claim a similar record.

(25) *To let you know something about my ancestry --my grandfather was a German born in Bavaria. My grandmother, named Shea was born in Ireland. She left there at a time when there was some little dispute about potatoes. She settled in a small Nebraska village and eventually I was born there. There were 374 people in that village before I was born, and I made number 375. We spent much of our time expecting the redcoats to come into that village any day. I don't want you to think that we had any special hate-the-British days, because we didn't. Every day was "down with the British." I was seventeen years old before I knew the words "damn British" were two words.*

(26) *By the year 1942, I had known two Britishers. Both wore monocles and I didn't care if I saw either of them again.*

Again from the serious note of a possible Soviet aggression in the uncertain future, Gruenther moves to a humorous vein, but explicitly announces his topic as *Anglo-American relations*. However, the Anglo-American relations are not on an international scale, but are developed with humorous witticisms on the basis of Gruenther-British relations!

His first quip was to chide the Duke of Edinburgh for not including in his introduction any reference to his

rank of Admiral in the Nebraska Navy--a navy which had never suffered *even one vessel damaged or defeated!* A fantasy--as it obviously was--but he continues the imaginary concept by posing the humorous question to the Duke whether *any navy he had ever been associated with could claim a similar record.*

His second quip concerned his ancestry--his grandfather was born in Bavaria and his grandmother named Shea, was born in Ireland, but she left when there was *some little dispute about potatoes* (a controversy which was very conservatively and diplomatically described by Gruenther in a humorous jest). That he was a *small-town* boy was conveyed by explaining that his grandmother settled in a small Nebraska village (Platte Center), where he was eventually born as the 375th member of the town!

Five witticisms followed:

We spent much of our time expecting the redcoats to come into that village any day.
I don't want you to think that we had any special hate-the-British days, because we didn't.
Every day was "down with the British."
I was seventeen years old before I knew the words "damn British" were two words.
By the year 1942, I had known two Britishers. Both wore monocles and I didn't care if I saw either of them again.

Obviously, unless he was convinced of the friendship and understanding which prevailed in Anglo-American relationships, he probably would not have risked this type of personal jesting as humorous anecdotes.

Perhaps some critics would conclude that Gruenther went out of his way to convey his ancestry as German and Irish. Since both Germany and Ireland had not enjoyed the most "congenial" relationships with England in the past, critics of rhetoric might question the reason for introducing this particular material even in jest at this particular time, before this particular audience.

[Paragraphs 27-28]

(27) *On a Wednesday late in July 1942, General Eisenhower asked for me to come to London. I arrived on the following Sunday evening, August 2nd, 1941. At the airport I received instructions to report immediately to General Eisenhower in this very hotel--on the fifth floor. He wanted to talk to me about an operation which was about to be put in the planning stage. I had come from Texas, where I had been Chief of Staff in a command where General Eisenhower had served. The General's first question was, "Do you know where Algiers is?" I couldn't tell the General I didn't know but actually*

I hadn't the slightest idea. I had been studying Texas geography, and anybody who's been to Texas knows that is a big assignment. As a matter of fact, we in Texas thought we were going to be attached by the Germans; so we had all the Texans mobilized. Algiers was the last thing I thought of, but I didn't admit it to General Eisenhower. Just as he started to tell me about this Operation TORCH a telephone call came, and it was the Prime Minister who said "I want you out at Chequers right away." So I learned no more about Algiers or the operation that night.

(28) *The following morning I was summoned before a British group of about 25 planners and they said, "General Gruenther, we would like your plan for Operation TORCH." Well, I assumed that TORCH had something to do with Algiers, but I didn't know; so I finessed that problem. The British looked down their noses at me, and I left that meeting sure that "damn British" still should have been one word.*

The anecdote on "Operation TORCH" of 1942--General Eisenhower's assignment to General Gruenther as Chief Planning Officer of the African Invasion of World War II --is covered in detail in Chapter I, page 31.

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[1]A prelude to the difficulty in securing information about Operation TORCH, not included in this speech, began with Gruenther's journey from Texas to Washington, where he had hoped to be briefed on Operation TORCH. But due to complications in the Military Headquarters in Washington he was obliged to leave for London with no information on his assignment!

His report that he had been Chief of Staff in a command in Texas where General Eisenhower had served was modestly stated, since he came to London as a Brigadier General to serve as Deputy Chief of Staff under General Eisenhower. Another indication of his humble attitude and of his willingness to become a laughingstock for the audience is his confession that he did not have the slightest idea where *Algiers* was located when questioned by Eisenhower. Likewise,--his reference to studying Texas geography and mobilizing all the Texans for an attack by the Germans is similar to the jest in paragraph #25 when Gruenther expected the redcoats to come to his hometown any day when he was a boy! Gruenther's willingness to be the laughingstock for the audience is the kind of methodology which is usually very effective in gaining rapport with the audience and increasing a speaker's credibility.

Again, he provided in his speech the circumstances for him to be laughed at when the twenty-five British planners asked about his plan for Operation TORCH--and his confession to the audience that he really didn't know

whether TORCH had something to do with Algiers! Since the British planners looked down their noses at this non-committal reply, he again implicitly refers to his jest about the *redcoats* in the little village of Nebraska (paragraph #25) for as he left the London meeting he was sure that "*damn British*" still should have been one word.

Since the British planners were obviously interested in "Operation TORCH" and an American was placed in charge of the planning, it was diplomatic for Gruenther to place himself as the laughingstock--and then to react in a perfectly normal way in resenting the British planners by whom he was victimized--by referring to them as the "*damn British.*"

[Paragraphs 29-31, inclusive]

(29) *That was in August 1942. Since then I have had a tremendous amount of experience with the British, and I want to tell you now that I have the greatest admiration for you all. I have numerous friends among the British officers and civilians. I think you people are tops, and I want to tell you that without reservation. Before you get too conceited, however, I don't want you to think you're the only pebble on the beach.*

(30) *At our headquarters at SHAPE we have a great deal of trouble with our parishioners, our clients--our allies, as they're sometimes called. Our number one trouble is with the Americans, the number two trouble is with the British.*

(31) *We find that a few Americans are very modest --very, very few. We had in one of our NATO hospitals a few weeks ago one of the doctors who called another doctor friend to look at a case. The latter said, "I don't have time." Finally he was persuaded to come, but first he asked, "What is this case I'm supposed to look at?" The answer was, "It's the most remarkable case we've ever seen in this hospital. It's an American with an inferiority complex." We run into very few of those at our headquarters, and I don't suppose you have seen many either.*

With personal address, personal testimony, and parallel construction for emphasis, Gruenther again reverts to the serious note in expressing very sincere admiration for the British

> . . . *I have had a tremendous amount of experience with the British*
> *I want to tell you now that I have . . . .*
> *I have numerous friends among the British . . . .*
> *I think you people are tops . . .*
> *I want to tell you that without reservation.*

Immediately following the above complimentary remarks, he includes a witticism--*Before you get too conceited, however, I don't want you to think you're the only pebble on the beach.*--which could only be directed

to an audience who understood the "tongue-in-cheek" barbs bountifully sprinkled throughout the speech.

To balance off the jesting on the British, Gruenther places the Americans as their number one trouble at SHAPE, with the British taking second place! And he probably attempts to even the score with another strike against the Americans--by the humorous anecdote in a NATO hospital where they discovered the rare diagnosis of an American with an inferiority complex!

Hope for the Future
[Paragraphs 32-33]

(32) *At our headquarters we have an allied staff consisting of 171 Americans, 82 British, 63 French, 29 Italians, 13 Canadians, 10 Belgians, 9 Dutch, 7 Greeks and 7 Turks, 5 Norwegians, 3 Danes, and one from little Luxembourg--a total of 12 nations and 400 officers. We have had so much experience with these people of varying backgrounds and traditions that we think we know a little bit about this question of international cooperation. Please don't think that we believe it is easy. Sitting outside my office is an American sergeant who gets more money than a French colonel of thirty years' service. He thinks he deserves it, but the French colonel may have other ideas about that. But in spite of many inequalities such as this one, and after*

35 years of service, I have come to the conclusion that our headquarters at SHAPE is the happiest headquarters I have ever been associated with. And the reason for that is that these people believe in the cause. They are thoroughly dedicated to the objective of international cooperation. We at that headquarters think we can solve any Anglo-American-Commonwealth problem that exists. There's only one that we haven't been able to solve, and that is to find a window that will allow enough cool air in to cool a Britisher to what he thinks it should be in January and still keep it warm enough for the American who sits next to him. But we hope to solve that within the next few months.

(33) *I don't want to tell you that the Americans are perfect. In fact, we receive so many irritating messages from Washington that we subscribe wholeheartedly to that wisecrack: "Washington is the only place in the world where sound travels faster than light." But, admitting all of that, may I say that the Americans have made tremendous progress during the past 15 years in developing a capacity for world leadership. I hope that you can put up with them--and--parenthetically, I also hope they can put up with you.*

The numerical description of the SHAPE Staff comprised of 400 representatives from the 12 countries of NATO provides the support for Gruenther's observation that these representatives with varying backgrounds and traditions gave SHAPE some first-hand experience in international cooperation. Perhaps Gruenther was attempting to convey to his audience that SHAPE in Paris was serving

as a pilot test laboratory for achieving the know-how of international cooperation on a larger scale among the peoples of NATO nations.

In admitting that some inequalities exist, Gruenther cites the American sergeant at SHAPE who gets more money than a French Colonel of 30 years' service! In passing, it is interesting to note that a similar comparison is also included in the speech Gruenther delivered in Rome in 1955 (the third case study to be analyzed), but in Italy he compared the higher salary of the American sergeant with an Italian Colonel of many years' service. In this London speech, however, Gruenther chose to cite a French Colonel rather than an English Colonel of many years' service for comparison with the American sergeant--perhaps dictated by the similarity of salary range for French and Italian Colonels.

In spite of the many inequalities such as the example given, Gruenther concludes that SHAPE is the happiest headquarters he had been associated with in his 35 years of service. By personal testimony he attributes this harmonious setting at SHAPE to the Staff's dedication to the cause for which they are working and to the

objective of international cooperation. Again, Gruenther's modesty comes through, for it was members of the Staff who conveyed to the writer a similar glowing account of the harmony that pervaded the headquarters office at SHAPE in Paris, but attributed the cause to the Supreme Commander!

Following the serious remarks on the dedication of his Staff, Gruenther again reverts to humor on the ventilation problems at SHAPE in January--to find a window that will allow enough air in to cool a Britisher and still keep it warm enough for the American who sits next to him!

In the concluding paragraph of the body of the speech, Gruenther conveys in personal address, *I don't want to tell you that the Americans are perfect.* But admitting some of their shortcomings (such as his adopted wisecrack on sound travelling faster than light in Washington, from which they receive so many *irritating* messages), Gruenther frankly states that the *Americans have made tremendous progress during the past 15 years in developing a capacity for world leadership.* He closes the Body of the speech with another quip which purports to

brush off some possible sensitive relationships in the guise of humor:

> *I hope you can put up with them--and--parenthetically, I also hope they can put up with you.*

The above statement might be interpreted by some critics as bordering on a barb with serious overtones. At any rate, it would seem that here is something which is a bit on the precarious side![1] In any event, this methodology or approach in the hands of a less competent craftsman could have been disastrous. But a superior speaker such as General Gruenther whose tact and diplomacy are legend, could most likely adopt this line of jesting without the danger of being misunderstood by his audience.

[Paragraphs 1-6]
(Conclusion)

(1) *Be that as it may, we cannot at this time afford to be disunited. I am absolutely certain*

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[1]In all fairness, the writer feels it is vitally important to report that General Gruenther was not informed that his speech was being tape-recorded at the time of delivery in London. Furthermore, he had no opportunity to edit the copy, since it was published without his knowledge.

that in the era that we are approaching now, we are going to have to solve this problem of security together and in common, or we are not going to solve it at all. Any time a mishap occurs to one of our partners in freedom, we should recall again the eternal refrain of John Donne:

> *". . . . never to send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee."*

Though we forget all else, we must not forget that.

(2) *It has been a tremendous pleasure and honor for me to be here this evening, and to see all these amateur speakers at the head table. It has interested me very much. The Duke says the most important one comes first, and to see Sir Winston following me has caused me to feel very, very happy. But, Sir Winston, I should like to tell you that we who followed your leadership in the war have the greatest admiration for you. I remember a speech you made in June 1940 where you said:*

> *"Let us therefore bring ourselves to our duties and bear ourselves in such a way that if the British Empire and the Commonwealth last for a thousand years they will say, 'This was their finest hour.'"*

We who heard that poured our hearts out for you with great affection sir, and we still do.

(3) *I am very much honored and wish to express my gratitude to you, to Mr. Atlee and to Mr. Davies for having taken time out of your busy day to be here tonight.*

(4) *I am confident that if we will continue to realize that in dealing with our allies we must*

have patience, wisdom and understanding, we can solve any of the problems in the cold war and face them with calm poise and steady purpose. For free men there is no other way to insure survival.

(5) *Thank you very, very much.*

(6) *I now have the honor to propose a toast to the President of the English-Speaking Union, the Duke of Edinburgh, who will visit SHAPE two weeks from today. From then on he'll not only be an admiral, but also a NATO General with all the knowledge of SHAPE strategy.*

The opening sentence of the Conclusion represents a summing up of differences in points of view and philosophy with the statement, *Be that as it may, we cannot at this time afford to be disunited.* In his support of unity, Gruenther acclaims, in personal testimony, the need for the NATO Alliance to solve *the problems of security together, and in common, or we are not going to solve it at all.* He implicitly reminds his audience of the provisions of the NATO Treaty (an attack on one nation is an attack on all) with the statement--*anytime a mishap occurs to one of our partners in freedom we should recall again the eternal refrain of John Donne, " . . . never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee."*

which Gruenther followed with the eloquent but simple statement--*Though we forget all else, we must not forget that.*

Again the transition from the serious to the humorous is noted in his reference to *all these amateur speakers at the head table.* In humorously quoting the Duke, who said that the most important speeches come first, Gruenther facetiously contends it made him *very, very happy* to see Sir Winston follow him in the speaking line-up! Whereupon Gruenther quickly reassures Sir Winston Churchill in personal address:

> *But, Sir Winston, I should like to tell you that we who followed your leadership in the war have the greatest admiration for you. I remember a speech you made in June 1940 where you said:*
>
> > *"Let us therefore bring ourselves to our duties and bear ourselves in such a way that if the British Empire and the Commonwealth last for a thousand years they will say, 'This was their finest hour.'"*

Gruenther's sincere expression of admiration for Sir Winston Churchill is an example of the kind of workmanship designed to motivate the pride of the audience in the excellence of their war leader, as well as to pay

deserved tribute to this great statesman of Great Britain by quoting his famous statement which has gained world recognition--especially in departments of Public Address in leading universities of the free world.

The climactic statement expressing the need for patience, wisdom, and understanding appears to be a very effective closing admonition of conviction for solving the problem of the cold war *with calm poise and steady purpose*. The terminal sentence of the conclusion, *For free men there is no other way to insure survival*, was the nearest approach to the fear appeal of survival in the entire address, inasmuch as the appeal to logical reasoning with supporting evidence predominated throughout his message, with the implication that the British have known war.

Since the Duke of Edinburgh had introduced him, it was most appropriate that the actual close of the speaking situation be a toast in the Duke's honor for his visit to SHAPE *two weeks from today* when he would become a NATO General *with all the knowledge of SHAPE strategy*. The exactness of timing from the date of the

current speech was a means of emphasizing the importance of the event at which the Duke was to be honored by the appointment as a NATO General!

PART III

EVALUATION OF THE LONDON SPEECH

The speech delivered by General Gruenther to the English-Speaking Union in London in 1954 seems clearly intended to convey news on the progress NATO was making, provide documentation on the growing strength of the Soviets as well as their *defects*, and to secure positive action by Great Britain for increased contributions to NATO military defense. Because Great Britain was well aware of the purpose, goals, and operation of SHAPE in its relationship with NATO, there was no reason for Gruenther to include here the extensive background information which was very necessary in the Copenhagen speech.

The English-Speaking Union is an organization composed of highly intellectual members of social and economic stature. Therefore, General Gruenther adapted his remarks with dexterity of judgment by eliminating detailed explanation, whenever feasible, for this audience

representing royalty, government officials, military officers, and others of social rank of England.

In the development of the four major topics covered in all of General Gruenther's addresses to NATO nations,[1] it is interesting to note that this is the only speech in which he pointed up some of the *defects* in the Russian military strength in his abbreviated coverage of "the threat of the Soviets." Here is another illustration of his keen awareness in audience adaptation, for he realized that discounting the Soviet power and emphasizing NATO capabilitites as of 1954 would not deter Great Britain's interest in the importance of NATO. Obviously, this approach was not appropriate for those NATO members who were apathetic and apprehensive regarding the need for building defense in the face of Soviet peace overtures! However, Gruenther was very discerning in pointing up in his London address the projection to five, six, seven, or ten years in the future to alert his audience to the realization that the continuous strengthening of Soviet

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[1]The Progress NATO was Making; The Threat of the Soviets; The Problems Facing NATO; and Hope for the Future.

military power might spell a grievous outcome to NATO from an aggressive attack unless constant vigilance in military defense continued to be a dedicated commitment of the Alliance.

Likewise, General Gruenther was equally astute in his use of jesting, quips, and witticisms to his English audience where translation to another language for a foreign audience was not necessary. Translated jesting often "does not come through" as intended by the speaker--as illustrated in United Nations' translations of this type of humor. That Gruenther has exemplified the epitome of audience adaptation in his choice of materials of development is the type of workmanship which should earn commendations from the rhetoricians.

As a military leader speaking to government officials of England it was most appropriate that the major part of the development of his speech was based on logical argument, supported by factual and numerical data, examples, illustrations, and personal testimony. Emotional appeals were kept to a minimum, especially fear appeals, for England was well aware of the ravages of war. Gruenther

concentrated on clear, rational arguments, unencumbered by fear-charged description, in his remarks to this audience.

The organization of this address is meticulously based on the chronological and topical format--with unity and brevity the watchwords. His frequent use of explanatory transitions (especially in the approach to each of his four topics) with problem-solution organization and cause and effect reasoning, added clarity to his message. The delineation between the introduction, body, and conclusion of his speech was clearly indicated.

The stylistic pattern followed in this address was also admirably adapted to his intellectual audience. Although his message adhered to simplicity and clarity in choice of words and composition, there was appropriately included more "heightened" language in tone and meaning, sometimes moving to the level of eloquence. The frequent use of first person pronouns with direct discourse brought personal involvement with the audience in the discussion of common problems, as well as in the progress of NATO. Rhetorical questions were also used frequently to simulate dialogue for audience involvement.

Perhaps the most distinguishing stylistic factor in this London speech is reflected in the interpolation of generous quantities of humor and jesting in a relevant way, providing frequent change of pace from serious to humorous tone--a methodology recognized by rhetoricians for maintaining audience interest. One or two of the jests, however, bordered on barbs, in the opinion of this critic. For example, in his anecdote referring to the *damn British* (as one word), perhaps some explanation of the use of "damn Yankee" as one word in some quarters of the United States might have softened any resentment which might have been incurred with some members of the audience. As previously mentioned, this methodology of jesting in the hands of a less competent craftsman could have been disastrous. But with General Gruenther's well-deserved credibility and his generally known qualities of kindness and sense of fairness to others, his intent in his jesting should have been clearly understood by the audience.

The principal purpose of Gruenther's jesting, appearing in paragraphs 24 through 33 in Part II can be interpreted, perhaps, as follows:

To promote NATO without flaunting the leadership of the United States perhaps it was necessary to place himself in situations where he could be the laughingstock to project his humility as well as to convince the English that the United States was not "running the show." The leadership of the United States, with Great Britain playing "second fiddle," would be neither consistent nor diplomatic, for the British Empire had dominated the world for centuries before the United States appeared on the horizon. And to counterbalance any impression that the United States was "eating crow" to ameliorate the English, it was important perhaps also to direct some jibes against the English.

General Gruenther's methodology was no doubt studied carefully and developed as a psychological strategy to achieve the objective of cooperation in the guise of jesting--a method used to attain an objective under circumstances where it would not be expedient to be explicit.

It should be observed, also, that Gruenther's methodology included another means of attempting to reduce the concern that the United States might "run the show."

Here, as in the Rome speech, he stressed the fact that Great Britain had early endorsed NATO before the United States was given the leadership of the military defense of the Alliance, and that he was merely attempting to do what had been requested by the National Council of NATO.

CHAPTER V

THE ROME SPEECH (MAY 2, 1955)

PART I

THE OCCASION, SETTING, AND AUDIENCE OF THE ROME SPEECH

On the evening of May 2, 1955, General Gruenther delivered his speech in Rome to an audience of over 500 persons at the Centro Italiano di Studi Per La Riconciliazione Internazionale (Italian Center for the Study of International Reconciliation)--a large building located in the center of Rome. The organization sponsoring the Italian Center was founded for the express purpose of dedicated study of international affairs, and some of the most notable Italian leaders held membership in the organization.

The platform of the large auditorium in the Italian Center was decorated with the flags of NATO nations, and a large NATO map formed the background to which General Gruenther referred periodically during his address.

(Both the NATO map and flags were always on display whenever the General spoke to NATO nations.) He was introduced by an official of the Italian Center for the Study of International Reconciliation.

Gruenther was facing a critical group, for within the Italian audience there prevailed a certain fear and suspicion of the great power of the United States, and a certain resentment of what is sometimes called "American impatience with European methods."[1] Military officers, ambassadors, and plenipotentiary ministers of the fifteen NATO nations were present,[2] and they represented a great divergence in their interests and opinions. In addition, numerous representatives from many other countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa (not members of NATO) attended the meeting, along with many Italian diplomats, military and civilian leaders, and other important political,

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[1]The Royal Institute of International Affairs (Report of Study Group), Atlantic Alliance, NATO's Role in the Free World (London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs), p. 42. (From Library of the National War College, Washington 25, D.C.) Series first published in 1952.

[2]Although the Federal Republic of Germany was not at this time an official member of NATO until its formal accession on May 9, 1955 (bringing the total to 15 nations) it sent some representatives to this Rome meeting.

economic, cultural, and journalistic representatives in Rome.[1] Therefore, many elements contributed to the skeptical attitude reflected in the Rome audience, and General Gruenther was aware that these representatives wanted the details on the defense picture.

The status of the Communist Party in Italy was of grave concern to the other NATO nations. Not only was the party active in Italy, but it was growing and exerting power in critical areas. The Communist Party in Italy had substantial control of the key positions in the Labor Movement, and thereby had the capacity to interfere seriously with any measures to eliminate confidence in a non-communist future for Italy.[2]

Furthermore, there were questions among some Italian leaders concerning the advisability of having joined the NATO Alliance in 1949 when they had not been invited to join the Brussels Pact in 1948 by the original signatories--Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,

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[1] A. Craig Baird, ed. Representative American Speeches, 1955-56 (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1956), p. 25.

[2] George F. Kennan, Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 331.

and United Kingdom.[1] It was well-known that the Brussels Pact was supposedly the forerunner of the NATO Alliance. But it was not until 1954 that Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany were invited to join the Brussels Pact.[2]

Some of the Italian representatives in the audience, as well as some representatives from other NATO nations (including France, Belgium, and the Netherlands), did not look with enthusiasm upon Germany's affiliation as a fellow-member in the Military Alliance of NATO, to help redress the numerical imbalance between the forces of NATO and those of the Soviet Union and its Satellites. They were fearful of the rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany and the possibility of the return of the old Nazism of World War II.

The above profile of the occasion, setting, and audience in Rome will provide the explanation for General Gruenther's unusually long introduction to his speech in conveying the origin and development of NATO, and the reasons for the establishment of SHAPE, the military defense arm of NATO.

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[1] NATO: Facts about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Paris: NATO Information Service, 1962), pp. 10-11.

[2] Ibid., pp. 237-38.

PART II

RHETORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROME SPEECH

BY PARAGRAPHS

[Paragraph 1]
(Introduction)

(1) *Eccellenze, Signore e Signori:*
It is a great honor for me to be here this evening. I wish I could speak to you in Italian--in perfect Italian--with, of course, a slight Nebraska accent. But that would be a bit difficult for me. I beg of you to excuse me if I now proceed in English--also with a Nebraska accent.

In the opening lines of his address to the Italian Center for the Study of International Reconciliation on the evening of May 2, 1955, at the Banci di Roma, Italy, General Gruenther expresses his recognition of the importance of the occasion and the significance of communicating with this distinguished group of men. As indicated in the preceding section on "The Occasion, Setting, and Audience," the audience included not only diplomatic and military officials from Italy, but also similar

representatives from other NATO countries, as well as numerous representatives from many other countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

Moreover, he indicates his wish to speak with the Italians in their native language, a wish that he saw as impossible because of his own limitations. This suggestion of humility and awareness of what the circumstance seemed to call for should have been helpful in building rapport with the assembly and identifying him as a straightforward, humble man, an impression the General no doubt wished to make.

The reference to the Nebraska accent--even in speaking English--adds a light, humorous touch that would allow the speaker to move ahead with some assurance that the audience was not skeptical at the start of the speech.

[Paragraph 2]

(2) *I feel that it is a sad commentary on the state of the world that you should find it appropriate to have a military man talk to this distinugished group in the year 1955. Unfortunately, however, the question of security is our main preoccupation in this uneasy world.*

This introductory material exemplifies the approach designed to arouse the interest of the audience and at the same time establish a high level of credibility through modest statement and inferred apology that a military man should talk to this distinguished group in 1955. He realized that the Italian people were war weary, for they had been overrun by the enemy. They were also fed up on men in military uniforms, and were no doubt averse to a military man from the United States--a large country which was apparently taking over the leadership of NATO. General Gruenther was eager to secure rapport with the Italian audience and to capture their interest and understanding in recognizing that *security is the main preoccupation in this uneasy world.*

Gruenther's overall language is simple and direct, with a limited use of descriptive adjectives. His emphasis in language pattern is on first and second person pronouns to convey the feeling of togetherness in animated conversation. The serious tone of his remarks in this second paragraph are in sharp contrast to the humorous opening paragraph.

[Paragraph 3]

(3) *I came to Italy for the first time in 1919 after we had just finished one world war. In fact, I played a major role in ending that war. I was a cadet at the United States Military Academy, scheduled to be graduated in 1921. The state of the war got to be so crucial that the United States Government decided to graduate our class early, specifically on the 1st of November 1918. The Kaiser heard about this significant increase in allied strength and 11 days later he surrendered. However, the United States Government now had 278 new Second Lieutenants on its hands, and there was little use for them. The decision was made to send us to Europe on a tour of observation and study. We visited Italy in the summer of 1919 absolutely convinced then that our profession would never be needed again in the new and better world which was just getting under way.*

This paragraph opens with an excellent transition sentence from the serious note of the military reference to a humorous, hypothetical story which could well have attracted the interest and attention of the audience, and no doubt helped to establish General Gruenther's credibility. By referring to his experience as a Plebe West Point Cadet who was graduated three years early to help win the war, causing the Kaiser to surrender 11 days later, he was placing himself as the victim of humor which usually builds credibility for a speaker with his audience. In

addition he was attempting to represent himself as a personable, warm-hearted individual.

Young Gruenther's military tour for observation and study in Italy following his early graduation could well have produced rapport with the audience. That the United States Government chose Italy for the continuing education of their 278 Second Lieutenants should have prompted a feeling of national pride in his listeners. Furthermore, it should be observed that instead of bluntly stating that he had first-hand knowledge of their country, by suggestion he outlined his previous contact in Italy.

[Paragraph 4]

(4) *The next time I came to Italy was in September 1943, when there was a very great need for the military. We landed at Salerno as a part of General Clark's allied force, and in the 18 months that followed I learned about war. My course of instruction lasted from the 9th of September 1943 until July 1945. By that time we had moved up the Italian peninsula to Verona. If I did not know of the futility of war earlier, I certainly had it impressed upon me indelibly during my experiences in Italy. I want to say, at the same time, that we learned to respect the Italian people. The assistance we received from*

> *the Italian Resistance movement made a very significant contribution to the success of the allied Italian campaign. I want to thank the people from Italy now for the magnificent assistance you gave us.*

In the chronological report of activities in the Italian Campaign General Gruenther merely mentions that he was part of General Clark's allied force. It is possible of course that some of the seasoned military leaders in the audience may have been aware of his major responsibilities during the Italian Campaign which, no doubt, would have been a contribution to his credibility. In January 1943, nine months before he landed in Salerno, he had been appointed as General Mark Clark's Chief of Staff on the personal request of General Clark. However, not to "pull rank" was typical of General Gruenther's modesty in the military realm as well as in the role of speech-making.

Gruenther spent almost two years in Italy, moving up to Verona by the end of the period--an experience which convinced him of the futility of war. This was a significant testimonial from a well-known military leader, trained in war strategy, yet implicitly admitting the

importance of the preservation of peace--a thesis to which he was constantly referring. In addition, there appears to be an important reminder to the Italian people that enemy invaders had been driven out by the "foreign military." Perhaps he was attempting to allay their fears that the foreign military were neither aggressors, enemies, or oppressors!

The special tribute he paid to the Italian people for their outstanding contribution to the Italian Resistance Movement was probably intended to appeal to their national pride. But these commendations could also have produced an audience attitude favorable toward a General who recognized and appreciated their achievements in the Italian Campaign.

In this fourth paragraph of the Introduction, ten forms of the first person pronoun were used to contribute to the conversational and informal tone of the message. The personal pronoun "I" was used six times; "we" twice; and "my" twice in relating himself to the audience in his assignments in Italy--and at the same time, perhaps, adding to his credibility.

