THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE MAMLUK EMPIRE IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

By

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ABSTRACT

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This study examines and analyzes the diplomatic relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the Mamluk Empire in the first quarter of the sixteenth century, with a particular focus on the conquest of Egypt by the Ottomans in 1517.

The study is divided into three parts. Part One provides a technical introduction, including statements of purpose, significance, and scope. It also provides a review of the sources which included ancient Turkish and Arabic literature as well as modern Turkish, Arabic, French, and English literature.

Part Two is the body of the study, provided in five chapters. Chapter One gives the historical background of the study. It provides information and some analysis of the Ottoman and the Mamluk empires, with data on origins, governmental systems and society of the two civilizations. Characteristics of the two empires are compared and contrasted. Chapter Two describes and analyzes the diplomatic

relationships between the Ottoman sultans and Mamluk sultans prior to the conquest. The examination begins with the year 1382, when the two empires first came in diplomatic contact with one another, and continues through 1517 when they faced one another in war. Chapter Three provides the researcher's analysis of the reasons behind the conquest. The reasons are defined as the revenge motive, the economic motive, the political motive, the religious motive, and the border state control motive. Each is examined in detail. Chapter Four outlines the course of the conquest in a chronological fashion. It begins with an examination of diplomatic correspondence between the Ottoman Sultan Selim I and the Mamluk Sultan Kansuh el-Gawri and continues through the Ottoman conquest of Cairo. Chapter Five provides a description and analysis of the effects of the conquest as seen by the researcher. These are categorized as political, economic, and religious effects.

Part Three of the study is the conclusion. In it the significant points of the study are reviewed, and results of the study are defined. One result of the study is the new body of information in the following areas: the diplomatic relationship between the Ottoman and Mamluk empires prior to 1517; the factors which contributed to the conquest; and, the effects upon both sides as a result of the conquest. Another result of the study is the new information it provides in English regarding ancient Arabic and Turkish sources. Also included in Part Three are suggestions

for further research. An appendix and extensive bibliography complete the study.

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IN THE NAME OF ALLAH
THE COMPASSIONATE
THE MERCIFUL



DEDICATION

(TO MY FATHER ALI IBN RABI AL-THAKAFI, TO MY MOTHER SALEHAH, TO MY RESPECTABLE WIFE MESLAHA HOSSIEN AL-THAKAFI, AND TO MY DAUGHTERS MONA AND NASEEM)

-({{ الاهداء الى الوالد علي بن رابع والوالدة صالحة وزوجتي الغالية مصلحة حسين الثقفي وطفلتيّ منى ونسيم }})-

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I would also like to acknowledge the officials of TopKapi Saray palace in Istanbul, particularly the Assistant Director, Jankiz Bey, who gave me permission and

access to primary sources in the archives and library. Additional thanks go also to the officials in Cairo at Dar el-Kutub and Mahad el-Makttotat el-Arabia (The Institute of the Arabic Manuscripts), who were helpful in my acquisition of microfilms and other materials. Personnel of inter-library loan at Michigan State University are recognized for their speedy location of a variety of materials from other universities. Also, thank you to the personnel of the History Department, especially Mrs. Doris Swanson and Mrs. Doris Cuthbertson for their help during my years of study there.

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PART ONE:

TECHNICAL INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE

From the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries A.D. the Ottomans expanded their possessions of land from a small district in northwest Asia Minor to a large empire which included Syria, Egypt, the Amirat of North Africa , Yemen, Aden and the holy Islamic cities of Mecca and Medina. In the beginning of the fifteenth century they started taking European territories one after another until they reached Vienna in 1529. During the first quarter of the sixteenth century there were two events which affected the development of the Ottoman state and its society. The first was the rise to power in Iran of the Shiite dynasty; the second was the Ottoman conquest in 1517 of Syria and Egypt.

After the destruction of the caliphate of Baghdad by the Mongols in the thirteenth century there was disorder and contention among the Arab countries. The Shiites took advantage of this unstable situation, gained control of Iraq, and attempted to spread their rule more and more. Finally, the Ottoman sultans, fearing Shiite influence which was surfacing in their border states of east Anatolia, took part in this rivalry between the Shiites and the Moslems.

First they succeeded in overcoming the Persians in the battle of Caldiran in 1514. Then the Ottomans directed their activities toward the Arab lands and overcame those lands part after part until the conquest of Egypt in 1517. During this period most of the Arab territories were under the rule of the Mamluk dynasty, sometimes referred to as the slave dynasty, and Egypt was the seat of the administering government. Therefore Egypt was the main target of the Ottoman campaign. This study examines the conquest of Egypt by the Ottomans in 1517 and, in particular, focuses on the diplomatic relationship between the Ottoman and the Mamluk Empires in the first quarter of the 16th century.

The first chapter of this study provides historical background of the Ottoman and Mamluk states. It attempts to explain who the Ottomans and the Mamluks were, as well as how and where they developed their states, and provides as a background to the study a general overview of the two societies.

Chapter Two describes the diplomatic relationships between the Ottoman and Mamluk sultans prior to the conquest. It is a chronological explanation of changing events and relationships prior to the conquest.

Chapter Three explores the major reasons for the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517. Among the causes that are put forth and examined by this study in detail are: a "revenge" motive of the Ottoman sultans; economic motives; political motives, including the imperialistic dreams and

personality of the Ottoman ruler; religious motives; and, motives developing from disputes over control of Ottoman-Mamluk border states.

The course of the conquest is outlined in Chapter Four. First, the deteriorated relationship between the Mamluk ruler el-Gawri and the Ottoman Selim is described, as well as their preparations for war. Then the battle of Marg Dabig and the Ottoman entrance to Cairo is depicted.

Chapter Five explains effects of the conquest on various aspects of life in both societies such as economic, religious, and political life. The concluding pages of the study summarize the events as well as restate the conclusions drawn by the researcher.

Purpose of the Study

The first purpose of this study is to examine diplomatic relationships between the Ottoman and Mamluk empires prior to the conquest of Egypt in 1517. These relationships took many forms. By examining correspondence between the two states one can see that attitudes and feelings fluctuated between friendliness, cool formality, cautiousness and suspicion. Finally, the tenuous association deteriorated to outright war.

The second purpose is to explore, explain, and analyze the main factors which motivated the Ottoman empire to invade Egypt. While some of these factors have been cited by other historians a close examination of the factors

by this study will show some of them to be of more influence than others. For example, revenge, economic and political motives appear to this researcher to be more of contributing factors to the fall of Egypt in 1517 than has heretofore believed. Seemingly well-meaning motives such as religious and the border state control motives are shown in this study to be mainly secondary justifications used by the Ottomans' Sultan Selim I to disguise his primary motives which were expansionistic in nature.

The third purpose of this study is to show the course of the conquest of Egypt in 1517 beginning with the deteriorating relationship between the contemporary rulers of both states. There is an attempt to determine which party was ultimately responsible for starting the conflict.

The final purpose, which is the main object of this study, is to give an accurate account of how the Mamluk Empire came to an end with the conquest of Egypt in 1517, and what effects this had, both negative and positive, upon both the Ottoman and Egyptian societies. Few scholars deal with this time period in Middle East history, as it is a period in world history treated as a "dark age" by many writers.

Significance of the Study

This study of the diplomatic relationship between the Mamluks and the Ottomans in the first quarter of the 16th

century contributes significantly to the understanding of the history of the Middle East as well as the history of Europe as a whole. The conquest of Egypt in 1517 by the Ottomans was a turning point in the history of the Arab world. The conquest without a doubt resulted in important changes in different aspects of life in the societies of the region. Therefore, it is the responsibility of scholars, especially those from the Middle East, to undertake the task of studying this period carefully and honestly.

It is the finding of this researcher, a native of the Middle East, after living and studying in the U.S.A. for more than six years, that the topic of this study has been poorly treated by historians. As a result the Mamluk-Ottoman relations in the first quarter of the sixteenth century is a subject virtually unknown to westerners. Many have never heard of the Mamluk empire, or may know of the Mamluks only as opponents of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1798. A good deal of materials, manuscripts, and archival documents do exist, but they are primarily in the Arabic and Turkish languages and in need of scholars to examine them. What has been written about the sixteenth century Ottoman-Mamluk relationship is primarily based on western sources. These sources may show the picture of the period from a wrong angle, perhaps with the intention of the authors of serving their own aims, perhaps on purpose, or perhaps as a result of the failure to consult the original documents in Egypt and Turkey from the time period. Also the many

centuries of animosity between Christians and Muslims, from the Crusades up to even present day in some instances, may have contributed to an inclination not to pay much attention to the Mamluks as compared to western concentration of states contemporary to the Mamluk Empire such as sixteenth century Greece, Italy, and other European countries. Therefore, it is significant that this study brings to light in the English language an object of great importance, the history of the Ottoman-Mamluk relationship in the first quarter of the Sixteenth century, and that this topic is researched and analyzed by a scholar with tri-lingual skills which provided access to Arabic and Turkish, as well as English sources.

Scope of the Study

This study is primarily concerned with and limited to the diplomatic relationship between the Ottoman and the Mamluk empires in the first quarter of the 16th century. An emphasis is given to the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517, as it is a focal point in the relationship of the two empires and a turning point in Middle East history. One chapter is devoted primarily to events prior to the 16th century, beginning with details of events in the year 1382. This date marked the beginning of the Circassian Mamluk Dynasty when the Mamluk and Ottoman empires first came in contact with one another.

Prior to 1382 the Mamluks were on good terms with the Ottoman sultans. While it is difficult to judge why no conflicts occurred in the early years, an examination of the political situation of the times indicates that neither state had strong designs against the others properties. This idea is examined in detail in Chapter Two.

It is not so easy to determine a single date which limits this study in regards to the after-effects of the conquest of 1517. Some of the repercussions were short-term while others, such as four centuries of Turkish occupation of Egypt, last for many years. However, this study is limited primarily to the more immediate effects of the conquest, those which can be seen when studying sixteenth century Ottoman rule.

Research Questions of the Study

The questions which constituted the focus of this study and demonstrate the themes on which it was constructed are provided at the beginning of each chapter. By providing meaningful answers to these questions the aims of the study as identified in the preceding pages were fulfilled.

Sources and Procedures for the Study

The objective of this study is to provide in the English language a meaningful and accurate analytical account of the Ottoman-Mamluk diplomatic relationship in the first quarter of the 16th century. It is a significant historical era found by the researcher to be inaccurately

reported or largely ignored in English texts. It would seem, therefore, that the best way to undertake such a study would be to examine the Arabic and Turkish writings, contemporary to the period, as these authors were witnesses to many of the events pertinent to the present study.

The researcher has used original Arabic and Turkish manuscripts and correspondence whenever possible to provide the main narrative for this study. To amplify these primary sources, minor English as well as French and Arabic sources were used as secondary references. A few books in the English language, and analytical reports provided by current periodicals also contributed to the data. The sources which deal with Ottoman-Mamluk relations and were used for this study could be classified as follows:

I. Primary Sources
   A. Archival materials
   B. Manuscripts
   C. Published materials
II. Secondary Sources
   A. Books
   B. Articles

Primary sources in the original languages were used whenever they were obtainable. Archives and libraries in Egypt and Turkey house many of the primary sources used in this study. In addition, the researcher's own books gathered from various countries and related to the research topic, contributed to the data. Books available at Michigan

State University and the University of Michigan, materials from other U.S. university libraries (such as the University of Minnesota) via inter-library loans, and various periodicals and journals also provided significant help. Data obtained from these sources was critically examined and analyzed in its relevance to the present study.

Primary Sources

Archival materials relating to the subject of this study exist in Turkey and Egypt. Some of these materials are previously published, others are not.

In Turkey, the archival materials are found both in Istanbul and Ankara. However, the TopKapi Sarayi Arsivi (Archives) in Istanbul was found by the researcher to carry materials most pertinent to this study. The Archives contain political,economic, and social materials from those areas which were under the domain of the Ottoman empire. TopKapi Sarayi was the principal residence of the Ottoman sultans following the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 by Mehmed II, the conqueror up to the middle of the nineteenth century.

The Archives has two large volumes which contain an index to the principle subjects mentioned in the registers and documents. Most of the materials in the TopKapi Sarayi Arsivi deal with the organization and finance of the personal households of the Ottoman sultans, personal correspondence of the sultans to members of the royal family and to the

outside governors, and reports of political conditions and military activities in different parts of the empire. Of great value to this study was the correspondence exchanged between the Ottoman sultans and the Mamluk sultans.

In Egypt, a collection of materials from the seventeenth century to present day is numerous. Archival materials dated prior to this period are limited. In 1820 the citadel in Cairo which held most of the archival materials was destroyed by fire, and most of the official papers concerning the Ottoman-Egypt relations were burned.

However, the provincial and local government offices in Cairo still have some archival materials which deal with the period of the sixteenth century and earlier. One such place is Daq al Mahfuzat el-Umuyah (The Egyptian National Archives). It contains a collection of materials dealing primarily with financial affairs, particularly the financial administration of the government, and two public registers, Diwan al-Daftari and Diwan al-Ruznamah. Little information is available in regards to political activities, for example, or correspondence between governmental figures. Another location in Cairo for archival materials is al-Mahkama el-Shariah (The Court of Personal Status). It contains annual registers of cases, but these do not deal with the sixteenth century at all. Materials there are limited to cases from the eighteenth century on.

Manuscripts relevant to this study are found primarily in libraries of Istanbul and Cairo. These libraries are:

TopKapi Sarayi Kutuphane (Library) in Istanbul; Dar el-Kutub el-Masriah in Cairo; and, Mahad el-Maktotat el-Arabia (The Institute of Arabic Manuscripts) in Cairo. In each of these libraries volumes of indexes are available to scholars. Each library contained manuscript materials contemporary to the period of this study.

Most of the manuscripts dealing with the sixteenth century and before, and available in the Istanbul and Cairo libraries, are written in Arabic, and often in the early Ottoman style. That is, spellings of words and formations of the alphabetic letters often vary considerably from modern Arabic. This presents an additional challenge to the scholars who are not proficient in the language, and makes it difficult for non-natives or those who do not speak Arabic professionally to choose and locate materials pertinent to their particular studies.

Copies of those manuscripts of great value to this study were obtained by the researcher. Microfilms were made of some materials. In some instances the researcher studied and took personal notes. The following pages describe some of the best and most relevant manuscript materials.

While it is not the purpose of this study to review in detail each of the numerous primary and secondary sources consulted during the research of this study, it is of use to the reader to have some understanding of the nature and quality of some of the sources considered most useful and reliable by the researcher. One example of the better

manuscripts is Feridun Bey's collection of Turkish state papers entitled Munshaat il-Muluk wal Salatin, compiled sometime before 1583. It was learned that this collection was published at Constantinople in two volumes in 1858, but could not be found by the researcher in an exhaustive search through bookstores and libraries in Istanbul and Egypt. Coincidentally, the adviser to this study, Dr. Alan Fisher of Michigan State University, possessed a copy of the 1858 collection and this was provided to the researcher upon returning to the United States. While the 1858 publication and the original manuscript are similar both are listed as consulted sources, the former was used primarily to verify the researcher's notes on the latter. The manuscript deals primarily with diplomatic correspondences which are arranged chronologically. It covers the period from the time of Timur (born 1336 A.D.) up to the end of the reign of Sultan Suleyman, the Magnificent (1520-1566 A.D.). Most interesting is the last half of the manuscript which is devoted to letters interchanged among the sultans of the Ottoman empire, and the rulers of Persia, and the rulers of the Mamluks of Egypt during the sixteenth century.

Another important manuscript is the last book of six in a collection (Auszuege gus Neshri's Geschichtdes Osmanischen hauses) by Neshri, who is said to have died during the reign of Selim. It provides a great deal of information regarding the Ottoman empire from its origin to the time of Selim. It seems to the researcher that Neshri was

a true historian for he possessed the historian's fundamental virtue, the desire to establish the truth of events.

A significant manuscript of the fifteenth century is that of Iqd al-Juman Fi Tawarih ahl l-Zamam by Aini. This history deals in part with the Mamluk history and in part with the early Crusades. Aini had the post of Grand Kadi (Judge) and was curator of a pious foundation. He had access to court materials for he was a great favorite of Sultan Barsbay (1422-1438). His manuscript is located in Dar el-Kutub el-Masriah under the number 1584.

In al-Manhal al Safi Abu l-Mahasin Gamal ed-Din Yousif Ibn Tagri Birdi (died 1470) provides biographies of distinguished men from the year 1252 to his own time. The writer came from a high-ranking Mamluk family and was a friend of Sultan Jakmak (1438-1453). This friendship undoubtedly gave him access to the official documents of the court. The manuscripts consist of two volumes, the second of which was most useful to this study as it covers social and political activities of the Sultan Jakmak. These volumes are located in Dar el-Kutub el-Masriah under the number 1209.

A small manuscript of just sixty pages entitled Tarih-i Devlet el-Aliah Osmanyye in Darl el-Kutub, author unknown, traces the origin of the Ottoman Empire up to the year 1640. In studying its contents it appeared that the author used reliable sources; for example, in his first chapter he mentions the point of view of Ibn Khaldun (who was

contemporary to the period before the conquest) regarding the origin of the Ottoman dynasty. Also, the unidentified author expresses viewpoints and ideas very similar to highly reliable authors of the time period.

The most outstanding manuscript dealing with the Ottoman invasion of Egypt is that of Ahmed Ibn Zunbul, Wakat el-Sultan Selim Khan Fi Fotoh Misir Ma el-Sultan el-Gawri (The Invasion of Sultan Selim I upon Sultan el-Gawri). This manuscript was obtained by the researcher from the Institute of the Arabic Manuscripts in Cairo and was microfilmed. It was also obtained on microfilm from the Oesterreichische National bibliothek in Vienna. In Dar el-Kutub el-Masriah the original manuscript is located under the number 124, Tarih. The manuscript is a collection of heroic prose and provides a history of the conquest in chronicle style. The first part deals with the campaign of Selim against el-Gawri, and the remainder deals with events following the battle of Marg Dabig (1516) until the Ottoman entrance to Egypt in 1517. Although the manuscript deals mostly with the course of the conquest and does not explain possible causes or effects of the invasion, it is probably the most important manuscript in regards to the courses of battles between the Ottomans and the Mamluks.

Published materials contemporary to the period of this study were also consulted. Probably the most important source for the history of the Ottoman-Mamluk relations in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries is

Muhammed Ibn Ahmad Ibn Iyas (died 1524) in his history entitled Bad'i az-zuhur Fi waqa'l ad-duhur. This straight forward and rather unbiased eyewitness account of the Ottoman conquest provides an insight into the political, social, and economic life of the Ottoman empire and Egypt. Also, it provides an otherwise unobtainable glimpse of the life of the natives of Egypt. The history consists of five volumes, sometimes published as one complete volume. It covers the time period from the conquest of Egypt by the Arabs in 640 A.D. through the conquest of Egypt in 1517 by the Ottoman Empire. Ibn Iyas's work is a reliable source for he had access to the Mamluk court and had friends among the Mamluk officers. He was born of a prominent family, and was a member of Awlad el-nas, the regiment consisting of sons of Mamluk emirs.

Ibn Tagri Birdi, author of the manuscript al-Manhal al Safi, wrote another scholarly work entitled el-Nujum az-zahirah Fi Akbar Misir wal Kahirah. The latter work consists of twenty-three volumes and deals mainly with political events of the Mamluk sultans described in chronological order. It provides a good background of Egypt in the period before the sixteenth century. The volumes cover the history of Egypt from its conquest in 640 by Omar Ibn el-As up to 1367. They were published by Dar el-Kutub el-Masriah, and were translated into English from the Arabic annals by the American scholar William Popper.

Of value for the history of Egypt during the skirmishes between the Mamluk and Ottoman empires in the first half

of the fifteenth century is the work of Tag-al-Din Ahmed el-Makrizi (1364-1442). el-Makrizi was one of the most famous medieval historians in Egypt. el-Makrizi was appointed Kadi (Judge), Imam, administrator of wakfs (endowments) in Egypt and Syria. He wrote a history of Egypt entitled Kitab as-Suluk li-Marifat dual al Muluk. The book includes geographical, historical, and biographical sections which treat both antiquity and contemporary events of the period. It is the opinion of this researcher that his work deserves first rank among histories of his time; his work emerged from theological and practical thought.

For the second half of the fifteenth century, Ibn el-Sairafi Ali Ibu Dawood's manuscript entitled Nuzhat el-Nufus wal Abdan Fi Twarih el-Zaman is of importance. This author was a contemporary of Ibn Tagri Birdi, el-Makrizi, and Ibn Iyas. His work,which is located in Dar el-Kutub el-Masriah under number 12861 H, was investigated and edited by Dr. Hassan Hebshi in 1970. Hebshi's investigation was compared by this researcher to the original manuscript, in order to find out if there was any difference in the presentation of data. Dr. Hebshi merely made minor corrections in such things as grammar and use of terms, and made some clarification of ideas. For an account of political events of the Mamluk Empire in the last half of the fifteenth century this source is reliable.

For the Ottoman-Mamluk war of 1485-1491 the chronicle of Ashaq Pash-Zade translated by Giese, is a good source.

It contains a description of the nature of the diplomacy and campaigns between the two states.

Western books which can be considered as primary sources include the works of R. Knolles who in 1603 compiled The General Histories of the Turks together with The Lives and Conquests of the Ottoman Kings and Emperors. He based his writings upon the chronicles of the contemporary writers such as Ibn Iyas, Ibn Tagri Birdi, and el-Makrizi. The book supplied information especially pertinent to this study, about the various personalities associated with both the Ottoman sultan Selim and the Mamluk sultan el-Gawri.

There also exists an abundance of good materials dealing with the Ottoman-Mamluk relationship in the sixteenth century in three volumes by de Lamartine, (translated to English from the French by D. Appleton and Company), and entitled The History of Turkey. The second volume was most useful to the present study as it dealt with the topic and time period of this research in particular. The work is not only an outstanding history of the Ottoman empire but an astute political analysis of the 16th and 17th centuries.

Another significant work is Des Osmanischen Reichs Staatsverfassung und Staatsverwaltung, a book in two volumes by Joseph Von Hammer. Von Hammer was familiar with most of the Middle East languages. His work consists of the gist of histories written by the Ottoman and Persian historians.

The original text is in the German language and was translated into French by Hellert.

Secondary Sources

The secondary sources which provided data relevant to this study are numerous, and written in a variety of languages (Arabic, Turkish, French and English). In all of them there are many things which yet require fuller detail and explanation. Two areas which need to be amplified are the diplomatic history between the Ottoman empire and the Mamluk Empire before the conquest of Egypt, and an analysis of the main factors which motivated the Ottoman empire to invade Egypt. As was noted, as it is impossible to cite and review all of the sources which contributed to this study; the following discussion is limited to the most important secondary sources.

In regards to sources dealing with the Ottomans as well as the Mamluks one text which was useful to the study was el-Dowlah el-Osmaniah wal Shark el-Arabi by Muhammed Anis. It is available in Arabic. The book is useful primarily as an overview sort of study, however, as it covers the history of four centuries of the Ottoman Empire in approximately three hundred pages. It covers a variety of topics, but in a very broad manner. The author in particular deals with the expansion of the Ottoman empire, the type of administration it established in many locales, and the ways in which the Ottoman Empire paved the way for the

influx of European rule in the Middle East by the 20th century. While the text is useful as a general history, the author neglected to use original Arabic and Turkish sources. Most of his work is based on European and English sources.

A second source which deals with both cultures was available to the researcher in the English language. Carl Brockelmann, considered one of the world's leading authorities on comparative linguistics, wrote The History of the Islamic People, published in German in 1939 and translated to English by Carmichael and Perlmann in 1947. Obviously thoroughly researched, using international scholarly literature and citing convincing evidence, the book covers the history of the Near and Middle East from the rise of Islam through the 1930's. It is a very detailed and data-filled source, covering political events as well as cultural and civilization trends of the Islamic people. A drawback to Brockelmann's book, however (as compared to Hitti's, for example), is that it cites primarily English, German, and a variety of European sources as opposed to original ancient Arabic or Turkish sources.

Another important source dealing with both the Ottomans and the Mamluks is The History of the Arabs by Philip K. Hitti. Like Brockelmann, Hitti covers an extensive period of history, from pre-Islamic civilizations of Arabia to the first part of the 20th century. Hitti's book is very well written, carefully organized and with a style that is

easy to read. It appears unbiased and accurate in that it is written in an objective and analytical tone and is carefully documented with a variety of respected international sources, as well as ancient Arabic and Turkish sources contemporary to the period such as Ibn Khallikan and el-Mazrizi. Hitti has taught at and conducted research from a wide number of universities throughout the world. His writings on Near and Middle East history are extensive. This text puts Arab history in perspective with the history of the older Semitic civilization.

Two books by Stanley Lane-Poole were useful to the research. One provided information on the Ottoman Empire and one provided a history of Egypt. The Story of Turkey, published in 1888, proposes to outline the history in broad strokes, and does just that. It clearly tells a story, a general overview of the history of Turkey and the development of the Ottoman Empire which provides the reader with a good background to the area and times. Lane-Poole's sources are poorly indicated, however. He cites von Hammer's Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches and Creasy's History of the Ottoman Turks but fails to indicate original Arabic and Turkish sources he may have consulted. Lane-Poole's book is significant however, in that it is one of the first texts in English to address the period of history, 1250-1880, in question. Lane-Poole's later publication A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages, is likewise a good overview of a lengthy period of history. It covers the 7th century A.D. up to the conquest

of Egypt by the Ottomans in 1517. Unlike The Story of Turkey this volume on Egypt lists an impressive group of primary Turkish and Arabic sources such as Ibn Iyas, el-Makrizi, and Ibn Khaldun. It also contains numerous footnotes to the data it presents, and includes useful tables and illustrations. As in his earlier book, Lane-Poole in A History of Egypt writes in a clear and authoritative manner.

Three sources in the list of secondary references deal with the Mamluk dynasty in particular. They are described below.

Sir John Glubb's Soldiers of Fortune : The Story of the Mamluks is well documented and scholarly, citing ancient historians contemporary to the period in question. Glubb covers the origin of the Mamluk dynasty through the fall of the empire in 1517. It is considered to be one of the most detailed accounts on the Mamluk dynasty to date, and is one of the few in English devoted wholly to the subject. Maps, tables, chronologies, and a large index add to its value. It includes fact-filled accounts of events as well as Glubb's analyses of significant developments and moments of Mamluk history.

The Mamluk or Slave Dynasty of Egypt by William Muir surveys the history of the Mamluks from their first importation as slaves in the 10th century A.D. through their rise as rulers of Egypt, through the conquest by the Ottomans in 1517. While Muir's primary source is German (Weil's

Geschiechte der Chalifen drawing from original Turkish and Arabic sources) his account is detailed, comprehensive, and well-organized. Like Vucinich's book, The Ottoman Empire: Its Record and Legacy (see p.25) it provides a good overview of many elements of one of the societies which were the topics of this study.

An Arabic text by Ibrahim Ali Tarkhan, entitled Misr Fi asr dawlat al Mamalik discusses the Mamluk empire from 1382-1517. It includes descriptions of economic, political and social life of the period. The text does not provide much detail about governmental administration. The author based his work on primary sources in Arabic (but not in Turkish) as well as modern English and French sources. It is useful to both the specialist and the general reader interested in the Mamluk history, but is available only in Arabic.

A variety of books deal specifically with the Ottoman empire and its development. One of these texts is by Herbert Adams Gibbons, entitled Foundation of the Ottoman Empire. It is a large book with many maps, a chronological table, an extensive bibliography including sources of numerous languages and a thorough index. The author was for many years a resident of Istanbul. His references include Byzantine writers, translated Turkish historians, chronicles by a variety of ancient writers, state papers, popular songs, and modern analytical sources, and numbers over five hundred.

The Foreign Relations of Turkey 1481-1512 by Sydney N. Fisher is a good source but has a somewhat misleading title. For the most part it deals with the succession and reign of the Ottoman sultan Bayezid II. It succeeds, however in providing useful and seemingly accurate information on the ruler. Fisher cites some primary Ottoman sources as references but does not list any Arabic sources. He also bases his work on a number of English and European scholars.

Halil Inalcik is a historian who is native of Turkey, the geographical area considered his specialty. He does research in a variety of languages including Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and English, and is a widely-published professor of history at the University of Chicago. His book entitled The Ottoman Empire: the Classical Age 1300-1600 is very comprehensive yet succinct, covering the political institutions of the empire and its development as well as elements of economic, religious, societal and cultural life. Inalcik is considered one of the finest scholars in Islamic history; the references he used includes significant works in a multitude of languages. Also included are a glossary of Ottoman terms, genuologies, and a chronological outline of Ottoman history which are extremely helpful. The translation is clear and enjoyable to read.

Stanford Shaw is a prolific writer and historian of Middle East history, a professor at Harvard University, and fluent in a variety of languages including Turkish, Arabic and Persian. Two works by Stanford Shaw were found very

useful to the researcher. The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517-1798, published in 1958 examines in great detail the system of government, finances, and administration set up by the Ottomans in Egypt. Shaw directly consulted Ottoman archives in Cairo and Istanbul as well as public and private libraries in Egypt, Turkey, France and London. Ottoman administrative documents and records supplied much of the data. The book is an extensive collection of figures, calculations, and tables, as well as an analysis of the basic objectives of Ottoman rule in Egypt and the extent to which they were fulfilled. The bibliography lists numerous Arabic and Turkish sources, and the well-organized index is very helpful. Shaw's History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey is equally well documented and carefully written, while more narrative in fashion. As Shaw admits in his preface, to relate the story of Ottoman history is complicated. He succeeds, however, in tracing the origin of the Turks through the rise and decline of the empire with a style that is flowing and easy. He covers political, administrative, religious, and social aspects of the diverse culture. His bibliography (with some annotative notes) is extensive and covers sources in all languages. The organization of the text and index Shaw provides facilitate the reader in locating facts in the wealth of data he supplies.

A source of which provides a good general account of the history of the Ottoman-Arabic relationship as a whole is

The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs, 1511-1574, a rather small book published by George W.F. Stripling in 1942. Stripling fails to analyze such things as reasons behind the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517, effects of the conquest, and the cause and effects of various stages of Ottoman-Arabic relationship. His outline of many significant historical events, and the details he provides on such things government, geography and trade in a variety of locales, is useful, however, in that it is provided in a clear, topical manner, and is based on numerous international sources. Many of the sources, however, are French and German; only a limited number of references are made to ancient writers contemporary to the period.

Wayne Vucinich's book, The Ottoman Empire, is useful in that it succinctly records the origins of the Ottomans and the type of administration they instituted as well as the society which developed. Elements such as government, armed forces, justice, education, and culture as well as specific topics such as the janissaries, Turkish art and poetry, the palace school, and harem and eunuch institutions are clearly described. The book is not, however, well documented. It contains no notes, and only a short bibliography. Vucinich's work is recommended as a good overview of the Ottoman civilization, and a useful source for individuals new to the field. The author is fluent in many languages (although none of the Middle Eastern languages are included), has published a variety of history books on

Russia, Europe, and Asia, and is a professor of history at Stanford University.

The Rise of the Ottoman Empire by Paul Wittek is a small but interesting publication. This 54 page book, based on his lectures at the University of London, poses questions in regards to traditional analyses of the rise of the Ottoman Empire. Herbert Gibbons work (The Foundations of the Ottoman Empire), for example, is viewed by Wittek to be too narrow in scope, ending its narrative of the empire's development with the year 1403 a time when Wittek feels no realization of an empire could have yet been realized. Wittek traces the development from its 9th century beginnings through its decline. The author also views the decline as a slow one, not accelerating until the 19th century. The book includes a small but various section of notes, and references are a variety of scholarly international sources.

Bibliography

The complete bibliography including journals, periodicals, and specific articles is listed in the final pages of this study. There are, of course, many works which contributed to the researcher's understanding of the topic but which are not directly cited in the text of the study and its footnotes which follow. In addition there are additional works which cover aspects related to this study (for example, studies of other societies in the world contemporary to the conquest; or, conquests similar to the Ottoman conquest of

the Mamluks) which are not included in the bibliography. This does not mean they have been of no value to the researcher. It would, in fact, be impossible to cite all of the references which have led me to and enabled me to undertake this project and attempt to produce a work which provides an honest insight into the historical period in question.

Definition of Terms

The following terms are defined to facilitate the reading of the study. The words will appear throughout this dissertation in just one spelling, except in some cases of direct quotation when another historians' spelling will vary and that author's spelling of the word will be used.

Agha - The name of a general officer, or head servant of a household. (In Ottoman usage, usually a Eunuch).

Bey - (1) the title given to a governor of a territory, or (2) the title given to a prince.

Beylerbey - "Lord of lords", the highest-ranking official in the Ottoman provincial government; his district was called Beylerbeyilik for it was the province with the largest administrative unit in the Turkish government; the office of the Beylerbey was called Beylik.

Caliph - the title of respect given to the one who was appointed successor to the throne; the Ottoman sultans tried to use this title to emphasize their pre-eminence among Muslim rulers and their protectorship of Islam; during the Abassid and Aumyad dynasties this individual was called Halife.

Celebi - (1) a title of respect given to those of upper classes, or (2) a title given to a religious leader.

Dar ul-harb-the land or home of war.

Dar ul-Islam-the land or home of Islam.

Defterdar - the chief of the treasury.

Dervish - a member of a Muslim religious order.

devsirme - the levy of Christian children who were taken by the Ottoman government and who were trained to hold posts in the governmental offices.

Divan-i humayun - the council of the Ottoman empire, the organ of the Ottoman government.

Emir - commander, prince.

emlak - real estate property

eyalet - a district or province

Ferman - a decree or edict of the sultan

fetva - a response from the Mofti or Shiek ul-Islam in any matter the sultan could ask for; most often the fetva would be based on what was written in the holy book of Islam, the Koran.

Fikh - the regulations of the sacred law

Gazi - a title of respect given to one who fights the infidels on behalf of Islam.

Grand vizir-the deputy of the sultans

Kutba - a sermon following Friday prayer. (In any mosque the name of the sultan had to be mentioned in the Kutba.)

Ibn - son

Imam - the lawful successor of Muhammed, a leader of daily prayers.

jizyah - tax on non Muslims

Kadi - a judge

Kadi al askar - a judge of the military forces

Kanun - a secular law issued by the sultan, an imperial decree.

Kanunnam - a collection of the sultan's decrees

Kizilbas - the tribes of East Anatolia whose religious belief is Shiite.

Maktaba - library

Mufti - Muslim legal authority

naib - a deputy or lesser judge

Osmanli - used within the title of ancient books, meaning "Ottoman empire".

Pasha - the title of a very high official, such as a governor of a province.

Ramazan - the month in which the Muslims fast (sometimes spelled Ramadan).

reaya - the subjects of the Ottoman empire; sometimes refers to the non-Muslim Ottoman subjects.

Sanjak - district or chief administrative unit of the Ottoman empire; its governor was referred to as Sanjak Bey.

Shiek - the chairman of the religious community, or the head of the tribe; preacher.

