

ARCHBISHOP HINCMAR OF RHEIMS (circa 806-882):
HIS IDEA OF MINISTERIUM IN THEORY AND PRAXIS

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
His Idea of Ministerium in Theory and Praxis.

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
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ABSTRACT

ARCHBISHOP HINCMAR OF RHEIMS (circa 806-882):
HIS IDEA OF MINISTERIUM IN THEORY AND PRAxis

by H. Haines Brown III

Despite the widely voiced observation that the influential ninth-century Archbishop Hincmar of Rheims is in need of a comprehensive and up-to-date biography, studies devoted to this interesting figure have tended to be fruitful only to the extent that they were also narrow in scope. The present investigation suggests that one major difficulty hindering a synthesis of Hincmar's life without the contradictions and inconsistencies which usually emerge, lies in methodology. Furthermore, it goes on to emphasize the utility of dialectical categories for a deeper understanding of what appears to be a critical theme shaping the archbishop's life and thought—his theory of public office.

For Hincmar, office was less an explicit legal delineation of public action, designed to prevent jurisdictional confusion or check personal ambition, than the central organizing principle of social and political life. Office gained this crucial role in his thought because it had the positive function of bringing Christian values and ultimate ends into contact with the concrete realities of public life.

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The fusion of spiritual values and worldly action had increasingly characterized the early Middle Ages, but until the ninth century, it had not been self-consciously articulated by men deeply involved in shaping the course of political history. Beginning early in the ninth century and reaching its culmination in Hincmar, a coherent and rational theory was elaborated making office not only a springboard of salvation, but a means for the realization of God's will on earth. This theory derived from a characteristically Benedictine psychology, whereby there was a turning to Christ—the source of love. The office holder found that his action in public life was disciplined by the legal definition of his office, and at the same time, his heart was to be directed to God. In the larger social context, the same principles were applied. The secular arm of government provided a discipline for its subjects, while the sacerdotal office acted as society's heart, directing the minds of all toward Christ. The king and the bishop were dialectically united in a single whole (the Ecclesia)—a whole implying neither a separation of church and state nor the absorption of one into the other.

However, the major focus of the present study is to ascertain the interaction of Hincmar's ideas and the course of ninth-century history. Two phases of his development are traced. The first begins with Hincmar's stepping into a position of prominence and independence in the West Frankish

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realm, includes his attempts to direct political life in conformity with his own ideas, and finally, ends with the reasons for his failure to do so. The second phase of Hincmar's life here studied concerns the modification of his ideas to suit political realities. This is the case particularly with his treatment of the relation of episcopal office to the king, where he not only seeks to reduce the direct involvement of bishops in political affairs, but encourages a greater freedom of royal action. In concluding it is suggested that while the full development of Hincmar's thought found little echo among his contemporaries, it nevertheless does permit the historian an insight into the categories of thought deeply operative within ninth-century society and extending beyond it into the future.

**ARCHBISHOP HINCMAR OF RHEIMS (circa 806-882):
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By

H. Haines Brown III

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PREFACE

No work of scholarship is the fruit of one man's endeavor, but rather, is a collective effort of many persons—those not only immediately involved in the mechanics of production or in directing the shaky steps of a neophyte in the world of historiography—but in the widest sense it is the product of a civilization contemplating itself—in awe certainly, but hopefully also in love and self-criticism.

I must be more specific, however, and acknowledge the generous help of certain persons (who may not yet have quite recovered), without whose interest, encouragement, and correctio this study of Hincmar would never have progressed. Doctor Richard E. Sullivan of Michigan State University supervised the entire project, and his intellectual and moral stimulation mixed with judicious criticism ensured the proper stabilitas to see it through to completion. Unbounded gratitude is due Doctor Walter Mohr of the University of the Saarland, who besides generously offering such warm hospitality as I had no reason to anticipate, gave willingly of his time and advice to direct the present writer toward an ever more critical interpretation of sources and synthesis of data. Finally, the leisure to study and write was assured by the Fulbright Commission, which provided a grant for the academic year 1966-67 in West Germany.

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INTRODUCTION

Medieval political theory has never failed to command the attention and even at times the respect of those historians and philosophers who have found in the ideas of the past a stimulating subject for study. The quantity of books and learned articles dealing with one or more aspects of what medieval man thought about government would stagger the imagination of those not personally involved in ferreting out the riches of this field of inquiry, and yet, the more one becomes acquainted with this literature, the more evident it is that he finds here, perhaps, an exception to the sanguine hope that human knowledge ever advances.

Taking the early Middle Ages as representative, one is first struck by the paucity of general syntheses of political theory. Despite the large number of really quite excellent studies on a particular person or problem, there exists not a single tome encompassing at once the idea of state and all offices within it, both major and minor, with their moral, political, and theological implications. This lack is certainly not due to an unwillingness or a disinterestedness for realizing such a project, but in the nature of the task itself. True, there are a number of inherent difficulties. The sources are few; there was little written which did not answer immediate problems at the expense of a broader

vision; and the age was not particularly interested in shaping coherent and fully elaborated tracts explaining what was on its mind for the benefit of future generations.

However, it appears that an even more serious stumbling block hinders the road of the investigator. When the seminal and influential studies of political theory are carefully read and then compared with one another, there is no mistaking a certain confusion in methodology. A study of the epistemological bases for this scattering of effort lies well beyond the scope of our present task, but it does seem worthwhile to illustrate the type of contradictions one faces by reference to a limited number of important histories of medieval political thought.

Not an uncommon pitfall is the attempt to judge the meaning of an idea or institution in terms derived from outside the historical context in which it occurs. A. J. Carlyle's A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West, vol. I, is an especially important instance in light of the wide respect which it has won since it was first written. A conscientious product of a full reading of sources, it nevertheless asks those questions of the source material dictated by a preoccupation with the ancient world. Without doubt, legal theory played a crucial role in late imperial political thought, and issues such as the natural condition of man and slavery were critical ones. Is this to say, however, that they were also central to early medieval concerns? Carlyle adequately shows that antique concepts failed to provide a basis for ninth-

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century political theory. Although it is true that various churchmen, such as Gregory the Great, could give an absolutist ring to statements regarding political authority, Carlyle notes that a "Teutonic" contribution was to limit authority through the idea of contract. But such law, lacking a philosophical base, was unable to provide the rational for social order in the ninth century. Carlyle attributed the lack of a philosophical system of political theory to an inability to relate actual conditions of limited authority with the writings of the late Empire and church Fathers. Despite certain conceptions of some lasting value, Carlyle found little in ninth-century thought which avoided confusion, contradiction, and imprecision. Is this dismaying state of affairs due to contemporary irrationality or to Carlyle's assumption that all rational thought has its roots in Antiquity and that Roman concepts of law and sovereignty are adequate yard-sticks for measuring early medieval political ideas?

Another very influential book suffering from a similar disability is H. X. Arquillière's L'Augustinisme politique. It should first be noted that "political Augustinism" is not the same as the body of political ideas held by Augustine himself—a confusing terminology which causes difficulties even for the author. In brief, Arquillière holds that political Augustinism signifies the fusion of the spheres of Church and State. No one would too seriously argue with the general validity of such an observation of what in fact was occurring in the early Middle Ages, but Arquillière goes on to associate

this fusion with a centralized and universal authority, either political or religious. This means that the author tends to constrict his attention to men who embody an office having such universal implications: he studies in detail the coronation of Charlemagne in 800 A.D. and the ideas of subsequent popes, especially Nicholas I. Arquillière avoids asking whether either aspect of Carolingian history was really central to the preoccupations of the time. Various persons actually disagreed as to the implications of Charlemagne's coronation, to say nothing of the sharp rebuff which Nicholas' involvement in political life elicited.

Thus, it would be unwise to apply Arquillière's observations to the age as a whole without first ascertaining the extent to which men associated a fusion of the worldly and the sacred with the centralization of authority. Furthermore, there exists a danger in using the term "political Augustinism," however much Arquillière warns against it, for it might suggest an immediate correspondance between Carolingian concepts and those of Saint Augustine.¹ Arquillière may well

¹Arquillière does this himself. On pg. 151 he translates a passage of Jonas of Orléans as follows: "Celui qui n'a pas cette bonne volonté, montre qu'il ne possède pas la charité, et c'est pourquoi il ne mérite pas de goûter la paix, qui est le Christ lui-même." He then interprets the passage as: "Si nous voulons jouir d'une période de calme et de tranquillité, il faut encourager les zéloteurs de la paix, fille de la charité," thus confusing Augustinian worldly peace (lack of conflict) with Carolingian peace (Christ's mystical presence in the world). And yet, in a comparable quotation from Pope Nicholas I (pg. 193), he makes clear that "la paix qui est le Christ lui-même" fuses the natural concept of Augustine with the spiritual peace of the New Testament (pg. 196).

[illegible]

be correct in arguing for a fusion of the worldly and spiritual, but in treating it in Classic-Augustinian (i.e., authoritarian and centralized) terms, he is compelled to exclude from consideration a great wealth of material which might indeed suggest that these categories were not central to the political thinking of the Carolingian period.

The last of these writers grouped together here because of their concern with showing how the early Middle Ages saved certain classic ideas for the benefit of future centuries is Louis Halphen. While Arquillière has deeply influenced anyone making a study of political theory, Halphen's ideas have reached a much wider audience because they have been incorporated into more general texts, one of which, his Charlemagne et l'empire carolingien, has become for many the standard treatment of Carolingian history. To take a different book, his Les barbares des grandes invasions aux conquêtes turques du XI^e siècle, for example, Halphen argues that what marks the basic demarcation of Antiquity and the Middle Ages is a changed idea of law and state. However, the youthful forces of these new peoples on the European scene had need of being channeled and disciplined, and it was the voice of the papacy which helped them realize this work by promoting the Roman idea of state. The fusion of these two factors—Germanic youthful vigor and the Roman idea of the ordered state—was especially marked at the coronation of Charlemagne in 800. Like Arquillière, Halphen has magnified an event, which to contemporaries was quite ambiguous in its implica-

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tions and often ignored, into the epitome of the Carolingian achievement.

Each of the three authors thus far cited had original and worthwhile contributions to make to our understanding of early medieval political theory, but each has also been so oriented toward Roman concepts that he has failed to take seriously enough the medieval contributions which do not fit nicely into the categories of thought forged by Antiquity. The three major contributions of the ninth century to political thought delineated by Carlyle were also ideas which had direct relevance to the preoccupations of the Empire.² Beyond these, in his opinion, there lies no systematic thought, but only ambiguity, contradiction, and faulty thinking. Arquillière posits as the focus of developments the fusion of two Roman categories—the sacred and the profane, which he then associates with a very Roman idea, the centralized state. It is not that Arquillière is wrong, but that his categories have confined his attention to matters which may well have been peripheral to what occupied the minds of Europe in the ninth century. Halphen, too, asks questions of this period which are designed to elucidate the extent to which the early Middle Ages passed on Roman concepts, but in so doing, it is possible he misses the richness and sophistication of contemporary thought. In his "L'idée d'état sous les Carolingiens,"

²These are: 1) human equality as a "natural" condition, 2) the sacred character of organized society (government), 3) the primacy of law, which conditions authority and checks tyranny.

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Revue historique, CLXXXV (1939), 59-70, Halphen traces an "objectification" of state in the Carolingian period, where the state ceases being a personal power held by the king and begins to represent the welfare of the collectivity for which the king is responsible. Because the Romans came to the same realization, but associated this monarchic minister of the public good with a centralized unitary rule, Halphen has an inbuilt prejudice against local autonomy and self-determination in church and state.

If there are obvious dangers in estimating the significance of ninth-century political theory by contrasting it with the imperial achievement or by seeing it in terms of categories derived from the Ancient World, what alternatives are left? An obvious one would be to understand a given institution or idea in terms of its functional relationship with the whole of a civilization's life and thought. Only by so doing can real objectivity be achieved. The coronation of Charlemagne in 800, for example, might have had far different significance for contemporaries than what the modern historian feels is its relevance to the Roman Empire or the Investiture Controversy. What was the implication of the word "empire" for the Carolingians; how did they relate this to traditional modes of authority; in what manner did it impinge upon their implicit and explicit values and needs; and what was its significance in terms of actual power relations and social structures? Only by answering such questions can the true meaning of empire be estimated.

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An important attempt to do just this is made by Fritz Kern in his Gottesgnadentum und Widerstandsrecht. Here he seeks to relate constitutional monarchy to the early medieval Weltanschauung, especially its religious ideas. The concepts of Gottesgnadentum and Widerstand he uses to suggest respectively the absolute prerogatives of the ruler deriving from his relationship to God and the right of the subject to check royal action. Thus, they indicate a complex of questions lying on the border between the theory and Praxis (action shaped by ends) of state life. Kern feels that objective law formed the natural connection between these two elements and permitted the formation of constitutional monarchy. Because Kern's interest is in constitutional history and he concerns himself with political theory only to the extent that it serves his central aim, there is little reason to enumerate his conclusions. He is here introduced because he integrates constitutional history with political theory to yield results very rich for our understanding of the former. Although his use of Weberian typology (Gottesgnadentum, Widerstandsrecht) introduces factors not subject to scientific verification, the outcome is a profound and objective description of early medieval monarchy.

It might be evident by this time that law has played the leading role in modern attempts to grasp the essence of early medieval political theory. However valid this may be for dealing with the Roman Empire or even the thought of the later Middle Ages, there is some question whether Carolingian

theorists made law central to their conceptions of the nature and ends of public authority. Kern was compelled to place law at the focus of his attention because he was dealing specifically with constitutional history, but had he used constitutional developments to illuminate the formation of a political theory in the early Middle Ages, then he would have had to evaluate the extent to which the Carolingians turned to law for the basis of their concepts and the principle mode of political action.

Recently there has been increasing doubt cast on the legalistic interpretation which has characterized traditional scholarship. One of the more influential of these revisionists is Marcel David. His La souveraineté et les limites juridiques du pouvoir monarchique du IX^e au XV^e siècle studies very carefully actual ninth-century efforts to limit the supreme authority of monarchs. He finds that, rather than turn to juridical sanctions to limit royal action, men of the ninth century preferred to couch their admonitions in terms of morality and theology. The churchmen who thus turned to ethical preaching and warnings of divine wrath to place a check on royal action were in a position to use law (the Gelasian theory) to support their own control of the state, but the interesting point is that they did not follow the implications of canon law to its logical conclusion and preferred to use their authority to check royal power rather than supplant it. David feels, after carefully weighing events of the ninth century, that political action was shaped by force, or

at least the menace of force, and that appeals to the law merely added weight to other more effective sanctions.

Both Kern and David have opened new avenues of investigation into the early Middle Ages by integrating dimensions of life previously thought irrelevant or peripheral with the focus of study. David, in particular, makes clear that one cannot adequately grasp the political theory of the ninth century if it is abstracted from the public actions and immediate ends of the persons involved. If, on the other hand, political theory is integrated with both action and with the deeper categories of contemporary thought, then there exists the possibility of a truly objective understanding and a greater appreciation of the sophistication and coherence of ninth-century thought. The present study of political office thus avoids wherever possible a narrowly legal-constitutional definition of office as an adequate description of its role in Carolingian life. What is being presented as an alternative is, it is hoped, a sociology of public office.

Such a sociological approach would first evaluate the implications of public office per se for the entire fabric of life—an evaluation providing a critical insight into the heart of civilization. In an effort to specify these implications, a recent definition of "office" suggests the following:

An understanding of the concept of office depends on the relation of the holder to supra-individual orders: office engages the given limitations of the material and biological world, its responsibilities are deter-

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mined by the duties of custom and cult, and the community's constitution forms the framework of its social development. At a certain cultural level these norm systems are not only more differentially apprehended, but also agencies are perfected to represent them. Wherever their functions are embraced within permanent complexes of rights and duties, there arise "offices" which objectify the obligations of their holders.³

This interpretation of office as the nexus of ideology and objective necessity reveals the extent to which a civilization has integrated its ends and values with its concrete situation. The reality, however, is more complex than suggested by the above definition. Office not only takes cognizance of the "duties of custom and cult and the community's constitution," it also becomes part of this cultural tradition, shaping it in accord with the aims of whoever defines an office's duties and objectives. Viewed as such, office becomes a dynamic agency for shaping social or political structures and directing society toward specific ends and value systems.

Another implication of office not included in the definition is the complexity of the ideological situation to which it is responsive. At what may be called for the sake of convenience a "low" cultural level, an office is little more than an instrument for carrying out the immediate aims of someone in authority. A royal missus may function for no other purpose than as an investigator of some local matter for which the king feels he has responsibility. The ends of this office represent perhaps little more than the personal

³H. Zeller, "Amt," Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, I (Freiburg i.B., 1957), cols. 451-52.

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objectives of the monarch. However, at a "higher" cultural level, it is possible for the parameters governing action in office to include ultimate ends and values having little immediate relevance to the purposes at hand. If our missus knows that whatever he does must be carried out in a spirit of Christian charity, then he is being responsive to two distinct ideological levels. Office, then, potentially integrates a society's immediate goals with its ultimate ends and value systems.

Office thus binds together three distinct levels of reality. First, office must take into account material conditions not subject to change. Government, to be successful, must fully appreciate the viable alternatives open to it and try to avoid impossible tasks. A consciousness of objective limitations (these limits were called necessitas in the early Middle Ages) has direct bearing on the efficiency of social and political action.

Secondly, it seems clear that the extent to which office provides norms of action and directs social or political energies into objectively defined paths toward common goals also strongly influences efficiency. Besides thus integrating the action of ruler and ruled, office likewise makes explicit the immediate ends which a ruler seeks by providing instruments for the realization of his aims.

Finally, office profoundly increases the efficiency of action by integrating ultimate ends and value systems with

the immediate and ad hoc goals of government, although this may not be immediately apparent. Social theorists have suggested that immediate goals are not isolated entities, but rather, are embedded in a web of ends which are in turn related to society's ultimate objectives. The most efficient means to achieve a given ends often cannot be ascertained by considering that end in isolation, but only when taken in relation to all other ends of which a person is aware.⁴ The optimum way to meet success in day-to-day problems is to be fully conscious of their relevance to ultimate ends and values. Another way of viewing this is to realize that the cognitive structure in terms of which man sees the world includes both the means and ends of immediate action as well as his ultimate ends and values.⁵ Consciousness of final objectives as part of an explicit ideology has the tendency of integrating action into a coherent whole, without which social and political action becomes diffused.⁶

These theoretical considerations serve to emphasize that the net effectiveness of a civilization depends to some extent upon the integration of ultimate ends and values with the agencies of public life. Whether consciously or not, the achieving of these conditions should be an important objective for a society's rulers. In the case of the Christiani-

⁴ Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (2nd ed.; New York, 1949), pp. 43-86, 250-264.

⁵ Kurt Lewin, Field Theory in Social Science (New York, 1951), pp. 60-87.

⁶ Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York, 1966), pp. 20-21.

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zation of Europe, not only was it necessary for those in public life to be sincere Christians, but ultimately, the organs of government and social institutions had to be brought into conformity with Christian ideals. In Western Europe, this process was slow, faltering, and perhaps only partially successful.

The present investigation will suggest that the first explicit and elaborated Christian interpretation of political and social life emerged in the ninth century and that this development found its most complete expression in Archbishop Hincmar of Rheims' idea of office. The elements of Hincmar's formulation were not new to the history of Christian (and especially Benedictine) thought, but because of his own intimate knowledge of and involvement in political life, they were fused into a coherent and elaborated theory relevant to the concrete political needs of the day. It is hoped that such a consideration of office in the ninth century will not only provide a conceptual framework for the whole of public life, but even go far toward explaining the emergence of a dynamic Europe in subsequent centuries.

PART I

HINCMAR'S IDEA OF MINISTERIUM IN THEORY

The sociological approach to an understanding of office suggested in the introduction invites certain difficulties in presentation. The written line of prose, leading the reader from sentence to sentence, from chapter to chapter, is better suited to analytical reasoning than to dialectical. If one's purpose is to understand political office as the nexus of ideology and practical concerns, then he is faced with the dynamic interaction of various elements, none of which remains fixed in time. If political history is ever in flux, so too is the development of ideas, and neither can be held fixed while the impact of the other on the development of office is scrutinized, for a change in one is likely to produce a change in the whole configuration.

In spite of these difficulties, there remains open the possibility of studying the relationship of office with that dimension of life which changes least—here assumed to be those most basic attitudes toward life and categories of thought by which one sees the world. These would appear to change less rapidly than either overt action or explicit and consciously held opinions. For this reason, the first part of the present study will be static rather than dynamic. It will attempt to

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discover just what Hincmar meant by "office" in both the abstract and the particular, all the while relating the specific idea of office to the broader range of the Archbishop's thought. In this way the religious (spiritual, theological, moral) implications of public office which intimately relate it to man's central ideological concerns will be ascertained. The plucking out of the crucial terms, exposing to light their connotations and associations—all this is essential before the dynamic analysis of the second part can be hazarded.

It was thought wise to introduce the first part with a partial recounting of the development of the idea of office from the Roman Empire to the ninth century. A rather bold undertaking, for the account cannot strive to be either complete or definitive. Nevertheless, it did seem useful to provide the reader with some idea of the development of office in the early Middle Ages while at the same time illustrating how a sociological treatment of office might appear if applied to this period. Certain offices important in the Late Empire were intentionally omitted from consideration, and others which would prove much more relevant to the Carolingian period were treated summarily.

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CHAPTER I

THE IDEA OF OFFICE BEFORE HINCMAR

The history of the idea of office from the Roman Empire to the Carolingian epoch reflects quite accurately the vicissitudes of political and social life in general. The contradictions inherent within imperial Rome became manifest in the third century, and despite fourth-century efforts to reconstitute life on a new basis in order to save the fruits of the pax romana, the methods used only exacerbated the underlying difficulty. One can apply these generalizations to almost any aspect of life and thought one chooses.

The old order had been supported by fictions which in the fourth and fifth centuries came to be abandoned by everyone outside the imperial circle, and only post-Nicaean Christianity offered a solution to the fundamental contradictions of the Roman Empire. But even this new world-view proved ineffectual as long as it remained bound to the ideals of Romanitas—a set of ideas suggesting that the political order of the Empire constituted perfection. Only in those areas of Christian life insisting on a sharp demarcation from forces trying to preserve what was left of the old order—in the monasteries and in the Ambrosian episcopacy—was there to emerge a fresh resolution of the imperial crisis.

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Undoubtedly, Roman imperial government was the spiritual heir of Greece, but in fact it was the direct descendant of the Roman Republic. The institutions of imperial government were derived from old family and tribal customs, and although the emperor was supposed to be little more than the embodiment of the public will, in fact he increasingly had all the authority of the pater familias. As such, the imperium had unilateral authoritarian implications tending to reduce the personal liberty of the citizenry.

However, the political thought which predominated in the Empire was imbued with Greek ideas poorly according with the above facts. Hellenic ontology defined two quite distinct modes of reality: an ever changing and thus corrupt world of matter and a static a-temporal sphere of metaphysical forms. Salvation consisted in rationally extricating oneself from the material world to win a fleeting communion with the demiurge. In the dress of Stoic philosophy, these categories deeply penetrated imperial legal and political thought. But the bridging of the temporal and the a-temporal, the physical and the metaphysical, the dynamic and the static, process and order, were impossible by rational means alone, for intermediates would have to incorporate mutually exclusive categories. That the Romans were apparently able to do this at all was through the use of legal fictions, by which the realities of traditional social and power relations were masked by an ideology borrowed from the Greeks.¹

¹Charles H. McIlwain, The Growth of Political Thought in the West (New York, 1932), p. 134.

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For the Stoics, there existed a universal transcendent natural law to which the entire cosmos had to conform in some manner. At a hypothetical time in the past, man lived in a natural state, where there existed neither authority, social distinction, nor private property. But in historical time, man fell into a state of vice. Vice was manifested concretely as war, private wealth, and structures of authority, which in turn necessitated a definition of mutual rights and obligations—called by the Stoic theorists ius civile. However difficult it might have been to actually define the content of ius naturale, ius civile was supposed to accord with it. A state or a government which did not embody ius naturale was inconceivable.

Such an ideology, however useful it might have been for obscuring the brute realities of life and providing a rationale and conceptualization for political action, never succeeded in gaining firm root. Perhaps the reason was that the order of reality considered perfect—the world of Logos—was understood mathematically and thus was little relevant to the world of experience. A few brilliant minds, such as Plotinus', were able to construct complex ladders of being uniting the two orders—the physical and the metaphysical, but for most, the fiction that they were rationally in accord substituted for a true integration of values and worldly action such as took place, it will be argued, in Hincmar's idea of ministerium.

There was a more concrete reason, though, why such a theory remained only tentative. Senatorial egoism, encouraged

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by the spoils of imperialism, threatened republican political order. The principate, as it emerged under Augustus, checked this unbridled opportunism by monopolizing political life for the central authority. The princeps embodied the law and the virtue of the commonwealth, becoming the nexus of order and process.² The standard of iustitia followed by the emperor did not derive from sources outside the commonwealth, but from humanitas—a worldly condescending love. The ruler's highest function lay simply in assuring imperial peace as a precondition for the common good and the dissemination of Greek culture. The emperor's growing monopoly of virtue prevented a generalized idea of office from becoming independently viable, for the only one which had important theoretical implications was that of the princeps, and from his person all other offices derived.

The commonwealth—the res publica—was little more than the sum of rights and responsibilities of the Roman people as a whole. The duty of one holding an officium within the government was simply to assure the citizen's rights in a manner comparable to that of the pater familias. In fact, the public officium was the family writ large. Originating as a moral duty in family relationships, the word officium came to signify the defense of another's interests and, in public law, the serving of the public interest.³ The officer's jur-

²For this and the whole question of the ideological implications of Romanitas, I rely heavily on Charles N. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture (2nd ed.; New York, 1957).

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isdiction (officium ius dicentis) comprised the rights and duties within the competence of a judicial magistrate.

Likewise, the potestas of the officer had its private as well as its public manifestation. In private law, it was the power of the head of the family over its members—power either in the sense of physical ability or legal right. The public nature of potestas was used to encompass the rights and duties connected with a particular magistracy.⁴ The term auctoritas, rather difficult to distinguish from potestas, seems to have implied more a moral rather than legal power. It was used for persons who commanded obedience and respect, and although it originally had some technical legal meaning as a function of context, by the fifth century it had lost any such connotation.⁵

The terms ministerium, ministeriales, and minister in the Empire referred to subordinate officials and their activities. Supervised by the magister officiorum, the ministeriales were appointed by the emperor to fulfill minor functions. A minister could be merely a servant or assistant to an official of the Empire, although the term might exceptionally refer to a higher official in the civil or military bu-

³Adolf Berger, "Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law," Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, XLIII, 2 (Philadelphia, 1953), 607.

⁴Ibid., p. 640.

⁵Ibid., pp. 368-69. Wilhelm Ensslin, "Auctoritas und Potestas. Zur Zweigewaltenlehre des Papstes Gelasius I," Historisches Jahrbuch, LXXIV (1955), 661-68.

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reaucracy.⁶ Before the reforms of Diocletian, the important provincial and Roman political posts were filled by the senatorial class, which, rather than being a paid professional bureaucracy, took upon itself political responsibilities as a natural expression of its class advantage, to further its personal political ambitions, and to enrich itself at the expense of the poorer classes.

In order to understand what happened to political office at the end of the Roman Empire and just how a new Christian concept of ministerium resolved the contradictions inherent in the Empire, it is useful to consider the nature of the so-called "crisis of the third century." This crisis, the resulting widespread alienation, and the attempted imperial solution of the fourth century through what has been called the "corporative state" (which only deepened that alienation), can be viewed on two levels, the ideological and the material.

Ideologically, the crisis of the third century destroyed the fiction that mankind is perfectable by means of worldly political action alone. The Greek ideal of the cultivation of the whole person through political action within the context of the city-state had been incorporated within the Roman imperial system as a dyarchy—the sharing of power by the princeps and the municipia. This meant on one hand that the virtue of the princeps ensured the peace in which the polis-ideal of Greece could flourish, and on the other, politi-

⁶ Berger, op.cit., p. 583.

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cal freedom and viability within the municipia themselves. Political office within the cities was the focus of human perfectability: by volunteering for the responsibilities of office, the urban elite at once worked toward the benefit of the commonwealth and for their own personal development.

This is not the place to review the causes of the third-century crisis, but its ideological implications for office are indeed relevant to the questions at hand. The success of Romanitas depended upon a confidence that the virtue won through political action was sufficient to counter ill-fortune. This confidence, however, was severely shaken by a number of set-backs which no fiction could hide. Military, economic, constitutional flaws and failures were only too obvious. Eastern religious ideas suggesting that man was not fundamentally good were receiving ever wider attention. Changed conditions and a growing sense of frustration demanded a willingness to undertake far-reaching reforms, but the ideology of Romanitas hindered their realization. The association of all that was good with unchanging order discouraged the acceptance of dynamic change. The conservatives could only seek to emphasize traditional means and ends at the expense of flexibility, and the innovators blindly adapted to new circumstances without any firm sense of direction or purpose.⁷

Men who had once found in the urban administrative of-

⁷ Cochrane, op.cit., pp. 160-61 et passim.

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fices the greatest attraction in life began to despair of meaningful self-realization in this political atmosphere. Increasingly, they abandoned the cities for the greater security and rewards of rural life, seeking to create on their huge agricultural estates material and cultural conditions more congenial to their aspirations. The filling of urban offices had always been voluntary, and the empire's very foundation rested on the willingness of an educated urban elite to accept the responsibilities of public office without pay. Their crisis in faith and their alienation from the ideals of Romanitas meant the inevitable loss of imperial viability.⁸

Of equal importance for the changing nature of office were the social and material conditions of the third century. Here too, there were fundamental contradictions which became ever more apparent and demanded far-reaching reform. The economic life of the city-state, with its middle class elite, rested upon the exploitation of rural resources. These, however, were sharply limited. The general depression of the rural laboring class (slaves and coloni) meant that they were excluded as a possible market for manufactured goods. Furthermore, the dependence upon slave labor to exploit the latifundia discouraged technological innovation. The level of agricultural technology on the imperial farms was surprisingly low. Despite these severe limitations on economic resources and despite the financial burden of an ever larger army

⁸ Ferdinand Lot, The End of the Ancient World and the Beginnings of the Middle Ages (New York, 1961), pp. 114-127, 171-186.

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and imperial bureaucracy, the urban centers continued to absorb the wealth of the Empire. Resources, extracted from the labor of an oppressed population, lined the pockets of corrupt officials, paid for a vast army whose effectiveness was ever more in doubt, and supported an idle urban population shirking their political responsibilities. This material alienation could not fail to stultify any efforts for constructive thinking or action.⁹

The third and fourth-century reforms of Diocletian and his successors did forestall complete collapse, and, in some respects, it even appeared to rejuvenate political life and culture. This success, however, proved to be ephemeral. Unable to act in other than political terms, the emperors could only make themselves the focus of all political action and abandon the ideal of Romanitas incorporated in the dynasty. A "corporative state" replaced the voluntary willingness of the populace to support the ideal of Romanitas. A compulsive bureaucratic police-state sought to cover the cracks in the wall by making rigid all aspects of public and even private life. Everyone was incorporated into the state,

⁹ For the social and economic implications of the crisis of the third century, see Mortimer Chambers, "The Crisis of the Third Century," in The Transformation of the Roman World, ed. Lynn White (Berkeley, 1966), pp. 30-58. For the social aspect, see also M. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire (2nd ed.; Oxford, 1957), I, 502-541. For an analysis of the impact of material alienation on both the worker and non-worker, see Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (New York, 1964), pp. 116-19. The impact of social factors on creative thinking is suggested by Mannheim, op.cit., pp. 94-97. See also, E. M. Schatajerman, Die Krise der Sklavenhalterordnung in Westen des Römischen Reiches (Berlin, 1964).

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and it was the state which took over all initiative.¹⁰

Although Diocletian sought by legislative means to compel administrators to remain in the city and carry out their public responsibilities, it became increasingly evident that there was no effective way to prevent their striking out for the relative ease and assured income of country estates. The emperor, who had previously, in theory at least, simply carried the imperium granted him by the senate and thus the people, now became the state. With this decline in the idea of public service sank also the importance of public office. Rising to take the place of the senatorial class in the actual governing of the Empire were the court officers—men attached to the person and palace of the emperor, having no loyalty beyond that which they owed their monarch. By the time of Constantine, government was by the comitiva, that is, by the "friends" of the princeps.¹¹

The ultimate failure of Constantine's effort to harness the energies of the Christian religion to revitalize the state is well-known. However, it is important to note that the failure of Romanitas went hand in hand with the failure of the Roman idea of office. This failure was both the result and in part the cause of the broader imperial collapse, and from it one ascertains the pre-conditions for a reconstitution of meaningful political office in the Middle Ages.

¹⁰ For the "corporate state," see F. W. Walbank, The Decline of the Roman Empire in the West (London, 1946).

¹¹ Id., op.cit., pp. 15, 121-27.

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The material contradiction implied by the cleavage between the rural producers of wealth and those who controlled it from the cities would have to be absent, for political action unintegrated with the realities of material and social conditions was inevitably sterile. Furthermore, the basic ideological contradiction resulting from the classic categories of thought (the physical and the metaphysical) would have to be resolved by an entirely new mode of thinking.

It will be recalled that the integration of a world view and ultimate ends with immediate political goals provided the parameters originally outlined for a fully developed idea of office. It is for this reason that a study of the development of a Christian idea of office in the Middle Ages becomes of crucial significance, for through it one understands how the fundamental contradictions of the ancient world were resolved and the false-consciousness which destroyed effective action was eventually overcome.

Following the Council of Nicaea in 325 A.D., which countered the Arian threat (Classicism in Christian dress) to orthodox theology, a new Christian ontology was realized, having revolutionary impact on classical thought.¹² For the Greek categories of matter and form, Christianity interposed those of flesh and spirit. Flesh, in contrast with the Greek matter, was not given a negative connotation, but merely neu-

¹²See Cochrane, op.cit., for a thorough discussion of the revolutionary nature of Christian thought in the Roman World. See also Schatajermann, op.cit., pp. 134-36, 291.

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tral. As for spirit, this was sharply differentiated from the world of forms which theoretically were intelligible by reason. Spirit was not understood in terms of mathematics, but of energy, light, and love. Because there was no logical contradiction in the union of spirit and flesh, the former was capable of entering the world to bring a freedom and energy to flesh which it did not have before. Christ—the historical prototype of the union of perfect flesh and perfect spirit—came into the world to set men free from the bondage of their earthly condition. Through knowing Christ, man was convinced that being and becoming could be one; that process and order were indeed compatible.¹³

The re-appearance of an idea of office which resolved at least the ideological contradiction of the Roman Empire was that of Christian magistracy. Although the idea of episcopal office was not fully realized until the third century, it had much earlier explicit justification based on the first letter of Clement (circa 96 A.D.). The God-ordained order anticipated by the Old Testament was realized when Christ entered the world. Upon ascending into Heaven, He commissioned the Apostles to nurture the order He had initiated, and it was from this apostolic commission that the bishops inherited their responsibility for acting as judges, teachers, and agents of salvation in this still rather amorphous Christian

¹³A rather non-historical yet highly sophisticated exposition of the philosophical implications of this point can be found in M. C. D'Arcy, The Mind and Heart of Love: A Study in Eros and Agape (Cleveland, 1962).

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community. In the third century, the bishops finally won for themselves the governance of the church; henceforth it was they who, as Cyprian asserted, acted as the vicarius Dei and subjected Christians to their authority.¹⁴

To Ambrose of Milan must be given credit for defining the nature of the episcopal office and its relation to the church and secular state. Although the worldly authority of the emperor was to be obeyed, he was by no means head of the church. Ambrose emphasized that the ius sacerdotale could be administered only by the magistrates of the church, and it would be improper for Theodosius to appropriate it. In fact, Ambrose made clear use of his libertas dicendi to castigate Theodosius when he thought him guilty of injustice.¹⁵

Although the nature of the episcopal office was to be further refined in later centuries, its essential basis had been firmly laid down by the courageous work of Ambrose. It will be seen that, however much Hincmar was influenced by Benedictine and particularly Gregorian attitudes toward his episcopal role, his idea of the episcopal office depended to a large degree on Ambrose. Open to God's illuminating grace, the episcopal office related man's ultimate spiritual ends and values to the immediate problem of ruling and directing the Christian community. This fusion of worldly needs with the

¹⁴Hans Erich Feine, Kirchliche Rechtsgeschichte (4th ed.; Köln, 1964), pp. 37-38, 43.

¹⁵For Ambrose, see Heinz Hürten, "'Libertas' in der Patristik—'libertas episcopalis' im Frühmittelalter," Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, XLV (1963), 1-14.

divine will in part resolved the ideological contradictions of of the Empire by permitting the strength and freedom of the spirit to vitalize a worldly order.

In spite of this accomplishment by Ambrose and his successors, the episcopacy in fact failed to reconstitute immediately social and political life on a new basis: it was to take quite some time for a specifically medieval world order to arise from the ruins of Rome. Perhaps the reason for this episcopal failure can best be understood when related to the material contradiction of the Roman world.

The new monarchy, as inspired by the work of Constantine, was less interested in putting the state into the service of religion than in harnessing the energies of religion to re-vitalize the ideal of Romanitas—an effort doomed to failure.¹⁶ Furthermore, the Christian church had not resolved social and economic contradictions. Such matters were still primarily the concern of secular government, and as such the exploitive nature of the late Roman Empire persisted and, indeed, was considerably intensified. Although Christianity measured man by the state of his soul rather than the development of his intellect, such democratic implications failed to change the sharp class distinctions imposing a grinding poverty on the majority and leaving the wealthy few to enjoy a life of pampered ease.

As represented by Augustine, the church continued for

¹⁶ Cochrane, op.cit., passim.

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some time to preserve a negative view of social and political life. The function of secular government was to ensure peace and order within which the church could flourish, and although no one could seriously deny the worldly benefit of such aims, they paled in comparison with man's real goal—eternal salvation.¹⁷ In many respects similar to the original ideal of Romanitas, which saw as the responsibility of imperial government the enforcement of the peaceful conditions in which political life could flourish, the church of the fourth and fifth centuries provided no radically new plan for the re-ordering of social and political life. However, within its own sphere, the concept of church office continued to develop. Augustine's Civitas Dei was characterized by three terms: pax, ordo, and iustitia, which by the seventh to eighth century, slowly began to influence the idea of royal office.¹⁸

However, it was not the episcopacy which provided crucial ideas for a new basis of political thought, for, until the late eighth or ninth century, it had lost for the most part whatever leadership it had achieved under the aegis of the late Empire. Certainly, it continued to hold political and economic power, but the failure to utilize these resources for a radical reconstruction of society meant that the

¹⁷ For the attitude of the church in such matters, see Herbert A. Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine (New York, 1963).

¹⁸ Eugen Ewig, "Zum christlichen Königsgedanken im Frühmittelalter," Das Königtum; seine geistigen und rechtlichen Grundlagen (Lindau-Konstanz, 1956), pp. 7-73. This remains the best work on the penetration of Christian values into the idea of the royal office until Louis the Pious.

church had lost its freedom to act. The German monarchies of the sixth and seventh centuries were quite well aware of the church's resources and were quick to enter into a symbiotic relationship which spelled the death of episcopal independence. Church offices were filled by men who were not chosen democratically as before, but were placed there by kings and magnates who knew they would be fully responsive to the ruler's political interests. The economic resources of the dioceses were freely tapped by monarchs to serve military purposes, and eventually the entire church fell under the sway of lay powers.¹⁹ It can be argued that there were also positive aspects of this development, but there is no denying that the episcopal failure to realize a new thoroughly Christian political and social order meant its ultimate loss of freedom in even spiritual matters.

This rather dismal picture of the church in the early medieval centuries has its partial exceptions, however. What concerns us here is the establishment of Christian utopian communities in which the whole sphere of human life was integrated by a central purpose; this was Benedictine monasticism, which more than anything else, shaped Hincmar's theory of office, for by bringing ideology into dynamic interaction with worldly activity, the monks provided categories of thought useful for a viable and constructive idea of public office.

¹⁹Ulrich Stutz, Die Eigenkirche als Element des mittelalterlich-germanischen Kirchenrechts (reprint of 1895 edition; Darmstadt, 1955).

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There is no point in tracing the introduction of monasticism into the West by men such as Saint Martin and its adaption there to local conditions and the needs of communal life. If one considers it at the moment when it first began to be a powerful force for change in Europe—in the sixth century—the revolutionary nature of this new mode of existence is immediately apparent.

To consider first its ideological import, the central role of the Benedictine liturgy forces itself upon our attention. Spiritual salvation was the central purpose in the monk's life, and to this purpose a large part of his time and energy was devoted. But lest the obsession for communion with God unhinge the stabilitas of the monk's psychic existence, the whole procedure of prayer was firmly disciplined through a balance of inner experience and outer expression (dance and song). In contrast to the excesses of the anchorite suffering in the Egyptian desert, the Benedictine monk prayed in the context of norms—social, artistic, and liturgical—which prevented the abandonment of self. Such a psychology of prayer—the integrating of inner spirit with outward form—lay at the heart of the Benedictine tradition.²⁰

The nourishment of the intellect was not altogether

²⁰Excellent for the monastic dynamic psychology arising from a dialectic between an utopian order and an alienation from it is Gerhart Ladner's "'Homo Viator': Medieval Ideas on Alienation and Order," Speculum, XLII (1967), 233-259. Particularly in regard to liturgy in this respect, see Ildefons Herwegen, Der heilige Benedikt (4th ed.; Düsseldorf, 1951), pp. 114-120.

abandoned in this atmosphere of intense emotional experience. The Benedictine Rule provided for the regular perusal of literature relative to the Christian life, and here too, an effort was made to discipline intellectual labor so that it not become perverted into a pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. Just as the case of liturgical prayer, the whole monk was here involved. Rather than reading silently, the monk read aloud—masticating the words and digesting this spiritual food into his system. Again, the peculiar Benedictine ability to enter the world of literary culture in order to transcend it contributed to the mystical dynamism which was an important element in early medieval thought.²¹

However, as suggested above, the monasteries not only provided a resolution of the old ideological contradiction, they also provided a utopian solution for social and political dislocations. The communal nature of Benedictine monasticism was not accidental, but rather, provided a social context without which salvation would have been difficult, if not impossible. The field of grace in which man lived in relation to his Creator found specification in terms of love—caritas. God's love for man causes Him to extend to the sinner his saving grace; man's love for God unites him with the Divine.²²

²¹For the dialectic of action in the world of intellect and the opening of the heart to God, see Jean Leclercq, The Love of Learning and the Desire for God (New York, 1961), pp. 38-40 et passim.

²²Friendship had a sacramental nature, for contact with a friend was considered contact with Christ, relating man to both the paradise of Eden and the future Kingdom of Christ. Mother Adele Fiske, "Paradisus homo amicus." Specu-

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Since man's essential nature was believed to be a function of the extent to which his flesh was spiritualized, his will to seek God's love and to live in accordance with the dictates of love thus determined the nature of his own being. This had, of necessity, to find expression in mundane terms, for contrary to popular opinion, the monks were not fleeing the world, but simply marking off an area of life to be brought into conformity with the celestial order. Without communal life, the monk would have lacked the worldly context in which love of neighbor was possible, and thus be deprived of the world as a spring-board of salvation.²³ With this as its base, Hincmar's idea of office forged an essential link between personal salvation and social context.

For economic life, Benedictine observance also had revolutionary implications, although their impact on the rest of society remains a very obscure subject indeed. It appears that the monasteries were the promoters of a high level of agricultural technology, not only because circumstances forced them to make the best possible use of undeveloped or relatively inferior farm land, but also, more importantly, be-

lum, XL (1965), 436-459, presents the evidence for various idea and symbol associations, but does not distinguish the specifically monastic contribution. Leclercq, op.cit., pp.57-75, covers similar ground, but suggests that it was the monasteries which carried on and developed the idea of sacramental friendship.

²³The idea of an awareness of social involvement for personal salvation survives in rather modified form today. For the Marxist, class-consciousness is a precondition both for understanding one's self and for salvation through revolution. Even for non-Marxists, social involvement is a pre-condition for meaningful thought; see Mannheim, op.cit., pp. 86-90.

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cause they had a theory of value which encouraged initiative and hard work. Regardless of the social milieu from which the monks derived, when they entered the monasteries they became members of one class—a class which praised the spiritual value of labor. Just as in the case of prayer and study, the physical labor, whether in field, scriptorium, or classroom, was rigidly organized into a pattern preventing exhaustion on one hand or laziness on the other.²⁴

Work in the monastic context was to serve a spiritual function, as were the products of labor. Rather than for profit, the products of labor were distributed toward an equitable support of the monks and their way of life. What was left over from their frugal needs was used for the social welfare of the surrounding rural populace, the relief of the poor, and protection of the defenseless. A study of the Rule has even suggested to one noted authority the beginnings of a labor theory of value, where the prices demanded for goods manufactured in the monastery were determined by the cost of production rather than market value.²⁵ As for the distribution of goods, it was to be done "to everyone according as he had need."

²⁴For the role of monasteries as promoters of an efficient organization of agricultural labor, see Robert Latouche, The Birth of Western Economy (New York, 1961), pp. 86-90.

²⁵Herwegen, op.cit., pp. 125-29. See also for monastic economy, J. Ambrose Raftis, "Western Monasticism and Economic Organization," Comparative Studies in Society and History, III (1960-61), 452-469.

This consideration of economic theory and agricultural technology might seem rather remote from a theoretical formulation of office, but it is here being suggested that these are elements fitting into a coherent and integrated whole going far to explain the success and impact of monasticism in the early Middle Ages. Without resolving these material contradictions, monasticism would not have fared any better than the episcopacy in being the source of fruitful ideas for the whole spectrum of medieval civilization.

One such example of the suggestiveness of monastic institutions for the broader reaches of society is the influence of the abbot's office. As the earthly representative of Christ, the abbot's exercise of justice was comparable to that of divine justice.²⁶ Yet this absolutist tendency which might seem to have imposed a rigid order on the life of the monks, was in fact softened by the essential love of the abbot for those subject to him, where he was compared to a shepherd tending his flock. This pastoral analogy found sharp echo in Gregory the Great's Pastoral Rule for bishops and in later attitudes toward the royal office itself. The abbot was to be an example of proper conduct and a teacher for the disci-

²⁶Walter Dürig, "Disciplina; eine Studie zum Bedeutungsumfang des Wortes in der Sprache der Liturgie und der Väter," Sacris Erudiri, IV (1952), 245-279, emphasizes the impact of Roman military discipline on ideas contained in the ideal of abbot and in monastic liturgy, and yet, it is a quite distinct discipline from that of Antiquity. Roman discipline sought to shape the person according to some explicit model; medieval discipline simply corrected a person if he transgressed certain limits, leaving the person essentially free to create himself within those limits.

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pline of the monk's life. This mixture of sternness and loving care was precisely that which later characterized the church's ideal of political office, such as is found in Hincmar's writings.

There were other monastic "political" practices which ultimately found reflection in lay government. For example, important matters in the monastery were to be decided only after consultation with all the monks. And yet, the monastery was not libertarian, for whatever the abbot decided finally to do, he had to be obeyed absolutely. However great the abbot's authority, it arose from the basis of love; however unilateral his decisions, they were initiated by consultation—this represented an integrated and balanced atmosphere of freedom and discipline which cannot be fully understood by rational analysis, and yet, does not seem at all strange in the monastic context. The monastic constitution served higher spiritual ends, the achieving of which assured the essential freedom of the individual despite his subjection to the yoke of the abbot's discipline. But when historians attempt to understand the same principles in ninth-century political life, they either take the position that men of that time were too naive to be consistent, or else, dispute among themselves whether or not government at the time was totalitarian.

Another manner in which monastic humility resolved problems not easily subject to rational solution was the Rule's attitude toward specialization of labor. Human nature being what it is, one would expect the more skilled and articulate

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monks to accumulate for themselves status and undue influence in the direction of the monastery at the expense of their less well-trained brothers, and thus at the expense of the caritative field in which they lived. However, Benedict warned that it was erroneous to judge oneself by external worldly advantages. Such an attempt to create social consciousness through discipline and concentration on love was actually a bold effort to change human nature so that social interaction would not be stymied by selfishness. The same objective will be seen to have been an integral part of Hincmar's theory of political office.²⁷ These examples taken from the Benedictine Rule are here raised to illustrate that monasticism revolutionized ideas of office—both as a mode of worldly action and as a structuring of authority—not simply by legal redefinition, but by integrating action and authority with man's highest spiritual ends.

When attention is turned from various aspects of church life to that of politics per se, it is clear that the early Germanic kings had even less sense of office than the ineffectual emperors they replaced. Beginning as army leaders and supported by the voluntary cooperation of the free warriors

²⁷ A full analysis of the correlation between Benedictine thought and ninth-century political theory is not to the point here, and examples are merely being cited for the sake of suggestion. Considerably more work remains to be done before the monastic contribution to early medieval life can be fully appreciated, but such a project is outlined in Richard E. Sullivan, "Some Influences of Monasticism on Fourth and Fifth Century Society," Studies in Medieval Culture, II (Western Michigan University, 1966), 19-34.

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who made up their comitatus, the kings of the invasion period made little distinction between their own personal and immediate interests and supra-personal responsibilities towards their subjects. With the rise of the king in power through military victory, the comitatus which supported him enjoyed a corresponding increase in status. It was not long before the combination of royal service and personal wealth made the aristocracy a serious threat to independent royal action. Their participation in government was essential, but they appropriated for themselves royal dominial prerogatives and, when allied with other members of the royal family who aspired to the throne, presented a block of power which the king sought to counter by any means at his disposal. This task was undertaken by two avenues of approach. One was to create a counterbalance to the aristocracy by filling royal offices (the word "office" used here in its narrow sense) with persons of little independent power and another was to make the ducal rank into a strictly subordinate office through bonds of vassalage.²⁸

The royal agents, however clearly their duties might be defined, remained from the king's point of view mere servants. This is true whether the house or court service was owed the king or some lesser magnate.²⁹ Nevertheless, these

²⁸Walter Schlesinger, "Herrschaft und Gefolgschaft in der germanisch-deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte," Beiträge zur deutschen Verfassungsgeschichte (Göttingen, 1963), pp. 9-52. For the various modes of royal power manipulation, see also Léopold Genicot, "La noblesse dans la société médiévale," Moyen Age, LXXI (1965), 539-560

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royal officers in fact gained a considerable amount of prestige and, whenever possible, entrenched themselves in power by means of their access to the king. Any possible theoretical implications of court offices were of little interest to the Merovingians, for their concern was merely for the powers and duties which each office implied.³⁰ The interesting developments in the idea of office are not found in minor officials, but in the royal office itself.

The symbiotic relationship between monarchy and church meant that the royal office took on a character quite distinct from that of other officials. Ecclesiastical wealth and administrative talent were placed in royal service, and the king, in turn, repaid the favor, at least in theory, with the extension of his protection (mundeburdium) to the church. Toward the end of the Merovingian period, as the church grew ever wealthier and the kings weaker, the impact of church ideas upon kingship became more marked. Characteristics usually applied to saints and finding expression in hagiographic literature soon became applied to the king, such as a responsibility to punish the wicked.³¹

²⁹ Ewig, op.cit., pp. 61-62.

³⁰ For the Germanic side of office, see K. Kroeschell, "Amt," Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, I (1964), 150-54. Sources for non-royal offices are rare in this period, but some ideas can be gleaned from Max Conrat, "Ein Traktat über romanisch-frankisches Amterwesen," Zeitschrift für Rechtsgeschichte, G.A., XXIX (1908), 239-260.

³¹ Beyond Ewig's work cited above, our understanding of this process has been deepened by Frantisek Graus, Volk, Herrscher und Heiliger im Reich der Merowinger (Prague, 1965), especially pp. 334-346 for the point made here. In neither work,

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Signs of a deeper awareness of the relation of Christian faith to political action appears to have been connected with the rise of the Carolingians as mayors of the palace.³² For instance, the so-called Fredegar Continuator, who is our main source for these years, began to suggest that the mayors had the good fortune of divine assistance in carrying out their duties. First with the Battle of Poitiers in 732 and continuing thenceforth in rapid succession, the reader meets more and more often such phrases as Deo adiuvante in the royal chronicle as one parameter of political or military action.³³ One also increasingly encounters liturgically derived analogies between the mayors and Old Testament figures such as Joshua.

The penetration of Christian ideas into the Frankish political mentality cannot be understood altogether abstractly, for the political conditions during the reign of Pepin and Charlemagne go far to explain the form and significance of their adoption.

Important for these Carolingian attitudes was the old-

however, is the specifically Benedictine contribution recognized as such.

³²For what follows, I am largely dependent on the important work of Ewig, op.cit., for the emergent Christian idea of office; and Walter Mohr, Die karolingische Reichsidee (Münster, 1962), for the relation between political events and the idea of state; and Heinrich Büttner, "Aus den Anfängen des abendländischen Staatsgedankens,; die Königserhebung Pippins," Das Königtum, ed. T. Mayer, pp. 155-167.

³³M.G.H., SS. rer. Mer., II, 177, 180, 182, 184, 187, 188, 190. See for this and other examples of the Christianization of kingship, Ewig, op.cit., pp. 42-43 et passim.

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er concept of royal legitimacy against which Christian ideas had to compete. This consisted largely of the charisma associated with the royal family (Gebblütsheiligkeit), which passed from generation to generation. This charisma, however, cannot be understood as the basis of legitimacy in any absolute sense, but rather, as simply a customary popular expectation of high performance from the royal family. The election by the magnates of the charismatic family member thought best able to excel ensured a certain direction and control by the aristocracy over the royal house and the fate of the land. Despite this opening for innovation, election betrays the fundamentally conservative nature of royal legitimation by its dependence on the past for its strength.

Charles Martel's successes, notably that of Poitiers, provided his family with a de facto magic sharply contrasting with that of the last of the Merovingian kings—a sad nonentity rotting away in an obscure monastery. This disparity, on both the Merovingian and Carolingian sides, between the reality of power and a title to accord with it, was one axis upon which Christian ideas of kingship penetrated political life in Francia. Despite all other differences, Germanic and Christian concepts of right order shared sensitivity to disparities between outward form and inner reality. In the Frankish context, charisma had to be constantly demonstrated by outward success, and the late history of the Merovingian line was proof enough that they were no longer really kings. On the other hand, the Augustinian idea of ordo, as found in

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such figures as Isidore of Seville and Pseudo-Cyprian, insisted that a title (nomen) correspond with the inner reality it expressed: "rex enim a regendo vocatur."³⁴

However, as far as the Franks themselves were concerned, there was no need to look to the church for any title, for the charisma of the Carolingian house was in itself constitutive. In A.D. 743 and 746, Charles Martel's sons Pepin and Carloman used the term "regnum nostrum" in their chancellory even though by that time the Merovingian puppet-king had been taken out of his monastery and set on the throne as Childeric III.³⁵ Büttner and, following him, Mohr see in this phrase a certain indication that the office of mayor of the palace had become a public responsibility.

The turn to a more explicitly Christian concept of the royal office arose less from a need to rationalize de facto rule than from the competition among Charles Martel's sons for the whole inheritance. Each of them—Grifo, Carloman, and Pepin—realized that a propaganda weapon useful for excluding the others from power would be provided by his holding the

³⁴Some authors, such as Jean Jolivet, "Quelques cases de 'platonisme grammatical' du VII^e au XII^e s.?" Mélanges René Crozet, I (Poitiers, 1966), 93-99, have argued that the reference to nomen is Platonic in spirit, but this seems to be stretching the philosophical term too far. In fact, it is well to consider if it is really even Augustinian, but rather perhaps a Benedictine concept from the Frankish side and a Graeco-Augustinian one from the papal.

³⁵Found in Pepin's charter for St. Vincent in Macon in 743 (M.G.H., Diplo.Merov., 103), and Karloman in 746 (the earliest product surviving from his chancellory) (M.G.H., Diplo.Mer., 102). The significance of this phrase is pointed out by Büttner, op.cit., p. 81.

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royal title. The final victor in this internal bickering was Pepin, who, in 751, united a claim of de facto success with justifications arising from a Christian context.

From Pope Zacharias Pepin obtained a Responsum to his inquiries concerning the propriety of ruling without title—an accomodation which the papacy was only too willing to grant, for immediate outside help was needed to counter the Lombard ambitions to take over the Byzantine shadow power in Italy. This Responsum contributed to a new concept of state, for it made the king protector of a Christian kingdom rather than merely a Frankish kingdom. However, some of the implications of the papal aims did not sit well with the Frankish aristocracy, who saw it as endangering the traditionally friendly relations between Francia and the Lombards. Certainly more crucial for the internal affairs of Francia than this rather disturbing document from Rome was Pepin's election to kingship by his magnates, whereby his proven effectiveness was formally acknowledged. There was, however, even within the Frankish domain, some direct impact of the church on Pepin's apotheosis. In addition to election, he was anointed by the Frankish bishops, who thus contributed a specifically Christian charisma to the Germanic.

The year 751 rather than 800 marks the revolutionary appearance of ideas defining the basis of government for centuries to come. To the Germanic traditions were fused radical Christian concepts such as non-traditional charisma, granted by God through anointment. Here were planted the seeds of a

fully Christian concept of political office. All that was needed for it to become dynamic was the introduction of Benedictine psychological ideas regarding peace and caritas by such figures as Alcuin and Benedict of Aniane.

But the full implications of the events of 751 only slowly penetrated Francia. The Franks were hesitant to accept papal concepts of state, and, indeed, they never fully grasped their implications. Elements of the scheme, however, following the papal unction of Pepin in 754 in Rome, began to penetrate north. Without tracing in detail the history of this papal-Frankish dialogue, one can simply note that by 800, Charlemagne's concept of his office was encompassed by the image of the New David: a divinely appointed ruler over a chosen people, whose task it was to realize God's will on earth. The direct contact between king and God made him both rex and sacerdos, but priest only in its functional sense of being the agent of God's saving grace. To what extent this constituted an authority over purely religious matters was not at all clear among court circles.

Charles felt that his authority, resting on a direct commission from God, permitted his immediate involvement in affairs both religious and secular. The responsibility for carrying out the renovatio of society in preparation for Christ's second coming, was most definitely his. However, Charles' broad powers were only accepted by the Franks because of his charisma and obvious concern for the interests of the church. Even Alcuin seems to have had a few reservations con-

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cerning the propriety of Charlemagne's sacerdotal responsibilities, but as long as Charles behaved as Alcuin though he should, he did not make any objection.³⁶ However, as Charlemagne grew older and especially when he was succeeded by a son less resolutely independent of church views, the latent episcopal sense of the church's responsibility for the destinies of Francia arose to make itself heard.

The reform effort of Louis the Pious' early years of rule, climaxing in 829, represents views which have come to be known as the church Einheitspartei.³⁷ Although some of the leading spokesmen were bishops, as were the instigators of an earlier reform movement in 813, their effort appears to have been closely associated with a revived concern for monastic reform. Bishops had traditionally not felt it incumbent upon their office to engage directly in matters of state, and the justifications for such a broadened sense of responsibility must have arisen from factors inherent in the political situation at the turn of the eighth century.³⁸ The Ambrosian idea of

³⁶ Heinz Hürten, "Alcuin und der Episkopat im Reiche Karls des Grossen," Historisches Jahrbuch, LXXXII (1962), 22-49.