Among the total of eight sentences comprising this paragraph, five were simple sentences, two were complex, and only one sentence was compound. The overall reflection of simplicity in his sentence composition applies equally to his word choice, confined for the most part to one- and two-syllable words in this paragraph.

[Paragraph 5]

(5) *Then came VE-Day on May 8, 1945. From Verona, I moved on to Vienna where I joined our allies, the Soviets; I saw much of them for the next several months. In Vienna we concerned ourselves with problems of occupation. I was confident that we had reached a good understanding and that international tension was a thing of the past. But in September 1945 those tensions began to reappear, and we experienced a chill in the Soviet climate.*

At this point, General Gruenther not only is continuing the narrative of his experiences and activities, but is leading to the discussion of the problem and indicating here the sudden turn of events from peaceful solutions, good understanding, and amicable relationships, to *tensions*. Again we have an opportunity to perceive

Gruenther as a man who can work cooperatively but is also sensitive to changes in behavior which might prompt more direct action.

When VE-Day arrived he worked equally hard to preserve the peace. At least implicitly, here is a man who wishes to sit around the conference table of peace as amiably and efficiently as he could plot a military campaign when necessary.

Causal factors for the tensions which developed between the Soviets and the Western allies resulted in a *chill in the Soviet climate*, a metaphor created by General Gruenther to describe the sudden change in Soviet relationships with the Western European nations.

In using the first person pronoun five times in this brief paragraph, General Gruenther apparently again sought to associate and establish himself with the Italian audience through a conversational and informal communication.

The Threat of the Soviets
[Paragraph 6]

(6) *Nevertheless, the Western allies continued to demobilize; but the Soviets did not. Soon a series of frictions developed, culminating in such incidents as the Czechoslovakian Coup and the Berlin Blockade. As a result, a number of the former allies found that they had to build a collective security organization in order to preserve the peace. It was called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and that treaty was signed on April 4, 1949.*

Here again, as in his earlier discussion of his visits to Italy, we see the General making good use of the chronological order of events--a practice which he used frequently.

Because of the great military strength of the Soviets, who had not demobilized following the War, General Gruenther developed one of his major topics in pointing up the potential threat of Soviet power which had already culminated in the Berlin Blockade and the invasion of Czecho-Slovakia.

Furthermore, since the Western allies were continuing to demobilize, in contrast to the pattern followed by the Soviets in constantly increasing their military

strength, the need for building a collective security for defense against acts of aggression became evident.

Therefore, the causal factors of weakness of the Allied military defense, and the increasing strength of the Soviet Bloc resulted in the collective security plan outlined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in April, 1949.

The clear, simply-stated development of the reasons for the organization of NATO in order to provide the audience with a comprehensive background of factual, chronological information represents outstanding competence in the handling of materials--an example of workmanship which should have added to General Gruenther's credibility.

In addition, this analysis of the reasons for the organization of NATO contains potentially significant appeals in the sense that the listeners were being made aware that NATO was created in response to a major need, and not as a result of the desire of the Generals to create just another military organization.

[Paragraph 7]

(7) *But NATO didn't make much progress until the Free World was once again shocked by the advent of war--this time the invasion of South Korea in June 1950. That act of aggression made it crystal clear that rapid progress was needed in perfecting our defense organization.*

The subsequent invasion of South Korea by the Soviet Bloc constituted further evidence of the need for collective security in a western defense organization.[1]

General Gruenther limited his reporting to factual evidence, without using explicit fear-charged descriptions of invasion incidents, for he preferred to build his arguments logically for collective security in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. His use of crisp, decisive language to explain the reasons for stepping-up the military power of NATO could have served the dual purpose of clarifying his analysis and at the same time jarring what may have been an audience apathetic to the urgent needs of NATO.

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[1]Since neither the United States nor any one of the major free nations of Western Europe could singly match the strength of the Soviet Bloc, General Gruenther and others believed that a defense organization was needed--that it was essential that the Western Allies band together for their protection against acts of aggression and for the preservation of peace.

[Paragraph 8]

> *General Eisenhower arrived in Europe in January 1951 to organize the defense of Europe from the Northern tip of Norway to the eastern borders of Turkey--a distance of 7,000 kilometers. He came as the servant of the North Atlantic Treaty organization--12 nations then, now 14. I was General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff. He arrived in Paris on the 7th of January 1951. After a three day survey in Paris he started his trips; first to Brussels, then The Hague, then to Denmark, Norway, England, Portugal, and Italy. We arrived in Rome on the 18th day of January 1951.*

General Gruenther's description of Eisenhower's arrival in Paris in January 1951 to organize the defense of Europe and not a military machine, per se, was reflected in his reference to Eisenhower as a *servant* of NATO, rather than the military title of "Supreme Commander." By calling attention to his appointment as Eisenhower's Chief of Staff he was suggesting his familiarity with NATO from the very beginning, and by association, setting himself forth as a man who also was defense-minded rather than offense-centered.

In addition, the selection of Italy as one of the seven nations visited by General Eisenhower soon after he became Supreme Commander of NATO was no doubt included by

General Gruenther in his address to emphasize the importance of Italy's participation in NATO--in the hope of capturing the good-will of the audience through the appeal to their national pride.

In this paragraph Gruenther uses a series of simple sentences--didactic and crisp--to convey chronological information which was vitally important for audience understanding of Eisenhower's objectives and activities upon his arrival in Europe as Supreme Commander.

[Paragraph 9]
(Concluding Paragraph of the Introduction)

(9) *I would like to tell you what the situation was then. First of all, the morale of the Free World was at a very low ebb. We had practically no strength. When General Eisenhower returned to Paris from this trip on the 24th of January, 1951, he had a meeting of his commanders. I can remember the conference very well, because there was present one very sour-looking officer, a general, who seemed to be rather unhappy about the state of the world. General Eisenhower asked the question: "What do you think the Soviets would need to move to the English Channel?" This despondent general said, "General, they need only one thing--boots!" This was his cynical way of saying that we had no defense worthy of the name.*

The opening statement of this concluding paragraph of the Introduction of the speech emphasizes personal address for rapport with the audience to reveal the great weakness of NATO military defense in 1951. Gruenther chose direct discourse to interpret the deplorable lack of military support among the NATO nations.

When General Eisenhower questioned his staff concerning the needs of the Soviets to move to the English Channel, a despondent General cynically replied, *"General, they need only one thing--boots!"*[1] This statement which very poignantly emphasizes the overwhelming strength of the Soviets in contrast to the lamentable lack of NATO defense carries a definite fear inference.

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[1]A similar reference appears in both the Copenhagen and London speeches: Copenhagen speech: ¶ 10:

> *One official, of a cynical turn of mind when asked three years ago, "What do the Soviets need to march to the Channel?" answered, "Only shoes!"*

London speech: ¶ 8: (most abbreviated coverage):

> *Three years ago the Soviets could march to the Channel on very short notice with only the forces that they had in occupied Europe.*

The use of direct discourse as a stylistic practice is frequently advocated as a means of beginning and ending an Introduction of a speech. Gruenther's use of direct discourse is in harmony with the best advice and counsel. Furthermore, this practice perhaps resulted in far more effective conviction and impact on the audience at this point in the speech than a detailed statistical report on the comparative military strength of the Soviets over NATO.

The Progress NATO Is Making
[Opening Paragraph of the Body of the Speech]

(1) *It is now four years and a few months since that conference took place. I can tell you that since that time our forces throughout our area have increased from three to four times numerically from what they were then, and when one considers the question of effectiveness, the increase is greater still. I can assure you that nobody can march to the Channel now by just putting his boots on. It would require more men and more air support to move the men in those boots. Most important of all, the Free World has become convinced that the only answer to this problem is Collective Security. If we had had a NATO organization in 1939, even with the defects that ours has now--and I can assure*

> *you it still has many--I'm convinced there would have been no World War II. If we could have served notice at that time an attack on one nation would be considered as an attack on all, Hitler would have been dissuaded from attacking.*

The sentence separating the Introduction from the Body of the speech serves as a transition by indicating the lapse of time of over four years since the NATO General's cynical remark concerning the military strength of the Soviets. Gruenther then moves directly to the development of his second topic--in spite of some shortcomings, NATO is making progress. In the development of this point, factual and numerical data--the increased size of NATO forces--and personal opinion form the basis of the speaker's proof. He relates his evidence to the previously mentioned *boots* interpretation and shows how the growth of NATO power leads to a revised analysis: *nobody can now march to the Channel by just putting his boots on.*

Gruenther generalizes that more fighting men and planes plus cooperative action on the part of NATO nations would and could produce the defensive potential necessary to discourage an offensive move on the part of the Russians. He views these elements as "cause" for producing the desired

"effect"; and in an if-then sequence reasons that <u>if</u> these causes--men, planes, cooperative action--had been operative, <u>then</u> World War II would not have resulted.

It appears that Gruenther sought to bring the force of his conviction and expertise to bear on this point since he does not hesitate to make use of the first person singular, particularly in stating opinions; his choice of verbs used with these pronouns also suggests strong commitment on his part to the ideas being expressed, for instance: *I can tell you, I can assure you, I'm convinced.*

[Paragraph 2]
(Body of Speech)

(2) *In any case that is what the Free Nations have decided on; that is the goal toward which they are building. They are now absolutely dedicated to the idea that no nation--be it large or small--is sufficient unto itself in this jet-atomic age. That is our doctrine, and therein lies our greatest progress and our greatest strength.*

The transition sentence, referring to the collective security clause in the Treaty (that an attack on one

nation would be considered as an attack on all) conveys the commitment of NATO members to the importance of collective security in this *jet-atomic age*. This Gruenther-coined phrase, *jet-atomic age*, which reveals the explosive combination of the devastating atomic bomb with the lightning speed of jet air power, presumably was intended to portray to the audience the menacing reality of unprecedented military power available to a possible enemy. Moreover, this military potential clearly provided the reasons for collective security since no NATO nation, whatever its size, was sufficient by itself to endure an enemy attack of *jet-atomic* proportions.

The thesis that the NATO nations were a cohesive unit is further strengthened in this paragraph by the selection of the words *absolutely dedicated*, which suggests strong commitment and oneness of purpose. At the same time, the reiteration of the conviction that *no nation . . . is sufficient unto itself* emphasizes once again that there is little choice but to be involved in the collective action.

In the concluding sentence of the paragraph, the repetition of *greatest--. . . and therein lies our greatest progress and our greatest strength*--produces impressive rhythm in the sentence structure to emphasize their doctrine of collective security. In addition, the use of the plural possessive personal pronoun *our* three times in the brief concluding sentence of only 14 words, is the type of workmanship which is designed to enhance the rapport of togetherness with the audience in confirming the need for unity in military defense and in suggesting an awareness on the part of the speaker that this nation could make a meaningful contribution.

[Paragraph 3]

(3) *We now have a going concern. We have an over-all headquarters at SHAPE in Paris, and four subordinate headquarters. We have a northern command at Oslo that has for its mission the defense of Norway and Denmark; a headquarters at Fontainebleau for the defense of the critical central area; a headquarters at Naples for the defense of Italy, Greece and Turkey; and a headquarters at Malta for the protection of the vital Mediterranean sea-lines of communication.*

Additional support for Gruenther's second topic that NATO is making progress is introduced by the description of the geographical spread of the four NATO commands to cover the defense areas within and adjacent to all the NATO nations, including the overall headquarters at SHAPE in Paris--thus providing, no doubt, a sense of security to the NATO representatives in the audience. The thought units are concise and the information concrete.

The progress in being a *going concern* and the assurance of NATO's dedication to collective security with the four military command headquarters are important expressions of optimism suggesting connotations of activity--expressions useful at this point in the speech before proceeding to the vivid detailed description of the military strength of the Soviets in the subsequent paragraph. The stylistic pattern adopted in these optimistic observations by Gruenther represents the type of workmanship intended to establish himself with the audience. In addition, in the first three sentences he relates himself to his material and to his audience through the plural first person pronoun, which was repeated three times in sentences

of parallel construction--each beginning with the phrases: *We now have . . . .--We have an . . . .--We have . . . .*

Furthermore, the use of the phrase *going concern* to describe NATO command is a picturesque expression readily understood by most laymen not familiar with the operation of a military command headquarters and provides a portrayal of NATO as an organization which was attempting to fulfill its purpose and responsibilities in building collective security defense for NATO.

[Paragraph 4]
(Body)

(4) *Those headquarters study the problems of not what a possible enemy may decide to do, but what he could do. We refer to that capacity in military jargon as "capabilities." We do not try to assess enemy intentions; that would be very dangerous. This is what we find: That the Soviet Bloc now constitutes some 800 million people--the most powerful empire in the history of the world. From the standpoint of air power, it has some 20,000 operational aircraft. From the standpoint of naval power it has a relatively weak surface navy, but a strong submarine fleet. To give you just an idea of Soviet naval power, I can cite that the Soviet Navy now has approximately 350 submarines of all classes, big and little,*

> *good and bad. To get an idea of what 350 submarines mean, please bear in mind that when World War II began, the Germans had approximately 75 submarines. That does not mean that the Soviets are five times as good as the Germans were then, because the Soviets do not have "know-how"; but it is an indication of where they are placing their emphasis.*

With the definition of a possible enemy's *capabilities*, Gruenther assesses the military power of the Soviets, not in terms of their intentions but what they could do with the support of their land, air, and sea forces. The run-down on their numerical military strength is "good" factual evidence for his listeners to consider, although he is quick to recognize and state that numbers alone were not the whole picture.

To explain the significance of the 350 Soviet submarines, Gruenther compares them with the 75 submarines which the Germans had at the opening of World War II, but he concedes that the great variance between the two does not necessarily indicate that the Soviets were five times stronger than the Germans were then, because the Soviets do not have *know-how*. In this way he is able to counter the refutation that may have arisen in the minds of some,

namely that numerical strength--both men and machines--did not tell the full story concerning military capability.

It is possible that the Italian members of his audience might have been repelled by any reference to Germany's part in World War II, reminding them of the devastating German invasion and recalling the gruesome memories of their great losses.

On the other hand, despite this possibility of antagonizing the Italian audience by referring to Germany, Gruenther perhaps has chosen Germany as an example for comparison with Soviet submarine power for two reasons. First, the Italians were well aware of the terrifying destruction which could be wrought by only 75 submarines, having been the victim of the German submarine attacks during the Second World War. Second, it is probable that Gruenther used Germany for comparison with Soviet submarine power to pave the way with the Italian audience for the information he was about to convey on Germany's accession to NATO--not only for their much-needed military contributions, but also for their military *know-how*.

Gruenther's competency in reporting the authentic detailed computation on Soviet overall military strength could conceivably have added further to his image as a straight-forward, alert, and knowledgeable leader. Furthermore, his clear and direct interpretation of military *capabilities* which could be readily understood by the audience, is free from military jargon and technical language. Also, the use of the phrase *know-how* further illustrates Gruenther's choice of expressions which people understand and which tend to promote a conversational, informal tone--a condition generally viewed as conducive to good conversation.

Gruenther confines his analysis of the Soviet military strength to the report-level with no interpretive or evaluative description. It is possible, however, that this enormous military power implicitly produced some emotional concern in the audience.

[Paragraph 5]

(5) *In addition to the Soviet forces, there are between 75 and 80 Satellite divisions, not nearly as good as the Soviet ones; but the Soviets know that and they are doing their best to improve them. The Satellites have between two and three thousand aircraft, again not nearly as good as the Soviets, but they are improving. The Satellite navies are relatively small and ineffective.*

Continuing his analysis of the Soviet *capability* by enumeration and evaluation of the Satellite potential, Gruenther evaluates their contributions as inferior to the Soviet's, but improving. His report appears to be "complete" and thorough.

The combined strength of the Soviets and the Satellites, referred to as the Soviet Bloc, would obviously constitute a threat far more formidable than an attack by the Soviets alone. Again the speaker refrains from fear-charged description, and confines his discussion to the report level. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the military statistics produced emotional concern in the audience.

[Paragraph 6]

(6) *Those are the forces of the Soviet Bloc. They are the forces which we at SHAPE use as the basis for our planning. We notice that the Soviet armed forces are constantly increasing in effectiveness. We do not say that these forces are ever going to be used. To speculate in that field is not our job. Our task is to plan to make an act of aggression by those forces so expensive that it will never take place. In other words, our prime objective is to prevent a third world war.*

The transition sentence serves as a summarization of the strength of the Soviet forces--the basis on which SHAPE was planning its military defense.

Because the Soviet armed forces were constantly increasing in effectiveness, it was, therefore, essential for SHAPE to build a defense system which would be such a threat to a potential enemy that an act of aggression would not take place. By this reasoning, Gruenther developed the prime objective of SHAPE--to prevent a third world war--an appeal to security and self-preservation. The speaker again sets forth his role as defender rather than aggressor and points up his "down to earth" approach for coping with the serious problem. He acknowledges the

severity of the problem but sounds a confident note that the goal can be achieved.

The several simple sentences clearly and succinctly describe the prime objective--to prevent a third world war--the concept included in the periodic climactic sentence closing the paragraph.

The use of seven plural first person pronouns in this brief paragraph indicates Gruenther's attempt to promote "togetherness" with his Italian audience, as well as with the representatives from other NATO nations, in the emphasis on their common objectives for the preservation of peace.

[Paragraph 7]

(7) *Yesterday was May Day in Moscow. May Day has traditionally been a celebration for the workers. However, in Moscow for the last several years, it has turned into an Armed Forces demonstration. Last year the Soviets showed some airplanes; it was expected they would show some new planes yesterday. But it rained very, very heavily and so no new planes appeared. I think it is well, however, for us to bear in mind that if we had had one of these Italian sunshiny days yesterday, you would have had big*

> *headlines today concerning new types of airplanes the Soviets had perfected within the last year. I mention that not to create any fear in your hearts, but merely to bring to your attention some of the grim realities that we're facing.*

This narrative on *May Day in Moscow* was used as an illustration to convey the probable strength of the Soviets in air power, although their planes were not displayed during the celebration due to the heavy downpour of rain. But he warned that had the weather allowed, headlines would have carried the tidings on the new types of airplanes the Soviets had launched.

The appeal to fear was more explicit here than in any previous section of the speech, for the word "fear" appears for the first time. Regardless of his explicit remark of not wishing *to create any fear in your hearts* he implicitly inferred fear by reference to the *grim realities that we're facing*. This last phrase in the periodic sentence leads to the climax of the paragraph.

May Day in Moscow, the euphonious phrase in the opening sentence of the paragraph, could well have captured the attention of the audience and maintained interest

throughout this vivid narrative on the Soviet day of celebration for their military strength. Likewise, the phrase *Italian sunshiny days* should have given pleasure to the listeners, as any such compliment might do. Concreteness and recency are evidenced in his statement that the Soviets had perfected *within the last year* the new types of airplanes which they had planned to exhibit on *May Day in Moscow* had the weather allowed.

[Paragraph 8]

(8) *We at SHAPE have been given the problem of planning for the defense of Europe. Our mission is two-fold; to defend our European territory--all of it; and secondly, in the event of an all-out act of aggression, to defeat the enemy. Notice that I do not say to "win," because I'm convinced that if there should be a third world war there would be no winner. However, it is essential that we be able to defeat the enemy.*

The problem of planning at SHAPE to implement a two-fold mission of defense of all NATO territory and defeat of the enemy was expressed in the first person plural pronoun several times to indicate the shared decisioning at SHAPE.

However, in contrast, Gruenther reverts to personal testimony in the singular first person pronoun--and with personal authority admits that he does not say NATO will *win* since if there were a third world war, there would be no winner. But he emphasizes it would be essential for NATO to be able to defeat the enemy, which of course underlines the basic premise of effective defense for NATO through collective security.[1]

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[1]Similar concept included in Paragraph 21 in Body of London speech--*that if there were a third world war, there would be no winner.* However, in the London speech his statement on the defeat of the Soviets is more definite than in the Rome speech:

London speech: *But the Soviets would definitely be defeated in every sense of the word.*

Rome speech: *However it is essential that we be able to defeat the enemy.*

This variance in degree of certainty in the defeat of the enemy could perhaps be explained by the greater threat from the Soviets prevailing during the Rome speech in 1955 than in 1954, when Gruenther spoke in London--or in the slackening of the rate of increase in NATO military strength in 1955 compared to 1954.

On the other hand, perhaps the variance of certainty concerning the defeat of the enemy could be explained by Gruenther's presumption that Great Britain would continue to contribute to NATO's defense support, while he was confronted with a persuasion problem in Rome to enlist continuous support from the Italians.

The supporting materials set forth in this paragraph can be classified as explanation and personal opinion. Having presented more factual material in preceding paragraphs, the speaker is now free to interpret what they mean and what must be done to counter them.

[Paragraph 9]

(9) *The next question is how well could we do now? Are we good enough to defend this 7,000 kilometer perimeter against an all-out attack now? Considering where we were four years ago, it would be nothing short of a miracle if we had developed that much strength in such a short period of time. Our forces were at a pitifully low level in 1951. In the year before General Eisenhower came over here--1950--the budget of the European nations for defense was approximately five billion dollars. Last year--1954--the budget in those same countries had gone up to 13.5 billion dollars. However, it takes time to implement defense measures, and so we're not yet strong enough to be certain of resisting successfully an all-out attack. Therefore, with respect to the first mission I have described--to defend our European territory--we cannot give that assurance yet. It was for that reason that when General Eisenhower was Supreme Commander, he recommended a German contribution.*

The two rhetorical questions simulating rapport dialogue with the audience are introduced at the opening

of the paragraph, no doubt, to capture the interest of the audience and to provide the answers to the status of NATO's military defense in the development of the paragraph. Then by means of a chronological arrangement, the speaker attempts to show how the answer to these questions has unfolded, by comparing and contrasting NATO military defense inadequacy in 1950 with its growth by 1954.

Evidence on the "pitifully" low level of NATO military strength in 1951 is a repetition of the similar facts conveyed in the concluding paragraph of the introduction of the speech to emphasize the lack of defense when General Eisenhower arrived in Europe.

Although the defense budget of European nations had increased over 2-1/2 times from 1950 to 1954, Gruenther provides the answer to the rhetorical question that NATO was not yet strong enough to resist an all-out attack. This inadequacy of military strength serves as the springboard for the introduction of the German contribution. To support the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO he relates the recommendation

of General Eisenhower (when he was Supreme Commander) as a source authority. This is the first use of outside authority that Gruenther has included in providing evidence for his remarks.

In the nine uses of the first person pronoun, eight were plural (six were the collective "we," and two were the possessive "our") with only one singular first person pronoun. These first person pronouns contributed to the conversational tone--a methodology designed to convey rapport and togetherness with the audience and to help in the establishment of himself as a cooperative and competent military leader.

[Paragraph 10]

(10) *A week from today in Paris, Signor Martino will be present at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Paris when Germany is admitted to NATO. As your Secretary General has stated, Germany will become the 15th member of NATO. We will then get, in due course, a German military contribution. That contribution will consist of some 1,300 tactical aircraft, 12 Army divisions; and some naval craft, for use generally in the Baltic area. When the German forces are effective, which will be in three to four years from now, we will be able to*

> *defend Europe even against an all-out act of aggression. That is the military reason why we have constantly advocated this German contribution.*

To convince the skeptical Italians of the need for the German contribution, it was important to associate Italian leaders in their official, cooperative relationship with NATO in the admittance of Germany to the Alliance. That Signor Martino would be attending the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Paris when Germany would be officially installed as a new member of NATO should have helped to promote acceptance of the audience to the accession.

The statistical enumeration of the German military contribution provided the evidence for Gruenther's conclusion that in three or four years Europe could be defended against an all-out act of aggression with Germany's accession to NATO--thereby appealing to the Italian audience through the motive of self-preservation. At the same time, the suggestion that Europe was vulnerable, and would be for several years, could have been a vivid reminder that continuing support was a "must."

This statistical report of Germany's military contribution was expressed in clear, understandable language which followed General Gruenther's usual pattern of eliminating military jargon and technical terminology.

[Paragraph 11]

(11) *The admission of Germany to NATO, however, has more than military significance. It is the beginning of a new Europe. We all have high hopes for the Europe which is going to evolve from this arrangement. I think the Italians should feel particularly proud of the role that Italy has played to bring it about. Certainly, Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi was one of the small group that sponsored the idea initially. It was he who spoke to General Eisenhower--he and Count Sforza--in January 1951, when General Eisenhower came here to Rome. Both of these distinguished Italians had long shared the concept of a united Europe. I'm sorry they cannot be present at the Palais de Chaillot a week from today.*

To tie the concept of a new Europe with Germany's admission to NATO and with the role that Italy had already played in the plan was a signal strategy to appeal to the national pride of the Italians, and perhaps, at the same time, to help promote greater receptivity by

the audience concerning Germany's accession to membership in NATO.

The specific naming of two Italian leaders, Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi and Count Sforza, as initial sponsors of the plan for a united Europe, and their personal endorsement of the concept to General Eisenhower in 1951, should have added even more to the sense of national pride of the audience than the more general comments. General Gruenther's method of paying tribute to others who have promoted the concept of unity for free nations is the kind of approach which should enhance his image and develop audience appreciation for the recognition accorded their national leaders.[1]

In summary, paragraphs 10 and 11 covered an overall method of problem-solution in presenting the following arguments in the hope of converting the Italian audience to Germany's accession to NATO:

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[1]In the London speech, General Gruenther also pays tribute to Ambassador Sir Gladwyn Jebb, a noted statesman, who had promoted the concept of a North Atlantic Alliance in March 1948. (See paragraph one of the Body of the London speech.)

1. Germany's military contribution to NATO

2. The testimony of Eisenhower endorsing the accession of Germany

3. The endorsement of three Italian leaders: Signor Martino, their Foreign Minister; and Prime Minister Alcide De Gasperi and Count Sforza who were Italy's initial sponsors of a United Europe--a concept which would be implemented by the addition of Germany for the political unity of Europe.

[Paragraph 12]

(12) *I have said that we cannot be sure of accomplishing our first mission--that is, the defense of Europe--now, but that when we get the German contribution we shall be. Because I have said it will take three or four years before that German contribution is effective, you may have in mind the question: "Doesn't that mean that we are in mortal peril during those three to four years?" Although there is no exact answer to that question, I'd like to make an observation on it. At this time--the second of May 1955--our side has a tremendous advantage over the Soviet Bloc in the field of long-range airpower. A little over a year ago an American plane, the B-47, of which there are many in the American Air Force, flew from Maine over to England in 4 hours and 34 minutes. That is an average speed of about 1,100 kilometers an hour.*

The first two sentences are internal summaries covering the German military contribution and the probable

delay in its ultimate effectiveness for three or four years--information previously discussed by General Gruenther. The important rhetorical question in the form of direct discourse concerning the degree of danger to be confronted during the interim is a rhetorical procedure designed to capture the attention and interest of the audience with its fear-charged expression of *mortal peril.*

However, Gruenther's personal testimony on the great advantage which NATO possessed over the Soviets in long-range airpower with the American plane, the B-47, conceivably could have contributed a feeling of confidence and optimism to the audience.[1] The good news

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[1]In the London speech (¶ 19) Gruenther did not explicitly identify the B-47 as an invention of the Americans but implied its origination by stating that four months previous to the London speech in June, 1954, a B-47 *left the United States and landed in England four hours and 34 minutes later.*

In contrast, however, in this speech in Rome he explicitly identifies the B-47 as *an American plane* flying *a little over a year ago from Maine to England.*

Presumably, the B-47 in 1954 was still under experiments for testing its adoption by NATO, while in 1955 in Rome, Gruenther identified it as an American plane and added *there are many in the American Air Force.* Perhaps, however, Gruenther merely decided in the London speech to withhold an explicit statement of U.S. credit for the plane for reasons related to diplomatic relations with England. In England he attributed to the B-47 a speed of 650 miles

conveyed by Gruenther on the B-47 American plane should also have contributed to his image as a reliable and trustworthy source of information. His account of this source of strength was brief and to the point. In journalistic fashion he identified what it was, where it came from, and what it could do.

The use of four plural first person pronouns and three singular first person pronouns contributed to the conversational tone as well as an involvement with the audience in sharing both the serious problem of danger until the German contribution would be effective, as well as the good news on the B-47 plane.

[Paragraph 13]

(13) *At this stage of technological development, there is no answer to that plane. The Soviets do not have an answer to that plane, and we do not have an answer to that either. We have a*

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an hour, which he thoughtfully transposed to 1,100 kilometers an hour, to adapt the measurement of distance to terminology familiar to the Italians.

> *significant number of those planes. For that reason, if a war should break out today, and if my most pessimistic assumption should prove correct--that the aggressor should overrun Europe--he would still be defeated because he does not have an answer to these long-range airplanes. Even if it had been a sunshiny day in Moscow yesterday, the answer would not have been shown. There might have been new planes displayed, and I'm sure there would have been. But it will take some time before the Soviets can get them to Detroit, Pittsburg, and Chicago, which they must be able to do before they can defeat us. I do not want to say that the time is not coming when they can do that, but what I do want to say is that the time has not yet arrived when they can surpass us in long-range air power. Moreover, if we are vigilant that day will never arrive. In other words I do not feel that the situation is hopeless. We must maintain our courage. I don't want to appear complacent about this matter, but at the same time I don't want to be hysterical either.*

Since there is no answer to the new B-47 either by the Soviets or NATO, Gruenther proposes the hypothetical supposition which should have instilled optimism and a renewal of confidence in the future for the audience:

> *. . . if a war should break out . . . and the aggressor should overrun Europe he would still be defeated because he does not have an answer to these long-range airplanes.*

In his opinion testimony as an authority in warfare he will not commit himself on whether the Soviet planes can attack the U.S., but he admits the time has not yet arrived when the Soviets can surpass the B-47. His reasoning brings him to the conclusion that the situation is not hopeless, yet he does not wish to leave the impression with the audience of over-optimism *by appearing complacent.* Implicitly, the inference of fear is conveyed to the audience, perhaps, by his statement, *I don't want to be hysterical, either.* Therefore, by his development of opinions through logical reasoning he has attempted to maintain courage and optimism on the one hand, yet has inferred the danger of over-confidence, on the other.

