THE OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT l-N MOORE A'ND HARE ' Thesis for the Degree of Ph; D MICHIGAN STATE umvmsm ‘ LORm WAYNE BROWNING 1972 .45“U This is to certify that the thesis entitled The Open Question Argument in Moore and Hare presented by Lorin Wayne Browning has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for ; Ph. D. degreein Phllosophy 152 W00 7 51‘ Major professor Date 93 A /67/ /?/2 LIBRARYN Michigan State nivcrsity THE Altho any as a co that the ver: that purpose. early ontolog give zit. p ha fa I Ialso show t' is a heuristi «Insic goodm "fire, all Of T Show that all 7; Vi 5 . )D ‘3 ABSTRACT THE OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT IN MOORE AND HARE By Lorin Wayne Browning Although the Open Question Argument has been taken by many as a conclusive refutation of ethical naturalism, I show that the versions used by Moore and Hare are inadequate for that purpose. After exhibiting a skeletal form of Moore's early ontology, I discuss and discredit four reasons which give prima facie plausibility to Moore's use of the argument; I also show that the Open Question Argument cannot function as a heuristic device for discovering Moore's concept of in- trinsic goodness. I find three instances of the argument in Hare, all of which are shown to be defective. Finally, I show that all forms of the argument are defective in that they are based on the false assumption that definitional analytic truths and formal analytic truths have the same function. In passing, I argue that Moore's concept-inspection procedure blurs important philosophical distinctions, that a modification in Moore's realistic epistemology further discredits t identified 9 important pc We need to . 'eoral law; Lorin Wayne Browning discredits the Open Question Argument, that Hare has mis- identified ethical naturalism, that Hare has overlooked an important point concerning the logic of standards, and that we need to set limits for the application of the vague term 'moral language'. THE OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT IN MOORE AND HARE BY Lorin Wayne Browning A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of Philosophy 1972 I wish C. Kerher ani' earlier draft Benjamin and latter draft Pressed to PI Rents and the improvement 04 My wifl Ccapleted. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to express my appreciation to Professors George C. Kerner and Ronald Suter for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper and to Professors Martin Benjamin and Bruce Miller for their helpful comments on the latter draft of this paper. A special appreciation is ex- pressed to Professor Donald F. Koch for both his encourage- ments and the many positive suggestions given for the improvement of my paper while it was still in draft form. My wife's tolerance and patience is deeply appreci- ated; without them, this paper would never have been completed. ii ENTER 1. INTROD 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 CHAPTER I. II. III. TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O G. E. MOORE AND THE OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT. 2.1 '\ 2.7 2.8 2.9 (“9 The Intended Preface to the "Second Edition" of Principia Ethica . . . The Word 'Good' and a Concept of Goodness . . . . . . . . . . . . . Can We Intuit Good (m)? . . . Significant Questions . . . . . . . Identity Statements and Verbal Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . Denotative Identity and the Law of Contradiction . . . . . . . . . . . Connotative Identity and the Law of Contradiction . . . . . . . . . . . Concepts and Objects-of-Concepts . Meaning and Concept . . . . . . . . M. HARE AND THE OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT . 3.1 Hare's Reasons for Rejecting Ethical Naturalism . . . . . . . . iii PAGE 13 4O 60 78 84 97 112 116 136 136 CrimER 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 1" THE 0; 4.: 4. 4. 4 4 4 4 ararresRAP A 300 8, Fe: C' 8ny D CHAPTER PAGE 3.2 Three Instances of the Open Question Argument . . . . . . . . . . . 149 3.3 Standards and Commending . . . . . . . 156 3.4 Definitions and Commending . . . . . . 161 3.5 Analytic Sentences and Commending . . . 170 3.6 The Naturalistic Rejoinders to Hare . . 174 IV. THE OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT AND ETHICAL THEORY . 191 4.1 The Open Question Argument . . . . . . 191 4.2 Analytic Sentences . . . . . . . . . . 193 4.3 Two Types of Analytic Sentences . . . . 196 4.4 Formal and Definitional Analytic Uses . 198 4.5 Metalanguage and Object Language . . . 201 4.6 Meaning and Moral Language . . . . . . 203 4.7 Ethical Naturalism . . . . . . . . . . 210 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212 A. Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212 B. Periodicals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214 C. Symposia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 D. Essays and Articles in Collections . . . . . . 227 iv By dra philosophers Mons, Gilb Phases of aria Clause, "Our reports Ryles aDressiOns . A) J: “Opt RYle ' s CHAPTER I INTR ODUCT I ON By drawing attention to the different idioms used by philosophers in referring to the objects of their investi- gations, Gilbert Ryle has distinguished three different phases of analytical philosophy.1 First, to use Ryle's clause, "our forefathers, at one time, talked . . . of the concepts or ideas corresponding to expressions." Later, reports Ryles, philosophers came to talk about the meaning of expressions. Most recently, he continues, philosophers have come to talk about the use of expressions. Thus, if we adopt Ryle's distinctions as a handy mode of classification, twentieth-century British philosophy can be viewed as being roughly divided into three major areas: (1) the earliest period, in which philosophers were concerned with the giving of analyses of extra-linguistic concepts; (2) a middle period, in which philosophers searched for synonymous lin- guistic expressions; and (3) the contemporary period, in which philosophers are generally concerned neither with 1Gilbert Ryle, "Ordinary Language," The Philosophical Review, LXIII (April, 1953), 172. 1 P discovering a expressions ? sue meaning? our ordinary I those tokens I have earliest peri unifying fact p‘irpose of t} uses of a pa figment . The T If anyo thing i certain notice one fac fashior discovering and analyzing concepts denoted by linguistic expressions nor with discovering which expressions have the same meaning; instead, the concern is now with the tokens of our ordinary language itself, a concern with elucidating how those tokens are in fact used in actual practice.2 I have chosen to consider a representative from the earliest period and one from the current period. A central unifying factor between these two representatives for the purpose of this paper is that each made similar important uses of a particular type of argument, the Open Question Argument. The Platonic Socrates once held: If anyone tells me that the reason why such-and-such a thing is beautiful is that it has a bright colour or a certain shape or something of that kind, I take no notice of it all, for I find it all confusing, save for one fact, which in my simple, naive and maybe foolish fashion I hug close: namely, that what makes a thing beautiful is nothing other than the prgsence or com- munion of that beautiful itself. . . . G. E. Moore favored a similar procedure for explaining what makes a thing good. In attempting to show that that which makes a thing good is nothing other than the presence of goodness itself, he employed a type of argument which has 2A similar scheme of classification is used by Morris Weitz, (ed.), Twentieth-Century Philosophy: The Analytic Tradition (New York: The Free Press, c1966), v. 3Phaedo 100d; R. Hackforth, translator. rose to be d». eany have ace used versions reporting, "1 and modif ica‘. philosophy 01‘ shall attempt have the fore This ; some of the r Wilment. S; actua1 Use 0: became of ti RPIOyed, I as“ that we fluenTial et applied the 'Qoodr. The r 4598 Of the \ 4 come to be designated as the Open Question Argument. So many have accepted the soundness of that argument and have used versions of it that a recent author was justified in reporting, "The Open Question Argument in various guises and modifications has become a stock-in-trade in the moral philosophy of the twentieth century."4 Nevertheless, as I shall attempt to show, the Open Question Argument does not have the force its proponents and users assume it to have. This paper is an attempt to clarify and to evaluate some of the "guises and modifications" of the Open Question Argument. Since an investigation of every instance of the actual use of the Open Question Argument is impractical because of the wide extent to which this argument has been employed, I shall limit my discussion to forms of the argu- ment that were used by two of the more prominent and in- fluential ethical theorists of the twentieth century as they applied the argument to purported analyses of the term 'good'. The Open Question Argument has been employed for many purposes. In order to keep this paper within manageable bounds, I have chosen to limit my investigation to certain uses of the Open Question Argument which purport to be 4George C. Kerner, The Revolution in Ethical Theory (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 16. refutations c naturalism. :at‘iralisn wi versions of I asong other I mean by natu refutations of a type of ethical theory known as ethical naturalism. Since what was taken as constituting ethical naturalism will be found to vary as we consider each author's versions of the Open Question Argument, I shall be concerned, among other things, with making explicit what both authors mean by naturalism in ethics. As a further limitation of the scope of my paper, I have chosen--perhaps arbitrarily—~to consider the Open Question Argument as it is applicable only to analyses of purported moral uses of the term 'good' although there have been those who used versions of the argument for the evalu- ation of analyses of other moral terms besides 'good'. For instance, I will not be concerned with applications of the Open Question Argument to attempts to naturalistically define 'right'. If we can get clear about the logic of the argument itself, what can be said concerning its application to purported analyses of 'good' can be applied mutatis mutandis to analyses of other terms, both moral and non-moral. Finally, I shall restrict my investigation of the Open Question Argument to its uses in selected writings of G. E. Moore and R. M. Hare where they are concerned with shOwing through applications of the argument that 'good' cannot be correctly analysed naturalistically. Moore shall be taken as a representative of the first stage described by vae, and Ha encompasses a in Princioia of this argur aeritical e 5i R. M. Har Both of the: Theory, WEI aretntatir Talism. I IN N SUCCessf Ryle, and Hare as a representative of the last. Since Moore encompasses all three stages, I shall limit my investigation to his earliest works. I shall begin with an exposition and evaluation of the Open Question Argument as it was employed by G. E. Moore in Principia Ethica. Although Moore was not the originator of this argument, he is its recognized popularizer.5 Next, a critical exposition of the Open Question Argument as used by R. M. Hare in The Language of Morals will be undertaken. Both of these works, landmarks in twentieth-century ethical theory, were concerned with presenting, among other things, a refutation of a type of ethical philosophy known as natu- ralism. The central thesis of this paper is that both were unsuccessful in refuting ethical naturalism by employing For historical progenitors of this argument, see Chapter IX, "The Naturalistic Fillacy: The History of Its Refutation," in Arthur N. Prior, Logic and the Basis of Ethics (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1949), pp. 95-107. Moore's most obvious predecessor in using the Open Question Argument is Richard Price whose Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals, published in the eighteenth century, contains "the same argument" concerning right: vide D. Daiches Raphael, The Moral Sense (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 1. Raphael credits Moore with having never read Price. Prior notes, p. 106, that Sidgwick's The Ethics of Green, Spencer and Martineau, published only a year before Principia Ethica, claimed that if good means pleasure, then pleasure is the ultimate good "would be a tautology and a tautology cannot be an ethical principle." Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics, mentioned by Moore in Principia Ethica, contains a similar statement on p. 109 of the seventh edition. versions of t is not to be of ethical n2: successful a; do not hold t that there he ref-ect ethica The Open Ques Convicrion: listic d to ask v definitf A Dutat questic raliStj versions of the Open Question Argument. My previous sentence is not to be taken as implying that I think that a refutation of ethical naturalism is necessarily dependent upon a successful application of the Open Question Argument, for I do not hold to that position. Nevertheless, I am convinced that there has been a tendency for some philosophers to reject ethical naturalism solely because they thought that the Open Question Argument was sound. Let me illustrate my conviction: A recent author has told us that: Moore's "open question" technique is famous; natura- listic definitions fail because it is not meaningless to ask whether something fulfilling the naturalistic definition is good. Another writer has stated: A putative analysans was required to pass the open question test or quit the scene. And . . . all natu- ralistic analyses were found wanting.7 Lastly, consider the following remarks by one of the twen- tieth-century's leading ethical theorists: No matter what set of scientifically knowable properties a thing may have (says Moore, in effect), you will find, on careful introspection, that it is an open question to ask whether anything having these properties is goo . It is difficult to believe that this recurrent question is a totally confused one, or that it seems open 6Rollo Handy, "Naturalistic Definition in Ethics and 'Common Usage'," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XVI (June, 1956), 540. 7William K. Frankena, "Moral Philosophy at Mid- Century," The Philosophical Review, LX (January, 1951), 49. only bec; must be If I can show guises and int: shoeing ethic that ethical :itimun, if j ethical natm ations other only because of the ambiguity of "good." Rather, we must be using some sense of "good" which is not definable, relevantly, in terms of anything scientifi- cally knowable.8 If I can show that the Open Question Argument in its "various guises and modifications" is not a sufficient condition for showing ethical naturalism to be a fallacy, then I hope that ethical naturalism may be reconsidered. At the very minimum, if I am successful, any purported refutation of ethical naturalism will have to appeal to some consider- ations other than the Open Question Argument for support. 8Charles L. Stevenson, "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms," Mind, XLVI (January, 1937), 18. G.E 2.1 'l ;-.. em 33’ employ unPllblisl the P1 in. be QR “Mural ab0ut Ill analytic In re es. ‘;EE:G.] “Retinal. t c (I) "r: (2) Cr (3) .. 3? Itat ls Wh TEC‘L 0f mu n, 1G. 5‘ Sity refe 2Ib CHAPTER II G. E. MOORE AND THE OPEN QUESTION ARGUMENT 2.1 The Intended Preface to the "Second Edition" of Principia Ethica. By employing some of Moore's own corrections in an unpublished manuscript, I give two central assertions of the Principia Ethica with which this chapter is to be concerned: (1) "Good is not identical with any natural . . . property," and (2) ". . . propositions about the good are all of them synthetic and never analytic." In the often-quoted section 6 of Chapter I of Principia Ethica, G. E. Moore draws at least the following three major inferences about "the only simply object of thought which is peculiar to Ethics."1 (1) "good is good" (2) Good "cannot be defined" (3) ". . . propositions about the good are all of them SYnthetic and never analytic. . . ."2 That is what Moore said, but what he meant has been the sub- ject of much dispute. But, fortunately, light was shed on 1G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 5; first published in 1905; here- after referred to as 'PE'. 21bid., pp. 6-7. Moore's mean; philosophy 9 Part I of th. finished man: Moore's meaning by the 1964 Dawes Hicks Lecture on philosophy given to the British Academy by C. Lewy.3 In Part I of that lecture, Lewy gave a synopsis of an un- finished manuscript of Moore's which was intended to have been a preface of a second edition of Principia Ethica.4 In this intended preface Moore claimed that he con- fused the assertion that "good is good" with the different assertion that "Good is simple in the sense of being in- definable or unanalysable."5 What did he originally mean by "good is good"? According to Lewy, quoting Moore, two meanings are possible: . . . either 'Good is different from everything other than Good' or 'Good is different from everything which we express by any word or phrase other than the word "good" I . 6 Moore then concluded that "good is good" is either "wholly trivial and unimportant" or "else obviously false."7 The 3C. Lewy, "G. E. Moore on the Naturalistic Fallacy," Proceedings g: the British Academy, L (1964), 251-62. 4In a letter dated August 4, 1970, Professor Lewy informed me that although "G. E. Moore's philosophical papers are not at present available for inspection," I could be assured that his summary given in Part I of the lecture is "very full & . . . accurate." Part of this section rests on the assumption that Lewy's lecture is indeed full and accurate. 5Lewy, pp. cit., p. 252. 6Ibid. 7Ibid., pp. 252—53. interpretatir than Good“ 1‘, . . . th. that is long to unanalys Thus it says tern 'good' . The interpre which We ex; 'good'" Can fact that If o'wOId 'desi ’good',vv9 900d" is (if consider 1‘ R, U} a Use 0: lO interpretation that "Good is different from everything other than Good" is trivial since . . . the property of being different from every property that is different from it, is a property which must be- long to every property without exception, analysable and unanalysable alike.8 Thus it says little to say of the property denoted by the term 'good' that it has a property which every property has. The interpretation that "Good is different from everything which we express by any word or phrase other than the word 'good'" can be seen to be false "quite apart from the obvious fact that there are languages other than English," for the "word 'desirable' is sometimes used as a synonym for 'good'."9 Since on either possible interpretation, "good is good" is discredited by Moore's own showing, I shall not consider it in this paper as one of the things to be proven by a use of the Open Question Argument in Principia Ethica. But what is the status of the claim that good is 31bid. 9Ibid., p. 253. It is worth pointing out that even in the Principia Moore gave synonyms for 'good'. Abraham Edel, "The Logical Structure of Moore's Ethical Theory," The Phi- losophy g: Q. E, Moore, Paul Arthur Schlipp, editor (second edition; vol. IV of The Library of Living Philosophers. New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1952), p. 138, indicated that Moore used 'intrinsic value', 'ought to exist', 'abso- 1utely good', 'good in itself', and 'ought to be' as synonyms for 'good'. Lan Freed, "A New Review of Principia Ethica," The Philosophical Quarterly, VI (October, 1956), 317, added 'worth having for its own sake' as an additional synonym. indefinable, ‘ Chapter I of F his intended a good is indefi whether good ; seen to him n: | hincinia. "10 x lished in the filmed. " What i {Rifles LEW}, Rdiural 01. ID! V {Good is un an Oil Moore) S C V‘ W, --i . Q Clte. ‘0 ustak 11 indefinable, the second of the inferences of Section 6 of r Chapter I of Principia Ethica cited above? Moore held in his intended second preface that "it is probably true" that gOod is indefinable in the sense of being simple, but whether good is definable or not in that sense "does not seem to him now nearly as important as it did when he wrote Principia."10 Thus I drop as one of the points to be estab- lished in the Principia the claim that good "cannot be defined." What Moore really intended to assert in the Principia, relates Lewy, was that "Good was not identical with any "11 natural or metaphysical property, and that that asser- tion "neither implies nor is implied by the proposition that Good is unanalysable."12 I take it then as being established on Moore's own testimony as reported by Lewy that the first two inferences from Section 6 of Chapter I of Principia Ethica cited above may be counted as either discredited or as mistaken attempts on Moore's part in trying to assert what, in his mind, was the central doctrine of the first part of the Principia, namely, the assertion that "Good is not identical with any natural or metaphysical property." 10Lewy,_9_p. cit., p. 252. 11 1 Ibid., p. 253. 2Ibid. support: (I) "Go (2) I lretain the is explicitlj knowledge, n; Ruargunents diargunents hatany proc Rh asucces I will 1 e ham: a modi 12 Thus we are now left with two major claims which, perhaps, the Open Question Argument may be invoked to support: (1) "Good is not identical with any natural or meta- physical property." (2) ". . . propositions about the good are all of them synthetic and never analytic." I retain the second claim from my original list because it is explicitly made in the Principia and, to the best of my knowledge, never rejected by Moore. Since Moore gave no new arguments for his assertions and did not comment on his old arguments in the intended preface,13 I shall assume that any proof of these assertions continues to rest 32 Bag: upon a successful application of the Open Question Argument. I will make one major modification in Moore's first claim, a modification by deletion. In order to tie my two authors together as much as possible, I have indicated that a common interest of theirs was to provide a refutation of ethical naturalism. Moore's first assertion shows that he wanted to refute both metaphysical and naturalistic ethics. JNevertheless I will not pursue Moore's use of the Open (maestion Argument as a tool for refuting any metaphysical ethics. I shall, instead, take Moore's first assertion to 13Ibid., p. 256. be "Good is n 2.2 I By making attempt ‘ refers t to denot. hibits a particul are firs EnPirice Psycholr identify emPiric; concept URlVeIS Moore 1 Particc arQue t C31 Wit Good (1 at all Wit ascertErin arguments like that I Can deg; property" it. More mea dune, it MODrgr S in ,. Ltemp 13 be "Good is not identical with any natural . . . property." 2.2 The Word 'Good' and 3 Concept 2: Goodness. By making use of several of Moore's early articles, I attempt to show what sort of thing it is that Moore refers to by the term 'good'. 