~ v- 7 «un-v- -vnv-.~.~..‘.h‘§

AN ANALYSIS 0F SIOU'I‘HEAST ASIAN NATIONS ‘
WITH REGARD TO THEIR POSSESSION OI? SOME
PREuCONDITiONS FOR MEMBERSHIP IN AN
ECONOMIC UNION

Thais for the Degree 0? M. A.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
WIIIiam T. Bucklin
1962f

LIBRARY

Michigan State
Univaéfy

 

ABSTRACT
AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS WITH REGARD
TO THEIR POSSESSION OF SOME PRE-CONDITIONS
FOR MEMBERSHIP IN AN ECONOMIC UNION

by William T. Bucklin

Karl Deutsch,l Ernst Haas,2 James Meade,3 and others iden-
tified some requisites for political and economic integration.
Several of these pre-conditions and others are analyzed to
determine if any Southeast Asian nations are capable of initia-
ting an economic union. Data from two functioning economic
unions, the European Coal and Steel Community and the Latin
American Free Trade Area, are used for comparative purposes.

Formation.of a union requires a broad range of regional
and international contacts among potential members; Southeast
Asian contacts are examined in Chapter II as are several recent
pr0posals for union. Integration also depends on the existence
of similar(though not necessarily high) economic develOpment
levels among members so data on seventeen statistical indices
are examined for the three regions to ascertain averages,
extremes, and ranges of variation in develOpment for nations in
these regions. Some of the most important pre-conditions are
those for which statistical data were not available. These are
examined in.Chapter V and include: similarities in governmental
leader backgrounds, political institutions and programs, his-
torical and contemporary relations, political and economic
nationalism, attitudes of major governments and United Nations

agencies, and administrative capabilities of these nations.
Several limitations restrict the study's reliability and

weaken the conclusions so major findings are presented in the

William T. Eunkirn

form of hypotheses. These findings are:
(l) the Philippines, Malaya, and Thailand are ready to
undertake economic integration that is scheduled to deepen
only as these nations' capabilities increase;
(2) Indonesia and Burma, when willing, could participate in
an economic union that involves no supranational control
and allows increasing activity as their abilities to carry
out responsibilities increase;
(3) South Vietnam and Cambodia could, if willing, undertake
limited regional economic cooperation not involving union
or supranational control, but would not benefit their
nations or others much;
(4) Laos is probably cOOperating economically to the extent
of the nation's capabilities, and remains unsuited for
membership or association in.any economic union.

Finally, it is suggested that the Association of Southeast
Asian States, an.incipient economic union, satisfies the cape-
bilities, if not yet the needs of the region. But direct
support of this Association.by the United States might solidify
already existing ideological divisions in Southeast Asia.

1Kari Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the North
Atlantic Area, (Princeton, 1957).

239s Uniting of Eurong, (Stanford, 1958).
3Bro‘blems of Economic Union, (Chicago, 1953).

AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS wITR REGARD
To THEIR POSSESSION OF SOME PER-CONDITIONS
FOB MEMBERSHIP IN AN ECONOMIC UNION

BY

William T. Bucklin

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State Univerersity
in.partia1 fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

1962

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to acknowledge his personal
indebtedness to his Thesis Chairman, Ralph H. Smuckler, and
to the members of his Committee, Guy H. Fox and Robert
Scigliano, for their invaluable guidance and advice during
the writing of this paper.

Special thanks also go to Bruce L. Smith who did so
much to clarify the author's thoughts during the early
stages of thesis preparation and to Jason S. Finkel who,
while serving as interim Thesis Chairman, was a real
inspiration.

Appreciation is also extended to the Michigan State
University.Library Staff whose unfailing courtesy and
consideration.were equalled only by the promptness of the
Inter-Library Loan Department in locating materials.

Finally, to my wife whose confidence and quiet
encouragement are real incentives and to my son, 'both of
whom bore the brunt of the author's frustrations, go my

heartfelt appreciation and gratitude.

11

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
PREFACE O O o o e e e e o o o o e o 0 e e o o e o o o e 11

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . ; . . . . . . . . . . v
LIST OF APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . ; . . . . . vii

Chapter
I. INTRODUCTION, METHOD, AND THEORY . . . . . . . 1

Introduction

Definitions, Sources for Pre-conditions,
and Methodology

Summary

II. SOME SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS FOR REGIONALISM
AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION . . . . . ._. . . . . 26

Arguments Favoring Regionalism
Economic Regionalism
Summary

III. SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
CONTACTS SINCE 1945 . . . . . . . , . . . . . 35

Asian Conferences

Regional Security Groupings

Regional Economic Groupings

Shared Sentiments and Unofficial Regional
Contacts

Effect of Regional Interaction in Integrative
Tendencies in Southeast Asia

Proposals for Political and Economic Integration
in Southeast Asia

Summary of Regional COOperation.in
Southeast Asia

IV. COMPARISONS OF DEVELOPMENT INDICES IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA, ECSC, AND LAFTA . . . . . . . 67

Basic Social Conditions

Economic Prosperity

Export Diversification, Regional Trading,
Industrialization, and Artificial Trade
Barriers

Iiii

Chapter

Communications and Transportation
Facilities

Compatibility of Major Value Systems

Summary of Findings

V. THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL FACTORS UPON
INTEGRATIVE TENDENCIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA . .

Similarities Among TOp Governmental Leaders,
Political Institutions, and Political
Programs

Similar Historical Backgrounds and Amicable
Contemporary Relations

Political and Economic Nationalism

Attitudes of Some Major Governments and
United Nations Agencies

Administrative Capabilities

VI. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY, SUMMARY OF FINDINGS,
AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

APPENDIX C O O O C O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 O O O C

BIBLIOGRAPHY O O O O O O O I O Q r.- O O O O O O O O O 0

iv

Page

107

. 151
168
172

Table
l.

2.

A.
5.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

LIST OF TABLES

Southeast Asian Attendance at Conferences
and Memberships in Regional Groupings . .

Southeast Asian Data on POpulation'
Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Averages, Extremes, and Ranges of Variation
of the Above Indices for Southeast Asia,
IAFTA, and ECSC O O O O O O O O O O O O 0

Southeast Asian Data on Economic Prosperity

Averages, Extremes, and Ranges of variatiOn
of the Above Indices for Southeast Asia,
WTA’ and ECSC O O O O O O O O O O O . O 0

Southeast Asian Data on Primary Exports,
Regional Trading, Industrial Output,
and Customs Tax Revenues . . . . . . . .

Averages, Extremes, and Ranges of variatiOn
of the Above Indices for Southeast Asia,
META, and E080 I O O O O O O O O O O O 0

Southeast Asian Data on Communications
Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Southeast Asian Data on TranSportation
Facilities 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0

Averages, Extremes, and Ranges of Variation
of COmmunications Indices for Southeast
Asia, LAFTA, and E080 . . . . . . . . . .

Averages, Extremes, and Ranges of Variation
of Transportation Indices for Southeast
Asia, LAFTA, and E080 . . . . . . . . . .

Percentage Estimates of Minority Group
Representation in Southeast Asian
Pepulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

57

7O

75
76

80

81

88

89

9O

93

93

94

I‘

Table Page

13. Summary of Southeast Asian Nations More
Similar on Economic Development Indices
Than Either ECSC or LAFTA Members . . . . . . 104

14. Backgrounds of Southeast Asian Governmental
Leaders . C C C O . O C C O O O C O O O O O O 109

15. Characteristics of Political Institutions
and Governing Parties in Southeast
Asian Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

16. Summary of Southeast Asian Similarity

Rankings on Four Groups of Economic
Development Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15?

vi

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix

I. Indices of Economic Deve10pment for
ECSC and LAFTA . . . . . . . . . . . . 168

II. Volumes of Total Trade in US Dollars

Between Nations in ECSC, LAFTA,
and Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . . 170

711

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION, METHOD, ALD THEOBI

INTRODUCTION

The Problem

 

There is a desire among some Southeast Asian policy-
makers and others to form a Southeast Asian regional economic
union, but considerable doubt persists as to whether the
leaders in these nations possess the capabilities for carrying
out the responsibilities of membership in a union.1 This
doubt derives from estimates of Southeast Asian capabilities
in general and not from a systematic analysis of specific
conditions that seem to have facilitated formation of other
unions. It has been argued that if an economic union is to be
successful, a number of prerequisite conditions must prevail
within and between potential member nations. Several studies
have outlined some pre-conditions which are thought to be

desirable for members of various types of political and econ-

omic unions and some of these have been.adapted for use in.

 

1The term "economic union" is used in a general sense to
describe any multilateral agreement among nations that permits
some degree of coordination upon Specified economic matters.
Soutneast.Asia, in this paper, includes the nations of Burma,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaya, the Philippines, Thailand,
and South Vietnamm

N

this analysis.2 To these pre-conditions the author has added
several which seem relevant to the particular situation in
Southeast Asia. And this paper seeks to determine the extent

to which the nations in Southeast nsia possess some of these
pre-conditions.

Data from two functioning economic unions, the European
Coal and Steel Community(SCSC) and the Latin America Free
Trade Association(LAFTA), that, presumably, possessed these
pre-conditions are employed to indicate the minimum pre—con-
ditions desired for successful union. It is eXpected that any
Southeast Asian nations approaching the pre-conditions possessed
by ECSC or LAFTA members would probably be able to undertake
some type of economic union successfully if other conditions
that are relevant to the particular situation in Southeast Asia

but which cannot be compared in this way are favorable.

thlVationS for Southeast Asian

—_

Interests in Economic Union

Southeast Asian interests in economic regionalism predate

ixmld War 11,3 but a marked increase of interest among the

g

2Karl w. Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the
§grth,atlantic Area, (PfIfiEEfon, 1957if‘LincoIn Jordon, "Econ—
Omlc.Hegionalism‘Heconsidered," World Politics, 13(January
1961)231—253; Ernst B. Baas, TheBUniting of nurOpe, (Stanford,
1958); C. Grove Haines, ed., EurOpean‘IntegratIOn, (Baltimore,
1957); James Reade, Problems of Soonomic‘Union, (ChiCago,
1953);.Bolf Sannwald and Jacdues ptohler, noonomic Integration,
(frinceton, 1959).

 

 

 

 

 

 

3K. h. Panikkar, "Regional Organization for the Indian
gcean.Area," Pacific Affairs, 18(September l945)2b6—251. Hilton
meyer, "Regional COOperatIOn in Southeast Asia," Columbia
Journal of International Affairs, 3(Spr1ns ”WWW.—

,“

3
region's national leaders has occurred during the last four
years. A number of official statements, government preposals,
and at least one detailed study of the problemAL since 1958
are indicative of this growing inter st and warrant discussion
later in this paper. At least three motIVations have contrib—
uted to this growing interest in Southeas Asian economic
regionalism.

Southeast Asia, during and since world war II, has been
a region of strategic importance to the major world powers
whose leaders often seek to influence policy-making in South-'
east Asian nations.5 It has been a continuing task of South-
east Asian government leaders to maximize the achievement of
desired political, economic, and social objectives without
subjecting their nations anew to the strictures of political
or economic imperialism. hany of these leaders have come to
feel that the disprOportionate influence of larger, richer,
or belligerent nations can be countered only by a concerted
and unified effort within the region as a whole.

The short—lived Japanese Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity

6

Sphere, the several Asian and Southeast Asian conferences

convened since world war II, and the memberships of these

nations in contemporary regional or international groups have

¥

——

Q “"Begional Co-Operation," Interim heport by the Executive
Uecretary, ECAFB, United Nations Publication, (New Delhi, 31
January 1961).

k SBussell H. Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia:
14245-192, (New York 1958), pp. Iz-I5 and fi‘irougumft. *

6

 

This plan is discussed in Ibid, pp. 27-31.

all led to a greater appreciation of the 00mmon problems to

be faced and have contributed to the belief that united,
COOperative action on a regional basis might alleviate some of
these problems.

Progress in implementing the EurOpean Eccnomic Community
(which has paralleled and probably contributed to an increase
in the economic welfare of its members) and the existence of
other economic unions pose both a negative threat and a
positive example for Southeast Asian policy—makers. Members
of the Burcpean Economic Community(hEC) and the Commonwealth
grant their overseas territories association that includes
preferential treatment for many commodities of trade. As a
result, the individual nations of Southeast Asia fear deter-
ioration of their bargaining power and terms of trade; they
eXpect increasing competition from the associated nations and
territories. The examples of EEG, the Commonwealth, and other
economic unions have also led Southeast Asian leaders to
believe that higher rates of economic growth might be possible

within a union.

Egportance of Economic Union in Southeast Asia

The formation of an economic union in Southeast Asia
would probably contribute to better political and economic
relations between regional members as well as between members
and other nations. A regional economic union might also:
(1) Contribute to the expansion of world trade in that consumers

uitiliZing the products of Southeast Asia would benefit from

A-I

 

\

.u¢«\

any further rationalisation of trade relations within the
region. (2) It could be a deterrent to war, both world—wide
and local, for naticns with econcmies intertwined might find
itciifficult to arm against each other. (3) An economic union
might further stabilization and expansion of the members'
econouues and thereby serve to strengthen and gerpetuate the
non-Ccmmmnist governments now in power. (4) It could also
increxise the ability of members to attract private as well as
PUblic>sddq thus making develogment programs in these nations
mOressecure. (5) And finally, it could be the beginning of
broader functional relationships among; these nations. In view
0f tunese important possibilities, it is believed that analyzing
tl”leexistence of some pre-conditions for union is of concern

tHD contemnorary politiCal scientists.

[7
L11
’2’}
H
47
H
*3
H
9
4-1
J]
a
U)
C
C}
{I}
O
D]
'1
( )
{U
"U
{'11
[1'1
I
O
S
H
' *3
H
{2
a

D
.fzginitions
Southeast Asia, in this taper, includes the nations of
‘D
"urma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Halaya, the Philippines,

Thailand, and South Vietnam. This definition conforms in

7

general to that of other writers concerned with geOQraphical
Or Politic l boundaries except that this paper excludes
British North Borneo, Netherlands New Guinea, Sarawak, Brunei,

and other colonial possessions because they are not considered
\

7For definitions of the region, see: Milton Meyer, “Reg-
1011111 COOperation in Southeast Asia," Journal of International
Affairs, 3(Spring 19u9)68. Francis G. carnell, “Southeast ASia
an 6 Modern world,' India Quarterly, 13(April-June l957)lOl-
120- Charles A. Fisher, "The Concept of South East Asia,"

mm World, 7(March 1953)12.

"1

0\

free agents in the conduct of political affairs.7 The Demo-
cratic Republic of North Vietnam is also excluded because:

(1) its trade with other Southeast Asian nations is negligible
and, (2) its membership would, at this time, be unacceptable
toxmost other Southeast Asian nations.

Technical terms that reduire definition at the outset
ineliuie association, organization, sugranational body, inte-
graticmn and golitical community; other terms are defined as
they (occur in the gaper.

An association is usually the least compliCated of reg-

 

iOnaJ. ties and, for the purposes of this paper, is any con-
tdlnling c00peration on a voluntary basis between two or more
melkxar nations in functions defined by treaty or by mutual
umlerstanding. members are not bound to abide by decisions of
alwf superior authority with regard to the snecified functions.8
IWNB British Commonwealth and the ;terling Area are examples

Of associations.

An organization is any continuing voluntary agreement
.between two or more naticns providing for coOperation in
S9eoific functions under sgecified circumstances. Authority
OVeP these functions may or may not be vested in a superior
authority, but an organization must gossess both continuous

formal institutions and fixed procedures of Operation. Examples
\

n t 8A similar definition is given by E. N. Van Kleffens,
Tue Case for Eurogean Integration: Political Considerations,"
9 C. Grove haines, ed., European Integration, (Baltimore,

1957), p. 80.

 

a/n
‘.

~1

of well-known regional organizations are the north Atlantic
Treaty Organization(NATO) and the Organization of American
States.

A superior authority to which members of an organization
may have delegated Specified and defined powers is termed a
Eggumniational body. although a distinction between unitary or
fedexmil sugranational bodies is imgortant administratively and
ma‘~I>"1:rofoundly affect the initiation or success of a regional
orgelrization, this distinction between tyges is not made in
this paper.9

Integration is a process by which Specified and defined

 

fiuurtions of two or more independent nations are voluntarily
delfifigated to the sugervision and control of a supranational
bO£13310 Integration may proceed in: (l) deoth, or number of
ftunztions involved; (2) scoge, or number of nations included;
and” (3) the rate at which new functions or members are incor-
PGrated into the agreement. The highest degree of integration
is unification of the nations involved and is achieved when
every government function, politiCal and econOmic, has been

transferred to the sugranational body.
\

 

9For the importance of administrative organization to

lieélonal grougings, see: Ernst B. naas, "Regionalism, Func-
10Ilalism, and Universal International Organization,” horld

POlitics, 8(January l956)238—263. Max Beloff, "Federalisfifas
§EFEEEI—for International Integration," Yearbook of World
Sing, 13 (1959)1ee-2ou.

 

loVan Kleffens, Op. cit., p. 80.

Integration supposedly leads to the formation of a

political community.ll A political community at the regional

 

level has been formed when the pOpulations concerned consis-
tently give allegiance to the supranational body rather than
the national government in matters related to the integrated

functions.12

§Enuu3es for the Pro-Conditions of Economic Union

Two analyses of actual integration processes and several
eccnuamic studies of requirements for econcmic unions have
mextributed to the framework emnloyed in this paper.

Karl Deutsch, in COOperation with eight other social
Scifindtists and historians, conducted an extensive historical
Siflkiy of ten integrations that occurred in Europe between the
Ifliddle Ages and the early Twentieth Century.13 These authors
‘Nere concerned with two types of integration, amalgamated and
1ildlralistic. Amalgamation involved the merger of two or more
independent units and the creation of a supranational body
while pluralistic integration coordinated activities between
members continuously over a period of time, but retained the
national decision-making centers. The following conditions
Were identified in the study as being "essential" in most

C“milgamated integrations:
\

llErnst B. Haas, The Uniting of EurOpe, (Stanford, 1958),

 

p. 5. Cited hereafter as’Uniting.
12Ibid.
13

W Karl W. Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the
*OPth Atlantic Area, (PrffiEEEEn, I957). Cited‘hereafter as
.2l_E}9aIICommunity.

 

(l) mutual compatibility of main values; (2) a distinctive

Gt

way of life; (3) expectations of stronger economic ties or
gains; (4) a marked increase in political and administrative
capabilities of at least some participating units; (5)
superior economic growth on the part of at least some
participating units; (6) unbroken links of social commun-
ication, both geographically and sociologically between
different social strata; (7) a broadening of the political
elite; (8) mobility of persons, at least among the poli-
tically relevant strata; and, (9) a multiplicity of ranges
of communication and transaction.14
Amalgyamated integration probably required cooperation by
membermsin.associations and organizations performing a fairly
wid£:;range of different common functions and services.15
"Helgxful" conditions included "previous administrative and/or
dyrkustic union; etnnic or linguistic assimilation; strong
SCCHMJmic ties; and fereign military threats."l6
Ernst Haas, in The Uniting of EurOpe, analyzed some of
timi conditions surrounding develOpment of tne EurOpean Coal
Steel Community(ECSC) and the EurOpean Economic Community.17
study focused upon the attitudes and expectations of groups
elites before and after ECSC was founded and was primarily
‘3Oncerned with ECBC'S importance as a "pilot project" leading,
by a process of "function spill—over” to the political inte-
gration of EurOpe. Some conditions Haas found important to
integration were: similar cultural, legal, and economic back-
EPOUnds; fragmentation of ideological and social Opinion;
mutuality of interests in selected elites; basically identical
political institutions and practices; similar political pro-

grams; and, a lack of controversial politiCal issues between
\

lulbid, p. 58. 16Ibid, p. 44.

 

15EB$§2 p. 54° 173niting, Op. cit.

I}

n

10

members.18

Acceptance Of scoc was also eased by a tradition
among industrial, political, and labor groups "Of mutual
consultation and rudimentary value sharing through past assoc—
iations Of members;" another helpful condition was the existence
Of a real or imagined external threat.l9

Two theoretical studies by economists as well as several
shorter analyses Of EurOpean and latin.nmerican economic

20 These economists stress

unions contributed to this study.
the desirability for nations attempting integration tO achieve
similarity in their economic infrastructures as quickly as
possible. A relative freedom of movement Of goods, capital,
and labor throughout the region presupposes similarity in
prices and qualities Of goods, investment Opportunities, wages,
and labor conditions in all member nations.21 Maintaining a
balance Of payments between members probably requires eventual
adOption Of a common currency, variable exchange rates, or a
common fund from which tO compensate members for differences in

trade balances.22 In addition, institutions with adequate

l8ibid,,p. 290.
19Ibid, p. xiii.

20The two theoretical works are: James Reade, Problems Of
Economic Union, (Chicago, 1953); and, Rolf mannwald and
Jacques—StOhIEr, Economic Integration, (Princeton, 1959). The
shorter works are listed in fOiIOming notes.

 

 

 

21 i a - . i
Giuseppe fella, "The Coal and steel Community as a Case
Study in Integration," in Haines, Op.cit., p. 140. see also:
Vu auoc Thuc, "Economic DevelOpmenE in southeast Asian Coun-
tries," Asian Culture, 2(January-Harch l960)l-32.

22

 

Meade, above, pp. 39-55.

I:

ll

authority to enforce compliance with measures must be designed
to bring about the above conditions.23 Finally, a level of

trade, existing or eXpected, between members must provide a

.21

financial return equal to or above the eXpense of forning and
perating the regional organization.

As with the pre-conditions posited by Deutsch and naas,
some of these economic reguirements can be fulfilled after the
union has been achieved, but their prior existence would
probably facilitate integration.

Eany of the pre-conditions given in the above studies
are so formulated that they cannot be examined in full with
data presently available to the author. After attempting to
use Deutsch's methodology, Peter Bohn concluded that the
concepts are too general and unobjective; reinterpretation and

simplification are needed to analyze other integ ation
24 i
processes. nata are unavailable, for example, to indicate
a“

fully the degree of social communication or the amount of

interaction among selected elites.25 Ernst Haas' procedure,

—-‘

23Galo Plaza, "For a Regional fiarket in Latin America,"

Foreign Affairs, 37(July l959)6l5. "The Common harket and Its
H§lation to a Free Trade Area," Round Table, 191(June 1958)2H5.
For these and other conditions important—to the success of
eGenomic unions, see: Fred H. Sanderson, “The Five-Iear ther-.
ience of the EurOpean Coal and steel Community," International
QPganization, 12(beptember l958)l93-200; Haines, Op.cit., pp.

— , , 22-123; Lincoln Gordon, "NATO and EurBEEZfi_Inte-
Eration,“ World Politics, lO(January l958)221.

 

 

 

 

‘ 2n"Testing Deutsch's Indices of Conmunity," Political
heswarch: Organization and Design, 2(september 1959)7-9.

 

 

25Ibid, p. 9.

too, is difficult to apply without conducting on-the—Spot
investigations and interviews. And in addition, he believes
his method applicable only to societies that are highly
develOped politically, economically, and socially and writes:
"I would hesitate to claim validity for it in the study of
regional political integration in Latin gmeriCa, the middle
East, or Sout‘-nast Asia."26 To indicate fully the pre-
conditions suggested by economists would also go beyond the
SCOpe of this paper; it would probably reauire a detailed

study of the national economies of all potential members.

hethodolog

 

Because of the difficulties in replicating the studies of
these pre-conditions mentioned above, the writer used these
studies as a guide in selecting for analysis a number of
related conditions for which information is available. Some
of these conditions are less inclusive than those suggested
by other students of integration, but all permit using readily
available information on the subject. Southeast Asian nations
are examined to ascertain develOpment conducive to integration
in the eleven pre-conditions that follow.

(1) A Broad Range of Regional and International Contacts.
The importance of regional and international interaction has
been stressed by Ernst Haas, Karl Deutsch, and James heade.

(a) Both Haas and Deutsch found that integration

was promoted by prior cooperation by nations

 

26Uniting, pp. xv-xvi.

13

in associations and organizations gerforming
a fairly wide range of different common
functions and services. In another study,
Alas suggests focusing on existing regional
institutions to facilitate study of integrative
tendencies in non-western settings.27
(b) Meade has suggested that it is esgecially
desirable for union members to belong to the
same security pact.28 This would provide
more security for members' interests in each
other's economies and ease balance of payments
problems by allowing joint decision—making and
greater Specialization of military preparations.
These regional and international contacts in Southeast
Asia since 1945 are examined in Chapter III using documents and
seccndary source materials. Attention is given to: (l) the
range of memberships and attendance, (2) the influence of
external participants, (3) the degree of coordination or control
achieved and, (4) the extent of involvement with economic
matters.
(2) Similarity in Basic iocial Conditions. Education
levels, numbers of persons urbanized, and sizes of agricultural

sectors indiCate social conditions that influence integrative

 

27"The Challenge of Resionalism," International Organi-
zation, 12(Autumn l958)456.

2809. cit., p. 27.

 

l4

tendencies.
(a) High levels of education and urbanization are
likely to contribute to social communication
and the formation of common political attitudes

-

that Deutsch and Haas found conducive to

integration.29

(b) Large agricultural sectors are apt to hinder
integration because gersons engaged in agri-
cultural gursuits are usually less recegtive
to new experiences.30 Then, too, governments
have been reluctar t to e:<;ose agricultural
groducts to free exchange31 because most of
these products face an inelastic demand and
falling prices.32

(3) Similarity in Economic Prosgerity. Some indication

of prOSperity within a nation is obtained by examining per

 

29Gabriel A. Almond and Jaxes 5. Coleman, The Politics
of the Develoning Areas, (Princeton, 1960), p. #75. ”B.5.
Hodder, ”Deiograthic’lhfluences on Economic Development in
Southeast Asia," in Philip Thayer, ed., Nationalism and ErOgress
in Free Asia, (Baltimore, 1956), o. 221.

30Ibid.

31Meade, op.cit., pp. 26—27; Sannwald and Stohler, op.cit.,
pp. 79-82. Ego—memssfs, in order to implement Stafle Two of the
Home Treaty on schedule, had to agree on agricultural tariff
reductions before 31 December 1961. This was accomplished only
after the 31 December meeting was extended without formal
adjournment until the middle of January, 1962. bee: New York
Times, (14 January 1962). Agricultural products have so far
Been excluded from the rCVisicns of the LA11A Treaty.

 

 

 

 

 

32The inelasticity of demand for agricultural products is
.noted in: Raul Brebisch, "Comnercial Eolicy in the Underdev-
elgted Countries," American Loonomic Review, 49(hdy 1/59)255-

 

1")

l5

capita incom , cost of living, and economic growth.

(a) harmonization of econ mic conditions must be
achieved sooner or later to permit a relative
freedom of movement of goods, capital, and
labor throughout the region and this pre-
suggoses similar levels and distribution of
national incomes.

(b) The relative stability between wages and
prices33 is measured by the cost of living
index and this index is helpful in sootting
any uncontrolled inflation that would be detri-
mental to economic integration.3u

(0) Karl Deutsch found that integration required
at least some members to be eXSeriencing
superior economic growth. But economic growth
may not improve the general welfare if increases
in the national output are absorbed by
increasing poloulations.35 So a comparison

BBNages, yrices, and factor movements are discussed in:
Rea e, cp.cit., pp. 56-65; and, Sannwald and Stohler, op. cit.,
pp . 12.0w

343. H. Bernstein and I. G. Patel, "Inflation in Relation
to Economic DevelOpment," in Bernard Ckun and Richard a.

Richardson, Studies in Loon,mic Development, (New Iork, 1961),
pp 0 1+3 9—1448 0

 

 

35For the effect of increasing ponulations on economic
growth, see: Benjamin Higgins and Ailfred halenbaum, "Financing
Economic Develogment," International Conciliation, 502(Aarch
l955)279-280. Also: "fogulation Growth and the Standard of
Living in UnderdevelOped Countries," United Kations subli-
cation, as quoted in Qkun and hichardson, above, :p. 254-260.

 

16

between economic growth and ponulation growth
has been made. That is, a ratio (economic
growth/booulation growth) has been used to
indicate national income increases beyond
growths encountered in pooulations.

(4) Similarly High Levels of EXport Diversification,
Regional Trading, and Industrialization and the Absence of
Artificial Trade Barriers.

(a) The excnange of the wide variety of Specialized
goods desirable between union members depends
upon erort diversification within each nation.
and export diversification in turn depends on
a high level of industrialization.

(b) A level of trade, existing or expected, between
members must provide a financial return equal
to or greater than the expense of forming and
Operating the regional organization.

(0) Artificial barriers such as customs duties and
exchange restrictions reduce the total volume
of trade which might otherwise take place with

union members.36

(5) Similarly DevelOped Facilities for Communication and
Mobility within and Between Nations. The emphasis in this
paper is necesSarily upon facilities within nations because

data are not available to indiCate the total amount of commun-

 

36Sannwald and Stohler, co. cit., pp. 45-68. heads,
op. cit., pp. 14-15. ._-—"—.U

ication and mobility between nations.

(a)

(b)

Both Deutsch and Paas emphasize the importance
of communication and mobility, at least within
and between the politically relevant strata of
potential union members.

Concentration upon existing formal facilities
to indicate communication and mobility was
suggested by Peter Rohn's critical note37 and
by an earlier Karl Deutsch study of communi—

cation.38

(6) Compatibility of Major Value Systems. Understanding

and sharing Values that are widely and deeply held by national

pOpulations was conducive to integration in both the Deutsch

and the Haas studies.

(a)

(b)

Haas notes that in ECSC ". . . no issues of
cultural diversity arose to plague the inte—
grating units . . ." and, "cultural and
religious values accented in one are typical
equally of, at least, a large portion of the
population of the others."39

Deutsch found that any increase in ethnic or
linguistic differentiation was likely to be a

disintegrative factor.)+0

 

370p. cit.

38Nationalism and social Communication, (new Kerk, 1953).

 

39Uniting, pp. 290-291.

40

Political Community, p. 62.

 

I,

18

(c) In Loutheast Asia major values are apt to be
ex; essed through racial and religious minor—
ities as well as through ethnic or linguistic
groups. Available data do not permit a stat-
istical comparison so a general discussion and
accompanying tables serve to indicate these
value distinctions.

Ere-conditions (2) through (6) are examined in Chapter’
IV using statistical indices compiled from United Nations
publications and other sources. The degree to which ECSC and
LAFTA members satisfied these pre-conditions at the time they
integrated will be compared with the degree to which Southeast
Asian nations satisfy the Same conditions at the present time.
The use of statistical indices of political, econOMic, and
social deveIOpment to compare nations has been suggested by

James S. Coleman,41

who compared degrees of "political compet-
itiveness" in underdeveIOped nations, and by Seymour M.
Lipset's similar attempt to identify some requisites for
democracy.)+2 In the present study, indices relating more
closely to conditions facilitating integration are used and
emphasis is upon similarity of develOpment within regions
rather than upon any rank order of nations.

It is understandable that this and other studies of
integration stress the need for similarity between nations

rather than the levels of deveIOQment per se in these nations.

 

41Almond'andColeman, 0p. cit., pp. 532-582.

42 ,
Political Nan, (Garden City, 1960), pp. 48-60.

 

 

19

Political as well as economic integrations have occurred in

the past between nations that were not highly deveIOped econ—
omically; all members of the Latin American economic unions are
still relatively underdevelOped. Economic integration, however,
is more desirable among nations that have the capacity for
trading a large number of complementary goods; these nations
will contribute most to and benefit most from the union.”3
Therefore, the level of economic deveIOpment should iot be

ignored when analyzing pre-conditions facilitating economic
integration. And so this study places emphasis upon Southeast
Asian nations that are similar to the most highly deveIOped

nation in the region with regard to each particular index.

(7) Similarities in the Backgrounds of TOp Governmental w
Leaders, Political Institutions, and Political Programs. The a ,;}</
heads of governments and their foreign ministers would be )3Mflt
prime negotiators of an economic union and their decision-
making scope would be limited by personal values as well as by
political institutions and processes.

(a) ECSC was negotiated by governmental leaders
extremely alike in background and Ernst ’aas
says, "There can be little doubt that broad
similarities in the social values entertained
by the dominant elites of the ECSC countries
explain in large part why the Treaty was accepted

and successfully implemented."44

 

43Daniel H. Garnick, "On the Economic Feasibility of a
Middle Eastern Common Market," Middle East Journal, (Summer
1960), pp. 265-267. ‘

uuUniting, p. 286.

 

20

(b) Deutsch found that a broadening of the poli-

 

tical elite was essential to the integrations
he studied.