Seriat - the sacred law of Islam

Sherif - the title of the governor of Mecca; means a descendent of the prophet Muhammed.

Shiite - one of the Muslim sects; its followers believe that Ali Abu Talib, the fourth caliph after the prophet Muhammed, was the first true Imam and who should have become the immediate heir of the prophet.

sofi - a dervish, or a very conservative Muslim who acts against modernization.

Sunnis - the Orthodox Muslims, one of the sects of the religious Islam which is always in conflict with the Shiites.

Timar - a fief of small income whose privileges are granted in return for military services.

Ulema - the Muslim people who were learned in the sacred law; a learned man was named Alim, but the whole

of the learned subjects was called Ulema.

Vakf - religious endowment

vizir - a government minister

PART II

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE TWO EMPIRES

In this chapter the researcher provides information as well as some analysis regarding the civilization of the Mamluk and Ottoman Empires. The following questions are addressed:

- Who were the Mamluks? The Ottomans? What are their origins? How did they come to rule?
- What type of government did they each establish?
- What were the characteristics of each society? the people? the economics? the armed forces?
- What were the unique qualities of each of the empires that may contribute to the success of each? to the final conquest of Egypt by the Ottomans?
- How do the characteristics of the empires compare with one another?

The specific information in this chapter is provided in a summarized or "overview" form as it is not the intent of this study to examine in detail the history and development of each civilization. The materials in this chapter are provided as a background to facilitate the understanding of the main topic of this study, the events of the Ottoman

conquest of Egypt in 1517 and possible reasons for and results of the conquest.

The Mamluks

The Mamluks were a dynasty of rulers in Egypt who held power from 1250 until 1517 when Egypt was conquered by the Ottomans.* The Mamluks had their origins** in soldiers recruited by the sultans of the Ayyubid dynasty

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*The Mamluk dynasty may be divided into two periods according to the background and ethnic descent of the sultans. In the first period which covered 1250-1382 the rulers were primarily Turkish in origin. They were called the Bahri Mamluks due to the fact that as slave bodyguards of Sultan Ayybid they had been quartered in barracks on Roda (Arrawdah) Island in the Nile River (Arabic "bahr") near Cairo. The Burji Mamluks reigned from 1382-1517. The ancestors of this group had been quartered in the Cairo Citadel (Arabic "burg")[1]

**Regarding the primary sources which deal with the history of the Mamluks the best are the works written by the contemporary historians in chronicle style. Of these are: Aini, Ahmed, Iqd al-Juman Fi Tawarih ahl l-Zaman; el-Sakawi, el-Tabr el Masbul Zail el-Suluk; Ibn Tagri Birdi, al Manhal al-Safi; Al-Jabarti Abd al Rahman, Ajaib al Athar Fi Tarajim wail akhbar 3 vols; el-Makrizi Tagi al-Din, Kitab as suluk li-ma rifat dual al muluk; Ibn el-Sairafi Ali Ibn Dawoodi; Nuzhat el-nufus wal Abdan Fi Twarih Ahl el-Zaman; Ibn Iyas Bada'l az-zuhur Fi waqa l ad-duhur. The best general discussion of the Mamluks history is the work by S. Lane-Poole A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages (1968), which gives a reliable survey of the Mamluk history in the general context of medieval Egyptian history. I.M. Lapidus, Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages (1967), focuses on the structure and dynamics of political and social classes in the Mamluk. A brief history of the individual sultans of the Circassian Mamluk is given by W. Muir, The Mamluk or Slave Dynasty of Egypt; S. John Glubb, Soldiers of Fortune. For the Mamluks under the Ottomans P.M. Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent 1516-1922: A political history (1966) provides a more detailed survey than that given by S. Lane-Poole. Three monographs by D. Ayalon analyze the structure and ethos of Mamluk institutions in meticulous detail: L'Esclavage du Mamluk; "Gunpowder

before them. These soldiers were extracted from the ranks of foreign slave corps. While some of their numbers were brought from other places, a great majority were of Turkish descent.[2] The Ayyubids conscripted these individuals at an early age, and trained them rigorously in the capital city of Cairo in politics, administration, and soldiering. They were then given positions in the armed forces or in government as guards, armour-bearers, body guards, etc. Those who showed promise were given administrative posts in the government and military.[3]

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and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom" (1956" an examination of the result of "Mamluk reluctance to adopt new equipment and technology" and the series of articles "Studies on the structure of the Mamluk Army," Bulletin of the school of Oriental and African Studies, 15:203-228, 448-476 (1953) and 16:57-90 (1954), "a description of the evolution of the Mamluk army." R. Lopez, H. Miskiman, and A. Udovitch, "England to Egypt 1350-1500," in M.A. Cook (ed), Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East (1970), sets forth the economic factors that contribute to the decline of the Mamluk State. The introductory chapter of S.J. Shaw, The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of the Ottoman Egypt 1517-1798 (1962), outlines the process by which the Mamluks infiltrated the Ottoman government of Egypt. Also, A.N. Poliak, Feudalism in Egypt, Syria and Palestine and Lebanon. The Circassian's Mamluk's relation, especially politically is given by G.W.F. Stripling, The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs, 1511-1574. Urbana, Ill. 1942 (repr. 1968); and N.Fisher, The Foreign Relation of Turkey, 1481-1512. Urbana, Ill. 1948. G. Wiet, Historie de la nation Egyptienne vol. v contains general history of Egypt, but the author based his information on the contemporary sources such as Ibn Iyas, Ibn Tagribirdi and so on.[4]

In 1249 the last of the Ayyubid sultans died. A decade of struggle for the throne by his heirs and other members of the government followed. Finally the Mamluks were successful in establishing one of their own, Baybars I (reigned 1260-1277)*, as sultan.[5]

The Mamluk sultans continued the practice of importing individuals to be specially trained for military and governmental posts, and eventually brought in men of Turkish, Kurdish, Circassian, and Greek descent as well as slaves from the Balkans and parts of Asia.[6] These individuals, molded for positions of authority, comprised a ruling group that was very separate from the rest of society.

The Mamluk governmental system was basically an oligarchy. The sultan was at the head and his power was absolute.[7] In cases of emergency the sultan might consult his emirs or the governors he selected to administer the various provinces of Egypt. He might also ask advice of his special counsel of chief military commanders. But the sultan was still the individual with sole responsibility for defending the properties of the country against enemies, for gathering necessary funds for operation of the government and the military, and for keeping stability within the country.[8]

The Mamluks ruled with vigor. Gains in land, successes in promotion and protection of the Islamic faith,

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*Further information regarding the life of Baybars can be seen on p. 32.

victories in war, activity in building, and developments in industry and agriculture, mark the period of Mamluk Egypt.*

Under the name of Islam the Mamluks expanded their empire at one point to the Libian desert as far as Barka in the west, in the south Nubia as far as Massow'a, and in the north to the Mediterranean Sea. Their rule extended over Syria in the east whose frontiers stretched to the Euphrates, to Der al-Zor through Rakka in the south, to the Arabian deserts, and in the north to the Taurus.[9] The sultan became the recognized protector of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

The Mamluks managed to consolidate their empire while gaining prestige in the Islamic-Arabic world when they succeeded in driving the last of the Christian crusaders from their territories and in keeping the Mongols from moving westward when they defeated them at Ayn Jalut, Palestine in 1260.[10] They justified their rule and their activities to the people of the Middle East by restoring the Caliphate in Cairo in 1261.[11] (The Caliph had been driven from Baghdad by the Mongols). Baybars I, the Mamluk sultan at that time, had the powers of the caliph ceremoniously transferred to the sultanate, however. The caliphate remained in Cairo for several hundred years and, while any power and influence it enjoyed was unwritten, the sultans still

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*See p. 32.

looked to the religious representatives for blessings upon their thrones and their actions.[12]

Dozens of buildingsof all types were erected by the Mamluks. Mosques, schools, monasteries, hospitals, and tombs were erected. The economy was prosperous for many decades, particularly with the government support of crafts and industries during the early decades,[13] and again in the middle half of the 14th century, when the Mamluks succeeded in their invasion upon Cyprus (the island spice-trade route to Asia) in 1426, Egypt took its place as the main transit route between the Orient and the Mediterranean.[14]

The people of Egypt under the Mamluks were divided into two very separate societal classes, the upper ruling class of foreign born Mamluks, and the lower working class of native Egyptians. This situation of a foreign born ruling class was unique to the Mamluk empire. As William Muir writes:

> We search in vain for a parallel in the history of the world. Slaves have risen on their masters and become for the moment dominant. But for a community of purchased bondsmen, maintained and multiplied by a continuous stream of slaves bought, like themselves and by themselves, from Asiatic salesmen; such a community ruling at will over a rich country with outlying lands--the slave of today the sovereign of tomorrow--the entire governing body of the same slavish race, that such a state of things should hold good for two centuries and a half, might at first sight seem incredible.[15]

The Mamluk dynasty's foreign origins, and its continuation of importing non-natives for development into powerful members of its ruling class undoubtedly fostered resentment in the native Egyptians. As will be shown in later chapters division, rivalry and disloyalty existed among the ruling class members themselves. This factionalism throughout the empire, apparently a result of the Mamluk habit of installing non-Egyptian leaders throughout all areas of life, necessitated their hard-handed rule of the people, and contributed to their eventual downfall.

The Egyptian natives cultivated the land, paid the taxes, and manufactured most of the goods. Large amounts of money and goods were continually gathered from the lower classes. Those individuals found contributing inadequately were publicly beaten. The natives were also not allowed to hold important positions in government and business, and were given only low-ranking administrative posts in the religious and judicial sectors. Children of Mamluk parents born in Egypt were also considered of lower rank than foreign-born Mamluks.[16] All of these individuals of less rank than the ruling class were regarded as common peasant workers. Law-breakers were dealt with harshly. If, for example, a native struck a Mamluk, even in self-defense, he often lost an eye or a hand. Even those natives who were lucky enough to hold a government administrative post (such as a supervisor of properties belonging to the sultan or caretaker of

the royal horses and camels) were treated harshly. During financial cutbacks, the Egyptians' stipends were the first to be reduced. If a native complained of injustice he faced dismissal from his post.[17] This treatment of the natives, of course, would not result in favor of the Mamluks. To this point Stripling writes regarding the feelings of the natives: "The Arab dislike of the Mamluks was based on suspicion and distrust of foreigners whom the Arabs could neither understand nor converse with."[18]

A question would arise of why the Mamluks isolated themselves from their subjects and treated them badly.

Muir based his idea of the isolation of the Mamluks upon the racial factor.[19] But the racial factor does not seem to be acceptable as the real reason of the Mamluk's isolation from the natives. Personal characteristics of both were almost the same. So, it is not probable that the Mamluks because of their race did not incorporate with the natives. It seems that political and economic motives were the main factors which contributed to the Mamluk's isolation. The Mamluks feared that by fusing themselves with or into the subjects, they might gradually lose their political power, and the status of lords over their subjects, whose main task was to serve them and cultivate the lands. Ibn Kaldun divided the society of Egypt during the Mamluk Circassian periods into two classes: the Sultan and the subjects.[20] According to his division, it seems that he was influenced by political consideration into explaining

that Egyptians by that time could be described as oppressed subjects by the oppressors; the Mamluks. What supported the political and economic motives was the division of the Egyptian society made by el-Makrizi. He states that people of Egypt were divided into seven categories. The first was ahl el-dowlah (the ruling class); the second was the rich merchants; third was the regular merchants; fourth was peasants who lived in villages; fifth, the poor people who consisted of the Fokaha (clergymen), scholars and most of Ajnad al Kalg (sons of peoples); sixth the profitional workers such as blacksmiths, carpenters and masons; seventh was the beggars and needy people.[21] According to this division one would say that el-Makrizi based his division of the Egyptian society upon economic foundations, however, for he made the ruling class as the first category and having nothing to do other tasks except taking care of political activities, he (el-Makrizi) supported the idea of Ibn Khaldun in regard to the political consideration and explains the roles of different categories of the rules subjects.

Another element of the Mamluk Empire that is particularly relevant to the topic of this study is the condition of the armed forces of Egypt under the Mamluks. While the army and the navy of the Mamluk Empire never attained the strength (nor obtained the advanced weaponry) of the Ottomans, they did succeed in developing a skilled corps of horsemen and a well-equipped navy powerful enough to fend off sporadic enemy attacks, particularly from the Mongols.[22]

Other conditions which developed by the 16th century as well as one innate characteristic of the Mamluk civilization are seen by the researcher to be particularly relevant to the present study of the Ottoman - Mamluk relations. They include economic and trade conditions which prevailed in Egypt in the years immediately prior to the conquest and the factionalism that occurred among the Mamluk themselves as well as between the two societal classes.[23]

Despite the renewal of the spice trade route through Egypt by 1375, the economy began to decay over the next quarter century. By 1400 the monies taken in from agriculture, taxes and industries had dropped sharply, never to rise again during the Mamluk reign. Reasons for the decline are many. One was the Mamluk inability to protect its trade and agriculture from the Beduoins, to defend Syria from Timurleng in 1400,[24] or to withstand Portuguese assault against its trade in the Red Sea at the turn of the 15th century.[25] Tax difficulties also contributed to economic woes. For example, Sultan Barsbay (1422-38) briefly restored Mamluk glory by invading and controlling Cyprus in 1426. While these sort of ventures brought some amount of renewed vigor to the Mamluks, they demanded increased and oftentimes impossible taxes for the people. Recent research shows that devastating plagues in Egypt and surrounding areas during later years also contributed to the citizens' inability to produce agriculture products, goods and labor

that would have kept the Mamluk economy stable.[27] By the time of the 1517 attack on Egypt by the Ottomans all sections of government and nonpolitical Mamluk life had been severely weakened because of the poor economy.

The Ottomans

The Ottomans may be identified as those members of the powerful empire which controlled most of Asia Minor by the 15th century and continued to conquer territories in the Middle East, Europe and Africa until it more than doubled its size and rose to its height as a world power in the 16th century. The seat of the Ottoman government at its zenith was located in Istanbul.[28]

The life of the Ottoman Empire--its governmental system, its society, economics, armed forces--defies easy explanation because of its nature as an expansionist empire. As will be shown, it was a state constantly on the increase through the late 16th century. Years of rapid decline through the 19th century continued to keep it a civilization in constant flux. As the historian Wayne Vucinich says, "The Ottoman Empire was an intricate network of social systems and subsystems, which changed from one period to another far more than is generally believed."[29] In view of this, the description of the Ottoman civilization which follows will be limited, as was the description of the Mamluks preceding, to those facets and those time periods which the researcher has deemed germane to the present study.

The origin of the Ottomans* is obscure. The word Ottoman has no ethnic significance, but is a dynastic term derived from the man who is considered the founder of the Ottoman state, Osman I** (1299-1326)[30] Tradition*** tells that the forefathers of Osman came from central Asia

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*The two classic studies of Ottoman origins are Paul Wittek, The Rise of the Ottoman Empire, London, 1938, which stresses their gazi connections, and Fuat Koprulu, Les Origines de l'Empire Ottoman, Paris, 1935, which emphasizes the essentially Turkish origins of Ottoman institutions. The latter was translated into Turkish and published as Osmanli Devletinin Kurulusu (The Foundation of the Ottoman State) Ankara, 1959, with an introduction and commentaries on later studies on the subject by the author. Ernst Werner, Die Geburt einer Grossmacht Die Osmanen, 1300-1481, Berlin, 1966, provides a comprehensive but rather Marxist-oriented study of the period. Fuad Koprulu, Turk Edebiyatinda Ilk Mutasavnflar (The First Mystics in Turkish Literature), 2nd ed., Ankara, 1966, discusses the role of the mystic leaders in the development of Turkish culture and civilization in Anatolia. Mukrimin Halil Yinanc, "Ertugrul Gazi," IA, IV, 328-337, provides an exhaustive study of Osman's father, Ertugrul. 31.

**M. Tayyip Gokbilgin, "Osman I," IA, IX, 431-443, brings together all available information on Osman I himself. See also Fuad Koprulu, "Osmanli Imparatorlugu'num Etnik Mensei Meseleleri" (Problems of the Ethnic Origins of the Ottoman Empire), Belletin 7, (1944), 219-313. Problems associated with the Kayi tribe, out of which the Ottomans emerged, are discussed by Fuad Koprulu, "Kayi kabilesi hakkinda yeni notlar" (New notes on the Kayi Tribe), Belletin, 8 (1944) 421-452; Faruk Sumer, "Kayi", IA, VI, 459-462; Faruk Sumer, "Osmanli Devletinde Kayilar" (The Kayis in the Age of the Ottomans), Belletin 12, (1948) 576-615; Faruk Sumer, "Anadolu' ya yalniz Gocebe Turkler mi geldi?" (Did Only Nomandic Turks Come to Anatolia?), Belletin 24 (1960); F. Demirdas, "Osmanli Devrinde Anadoluda Kayilar" (The Kayis in Anatolia in the Age of the Ottomans), Belletin, 12 (1948) 576-615; Paul Wittek "Deux Chapitres de l'Historie des Turcs de Roum", Bayantion, 11 (1936), 85-319; and Ismail Hakki Uzuncarsuli, "Osmanli Tarihi' nin Ilk Devreleri'ne Aid Bazi Yanlisliklarm Tashihi" (Correction of Some Mistakes Concerning the First Ages of Ottoman History), Belletin, 21 (1957), 173-188. 32.

***For the lack of written records of the origin of the Ottoman empire before the capture of Constantinople, Gibbons in his

to Anatolia, and then from Anatolia to Asia Minor as a small band of horsemen in the thirteenth century. Under Osman a strong state was developed in the late 1200's on the Byzantine border in northwestern Anatolia.[34] In 1326, the year of Osman's death, the Ottomans took Bursa.[35] Then began a somewhat slow but steady increase in territories until they controlled most of the extreme northwest corner of Asia Minor by mid-century. With their seizure of Gallipoli in 1354 the size of the Ottoman state grew rapidly. Next they invaded the Balkan states, and continued their steady advancement northward to Bulgaria, and westward to Macedonia. Bulgaria eventually was subjugated in 1393, and Serbia became a vassal state of the Ottomans.[36] In 1400 they were masters of almost the whole of Anatolia and had taken nearly all the European possessions of Byzantium and there remained only Constantinople.[37] By this time, the state had a ruler who bore the title of Sultan. Its new possessions were organized into two administrative regions, Anatolia (Asia) and Rumelia (Europe). It had well begun efforts of Islamization of its conquered people, and was strengthening its armies by conscription of young Christian boys into service of the new state.[38]

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book The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire stated that the legends are not to be ignored, but they should be examined and carefully weighted. He finally agreed that the Ottoman originally came as herds from Asia Minor and were granted a piece of land from Alaeddia, the governor in Yum. 33

The Ottoman expansion was halted for a time in the first years of the 15th century when the Mongols under Timurleng advanced from central Asia and defeated the Ottomans at a battle in Ankara in 1402.* In the 1420's and 1430's, however, the Ottomans recovered and continued their expansion into Greece, and towards Europe, pushing their frontiers into Albania, Serbia, and Hungary.[39]

The Ottomans were gaining a forefront position in terms of world power and were by the middle of the 15th century regarded by the rest of the world as an awesome force. The fall in 1453 of Constantinople to the Ottomans (who later called it Istanbul) marked unequivocally the beginning of the Ottoman empire (as well as the end of Byzantium).[40] In the next century the Ottomans continued their expansion into the Balkan Peninsula, Asia, and Africa.[41]

Just as the size of the Ottoman Empire holdings during its nearly six hundred years of existence was con-constantly in a state of flux, so were many facets of its governmental system. Even during the 16th century, a later time in this study, the empire was a network of enclaves, vassal principalities, ill-defined zones, and territories only recently conquered by the Ottomans. The people were a vast mixture of beliefs, nationalities, and

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*See Page 64.

languages, from Christian European heritage to Eastern Muslim descent. The amount and variousness of territory over which the government ruled was equally large.

One element of government that remained fairly constant during the six hundred years of the Ottoman rule, was the sultanate. As in the Mamluk Empire, the sultan was all powerful. The Ottoman government was basically a theocratic monarchy, with the sultan professing to base his rule on sacred Muslim law. The ruling Ottoman sultans, throughout the six centuries, were all from the Osman dynasty. Because there was no confirmed law in the early years of the Ottoman Empire which could be followed in regards to the succession to the throne, the strongest son became sultan when his father died. Examples of this situation can be seen by observing the many civil wars among sons of the sultans after the death of their fathers.*[42]

During the 15th and 16th centuries a two-part political administration system was perfected. One part was the ruling institution of converted Muslims and the other part was the Muslim institution of born Muslims; each had its own functions.

The ruling institution included the sultan, his family, officers of his household, high officers of the army, the armed forces, and a large body of young slave recruits (mostly foreign born Christians converted to Islam) who were trained for service in the army, the court, and the government. The ruling institution controlled all

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*Throughout this study some of these situations are discussed.

government functions except the judiciary.

In the Muslim institution were educators, priests, jurisconsults, judges and trainees for these positions. Also included were dervishes and sayyids (holy men believed descended from the Prophet Muhammed). These persons, all Muslim born, were responsible for Muslim learning, religion, and law.[43]

The sultan appointed many officials who assisted in running the central government. Regional governments of the empire's territories (there were nine territorial divisions in the 16th century) were headed by appointed governors, often brothers of the sultan, each of whom had an assisting staff. The territories were further divided into provinces and then into judicial districts all headed by officers appointed by imperial decree.[44]

A large amount of the taxes collected not surprisingly went to support the Ottoman military forces, the army and the navy. Until the end of the 16th century, the feudal army which they developed was the principal force.[45]

Fief-holders were obliged to provide soldiers as well as serve themselves. (In some cases financial payments could be made in lieu of such services). Augmenting this corps of peasant tenants were the Janissaries, the young Christian slave recruits were specially trained for the military life. It is believed that this practice of conscripting young men and specially molding them for the army began in the 1300's. It reached its height during the

years of Sultan Suleyman (reigned 1520-1566) when the Janissaries comprised the bulk of the powerful military, their numbers equalling about 12,000. During the time of the invasion of Egypt there were approximately 10,000 Janissaries,[46] according to Stanley Lane-Poole who stated that the urgent need of a strong and standing army led the Ottomans to develop an infantry, Janissaries, or "new troops" which for centuries constituted the flower of the Ottoman army.[47]

The navy did not develop nearly as much as the land forces. The reason is apparently because in the early years of the formation of the Ottoman state land warfare was the basis of the Ottoman strategies of conquest. A navy was not even developed until the 15th century. At first, the function of the navy was not more than the defending of straits and coasts, and the transporting of soldiers. During the second half of the 15th century, however, the navy achieved prominence by succeeding in turning the Black Sea into a virtual lake of the Ottomans. In the years following the conquest of Egypt it had other periods of prominence as it battled with the Portuguese for dominance over the Red Sea and Indian Ocean.[48]

As the Mamluks had the unique distinction of being a totally foreign-born ruling class, which resulted in conditions perhaps unfavorable for fending off the Ottomans, so the Ottoman society possessed a unique outlook that, while not accounting for the Ottoman victory over the Egyptians,

certainly sheds some light on why the Ottomans made such an expansionary effort and perhaps why they were for many centuries so successful.

Islam was the foundation of the Ottoman society. As Vucinich notes, "Few people have been so intransigently Muslim as the Ottomans, who took the missionary aspect of Islam seriously."[49] From the early days of Osman I there was high respect for the ghazi, or the frontier defender, who ideally was obligated to make jihad, or war against any infidel on behalf of the Muslim faith. Osman early campaigns attracted ghazis from other parts of the Islamic world, as well as others who came for the opportunity to win plunder. Throughout the many centuries of Ottoman conquests through the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Europe campaigns were undertaken in the name of Islam. Certainly its questionable if this was the singular motive of the Ottoman sultan. However, the ghazi ideal gave a form to the Ottomans activities. Their forceful attempts at new victories and the government and types of social reform they laid down in subjugated lands were couched in the expressed desire to eradicate the infidels and to consolidate the expanding Islamic world under their rule which was based in the principles of Muslim holy law.

In summary, we can see that some similarities existed between the Mamluk and the Ottoman empires. Both were Islamic states. Both were prestigious and powerful as world powers. Each supported a ruling class headed by a supreme sultan.

In contrast to one another, the Ottomans were constantly attempting to expand their territories while the Mamluks were not nearly so active in campaigns for new lands. Ottoman holdings were vastly larger than the Mamluks by the 16th century. The Mamluk economy was also suffering by this time while the Ottoman was not. Also, the army of the Ottomans used advanced weaponry such as firearms and the Mamluks did not. Both sides, however, depended largely on foreign-born soldiers to augment their troops. A characteristic unique to the Mamluk society was the ruler's practice of recruiting and training foreign-born individuals for all positions of power in society. While this apparently resulted in factionalism within the Mamluk empire, the vastly diverse Ottoman empire enjoyed some solidarity under the ideal of the ghazi, the desire to bring the world together under Islam. However, it should be noted that this ghazi ideal of the Ottomans was not a main motive behind the Ottomans march on Egypt in 16th century. It may be seen as giving impetus to the overall tendencies toward expansion, particularly in regards to Christian Europe. As the following chapters will show, numerous other factors and situations led to the Ottoman move to conquer Egypt in 1517.

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CHAPTER II

THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE OTTOMAN SULTANS AND MAMLUK SULTANS PRIOR TO THE CONQUEST

The relationship between the Ottoman sultans and the Mamluk sultans prior to the conquest is a subject requiring close examination if full understanding of the Ottoman victory is desired. In this chapter the following questions will be addressed:

What was the diplomatic relationship between the two states prior to 1517? Was it friendly or hostile, or was it characterized by both? What were the effective factors resulting in any such characteristics? What was the resulting impact, if any, on the two states? Did the internal or external affairs of either state have any impact upon their relations with one another? Did the border states contribute to a strain upon or developments in the relationship? Did the relationship between the Ottoman and Mamluk Empires prior to the conquest have any connection with the final invasion by the Ottomans which resulted in the destruction of the Mamluk Empire? If so, how did it develop? Who initiated the first strikes against the other? Was one state "more responsible" for the final confrontation than the other?

Prior to the conquest in 1517, the relationship between the Ottoman sultans and the Mamluk sultans took many forms. An examination of diplomatic correspondence between the two states shows feelings and attitudes fluctuating between friendliness, cool formality, cautiousness, and suspicion. This tenuous relationship finally deteriorated to the point of outright war.

In this chapter, the events and developments leading to the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517 will be examined. The examination will begin with the year 1382 which marked the beginning of the Circassian Mamluk Dynasty, when the Mamluk and Ottoman empires first came in contact with one another. According to sources contemporary to the period, such as Ibn Iyas, Ibn el-Sairafi, al Aini, and el-Makrizi it appears to the researcher that the Mamluk and Ottoman sultans were on good terms with one another in the years prior to 1382 from the time that the Mamluks first gained power in Egypt. There is no evidence of conflict between the two empires which suggests that neither state had any designs against one another. There are three additional points which support this suggestion. First, in the early time, the frontiers of both states were far from one another so there was little reason, for each power to intervene in one another's affairs. For many decades the two empires were separated by the Karman state which was relatively smaller than the Ottoman and Mamluk states but

nevertheless created some distance between their lands. There was no conflict along this common boundary until later, when the Ottomans marched upon the Amirates of Asia Minor (in the first quarter of the thirteenth century), such as Angora, Karasi, and Tokat.[1]

Second, the Ottoman Empire at this time, was occupied by expansionist activities in the west toward Christian Europe, especially the Byzantine and Balkan principalities; it did not spend its efforts toward the east. This also indicates to the researcher that the Mamluks may have viewed these Ottoman expansionist efforts favorably, as they, too, were Sunni Muslims, and the Ottoman activities were diverted against Christianity, a belief they also opposed. Third, it would seem that the advancement by the Mongols towards the West during this period, would have encouraged the Ottoman and Mamluk sultans to associate on good terms with one another in case of their need to unite efforts against a common enemy. It seems improbable that they did not see the potential danger of the Mongols, particularly after Timur's* (1336-1405) advancements

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*During his lifetime Timur had a record kept of all his acts and arranged for the preparation of an official biography. This survived in the contemporary recension of Nizam ul-Din Shami ed. by F. Tauer, two volumes (1937-56) and in the more florid version of Sharaf ul-Din Yazdi, trans. by F. Petis de la Croix (1722). The opposite point of view, bitterly hostile to Timur, is given by another contemporary Ibn Arabshah, translated by J.H. Sanders, Tamerlane: or Timur, the Great Amir (1936). The supposed memoirs (mulfuzat) trans. by C. Stewart (1830), and Institutes (Tuzukat) of Timur are generally held to be forgeries, and the circumstance of their

towards them. In 1384, an exchange of correspondence began which supports this idea that an awareness of and caution towards the Mongols existed in both governments. Sultan Murad I (1359-1389)* sent his envoy, whose name is

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alleged discovery and presentation to Shah Jahan in 1637 was itself open to suspicion. The most scholarly study of the evidence relating to Timur's life is in the English translation of V.V. Barthold, Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, Vol. 1, A Short History of Turkestan: History of Semirechye (1956), and Vol. 2 Ulugh-beg (1958). Based substantially on this work is the account of his life given in Hilda Hookham, Tamburlaine, the Conqueror (1962) which also contains the fullest available bibliography of works in English. Another account of Timur is given in Harold Lamb, Tamerlane, the Earth Shaker (1929).[2]

*Murad I's reign (1359-1389) is discussed generally by Ismail Hakki Uzuncarsili, "Murad I," I.A. 8 (1960), 587-598. The same author also considers the rise of the Turkish nobility, led by the Candarli, in Ottoman service in Candarli Vezir Ailesi, (The Candarli ministerial family,) Ankara, 1974. The same subject is also discussed by Franz Taeschner and Paul Wittek, "Die Vezirfamilie der Gandarlyzade (14.15 Jh) und ihre Denkmater," Der Islam 18 (1929). Murad's relationship with the ahi orders is studied by F. Taeschner, "War Murad I. Grossmeister oder Mitglied des Achibundes " Oriens, 6 (1953), 23-31. His conquests in Rumeli are described by Apostolos E. Vacalopoulos, Origins of the Greek Nation, 1204-1461, New Brunswick, N.J., 1970; Alexandre Burmov., "Turkler Edirne'yi ne vakit aldular " (When Did the Turks Capture Edirne), Belleten 13 (1949), 97-106; M. Munir Aktepe, "XIV vs. XV asirlarda Rumeli'nin Turkler tarafindan iskanma dair" (On the Settlement of Rumelia by the Turks in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries), Turkiyat Mecmuasi, 10 (1953), 299-313; P. Charanis, "On the Date of the Occupation of Gallipoli by the Turks," Byzantinoslavia, 16 (1955), 113-117, Halill Inalcik, "Edirne'nin Fethi (1361)," in Edirne, Ankara, 1956, pp. 137-159; English tr. in Archivum Ottomanicum, 1971; P. Charanis, "The Strife Among the Palaeologi and the Ottoman Turks, 1370-1402," Byzantion, 16 (1942-1943), 286-314; 17 (1949), 104-118. By far the best single study of Ottoman conquests is that of Halil Inalcik, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest," Studia Islamica, II, 103-129. See also D. Angelov, "Certain aspects de la conquete des peuples balkaniques par les Tures," Byzantinoslavia, 17 (1956), 220-275. The Battle of Kosova is analyzed in M.Braun, Kosova, Leipzig,1937; A d'Avril, La Bataille de Kosovo, Rhapsodie Serbe, Paris,1968; Ali Haydar, Kosova Meydan Murarebesi (The

not known, to the Mamluk Sultan Barkuk (1383-1399)* cautioning him of the Mongolian advancement towards their empires. Murad warned of great danger not only for the Ottomans but also for the Mamluks.[4] Unfortunately, this action marked the beginning of the decline in good terms between the two empires.

Although Barkuk was concerned about the moves of Timur toward Mamluk territories, he was more suspicious of Ottoman ambitions toward his country. His doubts came true when the new Ottoman sultan Bayezid I (1389-1402)**

Battle of Kosova), Istanbul, 1328/1910; and Mukerrem, Kosova, 1389, Istanbul, 1931.[3]

*The information about the life of Barkuk is treated by Weil, Geschichte der Chalifen, iv. 541-556 and v. 1-71 (wherein the introduction, p.v-viii. the Arab manuscripts are quoted). His complete biography is given in the Manhal al-safi. M.S. Cairo 1113, p.316-337[5]. Sources which deal fully with the Circassian Mamluks and contain information regarding Barkuk's life are on p.31.

**The most exhaustive and useful study of the reign of Bayezit I (1389-1402) is Mukrimin Halil Yinanc, "Bayezid I," IA. II, 369-392; that of Halil Inalcik, "Bayezid I," EL2,1, 1117-1119 is short but authoritative. Bayezit's relationships with the Byzantines are described in P. Charanis, "The Strife among the Palaeologi and the Ottoman Turks, 1370-1402," Byzantion, 16 (1942), 286-314. The Battle of Nicopolis has been the subject of numerous studies of which the most useful are Aziz Suryal Atiya, The Crusade of Nicopolis, London, 1934, and E. Gling, Die Schlacht bei Nicopolis in 1396, Berlin, 1906. Bayezit's other European conquests are discussed in R.J. Loenertz, "Pour l'histoire du Peloponese au XIV siecle," REB, I, 152-186; A. Zakythinos, Le Despotat Grec de Moree, Paris, 1932; A. Gegaj, Albanie et l'invasion turque, Paris, 1937; Max Silberschmidt, Das Orientalische Problem zur Zeit der Entstehung des Turkischen Reiches nach Venezianischen Quellen, Leipzig, 1923; Franz Babinger, Beitrage zur Fruhgeschichte der Turkenherrschaft in Rumelien, Munich, 1944; and G. Beckmann, Der Kampf Kaiser Sigmunds gegen die werdende Weltmacht der Osmanen, 1392-1437, Gotha, 1902.

in 1391 attacked the border territory of Kayseri whose emir whose name and for reasons which have not been recorded, was under the protection of the Mamluks. But Bayezid I soon realized that his army would be alone in the area against future attacks by Timur. Apparently hoping to re-establish friendly terms which would more likely insure Mamluk support against any Mongol advancement, Bayezid I, according to Ibn Iyas, sent an apology* to Barkuk, along with expensive gifts.[6] Bayezid I also flattered Barkuk by asking Barkuk to send him one of his

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**Continued from previous page.