'Good' is used by Moore to denote a concept, but Moore's early ontology ex- hibits at least five types of concepts. There are particular and universal concepts. Particular concepts are first divided into empirical and a priori concepts. Empirical concepts are further divided into intrinsic, psychologically causal and relational concepts. I identify the natural properties of the Principia with empirical concepts. Moore uses 'good' to denote an a priori concept, but at least two types of a_priori concepts are found: particular and universal. The universal a priori concept which 'good' denotes for Moore in the Principia is called 'Goodness (m)'; the particular a_priori concept is called 'Good (m)'. I argue that 'good' in the assertion "Good is not identi- cal with any natural . . . property" must denote Good (m), not Goodness (m), if it is to denote anything at all. With some philosophers it is relatively easy to ascertain their conclusions and then to see whether their arguments support their conclusions. But the case is not like that with Moore in this particular instance. Before I can decide whether the Open Question Argument supports the conclusion that "Good is not identical with any natural . . . property" it is first necessary to get clear about what Moore means by 'good' and 'natural property'. Until that is dOne, it will be impossible to ascertain whether or not Moore's argument supports his conclusion. This section is an attempt to get clear about what Moore means by 'good' and aid 'natura1 There has assune i' First, one rn failiar DOT haue t0 be i at least 071s :atural p10) interpreted uaierstandi assume that assunption attempting any nature be interpr Understand deiotatior I 14 and 'natural property'. There are at least two possible starting points one may assume in interpreting Moore's position in the Principia. First, one may assume that "natural property" is the more familiar notion. If this assumption is adopted, Moore will have to be interpreted as attempting to show that there is at least one concept denoted by 'good' which is not a natural property. From this starting point, Moore would be interpreted as attempting to provide the reader with an understanding of what he denoted by 'good'. Second, one may assume that "good" is the more familiar notion. If this assumption is adopted, Moore will have to be interpreted as attempting to show that that concept is not identical with any natural property. From this starting point, Moore would be interpreted as attempting to provide the reader with an understanding of what he means by 'natural property'. The denotation of 'good' is not to be explained since it is assumed we are already familiar with it. Both starting points are, in a sense, exaggerations; yet if we adopt the second perspective I am convinced that it will prove the more fruitful way of interpreting Moore. From this begin- ning we are expected to assume at the outset that we are already aware of that which 'good' denotes for Moore. What will need to be explained is what are natural properties. It seems to . hncrma th. his task is there is no ~ Ian section, 1 ‘ith the den fRina! wit aware of i t. M thing M0 In I concerned V busineSs w “Sage, as he will Us 15 It seems to me that Moore does in fact assume in the Principia that we are aware of the denotation of 'good'. His task is not to explain it; his task is to show that there is no natural property identical with it. I am adopting the second starting point in this section. I shall assume that the reader is already familiar with the denotation of 'good'. If the reader is not familiar with it, neither I nor Moore can make the reader aware of it. All that I can do is to point out the 512g of thing Moore held it to be, not what it is in fact. In the Principia Moore tells us that he is not concerned with analysing the word 'good'; neither is his business with giving a verbal definition of its "proper usage, as established by custom." He relates that although he will use the word in the sense in which he thinks it is ordinarily used, he is not anxious to discuss whether he is right in thinking it is ordinarily used in the way in which he is interested in discussing. As he tells us in the Principia: My business is solely with that object or idea, which I hold, rightly or wrongly, that the word is generally used to stand for. What I want to discover is the nature of that object or idea, and about this, I am extremely anxious to arrive at an agreement. 14PE, p. 6. Any the word ' caution is the neanin there is a used."15 did tell I ambiguous: number of L “Win h is 16 Any purported analysis of "the object or idea" which the word 'good' stands for needs to heed at the outset the caution issued by Ross in 1930 when he said that "a study of the meaning of 'good' . . . should begin by recognizing that there is a wide diversity of senses in which the word is used."15 Although Moore did not explicitly indicate in the Principia that 'good' may be used in several senses, he did tell us in another place that "the word 'good' is highly ambiguous: it is not only used, but correctly used, in a number of different senses."16 Lewy reports that Moore began his second preface by acknowledging that there are several senses of 'good' and he was concerned with only one of them in the Principia; Moore does not now think "that this sense can be called the ordinary sense of the word, 0 O O 17 even if any one sense of 1t is commoner than any other." 15W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 65. 166. E. Moore in a symposium with H. W. B. Joseph and A. E. Taylor, "Is Goodness a Quality?" The Aristo- telian Society, Supplementary Vol. XI (1932), 127. Many philosophers have agreed that the word 'good' is ambiguous. For example, see R. B. Braithwaite, "Verbal Ambiguity and Philosophical Analysis," Proceedings 2f the Aristotelian Societ , XXVII (1927-28), 136; A. C. Ewing, "A Suggested Non-naturalistic Analysis of Good," Mind, XLVIII (January, 1939), 5; Evander Bradley McGilvary, "The Summum Bonum," University pf California Publications in Philosophy, I (November 29, 1904), 1. 17Lewy,‘9_p. cit., p. 251. There’s late . . . an "good" i i9. sens about in have con senses. is just concerne sically Particul expressi 900d," interest by 190011" for Say: the ter Evaluate the is ruled Out CUTIESPODden 1 Go 1 . 'Od’ 1.9. ack”Oil’ledged 17 Moore's later revelation was that: . . . among the many different senses in which the word "good" is used, there is one particular sense which is the sense which I have been mainly concerned to talk about in my ethical writings. Perhaps I may sometimes have confused this sense with other closely allied senses. But I think it is true that, in the main, there is just one sense with which I have been principally concerned. I have often used the expression "intrin- sically good" as a synonym for "good," when used in this particular sense, and I have also sometimes used the expression "has intrinsic value" as a synonym for "is good," when "good" is used in this particular sense.18 Thus we see that we cannot discover the object of Moore's interest by attempting to discover the ordinary meaning of 'good', for 'good' has many ordinary meanings. That is to say, the term 'good' is ambiguous. However we may attempt to evaluate the analysis given in the Principia, one evaluation is ruled out: Moore's analysis is not to be judged by its correspondence with the facts of ordinary usage of the term 'good', i.e. that 'good' may be used in senses not explicitly acknowledged by Moore does not discredit his analysis; neither is it a discredit to his position to point out that the sense with which Moore was concerned is not the most common sense of the word 'good'.19 18G. E. Moore, "A Reply to My Critics," The Philosophy (If G. E. Moore, Paul Arthur Schlipp, editor (second edition; ‘Vol.. IV of The Library of Living Philosophers. New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1952), p. 554. 19Cf. ibid., pp. 570-71, where Moore said, "Principia does not use the words 'good,' 'right,' 'ought,' 'duty' in Once that ‘ioore is generali claims in ‘ ”business the word | hii mom: in the E linguisti( SEDSe 0f 1 ’good' is idERIiCal 18 Once we disabuse ourselves of the now-common notion that Moore was concerned with indicating how the word 'good' is generally used, we may come to take some of Moore's claims in the Principia literally. He did tell us that his "business is solely with that object or idea" which he holds the word 'good' "is generally used to stand for." It is not his concern to debate whether 'good"i§ so used that way: in the Principia Moore is not interested in the facts of linguistic usage. He is interested in only one possible sense of the word 'good'. And he wants to show that when 'good' is used in that sense, it is true that "Good is not identical with any natural . . . property." Moore intends to refer to something unique by his use of 'good' in the Principia. Since the term 'good' is ambiguous and since I wish to have an unambiguous expression to uniquely denote Moore's object of concern in the Principia I shall use the term 'Goodness (m)' to name that "object or idea". Several commentators have indicated that the Moore of the Principia held to a special theory of meaning, the any sense other than one in which they are used in common speech. . . . Thus in the case of 'good,' all that I did ‘was to assert (very likely wrongly), in the case of 233 of the senses in which that word is ordinarily used, that that sense was a simple notion: I was not assigning a new sense, which was a simple notion." the meaning aust look f c that does 'c say Goodness significance denotation c "object of t Although Moe sent did no end the not. auiss if I line being the COT) w OIted, 1 idea rep. i0r 19 20 According to this theory, a naming theory of meaning. term means what it names. Thus, if we wish to discover the meaning of 'good' with which Moore was concerned, we must look for the "object or idea" which it names. But what does 'good' in Moore's sense name? Verbally, I can say Goodness (m), but that does not tell us anything of significance. What is Goodness (m)? Moore refers to the denotation of 'good' by several terms: "object or idea,"21 .22 24 "object of thought,’ "notion,"23 "object or notion." Although Moore at this stage of his philosophical develop- ment did not always distinguish between the object named and the notion or idea named, I think that I will not be amiss if I drop the potentially misleading 'object' for the time being and refer to the object of Moore's interest as the concept denoted by the term 'good'; for, as Moore later reported, "In my usage, the analysandum must be a concept or idea, or proposition and not a verbal expression."25 Thus, 20For example, Barry R. Gross, Analytic Philosophy (New York: Pegasus, 1970), p. 43; Alan R. White, G. E. Moore? A Critical Exposition (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), pp. 39-40. 21PE, p. 6. 22Ibid., p. 5. 23 , 24 . Ib1d., p. 6. Ib1d. 25Moore, "A Reply to My Critics," pp. 663-64. John J. Fisher, "On Defining Good," The Journal 9£_Philosophy, LI (November 11, 1954), 732, in considering the procedure ie can ROW . in the PT in oscurrences of Moore's . in]. But b Particular hoore used 20 we can now say, if we assume the theory of meaning at work in the Principia, of the many concepts named by different occurrences of 'good', one of those concepts was the object of Moore's concern; that concept is the concept Goodness (m). But before we attempt to further identify that particular concept, it is necessary to get clear about how Moore used the word 'concept' at the time of the Principia. It would be an anachronism on our part if we inter- preted Moore's use of 'concept' to have the meaning normally attached to it today. For example, Gilbert Ryle has quite properly used 'concept' to refer to the function or use of an expression. Kerner defines 'concept' as "what is common to a range of instances of using a word or expression."26 Yet none of these designate (nor do they intend to designate) what Moore meant by 'concept' during the period in which the Principia was written. I shall now turn my attention to explaining what Moore meant by 'concept' for unless we know of Moore, held, "In spite of the fact that the analysandum and analysans must be verbally expressed, the analysis is not of words butrof concept and in terms of concept." George C. Kerner, The Revolution in Ethical Theory (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 10, argues persuasively that Moore must be interpreted as dealing with concepts and not with things or entities of any sort. And yet, as we shall soon see, "things and entities" are composed of concepts according to Moore's early ontology. 26Kerner, 22, cit., p. 10. that sort 0? be able to E from every r Herb. that m previously r 1899 paper of the ontoi Stoned up M: Judgment" i, . . . Ct leCtive M. P thought of thou a Ielat such a Change a Conce compOSe are thu a at, "It i. 21 what sort of things Moore took concepts to be we will not be able to adequately decide if Goodness (m) is different from every natural property. Herbert Hochberg has in my opinion correctly argued that Principia Ethica depends upon an ontological position previously outlined by Moore. As Hochberg said, "In Moore's 1899 paper 'The Nature of Judgment' we find . . . the origin . ,,27 of the ontology I attributed to Principia. . Hochberg summed up Moore's discussion of concepts in "The Nature of Judgment" in the following manner: . . . concepts are objective universals and not "sub- jective ideas." Among concepts we find red, this, and ‘ggfl. Propositions are composed neither of words nor of thoughts but of concepts. Concepts may also be objects of thought. But this merely means that they come into a relation with a thinker and are not dependent upon such a thinker. Further, concepts are incapable of change and hence are immutable. Existence . . . is also a concept. And, moreover, everything that exists is composed of concepts. Objects, as well as propositions, are thus composites of concepts. In the 1899 paper to which Hochberg refers, Moore tells us that, "It is necessary to regard the world as formed of 27Herbert Hochberg, "Moore's Ontology and Non-Natural Properties," The Review of Metaphysics, XV (March, 1962), 375. Hochberg's thesis is further developed in "Some Reflections on Mr. Nelson's Corrections," an essay prepared for E. D. Klemke, editor, Studies in the Philosophy 2: g. E. Moore (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), pp. 141-54. 28Hochberg, loc. cit. concepts accepts is the u . . . wh Concepts PIOduCEt T1 1137.8] 22 concepts. They are the only objects of knowledge."29 Moore accepts Bradley's argument that "the idea used in judgment is the universal meaning" as "conclusive . . . against those . . . who have treated the idea as a mental state."30 Concepts are "not a part of the content of our ideas, nor produced by any action of our minds."31 The concept is "not a mental fact, nor any part of a mental fact."32 A proposition or judgment is "composed not of words, nor yet of thoughts, but of concepts."33 Thus we can see that the ontological ultimates for Moore were concepts, but these concepts were not contents of any mind. Nevertheless Moore held that we can experience them directly. Moore seems to have been led to his position by considering, as the title of the article indicates, the nature of judgment. If concepts were psychological in nature, then judgment would be impossible Moore held, for we would never have any access to that for which the concept stood. Moore argued thusly: The theory would therefore seem to demand the completion of an infinite number of psychological judgments before any judgment can be made at all. But such a completion is impossible; and therefore all judgment is likewise ‘ 296. E. Moore, "The Nature of Judgment, Mind, VIII (1899), 182. 3°Ibid., p. 177. 311bid. 321bid., p. 179. 33 Ibid. inpossii this ab be some idea of From the ab assertions FEM" which position in Of the univ Which the w ately exper M001 ’9 of We iZPiIiCal C tissues Which CElnnc the wOrlci 2' the ConStis We“ ious 23 impossible. It follows, therefore, if we are to avoid this absurdity, that the "idea used in judgment" must be something other than a part of the content of any idea of mine. From the above remarks we can see that there are two major assertions to be gleaned from Moore's "The Nature of Judg- ment" which are important for our understanding of his position in the Principia: (l) The ultimate constituents of the universe are non-mind-dependent concepts, out of which the world is composed; (2) An individual can immedi- ately experience concepts.35 Moore held in "The Nature of Judgment" that concepts are of two types: empirical concepts and a priori concepts. Empirical concepts are those "which can exist in parts of time."36 By contrast, a_priori concepts are those concepts which cannot exist in an actual part of time.37 Although the world is formed of concepts, not all concepts enter into the constitution of the world. :5 priori concepts have "a precarious sort of existence."38 They exist, but they 34Ibid. 5Moore's celebrated "The Refutation of Idealism," which appeared in the same year as the Principia, was concerned to further argue for the proposition that the mind is directly related to concepts. 36Moore, "The Nature of Judgment," p. 187. 37_I_b.i_q. ’ p. 1890 381bido , p. 186. Although "given by El? giVer (n 24 do not "exist in an actual part of time."39 Examples of‘a priori concepts given by Moore are "attribute" and "two".40 Although all concepts, both a priori and empirical, are "given by experience," it is only empirical concepts which are given through perception.41 How Moore though we know a priori concepts is not given in "The Nature of Judgment." Since Moore did not give any positive statement on the status of a_priori concepts in his article but gave only a negative description, it is necessary to go to some of Moore's other works of the same period in order to attempt to further distinguish between a priori and empirical concepts. This distinction is necessary, for Goodness (m) will turn out to be an.a priori concept and natural preper- ties will turn out to be empirical concepts. An article by Moore written slightly before the Principia may help to understand Moore's difference between E priori and empirical concepts. In trying to explain how two things may be numerically different and still be con- ceptually identical, Moore presented a theory of universals in his article "Identity." In that article Moore held that two things may either be both numerically and conceptually 40 39Ibid., p. 189. Ibid., p. 186. 411bid., p. 183. or be nun. identical by saying always id; things are COlZlOfl PIG JUdgment,t the 5mg 9 C00C€ptg 1 Similar to C311}; iden r‘The Natur twain 9X mm‘3ricall that the)’ ”0019 PUts h; ; bUt DC haVe F 25 or be numerically different while being conceptually identical. The import of the second clause may be expressed by saying that "things which are indiscernible are not always identical."42 To hold that two numerically different things are indiscernible is to hold that the two things have common predicates. Or, in the language of "The Nature of Judgment," it is to say that the two things are composed of the same empirical concepts. To say that two things have a common predicate or to say that they have the same empirical concepts is to say "there exists in each a predicate exactly similar to that which exists in the other, but not numeri- cally identical with it."43 Or, again in the language of "The Nature of Judgment," it is to say that the two things contain exactly similar empirical concepts. What makes two numerically different empirical concepts exactly similar is that they stand in a certain relation to a third thing. As Moore puts his point: . . the fact that each of the things said so to be has a peculiar relation to a third thing, numerically but not conceptually different from them, which they have not to one another. This third thing is the Platonic idea, or, as we may now call it, the universal. And this third thing is not exactly similar to either 426. E. Moore, "Identity," Proceedings of the Aristo- .Eslégg Society, VI (1900—1901), 111. 431bid. of the thin 11.4 What is th tells us t versals (1: red ani t1 ness itge Th "EXistenc existenc‘ positing usto ad 10 adflil 26 of the particulars, just because there is no fourth thing to which it has the relation which they have to it.4 What is the ontological status of Moore's universals? He tells us that "it is at least doubtful" whether any uni- versals do exist, for ". . . it seems certain that this red and that red do exist, but very doubtful whether red- ness itself does."45 Thus we can see that in "Identity" Moore posited the "existence" of universals in addition to acknowledging the existence of the particulars of sense experience. The positing of universals seems to have been required to allow us to admit exactly similar things without thereby having to admit that exactly similar things were identical. I must admit that I find Moore's discussion of the relation between particulars and universals somewhat con- fusing. But at least this much seems certain: Moore holds that there are objects which we directly experience through perception: these are simply collections of empirical (fiancepts. Yet some of those collections contain properties ifliich are exactly similar to properties in other collections 0f empirical concepts. What makes those concepts exactly Sifltilar is the relation in which they stand with concepts of 441bid., p. 114. 45Ibid., p. 115. a differen lt . universals a priori 0 question ii it. But '1 31‘- essay w. 1922, a he an eXPansi in appear: (211331119 l identifie .‘i: COHCQPti Who 15 M3919 w. To the Wine in in EXp \ 27 a different sort, namely, to the universals of "Identity." It seems obvious to me that Moore holds that all universals are a priori concepts. But does he hold that all .3 priori concepts are universals? I find no answer to that question in the Principia or in any of his works preceding it. But in Moore's "The Conception of Intrinsic Value," an essay written between 1914 and 191746 and published in 1922, a negative answer is implied. This essay constitutes an expansion of Moore's early ontology, but I feel justified in appealing to it since Moore was still concerned with dis- cussing intrinsic value, a concept which the Principia identified with what I have called Goodness (m). Moore tried to characterise intrinsic value in "The "47 Conception of Intrinsic Value. Holding that intrinsic value is "a notion which is constantly in people's heads,"48 Moore went on to define intrinsic value: To say that a kind of value is "intrinsic" means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question. ‘TO explicate this definition Moore thought that he had to 46White, 22, cit., p. 22, gives this dating. 47G. E. Moore, "The Conception of Intrinsic Value," as painted in G. E. Moore, Philosophical Studies (Paterson, New Jersey: Littlefield Adams & C0,, 1959), pp. 253-75. 48 Ibid., p. 259. 491bid., p. 260. explain wh lhefact t L0t imply dws the it different 4 intrinsic r natures whe aml’ alike ankles, “P‘s. In; puperties the thing. relatiOns valuable p pgSitior] 1 If VOL pOSSes of it Value thing Drape We 1:11ng latrinsic \ 5( 28 explain what he meant by 'differing in intrinsic nature'. The fact that two things are numerically different "does 222 imply that they have different natures."50 Neither does the fact that two numerically different things have different external relations imply that they differ in intrinsic nature.51 Two things have identical intrinsic natures when they are exactly alike; what makes them ex- actly alike is, as we have learned from Moore's earlier articles, that they are composed of exactly similar con- cepts. The intrinsic properties of a thing would be those properties listed when one gave a complete description of 52 the thing. Yet such a listing need not include the relations into which the thing enters or the intrinsically valuable properties of the thing. Moore summarized his position thusly: If you could enumerate all the properties a given thing possessed, you would have given a complete description of it, and would not need to mention any predicates of value it possessed; whereas no description of a given thing could be complete which omitted any intrinsic property.53 ‘The import of this is, for Moore, that "predicates of ixrtrinsic value are not themselves intrinsic properties."54 50 , SI , Ib1d., p. 263. Ib1d., p. 271. 521bid., p. 274. 53Ibid. 54Ibid., pp. 274—75. Jus belonging to which a I. Irish to 600d (m) i. intrinsica 311 Good i3 0f Good (m! two Propos The intrin is "not it m that natures t degree or 9033mm “Elect m 1The it, intrinst 29 Just as Moore distinguished between red, the property belonging to an individual object, and redness, the universal to which all reds stand in "a peculiar nameless relation,"55 I wish to distinguish between Good (m) and Goodness (m). Good (m) is that property that a thing always has when it is intrinsically good; Goodness (m) is that universal to which all Good (m):s stand in "apeculiar nameless relation." Of Good (m), a predicate of intrinsic value, Moore held that two propositions are true: (1) Good (m) "does depend only on the intrinsic nature of what possesses it," and (2) Good (m) 56 It follows from is "not itself an intrinsic property." (1) that if any two objects have exactly similar intrinsic natures then either they both possess Good (m) to the same degree or they both lack Good (m) to the same degree; the possibility that Moore wished to rule out was that one (xfiect may be intrinsically good while another object exactly like it, though numerically different from it, may not be intrinsically good. At the same time he wanted to hold that Good (m) is not an intrinsic property. For the early Moore, a thing is composed of the tconcepts (properties) which make it up; there is no thing 55Moore, "Identity," p. 114. 6 . . . Moore, "The Conception of Intr1n51c Value," p. 273. apart from Value" 906 properties properties Nature of predicate Part of t has Where individua 13?? 