(0) Political institutions and practices in ECSC
were basically identical, coalitions of parties
habitually ruled, and "some identity in poli-
tical programmes prevailed across national

boundaries even before the douaniers stOpped

 

checking the coal Wagons."45
(d) In Latin America, too, leaders have similar
backgrounds, political institutions are
similar, and political programs coincide to
some degree.)+6
(8) Similar Historical Backgrounds and AmiCable Relations
Between Potential Member Nations.
(a) Both Deutsch and Haas support the need for
similar historical backgrounds and an economist
states that "economic associations are gen-

erally created in terms of the common interests.

of the associates and not of complementary

 

interests."u7

 

”Eibid, p. 291.

uéVictor Alba, "The Latin American Style and the New
Social Forces," in Albert 0. Hirschman, ed., Latin American
Issues, (New York, 1901), pp. 43-44. Alba also notes’taat the
EEEIEIAmerican political elite is broadening. pp. 48-51.

 

“7Jorge Castaneda, "Pan Americanism and Regionalism; A
Nexican View," International Organization, 10(August 1956)375.

 

fl

(b)

21

It is the author's conclusion that historical
backgrounds are extremely important in rel-
ations between Southeast Asian nations. And
it is possible that the absence of amiCable
relations between two or more nations could
deter or even prevent formation of an economic
union, although the presence of amiCability .
alone is not a sufficient basis for economic

integration.

(9) Absence of Excessive Political and EconomiC‘Nation-

alism.

(a)

(b)

"Nationalism is the most influential political
factor in the region at the present time,"

48

states nmry Vandenbosch, and it may be the

most important economic factor as well in
underdevelOped nations.”9
Deutsch recognized that feelings of nationalism
also existed and influenced the cases he
studied. And Ernst Haas noted the disruptive

influence of nationalism in EurOpe before and

after promulgation of ECSC.

 

1+8Amry Vandenbosch and Richard A. Butwell, Southeast Asia

Among the world Powers, (Lexington, 1957), p. 255.

 

ugThis is Gunnar hyrdal's thesis in several of his

recent works.

See his: An International Economy, (New York,

 

1956); "Economic Nationalism and InternitionaliSm," Australian
Outlook, 11(December 1957)3-50; and, Beyond the welfare State,

(New Haven, 1960).

 

22

(lO) Favorable or Acquiescent Attitudes by Major world

Governments and United Nations Agencies. External influences

are capable of exerting enough pressure to deter or prevent

initiation of an inclusive and effective union in Southeast

Asia.

(:1)

Southeast Asian nations all have political,
economic, and cultural ties of varying impor-

tance with former colonial powers.

(b) Any economic scheme initiated would be depen-

(C)

dent for its success upon the benevolence of
the richer powers5o because the economic and
political bargaining powers of Southeast Asia
are small and the region is vulnerable to
external pressures.

Neighboring nations also have ties or exert
pressures that influence decision-making in

Southeast Asia.

(11) Sufficient Administrative Capabilities for Operating

the Union.

(a) An essential pre-condition in the Deutsch study

was "an increase in the political and adminis—
trative capabilities of the main political

units to be amalgamated."51

 

50Benjamin higgins and Wilfred halenbaum, "Financing
Economic nevelOpment," International Conciliation, 502(harch

l955)275-339.

 

51Political Community, p. 50.

 

[\‘2
b)

(b) The organizational complexities and adminis-
trative requirements of an economic union as
outlined by Haas and others might be beyond
the capabilities of at least some Southeast
Asian nations due to a lack of personnel or
finances.

Chapter V examines pre-conditions (7) through (ll) of
which only the first has been established by other studies as
being necessary for integration. The remaining conditions are
included because the author believes they have especial signi-
ficance in determining the readiness of Southeast Asian nations
to integrate.

A comprehensive analysis of these remaining pre-conditions
would require accumulation of a great amount of interview data
and raw statistics that are not available to the author.
Consequently, discussion of these conditions is limited to
generalizations, relies heavily on secondary source material,
and is more grounded on impressions than upon empirical evi-
dence. Nevertheless, this attempt at analysis need not be any
less useful than any other based on a priori evidence. Data
presented, however, must be considered more illustrative than
definitive and the resulting conclusions are tentative and
suggestive of hypotheses, not definitive statements.

The limitations of the analysis as well as a summary of
the findings and conclusions based on these findings are
contained in Chapter VI. with respect for the fragility of

the analysis and the gross judgments of each pre—condition's

2Q

importance in the study, doutheast Asian nations are grouped

according to their readiness to integrate.

A Note on the Use of ECSC and LAFTA

 

for Comparative Purposes

 

The comparativeness of pre-conditions in EurOpe, Latin
America, and Southeast asia is reduced beCause LCSC and LAFTh
contain nations that have long been ind pendent while South-
east Asian nations are still consolidating their newly won
freedom. In addition, the effects of extant unions uoon their
members' political, economic, and social structures cannot
yet be fully determined because the unions were so recently
established.

But ECSC and LAFTA have not been chosen without reason.
One economist feels that the Coal and Steel Community is
". . . the fundamental pattern to be studied for a realistic
approach to the problems of economic integration . . ."52 ECSC
is the forerunner of a comprehensive common market that has
progressed further than any other toward integration and is
the form of administrative organization and implementation
that other economic unions have followed.

LAFTA was instituted under conditions not considered
conducive to successful economic integration and an economic
union in Southeast Asia would face many of the same problems.

LAFTA members have agricultural economies that are often

52Ugo La Malfa, "The Case for EurOpean Integration:
Economic Considerations," in haines, 0p. cit., p. 68.

25

competitive; they have low industrial production by infant
industries, occasional political unrest, and unstable cur-
rencies.53 Chronic deficit Spending, primary trade relations
with nations outside the region, and recurring commodity

54

surpluses are other characteristics of LAFTA nations shared

to greater or lesser extent by nations in Southeast Asia.

Summary

The problem has been defined as an attempt to determine
the extent to which nations in Southeast Asia possess some
pre-conditions for economic union. A majority of the eleven
pre-conditions to be examined are those deemed important in
other studies of the integration process while the remaining
ones seem to have particular relevance to Southeast Asia.
Utilizing simple and familiar methods of comparing nations
increases the ease with which several nations may be compared
although this procedure necessarily requires some sacrifice
of analytic depth. Employing comparative data from two
functioning economic unions helps relate the readiness of
Southeast Asian nations for integration to the integrative

readiness in other world regions.

 

53For discussions of these conditions, see: Albert 0.
Hirschman, ed., Latin American Issues, (New lork, 1961).

 

5uBoberto De Oliveira Campos, "Two Views on Inflation
in Latin America," Ibid, pp. 69-79.

CHAPTER II

SOME SUBEOHTING ARGUHENTS FCB REGIOKALISM

AND ECONOEIC IKTLGBATION

Arguments Favoring Regionalism

 

Prior to world war II there were few regional arrange-
ments of any kind; however, in the words of the economist
James Meade, "The years in which we now live are distinguished,
internationally, by attempts to build economic and political
systems on a wider basis than the nation-state."1 Regional
associations and organizations are now extant in most of the
world and these groupings may carry out single or multiple,
general or Specific functions. They may be administratively
simple associations as are the various inter-parliamentary
assemblies and the Commonwealth, or they may be extremely
complex and inter-connected organizations as are NATO and the
Organization for European Economic COOperation. And they are
more apt to be predicated upon some aspect of security than

upon Spiritual or cultural motives.2

 

1Problems of Economic Union, (Chicago, 1953), p. l.

 

2Norman J. Padelford and George Lincoln, International
Relations, (New Iork, 1954), p. #91.

 

 

26

27

Some regionalists maintain that regions are the largest
political communities that will allow 00hsideration of nations'
common interests.3 The whole world is believed to be too
diverse to be administered by one international organization
and until nations are ready to join together and delegate
elements of their sovereignty to he control of every other
nation, regional organizations will serve both as subareas of
global control and as "pilot projects" where experiments in
develOpment and administration may be carried out.“

The cold war has been a basic motivation for the initi-
ation of regional agreements.5 In fact, if the cold war were
somehow removed from the international scene, it may be ques-
tioned whether many regional security and military groupings,
as presently constituted, would survive. A need for collective
security in a world faced with the destructiveness of nuclear

weapons has served to unite most of the industrially deveIOped

 

3Jorge Castaneda, "Pan Americanism and Regionalism: A
Mexican View," International Crganization, 10(August 1956)373.
Inis L. Claude, swords Into Plowshares, (New York, 1959), pp.
111-112.

 

 

Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of EurOpe, (Stanford, 1958),
Preface and Passim. Karl Deutsch, et al.;“Political Community
and the North Atlantic Area, (Princeton, 1957), p. 159.

 

 

 

5Ernst B. Haas, "The Challenge of Regionalism," Inter-
national Crganization, 12(Autumn l958)440. C. Grove haines:
ed., EurOpean Integration, (Baltimore, 1957), p. 5.

 

 

nations in various overlapping regional agreementsé and the
Communist bloc of nations is similarly joined.

COOperation may be justified, too, because international
contacts have not increased egually among all nations. Some
nations are drawn into frequent interaction with others for
reasons of trade, geOgraphical prOpinguity, cultural affinities,
or security considerations so it is understandable that these
cooperating nations should seek to place their relationships
on a more stable basis.7

A basic tenet underlying organization on either the
regional or the global level is dissatisfaction with the
nation-eta e as a promoter of political, economic, or social
progress.8 Many independent nations cannot finance military
establishments large enough to assure their own security.9
They have also found themselves wanting in political influence
and economic bargaining power when dealing with the larger or

10

richer nations. And finally, they have become aware that

small national economies do not always permit resources to be

 

6Max Beloff, "Federalism as a model for International
Integration," Yearbook of World Affairs, 13(1959)188. John
Goormatigh, "EurOpean Coal and Steel Community," International
Conciliation, 503(May l955)344.

 

 

 

7Gunnar Eyrdal, Beyond the welfare State, (New Haven,
1961), pp. 228-231.

 

8Claude, Op. cit., pp. 111-112. Castaneda, 0p. cit.,
p- 373-

9B. N. Van Kleffens, ”The Case for EurOpean Integration:
Political Considerations," in C. Grove haines, ed., EurOpean
Integration, (Baltimore, 1957), p. 85.

10M

 

yrdal, Op. cit., pp. 216-217.

29

allocated in a manner conducive to rapid ecoiomic development.ll

Economic Regionalism

 

Support for economic regionalism has paralleled the
growth in regional security organizations such as KATO, 0A9,
SFQTO, and the Warsaw Pact although economic groupings do not
necessarily involve the same nations which cooperate closely
on security matters. There is general agreement that Euro-
pean nations in either n50 or the EurOpean Free Trade Assoc-
iation, by oooling their resources and submitting to supra-
national control over their economies, are likely to increase
their rates of economic growth. Agreement on the benefits of
economic integration for underdevelOped nations, however, is
not so widespread.12

Although various payments or commodity agreements have
existed between underdevelOped nations, the recent interest
in economic integration regresents a fundamental shift in
thinking about economic develOpment in these areas. Leaders
in these nations, searching for the road to rapid economic
develOpment, realize that foreign aid and investment are

inadequate to achieve this develOpment as fast as it is

 

llT. Silcock, The Commonwealth Economy in South East Asia,
(Durham, 1959), p. 140. Ugo La haIfa, "The Case fer European
Integration: Economic Considerations," in Haines, Op. cit., p.72.

 

12Contrast the statement: "Host of these countries have
too little in common to arrange large—scale customs unions, and
limited concessions which they could make would normally con-
flict with the provisions of the GaTT.", in T. Silcock, Op cit.,
p. 140 with Haul Prebisch's thesis that common markets are
essential for develOQment in these countries. See Prebisch‘s
"Commercial Policy in the UnderdevelOped Countries," American
Economic Review, u9(fiay l959)268; and New York Times, (16 May
1959).

 

 

g0

needed. Substantial alteration of economic infrastructures
is necessary to provide some of the needed capital and to
maximize the benefits of external aid and assistance.

Many leaders in underdevelOped nations believe their
nations can realize some of the same benefits from integration
that accrue to develOped nations. A few broad objectives
anticipated from membership in a union are increased production,
wider range of consumer choices, larger markets, and higher
standards of living.13 Research capital, plant eXpansion,
efficient division of labor, and Specialization of industry
as well as the containment of prices and maintenance of an
equilibrium balance of payments between members are other
advantages expected.14

To state the possible advantages of integrated economies
is not, however, to imply that these advantages will come
about automatically. The results of integration vary according
to, among other things; (1) the method used in integrating,

(2) the modal characteristics and size of the nations involved
and, (3) the tyoe of economic union effected. Integration
may take place either by creating common conditions in all
member nations and integrating whole economies, or it may take
place by integrating one or more specific sectors of these

economies such as coal, steel, or foreign trade. The ELC, AFTA,

j

 

13Heade, 0p. cit., pp. 3-11. Lincoln Gordon, "NnTO and
EurOpean Integration," World Politics, lO(January l958)219-231.

1H

 

Meade, pp. 3-11. La Halfa, Op. cit., p. 72

I“

r)

LAFTA, and the Central American Free Trade Association have
adopted the latter method, known as vertical or functional
integration,15 with the expressed intention of integrating
additional economic functions as conditions become favorable.
The number of nations involved and their characteristics
as well as the extent of their involvement also affect the
outcome of a union. An area adequate in size to carry out
one function may not include the same members as one set up
to carry out another function; the members may change depending
upon the desirability of involvement from one function to
another.16 Then, too, an economic union tends to expand and
include functions other than those originally agreed upon for,
". .4. economic integration in the long run cannot rest on
supranational rules and institutions for one economic sector
alone, no matter how vital that sector may be in the total
scheme of life."17 It may also be true that the more nations
included in the union, the less the members stand to gain from
inclusion and the more excluded ations stand to lose by
remaining outside the group.18 Students of EurOpean inte-
gration have observed that the more nations included at the

outset, the harder it is to reach agreement upon the functions

 

15Van Kleffens, 0p. cit., p. 90.

l6Claude, 0p cit., p. 113.

17Haas, Uniting, p. 103.

18"The Common Market and Its Relation to a Free Trade

Area," Round Table, l9l(June 1958)2u5.

 

to be integrated and the less is the likelihood of the supra-

19

national body being granted extensive powers. One economist,
E. A. G. Robinson, suggests that poor nations with small
DOpulaticns cannot realize economies of scale as can nations
with 50 million peOple and relatively high national incomes.20
He believes that the low levels of demand and necessity of
Operating on small profit margins prevent entrepreneurs from
investing in the modern technologies that bring these economies
of scale to richer and more populous nations.21
Types of economic unions include price stabilization
agreements, free trade areas, customs unions, common markets,
and regional industry and resource develOpment plans. A price
stabilization agreement is a COOperative attempt by nations to
end price fluctuations of certain commodities through government
control of stockpiles, production, or investment.22 A free
trade area involves a mutual abolition of tariffs(usually
reduced gradually over a pecified number of years) between

members. Customs unions include the abolition of tariffs

between members, but also establish common tariffs for goods

 

l9max Beloff, op. cit., p. 203. Also: Lincoln Gordon,
"NATO and EurOpean Integration," World Politics, lO(January
l958)221.

20 . i i H
The hconomic Consequencesgof the sizes of Nations,
(New York, lyoOT, pp. xviii and 269-274.

 

 

lebid.

2 a m . . ,. . .
Zbusan strange, "The Commonwealth and the sterling area,"

Yearbook of horld Affairs, 13(1959)QO-41.

 

 

entering from outside the union. 5 common market involves
integration of existing major national industries, the creation
of a supranational body, and is jerlwps best described as an
area ". . . in which there can be free circulation of invest-
ments and of manpower, a large unified zone in which goods, the
manpower needed to produce them, and the necessary capital can
circulate freely."23

A regional resource and industry development plan
involves COOperative develOpment of existing and planned
industries utilizing those resources in which a nation holds
a comparative or absolute economic advantage within the region.
Such a plan does not ipso facto posit an accompanying free
trade area, customs union, or conmon market; however, additional
rationalization of regional production would probably result
if one or another of these were included. Then, too, initiation
of the simplest form of union will supposedly impel members
toward a customs union, common market, and rationalization of

24

future resource and industry deveIOpment.

Summary

 

Since world Ear II nations of the world have continued a
trend toward regional security organization. Economic region-
alism is probably an outgrowth of these regionalist sentiments.

But economic regionalism can be justified on grounds other

 

23Giuseppe Fella, "The Coal and Steel Community as a Case
Study in Integration," in haines, cp. cit., p. 140.

zufiaas, Uniting, pp. lO3-llO. Galo Plaza, For a Beg-
gonaé garket in Latin America," Foreign affairs,"37(July 1959)
07-10

 

34

than those usually given for security alliances; that is,
membership in an economic union appears to hold many immediate
material benefits. Yet the extent to which these benefits

are attainable is governed by the type of union initiated and
the level of economic develOpment within member nations.
Leaders of many relatively underdevelOped nations in Latin
America and Southeast Asia have considered their nations
capable of initiating, Operating, and benefitting from economic

union.

CHAPTER III

SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
CONTACTS SINCE 1945

Southeast Asian nations have participated in.a number of
regional conferences and are members of several associations
and organizations active within.the region. They are also
drawn.together by shared sentiments and by unbfficial cooper-
ation in many private groups. And recently there have been.
several preposals suggesting formal cooperation on economic
matters. But the effects of these regional and international
contacts may not all be equally conducive to the strengthening
of Southeast Asian.integrative tendencies.

ASIAN CONFERENCES

Regionalism in Southeast Asia is not a new phenomenon;
interest in cooPeration among these nations was occasionally
eXpressed by Southeast Asian.policy-makers prior to 19145.1
During World War II the Japanese began uniting Southeast Asia
in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere but, because of

pressing war commitments, did not progress very far along

 

1Milton w. Meyer, IRegional CooPeration in Southeast
Asia ' Columbia Journal of International Affairs, 3(Spring
l9n9368-77. See aIso: K.SM.‘PanIkkar, "BegIOnaI Organization
for the Indian Ocean.Area,' Pacific Affairs, 18(September
l945)246-251.

 

 

35

0.1“

 

 

.- .

36

these lines.2 It was at the close of the war that the first
real attempts were made to deal with Southeast Asian problems
on a regional level. At that time a Special Commission was
created by the British to deal with critical food shortages in
their colonial possessions.3 This Commission formed a Liaison
Conference that soon included most of the nations and dependent
territories of Southeast Asia and held several special confer- '
ences on food production and distribution, nutrition, fisheries,
and social welfare. No votes were taken during these confer-
ences and political issues were avoided but, in 1949, the
Commission was the most tangible form of regionalism in South,
east Asia.“ Functions of the Liaison.Conference were gradually
taken over by agencies of the United Nations and Commission
,responsibilities have been delegated to other agencies.

Other conferences to which nations in Southeast Asia
sent delegates and which are customarily mentioned as being
important milestones in the deve10pment of regionalism are the
Asian.Relations Conference, the New Delhi Conference on

Indonesia, and the Asian-African Conference at Bandung.5

 

2Russell H. Fifield The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia:
l245-l958, (New York, l95éYITB. 27”§Edmfias§Ifi.

 

3Meyer, 0p. cit., pp. 7h—77.

"Ibid, p. 7n. . _

5Ibid, pp. 68-77. Fifield, above, pp. 449-“58. William
Hendersafi, “The DevelOpment of Regionalism in Southeast Asia,“
International Organization, 9(November l955)h65-468.

37

Asian Relations Conference

The Asian Relations Conference held in 1947 was an
unofficial meeting of representatives from twenty-eight
nations promoted by Prime Minister Nehru and sponsored by the
Indian World Affairs Council. Only the Philippines and Thai-
land were independent at the time, but representatives of
each of the other soon to be independent Southeast Asian
nations were present. The Conference was convened to publi-
cize the plight of the Asian nations and their desires for
independence; Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru considered it the right
moment for fellow Asians to confer I'. . . about the present
and the future, and lay the foundation of our mutual progress,.
well-being and friendship . . . .‘6 .During the 11-day meeting,
roundtable groups discussed economic, cultural, racial, or
labor tapics as well as national freedom movements; contro-
versial topics were avoided.7 Agreement was reached regarding
many common.problems, but only one resolution was passed and
and an attempt, supported by a few delegates, to form a
permanent Asian Union failed; plans to hold another conference

in.l9#9 did not materialize.8

 

5Speech by Nehru on March 23, 1947. Asian.Relations

Bei Report of the Proceedin s and Documentafrafi'of‘EHE‘Ffrst
Asian Relations Cofiference,_New Delhi, HErcHéEprII, I937,as

EuoEeE'IfifFIfield, 0p. cit., p. 450.
7Fifield, op. cit., pp. uu9-u50.

8Ibid, p. #51. The resolution created the Asian.Relations
OrganizaEIon and the Institute of Asian Studies, unofficial
research bodies to promote the well-being and progress of
members.

’4

.“

-4-

38

New Delhi Conference on Indonesia

 

The New Delhi Conference on Indonesia was convoked by
Nehru in January 1949 to marshal Australasian.and African
support against Dutch attacks on territory claimed by the
Republic of Indonesia forces.9 The Conference was official;
only representatives of recognized governments could parti-
cipate. Burma and the Philippines sent delegates and unofficial
observers were present from Thailand, Indochina, and Indonesia.
All delegates united in.condemning the Dutch actions and the
Conference ultimately influenced settlement of the problem.10
But another move to set up regional machinery, particularly for

promoting cooperation in the United Nations, failed.11

Bandung Conference

 

In.April, 1955, the Colombo Powers(Burma, Ceylon, India,
Indonesia, and Pakistan) sponsored the AsianpAfrican Confer-
ence that brought together leading statesmen from 29 nations
in.Bandung, Indonesia. Of the nations in Southeast Asia, only
Malaya, not yet independent, was absent. A variety of ques-
tions was discussed including economic and cultural c00peration,
human.rights and self-determination of peOples, colonialism,
membership in the United Nations, and disarmament.12 Although

 

9Ibic1, p. 456.
lQFifield, o . cit., p. #57.

11William Henderson, "The DeveIOpment of Regionalism in
igutheast Asia," International Organization, 9(November 1955)
7.

 

12mm.

 

..
I
Q
h...
.

“Cl

39

much.agreement was reached on.problems confronting these
nations, there was too little mutuality of interests to under-
take any solutions to these problems. The final communique of
2# April appeared to recognize a need for regional cooperation
in stabilizing commodity prices, increasing trade, establishing
regional banks, sharing atomic resources, and forming common
economic policies, but the communique ended with the Obser-
vation, 'It is, however, not intended to form a regional bloc."13
The.Asian Conferences served to reinforce nationalistic
sentiment, identify common economic and social prdblems, and
focus attention.upon these emerging nations;1h however, lasting
coOperation within a framework provided by the conferences has
been.impossible because of the heterogeneity of interests
involved and the negative rationale--opposition to colonialism!-
underlying the meetings. In.characterizing these conferences,
William Henderson says they I'. . . arose out of an.ill-defined
sense of Asian solidarity Springing from a shared colonial
past and common resentment against the west.'15 And, 'In.a
sense, the most significant thing about the three panpAsian
Conferences was the fact that they were held.'16 Further
limitations on the effects of these conferences were a lack of
unanimous attendance by nations within the area they purported

to represent and objective or subjective conflicts of interests

A__ _

13George McT. Kahin, The'AsianPAfricanACOnference,
Bandflflfit Indonesia, April laggi‘TIthaca, 19567, pp. 10:12.

lunenderson, Op. cit., p. #68.
15Ibid. 15Itid.

 

 

.
n
A
I
.
‘ .
i e
c ..
A
.
e
_ .
. I
e
.
I r
I
.
.
. . .
. ,e .
.
I.
e
i
.
‘ l
. .
’ v r
v . .
u . .
. ,
y t
i e
.
A
.

#0

among national leaders.

At least three efforts to prolong or recapture this
feeling of Asian solidarity have been made since 1955. The
Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement, an effort to capitalize on.the
'Bandung Spirit," held meetings in Cairo in 1956, 1957, and
1958.17 Delegates were not government appointees, but were _
Communist members of various Afro-Asian governments. In 1960,
11 Asian.nations and the Belgian Congo agreed to attend a
conference in New Delhi on the Tibetan prOblem but no confer-_
ence materialized from this declaration of-intent.18 In 1961,
Mrs. Supeni, the Indonesian roving ambassador, toured several
Afro~Asian.nations attempting to arrange a second Bandung
Conference.19 Again, the results have been unencouraging.

Perhaps realizing that interests in all-Asia conferences
were too varied to allow consensus on solutions of common
prdblems, Southeast Asian leaders convened and attended
conferences of their own, the most notable of which was the
Baguio Conference in 1950.20 After several false starts,
President Quirino of the Philippines succeeded in convoking
the Conference in May with Indonesia, Thailand, and the Phil-

ippines from Southeast Asia and four nations from outside the

1759w York Times, (23 December 1957) and (3 January 1953).

18New York Times, (19 March 1960).

 

19New York Times, (12 March 1961).

 

2°Fifield, op. cit., pp. u5u-458.

I.

I.

 

#1

region in attendance. Although originally conceived by Quirino
as a prelude to the conclusion of a security pact, military
matters were not discussed at the Conference.21 In fact,
questions discussed were primarily economic. The agenda
followed a Philippine resolution stressing rationalization of
economic develOpment, increases of agricultural and industrial
production, eXpansion of trade among nations of the region,
and possibilities for a multilateral clearing arrangement.22
Nevertheless, despite General Romulo's plea that:
This task is too big for any single nation to accomplish
by itself. The need for consultation, understanding,
Joint planngng and action by the countries concerned is
imperative. 3
the Conference ended with the observation that:
. . . internal economic development is a matter of national
concern for each government; that each individual country
cannot brook interference from the outside, no matter how
well-meaning, with its development plans and their
execution.2
It was apparent that at least the nations attending this COD!
ference were, in 1950, not yet envisioning any type of economic

c00peration that would bind their policy-making in any way.

f

§1Henderson, Op. cit., p. #7#. Werner Levi, "Union in
Asia,‘ Far Eastern Survey, 19(16 August 1950)l#5.

 

2zAmando M. Dalisay, "Economic ASpects of the Baguio
Conference of 1950,“ a paper prepared for the 11th Conference
of the Institute of Pacific Relations, (Manila, 1950), p. 2.

znlbid, Po 5.

#2

REGIONAL SECURITY GROUPINGS

James Meade has suggested that being members of the same
security pact would facilitate economic integration.25 Members
of ECSC and LAFTA are united in this way through NATO and the
Rio Pact, but there is at present no security pact embracing
the eight nations of Southeast Asia. Security pacts Operating
within.the region include the British Commonwealth, the Philip-
pine Pact, and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization(SEATO).

The Commonwealth's mutual security aspects have declined
in importance since World War II; protection from attack for
many members is assured by their participation in other
alliances and the association exists primarily for consultation
on economic matters.26 The Philippine Pact, signed with the
United States in August 1951, includes no other Southeast Asian

nations.

Southeast Asia Treaty Ogggnization

SEATO, the most comprehensive security grouping within
the region, includes Thailand and the Philippines as full
members while Laos,27 Cambodia, and South Vietnam are 'desig-

 

35Problcms of Economic Union, (Chicago, 1953), p. 27.

 

26Susan Strange, "The Commenwealth and the Sterling
Area,"Yearbook of World Affairs, 18(1959)25. ’Also: John.D. B.

gilger,‘TEe CommonweaItH‘Ii‘EHE‘Wor1d, (London, 1958), pp.
0- l.

 

 

2'ISEATC) members recently agreed to comply with Laotian.
desires to be excluded from protection under the Treaty. See:
Detroit Free Press, (6 July 1962).

 

. . ,
v ‘ ' . r A
‘ '. , _ .
e _ I L .
. ~ ‘ I' .
s . _ . .
v ‘ ' e . . v. . . ‘ r ‘. ' . ’
. . s ‘ . ' . -. _ ,' - c
‘ ‘ ‘. . n I .o ' ‘ ‘. _ ' ,
- . . , A I
l v-5 ‘
~ - - . o . .7 - . .- .a .| . w ‘ . - - .
'. ‘ ’ ' .
" ‘. - ‘ ' A h '
. . . . 1 - . .. , .,
U ' I 4
. ' , . . ‘ ‘ . .
O p . , . 8., . , .r _ .r l .' .
. t ,
I ‘ > . . . . . . . I
‘ . .
. . , ‘ ‘ r
.1 a . .. ,. .. - r , - .
l , ' . I
. > I . a v 9“ O v —'
‘ s ' -5 -1 a s. - J ' e s a .
- ,~ , w - . , .-. I
. . ‘ . .'
,. . ._ , . ‘ ,- « s: . ,._.,\, A.» . , '
. . . . - i 5
.. , __ ‘ ~. ,. 3 -
t _ 7' . I ‘ . . a o. t ‘. - ’ -
v . . . -
l . ' . . O 4 1- ~. ‘ -. .
I O ' ' I ‘ \ h ' ‘Q '

 

i ' . o .
. . - . ' . . . . . -- \'
‘
Q . . . , : , . _ . . ~.-_ - . e . ~ ~07-
. ' I ‘ \ ' - A
. ‘ 4 _ . o . . I -
A 3 \ ’ ' ' '- ‘ .- o .
. , u -
. . . ~ . v - ~ K . ‘I ‘ . v ..
1 ‘ ' ‘ ~I- .
f n ' - . n 1 r
‘ , \ ., . . . ‘ v . '
» . .J \J » ‘ - ‘ - ‘ I ' . |. ‘
" ' ' 0...-”- . c .4 - . - . .ul - . - Q r a - ., 1,, I ---<o c. ~- .g ~a~.a-o- .. , .-..-- . v u~~..-mx'h-~~
' . o . r ‘
I‘ 7 . , I. , " 0 g 1 . .
, u ‘ , ._
. . C . ‘ ‘ . ‘ , ( - , _ ‘ -
1 , . .g.x . o . n. .- . . ¢-—--' —t- e-~ . -Qb' 40-
n
. . . I . . ..
.. ‘ . - . -
. : n , .
l . ~ « - . .. ‘ 4 . an, . , . -
. , .
. v .‘ v . .a‘ . . . _- -

' . I . . .
e .0 ‘ O a ‘.
C C e . . . \ . .' ‘ ‘ . t . - o t ‘ '-
- . x o— '0‘- . . ‘- ' r t . bp- Q.l ’ . .
u . ' , g
. Q ' e .. - . I - o -. .‘ --4 . -:
‘ \
"a..- . -. . .,_ u or. - -. - . ~9... ,
—

' ‘- ~ , ' q .
'3 ‘ n 1 V ‘ ' . e. o .. ‘
' 7 ' ‘ ' 0 l." a I '~ ‘ - ’ -u I ‘ l .- U -0 : no . r' a 4
. D" D
v ‘ 4 .I r ',‘ ". ’ a . . ~ _ ’ ' s r
. g . ~ . I ‘ I '
o e < \ . ' > ' I t I , 4.1 d ‘4' ‘ .l . J ...'.
v o
. I - . . . e "',
. I -. .. '.' .-
. ‘ . - ‘ A . t v A .
no a. - . ~V— .. . ~ Q .5”, .07 7

 

#3
nated' territories for which Treaty members assume respon-
sibility in the event of aggression or external subversion.28
SEATO has permanent institutions and its military activities
are coordinated by a group of military advisors. Occasional
consultations at the foreign minister level have been held,
but the value of SEATO as a defensive alliance has been ques-
tioned by many because: (1) its strength depends upon United
States policy, (2) it represents only one-fifth of the people
it is designed to protect and, (3) it is increasingly resented
in.Asia.29 The organization was originally conceived also to
be an instrument “to promote economic progress and social well-
being and to further the individual and collective efforts of
governments toward these ends.'30 By 1956, however, it was
decided to utilize existing organs to promote general economic ' 'j

 
 
   

development and confine aid under the Treaty to compensati
for military expenses.31 Desires of Thailand, Pakistan, and
the Philippines to eXpand general economic aid under the Treaty
have been vetoed by the non-Asian.powers32 and William Ball

4

28Collective Defence in South East Asia, Chatham Hous;//
Study Group, (New”Ybrk, 1956), p."171. EaIaya is indirectl
tied in with SEATO through a mutual assistance agreement with
Britain, a SEATO signatory.

29wi11iam Ball, 'A Pelitical Re-Examination of SEATO,
International Or anization, 12(1958)7- -25. Also: Collective
Defence IE Soufifi East Asia, above, pp. 125-127 and-I52:I537

3°Treaty, Article III and Pacific Charter of the Treaty,
in Collective Defence in South East Asia, above, pp. 170-17#.