³⁷ The study of the Einheitspartei is exceedingly complex, but the following works are of especial use. The basic study of the idea itself is that of Roland Faulhaber, Der Reichseinheitsgedanke in der Literatur der Karolingerzeit (Berlin, 1931). See also Hans Liebschütz, "Wesen und Grenzen des karolingischen Rationalismus," Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, XXXIII (1950), 17-44; Josef Semmler, "Reichsidee und kirchliche Gesetzgebung," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXXI (1960), 37-65; Walter Mohr, "Die kirchliche Einheitspartei und die Durchführung der Reichsordnung von 817," ibid., LXXII (1961), 1-45; and Joachim Scharf, "Studien zu Smaragdus und Jonas," Deutsches Archiv, XVII (1961), 333-384.

³⁸ Heinz Hürten, "Gregor der Große und der mittelalter-

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episcopal liberty did not consider such action appropriate, nor did any later bishop argue for a new definition of the bishop's office until Louis' reign.³⁹

The reason for this is clear enough , for as long as the bonds of civil society were understood to be worldly, there was no way in which the spiritual action of the church could prove directly efficacious. It was for the king to defend the church, and for the church to pray for God's intercession in behalf of the king. However, with the spiritualization of society—the substitution of a respublica christiana for the traditional Kingdom of the Franks—the bonds of society were understood to be spiritual. The church Einheitspartei conceived of such a state having caritas as its political and social cement, permitting a close accord between worldly order and the divine will. It was this monastization of society which opened the way for a direct involvement of the episcopacy in political affairs. But indeed, this was an episcopacy educated in monasteries and reflecting Benedictine ideas. Hincmar's early career was itself in many ways typical of the leading figures of the realm at this time.

A number of magnates, in reaction to the theocratic implications of the Davidic kingdom and wishing to profit from

liche Episkopat," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXXIII (1962), 16-41, where the Gregorian concept of episcopal office discouraged political involvement.

³⁹Heinz Hürten, "'Libertas' in der Patristik—'libertas episcopalis' im Frühmittelalter," Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, XLV (1963), 1-14.

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any check to royal effectiveness, joined with the bishops in working for a more precise definition of Louis' office. This expressed itself as their cooperation in the effort to consider the royal position as a ministerium quite distinct from the person holding it.⁴⁰ The application of the term ministerium to the royal office rested at the end of a long evolution, starting, as has been mentioned, with its use for the servants of bishops, kings, or royal officials. By 802, however, the term was universally applied to all who had any public responsibility. This is seen in the Instruction for the missi of 802, which sought to counter feud: "They will diligently seek among bishops, abbots, counts, abbesses, and our vassals, how concord and amiable relations are to be obtained in the future within each of the offices, and also if there is seen any discord among them. . . ."⁴¹ Significant it is that each, whether bishop, abbot, count, or vassal, has a ministerium, and that friendship is a check to discord.

By 823 the imperial office itself had become a ministerium, and taken together with the ministeria of all other offices, the full objectification of the state in all its elements was complete.

But however much the total weight of this ministerium ap-

⁴⁰Theodor Mayer, "Staatsauffassung in der Karolingerzeit," Das Königtum, ed. T. Mayer, pp. 169-183.

⁴¹M.G.H., Capit., I, 101: "Ut diligenter inquirant inter episcopis, abbatibus sive comites vel abbatissas atque vassallos nostros, qualem concordiam et amicitiam ad invicem habent per singula ministeria, an si aliqua discordia inter ipsos esse videtur. . . ."

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pears to rest in our person, actually, it is divided by God's authority and man's organization in such a way that each of you, in his own place and order, knows he has a part in our ministry, and thus, it is fitting that I am the admonitor of you all, and you ought to be the adiutores of me.⁴²

To each person in his own ministry is carried over the same responsibilities of the king—obviously those which transcend the particular function of office in the fabric of government. If all cooperate under imperial direction, then peace and the "publica utilitas" assured.

The pax et concordia motif which did indeed penetrate political life, entering into a functional relationship with the older ideals of iustitia and ordo, reflects less an Augustinization of state than its monastization.⁴³ The basic distinguishing characteristic of Benedictine thought is the integration of a psychology of the spirit with the external manifestations of life in a dialectic of alienation.⁴⁴ Worldly

⁴² Admonitio ad omnes regni ordines, iii (M.G.H., Capit., I, 303): "Sed quamquam summa huius ministerii in nostra persona consistere videatur, tamen et divina auctoritate et humana ordinatione ita per partes divisum esse cognoscitur, ut unusquisque vestrum in suo loco et ordine partem nostri ministerii habere cognoscatur; unde apparet, quod ego omnium vestrum admonitor esse debes, et omnes vos nostri adiutores esse debetis." (cap. xiii, p. 305): "Omnibus etiam generaliter dicimus, ut caritatem et pacem ad invicem habeatis et generalem iussionem nostram generaliter observare decertetis et missis nostris, pro qualicumque scilicet aut ecclesiastica aut publica utilitate vel oportunitate a nobis directis, . . ."

⁴³ Hans M. Klinkenberg, "Über karolingische Fürstenspiegel," Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, VIII (1956), 82-98, attributes the distinctive character of ninth-century mirrors to monastic influence.

⁴⁴ To what extent the Christianization of the royal office under Charlemagne's predecessors was due to a fundamentally monastic source, is a question too complex to be entered

discipline, justice, and order become means for sharing in Christ's mystical presence on earth. The resulting nearness to spiritual perfection in turn makes all the more clear the inadequacies of the world as given.

Augustine had recognized the alienation of man from the world, but provided no psychological dynamic whereby this very alienation compelled one to change the world as it existed. Radical change remained spiritual and personal; human action in history could bear no lasting fruit.⁴⁵ With Benedictine monasticism, however, the inner spiritual dynamic integrated with worldly action, although at first within the confines of utopian communities. Belief in a progressive view of human action, seeking an ever closer conformity between the divine order and the worldly, remained cloister-bound until the Carolingian period. Here, once political action was sub-

into here. In any case, there seems a close tie between what has been called "monastic theology" and the nature of kingship as debated by Walter Mohr, op.cit., and J. M. Wallace-Hadrill, "The 'Via Regia' of the Carolingian Age," in Trends in Medieval Political Thought, ed. Beryl Smalley (Oxford, 1965), pp. 22-41.

⁴⁵For the Augustinian non-progressive view of history, see Theodor Mommsen, "St. Augustine and the Christian Idea of Progress," Journal of the History of Ideas, XII (1951), 346-374, and more recently, G. L. Keyes, Christian Faith and the Interpretation of History; A Study of St. Augustine's Philosophy of History (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1966), who points out how classic epistemology hindered fruitful understanding of human action in history. Hans J. Diesner, Studien zur Gesellschaftslehre und sozialen Haltung Augustins (Halle, 1954), pp. 112-17 et passim, reveals Augustine's blindness to social realities and tendency to rely on absolute political authority to ensure religious conformity. Augustine thus reflects the imperial effort to achieve order by repressive political action rather than opening the way for constructive social forces.

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sumed under the broader cover of respublica christiana, the way for its more positive evaluation lay open. If Alcuin can be taken as representative of one current of opinion at court, there is clear evidence of a compulsion to reshape the world in time for Christ's second coming: a sense of modernity and alienation from the past which asserted the progressive nature of Carolingian political life.⁴⁶ To Charlemagne he wrote, "A New Athens is taking shape in Francia, or rather, one even more excellent. For, ennobled by the teaching of Christ, it surpasses all the wisdom of the Academy. While that was merely learned through the Platonic doctrines, and shines by virtue of the seven arts, our academy, being endowed with the seven-fold fullness of the Spirit, exceeds the whole dignity of worldly wisdom."⁴⁷

With Louis the Pious, there was a concerted effort to

⁴⁶For the modernus idea in the Carolingian period, see Walter Freund, Modernus und anderer Zeitbegriffe des Mittelalters (Köln, 1957), pp. 41-52. There is a vast bibliography for the Carolingian reform effort. Especially useful are Percy E. Schramm, "Karl der Große: Denkart und Grundauffassungen—die von ihm bewirkte Correctio," Historische Zeitschrift, CXCVIII (1964), 306-345, and Josef Fleckenstein, Die Bildungsreform Karls des Großen als Verwirklichung der Normae Rectitudinis (Bigge-Ruhr, 1953). For the nexus of the will to reform, worldly action, and caritas, see for example, Friedrich Carl Scheibe, "Geschichtsbild, Zeitbewußtsein und Reformwille bei Alcuin," Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, XLI (1959), 35-62, and Wolfgang Edelstein, "Eruditio" und "Sapientia: Weltbild und Erziehung in der Karolingerzeit (Freiburg i.B., 1965).

⁴⁷M.G.H., Epist., IV, 279: "forsan Athenae nova perficeretur in Francia, immo multo excellentior. Quia haec Christi domini nobilitate magisterio omnem achademicae exercitationis superat sapientiam. Illa, tantummodo Platonicis erudita disciplinis, septenis informata claruit artibus; haec etiam insuper septiformi sancti Spiritus plenitudine ditata omnem saecularis sapientiae excellit dignitatem."

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impose a monastic-like discipline on the whole of life. His chief advisor for the first few years of his reign was Abbot Benedict of Aniane, who undertook a fundamental reform of Frankish monastic life, even going so far as to impose a monastic rule on the canons of cathedral chapters. There is no point here in estimating the extent to which Benedictine education shaped not only the kings and magnates of the age, but the bishops as well. A common complaint was that the monasteries resembled kindergartens more than islands of prayer. Hincmar himself, as so many other sons of the aristocracy, was sent at a very early age to St. Denis for upbringing. Here, as in many other monasteries, the Anianian reforms were introduced, and from such an atmosphere came the most influential bishops of Francia.

The introduction of the idea of peace into the Carolingian concept of state was a fact of critical importance, and for this reason it is essential to distinguish monastic concepts of peace from those of Augustine.⁴⁸ For the Bishop of Hippo, peace had two aspects. True peace, as found in the Civitas Dei, is impossible of realization on earth because of man's fallen nature. Earthly peace, however desirable it might be, should not be understood to contradict just and necessary warfare. The limited nature of this earthly peace

⁴⁸ Discussing the crucial role of peace at this juncture but failing to distinguish Benedictine ideas are H. X. Arquillière, L'Augustinisme politique (2nd ed.; Paris, 1955), pp. 170-187, and F. L. Ganshof, "La 'Paix' au très haut moyen âge," La Paix, I (Bruxelles, 1961), 397-413.

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is due to its being essentially a function of human nature. If "the most savage animals. . .encompass their own species with a ring of protecting peace. . .how much more powerfully do the laws of man's nature move him to hold fellowship and maintain peace with all men so far as in him lies."⁴⁹ In contrast, monastic peace found its focus in love which is Christ and held that worldly peace, because it was an integration of caritas and ordo, was not essentially different from Heavenly Peace. For the monk, then, worldly action becomes a positive good, for through it one participates in Christ's mystical presence on earth.⁵⁰

Louis the Pious' contemporaries were to find, however, that a reliance on such monastic concepts of state might have disastrous consequences. The bishops had so shaken the unilateral authority of the royal office by hedging it about with moral criteria that the ever grasping magnates of the realm, and in particular Louis' own sons, were quick to seize the opportunity to depose their ruler. Once it was granted that the cement of society was spiritual, then an assembly of bishops had all the justification it needed to both judge the king and reshape the political order according to their own conceptions.

The canonical justification for the bishops thus asser-

⁴⁹Quoted from Deane, op.cit., p. 79. See also pp. 154-171 for a discussion of peace and war, and pp. 137-38 for the heavenly-earthly peace distinction.

⁵⁰For a crucial example, lying close to the heart of the reforms under Louis the Pious, see Jean Leclercq, "Les Munimenta fidei' de Saint Benoît d'Aniane," Analecta Monastica, I (città del Vaticano, 1948), 21-74.

ting their authority over the king was based on the so-called Gelasian theory. Although Pope Gelasius himself had no such intention of distinguishing sacerdotal auctoritas from the king's worldly potestas, and during the reigns of Louis' predecessors there was little room to impose sacerdotal authority, yet the troubles of the second and third decades of the ninth century allowed the church party to take matters into its own hands.⁵¹ In 833, led by Agobard, it revolted against Louis because in its opinion he had failed to rule properly. A second such proceeding under Archbishop Ebbo of Rheims went so far as to actually depose Louis and incarcerate him in a monastery. This shocked public opinion to such an extent that Louis was able to recover his throne, and the church Einheitspartei was forced into the background for a number of years. When the party re-entered political life, it was under the leadership of Ebbo's successor, Hincmar, who tried to forge a more realistic, but nevertheless, still fundamentally monastic concept of society.

This consideration of the ideology of kingship during Louis' reign would be very misleading if the actual power conditions were to be ignored. The Carolingian scheme for the reform and revival of society is usually more admired in its conception than in its fulfillment, for neither Charlemagne nor Louis the Pious was able to bring about a lasting renaissance of culture or political viability. The promise of a unified Europe, forged by the early Carolingians and placed

⁵¹For Gelasius, see Ensslin, op.cit., pp. 661-68.

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on an ideological basis by at least 829, proved to be of short duration. An admirable effort to bring about a reform of religion and culture proved ephemeral, for there were very real limitations on royal power.⁵²

The king's power advantage over the magnates of the realm was very slight indeed, and every conceivable means was taken to assure continued public support—the preconditions of any royal undertaking. The creation of a loyal aristocracy, dependent on the king for status and wealth, served to check regional magnates, but the greatest care had to be taken lest these men in royal service also become entrenched through the building up of regional loyalties. Although novel oaths and success in battle may have reinforced royal charisma, an essential reason for the king's constant travelling throughout his realm was to evaluate local power complexes and to grant charters in order to build aristocratic support.

Despite his name, Louis the Pious was well suited to carry on the traditions of his father. An able military leader, he had already proven his ability as King of Aquitaine. When he became sole ruler, the attempt to carry out what he felt to be his responsibilities as a Christian monarch by a thoroughgoing church reform would only have increased contemporary loyalty to him, for through it, certainly, he would win

⁵²A useful corrective to the over-emphasis on the capacity of Charlemagne to shape the course of Carolingian history is provided, i.a., by Edouard Perroy, "Carolingian Administration," in Early Medieval Society, ed. Sylvia Thrupp (New York, 1967), pp. 129-146.

God's help. The magnates would see no contradiction between the king's Christian responsibilities and what was for them his principle function, the granting and protecting of political and economic privilege.

In spite of a good start, Louis' character encouraged certain tendencies which ultimately proved destructive to the network of loyalties which ensured his base of power. One "shortcoming," which he shared with other members of his house, was being too subject to the affections of women. Charlemagne's indulgent attachment to his dissolute daughters scandalized many at court, and Lothar's love-life became the major crisis of his reign. For Louis, trouble arose because of the passion which he had for his second wife, the youthful and attractive Judith of Bavaria. Judith's ambitions for her son Charles (the Bald) induced Louis to revamp his prior commitments for succession at the expense of his other sons.⁵³

Such family squabbles were familiar enough to men of this period, but this time ideological questions played a role more crucial than had hitherto been the case. The older sons, Lothar and Louis, saw in the idea of respublica christiana a propaganda tool useful for countering any further division of the realm. The events in the ensuing struggle are complex and too little understood, but it does emerge that Lothar's unscrupulous effort to capitalize on certain ideas (such as the

⁵³The early Middle Ages were rather insensitive to man's sinful nature, but had a profound appreciation for the importance of love—an interesting combination.

church's right to censure the king's political acts) meant a severe check to Louis' effectiveness. One sees a compliant churchman in Ebbo of Rheims, who tried to support Lothar's ambitions by using the Christian idea of supra-personal ordo to counter Louis' right to act unilaterally.

Any such check on the monarch's right to act freely within the political sphere could bode nothing but ill for the traditional base of royal power. The realistic evaluation of the power situation and the complete freedom to manipulate that situation through a distribution of honors would prove difficult indeed if bishops gathered in council countered royal action and even, as in Soissons in 833, removed the king to a monastery, far from the arena of political action. As has been noted, public reaction against Ebbo's and Lothar's scheme was immediate and decisive.

The Christianization of royal office, however admirable it may have been as an intellectual achievement, proved fruitless because it ignored the real conditions of political life. Traditional bases of power could indeed be modified, as the growing use of propaganda and public assemblies suggest, but such changes would have to be developed slowly and without permitting a gap to appear between magnate expectations and royal intentions.⁵⁴

⁵⁴For Louis' increased political use of public assemblies, see Joel T. Rosenthal, "The Public Assembly in the Time of Louis the Pious," Traditio, XX (1964), 25-40. The study of propaganda as the nexus of magnate mentality and royal aims has never been pursued, although Klinkenberg, op.cit., makes a number of suggestive remarks in this vein.

The severe check to royal power experienced during Louis' later years and the struggle following his death between the sons Louis the German, Lothar of Lothringia, and Charles the Bald of West Francia, contributed to a fundamental shift in the basis of kingship. Charles the Bald was only seventeen in 840 and had little choice but to turn to the territorial magnates of West Francia for an assurance of his continued rule. The more or less permanent settlement achieved at Verdun and Coulaines in 842 and 843 marked the initial success of a group of interests which sought to substitute for the royal manipulation of honors a mutual interest pact among all fideles as the basis of the king's power.⁵⁵

The settlement of 843 defining the boundries of the realm represents the product of a commission of magnates rather than unilateral royal action. Henceforth, the state of West Francia was to be a commonwealth assured by the cooperation of all orders rather than the personal creation of the king. From the old heterogeneous disunity of the Carolingian realm were now forged three more tightly knit regional unities resting on the interdependence of both secular and ecclesiastical fideles and the king to ensure the continuance of their respective interests against both outside attack and the disturbing influence of private interests on the royal person. Per benevolentiam the king was to respect the common-

⁵⁵For this and what follows, I rely to a large extent on the work of P. Classen, "Die Verträge von Verdun und Coulaines, 843, als politische Grundlagen des Westfränkischen Reiches," Historische Zeitschrift, CXCVI (1963), 1-35.

wealth, for he was custodia pacis caritatisque.

The impact of Coulaïnes on West Francia can perhaps best be seen in subsequent legislation. In contrast to his brothers, Charles the Bald produced a series of acts between 843 and 856 which carried on the principles of Coulaïnes into the political events of his reign. There is some evidence that these legislative acts were carefully collected together as a legal expression of the contract between the king and the fideles to guarantee political stability in contrast to the personal government which had hitherto predominated.

Although unanswered questions in regard to this series of legislative documents abound, there are good indications that they formed a unified whole, the purpose of which was to express in legal form the belief that the king was subject to law and that the law ensured the commonwealth. It is more difficult to ascertain the authorship of the program, although it seems rather likely that Hincmar exerted an important influence. Hincmar had been closely associated with an important spokesman of the church Einheitspartei, Abbot Hilduin of Saint Denis, but had also arranged for the reconciliation of Hilduin with Louis the Pious after the revolt against the king had collapsed. Furthermore, Hincmar had been active in royal service, especially in regard to the managing of royal assemblies, and revealed an exceptional legal ability. These and other factors all contribute to the hypothesis that Hincmar was an important agent in a movement to re-establish a Christian interpretation of the royal office and of state. Unfor-

tunately, so little is known of Hincmar's activity before he was appointed Archbishop of Rheims in 845, that the verification and elaboration of any such hypothesis would require a major investigation.⁵⁶

For this reason, the present project seeks a more limited task, that of ascertaining the nature of Hincmar's concepts once he had won for himself a more widely recognized and influential position in Francia after defending Charles the Bald's rule from Lothar's attempted coup of 858-59. At no time either before or after this crisis were Hincmar's ideas entirely successful in shaping royal policy, for the old personal concept of royal power through manipulation of honors continued to assert itself. However, just as Charles' weakness in 840-43 had permitted certain concepts tending to limit royal autonomy to impose themselves, likewise, during the crisis of 858-59, Hincmar had won for himself such an important place in the royal council that his ideas had greater impact on the course of political events.

The present study begins at the point at which this influence becomes manifest, particularly when Hincmar's extant writings began to carry a greater burden of more narrowly political concerns. It is hoped that this investigation will show the extent to which a Christian concept of office

⁵⁶ The events of Hincmar's life before his elevation to Rheims deserve careful study. However, until this is undertaken, the reader is best referred to the detailed but rather outdated work of Heinrich Schrörs, Hincmar, Erzbischof von Rheims (Freiburg i.B., 1884).

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was made fully compatible with the actual basis of royal power, and how Hincmar's ideas interacted with the course of political events throughout the remainder of his life. If this leads to a better comprehension of Hincmar's position, then an understanding of events between 829 and 858 would become greatly facilitated.

CHAPTER II

HINCMAR'S THEORETICAL BASIS FOR THE ACTION OF OFFICE

The usual interpretation put forward by historians to illuminate the ninth-century idea of political office has followed a familiar course. If one begins with the assumption that Carolingian government was an attempt to submit personal ambition and a complex of overlapping rights to the rule of law and that royal advisors saw as their principal aim the admonition of those at the head of state to respect that law, then it is a rather straightforward task to trace in the various sources those characteristics which defined the limits and ideals of office. The prince, for example, should have good character, be brave, just, and God-fearing—virtues which were not foreign either to Antiquity or the Renaissance.¹

However, merely selecting the ideas of a given writer such as Hincmar and showing how closely they resembled an ideal transcending the ages leaves much to be desired if his unique contribution is to be appreciated. In order to grasp fully the implications that such ideals had at the time, it is imperative to put the lists of princely virtues in the context

¹An example of this limited approach is that of Lester K. Born, "The Specula Principis of the Carolingian Renaissance," Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, XII (1933), 583-612. He argues that the princely ideal of Hincmar and his contemporaries differs little from that of Erasmus.

of thought from which they emerge. This is particularly true of such a tradition-conscious age as that of the Carolingian, for especially in this period, lengthy tracts were often written by weaving together bits and pieces of quotations from the Bible and church Fathers. When the fabric is analysed, each thread is discovered to derive its hue from outside sources, but the whole pattern can only be understood once the elements are restored to their proper place.

For these reasons, it is imperative to consider first the parameters of office in the context of Hincmar's entire thought. Once the ideological implications of his idea of office are grasped, it is further necessary to place them into the framework of actual political events, revealing not only how his ideas were relevant to political realities, but also in what way they grew out of public needs.

Hincmar's theory of office is fully illuminated only after its theoretical base is unearthed. This base, however, was constructed out of materials available to him for understanding the political and social world—ideas derived both from Benedictine psychology and from the old definition of episcopal office. For these reasons, it is essential to consider what he felt were the nature and ends of human action in the world.

A delineation of the perfect state of society is important for an understanding of what Hincmar held to be the goals of political life, for a myth of an idealized past pro-

vided an objective for positive action. Although the early years of Louis the Pious' reign and the Apostolic era were considered periods which contrasted favorably with the difficult times of the later ninth century, the most theoretically significant epoch was that of the Church in Paradise.

Hincmar believed that prior to Adam's fall the various tribes or nations lived together in a state of concord, for they were one in God. The natural order—the will of God which man unquestioningly obeyed—was the basis of this unity, and explicit law would have been superfluous.² This natural order in Paradise was characterized by pax, caritas, and concordia—terms which serve as keys to an understanding of the normative relation between men and God, either as realized in Paradise or as the goal of political action. It will be shown how Hincmar's use of these terms was characteristically Benedictine.

Hincmar, in common with traditional Christian attitudes, looked upon God as caritas and the source of all goodness.³

²De raptu viduarum, cap. v: "Cuius rei imitatione etiam sancta ecclesia antiquitus solemniter et venerabiliter custodivit, eos qui in illa velut in paradiso Dei coniugio copulandi essent, divina benedictione et missarum celebratione coniungens. Quae videlicet honesta et religiosa coniunctio, Deo auctore coepta, et eius benedictione firmata, etiam inter gentes, quae nullam legem acceperunt, nullam Dei habuerunt notitiam, legitimo ordine et naturali lege servata est. Nec unquam rem pacis, caritatis atque concordiae, per discordiam, et violentiam, et impietatem fieri licitum fuit." This oneness with God—not conceiving of God as other-than-self—assured the concordance of will. It is not nature which is "natural," but the absorption of all into God—a spirit of love. Any relation of this to Stoic thought is strictly coincidental.

³De praedestinatione, cap. xix: "Sed et caritatem,

Since these divine characteristics are found naturally in every individual, man loves God and therefore seeks to realize an ever more complete union with Him.⁴ Therefore, this love which man has for his Creator induces a corresponding desire for carrying out His will in the form of good works. In the exercise of his free will, man has the capacity for doing good, but only through God's grace has he the desire to act in accordance with God's will.⁵ Thus the relationship between concordia and caritas is very close, for it is through an accordance of God's will and that of man that the individual is filled with caritas and consequently, is motivated to do good.⁶ Just as concordia relates the form of man's acts to the divine will, so caritas unites their spirit with Him.

Hincmar makes no essential distinction between worldly love and love for God, and in fact, both express man's de-

quia una est, quia Deus caritas est. . . ." Ad reclusos et simplices, praef.: "Sed Dominus natura pius et fons bonitatis et pietatis origo. . . ."

⁴De praedestinatione, cap. xxix: "Qui ergo mente integra Deum desiderat, profecto iam habet quem amat. Neque enim quisquam posset Deum diligere, si eum quem diligit non haberet."

⁵M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 30: "Per liberum arbitrium gratiam subsequimur, ut bene agamus; gratia adiuvamur, ut bene agere possimus. . . ."

⁶Hincmar wrote in the acts of the Synodus Mettensis, a. 859, cap. vi: "Et cum mala cuncta bonis sequentibus diluantur, tantum est discordia malum, quae, nisi extincta funditus fuerit, bonum nullatenus sequi, evangelio teste, permittat; et caritas est, quae operit multitudinem peccatorum, sine qua, etiamsi quis corpus suum tradat ad ignem, nihil ei nisi ad damnationis iudicium proderit." The Latin word concordia will henceforth be used to indicate the relationship between man's will and the divine order.

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Behold the crucified Christ is given to the peoples of the world! But how do the people approach Him? By chasing after in faith; by the eagerness of the heart; by hastening love. Love is your feet, of which you have two—love of God and love of neighbor, and since you are not lame, with these two feet you hasten to God.⁷

It has already been suggested that a prerequisite of salvation being worldly action in a social context was a uniquely Benedictine contribution to Western thought, and Hincmar here reflects the same inclination to sanctify social relations. It was Hincmar's contribution to make this social context a political one as well, for caritas also necessitated bringing the worldly ordo into an ever closer accord with the divine will.

If a state of concordia exists, as was the case before Adam's fall, then the resulting situation is characterized by the term pax. To resist the will of God is to disturb pax and be removed from the source of saving grace.⁸ Pax is not simply "peace" in the sense of the absense of conflict, but ra-

⁷De cavendis vitiis, cap. xii: "Ecce gentibus datur crucifixus Christus. Unde accedunt gentes? Fide sectando, corde inhiando, caritate currendo. Pedes tui caritas est. Duos pedes, id est dilectionem Dei et proximi habe, ut non sis claudus, et istis duobus pedibus curre ad Deum." The Latin term caritas will henceforth be employed to emphasize its theological implications.

⁸Opusculum LV. capitulorum, cap. xxxvi: "Quorum perditionem evidenter catholica demonstrat ecclesiae, quae ut pro haereticis, ita coniunctim et pro schismaticis orat, ut ad fidei et pacis redeant unitatem, sciens haereticos et schismaticos in haeresi ac schismate in permanentes regnum Dei non intraturos: quia nisi ad iudicium, in scissura mentium Deus non est, ut beatus dicit Gregorius. Deus quippe in unitate est, et illi eius habere gratiam merentur, qui se ab invicem per sectarum scandala non dividunt."

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ther, the concordance of all creation in God's beneficence.⁹

The pax man enjoyed in Paradise was sundered by the fall, wherein man abused the freedom of his will by pridefully adopting ends which were not in accord with those of God.¹⁰ This identification of self as other-than-God, called superbia, enabled man in the freedom of his will to appropriate to himself God's creative nature and bring meaning to his worldly situation not in accord with the divine will.¹¹ Whenever

⁹De regis persona, cap. ii: "Pax enim populorum est, tutamen patriae, immunitas plebis, munimentum gentis, cura languorum, gaudium hominum, temperies aeris, serenitas maris, terrae foecunditas, solatium pauperum, hereditas filiorum, et sibimetipsi spes futurae beatitudinis." Hincmar here quotes Jonas' Capitula diversarum sententiarum, cap. xx, which in turn makes use of Pseudo-Cyprian. Henceforth, the term pax will be used to signify a world in accord with God's will and thus spiritualized by his mystical presence, rather than the narrower sense of "peace" as the absence of conflict.

¹⁰Mansi, XV, 565: "[Adam] autem diabolo invidenti quia illuc erat homo terrenus per debitam obedientiam ascensus, unde ipse cecidit per superbiam angelicus spiritus, et mendacia suadenti plus credens, quam voluntati conditoris sui obediens, abusus arbitrio libero deservit Deum, et desertus iuste a Deo peccavit ac cecidit, et per posse bonum vincere potuit velle malum."

¹¹M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 47: "Scimus tamen, quia sunt nonnulli, qui, dum plus sapere quam oportet sapere student, a proximorum pace resiliunt, dum eos velud ebetes stultosque contempnunt. . . ut quisquis habere sal sapientiae studet, cur et necesse est, quatinus a pace concordiae numquam recedat." De diversa et multiplici animae ratione, praef. (Sirmond, II, 104): "Et quia mens humana vicina est Deo, non autem quod Deus est hoc ipsa est, agit congruenter, . . ." Hincmar quotes Gregory in Opusculum LV. capitulorum, cap. xli (Sirmond, II, 537): "Cor quippe carnale, dum huius vitae gloriam quaerit, humilitatem respuit: Et plerumque ipse homo qui irascitur, discordantem sibi reconciliari appetit, sed ire ad satisfaciendum prior erubescit. Pensemus facta veritatis, ut videamus quo iaceant nostrae pravitatis actiones. Si enim membra summi capitis sumus, imitari eum cui connectimur debemus." "Erubescat ergo humana superbia, confundatur quisque si non satisfaciat prior proximo, quando post culpam nostram, ut ei reconciliari debeamus, . . ."

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man seeks to work for ends which are contrary to God's wishes. he plunges into darkness and he and his works are spiritually dead.¹² For this reason, positive action in the world is a direct function of man's spiritual state.¹³ This being the case, the active participation of the sacerdotal office in political life is essential, for the reformation of the Ecclesia (the entire respublica christiana) is contingent upon the accord of spiritual and worldly action. Just as in the monastery, the whole of society must be restored to an utopian condition approximating that of Paradise.¹⁴

As long as discordia existed, this reform effort had to be carried on within an explicit structure of law and authority expressing in worldly terms the norms of proper conduct. Although men might be naturally equal, the fact that they had sinned led to the loss of their freedom.¹⁵ Not only

¹²De cavendis vitiis, cap. vi: "Sicut mors exterior ab anima dividit carnem, ita mors interior a Deo separat animam. Umbra ergo mortis est obscuritas divisionis, quia damnatus quisque, cum aeterno igne succenditur, ab interno lumine tenebratur." The Freudian implications here are interesting.

¹³De divortio Lotharii, praef.: "Et 'si oculus'—id est intentio cordis—'simplex fuerit, totum corpus'—id est omnis actio—'lucenda erit; si autem ipsa intentio tenebrosa fuerit, iam tenebrae, quae in actione erunt, ut modum, ita et nomen tenebrarum pene excedunt."

¹⁴De ecclesiis et capellis (ed. Gundlach, p. 107): "Si autem ecclesia vetusta aut destructa ita in pristinum statum restaurari vel emeliorari non potest, ut consecratione non indigeat, videtur nobis. . .ut propinquissimus et conveniens locus obtinendus sit ab episcopo, ubi ita ecclesia a novo fieri possit, ut ibidem nullum sit corpus humatum, et ita consecrari valeat (like a bride for the groom—Christ)."

¹⁵Opusculum LV. capitulorum, cap. xiv: "Liquet, inquit beatus Gregorius, quod omnes homines natura aequales genuit, sed variante meritorum ordine, alios aliis culpa postponit. Ip-

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did this mean the subjection of one man to another, but of all men to law.¹⁶ For example, Hincmar observed that only through a reverent observance of regulations could the tranquility of universal peace be assured.¹⁷ However, this was no deadening authoritarianism, for, just as in the monastic context, submission to the discipline of authority brought one strength and freedom.

The authority structure imposed on man had the function of a correctio—to direct each person toward union and concord with God.¹⁸ The nature of authority had to take into consideration the nature of man himself if its action was to be efficacious, that is, it had to correct man both spiritually and temporally.¹⁹ Hincmar built upon a theory long devel-

sa autem diversitas, quae accessit ex vitio, divino iudicio dispensatur, ut quia omnis homo aequae stare non valet, alter regatur ab altero."

¹⁶Pro ecclesiae libertatum (Sirmond, II, 332): "quia homines omnium gentium, etiam et Iudaei Christianae legis inimici, passim legum suarum iudicantur iudicio, bubulcus, quoque, et subulcus, atque opilio, habent legem" De ordine palatii, cap. viii: "Cum enim dicitur nulli liceat leges nescire vel quae sunt statuta contemnere, nulla persona, in quocunque ordine mundano, excipitur, quae hac sententia non constringatur!"

¹⁷De iure metropolitanorum, cap. viii: "Quoniam universae pacis tranquillitas non aliter poterit custodiri, nisi sua canonibus reverentia intemerata servetur."

¹⁸De divortio Lotharii, inter. xii, resp.: "Reges enim et sacerdotes subditorum prave acta corrigunt. . . ." In De regis persona, cap. xxv, Hincmar quotes Pseudo-Cyprian: "Regem correctorem iniquorum esse oportet, . . ." "Undecimus gradus abusio est plebs sine disciplina, quae dum disciplinae exercitationibus non servit, Deum absque disciplinae rigore non evadit."

¹⁹Mansi, XV, 565: God made man "in animam viventem, id est factam animam rationalem, factam carnem vivificantem, atque in duabus, et ex duabus, scilicet spiritus ac luti, substantiis in unitate personae subsistentem. . . ."

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oping within Christianity stating that when Christ came into the world he was both king and priest over the community of believers—the Ecclesia. But when He ascended into Heaven, He distributed this rule between two offices, priestly authority and royal power.²⁰ Both the priest and the king formed ordines to fulfill distinct offices which accorded with the nature of their participation in God's grace.²¹ Thus each had a distinct mode of action. While the priestly authority worked to save souls by actio spiritalis, the power in the hands of laymen accomplished the same task through actio carnalis.²² A careful consideration of this distinction between worldly and spiritual action helps clarify what Hincmar felt to be the difference between auctoritas and potestas, and

²⁰ Epistola synodi Carisiacensis, cap. xv: "quia idem Deus in carne veniens, qui solus rex fieri potuit et sacerdos, et in caelum ascendens suum regnum, id est ecclesiam, inter pontificalem auctoritatem et regiam potestatem gubernandum disposuit. . . ." The term Ecclesia will henceforth be used to distinguish Christ's kingdom as a unified entity bound by the divine love from "Church" in the narrower sense of the organized body of all Christians in the world.

²¹ Admonitio altera, cap. i: "duo sunt, quibus principaliter, una cum specialiter cuiuscumque curae subiectis, mundus hic regitur, auctoritas sacra pontificum, et regalis potestas, in quibus personis, sicut ordine sunt divisa vocabula, ita sunt divisa in unoquoque ordine ac professione ordinationum officia. Quamvis enim membra veri regis atque pontificis secundum participationem naturae, magnifice utrumque in sacra generositate sumpsisse dicantur, . . ." Hincmar here makes use of Gelasius' eighth letter to the Emperor Anastasius and Tractatus, IV, ii.

²² Ibid., "sic actionibus propriis, dignitatibusque distinctis officia potestatis utriusque discrevit, suos volens medicinali humilitate salvare, non humana superbia rursus, . . . intercipi. . . quatenus spiritalis actio a carnalibus distaret incursibus. . . ." The idea of the distinction of actions is taken from Gelasius' Tractatus, IV, ii.

hence, key elements in his idea of office.²³

By working through spiritual action, the priestly order became the mediators of God's grace. Their concern was less the real possibilities inherent in man's situation in the world than the will of God. For this reason, they spoke with God's authority, inviting men to transcend their worldly situation.²⁴ In this manner, the efforts to reform the church by freeing it from worldly responsibility meant a more acute appreciation of the need to prevent a dilution of Christian ideals through accommodation with the attitudes of men preoccupied solely with worldly concerns.²⁵ This does not mean, however, a desire to escape worldly burdens, but on the contrary, the recognition that mundane action is fruitless if not intimately related to man's ultimate ends. Good works, Hincmar observed, mean little if they are not undertaken in a spirit of caritas.²⁶ Also, should man seek justification in

²³ Hincmar seeks to avoid the dualist implications of the Gelasian theory by attributing to both worldly and spiritual action the end of saving souls. The bishop and the king thus do not have distinct purposes, but rather, each has its own way to achieve a common end.

²⁴ Ad clericos palatii (M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 67): "et ad suos episcopos, qui eos corrigant atque diiudicent, divina auctoritate redire mandabo."

²⁵ Admonitio altera, cap. 1: "et ideo militans Deo minime se negotiis saecularibus implicaret, ac vicissim non ille rebus divinis praesidere videretur qui esset negotiis saecularibus implicatus, ut et modestia utriusque ordinis curaretur, ne extolleretur utroque suffultus, et competens qualitatibus actionum specialiter professio aptaretur."

²⁶ Opusculum LV. capitulorum, cap. xxxix: "quia quaelibet in nobis bona opera fuerint, si caritas desit, per malum discordiae locus aperitur in acie, ut ad feriendum nos valeat hostis intrare."

terms of the world rather than in love of God, his virtues count as nothing.²⁷ Because the bishops directed their admonitions toward a transcendence of the situation in which man found himself, their office can be described as positive in its effect. Hincmar, in fact, looked to the episcopal order as the most appropriate source for the renovatio which would restore the conditions of life in an approximation of those existing in the primitive Church of Paradise.²⁸

The potestas of secular rulers is distinguished from priestly auctoritas by its use of worldly means rather than spiritual action. When Hincmar observed that subjection to the king was necessary for one's salvation, he undoubtedly recognized that there had to be someone who defined the limits and obligations of the subjects action in the world.²⁹ He did not even exclude himself from the obligation to obey his king, for he recognized that all power is derived from God.³⁰

²⁷ Ibid., cap. liv: "Attendendum est etiam, quae nobis verecundia tunc erit in conspectu totius humani generis, omniumque virtutum caelestium confundi, et post confusionem quae nos poena sequetur, cum animam immortaliter morientem reatus involuet, et indeficienter deficientem carnem gehenna consumet, si radices cordis huic saeculo perseveranter infixas habuerimus. . . ."

²⁸ See note 14 above. Thus Hincmar envisaged a radical transformation of society by the united action of worldly discipline and spiritual admonition—a transformed world where there would be no social distinctions, no government authority, no war, and no exploitation of one man by another.

²⁹ Hincmar wrote to Pope Hadrian (Sirmond, II, 696): "quia non nos concedemus, ut aliter ad regnum Dei pervenire non possimus, si illum, quem ipse commendat, terrenum regem non habuerimus." Note that the king's means are worldly, but the effect of his action is spiritual.

³⁰ De ecclesiis et capellis (ed. Gundlach, p. 93):

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The king participated in the work of renovatio, but in a way which was distinct from spiritual action. It was his task to restore the honor and peace of the realm and church, and, as the context of Hincmar's statement indicates, the reign of Louis the Pious was to serve as a model.³¹

Hincmar makes the distinction between the spiritual action of episcopal office and the worldly action of the political ministerium yet clearer when he describes their objectives. The bishop, wielding the doctor's scalpel, heals by severing the diseased member from the healthy, while the king punishes the evil-doer with the sword of justice.³² While both offices contribute to the task of spiritual renewal by the negative means of punishing those who fail to meet their obligations, it is only through grace that the Christian is able to find justification before God. It is the bishop's and the king's task to encourage all men to turn toward this gift of grace which pervades society and is open to all men.

"faciam, quod iubetis, sciens ab apostolo commendatum, ut 'omnis anima (id est omnis homo) potestatibus sublimioribus subdita sit; non est enim potestas nisi a Deo.' Et iterum dicit: 'Subiecti estote omni humanae creaturae propter Deum sive regi tamquam praecellenti.'"

³¹De ordine palatii, cap. i: "ad institutionem istius iuvenis et moderni regis nostri, et ad reerectionem honoris et pacis Ecclesiae ac regni, ordinem ecclesiasticum et dispositionem domus regiae in sacro palatio, sicut audiui et vidi, demonstrum. . . ." Hincmar was born in circa 806 and came into contact with the center of Carolingian government at about the time Louis inherited the throne. Before 814, it is unlikely that Hincmar either saw or heard much of court activity.

³²De divortio Lotharii, quaes.vii: "episcopus medicinali mucrone, ut membrum putridum a sanis abscidere, et rex iudiciali gladio impios debet de terra perdere. . . ."

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It had long been realized that the positive character of the sacerdotal order gave it a more important responsibility and that the secular powers had not only to honor the spiritual, but obey it when political action impinged on matters of Christian responsibility. Hincmar evoked the Gelasian theory to point out that the bishops were ultimately held responsible for man's temporal activity and thus their authority in the world was the greater.³³ He also reinforced this priestly superiority by noting that it was the bishops who consecrated kings and not visa versa.³⁴ It should be noted that neither here nor anywhere else does Hincmar try to suggest that saving grace flows through the sacerdotal office alone and that this is the basis of priestly superiority.

Rather than hold a modern view of the division between church and state, the Carolingians maintained the objectives of the priestly and temporal order to be the same—the salvation of man. But no discussion of episcopal or political offices can disregard the sharp distinction which characterized the means by which the two orders strove to achieve their common end. The bishops, through the spiritual action of moral admonition strove to revive the body of the Ecclesia to make it

³³De fide Carlo servanda, cap. xxxix: "auctoritas sacra pontificum, et regalis potestas: in quibus tanto gravior pondus est sacerdotum, quanto etiam pro ipsis regibus hominum in divino reddituri sunt examine rationem."

³⁴In writing to Louis III in regard to the freedom of episcopal election, Hincmar noted (Sirmond, II, 198): "Et pontifices reges ordinare possunt, reges autem pontifices consecrare non possunt." "Non ergo dubueratis ita inverecunde qualicumque pontifici scribere, vestrae ditioni commissum."

worthy of the consecration of the Lord's second coming. The kings, on the other hand, sought to define the worldly situation in which their subjects worked for their salvation, emphasizing the disciplinary nature of government and enforcing the authority structure. These two themes—the effort to specify, strengthen, and elaborate man's worldly situation and the desire to transcend temporal concerns in favor of spiritual rebirth—were the central attitudes forming Hincmar's idea of public office.

It is well to recall the essentially Benedictine nature of Hincmar's ideas. Both king and bishop wield unquestioned authority over their respective spheres of responsibility, imposing a discipline necessary for worldly order. However, this discipline becomes the agency of spiritual rebirth, and as such it necessitates a total reconstruction of public life toward an utopian ideal in which law and authority would be superfluous. The means (discipline) and end (freedom) are not not isolated from one another, however, for both are united by an all-pervading caritas. Unlike Augustine's Civitas Dei, the utopia for which Hincmar strove was not inimical to the world.

CHAPTER III

THE EPISCOPAL OFFICE

Among the various church offices, only the episcopal proves especially relevant to a study of political ministerium. The two dignities within the sacerdotal order were the bishop and the minor office of priest.¹ Various members of the sacerdotal order were in common the healers of souls.² The priests, however, played a minimal role in political life. Directly subject to the bishops, they were generally restricted to fulfilling their sacramental functions and had neither the education nor the opportunity to speak out in any significant way.³ The monastic order could also find ample prece-

¹Admonitio altera, cap. iv: "Iesum Christum, qui. . . duos in sacerdotibus ordines constituit, in summis videlicet pontificibus, et in minoris ordines sacerdotibus, qui nunc presbyteratus funduntur officio. . . ." The word ordo has a variety of meanings and can only be understood in context. Not only does it refer to a mode of life (as that of laymen or churchmen), but also the differentiations of rank within the major social divisions and even the duties associated with a specific office. See Niermeyer, Mediae latinitatis lexicon minus (Leiden, 1960-), pp. 745-47.

²Ad presbyteros (M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 60): "Sicut vobis saepe dixi, sacerdotes medici sunt spiritales et infirmi homines sunt peccatores.

³It seems clear, in light of the palace's importance for the continuity of Carolingian political life and of the reform party's concern for the palace clerks' manner of life, that there was a profound connection between the activities of these clerks and the growing constitutional instability under Louis the Pious and Charles the Bald. However, a study of

dent for taking an active role in political life, especially as royal advisors. But Hincmar, in approving the reforms seeking the enforcement of the Benedictine Rule, felt that the sphere of monastic activity should not extend beyond the cloister. If for some reason the monk was compelled to assume the office of teaching in the broader world, it was to be largely by setting an example of virtue.⁴

The office of teaching was the particular responsibility of bishops, who had neither the practical restrictions of priests nor the theoretical hindrances of monks to prevent their engagement in worldly activity. Certain ideas, long important for the definition of the episcopal ministerium, were ever more extended to the idea of political office in the ninth century. The belief that the personal character of the priest or bishop was irrelevant to the efficacy of his official functions was of importance.⁵ This careful distinction between the person who filled an office and the office itself

this phenomenon is excluded from this study because it does not impinge directly on the idea of political office.

⁴De una et non trina deitate, cap. 1: "Debent ergo fratres ac filii nostri monachi, viri religiosi, attendere professionis suae regulam, in qua scriptum est, Octavus humilitatis gradus est, si nihil agat monachus, nisi quod communis monasterii regula, vel maiorum cohortantur exempla: et, Nonus humilitatis gradus est, si linguam ad loquendum prohibeat monachus, et taciturnitatem habens, usque ad interrogationem non loquatur. Si autem necessitas docendi parochiam exegerit ut per sacerdotes monachos verbum fiat ad populum, episcopus et sanitatem sensus, et catholicam fidem, . . . in eis probare debet, et sic ad doctrinae officium provocare.

⁵Ad presbyteros (M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 60): "Et licet nos peccatores simus, tamen dignatione Dei officium sanandi peccatores suscepimus: sicut saepe medici corpore infirmi per magisterium medicinae infirmos solent sanare."

was the central idea behind the objectification of political office arising from the reforms of Louis the Pious. If a bishop acted improperly, specific charges were to be brought against his person in such a way that the episcopal authority itself remained intact.⁶

Another traditional idea associated with church offices, exercising an important influence on political theory, was that proper conduct within office is objectively defined. Hincmar warned his fellow bishops to observe the specifications in divinely inspired laws which indicated how to live and what to teach. A violation of this definition of their office meant endangering the unity of the Ecclesia.⁷ Hincmar saw this as a schism within the church, for offices were the objective manifestation of worldly conduct in accord with God's will. To ignore the definition of one's ministerium would have been to resist God's peace by acting at variance with the

⁶ De praedestinatione, cap. xxxvi: "quod utrumque observare valebit, qui tempus, locum, personam, causamque secundum rationem discreverit, quicumque talia, sicut catholicorum doctrina redarguentes supra ostendimus, contra rectam fidem scripsit, contra episcopalem auctoritatem tanta praesumpsit, de principali dignitate indigna significavit. . . ."

⁷ De ordine palatii, cap. vii: "Habet quippe ordo sacerdotalis leges divinitus promulgatas, qualiter quisque ad culmen regiminis, videlicet episcopatus, venire debeat, atque ad hec recte perveniens, qualiter vivat, . . . et recte docens. . . ." "Quia non minus in sanctarum traditionum delinquitur sanctiones quam in ipsius Domini iniuriam presilitur. Qued tale est, quia, ut sacra monstrat auctoritas, cognata sunt schisma et heresis, ac, si aliis verbis dicatur, non minus schismaticus delinquit, cum prevaricatione sanctarum regularum per contemptum se ab unitate sanctae Ecclesiae, quae corpus Christi est, dividit, quam haereticus, qui de Deo, capite videlicet ipsius Ecclesiae, male sentit."

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concordia of all offices.⁸

One of the terms often used by Hincmar to describe the episcopal office is pastor. Although the implications of this word are important for an understanding of the office, its use is neither original with Hincmar nor even restricted to the sacerdotal order. Unlike the true pastor, the paid helper abandons the flock at the wolf's approach and places his own welfare above that of the sheep.⁹ Another use of the shepherd analogy is Hincmar's observation that one who attains the pastoral office by climbing the fence into the sheepfold instead of entering by the door of canonical election reflects a greedy lust for domination rather than a desire to follow the responsibilities of the pastoral office.¹⁰

The implication of this analogy seems to be the necessity of humbling one's own personal interest to the objective responsibilities of office—to shun the superbia which

⁸Opusculum LV. capitulorum, cap. xii: "Hinc etenim pax et charitas mutuo se invicem complectuntur, et manet firma concordia in alterna et Deo placita dilectione sinceritas, quia unumquodque tunc salubriter completur officium, cum fuerit unus ad quem possit recurri praepositus." Hincmar here is quoting Gregory's letter to the bishops of Gaul.

⁹Examples of the contrast between pastor and mercenary are found in De fide Carlo servanda, cap. viii and De concercendis militum rapinis (M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 63).

¹⁰De praedestinatione, cap. xxxvi: "Ergo qui contra sacros canones, Spiritu Dei per organa sua conditos, et totius mundi reverentia consecratos, ad Ecclesiae regimen provehitur, non intrat per ostium in ovile, sed ascendit aliunde, ac per hoc fur est et latro." "A se namque et non ex arbitrio summi rectoris regnant, qui sua cupiditate accensi culmen reginimis rapiunt potius quam adsequuntur."

introduces discord. Not only should the bishop not place selfish interests above his objective obligations, but equally important, he ought not to use his office as a means for exercising his personal potestas.¹¹ This is a useful reminder that potestas can refer to the worldly power of bishops, which, however subject to spiritual responsibilities, remains very real.

Hincmar observed that all having a responsibility for correcting others, and not simply bishops, priests, deacons, and rectors of monasteries, should be called pastors. In fact, there is no one who really leads a private life, for all men have responsibility at least for their own thoughts and deeds—their "spiritual sheep."¹² Hence, everyone has an objective office comparable to that of pastor since he corrects either himself or others in accordance with objective norms.¹³

¹¹Ad presbyteros (M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 62): "non mea potestate secundum hominem, sed secundum divinum ministerium, illum excommunicabo."

¹²De cavendis vitiis, cap. v: "Non enim soli pastores, episcopi, presbyteri, et diaconi, monasteriorum rectores sunt intelligendi, sed et omnes fideles qui vel parvulae suae domus custodiam gerunt pastores recte vocantur, in quantum suae domui sollicita vigilantia praesunt. Et quicumque saltem uni vel duobus fratribus cotidiano regimine praest, pastoris eisdem debet officium quia in quantum sufficit, pascere eos dapibus, et hortando, increpando, arguendo, corrigendo debet. Imo unusquisque, qui etiam privatus vivere creditur, pastoris officium tenet, et spiritalem pascit gregem, vigiliasque noctis custodit supra illum. . . ." Hincmar specifies "spiritual sheep" in De raptu viduarum, cap. iii: "non solum episcopi et sacerdotes in sedibus, sed etiam reges in regnis et palatiis suis, et regum comites in civitatibus suis, et comitum vicarii in plebibus suis, et quicumque patresfamilias in domibus suis, in unum dives ac pauper, in mente et actibus suis."

¹³The universal subjection of all men to law, discussed

The implications of this attitude are manifold. An imposition of objective norms on the definition of office assures the integration of Christian ends and values with any carrying out of public responsibilities. If taken seriously, it would provide a dynamism to structures of public authority. The idea was not new to ninth-century political thought, but by making the idea of ministerium universal, Hincmar was suggesting a radically new concept of mankind. In his view, no longer should anyone consider himself a private person, for each has objective responsibilities. Even the serf, wont to act as though bound by nothing outside the customary demands of his lord, now was to take cognizance of his spiritual responsibilities, to share in the distributive authority of society, and thus find himself socially integrated into the Christian commonwealth.

Unlike the term pastor which emphasizes the relationship of the bishop's person to his office, the implications of rector ecclesiae suggest the office's objective responsibilities. In the Carolingian epoch, laymen were at times rectors of the palace or even rectors over the material interests of monasteries. Abbots, too, were considered rectors.¹⁴ For Hincmar, however, the term was most often applied to indicate the doctrinal responsibilities of bishops.¹⁵ Even though

in a later chapter, provides the objective definition of the situation in which all men work for their salvation. The definition of office is simply the legal aspect of action in office.

¹⁴See Niermeyer, op.cit., pp. 892-93, and also the preceding note. De una et non trina deitate, cap. i: "monasteriorum rectores, qui vocantur abbates. . . ."

the king might order a bishop to define doctrine, nevertheless, the task was done as a function of the episcopal office.¹⁶ The bishop's role as rector gives little indication of the nature of his ministerium except that it represents a responsibility to correct others in conformity with their Christian duty. The distinction between the terms pastor and rector is that the former defines the relationship of the office to the field of caritas, while the latter implies inner-worldly authority. The bishop's pastoral responsibility is positive in that it seeks to unite those under his care with Christ, while his task as rector is negative and disciplinary.

When Hincmar spoke of his office as that of doctor, he attributed to it characteristics which brought it into immediate relation to political life. To teach and admonish were duties done in Christ's name and represented a fundamental responsibility and power of the episcopal office.¹⁷ In one way teaching resembled a sacrament, for it facilitated the saving action of grace. Hincmar felt that God spoke not only

¹⁵For example, as in De praedestinatione, cap. xxxi: "Sunt et alia, quae vocum novitatibus delectantes, unde sibi inanes comparent rumusculos, contra fidei catholicae veritatem dicunt." "Et plura alia, contra quae orthodoxos Ecclesiae catholicae rectores necesse erit sollerti studio vigilare."

¹⁶Ibid., Epistola ad regem: "Nunc vero, quia certi sumus, cuius compositioni debemus de saepenominatis quaestionibus respondere, servatis relationum absolutionibus contra eos quibus a vestra dominatione pro imposito nobis ministerio iusi sumus reddere rationem. . . ."

¹⁷Ad clericos palatii (M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 66): "Tamen pro ministerio imposito admoneo vos cum Paulo apostolo, et obtestor in Christo et per Christum. . . ."

directly to men's hearts, but also through the admonitions of the bishop into their ears.¹⁸

The subject matter of episcopal teaching was for Hincmar usually either moral admonition or the interpretation of divine law. Bishops should indicate to everyone just what is anathema, and if necessary, undertake to collect the law and pronounce upon it.¹⁹ But this legal competency of the episcopal order had implications extending beyond sacred law alone, for public law should conform to the divine.²⁰ Since the bishops themselves were obliged to make their admonitions conform to Scripture, the fulfillment of the office of doctor entailed a constant effort to bring temporal law into conformity with God's will.²¹ Thus the positive tendency of the sacerdotal auctoritas to bring the world into accord with non-temporal ideals was realized in the episcopal office of doctor. Late in life Hincmar seriously qualified these views, but this change had best be treated in the Praxis section of the present work.

¹⁸Ad presbyteros (M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 62): "Deus omnipotens, qui per me ista loquitur in auribus vestris, per se haec loquatur in cordibus vestris."

¹⁹Collectio de raptoribus, admonitio: "Episcopus autem omnibus dicere debet, quid sit anathema. . . ." "Sed et plura, si necesse fuerit, episcopus quisque colligere et dicere procurabit."

²⁰De raptu viduarum, cap. xii: "Quamquam in regno Christiano etiam ipsas leges publicas oporteat esse Christianas, convenientes videlicet et consonantes Christianitati."

²¹De una et non trina deitate, cap. i: "caveamus qui alios corrigere et docere debemus, ut non sacrilege sacras scripturas interpretemur. . . ."

The bishop's obligation to speak out and admonish was hardly a new attribute of the episcopal office, but Hincmar firmly insisted upon the fulfillment of this duty. His episcopal authority entailed dictating to kings their religious duty and the tenets of the faith.²² But it was also the ruler's obligation to listen to such admonitions, although Hincmar seems to have had difficulty securing the king's attention during his later years.²³ If indeed the bishop truly acted as doctor and the king dutifully obeyed the episcopal admonitions, then the way was open for a highly dynamic and constructive interaction of the royal and episcopal offices. The implications of the bishop's doctoral role in political life become clearer when viewed in light of the close tie between spiritual action and the power of reason.

The human being is composed of a hierarchy of elements

²²De divortio Lotharii, quaest. vii: "Tandem de his, quae in hac epistola pervenisse ad nos memoravimus, quantum Domino inspirante, ex sanctarum scripturarum atque catholicorum patrum doctrina, pro nostra mediocritate sensimus, compellente veritate et superimposito ministerio diximus, nullius sanae praeiudicantes sententiae, nec dehonores auctoritatem." De praedestinatione, cap. xxxvii: "De hoc autem unde certi sumus, et quae sine periculo licet multis sint cognita tegere silentio non valemus, quaeque pro ministerio nobis imposito his quae praemisimus subiungere ex auctoritate ecclesiastica commonemur, opportune importune volentibus et nolentibus ingerere procuramus."

²³De divortio Lotharii, quaest. vii, resp.: "Sed neque imperiale est libertatem dicendi negare, neque sacerdotale quod sentias non dicere." De visione Bernoldi (Sirmond, II, 806): "Et vidi ibi iacere domnum nostrum Karolum regem in luto ex sanie ipsius putredinis, et manducabant eum vermes, et iam carnem illius manducatam habebant, et non erat in corpore ipsius aliud nisi nervi et ossa. Qui vocans me ex nomine meo dixit. . . . Vade ad Hincmarum Episcopum, et dic ei, quia illius et aliorum fidelium meorum bona consilia non obaudi, ideo ista quae vides, pro culpis meis susteneo."

wherein the heart rules the "rational spirit" and the spirit in turn rules man's body—his actions, thoughts, words, and deeds.²⁴ In an effort to achieve union with God, each element of man's nature strives to obtain the perfection of the characteristic which it shares with God: his heart becomes filled with God's love; his spirit, with a faith in God's truth; and his action, with His goodness.²⁵ Justification requires the union of all three aspects of human nature with God, for should one of these remain discordant, the others accomplish nothing.²⁶ Each element has the help of outside forces which

²⁴De divortio Lotharii, inter. xiii, resp.: "quia victa anima a libidine carnis sit caro, sicut et corpus recte gubernatum spiritale appellatur. Animus tamen est, qui aut victus inlecebris totum hominem carneum facit, aut in vigore naturae suae manens, carni praestat ut spiritalis dicatur." Ibid., praef.: "Et 'si oculus'—id est intentio cordis—'simplex fuerit, totum corpus'—id est omnis actio—'lucida erit;' si autem ipsa intentio tenebrosa fuerit, iam tenebrae, quia in actione erunt, ut modum, ita et nomen tenebrarum pene excedunt." Mansi, XV, 566: "et verus homo anima rationali et humana carne in unitate personae subsistens. . . ."