To convey his opinions in conversational format he has used eight first person pronouns (five singular, and three plural) which accounts for the large proportion of personal testimony included in this paragraph.

Parallel construction in sentence structure is evidenced by the following series of sentences:

I do not want to say . . . .
I do want to say . . . .
I do not feel . . . .
I don't want to appear complacent . . . .
I don't want to be hysterical . . . .

Both word choice and sentence composition conforms to Gruenther's regular pattern of simplicity, directness, and clarity.

[Paragraph 14]

(14) *I know that in a group of this kind it is unnecessary to say that security consists of more--much more--than just the military strength. It consists of economic and psychological elements as well. The economic element speaks for itself. However, I'd like to devote a few moments to the psychological aspects.*

Up to this point in the speech Gruenther has been concentrating on the military strength of NATO, but obviously recognizes the importance of economic and psychological elements.

This paragraph merely serves as the bridge to the subsequent discussion of psychological problems. In this particular phrasing, we find one of the few direct procedural sentences wherein the General inserts a specific statement concerning the next topic to be discussed.

[Paragraph 15]

(15) *We have made tremendous progress in this alliance of ours--much greater success than we ever thought possible four years ago. We are much farther along than the estimates which we made in April 1951. That does not mean, however, that the path for the future is going to be a smooth one. My belief is that the next four years are going to be harder than the last four years, and largely because of the difficulty in solving the psychological problems.*

With an internal summary in the first two sentences on the coverage of his second topic--the progress of NATO--he comments on the tremendous progress since April 1941. He then proceeds to lead into his third topic--the problems of NATO with the personal testimony that the next four years would be harder than the last four years because of the psychological problems.

In the first two sentences he uses the plural first person pronoun four times to emphasize by inference that the progress and success which NATO has recorded during the past four years has been attained through joint efforts and cooperation--to convey togetherness with the audience, perhaps appeal to their natioanl pride, and probably build credibility for the leadership of NATO.

The Problems Facing NATO
[Paragraph 16]

(16) *We will have the problem of creating a public opinion stout-hearted enough to continue through this Cold War no matter how long it lasts, and it may last a long, long time. Our people are peace-loving, and it is very difficult for them to keep up their enthusiasm for defense burdens that are so heavy--and may grow even heavier. There is also a very strong peace offensive being waged now by the Communists. In this campaign the Communists are attempting by neutralist propaganda to divide and split our alliance. The Soviets are very clever in this propaganda business*

In pinpointing some of the major psychological problems facing NATO, Gruenther relies upon general process materials: explanation, description, and definition. He begins by describing the NATO members as *peace-loving* (thereby appealing to their pride), but at the same time is explaining, but not condoning, their lack of enthusiasm for building defense. This psychological problem of cause and effect relation must, therefore, be solved, according to Gruenther, by a strong public opinion to encourage the endurance for defense burdens if NATO is to fulfill its goal of collective security.

Another psychological problem facing NATO was the peace offensive being waged by the Communists in

"attempting by neutralist propaganda to divide and split our alliance."[1] In this observation General Gruenther is following one of the fundamental principles for effective persuasion by linking the opponent's cause to unethical tactics. By admitting the cleverness of the Soviets in this type of propaganda Gruenther is inferring that those who are weary of war and military defense burdens are vulnerable to promises of peace. It is this danger he was implicitly attempting to forestall in alerting his audience on the peace offensive being waged by the Communists, for this was no time for NATO nations to forsake military defense responsibilities.

In the opening sentence, the metaphor . . . *stout-hearted enough to continue through this Cold War no matter how long it lasts* . . . provides dramatic and significant impact to the problem of creating favorable public opinion.

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[1]Also in the Copenhagen speech (¶ 25), General Gruenther refers to the *major and continuing Soviet effort . . . directed toward the dismemberment of the NATO Alliance . . . the ancient but still valid strategy of* <u>*divide and conquer*</u>. And in ¶ 26 he continues . . . *surely we have learned the hard way that Soviet peace offers followed at once by Soviet threats is a key technique in the communist cold war.*

Here the General is implicitly pointing up the need for patience and courageous endurance to continue the building of military defense in the face of the Soviet peace offensive and their neutralist propaganda to divide and split the Alliance.

The use of the plural first person pronouns ("we" and "our") in the attempt to create this favorable public opinion encompassed the involvement of the audience and the need for "togetherness" in this venture of building defense without interruption. Gruenther's understanding of the purpose of the peace offensive of the Communists and his analysis of their neutralist propaganda should have alerted the audience to the implicit dangers involved, and presumably should have enhanced his image by his competency in recognizing the ulterior motives of the Soviet disguise.

[Paragraphs 17-20, inc.]

(17) *When I left Italy in the summer of 1945, I went to Vienna, and there for the next four months I saw a great deal of the Soviets. There I met one of the ablest officers I have ever*

known in any service. He was a Russian, aged 42, a four-star general. He was the number two man under Marshal Koniev who, as you saw in the pictures in your papers today, stood in the front row at the Moscow parade yesterday. I was the number two man under General Clark at the time, and so I saw General Koniev's deputy very often. We saw each other three or four times a week. Over a period of time he outlined his philosophy to me, and it can be summarized as something like this: "You come from a democracy. You're proud of the freedoms which you have. However, you will live to find that those freedoms are divisive. You ask your people to pass on issues which are so complicated that they cannot possibly decide whether the black answer is right or the white answer. And you send them to the polls to vote on those subjects. You're going to find that as time goes on in this jet age (he did not know about the atomic part then) you're going to find that they cannot reach sound decisions. We, in the Soviet Union, however, have solved that problem by appointing wise men at the head who tell our people what to do. We don't ask them. We don't have these foolish voting contests to decide these issues. You might just as well ask your people to vote on whether the Einstein theory is correct or not. What do they know about it?"

(18) *His second thesis was this: "You have religion. What a wonderful invention for the Capitalists! Of course you want to tell the people to get their reward in Heaven, so you can exploit them on this earth. You don't want to give them their just reward here. You have even gone so far as to devise a Commandment, 'Thou shalt not steal,' so that they don't get that reward here."*

(19) *His third thesis was this: "In order to make any government work, the people have to support it energetically, and that requires a*

very extensive educational campaign. It is necessary to start educating citizens at a very early age."

(20) *It is significant that that very officer has been made the head of what is called in the Soviet Union the "Main Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense." He has about 2,000 assistants, many of them university graduates, to help him. His job is to educate the young men of the Soviet Armed Forces; and because there is a turnover of about two million of them a year he has a sizable audience. Also, knowing him as I do, knowing how dedicated he is to his cause, I'm sure he's doing a very effective job.*

Within the four preceding paragraphs the Soviet philosophy on democracy, religion, and early indoctrination of the young is summarized by General Gruenther in the style of direct discourse from observations conveyed to him by a Soviet four-star general with whom he was personally associated in Vienna in 1945.

Gruenther's description of the Russian general as one of the ablest officers he had ever known in any military service was very likely conveyed to the audience to establish the Russian's credibility as an authoritative source for the interpretation of the Soviet philosophy. That the Russian general was number two man under Marshall Koniev (one of the top military leaders of Russia) and

that the rank of number two man was also shared by Gruenther under General Mark Clark, was no doubt included to clarify the close and frequent association between the Russian general and Gruenther during the occupation of Austria, thus providing the opportunity for their discussion which ensued over a period of four months. It would seem that because of their comparable rank and role, the two would and should have had a basis and opportunity for extended communication which would enable one to gain an understanding of the other's point of view.

In summarizing the Russian general's philosophy on democracy, Gruenther used direct discourse and parallel construction--and to attract the attention and interest of the audience adopted personal address in the opening six sentences describing democracy:

> *<u>You</u> come from a democracy.*
> *<u>You're</u> proud of the freedoms which you have.*
> *However, <u>you</u> will live to find that those freedoms are divisive.*
> *<u>You</u> ask <u>your</u> people to pass on issues which are so complicated that they cannot possibly decide . . . .*
> *And <u>you</u> send them to the polls to vote on those subjects.*

> *<u>You're</u> going to find that as time goes on . . . that they cannot reach sound decisions.*

To contribute to the clarity and simplicity of the above description, four of the six sentences are of simple structure, with the great majority of the words confined to one and two syllables.

Also in parallel construction, the Soviet ideology is contrasted to democracy, but shifted from the second person to the first person pronoun in personal address, a practice that is thought useful in obtaining the attention and holding the interest of the audience:

> *We, in the Soviet union, however, have solved that problem by appointing wise men at the head who <u>tell</u> our people what to do.*
> *We don't ask them.*
> *We don't have these foolish voting contests to decide these issues.*

In describing the futility of asking people to vote on complicated issues in *foolish voting contests*, the Russian general gives an illustration of an extreme hypothetical analogy--of asking people to vote on whether or not the Einstein theory is correct--which he considered of comparable futility to seeking answers from the populace on complicated government issues. It would

seem likely that the audience would be repelled by the communist denouncement of the democratic system, which is dedicated to upholding the freedom of the people's choice in resolving issues, since historically, and during the dictatorship of Mussolini, the Italians had experienced struggle against power from the top.

The sarcastic rhetorical question, "what do they know about it?" posed by the Russian general, brought the paragraph (#17) to a climactic close.

In his second thesis of denouncing religion as a "wonderful invention of the Capitalists" the Russian general continued his discourse with vitriolic criticism, replete with irony and sarcasm in each of his succeding observations. This derision of religion would hardly meet with much approval in the Vatican City of Italy, and this Soviet philosophy which ran counter to traditional and historical values held by the audience almost certainly should have stirred a stronger commitment to NATO, which stood in confrontation with the Russians.

The third thesis summarized by Gruenther in direct discourse of the Russian general covered the extensive

Soviet educational campaign for the early indoctrination of youth to develop their dedication to the Communist ideology. General Gruenther again builds the credibility of the Russian general as an authoritative source of information by describing his important position in Russia as head of the *Main Political Directorate of the Ministers of Defense* for the education of all the young men of the Soviet Armed Forces, with a turnover of about 2 million a year. *The Russian general had about 2,000 assistants, many of them University graduates, to help him.* The additional statistical information was included by Gruenther to support his reasons for reporting the viewpoints of this high ranking Russian general.

In this summarization of Communist philosophy by General Gruenther, conveyed to him by a Russian general, the use of personal discourse for the presentation of the three theses was no doubt adopted by Gruenther for several reasons--

First, the emotion-charged concepts, denouncing both democracy and religion, in the direct discourse of the Russian general should have resulted in violent negative reactions by the audience. The use of the specific Russian officer rather than general opinion would, according to rhetorical theory, be more forceful than the alternative.

Second, it would seem a fair presumption that Gruenther introduced this discourse into his speech to convey the Soviet ideology through the interpretation of a highly respected four-star Russian general to avoid the possibility of accusations of prejudice by a subjective interpretation. Also, rhetorical theory confirms that personal discourse is generally regarded as one of the most effective methods of enlisting and maintaining interest of the audience in detailed interpretation or description. The use of this approach was a nice change of pace from the earlier explanation and opinion evidence.

Finally, and perhaps most significant, the indictments against freedom of choice of the individual and freedom of religion voiced by the Russian general attacked

very sensitive areas of life upheld by most Italians. Thus, it is quite probable that this denunciation could very well have encouraged active support of military defense for NATO as a thrust against the Soviet ideology.

The stylistic pattern of simplicity in sentence structure as well as in word choice is followed in all four paragraphs, with a predominance of simple sentences, and one- and two-syllable words. As indicated, personal address, parallel construction, direct discourse, comparison and contrast, first person pronouns (plural and singular), a metaphor, and rhetorical questions were incorporated in the speaker's workmanship. Language management of this type is generally accepted as being conducive to effective communication since it aids clarity, is interest and attention arresting, and facilitates subsequent recall of the information.

There may have been some positive benefits for Gruenther, as a speaker and leader, derived from the use of the extended illustration. For instance, he should have emerged as one who can at least communicate with the Russians on an unemotional basis, an attribute of

value for a leader whose responsibility it was to confront the Russians, one way or another.

[Paragraphs 21 and 22]

(21) *To show you how effective their system is on these young men, I'd like to give you some examples. Mrs. Gruenther and I have two sons, and both of them have served in Korea. One of them was seriously wounded there. That young man, as the head of an Infantry Company, advanced almost to the Yalu River. Whenever he advanced, he had air support and artillery support and all the assistance that a powerful nation could afford in order to be saving human lives. He was fighting against men, Communists, who had no air support; and when I say no air support, I mean not even one plane was ever put in front of a Communist advance. What did that mean? It meant that they suffered losses five, six, seven times the losses that my son's company had. But those Communist soldiers had a dedication, or a sense of fanaticism, if that is a better explanation, because of their indoctrination, and they kept coming on and on in spite of their terrible losses.*

(22) *A year ago today we were in the last stages of a struggle in Indo-China where we had at Dien Bien Phu some 12,000 members of the gallant French Union surrounded by 30 to 40 thousand Communist forces. The Communists again had no air support, and again they took terrible losses, but on and on they came.*

These two paragraphs stand as amplification of the preceding one. Gruenther apparently has a need to offer additional proof to help establish the point that Russian indoctrination led to a great zeal in the minds and hearts of their fighting men. To prove the effectiveness of the Soviet system of indoctrination of their young men, Gruenther describes examples of their fanatic dedication on the battlefields in Korea and Indo-China.

In the first example, he explains that his two sons had served in Korea, and one was seriously wounded as the head of an infantry company. Gruenther narrates the dramatic personal experience of his son as he advanced to the Yalu River with air and artillery support and other military assistance to save the lives of his men. The Communists, however, gave no air support to their infantrymen, thereby increasing their losses many times the losses of his son's company. But the Communist infantrymen, against all odds, continued to fight *on and on* with the dedication of fanaticism, in spite of their *terrible* losses--reflecting the results of their intensive indoctrination to the Communist cause.

A second parallel example in Indo-China illustrated similar results of fanatic dedication by the Communist forces. Here, too, the Communist troops fought *on and on*, again resulting in *terrible* losses.

In both examples, the effect to cause relation prevailed--the Communists fought with fanatic dedication because of their indoctrination. In both examples, the repetition of the phrase, "and they kept coming on and on in spite of their terrible losses" emphasized with dramatic emotion-charged language the powerful significance of the Communist indoctrination. (That the Communist troops were sent into battle without any air support inferred implicitly the communist philosophy of the low value placed on human life.)

In reporting the total lack of air support for the Communist infantrymen, Gruenther posed the rhetorical question, *What did that mean?*, which he answered in terms of the great losses they suffered. But this question provided an explanation for the basic purpose of the

examples--effective indoctrination in a cause, resulting in fanatic dedication--a subject he pursued in subsequent discussion.

That Gruenther's two sons had fought in a war against communism in Korea, with one son having been seriously wounded in action, should have struck a sympathetic note in the minds of those Italians who had suffered from past wars. Moreover, the factual reference to both of his sons serving in the armed forces strongly points to the loyalty and service of the General and his family.

[Paragraph 23]

(23) *We must find an answer to that fanaticism, but our answer would never--must never--be the same as theirs. However, the problem we face was outlined by this former Soviet friend of mine. We must match their fanaticism by a dedication to our way of life. There is no reason why we should not achieve it. We have religion --a wonderful spiritual strength--a sense of freedom, and above all, the dignity of the individual. We have everything that men should be willing to fight for in a hot war or cold war. Our job, as I see it, is to inspire these 400 million people in NATO to be able to continue the struggle, to make the sacrifices*

> *which are going to be necessary for an enduring peace. We must understand our responsibilities as well as our privileges.*

Having indicated something of the problem faced by NATO in the realm of psychological considerations, Gruenther proceeds to an outline of the solution. The subordinate materials are laid out in topical fashion. The emphasis is on "what" we should do rather than the specifics of "how" it can be accomplished.

In a transition sentence to tie the examples of Communist fanaticism to the type of fanaticism needed by the free nations of NATO, an admonition is conveyed by Gruenther that *our fanaticism would never--must never--be the same as theirs.*

By deductive reasoning, Gruenther concludes that the fanaticism of the Communists must be matched by a dedication to our way of life. In reflecting optimism in achieving a dedicated fanaticism, he supports *our way of life* with four major assets: religion, a wonderful spiritual strength, a sense of freedom, and the dignity of the individual. These assets stand as direct refutation to the arguments set forth as criticisms by the

Russian general when he made an attack on the assets of the free nations of NATO.

By causal relation, these privileges brought their accompanying responsibilities--in being willing to make any sacrifice in a cold or hot war, as well as to inspire the 400 million people of NATO to continue the struggle necessary for an enduring peace.

The development of his thesis concerning privileges and responsibilities of free nations represents workmanship likely to impress the audience since the ideas were uttered by a spokesman who was obviously "practicing his preaching" by the very post he occupied as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers of Europe.[1]

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[1]Gruenther is a man of many talents--especially in the field of management--as documented by the demand for his counsel since military retirement as a member of the Board of Directors of four International Corporations and as former President of the American Red Cross. But he devoted over 45 years of his life in service to the United States--38 years in the U.S. Army, and over seven years to the National American Red Cross. He fulfilled his responsibilities with an outstanding record, in return for the privileges of being an American.

His emphasis on religion was most appropriate for this audience in the Vatican City.[1]

In the search for the answer to Communist fanaticism, the repetition of the word *never* brought forceful emphasis: *our answer would never--must never--be the same as theirs.* Here again is emphasis given to the seriousness of the threat and to the great concern manifested by the NATO Chief.

The series construction in the first six sentences, in which there is repetition of words and "tone" gives particular emphasis to the need for collective involvement and to the grave situation.

> *We must find an answer . . . .*
> *However, the problem we face . . . .*
> *We must match their fanaticism . . . .*
> *There is no reason why we should not achieve it*
> *We have religion . . . .*
> *We have everything . . . .*

Here, as elsewhere in the address, Gruenther uses the first person plural with a strong single syllable verb to "punch-home" the import of his message.

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[1]This emphasis on religion was especially appropriate for a military leader who in his youth had contemplated the priesthood for his life's service, and for having received in 1956 the Laetare Medal--the National Award for his many service contributions as a distinguished Catholic layman.

We have everything that men should be willing to fight for in a hot war or a cold war, is an observation that hits at pride motivation and may well have aroused feelings of pride in the accomplishments of NATO, a shared venture in which the Italians were participating. Here again was an opportunity for the speaker to pick up support for his ideas and appreciation for himself. His fervent enunciation of his confidence in the cause of NATO should have made a favorable impression on his listeners.

[Paragraphs 24 and 25]

(24) *I do not have the answer to the problem. I feel that I'm much in the same position of an American comedian, who a few years ago said he had the solution to the submarine problem. When asked for this answer, he replied: "Well, it's a very simple thing. All you do is bring the ocean to a boil; that will force the submarines to the top; and when they get there you knock them off!" "Well," someone asked, "how do you get the ocean to a boil?" "Oh," he answered, "now just a second. All I was doing here was outlining the general principle. It's up to you to work out the details."*

(25) *I, as he did, am submitting the general principle to you, in the belief that this very distinguished group can work out the details. It is, of course, not a military problem. However, unless we solve this problem of public participation, we are not going to succeed in this struggle.*

From the transition sentence, indicating he did not have an answer to this problem of public participation, he moves quickly from a serious tone to a humorous application of the dilemma.

The humorous anecdote with questions and answers in direct discourse by Will Rogers, the American comedian, was included as an analogy of the same situation in which Gruenther was placed. The comedian outlined the general principle of the submarine problem but told his questioner it was up to him to work out the details.

Likewise, Gruenther was submitting his problem to the audience to work out the details of securing public participation completely dedicated to NATO's purpose and goals, to insure success in the struggle for enduring peace. The humility in admitting candidly that he did not have an answer to the problem,

along with appealing to the pride of the listeners in submitting the problem *to this very distinguished group* to work out the details, appears to have been a "good" strategy. For it was important for his audience to realize the extent of the problems and the sacrifices required to achieve the goal of enduring peace. Recognizing the audience as capable of solving the problem of securing public participation in the goal of NATO was a strategic move to encourage them to ponder the problem as a means of enlisting their own support.

The conversational and informal tone in personal address, together with the humorous anecdote of Will Rogers in direct discourse is a well-placed break from the serious tone of the earlier discussion. Its interpolation in a relevant way follows the dictates of many rhetorical theorists who advise the use of change of pace materials and humor in this way.

By giving emphasis to the fact that it is not a military problem, but rather a problem of public participation, Gruenther again gives focus to the notion that the NATO approach is not one of military offensive. It

can also be observed that the alliteration in the phrase *problem of public participation* represents a fine example of interesting and dynamic word choice, one that would be lauded by most public speaking pedagogy.

[Paragraph 26]

(26) *I'd like now to move on to another point. NATO has been accused of being aggressive. That is simply not true. At my headquarters we make the plans for the defense of this part of the world. I can promise you that there has never been as much as one sentence written that envisages that we will start a war. In fact, we go on the assumption that we will have to absorb the first blow. That is a major disadvantage, but I'm sure that it is the right approach. However, we must counter these Soviet charges. For when we convince our people that this is a defensive organization--that NATO is an instrument for peace--I'm sure that we can get them to make the necessary sacrifices and to have the necessary wisdom and perseverance to support an alliance of this character.*

At this point in the speech, Gruenther seems to feel the need to state again, to reinforce his earlier statements: NATO is defensive, and not offensive; people must be"sold" on NATO and made willing to endure sacrifices in order to produce the desired security.

The opening sentence is a definite, explicit technique of announcing topical change to aid the audience in making the necessary mental shift. This is one of the few times that Gruenther introduces procedural guidelines so directly; generally a "hint" of the shift is offered, or a transition is provided by a transitional summary.

Gruenther proceeds with a type of rebuttal, trying to refute the false accusations waged against NATO by Soviet charges that NATO is aggressive. Personal testimony is the primary form of support offered. Gruenther adopts personal proof for his refutation by indicating that it is at his headquarters that the plans are made for defense. And he emphasizes that *there has never been as much as one sentence written that envisages that we will start a war.*

Not only does he explain the alleged fallacy of the accusations made by the Soviets, but also in logical sequence proposes the methodology of countering the Soviet charges by attempting to convince the people of NATO that the alliance is a defensive organization. Thus through problem-solution methodology Gruenther seeks to refute

the allegation of aggressiveness, counters the Soviet charge by proving NATO is a defensive organization, and finally, points up the need for urging the people of NATO to make the necessary sacrifices for the support of the alliance.

By his strong defense of "our" side, Gruenther's countering of the Soviets' allegations concerning the aggressiveness of NATO should have resulted in winning support for NATO.

Gruenther's logical proof that NATO is a *defensive organization* and is *an instrument of peace* emphasizes the ethical strength of the alliance, and, in turn should certainly establish the credibility of NATO's leader! The metaphor that NATO is *an instrument of peace* provides a most potent antidote to the Soviet allegation of aggressiveness!

The choice of such words as *I can promise you* and *I'm sure* have a "ring of truth" to them, and coming at this point in the address may well have served as a "capstone" for the speaker's attempt to project himself as one who is to be believed and "obeyed."

[Paragraph 27]

(27) *No military alliance of this kind has ever succeeded before in peace-time. There were times in the past four years when people said ours would not work. One public figure characterized it as "an administrative monstrosity." My answer to that is that we have made it work. In this, NATO could be likened to the bumblebee. You could prove by logic and aerodynamics that the bumblebee cannot fly--his body is too heavy and his wings are too small. But the bumblebee is too determined to be deterrred by logic and aerodynamics, so he goes ahead and flies anyway.*

Having developed his major line of arguments, the General moves into the "wrap-up" of his remarks. Having identified the problem with all its serious ramifications, and indicated some guidelines and/or directions for its solution, he is able to speak in a positive way about the success or achievement of the project he represents.

The opening sentence based on factual information is a source of pride which no doubt appealed to the audience because of NATO's singular achievement in succeeding in peace-time, but also because of audience involvement in the venture.

In quoting a public figure's opinion of NATO as an *administrative monstrosity* Gruenther, by personal

testimony, proclaims unequivocally that *we have made it work*,--again appealing to the pride of the audience in their personal involvement.

The anecdote which Gruenther relates on the bumblebee being able to fly by virtue of his sheer determination, in spite of scientific principles to the contrary, is an admirable analogy to the determination of NATO to endure[1] (without being deterred by false allegations and name-calling).

The determination of a leader to turn the tide against precedent and by dynamic faith and confidence in the great purpose of NATO dedicate himself to its success should have appealed to the audience and contributed to the credibility of their military leader.

[Paragraph 28]

(28) *We in NATO have not been deterred by our difficulties either. We have been able to make this organization succeed. One of the greatest tributes that has been paid to our effectiveness*

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[1]This bumblebee story is one of General Gruenther's favorites and is included in many of his speeches.

> *is the fact that the Soviet Union has made the dissolution of NATO the number one objective of Soviet Foreign Policy. A year ago they even offered to join it, although there may have been a reason why they made the offer on April Fool's Day.*

This paragraph represents a continuation of the preceding one, in which the tone is positive, the emphasis is on <u>we have succeeded together</u>, and the mood is somewhat light.

A direct tie-in with the bumblebee analogy is made in the opening transition sentence. NATO, as the bumblebee, is not deterred by difficulties, either. Once again the audience is "patted on the back" by the use of the plural first person pronouns. Here, as throughout the speech, the speaker seems to be working to build rapport with the audience.

Evidence of NATO's success is indicated by the fact that the Soviet Union had made the dissolution of NATO its number one objective. By personal testimony, General Gruenther considers this objective to be one of NATO's greatest tributes.

In noting that the Soviets offered to join NATO *a year ago* (1954), Gruenther is very likely correct in

reporting there may have been a reason why they made the offer on April Fool's Day. For this was probably tongue-in-cheek humor of the Soviets, based on their desire to make NATO look foolish under any and all circumstances!

Hope for the Future
[Paragraph 1]
(Conclusion)

The fourth major proposition--Hope for the Future --is covered in the conclusion of General Gruenther's speech by the summarization of goals and objectives in three paragraphs.

(1) *I'm not cynical about any efforts for lasting peace. On the contrary, I'm optimistic. I say that our statesmen can find an answer if they receive continuing popular support. We must continue to develop our position of strength, and above all, to improve our unity. I have seen this organization grow from the time it was a gleam in the planner's eye, and to me it is my whole life. I have seen it succeed in spite of numerous frustrations. I'm convinced, in spite of the difficulties still to be overcome, it will thrive.*

In personal address to the audience, Gruenther emphasizes his optimism by refuting cynicism. His opinion

testimony of optimism is supported by five factors expressed in parallel construction:

> *I say that our statesmen can find an answer . . . .*
> *We must continue to develop our position of strength . . . .*
> *I have seen this organization grow from the time it was a gleam in the planner's eye, and to me it is my whole life.*
> *I have seen it succeed in spite of numerous frustrations.*
> *I am convinced, in spite of the difficulties . . . .*

Since Gruenther was associated with NATO from its very beginning as Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, his evaluative statement on the significance of NATO in the statement, *it is my whole life*, conveyed the highest tribute he could pay to NATO and its member nations, and most likely enhanced his credibility considerably as a leader completely dedicated to the organization he was serving.

The last two of the factors enumerated--supporting Gruenther's optimism--are expressed in similar sentence structure and word choice; they provide a rhythmic tone which probably was most effective in delivery.

There is a noticeable stylistic change in the composition of the conclusion. While Gruenther's sentence

structure is seldom loose or involved in this address, he becomes in this paragraph even more terse. There is an almost journalistic brevity in each sentence, many of which are periodic and strong; additional forcefulness is provided by such wordings as: *I'm not cynical, I'm optimistic, I say, I have seen, I'm convinced.*

[Paragraph 2]

(2) *When General Eisenhower called our staff together four years ago, he told them this: "The outstanding characteristic of an allied staff officer is an ability to have a ready smile." That was his way of stating that friends could work well together; that friends could solve their problems if they had mutual confidence in each other. We have that characteristic in our headquarters, and all of them including Admiral Fechteler's headquarters in Naples, are all very happy headquarters. Of course, it is not always easy. Sitting outside of my office is an American Sergeant who gets more money than an Italian Colonel of 30 years service. That is the type of irritation we run into, but the Italian Colonel feels that he is dedicated to his cause, and he overlooks that type of irritation. With that sort of spirit--with that sort of dedication--it is not possible to contemplate failure.*

Continuing with the ending of the speech, Gruenther uses description to characterize the philosophy of

harmony and friendliness that permeated the various military headquarters of NATO. This is artfully blended with the well-known quotation from General Eisenhower, "The outstanding characteristic of an allied staff officer is an ability to have a ready smile." Specifically, Eisenhower's quotation serves as the undergirding for the whole philosophy of SHAPE with its emphasis on mutual confidence and harmonious relationships. In this connection, Gruenther especially notes Admiral Fechteler's headquarters in Naples, which should have added to his rapport with the Italian audience.

By admitting *It is not always easy*--Gruenther cites as an example the disparity in wages between an American Sergeant and an Italian Colonel and the latter's overlooking the irritation because of his dedication to his cause[1]--thereby serving as another important tribute to Italy's military leaders, and an approach almost certain to gain goodwill with the Italian audience.