Bln-AI—d. PO 1300

32New York Times, (5 June 1960).

;
~

 

I
.
e
. _ l \
I
p
x I
7’

.I"

##

concludes that SEATO '. . . is not a suitable vehicle for

economic or technical aid."33

REGIONAL ECONOMIC GROUPINGS

Memberships in existing economic groupings provide Oppor-
tunities for governments to exchange views on economic matters
directly related to those with which an economic union is
concerned. In EurOpe and in Latin.America economic integration
was actively promoted by other economic organizations.<beuth-

east Asian nations c00perate together and exchange ideas as A'A;A,J”

i' L
Av .. g,
V 1} .

members of price stabilization boards, trade and financial
associations, and economic development organizations, all of
which contain.nations outside the regionfj>

// rice stabilization boards are the oldest form of econ-
omickcooperation in Southeast Asia. Rubber and tin.agreemente
were concluded before World War II3“ and agreements on wheat,
tea, and sugar have also been in force at various times. These
agreements have not, however, been too successful in.controlling
prices of primary products. The sugar agreement has been com§~
promised by United States' preferential treatment of the
Philippines and some Caribbean nations; and, the rubber agree-
ment has suffered from the develoPment of synthetic rubbers.35

3392. cit., p. 25.

3“Klaus E. Knorr, Tin Under Control, and World Rubber
and its Regglation, bothffififiIIEfiEd‘Ef’Stfinford.15‘1945.

35C. W. James, "The Colombo Plan.Passes Halfway," Aust-
ralian Outlook, 9(March l955)29-38. T. Silcock, The Common-
EEEIEEIEaafiafiy’in South-East Asia, (Durham, 1959), pp.—8-9.
SEFEEEE7—EET'EIEZ, p. #0.

 

 

 

 

45

These price stabilization schemes have been relatively inef-
fective on a regional basis for several reasons. (1) Areas
outside the region also produce these commodities. An encom-
passing agreement on.rubber, tin, or sugar would have to
include parts of Greater Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

(2) Consumers importing these products, especially in the
United States, would have to agree to the scheme and they have
vetoed such arrangements in the past. In general, consumers
fear that price stabilization may mean price support.35 (3)
Synthetic fibres, synthetic rubber, and plastics are products
of industrialized economies that are being used more often;
the increasing use of these commodities faces producers of
their natural counterparts with a declining market and conse-

quently with declining price levels for their primary exports.

Commonwealth and Sterling Area

The Commonwealth and the Sterling Area are economic
associations of some influence in Southeast Asia, particularly
in trade and financial matters. Only Malaya in Southeast Asia
is a member of the Commonwealth while both Malaya and Burma
are within.the Sterling Area. Commonwealth members are informed
of each other's policies through Conferences of Ministers,
discussions, and High Commissioners posted in.most members'
capitals but there is no central control of foreign or economic

policies and members need not be bound together by formal

 

35Gunnar Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State, (New Haven,
1960). pp. 2#l-2##. ‘

#6
treaties, alliances, or obligations.37 The association
possesses no common overall institutional structure and is
what it describes itself as being--'a free association of
wholly independent and equal states.'38

Sterling Area members usually carry on the bulk of their
international monetary transactions in Sterling and hold a
major portion of their reserves in London; however, members are
under no Obligation to follow the dictates of the Commonwealth
Liaison Committee, a body reSponsible for coordinating
policies.39 The importance of the Sterling Area has depended
upon the advantages of the discriminatory exchange rate of
Sterling and upon preferential tariff policies of Great
Britain.“° As the drive toward convertibility of Sterling-
with other currencies increased after 1952, the discriminatory
nature of the exchange rates lessened and the importance of
membership in the Sterling Area diminished.”1 In recent years
preferential trade agreements important to both Britain and
the lesser developed members have been imbodied in bilateral

agreements and have been enjoyed by nations outside the

 

37John D. B. Miller, The Commonwealth in the World,
(London, 1958), p. 2750

33-The Commonwealth,‘ British Affairs, 3(December 1959)

 

 

19A. , _ .
39'Sterling and the Sterling Area,“ ibid, pp. 202-203.
“OStrange, cp. cit., p. 29.

nihiller, op. cit., p. 270.

#7

Commonwealth."2

In its economic aspects, the Commonwealth has not pro-
vided a great deal of leadership for its members and seldom
achieves unity on problems it discusses.”3 Efforts to tighten
the association by providing a permanent Consultative Committee
and a Bank have met with extreme disfavor; decisions and
policies might conflict with those of the many other groupings
to which Commonwealth members belong.“b There is little hepe
for expanding the Commonwealth into a more effective economic
organization because: (1) economic aid for develOpment is
tendered through the Colombo Plan, (2) Sterling convertibility

is increasing and, (3) imperial preference will probably end
if Britain joins EEC.

The Colombo Plan

The Colombo Plan, initiated by Commonwealth members in
1950 as a temporary measure to encourage economic deve1Opment,
has grown as intended to include all South.and Southeast Asian
nations;h5 it has been extended beyond the original six years

 

uzThe Union of South Africa, though not a Commonwealth
member, enjoys preferential tariffs. Burma does 65% of its
trade with Great Britain and accepted preferential tariffs
until 195#.

43Inis L. Claude, Swords Into Plowshares, (New York,
1959), pp. 117, 118, and‘IZZ. VAlso:*PauI”DeIouvrier, "Economic
Integration: Problems and Possibilities," in C. Grove Haines,
ed., European Integration, (Baltimore, 1957), p. 119.

4“Ze1man.Cowen, "The Contemporary Commonwealth: A General
View," International Onganization, 13(Spring l959)208.

“5The Colombo Plan for Co-Operative Economic Deve10pment
in.SoutKIand SouEH-EESE Asia,ReporE By the CommonweaIEfi Con:

suIEaEIve CommIEtee, (London, 1950), pp. Al—A5.

 

 

 

 

 

 

#8

and is eXpected to continue indefinitely.’+6 The plan is
actually not a plan at all but, through the Consultative
Committee composed of national Ministers meeting annually,
members are provided an Opportunity to talk over and coordinate
national development. The Committee arranges for aid from
donor nations (though aid is given in bilateral arrangements
between donor and recipient nations) and discusses progress
made by members during the year.“7 *Technical aid and technical
training programs are handled by two specialized agencies, the
Technical Assistance Scheme and its coordinating agency, the
Council for Technical Co-Operation. Members are subject to

no formal rules and the Consultative Committee has no direct
control over national plans; efforts to form a permanent
Secretariat have so far been unsuccessful.“8 Although the
Plan has achieved some success in channeling technical and
economic aid to members and in coordinating their development
programs, these efforts have been sufficient to do little more
than hold standards of living constant.‘+9 To accomplish more
would require a comprehensive program with more central dir-

ection than members have been willing to grant. The Plan has,

 

“screighton L. Burns, "The Colombo Plan," Yearbook of
World.Affairs, l#(1960)l98.

“7Antonin.Basch, l'The Colombo Plan, A Case of Regional
Economic COOperation," International Organization, 9(1959)2-6.

"31bid, p. 181.‘

“91bid, pp. 187-198. See also: "Under-Developed Countries
and POpuIEEIOn Trends," Bgitish Affaire, 3(December 1959)209.

 

 

 

 

#9
however, usually been credited with having eased international
tensions between leaders of Western and Asian nations and

among Asians themselves.5°

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East

 

Overlapping both in membership and in function with the
Colombo Plan is the United Nations Economic Commission for
Asia and the Far East(ECAFE). ECAFE was formed in l9#7 and
now contains all independent nations in Southeast Asia and
Asia as well as France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, the
Soviet Union, and the United States. The Organization has been
active in planning reconstruction, attempting to raise the
level of Asian economic activity, and broadening of Asian
economic relations. It may sponsor investigations and studies
as well as collect, evaluate, and disseminate economic, tech-
nological, and statistical information.51 The Commission,
meeting in Conference, is empowered to make nonabinding recom-
mendations by a majority of members present and voting, but it
cannot initiate action within a nation without that nation's
consent.52 C. Hart Schaaf, ECAFE Deputy Executive Secretary,
summarized its accomplishments in 1953 as having furthered

economic development, strengthened the United Nations, given

 

‘5°Burns, Op. cit., p. 198.

51"Helping Economic DevelOpment in Asia and the Far
East, The Work of ECAFE," United Nations Department of Public
Information, p. 6, as quoted in Fifield, Op. cit., p. #66.

52A. M. James, "The U.N. Economic Commission for Asia
and the Far East," Yearbook of World Affairs, 13(1959)l6#.

50
services worth their cost, and mitigated many difficulties
associated with Asian nationalism, the cold war, and willingness
to cOOperate.53 _A. M. James, while quick to credit the use-
fulness of the information-gathering and disseminating function
of ECAFE, was more cautious in his endorsement: In

. . . while Ecafe is likely to be used to the full it must

not be expected that from its activities there will nec-

essarily spring a feeling of regional unity and a lessening
of narrow nationalist emotions. . . . Emotions will have
their play and the result will be familiar: a group of
States, each having its own ideas about its interests,

guarding them watchfully, 00-0perating when cO-Operation
seems necessary or desirable, but putting, in the last ”

analysis, its own interests before those of the collect-
ivity.5“

Gunner Myrdal credits ECAFE with "modest beginnings toward
regional cOOperation" in specialized areas, but notes a signi-
ficant lack of success in approaches to major economic issues.55
Southeast Asian nations utilize both bilateral aid agree-
ments and deve10pment funds to provide capital for economic
deve10pment. The International Bank of Reconstruction and
Development and the International Monetary Fund provide capital
for specific projects(usually government sponsored) but require
little or no COOperation between reoipients.56 A cooperative
economic development fund to be administered by recipient:

Asian.nations was Once suggested by the United States. In

 

53"The United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and
the Far East," International Organization, 7(1953)#70.

5‘Janes, Op. cit., p. 187.
ssBeyond the Welfare State, Op. cit., p. 271.
56Fifield, Op.cit., p. #92.

51
1955, $20 million was made available to Asian nations and the
Simla Conference was convened in May that year to decide how
to administer and utilize the fund; only Burma in Southeast
Asia was absent from this meeting.57 NO agreement was reached
on implementation of the fund so the United States retracted
the offer.58 It was Obvious that the Asian nations preferred
'to keep economic, technical, and military aid on a bilateral
basis.59

Other Economic Associations

A Special United Nations Fund for Economic DevelOpment
(SUNFED) was preposed in 1953, actually established at a later
date, and now furnishes Southeast Asian and other nations with
limited develOpment funds. Full implementation of SUNFED,
tailored to meet the needs Of lesser develOped nations better
than IMF or IBRD, has been blocked by the United States and
other Western nations for policy reasons.60

In 1958 the United States allotted $2 million to initiate
a OOOperative project involving develOpment of the Mekong
River serving and separating Thailand, Cambodia, South Vietnam,
and Laos.61 The ECAFE Bureau of Flood Control organized a team
of international experts, led by Lt. General Wheeler of the
United States, to cOOperate with representatives of the four

nations in planning a series of multi-purpose projects to

 

57Henderson, Op. cit., p. #73.
581bid. 6oFifield, op. cit., p. #92.
591bid. 51New York Times, (7 March 1958).

 

52
control floods, provide irrigation and hydroelectric power,
and to improve navigation on the lower Mekong. In the begin.
ning there was so little c00peration by these nations that,
even after preliminary surveys and studies had been completed,
work could not begin. Even in 1961, although coOperation
appeared to rest on an adequate foundation,62 civil strife
and political unrest prevented the start of construction.63
By 1962, however, political conditions seemed more favorable
and resources were sufficient enough:

. . . to launch virtually all the data-collection
programs suggested by the Wheeler mission; to begin the
planning of ten multi-purpose projects, three of them

on the mainstream; and to make a start on construction.54

SHARED SENTIMENTS AND UNOFFICIAL REGIONAL CONTACTS
Neutralism and the Afro-Asian Bloc

.C
. l
l

Neutralism, though not a form of regionalism, is never3\:&f-
\‘r

 

\

theless, a shared sentiment contributing to a general feeling ‘\{f
that Southeast Asia, or more often.Asia, constitutes some kindlel
of separate entity. Asian.neutralists§ofor whom Nehru is the '
spokesman but not the leader,65 react against imperialism.and

the cold war; they strongly support disarmament and self-

 

62Willard A. Hanna, "The State of the States ofIndo-
china,‘ American Universities Field Staff Report, (New York,
1960), Part I, p. 5.

63Tran Van.Dinh, 'Territorial Planning and Equipping in
Asia,‘ Asian Culture, 3(April-June 1961)14-16.

 

'5“'The Mekong River Development Project,“ United Nations
Office of Public Information, ST/OPI/lll, 1962.

65Bobert A. Scalapino, 'Neutralism in Asia," American
Folitical Science Review, 48(March l954)51.

 

53

66 A former United States diplomat,

determination of peoples.
Hamilton Fish Armstrong, describes Asian neutralism in these
terms:
To the wide-ranging leaders today who proclaim their inde-
pendence, neutrality is not a declaration in advance of a
fixed position to be taken in case of war, or a claim to

rights against belligerent encroachment. It is a political
expedient. It is not passive but active.67

The practice of neutralism in Asia differs at least as much
between each Of its devotees as it does from the traditionally
passive role toward conflicts assumed by Switzerland. Burma
eschews alliances of any kind, preferring to follow an "active
and independent' foreign policy.68 India and Ceylon have, in
the past, sought to unite the neutrals of Asia to counter-
balance the bipolar powers but the attempt to form such a
union at the Asian Relations Conference for this purpose came
to no avail. Cambodia and Indonesia perceive neutralism in
more expediential terms; the Opportunity to trade Openly with
all nations and the maximization of foreign.aid are prevalent
motives in these nations' foreign policy-making.69

Akin to this shared sentiment of neutralism is the spirit
guiding the Afro-Asian.bloc of United Nations members. This

bloc, containing 29 members in 1958, votes as a unit on many

 

661bid, pp. 49-62.

67"Neutrality: Varying Tunes,” Foreign.Affairs, 35(Oct-
ober l956)6l.

68John S. Thomson, “Burmese Neutralism,‘ Political Sci-
ence Quarterly, 72(June 1957)279. Burma is, hdfi§?§F; an
a ve mem er in the United Nations.

69Sca1apino, Op. cit., p. 59.

 

 

11

5“
issues involving the possibility of nuclear war, colonialism,
and disarmament.70 Though not formally organized, the affairs
of the 'group' are managed by a monthly chairman who keeps
delegations informed on matters of importance to the bloc.71
Although both neutralism and Afro-Asian.bloc sentiments con-
tribute to the total amount of interaction among Southeast
Asian nations, discussion of common economic problems or their

solutions holds little place on the programs of these meetings.

Unofficial Regional Contacts

 

Unofficial regional contacts, if not numerous, have
involved important business, labor, and cultural elites as
well as government personnel. The Philippines has been espec-
ially active in trying to develOp closer relations with the
rest of Southeast Asia.72 A center for Asian Studies was
inaugurated there and a University Scholarship and Exchange of
Professors for Southeast Asia program is in operation. Since
195“ volunteer doctors, nurses, nutritionists, and agricul-
turists from the Philippines have gone to South Vietnam and
Laos to help under the Operation Brotherhood program.73
Various other regional meetings have been hosted and the

 

7°Gaganvihari L. Mehta, 'Aeian Nationalism vis-a-vis
Other Asian Nations,“ Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social SEIEfi§§T'3I8(UflIy I9533§3-§E, "

 

71Ibid, p. 9“.

72Amry Vandenbosch and Richard A. Butwell, Southeast
Asia Amongthe World Powers,_(Lexington, 1957), p. 95.

73New York Times, (22 November 1959).

q

55

Philippines is the site for the Asian Nuclear Center?“ but
other Southeast Asians still have reservations about accepting
the Philippines as Asian.75

The International Chamber of Commerce claims members in
Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and South Vietnam.76
The Asian Regional Organization of the International Confed-
eration of Free Trade Unions counts unions in Malaya, Thailand,
and the Philippines as members while the Communist-dominated
World Federation of Trade Unions in 1953 received delegations
from Burma and Indonesia. Burmese, Indonesian, and Malayan
delegates attended the Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon
that year. Buddhist Councils and Moslem Conferences have
periodically drawn representatives from most of the nations in
Southeast Asia. An.Inter-Parliamentary Union includes legis-
lators from Thailand, Indonesia, Burma, South Vietnam, and the
Philippines while an.Asian legal consultative committee, the
International Study Groups on Rubber and Tin,77 the Institute
of Pacific Relations, and an Eastern Regional Organization
for Public Administration as well as other smaller groups all

contribute to the interchange of ideas in Southeast Asia.

 

If

7“Fifield, Op. cit., p. 68.
75Vandenbosch and Butwell, op» cit., p. 96.

75The following paragraph is largely condensed from
Fifi-61d, Op. cite. pp. “’61-'“620

77Ibid, p. 462.

56
EFFECT OF REGIONAL INTERACTION ON INTEGRATIVE
TENDENCIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Conferences, security pacts, economic groupings, and
other expressions of regionalism in Southeast Asia, though
indicative of a growing amount of interaction among these
nations and with others, may not all be conducive to strength-
ening integrative tendencies within the region. Most Southeast
Asian nations are members of several regional groupings but
there is at present no important official organization embracing
all of the nations in the region and only those nations;
further, no official conference has included all of the nations
in Southeast Asia(see Table 1).:¥Every effort by leaders in
South and Southeast Asia to farm a permanent Official regional
organization.has failed while, with the exception of the Simla
Conference, attempts by Western nations to form these groupings
have usually succeeded.

Some of the existing groupings in Southeast Asia may
obstruct integration of the region as a whole. Cooperation of
Thailand and the Philippines in SEATO is criticized by other
Southeast Asian nations. Preferential treatment given.Commonp
wealth and Sterling Area members by Great Britain and that
given the Philippines by the United States are resented by
other Southeast Asian participants in stabilization agree-
ments. Generous aid allotments received by nations sympathetic
to policies of the richer powers are another source of envy
for nations seeking to remain.independent of power blocs. Even

memberships in unofficial organs are sometimes exclusive between

I.

 

 

 

--q.

57

TABLE 1
SOUTHEAST ASIAN ATTENDANCE AT CONFERENCES
AND MEMBERSHIPS IN REGIONAL GROUPINGS

CONFERENCES

 

’Asian New Delhi.Asian~

 

 

 

 

Relations on African Baguio Simla
Indonesia
BURMA X. X. X
CAMBODIA X. X X
INDONESIA X. 0 X X. X
LAOS X. X. X
MALAIA X. .X
PHILIPPINES X. X. X X. X
THAILAND X. 0 X X .X
S. VIETNAM X. 0 X X
MEMBERSHIPS

Phili- Common» Sterling Colombo ECAFE

ppines SEATO wealth .Area Plan

Pact
BURMA M M M
CAMBODIA D M M
INDONESIA M M
LAOS D M M
MALAIA M M M M
PHILIPPINES M M M M
THAILAND M M M

D M M

S. VIETNAM

4*

'The Asian Relations Conference was unofficial.

Official delegate

Unofficial Observer

Full membership

I'Designated." Under the protection of but not
members of SEATO.

.

CH3<D><

 

-a

58
a few nations. If for no other reason, the number of these
organizations, associations, and groupings is so large that
coordination becomes difficult even within a nation?8 and
despite conscious efforts to OOOperate, policies and objectives
will n essarily conflict.

Regional alignments in Southeast Asia have usually arisen
in reaction to problems other than those common to the region;
these alignments exert a centrifugal force pulling Southeast
Asian nations away from intra-regional OOOperation; They are
drawn into OOOperation with other underdeveloped and ex—col-
onial nations in the United Nations; security considerations
draw some toward the United States or Great Britain while
Others envision.develOpment of a ‘third force" consisting of
neutrals or non-aligned nations. Economic aid, ties with
former colonial nations, and currency exchange form still
other patterns of external forces pulling these nations away
from each other. Western nations, by their sponsorship and
participation, support nearly all of these sentiments, assoc-
iations, and organizations thus hindering deve10pment of a

grouping which might prove more suitable to the needs of the

region(:MDe8pite these centrifugal tendencies and the fact

that Southeast Asians following World War II have shown more
interest in.all-Asian or SOuth Asian regionalism than they-

have in.prOposals for closer relations among themselves,79 W,—<

 

78Harlan Cleveland, ”The Convalescence of Foreign Aid,“
American Economic Review, 49(May 1959)228. He lists more than

I5 eEonomIc aid and assistance programs Operating over 80
projects in Indonesia alone.

79Vandenbosch and Butwell, Op. cit., p. 26h.

1‘

59
there has been some interest lately in formulating an insti-
tution designed by Southeast Asians and capable of ministering

to their economic needs.

PROPOSALS FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Early PrOposals

 

The first Southeast Asian integration proposals were
primarily concerned with political unification. In 19“? the
French suggested a Pan-Southeast Asian.Union joining the
Indochinese states with Thailand but the plan was abandoned
when Thailand insisted on complete independence for the Indo-
chinese states.8° During the same year leftist Thai leaders
formed a Southeast Asia League composed of unofficial repre-
sentatives from several Asian nations. Enthusiasm for this
project also waned when it became apparent to other leaders
that the organization was a Communist front to assist Ho Chi
Minh in.Vietnam.81 Various other proposals concerning Pan-
Malay, PanaAsian, and Southeast Asian unions have been made
by national leaders including Thailand's former Premier
Thamrong Nawasawat, Indonesia's Socialist Party President
Soetan Sjahrir, Philippines Presidents Quirino and Magsaysay,

and Malaya's Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman.82

 

80Meyer, op. cit., p. 70.

31 Vandenbosch and Butwell, op. cit., p. 249.

azlbid, p. 250; arld Neyer, Opocit., p0 71.

60
The possibility of initiating an economic union in
Southeast Asia had scarcely been studied when these inte-
gration prOposals were put forth and it was the offhand Opinion
of many Asian Specialists in agreement with John F. Cady that,
because of ESEmunications inadequacies, political immaturity,

W'wmm":

and competitive economies, economic COOperation WOuld nOt be
profitablewfor these nations.83 ‘Despite the improvement of
conditions in Southeast Asia since 1950, this pessimistic view
on the part of these Specialists has persisted down to the
present. Guy Wint perceives too much disunity between all
Asian nations to permit any more cooperation than that offered
by existing plans and groupings.8n Peffer sees little that is
good in.the capabilities of these nations to assist one
another and cannot conceive of an organization that excludes
Western nations.85 William Henderson is more cautious, but
finds Southeast Asian economies too competitive to make an.

86

economic union profitable. And two other authors suggest

that these nations need to overcome some basic problems such

 

83"Challenge in Southeast Asia,I Far Eastern Survey,
19(8 February 1950)25. His statement is, 'EOOnomic ififégration
for Southeast Asia can be develOped only in the context of the
Far East as a whole, including India, China, and Japan.“

8"‘"South Asia--Unity and Disunity,‘ International Con-
ciliation, 500(195u)l3l-191.

85Nathaniel Peffer, "Regional Security in Southeast
Asia,“ International Organization, 8(1954)311-315.

86"Regionalism in Southeast Asia," Columbia Journal of
International Affairs, 19(Spring l956)76.

 

 

 

 

 

r0

61

as balance of payments deficits, economic competitiveness,
administration deficiencies, and inadequate financing before

an economic union.becomes possible.87

Recent PrOposals

 

South and Southeast Asian government officials have
sometimes taken.a quite different, though not necessarily
more realistic, view of economic regionalism. South Vietnam's
Secretary of Agriculture, in a recent session of the Food and
Agriculture Organization Conference, pled for unity, saying:
We have learned, above all, that many of our common prOb-
lems must be tackled in an integrated manner, because they
are vital to the economic deve10pment of our countries.
We must plan as a region. Even if we cannot do this
immediately, we must nevertheless, when we make our plans,
take into account the plans of our neighbors, and look 8
ahead to the day when our plans are really coordinated.8
The Ceylonese House of Representatives in early 1961
approved a prOposal to create a South Asian industrial deve1-
Opment plan in cOOperation with Burma, India, Indonesia,
Malaya, Pakistan, and Singapore. This proposal apparently was
not followed up with a plan of implementation.89 In.1960, the
Philippines government presented to the 16th ECAFE Conference,

and secured acceptance, a master industrial deve10pment and

 

87Vu Quoc Thuc, ”Economic DevelOpment in.Southeast Asian
Countries,‘ Asian Culture, 2(January-March l960)l-32. Dick
Wilson, 'A N3fi‘MEfiIIE3KEEIa Lumpur-Djakarta Axis?" Far Eastern
Economic Review, 26(15 January l959)67.

 

88"Collective Effort Urged in Tackling Agricultural
Problems,‘l Republic of Vietnam Press and Information Office,
6(30 December 1960)9.

89Letter to the Author from Dodwell Cooray, Press Attache,
Embassy of Ceylon, Washington, D. 0., dated 16 March 1961.

I.

62
trade plan establishing a Southeast Asian economic bloc.9o
Following the Philippine lead, ECAFE, in a comprehensive
report issued at the 17th Session, suggested Asian coordination
of economic deve10pment and COOperation in industrial projects,
trade, transportation, and other areas.91 Although the report
avoided mention of an economic union, Working Groups were
prOposed to study the advisability of creating "apprOpriate
machinery" for directing regional affairs.92 A more rounded
summary Of the ECAFE study is contained in a recent ECAFE
Bulletin.93 '

Probably the most persistent campaign for regional cOOp-
eration has been conducted by Prime Minister Tunku Abdul
Rahman of the Federation of Malaya. Since 1958, he has
Officially advocated cOOperation among Southeast Asian nations
in economic, cultural, spiritual, technical, and artistic
endeavors.9# First steps toward an economic union were taken
by Malaya in 1959 when, in a joint statement issued by Prime"
Minister Rahman and Philippines President Carlos Garcia, the

two nations called for an Association of Southeast Asian Lt’fi.<.55

 

9°New York Times, (10 March 1960).

91-Begional Co-Operation,' Interim Report by the ECAFE
Executive Secretary, United Nations Publication, (New Delhi,
31 January 1961).

921bid, pp. 25 and 26. At the 1962 ECAFE Conference in
Tokyo, ECKFE members failed to reach a decision to act on the
proposal. See: Yuaani Wu, "The Far East Trade Complex,“
Current History, 43(July 1962)n6.

93Economic Bulletin For Asia and the Far East, 12(June
196l)1-20}

94Letter to the Author from Manual A. Viray, First Sec-
retary, Embassy of the Philippines, Washington, D. 0., dated

 

 

 

10

t.

63
States.95 A proposal to this effect was presented to a joint
session of Malaya's Federal Parliament later that year.96
Joint Working Groups were established to study the possibilities
for union and these groups included representatives from the
Philippines, Malaya, and Thailand. In 1960 Prime Minister
Rahman told the National Press Club in Washington, D. C.,
We consider that there is so much affinity and identity
between the countries of the region that we must cooperate
more closely in the common interest. What we have in mind,
and what is slowly beginning to emerge, is known in our
area as ASAS--The Association of Southeast Asian States.
I am convinced that the day must come when such an assoc-
iation develOps as a working arrangement on lines similar
to those which have emerged as regional economic assoc-
iations in EurOpe and in this hemisphere.97
0n 1 February 1961, Prime Minister Rahman, Philippines
Foreign Minister Serrano, and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Thanat Khoman.of Thailand reaffirmed their plans to go ahead
with forming ASAS. They reemphasized that the organization
would be non~politica1 in character, independent of any power
blocs, and Open to other nations in the region.98 Represen-
tatives of the three governments, upon completion of reports
by the Working Groups, signed on 31 July 1961 the Declaration

of Bangkok declaring the establishment of the Association.with

 

95Paper presented by the Permanent Representative of the
Federation of Malaya at an informal meeting of Pacific Area
Permanent Representatives to the United Nations on 13 March 1961.

96New York Times, (25 November 1959).
97Speech before the National Press Club, 27 October 1960,

 

p. 6.
98Paper presented by the Permanent Representative, op.
cit., pp. 3-h. See also: New York Times, (lu February 198IT.

 

 

om

64
aims including the following:

1. To establish an effective machinery for friendly con-
sultations, collaboration, and mutual assistance in the
economic, social, cultural, scientific and adminis-
trative fields;

2. To provide educational, professional, technical and
administrative training and research facilities in their
respective countries for nations and officials of the
associated countries; . . .

. . 5. To provide a machinery for fruitful collaboration in
the utilisation of their respective natural resources,
the deve10pment of their agriculture and industry, the
expansion of their trade, the improvement of their
transport and communication facilities, and genera11§
raising the living standards of their peoples; . 9

A White Paper will be prepared after the working papers have
received approval of the national legislatures.loo

Since late 1961 Prime Minister Rahman has taken a new
turn in his efforts to initiate an economic union. He has
been busily negotiating with Great Britain to form a “Feder-

ation of Malasia' to include Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak, .'39f,

101

- in,
and Brunei. Britain, Malaya, and Singapore fundamentally :rf..

agree on the economic benefits of merger, but the union.poses,\:‘.w;;
difficult prOblems with regard to representation of Chinese AKI“

pOpulations, distribution of federal powers, and security

102

provisions. And the inclusion of North Borneo in the

merger might conceivably precipitate new conflict with other
99Letter to the Author from Kok-Swee Choong, First Secre-
tary, Embassy of Malaya, Washington, D. C., 11 August 1961.
°°Ibid.
101Christian Science Monitor, (24 November 1961).

102Christian Science Monitor, (31 October 1961) and (28
April 19GZTT'TTEE“DeIrOIE"FreePress, (1 August 1962), reports
that agreement has‘Been reached beffieen Malaya and Britain on
the merger.

 

 

 

‘2

I.

65

Southeast Asian.nations. Indonesia rules most of Borneo and
the Philippines has expressed a desire to possess North
Borneo if the British sever their ties with the oolony.1°3
Thus the stage is set for new differences of Opinion among
these three Southeast Asian nations. Nevertheless, the
inclusion of the British colonies could benefit a Southeast
Asian economic union. These territories have rich resources
that would bring in valuable exchange as well as increase the
complementarity of the union.1°“ Then, too, negotiations
between Malaya and Great Britain for immediate merger eliminate:
any problems that might arise if these territories wished to
join.the union at a later date.

SUMMARY OF REGIONAL COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
The network of intra-regional cOOperation and interna-

tional contacts in Southeast Asia nowhere approaches that

'J ,5 1)
V. .. . {I

found among the members of ECSC or LAFTAPD Only the Colombo ;fi{w :;
Plan and ECAFE bring governmental representatives of the eight
nations together regularly; cOOperation within these two
organizations is limited and actions are subject to consider-
ation‘by members outside the region. Southeast Asian reliance
upon richer powers for leadership has often been necessary and
desirable due to the need for military and economic security

which these newly independent nations have been unable to

guarantee. There is, however, a growing awareness that richer

 

l03Vandenbosch and Butwell, Op. cit., p. 282.

10“T. Silcock The Commonwealth Economy in South-East
Asia, (Durham, 1959), pp. zz-uo.

 

P‘-

I.

66
nations cannot fulfill all of Southeast Asia's needs, partic-
ularly in raising the level of the region's Share in inter-
national trade; the former's policies on trade are not always
beneficial to the nations within the region. National econ-
omic self-sufficiency for these small nations is incompatible
with economic deve10pment and higher standards of living and
it is apparent to many of the region's leaders that cOOperation
is needed to develOp regional resources economically. Although
regional economic cooperation is now in an embryonic state and
faced with seemingly insurmountable difficulties, it may be
expected that interest in COOperation will increase. The form
which any future cOOperation might assume cannot yet be deter-
mined, but the impetus for this economic cOOperation.is coming
and is likely to continue to come from Southeast Asians them-
selves rather than from sources outside the region if present

trends continue.

CHAPTER IV

COMPARISONS OF DEVELOPMENT INDICES IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA, ECSC, AND LAFTA

In this chapter, statistical indices of basic social
conditions, economic prOSperity, trade relations, communi-
cations and transportation facilities, and major value systems
I are used to compare similarities in regional development for
Southeast Asia, ECSC, and LAFTA.

The Southeast Asian nation ranking highest on.a Specific
index and the nation ranking lowest on this index are the
least similar of Southeast Asian.nations with regard to this
pro-condition. This is also true for ECSC and LAFTA members.
These high and low figures constitute a maximum range of
variation on each index that can be expressed as a ratio
(highest/lowest) illustrating the magnitude of the maximum
range. Expressing range in this manner allows comparison offl.kji‘
nations on indices in.which deve10pment levels vary widely. (/ (I
A ratio of maximum range has been Obtained for each region on
every index so similarity in deve10pment may be compared for
each of the three regions.