²⁵De una et non trina deitate, cap. xiii: "Ipsa autem visio intellectus est ille qui in anima est, adspectus animae ratio est." De praedestinatione, cap. xii: "sed operatione malorum; cuius operationis initium est infidelitas, scilicet desertio veritatis, sicut initium salutis fides esse dinoscitur donata gratia largitoris."

²⁶Ibid., cap. xxxiii: "et quicumque credere voluerunt, ac fidei congruis operibus vivere studuerunt, per passionis eius mysterium redempti atque salvati sunt: qui autem credere noluerunt, neque fide dignis operibus vivere studuerunt, ipsi se. . . a redemptione proposita alienos fecerunt." De una et non trina deitate, cap. xiii: "Et haec est vere perfecta virtus, ratio perveniens ad finem suum, quam beata vita consequitur." Explanatio in ferculum Salomonis (Sirmond, I, 767): "Sique monstratur a Domino, quia quod bonum volumus, cogitamus, loquimur et agimur, et Dei est per praeventem gratiam, et nostrum est per liberi arbitrii subsequentem obedientiam." "Quia scientia sine caritate inflat, caritas autem cum scientia sana aedificat."

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aid it in directing itself toward God. God's grace fills man's heart with love just as His Word illuminates the rational spirit with truth. These two aids to salvation work through spiritual action, but the third, discipline, corrects man's thoughts, words, and deeds through worldly action. A concordia within the psyche thus requires the outside aid of not only grace, but also of the discipline of worldly authority and the priest's appeal to the rational power by moral admonition. Clearly, both the king and the bishop must make their actions accord with God's will, for otherwise, the subject will be mentally disturbed and his actions fruitless.

Having clarified the essential role of the word in the episcopal office, it follows that the chief task of the bishop was to provide the king with moral admonition, for the king was subject to no earthly discipline but law. Even the king's correctio of his subjects, however, was not entirely independent of episcopal cooperation, for if law—the objective criteria of normative action—was to be an effective instrument of correction, then it should accord with the divine will. The king is thus obliged to consult the bishops as to the conformity of his acts.²⁷ Important in understanding the full impact of the episcopal office on royal action is Hincmar's belief that the efficacy of the king's acts and intellect are a function of the state of his soul.²⁸ The advisory

²⁷De regis persona, praef.: "Obaudientes praeceptum Domini per prophetam iubentis, 'Interroga sacerdotes legem meam,' super quibusdam capitulis me consulere vobis placuit."

²⁸This is because of the effectiveness of action and

role of the bishop is essential to political office, for the king receives caritas through the word, his actions are brought into concordia with the divine will, and his rule thus participates in God's pax.²⁹

The superiority of the episcopal office over the royal stems from man's ultimate judgment in Heaven as well as from the primacy of the soul. In the daily activities of political life, however, this relationship between the two offices becomes more complex. Ideally, the accord between spiritual and worldly action excludes the possibility of conflict. Once the bishop has recognized the competence of the

thought and the intention of the heart are mutually interdependent. For example, in De cavendis vitiis, cap. iv: "Et effugium in dolore constringente, ad orationem atque sapientiam oculis aperientibus sapientia minime proderit, quia hic, ubi operari debuerunt et potuerunt, operandi tempus amiserunt, ubi a voluptate clausos cordis oculos habuerunt." De regis persona, cap. iv: "Quid enim prodest habere sapientiam, si consilium neget? Si consulendi intercludas copiam, claudisti fontem, ut nec aliis profluat, nec tibi prosit." Effectiveness of action ("modum" in the above quotation from De divortio Lotharii, praef.) is a function of the state of the heart. This train of thought will not be pursued in the present study, although relevant to the episcopal office, because it concerns the king's person rather than his office.

²⁹Epistola synodi Carisiacensis, cap. ii: "quia non nostra scripsimus, mandavimus, diximus, sed quae dictante caritate, quae Deus est, in litteris sacris invenimus, et quae naturae insita recognoscimus. Caeterum quae contra illa, quae scripsimus, mandavimus, diximus, acta sunt vel aguntur, naturalis legis morbus et vitium etiam a minus sapientibus esse dinoscitur." De cavendis vitiis, cap. xii: "Sed quia, nisi sit intus qui doceat, doctoris lingua exterius in vacuum laborat, obsecranda est nobis divina clementia, ut quod per nos lequitur in auribus vestris, per sancti Spiritus organum infundat cordibus vestris. . . ." Hincmar wrote in the acts of the Synodus Mettensis, a. 859, cap. i: "divinus Paulus dicit: 'Legatione fungimur pro Christo, reconciliamini Deo,' legatione pro Christo fungentes vos, fratres carissimi, legatos Deo amatae pacis. . . ."

king—the concordance of his acts with the divine will—then the priestly authority willingly submits to royal power.³⁰ There are limits, however, for the extent to which political action should interfere in ecclesiastical matters, and the cooperation of the two offices does not imply an identity or fusion of the means at their disposal. Here, the definition of royal office and the restrictions of divine law specify how much the king can involve himself in church matters without hindering its spiritual action.³¹

In the ninth century, the most sensitive areas regarding episcopal liberty were the absence of free episcopal election and the subjection of church property and offices to secular interests. Hincmar emphasized that the outcome of episcopal election was an expression of the divine will. The king, therefore, should not capriciously hinder the operation of the bishop's spiritual action.³² Moreover, in regard to the entangling responsibilities of feudal obligation, Hincmar

³⁰De ecclesiis et capellis, praef.: "Et quoniam vestra regia a Deo constituta sublimitas sacerdotali religioni et cordis et corporis cervices devote inclinatur, competens esse dinoscitur, ut et pontificalis auctoritas regiae dignitati cum omni pietatis officio se submittat. . . ."

³¹Hincmar writing Charles the Bald noted (Sirmond, II, 331): "solerter providere debetis, ne extra ministerium vestrum, sicut Deo gratias hactenus providistis, manum in sacerdotalem ordinem, et in his quae eidem ordine Spiritus sancti dono commissa sunt, contra praeceptum Domini extendatur."

³²In the context of the freedom of episcopal election, Hincmar observed (Ad Ludovicum III regem, cap. v): "Et quoniam sine sancto spiritu ministerium episcopale non agitur, non sit vobis leve in episcopis contristare spiritum sanctum"

insisted that the bishop's tongue was an instrument of salvation, and as such, unbound by worldly oaths.³³

The liberty of spiritual action characterizing the episcopal office had important implications for constitutional history. The royal competence extended no further than the king's realm, and with the multiplicity of kingdoms within the Ecclesia, there naturally arose questions which could not be handled by unilateral royal action. The unity of the Ecclesia was essentially spiritual, and should disagreements arise which the monarchs could not amicably settle among themselves, it was incumbent upon the bishops, the wielders of spiritual authority, to take a leading role.³⁴ In 858, for example, Louis the German attempted to force a restoration of a unified political rule by military means. He had nearly fulfilled this ambition and was awaiting the crown confirming his newly won position when Hincmar, in the name of the West

³³ Epistola synodi Carisiacensis, cap. xv: "Et nos episcopi Domino consecrati non sumus huiusmodi homines, ut sicut homines saeculares, in vassallatico debeamus nos cui-libet commendare. . . aut iurationis sacramentum. . . debeamus quoquomodo facere." "Et lingua episcopi, quae facta est per Dei gratiam clavis caeli, nefarium est, ut, sicut saecularis quilibet, super sacra iuret in nomine Domini et sanctorum invocatione, nisi forte, quod absit, contra eum scandalum acciderit ecclesiae suae. . . ."

³⁴ De raptu viduarum, cap. i: "Quamvis enim potestas regni temporalis divino iudicio in hoc Christianorum regno ad praesens videatur divisa, una est tamen in omnibus et ex omnibus Christo Domino protegente ecclesia, unus Dominus, una fides, unum genus electum. . . ." "Cum ergo omnis populus Dei, tanto pretio redemptus et adunatus, unus grex sit sub uno pastore, et omnes huius gregis pastores per unitatem fidei, . . . tanta necesse est sint caritate uniti, tanta spiritus societate copulati, ut invicem onera sua libentissime compartiantur et portent. . . ."

Frankish bishops, warned him that royal deposition was a matter decided upon only by God's will as discovered in a church council.³⁵

Another area of direct involvement of the episcopal office in political life was the anointment of kings. Through episcopal unction the king received from Christ his nomen and thereby was obliged to act in a manner consonant with the Christian implications of his office and not as a private person.³⁶ Only the positive action inherent in the episcopal office could produce such a profound change in the royal status. And yet, Hincmar was not trying to assert the sacramental role of the episcopal laying on of hands as an explicit

³⁵Epistola synodi Carisiacensis, cap. xv: "Si enim sapientia vestra dignum iudicat loqui et tractare cum vicino rege eiusque fidelibus, secedente de ista parte regni domno nostro, fratre videlicet vestro, multo magnis nos oportet expectare tempus canonicum, et cum fratribus et comprovincialibus archiepiscopis et episcopis loquamur, quia generalis causa imminet totius cisalpinæ ecclesiæ." For these events and Hincmar's relation to them, see Joseph Calmette, La diplomatie carolingienne (Paris, 1901), pp. 191-94 et passim.

³⁶De divortio Lotharii, inter. xii, resp.: "Et non dicant reges, hoc de episcopis et non est de regibus constitutum: sed attendentes quia si sub uno rege ac sacerdote Christo, a cuius nominis derivatione Christi Domini appellantur, in populi regimine sublimati et honorati esse desiderant, cuius honore, et amore, atque timore, participatione magni nominis domini et reges vocantur, cum sint homines sicut et ceteri, et partem cum his in regno caelorum habere volunt, qui sacro peruncti sunt chrismate, quod a Christi nomine nomen accepit, qui exinde unxit sacerdotes, prophetas, reges, et martyres, ille unctus oleo laetitiae prae consoritiis suis, qui fecit eos in baptismate reges et sacerdotes Deo nostro, et genus regium, ac regale sacerdotium, secundum apostolos Ioannem et Petrum: intelligant et credant se in oculis Dei privari regii nominis et officii dignitate, quando si illud placitum Deo fuit quod manu firmaverant, faciunt contra manus suae conscriptionem, licet illud nomen usurpent ante oculos hominum terrena et instabili potestate. . . ."

check on royal power. Outside the field of writing coronation ordines, later to be discussed, he said very little about the participation of bishops in king-making, and it seems he believed the laying on of hands to be more or less a symbol of the royal assumption of an especial responsibility to God.³⁷ Hincmar spent far greater time and effort arguing for and carrying out what he felt to be the essential role of bishops in public life—the moral admonition of those holding political office.

This would seem to indicate a tacit de-emphasis of the spiritually unique position of the king, for the "magic" which the king receives from God comes to him in a manner similar to that accruing to any other officer and, in fact, to any other person. The truth of this hypothesis will become more fully evident when the theoretical implications of Hincmar's theory of political office are considered and then its application in Praxis.

³⁷ Hincmar wrote for Charles in the Capitula Pistensia, a. 862, cap. i: "Quia illum Spiritum sanctum, qui requievit super adiutorem in oportunitatibus, in tribulatione, Christum dominum nostrum, et quem per impositionem manus episcopalis in consignatione accepimus, contristatum malignis operibus a nobis effugavimus. . . ."

CHAPTER IV

HINCMAR'S IDEA OF POLITICAL OFFICE

The church reform party under Louis the Pious had advocated the objectification of royal office—that is, the parameters of office were to derive from objective law rather than personal interest. The church party suggested that the king's first responsibility was to God and, in particular, the carrying out of God's will for the Ecclesia. From the church's viewpoint, this theory of royal office was undoubtedly very attractive, and the bishops took care to develop further its various implications for political life. However, this Einheitspartei flew in the face of political reality, for however much the king might sincerely observe his Christian responsibilities, the basis of his power remained personal and little relevant to church ideals.

Although the bickering among Louis' sons provides only further proof of the essentially personal bonds which tied the magnates of the realm to whichever member of the royal family could promise the most honors, the result of their conflict so weakened the monarchy that its personal base of power began to give way. The implications of this collapse have already been discussed in regard to Charles the Bald's early years, and it was concluded that the understanding reached at Coulaines sought to establish a commonwealth in which the var-

ious orders of society participated for their mutual benefit. It would appear that this partially removed the prior contradiction between church political theory and the realities of political life. The way was open once again for an objective theory of kingship—one which insisted on the king's willingness to compromise his unilateral and personal control of political life.

Hincmar's theory of office in fact insisted on just such a denial of personal interest, at least as an end in itself. He felt the office holder should not seek to bend the will of God to his own human and fragile ends, for it would have been only self-frustrating and conducive to discordia.¹ Therefore, there was nothing worse in government than the ruler who forgets that his office serves God rather than himself. For a king to enter office in search of worldly benefit is nothing less than usurpation.² Such a greedy misuse of office is an expression of that superbia which in Paradise drew man's intentio away from union with God. For Hincmar, superbia was the key factor in political instability and

¹In a letter to Louis III, Hincmar wrote (Sirmond, II, 189): "Et non debetis inflexibilem Dei voluntatem, qui si mutat sententiam, non mutat consilium, ad humanam et fragilem voluntatem vestram velle inflectere, quod fieri non potest: sed vestram voluntatem Dei voluntati subdere. . . . Si enim a divina voluntate humana voluntas vestra perseveranter, quod non permittat Dominus, discordaverit. . . ."

²De divortio Lotharii, quaest. vii, resp.: "Quia nemo amplius delinquit in populis, quam qui perverse agens ordinem principatus usurpat." "Et ut honores et beneficia adulantibus tribuat, laudatur peccator in desideriis animae suae, et qui iniqua agit benedicatur, et mortuus a mortuis in morte pessima sepelitur. . . ."

and failure.³

Each office holder must enter into his responsibilities in full awareness that his privileged position is justified only by acting for God. He should grasp the entire implication of his office, both as to how he should act and for whom he acts.⁴ In other words, each officer is obliged to keep in mind the definition of his office lest it become perverted by improper ends and thus lead to his damnation.

The orientation of the officer's intentio toward God and a careful definition of the ministerium itself do not complete Hincmar's theory of office. In addition to these, de facto power acts as a disciplina for the correctio of man through worldly action.⁵ These three factors—real power, love, and objective definition of office—are necessary for

³Instructio ad Ludovico Balbum, cap. viii: "quia postquam radix omnium malorum cupiditas in regno isto exarsit, ut nullus aut pene nullus honorem aut aliquod bonum sine pretio posset acquirere, aut tenere, aut securitatem habere, pax et consilium, et iustitia, atque iudicium, sicut necesse fuerat, locum in isto regno non habuerunt." If the material advantages placed in the hands of the ruler serve personal greed, then there can be no peace, collaboration, or justice in the realm.

⁴De ordine palatii, cap. iii: "Sancta Scriptura in omni ordine et professione unicuique administratori praecipit, ut intellegat cuncta quae ait. Quoniam, si intellegit administratio quam gerit unde exordium caepit, sollicitius satagit, ut de administrationis talento sibi credito rationem redditurus." Writing to Charles the Bald (Sirmond, II, 331): "solerter providere debetis, ne extra ministerium vestrum . . . extendatis."

⁵The idea that government is a discipline to correct sinners is found in Jonas' Capitula diversarum sententiarum, cap. xiv, and repeated by Hincmar in De regis persona, cap. xviii: "Quia etiam disciplinam exercendo in improbos et perversos, non odii sui rancore, vel vindictae suae livore, sed amore iustitiae et divinae vindictae Christo serviat."

effective government.⁶ Clearly, the responsibilities of office engage man's whole being, for the intentio of the heart, the voluntas of the rational spirit, and bodily actio find corresponding political expression in the devotion of the ends of office to God, in the definition of office, and in the exercise of worldly potestas.

A discussion of Hincmar's idea of political office cannot avoid devoting much time to the office of king. Despite the ever dwindling power of ninth-century monarchs, the royal dignity continued to enjoy an important theoretical position.⁷ The bishops were concerned not only with the royal office, but also with the personal wisdom and forcefulness of the monarch, upon whom depended the stability and viability

⁶Ad Carolum III imperatorem, cap. v: "Et non solum regi, sed et omni qui in dominationis est potestate, tria necessario habere oportet, terrorem scilicet, ordinationem, et amorem. Nisi enim ametur Dominus, et metuatur, ordinatio illius constare minime poterit. Per beneficia ergo et affabilitatem procuret ut diligatur, et per iustam vindictam, non propriae iniuriae sed legis Dei, studeat ut metuatur. Et in his et aliis omnibus princeps semper Deum cogitet, et illi adhaereat: quia, nisi conditori suo pertinaciter adhaeserit, et ipse, et omnes qui ei consentiunt, cito deperient."

⁷The belief that political and military success and, in fact, even the fruitfulness of nature were profoundly affected by the virtue of the king had long been current. Hincmar in De regis persona, cap. ii, quoted Jonas' Capitula, which in turn quoted Pseudo-Cyprian: "[royal virtues] haec regni prosperitatem in praesenti faciunt, et regem ad caelestia regna meliora perducunt. Qui vero regnum non secundum hanc legem dispensat, multas nimirum adversitates imperii tolerabit. Idcirco enim pax saepe populorum rumpitur, et offendicula etiam de regno suscitantur, terrarum quoque fructus diminuuntur, et servitia populorum praepediuntur, multi et varii dolores prosperitatem regni inficiunt, . . . hostium incursus provincias undique vastant. . . ." However, this attitude is a carry-over from pre-Christian Irish paganism and perhaps is a poor indication of Carolingian mentality.

of the government.⁸ His leading position made him an example of moral virtue, encouraging a greater sense of responsibility in the lower orders.⁹

The king was to protect the church—an essential agency for the work of salvation. Because it was dependent upon material resources, the church looked to the monarch as defensor ecclesiae, thus obtaining the peaceful conditions necessary for its pastoral responsibilities.¹⁰ At times Hincmar sounds very much like Augustine, for it is the king's task to stand at the head of the church as defender of its constitution, so that "human peace"—even though less sweet than "divine peace"—be assured.¹¹ However, there is an important

⁸Divine help seems to have contributed in two ways to aid men achieve success in their office. Hincmar's acceptance of trial by water (see De iudio aquae frigidae) clearly entails divine action in history on the objective level. Yet, very important in the context of Hincmar's thought is his recognition that the Holy Spirit gives the officer psychological support, particularly through ensuring good Gestalt. A thorough discussion of this point lies outside the scope of this study. However, worth noting here is that Christ's peace provided mental stability and effectiveness. Hincmar noted in writing to his nephew (Migne, P.L., CXXVI, 562): "Et multis modis hac illac vadis fluctuando sicut arundo a vento agitata, videlicet animo fluctuante, quae nullius gravitatis pondere es stabilitus."

⁹Epistola synodi Carisiacensis, cap. xi: "Super quantos enim estis in regni culmine, tantorum moribus debetis servire et sicut lucerna super candelabrum in domo posita bonitatis exempla monstrare, quia omnium oculi in vos debent intendere."

¹⁰De fide Carlo servanda, cap. viii: "oves autem nobis commissae, quia sine pastore errabunt vel dispergentur, et facultates ecclesiasticae, quibus sustentari debent, velut relictæ sine custodibus, diripientur ac vastabuntur, si defuerit virtus principis, cuius potestate defendantur, vel custodes, qui pro ovibus et earum alimoniis principi et defensori ac tutori ecclesiae suggerant."

distinction between Augustine's idea of worldly peace and Hincmar's. For Augustine, as already noted, peace in this world had little value in itself and certainly was of an entirely different order than the true peace of the Civitas Dei. Hincmar was heir to a richer and more truly medieval concept, however, for he followed the Benedictine-Gregorian view that the peace of worldly political order and caritas dialectically interact to ensure human salvation.¹² Worldly peace is not only a precondition for the action of grace, it is the consequence of that grace.

Furthermore, Hincmar saw other important ways in which the royal office had a positive role in the work of salvation. As rector populi, the king provided the same discipline as did the abbot of a monastery, for to make a new man, all aspects of the person needed attention, even his physical actions. The nomen of the king implied his holding the office of rector, through which he corrected his subjects of their evil ways.¹³ Piety, the personal relation of the king

¹¹ Sirmond, II, 189: "regiam potestatem vobis non ad solum mundi regimen, sed maxime ad ecclesiae praesidium esse collatam, ut ausus nefarios comprimendo, et quae bene sunt statuta defendatis. . . ." De regis persona, cap. x: "Si autem pax humana tam dulcis pro temporali salute mortalium, quanto est dulcior pax divina pro aeterna salute angelorum?"

¹² Opusculum LV. capitulorum, cap. xii: "Gregorius . . . scribens ostendit, . . . 'creatura . . . in potestate et ordine, sicut nostris, differt alter ab altero. Hinc etenim pax et charitas mutuo se invicem complectuntur, et manet firma concordia in alterna et Deo placita dilectione sinceritas, quia unumquodque tunc salubriter completur officium, cum fuerit unus ad quem possit recurri praepositus.'"

¹³ Ad Carolum III imperatorem, cap. v: "Nomen enim re-

to God, and justice, the fulfilling of the office of rector, thus were the two major royal virtues.¹⁴ Considering first the act of judgment, Hincmar enumerated two factors which constituted aequitas iustitia: mildness and rectitude.¹⁵ The rectitude of severe judgment is particularly important, for the peace and tranquility of the realm are assured only if there exists a firm correctio.¹⁶ Since iustitia is governed by the heart, it follows that the chief threat to its fairness is superbia. Particularly in its prideful desire for worldly glory, the heart tyrannizes the mind and obscures its

gis intellectualiter hoc retinet, ut subiectis omnibus rectoris officium procuret. Sed qualiter alios corrigere poterit, qui proprios mores, ne iniqui sint, non corrigit? Iustitia vero regis est, neminem iniuste per potentiam opprimere. . . ." De coercendis militum rapinis (M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 65): "Quia, cum regis ministerium sit se et suos, qui bene agunt, in melius semper dirigere et praevalere a malis corrigere. . . ."

¹⁴ Admonitio altera, cap. xvii: "Regiae virtutes praecipue duae sunt, iustitia videlicet et pietas. Verum tamen in regibus plus laudatur pietas, nam iustitia per se sine pietate severa est."

¹⁵ De divortio Lotharii, praef.: "quia veritatem exsequens mansuetudinem cum iustitia conservabit, ut nec zelum rectitudines in mansuetudinis pondere derelinquat nec rursum pondus mansuetudinis rectitudinis zelo perturbet. . . ." Epistola synodi Carisiacensis, cap. xii: "Reddite subditis iudicium cum misericordia. . . ." This mixture of mildness and severity was previously noted in the monastic context.

¹⁶ M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 85: "scrutare caesarum nostrorum capitula et invenies, quantum profuerit atque prosit legum severitas non solum ecclesiasticae lenitati, verum totius Christianitatis optandae paci et colendae tranquillitati." Instructio ad Ludovicum Balbum, cap. ix: "Facienda est iustitia, non pro ullo terreno lucro, sed pro eo ipso quia iustitia est." "Faciendum est iudicium pro iniquorum correctione, et pro iniuriarum sustinentium directione, non pro malevolentiae ultione. . . ." But note in a letter to Pope John VIII (Sirmond, II, 771): "sic tamen est, ut sanctus Leo dicit, adhibenda correctio, ut semper sit salva dilectio, et plus erga corrigendos agat benevolentia quam severitas, plus cohortatio quam commotio, plus caritas quam potestas."

own vision for aequitas iustitia.¹⁷

Hincmar stressed the importance of this key royal function, for only through a correctio could political life be brought into accord with the will of God. The order and state of the "whole world" depended upon the king's fair judgment.¹⁸ Most importantly, in light of the failure of the Carolingian monarchs to provide adequate defense against the Norse invasions, it would restore military virtus.¹⁹ The contribution of the episcopal office to this royal function consisted largely of moral admonition, for discordia within the king's own person would obscure his actions, including the passing of judgment.²⁰

Important for the royal office was the promulgation

¹⁷De cavendis vitiis, cap. iv: "Quisquis vero eius in se tyrannidem [superbiae] captiva mente suscepit, nec primum damnum patitur, quod clauso cordis oculo iudicii aequitatem perdit." Here Hincmar quotes Gregory's Moralia.

¹⁸M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 84: "videlicet de aequitate servanda, subtiliter debes perpendere, ne videaris vel dicaris non solum ecclesiae, verum et totius mundi statum et ordinem atque vigorem velle confundere atque destruere. . . ."

¹⁹Instructio ad Ludovicum Balbum, cap. viii: "Ut iustitia et iudicium, quae quasi emortua apud nos sunt, reviviscant, ut virtutem nobis Deus reddat contra paganos." Hincmar's contemporaries undoubtedly saw the king's close relationship with God as contributing to his charisma and thus his military virtus, but Hincmar also had a rational explanation for this, based on the interrelation of mental stabilitas and efficiency of action.

²⁰De cavendis vitiis, cap. iv: "Quoniam qui semetipsum prius non iudicat, quid malum recte iudicet ignorat. Et si novit fortasse per auditum quod recte iudicare debeat, tamen iudicare aliena merita non valet, cui conscientia innocentiae propriae nullam iudicii regulam praebet." This is undoubtedly why "mirror of the prince" literature rarely departs from moral admonition.

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and preservation of the law. Quoting Pseudo-Cyprian, Hincmar observed that a people without law are without Christ, for they rush towards perdition through various paths of error.²¹ It was the task of the king to be the conditor legum for the sake of Christ and to repress actions which were contrary to the law.²² In fact, all law, whether folk or royal, found justification in its conformity to God's will.²³ This necessary conformity applied both to the law appropriate to specific offices or social distinctions and to royal adjudication.²⁴ One finds the practical application of this idea so crucial in Hincmar's thought in a variety of situations. For example, it might be noted that he made Louis III's serving the law a

²¹De regis persona, cap. xxvii: "Duodecimus abusio-
gradus est populus sine lege, qui dum edicta et legum scita
contemnit, per diversas errorum vias eundo perditionis laque-
um incurrit."

²²Hincmar quotes Jonas' Capitula, cap. xi, in De re-
gis persona, cap. xvi: "Serviant reges terrae Christo, etiam
leges ferendo pro Christo. Quomodo ergo reges Domino servi-
unt in timore, nisi ea quae contra Domini iussa fiunt, reli-
giosa severitate prohibendo atque plectendo? Aliter enim ser-
vit quia homo est, aliter quia etiam rex est. Quia homo est,
ei servit vivendo fideliter: quia vero etiam rex est, servit
leges iusta praecipientes et contraria prohibentes convenien-
ti vigore sanciendo." Hincmar writes Pope John VIII (Sirmond,
II, 769): "lectio sancti Evangelii patenter ostendit: ita idem
ipse, per quem reges regnant, et conditores legum iusta de-
cernunt. . . ."

²³Quoting Pseudo-Cyprian again in De regis persona,
cap. xxvii: "'Utique multae perditionis viae tunc inceduntur,
cum una regalis via, lex Dei videlicet, quae neque ad dexter-
am neque ad sinistram declinat, per negligentiam deseritur.'"
"Igitur aut a populo promulgatae iustae leges servandae, aut
a principe iuste ac rationabiliter sunt in quolibet vindican-
dae."

²⁴Ad Carolum III imperatorem, cap. iv: "Doceant eos
verbo et exemplo, regni primoribus et ceteris regni fidelibus,
atque sanctae ecclesiae defensoribus, unicuique in suo ordine
competentem legem et iustitiam conservare. . . ."

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condition of election to the throne.²⁵

Although the king seems to have been free in modifying the responsibilities of offices or establishing new ones, the critical issue, in Hincmar's opinion, was that he recognize his responsibility for the personal character of his subordinates. In particular, that they be free from cupiditas—the basic flaw in political life.²⁶ This holds true as well for those officials appointed by counts. They must be of such character as to avoid cupiditas and seek fair justice—the chief responsibility of all holding political posts.²⁷ God passes judgment on each officer both as an individual and as to the manner in which he fulfills his office.²⁸ It is im-

²⁵In a letter to Louis III (Sirmond, II, 198): "sed ego cum collegis meis, et ceteris Dei ac progenitorum vestrorum fidelibus, vos elegi ad regimen regni, sub conditione debitas leges servandi."

²⁶Epistola synodi Carisiacensis, cap. xii: "Constituite ministros palatii, qui Deum cognoscant, ament et metuant" "Constituite comites, et ministros rei publicae, qui non diligent munera, qui odiant avaritiam, qui detestentur superbiam. . . ." The De ordine palatii is an example of Hincmar's recognition that the king is free to redefine the purposes and varieties of political offices. Admonitio altera, cap. xiv: "Qui autem post regem populum regere debent, id est, duces et comites, necesse est ut tales instituantur, qui sine periculo eius qui eos constituit, quos sub se habent cum iustitia et aequitate gubernare intelligant, atque cum bona voluntate quod intelligunt adimplere procurent, scientes se ad hoc positos esse, ut plebem salvent et regant, non ut dominentur et affligant; neque ut populum Dei suum aestiment, aut ad suam gloriam sibi illum subiici, quod pertinet ad tyrannidem et iniquam potestatem." In Hincmar's opinion, the desire for worldly glory, power, and wealth are all expressions of the fundamental sin of superbia.

²⁷De ordine palatii, cap. x: "Tales etiam comites et sub se iudices constituere debet, qui avaritiam oderint et iustitiam diligant, et sub hac conditione suam administrationem peragant et sub se huiusmodi ministeriales substituant."

portant to note the distinction between these two criteria. As a person, the officer's actio (his thoughts, words, and deeds) are objectively evaluated, but as the holder of a ministerium, it is the character of those acts which are taken into consideration. Hence, it is the intentio of his heart and the justice of his official acts which are significant. This will prove to be a critical distinction for Hincmar's theory of office.

Having discussed Hincmar's idea of office in connection with men holding clearly defined political functions, there is some evidence that in addition to this he had a generalized idea of an office of power, termed ministerium potentiae temporalis.²⁹ Not only the authority derived from formal office, but also the dignity of power itself and the strength of virtue were considered yokes of responsibility for which one was answerable to God.³⁰ Such an idea is in itself not

²⁸Pro ecclesiae libertatum (Mansi, XVI, 769): "reddemus rationes, non solum de propriarum personarum actionibus, locutionibus, atque cogitationibus: verum et de ministeriorum susceptorum officiis, qualiter in eis ea quae ad ministeria pertinent, sincero corde, et iustis actibus egerimus. . . ."

²⁹De regis persona, cap. iii: "Cum ergo potentiae temporalis ministerium suscipitur. . . ." This expression is quoted from Jonas (Capitula diversarum sententiarum, cap. xxiv), and reflects the traditional Christian attitude toward the obligations inherent in talent. Hincmar's contribution to the idea of office was to make a careful distinction between the definition of specific office and the meaning of actio as determined by the officer's intentio.

³⁰De divortio Lotharii, quaest. vii: "His vero, qui auctoritate ordinis, aut dignitate potestatis, vel fortitudine virtutis, tali facto non possunt resistere, consulit divina clementia, dicens in eadem Apocalypsi, 'Vobis autem dico ceteris qui Thyatirae estis, quicumque non habent doctrinam hanc, qui non cognoverunt altitudinem satanae, quemadmodum di-

foreign to the Christian tradition, but with Hincmar's formulation, there appear new elements. The advantage of worldly power brought with it responsibilities for aiding the king, not so much because of ties to the royal person, but rather, to the objective idea of state.³¹ The magnates' power and honors were to be submitted humbly to God's purposes, and only if misused would they endanger the soul.³² In interpreting Psalm CIII, Hincmar noted that:

"The cedars of Lebanon" are the nobles and persons of rank in the world "planted by the Lord," Who approved of the wealth and distinctions of those who say: "It is He who has made us and not these worldly things, for just as He makes us vassals and dignitaries, so does He also create our privileges."³³

The critical point here is that the social position and advantages of the magnates are not in themselves meaningful for the person's essential worth if they are properly used. Hincmar seems here to be trying to substitute a Benedictine attitude toward the world for a Germanic concept of government in

unt, non mittam super vos aliud pondus: tamen id quod habetis tenete, donec veniam."

³¹Thus the king is obliged to rule with their auxilium et consilium. Ad Ludovicum III regem, cap.v: "et fidelibus vestris, quorum consilio et auxilio sanctam ecclesiam et regnum vobis commissum gubernare debetis. . . ." Again, this reflects the altered base of royal power after Coulaines.

³²Opusculum LV. capitulorum, cap. v: "Et quoniam non est potestas nisi a Deo, discernendum est in potestate, quid nobis Deus concedat propitius, et quid permittat iratus, ut concessa cum timore et tremore humiliter exequamur. . . ." Ibid., cap. li: "Timere etiam debemus, ne praelatio et honores, quos in isto saeculo habemus, si aliquid boni sumus, retributio nobis fiat, et a retributione iustorum alienos efficiat."

³³M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 170: "'et caedri Libani,' id est nobiles atque sublimes mundi, 'quas Dominus plantavit,' qui etiam de divitibus et inlustribus multos iustificavit, qui dicunt: Ipse fecit nos et non ipsi nos, quia sicut nos homines et inlustres, ita nihilominus et iustos fecit."

which divitiae and honors played the central role.³⁴

Having considered the nature of the various political offices, it remains necessary to specify more closely the manner in which they interacted with one another. Hincmar's theory of office tended to bring all social action within the purview of Christian values. For this he developed a complete corporate theory, stating that within a corporation, order is achieved only if the members scrupulously obey the head who provides for them.³⁵ Equally important, though, the head sanctifies the body by giving itself over to it in the unity of love.³⁶ This spiritual bond is the reflection of the worldly unity of obedience to God, and consequently, members of a corporate body lose autonomy if they seek to act discordantly. If, on the other hand, both head and members act in accord with

³⁴Erna Buschmann, "Ministerium Dei—idoneitas. Um ihre Deutung aus dem mittelalterliche Fürstenspiegeln," Historisches Jahrbuch, LXXXII (1963), 92-95, suggests that the monastic idea of humilitas-superbia found in ninth-century mirrors is not really monastic (i.e., other-worldly), but little more than advice to the king to realize the limits of his power. The present study, to the contrary, suggests that monastic thought was able to insist on the positive value of worldly wealth and distinctions if they serve as a spring-board of salvation.

³⁵M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 153-54: "ut cognoscatur, qualiter minores potioribus debeant obedire et potiores minoribus providere et ordo a Deo dispositus ab omnibus et in omnibus valeat conservari."

³⁶In reference to marriage and the Ecclesia as a corporation: De raptu viduarum, cap. xi: "Quid enim venerabilius, quam ut coniugium mysterium sit Christi et ecclesiae? Quid sanctius, quam ut sic diligant viri uxores suas, sicut Christus dilexit ecclesiam, tradens seipsum pro ea, ut illam sanctificaret atque mundaret? Quid carius atque coniunctius, quam ut vir caput sit mulieris, sicut Christus caput est ecclesiae, ipse salvator corporis?"

highest responsibilities, then freedom coincides with obedience.³⁷ Although Hincmar is not applying these observations directly to political life, his frequent reference to the state in corporate terms suggests he thought of political relations in an analogous way. The totalitarian implications of corporate views of the state became manifest in the late Middle Ages, but there was the contrary implication in Hincmar's ideas that submission to authority could liberate the individual.³⁸

The interaction of offices was usually subsumed under the expression auxilium et consilium. For Hincmar, consilium meant the best of one's knowledge, and auxilium, the best of one's ability.³⁹ The mutual support of officers by the giving of aid to one another appears unambiguous, but consilium had interesting implications for the power of the word in office. Hincmar once compared the use of words in a political context to a soft whistle, "which soothes the ferocity of horses and goads the keenness of dogs."⁴⁰ In light of the power

³⁷M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 82: "Quomodo poteris inferior-em partem corporis hominis illius, qui sub alterius providentia degit, separare et tenere sub paenitentia, quae nec orationi continenter sine consensu partis superioris vacare potest?"

³⁸See A. G. Weiler, "Deus in terris: mittelalterliche Wurzeln der totalitären Ideologie," Acta historica Neerlandica, I (1966), 22-52. For the medieval concept of liberty, see Gerd Tellenbach, Church, State and Christian Society at the Time of the Investiture Contest (Oxford, 1966), pp. 1-37.

³⁹Iuramentum (Sirmond, II, 835): "In eo enim quod dixi, secundum meum scire, consilium, et in eo quod dixi, secundum meum posse, auxilium continetur."

⁴⁰De coercendis militum rapinis (M.G.H., Epp., VIII,

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of words to influence action, it was of utmost importance for the king to encourage the greatest freedom of speech among his councillors.⁴¹

Hincmar's theory of political office was expressed in moral terms such as warning the king that concordia of caritas is the mother of all virtues and humility their guardian.⁴² Nevertheless, he always felt these admonitions had concrete implications. The various forms of superbia—avarice, lust for power, or pride in social advantage—divert the intentio of the heart away from the true purposes of government, thus destroying the possibility for fruitful cooperation between officers. This is not to suggest he was unaware of the very real and immediate tasks facing government, such as the practical welfare of the people, but he kept always in mind that the efficiency of the means used to solve the difficulty of the moment was a function of the extent to which it was seen in terms of society's ultimate ends and value systems.⁴³

64): "et ideo secundum quod scitis unicuique convenire, temperate sermonem. Scimus enim, quia lenis sibilus, qui equorum ferocitatem mitigat, canum sagacitatem instigat." It is interesting to note that Hincmar used the same analogy when describing the spiritual effect of Communion on its participants (Sirmond, II, 685).

⁴¹ De regis persona, cap. iv: "Similiter et in consiliis agere debet consiliarius, quia est et in consilio maxima liberalitas."

⁴² M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 117: "cum caritatis concordia, quae est omnium virtutum mater, et cum humilitate, quae est custos ipsarum virtutum. . . ."

⁴³ Hincmar recognized the need for a realistic appreciation of the needs of the people: Instructio ad Ludovicum Balbum, cap. viii: "quae ad Dei voluntatem et sanctae Ecclesiae statum et vestrum honorem ac primorum regni, et populi necessi-

Hincmar's theory of office, which related man's highest ideals with day-to-day problems and fused a dynamic spirit with worldly order, was constructed from ideas as far ranging as those of the Bible, Augustine, Gregory the Great, and Jonas of Orléans. However, when taken together, it becomes immediately apparent that his principal inspiration was the monastic rule of Saint Benedict. Chapter II of the Rule, "What the Abbot Should Be," parallels Hincmar's idea of the royal office point for point.

Benedict felt that "in a monastery (the abbot) is considered to take the place of Christ," and thus his acts should conform with the "command of our Lord . . . and be mingled with the leaven of divine justice." Hincmar often insisted that since all worldly power derived from Christ, and in fact, carries Christ's name and participates in the love, fear, and honor due Him, worldly justice is divine.⁴⁴

Furthermore, Benedict saw the abbot as a pastor over the flock of his disciples, warning that when the abbot finally meets his Lord's judgment, he is answerable both for the

tatem, et utilitatem scivit. . . ."

⁴⁴For The Rule of Saint Benedict, I am using the convenient translation of Gasquet (New York, 1966), and for the abbot's office, pp. 9-15. For Hincmar's idea that the king carries out "divinae vindictae," see note 5 above. For the ruler's having the nomen of Christ, De divortio Lotharii, inter. xii, resp.: "sed attendentes quia si sub uno rege ac sacerdote Christo, a cuius nominis derivatione christi domini appellantur, in populi regimine sublimati et honorati esse desiderant. . . ." Benedict noted that the abbot "is considered to take the place of Christ, since he is called by His name. . . ."

care of those under him and, indeed, for their righteousness. Hincmar used the same terms for the responsibilities of the royal office, for the king is also answerable to God at final judgment for the care he exercises over his flock.⁴⁵ Benedict emphasized that the abbot's principal means of correcting the monks was through providing an example of moral virtue. Although verbal castigation was also essential, the actions of the abbot spoke stronger than words. Hincmar likewise emphasized the role of the king as providing an example of shining virtue, while his words played a subsidiary, but nevertheless important role.⁴⁶

Incorporated within the Rule were certain principles of social egalitarianism. Regardless of the status of the monk before entering the monastery, once there he had a claim to the abbot's love equal to that of anyone else, for whether bond or free, they were all one in Christ. This was not to deny that there was a structure of authority within the monastery, but simply that differences between men were functional rather than social or legal distinctions in the essential value of the individual. Although Hincmar realized that all

⁴⁵Gasquet, op.cit., p. 10. For Hincmar, see notes 10, 13, 26, and 32 above.

⁴⁶Ibid., pp- 10-11. For Hincmar, see note 9 above. M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 78: "Quapropter regibus scribimus, ut quos Deus ideo in tam excellentissimo loco posuit, ut a subiectis omnibus valeant conspici et ad speculi vicem haberi, quatenus pravis et rectis vel terrori esse debeant vel amori, illa satagant facere, de quibus nemo subiectorum eos iuste valeat reprehendere, et ea studeant summopere devitare, quae in subiectos pro ministerio sibi a Deo imposito necesse erit corrigere. . . ."

men were equal in the sight of God, the realities of social life were quite to the contrary. The monastization of the entire society was not at all Hincmar's intent, but he did seek to apply certain Benedictine principles to government. Not only did the king have the care of all subjects in his heart, he was not to allow the selection of men to fill political offices to be dictated by considerations of selfish profit.⁴⁷ Furthermore, as we have seen, office was irrelevant to the essential value of the individual.

Benedict sought to bring together process and order by fusing caritas and authority. "Let (the abbot) manifest the sternness of a master and the loving affection of a father." Likewise, Hincmar emphasized that there were three essentials for the effective rule of one enjoying political office: his authority must command fear, he has to act by virtue of an office, and he must be loved.⁴⁸ Caritas made such harsh discipline acceptable, for its end was not to repress the individual, but to guide him into the path of freedom.⁴⁹

⁴⁷Gasquet, op.cit., pp- 11-12. For Hincmar, see notes 26 and 27 above.

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 12-13. Admonitio altera pro Carolomanno facta, cap. viii: "Tria ergo necessaria hos qui dominantur habere oportet, terrorem scilicet, et ordinationem, et amorem." "Per benedicia ergo et affabilitatem procuret ut diligatur, et per iustas vindictas, non propriae iniuriae, sed legis Dei, studeat ut metuatur." De regis persona, cap. xxxii: "in boni rectoris pectore . . . sit amor, sed non emolliens: sit vigor, sed non exasperans: sit zelus, sed non immoderate saeviens: sit pietas, sed non plus quam expediat parcens."

⁴⁹De divortio Lotharii, quaest. vii, resp.: "Siquidem hoc interest inter bonos et malos principes, quod boni liber-

Finally, Benedict noted that "The abbot ought ever to bear in mind what he is and what he is called; he ought to know that to whom more is entrusted, from him more is exacted." Likewise, Hincmar insisted that every administrator had some order or profession, the definition of which he was to keep firmly in mind, for ultimately he would be answerable to God for its proper management.⁵⁰ One important aspect of this heavy burden was the need to cope adequately with human nature.

The Rule warned:

Let him recognize how difficult and how hard a task (the abbot) has undertaken, to rule souls and to make himself a servant to the humors of many. One, forsooth, must be led by gentle words, another by sharp reprehension, another by persuasion; and thus shall he so shape and adapt himself to the character and intelligence of each. . . .

Hincmar, too, recognized that the king had to understand human psychology to bring men over to his point of view. "And therefore adapt your words to what you know is appropriate to each individual. For we know that a soft whistle both calms the ferocity of horses and enlivens the keenness of dogs."⁵¹

For Hincmar, office was less an explicit legal delineation of public action, designed to prevent jurisdictional confusion or to check personal ambition, than the central organizing principle of social and political life. Office

tatem amant, servitutem improbi."

⁵⁰Gasquet, op.cit., p. 13. For Hincmar, see note 4 above.

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 13-14. De coercendis militum rapinis, Feb., 859 (M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 64): "et ideo secundum quod scitis unicuique convenire, temperate sermonem. Scimus enim, quia lenis sibilus, qui equorum ferocitatem mitigat, canum sagacitatem instigat."

gained this crucial role in his thought because it had the positive function of bringing Christian values and ultimate ends into contact with the concrete realities of public life. The fusion of spiritual values and worldly action had increasingly characterized the early Middle Ages, but until the ninth century, it had not been self-consciously articulated by men deeply involved in shaping the course of political history. Beginning early in the ninth century and reaching its culmination in Hincmar, a coherent and rational theory was elaborated making office not only a springboard of salvation, but a means for the realization of God's will on earth. This theory derived from a characteristically Benedictine psychology, whereby there was a dynamic interaction between a disciplining of action and a turning to Christ—the source of love (caritas). The office holder found that his action in public life was disciplined by the legal definition of his office, and at the same time his heart (intentio) was to be directed to God. In the larger social context, the same principles were applied. The secular arm of government provided a discipline for its subjects, while the sacerdotal office acted as society's heart, directing the minds of all toward Christ. The king and the bishop were dialectically united in a single whole (Ecclesia)—a whole implying neither a separation of church and state nor the absorption of one into the other.

The delineation of Hincmar's theory of public office means little if abstracted from the realities of political

life. To have advocated ideals little relevant to the needs of the day would have been either foolish or irresponsible, and lest Hincmar be deserving of such an accusation, it is essential to understand the implications of his advice for the political events of his time. For this reason, attention will now be turned to the application of his thought, with the hope that from it will be ascertained both his responsiveness to real political needs and the extent to which he influenced the course of Carolingian history.

PART II

HINCMAR'S IDEA OF MINISTERIUM IN PRAXIS

While the preceeding investigation has attempted to relate Hincmar's theory of public office to the broader reaches of his world view—in particular, the basic categories of thought which structured that view—a full and objective appreciation of his ideas necessitates their being related to actual political, social, and power relations. Tending to integrate ends and means as lines of action, public office becomes meaningless if abstracted from concrete means and ends, just as it loses ideological significance if it does not provide a new dimension to public life, permitting an interaction between the actual and the ideal.

The application of these principles makes the study of Hincmar's earlier years rather problematical. Certainly one can rather hazily delineate what seems to be the nature of Hincmar's political involvements in the decade after his becoming archbishop in 845, but too many facets of his life and thought remain uncertain to allow full study of their interaction without imposing insights gained from his more mature activity.¹ For this reason, the study of Hincmar's the-

¹For accounts of Hincmar's public activity prior to 858-59, the reader is advised to turn to Heinrich Schrörs, Hincmar, Erzbischof von Reims (Freiburg i.B., 1884), part I;

ory of office in Praxis will commence only with the years 858-59—the point at which his role in political life takes on clearer lines and sufficient writings survive to ascertain his understanding of that role.

Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to review briefly the manner in which Hincmar found himself in such an advantageous position in public affairs. Born sometime shortly before 807 into an aristocratic family of some means in the Boulogne area, Hincmar was sent, like so many other youths of the nobility, into a monastery for upbringing. Between the ages of seven and fifteen, he arrived at the monastery of Saint Denis and there, as a canon, began the intensive training which would equip him for a leading role in the destiny of the West Frankish monarchy.

Ever since 814, this famous monastery near Paris was under the leadership of Abbot Hilduin—a man less known for the simple pieties than for vast schemes of aggrandisement for himself, his public office, and his monastery, the exact extent of which eludes the modern historian. Despite its rich cultural and historical tradition—offering Hincmar a microcosm of Frankish myths and spiritual associations—the monastery of Saint Denis had in recent years suffered a certain decline in its sense of religious mission due to the disruptions of a "worldly faction." Nevertheless, despite these distrac-

Calmette, op.cit.; Karl Hampe, "Zum Streite Hincmars von Reims mit seinem Vorgänger Ebo und dessen Anhängern," Neues Archiv, XXIII (1898), 180-195; and Émile Lesne, "Hincmar et L'Empereur Lothaire," Revue des questions historiques, LXXVIII (1905), 5-58.

tions, Hincmar went to work in the scriptorium copying manuscripts and presumably familiarizing himself with the great wealth of literature contained in the library. There is little reason to doubt that at Saint Denis, Hincmar became deeply imbrued with the political theology associated with the Frankish monarchy.

Hincmar's noble birth and exceptional ability encouraged Hilduin to bring the lad to the royal court as his protégé sometime after 819. Here the future archbishop was given a practical training in canon law in preparation for a career in royal service. By 828 he had become a member of the court chapel and a trusted advisor to Louis the Pious in matters where his legal and patristic knowledge would prove of use. Although the chaplains serving at court were notoriously lax in their spiritual lives, Hincmar was brought into contact with the leading minds of the age: Abbot Hilduin, Agobard of Lyons, and the radical reformer, Adalard of Corbie.

It appears that in 829-830 Hincmar responded to the new reforming spirit and gave his support to the church reforming party. He reveals his sincere concern for the spiritual revitalization of St. Denis by working at court to promote its reform. When the monks submitted—temporarily, it proved—to the Benedictine Rule, Hincmar was moved to return to St. Denis and resign himself to a life devoted to purely religious concerns. Managing to avoid being implicated in the revolt against Louis the Pious in 830 which resulted in Hilduin's exile to Corvey, Hincmar continued to hold at court

a reputation for being sensible and trustworthy. This permitted his obtaining from Bishop Landri of Paris permission to follow Hilduin into Saxony and finally to procure his abbot's release from exile. In May of 831, Hincmar returned to St. Denis in the company of Hilduin and the following year had the gratification of seeing the Benedictine reform of his monastery finally and permanently realized.

The following years were peaceful ones for Hincmar despite the political troubles outside his monastery's walls. He assisted Abbot Hilduin in writing a biography of St. Denis which was designed to encourage royal support of the monastery and which argued for the autonomy of the Gallican church. Besides this project, Hincmar went on to write a Miracula Sancti Dionysii and a Gesta Dagoberti, which further enhanced the importance of Saint Denis.²

Although resigned to the quiet of a monastic life, Hincmar's intelligence and reliability were virtues much in need at court, and by February of 835, he assumed the direction of episcopal assemblies, where his knowledge of law proved an immense advantage. It is certain that he performed this duty at the council of Thionville in 835, at which Louis the Pious was formally reinstated as emperor and absolved of the charges brought against him.

²The identification of Hincmar as the author is made by Léon Levillain, "Études sur l'abbaye de Saint-Denis à l'époque mérovingienne, I," Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartes, LXXII (1921), 58, 88-114. Relevant also is Max Buchner, "Zur Entstehung und zur Tendenz der 'Gesta Dagoberti,'" Historisches Jahrbuch, XLVII (1927), 252-274.

Louis' death in 840 meant only a temporary interruption in Hincmar's service to the monarchy, for his return to St. Denis lasted but a short time. Louis' successor in West Francia, Charles the Bald, immediately recalled Hincmar to court in 840 to undertake various diplomatic missions in order to resolve the conflicts between the king and his royal brothers. Unfortunately, the nature of these activities remains obscure. That they were appreciated by Charles, though, is not at all in doubt, for in recognition of his services, Hincmar received from the king two monasteries and some property to ensure his maintenance.

One of the major points of contention between the new kings was the see of Rheims, for it dominated a vast and wealthy section of West Francia on the Lothringian border. Charles had willingly enough left the see vacant, for he pocketed the episcopal incomes, but his rival—King Lothar—had a more or less legitimate claimant to the see in the person of Ebbo (deposed for revolting against Louis the Pious). To forestall Lothar's being able to impose his own henchman on perhaps the most crucial see in his realm, Charles turned to Hincmar to fill the vacancy.

In April, 845, Hincmar entered upon this new phase of his life. Now as archbishop, the matters which drew his attention between this year and 858 were numerous: Ebbo continued to represent the interests of Lothar and to challenge Hincmar's right to the see, the archbishop did not abandon taking an important role in the councils—a key instrument of govern-

ment, and he entered into a long and bitter theological dispute with Gottschalk of Orbais on predestination and the nature of the Trinity. It was particularly this last field of interest which assured Hincmar's notoriety throughout Europe as an indefatigable canon lawyer, ferocious opponent, and invaluable ally.

In light of the foregoing, there is little reason for surprise at the central role which Hincmar was to play in future political events. Each of the issues in which he was involved since 845 had political overtones, although it is difficult for the historian to evaluate fully Hincmar's own position in regard to them. This situation alters, however, with the events of 858-59. Here Louis the German took advantage of Charles' weaknesses in invade his realm and, through lightly undertaken promises to the magnates of West Francia, became the focus of a general revolt against the legitimate king.

In the following chapter, several aspects of this abortive invasion will be considered—in particular, the total paralysis of Charles' action due to the invasion, and the entry of the church under Hincmar's leadership into the void to frustrate Louis' plans. The central point to consider, perhaps, is less the specific ideological content of the propaganda whereby Hincmar forestalled Louis' intention, but the church's positing an ideology and reform program which presented an ongoing critique of Frankish political life. There is little to indicate in 858-59 any new or radical departure

from older ideas, but rather the emergence of a state of constant tension between what Hincmar felt should take place and political actualities. It is this tension—this critical edge—which permits one to ascertain the relationship of ideology and worldly action.

CHAPTER V

THE FATE OF HINCMAR'S IDEA OF MINISTERIUM IN POLITICAL LIFE, 858-860

In August of 858, Louis the German invaded West Francia and nearly succeeded in wresting the crown away from his brother, Charles the Bald. The retreat of the latter into a corner of Burgundy, where only his physical presence could assure the support of a few magnates, was but one factor among many which presented a severe threat to the theoretical and real basis of royal power established at Coulaines. At the same time, Norse invaders were traversing the land, leaving in their train untold destruction to the resources of West Francia and suffering for its people. These bold seamen had learned to ransom their captives, bringing about an economic crisis which threatened to paralyse royal action and contributed to a loss of confidence in the effectiveness of the king in political life.¹

Under Hincmar's inspiration, the bishops of West Francia delayed cooperating with Louis' demand for a crowning and in so doing, sufficient time was allowed for events to take their natural course. The magnates decided again to support

¹For the events of these years, see Calmette, op.cit., and Walter Mohr, "Die Krise des kirchlichen Einheitsprogramms im Jahre 858," Archivium Latinitatis Medii Aevi, XXV (1955), 189-213.

their king and Louis abandoned all hope for conquest. Immediately thereafter (February, 859), Hincmar wrote Charles, criticizing the monarch's long-standing shortcomings. Before considering their ideological import, it is worthwhile ascertaining just what criticism Hincmar raised. He did not hide from Charles what he felt to be his very real inadequacies and sought by every means to re-instill a confidence in his ability and a sense of the obligations of the royal office. Hincmar's criticism of Charles reveals the extent to which his idea of ministerium was intimately bound to the king's actual effectiveness in the political arena.

In light of the emphasis which Hincmar placed on the judicial functions of the royal office, the failure of the king to provide justice was undoubtedly a critical defect. Plaintiffs who came to the court with their cases received neither satisfaction nor even an interested response.² Materially, too, the king had lost control of his economic resources so that the ability to meet with his magnates in council was hindered by their finding no place able to support large concentrations of men.³ In an era so dependent on face-to-face-

²De coerendis militum rapinis (M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 65): "Alterum est, quia dictum est mihi, quoniam clamatores, qui ad palatium vestrum veniunt, nullam consolationem nec etiam bonam responsum ibi accipiant."

³Ibid.: "Quod ideo suggere vestrae dominationi praesumo, quia regno patris et avi in multis diviso capitalia loca de regno vestro multa perdunt et vobis pro regio honore, qui vos condecet, necesse est, ut nihil imminuatur de his, quae praedecessores vestri ex eisdem locis solebant habere, et pagani ac falsi Christiani maximam partem de parte regni vestri absumptam usurpant. Et si portiuncula in qua vestri fideles vobiscum degere debent, ita adnihilata perfuerit, nec vos nec

communications, such a limitation on the king could prove disastrous for the effective functioning of government. Both the lack of justice and of deliberative assemblies probably reflect the impact which Louis' presence had in West Francia, forcing politics back to the level of personal deals made between kings and magnates.

Furthermore, the economic reliance of officials on the king should have ensured their responsiveness to the royal will; but the crisis encouraged men to seek their own support by pillaging—a turn of events which seems to have been even encouraged by the palace officials.⁴ Perhaps a fundamental reason for Hincmar's concern for these violations of public order was the realization that the church was the first to suffer. Roving bands of marauders exacted payments from churches by threatening to force entry in order to loot.⁵ His criticisms point to the monarch's failure to provide the central direction and control which would have ensured the protection of the church's material interests. Unless the king were to receive immediate encouragement, there was a real danger that the royal office would cease being a viable

illi ibidem poteritis conducere."

⁴Ad clericos palatii (M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 65): "Audio de hominibus vestris, quia multa mala, rapinas scilicet et depredationes et fornicationes, et adulteria, in parrochia mea faciunt. Et etiam de vobis audio, quia illis rapinis consentitis, ut videlicet qui de illis vivitis et vestros homines atque caballos exinde pascitis."

⁵De coercendis militum rapinis (M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 65): "Tertiam est, quod satis invitus credidi, quia post precepta omnia, quae ad victum et potum necessaria sunt, de ecclesiis raptores aut redemptionem exigunt aut eas infringunt."

party to the commonwealth and by its weakness only encourage ambitious magnates to disturb the peace.⁶

The nadir of Charles' political fortunes at the end of 858 was of short duration due in large part to the firm resistance offered Louis by the West Frankish church, led and inspired by Hincmar of Rheims.⁷ In a manner so rapid and decisive that it suggested divine intervention, the extensive support which Louis had found among Charles' magnates evaporated, leaving him with no alternative but to flee back to Germany lest he fall victim to Charles' advancing forces. Before discussing the reform program advocated by Hincmar immediately upon Louis' defeat in January, 859, it is worthwhile keeping in mind the basic ideological positions supporting the two sides in this struggle for the throne of West Francia.

When Louis the German invaded in the fall of 858, he undertook a long and circuitous itinerary in order to bargain

⁶The Norse invasions may also have contributed to the breakdown in the coordination of local and royal power, for a society tends to bring its internal organization into conformity with the structure of outside groups with which it is in conflict. See Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Ill., 1956), pp. 133-37. At this time Norse centralization was being replaced by autonomous raiding parties, with the result that self-help groups arose within the Frankish population. Annales Bertiniani, a. 859: "Dani loca ultra scaldem populantur. Vulgas promiscuum inter Sequanam et Ligerim inter se coniurans, adversus Danos in Sequana consistentes fortiter resistit. Sed quia incaute sumpta est eorum coniuratio, a potentioribus nostris facile interficiuntur."

⁷For the role of Hincmar in the crisis of 858-59, see Joseph Calmette, op.cit., appendix II. The best study of the ideological factors in this crisis is Walter Mohr's "Die Krise des kirchlichen Einheitsprogrammes im Jahr 858." This crisis deserves further study as being perhaps one of the critical turning points in West Frankish history.

for the support of various key magnates within the land he hoped to rule. For a short while, he was almost entirely successful, and with a de facto rule based on personal bonds, he awaited only church consecration to legitimize his position. At this point the delaying tactics of Hincmar and other bishops became crucial, for in the interim Charles recovered sufficient strength to win back support and oust his brother. Hincmar's role in Charles' recovery has usually been attributed to nothing more than loyalty, but this explanation seems rather inadequate in light of what is known of Hincmar's attitudes and objectives.