Bayezit's invasion of Anatolia is described by M. Yasar Yucel, "Kastamonu'nun ilk fethine kadar Osmanli-Candar Munasebetleri, 1361-1392" (Ottoman Relations with the Candar Principality Until the First Conquest of Kastamonu), Tarih Arastirmalart Dergisi, I, (1963), 133-144; and B.P. Saxena, Memoirs of Bayezid, Allahabad, 1939. Tamerlane's resulting invasion is followed in M.M. Alexandrescu-Dersca, La Campagne de Timur en Anatolie, Bucharest, 1942. His relationships with the Ottomans' enemies in eastern Europe are studies by Zeki Velidi Togan, "Timur's Osteuropapolitik," ZDMG, 108, (1958), 279-298. The Battle of Ankara (1402) is studied by T. Uilmaz Oztuna, 1402 Ankara Muharebesi (The 1402 Battle of Ankara), Istanbul, 1946, and Gustav Roloff, "Die Schlacht bei Angora," Historische Zeitschrift, 161 (1943), 244-262. The problems involved in Bayezit's imprisonment and subsequent death are resolved by Fuad Kiprulu, Yildirim Bayezid'in Esareti ve Intihari (The Imprisonment and Suicide of Lightning Bayezid) Belletin, I (1936), 591-603, and the same author's "Yildirim Bayezid'in Intihari Meselesi" (The Problem of Bayezid's Suicide), Belletin, 7, (1943), 591-599. See also Jean Aubin, "Comment Tamerlan pernait les villes," Studia Islamica, 19 (1963), 83-122.[7]

*A copy of the apology does not exist although it is mentioned not only by Ibn Iyas but also by el-Sairafi. Because it is described only in Egyptian sources and not in Turkish sources, and because Ibn Iyas and el-Sairafi themselves were native Egyptians their description of the letter may be biased against the Ottomans.

famous professional doctors for reasons unexplained by Ibn Iyas,[8] but probably for himself or members of his family or court. Barkuk answered this request by sending his special doctor Shams el-din Mohammad Ibn Sagser, as well as fine medicine and drugs.[9] Barkuk and Bayezid I emphasized their now courteous relations in other ways. For example, in 1394 Bayezid I, most likely in order to affirm his respect and true friendship to the Mamluks sent an envoy and gifts, both left unidentified by the source, to the Abbasid Caliph in Egypt el-Mutawakil Ala Allah. At the same time he asked the Caliph for permission to adopt the title "Sultan" which carried more prestige than the title of "emir" used by his three predecessors.[10] It appears to the researcher that Bayezid felt his recent conquest of the sizeable territory of Asia Minor justified the adoption of the new and more reputed title. In addition, the fact that he sought this change with the blessings of the Caliph, the representative of Islam, indicates that Bayezid was attempting to show the Mamluks as well as the Ottomans that as a leader he was a protector of the Islamic faith. Brockelmann, an important historian of the Middle East, indicates that Barkuk as guardian of the Caliph could do nothing but accept this official religious sanction since he needed the good favor of the Ottoman sultan as his sole ally against the Mongols.[11]

During the reign of Sultan Farage of the Mamluks (1400-1412)* relations became increasingly hostile. Bayezid I continued to lead occasional attacks against areas under the protection of the Mamluks. In the spring of 1396 at the Battle of Buda his army defeated the Crusaders, French volunteers and noble families from England, Scotland, Flanders, Lombardy, Savoy, Bohemia, and all parts of Germany and Austria, who were under the proclamation of Pope Boniface IX to march against the Ottomans.[12] Bayezid then returned to Anatolia in victory and subsequently occupied the border city of Konya, previously part of the state of Karman. He seized other cities in the eastern part of the state also, although the entire state of Karman was not fully incorporated into the Ottoman Empire until seventy years later.[13] In 1398 Bayezid also put an end to the government of Sultan Qadi Burhan al-Din of Sivas, a city northeast of Karamania along the Halys River.[14] His forces then entered the territory of the Mamluks in the upper valley of the Euphrates, occupying several cities including Malatya, Darenda, and Elbistan.[15] Thus Bayezid was simultaneously waging war on the most powerful Muslim empire in the area at the time--

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*Good sources regarding the life of Farag are: Weil, Geschichte der Chalifen, v. 72-105 and 108-125; his biography is given in detail in el-Manhal al-Safi, Cairo, MS.1113, part III 16. See also p. 31.

the Mamluk Empire--and encroaching upon the Mongolian leader Timur and his influence in eastern Anatolia as far as Erzinjan.

Bayezid I again apparently regretted his moves against the Mamluks for he next sent an embassy to Sultan Farage which, according to the research by Sir John Glubb, asked Farage to be Bayezid's ally against the Mongols.[17] Bayezid was likely prompted to make this move because Timur was advancing toward Ottoman territories and recently took the city of Sivas that had been a short time before occupied by Bayezid. Farage, after consulting with his advisors, refused.[18] Possibly with the desire to retaliate against this shun by Farage and to gain strength against the Mongol, Bayezid I next took control of the smaller and less powerful states of Anatolia and Rumelia.[19] Throughout his reign of thirteen years, Bayezid I gradually increased the Ottoman empire, often at the expense of the Mamluk territories. As a result he also found himself in the forefront of a worldwide challenge.

With these new actions, which no doubt caused a greater gap in the Ottoman-Mamluk association, Bayezid I paved the way for Timur to crush both powers. As part of Timur's expansionistic design he first in 1387 made his campaign in Asia Minor, subduing the cities of Bayezid I, Erzaroum, Erzinjan, Mush, Akhat, and Van.[20] Then he entered the city of Baghdad and occupied the palace of the sultan Ahmed Jalaiv, who fled to Asia Minor and subsequently

asked support from Bayezid I.[21] Although the extent of any support Bayezid might have given Sultan Ahmed is not known, he must have provided the ruler with some sort of protection, for Timur sent Bayezid a letter written in Arabic and undated demanding the surrender of Sultan Ahmed, and warned him against providing shelter and disobeying Timur's command.[22] Bayezid refused, and the tone of his letter to Timur was very disrespectful.[23]

Meanwhile, Timur had dispatched an ambassador to Barkuk, the Mamluk sultan, asking about the possibility of forming a treaty and commercial ties between his empire and Barkuk's.[24] It appears to the researcher that Timur was attempting to keep a temporary peace with the Mamluks for the purpose of crushing their empire only after he had finished using his strength against the Ottomans. In August 1400 Timur began his march into Asia Minor by storming the city of Sivas.[25] A dispute then developed between Timur and the sultan of Egypt over the detention of the Mongolian ambassador by the Mamluks[26] who according to Ahmed Ibn Arabshah, was thrown in chains.[27] Timur apparently used this as justification to invade the Mamluk territories. In October 1400 he took Aleppo,[28] followed by Ham, Hims, and Balabak, and eventually Damascus in March of 1401.[29]

Timur had apparently not secured a strong hold on Baghdad in 1393, for in June of 1401 he turned against Sultan Ahmad once again. On June 20 he took the city

completely, killing many citizens in retaliation for the death of many of his own officers in the sieze.[30] On July 20 of the following year he faced the Ottomans at the Battle of Angora at which the Ottomans were defeated and their Sultan Bayezid I was captured.[31] The Ottoman ruler was held captive by Timur for nine months, until his death by apoplexy Feb. 26, 1403.[32] During his captivity, Bayezid was put in a cage and publicly displayed by the Mongols.[33] His son, Musa, however, was allowed to take his father's body upon Bayezid's death to Brusa.[34]

Following Bayezid's death there were several wars between his sons, Ahmed, Mehmed, Musa, and Suleyman* over

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*The definitive article on the Interregnum (1402-1413) is Paul Wittek. "De la defaite d'Ankara a la prise de Constantinople," REI, 12 (1938), 1-34. More recent research has been incorporated into studies of the individual Ottoman participations: M.C. Sehabeddin Tekindag, Musa Celebi, I.A. VIII, 661-666; Ismail Hakki Uzuncarsili, "Mehmed I," I.A. VII, 496-506; M.C. Sebabeddin Tekindag, "Mustafa Celebi," I.A. VIII, 687-689; and M. Tayyib Gokbilgin, "Suleyman Celebi," I.A. XI, 179-182. In addition, for the subsequent reign of Mehmet I (1413-1420), see Ismail Hakki Uzuncarsili, "Celebi Sultan Mehmed" in kizi Selcuk Hatun," Belletin 21 (1957), 253-260; Franz Babinger, "Schejch Bedr ed-Din, der Sohn des Richtern von Simavas..." Kadisi-Oglu Seyh Bedreddin, Istanbul, 1340/1924; Hans J. Kissling, "Badr al-Din, b.Kadi Samawna," EL2, vol. 1, 1'Empire Ottomane redigee par an auteur anonyme Grec," Belletin 21, pp. 161-172; J.W. Barker, Manuel II Palaeologus, 1391-1425, New Brunswick, N.J., 1969; and H.J. Kissling, "Das Menaqybname Scheich Bedr ed-dins des Sohnes des Richters von Samavna," ZDMG, 100 (1950), 112-176 36.

who would succeed the throne. Finally, Mehmed secured the power,[35] and reigned as Sultan Mehmed I from 1413-1421.* A congratulatory letter written in Arabic and dated Dol Haja 817 (February, 1414) carried by the envoy Eanih Kul of Brusa from Mehmed to the new Mamluk Sultan Shiekh al-Mueyyad (1412-1421)** indicates, with an apology for its delay, that there had been no head of power in the Ottoman empire during the eight years while the brothers struggled against one another.[38] The letter also asked that friendly relations between the Mamluks and the Ottomans be renewed.[39] In return, Shiekh al-Mueyyad sent the envoy Kurtubi el-Kasiki to the Ottoman sultan, carrying a letter also written in Arabic and dated in the month of Shaban, 818 (October, 1418) stating his congratulations and feelings of happiness on Mehmed I's accession to the throne. In its conclusion he also stated his desire to continue an

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*In addition to the sources mentioned for the interregnum which also contains valuable information about Mehmed I, the following sources provides a comprehensive information: The Ancient Ottoman chronicles Ashik Pasha Zade and Tawarikki Ali Othman, edited by Giese; Urudj Bey, ed. Babinger and the later historians, especially Ali, Kunk al-Akkbar. Of the Byzantine writers this period is treated by Phrantzes, Ducas and Chalcondylas. Further: von Hammer, G.O.R. i. 331, ssq. 1 Zinkeisen, Gesch des Osm. Reiches. Hamburg 1840, i, 388-500 and Jorga, Gesch des Osm Reiches. i, 361-377. 37.

**There is a manuscript written by Aini Ahmed entitled el-Saif el-Muhanad Fi Seret el-Malik el Mueyyad. This manuscript was edited of course, in Arabic and it is available in the University of Michigan Library. In addition to this other sources dealing with the period of el-Mueyyed are: Weil, Geschichte der Chalifen. v. 129-156; Ibn Iyas ii. 2-10; Ibn Taghribirdi,

exchange of letters between both powers.[40] It seemed, then, that better relations between the Mamluk and Ottoman powers were emerging during the early years of the fifteenth century. Perhaps the Ottomans realized that their ties with the Mamluks could not be underestimated and this prompted their first moves toward re-establishing a good relationship. Another exchange of letters occurred between Mehmed and al-Mueyyad. The Ottoman envoy was Hair el-Din Bey, and the letter he carried dated in the month of Shawal, 822 (October 1419) emphasized the strength of the mutual friendship between the two powers, comparing it to the mortar between two bricks. It also described the Ottoman victories over unidentified infidels.[42] Al-Mueyyad's reply, carried by the envoy Ibrahim Hagi Halil Bey, was a short letter (dated in the month of Safar, 824 (February, 1421) which also affirmed friendship and supported the Ottoman's actions against the unidentified infidels.[43]

The amiable relations between the Ottoman and Mamluk governments appear to have developed during the time of the next rulers, the Mamluk Sultan Barsbay (1422-1438)*

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ed. Popper VI/i/iii. 168-176; Ibn Taghribirdi, al-Manhal al-safi, Arab. MS. Vienna, Mixt. 329-, vol. 382-91; for the Asia Minor dynasties see E. de Zambaur, Manuel de Genealogie et de Chronologie, Hanover, 1927, p. 157, sq. 41.

*There is no specific sources dealing with the life of Barsb however, the following may provide good information. Weil, Geschichte der Chalifen, vol. 164-214; Muir, Mamluk or Slave Dynasty of Egypt, 137-148; Al-Manhal al-Safi, Cairo, MS 1113, I v. 307-313; Ibn Iyas (Bulak) passim. 44 for further information see p. 32

and the Ottoman Sultan Murad II (1421-1451)*. An exchange of envoys occurred. Murad II sent his representative to congratulate Barsbay on his successes against pirates who had begun to occupy islands off the Syrian and Egyptian coasts. In August of 1422 a cargo ship was captured and stolen from the harbor of Alexandria by a

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*The reign of Murad II (1412-1451) is brilliantly studied by Halil Inalcik, "Murad II," IA, VIII, 598-516. See also Ducas, Istoria Turco-Bizantina (1341-1462), ed Vasile Green, Bucharest, 1958; G. Beckmann, Der Kampf Kaiser Sigmunds gegen die werdemde Weltmacht der Osmanen 1392-1437, Gotha, 1902; Mehmed Cemil, Candarls Halil Pasa, Istanbul, 1933; Ismail Hakki Uzuncarsili, "Candarli," IA, III 351-357 and Candarls Vezir Ailesi (The Candarli Ministerial Family). Istanbul, 1974, describe the power exercised by the nobility through the Candarli family. Murat's relations with the Mamluks of Egypt and Syria are included in A. Darag, L'Egypte sous le Regne de Barsbay, 1422-1438. Damascus, 1961. On European relations leading up to the Crusade of Varna see Halil Inalcik, "1444 Buhrani" (The Crisis of 1444), in his Fatili Devri Uzerinde Tetkikler ve Vesikalar, I (Studies and Documents on the Period of Mehmet II The Conqueror), Ankara, 1954, p. 1-53; and David Angyal, "Le Traite de Paix de Szeged avec les Turcs (1444)," Revue de Hongrie (1911), 233-268, 374-392. On the Crusade of Varna itself and the Ottoman victory (1444) see Nicholas Iorga, Notices et Extraits pour Servir a i'Histoir des Croisades au XV Siecle, 6 vols., Bucharest, 1899-1915, and the same author's La Campagne des Croises sur le Danube, Paris, 1927. Also Oskar Halecki, The Crusade of Varna: A Discussion of Controversial Problems, New York, 1943, to be used with the review of J. Bromberg, Speculum, 20 (1945). Franz Babinger, "Von Amurath zu Amurath. Vor- und Nachspiel der Schlacht bei Varna (1444)," Oriens, 3 (1950), 229-265, 4 (1951) 80 J. Dabroski, "La Pologne et l'expedition de Varna en 1444," Revue des Etudes, Slaves, 10 (1930), 37-75; Huber, "Die Kriege zwischen Ungarn und die Turken (1440-1444)," Archiv fur Osterreichen Geschichte, 68 (1886), 157-207. Necati Salim (Tacan), Turk Ordusu'num Eski Seferleri'nden bir Imha Murarebesi, Varna 1444" (Among the Old Battles of the Turkish Army, A Battle of Annihilation, Varna, 1444), Istanbul, 1931; an Adnan Erzi, "Il Murad'in Varna muharebesi kakkunda fethnamesi" (A Bulletin of Victory of Murat II Concerning the Battle of Varna), Belletin 14 (1950) 595-647.

number of pirates, believed to be Frankish in origin. In May of 1424 two Muslim cargo vessels were also captured, off the coast of Damietta.[46] The Mamluks made several attempts to find the captors of their vessels, and in May of 1426 sent over one hundred ships down the Nile toward Cyprus, to which they believed the captors had fled. In July 1426 at Chiorokoitia, three or four miles southwest of Larnaca, Barsbay's army met with the army of Cyprus, under the leadership of King Janus, the Mamluks were victorious, taking the king as well as over one thousand other prisoners, who were subsequently paraded through the streets of Cairo.[47]

(Cont'd.from previous page)

Ottoman efforts to conquer Albania, and the resistance led by Scanderbeg, are described in A. Gegaj, L'Albanie et l'Invasion Turque au XV Siecle, Paris, 1937; Halil Inalcik, "Timariotes Chretiens en Albanie as XV Siecle," Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchiv, 4 (1952), "Arnavutlukta Osmanli Hakimiyeti'nin Yerlesmesi ve Iskender Bey Isyani'nin Mensei" (The Establishment of Ottoman Rule in Albania, and the Origins of the Revolt of Scanderbeg), Fatih ve Istanbul, Mecmuasi, I, 153-191, and "Iskender Bey," IA, V, 1079-1082, F.S. Noli, Georeg Castrioti Scanderbeg, 1405-1468, New York, 1947; and C. Marinesco, Alphonse V, Roi d'Aragon et de Naples et de l'Albanie de Scancderbeg, Paris, 1923. The second battle of Kosova is described in Necati Salim (Tacan), Ikinci Kosova Meydan Murarebesi (1448), Istanbul, 1932. On Murat's subsequent effort to besiege Constantinople, see Zafer Taslikhoglu, "II Murad'in Istanbul muhasarasi hakkinda bir eser" (A Work on Murat II's Siege of Istanbul), Tarih Dergisi, VIII, 209-226. His initial efforts to establish contacts with the Tartar hams of the Crimea are presented in Fevzi Kurtoglu, "Ilk Kirim Hanlarinin Mektuplari" (The Letters of The First Crimean Hans), Belletin 1 (1937), 641-655. Europe's reaction to the Turkish Question is discussed by Hans J. Kissling, "Die Turkenfrage als europaisches Problem," Sudostdeutsches Archiv. 7 (1964) 39-57 and the same author's "Militarische-politische Problematiken zur Turkenfrage im 15. Jahrhundert, "Bohemia:Jahrbuch des Collegium Carolinum, 5 (1964), 108-136 45.

Barsbay responded to Murad II's congratulations to the above events by sending his envoy to Murad with mutual salutations, and seeking to know about current conditions in the Ottoman empire as well as their foreign relations with the Balkan states.[48]

By this time Murad II had made a lasting peace in 1424 with the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Palaeologus (1391-1425) and turned his attention to other regions where he met with further success.[49] In Asia he drove from power most of the small rulers who had been restored earlier by Timur.[50] This was probably an easy task given the comparatively large size of the growing Ottoman force. The strongest of these small Asian states was Karaman, and the Ottomans were able to reduce it to a position of vassalage.[51] In Europe Murad II completed the subjugation of Serbia and Bosnia, conquested Salonica (Thessalonica) and its districts, and converted Morea into a tributary state.[52] All of these efforts were expanding the Ottoman domain, prompting Murad II to send letters relating his successes to Barsbay as well as to other foreign rulers.

This policy of exchanging news through letters between Barsbay and Murad II continued. Two other undated letters were sent from Murad to Barsbay. One announced his capture of Salonica from the Venetians and consoled the Mamluks on the death of the former sultan, al-Mueyyad.[53] Another asks for Barsbay's consultation in regards to conflicts between the Ottomans and the Greeks.[54] To both of

these letters Barsbay sent a reply. In one undated he expressed his support of the Ottoman policies in Salonica and stated his gratitude for the condolences sent by the Ottomans at al-Mueyyad's death.[55] A second undated letter advised Murad not to take further action against the Greeks but to follow the example of the prophet Muhammed as when he made peace with an infidel in Mecca.[56]

Further encouragement for the sultans to be friendly with one another were demands made on both sides by Shah Rukh, the Mongol Timur's son.* Shah Rukh demanded the right to furnish the Ka'aba with a precious holy curtain, a practice customarily performed by Islamic rulers to show their political power as well as their religious faith. It would seem that Shah Rukh, like Bayezid I (see p.60) before him when Bayezid asked the Caliph to sanction his new title, was trying to show the people that he had power in the region. Barsbay replied that he would respond to such an act by selling the curtain and giving the proceeds to the poor,[57] which seems to mean that he felt Shah Rukh's request was unacceptable. Shah Rukh sent an envoy with a princely robe commanding that Barsbay receive investiture in it as a vassal, but Barsbay tore it up. A quote by Muir** said: "Tell thy master," said the sultan to Shah

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*For further information, see p. 56 .

**Muir does not indicate the exact source of this direct quotation. His work, however, is based on the research of Dr.Gustav Weil who for his Geschichte der Chalifen consulted

Rukh's envoy, "that we smile at his demand; and if, to avenge thy disgrace, he appear not in the coming year, we shall hold him the weakest of mankind."[58] el-Makrizi in his fourth volume identified the envoy of Shah Rukh as Safa, and mentioned that Shah Rukh also demanded that the Imam of the mosque in Mecca mention his name after the daily prayers and that his name be imprinted upon the currency. According to el-Makrizi the envoy was beaten and thrown into a pool of water.[59] After hearing that Shah Rukh had made a similarly imperious demand on Murad II, Barsbay took the occasion for proposing the formation of a defensive alliance with Murad against the Mongols.[60]

Frequent communications of an amicable nature and exchanges of costly gifts also passed during the subsequent Mamluk reigns of Jakmak (1438-1453)* and Inal (1453-1461)**.

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such contemporary Arabic and Turkish language sources as:

Abulfeda (1273-1331)
Noweiry (1280-1332)
Ibn Batuta (1302-1377)
el-Makrizi (1358-1441)
Abul-Mahasin (1409-1470)
Ibn Iyas (1448-1524)

*For sources regarding the reign of Jakmak see the following: Weil, Geschichte der Chalifen, v. 215-248; Muir, Mameluke or Slave Dynasty of Egypt, p.149-155; Manhal al-Safi, Cairo, MS.1113, i,fo,474-490; Ibn Iyas (Bulak), passim.[62] Also for further information see p.31.

**Because Farage reigned almost in period closed to Jakmak the above source is valuable. Also the following are valuable for both rulers: Ibn Taghribardi, al-Manhal al-Safi, s.v. Inal; Ibn Iyas, ii. 39-65; Weil, Geschichte der Chalifen, Vol. v, where oriental and western references are given. [63]

In 1438 Jakmak sent a special letter dated in Jomad elowla, 842 (October 1438) to Murad II with news of the death of Barsbay and how Jakmak became the guardian of Barsbay's son Yousif who was just 14 years old at his father's death. It also tells the news of the course of internal events which eventually put Yousif under the influence of his young friends and created disputes in the country. The bad developments encouraged the Caliph el Moatadid be ellah Caliphat ellah fi ardehi to summon the great sheiks, cadis, and imams for consultation and discussion of the future of the country. The result of the conventions was the choice of Jakmak as the sultan of Egypt. In the last part of the letter Jakmak explains his accession to the throne and his order to his Mamluk followers to act with neighborly policies toward the Ottomans. He also entreated Murad II to facilitate the return of one of several merchants detained by the Ottomans.[61] (Details of this latter situation are not known, but perhaps the merchant was a favorite of Jakmak and was held for bad behavior or custom violations).

Murad II did not hesitate to return an undated letter to Jakmak, again with rare gifts. He congratulated Jakmak on his accession, and announced the good news that he had made his first attempt to gain from the Hungarians the fortress of Belgrade, which was the gate leading to central Europe. The tone of the correspondence expresses honor and respect which indicates amity between the two leaders. For example, one of the phrases says: Our

sultanate was decorated by the coronation of the best of mankind whom my god created, who possess the best moral and religious characteristics."[64] In another phrase Murad II describes himself as "a son of Jakmak."[65]

In a letter from Jakmak to Murad, dated in Dol jahaj, 843 (May, 1439) there was indication that Jakmak was happy about the news of Ottoman conquests against the Christians. He expressed that "both states could be as two spirits in one body or as the power of two forearms in one. Accompanying the letter was a gift of a copy of the Kuran which had been written by the hand of Caliph Osman Iban Afan.[66] It would seem that the gift of the religious book was a strong sign of respect from one Islamic ruler to the other.

To prove to the Mamluks that the Ottomans were prospering in accomplishing the work God had given them to perform, especially their victory at the Battle of Varna against the Christians in 1444, Murad II sent a letter along with five white slave women and expensive clothes as gifts.[67] He also sent fifty Mamluks*[68] who, although unidentified, may have been freed prisoners or a group of slaves returned to the Mamluk sultan.

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*In a duplicate transcript of this manuscript edited by Ahmed Ibn Mehmed al-Shalabi in 1053 and published by the library of the faculties of Al-Azhar and which is preserved now in the library of the University of Michigan, there is no mention of the fifty Mamluks, p. 123.

During the reign of Murad II's successor, Mehmed II* (1451-1481) repeated such embassies. Rich gifts were exchanged between Jakmak and Mehmed II. When Jakmak

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*The definitive studies of the reign of Mehmet II the Conqueror have been made by Halil Inalcik, "Mehmed II," IA, VLL, 506-535, and Fatih Devri Uzerinde tetkikler ve vesikalar (Studies and Documents on the Period of the Conqueror), Ankara, 1954, Salahaddin Tansel, Osmanli Kaynaklarina gore Fatih Sultan Mehmed'in Siyasi ve Askeri Faaliyeti (The Political and Military Activities of Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror According to Ottoman Sources), Ankara, 1953 (repr. Istanbul, 1971), provides detailed information on his military activities. Franz Babinger's immense work, Mehmed II, der Eroberer und Seine Zeit, Weltensturmer einer Zeitenwende, Munich, 1953 (2nd ed. Munich, 1959). (Translated into French as Mahomet Le Conquerant et son Temps. Une peur de Monde au tournant de l'Histoire, Paris, 1954, and into Italian as Moometto il Conquistatore e il suo Tempo, Turin, 1957; English tr. by W. Hickman in preparation), must be used with caution due to the author's over reliance on European sources and failure to use information in some Ottoman sources (see the review by Halil Inalcik, "Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time", Speculum, 25 (1960), 408-427; a complete list of reviews of this work is found in F. Babinger, Aufsatze und Abhandlungen zur Geschichte Sudosteuropas und der Levante, 2 vols. Munich, 1962-1966, I 37-39 and passim). A detailed chronological study of the reign is provided by Ismail Hami Danismend, Fatik'in Hayati ve Fetih Takvimi (The Life of the Conqueror and Calendar of Conquest), 2 parts Istanbul, 1953-1955. His conquests in the Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Sea are studied in I.H. Ertaylan, Fatih ve Futuhati (The Conqueror and His Conquests), 2 vol., Istanbul, 1953, Ankara, 1966. The conquest of Constantinople is discussed in Sir Stephen Runciman. The Fall of Constantinople, Cambridge, 1956; B.Lewis, R.Betts, N. Rubenstein, and P. Wittek, The Fall of Constantinople, London, 1955; A.D. Mordtmann, Belagerung und Eroberung Constantinopels durch die Turken in Jahre 1453 nach Originalquellen Bearbeitet, Stuttgart, 1858; and Feridum Dirimtekin, Istanbul'un Fethi (The Conquest of Istanbul), Istanbul, 1949. Also G. Schlumberger La Siege, La Prise et le Sac de Constantinople par les Turcs en 1453, Paris, 1914, and later printings; and Sir Edin Pears, The Destruction of the Greek Empire and the Story of the Capture of Constantinople by the Turks, London, 1903; but these are prejudiced and one-sided. See the contemporary description by Kritovoulos, History of Mehmed the Conqueror, tr. Charles Riggs, Princeton, 1964. Mehmet's effort to rebuild and repopulate the city

learned that Mehmed II became the new sultan and shortly thereafter sent soldiers into the east of Anatolia to punish people committing crimes of highway robbery, plunder, and murder, Jakmak quickly sent Mehmed a letter

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*Continued from previous page

is described by Halil Inalcik, "The Policy of Mehmed II Toward the Greek Population of Istanbul and the Byzantine Buildings of the City," Dumbarton Oaks Papers, no. 23 (1970), p. 213-249; and A.M. Schneider, "Die Bevolkerung Konstantinopels im xv Jahrhundert," Nachr. der Akad. der Wiss, in Gottingen, 1949.

The cultural and scientific development of the empire during Mehmet II's reign is described in Suheryl Unver, Fatih, Kulliyesi ve zamani ilim hayalti (The Conqueror, His College, and the Scientific Life of His Time), Istanbul, 1946; Emil Jacobs, "Mehemmed II. der Eroberer, Seine Beziehungun Renaissance und Seine Buchersammling," Oriens, 2 (1949), 6-30; L. Thusasne, Gentile Bellivi et le Sultan Mohammed II, Paris, 188; Ahmed Refik, Fatih Sultan Mehmet ve Ressam Bellini, 1470-1480, Istanbul, 1325/1909; and J. von Karabacek, "Abendlandische Kunstler zu Konstantinope im XV, und XVI. Jahrhundert. 1. Italienische Kunstler am Hofe Muhammeds II des Eroberers," Denkschriften der Akad, der Wissenschaften in Wien, Philos.-Hist. Klasse, 92 (1918).

The Conqueror's administrative and economic policies are discussed in Omer Lutfi Barkan, "Les deportations comme methode de peuplement et de colonisation dans l'Empire Ottoman" Revue de la Faculte des Sceinces Economiques de l'Universite d'Istanbul, 9 (1949-1950), 67-131; Halil Inalcik, "15. asir Turkiye iktisadi ve ictimai tarih kaynaklari" (Sources on Turkey's Economic and Social History in the Fifteenth Century), Istanbul University, Iktisat Fakultesi Mecmuasi, 15 (1955), 51-75; N. Beldiceanu, "Recherches sur la reforme fonciere de Mehmed II," Acta Historica, 4 (1965), 27-39; Bistra A. Cvetkova, "Sur certains reformes du regime foncier du temps de Mehmed II" JESHO, 6 (1963), 104-120; and Mustafa A. Mehmet, "De certains aspects de la societe ottomane a la lumiere de la legislation (Kanunname) du sultan Mahomet II (1451-1481)," Studia et acta Orientalia, 2 (1959), 127-160. Source collections concerning his legislation are: Franz Babinger, Sultanische Urkunden zur Geschichte der Osmanischen Wirtschaft und Staatsverwaltung am Ausgang der Herrschaft Mehmeds, II, des Eroberers, I. Teil, Das Qanunname-i Sultani ber Mudscheb-i Orf-i Osmani, Munich,

(undated) thanking him for his dealings with the criminals, and requesting a continuation of the correspondence about the goings-on in each country.[69] Like Murad II, Mehmed II responded by recognizing Jakmak "as a father", which indicates a strong respect held by the former for the latter, and thanking Jakmak for concern over the Ottomans. He also requested that their correspondence continue.[70]

It appears that Jakmak had succeeded in cultivating a strong friendship with the Ottomans, more so than his predecessors. This harmony was continued by his successor, Inal el ashraf seif elder, who decorated the city of Cairo in celebration and festivity for several days in 1453 after an embassy from Mehmed II brought the news of the conquest of Constantinople.[72]

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*Continued from previous page.

1955; N. Beldiceanu, ed. Les Actes des Premiers Sultans conserves dans les Manuscrits Turcs de la Bibliotheque Nationale a Paris, vol. I. Actes de Mehmed II et de Bayezid II du MS. fonds Turc Ancien 39(Paris and the Hague, 1960), vol. II. Reglements Miniers 1390-1512. Paris and the Hague 1964. Dr. Halil Inalcik, Dr. Robert Anhegger, eds. Kanunname-i Sultani ber Muceb-i Orf-i Osmani: II Mehmed ve II. Bayezid Devirlerine ait vasakname ve Kanunnameler (Prohibition Regulations and Laws Concerning the Periods of Mehmet II and Bayezit II), Ankara, 1956. Omer Lutfi Barkan, XV, ve XVI inci asirlarda Osmanli Imparatorlugunda zirai ekonominin hukuki ve mali esaslars. Kanunnameler, I. (The Legal and Financial Bases of the Agricultural Economy of the Ottoman Empire in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth centuries, The Law Codes), Istanbul, 1945; and Nicoara Beldiceanu, Code de lois coutumieres de Mehmed II, Kitah-i Oavanin-i Orfivve-i Osmani, Paris 1967. 71.

Later there were signs that the Ottomans were again not anxious for the friendship of the Mamluks. Relations grew particularly strained between Bayezid II*, who succeeded Mehmed II in 1481, and Khushkadam (1461-1467)** and Kaitby (1467-1496)*** the Mamluk sultans following Inal.

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*The definitive study of the political and military sides of the reign of Sultan Bayezid II is provided by Selahattin Tansel, Sultan II, Bayezid'in Siyasi Hayats (The Political Life of Sultan Bayezid II). Istanbul, 1966. The reign is also discussed generally by V.J. Parry, "Bayezid II," E12, I, 1119-1121; and Ismail Hakki Uzuncarsili, "II Bayezid," I.A., II 392-398.

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There was an unsuccessful attempt on the Ottoman throne by the Sultan Bayezid II's brother, Jem. Kaitby welcomed Jem to Egypt following the attempt, and made matters worse by permitting Jem to return freely to Anatolia.[76] Jem tried a second coup, but was beaten again. Jem then became the guest of the Grand Master of Rhodes, who was pressed by Bayezid and the Pope, as well as Kaitby, to give the Ottoman brother up.*

Continued from previous page.

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*The story of Jem will be discussed later.

Hostile feelings of the Ottoman sultan toward Kaitby for the hospitable receptions of Jem by Egypt were apparently accentuated by another situation. The two powers became involved in the affairs of rival princes in Anatolia, with the Ottomans and the Mamluks each supporting opposite sides. Anatolia had been in a state of disunion, never united in its territories under the rule of a single power, for many centuries. Attempts by the Ottomans and Mamluks to unite the territories of southern Anatolia and northern Syria were contested. Rulers of the territories often pitted the Ottomans and Mamluks against one another by such acts as switching allegiance when necessary to gain safety under the currently stronger force. Many small clashes turned into sizeable confrontations. A large number of armies from various territories, for example, at one point united with the Mamluk Kaitby in hopes of crushing the government in Istanbul. However, when Bayezid's forces became successful in a number of victories the Anatolian rulers began to retract their allegiance to Kaitby. The armies began to join with the Ottomans who were appearing to be the stronger power. Such vacillations in relationships and support appear to the researcher to be among the incidents which led to full war between the Ottomans and Mamluks.

A specific example of the sort of incidents mentioned above occurred when a border territory ruler,

Alaeddevlet of Dulkadar played to the sympathies of both the Ottoman and the Mamluk states. He was given support and reinstated to the throne with the help of Sultan Mehmed II during the final year of the Ottoman ruler's reign. Alaeddevlet's brother and rival, Shah Budak was at this time favored by the Mamluks. The objective of Mehmed, according to the historian Toynbee, however, was not only to support Alaeddevlet against his brother but also to annex a territory that was nearby (and not intending to go beyond Dulkadar, says Toynbee.)[77] Soon after, Mehmed's son Bayezid inherited the responsibility of the Ottomans obligations and involvement with the principality.

According to Von Hammer, Bayezid, in spite of his peaceful tendencies, apparently felt inclined to establish a strong policy of support in face of Mamluk interest in the area of Dulkadar, as demonstrated in their support of Shah Budak.[78]

The two empires, Ottoman and Mamluk, finally reached a point of direct hostility no longer venting their differences indirectly via the border territories and their governments. On the Ottoman side, Bayezid II, like his father before him, sent a military force to support Alaeddevlet with the interior motive of taking revenge on Kaitby of Egypt for his unfriendliness and support of Jem.[79] This force attacked Malta and Anteb, which were Mamluk protectorates, and brought many prisoners of noble rank back to Istanbul.[80] Thereby, Kaitby on the Mamluk

side, decided to retaliate by sending a military force in 1483 under the leadership of a commander named Temzar to combat with Alaeddevlet and his Ottoman allies.[81] Apparently foreseeing the possible dangerous results to both sides from war, however, Kaitby sent an Egyptian ambassador named Janibey to Istanbul in 1485 in order to seek peace between the two powers.[82] It was too late, however, for the mediator Janibey to succeed in his peace efforts for Kaitby, because the rival forces resumed struggle over the cities of Adana and Tarsus. Another incident, relatively small but nevertheless having its own effect of giving Bayezid additional justification for his actions of growing unfriendliness toward the Mamluks occurred when followers of Kaitby robbed an embassy bearing precious gifts, including a diamond dagger, to the Ottoman sultan. Kaitby eventually returned the dagger to Bayezid sending with it other gifts and friendly messages, but his envoy was ill-received.[83] Bayezid undoubtedly used this incident as further reason to pursue fighting on a larger scale.