In order to weigh these ranges in favor of nations with
high deve10pment, only the magnitudes of range between the

Southeast Asian nation ranking highest on an index and each

67

(I

68
nation ranking lower are considered. In this way, a group
of Southeast Asian nations with ratios lower than the higher
of ECSC or LAFTA ratios would satisfy the criterion of simi-
larity on the indices examined in this chapter.

Tables of deve10pment figures for Southeast Asian nations
and tables of averages, range magnitudes, and extremes for each
of the three regions are given. Raw data for ECSC and LAFTA
members are contained in.Appendix I. Southeast Asian nations
that seem to satisfy the criterion for integration on an index
and all observations that modify these statistical rankings
are summarized following each group of indices.

The reader is cautioned that some of the data available
are not genuinely comparative and all statistics are not

equally reliable.1 In.the introduction of his Atlas of Econp

 

omic DevelOpment, Norton Ginsburg says,

 

It should be kept in mind, however, that many of the data
available are no more than estimates, although they have
not been treated as such for mapping purposes.2
And even when comparable statistics are reported in a reliable
manner, environmental differences within each region may alter
the significance of particular indices. .Nevertheless, the

author is inclined to agree with James S. Coleman's statement

v-w—‘l’

 

1United Nations reports were the major source of statics
tical data, however, figures from several sources are included
and acknowledged in the tables or Appendices. 1953 data is,
in most cases, used for ECSC because, even though the agreement
was signed in 1952, the common market did not begin Operation
until 1953. The LAFTA T eaty was signed in 1960 so the latest

figures, in most cases 1 59 or 1960, were used for both LAFTA
and Southeast Asia. .

2(Chioago, 1961), p. 6.

y ‘ I ‘1' l ‘

-.o~...~. so. -.
!
v r I
. 2 a ‘ a ,_.
. . .. . -
_ (
I ~ . » ‘
o ’ , ' e
I e .‘F O . ~ ‘ ‘ ‘-
. O '. '; ‘ ‘
._ i , 4 ‘_ . ‘. 1
’ ‘ .
‘ ( o - . . , _. . _
. ' . .'. p , _
\. .. . . . . _ . - . .~-_ . .
. u .
. " .1 - . . J
.
v o ‘ ‘ M w
I. . Q
.

69

that:
Despite the many serious reServations one can and should
make regarding the accuracy, comparability, and signifi-
cance 0 available economic statistics, as well as the
validity of gross judgments regarding the . . . Character
of political systems, it is believed that . . ./5’compar-
icon of this typ§7 can, at the least, be suggeSfive.3

And the discussion.accompanying each table is intended to

alleviate some of the inadequacies inherent in the statistical

data.

BASIC SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Indices to be examined are: percentages of persons
urbanized, percentages of populations literate, percentages of
children ages 5 to 14 enrolled in primary schools, and percen~
tages of pOpulations employed in agriculture. These indices
help measure the amount of social communication that may take
place and receptivity to new ideas as well as possession of
common political attitudes. And they are also a partial
indication of a nation's economic productivity.“ Southeast
Asian.pOpulation data contained in Table 21, however, are
probably less reliable than ECSC or LAFTA data as indicators_

of these phenomena and are subject to several qualifications.

 

3Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, ed., The Poli-
tics of the DevelOping Areas, (Princeton, 1960), p. 538.

 

“Andrew 0. Frank, "Human Capital and Economic Growth,-
Economic DevelOpment and Cultural Change, 8(January 1960)
17U-l73.

 

fin... a

O.

70
TABLE 2
SOUTHEAST ASIAN DATA ON POPULATION CHARACTERISTICSa

 

 

 

 

J_ #t—

% of x of z of % of Children
Population POpulation in POpulation Ages 5-14 in
Urbanized Agriculture Literate Primary Schools

 

BURMA 8 69 57 16
CAMBODIA 10 80 36 19
INDONESIA 25 96 32 35
LAOS 2 80+ 20 ll
MALAYA 27 61 38 44
PHILIPPINES 25 61 65 6O
THAILAND 10 80 56 54
S. VIETNAM 11 8o 32 8

3Sources: Statistical Yearbook, United Nations Publica-
tion, (New York"I§3U77-WEFIEEEFEIEficyclOpedia of Nations,
(New York, 1960 ; GabrieI“A. Almond‘and James S. COIeman, ed.,
The Politics of the DevelOping Areas, (PrincetOn, l960);'
NEFEOn GIfiSburg, Atlas OT'EEBEOEIE'DevelOpment, (Chicago,
1961), Table 15, p. 42. ::""'

Note: The reader is cautioned that these figures are not

equally reliable and some indices represent no more than
informed guesses on the part of the above sources.

Percentages of Populations Urbanized

A large urban pOpulation usually indicates that a nation
is highly industrializeds and prObably possesses a broad

consensus on acceptable forms of political activity.6

 

5B. W. Hodder, “Demographic Influences on Economic Devel-
Opment in Southeast Asia," in Philip Thayer ’ed., Nationalism

and Progress in Free Asia, (Baltimore, 1956 , p. 22I. THIS Is
a common e w c , odder notes, does not hold true for
Southeast Asia. -

6Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 475.

71
1. Southeast Asian data on urbanization reveals less about
industrialization than it does for develOped nations
because city-dwellers in lesser develOped nations are
often engaged in commerce and trade rather than in
industrial pursuits.7 Many persons in Southeast Asia,
as in other underdeveloped nations, gravitate to the city
(usually the capital)8 to escape rural poverty without
guarantees that employment, industrial or otherwise, is
available.9
2. When industrialization lags behind urbanization,
these agglomerations of peOple, rather than promoting
consensus within a nation, may actually increase poli-

10

tical strife. This has been the case in Indonesia,

Thailand, and Burma as well as in Argentina, Cuba, and

Uruguay.11

3. POpulation growth in Southeast Asia has been extremely
uneven. Growth has occurred primarily in West Java,
I lower Thailand, lower Burma, Central Luzon and along the

12

lower Mekong River; concentrations of large, unassim-

ilated ethnic groups in areas surrounding Bangkok,

 

7Bert F. Hoselitz, 'The City, the Factory, and Economic
Growth,“ American Economic Review, 45(May 1955)173. Also:
Almond and-COIeman, Op. CIETT'ppT 100-101.

8Almond and Coleman, Op. cit., p. 537.

9Hodder, op. cit., pp. 221-222; and Hoselitz, p. 177.
lOHoselitz, op. cit., pp. 170-175.

1lAlmond and Coleman, Op. cit., pp. 100 and 475.
125212, p. 66.

 

 

(I

72
Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur and other cities add to political
unrest in these urban settings.
4. Philippines urbanization figures are somewhat distorted
because charters are granted to cities as political
favors in return for support at the polls; these cities
actually contain extensive rural areas and agricultural

pOpulations.13

Percentages of POpulations Employed in Agriculture

 

The uniformly large agricultural populations in Southeast
Asia are probably not conducive to economic integration.14
One indicator of the size of an agricultural sector is the
number of persons it employs.
1. The size of the agricultural sector is also dependent
upon.productivity, that is, the amount of goods produced
per person over a period of time. And deSpite the
uniformly large agricultural pOpulations throughout
Southeast Asia, thetotal amount of agricultural goods
produced is not high.15
2. In Southeast Asia, agricultural goods available for

export are usually competitive within the region; raw

 

13Paul F. Cressey, I'Urbanization in the Philigpines,‘l
Sociology and Social Research, 44(Ju1y-August 1960) 02.

1“See discussion and notes in Chapter I, pp. 13-14.

15Benjamin.Higgins' generalizations that, because of
technological backwardness in the subsistence sectors of most
underdevelOped economies, food shortages often exist and many
persons are underemployed for parts of each year is applicable
to Southeast Asia. See his: Economic DevelOpment, (New York,
1959). pp- 328-344. :_____

 

73

materials face severely fluctuating price levels;16 and,
their bulk and tendency to spoil make transportation
difficult and expensive.

3. Although ECSC exhibits a higher range of variation on
this index than do nations in LAFTA or Southeast Asia,
this may be desirable; it is in part a measure of reg-
ional economic complementarity. Dairy products from the
Benelux nations and fruit and cereals from France,
Germany, and Italy enter more easily into regional trade
than do the food products and plantation cr0ps of the

other two regions.

Percentages of Populations Literate

 

and Enrolled in Primary Schools

 

Literacy rates and percentages of children between the
ages of.5 and 14 in primary schools are two indicators of
national education levels but both of these indicators are
somewhat limited in comparability.

1. Comparisons of literacy rates are nebulous because

some nations report data without distinguishing between

the ability to scribble one's name(census literacy) and

the ability to comprehend or communicate written material

16T. Silcock, The Commonwealth Economy in South-East Asia,
(Durham, 1959), pp. 22 553'207. S§e aISO} Susan Strangé,
'The Commonwealth and the Sterling Area,“ Yearbook of World
Affairs, 13(1959)40-41.

 

 

,9

\
.
1\\'
O

74
(functional literacy).17
2. Numbers of children in primary schools do not signify
the achievement of identical educational levels in every
nation. In Southeast Asia, for example, schools gener-
ally maintain lower standards than do those in EurOpe
and individual schools vary both in quality and type of
education available.18
3. Because data for all three regions are for 1957, the
figures do not portray either the exact conditions
existing in ECSC or LAFTA when they were formed or the
contemporary situation in Southeast Asia. Changes in
the percentages of children in schools, however, are not
thought to be extensive within a span of three years.
Development in Southeast Asia on the four indices just
examined is in almost every case below ECSC and LAFTA averages;
only percentages of primary school enrollments in the Phili-
ppines and Thailand are higher than averages in the two unions.
But if similarity of the most highly develOped Southeast Asian

 

17John de Young, A Pilot Study in Communication Problems
on the Barrio Level, p. 96, as quoted in JOse V. Abueva,‘F06fi§
EH“EfiéwBafrI67"(MEEila, 1959), p. 23. Extreme literacy raE§”'
amBIguIEy Is evident in South Vietnam where, between 1957 and
1959, estimates of various sources ranged from 15% to 90%.
See: Norton Ginsburg, Atlas of Economic DevelOpment, (Chicago,
1961), p. 38; and Almondand’COIeman, o . cit. Appendix. The
high figure was reported in: The Worldmark EncyclOpedia of
Nations, (New York, 1960), p. II52. -

18Amry Vandenbosch and Richard A. Butwell, Southeast Asia
Amon the World Powers, (Lexington, 1957), pp. 207;208. G.

am Skinnef,‘ChInese Society in Thailand, (Ithaca, 1957),
pp. 227-234. RiOEEFE_BfiEfi§IIT_SBEBheaSE‘AsIa Today-~And
Tomorrow, (New York, 1961), pp. IIEéII7.

 

 

 

 

 

 

O
‘ l
l ‘ ‘ ‘
‘\
C
. , '-
. a '
I ' (
C . ‘ t
' r
..
( .
.
' ,. . z (
" Q
1
~ '

4‘

75
TABLE 3
AVERAGES, EXTREMES, AND RANGES OF VARIATION OF THE
ABOVE INDICES FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA, LAFTA, AND ECSCa

WM

SOUTHEAST ASIA LAFTA ECSC

ave extreme range ave extreme range ave extreme range

 

 

 

53%:iifiign 15 2-27 13.5 48 35-70 2.0 57 41-72 1.7

POpulation
in 76 61-96 1.6 51 23-63 2.7 26 12-41 3.4
Agriculture

P 1 t1
LIEEtheon “2 20-65 3.3 72 48-93 1.9 95 89-97 1.1

Children

in Primary 31 8-60 7.5 50 34-68 2.0 71 57-78 1.4
Schools

 

aRaw data for LAFTA and ECSC are contained in.Appendix I.
Averages constitute arithmetic means for nations in each region.
Extremes illustrate highest and lowest levels of deve10pment
for nations within a region, and ranges are range magnitudes

derived from the extremes.

nations is the criteria, the situation appears more favorable
for integration. 0f the most highly develOped nations, the
range between the Philippines and Malaya is lower than ECSC or
LAFTA on all four indices. Thailand and Indonesia can be
included with these leaders on three of four indices without
increasing the range above ECSC or LAFTA and Indonesia is only
slightly less similar on the percentages of persons literate.
Burma, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam are less developed

than either ECSC or LAFTA on these basic social conditions.

76

ECONOMIC.PROSPERITY

Some indication of similarities in economic prosperity
desirable for economic union members is obtained by comparing
per capita incomes, cost of living indices, and economic
growth-pOpulation growth ratios. The gross data reported in
these indices are, however, most revealing for develOped
nations where extremes of wealth and poverty are not so great

as in.lesser develOped nations.

TABLE 4

SOUTHEAST ASIAN DATA ON ECONOMIC PBOSPEBITYa
W

 

Per Capita Cost of Economic Growth/
Nat'l Income Living Index POpulation Growth
US A 8953 Base)
BURMA 72 96 2.1
CAMBODIA 70 141 4.5
INDONESIA 100 311 3.0
LAOS 50 199 b
MALAIA 310 92 b
PHILIPPINES 201 104 2.6
THAILAND 130 119 4.0
S. VIETNAM 100 133 b

 

aSources: Norton Ginsburg, Atlas of Economic DevelOpment,
(Chicago, 1961), Table 3, p. 18; SW
Nations Publication, (1959), Table 1667pp.‘i47=448'§nd Table
161, pp. 451-456; Almond and Coleman, Op. cit., Table 2 p. 101;
Demographic Yearbook, United Nations PfiEIIEEEIOn, (1958), Table
3 PP. 5'1030
bData missing or outdated.

Note: The reader is cautioned that these figures are not
equally reliable and some indices represent no more than
informed guesses on the part of the above sources.

 

77

Per Capita Incomes

 

Per capita incomes derived from gross national products
approximate incomes that would be received by each person if
the national product were distributed evenly. But due to
differing societal conditions governing distribution and
disposition of income, comparativeness is reduced and these
figures must be interpreted with caution.

l. Disparities in personal incomes are great in all of
Southeast Asia, even among the poor. Persons in the
subsistence sectors may live with little or no monetary
incomes while persons living on plantations and in the
Westernized urban areas have income levels approaching the
national average, but may live no better than their rural
neighbors.

2. In Southeast Asia, because climates are mild, clothing
and housing needs are more easily satisfied than in
EurOpe; thus, greater prOportions of personal incomes are
available to satisfy additional wants there than in
temperate EurOpean climates.

3. The gross figures on per capita income subsume any
differences in man-hours or labor forces needed to earn
these incomes.19 Data may also be distorted by multiple
exchange rates, inflationary spirals, cost restrictions,

or maldistribution of income in some of these nations.20

 

19Higgins, op. cit., pp. 631-635.

20E. M. Bernstein and I. G. Patel, "Inflation in Bel-
ation to Economic DevelOpment,'l in Bernard Okun and Richard W.
Richardson Studies in Economic Development, (New York, 1961),
pp. 439-44é. 3""'

 

78
4. Despite these qualifiers, this index is useful to
compare nations within the same geographical area that

share similar societal and climatic environments.

Cost of Living Index

 

The cost of living index measures the relative stability
between wages and prices.. As a barometer of inflationary
trends, it suggests the presence or absence of an economic
climate conducive to investment in domestic growth-promoting
ventures.

1. The index does not indicate whether or not the similar
wages or prices desirable for union members exist in
nations. It aids only in identifying inflation that might
be damaging to economic growth.21

2. A slow, controlled rise in.prices may not be damaging
to develOping economies. Some Latin American economists
maintain that inflation is a necessary part of economic
growth,22 but the experience of Malaya, Burma, the Phil-
ippines, and Thailand, where inflation is negligible or
nonexistent, are evidence to the contrary.

3. Governments may control wages and prices in various
ways and subsidization in any form distorts the cost-price

ratio that would exist if supply and demand were the only

 

21Bernstein and Patel, op. cit., give a good discussion
of inflation as it affects economIC deve10pment.

22Roberto de Oliveira Campos, 'Two Views on Inflation in
Latin.America,' in.Albert 0. Hirschman, ed., Latin American
Issues, (New York, 1961), pp. 69-80; See alSO‘EE§“T8II5fiIfig
Ewo articles in this volume, pp. 81-124.

I.

79
controlling variables.23

Economic Growth vis-a—vis POpulation Growth

 

Economic growth rates for Southeast Asia, ECSC, and
LAFTA were computed as the average rate of increase in.national
incomes at factor cost over a period of several years.2“ Popu-
lation growth was taken as the annual rate Of growth between
1953 and 1957 for all three regions.

1. Accuracy of these economic-population growth ratios is
reduced because of distortions in.mational income data and
arbitrariness in estimating the sizes of pOpulations.

2. The usefulness of the index is further impaired because
Laos, Malaya, and South Vietnam did not report national
income data.

Considerable similarity in per capita incomes, cost of
living indices, and economic-pOpulation growth ratios exists
among Southeast Asian.nations. With the exception of LaOS,W\‘
all nations reporting data on these indices are more nearly
similar than LAFTA; the Philippines and Thailand are more
similar than ECSC as well. In addition to being most similar
on these indices the Philippines, Thailand, Burma, and Indonesia
exceed LAFTA in rates of economic growth and stability of living

costs. It must be acknowledged, however, that these indicators

AA

23Hollis B. Chenery, 'Development Policies and Programmes,"
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 3(March 1958)75-76. Also:

Tan—TEET—Wgen, s 0 vs 0 m nt, (Baltimore, 1958), p. 53.

241m some cases it was necessary to use national incomes
computed at current costs. The rate of national income increase
in.ECSC was measured over the years 1950-1953; for LAFTA and
Southeast Asia the period used was 1953-1958.

r3
‘

80
TABLE 5
AVERAGES, EXTREMES, AND RANGES OF VARIATION OF THE
ABOVE INDICES FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA, LAFTA, AND ECSCa

W

SOUTHEAST ASIA LAFTA ECSC

 

‘

ave extreme range ave extreme range ave extreme range

 

Per Capita 129 50-310 6.0 260 108-569 5.2 861 442- 2.7
National 1191+

Income

Cost Of

Living 149 92-311 3.4 375 13:3 6.9 120 106-144 1.4
Economic/

POpulation 3.2 2.1-4.5 2.1 2.2 0.5-4.4 8.8 5.4 2.6-9.2 3.5
Growth

 

8Raw data for LAFTA and ECSC are contained in.Appendix I.
Averages constitute arithmetic means for nations in each region.
Extremes illustrate highest and lowest levels of develOpment
for nations within a region, and ranges are range magnitudes

derived from the extremes.

of economic prosperity do not measure directly the pro-conditions
for integration established by other studies and.are useful
determinants of integrative tendencies only in conjunction with
other indices that follow.

EXPORT DIVERSIPICATION, REGIONAL TRADING, INDUSTRIALIZATION,
AND ARTIFICIAL TRADE BARRIERS

Free trade areas, customs unions, common markets, or
regional industry and resource development plans would not
benefit economies of nations that did not trade with each other.
Trade is maximized in nations with diversified and industrial-
ized economies that do not discriminate against imports from

other nations. And many writers remain convinced that these

’-

I.

81
conditions do not exist in a degree that would make a Southeast

'Asian regional economic union feasible.25

TABLE 6
SOUTHEAST ASIAN DATA ON PRIMARY EXPORTS, REGIONAL TRADING,
INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT, AND CUSTOMS TAx REVENUESa‘

Primary Export % Of Industrial Customs Tax

 

 

 

 

 

% of Regional Origin of Revenues-% of
Total Trade Trading GNP-1 Total Taxes

BURMA R106 A 72 14 17 26
CAMBODIA Rice 30 19 12 b

INDONESIA Petroleum 37 19 10° 48
LAOS Tin. 60 34‘1 b b

MALAYA Rubber 60 23' hi 43
PHILIPPINES Coconut 36 4 22 . 23
THAILAND R106 46 27 19 33
S. VIETNAM Rubber 65 7 b b

 

aSources: Direction of Trade, United Nations Publication,
(1959). StatistiEEI'YearbOOk,‘Unffed Nations Publication,
(196 0), TEBIé‘I64,"pp.' 450- 455. International Financial Stat-
istics, United Nations Publication, 13(January-June'1960),
ParE I.
b

 

 

Data missing or outdated.

°Excluding construction.

dInl958, Laos did 34% of its trade within the region,
but this was not a normal velume of trade for this nation. The
exchange represented a 31 million trade with South Vietnam.

°Singapore trade is included with Malayan trade for 1958.

 

25T. Silcock, Op. cit., p. 140. Vu Quoc Thuc, "Economic
DevelOpment in SoutheasE Rs 1% Countries," Asian Culture,
2(January-March l960)29.

 

1
,' - o _ \ - b. :5 . _ ‘, “5.".
_I
.
.
I
7‘ .0
.
'4 f a . ‘
; - o . . - _. -
n
‘V ‘
v u 'C.
‘ u
‘ ' a ,
\- .
' r 3
‘ ,
' o
‘ u
\l \ -
‘0
. o
‘- -
‘ D
. 4.
.
. ~. \ . .‘
.
‘ u
- ~ ‘ I
' I
‘ .
o o. . . ’ _ - .
- Q
Q .
, o - - . -
‘1 o
Q ' ' ‘ o
. I.
t. . ‘
I
l ., 1

82

There are several explanations for the limited amount of
Southeast Asian trading. (1) Economies are often competitive
in many of the commodities produced and available for trade.26
(2) These nations have strong traditional trading links with
former colonial powers27 or other nations and much trading is
still controlled by foreigners living in Southeast Asia. _
(3) Artificial trade barriers and ideological differences disrupt
amicable trade relationships between these nations. (4) Finally,
a great deal of ignorance about other nations' available exchange
commodities still exists in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, ECAFE
economists are hOpeful that these limitations upon trade can be

overcome and will not prevent more extensive regional economic

cooperation in the future.28

Export Diversification

Economies in Southeast Asia are eSpecially competitive in
the raw materials and agricultural products that now account for
most of their gross national products. For example, five of
these nations export nearly all natural rubber entering into
international trade.29 Three of these nations supply half the

world's rice and three of them also supply a major portion of

 

26"Structure of Intraregional Trade of ECAFE Countries,I
Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East, 12(June 1961)20-26.

271b1d, p. 2a.
zarbld. pp. 53-54.

29Norton Ginsburg, The Pattern of Asia, (Englewood
Cliffs, 1958), p. 318.

 

fl

83
the world's t1n.3 °

1. Although every nation in the region depends on one or
two commodities for the major portion of its foreign
exchange, this situation is for most more a matter of past
circumstance than of present or future necessity because
the region is relatively rich in diverse natural resources.31
Many of these resources are as yet undeveIOped, in part
because richer nations(usually colonial powers), by
subsidies and preferences, prolonged and promoted the
production of selected commodities beyond their natural
market advantages. Lack of capital and technology as well
as insufficient internal control32 are other obstacles to
the deve10pment of these resources.
2. Latin.American nations are in a similar state of
resource develOpment and LAFTA exports are only slightly
more diversified than those of Southeast Asia. In contrast,
ECSC exports are so diversified that commodities could only
be classified into general categories of food, manufac-
tures, or iron and steel production.
3. Southeast Asian nations least dependent upon a single
export commodity for foreign exchange are the Philippines,
Cambodia, Indonesia, and Thailand. If those nations least

 

30Economic Survey for Asia and the Far East, (Bangkok,
1958), pp. 22-24. HusseII H. Firield, The DipIOmacy of South-
east Asia: l9u5-1958, (New York, 1958), p . 8-1I.“

31Fifield, above, pp. 8-11.

32George McT. Kahin, ed., Governments andPolitics of
Southeast Asia, (Ithaca, 1959), pp. 91; 133£Ijo; 217-219;
4944fl95.

 

 

I.

an

dependent upon two major commodities are ranked, they again
include the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, but
Malaya is next most diversified in this respect.

Percentages of Regional Trading

 

Intra—regional trading between Southeast Asian nations
is significant in spite of regional dependence upon single
export commodities. It is also one of the few indicators of
interaction between nations, although it may be both a cause
and an effect of this interaction.

1. The average percentage of Southeast Asian trade exceeds
that of LAFTA. _Even ECSC members, with a more complex
network of mutual trading interests than any other region
in the world,33 did only 28% of their trading among them-
selves in 1953(see Appendix II). Luxembourg and France
both do a smaller percentage of trading in ECSC than some
Southeast Asian nations do within their region; the same
situation is true for Mexico and Brazil in LAFTA.

2. Trade percentages, however, do not indicate the real
amount of financial exchange between nations nor do they
indicate the relative amount of the national incomes
derived from foreign trade. In 1958, for example, the
Philippines did only #% of its trading within the region,
yet in monetary value this exchange exceeded that of

Cambodia doing 18% of its trade within the region.

 

33Lincoln Gordon, “Economic Regionalism Reconsidered,‘I
World Politics, 13(January l96l)2h5.

85
3. Although Southeast Asia as a whole does a creditable
amount of regional trading, much of this exchange is on
a bilateral basis between a few nations and a trading
network such as ECSC'S, for example, does not yet exist.
h. Including India, Japan, and Singapore in a regional
trading complex with Southeast Asia would mean a signifi-

cant increase in the trade interdependence of these nations.

Industrial Origin of Gross National Product
A high level of industrialization contributes to the
amount of goods available for exchange between members of an
economic union. The value of this industrial production in
the total economy is indicated by the percentage of the gross
national product(GNP) derived from industry.
1. Low levels of industrialization in all Southeast Asian
nations limit the amount of regional trade that can pre-
sently take place. Although the Philippines, Thailand,
and Burma have the highest and most similar industrial
output levels in Southeast Asia, they average only 19% on
this index, and are less than half as industrialized as
are ECSC members.
2. Southeast Asian industry is composed largely of mining
and light industry while ECSC has primarily capital
intensive industry producing goods that remain in rela-
tively constant demand. And even the Philippines, with
the highest industrial output(22%) in the region, depends

86
upon agricultural goods for 76% of its exports.3u
3. Malaya did not report data on industrial origin of GNP,
but comparable indices suggest industrialization similar
to that of the Philippines, Thailand, and Rurma.35
h. Industry is expanding in Southeast Asia and regional
complementarity promises to increase as these nations
process more and more of their primary products domesti-
cally. Indonesia's Asahan River complex supplies power
for new aluminum and iron and steel plants as well as for
plants processing rubber, caustic soda, desiccated coconut,
cement, and textiles.36 The Mekong River deve10pment will
do the same for nations along its shores when the project
is completed. And even South Vietnam, with very low
industrialization, has Opened textile, glass, aluminum,
and plastics factories since 195“ despite a decline in
overall industrial output during this period.37

Artificial Trade Barriers

Southeast Asian regional trading has also been hindered

by customs duties and other indirect taxes, high shipping

 

3“Kanin, op. cit., p. A52.

35Norton Ginsburg, Atlaséof Economic DevelOpment,
(Chicago, 1961), Tables 33-w3, pp. 78-98. "“"

36Ben,1amin.Higgins, Indonesia's Economic Stabilization
and DevelOpment, (New York, 195777'p.‘7b. ‘Kahin, Op. cit.,
p. 218. *WIIffed Malenbaum, “The Asian Economic PdEenEIaI,'

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
W958 )19. “—

37Viotnam, United States Operations Mission.Annua1
Report, (SaIgon, 1960), pp. 35-39.

8?
costs, and foreign currency exchange restrictions.

1. Customs duties have long been the major source of
governmental revenue in Southeast Asia.38 These taxes are
extremely productive and their use enables governments to
easily control volumes or single items of trade merely by
raising or lowering the duties.39
2. Personal incomes are low and almost untaxable and there
is much tax evasion in the agricultural sectors where the
bulk of Southeast Asians are employed so the more easily
accessible merchants and traders bear the brunt of the tax

burdens.“0

3. Tax burdens borne by the exchange sectors in the Philip-
pines, Malaya, and Thailand have been decreasing since

1955 and are being replaced by other sources of revenue,“1
yet revenues derived from these taxes in all of Southeast
Asia are still twice as high as the LAFTA average and

three times as high as that of ECSC.

4. Most goods traded by these nations travel in foreign
bottoms and the high prices charged by these shipping

corporations(usually owned by richer nations) make it

 

38Jonathan V. Levin, The Export Economies, (Cambridge,
1960), p. 269. The same dependence on custms duties has pre-
vailed in.Latin America; see: William W. Pierson and Federico
G. Gil, Governments of Latin America, (New York, 1957), p. 405.

39Walter Heller, “Fiscal Policies for Underdeveloped
Economies,‘I in Okun and Richardson, op. cit., p. 461.

“oBenJamin Higgins and Wilfred Malenbaum, "Financing Econs
omic Development,“ International Conciliation, 502(March 1955)
313. Also: The Colombo Plan‘for‘Co-Operatiie Economic Develop-
ment in.Soutfi'afid‘SBEEfi-EasE‘AsIa,Report’by the Commonwealth
Consultative Committee, (LOndOn;“l950), p. 54.

ulSoutheast Asian Tax policies are discussed in: Frank

Golay, "Commercial Policy and Economic Nationalism," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 72(November 1958)574-587.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

’\

"I

88

profitable to ship goods only when substantial profit
margins are assured.’"2
5. Free exchange rates in Hong Kong and large markets in
Singapore also siphon Off goods that might, under other

circumstances, be exchanged for consumption or processing

in the region.“3

TABLE 7
AVERAGES, EXTREMES, AND RANGES OF VARIATION OF THE

ABOVE INDICES FOB SOUTHEAST ASIA, LAFTA, AND ECSCa

 

SOUTHEAST ASIA LAFTA ECSC

 

ave extreme range ave extreme range ave extreme range

 

Primary

Export 51 30-72 2.4 39 23-66 2.8 25 13-32 2.5
% of Trade

R i 1
misdigz 13 “-34 8.5 11 1-25 25 28 17-38 2.2

Industrial

Origin 16 10-22 2.2 2 14- l 262 46 - 6 1.
of GNP 5 3 37 5 5

Customs Tax
Revenues 35 23-48 2'1 18 “‘27 6-7 9 7-16 2.3

 

8Raw data for LAFTA and ECSC are contained in.Appendix I,
and II. Averages constitute arithmetic means for nations in
each region. Extremes illustrate highest and lowest levels of
develOpment for nations within a region, and ranges are range
magnitudes derived from the extremes.

 

“zGunnar Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State, (New Haven,
1960), p. 244. S. N. Haji,"InternationaI’Aspect (of Indian
Shipping,“ United Asia, 9(1957)254-259. Haji's observation
that rich nations reserve cargo(up to 75% in the case of the
United States) for national bottoms is applicable for Southeast

A313‘ “3Ginsburg, Pattern of Asia, 0pc cit., P- 385'

 

 

. s
e. .
.
1. '
\
.
-0 I w ‘
. .
~ 0
\ x
. '- vu .
' n-.. 7,.
. ‘ _ - . .- s
..
0
e-
. .
--
C
O
.
- ’V ' . W
. .
.
..
.
‘ ' .‘w
.
. -

89
Southeast Asian nations most similar in deve10pment
conducive to integration with regard to diversified eXports,
regionalvtrade, industrial output, and customsfltaxes are
Thailand, the Philippines, Malaya, Indonesia, Cambodia, and
Burma in that order. No combination of these nations equals
the low ranges of variation among ECSC members but all five are

generally more similar than LAFTA members.

COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES
These indices have been chosen to indicate the broad

range of facilities available for communication and mobility.

TABLE 8
SOUTHEAST ASIAN DATA ON COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIESa

   

._..._ --_...---_._.-_ ._ ._

International Telephones Newspaper

 

Mail Flow Per Per COpies Per
1000 Persons 1000 Persons 1000 Persons
BURMA 0.1 0.5 8
CAMBODIA 0.2 0.6 3
INDONESIA 0.1 1.1 11
LAOS 0.2 0.3 1
MALAYA 2.8 10.3 17
PHILIPPINES 0.4 3.3 19
THAILAND 0.2 1.5 4
S. VIETNAM 0.6 1.1 28

 

aSources: Norton Ginsburg, Atlas of Economic Development,
(Chicago, 1961), Table 44, p. 100. SEaEisticaI’Yeafbook,
United Nations Publication, (1959), T55I§‘ISUT"§§T‘367:369 and
Table 18“, pp. 578-579.

Note: The reader is cautioned that these figures are not
equally reliable and some indices represent no more than
informed guesses on the part Of the above sources.