0f p ”001:9 diC 'as Pan ( affjfiacy uniVerse 30 apart from the properties. "The Conception of Intrinsic Value" goes on to distinguish four different types of properties which a thing may have. They are (l) intrinsic properties which seem to be the empirical concepts of "The Nature of Judgment."57 There are also (2) subjective -predicates or properties which strictly speaking are not part of the object at all; they are the properties a thing has whereby it tends to bring about certain feelings in individuals. Perhaps an apt term to use to refer to this type of property is 'psychologically causal property'. Moore did not want to admit psychologically causal properties 'as part of an object's intrinsic nature because their efficacy is dependent on the causal laws at work in the universe and on the nature of the sentient beings being af- fected, both of which in changing may result in a "loss" of that objects psychologically causal properties. Such a loss Cfi'properties in Moore's view would not be a change in the intrinsic nature of the object.58 Hence psychologically causal properties are to be distinguished from intrinsic IIr0perties which depend upon what the thing is, not upon what :it does to something else. There are also (3) objective 57Vide ibid., pp. 260-65. 58Vide ibid., pp. 268—71. relational by a red r nature of Of intrins 'lhe Natur 0fva1ue, 0f dependi thenfitéo Pfoperties PrediCates differenu that he C: worth Tepi If, h VaIUe Fred 31 relational properties or predicates, such as being surrounded by a red ring, a change in which does not alter the intrinsic 59 nature of the object. Finally, there are (4) predicates of intrinsic value which seem to be the a priori concepts of "The Nature of Judgment." These properties, these predicates of value, share with intrinsic properties the "characteristic of depending only on the intrinsic nature of what possesses them."60 Since these predicates are not themselves intrinsic properties for Moore, there must be some difference between predicates of value and intrinsic properties, only what that difference is is hard to ascertain. Moore himself admitted that he could not "see what it is."61 Moore's own words are worth repeating here: If, however, we are thus to say that predicates of value, though dependent solely on intrinsic properties, are not themselves intrinsic properties, there must be some characteristic belonging to intrinsic properties which predicates of value never possess. And it seems to me quite obvious that there is; only I can't see what it is. It seems to me quite obvious that if you assert of a given state of things that it contains a balance of pleasure over pain, you are asserting of it not only a different predicate, from what you would be asserting of it if you said it was "good"--but a predicate of quite a different kind; and in the same way that when you assert of a patch of colour that it 59Ibid., p. 271. Moore is, in part, taking exception tr) Bradley's claim in Appearance and Reality that all relations are intrinsic. 60Ibid., p. 273. 61Ibid., p. 274. is "ye differ kind, This pass;1 tations: ness is of (1!), OI h a differen W I in Cannot be Confusion lt Stems fro at least Concepts the Part held to U3ac‘i‘P'ts are Uni. 32 is "yellow," the predicate you assert is not only different from "beautiful," but 82 quite a different kind, in the same way as before. This passage is subject to at least two possible interpre- tations: Moore may be asserting that the universal yellow- ness is of a different kind than is the universal Goodness (m). Or he may be asserting that a particular yellow is a different kind of particular than is a particular Good (m). I incline to the latter interpretation, but the former cannot be ruled out at this stage. This potential source of confusion appears often in Moore's early writings. It seems to me that much of this potential confusion stems from Moore's failure to realize that he has posited at least two and perhaps three different types ofla'priori concepts in his early ontology. On the one hand, there are the particular a priori concepts such as Good (m) which are held to be different in kind from particular empirical Concepts such as this yellow. On the other hand, there are universal a priori concepts such as yellowness (and .Perhaps Goodness (m)) which are contrasted with particular «concepts of any sort, whether the particular concepts be 2 Eriori or empirical. Moore perhaps admits as a third {Massibility, although I am not sure that this point can be ézlbido , pp. 273‘740 conclusive which are For refere u lue unit sals. If least hay tQ‘LWeen ( {3) Stan: differen then doe Willie m- Versal. versals higher whiCh t 33 conclusively established, universals of intrinsic value which are contrasted with universals such as yellowness. For reference, let me call the former universals a priori value universals and the latter, a_priori non-value univer— sals. If such a distinction be adopted then Moore would at least have a verbal means of telling what the difference is between Good (m) and, say, yellow: He could hold that Good (m) stands in "a peculiar nameless relation" to not only a different universal but to a universal of a different type than does yellow. The former is related to an‘a priori value universal; the latter, to an'a priori non-value uni- versal. But in order to distinguish between types of uni- versals would we not need to posit universals of yet a higher type and thus get ourselves into all the difficulties which the third man argument posed for Plato's original theory of universals? If Moore meant to assert in the passage which I cited above that the universal Goodness (m) is of a different type than is the universal yellowness, no 'wonder he failed to see what the difference is. I began this section by indicating that Moore was concerned with a concept of good and not with the word i900d}. But now we have discovered a plethora of conceptual kinds inherent in Moore's early writings. At the very mininnim there are (1) empirical concepts, (2) particular a m cor do the sui propertie. this scher different aplicit fipiriCal Particula i2} Objec Causal Cc aIet0 be ‘5) ShOuj "Vision M Given the thefirs- In th e 3 natural ‘ intiue- %b90 1y fit ti hwflp \ 6. 34 priori concepts, and (3) universal a priori concepts. Where do the subjective properties and psychologically causal properties of "The Conception of Intrinsic Value" fit into this scheme? It seems to me that they must be included as different types of empirical concepts although Moore is not explicit on this point. But if we do characterize these as empirical concepts, then we must identity four types of particular concepts: (1) intrinsic empirical concepts, (2) objective relational concepts, (3) psychologically causal concepts, and (4) a priori concepts, all of which are to be contrasted with (5) universal concepts. Perhaps (5) should be further divided as I indicated above but that division is not necessary for my immediate purpose. What properties are natural properties for Moore? Given the five types of concepts that I have just enumerated, the first three are held by Moore to be natural properties. In the Principia, Moore contrasted metaphysical objects with natural objects. Natural objects are those which "can exist in time--can have duration, and begin and cease to exist-— can be objects of perception."63 These descriptions certain- 1y fit the empirical concepts of "The Nature of Judgment." ‘Ah example of an objective relational concept——"more 63PE, p. 14. evolved"-- natural pr cerned wit causal prc A < clain tha Cfiutepts Dispertie want by | Wheth as l( as p: Willt 0the the natu ThOS decl thin Green ar “Cent 1 1310qu t: Contept logic a1 01 I913 \ 35 evolved"--is given in chapter II of the Principia as a natural property. Chapter III of the Principia is con- cerned with a natural property which is a psychologically causal property. A citation from Moore may further substantiate my claim that empirical concepts, psychologically causal concepts and objective relational concepts are all "natural properties." Moore gave a general description of what he meant by a naturalistic ethical theory when he said: Whether good be defined as yellow or green or blue, as loud or soft, as round or square, as sweet or bitter, as productive of life or productive of pleasure, as willed or desired or felt; whichever of these or of any other object in the world, good may be held to mean, the theory which holds it to mean them, will be a naturalistic theory. Those theories of Ethics, then, are 'naturalistic' which declare the sole good to consist in some one property of things which exist in time. . . .64 Green and blue seem to be intrinsic empirical concepts if we accept Moore's position in "The Nature of Judgment." Productive of life seems to be an objective relational Concept, while productive of pleasure seems to be a psycho— IOgically causal concept. Loud and soft, depending on how One evaluates Locke and Berkeley, could be either intrinsic (fir relational empirical concepts. It is with natural 64Ibid., pp. 70,71. properties with the ( For Soflething Jeans the pane in ti natural , ‘good' Dar home's 0‘ Afluent ‘ lhfiuenti “out no, 9'71 assum the f0Ice It for Moon the P053: concepts 31.11 if w Che 0f t 36 properties of these sorts which Moore wanted to contrast with the denotation of 'good'. For Moore, as I indicated above, a word must name something in order for that word to be meaningful: the word means the concept it names. What does Moore's use of 'good' name in the conclusion that "Good is not identical with any natural . . . property"? It may, of course, be asked if 'good' names anything at all, but it is clear that in Moore's own view it does.65 Since it is the Open Question Argument as based on Moore's early view that has been so influential in twentieth-century ethical theory, I shall adopt Moore's own view in order to show how, even on Moore's own assumptions, the Open Question Argument does not have the force which it has been taken to have. If we are not familiar with that which 'good' denotes for Moore, we would not be able to rule out at the outset the possibility that it may be any of the five types of concepts which I have extracted from Moore's early writings. But if we do know what it is, we may rule out that it is One of the first three types. Whether or not we know what ésyggg White, 92. cit., pp. 46-47, where he cites IE?ferences to show that although Moore eventually gave up ‘xls early view that the meaning of a term is the concept nanled by that term, as late as 1942 Moore still held to the view that 'good' names. it is at J least he c natural p exist in 1 tation of The only c or is it a Moore assq «a. prop W cor pTOPEIty, l concep.C G( Property? With the l conqude . with 600d Moore Was in) be is he 37 it is at the outset, Moore claims to know himself. At least he can say what it is not: it is not any type of natural property. It is not the sort of thing which "can exist in time"; it is not "a part of nature."66 The deno- tation of 'good' for Moore must then be an'a priori concept. The only question is, is it a particular a priori concept or is it a universal a_priori concept? That is to ask, when Moore asserts that "Good is not identical with any natural . . . property," is Moore asserting that the particular a priori concept Good (m) is not identical with any natural property, or is he asserting that the universal a priori concept Goodness (m) is not identical with any natural property? Although Moore does indicate that he is concerned with the universal concept,67 nevertheless I think we must conclude that in the particular assertion under consider- ation that Moore was concerned with a particular cencept, with Good (m). If we assume for the sake of argument that Moore was concerned with showing that the universal Goodness (m) is not identical with any natural property, Moore would be open to two charges: the charges of triviality and the Charge of holding a question to be open when it is in fact Closed. 66PE, p. 110. 671bid., p. 111. It property. overly 5: spots of tinction not a na‘ are hatu signiric is not a Ufllversa A '30‘35 not h’Oltted 1' 'good' w PIOperty The 91195 defined never n linvolved central )1 an open . \ 6; 38 If Moore claimed that "Goodness (m) is not a natural property," he would have made a statement which is not overly significant. Moore distinguished between individual spots of red and the universal redness. When that dis- tinction is made, it follows that the universal redness is not a natural property: it is a universal, and no universals are natural properties.68 Thus it would not be overly significant to assert of the universal Goodness (m) that it is not a natural property; such an assertion is true of any universal. A question is open when the answer to that question does not depend solely upon the meaning of the terms in— volved in asking that question.69 If the denotation of 'good' were Goodness (m) in the question "Is good a natural property?" then that question would not be an open question. The question would not be open because Goodness (m) was defined as a universal concept, and universal concepts are never natural properties. The very meaning of the words involved in asking the question closes the question. Yet a Central point of the early part of the Principia was to show ‘that a question such as "Is good a natural property?" is EDD open question. If 'good' in that question denoted Ibid. 691bid., p. 44. Goodness question. I t not ident: anything i Goodness I Th1 IT has 59 the conter Or not is ; if we 11k. Object: 1.; 3' all 9| : . rhi 39 Goodness (m), then the question would not be an open question. I conclude that if 'good' in the assertion "Good is not identical with any natural . . . pr0perty," is to denote anything at all, it must denote Good (m); it cannot denote Goodness (m). Thus I can now drop all references to Goodness (m). It has served its purpose in attempting to explain what is the content of Moore's claim. Whether Goodness (m) exists or not is superfluous to the scope of my paper. We could, if we like, assign Goodness (m) the status of an ideal object: ideal objects or those "objects" which may not exist at all, either in or out of time.70 Thus we are left with only one possibile denotation for 'good' in Moore's claim: it must denote Good (m) if it denotes anything at all. I have been concerned in this section with showing the kind of thing which occupied Moore's interest in the Egjncipia. I have referred to it as 'Good (m). But I have not yet said what Good (m) is. The term 'Good (m)' may be empty. Whether it is possible to discover a meaning for 7QCf. G. E. Moore, "The Value of Religion," Inter- lfiigional Journal of Ethics, XII (1901), 98, for two examples Of' ideal objects. that terr I be Good nean intu give as a atte Good nece I cc any 40 that term is the topic of the next section of this paper. 2.3 Can We Intuit Good (m)? I begin by noting that if we are to become aware of Good (m) we must intuit it. I indicate what Moore means by 'intuition' and the limits assigned by him to intuition as a proof-procedure. Following a suggestion given by Kerner,;£flinterpret the Open Question Argument as a potential heuristic device for one to employ in attempting to intuit Good:km) when he is not aware of Good (m). I show that the Open Question Argument necessarily fails as a heuristic device of discovery. I conclude that Moore has not shown that there is even any such thing as Good (m). At the time of his writing the Principia, Moore held that we can immediately perceive empirical concepts: We may directly experience this particular blue and that particular blue. That we do directly experience particular material objects is the central thesis of his "The Refutation of Idealism," where Moore asserted, "I am as directly aware of the existence of material things in space as of my own "71 sensations. . These material things are direct objects of perception. In this context, 'perception' refers to the testimony of the senses. Do we perceive Good (m)? J. M. Keynes' remembrances of Moore may lead one to think that Moore held that we do. E?or Keynes said of Moore that: 716. E. Moore, "The Refutation of Idealism," Mind, XII (1903), 433. iohe. took solid Love, tru goodness {it}: GO: then. I. COUCept, EXPerier 41 . . . even when he was awake, he could not distinguish love and beauty and truth from the furniture. They took on the same definition of outline, the same stable, solid, objective qualities and common sense reality. Love, truth and beauty are all things which possess intrinsic goodness in Moore's View, but they are not themselves Good (m): Good (m) is that property that belongs to each of them. If Good (m) is, as I have tried to show, an‘a priori concept, it is not the kind of thing that we can sensibly experience through perception, for it is not the kind of thing which can exist in time. And only things which exist in time can be objects of perception. How, then, do we come to know Good (m)? Moore's position is often referred to as ethical intuitionism,73 but a careful reading of Moore will reveal that in his usage the w0rd'intuition' usually did not describe how one came to eMIPerience Good (m) or any other intuitive object. His point was primarily negative: it was to show how we did not come to 72Cited by John 0. Nelson as reprinted in Klemke (ed.), Studies 32. the Philoscmhy of Q. E. Moore, 22. 91.1., I). 139. Nelson's article, "Mr. Hochberg on Moore: Some chDrrections," was originally published in The Review of Ekstaphysics, XVI (1962), 119—32. . 73For instance, an early article by J. G. Riddell on Moore's ethical theory was entitled "The New Intuitionism of Dr. Rashdall and Dr. Moore," The Philosophical Review, XXX (rVOMember, 1921), 545-65. See also the classic article by - F. Strawson, "Ethical Intuitionism," Philosophy, XXIV (~Ianuary, 1949), 23-33. how 600 support oion" 51c strong c evidence this ar‘ he hing. ‘See' i empiric .‘iOOIe ' S 42 know Good (m). Several textual examples can be given to support my claim. In a 1901 article "The Value of Reli- gion" Moore equates intuition with faith, where faith is a strong conviction on the part of a person when there is no evidence for that conviction. Although Moore does speak in this article of a person who "sees" that God exists which he himself does not "see", the context makes it clear that 'see' is not being used to describe the normal process of empirical perception which is usually referred to as seeing. Moore's own words are these: If a man still believes that God exists, he cannot support his belief by any appeal to facts admitted both by himself and the infidel. He must not attempt to prove that God probably exists; for that is im- possible. He must be content to affirm that he sees as clearly that God exists as he sees that he himself does. Many people, I admit, may really have had this strong conviction. And many people may be content to justify belief upon this ground alone. They, I think, are right. Their position is quite unassailable. . . . In fact, if I were the only person who could not see that God exists, and all the world agreed with you, it would yet be just as likely that I was right, as that you and all the world were right. It is equally likely we are right and equally likely we are wrong; but only equally. I have no more right to argue that probably God does not exist, because I cannot see he does, than you to argue that probably he does exist, because you see he does. This is all I have tried to show, when I maintain there is no evidence for God's existence. It is mere faith, not proof, which justified your state~ ment: God exists. Your belief is right, because you cannot help believing and my unbelief is right, because I have not got that intuition. We are both justified by mere necessity.7 74Moore, "The Value of Religion," pp. 94—95. Several p the above iSa "rig hamd,i nMogicai neither a tube the Of One Wi‘; Che. In the folio We ha DIOpo may s Iefut merel dOes 43 Several points concerning an intuition are made by Moore in the above passage. First, an intuition is not a proof; it is a "right belief" that one holds in the absence of proof. Second, incompatible intuitions are on an equal episte- mological footing: neither are necessarily veridical and neither are necessarily false. Third, an intuition seems to be the result of psychological necessity, the necessity of one who cannot help believing that such and such is the case. In Moore's 1903 article "The Refutation of Idealism" the following passage occurs: We have, then, in gssg is percipi, a necessary synthetic proposition which I have undertaken to refute. And I may say at once that, understood as such, it cannot be refuted. If the Idealist chooses to assert that it is merely a self-evident truth, I have only to say that it does not appear to me to be 50.75 Although the word 'intuition' does not appear in this passage, I think that it is clear that Moore wishes to identify what he earlier called an intuition with what is being referred to as "merely a self-evident truth," for later in the paragraph he refers to a "truth" of this sort as "a perfectly unfounded assumption," the sort of charac- teristic which intuitions had been asserted to have. The way of dealing with intuitions with which one does not 75Moore, "The Refutation of Idealism," p. 440. ——_ agree is is that absence Moore '3 nor an Wk it 44 agree is according to the passage just cited to report: '8 . . it does not appear to me to be so." The major point is that a self-evident truth is one held to be true in the absence of proof. So is an intuition. Self-evidence, from Moore's viewpoint, cannot be refuted; neither is it a proof, nor an unfailing sign of truth. The following passage occurs in Moore's second major work in ethical theory: It does seem to me to be evident that no voluntary action can be both right and wrong; and I do not see how this can be proved by reference to any principle which is more certain than it is itself. If, therefore, anybody asserts that the contrary is evident to him . . . I do not see how it can be proved that he is wrong. If the question is reduced to these ultimate terms, it must, I think, simply be left to the reader's inspection. Like all ultimate questions, it is incapable of strict proof either way.7 Again the word 'intuition' does not appear, but the gist of Moore's position is similar to that given above: To hold that a view is self-evident is to hold that view to be incapable of proof. When two persons disagree on what is self-evident, there are no further grounds for appeal. The question of who is correct is left to "inspection." When we come to the Principia itself, the word 'intuition' is used in at least two different senses, as 766. E. Moore, Ethics (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 54; first published in 1912. was prope In one se reason ca such a ju (P. 59): there bei this sens indgaents ’iUtUi‘tio aPQISon' judgments faculty a "Psycholo Slich jUdg onat int inmirror that the intuitiOr Wt 45 was properly indicated in the Index of that work (p. 229). In one sense, a judgment is held to be intuitive when no 77 Moore holds that reason can be given for that judgment. such a judgment "must be rested solely on its self-evidence" (p. 59), as "not amenable to direct proof" (p. 74), and there being "no reasons which prove its truth" (p. 144). In this sense, being an intuition is a characteristic of the judgments themselves. But there is a second sense of 78 'intuition' to be found in the Principia. In this sense, a person's intuition is the faculty whereby he arrives at judgments of certain types. But not all dictates of the faculty are intuitions in the first sense. Intuitions in a "psychological sense" are judgments held without reasons, but such judgments can at least sometimes be shown to be false.79 Other intuitions arrived at by employing the faculty of intuition cannot be shown to be true or false.80 It appears that the faculty of intuition yields two different types of intuitions. What are we to make of this muddle of intuitions? 77229.2 PE. pp. 59. 74, 144, 148. 78Vide ibid., pp. 75-77, 79, 144, 148. 79 Ib1d., pp. 148, 108. 