There was ample precedent for a unified rule of Francia, and in fact the Einheitspartei under Louis the Pious had believed this to be the constitution implied by the respublica christiana. In the early ninth century there were no national sensibilities to be wounded by having a "German" ruler on the West Frankish throne, nor is there really much evidence of Hincmar's firm personal loyalty to Charles the Bald before this date. On the contrary, as already indicated, Hincmar was sharply critical of Charles' shortcomings, and it appears that the archbishop's real objections to Louis' attempted coup were not personal, but were related to his idea of the nature of government and constitutional change within it.

Louis the German had tried to win the western throne through personal means alone, and thus had acted contrary to Hincmar's insistence that the various orders of society must be recognized as parties to major decisions. In his Epistola

synodi Carisiacensis, written in November, 858 to justify his hesitation to crown him, Hincmar accused Louis of first refusing to reach an amicable settlement by means of an assembly representing both kings and fideles.⁷ Louis, however, had preferred to make personal deals with Charles' magnates, including a number of bishops, and Hincmar undoubtedly saw this as a threat to the entire settlement of Coulaines and Verdun. The epistola which he wrote Louis, besides defining the responsibilities of the royal office, argued that the church was independent of royal control and should act as a body in political affairs.⁸

Because the letter of Quierzy was primarily concerned with the relation of the church to the political situation, it is rather difficult to ascertain just what Hincmar thought of the two conceptions of royal power as represented by Coulaines and by Louis' actions. Nevertheless, it does appear that he considered Louis' effort to return to a unitary rule based on personal ties with the magnates as doomed to failure. He challenged Louis to do whatever he could without the

⁷ Epistola synodi Carisiacensis, cap. iii: "quando, si-
cut et ante, petivimus, ut frater vester et omnes fideles il-
lius ante vestram fideliumque vestrorum praesentiam in ratio-
nes loco et tempore congruo venissemus et, quae male gesta
forent, vestro consilio et auxilio cum Dei adiutorio fierent
emendata."

⁸ Ibid., cap. xv: "quoniam cum nostris [the bishops]
et non cum istorum parentibus tenuerunt parentes tui regnum."
"Pro certo autem sciatis, quia cum nostris parentibus, id est
cum apostolis, Christus rex regum regnum suum, id est eccles-
iam, conquisivit, ampliavit et rexit; et per nos et nobiscum
. . . regnum suum, quotidie acquirit, auget atque gubernat
. . . ."

church, and if by any chance God should decide to favor the unified rule and thus allow it to prosper (God can accomplish what to men seems impossible), then the church would cooperate with the new king. The implication that Hincmar little favored personal rule and saw no particular advantage in having a single monarch rather than confraternitas is by no means proven by the letter of Quierzy. However, it gains some added weight when Hincmar's ideology is recalled.

It would be erroneous to attribute Augustinian views to Hincmar, for the cooperation of the church, the king, and his fideles was not merely formal, but a mystical union by no means compromising the identity and independence of each order. Likewise, the peace resulting from such concordia was not simply the true peace of God on one hand nor worldly lack of conflict on the other, but a fusion of the two. A recent work by Reinhard Schneider has tried to interpret ninth-century treaties in terms of an irreconcilable tension between the true peace of God advocated by the church party and an innerworldly peace as the concomitance of blood ties.¹⁰ Al-

⁹Ibid., cap. xv: "Operamini vos interim ista, quae cum fidelibus vestris sine nostra corporali praesentia operari valetis." "Et si Deus soliditatem et salutem ecclesiae atque regni in manu vestra adunare et prosperari decreverit, quae cum archiepiscopis et coepiscopis nostris plus congruere divinis dispositionibus viderimus, agere sub famulatu recti regiminis vestri studebimus. Potens est enim Deus minus bonum initium in perfecte bonum commutare processum, cui noscitur esse possibile, quod impossibile solent homines iudicare."

¹⁰See Reinhard Schneider, Brüdergemeine und Schwurfreundschaft (Lübeck, 1964), pp. 133-35, and 156-57 for the crisis of 858-59.

though Schneider is undoubtedly correct in many respects, it is doubtful whether Hincmar had an Augustinian idea of peace. In the letter of Quierzy, Hincmar does not contrast the peace of God with the absence of conflict on earth, but rather, he contrasts worldly peace uninfused with the spirit of caritas with true worldly peace.¹¹ The Augustinian categories would have discouraged the church's becoming intimately involved in political affairs—hardly the case at Quierzy.

The letter of Quierzy penned by Hincmar was less directed at changing the traditional state of affairs than to forestall Louis' attempt to reshape radically Europe's constitution. The archbishop does not unequivocally state just what his constitutional ideas are, but it is clear that he strongly objects to the East Frankish king's methods. In accord with the settlement of Coulaines, Hincmar felt that important changes could only be brought about with the full participation of all in a general council. In short, Hincmar was very much concerned to preserve limitations on unilateral royal action.

¹¹Schneider uses Hincmar's quotations from Paul as justification for the imposition of Pauline ideas on Hincmar, which is erroneous for the following reasons: first, Schneider bases his interpretation not on Hincmar's actual quotes, but on the passages as Paul wrote them, supplying a crucial pronoun not found in the Quierzy letter; second, Schneider interprets Pauline agape in terms made familiar by the works of Nygren and Bultmann, the validity of which has been seriously questioned by D'Arcy (op.cit.); and finally, one cannot assume that Hincmar adopted intact Biblical conceptions of love without a full study of Hincmar's ideas on the subject. For Hincmar to say that true peace is not amor privatus or amor carnis, he is not necessarily denying the possibility of true peace in the world.

Not only did Quierzy imply constitutional limits, but only months later Hincmar re-inforced them with ideological restrictions. Thus, he constantly reaffirmed the essentially Christian nature of office. The king's ministerium is to direct himself and his men toward righteousness and to correct sinners.¹² The idea of the objectification of office as implied by the pastoral analogy emphasized that the king served the world because he served God.¹³ As bad as the Norse invasions were, the strife between Christians was yet worse, for it disturbed not only the worldly order, but shattered the ideal bonds which united Christians within the Ecclesia. But particularly within the government itself—within the royal palace—such conflict is forbidden, for the palace is to be considered sacred.¹⁴

Although the import of these constitutional and ideological limitations on monarchy might seem to be intended to curtail severely the effectiveness of royal action, Hincmar's role subsequent to the invasion of 858-59 proves this not to be the case. In February of 859, only weeks after West Francia had seen the last of Louis, Hincmar wrote a series of tracts, which, taken together, add up to a thorough and coher-

¹²See chapter IV, note 13.

¹³See note 18 below.

¹⁴De coercendis (M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 63): "Scio vos dolere de istis malis, quae non solum a paganis, sed, quod magis temendum et dolendum est, a Christianis in regno vestro fiunt et, quod sine comparatione plus horrendum atque reprehendum est, in palatio vestro, quod sacrum appellari et esse debet, et in locis, ubi vos estis et per quae ambulatis."

ent program of reform. Rather than merely acting in the service of Charles, as had been the case before Quierzy, Hincmar now spoke as the voice of the church, admonishing whomever he pleased, including the king.

Undoubtedly, there were a number of factors which encouraged Hincmar to act so boldly. The collapse of effective monarchy left a vacuum into which the church easily stepped. Not only was the church instrumental for Charles' recovery, but Hincmar undoubtedly sensed that his leading role entitled him to respond more independently to the admonitory duties of his episcopal office. But most importantly, the intention of Hincmar's program was to strengthen the monarchy not only to face such attacks as they had just experienced, but also to meet the Norse threat and restore internal order to the land. Noteworthy is that a program designed to restore order and authority did so by placing constitutional and ideological limits upon the exercise of that authority. This contradiction is apparent only, for a detailed analysis of Hincmar's three reform tracts reveals a profound appreciation of the sources of strength and order inherent in a distribution of responsibility and authority.

In light of his belief that spiritual and political action work in accord for the salvation of man, it was natural that Hincmar directed one of the tracts—his Ad clericos palatii—to the royal palace—the king's most important agency of political action. The palace clerks, being churchmen, should have been particularly receptive to spiritual admoni-

tion, and through them Hincmar could hope for the restoration of viable government. Although Hincmar may not have been their bishop in most cases, he nevertheless could order them by the auctoritas of his office to submit to their own respective bishops.¹⁵ The need for disciplining palace clerks in order to check their dissolute lives had long been a key issue in the church reform program, for they represented an important source of continuity in Carolingian government and seem to have played a significant role in constitutional stability. Hincmar admonished them not only because they were considered to be the holders of a ministerium and thus possessors of a responsibility transcending personal political interests.¹⁶ Particularly in the palace administration could political and spiritual action have worked in accord to promote viable and stable government.

However, Hincmar directed most of his admonition to the king, for Christian values had yet but superficially permeated the lower social strata, and a renovatio could best be imposed from above. A tract entitled De coercendis militum rapinis was directed to Charles the Bald, encouraging him to keep in mind his divinely imposed ministerium to restore order

¹⁵See chapter II, note 24. One perhaps sees here a suggestion that Hincmar felt himself to be the spiritual arbiter of West Francia—a role which his Abbot Hilduin appears to have sought.

¹⁶Ad clericos palatii (M.G.H., VIII, 66): "Tamen pro ministerio imposito admoneo vos cum Paulo apostolo, et obtestor in Christo et per Christum, qui per Paulum locutus est, 'ut exhibeatis vos sicut Dei ministros, ne vituperetur ministerium nostrum.'"

and bring peace to his subjects. "I know you are grieved by the evil done not only by the pagans but also by the Christians within your realm and in your palace. I know you dread these things, for because of this the entire Ecclesia cried out: 'Rise up, oh Lord, raise your hand,' that is, in punishment, lest you are unmindful of the poor people."¹⁷

It is the responsibility of the episcopal ministerium to admonish the king and, although Hincmar is in the position to communicate only by letter, he reminds Charles of the obligations inherent within the royal office.

I am frightened by the Pastor of Pastors who says, "He who sees the wolf coming and by fleeing abandons the flock is not a pastor, but a mercenary." He flees in that he sees iniquity and refrains from speaking; he sees plunderers, pillagings, and other distresses prowling about among the people committed to him, and he keeps silent from any admonition.¹⁸

Both offices exist to ensure the welfare of the Ecclesia through positive action. Not only does each have a role in this common task, but neither can resign itself to an accommodation with evil in the world. There is in Hincmar's idea of the royal and episcopal office a clear impetus for dynamic action in the world, for the king is charged with care of the

¹⁷De coercendis (M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 63): "Scio vos dolere de istis malis, quae non solum a paganis, sed . . . a Christianis in regno vestro fiunt, et . . . in palatio vestro" "Unde timere vos scio, quod omnis propter hoc deprecatur Ecclesia, 'Exurge Domine Deus, exaltetur manus tua,' id est, ad vindictam ne obliviscaris pauperem populum."

¹⁸Ibid.: "territus a pastore pastorum, qui dicit, 'Mercenarius et qui non est pastor, videt lupum venientem, et dimittit oves et fugit.' Fugit autem, quia vidit iniquitatem et tacuit: vidit raptorem et rapinas, et ceteras miseras in plebe sibi commissa crassari, et ab admonitione reticuit."

people and the bishop must admonish him if he fails to do this.

The third tract here under consideration, also written in February of 859, clarifies the relationship of worldly and spiritual offices in the work of renovatio. Hincmar's Ad presbyteros was principally intended to reform the clergy within his own diocese of Rheims, but its secondary function was to supplement the worldly admonition given by Charles the Bald to his fideles. Hincmar recommends that, as Charles travels through the villae admonishing his men regarding the duties of Christian office as suggested in De coercendis, he also have his fideles read the Ad presbyteros.¹⁹ Here one sees the use of spiritual action as a complement to worldly admonition, for through Ad presbyteros Charles' followers hear the word of God.²⁰

Clearly, in the context of Hincmar's thought, worldly action is in itself unable to bring about the desired renovatio of government, and thus bishops, king, and fideles must work in accord to achieve peace within the Ecclesia. Furthermore, the concordance of the spiritual action of the former and worldly action of the latter secular powers is assumed to be comprehensible in worldly terms. That is, Hincmar makes

¹⁹Ibid. (pp. 63-64): "admonitiones presbiteris, ut eas raptoribus relegant, dirigo. Quarum exemplar dominationi vestrae transmittito. . . ." "Transmittito vobis, sicut dixi, exemplar admonitionis nostrae, quam per villas direxi, ut si vobis placet, post admonitionem vestram, in conspectu vestro eam fidelibus vestris iubeatis relegere. . . ."

²⁰Ad presbyteros (M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 62): "Deus omnipotens, qui per me ista loquitur in auribus vestris, per se haec loquatur in cordibus vestris."

no provision for a possible disparity between the means at the king's disposal and rightful Christian action. Henceforth, the mutual compatibility of the action of all offices in worldly terms will be referred to as a "rational concordance" of offices.

In his De coercendis, Hincmar emphasized that the king should not delegate his own responsibilities to his subordinates. In light of the fact that Hincmar's attitude was contrary to the actual tendency of his age which encouraged an increasing distribution of royal prerogatives into the hands of the dukes and counts, it is worthwhile to consider the realism of the archbishop's recommendations. The collapse of Romanitas, the mixing of diverse peoples during the period of barbarian settlement and the conversion to Christianity resulted in a state of anomie, necessitating firm central direction (as had been the case to some extent under Charlemagne) in order to achieve constructive political action. The successful decentralization of political life as later found in feudalism may well have been impossible without a prior consensus of values and attitudes. But in the ninth century, such a broad consensus had not been won, for true Christian religiosity was restricted to the upper clergy and probably to very few laymen. That distributive responsibility proceeded at a greater pace than the development of a true community of ultimate ends and basic values was probably brought about in large part by Norse invasions and resulted in the difficulties of the tenth century.

In any case, the De coercendis reflects Hincmar's attempt to counter the suggestions of those who favored a complete distribution of responsibility. He brings to Charles' attention a number of criticisms which he had heard people making of their king, the first being that the king should not concern himself with the depredations in the land, but rather, should let each person fend for himself as best he can.²¹ Hincmar states that he hardly believes that such a suggestion has been made—undoubtedly for rhetorical reasons, for else he would not have repeated to the king what "from the mouths of ordinary people would be rude to say to him." Furthermore, in Ad clericos palatii, Hincmar reports the claim that the palace clerks have consented to the devastation going on within the diocese of Rheims since they could thereby more easily support their men and provide for their horses.²² Although Charles' regaining of confidence and a sense of responsibility after his recovery from the invasion of 858 was undoubtedly due to a power shift in his favor, Hincmar's idea of the royal office provided a convenient justification for royal activism without resorting to the old personal and unilateral concepts. The extent to which Charles accepted these ideas, however, was to be determined by the political conditions of the time.

²¹ De coercendis (p. 65): "De his tribus, quae audiui, duo credere nolui, tertiam satis invitus credidi. Quorum primum est, quia per plurimorum ora vulgatur vos dicere, quoniam de istis rapinis atque de praedationibus nihil vos debeatis misculare: unusquisque sua defendat, ut potest."

²² See note 4 above.

In the relationship between the king and his fideles can be perceived the greatest disparity between Hincmar's recommendations and political reality. The royal manipulation of honors and beneficia had long been the principal means of controlling the magnates, but with the advent of a multiplicity of Carolingian monarchs under Louis the Pious and the constitution of Coulaines, this powerful instrument was ever more turned against the kings to the profit of the magnates themselves: they now made the promise of royal favor the condition of their support. Hincmar countered this threat to royal independence by seeking to place the bond uniting the king with his magnates on an ideological rather than a material basis. The fideles are to be chosen by reason of their loyalty to the king and concern for peace—nothing is said of the actual material interests which also bound them together.²³ In line with his Benedictine views, Hincmar is not trying to remove such material interests, but simply to make them subservient to society's purposes.

The king is to use an appropriate mixture of threats and gentleness in order to discover those willing to support him for reasons of the common welfare, acting out of love for their king and fidelity to God.²⁴ Undoubtedly the threats

²³De coerendis (p. 64): "Et mittite homines secundum consuetudinem praedecessorum vestrorum, qui in longius pergant propter fodrarios et curam de pace accipiant." Here is an example of the mythologizing of the past in the interest of the present renovatio.

²⁴Ibid.: "Et cum mansuetudine intermiscendo, sicut nunc tempus se habet, raro et non nimis duriter comminationes, si vobis videtur, non alias minas intentando, nisi quia in

and mildness often involved the offices and benefices held by the magnates, but the king was to use this means not for manipulating his men, but for the detection of those insincerely profiteering at the king's expense. It is clear that Hincmar saw the monarch's influence upon the magnates primarily in the form of admonition.²⁵

Charles is to choose his words carefully, tailoring them to match the personal characteristics of those addressed in order to bring the magnates into acquiescence.²⁶ The king is to see that all are admonished, lest some claim to have acted against the royal will out of ignorance. Should Charles carry out this task, then he has satisfied his obligations to God, for he can do no more than this. What distinguishes the admonitory responsibility of the episcopal and the royal office is that the latter works by worldly action rather than spiritual. Hincmar observes "that Charles can find excuse to some degree before God if he does all he can be reason of power."²⁷ But this is the power of worldly admonition as con-

hoc videbitis, qui Deo fidelis est et vos carum habet et de vobis ex regno vestro bene habere cupit. . . ."

²⁵Checking the "acquisitive man" has been a constant thread in utopian thought. Outside monasticism, however, the pre-Carolingian church seldom pursued this point. For an important exception, see Arthur O. Lovejoy, "The Communism of Saint Ambrose," Journal of the History of Ideas, III (1942), 458-468.

²⁶De coercendis (p. 64): "et melius cognoscitis fidelium vestrorum qualitates quam ego, et ideo secundum quod scitis unicuique convenire, temperate sermonem. Scimus enim, quia lenis sibilus, qui equorum ferocitatem mitigat, canum sagacitatem instigat."

²⁷Ibid.: "Vos tamen inde debetis consilium prendere,

trusted with the spiritual admonition of Hincmar's Ad presbyteros. It remained to be seen whether Charles would heed Hincmar's recommendations or press his advantage to check the autonomy of his fideles through the manipulation of honors and benefices. Hincmar believed that the cooperation of fideles and king was by no means a check to their respective independence as long as all observed the Christian responsibilities of their offices.²⁸

The reform Hincmar envisaged would be achieved through councils encompassing the cooperation of both laymen and bishops. It would then be incumbent upon office holders to realize the measures which the councils found requisite. In November of 858 Hincmar had written Louis the German from Quierzy that provincial synods should be regularly held with the bishops and also that other meetings should be held with priests.²⁹ But this recommendation was meant more for Charles the Bald than Louis the German.³⁰

ut iubeatis alicui qui vestra vice quotidie eos admoneat, ut si tales sunt qui antea hanc admonitionem non audierint, eis quotidie quando ad paramentum vestrum venerint relegat: quatenus et ipsi inexcusabiles sint, et vos aliquam excusationem coram Deo habere possitis, si tantum facitis quantum per rationem potestis."

²⁸ The idea of the compatibility of unity and diversity, of central purpose and local needs, had, for Hincmar, its roots in Benedictine thought and especially Gregory the Great. For Gregory, see Paul Meyvaert, "Diversity and Unity. A Gregorian theme," The Heythrop Journal, IV (1963), 141-162. For a purely theological analysis, see D'Arcy, opcit.

²⁹ Epistola synodi Carisiacensis, cap. vi: "Ut temporibus a sacris regulis constitutis comprovinciales synodos cum episcopis et speciales cum presbyteris habere quiete possint, annuite."

It is thus not surprising that far-reaching and ambitious reform synods were held in the course of the year 859. The most illuminating of these was a synod held in Langres in May, which was primarily concerned with church discipline. But it went further, demanding that the kings call regular annual provincial councils, biennial general councils, the founding of schools of sacred and profane letters wherever men could be found able to teach, the restoration of pilgrim rest stops and other charitable institutions, and the return of justice and order for the relief of the populace.³¹ This council, presided over by bishops and King Charles of Provence, which sought to improve conditions not only in the church, but also cultural, social, and political institutions, reflects a will to overcome the fundamental difficulties troubling the Carolingian world. However little the episcopal enactments may have brought about progressive changes within government, they at least show that the church reform party once again was encouraged to seek to direct the course of history in paths compatible with its own ideals. An important element in its program was the realization of an idea of political office such as that proposed by Hincmar of Rheims.

The issue which hindered Hincmar's theory of political

³⁰De coercendis (p. 64): "Et nolite negligere illa capitula . . . sed relegite illa diligenter, quia—mihi credite—plus pro vobis quam pro illo facta fuerunt."

³¹For the determining of the time and place of this synod, see Carlo de Clercq, La législation religieuse franque, II (Anvers, 1958), 228, n. 44. On pg. 230, de Clercq shows that this synod was a product of Hincmar's recommendations of 858.

office finding acceptance in public life was the troublesome relations between Charles the Bald and his brother Louis the German. To resolve this conflict, a general council had to be called which engaged the participation of all the kings, and since the dispute between the brothers shattered the unity of the Ecclesia, the spiritual action of the ecclesiastical office would have assured that all decisions taken conformed to the will of God. In May of 859 the bishops of the realms of Charles the Bald and Lothar II met together in Metz to resolve the dispute between the kings. A reading of the synodal acts reveals that Hincmar's ideas were here generally accepted. Hincmar himself was present, and it is even possible that he had much to do with the drawing up of the resolutions.

The essential point agreed upon was that the king had an objective responsibility of Christian office. It was his duty to correct sinners and inflict punishment upon them.³² But the objectification of political office assumed an ideal entity of which it formed a part—the Ecclesia. Because the Ecclesia is a spiritual entity, it was the duty of the bishops to take upon their own shoulders the initiative for the healing of political discord.³³ The bishops acted as the "messengers of God's peace," and their office demanded the admonish-

³²Synodus Mettensis, a. 859, cap. viii: "Et sanctus Cyprianus regis ministerium esse dicit, impios de terra perdere, homicidas, periuros, adulteros, veneficos, sacrilegos non sinere vivere."

³³Ibid., cap. vii: "Post haec si promiserit, quod iam ulterius tale vel simile schisma in hac sancta Dei ecclesia atque in ista christianitate non reiteret."

ing of kings and gave them the authority of royal ordination.³⁴ Furthermore, it was agreed that the ideal unity of the Ecclesia transcended political frontiers and that the restoration of the sacerdotal and political orders within it be undertaken as far as the nature of those difficult time permitted.³⁵

Because the gathered bishops considered themselves part of an entity which included the realm of Louis the German, they felt empowered to dictate to the king what he should do to find forgiveness for his guilt, including bearing responsibility for the damage done by his supporters to church property, and he must be willing to abandon those men who had switched their allegiance to him to the punishment of Charles.

When a delegation of the bishops from Metz, including Hincmar, met with Louis at Worms on 4 June, 859, they found their demands diverted by a clever subterfuge. The East Frankish king refused to enter into negotiations with them until after he had fully examined the whole matter with his own bishops. Thus, he turned the principle of episcopal participation in political deliberation against the formulator of the idea himself.³⁶ By substituting the concept of a na-

³⁴Ibid., cap. 1: "divinus Paulus dicit: 'Legatione fungimur pro Christo, reconciliamini Deo,' legatione pro Christo fungentes vos, fratres carissimi, legatos Deo amatae pacis, quoniam exinde iam gloriosos principes nostros Karolum et Hlotharium episcopali auctoritate monuimus, ad domnum Hlodowicum regem gloriosum mediante Domino ordinamus. . . ."

³⁵See the Episcoporum relatio of the Metz synod.

³⁶See M.G.H., Capit., II, no. 298B, which reveals the

tional church for the ideal unity of the Ecclesia which incorporated the whole of Christendom, Louis could at once accept a central tenet of Hincmar's idea of office while ensuring support favorable to his interests from the subservient clergy of East Francia.

Later in the month another meeting took place between Charles' and Lothar's bishops at Savonnières, but this time with the kings in attendance. Here the broad interpretation of the Ecclesia which Louis had rejected at Worms was even more strongly asserted. Peace and justice within Christendom can only be recovered when the political "schism" within the Ecclesia is brought to an end.³⁷ Despite Louis' calling forth of the idea of a "national" church, the bishops and kings gathered at Savonnières objected that they at least were all members of one Ecclesia, united together in concord.³⁸

extent to which Louis was willing to implicitly refute the idea of the unity of Christendom insisted upon by Hincmar. See in regard to this, Walter Mohr, "Die Krise des kirchlichen Einheitsprogrammes im Jahr 858," pp. 208-209.

³⁷Synodus apud Saponarias, a. 859, cap. i (M.G.H., Capit., II, no. 299): "Ut caritas fraterna et concordia pacis reformetur inter fratres, principes scilicet ac gloriosos reges nostros Hludowicum et Karolum, qualiter scisma, quod ortum est nuper in ecclesia, ad unitatem benignitatis valeat reintegrari et status ecclesiae pene conlapsus restitui et pax ac iustitia in populo christiano valeat procurari. . . ."

³⁸Ibid., cap. ii: "Episcopi namque secundum illorum ministerium ac sacram auctoritatem uniti sint et mutuo consilio atque auxilio reges regnorumque primores atque populum sibi commissum in Domino regant et corrigant. . . ." Ibid., cap. iii: "Reges nihilominus ac principes nostri Karolus et Hlotharius atque item Karolus [rex Provinciae] ad Dei voluntatem atque sanctae ecclesiae statum suamque salutem et populi salvationem, gratias Deo, uniti et in eadem salutari unitate firmati sunt."

However willing Charles personally might have been to accept the central tenets of Hincmar's position, he nevertheless realized that by appealing to the spiritual bonds of society, he had inadvertantly played into his opponant's hands, for now Louis could find ample ideological justification for whatever demands he might choose to make. A subservient East Frankish church would have backed whatever stand he took, and he could argue that Hincmar himself had established the principle that episcopal participation validated royal action.

It was only after a year of difficult and drawn-out negotiations that a compromise was reached for the sharp dispute which had so long disturbed the peace of Europe. With Lothar's mediation, Charles finally met Louis at Koblenz in June, 860, and together with Hincmar and other leading prelates arrived at a mutually satisfactory decision. Charles agreed with Louis' constant demand that the West Frankish vassals who had betrayed their king in 858 were not to lose their honors or be punished in any way. Louis, on the other hand, agreed to act henceforth in a spirit of brotherly cooperation so that future international peace would be assured.

It is important to note, however, that the whole of Hincmar's theory of political office was ignored: in this mutual accord there is the complete absence of any reference to the Ecclesia in the broad sense or to the idea of royal ministerium. Pax is not the worldly expression of the concordance of political action with the will of God, but simply the absence of conflict between the kings contrary to what "right-

fully" ought to be.³⁹ It is true that the bishops preserve their ministerium of admonishing kings, but it is once again an episcopal obligation to the person of the monarch rather than the mode of interaction between the two offices.⁴⁰ At Koblenz, Charles supported only those elements of Hincmar's theory which were also acceptable to his brother Louis, specifically, the responsibility of the episcopal office in political life. However, the idea of an objective political office acting in concordance with the episcopal ministerium within the Ecclesia fell victim to the necessities of the political situation.

One reason why Hincmar's ideas failed to make much of an impression on the course of political events was that the crucial point at the meeting at Koblenz concerned the relationship of the kings to their fideles. The fideles were not considered as holders of a Christian ministerium, but rather, attention was directed to whether Charles was going to ensure the continuation of the honors and beneficia of those who had betrayed him.⁴¹ Especially since Coulaines, the magnates were

³⁹ Conventus apud Confluentes, a. 860 (M.G.H., Capit., II, no. 242), Adnuntiatio domni Karoli: "Post hoc laboravit adiuuante Domino iste carissimus nepos noster, ut inter nos pax fieret, sicut per rectum esse debet. . . ."

⁴⁰ Ibid.: ". . . ut monentibus episcopis ad illam caritatem et fraternam concordiam rediret, sine qua nullus christianus salvus esse non potest."

⁴¹ Ibid., capitula ab omnibus conservanda, cap. x: "Ut nostri fideles, unusquisque in suo ordine et statu, veraciter sint de nobis securi, quia nullum abhinc in antea contra legem et iustitiam vel auctoritatem ac iustam rationem aut dampnabimus aut dehonorabimus aut opprimemus vel indebitis machinationibus adfligemus. . . ."

not about to tolerate a monarch's depriving them of their honors without just cause, for the mere exchange of loyalties from one king to another was not, in the minds of the traditionally oriented aristocracy, contrary to acceptable political practice. However much an objective idea of state had influenced kings, such a transcendent and non-personal view of political responsibilities had yet little impact on the lower orders.

At Koblenz Hincmar's fully developed theory of office was checked by the solid wall of political actuality. In fact, the one idea which was accepted—the royal appeal to the church for approval of policy—became a political instrument in Louis' hands, making the acceptance of the rest of Hincmar's thought impossible. While the older idea of the episcopal ministerium continued unabated, the theory of the rational concordance of political and ecclesiastical offices within the spiritual entity of the Ecclesia was excluded from political life. If it were the ideas themselves which were unpalatable, then one would expect that henceforth international relations would continue as in the past to be expressed in terms of fraternal love rather than as the concord of offices. But there is ample confirmation in the next few years that political factors determined the fate of Hincmar's ideas, for the deepening international concern for Lothar's divorce case once again suggested to Charles the political advantages in Hincmar's concept of the Ecclesia and the offices within it.

CHAPTER VI

THE ANALOGY OF MARRIAGE AND GOVERNMENT IN LOTHAR'S DIVORCE CASE (860)

The meeting at Koblenz in June of 860 represents an apparent failure of Hincmar's political ideas to provide a workable solution for international disputes to the satisfaction of either Charles the Bald or Louis the German. Koblenz, however, did not remove the atmosphere of tension within Europe, for while these negotiations were taking place in 860, new issues began to emerge which drew King Lothar II of Lotharingia away from a position of neutrality into direct confrontation with Charles. This dispute—just as the crisis of 858-59—engaged Hincmar's participation. It seems worthwhile to study this involvement to verify the conclusion of the preceding chapter, that Hincmar was less politically motivated than anxious to impose his own will and his own theoretical viewpoint upon the monarchs of Europe.

In 855, at the time he inherited the throne of the middle kingdom from his father, Lothar entered into a political marriage with a certain Teutberga, whose family undoubtedly provided useful allies in his consolidation of power.¹

¹Useful general accounts of the divorce issue can be found in Schrörs, op.cit., and Calmette, op.cit. Still solid is the more detailed narrative of Robert Parisot, Le roy-

Nevertheless, within two years Lothar had cast Teutberga aside in order to enter into a closer relationship with Waldrada, with whom he had long enjoyed a liason. Reasons of the heart may have been one factor, but it seems more likely that Lothar was increasingly anxious to sire an heir to the throne. Unfortunately, Teutberga had proven barren, thus in contrast to Waldrada, who had already provided Lothar with male offspring. It seems evident that Lothar's desire to legitimize his union with Waldrada in order to ensure a successor was the mainspring of his foreign policy from 860. He realized that his position was not strong enough to divorce Teutberga in face of the combined opposition of his brothers—Emperor Louis of Italy and King Charles of Provence—and his uncles to the east and west. Thus he busied himself at the end of the 850's to achieve his ends through diplomatic maneuvering. Louis of Italy and Charles were fully satisfied by the gift of certain territories. As for the monarchs of East and West Francia, Lothar tried to avoid taking sides in their dispute, and perhaps one finds here the explanation for his assuming the role of mediator between them in 860.

Believing himself free of foreign intervention, Lothar proceeded to call a Lothringian council in 858 designed to invalidate his marriage with Teutberga. She was accused of having had femoral intercourse with her brother, Abbot Hubert, prior to her marriage. It is interesting to note that, just

aume de Lorraine sous les Carolingiens (843-923) (Paris, 1899). For the legal implications, see Adh mar Esmein, Le mariage en droit canonique, I (2nd.ed.; Paris, 1929).

as in Louis the German's attempt to have himself crowned king in West Francia in 858, the monarchs of Europe implicitly recognized the increased weight of the church in political life, but in each case, sought to bend that force toward rather disreputable political ends. In Teutberga's trial, the court resorted to God's judgment (trial by cold water), but unfortunately for Lothar, his wife emerged exonerated.

This meant that Lothar would have to try again. He did so in January and February of 860 at a general council held in Aachen. Since Lothar was the chief mediator in the peace negotiations between Charles the Bald and Louis the German, neither king wished to compromise the anticipated accord by objecting to this council. Although Hincmar may have had political motives in refusing to attend (he would not have wanted to jeopardize the negotiations), he cites only personal and legal hindrances. Apologizing to one of Lothar's bishops, Hincmar asserted that neither the state of his health nor the shortness of time allowed his leaving Rheims. But more importantly, he argued that the divorce case was a matter requiring a general council: unless everyone was represented, it would lack validity.² None of these excuses has a false

²Writing *Adventus* of Metz on 26 January, Hincmar noted (*De divortio Lotharii*, inter. iii, resp.): "De mihi imprae-meditata isto in tempore quaestione, de qua iam talia ac tanta audieram, ut de ea modo nihil me auditurum putaverim, plurima heri, quantum mea permisit infirmitas, mutua sermocinatione locuti, tandem sicut melius et rationabilius nobis visum fuerat, finem eidem causa, ut synodo generali servetur, posuimus." ". . . quia instantia missionis et brevitatem temporis, non permittit ut dominos et coepiscopos meos in talibus consulam, sine quorum consultu, ut melius ipsi nostis, nihil, nisi

ring, and there is no reason to call forth political motives to explain his not going to Aachen.³

In June of 860 the old political dispute between Charles the Bald and Louis the German was finally resolved at the council of Koblenz. This left Charles the Bald free to cross swords with Lothar over the divorce issue, but it seems that he was in no hurry to enter the arena. Both monarchs were present at a council held in October and November at Tousey, and this, too, would have provided an ideal opportunity to raise the divorce question, since the meeting attempted to deal with the most urgent problems of the day. Our knowledge of the matters discussed is fragmentary, but it nevertheless does seem strange that no mention was made of Lothar's divorce case, shortly to be the focus of Frankish diplomacy.

Charles' apparent reluctance to broach the subject of the divorce during 860 makes it rather unlikely that he

quantum ad parochiam propriam pertinet agere a venerandis regulis mihi permittitur, contra quas non sine ultionis periculo quiddam praesumitur, timeo ne domnus rex putet meam debitam servitutem se ab obsequio suo velle suspendere, et venerandi episcopi suspicentur, si quid secundum sacras regulas diffinierint, cupere quod mihi non convenit retractare."

³Hincmar was called to the council only about twenty days before it was to take place—probably rather short notice considering his involvement with the diplomatic relations between Charles and Louis. Hincmar used the same delaying tactics in face of Louis the German's invasion of West Francia in 858, but then time was of the essence. In 860 the only advantage in gaining time would be to prevent obstructions to the peace negotiations then in progress (perhaps). In 867 Hincmar complained of ill health and the effects of age (M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 217, 223), and such troubles may already have hindered his actions in 860. In seeking Hincmar's motives, one should not ignore the obvious: by accepting Lothar's personal invitation to Aachen, Hincmar would betray his own views.

saw it at this time as a means of disinheritng Lothar. And yet, all accounts assume that when Hincmar entered the arena in the fall of 860 it was due to his willingness to put canon law into the service of Charles' political schemes. Hincmar is usually appreciated as a determined defender of canon law—fortunately, in this case, neatly coinciding with his firm loyalty to the dynastic interests of Charles the Bald. It has recently been objected, however, that Hincmar was more a jurist than defender of law, and that in the present case he was simply trying his hardest to find arguments in defense of Charles' potential claim to the Lothringian inheritance. This view, put forward by Carlrichard Brühl, certainly has much to commend it, but some caution must be observed before one interprets the archbishop as a Machiavellian.⁴

Brühl carefully considers a similar marriage problem which occurred somewhat later during the reign of Louis Balbus and comes to the conclusion that Hincmar held his tongue, objecting to the substitution of one wife for another would have seriously endangered effective government. Brühl argues that if Hincmar could have done it once, he was certainly capable of it earlier in the case of Lothar. If Hincmar acted

⁴Carlrichard Brühl, "Hinkmariana, II: Hinkmar im Widerstreit von kanonischem Recht und Politik in Ehefragen," Deutsches Archiv, XX (1964), 55-77. Brühl's argument rests on the silence of the Annales Bertiniani concerning the marital situation of Louis Balbus, but the question remains open as to whether Hincmar was always the author of these annales. Unanswered is just why the church hesitated to crown Adelheid if it was so indifferent to questions of canonical legitimacy. Brühl has not sufficiently clarified the issues behind Louis' marriages to come to really firm conclusions regarding the positions of the various parties involved.

in contradictory fashions in two comparable situations, and proved consistent only in loyalty to the monarch, then it would appear safe to treat him as primarily motivated by political considerations.

This, however, is open to question for a number of reasons. It ignores whether Hincmar's ideas may not have changed in the intervening years—a question with which we will deal in some detail. Furthermore, it overlooks a fundamental difference between the two marriage issues. Putting one wife aside to take another for political reasons was normal for the aristocratic society of this period. Charles had no reason to think that Lothar would hesitate to take any path assuring an heir to Lothringia. Lothar was neither old nor otherwise incapacitated, and five years of marriage is not such a long time that one might despair of having children. In short, by 860, Charles had no reason to expect any future claim on the Lothringian throne to emerge.

In August or September, 860, Hincmar wrote his De divortio Lotharii, intended as a major attack on Lothar's whole proceeding in the divorce case and probably also designated for the approaching council of Tousey in October and November. It seems rather odd that he would go to such troubles (De divortio takes up 148 folio pages in the Sirmond edition!) to press for a mode of handling marriage issues which thoroughly contradicted traditional practices accepted by most churchmen and was very unlikely to succeed. The reason for Hincmar's concern, however, is easier to understand if one recalls that

it was Lothar who had taken the initiative for the involvement of the church in promoting his political ambitions. It is imperative to consider whether, in fact, Hincmar's so active concern was not due precisely to the implications of this involvement. Indeed, it will become clear that Hincmar wished at any cost to avoid church-state relations as they had existed under Charlemagne, where the church had little independence and the political order depended on the unilateral will of the monarch.

Hincmar was anxious to see that the matters brought up at Tousey be decisively resolved, and although just what these matters were remains uncertain, it is probably that the divorce was one of them. The question remains whether Charles took the initiative by having Hincmar write his De divortio and by presenting it at Tousey as the first move in a vast and complex scheme aimed ultimately at depriving Lothar of a legitimate heir. If this were the case, however, then it would be hard to understand why Charles did not at Tousey push Hincmar's thesis so strongly as to have it lead to overt and immediate repercussions. The consideration of events in 860 suggests that Charles had little interest in pressing for a resolution of the divorce question until at least the fall of that year, when he offended Lothar by offering refuge to the condemned Teutberga. Hincmar, on the other hand, had taken an intransigent stand ever since the beginning of the year when he refused to attend the Aachen council. But in order to better understand Hincmar's motives, it is first necessary to

consider the content of his tract De divortio, written in August or September.

The first direction for investigating the ideas contained in the De divortio would be whether, as holder of an episcopal ministerium, Hincmar was compelled to take a stand on divorce. It is true that in the eighth and ninth centuries royal divorce was generally not a problem concerning canon law. We have the examples of Charlemagne's politically motivated marriage in 770 with Desideria, the daughter of the Lombard king, repudiated two years later, and that of Lothar I's marriage, dissolved without regard for Christian law. But in the ninth century, the political atmosphere was changing. Kings were now encouraged to act in conformity with Christian principles, and especially matters such as divorce could be considered under the aegis of the church. Hincmar, in particular, sought to place all political action within a Christian context wherein episcopal participation played a crucial role. Furthermore, that role was not to be passive, but entailed a positive obligation of admonishing the king and in some cases even deciding on the appropriateness of royal action. He felt too, that time was running out before the second coming and that every effort had to be made to bring political life into accord with the will of God.⁵ There is no

⁵This end-of-time consciousness is reflected in De divortio, inter. xv, resp.: "Sed non est mirum, si in istis temporibus ultimis talia Antichristi adventum praecurrentia veniunt. . . ." For the relation of end-of-time consciousness to a will for reform in the thought of Alcuin, see Friedrich Carl Scheibe, "Geschichtsbild, Zeitbewußtsein und Reformwille bei Alcuin," Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, XLI (1959), 35-62.

reason to be surprised, then, that Hincmar pursued a determined course in the divorce issue as long as he recognized it to be a matter within the competency of his office.

The De divortio is cast in the form of long answers to the questions raised by the Aachen council of February which had condemned Teutberga. Probably the most important defense presented by the Lothringian bishops was that Lothar's divorce was an internal matter which could be adequately dealt with by them alone.⁶ Hincmar's response was that there was essentially but one kingdom, the Ecclesia, of which Christ was the head, and one Christian law, from which there was no appeal. The nature of the case demanded that it be handled by the highest worldly authority within the Ecclesia, that is, by a general council.⁷

Hincmar's justification for making the divorce a church question sheds light on his theory of spiritual cooperation and the role of the episcopal office within it. The

⁶De divortio, quaest. 1: "Dicunt quidam quoniam rex Hlotharius habet in sue regne episcopos, et nobiles, ac fideles laicos, quorum consensu atque consilio causam inter se et uxorem suam diffinivit, et non ad alterius regni episcopos, vel ad alios quoscumque inde aliquid pertinet retractare."

⁷Ibid., quaest. 1, resp.: "Unum regnum, una Christi columba, videlicet sancta ecclesia, unius Christianitatis lege, regni unius et unius ecclesiae, quamquam per plures regni principes et ecclesiarum praesules gubernacula moderentur. Sed et haec de qua agitur talis est causa, quae generaliter ad omnes Christiane nomine insignites pertinere noscatur." "Quapropter necesse est, ut haec generalis causa ad omnes generaliter pertinens, in omnium notitiam veniat, et generali diffinitione determinetur. . . ."

bond of love between husband and wife is analogous to that of Christ and the Ecclesia, for it is a mystical union based on a spiritual tie.⁸ As such, it becomes the responsibility of the church: the bishops are to be consulted concerning the relevant laws, and ignorance of them is no excuse for acting contrary to their dictates.⁹ It is a responsibility inherent within the episcopal ministerium to find in the Scriptures and patristic writings answers to questions upon which the church should decide.¹⁰ The De divertio is thus not an attempt to exonerate Teutberga any more than the letter of Quierzy to condemn Louis, but simply an appeal for a general council to correct the procedural and factual errors made earlier

⁸Ibid., inter. v, resp.: "Quid enim venerabilius quam ut coniugium mysterium sit Christi et ecclesiae? Quod sanctius quam ut sic deligant viri uxores suas, sicut Christus dilexit ecclesiam, tradens seipsum pro ea, ut illam sanctificaret atque mundaret? Quid carius atque coniunctius, quam ut vir caput sit mulieris, sicut Christus caput est ecclesiae ipse salvator corporis?" Hincmar wrote Gunthar of Köln at this time (M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 82): "publicis nuptiis honoravit et sibi in coniugii copula sociavit et unum corpus unamque carnem secum effecit, sicut scriptus est: 'Erunt duo in carne una; iam non sunt duo, sed una caro;' et: 'Quod Deus iunxit, homo non separet.'"

⁹De divertio, praef.: "Ad consacerdotes autem nostros ac per hoc ad nos ipsos sermo noster dirigitur, ut ea doceamus, quae Dominus docuit, ea praedicemus, quae ipsi obnixius conservemus. Quia, sicut scriptus est: 'Interroga sacerdotes legem' meam . . . et: 'Tenentes,' inquit, 'legem nescierunt me,' quoniam qui fide et operibus, vita et moribus, verbo atque exemplo commissis non praedicant, licet nomine tenus colant, secundum veritatem Dominum nesciunt, iuxta quod scriptus est: 'Qui ignorat, ignorabitur,' videlicet reprobabitur. Quocirca non est, unde securi, nisi de misericordia Dei, esse possimus."

¹⁰Ibid., quaest. vii: "Tandem de his, quae in hac epistola pervenisse ad nos memoravimus, quantum Domino inspirante, ex sanctarum scripturarum atque catholicorum patrum doctrina, pro nostra mediocritate sensimus, compellente veritate

at Aachen.

Another justification to which Hincmar replied was Lothar's claim that he could not submit to synodal judgment because of political necessity. A significant number of his fideles received the patronage of other kings, and if Lothar should find himself excommunicated, they could revolt against him. Hincmar objected that unjust patronage might well offend God and therefore cannot properly be used as an excuse for neglecting his duty.¹¹ As already shown, Hincmar was fundamentally opposed to government based on material interests alone, and especially, as in Lothar's case, when material engagements were contrary to one's obligations to the king.

Another issue was whether the secrecy of Teutberga's confession of guilt (extracted from her through considerable pressure) could be betrayed by her bishop during the Aachen trial because of his oath of fidelity to Lothar. Hincmar insisted that the bishop was no mere agent of the king, for his first responsibility was spiritual. Political obligations for churchmen were secondary, and the sanctity of confession could

et superimposito ministerio diximus, nullius sanae praeiudicantes sententiae, nec dehonorantes auctoritatem."

¹¹ Ibid., inter. xii, resp.: "Et si quis dixerit, adduci non potest ad iudicium, quia fultus aliorum patrocinioregum rebellionem tenet contra regem; qui pro hoc crimine, et etiam pro aliis, eum vellet in iudicium mittere si posset, istam quam habet ad iudicium ducit; ante oculos habeant domini nostri reges veridicam sententiam regis regum, qui est veritas et iudex. . . ." "Propterea timeant reges, qui talibus hominibus iniuste patrocinioregum praebent, de quorum tuitione Deum offendere possint, et ecclesiae ac pauperes Christi, et humiliores homines opprimuntur, de devastantur, et iusta iudicia exerceri non possunt."

not be compromised.¹² One might conclude that Hincmar was not moved to attack Lothar's position for political reasons so much as for church-constitutional ones. He did not object to the church's participation in Lothar's divorce case in principle, but he did object to the king's gathering a council of bishops—chosen for their pliability—in January, 860. Hopefully, a general council would encourage the bishops in speaking out freely and in a manner consonant with their spiritual obligations.

Another of Lothar's justifications challenged by Hincmar was that the king is both free of synodal judgment and above the law. Although Hincmar later proved capable of arguing for royal liberty from tradition, he stressed in De divortio that Lothar was obliged to preserve and execute the laws of his predecessors.¹³ The judgment of the divorce case must conform to the standard of justice.¹⁴ Kings should re-

¹²Ibid., inter. vii, resp.: "Et si scivit, et propter secretam confessionem reticuit, quare, quod absit sicut dicitur, ut iudicium inde fieret obtinuit, vel consensit, non reverens sententiam legis pariter et evangelii, 'Non tentabis dominum Deum tuum?' "Si fidelitatem seniori suo promisit, quomodo huic inlusioni contra illum consentire praesumpsit? Et si tunc inter duo pericula positus, minus de iuramento negligere elegit, ut maius ne proditor confessionis fieret divitaret, quare ipsam confessionem nunc prodidit?"

¹³Ibid., quaes. v, resp.: "Capitula sunt legalia imperatorum et regum praedesessorum suorum, quid sustinere debeat qui post banum latronem receperit, et in chirographo regum nostrorum hinc expresse decernitur, cuius ministerium est agere, ut illa observentur. . . ." For liberty from tradition, see chapter X below.

¹⁴Ibid., inter. xii, resp.: "Haec dicimus, ut secundum rationem et legis ordinem cuncta agant regni principes, et ecclesiae sanctae rectores, sed et cum aequitatis iudicio supra scripta causa diffiniatur."

cognize that they are mortals just as other men and the elevation to their high office does not free them from law. Particularly in light of the Christian nature of the royal office and the role of episcopal consecration by which it is entered, kings, in particular, are obliged to observe Christian precepts just as the bishops themselves.¹⁵ Hincmar repeats again and again that Lothar cannot avoid subjection to the law. Royal acts, particularly in the case at hand, must be in concordia with the authority of Scriptures and ecclesiastical regulations.¹⁶ Although some wise men might say that the king is subject to no laws and judgments except those of God, Hincmar objects to this as a blasphemous suggestion of the devil, for if the king does not act in accord with what the nomen of his office implies (which Hincmar naturally assumes

¹⁵ Ibid.: "Et non dicant reges, hoc de episcopis et non est de regibus constitutum: sed attendentes quia si sub uno rege ac sacerdote Christo, a cuius nominis derivatione Christi Domini appellantur, in populi regimine sublimati et honorati esse desiderant, cuius honore, et amore, atque timore, participatione magni nominis domini et reges vocantur, cum sint homines sicut et ceteri, et partem cum his in regno caelorum habere volunt, qui sacro peruncti sunt chrismate, quod a Christi nomine nomen accepti, qui exinde unxit sacerdotes, prophetas, reges, et martyres, ille unctus oleo laetitiae prae consortibus suis, quique fecit eos in baptismo reges et sacerdotes Deo nostro, et genus regium, ac regale sacerdotium, secundum apostolos Ioannem et Petrum: intelligant et credant se in oculis Dei privari regi nominis et officii dignitate, quando si illud placitum Deo fuit quod manu firmaverant, faciunt contra manus suae conscriptionem, licet illud nomen usurpent ante oculos hominum terrena et instabili potestate. . . ."

¹⁶ Ibid., quæst. vii: "His denique perpensis, et aliis, quæ propter prolixitatem omisimus ponere, sanctarum scripturarum, et regularum ecclesiasticarum auctoritatibus, considerato etiam periculo quisque suo, sed et is de quo aditur, ad se redeat, et aut actum suum rationi et auctoritati evidenter concordare demonstret. . . ."

Lothar has failed to do), he falls within the purview of the law.¹⁷

In conclusion, it can well be said that the ideology of De divortio and the motives for its writing are of the same cloth as Hincmar's reform program of February, 859. The jurisdiction of the church in the matter rests upon his idea of the Ecclesiae already formulated. Hincmar's right to interfere arose as the result of his previously formulated idea of the episcopal office and the need for the bishops to take an active part in, if not the initiative for, reform. As for his denying the freedom of the king from law, it represents a basic weapon in his battle to prevent a return to a personalized form of government, whether in the divorce case or in connection with Louis the German's invasion into West Francia. One must conclude on the basis of De divortio's content that there is no indication that Hincmar needed to develop new lines of political thought or seriously modify old ones in order to find objections in the case of Lothar's divorce. This is not to deny that he may have had political motives or that Charles could have instigated Hincmar to concern himself with the case. But on the other hand, a theoretical con-

¹⁷Ibid., quaest, vi: "Dicunt quoque etiam aliqui sapientes, quia este princeps rex est, et nullorum legibus vel iudiciis subiacet, nisi solius Dei, qui eum in regno, quod suus pater illi dimisit, regem constituit, et si voluerit pro hac vel alia causa ibit ad placitum, vel ad synodum, et si noluerit, libere et licenter dimittet." Responsio: "Haec vox non est catholici Christiani, sed nimium blasphemii, et spiritu diabolico pleni." "Quod dicitur, quia rex nullorum legibus vel iudiciis subiacet, nisi solius Dei, verum dicitur, si rex est sicuti nominatur."

sideration of De divortio suggests his involvement and the position he took were the logical outcome of factors not immediately related to the Lothringian question.

If we conclude that Hincmar's participation in the crisis of 858-59 and the divorce arose from certain theoretical concepts—from his view of social structures (whether marital or political) finding their cohesion in a fusion of legal forms and the spirit of love—then one understands the crucial role played by the sacerdotal office. Further evidence that Hincmar interested himself in such bonds for their intrinsic significance is provided by two other complex marriage questions not having immediate bearing on Lothar's divorce.

The first of these concerned the Italian Count Boso, whose wife Engeltrude had abandoned him and sought refuge in Lothar II's realm. The council of Savonières in 859 may have taken cognizance of the case, but nothing was resolved concerning her return to her husband. In Aachen in February of 860, Boso and Engeltrude were invited to testify, but since Boso ignored this opportunity to assert his case, the bishops felt that they could not pass judgment. Feeling perhaps that he would get fairer treatment at the Koblenz conference in June, Boso went there with an appeal to Lothar not to give his wife asylum, but Lothar proved to be unresponsive. Boso saw that he could accomplish little north of the Alps and so returned to Italy to seek the aid of Pope Nicholas I. At the council of Tousey, held in October and November, Boso returned north with letters from Nicholas objecting to Engeltrude's

freedom. Although in 862 Charles was to make Lothar's intransigence a principal accusation against him, the West Frankish king appears not to have had much interest in the matter when at Koblenz and Tousey the conditions would have been ideal to attack his nephew.¹⁸

In the autumn of 860 Hincmar wrote Gunthar of Köln, in whose diocese Engeltrude had found asylum, expressing many of the same theoretical points found in his De divortio. In marriage, two persons become one in the spiritual bond of their love. How can Gunthar then separate the two or permit one member of this spiritual corpus to leave the other? Moreover, he should consider that Boso loved his wife dearly and had accused her of no crime, and only her leaving him encouraged him to commit adultery.¹⁹ The principal issue is to de-

¹⁸ Charles recalled Tousey in 862 (Conventus apud Saponarias, a. 862, cap. iv): "Quando altera vice pro his, quae dixi, tractandis ad Tusiaceum veni, adportavit mihi et episcopis regni nostri Boso ex parte domni apostolici epistolas quasdam nepoti nostro et episcopis regni sui mittendas, quas illas secundum mandatum domni papae transmisimus, quasdam autem nobis legendas et observandas, quarum et his textum habemus: in quibus invenimus nos increpatos, cur fornicarios in regno nostro immorari permitteremus et non solum ipsam feminam, sed . . ." "Nos autem audivimus praedictam feminam in regno nepotis nostri commorari, et hanc sententium postea audivimus immutatam."

¹⁹ Sirmond, II, 670: "et sibi in coniugii copula sociavit, et unum corpus unamque carnem secum effecit. . . ." "Unde tanto coniuncti sunt amplius quanto et spiritualius. . . ." "Quomodo poteris inferiorem partem corporis hominis illius, qui sub alterius providentia degit, separare, et tenere sub poenitentia, quae nec orationi continenter sine consensu partis superioris vacare potest?" Ibid., p. 671: "Et quoniam, sicut ipse Boso dicit, eidem mulieri, quae caro sua est, nullam crimen impingit, sed non modicam negligentiam, quia ab eius se subtraxit servitio, et quantum ex ipsa est, illum moechari fecit, contra auctoritatem atque iustitiam eum dimittens, et in aliis regnis circiter per triennium immorans, contumax mandatis illius adeo extitit. . . ."

cide whether the church can permit the breaking of a spiritual corpus by offering asylum. Hincmar encourages Gunthar to apply the law severely, for upon it rests the peace and tranquillity of Christendom.²⁰ Although the kings were to some degree involved in Boso's marriage case, it was primarily because Boso and his wife had appealed to them for support. Neither king seems to have been actively interested in the matter until later when each was seeking excuses to attack the other. Apparently, Hincmar concerned himself with marriage cases, not from political or material motives, but for their theoretical implications and his understanding of the episcopal office.

There was yet a third marriage issue at Tousey which engaged Hincmar's subsequent attention and one even further removed from possible political motives. Here the domestic difficulties of Count Stephen of Auvergne came up for discussion, the result of which was Hincmar's lengthy letter stating his opinion on the matter. It seems that Stephen claims to have had intercourse with a relative of his spouse before marrying her and therefore refused to consummate the marriage. Hincmar felt that although there was no proof of Stephen's sin, nevertheless, non-consumation of a marriage was sufficient grounds for divorce. In this letter he also pointed out that husband and wife became one in a mystical bond of

²⁰ M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 85: "scrutare caesarum nostrorum capitula et invenies, quantum profuerit atque prosit legum severitas non solum ecclesiasticae lenitati, verum totius Christianitatis optandae paci et colendae tranquillitati."

love—the same argument which played so important a role in the cases of Teutberga and Engeltrude.²¹ This mystical bond of love, whether applied to discussions of the Trinity, or to marriage, or even to political life, appears to have been central to Hincmar's conception of how individuals might act in accord to achieve order and true peace without losing their essential freedom or identity. The logical strictures of law assured an explicit framework of action, but without love—that is, caritas as a norm of political or marital life—the whole remains mechanical, lacking either purpose or spirit.

The applications of Hincmar's ideas in theology, though not directly related to political events, is nevertheless illuminating. His major concern during the years 859-861, if one can judge by the length of writings the importance attached to their subject, was in an area entirely unconnected with Lothar's divorce. At the same time that he was seeking reform in church and government after the invasion of 858, he wrote two works attacking the theological position of Gottschalk of Orbais—the ninth-century's outstanding heretic. In June of 859, when the reform efforts were at their peak, Charles the Bald presented Hincmar with a series of capitula relating to Gottschalk's teaching on predestination, reques-

²¹ M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 99-100: "quae ut plurimum in omni salutari actione, tum etiam in hoc negotio, in quo per nuptiale mysterium vir et uxor una caro efficiuntur, sed et in baptismo operosius operatur, quo per fidei sacramentum, non solum generaliter omnis ecclesia corpus Christi, ut dicit apostolus, et plenitudo fit eius, verum singillatim singulus quisque fidelis Christo incorporatus membrum eius efficitur."

ting the archbishop to write a rebuttal. Hincmar's response, De praedestinatione contra Gothescalum, taking up over 400 pages in the Sirmond edition, is a marshalling of sources which Hincmar felt adequately responded to all the points in the capitula. He employed the same method a year or two later in De una et non trina deitate to attack another of Gottschalk's teachings. Neither of these works were original in the matter of doctrine; however, the theological foundations are the same which lay at the base of De divortio and, in fact, his entire theory of office.

Transcending the apparent diversity of the world is the unity which comes from God.²² The very purpose of his writing the De una et non trina deitate was to establish the essential oneness of the Trinity: a mystical and spiritual unity comparable to that which in De divortio was claimed to bind the Ecclesia and marriage. Divorce, like heresey, threatens that concordant unity and thus becomes an act of the greatest evilness. Hincmar observed that in violating the law or doctrine of the church one is guilty of schism from the body of Christ.²³ The bishops are considered the pastors and teach-

²²De una et non trina deitate, cap. xi: "ac per hoc unam deitatem, unam sanctitatem, unam vitam, unam sapientiam, unam gloriam, unum timorem, unum amorem, unam caritatem, unam lucem, unam salutem, unam virtutem, unam pacem, unam caritatem, unam maiestatem, unam potestatem, unam pietatem,"

²³Ibid., cap. i: "Nemo igitur catholicus contra auctoritatem, nemo pacificus contra Ecclesiae pacem certare audeat, ne schismaticus et non catholicus inveniatur, et a Christi corpore separetur. Admonendi sunt ergo subdidi ab ecclesiae sanctae praepositis, ut sacrae legis verba recte intelligant, et si per se intelligere non potuerint, iuxta praeceptum divinae auctoritatis, 'interrogent patres suos et ad-

ers of the people and governors of the church.²⁴ As such, they have the divinely imposed office of deciding on doctrinal questions.²⁵ Reflecting the activist attitude of Hincmar during these years is his belief that his ministry requires that he speak out and that it is superfluous to collect the law unless it is applied.²⁶

There is little evidence that when Hincmar wrote De divortio he acted as the instrument of Charles the Bald's expansionist ambitions. On the other hand, there is ample reason to believe that Hincmar's involvement in the Teutberga case arose as a natural consequence of his theoretical and legal preoccupations of the preceding years. Although he may have realized that his stand would ultimately profit himself and his king, and although his firm posture was in part due to the self-assertive nature of his personality, the available evidence suggests that both the will to act and the form of his involvement were a product of ideological preconditions.

nuntiabant illis, maiores suos et docebant illos."