Leading up to the first major head-on confrontation between both states, the Ottomans retook Adana and Tarsus, under the commander Karaguz together with the two lesser commanders Musa and Ferhad.[84] They also subdued the beys of Warsak who were fighting the Karamanians as advocated by the Mamluks and enjoyed the booty of the newly-captured territories.[85] This spurred the Egyptians

to advance against the Ottomans, under the leadership of Uzbey and Temmerruz Bey. The Mamluks marched towards the north and met with the Ottoman army near the City of Adana for the first direct confrontation. They won the battle, the lesser commander of the Ottoman army, Ferhad and Musa, were killed and the rest of the Ottoman army was captured.[86]

The Egyptians also won the next confrontation of the struggle. Although they had not taken Adana and Tarsus in the previous battle, Bayezid II understandably wanted the Egyptians completely cleared from the region. He ordered Hersek Ahmed Pasha, beylerbey of Anatolia to march against the Mamluks. Under Hersek were Karaguz Pasha and Khirzbeyoglu Mehmed Bey. The latter commanders were uncooperative with their superior, possibly because of professional jealousy and, in a battle near Adana with the Egyptians, both withdrew along with two additional officers. Hersek Ahmed was forced to enter the battle himself. He fought beside two hundred janissaries but was eventually surrounded and captured by the Egyptians.[87] This second defeat of the Ottomans, which may have been prevented had the desertion by Karaguz and Khirzbeyoglu not taken place, was considered to be the most devastating defeat to date by the Mamluks upon the Ottomans. However, it proved to be no more than the loss of a minor border conflict as the Egyptian army never proceeded past Adana and Tarsus.

Adding insult to injury, the Egyptians brought Hersek Ahmed in shackles to Cairo, where a great victory celebration was held and where Hersek Ahmed was forced to kiss the sultan Kaitby's foot.[88] The Ottoman commander was imprisoned for a year.[89] Upon Hersek Ahmed's release, the Egyptians apparently hoped to re-establish good terms with Bayezid.[90] The defeats at Adana, however, had seemingly motivated the Ottomans to strengthen their forces for a new campaign. An Ottoman campaign against the Egyptians began in the spring of 1487. Under the command of the Grand Vizir Duad Pasha with the assistance of Ali Pasha the beylerby of Rumelia, a huge land force of four thousand janissaries united with the Anatolian army marched toward Karamania, where they were welcomed by Alaeddvelet and joined by the warriors of Dulkadar. They proceeded to the city of Aleppo but found that the Mamluks had withdrawn. Duad Pasha unable to lead his troops, who were suffering in the climate of the region, began the lesser task of reconquering the Turgud and Warsak tribes. Overwhelmed by the size of the Ottoman force, the Warsak beys immediately surrendered, while the Turgud commander escaped and fled to Aleppo. This first Ottoman success ended their campaign for the year and Duad returned his troops to Turkey.[91]

In spite of the Ottomans great preparation for serious attack against the Mamluks in revenge for two defeats, the war to this point still seemed piecemeal and

without any clear resolution. The border tribes remained indecisive and, apparently, unsatisfied. The fickle Alaeddevlet once more changed alliance, now turning to the Egyptians and giving his daughter in marriage to the son of the Mamluk general Uzby. As a result, Budak, Alaeddevelet's brother and rival, played the same game of taking advantage of changing situations. He severed his ties with the Egyptians, fled the Mamluk territory of Damascus, and went to Istanbul to pledge support to Bayezid.[92]

A huge strong Ottoman force, which included the Sipahis, the feudal cavalry of Rumeli and Anatolia, together with a large contingent of Janissaries, advanced toward the south under the command of the vizir Ali Pasha.[93] The Mamluks, reinforced by troops drawn from different regions of the empire, advanced towards Adana, the spot where the battle took place.

After successful attempts in the beginning by the Ottomans, the war ended with the defeat of the Ottoman army. This defeat apparently resulted in the desertion by Alaeddevlet to the Mamluk side. His brother Budak Bey fled to Istanbul, hopeful that Bayezid would restore him to the throne of Albistan.[94]

Again, proffers of peace were sent from one capital to another, this time originating with Kaitby and refused by the Ottomans. 1489, however, was a year of

relative peace between the Ottomans and the Mamluks. While he rejected ambassadors sent by Kaitby, Bayezid would not make an attack against Egypt.[95] Instead he hoped that good terms might now have an opportunity to be renewed between the brothers Budak and Alaeddevlet. For one thing, Bayezid probably concluded he would not like to continue support of the dependent Alaeddevelt. For another thing, Egypt's economy seemed to be under some strains.

According to the contemporary writer Ibn Iyas in the words of Kaitby:

> Ibn Osman (Bayezid) would not give up his fighting the Egyptian army, the conditions in Aleppo had deteriorated, the merchants had prevented what Egypt used to get of different kinds of merchandise, the Jalban Mamluks (soldiers) wanted more salaries and if I did not spend on them what they wanted they would ransack Cairo, plunder the houses and burn them. And if the soldiers came back after fighting with the Ottomans, they would not go back to fighting until I spent much money on them and swore that the treasuries were not out of money.[96]

These words by Kaitby indicate to the researcher that the Mamluk economy was clearly having problems. Peaceful relations would be good for both sides.

However, the ensuing course of events was devastating for both sides. First, Hersek Ahmed was put in charge of the expeditionary forces which Bayezid readied for a renewed march on the Egyptians in Anatolia.[97] He set out in 1490 to retrieve the city of Kaysari which Alaeddevelt

and Uzbey were besieging. Hersek Ahmed was captured again, however, and sent for a second time to Egypt as prisoner.[98] Meanwhile, a famine in Anatolia kept Uzbey from continuing his attacks and prevented the Ottomans from marching. With little advancement being made by either side, it was advantageous to both the Ottomans and the Mamluks to seek a true peace in Anatolia.

Tunis also advocated a peace between the two powers. Having been recently attacked by Spain the Tunisians sought the support of both the Ottoman and Mamluk sultans. An ambassador from Tunis came to Cairo, and then proceeded to Istanbul, accompanied by a Mamluk envoy with an offer of settlement. After lengthy bargaining a treaty was finally signed in 1491.[99] Adana, Tarsus, and a fortress on the frontier were ceded to Egypt, (although they were to remain pious Moslem centers belonging ultimately to Mecca and Medina). Hersekoglu and other Ottoman prisoners were released, and support by both parties was promised to Tunis.[100]

The war had brought no conclusive gains for either side. Both the Ottomans and the Mamluks suffered heavy losses in men and money, and neither sustained dominance over the other. Egypt had re-affirmed possession of the Adana-Tarsus area but continued to receive only wavering allegiance from the frontier tribes.[101]

After the signature of the 1491 peace treaty, Kaitby and Bayezid II renewed amiable terms with one another.

The Mamluk government was greatly preoccupied with internal economic affairs as described in the preceding pages. When Kansuh el-Gawri* succeeded to the Egyptian throne following Kaitby, he continued to be friendly to Bayezid II. The Ottoman sultan sent a letter dated in the month of Safar, 908 (August, 1502), of congratulations and expensive gifts to the new Egyptian sultan.[102] Kansuh el-Gawri reciprocated and, in his message, undated, apologized for Kaitby's indirect ways of seeking peace with the Ottomans. He also warned Bayezid II of suspicious movements

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*For further information see Weil, Geschichte der Chalifen. v. 384-416; v. Hammer, Gesch, des Osmanischen Reiches, Pest 1827 sqq. ii, 462 sqq. (in both the principal Oriental manuscript sources as well as the contemporary chronicles and consular reports of the west are given). Ibn Iyas deals with the reign of sultan al-Ghuri in the Buda'l al-Zuhur (see Ibn Iyas); but only the end is printed in the Cairo edition the years 906-922 are contained in the Paris manuscript, Bibl. Nat. de Slane, Cat. No. 1824 (years 906-913) and in the St. Petersburg manuscript, Rosen, Les Manuscripts arabes des l'Inst. des Langues orient, No. 46 (the years 913-922). The full biography of Ibn al-Hanbali has not previously been utilized; see Ibn al-Hanbali's Durr al-Habab fi Tarikh A'yan Halal, MS. Vienaa, Flugel, Die arab ...Handschr. der Hofbibl., ii. No. 1184 (Ch. Brockelmann, Gesch. d. arab. Litt. ii 368) , f. 176B sqq.; J.J. Marcell Hist. de l'Egypte depuis la conquete des Arabes, etc. Paris 1834, p. 407-11; W. Nuir, The Mamluk Slave Dynasty, London, 1896, p.187-201. On his building operations or detailed particulars will be given in the coming work on inscriptions in Aleppo in the sections "citadels and city-wall"; on his buildings in Damascus see M. Sobernheim, Die Inschriften der Zitadelle von Damaskus, No. 24-26 in Der Islam, xii. (1921); on commerce in his time see B. Moritz, Ein Firman des Sultans Selim in the Festscher. Ed. Sachau...gewidmet. Berlin 1915, p. 425-27. On his wars with Portugal see S. Ruge, Gesch.des Zeitalters der Entdeckungen (Samml. Oacken, ii 9) and H. Schafer, Gesch. Portugals, iii. Hamburg, 1850, p. 200, sqq. R.S. Whiteway, Rise of Portuguese Power in India. London, 1899. For his coins see Or. Coins. of the Cat. Brit. Mus. iv. 214-216 (104).

See also p. 32.

of tribes in eastern Anatolia, dangerous for both the Ottoman and the Mamluk states.[103] Further indications of the desire for open and cooperative relations can be seen when Bayezid II sent his envoy in the month of Rabi el-awal 916 (June, 1510), to el-Gawri requesting forgiveness for the governor of Tribli, who committed some crimes during his administration.[105] To this request el-Gawri responded with forgiveness of the Tribli governor, and a warning to Bayezid II now of dangerous movements of the tribes of el-q izilbash from the east.[106]

In summary, the relationship between the Ottoman and Mamluk empires prior to the conquest, progressed through many various stages ranging from friendship to hostility. It cannot be denied, however, that when balanced the majority of these stages were more often characterized by hostile than amiable feelings. A clear evidence of this can be seen in an observation of the five years prior to the 1491 peace treaty. Bayezid II's and Kaitby's governments were constantly at odds, confrontations occurring frequently from 1485-1491. In addition, even though a new period of relative peace was embarked upon in the period of 1491-1516, official correspondence shows that old sources of disagreement and rivalry resurfaced during the reign of Bayezid's successor, and the Ottoman-Mamluk fighting was renewed. With an explanation of the possible motives behind the Ottoman's eventual invasion of Egypt, which will be provided in Chapter Three,

one can possibly comprehend the reasons for the fluctuating relationship between the two empires prior to the conquest.

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86. Ibid., p. 37. Omar Farook, Tarih Abul Farook, Vol. I. Istanbul: Matbaat Amdi, 1947, p. 190. Hammer, p. 367. Tansei Sehattin, Sultan II: Bayezit in Siyasi Hayati, Istanbul: Milli Egitim Basimevi, 1966, p. 101.

87. Omar Farook.p. 191-4. S.N. Fisher, p. 38. Tarkhan, p. 170.

88. S.N. Fisher, p. 38.

89. Ibid., p. 38.

90. Ibid., Tarkhan, p. 170.

91. Ibid., p. 38.

92. Ibn Iyas, p. 559.

93. Hammer, p. 369.

94. W. Muir, p. 178.

95. Ibn Iyas, p. 557.

96. Ibid., p. 564.

97. Hammer, p. 370. Tarkhan, p. 172.

98. Tarkhan, p. 172. Tansel, p. 113-114.

99. Muhamad Fireed Bey. Tarih el-Dawlah el-Aliah el-Osmania. Istanbul: Muhammad Efendi Matbaah, 1896, p. 70. Tansel, p. 114, Manner, p. 370.

100. Richard Knolles. The General Histories of the Turks, London: 1687, p. 450.

101. S.N. Fisher, p. 42.

102. Feridun Bey, p. 347-349.

103. Ibid., p. 349-350.

104. M. Sobernheim. "Kansuh" The Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. II, 1927, p. 721.

105. Feridun, p. 354-355.

106. Ibid., p. 355-356.

CHAPTER III

REASONS FOR THE CONQUEST

During the early years of the reign of Sultan Selim I (1512-1520), there occurred a gradual change in the Ottoman Empire's strategy of expansion. The invasions upon the West ceased, and moves were directed to the East, toward the Mamluk Empire in particular. Prior to this turnabout, the Ottoman Empire had enlarged its domain at the expense of European-held territories. The Ottomans strengthened their armies with recruitments of Christian youth known as Janissaries, a group which eventually became the mainspring of the Ottoman war machine. While the Ottomans won their victories in the West under the name of Islam, the other Arab states no doubt looked on with appreciation and astonishment.

However, why the Ottomans actually changed their direction for the conquest of new lands from West to East, is a point for careful consideration. The following questions arise:

> Did the Ottoman sultans wish to punish the Mamluk sultans for frequently welcoming their exiled princes and for supplying them with means to attempt uprisings in Asia Minor?

> Did the Ottoman empire feel that by expanding southwards down both shores of the Red Sea and of the Persian Gulf they could stand up against the Portuguese (who had diverted the Indian trade route through Egypt to their new cape route around Africa?
>
> Did the Ottoman sultans desire to build a vast empire which would surround the Mediterranean Sea and make it into a lake of the Ottomans?
>
> Did the Ottoman Empire arrive at a degree of satisfaction with its conquests in Europe and was not able to find another direction to go but East?
>
> Did the difference of religious beliefs between the Ottoman Empire as orthodox sunnis and the Safavids of Persia as Shiites motivate the Ottomans to advance towards the East in order to protect the Moslem world?
>
> Did the Ottoman-Mamluk rivalry over the tribal states of East Anatolia play a role in the Ottoman desire to conquer Egypt?

It may be that all of the motives suggested above combined to cause the Ottomans to turn toward the East and the Mamluk Empire in particular. It appears, however, that some were major motives; others were minor or even questionable as motives. Each is examined in the following pages. The major motives may be described as the revenge motive, the economic motive, and the political motive. Others will be examined as minor or supporting motives.

One motive that encouraged the Ottomans to march against the Mamluks may be described as the revenge motive. The desire by the Ottoman sultans to punish the Mamluk sultans for harboring and supporting their exiled princes was apparently a principal reason behind the Ottoman

invasion of Egypt. To understand this factor one must study its historical background, as well as when and in what way it promoted the Ottomans' actions.

As was mentioned in Chapter One, there were no confirmed laws in the early years of the Ottoman Empire which could be followed in regards to the succession to the throne. When the sultan died, the most powerful son by the support of God would be the heir.[1] This situation led to the rise of serious conflicts among the princes and, consequently, some of the rival princes were executed under the law of fratricide. This law was made by the Sultan Mehmed II and was included in his kanunname. It says, "For the welfare of the state, the one of my sons to whom God grants the sultanate may lawfully put his brothers to death."* This law was

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*For a discussion of the Ottoman kunan-names see F.Kraelitz-Greifenhorst, "Kanunname Sultan Mehmeds des Eroberers," Mitteilungen zur osmanischen Geschicthe 1 (1921-22), 13-48. Babinger published the text of the kanun-name in facismile together with an introduction in "Sultanische Urkunden zur Geschichte der Osmanischen Wirtschaft und Staatsverwaltung am Ausgang der Herrschaft Mehmeds II, des Eroberers. I. Teil: Das Qanun-name-i sultani ber mudscheb-i orfi osmani (= Sudosteuropaische Arbeiten 59; Munich, 1956). For a transcription of the text, see Robert Anhegger and Halil Inalcik Kanunname-i sultani ber muceb-i orfi osmani (Ankara, 1956 as TTK: XI, seri, no. 5). More recently, cf. Nicoara Beldiceanu (ed.). Code de Lois coutemieres des Mehmed II: Kitabi-qavanini orfiyye-i osmani (Wiesbadan, 1967). For the latter consult also the review of V.L. Menage in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies (London), 32 (1969), 165-167. The regulations of secular criminal law (kanun) and their relation to the religious law are discussed by Uriel Heyd, "Kanun and Shari's in Old Ottoman Criminal Justice," Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities III (1969), 1-18. A posthumous publication by the same author is Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law, ed. V.L. Menage (Oxford, 1973),3

practiced until the time of Mehmed IV (1623-40) when the law of succession changed in favor of the oldest son in the family.[2] But up until then the rival Ottoman princes had no choice but to face death or to seek refuge in the countries of neighbors such as the Safavids or the Mamluks. And apparently by welcoming them these neighbors paved the way to serious tension and, in the case of the Ottoman-Mamluk relationship, severe disagreements between the two governments.

Four cases in particular show this strain between the Ottoman and Mamluk states as a result of the latter's treatment of exiled Ottoman princes. Apparently, the Ottoman leaders eventually decided that without the extermination of the Mamluk sultans cases like these would not be ended and the Ottoman Empire would face a continual threat of civil war.

The first case goes back to the time when the four sons of Bayezid I (Isa, Mehmed, Suleyman and Musa) joined in civil war after the defeat of Bayezid I at the battle of Ankara in 1402. They struggled for the sultanate until 1413, which ended by the emergence of Mehmed I as the uncontested sultan, who defeated his brothers and reunited the family possessions.[4] One of Suleyman's sons, named Orhan, occasionally showed disloyalty to his uncle Mehmed I. Orhan's son Suleyman and daughter Fatma Shahrazed, were brought up secretly fearing that if sultan Mehmed knew of

them, he might execute them in order to save his throne. After the death of their father, Orhan and two princes escaped secretly to Cairo as refugees, to the Mamluk sultan Barsbay, who received them with kindness and put them up in his royal house. When Murad II learned of their escape, he immediately sent envoys and letters requesting Barsbay to send the two back, but Barsbay refused. Instead he designated special teachers whose main jobs were to take care of and teach the two Ottoman royalty. Later Barsbay married the princess and added her to his royal harem.[5]

Without a doubt these acts strained the relationship between Barsbay and Murad, which was in some respects good, as we have seen in the previous chapter. But Barsbay's refusal of Murad's request to return the two royal boys seemed to create a decline in their diplomatic relationship. Later the Mamluk sultans did not hesitate to supply Ottoman refugees with arms to use against their fatherland as we can see in the next case.

The second case is the story of the Prince Jem, the brother of Bayezid II, who aspired to the throne and, when defeated, found with Kaitby of the Mamluks, a princely refuge and the means of pilgrimage to Mecca. Jem's treatment by the Mamluks, was not limited to hospitality and favors for an exiled Ottoman prince; the Mamluks supplied Jem with the means to retaliate against the Ottoman sultan, an act which most likely angered the Ottomans.

After the death of Mehmed II in 1481, a struggle for the throne between his sons Jem and Bayezid followed.* This disputed succession resulted in favor of Bayezid. He gained the possession of the capital and the armies and emphatically declined the proposal of his brother to divide the power. Jem raised large armies, and possessed the power to capture Brusa in 1481, but was repeatedly beaten.[6] These defeats directed his way south to take refuge within the Mamluk territory. He crossed the mountains of Tarsus, and entered the city of Aleppo where he asked the governor to report to Kaitby his wish to make a refuge for himself and three hundred soldiers. Kaitby agreed, and agreed to receive him in Cairo whenever Jem desired. It was July 14, 1481.[7]

When Bayezid II received news of the harboring of Jem by the Mamluks, he ordered Alaeddevlet to arrest Jem on sight. The opportunity was lost when Jem fled to Egypt on September 15, 1481. Kaitby received the Ottoman with honors and treated him as a son.[8] From Cairo Jem sent his brother Sultan Bayezid a letter suggesting he grant Jem the rule of some regions of the Ottoman Empire. Bayezid refused, and implored Jem to accept 100,000 ducats per year. Jem likewise refused his brother's offer.[9]

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*Sources regarding the conflict between Jem and Bayezid II are listed on p. 77.

Later in that same year Jem left Egypt and, accompanied by his family, undertook a pilgrimage to Mecca.[10] When he returned to Cairo his dreams of the Ottoman throne apparently resumed. Supporters such as Kasim Bey and Gedik Ahmed Pasha in Anatolia, and other Ottoman opponents of the Sultan, persuaded Jem to try once more to win at least one part of the Ottoman Empire.[11] By now, however, he probably knew he could not regain anything without outside support. Jem therefore, made a request to Kaitby, asking for support in his fight against his brother, Bayezid II. Kaitby, in May 6, 1482, summoned his princes to discuss Jem's request. All of the members of this council agreed,[12] with the notion probably that any disturbance that might occur in Anatolia would end in favor of the Mamluks.

Jem was equipped with several thousand soldiers, forty thousand ducats, and Kaitby's orders for the governors of Aleppo and Damascus to lend additional support. With the assistance of Kaitby and his supporters in Anatolia, Jem invaded Ottoman territory, aiming for Konya. He was defeated by Bayezid's army under the leadership of Ali Pasha. Jem then decided to move his forces to Ankara. After he held the city for several days, troops from Amasya and loyal to Bayezid arrived and routed Jem's forces. Finally, Jem ceased his operations in Anatolia, and he took refuge on 23rd of July, 1482, in Rhodes, with the expectation that the Knights of St. John would allow him to harbor

safely there.[13] However, the cavaliers quickly made an agreement with Bayezid II to keep Jem in their custody in return for 40,000 ducats per year.[14] In 1483 they sent him to France, where he was held for seven years. In 1489 the Knights ceded Jem to Pope Innocent VIII and he was transferred to Rome. In 1495 Charles VII of France invaded Italy. Jem was taken with the French, and, at Naboly in 1496, he died.[15] Of concern to this research in regards to Jem was his connection with Kaitby. This connection opened once more hostilities between the Ottomans and the Mamluks. As a result there were six great campaigns which exhausted the power of both sides.*

A third case differs from the previous two in that in this situation the Mamluks did not supply the Ottoman refugees with military means to retaliate against their home government. It does, however, show again the repeated tendency of the Ottoman exiled princes to seek and expect to receive refuge by the Mamluks, and the Mamluks tendency to receive, protect, and take care of the escaped royalty at whatever the price might be. These tendencies apparently eroded Ottoman patience and goodwill toward Egypt.

Korkud, one of Bayezid II's sons, was given Saruhan (Manisa) to govern, according to the Ottoman custom that the prince be given an opportunity to practice the art of

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*See p. 81-84.

ruling. While in Manisa he frequently asked his father to issue him more money. It was these frequent requests that probably motivated Bayezid to replace Korkud by his brother Alem Shah. Korkud was transferred to the governorship of Anatalya.[16] Korkud was not pleased with his action, for he wrote his father a letter explaining his beliefs in theology and religion, and explaining the unruliness in the province assigned to him. His main problem, he said, was that he needed financial help. Bayezid agreed, and issued 2,502,755 ducats per year.[17] Korkud's relationship with his father became very poor when Korkud wrote to the Porte asking to be reinstated in Manisa. The sultan, possibly under the influence of Korkud's brother, Alem, did not agree . Aggravating the problem was the Sultan's refusal of a request by Korkud to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca. Undoubtedly feeling like an outcast in his own country, he sailed from Anatalya in May 1509, to seek aid from the Mamluk sultan in Egypt. He arrived in the city of Damiata on May 25, 1509. Ibn Iyas relates the story of Kurkud's arrival and his welcome reception by the Mamluk sultan el-Gawri.

> In the month of Safar of the year 910 (May 25, 1509) news came from Damiata saying that one of the sons of the Ottoman sultan named Korkud had arrived in Damiata. When sultan el-Gawri heard of this he immediately named Ikby, the prince of Akus, Isdmar el Mohmedar, and Nanik el-Kasin, to receive Korkud. Accompanying them were special sailboats decorated with excellent illuminations. . . When Korkud arrived at the district of Shobra in Cairo, el-Gawri

> ordered all rooms in el-Brabkiah of Bolak to be cleared and to be occupied by Korkud and his followers. Both sheiks should stand on both sides of his way to greet him at his arrival.[18]

Ibn Iyas also details activities organized by the Egyptian government in honor of the presence of Korkud in Egypt.[19]

Three months after Korkud's arrival in Egypt el-Gawri sent Allan eldwadar to Bayezid II with a letter telling him of Korkud's presence in Egypt and assuring him of his good condition. In the same year Bayezid II sent his ambassador to Egypt to observe the steps the Mamluk sultan was undertaking to finance his son,[20] and probably to tell el-Gawri that any military support given to Korkud would strain their relationship and be considered an attack on the Ottoman Empire.

Egypt at this time was experiencing disastrous war with the Portuguese, and the Mamluk fleet had just been destroyed.[21] It was not likely, therefore, that the Mamluk sultan planned to furnish Korkud with military aid nor to bring Egypt face to face with another enemy. el-Gawri apparently tried to please Korkud without jeopardizing himself further with Bayezid.

In an undated letter to Bayezid, el-Gawri assured him that Korkud was in good condition while finally undertaking his pilgrimage to Mecca. He asked Bayezid to forgive his son and to assign him some Ottoman territories of his own to govern.[22] Bayezid agreed, and sent a reply to el-Gawri thanking him for the treatment of his son.[23]

Eventually, negotiations between el-Gawri and Bayezid over Korkud were successful. The exile set out for Anatalya but, when he was attacked by the Knights of Rhodes, he landed at Alexandretta,[24] (in Turkish, Iskenderun). A few months later by the order of his father, Korkud was transferred from Anatalya to Mansia.[25]

Korkud's situation changed totally when Selim I (1512-1520)* became the sultan of the Ottoman Empire.

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*The reign of Selim I (1512-1520) is studied in detail by Seliahattin Tansel, Yavuz Sultan Selim (Sultan Selim the Grim) Ankara, 1969; and Sinasi Altundag, "Selim I," IA. X, 423-434. The events surrounding his accession are described by M. Cagatay Ulucay, "Uavuz Sultan Selim Nasil Padisah Oldu " (How did Sultan Selim the Grim Become Ruler) Tarih Dergisi, 6 (1954), 53-90; 7 (1954), 117-142; 8 (1955) 185-200. The best general account of his Eastern relations is G.W.F. Stripling, The Ottoman Turks and the Arabs, 1511-1575, Urbana, Ill. 1942 (repr. 1968). His relations and struggles with the Safavids are described by E. Eberhard, Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safeviden im 16. Jahr.nach arabischen Handschriften, Freiburg, 1970; H. Sohrweide, "Der Sieg der Safeviden in Persien und seine Ruckwirkungen auf die Schiiten Anatoliens im 16. Jahrhundert." Der Islam, 41 (1965), 95-223; V. Minorsky, La Perse au XV siecle entre la Turquie et Venise, Paris, 1933; R.M. Savory, "The Principal Offices of the Safewid State during the Reign of Ismail I (1501-1525)," BSOAS, 23 (1960), 91-105; Tahsin Yazici, "Sah Ismail," IA, XI, 275-279; Jean Aubin, "Etudes Safavides, I. Sah Ismail et les notables de 1'Iraq persan," JESHO, II (1959), 37-81; L. Lockhart, "The Persian army in the Safavi period," Der Islam, 24 (1959), 89-98; Zeki Velidi Togan, "Sur 1'origine des Safavides," Melanges Louis Massignon, 3 (1957), 345-357; A.J. Toynbee, "The Schism in the Iranic World and the Incorporation of the Arabic Society into the Iranic." A Study of History I, (1934), 347-402; and W. Hinz, "Das Steuerwesen Ostanatoliens im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert, "ZDMG, 100 (1950), 177-204. Relations with the Dulgadir state are studied in J.H. Mordtmann and M.H. Yinancs, Dulkadirlilar," IA. III, 654-662. The Battle of Caldiran and its results are analyzed in M. Tayyip, "Caldiran," IA, III, 329-331; J.R. Walsh, "Caldiran," EI2,II, 7-8; and Tahsin Yazizi, "Safeviler," (The Safevids), IA, IX, 53-59.

Selim not only had five of his sons-in-law strangled, but reportedly contributed to the death of his father, Bayezid II.[26] Korkud therefore, sent him a letter undated and in Ottoman language, voicing his support and loyalty,[27] probably judged that this was the only hope for survival. Although Selim's reply had no intention of making anything against Korkud,[28] he acted hospitably for a while but then, as was the usual habit of the Ottoman sultans, he sent his commander Sinan Pasha, who strangled Korkud on March 13, 1513.[29] It seems that Selim may have felt that Korkud would take a second

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*Continued from previous page

Selim's conquest of the Arab world is described by H. Jansky "Beitrage zur Osmanische Geschictschreibung uber Agypten," Der Islam, 21 (1933), p. 269-279; and the same author's "Die Eroberung Syrien durch Sultan Selim I," Mitteilungen zur Osmanischen Geschichte, 2 (1926), 173-231, and "Die Chronik des Ibn Tulun Als Geschichtes-quelle uber den Feldzug Sultan Selim's I gegen die Mamluken," Der Islam, 18 (1929). 24-33; W.H. Salmon, An Account of the Ottoman Conquest of Egypt, London, 1939; Marie-Therese Speiser, Das Selimname des Sa'di b. "abd al-Mute'al, Zurich, 1946; H. Masse, "Selim Ier en Syrie, d'apres le Selim Name," Melanges Rene Dussaud, 2 (1939), 779-782. Halil Edhem, Sultan Selim's aegyptischer Feldzug. Weimar, 1916; Stanford J. Shaw, The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517-1798, Princeton, N.J. 1962; and Stanford J. Shaw, "The Land Law of Ottoman Egypt (960/1553): A Contribution to the Study of Landholding in the Early Years of Ottoman Rule in Egypt," Der Islam, 38 (1962), 106-137. On the question of whether the caliphate was transferred to the sultan, see C.A. Nallino, Notes sur la nature du "Califat" en general et sur la pretenqu "califat Ottoman." Rome, 1919; and Carl H. Bekcer, "Barthold's Studien uber Kalif und Sultan," Der Islam, 6 (1915), 386-412.[30]

refuge in Egypt, but one which would be completely different than the first. He knew how past Mamluk sultans had taken advantage of exiled Ottoman princes by supporting them for their own interests.

A fourth case was that of the refuge in Egypt of Ahmed (another of Bayezid II's sons) and Ahmed's sons Suleyman, Aladdin, and Kasim. Ahmed's case was similar to the previous three in that the Ottoman refugees in all instances chose Egypt as their haven and were greeted by the Mamluk sultan with honor and welcome.

Ahmed and two of his sons, Suleyman and Aladdin, did not gain military support from Egypt as the relationship between the two states at the time was not unduly strained and peace had been established. Kasim, however, gained full military support from el-Gawri, who realized that Selim I was rising to a position which would enable him to dominate not only vast territories in southeast Europe but also the eastern Mediterranean and its rich trade route to India.

When Sultan Bayezid II was near his death he called for his son Ahmed with the intention of naming him as his successor. However, by the insistence and support of the Janasseries, Selim was the successful heir. The Janassaries forced Bayezid to approve Selim as his successor rather than Ahmed.[31] With this disappointment, Ahmed was defeated and fled to the Mamluk territory in Syria, where he was received with courtly honors.[32] Immediately, Selim sent his envoy, Ali Shaweesh, to Khair Bey who was governor of Aleppo and

supposedly a strong supporter of el-Gawri. Khair Bey, however, on hearing the envoy's message regarding Ahmed's situation and Selim's desire that the Mamluks not harbor his brother, acted in a suspicious way. He now appeared very loyal to Selim, telling him that his message was being forwarded to el-Gawri and that whatever el-Gawri decided, it would be of no matter, and that nothing would happen without Selim's suggestions and view of the problem.[33] The tone of Khair Bey's letter suggests two things: it demonstrates Khair Bey's expressed loyalty to Selim (which consequently suggests he would not support Selim's exiled brother Ahmed), and it shows that Khair Bey considered himself an independent power that could behave in foreign affairs in Syria regardless of the desires of the central government in Cairo. It appears that Khair Bey was playing on both sides.

Ahmed apparently gave up all hope of military support from the Mamluks and, afraid to return to his homeland because of fear of reprisal, he married one of his daughters to Shah Ismail of Persia and allied with them.[34] When he returned, supported by Ismail Shah together with his own supporters, Ahmed was advancing toward the heart of Anatolia; meanwhile Selim reinforced his army and on 24th of April, 1513, a pitched battle was fought at Brusa in which Ahmed was completely defeated and taken prisoner. He (Ahmed) was strangled, some hours after the battle.[35]

Ahmed's sons, Suleyman and Alladin, escaped to Egypt, on January 13, 1513, and January 17, 1513, respectively.

Although they were received by el-Gawri, the Mamluk sultan refrained from giving them military support, an act he probably feared would provoke Selim to anger at a time when relative peace was being enjoyed. The two princes did not live long, however, so consequences of el-Gawri's lack of military support to them can never be known. Both died in April 1513 as a result of an outbreak of the plague.[36]

Selim was undoubtedly pleased at the news of the death of the two princes. The Ottoman sultan's military preparations and his continual bad faith toward the Mamluks, however, eventually made el-Gawri seemingly change his mind regarding military support to any refugees from the Ottoman government. el-Gawri took advantage of the presence in Egypt of Kasim, Ahmed's third son, who had fled Turkey on his father's death. As the relationship between Selim I and el-Gawri became more strained,* Kasim was well-received and was given promises of military support by the Mamluk government.[37] Kasim stayed a short time in Cairo; he then accompanied el-Gawri to Aleppo, where fighting between el-Gawri and Selim was in its preparatory stages. In Aleppo, el-Gawri gave Kasim royal gifts and a robe of honor apparently hoping that if the Ottoman soldiers learned that one of the Ottoman princes was being protected and supported by the Mamluk government, they might abandon Selim and work in favor of Kasim.[38] But

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*See the relationship between el-Gawri and Selim I, p.151-160.

el-Gawri's dream did not come true. He was defeated in the Battle of Marg Dabig (1516), and Kasim returned with el-Gawri and his followers to Egypt. Kasim later took part in the Battles of el-Redania and Wardan against Selim. Eventually, when Selim destroyed the Mamluks, Kasim escaped from Egypt but was, a short time later, arrested and executed.[39]

In sum, when the Ottoman-Mamluk relations were at low points, the Mamluks were not above taking advantage of the situation of exiled Ottoman princes, supporting them and favoring them, thereby aggravating civil crises inside the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, such acts by the Mamluks caused reductions in Ottoman military strength, kept the Ottomans busy with themselves, limited Ottoman strength and ability in expansion, and created a good balance of power in the Ottoman-Mamluk relationship. The Ottoman sultans apparently felt that the support of the royal Ottoman refugees by the Mamluks was antagonizing and underhanded. This would most likely have created mistrust between the two powers. It appears to be one reason why Selim and the Ottomans decided to act, first severing ties with the Mamluk sultans, and eventually overrunning their lands.