801bid., pp. 75, 144. Moore's : passages sometimes at all; s false, b; But there Such jun- U iniUitiv- l Wh.Ch is i” Princ: 33? be t1 f0: Cert; "9 Can 9; "It Seem, SUQh to . affirm 0 46 hkmwe's general position may be induced from the above passages to obtain something such as the following: We sometimes do make judgments for which we offer no reasons at all; such judgments may in fact be demonstrably true or false, but we choose to offer no reasons for our judgment. Such judgments could, if we wish, be called intuitive. But there is a philosophically more interesting kind of, intuitive judgment: that kind of intuitive judgment we make which is based on no reason at all because no reason can in principle be given for our judgment. Such judgments may be true or they may be false, but we can never ascertain for certain what their truth values are. The only support we can give for judgments of this type are reports such as: "It seems to me to be so; my faculty of intuition affirms such to be the case. Those whose faculties of intuition affirm otherwise have as much right to their intuitions as I do. I cannot prove that my intuition is correct; I can only try to convince." Such, in fact, seems to be Moore's position when he stated in one place that his intuition denied that which Sidgwick's affirmed: Moore realized that he could not prove his own intuition to be correct or Sidgwick's false; the most he could do was to try to present "considerations capable of determining the intellect." When intuitions differ, one must resort to convincing the t’i opponent position to The ma fact that Moore pu. banner : AIWai stoId WOIl( 0utv< I G001 (H1) Can do 1‘ At least 47 opponent of the truth of one's position; proving one's position is impossible.81 Such a state of affairs is admittedly unsatisfactory. The unsatisfactoriness in Moore's opinion results from the fact that there is no sure way of arriving at agreement. Moore put the difficulty with this view in the following manner: . . . our dissatisfaction in these cases is almost always of the type felt by the poor lunatic in the story. 'I said the world was mad,‘ says he, 'and the world said that I was mad; and, confound it, they outvoted me.’82 I have not explained how it is that one comes to know Good (m) on Moore's showing. Indeed I cannot. All that I can do is to say that we intuit it if we know it at all. At least this much can be said with assurance, we do not perceive Good (m) through the senses. Moore certainly held that he could intuit Good (m). And he further held that any one could intuit it if a certain procedure be followed. The recommended procedure 811bid., p. 75; cf. p. 77. 8?;21Q., PP- 75-76. Cf. the previously cited pass- age from p. 94 of "The Value of Religion": "In fact, if I 'Were the only person who could not see that God exists, and all the world agreed with you, it would yet be just as likely that I was right, as that you and all the world were right. It is equally likely we are right and equally likely ‘we are wrong." is a for: 48 is a form of the Open Question Argument. That there is such a thing as what I have called Good (m) can be shown, Moore held, by "a simple appeal to facts." The facts to which appeal is to be made are expressed in the following passage: But whoever will attentively consider with himself what is actually before his mind when he asks the question 'Is pleasure (or whatever it may be) after all good?“ can easily satisfy himself that he is not merely wondering whether pleasure is pleasant. And if he will try this experiment with each suggested definition in succession, he may become expert enough to recognise that in every case he has before his mind a unique object, with regard to the connection of which with any other object, a distinct question may be asked. Every one does in fact understand the question 'Is this good?‘ When he thinks of it, his state of mind is different from what it would be, were he asked 'Is this pleasant, or desired, or approved?' It has a distinct meaning for him, even though he may not recognise in what respect it is distinct. Whenever he thinks of 'intrinsic value,' or 'intrinsic worth,' or says that a thing 'ought to exist,' he has before his mind the unique object—-the unique property of things--which I mean by 'good'. Everybody is constantly aware of this notion, although he may never become aware at all that it is different from other notions of which he is also aware.83 TWO major claims are made in this passage: that 'Good (m)' does denote something, and that that which is denoted is "a unique object." I have already made reference to Moore's own later remarks about the ambiguities inherent in referring (to the uniqueness of Good (m), which may be interpreted 83PE, 16-170 P” t as either hinself 2 that aha“ pressibl; tigate t: 81 in this E- the latt. 0r "intri Glist. n 49 as either trivial or as a false statement. Since Moore himself admitted confusion on this point when he told us that what he wanted to prove in the Principia is not ex- pressible by saying 'Good (m)' is unique',84 let us inves- tigate the other claim made in the cited passage. Strictly speaking, there are two procedures suggested in this passage, both heuristic in nature. I will consider the latter one first: We are to think of "intrinsic value" or "intrinsic worth" or we are to say that a thing "ought to exist." But what is it that we are to think of when we think of, say, "intrinsic value"? Moore quite properly put that phrase in quotation marks, for it is not clear at all what it is that we are to think of when we think of "intrinsic value". Is it the expression 'intrinsic value'? Well, it is a nice expression with fourteen letters, but thinking of that expression does not help to discover what Good (m) is. Perhaps we are instructed to think of what 'intrinsic value' names. But that instruction either begs the question at issue or else it does not help us at all. The question begged is that 'intrinsic value' has one and only one meaning and that we are aware of that meaning. Why should we assume at the outset that 'intrinsic value' is unambiguous? The 84Lewy, op. cit., pp. 252-53. Hedonis concept instru< value‘ not in: We are ‘intri Good ( wtat G SO Hedonist, for example, may legitimately hold on Moore's concept denotation theory of meaning that he is being instructed to think of pleasure, of that which 'intrinsic value' denotes for the Hedonist. But Moore is certainly not instructing one to think of pleasure. Perhaps then we are being instructed to think of what Moore names by 'intrinsic value'. What does the expression name for Moore? Good (m). Is he then telling us that if we want to know what Good (m) is, the way to find out is to think of Good (m)? If so, and I can see no other plausible interpretation to the instruction, that procedure certainly does not seem very helpful. In so far as the other expressions cited by Moore are synonymous with 'intrinsic value' then it is of no help to be told to think of what they name. We need to know at the outset what they name, which is what Moore's procedure purportedly is designed to aid us in discovering. I conclude then that the latter procedure given in the cited passage does not function in such a way as to allow one who is unfamiliar with Good (m) to experience it. If a person does not know Good (m), then that procedure is useless: it is tantamount to telling a person to think of 'Good (m) when he is trying to discover if there be any such thing as Good (m) to think of at all. If a person is aware of Good (m), then the procedure is superfluous. But there version be looke device,8 011 Moore become a (1) ASSe Ask 'Is differen 51 is also another heuristic procedure given in the cited passage. The first part of the above passage contains a version of the Open Question Argument which, though it could be looked upon as a proof, may be interpreted as a heuristic device.85 This utilization of the argument is an attempt on Moore's part to provide a procedure whereby a person may become aware of Good (m). The procedure is as follows: (1) Assert of some X that it is identical with good. (2) Ask 'Is X good?‘ (3) Repeat the above steps by giving different substitution values to 'X'. The outcome of this procedure should be, if Moore is correct, one's becoming aware of Good (m). Several explanatory comments regarding this pro— cedure should be made: (A) It is possible, given Moore's position in "Identity" for X and "good" to be conceptually identical 86 without supposing them to be numerically identical. But it seems that if we assume Moore's ontology from the time 85This is the interpretation given by Kerner, 22° cit., p. 21. 86Moore admitted later that he was mistaken in holding in the Principia that the 'is' in assertions of the form 'X is good' is always the 'is' of identity; vide Lewy, gp.‘gi£., p. 225. 0f the impiis ident us th that conce‘ Wheth to be Will ident are n are n 9001" "900d F0: 1 Could with thEn, at no we re: then ‘ 301 t( It is 52 of the Principia that we must hold that numerical identity implies conceptual identity, while holding that conceptual identity does not necessarily imply numerical identity. Let us then adopt the weaker interpretation: When we assert that 'X is good' we are only asserting that X and "good" are conceptually identical and are leaving open the question whether they are numerically identical. For if it turns out to be the case that they are not conceptually identical, it will follow quite readily that they are not numerically identical; while if it turns out to be the case that they are not numerically identical, it will not follow that they are not conceptually identical. (B) If we intepret the 'is' in the assertion 'X is good" as expressing conceptual identity between X and "good" it follows quite readily that X must be a concept. For if X is a thing, a composite of concepts, then "good" could not be identical, either conceptually or numerically, with X. Since 'good' is held by Moore to denote a concept, then, if 'X' denotes a composite of concepts, "good" could at most be a part of X and thus not identical with X. If ‘we remember that for Moore a thing is a composite of concepts then we can readily see that if the assertion 'X is good' is not to be a category mistake, 'X' must denote a concept if it is to be potentially identical with "good". Further, ’X' must particul be poten universa kind of thus the Particul '9 are i Pal'ticul 53 'X' must not only not denote an object, it must denote a particular concept and not a universal concept if it is to be potentially identical with "good". If 'X' denoted a universal concept, then it could not in principle be the kind of thing identical with the particular concept Good (m). Thus the substitution instances of the variable 'X' must be particular concepts. For the first step of the procedure we are instructed to take a proposed identification of some particular concept with "good". (C) But what is "good" that we are to identify with X? It is not enough to say Good (m), for that is again begging the question. Neither will it help us to simply pronounce the judgment 'X is good" if we once admit that 'good' is ambiguous. If we assume-—and I think this is a correct assumption--that 'good' is ambiguous and assume further with Moore that its ambiguity consists in the fact that the word denotes more than one concept, then we have no guarantee that our assertion verbally expressed as 'X and good are identical' is the judgment Moore instructs us to make. This form of the Open Question argument is defective in the first instance because unless we are already aware of 'Good (m) we cannot be sure that it is Good (m) which we are asserting to be identical with X., For all we know, we may be using 'good' to denote a concept other than Good (m). Thus, alrea disco fornu did a Thus with the 3 ix}. is so ful b 54 Thus, in order to utilize Moore's heuristic device we must already know that which the device purportedly helps us in discovering. Let me illustrate this point further: Instead of formulating this version of the Open Question Argument as I did above, let me replace the word 'good' by 'Good (m)'. Thus the argument becomes: (1) Assert that 'X is identical with Good (m)'. (2) Ask 'Is X Good (m)?' (3) Repeat the above steps by giving different substitution values for 'X'. The same outcome should be expected if this procedure is sound. But for the assertion given in (2) to be meaning- ful by Moore's theory of meaning, the assertor must at the outset be aware of Good (m); otherwise he could not even meaningfully make the assertion or ask the question in (2). If such be the case, then the Open Question Argument as a heuristic device may help one to see that Good (m) is different from other concepts; it, on this interpretation, certainly does not provide a procedure for one's becoming aware of Good (m) when he is not already aware of it. There is, as far as I can see, only one interpre- tation of this version of the Open Question Argument which allows it to be both heuristically helpful and non-question- begging: Meaningfully say the sentence 'X is identical with Good (m). Meaningfully ask the question 'Is X Good (m)?' Repea' for ‘i to us instr 03158 C010 COUCI 55 Repeat the above steps giving different substitution values for 'X'. To meaningfully say the words 'X' and 'Good (m)' is to use them to name some concept or concepts. Thus the instructions tell us to let a substitution value of 'X' name some concept and to let 'Good (m)' name some concept, and then to assert that those two concepts are identical. In so far as 'intrinsic Value' and the other synonyms given by Moore for 'Good (m)' are not allowed to be substitution instances for 'X', the claim is that we will always discover that the concept denoted by 'X' is not identical with the concept denoted by 'Good (m)'. If we do discover the concepts to be identical, then Moore would have to hold that we are not using 'Good (m)' as 22 is using it. This procedure does not tell how to use 'Good (m)'; it tells how not to use it. In so far as there is an identity of concepts to be found, we are not using 'Good (m)' as Moore did. I have tried to make the expression 'Good (m)' un- ambiguous: either it denotes one and only one particular concept, or it has no denotation. The point at issue is which alternative is correct. Moore gives a procedure whereby one purportedly can come to discover that the 'exPression does have a denotation. But when we are instruct- ed to omit 'intrinsic value' and the other synonyms for ”Sood (m)' as substitution values for 'X' the procedure is vitiater that ‘it unaubigt concept. could be did Mood concept ConCept given b; is MOOIQ Eten apfi Starlees, Quest ion telling ”We h. notion . w 56 vitiated of its force. For it has not yet been established that 'intrinsic value' and the other synonyms are themselves unambiguous, that they denote one and only one particular concept. It is not altogether inconceivable that a person could be using those expressions in a different sense than did Moore. The force of my objection is that although a concept may be found which is not identical with a particular concept denoted by 'intrinsic value' and the other synonyms given by Moore, we still have no guarantee that that concept is Moore's Good (m); we may not be meaning by 'intrinsic value' what Moore means by it. Thus we must already be aware of Good (m) in order to even apply Moore's procedure in more than just a few in- stances. This, I think, is a telling objection to the Open Question Argument as a heuristic device, but it is not yet a telling objection against Moore's position. For, of Good (m), Moore hold that "everybody is constantly aware of this notion. . . ." Thus if we are aware of Good (m) at the out- set, the verbal gymnastics of the Open Question Argument may help one to distinguish Good (m) from other concepts. But it does not function as a positive heuristic device for allowing one to discover Good (m) when he is not already aware of it. There are two final objections to be made to the petic what W0 trit Haw “he. 1901 the dii 57 Open Question Argument as a heuristic device: Suppose one performed Moore's recommended procedure and discovered that what is before his mind when he asked 'Is X good?’ is not two concepts but only one. That is to say, suppose there be a substitution instance of 'X' such that the concept denoted by 'X' is identical with the concept denoted by 'Good (m)' and suppose further that substitution instance is not 'in- trinsic value' or any of the other synonyms given by Moore. How could Moore respond to a person who sees only one concept where Moore sees two? One possible response is that Moore "sees" or intuits a concept which he denotes by 'Good (m)' which is different from the concept which the other person intuits. Is there a difference or not? Is one person being morally blind in not seeing how Good (m) is different from the concept which he denotes by 'X'? Or, is Good (m)'s difference a moral hallucination on Moore's part? How are conflicting intuitions to be decided? No way is possible on Moore's showing;87 that much is admitted by Moore. Neither, as I have tried to argue, does the Open Question Argument help one in having Moore's intuition if he does not already 7Vide William Frankena, "The Naturalistic Fallacy," Mind, XLVIII (October, 1939), 474-76, and Strawson, _l_gg. 211., for the classic formulations of this criticism; for a recent version, vide Barton C. Cooper, "The Alleged Indefinability of Good," The Journal of Philosophy, LVI (December 3, 1959), 981-82. have : dcvic side: That 58 have it. It is, at best, a question-begging heuristic device. It does not prove; neither does it present "con- siderations capable of determining the intellect." Finally, the Open Question Argument as a heuristic device does not rule out the possibility that there may be some who honestly profess to be unaware of Good (m). Moore held that everyone is aware of Good (m), but some may perform the mental manipulations indicated by Moore and still not intuit that concept. Suppose that a person followed Moore's thoughts on intrinsic value from the Erin- gipia to "Intrinsic Value" to Ethics. Such a person may well come to agree with Moore that the term 'good (m)' ought not to be applied to any possible substitution values of 'X', for all the X's do not seem to be what Moore referred to by 'Good (m)'. In his Philosophical Studies, Moore referred to that "fundamental sense" of goodness which is "a characteris- .88 tic a thing would possess, i£_i£_existed quite alone.’ If we choose to limit the denotation of 'Good (m)' to that characteristic, it is entirely possible that many will not discover a denotation for 'Good (m)' at all: they will hold it to be meaningless. # 88G. E. Moore, "The Nature of Moral Philosophy," as printed in Moore, Philosophical Studies, 22.‘gi£., p. 326; my emphasis. Cf. PE, p. 91, where Moore referred to a similar method of "absolute isolation." held such sect give awar the ham con int he 59 Is there then any such concept as Good (m)? Moore held that there was. The ultimate evidence that there is such a concept must be Moore's own intuition. In this section I have tried to give and to evaluate the procedure given by Moore which purportedly would allow one to become aware of Good (m). I think that I have successfully shown the defects in that procedure. In the previous section I have tried to give the ontological status of Good (m) if there be such a concept at all. But where there be such a concept is a question I am not able to answer, for I do not intuit it. Moore could not be wrong in his intuition if he intuited Good (m), but his intuition is not evidence for any other person that there is such a concept. I have tried to show in this section how and why the Open Question Argument must be unsuccessful as a heuristic device for becoming aware of Good (m). Whether there even be such a concept is a question that I am not equipped to answer. Moore certainly thought there was even though he was not able to show that there was. Hereafter in this paper I shall assume with Moore that there is such a concept, for to decide whether there even be such a concept is not 'necessary for an evaluation of the Open Question Argument as a purported proof of Moore's two major theses cited in the first section of this chapter. 60 2.4 Significant Questions. I first give a form of the Open Question Argument which purports to prove that the concept denoted by 'X' when 'X' denotes an empirical concept is not identical with Good (m). That conclusion supposedly follows from the fact that the question 'Is X Good (m)?' is a significant question, while the question 'Is X X?' is not a signifi- cant question. I consider the assertion corresponding to the question 'Is X X?' in order to discover why Moore may have held the question to be insignificant. I dis- cover four reasons why Moore may have held that the assertion 'X is X' is insignificant: (1) There is no distinction between subject and predicate; (2) The assertion may be interpreted as being about the word 'X' and not about X itself; (3) 'X is X' does not assert a proposition; and (4) The assertion is provable by the law of contradiction alone. (3) is shown to result from a mistake on Moore's part. The other interpretations are accepted and each will form the basis of a different version of the Open Question Argument in succeeding sections. I wish to lay the groundwork in this section for evaluating the Open Question Argument as a proof that "Good is not identical with any natural . . . property." I have used 'Good (m)' as an unambiguous term to denote that which Moore intended to denote by the subject of the pre- viously cited assertion. I am willing to admit that Good (m) does exist even if Moore was not able to communicate to the reader what it was. But whether it exists or not is irrele- vant in evaluating the logic of the Open Question Argument as Va purported proof that Good (m) is not a natural property; neither does the argument show that ". . . propositions about the good are all of them synthetic and never analytic." 61 What follows may be read as a hypothetical claim on my part: Even if there be such a concept as Good (m), the Open Question Argument does not establish Moore's two claims. They may, indeed, be established in other ways, but it is not my concern in this paper to decide if these claims be true; my concern is to see if these claims be provable through applications of the Open Question Argument. Moore uses versions of the Open Question Argument in many places. ("The Refutation of Idealism," pp. 438-42 although no explicit question is raised; Principia Ethica, pp. 15-16, 16-17, 38, 41, 67, 126, 131-32, 135; Ethics, pp. 69-70, 88-89, 101-102)89 In addition to using it to attempt to prove certain assertions about what I have called 'Good (m)', Moore also used the argument to attempt to prove assertions about "right" and "percipi". I shall limit my consideration of this argument to his use of it to attempt to prove something about Good (m). A generalized form of the Open Question Argument may be given as follows: 891t should be pointed out that nowhere in the Principia or anywhere else does G. E. Moore ever specify any "argument to be the Open Question Argument. But in later literature directed to Moore's writings, the appellation 'Opeanuestion Argument' has come by convention to be applied to the type of argument used by Moore in these passages. 62 (1) When 'X' denotes an empirical concept, let us assume that 'Good (m)' denotes that concept also. (2) To ask 'Is X Good (m)?' is to ask a significant question. (3) To ask 'Is X X?' is not to ask a significant question. (A) The concept denoted by 'X' is not identical with Good (m) when 'X' denotes an empirical concept. I think my statement of the conclusion is a precise way of making Moore's claim that "Good is not a natural . . . property." The conclusion says that no empirical concept is identical with Good (m); and the converse also follows since '. . . is identical with . . . .' names a symmetrical relation. The general force of this argument seems to lie in the assertion that whenever the question 'Is X Y?' is a significant question, then X and Y are not identical concepts. Premise (3) is supplied by way of contrast with premise (2): There is a difference between asking 'Is X Good (m)?' and asking 'Is X X?' Moore thought that this difference was sufficient to establish the conclusion that X and Good (m) are not identical. There are at least four possible differences between these two questions indicated by Moore. I shall argue 'in the following sections that none of these differences is sufficient to establish the conclusion that the concept denoted by 'X' when 'X' denotes an empirical concept is not I IN cab u 1 pos in; ar e I l b 3' IE IT 1‘. 63 identical with Good (m). But first I must indicate the possible differences mentioned by Moore between the question 'Is X Good (m)?' and 'Is X X?' The differences which I will indicate are extrapolations on my part from Moore's early articles. What is it about the question expressed in (3) that renders it insignificant? It will be easier to explain Moore's thinking if I consider the assertion corresponding to the question expressed in (3) rather than the question itself. Thus corresponding to the question expressed in (3) is: (3a) The assertion 'X is X' is not a significant assertion. What for Moore does it mean to say that an assertion is not a significant assertion? Four possible answers to this question are given in several of Moore's early articles and in the Principia itself. (1) Part of what Moore attempted to demonstrate in 1900 was that there are no analytic truths.90 An argument which he used to attempt to establish that point is relevant here. Holding that when "the predicate is simply identical ‘with the subject" and the "proposition may be expressed in the form, A is A," Moore concluded that "we have certainly ‘ 906. E. Moore, "Necessity," Mind, IX (1900, 289-304. 