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[1]See ¶ 32 of London Speech and reference to French colonel in similar situation--also writer's subsequent analysis on the comparison of the London and Rome speeches with regard to the selection of a French colonel for illustration in the London address and an Italian colonel in Rome.

Even the closing sentence of the paragraph, with its rhythmic parallel construction--dramatically associated with the dedicated Italian colonel--serves as an additional tribute to Italy: *With that sort of spirit--with that sort of dedication--it is not possible to contemplate failure.*

[Paragraph 3]

(3) *I want to express my gratitude to the Italian people and the Italian Government for the loyal support they have always given us. With such unity, such understanding, such perseverance--no power, however menacing, will be able to prevail against this alliance.*
Mille grazie a tutti per la vostra gentile attenzione!

In these closing remarks, Gruenther very diplomatically expresses his gratitude to the Italian people and government for their loyal support, and he leads directly to the concluding tribute to Italy in a periodic sentence in parallel construction, eulogizing the loyal support Italy had always given--*With* <u>*such*</u> *unity,* <u>*such*</u> *understanding,* <u>*such*</u> *perseverance--no power, however menacing, will be able to prevail against this alliance.*

That he thanks the audience for their kind attention--in Italian--is a thoughtful and friendly gesture of togetherness for the climax of his message, an appropriate tie-in with his introductory remarks on the subject of accent. It should have rated well with his Italian audience--regardless of the Nebraska accent!

PART III

EVALUATION OF THE ROME SPEECH

The audience which General Gruenther addressed in Rome, Italy, on May 5, 1955, was probably the most critical group he had faced since becoming Supreme Commander--this accounts for his unusually long introduction of nine paragraphs to attempt to secure their goodwill. Aware that the Italians were skeptical and apprehensive about NATO, he carefully reviewed the events leading to the organization of NATO, commended the Italians for their contributions in World War II, conveyed the danger of the potential threat of the Soviet aggression, and included some humorous anecdotes in a relevant way to gain rapport with the audience before proceeding to the body of his speech to "sell" the importance of NATO for collective security. Although he far exceeded his usual two- to three-paragraph average length for introductions to his speeches, he wisely recognized the importance of interpreting the <u>need</u> for NATO before appealing for larger

contributions for military defense. General Gruenther's perception of the significance of careful adaptation of his message to the audience is apparent not only in the introduction but throughout the entire address.

The materials which General Gruenther selected to prove his rationale by logical methods constituted the major portion of his speech, with far less emphasis on the establishment of his personal credibility and emotional appeals within the speech composition. He had many opportunities in this speech to run the gamut of emotional appeals on the explosive subjects of war, nuclear weapons, and communism. But he wisely chose to follow restraint and moderation as a military commander who had personally experienced the horrors of World War II. Gruenther realized that fear-charged descriptions would have only defeated his basic purpose in promoting support for military defense contributions in later sections of his speech, where he covered the alleged "smile" of the Soviets in the peace propaganda program.

Concerning emotional appeals it should be noted, however, that General Gruenther lost no opportunity to

appeal to the pride of his Italian audience in the important part they played in identifying the need for collective security and unity before the establishment of NATO--evidenced by their declaration of interest in a United Europe. This tribute to the Italian pride for the support of European unity was excellent psychological strategy on the part of General Gruenther since it served as the bridge in attempting to sell to the skeptical Italians the importance of the military contributions of Germany as a member of the Alliance. This was of great importance because their memories of Germany were still vividly recalled as an atrocious enemy who had over-run their country in World War II. Thus, it could be inferred that Germany was contributing to this new United Europe envisioned by the Italians.

In his excellent chronological and topical format, Gruenther used internal summaries, transitions, problem-solution structure, and cause and effect reasoning in the body of his speech to contribute to the clarity of his message for the audience. As noted in the first paragraph of this evaluation, the threat of Soviet aggression

was included in the introduction of this speech rather than in later sections of the body of the address, as in the Copenhagen and London speeches. To include the Soviet threat in the introduction of the Rome speech was a logical arrangement since this topic was essential evidence in his review of the detailed events leading to the establishment of NATO.

The brief conclusion, consisting of three paragraphs, centered on the topic of "hope for the future"--in harmony with General Gruenther's usual pattern of organization. This "hope for the future" was dramatically and inspirationally conveyed to appeal to their continued support of NATO's collective security as well as to unity and preservation of peace for the future--along with the usual amenities to the audience.

Concerning General Gruenther's language usage, if the writer were to draft but one brief phrase which would characterize all of General Gruenther's oral communications it would be--"Dynamic, clear, and simple in word choice and composition." Although short sentences predominated in this speech (as well as in all of his

addresses), he uses a sufficient number of longer sentences to provide variety. Consistently, Gruenther adopted a majority of one- and two-syllable words for his NATO speeches for rapid translation to the various foreign languages.

Throughout his speech Gruenther very effectively used first person pronouns and direct discourse for involvement with the audience, and, also, rhetorical questions to simulate dialogue. Perhaps the long personal discourse of the Russian general conveying Soviet views on democracy and religion represented a means of interpreting Soviet philosophy and ideology which served as one of the most persuasive methods Gruenther could have chosen to include in a speech to these people of the Vatican City. The Russian general's denouncement of religion could very well have proved to be one of the most potent arguments of persuasion for enlisting the continued support of Italy in contributing to NATO's military defense.

This speech delivered by General Gruenther in Rome, although substantially longer than most of his NATO speeches, is probably one of the most impressive in terms of

persuasive qualities. This is true because of the methodology followed in the development and arrangement of materials for complete adaptation to the audience and for carrying the thesis of the urgent need for collective security to the very conclusion of the address.

CHAPTER VI

METHOD OF PREPARATION AND DELIVERY

General Gruenther's background training and experience as a military officer provided a veritable storehouse of information for the preparation of his speeches for NATO. Likewise, he did not assume his new post as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers of Europe as a stranger, as noted in Chapter II of this paper. He had been closely associated with the defense organization of NATO since its formation, as Chief of Staff for both General Eisenhower and General Ridgway, his predecessors. "He came to his post as a master-planner of large-scale defense moves. But equally important, he also came to this post as a 'master speaker' to enlist the interest and cooperation of the NATO countries in support of military defense."[1] Gruenther is a great salesman, possessing the arts of commending, convincing, and captivating his

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[1]See page 58, Chapter II.

audience with clear, simple language, in a cooperative and conversational tone. He was not only a very competent military commander, but an outstanding diplomat as well.

In addition to his staff responsibilities of information research for the two Supreme Commanders who preceded him, General Gruenther also travelled with these two Commanders over Europe--and then continued his visits to NATO countries when he assumed the post of Supreme Commander. During his journeys he searched for information on the political, economic, and military concerns of the NATO countries, and thus paved the way for his inimitable adeptness in audience adaptation in fulfilling his role as the spokesman for SHAPE, the military arm of NATO.

As this writer travelled throughout Europe in 1953, shortly after General Gruenther was appointed Supreme Commander, it was evident from interviews with military officers, government officials, and educational leaders, that he was considered one of the most popular American representatives in Europe. That he was well-liked

was readily apparent, for the American Embassies in the NATO countries confirmed the fact that no printed signs appeared in Western European communities disparaging the the Supreme Commander--such as "Gruenther Go Home!" Such "exit" suggestions, however, were prevalent in many areas for other military leaders during the recovery period following World War II.

General Gruenther's significant speaking capabilities were partially attributable to his intuitive judgment in adapting his remarks to each specific audience. However, he supported his selection of materials by carefully collecting information on the nature of the audience he was scheduled to address--covering such areas as their country's background participation in World War II, their familiarity with the purpose and operation of NATO, their specific goals for the future, their prejudices, and the factual and statistical profile of their economic, political, and military status. If the critic would wish to identify the pulse of General Gruenther's effectiveness as a speaker, he would no doubt point to the General's exhaustive search for information on the specific locale

of his speaking commitment, the particular occasion, and the audience he was to face.

Gruenther's thorough background experience, his personal authority, and knowledge provided most of the supporting evidence for the development of the four major topics[1] included in his NATO speeches--supplemented by wide reading of current magazines and European newspapers every day, and the constant research of his aides in securing current statistical data on the military capabilities of the Soviets with comparative evaluations on the military strength of NATO. Therefore, in his speeches on NATO it is evident that he was speaking on a subject on which he was well informed and to which he was deeply dedicated as the Supreme Commander in promoting the military defense of NATO for the collective security of the respective members.

General Gruenther's phenomenal memory, with his ability for immediate recall of facts and statistics, is a great asset to his speech preparation. It is well-known that Gruenther prepares his addresses in outline

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[1]Covered in Chapters III, IV, and V--Analyses of three speeches.

form, without a complete manuscript, since his storehouse of information and his infallible memory hold him in good stead in the extemporaneous delivery of his outlined topics.

The General says that his regular practice of outlining his speeches helps him to develop a clear continuity in his lines of thought for the organization of his message. The importance of effective organization drilled into his training at West Point is seen in his complete devotion to meticulous organization of his speeches. His abbreviated topical outline could well serve as his guide to extemporaneous speaking; but seldom, if ever, does he take any notes to the platform. The writer has never observed General Gruenther referring to his notes, in a platform address, tape-recorded interview, or broadcast. Whenever he serves as a participant in a discussion group where questions cannot always be anticipated, his outstanding memory of factual and statistical data with immediate recall is amazing to his fellow participants and to members of the audience. This rare ability of immediate recall without notes was clearly

evidenced in his recent participation in an unrehearsed round-table discussion for TV broadcasts over the NBC and CBS networks to eulogize the late President Eisenhower during the week-end preceding the funeral.

General Gruenther states that he prepared but one complete manuscript of a NATO speech, which was delivered in 1954. All the other NATO speeches delivered by General Gruenther from 1953 through 1956 while he served as Supreme Commander were confined to brief outlines for extemporaneous delivery. It should be pointed out, however, that the speech which was prepared in complete manuscript form was also reduced to a brief outline and delivered as were the other NATO speeches--without benefit of reminder notes.

The available texts of his NATO speeches were prepared from tape recordings made during the actual delivery before the audience. However, before the speech texts were circulated by the Public Information Division of SHAPE, they were edited by the P.I.D. Staff, in consultation with Gruenther's aides, without revision of lines of thought.

General Gruenther is well aware of the physical setting and its importance in capturing the attention and interest of his audience. As previously noted in this paper, he prefers to speak with a NATO map at his back to which he may refer during the course of his speech. He dislikes a podium and remains behind it only when he must use a public address system, for his extemporaneous delivery needs no podium for reference notes! He prefers to be as close to his audience as possible, and he is often very close to the edge of the platform--a procedure he followed whenever he addressed groups in the auditorium at SHAPE in Paris. The writer had the opportunity to observe the General when he addressed a large group of European university students at SHAPE--without a podium, without notes, but with a great deal of enthusiasm to capture the rapport and interest of this group of young people who had travelled hundreds of miles to meet together at SHAPE--to hear this Supreme Commander, who stood close to his audience and not only used rhetorical questions but actually invited their response in the language of their choice (many of whom could not speak English).

He did not talk down to them--it seemed that he was actually reasoning with them--and they received his admonitions on the preservation of peace with thundering applause and the vocal acclaim which is so typical of European youth!

The General's voice is crisp but very pleasant--with careful enunciation, yet "artfully" preserving the Nebraska accent. Gruenther uses very few gestures--just enough for emphasis at salient points in his delivery. When he is not wired to a public address system, he usually walks back and forth on the platform, making for informality and a conversational atmosphere with the entire audience. He always appears at ease when speaking, giving the impression that he truly appreciates and enjoys the privilege of "talking with" the audience, made realistic by his frequent use of rhetorical questions. He is blessed with a contour of facial expression which gives the appearance of a friendly, permanent smile--contributing to his natural and relaxed manner, which is nicely balanced by his rather rapid speaking, which evidences quick thinking and immediate, on-the-spot

adaptation to the occasion and audience. It is the opinion of this writer that General Gruenther has no peer in audience adaptation.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study of the speaking of General Alfred M. Gruenther is developed in terms of a philosophy of rhetorical criticism which embraces the several elements that enter into every speaking situation. Therefore, the purpose is to consider such factors as: the speaker's background, experience, personality, mental habits, and achievements; the historical events relevant to the issues covered; the current climate of opinion on those issues; the speaker's and audience's relationship to those issues; the nature and purpose of the immediate speaking situation and the nature of the audience; the speaker's choice of topics and the development of his ideas; the speaker's adaptation to the audience; the method of arrangement he employed; his choice of words and their composition; his methods of

preparation; his oral and visible practices; and general consequences of his speaking.

Biography of General Alfred M. Gruenther

Alfred M. Gruenther was born in Platte Center, Nebraska, in 1899 and received his education in religious and military schools. When he was but thirteen years old, he subscribed to a mail-order memory course. With the encouragement of his father, Gruenther's continued diligence in the development of his memory proved to be one of his greatest assets contributing to his success as a military commander and in his speaking role to NATO nations.

He was appointed to West Point Military Academy and was graduated fourth in his class in November, 1918, later becoming an instructor at the Academy for eight years. Following a series of Army Staff assignments he was sent to London as Deputy Chief of Staff under General Eisenhower's command, and subsequently became Chief of Staff for General Mark Clark's Fifth Army in North Africa and Italy.

Gruenther's war record was remarkable, and after the War he became General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff when SHAPE was organized in Paris in January 1951. In August of 1951 he was promoted to full General, when he was but fifty-two years old--the Army's youngest! When General Eisenhower answered the call from the United States to stand as a candidate for President, General Gruenther continued as Chief of Staff under General Ridgway, Eisenhower's successor. When General Ridgway returned to the United States as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General Gruenther became Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers of Europe in 1953.

He was not a stranger in his speaking role to NATO nations, for he had addressed many of these countries while he served as Chief of Staff for both Eisenhower and Ridgway. When he was Supreme Commander, his visits to the NATO nations required very careful and discerning judgment in adapting his message to specific audiences, since the Soviets had launched a peace propaganda campaign which was proving effective in lulling some areas into apathy

and skepticism concerning the need for military defense. It was during this period that General Gruenther, as the leader of the military arm of NATO, scored his greatest success in his official speaking role--by enthusiastically and competently conveying the urgent need for military contributions to the collective security of the Alliance as a threat to Soviet aggression. Although General Gruenther retired as Supreme Commander of NATO and the U.S. Army in November 1956, it is generally agreed that he has been--and still is--the outstanding spokesman for NATO.

Historical Events Relevant to the Issues Covered in General Gruenther's Speeches

As indicated in Chapter II on the "Origin and Development of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," NATO was indissolubly involved with the historical developments of the post World-War II period, with the demobilization of the armed forces of the Western Allies concurrent with the continued strengthening of the armed

forces of the Soviets on a wartime basis. History books on this period record the innumerable attempts of political conciliation with the USSR by the Western Powers, who made every effort to make the United Nations an effective instrument of peace.

As the Soviet Territorial Expansion penetrated Eastern Europe with effective "conquest without war," the Communist parties in Western Europe allied themselves with the Soviet Union and strengthened the Soviet policy by propaganda. When Czechoslovakia was brought into the Soviet orbit, the Western allies in Western Europe unanimously recognized that common defensive action was needed. Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom signed the Brussels Treaty and pledged to build up a common defense system and to strengthen their economic and cultural ties. It was the Brussels Treaty of the free countries in Europe which created the initial interest of the United States in the problems of security in the North Atlantic area. On April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington by the foreign ministers of the five members of the Brussels Treaty,

with seven additional western countries--Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and United States, making a total of twelve nations. Subsequently three other countries joined the twelve original signatories--Greece, Turkey, and the Federal Republic of Germany, making a total of 15 countries in NATO.

In 1950 the National Council of NATO decided that the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers of Europe (SHAPE) should be placed under an American officer, and requested President Truman to designate General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander, who was officially appointed and assumed commandership of SHAPE on April 2, 1951. The choice of an American officer was based on the contributions of the United States since 1947 when the free countries of Europe recognized the importance of finding a means of guaranteeing their freedom and security in the face of Soviet expansion. And they turned toward the United States, the one country which was strong enough to pose a threat to the USSR. As history has revealed, the reaction of the United States was prompt and decisive, emanating in the well-known Marshall Plan for

economic assistance which contributed so effectively to the recovery of the Western countries.

As reported in Chapter I, General Eisenhower asked to be released as Supreme Commander in 1952 in order to return to the United States and enter the Presidential Campaign; and on April 28, 1952, the Permanent Council of NATO appointed General Matthew B. Ridgway to the post of Supreme Allied Commander in replacement of General Eisenhower. A year later when General Ridgway was recalled to Washington to become Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General Alfred M. Gruenther was appointed by the NATO Council as Supreme Allied Commander on July 10, 1953.

In his speaking role for SHAPE, General Gruenther had the responsibility of addressing many of the NATO countries and their visiting journalists who convened in the Paris SHAPE office for news on NATO. He was initiated into this speaking role when he served as Chief of Staff for General Eisenhower and subsequently for General Ridway.

Three Representative Speeches for Analysis --Criteria for Selection

The choice of the three representative speeches selected for rhetorical analysis was determined on the basis of securing a spread in time sequence, and a variance in the primary objectives of the speaking situations --covering the period during which General Gruenther served as Supreme Commander from 1953-1956.

The first speech, analyzed in Chapter III, was delivered in Copenhagen, Denmark, on August 31, 1953. It was primarily expository since it was General Gruenther's first major address to the military officers and foreign ministers of the NATO nations just a month and a half following his appointment as Supreme Commander, when NATO was emerging from little or no defense capabilities. There in Copenhagen, Gruenther recognized the need to explain clearly NATO's specific operation, its organizational framework, and NATO's objectives as essential background information on which to launch the reasons for the need of military support for NATO nations. Since the writer had the privilege of attending this

meeting in Copenhagen, the occasion, setting and audience are based on personal observations in Part I of Chapter III.

The second speech, analyzed in Chapter IV, was the address delivered on June 8, 1954, to the English-Speaking Union of the Commonwealth in London, England, at a dinner meeting in the Hotel Dorchester. Gruenther was the honored guest and invited speaker for this important group comprising English Royalty (the Duke of Edinburgh, now Prince Philip), government and political officials of England (Sir Winston Churchill, Clement Atlee, and Clement Davies), military officers, and others of social status in London. The purpose of the speech was to convey news on NATO's progress, provide documentation on the growing strength of the Soviets (as well as their "defects"), and to secure more positive action by Great Britain for increased contributions to NATO military defense. Because Great Britain was well aware of the purpose, goals, and operation of SHAPE in its relationship with NATO, it was unnecessary for Gruenther to include here the extensive background information which was essential in the Copenhagen speech.

The third speech, analyzed in Chapter V, was delivered in Rome, Italy, on May 2, 1955 to a very critical and skeptical audience, a circumstance which accounts for the exceedingly long introduction of nine paragraphs to attempt to secure the goodwill of the audience. Gruenther recognized the importance of interpreting to the Italians the crucial need for NATO in this lengthy introduction before appealing for larger contributions for military defense in the body of the speech. Although this address is much longer than most of Gruenther's NATO speeches, and might be considered almost too long, it is probably the most impressive in terms of persuasive qualities.

Two of the three speeches chosen for analysis in this study were published in public address journals. The London speech, delivered on June 8, 1954, appeared in Vital Speeches of the Day.[1] This version, which was used for analysis in Chapter IV, includes a three-paragraph Introduction by General Gruenther

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[1] Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XX, No. 22 (Sept. 1, 1954), pp. 676-679.

that is not recorded in the script from the Public Information Division of SHAPE. The published text was an exact duplicate of the Body and Conclusion of the script received from SHAPE. The London speech also appeared in a brochure entitled, SPEECHES at the Dinner in Honour of General Alfred M. Gruenther under the Auspices of the English-Speaking Union of the Commonwealth, June 8, 1954, published in England.[1] This publication included the very complimentary introduction of General Gruenther by the Duke of Edinburgh (now Prince Philip) in which he commended the achievements and competency of General Gruenther. This publication also included the three-paragraph Introduction of the speech which was carried in Vital Speeches of the Day,[2] but not included in the script from SHAPE. (Following the text of General Gruenther's speech, three additional speeches on this same occasion were included in SPEECHES . . .: addresses by Sir Winston Churchill, Prime Minister; Clement Atlee,

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[1]Basil Blackwell, ed., SPEECHES at the Dinner in Honour of General Alfred M. Gruenther under the Auspices of the English-Speaking Union of the Commonwealth, June 8, 1954. Oxford University, 1954.

[2]Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XX, No. 22 (September 1, 1954), pp. 676-679.

Leader of the Opposition in Parliament, and former Prime Minister; and Clement Davies, Leader of the Liberal Party.) The Body and Conclusions of the Gruenther address appearing in SPEECHES . . . were also identical to the text issued by SHAPE.

The Rome Speech, delivered on May 2, 1955, appeared in Representative American Speeches[1] which was identical to the script from SHAPE.

Although the Copenhagen Speech, delivered on August 31, 1953, did not appear in a published speech journal, the notes taken down by the writer at the time of delivery confirmed the lines of thought in the script from SHAPE, despite the inadequacy of the writer's notes as a verbatim record.

Method of Analysis

The primary goal of General Gruenther's speaking role was to win military support for collective security of NATO nations as a threat against Soviet aggression.

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[1] A. Craig Baird, ed., Representative American Speeches, 1955-56 (New York: H. W. Wilson & Co., 1956), Vol. XXVIII, No. 3, pp. 25-37.

All of Gruenther's speeches on NATO covered four major topics--the threat of Soviet aggression, the progress which NATO had made, the problems which NATO was encountering, and hopes for the future. But, as is well-known in military circles, General Gruenther has never delivered a "canned speech." The degree of development of each of the four topics, as well as the chronological order in which they were covered, is revealed as one of the significant clues to Gruenther's meticulous care in adapting his message to his audience. The number and type of subordinate topics included under each of the four major divisions were dependent upon the background knowledge of the audience and their familiarity with the various aspects of NATO operation.

The methodology adopted for the analysis of the three representative speeches described above was based on a sequential, paragraph-by-paragraph examination and interpretation of the rhetorical principles and practices represented.

The materials selected by General Gruenther to prove his thesis by logical methods constituted the major

portion of his speech, with far less emphasis on the establishment of his personal credibility and emotional appeals within the speech composition.

Gruenther's speeches were replete with evidence, including numerical data, examples, analogies, comparisons, and personal testimony. He seldom referred to other authoritative sources for evidence, but supported his materials by his personal authority since the sources of military information were not disclosed for military reasons. Moreover, his position as Supreme Commander would also support his opinions as an authority in the areas he discussed. Obviously, all references to military capabilities of the Soviets as well as NATO would vary from speech to speech, as they were constantly changing, both geographically as well as numerically.

Gruenther preferred to reason inductively, summarizing or generalizing from the examples, analogies, facts, and numerical data. Sign reasoning was seldom used by General Gruenther.

One of the outstanding characteristics of Gruenther's speech organization was his development of ideas

in chronological order. In his excellent chronological-topical format he used internal summaries, explanatory transitions, problem-solution structure, and cause and effect reasoning to contribute to the clarity of his message for the audience.

The Introductionsof his speeches were usually brief, not more than two or three paragraphs (the speech in Rome was a rare exception with its nine paragraphs); the Conclusions were also usually brief, centered on the topic "hope for the future," with a closing statement dramatically and inspirationally conveyed to appeal to continued support of NATO's collective security, as well as to unity and the preservation of peace for the future.

The General followed restraint and moderation in the psychological appeals of fear, and avoided the fear-charged descriptions of warfare. He concentrated on the positive appeals of pride, unity, and the preservation of peace.

His plain, informal, and conversational language and frequent use of simple sentences--free from military jargon--made it possible for his messages to be easily

understood by the audience and thus promote "instantaneous intelligibility." By his frequent use of rhetorical questions, first and second person pronouns, and personal discourse to simulate dialogue, he sought attention and audience involvement in his attempt to relate himself and his program to his audience. Gruenther's humorous anecdotes, sprinkled relevantly and frequently throughout his speeches to change the pace from serious to humorous tones, provided the welcome relaxation for the audience--helping to maintain their attention and interest. Well-phrased parallel and series construction, together with repetitions, helped him to emphasize matters of importance --especially in the Conclusions of his speeches, where his appeals for the support of NATO added vividness and clarity to his message.

Perhaps the most outstanding characteristic of Gruenther's speaking is his inimitable facility in audience adaptation. He adjusts his communication to his audience in his choice of materials, the simplicity of the language in which his ideas are expressed, and in the topical and chronological arrangement of his address.

Gruenther's credibility was enhanced throughout his speaking role as Supreme Commander by the explicit evidence of the thorough development of the substance of the materials he presented. He certainly must have been perceived as a man of competence, character, and good-will. His intelligence, his dedication to exhaustive research on the local situation, and the evidence of his preparedness by extemporaneous delivery without consulting notes are certainly to be construed as evidence of competency in the speaking situation.

Gruenther gave the impression of confidence, as well as modesty, but it was evident from his immediate recall of information to be presented (without the aid of reminders) that he had mastered the facts to be conveyed.

Method of Preparation and Delivery

General Gruenther's preparation of his speeches was aided by his background training and wide experience, his travels, and his long-time dedication to continuous

learning--which provided a veritable storehouse of information, ready to be tapped and instantly available when he needed it. He was a voracious reader with a phenomenal memory which were great assets to his speech preparation.

Gruenther outlines his speeches without preparing a manuscript--seldom, if ever, using notes in a platform address, tape recorded interviews, or broadcasts. His infallible memory serves him well in his extemporaneous delivery.

He dislikes a podium and remains behind it only when he must use a public address system, for he likes to be as close to his audience as possible.

Gruenther's voice is crisp but very pleasant, with careful enunciation, yet artfully preserving his Nebraska accent. The rate of his speaking, with adequate variety in pitch and force, adds to the "ease of listening" for his audience. His facial contour constantly gives the appearance of a friendly and warm smile. He truly enjoys the privilege of "talking <u>with</u>" his audience, which is made realistic by his frequent use of rhetorical questions and direct discourse to simulate dialogue.

Gruenther uses very few gestures, and when "not wired for sound" usually walks back and forth on the platform, with a huge NATO map directly behind him--to which he points when the speech reference warrants.

From the statements which have been published recently, along with the many comments which have come personally to this writer following the recent NBC and CBS network discussion programs in which Gruenther participated, it could be generally agreed that his delivery consistently is in keeping with good rhetorical practice.

Postscript

In the evaluation of General Gruenther's speaking on NATO since 1951, perhaps the greatest vindication of his effectiveness is that the nations of Western Europe, listening to the competent voice of General Gruenther, responded to his urging and provided NATO with life and vitality. Perhaps, too, it is not erroneous to say that, in part at least, Gruenther's leadership was responsible for the fact that NATO has

endured, despite all the predictions to the contrary both in the United States and Europe. The current year, 1969, has brought the celebration of NATO's twentieth anniversary. Perhaps many will agree that SHAPE moved to Brussels, Belgium, with the blessings of Fate two years ago--departing from the French soil where, to De-Gaulle, NATO was an unwelcome visitor. But NATO is now on friendly soil--and flourishing!

Another star in the speaking crown of General Gruenther as a former Supreme Commander and dedicated spokesman for NATO is that he is in greater demand than ever before to speak on NATO and its contributions to the preservations of peace--as evidenced by the international news releases--and his presence and participation at educational symposiums on NATO on our American university campuses.

General Alfred M. Gruenther has earned a reputation as a man of integrity, who is friendly, likeable, sincere, warm--and despite his seventy years is just as active physically and intellectually as ever! That he

has had two hip-joint operations for arthritis, and uses a cane to rise from his chair, has not inhibited his traveling to various areas of the world to fulfill speaking commitments. As recently as the weekend of July 12, 1969, he met the other 14 members of President Nixon's commission in New York for the study of the feasibility of an all-volunteer armed force. And during the month of June he traveled over 29,000 miles, attending meetings and giving speeches in the United States and Europe!

Perhaps comments from those who knew him or worked with him during his service to NATO will substantiate some of the observations made in this study--

From NATO Secretary-General Lord Ismay, who served as personal Chief of Staff to Sir Winston Churchill during World War II:

> General Gruenther is the greatest soldier-statesman I have ever known.[1]

From General Dwight D. Eisenhower--(Gruenther proved invaluable to Eisenhower while he was President of Columbia University by keeping him informed about defense matters. During this period of the Columbia Presidency, before he was appointed Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, Eisenhower returned to the Pentagon on a brief visit, and made this observation in 1949):

> Everybody was turning to Al, and he would give the place, time and figures out of his head. It was almost a case of working a good horse to death.[2]

From President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956:

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[1] Time Magazine, Vol. LXVII, No. 6 (February 6, 1956), p. 25. Cover page carried close-up photograph with legend--"NATO'S GENERAL GRUENTHER."

[2] Robert Coughlan, "Thinking Machine Who Bosses NATO," Life, XXXIV (June 1, 1953), p. 84.

> Al Gruenther would make a good President of the United States.[1]

From President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1964:

> He [Gruenther] was--and is--one of the ablest, all-around officers, civilian and military, I have encountered in 50 years.[2]

From General Mark Clark (while Gruenther served as his Chief of Staff during World War II):

> On every efficiency report I ever turned in on Gruenther, I wrote, "Highly Qualified to be Chief of Staff of the Army at appropriate time."[3]

From Ernest O. Hauser, Paris correspondent for the Saturday Evening Post, 1953:

> Bridge, checkers, politics, or military strategy--Gruenther confronts a problem as an intellectual and the more insoluble it is the more interesting he finds it. His terrifying memory and his uncanny flair for expounding a difficult proposition in stripped-down terms are proverbial--so is his thoroughness.[4]

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[1] Time Magazine, Vol. LXVII, No. 6 (February 6, 1956), p. 26.