 

90
TABLE 9

SOUTHEAST ASIAN DATA ON TRANSPORTATION FACILITIESa

 

 

.-_______._________..__.._..__....f~ s.__.___.._.__..
Railroad Kms Civil Aviation Motor Vehicles
Per Person/ Miles Flown Per
Density Per Person 1000 Persons

BURMA 8 0.1 2

CAMBODIA 5 0.1 2

INDONESIA 6 0.1 1

LAOS b b 3

MALAYA 17 0.9 16

PHILIPPINES 4 0.5 6

THAILAND 14 0.2 3

S. VIETNAM 7 0.2 3

 

aSources: Norton Ginsburg, Atlas of Economic DevelOpment,
(Chicago, 1961), Table 26, p. 64. Sta tIs tIcaI YearEOOE, UnIteE

Nations Publication, (1959), Table'IE37I557I3363337IIIEITab1e
147. PP- 351-355-

bData missing or outdated.
Note: The reader is cautioned that these figures are not

equally reliable and some indices represent no more than informed
guesses on the part of the above sources.

Communications indices include international mail flow, numbers
of telephones, and newspaper cOpies per 1000 persons. Trans-
portation indices include railroad densities,uh aviation miles
flown, and motor vehicles per 1000 persons. International mail

is especially valuable as one of the few indicators of commun-

ication flows between nations. The following qualifications

 

HRailroad density is computed as the number of kilo-
meters of track per person divided by l/pOpulation density.
See Ginsburg, Atlas of Economic DevelOpment, Op. cit., p. 64.

91
are applicable to these indices in Southeast Asia.
1. Throughout Southeast Asia nearly all communication
facilities are located in urban areas and mass media seldom
directly reach the average villager.)+5 John de Young found
in the rural Philippines that only 23.9% of the households

 

had members who read newspapers and 76% of his informants

 

did not read newspapers at all.46 And radios are scarce
throughout all Of Asia.“7
2. The quality of mass media also varies greatly in South-
east Asia. Newspapers and the presses in the Philippines,
Burma, and Malaya generally Operate with relative indepen-
dence and objectivity“8 while in Indonesia and South
Vietnam, the presses are subject to harassment by govern-
ments and other persons.“9
3. The overall sparsity of mass media in Southeast Asia
makes it necessary for large segments of these pOpulations
to depend upon informal channels of communication such as

religious or communal leaders. In fact, because these

 

“Sc. William Skinner, Local, Ethnic and National Loyal-
ties in Village Indonesia: A ympos um, ew or , , p. .

 

”60p. cit., p. 8, as quoted on p. 49.

I7Statistical Yearbook, United Nations Publication, (New
York, 1953), note at bottom of p. 551. Except in the Philippines,
Southeast Asian broadcasting is government controlled. See:
Almond and Coleman, Op. cit., p. 137.

”3Almond and Coleman, Op. cit., pp. 135-136. The Burmese
press has been timid under thEINew Win governments.

“9Kahin, Op. cit., pp. 199 and 367. The press in Thai-
land has not been freeIOf government control but has been _
harassed less than is true in Indonesia and South Vietnam.

 

'0

92
informal channels are often so efficient, more information
is transmitted in these nations than statistics would
indicate.50
4. The same observation holds for mobility indicators; even
though transportation figures are extremely low in Southeast
Asia, animal power, small boats, and pedestrian facilities
account for a great deal of travel within and between
nations.51
5. The extent of communications and mobility between nations
is difficult to establish. There is little tourism52 dis-
tances between capitals and Other cities are great, and
travel facilities are expensive and limited. Indonesia and
the Philippines are insular nations accessible only by ship
or airplane and few railroads or all-weather roads exist
even between nations on the mainland.53 It is worth
noting, however, that inter-national communications and
mobility facilities between Latin American nations are
hardly more adequate.

59Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 136.

51For general problems of communication and transportation
in Southeast Asia, see: Ginsburg, Pattern of Asia, Op. cit.,

pp. 295-302.

~52Data on tourist travel for a limited number of nations
is contained in: Statistical Yearbook, United Nations Publica-
tion, (New York, 1954),*Tab1e‘141, pp. 318-323.

 

 

53Kahin op. cit., pp. 91 and 267. Fifield, op. cit.,
pp. 367 and 398. ”GIESBUrg, Pattern of Asia, Op. citT, pp.I2 -26.

 

93
TABLE 10

AVERAGES, EXTREMES, AND RANGES OF VARIATION OF COMMUN-
ICATIONS INDICES FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA, LAFTA, AND ECSCa

W

SOUTHEAST ASIA LAFTA ECSC

 

ave extreme range ave extreme range ave extreme range

 

Internat'l

Mail Flow 0.6 0.1-2.8 28 1.2 0.4-3.3 8.2 8,2 {702 5,7
Telephones 2.3 0.3-lo 34 26 5-57 1124 72 34-93 2.7
gggigzper 11 3'23 9.3 91 28-200 7.1 286 97-4h1 4,1

 

3Raw data for LAFTA and ECSC are contained in Appendix I.
Averages constitute arithmetic means for nations in each region.
Extremes illustrate highest and lowest levels of deve10pment for

nations within a region, and ranges are range magnitudes derived
from the extremes.

TABLE 11
AVERAGES, EXTREMES, AND RANGES OF VARIATION OF TRANS-

PORTATION INDICES FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA, LAFTA, AND ECSCa
W :M

SOUTHEAST ASIA LAFTA ECSC

 

ave extreme range ave extreme range ave extreme range

 

R i d I
Diniiii 7.6 0-17 -- 30 11-63 5.7 92 55-164 3-0

Civil
Aviation 0.2 0—0.9 -- 1.3 0.5-2.1 4.2 1.7 0-4.3 --
Miles

ggfiiiies 5 1-16 16 16 5—32 6.4 so 19-76 4.0

 

3Raw data for LAFTA and ECSC are contained in Appendix I.
Averages constitute arithmetic means for nations in each region.
Extremes illustrate highest and lowest levels of develOpment for
nations within a region, and ranges are range magnitudes derived
from the extremes.

0
.0
a...

94

An overall picture of communications and transportation
facilities indicates that Malaya has the most highly develOped
network in Southeast Asia; the Philippines, Thailand, and
South Vietnam rank next in that order. Ranges of variation for
the four nations in these indices rate them in every case
approximately as similar or more so than LAFTA members. But
only in civil aviation miles flown and foreign letters exchanged

are the four Southeast Asian leaders as similar as ECSC members.

COMPATIBILITY OF MAJOR VALUE SYSTEMS

Every Southeast Asian nation contains significant ethnic
groups, multiple Spoken languages, and religious minorities that
illustrate the existence of many value systems whose ideologies
may not always coincide.5“ And the exclusiveness and tenacious
adherence to these values may constitute a barrier to both

national and regional integration.

TABLE 12

PERCENTAGE ESTIMATES OF MINORITY GROUP REPRESENTATION
IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN POPULATIONSa

__ I

RELIGIONS ETHNIC LANGUAGES CHINESE°
GROUPSb

 

Buddhist 84 Indians 4
Animist 5 (Karens, Shana

BURMAd Hindu 4 Chins, Kachins Burmese 86 1.6
Moslem 4 total 5
Christian 2

CAMBODIA- Buddhist 85 Khmer 87 Khmer 85 5.5

Vietnamese 4

 

54Victor Purcell, "The Influence of Racial Minorities,-
in Philip Thayer, ed., Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia,
(Baltimore, 1956), pp. 234-245.

TABLE 12--Continued.

 

RELIGIONS

ETHNIC
GROUPSb

LANGUAGES CHINESEc

 

Moslem 98
Christian 1

Javanese 45
Sundanese 14

INDONESIA Buddhist .5 Madurese 7
Malays 8 26.6
Buddhist 66 Lower Lao 66 0.6
LAOS Animist 30 Many small
tribes
Moslem 50 Malays 50
MALAYA Animist 40 Indians 10 37.8
Hindu 10 European 2
Catholic 83 Tagalog 35
PHILIPPINES Aglipayan 8 English 30 5.3
Moslem 4 Spanish 2
THAILAND Buddhist 89 Thai 85 11.3
Moslem 4 Malays 3
Buddhist & Vietnamese85 Vietnamese 90
S. VIETNAM Confucian 85 Khmer 3 6.2

Christian 10

Montagnard 3

 

aSources: Almond and Coleman, Op. cit., p. 67; Worldmark
EncyclOpedia of Nations, (New York, IgEUTIIRIOhard Butwell, 22;
c .; p yer, op. cit.; EncyclOpaedia Britannica,
TC'HIcago, 1958); Virgmmpttrmminority
Problems in Southeast Asia, (Stanford, 1955); G. WilliafiISEIfiEEr,
IUEEFSeas Chinese in Soutfieast Asia,” Annals of the American

égademy Of Political and Social Science, SZIlJanuary I959JI3 -
7.

 

 

bThis column excludes overseas Chinese, the percentages
for which appear separately.

°Data on overseas Chinese is obtained from G. William
Skinner, above.

dMost Burmese religious, ethnic, and language figures are
1941 data projected to 1955. See Kyaw Thet, “Burma: The Poli-
tical Integration of Linguistic and Religious Minority Groups,‘
in Thayer, above, pp.16 -167.

Note: These minority group divisions often coincide.
That is, an ethnic or racial minority may also appear as a
religious or language group. For example, the Chinese in
Indonesia differ from the Indonesians racially, ethnically, by

religion, and by language. Thus, the categories are not mutually
exclusive and total minority representation in Opulations canno
be ovtained by adding up the percentages in eac category.

’0.

96

Ethnic Groupg

 

The single most important minority in the region comprises
at least 10% of the total Southeast Asian pOpulation and is
composed Of alien Chinese. _TheSe Chinese, distinct from other
Southeast Asians ethnically, linguistically, and in some cases
by race and religion, have an importance within the region.far
greater than their numbers would indicate.55 They control most
Of the merchandising in Southeast Asia; they constitute a
majority of the wholesalers and internal marketers; and, they
are significant as regional traders.58 Chinese also control
much of the production of rubber, tin, and rice in several of
these nations.57 Their commercial positions are usually
resented by indigenous pOpulations and they continue to be the
object of governmental policies designed to reduce their econ-
omic dominance.58 Probably the greatest intra-regional social.
cohesion is between the Chinese in these nations. They do not,
however, form a cohesive community even within a nation but are

fragmented linguistically, by ancestral origin, and by political

__-

550. william Skinner, 'OVerseas Chinese in Southeast
Asia," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social

50161166, 32I(Jan uary 1959 I136 :147.

55Justus M. Van Der Kroef, “Chinese in Southeast Asia,"
Current History, 33(December l957)345. _

 

 

57In Burma, Indian Chettyars enjoy an economic dominance '
similar to that of the Chinese in other nations. See: Virginia
Thompson.and Richard Adloff, Minority Problems in Southeast Asia,
(Stanford, 1955). PD. 83- 93.

58New York Times, (11 December 1959) and 11 January 1960).
G. William‘SKIflfitrT‘ChInese Society in Thailand, Ithaca, 1957),

pp. 322-382.

 

V

r-.-

9?
loyalties, national and international.59 Nevertheless, because
of their predominant economic influence in the region, Chinese
good will or neutral acquiescence in the formation of an econ-
omic union would be desirable.60 And at least one student of
Southeast Asian affairs, citing Chinese avoidance of economic
involvements in the past, does not expect them to favor any
type of economic integration.61

Although the Chinese have not challenged the authority
Of national governments by force, being too divided amongst
themselves, other minority groups by their adherence to
political and religious values other and higher than those of
the nation from time to time threaten internal security in
Southeast Asian nations, particularly Burma and Indonesia.
Many of these groups are separatist oriented,62 but in nearly
every case national governments have refused to recognize
these desires for autonomy, maintaining that divisions among
pOpulations are artificial ones fostered by colonial adminis-

trations.63

 

59Richard J. Coughlin, Double Identity: The Chinese in .

Modern Thailafid, (Hong Kong, I950), pp.6-8. Alsof‘Richard
u we , ou east Asia Today--And Tomorrow, (New York, 1961),

p. 34.

 

60For a discussion Of the strategic importance of the
Chinese in Southeast Asia, see: Robert S. Elegant, The Dragon's
Seed, (New Ybrk, 1959), pp. 8-9 and throughout.

61Conversation of the author with American Universities
Field Staff Representative Willard Hanna at Michigan State
University, 11 November 1960. The situation differs in Malaya
with regard to merger with Singapore. This merger would give
the Chinese a political majority and is favored by Chinese in
Singapore and in Malaya. '

zButwell, op. cit., pp. 23-24.‘
63Thompson and Adloff, Op. cit., p. 281.

 

9.. .

.
n
o
.
. .4
.
\
t v
1
.
Q
I 4.,
. ' '
~
.
.1
.
p
u
1
' e
v
o e _ ‘ - ' . .
n
e . -
t
u t .
‘ .
._-.
.
n
c
u
0 . .
\
O ‘ t‘ I
I
. . .
.
e-
O . . t
\
O

o.

98

Burmese minorities include Karens, Kachins, Kayahs,
Shane, and Arakanese. Agitation by the Christian Karens, the
Kachins, the Kayahs, and the Shan(Thai) for separate states
within the Burmese Union and special representation in the
Chamber of Nationalities was ameliorated when their demands
were granted.6u The Arakanese have not yet been so favored
and are still a threat to the national government.55. Arakanese
separatism was fostered by colonialism, World War II, and
geographical isolation; they have never been entirely compla-
cent about membership in the Burmese Union and accuse the
national government of neglecting their needs. But their
movement is divided. The majority are Muslim and, along with
a transient group of Indian Chittagonians, desire a merger
with Pakistan; Buddhist Arakanese are pressing for autonomy or
a separate state. The commercial minority of Indian Chettyars
in Burma are not militant, but are anxious to retain their
present positions in the national economy.

Indonesia is faced with a number of militant minorities
in addition to the Chinese pOpulation. The most violent of
these groups is the Darul Islams, a rebel group of orthodox
Muslims controlling outlying areas of West Java and parts Of

Sumatra and Sulawesi.66 This group wages continuous guerrilla

 

6‘I'Kyaw Thet, “Burma: The Political Integration of Lin-
guistic and Religious MinOrity Groups," pp. 156-168; and Htin
Aung, "Commentary," p. 94, in Thayer, Op. cit.; the Mons and
the Chins are being assimilated in BurEEIafidIhave lost their
separatist aspirations.

5The discussiOn of the Arakanese is taken from Thompson
and Adloff, op. cit., pp. 151-158.

66Kahin, op. cit., pp. 221-222.

99
.warfare against the central government and is pressing for an
Islamic state of Indonesia. The movement gains its strength
from anti-Dutch and anti-unitaryystate ideologies as well as
from its radical Mohammedanism and the fear which its cruelties

6?

inSpire. It is eXpected that the Darul Islams would Oppose

Indonesia's economic or political association with non-Muslim
nations.

The Christian Ambonese in the Indonesian Moluccas are
another separatist group pressing for independence. Under the

Dutch the Ambonese were accorded special treatment and upon
Indonesia's independence became the objects of persecution in
some areas.68 Many fled to the Netherlands while others
remained in the Moluccas and, with clandestine Dutch assis-
tance, declared their independence in 1949, setting up the
South Moluccas Republic.69 This insurrection was quelled by
the Indonesian army in 1952, but Ambonese still Oppose cen-
tralized government, Islamic extremists, and any further
deterioration of Indonesian-Dutch relations. The Ambonese
probably would not Oppose economic integration but, considering

their lack of influence in the Indonesian government, their

support would probably not facilitate the union much.

67Ibid, p. 222.

68This paragraph is taken largely from Thompson and
Adj-Off, Op. Cite, pp. 165-1690

69Ibid, p. 166.

100

Linguistic and Religious Groups

 

The need for a common language among integrating pOpu-
lations is difficult to substantiate. On the one hand, Karl
Deutsch found that language differences did not constitute
much of a barrier to integration.70 On the other hand, Brian
Harrison claims that a common language is one of the most
important factors facilitating national integration?1 and
therefore regional integration, a claim which seems more valid
in Southeast Asia where hundreds of languages are in daily
use. Many of these nations have only recently adopted a
national language and where these languages were not those of
an indigenous group national loyalties have probably been
strengthened.72 Where, however, the language of a single
ethnic group was adOpted as in the Philippines, Burma, and
Malaya, assimilation of some minorities has been slowed. In
any case, these newly adopted languages have not been assim-
ilated by the large majority of citizens and even when under-
stood, they are Often not the media of spoken communication.73

It is difficult to compare language differences in
Southeast Asia because linguistic group data are so sparse,
but South Vietnam, Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia rank high in

terms of persons Speaking a single national language. Less

 

70Karl Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the
North Atlantic Area, (PrIfiCéton, 1957), pp.‘38-44.

71'Problems of Political Integration in Southeast Asia,"
in Thayer, Op. cit., p. 143.

721bid, p. 143-144.

73Wa1ter H. Mallory, I‘Aftermaths of Colonialism," in
Thayer, Op. cit., p. 61.

 

 

101
homogeneity in spoken languages exists between pOpulations of
other Southeast Asian nations although elites in Malaya, Burma,
and the Philippines communicate easily in English while Indo-
nesia and Malaya have achieved rudimentary coordination between
their national languages with the ultimate aim of fusing the
two.7n

Religions, because they Often transcend minority differ-
ences, are a unifying force in several Southeast Asian nations.75
Buddhism is the state religion in Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos

6 Islam shares the same favor in

and may become that in Burma.7
Indonesia and Malaya while in South Vietnam and the Philippines
church-state separation is maintained. Ties exist among Muslims
in Malaya and Indonesia, Hinayana Buddhists in Burma, Cambodia,
Laos, and Thailand, and among Filipinos and the predominately
Catholic South Vietnamese elite.77 With the exception of the
Darul Islams and Christians in Indonesia and the Moslems and
Christians in.Burma, religions have seldom been militant in.any
but anti-foreign pronouncements.79 Amry Vandenbosch believes
most Southeast Asians to be basically animists and ancestor

worshippers, despite their professions of being Moslems,

Buddhists, Hindus, or Christians.79 But nevertheless, no

__

7"‘Pifield notes this language cOOperation between Indo-
nesia and Malaya; Op. cit., p. 15 .

 

75A1mond and Coleman, O . cit., p. 78.

76Butwell, op. cit., p. 73.

77Kahin, Op. cit., pp. 348-349.

781b1d' pp. 188-1890

 

79Op. cit., p. 18.

I.

102

religion with strong commitments to tradition can be expected
to countenance integration if it would decrease political and

economic influence it now enjoys within a nation.

Fragmentation of Opinion

I Ethnic, racial, language, and religious divisions fostered
primarily by geographical barriers and perpetuated under Western
colonialism have fragmented Opinion in all of these nations.80
These already existing divisions have been accentuated in many

nations that attained independence before they were politically
mature enough to govern and the result has been, in many cases,
continuing civil strife.

Fragmentation of Opinion also exists in Europe and
actually facilitated the formation of ECSC. But fragmentation
of Opinion in Southeast Asia differs in two major ways from
that in EurOpe. (1) Whereas in EurOpe, Opinions are held
lightly enough to permit consideration of and compromise with
other views, Southeast Asian Opinions result from uncompro-
mising loyalties to exclusive ideologies that are often.in
conflict. (2) In EurOpe, although allegiance to "Europe" did
not exist,81 pronounced loyalties to the national governments

were professed in nearly all groups excluding the Communists.

It is precisely this lack of national unity in some Southeast

8°A1mond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 149.' Francis G.
Carnell “Southeast Asia and-tha‘modern World “ India . rterly,
13(Aprii-June l957)107. Charles A. Fisher, " he—C—Euti‘r—oncep o

South East Asia,” Eastern World, 17(March 1953)12-14.

81Ernst Haas, The Unitingof EurOpe, (Stanford, 1958),
p. 200

 

 

103
Asian.nations that leads dissenting groups to advocate
insurrection against governments making decisions inmical to
the groups' interests.

But Haas found in his study that marginal groups tended
to suppOrt ECSC, probably because they expected treatment more
favorable to their interests under the supranational body than
presently found under national governments.82 He also found
that integration need not rest on identical aims of all parti-
cipants; it need only offer advantages, however different, to
these groups.83 This observation is probably more applicable
to Westernized groups committed to modernization than it would
be to traditional groups in Southeast Asia, although the
Chinese and possibly the Christianized minorities might support
integration in hOpes of acquiring protection and economic
betterment under a supranational body. In general, minority
groups, with the exception of the Darul Islams, no doubt
represent more of an indirect threat to economic union.by their
effects upon internal security in these nations than they do
by direct opposition to its formation.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The Southeast Asian.nations that best_satisfy the criteria
for ecOnomic integration are presumed to be, among other
things, those that are highest in deve10pment and exhibit the
least range of variation on the indices just examined. Nations

fulfilling these pro-conditions can be determined by ranking

 

82Ibid, pp. 294 and 300. 831bid, p. xiii.

TABLE 13

104

SUMMARY OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS MORE SIMILAR ON ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT INDICES THAN EITHER ECSC OR LAFTA MEMBERS

 

 

BASIC SOCIAL CONDITIONS

Population POpulation in. Population

Children 5-14 in

 

 

 

Urbanized Agriculture Literate Primary Schools
Malaya Philippines Philippines Philippines
Philippines Malaya Burma Thailand
Indonesia Burma Malaya Malaya

Thailand Cambodia Indonesia

Vietnam

Cambodia

Laos

Indonesia

 

ECONOMIC PROSPERITY

Per Capita Incomes Costs of Living

Economic-Population

 

 

Growth

Malaya Malaya Cambodia1
Philippines Burma Thailand
Thailand Philippines Indonesia
Indonesia Thailand. Philippines
Vietnam Vietnam Burma
Burma Cambodia
Cambodia _ Laos

. Indonesia

 

TRADE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

 

 

 

 

Primary Regional Industrial

EXportg_g Trading Origin of GNP Customs Taxes
Cambodia Thailand Philippines Philippines
Philippines Malaya Thailand Burma
Indonesia Indonesia Malaya3 Thailand
Thailand Cambodia Burma Malaya
Malaya Burma Cambodia1 Indonesia
Laos Victngmlies Indonesia

Vietnam Philippines

Burma Laos2

 

105
TABLE l3--Continued.

 

COMMUNICATIONS

International Mail Telephones NeWSpaper COpies

 

 

 

 

Malaya Malaya Vietnam
Vietnam Philippines Philippines
Thailand Malaya
Indonesia Indonesia
Vietnam Burma
Thailand
TRANSPORTATION

Railroad Density Civil Aviation Motor Vehicles

 

 

 

Malaya Malaya Malaya
Philippines Philippines Philippines
Thailand Thailand Thailand
Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam
Burma Burma Laos
Cambodia Cambodia

Indonesia Indonesia

 

Note: The ranges of these nations on each index are in
every case except where noted below the range of variation of
ECSC or IAFTA, whichever is the higher.

1Cambodia's rankings on these indices, although based on
earlier United Nations data, do not coincide with recent ECAFE
evaluations. “The growth in Cambodia's gross domestic product
at constant factor cost comes to 13 per cent between 1954 and
1959. when the series stOps. POpulation prObably increased at
a faster rate." See: Economic Survey for Asia and the Far East,
1961, (Bangkok, 1962), pp. 99-109. Quote from p. 100.

2Laos did a higher percentage of trading within the
region than this ranking illustrates, but the monetary value of
these exchanges was negligible so the nation's ranking on this
index was lowered.

3Malaya's ranking on this index has been determined from
other indices of industrialization.

 

 

them according to the number of times they appear in groups

more homogeneous than either ECSC or LAFTA. This tabulation
indicates that the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaya appear in

106

the most groups, are nearly equal in the number of times they
appear, and are highest in deve10pment on most indices; Burma
and Indonesia rank below them, but are decidedly above South
Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in the degree to which they satisfy
pro-conditions for integration.

This method of selecting nations possessing desirable
pro-conditions overlooks important variations in the extent
to which these factors facilitate integration. These indices
are also interdependent and must be considered in relation to
others in Chapter III and the following chapter. Thus, an
attempt to evaluate and weigh variables discussed in Chapter
IV without reference to other pre-conditions not yet discussed
would be premature and might distort their importance in the
overall analysis. So additional factors affecting integrative
tendencies within the region will be considered and the findings
in Chapter IV will be qualified as part of an overall con-
clusion in Chapter VI.

I.

CHAPTER V

THE INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL FACTORS UPON INTEGRATIVE
TENDENCIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Pre-conditions examined in Chapter IV are those usually
considered as economic, but political factors need also be
treated in a discussion of economic integration; "economic
unity and political unity, though they may be separately
discussed, are nonetheless two sides of the same coin.'1 And
despite satisfactory develOpment in other pre-conditions, some
Southeast Asian nations may lack the mutuality of political
interests necessary to integration.

This chapter examines the pro-conditions primarily
concerned with internal and foreign political institutions and
processes. Because of the primacy of political factors in any
decision to integrate economies, these conditions are probably
more crucial than any of those discussed earlier, with the
possible exception of regional and international contacts.

The following pro-conditions were chosen by the author for

1Hans Nord, 'In Search of a Political Framework for an
Integrated EurOpe," in C. Grove Haines, ed., EurOpean.Inte-
gration, (Baltimore, 1957), p. 225. Van Kleffens, InItHEIEame
wor , argues that the real problems of integration are poli-
tical rather than economic; see pp. 80-96. And in ECSC,
political objectives, not economic ones, seemed to be dominant.
See: John Goormatigh, “EurOpean Coal and Steel Community,‘
International Conciliation, 503(May 1955)344-346.

10?

 

 

108
their overall relevance in Southeast Asia, but no well-rounded

discussion of politics in these nations is intended.

SIMILARITIES AMONG TOP GOVERNMENTAL LEADERS, POLITICAL
INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICAL PROGRAMS

Backgrounds of Tongovernmental Leaders

 

The backgrounds of Southeast Asian governmental leaders
are not so similar as those of ECSC leaders, but Southeast
Asian.leaders do share some interests(see Table 14). Southeast
Asian.1eaders generally (1) are of the same generation, (2)
spent part of their lives under a colonial administration, (3)
represent the newly urbanized politically active segment of
the pOpulations and, (4) have received a Western-type univer-
sity education.2 But they also represent three major religions,
several religious sects, and vary in religiosity from the
messianic to atheistic.3 Governmental or political eXperience
ranges from that of royal families educated to govern to
President Macapagal Of the Philippines, almost a novice at
public officeholding. And ideological commitments vary from
democratic socialists and liberals to authoritarians and

enlightened despots.

 

2Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, ed., The Poli-
tics of the DevelOping Areas, (Princeton, 1960), p. 127.
REEEFtIEmerSOn,I‘ParadeeSItf Asian Nationalism,I Far Eastern
Quarterly, 13(February l954)136.

‘aFormer Prime Minister U Nu of Burma has actively pro-
moted a Buddhist revival in that nation and is looked upon as
a “present-day political and religious messiah.” See: Richard
Butwell, Southeast Asia Today-~And Tomorrow, (New York, 1961),
pp. 11 and 13.

 

 

 

2.

‘

109

 

chansons

 

 

 

 

cause a smaoamasm mama oosam as oweaaoo accused:
coaches compass nmaeaaaaom accuses an essence oasesmnsm .aa
omenMQMH unnamed
HMmH ma nouns sconce ascend“: essence
assesses noses com ascends: mosesmm as seam _soaosmmz asses
commence Imema mesa weasoe
Ham as means a soda moo; ummma madman mm
hacoscom peaches ummuooaem_nmaoaoaaom soamos D_wm:dmmm Hm umecamesm onLMMoom
«Hmmzooza
hounded:
swaeuom swam meme
hpamm emestMh tmnma 2m
aaassasoo seas seem nnmauaema huaseosm cases a command:
Heaoom coaches . Iuomooo .wmam uno>en .D.momamm o: madam xsommmam eosaam
«Hoomsmo
seduced sarcasm uaeaa
Ishmael cameo e as space as s mm acceded:
Ammmm_eoassmz aanmsosm msoaam> omaseesm cmeacoamo on swnoaom oasm asam omm
whommameh Azm Bony
sea a names .swm as mm accuses
momma ma hupmama: .Dcmoowsmm mm asks sax oz
moapomu emenmmmh ahead AneaAOhv
Acheson cause a noose stomachs amasoosm 3mm s an accused:
Ahmad sedans: hhumasaz .mmoawsoo mso>oo .D soommmm an esaam oz D
mamam
mozmHmmmxm
seams maaaam sozmammmxm q.a>oo
uscHeHmom uaaHmmz mm: maoasmmm zOHqumm zoaamcsom mom amom

 

 

"MUM .i
. flmmmnqu Adfizmzzmm>oo 24Hm¢.8m4mmfibom mo mQZDomuxo<m

3H mamdfi

 

.l .
u u, . .
. I a
A
O . l
O . l ..
. . .. e
. . , .
. . .
I
r o o (I n p y
.‘
. . ..
... .I . I . . I . . .. . (x. 0. . o
..
.- O . .
.
0 0 V
( . . at o. .n. I . 0,
)fl' l t
. . . 0..
.
I. ,
.
.
n . .I
.
. 7 a

 

110

uaowm mmenwmoo a

mafia» N somehlapsm 2D .Immma

moaaosoom

nonmanaz
dudesom
e.meam eoa>

womaem Housmasm

 

 

 

 

antenna echoes: .uosm 3mg cam Assam endorses a sma.osm an ombudsman anemones: .o
mmZHmquHmm
mnma command: eeamoo I I I l I I I I I I I I
moduomhm a mumom Hoodoo: .D houmdmaz HamamH
oum>aam msoasm> soamoz consonaoz we dwaonom comm .mmsmmm
. cameo n encasemeaonma mouom ;
oommddam mesa» m henna msoahm> 3mg m mm commands
a can: smashes attach a condom season omeasnamo om oases smasmm asses
4H<Amz
.csH H.omz gamma
no mmmouoo .aApmasaz s commasaz
com .300 nonmmmmmsm dwaeaom magma mamaammm
hphmm grandmas
e>ammoumosm onma nevus Aeomamsm madam
Hmsoapmz ..ope .zm edema ow stench masonm Newsroom
unwed wads oesoaom
moms .onma memos Hmoaoaaom
sH usoasm> unasoesm assoc no mean homecom> worsen
moan
mozmHmmmxm
Nsmmm mpamam mozmHmmmxm A.B>oo
A<0HBHAom AdHHmmz m¢3 mDOH>mmm zonchmm ZOHamoDQm mom amom

 

odommaamOOIlafl gamma

I!
II
III!

{cl‘ lllll

III.
III. .

’

.olll.

111

.mumo wmammaa cascaded meomem mamam ”euoz

.amsco«> sosom one .mosaaaaaanm one .mamama .mamesoesa .maooosmo

.msA5m up mmmmmmmsm own no meoaswom scapmsno_a e son e so me . u .so a

.EOOAAMoH m.nm3mOBMum “Aomma .meoanpv .emHHm commemomsH snowmz one uo ease seam ema

.Hcmz so» phenom “Ammma shade meosmbv .msommmz 302 one no msoomeq .hsusozmom .m osmsooq
«moans mac» soz “Aowma .msom wsomv .osz m.on3 camm ”scam eeaacsoo seen open mamas

 

 

.meoz a
humsoau hem chamemmd some
usaoeom masses .mmma Hausa

assesses homeroom chamomsH ecm Habao endosomo .nqhomasm mm unoosmowm scan scan omz

 

2¢ZBQH> mabom

chasm mama on

 

on as .mema men accused:

sameness ohm Ha>ao hates an essence mucosa assess
named Hmaosoo e
mesa» N neosmssoo amended: hsoomom hemmdmam

coaches sass -mmaa sass sameness no chasm chasm assesses

ozmnamma
semen unseen mozmHmmmxm
amoHaHuom Sesame: mozmammmxm q.a>oo

mm: mDOHammm zoaeammm zoaamcsom mos amom

 

.dozflduflOOIIafl mgm<8

.
-.1 . at.
a I...
’l
.
\
I .I l
a
p I .
DI
I
a. ,
. n
. w-
n - -.

.\10

b...

I. '.o

112

A broadening of the political elite in Southeast Asia is
taking place on the secondary level because Of education,
modernization, expansion of governmental tasks, and deepening
of the politically active segment of the pOpulations. Counter
elites are growing within ethnic or cultural groups, the
younger generations, and the mass organization leaders.
Politics in these nations,’however, is still controlled by.a
small number of persons who usually manage to manipulate the
various political forces to their advantage.“ In.fact, auth-
oritarian tendencies seem to be increasing as leaders attempt
to perpetuate themselves and simulate political stability by
postponing elections or tampering with election returns.5
Since World War II military coups d' etat have been attempted
in every nation except Cambodia6 and the Philippines; coups
were successful in Burma(l958 and l962).and Thailand(l948 and
1958). Burma's Ne Win has intervened and formed a caretaker
government for the second time in four years; Thailand's
General Sarit has continued to guide that natiOn for four
years. Soekarno's guided democracy in Indonesia has, for all
practical purposes, transferred executive and legislative
powers to the presidency while Diem's tight centralized control
Of South Vietnam approaches 'nepotic despotism;'7 and, Prince

4George MOT. Kahin, Governments and Politics of Southeast
Asia, (Ithaca, 1959), ppfjo, 1.00, 2H, andjbn.