64 not two different terms, and therefore we have no propo- sition," for "any proposition . . . must contain at least "91 two different terms, and their relations. Later Moore identified a particular such identical proposition as "a pure tautology".92 Moore seems to hold that a statement of the form 'A is A' is not a proposition, but only a tautology. Why a proposition must contain two different terms is not told us in this article. One difficulty with sentences of the form 'A is A' is given in another early article by Moore. In commenting on what may have led Hegel in his Smaller Logic to assert that utterances in accord with the Law of Identity-—utterances such as "A is A; everything is identical with itself"--are justly "accused of silliness," Moore attempted to show wherein their silliness lies in his 1900-1901 article "Identity". He summarized his point thusly: But there still seems room to ask why these remarks are silly if they are true. I think, in the first place, it is because the same word happens to be used in subject and predicate. It is true, as Hegel himself remarks, that the propositional form always "promises a distinction between subject and predicate," and if a distinction is meant, it usually seems silly to use the same symbol for what is meant to be distinguished.93 If we wish to make a distinction between subject and predicate 911bid., p. 295. 93 92Ibid. Moore, "Identity," p. 118. 65 when we assert a proposition, the same word should not occur in both subject and predicate position of our sentence, even if that word occurs with different meanings. As Moore said, "We cannot enunciate all truths in the form of puns. . . ."94 The important point for our purpose to be gleaned from the above passage is that sentences of the form 'A is A' are defective in some sense: one defect follows from Moore's assumption of the nature of propositions: propositions "promise a distinction between subject and predicate," while 'A is A' yields no such distinction if it be not a pun. Thus 'A is A' is a "pure tautology" and is thus held to be an insignificant assertion. (2) A further defect in sentences of the form 'A is A' which is given in "Identity" and only hinted at in "Necessity" results from the fact that any such sentences which do not assert "a relation between two different things" are "pure nonsense" and do not have "a contradictory."95 But is not 'A is not A' the contradictory of 'A is A'? If I understand Moore correctly, he holds it not to be the contradictory. To be a full-fledged proposition for Moore, both the sentence and its contradictory must sometimes both be true, although, of course, not at the same time. Since 94Ibid. 951bid., p. 119. 66 'A is not A' can never be true, it cannot be a proposition; thus it cannot be the contradictory of 'A is A'; thus 'A is A' is not a proposition; hence it is "pure nonsense." Much argument is needed to fill in the steps of what I take to be Moore's argument, butiit seems to me that the most important part of the argument is the first where it is held that every proposition must sometimes be true and sometimes be false. Let X be a particular proposition and not-X be its contradictory. When X is true, not-X is false; when X is false, not-X is true. If X is sometimes true and sometimes false, then both X and not-X have a particular property: the property of being either true 2£_£al§g. That property-- referred to as "a property common" and as "some property"-- is held to be a property which belongs to every proposition.96 Moore seems to have held that since 'A is not A' can never be true and is thus always false, it lacks an essential property of propositions, namely, the property of being true or false. Hence 'A is not A' cannot be the contra- dictory of 'A is A'; hence 'A is A' is not a proposition since it has no contradictory. How is Moore's position to be evaluated? I think it 96Moore, "Necessity," p. 298. 1c 1: 0—9 67 is certainly false. It seems to stem from a failure to look upon the property of being either true or false as a property which a proposition may have insofar as it has at least one of the properties of being true or of being false. It need not have both to be either true or false. I think Moore is guilty of a simple confusion. I find Moore to have given no convincing reason for holding 'A is A' to be "pure nonsense." My last point should be elaborated. Let us assume that a proposition must be either true or false and that 'A is not A' cannot be true; it must always be false. Moore's position seems to be that since 'A is not A' must be false, it is not possible for it to be true 25 false; it can only be false. Moore's position is somewhat similar to one's holding that if I must go to town, then the alternative of either going to town or staying at home is not open to me. To be a proposition in Moore's theory requires that the alternative of truth or falsity be open to it; such an alternative is not open to 'A is not A'. Is being true or false a sufficient condition for being a proposition, or is it a necessary condition? If we assume it to be a sufficient condition, then it follows that if X is true then X is a proposition and if X is false then X is a proposition. That inference does not follow 100‘ pro: lea It 3100 II. '4 4......“ 91V NOT. the 'A po it fa th 9C 67 is certainly false. It seems to stem from a failure to look upon the property of being either true or false as a property which a proposition may have insofar as it has at least one of the properties of being true or of being false. It need not have both to be either true or false. I think Moore is guilty of a simple confusion. I find Moore to have given no convincing reason for holding 'A is A' to be "pure nonsense." My last point should be elaborated. Let us assume that a proposition must be either true or false and that 'A is not A' cannot be true; it must always be false. Moore's position seems to be that since 'A is not A' must be false, it is not possible for it to be true or false; it can only be false. Moore's position is somewhat similar to one's holding that if I must go to town, then the alternative of either going to town or staying at home is not open to me. To be a proposition in Moore's theory requires that the alternative of truth or falsity be open to it; such an alternative is not open to 'A is not A'. Is being true or false a sufficient condition for being a proposition, or is it a necessary condition? If we assume it to be a sufficient condition, then it follows that if X is true then X is a proposition and if X is false then X is a proposition. That inference does not follow if we for I ther ap; len Whi Ca‘ Wh 68 if we assume being true or false is a necessary condition for being a proposition. When 'Tx' means 'x is true', 'Fx' means 'x is false' and 'Px' means 'x is a proposition' there are two possible formulas to consider: (1) (x) ((Tx v Fx) 3 Px) (2) (x) (Px 3 (Tx v Px)) (l) is a way of specifying a sufficient condition for being a proposition; (2), a necessary condition. (1) is equiva- lent to (3) (x) ((Tx 3 Px) . (Fx 3 Px)) which yields by instantiation, simplification, and quantifi- cation (4) (x) (m :> Px) which says that for any particular x, if x is false, then x is a proposition. Thus if being true or false is taken as a sufficient condition for being a proposition, it follows that 'A is not A' is a proposition contrary to Moore. But that result does not follow from (2), which is equivalent to (5) (x) ((Px 3 Tx) v (Px 3 Ex). It is not valid to deduce (4) from (5). The point that I am trying to illustrate is that if being true or false is taken only as a necessary condition for being a proposition, we may not conclude from the fact that 'A is not A' is always false that it is a proposition. But n are i a sui for 1 that Sinc- char and not Henc is 1 The: an Si‘ In 1h 0n be 69 But neither may we conclude that it is not. Both inferences are invalid. But if we take being true or false as either a sufficient or as both a necessary and sufficient condition for being a proposition it does validly follow from the fact that 'A is not A' is false that 'A is not A' is a proposition. Since Moore later took being true or false as a defining characteristic of propositions, as being both a necessary and a sufficient condition, and since I can see no reason not to so take it, I conclude that it should so be taken. Hence it follows that 'A is not A' is a proposition and so is its contradictory, the identity statement 'A is A'. There may be other objections to sentences of the form 'A is A', but it is mistaken to hold that they are not propo- sitions. (3) Further reasons are given by Moore in his 1903 article "The Refutation of Idealism" for holding that propo- sitions of the form 'A is A' are not significant assertions. In that article Moore held that in the assertion 'ggsg is percipi' the copula 'is' is ambiguous, being subject to three different interpretations. The assertion may be true on either of the first two interpretations, but it will not be "important."97 Let me give the unimportant interpretations 97Moore, "The Refutation of Idealism," p. 438. firs _. than Tha‘ an: M03 a I bet tel im: '8 fr. 70 first: (A) the statement may be an assertion that the word 'esse' is "used to signify nothing either more nor less than the word 'percipi'." Or, as Moore further expressed it: The statement may be meant to assert that the word 'esse' is used to signify nothing either more or less than the word 'percipi': that the two words are precise synonyms: that they are merely different names for one and the same thing: that what is meant by esse is absolutely identical with what is meant by_ percipi.9 That the assertion 'esse is percipi' may be interpreted as an identity statement is the first interpretation given by Moore. But it is important to notice how Moore interprets a statement of identity in this context. The claim is not that esse is identical with perc'pi; it is that the words 'esse' and 'percipi' name the same thing. On such an in- terpretation, 'esse is percipi' functions "merely to define a word."99 Thus what appears to be an assertion about esse becomes an assertion about the word 'esse'. Moore does not tell us in this article why 'esse is pgrcipi' would be un- important on this interpretation. To find such a reason requires that we turn to the Principia. Consider the following passages, both relatively long, from the Principia: When A says 'Good means pleasant' and B says 'Good means desired,' they may merely wish to assert that most people have used the word for what is pleasant and for \ 981bid. 99Ibid. 1W: 91 u d a C T w d -w .c In Ans ho] C01 in 71 what is desired respectively. And this is quite an interesting subject for discussion: only it is not a whit more an ethical discussion than the last was. Nor do I think that any exponent of naturalistic Ethics would be willing to allow that this was all he meant. They are all so anxious to persuade us that what they call the good is what we really ought to do. 'Do, pray, act so, because the word "good" is generally used to denote actions of this nature': such, on this view, would be the substance of their teaching. And in so far as they tell us how we ought to act, their teaching is truly ethical as they meant it to be. But how perfectly absurd is the reason they would give for it! 'You are to do this, because most people use a certain word to denote conduct such as this.’ 'You are to say the thing which is not, because most peogle call it lying.‘ That is an argument just as good!10 If right, by definition, means conducive to general happiness, then it is obvious that general happiness is the right end. It is not necessary now first to prove or assert that general happiness is the right end, before right is defined as conducive to general happi- ness--a perfectly valid procedure; but on the contrary the definition of right as conducive to general happi- proves general happiness to be the right end--a perfectly invalid procedure, since in this case the statement that 'general happiness is the right end of human action' is not an ethical principle at all, but either, as we have seen, a proposition about the meaning of words, or else a proposition about the nature of general happiness, not about its rightness or goodness. In both of these passages Moore is holding that it is not an answer to the question of how one ought to live to point out how people use words. That the purported definition is a correct report is one concern; that the definition is a reason for an ethical judgment is another. The definitional truth expressed as a purported identity statement is not IOOPE, pp. 11-12. 1°11bid., p. 19. absol conce arriv coulc £3221 Idea. Wist Idea def. And at aIe had 44. ta 72 absolutely unimportant--it is unimportant for a particular concern; knowing how words are used is unimportant for arriving at ethical truths. Likewise, by extrapolation, one could say that the interpretation (A) given to 'esse is pg;- 0 p ' is unimportant to Moore's concern in "The Refutation of Idealism": knowing how the word 'esse' is used is not impor- tant as a source for arriving at a knowledge of what is real. Just as Moore wished to ascertain what is Good (m) in the Principia instead of how 'Good (m)' is used, likewise he wished to ascertain what is esse in "The Refutation of Idealism" instead of how the word 'esse' is used. Verbal definitions are characterized in the Principia as tautologies. And a tautology, held Moore, is not an ethical proposition at all.102 Tautologies are not absolutely unimportant; they are unimportant relative to a particular concern which Moore had. Thus 'esse is pgrcipi' may be interpreted as an assertion about the word 'esse'. When it is, although the assertion may in fact be true, such an assertion is not important for discovering truths about esse. Thus interpre- tation (A) is held to be unimportant. ‘ Another interpretation of 'EEEE is percipi' is given 102Ibid., p. 73. in " whit (B) ider the int: Th1 tn; f0: I??? 73 in "The Refutation of Idealism" which gives an assertion which in Moore's opinion is also unimportant. We may hold (B) that what is denoted by 'esse' "though not absolutely identical" with what is denoted by 'percipi' "yet includes "103 Moore's second the latter as a pa££_of its meaning. interpretation can best be expressed symbolically: Let us assume that 'percipi' denotes the concepts y and z, and that 'esse' denotes the concepts x, y and 2. Thus esse and percipi would not be completely identical, although the terms 'esse' and 'percipi' do denote some common concepts. But such an interpretation yields an unimportant assertion because: . . . from the fact that a thing was experienced we should 223 be able to infer that it was real; since it would.not follow from the fact that it had one of the attributes essential to reality, that it also had the other or others.104 -——_. Thus, again, the assertion is unimportant, but it is unimpor- tnat relative to a particular Moorean concern--the concern for ascertaining whether there be anything real which is not experienced. (4) The third interpretation given to 'esse is Eercipi' is an interpretation which gives a fourth reason 103Moore, "The Refutation of Idealism," 10c. Cit. 104Ibid., p. 439. 74 for holding that statements of the form 'X is X' are not significant is an assertion (C) that percipi can be in- ferred from x alone, where x is a concept or concepts not common to both esse and percipi. Failure to admit such an "105 x makes 'esse is percipi' an "absolute tautology. This interpretation yields an assertion that if 'esse is percipi' is true and important at all, it is a synthetic truth. Taking analytic truths as truths which are not syn— thetic, Moore identifies analytic truths as those provable . . 106 n by the law of contrad1ct1on alone. And a purely identical proposition" is "proved by the law of contradiction alone."107 If I do not misunderstand Moore's position, he is now holding that identical propositions are "perfectly barren" and what makes them perfectly barren is that they are provable by the law of contradiction alone. In this context, an assertion is not significant if it is provable by the law of contradiction alone. I have been trying to explain why on Moore's showing an assertion of the form 'X is X' is not a significant assertion. Several purported reasons have been discovered: (1) In such an assertion there is no distinction between 10 106 51bid., p. 440. Ibid., p. 441. 1°7Ibid., p. 442. 75 the subject and the predicate. (2) 'X is X' does not assert a proposition. (3) It is possible to interpret 'X is X' as being about the word 'X' and not about X itself. (4) 'X is X' is provable by the law of contra- diction alone. I will tentatively accept (l) as giving a good reason for holding that the assertion 'X is X' is not a significant assertion. My position closely, though not exactly reflects the idea expressed by Moore's statement that ". . . there is no meaning in saying that pleasure is good, unless good is something different from pleasure."108 I have tried to show why (2) must be rejected because it is based on a false assumption. I shall accept (3) as a possible way of interpreting statements with the form 'X is X'; nevertheless, I shall argue below, this interpretation vitiates the force of the Open Question Argument if it is utilized to attempt to show that Good (m) is not identical with any natural property. I shall give that argument in the next section. I will agree that, given Moore's realistic epistemology, (4) may be accepted. But I shall attempt to show that only some and not all identity propositions are provable by the law of contradiction alone. I shall attempt to show how Moore's realistic epistemology coupled with his 1081313, p. 14. 76 ontology prohibited his seeing that there are two types of identity propositions and that once this distinction is made the Open Question Argument again looses its force. I began this section with a general version of the Open Question Argument. Drawing on the investigations of this section I can now give the argument more fully. An elaborated form of the Open Question Argument as used by Moore to attempt to show that "Good is not a natural . . . property" may be given as follows:109 (1) Let us assume that some natural property, X, is identical with Good (m). (2) But it is significant to ask 'Is X Good (m)?' It is a significant question because the assertion 'X is good (m)' either (a) offers a distinction between the subject and the predicate of the assertion, or (b) it is not possible to inter- pret the assertion as being about the word 'X', or (c) the assertion is not provable by the law of contradiction alone. (3) It is not a significant question to ask 'Is X X?' because the assertion 'X is X' is not a significant assertion because either (a) the assertion does not offer a distinction between the subject and the predicate, or (b) it is possible to interpret the assertion as being about the word 'X', or (c) the assertion is provable by the law of contradiction alone. 1091 want to emphasize again that Moore also offered other arguments to establish his conclusion. A complete rejection of Moore's position would necessitate a refutation of those other arguments. I want to establish only one thesis in this chapter: Moore's position cannot be demon- strated through his use of the Open Question Argument. 77 (n) X, an empirical concept, is not identical with Good (m). As the substitution values of 'X' are changed so that 'X' denotes differing empirical concepts, this procedure is repeatable and (2) will continue to be true and the con- clusion will continue to follow is the further claim that Moore made about this argument. Premise (1) does not need to be proved; it is only assumed in order to be shown false by a reductio ad absurdum proof. Premise (2) is shown to be true by "a simple appeal to facts." I shall try to show that even when (2) is true, Moore's conclusion does not follow. I have already tried to give Moore's reasons in support of (3) in this section. There are three different forms which the Open Question Argument may take in attempting to show that X is not identical with Good (m). Each different reason given for holding that the question 'Is X Good (m)?' is a sig- nificant question will generate a different version of the argument. Section 2.5 will evaluate the argument when (b) is given as the reason for the significance of the question raised in premise (2); section 2.6 will evaluate the argument When (0) is assumed as the reason; section 2.7 will evaluate it when (a) is assumed. I will show that the argument does g 110Moore's phrase in PE, p. 15. 78 not establish its conclusion on any of these interpretation. 2.5 Identity Statements and Verbal Definitions. In this section I negatively evaluate a first version of the Open Question Argument. Moore held that one reason why the question 'Is X X?' is insignificant is that the assertion corresponding to the question may be interpreted as being about 'X' and not as being about X. I interpret the question 'Is X Good (m)?' as also being about 'X' and show by examples that although the two questions 'Is X Good (m)?' and 'Is X X?' do differ, that difference is not sufficient to establish the conclusion that X is not identical with Good (m). We have discovered several reasons why Moore may have held that the question 'Is X X?' is an insignificant question. One reason is that the assertion corresponding to that question can be interpreted as being about the word 'X' and not as being about the object X. If the question 'Is X X?' is insignificant for that reason, it would seem to follow that Moore must hold that the question 'Is X Good (m)?' is significant for the denial of that reason. That is to say, he must hold that 'X is Good (m)' is significant be- cause it cannot be interpreted as being about the word 'X'; it must be interpreted as being about X. In passing, in the previous section, I indicated why Moore thought the asser- tion ought not to be interpreted as being about 'X'. Such an interpretation would not be important relative to a particular concern of Moore's. Yet he did not show that the assertion cannot be interpreted in such a way: he only insists 79 that such an interpretation would not yield an ethical proposition. Moore himself allows the possibility of such an interpretation. In this section I will interpret the questions 'Is X X?' and 'Is X Good (m)?' as both being about the word 'X' and not as being about the object X. On such an inter- pretation I will agree that there is a difference between the two questions. Yet, I shall argue, that difference is not sufficient to establish the conclusion that X is not identical with Good (m). Thus one version of the Open Question Argument will be shown to be defective. Moore held that the statement 'esse is percipi' may be taken as a statement of identity. When it is so taken, it may be interpreted as a statement about the word 'esse' as I reported above. It seems to me that, in like manner, the assertion 'X is Good (m)' may be taken to be about the word 'X'. In Moore's language, this interpretation would yield the assertion that the word 'X' denotes the same concept that 'Good (m)' denotes. Is that assertion ever true? Its truth or falsity would depend on how the two words are used, on the facts of customary usage. But such a consideration would be of only philological, not philosophical interest to the Moore of the Principia. As early as 1900 Moore indicated that "the only test that a word is correctly 80 used is common usage."111 But Moore then went on to say that he was not interested in discovering facts concerning correct usage.112 It was not until 1925 that Moore came to show an interest and respect for how a phrase is "ordinarily understood",113 a view which contrasts with the claim in Principia that "my business is not with proper usage, as established by custom."114 Whether the assertion that the word 'X' denotes the same property as 'Good (m)' denotes is true was not Moore's early concern to discover. Yet the fact that this inter- pretation is possible negates the force of the Open Question Argument. Consider the two words 'lout' and 'looby'. Both are adjectives and, following Moore's position that the mean- ing of a word is the concept denoted by that word, both denote concepts; in this case, both denote the same concept. Suppose one were to ask (a) 'Is a lout a looby?' and also to ask (b) 'Is a lout a lout?'