A second motive which apparently impelled the Ottomans to turn toward military confrontation with the Mamluks, was economic in nature. The Ottoman Empire had, as one of its aims, control of all trade routes of land and sea connecting east and west. To understand this aim and how the invasion

of Egypt became a part in the overall design, one must examine the historical background of the commercial competition between the Portuguese and the Ottomans on one side as well as the competition between the Portuguese and the Mamluks on the other.

While the Ottoman sultans were fixing their control over new land and sea frontiers relatively close to their own homeland, several great maritime discoveries occurred elsewhere and were announced to the world. Christopher Columbus (1451-1506)*, an Italian mariner, had set out from Palos near Cadiz on August 3, 1492, in three small ships and reached the Bahama Islands. On October 12 of the same year, he eventually went on to discover what is now known as Cuba and San Domingo. Two later voyages brought him to the New world (North America).[40]

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*For further information see the following sources: C. Fernandez Duro, Colon y Pinzon (1883); Salvador de Madariaga, Christopher Columbus, new ed. (1949); R.H. Major (ed.), Select Letters of Christopher Columbus (Hakluyt Society, 2nd ed., 1870), standard collection of the most important chapters on the life and discoveries of Columbus; Samuel Elliot Morison, Admiral of the Ocean Sea: A Life of Christopher Columbus, 2 vols. (1942), and Christopher Columbus, Mariner (1955), two of the finest biographies of Columbus in the English language; M. Fernandez de Navarrete (ed.). Coleccion de los viajes y descubrimentos que hicieron por mar los espanoles, 5 vol. (1825-37); Milton A. Rugoff (ed.), The Great Travellers, 2 vols. (1960), general text on the most important explorers, including Columbus; Earl P. Hanson, South from the Spanish Main; South American Seen Through the Eyes of its Discoverers (1967) an anthology.42

Following Columbus' voyages the number of geographical discoveries grew rapidly. In 1497, Vasco da Gama* set out from Portugal with four ships to reach India. He rounded the Cape of Good Hope and worked northward along the east coast of Africa,[41] coming soon to an area of Mamluk territory where the route to India was well known. Despite the Mamluk jealousy of the intruder, da Gama was able to secure a pilot and reached the coast of India at Calcutta.[43]

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*There is no autobiography of Vasco de Gama Portuguese chroniclers wrote at length about his voyage of 1497-99, and some of them must have access to secret documents since destroyed. The only one translated into English is that of Gaspar Correa (c. 1490-1565) from his Lendas da India; see The Three Voyages of Vasco da Gama, and His Viceroyalty, ed. by Lord Stanley of Alderley (1869, reprinted 1963). The only first-hand account of the first voyage has also been printed in English in E.G. Ravenstein (ed.), A Journal (by an unknown writer) of the First Voyage of Vasca da Gama, 1497-1499 (1898, reprinted 1963). A later and more definitive edition has been printed in Portuguese in Abel Fortoura da Costa (ed.) Roteiro da Primeira Viagem de Vasco da Gama, 1497-1499 por Alvaro Velho, 3rd ed. (1969). The story of the voyage of 1497-99 is breezily told in Henry H. Hart, Sea Road to the Indies (1950). An outstanding syntheses of the background of Vasco da Gama's achievements is found in John H. Parry, The Age of Reconnaissance; Discovery, Exploration and Settlement, 1450-1650, 2nd ed. (1966). For brief accounts together with English translations of extracts from early documents, see John H. Parry (ed.). The European Reconnaissance: Selected Documents (1968). The unique manuscript copy of the three Roteiros (Sailing directions) of Vasco da Gama's Arab pilot, Ahmad ibn Madjid, has not been fully translated and printed in English, but see A.G.R. Tibbetts, Arab Navigation in the Indian Ocean Before the Coming of the Portuguese (1971). For the definitive Portuguese translation of the Arab text, see T.A. Chumovsky (ed). Tres Roteiros deconhecidos de Ahmad ibn Madjid (1960).[44]

The Portuguese now had an ocean route to the East. Such commercial activities of the western nations finding new trade routes resulted in the decline of the Mediterranean Sea as the primary place for commercial enterprise.

Prior to these discoveries Egypt had become, by the fifteenth century, a very wealthy place due to its place as a crossroad of trade between Asian and European countries, and due to its agricultural growth. I agree with the opinion of Fisher when he cites:

> The steady growth of this trade in the fifteenth century, together with the natural productivity of the Nile Valley and the skilled artisan manufacturers of Egypt, gave the Mamluk-Arab society a brilliance unrivaled in any other Arab land.[45]

However, following the discoveries by the Western European explorers, the high position of Egypt deteriorated and the country undoubtedly became tempting for the Ottoman Empire to take advantage of and invade.

The author, Balls, recorded some observances of the change of the trade route:

> In the reign of el-Ghuri (el-Gawri), who came to the throne in 1510 at the age of 60, trouble was brewing fast. The Portuguese were diverting the Indian trade from Egypt to their new cape route around Africa, and refused to be beaten by force. Sea powers of the Western nations had thus begun to exercise the influence on Egypt's fortunes which it still exerts. Lastly, Selim I of Turkey came to the Ottoman throne and began to mass his troops near the Egyptian frontier, ostensibly for an attack on Persia.[46]

The Portuguese did not stop at their discovery of the Cape of Good Hope. Within a decade they succeeded in taking almost all trade routes that had previously been controlled by the Mamluks. Alboquerque, the admiral of the Portuguese Indian fleet, ruthlessly determined to drive the Mamluks from power, to seize all their key points and establish the Portuguese in the Straits of Hormuze and Aden.[47] He, in the beginning, met no opposition, apparently because the Mamluks were mostly soldiers and cavalrymen, not sailors. Also they had no war experience in sea fights. In addition, they had no suitable wood for building ships and the materials. Workmen and engineers had to be imported. But when the Portuguese in 1505 threatened Jeddah, the port city of Hijaz, el-Gawri became nervous and consequently gave the order to build a fleet under the Admiral Hussein the Kord.[48] His main objective apparently was to fortify the port of Jeddah, the key to the Holy Cities of Islam, against the threatening moves by the Portuguese. While the Mamluks were constructing their fleet, the Portuguese captured Soctra in 1506, an island in the Gulf of Aden which controlled the entrance of ships to the straits of Bab el-Mandab, the southern border of the Red Sea.[49] In response to this dangerous situation el-Gawri ordered his fleet in Jeddah to set out to combat the Portuguese. Various engagements took place with successful fighting in behalf of el-Gawri's fleet. In one fight in the battle of Ghoul, Lorenze the son of Almeida, lost his life,[50] but in

1509 the Mamluk fleet was destroyed by the Portuguese, in the Battle of Diu.[51] However, the Portuguese, in order to satisfy themselves, planned the blockade of the Red Sea, and decided to blockade the trade route through the Persian Gulf. In 1511 Alboquerque captured Malacca, the entrepot of spices for the Arabs.[52] Thereby imports from India and the Far East almost ceased, and cotton and muslim materials were virtually unobtainable. Gradually, most of the traffic in spices and other products of India and Arabia was diverted from Syrian and Egyptian ports.** In 1513 Alboquerque attacked Aden, in which the commercial movements between Egypt and India became totally paralyzed.[53]

Not only Egypt was affected by the Portuguese blockade but also the Italians, particularly the Venetians, for they lost the high profit of their commercial activities in the East. They, according to Winius,* made unsuccessful efforts

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*Winius, the author of The Foundation of the Portuguese Empire, 1415-1580, was surprised by the phrase used by the Signoria "Rapid and secret remedies" as the Signoria tried to propose that means be found to discourage the return of the Portuguese to Indian waters. The author believes that if the news of this phrase leaked out to the Christian world, no one could maintain that Venice necessarily supported the downfall of a fellow Catholic power at the hands of the Infidel. (55) To me it seems that Winius had forgotten that each society any time, anywhere, even in our present time concern with economic values rather than other elements such as racism or religions. Example of this competition can be seen among the big powers of today regarding profits and interest in the Third World.

**See p. 117a.



SOURCE: Sir John Glubb, Soldiers of Fortune, The Story of the Mamluks, New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1973.

to form a league against the Portuguese. In December 1502 a commission of fifteen notables was appointed in order to consider what might be done to the Portuguese. An ambassador chosen by the Signoria was sent to Egypt to voice the Commission's concern over what the Portuguese were doing to the Oriental trade.

The ambassador suggested to the Egyptians that duties on spices and Indian goods be lowered to make the Venetian competitive with rival prices of the Portuguese in European markets.[54] el-Gawri also sent notice to the Pope Julius II and to some of the western nations, complaining about the acts of the Portuguese and warning them that if they would not agree to make severe proceedings against the Portuguese, the Christians living in his territories would receive bad treatments and the Holy places in Jerusalem would be burned. In spite of these threats, the western nations neglected his requests.[56]

The Venetians, however, in addition to the previous suggestions to el-Gawri, added the proposal to dig a canal between the Red Sea and the Mediterranean.[57] But because of internal problems el-Gawri did not execute these suggestions. Consequently, Genoa, in order not to lose its markets one after another, took a short cut by buying its commercial needs from Portugal.

Under these worsening conditions and serious decline in goodwill with Portugal, el-Gawri thought of a new source to help build a new and strong fleet. He turned to his old

enemy the Ottoman empire, asking for materials. Apparently because the Ottomans knew what was going on between the Mamluks and the Portuguese, and because the latter was a new rival to the Ottomans in the Middle East, Bayezid II without hesitation promised to furnish el-Gawri with timber for thirty vessels carrying three hundred iron guns, one hundred fifty masts, three thousand oars, and other apparatus.[58] When the Knights of St. John, who held the Island of Rhodes, learned of these promises, however, they attacked the Egyptian vessels which were delivered to load the promised timber in the Gulf of Ayas and captured them, taking them back to Rhodes. Hearing of this disappointment, el-Gawri, in retaliation ordered the arrest of Europeans in Alexandria and Demiata, as well as the Christian clergymen in Jerusalem. Twenty monks were forced to write letters to the European governments demanding the return of the Egyptian ships with the captured arms. el-Gawri also warned the Christians of closing the church in Jerusalem; he finally did close it in January 1511.[59] The aids which arrived safe in Egypt were mentioned by Ibn Iyas.[60]

Feeling that he was able to confront the Portuguese el-Gawri sent his last military expedition in 1514, under the leadership of Hussien the Kurd to Jeddah and from there to India. But the Mamluk engagement in war with the Ottoman Empire in Syria had exhausted their strength, and their hopes of beating the Portuguese failed.[61] Unfortunately, as mentioned, the Portuguese captured all sea passages which surrounded the

Arab world on the side of the Indian Ocean. Thereby, the Portuguese freed themselves from the high taxes which they used to pay to the Mamluks as custom duties and became the masters over the keys of the trade-routes in the Indian Ocean.

The Ottoman Empire competed with the Portuguese in areas of the Mediterranean Sea. It was not in their interest, either, to let the Portuguese extend their control over the trade-route in the East. Sultan Selim, after his victorious campaign gainst Persia, ordered Biri Pasha to undertake the building of a new fleet by which he could make the Mediterranean Ottoman Lake, eliminate European influence (especially that of Venice and Genoa) and punish the pirates who occasionally caused a break in the peace of the commercial movement in the Mediterranean Sea. Selim's high concern with the sea struggle was apparent when he called Piri Pasha one morning to the palace:

> I have not slept all night, said Selim. Enable me to sleep. So long as that race of Scorpions, the Genose, the Venetians, the Christians of Rhodes, the Neopolitans, the Sicilians, and the Spanish, cover with impunity the sea with their vessels, I do not reign over Asia and Europe, of which this sea is the cincture. I am prisoner in an empire in which they occupy the routes and gates. I must have a navy proportioned to the greatness of my possessions.[62]

It is most probable that the Ottoman plan to oppose the Portuguese apparently would have been useless, however, without taking control of Egypt. By controlling Egypt, the Ottoman Empire would lift the Portuguese blockade upon ports

in the Arabian peninsula, thereby reopening the trade routes which had been closed in the face of the Mamluk Arabs. In addition the Ottoman Sultan Selim I may have realized that the prosperity of Egypt depended on its control of the trade routes between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. Doubtless, the Ottoman Empire by conquering Egypt would make high profits and would be able to maintain in Egypt a high degree of luxury. Through the Egyptian ports passed the jewels and spices of the East. Its merchants grew prosperous on the very active trade of which Egypt was the center. Also, Egypt links the three continents (Asia, Egypt and Africa), a fact which was of interest to the Ottomans. After the conquest of Egypt in order to revive commercial activities, the Ottoman Empire in 1535, gave the French merchants certain privileges, hoping that these merchants would use Egypt as a connection for trade with Asian countries instead of using the new trade route via the Cape of Good Hope.[63] Even before the conquest, in order to challenge the Portuguese influence in India, in 1453 the Ottoman Empire granted certain privileges regarding commercial activities to Genoa and Venice.[64] Also, in the beginning of the sixteenth century the Portuguese suggested a project of united naval operations including Spain, Portugal, and France. Its main goal was to divide the shores of the Red Sea and the Mediterranean against the Ottoman Empire, but it failed because France dissented from this project.[65]

In light of the facts above, one cannot disregard an economic motive behind the Ottoman move against Egypt in the sixteenth century. Although Selim I knew that by conquering Egypt he might inherit the feud which had arisen between the Mamluks and the Portuguese, he probably considered that a hold over Egypt would be beneficial as a commercial connection and would bring a great boost to the Ottoman treasury. In the chapter dealing with results of the conquest, we will see whether the conquest was of help in this regard or whether it only worsened economic life in Egypt.

Another motive behind Ottoman plans to march against Egypt was political in nature. As was mentioned above, the Ottoman sultans did have a dream of building a vast empire surrounding the Mediterranean Sea, making the body of water like a lake of their own. It appears to be another major motive behind their invasion of Egypt. Suggesting this Ottoman expansionist dream and its existence as a motive behind the Ottoman move on Egypt, was the very political personality of Sultan Selim I and the positions of the surrounding powers to the West and the East, which colored Selim's choices when directing the Ottoman expansion. By tracing his background from his days as governor in East Anatolia to his succession as Ottoman sultan, we can see the effects which apparently influenced his political beliefs and his strong inclination toward fighting. East Anatolia was a battlefield, part of it in struggle between the Ottomans and Persia and part of it wrestled by the Ottomans from the subordinate principalities

of the Mamluk Empire. Selim lived in the area for about thirty years serving as governor of Trabzon and was undoubtedly influenced by war and political crisis which were parts of life in the region.

Selim, since his birth in 1470, was known as Yavuz the Grim because of his drastic behavior, temper, dash, and swift movement.[66] In 1483, he was appointed governor of Trabzon. During his rule there, frequent skirmishes and battles occurred between his father and Kaitby, the Mamluk sultan.* Selim was also in the area during the crisis of Jem who was supported by Kaitby, and during many frequent disputes over the subordinate principalities of the Mamluks in Anatolia.** In Trabzon, Selim made close observation of the Safawi's movements in East Anatolia, the place where the Safawis occasionally tried to spread their religious beliefs by using force. They invaded neighboring territories on the Ottoman border and were responsible for much destruction there during the revolt by Shah Kuli, one of the followers of Ismail Safaw.*** These sorts of incidents and observation of them undoubtedly effected the spirit of young Selim, causing him to ponder what would be best for him to do to restrain these crises in East Anatolia. He decided to send to Istanbul and members of the Divan a letter explaining the bad conditions

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*See Chapter II, p. 81-84.

**See Chapter II, p. 101-104.

***See Chapter II, p. 135.

in East Anatolia and asking them to take the matter seriously, helping him to solve the crisis.[67] Feeling that the members of the Divan were ignoring his request, he sent his father a letter asking the same. His father, too, was not responsive.[68] Therefore, Selim left Trabzon and from there sent a letter to Istanbul, saying that after being a governor for thirty years in Trabzon, he could not do less. He promised that if he were given the rule of Silistra in Rumeli he would execute all orders and demands made by the central government.[69] The Porte, the head of the Divan, was not indifferent and conveyed to Selim's father what had gone between himself and his son, thereby Sultan Bayezid II then sent his son Selim one of his scholars, Nur el-Din Sari Korz, in order to advise Selim to return to Trabzon. Characteristically obstinate, Selim refused to listen to his father's envoy. Nur el-Din, in his report to the sultan, described the stubborn attitude of Selim, his disregard of what the sultan might do, and his insistence on being away from Trabizon regardless of the sultan's orders.[70] When Selim later realized that his predicament was not getting better, he sent another letter to the Divan, seeking favor and explaining his side. He insisted that he was right to stay with his son, Suleyman, in Kefe in the Crimea and that his father was not acting justly for his demands were not being responded to while his brother Ahmed was being promised the sultanate and was given rule of the divisions of Kebo Kalke and Rumeli.[71]

It apparently became evident to Selim that he could not change his father's policies or ideas without using force. With his own men and those of Khan Rumili he created an army and advanced to Edirne to negotiate with his father. Hearing of this news, his father, sending some of his special government officials, tried to advise his son of his return to Kefe, but his efforts were useless. When Selim was very close to the city of el-Tonah, the leader of the infantry sent by Bayezid arrived. He carried with him a Sultanic firman (decree) which granted to Selim the governorship of Kefe, and an annual salary from the products of kili and akirman in case the revenues of kefe was not sufficient. But Selim did not bow in submission to his father's temptations. He instead swore by God and the Holy Book of the Kuran, that he would not return before he reached el-Tonah.[72] Fearing Selim, his father immediately sent his firmans to the generals of the brigades telling them to gather in Edirne lest Selim marched on it. Meanwhile, Selim sent a letter to his father telling him that he was not rebelling against him, but that he wanted to negotiate with him. Although Bayezid may have desired to meet his son, the ministers prevented any letter of permission to get to Selim. Selim, perhaps feeling that he would gain nothing, unwillingly yielded a short time later and accepted his appointment as a governor of Samandarah.[73]

Feeling that his health condition was serious, Bayezid II sent for his oldest son, Ahmed, who was the favorite of his father. Bayezid designated him for succession to the throne.

By doing this, he brought his three sons (Ahmed, Selim and Korkud) into rivalry. The great men of the Divan preferred Ahmed to be the heir while the Janissaries believed that Selim was far better than Ahmed. Selim, with the support of the Janissaries determined to hurry along the death of his father and to secure the throne for himself. The Janissaries were dissatisfied with the long inaction of Sultan Bayezid II and hoped for new conquests and loot under Selim. Bayezid eventually found that he could not rely on any section of his army. He submitted and on April 24, 1512, he was forced to abdicate.*

In brief, when Selim I ascended the throne in 1512, he was a man with many useful political experiences in his past. He had lived for about thirty years among three rival states (the Ottoman Empire, the Mamluk Empire and the Safawi), he was contemporary with the political conflict between his father and his uncle Jem and he was familiar with important diplomatic correspondence between the Porte, his father, the great members of the Divan, and himself. He was undoubtedly very aware of conditions of neighboring forces and their plans. That he was wary of events in East Anatolia resulting in good results for the Ottoman is evidenced by the frequent requests he made to his father and the Porte to pay attention and make strong demands against Ismail before things worsened.

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*See p. 109.

When Selim became sultan he found the Ottoman Empire in control of all of Anatolia and of the South Balkans. Therefore, he had a choice between one of two matters. Either he could keep the Ottoman strategy which was drawn up and executed by Mehmed II and continued in the time of his father Bayezid II, or he could plan a new strategy which would constitute a new form of expansion. We do not know if his father ever considered the latter, but we do know that Selim's personality was different from Bayezid, his father. While his father did not add new territories to the Ottoman Empire, except for his subjection of Herzegovina, which had been a tributary state under his predecessor, Selim approximately doubled the extent of the Ottoman Empire in eight years.[74] Also, while his father was a man of religious and peaceful characteristics, Selim was a man of indomitable will, a man of war with greed for expansion of his empire, and a man of ruthlessness. An example of his character was the way he treated the Shiites within his empire. In 1514, according to Edward G. Browne, he gave secret orders to his subordinates to fall upon them and all in one day, without warning, he executed some forty thousand partisans of Shah Ismail in Anatolia.[75] Although this number may have been exaggerated, it carries behind it some sort of the truth regarding the cruelty of Sultan Selim. In addition, one by one he executed his brothers who were his rivals for the throne. Lamartine says of Selim:

> Men who owe their usurper sovereignty to accomplices can maintain it but by satiating or by slaying the authors of their criminal rise. Whoever mounts a throne by crime can sustain himself but by blood. Such was the situation of Selim the day following the natural death of the parricide of his father.[76]

Their leader's personality* together with his political knowledge of the scope of strength and weaknesses of his neighbor countries was without a doubt one of the effective factors which drove the wheel of Ottoman expansion towards the east and consequently to the Mamluk Empire as one of its victims.

Besides his strong and influencing personality, Selim possessed a political outlook and understanding that contributed to the overall political motive behind the Ottoman invasion of Egypt. The leader apparently examined the Ottoman strategy in accordance with the position of contemporary powers in the West and in the East before going ahead with any new moves.

In the West, according to some scholars such as John B. Harrison and Richard E. Sullivan and others, the fifteenth century was a time of transition. Europe was molded by three

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*One of the letters sent to Shah Ismail from Selim before the Ottomans marched on Persia brings further understanding of what type of personality Selim possessed: "I Sovereign Chief of the Ottoman" says Selim I, "I, master of the heroes of the ages, who combine in my person the power of Feridun, the glory of Alexander the Great, the Justice and the Clemency of Chosroes; the exterminator of idolaters, the destroyer of the enemies of the true faith, the terror of the tyrants and of the pharaohs of this age, I whose hand breaks the sceptre of the strongest..."[77]

major developments. Politically, the feudal system gave way to the national state as the dominant unit of organization. Spain, Portugal, France and England succeeded in achieving political unity within the population of each country uniting under powerful national monarchs. (Only Germany and Italy did not create powerful national states; we cannot deny, however, the vital role these countries played in the advancements of cultural and scientific developments which contributed to Europe's changing shape). Economically, there were great geographical discoveries being made by Europeans which resulted in changes in their view of the world as well as growth in their economic power. The "New World" had been discovered, and trade routes to India via the Cape of Good Hope had been found.* The age of discovery created the stage for capitalistic economy and resulted in the expansion of European commerce and the strengthening of royal absolutism. Culturally, the fifteenth century was marked by a renaissance in humanism, literature, art and science.[78] In the art of navigation, for example, Europeans made marked advances including the development of scientific sea charts or portolans, based on the observation and experience which seamen provided.[79]

The above developments undoubtedly contributed to the rise of a new form of military system. The military system based on feudal foundation was no longer a possible one in

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*See p. 114.

the new powerful system in Europe. Therefore, the need for organized soldiers under the leadership of a central administration was necessary. Thus the armed forces were the ruler's forces, no longer mere feudal levies. They were paid professionals, often trained to parade, to dress ranks and keep discipline. The weapons were of an extraordinary variety. This development made armies to handle warfare as an art. In addition, this development was not only confined to land. The first modern navies were also being produced. The naval organization, naval supply, and the dispatch and handling of ships, all required more orderly centralized methods than an army. They could not tolerate the survival of rugged feudal individualism, indiscipline, and lack of planning. So the naval supremacy passed out of the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, where it rested briefly with Spain, and then passed to the northern maritime powers of England, Holland, and France.[80]

In the East, the political system of the Middle East collapsed and had never recovered from the invasion of the Mongols and the devastation of Hulagu Khan. The Arabs had not, in the time of their greatness, succeeded in building up a sound social system, nor did they show any ability to set up a political system which could survive, even a temporary disaster, as the Turks had succeeded in doing after the invasion of their country by Timur.[81] Although Egypt survived the destructive invasion of the Mongol, on the other hand, it fell a victim to the rule of the Mamluks whose political

system was of a feudal military form, a small group of professional soldiers who were ethnically entirely different from the subjects.[82] This kind of system seemingly was not suitable to the military life which had been organized by the European powers and the Ottomans by that time.

In view of the differences between the powers in the East and West, then, it would seem that Selim acted wisely in his decision to shift Ottoman expansion toward the East. It appeared to be the less formidable foe. The Ottoman expansion toward the West was becoming questionable; victories could not be counted on because of the swift advancements in scientific and military tactics achieved by Europeans. Also, as the State of Shah Ismail was at the formative stage, not yet stable, it was wise that Selim chose to concentrate his attention to easily crush the newly arisen force, in order to not repeat the mistake which Bayezid I did when Timur invaded the Ottoman Empire and defeated its army, in the Battle of Angora.* Lastly, the development of the artillery as important weaponry of the Ottomans while it was neglected by the Mamluks, would contribute to the crushing defeat of the latter by the Ottomans.[83]

The struggle between Shah Ismail of Persia and Selim I of the Ottomans, regarding differences in religious beliefs, cannot be accepted as one of the primary causes or reasons which motivated the Ottoman Empire to invade the Mamluk Empire. It could, however, be considered a secondary motive, which

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*See p. 62.

supported or justified the possible causes for the Ottoman advancement which were described in the preceding pages. In regards to this struggle over religious differences, Arnold Toynbee points out:

> ... After the post Abbasid interregnum, in which the Syriac society went into dissolution, two new societies, both affiliated to the Syriac, arose in different parts of the derelict Syriac domain. We have called these two sister societies the Arabic and the Iranic respectively. . . In this respect, the history of the relations between the Iranic and the Arabic society has taken a markedly different turn. For, as early as the first quarter of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era, about two hundred and fifty years after the emergence of the two Islamic societies from the post Abbasid interregnum the Iranic society took the offensive right against the Arabic society and won a decisive victory. This Iranic offensive was taken and this Iranic victory was won, by one particular state among those into which the Iranic society had come to be articulated; and this state was the Ottoman Empire. . . The conquest of the Arabic world was virtually forced upon the Osmanlis in consequences of a religious schism within the bosom of the Iranic society to which the Osmanlis themselves belonged; and that this schism arose through the unexpected and revolutionary resuscitation of Shiism as a militant political force by Ismail Shah Safawi.[84]

According to Toynbee, then, motivating the Ottomans to direct their activities towards the Mamluks was the rise of the Safawis and a religious division within the Persian society to which the Ottomans belonged. Toynbee feels that the Ottoman Empire as part of this society, was forced to stand in the face of this revolutionary religious movement and was consequently forced to face the Mamluks as a result of the continuing conflict between the two Iranian forces, the Ottoman

Empire and the Ismail Safawi. On this point I disagree with Toynbee in his emphasis on Ismail rather than Selim I as the turning force in the course of Islamic history. Ismail appears to have had no imperialistic dreams compared to that which Selim I had been shown in this study to have possessed.* If Ismail had possessed such intentions, he most likely would have taken advantage of the weakness of the peace-loving Bayezid II by advancing into Anatolia, or perhaps by declaring war on his neighbor the Mamluk Empire, because of their differences in religious beliefs as Sunnis. In other words, if Selim was in disagreement with Ismail, because of their differences in religious beliefs, as according to Toynbee's view, he would not have stopped his advancement after partial successful campaigns all his military activities to direct them toward the Mamluks, who held the same religious beliefs as the Ottomans. Instead, would he not have made the Mamluks an ally against the common enemy, the Safawis? Considering this, we cannot say that Ismail had much more ambition in imperialistic dreams than Selim I. Selim I apparently did not mind fighting either the Shiites or the Sunnis as long as he could satisfy his desire to conquer.

The conflict between the Ottoman Empire and the Safawis may have had political and religious motives of its own. We cannot say, however, that the Ottoman invasion of the Mamluk

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*See p.122

Empire was merely a result of the continuing severe conflict between the two states of the Ottomans and the Persians, regardless of other main motives. However, we can say that Selim took the opportunity of being close to the Mamluk territory and having defeated the Safawis to then execute his plan of invading the Mamluks. Selim's conflict with the Safawis had its own reasons which are not totally related to his conflict with the Mamluks. Ismail Shah, after he succeeded in forming Persia piece by piece, into a country and in making Shiism the official religion in his kingdom,[86] had begun a career of conquest that lasted from 1500-1512. Successively, Ismail Shah in the first decade of the sixteenth century, conquered most of Kurdistan, north of Mesopotamia, and Baghdad. Several events occurred which undoubtedly then made Selim think seriously about the danger of the rise of Ismail's power. In the political sphere Ismail had taken advantage of the pacifist tendencies of Bayezid II by making two invasions, in 1505 and 1507, across the Ottoman frontier in the direction of Sebin Karahisar. Ismail's aim was to isolate Alaedevelet of Dulkadr in his efforts to bestride the Euphrates and occupy Diyar Bakir. To prove his intention that he had no plan of invading either the Ottoman or the Mamluk territories, he sent two ambassadors, one named Culibech, to Bayezid of the Ottomans and the other named Zaccarebech to el-Gawri of the Mamluks, swearing by his head and other oaths, that he would do them no harm, and he only wished to destroy his enemy Alaeldevlet.[87] Alaeldevlet was defeated in the upper valleys

of the Tigris and the Euphrates were absorbed,[88] and thereby had come close to the Ottomans and the Mamluks. Even though these territories were claimed by both the Ottoman and Mamluk Empires, there is no clear evidence to show Ismail's intention to invade the Ottoman territories. If Ismail had thought to do this, he would not have busied himself during the years 1509-1512 in marginal wars on the eastern front and remained apparently satisfied with the successful campaigns that he completed after becoming the real heir of Timur's empire.[89] Another issue which undoubtedly stirred the feelings of Selim, was his belief that Ismail was acting behind the spread of Shiism in the Ottoman domain.[90] Selim thought that Ismail made use of his father, Bayezid's, tolerant attitude to encourage his political agent Shah Kuli, to break into an open rebellion.* Toynbee supports this belief that Ismail wanted to spread his religious beliefs in Anatolia by the use of force.[91] To this researcher it seems that although it cannot be denied that Ismail Shah probably desired to spread the Shiism, it does not really mean that he was behind the movement in Anatolia. There is no clear evidence that supports the idea that Ismail had any role in the rebellion which Shah Kuli undertook. Besides, Ismail during this time of the year 1511

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*In the spring of 1511, amongst the adherents of the Savawis, and under the leadership of Shah Kuli, a great revolt broke out in Tekke. He (Shah Kuli) preached the end of the Ottoman domination, declaring that Ismail Shah was the incarnation of the Godhead, and he himself the guided one who would restore the rule of a true believer.[92]

was heavily engaged in the eastern frontier in Khurasan.[93]

Ismail, by defeating his last enemy to the north in 1514, the Usbeks under Sheibani Khan, at the Battle of Merr,[94] undoubtedly became something different in the eyes of the Ottoman Sultan. Selim probably considered the large expansion of territories accomplished by Ismail. To the east of Persia lay only weak India and to the south only the Indian Ocean. Sultan Selim I decided to invade Persia. Two other events likely prompted this decision. These two events were the asylum which Persia gave the sons of Ahmed, his nephews and competitors for the throne of the Ottomans,[95] and the attempt of Ismail Shah to bring Egypt into a leage against the Ottomans.[96] The latter event is of great importance as it affected seriously, the Ottoman relations with the Safawis and with the Mamluks. This alliance stirred Selim's anger because it occurred between two different nations with different religious beliefs. Although the Safawis and the Mamluks became allies, there was no evidence to show that their alliance was practical for both did not honor their agreement to support one another.

Another important piece of evidence which indicates that Selim did not intend to expand his holdings deep into Persian land, rather than towards the Mamluk territories, regardless of their disagreements over religious beliefs was Selim's immediate halt after his successful campaigns against Persia, and his turn towards the Mamluks. Selim marched via Konya and Sivas into Persian territory which was laid waste by

Ismail's orders. In August 1514, Selim defeated Ismail's army at the Battle of Caldiran, and later he entered Tabriz in triumph.[97] From this point there is no evidence to show that Selim did proceed further into Persian territory. This indicates his main concern was not a religious expansion, but a territorial expansion even in Sunni territories. Also, by examining letters exchanged between Selim I and el-Gawri, it appears to the researcher that Selim's tendencies, without a doubt, were towards the Mamluk Empire. After the Battle of Caldiran in 1514, Selim marched upon the principalities of East Anatolia (which were regarded by the Mamluks as their protectorates) and occupied by them one after another. Allaedevlet, now one of the strongest supporters of the Mamluks, was killed by Selim in 1516.[98] Then Selim sent a letter written in Arabic to el-Gawri explaining that he planned to defeat and clear the eastern territories from the Qizilbash, and asked el-Gawri not to pay attention if the Qizilbash asked for military support.[99] There was no reply from el-Gawri which indicates his anger and discomfort regarding this and what had happened to his ally Allaedevlet. In another letter written in Arabic to el-Gawri in 1516, Selim tried to justify his attacks on the Qizilbash as merely a fulfillment of the order of Islam to fight infidels and wrongdoers.[100] Probably knowing the real intentions of Selim to move toward the Mamluks, el-Gawri sent the Ottoman sultan a letter in order to mediate between Selim and the Qizilbash. It seems to the researcher that el-Gawri was attempting to examine the Ottoman sultan for

his real plans. el-Gawri explained in the letter that because most of the subjects in east Anatolia were Sunni Muslims and because Ismail Safawi had been defeated, it would not be a good idea to go beyond this defeat.[101] It appears, however, that Selim had already decided to go no further into Persia after the battle of Caldrin, and his army was already on its way towards the Mamluks. In a letter to el-Gawri, Selim threatened the Mamluk Empire as it was his main target. In his letter he said:

> In the beginning our concern was to defeat the infidel Qizilbash in order to revive Islam in those territories. But after, it was clear to us that your behavior was not good, when you asked to mediate between me and the apostates. I am coming to teach you a lesson for you are worse than them.[102]

So, in summary, the difference in religious beliefs held by the Sunnis and the Shiites, contributed to the overall motivation for the Ottomans to march upon the Mamluks in that religious causes brought the Ottoman advancing toward the east and once there, they took advantage of being close to the Mamluk territories to begin their attack upon them.

Another factor which could be considered a secondary reason for the final Mamluk-Ottoman confrontation, was the continual and growing dispute concerning the border states of east Anatolia. The regions of southeast Anatolia, particularly those on the border between the Ottoman Empire and the Mamluk Empire on the other side were of great importance for both powers. Most of these regions were under the protection of the Mamluks prior to the conquest. They were particularly

concerned, therefore, about maintaining their control over these areas bordering the Ottoman and the Persian states. The Ottomans also looked to these areas as a place to insure the strength of their boundaries. Both sides made concentrated efforts in order to bring these regions under their influence, appointing governors who functioned much like vassals, and apparently regarding the regions as buffer zones between themselves and their rivals. The efforts finally contributed to serious conflict and real confrontation between the larger powers.