5John F. Cady,"Evolving Political Institutions in South-
east Asia," in Philip Thayer, ed., Nationalism and Progress tn
Free Asia, (Baltimore, 1956), pp. lZI and 124-125.

IgThere was an externally inspired revolt in Cambodia
during 1958 that drew support from several Cambodian military
and civilian leaders. It was easily quelled.

’Butwell, Op.cit., p. 77. Almond and Coleman, Op.cit., p.123.

 

 

 

\4

..\

113

Sihanouk manages the affairs of Cambodia whether in or out

Of Office.8 Only in the Philippines have leaders responsible
for independence moved out of office in reSponse to the wishes
Of an electorate.

The efficacy of participating in an economic union or
other forms of regional cooperation evokes contrary Opinions
among Southeast Asian leaders. TOp leaders in Malaya, the
Philippines, and Thailand are staunch supporters of the
prOposed Association of Southeast Asian States and President
Diem has shown some interest in joining it.9 But Soekarno is
clearly Opposed to the Association and Prince Sihanouk as well
as the Burmese remain cool toward it.10 Even among those
committed to some type of regional economic cooperation, com-
:Petition for leadership is keen. Various proposals are
advanced from time to time but reSponse is more Often in the

form of counter-prOposals than in real agreement among these

leaders .

      
   

MW

and, ambitions is that ECSC promised a host of different advan-

A hopeful note in the face of these diverse background

tages for the various groups and governments in EurOpe.11 It

Was recognized that ECSC would:

. . . relieve these men of difficult decisions while they
are in office and perhaps help to keep them in office.
It will provide them with a joint source of prestige and 6

8Willard A. Hanna, “The State of the States of Indochina,“
lIimericzn Universities Field Staff Report, 8(1960), NO. 1, Part
.’ p. e . _
9Butwell, op. cit., pp. 113 and 162.
1°Ibid. And: New York Times, (26 January 1960).
p Itil-“:Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, (Stanford, 1958),
e 1.

I.

114
patronage so long as they stick together, and strengthen
them against their Opponents of the right and left. . . .
This group of leaders recognized in the project an instru-
ment or prolonging the political advantages that time and
circumstances had played into their hands.12

Similar reasoning by Southeast Asian leaders could promote
broader agreement upon integration and lead to the settlement
of explosive issues on which decisions have been postponed or

evaded so governments could remain in power.

Institutional Structures

The similarity and stability of governmental institutions
in Southeast Asia does not approach that found among ECSC or
even among LAFTA members. In Southeast Asia these institutions
are often bypassed in the political process. And, as Lucian
Pye notes, '. . . it is still hard to discern even the outlines
of the political and social systems that are evolving.'13

Constitutions do not command reapect nor circumscribe
governmental activity in Southeast Asia as they do in most of
Europe. These documents more often eXpress future hOpes and
desires of these incipient nations than present-day realities
by which they are governed. Fairly frequent alterations of
constitutional forms and abrogation.of constitutional rights
attest to the political instability of these nations. Thailand
has Operated under four constitutions since World War II and

 

12Horst Mendershausen, "First Tests of the Schuman Plan,"
Review of Economics and Statistics, 35(November l953)270, as
quted in Haas, Op.cit., p. 154.‘*A similar statement was made
by the former President of Ecuador, Galo Plaza. See his: "For
a Re ional Market in Latin.America,' Forei Affairs, 37(July
1959§610.

 

 

13Almond and Coleman, Op. cit., ~p. 66.

C»
o I
.
t
,l p ‘1
.
_
.IA
\
r
. . s
. .
a . v
. .
7‘ . a
A ll ..
I u ’
L.
.
O
C e ‘-
. .
_
.-. . e.
.
. . .
~ r
O _
t, .
\ v.
.
- I
. ..
.
. -
4w . _
I u
. . .
. . -
.
e U
c
U l
,
-
~ ..
.
I I
.. .
. .
,_ .

.,.-

 

 

115
the last one was suSpended in 1958.14 Indonesia adopted
constitutions in l9h5, 1949, and 1950; a Constituent Assembly
preparing a new constitution was dismissed in 1959,15 and the
nation is nominally governed under the 1945 document today.

Classification of these nations into presidential, par-
liamentary, or monarchical governments disguises the many
differences between these systems. Diem's presidential powers
are unchecked by other branches of government. Soekarno's
appropriation of powers to the Presidency has altered the
Indonesian government in fact, if not in form. And the conp
stitutional monarchies of Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia differ
as much from each other as from other Southeast Asian govern-
ments.

Legislatures in Southeast Asia are neither equally
representative nor equally effective in.the policy-making
process. In some of these nations legislatures represent no
more than the ruling faction and for the most part only put
the stamp of approval on decisions already arrived at by the
dominant leaders in the governing party.16 The Philippines
has the only functioning legislature containing a large
Opposition, but the President's executive powers still enable
major government programs to be adOpted regardless of legis-
lative approval}7 It is quite probable that, because of

 

l#Kahin, op. cit., p. 44.

l5Butwell, Op. cit., pp. 147-149.
16Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 142.

17Kahtn, qp. cit., pp. u6n-u65.

116
executive dominance and frequent circumvention of govern-
mental institutions, negotiation of an economic union would
not be appreciably hampered by constitutional restrictions

upon governmental decision-making.

Political Parties

 

Political parties in Southeast Asia are at least as
complex as those in.LatinAmerica.18 Parties are government-
Sponsored in Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam; in other
nations many parties are no more than personal followings of
revolutionary leaders; and throughout the region these parties
are, as is Burma's National Unity Front(NUF), '. . . leader-
dominated with no voice from below.'19 Only in.Malaya,
Burma, and the Philippines have parties formed governments
and been responsible for governing over a period of time.
Malaya and the Philippines remain relatively democratic and
Burma is a sometime democracy, but Indonesia, Thailand, and
South Vietnam '. . . cannot be regarded as democracies by
any criteria.'2° And Cambodia and Laos are still oligarchies
governed by competing royal factions.

In ECSC multiparty systems predominate and result in
coalition governments where parties must compromise to reach
agreement on political issues. And in Southeast Asia, while
in every nation except the Philippines and Indonesia, parties

 

“For the diversity of Latin American political parties,
see: Russell H. Fitzgibboni “The Party Potpourri in Latin
America,‘I Western PO itical Quarterly, 19(March l957)3-22.

19Kahin, op. cit., p. 117.
20Butwell, 0p. cit., p. 44.

O\

O

117
responsible for national independence have no major rivals,21
multipartyism is also common. This multipartyism derives
from the newness of the political systems, geographic config-
urations encouraging fragmentation, and the exclusive poli-
tical orientations of ethnic and communal groups._ The
Philippines superficially has a two party system, but aligns
ments are fluid among major and minor parties; Philippine
party strengths are a reflection of a leader's ability to
command a following rather than belief in a specific phil-
'osophy.22 Indonesia has four major parties and a fifth(Soc-
ialist) with only a small following, but possessing excellent
leaders.23 Because of the atrOphy of electoral processes
there, however, these parties function more as interest
groups than as electoral machines. In the sushi: that elections
are held, control of the government by the Masjumi party is
possible and their reliance upon support from the Nahdatul
Ulama party and the Darul Islams could presage the creation
of an Islamic state.2“ Cambodia tried a multiparty system
during 1954-1955, but this eXperiment was abandoned after
Sihanouk formed the Social Community Party which captured all

 

‘21Richard L. Park, I'Problems of Political DevelOpment,"
in Thayer, O . cit., pp. 103-104. Although his statement
does not incgudé—Efie Philippines, it is clear that personnel
and party changes In the government since 1956 warrant its
1110 1118 lone

22Almond and Coleman, Op. cit., p. 129.
23Ibid, p. 111.

2"'Inl958 a Masjumi leader and his followers were
joined by some Darul Islams and set up a ''Revolutionary Govern-
ment of the Republic of Indonesia" in Central Sumatra.
Although the government was crushed by the Indonesian army,
the movement still continues in some areas.

,e

118
Assembly seats in the 1955 and 1958 elections.25 Malaya's
Alliance precariously combines three ethnic based factions.
dominated by the United Malays National OrganizationlUMNO),
and Burma's AEPEins a loose confederation of several parties,
ethnic associations, and professional organizations of
diverse ideologies.26

Parties in Southeast Asia Often attempt to provide a
complete way of life for their adherents and this is par-
ticularly true where organization is on an ethnic, racial,
or communal basis.27 The overaddiction to ideology, theory,
and idealism that characterizes these parties causes them
to overloOk practical politics and makes compromise difficult,
if not impossible.

Ideologies of governing parties in these nations range
from the right-wing authoritarian groupings in Thailand to
the avowedly socialist Burmese AFPFL, but all major parties
are Opposed to unmodified laiseez-faire capitalism. Only
governing parties in the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, and
South Vietnam are committed to a free enterprise approach28

and even these parties accept a great deal of national

25Butwell,'Op. cit., p. 41.
26Kahin, Op. cit., pp. 94 and 280.
1;?Almond and Coleman, Op. cit., p. 110.

. 26Butwell, Op. cit., p. 73. His characterization of
the South Vietnamese‘ecfifiomic system as free enterprise is
somewhat of a misnomer because the government controls at
least 51% of the stocks in all major industries. with this
reservation in mind, however, his term will be used through-
out this paper to describe the South Vietnam system because

competition is allowed and there is no governmental sentiment
for socialism.

 

 

OM-

“up

119
planning, welfare services, and restrictions on business for
economic stability and deve10pment reasons.29 The UMNO in
Malaya is willing to accept some international control over
the economy30 as are both the Nacionalista and Liberal
parties in the Philippines and the National Revolutionary
Movement in South Vietnam; Burma's difficulties in marketing
export products might even diapose AFPFL leaders toward more
economic cOOperation. Socialist parties in Southeast Asia
have been less doctrinaire and have shown more international
unity than those in EurOpe.31 So it is possible that the
socialists may approve integration of the right kind, but an
economic union initiated among all nations of the region
would require substantial attention to socialist demands to
be successful.

Only the Communist parties in the region.are well
organized on the local level32 and these parties probably
embrace the closest ideological ties common to every nation
in the region, though in electoral strength they are not
significant except in Indonesia where the PKI polled 22%
of the vote in 1955 and in.a free election could controllall
of Java.33 And the Communists themselves are not unified
within the region but split between loyalties to the Soviet

 

‘ 29Russell H. Fifield The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia:
1945-1958, (New York, 19585,—"'I2tffp.

30T. Silcock, The Commonwealth Economy in South-East
Asia," (Durham, 1959), p. 173.

31Frank N. Trager, et al., Marxism in Southeast Asia,
(Stanford, 1959), pp. 29842997“

Almond and Coleman, Op. cit., p. 115.
33New York Times, (4 September 1960).

 

 

 

 

.
.
.
.
O ’ a
.
.
. O
.
. _
. .
.
.
..
u
o
s
4
.
.
\ f
a
.
.
I.
. ..
.
. ..~
. c . x
I O
.
.
.
.
,
.
. .

6.7

I!

.8

120‘

Union or China.34 Communist parties are outlawed in Malaya,
Burma, and the Philippines and barely tolerated in Cambodia;35
the PKI was banned in Indonesia's South Sumatra, Sulawesi,
and Kalimantan for incompatibility with guided democracy.36
Only in the Philippines, Thailand, and South Vietnam is
Communism considered as an international conspiracy'so anti-
Communism has not been a basis for unity within the region.

The Communist position regarding the formation of ECSC
was uniformly national in.every member nation and has con-
tinued to be so since.37 In Southeast Asia, one could expect
the same attitude to prevail because: (1) Communists have
continually attempted to frustrate internal deve10pment of
theSe nations and the region as a whole, and (2) they have
been attempting to link the nascent Association of Southeast
Acian States to SEATO.38

Within the region Communist activity is pursued not
only through political parties but also by subversion,

 

,Bdbivergences in Soviet and Chinese policies in under-
develOped nations are discussed in: Thomas P. Thornton,
“Peking, Moscow, and the UnderdevelOped Areas," WorldLPoli-
tics, 13(July 1961), pp. 491-504. These cOnflicEIfig‘IfiyaIEies
Ifi'Indonesia are related in: Guy J. Pauker, "The Soviet
Challenge in Indonesia,“ Forei Affairs, 40(July 1962)612-
626. He notes that Soe O s a ona sts and the Communists
have grown.very close under guided democracy.

35New York Times, (4 September 1960).

361bid. . .

,37Haas, Uniting, p. 114. John Goormatigh,’ EurOpean
Coal and Steel ommunity," International Conciliation, 503
(May_l955)351-352.

38Vu Quoc Thuc, “Economic DevelOpment in Southeast
Asian Countries,é Asian Culture, 2(January-March l960)10.
New York Times, (26‘3dfifi'I96UT?

 

 

 

121
internally and externally inSpired. South Vietnam and Laos
have been caught in the throes of externally inspired Com-
munist activity since their independence in 1954. This
situation has deteriorated since 1957, and with increasing
rapidity since 1959.39 Communist guerrillas Operate through-
out rural South Vietnam and the government controls many
areas outside the capital only by day.“0 In Laos, effective
government is nonpexistent, the army is ineffective, and the
peOple are apathetic in the face of Communist victories that
have now claimed approximately half Of the national terri-
tory.“1 The lack of a functioning Laotian government and
the impossibility of determining the character of a new one
seem to preclude this nation from membership in a union at
present because other nations are extremely reluctant to
engage in long-term.agreements during a period of political
turmoil. South Vietnam's government still functions and is
considering membership in ASAS, but its value as a union
member is diminished by continuing internal security and
economic stagnation.

Parties which, judging by their ideological orientation,

leaders' pronouncements, and support for the ASAS, probably

 

.figButwell, Op. cit., pp. 99-100.
‘90New York Times, (22 April 1962).

ulAverell Harriman, "What We Are Doing in Southeast
Asia," New York Times, (27 May 1962), p. 7 and continued.
At the EImé”EHI§ paper is being prepared fighting in Laos
has ended, foreign trOOps have withdrawn, and a new govern-
ment is being formed. This government is a neutral coalition
and would prObably forego membership in.any economic union
that did not include neutrals as well as westernporiented
members 0

 

v
9
g
0 ..
O
n
o C I! s
a I
.. .
.
..
- i t
. a .
. _
. c u .\
A .
4
H . . . . _ .
a x
r o. . I! O
I O
t .
W ' ‘
_ Ill U
x . . I
o e . t
0‘ . .
O u
I A
O
t
.
.
. . r
.
.

122

TABLE 15
CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNING
PARTIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONSl

_—-.-.

 

TYPE OF NO. OF GOVERNING CHARACTER OF
GOVERNMENT MAJOR PARTY POLITICAL
PARTIES PROGRAMZ
BURMA Parliamentary 2 (Under Socialist
Republic3 Military
Control)
CAMBODIA Constitutional 1 Social Socialist
Monarchy Community
Party
INDONESIA Parliamentary 4 Appointed Socialist
Republi03 Coalition
Council4
LAOS Constitutional 3 (In Process No
Monarchy of Change) Commitment
MALAYA Parliamentary 1 Alliance(UMNO,Free
Republic MCA, MIC) Enterprise5
PHILIPPINES Presidential 2 Liberal Free
Republic Enterprises
THAILAND; Constitutional 0 (Under Free
Monarchy3 Military Enterprise5
Control)“
S. VIETNAM Presidential 1 National Free
Republic Revolutignary Enterprise5
Movement

 

1Sources: Gabriel A. AlmOnd and James S. Coleman, The
Politics of the DevelOpi Areas, (Princeton, 1960); Georgi '
MET. KEHIn, Governments and PoIItics of Southeast Asia,

(Ithaca, 19597; RIC 5553 K. Butwell, Soutfiegst Asia Taday—-And

 

 

Tomorrow, (New York, 1961); Russell e e p oma y
of Southeast Asia: 1945-1958, (New York, 1958); a esman.s
Year" “Bo'o'f,“(LO—ndo'_‘n, 1951:). "' .

8 2These characteristics are taken from: Butwell, above,
pp- 3-92-

3Constitution temporarily suspended. In Indonesia,
President Soekarno, rather than the Prime Minister, wields the
decision-making power. He does so, however, because of his

adroitness in maintaining a balance among competing parties
and interest groups. See: Butwell, above, p. 77.

bIn these nations, government decisionemaking is
dominated by the Chief Executive.

51n.all of these nations, some state ownership and
control of industry as well as some state planning are accepted.

--.—

\
c .
l
D
. -
a.
l
q
.‘.
\

7..

123
would support integration include the Nacionalistas and
Liberals of the Philippines, the UMNO faction of Malaya's
Alliance, Diem's NRM, and Thailand's personalistic groupings.
Those clearly Opposed include the Communists, Soekarnofs
Nationalist party and the Islamic parties in.Indonesia, and
at least some elements of the Burmese AFPFL. Other parties
that might oppose integration include the Malayan Chinese
and Indian Congresses, Burma's NUF, and Sihanouk's Social
Community Party.

Interest Groups

Major interests influencing Southeast Asian politics
are overwhelmingly urban.and articulated primarily by tra-
ditional groups, military and labor organizations, business
and industry, and administrative bureaucracies. .Traditicnal,
interests are mainly those of the ethnic, racial, linguistic,
and religious groups already discussed.. Though not usually
the dominant interests in these nations, traditional inter-
ests necessarily influence decisionpmaking, even where the
policy-making process is normally dominated by a single--
interest group. .

Military organizations, responsible for winning inde-
pendence in all but Thailand, Malaya, and the Philippines,
have assumed the role of guardians of the national interest.“2

Armies are capable of intervening in politics when.policy
takes an undesirable turn and have done so in Thailand,

 

“ZHarry J. Benda, "Southeast Asia," in Vera Michele: '
Dean, The Nature of the Non-Western World, (New York, 1957),
p. 152.

124
Burma, Indonesia, and South Vietnam.43 Military leaders have
governed Thailand for 20 years and today "the army dominates
all phases of national life . . . ,‘44 though with some
consideration of other interests, primarily business and
bureaucracy. Thai leaders are promoting economic deve10pment
and social progressu5 and they have not been.averse to inter-
national or regional cooperation. Thailand has joined assoc-
iations and organizations for security and prestige purposes
and is a member of the ASAS.

The Burmese army became entrenched in the union's
politics and economics during the 18 month reign ending in
1960.46 The 1962 coup d' etat returned Ne Win to power and
promises to deepen military involvement in.nationa1 affairs.
The latest coup came to forestall control of the government
by extreme left-wing:AFPFL members and to prevent adoption
of a federalist government.u7 Army interventions in both of
these nations have come to prevent "a swing to the left" and

the military regimes have been receptive to economic

 

“BButwell says armies are ”the single mOSt important
organized groups in Thailand, Burma, Indonesia, and South
Vietnam.'; cp. cit., p. 69. The Philippines army failed in
a strike diFEEEEH‘Et influencing politics in that nation
during 1956. See Kahin, op. cit., p. 458.

t“Plautwell, Op. cit., p. 103.

.95Frank C. Darling, "Modern Politics in.Thailand,'
The Review of Politics, 24(April l962)l74.

-”6The army even Operates businesses in Burma. See:
Butwell, Op. cit., p. 103.

47New York Times, (3 March 1962); and, (4 March 1962).

 

 

125

cooperation in the past.’+8

But the accompanying nation.
alism of these military establishments might preclude
delegation of national policy-making powers to a supranational
body. The Indonesian army is not a monolithic organization
and some elements have been influential in Soekarno's
national council”9 while others have supported regionalists
in the outer islands. In South Vietnam the army, along with
the administration, is the strongest government supporter.
Labor has a large potential for influence in all of
Southeast Asia and in several of these nations trade unions
are already more highly develOped than the industrialized
sectors of these economies.50 The Indonesian.labor move-
ment, though split between socialist and Communist unions,
has successfully pressured the government and employers into
granting many of its demands.51 Militant activity by Indo-
nesian trade unions forced wages higher than some employers
can afford to pay and prompted social welfare legislation
more extensive than the government can support.52 In.Thai-
land and South Vietnam, labor unions are new and ineffective

while in Malaya they have so far avoided politics;3 The
Philippine labor movement resembles that of the United States

 

48Thailand has been more receptive to cOOperation than
Burma and observers anticipate no change in.Burma's
neutralist policy. New York Times. (3 March 1962).

49sutwell, Op.cit., pp. 48-50. Kahin, Op.cit., p. 205.
5°A1mond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 132.

51Trager, Op. cit., pp. 230-231.

5€Kahin, op. cit., p.216.

53933, pp. 36 and 276.

 

.e. .._

126
and votes are controlled by political parties rather than by
trade unions.54 And unions in all of these nations are often
the agents of ethnic, nationalist, or Communist groups55 that
encourage demonstrations and protest activity for political
more than for interests related solely to labor's needs. But
as labor demands become differentiated from those of the
current controlling interests, the labor union.movement(except
for Communist unions) will probably support economic inte-
gration as they did in ECSC56 if the issue is presented in
terms of the advantages laborers stand to gaint And the
growing labor union strengths would, if an economic union
were initiated, probably force already over-inflated wage
levels up to the highest level existing in the region.

Business groups and administrative bureaucracies
exert varying influences upon Southeast Asian governments.
Although both make essentially middle class demands, these
demands are not identical in content or intensity within the
region. Organized business groups are influential only in
the Philippines and Malaya57 and are hampered throughout the
region because: (1) the business sectors of these economies
are relatively small, (2) interests of large and small
businessmen diverge, (3) some demands which, in other nations,

would be made by business groups are contained within the

 

5%: P0 351-

55A1mond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 116.
,56Haas, Uniting, p. 239.

57Butwe11, Op. cit., pp. 68-69.

1‘

127

nationalized sectors of these nations‘ economies and, (4)
business interests are divided between demands of indigenous
businessmen and those of a1iens--Chinese, EurOpeans, and
Americans. The preponderance of conservative, alien-cone
trolled small businesses over large industrial and business
firms Operates to hinder mobilization of business support
for economic integration. Government planning and subsi-
dization of nationalized and other strategic enterprises
might also hamper regional economic integration.

Administrations are consolidating newly won indepen-
dence in Southeast Asia and have successfully realized many
of their demands upon government. Administrators make up
a major portion of the educated pOpulations in these nations;
they are the most politically active groups and highly
nationalistic in seeking to maintain their vested interests
in the existing governmental structures. Soekarno has found
it difficult to ignore pressures by Indonesian veterans now
in administrative positions; conflicting objectives of central
and regional administrators have also plagued this nation.58
Burmese administrators have continually thwarted political
leaders there. And the U Nu government could never quite
cOpe with the bureaucrats59 who were in part responsible for

army interventions. Administrators in South Vietnam are

 

58COnflicts between interests of central and regional
administrators are discussed in: J.D. Leg e, "Experiment in

gggafiagovernment,' Australian Outlook, 13 December 1959)

59Geoffrey Fairbain, I'Aspects of Burma and Thailand,‘I
Australian Outlook, 12(September 1958), pp. 3-10.

V

 

128
largely responsible for the electoral support enjoyed by
the Diem regime.6° Only in the Philippines have adminis-
trator's interests been subordinated to others and to those

of the nation as perceived by politicians.61

SIMILAR HISTORICAL BACKGROUNDS AND AMICABLE
CONTEMPORARY RELATIONS

In EurOpe, historical backgrounds and cultures have
been diffused for so many years that they are mutually
understood, if not shared, by the region as a whole. In
Latin.America, too, nations have similar cultural, legal, and
political heritages bequeathed by the Spanish or, in Brazil,
Portuguese conquerors. Such is not the case in Southeast
Asia. Diverse historical traditions abound and contemporary
relations between several nations are seriously strained,
though EurOpe and Latin America are not without their differ-

ences in contemporary relations.

Historical Backgrounds

 

Pro-colonial Southeast Asia was fragmented racially,
religiously, and politically and these divisions still
govern relationships to varying degrees among the various
pOpulations. Burmese are of Indian stock and are still
inSpired from that direction; Malayans predominate in
Malaya(excluding Singapore), Indonesia, and the Philippines

 

§°Robert Scigliano, “The Electoral Process in South
Vietnam: Politics in an UnderdevelOped State," Midwest
Journal of Political Science, 4(May l960)l44-16I.

610nofre D. Corpuz, The Bureaucracy in the Philippines,
(Manila, 1957), p. 247.

 

y"-

129
while pOpulations in South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand are
of Chinese descent.62 Yet Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia have
legacies of Indian culture while the remaining mainland
nations were influenced greatly by China.63 The Philippines
shares fewer cultural legacies common to either group.
Although racial problems in Southeast Asia are few,6b ethnic
and religious differences give rise to similar problems.
Traditional animosities existed primarily between Burma,
Thailand, Cambodia, and South Vietnam.65 With the exception
Of Thai-Burmese relations, these animosities have persisted
down to the present.

Legacies of colonialism have been deposited in the
region by British, French, Dutch, Americans, and Spanish.
As Lucian.Pue notes, these colonial impacts affected terri-
tories by direct and indirect rule to varying degrees and for
varying lengths of time.66 And the emphases of these
colonial administrations also varied. The British emphasized
law and order government and laissez-faire economies; the

Dutch were paternalistic in their indirect rule and develOped

 

52The Khmers in Cambodia may also have come from India.
See: “Cambodia,“ EncyclOpaedia Britannica, (Chicago, 1957),
pp e 6&0'614’1 e

‘fiaAlmond and Coleman, Op. cit., p. 71.

“Amry Vandenbosch and Richard A. Butwell, Southeast
Asia Among the World Powers, (Lexington, 1957), p,‘l5.

65These traditional animosities are noted by: Fifield,
Op. cit., p. 4. Also by: John.F. Cady, "Challenge in South-
east XsIa,' Far Eastern Survey, 19(8 February 1950)24-26;
and, Htin Aung inWThayer, Op. cit., pp. 85-87.

 

 

66Almond and Coleman, Op. cit., pp. 82-84.

130
dual economies; France was concerned with cultural aspects
and stressed either assimilation or association; and,
Filipinos, under American tutelage, were urged to concentrate
on administration, education, and politics.67 Contradictory
social, economic, and political practices arose because
colonial administrations and Western customs did not per-
meate these societies completely. And these contradictions
were probably accentuated by the abrupt and sometimes
premature withdrawal of the colonial powers.

Legal systems are an excellent example of the effect
these contradictory heritages might have upon integration.
Codified law dominates the Indochinese states while British
precedents form the bases for law in.Burma and Malaya. '
Indonesian adat or customary law still governs family and
village life there despite conflicts with both Western legal
concepts supported in the courts and Islamic law supported
by Muslim Imams.68 Philippine legal precedents are firmly
established and rest upon those set by American courts and
several centuries of Spanish codes, all of which must be
mastered by the aspiring lawyer. It is anticipated that
establishing a supranational authority over nations with
these different and sometimes conflicting legal and other

traditions would be tedious.

 

67Ibid, p. 84.
58G. William Skinner, Local Ethnic, and National

Loyalties in Village IndonesIaf'KLSyfipoeIum, (New YOFK, 1959).

to

131

Contemporary Animosities

 

Any decision to integrate must also contend with
contemporary inter and intra-national animosities deriving
from pro-colonial and colonial roots as well as from post-
independence altercations. Old colonial boundaries were
used in many cases to define the newly independent nations'
borders and these lines often divided ethnic groups and
former kingdoms as well as geographically contiguous or
easily accessible areas. As a result, frequent border
disputes between Thailand, Cambodia, and South Vietnam have
become important in these nations' foreign relations;
disputes between the Philippines and Indonesia and between
Thailand and Burma have also occurred. Differences still
exist between Malaya and Thailand over minorities in
bordering provincesé9 where neither nation has been able to
maintain order.

The most serious contemporary animosities are those
between Cambodia and its neighbors. Besides arguments over
disputed territories, there are periodic prOblems involving
border crossings, smuggling, Oppression of minorities, and
accusations of trade obstruction.7° Prince Sihanouk harbors
a fear of Thailand and South Vietnam, accusing them of plots

to overthrow his government, and alleges that other SEATO

 

69Pifie1d, op. cit., pp. 18 and 257- 260.

‘60.?

%bWillard A. Hanna, 'The State of the States of Indo-
China, ' American Universities Field Staff Report, 8(New
York, 1960), NO. 3, Part III, pp. 6-7.

a.

\l

132
members are implicated.?1 It is possible, however, that the
historical importance of these differences has been blown
up out of prOportion and the disputes are continued only to
serve immediate ends in these nations. Nevertheless,
Sihanouk is not likely to favor any integrative or cOOper-

ative scheme containing, as does ASAS, only SEATO members.

Contemporary Affinities

 

A number of historical and contemporary affinities
existing between Southeast Asian nations are apt to promote
closer regional ties. Foreign relations between insular
Indonesia and the Philippines are good and these nations
share many prOblems associated with their insularity. Indo-
nesia and Burma are also on good terms and their foreign
policies are similar in many respects. Philippines-South
Vietnam relations are also especially close?2 And relations
between the traditional enemies, Thailand and Burma, have
become cordial and Often warm since settlement of the Shan

States and Koumintang disputes.73 Even Thailand, Cambodia,

 

711bid, p. 7. Vandenbosch and Butwell relate that
Sihanouk's resignation as Prime Minister in 1956 was prompted
by differences with Thailand and South Vietnam who had
charged lawless acts against their territories by Cambodian
nationals. His action was designed to increase national
indignation at these acts. Op. cit., pp. 139-140.

72F1field, Op. Cite, pp. 95-96.

751bid, p. 24?. John S. Thomson, "Burmese Neutralism,‘
PoliticaI‘SEience Quarterly, 72(June l957)283 and throughout.
‘Tne‘Shan‘StatES‘prUBIEM‘arUse over desires of the Shah, who
are of Thai descent, to be associated with Thailand rather
than with Burma. The other problem involved allegations that
members of the defeated Koumintang army from China were
being harbored in Thailand and conducting raids into Burmese
territory.

—-’

133
and Laos have managed to cooperate and settle common Mekong
river transit problems by negotiation7“ despite other con-
tinuing disputes between them.

An evaluation of the deterrent effect of national dif-
ferences upon economic integration in.Southeast Asia could
easily be exaggerated. Haas found that EurOpean integration
was more affected by contemporary political and economic
conditions than by historical factors; in LAFTA too, agree-
ment was reached despite existing boundary disputes between
several of the members. Chapter III records numerous
instances of COOperation by Southeast Asian nations in.assoc-
iations and organizations that transcend issues under
dispute. And if cOOperation on economic and other matters
continues or increases among Southeast Asian nations, their
acceptance of Old colonial or disputed borders might be
eased. Traffic across national boundaries and even.nation-
ality itself becomes less relevant when border restrictions

are loosened and similar conditions prevail on.both sides.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC NATIONALISM
Political Nationalism

 

Although nationalist movements in each Of the Southeast
Asian nations were parallel in their drives toward indepen-
dence, the movements were not coordinated or in contact with
each other.75 Geographic isolation, varying colonial influ-

ences, and desires to create national unity out of individual

75Almond and Coleman, op. cit., p. 107. Vandenbosch
and Butwell, Op. cit., pp. 23732487-

 

134
historic pasts have given rise to several forms of nation-
alism within the region.

(1) Thai nationalism, perhaps because of the nation's
long independence, is conservative, unmilitant, and
concerned primarily with fostering national identity
within the pOpulation.76
(2) Philippine nationalism has anti-clericalism as its
most important source Of strength77 and, because inde-
pendence came peacefully after long preparation, the
people are less fearful of a resurgence of colonialism.
(3) Malaya actually has three nationalisms--Ma1ay,
Chinese, and Indian.78 And in.Indonesia and Burma,
minority groups are also outside the main current of.
nationalism where they often bear the brunt of resulting
prejudices.79
(4) Laotian nationalism hardly exists. The capital's '
'. . . physical and psychological ties with most of the
area and peOples which it supposedly governs are '
exceedingly tenuous."80

Most nationalist leaders in Southeast Asia are middle

class intellectuals or professional men with high Western

 

76Kahin, 0p._cit., p. 40.
77Ibid, p. A60.
‘76Ibid, pp. 278-279.