. Let us interpret both questions as being about language. Then (a) becomes (c) 'Does the ll 1 Moore, "Necessity," 22. cit., p. 19. llzPE, p. 6. 113 G. A. Paul, "G. E. Moore: Analysis, Common Usage, and Common Sense," in The Revolution in Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1965), p. 64. Paul's claim is criticized, I think, mistakenly in White, 22. 913., p. 29. 114 PE, p. 6. 81 word "lout" denote the same concept as does the word "looby"?' and (b) becomes (d) 'Does the word "lout" denote the same concept as does the word "lout"?' The answers to (b) and (d) are obvious. In one of the few places in the Principia where Moore uses the phrase 'open question', he characterizes an open question as one whose answer is not obvious.115 There is a difference between (c) and (d). The answer to (c) is not obvious to many. A dictionary may be needed to find the answer to that question. If we interpret (a) in such a way that it is a question about louts instead of as a question about the word 'lout', then the answer to (a) would also be obvious. If one were to meaningfully assert that a lout is a looby (as opposed to merely saying the words 'a lout is a looby'), this assertion would on Moore's grounds be equivalent to the assertion that a lout is a lout. Either could be meaningfully asserted only by one who understands what the terms 'lout' and 'looby' denote. As material rather than formal assertions 'a lout is a looby' and 'a lout is a lout' would be synonymous because exactly the same concept would be denoted by the subject and predicate of both assertions. The answer to question (a) above would be as llSIbid., p, 43; the expression also occurs on PP- 27 and 44. 82 obvious as the answer to question (b) to anyone who under- stood either question, because they are the same question. They are the same question because they are synonymous. But questions (c) and (d) are not synonymous in the same sense, for the subject of those sentences, namely, the word 'lout' is related to different predicates. In the one case, the relation is to the word 'lout'; in the other, to the word 'looby'. That 'lout' and 'looby' may in fact denote the same concept does not prevent the question 'Is a lout a looby?' from being meaningful in a way in which the question 'Is a lout a lout?’ is not a meaningful question when the questions are interpreted according to the pattern established by Moore himself. Likewise, 'X' and 'Good (m)' may in fact denote the same concept and thus be synonymous terms despite the fact that there is a difference between asking 'Is X Good (m)?' and asking 'Is X X?' For if we interpret both questions as being about words instead of being about concepts, i.e. if we ask not are the concepts identical but if we ask do the words denote the same concept, we can discover a difference between the questions. One may be asking for information about customary usage in asking 'Does "X" denote the same concept as does "Good (m)"?' because he is not sure about the proper usage of one or the other of the 83 words 'X' or 'Good (m)'. He need not have to know what concepts, if any, that 'X' and 'Good (m)' denote in order to meaningfully ask the questions, while he would have to know the concepts denoted in order to meaningfully ask either question (a) or question (b) above. If the question 'Is X Good (m)?' be expressed in the formal rather than in the material mode as Moore allows in an article contemporary to the Principia then it does not follow that this version of the Open Question Argument shows X and Good (m) not to be identical. That conclusion does not follow because of a conjunction of two reasons: (1) more than one word may denote the same concept, which Moore admits; and (2) one may raise questions about the denotation of a word without being aware of what the word denotes. Is there any reason not to interpret the question as I did? There is only one reason given by Moore than I can find, but that reason-~important thought it may be--is not relevant in evaluating the logic of the Open Question Argu- ment. Moore held that a linguistic definition does not serve as a reason for an ethical judgment. Such may well be the case. How the word 'Good (m)' is conventionally used may not give us any reason for acting in a certain way; nevertheless such a fact does not show that the question of how words are used cannot or ought not to be raised. I 84 think that at this stage of his career Moore over-reacted to his important discovery that definitions have been taken as ethical propositions; he seemed in 1903 to want to deny definitions any philosophical importance. If 'Is X Good (m)?' is interpreted as a question about the words 'X' and 'Good (m)', the question can be significant without necessitating the conclusion that X and Good (m) are different concepts. They may well be different concepts but this version of the Open Question Argument does not show them to be different. Moore himself provided a procedure in "The Refutation of Idealism" which if adopted destroys the critical force of this interpretation of the Open Question Argument. 2.6 Denotative Identity and the Law of Contradiction. I begin by distinguishing between connotative identity statements and denotative identity statements. Using that distinction, I show that the version of the Open Question Argument which holds that 'Is X X?' is answerable by considering the Law of Contradiction alone while 'Is X Good (m)?' is not does not show X and Good (m) to be non-denotatively identical. Another reason why Moore held that the question 'Is X X?' is an insignificant question is that the assertion corresponding to that question is provable by the law of contradiction alone. I will agree that the assertion corresponding to the question 'Is X Good (m)?' is not 85 provable from the law of contradiction alone. Yet I will show that this difference in the questions does not show X to be non-identical with Good (m). In support of my thesis, I will argue that Moore's concept-inspection procedure clouds a difference between connotative and denotative identity statements. Once this distinction is drawn, this version of the Open Question Argument is easily shown to be invalid. In this section I will be concerned with showing that the Open Question Argument does not show lack of denotative identity between X and Good (m); in the next section, I will be concerned.with showing that it does not show lack of connotative identity. The assertion that 'The morning star is the evening star' is normally and, I think, correctly taken to assert that the relation of being identical holds between two objects. But such language is apt to be misleading, for, strictly speaking, it is not two things which are identical: there is only one thing which is called by two different names. There is not one thing called 'morning star' and another thing called 'evening star' which are asserted to be identical. One who remembers Butler's maxim that everything is what it is and not another thing may be tempted to argue that since everything is what it is and not another thing, anyone who attempts to identify two different things must be 86 guilty of a confusion: the type of confusion Moore denominates 116 the naturalistic fallacy in the Principia. If we are not careful with our language we may lead one to think we made a mistake where no mistake was intended or committed. Is the relation named by 'is identical with' a monadic or a dyadic relation? That is to ask, does it hold between two things, or is it properly a property belonging to only one thing? It is tempting to call it a dyadic relation because the normal locutions in which it is mentioned are of the form 'X is identical with Y'. But this suggests that two things, X and Y, are asserted as identical. But if they are two things, they cannot be identical; at most, they can only be exactly similar. If we posit two different things as identical, we certainly seem to be contradicting ourselves. It would appear then that 'is identical with' names a monadic relation and every statement of identity is a trivial instance of Butler's maxim. Or, at least, so Moore seems to have held. But we do not have to come to this con- clusion. We can hold that the relation is dyadic, that there 116Vide Frankena, 22. cit., P- 471- Frankena iden- tified the naturalistic fallacy as a species of the definist fallacy. According to Frankena, the definist fallacy is "the process of confusing or identifying two properties, of identifying one property by another, or of substituting one property for another." And, "the fallacy is always simply that two properties are being treated as one." 87 are two terms to this relation; but in this case, the terms being related are not things: the two terms are words. And, yet, even this way of putting it is misleading, for we may be inclined to assert that the two words themselves are identical, which would be false. Instead, we should say something such as: (1) To assert 'X is identical with Y' is to assert that the words 'X' and 'Y' denote the same thing. There is a standard distinction which goes back to at least John Stuart Mill's System gf Logic between the connotation of a word and its denotation. Given that distinction, we could also hold: (2) To assert 'X is identical with Y' is to assert that the words 'X' and 'Y' have the same connotation, i.e. they are synonyms. Thus we may have either denotative identity or connotative identity. I wish to show how Moore's position tends to blur this distinction between two types of identity statements. To ask 'Is the morning star the evening star?' is not to ask 'Is the morning star the morning star?' The former question is significant; the latter is trivial. Here it is obvious that one who asks the former question is not asking the latter question; yet the difference between the two questions is not sufficient to force the conclusion that the morning star is not the evening star. That we know the morning star is the evening star follows from astronomical 88 discoveries; the truth of the statement is not proven by the law of contradiction alone. One type of identity statement is represented by sentences such as: (l) The morning star is the evening star. (2) Scott is the author of Waverly. (3) Cicero is Tully. All of these are denotative identity statements; it is not enough to appeal to the law of contradiction alone to dis- cover their truth values. As Quine cogently put the point I am trying to make: To say that two names designate the same object is not to say that they are synonymous, that is, that they have the same meaning. To determine the synonymity of two names and other expressions it would be sufficient to understand the expressions; but to determine that two names designate the same object it is commonly necessary to investigate the world.11 For Quine's point to hold, we must interpret the three examples above as being about words. What is asserted in the examples is not identity of concepts, but that two names or name-like phrases denote the same object. Identity statements of this sort are to be distinguished from statements such as: (4) A brother is a male sibling. 117Willard V. Quine, "Notes on Existence and Neces- sity," The Journal 2: Philosophy, XL (1943), 119. 89 (5) A triangle is a three-sided plane figure. Let me call statements of this latter sort connotative identity statements. These statements could also be inter- preted as being assertions about language. For example, (5) could be interpreted as the assertion that the word 'brother' denotes the same concept or set of concepts as does the word 'male sibling'. On this interpretation there is a similarity between the first set of sentences, (1), (2) and (3), and the second set, (4) and (5): the truth of both depends on how the words mentioned are in fact used. In this sense, we have to at least know how our language is used in order to ascertain the truth of any of the assertions. But there is an important difference between the two groups: in the case of the former group, we have to know 2213 how the words are used and certain non-linguistic facts; in the words of Quine, we also have "to investigate the world." In the case of the latter group, we only have to know how the words are used, but we do not have to investigate the world. In Moore's terminology, as soon as we understand the latter group of sentences, i.e. as soon as we become aware of the concepts denoted by the words in the sentences, i.e. as soon as we become aware of the connotations of those words, we may immediately ascertain their truth value by appeal to the law of contradiction alone. We can see that to deny any of them 90 would yield a sentence which is self-contradictory; such seems not to be the case for the former group of sentences. Consider the sentence 'A bachelor is an unmarried man'. Let Y be the concept which both 'bachelor' and 'un- married man' denote. When one comes to realize that the two terms denote the same concept, i.e. have the same meaning in Moore's language or, in Mill's language, have the same connotation, he comes to realize that the sentence may be interpreted as an assertion that Y is Y. This identity can be proven by the law of contradiction alone in the sense that the denial is a self-contradiction: Y is not Y. And the law requires that the denial of a self—contradiction be true. It is important to notice that two paradoxical results follow from Moore's identifying the meaning of a term with the concept(s) denoted by that term: (1) only identity statements are analytic, and (2) there is no distinction between denotative identity statements and connotative identity statements. I shall argue for the first result below when I evaluate Moore's claim that ". . . propositions about the good are all of them synthetic and never analytic." But now I must try to establish the latter. I have pointed out above that according to Moore's ontology at the time of the Principia a thing, such as the 91 morning star, Scott or Cicero, is a composite of concepts. Notice, for example, that the morning star and the evening star are composed of identical concepts. If we assume as did Moore at this period that a word means the concept or concepts which it names, then the words 'morning star' and 'evening star' would have the same meaning because they denote the same concepts. It is necessary to emphasize the point that the concepts denoted by the woods 'morning star' are not just exactly similar to those denoted by the words 'evening star'; they are one and the same. Moore held that two numerically different things could be exactly similar and still be numerically identical, but here we have a case of the morning star being numerically identical with the evening star. If there is numerical identity then there is conceptual identity, and where there is conceptual identity there is sameness of meaning for the words which refer to the same objects. Thus it would seem that 'the morning star is the evening star' should be provable by the law of con- tradiction alone if 'a brother is a male sibling' is thus provable. And if it is, then there is no distinction between the two different classes of identity statements which I have tried to distinguish. My point may be put another way: If we take Moore's concept inspection procedure of what is before our mind.when 92 we use a term to be the source of our discovering what a term means and if we take the meaning of a term to be the concept or concepts denoted by the term and if we take Moore's position that we are immediately aware of concepts and if we take, as did Moore, the object to be composed of concepts, then to ask 'Is the morning star the evening star?' is to ask 'Is the morning star the morning star?' when the two questions are interpreted as being in the material rather than the formal mode of speech. If we take the questions to be in the formal mode--as being about words--then the results cited in the previous section follow: the Open Ques- tion Argument looses its force for the reasons given there. But if we leave the question in the material mode, it follows on Moore's ontology and epistemology of the Principia that either denotative identity statements are provable by the' law of contradiction alone or no identity statements are provable by the law of contradiction alone. It seems, at best, paradoxical to hold that certain astronomical discoveries can be made simply by taking thought, without having investigated the world. Likewise it seems paradoxical to hold that statements of the form 'A is A' cannot be proven by the law of contradiction alone.. Is there any way out of this dilemma? Let me propose one which will be developed into a further criticism of the Open 93 Question Argument. Moore could hold consistently with his position that the terms 'morning star' and 'evening star' do in fact denote the same concepts, but we are not aware of all of the concepts denoted. Given Moore's theory that objects are made up of concepts it would appear that we are not aware of all the parts which compose that celestial body because it is too far away from us for us to completely experience all of it. Thus we may have only a partial awareness of the meaning of the terms 'morning star' and 'evening star', and what a person means by one term may not be what he means by the other, although the terms in fact have the same meaning. If we once admit the possibility of partial awareness of the concepts denoted by the two terms, we may discover that what is before our minds when we think of the morning star is positively different from what is before our minds when we think of the evening star. For in neither case are we thinking of the morning star or the evening star in its totality of concepts: we are thinking of different parts of it on the different occasions. Contingent identity statements need not be held to be provable true by the law of contradiction alone if we hold that we have only partial awareness of the meaning of certain terms. In such a consideration we would have 94 to investigate the world in order to ascertain the full meaning, i.e. all the concepts denoted, for a given term. Once the empirical investigation was complete then it would follow that the statement 'the morning star is the evening star' would be provable by the law of contradiction alone. It is only when we are completely aware of the denotation of the terms 'morning star' and 'evening star' that we would discover that there is no difference before our minds when we ask 'Is the morning star the evening star?' from when we ask 'Is the morning star the morning star?' Empirical research would be necessary to discover the synonomy of 'morning star' and 'evening star'. Whether the two terms are to be taken as synonyms is a function of our degree of ig- norance or lack of knowledge of empirical fact; whether they 255 in fact synonyms depends on what the word is like, whether we know it or not. A difference in belief does not imply a difference in ontological fact.118 That a person believes that X is not identical with Y does not imply that X is not identical with Y. My point can be made by considering two possible senses of 'means'. I wish to say that on Moore's theory 'morning 118Cf. Moore, Ethics, 22. cit., Po 102, where Moore distinguishes between believing a thing to be intrinsically good and a thing being intrinsically good. 95 star' need not mean 'evening star' while in another sense the two words do mean the same. The concepts before one's mind when he thinks of the morning star are what 'morning star' means in one sense; the concepts which actually constitute the morning star are what 'morning star' means in another sense. The first may be called a partial meaning of 'morning star'; the latter the complete meaning. I think it does not need to be argued that a term may have many partial meanings, ranging from person to person and even within a person from time to time. In so far as a term denotes only one object it has only one complete meaning. If the complete meanings of two different terms are not identical, then the terms do denote different things. But it does not follow that if the partial meanings of two terms vary, the terms denote two different things: the terms may be being used to refer to different parts of the same object. One objection to the Open Question argument may be put thusly: I will admit for the moment that 'X is Good (m)' is not provable from the law of contradiction alone, while 'X is X' is. But that does not show that X and Good (m) are not identical. For one may not be fully aware of the complete meanings, i.e. of all the concepts denoted, of 'X' and 'Good (m)' when the questions corresponding to the 96 above assertions are asked. The answer to 'Is X X?' is discoverable through an application of the law of contra- diction insofar as the person sees that he is using the same partial meaning of 'X' in both instances, insofar as he sees that he is using 'X' to denote the same group of concepts. He does not have to know the complete meaning for 'X' in order to discover the truth of 'X is X' from the law of contradiction. When 'X' and 'Good (m)' are being used with different partial meanings then the assertion 'X is Good (m)' is not provable by the law of contradiction alone. Yet this only shows that 'X' and 'Good (m)' are being used with different partial meanings; it does not show that X and Good (m) are different; it does show that their complete meanings differ. Such an interpretation as I have given above could a- rise only if one permitted X to be a complex concept and one further admitted that he does not know all of the concepts denoted by a word. Thus without modifying Moore's epistemol- ogy and ontology, I have tried to show how we need more than the law of contradiction to prove that the morning star is the evening star. I have argued that on Moore's showing the sentence 'the morning star is the evening star' would become provable by the law of contradiction alone if we had complete ‘knowledge of the denotation of the terms 'morning star' and 97 'evening star'. But that knowledge--if it comes at all-- comes through experience. Thus we can distinguish between, say, 'a brother is a male sibling' and 'the morning star is the evening star' on the basis of our varying degrees of awareness of the concepts denoted by the terms involved. In- sofar as we can see that the subject and predicate terms do denote the same set of concepts, both are connotatively identical statements according to my interpretation of Moore's position. But once we distinguish between deno- tatively and connotatively true identity statements in the only way possible given Moore's position, then this distinc- tion yields another telling objection to the Open Question Argument: It does not follow from the fact that 'X is Good (m)' is not provable from the law of contradiction alone while 'X is X' is provable, that X is not identical with Good (m). We can account for the difference in the assertions, but a difference in the assertions does not imply a differ— ence in the objects. 2.7 Connotative Identity and the Law 2£_Contradiction A third version of the Open Question Argument holds that there is no distinction between the subject and the pred- icate of the assertion corresponding to the question 'Is X X?' while there is a distinction between the subject and the predicate corresponding to the question 'Is X Good (m)?' I begin by showing that Moore's concept inspection procedure blurs a distinction which may be exhibited by distinguishing among definitional logical 98 truths, formal logical truths and incomplete logical truths. By employing these distinctions and using terms admitted to be synonymous, I show that there is indeed a difference between asking 'Is X X?' and asking 'Is X Y?'