[2] Democrat and Chronicle (Rochester, New York), March 20, 1964.

[3] Time Magazine, Vol. LXVII, No. 6 (February 6, 1956), p. 26.

[4] Ernest O. Hauser, "The Army's Biggest Brain," Saturday Evening Post, CCXXVI (October 31, 1953), p. 34.

From Edmond Taylor, well-known journalist--When questions were posed by some observers who voiced doubts about Gruenther's ability to practice the rare art of command at the highest level, Edmond Taylor points out that the doubters turned out to be right in one way and wrong in another:

> Gruenther had no difficulty in learning to look at the big picture through a Supreme Commander's spectacles. The speed with which he grew into his new job surprised even his greatest admirers . . . he never completely grew out of the periphery of staff responsibilities . . . he simply worked with equal efficiency at two levels.[1]

Finally, a current newspaper report on General Gruenther's speech to the Medical Society in St. Petersburg, Florida, July 7, 1969:

> "Without an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) System, America cannot defend itself against the intercontinental nuclear weapons in the Soviet arsenal."
>
> That grim warning was sounded last night in St. Petersburg by one of the most prominent men the United States has produced, retired Army General Alfred M. Gruenther . . . . General Gruenther

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[1]Edmond Taylor, "The Atlantic Alliance: After Gruenther, What?," The Reporter, June 2, 1955, p. 19.

> is still a top adviser to the White House and the Pentagon at 70 . . . .[1]

Furthermore, General Gruenther has earned a reputation as a speaker of great competence. In the light of this study, it appears that this reputation is fully warranted because he speaks out of tremendous knowledge and exemplifies the best of rhetorical principles--careful preparation, analysis, and development of materials with attention to the specific situation in adaptation; meticulous organization; thoughtful composition; and articulate, direct delivery, with a high level of rapport with his audience.

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[1] St. Petersburg Independent (St. Petersburg, Florida), July 8, 1969, Profile, 1B.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Washington D.C., 4 April, 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.
They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.
They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.
They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.
They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

ARTICLE III

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

ARTICLE V

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI [1]

For the purpose of Article V an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France [2], on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VIII

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

(1) The definition of the territories to which Article V applies has been revised by Article II of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey (see p. 242).

(2) On 16th January, 1963, the North Atlantic Council has heard a declaration by the French Representative who recalled that by the vote on self-determination on 1st July, 1962, the Algerian people had pronounced itself in favour of the independence of Algeria in co-operation with France. In consequence, the President of the French Republic had on 3rd July, 1962, formally recognized the independence of Algeria. The result was that the "Algerian departments of France" no longer existed as such, and that at the same time the fact that they were mentioned in the North Atlantic Treaty had no longer any bearing.
Following this statement the Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from 3rd July, 1962.

ARTICLE IX

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles III and V.

ARTICLE X

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

ARTICLE XI

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.

ARTICLE XII

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE XIII

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE XIV

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies will be transmitted by that Government to the governments of the other signatories.

FOUR CHARTS COVERING CIVIL AND MILITARY

ORGANIZATION OF NATO

PRINCIPAL COMMITTEES OF THE COUNCIL



NATO INTERNATIONAL STAFF



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

* *Office to be disestablished upon completion of tour of incumbent*

ALLIED COMMAND ATLANTIC



The flags of the original 12 nations being raised for the first time during opening day ceremonies of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe, Rocquencourt (Marly), France, 23 March 1951.

Main entrance to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Brussels (Costeau), Belgium, 6 Sept. 1968.



GENERAL ALFRED M. GRUENTHER

APPENDIX B

TAPE RECORDED INTERVIEW: General Alfred M. Gruenther and Lilyan M. Alspaugh at the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers of Europe (SHAPE), Marly, France, July 25, 1956.

TAPE RECORDED INTERVIEW: General Alfred M. Gruenther and Lilyan M. Alspaugh at the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers of Europe (SHAPE), Marly, France, July 25, 1956.

ALSPAUGH: General Gruenther, it is a real privilege to be here in your office at the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers of Europe. I want you to know that from the first time I heard you speak--when you addressed the NATO Conference in 1953 at Copenhagen, Denmark--I have followed your career with great interest. I agree with the press opinions that you possess an inimitable and rare combination of qualities of both a statesman and military authority. Certainly in the NATO Alliance, the diplomatic relationships among the fifteen NATO countries are an essential and vital counterpart to the military unity and strength.

Has this new soft-line policy of the Russian leaders with the emphasis on peace changed the need for NATO? That is, has the military mission blunted the resolve of NATO, weakened by Moscow's change from frowns to smiles?

GRUENTHER: I would say first of all, in answering your first question that the need for NATO is now greater than it has ever been before. I'd also like to comment on an element in your question where you say that the Soviet emphasis is for peace. Actually, NATO has as its fundamental objective the maintenance of peace. That is the reason why the fifteen member nations have banded together--to secure peace by collective security and to make it so expensive for an aggressor that the conflict will never come.

You say in effect, has the Soviet soft line blunted the resolve of the West? I don't think it has blunted that resolve yet; and I don't think it will if our people understand the real objective of NATO as a defensive organization to thwart enemy aggression.

I do not think that it is correct to say that the Soviets intend to go to war now or at any time in the future. But they do have a military capability; that military capability continues to increase; and our job is, in the free world, to be able to match by unity that strength which they have, and to prevent active aggression from ever taking place. With what you refer to as "the soft line," beginning to function more effectively, there is a danger that our people will tend to relax; because the democracies love peace--and it is to their credit that they do. They are always willing to go more than halfway to see and give the other fellow the benefit of the doubt. It is in that field where we may have a danger and where we may engage in wishful thinking.

ALSPAUGH: I wonder, then, if we can feel that war is less likely at the present time than it was several years ago--in view of what you've said?

GRUENTHER: That brings up a question, of course--whether war was likely several years ago. I don't think I can answer that in the terms in which you've asked it--at least categorically so. I think this--I think there has been a change in Soviet policy as a result of this unity which the West has been able to develop. I think that the rulers of the Kremlin instead of being outwardly as aggressive as they were a few years ago, are now treading more softly. I feel that whether you say war is less likely now than it was a few years ago is problematical. I do not think there is going to be a Third World War, but it is up to the West to see that that objective is achieved and I believe it can be.

ALSPAUGH: Very promising. General Gruenther, do you think that the concept of land armies is an outmoded one? That is, in this jet atomic age, must we change our strategy of World War II concepts?

GRUENTHER: Oh, we've changed our strategy of World War II concepts very considerably already. The introduction of this vast destructive power of the atomic weapon has already, in the few brief years since this element of power has come into our army, caused radical changes.

You've asked, is the concept of land armies outmoded? No, it is not outmoded. Land armies will be needed. But perhaps they will not be needed in the numbers that they were, let's say, twelve years ago when General Eisenhower landed in Europe. We feel that because of this new destructive power, you will not need as large land forces as you needed before. In other words, we are streamlining our tactics.

We have what we call now a new weapons concept. It does not eliminate land armies, but it gives them a new type of mission; and it brings our strategy, we think, up to date. We can't be complacent about that. I think we have to be reviewing it constantly; because there will be changes as we move ahead--say about 1966--and in looking back on our 1956 strategy, we will probably find that by 1966 our '56 concepts were a bit out of date. Just as the '44 concepts are out of date now.

ALSPAUGH: General Gruenther, does the fact that an air general has been selected to take your place upon your retirement signify any change in NATO's strategy?

GRUENTHER: Oh, not at all. General Norstad has been associated with this project almost since it started. Even back in the Pentagon in his staff position there, he had an intimate connection with it. General Norstad was selected without regard to the color of his uniform. He was selected because of his outstanding grasp of matters in this field. From time to time one hears that means a return to peripheral strategy. It means nothing of the kind. I'm sure there is no tendency on the part of

the responsible official opinion of the United States that has any thought of returning to a peripheral strategy concept, or going to it. I should say we are not returning to it, because we never had it.

ALSPAUGH: That is very interesting, for this question covering a change to peripheral strategy has been raised frequently among discussion groups in the United States.

GRUENTHER: You can answer that question very firmly and I can assure you that General Norstad is very much dedicated to this concept. He's helped with all of the policies we made here. He's been right in on them from the start. The change-over will be very smooth, I assure you. He will do a much better job than I did, but I can assure you there is no question of a change of the strategic concept; certainly not to any peripheral strategy.

ALSPAUGH: Perhaps it's your modesty, General Gruenther, that has contributed so much to your success. Now, turning to Germany. Is the German contribution of military forces an essential ingredient to the success of the NATO air and ground shield force, would you say?

GRUENTHER: Oh, yes. As you know, the Germans are going to contribute some 1,300 tactical aircraft, some twelve German divisions and a certain number of naval craft for use largely in the Baltic. Those forces are extremely important and we have continuously advocated them. The German government intends to make the contribution; and their parliament, just before it adjourned the other day, passed the first part of the conscription bill. Though they still have not designated the length of the conscription. That will be taken up when the parliament returns from its recess this fall. The Germans have now moved forward towards creating this contribution, and it is very important. Definitely.

ALSPAUGH: That's fine. Would you say that it's likely that the mere existence of NATO has contributed to changes in Soviet policy? That is, would you say it was logical to assume that if the Western World undertook reductions in armaments now, it might easily persuade the Russian leaders to alter their policies once more?

GRUENTHER: With respect to your first question, I think that there is a great deal of evidence that the establishment of NATO and the resulting unity and strength which came about from that alliance, has had a very important effect on the shifting of Soviet policy. Perhaps one can get a better line on that by considering the statements of Soviet officials. Take Khrushchev. Time after time he has made it unmistakably clear that one of the prime objectives of Soviet foreign policy is to secure the dismemberment of NATO. Just a few weeks ago, about three weeks ago now, at one of the receptions in the Kremlin, the toast to which he drank was to the death of NATO. So, as we contemplate our own weaknesses, it is well for us to realize, from time to time, that the organization is held in great respect by the Soviets.

They misrepresent the purpose of the organization and constantly they refer to it as the "aggressive" NATO organization. But you realize well the one thing the organization is not--it is not aggressive! We do not have the capability; we do not have the strength even if we had the intention. I reiterate once again that our objective is to secure peace, and very definitely to prevent an act of aggression from taking place.

As to the second part of your question, "Would it be logical to assume that by our carrying on further reductions in armaments, would that have the effect of persuading the Russians to alter their policy once again?" I would doubt that very much. The Soviets have shown they respect strength. They respect one of the attributes of strength and that is unity, which we have already been able to develop. The very fact that they are trying to divide us, and secure a break-up of NATO, indicates that they want us to do just what your question says--not for the purpose of changing their policy further, but for the purpose of giving them an advantage. I would say it would not be logical to assume that any unilateral reduction in armaments would bring about a change in Soviet policy.

ALSPAUGH: I see. Do you feel that the Allies are carrying their share of the military burden of NATO, General Gruenther?

GRUENTHER: That's a very difficult question you ask. The way in which you ask the question reflects an implication of whether the United States is carrying its share of the burden. You might very well broaden the question to say, "Are all Allies carrying their share of the burden including the United States?" There is a tendency on the part of many Americans to feel we are carrying a burden far in excess of what we should. There is no answer to that question as to whether or not an ally is carrying its proper share of the burden, because there really is no yardstick.

But let me just discuss a question which bears on that. Greece has an income of approximately $200 per person per year. The United States, by the same method of calculation, now has an income of about $2,000 per person per year. Now, that brings up the question, should the Greek contribution be one-tenth that of the United States? I think that it is obvious that that isn't a fair way of evaluating what the Greek contribution should be, because the individual that is living on a $200 a year income has very little in the way of surplus there. He has the bare necessities of life and maybe not always that. So to say because of that line of reasoning, that Greece should undertake one-tenth the burden that the United States does, I think, is incorrect.

But that isn't answering your question. You've asked, are the Allies carrying out their share of the burden? I think they have all made a very substantial contribution--much greater than when we started. When General Eisenhower came here, he found that the budgets--the military budgets--for the members of NATO for the year prior to the time he came, were about six and one-half billion dollars for that year. In '53

it increased to about twelve and a half--(12.7 billion). It has now tapered off and it is now down to a little over 12 billion.

So whether they are making the contribution that you say they should is one of those questions we will never be able to determine and, moreso--whether or not the United States is paying its share of the burden. But the NATO nations are making sacrifices, and they submit each year to a cross examination in a process called the "annual review" where the other members sit around and say, "Why didn't you do this; why didn't you do that?" Some of those question session are very tough ones. They expose all of their weaknesses in this process--this annual review process--which is for the purpose of trying to get countries to state the approximate share that they should give, and I think that is working out fairly well. I would be inclined to say that the countries, by and large, are making a fair share contribution.

ALSPAUGH: That is very gratifying information, indeed.

GRUENTHER: Before leaving this question on contributions by NATO nations, I would like to add one comment which occurs to me. There is a tendency sometimes for Americans to propose calculations on the basis of numerical figures--just like the Greek example I just mentioned.

But there is one other factor that we forget and it is this: In most of these countries, the salary they pay their men in uniform is only a pittance. Take the case of France. In France, a soldier, a sailor, or an airman conscripted will get the equivalent of about eight cents a day. That's all he gets. Now, the boy doesn't live on eight cents a day; he is supplemented by funds from home. That never gets into a budgetary figure at all. In Turkey, the conscripts receive a starting salary of 13¢ a month and that goes up to 21¢ a month. Now, a regular soldier--a man who is going to make a career of it gets more than that in Turkey and also more than that in France. But when you go to strictly numerical figures, you do not get the whole story; because this element of service pay of men and so forth is figured in the United States on a vastly different scale than it is for these European countries.

ALSPAUGH: Now I can see that I really shouldn't have posed that question. It really isn't fair to pose it the way I did.

GRUENTHER: Well, no, I think it is all right to raise the issue; but it doesn't lend itself to a yes or no answer.

ALSPAUGH: General Gruenther, you've seen the development of NATO at first hand from the very beginning and how would you evaluate the positive accomplishments of NATO militarily as well as politically?

GRUENTHER: Well to start out, I think you have to go back to when General Eisenhower arrived here in January 1951. The state of the free world was at a very low ebb. We had, for the most part, disarmed at the

end of World War II, whereas the Soviets had retained a very large part of their armed forces. Then, a series of incidents took place--the Czechoslovakian Coup; the Berlin Airlift; and finally the Korea Attack which convinced the free world that Soviet imperialism was again on the march.

When General Eisenhower came to Europe, we had precious few resources. Worse than that, the resources we did have couldn't be used effectively; because we had no common concept for their use. There was no strategic concept.

Those defects have all been changed--we now have forces from four to five times as strong as they were then. And above all, we now have a common concept so that we can use the forces that we do have, and the people of NATO subscribe to--and really believe in the idea of collective security. That is another way of stating that they believe in this idea of unity. That has been a tremendous accomplishment.

Now mind you, there are still many shortcomings. And we democracies tend to examine those shortcomings a great deal, and I think it is well that we do. But there is an inclination to exaggerate our deficiencies or pay too much attention to them without recognizing many of the accomplishments that have taken place. And those accomplishments, one that I would give absolute priority to, was the number one that has been ours, and that is this development of unity; because that was the big thing where we were at a big disadvantage when General Eisenhower first came here. The Soviet gets his unity by the gun-in-the-back method and we've got to get ours by the somewhat more cumbersome processes of democracy. And we've done a very good job in that field.

ALSPAUGH: Is there understanding and unity among the fifteen NATO countries?

GRUENTHER: Oh, a great measure of it. Tremendous. Now, I don't want to say that they don't have disagreements, because you know very well that they do. But the progress in this development of unity has been remarkable. The progress in the development of military strength has been very significant.

ALSPAUGH: And even has gone so far as to meet your expectations, General Gruenther?

GRUENTHER: Well, to say that it meets your expectations . . . a military man is never satisfied and so I don't want to say that. But I would like to say this, though--when we planned five years ago, at the time when General Eisenhower was just getting the organization started, we planned then where we would be five years hence, which means where we would be now. We are further ahead now than we thought at that time we would be. In other words, our progress has been <u>greater</u> than we estimated. That doesn't mean we are satisfied with that progress, and we are

finding the very fact that we've got deficiencies means we feel we should be correcting those. We are trying to correct them all the time. The progress has been really and truly inspiring, and far ahead of what we ever thought possible.

ALSPAUGH: But even to identify deficiencies is progress.

GRUENTHER: Yes, I think that's right.

ALSPAUGH: How would you evaluate the importance of the United States in NATO?

GRUENTHER: In my opinion, the importance of the United States in NATO is overwhelmingly great. Whether we like it or not, we have got to realize that the mantle of world leadership has fallen upon our shoulders. The pattern which is going to develop is going to be molded very much according to the inspirational leadership which we are able to furnish. I think the United States has done a good job in that respect. I think that the progress we have made in the international field in the last fifteen years is great indeed. You hear from time to time certain anti-American statements and that causes people to wonder whether the United States is appreciated. I think the answer to that question is that it is very much appreciated in spite of some of this anti-American sentiment, some of which develops because a country with a living standard as high as ours is bound to be the subject of some envy.

The anti-American sentiment is not what bothers me so much as it is the attitude of skepto-Americanism. And I use that term to indicate a fear that our friends have that we may not be able to discharge this burden of leadership satisfactorily. That while we have in the field of production an industrial potential (there is no country in the world that can come anywhere near us in that field) it doesn't mean automatically that we have the wisdom to make an alliance of this sort thrive. An alliance such as this one is a difficult one to maintain, especially considering the competition that we are facing from the Soviets who are doing everything possible to lull us into a state of relaxation.

That is where American influence can be very decisive. I feel that a job we have ahead of us is to be able to convince our European allies, and to continue to convince them, that our objectives and theirs are the same. In other words, that there is a mutual field of interest. This is what the Soviets are trying to convince our European allies does not exist. They are trying to paint the picture by showing that this contest is a bi-polar one with Russia at one end of the pole and the United States at the other. Their line to the European countries is, "Why should you get mixed up in this type of contest?--just stand on the sidelines--you have nothing to gain and everything to lose."

That is where our U.S. leadership has got to be very wise and understanding in dealing with allies so that they are made to feel a part

of the team; that we make it clear to our people that we are engaged in this project not as a community chest operation, but as a part of the vital security interests of the United States--and that we are interested in defending Europe as part of that security objective. All of that, because of our power position depends very, very heavily on the support that we get from the United States in this project.

You asked me earlier about advice to young people, and while I would be presumptuous to feel that my words in that respect are profound, I do have this feeling though that the future of our civilization is going to depend upon these young people in the United States who are going to be the leaders of the 21st century, which after all is just 44 years away. The new and better world that we are going to have then is going to be largely formed in accordance with the ability that these young people are going to be able to put into it.

I have specifically this in mind--we're a very big country in the United States with this tremendous technological advance, and there is a tendency for us as we come up through our educational processes to feel that we are the big noise and fail to understand some of the problems of the rest of the world. It is natural that young people are interested in engineering jobs and so forth, and I have no objection to that. I'm glad that they're getting into it; but I do hope that these young folks, as they come along, will be able to understand more and more of what makes the world tick--what the responsibilities of the United States are--and how that wisdom is to be acquired and exercised; because the burden is a heavy one--it's a vital one--and if our civilization in the form in which we cherish it is going to survive, we are going to have to do more than match the dedication on the part of the communists.

We should all bear in mind that they have a very vigorous group of missionaries preaching their sinister philosophy. I'm talking about the communist party which has, according to Khrushchev, 7,200,000 members. Those people are dedicated. I'm not worried that the United States is going to go communist, because of the 167 million people we have. There are very few that really believe in the communist philosophy. But to say that we have 167 million people who do not believe in it, does not mean that we have 167 million crusaders. Nor does it mean that we have 7,200,000 crusaders. While we're not a crusading nation, I do feel that we have got to be dedicated in a positive way to the ideals which we cherish so very, very warmly.

I feel that foremost among those are the concepts of liberty and freedom which spring from our religious civilization, and that is matched--and the issue is very clearly drawn--against any atheistic civilization. But just to say that we like to be religious, and that we love freedom doesn't mean that we get it, and it doesn't mean that our way of life is necessarily going to prevail. The other fellow has supreme confidence in his, and he wants no part of ours. In addition to being a dedicated philosophy on his part, he has made it an aggressive one. He has

announced his intentions on having that spread, and he has communist parties throughout the world to foster that.

It is going to require a tremendous amount of vigilance on our part. I am talking now not about military vigilance--I'm talking about spiritual vigilance--this wisdom, this know-how in how to make a very complicated machine work, namely, an alliance. But I'm sure we can do it. I'm sure our people have the natural talent if they'll only understand what the issues are and spend some time in studying the matter. There is no question in my mind that we will develop the necessary leadership, that we'll prevent a Third World War from taking place, and that we will more than hold our own in the Cold War which unfortunately seems destined to continue for some time in the future.

ALSPAUGH: I certainly wish that we could convey that message, General Gruenther, to every young student in our country. You have certainly spearheaded the significance of democracy in coupling the importance of education and our spiritual way of life. Certainly with the promotion of our educational system in the area of democracy, accompanied by our deep and abiding spiritual faith, I'm sure that the optimism that you have outlined this afternoon will come to pass.

I want to thank you very much for having given me this great privilege to interview you this afternoon. I have hoped and prayed since 1953 this would come to pass and it has. It has been a real joy to talk with you.

When you re-enter civilian life back in the United States, may I wish you and Mrs. Gruenther every happiness and continued success.

GRUENTHER: Well, thank you very much. It's been a great pleasure to have you here, and I trust that you'll find your trip in Europe an interesting one. And that you'll go back beating the drum for this very, very essential and noble cause. Thank you kindly for coming.

ALSPAUGH: Thank you.

To Mrs Lilyan Alspaugh
It was a great pleasure to have you visit our headquarters
Alfred M. Gruenther

SHAPE
Paris
25 Jy 56

APPENDIX C

SIXTY-THREE SPEECHES SENT TO WRITER BY PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION OF SHAPE

List of 25 Speeches Delivered by General Gruenther as Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower and General Ridgway (1951-1953)

28 Jun 1951	Address to American Club of Paris
3 Nov 1951	Address to International Chamber of Commerce, Paris
15 Nov 1951	Briefing of British Press Editors, at SHAPE
15 Jan 1952	Addresses in Briefing of British MPs
21 Jan 1952	Remarks to members of Press
24 Jan 1952	Addresses in Briefing to Netherlands Government Officials
25 Jan 1952	American Chamber of Commerce, Paris
21 Mar 1952	Address to Members of French Press
31 Mar 1952	Address in Briefing of Italian Government Officials
4 Apr 1952	1st Anniversary of NATO
21 Apr 1952	Address to the Associated Press, New York
21 Apr 1952	Address to the Corps of Cadets, West Point
28 Apr 1952	Address to US Chamber of Commerce
5 May 1952	Briefing of American Press
6 May 1952	Briefing of British Press
15 May 1952	NATO Defense College
20 May 1952	Briefing US Businessmen and Women
24 May 1952	European Conference of International Council for Christian Leadership, The Hague
18 Jun 1952	Société de la Géographie Economique

6 Jan 1953	Address NATO Defense College
8 Jan 1953	Briefing for British MPs
19 Jan 1953	Institut des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale
18 May 1953	Visiting Journalists to SHAPE
26 May 1953	Briefing of New SHAPE Officers
30 May 1953	Memorial Day Services at American Cemetery, Anzio

List of 38 Speeches Delivered by General Gruenther
as Supreme Allied Commander (1953-56)

11 Jul 1953	Handover ceremony at SHAPE
20 Jul 1953	Remarks in the Critique on Exercise
30 Jul 1953	Interview--US News and World Report
31 Aug 1953	Atlantic Community Convention, Copenhagen
3 Sep 1953	Press Representatives at Hq Mediterranean
11 Sep 1953	Interview US News and World Report
27 Sep 1953	BBC--NATO AS I SEE IT
8 Oct 1953	Alfred E. Smith Memorial Foundation Dinner, New York
11 Jan 1954	Remarks at SHAPE Correspondents' Luncheon
6 Feb 1954	Correspondence with Wesleyan University, Conn.
10 Mar 1954	Bulletin Forum at Philadelphia
5 Apr 1954	County Hall, London
7 Jun 1954	Publication--News Week
8 Jun 1954	English Speaking Union of the Commonwealth, London
22 Feb 1955	North Dakota Legislative Assembly
1 Mar 1955	Delegates to 2nd NATO Troop Information Conference
15 Mar 1955	SHAPE CORRESPONDENTS' LUNCHEON
29 Mar 1955	Remarks to German Correspondents
30 Mar 1955	European-Atlantic Group
2 Apr 1955	Fourth Anniversary of SHAPE

2 May 1955	Italian Center of Study of International Reconciliation
11 May 1955	City Livery Club, London
27 May 1955	University of Maryland Overseas Program, Heidelberg
28 Sep 1955	Annual Convention American Bankers Assoc.
4 Oct 1955	Convention of American Women's Activities in Europe
17 Nov 1955	Dallas Council on World Affairs
6 Feb 1956	Los Angeles World Affairs Council
7 Feb 1956	Annual Congressional Dinner, Veterans of Foreign Wars
23 Feb 1956	English Speaking Union
5 Mar 1956	SHAPE Staff Officers
22 Mar 1956	Statement before The House Foreign Affairs Committee
29 Mar 1956	Correspondents--German
5 Apr 1956	International Broadcasting Service Group
9 May 1956	Bonn Economic Policy Club
16 May 1956	Banquet by "The Scotsman"
21 Jun 1956	Senate Appropriations Committee
13 Nov 1956	Farewell Conference
20 Nov 1956	Farewell Speech at SHAPE

APPENDIX D

TEXTS OF THE COPENHAGEN, LONDON, AND ROME SPEECHES ANALYZED AS CASE STUDIES IN CHAPTERS III, IV, AND V, RESPECTIVELY

THE COPENHAGEN SPEECH*

*Copied from transcript received from Public Information Division, SHAPE.

Address delivered 31 August 1953, in Copenhagen, Denmark, to members of the Atlantic Community Convention.

THE ROLE OF NATO IN THE DEFENSE OF THE WEST

GENERAL ALFRED M. GRUENTHER

SUPREME COMMANDER ALLIED POWERS EUROPE

General Eisenhower arrived in Paris approximately two and one half years ago to organize Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, commonly known as SHAPE. That Headquarters is now a going concern, and is charged with the defense of Europe, extending from the Northern tip of Norway to the Eastern borders of Turkey, an arc of some 7,000 kilometers.

SHAPE is one of three major military commands which function under the North Atlantic Council, the overall civilian political authority, which sits in continuous session in Paris. The Council is served by an international staff under the leadership of Lord Ismay, the Secretary General. The governing military body is the Military Committee, consisting of one representative from each of the fourteen member nations. The present Chairman of the Military Committee is Admiral Qvistgaard of Denmark. To provide for more rapid and effective action the Military Committee set up the Standing Group, consisting of a representative of the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. The Standing Group sits permanently in Washington, and functions as a type of executive committee for the Military Committee.

All countries represented here this evening have had defense problems throughout the centuries. In the case of Denmark, for example, more than 1,000 years ago your Danish ancestors set up stone walls as ramparts for the Southern land defenses against the predatory Saxons. On the site of beautiful Copenhagen, Bishop Absalon, its farsighted founder, built a stronghold 900 years ago against the pirating Wends. Happily, the enemies of those days are today friends. It is not necessary for me to point to other symbols of the enduring will of Denmark during the past 1,000 years to defend its freedom. Our objective in NATO today is the same, but the scope of the problem is much more vast, and the methods differ.

Our basic defense philosophy involves the use of the minimum number of active forces, and to place maximum dependence upon Reserve forces. We visualize that with this minimum of active forces we will create a shield to give us a cushion of time sufficiently long to enable our Reserve forces to mobilize. In case of attack we would depend upon the Tactical Air Forces and the Land Forces to fight the combined air-land battle, while our Strategic Air Forces would strike deep into enemy territory against industrial targets.

To provide for more effective control of the defense battle the SHAPE area has been broken into regional commands, set up as follows: the Northern Command under General Mansergh at Oslo, the Central Command under Marshal Juin at Fontainebleau, the Southern Command covering Italy, Turkey and Greece under Admiral Fechteler at Naples, and the Mediterranean Command under Admiral Mountbatten with headquarters at Malta.

When General Eisenhower arrived early in 1951 the state of the defenses in Europe was pitifully low. Since then there has been a tremendous improvement. The forces have approximately doubled, and the gain in effectiveness has been greater still. That applies particularly to our air forces, which initially were especially weak. One of NATO's outstanding achievements is the increase in number of airfields. We shall have by the end of this year about 125 usable fields.

The defense budgets of the member countries have increased. Not considering the United States, the other countries have more than doubled the amounts spent for defense. If the U.S. increase is taken into account the ratio is much more favorable.

Nearly all countries have increased their periods of national service, the most recent case being that of Denmark which has now provided for 18 months' service, a very gratifying development.

During this two and one half year period we have had the opportunity to prepare detailed defense plans for the employment of our forces. Every commander now knows exactly what he would do in the event of an emergency. That does not guarantee that we would be able to withstand an attack successfully, but at least each element of the command knows what action to take. The success of our efforts would depend upon the amount of force that the aggressor would bring against us, and also on the skill with which he would employ that force.