A region which caused serious strain in the Mamluk-Ottoman relationship prior to the conquest, was Dulkader. The conflict arising from the larger powers' desires to control this area, was described in detail in the previous chapter. We have also seen how this principality played off both the Mamluks and the Ottomans, changing allegiance depending on which of the two offered the better chance for security. This sort of practice continued in the time of Sultan Selim I. When Selim marched with his troops upon the Safawis, Alaedevlet did not support him for he was one of the Mamluk's clients. Selim, upon his return after his victorious battle of Caldrin over the Persians, gave an order to the Porte Sinan Pasha to attack Alaedevlet.*

The attack of the porte upon Alaedevlet resulted in the defeat of the latter. He was replaced by Ali Shah Sawar,

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*See p. 156.

a client of the Ottomans. This defeat of Alaedevlet destroyed the Mamluk political influence in the Dulkader principality. It consequently motivated el-Gawri to send an envoy to Selim with a diplomatic letter, notifying Selim that his action was ill-received. It also told Selim that the father of the new governor Shah Sawar was previously a troublemaker and perpetrator of hostilities between Rome and the Muslim states; the father had been killed in Cairo for such actions. The letter to Selim also advised that the political situation in Dulkader be restroed to its previous system. Selim's response was an angry letter to el-Gawri. Instead of following el-Gawri's demands he insisted that he would never change his mind regarding what he had done. Details regarding these letters will be discussed in Chapter Four in connection with the events leading up to the conquests of Egypt by the Ottomans.

In summary, there appear to be numerous motives which contributed to the Ottoman desire to conquer the Mamluk Empire. These were summarized and categorized by the researcher as: (1) the revenge motive, the desire of the Ottomans to punish the Mamluks for harboring their own rivaling princes and to thwart the continual struggles by the Ottoman princes for the throne; (2) the economic motive, or the desire of the Ottomans to gain land and wealth by expanding southwards down both shores of the Red Sea and of the Persian Gulf, and by standing up against the Portuguese who had diverted the Indian trade route through Egypt to their new cape route around Africa; (3) the political motives, consisting of the war-like personality of

of Selim I and his dream to rule over a vast empire; (4) the religious motive, or apparent desire by the Ottomans to spread their specific religious beliefs; and (5) the border state control motive, the will of the Ottomans to stop the continual Mamluk-Ottoman skirmishes over control of smaller bordering territories.

By comparing these motives, it seems to the researcher, that the first three of the motives listed above can be viewed as major motives. The revenge and the economic motives described in the preceding pages, can equally be seen as intertwined and related to the primary motive of Selim's imperialistic dream. He needed to acquire more goods and more capital in order to give his government and his armies strength to attain a hold over a large portion of the world. The last two motives can be considered as minor or secondary motives, in fact justifications for the more significant motive of Selim's desire to control a large and powerful realm. The religious factors were simply additional reasons that fed the Ottoman's eventual plan to march upon Egypt. The border states disputes were also part of a larger struggle over balance of power between Persia, the Mamluks and the Ottomans, and the latter's attempt to stop these disputes was not merely a wish to bring peace to East Anatolia, but a dream to gradually add land to a growing empire and gradually to bring its influence closer to the larger and more desirable territories of the Mamluk Empire. Similar encroachments can be seen throughout history and even today. For example, the Russian

invasion of Afghanistan in 1980 can be viewed as its desire to tip the balance of power in the Middle East in its favor, particularly in light of the strength the United States gained in the area during the reign of Egypt's Sadat. Selim's move toward control in East Anatolia was a similar attempt progressively to gain hold over a larger area.

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CHAPTER 4

THE COURSE OF THE CONQUEST

In this chapter the events of the conquest will be described and analyzed in chronological order. First the relationship between Sultan Selim I and Sultan Kansuh el-Gawri will be considered, then the battle of Marg Dabig and the defeat of the Mamluks in Cairo will be examined. The following questions will be addressed in this chapter:

- What sort of a relationship developed between el-Gawri and Selim? Was it characterized by honesty and openness or was it a continuation of the bad feelings between the Mamluks and the Ottoman sultans before them?
- Which if either of the two leaders, was the more stubborn in terms of ignoring opportunities for renewed peace? Which, if either of them, took advantages to gain power over the other?
- Did the relationship of el-Gawri and Selim lead to the eventual confrontation between the Ottomans and the Mamluks? If so, which leader was the more responsible?

- Who started the first march upon the other in the final confrontation?
- What form did the conquest take in its early stages? Was it small border struggles, or a siege upon the capital?
- What factors contributed to the victories by either side? Can they be attributed to the number of troops? loyalty of the soldiers? sophistication and numbers of weapons? strong leadership?
- What factors contributed to the final destruction of the Mamluk Empire by the Ottomans? Was it acts by traitors? size and power of the Ottoman forces? weaknesses in the Mamluk government? internal crises in the Mamluk society?
- Did the Mamluks' reluctance to strike first against the Ottomans contribute to their final downfall?
- Was the course of the conflict consistent for the Ottomans or did the struggle change between easy and difficult maneuvers?

The Relationship Between Sultan Selim I and Sultan Kansuh el-Gawri

A close examination of the relationship between the Ottoman Sultan Selim I and the Egyptian el-Gawri, will provide further understanding of the Ottoman-Mamluk relationship

which was described in Chapter Two. A study of the two leaders and their feelings and actions toward one another will also provide insights to help us determine who started the war and who first marched upon the other. The following pages also contain details about the activities of Selim giving us an even clearer picture of his personality, his ambitions, and his imperialistic motives of expansion which he set forth in a careful and well organized plan.

Like the ever-changing relationship between the two empires in the decades preceding the invasion, the relationship between Selim I and el-Gawri fluctuated considerably. By examining the correspondence exchanged between the two, one can see that their association was sometimes amiable and at other times colored by suspicion and caution. Finally, it deteriorated to tension, with both parties threatening one another. In the end it was war. The tone of their correspondence was markedly different from those letters which el-Gawri exchanged with Bayezid II.

Secret correspondences marked with loyalty and friendship were, however, exchanged between Selim I and Khair Bey the Mamluk governor of Aleppo. In 1511 a secret letter accompanied by costly gifts was sent by Selim to Khair Bey, its purpose being to emphasize their friendship. In reply, Khair Bey thanked Selim, and stated that both countries should not be considered separate states. He noted that he was ready to attempt to achieve anything Selim asked. In part of the letter Khair Bey writes:

> . . . our countries are just one empire . . . to your Majesty, I am your servant who awaits to hear any of your decrees or orders, to fulfill whatever wishes you desire; I hear and obey.[1]

This letter and others from Khair Bey were sent without mention or acknowledgement of the central government of Egypt. Upon learning of the correspondence and considering Khair Bey's actions as treasonous, Siby., the governor of Damascus, warned el-Gawri of Khair Bey. Citing disloyalty and partiality towards the Ottomans, he suggested that Khair Bey be killed.[2] el-Gawri, however, was busy in preparation for his first military expedition (which he sent to Aleppo to watch over conditions resulting from conflicts between Selim and Shah Ismail). The sultan disregarded the advice of Siby.[3]

Meanwhile, Selim's army had been advancing from Edirne intending to attack the Persians. Upon el-Gawri's dispatch of his new expedition, the Ottoman porte sent an envoy to el-Gawri to make sure that the Egyptian forces were not planning to join the Persians against the Ottomans and that there was no alliance between the two. el-Gawri then ordered Khair Bey to reply to the Ottoman ruler. While the Ottoman forces were on their way to Persia, Khair Bey sent a message to them which stated his disapproval of any kind of support or alliance between the Egyptians and the Persians, and assured the Ottomans of the continuation of their friendship regardless of the current conflict between the Ottomans and the Persians. In addition, Khair Bey exemplified his

loyalty to the Ottoman sultan by providing him with news about spies from the east with information that Shah Ismail's forces were located in a place called Karkan and that the Persian army was not strong.[4] The tone of Khair Bey's letter to Istanbul did not indicate an alliance between the Mamluks and the Persians. el-Gawri, however, continued to be very disturbed and suspicious of the Persians and the Ottomans, fearing that either power that might be victorious over the other would be a potential threat to the future of the Mamluks. Hearing about the Ottoman and Persian preparations for war against one another, el-Gawri said, "I myself, will go to Aleppo in order to make a close observation of the two powers, the Safawis and Ibn Osman (Selim), believing that either one who wins the victory would march upon our country."[5]

Selim caught up with Ismail's forces in eastern Anatolia and won a decisive victory at Caldiran on August 23, 1514.[6] The victory not only weakened and led to the eventual ruin of the Persians, it added the mountain regions from Erzurum to Diyarkabir to the Ottoman Empire.[7] Selim was motivated to send royal letters to the princes of the Eastern territories, to the governor of Edirne and Selim's son Suleyman, and to el-Gawri of Egypt. Khair Bey took the responsibility of responding to Selim's letter. In his correspondence he told Selim how pleased el-Gawri and the Mamluks were with the Ottoman's victories.[8] In reality, however, el-Gawri and his administration were displeased by the news of

the Ottoman gains over the Persians, and were wary. Khair Bey appears at this point, more than ever as a deceiver, disloyal to el-Gawri. The contemporary eye-witness Ibn Iyas gives this viewpoint of el-Gawri and his administration's attitude toward Selim's victory:

> When Selim's envoy arrived in Egypt to tell el-Gawri about the decisive victory over the Safawis, el-Gawri gave him costly gifts and boarded him in the castle. el-Gawri did not, however, order the customary celebration and decoration of Cairo. No one could understand this irregularity nor the reasons behind it.[9]

However, few could believe that el-Gawri was actually pleased about the Ottoman victory. Letters and words of congratulations and adulation continued to be exchanged as long as there was no real confrontation between the two parties.

When Selim succeeded in another victory over el-Karhani, the governor of Mardin, he sent his envoy Hassan Bey to el-Gawri with more reports of good news for the Ottomans.[10] el-Gawri was undoubtedly disturbed by this news and reluctantly sent a letter with his envoy Jamal el-Din el-Kaitan informing Selim that his news was received with pleasure and happiness. In the same letter el-Gawri informed Selim that he had given his envoy some money with which to buy certain woods necessary for important interests in Cairo.[11] It seems that el-Gawri had something else in mind when requesting the wood. If, for example, he desired the wood for the building of a fleet to move against Portugal, he would have mentioned that explicitly in the letter, for Portugal was an enemy

common to both Egypt and the Ottoman Empire at that time. It is possible that el-Gawri, sensing danger in the movement of the Ottomans and the proximity of their territories, felt it was time to build up a strong fleet in protection from the audience. He was alerting the Ottomans of his intentions and capability to stand up against them. el-Gawri probably correctly realized that the Ottomans were not satisfied with their victories over the Persians. That the Ottomans had also recently destroyed the principality of Alaedevelete, a close ally of the Mamluks, was a fact undoubtedly heavy on el-Gawri's mind. The Ottoman ambassador had recently arrived in Cairo and had presented the Egyptian sultan with Alaedevelete's head.[12]

Shortly thereafter the tone in the letters exchanged by Selim I and el-Gawri developed into that of cruelty and obstinacy. When el-Gawri sent his ambassador to Selim asking for his reasons behind closing the trade routes in east Anatolia, Selim replied:

> If you disagree with what I have done. . .
> and you persist with your disagreement,
> what my god has destined will come true.
> The matter is in God's hands.[13]

Despite the tone of preceding paragraphs in the letter which indicates that it was not the Ottoman's objective to complicate the relations between the two powers, and despite the fact that the letter contained no indication of Ottoman designs on Egyptian territories, el-Gawri now began to suspect the intentions of Selim. According to the Mamluk's

undercover investigator, intelligence reports declared that the Ottomans were amassing forces on the Syrian border. War now seemed to be inevitable.

It does not appear that Selim intended to continue his warfare with the Persians, and not with the Mamluks as his letters to the Egyptians had hinted. His victory over the Persians and the principality of Dulkadir brought his new borders adjacent to the borders of the Mamluks. Selim apparently saw a good opportunity in an internal crisis in the Mamluk government to aggravate hard feelings between himself and the Egyptians. Young Mamluks began to mutiny with demands for the abolition of extra taxes, for the payment of their late salaries, and for the end to arbitrary confiscation of their money and belongings. el-Gawri appeared almost at the point of giving up his position saying, "I never wanted to be sultan. Let me go somewhere else. Choose another sultan."[14] According to Ibn Iyas the young Mamluks took advantage of these unstable conditions and began looting in Cairo. Finally, the emirs begged el-Gawri to satisfy the protestors' demands and asked him to change his mind about resigning. Agreeing to their requests, el-Gawri made a speech in which he reprimanded the young Mamluks, saying, "Do not be angry. The enemy, the Ottomans, are ready to attack us. Ibn Osman (Selim) is declaring war upon us. It is necessary for us to prepare a new military expedition."[15] Selim and el-Gawri openly made clear their distrust of one another. Their mutual concern over Persia, which was no

longer a large threat, could no longer be used as a point of friendship between them.

Both governments began to prepare openly for war. For the Mamluks el-Gawri did not hesitate, according to the contemporary writer Ibn Iyas, to make an alliance with the Shah Ismail of Persia.* He secretly sent the Persians a number of elephants.[16]

el-Gawri's second step in preparation for war was to gather and organize all of his forces. Every Mamluk that could bear arms was equipped and marched toward Syria, leaving only a few thousand of the very old or young or sick to guard Egypt itself. Outfitting such an expedition took longer than anticipated, however. Led by Kansuh el-Gawri, the troops set out from Cairo on May 17, 1516, a full sixteen days later than their projected departure date. Meanwhile the Turks had advanced nearer to Egypt.[17]

Kansuh and his men were met with receptions of mixed feelings as they began their march through the Mamluk northern territories. Palestine and Syria, for example, showed a display of loyalty to the Mamluk regime by receiving the sultan's representative with celebrations and honors. In Damascus, however, during a jubilant ceremony in honor of the

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*While there is no extant evidence to show that a formal pact was made between el-Gawri and the Persians at this time it does seem probable. Ibn Iyas was a writer who lived in Egypt at that time, and el-Gawri would have been prompted to make such a move when recognizing Selim's intent to march upon the Mamluks.

sultan's expeditionary force, a degree of indifference and, perhaps, a lack of respect for their leaders was shown by the Mamluk people. For instance, when Kansuh was showered in praise with gold and silver coins, he was nearly pushed from his horse by his slave troops scrambling for the money.[18]

From Damascus, Kansuh's forces went to Homs, and from there to Hamah, and finally, Aleppo where he arrived on July 10, 1516. Selim had sent an embassy which met Kansuh el-Gawri. Headed by Rukneddin and Karaja Pasha, the embassy informed Kansuh el-Gawri of the bad behavior of the Qizilbash (supporters of the Persians) and their bloody destruction in parts of the country. According to Selim, these individuals were "worse than Christians". The embassy explained that it was the responsibility of the sultan to fight these people. el-Gawri was told of Selim's preparation of an army. The embassy also implored el-Gawri to pray with them, and to tell the people of the Holy Cities to pray, to ask God's help in executing the law of Islam and in defeating the Qizilbash.[19]

In another letter from Selim to el-Gawri, Selim responded to the latter's request for building supplies and carpenters. Selim began the letter with flattering words, calling el-Gawri "protector of Islam" and "Of the holy cities", but told him that while he could have the supplies, workers could not be sent. Selim needed them to build one hundred ships of his own.[20]

The response of el-Gawri to Selim's messages was not one of complete agreement with Selim's actions. He argued that Selim should not fight against the Qizilbash any longer because most of them were fellow Sunnis and that Selim should be satisfied with his victories now. el-Gawri informed Selim that he would be coming with his troops to the eastern front in order to mediate between Selim and the Safawis.[21]

The Battle of Marg Dabig and the Defeat of the Mamluks in Cairo

The events which followed should have, if history followed past events, taken a different course. The Ottomans had lost all previous battles between the two states. The Mamluks appeared to have Persia on their side. The Ottomans were not, however, to lose this time. Rather, it was soon to become the leading power in the Middle East. It was a battle for world power. Selim must have realized this (as well as the precarious position the Ottomans were in with the Mamluks so close at hand). He apparently also had decided that time was important, and a victory necessary before the Persians and the Mamluks actually took steps to combine forces.

The Ottoman troops under Selim and Sinan Pasha marched east toward Malatya. They were planning to wait for the next move by the Persians, who were in the province of Diyarbekir, northeast of Syria, which the Ottomans had seized from the Persians in 1515, and the next move of the

Mamluks, now in Aleppo.[22] Selim did not enter the town, however, which was still under the control of Kansuh el-Gawri, apparently still hoping to prevent war.

By the end of July the Mamluks had left Aleppo. Upon hearing this news, a council of the Ottomans a few days later, decided that war with the Mamluks was inevitable. They gave up their campaign against the Persians and on August 5, marched toward Aleppo and the Mamluks. At the same time a special messenger from the Egyptians, the dawadar (secretary) Mughulbey Sikkin, came with hopes of opening communication lines between the two enemies. Insulted by the fact that a military man was being sent as an envoy and perhaps remembering the recent harsh treatment of his own embassy by the Mamluks, Selim had the Egyptians' entourage killed. A high official of Selim's court, Yunus Pasha, convinced his sultan not to murder Mughulbay. Instead the Mamluk envoy was sent home on a lame mule, his hair and beard shorn, and his head covered with a night cap.[23] Kansuh knew that the insult meant that a battle was just around the corner.

Kurtbay was sent by el-Gawri to scout the surrounding countryside. He found that the people of the territories north of Aleppo were hostile towards the Mamluks. Their governor, Yunus Bey, had already pledged support to Selim. Selim, according to Kurtbey, had set out from Antep and continued to march upon other fortresses such as Kuri, Divirgiv, Darende, and Malatya. All routes out of Anatolia were now in Selim's possession.[24]

North of Aleppo there was a place called Marj Dabig,[25] at which both powers met and recorded the most important battle in the history of both states, and a battle which marked a turning point in the history of the Middle East. Diplomatic letters and attempted peace missions during the past few years had failed to re-establish friendship between the two empires.

The exact numbers of the troops on both sides cannot be definitely determined. The French historian De La Martine cites that the Mamluk troops numbered approximately 50,000.[26] Stanley Lane-Poole writes of the leaders of the Mamluk army numbering fifteen princes and el-Gawri's special forces totaling between 5,000 to 14,000.[27] Poole does not attempt to estimate the combined number of both forces, citing the lack of any mention of such a figure in his sources as his justification. According to contemporary writers on the battle, such as Ibn Iyas and Ibn Zunbul, the figures mentioned by Poole seem to be the best estimation. Ibn Iyas wrote that el-Gawri's special forces were about 5,000 in number, and also mentioned that there were other forces of the Mamluks from different sections of the society who joined the battle.[28] Ibn Zunbul's estimation of 13,000 is also very close to what Poole cites as the Mamluk numbers. His estimation of the Ottomans is 150,000.[29] Estimations of the Ottoman troops may show the biased opinions of historians. Matrakzi Nasuh, in his manuscript Fethname, mentioned that the Ottoman troops were about 60,000 and the Mamluk troops

were 80,000.[30] Nasuh, however, was an Ottoman himself and it seems to the researcher that this fact should be kept in mind. Perhaps his estimation is biased. It appears to this researcher that these larger figures are great over-estimations and the smaller figures cited by the contemporary sources, such as Ibn Iyas and Ibn Zunbul, are much more accurate.

At dawn on August 24, 1516, the decisive battle between the two powers began. According to a description by Ibn Iyas, el-Gawri was riding a horse and on his right side rode the caliph, el-Mutawkil al allah, accompanied by a number of nobles bearing approximately forty copies of the Koran carried in yellow silk bags,[31] apparently indicating the Mamluks hope that God was on their side. Ibn Iyas also mentioned that behind el-Gawri was the Mamluk commander, Sunbul, the four kadis, and the prince Zurdkash, the chief steward of the weapon-makers. The right wing was under the leadership of Siby, the governor of Syria, and the left wing was under the leadership of Khair Bey, the governor of Aleppo. In the middle the heart of the force was led by Sudun el-Ajami.[32] As for the Ottoman army, the right wing was headed by Sinan Pasha, and the left wing led by Yunus Pasha. The heart of the Ottoman troops were led by Selim himself accompanied by his special force, the Janissaries.[33]

In the first stage of the battle the Mamluks were victorious and, according to Mamluk sources, about 20,000

soldiers of the Ottomans were killed. The Mamluk sources also state that Selim at this point, attempted to retreat and proposed a peace settlement.[34] The Ottoman sources make no mention of these details which indicates that the Mamluk figure of Ottomans killed may be biased, and their account of Selim's attempted retreat untrue.

At this critical point, an incident occurred which caused dissension and division in the Mamluk army. Khair Bey the governor of Aleppo, began to commit treason against the Mamluks, by spreading a rumor through the forces that el-Gawri made an order to his Julban soldiers to stop fighting until new orders were prepared.[35] According to Ibn Iyas and Ibn Zunbul, the news spread like wildfire and the result was confusion among the troops. The confusion and rumor of the order to stop fighting prompted some of the other soldiers to confront el-Gawri, saying, "We are fighting against the army while you stand there looking at us with innocent eyes. Why don't you make an order to your special Mamluks to go to the battle site instead of us."[36] They were apparently displeased about the supposed indecisiveness of their leader. Also adding discouragement and frustration among the soldiers was the death in the battle, of Sudan el-Ajami, the commander of the middle forces, and death of Siby, who led the right wing. This led to the desertion of many soldiers, as well as the soldiers of the left wing who departed with Khair Bey.[37] Before leaving, Khair Bey started a second rumor that el-Gawri had given word that the Mamluks

were on the verge of defeat and that the sultan had said, "Escape, escape! Selim surrounds us and we are defeated."

The result was the collapse of the strength of the Mamluk army, which forced el-Gawri to stand alone with a small number of men to struggle against the Ottomans. According to the contemporary sources, el-Gawri called in vain for his troops to return, and a moment which affected him deeply, was when Zurdkash, the chief steward of the weapon-makers came with the rolled-up Mamluk flag and urged him to flee to safety. It was at this moment, according to Ibn Iyas, that el-Gawri became paralyzed and fell from his horse and died.[39]

Details regarding el-Gawri's death have been debated by historians. Ibn Iyas adds to his account that the Mamluk sultan's body was never found, as if it was swallowed by the earth.[40] Von Hammer, supported by De Lamartine, says that el-Gawri was surrounded by a large group of sipahis as he was hurled from his horse by a Savus who cut off the Mamluk leader's head and took it to Selim attached by its wheat beard to the pommel of his saddle.[41] According to his version, the behavior was ill-received by Selim who was indigant at the outrage to old age, to the throne, and to heroism, and had the Savus put to death.[42] In another story given by Ibn Zunbul, however, one of the Mamluk princes named Allan wanted to sever el-Gawri's head from his body so it could be buried and hidden from the Ottomans to prevent its display by the victors. Ibn Zunbul says Allan carried out this plan.[43]

Ibn Tulun says that the head of el-Gawri was taken by the Ottomans to Istanbul and the body was buried on the battlefield.[44] There is also a manuscript by an unknown author in the library of TopKapi Sarayi which mentions an Ottoman individual named Alakuz Bey who found the body of el-Gawri on the battlefield and brought its severed head to Selim.[45]

The words spread by Khair Bey which eventually led to the destruction of the Mamluk army and the death of el-Gawri were, according to this researcher, falsehoods perpetrated by a traitor. The statements made by Khair Bey regarding el-Gawri and his leadership were totally opposite from what the Mamluk sultan's words and actions indicate him to have been. According to Ibn Iyas, el-Gawri spoke to the troops which were left with him after the desertion by Khair Bey and the others saying, "This is the time, if you have any morality to stay and fight. This is the time for support and the time for bravery. . . . Ask God for help. . .".[46] This indicates to the researcher that el-Gawri had not been trying to mislead his men and was fully intending to fight the Ottomans. In addition, to prove this, he stood even with reduced forces against the enemy and was eventually killed. And if his reaction to the unfurled flag presented to him by Zurdkash is true, this is further evidence of his intentions to fulfill his obligations to achieve what he was responsible for--in this case, victory over the Ottomans--as the leader of the Mamluk Empire.

The battle of Marj Dabig resulted, then, in the death of the Mamluk sultan el-Gawri as well as the death of many important Mamluk commanders including Sudan, Siby, Barbars, Ikby, Traby and Temzar. In addition, the Ottomans enjoyed the spoils of their victory. Selim himself captured el-Gawri's command post and took money, weapons, and other items. His Ottoman commanders took the command post of the Mamluk leaders who had been killed or fled.[47]

The remaining Mamluk troops first went to Aleppo. They were met by closed gates at the city, however, and not allowed in because of the bad reputation the troops had made for themselves there previously, because of crimes and disruptive behavior. They then went to Damascus, according to Ibn Iyas, with the hopes of merely surviving.[48]

As for Selim and his men, they peacefully entered Aleppo, and in contrast to the reception given the defeated Mamluks, were not opposed. Selim's name was soon mentioned in the daily prayers,[49] an indication that the people regarded him as the rightful leader.

When the name of Selim was mentioned by the Imam as the servant of the Holy Cities, according to el-Bakri, the author of the manuscript el menah el-Rahmania Fi eldualah el-Osmaniah, Selim then took off his vestment and put it on the Imam.[50] It appears to the researcher that this was a further gesture of goodwill and a sign that Selim felt happy in his victories over the Mamluks as well as the Persians and that his plans for expansion were going well.

Khair Bey, who previously contributed to the defeat of the Mamluk army, meanwhile made a secret agreement with another Mamluk, Janbirdi al-Gazali, the governor of Gaza, to work on behalf of the Ottomans. This agreement was a plan that al-Gazali should make his way to Egypt accomapnied by the Mamluk soldiers, and Khair Bey would work with Selim and once the Mamluks were defeated he would be deputy governor of Egypt.[51] While Khair Bey made his way to the Ottomans in Aleppo, Janbirdi al-Gazali joined the remaining Mamluks in Damascus. In Damascus, the Mamluks were not popular, although they were allowed to remain in the city. They declared Jarbirdi al-Gazali their governor. The situation for the Mamluks in Damascus was not favorable for them, and they lacked the military strength to face the Ottomans again. Janbirdi then took the troops and headed toward Egypt and left Nasir el-din Ibn Hanash in Damascus as governor in his place.[52]

In Egypt, the Mamluks apparently realized the surmounting dangers presented by the proximity of the Ottomans and believed that they quickly needed to build their forces and appoint a new sultan.On October 11, 1516, Toman Bey* was chosen as the successor of el-Gawri[53] and, according to

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*In addition to the sources which deal with the Mamluk period as a whole, the following sources have good information regarding the life of Toman Bey. Stanley Lane-Poole, A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages, 4th ed. (1968). I.M. Lapidus, Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages (1967). P.M. Holt, Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922. W. Muir, The Mamluks

Ibn Iyas, was told by the people that he was the only choice and must accept their will.[54] It seems to the researcher that the throne was coveted by few people at this time. First, Toman Bey had to be persuaded to accept the position. Also, before accepting it he made the people promise not to be dishonest, nor to betray him, nor to plot against him, and he called upon them to accept his words and actions.[55] Toman Bey's hesitations can certainly be viewed as understandable considering the disloyalty and defeat el-Gawri, the previous sultan had suffered.

As for Selim, he meanwhile had advanced to Damascus and entered the city on September 27, 1516. The rest of the regions of Syria did not hesitate to follow the actions of their capital, Aleppo, and Selim continued to be welcomed.[56]

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*Continued from previous page.

or the Slave Dynasty of Egypt. Sir John Glubb, Soldiers of Fortune, The Story of the Mamluks, Yusif b. Taghribirdi al-Nudjum al-Zahara Fi Muluk Misr wa li Kahira, ed. Popper Berkeley 1909. Ahmad al-Makrizi, al-Suluk li-Marifat Duwal al-Muluk (Part 1). Transl. E. Blochet, Paris, 1908; (part 2) Historie des Sultans Mamlouks de l'Egypte, transl. E. Quatremere Paris, 1837-1845 (to 708 (1309); the rest still in M.S., s G.A.L., ii 38; Abn 'l-Fida, Tarikk, Istanbul, 1286; al-Nuwairi, Nihayat el-Arab fi Funkin al-Adab, vol. 1 sqq. Cairo, 1342; Omar b. al-Habib, Durat al-Aslak fi Dawlat al-Atrak (Full list of contents by H.E. Weyers in Orientalia,ii. Amsterdam 1846). Ibn Hadjar al-Askalini, Inba al-Ghumr bi Abna al-Umr, only in M.S. (s. Brockelmann, ii, 70); Ibn Iyas, Ta'rkk Misr, 1311-1312 (for the years 906-922 only in M.S., s Brockelmann, ii, 295); Sakhawi, Kitab al-Tibr al-masbuk fi Dhail al-Suluk, Bulak 1896.[57]

In Egypt, Toman Bey began to prepare himself in order to face the Ottomans who were signalling their dangerous presence in the area by their movements nearby. Toman Bey immediately appointed Sudun el-Shahabi as general commander of the army in place of Sudun el-Ajami who was killed in the battle of Marj Dabig. He also appointed Janbirdi al-Gazali as governor of Syria and its districts, in place of Siby who had also been killed in battle.[58]

Ibn Zunbul believed that Selim had no desire at this point to advance against and occupy Egypt now that he had acquired a hold over Syria, but Selim was influenced by Khair Bey, the governor of Aleppo, who attempted to encourage Selim to do so by saying to the sultan:

> Let us go to Egypt and take it, by cutting this Circassian race and expelling them from Egypt. I assure you, with the help of God, we will be successful.[59]

Ibn Zunbul presents two important things. First, he shows clearly the treasonous actions of Khair Bey towards the Egyptian side. He also indicates at least a notion being considered in the Ottoman Empire, about the possibility of invading the Mamluk Empire. It is concerning this latter point, however, that the present researcher is in disagreement with Ibn Zunbul. It is my opinion that Selim did, in fact, plan to invade Egypt in spite of the fact that Khair Bey's letter seems to suggest the Ottoman sultan needed coaxing. Evidence for this belief is in the form of a letter sent to Toman Bey from Selim. First, the tone of the letter

suggests pride by the Ottoman sultan in his latest conquests and in the strength of his army.[60] He does not sound like a man who needs prodding to continue his attempts at conquering new lands. Second, the letter indicates the ruler's desire to be a super-power and that any difficulties to stop him will be met with success. The letter may be translated:

> God revealed to me that I would someday be ruler over lands east and west like Alexander the Great. . . You (Toman Bey) are no more than a slave that can be bought and sold. You have no right to be sultan and all powerful. . . I have descended from a line of twenty kings. I became successor to the throne with the approval of the Kadis and the Caliph. If you want to be spared from our take-over of power, make an order to put our name on your currency, and for the imams in the mosques to mention our names in the daily prayers, and we may let you be. . . . If you don't do these things, I will enter Egypt and kill every Circassian, even the babies in the womb.[61]

To the present researcher this letter does not signify any new and heretofore unconsidered plan by Selim. As we have seen in previous chapters, there were numerous reasons that contributed to the Ottoman invasion of Egypt, and it can be deduced that Selim already intended to march against the Mamluk Empire. It is my belief that Selim was simply setting the stage for further justification to march against the Mamluks, and that he hoped his orders would be ignored.

Indeed, the Mamluks did not bow to his threats. According to Ibn Zunbul, Selim's embassy (three persons)

which delivered this latest letter, were killed by the Mamluks.[62] Hearing of this, Selim ordered his commanders to begin their moves toward Egypt. First, the Ottomans marched upon Gaza, where they met with the Mamluk army, under the leadership of Janbirdi al-Gazali. The Mamluk leader apparently felt ill-equipped to face the strong Ottoman army and according to the Ottoman sources, fled back to Cairo,[63] while the Arabic sources such as Ibn Zunbul mention that he was captured.[64] Whatever the sources say, al-Gazali was freed by one way or another. Sultan Selim, in his later letters announcing his conquest of Egypt, described this incident to his son Suleyman,* as an indication of loyalty to el-Gazali as he led his troops in retreat.[65] It seems from the tone of this letter that al-Gazali contributed to the Ottoman victory at Gaza; further indication that the Mamluk commander acted in favor of the Ottomans that day is the fact that he was later the most influential person upon Selim regarding the execution of Toman Bey.[66]

Toman Bey, upon hearing of the defeat of al-Gazali, was undoubtedly disappointed and disturbed and was forced to prepare his armies for Egypt with no doubt be next. Although he tried to face the Ottoman enthusiastically, his army, apparently feeling helpless, took the matter carelessly.

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*See the appendix on p. 226.

They returned this pay to Toman Bey, perhaps because they thought it too little for what they were to do. Toman Bey then asked his people to nominate another sultan with whom they could cooperate.[67] In addition, Toman Bey heard some of his soldiers saying, "If you are a real sultan you should follow the same path followed by your ancestors. If you want to resign, may God envoke evil upon you. Another sultan will replace you."[68]

These actions by his soldiers most likely brought pain to Toman Bey, but he responded as if he had not heard them, probably in an attempt not to draw additional attention to the division and disorder among some of his troops. Instead he bravely tried to motivate his soldiers to defend Cairo by facing the Ottoman army outside of Cairo at el-Salehia.[69] The soldiers, however, refused to go that distance from the city and insisted they not proceed beyond the nearby el-Redania.[70] There, Toman Bey had a ditch dug all along the front lines in order to protect el-Redania, and tried to organize his men and military equipment.[71] In spite of his preparation, some of his soldiers still did not take the matter seriously, and stayed at el-Redania only during the day, returning to Cairo at night.[72] A second attempt by Toman Bey to take his soldiers to el-Salehia, to take the battle further from the capital, also failed.[73] This poor attitude by the Mamluk soldiers, it seems, helped the Ottoman army penetrate Egypt step by step. On January 23, 1517,* the Ottoman army advanced through Belbes and its

*See p.173a.



SOURCE: Sir John Glubb, Soldiers of Fortune, The Story of the Mamluks, New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1973.

soldiers were seen going around el-Redania towards Cairo.[74] Hoping to stop them, Toman Bey found no other way but direct confrontation with the Ottoman army. In el-Redania the battle took place with both sultans, Toman Bey and Selim, fighting alongside their soldiers.