. A distinction between the subject-and the predicate of the latter question is found, but it is not a distinction which would yield the conclusion that X is not connotatively identical with Y. Thus the third version of the Open Question Argument is shown to be defective. Using the same distinctions between different types of logical truths, I evaluate Moore's claim that ". . . propositions about the good are all of them synthetic and never analytic." Using 'analytic' to mean 'probable by the law of contradiction alone', I show that 'X is Good (m)' may be a logical truth even if it is not analytic. I show that the most that the Open Question Argument shows, even if it shows this much, is that the statement is not a formal logical truth; it does not show that it is not a definitional logical truth. A third version of the Open Question Argument may be generated by holding that there is no distinction between the subject and the predicate of the assertion corresponding to the question 'Is X X?' while there is such a distinction in the assertion corresponding to the question 'Is X Good (m)?' By distinguishing three different types of logical truths, I will show that even when two obvious synonymous terms are employed, there is an important distinction between the assertion 'X is Y' and the assertion 'X is X'. Nevertheless that difference is not sufficient to establish the conclusion that there is a lack of connotative identity between X and Y. The third version of the Open Question Argument will be shown to be defective. 99 The same distinctions between different types of logical truths will enable me to evaluate Moore's claim that ". . . propositions about the good are all of them synthetic and never analytic." We will see that even if the Open Question Argument shows that the judgment expressed by 'X is identical with Good (m)' is not analytic, it does not show that the statement is not a logical truth. Following Moore, I am limiting 'analytic' to refer to judgments provable by the law of contradiction alone. Moore states: It is very natural to make the mistake of supposing that what is universally true is of such a nature that its negation would be a self-contradiction. . . . And thus it is very easy to conclude that what seems to be a uni- versal ethical principle is in fact an identical proposition. . . .119 In this passage Moore certainly seems to be implying that only an "identical proposition" is of "such a nature that its negation would be a self-contradiction." This interpre- tation is reinforced by several other passages from Moore.120 .A proposition is an analytic proposition for Moore if it is gprovable from the Law of Contradiction alone. Following Kant, Moore held that a proposition is provable from the law 119PE, p. 16. 120"Necessity," p. 294; "The Refutation of Idealism," p. 4429 100 of contradiction alone if its negation is a self-contra- diction.121 Let me mention that a distinction should be made be- tween a sentence and the judgment expressed by the sentence. When this distinction is made the notion of analyticity may be applied either to the judgment or to the sentence. But in the Principia it is the judgments which are held to be analytic; Moore is not concerned with analytic sentences. For Moore, there would be no difference between the judgment expressed by the sentence 'a brother is a male sibling' and 'a brother is a brother'. The sentences certainly differ, but the judgment expressed by each sentence is identical with the judgment expressed by the other sentence. The reason why on Moore's grounds that there would be no difference between the two judgments is that upon inspecting what is before one's mind when one makes either of these judgments, one would find that the same concept is being denoted by the subject and predicate terms of both sentences. I want to claim that Moore's concept inspection procedure blurred an important difference between 'a brother is a male sibling' and 'a brother is a brother' and by identifying the meaning of a 121Cf. Lewis White Beck, "Can Kant's Synthetic Judgments Be Made Analytic," in Moltke S. Gram (ed.), Kant: Disputed Questions (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), p. 243; first published in Kant-Studien (1955), pp. 168-81. 101 term with the concept denoted by that term Moore was lead to . . 122 the Paradox of Analy51s from wh1ch he saw no escape. Let me argue for my claim. Consider the following statements: (A) A triangle is a plane figure with exactly three sides. (B) A triangle is a figure with at least one side. (C) A triangle is a triangle. Each of the above statements is a logical truth in some sense. A denial of any of them would result in a contra- diction; yet only a denial of (C) would result in a self- contradiction. Yet there are significant differences among the three sentences despite the fact that all are logical truths. To know that (A) is true, one must know that 'triangle' and 'figure with exactly three straight sides' 122For a representative discussion of this so-called paradox which arose out of an interchange between C. H. Langford and G. E. Moore in The Philosophy 2: Q. E. Moore, gp.‘gi£., pp. 321-42 and 660-67, see Max Black, "The 'Paradox of Analysis'," Mind, LIII (July, 1944), 263-67; Morton G. White, "A Note on the 'Paradox of Analysis'," Mind, LIV (January, 1945), 71-72; Max Black, "The 'Paradox of Analysis' Again: A Reply," Mind, LIV (July, 1945), 272- 73; C. H. Langford, Review of "The 'Paradox of Analysis'" by Max Black, The Journal 2: Symbolic Logic, IX (1944), 104-105; and Max Black, "How Can Analysis Be Informative?" Philosophy and Phenomenolggical Research, VI (June, 1946), 628-31. For a later summation see Lennart Agvist, "Comments on the Paradox of Analysis," Inquiry, V (1962), 260-64. 102 have the same meaning. How can we know that these terms have the same meaning? At least two different types of answers are possible: (1) In a logical system, the truth of (A) can be established in one of two ways: (a) 'A triangle is a plane figure with exactly three straight sides' could be an axiom in some system. That is to say, it could be postulated as an unproved axiom that the sentence as a whole is true. We would know it to be true in a certain logical system by knowing it to be an axiom in that system. (b) More likely, the semantical rules of the system would stipulate that 'tri- angle' and 'plane figure with exactly three straight sides' are synonyms. To know that (A) is true in this case, one would have to do more than just inspect what was before his mind when he asserted (A). He would have to consult the definitions of some system. It seems to me that if we can in any sense look upon the English language as an informal logical system, this would be the procedure of the determi- nation of the truth of (A) in English.123 Let me call statements such as (A) 'definitional logical truths'. 123Vide Morton G. White, "The Analytic and the Syn- thetic: An Untenable Dualism," Semantics and the Philosophy ‘gf Language, Leonard Linsky, editor (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, c1952), pp. 321-24, for the difficulties in identifying synonyms in a natural language. White holds that ordinary languages, unlike artificial languages or logical systems, have no precise rules for determining analyticity. I think White is correct. 103 A denial of (A) would 223 be a self—contradiction, although the denial would contradict either an axiom or a definition in some logical system. (2) Another way of deciding the truth of (A) is Moore's intuitive method, the method of concept-inspection. One would simply inspect the concept before his mind that 'triangle' and 'figure with exactly three straight sides' denoted by him to see that it is the same concept. In this way, the denial of (A) wgulg be a self-contradiction. How could we know (C) to be true? Again, at least two different types of answers are possible. (1) In a logical system two answers are possible, although the second one is again more probable: (a) An axiom of a logical system could be 'a triangle is a triangle'. The truth of (C) would be determined by the inspection of the axioms. (b) But more likely is that some abstract statement of the law of identity would be given as an axiom. Attention only to the form of (C) would be required to discover its truth. It would not be necessary to know any meaning for 'triangle' as is necessary for determining the truth of (A).124 (C) could be determined to be true simply by formal considerations 124It is not necessary to know the meaning of 'tri- angle' for it would be stipulated that each symbol in the logical system would be univocal, that all tokens of a certain type have one and only one meaning. 104 alone. One would "see" that it is an instance of the logical law of identity. That is to say, it is a substitu- tion instance of what could be laid down as an axiom of the system. This is the procedure we would employ for determining the truth of (C) in English. I wish to call statements such as (C) 'formal logical truths'. (2) Another method of ascer- taining the truth of (C) is Moore's method of inspection. One would simply inspect the concept denoted by 'triangle' and by 'triangle' to see that it is the same concept. There is a logical difference between (A) and (C). To determine the truth of (A) one must appeal both to the semantical rules and to the axioms of a language. To deter- mine the truth of (C) one must appeal to the axioms of a system, namely, to the law of identity. Thus (A) is, to adopt Carnap's terminology; discovered to be true by both semantical and syntactical considerations, (C) by syntactical considerations alone. Moore's use of inspection as a proced- ure for determining the truth of both (A) and (C) obliterates that difference. (B) also differs from (A) and (C). The difference is that both (A) and (C) are validly convertible while (B) is not. That is to say, it is not always true that a figure with at least one side is a triangle. But this difference is not sufficient to allow one to conclude that (B) is not 105 also a logical truth. That (B) is a logical truth can be shown in at least two ways: (1) In a logical system containing basic arith- metical notions and a method of defining 'triangle' as a plane figure with exactly three straight sides, it could be deduced from 'x is a triangle' that 'x is a plane figure with exactly three straight sides'. And from 'x is a plane figure with exactly three straight sides' it could be deduced that 'x is a figure with at least one side'. In other words, in a system like English which counts 'a triangle is a plane figure with exactly three straight sides' as a definitional logical truth and which contains elementary arithmetical notions, it could be deduced that a triangle has at least one side. It could not, of course, be deduced that a figure with 125 That, though, is what at least one side is a triangle. was meant by claiming that (B) is not validly convertible. Let me call statements like (B) 'incomplete logical truths." (2) Another method, Moore's concept inspection method, could also come to the conclusion that (B) is a logical truth. By inspecting one's concept denoted by 'triangle' one could notice that the set of concepts included in that concept 125I am overlooking for the sake of simplicity the claim made by Tarski and others that English is an in- consistent language. 106 includes the concept of having at least one straight side. Such an inspection would not have yielded a full identity between concepts, but it would be a partial identity. It could be seen by inspection that it is a self-contradiction to assert that a triangle is not a figure with at least one side, but having at least one side would be seen to be a part of the concept of triangle. Thus far I have distinguished three different types of logical truths: formal logical truths, definitional logical truths, and incomplete definitional logical truth. If these distinctions be adequate, then, contrary to Moore's claim in the passage cited at the beginning of this section, it is not quite so easy as it might appear to conclude that what seems to be a universal ethical principle is in fact an identical proposition, for incomplete logical truths are never identical propositions and formal logical truths only 126 If we are to admit that there are univer- sometimes are. sal synthetic truths and that some of them are sometimes confused with logical truths, the confusion need not bei between identical propositions and synthetic truths. I wish to take a particular sybstitution instance of 'X' in the assertion form 'X is Good (m)' to further 1265.g°, 1p v ~ p' is a formal logical truth in some systems; yet it is not an identical proposition. 107 evaluate the Open Question Argument in light of the dis— tinctions between different types of logical truths. In particular, I will use the term 'pleasure' as the substi- tution instance since it is often used by Moore himself. When that substitution is made then there are two questions for our attention: (1) Is pleasure Good (m)? (2) Is pleasure pleasure? Moore held that "whoever will attentively consider with him- self what is actually before his mind" when he asks the first question "can easily satisfy himself that he is not wondering whether pleasure is pleasant." Let us ask ourselves both questions to see if what is before our minds is the same when both questions are asked. Suppose, following Moore, that what is before our minds is different. Would that show that 'pleasure is Good (m)' is not a logical truth? I wish to show that we need not draw that conclusion. 'A triangle is a triangle' and 'a triangle is a plane figure with exactly three straight sides' are both logical truths, even though the former is trivial in a sense in which the latter is not. Thus whoever would ask both 'Is a triangle a triangle?‘ and 'Is a triangle a plane figure with exactly three straight sides?' would find himself to be asking two different questions. And if he would consider 108 what is before his mind when he asks both questions, he would indeed find two different things to be before his mind. If we consider methods for obtaining answers to these questions open to one who seriously asks both questions, we will find that since the procedures for discovering the questions' answers differ the questions also differ. When one asks the former question, if he uses Moore's inspection method he need only consider his understanding of the law of identity; if the question be interpreted as being about language, he need consider only the syntactical structure of the question. When one asks the latter question, if he uses Moore's inspection method he needs to consider both his understanding of the concepts denoted by 'triangle' and 'plane figure with exactly three straight sides' and the law of identity; if the question be interpreted as being about language, he needs to consider the semantical formulas and the syntactical formulas of the language. Thus, on either method of finding an answer, both questions differ in that the methods of answering them differ. Neither question would be an open question for Moore since there is only one logically possible answer to each.127 1271 am assuming that 'triangle' and 'a plane figure having exactly three straight sides' are synonyms. If that assumption is mistaken, this entire argument in this section is irrelevant. 109 But even though both questions be closed, the asking of one is not the same as the asking of the other. And yet the assertions corresponding to both questions are logically true. Moore held that whoever asked himself 'Is pleasure Good (m)?' "could easily satisfy himself that he is not merely wondering whether pleasure is pleasant." I have tried to show that even when we take two terms which are synonymous questions analogous to Moore's example can be asked about the synonymous terms which are also different questions. Perhaps I can best illustrate my point by para- phrasing Moore: Whoever will attentively consider with himself what is actually before his mind when he asks the question 'Is a triangle a plane figure with exactly three sides?' can easily satisfy himself that he is not merely wondering whether a triangle is a triangle. Thus if this version of the Open Question Argument were telling, we should conclude that it is a fallacy to mis- takenly identify a triangle with a plane figure with exactly three straight sides. We should conclude that who- ever would assert that 'A triangle is a plane figure with exactly three straight sides' would be guilty of committing something similar to what Moore held to be the Naturalistic Fallacy, that such a person would be guilty of misidentifying two different things. Thus if the Open Question Argument 110 were telling, no definitions at all could be offered since the asking of 'Is X Y?' would always be a different question than the asking of 'Is X X?' What I have tried to do was to account for the difference between the two questions, a difference which occurs even when 'X' and 'Y' are assumed to be synonyms. If we cannot account for this difference between the two questions and if we assume the tellingness of the Open Question Argument, we will be drawn into what has been called the Paradox of Analysis. That paradox is one that I wish to avoid and one that I think can be avoided by making certain distinctions. But when those distinctions are made the Open Question Argument is again seen to be defective. I have tried to show how Moore's concept inspection procedure blurred an important distinction between two different types of logical truths and how that procedure lead to paradoxical results. That the results were para- doxical should have lead Moore to question his early theory of synonymy as identity of concepts denoted by two terms. In so far as synonymy is ascertainable by inspecting what is before one's mind, The Open Question Argument may show that .X is not identical with Good (m); but it would also show that a brother is not identical with a male sibling, a result 111 which is to be avoided if possible. In this section I have tried to answer the Open Question Argument in two of its forms. I have tried to show how a distinction is offered between the subject and predi- cate of the assertion 'X is Good (m)' which is not offered by 'X is X' even when X and Good (m) are taken to be identical concepts. By the same procedure I have tried to show why 'X is Good (m)' is not provable by the law of contradiction alone even though 'X is X' is so provable; yet I have tried to argue that that difference in the assertions does not force the conclusion that 'X' and 'Good (m)' must denote different concepts or the conclusion that 'X is Good (m)' is not analytic. Given Moore's epistemology and his ontology, the Open Question Argument does not validly yield the conclusion that "Good is not identical with any natural . . . property" or that "Propositions about the good are all of them synthetic and never analytic." Both of these assertions may be true. My thesis is only that Moore has not demonstrated them to be false through his uses of the Open Question Argument. In the remaining sections of this chapter I wish to suggest one obvious modification in Moore's ontology and one obvious modification in his epistemology and to show how the same evaluation of the Open Question Argument follows. 112 2.8 Concepts and Objects-of-Concepts. I modify Moore's position by (1) no longer looking upon objects as composed of concepts and (2) holding that concepts, not objects, are what is directly before our minds. I show that even if the difference between the questions 'Is X X?' and 'Is X Good (m)?' does establish a difference in concepts, that difference does not establish a difference in objects-of-concepts. Thus the Open Question Argument does not function as a valid method of discovering ontological difference. Suppose we assume, contrary to the Moore of "The Refutation of Idealism," that we do not directly experience objects or properties. What is before our minds when we think of X is, to continue to use the word, a concept. But now the concept is neither X itself nor a part of X; it is a concept ngX. If this simple modification be admitted, it is relatively easy to show that although two concepts may in fact be different, the difference to be disclosed by conceptual inspection, it does not follow that the objects-of—concepts differ. An example may help to make my point clearer. Narcissus fell in love with an image of himself. Suppose that in addition to his reflection in the pool with which he fell in love, he also saw an image of himself in a curved bottom of a silver bowl. At that time Narcissus would be confronted with two images: Let us call them image A and image B. Image A, the reflection in the pool, is a different image from B, the image in the silver bowl. 113 It is at least numerically different, but another difference also results from the distortion resulting from the curvature of the silver bowl which does not occur in the reflection from the flat surface of the water. Suppose Narcissus raised a question concerning the identity of image A and B. By inspecting the two images he may correctly notice that the two images are not identical. Is he justified in con- cluding that that of which they are images are not identical? Of course not. Difference in images does not necessarily imply difference in that of which they are images. In the Principia Moore maintained that intrinsic goodness was an objective property that a thing sometimes possessed, while still holding that that property was not identical with any natural property. If we make a distinc- tion which Moore made in Ethics between thinking an action to be intrinsically good and that action's being intrinsically good, 128 then we can see that even if one's concept of X is found by inspection not to be identical with one's concept of Good (m), it does not follow that X and Good (m) are not identical ig themselves. Moore appealed to the following psychological fact in the Ethics: . . . a man certainly can believe with regard to a given thing or state of things, that the idea of it 128Moore, Ethics, 92. cit., p. 102. 114 does please somebody, and is desired, and even desired for its own sake, and yet not believe that it would be at all worth while that it should exist, if it existed quite alone.129 In Moore's own words, that fact . . . shows conclusively that to judge that a thing is e intrinsically good in not the same thing as to judge that some man is pleased with it or desires it or desires it for its own sake. Unless we posit an isomorphism between concept and object- of—concept, i.e., unless we hold that that which is before our mind is the object itself as Moore held earlier, it is not the case that because one thinks the concepts to differ, the object-of—concept also differs. The same point can be put another way: Unless we posit an isomorphism between thought and reality, it does not follow that because two thoughts differ, that that of which they are thoughts also differ. One could hold that that which is before one's mind ‘when he asks 'Is X Good (m)?' is positively different from that which is before his mind when he asks 'Is X X?' Let us gm) further and assume (falsely) that the difference in the questions does constitute a difference in the concepts 'whirflitare before the mind when the questions are asked. But just as it is possible for two different words to name the 1291bid. 13°Ibid. 115 same concept or for two different images to be reflections of the same object, it is also possible for two different concepts to be concepts of the same quality, whether that quality be empirical or‘a priori and for two different thoughts to be thoughts of the same thing. This modification in Moore's theory results in the criticism of the Open Question Argument which I am now trying to present. The modification in Moore's theory consists in (1) no longer looking upon objects as composed of concepts and (2) holding that concepts, not the objects, are what is directly before our minds.131 When this MOdi- fication is made Moore can still hold to his concept inspection procedure for discovering what is before his mind and can conclude that the concepts may in fact differ. But he cannot thereby conclude that the objects of the concepts differ: he cannot conclude that X and Good (m) are different through an employment of the Open Question Argument. The concept inspection procedure as an integral part of the 131My distinction between concepts and objects-of- concepts is similar to Moore's distinction between sense data and physical objects given in Chapter II of G. E. Moore, Some Main Problems 9f Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1953); vide p. 29. These lectures were given "in the winter of 1910-11." Moore, of course, did not make the distinction as I did. But once it is admitted that what is before the mind may be different from what is external then the distinctions raised in this section can be made. 116 Open Question Argument destroys the force of that argument for proving a difference in the properties of which we have concepts. The distinction between concept and object-of—concept prohibits a valid use of the Open Question Argument as an instrument for discovering ontological difference among 132 objects-of—concepts. But it still may be held that the Open Question Argument can serve as an instrument for distinguishing differences among the meanings of the terms of our language. I shall argue in the next section that the Open Question Argument cannot serve that function either. 