Just what could our NATO forces accomplish now? One official, of a cynical turn of mind, when asked three years ago "What do the Soviets need to march to the Channel?" answered "Only shoes!" I can assure you that at this time the NATO forces of Allied Command Europe are of such strength that the Soviets do not have sufficient power in occupied Europe to be reasonably certain of success if they should attack with the forces now there. In other words, I believe they would have to bring in additional forces from the USSR before they could launch a successful attack

against the West. If that estimate is a correct one, it represents a most significant achievement, because it means that we should be able to obtain a reasonable amount of warning of an impeding [sic] attack.

We should then be able to mobilize our reserves, and otherwise take appropriate readiness measures, to enable us to meet the threat.

This is real progress, much greater than we thought would be possible when we started out two and a half years ago.

Before leaving the question of progress, I desire to make clear that we still do not have adequate strength to defeat an all-out attack. But we would in no sense be a pushover.

What are some of the major problems which we still face?

We consider that air power is the dominant factor in modern warfare. Our most critical deficiency today is the strength of our air forces, and I say that in spite of the excellent progress already made. The Soviets have an air force of some 20,000 operational planes, a large proportion of which are jets. To meet that air threat our air forces must be increased and their effectiveness must be such as to be ready to fight on an instant's notice. It is not sufficient to depend upon Reserve air forces for the reason that air attacks can develop with such devastating swiftness that we would not be able to mobilize air reserves in time. We at SHAPE have given first priority to the development of our air forces. That does not mean that we think we could win a war solely by the use of air power. We consider that an adequate defense posture can be obtained only by the air-land-naval team. It is essential, however, that increased emphasis be placed on the development of larger and more effective air forces.

Earlier I told you that under our concept our shield would hold long enough to enable our reserve forces to mobilize and move to the area where they are needed. Unfortunately those reserves are still critically inadequate. That deficiency represents our second major problem. The Soviets have a very large active land force in being, consisting of 175 Soviet divisions, and approximately 70 satellite divisions. The Soviet divisions are less effective, but their effectiveness is increasing constantly. We have no thought of trying to match that force division for division, because to maintain active forces of that magnitude would place unacceptable strain on our economy. That is the reason why we place such great dependence of reserve divisions. But those divisions must be good, because if they are employed against Soviet forces their effectiveness has to be of higher caliber. The creation of adequate reserve forces presents a difficult problem for the NATO governments. It means that a large proportion of our manpower will have to spend considerable time each year in reserve training. That is inconvenient for the individuals concerned, and of course it tends to create economic strains.

Our third major difficulty lies in the Logistics field. We must have adequate supplies for our forces if an emergency should develop and we must have a logistic system which enables us to move those supplies quickly to the places where they will be needed. Our progress in both of these respects is still far below what it should be and we are constantly urging member governments to take appropriate measures.

Now for a short discussion of the role of naval forces in the defense of Europe. The Soviets have an extensive submarine capability which can be exercised by the more than 300 submarines in the Soviet Navy. Also they have a significant mining capability. Both of these could be used to interfere with our vital sea lines of communication from North America. Admiral McCormick, SACLANT commander, with headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia, is charged with the protection of the sea lines of communications across the Atlantic. In addition Admiral McCormick's forces will assist in the defense of our vital North flank of Denmark and Norway, by the extensive use of naval power, both surface craft and naval aviation. In the Mediterranean Admiral Fechteler has assigned to him the U.S. Sixth Fleet with its powerful carrier-based aviation which will be able to give effective air support in the Mediterranean area. Admiral Mountbatten is charged with the protection of the lines of communication in the Mediterranean, and with other important naval assignments. Naval power by means of its great flexibility will be able to make a substantial contribution to the defense of Europe.

In outlining these major problems to you, you have noted that the philosophy behind our concept is certainly a defensive one. I stress that point because Soviet propaganda efforts, particularly in the last month, have emphasized the aggressive nature of NATO. I can assure you that there has never been as much as a single paragraph written at SHAPE which envisages that we would be the aggressor. All of our plans are based on the assumption that war, if it comes, will be started by the enemy, and that we will have to adjust our strategy accordingly. I need not tell you that in this day of modern weapons that is a tremendous disadvantage for us. Moreover, the Soviets know well that our troop dispositions and our strength are such that we do not have a capability to assume the role of an aggressor. Our alliance is clearly defensive. It is that common bond--that objective for the preservation of peace--which has been responsible for the progress that we have already made.

Much thought is being given by the planners at SHAPE and at the Standing Group for the employment of new weapons. The peoples of the NATO nations, and especially the Finance Ministers, are constantly asking the question "To what extent will new weapons lessen the requirements? To what extent may we expect to have our taxes reduced as a result of the advent of these new weapons?". We do not yet have a satisfactory answer to that question. It is a difficult problem, involving the projection of strategic thinking about four years in advance. Many of the new weapons are still in the testing stage, with the result that not enough is yet known of their capabilities. Even if these new weapons

should reduce the requirements for conventional forces, that would not necessarily mean lower cost, because most of the new weapons are very expensive. I don't want to go so far at this time as to say that the outlook for the reduction of expenses is a discouraging one. At the same time I do not want to hold out the hope that there will be a substantial reduction, until the subject has been more thoroughly studied.

In this connection you will I am sure be interested to know that the United States Command in Germany organized on May 1st a Special Weapons School at Oberammergau in Germany to teach Allied officers the application of the new weapons in tactical situations. In our maneuvers this fall atomic warfare considerations will be realistically played.

What are our prospects for the future? When General Eisenhower made his estimate shortly after he arrived in Europe he came to the conclusion that the first two to three years would probably be the most difficult. No similar alliance in history had ever succeeded for any length of time during peace. The project was a very new one, involving a cumbersome procedure to obtain unanimous action by the members. In spite of those disadvantages, however, the alliance has thus far succeeded beyond all expectations. The doctrine of collective security has been adopted wholeheartedly by all NATO members.

That very success, however, is causing us trouble for the future. I think that it requires no great vision to be able to predict that the next two and a half years will probably be more difficult than the first two and a half year period.

It is well to recognize that NATO was created in an atmosphere of fear. The threat was towering and immediate, the hour was late. The whips of fear drove us into each other's arms. Ancient rivalries were forgotten. Political differences were reconciled. Confronted by the facts and by the question of survival, we found that survival was paramount and all else secondary.

That element of fear is beginning to disappear. We have grown stronger, and we are becoming more susceptible to the blandishments of the Soviet peace offensive. I can assure you, however, that there is no evidence that the armed strength of the Soviet bloc is growing weaker. On the contrary, all intelligence reports indicate that it is increasing. It is true that the Soviet dictatorship appears to be having difficulties in the captive countries. What this will mean to the nations of the West is not yet clear. Certainly the speech which Malenkov made to the Supreme Soviet on August 8 was hard and unyielding. There was no hint in it, or at any time since, that the Soviets plan to make any consessions to the West.

I shall not dwell on possible Soviet intentions other than to point out that at the 19th Soviet Congress in Moscow last October Malenkov made it clear that the major and continuing Soviet effort would be

directed toward the dismemberment of the NATO alliance and the progressive isolation of its member states. This of course is the ancient but still valid strategy of divide and conquer. Even without the cynical public announcement of this intention, I can not believe that any of the NATO partners would be gullible enough to be taken in by this oldest of confidence games.

The plan of world communism has been chronicled and proclaimed. Both the strategy and the tactics of the communist drive have been published and republished in every corner of the earth. We know the techniques and we know the successes those techniques have won. We will continue to ignore them at our peril. Surely we have learned the hard way that Soviet peace offers followed at once by Soviet threats is a key technique in the communist cold war--a technique designed to keep the West off balance and at the same time to foster despair, disillusionment and loss of confidence in our leaders.

A friend of mine used to say "The pocketbook is the most sensitive nerve of the human body" and I suppose that is a wise observation. Certainly it is true that the economic difficulties of the NATO nations are increasing. It is also true that important social and economic projects are being deferred as the result of expenditure for defense. I realize our armed forces will be effective and unblunted only to the extent that the nations supporting them remain strong in spirit, active in intellectual endeavor and sound economically. The task for NATO is to strive for that balance between military economic and social requirements that will make us secure both from external attack by an aggressor and from internal disintegration resulting from poverty and discouragement.

This determination must be made on a long-term basis. It would be the most dangerous type of wishful thinking to assume that the struggle will be of short duration. A defense program is not something that can be turned off every time Soviet leaders speak of the possibility of coexistence and turned on a month later, when a Laos is invaded or an Iran maneuvered to the edge of the land of no return. We can not afford it psychologically and we can not afford it financially. That way, indeed, lies ultimate bankruptcy for the West. Having agreed upon our minimum requirements we must push steadily and uniformly between optimism and despair, without sudden outpourings of billions and equally sudden and violent retrenchments.

I feel that we are facing a period ahead where service to the cause of freedom must be given unselfishly by the North Atlantic peoples. From my experience I am confident that the people will make the necessary sacrifices if they understand why they are being made, and if they believe that NATO can be an effective agency to preserve the peace. For that reason I am particularly gratified that you men and women have taken the time and trouble, at considerable expense, to meet in connection with the Atlantic Community Conference now taking place at Copenhagen. Your

contribution in crusading for this cause can indeed be a tremendous one. I am especially pleased to see you stressing the civilian aspects of NATO. I congratulate you on the efforts you are making to strengthen NATO and I want you to know that if we at SHAPE can be of any assistance to you, we stand ready to help. We would be particularly honored to have any of your groups visit SHAPE. You will find there 420 officers from twelve nations who have made an outstanding success in the field of international cooperation.

Many years ago Clemenceau said "War is too important to be entrusted to the generals." While he was half joking when he made that statement, the events since then have certainly proved him to be correct. Modern war embraces not only the military factor but also vast political, economic and psychological considerations.

Although it may seem strange to have men in uniform advocating the cause of peace you will find that the officers at SHAPE, as well as throughout Allied Command Europe, consider that to be our prime objective. Most of us have seen too much of war to believe that any benefits can come from another world struggle. I would not go so far as to say that "Peace is too important to be entrusted to the civilians." But I do say that we in the military are making a real contribution to peace by denying to a would-be aggressor an easy, cheap and profitable conquest. We firmly believe that if NATO had been in existence in 1939 World War II never would have taken place.

It is a sad commentary on the state of the world today that peace cannot be established without power. Nevertheless, that is a fact. We have tried negotiation from weakness, and in the process, we have seen almost half of the world swallowed up in the darkness of Soviet imperialism. We must have military strength not only to resist aggression but also to give our statesmen a firm basis from which to negotiate a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union.

The task of leadership in the period is indeed a heavy one. It is time to reconcile our national policies where they show signs of diverging. It is time to heal the wounds to national pride that have come from bitter and ill-considered words. It is time for forgiveness, for understanding, for patience, and above all for rededication to that fundamental unity of purpose and policy without which we shall surely perish.

Our modest strength is beginning to reap dividends. It would be a tragedy if we should weary and falter in the last hard stretch to the goal we have agreed upon.

Never was there greater need among the NATO nations for unity, for wisdom and for perseverance. Never was there a greater need to see clearly that our lives are bound inextricably together. Never was there a greater need to demonstrate that we who have inherited freedom, have not forgotten the value of that heritage nor lost the will to defend it.

THE LONDON SPEECH*

*See Blackwell, Basil, ed. Speeches at the Dinner in Honour of General Alfred M. Gruenther under the Auspices of the English-Speaking Union of the Commonwealth, June 8, 1954. Oxford University Press, 1954.

SPEECHES

AT THE DINNER IN HONOUR OF
GENERAL ALFRED M. GRUENTHER
UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE
ENGLISH-SPEAKING UNION OF THE
COMMONWEALTH, JUNE 8, 1954

With an Introductory Note

By LIONEL CURTIS

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THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING UNION OF THE COMMONWEALTH

DINNER IN HONOUR OF

GENERAL ALFRED M. GRUENTHER

HELD AT

THE DORCHESTER HOTEL, LONDON, ON JUNE 8, 1954

Corrected Report of Speeches]

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE DUKE OF EDINBURGH

General Gruenther and Ladies and Gentlemen:

This dinner to-night falls very near the Tenth Anniversary of the Invasion of Normandy. That great undertaking will be remembered as long as history lives, but we remember it to-night for one very special reason: the invasion was probably the supreme example of co-operation for success, co-operation between Services, between nations, between planners and leaders, and it will always be there to show what can be done.

We are also gathered here for another reason. This dinner is being given in honour of General Gruenther whose main job at SHAPE is to get people and nations to co-operate *now*. We had also hoped to entertain Mrs. Gruenther, who has played such a notable part in helping the General to build a happy and co-operative atmosphere at his Headquarters, but she has been unavoidably prevented from joining us this evening.

Europe, at the end of the war, needed two things very badly: social stability and military security. To build up confidence, those two problems had to be solved. The solution of one without the solution of the other could not and will not achieve the desired result. I think, perhaps, I had better not go any further with that as I shall certainly end in trouble, and there are altogether too many experts here to-night!

But at least I can say this: here is the man who is tackling the problem of building up in Europe a sense of military security, and a sense of military security only follows from the facts. We know he is fitted for this difficult job by his previous record as a staff officer, but even more by his remarkable record as Supreme Commander since he succeeded General Ridgeway.

He has been in Europe some time as Chief of Staff to the two previous Supreme Commanders, and he has most certainly acquired an extensive knowledge of the unpredictable ways of Europeans. At any rate, he knows enough to be accepted, indeed welcomed, as an impartial umpire in the age-old game of European rivalries. Having been an international bridge umpire in his spare time may have something to do with it!

He is the third Supreme Commander in Europe and the third American in that post. That is a compliment to America as well as a tacit acknowledgment that America is playing the leading part in building up military security in Europe,

I think we in this Union can also take pride in the fact that he speaks English—or perhaps, so as not to wound any feelings, I had better put it that he speaks a language which we can all understand. I think it would only be fair to add that he has, of course, the invaluable support and assistance of an English-speaking Field Marshal!

In the last six months, the Queen and I have had a unique opportunity to discover by practical experience that unity between peoples is brought about by a common acceptance of ideas, good ideas, which have the quality of striking a responsive chord in human minds; unity of thought cannot be brought about by coercion. The good ideas which are embodied in the British Commonwealth and Empire have developed and grown over many centuries. SHAPE, on the other hand, has had to achieve the same sort of unity, in a notoriously disunited area, in a few short years.

We have every cause to be thankful to the Supreme Commanders for what they have accomplished in the face of tremendous obstacles. If anything, the present will prove to be one of the most testing periods. With increased resources, experienced staff, and a slight reduction of tension, General Gruenther must somehow keep alive the sense of urgency, extend and improve the machinery of the organization as a whole. We can help by showing our confidence in him and in all those who are working for him.

Personally, I am looking forward to seeing something of

General Gruenther's set-up in a fortnight, and I hope that what I have said proves to be true. In the meantime, on behalf of the English-Speaking Union, everyone here to-night as well as many others, we thank you for what you have done, we wish you further success in the future, and we would all like to drink to the health of General Gruenther and, although she is absent, to Mrs. Gruenther.

GENERAL ALFRED M. GRUENTHER

Your Royal Highness, Sir Winston Churchill, Your Excellencies, my Lords, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am deeply grateful for the generous introduction which Your Royal Highness gave me. I should like to say to you that during the trip which the Queen and you took, we at SHAPE watched your progress carefully, and with a great deal of interest. We felt that your journey was an event of great significance for the entire Free World. I hope you will be kind enough to convey to Her Majesty our sincere admiration and gratitude for her devotion to the concepts of liberty and freedom for which we are all working.

I regret very much that Mrs. Gruenther could not be here this evening, but it happens that we have two sons and seven grandchildren. Some of you will be old enough eventually to have grandchildren too. And you will then learn that complications develop in the lives of grandchildren, especially when one of the sons happens to be in Korea, and his wife is left with four children between the ages of eight months and five-and-a-half years. That was the situation which developed in our family and Mrs. Gruenther had to go back to the United States last night.

But it's about the future of those grandchildren that I would like to talk to you to-night—not about the toys that they play with, but about the kind of world to which they must look forward. That is why the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed in 1949.

You will be interested to know that the first person I ever heard discuss NATO was a British subject. It was Ambassador Sir Gladwin Jebb, and the month was March 1948. At the time I heard him first outline the concept, I thought it was a very elusive and illusory project. But he was a crusader, a dedicated man. He continued on it, and with the help of the British Government and the governments of the other free countries, a pact was finally signed in 1949 on April 4th.

You are aware, of course, that General Eisenhower came to Paris, and set up our headquarters—SHAPE—as part of this organization on April 2, 1951, to organize a defence of Europe from the northern tip of Norway to the eastern borders of Turkey—a perimeter of some four thousand miles.

When he arrived in Europe, the morale of the Free World was at a very low ebb. It was only a matter of weeks until we were going to be ejected from the Korean peninsula. In Europe itself the new and better world we had hoped for was confronted with the stark realization that Soviet imperialism was again on the march.

Our assets were very, very meagre. But what was even more discouraging was the fact that the security resources we possessed could not be co-ordinated to respond to a single strategic plan of defence. Now, three years and two months later, I can tell you that we have made very significant progress in developing a position of strength.

The forces which General Eisenhower had in 1951 have been increased numerically some three to four times—and from the standpoint of effectiveness the increase has been greater still. To give you an idea of what we have now, there are available for the defence of Europe, between 90 and 100 divisions in varying degrees of readiness. Some of these divisions will be ready on D-day, others on D plus 15, and still others on D plus 30.

With respect to air power, the increase has been even greater. To quote one statistic: When General Eisenhower arrived we had fifteen airfields. Not one of them could take jets, but that wasn't important, because we had no jets to put on them. Now we have 120 airfields, and every one of them can take jets. By the end of this year the number of airfields will be further increased.

With respect to practical results, I would like to invite your attention to the following facts:

Three years ago the Soviets could march to the Channel on very short notice with only the forces that they had in Occupied Europe. Now, however, because of the shield we have developed, they would have to reinforce their forces in Occupied Europe from the Soviet Union. If that estimate is correct, it gives us a certain insurance against a so-called accidental or miscalculated war. It means that if World War III should erupt it would be only because the Soviets in the Kremlin had made the firm and fateful decision to start it, with all of the responsibilities which that decision entails.

I would be less than frank if I did not tell you that we still have great deficiencies. It would be almost miraculous if in the short period of three years we had been able to build up from the low level at which we were in 1951 to a strength which would stop an all-out Soviet attack now. We are just not that good yet, and that is one reason why we have recommended to our policital superiors, the North Atlantic Council, that we have additional forces. It is the reason why we recommended that there be a German contribution to our protective shield.

We are engaged at SHAPE at this very moment in working on a philosophy of war—if unfortunately it should take place—projected some three years into the future. We have not completed that study yet, but I can tell you some of the highlights of it.

If a full-scale war should take place three years from now, we visualize a conflict in which we would use atomic weapons. We are working on a concept of having as small a force in being as possible while depending heavily on reserve forces. Our protective shield, therefore, must be able to hold long enough for those reserves to mobilize. We feel that it will not hold long enough unless we have atomic power to support it. So in our thinking we visualize the use of atomic bombs in the support of our ground troops. We also visualize the use of atomic bombs against targets of war making potential deep in enemy territory.

I recognize that such a plan creates a major political problem, and I want you to realize that we at SHAPE do not think we are the political masters. We understand clearly that the strategy which will be adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be a strategy which has been accepted by the fourteen member governments of NATO.

I am only telling you what our thinking is now, and the type of plan that we shall forward to our political superiors. Whether they approve of it or not is a matter for them to decide.

I recognize full well, as does everybody in this audience, that people are deeply worried over the possibility of an atomic war. I can assure you that worry extends to our headquarters just as much as it does into your homes. We are trying to build

a force of such strength that it will deter aggression. We do not want war to take place—any kind of war!

But if it does take place, there is no question in our minds that every weapon must and will be used. You all know that the Soviet Union, especially during the last few weeks, has been conducting a very vigorous campaign asking that atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons be banned. We at our headquarters do not think that that is the answer to the problem. We feel that if you ban those types of weapons, you require our forces to adopt a wall-of-flesh type of strategy. We have just within the last two months seen a very clear illustration of the result of that kind of strategy, where at Dien-Bien-Phu forty thousand of the Viet-Minh forces finally overwhelmed, after a most fierce struggle, some ten thousand gallant members of the French Union forces.

If, however, a decision is made that atomic weapons are not to be used, we at our headquarters will point out to our political superiors that our defensive posture can only be maintained successfully at the expense of increased manpower. When one considers the low value placed on human life by the Soviets, we, in our humble opinion, believe it would be a major mistake for the West to adopt a type of strategy which substitutes human beings for atomic weapons.

We believe that an atomic disarmament should be part of a safe and secure across-the-board total disarmament plan. In other words, we feel that war itself should be made impossible, because we see no profit from war—and we think that we know a little about that subject!

Now, let us suppose that this war should unfortunately take place this year—1954. I have already mentioned that we have grave disadvantages. What would be the result of the war now? My firm belief is that the Soviet Union, if a war took place this year, would be defeated!

I think that statement requires some explanation. At the present time we have many serious deficiencies. Some of our troops are poorly trained. Some of our supplies are altogether too inadequate. But we have one asset now which is of tremendous value, and that is that we have a long-range air capability to which the Soviets now have no answer. I refer to a plane, the B-47, which can fly so fast and so high that there is no defence against it in the year 1954. One of those planes four months ago left the United States, and landed in England four hours and thirty-four minutes later. That is an average speed of 650 miles an hour. Now I will confide to you that our people wouldn't have announced this record unless they know they had a good friendly tail-wind to send it over here. But even so, that's travelling. That plane can fly very fast, and drop atomic weapons, and drop them accurately! I hope and pray it will never be necessary to employ this power in an active role.

In the cold war, we have assets of incalculable value. We have a spiritual strength which the Soviet Union cannot equal under any circumstances. Our economic potential is still on the rise, and much greater than anything which an enemy can match. Above all, we now have an integrated allied chain of command, throughout the entire fourteen NATO nations, which will be able to direct our resources to the best advantage.

Because of all these reasons I say to you that if the Soviets should launch an attack in 1954 they would suffer a severe defeat! I don't want to say that we would win, because I am sure that in a third world war there would be no winner. But the Soviets would definitely be defeated in every sense of the word!

My point in making these assertions so positively is that we spend a considerable amount of our time trembling over the assets of the Soviet Union. There is a considerable tendency on our part to think that every Soviet soldier is eight feet high. But I can assure you there are some five-foot Soviet soldiers, and even some five-foot Soviet Generals, and we know some of their defects. Instead of emphasizing only what they have on the credit side of the ledger let's all realize that they have many items on the debit side too. I am sorry to say that they have had considerable success in the past two months because of our timidity. By living dangerously, and with no public opinion of their own to which their leaders must respond, they have caused us great trepidation. Let's stop being frightened. Let us become more and more aware of the fact that as the Soviet political and military leaders balance our assets and deficiencies, they must arrive at the clear conclusion that they could not win a war against a united Free World. What I want to see is our people more confident of our present capabilities and less fearful of what, on the surface, appears to be overwhelming Soviet

power. This business of undermining confidence is a favourite Communist trick.

Having said that, I want to make it clear, that as we project our thinking ahead some five to ten years, I am not sure that our present margin will exist then. In other words, I cannot be confident that time is on our side, even though we have the advantage now. After all, on May 1st, in the May Day parade, the Soviets exhibited some aeroplanes with very devastating characteristics. We know that their atomic stockpile is increasing, that they are working hard on their air defence, that they are stockpiling and creating additional war supplies, and that their industrial potential is increasing. What kind of an overall power balance that will give five, six, seven, eight and ten years from now, I do not know. I am sure that we have it in our capacity to continue that balance in our favour, but whether or not we will, is something for the future to decide. If the present tendency to relax should continue, I'm afraid the ultimate results would be extremely disadvantageous and tragic to the concepts we hold so dear. Freedom and the dignity of the human individual.

At this point I hope you will permit me to touch on the question of Anglo-American relations. I came from a small town in Nebraska. The Duke of Edinburgh was very kind to advertise my many qualifications in his flattering introduction, but he left out one of great pride to me. I am an admiral in the Nebraska Navy. And the Duke didn't say a word about that. I'll have you know, before some of those titters erupt into loud laughter, that the Nebraska Navy has never suffered even one vessel damaged or defeated. I'd like to ask the Duke if any navy that he's ever been associated with can claim a similar record.

To let you know something about my ancestry—my grandfather was a German, born in Bavaria. My grandmother, named Shea, was born in Ireland. She left there at a time when there was some little dispute about potatoes. She settled in a small Nebraska village and eventually I was born there. There were 374 people in that village before I was born, and I made number 375. We spent much of our time expecting the redcoats to come into that village any day. I don't want you to think that we had any special hate-the-British days, because we didn't. Every day was 'down with the British'. I was seventeen years old before I knew the words 'damn British' were two words.

By the year 1942 I had known two Britishers. Both wore monocles and I didn't care if I saw either of them again.

On a Wednesday late in July 1942, General Eisenhower asked for me to come to London. I arrived on the following Sunday evening, August 2, 1942. At the airport I received instructions to report immediately to General Eisenhower in this very hotel—on the fifth floor. He wanted to talk to me about an operation which was about to be put in the planning stage. I had come from Texas, where I had been Chief of Staff in a command where General Eisenhower had served. The general's first question was, 'Do you know where Algiers is?' I couldn't tell the General I didn't know, but actually I hadn't the slightest idea. I had been studying Texas geography, and anybody who's been to Texas knows that is a big assignment. As a matter of fact, we in Texas thought we were going to be attacked by the Germans; so we had all the Texans mobilized. Algiers was the last thing I thought of, but I didn't admit that to General Eisenhower. Just as he started to tell me about this Operation TORCH, a telephone call came, and it was the Prime Minister, who said, 'I want you out at Chequers right away'. So I learned no more about Algiers or the operation that night.

The following morning I was summoned before a British group of about twenty-five planners, and they said, 'General Gruenther, we would like your plan for Operation TORCH'. Well, I assumed that TORCH had something to do with Algiers, but I didn't know; so I finessed that problem. The British looked down their noses at me, and I left that meeting sure that 'damn British' still should have been one word.

That was in August 1942. Since then I have had a tremendous amount of experience with the British, and I want to tell you now that I have the greatest admiration for you all. I have numerous friends among the British officers and civilians. I think you people are tops, and I want to tell you that without reservation. Before you get too conceited, however, I don't want you to think you're the only pebble on the beach.

At our headquarters at SHAPE we have a great deal of trouble with our parishioners, our clients—our allies, as they're sometimes

called. Our number one trouble is with the Americans, the number two trouble is with the British.

We find that a few Americans are very modest—very, very few. We had in one of our NATO hospitals a few weeks ago one of the doctors who called another doctor friend to look at a case. The latter said, 'I don't have time'. Finally he was persuaded to come, but first he asked, 'What is this case I'm supposed to look at?' The answer was, 'It's the most remarkable case we've ever seen in this hospital. It's an American with an inferiority complex.' We run into very few of those at our headquarters, and I don't suppose you have seen many either.

At our headquarters we have an allied staff consisting of 171 Americans, 82 British, 63 French, 29 Italians, 13 Canadians, 10 Belgians, 9 Dutch, 7 Greeks and 7 Turks, 5 Norwegians, 3 Danes, and 1 from little Luxembourg—a total of 12 nations and 400 officers. We have had so much experience with those people of varying backgrounds and traditions that we think we know a little bit about this question of international co-operation. Please don't think that we believe it is easy. Sitting outside my office is an American sergeant who gets more money than a French colonel of thirty years' service. He thinks he deserves it, but the French colonel may have other ideas about that. But in spite of many inequalities such as this one, and after thirty-five years of service, I have come to the conclusion that our headquarters at SHAPE is the happiest headquarters I have ever been associated with. And the reason for that is that these people believe in the cause. They are thoroughly dedicated to the objective of international co-operation. We at that headquarters think we can solve any Anglo-American-Commonwealth problem that exists. There's only one that we haven't been able to solve, and that is to find a window that will allow enough air in to cool a Britisher to what he thinks it should be in January and still keep it warm enough for the American who sits next to him. But we hope to solve that within the next few months.

I don't want to tell you that the Americans are perfect. In fact we receive so many irritating messages from Washington that we subscribe wholeheartedly to that wisecrack: 'Washington is the only place in the world where sound travels faster than light'. But, admitting all of that, may I say that the Americans have made tremendous progress during the past fifteen years in developing a capacity for world leadership. I hope that you can put up with them—and—parenthetically, I also hope they can put up with you.

Be that as it may, we cannot at this time afford to be disunited. I am absolutely certain that in the era that we are approaching now, we are going to have to solve this problem of security together and in common, or we are not going to solve it at all. Any time a mishap occurs to one of our partners in freedom, we should recall again the eternal refrain of John Donne: 'Never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee'. Though we forget all else, we must not forget that.

It has been a tremendous pleasure and honour for me to be here this evening, and to see all these amateur speakers at the head table. It has interested me very much. The Duke says the most important one comes first, and to see Sir Winston following me has caused me to feel very, very happy. But, Sir Winston, I should like to tell you that we who followed your leadership in the war have the greatest admiration for you. I remember a speech you made in June 1940 where you said: 'Let us therefore bring ourselves to our duties and bear ourselves in such a way that if the British Empire and the Commonwealth last for a thousand years they will still say, "This was their finest hour" '. We who heard that poured our hearts out for you with great affection, sir, and we still do.

I am very much honoured and wish to express my gratitude to you, to Mr. Attlee, and to Mr. Davies for having taken time out of your busy day to be here to-night.

I am confident that if we will continue to realize that in dealing with our allies we must have patience, wisdom and understanding, we can solve any of the problems in the cold war and face them with calm poise and steady purpose. For free men there is no other way to insure survival.