In this battle the fate of the Mamluks was foreshadowed. Both armies, however, made strong efforts to be successful. In the beginning, the Mamluks appeared to be headed for victory. The commander of the Ottoman army, Sinan Pasha,* was killed.[75] The Ottomans, however, had two things working in their favor. First was their use of military artillery far superior to the weaponry used by the Mamluks. Second was the apparent traitor Janbirdi al-Gazali who now, according to Ibn Iyas, informed Khair Bey of the plans Toman Bey had been making for his army's movements and maneuvers.[76] Toman Bey was eventually forced to flee to Turna and the Mamluks were defeated.[77] Both sides lost substantially in materials and men,[78] but the victory now paved the way for the Ottomans to advance toward Cairo itself.**

On this same day of January 23, 1517, Selim I entered Cairo accompanied by his ministers, Khair Bey and

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*Ibn Zunbul mentioned that Sinan Pasha was killed by the sword of Toman Bey who thought that he was Sultan Selim. "Oh Selim", Toman Bey said, "You are not free from me now." He then pulled him from his horse with his left hand and knocked his head off.[79] The death of Sinan, however, was apparently a hard blow to Selim as he said, "I have gained Egypt," cried he, "but I have lost Sinan."[80]

**See p. 174a.



SOURCE: Sir John Glubb, Soldiers of Fortune, The Story of the Mamluks, New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1973.

the Kadis (Judges) who had been captured after the battle of Marj Dabig. Also on this same day, the name of Selim was mentioned at the pulpits of the mosques of Cairo. According to Ibn Iyas some of the words were to the effect:

> Oh Lord! Uphold the sultan, son of the sultan, ruler over both lands (Egypt and Turkey) and the two seas (Mediterranean and Red Seas), conqueror of both hosts (both armies), monarch of the two Iraqs, minister of the two Holy Cities (Mecca and Medina), the victorious King Salim Shah. Grant him, O Lord, thy precious aid; enable him to win glorious victories, O Ruler of this world and the next, Lord of the universe.[81]

This indicates that the Mamluks were already recognizing the Ottomans' conquest over their land.

The Mamluk army, apparently confident of its safety following an Ottoman proclamation of general amnesty for the Mamluks, re-entered Cairo to recognize the sovereignty of Selim. At that point, however, the Ottoman army surrounded Cairo and massacred thousands of Mamluks. Lord Eversley gives us some description of the Ottoman actions:

> The streets were barricaded and every house was turned into a fortress. Selim spent three days in getting possession of the city.[82]

Sultan Selim routed the Mamluks and held control over the people, treating them harshly.

> Eight hundred Mamluks who surrendered on the promise of their lives, were put to death. A general massacre of the inhabitants then took place and fifty thousand of them perished by sword or were thrown into the flames of burning houses.[83]

Toman Bey escaped and returned within weeks to make small attacks on the Ottomans, reportedly with the support and assistance of Arab Tribes.[84] He was once more beaten in March of 1517, and soon after was captured. On April 23, 1517, Toman Bey* was executed in Cairo.[85]

Selim began his preparations in September of the same year to return to Anatolia and subsequently to Istanbul. He named Khair Bey as pasha of Egypt,[86] probably because of the former Mamluk supporter's experience and knowledge of the people and circumstances there. Selim left Cairo on Sept. 10, 1517, and was outside Damascus on October 7, 1517. The sultan spent the winter months there, making plans for the governorship of Syria and dealing with Ibn Hanush, an Arab chieftain who had apparently tried to revolt against the Ottoman rule.

During this stay in Damascus Selim received an envoy who brought him congratulations from Persia regarding the Ottoman conquest over the Mamluk Empire. In March 1518 Selim progressed to Aleppo, after appointing Janbirdi al-Gazali to administer Damascus.[88] Selim remained in Aleppo for two months, and then progressed to Istanbul. He reached

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*At one point Toman Bey was separated from his troops and sought safety with the tribe of sheik Hassan-Miri. The chief pretended to be on his side and entertained Toman Bey as well as offered him refuge. That night he slept in a cavern nearby. Meanwhile the agha of the Janassaries who was marching with a cavalry of five hundred men, came to the cavern and captured Toman Bey. They manacled his hands and marched him on horseback to Cairo.[87]

the city on July 25, 1518, approximately two years passing since he left in 1516 to advance toward the Mamluks.[89]

Several factors contributed to the Mamluk defeat by the Ottomans. First was the fact that the latter's army had military weaponry and artillary far superior and modern to that used by the Mamluks. As Fisher points out in his book, The Middle East, A History:

> Again it was victory of artillery, muskets, bullets, and powder in the hands of a well-disciplined, well-paid, and well-supplied army over swords, spears and bows and arrows in the hands of an undisciplined, unpaid and disloyal motley force.[90]

Ibn Zunbul, the contemporary writer of the events, in several occasions in his manuscript, emphasized that the use of the artillery by the Ottoman was the main factor which contributed to the defeat of the Mamluks.[91] The historian Edward Creasy also attributes the Ottomans' victory partly to their use of more advanced weapons. Creasy also mentions the second factor the present researcher would like to suggest: that of the disorder and lack of spirit among the Mamluk soldiers.[92] It seems to me that this lack of enthusiasm, even loyalty, was caused by low pay and a general inadequacy in funds for the army. This poor economic circumstance appears to the researcher not to be the fault of the Mamluk government, however. It was not, for example, the result of corruption in the administration of funds. It must be recalled that Egypt's economy was lagging at this time, mostly because of the shift of the trade route to the

East from a route through Egypt to a route around the Cape of Good Hope. A third factor which contributed greatly to the downfall of the Mamluks were the numerous acts of treason that occurred among the Mamluk ranks. According to Ibn Iyas several lesser officers and close friends of el-Gawri (identified as Ibrahim el-Samarkandi, Yonis el-Adili, and el-Ajami el Senketi) wrote letters to Selim and told him of conditions in Egypt. Following the battle of Marg Dabig and prior to the battle of el-Redania these three had joined the Ottoman side.[93] We have seen the examples of treason by the Mamluk officers of higher rank, Janbirdi al-Gazali and Khair Bey. It seems to this researcher that had these two officers not committed their acts of treason, the conquest of the Mamluks by the Ottomans would have not occurred so swiftly, or perhaps the Ottoman-Mamluk struggle would have ended in a truce and not the virtual elimination of the Mamluk Empire.

ENDNOTES

1. Turkey, Istanbul. TopKapi Sarayi Arsivi (archives) No. I.E. 5850.

2. Ibn Zunbul Ahmed. Wakat el-Sultan Selim Khan Fi Fotoh Misir Ma el-Sultan el-Gawri. A manuscript in Cairo Mahad el-Maktotat el-Arabia (The Institute of the Arabic Manuscripts), No. 124, p. 4, 12. Abrahim Tarkhan, Misr Fi asr dawlat al-Mamalik. Cairo: Maktabat el-Nahda el-Masriah, 1960, p. 176.

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69. Ibid., p. 1072, Tarkhan, p. 188.

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CHAPTER V

THE EFFECTS OF THE CONQUEST

Ottoman political theory considered the conquered peoples human flocks to be shepherded for the benefit of the conquerors, the descendants of Central Asia nomads. As such they were to be milked, fleeced and allowed to live their own lives so long as they gave no trouble. Mostly peasants, artisans and merchants, they could not aspire to military or civil careers. But the herd needs watchdogs.

Philip K. Hitti[1]

In this chapter the major effects of the conquest of Egypt by the Ottomans in 1517 are summarized and analyzed. The effects were diverse, and had ramifications not only for the Egyptians but for the Ottomans as well. In addition, favorable as well as unfavorable effects resulted for both parties. The major effects are categorized by the researcher as political effects, economic effects, and religious effects.

The following questions will be addressed in this chapter:

Political Effects. To what extent was the Ottoman Empire enlarged as a result of the conquest of Egypt? As a result of the conquest of other regions?

- What factors contributed to this progressive enlargement of the Ottoman Empire? Was the conquest supported by the geographical location of Egypt? Was there a continuing motive such as the Ottoman sultans desire to build a vast empire?

- Did the Ottoman Empire take direct control of the regions they invaded or did they utilize natives as vassals? Did any administrative units remain in the hands of the natives? What types of relationships developed between the central government and the local governments of the new provinces?

- Did the conquest effect the position of Egypt as the central seat of leadership of the Muslim world? What was Egypt's position after the conquest?

Economic Effects. Did the conquest of Egypt result in economic prosperity or stagnation for Egypt?

- What impact did the conquest have upon the Ottoman-Portuguese relations in regards to the trade route to the east? Did the conquest result in a revival of commercial activities between the east and the west through Egypt (which had declined earlier upon the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope in 1497)? If so, what means did the Ottomans use to stimulate revival of trade along the Egyptian route?

- What were the effects of the conquest on agricultural activities? Were there increases in revenues to

the Ottoman treasury in Istanbul?

- What kind of arrangements did the Ottoman Empire make in order to collect the Egyptian revenues? Was there maltreatment or misrule which could have an impact upon the population? What were the revenues and where did they come from? Were there land taxes? If so, how did they collect them (in cash or in kind)?

- Did the industrial activities of Egypt either develop or deteriorate after the conquest? What factors contributed to any changes?

Religious Effects. Did the conquest of Egypt have any effect in regards to the title of the caliphate? If so, what was the significance, and for what purpose was the Ottoman use of the title? If not, what evidence can be shown to prove that the title was not used and there was little significance attached to its use?

- Or did the Ottomans use Islam as a reason to bring the holy cities under their control, citing their protection of the cities as their justification?

Political Effects

Politically, the conquest of Egypt by the Ottomans brought several significant results, some of which had negative aspects in regards to Egypt and others which had positive aspects in regards to the Ottoman Empire.

First was the alteration of the position of Egypt from a powerful empire, particularly within the Muslim world,

to a lower position of statehood, merely equal to Ottoman provinces elsewhere.[2] By looking back at the prestige and power Egypt had enjoyed prior to the conquest, one can appreciate the changes that took place. With its central geographical location, Egypt previously held the position as one of the strongest powers in the Middle East. It also was leading in the Muslim world, for Cairo was the residence of the Caliph,[3] and Egypt made itself known as the protector of the holy cities of Islam. When the Portuguese tried to invade Mecca and Jeddah in the early part of the 16th century, for example, Egypt did its best to challenge the invaders.[4]

In addition, this important position held by Egypt was not confined merely to the Muslim world, for its location between the three continents of Asia, Africa and Europe resulted in its prominence politically and economically in the world at large. Egypt was a central place for world-wide commercial and political activities among the nations of the East and West. This was true not only in the modern period but also through the past centuries. W.B. Fisher says of Egypt "Egypt occupies an almost unique place in the world as a region where, in all probability, the earliest developments of civilization and organized government took place."[5] During the Mamluk period, Cairo was a center for diplomatic missions which were reportedly coming and going continuously. Ibn Iyas described one typical month of visiting by diplomats:

> One of the wonderous things in this month (Rabi el-Thani) was that about fourteen delegates were gathered in the sultan's court, and each delegate from a different part of the world. Of those delegates were the envoys of Ismail Safawi, of the king of el-Korg, of Ibn Ramazan, of the governor of Tunis, of the Sharif of Mecca, of Hassien who went to India, of the King of France, of the ruler of Venice, of Aladevlet and others.[6]

It seems to the researcher that representatives from different countries came to Egypt with the belief that it was the strongest power in the region and that one would be prudent, therefore, to cultivate good relations with Egypt.

The prestigious position of Egypt as an independent world power disappeared as a result of the Ottoman invasion. The Ottoman conquerors saw to this by the type of administration they set up in their newly-won territories. First, the Ottomans appointed the Pasha or governor of Egypt (the first being Khair Bey, the apparent traitor of the Mamluks).[7] This position was largely that of a representative of the central administration in Istanbul. Ibn Iyas observed that the rulers of Egypt became no more than mere deputies of the Ottomans after the conquest.[8] Apparently the governor could easily be replaced by the sultan as many were recalled to Istanbul after serving only a few years or even months.[9] Also, the Ottoman government used division of power in order to safeguard against attempts at independence in the Egyptian territories.[10] The army was divided into six segments each under a commanding officer with a seventh officer ruling overall.[11]

Under the pasha, Egypt was divided into twenty-four provinces and each of these ruled by a Mamluk beylerbey. Each beylerbey had a number of sanjakbeys under him as well as an administrative staff for the province including a mufti (high judge), a reis effendi (recording secretary) a defterdar (treasurer), and a body of clerks who advised them. Each sanjakbey had a similar entourage of administrative assistants.[12] Each of the beylerbeys apparently wielded as much power over the native Egyptians as the Mamluks had done in former days. Now, however, they were responsible to the sultan in Istanbul and were expected to collect the taxes and tributes for the Ottomans as well as uphold Ottoman authority. The Mamluk beylerbeys became like lords over the provinces they administered. Rivalries grew between some of these feudal lords and the Ottoman sultans apparently took advantage of any divisions between the conquered people. They undoubtedly encouraged, or perhaps made no attempt to discourage, dividing rivalries among the beylerbeys.[13] So, as can be seen, the Ottomans managed, through the government administration they set up, to put Egypt into a position as a dependent territory of their empire. No one person or body of officials was allowed too much power, and means for a rebellious unification of the Egyptians against the conquerors was thereby prevented. As Sir John Glubb points out, "Stability was sought by balancing the elements--the old principle of divide and rule."[14] A further example of this Ottoman tactic was their separation of Egypt from other

territories formerly under Egyptian control, such as Tripoli, Aleppo and Damascus. The new administrations in these territories were set up separately from one another, and each was dependent on the central administration in Istanbul.[15] This action, it seems to the researcher, contributed further to Egypt's decline as an independent world power and to its isolation.

Another course of action taken by the Ottomans toward Egypt following the conquest appears on the one hand to be religious in nature, but was, in fact, a political move with political ramifications. Selim sent the Caliph al-Mutawkil ala allah and the sons of his cousin Kalil, along with 800 other professional people and officials to reside in Istanbul.[16] It appears to the researcher that Selim desired to make Istanbul, not Egypt, the center of the Muslim religious world, thereby strengthening it as the political capital as well. This action put Egypt even deeper into the role of a secondary province.

A second result of the conquest which had negative ramifications was the reduction of Egypt by the Ottomans to an isolated backwater province. It was deprived of contacts with its neighbors as well as with the West. Following the conquest it went into a "medieval-like stagnation", according to the historian Nadav Safran, and this stagnation lasted for nearly three hundred years.[17]

A political result of the conquest that may be viewed as positive in regards to the Ottomans was the facilitations

that control over Egypt provided to the Ottomans in their desire to build a vast empire. By dominating Egypt, with its position of power and influence over lesser countries and its central geographical location in the Middle East, the Ottomans were aided in their attempts to further expand their holdings in the region, conquering area after area. Bernard Lewis describes the Ottoman Empire's growth following its conquest of Egypt:

> From Egypt, Ottoman sovereignty was extended southwards down both shores of the Red Sea, and westwards along the Barbary Coast to the borders to Morocco. In the East, the Ottomans succeeded in wrestling Iraq from its Persian masters, and extending Ottoman power to the start of the Persian Gulf.[18]

Another result that occurred favorably in regards to the Ottomans following the conquest, was the submission without resistance by the representative of Mecca and Medina to the new rule. The holy cities put up no apparent opposition. The sharif of Mecca, Abu Barkat, soon after the conquest, sent his son Abu el Hosni to Selim I, accompanied by a number of sheiks. They brought gifts, the key to the Kaaba, congratulations on the sultan's victory over Egypt, and assurances that Mecca was now under the wishes of the Ottomans.[19] (Unlike the holy cities, however, some areas of the Middle East did not bow so easily to the new rule. Yemen and Iraq, as well as the North African states, attempted to resist the new governments imposed upon them, but were soon brought under control by the Ottomans).[20]

An additional result favorable to the Ottomans following their conquest of Egypt and subsequent territories, was the new power and prestige the Ottoman Empire held in the world. Under Selim I, the Ottomans conquered Egypt, northern Mesopotamia, Syria and the Arabian Peninsula.[21] His son, Suleyman the Magnificent (1520-1566)* began to take advantage of his country's new strength and newly secured eastern borders, and began to direct his activities westward towards

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*The contemporary Turkish sources which have been printed or translated are the Chronicle of Muhyi i-Dun which forms the last part of the Tawarikk-i Othman. Publ. by Giese. Breslau 1922, p. 138-153 (to 960 A.H. (1553)); Kemal Pasha Zade, Ghazewat-i Muhai or Muhai-name, publ. and trans. by Pavet de Courteilles, Paris, 1859; Rustam Pasha Tarikki al-i Othman, transl. by I. Forrer, "Die osmanische Chronik des Rusten Pasha (to 1561); in Turkische Bibliothek, Leipzig 1923, vol. 21; the last years of the reign are described in Selaniki, Ta'rikh, Constantinople 1281 (from Sept. 1563); the "Journal of Sulajman" describes day by day the last eight campaigns is given in Feridun, Munshe at-i seldin Constantinople 1275, i. 507 (Belgrade campaign), p. 529 (Rhodes), p. 554 (Mohacs), p. 567 (Vienna), p.577 (Guns), p. 584 (Tabriz and Baghdad), p.507 (Walona), p. 602 (Moldavia); the Vienna campaign was publ. and transl. by F.A. Behrhauer, Suleiman des Gestzgbers Tagebuch auf seinem Feldzuge nach Wien, Vienna 1858; the Munshu at of Feridun also contains many documents of the reign of Sulaiman (i. 500-ii 86). There seems to be a more complete collection in M.S. No. 227 of the National Library of Vienna (Flugel, p. 293); Munshe' at we-bazl waka-i-i Sultan Suleiman Khan which von Hammer considered the eleventh vol. of the original compilation by Feridun (ef. Selaniki, p.137). Among contemporary western sources first place should be given to the Relazioni of the Venetian ambassadors publ. by Alberi, then the narratives of other envoys like Basbecq, accessible in Foster and Daniell, The Life and Letters of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq, London, 1881; the Tagebuck of his companion Hans Dernschwam, ed. Babinger, Munich and Leipzig, 1923, is very useful for its description of Turkey in the time of Suleiman; Lewenklaw, in Neuwe Chronica Turckischer Nation, Frankfort, 1590, gives in the appendix an important

Europe, especially Belgrade, the gateway to central Europe and Rhodes, the key to the Eastern Mediterranean.[22] Cortung-Oglu, one of Suleyman's advisors, told him:

> In what wars can you more easily gain dying fame than in vanquishing and subduing Rhodes, the bulwark of Christiendom, which alone keeps us from their countries.[23]

By the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had become an important force in the bid for the balance of power in European politics. It had, in effect, "grown up" and now had to be regarded as an important and powerful state. It looked to the west for the prospect of new lands and strength.

By this time, the early years of the 16th century, Europe was divided. During Suleyman's reign a major war between Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire and Francis I

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*document (e.g. on page 418 the stages of the second campaign in Persia); Boissard, Vitae et Icones Sultanorum Turcicorum, Frankfort, 1596.

The modern historians beginning with von Hammer have also used, sometimes almost exclusively, western sources (Hungarian, Austrian, Romanian, etc.), von Hammer, G.O.R., iii. 1-495; Zinkeisen, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in Europa Gatja 1854, ii 611-936; iii 1-386; Dupeliwieser, Die Kampfe Osterreichs mit den Osmanen vom Fabre 1525-1537, Vienna 1899; Jorga, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches Gotha 1909, ii, iii, Modern Turkish works are: Thuraiya Efendi, Sidjiil-i othmani, i, 143; Namik Kamal, Othmanli ta'rikhl, Constantinople 1326-1328; Khair Allah Dewlet'i othmaniye tarikhi. Constantinople 1292, vol. xi; monographs by the historian Ahmad Rafik; Sokolli, Kadinlar Saltanati Aimier wa-San at karlar: Mehmed Zaki, Maktul shahzadeler, Constantinople, 1336.

A.H. Lybyer. The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the time of Suleiman the Magnificent, Cambridge, Mass., 1913; E.J.W. Gibb, History of Ottoman Poetry, London, 1904, iii 1-9; Ilafiz, Husain al-Aiwansarayi, Haaikat al-diawani Constantinople 1281, i 14, 15, 16, 101; ii, 72, 100, 186. (24)

of France had erupted.[25] Religious disputes contributed to problems in Europe. Pope Leo X was busy arguing for resistance against the growing influence of the German monk Martin Luther, the leader of the Protestant movement.[26] In addition to these crises, Belgrade was disturbed internally, possibly as a result of the youth and inexperience of its king, Louis II, and disagreement among its princes.[27] Sultan Suleyman took advantage of the disorder and unrest caused by these troubles, and marched upon Belgrade in August of 1521 and Rhodes in January of 1522. He subsequently invaded Hungary, the nominal ally of Charles, and was victorious in the battle of Mohacz in 1526.[28] Suleyman set forth to march upon Vienna, one of the chief cities of central Europe. The distance made communication difficult, however, and an alliance was recently made between Charles V and Francis I. These factors contributed to Suleyman's failure to capture the capital.[29] These Ottoman successes in gaining new land are an indication of their growing stature and power in the eyes of the world.* In addition such incidents as an alliance made by Suleyman with King Francis I of France after the latter's defeat by Charles V, in the Battle of Pavia in Italy in 1526,[30] suggests the Ottomans' place of significance in world opinion by this time.

It should be noted here that Suleyman was advancing towards the west while his father, as it was pointed out earlier, chose an opposite course, that is not to proceed

*See p. 195a.



SOURCE: Sir John Glubb. A Short History of the Arab Peoples, New York: Stein and Day Pub lishers, 1969.

towards Europe because of his fear of meeting with failure. It is the researcher's opinion that Suleyman had gained a confidence in the strength of the Ottomans now that his empire had increased so vastly, and this confidence was well-founded, for he met with such frequent successes on his European front.

Not all of the political effects of the conquest can be regarded as favorable to the Ottomans. One result of their conquest over Egypt was their inheritance of the lengthy conflict that the Mamluks had been facing with the Portuguese. The Ottomans took over the responsibility of protecting the shores of the Arabian Peninsula and the Mediterranean, which had once been the charge of the Mamluk Empire. In Chapter Three we saw how Selim was concerned with building his navy to compete with the Portuguese even before the conquest of Egypt, particularly exemplified by the words to Piri Pasha (see p. 120). Following the Ottomans' taking of Egypt there was no all-out confrontation with Portuguese, but the Ottomans did, however, manage to progressively wrest control of trade routes and key ports from them. In 1538 the Ottomans mounted a naval expedition to conquer Zehid under the admiralship of Suleyman Pasha (1535-8). The move was successful, and a subsequent attempt was made at taking Aden. A second attempt had to be made at Aden in 1551, when it was finally taken, as well as Masket.[31]

These Ottoman expeditions in 1551 were led by Piri Reis who tried unsuccessfully to gain control of the Strait of Hormuz, but was stopped by a severe storm which destroyed much of his navy. Fifteen of his ships took refuge in Basra, Iraq, which left only three with Piri Reis. He was forced to retreat through the eastern shores of the Arabian Sea, then along the shore of Hadramot, to Bab elmandab, and finally up the Suez. Piri Reis was eventually executed for his failures, apparently because he was well-equipped with thirty vessels and still his leadership was not successful against the Portuguese.

A third expedition by the Ottomans against the Portuguese was prepared in the Suez. Under the admiralship of Sidi Ali in 1553, the force consisted of 30 ships and had as its main objective to bring back the ships left by Piri Reis in Basra. When the Ottoman force headed to Shut el-Arab to meet with 24 Portuguese ships, bad luck with a storm was now with the latter. A storm battered the Portuguese navy and kept them from clashing with the Ottomans. The Ottoman vessels harbored in India in Duir Swart, and returned to Turkey in 1557.[32] The result of these actions taken by the Ottomans in regards to the Portuguese apparently had the effect of making the Portuguese realize they were facing a very strong foe. They avoided direct confrontations with the Ottomans, and stayed away from the Arabian and Mediterranean Seas.

Economic Effects

Economic conditions in Egypt which developed after the conquest by the Ottomans were marked by a stagnation. Three factors contributed to this: the transfer of the craftmen and artisans from Egypt to Istanbul; the misrule by the Ottoman governors of Egypt and their exploitation of the country; and the decline of trade which occurred in the region.

Immediately following Selim I's successful entry of Cairo, the Ottoman sultan sent many of Egypt's skilled workers to the Ottoman capital.[33] Ibn Iyas reports that groups of cobblers, woodworkers, metalsmiths, painters and builders, pavers, engineers, and stonemasons were sent to Istanbul, and their numbers totaled approximately one thousand. Ibn Iyas suggests that this loss of craftsmen was among the worst things Egypt had to endure following the conquest.[34] Selim's action is seen by the present researcher as analogous to Hulaco's following the latter's destruction of Baghdad and Damascus in 1258 when he sent many of those cities' workers to Persia and destroyed most of the buildings, mosques and libraries.[35] In both instances, because such a large number of people were transferred, the actions undoubtedly had a strong effect and contributed to a sharp decline in the local industries. In Cairo many of these industries were organized within a hereditary guild structure, the specialized skills and secrets for many

passed down from generation to generation.[36] The disruption of this structure likely resulted in, if not the destruction of some specialized skills or techniques, then perhaps allowed or altered the development of others. This transfer of the skilled workers to Istanbul points to the second factor which contributed to the economic problems befalling Egypt after the conquest, that is the misrule of the region by the Ottoman governors and their apparent motive to exploit the newly-captured land.

The large transfer of Egyptian workers to Istanbul indicates that the Ottomans were concerned not with the welfare of the conquered region, but only for their own interest. Further indication that the Ottoman governors in the area cared mostly for the size of their own purses was the disorganized and unruly way they heavily taxed the people. A contemporary writer Ali Mustafa b. Ahmed (1541-1600) who visited Egypt twice in the latter part of the 16th century described these activities. The tax-paying population had to pay money to the regional administrators as well as to the beylerbey, and were still forced to submit a large sum to the capital as "tribute" each year.[37] And each year brought more and more demand for money until the peasants were, according to Ali Mustafa b Ahmad, forced to sell their implements. Said Ahmed:

> Under these circumstances. . . the country will soon be in ruins and depopulated and not even able to pay the Egyptian troops, let alone the tribute. Its defense corroded, the country will become a prey to the enemy.[38]

This opinion of this writer is especially interesting (and perhaps it can be deduced that his estimation of the situation was not exaggerated in favor of Egyptians) since Ali Mustafa was an Ottoman official who held various offices in financial administration and was secretary of the Janissaries during his career.

Whereas it might be the inclination to hold the Ottoman rulers as solely responsible for the unjust and declining economic situation, the Mamluks must also carry some of the burden. Both groups were foreign to the region and perhaps the Mamluks as well as the Ottomans were not entirely devoted to the development of Egypt. As Gibb and Bowen point out:

> . . . Theoretically, no system of government could be worse or could more quickly lead to economic destruction and anarchy than that of foreign slave-born despots, linked by no ties of nature to the country and people they exploited, and with no ambitions but power and wealth.[39]

The Mamluks and the Ottomans alike during their successive reigns of power in Egypt neglected irrigation and other agricultural matters, for example. This poor management caused a deterioration in economic conditions. Similarly, trade and industry, arts and crafts undoubtedly suffered under the many years of general political problems in the country, and especially, as was pointed out, when Selim transferred the skilled workers to Turkey.[40] Another factor which somewhat lifts the blame for the economic problems which beset Egypt following the conquest is suggested

by George C. Arnakis. He notes that the dominant caste of the Ottoman Empire were the Turks, whose chief pursuit was war. The Ottoman state grew because of their skills and strength on the battlefield, not because of their political and commercial powers. Their empire grew wealthy primarily because of captured cities and booty.[41] Arnakis is not surprised that its empire stagnated in times of peace. The Turks, he says, despised commerce and industry as incompatible with a soldier's ways.[42] It is the researcher's suggestion that this possible innate characteristic of the Ottomans was one reason why regions under their rule might have fallen into economic decline.

In trying to ascertain the possible reasons behind the Ottomans mismanagement of economic conditions it should also be remembered how the Ottomans regarded their new subjects. Just as the Egyptians undoubtedly despised their new rulers, the Ottomans considered all Arabic-speaking people as less worthy than they and designed by nature to be ruled over.[43] The Ottomans probably cared very little for the Egyptians' welfare and the welfare of their society except in terms of the benefits they could reap from it.

Nevertheless, the Ottoman administrators of Egypt following the conquest were responsible, up to a point, for the decay of lands. They did virtually nothing to improve economic conditions in agriculture and commerce in ways that were already being used successfully by the Byzantine and

and Persian Empires. Some of these methods were the building of roads, transporting populations for economic purposes, the colonization of fertile farm land, keeping the canals in good repair, and other sound administrative practices.[44] The Ottomans again can be seen as neglecting agricultural and commercial development for the sake of military conquests, and exploiting the conquered people for the immediate fattening of their coffers.[45]

In addition to the above examples of misrule and poor administrative choices by the Ottomans, many examples can be seen of the Ottomans' exploitation of the Egyptians. Many were suggested in the above examples. Stanford Shaw states in the introduction of his book, The Financial And Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt that, "the chief aim of the Ottoman Administration in Egypt was to secure the exploitation of its wealth and the diversion of a maximum portion of the resulting revenues to the porte or to its objectives and obligations in Egypt and the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina.*[46] This exploitation of the

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*One should note that this is a primary premise of Shaw's book. It is my opinion, however, that this was not the only goal of the Ottomans in organizing an administration in Egypt. Shaw neglects to consider other important subjects of Ottoman concern. Egypt's location was a very important factor encouraging their expansion in that area. By controlling Egypt the Ottomans could dominate the routes of the East-West trade, and it facilitated their control of other Arabian states. Egypt was then the most important state in the Middle East and had strong influence over other Arab states of the time.

people which eventually contributed to economic stagnation was accomplished not only by the Ottoman changes in the personnel structure of the Egyptians' industries, but also as was noted above, by the levy of extreme taxes and monetary burdens on the conquered people. Selim I, immediately after taking control of Cairo, ordered that customs dues collected in Jeddah, Rosetta, Damietta, and Alexandria were to be remitted directly to Istanbul.[47] Individuals who were ordered to collect such money from the people were likely to be seized and tortured or imprisoned if he did not fulfill his obligations to collect taxes and assure the cultivation of lands.[48] In addition, this individual's own property would be seized for the Imperial treasury in Istanbul.[49]

The Ottomans also devised ways to increase the amount of taxes under the guise of ethical government practices. Soon after their occupation of Egypt, the Ottomans organized their first cadastral survey in order to assess revenues to be expected and extracted from the country. (Sources differ in their dates for this first survey. Richard Leslie Hill states that it occurred in 1526[50] while Shaw dates the first survey at 1517, immediately following the conquest.[51] Shaw is more reliable for he has seen the census in question.

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*Continued from previous page

Also, the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina were subordinate to Egypt, and if they should come under control of the Ottoman sultans, the Ottomans would gain leadership over the whole Muslem world, and thereby insure their power in the Middle East.

Previous records of Egyptian landholding had been destroyed, whether this action was taken by the Egyptians during the flight of the Mamluk sultan at the time of the conquest with the hope that tax liabilities could be kept from the conquerors, or whether the Ottomans destroyed the records in order to ascertain the landholding situation themselves is unknown. The survey allowed the Ottomans, however, to set their own new tax levies, and, as it was noted, the taxes were high.[52]

In addition to taxes and annual tributes, the Egyptians were also ordered to supply Istanbul with military means. Egyptians soldiers were also kept readied in Egypt to help the Ottoman armies protect their interests there in case of intrusion by any outsiders. Men and ships were contributed to the Ottomans for their military undertakings. Eversley writes:

> Of more material was the fact that an annual tribute was paid by the Egyptian government, which a few years later, under Suleyman, was fixed at 80,000 ducats. It also contributed men and ships to wars undertaken by the sultan. In the siege of Rhodes, in 1524, Egypt sent three thousand Mamluks and twenty vessels of war.[53]

The Egyptians were also forced to supply raw goods to Istanbul. The sultan's palace there was supplied with wheat, rice, barley, spices and sugar. In addition, Egypt was made to provide for the Holy Cities. Large sums of money were sent. "In 1532, for example, fourteen thousand gold ducats were sent as alms to the Holy Cities of Mecca

and Medina; for the Palace 13,866 ducats were expended on sugar, spices and drugs, and 12,053 on jewels and textiles."[54]

In regards to economic results in the area of trade activities of Egypt following the Ottoman conquest, little information can be found. Several points, however, can be made and some results following the conquest can be seen.

It can be concluded that the most favorable political condition for the economic prosperity of Egypt in regards to trade under the Ottomans would have been one of unity under a government capable of maintaining order, removing obstacles to trade, keeping trade routes open, and maintaining relations with neighboring states which would foster commerce . The Ottoman sultans did achieve a political unity of the Middle East and secured a considerable measure of control over trade routes east to west and north to south but the fostering of all of the above factors which would have developed trade for Egypt was not achieved.[55]

Sultan Selim continued the former Mamluk commercial relations with the European states and confirmed the capitulations previously enjoyed by the French. On September 17, 1517, Selim made an agreement with the Venetians by which the latter party agreed to pay the Ottoman government what they had paid to the Mamluks for the possession of Cyprus.[56]

In 1528 Selim's son, Suleyman, renewed the capitulatory rights accorded to the French in Egypt, and extended these privileges to the Catalans as well. These were the last capitulations that applied specifically to Egypt, however.[57] From 1528 on, the capitulatory regime in Egypt, as a province of the Ottoman empire, came under the general concessions given by Istanbul to foreign states. But as far as the Ottoman Empire was concerned, the revival of commercial activities in Egypt was the main aim. The income of the Ottoman government was primarily gained through taxation; and an important segment of this revenue came from taxes levied on international trade passing through the empire, especially through Egypt as it was an important part of the Ottoman Empire. So the Ottoman Empire concluded the main capitulatory treaty* with France in 1535.[58] The Ottoman government probably hoped that by giving the French merchants certain privileges, these merchants would use Egypt as a connection for trade with Asian countries and consequently these activities would stabilize the Porte's tax revenues. France also viewed the treaty of 1535 as a means

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*The text of this treaty of 1535 is from a translation found in Senate Document No. 34, 67th Cong.; 1st Sess. The French version is found in Noradounghian, G., Recueil d'actes internationaux de L'Empire Ottoman, I 83-87. The text in French and Latin is given in Charriere, E., Negociations de la France dans le Levant, I, 283-294. And in Un Ancient Diplomate, Le Regime des Capitulations; 60-63. The text in Turkish version is found in Mohammad Farid Bey, Tarih el Dollah el-Alian el Osmania, p. 91-95.

of gaining an advantage over other European states, to gain access to trade with the Far East, and to re-establish her own trade in Egypt.[59] In spite of all efforts made by the Ottomans, the position of Egypt as a central commercial place as it used to be lost its importance.

It is also the opinion of the researcher that a fourth result occurred because of the act of Selim of sending many of the skilled industrial workers to Istanbul. It is very likely that Egypt's trade declined as a result, since many of the fine quality goods the country traded could not be made.