79Rupert Emerson, l'Paradoxes of Asian Nationalism,"
Far Eastern Quarterly, 13(February l954)l4l.

80Hanna, Op. cit., No. 2, Part II, p. 3. Also:
Harriman, Op. cIEJ, p. 53.

135
contact.81 Loyalties expressed by the peOple have more often
been to these pOpular leaders than to the national interest
and leadere' followings were ordinarily confined to Western
urbanized pOpulations. But nationalism is deepening in
Southeast Asia and the younger educated adherents are more
militant and less personalistic than has been true in the
past.82 And with the growth of national identities, Amry
Vandenbosch finds that, rather than drawing closer together,
these nations are becoming increasingly differentiated, not
only in their attitudes toward each other, but also in their
approaches to larger world problems.83 Fragmentation is also
increasing within these nations as nationalists who agreed
upon independence fall into disagreement about the goals Of
the new nations. V I

Despite the recognized force of political nationalism
within the region, it may not deter formation of‘a union.
Feelings of nationalism existed in many of the cases Deutsch
studied, but nevertheless, integration was often successful.8u
And within.nations of ECSC or LAFTA this was also no doubt
the case. Southeast Asian nationalism, though strong, may

still be pliable because only small segments of these

 

8lEmerson, Op. cit., pp. 135-136.
82Almond and Coleman, Op. cit., p. 129.
fiaVandenbosch and Butwell, Op. cit., p. 255.

8“Karl Deutsch, et al., Political Community and the
North Atlantic Area, (PTIfieetofi, 1957), p. i9.

 

136
societies are politically active85 and because political
leaders command a personal following that is in.part inde-
pendent of any national ideology. And concentration on
the results of integration, rather than on the implications
for national sovereignty could ease the transition from

nascent national lcyalties to a regional loyalty.

Economic Nationalism

 

Economic nationalism is a necessary, potent, and
growing force in nearly all underdeveloped nations; it is
useful to further economic develOpment and stabilization as
well as to reduce these nations' dependence upon foreign
factors of production. There is, of course, the danger of
fostering too much nationalism86 in which case the effects
will be a reduction in total trade,eldshocf needed foreign
investment, and a decline in economic growth.

Excessive nationalism is evident in Indonesia where
President Soekarno, in order to increase local support for
the central government,87 fanned the West Irian fire and
courted a war with the Dutch88 that the Indonesian economy

 

85Robert A. Scalapino 'Neutralism in.Asia," American
Political Science Review, 48(March 1954)6o. He sayST—TMEEE
IEEOEEPInation on an IfiEensive scale has just begun in parts
of the Far East, and in any case is likely to follow govern-
ment policy in most areas."

8éGunnar Myrdal, BeyOnd the Welfare State, (New Haven,

1960), pp. 209-213. _
87Fifield, Op. cit., pp. 136-137.

86New York Times, (4 September 1960). Soekarno's
persistSEEE'FEEEEEI§'Overcame Dutch Objections and West
Irian.will be transferred to Indonesia after a short interim
period during which the United Nations will administer the
territory.

 

 

4‘

137
could not afford without sacrificing Opportunities for
economic develOpment. Burmese nationalism led to a rejection
of foreign aid in 1953. but the ensuing retardation of devel-
Opment was responsible for a change in policy, again allowing
acceptance of aid from Soviet as well as from Western
nations.89

In all Southeast Asian.nations, governments accept
some responsibility for improving social and economic
welfare. This reSponsibility has been translated into
develOpment plans that, in order to be carried out effectively,
require governmental control or supervision of nearly all
economic sectors. And these nations, in addition tcgpre-
moting deve10pment, are concerned with reducing foreign
control over their economies; their policies have more often
reflected the latter objective than the former.90 Frank H.
Golay states,

Southeast Asian nations are determined to reintegrate
their societies on the basis of an exclusive nation-
alism. Economic nationalism is not so much concerned
with increasing the size of the pie as it is with

increasing the share accruing to indigenous Southeast
Asians.9l

 

89Butwell, op. cit., p. 160.

stlement Johnson, Southeast Asia, Report on U. S.
Foreign.Assistance Programs, (U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1957), as quoted in Nathaniel Peffer, Transition
and Tension in Southeast Asia, (New York, 19571"Efi'7flfir'
PETTeP_EESEES‘JOHEEOE"§§'§§§Ing, "In.all conflicts between
nationalism and sound economic policy, nationalism has
prevailed.“

91"Commercial Policy and Economic Nationalism,I
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 72(November l958)587.

 

I.

.
.
..
. .
:
g .
.
.
.
.
'0
.- . -

138
He also notes that the commercial policies utilized to
nationalize(de-alienize) these economies tend to reduce the
volume of trade and increase product concentration rather
than diversification.92

Economic nationalism in Southeast Asia may be less

easy to overcome in Southeast Asia than political nation-
alism. Deutsch notes that not one full-fledged modern
service-state has successfully federated or otherwise
merged.93 Myrdal is even pessimistic about united EurOpe's
long-term outcome and feels that, although tariffs may be
eliminated, they will be replaced by quotas or cartel agree-

ments.9u

But Haas feels that if integration of basic
sectors can be achieved, then commitments to social welfare,
economic,develOpment, and planning will lead to a “spill-
over"into other sectors of the economies and these sectors
will have to be included in the union.95 He also notes
that even though governments in response to internal
pressures sometimes balked at decisions of the supranational
body, no nation would take responsibility for destroying
the union once it was initiated.96

Southeast Asian integration could be eased if it were
considered and presented to the pOpulations as a means of
achieving economic develOpment rather than as an end of
national sovereignty. And leaders could profit by capital-
izing on anti-foreign sentiments in stressing the protection

W—w'

 

g21PM. pp. 583-584.
93M: P- 22- 95Uniting, p. 299.
9592;_212;. P- 147-148. 95Ibid, pp. xiv, 268-280.

’0

139

from imperialism offered by an economic union.

ATTITUDES OF SOME MAJOR GOVERNMENTS
AND UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES
External Governments' Interests and Influences

Decisions to initiate an economic union in Southeast
Asia would be influenced by the attitudes of; (l) former
colonial nations with whom ties are still maintained, (2)
major world governments upon whose benevolence these nations
must depend for a number of years, (3) neighboring nations
with ties to the region or desires for association and, (4)
United Nations agencies concerned with Southeast Asian
affairs and international trade.

Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands held
similar desires to include their former colonies in assoc-
iations with the mother country. Britain pursued this
policy in the Commonwealth and Sterling Area and eschewed
until recently any other economic ties so as to preserve
British influence over these territories. With the decline
of these associations' importance, however, a change of
policy became necessary and Britain began negotiating for
entry into EEC. Anticipating the end of preferential
treatment for remaining colonies, the British sought to
strengthen the economic independence of those in Southeast
Asia by encouraging merger with Malaya.97

 

97Christian Science Monitor, (24 November 1961). The
Detroit Ffee Press, (IAugusE I952), reports that agreement
HES Been reached creating the Federation of Malasia.

 

 

140

France's first efforts to form an Asian Union of the
Indochinese States failed in 1947 and South Vietnam and
Cambodia both elected to forego membership in the French
Union when they attained independence in 1954. Laotian
membership still remains a moral rather than a material
satisfaction for France. And the French have been too
occupied with Algeria and other problems since 1954 to
reinforce their waning Southeast Asian influence. Cultural
ties still exist between.France and her former possessions,
but the economic relations of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and
Laos are now closely tied to the United St;ates.98

Dutch plans to retain political influence in Indonesia
were quashed following the archipelago's independence
although some economic interests remain in the area. But
the Indonesian government is making a conscious effort to
eliminate the last vestiges of Dutch economic control.99
In view of the present tense relations between the two
nations, any Indonesian decision on integration would quite
probably be reached without regard for Dutch wishes.

Support or acquiescence of the United States and the
Soviet Union, due to their immense political and economic
influence throughout the world, would be a prerequisite for
initiating an economic union in Southeast Asia. These
nations have the potential to prevent or sabotage a planned

or existing union among Southeast Asians. And these richer

98Eifie1d, op. cit., pp. 311 and 313-314.

99J. A. c. Mackie, 'The Political Economy of Guided
Democracy,‘| Australian Outlook, 13(December 1959)289.

 

141
nations have the resources to reduce persisting balance of

100 The reduction or

payments deficits of Southeast Asia.
elimination of these payments deficits would go a long way
in assuring the success of integration.

The United States has never Openly opposed regional
organization in Southeast Asia and in fact has encouraged
regionalism for security reasons. But the American position
regarding Southeast Asian economic regionalism is not so
clearly stated; the stress has more Often been upon security
than trade and upon bilateral rather than multilateral
relations in this region.101 United States policy with
regard to the formation of a EurOpean economic union was,
however, clear and positive. In Latin America, too, this
favorable approach has been pledged.102 So it is probable
that, judging from examples of two previous experiences and
American interests in develOping Southeast Asia economically,
support for any economic union that appears viable will be
forthcoming. But this support, if given Openly and bilat-
erally, might antagonize some Southeast Asian nations.' Too

much encouragement by the United States might bring cries of

imperialism from Burma, Indonesia, and Cambodia, alienating

 

1°°Vu Quoc Thuc op. cit. p. 29.
101 "519, 9‘0 A;
Wilfred lenbaum, "United States Economic Policy
in South and South East Asia," India Quarterly. (April-
June l956)lO7-116.

1°2-A lO-Year 'Marshall Plan" to Build up Latin
America," U.S. News and World Report, 50(27 March 1961)100-
102. FulI‘E5EE‘OTTE‘SEEEEH‘BT‘PFESIdent Kennedy at a White
House reception for Latin American diplomats on 13 March
1961. The United States also provided $10 million for
deve10pment of the Central American Free Trade Association.
New York Times, (4 November 1960).

 

 

It

I.

142

these nations, and perhaps others, from their neighbors.

Soviet support for an economic union in Southeast
Asia cannot be guaranteed though acquiescence might be
secured. The Soviet Union pursues ideological rather than
trade objectives in Southeast Asia; increasing economic or
political stability of existing governments within the
region is not a goal of Communist ideology. The growth of
strong institutions in the region has been obstructed both
through Communist party organizations and by direct Soviet
intervention in these nations" affairs. During the middle
1950's, the Soviet Union dumped large amounts of tin on the
world market, undercutting Malayan.prices and piling up
surpluses in Malaya that threatened to wreck that nation's
economic stability.1°3 Soviet shipments of manufactured
goods to Burma in exchange for rice were too slow and of
such poor quality that economic develOpment there could not

104

proceed according to plan. Burma subsequently turned to

the United States for develOpment capitalrlo5’ But the
Soviet Union has been resoonsive to world Opinion in the
past106 and probably would not risk incurring the resent-

ment of Southeast Asia and other nations by Openly Opposing

__—

lo3Hanna, Op. cit., No. 8, Part II, p. 6.

10“A. Z. Rubinstein, "Soviet Policy in South Asia,"
Current History, 32(February 1957), as quoted in Peffer, Op.

EIE., pp. 262-205. .
Butwell, Op. cit., p. 160.

1°6Ernst B. Haas, "Regionalism, Functionalism, and
Universal International Organization," World Politics, 8
(January l956)257. Susan Strange, ""The CommonweaIth and the
Sterling Area," Yearbook of World Affairs, 13(1959), p. 43,
says, "And the SB?I§E”UnIon which has pf§sented itself so
often as the friend, champion and savior of underdevelOped
countries, would surely hesitate to upset prices otherwise
stable and so incur the whole blame."

 

 

I.

I.

,Q

143
an economic union.

'Southeast Asian relations with Nationalist and Communist
China, India, and Japan would also influence the form
regional integration would take. Even though the Philippines,
Thailand, and South Vietnam recognize Nationalist China,,
only the latter is on good terms with the Formosa regime.107
And Communist China Opposes any measures that would strengthen
these governments. The Chinese have expansionist aims and
covet Southeast Asia as a pOpulation outlet and a source of
food, raw materials, and market for future manufactures. The
Chinese are generally more militant and revolution-oriented
than the Soviets in underdevelOped areas108 and are actively
assisting in subversion and overthrow of governments in
South Vietnam and Laos.109 Pressure against integration
would no doubt be exerted by China through direct threats
against these nations and through overseas Chinese in-these
nations.

India does not conceive of Southeast Asia as a region
with a destiny distinct from that of South Asia. The
spiritual ties between these nations have been stressed in
the past and Nehru seeks to cultivate their common interests.
Burma Often follows India's foreign policy lead and has
suggested that India take the initiative for forming an

 

l07Butwell, Op. cit., pp. 144-146.
1°8Thornton, op. cit., pp. 491-504.

.lagsutwell, op. cit., pp. 153—154. The Soviet Union
is supplying the major support for the Pathet Lao.

144
economic union}lo Indonesia, too, maintains close cul-
tural, economic, and foreign policy relations with the
sub-continent. But India has been lukewarm about economic
regionalism in South and Southeast Asia,111 eSpecially when
Commonwealth nations are involved. §&:

The Japanese also have interests in Southeast Asia. 'AS

They are providing technical assistance and develOpment
funds in connection with reparation payments and they do a
significant amount of trading with several of these nations.
One Japanese economist envisions that these mutual trading
ties will "beyond doubt, assist in forming an Asian Common
Market in the very near future."112 Exclusion from a
regional market would be serious for Japan and perhaps for
Southeast Asia as well. Boyd estimates that trade inter-
dependence of the Philippines, Malaya, and Japan will
increase 150% by 1975.113 The Philippines is pressing for
Japan's inclusion in ASAS and Boyd goes on to say that the
Association

'may depend very much on the attitude of Japan who . . .

will probably be the Association's main trading partner

among the industrial nations, and who is well placed to

serve as the Association's main source of capital
goods . . .114

 

1103. G. Boyd, nThe ASsociation of South East Asian
States," Australian Outlook, 14(December l960)247.

viiiLincoln Gordon, "Economic Regionalism Reconsidered,"
World Politics, 13(January l961)235.

fiIlZHayato Ikeda, "Japan's Share in Economic CO-Oper-
ation," Contemporary Japan, 26(August l959)3l.

1130p. cit., p. 251.

 

 

145

The relationships of Southeast Asian nations with those
mentioned above are primarily bilateral and Operate, as do
existing regional associations and organizations, as a
centrifugal force pulling Southeast Asians outward and toward
other alignments. And an economic case can be made for
including several other nations such as Japan India, and
even Australia in a Southeast Asian union.115 Overt govern-
mental Opposition to an economic union can be expected only
from Communist China and perhaps the Soviet Union. But
private business interests engaging in international trade
may also find obstruction of a union favorable to their
immediate, if not their long-run interests. And business
interests, particularlyxAmerican ones, have frustrated
regional stabilization agreements even when-these were

supported by the United States government.

Attitudes of ECAFE and GATT

All Southeast Asian nations except South Vietnam are
members of the United Nations and all participate in at least
some of its specialized agencies. Two of these agencies,
ECAFE and GATT, are intimately involved with economic inte-
gration. They might provide a way of circumventing explosive
issues surrounding integration which affront sensitive

national feelings in Southeast Asia.
The United Nations Charter makes no attempt to circum-

scribe economic unions as it does security pacts and military

 

llfiBoyd Op. cit., pp. 255-256 advocates association
but not a full'meEBEFSHip for Australia in ASAS.

146
alliances.116 Although some persons maintain that regional
economic unions obstruct the flow of international trade
and defeat the purpose of the UN economic agencies,117
activities of the regional UN Economic Commissions of the
Economic and Social Council do not indicate that any impor-
tant incompatibilities between these unions and UN Objectives
exist. The Economic Commission for Europe cOOperated freely
with both ECSC and EEC; the Economic Commission for Latin
America was instrumental in creating the Central American

118

and the Latin.American free trade associations; and,

ECAFE has devoted several publications to studies of the
feasibility of integrating Southeast Asian economies.119

The activities of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade(GATT), have not been so clear-cut nor so positive in
support of regional economic groupings. GATT permits full
customs unions and free trade areas, but has been reluctant
to grant the concessions needed for initiation of these

120

unions. Despite this generally unsympathetic attitude

 

ll‘SArticles 51, 52, and 68 of the Charter deal with
regional agreements.

-117These views are discussed in: Inis L. Claude,
Swords Into Plowshares, (New York, 1959), pp. 111-118.

118"Progress Towards the Latin.American Common Market,"
Report of the Working Group on the Latin.American Regional
Market, Economic Bulletin for Latin.America, 4(March 1959),
pp. 1-12. '

"ll9"Regional Co-Operation," Interim Report by the ‘
Executive Secretary, ECAFE, (New Delhi, 31 January 1961);
Economic Survey for Asia and the Far East, (New York, 1959);
Economic BfiIIeEIfi for'Asia and the’Far‘East, 12(June 1961).

120Gordon, Op. cit., p. 231. Silcock, Op. cit., p.181.

 

 

 

 

147
toward economic unions, GATT did accept ECSC and EEC as
collective memberships, granting them 5-year waivers on
Obligations, and LAFTA has petitioned for similar grants.121
It is possible that GATT members unaligned with any economic
union may act to prevent entry of a Southeast Asian or other
union in the future. These nations fear that these unions
may become exclusive clubs and discriminate needlessly
against the commodities of outsiders.122 It is possible
that they also fear admission of any more blocs or collective
memberships to GATT might conceivably force a change in
voting procedures that would reduce the influence of

unaligned nations.

ADMINISTRATIVE CAPABILITIES

A successful economic union depends upon the existence
of adequate institutions and sufficient personnel to control
the organization. The five governing organs of ECSC are
staffed with more than 150 tOp level governmental personnel
and the total EEC staff runs into thousands; LAFTA requires,
fewer personnel, but both organizations depend upon a large,
well-trained staff of administrators and technicians. There
is no doubt that staffing a regional organization of this
size would be a major task for Southeast Asians. The supply
of tOp level administrators and technicians in Southeast
Asia is limited because: (1) these nations lack apprOpriately
educated and trained persOns and, (2) governments are not

financially able to pay for needed services and facilities.
iiiNOrldmark EncyclOpedia of Nations, (New York, 19600,

122Myrdal, "Economic Nationalism,", Op. cit., p. 7.
«Silcock, o . cit., p. 175.

 

148

Colonial backgrounds left these nations with wide
variations in experience and preparation for self-government.
Their administrators were trained to function under bureau-
cratic colonial regimes and in some cases are not able to
handle the tasks of self-government. In Indonesia, where
Dutch colonials staffed much of the colonial government,
few indigenes were educated for positions of leadership;
nationals working under the Dutch were largely distrusted
after independence so the new government was staffed with
veterans of the revolution as rewards for their service. And
the result of using these untrained veterans as adminis-
trators was gross inefficiency and corruption.123 Burma
and the Philippines, although possessing an overabundance
of trained and educated persons to fill administrative

124

positions, have not been able to afford their services;

competent persons thus go unemployed or gravitate to private
employment where salaries are higher. Persisting low wages
and the necessity of employing second-rate candidates also
contribute to corrupt practices that are more or less
institutionalized in all of Southeast.Asia.125
In.most of Southeast Asia finances are not available
to provide military personnel for internal security, a task

magnified in insular Indonesia and the Philippines and

 

 

 

123Har01d M. Vinacke A Histor of the Far East in.’
Modern Times, (New York, 1959), pp.—%34=8367

124A1mond and Coleman, 0 . cit., pp. 103 and 129.

125As examples of this pOint, see: Fairbain, Op. cit.,
pp. 8- -9; and, Corpuz, op. cit., pp. 238-241.

 

. 149
requiring large expenditures in other nations, in addition
to administrative personnel. Internal control and provisions

for stability are among the greatest problems to be faced by

126

Indonesia. It has been estimated that 60% of Sumatra's

production of rubber finds its way to Malayan markets
without payment of export duties to the Indonesian govern-
ment. The Philippines has been unable to prevent(but has
reduced) the flow of Indonesian Moslems into the southern
islands.127 Hukbalahaps still Operate in Luzon as do other
bandits in Indonesia and along the borders of mainland
nations.128 South Vietnam even lacks enough administrators
to execute its economic develOpment plans129 while Burma has
had to postpone membership in UN agencies until competent
personnel became available to represent the nation. .

The problem of acquiring administrators is not,
however, being ignored in these nations. The Colombo Plan
Technical Aid Scheme trains personnel in many nations, and
some of these persons move into government positions. The
Philippines government and the United States Operations
Mission jointly sponsor a Southeast Asian Regional Training
Program that trains Southeast Asian administrators.130 The
Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration

studies administrative problems and also anticipates Sp0n94_

123Kahin, op, cit,, pp.384-386. Silcock, Qp,oi§,,p.43-44.
127Fifield, Op. cit., p. 92.

128Butwell, op. cit., pp. 99-101. QA‘

129Hanna, Op. cit., Part IV, p. B'NGQQ‘)

13°“Southeast Asia Regional Traini Program," Phil-
1Ppine Journal of Public Administration, (April 196071737

150
soring training programs. And most of these nations have
formal Public Administration Institutes conducting training
programs.131 Further, if an economic union were contemplated
by Southeast Asians, it is quite probable that a limited
number of competent administrators could be temporarily
supplied by develOped nations through technical aid programs
now Operating. These persons would help fill the gap until
a staff could be trained within the region. And Western
economic aid as well as a production tax upon the integrated
products of a union could provide some financial security

by furnishing funds for administration, investment, research,

loans, and the relocation and retraining of workers.132

 

~131A full issue Of the Philippine Journal of Public
Administration, 2(April 1958): Is devbted‘to short discué-
sIOne“OT”tHEEE programs in South and Southeast Asia.

.
, ,‘

 

132Haas, Uniting,_pp. 70-71. The production tax is
the major sourcE‘Bf‘Operating funds for ECSC and EEC.

 

CHAPTER VI

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY, SUMMARY OF
FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
Several limitations to the preceding analysis restrict

its reliability and weaken the conclusions that may be
drawn from it. Analyzing several nations on.a tOpic as bread
as economic integration often required that discussion.and
analysis of the numerous factors be confined to general
statements about similarities in the region.and in the
nations involved. To compensate for the necessarily short
treatment of many factors important to the subject, the
author footnoted in greater detail than would otherwise be
necessary. Footnotes, however, were not intended to elim-
inate all weaknesses and when interpreting data or conclusions
the following six limitations must be borne in mind by the
reader. ,

l. The greater part Of the study is a static, point-in-

time analysis that considers few dynamic aSpects of a

region undergoing rapid economic, political, and social

change. It was therefore impossible, in most cases, to

speak about trends in the develOpment of these nations.

Nevertheless, it is suggested that trends of economic

151

I.

J
' 1 .'

152
develOpment would illustrate that general welfare in the
Philippines, Malaya, and Thailand is increasing at a
faster rate than in Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia, South
Vietnam, or Laos where deve10pment is lagging or has
become stagnated.

2. The study was not confined to a full examination of
pro-conditions suggested by other integration studies.
Some factors that might affect integration in one way or
another were not examined at all and many pro-conditions
were altered by the author in the light of available
resources. And so, although some of the altered pre-
conditions are amenable to indirect verification, others
only approximate those suggested by Deutsch, Haas, or
the economists and the reliability of these pro-conditions
remains to be tested.

3. Data in Chapter IV blur disparities in develOpment
between Westernized urban areas and rural traditional
areas of these nations. Every Southeast Asian nation
contains dual(or plural) economies and societies that
exist side by side and often are almost separate. Wes-
ternized sectors are relatively modern while rural areas
remain.undeveloped. SO economic growth rates, indus-
trialization, per capita incomes, communications facil-

ities, and other indices relate primarily to the level
of develOpment in Westernized Southeast Asia.
4. Data were either unavailable or too unreliable to

permit a rigorous statistical analysis of the selected

indices in Chapter IV or elsewhere. To have computed

I.

Hi

153
correlations, statistical error, or deviations would
only have added to existing distortions in the data.
In several instances it was even necessary to qualify the
ranges of variation between nations to arrive at relation-
ships that were logical in the light of more reliable,
non-statistical information.
5. No satisfactory method exists to weigh the importance
of individual indices for each nation in the overall
analysis. This weighing can only be accomplished on an
introspective basis. And it is well to recall that these
pre-conditions are not all mutually exclusive of each
other in the areas that they test. That is, economic
deve10pment correlates highly with representative govern-
ment, a causal relationship exists between political
programs and the amount of regional interaction.and,
education levels govern the level of deve10pment in
several other pre-conditions.
6. The inability to obtain evidence on attitudes of
groups and_1eaders toward economic integration is a major
limitation.upon the thesis. Lack of interview data or
other statements relating to the subject meant that .
general orientations toward regionalism, COOperation, or
international relations had to be interpreted for their
relevance to economic integration. Thus, conclusions
from this evidence are somewhat impressionistic and

inconclusive though not, therefore, unreliable.

 

rant

154
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Participation in Regional Groupings

 

All Southeast Asian nations are members of the Colombo
Plan and ECAFE so it can be said that none of them are wholly
Opposed to regional COOperation. They are not reluctant to
COOperate in associations or organizations that make no
restrictions upon national policy-making, but their unwill-
ingness to relinquish national sovereignty to a supranational
body remains a stumbling block in the path of Southeast Asian
economic regionalism.

Southeast Asian participation in regional groupings
may be evaluated in terms of: (l) attendance at regional
conferences, (2) memberships in associations and organi-
zations, (3) alliances under the same security pact and,
(4) endorsement Of economic integration plans. Of the eight
nations, official COOperation has most often involved the
Philippines and Thailand. They have been represented at the
greatest number of conferences, are members of most assoc-
iations and organizations, belong to the same security pact,
and endorse at least one economic integration scheme.
Malaya, though having attended fewer conferences, partici-
pates in most of the same groupings, is indirectly protected
by SEATO, and Prime Minister Rahman has been a prime mover
for Southeast Asian economic integration. South Vietnamese
representatives attended more conferences than those of
Malaya; South Vietnam has mutual security ties with the

above nations, maintains several regional memberships, but is

 

 

 

lllllllllllll I.

155
not committed to economic integration. Leaders in Indo-
nesia, Burma, and Cambodia attended fewer conferences, Share
fewer regional ties and Oppose, in varying degrees, all
existing plans for economic integration; they wish to maintain
Open trading with all nations. Laotian Officials, participants
in several conferences, regional groupings, and economic
associations, remain uncommitted upon economic integration.

It is suggested that, of all measures of regional *
COOperation, willingness to submit to supranational control
and desires for economic integration are most significant
for this study. And if this is so, then the Philippines,
Malaya, and Thailand, by virtue of their supranational
security ties with the United States and Great Britain and
their memberships in ASAS, display more readiness for inte-
gration than other Southeast Asian nations. South Vietnam
seems next best qualified although this nation.has expressed
only qualified desires to participate in an economic union
and its security ties are not supranational. The remaining
Southeast Asian nations eschew any degree of supranational
control for security or other reasons and remain either

uncommitted or opposed to economic integration.

Similarity of Economic DevelOpment -
All of Southeast Asia remains undevelOped economically\ guyw’
' \‘l

and it may be questioned whether economic integration would i .
I

be immediately profitable for these nations in their present1

state of develOpment. Yet it may be precisely because they

are underdeveloped and economically competitive in the goods

156
they produce that an economic union may be beneficial, in
spite of the fact that it may not be immediately profitable.
A union could permit a more rational allocation of existing
resources throughout the region and provide for future
complementary relationships between new industries. Economic
self-sufficiency and isolation for small underdeveloped
nations is not compatible with their economic deve10pment
and, by acting as a larger unit, these nations are apt to
increase regional economic independence and raise the
region's economic bargaining power vis-a-vis richer or other
nations outside the region.

The Philippines, Thailand, and Malaya are the most
highly developed nations in Southeast Asia and are nearly
equal in their overall level of develOpment; they are found
at the tOp on each of the four groups of indices(see Table
16). Burma and Indonesia form a secondary level of devel-
Opment and are very similar in three of the four groups
while South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos are significantly
less develOped than the rest of Southeast Asia and are
relatively similar to the above nations only on one group of
indices.

It is suggested that the indices portraying basic social
conditions and trade and industrialization are more impor-
tant in determining the readiness of nations to integrate
than are indices of economic prosperity or communications and
transportation facilities. There are several reasons for

weighing these indices in this way. First, ECSC and LAFTA

TABLE 16

157

SUMMARY OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN SIMILARITY RANKINGS ON FOUR

GROUPS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INDICES1

W

BASIC SOCIAL CONDITIONS

 

Philippines
Malaya
Indonesia
Thailand
Burma

1

ECONOMIC PROSPERITY

 

Malaya
Philippines
Thailand
Burma
Indonesia
Cambodia

S. Vietnam

TRADE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORTATION

Thailand
Philippines
Malaya
Burma
Indonesia

Malaya
Philippines
Thailand

8. Vietnam

RANKINGS ON FOUR GROUPS OF INDICES

 

Thailand
Philippines
Malaya

(These nations are included
in all four groups above.)

Burma
Indonesia

(These nations are included
in three of the groups above.)

S. Vietnam
Cambodia
Laos

(These nations are included
in two or less of the groups
above.)

 

1This table is a summary of all tables contained in

Chapter IV.

Under the above headings are included those

nations ranking highest on the greatest number of indices

of each type.

The criteria for including nations in these

rankings were different for each type of index and in some
cases the similarity between nations under each heading in
this table does not equal that of ECSC or LAFTA

158
were both inaugurated despite greater dissimilarities between
members on per capita incomes,coostseéf living, and economic
growth than exist between most Southeast Asian nations. And
many of the conditions portrayed by these indices can be
harmonized after the union is promulgated. Second, economic
prosperity indices approximate but are not identical to
those economic conditions deemed important to integration
by economists. Third, communications and transportation
facilities within and between these nations are at least
comparable to those within and between nations involved in
the early integrations studied by Karl Deutschr\S§nd inter-
action between elites in Southeast Asia probably exceeds
that found between elites in the successful EurOpean inte—
grations prior to the Twentieth Century.‘ Fourth, similar
basic social conditions indicate underlying factors that
will likely tend to reduce any disparities in economic dev-
elOpment between nations that are equally urbanized and
educated. Thus, facilities for interaction will tend to
become more similar as the capabilities of populations to
communicate increase. And fifth, indices of trading and
industrialization are eSpecially relevant to economic inte-
gration; the feasibility of a nation's membership in an
economic union will undoubtedly be consciously determined
by policy-makers more upon these economic indices than upon
others examined.

If the foregoing proves to_be true, then Malaya, the

Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and Burma are clearly more
ready to undertake integration than are South Vietnam,

159

Cambodia, or Laos.

Political and Other Factors Affecting

 

Integrative Tendencies

 

Discussions of political and other factors such as
minority groups, historical backgrounds, and external
influences has done little more than illustrate the myriad of
diverse relationships among peOples and governments in South-
east Asia. However, it has been noted earlier that: (l)
minority group influences upon integration will probably be
indirect as they affect political and economic stability in
”these nations and, (2) political and economic factors will
probably take precedence over historical affinities or
animosities.

In all of Southeast Asia it is suggested that poli-
tical ideologies as eXpressed by these nations' leaders are
more reliable and important in ascertaining similarities
between these nations and their readiness to integrate than
are political institutions or other major values. These
political ideologies divide Southeast Asian nations sharply
into two major groups, those sharing Western alignments and
free enterprise orientations and others, neutralist and
socialist oriented. In the former group are the Philippines,

Malaya, Thailand, and South Vietnam1 while the unaligned

 

1South Vietnam is included in the free enterprise
group because, despite substantial government control of
business and equity in industry, economic competition is
encouraged and a socialist state is not a goal of the Diem
government.

160
nations include Burma, Indonesia, and Cambodia.2 Laotian
political and economic orientations are as yet undetermined.
Also of consequence are combinations of political and
economic instability, Communist subversion, and unfavorable
foreign factors that may render it extremely difficult Or
impossible for some nations to participate in a union at the
present time, even though they might desire to do so.

Indonesia's lack of internal control and national unity
are serious detriments to participation in an economic union.
Any major policy to be implemented by Soekarno's government
requires agreement bamongn Communists, Muslim political
parties, regionalists, and the army. And it is unlikely
that the issue of economic integration would engender enough
agreement among these factions to permit the Indonesian
government to make a decision. But initial success of a
union among other Southeast Asian nations might serve as a
sufficient example to allow Indonesia‘s future participation.
T1. _Communist infiltration and subversion in Laos and
South Vietnam combine with other factors in these nations
to impede exercise of the most basic governmental functions.
Laos continues under Communist siege, and negotiations of
the Geneva Agreement signatories give hint of restricting
the nation's membership in any discriminatory group. All
things considered, it seems clear that Laos is unable to
carry out national obligations and is as yet unsuited for

membership in.an economic union.