Thank you very, very much.

I now have the honour to propose a toast to the President of the English-Speaking Union, the Duke of Edinburgh, who will visit SHAPE two weeks from to-day. From then on he'll not only be an admiral, but also a NATO general with all the knowledge of SHAPE strategy.

THE ROME SPEECH*

*Before the Italian Center of Study for International Reconciliation. Rome, Italy, May 2, 1955. Source: Baird, A. Craig, ed., Representative American Speeches, 1955-56. New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1956, pp. 26-37.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION AND DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE [3]

ALFRED M. GRUENTHER [4]

General Alfred M. Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, military commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, gave this address before the Italian Center for the Study of International Reconciliation, Banco di Roma, Italy, on May 2, 1955.

His Rome audience, typical of many that Gruenther addressed in Europe since his appointment as Supreme Commander in July 1953, included the ambassadors and plenipotentiary ministers of fifteen countries of the Atlantic Pact, numerous representatives of many other countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa, numerous Italian diplomats, the highest military and civilian authorities, as well as other important political, economic, cultural, and journalistic representatives in Rome.

General Gruenther here followed his usual pattern of speech ideas and organization. He presented clearly his central theme—(1) today the free world is threatened by the Soviet Union and her satellites, and (2) NATO is our dependable defense. His speaking aim was to "sell" his program. His introduction was relatively long—to gain rapport with his somewhat skeptical audience.

To support his thesis he reasoned logically and factually with emotional appeals, to fear (of Russian aggression), to the spirit of Western unity, to love of religion, and to his personal prestige. He skillfully established his own good will, character, and sagacity.[5]

His language here, as in his other speeches, was concise, terse, easily comprehended, with a sprinkling of anecdotes and stories.

The General's unusual memory aids his delivery. Whether or not he refers to a manuscript, he is extempore, informal, brisk. His personality is friendly, humorous. His voice is easy to listen to, "crisp, metallic, sharp, but very pleasant, each word carefully enunciated, yet artfully preserving a Nebraska accent." [6]

[3] Text supplied through the courtesy of Lieutenant Colonel H. Glen Wood, special assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, with permission of General Alfred M. Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, for this reprint.

[4] For biographical note, see Appendix.

[5] Donald Dedmon, "Rhetorical Analysis of Four Representative Speeches of General Alfred M. Gruenther on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization," graduate thesis at the State University of Iowa, January 1956.

[6] T. H. White, New York *Times Magazine*, p 12, July 12, 1953.

General Gruenther announced his forthcoming retirement from the military command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and from the United States Army, in April 1956.

Eccellenze, Signore e Signori:

It is a great honor for me to be here this evening. I wish I could speak to you in Italian—in perfect Italian—with, of course, a slight Nebraska accent. But that would be a bit difficult for me. I beg of you to excuse me if I now proceed in English—also with a Nebraska accent.

I feel that it is a sad commentary on the state of the world that you should find it appropriate to have a military man talk to this distinguished group in the year 1955. Unfortunately, however, the question of security is our main preoccupation in this uneasy world.

I came to Italy for the first time in 1919 after we had just finished one world war. In fact I played a major role in ending that war. I was a cadet at the United States Military Academy, scheduled to be graduated in 1921. The state of the war got to be so crucial that the United States Government decided to graduate our class early, specifically on the first of November 1918. The Kaiser heard about this significant increase in Allied strength and eleven days later he surrendered. However, the United States Government now had 278 new second lieutenants on its hands, and there was little use for them. The decision was made to send us to Europe on a tour of observation and study. We visited Italy in the summer of 1919 absolutely convinced then that our profession would never be needed again in the new and better world which was just getting under way.

The next time I came to Italy was in September 1943, when there was a very great need for the military. We landed at Salerno as a part of General Clark's allied force, and in the eighteen months that followed I learned about war. My course of instruction lasted from the ninth of September 1943 until July 1945. By that time we had moved up the Italian peninsula

to Verona. If I did not know of the futility of war earlier, I certainly had it impressed upon me indelibly during my experiences in Italy. I want to say, at the same time, that we learned to respect the Italian people. The assistance we received from the Italian Resistance movement made a very significant contribution to the success of the Allied Italian campaign. I want to thank the people from Italy now for the magnificent assistance you gave us.

Then came VE-Day on May 8, 1945. From Verona, I moved on to Vienna where I joined our allies, the Soviets; I saw much of them for the next several months. In Vienna we concerned ourselves with the problems of occupation. I was confident that we had reached a good understanding and that international tension was a thing of the past. But in September 1945 those tensions began to reappear, and we experienced a chill in the Soviet climate.

Nevertheless, the Western Allies continued to demobilize, but the Soviets did not. Soon a series of frictions developed, culminating in such incidents as the Czechoslovakian coup and the Berlin blockade. As a result, a number of the former Allies found that they had to build a collective security organization in order to preserve the peace. It was called the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and that treaty was signed on April 4, 1949.

But NATO didn't make much progress until the free world was once again shocked by the advent of war—this time the invasion of South Korea in June 1950. That act of aggression made it crystal clear that rapid progress was needed in perfecting our defense organization.

General Eisenhower arrived in Europe in January 1951 to organize the defense of Europe from the northern tip of Norway to the eastern borders of Turkey—a distance of seven thousand kilometers. He came as the servant of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization—twelve nations then, now fourteen. I was General Eisenhower's Chief of Staff. He arrived in Paris on the seventh of January 1951. After a three day survey in Paris he started his trips; first to Brussels, then The Hague, then to Denmark, Norway, England, Portugal, and Italy. We arrived in Rome on the eighteenth of January 1951.

I would like to tell you what the situation was then. First of all, the morale of the free world was at a very low ebb. We had practically no strength. When General Eisenhower returned to Paris from this trip on the twenty-fourth of January 1951, he had a meeting of his commanders. I can remember the conference very well, because there was present one very sour-looking officer, a general, who seemed to be rather unhappy about the state of the world. General Eisenhower asked the question: "What do you think the Soviets would need to move to the English Channel?" This despondent general said, "General, they need only one thing—boots!" This was his cynical way of saying that we had no defense worthy of the name.

It is now four years and a few months since that conference took place. I can tell you that since that time our forces throughout our area have increased from three to four times numerically from what they were then, and when one considers the question of effectiveness, the increase is greater still. I can assure you that nobody can march to the Channel now by just putting his boots on. It would require more men and more air support to move the men in those boots. Most important of all, the free world has become convinced that the only answer to this problem is collective security. If we had had a NATO organization in 1939, even with the defects that ours has now—and I can assure you it still has many—I'm convinced there would have been no World War II. If we could have served notice at that time that an attack on one nation would be considered as an attack on all, Hitler would have been dissuaded from attacking.

In any case that is what the free nations have decided on; that is the goal toward which they are building. They are now absolutely dedicated to the idea that no nation—be it large or small—is sufficient unto itself in this jet-atomic age. That is our doctrine, and therein lies our greatest progress and our greatest strength.

We now have a going concern. We have an over-all headquarters at SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe] in Paris, and four subordinate headquarters. We have a northern command at Oslo that has for its mission the defense of Norway and Denmark; a headquarters at Fontainebleau for the defense of the critical central area; a headquarters at Naples for the defense of Italy, Greece and Turkey; and a headquarters at Malta for the protection of the vital Mediterranean sea-lines of communication.

Those headquarters study the problems of not what a possible enemy may decide to do, but what he *could* do. We refer to that capacity in military jargon as "capabilities." We do not try to assess enemy intentions; that would be very dangerous. This is what we find: That the Soviet bloc now constitutes some eight hundred million people—the most powerful empire in the history of the world. From the standpoint of military strength, it has in the Soviet Union itself approximately 175 infantry divisions comprising 2.5 million men. From the standpoint of air power, it has some twenty thousand Soviet operational aircraft. From the standpoint of naval power it has a relatively weak surface navy, but a strong submarine fleet. To give you just an idea of Soviet naval power, I can cite that the Soviet Navy now has approximately 350 submarines of all classes, big and little, good and bad. To get an idea of what 350 submarines mean, please bear in mind that when World War II began, the Germans had approximately seventy-five submarines. That does not mean that the Soviets are five times as good as the Germans were then, because the Soviets do not have the "know-how"; but it is an indication of where they are placing their emphasis.

In addition to the Soviet forces, there are between seventy-five and eighty satellite divisions, not nearly as good as the Soviet ones; but the Soviets know that and they are doing their best to improve them. The satellites have between two and three thousand aircraft, again not nearly as good as the Soviets' but they are improving. The satellite navies are relatively small and ineffective.

Those are the forces of the Soviet bloc. They are the forces which we at SHAPE use as the basis for our planning. We notice that the Soviet armed forces are constantly increasing in effectiveness. We do not say that these forces are ever going to be used. To speculate in that field is not our job. Our task is to plan to make an act of aggression by those forces so expensive that it will never take place. In other words, our prime objective is to prevent a third world war.

Yesterday was May Day in Moscow. May Day has traditionally been a celebration for the workers. However, in Moscow for the last several years, it has turned into an armed forces demonstration. Last year the Soviets showed some new airplanes; it was expected they would show some new planes yesterday. But it rained very, very heavily and so no new planes appeared. I think it is well, however, for us to bear in mind that if we had had one of these Italian sunshiny days yesterday, you would have had big headlines today concerning new types of airplanes the Soviets had perfected within the last year. I mention that not to create any fear in your hearts, but merely to bring to your attention some of the grim realities that we're facing.

We at SHAPE have been given the problem of planning for the defense of Europe. Our mission is twofold: to defend our European territory—all of it; and secondly, in the event of an all-out act of aggression, to defeat the enemy. Notice that I do not say to "win," because I'm convinced that if there should be a third world war there would be no winner. However, it is essential that we be able to defeat an enemy.

The next question is how well could we do now? Are we good enough to defend this seven-thousand-kilometer perimeter against an all-out attack now? Considering where we were four years ago, it would be nothing short of a miracle if we had developed that much strength in such a short period of time. Our forces were at a pitifully low level in 1951. In the year before General Eisenhower came over here—1950—the budget of the European nations for defense was approximately five billion dollars. Last year—1954—the budget in those same countries had gone up to $13.5 billion. However, it takes time

to implement defense measures, and so we're not yet strong enough to be certain of resisting successfully an all-out attack. Therefore, with respect to the first mission I have described—to defend our European territory—we cannot give that assurance yet. It was for that reason that when General Eisenhower was the supreme commander, he recommended a German contribution.

A week from today in Paris, Signor Martino will be present at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Paris when Germany is admitted to NATO. As your chairman has stated, Germany will become the fifteenth member of NATO. We will then get, in due course, a German military contribution. That contribution will consist of some thirteen hundred tactical aircraft, twelve army divisions; and some naval craft, for use generally in the Baltic area. When the German forces are effective, which will be in three to four years from now, we will be able to defend Europe even against an all-out act of aggression. That is the military reason why we have constantly advocated this German contribution.

The admission of Germany to NATO, however, has more than military significance. It is the beginning of a new Europe. We all have high hopes for the Europe which is going to evolve from this arrangement. I think the Italians should feel particularly proud of the role that Italy has played to bring it about. Certainly, Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi was one of the small group that sponsored the idea initially. It was he who spoke to General Eisenhower—he and Count Sforza—in January 1951, when General Eisenhower came here to Rome. Both of these distinguished Italians had long shared the concept of a united Europe. I'm sorry they cannot be present at the Palais de Chaillot a week from today.

I have said that we cannot be sure of accomplishing our first mission—that is, the defense of Europe—now, but that when we get the German contribution we shall be. Because I have said it will take three or four years before that German contribution is effective, you may have in mind the question: "Doesn't that mean that we are in mortal peril during those three to four years?" Although there is no exact answer to that question, I'd like to make an observation on it. At this time—the second of May 1955—our side has a tremendous advantage over the Soviet bloc in the field of long-range airpower. A little over a year ago an American plane, the B-47, of which there are many in the American Air Force, flew from Maine over to England in four hours and thirty-four minutes. That is an average speed of about eleven hundred kilometers an hour.

At this stage of technological development, there is no answer to that plane. The Soviets do not have an answer to that plane, and we do not have an answer either. We have a significant number of those planes. For that reason, if a war should break out today, and if my most pessimistic assumption should prove correct—that the aggressor should overrun Europe—he would still be defeated because he does not have an answer to these long-range airplanes. Even if it had been a sunshiny day in Moscow yesterday, the answer would not have been shown. . . . There might have been new planes displayed, and I'm sure there would have been. But it will take some time before the Soviets can get them to Detroit, Pittsburgh and Chicago, which they must be able to do before they can defeat us. I do not want to say that the time is not coming when they can do that, but what I do want to say is that the time has not yet arrived when they can surpass us in long-range air power. Moreover, if we are vigilant that day will never arrive. In other words I do not feel that the situation is at all hopeless. We must maintain our courage. I don't want to appear complacent about this matter, but at the same time I don't want to be hysterical either.

I know that in a group of this kind it is unnecessary to say that security consists of more—much more—than just the military strength. It consists of economic and psychological elements as well. The economic element speaks for itself. However, I'd like to devote a few moments to the psychological aspects.

We have made tremendous progress in this alliance of ours—much greater success than we ever thought possible four years ago. We are much farther along than the estimates which we made in April 1951. That does not mean, however, that the

path for the future is going to be a smooth one. My belief is that the next four years are going to be harder than the last four years, and largely because of the difficulty in solving the psychological problems.

We will have the problem of creating a public opinion stout-hearted enough to continue through this cold war no matter how long it lasts, and it may last a long, long time. Our people are peace-loving, and it is very difficult for them to keep up their enthusiasm for defense burdens that are so heavy —and may grow even heavier. There is also a very strong peace offensive being waged now by the Communists. In this campaign the Communists are attempting by neutralist propaganda to divide and split our alliance. The Soviets are very clever in this propaganda business.

When I left Italy in the summer of 1945, I went to Vienna, and there for the next four months I saw a great deal of the Soviets. There I met one of the ablest officers I have ever known in any service. He was a Russian, aged forty-two, a four-star general. He was the number two man under Marshal Koniev who, as you saw in the pictures in your papers today, stood in the front row at the Moscow parade yesterday. I was the number two man under General Clark at the time, and so I saw General Koniev's deputy very often. We saw each other three or four times a week. Over a period of time he outlined his philosophy to me, and it can be summarized as something like this: "You come from a democracy. You're proud of the freedoms which you have. However, you will live to find that those freedoms are divisive. You ask your people to pass on issues which are so complicated that they cannot possibly decide whether the black answer is right or the white answer. And you send them to the polls to vote on those subjects. You're going to find that as time goes on in this jet age—he did not know about the atomic part then—you're going to find that they cannot reach sound decisions. We, in the Soviet Union, however, have solved that problem by appointing wise men at the head who tell our people what to do. We don't ask them. We don't have these foolish voting contests to decide these issues. You might just as well ask your people to vote on whether the Einstein theory is correct or not. What do they know about it?"

His second thesis was this: "You have religion. What a wonderful invention for the capitalists! Of course you want to tell the people to get their reward in heaven, so you can exploit them on this earth. You don't want to give them their just reward here. You have even gone so far as to devise a commandment, 'Thou shalt not steal,' so that they don't get that reward here."

His third thesis was this: "In order to make any government work, the people have to support it energetically, and that requires a very extensive educational campaign. It is necessary to start educating citizens at a very early age."

It is significant that that very officer has been made the head of what is called in the Soviet Union the "Main Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense." He has about two thousand assistants, many of them university graduates, to help him. His job is to educate the young men of the Soviet armed forces; and because there is a turnover of about two million of them a year, he has a sizable audience. Also, knowing him as I do, knowing how dedicated he is to his cause, I'm sure he's doing a very effective job.

To show you how effective their system is on these young men, I'd like to give you some examples. Mrs. Gruenther and I have two sons, and both of them have served in Korea. One of them was seriously wounded there. That young man, as the head of an infantry company, advanced almost to the Yalu River. Whenever he advanced, he had air support and artillery support and all the assistance that a powerful nation could afford in order to be saving human lives. He was fighting against men, Communists, who had no air support, and when I say no air support, I mean not even one plane was ever put in front of a Communist advance. What did that mean? It meant that they suffered losses five, six, seven times the losses that my son's company had. But those Communist soldiers had a dedication, or a sense of fanaticism, if that is a better explanation, because of their indoctrination, and they kept coming on and on in spite of their terrible losses.

A year ago today we were in the last stages of a struggle in Indo-China where he had at Dien Bien Phu some twelve thousand members of the gallant French Union surrounded by thirty to forty thousand Communist forces. The Communists again had no air support, and again they took terrible losses, but on and on and on they came.

We must find an answer to that fanaticism, but our answer would never—must never—be the same as theirs. However, the problem we face was outlined by this former Soviet friend of mine. We must match their fanaticism by a dedication to our way of life. There is no reason why we should not achieve it. We have everything. We have religion—a wonderful spiritual strength—a sense of freedom, and above all, the dignity of the individual. We have everything that men should be willing to fight for in a hot war or cold war. Our job, as I see it, is to inspire these 400 million people in NATO to be able to continue the struggle, to make the sacrifices which are going to be necessary for an enduring peace. We must understand our responsibilities as well as our privileges.

I do not have the answer to the problem. I feel that I'm much in the same position of an American comedian, who a few years ago said he had the solution to the submarine problem. When asked for this answer, he replied: "Well, it's a very simple thing. All you do is bring the ocean to a boil; that will force the submarines to the top, and when they get there you knock them off!" "Well," someone asked, "how do you get the ocean to a boil?" "Oh," he answered, "now just a second. All I was doing here was outlining the general principle. It's up to you to work out the details."

I, as he did, am submitting the general principle to you, in the belief that this very distinguished group can work out the details. It is, of course, not a military problem. However, unless we solve this problem of public participation, we are not going to succeed in this struggle.

I'd like now to move on to another point. NATO has been accused of being aggressive. That is simply not true. At my headquarters we make the plans for the defense of this part of the world. I can promise you that there has never been as

much as one sentence written that envisages that we will start a war. In fact, we go on the assumption that we will have to absorb the first blow. That is a major disadvantage, but I'm sure that it is the right approach. However, we must counter these Soviet charges. For when we convince our people that this is a defensive organization—that NATO is an instrument for peace—I'm sure that we can get them to make the necessary sacrifices and to have the necessary wisdom and perseverance to support an alliance of this character.

No military alliance of this kind has ever succeeded before in peacetime. There were times in the past four years when people said ours would not work. One public figure characterized it as "an administrative monstrosity." My answer to that is that we have made it work. In this, NATO could be likened to the bumblebee. You could prove by logic and aerodynamics that the bumblebee cannot fly—his body is too heavy and his wings are too small. But the bumblebee is too determined to be deterred by logic and aerodynamics, so he goes ahead and flies anyway.

We in NATO have not been deterred by our difficulties, either. We have been able to make this organization succeed. One of the greatest tributes that has been paid to our effectiveness is the fact that the Soviet Union has made the dissolution of NATO the number one objective of Soviet foreign policy. A year ago they even offered to join it, although there may have been a reason why they made the offer on April Fool's day.

I'm not cynical about any efforts for lasting peace. On the contrary, I'm optimistic. I say that our statesmen can find an answer if they receive continuing popular support. We must continue to develop our position of strength, and above all, to improve our unity. I have seen this organization grow from the time it was a gleam in the planner's eye, and to me it is my whole life. I have seen it succeed in spite of numerous frustrations. I'm convinced, in spite of the difficulties still to be overcome, it will thrive.

When General Eisenhower called our staff together four years ago, he told them this: "The outstanding characteristic of an allied staff officer is an ability to have a ready smile." That

was his way of stating that friends could work well together; that friends could solve their problems if they had mutual confidence in each other. We have that characteristic in our headquarters, and all of them, including Admiral Fechtoler's headquarters in Naples, are all very happy headquarters. Of course, it is not always easy. Sitting outside of my office is an American sergeant who gets more money than an Italian colonel of thirty years' service. That is the type of irritation we run into, but the Italian colonel feels that he is dedicated to his cause, and he overlooks that type of irritation. With that sort of spirit —with that sort of dedication—it is not possible to contemplate failure.

I want to express my gratitude to the Italian people and the Italian Government for the loyal support they have always given us. With such unity, such understanding, such perseverance, no power, however menacing, will be able to prevail against this alliance.

Mille grazie a tutti per la vostra gentile attenzione. (Thank you very much for your very kind attention.)

APPENDIX E

TEXTS OF TWO REPRESENTATIVE SPEECHES DELIVERED BY GENERAL ALFRED M. GRUENTHER AS PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL AMERICAN RED CROSS

RED CROSS CONVENTION DINNER, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA,
MAY 19, 1958

The colorful convention dinner was presided over by Convention Chairman Sydney G. Walton. The invocation was given by the Rt. Rev. Monsignor William J. Flanagan, Archdiocese of San Francisco. Musical highlights of the evening included Scottish airs by the kilted Sixth Army Pipe Band under the direction of Sgt. Alvin L. Pierce and selections by the University of California Glee Club directed by Robert P. Commanday. Ray Hackett's Orchestra furnished background dinner music. The feature of the dinner was an address by American Red Cross President Gruenther. In introducing General Gruenther, Mr. Walton referred to him as "our own intercontinental missile . . . only Sputnik is circling the earth faster."

ADDRESS BY GEN. ALFRED M. GRUENTHER: Youth's Challenge

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Guests, and Fellow Red Crossers:

This morning, in the very dramatic opening of the Convention--presented so effectively by the chapters in the Bay Area--we saw "Sally Jones" explain rather pathetically that she was confused about what Red Cross means with respect to service. Sally, a symbolic figure representing the average American adult, did recall clearly, however, that she once belonged to the Junior Red Cross. But she didn't seem to understand the basic humanitarian concept of the organization. I think it is well for us to ponder this evening whether or not we are partially responsible for Sally's confusion. With that objective in mind I should like to discuss some aspects of our Junior Red Cross problem.

I am sure most of you know that the organization came into being in September 1917, five months after the United States entered World War I. It was initiated by President Wilson to give the young people of that time a chance to do something in the war effort.

Since then, Junior Red Cross has been building its important programs of community, national, and international service. Between 1946 and 1957 its membership increased from 19 million to slightly over 22 million. Twenty-two million of anything would seem to be a large number in which one could take considerable satisfaction. However, in my 16-1/2 months' service with the Red Cross, I have been increasingly distressed by certain trends that lie hidden within the apparent Junior Red Cross success. Our current 22 million Junior Red Cross members, we find, are

60 percent of the total school population. The 19 million members in 1946 constituted 74 percent of the total school enrollment.

Moreover, the number of schools enrolled in Junior Red Cross has dropped sharply in this period. In 1946, 124,000 schools were enrolled; in 1957 only 67,000. The chapters having a Junior Red Cross program fell from 78 percent in 1946 to 52 percent in 1957.

I think it is advisable to consider just what these statistics mean to us from the standpoint of the American position in the world, and also to compare our situation in the field of youth activities with that of the U.S.S.R.

At national headquarters, as some of you know, we are conducting a study of youth's place in Red Cross. The study has been in progress for several months, with the assistance of Dr. Chris Sower of Michigan State University. We have sent out to many of you questionnaires that are now being analyzed. I hope that within the next several months we will be able to make specific suggestions for modernizing our youth programs. However, I am already convinced that the youth of today, properly selected, properly trained, and properly supervised, can make a significant contribution to every one of the Red Cross services.

For example there is the field of safety. Last year 40,000 persons died in automobile accidents and 1,400,000 were injured. Red Cross has remedial activities in the form of first aid programs and driver training, in both of which juniors could be of real service.

Another great cause of accidental death is water accidents. Last year 6,000 people died in these. Most water tragedies occur at beaches and other such recreation spots, but no small numbers happen in places you would hardly suspect. Some 350 of last year's 6,000 drownings occurred in farm ponds. And these ponds are increasing at the rate of 80,000 a year. Just recently, the Soil Conservation Service of the Agriculture Department asked Red Cross for increased help in preventing farm pond drownings. Here, as in the water safety field generally, the role of Junior Red Crossers could be a very important one. Many of you have seen the pamphlet Teaching Johnny To Swim, which is one of our first materials directed toward solving the problem of accidents at the "old swimming hole" and in home pools.

Juniors Red Cross members, I believe, could also make an important contribution in combating juvenile delinquency. I have been shocked to learn that since 1950 major crimes have been increasing at a rate four times faster than the increase in population. In the year just past, 1957, there were 3,000,000 major crimes committed, and almost half of those were committed by young people who have not yet reached their eighteenth birthday.

Crime and its prevention now cost us twenty billion dollars a year. Next to our national defense budget, there is no other item that

we pay as much for. So, simply from the standpoint of economic interests--disregarding for the moment the moral values--it is obvious that we must do something to develop corrective measures. My own feeling is that we do not have enough participation in such programs as the Junior Red Cross. As a result, Junior Red Cross members are not having the advantage of participation in a community and world-wide service activity that was created especially for them.

Good citizenship is a priceless asset and one which must be fostered at this critical period in world history. At least part of the reason for special alertness in this respect can be inferred from a look on the other side of the hill to see what other people are doing. I move for that purpose to the U.S.S.R.

At the end of the war, I was in Vienna from July to November 1945. In my capacity as deputy to General Clark, I saw my Russian opposite number several times each week. All of us then thought that we were at the beginning of a new and better world. We believed that there should never be again such a thing as danger of war. We spent much time in working out the details of such things as clubs for Allied personnel to develop better understanding.

My Soviet counterpart in these negotiations was a four-star general, age 42, a colonel-general in the Soviet Army. He was an able officer and dedicated to the Communist ideology. He was at his desk every day at 10 o'clock in the morning, and he was still there at 2 o'clock the next morning. Since we were closely associated in our work, we discussed the world frequently. I can remember very well that in some of our talks he spoke of the divisiveness of liberty and how the very institutions we had set up in this country to safeguard our freedom were going to be our undoing. He said, "You are going to live to see the day that you wish you had a very strong government such as ours. We put good men at the top and then we tell the people what to do. You, on the other hand, entrust those major decisions to a ballot-box type of operation. Thus, under your system the people make important decisions, but they do not understand what it is all about." He went on, "Of course, you are very clever in the way that you fool the people. You constantly hold out hope for reward in the next world. In that way you are able to exploit the working man. In fact, you have been clever enough to devise a commandment, 'Thou shalt not steal,' so that the working man does not get what is coming to him in this world. But the day is going to come when you are going to find that this will not work. You will need, first of all, a much stronger form of government. Secondly, you must start the indoctrination of young people at a very early age. They will then carry you over most of your obstacles."

The more I have studied the Soviet system of youth training the more I am inclined to agree with my former military associate that the Russians have perfected an effective organization in the youth field. These boys here on this stage--the Boy Scouts and Cub Scouts--would, in

the Soviet Union, belong to an organization called the Young Pioneers. Then, when they reached the age of 14, most of them would join a group known as the Komsomol. The Komsomol, which would carry them through from 14 until 26, has the following objectives:

> To encourage participation of the youth in the state and in economic construction.
> To establish cultural centers.
> To strengthen student discipline, to promote the ideological-political training of youth through political education, propaganda work, and political agitation.
> Actively to promote atheism.
> To encourage and organize sports program for youths.

Young people who prove themselves most outstanding during their service in the Komsomol are then selected for membership in the Communist Party.

Competition for selection by the party is very keen. Of the 200,000,000 people in the Soviet Union, only slightly more than 7,000,000 are allowed to join. The party gets the cream of the crop.

However, whether or not they are considered potential party material, all young people--both the Young Pioneers and the Komsomol--actively work in the field of political indoctrination. The Soviets thus develop a well-disciplined, dedicated group.

But even so, they have their troubles, too. One Komsomol member named Mikhail served as a godfather in a church baptism. This led the newspaper Komsomolskaya Pravda to reproach him in these words:

> Yes, Mikhail, you did not act as a Komsomol member; a Komsomol member must keep to the principles which originate in a lofty ideal consciousness and a stable, socialist world view, with which the Communist Party arms Soviet youth. Our world view is a Marxist and materialist world view. It is the most advanced and the only scientific one.

The same paper on July 8, 1956, took occasion to criticize a young lady Komsomol member for marrying in the church. She was required to explain why she did, and she submitted this explanation:

> My grandmother, who brought me up, insisted on it, and besides, a wedding comes only once in one's life, and I was so anxious that everything should be beautiful.

What action was taken in her case is not known. The mere fact that the paper recorded her explanation, however, may be assumed to have been a tacit rebuke.

I have pointed to these two cases as an indication of the careful supervision of youth--especially in the field of promoting atheism--being taken by a country that is playing a very important part in our uneasy world. Moreover, it will be playing an increasingly important part for the rest of the lives of everybody here.

In the dedication that the Soviets encourage among youth they are creating a very formidable strength. This is an important factor in the cold war now in progress. It is also a valuable element whenever the Kremlin decides to give high priority to a program such as industrial production or emphasis on scientific training.

We in the Free World must secure our dedication by voluntary methods. Whether we like it or not, the mantle of world leadership has fallen on our shoulders. The fate of our civilization will depend, in large measure, on our ability to discharge this heavy burden. That is why I am so eager to see the concept of service developed at an early age through the medium of the Junior Red Cross.

In addition to the element of service, our leadership role requires that we as a nation, broaden our understanding of world affairs. We have made good progress in this field in the last 20 years, but in many respects our outlook toward other peoples--their cultures and traditions--is still somewhat parochial.