²⁴Ibid.: "Nos quoque pastores et doctores nobis commissarum plebium, et episcopi ac gubernationes ecclesiae. . ."

²⁵Ibid., prologus: "Quapropter ministerio dignatione divina indignitati meae imposito, ad hanc sollicitudinis curam ac studium non modo vestris petitionibus sum invitatus, verum et tractus. . . ."

²⁶De praedestinatione, cap. xxxvii: "De hoc autem unde certi sumus, et quae sine periculo licet multis sint cognita tegere silentio non valeamus, quaeque pro ministerio nobis imposito his quae praemisimus subiungere ex auctoritate ecclesiastica commonemur, opportune importune volentibus et nolentibus ingerere procuramus." Ibid., cap. xxxvi: "Sed superfluum est leges colligere, cum adhuc nemo personam studet signatius demonstrare."

Any effort to summarize the import of Hincmar's involvements in the years 859-860 must acknowledge the difficulty in synthesizing the diversified nature of his concerns. It does appear, however, that the vacuum in leadership in West Francia during the crisis of 858-59 permitted the church under Hincmar's inspiration to seek to restore peace to the land through its own concept of order. If this was only anticipated by the letter of Quierzy, it was fully developed by Hincmar as a comprehensive reform program shortly thereafter. This program was not without implications for international diplomacy and the internal constitution of the realm, and it was the fruitfulness of these implications more than anything else which would determine whether Charles the Bald would willingly adopt Hincmar's suggestions.

The immediate relevance of Hincmar's ideas to political life centered on his views regarding the interaction of offices within Christendom. Because each office holder had a direct relation to God, the action of every officer was justified by its role in carrying out the divine will. In turn, this meant that as long as everyone acted in a spirit of humility, their individual and joint decisions would be in accord, and there was no need for an absolute and unilateral authority. International or internal difficulties could best be resolved by the cooperation of kings, magnates, and bishops in common council. To a certain extent, this represented the actual state of affairs, for thus far Charles had insufficient power to act unilaterally against the combined weight of the

magnates of West Francia.

The first test of the applicability of Hincmar's ideas for resolving international disputes culminated at the meeting of Koblenz in 860, where compromise was reached on a personal basis rather than through collective action. One suspects, but cannot be certain, that this meeting in June of 860 marked the beginning of Charles' turning away from the views of his episcopal advisor. When one shifts the focus of attention to Hincmar's involvement in Lothar's divorce case, it is important to ascertain to what extent the archbishop acted on his own rather than as the obliging servant of the king. It was argued that Charles' intense interest in the divorce followed well after Hincmar's writing of De divortio Lotharii and the council of Tousey in the fall of 860. Furthermore, it seems likely that Hincmar's involvement in this matter arose in part because of Lothar's cynical use of the church in Teutberga's trial and also due to the archbishop's interpretation of marriage as analogous to government. In short, it appears unlikely that Hincmar tailored his admonitions to suit the political aspirations of the king—had had been too openly critical of Charles for that, and certainly his constitutional views were not too flattering to the royal ego. If Charles' indifference to Hincmar's advice did not crush his spirit, it becomes interesting to see under what conditions he indeed would be compelled to modify his views. These conditions emerge soon enough in his contest with Pope Nicholas I in the case of Bishop Rothad of Soissons.

CHAPTER VII

THE FAILURE OF HINCMAR'S EARLY CONCEPT OF MINISTERIUM, 860-65

The concordance of spiritual and worldly offices assumed that in each the holder of a ministerium acted in accord with the will of God. Hincmar felt that if all were to put aside superbia and personal interest, discord would no longer disrupt a mutual cooperation for achieving the optimum worldly conditions for salvation. However, as long as Hincmar's ideas made little provision for human shortcomings or a possible disparity of interest between the church and the secular government, there was little chance for his ideas being widely accepted. The study of the assembly of Koblenz and Hincmar's De divortio has shown that the extent to which Charles was willing to consider ideas which assumed the existence of an Ecclesia depended on his own political objectives. Further events in the 860's were to be no exception to this rule.

One example will suffice to show the extent to which Hincmar was unwilling to accept the realities of power politics. In October of 861, Charles the Bald invaded the realm of his nephew, Charles of Provence. The Annales Bertainiani, usually indicative of Hincmar's own views, claimed that Charles invaded at the invitation of certain men (probably a

faction hostile to Count Gerard of Vienne, the regent and de facto ruler) because Charles of Provence was "useless and rules in a manner incongruent with the royal honor and nomen."¹ That is, because his rule failed to conform to the objective definition of his office, the necessity for a restoration of concordia justified outside interference.

Gerard undoubtedly penetrated Charles the Bald's motives, for he wrote Hincmar "indicating that Charles, the King of Francia, wanted to snatch secretly for himself the kingdom of his senior, Charles of Cisalpine Gaul." Hincmar responded to Gerard's letter by stating that this was not at all Charles' intention.² In 858, Hincmar had argued that a realm ruled by an incompetent king could only be annexed after a general council, comprising everyone involved, including the bishops as interpreters of God's will, had agreed that it was the proper course of action.³ From Hincmar's viewpoint, the difficulties facing Provence could only be resolved by the concordant action of bishops and kings, and Charles the Bald should have had no other objective in mind than to initiate

¹Annales Bertiniani, a. 861: "karolus . . . a quibusdam invitatus quasi regnum Provinciae adepturus, quoniam Karolus, Hlotharii quondam imperatoris filius, inutilis atque inconueniens regio honori et nomini ferebatur, cum uxore Burgundiam usque ad civitatem Matescensius peragrat" For these and the other events discussed in this chapter, the most convenient survey is that of Calmette, op.cit.

²M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 115: "Item pro his, quae sibi litteris idem Gerardus significaverat, scilicet quod Karolus Franciae rex senioris ipsius Karoli Cisalpinæ Galliae regis regnum sibi vellet subripere, quod ipse domnus Hincmarus nequaquam fieri asserit."

³Epistola synodi Carisiacensis, cap. xv.

such proceedings. But the actions of Gerard and possibly of Charles the Bald himself were dictated by their own ambitions.

The early 860's provide a number of examples showing the failure of a general mixed council to resolve problems in which personal interests and ambitions were involved. Besides the question of Lothar's divorce from Teutberga, there was also the problems of Count Boso's wife Engeltrude, who sought asylum in Lothar's realm despite the disapproval of Charles the Bald, and the king's daughter Judith, who had eloped with Count Baldwin of Flanders. In 862 Charles had reason to think a council would resolve these and other disputes in a manner favorable to his own hopes and thus called for a meeting at Savonnières in which Hincmar had a guiding hand. Here it was stated that since the various questions were ones which affected the whole of Christendom, a general council incorporating both fideles and bishops should be called to handle them.⁴ But rather than the council's solving the problems, Boso and Lothar preferred to turn to the papacy for support presumably in the expectation that their personal action in Rome had better chance of success than opening the question to a general discussion.

The case which drew the greater part of Hincmar's at-

⁴Conventus apud Saponarias, a. 862, cap. ix: "quia vult secundum domni apostolici et episcopale, immo divinum consilium ad placitum convenire cum episcopis et fidelibus atque amicis Dei et nostris ac suis, quoniam haec causa generalis est omnibus christianis. . . ." This last phrase is identical to that which appears in De divortio, inter. iii. For Boso's appeal to Rome, see the letter of Bishop Arsenius directed to the bishops of Gaul (M.G.H., Epp., VI, no. 11).

tention during these early years of the 860's, which most clearly raised theoretical issues, and which ultimately had the most profound impact on his own ideological development was that of Bishop Rothad of Soissons. Since Rothad was his suffragan, the long years of an incompetent regime in Soissons obliged Hincmar to take active steps to remove him from his post. In 862 Rothad appeared at the synod of Pitres and declared that he would appeal his deposition to Rome, although Hincmar interpreted a purloined letter to signify that Rothad wished only to be retried by iudices electi and would renounce his appeal. While Rothad fretted in prison, Pope Nicholas and Hincmar began a contest of strength over the question, each seeking to make of Rothad's appeal a test of their respective opinions regarding the constitution of the church and the nature of priestly authority.

Hincmar took his first stand in a treatise (referred to here as Memorandum for the Trial of Rothad of Soissons) which he wrote in February or March of 863 to defend his previous course of action to Nicholas. Rothad had claimed that bishops had no right to depose their fellow bishops without the authority of Rome, to which Hincmar found a number of objections. First of all, Rothad had used the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals to support his position, and Hincmar stated that he was unwilling to accept conclusions drawn from them—whether because of their doubtful authenticity or Rothad's interpretation of them is uncertain.⁵ Hincmar also supported metro-

⁵Memorandum for the Trial of Rothad of Soissons, pars

politan authority as the fully competent representative of Rome by recalling the commission which Pope Zacharias had granted Boniface in the eighth century. Zacharias had specified that Boniface was the representative of the papal majesty within the whole of Gaul, and thus, Hincmar reasoned, his own metropolitan dignity had full competence within his province.⁶

Hincmar recognized that Nicholas' challenge of his handling of the Rothad case called forth a careful definition of the episcopal office, not simply as the papacy's regional representative, as Nicholas would have it, but fully competent within its own sphere of action. All bishops are given the authority of binding and of freeing men from sin; what distinguishes the papacy is that it in particular holds the keys to Heaven and has the power of final judgment.⁷ The archbishop had no intention of challenging papal authority or of asserting the complete autonomy of the provincial metropolitans from Rome, If all bishops fulfill the definition of their office, in seeking to accomplish the will of God on earth,

b, cap. x: "Nec perfunctorie transeundum est, quod quidam volentes Rothadum statuere qui nesciunt quae locuntur neque de quibus adfirmant, testimonia ex decretis Iulii papae atque Victoris et quorundam antiquorum apostolicae sedis pontificum ad suum confirmandum errorem adsumunt, dicentes, quod nullus episcopus sine auctoritate Romani pontificis possit deponi."

⁶ Ibid., pars a, cap. ix: "'Et non solum Baiouuariam, sed etiam omnem Galliarum provinciam, donec te divina iusserit superesse maiestas, nostra vice per praedicationem tibi iniunctam. . . .'" Ernst Dümmler, Geschichte des ostfränkischen Reiches (Leipzig, 1887-88), II, 88-96, gives a detailed account of the Rothad case.

⁷ Memorandum, pars a, cap. xxiii: "Omni igitur electorum ecclesiae . . . ligandi ac solvendi datur auctoritas. Sed ideo beatus Petrus, qui Christum vera fide confessus, vero

then there can be no discordance between the action of a bishop and the pope. Ideally "their governing is coordinate, their decisions canonically compatible, and their judgments in agreement."⁸ Thus there could be no objection to a metropolitan passing judgment on one of his suffragans, for a metropolitan has full authority over his province and, as the holder of an office which demands the conformity of his acts to the will of God, he has no reason to fear that his decisions will differ from those of the papacy. As for the reason why Hincmar felt that it was more fitting for a local synod to pass judgment rather than Nicholas himself, he observed that the necessitas inherent within the particular situation provided both the rationale and authority for his doing so.⁹

This recognition that necessitas—the demands of the local situation—must play a crucial role in any definition of episcopal office proved incompatible with Nicholas' insistence that Rome was the sole final repository of sacerdotal

est amore secutus, specialiter claves regni caelorum et principatum iudiciariae potestatis accepit. . . ."

⁸ Ibid., pars a, cap. xxii: "Sic et quicumque nostrum dignatione divina primates provintiarum constituti sub apostolicae petrae iudicio iudicamus vel cum decretis illius una cum coepiscopis nostris decernimus: apostolica est sedes, quae in nobis famulis suis et pro patribus natis filiis, id est pro apostolis ordinatis episcopis, in ordinandis coordinat et in decernendis canonice condecernit et in iudicandis coniudicat."

⁹ Ibid., pars a, cap. xxi: "Cum haec ita se habeant, nos, ubi rationes et auctoritates perurget necessitas, et iudicia canonica exequimur et culpandi non sumus, quoniam aliter erga fratres non agimus, quam apostolicae sedis papae fieri placet quamque quod ipsa prima in toto orbe terrarum sedes fiendum esse decrevit. Quae non inter se adversa neque diversa tenemus."

authority. The difference between Hincmar's and Nicholas' position was profound, for it reflected the deepest possible disparity between their respective epistemologies. For Hincmar, all that was required was humilitas for an assurance that the bishop's perception of truth become validated and his decisions in accord with the will of God. In contrast to this Benedictine view, Nicholas reflects the Roman imperial tendency to concentrate virtus in the head of a hierarchy from which all authority is delegated, but which alone has a proximity with the Absolute making certain the righteousness of its decisions. Furthermore, it should be now clear that Hincmar's idea of political office was cut of the same cloth as this view of his own episcopal ministerium, and an attack upon the one idea was also a challenge to the other. Just as he appealed to necessitas in a vain attempt to halt Nicholas' undercutting of his idea of episcopal ministerium (the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals were in large part enactments stemming from the Roman imperial church), so, as will be shown, necessitas became the springboard for a re-definition of political office free of the encroachment of Rome.

Both Nicholas and Hincmar saw in the Rothad case an opportunity for asserting the predominance of their own office within the church and thus both fought bitterly for jurisdiction. The pope wrote a number of forceful letters to his opponents in the north asserting his own prerogative in all church matters, particularly when it was a question so serious as the deposition of a bishop. One of his arguments,

which no one had really denied, was that the pope was clearly the final authority and judge in cases within his jurisdiction, and to resist him would be both wrong and fruitless. Hincmar felt that in the Rothad case his own judgment had been adequate, but once an appeal was made to Rome, the pope naturally had final say in the matter.

In October of 863, Nicholas wrote Queen Irmentrude, who together with her husband, Charles the Bald, had been doing everything they could to prevent the decisions in this and other critical issues from slipping out of their own and Hincmar's grasp. He stated that the pope's responsibilities were comparable to that of a king: what monarch can refuse to listen to the pleas of an abused subject?¹⁰ Nicholas believed the viability of the whole church depended upon the efficacy of central control. Nowhere in his letters does there appear Hincmar's thesis that ordo and concordia within the church are dependent upon the spiritual bond uniting all holding the priestly office with God. For Nicholas, it is simply the undisputed and decisive will of Peter's vicar on earth which brings a unity of purpose and a coordination of action in worldly terms. Earlier in this year, Nicholas had written the bishops gathered at Soissons to judge Rothad, that only through the observation of papal decretals and protection of Rome's

¹⁰ M.G.H., Epp., VI, 376: "Quis, rogo, in toto orbe regni vestri lesus aut ledendus clamaret umquam ad sublimitatem vestram, cuius vos vocem postponeretis et non magis ultione districta ipsius iniurias vindicaretis? Et nos, quo modo oritari videmini, ut vocem sanguinis fratris nostri non exaudiamus?"

prerogatives can the privileges of the whole church be defended against the assaults of the wicked—by implication, Hincmar.¹¹

The other prong of Nicholas' rebuttal of Hincmar's Memoradnum was an attack on the idea of necessary concordance. Since the pope had thus far not been able to bring Rothad to Rome so as to clear him of charges and restore him to his see, and thereby to prove in fact that discordance was a very real possibility, it was necessary for him to undercut Hincmar's theoretical arguments. Charles the Bald had cooperated with the archbishop in preventing Rothad from appearing in Rome within the time specified; such action by the holder of the royal office would be quite permissible given Hincmar's theory of the concordant action of secular and ecclesiastical offices. But Nicholas wrote Charles that such interference by the hand of secular government was inappropriate, for the papal decisions in this matter were either manifestly just, or, if obscure for him, were nevertheless done with sufficient reason.¹² But Nicholas also argued against the compatibility of human and divine law. The bishops gathered at Soissons had appealed to imperial law to justify their course of action, and Nicholas found this not at all proper, for much which is permitted by human law is prohibited by divine.¹³ Thus Nicho-

¹² M.G.H., Epp., VI, 371: "Itaque, carissime, cum vestrae regiae potestati ab apostolica sede interdum duriora fuerint missa, non moleste feratis nec vos a nobis odio habitos esse putetis, quoniam aut manifeste iusta sunt nostrae correctionis iacula aut certe occulta sunt et aliquam habentia rationem."

las persisted in the Roman imperial separation of church and state, failing to grasp Hincmar's theory of dynamic interaction in one spiritual body.

Hincmar, in his subsequent letters, had no recourse but to repeat and refine his own arguments regarding the concordance of papal and episcopal action, for he did not wish to challenge the principle of final papal arbitration in matters beyond episcopal competence.¹⁴ This involved him in a careful delineation of his theory of spiritual corporation, wherein all members—the holders of ecclesiastical offices—worked in a necessary accord. Under no circumstances would be doubt the efficacy of the given authority structure as an expression of the *ordo* layed down by God.¹⁵ But this does not mean that all action is a result of the unilateral and arbitrary will of the head of the corpus. Each person acts with-

¹³M.G.H., Epp., VI, 357: "Insuper autem . . . imperatorum leges proponitis, quibus quasi prohibentibus astruere non habuisse appellationis vocem Rothadum nitimini, cum constet in ius mundanum legum et imperatorum non omnibus ecclesiasticis controversiis utendum esse, praesertim cum conveniatur evangelicae ac canonicae sanctioni aliquotiens obviare." "Ecce quemadmodum imperiali iudicio non possint ecclesiastica iura dissolvi, ecce qualiter, quod lex humana concessit, lex divina prohibeat."

¹⁴M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 154: "Et haec dico, non, quod absit, praediudicans summae sedis apostolicae et sancti apostolatus vestri potestatem in aliquo, cui in omnibus sum, sicut rectum est, oboedire paratus; sed quia summae auctoritati vestrae obsequium praestare me puto, cum ea, quae sentio, aut ad probationem aut ad correctionem humiliter sapientiae vestri magisterii pando." Note the nexus of humility and true knowledge.

¹⁵M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 153-54: "ut cognoscatur, qualiter minores potioribus debeant oboedire et potiores minoribus providere et ordo a Deo dispositus ab omnibus et in omnibus valeat conservari."

in his ministry in accordance with his own ability and in response to God's will.¹⁶ Thus, what makes the various members of a body work in accord is not their exact duplication of the action of the head, but each functioning according to its own nature and ability to carry out the divine plan.

Having established the competency of the lower offices within the church constitution, Hincmar went on to quote canon law to the effect that cases should not be appealed from provincial synods to Rome, for if the matter is locally handled, it is not difficult to obtain witnesses and discover the truth so that the case is decisively terminated.¹⁷ It is here that Hincmar's epistemology plays a key role, for he does not distinguish the discovery of God's will and ordinary rational processes such as adjudication. Rather than a mystic revelation of the divine will, Hincmar saw God's guiding hand working through the human effort to discover truth by an in-

¹⁶M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 154: "Unde summus ecclesiae pastor docet: 'Si quis ministrat, tamquam ex virtute, quam administrat Deus, ut in omnibus honorificetur Deus,' qui servis suis commisit negocia sua et 'uniquique secundum propriam virtutem,' sicut et de spiritu sancto scriptum est, quod 'dona dividit singulis, prout vult.'"

¹⁷Ibid.: "Et hinc iuxta Sardicense concilium summus primae et sanctae sedis Romanae pontifex pro examinis renovatione ad se reclamantis et confugientis cum sua clamazione deiectioni provincialis episcopi non statim singularitate privilegii et auctoritatis suae restituit, sed remittens eum ad provinciam, ubi causa patrata fuerat et in qua iuxta Cartaginenses canones et iura legis Romanae causa potest diligenter inquiri et quo non sit difficile testes producere, veritas inveniri, aut finitimis episcopis dignatur scribere aut e latere suo mittit, qui habentes eius auctoritatem praesentes cum episcopis iudicent et diligenter causam inquisitam diffiniant, aut dignatur credere episcopos sufficere, ut negocia terminum possint imponere."

terpretation of legal sources and rational argument. It then stands to reason that it would be far easier for a local synod having direct contact with the facts in a case to make judgment in conformity to God's will than a distant and poorly informed court in Rome. In fact, Hincmar observed, canon law provides that illness or some other necessity or impossibility inherent in the situation may be just cause for a bishop's refusing to present himself before the pope.¹⁸ Papal compassion in the Rothad case might well harm the vigor of the church by encouraging others into similar wrongdoing. If papal moderation prevails, such could easily happen in those regions far remote from Rome.¹⁹ Hincmar well appreciated that rational concordance of action among offices would only be possible in those days of difficult communications if local decision-making bodies had full competence to deal with their own problems.

The Rothad dispute reflects the deep epistemological cleavage separating the papacy from Hincmar in the north. The

¹⁸ M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 151: "quoniam vestra auctoritas illum cum nostris vicariis ad suum praeceptum destinari iudicium, dignum et iustum est, ut, quemcumque episcopum Romanus pontifex ad se Romam venire mandaverit, si infirmitas vel gravior quaecumque necessitas vel impossibilitas, sicut sacri praefigunt canones, eum non detinuerit, ad illum venire studeat. . . ."

¹⁹ M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 158: "videlicet ut sic Rothado ab auctoritate vestra compassio exhibeatur, ut vigor ecclesiasticus non dissolvatur, et sic vigor ecclesiasticus conserveatur, ut debita misericordia et necessaria sufficientia ei non denegetur, quatinus nec ipsius exemplo ad excedendum alii provocentur; ne, quibus in istis regionibus longius ab apostolica sede remotis censurae ecclesiasticae moderatio est commissa, hinc, quod absit, conspiciant. . . ."

fusion of spirit and the world is what really characterizes Hincmar's belief that the worldly action of local synods can participate in the perfect spirit of God's grace to realize the divine will in its decisions. Nicholas accepted the same categories of thought, but being uninfluenced by the Benedictine achievement, tended to feel that spiritual action should be kept from being corrupted by worldly involvement. To evaluate the impact of this epistemological dichotomy on eighth-century Frankish-papal diplomacy or even much later on the Investiture Controversy is not the concern of the present study of Hincmar's thought. Suffice it to say that its presence appears very real in the archbishop's dispute with Rome in the 860's.

In retrospect, Nicholas' victory in the Rothad affair seems a foregone conclusion. Even if he had chosen to come to grips with Hincmar's theory of office, only to fail in rebutting it, the basic fact would nevertheless persist that there was no disputing Rome's right to final arbitration. Under threat of excommunication, Hincmar had no choice but to let Rothad go to Rome where he was exonerated in all respects and restored to his see of Soissons. Hincmar's status in West Francia, both as metropolitan and as an influential advisor of royal policies had been severely shaken.²⁰ Further-

²⁰In general one notes the Annales Bertiniani, a. 867: "Karolus autem, immemor fidelitatis atque laborum, quos pro eius honore et regni obtentu saepe fatus Hincmarus per plures annos subierat," For a general treatment for the reasons for Hincmar's fall from a position of influence and general exclusion from political life in these years, see Calmette, op.cit., pp. 101-102.

more, he was also faced with the undeniable fact that a well-informed and careful judgment of a synod had been found discordant with the decision of the pope in the same matter, which either meant the destruction of his idea regarding the organic relationship of offices within the Ecclesia or the presumption of superbia on the part of Nicholas.

There can be no denying that Nicholas' interest in the Rothad case was anything but altruistic and free of superbia. In addressing the decisive synod in Rome in December of 864, he made the sole theme the victory of his own constitutional views over the challenges raised by Hincmar and Charles the Bald.²¹ Again, in January, after Rothad was once more in theoretical possession of his see, he wrote Hincmar a gloating letter informing him that his effort to compromise his canonical and apostolic authority had been a total failure.²² Quick to take advantage of his position, Nicholas then wrote the bishops of Gaul to emphasize that they were in no circumstances to dissent from the decisions of the pope, who is the head of a single and unified church.²³ Hincmar's be-

²¹ In this letter which demands the synodal verification of Nicholas' own exalted idea of his position, he names his enemies (M.G.H., Epp., VI, 379): "Denique, fratres, cum praesens Rothadus a multis fuisset retro temporibus a metropolitano suo et quibusdam sectatoribus suis, etiam a sublimiori saeculi persona. . . ."

²² M.G.H., Epp., VI, 391: "Haec quippe nos in Rothaldo idcirco noveris operatos, ut privilegia sedis apostolicae, quae male a vobis violata esse videbantur et a nobis tot impensis laboribus vestra resistente contumacia recuperari non poterant, auctoritate apostolica et canonica patrum deliberatione pristino tandem genio et proprio decorarentur honore."

²³ M.G.H., Epp., VI, 392: "Quamvis singularum ecclesi-

lief that church offices could work in accord failed to meet the facts in the Rothad case largely because the people involved, perhaps including himself, acted with superbia in their hearts. Although his own approach to difficulties within the church was theoretically wiser, its failure to bring about satisfactory solutions for the problems facing West Francia meant that the concordance of ecclesiastical and secular offices would no longer be acceptable to Charles the Bald.

On February 19, 865, after Hincmar had been disgraced in the Rothad affair and after Nicholas had succeeded in putting Lothar on the defensive in his divorce case, an important meeting took place between Charles the Louis the German at Tousey. Its ostensive purpose was a reconfirmation of the accords reached in the past at Meerssen and Koblenz. The interview concluded with a recommendation to Lothar that he seek to live in peaceful accord with his uncles. Appointed to guarantee these royal declarations of good will were Hincmar for Charles the Bald and Bishops Liutbert and Altfred for Louis the German. But it appears that there had occurred some bargaining beneath the table which aroused suspicions in Lothringia that the hidden purpose of the meeting was to hatch plans at Lothar's expense.²⁴ Lothar, who should have been

arum, quae propter diversitatem terrarum multae esse dicuntur, cum una sit et unica sponso suo. . . ." "Unicam suam pastor et episcopus ac pontifex dominus noster Iesus Christus, qui hanc creavit et redemit, existat. . . ." Ibid., p. 393: "An episcopi de universali ecclesia non sunt, ut de illis dampnandis per vos aliquid ad unam sedem Petri non deferri curetur? Vel quomodo nil usquam a suo capite dissidet, cum de adiudicandis praecipuis membris ecclesiae, ed est episcopis, a capite, id est a sede apostolica, dissentitis?"

well informed, since the meeting was held within his territory and included his own representatives, surmised that Charles and Louis were actually planning to invade his realm.²⁵ In light of later accords, it appears likely that the future of the middle kingdom was indeed discussed, but whether the brothers intended to force the issue before Lothar's death remains uncertain.²⁶

Hincmar's role in these secret negotiations would remain obscure had he not later restated his position to Louis the German in the form of an exegetical interpretation of the passage in Psalm 103: "The trees of the plain are watered and also the cedars of Lebanon which He had planted; there the sparrows make their nests and the house of the heron is their leader." It appears that in the course of negotiations between the two kings, just prior to the pronouncement of their accord to the assembled fideles, Louis drew Hincmar aside to

²⁴The Lothringian bishops addressed a collective letter to the French (M.G.H., Epp., VI, 229): "Et si forte aliqui fraude et infidelitate sive cupiditate decepti, qui suo seniori cogitent, vel machinentur mala, vobis tamen non convenit iugem ducere cum infidelibus."

²⁵Annales Bertiniani, a. 865: "Hlotharius vero, putans quod sibi regnum subripere et inter se vellent dividere, Liutfridum, avunculum suum ad fratrem et Italiae imperatorem transmittit, petens illum apud apostolicum optinere quatenus pro eo patris suis epistolas mitteret, ut pacem servantes de regno suo nullum ei impedimentum facerent."

²⁶M.G.H., Epp., VI, 229: "Porro fatemur, quia nostro regi fideles sumus et esse cupimus, cui videlicet fidem de manu patris in regem excepto constanter promisimus." This suggests that the usual pre-invasion propaganda had already been circulated to the effect that the king was loosing the support of his followers, but more likely the bishops were simply taking a precautionary measure to discourage foreign plots.

sound him out regarding certain ideas.²⁷ Bishop Altfrid, Louis' chief advisor, had also been asked to participate, but before his arrival, Hincmar found time to reply to a number of the king's inquiries. This discussion seems to have followed a line of pointed argument. Louis first ascertained that all God's works are good and consequently, the law as found in the Scripture, if properly interpreted, represents the truth.²⁸ Just as Louis reached the object of his reasoning—the interpretation of the passage concerning the house of the heron as being their leader—by chance or by precise timing, Altfrid arrived, interrupted Hincmar, and with his "natural sound judgment and greater skill in disputation," began to impose his own interpretation on the passage. But they had not gone very far when Charles came up to Louis to inform him that it was time to pronounce the purpose of the gathering to the assembled fideles.²⁹

²⁷M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 168: "Nuper quando in Tusiaco cum domino meo rege Karolo unico fratre vestro locuti estis, sicut bene reminisci valetis, quadam die accersito Altfrido venerando episcopo apud exiguitatem meam secundum sapientiam vobis a Deo datam de quibusdam sacrae scripturae abditis et difficilioribus sententiis quaerere et subtiliter investigare coepistis, de quibus prout Dominus dedit, et opportunitas temporis ac loci permisit, respondere curavi."

²⁸Ibid.: "Sed inquisitio vestra eousque processit, ut et quaesitum atque dissertum foret, cum iuxta veritatem scripturae Genesis omnia opera Dei bona sint valde, quod et confirmat Apostolus dicens, 'omnia sunt munda mundis, et, nihil reiciendum quod cum gratiarum actione percipitur,' cur in lege quaedam immunda et non percipienda Dei populo describantur. Et cum quaestio traditione catholicorum extitit absoluta, interrogastis quid sibi vellet quod in Psalmo canitur, 'Herodii domus dux est eorum.'"

²⁹Ibid.: "Post [Altfrid] cum respondere inciperem . . . supervenit dominus meus rex Karolus inicus frater vester. Et commonente illo perrexistis ad adnuntiandum vestris fidei-

Hincmar thus had to put his own interpretation of the passage into a letter which he later addressed to the German king. His exegesis suggests that the discussion had implications regarding political theory. It would seem, then, that Altfrid and Louis sought to justify a certain standpoint at variance with Hincmar's own views. Also, although the matter may have originally come up during the personal discussions between Charles and Louis, it was neither resolved then, nor did it affect the overt accord which the two kings accounced to the fideles. It seems likely, then, that an important theoretical element in the secret negotiations remained unresolved. It also appears that either the rumor of the two kings' agreement to invade Lothringia was discussed but not agreed upon, or else, if the kings were in accord, Hincmar found himself in opposition to the covert settlement. This, of course, is merely speculation, but it is noteworthy that it would be two years before Hincmar again participated in the political life of West Francia.

Hincmar's letter relating to the house of the heron presents a Christian interpretation of the structure of society. The two lay orders, the populace and the nobility, Hincmar symbolizes respectively by the trees of the plain and the cedars of Lebanon. All men (trees) are nourished by God's grace (saturabuntur). The Lord also establishes the nobles and approves of their wealth and social distinctions. Thus the privileged class is to recognize that the advantages of

bus, quapropter conventus vester extiterit."

its members are derived not from the world, but from God.³⁰

Among the cedars the sparrows build their nests, that is, those who reject the world in Christian humility, whether they be churchmen or laymen, keeping nothing for themselves, and rely on the wealth of the houses and fields of Christians for their support.³¹ These contemptores mundi are often laymen whose hearts are filled by faith in Christ and whose works are a shining example of virtue.³² Hincmar has thus far delineated two general classifications of men. Those represented by trees are laymen living in the world, and the others—the sparrows—fly above it and depend on men living in the world for their support. All the trees of the plain, that is, all men, receive the bounty of God's grace, but the cedars of Lebanon—the nobility—have an added advantage of wealth and status given them by God on condition they use their position for God's purposes.

³⁰Ibid., p. 170: "Saturabuntur," inquit psalmus, 'ligna campi,' id est, plebes populorum, gratia spiritali, 'et caedri Libani,' id est nobiles atque sublimes mundi,' quas Dominus plantavit,' qui etiam de divitibus et inlustribus multos iustificavit, qui dicunt: Ipse fecit nos et non ipsi nos, quia sicut nos homines et inlustres, ita nihilominus et iustos fecit."

³¹Ibid.: "'Illic [in the cedars] passeret nidificabunt,' scilicet in istis caedris Libani, quas gratia Dei plantat et satiat, nidificabunt passeret, hi videlicet, qui elegerunt humilitatem et relictis quae habebant aut venditis nihil sibi in hoc saeculo reservarunt, sed divitum Christianorum domibus agrisque susceptis necessariis solaciis adiuvantur."

³²Ibid., p. 171: "passerum, id est mundi contemptorum; quia saepe etiam in saecularibus, in quorum cordibus per fidem habitat Christus et in quorum opere ipsius lucent exempla, non solum ecclesiastici vel monachi, in subditis praelati, in privatis regis potestate praecelsi, videre valent quod imitentur, verum et unde se reprehendant et erubescant. . . ."

The contemptores mundi include all who reject the world, whether churchmen, monks, or laymen. These are not ruled by the nobility, but by the sacerdotal order—the house of the heron.³³ There are two species of the heron, of which the greater flies faster and is able to overcome the eagle—that is, has greater authority and combats evil. By this Hincmar wishes to indicate that within the sacerdotal order, it is the bishops who are the rulers. It is they who rule the church and fight evil in the world in expectation of the second coming.³⁴ By the minor species of the heron, Hincmar signifies the lower clergy, who do not have such authority and therefore are not the rulers of the contemptores mundi.³⁵

It is the task of the bishops to use the power of the word to counter the force of evil in the world, showing men

³³Ibid., p. 170: "(passeres) tamen licet in caedrorum altitudine requiescant, non ipsis caedris ducibus utuntur, sed domus herodii dux est eorum."

³⁴Ibid., pp. 170-71: "Herodius enim maioris generis, ut verbis Hieronimi diximus . . . aquilam . . . vincit et comedit. Saepe enim in scripturis per aquilam significatur diabolus. Et iuxta evangelicam veritatem fortem armatum custodientem atrium suum et in pace sua possidentem, id est fortem diabolum, mundum, qui in maligno positus est, usque ad adventum salvatoris male pacato potentem imperio fortior superveniens Christus vicit et universa eius arma, in quibus confidebat, abstulit. . . ."

³⁵Ibid., p. 171: "Et nec in minore herodii genere haec intellegentia abhorret a vero, cum dicitur: 'Herodii domus dux est eorum; . . .'" "Cuius herodii domus passerum, id est mundi contemptorum. . . ." "Cuius herodii domus, id est rectores ecclesiae, dicente Paulo 'quae domus sumus nos,' duces passerum, mundi videlicet contemptorum, super egenum et pauperem intellegentium, sumptibus sustentatorum esse noscuntur."

how they can achieve salvation.³⁶ The bishops play a critical role in secular life, for those laymen in particular who are burdened with daily cares and subject to worldly frailties cannot live without some contagion of guilt. Especially those who have taken upon themselves heavier responsibilities will find that they are more severely judged by God for their use of worldly advantage.³⁷

It is interesting to note that Hincmar's two orders of society do not quite coincide with legal status (layman, priest), but with the relation a person has with the world. On one hand, there are those whose roots sink deeply into earthly concerns, and others, who fly between heaven and earth and rely on the contributions of men living in the world for sustenance. This is no hierarchic society, for all men are offered God's saving grace directly from on high, without intermediary. And yet, the two orders each contains a sub-

³⁶Ibid.: "Unde propheta dicit: 'Erubescere, Sydon; ait enim mare, fortitudo maris dicens. . . .' Per Sydon quippe religionis nomine quasi quadam fortitudine muniti et decorati, per mare autem saeculares intelleguntur, qui, ut verus herodius velocitate volatus et magnanimitate virtutis quasi capiens volucres semen iuxta viam comedentes, id est daemones verbum de corde audientium tollentes, ne credentes salvi fiant, coercet et comprimit, ne tantum possint temptare homines, quantum volunt, docet: 'Discite,' inquiens, 'a me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde,' parvi sunt apud se in corde et apud homines laude."

³⁷Ibid.: "Qui etsi cura rei familiaris ac terrena fragilitate adgravati, quamdiu in hac vita sunt, sine culpae contagio esse non possunt, tamen cum eis inest quod deprimat, multa virtus bonae actionis suppetit, quae illos in superna sustollat. Unde cum maximo timore ac tremore cumque maxima sollicitudine continue considerare atque timere debemus, ne nos, qui plus ceteris in hoc mundo accepisse aliquid cernimur, ab auctore mundi gravius inde iudicemur. Cum enim augentur dona, rationes etiam crescunt donorum."

group in a position of authority: the nobility to assure discipline through government and the episcopacy to admonish. This image of society accords well with what is already known of Hincmar's views, but it is a useful reminder that when Hincmar sees the whole of society, he does not perceive a vast panoply of interlocking offices such as pope, emperor, count, or deacon, but large groups of people classified by the inner function of their office rather than its external legal definition. Furthermore, it is a volunteeristic society in that the order one belongs to depends on the wish of the individual, whether he has a "higher" calling or would rather be engaged in worldly concerns.

Of more immediate interest, however, is a question which is not clearly resolved by an analysis of Hincmar's interpretation of Psalm 103. What precise role do bishops have in narrowly political matters? Until his defeat in the Rothad case, Hincmar had felt that episcopal and secular action explicitly and rationally accorded, especially through a turning to general councils for decision-making. With Nicholas' victory in the Rothad case, however, it should have been clear that any theory encouraging priestly responsibility in worldly matters would encourage a disturbing papal interference in Frankish political life—a disturbance feared and resisted by the archbishop of Rheims. Since one alternative left open to Hincmar would have been to discourage explicit priestly involvement in politics, it is of interest to ascertain in Hincmar's letter to Louis the German the extent to which the

"house of the heron" had a concrete role in public life. It is here that Hincmar's interpretation of the psalm appears to deviate from his ideas in the past, for the "house of the heron"—the bishops—is clearly detached from the world and devotes itself to admonition and combating evil. One might surmise that, if Louis and Charles were indeed plotting some future invasion or division of Lothringia, Louis would be most anxious to sound Hincmar out regarding the potential role of the West Frankish church. If Hincmar's interpretation of the psalm was his answer to Louis, then the East Frankish king would have concluded that the western church was washing its hands of any responsibility in such a purely political matter.

Another hint that 865 perhaps marks a turning point in Hincmar's view regarding the interaction of secular and sacerdotal offices is seen in two references he made to the deposition of Louis the Pious at Soissons in 833. In the De divortio, written in 860, he recalled that after Louis had won the unanimous satisfaction of the bishops, he was restored to the throne with the consent of the people and the church.³⁸ Thus Hincmar in 860 assumed the church had a key role to play in this political matter and its action accorded with that of the "people." However, in August of 866, he referred to the same incident in rather different terms. After noting that Ebbo of Rheims—the instigator of the deposition

³⁸De divortio, quaes. vi, resp.: "post satisfactionem episcopalis unanimitas, saniore consilio, cum populi consensu, et ecclesiae et regno restituit."

—had been moved by his greed for honors to bring false charges against Louis, he then emphasizes that Ebbo had irreverently put his hand upon the lord's anointed and was guilty of lèse-majesté.³⁹ Hincmar does not here hide the fact that the church had absolved Louis of guilt and found Ebbo at fault, but he stresses that the deposition was the result of a person's attack upon the royal office rather than a mistaken decision by the sacerdotal order led by Ebbo to disqualify Louis as a person for kingship.

If in 865 there were only hints that Hincmar was reconsidering his position regarding the interaction of offices, events of subsequent years clearly show that a fundamental change had taken place at about this time. In the period 860-65, not only in political matters but in the internal constitution of the church itself, Hincmar had faced a series of failures which checked his prestige and his authority in public life. He found himself excluded from participation in Charles' government, for the king would not allow the church, whether the pope or synod, to interfere with what he felt requisite for successful political action. At this point Hincmar was forced to reconsider the theoretical basis of his

³⁹M.G.H., Epp., VIII, 179-180: "Sed nec ista regula Ebonem absolvit; cum et sacerdotes et omnis pene mundus et ipsa etiam sedes apostolica eius falsis criminibus appetitum et quadam traditione pro honoribus cum iuramento exinde acceptis venditum et ab imperio atque ab ipso ecclesiae aditum augustum Hludouicum satagente ipso adiectum gravissime ingemuerit et innoxium a criminibus inventum et iustissime restitutum totus in orbe terrarum mundus gaudio exultaverit et Ebonem deiciendum, qui inreverentius manum in christum Domini miserat, ut reum maiestatis una cum ipso clamaverit."

theory of offices, particularly in regard to their expected rational concordance. A number of important events in his life soon would prove crucial for the formation of a new theory, not only in regard to the role which the sacerdotal order was expected to play in public life, but also effecting the respective structures of authority within both government and church.

CHAPTER VIII

THE INVASION OF LOTHRINGIA AS CATALYST FOR A NEW THEORY OF OFFICE

Even after years of effort, the various problems troubling the peace of Francia remained unresolved and divisive both within the church and in political life. In tracing the most important of these problems—Lothar's desire for a divorce from his barren wife Teutberga—there were factors which decisively ended any hope that Hincmar's theory of the rational concordance of offices would convince Charles' of its applicability in political life. By the end of the 860's, Hincmar was forced to arrive at a new formulation which at once countered certain ideas developed by the papacy and at the same time proved a pragmatic adjustment to political realities.

In the matter of Lothar's divorce, it will be recalled that an impasse was reached due to the successive closing of various avenues of resolution. Lothar himself had initially sought to have his own subservient bishops invalidate his marriage to Queen Teutberga by means of a synod. In the face of Hincmar's challenge demanding that all problems concerning the Ecclesia be handled in a general council including both ecclesiastical and secular offices, Lothar felt that by putting the issue in the hands of head of the church—the papacy

—a more propitious outcome could be expected. But he had not counted on Pope Nicholas' single-minded determination to uphold canon law in regard to the marriage bond, and after the excommunication of the leading Lothringian bishops, the support which Lothar had been receiving from his church collapsed. For example, Bishop Advent of Metz wrote Nicholas an apologetic letter which was so grovelling that it well reveals how little the Lothringian episcopacy could be counted on to resist the will of Rome.¹ Furthermore, the Rothad case indicated how Hincmar, the leading spokesman of episcopal action, found his entire position undermined by the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals, which protected suffragans from their archbishops through the right of appeal to Rome. Likewise, the meeting at Tousey in February, 865 suggested the failure of his old ideas in political life. The way was now open for the papacy to take the initiative for resolving the Lothar divorce issue.

Nicholas realized that were he to invite the northern kings to send their representatives to a synod held in Rome under papal supervision, it might be possible to satisfy the desire of interested parties to have a hand in the outcome of the divorce case while maintaining his own decisive influence. This he tried twice, on November 1, 864 and in April of the following year, but there was little response from the north.

¹M.G.H., Epp., VI, 221: "Sectatorem damnatorum ac seditiosum vel coniurationis aut conspirationis reum me penitus esse denego: faventibusque quibuscumque nequaquam assentire fateor, sed cum capite, id est sancta et venerabili sede beati Petri, cui claves regni caelorum misit, in qua etiam petra Christus rex aeternus sanctam aedificavit ecclesiam, contra quam portae inferi non praevalerunt, canonice in omnibus me favere profiteor."

Charles argued that the shortness of time and the difficulty of travel prevented his complying, but it also seems clear that he was jealous of his autonomy and hesitated in establishing a precedent for the resolution of Frankish problems in Rome.² Since the divorce was obviously a matter which involved the church and, since the bishops were unwilling to cross swords with the papacy, the only recourse left open to Nicholas was to adjudicate unilaterally and enforce his will by sending north a representative with full powers to act in his name.

This policy proved highly effective. In the summer of 865, Bishop Arsenius of Ostia traveled to each of the three kings and brought an end to this and other disputes so decisively that no one dared find objection. Arsenius' mission represented a fundamental challenge to Hincmar's theory of episcopal office, for it implied that concord within the church resulted from the conformity of all members to its worldly head—the papacy, rather than from the responsiveness of each bishop to God's will. Nicholas wrote the bishops of West Francia asking them to welcome Arsenius and respect his decisions, for he carried the full authority of the papacy to resolve those problems which he could, and those he could not were reserved for Nicholas himself.³ Concordant action by the

²Ibid., p. 309: "Sed quia eos ad synodum nostram et pro angustia temporis et pro iniuria transitus occurrere non valere dixistis, merito dure tulimus, cum tanta temporis angustia non immineret, ut saltem de vobiscum conversantibus binos mittere nequivissetis,"

³Ibid., p. 304: "Sed innumeris undique Christi domini

bishops had failed to be efficacious, and there was no alternative but for the papacy to take the leading hand.

In light of the ultimate involvement of the papal office in the course of European political history, it is important to note the extent to which Nicholas made such an involvement his objective. In the not too distant past there had been examples of papal interference, but no justifying principle had been enunciated.⁴ Nicholas wrote that his motive for sending Arsenius north was to ensure the peace of the church.⁵ But it was also clear that the problems he was seeking to resolve engaged the political order and that the correction of these worldly disputes might be indirectly achieved through papal action.⁶ Nicholas was not suggesting by this involvement that purely political matters were the

nostrae ecclesiae, cuius principaliter curam gerimus, laboribus impediti haec, ut obtabamus, hactenus agere profecto nequivimus." Ibid., p. 305: "Tumque demum, si qua sunt, quae per se corrigere possit, auctoritate nostra corrigit, reliqua vero, quae forte difficiliora sunt, apostolatus nostro diffinenda reservet."

⁴In the correspondence connected with Rome's supporting the Carolingian usurpation of the Merovingian throne in the eighth century, there was the realization that an objective idea of the royal office was a precondition for papal involvement, but no justificatory theory was developed. Pope Gregory's interfering in a civil war during the reign of Louis the Pious was encouraged by personal interest and was deemed mistaken by contemporaries.

⁵M.G.H., Epp., VI, 303: "Arsenio . . . scriptis et dictis iniunximus, cui bene faciet gloria vestra in cunctis adtendens et in his, quae sibi ex nostri apostolatus auctoritate de pace sanctae ecclesiae perhibuerit. . . ."

⁶Ibid., p. 225: "Sed cum nos a beatorum principum apostolorum scilicet Petri et Pauli fuisset egressi liminibus et ab eius utique sanctimonio directi fratrum pro pace regumque concordia Galliarum intra properassemus in finibus. . . ."

church's concern, for the sacerdotal office wielded only the spiritual sword while the worldly remained in the hands of secular government.⁷ In agreement with Hincmar, he felt that the pastoral responsibilities of the sacerdotal office entailed admonishing rulers to bring political action into conformity with the divine will. The character of Nicholas' involvement in political life was by no means radically new, but simply the extension of principles already widely recognized.

One area for the extension of papal prerogatives lay where secular and ecclesiastical jurisdiction or responsibility overlapped, such as marriage. While Hincmar interpreted marriage questions largely in terms of corporate theory, Nicholas responded to Teutberga's pleas on grounds of church asylum and protection of the innocent.⁸ Here, where church asylum and royal responsibility for shielding the defenseless merged on a single issue, the failure of the throne to meet its obligations left Nicholas the opening he needed to give

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 327: "videlicet ut quod ille materiali, vos exerceatis gladio spiritali, saltem Nathan, Heliam ceterosque prophetas, qui delinquentes reges salubriter corripuerunt, aemulatione sacerdotali seu pastoralis sollicitudine revocare non rennuatis."

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 321: "Siquidem tu, quantum humanus intellectus sufficit invenire, non solum innoxia saepe comprobata es, verum et ecclesiae semper auxilium provocasse dinosceris; insuper et sancti apostolorum principis Petri praesidium refugiumque petisti, Unde sedes apostolica tuam causam coepit discutere et specialiter, quicquid quaestiones emersisset, iudicio suo reservare proposuit. Quamobrem quisquis contra te agit, non solum ecclesiam Dei graviter laedit, verum etiam sedem apostolicam, de cuius iudicio non licet retractari, vehementer adversus se commovere convincitur."

a broad definition to the role of the sacerdotal ministerium in public life. Hincmar, on the other hand, had objected to Bishop Gunthar of Köln's allowing church asylum to disrupt the spiritual union of Boso's marriage to Engeltrude. Unlike Nicholas, he made theoretical considerations primary, even at the expense of such traditional rights of asylum.

Another example of Nicholas' extension of his authority into regions of mutual interest to the church and secular government concerned the church's material wellbeing. He wrote the aristocracy of Aquitaine that their failure to respect ecclesiastical property necessitated his own active involvement, since he bore the responsibility for God's universal church.⁹ Nicholas' attitude is quite straightforward: there is one universal church of which he is the head; both the episcopal and royal offices have shown themselves inefficient or even unwilling to arrive at satisfactory solutions to those problems which are in varying degrees the responsibility of the church; and thus the papacy has no choice but to exert its prerogatives to their fullest in order that peace and order return to Francia. It was with such a set of attitudes that Nicholas' less forceful and persistent successor, Hadrian II, concerned himself with the political fate of Lothringia and found that he had overplayed his hand, for everyone north of the Alps had come to appreciate the advisa-

⁹Ibid., p. 317: "Sollicitudinis, quam pro universis ecclesiis Domini circumducimus, necessitas nos compellit de omnium fidelium statu impigram gerere providentiam." Hincmar also cites necessitas as justification for radical action.

bility of excluding the papacy from Frankish political life.

Although Lothar had not permanently resigned himself to dying without heir, it became increasingly obvious to Charles the Bald and Louis the German that the succession to the valuable middle realm might well be theirs. When the two kings began to discuss this eventuality among themselves, Lothar, stricken with fear of an invasion, pretended to accept fully Nicholas' view concerning the divorce. Thus he could in exchange obtain papal protection for his crown while he yet lived. Here was a clear invitation for the involvement of Rome in the political affairs of northern Europe—a responsibility which neither Nicholas nor Hadrian II hesitated to shoulder. Just as the Rothad issue and Lothar's divorce case meant the failure of Hincmar's theory of the rational concordance of all offices, so the problems of the Lothringian succession ultimately proved correct Hincmar's contention that efficacious spiritual action can not originate entirely in Rome. In tracing the various ideas involved in the Lothringian succession, it is possible to understand the final collapse of the Einheitspartei view of the concordance of offices, which assumed that there should be no explicit contradiction between the king's recognition of political necessity and episcopal admonition.

The Lothringian bishops were the first to reveal a retrenchment from the path they had originally cleared for their king. In seeking to use the spiritual action of the sacerdotal office to impede any possible compromise of Lothringian

territorial integrity, they knew that a general mixed council would be a hindrance, for it could hardly fail to reflect the interests of the majority of bishops coming from the realms of Charles the Bald and Louis the German. On the other hand, it must have been equally clear that the distant authority of the papacy was in no position to thwart sudden attacks or otherwise effectively or reliably to take a hand in political developments. The difficulty of their position is made manifest in a letter directed to their fellow bishops in West Francia shortly after the Tousey meeting.

In this letter the bishops reiterated the rumor that certain people in Lothringia had suggested to Charles the Bald the advisability of taking over in some way the throne of his nephew, for Lothar was a king worthy only of contempt and had been abandoned by his subjects.¹⁰ However, the bishops quickly assured their western counterparts that they had not by any means abandoned their king. If there are some subjects who are disloyal to Lothar, they should certainly not be supported, especially now that he has changed from his adolescent ways by accepting good council and observing episcopal decrees.¹¹ He who encourages such evildoers in Lothringia sows discord, disrupts the concord of the church and seeks

¹⁰ Ibid., VI, 229: "Audivimus enim, quod quidam in his partibus vestro prinipi nitantur persuadere, ut regis nostri regnum quolibet modo acquirat ipsumque nostrum principem quasi despectum et a suo populo derelictum patrio regno expellat. Sic et de vestro domino rege Karolo perfidi et maligni homines voluerunt confingentes, quod etiam ipsi episcopi eum deserere ac regno expellere voluisset, sed mentitia est vox vana sibi."

to disturb the peace in the realm. He is to understand that he faces the spiritual authority of the episcopal order to punishment by anathema.¹²

It is worth noting that the definition of the royal office inherent in the propaganda cited by the bishops contains both personal and objective elements. While abandonment by the people and refusal to take council are personal shortcomings, failure to observe episcopal decrees is a slighting of the objective responsibilities of the royal ministerium. The bishops have retained an idea of the objective definition of royal and episcopal offices, just as they maintained the concept of the Ecclesia. They failed, however, to present a theory reconciling the mutual action of the two orders other than by episcopal anathema—that is, they acted as a distinct agency, choosing to back their king by spiritual

¹¹Ibid.: "Porro fatemur, quia nostro regi fideles sumus et esse cupimus, cui videlicet fidem de manu patris in regem excepto constanter promissimus." "Et si forte sunt aliqui fraude et infidelitate sive cupiditate decepti, qui suo seniori cogitent vel machinentur mala, vobis tamen non convenit iugum ducere cum infidelibus." "Praesertim cum ipse rex, adolescentiae mobilitate et astutia hominum aliquando seductus, nunc autem ad meliora conversus, se totum, Domino praestante, episcopalibus decretis ac salubribus monitis bonorumque consiliis aptare festinet."

¹²Ibid.: "Nolumus itaque vestram latere praestantiam, quia, quisquis inceptor malorum, quisquis seminator discordiarum, quisquis ecclesiasticae concordiae disruptor fuerit, quisquis denique hanc tantulam pacem in his partibus regni . . . perturbare temptaverit, horrendi anathematis ignominiae subiacebit. . . ." "Bonum nobis videtur . . . ut haec omnia nullatenus abscondamus neque sileamus, sed inseparabili atque ineluctabili sacerdotali auctoritate, qua ligandi atque solvendi potestatem a summo sacerdote Christo domino percepimus, freti anticipemus . . . ac pravis studiis tota virtute resistamus."

action. It thus appears that they neglected any possible fusion of worldly and spiritual action in common council in the manner of Hincmar.

In June, 868, Charles the Bald and Louis the German entered into a pact at Metz regarding the realms of their nephews, Lothar II and Louis II of Italy, because it appeared that neither would have an immediate successor. Hincmar was present at this meeting, and it has been suggested, although never proved, that in fact he was the author of the agreement made there.¹³ The two kings agreed that were God to give them Italy and Lothringia, then the acquisition and division of those regions would be carried out by peaceful means either by the kings alone or with the help of their fideles. Each would then provide the other with consilium and auxilium, acting as brothers rightly should.¹⁴ It is important to note that this plan did not incorporate the objective idea of of-

¹³The pact of Metz embodies much of the wording in Louis' oath at Koblenz in 860, but the latter, where Hincmar's influence was excluded, spoke of "sanctae ecclesiae status," the former incorporated the idea of renovatio (Hludowici et Karoli pactiones Mettenses, a. 867 [M.G.H., Capit., II, no. 245]): "ad Dei voluntatem et sanctae ecclesiae restorationem. . . ." For the disputed date of Metz, see Calmette, op. cit., appendice III.

¹⁴Ibid.: "Et si Deus nobis amplius adhuc de regnis nepotum nostrorum donaverit, et in acquirendo ac in dividendo, sicuti plus aequaliter aut nos aut nostri communes fideles invenerint, quos communi consensu elegerimus, et in ipsa divisione consentiendo et in habendo et in conservando atque defendendo tam istud, quod habemus, quam et quod nobis de prefatis regnis Dominus concesserit, absque dolositate aut deceptione vel superabreptione illi sincerus auxiliator et cooperatore ero, sicut verus frater vero fratri per rectum esse debet; in hoc, ut ipse similiter erga me conservet."

fices and handled the constitutional change as a personal matter concerning the Carolingian family and their fideles. Whether or not Hincmar was himself the author of this accord, certainly his unprotesting presence suggests that he too had given up any hope for concordant action of the sacerdotal and political offices to arrive at a mode of succession satisfactory to all parties.

Further evidence that the agreement of Metz intentionally avoided compromising political action by reference to the idea of objective office working within the Ecclesia is to be seen in the lack of any provision for the imperial title. Although Louis the Pious' succession had provided a precedent for considering the imperial title as a personal honor gained by worldly succession rather than an objective responsibility requiring the spiritual action of the church for its transmission, there must have been some fear at Metz that an open consideration of the title would entail unwanted papal involvement. This appears to be the reason why the title itself was not mentioned although its responsibilities were explicitly distributed to both kings—that is, the obligation for defending Rome is a family, and therefore a personal, matter rather than the responsibility of an objective office.¹⁵ Hincmar, who had abandoned hope for a rational concordance of spiri-

¹⁵Ibid.: "Mundeburdem autem et defensionem sanctae Romanae ecclesiae pariter conservabimus in hoc, ut Romani pontifices nobis debitum honorem conservent, sicut eorum antecessores nostris antecessoribus conservaverunt." It is interesting to note that the papal obligation to the kings of the north is to "honor" them, that is, he has only a passive role.

tual and worldly action, could not be expected to advocate the perpetuation of the imperial dignity.

On 8 August, 869, Lothar was the first of the two nephews of Charles the Bald to die, leaving Lothringia open to whoever could effectively assert his claim. The Emperor Louis II of Italy had the legal right to the crown, but his position in Italy was not strong enough, and his patron, Hadrian II, failed to provide him with sufficiently effective support. Louis the German was also indisposed at the time by ill health. The needs of the Lothringian people and church for defense against Norse invasions coincided with the ambitions of Charles, and he lost no opportunity in marching on Metz to be elected there and crowned king of Lothringia on 5 September, 869.

Hincmar's relation to events thus far is not clear. He later claimed he had entered Lothringia at Charles' side in the belief he was serving the "interests of the Ecclesia and promoting the peace of Christendom."¹⁶ The Annales Bertiniani had also pointed to the practical necessity of the act by calling it both "saniori" and "salubrius." Although Charles violated the legal claims of new nephew and his brother, he may have sincerely felt that political necessity was sufficient justification for his unilateral move. This

¹⁶Hincmar wrote his nephew Hincmar of Laon, explaining his absence (Migne, P.L., CXXVI, 534): "Nunc vero quia sicut mihi domnus rex litteris suis mandavit, et te audisse iam credo pro utilitate sanctae Ecclesiae, et pace populi Christiani una cum eo in longiores partes a parochiis nostris pergemus. . . ."

contradiction between political necessity and legal restrictions ultimately proved to be the central issue in Hincmar's justification of Charles and his starting point for a re-definition of the action of the royal office.

The election and coronation which took place at Metz, although promoted by Bishop Advent, reflects the views of Hincmar, who appears to have written the ordo and took the leading part once Advent had initiated the proceeding. The election itself had both personal and objective elements. The king gained his title by the worldly means of the election of his person, and by the church annointment he accepted the objective Christian definition of the royal ministerium. However, it is important to note that worldly and spiritual action did not work through the rational accord of a general council, but rather, by separate action. The gathered bishops had agreed that Charles was the proper candidate and following this the magnates unanimously acclaimed him.¹⁷ The choice of the bishops and magnates coincided not because they were joined in one deliberative body, but because Charles appealed to both as the most worthy candidate, that is, the choice of God.