2.9 Meaning and Concept. I assume that 'Good (m)' does denote Good (m). I investigate in what senses 'X' may denote Good (m) without the assertor of 'X is identical with Good (m)' being aware that they denote the same concept. I delineate three senses in which a term may be said to denote the same concept as another term denotes. I show it is only when an individual is concerned with what hg means by two terms at a particular time that he can use the concept inspection procedure of the Open Question Argument to show that 'X' denotes a different concept for him at that time than does 132Henry Veatch, "On Trying to Say and to Know What's What," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXIV (September, 1963), 83-84, shows that Moore can fruitfully be interpreted as having been primarily concerned with the ontology of goodness in the Principia. Vide also Henry Veatch, "Non-Cognitivism in Ethics: A Modest Proposal for Its Diagnosis and Cure," Ethics, LXXVI (January, 1966), 104-109, for an elaboration and further clarification of that claim. 117 'Good (m)'. That result follows from the inspecting of what is before his mind: the Open Question Argument is superfluous in establishing that conclusion. Moore holds that if a person does not believe that two different terms denote the same concept, there is a sense in which the two terms are non-synonymous. This sec- tion is an attempt to specify different ways in which a person's individual awareness or lack of awareness of meaning is sufficient to establish identity or difference of meaning. In particular, I will investigate to what extent the Open Question Argument based on a person's ability to "see" a difference between the concept denoted by 'desired' and the concept denoted by 'Good (m)' establishes a difference in meaning between 'desired' and 'Good (m)'. We will discover that there is a sense of meaning in which a person's aware- ness that two terms denote the same concept is sufficient to show synonymy between the two terms and there is a sense of meaning in which a person's lack of awareness that two terms denote the same concept is sufficient to show lack of synonymy. I will introduce distinctions which imply that 'synonyny' is being used in two different senses in the preceding sentence. I will conclude that there is one sense in Which Moore has shown that 'Good (m)' is not synonymous with 'pleased', but that lack of synonymy is shown by Moore's own inspection of what is before his mind when hg 118 uses the two terms; it is not shown by the Open Question Argument. I will show that there is another sense in which Moore has not shown that 'Good (m)' is not synonymous with 'pleased' and that he has not shown that it must be non- synonymous with 'pleased'. Moore relates in his Ethics that he wishes "to concentrate attention upon one particular usage" of the word 'good'.133 Admitting that 'good' has many senses, there is one meaning of the word which he wishes to expli- cate, a meaning which we employ when we judge of a thing that "it would be worth while that it should exist, even if there were absolutely nothing else in the universe besides."134 Moore tells us that he wants to show that 'good' is at least sometimes used in this sense, a sense or concept which I earlier used the term 'Good (m)' to denote. One way of showing that there is such a sense is to show how the meaning of 'Good (m)' can be distinguished from some of the other things sometimes taken to be intrinsically good. After using the version of the Open Question Argument reported in my last section, Moore concluded that: 133Moore, Ethics, 22° cit., p. 100. 134Ibid., p. 101. 119 . . . to say that a thing is intrinsically good is not the same thing as to say that it is desired: and this follows absolutely, if even in a single case, a man believes that a thing is desired and yet does not believe that it is intfinsically good.135 '—_— Several comments on this passage are in order: First, Moore is now concerned at least in part with language; he wishes to present a meaning for the term 'good. Second, although his concern is in part with language, the units of meaning are not themselves linguistic, but are still concepts. Third, one way of expressing Moore's claim is to say that when 'good' is used in his sense, the word 'good' is not synonymous with the word 'desired'. Four, and most impor- tantly, the difference in synonymy between the two terms is established "if even in a single case, a person believes a thinins desired and yet does 223 believe that it is intrinsically good." If I do not misinterpret Moore's remarks, he holds that it takes only one person's awareness of a concept which a word may denote in order to justify that concept's being held as gag meaning of that word. Although a person may be using a word in a sense in which no other person uses it, that is still a meaning for that word. I think it is established on Moore's showing that there is such a concept as Good (m), if for no other reason than that at least Moore himself is aware of Good (m). 120 Still taking concepts to be what is before one's mind when one thinks of the meaning of a word (and ignoring the ontological status of concepts), I wish to present several senses in which it may be possible to hold that Good (m) is one possible meaning for the word 'good' and then to consider whether or not the Open Question Argument is sufficient to show that other terms must be nonsynonymous with 'good' when 'good' is used to denote Good (m). Let me speak of private intensions and of public intensions of a term in order to try to make my point clear. Let 'X' be some non-ambiguous term for an individual a. What is before the mind of that individual when he thinks of X is what I mean by the private intension of the term 'X' for a. The private intension of 'X' for b, another individual, need not be what the private intension of 'X' is for a. And the private intension of 'X' for a could vary on different occasions of a's thoughts of X. So let me call what is common to all of a's private intensions of 'X' the private necessary intension gf 'X' forg.136 136Although the phrase 'necessary intension' is borrowed from Henry S. Leonard, An Introduction :2 Principles .2: Right Reason (New York: Henry Holt and Company, c1957), pp. 243 ff., I am not using 'intension' in Leonard's sense. For Leonard, an intension of a term is "any set of char- acteristics that is common and jointly peculiar to the extension of that term." (p. 612) And the extension of a term is "the group or class of actual things to each of which 121 Let me call the set of all concepts common to all private necessary intensions of 'X' the public necessary intension Of 'X'.].37 Private necessary intensions are relative to individual users of the term; public necessary intensions are not relative in the same sense. It was stipulated that 'X' is unambiguous for a. That was to say that 'X' has one and only one private the term refers or applies." (p. 611) Since Leonard allows intension and extension to both concrete terms--terms "purporting to refer or apply to objects or events having definite locations in space and time" (p. 609)--and to abstract terms--terms purporting to "refer or to apply to things that are abstract" (p. 608)--it follows that the intension of a term for Leonard may sometimes be something physical. As I use the term, an intension is always mental in the sense that the intension is before the mind: whether the intensions also be external to the mind or only internal is a question I do not have to decide in order to make my point. Leonard's terminology is adopted here because of his distinction between the necessary and merely contingent members of an intension of a term. Although I am adopting his terminology, I am not using it in his sense either. In my use, the private contingent intension of a term for person a at time t is the total of all the concepts denoted by that term for a at time t. It is what is before his mind at time t when he thinks of X at time t. The set of concepts common to all of the different private contingent intensions of 'X' for a is the private necessary intension of 'X' for a. I use these terms because I know of no others that exactly express what I think needs to be expressed to get clear about Moore's sense of concept. 137 . . . Th1s statement clouds a lot of ep1stemolog1cal questions. For, in one sense, no concepts are common to different people, i.e., each person has only his own concepts before his mind. Yet, in another sense, each person potentially is able to think of the same thing as another person. In this latter sense, there is a possibility that a term could have a public necessary intension. 122 necessary intension for a. It is conceivable that 'X' has a completely different private necessary intension for b. And it is also conceivable that 'X' could have more than one private necessary intension for b. In both of these latter cases it would seem that the term 'X' would have no public necessary intension. But there is a way open to us to say that 'X' does have a public necessary intension and still hold that 'X' denotes different concepts for a and b and that it denotes more than one concept for b. Let us decide to use a new set of symbols to avoid confusion. Let us assume that 'X' denotes n different concepts (denotes n different private necessary intensions) and use 'X (l)', 'X (2)', . . . , 'X (n)' as symbols for the ambiguous 'X', each of which denotes one and only one of the private necessary intensions denoted by 'X'. And to be yet more precise, let 'X (1) (a)' be the symbol for what 'X (l)' denotes for a. To say now more precisely what I said very roughly earlier when I said that 'X' could have a completely different private intension for b than it does for a is to say that X (l) (a) is a different concept than is X (2) (b). To say that 'X' has more than one private necessary intension for b is to say that X (2) (b) is a different concept than is X (3) (b). To speak of the public necessary intension of 'X' 123 was to speak imprecisely. A more precise way would be to speak of the public necessary intension of 'X (k)' where 'k' denotes one and only one precise concept among the many concept denoted by 'X'. 'X (k)' would have a public necessary intension if and only if all users of the language recognize 'X (k)' to denote the same concept of which they are aware. In this way we can speak of thg_meaning of 'X (k)' but we can only speak of the meanings of 'X'. That is to say, a term has a public necessary intension if and only if all private necessary intensions of that term have a common element. Let 'Good (m)' be the term which denotes that concept of intrinsic goodness recognized by Moore. 'Good (m)' does have a private necessary intension for Moore. The only evidence that can be given and needs be given is Moore's own testimony that 'good'-—'Good (m)' to use my terminology--denotes a concept for Moore. Could a speaker be using two different terms to denote the same concept and yet not be aware that it was the same concept? That is to ask in this context, can a person be using synonymous terms without being aware that they are synonymous? In particular, does the fact that a person can be sure that something is desired while doubting that that thing is identical with Good (m) show that 'desired' and 'Good (m)' do not denote the same concept? 124 In order to distinguish between the momentary concept and the continuing concept which a term denotes for an individual I will use the phrases 'private contingent intension of "X" for a at time t' and 'private necessary intension of "X" for a'. The private contingent intension of 'X' for a at time t is what is before a's mind when he thinks of X at a particu- lar time t. It is, in a sense, the concept which 'X' denotes for a at time t. The private necessary intension of 'X' for a is the element or elements common to all of the private contingent intensions of 'X' for a. It is, in another sense, the concept which 'X' denotes for a. With these distinctions before us, we can see that the question with which we are concerned can be interpreted as at least four different questions. When 'X'and 'Y' are the two different terms, the question 'Can a speaker be using two different terms to denote the dame concept and yet not be aware that it is the same concept?‘ can be seen as an ambiguous question which may be interpreted to meani at least the following: (1) Can 'X' and 'Y' have the same private contingent intension for a at time t if a is not aware of the sameness of intension? (2) Can 'X' and 'Y' have the same private necessary intension for a if a is not aware of the sameness of intension? (3) Can the private necessary intension of 'X' for a 125 be the same as the private contingent intension of 'Y' for a at time t if a is not aware of any sameness? (4) Can the private contingent intension of 'X' for a at time t be the same as the private necessary intension of 'Y' for a if a is not aware of any sameness? It is important that we keep these questions distinct. These questions could be asked by a or about a by another person. I wish to consider them only as being asked by a in order to see if the Open Question Argument will help a in giving an answer to them. Since we are only concerned with the question of a's using two different terms to denote the same concept, we do not have to consider the private necessary or contingent intensions of 'X' and 'Y' for anyone other than a. Neither need we consider the public necessary intensions of 'X' and 'Y' at this stage. As the next paragraph will show, the Open Question Argument does not allow a to decide if his private necessary inten- sions for 'X' and 'Y' are the same or not. The Open Question Argument can yield Moore's result only when it is applicable to question (1) above. It is not telling in all instances to the other three because they all ask, in part or in whole, about the private necessary intensions of the terms for a. Since it is at least possible for a speaker not to be completely aware at any time of all 126 the constituents which go to make up his private necessary intension of a term, it may not be obvious to him at any given moment which constituents are common to all of his uses of a term. When he lacks such an awareness, his asking 'Is X Y?' could be significant without the necessity of his concluding that X and Y are not the same concept for him. The significance of his question results from an interpretation similar to that given by Mrs. Warnock, viz., 'Is my analysis correct?'138 To ask 'Is my analysis correct?’ in this context is to ask 'Is the private necessary intension of "X" for me the same as is the private necessary intension of "Y" for me?‘ They could be the same and he be unaware of it. That is not the type of question that could be answered by inspection of what is before his mind at the momment. Perhaps it could not be answered at all. Similar remarks may be made about questions (3) and (4). To the extent that they are questions about private necessary intensions and to the extent that the questioner be unsure about his private necessary intensions, the Open Question Argument does not prove a lack of identity between private necessary intension and private contingent intension at time t. 138Mary Warnock, Ethics Since 1900 (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 25. 127 It is only to the considerations raised in question (1) that the Open Question Argument is always relevant. A speaker could not be unsure of what was the private 139 contingent intension of a term at time t for him. The speaker could be sure by inspection what a term 'X' meant to him at time t,i.e., he could be sure of the private contingent intension of 'X' at t. He need only to look into his mind to discover that particular private contingent intension. Thus, any significant question of the form 'Is the private contingent intension of "X" at time t the same for me as the private contingent intension of "Y" for me at time t?' would show that the concepts are not identical. For, if when he inspected the two concepts he would have found them different, he could not significantly raise the question. The answer would be immediately obvious to him; the question would not be an open question to him: he could See that the concepts were not identical. ‘ 13 9Of course it may be objected that by the time the Open Question Argument can be raised, it would no longer be time t. And that at time t plus n, because of the -fallibility of human memory, the questioner cannot be sure Qf'what the private contingent intensions of his terms at 'time t was. To the extent that this objection is telling, 3I would have to conclude that the Open Question Argument does ruzt succeed in proving or disproving identity of denotation CH? private contingent intensions at time t for a questioner. 3hl the body of the paper I am acting on the assumption that 1&1e time lag between use, inspection, and question is not important . 128 I conclude from the above remarks that there is at least one sense in which a person could be using two differ— ent terms to denote the same concept and not be aware that his terms do denote the same concept. This sense of concept is what I have tried to suggest by the phrase 'private necessary intension of a term "X" for a'. When 'concept' be interpreted in this way, the significance of the Open Question cannot be taken as proof that the concepts differ. There is another sense in which a person could be using two different terms to denote the same concept and could not be unaware that his terms do denote the same concept. This sense of 'concept' is what I have tried to suggest by the phrase 'private contingent intension of a term "X" for a at time t'. When 'concept' be interpreted in this way the significance of the Open Question can be taken as proof that the two concepts are different £25 the questioner. The insignificance of the Open Question can be taken as proof that the concepts are identical £25 the speaker. Moore claimed that the concept which I am denoting by 'Good (m)' has a "distinct meaning" and "everybody is constantly aware of this notion."140 Suppose a person said 14oPE, p. 17. 129 to Moore: "I do not find any such concept as the one you tried to present in the Principia. I am aware that the word 'good' is ambiguous and can be used in many different senses, but I denote by 'Good (m)' the same concept which I denote by, say, 'desired'." How could Moore respond to such a person? It seems to me that at least two different kinds of reply are open to Moore: (1) From the fact that a speaker used the same term as Moore, i.e. 'Good (m)' or 'intrinsic goodness', it does not follow that the speaker uses the term to denote the same concept as Moore uses it to denote. The worst we can say about the speaker is that he is misusing the term 'Good (m)'. Moore took that term and tried to give it a precise meaning. He tried to have it to refer to one and only one concept. If the speaker intends to refer to a different concept, then, for ease and possibility of clear communication, he should use a different term, say, 'Good (d)'. And for that speaker 'Good (d)' and say 'desired' would denote identical concepts. In admitting that tokens of the type 'good' were ambiguous, Moore implicit- ly admits the possibility that tokens of the type 'good' could sometimes be used as synonyms for natural properties. (2) Moore could reply that such a person who uses 'Good (m)' as a synonym for 'desired' is confused. Moore's 130 reply would be that such a person has confused Good (m) with something else; he has confused two different concepts. This reply could be based only on Moore's own intuition, on his own inspection--which on his own showing is not verdical. But what if the person based his reply also on his own intuition and truthfully reported that he did not find himself to be making such a confusion? It seems to that there would be no way to settle the dispute. But what if the dispute between Moore and his opponent be about public intensions and not about private intensions? What if 'concept' be interpreted as public necessary inten— sions? The public necessary intension of 'Good (m)' is the set of all concepts common to all private necessary intensions of 'Good (m)'. The Open Question Argument now becomes relevant. On the assumption that a person is clear about the private necessary intension of 'Good (m)' for him, his asking 'Is that which we desire to desire (to use one of Moore's common examples) Good (m)?' could serve as an indication of whether or not that which we desire to desire is to be excluded from the public necessary intension of 'Good (m)'. For the significance of the question to him would show that that which we desire to desire is not a part of his private necessary intension of 'Good (m)'; and, thus, since it cannot be common to all private necessary intensions 131 if it be excluded from his, it is not a part of the public necessary intension of the term. My notion of public necessary intension of a term's having to include what is common to all private intensions of that term is at least in keeping with the spirit of Moore's claim cited above that an individual's recognition of a proposed definition is requisite before such a definition could be considered the meaning of that term. But if the question be insignificant, he cannot conclude that that which we desire to desire is part of the public necessary intension of the term. Before he could draw that conclusion, he must investigate all other private necessary intensions. All that he can conclude is that it is a part of his private necessary intension. When the Open QuestiOn Argument does work, its force is opposite to Moore's intension. We may conClude, then, that the Open Question Argument can be used to show that some concept X is not part of the concept denoted 'Good (m)' when 'concept' is interpreted as public necessary intension. To eliminate )(zfrom the concept of 'Good (m)' would take only one Pextson's failure to recognize it as part of that concept. I“kicznre's failure to recignize a particular X as part of his (NNrcept is the only fact to which we need appeal in order to Conclude that the concept denoted by 'Good (m)' does not 132 contain X as a part of its public necessary intension. I have concluded that the Open Question Argument does not yield the conclusion Moore thought it to yield when 'concept' be interpreted as the private necessary intension of a term. The fact that the Open Question Argument can be significantly raised shows only that the questioner is unsure about the private necessary intensions of his terms. When 'concept' is interpreted as private contingent intension at time t, the Open Question Argument has more force. When an individual wishes to determine if two terms denote the same concept for him at any given time, he can raise the question 'Is X Y?' to see if it is significant. If it is significant, he may conclude that the two terms denote different concepts; and if it is insignificant, he may conclude that the two terms denote the same concept. But if inspection be included as an essential part of the .procedure, then the actual raising of the question is superfluous. For all that he needs to do is to inspect the ‘concepts to see if they are the same or not. If they are or are not, he can tell by direct inspection. Thus there 1h; no need for him to even raise the Open Question Argument. infia essential and telling part of the Open Question Ar91.1ment is not the raising of the Open Question; it is the inspection of one's own concepts. The most the procedure 133 allows one to conclude is about how he uses terms. He cannot conclude from his usage that others use the Same terms either differently or the same, or that his usage is different from those of others. When 'concept' is interpreted as public necessary intension, the Open Question Argument can be used to rule out certain concepts (i.e., certain private necessary intensions) from the public necessary intension of 'Good (m)'. But this is not to say that other terms of the type 'good' do not include those concepts as part of their pub- lic necessary intensions. Since 'good' is ambiguous, it is to be expected that several public necessary intensions are associated with 'good'. We may show by a use of the Open Question Argument that 'Good (m)' does not include any empirical concept as part of its public necessary intension; the question still to be answered is: Does it have a public necessary intension? I have tried to show how there may be at least two different senses of 'meaning' even if we assume Moore's