An example of a problem in understanding that confronts us today is provided by India, where, last fall, I had the pleasure of attending the International Red Cross Conference. India is a country of 380,000,000 people whose standard of living is indescribably low. Average life expectancy is 32 years and the national income is $58 per person per year as against ours of $2,050.

Of course, one may say that India is unique. But if you draw an arc from Japan through Burma, Thailand, India, and Pakistan to Afghanistan, you include the homelands of a billion and a half of the world's 2,700,000,000 people. And of that billion and a half, more than 50 percent go to bed hungry every night.

If a significant number of people in that part of the world should come under Communist domination, we as a nation would be in real trouble from a standpoint of security and also from a standpoint of the ideals that we and our partners in freedom consider so sacred.

Our task is to be able to communicate with those people, to make them understand that our beliefs and theirs are the same when it comes to the preservation of peace and to service to mankind.

Among the many things Americans will need for greater communication with other peoples is more training in languages. Some experience of the Foreign Service Institute--on whose advisory group I serve--will

be pertinent in this connection. The Institute is conducted by the Department of State to educate young men and young women who are entering the diplomatic service. They go to college, apply to come into the Foreign Service, and if they are accepted, they study at the Institute for 4 months before being sent out on their first assignment at some foreign station.

Obviously, languages are an important part of the qualifications for the Foreign Service. But, alas, of the 8,000 young men and women applying in recent years and otherwise very well qualified, only 300 of them had any ability in any foreign language whatsoever. Many candidates must be accepted without language qualification; then follows a long, painful, and expensive process of teaching them a language.

By way of comparison, in the Soviet Union there are 10,000,000 people studying English and 4,000,000 studying German. In our country 8,000 are studying Russian. The Soviets can develop such mass education programs because they are a disciplined people and because their youth organizations have developed a stern dedication to the state. The Soviet educational system has the primary duty of training the nation's youth for the purpose of furthering the state's interests; the Soviet student, in short, prepares himself to serve the state in whatever capacity he is assigned. He is told what to do, and he does it. It is an evil system but an effective one.

I am not advocating that we have anything like the Soviet educational program. I have merely outlined their situation with respect to youth training so that we can realize better the type of problem that confronts us.

During my 6 years in Europe, I traveled from the northern end of Norway to the eastern borders of Turkey many times. As I visited these countries, I was always tremendously interested to find out why ancient civilizations in some of these areas had disappeared. I found that historians generally are of the opinion that they disappeared because the people became more engrossed with the material aspects of their lives than with the spiritual side. Or, stated in another way, they lost their community spirit.

One by one these civilizations faded. Now all you can find of many of them are ruins, 50 feet or more beneath the surface of the earth.

A Far Eastern philosopher 6 months ago took a trip to the Soviet Union and asked many persons there, "What is the object of your society?" The invariable reply was, "Our object is to serve the state so that we will build up a system that will surpass that of the United States."

The philosopher later came to the United States and spent 3 months here. He put his question to many Americans and, of course, got various answers. The replies added up, however, to the impression that we in the

United States consider that the number one objective of our society is to improve our standard of living.

Naturally, I have no objection to the improvement of our standard of living. But I am sure you will agree with me that it is not an end in itself. Throughout history there has never been a great civilization that has been able to use a great amount of leisure successfully. In other words, most, as they have gotten the higher standard of living and the leisure that went with it, began to decline, and they are now subjects of history books--and Ancient History at that.

I don't think that this will ever happen to us--I am sure it won't. But I do say that if crime continues to increase at four times the rate of the population increase; if half of our major crimes are committed by young people 18 years and younger; if we fail to teach to young people the nobility and grandeur of voluntary service--we could be well on the way to serious trouble.

I think we can solve this problem. I would hope, as one element of the solution, that all chapters will take immediate steps to improve the effectiveness of the Junior Red Cross programs. In that way we will not only be performing a great service for the Red Cross, but an even greater one for the United States and for the entire Free World.

It has been my pleasure to visit a large number of chapters since the first of January 1957. I want you to know that I am most favorably impressed with the seriousness with which the chapters and the volunteers undertake their work.

Slightly over a year ago I spoke to a group of volunteers in this city. Afterwards I was told by a good friend of mine--a volunteer--that I tended to glorify the volunteers too much, and that this attitude might create frictions between the professional staff and the volunteers.

I want you all to know that I still prefer my weakness; I have a profound admiration for volunteers. I intend to continue in that frame of mind, because I think the job you are doing is a tremendous one.

I am prouder than ever that I belong to the Red Cross. The prestige of the organization is very high, and it increases daily. With the fine leadership I see being shown in the overwhelming majority of our chapters, I am absolutely certain that we are going to be able to make the contribution that our spiritual heritage demands of us.

Only by wrestling with our problems forthrightly, imaginatively, and in humble determination to find wise solutions, will we be able to maintain our concepts of freedom and human dignity in a highly competitive and troubled world.

It has been a very great pleasure for me to be able to meet with you this evening. Our convention started off well. I am confident that your active participation during the next 2 days will make it the best ever.

Good luck to all of you. God bless you.

AFL-CIO MURRAY-GREEN AWARD TO GENERAL GRUENTHER
NEW YORK, APRIL 4, 1963

No one can receive an award of this kind without being deeply grateful and, at the same time, considerably embarrassed. No one person in the Red Cross can be good enough to justify all of the praise which I have received this evening. The effectiveness of the American Red Cross has come about because of the devoted service of our two million volunteers and the relatively small career staff. They are the ones who should receive the Murray-Green Award. On their behalf I am happy to accept this honor.

With the consent of your organization, the $5,000 check which I have just received, will be placed in a special African-Asian Red Cross Fund. It will be used to bring members of the newer Red Cross Societies on study visits to this country. Transportation expenses will be defrayed from this fund. While the representatives are in the United States they will be guests of the American Red Cross, nationally and in the chapters visited.

There are now 88 Red Cross Societies in the world. At the end of World War II there were only 56 societies. This gives an indication of the numbers of new societies and of the magnitude of the problem faced by the emerging countries as they attempt to develop community services. These study visits can be very important to this development.

The AFL-CIO Community Services has had considerable experience in this field--First Aid, Home Nursing, Disaster Services--and we shall call on you to help us. There is another area where you can be of great assistance, and this is in the development of Blood Programs.

I have inspected blood programs in almost 25 countries. Once you leave Europe and the North American continent, most blood programs are grossly inadequate.

As you know, the American Red Cross operates the largest blood bank in the world. Last year we collected approximately 2-1/2 million pints of blood, constituting about 45% of all of the blood used in this country. From this experience, the Red Cross has developed a considerable know-how.

But we still have much to learn. We have had study visitors from many Red Cross Societies to study our blood program in action in the hope that this process would assist them to organize adequate blood

programs in their own countries. I regret to say that, in general, we have not been as successful as we would like to be. The visitors have often been over-impressed with the gadgets in a blood center. Many of them conclude that if they could only have this equipment their own blood programs would be successful.

You in the AFL-CIO Community Services know very well that equipment is not what makes a blood program function. What is needed is the motivation to convince an individual to put out his arm and allow someone to put a needle in it to withdraw blood for a person he will probably never know nor see. You have supported the Red Cross Blood Program magnificently, and you have had great success in motivating your members to donate blood. The method that succeeds in Washington, D.C., or in Los Angeles may be worthless in Djakarta, Indonesia. But I am sure that by working together we can solve this problem and thus eliminate much suffering in the world, because blood is such an important factor in clinical medicine.

The 88 Red Cross Societies constitute the League of Red Cross Societies which has its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. There is a meeting of the Executive Committee of the League every September, and a meeting of the entire Board of Governors every other September. At such meetings we are not concerned with ideological subjects. Still, the impact of the two major conflicting philosophies in the world today cannot be avoided entirely.

It has caused me considerable distress to find that in many cases our motives are misunderstood. On several occasions I have had people say to me--people who are in no sense unfriendly to us--something like this: "Yes, we know you are against Communism because it is a materialistic doctrine. But aren't you in the United States materialistic? Isn't making money one of your prime motives? And don't you exploit the underdog in order to make these profits?"

Naturally, we disagree with this type of charge. But there is a big difference between disagreeing and convincing other people. Of course, there is regrettably a certain amount of exploitation in our country, but certainly large-scale exploitation is well in our past. The answer to any remnant which may still exist is definitely not Communism. The answer is to correct the defects in our system so that its effectiveness will continue to increase. Our philosophy is based on the freedom of the individual, but this carries with it a high degree of individual responsibility. Frequently, the responsibility is neglected. After all, in a population of 188 million people it is difficult to convince that number of individuals that each one must carry his share of the load. This is where I feel that voluntary organizations such as the AFL-CIO Community Services, the American Red Cross, and many many others too can play an important role. The concept of serving voluntarily in order to improve the lot of distressed individuals is a noble one. Furthermore, it is the very heart of individual responsibility.

Whether we like it or not, we have an even heavier national responsibility on our shoulders. We have an obligation to furnish leadership for the Free World. This is a tremendous burden. It involves not only a financial responsibility, but also one which may be more difficult to meet: that of understanding the cultures of other peoples, their problems and their aspirations.

In carrying out this task our wealth is often a handicap. We are the richest nation in the world, and that fact of life frequently creates a certain amount of envy and resentment. To deal with that aspect requires great understanding and sympathy.

Two and a half years ago a member of the American Red Cross Board of Governors and I were in the U.S.S.R. We were courteously received, and we enjoyed the visit very much. As for me, I came away with an impression of discipline. I was tremendously interested in the youth programs in the U.S.S.R. We have approximately 22 million young people in our Junior Red Cross activities, so I was eager to see how the Soviets handle their youth programs. I would say that, generally speaking, they handle them very well. Not only does one get an impression of stern discipline, but one is also struck by the very conscious effort to instill a tremendous love of country into the hearts of all young people. And I would also say that I believe they are successful in this endeavor.

Along with this indoctrination, they also promote a strong antipathy toward capitalism. They never speak of our system as the Free Enterprise or the Incentive system. It is always "Imperialist Capitalism," and always stated as though it is something sinister and evil, born of greed and avarice.

While I have indicated some of the strengths of the other side, I do not want to end this talk without making it crystal clear that they have their problems and some are very serious ones. On balance, there is no question but that democracy is on the march, and that Communism is retreating.

While we were in Moscow, we stayed at the National Hotel which faces Red Square. From my room I could look out and see the mausoleum in which lay the bodies of Lenin and Stalin. When we went through the mausoleum, we watched a long line of approximately 10,000 Soviet citizens follow us. We could not tell what they were thinking, but certainly there was an attitude of respect and reverence.

The day after we visited the mauseleum was Sunday and we were scheduled to catch a plane leaving Moscow at 7:30 that morning. We were told to have our bags ready by 5:30, since the trip to the airport is a fairly long one. My baggage was ready by 5:15 and I stood on the small balcony outside my room taking a last look at Red Square. I was very much surprised to see that already approximately a thousand people were

lined up to go through the mausoleum. And it does not open until 11 o'clock on Sundays. While I was standing there three buses came up and discharged their passengers. As they oriented themselves and saw the crowd, they actually ran to get into the line. Why? I don't know. They were not going any place for approximately five and one half hours.

Just imagine what those people and the other 220 million people of the U.S.S.R. thought some months later when they were told that Stalin was a traitor and a criminal. His body was removed from the mausoleum and buried in a small grave behind it. Just a month ago when the 10th Anniversary of Stalin's death took place, there was not a single mention of it in any Soviet newspaper.

Today as I left Washington I passed the Lincoln Memorial. Nearly all of us have seen it. Just think of the shock it would be to all of us if our President should suddenly announce that Lincoln had been a criminal, a traitor, and that all Lincoln memorials were to be destroyed.

Then for a moment let us consider Berlin. There is a 28-mile wall which divides the two cities. But it is only a part of a longer wall--one 750 miles long--between the East and the West. The purpose of that wall, the concrete and barbed wire sections, is not to prevent an attack. Its purpose is to keep the people within an earthly paradise--the one under which our grandchildren will be living according to Mr. Khrushchev. But Mr. Khrushchev faces a problem as he tries to explain why it is necessary to keep people within those boundaries.

Just as these illustrations represent serious problems for him, they are advantages for us, if we can continue to increase our dedication to the ideals in which we believe.

I want to make it clear that I am not trying to stir up hatred against any other nation or philosophy of government. I am not so much interested in what we are <u>against</u> as I am in what we are <u>for</u>.

Earlier this evening my beloved wife, Grace, was introduced. You are also aware that Lt. General Garrison H. Davidson, who is directly to our front, is married to my sister. What you don't know, however, is that these two individuals--Grace and Gar--belong to a very active organization. When Grace and I were married 41 years ago, I took her to our home in Nebraska. After she was there a few days, she said: "If you don't mind my saying so, your family is a very cocky one." I expressed great shock, and begged her to keep her views to herself. But she refused to comply, and within a week or so, she had organized the Anti-Gruenther Society. I regret to tell you that the society has flourished during the last 41 years. She is now the President, and Gar Davidson is the Vice President.

I told you at the beginning of my talk that I was embarrassed to receive the Murray-Green Award this evening. That is still true. However, I must confess to you that I did get a certain measure of

satisfaction from the highly flattering things which were said about me, because I could see the consternation that it was creating in the minds of the President and Vice President of the Anti-Gruenther Society.

I regret that the President of the Pro-Gruenther Society, my brother Homer, is not here tonight. Homer is a member of the White House staff, a holdover from the previous administration. I think he is afraid to leave Washington for fear they might put someone else in his place. His office is in the East wing of the White House. After listening to that wonderful message from President Kennedy this evening, I concluded that Homer must have been able to get over to the West side of the White House earlier today. I would not go so far as to say that the message is forgery, but neither am I going to take a chance on verifying its authenticity.

This has been a wonderful evening for us--that is, for the Red Cross and for the two members of the Pro-Gruenther Society who are present. Best wishes to all of you, and good luck to the AFL-CIO Community Services.

APPENDIX F

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION ON GENERAL

ALFRED M. GRUENTHER

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

ALFRED M. GRUENTHER
General, U.S. Army (Retired)

BACKGROUND:

Born, Platte Center, Nebraska, March 3, 1899; Mother a schoolteacher; Father, the publisher of the Platte Center Signal.

CAREER:

Graduated from U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York; November 1, 1918 (originally Class of 1921). After the armistice was signed, his class was sent back to West Point and remained there until June 1919. From 1919 to 1941, routine peace-time assignments. He was Instructor and Assistant Professor in Chemistry and Electricity for 8 years at West Point. He served as a lieutenant for 16-1/2 years.

In October 1941, he became Deputy Chief of Staff, Third Army, San Antonio, Texas. Lt. Col. Gruenther was made Chief of Staff, Third Army, when Brigadier General Dwight D. Eisenhower was transferred to Washington on December 12, 1941.

In August 1942, he was transferred to London, as a Brigadier General, to serve as Deputy Chief of Staff under General Eisenhower. In January 1943, he was named Chief of Staff of General Mark W. Clark's Fifth Army in North Africa (Major General). Later he became Chief of Staff of the 15th Army Group, still under General Clark. In July 1945, General Clark was named Commander of the U.S. Forces in Austria, and General Gruenther was named Deputy Commanding General.

1946-1947,	Deputy Commandant, National War College.
1947-1949,	Director, Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
1949-1950,	Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Department of Army (Lieutenant General).
1951-1953,	Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE, Paris) (General).
1953-1956,	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Succeeded General Matthew B. Ridgway). Retired December 31, 1956.
1957-1964,	President, American Red Cross. Retired March 31, 1964.

ALFRED M. GRUENTHER

He is married to the former Grace Elizabeth Crum. They have two sons, both of whom were West Pointers, and now Colonels in the Army. The older son, Donald (8 children) was in Vietnam from 1967 to 1969, and is now stationed at the Pentagon; the younger son, Richard (6 children) was in Vietnam from July 1968 to July 1969, and is now at West Point as Head of the Department of Military Instruction.

ACTIVITIES:

The Business Council
General Advisory Committee, Arms Control and Disarmament
General Advisory Committee on Foreign Assistance
President's Committee on Traffic Safety
Board of Directors, Pan American World Airways
Board of Directors, New York Life Insurance Company (Executive Committee)
Board of Directors, Rexall Drug and Chemical Company (Executive Committee)
Board of Directors, Federated Department Stores (Executive Committee)
Electoral College, Hall of Fame
Executive Committee, Atlantic Council
Visiting Committee, Johns Hopkins School of Medicine
Editorial Advisory Board, Foreign Affairs Magazine
Honorary President, World Bridge Federation
Chairman, English Speaking Union, November 1966-68.

HONORARY DEGREES: (37)

Babson Institute; Bates College; Belmont Abbey College; Brandeis University; The Citadel; Cleveland-Marshall Law School; Columbia University; Creighton University; Dartmouth College; Harvard University; College of the Holy Cross; Jefferson Medical College; LaSalle College; Loyola University (Chicago); Loyola University (Los Angeles); University of Maryland (Heidelberg); University of Nebraska; New York University; Oberlin College; Rockhurst College; Rutgers University; St. John's University; Saint Lawrence University; College of Saint Thomas; Saint Vincent College; Seattle University; Simpson College; Springfield College; St. Anselm's College; Syracuse University; Temple University; Trinity College; Union College; Villanova University; Williams College; Yale University; Iowa Wesleyan College.

ALFRED M. GRUENTHER

DECORATIONS:

United States, Distinguished Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters; Legion of Merit; Belgium, Grand Cordon Order of Leopold; Brazil, Commander, Order of Military Merit; England, Companion of the Bath; France, Grand Cross, Legion of Honor, Medaille Militaire; Germany, Grand Cross of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany; Greece, Grand Cross, Royal Order of Saviour; Italy, Knight of the Order of the Grand Cross of Merit of the Republic of Italy, Ordine Militaire D'Italia; Luxembourg, Grand Cross, Order of the Couronne de Chene; Morocco, Grand Officer, Quissam Alaouite; Order of Malta, Grand Cross of Merit with Star and Ribbon; The Netherlands, Grand Cross, Order of Orange-Nassau; the Philippines, Golden Heart Presidential Award; Poland, Virtuti Militari; Portugal, Grand Cross of Aviz.

RED CROSS DECORATIONS:

Argentina, Argentine Red Cross Medal; Australia, Australian Red Cross Medal of Honour; Brazil, Cross of Distinction, Brazilian Red Cross Society; Chile, Grand Cross of Honor, Chilean Red Cross; Ethiopia, Red Cross Grand Gold Medal; Finland, Cross of Merit, Finnish Red Cross; Greece, Gold Cross with Laurel, Greek Red Cross Society; Japan, Red Cross Order of Merit; Philippines, Sampaguita Medal; USSR, Badge of Honor, Alliance of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

AWARDS:

Veterans of Foreign Wars Gold Medal Award, 1956; Laetare Medal, 1956; James Forrestal Memorial Award, 1957; Gold Medal, National Institute of Social Sciences, 1957; Gold Medal, Pennsylvania Society, 1957; Lafayette Gold Medal Award, 1958; Distinguished Service Medal, Theodore Roosevelt Association, 1958; Father of the Year, 1959; Cardinal Gibbons Award, 1959; National Veterans Award, 1959; Boy Scout Silver Buffalo Award, 1960; Research Institute of America Living History Award, 1960; Bellarmine Medal, 1962; Murray-Green Award, 1963; Salvation Army Award for 1964; Distinguished Nebraskan Award for 1966; Magna Charta Award, 1968; Order of Lafayette Freedom Award, 1969.

(Prepared September, 1968; Revised September, 1969)

APPENDIX G

CONGRESSIONAL TRIBUTE TO GENERAL GRUENTHER

GENERAL GRUENTHER, A DISTINGUISHED NEBRASKAN

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, on Wednesday evening of this week, the Nebraska Society of Washington presented its annual Distinguished Nebraskan Award to Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, U.S. Army, retired, the illustrious former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and later president of the American National Red Cross.

The presentation was made by our colleague, Senator CURTIS, who is retiring after 3 years as a member of the Nebraska Society's board of governors. I ask unanimous consent to have the text of those remarks printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my statement.

It is unfortunate that we do not have a copy of General Gruenther's extemporaneous response. It was witty, modest, and charming, as is the man who made it.

All Nebraskans share a great pride in General Gruenther and in his titanic contributions to the cause of peace. This dedicated soldier-humanitarian heightened that pride when he told us he always has and always will regard himself as a Nebraskan.

We were pleased, too, Mr. President to have a number of congratulatory messages sent to the president of our society, Mr. Kimon T. Karabatsos. I ask unanimous consent to have two of them, one from former President Eisenhower and one from Governor Morrison of Nebraska, printed in the RECORD following Senator CURTIS' splendid salute to General Gruenther.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TRIBUTE TO GEN. ALFRED M. GRUENTHER ON THE OCCASION OF THE AWARD DINNER OF THE NEBRASKA STATE SOCIETY OF WASHINGTON BY SENATOR CARL T. CURTIS, JANUARY 26, 1966

We are here to pay respectful tribute to a man who has earned the right to be called an outstanding American. As native sons of Nebraska, we are here to honor a great Nebraskan.

You have no doubt noticed, as I have, that men of high ability are seldom, if ever, one-track men. Though they carve distinguished careers in one field, they show extraordinary talents in many others. Sometimes they achieve top rank in one career after another. And, sometimes, as with our honored guest this evening, they manage several diversified careers—almost at one time—with no apparent strain.

It would be easy, at this point, to tell you that our guest was born in Platte Center, Nebr., in 1899, and then rattle off, in rapid succession the events and remarkable achievements which have marked his life. But somehow I feel that would not give you a true picture of the man. We will come closer to getting a three-dimensional view if, instead, we take a brief look at one or two incidents in each of the five careers which he has made for himself, simultaneously, or in rapid succession.

Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, the man we honor tonight, was born in Platte Center in 1899. I've been told that he carries in his pocket a silver dollar, minted in that year. Though why anyone with his phenomenal memory should need a reminder, I wouldn't know.

This fantastic memory, plus the keen intellect and facility for intense concentration which accompany it, are the combination which has helped General Gruenther in everything he has undertaken. The effect of this powerful combination was first demonstrated when he was graduated from West Point, fourth in his class, at the age of 18.

In times of peace and prosperity, it is not easy for even the finest junior officer to find rapid advancement. But Lieutenant Gruenther, who had married Grace Elizabeth Crum, of Jeffersonville, Ind., had an idea for supplementing his less than generous military income. He acquired a manual on how to play bridge. Soon he was recognized as one of the Nation's finest amateur players. And soon he was arranging and refereeing bridge matches, an activity which helped to provide for his wife and two sons. General Gruenther has retained his early skill at bridge, a talent which might have led some men to a professional career. General Gruenther, on the other hand, seems quite content to be the favorite partner of his longtime friend, general, and later President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

General Gruenther's second career began with the rumblings of World War II. In October 1941, Lieutenant Colonel Gruenther was named deputy chief of staff of the 3d Army. Brig. Gen. Dwight Eisenhower was chief of staff. Within months, Colonel Gruenther succeeded his friend as chief of staff of the 3d Army and within a year was again a deputy chief of staff, this time to General Eisenhower at Allied Command Headquarters, Europe.

In these assignments, and his final wartime post as chief of staff for Gen. Mark Clark's 5th Army, General Gruenther built an enviable reputation. Through his consummate skill in organization, his ability to forsee situations and his meticulous attention to detail in seeing that orders were carried out, he was both recognized and rewarded as the perfect staff officer. While he was, as yet, little known outside the military, inside he was already becoming known as the possessor of one of the greatest minds in the Army. By war's end, in 1945, he was the youngest of all the major generals.

Stage three concerns a new career—General Gruenther the planner. After 2 years as Deputy Commandant of the National War College, the general was appointed director of the joint staff which served as the working force of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the preparation of strategic and logistic plans for the Armed Forces.

During this period and in the 2 years between 1949 and 1951 when he served as

Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans at Army Headquarters, most of the plans actually put in practice by the Army passed through his hands for approval.

When General Gruenther was appointed, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe, it appeared, as it had several times in the past, that he was destined to remain the smart, capable, and highly efficient No. 2 man on whom every commanding officer could depend without question. But that limited horizon, too, was soon to be broadened. In July 1953, he succeeded Gen. Matthew Ridgway as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and commander in chief of the U.S. European Command. So began career No. 4.

Upon the shoulders of a supreme commander of allied forces rest many burdens, not the least of which is the task of maintaining good relations with dignitaries of many stripes. On one such occasion, General Gruenther put his fantastic memory to good use.

During a visit they had made to Allied headquarters, the general had met, quite casually, 180 members of the British Parliament. As things developed, it became necessary for General Gruenther to visit the House of Commons. In typical fashion, he included in his preparations an hour's study of the names and photographs of all 180 of the members he had met. When he arrived at Westminster, he recognized them all, addressed each one by name as he shook hands, and even made a few personal inquiries about their families.

Not too long after this incident in Commons, it was announced that President Eisenhower would pay a 1-hour visit to Allied headquarters in the near future for a conference. The subjects to be discussed were listed. Although it had no place on the list, General Gruenther immediately directed his staff to compile a chart showing the location of every unit, squad, and individual serviceman in the whole command.

The President arrived, the conference began. After about 50 minutes the listed subjects had been discussed. There mas a brief pause. The President broke the silence by asking the distribution of the forces—the staff officer, the planner, the supreme commander was ready. It was this kind of keenness and foresight that led Lord Ismay to call him "the greatest soldier-statesman I have met."

After 38 years of tremendous achievement you might think that General Gruenther would feel as Gen. George Marshall once put it, "I want to go and sit in a chair on my front porch. In about 6 or 8 weeks I'll begin to rock a little." But not General Gruenther—he was still looking for action and he found it.

There is an old adage among athletic coaches: "It's a lot easier to make a fine runner out of a boxer than it is to make a runner into a fine boxer." I submit that it is easier to make a great humanitarian out of a soldier than it is to make a fine soldier out of a humanitarian, especially when you are referring to our friend from Nebraska.

On January 1, 1958, the day after he retired from the Army, General Gruenther—with all the enthusiasm, fire and concentration he had demonstrated in the military—became the president of the American National Red Cross, and career No. 5 was born.

From the end of World War II to 1957 the trend in voluntary contributions to the Red Cross and other organizations had been slowly, but steadily downward. With a larger population to serve in the face of rising costs, the Red Cross needed to reverse that trend. As always, it didn't take the general long to catch on. He soon became convinced that one of his principal missions in his new post was to tell the Red Cross story to people—lots of people. And he did just that.

In a little over 7 years—in addition to all his other administrative duties—General Gruenther crossed this country scores of times, visited Africa once, the Far East three times, South America three times, and Europe seven times, spreading the word wherever he went. All together he traveled about 700,000 miles and made more than 800 major addresses.

I'm sure by now you have guessed the result. Beginning in 1958, contributions to the Red Cross began to increase—and I'm happy to say they have continued to improve every year since. To tell you the truth, I don't think they would have dared to do anything else.

General Gruenther has been decorated by many nations including his own. He has been similarly honored by Red Cross societies of at least 9 nations and he has received honorary degrees from no fewer than 25 colleges and universities.

We know nothing of what new career and what new honors may await him in the future, but I can say with certainty that no recognition he ever receives will carry with it more true admiration, greater respect, or warmer affection than that he receives from all of us tonight.

GETTYSBURG, PA.,
December 29, 1965.

Mr. KIMON T. KARADATSOS,
Velsicol Chemical Corp.,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. KARABATSOS: I have been informed by Senators HRUSKA and CURTIS that the Nebraska State Society of Washington is honoring my friend, Gen. Alfred Gruenther, with its annual Distinguished Nebraskan Award. Although it is impossible for me to attend the ceremony at which your society is presenting the award, I do want to join you, by means of this letter, in paying tribute to Alfred Gruenther.

In war and peace he has served his country in important posts, brilliantly, selflessly, and effectively. Joining the Army during World War I, he early established a record for efficiency that caused him to be classed among the most promising officers in the service. He fully lived up to the promise and in his final post, as commander in chief of military forces of NATO, he established an international reputation for fairness, integrity, and a profound understanding that commanded the admiration of both European and American governments.

On such a subject I could write volumes; possibly I should content myself with saying that in every position in which he has served he has established standards that no other has exceeded.

He is my intimate friend and I hope that at the dinner you will extend to him my warm personal greetings and my felicitations that he is to receive the award you are now giving him.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

P.S.—He is also a fair kind of bridge player and is the world's champion at revoking.

STATE OF NEBRASKA,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE,
Lincoln, Nebr., January 26, 1966.

Gen. Alfred M. Gruenther, distinguished Nebraskan: Your native State of Nebraska, always humbly proud of the meaningful influences for good which have been exerted by its many illustrious sons and daughters, is honored with you in your designation as a distinguished Nebraskan by the Nebraska State Society of Washington, D.C.

I am confident that your selection, gratifying though it may be to you, is a source of similar satisfaction, not only to all of your fellow Nebraskans, but also to all of those men and women of our Armed Forces who served with you in meeting the great responsibilities you encountered in your steady ascent up the stairway of service to your countrymen.

It must also be a source of high pleasure to those citizens of the nine foreign countries whose various decorations you wear as an attestation of their appreciation for your efforts in their behalf—and that of the entire free world—as Nebraska's "Pershing of Peace." For that, my friend, was your true role as the Chief of Staff of SHAPE, under that great general, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.

A distinguished Nebraskan you are, sir. And Nebraska is distinguished by the strength for military and American Red Cross humanitarian service which you drew from your Nebraska family and your native roots. Your fellow Nebraskans, everywhere, join in the accolades attendant upon your selection and in every best wish that all of the blessings of this good life, and of the freedom you helped to insure, may be yours throughout the years to come.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK B. MORRISON,
Governor of Nebraska.

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