 

2Cambodia is somewhat reluctantly under the protection
Of SEATO and Sihanouk maintains that his nation is neutral.

161

The situation in South Vietnam is somewhat different.
The Communist threat approaches the seriousness of that in
Laos, but the government still functions, the nation is
decidedly more develOped economically, and the elite harbors
desires to participate fully in regional and international
activity. The question here revolves around the feasibility
of including an unstable member in a union when there are no
guarantees that another government coming to power(possibly
Communist) would respect agreements made with other union
members. It appears that integrating any sector of South
Vietnam's economy with those of other Southeast Asian nations
would not be feasible at present, but the nation does seem
capable of cOOperating economically with others to their

mutual benefit.

CONCLUSIONS
Readiness for Economic Integration

The purpose of the foregoing study was to examine some

 

of the pre-conditions believed by a number of students of
integration and by the author to be important in determining
readiness of nations to integrate. In view of the limi-
tations imposed upon the study by the purpose and available
data, major conclusions are offered as hypotheses that may
or may not stand up in further analysis of additional
factors affecting Southeast Asian economic integration. The
four hypotheses are:

(l) the Philippines, Malaya, and Thailand fulfill most

of the pre-conditions examined and are ready to

I.

162
undertake regional economic integration that is
confined to a few economic sectors and scheduled to
deepen only as these nations' capabilities increase;'

(2) Indonesia and Burma fulfill fewer pre-conditions but,
when willing to do so, could participate in an econ-
omic union that exerts no supranational control and
allows increasing participation.as their abilities
to carry out responsibilities increase;

(3) South Vietnam and Cambodia fulfill some pre-conditions
and could, if willing, undertake limited cOOperation
not involving integration or supranational control,
but would not benefit their nations or others much
until they achieve a higher level of economic devel-
Opment;

(4) Laos fulfills only a few pre-conditions, is probably
cOOperating economically in other groups to the
extent of the nation's present capabilities, and will
remain unsuited for membership in any economic union
for as long as political chaos and economic stagnation

C ont inue e

The ASAS

Recent concern for economic integration in ECAFE and
in Southeast Asia stems from a relatively realistic assess-
ment of the needs and capabilities of the region. A need
exists for a Southeast Asian organization that is capable
of evaluating national develOpment, planning regional

resource allocation, and coordinating the many regional aid

163
and assistance programs for all of these nations. And an
organization performing these functions could pave the way
for a more comprehensive economic union.by studying and
adjusting unfavorable legal restrictions, financial bottle-
necks, tax policies, and trade relations.

It appears that the emerging Association of Southeast
Asian States gives promise of becoming an organization suited
to the present capabilities, if not yet the needs of the
region. The initiative in forming ASAS has been taken by
the three nations--Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailan --
that best satisfy the pre-conditions examinpd in this study.
The members have delayed erection of a supranational body,
retained emphasis upon future deve10pment, and left the door
Open to allow other nations to participate as they become
willing and able. To erect a supranational body between the
three members might solidify persistent ideological divisions
between Southeast Asian nations and defeat the purpose of
the union; it would without doubt alienate nations who
already distrust alliances between these security partners
and who are unwilling to submit their economies to any
control by other nations.

Still, the problem remains of assessing how much
sovereignty ASAS members and other Southeast Asian nations
are willing to designate to the Association. 'There are too
many conflicting commitments both internal and external in
all of these nations to permit a comprehensive scheme of
integration.at the present time. Even the current members

are separated by ties to different currency blocs and trading

 

I.

164
routes and by some political issues.

In the interests of broadening the membership and
increasing its value to the region, ASAS members may profit
by foregoing supranational control for the present. All
economic unions entail relinquishment of some national
policy-making autonomy, but a regional resource and industry
deve10pment plan requires less coordination than a free
trade area, customs union, or common market and resource
develOpment may be an area where the highest rewards could
now be realized. A resource and industry deve10pment plan
could encourage coordination of deve10pment for the benefit
of all and would be less likely to alienate others during
the plan's formative period. Then, too, the commodities ncw
traded between these nations would be of little consequence
in a free trade area or common market; it is the new products
that will come from develOping industries that need free
entry into a larger market while at the same time maintaining
protection against competing products from outside the region.
And when these products are develOped, the impetus for
enlarging the scOpe of ASAS and converting it into a

common market will be there.

Foundations for a United States Policy Toward ASAS

 

The United States has not Openly Opposed regionalism
in Southeast Asia. But an almost indiscriminate support of
all non-Communist regional groupings contributes to centri-
fugal tendencies pulling Southeast Asians toward several

spheres of influence outside the region. And these

165
centrifugal tendencies prevent any extant associations and
organizations from becoming an adequate foundation for an
economic union. The historical division of the region into
a multiplicity of small political units has been altered but
unity has not increased. New divisions have been substituted
for Old and instability persists.

United States allocations of technical and financial
aid to Southeast Asia since World War II attest to the
former's commitment to economic deve10pment. But this aid
has often fallen short of expectations of policy—makers in
promoting deve10pment. United States policies in Southeast
Asia have been primarily concerned with security interests
and the major portion of foreign aid to the region has been
military aid. While this military aid has increased the
defensive capabilities of several of these nations, aid in
this form has not enabled Southeast Asians to deal with the
underlying causes of instability that make these large
military forces necessary. United States policy-makers have
not always been able to give first priority to projects
promoting social andeolitical change that would help these
nations stabilize their currencies, broaden their tax base,
increase their trade, and balance their payments. Never-
theless, while these economic instabilities remain, benefits
of foreign aid cannot be maximized in these nations. Fre-
quent price fluctuations or inflationary recessions mean
that aid funds will necessarily be employed to cover governp

ment deficits rather than to continue work on develOpment

166
projects.

It is believed that if the United States could channel
aid throughout the region to provide a firmer foundation for
economic growth in all of these nations, this would assist
removal of the conditions conducive to Communism., And if
economic and political conditions were stabilized, the need
for foreign aid could eventually be decreased because more
foreign and domestic investment would then become available
to the region. Direct financial support of ASAS by the
United States at the present time, however, is not thought
to be advisable. While only three nations allied with the
United States are members of ASAS, direct financial support
to the Association might only serve to broaden the gap of
distrust between.these and other Southeast Asian nations,
thus restricting future ASAS membership.. And the United
States as a member or associate of this or any other regional
economic union would tend to make the union another sphere
Of influence.

Greater United States participation in.United Nations
aid programs would also be helpful in inducing more Southeast
Asians to join.ASAS. These nations might have less fear of
accepting the assistance necessary for them to carry out
ASAS responsibilities if this assistance were tendered
through the United Nations, even though much of the aid
would still have originated in the United States.

f.

167
At least dnescrucial area; in ascertaining whether or not a
viable economic union will be initiated in Southeast Asia
remains for further study. Because official and unofficial
leaders are able to sway Opinions in all of these nations,
these leaders can determine and carry out policies Often
. without even consulting those whose interests they represent.
Governmental leaders are left with a great deal of discretion
in deciding national policy and there is_a close interdepen-
dence between national political, social, and economic opinion
leaders. Consequently, attitudes of important leaders
regarding their support for or acquiescence in the initiation
and Operation of an economic union are of extreme importance.
A study of attitudes, Opinions, and beliefs of a few hundred
tOp leaders in Southeast Asia would go a long way in deter-
mining the readiness or willingness or nations to participate

in a regional economic union.

APPENDIX I
INDICES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR

suosaea OOOI meg
seIqueA Joqow

uosaea Jea uMOIg
SGITN VOIQQTAV ITAIO

Kitsueq
PBOJITBH

needed 080; Jed
setdoo as a smen

suossed 000% Jsa
seuou stem

uosmsa JQCI
MOIJ Item qusudenul

Z - ssuuexea
xsm smoqsno

z - dND :0
uISIJo IeIJqsnpuI

%'- Burpsdm
-- Isuotfieg

- GDBJL uSIeJog
%} qaodxg Kasmtaa

ECSC AND LAFTAa

unmoaa uotqetndoa
/qqmoao otmouooa

(esss OSéI) xepuI
BuIAIq JO qsoo

ssh-emooul 1.49N
Batdso Jed

g - stooqos faemtda
u: flI-S uedpttuo

% - GQBJGQIT
notqetndoa

Z - anqtnoIJSv
at uotqstndoa

% - PGZIUBQJH
notqstndoa

 

7 8.? 88.6 330 97 2.6 60
8 7.7 6u.6 281 82 1.3 76

762 108 4.8 27 27 56 16 4.0 66.5

BELGIUM 6: 122:797 73 1015 106 2.7 22 38 at

 

56 37 97 78 10G6 144 9.0 13 17

GERMANY 72 22 95 75

FRANCE

 

45

97

 

 

 

 

Ox 0 L\
H L» N
N M
O O
o _:r
:r
(I) \o in.
tn H in
8: " a;
3: cu
a \o \o
O O O
41‘ N (N
n O\ OO
O N 00
O O O
m N C0
r4 .
(I) (x
(\- l\ :2'
n :2' 41'
H n \o
N H on
Us N
N n
N \o CO
0 O O
O\ N m
5- r1 cu
H N N
H H H
N :1- 00
:i (h o
:l' H (\
H
b- N O
V\ b~ t~
O\ In m
00 O\ O\
H \o O\
a N H
H (I) \n
:l' in tn
. ii
Macaw)
,4: CGIIIQ
agenn
[-4 0:11:11
quzq

168

9 8.2 72.# 286 92' 1.7 so

861 120 5.4 25 28 46

57 26 95. 71

ECSC
AVERAGE

 

169

scans Bonn moonsom osmosmpm on» no puma
chm.nsm capmaacu maamsoo nos cam memo chomp

neon new: tune omma nut mmma made: mnma toe

.oOHaasoo seen e>mc headway
on» so memmcsw ocsnomna some macs on scumo
pomp oesoapzmo ma smooch one “mpoz
.oanammoa Ambonccz mammq com com:
.mcmme pmoa nu .ouo omom hon sumac

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ea m.H on Hm em m.H ma ma Ha mm _~.m mam new. on «A an we moamm><
«amen
m.o an com me e.m ma an new men we mm on Hangman
ea m.o Ha we n.o mm mm oH mm o.n and 02H me mm mm mama
m m.o ma mm m 3.0 ea mm em m.o oem moa an me an mm aasoamam
ma :.H mm m: ma n.m_ em H mm a.: hand .uma a: m: mm m: OOmea
ma A.H an as am m.o AH an oa mm m.H need oma mm on on mmHmo
NH H.~ ma on :H n.o ind mm A mm o.m emm New an me mm mm. sumamm
mm m.a no and an n.o : on ma em s.a so: can we «a mm on «zHazmoma
in .3 an an an an an nu an in an an an an in an an
mm min. We... JM JI in. AS D. 98 mt. do PS 4i 7...... find dd
0 we» SI 3 Ac 9 0% 9n PT em nu en+ .. I an In Mm
Id TL 11 Id .Ad.d uo NS To I We x Tgu Mn JI OI I
O 1.0 09 OH 8w nm d1 um awe“ m 0 8 Be .ne 1.8
CA dV KB 0d “Xv,“ Es egg 5 1T )Qc Id £9 41 I4 23
onnn p 0n 0w magi a... in as me we en.” am. mm.
d... B d d8 uI .m d8... ax HO C1... Om. Or: .u mu u
so d4 90 9 [up ed J CA m 0.. e .
JI 9.... Jo J N Ma 0 P0 90 I. 9 oIdP I.
so Jo sd 3 a 1 ea an mu ofl .u %
one end 0.; o I I we oa+ 9n . .L
a m... a; n T. n .7. mm a n 3w. z
u .n u «an "a (. an .
T. T. he
s O Mp
S M

 

edmzfldQGOOIIH XHszmm¢

IL

APPENDIX II

170

VOLUMES OF TOTAL TRADE IN US DOLLARS BETWEEN NATIONS

IN ECSC, LAFTA, AND SOUTHEAST ASIAa
W

 

 

 

 

 

 

U)
ECSC 53 2
(in S. 8 m 2 *3
millions) B Q E72 :33. 3 E :3 E3
.5312 a E a a E a
:10 +4 c. 'o H E B E-o
BELGIUM- 449.2 507.5 111.1 734.8 4681.8b
LUXEMBOURG b
FRANCE 405.8 595.4 193.7 181.0 7721.8
GERMANY 514.4 597.1 470.8 693.1 8231.1b
ITALY 112.6 204.8 453.4 71.5 3927.1b
NETHERLANDS 723.3 186.2 664.6 63.2 4547.3b
PERCENTAGES 38 17 27 36
L 4* * i
<1:
2 >4
LAFTA H 4 N
52 ii E3 53 E§ .qu:
(in m N 53 H :2 o «n a
millions) U E 53 a “335 E E S S
53 m o n. n. :2 E-1 ea
ARGENTINA l#6.“ 53.6 1.0 17.7 18.2 6.6 2002.0b
BRAZIL 147.4 18.5 0.8 0.9 1.7 22.4 2656.5b
CHILE 50.6 15.4 2.6 0.1 19.2 1.2 909.4b
MEXICO 1.7 0.3 2,9 0.3 1.5 0.3 1609.3b
PARAGUAY 13.8 "‘ "" "- -" lo]. 6003b
b
PERU 23.7 1.6 33.9 1.4 0.1 , 0.7 608.4
URUGUAY 3.1 24.2 1.3 0.1 1.1 1.4 257.713
PERCENTAGES :12 7 10 1 £5 10 12

 

171

APPENDIX II--Continued.

 

 

U)
SOUEgEfiST :3 £2 0 E; ES g;
miIIions) g g g 8 4?; a g: E g g
53 Efi 53 :5 2? 33 ea a; Eha
BURMA 32.4 27.0 0.5 440.1b
CAMBODIA 3.1 6.4 1.2 7.0 93.2b
INDONESIA 46.6 220.0 17.1 36.6 6.3 1735.1b
LAOS 1.2 9.6 2.0 37.8b
MALAYAc 36.4 6.1 450.3 0.4 6.2 136.0 13.6 2717.7b
PHILIPPINES 22.3 15.3 1.9 943.1b
THAILAND 1.2 0.8 31.5 12.3 137.5 3.1 1.2 700.9b
S. VIETNAM 2.8 11.4 1.0 2.6 0.2 0.1 252.7b
PERCENTAGESb 14 19 19 34d 23 4 27 7

 

aSource: Direction of International Trade, United
Nations PublicatIOn,‘I954, 1958, 1959.

 

bFigures must be added horizontally to Obtain these
totals. Discrepancies between exporting and importing totals
arise from different accounting methods as well as from
smuggling and oversight.

cSingapore trade is included with Malaya totals to
each of these nations.

, 6‘This represents a $1 million exchange not found in
other years. Discounting this exchange would reduce Laotian
regional trade to 29%.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

 

Abueva, Jose V., Focus on the Barrio, University of the
Philippines, (Manila, 1959), pp. 527.

leond, Gabriel A. and James S. Coleman, ed., The Politics
of the DevelOping Areas, Princeton UniveFSIEf‘PFSSS;

TPrinceton, I960), pp. 591.

,KSia WhO's Who, PanpAsia Newspaper Alliance, (Hong Kong, 1960),
PPO 5950

’Bfitwell, Richard, Southeast Asia Today--And Tomorrow, Praeger,
(New York, 1961), pp. 182.

 

Claude, Inis L., Swords Into Plowshares, Random House, (New
York, 1959), pp. 397.

Collective Defence in South East Asia, Chatham House Study
*Group, RoyalIInsEIEute of International Affairs, (New
York, 1956), pp. 197.

Colombo Plan for Co-Operative Economic DevelOpment in South
and SouthQEast ASIa, Report By the COmmonweal
COhsuItatIVe Committee, HMS Office, (London, 1950),

 

 

pp. 101.
florpuz, Onofre D., The Bureaucracy in the Philippines, Univ-
ersity of themPfiilippInes, (MEEIIE, I957), pp. 268.

Coughlin, Richard J., Double Identity: The Chinese in Modern
Thailand, Hong Kong'UnIversIEy‘Press, (Hong_Kong,
I960), pp. 2220

‘fléan, Vera Micheles, The Nature of the Non-Western World,
Mentor Books, (New York, 19577, pp. 288.

Péutsch, Karl W., Nationalism and Social Communication, Tech-

nology Press and WIIéyT'TNéfi‘YOrK: 1953),'pp.‘292.

. et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic
Area, PrIncétOn“Univer§Ity Press, (PrIficeton;_l957),
pp. 2280

 

172

173

Elegant, Robert S., The Dragon's Seed, St. Martin's Press,
(New York, 1959f; pp. 319.

‘fifield, Russell H., The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia: 1945-
1958, Harper and‘Brothers, (New York,‘I9581, pp. 56H.

Ginsburg, Norton, Atlas of Economic DevelOpment, University
of Chicago Pfess, (Chicago, 1961), pp.‘Ii9.

. The Pattern of Asia, Prentice-Hall, (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., 1958), pp. 929.

Baas, Ernst B., The Uniting of EurOpe, Stanford University
Press, (Stanford, 19587, pp. 552.

[Haines, C. Grove, ed., EurOpean Inte ation, Johns HOpkins
Press, (BaltimoreI‘I957), pp. £10.

Higgins, Benjamin Economic DevelOpment, Norton Press, (New
York, 1959). PP. 803.

. Indonesia's Economic Stabilization and DevelOpment,
Institute of,PacIfIc HeIEtIons, (New IorE, I957),
pp. 1790

Hirschman, Albert 0., ed., Latin.American Issues, Twentieth
Century Fund, (New York, 1961), pp. ZOI.

)Kahin, George McT., The Asian-African Conference, Band ,
Indonesia, AprI'1955;'CdffiéII'UEITeFSIty PFe‘SS,5E
mca, 19567, pp. 66.

. ed., Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia,
Cornell University Press, (Ithaca, 1959), pp. 531.

flenworthy, Leonard S. , Leaders of the New LNations, Doubleday
Books, (Garden CIty, 1959), pp. 336.

Knorr, Klaus B., Tin Under Control, Stanford University Press,

. World Rubber and Its Re lation, Stanford University
"'Press,‘ '(‘Sta‘fifoTr ,"Igll'ST', 'p'p.E'255'—.

Levin, Jonathan V., The EXport Economies: Their Pattern of

DevelOpment ifi‘HIStOFIEaI P5?spattItET‘HEFVaFdIUfiIter-
s y ress, am r ge, , pp. .

Lipset, Seymour M., Political Man, Doubleday Books, (Garden
City, 1960), pp. “)2.

Meade, James B., Problems of Economic Union, University of
Chicago Press, (Chicago,'I953), pp. 102.

174

Miller, John D. B., The Commonwealth in the World, Duckworth
Press, (London,'l958):pp. 308.

 

Myrdal, Gunnar, Beyond the Welfare State, Yale University
Press, (NEwHaten, 1960}, pp. 287.

 

. An International Economy, Problems and Prospects,
""'""""'Har"'pe"r"an"'d'Br'otH‘er"s‘, TN‘ew' Yo'r‘k, 1956f, pp. 38IT

. Rich Lands and Poor, Harper and Brothers, (New York,
419577) PPS—165:

 

 

Okun, Bernard, and Richard W. Richardson, Studies in Economic
DevelOpment, Holt-Rinehart-Winston, (New‘iork, 1961},

pp. 395.

Padelford Norman J., and George Lincoln, International
Politics, Macmillan Co., (New York,—I95'47—""71, pp. 9.

Peffer, Nathaniel, Transition and Tension in Southeast Asia,
Fund for AduI t'Ed’u‘Ea'tio—TN‘n, ew' Yo' 'r'it,1957), pp. 279.

Pierson, William W., and Federico G. Gil, Governments of
Latin.America, McGraw-Hill, (New YOPK, 1957), pp. 514.

 

 

 

 

Robinson, E. A. G., The EcOnomic Consequences of the Sizes of

Nations, St. MfittinWb Pratt: TNéfi'Ytrk, 1960), pp. HEB.

Sannwald, Rolf, and Jacques Stohler, Economic Integration,
Princeton University Press, (Prificeton,‘1959), pp. 260.

,Silcock, T., The Commonwealth Economy in South-East Asia,
Duke University Press, (Durham, N. Car., 1959), pp. 259.

 

 

Skinner, G. William, Chinese Society in Thailand, Cornell
University PreSST—TItfiaba,'I957),pp. ESU.

. Local, Ethnic, and National Loyalties in Villa e
Indonesia: A Sy‘mp""'os"1'um" " "‘1" 't‘itu' te""oT‘P"t'if'ia e"'E"'eTa"%ions ,

ns
ew or , , pp. 68.

 

 

Thayer, Philip, ed., Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia,
Johns HOpkins'PFEEST‘TBEIEIEOFET‘1950), pp. 394.

Thompson, Virginia, and Richard Adloff, Minority Problems in

Southeast Asia, Stanford University‘P?§§§7“18tafif5Fd;
1955’: PP. 289-

 

Tinbergen, Jan, Desig; of DevelOpment, Johns HOpkins Press,
(Baltimore, , pp. We

I.

175

Trager, Frank N., et al., Marxism in South East Asia: A Stu
of Four Countries, Sfafifbrd University Press, TSEan—
Yard, 1959). pp. 450.

 

Vandenbosch, Amry, and Richard A. Butwell, Southeast Asia
Among the World Powers, University oT'KenEucEy‘PrESS,

(Lexington, 1957 f, pp. 336.

Van Niel, Robert, The Emergence of the_Nodern Indonesian Elite,
Quadrangle BOOKS, (Chicago, lyooi, pp. 314.

 

,v'inacke, Harold N., A History oféthe Far East in Modern Times,
Appleton—Century;crorts, (new lorx, 1959), pp. 677.

Articles

&A lO-Year 'Harshall Plan' to Build up Latin America," Full
text of a speech by President Kennedy at a White House
reception for Latin American diplomats, U.S. News and
World Report, 50(27 March l96l)lOO-102.

Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, ”Neutrality: Varying Tunes,"
Foreign Affairs, 35(October l956)lh4-150.

 

Ball, William, IA Political Re-Examination of SEATO," Inter-
national Organization, 12(1958)7-25.

Basch, Antonin, “The Colombo Plan, A Case of Regional Econ,
omig CoOperation,' International Organization,9(l955),
1-1 0 :

Beloff, Max, I'Federalism as a Model for International Inte-
gration,“ Yearbook of World Affairs, 13(1959)188-204.

Poyd, R. G., "The Association of South East Asian States,”
Australian Outlook, 14(December l960)246-256.

 

Burns, Creighton L., l'The Colombo Plan,” Yearbook of World
Affairs, l#(1960)l76-206.

‘flady, John.F., "Challenge in Southeast Asia," Far Eastern
Survey, 19(8 February 1950)21-27.

Carnell, Francis G., "Southeast Asia and the Modern World,"
India Quarterly, 13(April-June l957)lOl-120.

 

Castaneda, Jorge IPan Americanism and Regionalism: A Mexican
View,“ nternational Organization, 10(August l956)373-

389-

Chenery, Hollis B., "DevelOpment Policies and Programmes ”
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 3(March 1958351—77.

 

 

176

Cleveland, Harlan, "The Convalescence of Foreign Aid,"
American Economic Review, h9(May;1959)216-232.

 

l'Collective Effort Urged in Tackling Agricultural Problems,"
Republic of Vietnam Press and Information Office,
6(30 December 1960)9.

“The Common Market and Its Relation to a Free Trade Area,"
Round Table, 191(June l958)238-247.

 

"The Commonwealth," British Affairs, 3(December l959)l94-201.

 

Cowen, Zelman, "The Contemporary Commonwealth; a General View,”
International Organization, l3(Spring l959)20#—218.-

Cressey, Paul F., 'Urbanization in the Philippines ' Socio-
logy and Social Research, “4(July-August 19éOXEUZ:EU9.

 

Dalisay, Amando M., 'Economic ASpects of the Baguio Confer-
ence of 1950,“ a paper prepared for the llth Confer-
ence of the Institute of Pacific Relations, (Manila,

1950). PP. 7.

Darling, Frank C., "Modern Politics in.Thailand,' The Review
of Politics, 2u(April 1962)161-l76.

 

Dinh, Tran Van, I'Territorial Planning and Equipping in.Asia,”
Asian Culture, 3(April-June l961)13-30.

 

‘Emerson, Rupert, |‘Paradoxes of Asian Nationalism,“ Far East-
ern Quarterly, 13(February l954)l3l-1h2.

 

/Fairbain, Geoffrey, ”Aspects of Burma and Thailand," Austra-
, lian Outlook, 12(September l958)3-10. .

 

Fisher, Charles A., "The Concept of South East Asia,“ Eastern
World, 7(March 1953)12-lu. """"

Fitzgibbon, Russell H.,-“The Party Potpourri in Latin America,"
Western Political Quarterly, 19(March l957)3-22.

Frank, Andrew G., "Human Capital and Economic Growth,I Econ-
omic Development and Cultural Change, 8(January
107-173. .

Garnick, Daniel H., ”On the Economic Feasibility of a Middle
Eastern Common Market,“ Middle East Journal, (Summer
l960)265-276.

 

flolay, Frank "Commercial Policy and Economic Nationalg m "
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 72(November 195 $574-

557 o

I.

1??

Goormatigh, John, "European Coal and Steel Community,"
International Conciliation, 503(May l955)3h3-408.

Gordon, Lincoln, “Economic Regionalism Reconsidered," World
Politics, I9(January l9 l)231-253.

 

. I'NATO and EurOpean Integration,“ World Politics,
ID(January l958)219-223.

 

Haas, Ernst B., "The Challenge of Re ionalism," International
Organization, 12(Autumn l958)4 0-458. *‘

 

. "Regionalism, Functionalism, and Universal Inter-
} nati

onal Organization," World Politics, 8(January 1956)
238-263.

Haji, S. N., “International Aspects of Indian Shipping,”
United Asia, 9(1957)254-259.

/Hanna, Willard A., “The State of the States of Indochina,“

American Universities Field Staff Report, (New York,
1960), Parts I, II, and III.

Harriman, Averell, "What We Are Doing in Southeast Asia,"
New York Times, (27 May 1962), p. 7 and continued.

Henderson, William, "The DevelOpment of Regionalism in South-

east Asia '_International Organization, 9(November
l955)463-&76.

. "Regionalism in Southeast Asia," Columbia Journal
"‘""6T International Affairs, 19(Winter l956)b9-70.

 

Higgins, Benjamin and Wilfred Malenbaum, “Financing Economic

DevelOpment," International Conciliation, 502(March
1955)275-339.

Hoselitz, Bert F., "The City, the Factory and Economic
Growth," American Economic Review, 55(May 1955)166-184.

ifkeda, Hayato, "Japan's Share in Economic Co-operation,'
Contemporary Japan, 26(August l959)lh-32.

James, A. M., “The U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the
Far East,f Yearbook of World Affairs, 13(1959)161-187.

James, C. W., I'The Colombo Plan Passes Halfway,‘ Australian
Outlook, 9(March l955)29-u2.

 

 

‘lsgge, J. D. "E eriment in Local Government," Australian
Outlook, l§€December 1959)272-284.

I.

f.

178

Levi, Werner "Union in.Asia," Far Eastern Survey, l9(August
1950)1hu-lu9.

,flackie, J. A. C., "The Political Economy of Guided Democracy,"
Australian Outlook, 13(December 1959)285-292.

 

 

Malenbaum, Wilfred, "The Asian Economic Potential," Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Solence,
318(JuIy‘1958)18-zo.

 

. llU.S. Economic Policy in South and South East Asia,"
“ India Quarterly, 13(April-June l956)lO7-ll6.

Mehta, Gaganvihari, L., "Asian Nationalism vis-a—vis Other
Asian Nations,“ Annals of the American Academy of Poli-

tical and Social'ScIence,'3I8(JuIy‘I958789-9o.

Meyer, Milton, "Regional COOperation in Southeast Asia,"
Columbia Journal of International Affairs, 3(Spring
I949)58-77.

 

Myrdal, Gunnar, “Economic Nationalism and Internationalism,"
Australian Outlook, 11(December l957)3-50.

 

Panikkar, K. M., 'Regional Organization for the Indian Ocean
Area,‘l Pacific Affairs, 18(September l9#5)246-251.

Pauker, Guy J., IIThe Soviet Challenge in Indonesia," Foreign
Affairs, u0(July l962)612-626.

Peffer, Nathaniel, "Regional Security in Southeast Asia,"
International Organization, 8(1954)311-315.

Plaza, Galo, “For a Regional Market in Latin America,"
Foreign Affairs, 37(Ju1y 1959)607-616.

 

Prebisch, Raul, "Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped
Countries," American Economic Review, 49(May 1959)251-
273.

7Progress Towards the Latin American Common Market," Report
of the Working Group on the Latin American Re ional
Market, Economic Bulletin for Latin America, (March
l959)1-lz.

 

 

Rahman, Abdul, Speech before the National Press Club, Wash-
ington, D. C., 27 October 1960, pp. 9.

nRegional Co-Operation,' Interim Report by the ECAFE Exec—
utive Secretary, United Nations Publication, (New
Delhi, 31 January 1961), pp. 119.

179

Rohn, Peter, "Testing Deutsch's Indices of Community,"
Political Research: Organization and Design, 2(Sept-

ember 1959)7-9.

Sanderson, Fred H., “The Five-Year Experience of the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community," International Organi-
zation, 12(September 1958)l93-200.

[Scalapino, Robert A., "Neutralism in Asia,n American Political
Science Review, u8(March l95u)l-l9.

Schaaf, C. Hart, "The United Nations Economic Commission for
Asia and the Far East,‘I International Organization,

7(1953)218-248.

Scigliano, Robert, "The Electoral Process in South Vietnam:
Politics in an UnderdevelOped State ' Midwest Journal
of Political Science, 4(May l960)135-16I.

Skinner, G. William, "Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia,“
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social

science, 321(January1959)136-147.

"Southeast Asia Regional Training Program," Philippine
Journal of Public Administration, b(AprI'1960)I75-l76.

“Sterling and the Sterling Area," British Affairs, 3(December
1959)202-207. * ,

Strange, Susan, "The Commonwealth and the Sterling Area,"
Yearbook of#World Affairs, 13(1959)24-44.

Thomson, John S., "Burmese Neutralism,’I Political Science
Quarterly, 72(June l957)26l-283. '

Thornton, Thomas P., "Peking, Moscow, and the UnderdevelOped
Areas," World Politics, 13(July l96l)49l-504.

(Thuc, Vu Quoc, "Economic DevelOpment in Southeast Asian
Countries,“ Asian Culture, 2(January-March l960)l-32.

"Under-Developed Countries and POpulation Trends," British
Affairs, 3(December 1959)208-211.

Van Der Kroef, Justus M., "Chinese in Southeast Asia,“
Current History. 33(December l957)367.

Wilson, Dick, ”A New Manila-Kuala—Lumpur*Djakarta Axis?",
Far Eastern Economic Review, 26(15 January l959)67.

Wint, Guy, “South Asia-~Unity and Disunity," International
Conciliation, 500(1954)l3l-191.

Wu, Yuan-Li, “The Far East Trade Complex," Current History,
43(July l962)h3-h9 and continued.

’l

I.

180

General Reference Works

 

EncyclOpaedia Britannica, University of Chicago, (Chicago,
l957i.

 

World Atlas, University of Chicago, (Chicago, 1957).

 

Worldmark EncyclOpedia of Nations, Harper and Brothers,
(Newlork, Igoci.

 

Statesman‘s Yearbook, (London, 1960).

 

NeWSpapers

 

Christian Science Monitor

 

New York Times

 

United Nations Publications

 

Demographic Yearbook

Direction of International Trade

Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East
Economic Bulletin for Latin America '
Economic Survey for Asia and the Far East
Financial Statistics

Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics

Letters to the Author

 

Dodwell Cooray, Press Attache, Embassy of Ceylon, Washington,
D. C., 16 March 1961.

Kok-Swee Choong, First Secretary of Information, Embassy of
Malaya, Washington, D. C., 11 August 1961

Manual A. Viray, First Secretary, Embassy of the Philippines,
Washington, D. C., 8 August 1961.

Interview

 

Willard A. Hanna, Universities Field Staff Representative,
at Michigan State University on 11 November 1960.

 

 

var- VIELI

flan? r—
9"; ig‘: t.“ \h“(:
c. ‘ ' 1
~ ¢'
.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

,rb

 

       

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII

urnmyunmmmwmunmtnum 1qu

082 2575