When Advent initiated the ceremony he expressed a view

¹⁷Electionis Karoli Capitula, a. 869 (M.G.H., Capit., II, no. 276), responsio Karoli ad populum: "Quia, sicut isti venerabiles episcopi unius ex ipsis voce dixerunt et certis indiciis ex vestra unanimitate monstraverunt et vos acclamastis me Dei electione ad vestram salvationem . . . et gubernationem huc advenisse, sciatis me honorem et cultum Dei atque sanctarum ecclesiarum Domino adiuvante conservare. . . ."

which undoubtedly was meant to represent that of the episcopacy as a whole. Since they had been deprived of a king, the bishops turned to God in prayer, and thus were able to come to unanimous agreement as to whom God favored as their new king.¹⁸ The Lothringian bishops acted here no differently than several years previously when addressing the letter to their West Frankish counterparts demanding respect for Lothringian territorial integrity. The spiritual action of the episcopal office had a clear role to play in political life. Neither then nor now did the bishops yield the initiative for such action to Rome or to a general council.

The coronation of Metz deserves particular attention, for it became the normative procedure for future medieval royal elevations.¹⁹ Of course, there took place no "election" in the modern sense. The magnates were but a small minority of the populus, and there was no choice of candidates to the

¹⁸ Ibid., *adnuntiatio Adventii episcopi*, cap. 1: "rege et principe nostro destituti ac desolati, nobis omnibus esse consideravimus, ut ieiuniis et orationibus ad eum nos converteremus, qui est 'adiutor in opportunitatibus, in tribulatione,' . . . et 'facit unanimes habitare in domo solvens medium parietem et faciens utraque unum;' deprecantes ipsius misericordiam, ut daret nobis regem ac principem secundum cor suum . . . et corda omnium nostrorum unanimiter ad eum inclinaret atque uniret, quem ipse ad salutem et profectum nostrum praescitum et electum atque praedestinatum habeat secundum misericordiam suam."

¹⁹ Walter Schlesinger, "Karolingische Königswahlen," Zur Geschichte und Problematik der Demokratie; Festgabe für Hans Herzfeld (Berlin, 1958), pp. 207-264. On pp. 236-39, Schlesinger analysis the nature of the participation of the magnates in the Metz coronation. By relating it to the constitutive homage offered Pepin in 751, he seems in danger of overemphasizing the personal autonomy of Charles' action in 869.

throne. Nevertheless, modern legal or constitutional preconceptions should not be made a criteria. Lacking the Roman idea of absolute sovereignty, it was natural that the choice of the king involve only those orders affected by him. Furthermore, it was not personal qualities which enabled a member of the royal family to become monarch, but rather, his willingness to obligate himself to maintain the honors and beneficia of his fideles. At Metz, the homage of the fideles became constitutive because the secular responsibilities of the royal ministerium were understood to be the protection of the interests of the privileged few of the nobility. The bilateral obligations of Coulaines became at Metz the basis of royal election for centuries to come.

However, the role of the church at Metz should not be underestimated. As indicated above, God did the electing, but this cannot be pushed aside as mere propaganda or naive mysticism. Hincmar and his contemporaries saw the action of God's will in terms both rational and spiritual and their unanimous choice of Charles as the suitable candidate for the throne rested on the objective criteria of utility and appropriateness. Because Charles had responded to the situation by acting in the interests of the Lothringian people and church, he clearly was carrying out the will of God and was therefore God's elect.²⁰ This acquiescence to the suitability

²⁰Electionis Karoli Capitula, adnuntiatio Hincmari archiepiscopi, cap. iv: "in hoc etiam animadvertere potestis voluntatem Dei esse, ut praesens domnus et rex noster, qui in parte regni, quam hactenus tenet et tenuit et nobis ac ecclesiis nostris et populo sibi commisso utiliter praeest ac prae-

of a king must be considered a form of election, for just as in 858, the churchmen could have come to the conclusion that Charles was not sincerely interested in the welfare of the church and people and have refused to meet together and crown him. Thus there took place at Metz two "elections," corresponding to two definitions of the royal office. On one hand, the fideles chose to support him on the basis of the king's "feudal" obligations, and on the other, the church agreed to his rule on the basis of its definition of office.

The prayers offered during the coronation ordo form a small treatise on princely virtues which contributes to our understanding of the church ideal of the royal office.²¹ The king was supposed to have the moral virtues of any Christian, but with an emphasis on his wisdom illuminated by divine grace. Hincmar's own prayers add the crucial criterion, derived from a monastic context, that the king fought the spiritual enemies of the people and thus worked directly for the public salvation.²² He is more than simply the typus Christi, for through his office he actually shares in Christ's powers and effects.²³

fuit et salubriter prodest et profuit, inde ad hunc locum Domino ducente pervenerit, quo etiam vos eius inspiratione confluxistis et ipsi vos sponte commendastis, cuius instinctu animantia omnia in arcam Noe significantem significantem ecclesiae unitatem nullo cogente convenerunt, . . ."

²¹Anneliese Sprengler, "Die Gebete der Krönungsordines Hincmars von Reims für Karl den Kahlen als König von Lothringen und für Ludwig den Stammeler," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXIII (1950/51), 245-267.

²²Ordo Coronationis Karoli II (M.G.H., Capit., II, no. 302): "liberetque te ab adversitatibus cunctis et ab omnibus visibilium et invisibilium inimicorum insidiis."

The cooperation of church officers during the course of Charles' election was rationally understood, for Hincmar was anxious to justify his participation on legal grounds. It was uncumbent upon him to show that his action was compatible with that of the Lothringian bishops, not only in conformity with God's will, but legally as well.²⁴ He argued on constitutional grounds that since Metz lay in the archbishopric of Trier, and since the latter was then vacant, the old association of Rheims and Trier within the region of "Belgica" permitted his standing in for the archbishop of Trier during the coronation.²⁵

Hincmar's position in the preceding events reveals a certain shift in his theoretical position. He participated

²³Ibid., unction prayer: "Coronet te Dominus corona gloriae in misericordia et miserationibus suis et ungat te in regni regimine oleo gratiae Spiritus sancti sui, unde unxit sacerdotes, reges, prophetas et martyres, qui per fidem vicerunt regna et operati sunt iustitiam atque adepti sunt promissiones; . . ." "Victoriosum te atque triumphatorem de visibilibus atque invisilibus hostibus semper efficiat; et sancti nominis sui timorem pariter et amorem continue cordi tuo infundat;"

²⁴Electionis Karoli Capitula, Admuntiatio Hincmari, cap. ii: "Messis autem amici est populus in provincia alteri metropolitano commissa. Unda vos hortando, quasi manu operis confricando, ad Dei voluntatem et vestram salutem in corpus unitatis ecclesiae valemus et debemus traicere."

²⁵Ibid., cap. i: "Ne alicui forte videatur incongrue ac praesumptiose me ac provinciae nostrae venerabiles coepiscopos facere, quoniam de altera provincia ordinationi et causis huius provinciae nos immiscemus, sciat nos contra canones sacros non agere, quoniam Remensis et Treverentis ecclesiae in hac regione Belgica cum sibi commissis ecclesiis sorores et comprovinciales habentur, sicut auctoritas ecclesiastica et antiquissima demonstrat consuetudo, ac per hoc unanimi consensu et synodalia iudicia exercere. . . ."

in Charles' usurpation of the Lothringian throne, which was masked only by the thinnest of legalistic justifications, while ignoring his usual stand, where he demanded an "international" council for the representation of all interests. When Hincmar was later accused of being the consors, if not the auctor, in setting up of a tyrant (illegal imposition of a king), he emphatically denied it, leaving the reader in some doubt as to whether he was refusing to admit the illegality of means by which Charles obtained the throne, or whether he had indeed promoted it.²⁶ However, the archbishop's obvious role at the coronation would suggest that he felt nothing at all to be amiss with the method by which his king obtained the throne.

Hincmar raised no objection to a disputed succession wherein the church had a collaborative role. Perhaps his unfortunate experiences of the years 865-66 had taught him the danger of letting the church take too active a role in political life, especially after the introduction of the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals, which clearly made the pope the sole head of the church. There could be no such close concordance of worldly and spiritual action in political life if the authority of the metropolitan should find itself compromised, leaving the initiative and all ultimate authority in the hands of a distant pope.²⁷ The idea of the unity of the Ecclesia found

²⁶Sirmond, II, 693: "Nam ut vestrae dignationi veraciter fatear, nec auctor, nec consors, nec consensor ullius tyrannidis unquam, vel usque ab ipsis cunabulis hactenus extiti."

²⁷Besides the Carolingian belief that Italy was in

only limited application in the coronation, and the election was presumed to be a specifically Lothringian affair from the secular side. There is also implied by the whole proceeding the recognition that necessity, here arising from the immediate need for political leadership, together with the belief that God's will was being done, permitted a certain transcendence of legal barriers and the claims of others to the throne based on blood ties and old agreements.

It was only to be expected that Louis the German and Louis II of Italy would be quick to voice complaint over Charles' incursion into Lothringia. Pope Hadrian II, representing the Italian emperor's interests, and the king of Germany made their objections on legal grounds, forcing Hincmar, as will appear, to defend his own king's action on the basis of necessitas and libertas. When Charles left Metz on a hunting expedition in the Ardennes, he encountered there a legation from Louis the German demanding that the equitable division specified by the Metz treaty of 868 be observed. Charles gave some kind of appropriate response which, in light of Louis' subsequent actions, could not have been too satisfactory.²⁸

some ways a land lying outside greater Francia and had her own distinct problems and interests, it should be noted that in an age so dependent upon face-to-face relations, the spiritual action of the pope must of necessity appear rather remote and abstract. Hincmar later objected to Hadrian's interference in this affair by noting that (Sirmond, II, 692): "dico, quia ille qui forte hac opinione, sed non cognitione, ad iniuriam et increpationem meam vobis suggestit, scire debuerat, vestrae auctoritatis gravitatem sufficienter recolere quod scriptus est, 'Causam quam nesciebam diligetissime investigabam.'"

In November, while he was at Gondreville, Charles also received a mission from the Emperor Louis II and Pope Hadrian, bearing letters dated September 5. These letters were written in knowledge that Charles planned an expedition into Lothringia, but ignorant of the fact that it had already been successfully concluded. At the same time at Gondreville, Hincmar received letters which he was to circulate to the magnates and bishops of West Francia. In these, Hadrian threatened to excommunicate whoever violated the legal rights of Louis II to the throne of Lothringia by invasion.²⁹

Louis the German eventually recovered from his illness and in April and May of 870 was able to advance into Lothringia and assert his claims to at least his fair share of the middle kingdom. As usual for those times, the appearance of a royal challenger was the signal for a shifting of the allegiances of magnates: as Louis advanced he gathered supporters about him, hoping to win a position of strength from which to bargain. He also sent messengers to Charles demanding his withdrawal from Lothringia. Finally in March, Charles agreed to begin negotiations on the basis of a partition to be sought through peaceful compromise. At first they tried to achieve equitable settlement by means of a commission, but

²⁸For the meeting of Charles with the legation from Louis, see the Annales Bertiniani, a. 869.

²⁹For the letters addressed to the magnates and bishops of West Francia, to Hincmar, and to Lothar's magnates, see M.G.H., Epp., VI, nos. 16-19. Hincmar's response has been lost, but is mentioned in the Annales Bertiniani, a. 869.

the cupidity of the magnates destroyed any accord.³⁰ Only after the partition was finally referred back to the kings, were they able to arrive at a mutually convenient settlement at Meerssen in August of 870.

Although the pact of Meerssen satisfied Louis the German's interests in Lothringia, it could hardly have been welcome news to Hadrian II. Papal letters sent from Rome in June arrived at Louis' palace in Aachen, and then were sent on to Saint Denis in Paris, where Charles received them in October. Hadrian demanded Charles' withdrawal from Lothringia and censured the magnates and bishops, especially Hincmar, for their support of the king's illegal seizure of lands properly belonging to Louis II of Italy.³¹ Hincmar immediately sent back a withering response, in which he revealed a new theoretical stand.

Hincmar scornfully wrote Pope Hadrian: "You warned, you thundered, you refuted, and you gave orders, but never-

³⁰Annales Bertiniani, a 869: "ubi et xii^{cim} missos fratris sui Hludowici pro divisione regni accepit, qui superciliose tam de sanitate corporis Hludowici quam de prosperitate, quia Resticium Winidum sibi diutino tempore infestissimum, tam dolo quam bello captum [in custodio retinebat], elevati, minus debito sacramenta inter eos facta duxere servanda." Hincmar simply noted that the negotiations were difficult (Instructio ad Ludovicum Balbum, cap. V): "Mortuo autem Hlothario filio Hlotharii, post multas controversias facta est divisio inter patrem vestrum, et patrum vestrum Hludowicum, de parte regni Hlotharii." This commission recalls that of Verdun and reflects the sharing of governmental responsibilities between king and fideles. Unilateral royal action was resorted to only after cupiditas had hindered mutual accord.

³¹For these letters, see M.G.H., Epp., VI, nos. 21-24.

theless you did not see fit to forewarn those, including myself, about your threatening participation, nor even those who, as some say, invited our king into Lothringia for their own interests and the obtaining of honors in that kingdom."³² He asked what would have happened had the dealings between the kings, to which Hadrian so strongly objected, not taken place. Such political action arose out of the necessity of preventing the sedition and slaughter which would have ravaged a leaderless people.³³ Hincmar told Hadrian he had not ignored the pope's earlier request to ensure that nothing improper be undertaken in Lothringia, although naturally, he had not fully cooperated: he had simply asked the magnates if they thought it possible to exist without a king to defend them as the pope was demanding.³⁴

³²Sirmond, II, 693: "monueritis, increpueritis, redargueritis et instruxeritis, non tamen, sicut me, illos de participatione communionis vestrae intentando comminari voluistis, nec etiam eos, qui, ut quidam dicunt, regem nostrum in regnum quondam Lotharii pro sua necessitate invitaverunt, et honores ex eodem regno obtinuerunt,"

³³Ibid., p. 696: "Et alia de iuramentis, et periuriis, et de tyrannide, de quibus scripsistis, sed et de firmitatibus, quae inter reges nostros factae fuerunt, et de seditionibus quae pro illo regno exortae fuerunt, et ad internecionem multorum pervenirent, nisi ipsae firmitates executae fuissent, nobis dicunt, quae vestrae auctoritati mandare nobis non convenit."

³⁴Ibid., p. 691: "et ut Ecclesiarum rectores ac viri nobiles, de multis partibus a paganis impetiti, et sine rege ac principe, nisi quem ipsi post mortem Lotharii pro sua quisque convenientia elegerint, sicut fatentur, existentes, non debeant, vel sicut habent necessitatem, non habent libertatem rectorem eligere, qui sanctam Ecclesiam, et eos atque Christianitatem in illo regno consistentem defendat et gubernet, dicere anxians sine generali unanimitate episcoporum regni domni Caroli, quibus domnus Apostolicus de causa regni Lotharii suam misit epistolam, quam eis, sicut mihi est praeceptum, direxi, de his quae praemisi, quantum ex me est, nulli definitioni audeo consentire. . . ."

Hincmar defended the liberty of royal action because of political necessity and argued that political means were in themselves sufficient to obtain political ends. In matters of the world, it is not for the spiritual authority either to direct the course of affairs or to bear the ultimate responsibility. The Gelasian theory now becomes an instrument curtailing priestly authority. Rather than use it in arguing for the greater responsibility of the bishop, Hincmar notes that the distinction between the two orders implies a careful delineation of the responsibilities and legal rights of the priestly authority.³⁵ Worldly realms are acquired by the sword and propagated through military victories, not by the excommunications of popes or bishops!³⁶ Hincmar reminds Hadrian that salvation is impossible without kings, presumably wishing to emphasize that the efficacy of worldly discipline in the work of salvation should not be hindered by forces of a non-temporal nature.³⁷ It is the responsibility of priests

³⁵ Hincmar writes Hadrian in Charles' name (Sirmond, II, 712): "sancto etiam attestante Gelasio, quia duo sunt, quibus principaliter mundus hic regitur, auctoritas sacra pontificum, et regalis potestas. Et per regem regum, ac summum pontificem cunctorum pontificum, qui solus rex et sacerdos fieri potuit, 'conditores legum iusta decernunt,' quas leges principales potestates appellaverunt aeternas, et sacri canon- es spiritu Dei sunt conditi, et totius mundi reverentia consecrati, . . ." "Nam quomodo leges principum rite vocabuntur aeternae si transeuntibus principibus una cum eis constitutio legis transibit?"

³⁶ Ibid., p. 695: "Et computant quanta iste ab episcopis et populo, qui regem non habebant, et a paganis et seditiosis impetebantur, in regnum quod Lotharius habuit invitatus exordinata ordinaverit: et dicunt saecularem scripturam dicere, quia omne regnum saeculi huius bellis quaeritur, victoriis propagatur, et non apostolici vel episcoporum excommunicationibus obtinetur."

to pray, not to involve themselves in tasks which are the proper concern of kings. The distinction between priest and king is supposed to ensure the liberty of the latter's political action.³⁸ The kings of the Franks were never the viceroy of bishops, but were always the fully competent lords in worldly matters.³⁹ Thus, not only does Hincmar give secular government a positive (spiritually constructive and thus materially as well, as we have seen) role to play in life, he also attempts to free royal action from church-imposed restraints.

In his justification for Charles' invasion of Lothringia, Hincmar compromised his previous theory of episcopal of-

³⁷ Ibid., p. 696: "quia non nos concredemus, ut aliter ad regnum Dei pervenire non possimus, si illum, quem ipse commendat, terrenum regem non habuerimus."

³⁸ Ibid., p. 695: "et si vultis ad defensionem habere nostrum auxilium sicut volumus de vestris orationibus habere adiutorium, nolite quaerere nostrum dispendium, et petite domum apostolicum, ut quia rex et episcopus simul esse non potest, et sui antecessores ecclesiasticum ordinem quod suum est, et non rempublicam, quod regum est, disposuerunt, non praecipiat nobis habere regem, qui nos in sic longinquis partibus adjuvare non possit contra subitaneos et frequentes paganorum impetus, et nos Francos non iubeat servire, quia istud iugum sui antecessores nostris antecessoribus non imposuerunt, et nos illud portare non possumus, qui scriptum esse in sanctis libris audimus, ut pro libertate et hereditate nostra usque ad mortem certare debeamus."

³⁹ Again writing in Charles' name (Ibid., p. 706): "quia reges Francorum ex regio genere nati, non episcoporum vicedomini, sed terrae domini hactenus fuimus computati: et ut Leo ac Romana synodus scripsit, reges et imperatores, quos terris divina potentia praecepit praeesse, ius distinguendorum negotiorum episcopis sanctis iuxta divalia constituta permiserunt, non autem episcoporum villici extiterunt. Et sanctus Augustinus dicit, per iura regum possidentur possessiones, non autem per episcopale imperium reges villici fiunt, actoresque episcoporum."

fice. No longer were political acts seen as the outcome of the rational accord and cooperation of spiritual and worldly action, but bishops and kings were now felt to work within distinct spheres of responsibility. This meant that the Ecclesia represented little more than a spiritual bond, having minor relevance for political matters. Only by thus excluding political action from the spiritual authority governing the Ecclesia could a settlement be found for the Lothringian question.

However clear the shift in Hincmar's theory of office, particularly the sacerdotal, the reasons which compelled him to change his earlier opinions are not apparent. Two possibilities come immediately to hand: Hincmar may have recognized that it was to his king's advantage to gain Lothringia and to his own to bring his suffragan bishop of Cambrai under the political authority of Charles; and thus he was willing to put forward justifications to support Charles' violation of other legitimate claims to Lothringia. Secondly, Hincmar had suffered devastating personal setbacks since the introduction of the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals and may have recognized that his own interests and those of the metropolitan dignity in general would have been much better served by supporting the royal office rather than submitting to the pope. It seems more likely that the latter motive was of greater significance for Hincmar's course of action, for his political activity in the first half of the decade showed him devoted to what he felt to be a proper course, even if it meant

alienating his king. However stubborn he was when faced with the combined opposition of all the powers of Europe, there is no reason to think that he would not reexamine his position had he himself thought it led in directions which were not fruitful.

Hincmar's abandonment of a rational accord between sacerdotal and temporal offices is of crucial importance for the royal office itself. The study of Hincmar's theory of office suggested that government had a positive function because it contributed to individual and collective salvation, which, in turn, assured a greater efficiency and fruitfulness for worldly action. But the hoped-for renovatio of society through political action rested upon the assumption that the spiritual action of the priest and the worldly action of the temporal office holder entered into a dialectical relationship. Either one by itself would have accomplished little if anything, for the three elements of human nature—body, mind, and soul—needed concordant support and direction from without. To have abandoned a concordance of offices altogether, would have been to abandon his entire theory of office. However, Hincmar did not go that far and only sought to remove concordant action from the rational and institutional plain. That is, he turned away from recommendations for general councils incorporating the episcopal order and from a direct involvement of the priestly office in purely political matters. If the invasion of Lothringia just studied has shown a turn from rational concordance, two other affairs occurring

simultaneously—the dispute with his nephew, Hincmar of Laon, and the revolt of Charles' son Carloman—will reveal the deeper implications of Hincmar's new direction of thought for the idea of office itself.

CHAPTER IX

THE CONFLICT WITH HINCMAR OF LAON AS A CHALLENGE TO THE RATIONAL CONCORDANCE OF OFFICES

It was suggested in the last chapter that Hincmar's ideas underwent significant change in response to a recognition that they may not always have been too relevant to the realities of political life. Here it will be our task to reconsider this same crucial period in Hincmar's life in light of another failure—that of being unable to discipline his nephew, Bishop Hincmar of Laon, in the face of papal opposition.

Pope Nicholas I's claim to jurisdiction in this matter rested on his use of a partially forged group of law collections known as the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals. It has usually been assumed that the intent of the decretals was to institute a thoroughgoing reform of the entire church in line with the papal conception of how the church should be constituted. Furthermore, it is also assumed that the actual state of affairs it was seeking to do away with represented little more than anarchic disorder and a secularization corrosive of spiritual ideals.¹ But what was being attacked—as it turned

¹These assumptions are emphasized by Paul Fournier and Gabriel Le Bras in their basic work, Histoire des collections canoniques en occident, I (Paris, 1931), 130-37. I rely on this work for my summary of the implications of the decretals for the church constitution. For Hincmar's personal knowledge

out, more or less successfully, were not only clear abuses within the church, but also a rival conception of that church as enunciated by Hincmar.² It is perhaps best to recall briefly some of the themes brought out in past chapters in order to more fully appreciate the Pseudo-Isidorian challenge.

Although Hincmar makes a distinction between spiritual and temporal action, he does not thereby imply that the two are not dialectically interrelated. The authority of the king provides a discipline for his subjects which encourages them to open their hearts to Christ. By submitting to law and the definition of office, the king, too, finds the spiritual regeneration of his whole being facilitated. In turn, the infusion of the Holy Spirit as caritas throughout society ensures that on the psychological, social, and political level, worldly action becomes ever more efficacious. Putting aside for the moment his rather naive optimism concerning human nature, it remains clear that Hincmar had a very realistic appreciation of the crucial role which face-to-face, rational, and concrete human interaction had in the body politic.³ If

and use of the decretals, see Jean Devisse, Hincmar et la loi (Dakar, 1962).

²A very useful book making this same point is that of Karl F. Morrison, The Two Kingdoms; Ecclesiology in Carolingian Political Thought (Princeton, 1964). Although Morrison provides a rich mine of information and a useful bibliography for not only the question immediately at hand, but also for Hincmar's broader reach of activity, his conceptual categories are sufficiently distinct from those of present writer that its general conclusions and evaluations have only peripheral relevance to the problems at hand.

³An interesting article which fully appreciates Hincmar's complete and coherent concept of society while flying in

the bishop and king are to work together successfully, the two must be able to enter into a free dialogue wherein the bishop is fully aware of immediate practical problems and the king is open to spiritual aid as he reasons and chooses among the alternatives open to him. A structure of authority which is hierarchical and finds its sole head in a distant monarch, whose decisions are unilateral and absolute, could not have been further from what Hincmar had in mind.

What now was the general implication of the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals? Their purpose was to free the church from its subjection to secular powers. That is, they collected together forged and valid papal decretals, Roman and Germanic secular law, and a variety of other writings to emphasize that the patrimony of the church was not for the use of kings and magnates, that clergy were to avoid serving the state in non-clerical functions, and, to remove the pressures of laymen upon individual bishops, that all churchmen were to submit without question to the final and absolute authority of the papacy.

The scheme for the church's constitution spelled out by the decretals was hierarchic, deriving in large part from the Roman imperial provincial administration centered in the civitas. The ordinary bishop was to have full competence within his diocese, including unquestioned authority over rural bishops, monasteries, and parish priests. The next high-

the face of human nature is that of Jean Devisse, "'Pauperes' et 'Paupertas' dans le monde carolingien: ce qu'on dit Hincmar de Reims," Revue du Nord, XLVIII (1966), 273-287.

est rung in the hierarchy was not the archbishop, but the synod of all bishops within a given province. The archbishop merely presided over these synods and was little more than primus inter pares. Naturally, at the peak of the hierarchy was the pope. Any suffragan could appeal to him over the head of an archbishop and expect that whatever the resulting decision might be, there was no challenging it.

Clearly, the autonomy of the the archbishop was sharply curtailed by the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals. He lacked sufficient authority to impose his will on suffragans and he himself might be called to question by the papacy with little recourse. There are a number of implications of the decretals which called into question Hincmar's way of seeing things. Political events moved too rapidly to allow any close cooperation between the pope and monarch, for by the time messages had twice crossed the Alps, it would have been too late for coordinated action. Furthermore, Hincmar must have been acutely aware that the political interests of the papacy were to be inevitably shaped by an Italian perspective. When one turns to the potential impact of the decretals on West Francia itself, their significance is no less marked. How was the king to obtain the spiritual aid of the church while resolving problems if each time he sought it all the provincial synods had first to be called and then their respective findings somehow integrated into the political process? As long as the archbishops had retained their autonomy, they were fully qualified to speak for themselves and their respective churches,

having little fear that either the papacy or their synods might condition their dialogue with the king.

If the political implications of the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals outlined above are fully considered, then it becomes clear why the jurisdictional balance between Hincmar and his king was seriously shaken by their application to the internal affairs of West Francia. This, indeed, was to occur in a dispute arising between the two over whose right it was to judge Hincmar of Rheims's troublesome nephew, Bishop Hincmar of Laon. Archbishop Hincmar's failure in this case was to clearly demonstrate the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals' damaging impact on his past advocacy of a close cooperation between bishop and king in political life. If he was not to question the decretals, then Hincmar of Rheims had little alternative but to abandon an institutionalized and rational coordination of spiritual and temporal action by church and state.

Hincmar of Laon owed his career within the church to his uncle, for in Rheims he was educated and promoted to an important diocese. But his unsettled nature and his domineering and covetous machinations within the diocese of Laon soon brought him into conflict with Charles the Bald. One of his subordinates, to whom he had first granted and then from whom he forcefully recovered a benefice, appealed to the king for justice. Charles quickly supported the dispossessed man and summoned Hincmar of Laon to answer before a royal tribunal, thus seeking to impose secular judgment on an ecclesiastic. Hincmar of Rheims, jealous of his authority as metropolitan,

sided with his nephew and wrote a memorandum in his favor demanding the king's observance of the immunities of churchmen and ecclesiastical property. But Charles refused to take cognizance of such a long and prolix dissertation, asserting that in cases involving the deprivation of benefices the civil tribunal had competent jurisdiction.⁴

Hincmar of Rheims' defense of his nephew made use of law to ensure the ecclesiastical independence of lay judgment. He wrote Charles that the law cannot be compromised and that it clearly limited royal jurisdiction to cases involving laymen. If the Roman emperors called their laws eternal and perpetual, how much more so are Christian laws, which are promulgated by the Holy Spirit.⁵ Just as the name of Christ should be universally honored everywhere on the globe, so ought the law of God be observed. Just because these troubled times have encouraged a general disrespect for that law, that is no excuse for our disobeying it.⁶ When Charles was an adolescent, as age when the mind lacks stability and is inclined to inappropriate practices, he managed to avoid violating the de-

⁴The most useful account of the whole affair is that of Schrörs, op.cit., pp. 293-302, 315-353.

⁵Sirmond, II, 332: "Nam si imperatores Romanorum suam legem aeternam ac perpetuam appellaverunt, multo magis lex illa aeterna est, quae est sancto Spiritu promulgata."

⁶Ibid., p. 333: "Qua de reflens dico, et corde moerenti gemens pronuntio, quia nunc lex Domini inreprehensibilis nostris infelicibus et periculossissimis temporibus tantum vigorem non habet reverentia divinitatis, sicut antquam nomen Christi in honore per universum orbem fieret, leges Romanae habebant timore imperatoris."

definition of the episcopal ministry; now, having reached full maturity, he should not turn back on such a good start.⁷ The Gelasian theory, continues Hincmar, should also be a warning to the king that he not exceed the definition of his own office by meddling in the affairs of the sacerdotal order.⁸ Such considerations make clear that churchmen are not to be judged by kings, for both they and kings are subject to the Ecclesia wherein pontifical authority is the greater.⁹

The initial conflict between Hincmar of Laon and Charles the Bald ended on a note of grudging compromise, though the theoretical dispute concerning jurisdiction had not been resolved. A second difficulty arose between the two men on similar grounds, but with important differences. This time,

⁷Migne, P.L., CXXVI, 95: "quaestio contra eundem Hincmarum commota, regulariter audita et ventilata est ac definita, quantum ad ministerium episcopale pertinuit, licet isdem episcopus ex intergro non fuerit reuestitus. Contumacium autem causa, alterum finem exspectat. Non igitur, quod in adolescentia vestra, quando animus hominis lubricus, et ad indubitata usurpanda solet esse proclivus, Domino vos custodiente, non accidit, in perfecta aetate vobis subripi, minime autem persuaderi leges ecclesiasticas, vel in modico infringi, sive convelli a quocunque sustineatis."

⁸Sirmond, II, 331: "ex verbis beati Gelasii, duo sunt quibus principaliter mundus regitur . . . solerter providere debetis, ne extra ministerium vestrum, sicut Deo gratias hactenus providistis, manum in sacerdotalem ordinem, et in his quae eidem ordini Spiritus Sancti dono commissae sunt, contra praeceptum Domini extendatis."

⁹Ibid., p. 329: "Non est humanarum legum de talibus ferre sententiam absque ecclesiae principaliter constitutis pontificibus, obsequi solere principes Christianos decretis ecclesiae, non suam praeponere potestatem: episcopis caput subdere principem solitum, non de eorum capitibus iudicare. Unde constat quia si non licet principi, nec cuiquam alteri licet nisi episcopis, de episcoporum capitibus iudicare. Quin etiam ipsae leges publicae, ecclesiasticis regulis obsequentes, tales personas non nisi ab episcopis sanxerunt iudicare."

Hincmar of Laon appealed to Rome and thereby lost the support of his powerful uncle, Hincmar of Rheims. Hincmar of Laon resorted to a number of violent acts, among which was an attempt to oust a royal vassal from his benefice. When he was called to the assembly at Verberie, scheduled for April, 869, he told his diocesan clergy before departing that, should he be arrested and prevented from going to Rome, they were to cease performing the sacraments in the diocese of Laon. He was not arrested there, however, but at Servais somewhat later in May. The clergy of Laon found themselves in an awkward position and decided they had better write their metropolitan, Hincmar of Rheims, to discover the proper course of action. Hincmar's refusal to let them carry out his nephew's order put the archbishop in Charles the Bald's camp, and, although the council of Pîtres in July ordered Hincmar of Laon's release, it upheld the royal thesis regarding the state's relationship to the church in matters of jurisdiction.

When he realized that his case was finally to be settled at the council of Attigny in June, 870, Hincmar of Laon wrote a full justification of his complaints against Charles. This work, the Pittaciolus, was based on Pseudo-Isidorian themes supporting the liberty of suffragan bishops, restricting the authority of a metropolitan to act without the consent of his subordinate bishops, and giving Rome the final jurisdiction in legal disputes within the church. Hincmar of Rheims used the time available to him before Attigny to prepare a lengthy argument of his own—the Opusculum LV. capitulorum ad-

versus Hincmarum Laudunensem. When Hincmar of Laon saw that the bishops gathered at Attigny were not looking with favor on his case, he decided to make concessions by signing a promise of fidelity to the king and respect for metropolitan authority, but on the condition that Hincmar of Rheims also promise to respect the authority of suffragan bishops. Needless to say, the archbishop considered the request insolent and refused to do any such thing. The younger Hincmar decided that the best course was to escape from Attigny and seek papal support, but unable to act because of combined opposition, he finally decided to change his position, accepting Charles' demand that he be tried by civil tribunal. The trial, held at Servais on 1 September, 870, represented a practical victory of worldly authority in disputes engaging both ecclesiastics and laymen.

In the Opusculum LV. capitulorum Hincmar, seeking to challenge the Pseudo-Isidorian thesis, was forced to modify his previous theory of episcopal office. The concord of sacerdotal and worldly offices was no longer conceived of as being rational—that is, the definitions of the two offices and their action in the world were no longer believed to be logically compatible with one another. What Hincmar substituted was a mystical concordia, wherein the source of unity in the world was the peace of Christ, not necessarily comprehensible in worldly terms. Inconsistency in worldly action and apparent disunity are to be resolved by a humble love of God and the realization that the meaning or judgment given

something in terms of the world, although logical, might well be contrary to its essential meaning in reference to God. Thus, Hincmar claimed that the peaceful concordance of offices is a function of caritas and that, in fact, pax and caritas have a dialectical relationship.¹⁰ Despairing of any rational conception of the compatibility of worldly necessity and sacerdotal responsibility, Hincmar turned to a mystical interpretation of the worldly action of episcopal office based on the writings of Pope Gregory I.

The central tenet of Hincmar's position was his belief that Christ, who is our Peace, permits the resolution of contradiction.¹¹ Thus, an apparent discord between episcopal action and Christian ideals is transcended by love of Christ, but only if the office holder acts in a humble spirit. Paraphrasing the thought of Gregory, Hincmar noted that we find salvation through conformity with God's will. One cannot, as Hincmar of Laon sought to do, use worldly wisdom and reason to dispute duly constituted authority within the church.¹²

¹⁰Opusculum LV. capitulorum, cap. xii: "Hinc etenim pax et charitas mutuo se invicem complectuntur, et manet firma concordia in alterna et Deo placita dilectione sinceritas, quia unumquodque tunc salubriter completur officium, cum fuerit unus ad quem possit recurri praepositus.

¹¹Ibid., cap. v: "Quis enim cum Christo, qui est pax nostra, et soluto medio pariete fecit utraque unum, pacem habere desiderans, non amplectatur quod dicit apostolus, 'Solliciti servare unitatem spiritus in vinculo pacis?'"

¹²Ibid., cap. xxxvi: "Quorum perditionem evidenter catholica demonstrat ecclesia, quae ut pro haereticis, ita coniunctim et pro schismaticis orat, ut ad fidei et pacis redeant unitatem, sciens haereticos et schismaticos in haeresi ac schismate permanentes regnum Dei non intraturos: quia nisi ad iudicium, in scissura mentium Deus non est, ut beatus dicit

The archbishop of Rheims wanted to remove the structure of authority from the need of rational justification in worldly terms to the humble acquiescence to God's plan for men.

Such a train of thought led Hincmar into a careful investigation of the origin of authority. Just as there exists a structure of authority in Heaven, so there is one on earth because of man's Fall. Therefore, spiritual life is won by humble submission to authority and resistance to a prideful and selfish will.¹³ Quoting Gregory's Moralia, chapter x, Hincmar rejects any natural justification for worldly distinctions by asserting that all men are naturally equal and have in fact only diverse rank arising from divine dispensation.¹⁴

Gregorius. Deus quippe in unitate est, et illi eius habere gratiam merentur, qui se a invicem per sectarum scandala non dividunt. Unde per se veritas admonet dicens, 'Habete sal in vobis, et pacem habete inter vos.' Ut quisquis habere sal sapientiae studet, curet necesse est quatenus a pace concordiae nunquam recedat. Sed sunt nonnulli, qui dum plus sapere quam necesse est student, a proximorum pace resiliunt, dum eos velut habetes stultosque contemnunt, sicut tu egisti, qui cum tuis complicitibus, et tecum subscribentibus, a vinculo et unitate pacis ecclesiasticae divisisti, contemnens auctoritatem tuae metropolis. . . ."

¹³ Ibid., cap. xiii: "Nam si, ut legimus, angelus angelo dicit, curre et loquere, et angelus obedit angelo, non debet homo dedignari homini obedire: praesertim cum inobedientia Salvatoris nostri, qui factus est obediens patri usque ad mortem crucis, reparatio sit humanae salutis. Diabulus quippe superbus hominem superbientem perduxit in mortem: Christus humilis hominem obedientem reduxit ad vitam. Quia sicut ille elatus cecidit, et deiecit consentientem, sic iste humiliatus surrexit, et erexit credentem."

¹⁴ Ibid., cap. xiv: "'Liquet, inquit beatus Gregorius, quod omnes homines natura aequales genuit, sed variante meritorum ordine, alios aliis cupa postponit. Ipsa autem diversitas, quae accessit ex vitio, divino iudicio dispensatur, ut quia omnis homo aequae stare non valet, alter regatur ab altero.'" In contrast to Stoic thought, Gregory's natural equality is real, for man's real essential being is his relation to

Again relying on Gregory, he insists that the hierarchy of the church and the "earthly republic" find their exemplar in Heaven.¹⁵ Of course, Hincmar meant to weaken the rational arguments put forward by Hincmar of Laon based on the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals by questioning the applicability of legal reasoning itself as the only and ultimate criterion of truth. But, as the case of his defense of Charles the Bald's invasion of Lothringia, Hincmar's response to the challenge of the decretals compelled him to formulate a new theory of office.

The rational concordia of the episcopal and royal office assumes that the actions of both in the world are logically and legally compatible, which is to say that the meaning of worldly action is comprehensible in worldly terms alone. But Hincmar now questions whether in fact the world in itself provides a valid source of meaning. If it can be proved, as Hincmar seeks to do, that meaning is a function of man's intentio—that is, his will—then rational distinctions between ideal action and practice, or between the ends of the church and of the king, lose validity. Not only is the royal office

God, and Hincmar points out that worldly actions are irrelevant to man's real worth.

¹⁵Ibid., cap. xii: "Et quia legimus sacros ordines in caelo et in terra, et in testamento veteri et in novo, dispositos ad Deo, ex quo iuxta apostolum omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra nominatur, qui sint ordines, id est paternitates in caelo, et in ecclesia, et in terrena republica. . . ." "Et beatus Gregorius . . . in epistola ad episcopos Galliarum scribens ostendit . . . 'Quia vero creatura in una eademque aequalitate gubernari vel vivere non potest, caelestium militiarum exemplar nos instruit: quia dum sint angeli, sint archangeli, liquet quia natura aequales sunt, sed in potestate et ordine, sicut nostis, differt alter ab altero.'"

now provided with the liberty to give an unhampered response to the necessities of the political situation, but the bishop is free to undertake actions which logically would be incompatible with Christian ideals. The practical consequences of both of these corollaries of Hincmar's thought shed considerable light on the obscurities of his political action in the 870's. It must be emphasized that Hincmar's developing rejection of the rational aspects of law and offices does not at all mean he will deemphasize their disciplinary function or question their authority. On the contrary, he will show the older he gets an increasing tendency to push law and office definition to the forefront of his adminitions, but in so doing he also avoids subjecting them to reason.

The key to Hincmar's position is the traditional recognition that while pride, the assertion of the world, leads to discordia, the love of God unites the humble believer with the source of truth. Relying on Gregory's Homily number xxxii on the Gospels, Hincmar observes that worldly glory can divert the heart from God, and that such meaning provided by the world threatens one's humility.¹⁶ However, this is but one example of the dangers of pridefully grasping to oneself meaning arising from the world. If a person enjoys an elevated worldly position, the consciousness of this distinction can negate whatever virtues he might have. As long as the "roots

¹⁶ Ibid., cap. xli: "'Cor quippe carnale, dum huius vitae gloriam quaerit, humilitatem respuit: et plerumque ipse homo qui irascitur, discordantem sibi reconciliari appetit, sed ire ad satisfaciendum prior erubescit. Pensemus facta veritatis, ut videamus quo iaceant nostrae pravitatis actiones.'" "

of the heart" are imbedded in the world, man is spiritually dead.¹⁷ Another example concerns the reality of peace. Should worldly peace be sought with excessive zeal, then the ruler looses touch with the author of peace; should he become apprehensive about human bickerings outside him, then he is "slain in the argument of his own internal foulness."¹⁸

But just as pride casts a shadow over the meaning of one's action in the world, so a humble submission of the will to God gives a positive value to one's activity. Good works, for instance, are without meaning in worldly terms alone, for without caritas—the proper intentio of the heart—they become the source of discordant pride.¹⁹ This he makes yet clearer in a quotation from Gregory's Moralia to the effect that superbia is the root of all evil because it makes even good acts an expression of the vain desire for glory.²⁰ There

¹⁷Ibid., cap. liv: "Attendendum est etiam, quae nobis verecundia tunc erit in conspectu totius humani generis, omniumque virtutum caelestium confundi, et post confusionem quae nos poena sequetur, cum animam immortaliter morientem reatus involuit, et indeficienter deficientem carnem gehenna consumet, si radices cordis huic saeculo perseveranter infixas habuerimus. . . ."

¹⁸Ibid., cap. xxxvii: "Pax igitur praesens ita tenenda est, ut et diligere debeat et contemni; quae si immoderate diligitur, diligentis animus in culpa capitur: et dum nimis humanam pacem desiderat, pravae hominum mores nequaquam redaruit, et consentiendo perversis ab auctoris sui se pace disiungit, et dum humana foras iurgia metuit, interni foederis discussione feritur."

¹⁹Ibid., cap. xxxix: "quia quaelibet in nobis bona opera fuerint, si caritas desit, per malum discordiae locus aperitur in acie, ut ad feriendum nos valeat hostis intrare."

²⁰Ibid., cap. lii: "Ait enim, 'superbia, inquit, quam vitiorum radicem diximus, nequaquam unius virtutis extinc-

can be no doubt that wisdom is a worldly virtue, but without the humility which is the guardian of virtues, it is but dust in the wind.²¹ Not only is the meaning of worldly actio a function of the heart's intentio, but the very effectiveness of such action is thereby determined. In the case of exegesis—here Hincmar of Laon's use of sources to justify his position—human powers of rational understanding must be combined with a humble frame of mind to attain the truth of the written word.²² Hincmar wrote that the diversity of tradition did not give one *carte blanche*, and therefore, his nephew should look into his own heart to discover the proper course of action by carefully weighing the appropriateness of his ends.²³ Worldly power is also dependent on the attitude of

tione contenta, contra cuncta animae membra se erigit, quasi generalis ac pestifer morbus corpus omne corrumpit, ut quicquid illa invadente agitur, etiam si esse virtus ostenditur, non per hoc Deo, sed soli vanae gloriae servitur."

²¹Ibid., cap. xxxvii: "Scientia etenim virtus est, humilitas custos virtutis, et miranda actio cum elatione non elevat, sed gravat. Qui enim sine humilitate virtutes congregat, in ventum pulverem portat, et unde aliquid ferre cernitur, inde deterius caecatur." "Ut quisquis habet sal sapientiae, studiose curet necesse est, quatenus a pace concordiae nunquam recedat. Et ne in pace tenenda quis erret, per semetipsam veritas, cum terrenam pacem a superna distingueret. . . ."

²²Ibid., cap. xxxviii: "Quia nimirum bene dicta prae intelligentes, fidelium mentes, quae iam aliquid de veritatis intellectu conceperant, perversa doctrina perimunt: et dum scientiae sibi nomen extendunt, parvulorum corda iam de verbi conceptione gravis erroris gladio scindunt, et quasi doctrinae sibi opinionem faciunt. Quibus primum necesse est ne inanem gloriam quaerant: quia si radix elationis absciditur, consequenter rami pravae assertionis arefiunt."

²³In a letter to his nephew, Hincmar wrote (Migne, P. L., CXXVI, 550): "Quia vero de traditione tua quereris, et nihil sit in terra sine causa, nihilque quod aut non faciat Deus propitius, aut fieri non permittat iratus, et pluraliter fieri traditiones atque diversis modis diversos et pro diver-

its holder, for without a fear of God and honor of fellow man, such power achieves nothing.²⁴

Charles' successful imposition of his will in the case of Hincmar of Laon, which involved jurisdictions common to both the ecclesiastical and secular worlds is of direct significance for Hincmar's idea of office only insofar as the sphere of the spiritual authority was narrowed on the practical level. And yet, in Hincmar's need to find answers to the Pseudo-Isidorian challenge (however suspect he may have held some of the decretals), he was forced to reconsider his epistemology in reference to the concordance of offices. For Hincmar the only course of action other than conceding Hincmar of Laon's points was to challenge the validity of logic as the sole means of discovering truth in the legal sources. The epistemological stand which Hincmar assumed in the later 860's was not new to Christian thought, but it does represent the first significant application of Christian mysticism to political theory. Until this time, Hincmar had assumed that the sacerdotal and secular offices could work hand in hand, one by spiritual and the other by worldly action, to achieve not only their distinct objectives, but common goals as well.

sis causis traditos legimus, necesse est tibi subtiliter mentem tuam discutere, ut meditatus cum corde tuo, et non dolosa, sed recta statera appendens mores, cogitationes, verba, et actus tuos, apud te invenias haec traditio tua unde, et a quo processerit, et quem processum habeat, vel ad quem finem spectat. . . ."

²⁴Opusculum LV. capitulorum, . cap. v: "Quid enim, quantum sibi a potentia superna permittitur, non potest homo temporali potestate suffultus, qui Deum non timet, et hominem non reveretur? Nam et nos aliquid possumus, sed utinam semper in Deo possimus qui nos confortat."

But now that the decretals had challenged the practicality of such a scheme, and perhaps more importantly, now that a rational use of legal sources had challenged the dignity of Hincmar's own metropolitan rank, the archbishop turned to a non-rational justification and interpretation of the structure of worldly authority and offices.

Perhaps the church reform party, in whose ranks Hincmar had been a leading spokesman, had naively hoped that through the spiritual action of the bishops a radical transformation of political and social life would take place. But Hincmar, now in his 60's, had suffered setbacks, not only through the challenge of the decretals, but in his physical constitution, and had witnessed a growing Norse threat and an increasingly apparent ineffectiveness of government. He was well aware that the period of Carolingian prosperity had by now passed and must have felt that the time had come for a return to those political means which had once been so effective. In fact, in the matter of Carloman's revolt, which followed immediately on the heels of Hincmar of Laon's defeat, he used Christian thought to encourage an intensification of those means by removing traditional checks on royal action.

CHAPTER X

THE REVOLT OF CARLOMAN

The study of Charles the Bald's invasion of Lothringia in 870 suggested that Hincmar's ideas tended at that time to reflect a decidedly new cast—one favoring the freedom of the monarch to do whatever he felt politically advisable without direct episcopal interference. We now turn to another political crisis which followed shortly thereafter and seek to discover whether, indeed, Hincmar had permanently abandoned a rational accord of the episcopal and royal offices. The issue to be considered here is the harsh punishment of blinding which Charles imposed on his son Carloman in 873 for banditry and treason. But well before this date, Hincmar had become involved in the atmosphere of increasing tension which divided father and son.

Being blessed with four sons, Charles the Bald decided in 854 to direct one of them—Carloman—into a church career. The lad was tonsured and provided with an ecclesiastical education by a certain Wulfad, a canon in Rheims and a bitter enemy of the archbishop. From here Carloman proceeded to Sens, where he attained the rank of deacon. Unhappy with the lot which fate had dealt him, the young clerk preferred to gather about him a band of desperados and turn to looting the countryside of Rheims.¹

Charles found himself too involved in Burgundy to devote sufficient attention to his son's activities, and so he wrote Hincmar in the hope that the archbishop might obtain the assistance of a number of bishops and fideles to check the disorders.² At the same time, Hincmar wrote Charles late in 870 in an attempt to soothe the irate king, lest upon his return from the south he take extraordinary measures against his son.³ However, it appears that a false rumor of Louis of Italy's death provided both Charles and Carloman with ample motive to

¹Hincmar surveyed Carloman's life in a letter to Archbishop Remigius of Lyon (Sirmond, II, 353): "Karlomannus, domini nostri Karoli regis gloriosi carne filius, in dioecesi Remorum spiritu sancto regeneratus, et a patre sacro altari oblatus, religiosus divini servitii obsequiis mancipandus ac in clericum tonsus, in dioecesi vero Senonensi, et in parochia Meldensi ab Hildegario eiusdem civitatis religioso episcopo per singulos gradus usque ad ordinem diaconatus proventus . . . nuper a patre, post plurima benignitatis ac beneficentiae dona sibi collata, fuga lapsus congregavit secum plurimos filios Belial, qui inaudita nostris temporibus mala in parochiis dioeceseos Remorum exercuerunt, in rapinis et depredationibus, et homicidiis atque adulteriis, et ecclesiarum violationibus, aliisque quamplurimis flagitiis ac facinoribus, quae diabolica instigatione et humana crudelitate possunt patrari." For an account of Carloman's subsequent activities, see Schrörs, op.cit., pp. 313-15.

²Flodoard, Historia Remensis Ecclesiae, III, xviii (M.G.H., SS., XIII, 508): "Quando etiam filius suus Karolomannus clericus adversus eum consurrexit, et ipse rex ad Vienne contra Gerardum comitem, qui a se desciverat, profectus erat, huic presuli nostro litteras suas misit, mandans, ut convocaret coepiscopos regni ac laicos ipsi fideles: ut episcopi secundum ministerium suum prohiberent Karlomanno, ne aliquid dampnum in hoc regno faceret, et laici resisterent illi, ne hoc facere posset."

³Ibid.: "Litteras quoque deprecatorias regni iam pro eodem Karlomanno direxerat et pro pace inter ipsum et patrem eius laborabat; multa tamen mala et depredationes ab ipso eiusque complicibus patiebatur." Calmette, op.cit., relates the fluctuating attitudes of father and son at this time to rumors of Louis II's death

resolve their differences as quickly as possible. Unfortunately for the latter, he had placed himself at his father's mercy before discovering the rumor to be erroneous, and in January of 871, he submitted to the judgment of the church and suffered excommunication. At the instigation of Hincmar of Laon, Carloman thought it best to try an appeal to Pope Hadrian II, but despite sharp letters from Rome demanding a lifting of the excommunication and an end of any use of force against Carloman, Hincmar seems not to have paid any heed. Realizing that his situation was rapidly becoming desperate, Carloman submitted to his father and accepted imprisonment at Senlis. But even there, Carloman remained the hope of dissident factions, and by 873, a serious uprising was emerging with a program calling for the release of their hero and the expulsion of Charles from the throne in his favor.

For Charles the Bald, things had gone quite far enough. He condemned his son to death, but then, reconsidering the extraordinary nature of this punishment, decided that by blinding him he could achieve his central aim, for in Frankish opinion, a blind man can never become king. Thus far in the course of events, Hincmar has been involved in two ways. First, Charles knew he could count on the archbishop to coordinate church and secular powers in an attempt to put an end to Carloman's career as highwayman. But, apparently on his own initiative, Hincmar sought to calm the king's anger lest he take measures against Carloman more severe than the situation warranted. Between these events of circa 870 and the blinding

of Carloman in 873, Hincmar seems not to have played any significant role. Despite Carloman's association with Hincmar of Laon, his appeal to Pope Hadrian, and his destruction of property within the see of Rheims, one finds little reason to suspect that Hincmar was so moved as to encourage Charles' imposing on his son the maximum penalty of blinding.

However, Hincmar addressed a tract to the king entitled De regis persona et regio ministerio which could do nothing else than to support Charles in whatever cruel action might be necessary to crush this challenge to his authority. Hincmar based his work to a large extent upon the Capitula diversarum sententiarum of Jonas of Orléans written earlier in the century, but he freely deleted those parts of Jonas' work which accorded poorly with his own ideas and added articles designed to ensure the greatest freedom possible to the king.⁴ An analysis of the content of De regis persona will indicate not only why Jonas' work proved so useful in the present context, but, more importantly, for Hincmar's new theory of ministerium.

It is unnecessary to repeat here the arguments Hincmar brought forth in De regis persona supporting the important role of the bishop as advisor to kings. Admonition—a central responsibility inherent in the episcopal office—was recognized

⁴For the relation of Jonas' Capitula and Hincmar's De regis persona, see Carl Erdmann, "Ein karolingischer Konzilsbrief und der Fürstenspiegel Hinkmars von Reims." Neues Archiv, L (1935), 106-134.

by Jonas and found constant repetition throughout Hincmar's writings. Hincmar's abandonment of the rational concordance of offices would not curtail the episcopal responsibility for admonition but simply that the content of that advice may not always rationally accord with needed political action.

However, what is of interest in the present context are the hints in De regis persona that Hincmar's advice met considerable opposition among the king's other advisors. This seems the only way to account for Hincmar's emphasis of a point which Charles had long accepted as valid. But what would have met considerable opposition was not Hincmar's right to advise the king, but the content of his recommendations. The shedding of the blood of one's relatives had long been considered one of the worst of crimes in a society based on the extended family group. Louis the Pious had blinded his half-nephew, Bernard of Italy, and the subsequent death of the Italian monarch so dismayed Louis' contemporaries that his rule was shaken to its foundations and he was seldom again confident of the full support of his magnates. There must have been many who warned Charles against the dangers of repeating Louis' mistake by following Hincmar's advice.

These considerations account for the emphasis which Hincmar placed on his own right to speak and the obligation of the king to listen.⁵ Quoting Ambrose, always a good source for the episcopal responsibility for admonishing kings, Hinc-

⁵De regis persona, cap. iv: "Similiter et in consiliis agere debet consiliarius, quia est et in consilio maxima liberalitas."

mar advised the monarch to seek good councillors. Their words are like water pouring from a fountain: what is the use of having wisdom should Charles refuse to drink?⁶ But, on the other hand, Hincmar suggests that the king is also open to pernicious advice. He warns that kings should avoid such villainous friends, for their influence turns Charles away from God.⁷ If Hincmar's description be accurate, the reader even finds a hint as to their method of swaying the king, for he warns against being decoyed by gifts, smooth talk, and adulation.⁸ In sum, it would appear that Hincmar met considerable opposition at court from certain parties favoring a more lenient handling of the rebellious son and suggesting to the king that it would be to his benefit not to carry out this harshest of punishments.

One of the central themes running through De regis persona is the use of Christian ideas to strengthen the royal office. If Charles was to take such a bold step as blinding his own son, he would need all the ideological support he

⁶Ibid., cap. iv: "quis vero quamvis instructum ad consilii opem, difficilem tamen accessu ambiat, in quo sit allud, tanquam si quis aquae fontem praeccludat? Quid enim prodest habere sapientiam, si consilium neges? Si consulendi intercludas copiam, clausisti fontem, ut nec aliis profluat, nec tibi prosit."

⁷Ibid., cap. xxii: "Sed et cavendum est principibus, ne etiam huiusmodi sceleratorum amicitias coniungantur, vel huiusmodi in familiaritatem suscipiant." "Inimicos etiam Dei perfecto odio odisse est, ad quod facti sunt diligere, et quod faciunt increpare, mores pravorum premere, vitae prodesse."

⁸Ibid., cap. xxi: "Timeatque princeps quod in Regum Historia legitur, ne muneribus vel blanditiis cuiusquam scelerati pelliciatur, vel adulationibus decipiatur."

could find, and the idea of Christian office gave him exactly the needed justification. Hincmar could not have chosen a better work than Jonas' Capitula for emphasizing the divine justification of royal action, for it regards monarchy as essential for the realization of God's will on earth. Hincmar's own contribution was to emphasize that the responsibilities of the king to God, as implied in the royal office, transcended any worldly bonds, such as those of blood and love, which would discourage Charles from punishing his son. The law serves to aid men in seeking their salvation, but what can it accomplish if the king's mercy negates the rigor of that law?

If a doctor discovers the scar tissue of a malignant interior wound, he ought to cut back the infected flesh lest it spread further. But if he is turned away from his purpose of cutting and scraping by the patient's tears and covers with medicaments what would have been revealed by the scalpel, is not this mercy injurious were the whole body to decay and the enjoyment of life end because of a transient incision and burning pain?⁹

Hincmar points to the Biblical example of Absalom, condemned by his father for rebellion: Charles, therefore, should have no fear of bringing such punishment upon his own flesh and blood, if the peace of the realm requires it.¹⁰ It

⁹For the necessity of law for salvation, see ibid., cap. xxvii: "Hoc eo dictum est, ut sicamus secundum verbum Dei, secundum rationem dispensandam esse misericordiam debitoribus. Medicus ipse, si serpentis interius inveniat vulneris cicatricem, cum debeat resecare ulceris vitium ne latius serpat, tamen a secandi urendique proposito lacrymis inflexus aegroti, medicamentis tegat quod ferro aperiendum fuit, nonne ista inutilis misericordia est, si propter brevem incisionis vel exustionis dolorem, corpus omne tabescat, vitae usus intereat?"

¹⁰Ibid., cap. xxxi: "Qui autem de maximis et publicis criminibus ex corde se non humiliat, sed ad excusandas excusationes in peccatis, peccata sua defenere curat, huic non impendenda est misericordia, quia praestari nullatenus praevallet

is true that the fundamental ideas brought out here by Hincmar are not original, but such an application of the Christian idea of the royal office in opposition to older traditions and customs represents an ever greater penetration of Christian values into political life.¹¹

However, this is not the only theoretical consideration for strengthening of royal action found in De regis persona. Hincmar also applies older ideas regarding the distinction between the man and his office to argue that the office holder is freed from those restrictions of Christian morality which would make many political acts a danger to spiritual well being. This is not to say that the office holder is freed of any consideration of Christian values, but rather, the crucial factor is the person's intentio. This drawing away from measuring an act strictly in terms of the world means that political necessity can in certain circumstances free royal action from such restraints of conventional morality so as to assure the welfare of the people and peace in the realm. The appeal to necessitas has already been pointed out in Hincmar's justification for Charles' invasion of Lothringia,

indulgentio, sicut . . ." "Nam si aliter non meruit habere pacem domus David, nisi Absalon filius eius in bello, quod contra patrem gerebat, fuisset extinctus, quamvis magna cura mandaverit suis . . ." "Quod si propriis visceribus in servanda pace non est indultum, quanto minus in extraneis severitate legum censemus parcendum?"

¹¹In other respects, too, the De regis persona is a reflection of the extent to which (in theory at least) Christian ideas had encompassed political life since the time of Jonas. Hincmar rejects Jonas' ideas concerning fame and good reputation as worthwhile goals in life and also Jonas' interpretation of war in non-Christian terms.

but here it is cited in order to allow the king to transcend blood ties. The Annales Bertiniani suggest that the revolt of Carloman was an affair of considerable political importance, for "there were many who expected to achieve their evil ends through him."¹² It should also be recalled that rebellion at home complicated Charles' march toward Italy in 871, for he was first compelled to come to terms with his son. Although the rumors at that time of Louis II's death proved false, Charles still must have been very concerned lest his hands be tied when a second opportunity arose to make a bid for the Italian throne. The most recent escape of his son and the attribution of the royal title to Carloman by his supporters may well have convinced Charles that drastic steps were required to eliminate permanently this thorn in his side.

In the De regis persona itself are found references to the necessities of the political situation demanding measures so harsh as the execution of a son. Pointing to the example of God, Who sent His Son to His Passion although He loved Him, Hincmar warned Charles that the "peace of the whole church and the general welfare" should weigh more heavily in the scale of judgment than the ties of blood, especially in the case of a degenerate son.¹³ But even considering all the

¹²Annales Bertiniani, a. 873: "Quia ergo multi erant in regno Karoli qui expectabant ut per Karlomannum adhuc rediviva mala agerentur. . . ."

¹³De regis persona, cap. xxx: "Hoc modo princeps filius vel propinquus, si peccaverint, recognoscentibus ac possidentibus parcere debet, alioquin vindictam secundum modum culpe in peccantes exercere." ". . . et tamen pater amavit filium, quem ad passionem misit, qui, ut item dicit Apostolus,

factors which would demand the severest of punishments, Hincmar wanted to emphasize the freedom of the king to act as he best saw fit. The king can suspend just punishment if "in the time of necessity," he recognizes that such a course is appropriate.¹⁴ Whether Charles is to condemn his son or not depends on the realities of the political situation and not on the natural sympathies of a father for his son. Because of the royal ministry, the king should not allow family ties to interfere with his judgment of criminal acts against the church or the republic.¹⁵

It was noted in the study of Hincmar's attack upon Hincmar of Laon that he turned to an emphasis on the mystical rather than rational concordance of the episcopal and royal offices. Not only was this tendency continued in De regis persona, where worldly criteria of action in office were rejected, but it is also crucial in another work written at about this same time for Charles' edification, the De cavendis vitiis et virtutibus. Relying heavily on the mysticism of Gregory the Great, Hincmar turns his attention toward a clearer inter-

se pro ecclesia tradidit, necessario praeponderare debet pax ecclesiae universalis, et soliditas generalis, dilectioni etiam dilecti, multo magis autem degeneris filii,"

¹⁴Ibid., cap. xxviii: "Quod etiam his, qui pro sceleribus puniendi sunt, si in tempore necessitatis, et periculi urgentis instantia, vel in ultimo spiritu, praesidium poenitentiae, et mox reconciliationis petierint, nec satisfactio interdicenda sit, nec reconciliatio deneganda. . . ."

¹⁵Ibid., praef.: "Rex propter ministerium regium, etiam nec quibuscumque propinquitatis necessitudinibus, contra Deum sanctamque Ecclesiam atque contra Rempublicam agentibus criminaliter, affectu carnali parcere debeat."

pretation of the meaning of action in office to emphasize that law and tradition are not in themselves adequate criteria for judging a king's acts. Hincmar insists that action engages the whole person, both in body and mind. But just as bodily acts relate one to the world, so does the mind direct the heart to God. The resulting tension between the world as given and God's will for man yields a particularly dynamic psychology from which action emerges as being neither totally comprehensible in terms of the world nor of man's ultimate ends and values. This being the case, to judge royal actions in terms of objective criteria alone—whether expressed in law or in tradition—is to leave out of consideration one crucial dimension of the human condition. For Hincmar's immediate purposes, he seeks to emphasize that the particular demands placed on the king by political necessity may not be logically compatible with Christian norms or values—assuming these to represent God's will. As a person, the king naturally is obliged to obey divine law, but as an office holder meeting the needs of organized society, his actions do not have to conform logically with any law and are free to meet the needs of the realm.

The distinction made between the person of the king and his office not only permits the assertion of an ideal of action independent of personal interests, but it also allows action in office to be free of objective limitations. Such action can at once satisfy the objective necessities of the world (often having little relevance to Christian life or even

contrary to it) and the personal imperative of Christian goals and values. Hincmar is realist enough to recognize that political necessity does not always conform to the Christian values relevant to the individual. He notes that it is good that a virtuous king rule long, but the virtue is more useful to the king than the length of the rule. "In this world the realm of good men is benefited not so much by [the king's piety and probity] as by temporal things."¹⁶

One of the most obvious examples of this is the continuing presence of warfare in Christian society. It is necessitas which causes war, for through it the discord which makes peace impossible can be checked.¹⁷ But Hincmar is not simply seeking to justify warfare in all circumstances, for it must be carried out as a function of one's office. The divine precept "Thou shalt not kill" can have exceptions, for if a person holds an office which involves killing, then he does so without danger to his soul.¹⁸ For Hincmar—and for Jonas

¹⁶Ibid., cap. vi: "Si verus Deus colatur, eique sacris, veracibus, et bonis moribus serviatur, utile est ut boni longe lateque diu regnent, neque hoc tam ipsis quam illis utile est quibus regnant. Nam quantum ad ipsos pertinet, pietas et probitas eorum, quae magna Dei dona sunt, sufficit eis ad veram felicitatem, qua et in ista vita bene agatur, et postea percipiatur aeterna. In hac ergo terra regnum bonorum non tam illis praestatur, quam rebus humanis."

¹⁷Ibid., cap. viii: "Bellum necessitas faciat, ut sopita discordia pax recuperari possit." This is a quotation from Jonas' Capitula, cap. xxii.

¹⁸Ibid., cap. ix: "Quasdam exceptiones eadem ipse divina fecit auctoritas, ut liceat hominem occidi. Sed his exceptis, quos occidi iubet, sive data lege, sive ad personam pro tempore expressa iussione. Non autem ipse occidit qui ministerium debet iubenti, sicut adminiculum gladius utenti. Et ideo nequaquam contra hoc praeceptum fecerunt, quo dictum

whom he quotes—the concept of pax is clearly not Augustinian, for the antonym of pax is not bellum but discordia. Hincmar is less concerned about conflict per se than a disruption to God's true order. But this is no crass indifference to human suffering, for true order brings with it caritas and human happiness on a level higher than mere absence of conflict.

Hincmar seeks by which ever way he can to free Charles of objective criticism so that he can find the most rapid and effective solution to the difficulties attending his reign. It becomes impossible to challenge royal decisions on the basis of objective complaints over his rule. Quoting Saint Augustine, he noted that "there is nothing which God has not either made or justly permitted to be." Good kings rule because of God's beneficent grace, while bad kings "are permitted to rule by divine justice, which however obscure it may be, is never wrong."¹⁹ Having given Charles a free field for action, he also seeks to encourage the king to take advantage of his op-

est 'non occides,' qui Deo auctore bella gesserunt, aut personam gerentes publicae potestatis, secundum eius leges, hoc est iustissimae rationis imperium, scelereatos morte puniunt. . . . His igitur exceptis, quos vel lex iusta generaliter, vel ipse fons iustitiae Deus specialiter occidi iubet, quisquis hominem, vel seipsum, vel quemlibet occiderit, homicidii crimine tenetur." This is a quote from Augustine's Civitas Dei, I, xxi made in Jonas' Capitula, cap. iv.

¹⁹Ibid., cap. i: "sicut beatus Augustinus in libro de Bono perseverantiae dicit, 'Nihil sit nisi quod aut Deus facit, aut fieri iuste permittit, cum boni reges regnant, sicut Dei gratia boni sunt, ita et Deo agente regnant, sicut ipse dicit, 'Per me reges regnant,' et cum mali reges regnant, sicut mali sunt suo vitio, ita et regnare permittuntur divino iudicio, interdum occulto, sed numquam iniusto. . . ." Because of his position on the predestination question, Hincmar changed Jonas' belief that God gave men bad kings to God permits bad kings.

portunities. We are ignorant of the time of our approaching death, and since nothing can be accomplished once we are dead, it remains that before death we snatch at whatever time is granted us.²⁰

Hincmar wished to convince Charles that the objective meaning found in the world has no relevance to his own value as a person. For instance, worldly power is a source of meaning which should be distinguished from the real nature of man. Excessive interest in worldly matters is in itself a grave sin, and he who pursues this risks spiritual death "just as a dog keenly following upon the tracks of a wild boar or stag perishes by the tooth or horn of his prey."²¹ The opinion others have of him can serve only to divert Charles from what he knows that political necessity requires. Adulation is a most pernicious disease which seizes upon the mind, and it is inane to believe what others think of us rather than what we know to be true.²² Charles should tailor his acts not to win the

²⁰De cavendis vitiis, praef.: "Quia ergo et venturae mortis tempus ignoramus, et post mortem operari non possumus, superest ut ante mortem tempora indulta rapiamus."

²¹Ibid., cap. v: "Grave namque est curiositatis vitium, quae dum cuiuslibet mentem ad investigandam vitam proximi exterius ducit, semper ei sua intima abscondit, ut aliena sciens se nesciat, et curiosi animus, quanto peritus fuerit alieni meriti, tanto fiet ignarus sui. Et saepe dum curiosus quisque quae sunt aliena investigat, suam molestiam excitat, sicut canis apri vel cervi sagaciter vestigia insequens, consequuti dente vel cornu perit."

²²Ibid., praef.: "Perniciosissima siquidem pestis est adulatio, et cito subripit mentem, nisi fuerit in ipso remota initio. Discutiendum igitur nobis est quid de nobis audiamus, et probare quid dicatur ex nobis. Credamus quia stultum est plus aliis de nobis quam nobis ipsis credere."

praise of others, but do what is right in his own opinion, lest human esteem and gratitude divert him from his proper course.²³

The idea of distinguishing between worldly office and the holder of that office is, of course, not original. Jonas and others before him had recognized that anyone having elevated positions in the world would be tempted by the flattery of others and the consciousness of his own fortune to take a self-satisfied view of the state of his soul. But Hincmar turns a moral admonition to political advantage by using it to free the king from criticism as well as flattery. The heart of Jonas' position is that the office one enters is for the benefit of others, and such worldly position is not indicative of one's own essential worth. The officer must always look into his heart, keeping in mind his natural equality with all men and the superficiality of his temporal dignity. "For as much as power is externally conspicuous, so must it be disparaged, lest it overcome the faculty of rational thought, lest in self-satisfaction it ravish the mind, lest now that the mind cannot rule itself, it submits to it in the passion of domination."²⁴ But for Hincmar, the freeing of the office

²³ *Ibid.*, praef.: "Quasi latrunculus est enim appetitus laudis humanae, qui recto itinere gradientibus ex latere iungitur, ut ex occultis educto gladio gradientium vita trucidetur. Cumque propositae utilitatis intentio ad studio privata deducitur, horrendo modo unum idemque opus culpa peragit, quod virtus inchoavit." "Unde etiam in bonis quae agimus necesse est ut cum magna cautela timeamus, ne per hoc quod a nobis rectum agitur favor aut gratia humana requiratur, ne appetitus laudis subripiat, et quod foris ostenditur, intus a mercede vacuetur."

holder from the worldly definition of his action permits him the liberty to respond adequately to political necessities, whether the invasion of a land in violation of legal restraints or the execution of a son.

Hincmar was also interested in keeping Charles' personal obligations to a minimum, for these, too, could hinder the freedom of royal action. Particularly in the case of oaths, the royal office would find itself inhibited by the personal commitments of its holder. He advised Charles to avoid taking oaths, but should they prove necessary, then they are to be undertaken in all sincerity.²⁵

The general implication of Hincmar's political thought after the late 860's is a strengthening of the royal office. In each case thus far examined, there can be found personal motives which might have encouraged Hincmar to take such a

²⁴De regis persona, cap. iiii: "Cum ergo potentiae temporalis ministerium suscipitur, summa cura vigilandum est, ut sciat quisque et sumere ex illa quod adiuvat, et expugnare quod tentat. Teneamus ergo exterius quod pro aliorum utilitate suscepimus, teneamus interius quod de nostra aestimatione sentimus. . . . Servata autem auctoritate regiminis, ad cor nostrum sine cessatione redeamus, et consideremus assidue quod sumus aequaliter cum ceteris conditi, non quod temporaliter ceteris praelati. Potestas enim quanto exterius eminet, tanto premi interius debet, ne cogitationem vincat, ne in delectatione sui animum rapiat, ne iam sub se mens eam regere non possit, cui se libidine dominandi supponit."

²⁵De cavendis vitiis, cap. v: "Cavendum est igitur iuramentum, multo magis autem periurium. At si iurandi necessitas perurget et arctat, id puris verbis et mente pia gerendum est. Nec iurans verbi arte se putet fallere Dominum posse, cui nihil absconsum est, cui corda cuncta patent, qui non accipit sicut quis iurat, sed ut is cui iuratur iurasse putat."

stand. The most obvious and persistent of these was his fear that the implications of the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals would destroy the rational concordia between spiritual and worldly action which had been his ideal before 865. Now that this unity of action had been threatened on the practical level, Hincmar's attitude toward the royal office reflects a willingness to return to the king the personal initiative of a Charlemagne or Louis the Pious, but without abandoning the Christian objective definition of the royal office. For Charles to achieve a greater freedom of action and to find justifications for transcending the political situation, it was first necessary to free the king from the inhibitions of traditional modes of action and Christian values, the former hindering positive action in the world and the latter providing means often inappropriate to the needs of the time. Hincmar's recommendations regarding the punishment of Carloman, an act which ran contrary to Christian values and to the traditional prejudices against shedding the blood of a relative, shows the development of a phenomenology of office allowing the king to respond freely to political necessity. Henceforth not only would the concordance of offices be non-objective—that is, mystical, for the unity necessarily exists only in the mind of God, but also the action of office itself would be freed of objective criteria and find its sole meaning in its relation to God's will.

CHAPTER XI

THE ITALIAN SUCCESSION AND THE MYSTIC CONCORDANCE OF OFFICES

Both Charles the Bald and Louis the German had for some time looked forward to an opportunity for adding the Italian realm to their territories. In 868 they had mutually sworn that, were it God's will for the domains of their nephews to fall into their hands, they would amicably arrive at an equitable division. Although Charles had taken advantage of the situation at Lothar II's death in 870 to seize all of Lothringia before his brother could act, they ultimately divided the middle kingdom between them at Meerssen in 870. Then in the fall of 875 came the news from Italy that the Emperor Louis II had died, leaving no male heir. The details of Charles' response to this opportunity for obtaining not only the crown of Italy, but also inheriting Louis' imperial title are not of immediate concern in the present context, but it is important to observe Hincmar's reaction, for in it one perceives his new attitude toward the role of the bishop in political life.

It is instructive to keep in mind that when Charles learned of Louis' death, he appears at that point to have already laid careful plans to snatch what must have been for him a valuable prize. Louis died on August 12. Couriers trans-

mitted the message across the Alps and to the king in the Ardennes. Upon receipt of the news, Charles called together his supporters at the council of Ponthion, gathered his army, and was on his way to Italy by September 1—all this within only eighteen days!¹

The prime object of such an exceptionally well planned and executed move is not easily ascertained. Once in possession of the imperial title, he found little difficulty obtaining the crown of Lombardy—perhaps this was the major goal he had in mind. Whether there was more involved—such as reuniting Europe under one head—is hard to determine simply in light of subsequent events. There are hints here and there that at least the papacy saw the imperial dignity as having wide ideological implications, but what impact such ideas had on Charles remains obscure.² When he later asked his fideles to recognize his new title at Ponthion, he shocked many by adorning himself in Byzantine garb. Whatever he may have intended, it was not revealed in the course of this meeting.

¹Annales Bertiniani, a. 875: "Karolus mense augusto ad Duciacum secus Ardvennam pervenit, ubi certo nuntio Hludowicum nepotem suum Italiae imperatorem obisse comperit. Quapropter mox inde movens, ad Pontigonem pervenit . . . kalendis septembris iter suum incoepit, et per Sancti Mauricii monasterium pergens, montem Iovis transiit et Italiam ingressus fuit."

²One obtains some idea of the papal ideas from Percy Ernst Schramm, Der König von Frankreich (2nd ed.; Weimar, 1960), I, 32-43. Although Schramm believes Charles sought to re-occupy the position in Europe once held by Charlemagne, other interpretations are possible. Suggesting a Byzantine model is Werner Ohnsorge, "Byzanz und das Abendland im 9. und 10. Jahrhundert; Zum Entwicklung des Kaiserbegriffs und der Staatsideologie," Saeculum, V (1954), 194-220.

Likewise, his subsequent attempt to expand his borders at the expense of Louis the German reveals nothing strikingly new in European diplomacy. Whatever he may have thought of his new title, it could not fundamentally alter the political situation, for the Carolingian monarchs were no longer in a position to act unilaterally and contrary to the will of their fideles—now well entrenched as independent foci of power in their own right.

Regardless of what Charles may have sought, it does seem clear that Hincmar understood his prime ambition to be the winning of north Italy, although he appears rather doubtful of its being worth the shedding of Christian blood.³ Hincmar felt that the agreement of Metz, proposing a peaceful division of Lothringia and Italy, should be observed, or if not, then contradictory claims at least not be so ardently pursued that it lead to discord among bishops, disruption of the church, affliction of the people, and fighting among the magnates.⁴ As subsequent events show, Hincmar was neither

³Hincmar makes no mention of the imperial title, but assumes that the conflict between the brother is over the kingdom of Italy. He recalled the whole affair in rather negative terms (Instructio ad Ludovicum Balbum, cap. v): "Mortuo autem Hludowico fratre Hlotharii in Langobarida, requisita est patri vestro a fratre suo et a filiis eius pars de regni illius; unde adhuc vivente Hludowico, sed et anno praeterito, tales devenerunt miseriae, sicut vobis sunt notae, et hoc anno talis provenit lugenda infelicitas, quae per universum pene mundum, et per futura tempora merito erit in opprobrium." He attributes Charles' motive as a desire to appropriate Italy (De fide Carlo servanda, cap. iii): "regnum . . . defendant, donec ipse adepto regno ad quod accipiendum ivit, auxiliante Domino revertatur in pace."

⁴Ibid., cap. xi: "et quae conditio de regnis nepotum suorum inter illum et fratrem eius sit sacramento firmata, u-

to Charles' real ambitions nor even consulted concerning royal policy in general.

However Charles may have looked at the matter, Hincmar certainly did not see the Italian adventure as a political necessity. In fact, it was mistaken of Charles to forsake his kingdom and try his luck in Italy without adequate provision for his own realm's defense. Although he had made advance preparations for his march south, the requirements of secrecy demanded that many steps vital for the continuance of order within his realm be made at Ponthion only after the news of Louis II's death. The Annales Bertiniani state that this involved calling together as many "councillors" of the region as possible and "from whomever Charles was able, to obtain support for his march."⁵ This suggests that the approval of his fideles was not included in Charles' advance arrangements, and that his request for support was not too enthusiastically received. From Ponthion he proceeded to Langres, where, apparently still anxious to hide his intentions and conceal those who were destined to accompany him into Italy, he sent his wife Richilde to Servais and his son Louis Balbus into the part of Lothringia under his control.⁶ While Charles was cross-

tinam aut ignoraretur, aut inter eos ipsa conditio servaretur, et neque discordia ecclesiarum praesules, et servi ac ancillae Domini inquietarentur, et Christianus populus affligeretur, ac inter regni primores viscere bellum insurgeret, et rapinae ac deprædationes rerum ecclesiasticarum, atque divitum seu pauperum conflarent.

⁵Annales Bertiniani, a. 875: "ad Pontigonem pervenit et quoscumque potuit de vicinis suis consiliariis obviam sibi venire praecepit et a quibuscumque valuit suppetias in itinere suo accepit."

sing into Italy, his wife and his son fulfilled the responsibilities of the royal office in West Francia. This raised an interesting question concerning the theory of royal office which Hincmar felt compelled to study.

In light of the greater emphasis which Hincmar had placed in recent years on political necessity, an interpretation of his attitude toward the events of 875 must consider what the archbishop felt to be the real as well as the ideological parameters of royal action. It has already been indicated that Hincmar found no compelling reason why Charles should mix in Italian affairs. Furthermore, he was well aware of the need for firm leadership at home. Shortly after Charles' departure, Hincmar wrote a tract to the bishops and magnates (proceres) of the province of Rheims entitled De fide Carlo servanda, recommending that, whatever complaints they might have against the king, nothing permitted them to neglect their sword fidelity. He observed that "now that the realm is surrounded by pagans [the Norse] and false Christians—that is, the Bretons—and, as we have said, is perturbed by the visceral commotions which for some time now the fideles and government officials have been seen to cause in it," it is better not to enter into a conflict over Italy.⁷

⁶Ibid.: "Et inde Lingonas pervenit et eos quos secum in Italia ducere praedestinavit operuit; sicque Richildem, uxorem suam, per civitatem Remis ad Silvacum remittens, et filium suum Hludowicum in partem regni quam post obitum Hlotharii nepotis sui contra fratrem suum accepit dirigens. . . ."

⁷De fide Carlo servanda, cap. xi: "Nunc autem qualiter regnum istud undique a paganis et falsis Christianis, scilicet

The traditional view of the royal office presumed that the king was never so far away as to hinder seriously his personal leadership. In practice, face-to-face ties between the king and his fideles continued to be essential for the efficient carrying out of political responsibilities, for the royal presence enabled the magnates to work together (hopefully) in the interests of the commonwealth. But even on the theoretical level, the objective idea of royal office discouraged any physical absence of the king's person. The belief that through God's grace the king was able to pass judgment and provide a correctio for the people in conformity with the divine will assumed the personal involvement of the monarch. Although some responsibilities could be delegated, nevertheless, it was the presence of the royal person which ensured the smooth functioning of the whole and provided a final court of appeal.

In light of the problems facing Francia—the long standing external threats and internal discord cited by Hincmar—it is necessary to ascertain what measures Charles took to meet such political necessities at home. While still
gres, he directed his wife Richilde (Queen Irmentrude had died in 869) to proceed through Rheims to Servais, apparently to reconfirm, in the absence of her husband, the oaths taken by the fideles to their king.⁸ Extraordinary as it was for a

Britonibus, sit circumscriptum, et ut ita dicamus, viscerali commotione de his, qui aliquandiu in eo fideles ac utiles visi fuerant extitisse, sit perturbatum: et quae conditio de rennis . . . aut ignoraretur, aut inter eos ipsa conditio servaretur"

queen to be a party to oaths made to a king in absentia, she also deprived the chamberlain and master of the horse, Engilram, of his honors and position in the government—undoubtedly a result of his suspect loyalty.⁹ However appropriate the measures taken by the queen were, they certainly ran counter to traditional expectations of royal responsibility.

Charles suspected that Louis the German would seek to force his return from Italy by invading West Francia in his absence. Therefore, he sent his son Louis Balbus into Lothringia to block any German advance.¹⁰ It was probably Engilram who reported to Louis the German Charles' departure for Italy and advised him to act immediately.¹¹ While the magnates in rebellion against Charles rushed to give support to Louis' son, Louis the Younger, a propaganda war commenced which

⁸ See note 5 above. Somewhat later in the year we learn that Richilde had confirmed the oaths of the magnates to their king (Annales Bertiniani, a. 875): "Ad quem obsistendum primores regni Karoli, iubente Richilde regina, sacramento se confirmaverunt, quod non attenderunt, sed ex sua parte regnum Karoli pessumdantes. . . ."

⁹ Ibid.: "Engilrammo, quondam Karoli regis camerario et domestico, suasionem Richildis reginae ab honoribus deiecto et a sua familiaritate abiecto. . . ."

¹⁰ The Annales Fuldensis specifically state that Louis' purpose was "ut eum de Italia exire compelleret." The Annales Bertiniani (see note 5 above) observed that Charles had sent his son to guard the frontier in Lothringia against Louis the German.

¹¹ Annales Bertiniani, a. 875: "Hludowicus vero, persuadente Engilrammo . . . cum hoste et filio ac aequivoco suo Hludowico usque ad Attiniacum venit. Ad quem obsistendum primores regni Karoli, iubente Richilde regina, sacramento se confirmaverunt, quod non attenderunt, sed ex sua parte regnum Karoli pessumdantes, hostili more devastaverunt. Similiter et Hludowicus sum suo exercitu idem regnum in pessum dedit. . . ."

raised some fundamental questions regarding Charles' role as king.

What makes this propaganda particularly interesting is that it originated within Charles' own territory rather than being an immediate product of Louis' machinations. Hincmar notes that when Charles is able to read the accusations, he will seek to correct himself, should any be true. When Louis reads them, he would be better advised to judge his own performance in light of the criticisms of Charles.¹² Hincmar reviewed the arguments brought out by those supporting Charles' action as follows:

Now, however, whereas Charles left us and his realm of his own free accord and proceeded right on to Italy, it has been asserted by the mouths of many that Louis was coming with hostile intent to take over the kingdom, and Charles is said to have disposed military units—in common parlance, posses—and to have deputed magnates for these bands to resist his brother, lest he succeed in occupying his realm. Also, that these, by the order of his wife, with his son Louis, are defending his kingdom from all enemies, whether Christian or pagan, with the council and help of the bishops and certain councillors.¹³

¹² De fide Carlo servanda, cap. ii: "Quatenus si rex noster ea legerit quae de illo dicuntur, si vera sunt illa corrigat, si autem vera non sunt, de cetero admittere caveat. Si autem et frater eius dominus Hludowicus ea legerit, quae de fratre illius dicuntur notabilia caveat, et quae de illo laudabilia promittuntur exequi studeat."

¹³ Ibid., cap. iii: "Nunc atuem, quia dominus Karolus nos et regnum istud sponte reliquit, et in Italiam perrexit, dominus noster Hludowicus multorum oribus accipere regnum istud hostiliter venturus asseveratur, et dominus Carolus bellatorum acies, quas vulgari sermone scaras vocamus, dispositas, et eisdem aciebus primores deputatos ad resistendum fratri suo, ne regnum illius occupare valeat, habere dicitur, qui iussione uxoris suae, cum filio suo Hludowico, regnum suum ab omnibus tam Christianis quam paganis hostibus, cum consilio et auxilio episcoporum ac ceterorum consiliariorum suorum defendant, donec ipse adepto regno ad quod accipiendum ivit, auxiliante Domino revertatur in pace."

In sum, the essential responsibility for the defense of the realm had been adequately dealt with by delegation, and Charles had satisfied the constitutional requirement of obtaining consilium and auxilium from the bishops and at least a number of magnates. Although each of these justifications was open to dispute, they were not altogether untrue. For instance, Hincmar noted that ministers of the republic had received a royal order to obtain the consilium and, by implication, the auxilium of the bishops.¹⁴

But there was another side of the argument to which Hincmar felt obliged to give some attention. He noted first that it is said that Louis was not coming simply to invade West Francia, but to restore it from destitution, defend it, procure peace and justice, and provide the church and its clergy with due honor and defense so that they and the people committed to them would not be exposed to danger.¹⁵ The implication of this recital of Louis' motives is that the central justification of his advance was the lack in West Francia of anyone to fulfill royal functions—notably, to defend the

¹⁴Ibid., cap. iv: "in consilio, quod a nobis reipublicae ministri secundum domni regis mandatum petierint. . . ."

¹⁵Ibid., cap. ii: "Igitur dicamus libere Domini sacerdotes, quae dicuntur notabilia et reprehensibilia de rege nostro, et quae dicuntur laudabilia promissa de fratre eius domno rege Hludowico, qui venturus asseveratur in hoc regnum fratris sui. . . ." Ibid., cap. viii: "cum superventurus rex, ut fertur, dicat se non venire ad regnum invadendum, sed ad destitutum restituendum, et defendendum, et pacem ac iustitiam in eo procurandam, et sanctae ecclesiae ac eius sacerdotibus debitum honorem ac defensionem exhibendam, et nos et oves nobis commissae periclitari videbimur."

church and the realm and to provide justice. To this Hincmar added other objections to Charles' withdrawal into Italy:

We hear complaints from the people that it is not right for our king to abandon without consultation the kingdom, which is surrounded by pagans, internally disturbed and unsound, and to relinquish and desert the regents and defenders, whom he appointed to carry out God's will and who commended themselves to him for this purpose.¹⁶

Thus, the criticism of Charles assumes that a constitutional change had been arrived at in an improper manner, for not only was it done without consultation, but the regents could not be expected to carry out their tasks in the absense of the king. It must be born in mind that the personal absense of the king in times of emergency could be considered tantamount to abdication. Charles seems to have taken some precautions so that the royal functions would continue to be carried out, but for his contemporaries, this satisfied neither ideological nor constitutional prerequisites.

Another factor to be considered before an evaluation can be made of Hincmar's position in the conflicting interpretations of Charles' actions is the extent to which propaganda was meant to obscure underlying material interests. Hincmar implies that some were, in fact, tempted to break their loyalty to the king because of worldly gain, but also, there may have been legitimate complaint regarding past injuries.¹⁷

¹⁶Ibid., cap. xii: "quod et a plebeiis conqueri audimus, quoniam non oportuerat regem nostrum regnum istud, a paganis undique circumdatum, et intra commotum et non solidum, inconsultem dimittere, ac quos regendos et defendos iudicio Dei suscepit, et qui ad hoc illi se commendaverunt, relinquere ac desere. . . ."

In 875 there was no wholesale shifting of loyalties as had occurred during Louis' invasion of West Francia in 858. This suggests that the West Frankish magnates had little faith either in the success of Louis' venture or the reliability of the East Frankish king. Rather than defend Charles' rule, Hincmar merely states that he is confident Charles will seek to correct those reprehensible acts for which he is responsible.¹⁸ Whatever troubles the bishops or magnates have suffered in the past, it hardly serves as an excuse to invite Louis into West Francia.¹⁹ Although the reader is uncertain just what these complaints against Charles were and to what extent material advantage played a part, there seems in De fide Carlo a clear suggestion that the theoretical implications of the current propaganda were worth Hincmar's serious consideration.

In light of these important questions, it is truly remarkable that Hincmar never directly responded to the contradictory viewpoints he so carefully summarized in his tract, and his own position in the matter must be ascertained by negative means. Addressing the magnates and bishops of Rheims,

¹⁷ Ibid., cap. viii: "Nos quidem, quia non pastores sed mercenarii, et apud Deum et apud homines iudicabimur." Ibid., cap. xxxiii: "Est etiam, quoniam ab alio quocumque iuste et rationabiliter credi non poterimus neque debemus, si quocumque terreno lucro vel illata iniuria, salva in Deum fide, seniori nostro fidem non servaverimus."

¹⁸ Ibid., cap. ii: "Quatenus si rex noster ea legerit quae de illo dicuntur, si vera sunt illa corrigat, si autem vera non sunt, de cetero admittere caveat."

¹⁹ Ibid., cap. xii: "et quia dicimus, non debere fratrem suum regnum eius . . . invadere, aliquod incommodum passi fuerimus, patienter inflata portemus pro Christo. . . ."

he noted that the sheep committed to them wandered without a pastor and were dispersed, and that the resources of the church, which ought to be maintained for their support, being left without custodians, were plundered and devastated so long as they lacked the virtus of the king, by whose power they are defended.²⁰ But Hincmar does not, as he well might have, use this worldly necessity to justify an appeal to Louis. For this he advances a double argument. First, the Christian virtue of humility demands the patient bearing of worldly burdens, and thus, Charles' improprieties should be faced in a similar spirit.²¹ A more telling argument was based on the idea of Christian kingship. The royal office is divinely imposed, and it is wrong for any man to resist the anointed of God.²²

The first conclusion to be drawn from these arguments is that, however great the emphasis which Hincmar placed on necessitas for determining royal action, he did not extend this idea to the magnates of the realm. Apparently, the dir-

²⁰ Ibid., cap. viii: "oves autem nobis commissae, quia sine pastore errabunt vel dispergentur, et facultates ecclesiasticae, quibus sustentari debent, velut relictæ sine custodibus, diripientur ac vastabuntur, si defuerit virtus principis, cuius potestate defendantur, vel custodes, qui pro ovibus et earum alimoniis principi et defensori ac tutori ecclesiae suggerant."

²¹ Ibid., cap. xii: "patienter inlata portemus pro Christo, quia pro veritate illa sustinebimus, imitatores pro modulo nostro eorum, qui 'ibant gaudentes, quoniam digni habiti sunt pro nomine Iesu contumeliam pati.'"

²² Ibid., cap. xxxiii: "'Imposuisti homines super capita nostra,' dominum et regem ipsum persecutorem suum vocabat, et cum saepe habuerit opportunitatem ut illum posset occidere, non solum non occidit, sed et socios ab eius occisione compescuit, dicens, 'Absit, ut mittam manum in christum Domini, quia unctus Domini est.'"

ect tie between the royal office and God granted it the freedom necessary to give an unhindered response to the political situation rather than the imperatives of worldly action themselves. Should a deeper appreciation of the latter have been the major reason for the change in Hincmar's idea of the royal office, then he would have applied the same principle to magnates facing serious difficulties without the support of their king. Furthermore, Hincmar's arguments for continued loyalty to Charles also reveal an increasing cleavage between the royal office and other positions subordinate to it. In response to the mounting troubles in the realm, Hincmar attempted to free the king from the worldly discipline of law and custom while at the same time demanding an ever greater unquestioned obedience on the part of all subjects.

Despite a firm loyalty to his king, Hincmar's stand does reflect serious misgivings about Charles' course of action. He had many times in the past defended him against unjust accusations, but here he cites the charges without denying them, merely showing how they are irrelevant to the essential question at hand: whether the magnates will continue to observe their oaths of fidelity. However, he does state that the realm was torn by strife when Charles left, and he also suggests that the flock was abandoned to its own fate, thus appearing to be in sympathy with the concrete objections of the propaganda favoring Louis the German. But more important than these practical matters is the theoretical question which lay at the core of their objection. Can the ultimate responsi-

bilities of the royal office be fully delegated to others without constitutional and religious formalities? The context of Hincmar's theory of the royal office and his stand in the present crisis reflect his belief that they cannot, and he must have been sincerely dismayed over Charles' policies in the winter of 875.

Hincmar's De fide Carlo servanda also sheds light on his new attitude toward the interaction of the royal and episcopal offices in political life. The idea of the rational concordance of the two offices would tend to encourage the direct participation of the church in an internecine dispute, for there would be no sharp cleavage expected between church action and political ends of which it approved. However, in 875, Hincmar is anxious to preserve a strict neutrality, finding a mystic (non-rational) solution to the anguish of deciding between Charles' request for support against Louis and the obvious need for order promised by the German king. No longer does Hincmar, as he insisted in 858, call for a general synod representing the whole church north of the Alps to propose solutions for the crisis. God's will now expresses itself on the field of battle rather than through an assembly of bishops.

Hincmar states that, while the ministers of the republic had asked for the consilium of the bishops, the definition of the episcopal office clearly limits the nature of the council and aid which can be given. Following the mandate: grant

unto Caesar what is Caesar's, the archbishop concludes that the only auxilium he can give is to pray to God for an end to the spilling of Christian blood, particularly among brothers, acquaintances, and relatives.²³ As for consilium, the church has every right to contribute to the defense against pagans, but in civil war among Christians, the sources provide a different answer.²⁴ The bishops are placed between the two brothers as between hammer and anvil, for while Charles tarries in Italy, Louis is on his way to relieve an unprotected church. Lacking any firm precedent, Hincmar decides that he would not recommend giving Louis support, particularly in view of the king's supposed purpose of bringing a restoration and defense for the destitute.²⁵ He makes the last remark because, should

²³Ibid., cap. iv: "Qua de re nobis episcopis satis agendum est, ne in consilio, quod a nobis reipublicae ministri secundum domni regis mandatum petierint, a nostro ministerio excidamus, et ne de auxilio, quantum Deus unicuique nostrum posse dederit, abscedamus, sequentes sententiam Domini dicentis, 'Reddite quae sunt Caesaris Caesari, et quae sunt Dei Deo.' In auxilio igitur praebeamus arme divina, ieiunia, orationes . . . et auxilio divina ut non effundatur sanguis Christianus seditionali certamine inter fratres et cognatos atque propinquos. . . ."

²⁴Ibid., cap. v: "Si enim contra paganos bellum immineret, consilium daremus bellatoribus nostris, et hortaremur eos adhortationibus, quas in litteris ecclesiasticis legimus. Nunc autem, quia civile et plusquam civile bellum inter Christianos instare opinamur, patrum innitentes vestigiis, videamus quid ad haec sit nobis agendum."

²⁵Ibid., cap. viii: "Inter duos reges carne fratres, de hoc regno in quo degimus satagentibus, velut inter malleum et incudem, episcopi sumus. Si enim, quia secessit longius in regnum aliud rex noster, in adventu superventuri regis, ecclesias nostras quaquaversum nemine persequente, vel praedudicium, ut dicitur, inferre moliente, sugientes discesserimus, et nos ad superventuri tutelam regis non contulerimus, praesertim, cum superventurus rex, ut fertur, dicat se non venire ad regnum invadendum, sed ad destitutum restituendum et defendendum. . . ."

Louis' objectives truly be pacific, he would not have need of military aid.

The difficulty facing Hincmar concerning the participation of the church in the conflict between the two kings—between two contradictory necessities, for defense and for obeying authority—is resolved not by an appeal to logic, but to a mystical search for the will of God.

In truth we are placed between the hammer and the anvil, and whatever is laid there is crushed, either to be shattered to pieces, or to be formed and shaped. Just as we read in the Book of Numbers, the Lord ordered Moses to make wrought silver trumpets between hammer and anvil, the din of which was to bring forth the people to the worship of God and also to enflame the minds of the obedient for war. Between the hammer and the anvil we seek trumpets wrought in silver—that is, God's eloquence—because it is the "Silver tested by fire, seven times refined," making them resistant and viable. For their instruction we eagerly learn in the anguish of our confusion what we are to do in connection with the necessary war, for otherwise we are crushed and shattered to pieces between the hammer and anvil.²⁶

No longer is church participation in political life so easily determined by rational or legal justifications. Hincmar, when now caught between apparent contradictions in his situation,

²⁶ Ibid., cap. xiii: "Verum, quia inter malleum et incudem positi sumus, et quod inter malleum et incudem ponitur aut frangitur vel conquassatur, vel producitur et formatur, sicut Numerorum libro legimus praecepisse Dominum Moysi, ut faceret tubas argenteas inter malleum et incudem productiles, quae clangore suo ad solemnitates Dei populum excitarent, atque audientium animos ad bellum accenderent." "Quaeramus tubas argenteas inter malleum et incudem productas, id est eloquia Domini, quod est 'argentum igne examinatum, purgatum septuplum,' relucentes et virtute vigentes, quorum doctrina ad bellum necessarium et imminens discamus in perturbationis nostrae angore quid nobis agendum sit, ne inter malleum et incudem frangamur vel conquassemur, sed producamur atque formemur, ut per eorum vestigia inoffenso pede gradientes non aberremus."

seeks in anguish to discover God's will.

Whatever active participation Charles' ministers may have requested from the bishops, Hincmar firmly pursued a course of passive resistance. If, despite Hincmar's recommendation that the magnates respect their duty of fidelity to Charles, there appears no military resistance to Louis' approach, then the church must acquiesce to the changed political situation and offer the new king all support consonant with their offices.²⁷ Naturally, should God approve that Charles return, the bishops would welcome him with joy, but were God's will contrary to their hopes, then they would obey in a sincere devotion and faith.²⁸ No longer does Hincmar call for a general synod to resolve the differences between Charles and Louis as in 858 or even as in connection with Lothar's divorce in 862. The higher dignity of the episcopal office and its influential role in political life is no longer the channel of God's will concerning the direction of political affairs. In 875, Hincmar understood God's will to be expressed directly in the course of political history without any ne-

²⁷ Ibid., cap. xxxvii: "Videlicet, si supervenerit rex alius in regnum senioris nostri, et non fuerit militaris manus quae ei resistat, sequamur nos episcopi, et in ordinatione ordinis nostri, et in conservatione fidei erga senierem nostrum, patrum vestigia, et in receptione, et in ceteris, munus placationis erga superventurum regem, videlicet in receptione." ". . . quae sunt Caesaris Caesari, et Deo quae Dei sunt reddisse."

²⁸ Ibid., cap. xlii: "Si denique rex noster fuerit annuente Deo reversus, recipiamus eum cum gaudio. . . . Si vero, quod non optamus, alter iudicio Dei contigerit, devotionem ac fidem debitam erga illum sinceriter custodientes. . . ."

cessary intermediary of the bishops. The action of the church within Christian society was to remain spiritual and its immediate ends and the state's were to be clearly distinct.

As for the royal office, the archbishop wanted to ensure it the greatest freedom to act in response to the needs of the political situation. Despite his doubts concerning the advisability of Charles' Italian venture, he made no direct criticism of the king and acquiesced to whatever the outcome would be. He trusted that Charles would seek to comply with God's will and by so doing would prosper in his enterprises. However, it was the religious implications of the royal office which permitted such a concordia, for Hincmar did not see in political necessity a justification for the magnates to turn to Louis for the requisite leadership needed to bring order to the troubled land. In neither the episcopal office nor the lower political offices did necessitas play a role—it constituted a factor in royal action alone.

CHAPTER XII

THE END OF CHARLES THE BALD'S REIGN AND THE CRISIS OVER THE ROYAL OFFICE

When in 876 Charles the Bald returned in triumph to his realm, he held a general synod at Ponthion to have his new titles of emperor and king of Italy recognized and, furthermore, to have the decrees of the council of Pavia held earlier in the year approved in West Francia. Although the meeting at Ponthion is generally referred to as a council, it was nothing more than a synod wherein Charles sought to have the West Frankish church put its stamp of approval on his Italian venture. By adding his signature, Hincmar joined the rest of the churchmen in acquiescing to Charles' new dignities. In fact, however, he became a leading opponent at Ponthion of Charles' attempt to enlarge his powers wherever he could. Charles believed his new imperial title now permitted his going far beyond the traditional limitations imposed on the royal office. However, he found that his every step was blocked, not only by Hincmar, but subsequently by the majority of the Frankish aristocracy.

The formal expression of the emperor's new status was specified by the Iuramentum sworn at Pavia by the bishops and magnates of Italy and later demanded of the Frankish bishops

at Ponthion. With the exception of repetitiously expressing a diversity of ties binding the fideles to the emperor, the oath contains few new elements. The subject must promise that for the duration of his life he will be faithful, obedient and helpful to his senior, providing auxilium and consilium (even "beyond the extent of one's knowledge and ability"!) and avoid any harm to his senior's honor, church, and realm.¹ Hincmar signed the oath, but then proceeded to criticize it in detail, mocking the fruitless effort of the writer to find a theoretical expression for the power inherent in the newly won imperial dignity.

Starting his attack with the oath's opening phrase, Hincmar objects to the words "I promise thus" being posited in such an absolute manner as unrealistic, for we little know what lies in the future and in any case we are compelled to obey the will of God.² Thus, Hincmar placed the dictates of conscience before any binding obligations to the king, but he undoubtedly meant this simply as the duty of his own episcopal office rather than general license for anyone to resist the royal will should he think it to ill accord with God's

¹Karoli II. imperatoris electio (M.G.H., Capit., II, 100): "Sic promitto ego, quia de isto die in antea isti seniori meo, quamdiu vixero, fidelis et obediens et adiutor, quantumque plus et melius sciero et potuero, et consilio et auxilio secundum meum ministerium in omnibus ero. . . ." See also Hincmar's Iuramentum (Sirmond, II, 834) for the same text as used at Ponthion.

²Iuramentum (Sirmond, II, 835): "Quod isto iuramento absolute positum est, 'Sic promitto ego,' Iacobus Apostolus contradicit, 'Qui ignoratis,' inquit, 'quid sit in crastinum: pro eo ut dicatis, Si Dominus voluerit, faciemus hoc aut illus.'"

plans. Hincmar's whole theory of office rested on the assumption that officers would try their best to avoid superbia. The archbishop now had to face the truth that his ideas, while limiting authority in theory, could in practice encourage absolute rule, for there was no assurance the ruler would not use his position to satisfy personal ambition. While Hincmar had little choice but to sign the oath, his objections to it show how foreign to his thought was Charles' attempt to real-absolute and unilateral government in West Francia.

Hincmar shows he is aware of Charles' superbia by objecting to the use of the word senior in the oath, preferring that of imperator. He concedes that Charles may be more excellent in the nobility of his person and in his imperial worldly power, but he is not only younger than Hincmar, the Gelasian theory makes clear that the priestly order is superior to the lay.³ The implication of the word senior, expressing the archbishop's subjection to the king, was undoubtedly meant by Charles the Bald to apply to Hincmar's person, but Hincmar introduces the idea of the higher authority of the sacerdotal office to register his dissatisfaction with a royal prerogative dictating his obligations.

Hincmar made a petty objection to the wording of a phrase in the oath which shows how much he wants to reserve

³Ibid.: "Ceterum rationabilius dicitur, isti Imperatori, quam 'isti seniori meo,' qui est iunior aetate, licet sit excellentior personae nobilitate, et mundana imperii potestate, non autem sacri ordinis dignitate, sicut demonstrat sanctus Gelasius Papa scribens ad Anastasium. . . ."

absolute obedience to God alone and that worldly absolutes are to be avoided. The iuramentum expressed Charles' wish to receive consilium and auxilium beyond the person's knowledge and ability. Hincmar found this to conflict with the monastic attitude that it is not proper to seek to know more than is fitting.⁴ He is referring to the traditional belief that superbia encourages an excessive interest in the world and draws a person's intentio away from God. Thus, excessive striving to satisfy the worldly demands of the emperor might obscure the subject's sense of what God demands of him. But it should be noted that such danger would not exist for Hincmar if he felt that there existed a rational concordance between the worldly action of his own and his king's office, and both were filled in a spirit of humility.

When the oath to Charles stated: "I will be faithful, obedient, and helpful, in all things, according to my office," Hincmar noted that such an oath is demanded by kings and lords from their subjects and even servants. But the Scriptures say that there is no man on earth who does only good and never sins.

⁴Ibid.: "Quod hic scriptus est, 'quantocumque plus et melius sciero et potuero,' non convenit apostolo dicenti, 'Non plus sapere, quam oportet sapere, sed sapere ad sobrietatem,' id est ad temperantiam." "Rectius igitur dictum est, Secundum meum scire et posse, quam, Quantocumque plus et melius sciero et potuero." The monastic character of this can be appreciated when one compares it with Jean Leclercq, "Un centon de Fleury sur les devoirs des moines," Analecta Monastica, I (Città del Vaticano, 1948), 75-90. This is a rich description of just what was implied by monastic renunciation at this time.

If it happens that our king, because of his absense, meddles and orders something unbefitting the episcopal office, this wisest of writers [responsible for the oath] should consider whether the bishop ought to be his obedient accomplice in it. I would maintain that there exists no man who can be at the same time faithful, obedient, and cooperative with someone else in everything.

Clearly, we would rather he always order and undertake things in which we should and are able to comply. But the Apostle regognized this to be beyond human possibility, for all of us cannot do all things.⁵

Although there is a suggestion here that even the fideles might find it rather difficult always to obey their lord, Hincmar is primarily concerned with the liberty of his own episcopal office. He was anxious to counter any appearance of theocratic kingship, such as Charles might seek now that he had the imperial title. However responsive subjects and servants must be to the wishes of their lord, the bishop must preserve the freedom inherent within his office to obey the will of God and pursue the interests of the church. Especially on the heels of the ill-advised Italian expedition, it had to be clearly specified that the church was free to dissociate

⁵Ibid., pp. 835-36: "Quod scripsit scriba doctus, 'Secundum meum ministerium in omnibus scilicet fidelis, et obediens, et adiutor ero,' contra consuetudinem iuramenti, quod principes et domini suis subiectis et etiam servis iurare iubent adscripsit. Sicut enim scriptura dicit, 'Non est homo in terra qui faciat bonum, et non peccet, . . .'" "Si forte domnus noster, quod absit, subreptione aliquid iusserit vel egerit, quod episcopali ministerio non conveniat, videre debu-erat hic scriptor sagacissimus, si obediens et adiutor in hoc illi ipiscopus esse debeat. Et non puto ut ullus homo sit, qui alteri homini in omnibus fidelis et obediens et adiutor in-simul esse possit." "Ut videlicet cupiamus eum ea semper iu-bere et semper agere, quibus debeamus et valeamus obedire, et ad quae illi debeamus et valeamus obedire, et ad quae illi debeamus et valeamus adiutores esse. Sed . . . aliter intel-lexit apostolus de humana possibilitate, quia non omnia pos-sumus omnes. . . ."

itself from any rash and foolhardy royal policies.

Hincmar then launched into a long and sharp criticism of the duplication found in the oath. He noted that infidelity implies all the various machinations against the king which are so carefully spelled out in the oath. A detailed specification of all the means by which such disloyalty can be carried out Hincmar finds "ridiculous." Other phrases he finds "alien to reason" and the product of an "unsound mind." More to the point would be an oath which states: "Besides the implications of my office, I will be faithful according to my knowledge and ability, just as an archbishop is rightly faithful to his emperor."⁶ Thus the personal tie of a bishop to his king—his fidelity, that is—is conditioned by the demands of his office. And since the office must be free from royal obstruction, Hincmar feels an oath demanded from a bishop to be superfluous.

The Iuramentum of the archbishop of Rheims then goes on to quote a series of passages from the Bible which discourage or forbid the swearing of oaths. Furthermore, Hincmar considers the demand of an oath at this time to be a personal affront.

⁶ Ibid., p. 837: "Nam sicut apostolus dicit, 'Dilectio proximi malum non operatur,' et, 'Plenitudo legis est dilectio,' et, 'Qui diligit, legem implevit, et, si quod est aliud mandatum, in hoc verbo instauratur,' ita omnia quae menta insana, quoniam caritate experte, scriptor iste conscripsit, in eo continentur quod dictum est, 'Secundum meum scire ac posse, iuxta ministerium meum fidelis ero, sicut archiepiscopus per rectum imperatori fidelis esse debet.'" Thus caritas rather than law is the chief characteristic of the episcopal ministerium.

Another oath should not now be required of me, who, for so many years, from youth to this advanced age, has served by written and spoken declarations. But it is not surprising if certain persons, burdened with jealousy and without cause, have dislodged the friendly disposition of your mind to require of me what had not been required by either your father, who while living entrusted his secrets to me without hesitation for about eight years, or you for these past thirty six years.⁷

It is generally assumed that Hincmar was only one of many bishops who were requested to make this oath, but due to the lack of extant manuscripts, one cannot be certain in light of the above passage that Hincmar was not singled out to give formal attestation to a concept of imperial authority new to West Francia.⁸ The archbishop felt such an oath to be inappropriate in consideration of not only his past faithfulness, but also the dangers of compromising the freedom of the episcopal office by worldly bonds. It would appear that Hincmar felt the imperial title added nothing to the position of Charles in Francia and might in fact encourage him into a dangerous

⁷ Ibid.: "Et a me, qui . . . professa et subscripta per tantos annos a iuventute usque ad hanc senectutem servavi, nunc iuramentum aliud non debuisset requiri. Sed non mirum est, si per baiulos invidiae . . . sine cause animus benignitatis vestrae commotus nunc a me requirit, quod nec pater vester in vita sua, qui mihi per octo circiter annos secreta sua indebitanter credidit, requisivit, nec per triginta et sex annos hactenus requisistis."

⁸ No manuscript superscriptions exist of Hincmar's oath, and only two modern editions give the following superscription: "Iuramentum Hincmari archiepiscopi et reliquorum procerum." These are Sirmond, Concil. Galliae, III, 437, seq, and Baluze, Capit., II, 235, seq. But it should be noted that when Sirmond re-edited the oath in Hincmari Opera, II, 834, he simply entitled it: "Iuramentum quod Hincmarus Archiepiscopus edere iussus est apud Pontigonem," and Baluze was actually editing the Pavia oath. Furthermore, there is no evidence that "proceres" were at Ponthion.

presumption regarding his authority over the church.

However much Hincmar disliked the implications of the Ponthion oath, his signing of it proves his unwillingness to break completely with the king. Nevertheless, there were a number of important issues brought up at this synod which met with his firm opposition.⁹ Charles had translated Bishop Frotarius of Bordeaux to Bourges and now was seeking the approval of the West Frankish bishops. Perhaps in his refusal to recognize the transfer Hincmar was recalling with bitterness Frotarius' refusal to cooperate in the condemnation of Hincmar of Laon at the council of Douzy in 871. It is equally possible that the archbishop wanted in this manner to check any aspirations of the new emperor to take a firmer hand in the direction of the church.

More important than this issue was the unwillingness of the gathered bishops to cooperate fully with their king in the appointment of Bishop Ansigisus of Sens as papal vicar north of the Alps. Charles sought for Ansigisus the power to convoke councils and apply papal decretals, except in the most important cases. In addition to this, the emperor had the fifteen articles adopted at Pavia recognized in the north. These emphasized the respect due to Rome from all churches and clarified regulations concerning bishops. Worth noting among the latter is that bishops act within their dioceses as the full representatives of the king in both potestas and auc-

⁹For Ponthion see Charles de Clercq, op.cit.

toritas.¹⁰ Also, the fifteenth article specifies that no one is permitted to protect or hide anyone unfaithful to the king.¹¹ Both articles reflect Charles' ideas concerning the imperial authority. Although the former might seem to increase the power of the bishops, actually, by recognizing the bishops as the wielders of worldly potestas, it tends to compromise the independence of spiritual auctoritas from the will of the monarch. The latter article also blurs the theoretical distinction between the royal and episcopal offices, for the idea of ecclesiastical sanctuary assumes a possible disparity between the interests of state and Christian values.

Being Rome's official protector and having a loyal bishop as papal vicar in both East and West Francia naturally tended to give Charles a considerable influence over the church. It is clear why Louis the German did everything possible to frustrate Charles' plans, for he feared his brother now had both theoretical and practical strength for expansion toward the East. Hincmar, too, must have looked upon the Ansigisus appointment as a blow not only to his own prestige as the primate of Gaul, but also to his concept of the rela-

¹⁰ Karolii II. capitulare Papiense, a. 876 (M.G.H., Capit., II, no. 221), cap. xii: "Ipsi nihilominus episcopi singuli in suo episcopio missatici nostri potestate et auctoritate fungantur."

¹¹ Ibid., cap. xv: "Ut nemo fidelium nostrorum quodammodo aliquem celet, quem nostrum scierit infidelem esse, neque ei sustentationem quamcumque praestare pertentet, si eum nostram fidelitatem revocare nequiverit. Quicumque autem contra hoc fecerit, praedescessorum et progenitorum nostrorum iudicium experietur."

tion of spiritual and political action.

Hincmar's opposition will not be recounted here in detail. Suffice it to say that the bishops gathered at Ponthion said they were willing to obey the papal decretals, but that the claim of Ansigisus to represent the papacy should under no circumstances compromise metropolitan authority.¹² Hincmar wrote a long work entitled De iure metropolitanorum, cum de Ansegisi primatu ageretur, the purpose of which was to assert his own primacy in the north. When Hincmar had received the pallium years before, he was given the primacy in Gaul, Belgica, and Germany, because he was the first metropolitan ordained among the ones then in office.¹³ He appears at this time to have written the Vita Sancti Remigii which also sought a historical justification for the primacy of Rheims. To assert that Hincmar's sole motive was the preservation at any cost of his own personal dignity and the autonomy of the metropolitan office would be to miss its implica-

¹²Annales Bertiniani, a. 876: "Quorum responsio talis fuit, ut, servato singulis metropolitanis iure privilegii secundum sacros canones et iuxta decreta sedis Romanae pontificum ex eisdem sacris canonibus promulgata, domni Iohannis papae apostolici iussionibus oboedirent. Et cum imperator et legati apostolici satis egerint ut absolute archiepiscopi responderent se oboedituros de primatu Ansigisi sicut apostolicus scripsit, aliud nisi ut praedictum est responsum ab eis extorquere non potuit. . . ."

¹³De iure metropolitanorum, cap. xvi: "Et quod de uno hoc primate Gallicano, qui a sede apostolica pallium acceperat, dixit, hoc et de reliquis Gallicanorum et Belgicorum atque Germanicorum primatibus est utique intelligendum. Inter quos, sicut et inter reliquos episcopos, haec conditio regularis servatur, ut qui prius fuerit ordinatus, prior habeatur."

tions for his political thought. When Hincmar lost hope in the efficacy of an inner worldly concordance between the episcopal and royal offices, there were two possible alternatives left open to him: either to recognize the concurrence of worldly and spiritual action in the person of the emperor, such as had been the case before Louis the Pious, or to emphasize the temporal distinction between political and religious ends, while preserving their concordance on a spiritual plane.

The incompatibility of worldly action and Christian imperatives never presented much of a problem for Carolingian thinkers. This tendency to fuse the world and the spirit was further developed by Hincmar as the only way to resolve the difficulties of a Christian acting in a world inimical to religious values. But Hincmar also held to an interpretation of the Gelasian theory which stated that it was Christ alone Who held worldly potestas and sacerdotal auctoritas, and thus, although the royal office contributed to the spiritualization of society, the king lacked spiritual authority. With whatever nostalgia Hincmar may have recalled the successful rule of earlier Carolingian monarchs, it certainly could not have included the re-incorporation of spiritual authority in kingship. Hincmar's indifference or even opposition to Charles' assumption of the imperial title, then, becomes understandable.

Perhaps seduced by the high dignity of his title and believing himself in a position to enlarge his realm at his brother's expense, Charles undertook an expedition to extend

his eastern frontier to the Rhine. Louis had taken the precaution of submitting a number of his men to trial by water and iron, and the successful outcome encouraged the belief among them that God favored their cause. In October, 876, at Andernach, the first major battle between Carlongian monarchs in many years took place, and the outcome was such a devastating defeat for Charles that a permanent blow was dealt to his own prestige as an effective war leader and to the royal office. Even the Annales Bertiniani, which usually throws as good a light as possible on Charles' actions, observed that the emperor's hostile incursion into Louis' lands fulfilled the Scriptural saying: "What, plunderers, will you not also be plundered?" Everything which the emperor's plunderers had was plundered."¹⁴

Although Charles had proved himself unable to cope adequately with the difficulties facing his own lands, his new dignity now also meant he was responsible for the defense of Italy against the Saracens.¹⁵ Pope John VIII repeatedly appealed to the northern monarch for support, but Charles suffered from a pleurisy which prevented any response until the summer of 877.¹⁶ He knew it was impossible to leave his

¹⁴Annales Bertiniani, a. 876: "Et impletum est dictum propheticum ubi ait: 'Qui praedaris, nonne et ipse praedaberis?' Omnia quae praedatores qui erant cum imperatore habuerunt, sed et ipsi praeda fuerunt, adeo ut qui amminiculo equorum effugere poterant, animas suas haberent pro spolio."

¹⁵For the last year of Charles' rule, see Calmette, op. cit.

¹⁶The increasing desperate appeals of Pope John VIII are to be found in M.G.H., Epp., VII, nos. 31-33, 36.

lands in their present condition and thus sought to check the Norse raids through a tribute of 5000 librae of gold exacted from a resentful realm. This certainly must have been considered an unworthy act in an age which so highly valued military prowess. Unable to defend the realm against the Norse or against internal feud, disgraced by an ignominious flight from Andernach, and now choosing to buy off the enemy so that he could once again absent himself from the realm which cried for his leadership, it is little wonder that Charles rapidly lost whatever sympathy there had existed for him in previous years. The church had particular grounds for complaint, for it was the most victimized by the lack of adequate leadership and defense, and furthermore, it carried the greatest burden of the tribute. Hincmar disapproved of this exaction, for undoubtedly he recognized that were the church thus forced to carry the burden of its own defense, its meeting of spiritual responsibilities would be compromised.¹⁷

Charles knew that his health was precarious and that a full political settlement was a necessary prerequisite for his march into Italy. In June, 877, he called a council at Quierzy at which he formalized in law the traditional personal responsibility of the king to grant and guarantee the continuance of honors and benefices for the fideles. As in the case

¹⁷ Instructio ad Ludovicum Balbum, cap. viii: "ut Ecclesiae in isto regno per occasionabiles circadas et per indelitas consuetudinarias exactiones, quae tempore Pippini, Caroli, et Hludowici non fuerunt, ante annos viginti impositas non affligantur."

of the tributum normannicum, he sought to distribute the responsibilities of the royal office onto the realm itself. One recalls that at Ponthon he had to do the same thing by recognizing the bishops as the competent wielders of royal authority and power within their dioceses. Whether he recognized his personal weakness and that of his office to cope with political realities, of whether he simply wanted the freedom from responsibility in order to pursue the fruitless dream of universal monarchy, Charles consistently pursued a policy in the 870's which reduced the importance of the monarchy in Frankish life because he went far beyond his resources in trying to overcome traditional demands placed on the monarchy by the bishops and magnates of the realm. Throughout his life Hincmar had constantly discouraged the king from making inroads into the particular responsibilities and freedoms of the church. Nevertheless, he always tried to strengthen the position of the king within the definition of the royal office. This is perhaps one reason why Charles did not choose Hincmar as one of his son's advisors when he established at Quierzy a regency for the duration of his absence in Italy.¹⁸

In June, 877, Charles left for Rome despite the disapproval of his fideles. This was the signal for the outbreak of the revolt which had been brewing for years but now involved nearly all the magnates and bishops of the realm.¹⁹ Hinc-

¹⁸The Quierzy document is found in M.G.H., Capit., II, 355-363. Of the regents appointed to care for the realm during Charles' absence, Hincmar's name is conspicuously missing.

mar's previous attitude toward the monarchy would suggest that however little he favored the imperial ambitions of the king, he would brook no resistance to royal authority. His position in regard to the revolt is difficult to ascertain, for he too suffered from ill health and refrained from direct political involvement. However, he did write to Abbot Gozlin of Saint Germain in the hope of convincing his nephew Bernard not to participate in the sedition, but Gozlin was himself a rebel and did not deign to answer Hincmar's appeals.²⁰ In lieu of other evidence, this would seem to be an adequate indication that Hincmar did not let his disapproval of Charles divert him from his loyalty. However mistaken the king's policies might be, he felt the royal office to be a necessary focus of discipline in political life.

The Italian expedition proved too much for Charles' precarious health, and he suffered a relapse of his pleurisy. Seized by a fever, Charles drank a medicinal powder and eleven days afterwards, on October 6, "died with a most vile swelling."²¹ This left Charles' son, Louis Balbus (The Stutterer)

¹⁹Annales Bertiniani, a. 877: "Imperator autem, aliquamdiu una cum papa Iohanne in eisdem locis immorans, expectavit primores regni sui, Hugonem abbatem, Bosonem, Bernardum Arvernium comitem itemque Bernardum Gothie markionem, quos secum ire iusserat, qui una cum aliis regni primoribus, exceptis paucis, et episcopis adversus eum conspirantes coniuraverant."

²⁰Flodoard, Historia Remensis ecclesiae (M.G.H., SS., XIII), III, 24: "Gozlino pro Bernardo, nepote ipsius, qui seditionem contra regem moliri ferebatur, hortans, ut ab hac intentione studeat eum revocare, et ut ipse Gozlinus pro nullo carnali affectu a recta via declinet. . . ." For Gozlin, see the Annales Bertiniani, a. 879-880.

to take over a crown little respected by the majority of his subjects and a realm torn by external attack and internal strife.

In advising the new king, Hincmar recalled a number of times the conditions prevailing at the end of Charles the Bald's reign as a warning against the danger of abandoning the responsibilities of the royal office.

Concern yourself with nourishing as much as possible a concord between yourself and God's faithful which is in accord with God's will and was mentioned by your father recently at Quierzy. And handle yourself before them in such a way that they are neither prevented nor frightened to give you advice. For I have heard that many despaired of any use in your government because the councillors who knew what was good and useful neither dared nor had any opportunity for speaking out.²²

Clearly, Hincmar himself was one of these advisors who knew what was right and useful, but was unable to gain the king's attention.

Confirmation is found in an interesting piece of propaganda which Hincmar circulated at about this time. A cer-

²¹Annales Bertiniani, a. 876: "Karolus vero febre correptus, pulverem bibit, quem sibi nimium dilectus ac credulus medicus suus Iudaeus nomine Sedechias transmisit ut ea portione a febre liberaretur. Insanabili veneno hausto, inter manus portantium transito monte Cinisio . . ." "Et XI die post venenum haustum in vilissimo turgurio mortuus est II nonas octobris."

²²Instructio ad Ludovicum Balbum, cap. viii: "concordiam, quae secundum Deum est, de qua nuper in Carisiaco pater vester mentionem habuit, inter fideles Dei et vestros haberi et vigere quantum potueritis satagatis, et vos talem erga eos praeparetis, ut verum consilium vobis dare possint et audeant. Quia, sicut per multos audiui, multum deperiit de utilitate in isto regno, pro eo quia consiliarii quod sciebant bonum et utile, dicere non audebant, nec ut dicerent locum habebant."

tain priest named Bernold belonging to Hincmar's diocese was supposed to have had a vision shortly before his death, in which the archbishop's enemies were pictured in Hell, suffering for their transgressions. Bernold recalled,

I saw our King Charles lying there in the mire from the corruption of his own decay, and worms were gnawing at him and, now that they had eaten the flesh, there was nothing left of his body but nerves and bones. He said to me, go to the Bishop Hincmar and tell him that I did not harken to the good council of him and the others of my fideles and the things which you see I bear for my sins. And tell him, since I always held him in trust, to help me so that I am freed of this punishment.²³

In his instruction to Louis Balbus, Hincmar makes clear just what the principal failures of Charles the Bald had been.

Discover with God and your fideles how to put an end to the plundering and depredations in your realm and how is to be found some remedy for the misery of the people, now for years afflicted by various and continuous depredations and by the exactions necessary for repelling the Norse, and how to revive that justice and judgment, which are almost extinct in our realm, so that God return to us virtus against the pagans. For many years now there has been no provision in this realm for defense other than ransom and tribute, which have now destroyed not only the poor people, but the former wealth of the church.²⁴

²³ De visione Bernoldi presbyteri (Sirmond, II, 806): "Et vidi ibi iacere domnum nostrum Karolum regem in luto exsanie ipsius putredinis, et manducabant eum vermes, et iam carnem illius manducatam habebant, et non erat in corpore ipsius aliud nisi vervi et ossa." "Dixit mihi, Vade ad Hincmarum episcopum, et dic ei, quia illius et aliorum fidelium meorum bona consilia non obaudiui, ideo ista quae vides, pro culpis meis sustineo. Et dic illi, quia semper in illo fiduciam habui, ut me adiuvet, quatinus de ista poena sim liberatus. . ."

²⁴ Instructio ad Ludovicum Balbum, cap. viii: "inveniat cum Dei et vestris fidelibus, qualiter istae rapinae et depredationes in isto regno cessent, et miser iste populus, qui iam per plures annos depraedationes diversas et continuas, et per exactiones ad Nortmannos repellendos affligitur, aliquod remedium habeat, et iustitia et iudicium, quae quasi emor-

Two elements are here brought forward which enable the king to accomplish his ends: consultation with his fideles and proper judgment. Both are the traditional basic elements in the idea of the royal office which Charles had allowed to lapse. His Italian venture was undertaken without the full consent of his fideles, and at Ponthion he had sought to delegate royal responsibilities to those under him.

Such a manner of acting was altogether contrary to Hincmar's ideal of the royal office. As the above passage makes clear, the king's close tie with God is what enables him to be an effective ruler. His deliberations and acts of judgment must take into consideration the will of God, for otherwise they will be discordant and doomed to failure. Hincmar believed that through justice and judgment—the essential agency of worldly correctio and thus of a discipline essential for man's salvation—the king regains the virtus which enables him to effectively combat the Norse. This close relationship with God and the king's role in contributing to man's salvation were always central to Hincmar's idea of the royal office, and they prevented the archbishop from joining many of his contemporaries in abandoning the government of a king.

When Charles had sought to expand his realm and pursue the imperial dignity, he was acting in accord with a con-

tua apud nos sunt, reviviscant, ut virtutem nobis Deus reddat contra paganos: quia usque modo iam ante plures annos locum in isto regno defensio non habuit, sed redemptio et tributum, et non solum pauperes homines, sed et Ecclesias quondam divites iam evacuatas habent."

ception of government foreign to the Frankish tradition. For Hincmar, an increasing emphasis on the power and freedom of the royal office to restore order in the world was not a turn to a theocratic and absolute government such as Charles seemed to advocate after his return from Italy. However much Hincmar emphasized the essential disciplinary function of government, he never abandoned its larger context. This context was the belief that government served to liberate man by bringing him into a closer relationship with God and to spiritualize society by making caritas the axis of all social and political action. A lack of effective kingship was as much a danger to mankind as an autocratic and unilateral rule dominated by superbia—in neither case could the essential purposes of government be achieved. While both these dangers seemed present in the later years of Charles the Bald's rule, the succession of a series of ineffectual kings made clear that the future trend would be the abandonment of viable monarchy altogether.

CHAPTER XIII

THE SUCCESSORS OF CHARLES THE BALD (877-882):

OFFICE CONSIDERED AS A PROGRAM OF RADICAL RE-EDUCATION

Following the death of Charles the Bald in 877, there was a succession of Carolingian rulers in West Francia whose personal abilities fell considerably short of those of their more illustrious predecessors. Charles' son Louis II Balbus reigned only until 879, when a malady which had hindered his rule ultimately took his life. Then, from 879 to 882, West Francia was subject to Louis' youthful sons, Louis III and Carloman. These facts alone would suggest that Hincmar's political involvement was to be quite other than had been the case in previous years. However, there were also theoretical considerations, as we have seen, which discouraged the active participation of churchmen in the immediate concerns of political life. As Charles' rule drew to its close, the relationship between him and Hincmar grew increasingly tense, until the king's striving for the imperial title in Italy and the imposition of AnsGISus of Sens as papal vicar at the head of the Frankish church entirely discouraged Hincmar's participation. In exchange for the archbishop's sharp criticisms of Charles for not listening to his advice, the king disregarded Hincmar as one of the advisors appointed for Louis Balbus at Quierzy (877).

Although much remains uncertain in the career of Louis Balbus, enough is known to throw light on the factors lying behind his succession in 877.¹ Louis had revolted against his father in 862, and it was not until the meeting at Quierzy early in 877 that Charles was compelled by a need to arrange for the succession before leaving for Italy to come to terms with his son. Louis' first marriage was with Ansgard, the daughter of Count Hardouin, who was promoted to a position of some power in North Neustria by Charles the Bald. Circumstantial evidence has led Carlrichard Brühl to suggest that Ansgard's brother Odo hoped through the marriage to gain for himself an advantaged position with the possible future king of West Francia. It also seems probable that Louis himself expected to use the Ansgard family connections to forge for himself a powerful clientel at the expense of the group of primores who shared with his father the rule of the kingdom.

These matters have direct bearing on the definition of royal office, for in failing to take over the realm on his own terms, the bishops and magnates imposed on Louis their concept of the royal office, providing a clear delineation of just what was expected of the young king.

There is no need in the present context to go into

¹Brühl, "Hinkmariana, II," op.cit., provides the most recent analysis of the factors surrounding Louis' coronation, but his conclusions do not seem in all cases to be beyond question.

the details of Louis' succession except to indicate the full extent of his failure to do so on his own terms. Louis was in Orville when he heard of his father's death, and he immediately gathered about him whatever supporters he could, promising to each certain rewards, such as monasteries, counties, and villae. The primores of the realm were indignant at this effort to forge a new power base by unilateral means, and under the leadership of Louis' step-mother, Queen Richilde, formed a conspiracy against him at Compiègne. After a series of negotiations, Louis had to yield on all points, even, it seems, agreeing to put aside Ansgard and accept in her place a certain Adelheid, a member of the traditional aristocracy.

In his election professio, Louis reveals the extent to which he accepted an objective idea of royal office—an office which he owed to God's will and "popular" election rather than to any right of his own, such as inheritance.² Since his office was granted him by God and the people, he was obliged to respect the interests of each. He ruled the church only to the extent to which it was compatible with ecclesiastical autonomy as set forth by the definition of the episcopal office and by canonical regulations.³ Furthermore,

²Capitula electionis Hludowici Balbi (M.G.H., Capit., II, 364): "Ego Hludowicus, misericordia domini Dei nostri et electione populi rex constitutus, . . ."

³Ibid.: "premitto teste ecclesia Dei omnibus ordinibus, episcoporum videlicet, sacerdotum, monachorum, canonicorum atque sanctimonialium, regulas a patribus conscriptas et apostolicis adtentationibus roboratas ex hoc et in futurum tempus me illis ex integro servaturum."

he ruled the people only to the extent that he recognized their rights. These rights were guaranteed by laws ensuring the well-being of the people and the prerogatives of the fideles to take counsel with their king in important matters.⁴ One sees here the conception of state towards which Hincmar had been moving in recent years. Each of the three orders had its autonomy ensured by law and the definition of office, but this autonomy was not absolute, for, to the extent permitted by these regulations, the king had supreme authority.

This use of a definition of office and law to ensure the freedom of each order while at the same time permitting the king to preserve a central role reveals the extent to which the idea of ministerium was the axis of Carolingian political life at this time. However, it would be mistaken to go only this far and consider the constitution in purely legal terms, for no constitution, however perfect, can successfully function unless there exists a commitment to it by all parties concerned. To a certain extent, this was the reason for the Carolingian collapse, for the ideological implications of the constitution—the preconditions for its viability—were not sufficiently accepted by all. Everyone jealously guarded his own autonomy and saw in it a means for enriching himself or extending his own power at the expense of his neighbor. Louis Balbus' difficulty at succession is a case in point.

⁴Ibid.: "Polliceor etiam me servaturum leges et statuta populo, qui mihi ad regendum misericordia Dei committitur, pro communi consilio fidelium nostrorum,"

If the liberties incorporated into this constitution were understood by everyone as merely a license to seek thoroughly selfish ends, then it would have led to anarchy—the war of all against all. This, indeed, is what many historical accounts consider characterizes the situation in tenth-century France. But is this a just evaluation? Before dealing with the question more carefully, it would first be worthwhile to delineate the function of office in the constitution in more than just legal terms, for ideological implications go far in explaining its relative success or failure. The full implication of Hincmar's idea of office is that it allowed a disciplina of the realm's subjects in accord with Christian ultimate ends and values. This has been clearly apparent in Hincmar's activity during Charles the Bald's reign, but it is also true that office served to educate (in the full sense of the word) its holder. It is this latter function which characterizes Hincmar's advice to the ineffectual Louis Balbus and his successors.

When Louis was compelled to turn to the traditional powers in West Francia to ensure the continuance of his rule, Hincmar once again found himself in a position to become involved in the course of political life. In order to advise Louis, Hincmar wrote an Instructio ad Ludovicum Balbum which reveals the theoretical implication of the constitution and of the royal office within it. This is best understood not in legal, but in monastic terms.

The Instructio was written largely in response to a

crisis existing between Louis and his fideles, and thus the royal office is discussed in relation to the constitution. First of all, the king serves all the people, not just his own interests by means of a handful of powerful magnates. Hincmar felt that it was a major flaw in the Roman imperial constitution that emperors won the throne by means of factions rather than through the consent of all the primores.⁵ Just as Louis' attempt to seize the royal title with the help of a few clients, at the expense of the remaining aristocracy, brought disorders, so the Roman emperors could only with difficulty keep peace among the various military factions.

To some extent, the royal election was very real, for it appears that the primores of the realm had despaired of Louis' ability to keep the peace and preferred looking to their own interests rather than relying on the king. Hincmar wanted to correct this situation by encouraging Louis to abandon his selfish aims, concern himself with the general welfare, and especially, take the magnates into his counsel, so that no one would fear retribution if he spoke out.⁶

⁵Instructio ad Ludovicum Balbum, cap. i: "Legimus in antiquis historiis, quia saepe, quando reges constituti sunt, inter regni primores discordia orta est, quoniam aliqui sine aliorum consilio eius constitutionem vindicare sibi voluerunt. Quae discoridia non sine impedimento fuit pacificata."

⁶Ibid., cap. viii: "Quinto, ut concordiam, quae secundum Deum est, de qua nuper in Carisiaco pater vester mentionem habuit, inter fideles Dei et vestros haberi et vigere quantum potueritis satagatis, et vos talem erga eos praeparetis, ut verum consilium vobis dare possint et audeant. Quia, sicut per multos audivi, multum deperit de utilitate in isto regno, pro eo quia consiliarii quod sciebant bonum et utile, dicere non audebant, nec ut dicerent locum habebant."

Louis cannot unilaterally resolve the troubles of the realm, for he must not only take cognizance of God's will, but also the needs and advice of the fideles.⁷

It is here that ideology and practical matters met, for the royal office was the nexus of God's will and the people's needs. The king fulfilled this difficult role through his realization of justice—a justice which served God and subject, not the king alone.⁸ The appropriation of justice to his own ends—an expression of cupiditas, the root of all evil—can do nothing but disturb the status quo and encourage the primeres in turning to bribery for their honors and benefits.⁹ Justice thus has both a spiritual and a worldly function. While it serves as a correctio of men according to

⁷Ibid., cap. viii: "Quarto, ut inveniatis cum Dei et vestris fidelibus, qualiter istae rapinae et depraedationes in isto regno cessent, et miser iste populus, qui iam per plures annos depraedationes diversas et continuas, et per exactiones ad Nortmannos repellendos affligitur, aliquod remedium habeat, . . ."

⁸Ibid., cap. ix: "Facienda est iustitia, non pro ullo terreno lucro, sed pro eo ipso quia iustitia est." "Facendum est iudicium pro iniquorum correctione, et pro iniuriam sustinentium directione, non pro malevolentiae ultione, nec pro iustam causam habentium oppressione. Nam qui iniuste iudicant, non iudicant iudicium, id est, iure ac legaliter dictum, sed praeiudicium."

⁹Ibid., cap. viii: "Tertio, qualiter regni primores cum debita securitate ac honore erga vos consistere possint, et ceteri nobiles homines in regno securitatem habeant, ne per diversa ingenia a suis opibus quas habere potuerint despolientur: quia postquam radix omnium malorum cupiditas in regno iste exarsit, ut nullus aut pene nullus honorem aut aliquod bonum sine pretio posset acquirere, aut tenere, aut securitatem habere, pax et consilium, et iustitia, atque iudicium, sicut necesse fuerat, locum in isto regno non habuerunt."

God's will, it also assures an equitable and rational distribution of material benefits. In common with all successful education, whether in the fifth-century Athenian polis or a Benedictine monastery, worldly action is so disciplined as to shape the individual and direct him toward ideals and values which transcend the world.

Carolingian government was no more anti-worldly than Benedictine monasticism, for by this attachment to values beyond the selfish interests of the individual, worldly action would become ever more efficient. Hincmar firmly believed that if Louis was indeed able to restore true justice to his government, not only would internal disorder be resolved, but he would actually gain military success against the Norse.¹⁰ This correlation of worldly effectiveness with consciousness of ultimate ends and values is not simply a naive belief that God would be on his side, but a deeper appreciation of the basically destructive nature of egocentricity. The Athenian citizen believed that his freedom, won through active political participation in the polis, was the best guarantee of military victory over the Persians; the Benedictine monk, as the miles christi, greatly contributed to the creation of a new economic and social order in the early middle ages; and Chairman Mao assures his people that reading his thoughts contributes to the building of better truck engines and makes the people unconquerable. In each case, there is the use of

¹⁰Ibid., cap. viii: "Ut iustitia et iudicium, quae quasi emortua apud nos sunt, reviviscant, ut virtutem nobis Deus reddat contra paganos."

an almost military discipline to shape the individual so as to exorcise selfishness and encourage ideological consciousness.

Hincmar's idea of office is an example of a theoretical scheme for democratization, for it has within it both a broad program of discipline which educates subjects toward freedom and an open-ended potentiality for self-rule. The archbishop's attitude toward the lower social orders reflects his scepticism regarding their readiness for self-rule and participation in government, yet his idea of universal office opens the possibility of their ultimate liberation. Although Carolingian government lacked the resources for re-educating the common people away from parochialism and superbia, the greater impact of monastic education and episcopal admonition upon the magnates meant the possibility of their sharing with the king the political responsibilities of the realm. The extent of their ideological preparation would prove a decisive factor in determining whether the public disorders and breakdown of monarchy would mean a retreat to anarchy or the encouragement of local political viability and social-institutional creativity. Hincmar, however, continued to recognize the essential role of the king for providing the necessary discipline to counter disorder. Just as the magnates, the king was to keep in mind that his office was an instrument for achieving objective non-personal ends.

For the sake of analysis one might speak of a double

objectification of office in Hincmar's thought. On one hand there is the insistence that action in office be objectively defined by law and constitution, and on the other, that the intentio of the office holder be ever directed to God rather than to egocentric and acquisitive ends. The former, the objectification of means, seems to have been accepted since Coulaines by the majority of the aristocracy. Particularly in the case of Louis III, his acceptance of the constitution was the condition of his entry into office, and only a minority of ambitious magnates sought to achieve their aims through a return to older personal government.

It is not difficult to understand why the objectification of means was so readily accepted. The alienation of fief lands continued to make unilateral royal action ever more difficult, the Norse invasions were of the nature that only a distributed political viability could hope to cope with them, and the magnates were desirous of forging local bases of political power to better pursue their ambitions. In contrast with this side of the question, however, the objectification of ends was a much more difficult idea to convey to the magnates of the realm, for it involved a fundamental change in human nature. It is important to consider the factors which contributed to reduce this tension between Hincmar's monastic attitudes and lay mentality. Included among these are the extent to which the aristocracy was tained in monasteries, and their exposure to the homilies of Caesarius, Gregory, or Hincmar himself, which were used in church services.

The element lacking which prevented a more successful imposition of church views was the very limited and partial discipline of action afforded by government. Although Hincmar's view of political life was monastic, the intensity of monastic discipline was lacking, especially with the slow fragmentation of royal power. While the monastery combined the discipline of the mind, body, and spirit in one organization, the Carolingian situation was quite different, for the government looked to worldly action while the church relied on rational and spiritual action.

The declining ability of the king to provide the discipline required became evident after Charles the Bald's death. His son, Louis Balbus, was a young and intemperate man, and his rule was severely dampened by a serious illness which led to his death in April, 879, at the age of 33. Succeeding to the government were his two sons, Louis III (sixteen years of age) and Carloman (twelve or thirteen years old). The magnates of the realm were not too happy about this state of affairs, especially since Louis III and Carloman were the children of Ansgard, whom they had so carefully ousted from any association with the throne. Although Louis III's rule was not as unfortunate as one might expect, there was sufficient trouble to encourage the magnates to turn to the East Frankish ruler, Charles III. It was hoped that Charles would adopt the youths of the neighboring realm and act as regent until they were in a position to rule on their own account. In writing to Charles, Hincmar made clear once

again not only his idea of the royal office, but brought out certain points regarding the government's role as an instrument of education, whereby it looked to a fundamental reshaping of the whole person.¹¹

The central objective of this education which Charles III should undertake for the sake of Louis III and Carloman was to make of them new men. Hincmar noted that Alexander the Great's undisciplined youth meant that, although he conquered kingdoms, he could not rule himself.¹² Quoting Pseudo-Cyprian, Hincmar emphasized that the royal office educates the subject through a correctio, which shapes the individual in accordance with Christian ideals.¹³ This discipline or correction primarily involved the objective definition of office in law. By word and example, Charles is to teach the youths to conserve justice and the law appropriate to each office.¹⁴ For Charles to have directly disciplined the boys

¹¹Ad Carolum III imperatorem, cap. i: "istos iuvenes, reges nostros, propinquos vestros, et pupillos sine patre loco filiorum teneatis, . . ." For a study of Louis III's reign, see Ehrenforth, "Hincmar von Rheims und Ludwig von Westfranken," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, XLIV (1925), 65-98.

¹²Ad Carolum III imperatorem, cap. ii: "Et quia legimus de Alexandro Magno, cuius paedagogus Leonides nomine fuit, quod citatos mores et inhonestum incessum habens in pueritia idem Alexander, ex praefato paedagogo suo eadem accepit vitia, quae adultus in seipso corrigere voluit, et cum omnia regna vicerit, seipsum in hoc vincere non potuit, . . ."

¹³Ibid., cap. v: "Regem inquiens, non iniquum, sed correctorem iniquorum esse oportet." "Nomen enim regis intellectualiter hoc retinet, ut subiectis omnibus rectoris officium procuret."

¹⁴Ibid., cap. iv: "Doceant eos verbo et exemplo, reg-

would have been to violate the constitution, for they were not subject to him. For this reason, Hincmar could advocate at most merely a verbal admonition. Just as with the episcopal office, Hincmar appreciated the effect of words to shape others in ways both good and evil.¹⁵

Office serves, however, not only to shape the external actions of men, but to relate those actions to ultimate ends and values. Not only as kings, but anyone enjoying worldly power must have three essential qualities: be an object of fear, hold an office, and act out of love. It is love of God which yields efficacy to action in office, for it keeps such action from being turned toward selfish ends. If the officer follows this, then the one holding power will gain the respect and obedience of those subject to him.¹⁶

ni primoribus et ceteris regni fidelibus, atque sanctae ecclesiae defensoribus, unicuique in suo ordine competentem legem et iustitiam conservare, . . ."

¹⁵Ibid., cap. vi: "Et sanctus Gregorius admonet nutritores filiorum Imperatoris Graecorum, . . . inquiring, nutritientium, aut lac erunt si bona sunt, aut venenum si mala."

¹⁶Ibid., cap. v: "Et non solum regi, sed et omni qui in dominationis est potestate, tria necessario habere oportet, terrorem scilicet, ordinationem, et amorem. Nisi inim ametur Dominus, et metuatur, ordinatio illius constare minime poterit. Per beneficia ergo et affabilitatem procuret ut diligatur, et per iustam vindictam, non propriae iniuriae sed legis Dei, studeat ut metuatur. Et in his et aliis omnibus princeps semper Deum cogitet, et illi adhaereat: quia, nisi conditori suo pertinaciter adhaeserit, et ipse, et omnes qui ei consentiunt, cito deperient. Omnis igitur qui praees hoc primitus tota animi intentione procuret, ut per omnia de Dei adiutorio omnino non dubitet. Si namque coeperit in actibus suis auxiliatorem habere Dominum, nullus hominum contemptui habere poterit eius dominatum. Non est enim potestas nisi a Deo. Ipse elevat de stercore egenum, et sedere facit cum principibus populi sui. Deponit potentes de sede, et exaltat humiles."

This effort to create political order by insisting that anyone holding power humbly subject it to the will of God was certainly expecting much from the magnates of the day.¹⁷ And yet, if the interaction of offices within the constitution was to work at all, this utopian ideal had to be realized to some extent. It was not that the magnates would henceforth don a mien of monkish humility, but that they take seriously the state of their souls and worry enough about God's judgment to permit some modification in the configuration of their world view and in their daily actions.

However, as a direct effort to change radically human nature through political office, Hincmar's ambitions far exceeded the capacities of the age. An excellent illustration of this is the difficulty which Hincmar had trying to keep Louis III from imposing his own candidate, Odoacer, on the see of Beauvais, despite the election rights of the clergy and despite Hincmar's excommunication of Louis' candidate. On 2 April, 881, Hincmar called a synod at Fismes with the purpose of admonishing the king to respect the liberties of the church, its freedom of election of bishops, and the distinct sphere of spiritual action.¹⁸

¹⁷ Ibid., cap. vi: "Ipsi autem baiuli magnopere providere debent, ne super socios suos se extollant, sed iuxta Scripturam dicentem, 'quanto magnus es, humilia te in omnibus, et coram Deo invenies gratiam.'"

¹⁸ For an analysis of this synod, see Charles de Clercq, op.cit., pp. 317-19. A detailed study in terms of canon law of the struggle between Hincmar and Louis III is traced by Gerhard Ehrenforth, op.cit., which stresses the extent to which church regulations were shaped to meet the church's political needs.

This synod reflects the failure of the rational concordance of royal and episcopal offices. It was called on the initiative of the bishops without royal request or participation. However, it is important to note that its acts were not considered public law as had been the case in older mixed councils, but remained on the order of admonition.¹⁹ It drew upon a variety of sources, chiefly the acts of ninth-century councils, to discourage human superbia on a number of levels. Although the injustice of the king's domination of the church to further his own selfish ends was the focus of its criticism, it also tried to counter human acquisitiveness in general: excommunication awaited those guilty of usury and expropriation of property.

This tension between traditional human nature and Hincmar's attempt to change it through the ideological and worldly implications of ministerium found further expression in a letter which the archbishop sent Louis III along with the acts of Fismes. Here again, Hincmar tried to encourage a monkish humilitas—the humble subjecting of the king's will to God's purposes.²⁰ The king as well as bishops should act in full realization that the authority of both comes from Christ.²¹ It is this which assures not only the concor-

¹⁹ Hans Barion, Das fränkisch-deutsche Synodalrecht des Frühmittelalters (Bonn, 1931), pp. 294-96.

²⁰ Ad Ludovicum III. Regem, cap. 11: "Et non debetis inflexibilem Dei voluntatem, qui si mutat sententiam, non mutat consilium, ad humanam et fragilem voluntatem vestram vellem inflectere, quod fieri non potest: sed vestram voluntatem Dei voluntati subdere,"

dance of their actions with one another, but maintains the essential liberty of each. The royal power was given Louis by Christ not to be sole ruler of the world, excluding the church, but rather, also "president" of the church. What has been well established by the church is to be protected; what is wrong, to be corrected.²²

This assures the liberty of the church in the world. The episcopal action is spiritual, and thus it is not for the king to interfere with its realization.²³ In the present context, the attempt to impose Odoacer, a mere layman, by worldly means, on a see to which he was not elected, and for material interests alone, violated the whole idea of the distinct nature of the sacerdotal office.²⁴ The Odoacer case well illus-

²¹ Ibid., cap. v: "Quatenus devotione et operatione ostendatis, quia Christus, a quo legitimus omnis episcopatus cepit exordium, et omnis principatus accepit provectum, auctor sit vestri reginimis, et protector fiat vestrae sublimitatis."

²² Ibid., cap. ii: "regiam potestatem vobis non ad solum mundi regimen, sed maxime ad ecclesiae praesidium esse collatam, ut ausus nefarios comprimendo, et quae bene sunt statuta defendatis, et veram pacem his quae sunt turbata restituantis." Note that a restoratio of true peace remains in part the duty of the king.

²³ Ibid., cap. v: "Et quoniam sine sancto spiritu ministerium episcopale non agitur, non sit vobis leve in episcopis contristare spiritum sanctum, . . ."

²⁴ Ibid., cap. iiii: "Nam si quod a quibusdam dicitur, . . . illum debent episcopi et clerus ac plebs eligere, quem vos vultis, et quem iubetis, (quae non est divinae legis electio, sed humanae potestatis extorsio) si ita est, . . ." Act of excommunication levied against Odoacer (Sirmund, II, 814): "Et Odacrus invasor vacantis ecclesiae, . . . per saecularem potestatem prius res et facultates ipsius ecclesiae vacantis obtinuit, ut saltu quoquo modo ad altitudinem episcopalis nominis pervenerit, et sacerdos non esse, sed dici tantummodo

trates the magnitude of Hincmar's problem. While the change of heart which he would bring about in all men depended on the episcopal admonition encouraging an ideological interpretation of office, the concurrent worldly discipline expected from public government was vitiated. Not only was Louis III personally incapable of providing that discipline, either because of a paucity of real concern for the church or personal worldly ambition, but also his action in regard to the see of Beauvais would compromise the role even of the spiritual agency to meet its responsibilities.²⁵

Whatever hope Hincmar may have had for a conscientious fulfilling of office to discipline and educate Louis III, it was doomed to disappointment, for on 5 August, 882, Louis died and was succeeded by his sixteen year old brother Carloman. Again, the archbishop undertook to admonish a youthful king to act properly. Carloman himself had turned to Hincmar for help, but it is also clear that a number of concerned magnates had encouraged him in this to assure a more rational and effective ordering of the machinery of government.²⁶

inaniter concupivit. Non attendens, quia sic ab ipso Christo, summo pontifice ac rege regum, sunt distincta potestatum officia, ut spiritalis actio a carnalibus distaret incursibus, et militantes Deo minime se negotiis saecularibus implicarent, ac vicissim non illi rebus divinis praesidere viderentur, qui essent negotiis saecularibus implicati."

²⁵ Louis' personal shortcomings are outlined by Hincmar in Ad Ludovicum III. Regem, cap iv: "qui minoris potestatis et aetatis atque sapientiae adhuc estis, . . ."

²⁶ While the title of this tract, commonly called De ordine palatii, is open to some dispute, its content gives some idea of its purpose. It was written as a function of Hincmar's office and by Carloman's order (De ordine, cap. iii):

Hincmar sought to educate the king in the manner of organizing a government, using as a model the reign of Louis the Pious. However, this admonition formed part of a broader corpus of writings which should properly be considered as a whole.²⁷ While the acts of the synod of Fismes defined the liberties and responsibilities of the church, the De ordine palatii provided a model for secular government. Another work, shortly to be discussed, summarized these as well as his De regis persona, and taken together, they represent Hincmar's final admonitions for the three orders of the realm.²⁸

Because De ordine is primarily concerned with the organization of government, it deals with the worldly objectification of means rather than the spiritual objectification of the ends of office—that is, it emphasizes the disciplin-

"Ego autem, et pro imposito ministerio et pro bona et rationali vestra iussione, aggrediar exequi quod rogatis non meo sensu neque verbis meis, sed" However, Hincmar addressed himself to the magnates or advisors (Ibid., cap. 1): "Pro aetatis et sacri ordinis antiquitate, posteriores tempore, boni et sapientes viri, rogatis exiguitatem mea ut"

²⁷Ibid., cap. xxxvii: "Personas autem hominum, et mores ac qualitates illorum per quos si aliqua sunt collapsa restituantur vestra solertia providebit, quoniam de his quos tempore domni Hludowici imperatoris vidi palatii procuratores et regni praefectos, neminem scio esse superstitem:" Although the work of Adalhard upon which Hincmar based his De ordine may have been written before Charlemagne's death, Hincmar almost always looked back on Louis the Pious' reign as a model for kingship.

²⁸Ibid.: "Post illa quae in synodo apud martyrium sanctae Macrae [Fismes] de majorum constitutionibus collecta et regi Hludowico nuper defuncto fuere directa, haec de ordine palatii et dispositione regni, vobis ad institutionem istius regis nostri ac ministrorum eius regnique provisorum," This makes clear that Hincmar intended De ordine to serve to educate the secular order, both king and public officers.

ary function of office as expressed in law. Furthermore, since the immediate problem seems to be ineffectual monarchy rather than undisciplined primores, there is also an emphasis on the educative or disciplinary impact of the office on the holder himself. The royal office cannot correct others if the king does not first correct himself.²⁹ This means an objectification of action on the levels of both spiritual ends and worldly means. The significance of the former is contained in the admonition that the king and his officers are to direct their hearts to God rather than love of worldly gain.³⁰

However, Hincmar is more interested here in the worldly means of office. First and foremost, this concern suggests that each individual who holds a public responsibility is obliged to keep in mind the purposes for which it exists.³¹ These purposes found expression in law, and it is this law which Hincmar emphasizes, although in the context of his thought, law in itself is not sufficient, for it must be spiri-

²⁹ Ibid., cap. vi: "Sed qualiter alios corrigere poterit qui proprios mores ne iniqui sint non corrigit." In cap. i, Hincmar repeats the anecdote about Alexander (see note 12 above).

³⁰ Ibid., cap. x: "Tales etiam comites et sub se iudices constitutere debet, qui avaritiam oderint et iustitiam diligant, . . ." "Et sciat quod, sicut in principatu hominum primus constitutus est, ita quoscunque peccatores sub se in praesenti habuit, nisi se et illos correxerit, supra se modo implacabili in illa futura poena habebit."

³¹ Ibid., cap. iii: "Sancta Scriptura in omni ordine et professione unicuique administratori praecipit, ut intellegat cuncta quae ait. Quoniam, si intellegit administratio quam gerit unde exordium caepit, sollicitius satagit, ut de administrationis talento sibi credito rationem redditurus."

tualized by a directing of the intentio to God. Because it is essential for everyone to keep in mind the objective responsibilities of office, it is likewise important for him to be fully aware of the law.³² Law and order are essential only because they serve higher purposes and are not ends in themselves. Nor more than the ordering of monastic life, did these rules and regulations have meaning independent of man's central purposes, and to consider them detached from those purposes distorts their true significance. The regulations to which Hincmar refers have little explicit religious content, and yet they were to act as a discipline of the person and as a springboard of salvation.³³

Less than a month before his death, Hincmar followed up his De ordine with another admonition, again addressed to Carloman, but also meant for the edification of those holding lesser offices in the realm. This Ad episcopos regni, admonitio altera pro Carolomanno apud Sparnacum facta served to

³²Ibid., cap. viii: "Cum enim dicitur nulli liceat leges nescire vel quae sunt statuta contemnere, nulla persona, in quocunque ordine mundano, excipitur, quae hac sententia non constringatur. Habent enim reges et reipublicae ministri leges quibus in quacunque provincia degentes regere debent, . . ." This reflects also the gradual shift in emphasis away from admonition of the king alone to a greater reliance upon the magnates for self-discipline.

³³This is not to say that the primores were not also obliged to obey divine law, which was specifically Christian in content. Ibid.: "Multo minus autem regi vel cuilibet in quocunque ordine contra leges divinas licet agere per contemptum. Unde, principi terrae magnopere providendum atque cavendum est, ne in his Deus offendatur per quos religio christiana consistere debet et caeteri ab offensione salvari."

summarize Hincmar's thought for the benefit of other bishops taking it upon themselves to advise the kings and magnates in the future. Because it relied so heavily on Hincmar's earlier writings, there is little point in studying it in detail, except to emphasize his recognition of the dominant role of the primores in the realm. Without doubting for a moment the important authority of the king, he nevertheless gave the lower offices the same political-theological function. This represented less a fundamental change in his theory of office than its adjustment to contemporary political conditions. Hincmar had tried to re-inforce the authority of the royal office under the last years of Charles the Bald, but now that the realm was administered by an ineffective monarch, the archbishop looked to law as a substitute for the disciplinary effect of kingship.

Regardless of the office, Hincmar insisted that its holder act in accordance with its objective definition.³⁴ Just as the king, the dukes and counts are to seek justice in accord with God's will and thereby contribute to the salvation of the people.³⁵ Like the king, they are not to measure them-

³⁴Admonitio altera pro Carolomanno facta, cap. iii: "Diligenter igitur quisque debet in ordine et professione sua quo nomine censetur attendere, et maiorem in modum providere, ne a nomine discordet officio."

³⁵Ibid., cap. xiv: "Qui autem post regem populum regere debent, id est, duces et comites, necesse est ut tales instituantur, qui sine periculo eius qui eos constituit, quos sub se habent cum iustitia et aequitate gubernare intelligant, atque cum bona voluntate quod intelligunt adimplere procurant, scientes se ad hoc positos esse, ut plebem salvent et regant, . . ."

selves in terms of worldly advantage, but to recognize that they participate in God's work of salvation.³⁶ It is easy to find evidence in the sources for a royal theology, but it was but one expression of a political theology which encompassed the whole of society and every office within it.

Thus it is the whole structure of authority within society which provides the discipline and correction which contributes to the salvation of all. Public officers not only have a spiritual function in public life, but they themselves are judged by their use of office to further God's ends. However, to consider this order, or the law defining it, as simply God-ordained (and thus commanding absolute obedience) is to miss Hincmar's intention. Law and political authority are justified because they originate in Christ, and mere obedience without a consciousness of this divine connection is insufficient.³⁷ Office is the nexus of Christian values and worldly situation, and any attempt to define it in purely

³⁶ Ibid., cap. xiv: "neque ut populum Dei suum aestiment [counts and dukes], aut ad suam gloriam sibi illum subici, quod pertinet ad tyrannidem et iniquam potestatem." Ibid., cap. i: "sic actionibus propriis [king's], dignitatibusque distinctis officia potestatis utriusque describit, suos volens medicinali humilitate salvare, non humana superbia rursus, . . . intercipi. . . ."

³⁷ Ibid., cap. xv: "Et in his omnibus non solum non solvunt fasciculos secundum Isaiam deprimentes [regarding one who merely follows the letter of the law, thinking himself justified by fasting], sed etiam superaddunt super miseros et egentes. Quando enim sperant aliquid lucrari, ad legem se convertunt: quando vero per legem non aestimant acquirere, ad capitula confugiunt: sicque interdum sit, ut nec capitula pleniter conserventur, sed pro nihilo habeantur, nec lex." See also chapter IX, notes 14-19 for further examples.

worldly or legal terms would be to subvert their true significance. Hincmar insisted upon this, and it seems also a valid criticism of modern historiography which tries to "understand" an institution in legal terms without penetrating its deeper function in an epoch's total Gestalt.

Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to permit the generalization that as Hincmar grew older, he placed increasing weight on the importance of law and the definition of office.³⁷ The later years of the archbishop's life were in part devoted to an encouragement of viable monarchy just when it seemed least likely to be forthcoming. The chaos into which public life was slipping naturally encouraged the writing of such a work as De ordine palatii which defined to the smallest detail the various responsibilities of public officers. It seems probable that this shift in emphasis toward the legal aspect of ministerium found its analogue in his modified attitude toward the involvement of the episcopal office in political life. The mystical concordance of offices had the result of curtailing potential criticism of royal action by the sacerdotal order except on a narrowly moral plane, so that the disciplinary function of the king would be less conditioned. Although the logical conclusion of this trend in his thought might seem ultimately to have been the abandonment of his theory of ministerium altogether, Hincmar never modified his central tenet, that love and discipline,

³⁷For the development of Hincmar's use of law, see the sketch of Jean Devisse, Hincmar et la loi.

whether applied to a single office or to the total collectivity of offices making up the whole of society, enter into a dialectical relationship assuring creative order and personal liberation.

CHAPTER XIV

CONCLUSION

It would be superfluous here to retrace the definition for the various public offices as formulated by Hincmar. They are not unfamiliar to students of Carlingian history, and the present study has not seriously challenged the familiar lists of royal virtues and responsibilities on one hand nor the definition of episcopal liberties and duties on the other as found in the various tracts of the ninth century and in law. However significant the definitions of various offices might be for ascertaining the Roman or Germanic roots of later medieval institutions, the present investigation has tried to clarify the significance Hincmar's ideas had for his own time by revealing their function in society. For Hincmar, the crucial difference was between the sacerdotal and the secular office and their respective modes of action, rather than emphasizing the distinctions between the levels in a hierarchy of authority.

Where the present investigation has really sought to plough new ground is in suggesting a different methodological approach to the study of institutions. More specifically, it has attempted to ascertain the meaning of ministerium by studying its functional relationship to both the deeper levels of

psychic existence and to the material situation in which the office was expected to operate. To detach what we know of the legal definition of various offices from their ideological and material context is to hamper seriously our understanding of their significance for the time. For this reason, a considerable amount of attention has been devoted to the political events to which Hincmar responded and to the broader reaches of his thought.

The suspicion that Hincmar's world view was fundamentally Benedictine is aroused by recalling that he was educated in a monastery at a time when monasticism was enjoying a reformation and an increasing influence upon all aspects of life. This re-evaluation is further verified by a careful consideration of the manner in which Hincmar used certain terms fundamental to Christian thought, such as pax, ordo, caritas, and superbia. In particular, although his explicit legal definitions of various offices derived in part from non-Benedictine sources such as Ambrose, his idea of the role which offices played in the fabric of social and political life can only be understood as an expression of monastic views. When he attempted to explain how offices related to man's effort to find salvation, he most often had recourse to ideas contained in Gregory the Great and the Benedictine rule.

Because monastic thought had proven highly successful in reshaping the world and the monk himself by integrating worldly action and spiritual ends, it provided an ideal base for Hincmar's idea of office, for here too, there was need to

understand the workings of government and social structure in terms relative to Christian ends and values. His concept of political office, which thus provided the nexus of political action and ideology, became for him the axis of Carolingian political life. He was quite justified in believing that were his views generally accepted, they would provide a more coherent and efficient action in the world, comparable to that achieved by Benedictine monasticism except on a much broader scale.

When Hincmar's idea of office is placed in the broader context of his thought, it appears that he saw ministerium basically as a mechanism for the radical re-education of both the holder of the office and the persons subject to its authority. This, in turn, suggests both the strengths and weaknesses of his position, for directing men's actions in the world is a much easier task than reshaping the whole man. Office considered externally, as the objectification of worldly means, found Hincmar readily adjusting his ideas to political realities. He abandoned his early hope for a rational concordance of offices, and then, when the monarchy became incapable of providing a necessary disciplina for its subjects, he emphasized that all men held office and thus all men were subject to some discipline regardless of the state of the monarchy. Not only kings, but also dukes, counts, and even private persons hold an office wherein they act so as to realize God's will on earth in terms of objective responsibilities.

When Hincmar considered the inner aspect of office—as the objectification of spiritual ends—he found the least response from his lay contemporaries. His effort to encourage a humble turning away from treating worldly goods as ends in themselves toward an opening of the heart to God's will fell on the hard soil of an avaricious and ambitious aristocracy. Due to his monastic training, Hincmar believed that a three-fold action corresponding to each of the three elements of man's being could actually bring about a fundamental change in human nature: the discipline of worldly authority, the admonition of spiritual action, and God's saving grace. He failed to appreciate that Carolingian government was not so tightly organized as the Benedictine abbey and was more open to disturbing outside influences. Hence, the radical re-education for which he strove was doomed to failure.

One must ask, therefore, whether his efforts had any appreciable effect. Most of his admonition was directed to a monarchy soon to become a minor factor in public life, and as for the aristocracy, there is ample evidence from tenth-century France that humility was the farthest thing from their minds. On the other hand, there is also evidence of a growing lay piety. Despite the watering-down of religious thought and the subjection of the church to lay powers, there was (perhaps as the consequence) a much more intimate relationship between the church and the broad reaches of society. Certainly Hincmar's opposition to a monarchic structure of authority in the church and his encouragement of a dynamic in-

teraction of Christian ideals and political action encouraged this tendency. However difficult it may now be to grasp, this increased lay piety could not help but influence the thought of the crude warriors and poor villagers of the time.

It is now increasingly realized that the tenth and eleventh centuries witnesses a period of dynamic growth. Here took place the rapid development of socio-economic (manorial) and socio-political (feudal) structures which were to enjoy a long life and provide a great source of strength and well-being for medieval Europe. There appears to have been a major revolution in agricultural technology, an expansion in economic activity, a clearing of new lands, and a rapid increase in population. It would be tempting to explain this phenomenon in part by reference to this new piety, whereby the people of Western Europe were able to understand worldly action in relation to Christian ideology—an ideology sanctifying the world by subjecting it to spiritual purposes. In other words, what Hincmar was trying to do for the political structure of the ninth century, laymen on a much less rational and sophisticated level may also have done for their own action in the world.

Here again, one can be misled by appearances. Tenth-century France is generally considered a period of feudal anarchy about which little good can be said. However, every effort should be taken to study this atmosphere of conflict more closely. Through their ambitions to expand and consoli-

date their power in order to better enter into conflict with neighboring princes, the feudatories of the tenth and eleventh centuries developed sophisticated instruments of government and efficient means for exploiting resources. One might call this "meaningful" conflict, in contrast to conflict which simply squanders resources and produces social and political disorientation and anomie. Social theorists suggest that a precondition for what we are here calling "meaningful" conflict is some degree of agreement over ultimate ends and values. Without this, rather than building the viable principalities which emerged in tenth to thirteenth-century France, there may well have been the kind of self-defeating contention which so vitiated life in the late Merovingian period.

In the ninth century, as vassals appropriated royal prerogatives and responsibilities, they also found themselves exposed to ideas associated with them, including the objective idea of office in means and perhaps also to some extent in ends. This being the case, then the emergence of the "mystique" of vassalage in the ninth century may not be as absolutist as is assumed.¹ If one looks beyond the legal definition of office, then one realizes that subjection to the lord provided a saving discipline which represented neither weakness of the vassal's part nor any so-called totalitarian right of the lord. The subjection of office was felt to be subjection to Christ—an easy yoke, for it was one which liberated man

¹Francis L. Ganshof, Feudalism (2nd English ed.; New York, 1961), pp. 32-33.

and set him free. This not only justified the structural authority, it made of it a welcome bondage, for it served the most fundamental and far reaching interests of the vassal by providing a saving discipline.

No doubt such considerations were often lost sight of in the brute realities of life, but had they been totally lacking, the creative social and political activity of this and succeeding centuries may well not have taken place to produce medieval civilization. Besides this more general consideration of the impact of the idea of office on non-royal areas of political life, there is a more restricted connection which, although difficult to verify, yet remains intriguing. When Hincmar thought of office as being at once submission to authority and freedom through commitment, as well as the nexus of ideology and political necessity, there was a close resemblance to later knightly attitudes. In an interesting article on the relationship between the knightly ideal and its reality, Arno Borst has suggested that a combination of freedom and subjection emerged as decisive for the character of late eleventh-century knighthood.²

Such attitudes as freedom in commitment emerged as part of a growing knightly class consciousness, but it was a class which had appropriated the public prerogatives and responsibilities of the king. The history of this appropriation

²Arno Borst, "Das Rittertum im Hochmittelalter. Idee und Wirklichkeit," Saeculum, X (1959), 213.231.

is well enough known—it can be traced in some detail through the ninth and tenth centuries—but the literacy of this class was so restricted that today the study of a possible appropriation of royal ideology has barely begun. The present investigation has attempted to show how Hincmar placed the idea of the royal office in a Benedictine context and then extended its application to the whole of government. Further study might well reveal that this side of his activity contributed greatly to aristocratic class consciousness and thus more to the emergent medieval world than his furthering of an ideal of kingship.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY

The various works of Hincmar relevant to the purposes of this study have received detailed attention in the text, and here discussion will be devoted to secondary bibliography. Something should be said, however, of the editions used for Hincmar's writings. A number of the texts most important for a study of his idea of political office were contained in a manuscript of the cathedral of Spire. This document was destroyed, but fortunately, before that happened, Jean Buys had edited them in his Hincmarus; Epistolae. Ex ms. membrana-
ceo cod. bibliothecae nd. et cathedralis Eccl. Spirensis des-
criptae . . . ed. J. Busaei (Monguntiae, 1602). Because of the rarity of the Buys volume, the present study has used the edition of Jacob Sirmond, Hincmari Archiepiscopi Remensis, Opera, duos in tomos digesta (2 vols.; Paris, 1645). Migne's Patrologia Latina, although the most convenient edition of Hincmar's works, was considered too full of errors to provide always reliable readings.

In certain cases, however, there have been editions of individual works of Hincmar which are preferable to that of Sirmond. This is particularly true of the partially completed collection of Hincmar's letters comprising the Monumenta Germaniae historica, . . . Epistolae, VIII, pars 1 (Berlin, 1939). Furthermore, a number of Hincmar's writings have been

edited in recent years in scholarly journals. This is the case of Ad reclusos et simplices, edited by Wilhelm Gundlach, "Zwei Schriften des Erzbischofs Hinkmar von Reims," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, X (1889), 258-310; De ecclesiis et capellis, edited by Wilhelm Gundlach, "Zwei Schriften des Erzbischofs Hinkmar von Reims," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, X (1889), 92-145; and Memorandum for the Trial of Rothad of Soissons, edited by E. Perels, "Eine Denkschrift Hinkmars von Reims im Prozeß Rothads von Soissons," Neus Archiv, XLIV (1922), 43-100. Finally, to complete this list of primary source editions, Maurice Prou's De ordine palatii epistola (Paris, 1885), was used for this important work.

For the sake of analysis, it is perhaps best to distinguish three types of secondary works relevant to Hincmar's idea of office, corresponding to the three facets of his thought presented in the body of this dissertation. First, one has to consider his legal definition of various offices. Second, an appreciation of the interrelation of his idea of office and the social and political context requires a careful evaluation of the events to which Hincmar responded and the course of which he tried to influence. Third, this dissertation has argued that Hincmar's ideas cannot properly be understood isolated from the whole of his Weltanschauung. Therefore, one is compelled to seek the relation of his concept of office to more general ideas—identified here as essentially Benedictine.

There exists an extensive literature dealing either directly or indirectly with Hincmar's legal definition of the royal office, and no effort will be here made to provide an exhaustive bibliography. Albert Werminghoff, "Die Fürstenspiegel der Karolingerzeit," Historische Zeitschrift, LXXXIX (1902), 193-214, provides a general, although useful, introduction. The present study has suggested that a narrow legal investigation of Hincmar's idea of office would over-emphasize his reliance on Augustinian concepts, and make his writings seem *recherché* and irrelevant to political life. Contributing to this I believe mistaken line of endeavor was Hugo Tiralla, Das augustinische Idealbild der christlichen Obrigkeit als Quelle der "Fürstenspiegel" des Sedulius Scottus und Hincmar von Reims (Greifswald, 1916), who detailed the extent to which Hincmar was dependent on Augustine, Gregory the Great, and Pseudo-Cyprian. The most convenient summary along this line of Hincmar's ideas, although not without factual errors, is that of Lester K. Born, "The 'Specula Principis' of the Carolingian Renaissance," Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, XII (1933), 583-612. Born has the virtue of seeing the fundamentally moral rather than religious nature of the mirrors, and, although recognizing this to be somehow original and important for the future, fails to appreciate its full significance. Carl Erdmann, "Ein karolingischer Konzilsbrief und der Fürstenspiegel Hinkmars von Reims," Neues Archiv, L (1935), 106-134, still maintains that Hincmar was more a man of action than of original thought. The only per-

son to seriously challenge Hincmar's supposed legalism and Augustinism is H. M. Klinkenberg, "Über karolingische Fürstenspiegel," Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, VIII (1956), 82-98. To some extent, the present investigation has been in effect a realization of some of the suggestions made by Klinkenberg. The most recent general study, that of Werner Andreas Schmidt, Verfassungslehren im 9. Jahrhundert (Diss. Mainz, 1961), although a convenient categorization of ideas, contributes little that is new. Jakob Schmidt's Hincmar's "De ordine palatii" und seine Quellen (Diss. Frankfurt a.M., 1962), was not available to the present writer.

Klinkenberg's suggestions have not elicited an immediate response from other scholars, and in fact, in one case, they have been challenged. Erna Buschmeann, "Ministerium Dei — idoneitas; Um Deutung aus dem mittelalterlichen Fürstenspiegeln," Historisches Jahrbuch, LXXXII (1963), 70-102, suggests that monastic morality did not constitute the basis of the royal office, but rather, was attempt to check the unlimited power which the king derived from God. Since neither Klinkenberg nor Buschmann attempted to do more than suggest hypotheses, hopefully the present study throws further light on the question. Although Buschmann's observations may well be relevant to what the monarchs themselves thought, it also seems clear that Hincmar saw in monastic humilitas not only a means of checking undesirable royal action, but also a contribution to its strengthening when directed to proper ends.

Generally speaking, no attempt was made in the course of the present work to re-interpret Hincmar's political activity beyond what is suggested in light of his thought. For the details of Hincmar's political career, one turns first to Karl von Noorden, Hincmar, Erzbischof von Rheims (Bonn, 1863) and Heinrich Schrörs, Hinkmar, Erzbischof von Rheims (Freiburg i.B., 1884). Both of these works are sound and valuable accounts, especially the latter, which catalogues Hincmar's writings. However, what these two men found interesting in Hincmar's career does not only reflect the same preoccupations which concern the historian today. Our differing interests and the considerable amount of work which has subsequently been done in ninth-century history means that a fresh biography of Hincmar is a prime desideratum. Until such a biography appears, one can turn to other studies detailing Hincmar's political involvement, such as Ernst Dümmler, Geschichte des ostfränkischen Reiches (2nd ed., 3 vols.; Leipzig, 1887-88), and Joseph Calmette, La diplomatie carolingienne (Paris, 1901). The most recent history, pleasant reading while contributing nothing new, is that of Paul Zumthor, Charles le Chauve (Paris, 1957).

There are a number of very good reasons why a biography of Hincmar has yet to appear, although the need for one is often asserted. One of these factors, immediately relevant to the problem at hand, is the lack of agreement as to Hincmar's attitude to law. If one begins with the assumption that Hincmar was devoted to the preservation and enforcement of law,

it is possible to find much evidence to support it. Jean Devisse, Hincmar et la loi (Dakar, 1962), even suggests that Hincmar was responsible for a renaissance of Roman law in West Francia. Once given this estimate of Hincmar's attitudes, then it is possible to construct complex edifices designed to illuminate Hincmar's action in public life. A recent attempt to do this is Karl F. Morrison's The Two Kingdoms; Ecclesiology in Carolingian Political Thought (Princeton, 1964).

Is it true, though, that Hincmar saw the maintenance of law as an end in itself? If not, then the greatest of caution must be exercised lest elaborate arguments prove nothing more than sand castles contributing to a misunderstanding of the man and his times. Casting doubt on Hincmar's absolute devotion to the letter of the law are Gerhard Ehrenforth, "Hinkmar von Reims und Ludwig III. von Westfranken," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, LXIV (1925), 65-98, and Carlrichard Brühl, "Hinkmariana, II: Hinkmar im Widerstreit von kanonischem Recht und Politik in Ehefragen," Deutsches Archiv, XX (1964), 55-77.

It is hoped that the present study has thrown some light on this crucial question by suggesting that for Hincmar, formal definitions of action, whether in law or ministerium, lay in a field spanning the worldly situation and God's will. Thus, while law was to be revered because it was an expression of the divine will, it was also subject to dynamic change because anchored in the changing circumstances of life. If this

thesis regarding Hincmar's thought has been sustained with any success, then one finds a resolution of the apparent contradictions which have caused modern historians such difficulties when dealing with the archbishop . Perhaps we stand too much under the shadow of nineteenth-century bourgeois historiography, which forgot that law simply objectifies power relations and to be viable must serve ends which lie above it. Perhaps modern historians are in a better position to understand Hincmar's idea of office by seeing it in terms of actual ninth-century power structures and also in terms of that society's ultimate ends and values, for they have less of a vested interest in hiding real power relations with a legal veneer.

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