It should also be noted that trade at this time in the area was characterized by several factors, and the upsetting of these factors could easily hamper the amount of trade both internally and externally. General poverty of some areas of Egypt made prospects of trade expansion under the Ottomans extremely remote and, as we have seen, the Ottomans made additional burdens upon the people in the form of taxes and payments of tribute which undoubtedly kept the prospects for trade expansion even more remote. Also, the limitations in communication and transportation, and the constant necessity to secure the region against highwaymen and robbers also meant that there was a slow pace overall to commercial trade. The neglect of the Ottoman governors to help the Egyptians in such things as repairing and building roads probably contributed to an even slower style of travel and trade.[60]

Religious Effects

The most significant religious effect which occurred as a result of the Ottoman conquest of Egypt, was the transfer of the religious leadership from Cairo to Istanbul. This change, as was noted earlier, came immediately after the conquest when Selim sent the caliph al-Mutawakil ala allah, to Istanbul[61]. The action has caused many debates among historians as to whether the caliph actually relinquished the title to the Ottoman sultans or not. To understand and better compare the varying viewpoints one must have some background about the caliph and its significance.*

The transfer of the caliph to Egypt from Baghdad in 1258 after the destruction of the Abbasid dynasty by the

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*"Caliph" is from the Arabic "Khalifa" meaning "successor" which first referred to the prophet Muhammed's follower Abu Bakr (d. 634 A.D.). Abu Bakr succeeded the prophet as political and military leader of the Muslims, and inherited the Imamate, the privilege of leading the prayer. He did not, however, inherit the prophetic function nor was he considered the spiritual head in place of Muhammed. The office eventually became that of defender of the faith and promoter of the sacred law of Islam. The caliphate nearly ended in the Mongol defeat of Baghdad in 1258; the seat of the Abbasid dynasty of Caliph then became Cairo in 1261 when the Mamluk sultan Baybars transferred a member of the dynasty to Egypt and installed him there, most likely to legitimize his rule and the claims of Mamluk sultans that they were supreme protectors of the Muslim faith. The Caliphs did not possess many rights in government but certainly enjoyed some privileges and influence as living symbols of the faith. They presided over parades and celebrations, and bestowed their blessings on new sultans of Egypt until the Ottoman conquest in 1517.

Mongols[62] was one of the elements which helped put Egypt in its place of importance in the Muslim world. Even though the caliph had no real political powers and duties, the Mamluk sultans recognized the influence of the religious leaders and looked to the caliph for approval. To protect his throne, for example, a sultan sought the caliph's commendation on his succession so he could use this endorsement of his leadership by God's representative throughout his reign.[63] But in reality and in practice the caliph had no political privileges. Some Mamluk sultans, in fact, showed their exploitation of the influence of the caliph by showing courtesy and respect publicly and disrespect privately. The historian Al-Sueti, for example, describes how the caliph came to visit and pay respects to the sultan each month. The sultan would obligingly sit on the floor with the Caliph and talk with him, but on his departure treated the religious leader lightly, like any other citizen.[64] This example of Al-Sueti also suggests to the researcher the real governmental power which the Caliph lacked. It cannot be denied, however, that the caliph did have significant influence on the people, and the governmental figures knew this. The Caliph was believed descended from the prophet Muhammed. Barani has said that in some instances, "Without the Caliph's command the King scarcely ventured to drink a cup of water."[65] In 1343, Muhammed (one of the Indian kings) reportedly granted the caliph extravagant honors following

some successes in dispersing bandits, perhaps in case the religious representative and God had anything to do with the latest victories.[66] For another example, Sultan Bayezid I in 1394 sent to the caliph el Mutawkil Ala Allah numerous gifts and simultaneously sought approval of his recent succession to the throne.[67] Thus we can see that whatever the particular governmental leader's individual feeling toward the caliph it was an accepted notion that the caliph had some influence over what happened in society. The seat of the caliph located in the Mamluk capital gave additional prestige and respect to their empire in the Islamic world.

Selim I, as was pointed out, moved the Caliph to be near the new center of government in Istanbul in 1517. Ibn Iyas reports that word of this transfer spread quickly and with anger among the Mamluk people.[68] In Istanbul the caliph was housed in luxury. But apparently he fell into ill-favor with Selim, and was subsequently exiled to a fortress at Saba Kulat where he remained until the death of Selim.[69] In 1520, Selim's successor and son Suleyman allowed the caliph to return to Cairo where he died in 1538.[70]

Following the death of al-Mutawakil, historians began to debate over the caliph's relinquishment of title. First, did he relinquish it and second, if he did, was it to Selim or to Suleyman? Finally, when did the relinquishment occur, if there was one? Was it when the caliph was still in Cairo or not until he arrived in Istanbul?

Regarding the primary sources in both Arabic and Turkish concerning this time period, there is no mention of such a relinquishment of title. If the caliph did give up his title to Selim, it seems to the researcher, that this fact would be included in the announcements Selim sent about his conquests following the capture of Egypt. There is no mention of it in these letters, nor in a more likely place, that of a letter to Suleyman from Selim in which he describes his latest victories and even writes of the caliph.[71] In addition, historians contemporary to the period, such as Ibn Iyas, fail to mention such a relinquishment although Ibn Iyas, for example, writes at length about the caliph's departure from Cairo.[72] There is also no evidence of such action mentioned from the pulpits of the imams and no sign on the currency that such a title cessation had occurred.[73] This lack of data should not be considered lightly. The caliph's surrender of his title is an act, it seems to the researcher, that would show its evidence in the examples cited above.

Regarding modern writers and secondary sources, Stanley Lane-Poole in his book The Story of Turkey, supports the belief that the caliph was forced to give over to the sultan the symbols of his office, the standard and the cloak of the Prophet Mohammed, thereby relinquishing his power.[74] In a later book by Lane-Poole, A History of Egypt In The Middle Ages the historian alters his account a bit by

indicating that the relinquishment of title by the caliph occurred not under Selim, but during the reign of his son Suleyman.[75] Likewise, William Muir in his book The Caliphate says that the rights of the caliph were resigned to Suleyman only after he enjoyed a few years of a privileged life in Istanbul followed by his imprisonment and then forced retirement to Egypt.[76] Thomas Arnold, in his book also entitled The Caliphate, takes a different view on the whole situation compared to the other modern writers. He maintains that a formal transfer of the caliph's office whether to Selim or Suleyman, did not take place.[77] Arnold points out that undoubtedly Selim carried off to Istanbul symbolic relics such as a robe and a sword handed down from the days of the prophet Mohammed. But Arnold argues that the contemporary sources give no evidence at all of a formal relinquishment. Furthermore, Muir says, there was no real necessity by the Ottoman sultans to officially take over the office at this point.

> . . . by this period the title of Khalifah had been assumed by so many insignificant princes that it had ceased to carry with it the same impressive associations as it had borne in earlier centuries. . . Selim and his ancestors had already been long accustomed to enjoy such prestige as went along with the use of the title Khalifah, and when Selim cared to adopt it, he would do so, as his fathers had done before him, in virtue of divine appointment, and he certainly would not look upon himself as having taken it over from so significant and so negligible a personage as the Abbasid Caliph of Cairo in whose family the historic Caliphate had lost all the dignity it had once possessed. . .[78].

Furthermore, Arnold suggests that the caliph by this time, was almost a puppet in the Mamluk Empire and held no desirable rights for Selim to feel impelled to take over.[79]

Hitti similarly identifies the caliph at this period in history as a puppet. In his book The Arabs: A Short History, Hitti concludes that whether an official transfer was made or not the fact remained that the Ottoman sultans gradually absorbed the caliph's privileges and finally, the title itself. He also adds that while Selim and some of his successors used the title and even styled themselves caliphs, the title was only complimentary and not recognized by the Muslim people outside the immediate territory. (The first known diplomatic document which uses the term caliph in regards to the Ottoman sultan and officially recognizes his religious authority over Muslims outside of Turkey, notes Hitti, is the Russo-Turkish treaty of 1774).[80]

According to what we have seen there is much argument as to whether an official transfer took place and what its immediate significance might have been. It is the present researcher's opinion that the lack of evidence of such a transfer in contemporary sources (such as Ibn Iyas and Ibn Zunbul), is the best evidence that no formal relinquishment occurred. Additional support for this conclusion is the lowly reputation to which the position of caliph fell and the lack of prestige the title then carried. It certainly was not a strong source of envy for Selim. It may of

course, be argued that the contemporary writers were biased and did not want to mention either the transfer of the caliph's title to the new conqueror nor the lack of prestige the title may had then possessed. In the cases of Ibn Iyas and Ibn Zunbul this may be true. But there is no mention of the transfer by the Ottoman historian Feridun who lived almost contemporary to the period, and who certainly would be likely to mention the formal event*. Feridun does write about "the caliphate el-Mawitakil ala Allah Mawlana Muhi el-Din from the Abbasid Dynasty who was considered the last caliphate in the protected Egypt."[82] Thus it appears that a takeover of the caliph's title by the Ottoman sultans must have been a gradual transfer such as suggested by Hitti.

A second Ottoman document further supports the idea that no official transfer was made. Found by the researcher in Dar el-Kutub in Cairo and dated 1557, it is a legal document of an endowment and was issued by Rustim Pasha who occupied the post of vizier two times (in 1544 and 1552)

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*It is interesting to note that another Ottoman writer Halide Edib in Conflict of East and West in Turkey contends that even the transfer of the caliph to Istanbul may be a myth, stating that the "historian of the time does not mention it." This hypothesis is, of course, incorrect as the transfer was described by Ibn Iyas.[81]

during the reign of Suleyman.[83] It mentions the titles of Sultan Selim and Sultan Suleyman, but makes no mention of any additional title of caliph for either of them.[84] It would seem unlikely that the contemporary Rustim would have neglected to state such a title if the official transfer had been made.

In spite of the fact that much debate has occurred about the alleged transfer, the important matter, it seems to this researcher, is what occurred in regards to the caliph and the office following the Ottoman conquest of Egypt. That is to say that whether or not the Ottoman sultans found the prestige and title desirable, and whether or not they officially took over the title at one point in time, the Ottomans did succeed in bringing about the end of the Abassid caliph dynasty in Egypt. They also succeeded in moving the religious, as well as political capital, from Cairo to Istanbul, gaining undeniable stature in the eyes of the rest of the world as a strong and formidable power.

As we have seen, the types and amount of effects resulting for both parties following the conquest of Egypt by the Ottomans were numerous. Politically, economically, and in religious terms, Egypt fell from a strong and independent power to a lower position of statehood merely equal to Ottoman provinces elsewhere. We can also see that while the effects have been categorized by the researcher into three

general divisions, the repercussions of the effects were felt in many facets of both societies.

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PART THREE: CONCLUSION

This study was an examination and analysis of the diplomatic relationship between the Ottoman and Mamluk Empires in the first quarter of the 16th century. A particular emphasis of the study was the conquest of the Mamluks by the Ottomans in 1517.

Chapter One provided the reader with a brief summary of the historical background and societal characteristics of both the Ottoman and Mamluk states. Governmental systems, armed forces, economy, the people, and religion were among those elements of the two states which were compared and contrasted. This information was intended to serve as a background for the rest of the study. Chapter One also described an important difference between the intentions of the two states in regards to each one's status as a world power. The Ottomans were seen possessing a strong desire to increase the holdings of their empire; the Ottoman state grew from a tiny state in Anatolia to a vast empire of the Middle East. The Mamluk Empire apparently possessed no such imperialistic designs.

The Ottoman tendency toward expansion was also seen throughout the examination of diplomatic relationship between the two states prior to the conquest which was provided in

Chapter Two. In this chronological review and analysis it was shown via examinations of official letters and accounts by historian contemporary to the period, that the relationship between the two states vacillated between various feelings ranging from openness and friendship to animosity and hostility. It was seen, however, that more often than not the relationship was characterized by hostility and suspicion. These unfriendly feelings grew until there was outright war.

The tenuous relationship between the Mamluks and the Ottoman Empires was further described in the third chapter in which motives behind the conquest were identified and examined. The researcher deduced that the principal reasons for the Ottoman march upon Egypt were the "revenge" motive, or the Ottomans' desire to punish the Mamluks for harboring exiled Ottoman princes; the economic motive, or the Ottomans' desire to control Egypt in order to lift the Purtuges blockade upon ports in the Arabian Peninsula, thereby reopening the trade routes which had been closed in the face of the Mamluks and increasing their holdings and thus, their wealth; the political motive, in particular, it was the Ottoman sultans' desires,especially that of Selim I, to rule over a vast empire, as well as a result of Selim I's aggressive personality. Other motives were seen as secondary and in many cases as "justifications" for the primary political (including the revenge motive) and economic motive. These other motives

included: the religious motive, or the Ottomans' desire to stand against the spread of Shiism and to protect the Muslim world; the border state control motive, or the Ottomans' desire to end the continual skirmishes in territories between the two empires by finally gaining control of the entire area.

Chapter Four describes the course of the conquest. First it detailed the relationship between the Mamluk sultan el-Gawri and the Ottoman sultan Selim I, and described their preparation for war. Selim was seen by an examination of correspondence and contemporary historical accounts as most responsible for initiating the first direct confrontations between the two powers. Also, the battle of Marj Dabig and the Ottoman entrance to Cairo were depicted. Some analysis was provided here as well, in particular the probable factors leading to the Mamluks defeat which were identified and discussed. Those factors included acts of treason by Mamluk officers, low spirits and lack of unity among the ranks of Mamluk troops, economic problems which plagued Egypt, and Ottoman superiority in terms of artillery and weaponry.

Chapter Five provided the researcher's identification and analysis of what was found by this study to be the effects of the conquest. Effects were seen to be very numerous and varied, and included both positive and negative effects in regards to both states. The effects were classified by the researcher as political in nature (most significant was the change in Egypt's status from a prominent world power to a

submissive territory under Ottoman rule), religious in nature (the transfer of the caliphate from Cairo to Istanbul was very important and had political as well as religious ramifications), and economic in nature (in particular was the sharp decline in Egypt's economy and the long period of economic stagnation which resulted).

It appears, then, that the purpose of this study, to provide an explanation and examination of the diplomatic relationship between the Ottoman and Mamluk Empires in the first quarter of the 16th century, was successfully completed. Particular emphasis was given to analyzing and understanding the conquest of the Mamluks by the Ottomans in 1517. While it is of course, impossible for the modern historian to give a totally accurate and complete picture of a period of history long past, the researcher must attempt to provide as an objective and true total picture as is possible. It is felt that the present study provides such a picture, as the researcher drew from as many historical accounts and records contemporary to the period as possible, as well as compared and contrasted viewpoints and information provided by other scholars who have attempted to analyze the particular period of Middle East history in question.

A significant result of this study is the new body of information it provides in regards to three areas in particular: the relationship between the Ottoman and the Mamluk Empires in the years prior to the conquest; the factors which

contributed to the Ottoman move toward conquering the Mamluks; and, the effects upon the Ottoman Empire as well as upon Egypt as a result of the conquest. Other scholars for example, have provided reviews of the course of the conquest itself, but little information and analysis of the items above were available. It is also of great importance that the information in this study was gleaned from study of Arabic, Turkish, French, and English sources before being provided to the reader in English. Heretofore, few sources in the English language which deal with this period of Middle East history made use of sources in a variety of languages and by historians with a variety of backgrounds and viewpoints.

Another significant result of the study is the example it provides of the size, strength, and potential of the Ottoman Empire. Certainly it is an accepted notion that the Ottomans created one of the most vast and unique states in the history of the world. This study, however, is additional testimony to the awesome power of such an empire which took over another well-established empire, the Mamluk state of Egypt, and literally destroyed it.

It must also be noted in conclusion to this study that the researcher as a result of its undertaking, was made aware of the unusual circumstances of the native Egyptian people throughout much of their history. As was seen, the Mamluk rulers were a body of foreign rulers to the Egyptian natives.

With the Ottoman take-over, foreign rule continued. Was this not simply a case of replacing the wolf with the lion? And such a predicament has continued for the Egyptian natives even until modern times. Finally, the Ottomans lost their rule of Egypt in 1882, but they were replaced by the English, still another body of foreign rulers. As was mentioned on page 200 it can be deduced that foreign rulers can never have the same plans for the country nor the same support of the public that native rulers would have. One is left to speculate just what sort of a country Egypt might have been had it not been under the rule of foreigners for so many hundreds of years.

A final and perhaps most significant result of this study is the other ideas it has stimulated in the researcher in regards to further research in the field. The following suggestions for further study are made in the hopes that historians and scholars can come to an even fuller understanding of the general topic of this study, the Middle East in the first quarter of the 16th century:

- A study which compares and contrasts the changing viewpoints of the native Egyptian people in regards to their rulers as well as differences in their treatment by the rulers during the many centuries of foreign rule by first the Mamluks, then the Ottomans, and then the British.
- A detailed analysis of the Ottoman treatment of the lower classes by the ruling class in comparison to

the Mamluks treatment of the lower classes by the ruling class during the first quarter of the 16th century.

- A new account of the course of the conquest of the Mamluks by the Ottomans in 1517 written by a scholar proficient in English, French, Turkish, and Arabic, and drawing upon all existing modern and ancient sources. (Much conflicting information was found by the researcher on such details as the courses of battles and related events, the transfer of the caliphate from Cairo to Istanbul, the death of el-Gawri, etc.).
- Complete translation in English of the works of the following important Arabic and Turkish writers:

Al-Aini, Badr el-Din Mahmud
Al-Sairafi, Ali Ibu Dawood
Feridun Bey Ahmed
Ibn Tulun, Shams al-Din
Ibn Tagri Birdi Abu el-Mahasin
el-Makrizi, Tag al-din Ahmed
Ibn Iyas, Muhammed Ibn Ahmed
Ibn Zunbul, Ahmed Ibn Muhammed
Monjem Pasha Ahmed
Al-Jabarti Abd al-Rahman

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

A CONGRATULATION LETTER FROM SULTAN SELIM TO HIS SON SULEYMAN REGARDING THE CONQUEST OF EGYPT

The letter started with a conventional greetings typical of the style of writing in that era. It says, "My son, my successor, who is as valuable to me as my eyes, the one whom had been bestowed upon with the religious wisdom and political vision, the holder of royal traits, GULAM SULEYMAN SHAH, long-lived and granted his wishes." In the Month of Rajab, the year 922 and by the help of God our armies have conquered the armies of TOMANBY which were led by JANBIRD AL-GAZALI in the battle of GAZA. This victory took place at the beginning of the spring under the leadership of our undefeated army-leader SINAN PASHA. As a result of this victory, the Arab tribes near GAZA submitted with no resort for force and expressed their loyalty to us. The advancement to our armies to BIRKAT EL HAJ and JABAL AL-MAGTOP brought fear into the hearts of the MAMLUKS. TOMANBY took strong defensive measures to prepare himself for a renewed military confrontation. His defensive measures, however, fell short of stopping the advancement of our armies. Later, he led a retreat to nearby Cairo."

The letter had also quoted verses of the Koran aiming at strengthening SULEYMAN's morals and aspirations. Examples of these verses are:

> "ALA ENNA HIZB ALLAH HUM AL-GHALIBON" (The party of God is always a winner), "LUN YANFAKUM AL-FERAR EN FARARTUM MIN AL-MWAT OW AL-GATIL" (Retreat is not a way to avoid death or injury).

The letter goes on to detail the turnout of the battles at the REDANIA and BOLAK. The description of the battles were always followed by a carefully chosen verse of the Koran aiming at establishing a relationship between the victories of SELIM's armies and what is an outcome previously determined by God for those who aim at spreading his word. As examples of such verses are the following: "YWAM YAGHSCHIEHM AL-ATHAB MIN FAWGEHEM WA MIN TAHIH ARJULIHIM" (When they are overtaken by punishment from above their heads and below their feet), "YWAM YAFIRRU AL-MAROU MIN AGHEH WA OMMIHE WA ABEEH" (It is the day when one leaves his brother behind and parents alone), "WA GA-ALNA ALEEHA SA-FILAHA" (and we have dismantled the hills with the valleys). In the battle of BOLAK the letter changes tone from the one-sided, unstopped faithful armies of God to account for a strong defensive measure and notable enthusiasm on part of the native Egyptian armies and the CIRCASSIANS. However, it should come as no surprise that the outcome of the battle is always with those whom God had enlightened their hearts and showed them the right path.

The letter ended by emphasizing three major points. The first is that the execution of TOMAMBY which was only natural according to the holy versem "GULL ENNA AL-MAWT ALATHE TA-FERRON MENHU FA-ENNAHOU MULAGHEKUM" (Tell them you shall encounter death no matter the times you escape). Although SELIM's wanted to save TOMANBY's life as a recognition of his brave stand and legitimizing his opinion by the holy verse, "ERHAMO AZIZA GOUM MEN THUL" (Give merely upon whom was high and dignified among his people), his final position to execute TOMANBY was influenced by the advice of MUSTAFA PASHA and JAN BURDI AL-GAZALI. The second point is that the Ottoman victories have proved them a strong force in the region, capable of defeating any uprising by their endless faith. The letter points out that this domination is evidenced by the Ottoman's upper hand in the affairs of regions such as Egypt, Yemen, Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem and Morroco. The last point highlights the support given to the Ottomans by Arab leaders and their admission of the role played by the Ottoman authorities in bringing life back into its natural course.

dated Muharram, the year 923
in the city of Cairo, Egypt.

El-Jawab (The Response)

A Summary

The letter of victories has touched a deep cord in our hearts since it brought to us the news of victories in Egypt and Damascus under the leadership of all-knowing, the king, and his faithful assistants. The most happy news was the conquest of Damascus and the defeat of TOMANBY especially in the last campaign in AL-EXANDRIA. Such achievements would not have materialized without a wise directive effort and leadership. These events made the end of MUHURRAN, 923, a turning point in the history of the Ottoman state. These victories which covered vast regions with the help of God brought happiness to the hearts of the public and the private and made them continuously pray for an ever-lasting blessing. Now, God bless our leadership and bestow upon it an ever-lasting happiness.

Your Gulan Suleyman

مصر تسخیر ننده شهزاده سلطان سلیمان حضرتلرینه کوندریلان فتحنامه همایون صورتیدر

فرزند ارجمند دولتیار وخلف سعادتمند کامکار حدقهٔ باصرهٔ دین ودولت وحدیقهٔ ذات بهجت ملك وملت دراکلیل شهریاری دریهٔ فلك تاجداری المختص بانواع مواهب الملك الاله اوغلم سلیمان شاه طال بقاه ونال مناه توقیع رفیع همایون واصل اولیحق معلوم اوله که اشبو کچن سنه طقوز یوز یکرمی ایکی اواخرنده حلبه قریب مرج الدابق نام محله غوریٔ مقهور مخذول ایله محاربه قلنوب بعنایة الله تعالی لشکر اسلام غالب وکروه چراکسه مغلوب دوشوب وغورینك باشی کسیلوب سم سمند همایونم اوکنه نکونسار براغلدقدنصکره طوماناباى نام بدبخت بقیة السیوفیله مصره واروب دعوای تخت وسلطنت ایتمکین حلبدن شامه واریلوب انده برقاچ کون آرام قلنوب تدارك تام ایله اول بهاردە اوزرینه توجه ونهضت همایونم واقع اولوب برروز بیروزده حق سبحانه وتعالی یه توکل وسید کائنات علیه افضل الصلوات معجزاتنه توسل وچاریار عظام واولیای کرام رضوان الله علیهم الی یوم القیام ارواح طیبه لرندن استدعای همت قیلنوب اعلام ظفرنکار والویهٔ سعادت شعار وعساکر جنك جوی وصاعقه خوی ودلیران آهنین قبای ممالك کشای ومبارزان تازی سوار خصم شکار ایله محمیهٔ دمشقدن قالقوب قطع منازل وطی مراحل قلنوب طومانباى مقهور جانبردی غزالی نام کسنه یی شام ایالتنی سکاویردم دیو غزه جانبنه کوندردیکی استماع اولنمغله بوجانبدن دخی مقدمة الجیوش اولان عمدة الوزراء العظام قدوة الکبراء الفخام الغازی فی سبیل الله المجاهد لوجه الله وزیرم سنان پاشا انده بولنوب مقابله ایتدکلرنده بعنایة الله تعالی وزیر مشارالیه غالب وطائفهٔ مزبوره مغلوب دوشوب وجانبردیٔ مزبوردخی بوجانبه نوعا انهزام اخلاص ایدوب وکیروقاچوب مصره واروب طومانبایه ملاقات ایدوب تدارکه مشغول ایکن بندخی

الجواب

درکاه ظفرپناه وبارکاه نصرت دستکاه ترابنه عرض بندهٔ بی اشتباه بودرکه حالیا فتح ممالك مصروشام بتوفیق الملك العلام بالکلیه انجام بولدیغی فتح نامهٔ همایون چاشنیکیر رضوان لالام قوللریله اسعد ایامده وصول بولوب مضمون اقبال مشحون بندە غوریٔ مخذولك انکسار وقتلندن صکره حلبدن شامه تشریف یوریلوب ومحروسهٔ دمشقدن مصره وارلدقده انده سلطانلق دعواسن ایدن طومانبای تیره رای ایله برقاچ دفعه جنك وجدال وحرب وقتال ایدوب هربار مغلوب ومنهزم دیار صعیده قاچوب دفعهٔ اخیره ده اسکندریه سمتنده کلوب شام وشرقه قاچرکن ذات سعادت سمات ایله اوزرینه وارلدقده کذلك انهزام بولوب بحیره دن دیارمغربه قاچدقده روم ایلی بکلربکی مصطفی پاشا لالام اردنجه الغار ایدوب ایرشدکده الی بغلورکاب همایونه کتوردکده رعایت ومرحمت مفیده دوشمیوب سنه ثلث وعشرین وتسعمائة محرمنك اواخرنده صلب وسیاست اولنوب فتنهٔ عالم مندفع اولوب لله الحمد جمیع مرادات دلخواه احبا اوزره درجهٔ حصوله وصول بولوب واول دیار جلیل الاعتبار طولا وعرضا ضبط وتسخیر اولندیغی مندرج اولمغین انواع شکر وسپاس الهی ادا قلنوب هرجانبه صورتك یازدیروب ارسال وایصال ایتدیروب وبالجمله شهر وبازاره زینت ویریلوب کمال سرور وابتهاج ایله خواص وعوام دوام دولت ابدپیوندلری ادعیه سنه علی الدوام اشتغال کوسترمکین شولکه واقع حالدر سدهٔ سدره مقامه عرض اولندی باقی فرمان درکاه معلا نکدر بندهٔ سلیمان

Source: Feridun Bey Ahmed Munshaat Il-Muluk wal Salatin, Vol. I, Constantinople, 1858.

اسامي السلاطين	سنة ولادتهم	تاريخ جلوسهم	وفاتهم	مدة سلطنتهم	مدة عمرهم
	من سني الهجرة				
السلطان الفاتح محمد خان الثاني	٨٣٥	٨٥٥	٨٨٦	٣١	٤٩
〃 بايزيد خان الثاني	٨٥٦	٨٨٦	٩١٨	٣٢	٦٢
〃 سليم خان الاول	٨٧٤	٩١٨	٩٢٦	٠٨	٥٢
〃 سليمان خان	٩٠١	٩٢٦	٩٧٤	٤٧	٧٤
〃 مراد خان الثالث	٩٥٣	٩٨٢	١٠٠٣	٢١	٥٠
〃 محمد خان	٩٧٤	١٠٠٣	١٠١٢	٠٩	٣٨
〃 احمد خان الاول	٩٩٨	١٠١٢	١٠٢٦	١٤	٢٨
〃 مصطفى خان بن محمد خان	١٠٠١	١٠٢٦	....	.. شهر ٣	..
〃 عثمان خان الثاني	١٠١٢	١٠٢٧	١٠٣١	٠٤	١٩
ولاية مصطفى خان الثانية	....	١٠٣١	١٠٣٢	٠١ شهر ٤	٣٢
〃 مراد خان الرابع	١٠٢١	١٠٣٢	١٠٤٩	١٧	٢٨ شهر ٦
〃 ابرهيم خان الاول	١٠٢٤	١٠٤٩	١٠٥٨	٠٩	٣٤
〃 محمد خان الرابع	١٠٥١	١٠٥٨	١١٠٤	٤٠ شهر ٦	٥٣
〃 سليمان خان الثاني	١٠٥٢	١٠٩٩	١١٠٢	٠٣ شهر ٦	٥١ شهر ٦
〃 احمد خان الثاني	١٠٥٢	١١٠٢	١١٠٦	٠٤ شهر ٦	٥٤
〃 مصطفى خان الثاني	١٠٧٤	١١٠٦	١١١٥	٠٩	٤١
〃 احمد خان الثالث	١٠٨٣	١١١٥	١١٤٣	٢٨	٦٠
〃 محمود خان الاول	١١٠٨	١١٤٣	١١٦٨	٢٥	٦٠
〃 عثمان خان الثالث	١١١٠	١١٦٨	١١٧١	٠٣	٦٠ شهر ٦٠
〃 مصطفى خان الثالث	١١٢٩	١١٧١	١١٨٧	١٦	٥٨ شهر ٦
〃 عبد الحميد خان الاول	١١٣٧	١١٨٧	١٢٠٣	١٦	٦٦
〃 سليم خان الثالث	١١٧٥	١٢٠٣	١٢٢٢	١٩	٤٨
〃 مصطفى خان الرابع	١١٩٣	١٢٢٢	١٢٢٣	٠١	٣٠
السلطان محمود خان الثاني	١١٩٩	١٢٢٣	١٢٥٥	٣٢	٥٥ شهر ٦
〃 عبد المجيد خان الاول	١٢٣٨	١٢٥٥	١٢٧٧	٢٢ شهر ٦	٣٩
〃 عبد العزيز خان	١٢٤٥	١٢٧٧	١٢٩٣	٢٤	٤٨
〃 مراد خان الخامس	١٢٥٦	١٢٩٣	....	... شهر ٣	..
〃 عبد الحميد خان الثاني					

الفصل الثاني

في ذكر ملوك آل عثمان وسني ميلادهم واهم حوادثهم وسني وفاتهم

رأينا ان نبدأ بوضع جدول يحتوي على اسماء الملوك الكرام من آل عثمان موضحا امام كل اسم سنة ميلاده وتوليته ووفاته ومدة حكمه وعمره وبعد نذكر اهم الحوادث بالترتيب

اسماء الملوك	ميلادهم سنة هجرية	توليتهم سنة هجرية	وفاتهم سنة هجرية	مدة حكمهم سنة هجرية	مدة حياتهم سنة هجرية
المرحوم السلطان الغازي عثمان خان	٦٥٦	٦٩٩	٧٢٦	٢٧	٧٠
السلطان الغازي اورخان خان	٦٨٠	٧٢٦	٧٦١	٣٥	٨١
السلطان مراد خان الاول	٧٢٦	٧٦١	٧٩١	٣٠	٦٥
السلطان يلدرم بايزيد خان	٧٦١	٧٩١	٨٠٥	١٤	٤٤
السلطان محمد چلبي خان	٧٨١	٨١٦	٨٢٤	٠٨	٤٤
السلطان مراد خان الثاني	٨٠٦	٨٢٤	٨٥٥	٣١	٤٩

SOURCE: Unknown author. Tarihk al Dowlah el-Aliah el-Osmaniah, A Manuscript in Dar el-Kutub el-Masriah, No. 42.

SOURCE: Monjem Pasha Ahmed Dedah. Sahaif el Akbar Fi Waqai el-Asar, Istanbul: Topkapi Sarayi Kutubkhane (Library), No. 2954.

APPENDIX E

السلطان سليم فاشار واعليه بتسليم الملك له وامر
عليه في ذلك فلما راى ان لا بد من تسليم الملك
لولده عهد اليه بالسلطنة وخلع نفسه منها
ودنا فهم بادرنه فتنه ردها به لوامات في طريق
رحمة الله عليه [illegible] انتهى [illegible]
فبذلك سلطنة مولانا السلطان سليم فاتح مصر وهو
ابن السلطان بايزيد جلس على تخت الملك بعد خلع
ابيه في سنة سبع عشر وتسعمايه وكان عمره
اذ ذاك سنا واربعين سنه وتوفي في سنة ست
وثلاثين وتسعمايه عن اربع وخمسين سنه
من عمره وكانت مدة سلطنته تسع سنين
وثمانية اشهر وكان سلطانا قهارا ذا هيبة
وشهامة متنكا [illegible] كثير التفحص عن اخبار الناس
وكان في التجسس له الغاية [illegible]
الاخبار [illegible] وكان كثير
[illegible]
والعربية والفارسية وكان حسن النظم بالعربية
ذ

SOURCE: El-Bakri, Muhammed Ibn Abi el-Surur, El-Menah el Rahmaniah Fi el-Dowlah el-Osmaniah, Cairo: Dar el-Kutub el-Masriah, No. H 1929.

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(The following documents are diplomatic letters exchanged between governmental leaders)

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C. PERIODICALS

The following periodicals contain innumerable articles that contributed both directly and indirectly to the researcher's understanding of the topic of this study, and are recommended to the reader as data sources for Middle East history.

AHR American Historical Review

AHS African Historical Studies

AI Ars Islamica

And. al-Andalus

AO Acta Orientalia

ArO Archiv orientalni

ArOtt Archivum Ottomanicum

BEO Bulletin d'etudes orientales

BGA Bibliotjeca geographorum Arabicarum

BIE Bulletin de l'Institut d'Egypte

BIFAO Bulletin de l'Institut Francais d'Archeologie Orientale

BSOAS Bulletin of the School of Oriental & African Studies (London University).

BZ Byzantinische Zeitschrift

CH Current History

CIA Corpus Inscriptionum Arabicarum

CSSH Comparative Studies in Society and History

DI Der Islam

EHR English Historical Review/Economic Historical Review

EI^1 The Encyclopedia of Islam, 4 vols., supp. Leiden, 1913-42.

EI^2 The Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed., Leiden, 1954-

GAL Brockelmann, C. Geschichte der arabischem Litteratur. 2nd ed., 2 vols., Leiden, 1943-1949.

GALS Brockelmann, C. Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur Supplement, 3 vols., Leiden, 1937-1942.

GAS Sezgin, F. Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums, Leiden, 1967-

GMA Gibb Memorial Series

HO Spuler, B. (ed.), Handbuch der Orientalistik, Leiden, 1952.

IC Islamic Culture

IEJ Israel Exploration Journal

IJAHS International Journal of African Historical Studies

IJMES International Journal of Middle East Studies

IQ Islamic Quarterly

IS Islamic Studies

JA Journal asistique

JAH Journal of African History

JAL Journal of Arab Literature

JAOS Journal of the American Oriental Society

JCH Journal of Contemporary History

JESHO Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient.

JJS Journal of Jewish Studies

JMAS Journal of Modern African Studies

JMH Journal of Modern History

JNES Journal of Near Eastern Studies

JRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.

JSS Journal of Semitic Studies

JWH Journal of World History

MEED Middle East Economic Digest

MEF Middle East Forum

MEJ Middle East Journal

MESA Bulletin Middle East Studies Association

MIDEO	Melanges de l'Institut Dominicain d'Etudes Oreintales de Caire.
MIFAO	Memoires de l'Institut Francais d'Archeologie Orientale
MW	Muslim World
OM	Oriente moderno
Ois	Oriens
PO	Patrologia Orientalis
RAAD	Revue de l'Academie Arabe de Damas
REI	Revue des etudes islamiques
REJ	Revue des etudes juives
RH	Revue historique
RHC	Recueil des historiens des croisades
RIMA	Revue de l'Institut des Manuscripts Arabes
RMM	Revue de monde musulman
ROC	Revue de l'Orient chretien
RSO	Rivista degli studi orientali
SEI	Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam
SI	Studia Islamica
Sped.	Speculum
WI	Die Welt des Islams
Wo	Die Welt des Orients
ZDMG	Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft